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THE INDO-PACIFIC JOURNAL OF Phenomenolody

Phenomenology of Consciousness in Ādi Śamkara and Edmund Husserl

by Surya Kanta Maharana

Abstract

The philosophical investigation of consciousness has a long-standing history in both Indian and Western thought. The conceptual models and analyses that have emerged in one cultural framework may be profitably reviewed in the light of another. In this context, a study of the notion of consciousness in the transcendental phenomenology of Edmund Husserl is not only important as a focus on a remarkable achievement in the context of Western thought, but is also useful for an appreciation of the concern with this question in the Indian philosophical tradition, and especially in the tradition of Advaita Vedānta of Ādi Samkara. The starting point for this paper is the belief that phenomenology has a recognizably common face for both these traditions.

This paper investigates the possibility of a parallel notion of consciousness in the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl and the Advaita Vedānta of Samkara, with particular emphasis on Husserl's 'Transcendental I' and Samkara's 'Witness Consciousness' (Sākshi Caitanya). In the process, it explores the phenomenological relevance of the concept of consciousness in Indian philosophy, with special reference to the concept of pure consciousness as one of the essential criteria for any sound theory of knowledge. It more importantly highlights the Advaitic understanding of pure consciousness as one of the major contributions to the field of comparative philosophy that forms a vantage point for cross-cultural comparison. While pointing to significant differences in their respective approaches to understanding the nature of consciousness, the exploration finally unveils the common thesis for both Samkara and Husserl that 'pure consciousness' is essentially foundational, evidencing and absolute for any epistemic act.

Introduction

In linking the philosophers' names in the phrase "Ādi Śamkara (688-720AD) and Edmund Husserl (1859- makes sense to ask if the phenomenological

1938)", the "and" does not imply any relationship or movement has had any impact, we can nevertheless

influence obtaining between the two. Any such still aspire to look for some phenomenological

relationship is obviously out of the question for the elements in the Advaita Vedānta of Śamkara.1 This

classical Indian philosophy of Samkara. While it is thus only when we come to speak about more recent The crucial thesis of Samkara's philosophy of Advaita and contemporary trends in Indian philosophy that it Vedanta submits that the all-pervading consciousness called "Brahman" is the Ultimate Reality. It is the centre

The IPJP is a joint project of the Humanities Faculty of the University of Johannesburg in South Africa and Edith Cowan University's Faculty of Regional Professional Studies in Australia. This document is subject to copyright and may not be reproduced in whole or in part via any medium without the express permission of the publishers.

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paper is an exploration of the phenomenological Kalidas Bhattacharyya, J. N. Mohanty, Debabrata elements in the complex world of the Vedānta Sinha, R. Balasubhramanian and various others have doctrine of consciousness. In this context, it is worthwhile to quote the observations made by J. N. paved the way for a meaningful dialogue between the

Mohanty, one of the pioneers in the study of the links two traditions. The confrontation of the Vedänta with the phenomenological movement is of recent origin. between Indian philosophy and phenomenology. Mohanty greatly desired that the philosophies of Edmund Husserl, the spearhead of recent German idealism, was led to his notion of transcendental ancient India should demonstrate phenomenological investigations of a high order, and accordingly consciousness through various philosophical motives. Similar notions are also reflected in the tradition of comments: Indian Philosophy, especially in the Sāmkhya and Vedānta systems, where one can look for parallels. If It has been unfortunate that little notice of this anywhere, it is here that we find the Cartesian search aspect has so long been taken by Indian for indubitability. The Atman or transcendental scholars in their attempts to place Indian philosophy in the perspective of the Western consciousness is supposed to provide the absolute foundation for all knowledge, and indeed for all philosophies. As a result, the dynamics of philosophical thought have been lost sight of. conscious behaviour. In Husserl, there is the idea of

And what we have been given has only been a an absolute and adequate givenness, a relentless search for the 'originary' given, and the call to return table of parallel world-views on either side. A world-view, however, is not philosophy. to 'the things themselves'. It is, however, one of the

Philosophy is an activity, progressively cardinal doctrines of the Samkhya and the Vedānta

leading on to new truths. What comparative that consciousness alone is self-given (svaprakāśa),

philosophy can best do is to trace parallel lines that it alone in fact is the very principle of givenness, whereas all transcendence is given in and through of progress, parallelly-motivated dynamics of thought. (Mohanty, cited in Bilimoria, 1993, p. relatedness (real or apparent) to consciousness. Within these Indian traditions, and especially in the 249) Advaita Vedānta, consciousness is a phenomeno-

It was during the last decades of the 19th and the first logically primitive term. It is given apodictically and

quarter of the 20th centuries that Vedäntic philosophy adequately, as it alone is capable of being absolutely

came to be confronted with the grand systems of given. Samkara, like Husserl, traces back the ego to

German idealism, and then with the idealistic the dimension of transcendental consciousness which is both foundational and unconditional. positions of the British and American neo-Hegelians. Attempts were made to look back at the systems of Vedānta, for example, through the neo-Hegelian Close Parallels in Samkara and Husserl

spectacles. The attempts made by philosophers like Husserl happens to be one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. His philosophy

1 Cont. seems to have gained in fascination partly because of the various apparent parallels that can be found with and basis of all knowledge and experience. Knowledge is the result of the association of it with the internal organ Indian philosophy. One such parallel between

(antahkarana).There is no distinction between the all- Husserl's philosophy and Indian philosophy, and

pervading consciousness and the individual self (jiva); it central to both, is the nature of consciousness. The

is the one and the same ultimate reality, viewed following discussion is aimed at investigating parallel

differently from the Paramārthika (transcendental) and notions between Husserl's philosophy and Indian from the Vyavahārika (empirical) levels. Since the all- philosophy such as (1) the nature and constitution of pervading consciousness has no distinguishing marks, it consciousness and (2) the distinction between the is described through the negative approach called neti ... empirical and transcendental consciousness in both neti (not this ... not this ... ). It is called Turīya, the the transcendental phenomenology of Husserl and 'Fourth' from the perspective of three states of human Samkara's philosophy of consciousness. consciousness, viz., waking, dream, and deep sleep. It runs through all the states remaining unaffected by them. It appears to be intentional through all the states, but The principal task of phenomenology is to understand

essentially it is non-intentional. When the individual self the nature of consciousness. Over the years, both the attains the state of Turīya, he is called Jivan-mukta, Eastern and the Western schools of philosophy have liberated from suffering in the embodied state. Finally, attempted to arrive at a phenomenologically true Samkara concludes that the knowledge of the world is understanding of the nature of consciousness, with illusory and indescribable either as real or unreal their primary interest in pertinent questions such as (anirvachaniya). whether consciousness is (a) pure, self-revealing and

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non-intentional, (b) exclusively intentional, or (c) both self-revealing and intentional. noema structure" of Husserl. Samkara seems to deny intentionality of consciousness and rejects any attempt to describe consciousness logically. Of The schools of philosophers have argued over these course, for common understanding (lokavyavahāra) issues throughout the centuries, each refining its of the concept, he attempts to define it as self-shining arguments and strengthening its theses as the controversies continued to develop. In order to initiate or self-manifesting (Svayam-prakāśa), although by its

the discussion here pertaining to the aforementioned very nature it is indefinable. The very reason why he seems to deny the intentional nature of consciousness issues regarding consciousness, it is appropriate to is because he considers the "object-directedness" of attempt to highlight the nature and limitations of the consciousness to be the result of ignorance (avidyā). arguments of the respective schools. Consciousness, by its very nature, is non-intentional

To begin with, the philosophy of Husserl is based on (asanga). Thus Samkara could not logically blend

certain central themes, such as the doctrine of intentionality of consciousness with its intrinsic non-

essence, the method of description, the epoché, the intentionality or self-luminosity. He nevertheless

doctrine of intentionality, the concept of lifeworld, made it very clear in the first verse of his Brahma

and the doctrine of transcendental phenomenology. Sutra Bhāsya, introducing a notable distinction

Husserl called his phenomenology 'transcendental between Consciousness (asmad/visayi) and Object

phenomenology', with his use of 'transcendental' (yusmad/visaya). To him, consciousness and object

clearly having Kantian overtones. What he meant by are as diametrically contrasted as light and darkness

the word was that everything in the world, and the (Samkara, trans. 1965, p. 1). According to Mohanty, this polarity arises not due to the fact that world itself, derives its meaning from consciousness consciousness and object cannot coexist, but due and its intentionality. The purpose of the phenomeno- rather to the fact that the kind of opposed properties logical programme is to demonstrate that all things they possess cannot be confused with one another. are constituted in consciousness, and in this sense Mohanty, however, feels that it is not sufficient to consciousness is said to be transcendental. But consciousness is not only intentional; temporality is rule out the "object-directedness" of consciousness

one of its important characterizations, so that the simply because consciousness and object have very

process of constitution is exclusively a temporal different properties (Mohanty, 1992, p. 45). The only

process that gives rise to the historicity of the philosopher who combines both 'self-shining' and 'object-directedness' of consciousness is Rāmānuja transcendental consciousness and to the world which (1017-1137AD), the exponent of Visistādvaita it constitutes. We are also confronted with the question of how I as a transcendental ego come to philosophy (Qualified Non-Dualism). Rāmānuja takes

share a common world with other co-constituting these two features to be mutually dependent. For Rāmānuja, consciousness reveals itself to its locus transcendental egos. (Owner or Ego) only when it manifests its object

The Indian philosophical tradition, on the other hand, (Gupta, 1982).

has witnessed lively discussion on the nature of Regarding the distinction between the empirical and consciousness, identifying some of its essential the transcendental consciousness, there are some features as aparokshatva (immediacy), pratyakshatva differences between the two traditions. In the (inner nature of consciousness) and abadhitatva (infallibility). Although the Western tradition, and Husserlian tradition, consciousness is transcendental in the sense that it constitutes the world, while in the especially the Cartesian tradition, accepts the immediacy, infallibility and so forth of consciousness, Indian tradition, especially in Advaita Vedānta, consciousness is transcendental in as much as it the point which differentiates Samkara's Vedāntic detaches or dissociates itself from the world and interpretations from Descartes is that there is no enjoys its freedom within itself. This is how K. C. distinction between the 'mind' and 'spirit' in the Cartesian scheme. But the spiritual dimension, as pure Bhattacharyya (Bhattacharyya, 1929/1958, Vol. 2, Preface) construes the transcendental dimension of subjectivity or as 'Cit', has much in common with the consciousness from the Indian perspective. It is only transcendental Ego of Husserl's phenomenology. in Sämkhya that the empirical world is taken to be the

The Nyāya-Vaiśesika system of Indian philosophy product of prakriti; it is also in this dimension of reality of the world that the philosophy of Sāmkhya treats consciousness as intrinsically intentional. Yogācara Buddhism denies the external world and keeps room for the relationship between each Purusha and its own world and the one common puts forward a distinction between subject and object world that would emerge from the shared experience within consciousness, which sounds like the "noesis- of all Purushas. It appears that, in the schools of

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theism, and especially in one system of philosophy, consciousness, a principle of 'ignorance' or namely the Kashmir Saivism, which is a modified 'limitation' that projects the world of names and form of Advaita Vedānta, pure consciousness itself is forms on the one consciousness. construed as temporal, or, more exactly, as time itself. It emerges from this brief discussion that there is one Against this background, I will now turn to a point that both Samkara and Husserl hold in common: comparative study of the notion of pure consciousness pure consciousness is foundational, evidencing and in the philosophy of Samkara and Husserl absolute. But in this there are some differences, as, respectively. for Husserl, this ultimate consciousness is also, at the same time, active and constitutive. Although agreeing Husserl's Pure Consciousness versus Samkara's that it is absolute and foundational, Husserl deviates Pure Consciousness from Samkara in holding that consciousness

Husserl's phenomenology centres around a specific constitutes itself first and then the world. For Husserl, consciousness is understanding of the nature of consciousness: the the pure or transcendental

intentionality of consciousness. The thesis of intrinsically temporal and, by virtue of its intrinsic

intentionality has two parts: firstly, that consciousness time, it constitutes itself as a flux. It constitutes its

has object-directedness and as such is always directed unity as an enduring ego, as unities of immanent acts

towards an object, irrespective of the fact that the and temporal entities. All these constitutive accom-

intentional object may or may not exist; secondly, that plishments, including the temporal dimensions of

every conscious state has a correlative sense or past, present and future, have their origin in the "living present", which is, for Husserl, the absolute meaning or a noema. Husserl also talks of pure pure consciousness. Samkara's pure consciousness consciousness as the transcendental subjectivity that does nothing. It simply manifests, reveals, illuminates is the foundational and the constitutive consciousness or evidences; as non-intentional, non-temporal, non- which is arrived at by the performance of the actional consciousness, it is non-constitutive. It is still transcendental epoché. Husserl considers this pure the foundation of the world-appearance, but it does consciousness as world constituting, as it is only through consciousness that this world could be not constitute the world in any sense. Husserlian constitution is a constitution of sense, not constitution presented as meaningful. It is only in this sense that all world-related meanings, including the meaning of of the thing itself. Mohanty (1988) is of the opinion

the term "world", have their origin in appropriate that one reason why, in spite of a metaphysics of transcendental consciousness and a rich descriptive structures of consciousness. It is this constitutive consciousness alone that provides the ultimate psychology of the inner life, Indian thought does not

evidence for all cognitive claims and is thus the yield to a transcendental constitutive phenomenology, is that the Indian theories did not quite come to absolute foundational consciousness. subscribe to the sort of theory of meaning or sense - as distinguished from reference - that seems to have At first sight, Husserl's thesis of a world-constituting, led Husserl to a theory of constitution (primarily of evidencing, absolute foundational and pure sense). With regard to the constitution of things, in as consciousness seems very close, in spirit, to the pure much as a thing can be shown to be a noematic consciousness of Samkara's Advaita Vedānta. As for structure, we have to look for similar doctrines not in Samkara, the most fundamental principle, the founda- Vedänta but in Buddhism (for example, the Buddhist tional reality that underlies and makes possible all apoha-theory, where the concept of reference is cognitive activity, is consciousness (cit, and also called into question) and in some versions of the called Atman or Brahman). This consciousness, in Śamkara, is self-showing (Svayam-prakāśa), and it is sphota theory, where the belief in the eternity of

this light that illumines all objects including itself. In 'word' led to the positing of eternal meanings. The Indian theories of meaning, however, were referential its ultimate stage, however, it is not intentional. The state of its intentionality, being-of-this-or-that-object, (Mohanty, 1988, pp. 272-273).

is only a "superimposed" property arising out of the From the perspective of Husserl's phenomenology, wrong association of consciousness with avidyā (Individual Ignorance). Consciousness, for Śamkara, Buddhism offers greater affinity in terms of its theory

is basically non-intentional, freed from the empirical of meaning. In its theory of meaning, Buddhism, in all its forms, originally tended to deny direct constraints of body and world, one and not many, not differentiated into mental states, and with no reference, and tended to regard the thing to which

intentional directedness towards the world. The language claims to refer to be rather a conceptual

possibility of empirical experience requires, besides construct (vikalpa). In a more developed form, the theory of meaning became "differential"; the word

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"man", for example, means what it does insofar as it performs because of desires and aversions, and hence serves to exclude nonhumans but does not positively denote all men. Such a theory of meaning is based on enjoys or suffers pleasure or pain., the witnessing consciousness is a disinterested on-looker, not a the Apoha theory of the Dignaga School of Buddhism, which defines Apoha as literally meaning performer of actions, and hence not an enjoyer or

"differentiation" or "exclusion". Words are the result sufferer. Ordinarily an individual passes through three

of mental conceptualization, and as such they refer to different types of states of consciousness - waking, dreaming and deep dreamless sleep. Witnessing mental images and cannot be directly associated with external realities. Meaning, therefore, denotes the consciousness witnesses not merely what the

'referend', the instrument of an act of reference, as individual does in his waking state, but also in the

distinct from the referent, the object toward which the dream state, as well as in dreamless sleep. Consciousness that is aware of the 'blank' of act of reference is directed. The Buddhist regards it as only a logical concept, not an external entity dreamless sleep cannot be of ordinary experience of objects. Witnessing consciousness, which cannot go inherently residing in the individual image or word. In other words, meaning implies the relation between the to sleep, is there to 'know' the state of sleep.

word and the image of the object. The word cannot directly be associated with external objects; it cannot, Gaudapāda,2 too, speaks of the witness consciousness

therefore, denote the object. The word has an a priori as the 'all seer' always (sarvadrik sadā) (Śamkara, trans. 1995, I.12). The term 'Sākshin' indicates that existence, independent of external objects (Sharma, that which directly or immediately perceives is the 1968, pp. 3-10). sole agent of this intimate and immediate perception. Accordingly, the term 'Sākshi' stands for a witness. It Along with this theory of meaning and consequent disavowal of reference, Buddhism, in contrast to the refers to a witness in the sense of the phenomeno-

Indian philosophies, understood consciousness to be a logically pure observer, the observer who observes without the mediation of any process. It signifies the stream of events (of 'consciousing') rather than as self, which, although not itself involved in the states of a substance, and also as having a form or a disinterested content (ākāra) of its own, as opposed to the cognitive process, functions as

generally accepted Indian view that consciousness is formless or contentless (nirākarā), with what appears to be a content being really an object out there. Given Gaudapāda, the author of Māndukya Kārika, aims at an exploration of the various states of human consciousness, these two conceptual resources, Buddhism could namely, waking, dreaming and sleeping, and concludes arrive at the view that both the ego and the object are that the 'Self (Atman) has been identified with the but constructs - in other words, constituted in the "Fourth" state called "Tūriya", the witness conscious- ongoing stream of consciousness. This emphasis on ness, even though it is not really a state. The highest truth 'absence' over 'presence' brings 'apoha' theory is non-dual Tūriya, which leads to "Ajātivāda", the theory

closer to Derrida and his emphasis on 'differenz'. that nothing is ever created as all duality is illusory. Gaudapāda exercises a very significant position in the

Transcendental Ego of Samkara Advaita Vedānta tradition as the grand teacher of Adi Śamkara. He focuses on a religious or spiritual pursuit where philosophy is presented as a rational attempt to At this stage it seems that the Sākshin Caitanya understand the experiential dimension. Furthermore, (Witness Consciousness) of Samkara is very similar Gaudapāda aims at the nature of man's experience and to what is understood by the transcendental Ego in exploration of truth by a method called Asparśa Yoga Husserl's phenomenology. This assessment is further using homologies based on the syllable 'OM' (AUM) strengthened by the fact that Husserl himself admitted manifested through four pādas (quarters) as basic states

the possibility of a witness- or spectator-like ego or of the Self (Atman). The four states are: Viśva, the

consciousness. In order to understand the parallels waking state - where consciousness goes outward and is

between the Säkshin and the transcendental Ego, one intentional; Taijasa, the dream state - where conscious-

has to keep in mind the nature and role of Sākshin, on ness goes inward, and is still intentional, and Prājna, the deep sleep state - where mass consciousness exists, is the one hand, and the notions of the transcendental non-intentional but has the possibility of becoming Ego or I and the intentionality of consciousness, on intentional. Besides these three states, the 'Self' has been the other hand. Etymologically, consciousness as indicated as the "Fourth" state called called "Turīya", the 'Witness" (Sākshin) is contrasted with consciousness witness consciousness. Gaudapāda uses two levels of

as the enjoyer or sufferer (bhokta) and the implication truth, namely, vyavahārika and paramārthika. Turīya,

of the latter that consciousness is involved in action being paramārthika, is the only ever-present reality or

and its consequences. While the outward-looking truth. Critics acknowledge some kind of Buddhist

consciousness is involved in actions which it (Mādhyamika School) influence on Samkara through Gaudapāda.

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uninvolved onlooker. A phenomenological explora- tion leads to the recovery of this principle as a correlation between types of objects and types of intentional reference in the sense that to necessary ingredient in any epistemological process. In simple terms, it represents an attempt to understand each type of object there corresponds a certain mode of givenness. In fact, the mode of experience and its implications. The object as such is givenness characteristic of a certain type of not the focus of attention. Rather, the focus for object may be used to bring out the attention, vis-à-vis the object, is consciousness, which functions as the medium for the manifestation of the phenomenological distinctiveness of that type.

object. Sākshin, in other words, is a form of In the second place, to each particular object there corresponds a whole series of factual and apprehension, which as such is direct, non-relational, possible intentional acts which have precisely non-propositional and non-evaluative in both that object as their intentional object. Two cognitive and practical matters. In the absence of this typically Husserlian notions arise out of this notion, no knowledge at all would be possible. latter situation: the notion of noesis-noema Mohanty, however, observes that a non-intentional correlation and that of the constitution of consciousness or Säkshin or Tūriya such as that of the Advaita Vedanta school of thought does not objects in the acts. (Mohanty, 1972, p. 56)

phenomenologically constitute any object. Nor do the What follows from this is that, if we succeed in other layers of consciousness correspond with setting aside all presuppositions of our conception of transcendental-constitutive phenomenology. It could the world, as well as of consciousness as a part of the thus perhaps be termed a sort of descriptive world, then what would result would be an experience phenomenology of consciousness that "oscillates between descriptive psychology and metaphysics of of one's own consciousness which does not belong to

consciousness" (Mohanty, 1988, p. 274). this body or person. The consciousness thus experienced as the 'transcendental I' sounds very much like the 'witness consciousness' of the Advaita Transcendental Ego of Husserl Vedānta of Samkara. If we turn to the writings of Eugen Fink, an assistant and a close co-worker of The transcendental ego, argues Husserl, is 'purified Husserl during the last years of his life, we find that consciousness' or 'transcendental consciousness'. It is reached by a conscious reflective methodological Fink talks about three types of Ego. Of the three types

move called the epoché. Husserl (1931/1973, p. 26) of ego, one seems to sound like the Sākshi Caitanya,

describes the epoché as follows: the Witness Consciousness. The most fascinating factor here is that Husserl himself acknowledged Fink's understanding of the three egos. Fink's By phenomenological epoché I reduce my understanding of the three egos has been reflected in natural human ego and my psychic life ... to his portrayal of the epoché or transcendental my transcendental-phenomenological Ego, the reduction. Fink holds that it " ... is not a 'direct' realm of transcendental-phenomenological refraining from belief paralleling the believing life of self-experience. The objective world, the world the thematic experience of the world which directly that exists for me, that always has and always enacts its beliefs, but and this cannot be will exist for me - this world with all its objects, I said, derives its whole sense and its overemphasized is a structural moment of transcendental reflection. The epoché is a reflective existential status, which it has for me, from me myself, from me as the transcendental Ego, the epoché, it is a refraining from belief on the part of the reflective observer, who looks on the belief in the Ego who comes to the fore only with world and the actuality of its live performance transcendental-phenomenological epoché. without taking part in it" (Fink, 1933/1970, p. 115).

The epoché involves complete suspension of all Fink's point is that, in the natural reflective attitude, a human ego reflects upon herself within the presuppositions, a 'bracketing', that is, a setting aside by the knowing mind of all beliefs about the world. confinement of the natural attitude. Bracketing the

Husserl seeks to establish phenomenological truths world establishes a reflective ego which is outside

about consciousness with the help of the epoché. In human apperception. He adds, "This ego knowingly

fact, Husserl even goes a step further and asserts that directs itself toward the universal world apperception

a certain type of intentional act corresponds to each as its theme. The disconnection of the world, however, not only makes possible the formation of a type of object. Mohanty explains this aspect of nonworldly reflecting-self, but ... also makes possible Husserl's position as follows: the discovery of the true subject of the belief in the

On the one hand, there is, for Husserl, a world: the transcendental subjectivity which accepts the world" (Fink, 1933/1970, p. 115). Fink outlines

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the three egos he identifies in Husserl's thinking thus: consciousness'. "1. The ego which is preoccupied with the world (I, the human being as a unity of acceptance, together with my intramundane life of experience); 2. The It can, however, be observed from the investigation into the nature of consciousness in Husserl and transcendental ego for whom the world is pre-given in the flow of the universal apperception and who Samkara respectively that the Self or consciousness is

accepts it; 3. the 'onlooker' who performs the different from the ego, just as it is different from the senses, the body, and the external objects. Western epoché" (Fink, 1933/1970, p. 115-116). phenomenologists do not generally draw a distinction between the concepts of 'self', 'consciousness' and It thus appears from Fink's thesis that there are three Husserlian egos, namely (1) the empirical ego which 'ego' and the entities they refer to. At one stage,

is engaged in the world, (2) the transcendental ego, Husserl does draw a conceptual distinction between

which is involved in the constitution of the world and consciousness and the ego; but he does not adhere

so is not in the world, and (3) the transcendental ego consistently to this distinction throughout his

as the 'on-looker' for whom this distinction between phenomenology. Husserlian phenomenology, which

the first two egos holds good. In other words, it is has gone through descriptive, transcendental and

possible to distinguish between two 'I's, the empirical egological stages in its development, is aware of the distinction between the Self and the ego when it 'I' and the transcendental 'I'. The former belongs to the natural order, while the latter is the same 'I' but speaks of 'the transcendental I' and 'the empirical I', 'the pure ego' and 'the psychological ego'. However, purified of all natural presuppositions. The observer who apprehends this distinction must be a purely since this distinction is not strictly adhered to, scholars are of the view that the tension between the disinterested spectator, an 'on-looker'. Such a concept two 'I's, between the two egos, has not been resolved of a phenomenological 'onlooker' who does not in Husserlian phenomenology (Sinha, 1974, p. 74). participate in the world perhaps comes closest to the The usage of the words 'I', 'ego', 'self' and 'mind' Advaitic notion of Sakshin or the witness seems to be ambiguous and thus confusing. consciousness, the disinterested witness. Finally, it is worth nothing that, in the Preface to the article in The more critical followers of Husserl, like Sartre, which Fink introduces the notion of disinterested who have been inspired by the programme and spectator, Husserl himself acknowledges that he agrees with Fink's interpretation of his philosophy. method he initiated, are of the view that Husserl went

Husserl writes, "I am happy to be able to state that it back to the Cartesian ego in the final stage of his phenomenology notwithstanding his insight into pure contains no sentence which I could not completely accept [as] my own or openly acknowledge as my consciousness as the 'phenomenological residuum',

own conviction" (Fink, 1933/1970, p. 74). that which stands on its own providing meaning and validity to every aspect of our experience, outer as

The above analysis, however, should not be taken to well as inner - that is, our experience of the life-world

imply that there is complete agreement between as well as our experience of the cogitations of the ego.

Husserl's disinterested 'on-looker' and the Advaita These ambiguities of meaning of the self, ego, consciousness and so forth that one finds in the notion of 'disinterested witness'. The Advaita account holds that, in cognition, of whatever sort and of writings of Western phenomenology do not, however,

whatever object, besides the cognitive process arise in the phenomenology of Samkara's Advaita. The Advaita of Samkara very clearly differentiates appropriate to that kind of cognition and to that consciousness from the ego. There is absolutely no object, there must necessarily be an accompanying confusion of these two terms. The term used for witness consciousness. The witness consciousness, for the Advaitins, is the presupposition of all consciousness is cit or caitanya. Sometimes the word 'Purusha' is also used to suggest that the Self or knowing; it illuminates all that is known as well as the process of knowing, thereby making knowledge consciousness dwells in the body, or pervades the entire body. Since Atman, which is translated in possible. Husserl's transcendental 'I', unlike the English as Self, is consciousness through and through, Advaitins' disinterested witness, is not merely a the terms 'consciousness' and 'Self", or Cit or Ātman, spectator; it is also a constitutive ego. This on-looker, argues Husserl, is revealed in reflection. The signify one and the same entity. The other entity called the ego or the mind is the internal organ existence of this on-looker, however, is not, for Husserl, a necessary condition for the occurrence of (antah-karana). As stated earlier, the internal organ is designated in four different ways as mind (manas), any cognition. Nonetheless, the fact still remains that what Husserl calls the 'disinterested on-looker' very intellect (buddhi), ego (ahamkāra) and memory-stuff

closely captures the Advaita concept of 'witness (citta) depending upon the function it is performing. Since everything other than consciousness is material,

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the internal organ, in differing from consciousness, is the notion of intentionality more clearly than in material too. Carrying the reflection or semblance (ābhāsa) of consciousness, it performs the manifold Śamkara. For Rāmānuja, although consciousness is the essence of the self, it is not equivalent to the self, operations of cogitations, becomes the first entity to be the object of consciousness, and also serves as the but is, instead, an attribute of the self

medium for all other entities to be related to (Dharmabhutajnāna). Consciousness is always consciousness of something. There is no such thing as consciousness as its objects. Consciousness becomes consciousness without an object, for it is never intentional only because of the internal organ's encountered. Object-directed acts of consciousness presence and functioning. When its functioning gives belong to an agent of experience. Intrinsic rise to a doubtful cognition of an object, then it is called mind. If it produces definite knowledge of an intentionality is the mark of mental acts. This is where Husserl's notion of intentionality comes object, then it is called intellect. When the sense of 'I' somewhat closer to Rāmānuja's philosophy of arises from its functioning, it is called ego. It goes by consciousness. Although consciousness for Rāmānuja the name of memory-stuff when it recollects the past. The functional modifications of the internal organ are is self-luminous, it is absolutely intentional and not a

called vrittis; and each of these vrittis, when illumined pure consciousness or a transcendental ego.

by consciousness, is called vritti-jnāna - what the Western phenomenologists call the cogitations of the It is, however, worth mentioning here that the School of Nyāya-Vaiśesika might possibly portray ego, which appear and disappear. The Husserlian phenomenological elements in its doctrine of tripartite formula, "ego cogito cogitata", applies consciousness. To the Nyaya-Vaiśesika School, respectively to the internal organ, its intentional consciousness is formless (nirākāra), since it is not a performances - doubting, understanding, affirming, denying, feeling, willing, and so on - and its intended substance (dravya) but rather a quality (guna).4 Whatever form (ākāra) it appears to have is derived objects. While consciousness has neither structure nor from its object. For example, when an object is blue, function, the internal organ has both structure and function. Since consciousness is present as a witness the consciousness seems to be a consciousness-of- blue. To put it in another way, consciousness, of to the absence of objects in the state of dreamless course, is of an object, but supposing that its object is sleep, it is not intentional; it is, however, intentional a patch of blue, one is not entitled to say that being- (samsrista) in the other two states, revealing the of-blue is internally constitutive of that state of objects which it is conscious of. Thus Husserl's consciousness. In this strict sense, one might be led to intentionality approximates Samkara's intentionality understand that the Nyāya School does allow for only to the extent of the waking and dreaming states. Śamkara, however, goes a step further by saying that consciousness having an intrinsically object-directed character (svābhāvika visayapravanatva) (Mohanty, consciousness is essentially non-intentional insofar as 1988, p. 272), thus formulating intentionality of it witnesses all three the states without fail. Its consciousness which can be compared, while being intentionality is, thus, contingent and not necessary. Here, Husserl's transcendental ego (unlike the duly cautious in respect of many of its other dimensions, with the phenomenology of Husserl. empirical ego which may come and go), which no Nevertheless, since the intended focus of this paper is reduction can ever bracket and which is the exclusively on understanding the phenomenology of presupposition of all experience and also the residuum of pure consciousness, seems to come consciousness in Husserl and Samkara, this is not the place to reflect further upon the relationship between closer to the witness consciousness (Sākshin) of Śamkara. phenomenology and Nyāya-Vaiśesika.

In Rāmānuja's philosophy,3 however, one can find selves and God; and hence, it is called svarupa-bhuta- jnāna (substantive consciousness); it is also an attribute, as it exists as an attribute of both God and the selves

3 For Rāmānuja, the founder of Visistādvaita Vedānta (ätman). When it so exists, it is called dharma-bhuta-

(Qualified Non-Dualism), consciousness is jnāna (attributive consciousness). ajada (immaterial) and is distinguished both from matter (jada) According to the Nyāya-Vaiśesika School, all objects of experience can be classified either in terms of one of nine and spirit (cetana). Consciousness is always of a qualified character and is also invariably related to a ultimately real substances (dravya) or in terms of the

knower or the self, with the self being the substrate of various properties and relations which pertain to these

knowledge. Rāmānuja agrees with Advaitins insofar as substances. According to this analysis, the self (Ātman) is

he holds that consciousness is the essence of the self only one of these nine real substances. Knowledge, or

(Åtman), but he differs from Advaitins when he asserts consciousness, is properly categorized as an attribute

that consciousness is also an attribute of the self. Being a (guna) which is altogether distinct from each individual self and yet belongs to, or inheres in, the self substance, consciousness constitutes the essence of the adventitiously.

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From the discussion so far, the following thesis . The earlier Husserl of Logical Investigations emerges: (1900) did not believe in the existence of the absolute, pure consciousness, but the later · The concept of consciousness as set forth in the Advaita is totally different from the one that is Husserl frankly admitted in his Ideen (1913) that his earlier scepticism with regard to the ego, available in the West. In Advaita tradition, there an identical subject, was untenable. The later is no confusion of consciousness, mind or ego. Husserl held that there is a transcendental ego, · Husserl, who indicated a distinction between 'standing behind' or 'presiding over' the consciousness and ego at one stage in his intentional consciousness. Consciousness is not phenomenology, does not hold on to it. empty consciousness, but is ego-endowed . The term 'consciousness' (cit or caitanya) consciousness. Consciousness in Samkara, means the self-luminous light or shining however, is not egological; the 'ego' is a principle, whereas 'mind', which is but antah- mundane object of consciousness. This karana, the instrument being located in the transcendental ego of Husserl is comparable to body, serves as the means for knowing, feeling the Self (Atman or Brahman) which stands and willing. So the two terms are not behind the internal modified consciousness synonymous. (antahkarana). · In Samkara, consciousness reveals objects on its · For Husserl, the intentional act of consciousness own; it also reveals them through the ego or the is something 'directed towards an object' mind.5 It is with reference to this ego or mind outside it. Consciousness, therefore, is always that Advaita speaks of the intentionality of consciousness of something. This view of consciousness. The intentional performance is Husserl is comparable to the 'internal organ' or not ascribed to the pure Self or consciousness, modified consciousness (antahkarana) whose but only to consciousness associated with the sole function is to intend to, to deal with, some ego or 'I' which is transcendent to object in the world. consciousness. · A question that can be raised in the context of · The distinction which Advaita makes between Husserl's distinction between 'the pure I' and the pure consciousness and the ego- 'the empirical I' is: Which consciousness is it consciousness (mind-consciousness), which is that is intentional? Is it the pure consciousness, very subtle, but profound and crucial, is 'the phenomenological residuum', that is comparable to the distinction between the pure intentional? Or is it the epoché-performing ego or the transcendental ego and the epoché- that is intentional? It seems to me that Husserl performing ego accepted by Husserl. replies positively to the second question, as a · Consciousness is immutable and inactive; but result of which 'the epoché-performing ego' the mind is active and mutable, and plays its comes closer to 'the internal organ or role as the knower, agent and enjoyer in antahkarana' of Šamkara's Advaita. everyday life with the help of consciousness. . On the basis of the distinction between Thus, consciousness and mind are essentially consciousness and the ego, Advaita may hold different in Advaita. that not only the intentional act, but also the While consciousness is sentient, mind is functions of objectivation, identification, insentient; and so they can never be identical in fulfilment and constitution mentioned by Advaita. Consciousness or Cit is beginningless, Husserl, belong to the ego or the mind, which is and it has no end as it is changeless. transcendent to consciousness. It justifies this · Mind, in Advaita, which has been active in the position on the ground that these cogitations are waking and dream states, becomes quiescent in known in the same way as the external objects sleep for the reason that it, being the product of and their qualities are known, and what is avidyā, gets resolved in the latter in the same known must be transcendent to the knower. In way as a clay-pot, on losing its identity as clay- other words, since consciousness is aware of pot, merges with clay, its material cause. these cogitations as they occur from time to time, as they appear and disappear in the mental horizon, they cannot belong to, or be part of, 5 Advaita holds the view that any 'object', whether known consciousness. For example, when someone or unknown, must fall with the scope of consciousness. sees an object, the object seen is transcendent to An often quoted statement conveys this basic standpoint the seer. as follows: Like Husserlian "sarvam vastu jnātatayā vājnātatayā vā sākshicaitanyasya . phenomenology, Advaita

visaya eva". philosophy holds that whatever is presented to

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consciousness is 'transcendent' to it and thus becomes an object of consciousness. Samkara traditional conception of consciousness in the sense that the absolute character of con- puts it as the distinction between 'asmad' and sciousness is not disclosed in relation to 'yusmaď' (subject and object). The description mundane realities, as is the case with, for of consciousness which Aron Gurwitsch (1966) example, the empirical ego. It is in this sense derives from the writings of Husserl seems to that the Advaita attitude, like the phenomeno- come closer to the Advaitic thought. Gurwitsch logical, may be said to stand in contrast to all contends that consciousness is not regarded as the natural attitudes presupposed by traditional part of the real world and as one reality among others. Consciousness can thus rightfully be ontologies. The Advaita analysis is a radical departure from other traditional systems in its characterized as absolute only to the extent that understanding of the foundational and absolute we conceive of it exclusively as a medium and, character of consciousness. Consciousness in so to speak, as the theatre in which the Advaita is not temporal, it is not in time. constitution of all sorts of objects - including Consciousness in Advaita is empty of all psychical and human realities, such as the soul, the mind, the ego, the personality, our social and contents - but, for Husserl, consciousness is

historical being, and so forth - takes place. 'content-full'.

Consciousness is a common focus for both · In Advaita, the notion of constitution is to be

psychology and phenomenology, and yet there located somewhere in between the idea of mere

is a difference insofar as consciousness in manifestation (Prakāśa) and the idea of creation

psychology is accepted as one reality among (sristi), so that the constituted (in this case, the

others and is studied in its dependence on extra- empirical world) is neither an independently

conscious data. existing generality that is merely manifested by

· To the question, 'Can consciousness, considered consciousness nor a subjective production.

in its purity, as a self-contained system of Conclusion Being, as a system of Absolute Being, into which nothing can penetrate, and from which My observations so far have revealed that, while there nothing can escape, be regarded as human consciousness?' (Husserl, 1913/1969, §49, p. are some differences between the perspectives of

153), Husserl seems to reply that 'being human' Advaita Vedānta and the phenomenology of Edmund Husserl that keep room for not only further is an interpretation, a meaning constituted by differences but also similarities, in certain other transcendental consciousness. In other words, 'I am human' is also a meaning and so is a respects there is the possibility of meaningful

constituted noema. In the same vein, for interaction between Samkara and Husserl. Before coming to any definite conclusion regarding points of Advaita, transcendental consciousness appears commonality between Samkara and Husserl, as living being (jiva) owing to avidyā or however, there is a need for further analysis of these nescience. · Husserl's noesis-noema (subject pole-object perspectives.

pole) structure of experience can be compared There is a significant dimension in Samkara that is with the asmad-yusmad (subject-object) absent in Husserl. Samkara undertook his study of structure of Samkara. Samkara's asmad-yusmad consciousness more for soteriological reasons than for structure of experience asserts that the subject the sake of a purely theoretical or epistemic and object are opposed to each other like light 'Brahman or Ātman' quest. Husserl, in contrast, was and darkness. The object is superimposed interested in the epistemological domain of (Adhyāsa) on the subject. In contrast, in consciousness and its certainty rather than in Husserl's noesis-noema structure of experience, soteriology. For him, transcendental consciousness is even though the subject pole and the object pole disclosed after the mundane world is bracketed, and it are not opposed to each other, they are the two is then shown as that which is not in time but the poles of the same consciousness. However, source of temporality; it is both streaming and insofar as Samkara says that consciousness is standing, a point that would take it closer to the neither the subject nor the object, the Husserlian Sākshi Caitanya of Śamkara. Constitution for notion of consciousness, in which the subject Śamkara is accorded not to consciousness as such but and object are two poles, seems to come closer to the power of avidyā or māyā; the adhyāsa or to Samkara's notion at this particular point. superimposition of māyā in this sense has its āvarana · The Advaita understanding, not unlike that of (concealment) and vikshepa (projection) that is transcendental phenomenology, abandons the constitutive and dynamic and can account for the

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constitution of the samsāra (world) and its meanings. Writings of Buddhism" (Husserl, 1925, as cited in Schuhmann, 1992, p. 25). There is no evidence that This observation, however, is not based on Husserl's Husserl studied any other works of the Indian own understanding of Samkara's Advaita Vedānta, as the former had hardly any opportunity to study the tradition in his later life. His image of Indian thought seems, rather, to have been determined by those parts latter. Husserl's personal relationship with the famous of Neumann's translation of the main texts of the Indologist Hermann Oldenberg (1854-1920), his colleague in the Faculty of Philosophy at Gottingen, Suttapitaka which he had read and commented on in a brief review (Husserl, 1925). Schuhmann points out suggests that they may have discussed Indology that Husserl, in fact, not only "identified these texts together (Schuhmann, 1992, p. 24). Husserl's know- ledge of Vedänta may also be surmised from the with Buddhism in general", but "identified (in the traditional Schopenhauerian way) Buddhism with collection of books he had in his library, all of which Indian thought as a whole". While Husserl's reading were published around 1880, containing some articles of Neumann had led to the recognition that "Indian on the Vedas, Max Muller's lecture India and Paul thought moved in an important sense on the same Duessen's Das System Vedānta: Nach den Brahma Sutra's des Bādarāyana [The doctrine of Vedanta: A level as his own philosophy", the fact that Indian philosophy appeared to him to be motivated by the translation of the Brahma Sutras of Badarayana]. It is also possible that Husserl possessed these books goal of salvation, with its theories developed only in

because of his broader interest in anthropology - subservience to this practical aim, conflicted with the

attested to by, for example, his discussions on the pursuit in European philosophy of "the goal of pure theory, theory for no external purposes and without counting and numbering practices of various peoples in Chapter XII of the Philosophy of Arithmetic any ancillary function being assigned to theory as a

(Schuhmann, 1992, p. 24). whole" (Schuhmann, 1992, pp. 27-32).

That Husserl, moreover, had studied Buddhism to As Schuhmann (1992) concludes, "This, then, might be considered as a first step in determining the some extent is very clear from his own words: "I have now read the greatest part of Karl Eugen Neumann's 'complete opposition' between European and Indian

German translation of the main parts of the Holy thought which Husserl had alluded to in the Neumann review."

About the Author

Dr Surya Kanta Maharana is an Assistant Professor of Philosophy at the Birla Institute of Technology and Science in Pilani, Rajasthan, India. Dr Maharana has published a number of articles in reputable journals and has co-edited a book entitled Perspectives on Indian Ethics (ICON Publications, New Delhi, 2008). His current research interests include Indian Philosophy (Advaita Vedanta), Phenomenology and Ecosophy.

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Gupta, B. (1982). Phenomenological analysis in Husserl and Rāmānuja: A comparative study. International Studies in Philosophy, 14(2), 19-32.

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The Indo-Pacific Journal of Phenomenology (IPJP) can be found at www.ipip.org.