1. A Critique of The Theories of Viparyaya Nani Lal Sen

A CRITIQUE OF

THE THEORIES

OF VIPARYAYA

Nani Lal Sen, M. A., Vedantatirtha Head of the Department of Sanskrit, Rabindra Bharati University

RABINDRA BHARATI 1965

Published by : Shri Dhirendra Debnath On behalf of Rabindra Bharati 6/4 Dwarkanath Tagore Lane Calcutta-7

First Edition, 1st June, 1965

Price : RUPEES FIFTEEN only

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Dedicated to the hallowed memory of my father late J. N. Sengupta

सप्तनिष्कोजभितामेतां वाजसनेयिकां मम। सप्तसप्तिस्वधामस्थो भर्गदेवो महोयताम्॥

FOREWORD

This is a highly specialised book dealing with an important. epistemological question having bearing on the different systems of Indian Philsophy. To get an idea of the nature and scope of this book we should start with acquainting ourselves with certain technical terms touching on the subject .. We may conveniently do so. The title of the book indicates that it is a critical study of the theories of Viparyaya. Now what is Viparyaya ? Sankara- cirya defines it very tersely, but clearly enough, as 'a cognition of thatness in something other than that'. Let us have a concrete example. The typical example cited in books dealing with the subject will serve our purpose very well. When we look at a shell of the mother of pearl, known as nacre, we may perceive it as such. This is a case of correct perception. But sometimes it does happen that its silver-white lustre may mislead us to take it to be a piece of silver. This, in psychological terminology, is known as illusion. It is to be contrasted with what is known as hallucination, where we perceive a thing without there being any objective basis for it. In Indian epistemology also there is a similar scheme of terminology. A false perception is called Bhrama. This may be subdivided into two classes. In one case there is an objective basis but the cognition is faulty, as in the example cited above, where nacre is mistakenly perceived as silver. It is, therefore, called Salambana Bhrama. In the other kind there is no objective basis at all as in hallucination. It is, therefore, called Niralambana Bhrama. Now Viparyaya refers to the first kind of faulty perception. It may be, therefore, taken as synonymous with illusion in a general way. To be precise, it refers to errors. of perception of all varieties. There is another term with which acquaintance is essential. That is Khyati. In ordinary parlour Khyati means cognition. But as a technical term used in Indian epistemology, it has acquired a different connotation. Here it stands for the same thing as illusion. Accordingly the different theories of illusion are known as Khyativada.

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Ordinarily, epistemology forms a distinct part in philosophy, just as Ontology does. While the latter confines itself to the study of being, the former is occupied with the study of know- ledge. They are distinct provinces of Philosophy and form separate parts. In Indian Philosophy, however, they have converged and even got linked up together. The reason is this. There are many schools of Indian Philosophy which deny reality to the objective world. For example, we may refer to the Yogacara and the Madhyamika Schools of Buddhist Philosophy. The most typical example is provided by the Advaita School of Vedanta Philosophy propounded by Sankaracarya. It is an extreme form of abstract monism in which the Brahman alone is considered real and the perceptual world is explained away as a pure illusion. For the purpose of explaining away the testimony of the senses, which contradicts the theory propounded by such philosophical systems, it became necessary to build up a special theory of epistemology to reinforce the ontological part. In the process, therefore, epistemology joined hands with ontology and thus became linked up with it. That also explains why the theory of illusion assumed such disproportionate importance in our philosophical systems.

In this context, it is understandable why the different con- flicting theories of illusion grew up as integral parts of different philosophical systems. In the process they ramified into an intricate mass of complicated philosophical thought. The subject, therefore, calls for special treatment. To make the understanding of the shades of difference marking out the various theories easy, the need is felt for a book which will undertake a comprehensive survey of them. Not that the subject has not received attention from authors who specialised in Indian Philosophy. They do not, however, meet the full requirements of a scholar who is interested in a comprehensive study of the subject. There are histories of Indian Philosophy written by renowned scholars which touch on the subject, but the treatment is fragmentary. Again, there are specialised books which exclusively deal with this subject. Unfortunately, however, they restrict their studies to the principal theories of illusion only. They are not, therefore, sufficiently comprehensive. The need for a comprehensive study of this complicated subject is still left unattended.

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The present book, in my opinion, is competent to meet this need. The author has taken great pains to collect together all the various theories of illusion. He has been able to trace out as many as fourteen theories of which about half a dozen only are well-known. This will indicate the comprehensive character of this book. Moreover, under each major theory are grouped together theories which are marked off from one another by minor shades of difference. The theory of Anyatha-Khyati is an illustration on point. This is shared by many schools of philosophy each accepting it in a different way. All these theories have been enumerated and their differences explained. The book thus exhaustively deals with all theories of illusion.

This survey is followed by an analytical study of each theory. To do proper justice to them, a whole chapter has been devoted to the study of each. After that there is a critical appreciation in which the author brings out the weak and strong points of a particular theory.In this connection, he has taken all necessary pains to see that the treatment is exhaustive. He has referred to the exposition given by different scholars and assessed their merits. Where necessary he has not hesitated to criticise even renowned writers in the true philosophical spirit which pays homage only to the altar of truth. At the end of the book the author has ventured on a theory of illusion of his own. His approach is eclectic. Without entering into the details of his thesis, it may be said that he discovers many facets of the subject and says that the difference between the principal theories lies in the fact that they have put emphasis on one of them only in preference to the others. From these premises he draws the conclusion that from the overall point of view, there is involved a co-existence of contradictories as propounded in the Acintyakhyati-vada propounded by Sri Caitanya and elaborated by Jiva Goswami. Whether we accept his conclusion or not, this clearly indicates that the author has adopted an impartial attitude in the study of this complicated subject, a point which evidently adds to the merit of the book,

Rabindra Bharati, Hiranmay Banerjee Calcutta Vice-Chancellor 15th May, 1965

PREFACE

Viparyaya is an important and gripping epistemological problem tinding its place of pride in all the different systems of Indian philosophy. The literature bearing on the problem is so vast, varied and intricate that it is really difficult to present in the short compass of a sizable book all the diversified reflections of the different Sanskritic philosophers, whose number and volume of total output are, to say the least, definitely heart-depressing .. The deliberations of my fore-runners in the field are in some cases incidental and fragmentary. In other cases where Viparyaya is the principal or sole concern of the author, the discussion generally pertains to three, four or, at best, five widely current theories of Viparyaya from sectarian stand-point. leaving out of account not only the other theories, but also the different variants and ramifications of the well-known theories. So, the systematic and unbiased presentation of the different thories of Viparyaya together with a critical evaluation of each was a genuine desideratum. And I have perhaps been overbold in addressing myself to this titanic task, and I, theorefore, meekly offer this book to the indulgence of scholars. Nevertheless, I want very humbly to submit that my work embodies discovery of new facts observed by myself, of new relations of facts observed by others and constitutes an almost exhaustive study and criticism of the published Sanskrit and English works on the subject. The special features of the book may be broadly outlined thus :- (i) The first Chapter distinguishes Viparyaya from the Yoga and the Buddhist Vikalpa and from Samsaya. Different causes of Viparyaya and its classification dealt with exhaustively. (ii) The Chapters II-VII deal with theories which are all but unknown or are most imperfectly known. The myth about Bhäskara advocating Anyathakhyati has been shown to be base- less in Chapter VI. (iii) In Ch. VIII it has been shown that Sadasat-khyati is the real Samkhya theory of Error ; three different interpreta-

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tions of the theory offered. In Ch. IX it has been shown that Vaibhasikas did not uphold Atma-khyati. The difference between Viparyaya and Samvrti-satya according to Yogacara brought out-a point perhaps not discussed by others. A new interpre- tation of the philosophic position of Yogacara. In Ch. X I have suggested a new interpretation of the term 'Madhyamika' and of Madhyamika philosophy. (iv) A new interpretation of the Satkhyati of Ramanuja, new arguments against it and its variants presented in Ch. XI. In Ch. XII the implications of the Prabhakara theory have been interpreted anew and the view that the older Prabhakaras accepted a third unitary cognition to explain Viparyaya has been disproved and its real sponsor has been traced out. (v) In Ch. XIII Anyathakhyati with all its variants has been discussed. A new interpretation of the Yoga view. Mandana's view and the hitherto unexplored dimensions of Kumarila's theory discussed. The Madhva theory discussed. In Ch. XIV Anirva- canīyakhyati has been most exhaustively presented. In Ch. XV the Acintyakhyati of Srijiva has been presented. In Ch. XVI an eclectic theory of viparyaya has been presented.

In spite of my best efforts, I could not avoid typographical and linguistic blemishes. For all these and for my claim to originality, I crave the indulgence of the masters and of my fore-runners in the field. If I have contradicted many, I have done it by learning much from them and, therefore, mean offence to none.

My sincerest and grateful thanks are due to our most humane Vice-Chancellor of wide erudition who very kindly has prefaced my book with an excellent Foreword. I must thank that radiating, scholarly personality, Dr. Gaurinath Sastri, Prin- cipal, Govt. Sanskrit College, West Bengal for offering me all facilities to use the Sanskrit College Library, for taking keen interest in the progress of the work and for going through a few chapters of the book and suggesting improvement thereon. Thanks are also due to Shri. D. Debnath, M. A., Secretary to the Vice-Chancellor for his tenacious interest in publishing the book,

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weathering all the storms raised by me now and then. The manager and the compositors of the National Printing Works deserve hearty thanks for rushing the book through the Press amidst heavy odds. It now remains tor me to refer with delight- ful tears to one Dr. Bhattacharya (who should remain incognito), who has been a perpetual source of inspiration to me right from the beginning of my career. He was and is the never-failing propelling force behind my literary pursuits and exhorted, enthused, scolded and battered me with words even like a dictator to make a man of me. I had better stop here, for my words are too effete to express adequate loving gratitude to him.

Rabindra Bharati University THE AUTHOR 19th May, 1965.

CONTENTS Page

Foreword i-iii Preface v-vii

CHAPTER I Introductory .. 1-15 CHAPTER II Nirvişaya-khyati ... 16-20 CHAPTER III Niradhisthana-khyāti ... 21-23

CHAPTER IV Akhyāti 24-27 CHAPTER V Alaukikakhyāti ... ... 28-31 CHAPTER VI Prasiddhartha-khyāti ... 32-39 ...

CHAPTER VII Anyakhyati ... .. 40-47

CHAPTER VIII Sadasat-khyati ... 48-58 ... CHAPTER IX Ātma-khyati ... ... 59-78

CHAPTER X Asat-khyāti ... 79 -- 97 ...

CHAPTER XI Sat-khyāti ... 98-121 ...

CHAPTER XII Vivekākhyāti ... ... 122-160 CHAPTER XIII Anyathakhyati .. 161-202 ...

CHAPTER XIV Anirvacanīya-khyati ... 203-238 ...

CHAPTER XV Acintya-khyati 239-242 ..

CHAPTER XVI Towards a theory of Viparyaya ... 243-248 . Appendix ... 249-251 A select bibliography with abbreviations 252-256 Index ... ... 257-259

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

CHAPTER I

Introductory

"And what then is Viparyaya" ?- One might ask like the Jesting Pilate without waiting for a reply. But, despite all such malign banters, the fact remains that we live in a world of eternal antinomies, a world that is astir with the ever-contending forces of attraction and repulsion, of good and evil, of right and wrong, of truth and falsity. Indeed, like the problem of evil the problem of Viparyaya also is a hard fact of life in contemplation and in action and philosophers and the mass of the people alike have viewed the phenomenon with great misgiving. Down through the centuries of cultural evolution, it has posed as an ontological puzzle, an epistemological curio and a psychological abberration. Hence, Viparyaya has a rightful claim to a systematic study and, as a matter of fact, it has grown to be a major epistemological problem of the philosophies of the East and the West. We, therefore, propose here to attempt a thorough and systematic study of the problem in the light of the deliberations of our Indian Philosophers. Vallabhācārya in his Nyāya-līlāvatī classifies cognition under two heads, viz., Vidyā and Avidya. He subdivides Avidyā again into four distinct categories, namely, Sam-s'aya, Viparyaya, Svapna and Anadhyavasāya1. Purusottama also in his prasthāna- ratnākara makes a five-fold division of determinate cognition in which Viparyasa comes second2. The yoga-sūtra of Patañjali considers Viparyaya as one of the five psychical modes (Vitti) enunciated in the system3. Män ikya-nandin begins his Parīk sä- mukha-sūtram with a rigid differentiation of Viparyaya from Pramana as follows : "Pramānad artha-samsiddhistad-ābhāsad Viparyayah (PMS., Sl. i). Dharmakīrti, the great Buddhist logician, also says : "Atasmimstad-graho bhrantih."

One may not, if at all, see eye to eye with Purusottama when he places Viparyāsa under determinate cognition ; but, all must unhesitatingly admit that all the schools of Indian philosophy, 1 "Prakās'o buddhiḥ. Sā ca dvividhā vidyā cāvidyā ca. Tatrāvidyā Sam s'aya-viparyaya-svapnanadhyavasaya-laksana". (NLV., p. 40). .. Savikalpakam tu pa nca-vidham, Sam s'aya-viparyāsa- 2 nis'caya-smrti-svāpa-bhedāt". (PR. p. 14). 3 "Vrttayahı pancatayyah klitāklit āļ .Pramāna-viparyaya-vikalpa- nidra-smrtayah". (YS., 1.5 and 1.6/).

2 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

idealist and realist, orthodox and heterodox, are at one in accepting error or Viparyaya as a hard fact of experience. Not to speak of the Samkarites, whose whole system hinges upon Adhyasa and Avidya, even the Vedanta schools of Bhaskara, Madhva, Nimbārka, Vallabha and S'rījīva and the systems of Samkhya, Nyaya and the Kumārila school of Pūrva-mīmāmsā as also the pratyabhijñā and other schools of S'aiva philosophy, besides the systems noticed previously, openly affirm the verity of Error as a distinct cognitive phenomenon. Ramanuja and Prabhakara also pay homage and fealty to the officious self-assertion of Error, but only relegate it to the domain of our overt action (Pravrtti) So, error as a sheer fact of experience has never been called into question in Indian philosophy. On the contrary, experience has dispelled the mist of improbability (Asambhavana) with regard to it and has imbued it with a reality indubitable and incontestable. One may profitably refer here to the observations of Citsukha on the philosophic attitude that rules out invalid cognition. Besides pointing out that there is an amplitude of causes and conditions which can account for invalid cognition, he curtly asks an unanswerable question to the opponent in the following manner : "What would the opponent say about the cognition of the form 'there is invalid cognition' ? He cannot condemn it as invalid on pain of self-contradictory perdition. Hence, he is compelled to take it as valid and eventually to concede the existence of invalid cognition. ("Kim cāyathārtha- pratyayo' stītyasya pratyayasya yathārthatve tasya sālambana- tvāya kas'cid api ayathārtha-pratyayo' bhyupeya " Tp., p. 62). The implication of the argument is that one cannot maintain a position that threatens with doom one's role as a disputationist. Venkat anātha clearly asserts the unreasonableness of such a position in the following s'loka : "Na sarvasyapramanatvam svapakş asya svatah ksateh/Na sarvasya pramāņ atva m svapakș asyā- nyatah Ksateh / /" Np., p. 31, Chowkhāmbā ed.). So, now that error has been shown to be a fact of experience on the strength of arguments and the common consensus of opinion of philosophers of divergent affiliations, we can proceed with it as a subject of our scrutiny. (cf. "Sambhāvitah Pratijñāyām paksah hetunā/Na tasya hetubhistrā nam utpatanneva yo hatah/ /") sadhyeta

In pursuance of the traditional maxim "Laksana-pramāņ ā- bhyamhi vastu-siddhih", our study of Errorpresupposes a definition, though tentative, of Error. In the yoga-stra of patañjali 'Viparyaya' is defined as 'a false cognition that takes note of something other than the really presented sense-datum' (cf. 'Viparyayo mithya-jnanam atad-rupa-pratistham". Ys. I. '8). The great S'am kara defines error as 'Atasmi mstad-buddhih' (S'B. on BS., p. 4, vvp.), i.e. an error is 'a cognition of thatness in something other than that : Dharma-kirti also defines error as "Atasmi mstad- graho bhrantiḥ".

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 3

It appears from the above that error is an invalid cognition in which one thing is cognised as another, in which we perceive one thing, while the presented sense-datum is some other thing. We can for the time being rest contented with such a working definition ; but, even here and now we must carefully distinguish between error and doubt (Sams'aya), on the one hand, and between error and the Buddhist categories of thought (Vikalpa) on the other. Indeed, the yoga philosophy does not recognise a separate psychical mode called 'Sams'aya', but includes it in 'Viparyaya'. Bhojarāja in his Rājamārtanda-vrtti explicitly states : "Sams'ayo' pyatad-rūpa-pratisthatvāt mithyājñānam, yathā sthanurva purusoveti". (RMV. on YS., p. 4). Hence it is imperative that we should draw a clear line of demarcation between Viparyaya and Sams'aya to avoid unnecessary complica- tions in our study of error. The Nyaya-sūtra of Gotama defines Sams'aya in general as the cognition of mutually contrary entities in one and the same substratum Vimars'ah Sams'ayah", NS., I. 1.23). S'ankara Mis'ra also defines sams'aya likewise as follows : "Ekasmin dharmini virodhi nānāprakārakam jnānam sams'aya" (upa., VS. II. 2.17). Though neo-logicians do not accept two or more positive entities as the two counter-entities of doubt and assert to the contrary that a doubt-judgment is expressed in the form 'whether it is A or not', 'Stha nurna va' in which only one term is positive (cf. "Sa Sams'ayo matiryā Syādekatrābhāva- bhavayoh". BP. Ka. 130), all other thinkers are at one in upholding both the terms of a doubt-judgment as positive. Even Vis'vanatha, a neo-logician, tacitly confirms this universally accepted position when he says : "Kimsvinnaro va sthanurvetyādi- buddhistu sam s'ayah" (Bp., Kā. 129). A viparyaya, however, is expressed in the form 'Idam rajatam', the presented datum in this case being a nacre only. It is now easy to see that both error and doubt are generally concerned with perception, both involve an element of smrti as also the perception of the common properties of the counter-entities. If we analyse the psychosis or psychoses of a doubt-judgment like 'Sthanurva purusova', we shall find that the eye, though in intercourse with the trunk of a tree, perceives only those properties which are common to both the trunk and a man and does neither perceive the specific properties of any, nor the mutually excluding properties of the two and the perceiver only calls to mind the specific properties of both. Puro'vasthite dharmini ūrdhvatvādi-sādhārana-dharma-grahaņāt (cf. "

sthanu-purusa-gata-vis'e agraha nad-ubhaya-vis'esasmrteh sams'ayo bhavati". (NM., p. 167, Chowkhāmbā. Also "Sāmān ya-pratyak șāt vis'e sā pratyaks āt ubhayavis'e sasmr tes'ca sams'aya h". Vs. II. 2.17). In an error of the form 'Idam rajatam', the eye contacts a nacre,

4 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

but perceives only those properties which are common to both a nacre and a silver, the specific properties of the nacre or the mutually excluding properties of the nacre and the silver not being perceived, and the perceiver calls to mind in this case the specific properties of the silver which the eye then seems to perceive. Thus, while in doubt the specific properties of both the entities are called to mind, in error only those of one are brought before the mind (cf."Sams'aye hyubhayavis'eşasmaranam Kāranamiha tvanyatara- vis'esa-smaran amiti vis'esah', NM., p. 167). Moreover, a doubt is a case of indecision, of a hesitant excitement, whereas an error has a stamp of certitude and self- query and

compcsure all about it. Furthermore, the locus of a doubt is veiled from us only in a restricted sense, while that of an error practically completely save for its characteristic of 'thisness' only. To be all the more critical, a doubt is generally dispelled by the non-perception of the specific properties of one of the entities aided by inductive reasoning (Tarka) and the perception of those of the other, as Vacaspati Mis'ra holds, while an error is corrected by the perception of the locus only. Again, a doubt emerges with its dubious character unconcealed, while an error puts on the guise of a valid cognition and only very rarely does it carry along with it the stamp of erroneousness. To put it in other words, a doubt remains a doubt even though known as such, while an error, except for very peculiar cases like the world-illusion, is never during its live career known as such and it vanishes a moment before the sense of erroneousness dawns. (cf. "Sāksātkrte tvadhi ș- thāne samanantaranis'citih/Adhyasyamānam nāstīti bādha ityu- cyate budhaih/ /" (V. Si. Muk., p. 127). Thus we see that a doubt and an error are to be distinguished on various grounds. A doubt, however, may give rise to an error and an error, in its turn, may also end in a doubt. So, logically or psychologically, it is not possible to speak of any invariable anteriority or posteriority in this regard. We are now confronted with the task of analysing the difference between Viparyaya and Vikalpa of the Buddhists. The yoga-sūtra of patañjali considers vikalpa as a psychosis (Vrtti) having no objective counterpart, but arising out of verbal knowledge (cf. "S'abdajñānānupātī Vastus'ūnyo vikalpah/Ys. I. 9.). The commonest example of a patanjala vikalpa is 'Rahoh S'irah'. As stated in the vyāsa-Bhasyam, this vikalpa is not to be included in viparyaya inasmuch as it helps linguistic usage and is un- avoidably linked up with our common-sense pattern of thought. This vikalpa is but a vague ideation arising out of positive, predi- cative and negative terms and is thus of three kinds, namely, (1) Vastuvikalpa, (2) Kriyāvikalba, and (3) Abhāva-vikalpa. To put it in the words of Carveth Read, a vikalpa is a 'conception

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 5

on the strength of concepts representing nothing'. But this vikalpa is not to be equated with the vikalpa or the kalpana of the Buddhists. According to the Buddhists, the indeterminate percep- tion which takes note of the 'Svalaksana' only of the presented datum is the only valid perception ; the determinate perception is presentative-representative in character and here the mind is more a lender than a borrower. It invests the cognitum with a name, a universal and the like which are not its part and parcel, nor are even anything having objective reality and as such it is invalid. For, such a position cannot stand the scrutiny of the corres- pondence theory of truth as is advocated by the Buddhists (cf. "Artha-sārū pyamasya pramāņam. NV. Ch. I, p. 103, Peterson's edition). By vikalpa the Buddhists thus understand this 'Nama', 'Jati' etc. which are unsubstantial (cf. "Vikalpo" vastunirbhasad-asam vadādupaplava h" namasa ms'raya h' Ibid). Dignaga says 'Nāmajātyādyasam-yutam' by Pv. ; also 'Vikalpo

way of explaining the word 'Kalpana'. Dharmakirti in his NB says : "Abhılapa-sam sarga-yogya-pratibhasa-pratītih kalpanā" (p. 103, Peterson's ed.). That is to say, a 'Kalpana' is that kind cf cognition whose content is apt to be associated with verbal expressions. To be brief, a 'Kalpanā, or a 'Vikalpa' is a purely subjective construction, a figment of imagination and has no objective reality behind it. Jayanta Bhatt a in his Nyāya-Mañjarī explains this 'Kalpana' thus : "These subjective constructions are five-fold ; namely, genus, quality, action, name and substance. And these are called 'Kalpana, since they assume difference in identity and identity in difference. (cf. "Pañca caitah kalpanā bhavanti-jātikalpanā guņa-kalpanā kriyā-kalpanā nāmakalpanā dravya-kalpanā ceti. Tās'ca Kvacidabhede' pibheda-kalpanāt kvacicca bhede' pyabheda-kalpanāt kalpanā ucyante". NM., p. 122, Beng. ed.). These conceptual constructions do not arise from the sense-datum and, thus being divorced from the objective reality, are characterised by a variable, blurred apprehension and this accounts for their invalidity. (cf. "Vikalpa-vijnanam tvarthā- nnotpadyate. Tatah Pratibhāsa-niyama-hetorabhāvād-aniyata- pratibhāsam". NB. T., p. 10).

Now, a question naturally arises. If these vikalpas are mere conceptual constructions not conversant with reality and are sheer 'perversion of relations' as Dr. S. Mookerji so aptly characterises them, why are they not sublated even like errors and illustions? The answer is that a vikalpa does not partake of the character of errors and illusions. When one entity appears as another as in the case of the solar rays being perceived as water, we have scope for a subsequent sublative experience. This is just the domain of errors and illusions. But, here in regard to vikalpa, the conceptual constructions like the genus are not

6 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

discrete and distinct entities beside the self-characterised 'svalaksana and as such they are not amenable to cognition as distinct entities. On the contrary, all these vikalpas of identity and difference refer to the suigeneris individual as their substratum. So, no contradicting cognition occurs with regard to them, as they never present themselves as distinct entities. Hence, these vikalpas are not of the nature of Viparyaya. They are not to be reckoned as valid cognitions either, since the genus etc. are unsubstantial. So, these vikalpas are neither 'pramana', nor 'Viparyaya', but belong to a third category. (cf. "Tat kathamāsu bādhakah pratyayo na jāyate s'uktikā-rajata-buddhivat ? Ucyate-yatra vastu vastv- antarātmanā' vabhāsate, tatra bādhako bhavati marīcișviva jala- buddhau ; iha tu na jātyādi vastvantaramasti, yato vastva- ntaratmana sya graho bhavet. Vyaktivisayā evaite sāmā- nādhikaran ya-vaiyadhikara n ya-vikalpāh. Tasmād vastavantarā- navabhāsisvesu na bādhaka-pratyayo jāyate. Tasmānna viparya- yātmāno vikalpāh. na caite pramāņam, etad-ullikhyamānasya jātyāderapāramārthika-tvāt. Ata eva pramāņa-viparyayābhyā- manya eva vikalpa ityācaksata ityalamr vistareņa". (NMP., P. 124); Even if the Buddhist is pushed to a tight corner and marooned by the deluge of onslaughts of the rival philosophers, he can readily have recourse to a strategic retreat and hold fast to the irreducible minimum of the import of the word 'kalpana' as his last citadel reiterating with added vehemence the insuperable claim of verbal association, whether actual or potential, as the unassailable import of 'Kalpana'. Dr. Mookerji brings this position into bold relief when he unswervingly states :' S'antaraks ita .... had to admit at last that verbal association alone is sufficient to characterise kalpana" (Flux, P. 284). Indeed, S'äntaraksita in his Tattvasamgraha fought hard to maintain his original position, but ultimately gave in and took resort to blinking prudery which practically left his venerable master in the lurch. (cf. "Satyam lokānuvr ttye'dam ukta mnyāyavide' drs'am/iyān eva hi s'abde'smin vyavaharapatha m gat ah/ /" T. S., Sl. 1228). Now, we can easily appreciate the special features of each of the triad, namely, the Patañjala Vikalpa, the Buddhist Vikalpa and Error. Though a Patañjala Vikalpa assumes difference in identity except in cases of Abhava-Vikalpa, it differs from the Buddhist Vikalpa in this regard that in it both the terms of judgment are real, though in a different context, while in the latter one term is unreal and imaginary. The main point about the Pātañjala Vikalpa is its unthinkability in a particular context or absolutely in the case of Abhava-Vikalpa, though our linguistic habit and work-a-day thought-pattern under-lying it adheres to it unwittingly. Though it might seem paradoxical, our relational thought has a tendency to queer, if not Quixotic, abstractions, and we thus arrive at an absolute that is relative and workable.

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 7

The Patañjala Vikalpa is the result of this tendency of abstraction, while a Buddhist Vikalpa is akin to the 'categories of thought' of Kant, in the sense of spontaneous thought-construction involved in cognition. While the latter is a 'working error', as Dr. Mookerji points out so felicitously, the former is a working thinkable. The Buddhists even like the Sankarites, postulate different grades of reality, viz. (1) 'Samvrti-satya' which is equivalent to the 'Vvavaharika satya' of the sankarites, and (2) 'paramartha satya'. (cf. Dve satye samupās'ritya buddhānām dharmades'anā/ Loke samvr ti-satyañca satyañca paramārthatal //") The vikalpas are samvr ti-satya', while errors are 'Samvrtimithya'. If the latter give to 'an airy nothing a local habitation and a name', the former are fairly 'true to the kindred points of heaven and home'. An error, however, is neither an abstraction, nor a conceptual construction, but is a common cognitive phenomenon with all the airs of normalcy, though seldom surviving the acid test of an identity parade. So, we can safely and summarily dispose of Vikalpas of whatever brand as having no essential bearing upon a study of errors and illusions.

II

Before embarking straightaway on a study of errors, it is necessary that we should be conversant with the different varieties of Error as also its varying causes and conditions. An observation, that is cooped up within a narrow compass and shuts out the ever-expanding diversity of experience, is apt to be condemned as malobservation. Indeed, a sweeping induction that fights shy of too much of afferent stimuli turns out verily to be a protean untruth. A study of error must comprise a systematic explanation of any kind cf error and should not be slipshod and fragmentary, erratic and shaky. It is possible only when our theorising looks facts in the face and reckons with the richness and variety of errors and illusions. So, we propose here to classify errors from different points of view. Jayanta Bhatta in his NM. speaks of two distinct kinds of error, namely, (1) one that is peripherally excited, and (2) one that is centrally excited. (cf. "Tathahi dvividha bhrāntirbahyendr- ivajā mānasī ca". NM., P. 110, Chowkhāmbā). The former has some sense-datum for its excitant and is so called 'Salambana bhrama' i.e. an illusion proper. The latter, which is purely mental, has no external stimuli to contend with and is 'niralambana'. So, in modern terminology it is 'hallucination'. The former, again, is subdivided by Jayanta into two according as it is due to some defects in the external stimuli (Visaya-doas)

8 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

or due to defects of the peripheral organs (Indriya-dosa). The: experience of a fiery circle from a revolving fire-brand (Alatacakra) is an instance of the first type, while the experience of a yellow conch-shell is an instance of the second type being due to the jaundiced: eye. Puru sottama, however, in his. Prasthana-ratnakara contends that, in the ultimate analysis, illusions must be assigned to defects of peripheral organs inasmuch as these defects are inalienably necessary for any illusion to occur and also as it is in harmony with the law of parsimony (laghava). (cf. "Ayam ca vişayadosat Karnado sacca bhavati Vastutastvāvas'yakatvātlāghavācca Karan adosadeveti nis'cayah" PR., p. 16-17). The Madhvas take exception to this position and hold that organic disorder is no cause of illusion, but that does. not make it a hallucination either. They assert that in an illusion there is nothing wrong with the sensory stimuli, the sensory mechanism and the afferent and efferent nervous tracts ; but what happens is that 'the incoming stimuli are wrongly interpreted' as: R. Nagaraja S'arma puts it in his 'Reign of Realism'. Be that as it may, Jayanta's classification is based upon the varying nature. of the exciting cause of error. As an instance of hallucination, we may cite the perception of the image of the beloved when she is really far off. S'ridhara, author cf the Nyayakandali divides peripherally excited errors into 'nirvikalpaka' and 'savikalpaka'. The former, according to him, is due to patholo -. gical disorders of the peripheral organs alone and are simply presentative. The yellow conch-shell is an instance in point. The rope-snake, on the contrary, is an example of the savikalpaka type. This classification of S'ridhara rests upon the intrinsic nature of invalid cognition. Jayasimhasurī, again, in his Nyāyatātparyadīpikā. divides viparyaya (Error) as follows :- "Viparyayo dvidha' nubhuyamanarcpah smaryamanaropas'ca" (p. 60, Cal. ed.). That is to say, the first kind cf error is a superimposition of an actually perceived object on another object present to a sense-organ. An illusory perception of bitter molasses, of a yellow conch-shell and, according to Jayasim ha, of the double moon even belongs to this kind of error. The other kind of error occurs when a memory-image is superimposed upon a presented sense-datum. The rope-snake or the nacre-silver is an instance of this variety. Evidently this classification takes note of the nature of the super-imposed entity. From a different standpoint, errors may be divided into 'Sopadhika' i.e. those that are caused by some adventitious adjuncts (upadhi) contaminating the presented sense-data, and 'nirupadhika' i.e. those that make- no room for any such contaminating factor. The red crystal is an example of the first variety, while the rope-snake and the like. are instances of the second. From the stand-noint of causal efficiency, the Buddhists, again, draw a line betwcen two kinds of

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 9

error which they call "Samvadi' and 'Visamvadi' respectively. As. Dharmakirti proclaims, "Bhrantirapi Sambandhatah pramā". When an error, as for example, the cognition of the ray of a jewel as the jewel itself, brings in its wake successful activity, it is "Samvadi' and when it is the other way round, it is called ·Visa mvādī' (cf. 'Manipradīpaprabhayor-mani-buddhya' bhidhā- vatoh /Mithyajnanavis'ese'pi Vis'eso'rthakriyam prati", PB). Again errors may be divided into timeless (Anadi) and temporal ones .. The world-illusion, which has no beginning in time, is of the fcrmer type and the illusion of the rope-serpent, the nacre-silver etc., which are ushered into being at particular points of time, are of the second order. There is, yet again, another type of errors that is of an abiding nature and, despite the corrective ccgnition, persists as a psychclogical phenomenon all the same .. This is indicated by Vacaspati by explaining the word 'Avabhasa' in S'ankara's definition of Adhyasa as 'Avasanno' vamato vā bhaso' vabhasa h' where, as Amalananda says, 'avasada' means 'uccheda' i.e. destruction and 'avamana' means logical sublation (cf. ""Avasāda uccheda avamāno yauktikatiras-kārah" VK., p. 18). These in their turn may again be divided into (1) those- that are called empiric realities by the Samkarites, and are never corrected de facto and (2) thcse that are corrected only when the frame of reference is altered. The world-illusion is of the first type and the illusions of the bent stick, of the yellow conch- shell, of a parallax and the like are of the second order. Adhyasa, which is the central point of viparyaya according to the samkarites,. has been sub-divided in the following manner : (1) Svarūpādhyasa i.e. integral superimposition ; e.g. 'I am this', 'I am a man' etc. (2) Samsargadhyasa as in the case of 'my body' etc., (3) Aharyadhyasa i.e. purposive superimposition which is adopted by the s'astras in regard to symbolic worship (Pratīkopāsanā) as in the case of a slab of stone of a certain shape being considered as Vișnu, (4) Dharmādhyasa i.e. attributive superimposition, (5) Dharmyadhyasa i.e. substantive superimposition, (6) Sambandhā -. dhyasa (7) Arthādhyāsa i.e. superimposition of one cognitum upon another, and (8) Jñanadhyasa i.e. cognitional superimposi- tion. Thus we see that Viparyaya admits of various classes and sub-classes which should be carefully scanned before building up any epistemological theory or any theory about errors. As regards the causes of various types of Viprayaya, Jayanta makes the following statement : More often than not an error is invested with a form presented in recollection and the cause of this recollection varies according to the exigencies of the situation. Sometimes it is the cognition of similarity and some- times it is due to lust, sorrow and the like ; somewhere it is the habitual perception of an entity and elsewhere it is caused by the cataract of the eye ; now it is evoked by somnolence and then it

10 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

appears in the wake of anxiety ; elsewhere it is due to the pathological disorder of the bodily humours and, in the absence of any other observable cause, 'Adrsta' (merit or demerit) is to be assumed as the cause. (cf. "Akarah smr tyuparudhah prāye na sphurati bhrame / smrtestu kāranam kiňcit Kadācid bhavati kvacit / / Kvacit sādrs'yavijnānam kāmas'okādayah kvacit / kvacittaddars'anabhyasastimiram cak susah kvacit / / kvacin- nidra kvaciccinta dhatunam vikrtih kvacit Alaksyamane taddhetāvadrstam smr tikāran am // NM., P. 101, 2nd pt., Beng. ed.). Dharmakirti in his NB asserts that organic disorders like cataract, fast movement, journey by boat and irritation of the bodily humours are some among the various causes of error. (cf. Timirās'ubhrama ?a-nauyana-samksobhādyanāhita-vibhramam jñānam pratyak sam, NB., P. 103, Peterson's ed.) Dharmottara in his gloss on NB analyses the said causes and classifies them one by one. Thus he calls cataract and the like the organic causes of error; fast movement is a cause that has the cognitum as its substratum ; the error arising during a journey by boat is caused by the peculiar conditions of the conveyance. Finally, errors arising out of 'Sa mksobha' are assigned to the physical state of the perceiver as their cause. Dharmottara thinks, however, that in the ultimate analysis, the perversion of sense-organs is the cause of errors; for, how can organic error at all emerge when the organ is quite alright? (cf. "Sarvaireva ca vibhrama-kāra n air-indriya-vis ayabāhyādhyātmikās'raya-gatair indriyameva vikartavyam. Avikrte indriya indriya-bhrāntyayo- gat". NBT., p. 12, Peterson's ed.). Without going into further details, we may profitably bottle up the various causes; of error in the following manner : Error is due either to (1) defects in the conditions of perception, or to (2) wrong operation of the sense-organs with regard to their objects (Asamprayoga), or due to (3) subconscious impressions. The first type may be sub- divided thus : (i) defects in the external stimuli, e.g. similarity, mobility, distance etc., (ii) the movement of our conveyance which 'gives rise to illusions like the parallax, (iii) defects in the external medium of perception, e.g. ālokamalimasatva, refraction of light etc., (iv) pathological disorders of the peripheral organs, (v) pathological disorders of the bodily humours, (vi) defects in the central sensory (manodosa) and (vii) defects in the self. Though errors may arise from pseudo-inference and pseudo- 'scriptures, indeed from any pseudo-pramana, we are here principally concerned with errors of perception, and are not inclined to deal with the errors of inference, analogy, presumption and the like (cf. "Sa ca pratyaksānumānāgamābhāsebhyo jāvate" PC., P. 134, C. U. ed.).

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 11

III

Error as a psychological phenomenon had been a veritable bugbear to the Indian philosophers of every age and it had gnawed disquietingly into their logical consciousness and had ridden rcughshod over their ontological conscience and its complacent moorings. Philosophy, if anything, is a critique of knowledge, and the problem of error is bristling with so many epistemological perplexities of grave cencern that no philosophy can conscienti- ously play false with it and turn a deaf ear to its persistent and sumptuous bickerings. Every philosophy has its own scheme of epistemology and India also had witnessed through the ages a long array of epistemological systems which evince an irredeemable bable of tongues that threaten to make confusion worse confounded. Indeed, as Dr. S. N. Das Gupta observes, "There is a lot of con- fusion in this concept of error or ignorance, and the philosopher incapable of explaining it is content with leaving it untouched as the flourish of the irrational in experience". (Philosophical essays, P. 229). Without sharing the sarcasm concealed in the above observation, we can safely submit that the problem is a titanic one and it grew a thousand-fold more problematic with our philosophers because of their ontological obsessions and the religious fetishes which served as bottle-necks to free intellectual output. As Dr. Asutosh Bhattacharya observes in his "Studies in Post-Samkara dialectics" with abundant insight and felicity of expression, "Epistemological estimation should be based upon the testimony of psychology and logic and it is bound to err when metaphysical preoccupations are allowed to warp the epistemologi- cal vision". Indeed, our illustrious philosophers seem to be guilty of putting the cart before the horse ; it seems to be a transparent truism that their epistemology was a direct deduction from their metaphysics instead of being the other way round. Their religious bias grafted on their intellectual vision inelastic ontological specks and they could hardly go the way of a freelance in philosophic wrangles *. We, however, hear it told that a certain philosophy is realistic in epistemology and idealistic in metaphysics. But, in the ultimate analysis, it seems to be a pious platitude without even a semblance of truth. This bias accounts for the fact why much of their intellectual energy, with its unparalleled vigour and acuteness, was misspent on a wild- gocse chase. We do not intend here to adjudge the methodology of our indigenous philosophies, nor the psychological conscience of our philosophers. Our endeavour here is only to highlight the curious fact that every system of Indian philosophy had its

• I make this bitter comment rather by way of self-criticism. In point of fact, all conscious thought-constructions proceed more or less from sub-conscious ideational urges.

12 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

own epistemology whether it had the sanction of experience or not. That is why the problem of error has been discussed by every philosopher in his own way and the result is that we get as many theories of error as there are systems of philosophy in. our country. A theory of error goes by the name of 'Khyativada' in Indian philosophy. Though the word 'Khyati' has been from time immemorable used in the sense of cognition, it etymologically means both 'cognition' and 'presentation' (to cognition) and the logic underlying the christening of a theory of error as 'Khyātivāda' is that such a theory has to discuss and assure itself of the ontological character of the 'presentation' in question. The philosopher engaged in a study of error has to explain the entitative value of the presentation, its why and how and thus 'the: presentation' is his principal concern. So, it is not inept to use- the word Khyativada for a theory of error. The number of Khyativadas current in Indian philosophy is: almost a legion. Sometimes a single name represents theories. which are widely divergent in their minute details and which, in fact, have been differently propped up. Not only this ; there are at least a few instances where two theories pass by the same name, but have nothing in common except the finally demonstrated conclusion. We shall even chance upon theories passing under the identical name where there is no agreement even in conclu -. sion. Indeed, appearances will certainly be deceptive in this. regard and we should not patch up any facile equation, deluded by the advances of nomenclature. On the other hand, we have evidence of a few theories being each differently named by different philosophers. The situation grows all the more per- plexing, when we find these theories being classified now ontologically, then psychologically and logically. Thus Vimuktāt- man in his Istasiddhi classifies the principal theories of illusion thus :- "Rajata m bhati yad bhrantau tat sadeke pare tvasat/ Anye' nirvacanīyam tadāhustena vicāryyate/ /" (IS., Sl. 2, ch. I, G.O.S.). He then proceeds to subdivide the 'satpak a' into three distinct theories, namely, Atmakhyāti, Ąkhyāti and Anyathākhyāti .. (cf. "Tatra satpaksa-stridhā bhinna - Ātmakhyātir-akhyātir-anya- thakhyatiriti". Ibid, p. 40). The word 'Satkhyati', however,. invariably and unwittingly brings to our mind the ontological theory of error of the great Ramanuja whose toursde force to support it are symptomatic of a peculiar feature of Indian philosophy. On the other extreme, it seems apparently to pass: one's understanding how the Buddhist theory of Atmakhyati with its patent idealistic nuances could be emboxed within 'Satkhyāti" along with Akhyāti and Anyathākhyāti. So, we must steer clear of any kind of fetishism or idolatry in our metaphysical quest,

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 13

lest we fail to capture the real spirit of the dissertations of our masters. The great S'ankara in his superb "Adhyāsa-bhāsyam" puts forward the different theories of error one by cne by way of explaining the concept 'Adhyasa'. He does not, however, affix any names to these theories, but his scholiasts zealouslv address themselves to this purpose and never fail to point out that this or that theory belongs to this or that school. S'ankara begins his discussion with his own definition cf 'Adhyasa' which is as follows : "smrtirupah paratra purvadrstavabhasah" (SB., Pp. 17-18, A. K. S'astri's ed.). According to S'ankara, then, Adhyāsa is a presentation, simulating recollection, of some precognised entity in some other entity. He then notices with abundant brevity the divergent views on this issue. As he himself says, "tam kecit anyatra-nya- dharmādhyāsa iti vadanti. Kecittu yatra yadadhyāsastasyaiva viparītadharmatvakalpanām ācakșate iti". (Ibid, pp. 18-32). The commentator Amalananda in his Vedantakalpataru points out that the first view is to be called Atmakhyäti which is upheld, as Apyaya Diksita persuades us, by all the three Buddhist schools of the Vaibhasikas, the sautrantikas and the yogacaras. (cf. "Anyatrānyadharmādhyāsa iti bhasyam dharinagraha nena

'26; also buddhyākāratvasūcanādātmakhyātyanuvādārtham". VK., pp. 25- "Bahyastitvavadinor-vaibhās ika-sautrantikayoh sat s'uktis'akalādikamadhisthānam, tannāstitva-vādino yogācārasya tvavidyākalpitam tadadhisthānamityevam matabhedenādhisthāna- bhedamahetyarthah" VKP., pp. 26). The second view he calls Akhyātivāda and the third he asserts to be Anyathākhyātivāda. Thus we get from S'ankara evidence of four different theories of error including his own view called Anirvacanīyakhyāti. Prabhächandra in his Prameyakamala-Mārtanda speaks of seven different theories of illusion, namely, (1) Akhyati, (2) Asatkhyati, (3) Prasiddharthakhyati, (4) Ātmakhyāti, (5) Anirvacanīyārthakhyāti, (6) Viparītārthakhyāti and (7) Smrti- pramosa or Vivekākhyāti. (cf. "Kinca ayam Viparyayo'khyātim, Asatkhyātim, Prasiddhārthakhyātim, Atmakhyātim, sad-asattvā- dyanirvacanīya-khyatim, viparītartha-khyatim, smrtipramosam vābhipretya nirākriyeta prakārāntarāsambhavāt ?" PKM., p. 48, NSP.). Vadidevasurī, another Jaina philosopher, and Jayasim- hasurī mention another theory of error called 'Alaukikarthakhyati', thus bringing the number of khyativadas to eight. (cf. "Atra vādinām vivekākhyātyakhyātyasatkhyātiprasiddhārthakhyātyātma- khyāti - sadasattvādyanirvacanīyārtha - khyātyalaukikārtha - khyāti- viparīta-khyātirūpā astau vipratipattayah santi. NTD., p. 66, Cal. 'ed.). We can further add to this long list the satkhyati of

14 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

Ramanuja and some other Vaisnava philosophers and the sadasatkhyāti of sāmkhya. So, the number of khyātivādas ultimately mounts to ten in all. We are, then, concerned here with these ten theories of Error and our endeavour should be to present and elucidate these theories one by one and to examine the arguments for and against them and finally to submit our own observations on them, however modest they might be. But, we should be failing in our duty if we do not mention here the nirvisaya-khyati of the followers of Patañjali and Niradhisthana- khyati as pointed out by Venkatanatha and Anyakhyāti of Balakrsna Bhatta, a thinker of the S'uddhadvaita school of Vallabhācārya. We shall briefly discuss these theories also and make our observations thereon.

IV

The traditional method of examining a theory of error is to raise the queries of why and how with regard to the origin of the illusory experience, the consequent activity prompted by it, and its subsequent sublation. That is to say, we are to explain the genesis of the illusion psychologically, and try to show in conformity with a particular theory how the experience prompts. one to activity and how it is finally sublated. If any theory fails to give a good account of itself in these three aspects of the problem, it invariably stands self-condemned. We also shall advisedly follow this method of appraisal in our proposed study of errors.

A theory of errors and illusions may be studied from different points of view. Thus, we may approach the problem psycholo- gically and logically, or ontologically, or even physiologically. While logic and psychology are invariably connected with metaphysics, physiology does, on no account, share a similar privilege. Not that metaphysics shuts out the results of physiological investigations,-for, it is said to systematise the data supplied by the different sciences-but that it reduces the latter to a poor stature by using it as grist for its ontological mill. Logic and psychology, on the other hand, are the two tentacles of this giant-worm with which it absorbs anything it comes across. Indeed, it brings home to our mind the patent difference between metaphysics and the sciences, we mean the difference in attitude. Two molecules of hydrogen, when chemically combined with one molecule of oxygen, gives you water is no manner of explanation for a philosopher. That is why physiology, however well-intentioned it might be, has no real claims in the domain of philosophy, of which it might at its best serve as a hinterland, and hence we excuse ourselves the task of attacking the problem from that standpoint. This attitude of ours should

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 15

not be construed as being prompted by or being quite on all. fours with that of our philosophers; for, it will be a travesty of truth to assert that our philosophers had nothing to do with the physiology of errors. On the contrary, they, as facts amply bear out, did certainly attempt here and there a physiological analysis of the phenomenon of error as a foreward to their theoretic formulations, but their analysis in this regard was conspicuous by its brevity and it never attained any measure of self-sufficiency. Nor should we be misconstrued as attaching practically no importance on a physiological study. That is not surely at the- back of our mind. Indeed, physiology can serve as a concrete corrective to the vagaries of metaphysical abstractions, to the logical and even psychological extravagances and in this aspect its services may be requisitioned by us now and then ; but, we- shall, in general, avoid bringing in physiological issues in our proposed study. Philosophy in India was never a strange interlude or an: atrocious parenthesis in our life. On the contrary, it was the philosophy of life actually lived and as such it was never divorced from religion whose raison d'etre was supplied by it. If 'work is worship' is the provencal proverb, 'contemplation is worship" is the Indian adage. In the circumstances, Indian philosophy of the last two millenia had been sectarian and denominational, to say the least. This fact fostered in our philosophers, to some extent, illogical tenaciousness, prejudiced thinking, inequitous criticism and facile claptrap which seem obnoxious to a moderner who grows instantly allergic to all these vagaries of our philosophers. We, however, propose to take here an impartial, nonsectarian attitude and shall try our level best to assess the intrinsic worth of every theory without any bias or bigotry. So, our method of approach will be partly in agreement with our philosophers and disharmonious in those parts where a modern mind will naturally rise in revolt against them for their unrealistic exuberance of wrangles, quibbles and other uncharitable- contrivances.

CHAPTER II

NIRVISAYAKHYÄTI

This is a theory of errors which one comes across very rarely in the history of Indian philcsophy. We find reference to this Nirvişayakhyāti in Venkatanātha's Nyāyaparis'uddhi, Nyāya- siddhāñjana and Tattvamuktākalāpa. But Venkata's treatment of this Khyati was perhaps never followed up seriously by any of his successors; nor can we possibly point out any illustrious predecessor of his who might have advocated such a view or discussed it with a view to its refutation. Vyomas'ivācārya, however, in his Vyomavatīvrtti on Pras'astapāda Bhāsya of Vais'eșika Sūtras might seem to refer to such a view. Let us present here the situation in its original setting. Pras'astapāda in his Bhasya, while discussing Viparyaya, refers to a rather unusual phencmenon. He says that there are cases where, though no sense-perception is actually in evidence, one has the consci- ousness of having sense-perception. As an instance, he cites the case of one who seems to visualise nocturnal darkness, when what he actually sees is the cloudless sky which is like the inert ocean and is as dark as a huge lump of pulverized collyrium. (cf. "Asatyapi pratyakse pratyaksābhimāno bhavati yathā vyapagata- ghana-patalamacala-jalanidhisadrs'am ambaram anjanacurna- punja-s'yamam s'arvaram tama iti". P. Bh., P. 538). Here Vyomas'ivacarya places on record the fact that some explain the above statement of Pras'astapāda as referring to Nirvișaya Viparyaya. (cf. "Asatyapi Pratyakse pratyaksābhimāna ityādinā nirvişayam Viparyayamāheti Kecit". (VV., p. 541). Indeed, it is rather difficult to decipher what Pras'astapada and Vyomas'iva intend to bring home to our mind here. Apparently it might seem that they are simply referring to a particular variety of errors that is nirvisaya. But, here nirvisaya cannot be taken to mean 'content-less' inasmuch as nocturnal darkness is the content in the example cited by Pras'astapada ; nor can we equate it with 'nirālambana viparyaya' ; for, in that case, Pras'astapāda should have had no occasion for describing vividly the external environs of the invalid cognition in question. The situation grows all the more intriguing when we focus our attention upon the words 'Asatyapi pratyakse'. For, how can one hold that one does not have any sense-perception despite the fact that one sees nocturnal darkness? If one argues that perception is denied simply because one does not in this case see nocturnal darkness in reality, then the :argument holds equally good in many other cases of error. Apart

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 17

from that, one cannot deny the character of perception to such a cognition, whatever the cognitum might be. One might, however, try to bring such a cognition into line with cases of acquired percep- tion like 'Surabhi candanam pas'yami' ; but the example cited by Pras'astapada does not warrant such a hypothesis. In the circumstances, it is extremely risky to make any definite pronounce- ment on this issue. It seems, however, pretty sure that what we get here is but a variety of errors and has nothing to do with any theory of error. So, it is futile to trace here the origin of the Nirvi ayakhyāti as defined by Venkata. (Incidentally, it may be pointed out here that Pras'astapada hits upon a simple truth about Viparyaya expressed naively by him in "Asatyapi pratyakse pratyaks abhimänah". We seem to perceive where there is no real perception. This, however, leads to Anyathā-khyāti.)

S'rīnivasadāsa, a scholiast of Venkata's Nyāyaparis'uddhi, however, fathers this theory upon a minor section of Advaitins and substantiates his position by quoting from a book of this school a hemistich which asserts that in an error one has a contentless psychosis which is but a semblance of cognition (cf. "yathahuh jñāne nirvisayā vrttirjnānābhāsatayesyate "NS., on NP., p. 52, chowkhāmba). Since my aim is more critical than historical, I have readily excused myself the task of tracing the hemistich to its source. Curiously enough, the scholiast seems to be rather shaky and in doubt about the truth of his statement and suggests as an alternative the Patanjala Vikalpa which might stand here for nirvisayā khyāti (cf. "Yadvā S'abdajñānānupātī vastus'ūnyo vikalpa" iti nara-s'rngādi-s'ravan ānantaramavas'ya m bhavatyeva nirvisayā vrttiryā sā vikalpa itipātañjalāh.") As we have already seen in our 'Introductory', a pātañjala vikalpa can by no means be called a viparyaya, not to speak of its representing a theory of error. It is really strange how S'rīnivasa, a scholar of no mean repute, could make such an unwary statement and how Dr. S. N. Das Gupta could glide over it by simply referring to this theory in the following words : "Venkata mentions Nirvisaya khyati through linguistic usage of the followers of Patañjali". Be that as it may, the theory has not been elucidated by Venkata in his Nyyaparis'uddhi where he only refutes it in the s'loka "Vişayālīka-bhāvādau" etc. But, S'rīnivāsa supplies us with the rationale of this theory in his commentary called Nyayasara. He says : A certain section of Advaitins actuated by a zeal for avoiding the irrationality in the aspect of subsequent sublation of an invalid cognition in general, or as sought to be established in the theory of Anirvacaniya-khyati, assert that the cognitions of the nacre-silver type have no content at all. If an invalid cognition has a content, what on earth does throw it into dis-repute and taint it as invalid ? So, they would argue, it has no content and only 2

18 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

then can it be contradicted and sublated. In our everyday experience, we see that a cognition sets at naught another just preceding it. The cognition of a jar that wakes up in my mind at this moment must make headway through the ashes of the cognition of (say) a piece of cloth of the previous moment. But, that does not invalidate the cognition of the jar. Moreover, a cognition lasts either for a moment or for twc, and then it dies a natural death. So, it is only a truism to point out that contradic- tion or sublation is of a piece with cognition and that can ill afford to draw an invidious distinction between cognition and cognition. Again, it passes one's understanding how a cognition differing from another in its content, can sound its death-knell and why a latter cognition should enjoy the proud privilege of cancelling a previous one and not vice versa. upon the proper object of Badha (Sublation) : Nor can one assuredly hit Is it the cognition that is sublated, or the cognitum, or else our behaviour prompted by the cognition ? Neither of the alternatives stands to reason and hence it is safe to conclude that an invalid cognition is devoid of any content. Thus, as presented by S'rinivasa, the theory robs peter to pay Paul in that it outright disposes of the verdict of experience and welcomes reason as the sole 'open sesame' to philosophical problems. Its rationalism is also a negativistic one born of a kind of atrophy of reason itself. Venkata finds fault with this theory and criticises it in the following s'lokas : "Vişayālīkabhāvādau khyātyantara-parigrahah/ Anullekhastu rūpyādidhīrityuktyā nibarhitah". Let us sum up the arguments of Venkata against this theory, following the gloss of S'rinivasa. The opponent is to explain what he means by 'Nirvişaya'. It may mean the non-existence of the visaya (cognitum); but that would be giving quarter to Asatkhyati, which theory can by no means be accepted simply because what is an utterly naught can never be cognised. Or, it may mean indescribable subsistence (mithyätva) which would fling open the gates for Anirvacanīyakhyati. The word may, again, mean the absence of visaya in the particular locus. That would transport the opponent into the unwelcome realms of Anyathakhyati. For, the opponent then cognises as present in a particular place an object that is really absent there. Thus, in any of these views of the situation, Nirvisayā Khyati is resolved into some other khyati. If, however, the opponent means to say that no object appears in an invalid cognition, he contradicts himself. For, how can a cognition be called a cognition of silver, unless a silver is revealed in that cognition, and how, again, can one maintain in the same breath that this is a cognition of silver, though no silver appears in it? Thus this theory stands self-condemned (cf. "Nirviş ayas'abdena kim vişayasyālīkatvam ucyate uta pratipanno- pādhinisthābhāvapratiyogitvātmakam mithyātvam ucyate āhosvit

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 19

tatrāvidyamanatvam yadva vişayānullekha eva. Adye' satkhyā- tyapattin. Na cestāpattih. Pratītivisayasyālīkatvavyāghātāt. Dvitīye' nirvacanīyakhyatireva syāt. Trtīye'nyathākhyātih. Tatrāvidya- manasya vidyamanatvena bhanabhyupagamāt. Caturthe rajatā- dijñānasya nirvisayatvam ityuktirvya vittaiva syat. Rajatā- dyanullekhe katham tasya rajatajnanatvam rajatajnānatve ca katham rajatanullekha iti dosanaha". NS., P. 52, Chowkhāmbā). We for ourselves beg to submit here further that a psychosis without a content is a monstrous absurdity. It is not a psychosis of the cognition of absence as is evidenced in sleep (cf. "Abhavapratyayālambana vrttirnidrā" YS. I. 10.) ; nor one of the cognition of a nonexistent as is upheld by the Madhyamikas ; for, in the former, 'absence' itself is the content of the cognition and in the latter, the 'nonexistent' is the content. But, the psychosis in question has no content to prop upon. So, such a psychosis can never come into being ; even if we grant it a hypothetical and tentative life, it can have no conative poten- tialities in it and we can never know when it is sublated. Even if we grant its sublation, we must accept the subsequent cognition with whatsoever content as its sublator and should not wait for a particular cognition of the type 'This is a nacre' for the sublation of the invalid cognition 'This is silver'. Moreover, once you grant a psychosis without a content, you cannot shut it out even at the stage of liberation and an element of erroneousness dogs your steps even at that ultimate stage of pure consciousness. So, such a view of errors cannot stand to reason. Venkata in his Tattvamuktākalāpa and his vrtti on it called Sarvarthasiddhi, however, furnishes the rationale of the theory in a slightly different manner and his order of treatment of the different theories of errors suggests that this theory was upheld by a Buddhist school. The s'loka dealing with this theory is the 30th one in the 4th chapter called Buddhisara and the s'lokas immediately preceding it present the different Buddhist theories of errors. The vrtti Sarvarthasiddhi on the S'l. 27 remarks :"Now are being refuted the different views put forward by the Buddhists accepting extra-mental reality" (cf. "Atha bāhyārthavādibauddha- kalpitāh paksāh pratiks ipyante". SS. on TMK.). The Vrtti introduces the S'l. 29 with the remark : "Now (the author) presents Niradhisthanakhyāti as advanced by certain Buddhists accepting extra-mental reality". So it appears that this view was sponsored by a Buddhist school of philosophers. In TMK. and SS. the theory has been presented as follows : Advocates of different theories of errors are constrained to accept in the ultimate analysis either the Akhyati view of Prabhākara or

20 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

Anyathakhyati. The former will lead to a denial of cognition itself and the latter will bring in its wake Asatkhyati. So, to avoid these two unwelcome contingencies, some advocate the theory of Nirvisaya khyati following the maxim of the eyes being fixed upon something other than what appears in cognition (Anyasaktadrstinyāya). The maxim of Anyasaktadrsti may best be explained by a reference to the following s'loka "Jalpanti sārdham anyena pas'yantyanyam savibhramāh/Manasā cintayan- tyanyam ke nāma yositam priyah'/". That is to say, we are to call into request here something analogous to the psychological phenomenon of split personality. In an invalid cognition of the type 'This is silver', the eye is fixed upon a nacre which is different from what appears in cognition. Thus, the cognition of silver not being occasioned by anything, Nirvisaya khyati is the only view that is acceptable as a theory of errors. It appears from the above that 'visaya' is here taken to mean the sense- datum, the external excitant of a cognition. The theory, then, turns out to be an idealistic one which does not feel the necessity of having recourse to an external object to explain a cognition. But, Venkata shows that this view can explain neither the origin of an invalid cognition, nor the behaviour prompted by it, nor even its subsequent sublation and erroneousness. If the 'nirvi- sayata' means absence of the cognitum in the locus in question, it leads to Anyathakhyati. Moreover, if what is 'nirvisaya' appears as 'Savisaya' ('having a content'), then again, we stumble into the domain of Anyathakhyati. If, however, the 'nirvisaya' appears as such in experience, it can prompt no activity at all. If, on the other hand, the 'nirvisayata' means universal absence, the theory becomes reduced to Asatkhyati. Moreover, we beg to point out, that if 'nirvisaya' means a cognition having no sense- datum, the theory may possibly explain hallucinations only and not also illusions. So, the theory is untenable from whatever standpoint we approach it.

CHAPTER III

NIRADHISTHĀNAKHYĀTI

It is Venkata, again, who acquaints us with a theory of errors styled 'Niradhisthanakhyati'. That great philosopher of the Vis'istadvaita school treats of this theory also in his NP., Nyāyasiddhanjana and TMK. Here too, as in the case of Nirvisayakhyāti discussed before, the Sarvarthasiddhi commentary on TMK. and the Nyayasara on NP. differ in introducing the doctrinal peculiarities of the theory. While according to Nyaya- sära, it is a theory upheld by the Madhyamikas, the Sarvartha- siddhi commentary attributes it to a school of Buddhist realists. Nyāyasiddhāñjana of Venkata records an endeavour of proving non-locative presentation by means of the following inference :- All cognitions like perception etc. are without any substratum inasmuch as they are cognitions even like dream-cognitions (cf. "Pratyakşādipratyayo nirālambanah pratyayatvāt svāpnapratyaya- vat" NSi., p. 227). The argument is characteristic of the Buddhist idealist and it makes no room for any distinction between valid and invalid cognitions from the objective standpoint. Still it furnishes us with the rational basis of the theory under discussion. According to this theory, all errors are characterised by a superimposition of something upon a sheer nothing; not that there is a locus of superimposition that melts into nothingness on scrutiny, but that there is no locus at all and as such no question of superimposition at all arises. What this theory makes the most of is its stubborn denial of any externalisation or localisation even within the mind or outside it of the content of an invalid cognition. The difference between this theory and the theory called Nirvişayakhyāti is that while the latter emphasises, according to S'rinivasa, the contentlessness of an invalid cognition and is rather ontological to that extent, the former, regardless of the ontological status of the cognitum, knocks outright the bottom of the muchaccredited substratum of an invalid cognition and denies the operation of any mental projection in such cognitions. The final implication of the theory may be made out to be a bit different from what we have adumbrated above. We may maintain that the main point of this theory is to show that erroneous cognitions are not occasioned by any external entities, that they have no 'Alambana Pratyaya', to borrow a Buddhist term ; they are the bubbles of erratic secretions of consciousness which are not a whit conditioned by any spatiotemporal complex as excitants. Which- ever interpretation we give our seal of approval on, this theory,

22 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

though akin to Asatkhyati of the Madhyamikas in certain respects, cannot be made to converge with it because it has no ontological goods to deliver to us. Let us now see how the theory has been represented in the aforesaid commentaries. The upholders of this theory point out that we have erroneous perception of a mass of hair and the like when we shut our eyes ; Such a perception has assuredly no substratum. For, if there were one, it would have been cognised both at the time of the invalid perception and at the time of the sublating cognition. But, our experience fails to present any such substratum to us. Since experience, and not abstract logic, is the final court of appeal in all philosophical disputations, we must accept invalid cognitions as having no substratum. If one argues that the experience of an illusory mass of hair is but recollection, the ready retort would be that the experience is impressed with a 'thisness' which rules out its being a recollection which must be characterised by 'thatness'. If it is argued that a groundless error is an impossibility and one must accept some real entity as the ground of an error, the upholder of this theory would point out that an unreal, fancied ground may explain an error even as in the opponent's view an error is explained on the assumption of a fancied knower, of one who is the fancied substratum of defects. This last argument is found in NP. and, if we attach much importance on it, it comes into line with Asatkhyāti to a degree. (cf. "Na ca niradhisthāna- bhramasambhavat bhramadhisthanam kincit paramarthika m tattvam as'rayitavyam dosās'rayatva-jñātrtvā pāramārthye'pi bhra- mopapattivat adhist hānāpāramarthye'pi bhramopapatteriti". NS. on NP., P. 47, Chowkhāmbā). Now, let us turn to its refutation. NP, and following it, NS, hold that the content of a wrong cognition in this view is non- existent, thus equating it completely with Asatkhyāti (cf. "Atrā- sadeva bhavatām" etc. NP., P. 47 ; Chowkhāmbā) and ask the question whether that non-existent entity appears in cognition as being here or not ; if the answer is in the affirmative, the opponent is forced into conceding a ground of error ; if it is the other way round, the opponent denies not only the ground of an invalid cognition, but invalid cognition itself; for, it appears as being here. All cognitions have certain spatio-temporal determinations without which they cannot come into being. So, to deny the ground of an error is to deny its spatiotemporal characterisation and thereby to deny error itself. The SS. commentary further argues that to deny the ground of an error is to deny its determi- nant which would lead one to the contingency of accepting any erroneous cognition anywhere. Moreover, the darkness within the eyeball is the ground of the invalid cognition of a mass of hair. So, it is futile to talk of groundless errors. Furthermore, if the upholders of the view maintain that what appears as 'this'

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 23

in such an invalid cognition is 'not-this', then they unwittingly embrace Anyathakhyati and can no longer maintain their own position. It may be pointed out here that such a view takes note of only a few of invalid experiences and makes wild generalisations on that basis and thus fails to grasp the real magnitude of the problem which has to reckon with diverse types of erroneous experiences. Thus, this theory, when examined, either leads to admission of the contradictory, or to denial of such wrong cognition itself, or to Anyathākhyāti. So, it is indefensible.

CHAPTER IV

AKHYĀTI

Akhyati is generally known as the theory of errors maintained by the Prabhakara school of Purva-Mimamsa. Not only the philosophers of the Prabhakara school, including s'alikanatha, Bhavanatha and even Prabhakara himself, call their own theory of errors 'Akhyati', but philosophers of different schools follow suit and invariably use the term 'Akhyati' to refer to the Prabhākara theory. In certain Jaina treatises, however, like Prameya-Kamalamārtanda and Nyāya-Kumuda-candra of Prabhā- candra, and Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra of Vādidevasūrī with its gloss Syādvādaratnākara the Prabhākara theory of errors is styled 'Smrtipramosa' and beside it another theory of errors called 'Akhyati' is discussed. The above-named writers nowhere clearly indicate the school of thinkers who sponsored this theory, but simply content themselves with a statement like the following : 'Bhrantim Akhyatim Acakhyuh samkhyavinmaninah (SVR., p. 124). But the expression 'Samkhyāvinmāninah' seems „pare/"

to definitely refer to the Sam khyas who, according to many modern scholars advocated the theory of Akhyati. Still, the editor of PKM. points out in the foot-note that this view was maintained by the carvakas. In view of the fact that the carvakas certainly accept perception as Pramana and do not deny the reality of the external world so far as it is apprehended through the senses, it seems difficult to take the editor at his word readily.

But, this sceptical attitude is abandoned to a great extent when we find that no less a person than Mm. Gopīnath Kaviraj calls the carvaka theory of errors 'Asatkhyati'. That great savant in his introduction to his translation of Nyāyakusumāñjali refers to the cārvaka thus : 'To the chārvaka, who assumes asat-khyāti for an object not rightly cognised ... " (SARA. B.S., Vol. 2., p. 182). Not that I intend to equate Akhyati with Asatkhyati, but that I want to point out that Akhyati proposed to be discussed presently is not a far cry from Asatkhyati and that if Asatkhyati be accepted as the carvaka view of errors, the editor's note referred to above is not much wide of the mark. The fact of the matter is that, contrary to current imperfect information about them, the carvakas had at least three schools of which one school, called the Vaitandikas, rejected even perception as a valid source of knowledge. These aesthetic wranglers headed by Jayaras'i Bhatta are otherwise known as Tattvopaplava-vadins and they are alleged to deny all tattvas without exception. Naturally this amounts to

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 25

S'ünyavada and Asat-khyati. So, we may for the time being echo the words of the said editor and take Akhyati as representing the view-point of these cārväkas in regard to errors.

Let us now elucidate the theory as represented in PKM., NKC. and SVR. The carvakas advocating this theory argue thus : In an invalid cognition of the type 'this is silver', the cognition reveals a piece of silver to the perceiver, but this cognition can not have for its object a real, existent silver ; for, in that case, the cognition would not have been condemned as invalid. Nor, on that account does the cognition reveal the absence of silver ; for, it takes the form of a positive proposition predicating silver. Nor can it be said that it reveals a nacre as its object, as that would raise the cognition to the status of a valid one. Neither can it be maintained that a nacre is apprehended in the form of silver ; for, the one is different from the other, and experience dces not record any fact of, say, a piece of cloth, which is other than a pitcher, being apprehended in the form of a pitcher. So, the invalid cognition is but without any content ; for, nothing characterisable is revealed in such a cognition.

The theory has been refuted on the following grounds : If nothing at all appears in invalid cognition, how can they be individualised and known one from the other? How can you name one 'the wrong cognition of water' and the other 'the wrong cognition of silver' unless anything appears in the respective cognitions ? Moreover, if such a hypothesis be at all acceptable, it would lead to a confusion of invalid cognition with deep sleep. Waking after a deep sleep, we are used to saying that we appre- hended nothing during it. The upholder of Akhyāti maintains that an invalid cognition apprehends nothing and as such any and every state of deep sleep would be that of an invalid cognition, a contingency, which is ridiculous, to say the least. (cf. "Bhrantisus uptavasthayo-ravis'es aprasangas'ca" PKM., p. 49). If, however, by akhyati the champions of the theory mean not the absence outright of any object of cognition, but merely slightness of apprehension, taking the negative particle in the term Akhyati to mean 'tadalpata', even then they can ill afford to save their skin. For, what do they endeavour to connote by 'slightness of apprehension' and how does such an attenuated apprehension come into being? If it means the nonrevelation of the cognitum as it really is, its implication is that the invalid cognition presents its cognitum as something different from what it is and this invariably leads to Viparītakhyāti at the expense of Akhyati. So, Akhyati as a theory of errors cannot fare any the better than its analogues discussed before, namely, Nirvisaya- khyāti and Niradhist hānakhvāti.

26 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

In the treatment of this theory of Akhyati Prabhacandra and Vādideva make no distinction between 'Alambana' and 'Visaya' which terms are readily interchangeable with them. Generally 'alambana' means 'an excitant', 'a substratum', rather 'a sense- datum' of a cognition and 'Visaya' is the object or content of a cognition. But, no such distinction between the two is at all possible with a Jaina philosopher, since he does neither subscribe to the theory of Prapyakarita (Efficiency exercised through contact) of the Naiyayikas with regard to visual perception, nor does he accept the causal theory of knowledge of Nyaya where a sense- datum occasions a cognition (cf. "Nārthālokau kāraņam par- icchedyatvat tamovat" PMS. II. 6). So, when Prabhācandra says, "Tato nirālambanam jalādi-viparyaya-jñānam" (PKM., p. 49), what he means to say is that an invalid cognition has no content. So, it is definitely wrong to remark that, accord- ing to the theory of Akhyati, an error is 'purely a hallu- cination' (cf. India psychology-J. N. Sinha). Indeed, prabhā- candra is unhesitatingly clear on this point when he says, "Ato na Kiñcidatra jñāne khyāti iti siddhā akhyatih" (NKI., p. 60). This may tempt us to equate this theory of Akhyati with the Nirvişayakhyāti discussed before. But, while the latter theory takes an invalid cognition to be devoid of content ontologically, the former demonstrates the impossibility of any attempt at characterising its content and hence concludes that it is contentless. This is quite in consonance with the polemical attitude of Jayarās'i and other cārvākas who deny all Praman as and Prameyas as being at all definable and demonstrable. Scholars are generally inclined to interpret this attitude as being in accord with the Mädhyamika nihilism. But, can't it be maintained that what these much-maligned philosophers mean to say is that they do neither discard the objective, entitative existence of things, nor throw overboard the insuperable claim of perception as a means of proof, but contend that inference or any other kind of reasoning cannot define the inalienable nature of anything as discrete from other things? If this interpretation be acceptable, these scholars headed by Jayaras'i may be called thorough-going sensationists who accept nothing beyond sensation. Be that as it may, it is our humble contention that Prabhacandra is not right in raising an alarm to the effect that, if the view of akhyāti be acceptable, there will be no distinction between an invalid cognition and cognition in deep sleep. This argument, however, has not been contrived by Prabhacandra for the first time. Mandana in his Vibhrama-viveka brings this charge against the theory of Akhyati upheld by the Prābhākaras in the following lines : "Akhyāteravis'esena syāt sușupte'pi vibhramah/Akhyātih khalu tatrāpi na cākhyātirvis'isyate//" VV., Sl. 9, p. 2). But, we fail to realise any force of this argument

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 27

against the Akhyati we have discussed here. Our cognition in deep sleep is not devoid of a content; on the contrary, absence of any cognition, or nescience, as an Advaitin will put it, is its content. But, in Akhyati we have no content or characterisable content at all. So, Akhyati should not be charged thus with having merged all distinctions between an erroneous cognition and the cognition in deep sleep.

CHAPTER V

ALAUKIKAKHYĀTI

Vyomas'ivacārya in his Vyomavati Vrtti on Pras'astapāda's Bhäsya, while discussing the problem of ascertaining beyond all inconsistency the 'Alambana' of an invalid cognition, incidentally suggests that one might try to easily steer clear of such a disquieting contingency by contending that a supernatural silver is the object of an invalid cognition of the type 'This is silver' (cf. "Athālaukikam rajatamevāsya vișayamiti" etc. VV., p. 540). He does not, however, care to record as to which school of thinkers subscribed to this view and we may easily construe it as an anticipatory device calculated to wriggle out of the impasse created by the question of an Alambana of an invalid experience. Though certain other theories of dubious origin seem to be distant echoes of this theory of Alaukikakhyāti or Alaukikārthakhyati, the theory is hardly traceable to its origin and no welcome light is thrown before us by the scholars of the orthodox schools in this regard. Sudars'anācārya in his Advaitacandrika refers to a view that in an invalid cognition of the type 'this is silver' what occurs is that the nacre is transformed into silver at the time of the cognition and fathers it upon the theorists of momentariness i.e. the Buddhists. (cf. "Na ca Ksaņikamatānusāreņa s'uktireva rajatajnānasamaye rajatākāreņa pariņamate iti yuktam" Ad. C.,P. 7). This makes the confusing situation worse confounded; for, no such actual view has been as yet discovered in any Buddhist treatise, though it is not at all inconsistent with the fundamental tenets of the Buddhists ("cf. Jñanasahabhurevartho bhogyatvat sukhadivat" V. Bhā. on YS. IV. 16).

This statement also seems to be an anticipatory argument without any factual basis. Again, Rangoji Bhatta refers to a view of the Digambara Jainas to the effect that at the time of the invalid cognition of silver, a real silver comes into being (cf. "Nāpi pāramārthikasyaiva rajatasyotpattiriti digambaramatam sādhu," ADCI., p. 47). Though our acquaintance with the Jaina philosophy is anything but wide, we feel rather sure that it would be really a job to try to bear Rangoji out from the philosophical treatises of the Jaina Digambara school. On the contrary, Prabhacandra, who is a champion of the Digambara school, does not even refer to such a view, not to speak of committing himself to it as the theory of error of his school. Be that as it may, these two views of suspect historical basis are not in tune with the Alaukikakhyati which is now on the anvil.

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 29

This theory of Alaukikakhyāti is included by Jayasimhasūri in his list of different theories of error and Vadideva as also Pra- bhacandra discuss and refute this theory in their works. Prabhacandra, who treats of this theory in NKC., does not enlighten us about its author, but Vādideva in his Syādvāda- ratnakara assures us that the theory was offered as a new dispensation by a lumberheaded Mimamsaka (cf. "Acchekami- mām sakavedhasā'tra prakalpitām nūtanasrstikalpām/Nirmūlanā- s'ārthamimāmidānīmalaukikakhyātimupaksipāmah //" SVR., P. 134). It is really difficult to identify the poor mima msaka who had been pulled by the ear and put to shame and ridicule by Vadideva and to salvage his name from the sea of our lost heritage. It is common knowledge that Prabhakara advanced the theory of Vivekākhyāti and the other mīmām saka, Kumarila, held fast to the theory of Anyathakhyati. History reveals to us the name of another mīmamsaka, Murari Mis'ra, whose works are all but lost to us. Beside other minor points, we know this much about him that he advocated the theory of self-validity of knowledge like his compatriots, but instead of propping it up on the hypothesis of triple consciousness (Triputi-samvid) of the Prabhakaras or on the basis of an inference on grounds of 'Knownness' generated in the known object (jñātatāli ngakānu- mānam) as maintained by Kumārila, asserted that the validity was ascertained by an introspection (Anuvyavasāya) of the form 'Ghatatvena ghatamaham janami'. From this we can arrive merely at a negative conclusion that Murari Mis'ra can by no means be a thorough-going Asatkhyativadin (We use the word 'thorough-going' advisedly ; for, almost all the khyātivādas involve, however implicitly, an element of Asatkhyati). So, at the present state of our knowledge, it is difficult to determine who was the target of the pungent words of humour of Vadi deva. Let us, therefore, drift from such an enquiry to and focus our attention upon the theory itself as presented to us by the afore-said Jaina writers. The protagonists of this Alaukikakhyati maintain that the silver apprehended in the invalid cognition 'this is silver' exists here and now even as it does in the valid cognition of the same form. But, since all theories of error evince incongruity under logical duress, and since the real character of the entity presented in a wrong cognition eludes all logical determination, whether it belongs to the external world or is within us, we are to assume that what is presented before us is a supernatural entity. To elucidate, it is supernatural not in the sense of being anything supramundane, but in that it does not lend itself to any logical determination, any conceptual categorisation. Vadideva, while explaining it, says : What is known by a silver-cognition is called silver ; now the silver that is found in the silver-merchant's shop is laukika, and

30 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

what is different from this silver is called Alaukika. Thus, this theory is quite confident of the existence of silver apprehended in an invalid cognition, but asserts in the same breath that this silver does not answer to our normal experience of silver inasmuch as its ontological character cannot be determined. The theory starts with empiricism and realism and then makes a compromise with rationalism. Contrary to the attitude of the Advaitins,who maintain the theory of Anirvacaniyakhyati, this theory holds that failure to characterise a thing does not tell upon the ontological status of the thing. What is intuited need not necessarily be expressible. So, an invalid cognition presents something that is real in every sense ; only it is not of the ordinary order of things, but is Alaukika.

Prabhacandra refutes the theory in the following manner; What is exactly meant by 'Alaukikatva' of the content of an invalid cognition? It might mean 'to be invested with a different form' ('Anyarüpatvam'), or an altogether different causal efficiency ('Anyakriyākāritvam'), or a different causality (Anyakāranaprabha- vatvam), or absence of causality (Akaranaprabhavatvam'). The first alternative cannot be accepted ; for, in point of appearance, there is no difference between a valid and an invalid cognition. Moreover, if the invalid cognition present a different from, Alaukika-khyati becomes reduced to viparītakhyāti. The second alternative, too, does not stand to reason. If one thing is capable of discharging the function of a different thing, then it becomes unnecessary to assume different causes for different effects ; for, one cause can serve as the matrix of all effects. The same argu- ment disposes of the third alternative also. The fourth alter- native also on scrutiny shares the same fate. For, if this Alaukika content is uncaused, is it something existent or not? If it is existent, permanency will hang upon it like a dead-weight which it can never hope to shake off ; for, an entity that is existent and uncaused at the same time can never be impermanent. (We are to note here that this statement holds good only in regard to a positive entity ; for, the negative entity called 'Prāgabhāva' is an uncaused existent and is all the same impermanent). If this position be accepted, then no subsequent sublation is at all possible. If, however, it is non-existent, how does the cognition take a positive form like 'this is silver' ? If a jar is non-existent,no positive cognition of the form 'this is a jar' is at all possible even in a dream. If the opponent demurs and takes the plea that the non- existent is cognized as existent through some error, then it becomes Viparīta-Khyāti. Vadideva offers the following arguments in refuting this theory : If an alaukika silver is apprehended as such in a wrong cognition of silver under discussion, no activity can follow ; if

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 31

however, that alaukika silver is cognised as laukika, then it will be Viparīta-khyāti. Moreover, if this invalid cognition of silver is occasioned by an alaukika silver, then since it is perceptible, it will reveal its particularities more and more according as the perceiver comes near it more and more. In that case, this alaukika silver will have to be accepted as equally real like a laukika one and no bädha will then be possible. If, however, it is held that the sublating cognition denies the 'laukikatva' of the alaukika silver, even then it is not quite on all fours with experience. For, the sublating cognition of the form 'this is not silver' denies silver only and does not reveal its supernatural character by denying its 'laukikatva'. Moreover, what has a scope for predication can only be denied ; a laukika silver has no such scope here and hence cannot be denied by the said sublating cognition. If it has really any scope, then the negation will mean that what is taken as laukika is in fact alaukika and this will set the stage for Viparītakhyati. Moreover, in this case we cannot have a recognition of the form 'this piece of nacre was previously apprehended by me as a silver'. So, this view is illogical and as such cannot be maintained.

Furthermore, we beg to submit that once we go beyond reason and accept anything as alaukika, we drift away from the realm of philosophy which is a speculative science. Here reason goes beyond itself and thus spells its own disaster and utter undoing. We may further point out that the theory shows a sham regard for experience ; for, experience does not show off the content as alaukika which position it arrives at only through reason that commits suicide on that very account.

CHAPTER VI

PRASIDDHARTHAKHYATI

This theory, as its very name indicates, may be set off against Alaukikakhyāti discussed presently. Jayasimha sūrī mentions it in his list of Khyativadas, while Prabhācandra and Vadideva discuss it, give the lie direct to it and throw it completely out of gear in their works. It is, again, the editor of PKM. who assures us that this theory was advocated by Bhaskara, the Vedantist and in the Samkhya system. Whether this assurance has any factual or theoretic basis or not, we shall discuss towards the end of this chapter. Let us for the present set ourselves the task of elucidating the theory as explained by Prabhacandra and Vadideva. The upholders of this theory contend that what appears in an invalid cognition can by no means be something non-existent. A non-existent like the sky-flower can never be presented in a cognition. Moreover, Asatkhyäti cannot account for the multi- plicity and variety of erroneous experiences. So, 'what appears in an invalid cognition is a non-existent' is a proposition that has to give in before the irrepressible claims of logic. Hence, the cognitum of an invalid cognition is an objective reality established by the normal means of proof. It cannot be urged against this position that this fancied reality, when placed upon the crucible of reason, loses its solidity, develops strange elusive symptoms and melts away into nothingness. For, reason is a mere tool at the hands of experience ; reason that denies and runs counter to experience commits suicide or wends the way of infinite spiral regressus. Abstract reasoning divorced from experience is a bane, and not a boon and it can never even dream of locking into embrace any objective reality. So, too much reliance on abstract reasoning should not encourage one to contraband the cargo of experience and cast it to the four winds. (cf. "Na cāsya vicāryamānasyāsattvam ; vicārasya pratītivyat- irekeņānyasyāsambhavāt" PKM., p. 49). Esse est percipi is an incontrovertible fact of our life. Even one's palm is accepted to be existent only on the strength of one's apprehension of the same. This apprehension is in evidence even in the case of an invalid cognition. So, what is apprehended there must be taken to be something existent. Though what is apprehended in an invalid cognition does not lend itself to re-apprehension at a subsequent point of time, still it must be admitted that it certainly exists at the time of apprehension. Otherwise, short-lived entities like lightnings will be robbed of their undisputed existence. So, an invalid cognition presents a real object which is existent in the universally accepted sense of the term (cf. "Yadyapyuttarakālam

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 33

tathā so'rtho nāsti, tathāpi yadā pratibhāti tadā tāvadastyeva, anyathā vidyudāderapi sattvasiddhirna syāt". PKM., pp. 49-50). But this theory, Prabhäcandra argues, does not stand to reason. If what is apprehended in an invalid cognition is real, there is nothing to differentiate an error from a valid cognition. Moreover, water, silver, serpent and the like that are apprehended in invalid cognitions do not instantly die out without leaving any trace behind like lightnings. So, if real water be revealed in a mirage-water cognition, the subsequent cognition should reveal at least the damping effect of water on the ground; but this is never in evidence. Again, if the cognitum of such an invalid cognition possess a reality commensurate with the reality of entities of normal experience, it would be equally well noticed by all present there even like a lightning. Moreover, if two cognitions both reveal reality, neither can serve as the sublator of the other. So, Prabhacandra concludes that this theory is not at all maintainable (cf. "yathāvasthitārthagrhītitvāvis'ese hi bhrāntā- bhrāntavyavahārābhāvah syāt. Api cottarakālamudakāderabhāve 'pi taccihnasya bhūsnigdhatāderupalambhah syāt. Na khalu vidyudādivadudakāderapyās'ubhāvī niranvayo vinās'ah kvacidupala- bhyate Sarvataddes'adrastrnāmavisam vādenopalambhas'ca vidyu- dādivadeva syāt. Bādhyabādhakabhāvas'ca na prāpnoti ; sarva- jñānānāmavitathārthavișayatvāvis'e āt" P.K.M., p. 50). Vädideva avails himself of the commonest conceit of contro- verting a theory of error and argues thus against this theory in his Syādvāda-ratnākara : The theory is in no wise blameless. The upholders of this theory of Prasiddharthakhyati maintain that the so-called illusory nacre-silver, the rope-serpent and the like do certainly exist at the point-instants of their presentation in cognition. But, this contention does not stand to reason. It might be asked : Where does the nacre-silver etc. exist at the particular point-instant of its presentation ? Does it exist at some other place (which is beyond the ken of one's observation at that particular moment), or in the locus of the nacre itself ? If the second alternative be accepted, the nacre-silver etc. comes to stand on a par with any object of normal sense-experience, becomes a 'Prasiddha artha' ('an object indisputably established through experience') in every sense, and there is no reason why it should not be cognised by others in the self-same locus at that particular point-instant. But, it is a patent fact that phenomena like the nacre-silver avoid the outrage of public vision and reveal them- selves to a chosen this or that perceiver. If, however, the first alternative is pressed forward, the question would be pertinently raised how an entity that is elsewhere, if not also elsewhen, would be intuited here, say, in the locus of a nacre. If it is conceded that the silver does not exist in the locus of the nacre, the assertion of its existence elsewhere can have no bearing on the cognition 3

34 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

in question and it is as good as non-existent. Even though, for argument's sake, it be accepted that an elsewhere silver can be cognised here in the locus of the nacre, it instantly resolves the theory into the much-maligned theory of Viparitakhyati. For, the silver cognised as here is really other than being here, i.e. is elsewhere. So, what is really elsewhere is presented as being here, as being other than what it is. So, Prasiddhartha-khyāti is ultimately reduced to Viparītakhyāti (cf. "Athānyades'ālambino'pi kaladhautādeh . . s'uktikades'e pratibhāso'bhyupagamyate. Hanta tarhi samāyātā seyam tapasvinī viparītakhyātireva'. Syā. Vā. Rat., p. 127). It is now easy to draw a line of demarcation between Prasiddhārtha-khyāti and Alaukikārtha-khyāti. Both the theories: start with empiricism and hold fast to the fact of perception. To both what appears as content in perception is sacrosanct and to question its reality is to question perception itself as a source of knowledge. In this regard their sensationistic realism is on a par with the attitude of the Sankarite illusionists who assert that the existence of an object is determined by what appears in a cognition (cf. 'yathāsa mvidavabhāsādhīnatvād arthanis'cayasya' PPV., p. 159, Cal. Skt. Series. Also, 'tasmād yad yatha khyati tat tatha 'styeveti sthitam'. IS., p. 42). But, while Prasiddhārtha- khyāti makes a fetish of perception and its deliverance and shuts out logical scrutiny, the latter opens up the gates for reason to sit in judgment over the content of perception. In other words, the former theory makes no compromise with rationalism, but persistently asserts that perception affirms not only the reality of its content, but also its real modality, even the modality of reality, if there be any. That is to say, when one mistakes a nacre for a silver, the silver so presented is to be taken as real like any other silver of common experience. For, experience does not show it off as something different from ordinary silver. Hence to call the silver real on the strength of cognition and then to assess its reality as being of a different order from the common species is to evince half-heartedness symptomatic of what is so elquently illustrated in Ardhakukkuti-Nyaya. But, this is exactly what Alaukikarthakhyati does by weighing anchor from the mooring of perception and letting the content be blasted by the billows of the unchartered ocean of reason. Herein lies the real difference between the two theories and the parting of ways is signalled by the sudden emergence of reason in the latter theory. The raison d'être of this theory of Prasiddhārthakhyāti has been only partially stated so far. This theory makes bold to assert that privacy is not profanation and that commonalty of experience need not be the unfailing test of truth. It is the negative idolatry of abjuring the idolatry of time and individuality that endeavours to transport truth to the transcendental realm of

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 35

ethereal non-temporality and impersonality. Vox Populi is not necessarily Vox Dei and the validity of a cognition need not await the approval of the populace. Indeed, one's own feelings and emotions, which are solely private to oneself, are certainly as real as cognitions that are shared in common by a multitude

manifold of psychical phenomena would be reduced to a sheer non- of men. Otherwise, the whole of our mental life consisting of the

entity. So, according to this theory, a nacre-silver should not be rejected as unreal simply on grounds of privacy of the experience. It is interesting to note in this connection that a few writers have fathered an almost identical theory upon the Digambara Jainas. Prakas'ātmayati, while discussing the nature of Adhyāsa in his PPV., joins issue with his opponents one after another and raises a pointer from the standpoint of an adversary in the following manner : "Well then, let the reality of what is presented in a cognition be affirmed in the accredited locus ; for, thus may be avoided the defects of prolixity of assumption and the like" (cf. "Astu tarhi pratipannopādhāveva yathāpratipatti paramārtha- tvam, Kalpanāgauravādidosaparihārāditi" PPV., p. 211, Cal. Skt. Series). Akhandānanda, while explaining this statement of Vivarana in his Tattva-dipanam, assures us that the pointer in question is from the standpoint of Digambaras who hold that the object of an illusory cognition should be adjudicated as real in deference to cognition itself (cf. "Pratītyanurodhena bhrāntivi- şayasya paramārthatvamestavyamiti Digambarah S'ankate" TD., p. 211). From this it appears that Digambaras were rather disgusted with the different theories of illusion, all of which evinced a hectic ardour for unwarranted assumptions, and, in strict pursuance of the Law of Parsimony (cf. "Kalpanalaghavam yatra tam paks am rocayāmahe" MMD.), concluded that the phenomena like the nacre-silver are real and not illusory. Again, Rangoji Bhatta in his Advaita-cintāmani, while dis- posing of the rival theories of illusion, states that the Digambaras assert the becoming of a real silver at the time of the cognition of a nacre-silver and then refutes it as unsound (cf. "Napi pāramārthikasyaiva rajatasyotpattiriti Digambara-matam sādhu" ADCH., p. 47). The theory fathered upon the Digambaras by Prakās'ātman and his scholiast Akhandananda is almost identical with Prasiddhärtha-khyati with this much of difference that here the inductive reasoning known as 'Laghava Tarka' is pressed into request to benumb the discursive mind and compel it to accept unquestioningly the verdict of perception. But the. Digambara theory as presented bv Rangoji goes a step further beyond the bounds of Prasiddhartha-khyati and assumes the origination of a piece of silver in the locus, a real piece of silver and not a sub- sistent one like that of the Advaitins. It is queer how such a theory could be upheld by the Digambaras without prejudice to

36 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

their epistemological postulations. Indeed, the Digambaras do not subscribe to the causal theory of knowledge. To them, knowledge is not creation, but revelation (cf. "Atajjanyamapi tatprakās'akam"// and "Pradīpavat"// PMS. 2/8-9). So, it becomes difficult to decipher how a new piece of silver would be ushered into being at the time of the cognition of a nacre-silver. Even without dilating upon the theoretic absurdity of such a contingency being pressed forward by the Digambaras, it may be straightaway submitted here that neither of the two theories noticed presently is to be found in the works of Vādideva, Prabhacandra and such other Digambara Jaina scholars of repute. Nor can these theories be interpreted as being variants of Anyathākhyāti which is the view of the Digambaras ; for, Prakās'ātman refutes that theory separately and Rangoji also discusses the theory of Anyathakhyati just after the Digambara theory in question. Now, we can go into the question whether this theory of Prasiddhärtha-khyäti might be brought into line with the view upheld by Bhäskara, the Vedantist, and, in the Sankhya system in regard to illusory cognition. As for Bhāskara, he was a celebrated commentator on the Brahma-sūtras of Bādarāyana and championed the philosophic view known as "Bhedābheda-vāda". This doctrine of Bhedabheda is mainly concerned with causation. To Bhäskara, the cause and the effect stand in a relation of difference-cum-nondifference. Viewed from the standpoint of the effect, there is multiplicity and the manifold of existence is an undeniable reality. But, from the standpoint of the cause, there is no difference, no distinction, no bable of sensations ; All multi- plicity is resolved into the oneness of the cause. (cf. "Kāryarū- peņa nānatvam abhedah kāraņātmanā/Hemātmanā yathā'bhedah kuņdalādyātmanā bhidā//Bhā. Bhā. p. 18, Chowkhāmbā; Also 'Kāranasyāvasthā-mātram kāryam vyatiriktāvyatiriktam', p. 93, Ibid.). The world with its endless panorama of differences is not unreal or illusory as the Sankarites would induce us to believe, but is real. To Bhāskara, our bondage even is real and even as a real jar is reduced to nothingness by breaking it with a cudgel, so we attain salvation by breaking off our bondage which is a stern reality. Bhāskara pooh-poohs the Vivarta-vādin's postula- tion of the falsity of world-appearance. He finds fault with the ego-centric predication of falsity or otherwise of the world. As he argues, the world cannot be taken to be false with regard to the seekers of salvation and real with regard to others. Indeed, one cannot reasonably maintain that colour is a non-Ens with the blind, though a reality with others. Verily, the nature of entities is an invariable constant and does not vary with the variation of the perceiving agent. It does not stand to reason that the double moon was a previous reality and is a subsequent unreality. (cf. "Tasmād yatkiñcidetat yat prapañce mithyātvaprati-

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 37

jñānam. Na ca purusāpeksayā mithyātvam satyatvam vā pra- pañcasya kalpayitum s'akyam, mumuksūn prati mithyā itarān prati satyamiti. Na hi rūpamandhān prati asatyamitarān prati satyamiti s'akyam vaktum. Na hi purusa-svarūpānurodhino bhāvā yena tadapeksayā satyatvamasatyatvam vā bhajeran .... Na hi dvican- drah pragasīt pascannāstīti yujyate" (Ibid., p. 18). Thus, according to Bhäskara, the world is not an unsubstantial appea- rance, but a reality. Keeping in view this ontological affirmation of the reality of the world, one might readily take it for granted that Bhaskara advocates a similar reality for the content of an illusory perception ; for, philosophy aims at arriving at a system of general principles and it possibly ill affords a philosopher to be a realist in matters of metaphysics, while being an idealist in epistemology. So, it might seem well nigh sure that, according to Bhäskara, an illusory cognition presents a content, say, a nacre- silver that is real in the current, accredited sense of the term. That is why the editor of PKM. has suggested that Bhāskara championed Prasiddhartha-khyāti in regard to illusions. But, facts seem to belie such a contention. Indeed, abstract theorising and hasty generalisation have led many scholars astray on this question, including savants of the stature of Dr. S. N. Das Gupta, Prof. Hiriyanna and the like who have discovered in Bhāskara a champion of Anyatha-khyati. Let us hear what a young scholar says with an almost gripping conviction on this point, "This alternative of real transformation . . of the substratum into the illusory object is the very old view of Anyatha-khyāti as advocated by Bhagavad Bhäskara, who admits both difference and non-difference .. . in every relational knowledge. This view is, therefore, not the Naiyayika's own, but borrowed from Bhaskara" (Dr. B. Sen Gupta's A Critique of the Vivarana school, p. 63). Mm. Jogendranath also holds an identical view in this regard (vide Viv. on AS., Pt. I, p. 122). But, we shall presently see that Bhaskara held an altogether different view. While discussing that the reality of an entity is independent of any ego-centric characters and that the world is real, Bhaskara makes a significant observation to the effect that it is yet to be proved that perceptual knowledge and the like are of an ontological status similar with that of the cognition of the double moon. This shows that normal perception, which is a valid one, taking, as it does, the real world for its sense-data, according to Bhāskara, is different from the cognition of the double moon. Hence, it necessarily follows that when the former is valid and real, the latter is invalid and unreal. Bhaskara further points out that no causal defect can be brought to bear upon the fancied falsity of the world even like the defective eyesight in cases of illusory perceptions. (cf. "Dvicandrajñānatulyatvam pratyaksādestvapek ș- yate// . . Na ca timiravat prapañcamithyātve kāraņa-doș o

38 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

grhyate", Ibid, p. 18). Again, while commenting on the Brahmasūtra 'Vaidharmyacca no svapnadivat' (BS. 2.2.29), Bhaskara attacks the contention of the Advaitins that unlike a dream the waking state is not self-invalidated, is not sublated of itself and points out that this cannot be a special characteristic of the waking state ; for, even in dreams falsity is brought home to us through subsequent cognitions. Indeed, the cognition of a nacre-silver can in no wise comprehend its own falsity (cf. "yat tu pratyaksādīnām svato mithyātvam nāsti paratastu mithyātvamiti kim vis'isyocyate. Nanu sarvatra svapnādāvapi parata eva mithyatvam gamyate, na svato, na hi rajatajñāne tad-gata- mithyatvam grhyate" (Ibid., p. 124). Here Bhāskara himself declares in no uncertain terms that the nacre-silver is false. Then, while commenting on the sūtra "Māyāmātram tu kārtsnyena anabhivyakta-svarūpatvāt" (BS. 3.2.3), he condemns dream- cognition as a 'Maya', as a cognition having no external object to account for its origin and as being a purely mental construct prompted by the recollection of what was previously cognised in a different spatio-temporal setting. A dream-creation is, according to him, the achievement of an individual soul, not of God whose creation is undoubtedly real. Thus, dreams and nacre-silver cognitions are false according to Bhāskara (cf. "Svapne Srstirmāyā- mātram na bāhyārtho'stīti mātragrahaņam. Kā punariyam māyā ? Arthas'ūnyapratyayah Des'āntara-kālāntarānubhūtānus- maranāt Jīvasya saisā srstih sukha-duhkha-pratibhāsanāt nes'varasya rthaiva" (Ibid, p. 161). . Is'varasya tu yā srstirākās'ādivisayā sā paramā- A cursory perusal of the expression 'Des'antara-kalāntarānubhūtanusmaranāt' may tempt one to equate. the theory with Anyatha-khyati ; but, the point to be particularly. noted here is that Bhäskara does not affirm the elsewhere or else- when existence of a nacre-silver, but only asserts that the content of such an illusory cognition is a thing being remembered and not an external object. Hence, we can safely conclude that Bhäskara was an advocate neither of Prasiddhartha-khyāti, nor of Anyathākhyāti, but of a pure falsity of the illusory cognitions. We do not, however, preclude the possibility of Bhäskara's theory being reduced easily to Anyatha-khyāti by showing that, according to him, the content of recollection appears as the content of perception in illusory cognitions. But, these devices of reduction of one theory into another are of no avail in determining the essential character of a theory and in christening the theory with a suitable name. Indeed, it may be shown that almost any other theory of illusion may be reduced to any other theory. Never- theless, a theory maintains its distinctness by what it particularly stands for and singularly emphasises. So, we find no cogent. reasons for dubbing Bhāskara as an Anyathā-khyāti-vādin.

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 39

Now, let us turn to the consideration of this theory of Prasiddhärtha-khyati being professed by the Samkhyas. No anc.ent or mcdern writer on Indian philosophy seems to assert in unison with the editor of PKM. that the Samkhya system spcnsors the theory of Prasiddhartha-khyati. On the contrary, some hold that the samkhya makes room for Akhyāti or Vivekā- khyäti, while others insist on the theory being no other than Sada- satkhyāti. So far as the Samkhya sūtras are concerned, it is un- deniable that they advocate the theory of Sadasat-khyāti as clearly stated in the Sūtra "Sadasat-khyātirbādhābādhāt" (SS. 5.56). Since we shall have occasion of studying this theory separately in a subsequent chapter, we do not like here to open any discussion on this theory. But, whatever may be the accredited thesis of the Samkhya system, there are reasons which might delude one into asserting Prasiddhartha-khyati as the theory of illusion of the Sam khyas. The Sam khya advocates the doctrine of Sat- kāryavāda (i.e. pre-existence of the effect in the cause) as opposed to the Asat-kārya-vāda or Arambha-vāda of Nyāyavais'e sika and even there it zealously adheres to Parināmavāda as against the Vivarta-vada of the Advaitins. Causation to Sam khya, therefore, primarily means a progressive unfoldment, a move from the implicit to the explicit, from the unmanifest to the manifest. So, creation is not the emergence of anything new, but a perpetual rehearsal of the old. It is as though the Ova of Eve contained all the multitude of future generations of people. Thus, the world is a reality both in its manifest and unmanifest aspects. Moreover, knowledge is but psychosis with the Samkhya and a psychosis, that merely rests on psychological objectivity, and, not on ontological objectivity, seems to be an unusual phenomenon with it. These two fundamental postulates of the Sam khya make it rather probable that Prasiddhärtha-khyati is assuredly the theory which the Sam khya advances to explain an illusory experience. But, as we have already stated, facts point to an altogether different conclusion. Here also abstract reason trots out concrete facts of commission in the Samkhya sūtras whence arises the misconception of the editor of PKM.

CHAPTER VII

ANYA-KHYĀTI

Dr. S. N. Das Gupta in his monumental work, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. 4 springs a pleasant surprise by his welcome discovery of a new theory of error as implicitly suggested by Vallabhacārya, a Vaisnava philosopher and religious reformer of the 16th century and subsequently elaborated by his followers. As Dr. Das Gupta himself observes inter alia, "Taking his cue from Vallabha, Balakrsna Bhatta tries to evolve a philosophic theory of error according to the Vallabhite school .... This view of illusion is called anya-khyati i.e. the apprehension of something other than that with which the sense was in contact". (Vide A Hist. of Ind. Phi., Vol. IV, p. 359). Though his treatment of this theory is unfortunately a bit confusing and is apt to delude one into believing that Balakrsna Bhatta was the solitary champion of this theory, it transpires clearly from a study of the literature of this school, that not only Balakrsna Bhatta alias Lalu Bhatta, but also Purusottamajī Mahārāja tries to formulate this theory of Anya-khyāti in his works. Bāla krsna seeks to establish this theory in his Khyativivekah, which is an appendage to his work named prameya-ratnärnavah, following the subodhini commentary of Vallabha on the third skandha of the Bhagavatam. Pur usottama sponsors this theory in his Prasthana-ratnakarah and khyātivādah, the latter being a brief philosophical tract included in an anthology of philosophical essays styled 'Vadāvali'. From the writings of these two scholars, Anyakhyati has come to stand as the Vallabhite theory of error. The current popular verdict, however, runs counter to such a position and Vallabha is generally supposed to uphold the theory of Satkhyati in perfect accord with the metaphysical assertions of his system. Thus, we find S. C. Bharati, a Sankarite scholar of the modern age, remark in his treatise called 'khyāti-vādah' : "Vallabha-matakhyātistu sat-khyātyantargatā" (p. 71). Though one might easily discover in the disquisitions of Purusottamji Maharaj a ready endorsement of the Sat-Khyati theory, it is nevertheless undeniable that the Vallabhaites held a different view of error, which they christened as Anya-Khyati. Here too the popular assertion as voiced in the above statement of S. C. Bharati is guilty of intellectual somnambulism that thrives on metaphysical abstractions which are sometimes widely divergent from the real deductions of a system. However, let us see what Vallabha himself has to say on this vexed question and then we shall present the views of his successors who have endeavoured

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 41:

to develop the views of the master into a rigid philosophical system. Vallabha, like many other Vaisnava compatriots, asserts that the domain of sense-experience is not unitary in character. The senses are in no way inherently degenerate and as such they need. not necessarily present a sham show before us. In normal sense- experience what one intuits is a hard fact and its reality is indubitable. What one perceives as a jar in one's wakeful consciousness persists as such even after the lapse of many years .. But, this persistence is not shared by the objects intuited in dreams, or illusions1. So, to Vallabha our experiences are two-fold- veridical and non-veridical. The world-experience is a veridical one in as much as it is not apt to be sublated like the objects of dream-experience. The world, therefore, is a reality. Indeed,. the effect is non-different from the cause and is as much real as: the cause itself. Non-difference does in no wise imply falsity2. So far Vallabha seems to advocate a dichotomy of sense-experience where truth and falsity are the two contradictories that exhaust together the universe of discourse.

Are we then to conclude that Vallabha's scheme of epis -. temology does not necessitate the postulation of a tertium quid on the ontological plane, of a reality that is neither true, nor false, but indescribable-a subsistent, neutral reality ? But, such a conclusion seems unwarrantable. While discussing the ontolo- gical status of dream-cognitions, Vallabha asserts in his Anubha syam that s'ruti undoubtedly speaks of creation in dreams,. but it does not hold any brief for its reality3. That is to say, there is creation in dream, but that is false. This is nothing but Vivartavada of the Advaita philosophers. Here denial of 'Satyatvam' can mean nothing but 'mithyatvam' in the advaitic sense. It is, however, difficult to decipher what Vallabha intends to convey by the word 'mithya' as used by him in his writings. As presently pointed out, a dream-creation is 'Mithya' to him in the strictly Advaitic sense. Elsewhere we find him condemning a superimposed quality or characteristic of an entity to which it does not really belong as being 'Mithya'. The rock and roll of water is attributed to the moon reflected in it and the moon seems to be rocking to and fro. This phenomenon of the moon is called.

1. Svapnādişu tadānīmeva svapnānte vā vastuno 'nyathābhāvo- palambhat/ na tatha jagarite varsanantaramapi drs'yamanah stambhah stam -. bha eva/(P. 159, Anu-Bhāsya, Biblio. Indi). 2. "Kāryasya Kāraņananyatvam na mithyātvam" (P. 144, Ibid). 3. S'rutiņ srsțimevāha na tasya satyatvamapi (P. 216, Ibid)

42 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

'Mithya' by Vallabha.+ Likewise Vallabha says elsewhere in regard to the world that it has ne 'mithyatva' like the nacre- silver."

In both these cases, 'mithyatva' might mean complete negation, but that seems to be doubtful ; because Vallabhaites reject the very concept of atyantabhava (not only as a category) in their metaphysical speculations a. It might then mean indes- cribability of the Advaitins. In the first alternative, an error or an illusion is an Asatkhyāti, and in the second, it is Anirvacanīyakhyāti from the ontological stand-point. Even if the first alternative seem to be preferable, a dream-cognition must be characterised as Anirvacanīyakhyati ; or perhaps we may delve deeper here and observe that appearance is not reality and what appears need not be real even at the time of appearance. If such an extreme position be acceptable, Vallabha's theory becomes nothing but Asatkhyati. This is quite in conformity with the following remark of Balabodhinī, a gloss on Anubhasyam of Vallabha : "Ato' gamyāgamanam svāpnikamyathā na satya m tathā sarve svāpnikā padārthāh asatyāh". Vallabha unfortunately seems to present a congeries of disparate ideas which ill affords to form into a rigid philosophical system. Thus in subodhini he remarks in a place that considered from one aspect everything is real, though from another everything is false.5b So, from such an aspect in which truth is ubiquitous, an error is nothing false and Vallabha should be taken to advocate the theory of Satkhyati. Again, while commenting on the Bhagavata s'loka, "rte' rtham yat" etc. (II. 9. 33), he says that our intellect, confused by Maya, considers things to be otherwise, though the things do not become otherwise.6 Here the words 'anyatha manyante' seem to suggest the theory of Anyathakhyati from the psychological stand-point, though ontologically Asatkhyati through the implication of the words 'na tu padartha affirming

anyatha bhavanti'. Continuing, he says, "An invalid perception

4. "Yathā jale candramasah pratibimbitasya tena jalena krto gunah kampādidharmaḥ āsanno vidya-māno mithyaiva drs'yate na vastutascan drasya", (P. 358, Subodhini) 5. "na tu mithyatvam s'uktirajatavat iti s'rīmadācāryairuktam" (p .- 7 Khyātivivekaḥ). 5a. "Evam anyonyābhāve nirākrite padārtha-mātrasya sarva-rūpa- tvena atyantābhāvo'pi dūrīkrto jneyaḥ" (p. 2, Pr. R. of Bālakrsņa). But Vallabha might possibly not subscribe to this view. 5b. "Prakārabhedena sarvameva satyam sarvam asatyam ityartha'ḥ". 6. "Tayā vyāmohitā buddhi padārthān anyathā manyate, na tu padā. stha anyatha bhavanti".

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 43

does nct ascertain any object. Otherwise, the world would have been of the perverted form as perceived in an invalid cognition. Hence, some sort of "Visayata is to be assumed whereby our invalid perception might become shorn of any content or sense- datum"7. Here the last line suggests Nirvisayakhyati. Proceeding further, he says : "As the lunar double is created by Maya and one does not assume two moons in deference to one's experience, so Vișayata too is created by Māya. This Vișayatā has two facets. Through one it acts as an enveloper of the real nature of a thing and through the other it occasions an otherwise cognition. The first one keeps concealed the Brahmic nature of things and the second reveals the empiric world. The diverse means of proof are called into request to set at naught both these contingencies"8. Here we find that even the world of our sense-experience is not real, when divorced from its Brahmic nature. From what we have so far discussed about Vallabha's philosophy, it appears that he accepts two grades of reality : the ultimate metaphysical reality and the empiric reality. Outside these two, there is mere appearance, a sham show which has objectivity bereft of reality. How, then, does it differ from the conclusions of the Advaita school ? But such questions apart, the writings of Vallabha as surveyed presently seem to suggest as many as five different theories of error, viz. Asatkhyāti, Anirvacanīya- khyāti, Satkhyāti, Anyathākhyāti and Nirvisayakhyāti of which the fourth emphasises the psychological aspect, while the others reveal the ontological status of the object of an invalid cognition. However, we do not find any trace of a theory like Anyakhyati in his writings. Still, a casual statement to the effect 'Viparyaso bhinnartha-pratipadakah' in his Subodhinī might possibly have suggested the theory of Anya-khyati to his followers. Anyway, his followers have fathered the theory upon him and have tried to supply the philosophical rationale of this theory. Let us now see how they seek to establish Anyakhyati as the Vallabhaite theory of error. Balakrsna Bhatta prefaces his critique of errors and illusions by certain metaphysical observations which epitomise the funda- mentals of S'uddhadvaita philosophy to which he tightly tethered his conscience. He asserts that all the attributes of Brahman are

7. "Bhranatpraticestu nārthaniyāmakarvam/ Anyathā bhramadrstvā grhītam jagat bhramarūpameva syāt/Ato viayatā Kācit svīkartavyā yayā drstirnirvișaya syac" (Subodhinī). 8. Yatha candradyabhasah Maynyaive janyate, na tu pratityanurodhena candradvayam kalpyate ; evam visayatāpi māyayā janyate ... ... eã ca vi- sayatā dvidhā ācchādikaikā anyathā-pratītihetus'cāparā tatraikā Brahma- rūpatām, na prakās'ayati, ekā tu jagadrūpā vişayatā; tadubhayavyāvrttya- Ttham sarvan i pramananīti bhavah" (Ibid).

44 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

present in every entity of this world; but, God regulates the emergence of certain attributes in one and the subsidence of them in others. So, ontologically speaking, everything is every other thing, and everything exists everywhere and as such everything is Brahman. So, there is no ontological necessity of assuming the categories of numerical difference or Anyonyābhāva and absolute absence or Atyantabhāva9. Thus, everything being Brahman, there is no real scope for the contingency of an erroneous cognition. Still, Maya, the deluding principle, confounds the intellect of the Jiva, creates in it an illusory object in the likeness of a real entity of the objective world and projects it upon the sensedatum. In the circumstances, we, in our attempt at cognising the presented datum, cognise the projected entity also and thus. the cognition, being qualified by the cognition of this exotic entity, becomes damned as erroneous. So, it is the cognition of a deluded man that is illusory ; the external object is not tainted in anyway. He expounds the position further in his Khyativivekah thus : The sense-datum is not presented in its true nature and the intellect, spurred ahead by the resurgent impression of silver and the discovery of the common attribute of glitter, creates silver on that locus. It is this conceptual ('bauddha') silver-not mental (mānasa), to be sure, as he warns us against such a supposition- that is apprehended by the intellect. It is verily not an object of the visual perception in its generic stage. But, in the subsequent. specific stage, the silver, which is fancied into existence and as: such is internal, is intuited by the intellect and not by the senses10. Thus, since in an invalid cognition, a silver, which is other than what is apprehended by the senses, is cognised, it is called Anyakhyati 11. This conceptual entity is called intermediate creation and is illusory 12. Following Subodhini, Balakrsn a points out that the cognition tainted by Visayata is invalid. Visayata sometimes takes the form of an attribute and sometimes it becomes a substantive. Thus, in an invalid cognition like 'the pitcher is

9. 'Ata Pramāņa-siddhābhyamāvirbhāva-tirobhāvābhyām sarva-karya siddhau nanyonyabhavo' ngīkartavyeh/ ...... Evam anyonyābhāve nirakrte padarthamātrasya sarvarūpatvena atyantabhāvo'pi cūrikrto jneyah (Pr. R., P. 2). 10. "Tadidam bauddham eva rajatam buddhyā vişayīkriyate na tu samanyajnāne cakşurvişayībhūcam iti vivekah ......... Vis'eșajnāne tu rajatasya Kalpitatvena antaratvad buddhyaive grahanam, na tvindriyaih" (P. 3, Khy .. Vi.) 11, 'Evamsati indriyeņa grhyamanad vişayāt s'uktyādirūpāt anyasya raja adeh khyatiranya. khyatirityucyate" (Ibid, P. 3). 12. "Ayameva buddhau (bhatahı padarthah antarālikī srstirityucyatet tas, aiva mithyatvam" (lbid, P. 4).

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 45

revolving', the revolving character is a Visayata. Similarly, when I perceive a yellow conch-shell, the yellow-ness is a vis ayata. This visayata is out and out a falsity. Hence, things do not turn otherwise ; it is rather under the spell of visayata that they appear otherwise. From the foregoing discussion it transpires that a nacre-silver and such-like phenomena are 'mithya' or illusory according to Balakrsna, though from the psychological standpoint, he calls it Anyakhyati. The point to be particularly noted here is that the 'Anya' here is not an elsewhere or elsewhen reality, but an intermediate conceptual creation which is internal in its location. But, this internal presentation too is not a reality. Thus, it is neither the Anyatha-khyati of the Naiyayikas despite the fact of 'padārthānam anyathabhanam' being admitted, nor A tmakhyāti of the yogacara Buddhists. Still, it smacks of both these theories, though ontologically it stoops towards illusionism. The theory of Anyakhyati thus seems to betray an ostentatious parade of sectarian exclusiveness that must carve out a separate path for itself though the facts hardly warrant such an attempt. Let us now address ourselves to an appraisal of the advocacy of purusottamjī Mahārāj in support of Anyakhyāti. Purușottama defines a Viparyäsa or an error as that kind of objective knowledge which apprehends an object other than that with which the sense is in contact13. According to him, an error errs not in omission, but in commission. Thus, in the case of a nacre-silver, right know- ledge apprehends the nacre only; but, the cognition lapses into invalidity the moment it apprehends an additional element of silver. He avers that the cognitum of an erroneous cognition is nothing non-existent ; on the contrary, it is an elsewhere reality. He explains the genesis of an error thus : The latent impressions of previous experiences are welled up by excitants and the intellect then assumes the form of those flashed-out objects which are projected outwards by Maya. The buddhi thus transformed and objectified screens the presented datum completely or partially and is apprehended in that locus. Thus, in an error, some other thing-a creation of Maya is apprehended and so it is called Anyakhyāti. It is interesting to note in this connection that purusottama does not hesitate to toe the line with the Naiyayikas in accepting two kinds of sense-contact : laukika (normal) and alaukika (supra-normal). The latter he subdivides into three : sāmānya, yogaja and Maya. The last is, as he says, called into request to present non-existent objects before the buddhi. This Māya represents, as he himself explains, the jñana-laksan a-pratyāsatti of

13. 'Viparyasast . jnanam (P. 16, Pr. Ra.' samprayuktabhinnarthamātra-pratipādakam bāhyam

46 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

the Naiyayikas.1+ At bottom, then, the theory of Purusottama is not different from the Nyaya theory. While Nyaya highlights the psychological aspect, he lays more stress on the ontological aspect of it. Indeed, if he could avoid the bottle-neck of sectarian obsessions, his theory would have fitted squarely into the theoretic scheme of Nyaya. But, he abhors the idea of Anyatha-tva for its irrationality. He discusses this in his Khyativada and shows that Anyathätva cannot mean a new creation, or a transformation, or even a special kind of identity of the substantive, or of the adjunct, or even of the qualified substantive.15 We must, however, distinguish between the two theories in two respects at least. First, the supra-normal Pratyasatti called Maya by Purusottama has no reference to any elsewhere reality (though he speaks of such a reality in a different context-See supra) which is assured by the object intuited through jñana- lak sana-Pratyāsatti of Nyāya. Secondly, Māyā does not present the illusory silver in the locus of the nacre as is done by Nyaya Pratyäsatti, but merely presents it to the intellect, which, however, projects it outwards upon the locus of the nacre. (Elsewhere, however, he attributes all these to Māya where it is possibly not a Pratyäsatti). So, the reality that is affirmed of a nacre-silver by Nyaya cannot be asserted with regard to the nacre-silver of Puru sottama's conception. To him it is nothing but a silver of the reflective consciousness, though projected outwards upon the sense- datum. But, in Vadāvalī he does not accept this position in an absolute sense. While discussing the theory of Rāmanuja in that brochure, he says that, according to Rāmānuja, inasmuch as silver really exists in nacre, the cognition of a nacre-silver is a valid one and such a cognition is to be termed Akhyāti. Purușottama readily gives his seal of approval on such a position with certain qualifications. He points out that everything exists everywhere ; still one has to assume the disappearance of objects other than actually present with a view to drawing a line of demarcation between error and truth. He further asserts that those who are completely established in knowledge or in yoga cognise anything anywhere. So, the theory of Akhyati holds good in their cogni- tions of the nacre-silver type. But, in the case of ordinary mortals, some past impression is aroused and the intellect being characterised by such impression is projected outwards by Māya ; as a result, one apprehends the attributes of a silver and the like

14. "Sa tāvallaukikālaukika-bhedena dvidhā / Tatrālauki Kastridbāl- Sāmānya-yogaja-Māyā-bhedāt/ ......... Trtīyā tvavidyamānānām buddhāvupa- sthapane. Ata eva Naiyayikanam jnane pratyasatti-bhramah". (Pp. 116-117, Ibid). 15. "Kimidam anyathātvam nāma arambho vipariņāmas-tādātmyav. is'eso va ? so'pi vis'istasya vā, vis'esaņasya vā, vis'eșyasya vā ?" (P. 122, Khy. Vã.)

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 47

and hence Anyakhyati is proper here. For, the word Anya, as he says, means similar and in an error one verily apprehends the attributes similar to those intuited in the sense-datum. So, according to him, Akhyati and Anyakhyati are the two theories to be accepted with proper demarcation of their provinces of application. We need not attempt here any refutation of such a theory ; because, it is blistering with so many contradictions and confusion of thought that it can be easily resolved into, as has been already shown, many of the other traditional Khyatis. Moreover, its fundamental postulates are open to serious objection and its disapproval of Atyantabhava, which fact perhaps makes them advocate Anya-Khyati, is highly illogical and unproved. And the rejection of the concept of Anyonyābhava by Balakrsna carries with it the consequent rejection also of Anya-Khyati as a concept.

CHAPTER VIII

SADASAT-KHYĀTI

The Samkhya-Sutras place on the anvilthe problem of illusion, and, after much debate and deliberation, offer a solution in the following Sūtra-"Sadasat-Khyātirbādhābādhāt" (SS. VI. 56).

From this the plain fact emerges that the Samkhya upholds the Sadast-Khyati theory of illusion. This fact has been noted by many scholars and readily accepted too. Thus S. C. Bharati refers to this theory of the samkhya in his brochure called 'Khyati-Vadah'. Dr. J. N. Sinha in his History of Indian philosophy says, "The Sam khya advocates the doctrine of Akhyāti, Vivekākhyāti or Sada- sat-Khyati." (Vol. 1, p. 134). Mr. Rajendra Nath Ghosh also in his Introduction to Advaita-siddhi observes that the Samkhyas generally advocate the doctrine of Sadasat-Khyāti (p. 367). Mr. K. C. Bhattacharya, the great philosopher of the renascent India, is emphatic in his assertion that Sadasat-Khyati is the characteristic theory of illusion of the Samkhya. Despite all these, many scholars seem to attach little importance on the particular Stra formulating such a theory. To them such a theory ill affords to be representative of the Samkhya philosophy. Some of them even go the length of knocking the bottom of such a thesis on the ground of dubious origin of the Sam khya Sutras which can in no wise be placed earlier than the 9th Cen. A.D. Indeed, as they point out, the Samnkhya primarily means the Samkhya-Kārikā of Is'vara-Krsn a supplemented by the Mathara-Vrtti. All the philosophers of note of medieval India starting from the great S'amkara down to Vidyara nya draw exclusively upon this treatise with a view to presenting the doctrinal essentialsof the Sam khya. But, the fact of the matter is that no trace of Sadasat-Khyati can be discovered in this treatise. In the circumstances, scholars have generally ignored the verdict of the Samkhya-Sutras and have taken Akhyati to be the proper theory of illusion of the Samkhya. Not only Dr. Sinha2, but also Dr. S. N. Das Gupta3, and Prof.

1. See Ph. 14. 25-27, Khyati-Vádaḥ by S. C. Bháratī. 2. See Ante., Dr. Sinha's Hist. of Indian Phil., Vol. 1. 3. "The Viparita-khyati or Anyatha-khyati thenry of illusion is acc- epted by the Nyaya, Vais'esika and the yoga, the "Akhyati theory by Mimansa and.Sankhya and the Atma-Khyati by the Buddhists." (P. 385, Dr. Das Gupta's Hist. of Indian Phil., Vol. I.).

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 49

Hiriyanna subscribe to this view unequivocally. The first two scholars approach the problem from a metaphysical standpoint, while Prof. Hiriyanna emphasises the theory of selective apprehension of the Sainkhya and has recourse to an epi. temo- logical and psychological view-point to arrive at an identical conclusion. But, Dr. Tatia is neither here, nor there, and smells the rat at this point. He finds fault with these scholars, though almost peremptorily, for their supposed zeal to equate the theory of the Sankhya with the Akyhati theory of the Prabhakaras. As he himself says, "There is an unfortunate tendency to inter- pret the Sankhya theory of error on substantially the same lines with Prabhakara's theory. There is not the slightest war- rant for this supposition. The Sa nkhya must believe in positive error" (P. 99, Dr. N. Tatia's studies in Jaina Phil.). But, the enthusiastic scholar does not stop here. He takes great pains to induce us to believe that Aviveka is the theory of error of the Samkhya as well as of the yoga. (Pray, sir ! is then Aviveka something purely positive, and is it really different from Viveka- khyati ? ) Dr. Tatia emphatically asserts that "the yoga and the Samkhya do not differ as regards their conception of Viparyaya or Avidya" (Ibid., P. 93). In this connection he brings the Pañca-kleśas of the yoga; viz. Avidya, Asmitā, Rāga, Dveșa and Abhinivesa into line with the five varieties of Viparyaya of the Sankhya, namely, Tamas, Moha, Mahamoha, Tamisra and Andha-tamisra. He, then, assures us of "passages in the yoga- bhasya which imply the doctrine of Aviveka as well" (P. 97, Ibid). He does not, however, rest awhile to consider the serious implication of the difference between implication and proclama- tion in regard to theorising on errors and illusions. Thus, extending the frontiers of the yoga into the domain of the Samkhya, he, then, looks across the province of discourse and observes, 'On the other hand, there is a passage quoted in the yoga-bhasya and ascribed to the great Sankhya exponent Pañcasikha by Vacaspati which can easily be interpreted as implying the doctrine of Anyatha-khyati for the Sankhya

4. "It may not indeed amount to an error of commission (Viparita- khyati) ; but, it is partial, and, so far as it is uot recognised to be partial, it becomes an error, though only an error of omission (Akhyati)". (P. 47, The Saukhya by Prof. Hiriyanna, The Cultural Heritage of India).

4

50 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

system'. (P. 97, Ibid.). Dr. Tatia thus means to say that since the yoga implies the Saukhya theory of Aviveka, and, the Samkhya in its turn implies the yoga theory of Anyatha-khyati, both the schools share the same pasture and uphold an identical theory of illusion. It is like arguing that since a consonant is sometimes preceded by 'An', the specific article for vowels, and a vowel likewise is preceded by 'A', the article for consonants, vowels and consonants are co-extensive and are identically articled. Such arguments based on implication are quite un- availing in our enquiry. But, granting such an identical theory, what is that theory ? Let us hear Dr. Tatia in his own words, "The truth seems to be that both the systems, the yoga and the Samkhya, had a common theory of error, and that was the theory of Aviveka" (P. 97, Ibid.). Splendid philosophy, indeed, based on vaulting abstraction! But, what a poor metaphysical husbandry ! Philosophy is nothing but abstrac- tion; but, the spring-board of abstraction differs from one system to another. No two systems weigh anchor from the same region or in an identical manner. Indeed, if we could make abstractions according to our sweet will, there would not have been a legion of theories of illusion. It will be shown, as we proceed with our study, that every such theory implies a certain element of Akhyati, Anyatha-khyati and Asat-khyati. But, that does not debar an exponent from advocating his own peculiar theory of illusion. Dr.Tatia has completely lost sight of this necessary perspec- tive and has made wild intrusions into unchartered regions. Anyway, the learned doctor now looks mighty serious and pounces upon the concept of Avidya and its operation upon Buddhi. This operation, as he says, may be interpreted either as an atrophy of the function of Buddhi, which leads to the theory of Aviveka, or, as misguiding the Buddhi which results in the theory of Anyatha-khyati. Now, since 'The yoga and the Samkhya, had a common theory of error, and that was the theory of Aviveka', as the writer himself assures us, are we to conclude, to avoid contradiction, that the theory of Anyatha- khyati was a later development in the yoga ? But, then, the yoga-sutra 'Viparyayo mithya-jnanam atadrupa-pratistham' (Ys. I.8.) has to be knocked out of existence. Dr. Tatia with a sphinx-like smile may read out for us from the Geeta, 'Ekam

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 51

Samkhyañca yogañca yah pasyati Sa pasyati'. But, this talk of the basic unity of the two systems is of as much help to us in our philosophical quest as is that of 'Sarvam khalvidam Brahma' for a worldly-wise, work-a-day man.

In point of fact, Dr. Tatia has missed the subtle points of difference between the Samkhya and the yoga. Though it is generally held that the Samkhya and the yoga are comple- mentary, the former supplying the metaphysics and the latter the practical discipline, the difference between the two can by no means be overlooked. Thus, it may be shown that the Samkhya understands the Gunas in terms of feelings, while the yoga understands them as the triplicity of mental functions. Indeed, while in the yoga the faculty of will steals the lime light, the Samkhya oscillates between thinking and feeling faculties. The Samkhya does not make room for any immanent change as accepted by the yoga. Moreover, it advocates a continuity between life (Bhoga) and reflection leading to Apavarga, while the yoga does not. Then, again, the conception of the will is different in the two systems. To the Samkhya, it is a function of Buddhi. There is also an essential difference between the two systems in regard to the conception of Bhoga.

To quote Prof. K. C. Bhattacharya : "Bhoga is no function of the pure self either to yoga or to Samkhya, but as a function of buddhi-endowed self, it is real to yoga and unreal to Samkhya. It is real conative appropriation to yoga, real perpetration of an illusion or contradiction, real willing of the contradiction of the object being the self. This willed contradiction is the real significance of the theory of Anyatha-khyati, the theory of illusion accepted by yoga and Nyaya. The root of conative appropriation is called in yoga 'avidya' which is defined as the viewing of the not-self as the self, ... To Samkha, bhoga is the feeling of the self being the not-self, wearing the form of the Vrtti, getting objectified or modified into the form of the affective object in the last resort. ...... The root of the affective illusion ...... as distinct from the willed contradiction in yoga ...... is aviveka which, too, like avidya, is not merely privative, being: the positive feeling (not presentation) of the self being impossibly affected or modified like the object ...... The non-distinction of the object from the self is an actual objective situation, factual

52 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

or sat though terminable, but the positively felt identity of the self from (Sic.) the object is unreal or asat. Hence, illusion is taken in Sahkhya as Sadasat-khyati". (Pp. 229-30, Studies in Philosophy, Vol. I-Prof. K. C. Bhattacharya). It is now clear from the above that the Samkhya and the yoga differ in their conception of Bhoga which is real conative appropriation to the latter and an affective objectification which is real-cum- unreal to the former, its root being Avidya in one and Aviveka in the other. Hence, it stands to reason that, while Anyathä- khyati is advocated by the yoga, the Samkhya view of illusion is no other than Sadasat-khyati. This Samkhya theory of Sadasat-khyati bas been elucidated by Aniruddha in his Samkhya-sutra-vrtti, by Vijnana Bhiksu in his Samkhya-Pravacana-bhasya and by Nages'a Bhatta in his Mañjusa. Let us now deal with their deliberations on it one after another. In the 5th Adhyaya of the Samkhya Sutras, we get the following five consecutive Sutras : 'Nasatah Khyanam nrsrngavat' (Su. 52), 'Na Sato badha-dars'anat' (Su. 53), 'Nanirvacanīyasya tadabhavat' (Su. 54), 'Nanyatha-khyati sva-vaco-vyaghatat' (Su. 55) and 'Sadasat-khyatirbadha-badhat' (Su. 56). Aniruddha in his gloss on these Sutras points out that the two theories of Anirvacaniya-khyati and Anyatha-khyati are not at all main- tainable. He explodes the first theory by showing that a nacresilver is not at all indescribable; for, it can certainly be described as 'this is silver' ; furthermore, though it be indes- cribable, being neither sat, nor asat, this its indescribability is verily its description. Hence, Anirvacaniya-khyati has to give in,. The theory of Anyatha-khyati does not fare any the better. For, how can a nacre appear as a silver ? Something appearing and being apprehended as a different thing is a posi- tion which contradicts experience and betrays self-contradictory cognitione. Nor may the illusion of a nacre-silver be explained as asat-khyati. It may be argued that, in an illusion like 'this is silver', one apprehends between a nacre and a silver an identity which is non-existent. But, Aniruddha rules out such a possibility. He argues that what is non-existent is devoid of

5. "Tanna ; idam rajatam ityanenaiva nirvacanīyatvat, na sannasan iti anirvacanīyatvena nirvacanacca" (SSV. P. 281). 6. "Anyat anyatmana avabhasate iti samvid-viruddham" (Ibid. P. 282).

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 53

causal efficiency and, as such, a non-existent, like the horn of a man, cannot reasonably generate any cognition7. Then is such a nacre-silver non-existent ? No, says Aniruddha. One might argue that, in 'this is silver', the 'this' refers to the thing. in front and the 'silver' is memory, and, through non-apprehen- sion of the distinction between these two discrete cognitions, we are prompted to get at the nacre-silver. Aniruddha refuses to ccept such a thesis and says that inducement to activ ty comes through the apprehension of identity and not through any non- apprehension of distinction. Moreover, the cognition 'this is silver' is found to be contradicted and sublated by the cognition 'this is not silver'. But, a valid knowledge never suffers subla- tion. So, the nacre-silver cannot be taken to be real eithers. Then, what is the ontological status of this cognition of nacre- silver ? Aniruddha assures us that it is real and unreal-real in so far as it refers to a thing in front, and, unreal in regard to its cognitum being a silver, in as much as the former is not contradicted, while the latter is contradicted. The silver appear- ing there is a super-imposed one,. It is not, however, clear what Aniruddha precisely means by the expression 'Aropita -. rajatam' here. It may mean a mental projection on the 'this',. in which case it tends towards Atma-khyati, except for the fact. that here the projection and its locus, or, for the matter of that, the external world, are real. It may also signify an elsewhere reality brought to bear upon the 'this' ; but, such an alternative is ruled out by damning the cognition as false with reference to silver ('rajatavişayataya tu asat').

It seems that Aniruddha's statements silently pave the way for saduparakta-asatkhyati as advocated by the Madhva philosophers. The thing to be particularly noted here is that the criteria of truth and fal-ity are, according to Aniruddha, Abadha. (absence of contradiction) and badha (contradiction) respectively, which are, as we know, the two corner-stones of the magnificent edifice of Advaita-vada. Elsewhere, however, he has recourse to

7. "Idam rajatam iti asadeva sukti-rajata-tadatmyam pratibhati/Tanna, asatah artha-kriya-virahat jnana-janakatvanupapatteh, Yatha manusya- śrugasya" (Ibid., P. 278). 8. "Idam rajatam iti purovarti-visayataya sat, abadhanāt/rajata- visayataya tu asat, badhat tasmāt sadasatī tattvam" (Ibid., P. 283). 9. "Āropita-rajatameva tatravabhasate iti sva-matam aha" (Ibid.).

54 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

the pragmatic theory of causal efficiency as the criterion of truth ('Asatah artha-kriya-virahat', Ibid., p. 278). This mental imbalance is all the more betrayed when we careto go through the whole of his Vrtti. Thus, in one place he says that the nacre- silver is sublated by the cognition 'this is not silver'. And this silver is adjudged to be false because of its origin from defective cause even like the cognition of a yellow conch-shell occasioned by jaundice10. In another place, on the contrary, he says that even a dream-cognition is not utterly false like a sky-flower ; for, in the ultimate analysis, a dream cannot be false with regard to itself, or, it will cease to be called a dream at all. Nor can a dream thrive on something utterly unforeseen. On the contrary, it has for its content the things of wakeful consciousness 11. From this we can make several deductions as follow :- (1) that a dream-cognition, or, for the matter of that, any illusion, is not false, which fact flatly contradicts the postulation of its falsity referred to presently, (2) that the statement that a dream qua dream is a reality only takes after the view-point of kumarila when he says, "Tasmad bodharthakatvena prapta buddheh pramanata" (S'v.). (3) that a sky-flower and the like are unreal which fact contradicts the statement that whatever is con- tradicted is unreal, (4) that the content of a dream is an else- where reality and not an utter naught, which fact also reminds one of Kumarila's pronouncement to the following effect, "Sarvatralambanam bahyam des'a-kalanyathatmakam" (Sv.) and smacks of Anyatha-khyati. Thus, it transpires that Aniruddha gives expression to a congeries of ideas which he cannot weld together to form a rigid philosophical system. His approach is rather uncritical and it is futile to attempt any refutation of his exposition of the theory, as it stands almost :self-condemned.

Vijnana Bhiksu, another interpreter of the Samkhya Sutras, does not fare better. The texture of his thought is extremely loose and hardly stands any serious scrutiny. While explaining

10. "S'uktau rajata-jñāne nedam rajatamiti jnānāt rajata-bādha h/. ....... dusta-kāraņa-janyatvacca mithyeti avagamyate, yatha kāmalādi-dosāt pītasamkha-jnanam Kasyacit" (Ibid., P. 84). 11. "Svapna-pratyayasyapi na atyantikam mithyatvam kha-puspa-vat, na ca svātmani api mithyātvam, anyathā svapna ityeva na syat/na ca atyantadrste svapnah, kintu jagrad-drste' rthe" (Ibid., P. 198).

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 55

the Sutra "Sadasat-khyatirbadhabadhat", he first points out that all things in their self-subsistent, entitative aspect are real and uncontradicted ; but they are unreal in their relational character. Thus, redness and a piece of cloth are both equally real ; but when they are related to each other, the composite thing is unreal as also the relation itself. One should not demur that reality and unreality cannot co-exist ; for, the contradiction may be avoided by making room for different modes of approach. Thus, redness is certainly something real, but, lapses into unreality as a reflec- tion on crystal. Again, a silver is real as existing in a mer- chant's shop, but is unreal as superimposed upon a shell. This manner of speech certainly tends to Asat-samsarga-khyati or Anyatha-khyati. He, then, unlike Aniruddha, does not explain the illusion 'this is a silver' as a composite experience of which 'this' is real and 'a silver' is unreal. He accords this reality- cum-unreality not only to errors and illusions, but also to the world at large. But, quite contrary to this, he elsewhere pleads that the fact that the Sutrakara himself would affirm reality- cum-unreality of the world does not involve contradiction, since reality and unreality there stand for manifestness and unmani- festness respectively 12. In another place he says that their avowed object is to deny of the world a similarity to the nacre- silver 13. The self-contradiction is too apparent to call for any elucidation. One might come to the rescue of the Bhiksu and point out that while a real silver of our normal experience is unreal only when superimposed upon immaculate consciousness, a nacre-silver is unreal even as a super-imposition upon a nacre. But, that is nowhere stated by the Bhiksu. He else- where states that the world is not sublated like a dream and what is sublated is unrcal. Indeed, a dream-rope cannot bind any one. The world is neither created by a defective cause in the fashion of the yellowness of the conch-shell occasioned by the defective organ. Hence the world is real and not unreal like a dream, a sky-flower and the like. Here, again, he calls dreams and illusions 'avastu' i.e. unreal and equates them with

12. "Swayam tu sadasattvam prapañcasya yad Vaksyati tatra sattvā- sattve vyaktavyakta-svarupatvad viruddhe eva na bhavatah" (P. 257, SD., Beng. ed.). 13. "S'ukti-rajatadi-tulyatvasyaiva prapance' (P. 267, Ibid.). smabhiḥ pratisedhat"*

56 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

sky-flower which is totally non-existent. On yet another occasion, he takes us by storm by affirming that dreams and illusions are not completely divested of reality inasmuch as they are but transformations of the mind14. It is certainly difficult to keep one's foothold upon such a drifting log. Again, while explaining the Sutra "Nanyatha-khyatih svavaco-vyaghatat", he disposes of the theory of Anyathakhyati and remarks : "An entity, absent in front of the percipient, cannot be apprehended simply by its existence elsewhere. It need not be argued that apprehension presupposes some existence somewhere, or else, in the absence of any sense-contact etc., it cannot be apprehended. For, we can safely refer te the time-less continuum of impressions as the cause of errors"15. This is sheer self-contradiction, and, in a sense, it clearly smacks of Atma-khyati of the yogacara. He involves himself, perhaps unwittingly, in insurmountable difficulties by saying that Prakrti, being super-imposed upon the rope-like Purusa. becomes like a serpent16. Thus it appears that his utterances are a medley of divergent thoughts which are neither here, nor there as a whole. His endeavour to read the thoughts of the Brahma-sutras and the Geeta in the Samkhya-sutras is pathetic, indeed. But, in one point he certainly enlightens us when he says that the Samkhya differs from the yoga only in respect of non-acceptance of the theory of Anyatha-khyati17. This theory of the Bhiksu, like most of the theories discussed before-hand, is fragmentary in its nature ; for, it has no explanation to offer in regard to the genesis of illusion, the overt action in its wake and its subsequent subla- tion-the three cornerstones of any full-blooded theory of illusion.

14. "Svapna-padārthānāmapi mana -pariņamatvena atyantāsattā- virahacca" (Ibid., P. 362). Aslo "S'ukti-rajata-svapna-manorathadau ca manaḥ-parinama-rupa evarthah pratīyate natyantasanniti vaksyati" (Ibid., P. 458). 15. "Purovartinyasattve 'nyatra tat-sattaya bhana-prayojakatvamiti bhāvah/na ca sarvatrāsato bhāne sāmagrī na sambhavati sannikarsadyabhāvāt ityata kvacit sattāmātram apeksyata iti vācyam/anādi-vāsanādhārāyā eva bhrama-hetutva-sambhavaditi. (Ibid., P. 459). 16. "Uraga-tulyatvam ca pradhanasya rajjutulye puruse samāropaņāt" (Ibid., 415). 17. "Anyatha-khyatyanabhyupagama-mātra eva yogato' traviseșaucityāt' (Ibid., P. 274).

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 67

Mr. S. C. Bharati in his brochure called 'Khyativadah' represents Nagesa Bhatta as a patron of the theory of Sadasat- Khyati and quotes sparingly but two brief sentences from his Manjusa by way of attempting an exposition of his theory. The Manjusa under reference is evidently a gloss of Nagesa on the Samkya Sutras17a ; but, unfortunately for me, I have not been able to procure a copy of it for my use. So, I have no other alternative but to closely follow the exposition of Mr. Bharati in presenting the view of Nagesa. According to Nagesa, the Vyavaharika as also the pratibhasika world has both the- absence of the numerical difference of Sat (Sad-bhedatyanta- bhava) and Asat (Asad-bhedatyantabhava). Hence, the empiric world as also the subsistent world i.e. a phenomenon of the nacre-silver type is a negation of both what is different from the real and what is different from the unreal at the same time. The first negation pertains to its unreality and the second to its reality. Now, this negation of reality-cum-unreality being a simultaneous one, it is anirvacya i.e. indescribable. The nacrc- silver, according to Nagesa, is a mental reality, and, has no existence in the outside world ; still, the reality of the substratum is super-imposed upon it whereby it appears to be real. Nageśa does not yield his palm to the advaitic view of a pratibhasika silver being created in the locus in question. For, avidya may very well generate an immediate cognition of a nacre-silver even without its external existence, and, in the circumstances, it will be sheer useless complexity of hypothesis (i.e. Kalpana-gaurava) to assume the creation of silver. The cognition of such a nacre-silver remains uncontradicted so long as the particularity of the locus is not apprehended and it is contradicted thereafter19. The words of Nagesa may thus be explained. The nacre-silver is a mental reality ; but, it is not projected outwards and superimposed upon the datum of intui- tion. Rather, the reality of the datum is super-imposed upon it and that makes it appear as an external reality. So, his view

17a. This is a wrong surmise corrected through a perusal of the Bhumika of the Panca-padika (Madras ed., I958). The Manjusa is the vaiyākaraņa- laghu-mañjusa of Nageśa. See Appendix. 18. "Yāvad-visesādarśanam abādhah, taduttarañca bādhaņ, adhisthāna- gata-sattvāropeņa tu yāvad-visesa-darsanam bahiḥ sattvena pratītīrbuddhi- sad-rajatasya". (Mañ. quoted in Khyātivādah, P. 27)

58 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

seems to be quite different from that of the Bhiksu, though nearer to that of Aniruddha in a sense. In the absence of first- hand materials to draw upon, we excuse ourselves the task of attempting a criticism of this theory. We may only casually point out a few of our objections to his rather imperfectly known view. (1) If avidya is capable of generating cognition even without any cognitum, the causal theory of knowledge of the Samkhya will be cast to the four winds and knowledge, being neither dis- covery nor creation, would be a chaotic incidence. (2) That the expression 'bahih Sattvena pratitih' smacks of Atma-khyati and leads inevitably to Anyatha-khyati ; for, what is not actually 'bahih', appears as 'bahih'. (3) That avidya of the advaitic brand is exploded in the Samkhya Sutras19, and that the Samkhya does not advocate :any knowledge without sense-object-contact and the consequent mental modification. So, the proposition of knowledge only through Avidya even without the existence of an object is .definitely at variance with the Samkhya theory of knowledge. In fact, Nageśa betrays his subconscious affiliation to the vedantic anirvacanīya-khyati, but forsakes its realistic episte- 'mology and moves straightaway into the orbit of Atma-khyati of the yogacara school.

19. cf. the Samkhya-Sutras 20.24, Adhyaya I.

CHAPTER IX

ATMA-KHYATI

The Atma-khyati theory of error and illusion is traditionally fathered upon the yogacura buddhists who, though denying dualism, generally advocate monistic pluralism in which nothing but the incessant stream of momentary consciousness-units is real. The yogacara buddhists, unlike the Vaibhasikas and the Sautrantikas, deny the reality of the external world which is at best a Prajñapti-sat to them and hence they reduce all existence to a monolith of fleeting cognitions, the only reality acceptable to them. So, it is only to be expected that they should put for- ward the Atma-khyati theory of error. The Madhyamikas hold themselves studiously apart from such a view and are said to sponsor the view of Asat-khyati in consonance with their meta- physical doctrine of Sunyavada which presumably cuts off even the inner world of ideas and reduces reality to an unqualified void. But, what about the Vaibhasikas and the Sautrantikas ? Dr. A. Roy Choudhuri in his book entitled 'The doctrine of Maya' says, "The philosophers of the Sautrantika, Vaibhasika and the yogacara schools of Buddhism hold the doctrine of Atma-khyati" and refers to Bhamati of Vacaspati Misra and Parimala of Appyaya Dīksita as his authorities in point. Dr. B. K. Sengupta also harps on the same string when he confidently remarks, "It is well-known that except the Madhyamikas, all other schools of Buddhism subscribe to this Atmakhyati theory of error which explains it from the angle of an epistemological idealism" (P. 63, A Critique of the Vivarana School). Mr. S. C. Bharati also appeals to the same authorities with a view to arriving at an identical conclusion. In the Bhamati of Vacaspati we come across the following sentence "Sautrantika-naye tavad bahyam asti vastu-sat, tatra jñanakarasyaropah" (Bhā., P. 26, A. Śāstri's ed.). This coupled with the gloss on it called Kalpataru1 and the sub-gloss there-on named Parimala2 has led the scholars referred

1. "Yadyapi Sautrāntikasya Vaibhāsikavad artho na pratyaksah, tathāpi jnana-gatarthasarupyeņanumī-yamanatvad asti tavad adhisthanam, aropyam tu jñānākāra eva, bhrānti-jnānākāra-sadrsasya bāhyārthasyābhāvād ityar- thah". (Kalpataru, P. 26). 2. "Bahyāstitva-vādinor-Vaibhāsika-Sautrāntikayoņ sat suktikā-S'akalā-

60 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

to presently to the conclusion that the Vaibhasikas and the Sautrantikas also upheld the theory of Atma-khyati. Mr. Bharati registers the approval of such a position by Nagesa also, at least with regard to the Sautrantikas3. But, the situation grows intriguing when others view such an opinion with disapproval and present matters altogether differently. Thus, Mahadeva Punatamakara in his 'Nyayakaustubha', though confirming the view in regard to the Sautrantikas, denies it of the Vaibhasikas of whom he says : 'Vaibhasikastu bhrame' sadeva rajatam bhasate ityasatkhyatireva bhramah" (Pp. 77-78). His silence in regard to the yogacaras seems ominous, and it may be reasonably doubted if he had sufficient opportunity of getting acquainted with the metaphysical speculations of the Buddhists. But, Vacaspati's silence in regard to the Vaibhasika standpoint here seems to be highly significant. Amalananda also in his Kalpa- taru does not clearly state that the Vaibhasikas also upheld: Ātma-khyati. Moreover, no less a person than Vedantadesika Venkata-Natha seems to hold a different view, as will appear from even a cursory perusal of the chapter named Buddhisara of his book entitled Tattva-mukta-kalapa. This prolific writer deals: with the different theories of error in verse in the chapter called Buddhisara and in his Sarvartha-siddhi commentary on it intro- duces śloka No. 27 with the following remark : "Atha bahyartha- vādi-bauddha-kalpitāh pakşah pratiksipyante. Tatra Sautrantikaḥ Prahuh". It is to be noted here that the Asat-khyati theory of the Madhyamikas has been already refuted in sl. 18 and the Atma-khyati theory of the yogacaras has been disposed of in the Śls. from No. 20 to No. 26. This definitely proves that the view of the Sautrantikas was different from the Atma-khyati of the yogacara school. We must note that Sl. 26 represents only one paksa among the 'Paksah' referred to above. These other Paksas appear in Śls. 28 and 29, if not also in Sl. 30. In the Sarvartha-siddhi on Sl. 28 Venkata says : "Anye tvahuh-buddhi- rarthaśca vastuto nirakārau; tathāpi cūrņa-haridra-yogaja- raganyayena sita-rakta-dirakarastadotpanno grhyata iti".

dikamadhisthānam, tannāstitva-vādino yogācārasya tvavidyā-kalpitam tada -- dhisthanam ityevam matabhedenadhisthana-bhedam ahetyarthah" ( Pari- mala, P. 26). 3. "Nāgeśenāpi Mañjūsayām Sautrantika-naye juana-dharma eva bhāsata ityuktam". (KV., P. 21).

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But, on close scrutiny it will appear here that the Sls. 27 and 28 do not deal with any theory of illusion, but only present the peculiar views of certain sections of Buddhists in regard to the nature of Buddhi. Incidentally it may be pointed out here that the yogacaras*, the Sautrantikas and the Vaibhasikas" are at one in denying fromlessness of cognitions and hence the Sl. 28 does not refer to any of them. Though it is extremely difficult to ascertain who amongst the buddhists are the target of attack in Sl. 28, particularly in view of the fact that there were as many as eighteen different schools of them maintaining widely diver- gent views starting from the doctrine of the soul to that of soullessness and the void, one might be tempted to tind in it a reference to the Madhyamikas who are represented in the Viveka- vilasa in the following hemistitch : "Kevalam samvidam svastham manyante madhyamah punahs". But, such a hypothesis is ruled out by the Sarvartha-siddhi commentery which clearly states that the Sls. bcginning from No. 27 bear upon the views of those buddhists who accept external reality. Be that as it may, the Sl. No. 29 is openly declared to be in refutation of of Niradhisthana-khyati and the SS. commentary introduces it with the following remark: "Atha Kaiscid bahyarthavadibhiḥ saugatairuktām niradhişthāna-khyātim anvākhyāti". (P. 454). Now, of the four traditional schools of the buddhists, it is only the Vaibhasikas, besides theSautrantikas, who advocate the reality of the external world. So, it may be concluded, without any serious violence to discursive thought, that the Vaibhasikas are represented here as advocates of Niradhisthana-khyati. Venkata in his Nyaya-Parisuddhi also discusses this theory7. But, his scholiast Sri Nivasadasa in his Nyayasara commentary affiliates this view to the Madhyamika school, as appears from the preface to his exposition of this view, with the following remarks: "Idanīmn sakşān madhyamika-parigrhīte niradhis-

4. 'Ākara-sahita buddhiḥ yogacārasya sammata' (Vivekavilasa quoted in SDS., P. 29, Cal. ed.). 5. "Cittam mano' rtha-vijnanam ekartham citta-caitasāḥ/Sāsrayā- lambanākārāņ samprayuktāśca pañcadhā" (Kosasthāna 2, Kā. 34). Also, 'Artha-sarupyamasya pramanyam' (NB., Su. 20). 6. Cf. SDS. P. 29, Cal. ed. 7. "Anyeşam tacca niradhisthana-khyatau vicāryatām/Atrāsadeva bhavatam atreti jnayate na va etc." (NP., P. 47, Chowkhambā ed.)

62 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

thana-khyati-pakse dosam vakturi pratijanite" (P. 47, NS). Śri Nivāsa evidently had the word 'Atrasadeva bhavatam' of Venkata ringing into his ears, and he presumably pounced upon: the word 'Asat' as the foundation of this theory, wherefore it was fathered upon the Madhyamikas by him. This explains also why the author of Nyaya-Kaustubha represents the Vaibhasikas as subscribing to the view of Asat-Khyati. But, from what has been presently discussed with quotations from TMK. and SS. it becomes perfectly clear that Venkata had no such idea of facile equation at the back of his mind when he treated of the theory of Niradhisthana-khyati. On the contrary, we have it on the authority of his SS. that it was a theory of a section of the bahyartha-vadī buddhists whom we equate with the Vaibhasikas for reasons stated heretofore. Hence, it is difficult here for us to toe the line with other scholars and engraft the Atma-khyati theory of illusion upon the Vaibhasikas.

Here one might demur : If the adhisthana or the substratum is once denied, the stage is once for all set for Atma-khyati irrevocably to the exclusion of all other khyatis. To this it may be replied that just as Atma-khyati has an element of Sat-khyati from one view-point and also an element of asat-khyati from another, so, Niradhisthana-khyati has certainly an element of Atma-khyati in it; but that does not assuredly equate it with the latter. It is to be particularly noted here that the difference between the two theories does not lie in the assumption of different substrates of illusion as highlighted by Appyaya ; On the contrary, to Niradhisthana-khyati the substratum is in every sense a non-etre. As explained by Venkata, according to this theory, what happens in an illusory cognition is that a silver is presented through impressions along with its certain particulari- ties lying submerged and it then appears, through some defect, as 'this'. What is studiously denied here is the super-imposition of a silver upon a thing-in-front8. Though admitting external reality, this theory allows no influx resulting in an illusory cognition ; but, on the contrary, an afflorescence of a latent. impression into a cognition and its subsequent efflux into the outer world. The main point about this theory is its denial of

8. "Natra purovartini rajatādhyāsaļ, kintu samskaropanītam pramus- ita-tattadyamsam rajatam dosa-vasadidamiti bhāti" (SS., P. 454, Kāsi ed.)

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all afferent stimuli and sense-activity as is quite apparent from its stock example of illusion which is 'an woollen mass of hair' experienced with closed eyes. The Vaibhasika standpoint may be better understood in reference to their postulation of mental cognition of the past and the future. They characterise the past cognition as 'Manas'11. They hold that this Manas as 'adhipati- pratyaya' along with the rupa etc. of the past or future entities generates a kind of mental cognition which is not to be confused with the Mano-vijnana variety of Pratyaksa. An illusion is such a kind of mental cognition whose content is projected outwards through some defect. Hence, in deference to the silence of Vacaspati on the point and the view of Venkata, we conclude that Atma-khyati was advocated by the Sautrantikas and the yogacaras, and the view of the Vaibhasikas was different, though similar in certain respects, from it. It may, however, be pointed out here that in the: Vaibhasika system 'Vijnana' and 'citta' are identical9, and that this citta or vijnana is metaphorically called 'Ätman10' and as such the Vaibhasika theory of error may cer- tainly be called 'Atma-khyati' from the terminological point of view.

Before embarking on a discusslon of the Atma-khyati theory of error, it is necessary to present here the fundamentals of the yogacara philosophy and its raison d'être. The yogacara idea- lists are un-compromising monists denying the incipient or convex dualism of the Sautrantikas or the Vaibhasikas. While the new realists cut off ideas, the yogacara cuts off the external. world. To him consciousness is the only reality, and, since reality is momentary, abiding as it does only for a single moment, by its very nature and constitution, the ultimate reality is but the stream of momentary consciousness-series. The yogacara idealist postulates two aspects of Knowledge : Samaropa or the phenom enal aspect from which the external world seems to exist, and apavada i.e. the metaphysical aspect. From this latter aspect, vijnana is the sole integral reality, the cognitum and the

9. "Cittam mano' rtha-vijñānam ekārtham" (Kośa-sthāna 2, Kā. 34). 10. "Cittamahamkāra-niśraya ityatmetyupacaryate" (Kosasthāna 1, Kā. 39, Sphu!ārthā). 11. "Sannamanantaratītam vijnanam yaddhi tanmanah" (Ibid, Ka. 17).

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cogniser being only false appearances12. Consciousness is rigidly impartite and it has neither subject nor an object. As quoted by Mm. Phanibhusan Tarka-vagīsa in his Bengali edition of Nyayadarsana, according to the Buddhists (excluding the Vaibhasikas) who advocate momentariness and universal flux, 'Bhūtiryeşā:n Kriyā saiva karakamn saiva cocyate" (P. 162, Vol. 5). Indeed, consciousness is 'a mathematical point-instant', to use the expression of Prof. Stcherbatsky, and is self-luminous13. It has no other object of illumination. Consequently, the yogacara advocates an epistemological monism and a presentative theory of knowledge as opposed to the representative theory as upheld by the Sautrantikas14. The yogacaras, therefore, discard the causal theory of knowledge and as such knowledge to them is not discovery, but creation, This consciousness, however, is not formless like that of the Nyaya and the Samkhya or of the Midhyamika school15, but is invested with a definite form. Vasubandhu recognises a three-fold transformation of this con- sciousness into Vipaka, Manana and Visaya-Vijnapti. The first transformation is called Alaya-vijnana by him16. This Ālaya- vijmana may be called the I-consciousness. The transformation called visaya-vijnapti is otherwise named as Pravrtti-vijnana which may be described as object-consciousness17. The pravrtti- vijnana owes its origin to the Alaya-vijnana18. The yogacaras postulate innumerable continua of beginningless subconscious impressions, which mature and flower forth into Pravrtti-vijnanas in the form of diversified specific object-cognitions. This vasana is what taints and stagnates consciousness and liberation is

12. 'Avibhāgo' pi buddhyātmā viparyāsita-darsanaiḥ/Grāhya-grāhaka- samvitti-bhedavan iva laksyate' (quoted in SDS., P. 20, Cal. ed). 13. "Nanyo' nubhavyo buddhyā' sti tasyā nānubhavo' parah/Grāhya- grāhaka-vaidhuryāt svayam saiva prakāsate" (Ibid., P. 19). 14. -Apratyaksopalambhasya nartha-drstih prasidhyati' (Dharmakīrti quoted in SDS., P. 19, Cal. ed.). 15. 'Kevalam samvidam svastham manyante madhyamah punah' (Viveka- vilāsa quoted in SDS., P. 96). 16. 'Vipako mananakhyaśca vijaaptir-visayasya ca/Tatralayakhyam vijñānam vipāka sarva-bījakam'. (Tri. Vi. Kā., Kā 2). 17. 'Tat syadalaya-vijnānam yad bhavedahamāspadam/Tat syāt pravrtti- vijňānam yannīlādikam ullikhet" (quoted in SDS,, P. 23). 18. 'Oghantara-jalasthānīyat alaya-vijnānāt pravrtti-vijana-tarauga utpadyate' (Lañ. Su.).

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nothing but the emergence of pure consciousness freed from the shackles of object-cognitions arising out of the subconscious impressions19. We should mention here at least some of the arguments with which the yogacaras endeavour to prove their thesis. The first argument is an inference which may be syllogistically put thus : All cognitions are without any substrate (Alambana), even like a dream-cognition ; for, as cognitions, they do not differ from dream-cognitions20. It is an agreed fact that dream-cognitions have no external cognita ; and they are as much cognitions as any others ; so, if they can thrive without any external cognita, other cognitions may as well do so. The second agrument is also based on inferenee. It may be stated thus : The cognitum does not differ from the cognition which cognises it even as in the case of self-cognising cognition. (And it is to be borne well in mind that, according to the yogacara, consciousness is self-luminous.). And the blue etc. are cognised by the cognitions and, hence, they do not differ from the latter21. A third argument is based on what is known as the law of com-apprehension ('Sahopalambha- niyama'). A cognition always appears along with its cognitum and never in separation. A jar and its cognition are apprehended in one sweep and, as such, they are identical2 2. We may refer here to a fourth argument to the following effect :- The so-called objects vary in their affective tone in regard to different persons at the same time and in regard to the same person at different times. This fact proves the unreality of objects 23. A slightly different argument from the second one is as follows ;- Objects are not anything extra-mental ; for, they are cognisable even like feelings etc. As feelings etc. are not distinct from consciousness,

19. "Tataśca prag-ukta-bhāvana-pracaya-balānnikhila-vāsanocchedaviga- lita-vividha-visayakaropaplava-visuddha-vijnanodayo mahodaya iti" (quoted in SDS., P. 21). 20. "Pratyakşādi-pratyayo nirālambanaḥ pratyayatvāt svapna-pratya- yavat" (P. 22n, NSj. of Veukata). 21. "Yad vedyate yena vedanena tat-tato na bhidyate yatha jñānenātmā, vedyante taiśca nīlādayah" (quoted in SDS., Pp. 19-20). 22. "Sahopalambha-niyamadabhedo nīla-taddhiyoh" (Ibid., P. 20). Also, "Yat.samvedanameva syad yasya samvedanam dhruvam/Tasmadavyatiriktam tat tato va na vibhidyate//" (TS., P. 567). 23. "Paribrāt-kāmuka-sunāmekasyām pramadā-tanau/kuņapaņ kāminī bhaksya iti tisro vikalpanab//" (SDS., P. 18). 1!

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though cognisable, so are objects. Hence, they are identical with consciousness 2 4. Moreover, the yogacaras point out that, granting the existence of external objects, it is impossible to prove any relation between cognition and the object other than that of identity. The doctrine of momentariness precludes any causal relation between the two; for, if the object causes the cognition, the latter can no longer cognise the object inasmuch as it has by the time had passed into- nothingness. If it is argued that the cause of a cognition is its object, it may be pointed out that the sense-organs like the eye should also, in that case, be taken as objects-a situation which is furthest from the truth. The yogacara promptly dismisses the suggestion that the cognition 'I cognise silver' registers a subject-object relation by pointing out that the cognition in question is a composite one consisting of three separate cognitions. The verb 'cognise' here cannot serve as the relation between the two. For, as has already been said, a momentary entity can have no activity as apart from and supplementary to it. Hence, the only imaginable relation between the two is identity. If, however, it is argued that external entities may be objects of cognition even without any relation between the two,. it will lead to the absurd contingency of all entities being revealed: in a cognition without any exception. Furthermore, cognitions. have specific forms and each cognition presents only one form and not two. Now, this form must belong to the cognition as is. proved by the joint methods of Agreement and Difference and by an analogy with the dream-cognition. This also proves the external object to be a fiction. The cognitions and the sub- conscious impressions are the mutual causes of each other even like the seed and the sprout, and this explains the diversity of our experiences 25. Now, we propose to present the Atma-khyati theory of illusion

24. "Na citta-vyatirekiņo visayah grāhyatvad vedanadivad iti. yathā vedanādi grāhyam na citta-vyatiriktam, tatha visayā api" (NV. of Uddyota- kara). 25. "Sambandham vina visayatve sarva-visayanam ekasminneva jnane" va bhasa-prasaugat, .. Tataścāugīkrte jnanākāre akaradvayanupalambhāt apāramārthikyeva bahiskāra-kalpanā ... Anādau samsāre vījankura-vaj- jñananam vasanananca anyonyanimittakatvena vaicitryat". (NY. S. On NP.,. Pp. 43-44).

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of the yogacaras. The yogacaras hold that in an invalid cognition like 'this is silver', the silver is but a cognitive construct and what is apprehended is nothing but cognition itself. They would arge thus : The silver in question cannot be nonexistent ; for, in that case, it could not be apprehended. Nor is it an external reality placed within the ken of our vision ; for, its erroneous character and subsequent recantation would then be unintelligible. Neither is it an elsewhere reality. Hence by the operation of the law of the residue, the silver is reduced to a cognitional reality. Moreover, tho point may be established by the following syllogistic reasoning : The silver under discussion is but cognition itself ; for, it is immediately perceived without the intercourse of sense-organs even like a cognition. It should not be argued that if the silver be a reality in its form as cognition, it would no longer be an error. For, as the yogacaras contend, the error consists in apprehending what is internal as something external. So, the sublating congnition 'this is not silver' contradicts only the externality of the silver2 6. It does not negate the reality of the silver also. For, the form of the sublating congnition is not 'Not this, not silver', but simply 'this is not silver'. When illusion and its rectification may well be explained by negating only the externality of the silver, it is improper to negate the silver also. For, the law of parsimony demands that we should assume the sublation of one factor only to the exclusion of two, when that much is enough for explaining an error and its final rejection. If the opponent argues that let. the silver be taken as sublated instead of fts externality, the yogacara would rejoin that the silver being the substantive, its. sublation would spell disaster for the attribute of externality as well. Hence, it is judicious to sublate the latter 2 7.

26. "na tavadasadeva rajatam pratītyanupapatteh. Napi purata eva sad bhrantyanupapatteh. Badha-virodhacca. na ca desāntare sat pramānābhāvāt. Ataḥ parisesāj-juānākāramevāvatisthate. Kim cedam jñānarūpam indriya- samprayoge asatyaparoksatvāt jnanavat. Na ca satyatve bhrantyanupapattiḥ' Āntarasyaiva bāhyatayāvabhāso bhrama ityangīkārāt. Tasya nedamiti bahyatā-nisedhenaiva badhakasya bādhakatvopapatteriti". (NS. of Jaya- tīrtha). 27. "na hi nedam, na rajatam iti ca bādhah. Ato rūpyasya sattvam na. virudhyate ...... na hyekasyaiva bādhena iste siddhe dvayor-bādha-kalpanā nyāyyā, kalpanā-gauravāt. Rupyasyaiva badho' stviti cet, tanna ; dharmi- badhe bahyatvadharmasyapi badhat dvayor-badha-prasangat. Ato bahyataiva bādhyate, na rūpyam". (IS., G. O. S., Pp. 40-41).

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To explain the position more clearly, the yogacaras, though denying all manner of external reality, imagine unreal external entities as projected outwards by the potency of subconscious psychoses caused by timeless Avidya. Upon such an unreal nacre is superimposed the silver, which is nothing but cognition. Now, since we must accept facts as they are intuited unless there is any strong contradictory intuition, we must accept the reality of the silver under review. But, the sublating cognition 'this is not silver' restricts the reality of the silver to the cognitive domain only, the silver being nothing but consciousness itself2s. So, the erroneousness of the cognition consists in the external localisation of the silver, for example. This error of externality comes into being due to the impelling force of timeless vasanas. These vasanas, that give rise to errors, may arise both from logically valid and invalid intuitions. For, as the yogacaras contend, not only the valid cognition, but also the invalid ones may give rise to Vasanas maturing forth into errors29. A parti- cular cognition takes the from of a particular object due to its peculiar intrinsic nature or potency and this fact cannot be explained otherwise3o. The different cognitions and vasanas are mutually causally related from beginningless time even like the seed and the sprout, and so no objective entity is necesary to explain the manifold of cognitions or their veridical and non- veridical characters 1. In other words, there are mutually exist- ing loci of vasana and Vijñana, and so it is not necessary to assume any third locus of error and illusion. Two points are to be noted here particularly. In analysing an erroneous judgment like 'Idam rajatam', all the disputationists

28. "Vijñāna-vādināmapi yadyapi na bāhyam vastusat, tathāpyanādya- vidyā-vāsanāropitam alīkam bāhyam, tatra jňānākārasyaropah. Upapattiśca yad yadrsam anubhavasiddham rupam tattadrsameva-bhyupetavyam ityutsar- gaņ etc.' (Bhã., P. 26). 29. "Pramāņa-samskāra eva na bhrama-hetuḥ, bhrama-samskārādapi bhrama-darsanat" (Joanottama's Vi. on IS., P. 497). 30. It is interesting to note in this connection the following two kārikas of Vasubandhu :- "Desadi-niyamah siddhah svapnavat pretavat punah/ Santānaniyamah sarvaiḥ pūya-nadyādi-darsane//2// karmaņo vāsanānyatra phalamanyatra kalpyate/Tatraiva nesyate yatra vāsanā kim nu kāraņam//7// (Vimsatikā-kārikā). 31. "Anādau samsāre vījānkuravaj-jñānānām vāsanānānca anyonya- nimittakatvena vaicitryāt" (NS, on N. P., P. 43).

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are at one in taking the 'idam' as the substantive, 'rajatam' being only an adjunct to it. But, the yogacara, in perfect accord with his metaphysical position, reverses the situation outright and hits upon'rajatam' as the substantive, 'idam' being merely an adventitious false adjunct attached to it. Still, this false adjunct simulates reality and it serves as the substratum of superimposition of the silver-cognition. So, according to Atmakhyati, an illusion is not the superimposition of one real cognition, say of the silver, upon another. Hence, when Prof. Hiriyanna states in this regard that "the stimulus to erroneous experience comes wholly from within and not in the least from without"32, he states only a half-truth ; for the fancied, external entity, say a nacre, is present there to serve as the substratum of the superimposed silver. So, as Dr. J. N. Sinha says, an error is simply an eccentric projection of a subjective idea into the the external world". So, this ls the attitude of the yogacaras, the subjective idealists of Indian philosophy, in regard to illusions. But, this position has been subjected to violent diatribes by all the rival schools of Indian philosophy. There is a legion of arguments that has been put forward to discountenance the general metaphysical position of Ātma-khyati, but that need not detain us here for long. We need simply say that Atma-khyati leads invariably to solipsism33, which is a serious charge against any speculative thought and need point further to the pithy observation of Madhusudana Saraswati to the following effect ; "Badhena sopadhikatanumane upaya-bhavena sahopalambhah/ Sārupyato buddhi-tadartha-bhedah sthularthabhange bhavato'pi tulya//" (Gloss on the BS.' 'Vaidharmyacca na svapnadivat'). The doctrine of momentariness, which is the corner-stone of Buddhist metaphysics, has been refuted by all the rival schools of philosophy if at least for the necessity of postulating a trans- fluxional entity, an entity that outlives the point-instant, a percipient that experiences the manifold of momentariness. We may very briefly attempt here a general refutation of the yogacara philosophy in the following manner : Is reality reduced to consci- ousness alone on the strength of any positive proof for the

32. Quoted by Dr, A. Roychoudhuri in his "The doctrine of Maya". 33. cf. "Tarhi bahirarthavat sva-jñana-santanāt anyāni santānantaraņy- api visīryeran". (Gloss on St. 56, sad. dar.sam of Guņaratna).

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impartite nature of consciousness or on the ground of an argu- ment contradicting the reality of external objects ? Neither alternative is acceptable here. For, in the first alternative, neither perception, nor inference is competent to prove the posi- tion. For, neither of them can help ascertainment of absence of external entity without which the existence of mere conscious- ness can never be proved, An inference on the ground of Svabhava or Karya-karana-bhava, or Anupalabdhi can not surely prove Arthabhava. Thus, it appears that both the alternative proofs for the existence of mere consciousness are quite hollow. To assert the identity of consciousness and its object on the strength of the principle of Sahopalambha is equally fallacious ; for, it is clearly contradicted by perception and the example of the double-moon is certainly prejudicial to the probandum. Besides, the principle of Sahopalambha doos not stand to reason. For, the probans becomes Asiddha (or unproved) in cases of feeling-intuitions and is Anaikantika(or bilateral) also as is proved by the simultaneous apprehension of colour and light. Moreover, what does Sahopalambha exactly mean ? It can neither mean 'simultaneous apprehension' nor absence of any sequence of apprehension, nor unitary apprehension ('ekopalambhah'). For, all of them are fraught with inconsistencies and are unavailing. In the first and the second alternatives, the probans beeomes viruddha (contradictory) and Asiddha respectively, The third alternative may be interpreted as either an apprehension in the form of an identity, or by a single cognition, or of a single entity ; but neither can serve the purpose of the yogacara since all of them are vitiated by the fallacies of either Sadhya-samata or Asiddhi or Viruddhata 3 4. Let us now attempt a criticism of Atma-khyati as a theory of error of the yogacara. The yogacara holds that a nacre-silver is real, though internal. But, this supposition of reality is flatly contradicted by the subsequent retrospective cognition 'Asadeva rajatam pratyabhat' (i.e, 'the silver, that appeared, was verily unreal')35. This proves that the reality of the nacre-silver is nothing but a mere fiction. Then, the cognition of externality

34. Cf. PKM, pp. 77-82. Also see SM. Țīkā, pp. 349-353, SVR., pp. 155-159, Vyoma. Vr. pp. 527. 35. Cf. "Sattve asadev rajatam ityasattvavedaka-pratyaya-virodhasya uktatvat". NS. of Jayatīrtha.

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is an illusion, an unreality according to the yogacara. Now, since they themselves hold that what is unreal cannot be apprehended, it follows that externality also, being unreal, should not be amenable to intuition. It cannot be argued that external reality is negated by the subsequent sublating cognition ; for, there is no strong proof for the subjectivity or internality of the nacre-silver. Moreover, the argument from inference, that a nacre-silver is of the form of consciousness since it is directly intuited even with- out sense-intercourse just like a cognition, is fallacious ; for, its probans is both Anekanta and Asiddha and the example is shorn of the probans 3 6. Again, when one mistakes a bunch of guñja fruits for fire, that fire, being internal, would certainly burn the body ; otherwise, it would be unreal even as an internal entity and that would lead to Asatkhyati. The hypothesis of timeless subconscious impressions to account for externality is also un- tenable. For, this vasana must be either Avastu (a fiction), or Vastu (a real entity). If it is avastu, it, being as unreal as a sky-flower, cannot operate as a cause. If, however, it is a vastu, is it something different from the emerging consciousness or not ? If different, the cognitional monism (Vijnanadvaita) as accepted by yogacara will suffer damnation. If, on the contrary, it be identical with that consciousness, the appearance of externality will be due to the cognitum being of the form of consciousness itself-a contingency that would lock into embrace the probans and the prabandum and turn them identical3 7.

36. Cf. "Asataḥ pratītyanupapattau ca bahisthatāyā api pratītyanupa- pattiprasangat ...... Bahi-sattvameva asat-pratyayena nisidhyate iti cenna. Antara-tve pramaņābhavāt. Indriya-samprayogamantareņa aparoksatvasya hetor-bāhyatāyām anaikāntyāt. Sukti-samprayogeņa aparoksatāyāņ svīkārāh asiddhaśca. Drstantaśca sādhana-vikalaḥ jñānasyāpi indriya-samprayogā- deva aparoksa-tāngīkārāt. Kiñca guñja-punjadau dahanadi-samārope tasya antah-sattve deha-dahādi-prasaugah. Anyatha antare'pi tadasat ityatyantā- sadeva apannam iti natma-khyatipakso'pi upapattiman". (Ibid). Also "Buddhi-rupatvanca buddhau kalpitatvam cet sadhya-vaikalyam etc .. ' (P. 7, Pra. Vi.). 37. Cf. "Iyam vasanā avastu-rūpā vā vastu-rūpā vā. Tatra yadyavastu- svarūpā, tada nabha-stamarasa-tulyayastasyah katham kancana vyavastham prati hetu-bhāvaḥ sambhavati. Atha vastu-svarūpā, sāpi jnānākārāt pārthak- yena svarupam ābibharti anyathā vā. Prathamapakse jnanadvaita-ksatiņ ... ... Atha na parthakyena svarupam ābibharti. Tarhi jnanākāra evayamiti jñānākāra-māhātmyaād bahiriva pratibhāsate iti tadeva sadhyam tadeva ca sadhanam abhihitam bhavet" (P. 128, SVR).

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Vacaspati Misra in his Bhamatī as also in his Nyaya- vārttika-tātparya-țīkā attacks the yogacara position thus :- It may be asked whether the cognitive charater of the nacre-silver is established either by perception or by inference. If it is established by perceptual cognition, is it the cognition of nacre- silver or the subsequent sublating cognition ? The former only shows the silver as 'this', as something 'not I'. Had it not been so, the cognition would have been of fhe form 'I am silver', the percipient being non-different from the perception. If, then, tbe sublating cognition be called into request to account for the cognitive character of the nacre-silver, even that too becomes futile. For, the cognitive character does not follow from the negation of proximateness (Purovartitva) ; on the contrary, it ought to be distant from the perceiver instead of being the most proximate through its identity with the latter. So, the cognitive character of the nacre-silver cannot be proved 3 8.

Prabhacandra in his prameya-kamala-Mārtaņda attempts a brief, but radical, refutation of the theory. He points out that the theory under review cannot satisfactorily explain either the genesis of error, or the conation prompted by the erroneous cog- nition, or the subsequent recantation of such a cognition. To begin with, if all cognitions are conversant only with their own forms and not with any corresponding 'ed' (as Lloyd Morgan puts it), then all distinction between truth and error will be buried and all talk of cross-cognitions and their sublation will be mere idle gossip ; for, there will remain absolutely no scope for any lapse of a cognition from registering its accredited form. Then, the percipient will not feel any urge for getting hold of the erroneous nacre-silver, for example. For, the supposed nacre-silver is neither an external entity, nor a permanent one -it being only a form of momentary cognition-and, as such, it will not be a fit object of conation. If, however, it is argued

38. "Vijñānākāratā rajatāderanubhavādvā vyavasthapyeta anumanaď vā ...... Anubhavo' pi rajata-pratyayo vā syāt, bādhaka-pratyayo vā, Na tāvad rajatānubhavaņ, Sa hīdaukārāspadam rajatam āvedayati, na tvāntaram ahamiti hi tadā syāt, pratipattuḥ pratyayād avyatirekāt, ...... Jñānākāratā punarasya bādhaka-pratyaya-pravedanīyeti cenna, asannidhānāgraha-niședhā- dasannihito bhavati pratipattuḥ, atyanta-sannidhānam tvasya pratipatrā- tmakam kutastyam." (p. 26, Bhamati, Ananta Krsna's ed. See also, NVTT., Vizi. Skt. Series, P. 54).

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that, under the spell of nescience, it appears as external and permanent, the theory clearly is reduced to Viparita-khyatis9. And in the wake of such a concession to Viparīta-khyati,. Asatkhyati and Akhyati will also have their sway over the theory under review. For, it will become Asat-khyati in as much as externality, though non-existent, is said to be apprehended. And it will pave the way for Akhyati since here the nacre-silver, which is internal, is not apprehended as such. But, the deadliest and most consistent onslaughts upon Atma- khyati were hurled by Vimuktatman, the illustrious author of Ista-siddhi. Let us summarise his points of attack one by one :- (1) Ātmakhyati is untenable, because it contradicts the experience of externality. Moreover, by its admission of an internal entity being apprehended as external, it makes possible the reverse admission of apprehending non-cognition as cognition and thus shakes the very foundation of certitude in knowledge. Further-more, it involves the contingency of apprehending a non- existent in the form of externality 40. (2) In Ätma-khyäti, there is no scope for 'badhya-badhaka- bhava' in the domain of cognition and hence, there being no badhya-jnana, no error is possible; or, on the contrary, all cognitions, being mutually contradictory, will be erroneous. That the silver having the form and essence of cognition (or, 'cogniform' silver) appears as external cannot verily be appre- hended by that particular cognition, since cognition is integral and impartite and can have no division into the cognitum and the cogniser. Nor can some other cognition apprehend it ; for, cognitions are momentary and in particular series are identical41. Moreover, if it be assumed to be apprehended by

39. "Sarva-jnānānam svakara-grahitve ca bhrantabhranta-viveko bādhya- bādhaka-bhāvaśca na prāpnoti, tatra vyabhicārābhāvāviśesāt ...... Pratipattā ca tadupadānārtham na pravarteta, abahisthāsthiratvena pravrtyavisayatvāt. Athavidyopaplava-vasat bahistha-sthiratvenadhyavasayah, kathamevam vipa- rīta-khyātireva nestā" (PKM., Pp. 50-51). 40. "Natma-khyatirapyata eva bahya-samvid-virodhat, abahye bahya- khyativad abuddhau buddhi-khyati-sambhavād anāsvāsāt, bāhyatvasya asataļ khyāti-prasangacca" (IS. Pp. 41-42 G. O. S.). 41. Cf. "Anirbhāsam sanirbhāsamanya-nirbhāsameva ca Vijānāti na ca

74 A CRITIQUE OF THE THTORIES OF VIPARYAYA

someother cognition, then the postulation of auto-illumination of cognition will have to be abandoned with a view to making room for alter-illumination. If, however, it is assumed, for argument's sake, that it is apprehended by the self-same cognition instantly, then there will be no error. To be brief, no matter whatever assumptions the yogacara might make to weather the storm, all cognitions will be proved to be either false or true, alter-illumined or auto-illumined, or, on the contrary, partly true and partly false, partly alter-illumined and partly auto-illumined. If self- luminosity is tenaciously adhererd to, cognition must be one, indivisible, external and immutable. If, on the contrary, cogni- tion is assumed to be characterised by origin, decay, multiplicity, impurity and the like, it will necessarily be alter-illumined and, in that case, the yogacara will be compelled to accept a perma- nent soul to avoid all-out blindness 4 2. So, Ātma-khyati, as it stands, cannot account for the genesis of error and its subsequent rejection. (3) Moreover, the yogacara can ill afford to argue that the nacre silver is an elsewhere reality,-a cognitive fact, a subjec- tive existence. It cannot be said that since silver is apprehended and since its externality is contradicted, its existence elsewhere is assumed, though not apprehended. For, its appearance as non-existent here cannot suggest its existence elsewhere. If experience determines existence, it must locate it in the locus of appearance. For, an assumption of existence even without apprehension will lead to a lack of necessary concomitance between the two43.

jnanam bahyamrtham kathancana". Here 'bahyamartham' implies other cognitions as well. :42. "Tatha ātma-khyati-vadino'pi syātekārthayorbhinnārthayośca badhya-badhakatvayogat ; Buddhyakaro rupyam bahirvad bhatīti tayā buddhyā jñātum asakyatvāt ekasyā buddherniramsatayā grāhya-grāhaka- tvāsambhavāt ; buddheśca buddhyantarāvisayatvāt-samatvāt ksaņikatvācca ; etc. up to Tasmāt atma-khyativādino'pi na bhrama-bādhau sambhavata iti sthitam". (IS., Pp. 113-115). 43. "Nānyatra bhāti rūpyam tadiha bādhāt tu kalpyate/Ihāsad bhāti ced rūpyam khyātiņ sattām āa kalpayet//Sattām cet kalpayet khyātirasat- khyāterayogatah/yatra yad bhāti tatraiva tasya tāmkim na kalpayet//

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(4) Furthermore, Ātma-khyati involves an element of Anyatha-khyati without which no talk of error will be possible. But, Anyatha-khyati is a concept which is inexplicable both psychologically and metaphysically. If the nacre-silver and the like are of the nature of cognition, error is ruled out ; if not of the nature of cognition, they themselves must be taken to appear as such and not cognition. Assuredly, it is silly to conceive that one thing will appear, though another will be the agent of :appearence 4 4. So, to quote Vimuktatman verbatim, "Yanna khyati na tat khyāti yat khyati na tad anyatha/Anyatha-khyāti- gīstasmānmāta bandhya mametivat/" (Sl. 116. Ch. III). (5) From the metaphysical standpoint, Vimuktatman refutes the Atma-khyati theory in the following manner :- The yogacara does not provide for any witness-self that will illumine cognition and as such it remains unillumined ; An unillumined buddhi cannot illumine its cognitum and, in the absence of illumination of both, no Vasana is possible; and without it the momentary cognition cannot take the from of silver. Hence, there is neither error, nor truth ; the world is but an impenetra ble mass of mute darkness and scriptures are without any basis. Hence, to avoid such contingencies, we must hold that Atma-khyati is untenable45. Vidyaraņya in his vivaraņa-prameya-Samgraha endeavours to prove that in the Atma-khyati theory there is no possibility at all of the nacre-silver. for example, bcing apprehended. For, the nacre-silver must have either no origin, or regular origin like an ordinary silver. In the first alternative, it cannot be of the form of cognition which has distinct origin. In the second alternative, it must have its origin from cognition, external objects being rejected by the yogacara. But, that cognition must be one occasioned by a defective cause. This cognition, however, cannot apprehend the silver because of the momentary and 'non- equitemporal' character of both of them. If some other cognition

Tatra bādhānna kalpyā cennānyatra khyātyabhāvatah/khyātim vināpi cet satta kalpyate niyamah kutah" (IS. Pp. 129-130). 44. "Akhyātyātma-khyāti-paksau cokta-nyāyena pratyuktau. Tayorapi :anyatha-khyanam estavyam, anyatha bhrama-vyava-harayogat ...... Ātma- khyatipakse pi rupyadih dhiyaścet svarūpam etc": (Ibid. P, 291) 45 See Sls. 19-21, P. 293, IS.

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effected by a non-defective cause is said to apprehend it, there will be the contingency of overlapping assumption. If, however,. the cognition arises from a defective cause, say a nacre-silver, the nacre-silver must be existent and external reality will have to be accepted. If, on the contrary, it is not caused by the silver, the silver cannot serve as its cognitum. For, a cognitum is said to be what lends a particular form to a cognition16. So, the silver has no earthly chance of being intuited.1.7. To my mind, the yogacara seems to have been unreasonably disgraced by the opponents at least in certain respects. The argument, that since the yogacara cognition of nacre-sllver fails to apprehend the falsity of externality, it is no longer self- luminous, or, on the contrary, since it, being self-luminous, apprehends the falsity, no error is possible, does not seem to carry much weight. For, if a cognition chooses to appear in the form 'this is silver', its self-luminosity fructifies itself if it reveals that form and can by no means extend beyond it to what is not in the form ; subsequently when the cognition appears In the form 'not this is silver', the cognition reveals this form which denies externality. Then arises another cognition of the form 'the cognition of 'this is silver' is false' and the falsity is then revealed. So, the charge of cognition lapsing into the state of alter-illumination does net seem to stand to reason. However that may be, the theory is damned a thousand-fold and it is difficult to salvage it from the sea of damnation.

NOTE

It is a pity that many of the Buddhist philosophical texts are lost to us and the few we have seem to prove that the philosophers of the orthodox systems did not properly present the Buddhist doctrines, if not misrepresent them wilfully. Venktanatha and Vidyaranya, beside a few others, seem to give a purer account of these doctrines, but even in them are found wanting certain important aspects of those doctrines. Many

46. Cf. "Nakaranam visayah" quoted in PKM., p. 502 as the Buddhist definition of 'Visaya'. 47. "Atrocyate kim tad rajatam alaukikatvat juanaropitam etc" (P. 218, VPS., Beng. Ed.).

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critics have pointed out that since the Atma-khyati theory offers no principle of differentiation between the cognition of a nacre- silver and that of a silver of normal experience, all cognitions will be either true or false equally. It is on this very supposition that Vimuktatman has classed Atma-khyati under Sat-khyati. But, such a conclusion seems to be unwarranted. The yogacara advocates, as already stated, two grades of reality ; viz. Samaropa and Apavada. The former has been classified into four kinds in the Lankavatara-sutra of which Asat-triksana-samaropa, which principally accounts for phenomenal reality, is the first one. These two grades are otherwise known as Samvrti-satya and Paramarthika Satya4s. Now, this Sanvrti has again been divided into Loka-samvrti-satya or Tathya-samvrti and Mithya- samvrti49. Hence, ultimately three grades of reality are accepted by the yogacara ; namely, Mithya-samvrti, Tathya- samvrti & Paramarthika Satya. These thrce grades are other- wise known as Parikalpita, Para-tantra and Pari-nispanna respectively50. This triple classification may easily be brought into line with the advaitic triple classification of reality into Pratibhasika, Vyavaharika and Paramarthika. Hence, it is unfair to assert that the Buddhist subjective idealist can not consistently admit of any erroneous cognition in his system. A cognition is illusory when it does not withstand a pragmatic test or when it fails to be shared in common by others and to be coherent with other ideas51. In other words, the external world with its law of uniformity of nature is a pragmatic reality, though, ultimately a fiction; but, when a phenomenon turns out to be a double fiction because of its failure to square itself up with the law of uniformity, it is damned as an error or illusion. Moreover, we should here profitably call to mind the distinction between Samvadi bhrama and Visamvadi bhrama as

48. Cf. "Dve satye samupāśritya Buddhānām dharmadeśanā Loka- samvrti-satyanca satyanca paramarthatah" (Mād. Kā.) Also "Samvrtiḥ paramārthaśca satyadvayam idam smrtam/Buddhera- gocaram tattvam buddhih samvrtirucyate" (Bodhi-Caryavatara of Santideva). 49. See Bodhi-caryāvatāra-pañjikā, P, 353. 50. "Maya-krtam mantra-vasat khyati hastyatmanayatha/Ākara-matram tatrāsti hastī nāsti tu sarvathā//Svabhāvo kalpito hastī paratantrastadākrtih/ yastatra hastyabhavo'sau pari-nispanna isyate", (Tri-Svabhava-nirdeśa ḥ) 51. Vide Dr, J. N. Sinha's Indian Realism.

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analysed by Dharmakirtis2. This distinction will help us a long way in understanding the yogacara position in regard to error. A mithya-samvrti may be likened unto Visamvadi bhrama, while a tathya-saivrti may represent samvadi bhrama.

We may hazard another interpretation of the situation, all our own, in keeping with the yogacara doctrine. When a pravrtti-vijnana of silver is abosrved as such by the alaya -. vijnana, the cognition and its cognitum are empirically real ; but, when a pravrtti-vijnana of a nacre in its indeterminate state gives rise to that of a silver and the latter is accepted as such by the alaya-vijnana, this sliver and its cognition are both false. Be that as it may, the yogacara is in perfect agreement with the Advaitin in his postulation of the three grades of reality. The only important point in which he differs from the latter is in his denial of a permanent self. Even in this regard he has recourse to an unceasing flow of consciousness, of Vijnana-santana, which has a sort of stream-like permanence. To be honest to oneself,. it is really difficult to properly appraise the metaphysical. position of the yogacara vis-a-vis the Advaitin and this difficulty has grown into menacing magnitude due to the paucity of yogacara texts. Indeed, one might wish it were not a far cry from Vijnanadvaita to Kevaladvaita, but that will remain a wishful thinking only until further materials on yogacara. metaphysics are easily available to us.

52. Cf. "Maņi-pradīpa-pra bhayormaņibuddhyā' bhidhavatoh/Mithyā- jñānāvišese'pi viśeso' rtha-kriyam prati".

CHAPTER X

ASAT-KHYĀTI

The theory of Asat-khyati is generally fathered upon the Madhyamika's or the nihilist buddhists. In the narrower sense of Asat-samsarga-khyati, the theory worms its devious way into. almost all other khyativadas. Thus, the Bhattas, the Jainas and the Naiyayikas, to mention only a few, have had to accept in some way or other the asat-samsarga-khyati, though they never expressly confess it. Indeed, on acute analysis it will transpire that almost all the different theories of illusion implicitly involve an element of Asat-samsarg&-khyati which sits tight on them like a parasite and saps their foundation .. But such a position is brought out by logical scrutiny and is never professed in the theories themselves. So, in all fairness to these theories, they should not be included in any dissertation on Asat-khyati. But, the Anyatha-khyati theory of the Madhvas should certainly be accepted as a variant of Asat-khyati inasmuch as their theory is otherwise known as "Sad-uparaktasat-khyati". This theory will, however, be taken up for discussion along with the general theory of Anyatha-khyati. And the Sadasat-Khyati of the Samkhya, which is openly an asat-khyati in one aspect, has already been disposed of. So, we are here concerned only with the general theory of Asat-khyati which is advocated by the Madhya- mika's only. Some scholars, however, are of the opinion that the Carvakas also upheld the theory of Asat-khyati,. Udayana in his Nyaya-kusumanjali is perfectly clear on this point and we may without any prejudice refer this theory to all the three classes of Carvakas, namely, the Dhurtas, the well-trained Carvakas of the type of purandara and the Vaitandika or the Tattvopaplavavadins.

1. Cf. "Asat-khyāti-vādinā ca cārvākeņa tatha anabhyupagamat" (VSM. of Prakāśānanda, P. 271). Also, "Sarvatha śunya-vadina-stattvopaplava-vadino brahma-vādino vā jagradupalabdhartha-kriyayam kim na bādhaka-pratyayah" (Tattvārtha- śloka-vārttika of Vidyānandī). Also, see Nyayakusumañjali.

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But, except the Tattvopaplava-simha of Jaya-rasi-bhatta2. we have no other book on carvaka materialism to draw upon, and in the circumstances, it is not possible to attempt an exposi- tion of the theory as upheld by them. Moreover, the carvakas in general, leaving aside the Vaitandikas, however, are not nihilists and they advocate Asat-khyati only in the sense that the non- existent may be intuited and not also in the reverse sense that what-ever is intuited is non-existent. Thus, they admit the verbal cognition of God and the like that are non-existent to them. So, we confine ourselves here only to the consideration of the full-blooded theory as sponsored by the Madhyamika's.

The Madhyamika buddhists believe in no reality whatsoever, whether mental or extra-mental and as such they are known as Sunya-vadins. They proceed a step further from the yogacara and show that even cognition is not a reality. Reason lays bare the hollowness of all so-called entities which are bundles of inconsistencies and can in no wise pass the test of logical scrutiny. So, all experience is a delusion. There is no causation and hence nothing exists. There is no bondage or liberation. The whole panorama of existence is a mighty illusion ushered into existence through the impelling force of timeless Avidya which has the peculiar potency of showing off the non-existent. The Madhyamika points out that the yogacara has lamentably failed in appraising the irresistible logical deductions of his own assump- tion of consciousness as the sole reality. For, if consciousness alone is real, the object-consciousness of the blue and that of the yellow will negate each other and both will be reduced to non- entity like a santanantara3. So, everything of our experience is unreal; everything is void. Reality and falsity are exclusive terms and they can never co-exist. If experience were conversant with reality, it would necessarily stamp with reality the ex- perience, its object, its substrate and the necessary relations. But, no disputant accepts the reality of all of them. So, when one or more of them are proved to be unreal, logical consistency

2. Cf. "Tadevam upaplutesveva tattveșu avicārita-ramanīyāh sarve vyavahara gha!anta iti". (Tattopaplava-simha of Jayarasi). 3. "Tatha hi nīle pravrttam jnānam pītādau na pravartate iti pītādeḥ santanantaravadabhava etc."

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demands that the whole scheme should be unreal4. Hence, the void is the only reality, though this void is not something positive. Nothing is not 'something' that is delivered to us by reason. On the contrary, it is a negation of all affirmation and at the same time the negation of affirmation of negation itself as something. Hence, the void is the negative truth about the universe of our experience. Still the inscrutable Avidya spins out for us the empiric world of experience which is accorded a provisional reality called Samvrti-satya as opposed to paramartha- satya. The whole epistemology of the Madhyamika is hinged upon the assumption that what is non-existent may be intuited, not only through verbal indirectness, but even directly through perception. The advaitin accepts the verbal apprehension of the non-existent, though denying its direct intuition. The Madhvas, however, think that the non-existent may even be directly intuited when it is somehow affianced with an existent even as Rahu, which is but the ascending node, becomes perceptible when it eclipses the sun. But, the Madhyamika differs from both of them and asserts that an asat may be intuited in itself and no intermediary need be called into request for the purpose. So, it is the non-existent that is apprehended by us in our normal and illusory experiences alike. Hence, asatkhyati is the general rule with all our empiric experience fraught both with error and provisional reality, with mithya-samvrti and satya-samvrti. So, when our normal experience is grounded in Asat, it is only to be expected that an error, which cannot withstand the pragmatic test and which is not a socialised product 'to the widest commonalty spread', should be all the more bred in it. Hence, the theory of errors as advocated by the Madhyamika is Asat- khyāti. The Madhyamika tries to prove his thesis in the following manner :- Apart from all metaphysical preoccupations, it may be easily proved that in an illusory experience like 'this is silver', the intuited silver turns out to be non-existent on scrutiny. For, one apprehends it upon a nacre where it is assuredly not. So, it is evidently asat. The typical example of an illusion with the Madhyamika is, however, the intuition of a

4. "yadi drstam sat tadā tad-viśistasya darśanasya idantāyā adhișthā- masya ca etc." (P. 17, SDS). . 6

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Kesonduka or a woollen mass of hair which is postulated to have no substratum at all. Thus, the locus being not, the thing located is also not. For, the world of our fancy being a relational. one, if one relatum is negated and knocked off, the whole structure tumbles down in no time. The Madhyamika points out that all the disputationists are to concede direct cognition of non-existence either in regard to relation or to relatum ; and once one accepts the contingency of direct intuition of the non-existent, one inevitably casts one's anchor at the shore of Asat-khyati and cannot but accept the theory at least for self-consistency and also. in deference to the law of parsimony, For, otherwise, one has to assume a lot of things like the recollection of the illusory silver, for example, its concealment (pramosa) and consequent absence: of discrimination between perception and recollection and the likes. The Madhyamika is no less devoted to the deliverance of perception than his rivals, but unlike them he lays emphasis on the negative intuition consequent upon an illusory cognition,. i.e. upon the recanting intuition of the type 'Nedain rajatam' (this is not silver) or 'Asadeva rajatam abhat (The non-existent silver did verily appear) and purports to say that such negative intuition itself proves Asat-khyati indisputably. Moreover, the law of presumption proves that the silver, for example, must be asat ; otherwise, its sublation does not stand to reason. So, to justify sublation, we must assume the silver to be illusory. And, this law of presumption is the strongest argument in settling a. dispute 6. To follow the summary of the contention of the Madhyamika as presented by a scholar of a rival school : The silver presented in an illusory cognition cannot be real ; for, then, it cannot be contradicted. Nor can it be both real and unreal at the same time ; for, reality and unreality are mutually exclusive. If, however, the two are affirmed of the same silver in different spatio-temporal relations, they may equally be affirmed of a pitcher and the like, that are the cognita of our normal valid

5. "Sūnya-vadinastu ...... rūpyādeļ viparīta-dharmatvasya avidyamāna- sya kalpanam bhasamanatām acaksate atyanta-laghavat. Itaratha rupya- smaranam tat-pramosa tannimittāvivekasceti garīyasī kalpana syat". (PV., P. 8, Madras Uni. Skt. Series) 6. Cf. "Anyathanupapattisced asti Vastu-prasādhika/pinasti drstavai- matyam saiva sarva-baladhika" (KKK. of Srīharsa).

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experience. Moreover, accepting, for argument's sake, the affirma- tion of both reality and unreality, one cannot damn as erroneous a cognition like 'this is real silver' ; for, its reality has already been affirmed. If, however, it is pointed out by the opponent that the cognition is erroneous only because the silver which is. real-cum-unreal, has been taken as real only, the retort will be as follows :- It follows from the opponent's argument that a cognition, that is partial and imperfect, is erroneous. In that case, the subsequent sublating cognition will also be erroneous, because it is impressed only with the unreality-aspect of the real-unreal silver. If such a contingency be granted, all talk of one cognition being negated and falsified by another will turn out to be hollow. So, what appears in an illusory cognition is non- existent7.

If one argues to the contrary that a non-existent cannot be an object of knowledge simply because it cannot be a cause, the Madhyamika would point out that he does not advocate a causal theory of knowledge and hence there is no bar to a non-existent being a cognitum. In fact, cognition itself has a peculiar potency whereby the non-existent may be apprehended as existent. Indeed, this inexplicable potency of cognition calculated to manifest the non-existent is called Avidya by thems. The traditional four causes of the Buddhists are not necessary here. Avidya aided by the timeless divers impressions is potent enough to make a show of reality where there is no reality at all. Thus, in all cases of errors and illusions, (hallucinations and delusions are all the more welcome) it is only the non-existent that appear as

7. "Na tavad idam sadeva, badha-bodha-virodhat. Napi sadasat. Tatraiva tadaiva tasyaiva sad-asattva-virodhat. Deśa-kāla-prakāra-Vyavas- thaya sad-asattva-ngikare ghaladi-tulyata-patat. Kim caivam sati sad idam rajatam iti juanam bhrantirnaiva bhavet. Sattvasya vidyamanatvat etc." (NS. of Jayatirtha), (This shows how anticipatory arguments are cooked up by opponents to discredit their rivals without much ado. Indeed, it is too much to expect that a Madhyamika would argue out his case in the above manner). 8. "Na casato vi aya-bhavo nopapadyate ; Na hi visayatvam karapatvam yenāsati na syāt, kintu sva-kārauadhīnaḥ sāmarthyātiśayah sa tādrso jūānasya yena santam ivasantam api gocarayati ...... Ata eva asat-prakāśana- samarthyameva mithya-jnananam avidyatvam anirvacanīyatvam kecid asthi- sata'. (P. 54, NVTT., Vizianagram Skt. Series).

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existent and hence asatkhyati is the theory of errors and illusions that stands to reason. The speciality of the theory is that in it both the qualifier and the qualificand, the attribute and the substantive, the superimposed entity and the substratum are equally false. Hence, the general contention in regard to an invalid cognition that 'Dharmini sarvam abhrantam prakare to viparyayah' does not hold good here. In point of fact, neologicians have demonstrated that there may be cognitions which are entirely false, the subject and the predicate of the judgment being equally non-existentsa. It seems to us that neo-logicians thus render incalculable service to the establishment of the theory of Asat-khyati. For, once it is proved that an asat may be super- imposed upon another asat, the situation may easily be universal- ised and extended to all the phenomena of our experience. Thus, asat-khyati seems to thrive on the omissions and commissions of rival philosophers and strengthen its citadel against all inimi- cal onslaughts. But, the truth of the cartesian dictum 'Cogito ergo sum' is never unavailing and we may, following it, assert that I exist, because I deny ; not only that ; the fact of denial exists as also the fancied existence. From the last one it may be deduced that some existence must exist somewhere in whose likeness existence may be fancied at all. Hence, to deny all is to deny the denial itself and thus to revert to the affirmation of all. That is why Badarayana has with much brevity refuted the position in the Sutra "Nabhava Upalabdheh". So, Asat-khyati as a general metaphysical theory is self-condemned.

Let us now present its refutation by the rival philosophers. Vidyaranya in his Vivarana-Prameyasamgraha combats the theory mainly from a metaphysical standpoint and lays bare its hollowness. He points out that there can neither be an error without a real substratum, nor a sublation (Badha) divorced from a term of reference. The Kesonduka and Gandharva-nagara (Fata morgana) are not really without substratum. For, the

8a. Suppose I mistake the surging billows of the sea for a hill and the water tinged with the crimson rays of the sun for fire and say 'the hill is fiery'. Such a judgment is entirely false. Here, however, some might disagree and point out that 'dharmin' is not the logical substratum, but the ontological base. But, that goes against the assumption of the neo-logician.

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optical rays arched through the pressure of finger are the substratum of the former and 'Akasa' is that of the latter. If this be not accepted, even nihilistic cognition will become errone- ous and that will invalidate nihilism itself. If, however, the Madhyamika tries to wriggle out of the situation by assuming that jnanadhyasa and Arthadhyasa are the mutual substrata of cach other, this will lead to the fallacy of interdependence. This interdependence is not of the order of the seed-and-the-sprout series ; for, fhe Madhyamika cannot point out any permanent entity running through the series of jnanadhyasa and Arthadhyasa just like mud which is an invariable constant pervading the seed-and-the-sprout series. In the ultimate analysis, the witness-consciousness must be inalienably taken as the substratum of error and the term of reference of sublation. [ndeed, the sunya cannot be the substratum; for, it never pervades the superimposed entity. Had it been otherwise, our cognition would have taken the form 'Sunyam rajatam' rather than the form 'idam ra jatam'. Similary, Sunya cannot serve as the term of reference of badha. It can neither be the superim- posed entity ; for, then, it could not be directly apprehended. If the Madhyamika welcomes the position, he cannot explain the apprehension of sublation either. So, the theory is fraught with inconsistencies and is untenable9.

In fact, the 'idam' of the fallacious cognition 'idam rajatam" must be taken to be real, because its existence is apprehended both before and after the illusory cognition. If the element referred to by 'idam' were otherwise, then it would not have been pointed out with the finger both in illusion and in recanta- tion and seized in the former, while forsaken in the lattcr. More- over, the Madhyamika has to explain the genesis of such an in- valid cognition. Defective organs cannot generate it. For, in the absence of any intercourse with the sensedata, the senses can- not be operative. And there cannot be any intercourse with the

9. "Naitat sāram ...... bestitānām netra-raśmīnām keśoņdrakā-dhisthāna- tvāt Ākāśasya ca gandharvanagarā-dhisthānatvāt. Anyathā śūnya-jñānasyāpi bhramatva-prasangat. Tathatve ca Sunyasiddheh. Jñānajñeya-bhrama- yoranyonyadhisthanatve ca adhisthanasya purva-bhavitvena anyonyaśrayat- vāt. Bījankura-nyāyena jnana-jneya-vyaktīnam paramparabhyupagame'pi Bijankurapravahanugatamrdvat jnana-jneya-pravahanugatasya sthayinah kasyacit abhyupagantavyatvat etc." (Pp. 16-17, VPS., Vol. 2, Beng. ed.).

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unreal. If intercourse with the nacre and the like is affirmed, the intuition of the nacre cannot be denied at the same time. If it is argued that nescience is the cause of the apprehension of silver, then one cannot shut out the contingency of even a blind man apprehending it even in the absence of nacre. If to avert such a calamitous situation it is assumed that the sense-nacre-contact serves as the auxiliary cause, then the nacre ought to be apprehended as such even like the ground, the ultimate locus. If then the totality of cause is reinforced by the nonapprehension of nacreness due to defect, then since the Madhyamika does not accept any substratum of illusion, it cannot be decided incontestably whether the non-apprehension of the ground or that of the nacre is the cause. Furthermore, the unreal silver of the Madhyamika conception cannot. appear as unreal. For, an unreal cannot prompt any conation. If then it is admitted that the unreal appears as real, the admission inevitably paves the way for Anyathakhyati. In that case it is better to assume that what appears as silver is verily a nacre10.

The Madhyamika may further be pushed to a tight corner by asking him to explain the nature and function of Avidya which is professedly a potency of Vijnana. Indeed, what does the potentate Vijnana achieve with its potency of Avidya ? In other words, what is the exact function of Avidya ? Does it create the unreal object, or simply reveal it ? The first alterna- tive is not tenable ; for, an unreal cannot be created, and even though such creation be conceded, Avidya will consequentially forfeit the alternative function of revealing the unreal which will then remain unapprehended. The second alternative also does not stand to reason. For, Avidya cannot reveal the unreal object as the content of some other cognition, which is assuredly not, according to the Madhyamika. Even if some other cogni- tion be granted, that will have to be revealed by another cogni-

10. "Tad asat. Idam-kārāspadasya śuktika-sakalasya prag urdhvam sattvāvagamāt. Yadi ca na tad idam-kārāspadam tadā na bhrānti-bādhayor- angulyagrena nir-diset nopadadyat na parityajet. Kim cāsya jñānasya kāraņam vaktavyam. Duştendriyādikam iti cenna. Tasya sannikarsādyana- peksasya kāraņatāyam atiprasaugat. Asatā ca sanni-karsayogat" etc. etc. up to "Sattayā pratibhāse tu anyathā-khyātiņ aūgīkrteti śuktireva rūpyatayā avabhāsate iti kuto nāngīkaraņīyam (NS. of Jayatīrtha).

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tion, and that by another, and thus there will arise the fallacy of infinite regression. If to steer clear of this difficulty, it is argued that Avidya reveals the unreal as a content of the self- same cognition, it does not improve the position. For, then cognition, which is the substratum of the potency called Avidya, becomes at once the potentate and the potential ('Sakya') of the potency, Avidya. In other words, the cognition itself becomes the very thing to be achieved by Avidya. But, this is impossible. For, it is flagrant contradiction to hold that an entity is at once 'being' ('Siddha') and 'becoming' ('Sadhya')-'being' as the substrate of potency, and 'becoming' as the object of that potency. Indeed, the same cognition becoming the revealer and the revealed at the same time is impossible. If, now, the taciturn Madyamika argues that the Vijñana itself is the revela- tion of the unreal, the retort will be that there can be no relation between the real and the unreal. The relation of the deter- minate-and-the-determinant ( 'Nirūpya-Nirūpaka-sambandha' ) between the cognition and the unreal object is not maintainable. For, this determination dependent on the unreal is in its turn dependent upon some other relation and that upon some other, thus leading again to infinite regression. Moreover, the unreal can not be the substrate of a relation, nor of the atisaya ('excess') generated by the cognition. Hence, the Madhyamika contention is untenable11.

11. " ...... Vijñānam eva avidyayā asat-prakāśana-śaktimad iti cet tarhi vaktavyam kim asyāḥ sakyam iti. yadi asadeva kim etasyāh kāryam uta etajjnapyam. Nādyaḥ, asato 'kāryatvāt prakāśana-saktitva-vyaghātācca. Na dvitīyaņ, prakāśāntarābhāvāt anavasthanācca. Tadeva vijnanam asataḥ prakāśa iti cenna. Vijñānāśrayām śaktim prati vijñānasyaiva śakta-śakya- tayā vişayatvānupapatteḥ. Na hi ekasya ekadaiva siddhatayā śaktyāśraya- tvam asiddhatayā ca tadvisayatvam sambhavati yugapadeva siddha-sādhya- tvavirodhat ...... Astu tarhi ...... vijnānam eva asataḥ prakāśa iti cenna. Tad- adhīnanirūpaņa-tvasyāpi sambandhāntaradhīnatvāt asataśca nirupākhyatvāt sambandhādhāratā-nupapatteh, jnāna-janyatisayana-dhāratvācca". (Pp. 70- 71, TP. of Citsukha). Also "yato yeyam asat-prakasana-śaktir-vijnānasya, kimpunar-asyāḥ śakyam, Asaditi cet, kim etat kāryam āhosvit asyā jñāpyam etc." (P. 22, Bhã.) Also "Sakyābhāve saktereva asiddhatvāt. Na cāsadeva asya śakyam iti vacyam etc." (P. 195, SSD. of Purusottama-Prasāda). Also see Nyāyama- karanda.

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Vimuktatman in his Ista-siddhi refutes Asat-khyati on the following grounds :

(1) If in the illusory cognition "this is silver", the silver is taken to be unreal, it contradicts the intuition of silver as real. If the unreal may appear as real, it leads to universal lack of certitude in knowledge and, who knows, even what appears as real may be unreal. Besides, the unreal cannot be appre- hended12.

(2) If the Asat-khyati theory be accepted, the apprehension and rejection of the silver, for example, cannot be explained. If the cognition apprehends an unreal silver, it should be apprehended as such ; but, in fact, it is apprehended as real ;. so, it is not the unreal silver that appears. If it is argued that the subsequent recanting cognition brings home to our mind the unreality of the silver, the situation does not stand scrutiny. What, pray, is the unreality of the silver ? Is it the silver itself, or the silver in another form, or something else ? In the first alternative, the recanting cognition will contrari-wise streng- then the reality of the silver all the more. The other two alternatives are untenable, because they presuppose the reality of the silver, which, however, is denied in the theory. So, the silver must needs be real. Indeed, from the above it follows that to say that an unreal silver appears as real means practically that the real appears as real13. Moreover, if an unreal can serve as a cognitum, the means of cognition may as well be unreal; and once it is accepted, there arises the ludicrous contingency of the unreal being apprehended all the while. If such means of cognition might dispel error, then, such means being omnipresent, an error will never occur. Moreover, if the means be admitted to be unreal, it will make room for the perpetual apprehension

12. "Anye' satah khyātyayogāt sat-samvitti-virodhata h/Nasatkhyatir- anaśvāsāt ...... " (P. 41, IS,) 13. "Asaccet rūpyam buddhya jñāyate, asadātmanaiva jñāyeta ; sadāt- manā tu jñāyate .. ... Tasyasattvam badhaka-jnanam bodhayatīticettasya- sattvam nama kim tadeva, kim va tasyaiva rupantaram, utanyat .. ... Tadeva cet, badhakam apitadeva sad-rupam drdhīkuryat. Rupantaram api hi tasya tasmin satyeva bhavet. Tatha tato'nyad api .. ... ata sattvam eva rūpyasya nasattvam ......... Ato' sat sadātmanā khyāti ityukte sadeva sadāt- mana khyatītyarthah syat". (pp. 116-118, Ibid).

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of the real beside that of the unreal; and the conflicting claims will invalidate and nullify both14. Vimuktatman asserts that a cognition can only inform, but cannot annul. So, the recanting cognition only informs by dispelling the ignorance, but does not negate the silver1s.

(3) If the void appears as the real silver, does it appear so of itself, or due to some extraneous cause ? In both the cases, the void will be not. Moreover, in the first alternative, the silver and the void being identical, the disappearance of the silver will mean the disappearance of the void too. So,. Asatkyati cannot be maintained at all-epistemologically. logically or metaphysically 1e. We may humbly point out further all on our own that the Madhyamika hastily concludes the unreality of all from the unreality of some relata or relations of a system of relations for which he has very little epistemological or logical sanction. For, while the negative cognition suggests unreality, the prior positive intuition suggests reality with equal vehemence, if not more. The argument based on the mutual exclusiveness of reality and unreality may cut both ways and if reality can catch contagion of unreality and become unreal, unreality in its turn may also be absorved by the real and become itself real. Moreover, the theory implicitly involves, besides Anyatha-khyati, an element of Akhyati also ; for, here the unreal silver is not apprehended as unreal. So, the theory is condemned to the core and illogical to the marrow and cannot be maintained by any one except a Vaitandika who revels only in destructive criticism and has no positive thesis to prove and hold fast to. It can neither explain the genesis of error, nor the conation following it, nor even the final rejection of error. The ultimate paradox

14. "Yadi asadapi meyam syāt, asadapi mānam kim na syāt, syāccet, sadaiva asata khyatiḥ syāt. Sa ced bhrantim nudet, tasyāḥ sadā-bhāvāt na Kadācidapi bhrānti syāt. Asadapi cenmānam syāt, sat-khyātirapi sadaiva syāt· Sad-asat-khyātyośca virodhe naikāpi syāt, aviśeșāt". (P. 118, Ibid). 15. "Akārakatvāt jnānasya, anyathā ati-prasangāt. Ato bodhakam eva jñānam, ajñanam tu nivartayet ... Jñānasya jñeyānāsakatvāt". (P. 117, Ibid.). Also "Na hanti bādha-dhīrvastu sā hi tattva-prakāsikā" (P, 154, Ibid). 16. "Bhāti rūpyātmatā yasya sa svatah kimutānyata/Svatascenna tato'- peyāt tadrūpatvāt na sūnyatā etc." (P. 179, Ibid.)

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of the situation is that the arguments of nihilists turn back upon them like a boomerang and their pet dogma of Asat-khyati withers away before logical scrutiny like leaves of a tree in wvinter17.

Note

The above dissertation is an exposition of the Madhyamika standpoint and of its refutation on traditional lines. Beginning from the most ancient Vatsyayana and Vyasa, commentators of NS. and YS. respectively down to Viśvanatha of Bhasa-pariccheda fame and Vijñana Bhiksu, from the great Samkara down to Vidyaranya and venkata, Vyasa-tīrtha and Madhusudana, all philosophers of note of India have described the Madhyamika Buddhists as nihilists and have dubbed them Vainasikas. But, it seems almost dead sure to us that the Madhyamikas held an altogether different view which had no semblance of nihilism in it. This intriguing fact has been referred to as the decisive truth about the Madhyamika metaphysics by Dr. S. N. Dasgupta in his 'A History of Indian philosophy'. Vol. I and by Mm. Phaņibhūsan Tarkabagīsa in his Bengali expository treatise on NS. together with Va. Bhasya. They, however, did not try to demonstrate the truth from the Madhyamika treatises in any systematic manner. Mm. Tarkavagīsa, however, admits in the same breath that there was certainly a theory called Sunyatavada or nihilism in ancient India as distinguished from the Madhyamika Sunya-vada. He, however, is not sure as to which school advocated such a theory, though he studiously denied it of the Madhyamikas. Here then we are confronted with an almost interminable puzzle of the history of Indian philosophy. It seems extremely odd to surmise that even Sankara was ill-equipped to present a faithful exposition of the Madhyamika doctrine and acutely disquieting, nay blasphemous, to choose to think that he wilfully distorted it with a view to achieving an easy victory over his opponent. Still, the fact seems undeniable that the Madhyamika is not a nihilist. He is not an empiricist, to be sure. A rationalist he is undoubtedly and his rationalism leads him to agnosticism. If he is at all

17. Cf. "Yatha yatharthascintyante Visīryante tatha tatha" (SDS, P. 15).

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an empiricist,-for, certain statements of his point to such a conclusion-his empiricism is of the type of thorough-going sensationism though unlike that of the western neo-realists. But, all these facts havo never been thrashed out by any scholar as yet. It is a pity that even the term 'Madhyamika' has not been properly explained as yet. Though I may possibly play the fool, while rushing in where angels fear to tread', I crave the never-failing indulgence of the masters and propose, with due deference to my predecesors, to try to establish on a solid basis the truth about the Madhyamika doctrine as tacitly put forward by Dr. Dasgupta, and Mm. Tarkvagisa* (See also Radhakrishnan's I. P. Vol. I, Pp. 662-666).

In this connection it is to be noted that Prof. Hiriyanna studiously subscribes to the traditional view, though, on the authority of Candra-kīrti, he distinguishes Madhyamika nihilism from vulgar nihilism, the former being called critical and the latter dogmatic18. But, the learned professor seems to misrepresent the import of Candra-kirti's remark. It is a pity that neither he. nor any other scholar has attempted any serious interpretation of even the term 'Madhyamika'. The traditional interpretation as found in Vidyaranya's SDS and such other treatises seems to be based on folk-etymology. The learned professor glibly observes : "The term signifies an adherent of the 'middle path', which is a distinctive feature of Buddhism" (Footnote, P. 206). That the term does not owe its origin from 'the middle path'19 is quite apparent and it will be all the more clear from the discussion that follows.

Let us then first try to understand the meaning of the term 'Madhyamika'. Nāgārjuna in his Mādhyamika-kārika asserts that "a wise man discards the two extremes of a situation, say,

• How can I with my poor lights ignore or under-rate the deliberations of my predecessors, bearing in mind the admirable humility of no less a personage than Abhinava Gupta expressed in the following śloka :- "Tasmāt Satāmatra na dūșitāni matāni tānyeva tu sodhitāni/Pūrva- pratisthāpita-yojanāsu mūla-pratis!hā-phalam āmananti" ? (P. 280, Abhinava- bhāratī). 18. See OIP. of Prof. Hiriyanna, p. 222. 19. "The middle path" is the golden mean of couduct as accepted by the Buddhists.

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existence and non-existence, purity and impurity ; still he does not welcome the mean of the two"20. This assertion proves beyond any spectre of doubt that the Madhyamika does not uphold the middle path ; in other words, he does not accept even sadasat as the reality, even after ruling out the two extremes of Sat and asat. This fact is readily corroborated by. the following verse : "Catuskoti-vinirmuktam tattvam saugata- sammatam". But, then, this 'tattva' of the Madhyamika is not an entity of the fifth category like the cessation of nescience of the Advaitins. (In fact, the Madhyamika does not support the Advaitic phillosophy of universal negation in the locus of a positive Brahman, nor the Jaina philosophy of alternative. standpoints). He characterises his intuition of things as 'madhyama pratipat'. This word 'madhyma' has certainly given rise to the term 'madhyamika'. Now, the word 'madhyama' here cannot connote the middle path, the golden mean ; for, that has already been discarded as being not the reality. The word, then, may only mean 'indifferent', 'detached'. The 'madhyama pratipat', therefore, means that the intuition is. indifferent to and detached from the two extremes and their mean and does not submit to any concretisation or characteri -. sation. Hence, such indifferent intuition reveals to us entities that are 'madhyamika' of which nothing can be affirmed or denied in as much as they possess no definable character2 1. Thus, the theory has been very significantly named 'Madha- mika'. The crux of the theory is that it stands against all categorisation and concludes that entities are devoid of any definitive character2 2. Nagarjuna and his scholiast candra-kīrti equate the 'madhyama pratipat', which is uncharacterisable, with Sunyata and the latter again with Pratitya-samutpada. Indeed, as Nagarjuna says, "It is Pratītya-samutpada that is christened Sunyata ; and the cognition of this Sunyata is called the

20. "Astīti nāstīti ubhe'pi antā śuddhī aśuddhīti ime 'piantā/Tasmā- dubhe ante vivarjayitva madhye'pi sthanam na Karoti panditah" (MK. P. 97, Budd. Text Soc. of India). 21. "Tasmat madhyamikanam eva bhavanam svabhavanabhyupagamat"" (M. Vr. of Candra-kīrti, P. 119). 22. Cf. "Buddhya vivicyamananam etc." quoted before.

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'madhyama Pratipat"23. To understand the Madhyamika philosophy, then, is to understand in their fullest implications the terms Pratītya-samutpada, Sunyata and Madhyama Pratipat. So far as the last one, which has been presently discussed, is concerned, it should be noted that it does not make room for any analogue of the marxian theory of penetration of opposites as has been curiously assumed by some Bengali writers with communistic leanings. Sunyata is not a conception of nothingness, but of an analytical negativity of all positive categorisation. It steers clear of all idolatry of thought and, instead of denying an entity, it points out the failure of reason to characterise it ; as a result, the entity becomes indeterminable. The philosophy of Sunyata thus becomes equated with the philosophy of Tathata as propounded by Aśva-ghosa. From another standpoint Sunyata means the absence of origin of anything by its own nature and constitution24. Candra- Kīrti in his Prasanna-pada Vrtti quotes Lankavatara-sūtra to the following effect : 'Oh you of great intellect ! I have shown all entities to be Sunya with a view to implying the absence of origin of them all by their very nature", e"25. For, as Nagarjuna asserts : "What is born through causes and conditions, is, in fact, unborn ; for, it is not born out of its own nature". In another place he says : "If existence were bred in the nature of a thing, that thing could not have lapsed into non-existence ; for, the proposition of the nature of a thing being altered does not stand to reason"27. Nagarjuna is categorical on the point that nothing can originate without the dependence of causes

23. "yah pratītya-samutpādah śūnyatām tām pracaksmahe/Sā prajñap- tirupādāya pratipat saiva madhyamā" (MK., P. 184). Also "Sarvasva bhāvānutpatti-laksaņā sūnyatā madhyamā pratipat mad- hyamā marga ityucyate. Tadevam pratītya-samutpādasyaive ete viseșa- samjñāņ sūnyatām upadāya prajnaptiņ madhyamā pratipat" (M. Vr., P. I85). 24. "Sarva-svabhāvānutpatti-laksaņā Sūnyatā ...... " (Ibid, P. 185). 25. "Svabhava-nutpattim Sandhaya mahamate sarvadharmāh Sunyā iti maya darsitah" (Ibid.) 26. "Yah paratyayai-rjayati sa hyajatah na tasya utpadah svabhavato' sti" (M. K, P. 185). 27. "Yadastitvam prakrtya syānna bhavedasya nāstitā/Prakrteranyathā- bhāvo na hi jātūpapadyate (MK., P. 97)

94 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

and conditions ; origin implies dependent origin. And whatever has dependent origin, is, on that very account, born not of itself, not through its own nature, but through the operation of extraneous agents. So, it is a Sunya and it follows that there is no object that is not Sunya2 9. Nagarjuna employs his implacable dialectics to prove that the whole scheme of worldly relations has no demonstrable character, positive or negative. As he argues; "Since there may be no Karma having dependent origination, or bereft of it, there may be no karta either. If, then, karta and karma are knocked out of existence, there can be no fruit of actions ; and, in the absence of it, there can be no enjoyer 29. So, the outer world and the inner mental world are both Sunya and the experient of Sunya is also naught30. Following the same kind of reasoning, Nagarjuna asserts that neither existence nor non-existence can be affirmed of the so-called soul31. The conception of causality and the like are mere figments of imagination. As one perceives the reflection of one's face in a mirror and the reflec- tion is, to be sure, no reality, so does egoity appear in the wake of the assumption of Skandhas. Does then Nagarjuna advocate some sort of nihilism ? The answer is an emphatic 'no'. Nagarjuna says that our afflictions, actions, fruits of actions and. our bodies and the like are like Fata morgana, the mirage and the dream 3 2. Commenting on this, Candra-kirti says : "All these are to be conceived as being devoid of any character like Fata morgana etc"33. Candra-kīrti thrashes out the point in

28. "Apratītya samutpanno dharmaḥ Kaścinna vidyate/Pratītyasamut- pannaśca śūnyastasmad asunyodharmo nāsti". (MK., P. 186). 29. "Na pratyaya-samutpannam na pratyaya-samujjhitam/Asti yasmā- didamı karma tasmāt kartāpi nāstyatah//Karma cennāsti kartāca kutaļ syāt karmajam phalam/Asatye' tha phalebhokta kuto eva bhavisyati (MK., P. 117). 30. "Tathoktam bhagavatā: "Sunyam adhyātmikai pasya pasya sunyamı bahirgatam/Na vidyate sopi kascid yo bhavayati sunyatām (Mk., P. 124). 31. Atmanostitva-nastitve na kathancana sidhyatah (MK., P. 163). Also "Buddhairātmā na vā natmā kascid ityapidarsitam (Mk,, P. 127) 32. "Kleśah karmāņi dehaśca phalāni ca/Gandharva-nagarākārā marīci- swapna-sannibhah (Mk., P. 119). 33. "Gandharva-nagarakaradivat niḥsvabhavā veditavyah (M. Vr.,. P, 119).

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 95.

another place and openly denies any semblance of nihilism in their theory in the following manner : "We are not nihilists, to. be sure. Neither do we deny the existence of karma, karta, phala and the like ; we merely ordain that they are devoid of any character"34. So, Dr. S. N. Dasgupta is perfectly right when he observes : "It is this interdependence and relativity of all appearance that was called ...... Sunyata by Nagarjuna"35.

From our foregoing diseussion it transpires that Sunya means what is indeterminable, what is devoid of origin by itself and what has dependent origination. If now this dependent origi- nation is Sunyata, then there being no origination of anything. by itself, Sunya must be unreal. Hence, Nagarjuna clearly says : "Whatever is born through the operation of causes and condi- tions, is unborn" (See FN. 26 ante). To him truth is what knows. no lapse from its identity 3 6. Transmutation and the transmuted entity are not realities. The real must be inmutable and above all modalities. All heterisation is false and whatever is inalienably self-poised, self-sufficient and self-identical, is real. It is easy to find in this theory an analogue of the Advaitic theory of truth based on non-contradiction. But, it is easier to understand that, according to Nagarjuna and his scholiast, heterisation is but a nursling of relations. So, reality must be absolutely non-relational-a proposition which is readily accepted by the Sankarites for their absolute Brahman. The non-relational character of all reality is further emphasised by Nagarjuna when he says : "Everything is, therefore, neither Sunya, nor non- Sunya3 7. Then, what is truth and reality ? Sunya is merely a negative characterisation of the positive reality as 'neti' is of Brahman. What is 'apoha' as a logical category, is 'Sunyata' as a metaphysical concept. But, the reality is a supralogical or infra-conceptual entity. It is, to express it straightaway, a "svalaksana' which is a metaphysical untouchable fighting shy of all categories of logical thought. It is a simple intuitive integer that does not submit itself to any judgment. This

34. "Na vayam nastikah ...... Na ca vavam karma-kartrphaladikam nast īti brumah nisvabhavam eveti vyavasthapayamah (M. Vr., P. 118). 35. Vide A Hist. of Indian Philosophy., Vol. I .- Dr. S. N. Das Gupta. 36. "Tatra tathyam nama yasya anyathatvam nasti (M. Vr., P. 132). 37." "Na sunyam napi va sunyain tasmatsarvam vidhīyate (Mk., P. 860).

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'svalaksana', however, is not the one accepted in common in all the four Buddhistic schools. It differs from the other in that it is a 'svalaksana' not only logically, but ontologically too and that the 'sva' in this case means consciousness pure and simple. It is for this reason that Viveka-vilasa records that the Madhyamikas accept only self-poised consciousness as the sole reality 38.

What, then, is the nature of the external world ? Is it real, or unreal ? Nagarjuna assures us that it is unreal ; for, all the world is a super-structure on the corner-stone of egoity which is a false entity. And how can an entity, whose root-cause is false, be real39 ? But, then the world is real as an appearance, i.e. a 'samvrti-satya' from the empiric standpoint, a Sunya from the rationalistic standpoint and pure consciousness, a svalaksana from the ultimate intuitive standpoint. It is interesting to note here that to an Advaitin also the world is real from the empiric standpoint, indescribable from the rationalistic standpoint and mere Brahman from the ultimate intuitive standpoint4o.

Then, what is the difference between the Madhyamika and the Advaitin in matters of ontology ? 1t cannot be broached that while the Advaitin accepts an eternal consciousness, the Madhyamika accepts a consciousness that is fluxional and momen- tary. For, had the Madhyamika accepted such a fluxional cons- ciousness as the ultimate reality, it would have been a case of Pratitya-samutpada which would have profaned the reality into a Sunya. That is why consciousness has been qualified by the word 'Svastham' in Viveka-vilasa. So, the consciousness of the Madhyamika also is eternal and permanent. If such an exposi- tion of the Madhyamika theory is at all maintainable, then the Advaitin and the Madhyamika seem to merge their differences and advocate the same metaphysical theory with difference in name only 41.

38. "Kevalam samvidam svastham manyante madhymah punah (See Dr. A, Sastri's vedantadarśan-Advaitavāda, Vol. 3) 39. "Bijam yasyanrtam tasya prarohah satyatah kutaḥ". 40. See Fn. 5 on Satkhyati. 41. Cf. "Yat Sunya-vadinah Sunyam tadeva Brahma mayinah (Madhva's Aņubhāsya on BS. II. ii. 29).

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Once such a position is acceded to, the theory of error and illusion is bound to be one and the same in both the systems. So, it ought to be anirvacaniya-khyati or Sunya-khyati according as one or the other christens it. That it is just the fact has been incidentally shown previously. We can further demonstrate the truth of our supposition by a reference to the Lankavatara- sutra, which is curiously a medley of yogacara and Madhyamika metaphysics. The Lankavatara incidentally brings into the forum the problem of error and illusion and assesses their reality in the following manner : "Oh intelligent one! As, for example, fools label the term 'city' to a Fata morgana ; yet that city is neither a non-city, nor a city ...... that woollen mass of hair is neither existent, nor non-existent ...... Those bubbles of water, oh intelligent one ! are neither gems, nor non-gems" 42. This shows that illusion has no definable character and as such it is Sunya. Nagarjuna seems to hint at this Sunyata when he remarks : "If the mirage were water, why is it not perceived as such by the neighbouring people ?"43. But, from another standpoint, since an illusion is not a case of Pratītya-samutpada, -for, it does not depend upon the 'rupa' of the presented datum -but, rather of Adhītya-samutpada, it is not a Sunya. Neither it is a non-Sunya ; for, in that case, it would be real. So, it is neither Sunya, nor non-Sunya. Thus, again it is uncharacteris- able and hence Sunya, Candrakīrti points out that in Vijnanavada an illusion like the perception of the double moon, which is a tissue of fancied attributes, is Sunya inasmuch as it is not pratītyasamutpanna. But, 'Sunya' there means purely 'false'. Be that as it may, we feel compelled here to conclude from the fore-going discussion that the real Madhyamika theory of illusion is Sunya-khyati, which is but another name for anirvacanīya-khyati.

42. "Tad yatha mahamate gandharva-nagare' vidusam anagaram nagara- samjna bhavati ...... Tacca na garam nānagaram na nagaram ... Tacca kesoņdu- kam ...... na bhāvo nabhāvo ...... Te ca mahāmate udaka-budbudakā na maņayo namanayo ...... (Lam. Su., P. 90). 43. "Marīciryadi vari syad asannaiḥ kim na grhyate (Mk., P. 123). 7

CHAPTER XI

SAT-KHYĀTI

Vimuktatman in his Ista-siddhi broadly classifies theories of Khyati-vada in the following manner : Satkhyati, Asat-Khyati and Anirvacaniya-khyati. He further subdivides the theory of Sat-khyati into Ātma-Khyati, Akhyati and Anyatha-khyati1. While Akhyati and Anyathakhyati will be dealt wtth subse- quently, Atmakhyati has already been disposed of by us, though it is difficult to designate it, as has already been shown, as a type of Sat-khyati. The point to be specially emphasised here is that these theories are called Sat-khyati because they accept the reality of the appearance as an elsewhere and/or elsewhen entity. It is easy to understand that such a sat-khyati implies and thrives on a kind of asat-khyati; for, the moment one asserts that the nacre-silver, for example, is an elsewhere and elsewhen reality, one denies its reality now here i.e. in the locus of the nacre at the time of the intuition of the silver. Hence, such a sat-khyati presupposes asat-khyati and, on that very account, it negates. itself. It fights shy of the living present and facetiously takes. refuge in the disinterred past-a past whose reality blurs the vision and the unreality of the experienced present is not taken any note of. But, such an exotic reality cannot satisfy the demands of a thorough-going realist who abhors a reality in retreat, a reality that fails to move abreast of our work-a-day life. He contends that a dark-chamber theory of reality only shelves. the problem of epistemology without squarely answering it till at long last unreality saps its foundation outright. Indeed, once unreality is harboured and given quarter to in any sector of our experience, it would beseige and beleaguer the whole field and reality would be reduced to a non-entity. Whatever appears in perception must be existent and true ; to speak of an error is a psychological or logical absurdity. So, any intuition, any experience is invariably conversant with reality. This uncom- promising and radical Sat-khyati is advocated by the great Ramanuja, the founder of the Visistadvaita school of Vedanta.

1. "Tatra sat-pakşah tridha bhinnaļı-Ātma-khyatiņ Akhyatiḥ Anyathā- khyātiriti (I. S., P. 40).

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Ramanuja, the protagonist of qualified monism, is necessarily a dualist in epistemology. To him a cognition is recognition and to know is to discriminate. The so-called nirvikalpa is but a kind of cognition devoid of recognition. A nirvikalpa of the un- qualified type is a psychological and logical fiction .. Knowledge is not an identity, but a synthetic unity, a judgment. It always implies a subject and an object. The dharma-bhutajnana or the attributive jñana of Ramanuja is neither jada (i.e. matter), nor cetana (i.e. spirit), but is ajada. Hence 'it can only show but cannot know 3. The knower is the spirit itself, the dharmi- bhuta-jnana and, it being unchangeable, must know only what is real. Moreover, Ramanuja's description of the process of knowing implies that objects are independent of our knowledge and are therefore absolutely real. He holds that this inexorable realism is preached by the vedicists4. The spiritual forbears of Ramanuja-Bodhayana, Nathamuni, and yamunacarya-tacitly put forward this theory of Satkhyati and Ramanuja and his followers tried to give the fillip to it. Ramanuja evinced abun- dant catholicity of thought in his treatment of illusory phenomena and could easily tether his philosophical conscience equally well to either Sat-khyati or Anyatha-khyati or Akhyati. Still, this catholicity is not symptomatic of indecision through disorganised thinking ; for, while subscribing to the view of Sat-khyati ontolo- gically, he lends his warmest support to Anyatha-khyati from the psychological and logical standpoint. But, then again, the law of parsimony inclines him towards the theory of Akhyati An interesting point to be noted here is that a cognition of error, according to Ramanuja, is a case of Sat-khyati from the vedic (Śrauta) standpoint, an anyatha-khyati from the psychological (laukika) standpoint and an akhyati from the logical standpoint. This reminds one of Vidyaranya's assertion that the cognition of an illusion is real from the empiric standpoint, indes- cribable from the logical standpoint and 'tuccha' from the scrip- tural stand-points. Does then Ramanuja make room for grades

2. "Sapratyavamarsa-pratyaksam savikalpam. Tadrahitam pratyaksam nirvikalpam (NP. of Venkata). 3. Vide OIP., P. 337. 4. Cf. "Yathartham sarva-vijnānam iti veda-vidam matam (Pp., p. 32). 5. "Tucchānirvacanīyā ca vāstavī cetyasau tridhā/jñeyā māyā tribhir- bodhaiḥ śrauto-yauktika-laukikaiḥ (Pancadasī, VI, 130)

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of reality in his system much in the manner of his sworn adver- saries, the Sankarites ? Certainly he does ; but the grade he approves of, though not consciously, is one of reality, which, unlike that of the Sankarites, never at any stage lapses into complete unreality. For, to him it is a simple reality in one case, a displaced reality in the other and a condensation of two realities in the third case. So, these thrce theories, even though taken together to form a composite theory, does in no way bring Ramanuja into line with the Sankarites 6. But, Ramanuja's first preference for the theory of Sat-khyati is unmistakable in his dissertations. Anyathakhyati is agreeable to him only as a second preference and that also only when Sat-khyati is kept aside (cf. "Yathartha-khyati-vyatirikta-pakşeşu anyatha-khyatipaksaḥ prabalaḥ"-Sruta-prakasika of Sudarsana). But the followers of Ramanuja show an increasing apathy for Sat-khyati which hardly satisfies the demands of logic7. This explains why some of them at least hold fast to one of the theories of Anyatha-khyati and Akhyati to which they easily resolve even the Sat-khyati of Ramanuja and his hallowed predecessorss. Venkatanatha, however, holds the balance between Ramanuja and his aforesaid followers and re-asserts the position of Sruta-prakasika,. He seems to give his seal of approval on all the three theories, though personally prefering the theory of Anyatha-khyati, and he defines valid

6. Prof. Hiriyanna observes : "But it must be distinctly understood that such a classification does not mean that he admits different types of reality-an admission which would place his doctrine epistemologically on the same footing as Samkara's Advaita" (P. 393, OIP). But, such a supposi- tion is unwarranted ; for, every philosopher must necessarily admit at least two types of reality ; still, such an admission need not make him a Sam- karite. Ramanuja, however, does never consciously accept two types of reality. 7. Cf. "Yan Natha-muni-miśradyaiḥ yathartha-khyati-sadhanam/Tallo- kabuddhyanarohad vaibhavam kecid ucire. (NP. of Veukata) 8. Cf. "Anye tu yathartha-khyati-pakse anyathā-khyātau akhyātau vā visrāntiņ estavyeti tadanyatara-khyātiparigraha eva yuktah (P. 37, NS. on NP. of Venkata). 9. Cf. "Ātma-khyātyādi-vādeșu anyathatvam avāritam. ... Sarvairapyanyatha-khyatih dustyajatval laghiyasī/Tadvadinapyavarjyatvāt tatopyakhyati-laghavam//Svarasyam anyatha-khyatau akhyatau laghavam sthitam/Iti darsayitum bhāsye dvitayam tad anuśritam//(P. 40, NP. of Venkata)

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knowledge as "yathavasthita-vyavaharanugunam prama" (P. 36, NP. of Venkata), keeping in view the demands of all the three theories1o. But, elsewhere he evinces his partiality for Akhyati which he combines with Sat-khyati on which is based the view. of Mm. Kuppu Swami Sastrī when he says; "The vedantins of the Visistadvaita school adopt the Prabhakara theory of Akhyati with certain modifications and their version of Akhyati is known asnon-apprehension-cum-apprehension of reality' (Akhyati- samvalita-sat-khyati)" (Br. Si. of Mandana, Introduction by Mm. Kuppu Swami Sūstrī, P. LXV)11.

Let us now see how Ramanuja and his followers endeavour to establish the Sat-khyati theory of error and illusion. Ramanuja calls into request the upanisadic principle of quintuplication (panci-karana) or triplication (Trivrtkarana) to account for the genesis of error. Aceording to the theory of Pancikarana, the things of the world are composed of all the five primal elements, though in varying proportions. Thus, the physical Ap (i. e. water) is a compound of primal water and the four other primal elements. Still, it goes by the name of Ap only because of the preponderance of that element in it. The scheme of creation is thus not only unity in diversity, but something more. Every diversity is itself a unity. Evolution atany stage, according to Ramanuja, proceeds not through elimination and natural selection, but through the aggregation and absorption of all the principles of the preceding stage. So, looked at from a certain stage, creation is a movement from the simple to the complex, from the disparate to the integrated, from the chaos to the cosmos. This seems to be the real implication of Ramanuja's espousing the principle of quintuplication to explain error, though such an interpretation has not been offered by any scholar as yet. Every stage is a rehearsal cf the preceding stage and this history of the

10. Cf. "Sva-saiddhantikabhimata-khyati-traya-paksa-sadharanam idaň laksanam etc." (P. 36, NS. of Srinivasa) 11. Cf. "Suktau rupyam prabhambhah śruti-naya-vasatah svāpnam apyastu satyam yogyayogyadi-bhedagraha iha caramam gahate sam- pratistham" (Sl. IO, Buddhisara, TMK of Veukata) Also cf. SAS of Venka!a, pp. 403/7. Also cf." ... Ramanujacaryastu .... rajatādeḥ sattvāt tatrāpi jřanain yathartham eva ityakhyatirevocitā" (Khyativada of Purusottama, pp. 123-129).

102 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

process of evolution repeats itself even beyond the stage of elements. To put the matter direct, the principle of quintupli- tion holds good even in the case of the evolution of Bhautikas and their species. That is why Rimanuja concludes that every- thing is every other thing (c.f. "Evam sarvasya sarvatve etc." Sri-Bha.) The metaphysical background being thus prepared, Rimanuja proceeds to enquire into the physics of similarity. For, though everyting is every other thing, it is common know- ledge that nobody takes a nacre for a piece of gold or a rope for a tiger. The mutual physical identity of all things is only metaphysically evident, but the similarity between two parti- cular things is also physically cognisable and demonstrable,-a fact which explains the speciality of the content of an erroneous cognition. So, Rimanuja takes up the conception of Sadrsya whose physical basis he tries to investigate and concludes that. a thing is similar to another thing when it has partial identity. of material with the other one. The Sruti enjoins the substitu-" tion of Soma and Vrihi by Putika and Nīvara respectively in case the former are not available. This implies that Pūtika and Nivara comprise some material part or parts of Soma and Vrīhi respectively12. So, what occurs in a so-called erroneous cognition, according to Ramanuja, is that due to defective organ like the eye, one perceives the silver-part uncontaminated by the nacre-part of a nacre and proceeds to possess it. But, the defect being gone, one apprehends the nacre-part only and the silver is no longer intuited. Contradiction in such cases is conceivable on the ground of the predominance of the nacre-part. So, what is contradicted in such erroneous cognitions is the volition consequent upon it and not the content of the cognition.

Thus, in the cognition of a nacre-silver, the silver-element is in fact persent in the nacre and so far the cognitum is real. But, since the silver-element is meagre, the cognition is erroneous only from a pragmatic stand-point. The correction of error occurs when one apprehends the predominance of the nacre-element. In

12. "Somābhāve ca pūtikā-grahaņam śruti-coditam/Somāvayava-sadbhā- vadi ti nyaya-vido viduh//vrīhyabhave ca nīvara-grahanam śruti-coditam/ tadeva sadrsam tasya yattad-dravyaika-deśabhāk// (Śri Bhā., P. 184).

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an erroneous cognition like 'the yellow conch-shell' the visual rays, being mixed up with the yellow bile of the jaundiced eyes, are focussed upon the white conch-shell and thus the yellowness is actually transmitted to it whose whiteness is screened thereby. Thus, even in this case knowledge registers only what is actually objectively given, not only in respect of the relata, but also of the relation itself. The yellowness under discussion is too subtle to be perceived by any one other than the person from whose eyes it has been secreted. Similar is the case with the cognition of a red crystal when a red flower is placed beside it. The cognition of water in a mirage admits of the simplest explanation according to the principle of quintuplication. Confusion of direction may also be accounted for by asserting that any particular direction includes other directions also. Similarly the phenomenon of a whirling circle of fire is also real. Here the rapidity of whirling causes non-apprehension of the intervening points of space that are bereft of fire and there arises the apprehension of a real circular ball of fire. The reverted reflection of one's person in a mirror is likewise due to the refraction of the visual rays after their contact with the mirror. The phenomenon of the double moon may also be explained by holding that the eye being pressed by the finger, the darkness in the eye bifurcates the visual rays which are thus severally focussed upon the moon. Since there are two separate streams of visual rays directed separately towards the moon, the apprehension of the double moon is a real experience14. Prof. Hiriyanna and Prof. Dr. Asutosh Sastri attach too much importance on the principle of quintuplication and the concept of Sadrsya as pressed into service by Ramanuja and assert that, according to Ramanuja, there may be an error of omission only, but not of commission1s. But, this assertion holds good only in a limited sphere. For, in all cases of errors caused by adventitious adjuncts (Sopadhika bhrama) like the yellow conch-shell and the red crystal, there is an error of commission as well. Still, it is a commission only from the standpoint of the bare objective reality stripped of all its adjuncts. Dr. A.

14. "Pacīkarana-prakriyayā prthīvyādisu sarvatra sarvabhūtānam vidyamānatvāt. Ata eva śuktikādau rajatāmśasya vidyamānatvāt jāna- vişayasya satyatvam. etc. etc. (YMD. of Sriīnivāsadāsā, Pp. 12-14). 15. Cf. Hiriyanna, OIP. Pp. 391-394. See also Dr. A. Sastrī, SPSD., P. 270.

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Śastrī seems to strike a deeper note in regard to visistadvaita epistemology when he says; "In this he (i.e. Ramanuja) seems to have drawn a distinction between reality and actuality and he thinks that all things are real which are objects of knowledge, though all things are not actual. The falsity lies in actuality, not in reality1c". This is quite in consonance with Ramanuja's assertion as also with that of his scholiast17 and is referred to by Prof. Hiriyanna also. But, they never try to show why accord- ing to Ramanuja "all things are real which are objects of knowledge".

A dream-phenomenon, again, is neither an error of omission, nor that of commission. Though on one occasion Ramanuja contends that the content of a dream-cognition is unrealis, he elsewhere asserts that the dream-objects are created by the Almighty according to the desert of the individual dreamer and as such they are real19. This shows that, according to Ramanuja,. the privacy of an experience does not take away its reality. But, we are still to answer why these queer intuitions are at all real. They are certainly not real only as cognitions qua cognitions, as is sometimes held by kumarila20. For, such a reality does not go beyond the cognition itself. Ramanuja in cne place attempts to explain why these cognitions are real21. He bases his argument on the simple logic that an unreal can never come into being through the operation of any cause, nor can it impinge its unreal existence upon any other thing. What Ramanuja seems to suggest is that a cognition, that comes into being at a point of time, must have some cause, some real objective basis, the theory of vivarta being studiously discarded by him. So, there must always be a real datum of cognition, a cognitum having independent objective reality. No object, no cognition. But,

16. Vide SPSD., P. 26. 17. Cf. "Jnana-phala-bhuta-pravrtti-badhyatvam (Sr. Pra. of Sudarśana, P. 185). 18. "Svapna-jnānasya asatyatvābhāvāt. Tatra hi vişayānāmeva mithyāt- vam, tesāmeva hi bādho dršyate, na jnānasya. (SB., P. 121, Sāhitya Pari- sat ed.). 19. Vide SB. III. ii. 3 & 5. 20. Cf. "Tasmāt bodhārthakatvena prāptā buddheļ pramāņata (SV) 21. "Eteşam samvedananam utpattimattvat artha-kriya-karitvacca. satyatvam avasiyate (SB., P. 121, Sa. Pa. ed.).

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why does the object appear differently in certain cognitions ? Taking the cue from Ramanuja, we may say that his principle of Panci-karana leads him to the assumption of reality with many facets as is advocated in the Anekunta theory of the jainas. Every object is a complex entity comprising different facts which are velated to the substratum by Aprthak-sidhi ('inseparability'). So, when one perceives a nacre-silver, one really perceives what is silver from one standpoint. The implication of Ramanuja's contention seems to be that if the whole psychosis be repeated with all its accessories, an identical cognition will result. Whoso- ever looks at the moon with his eye pressed with the finger-tip must see the moon double. So, the truth of the cognition may be experimented upon and verified as often as one wishes to. If you approach an object in a particular manner, you will have a particular cognition which is real in the circumstances and the reality extends from the cognition to the cognitum also. But, Ramanuja warns us that these realities have no pragmatic value. Indeed, this betrays Ramanuja's disquieting disapproval of the falsity-fetish of the Maya-vadins and shows why he strenuously endeavours to prove that knowledge is always a discovery and never a creation. Thus, while Samnkara establishes the unity of the whole existence from the absolute standpoint, Ramanuja. advocates the unity of the physical world from the metaphysical standpoint and bases thereon his theory of Sat-khyati. A variant of this satkhyati may be discovered in the writings of Vaisnava scholars of the Dvaita-dvaita school. Ramanuja's Sat-khyati is verily yathartha-khyati in both the senses of the cognition being "Arthasya yogyam" and "artham anatikramya22". But, the variant under reference cannot be called 'Yathartha- khyati' in any sense of the term. The protagonists of such a Sat- khyati explain their position by pointing out that the so-called illusory cognitions like the rope-serpent, the nacre-silver etc. are real in the sense that they are based on real causes and condi- tions. A cognition, they say, would be valid if it has behind it a real entity as its cause or condition23. Thus Anantarama

22. Vide the different meanings of 'yatha' as given by Bhattoji in his Siddhanta-kaumudī : "Yogyatā-vīpsapadārthanati-vrtti-sadrsyani yathar- thã (P. 162, NS. ed.) 23. "Sad-dhetuka khyati sat-khyati ityarthabhyupagamat (P, 16, VTB of Anantarama).

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observes : "All Vedicists, who are advocates of Sat-khyati, accept every cognition as valid. If it is asked how then a cogni- tion is contradicted and how a contradicted cognition may still be valid, the answer is that even a real entity may be sublated on the strength of pramana. But the pramana cannot affirm its universal negation. Verily, it has been observed and heard also that a sin is removed by piety, a disease remedied by wholesome drugs and an anterior cognition disposed of by a posterior one" 24. Anantarama illustrates his above thesis by pointing out that the cognition of silver in the so-called illusory perception of the form 'this is silver' has defect and simiiarity, which are real, for its cause and as such it is real. Still this valid cognition is quite legitimately removed through the contact of the eye with the nacre. Anantarama does not feel any urge or necessity to enquire if the object exists or not ; for, the Satkhyati of his conception becomes established beyond dispute if the cognition is demon- strated to be based on some real cause2s. Purusottamaprasada also in his Vedānta-kārikavalī says that all cognition is invari- ably real and it is nowhere falsified26. Both Anantarama and Purușottama Prasada raise the question how the cognition of fear consequent upon the cognition of rope-serpent may be called valid ; for, here the fear-cognition is generated by the serpent superimposed upon the nacre and this superimposed serpent is not real. But, it's no puzzle with them. Though realists to the very core, they now embark on a cognitive rock-and-roll and point out confidently that the fear-cognition is occasioned by the serpent-cognition, not by the superimposed serpent27, and hence their thesis is inviolable. Thus, while it is generally held that the truth of a cognition is verified by the fruition of the resulting

24. "Sat-khyāti-vādinām vaidikānām sarvesām jnānānām satyatvābhyu- pagamat. Katham tarhi tasya badho, badhe ca katham sattvam iti cet ucyate. Satopi pramanabalena nivrttiḥ jāyate, na tu atyantābhāva. Punyena pāpasya, sadausadhibhī rogasya uttara-juanena pūrva-juanasya ca nivrtteļ drstaśrutatvāt (Ibid). 25. "Tāsmat jñānasyaiva sattvād visayasya sattvāniyamāt satkhyātivāda- siddhiḥ (Ibid). 26. "Jñanantu satyamevasti tadbadho na hi Kutracit". (P. 190). 27. "Sarpa-bhrama-sthale'pi sarpa-visayaka-juānasyaiva bhayādi-hetut- vam, naropita-sarpasya". (VTB., P. 17). See also "Rajjvādyaropitahyadeh etc.", (VKa., P. 190).

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purposive action that followse8, they seem to opine that the validity of a cognition is ensured by the reality of its cause or conditions. The process of veritication is, then, with them a hackward movement, a study in retrospect ; the means justifies the end and not vice versa. This validating cause or condition may be another cognition as in the case of the cognition of fear dealt with heretofore. But, this should not encourage one to aftiliate the theory with vijuana-vada ; for, the cause or con- dition under reference may as well be an objective fact. Organic defect is certainly an objective fact and the idea of Sidrsya has verily an objective basis. The 'hetu' here, however, does hardly mean the cause; rather it signifies the special conditions which are responsible for the erratic cognition of the nacre-silver etc. Thus these scholars endeavour to construct a cognitive world of inner consistency which may here and there break away with the external world of reality, without any prejudice to the reality of the corresponding cognition. The peculiarity of this theory is that though there may be cognition without any corresponding external object, the cognition is not self-poised, self-subsistent on that account, but is occasioned by some real 'hetu'. This unmistakable reference to hard objectivity as its basis is what distinguishes it from Asat-khyati.

It is interesting to note here that this theory is almost diametrically opposed to the view of certain scholars of the Suddhadvaita school. Thus, Ramakrsna Bhatta in his gloss called 'Prakasa' on Suddhudvaitamartaņda of Giridhārijii Mahāraj observes : 'The cognition of numerical difference between Nama (i.e. Name) and Rupa (i.e. Form) is illusory ; but, Nama and Rupa are not illusory. Similarly, the cognition of numerical difference between Isa (God) and Jiva, and between cause and effect are illusory29'. Thus, while Ramakrsna nestles illusoriness in the world of cognition, granting immaculate reality to the external world, the scholars of Dvaitadvaita assert the

28. Even Vanamali Misra, a scholar of the Nimbarka school under reference observes : "Phala-samvadinam satyatvaniyamat". (P. 59, Vedanta-siddhänta-samgraha), 29. "Nāma-rūpa-bheda-jñānameva āvidyakam, na tu te. Evam Īša-jīva- bheda-jnanam, tatha karya-karana-bheda-jnanam iti". (P. 2, Prakāśa on Šuddhādvaita-mārtaņda).

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impregnable rectitude of all cognition and, snapping the time- honoured relation of accord between cognition and the external object, hold that wherever a cognition brings in its wake abortive activity, the content of that cognition is unreal as an external entity. So, the nacre-siiver, the rope-serpent ete. are non-existent, though their cognition is unimpeachable.

Is then the nacre-silver etc. and, for the matter of that, the world unreal ? Realists as they are, they vigourously affirm the reality of the world ; but, so far as the phenomena like the nacre-silver etc. are concerned, they damn them as being unreal. For, what is contradicted in its own locus is considered unreal by them, though not illusory 30. Moreover, no entity can come into being without any cause; but, in the case of the nacre- silver ete., no proof can be demonstrated in support of its origin. Hence, in the absence of any proof in point, the nacre-silver has no origin, and, as such, it has no real being. Our subsequent intuition also proves the unreality of the nacre-silver. This intuition is to the following effect : "This was so long known as silver, but no silver was here31". But, then, all such unusual phenomena are not unreal. Dream-objects are not all unreal. as a class. Only those that are contradicted within the period of dream-experience or are incongruous with it are unreal32. The Veda itself declares the creation of dream-chariots etc. The creator here is God himself and the material cause is Vasana of the experient Jiva. Such entities are certainly not negated at the time of their experience, and, as such, there being absence of tri-temporal negation in their regard, they are real33. It may

30. "Yasya tatraiva badhah syat tanmithyātvam urīkrtam". (P. 187, Ve. Kär.). 31. "Vinākaranam utpattirvastuno naiva yujyate/. Utpattau sukti- rūpyāder-mānamkincinna vidyate// ...... Suktirūpyam na vastu na vā tasyot- pattir-manabhavat. Idam etāvat rūpyatayā jnātam rūpyamatra nāsīt ityanubhavācca". (Pp. 207-208, Vedanta-Siddhanta-Samgraha). 32. "Svāpnikānām na vastunām sarvesam hi mrsatmata/Kesancit syāt tadanim ced yesam artha-viparyayah//". (P. 89, Ibid.). 33. Evidently 'Trikalabadha' is here taken in the sense of 'Atrikalabadha'. "Svapnikanam rathadinam srstim praha srutiḥ sphutam/Bhavet sattvam atasteşām trikālābādha-laksaņam// ...... Yadā yasya pratītiḥ syāt tadā 'bādhya- tvamatrata/Traikalikasya Badhasyabhavah sattvain bhaved drdham// .. Kartā tatra paresaļ syad upādānam hi vāsanā//. (P. 207, Ibid.)

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now be argued that the nacre-silver ete. also has origin; for, it may be due to the efficient cause, God and the material cause, Vasana even like dream-objeets. But, such a position is emphati- cally denied as shown above because there is no vedic text in .support of its creation.

Purusottamaprasad also says that in a phenomen like the rope-serpent, the serpent is superimposed upon the rope3 4. So, such entities are unreal. Purusottama Prasad here initiates a discussion in the following manner : If dream-objects are created by God, they ought not to be contradicted at that time, nor should they remain unperceived by others. So, they are created by individual jivas and as such they are all the more unreal. He, however, discredits such objections by observing that the creation of God is in accordance with His will and it need not necessarily be always durable in nature. The span of existence of the creation depends entirely upon the will of God. As Devadatta's mental agony, which is imperceptible to others, is still real, so these dream-objects may also be real, though unnoticed by others. The fact is that the dream-objects are created by God in accordance with the merit or demerit of individual souls and, as such, are experienced by them alone for a stipulated period of time. So, their reality is unquestioned. Hence from the above discussion it transpires that the rope- serpent etc. are unreal, though their cognition is real and that the dream-objects, which are created by God, are also real35.

But, it is a pity that Purusottama Prasad fails to maintain this position every-where and perhaps unwittingly contradicts himself in his Vedanta-Karikavali as also in his Srutyanta-sura- druma. In the former treatise he asserts that the whole world is real, or else there would be insuperable incongruity. For, the omniscient God would not certainly nurse the cognition of silver, knowing all the same that the silver is in reality a nacre36. In Śrutyanta-sura-druma he asserts the proposition that all cogni-

34. "Rajjvādyāropitāhyādeḥ etc (P. 190, Ve. Kār.) 35. "Nanu yadi paramesvari svapna-srstih tarhi etc.". (P. 200, Śr. Su. Dru.) 36. "Prapanco vastavah sarvo' nyatha syad vyahatiḥ sphutam/na suktim tattvato janan sarvavid rupya-palakab//". (P. 187, Ve. Kär.).

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tion is 'yarthartha'. Why then are not the nacre-silver etc. perceptible ? He answers that the imperceptibility is due to. its presence in a subtle form which precludes pragmatic. activity37. Hence, as a matter of fact, the nacre-silver is real3s. Such a position, however, is in no way different from the yathartha-khyati of Ramanuja. It may also be pointed out here that the variant discussed presently might have been. also suggested by the writings of Ramanuja 39. The theory of Sat-khyati has been severely criticised by the exponents of the rival theories, although sometimes with. great impatience. Let us now present here the arguments advanced by these rival scholars to refute the theory of Sat- khyati. Nrsimhasrama, a Samkarite philosopher observes that Sat-khyati thrives on a misinterpretation of the principle of quintuplication. The misinterpretation lies in the undue exten- sion of quintuplication beyond the domain of the five elements. to that of their evolutes or derivatives ('bhautikas'). Nrsimha- śrama argues that quintuplication holds good in respect of the five primal elements only and not with regard to their derivatives. Otherwise, one is confronted with the contingency of apprehend- ing silver even in a pillar and the like4o. This argument, however, does not seem to be a sound one. For, even granting that quintuplication applies only with regard to the five primal elements, the thesis of Ramanuja that everything is everyother thing suffers no damnation and is by no means disproved. It is so for the simple reason that all objects of this world are composed of these five quintuplicated elements. And then to argue that if the plea of quintuplication had any force in it, one would be constrained to accept the contingency of intuiting even a pillar as silver is, to say the least, hasty and ill-conceived. For, such.

37. "Sarva-juananam yatharthatvasya sastra-drstya satkhyativadinam. istatvat ...... Tarhi Katham anupalabdhiriti cet, sūksmātmanā sattve'pi artha-karitvanarhatvad iti brumah". (P. 21, Sr. Su. Dru.). 38. "Vastutastu sadrupameva rajatam". (P. 199, Ibid.) 39. cf. "Etesam samvedananam utpatti-mattvat artha-kriya-karitvacca. satyatvam avasiyate". (Śrī. Bhā., P. 121). 40. "Bhūtānāmeva pancīkrtatvāt bhautikanam tad-abhavāt, anyathā stambhadavapi rajata-pratītiprasangat". (Nrsimhaśrama's Com, on Sam. Sā., Ch. I, Verse 20.)-

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an argument takes no note of Ramanuja's other principle of Sadrsya, which coupled with the metaphysical priniciale of 'Sarvasya Sarvatmakatvam', sets the stage for Sat-khyati. So, it is perfectly clear that the objection of Nrsimhasrama is completely wide of the mark and pathetically unavailing.

But, the Samkarites are not to be cowed so easily. They now resume their attack from a different standpoint and assert that Ramanuja and his followers unwittingly accept grades of being. whereby they are inevitably pushed into the fold of the Samkarites. For, they have to accept two classes of erroneous perception-individualistic like the dream-chariot and general like the mirage or the Oyster-silver.Moreover, the Samkarites argue, the will of the Almighty that is supposed to create dream- chariots and the like is to be equated with the Maya of their (samkarite) school. So, Satkhyati becomes ultimately moulded into Anirvacanīya-khyati41. To my mind, these two arguments also are completely effete against the Rumanuja theory of Satkhyati. For, individualistic phenomena like the dream-chariot etc. are real in every sense according to Ramanuja and the fact of a phenomenon being private does not take away its reality. In point of fact, such phenomena do not call for acceptance of different grades of reality at all42. Even if it is proved that Ramanuja accepts grades of reality, he cannot be brought into line with the Samkarites for reasons already stated 43. As regards the second argument, it may be pointed out here that a Ramanujist may pay back a Samkarite in his own coin by asserting that the Maya of the Samkarites is an illogical and unwarrantable supposition and is to be resolved into the will or Energy in general of the Almighty. So, in such an eventuality, it is not possible to take any side decisively because of 'Vinigamanaviraha' (i.e. 'absence" of conclusive proof in favour of any one of the two conflicting issues.).

Nor does the polymath Appyaya Diksita succeed in dealing: the death-blow, or even any meaningful blow, on Sat-khyati

41. Vide Post-Samkara Advaita Dialectics. (Pp. 271-72) 42. Vide footnote no. 6 in P. 4. 43. See Ante. P. 4 and the f. n. 6.

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with his armoury of transparent sophistry. It is really odd to discover him say in his sub-gloss Parimala that the absence of silver in a shell is proved beyond any spectre of doubt by the fact that the latter is turned into ashes by fire and is not liquefied as it ought to be if it were silver44. The hollowness of this finding of the Advaitic Inquisition becomes at once apparent when we call to mind the fact that Ramanuja's Sat- khyati is avowedly allergic to all manner of pragmatic behaviour. Moreover, methinks a Ramanujist might say by pursuing the logic of Diksita that the advaitic thesis of non- difference of cause and effect is disproved by the fact that the effect jar can contain water, while the cause, a lump of clay, cannot. This proves how much useless these arguments are in appraising a situation.

But, the indictment of Advaitananda in his Brahma- vidyabharana seems to carry much weight with it. He takes exception to the Ramanujist assertion that in the cognition of a nacre-silver, silverness really inheres in 'Idam' (i.e. 'This'), the locus of nacreness. He argues out his point thus: If this silverness comes into being at the time of the particular cognition, then the Ramanujist accepts the Advaitic view of the creation of silver. If, however, it is maintained that this silver- ness is tritemporal, how is the contradiction with nacreness set aside4s ? To this it may be rejoined from Ramanuja's standpoint that the opponent has misrepresented the position of Sat-khyati. For, a Ramanujist does not experience any 'silver- ness' as apart from 'Idam' ; rather a denier of in determinate cognition that he is, he expereinces 'this is silver' as a complex whole. His experience is certainly not of the form 'silverness inheres in this' and, hence, to father such verbal transcription of his experience on him is a sheer travesty of truth which will never be accepted by a thorough-going Ramanujist. To raise the charge of impossibility of 'Virodhaparihara' against him is again a clear mincing of matter. For, Ramanuja himself points out

44. Vide Parimala of Appyaya Dīksita, P. 690, Mm. Ananta Sastrī's ed. 45. Vide "Etena yat sat-khyati-vadinoktam-Suktitvādhikaraņe idami rajatatvam vartate iti, tat pratyuktam. Yadi tat pratibhāsakāla utpadyate, tada asmanmatapravesah. yadi tu traikalikah, katham virodha-pariharah". (Br. Vi., P. 20).

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that truth has many facets and it is for all practical purposes selective and incomplete. So, the contradiction in question is resolved by the failure of purposive action. Advaitananda per- haps himself realises the weakness of this charge raised by him and reluctantly accepts the thesis of Ramanuja when he says : "Let there be somehow the assemblage of the parts of silver in a nacre and let it be conceded on such a slender ground that the experience 'this is silver' is valid46. He then raises another objection which is very significant in its implication. He takes peculiar cases of invalid cognition in which the superimposed entity is a composite whole. As Dr. Roy Choudhury explains the position : "Jarness inheres in the jar alone. It does not exist in the component parts of a jar. Therefore we can never correctly perceive an anthill as a jar or as an object characterised by jarness. Such is also the case with rope-snake. Snakehood inheres only in the snake and never in its formative elements4 7". So in such cases a Ramanujist must take refuge in Akhyati with a view to maintaining his theory of Sat-khyati. In that case, it is better to explain all invalid cognition as Akhyati48. Evi- dently this objection is directed against cases where the jati is 'avayava-samsthana-vyangya' i.e. manifested by the particular structural adjustment of parts. But, a Ramanujist may meet this objection by holding that the word 'ekadesa' in the proposi- tion 'Tadeva sadrsam tasya yat tad-dravyaikadesa-bhak' does not merely mean a physical part, but even an isolated aspect, a partial facet of an entity which is a complex of multifarious aspects. To Ramanuja an entity is a bundle of divers ideas transformed into materiality. The particular idea that is 'to the widest commonalty spread' is the bed-rook of all purposive action in community life. The other ideas, though equally real, are ostracised and cannot generally keep going on any socialised commerce of life. Social boycotts, they are still metaphysical or even factual compatriots. Moreover, a Ramanujist will say

46. "Astu vā yatha-kathañcit tatra rajatāvayava-samāveśah, tāvanmā- treņa ca rajatam iti pratīteh pramātvam. (P. 21, Ibid.) 47. See The Doctrine of Maya by A. Roy Choudhury. 48. "Valmīka-nīvārādisu ghatatva-vrīhitvadyavagahisu bhramesu kā gatiḥ. Ghatatva-vrıhitvadi-jater-avayavi-viśesa-matroparaktatvāt. Tatra Akhyati-svīkare ca saiva sarvatra astu (Ibid).

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that he experiences no error characterised by class-character separately. So, the last argument also does not seem to have- much force against Sat-khyati. Advaitananda then reverts to the former argument of 'sil- verness in Idam', and observes that if the Ramanujist answers the charge by maintaining that in the cognition of the form 'this is silver', silver, divested of all characteristics, is intuited in the 'Idam' as locus, this explanation will be quite contrary to alk experience and will be disregarded by all,9. But, this cannot be the position taken by a Ramanujist inasmuch as, not to speak of the nacre-silver cognition, no cognition is accepted to be indeter- minate in nature by him. So, this is nothing but a fantastic effort at marooning an adversary in a place where he is not.

Mahadevananda Saraswati, an Advaita scholar, impugns in his gloss named Tattvanusandhanam on his Advaitacinta-kaus- tubha the Ramanujist assertion that in a so-called invalid cog- nition purposive action is only thwarted. He observes that it cannot be maintained that in such cognitions, the cognition or its cognitum is not contradicted, but only the social behaviour based on it is negated. For, the sublation of the cognitum is established by experience. Otherwise, the form of the sublating: cognition would have been 'this is not activity pertaining to. silverso'. A Ramanujist will, however, assert in reply to this thatwhen the particular volition will be thwarted, he will realise that the cognised silver, though real, has no pragmatic value even like the 'samvrta' vowel 'a' of panini,1 and the sublating cogni- tion will take the form 'nedain rajatam' from the pragmatic stand- point. Or, he will try to vindicate his position better by asser- ting that the form of sublation will be 'natra rajata-vyavaharaḥ" as opposed to the form 'natra rajatam' as is advocated as an alternative by the Advaitins.

49. "Rajatam idam ityatra aparoksataya idam-padarthe adhis!hane nissvarupam eva rajatam pratīyata iti matamı tu anubhava-virodhād eva anadaraniyam (Ibid). 50. "Na ca vyavahāra eva badhyate na jranam visayo veti vacyam. Vişaya-nişedhasya anubhava-siddhatvāt. Anyatha nedari rajatavyavahāre. ityeva ullekhah syat (P. 21, Tattvanusandhanam on Ad. Ci. Kau). 51. Panini's sutra 'a ah' (Astādhyayī, VIII. 4, 68) ..

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Cit-sukha in his Tattva-pradipika vehemently criticises this plea of thwarted pragmatic activity in regard to the nacre-silver as advanced by the Ramanujist.

He argues the point out in the following manner :- Negation of pragmatic activity cannot be accepted as the import of sublation. For, people who have no hankering after silver and the like will not be prompted into any possessive activity and, in the absence of any such activity, the cognition 'this is silver' will have nothing to dispute its authority. On the other hand, if whatever thwarts consequent activity be accepted as the sublator, even the cognition of the presence of thieves and the like that can thwart the activity of a lustful man may also serve as sublator5 2. Nor can it be argued that sublation means the negation of pragmatic potentiality. For, then will arise the contigency of actual pragmatic activity being thwarted on some- other occasion. Neither can sublation be taken to mean atrophy of potentiality inasmuch as there is no valid ground for such supposition of atrophy. Hence, sublation cannot be meaningful simply by shutting out 'vyavahara 53. But the bitterest criticism of Sat-khyati came from one who was a sturdy fighter of a rival vaisnava school. Indeed, it was jayatīrtha, the great successor of Madhva, who dealt a severe blow on Sat-khyati and served as an eye-opener to many a Ramanujist who eventually discovered 'vaibhavam' in the advocacy for Sat-khyati. Jayatirtha puts the sponsors of the theory to utmost ridicule and shame in his Nyaya-sudha in course of a long-drawn discussion on different theories of Illusion. It is. better here to hear him in his own words transcribed in English. After presenting the theory in some detail, he observes5 4 : "This

52. "Na vyavahara-vyavacchedo badha. Atad-arthinam tatra vyava- haranudayena idam rajatam ityadi-jnanasya abadhakatva-prasangat. Tad- arthinam ca vyavahāra-vicchedakasya bādhakatve corādi-jnāna-syāpi tad- vicchedakasya badhakatāpatteh (P. 66, Tat. Pra.). 53. "Na ca tad-yogyata-vicchedo badhah, tad-vicchede samayantare punastatra vyavahārābhāva-prasangāt. Yogyatapratibandho badha ityapi na, ...... pratibandba-kalpanānavakāšāt ...... Ato na vyavahāra-nirūpaņena bā- dhakasya badhakatopapattiḥ (Ibid). 54. "Tadidam ayuktam. Tathahi yāni tāvat śuktikādisu rajatādi- sadbhave śruti-puraņa-sutrani pathitāni tāni tejo'bannādīnam misratām abhidadhati. Na punārajatādīnām suktikādau sadbhāvam. Na hi kāraņa-

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is uureasonable. For, the vedic, puranic and Brahmasutra texts quoted in support of the presence of silver etc. in nacre etc. do only speak of the fusion of Fire, Water and Earth. They do in no wise affirm the presence of silver etc. in nacre etc. We could possibly accept this thesis if we could argue with conviction that the presence of the cause (not however as cause) invariably vouches for the presence of the effect. But, this we cannot do. For, if it were so, one could cognise every- thing in nacre even like silver. It cannot be maintained that this is not so because of Adrsta and the like. For, the supposition of Adrsta finds scope only after the ascertainment of the presence of the effect. The argument from verbal presumption is extremely unreasonable here. For, do you assume the presence of the parts of Soma etc. in Putika etc. in abundance, or in equal pro- portions, or in deficit ? In the first alternative, it is but soma and as such no question of substitution arises. Verily, even Soma is not (according to this theory): Soma exclusively, but an entity possessing the parts of Soma in super-abundance. Nor is the second alternative maintainable ; for, then one should cognise both. In the third alternative, how can it (i. e. putika) do the work of Soma ? If it does, why should not the nacre also dis- charge the purposive action of silver ? If it is pleaded that we have it on the authority of the vedas that putika serves the purpose of Soma, we are constrained to beg of you not to take the trouble of assuming parts of Soma in Putika; for, you can readily accept the identity of purposive action being done by utterly distinct objects. Moreover, ghee and oil, being similar to each other, must possess each other's parts and should, on

sadbhave karyasya sadbhavo niyatah yena upapattya api imam artham pratīmaļ. Tathatve suktau rajatavat sarvasyāpi pratitih prasajyeta. Adrstādi- vasat naivam iti cenna. Karya-niscayottarakalīnatvat asyah kalpanāyāh. Śrutārthāpattiḥ tu atyantāyuktā. Tathapi putikadau somādyavayavāl bhuyamsah kalpyante uta samah atha alpīyatsah etc ...... Srutiprāmāņyāt tadartha.kriya-kāritā avagamyate iti cet. Kir tarhi somāvayava-kalpanayā, śruti-pramanyat atyantaviviktanam eva vastūnām artha-kriya-sāmyam upagamyatam ...... Kim ca ghrta-tailayoh etc ...... Na bhavyam ca visadrsayoh. Kim ca matr-matanga etc ..... aparavayava-samyoga eva sadrsyam cet, katham kakāra-khakārayoh sadrsyam iti cintyam. Rajatārthinaḥ suktikāyām pra- vartakam ca kim bhūyasām suktyavayavānam adarsanam uta alpīyasanı rajatāvayavānam darsanam utobhayam etc ...... katham casya jnanasa bhran- titvam. Alpāmsa-grahanāt iti cet. Nūnam Brahma-jnānamapi mahā-

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that account, do cach other's function, while dissimilar objects should have no such reciprocation. Furthermore, since the wife and the like have great similarity with the mother and the like, the enjoyment of the former should be a sin. If the situation be sought to be bypassed on the plea of the presence of fewer parts of mother in wife, it will be asked how 'nivara' can serve as a substitute for 'Vrihi'. The dogma of vedic authority has already been disposed of. Similarity, again, is not the presence in one of the parts of the others. For, then the similarity between the two alphabets 'ka' and 'Kha' would be difficult to explain. What, again, does prompt the silver-seeker towards the nacre ? Is it the non-perception of many parts of the nacre, or the per- ception of the fewer parts of silver, or again both ? It is not the frst one ; for, otherwise even a sleeping man should have such inducement to action. In the case of the second alternative, it may further be asked whether the cognition of fewer parts of silver, or of many parts, or again a mere cognition gives induce- ment to action. In the first case, one apprehends non-silverness. and this apprehension cannot generate the necessary purposive action. The second case makes room for Anyatha-khyati. In the third case, the inducement is apt to be for anything similar. The third alternative also is not reasonable. For, otherwise it may as well be contended that inducement comes from the indefinite cognition that something is there. How, again, is this cognition invalid ? If it be due to the apprehension of the fewer parts. only, well, then, even Brahman-cognition lapses into irrevocable. invalidity. Hence contradiction also cannot serve as sublator. If, for example, the conch-shell be dyed with the yellowness of the yellow bile, why does it not lend itself to the vision of the bystander ? That is because it is subtle, you may growl out.

bhrantirāpanna. Ata eva na badhasya badhakatvam api. Pitta-gatapītima- nuliptah cet śamkhah katham tarhi na tatha pārsvasthena drśyate. Suksma- tvāt iti cet. Kimidam suksma-tvam atīndriyatvam cet. Na tarhi bhrante- nāpi drśyeta, Anyat cet kim anena. Pittopa-hatena tu sāmīpyāt drsyata iti cet. Kimidam sāmīpyam nāma. Indriya-sannikarsah cet, sa tarhi ubhayoh samanah; Sarira-samipyam cet tat anupayuktam. Anyatha para- śarira-samīpa-sthanam danda-kuudalādinam adarsana-prasaugāt. Pītaļ samkha pratiyate iti Ko'rthah. Kim pīta-rupa-vattaya iti uta pīta-rupa- dravya-samyuktataya iti. Nadyah anyathakhyati-prasaugat. Dvitiye' nubhava-virodhah. Evam udaharanantarani vi-pratipannani nirasanīyan! ityalam upahasaniyaprakriya-nirakriya-vistarena" (NS. of Jayatirtha).

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Well, then, is this subtleness supra-sensuous ? In that case, it would elude the vision of the deluded experient also. If it be something else, it's no use fastening one's veason on it. You might reopen the issue by asserting that a jaundiced man can only see it because of proximity. Teach us, then, what is proxi- mity. If it be sense-intercourse, it holds good for both. It cannot, however, be proximity of the body : for, otherwise, the staff, the ear-trinket etc., which lie proximate to some other's body, would remain unperceived. Then, again, what do you mean by saying that a yellow conch-shell is being apprehended ? Does the conch-shell appear to possess yellow colour, or does it have conjunction with yellow substance ? The first alternative welcomes Anyath-Khyati and is, hence, unacceptable. The second alternative rides roughshod over experience. Thus may be set aside other illustrations of Invalid cognition. But, no need of prolixity in refuting such ridiculous propositions". This long-drawn, threadbare and pungent criticism, though aot beyond reproach, has certainly much force in it. But, the most effective criticism of the theory comes unfortunately from venkata-natha, the most illustrious scholar in the line of Ramanuja. He observes in a cryptic sloka that he, who accepts everything as valid, suffers his own theory being disproved by an opponent ("Na sarvasya pramanatvan sva-paksasyanyatah ksateh".). Though he does not direct it against Sat-khyati, it can be thus utilised easily. For, Riminuja must have to accept that his opponents' cognitions are also real and this admission will signal the doom of Sat-khyati. Cit-sukha also makes use of this argument, though against the Prabhakara theory, and observes that if all cognitions were valid, the cognition of the form 'there is invalid cognition' will also be valid, thus making room for the acceptance of invalid cognitions. Indeed, the advocate of Sat-khyati has got to keep mum in all philosophical disputations; for, by criticising others he disproves his own thesis that all cognition is valid. We may push the argument further forward. All of us now and then experience that we misunderstood a certain matter, that we had a wrong notion of something. Now, if this cognition of wrong notion be a reality, there is certainly wrong notion i.e. invalid cognition. If, again, the cognition is unreal, it itself is a wrong i.e. invalid cognition.

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What has Rimannja got to say in regard to our cognitions of the type 'I am fat', 'I am Brahmin' and the like ? These cognitions are certainly erroneous ; still they, far from impeding purposive action, are the very foundation of it. One might plead that Rimanuja's Sat-khyati pertains only to the epistemological sphere and not also beyond it to the metaphysical domain. Though many dualistic philosophers estrange epistemology from ontology, the fact is not true in regard to Ramanuja. He, on the contrary, brings in a kind of physics-laden metaphysics that abhors pragmatic activity. Herein lies the fatal weakness of his theory.

Indeed, Ramanuja, though a realist, looks askance at a cer- tain kind of 'Vyavahara', though not at the whole lot of them in the Advaitic manner. But, once an erroneous type of 'Vyavahara' is harboured, the reality of 'Vyavahara' in general becomes problematic and fraught with misgivings, leading inevitably to the Advaitic 'mithyatva' of all 'vyavahara'. It might be contended that the things left to themselves are quite all right, but it is the relations that bring in falsity. Though this cannot be the position taken by Ramanuja unless we accept Akhyati-samvalita satkhyati as his theory, still we may observe against it that the relations are imposed by the intellect which conceives them and hence this conception must be erroneous. The ultimate fact of the matter is that Ramanuja cannot rule out Error. He only shifts it from one place to another, from cogni- tion to 'Vyavahara'. And causality demands, not to speak of Ramanuja's application of the principle of quintuplication, that cognition and Vyavahara should both be either real or unreal.

The oddity of Ramanuja's argument comes out in bold relief when we consider that he postulates valid cognition as sand- wiched between invalidity on both the ends, defect of organs on the one side and invalid 'vyavahara' on the other. If, then, truth can come out of falsity and good out of evil, let the merciful God of Ramanuja abdicate in favour of Satan. If, again, a valid cog- nition can bring in its wake an invalid 'vyavahara', why should not the God of Ramanuja create an unreal, or even 'mithya' world even with His real Sakti ? Then again, if Dosa or defect can reveal truth without shrouding and perverting it, why should the Dosa of Maya be the cause of our bondage by shutting out

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from us the true nature of the self and God and sundering us from the servitude of the latter ? These arguments as they have appeared to me seem to shake to its very foundation the meta- physical edifice of Ramanuja.

Furthermore, it appears to me that the theory has its weak- ness in another regard also. Ramanuja, as has already been said, holds that Nirvikalpaka is not indeterminate, but non-recognitive,. non-discriminatory cognition. And Savikalpaka is recognitive and discriminatory cognition. Now, the cognition of nacre-silver taking the form 'this is silver' must be called Savikalpaka by Ramanuja. But, is there any nirvikalpaka cognition of the same preceding it ? For, in order to be recognitive, it must necessarily be preceded by a Nirvikalpaka cognition of the same. But, can Ramanuja prove that he had at any point of time a nirvikalpaka cognition of silver in a nacre ? Certainly he cannot ; for, if he could, the Savikalpaka in question becomes well-grounded and conventionalised and in that case he cannot find fault with vyavahara even. So, he is constrained to deny any such nirvi- kalpaka. And the moment he does so, he denies to the cognition in question the character of Savikalpaka also. Thus, both nirvi- kalpaka and savikalpaka being ruled out of court, it loses all claim to cognition at all.

These are some of the more important arguments against Sat- khyati that have appeared to me on a close scrutiny of the system.

The variant of Sat-khyati as advocated by the scholars of the Dvaitadvaita school does not require being separately scrutinized ; for, it almost stands refuted by the arguments given against the Sat-khyati of Ramanuja. Still, we may draw attention to one or two positive defects of this variant. In the first instance, it disregards the time-honoured coherence or correspondence between cognition and its datum-a fact which is apt to let loose the forces of riotous indiscipline in the domain of epistemology. It would be really difficult for us to ascertain if there is a parti- cular thing before us and all our behaviour will be at a standstill. Secondly, the theory postulates that a cognition is real if it arises. from a real cause ('Saddhetu'). But, how to know that the cause is real ? The theory brings in complete rupture between

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cognition and its external cognitum and we cannot pass confi- dently from the former to the latter. For, we are not sure of the existence of the external object outside the cognition as in the case of the nacre-silver. So, the reality of the cause must be tentatively known by some other prior cognition whose reality again depends upon another prior cognition and so an ad infinitum, leading to infinite regression. To avoid this, it may be said that the cause must be cognised by the cognition taking the form 'this is real'. But, then, the cause like 'dosa-samskara' etc. being cognised, the cognition of the nacre-silver and the like will not occur at all, or else all illusions will be of the abiding type like the bent stick. Moreover, the infinite regression of the chain of cognitions will reduce the world to a cognitive one and the objective world will be practically done away with.

Hence, sat-khyati in either form does not stand to reason and: cannot be accepted by a logical mind, far less by one who is. moreover a realist to the core.

CHAPTER XII

VIVEKĀKHYĀTI

Vivekākhyati, or Smrti-pramosa, or Akhyati, as it is generally termed, (the Akhyati of the Carvaka being an altogether different theory as discussed previously) is the theory of Error advocated by Prabhikara and his followers. Prabhakara, or Prabhakara- guru, or simply Guru, as he is sometimes called, was a great Mimamsist who probably flourished earlier than Kumarila-Bhatta round about 650 A. D. He was the illustrious founder of a separate school of Mima nsa which differed from the school of Kumarila in many respects. Though it is generally held that "the Prabhakara school seems to be the older and to preserve better the distinctive lineaments of the original Mimansa"1, it is difficult to decide the chronological issue as between Prabhakara and Kumarila. The former is said to be senior to the latter by some fifty years. But, the hypothesis becomes shaky when we consider that Salika-natha, said to be a direct disciple of Prabha- kara, quotes in his Rju-vimala, a sub-commentary on Prabha- kara's Brhatī, verses from Pramana-varttika of Dharma-kīrti, a nephew of Kumarila (?)2. Kumarila's school, however, attained greater calebrity in course of time and the school of Prabhakara suffered a great set-back, its adherents being mainly located in South India among the dualists like the Ramanujists. Even in South India it had to contend with the rival school of Kumarila that enlisted the sympathy of the great Sankara and his followers (cf. "Vyavahare Bhatta-nayah"). That does not, however, prove that the school was weak in its philosophical texture, or that it was saturated with heretical ideas as is sometimes alleged (cf. 'Prasiddham eva loke' smin Buddha-bandhuh Prabhakarah'- Śri Harsa). Prabhakara, Salikanatha and Bhavanatha were great thinkers, but the fact that they fell foul of the major

1. Hiriyanna's O. I. P., P. 302. 2. The fact that Salika-natha refers to Dharma-kirti as simply 'kirti' is highly significant. For, a long period of time must have elapsed before this : abbreviation could occur as a memento of his far-flung fame.

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philosophical movement of the time-I mean the Adviata move- ment of Sankara-signalled their discomfiture and premature doom. As a matter of fact, Prabhakara's system, whose essentials I am presenting presently, has many attractions for us even to this day.

Prabhakara, like Kum rila, took the Vedas as revealed know- ledge and, therefore, infallible. Hence, he upheld the theory of self-validity of knowledge, both in ratio essendi and ratio cognos- cendi. All cognition is axiomatically valid to him. Even Smrti is not invalid, nor is it valid. The fact is that it has no occasion to face the question of validity3. All cognition is, according to Prabh Skara, self-luminous. It is, therefore, cognised not as an object, but as cognition itself .. A cognition is not invested with the form of its object ; in this regard, it is formless. Prabhakara maintains that every cognition reveals not only itself, but also its cogniser and cognitum. Hence, a cognition (say) of a jar arises not in the form 'this is a jar', but in the form 'I know a jar'. In other words, according to Prabhakara, every cognition is self-cognition and there is no self-appropriating perception beyond perception itself. It follows as a corollary of this postu- late of triple cognition (Triputi-Sarhvid) that the object and the cogniser are illumined ab extra by the cognition. The cogniser, which is the self, is the 'I-notion' itself and becomes manifest in all cognitions. It is intrinsically wholly non-sentient, but is never the object of any cognition, though revealed by it. Furthermore, Prabhakara doas not admit that the self suffers any change- either change of place, or change of form. The souls are many in number and they are all ubiquitous. Every cognition points to a cognitum as an external object and this object is the cause of the cognition. Tbis causal theory of cognition makes Prabha- kara a realist and as a through-going realist he refuses to admit any cognition as invalid. Another special feature of the school

3. " .. Smaranam, tasya ananubhava-rupatvat na pramanya- prasanga h"'. (PP. of Sālikanātha, P. 43) "Na pramanam smrtiḥ purva-pratipatti-vyape-ksanat" (Ibid). This statement does not mean that Smrti is invalid, but simply says that it is not valid. 4. "Samvit-tayaiva hi samvid samvedya na samvedyatayā". ( Br, P. 64 ).

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is that in it 'Nirvikalpaka' is not a mere logical necessity as in Nyaya, nor an apprehension of the pure Esse only as in Advai- tism, nor even an 'Alocana-jnana' as in the Bhatta school. The Nirvikalpaka here apprehends both Samanya and Visesa only as entities, while Savikalpaka relates them and apprehends their specific characterss. Prabhakara further asserts that though cognition is self-luminous, it is never a knowable (Sarnvedya) ; the presence of a cognition, however, may be apprehended through inference, but never its cognitional character as such (cf. "Na hi anumanad rupa-grahanam, Sanmatra-grahi anumanain bhavati" Brhati). That is to say, a cognition is not 'Samvedya', but 'Prameya', and that also through inference. Furthermore, "the proof for the existence of anything", according to Prabhakara, as Dr. G. N. Jha says in his Prabhakara School of Purva-mīmamsa, "must ultimately rest in our own consciousness". (P. 98). Cons -. ciousness is infallible and whatever appears in it is invariably real. Another special feature of this school is that it makes. knowledge a means to an end. All knowledge, according to this. theory, prompts activity.

Let us now see how Prabhakara and his followers explain the phenomena of errors and illusion with the theory of Viveka- khyati. Prabhakara explodes the five-fold kalpana of the. Buddhists6, but he himself enunciates another five-fold kalpana,. which is at the root of superimposition, which latter is respon- sible for the so-called erroneousness of cognitions. He holds. that five kinds of imagination bring in their wake Adhyasa which gives rise to the so-called invalid cognition. He puts to himself: the question what Adhyasa is and answers readily : "It is non -- apprehension of discrimination; it is the superimposition of common attributes due to absence of enquiry for difference- because of the apprehension of the individuality only of an entity ; it is the similarity with some other entity of one that is non- different ; it is the super-imposition of difference due to absence of enquiry for the similar ; and it is the non-ascertainment of the

5. Vide "Tasmāt samanya-visesau etc.". (PP., p. 54) .. 6. "Bhavati kalpanā-jřāna m, yadi pratyaksa-samadhi-gamyatā jūānasya: svat. Ānumānikatvam tu jhānasya vaksyati". (Brhatī, P. 44, Chowkhāmbā) .. Also "tatha ca vidya-manartha-grahanat na kalpana-rupateti". (Rju, P. 44)

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similar because of absence of enquiry for difference"7. This adhyasa is the matrix of all so-called erroneousness as he himself explains : "How, then, are we to account for such contrary apprehensions as those of the self in the non-self and the like ? The answer is as follows :- The cognition that arises propping upon a different, though similar, object, but does not provide for apprehension of discrimination, becomes the cause of recollection in regard to some other similar object-a recollection which does not appear in the from "I recollect"s. (Incidentally, I want to point out that this portion of Prabhakara's Brhati is highly valuable as supplying a hitherto undiscovered historical perspec- tive for a study of the evolution of a particular philosophical concept in India-I mean the concept of Adhyasa. How abun- dantly clear is the fact that the great Sankara was much intlu- enced by this portion of Brhati in preparing his brilliant Adhyasa- bhasya, and how lamentably pathetic is the tonguetied silence of scholars in this regard ! It is certainly exhilarating to find that Sankara imbibes the ideas of Prabhakara in writing his Adhyasa-bhasya ; in the ultimate analysis, it may transpire that Prabhakara also imported the concept of Adhyasa from the Buddhist schools9. It is highly exhilaraing to get to discover that Adhyasa forms the bed-rock of the Akhyati theory of Pra- bhakara-a fact, which I think, has occurred to no scholar as yet). Basing then his thesis on Adhyasa, Prabhakara asserts that a cognition, whose cognitum is different from what the sense

7. "Ko'yam adhyaso nama ? Vivekagrahanam ; svarupa-matra-graha- nat bhedananu-sandhanat samanyadhyasah. Abhinnasya ca arthantarena sadrsyam ; sadrsananu-sandhanat bhedadhyasah. Sadrsanava-grahanam tu bhedananu-sandhanat. Seyam panca-vidha kalpana". (Brhati., P. 61). 8. "Katham tarhi viparita-graha anatmani atmadayah ? Ucyate- Vişayantaram sadrsam ava-lambya agrhīta-vivekam yat jnanam utpannam tat sadrsa-visayantare smrti-jnāna-hetutām pratipadyate smarāmīti juāna- śūnyasya. (Ibid., P. 65). 9. Salika-natha in his Rju says the following : "Taduktam kirtinaiva 'Sastra-cintakaḥ khalu evam vivecayanti, na tu partipattarab. Te tu drśya-vikalpau ekīkrtya bahyameva anumanyamanah pravartante' iti". (P. 41, Chow.). A casual perusal of the words 'Satyanrte mithunikrtya" of Samkara side by side with the above underlined words of Dharmakirti clearly establishes borrowing on the part of Saukara. The word 'Adhyasa', however, first occurs in the following yoga-sutra : "Sabdartha-pratyayanam itaretaradhyasat etc". (Ys. III. 17).

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contacts, is not perception. On the contrary, such an erroneous; cognition occurs as a result of non-apprehension1o. Prabhakara assails here the popular contention that invalid cognitions are due to defectiveness of organs. He asserts that defectiveness can only reasonably do away with the causal potency of an entity ; it can, on no account, generate a different causal potency. Hence, all errors and illusions are occasioned by Adhyasa based on non- apprehension of difference1 1. Śalika-natha in his Prakarana-Pancika and Bhavanatha in Naya-viveka have elaborated the thesis of Prabhakara and have tried to place it on a firm footing. Salika-natha starts with the assertion that what appears in a cognition is verily the object of that cognition. And since silver appears in the cognition of the form 'this is silver', silver surely is the object of that cognition, not the nacre. So, the proposition of something appearing as some other thing contradicts cognition itself12. In point of fact, the nacre is intuited in its general aspects,: its. differentia from silver remaining unknown. Then occurs recolle -- ction of silver in which the characteristic of 'thatness' is left out due to mental defect. Finally, this recollected silver is not differentiated from nacre13. That such so-called invalid cogni- tions are due to recollection is proved by the Law of Residue (parisesya-pramana'). For, in the case cited above, the silver cannot be perceived, being absent there; nor can it be known by other means of proof like Inference inasmuch as there is absence of grounds of inference and the like. Hence, in the last resort, it must be ascertained to have been supplied by recolle -.

10. "Anya-samprayukte cakşuşi anya-vişayam jnānam na pratyaksam iti. Katham tarhi viparyayah ? Agrahanad eveti vadamaḥ". (P. 66, Brhati). 11. "Yuktam ca duslatāyāh kāryāksama-tvam, na punaḥ kāryāntara- samarthyam. Tasmat agrahaua-nibandhana eva viparyayah". ( Ibid., P. 67 ). 12. "Atra brūmo ya evārtho yasyām samvidi bhāsate/Vedyah sa eva ..... // Idam rajatam ityatra rajatancavabhasate/Tadeva tena vedyam syanna tu suktiravedanāt//Tenanyasyanyatha bhanam pratityaiva parahatam//". (Pp. 33-34, Pp., Chowkhāmbā). 13. "Suktikāyā viśesā ye rajatād bheda-hetavah/Te na jnātā abhibhavad jñata samanya-rupatā//Anantaranca raiate smrtirjātā tayāpi ca/Mano-doșāt tad ityamśa-parāmarśa-vivarjitam//Rajatam vişayīkrtya naiva śukterviveci- tam/". (Ibid., P. 34).

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ction14. The fact of the matter is that we have two distinet cognitions here : 'this' is perception and silver is recollection, the latter immediately succeeding the former. But, these two. are unwittingly identified due to non-apprehension of difference with the result that they do not appear distinct. Hence, this apprehension, what with its seeming directness of cognition and what with its seeming possession of the same cognitum, does not appear a whit different from the valid cognition of sllver. As a result, a similar volition occurs ; but this volition is thwarted, giving rise to the sublating cognition. So, the sublating cognition justifies itself by negating the volition in regard to the silver under reference ('Prasajyamana-rajatam')15. Śalika-natha then applies this theory to explain different cases of illusion. He now points out that all illusions do not as a rule arise out of partly eclipsed memory (Smrti-pramosa)16. Thus, in the case of the cogniticn of a yellow conch-shell, we do not discriminate between two perceptions-one of the conch- shell and the other of the yellowness of the bile. Similar is the case with the cognitions of 'the bitter molasses', 'the double moon', 'the circular fire-brand' and the like. Similarly, there may be non-discrimination between two recollections as in the case of doubt. Śalika-natha incidentally observes that we do not damn a cognition as invalid when our purposive action in regard to it is not hindered as in the case of the cognition of 'hot water 17. Bhavanātha in his Naya-viveka tries to discredit Anyatha- khyati from the causal standpoint, He develops the arguments of Prabhakara and Salikanath to the effect that an invalid

14. "Na hyasannihitam tāvat pratyaksam rajatam bhavet/Lingādya- bhāvac-Cānyasya pramāņasya na gocarab//Pariśesāt smrtiriti niścayo jāyate punaḥ". (Ibid.). 15. "Grahana-smarane ceme vivekanavabhasinī/ .. .. bhinne nabhato bhedagraha-samatvata h// .Aparoksartha-bodhena samanartha-grahena ca/ Availaksanya-samvittiriti tavat sama rthitam/etc.". (Ibid., P. 34-35) 16. "Na hi smrti-pramosena sarvatraiva bhramo matah" (Ibid., P. 36). Also "Tadevam vivekagrahat kvacit smrtyoh kvacid grhītyoh kvacid grhīti- smrtyoh svapna-pītaśankha-śuktirajatadibhranti-siddhiriti dinmātram" (Na. Vi., P. 94). 17. "Yatra tu vyavahāra-visamvādo nāsti tatra bhrāntirapi na vyapadi- śyate, yatha usna-jala-jnane". (Ibid., Pp. 43-44).

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cognition can not be causally explained. He argues that those who arrive at Anyatha-khyati from the causality of intellect impaired by defect, assume some potency of defects which is contrary to their nature. A defect arrests the creative potency and does not infuse different potency. A burnt cane-seed is the cause of a plantain-tree; in this regard, burning is no defect, though it is in regard to the growth of cane-plant. So, a cause that gives rise to a certain effect, cannot generate a defective species of the same effect when it is marred by defect. Hence, a defective cognition i.e. an invalid cognition cannot arise from defective intellect18.

Now, Bhavanatha raises an interesting point. How, he asks, can we deny invalidity of the nacre-silver cognition when in it, contrary to actuality, 'silver' is apprehended as being in apposition with 'this' ? He meets this charge in the following manner : In the case of an invalid cognition of the type 'this is silver', one apprehends in 'this' an entity similar in properties to a piece of silver and this brings the recollection of the silver- species ; this recollection, however, is absorved into the cognition of 'this' which is the substant ive. As no cognition of discrimi- nation arises, the two are related in apposition even as in a valid cognition and appear as though integrated in a single cognition. The two cognitions, though occurring successively, appear as substantive and its adjunct. And since the substantive and the adjunct are apprehended in one cognition, here also direct apprehension and recollection, or for the matter of that, their objects, are cognised in one sweep by a single cognition, though seemingly 19.

18. "Ye tu dosopahata-dhī-sāmagrīto' nyathākhyātim āhuh, tesām doșa- svabhava-viparīta-sakti-kalpana syat ....... Dagdham tu vetra-bījam kadalī- karye samagrī, na tu daho' smin karye dosah, vetrajananat tu doșatā ..... Evam ca yajjatīya-kāryajanikā yā sāmagrī, na sā dosāt tajjatīyam karyanı karotīti na dhi-jatīyam dosād vikrtam yuktam". (Na. Vi., P. 92). 19. "Nanu idam ityetat-samanadhikarauataya rajata-bhanam ; Na tu vastu tatha ityayathartham eva. Maivam ; idam iti rajatavyakti-tulya- dharmaka-vastubhāne rajatajāti-smrtau ca satyām rūpyantar-bhāvācca rūpa- buddheḥ idamantarbhāvo jātaḥ, tatra tu viveko na bhātah ...... Ato bhānastha- mātrāpeksayā satyadhītulyatā iti yuktā samānādhikaraņatā ...... Nirantara- bhanam hi rupa-rupinoh eka-dhī-vedyataya svato yuktam iti eka-dhivedyata' ugīkrta" (Ibid., Pp, 90-91).

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Jayatirtha, the great Madhva logician, presents this Prabha- kara theory in a highly systematic manner. Let us refer here to some of the points discussed by him. The so-called invalid cogni- tion consists of two cognitions : direct apprehension and recollce- tion. Recollection, which is apprehension of the apprehended, sheds off its characteristic of thatness-cum-apprehendedness due to defect and is reduced to mere apprehension. So, the recolle- ction of 'silver' and the apprchension of 'this' are not mutully discriminated either entitatively or in respect of cognitum and, as such, due to the similarity with the cognition of a presented silver, these two appear non-different and form appositional relation with each other2 o. That the cognition of silver is recollection transpires from the fact that a nacresilver is not cognised by one who has never before cognised a silver. It cannot be contended that the cognition of silver, shorn, as it is of thatness, cannot be called recollection ; for, 'thatness' is not invariable as is evident in the recollection of meaning from a word and in that of Hari, Hara and the like. Moreover, recollection need not necessarily report the whole of what is apprehended2 1. Again, even those who affirm invalid cognition must accept non-apprehension of difference. For, when difference is apprehended, there remains no scope for invalid cognition ; otherwise, an invalid cognition would never have been contra- dicted. So, when non-apprehension of difference can explain everything, why do you assume an invalid cognition22 ? More-

Also "Vijnana-dvayancaitat eka-sadhārana-rupam. Tatra ekavijnana- sadhāraņa-rupavamarsad ekamiva jnanam etc." (Pp., p. 43). 20. "Tatha ca rajata-smrte purovarti-grahanasya ca mithab svarūpato visayatasca bhedagrahanāt sannihita-rajata-jnāna-sārupyena idam rajatam iti bhinne api grahana-smarane abheda-vyavahāram sāmānādhikaraņya- vyapadesam ca pravartayatah" (NS). See also Bhamati, P. 28 (Mm. A. K. Sāstri's ed.). 21. "Kiñcedam smaranam anakalita-rajatasya anutpadyamanatvat sampratipanna-smaranavat. Na cedam asmaranam ; Tattamsa-vikalatvāt sampratipannavat iti yuktam. Padat Padarthasmrtau Hari-Haradi-smrtau ca vyabhicārāt (Ibid.). Also Cf. "Iha bhutale ghato nasti ityanullikhita-tadamsasyāpi smaraņasya svīkaraņāt" (SVR., P. 105) 22. "Kinca viparyayam angīkurvāņena api Vivekāgraho grāhya eva. Na hi viveka-grahe viparyayāvakāso'sti, Virodhāt. Anyathā vīparyaya-nivrtty- anupapatteh. Tatha ca tata eva sarvasya upapattau kim viparyaya-kalpa- nayā". (Ibid.)

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over, the following inference proves that all cognition is valid : "Jnanatvai yathartha-matra-vrtti, jnana-matra-vrttitvat pramat- vavat" (NS).

This then is the Vivekakhyati of the Prabhakaras. But, in order to understand the special traits of this theory, we are to distinguish it from the Akhyati or Vivekahyati theory as is said to be upheld by Ramanuja, the Samkhya and the Bhattas. The Ramanuja brand of Akhyati hinges upon the law of Parsi- mony and is arrived at only as a consequence of Sat-khyati or Anyathakhyati. In it there is no postulation of two distinct. cognitions whose Vivekagraha gives rise to the so-called invalid cognition in the Prabhakara system. On the contrary, here the vivekagraha takes the shape of asamsargagraha' which is in regard to plentitude of the particles of silver in nacre in the case of Satkhyati ('bahutva-samsargagrahena eva bodhopapateriti'. N. Sa. On Np., p. 37) and in regard to the superimposed charac- teristic of (say) silverness in the case of Anyathakhyati ('Āropya- dharmasamsargagraha-rupaya Akhyateh avarjanīyatvat N. Sa. on NP., p. 43). In the case of Anyathakhyati, it may also be said that there is non-apprehension of Anyathatva and this fact constitutes Akhyati.

The Samkhya Akhyati, however, is more radical and does. not depend simply upon any slender non-apprehension at any stage of the invalid experience. The Akhyati it makes room for in its system is arrived at from two different standpoints. From the psychological standpoint, it advocates the view of selective apprehension and asserts that all our cognitions are partial and incomplete. All knowledge is fragmentary. Hence, as Prof. Hiriyanna says, It may not indeed amount to an error of com- mission ; but it is partial and so far as it not recognised to be partial, it becomes an error, though only an error of omission'. (The cultural Heritage of India, Vol. II, p. 47). The activity which the Buddhi exercises in apprehending an object is selective and only that much of the nature of an object is apprehended as. is in accord with the percipient's attitude at the time. So, there is non-apprehension of the complete nature of an object. From the metaphysical standpoint, again, knowledge is marked by another deficiency. Every experience presupposes the invariable identity of the Buddhi and the self, that are in reality different.

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This failure of discrimination or Vivekakhyati leads to Avivek- akhyati which is at the root of all our empiric experience where- from we can free ourselves through Viveka-khyati (cf, 'Viveka- khyatiraviplava hanopayah'. Ys. II. 26). Both these types of Akhyati are, however, metaphysical errors from which we can rid ourseives only through Liberation. Purusottamaji Maharaja states that the Bhattas advocate the theory of Akhyati because they hold that an invalid cognition is due to recollection whose character of thatness hasbeen engulfed because of defects of the agent. ('Bhattastu karty- gatairdosaih pramusta-tattaka smrtirevatra ityakhyativadamahuh' (PR., p. 17). Dr. S. N. Dasgupta also says .: 'Kumarila agrees with this view as expounded by Prabhakara' (A Hist. of Ind. Phil., Vol. I, p. 386). This, however, sounds queer as the Bhattas are said to advocate Anyathakhyati. But, the fact of the matter is that Kumarila in his Niralambana-vada in SV. seeks refuge in Smrti to explain invalid cognitions and also hints at Samsargagraha in the hemistitch 'Vastvantaraika-samsrstah padarthah Sunyata-dhiyah'. These two features of the theory of Kumarila, namely Smrti and Samsarga-graha, are emphasised by some of his followers. Thus, Gaga Bhatta in his Bhatta- cintamani says : 'Thus arises the apprehension of objects, that are known as related to one thing, as related to some different thing as in the case of nacre-silver. This (explanation) is not faulty because we assume recollection divested of thatness"23. Partha-sarathi Misra also says as follows while explaining an illusion : 'The piece of nacre, through contact with the (visual) organ, is apprehended in its aspect of luminosity shared in common with the silver ; and the specific characteristic of nacre- ness is not cognised due to organic weakness. Then, the impres- sion being revived, the silver is recollected and the nacre is apprehended as the silver in recollection due to defect'24. This Pramustatattaka-smrti coupled with Sarhsarga-graha affiliated

23. "Evam ca anya-sambandhitvena avagatanam anya-sambandhitvena bhānam śukti-rajata-jnānavat ... Pramusta-tattāka-smaraņāugīkārad vā na dosah" (Bh. Ci., p. 26). 24. "Indriya-samprayogāt śuktī-śakalam rajata-sādhāranena bhāsvarat- vādi-rūpeņa grhītam asadhāranam tu suktikātvam īndriyadaurbalyadagrhi- tam, anantarañca samskārodbodhād rajatam smrtam, tataḥ smrta-rajatāt- manā suktirdosad grhyate" (Sd., P. 30).

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the theory to Akhyati from the strictly logical standpoint, though from the psychological standpoint the two theories are widely apart. The fact of the matter is that, though both the schools emphasise the role of Smrti in explaining illusions, the Prabhakara school makes illusion logically a complex cognition composed of presentative and representative elements whose asa.nsargagraha is responsible for illusion, while the Bhatta school pounces upon the positive aspeet of Sa hsarga-graha which suggests to them the theory of Anyathikhy iti. Logically speaking, there is little difference between Asa nsargagraha and Sa nsarga-graha. But, psychologically, the two are worlds apart and. as such, it is not proper to let the same name of Akhyati be shared by both the schools. But another matter of great import must detain us here for some time before we can proceed with the criticism of Viveka- khyati. Vimuktatman in his Ista-siddhi points out that no volition can result from two discrete cognitions that are not in apposition and so he suggests in favour of the Pribhaikara the following : 'Trtiyan va saminidhikaranyajnsnatn minasamasti, tato va pravrttiriti' (p. 44). Jnanottama, the scholiast, introduces this view with the following observation: 'Cirantanakhyati-matan upanyasyati -trtiya hveti'. Prof. Hiriyanna waxes eloquent on this observation of Jnanottama and says the following in his article entitled 'Pribhakaras : Old and New' in the JOOR, Madras (1930) : 'From this it is clear that the older Prabhakaras admit over and above the two jñanas referred to above, unitary jñana which the manas of the percipient constructs out of the material furnished by the senses and memory. It is this addi- tional jñana that is bhrama. .It is this sarnsargagraha where there is no sa nsarga that constitutes error" (p. 106). So, Prof. Hiriyanna thinks that the older Prabhakaras assumed a third unitary cognition, as a result of purely mental operation, which prompted consequent acitivity and which was damned as invalid by them. That this third cognition is held invalid instead. of the first two is accounted for by pointing out that the validity of the Vedic knowledge can be assured of only if sense-perceptions and the like are held to be veridical in nature. This explanation offered by Vimuktatman in favour of the acceptance of a third cognition, which is invalid, seems to support apparently the supposition of Prof. Hiriyanna. For, the unimpeach-ability of

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vedic knowledge is advocated most of all by the Prabhakaras and the Bhattas of whom the latter are represented by Vimuktatman as sponsoring Anyatha-khyati. But, unfortunately for me, I have not discovered any data that may lend support to such a thesis and wonder how the learned professor could jump to such a conclusion. It is to be noted here before anything else that this suggestion of a third unitary mental cognition takes away the essential character of the theory of Akhyati from it. For, the principal psychological fact about Vivekakhyati or Asamsargagraha is that the mind remains in a partial stupor wherefore it admits of only negative characterisation much in the lines of the Citra-turaganyaya of Śankuka in matters of Rasa-exegesis. Prof. Hiriyanna also states in the foot-note, "This may appear to be the same as the Viparīta-khyati of Kumarila as expounded by Partha-sarathi Miśra". Inpoint of fact, irrespective of the old and new Prabhakaras, neither Prabhakara himself, nor Salikanatha. nor Bhavanātha, nor Ramanujacarya alias Vadihamnsāmbuvahācārya is found to make any statement which can bear out the above supposition. And it is the furthest from truth that any Prabha- kara would concede invalidity to mental cognitions (of. "Yathar- tham sarva-vijnanam iti Veda-vidam matam" PP). None of the above-mentioned writers is found to assume any third unitary mental cognition. That the invalid cognition is as though an integral one, at least psychologically, is vouched for by Prabhakara and the whole band of his followers ; but, that it is a third unitary cognition, and a mental one at that, is not accepted by any of them. He asserts, as already pointed out, that perception of an object in its general character brings about the recollection of a similar object in a manner that completely engulfs its character as recollection. Upon this Salikanatha comments : "Hence the difference between what is perceived and what is recollected is not apprehended" ("Tena grhyamana- smaryamanayoh bhedo navasīyate" RV., P. 65). In fact, Prabhakara's partiality for the term 'Adhyasa', with which he explains away invalid cognition, proves that he takes all invalid cognition to be apparently integral in nature. Salikanatha also refers to it as though it were a single cognition ("ekam iva jñanam" PP., p. 43). Bhavanatha is perfectly clear and emphatic on this point. He contends that, though in fact, we have two.

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discrete cognitions, their presentation in apposition with each other as an integrated whole stands to reason ("yukta samanadhi- karanata" NV., p. 90). It is clear that none of these three scholars call into request a third unitary mental cognition to explain illusion. On the contrary, Salikanatha and Bhavanatha emphasise the fact that an invalid experience appears as not a whit different from a valid experience ("Aparoksartha-bodhena samanārtha-graheņa ca/Availaksanya-Sarvittiriti tāvat samar- thitam" PP., p. 34) ; Also 'Ato bhanastha-matrapeksaya satya- dhī-tulyata iti yukta samanadhikaraņatā' NV., pp. 89-90). Incidentally, it may be pointed out here that the great Ramanuja also thinks that the Prabhakaras take illusion as a single cognition. He gives vent to such a conviction in regard to Vivekakhyati when he says that the theory is ultimately reducible to Anyathakhyati inasmuch as it conceives two cognitions as one. ("Khyatyantara-vadinām tu sudūram api gatva anyathā- vabhāso' vaśyaśryaņīyah .... .Akhyati-pakse'pi ...... Jnāna-dvayam ekatvena ca". Śri Bha., P. 89, Kan. ed.). Vadiha hsambu-vahacarya, however, seems to strike out a new path for himself in his Tantra-rahasyam. He asserts that an appositional volition results from the non-apprehension of difference between perception and recollection, and not from a single qualified cognition. ("Tatra ...... grahaņa-smaraņayorva bhedagrahat .... Viśista-vyavahāraḥ, na tu viseșa-dhīta" P. 2). Proceeding further with his discussion, he springs us a surprise when he compares his pet theory of Vivekakhyati with Anyatha- khyati. He now points out that the advocate of Anyathakhyati also explains illusion on the basis of perception and recollection at the first instance and then brings in the superimposition of the recollected object upon the perceived one. But, in his own theory, an illusion may be explained by those very two cognitions in their mutually undifferentiated nature and subsequent volition made possible. So, in deference to the Law of Parsimony, no third cognition is assumed in his theory. ("Kith canyatha- khyativadinapi bhavatā prathama grahaņa-smarane angīkrtyaiva tabhyām viparyayo jayata ityuktam. Ata evātra smaryamāņāropa iti bhavato vyavaharah. Asmakam tu tābhyām eva agrhīta-bhe- dabhyam bhranti-vyapadesopapatteh pravrttisambhavacca na tṛtīya-jñānāngīkarah, lāghavāt". P. 3).

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This seems to suggest that the assumption of a third unitary cognition was never pressed into request (though this writer was a later Prahhakara) by any Prabhakara, old or new. On the contrary, it was perhaps accepted by a certain section of the Anyatha-khyati-vadins who may very reasonably be identified with the Bhattas, the sworn enemies of the Prabhakaras. It may be argued here to the contrary that if 'smaryamanaropah' implies unitary cognition in respect of Anytha-khyativadins, why should the same be not implied in respect of Prabhakara also who assumes 'adhyasa'. This objection, however, is beside the point ; for, as I have shown on many previous occasions, psychology and not logic should generally guide us in determining the true nature of a theory unless otherwise directed in the theory itself. Moreover, the Prabhakara's insistence on the absolute non-difference of an invalid cognition from a valid one from the stand-point of mere apprehension must not be lost sight of. The real fact of the matter is that Vivekakhyati is principally a psychological theory with explicit ontological implications and not a logical or metaphysical theory at bottom like Sat-khyati, Ātma-khyati or Anirvacanīya-khyati. But, scholars of rival schools have either wilfully misrepresented it or illegitimately brought in logical scrutiny to bear upon it. Logic will surely enter the scene when the theory will come up for criticism, but before that stage it ought to be kept cautiously apart in consi- deration of the psychological nature of the theory. In fact, what Prabhakara and his followers mean to say is that an invalid cognition invariably appears as a single cognition ; their affirma- tion of non-difference of dream-illusions from illusions in general proves this fact beyond any spectre of doubt. But, subsequent scrutiny reveals to them that it is in reality composed of two distinct cognitions, perception and memory, which appear un- differentiated in the invalid cognition. So, what is a single cognition-and a perception at that-in presentation gives way before logical analysis and is bifurcated into perception and memory. But, this bifurcation does in no way represent the psychosis of the moment of presentation. This bifurcation again may be subsequently integrated into a third unitary mental cog- nition. But, this mental cognition is wholly exotic in regard to the presentative cognition which takes after any valid cognition.

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So, a Prabhakara can never assume such a third unitary mental cognition simply because his experience at the moment registers no such thing ; and, as such, it flatly contradicts his fundamental postulate that a cognition is what it appears like at the moment of its experience. It may now be safely concluded that this theory of a third unitary mental cognition cannot be fathered upon the older Prabhakaras. Indeed, Jnanottama himself never does it, but simply introduces it as the older Akhyati theory. So, it is not unlikely that it might have been upheld by some other school older than the school of Prabhakara. And, to our great delight,. we find such a theory being referred to by citsukha in his Tattva- pradipika. After fighting out the Prabhakara prejudice against invalid cognition, Citsukha discusses and disposes of Asat-khyati and then scrutinises Satkhyati in the aspect of Anyathakhyati. It is here that he states the following: "Athadhunikasya kasyacit matānusāreņa idam rajatam iti jnānam idamākāra- rajatākārayoh na sainsarga-grahakam api tu tayoḥ eka-jñāna- samsarginoh bhedāgrahad ayathartha-vyavahāro(?) grhyamāņayoh bhedagrāhi savikalpakam ekarn vijnanamn vibhrama iti bhrama- lakşaņābhyupagamāt. Tatha ca nasatah Kasyacit Khyātiriti kaścit brūyāt tam prati bruyat" (P. 71). Upon this the scholiast Pratyag-rupa-bhagavan says in his Nayana-Prasadinī, "Nyaya- kalpatarau udīritam asankate". A little later he again says, "Eka-jnanopāroha-svīkāre'pi samsarga-juanapalāpa-samyāt Akhyā- ti-vadini samsarga-jnanapalapini uktamn śabdanumana-pratya- kşapramanya-prasangam dosam atrapyaha". From the above it follows that the theory of a third unitary cognition was advanced in a book called Nyaya-kalpataru and that it was a kind of Anyatha-khyati and different from Akhyativada, perhaps of Prabhakara, which did not accept "eka-jnanoparoha" as the scholiast says. Nyaya-kalpataru is an undiscovered book on Nyaya and it may very well be that the old Nyaya school had germs of such a view which was developed and systematised by the author of Nyaya-kalpataru. Jayanta Bhatta in his Nyaya- manjari evinces his partiality for Akhyati when he says that the other thr e khyati-vadins cannot rule out Akhyati ("Khyati- traya-vadi-bhirapi ceyam apratyakhyeya nunam Akhyatih" .. (P. 164, Beng. Ed., pt. II). In this regard he further says, "Vipa-

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rīta-khyatavapi ... rajata-smrtih apariharya, sa ca rajata-smrtirna tada svena rūpeņa prakasate smarāmīti pratyayabhavat" (P. 165, Ibid.). Then, while refuting Akhyati, he says : "Yaduktam ..... dve ete juane iti tad asampratam, pratyabhijnavad ekatvenaiva saihvedyamanatvad" (P. 166, Ibid.). This shows that he accepts the recollection of silver, but still affirms one single cognition even as in Recognition. Does it not answer to the requirements of the theory of a third unitary cognition ? In this connection, it is further to be noted how Jayanta explains acquired percep- tion of the type 'Sugandhi puspam'. He holds that a fragrant Hlower is perceived not by the visual organ, but by the mind ("Locanagocare'pi kunda-kusume tadavisaya-gandha-visesite bahyendriya-dvaraka-grahaņam aghatamānam iti mānasam eva surabhi kusumam it jnanam" (NM). So, according to him, it is a new type of a synthetic unity of apperception, though the neo-logicians donot accept any mixed mode of consciousness even like William James. So, we may conclude that the theory in question was upheld by a certain section of Anyathakhyati- vadins, whether a group of old logicians like Jayanta or a group of Bhatta scholars as suggested in Tantra-rahasyam.

But, even this conclusion fails to carry conviction with it when set off against a subsequent statement of Vimuktatman to the effect that there are four variants of the Akhyati theory whereupon Jnanottama comments that the first three belong to the older school and the fourth to the newer one ("Akhyati- vadino'pi sukti-rupyayoh prthak satoh aprthagavabhasabhimāna iti kecit. Anutpanna eva ekatva-jnana utpannabhrama iti canye. Apare tu trtīyam mānasam aikya-jnanam āhuḥ. Yadā tu avivekagraha eva bhramo viveka-grahaśca tadbadha iti ...... etc." (Is., P. 291). Also "Cirantanakhyati-mata-paryālocanayā any- athakhyanam apadya adhunikakhyatimate dosantaram atidisati yadā tu avivekagraha eva iti" (Viv. of Jñānottama, p. 583). So, at the present state of our knowledge; which is very limited, due to the paucity of materials at our hands, it is better not to risk any conclusion, but leave the issue an open question. Still, it is to be noted here that jñanottama here calls all the first three variants the older views, whereas on the previous occasion, he only hits upon the third one as the older view. Does it not suggest some amount of vacillation on the part of jñanottama ?

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Furthermore, it is worthy of note here that the great Saukara and Vacaspati Misra both characterise the theory as 'Viveka- grahanam' or 'Agrahanam'. So, the supposed older view of a third unitary mental cognition must, however curious it may seem, come after them if it needs be fathered upon the Prabha- karas. But, the plain fact is that we cannot trace it to its source and hence can make no categorical statement in support of or against this view, though our present findings seem to almost falsify the predication of jnanottama in this regard. The fourth view, which is styled the new theory of Akhyati by jnanottama, brings in a radical change in the theory by chara- cterising illusion in positive terms as Aviveka-graha instead of in negative terms as Vivekagraha and this theory also cannot be surely traced to its source. It appears, therefore, that all these different views are only logical constructions without any factual basis.

A legion of scholars of diverse philosophical affiliations has dealt sledge-hammer blows on Vivekakhyati which has been almost proved to be a leaky boat incapable of salvaging the Prabhakaras from the deluge of attacks. Indeed, the attacks were vitriolic to the utmost and the war was waged on different fronts, though foul play was much in evidence in some of the sectors of the battle-field. We shall now present the different spear-heads of attack one after another and assess their value wherever necessary.

The first general objection is that Akhyati, by which name Vivekakhyati is generally known, is not at all a logical concept. For, its connotation cannot be logically determined. It may be asked if Akhyati means a kind of Khyati i.e. presentation, or an absence of Khyati. Now, for fear of unwelcome issues and as a matter of fact, the Prabhakaras cannot and do not explain Akhyati as absence of Khyati. Nor can it mean a kind of presen- tation. For, then will arise the contingency of all cognitions being invalid. Moreover, if such presentation be deemed erroneous, what will contradict it ? If it is answered that another presen- tation will contradict it, that will lead to undue extension of the province of contradiction which will then find scope any- where. So, it follows that a supporter of Akhyati cannot speak of any error ; or, if he does, he must affirm it as a possibility

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in case of all presentations.s. Furtheremore, if Akhyati means absence of Khyati as said before, we should have error in slumber, not in wakeful state and dream26. Nor can it either mean a cognition that prompts one to something different from what one seeks, or an undifferentiated cognition of many objects. For, in the first case, it will not be erroneous where there is no consequent volition due to instantaneous contradition or sluggis- hness. In the second case, what is exactly meant by Viviktatva (i.e. differentiatedness), which is the counterentity of 'Avivik- tatva' ? It cannot mean cognition of difference ; for, that would logically rule out any kind of non-cognition of difference which the Prabhakara postulates. Nor can it mean non-cognition of non-difference since the aforesaid argument shuts out any cognition of non-difference and thereby logically hinders any cognition of Aviviktatva which is but negation of the absence of cognition of non-difference. Neither can it mean a composite cognition formed of difference and duality etc. For, in that case, either non-differentiation will overlap its supposed province or else will be too narrow to include cases which are styled errors. Hence it follows that Akhyati is not a logically analysable concept27. But, a Prabhakara might demur here and say that logical inderterminism can in no way corrupt the reality of anything. Moreover, if the Sankarites can speak of 'Akhandar- thabodha' and the logicians of 'Akhandopadhi', both of which defy analysis, what's the harm if tbe Akhyati of Prabhakara turns out perchance to be unanalysable ? In point of fact, however, Vimuktatman betrays his perfect understanding of the concept of Akhyati when he says that if Akhyati be denied, Omniscience would stalk the world and all the Pramanas would

25. "Kā ceyam akhyati. Kim khyātireva, uta khyatyabhavah. Na tāvat khyatyabhavah, abhāvasya anistatvāt. Nāpi khyātireva, sarva-khyātī- nam bhrantitva-prasangat ...... Khyatiscet bhrantiḥ, sā kena baādhyeta. Na hi khyatih khyatim badhate, atiprasaugat ...... Tasmat nakhyati-vadinah kacid bhrantih, sarva va khyatih bhrantih syāt". (IS., P. 116, G. O. S.) 26. "Adye susuptau bhramah syat na jagrat-svapnayoh (Vi. Pra. Sa., P. 190, Beng. Ed.). 27. "Dvitīye jhaliti bādhāt alasyad va yatra na pravrttih tatra bhrantiḥ na syat. Trtiye'pi aviviktatva-pratiyogi viviktatvam nama kim bheda-graha uta abhedagrahah āho svid itaretarābhāva-bheda-dvitvādi-saukhyā-visista- jñānam etc." (Ibid.).

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be useless, there being nothing unknown29. This shows that the charge lacks sincerity and is framed as a device for out- manoeuvring the Prabhakara. The second objection against the theory is that the Law of Residue, which is called into request to prove that in an invalid cognition like 'this is silver', silver is supplied by memory, has no scope here. For, the experience may very well be generated through defective organs and the like. The argument that one, who has perceived silver before, can have no such experience, lacks certainty ('anaikantika') in cases like the void. If, then, it is argued that one, having previous experience of silver, can have such a cognition, the answer is that in that case the cognition would not have been conspicuous by its absence in behaviour prompted by silver- impression. If the Prabhakara qualifies the inference by 'there being cognitionhood'an, even then the position does not improve. For, if the experience occurs only to one who has previous indeterminate cognition of silver, then it will not answer squarely to the determinate cognition of silver; if, again, the experience is vouched unto one who has a previous determinate cognition of silver, it would not have any impress of certitude in regard to the conative corollaries like rejection or acceptance. More- over, the inference is vitiated by the upadhi in the form 'Origina- tion from mind assisted by impressions only'30. So, the silver cannot be proved to be recollection through the operation of the Law of Residue, or by any independent inference. Inference is unavailing here also because the major term of the inference would be 'Smaranatva', which is a genus, but the Prabhakaras do not accept any genus in regard to a guna which 'smarana"

28. "Akhyatyabhave ca sarvo janah sarvada sarvajnah syāt, sarva- -pramāņānām canarthakyam, ajnatārthabhāvāt" (NS., p. 116, G. O. S.).

29. The inference is as follows ; "Idam smaranam jnanatve sati rajata- jnanavata utpadya-manatvat sampratipanna-smaranavat" See NS. 30. "Anākalita-rajatasya anutpadyamānatvam gaganādau anaikāntikam. Rajata-jnānavata eva utpadyamānatvam vivakșitam iti cenna. Tathāpi rajata-samskāra-vyavahārādau vyabhicārāt. Jñānatve satīti viseșaņād adoșa iti cenna. Rajata-nirvikalpaka-jñānavata eva utpadyamāne rajata-savi- kalpaka-nubhave vyabhi-cara-tadavasthvāt. Rajata-savikalpaka-jnanavata eva utpadyamānatvam vivaksitam iti cenna. Hānādi-buddhisu anaikāntikatā- nistārat. Samskara-matra-sahakrta-manojanyatvo-padhi-grastam canu- manam" (NS).

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is ('Kincedam smaranatva:n sadhyam, na tavat samanya i gunesu prabhakaraih abhyupagatam" NS.).

Indeed, it cannot be proved that the cognition of silver is through recollection ('Yadapi kaiscid ucyate dosavasat pramuşta- tattamsa-smaranan bhavatīti, tadapi nopapanna:h tadiya- smaranatve pramanabhavat'. Kha. Kha. Kha.). If a Prabha- kara tries to push forward his assumption of recollection of silver by defining 'smrtitva' as that which has its origin from impression unaided by any other means of proof or as a genre implied by such impressions, he cannot remain unscathed. For, why should not the visual organ be taken as its cause ? The Prabhakara might say that the visual organ has at the moment no intercourse with the objeet in question and, since the assumption of a contact-less organ producing cognition would lead to undue over- extension, it stands to reason that the cognition of silver is not sensuous. But, this charge of undue over-extension may be made also against the Prabhikara assumption of mere impression produeing the cognition of silver. For, if mere impressions could produce cognitions, anything previously experienced might suggest itself to the mind at any moment and there will be syncretism and consequently a babel of cognitions. If it is argued that impressions aided by auxiliaries may very well produce the said cognition, it may be redargued that the visual organ may equally well produce it, aided by the same auxiliary31. So, however one might define smrti, an invalid cognition cannot be brought within its fold by any means.

Jayarasi Bhatta in his Tattvopaplava-si.nha disproves com- pletely the claim of an invalid cognition like the mirage being called a smrti in the following manner :- How is it smrti ? Is it so as a perception of water ? In that case, all cognitions of water would become smrti. If it be so as a perception of the perceived water, then the original perception would also become smrti. Not only this : Continuous cognitions of an object, recog-

31. "Pramanantarasaha-krta-samskarajatvam tad-vyaugyo va jativisesa eva smrtitvam iti cet. Maivam ; tatra kāraņatvam kimiti nāksasyaiva, yena samskara-jatvam vyavasthapyate. Tenarthena saha tadaksasya sannikarsā- bhavat asannikrstasya ca tasya juana-janakatve'tiprasaugat nendriyajatvam tasyeti cenna. Samskārasyāpi kevalasya tajjanane'tiprasauga-tādavasthyāt etc." (Kha. Kha. Kha.).

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nition and inference would also be turned into smrti. Similarly, it can be proved that it is not smrti as one occurring in the moment following the moment of water-perception, or as one having no object, or as one occurring in the form 'what I perceived'3 2.

Even if smrtitva be conceded, it is difficult to explain what is meant by Smrtipramosa. It cannot mean absence of smrti. For, then it is not possible to apprehend the previously perceived silver. Moreover, even a state of swoon would have then to be called a state of smrti-pramosa. If now it is argued that a state of swoon is not a state of smrti-pramosa 'since in it there is no presentation of 'this', then the Prabhakara is to be asked what appears in 'this'. If he answers that a piece of nacre lying in front appears in 'this', he would be asked whether this piece of nacre appears there as qualified by its own attributes or as related to silver. The acceptance of the first alternative amounts to the denial of smrti and hence of smrti-pramosa. For, when the nacre appears as characterised by its specific properties, there is no scope for recollection of a similar object. The second alternative also is untenable simply because the nacre cannot be related to silver which is absent there ; Moreover, there would arise the positive contingency of the apprehension of atoms etc. lying there and having contact "with the visual organ. Nor can smrti-pramosa signify the presentation of something different (from the recollected silver). For, if it were so, it would either be synchronous with the silver-rscollection or would be posterior to it. If the first alternative be welcomed, even a pitcher-cognition synchronous with the silver-recollection would effect smrti- pramosa. The other alternative also is unacceptable for fear of undue extension. For, then, the succeeding cognition would become the smrti-pramosa of the preceding one and as such the former should not be acceptable to a Prabhakara. Moreover, this would lead to the acceptance of all different presentations ('anyavabhasa') as smrti-pramosa i.e. as negative in implication. If again smrti-pramosa means apprehension of a contrary form, then it leads to Viparita-khyati. And what is this contrary

32. "Tasya katham smrtitvam-kim udaka-grhītitvena, grhītodaka- grhītitvena vā, udaka-grahaņānantara-kāla-bhavitvena vā, nirvisayatvena vā, yam aham adraksam ityanena akarena upajavamanatvena va ? etc." (TPS., P. 17, G. O S.).

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form ? If it means distinct apprehension of something, then it is of the form of perception and cannot be related to smrti. Nor again can smrti-pramosa mean the remembrance of some- thing past as present ; for, then, the silver-cognition would not have been a distinct apprehension. If, ultimately, it is argued that smrti-pramosa means apprehension of recollection as undifferentiated from perception even like the apprehension of a mixture of milk and water, the Prabhakara must explain what he means by 'aviveka' here. Does it mean a non-differenced apprehension of two different things, or admixture of the two, or consecutive apprehension of the two ? The first alternative leads to Viparīta-khyati. The second alternative of admixture, which is possible only in cases of objects having perceptible. forms, does not hold good in respect of two formless cognitions. The last alternative, again, would reduce inference to smrti- pramosa. Hence, smrti-pramosa is unexplainable33.

Even conceding smrti-pramosa, it may be asked why the part of 'thatness' of smrti is eclipsed. For, the impression generated by the previous cognition of silver as a particular spatio-temporal complex must register this spatio-temporal characteristic .. Recognition also proves this fact. If it is argued that, due to some 'defect' in recollection, 'thatness' is not apprehended, it will be asked what 'defect' is. The Prabhakara might now answer that 'defect' is that from which the opponents postulate the origin of error. Sriharsa is severely critical of this attitude and would not give quater to the Prabhakara. To quote him in the original : "Tarhi tad-rajata-visistam idam rajatam ityatra, saiva rajata-vyaktiriyam ityatra va, punah tadeva rajatam upasthitam itīha vā, sāmānyata eva rajatasya tadāpi para- mrstasya bhrāntau tattamsa-mosah syāt doşasya vidyamānatvāt.

33. "Kascayam smrteh pramosah-kim smrterabhāvaḥ, anyāvabhāso vā syāt, viparītākāra-veditvam vā, atīta-kālasya vartamānataya grahaņam vā, anubhavena saha ksirodakavat avivekena utpado va, prakarantarasambhavat etc." (PKM., P. 56, Mahendra Sastrin's ed.). Also "Ko'yam vipramoso nama-kim anubhavākāra-svīkaranam, smara- nakara-pradhvamso va, purvartha-grhītitvam va, indriyartha-sannikarsajatvam vā. (TPS,, P. 18). Also "Kim smrterabhava, uta anyavabhasah, ahosvit anyakaraveditvam iti vikalpah" (Sanmati Țī., P, 28).

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Anyatha idan rajatam ityamise'pi tasmin jnane tattathsa-moso na syad ityasta n iyam prasaktanuprasaktih" (Kha. Kha. Kha.). Prakasatman in his Vivaranam states that memory is never with regard to the auxiliary aspects of the object, but always in regard to the pure object. But, Vidy ranya in his Vivaranaprameya-sargraha points out that, though memory due to mere perception is with regard to the pure object, that due to apperception certainly refers to the auxiliary aspects whose eclipsing cannot be explained 3 4. We, however, beg to submit in favour of the Prabhakara that partially eclipsed memory is quite a psychological pheno- menon and is within the experience of normal life. How often do we hear people exclaim at the sight of an old acquaintance, "Yes, I remember your face, but cannot identify you ; nor can I recall to my mind the environs of our tirst meeting". So, smrti- pramosa as a psychological fact cannot be questioned, though its role in explaining error may be disputed. The third objection against Vivekakhyati may be presented in a composite manner. It may be urged that the theory cannot satisfactorily explain the origin of error, its subsequent annulment as also the volitional activity prompted by the invalid cognition. While discussing the illogicality of the concept of Vivekakhyati, it has been shown following Vimuktat- man that if Akhyati is error, there is either no error at all or else all cognitions are erroneous-a fact which demonstrates that the Prabhakara cannot explain error. Indeed, 'Viveka' means 'bheda' and, as the Advaitins aver, it is not amenable to sense-perception ("Bhedo na pratyaksena grhyate"-Brahma- siddhi of Mandana) and consequently to inference also. In the circumstances, 'Viveka-graha' being an impossibility, 'viveka- graha' would be universal and hence every cognition would be erroneous ; in other words, the world will be relieved of the gnawing tentacles of error which will be a non-etre. Indeed, from logical analysis it appears that Vivekagraha cannot be called bhrama 35. For, Vivekagraha itself is impossible

34. "Anuvyavasāyena jňānagocarānumānena vā janyeyam smrtiḥ vya- vasaya-janyaya gha!a-matra-gocarayah smrteranya etc." (P. 195, Beng. ed.). 35. "Itaśca nākhyāti-pakso yuktah; yataḥ-Na graha-smrtitanmeya- viveko'pi grahantarat / Asakteranavasthanannato' khyatirbhramo matah" (IS., P. 292).

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when one postulates the theory of triple consciousness. If it is argued that there is Vivekagraha not between perception and recollection, but between what is perceived and what is recollected, then such Vivekagraha is apt to occur anywhere. Then the question arises how these two are differentiated. Certainly not through some other perception ; for, that other perception has no scope here and there will arise the eventuality of infinite regression. Since two cognitions are to be differentiated, they must be taken to be thus differentiated not by one, but by two other cognitions ; but, these two subsequent cognitions may again remain undifferentiated, thus leading to infinite regress. Moreover, we never have any experience of two sublating cognitions. Furthermore, perception and recollec- tion being imperceptible, their non-discrimination and discrimina- tion would lead, if at all, for argument's sake, to 'bhrama' and 'badha' respectively which are suprasensuous-a contingency which flatly contradicts experience. Again, what is perceived and what is recollected, being respectively immediately and mediately apprehended, the 'bhrama' and the 'badha' under reference should neither be immediate nor mediate knowledge. So, the Prabhakara cannot prove the fact of 'bhrama' itself3 6.

The Prabhakara would certainly repatriate his brand of 'bhrama' by asserting that the undifferentiated cognition is an error in that it leads to erroneous behaviour. But, it's a poor defence. For, when the cognitions are themselves quite valid, how can they prompt invalid behaviour ? If they can, other valid cognitions would also have the possibility of initiating such invalid behaviour37. In the circumstances, the Prabhakara postulation of the invariable validity of all knowledge adhered to with a view to ruling out chaos and confusion from the domain of consciousness and installing impeccable certitude in their place defeats its very purpose. For, now it transpires that wc cannot assure ourselves of the validity of one behaviour as

36. "Na grhyamāņa-smaryamāņāviveko yuktaļ ...... Anyathā sadāviveka- prasangat. Na hi tayoh viveko grahantarat, asakteranavasthanācca ...... Dve ca jňāne tad-visaye, tābhyām api pūrvābhyām iva na syād viveka, ...... na cātra dve bādhaka-jñāne ...... grahaņa-smaraņayoļ .... apratyaksatvāt tadvivekā- vivekau na pratyksa-bhrama-badhau syātam etc." (Ibid). 37. "Na hyayathārthavyavahāra-hetutvam etc." (IS., p. 43). 10

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against the invalidity of another inasmuch as both are equally prompted by valid cognitions. So, the chaos and uncertainty that was externed from the domain of cognition becomes ultima- tely rehabilitated in the sphere of behaviour. So, overt be- haviour being once called into question, not only the whole of practical life is thrown out of gear, but training in the grasping of syntactically related meaning through the observation of behaviour of experts-a postulate of the Prabhakara-becomes impossible3s. In this connection it may be further stated that there is no knowing where 'Vivekagraha' or 'Asamsargagraha' will occur, granting its presence in certain cases, and, as a result, all our behaviour will be shrouded by the lengthening shadows of doubt. Indeed, absence of recantation, which follows. behaviour, cannot assuredly prompt indubious behaviour. Even if it does, it becomes instrumental in validating the validity of cognition and thereby cuts at the root of the theory of self- validity of knowledge of the Prabhakaras9. It may further be argued that if valid cognition may induce invalid behaviour, as the Prabhakara urges, then it follows that defects have the potency of generating effects that are contrary to the usual ones-a conclusion which has been vigourously opposed by the Prabhakara who thinks that defects straightaway arrest the emergence of the normal effect40. So, the Prabhakara cannot make out a case for the occurrence of error in his theory of Vivekākhyāti.

Nor can Vivekakhyati explain Pravrtti or the motor activity

38. "Ataeva anāśvāsa-nirasanopāyo na jřānesu kaścid viśeso'stīti nirastam. Anyatha parasyāpi katham vişaya-vyabhicāre vyavahrter-vyava- harantare samasvasah syat. Tadabhave ca katham vyavahāra-darsanena an- vitarthe vyutpattiḥ' (NS.). 39. "Kvacid vivekāgrahe ca katham anyatra viśista-pratyaye viśvāso. bhavet. Tadabhāve ca katham niņsankā pravrttiņ ...... kiñca pravrttyuttara- kalīno Ładhakabhavah katham niņsanka-pravrttau upayujyate. Bādhakā- bhavādina visista-jnana-svarupa-niscayam augikurvanah katham svaprakāsa- vijñāna-vādam na jahyat" (Ibid). Also "yaccoktam kvacit jnānasya aprāmāņye sarvatrāpi prāmānya-samśa- yāpattyā nişkampa-pravrttirna syād iti, tanna. Parasyāpi kvacid vidyamā- nāsamsargāgrahāugīkāre sarvatrāpi tat-samsayāpattya niskampa-pravrttirna syātityalam" (Br. vi. Bha., p. 27). 40. "Tatha sati samīcīna-vyavahāra-hetor-vijuanād ayathārthavyava- hara-janmanupapatti-prasaugat (NS).

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following the cognition of (say) nacre-silver etc. In a general way it may be pointed out first that perception and recollection, the two discrete cognitions accepted by the Prabhakara in cases of illusion, being momentary, cannot combine to prompt activity. It cannot be argued that the two cognitions occurring conse- cutively will induce activity ; for, perception is sundered from the activity by an intervening memory and, as such, it cannot be an unconditional antecedent of the activity41. The Prabha- kara may argue that the dichotomisation into two cognitions is but the produce of post-cognitional analysis and, since from the cognitional standpoint, the so-called invalid cognition is similar in all respects to its valid type, it would prompt activity even like the valid cognition. But, this advocacy also cuts no ice. Against this it may be asked whether this similarity with valid knowledge prompts activity through its conscious apprehension or merely through its subconscious facthood (or existence). The first alternative is not acceptable. The cognition of a cognition, though similar to a valid cognition, cannot induce activity. For, one seeking a cow cannot be prompted towards a 'gavaya' through the cognition of similarity between a cow and a gavaya. The second alternative stands to reason only when similarity leads to the superimposition of one of the undifferentiated cognitions or its objects upon another. For, conscious activity cannot be preceded by any absence of knowledge. Certainly the recollection of the meaning of the word 'silver' cannot justify activity. How can one move towards the 'this', when what one wants is something else ? So, one must know 'this' to be silver before one can proceed to have it. Hence, without accepting superimposition, the Prabhakara cannot explain 'Pravrtti'42. Vadideva surī points out that the Prabhakara

41. Vide Tattva-dīpanam. 42. "Atha samīcīna-jnāna-sārupyam anayoņ grhyamāņam vā vyavahāra- pravrtti-hetuņ, agrhyamāņam va sattā-mātreņa ... ,. Tatra na tāvat samīcīna- jñāna-sadrśī iti jñānam samīcīnajnānavat vyavahāra-pravartakam ; na hi go-sadrso gavaya iti jnanam gavarthinam gavaye pravartayati ...... Tasmāt sattāmātreņa bhedāgraho' grhīta eva vyavahāra-heturiti vaktavyam. Tatra kimayam āropotpāda-krameņa vyavahāra-hetuņ, āho'nutpāditāropa eva svata iti. Vayam tu pasyamaḥ-cetana-vyavahārasya ajnānapūrvakatvānupa- patteņ, āropotpāda-krameņaiveti ...... Na ced idam-kārāspadam rajatam iti. janiyat katham rajatarthī tadicchet. (Bhamati, P. 28, Mm. A. Sastri's ed.).

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flatly contradicts himself by supposing that the recollection of silver prompts activity in regard to nacre. For, recollection will generate undisputed activity in the locus of the previous apprehension whose recollection it is. So, by assuming that recollection generates an unconventional effect, he does away with his pet thesis that defects cannot generate a different effect+3.

Jayatirtha thrashes out the case against Pravrtti as prompted by Vivekagraha. He points out that 'Viveka' or 'Bheda' here cannot signify either of the collateral entities ('Svarupam') inasmuch as that cannot remain unapprehended in the theory of triple consciousness. It can neither mean separateness. For, separateness, being a quality, cannot inhere in cognition which is itself a quality. Moreover, it will lead to the universal possibility of motor activity in something different from what is desired, because non-cognition of difference might occur anywhere in the circumstances. Nor can it mean reciprocal negation. Nor again can it mean possession of different attributes. The Prabhakara may argue that the non-apprehension of the attribute of nacre- ness of the 'this' that bars out silver on the one hand, and that of the attribute of distantness inhering in silver that bars out the 'this' on the other, will together prompt activity. But, that is not reasonable. For, if the nacreness is not apprehended in 'this', one seeking nacre would not move towards it. And, one seeking silver would not be drawn towards it, if the attribute of distantness remains unapprehended. So, the Prabhakara cannot explain Pravrtti. Moreover, he must either hold that such invalid behaviour is prompted by non-cognition of difference, while valid behaviour springs forth from cognition of non- difference or that all behaviour is equally prompted by non- cognition of difference. The first alternative invites chaos in the realm of causality. If it is argued that though cognition of non-difference is generally the propelling force, still non-cognition

43. "Tasmat autsargika-karya-karane pratihata-sāmarthyanam kārananam viparīta-karyotpadakatvam upalabhyamanam bhavata abhyupagantavyam. Anyathā svamata-vyāghātah. Tathāpi rajatam iti smaraņasya purvānubhava- deśābādhita-pravrtti-rūpautsargika-kāryātikrameņa śuktikā-deśe pravrtti- janakatvam bhavataiva augīkrtam. Tacca evam ucyamane katham samgac- cheta" (SVR., p. 108).

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of difference may prompt activity through its similarity with the former, even then the charge of chaos in causality is not obviated. Moreover, it may be asked if this prompting through likeness with the legitimate prompter is assumed only here, or it holds good universally. The first alternative is vitiated by the assumption of the unforeseen. And if the second were true, a cluster of 'Gunja' fruits simulating fire would have warded off cold. If two discrete cognitions could prompt activity simply because they simulated a legitimate prompter, why should they not also arrest activity because of the presence there of non- cognition of non-difference which simulates cognition of differ- ence 44 ? Now, the Prabhakara might desparately plead that just as, according to the opponent, 'bhedagraha' gives rise to 'abheda-graha', similarly it would prompt activity also. But, this is far from the truth. For, cognition is entirely dependent upon its causes, while prompting to activity is entirely at the mercy of the agent. Moreover, a cognition cannot directly prompt activity ; nor can two discrete cognitions generate activity through the evoking of desire and effort. Furthermore, the apprehension of a mere thing-in-itself (not Kantian) and the non-apprehension of non-relation brings the cognition in question into line with indeterminate cognition and all talk of determinate cognition becomes unreal gibberish. And an indeterminate cognition can never prompt any activity. Moreover, if activity is supposed to start invariably from 'asamsargagraha', then a child, who learns from the activities of an expert, can never have any scope for knowing the mutual relation of things. Thus, the theory of the syntactical import of words falls to the ground and the verbal testimony follows suit. So, the Prabhakaras cannot explain Pravrtti through their theory of error45.

44. Comp. "Atha navagacchet na pravartate, tat-kāryāvagamādhīnatvāt pravrtteḥ. Atha akaryatvanavagame'pi karyavagatisadrsyat pravrttiḥ. Tatastat-kāryatvānavagamena akāryāvagati-sādrśyam api astīti nivrttirapi syāt sādrsyayo avisesāt" (Sd. of Pārthasārathi, p. 40). 45. "Nanviyam pravrttiņ svarūpato visayataśca agrhītabhedāt vedana- dvayāt upapadyate iti cet. Ko'yam bhedo nama. Kim svarupam uta prthaktvam uta anyonyabhāvaḥ athavā vaidharmyam etc ...... Kiñca bhedā- grahāt anyarthino'nyatra pravrttim aācaksānah prastavyah. Kim ayam eva vyavahāro bhedāgrahat anyastu abheda-grahat. Uta sarvo'pi bhedagrahaditi. Nadyah, aniyata-karanatapatat ...... Kinca pravartaka-sādrsyat pravrttiņ

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Nor can the Prabhakara explain badha. The Prabhakara holds that the cognition 'this is silver' becomes a sublation by the annulment of 'abheda-vyavahira', which is brought in by 'bhedagraha'+c. But, this ill affords to explain badha. For, a cognition need not necessarily induce motor activity. So, where there is no such activity, no badha will at all occur. Even if such activity be conceded, the sublating cognition 'this is not silver' does hardly recant the abheda-vyavahara simply because it is not consciously present in the previous positive cognition 47. Similarly, from the stand-point of smrti-pramosa it may be said that the sublating cognition, if there be any, ought to appear in the form 'rajata-pratibhasah smrtih' and not in the form 'nedam rajatam'. So, the Prabhakara can hardly find out a 'badhaka pratyaya' 48. That recantation is impossible in Vivekakhyati is vigourously demonstrated by Jayatirtha. For, it cannot come into being as sublating non-apprehension since all cognitions, which by their very nature partake of such a function, will effect some sort of recantation. Nor, can recanta- tion mean arrest of activity. For, those who do not seek it (say, a silver) will have no activity which might subsequently be recanted by the cognition 'nedam rajatam'. On the other hand, the cognition of the presence of tiger, thief and the like, which are apt to arrest activity, would turn out to be sublators. Neither is recantation possible by way of arresting the implicit workability of an entity ; for, such atrophy may occur in other occasions also. Neither again can it occur as simply hindering activity. For, in that case activity might well cease with the cessation of Aviveka and as such no hindrance need be assumed at all. Besides, here too the cognition of tiger, thief and the like would also serve as sublators 4 9.

ityatraiva kalpyate, uta yad yat sadrsam tat tat-kāryakārīti sarvatra niyamaḥ etc. etc." (NS). 46. "Bhedagraha-prasajitabheda-vyavahara-badhanacca nedam iti vibhedaka-pratyayasya bādhakatāpi upapannā" (NM., p. 64). 47. See NM., p. 65 et seq. 48. "Kiñca smrti-pramosa-pakse bādhaka-pratyayo na syāt, sa hi puro- vartini arthe tat-pratibhasasya asad-visayatam adarsayan 'nedam rajatam' ityullekhena pravartate, na tu rajata-pratibhasah smrtiḥ ityullekhena" (PKM., p. 58). 49. "Na tavad agrahaņa-nivartakataya badhakatvam. Sarva-pratya- yanam tathatvapatat. Napi vyavahara-vicchedakatvena ; atadarthinam

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In short, the Advaitins point out that unless nescience is assumed, error, its sublation and the motor activity consequent upon error cannot be explainedso. Others, again, aver that unless error is accepted as a cognitional fact, all these cannot be established. Anyway, the upshot of this long discussion is that the Prabhakara can by no means prove bhrama, pravrtti and badha-the three pillars of any theory of error. To my mind, the above criticism of Vivekakhyati is to a great extent based on wilful misrepresentation of facts. The postulation of two discrete cognitions, which has been fully exploited by the opponents, is but an outcome of post-cognitional analysis which is resorted to with a view to demonstrating that there is nothing erroneous in so-called invalid cognitions. It has, however, nothing to do with the genesis of error and the consequent motor activity which are all explained by the peculiar psychosis embodying the cognition which is later damned as invalid. Indeed, what the Prabhakara means by bhedagraha is not negativity as a positive factor or as a conscious factor, but mere existential negativity of a positive attribute. What seems to be at the back of the mind of the Prabhakara is that an invalid cognition is the operation of a twilight consciousness which may best be, though imperfectly, described negatively. So, it is easy to see that many of the aforesaid charges against him are mockeries with his logically defective expression of his essentially psychological theory. But, many other charges against him are quite apt and fully justified.

The next objection raised against the theory of the Prabhakara is with regard to his assertion that the origin of

vyavahārānutpattau nedam rajatam iti jnānasya abadhakatva-prasangāt. Vyāghra-corādijnānasyāpi pravrtti-vicchedakatvena bādhakatva-prasakteśca. Na carthasya vyavahara-yogyata-vicchedakatvena. Samayantare'pi tatra vibhramat pravrttyabhavapatteḥ. Na ca vyavahara-pratibandhakatvena. Avivekanivrttau kāraņābhāvādeva vyavahārānutpatteḥ pratibandhakalpanāyo- gāt. Vyaghia-coradi-jnanasya badhakatapattesca" (NS). 50. "Na hyavidya-siddhatvam vina tasya nirākāryasya nirakaranam yuktam, asiddhasya pramānataḥ siddhasya ca nirākaraņasya naisphalyad aśakyatvacca" (IS., p. 143). Also "Mayam anicchatastuccha-khyātiḥ prāp- notyanīpsaya/" (Ibid., p. 154). Also "Anyathakhyatirakhyatiratma- khyātiriti trayab/ Sat-khyatipaksa naite'pi vina sidhyanti mayaya//" (Ibid., p. 218).

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an invalid cognition is causally impossible. The Prabhakara. says that defective causes lose their causal potency outright and cannot bring into being effects different from the scheduled ones. But, Anandabodha, Vacaspati Misra, Jayatīrtha, Vadideva Suri, to name only a few, cry a halt at this point and try to prove the hollowness of this assertion. It is sheer suppression of facts or lamentable lack of observation to assert that defects cannot infuse a new kind of causality. It is common knowledge that a burnt cane-seed produces the embryo of a plantain-plants1. But, the Prabhakara would not yield here so. easily. He would naturally ridicule the idea of 'a defective cause' which is silly talk with him. Suppose 'a' is the cause of 'b'; now, 'a', being tainted by some defect, can no longer effect 'b', but may effect 'c' which is something different from 'b'. Here 'a' appears not in its former causal character, but merely in its entitative character and, being characterised by a defect, becomes a new cause effecting 'c'. So, the former cause 'a' does in no way effect 'c'52. From this it follows that the burnt cane-seed is the cause of plantain-plant ; so far as this effect is concerned, burning is no defect ; it is verily a defect in regard to the cane-plant as effect whose generation is prevented by it ; but, it does not give rise to a depraved kind of cane-plant. So, the opponent is open to the charge of shifting of position. Burning is considered by them a defect in regard to one thing, while it is considered a cause of a different thing in which case it is not a defect at all. If the opponents could demonstrate that a burnt cane-seed produces a perverted cane-plant, they might have silenced the Prabhakara. Here Jayatirtha tries to rout the zealous Prabhakara with his sharp dialectics. He asks whether any auxiliary of the cause bars out its contrary potency or only defects as auxiliaries do it. The first alternative, if accepted, will raise a fresh round of questions. It would be asked if animal-slaughter has natural potency to generate merit or demerit. If it generates merit, why should it not do so even

51. See Bhamati, p. 30, Mm, A. Sastri's ed. 52. "Dagdham tu vetra-bījam kadalī-karye samagrī, na tu daho'smin karye dosah, vetrajananāt tu doșatā, na tu vikrta-vetrajananat. Evam ca yajjātīya-karya-janikā yā sāmagrī, na sā doşāt tajjatīyam karyam vikrtam karotīti na dhī-jatīyam dosad vikrtamyuktam". (NV., p. 93).

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when it is not a part of a sacrifice ? If, however, it generates demerit, why should it not do so even as a part of sacrifice ? If the Prabhakara argues that all this is due to some auxiliary, he unwittingly accepts that auxiliaries may generate contrary potency. The original second alternative also does not stand to reason because of absence of any regulative principle. Moreover, disease of the eye etc. also are considered auxiliaries in generating contrary cognition. And what arrests the desired effect is called a defect. If it is asked why fried kutaja seeds do not generate banyan-sprouts, the answer is that it is not so because of the multiform potency of things. Thus, frying etc. arrest the potency of producing a different thing. Others prevent the natural potency, but generate a contrary potency ; thus, there are things that arrest the death-dealing potency of poison, and produce instead a healing potency5 3. Hence the Prabhakara thesis that a defect cannot produce a contrary effect is unjustifiable.

But, it seems to my humble self that Jayatirtha or any other scholar has not been able to rebut the arguments of Bhavanatha discussed above and to disprove the Prabhakara thesis under discussion. The only potent refutation of this thesis is possible by showing its contradiction with some other assumption of the Prabhakara as has been already referred to by us 54. The next objection which the oppenents most confidently raise against the Prabhakara is as follows :- The Prabhakara. assumes auto-illumination of all cognition. How can he then

53. "Kiñca sahakāri-mātrasya viparīta-saktyanādhāyakatvam augīkar- tavyam doşaņāmeva vā. Ādye pasu-himsā kim dharmajanane svārasika- śaktimatī utādharma-janane iti vācyam. Adye katham kratu-bāhyāpi dharmam na janayet. Dvitiye katham kratvantargatapi dharmam janayet. Sahakārivaśāt iti cet; angīkrtam tarhi sahakāriņām svārasika-sakti-prati- bandhena viparīta-saktyadhayakatvam. Na dvitiyah. Niyamakabhāvāt. Kiñca kācādayo'pi viparīta-jñāna-janane sahakāriņa evāngīkriyante. Doșat- vam tu ista-kārya-vīghātitāmātreņa ucyate ...... Na caivam bharjitāḥ kutaja- dhānā vatankuram kuto na janayantīti vācyam. Padārtha-śakti-vaicitryāt ; kecid vastvantara-śaktim eva pratibadhnanti yatha bharjanadayah. Kecit sahaja-śakti-pratibandhena viparitām api saktim ādadhati, yathā visasya marakatva-śaktim pratibadhya arogyadisaktim adadhana padarthah" (NS.). 54. See foot-notes Nos. 40 and 43 supra.

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consistently speak of 'smrti-pramosa' or of 'bhedagraha' ? If the cognition arises with its self-luminosity, in other words, its self-appropriation, how can its proper nature remain still maskedss ? It must either appear as recollection or as percep- tion. In the first alternative there is no 'pramosa' and the second alternative paves inevitably the way for Viparīta- khyati5 6. But, this argument also does not seem cogent to me. The opponents only resort to misinterpretation of the supposed self-luminosity of cognition and intend thus to discredit the Prabhakara. The real import of the assertion of self-luminosity of cognition is that a cognition cognises itself by itself without the help of some other cognition ; in other words, every cogni- tion is self-cognition and appears in the form 'I know'. Furthermore, the cognition is cognised not in its logically demonstrated character, but in its cognitional character in a double sense. To explain, it appears as cognition and in its psychological peculiarity of the moment of cognition. So, there is no scope for discovering any self-contradiction here.

The next objection raised against the Prabhakara is that Vivekakhyati leads to Anyathakhyati. For, the two discrete cognitions are not known as such ; it further assumes Vivekā- graha and Asamsargagraha where there ought to be Vivekagraha and Asamsarga-graha respectively K 7.

Parthasarathi Misra further points out that Vivekakhyati cannot explain cases like the double moon, confusion of direction etc.5 s. The illusion of the bent stick, the continuous illusion, the illusion of the form 'Ime ranga-rajate' cannot be explained in this theory.

Vadideva Suri raises another objection against the theory.

55. "Sarva-bhavanam svayam-prabhatvena sphutatarava-bhasayoh sam- vidoḥ tadadhīna-prakasayośca arthayoh katham vivekāgraha-vācoyuktiḥ yuk- timatī, na khalu avabhāsamānasvabhāvasya eva anavabhaso bhedasyeti sampratam, avabhasanavabhasa-viruddha-dharmasya ekasmin asambhavāt. (NMAK., p. 65, Chowkhamba ed.). 56. Vide NM., pp. 166-197. 57. Vide PKM. p. 57 ; SD., p. 40. Also see NS. 58. Vide SD., p. 39.

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He asks whether the two cognitions arise simultaneously, or in succession. Not simultaneously ; for, that goes against the Prabhakara assumption. They cannot arise in succession either. For, in that case, the recollection of silver must occur either earlier or later than the cognition of 'this'. The first alternative is unwarranted ; for, before the perception of 'this' there is nothing to evoke the latent impression which is the cause of recollection. The second alternative also is not sound. For, in that case the recollection may occur even after the cessation of the operation of the eyes even unto one with eyes closed. Moreover, this succession of occurrence is not apprehended and is, therefore, contrary to experience5 9.

Another objection generally raised against this theory is that it disregards the Law of Parsimony or simplicity of Hypothesis, as Russell puts it, and suffers from prolixity. The Prabhakaras themselves hold that to accept Viparyaya is to invite prolixity. They point out that their theory, which can explain the motor attitude and the overt behaviour with the help of a cognition that is characterised by (say) silverness and by non-apprehension of unrelatedness, is, on that very account, conspicuous by its simplicity. But, this simplicity turns out to be over-burdened with varied hypotheses when examined by the opponents. Thus, Gaga Bhatta points out that in the above hypothesis of the Prabhakara, cognition has two adjuncts whose mutual rela- tion as substantive and attribute being undecided on both the sides, both may be affirmed of the two adjuncts in turn and that makes the Prabhakara assume in fact two sets of causes. Again, if the sense of duty-hood serves as the cause of volition in general, then where volition starts from a wrong sense of

59. "Api cedam rajatamiti yadidam samvedana-dvayam abhyupagamyate, tasya kim yaugapadyena paryāyeņa vā prādurbhāvaḥ syāt. Na tāvad yauga- padyena, sva-krtānta-prakopa-prasangāt. Paryāyeņāpi pradurbhutau idam iti pratyaksāt pūrvam uttaratra va rajata-smaranam udbhavet. Tatradyah paksa preksā-caksusam na laksayitum ucitaḥ. Idam iti pratyaksāt pūrvam̧ smṛti-bījasya samskārasya pra bodhakatvanibandhanāt ....... Athedam iti pratyaksād uttaratra rajata-smrtiḥ prādurbhavati ityabhiman- yate. Tanna śobhanam. Yasmāt idamiti pratyaksāt paścāt prādurbhavantī rajata-smrtiḥ virata-vyāpāre'pi caksusi prādurbhavet. Evam ca sati nimī- lita-locanasyāpi rajata-smrtyanubhavaḥ syāt. Paryāyena ca bhavad-abhimata- jnanadvayasya pradurbhavah pratīti-viruddhah" (SVD., pp. 119-I20).

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duty-hood, there would arise a confusion between non-apprehen- sion of unrelatedness and the attributiveness of duty as to which of them should be substantive and which attribute. As & result, here too the Prabhakara would have to assume two sets of causes. In this manner other such cases of multiplicity of hypothesis would occur and weaken the position of the Prabhakara 60. Advaitananda also in his Brahma-vidya-bharanam brings tre charge of prolixity against the Prabhakara. He points out that those, who accept a single qualified cognition as the cause of an invalid experience, can have their theory or theories of error propped upon a single cause ; but, the Prabhakara has to assume 'asamhsargagraha' as an additional cause in order that he may eliminate the possible hindrance in the way. Moreover, what should he say about a cognition like 'these are two pieces of silver' in regard to a piece of zinc and that of silver ? He must resort to 'asa nsargagraha' in regard to the piece of zinc, but to 'samsarga-graha' in respect of the piece of silver. This is sheer contradiction of experience. He had better give up 'ardha- jaratiya (i.e. affirming two contradictory qualities at the same time in an identical locus) and accept 'asansargagraha' even in regard to the silver-part of the cognition. If now the Prabhakara argues that his acceptance of the recommendations of the opponent would merge all differences between the volition from a so-called invalid cognition and a fruitful volition, he betrays a fresh multiplicity of hypothesis. For, while in the view of the opponent mere 'pravrttitva' may well serve as the co-extensive adjunct ('avacchedaka'), the Prabhakara would have to assume instead 'samvadivisaya-pravrttitva' as the adjunct- a much more sumptuous assumption. Besides, he would be guilty of assuming two alternative causes of volition- asamsargagraha in cases of volition in general, but a qualified cognition in cases of fruitful volition. Hence, it is quite clear that the Prabhakara is open to the charge of 'Kalpana-gaurava' on various grounds 61. [ The worth and ontological importance

60. "Tanna. Asamsargavisayatva-ra jatatva-prakarakatva yoh jñāna- viśesaņayoḥ viśesa ņa-visesyabhāve vinigamanābhāvena kārya-kārana-bhāvad- vaya-kalpanā-gauravāt" et. seq. (Bhā. ci., p. 29). 61. "Apica yena visista-jnānasya kāranatvam ucyate, tanmate ekameva

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of arguments based on 'Laghava' and 'gaurava' will be discussed in the concluding chapter. Suffice it to say here that, one's acquaintance with the late mediaeval philosophical literature of India shows that it is a weapon which, like Occam's rajor, cuts both ways, though not in one sweep. This argumentative device has been resorted to by both the contending parties so indiscriminately that its practical utility has been, to say the least, reduced to the minimum. So, a sincere seeker after truth should attach little importance on the charge of 'gaurava' against the Prabhakara. ]

The naive realism with which the Prabhakara explains the genesis of invalid cognition is fascinating. But, he imperils his position by engrafting on it logical cannibalism that, in many cases, tears asunder the psychological realism into smithereens. He starts with passive photometry, but ends in aggressive ionometry (if the expressions are permissible). The dichotomi- sation and logical analysis adhered to by him with a view to demonstrating the validity of all cognitions spells disaster for him. Even his logical thought is expressed with a psycho- logical yeast which saps the very foundation of his logic. His 'bhedagraha' and 'asa nsargagraha' and the consequent 'pravrtti' seem to me te be psychological facts. But, he cannot explain away invalidity thereby. Indeed, the most potent argument is that the theory cannot rule out invalidity ; it only shifts it from the realm of cognition to that of behaviour62 and entails interminable trouble. The Prabhakara thus cuts off the world of behaviour, in fact, the external world itself, while affirming the world of cognition. He thus starts with naive realism and ends in idealism of the yogacara brand.

The Prabhakara, however, can silence, as I see, the Advaitin easily. I have previously referred to the fetish of 'akhandartha- bodha' of the Advaitin which may be utilised by the Prabhakara with advantage. He may further point out that as the Advaitin

kāraņam ...... Pareņa tu pratibandhakābhāvataya asamsargagrahah kāranān- taram kalpaniyam iti mahad gauravam. Apica rauga-rajatayoh 'ime rajate' ityatra amsadvaye tulyataya ullekhe'pi raugamse asamsargagraho, rajatamse samsarga-graha iti vadata anubhavanusarah parityaktah" et. seq, (Br. Vi., P. 25). 62. See ch. X, Pp. 33-34.

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aceepts identity and, therefore, 'bhedagraha' between 'Tat' and 'Tvam' in the upanisadic sentence 'Tat tvam asi' through the application of 'jahadajahat-svartha vrtti', similarly he postulates: 'bhedagraha' between perception and recollection. But, all these contrivances can not rescue him from his inevitable doom. By asserting 'asamsargagraha', he accepts a relation between the two cognitions that is in fact a non-etre. So. he unwittingly moves into the groove of 'asat-samsarga-khyati', besides har -. bouring 'anyathakhyati'. Moreover, he cannot successfully explain the illusion of the bent stick, the parallax, the illusion of a fish in the aquarium looking double and such other cases .. Furthermore, he cannot explain why, even after the demonstra- tion of difference between the two cognitions, the invalid experience should still persist. He might here take the plea that this proves that error is not a logical fact. But, then, he- has to forsake outright the logical interpretation of the experience whereby he endeavours to prove its validity. And, if he does. so, he straightaway moves into the orbit of Asat-khyati pure and. simple. If again, he takes both the invalid cognition and its. sublator as alogical experiences, he is face to face with the inexplicable Maya and pays homage to the Anirvacaniya-khyati of the Advaitin. So, this theory also goes the gloomy way of: its fore-runners and is condemned to perdition.

POST-SCRIPT

This post-script becomes necessary, because certain facts,. which give the lie direct to the assumption of Prof. Hiriyanna, of a different Akhyati view of the older Prabhakaras, escaped my notice at the time of preparing this chapter. I am now presenting them in original in order to shed straightaway all' misgivings about the matter. Prskasatmayati in his Pañca- padika-vivaranam, while discussing the Akhyati-theory of the Prabhakaras, makes the following statement : "Pramana-smrti- dvairāsyameva vijnanasya na trtiyam mithya-jnanam namastīti: akhyativadī pratyavatișthate" (P. 22, Vizianagram Skt. Series). This positively states that the Prabhakara, who advocates. dichotomy of cognitions in invalid experiences, does not accept a third unitary mithya-jnana. But, some might still entertain doubt in regard to it ; for, the above statement of Prakasatmam

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 159.

may very well represent only the generally current variant of the Akhyati view, without implying that there is no other variant of the view. So, I beg to draw the kind attention of my learned readers to a passage from Nyayasudha of Jayatirtha. whose vast erudition and dialectical skill are undoubted. This passage occurs just after where the Ramanuja theory of Sat- khyati is discussed and disposed of. The Prabhakara theory of Akhyati is discussed just before the presentation of Sat-khyati of Ramanuja and hence there is no scope for reading Prabhakara thoughts in this passage. The passage itself, however, clearly dispels all doubt about it. Let me quote the passage here in original so that it may speak for itself independent of my poor advocacy. The passage is as follows :- "Anyastu manyate. Grhyamāņayoh bhedagrahi savikalpakam ekameva vijñānami vibhramaḥ. Tathapi rajata-samskaradosa-sacivam indriyam śuktikā-śakala-sannikrstam rajata-śuktīdam-ausavişayatn tatsa- msargasamsargau anavagahamanam ekam eva savikalpaka-jnanam utpādayati. Tatha ca tayoreka-vijnanoparohinoh bhedagrahāt ayathartha-vyavaharah. Tannirasadeva viveka-jnanan bad- hakam ityucyate. Na punaḥ anyad anyātmana pratīyate iti. Tadidam anupapannam. Vivekagrahah Kim sarvatra pravrtti- hetuḥ utātraiveti prāgukta-dosāņām asesāņām avisesāt. Kiñca Prabhakaraņāmn veda-pramanya-siddhyangataya astyakhyati- svīkāre prayojanam iti vidyate bhramah. Kaņabhaksākșa-caraņa- pakśa-pātinā tu atasmimstad iti pratyayo viparyaya iti pūrvā- caryavacanam anadrtya paramata-pramosah kasmad isyate etc.". A cursory perusal of this passage will reveal to any one that this is the theory which has been fathered upon the author of Nyayakalpataru by Pratyagrupa-bhagavan in his gloss on Citsukha's Tattva-pradīpika. Jayatīrtha here explicitly states that this view was advocated by a scholar or a handful of scholars belonging to the Nyaya-Vaisesika school. The fact that Jayatirtha refers to the upholders of different theories of error always in the plural except in the case of Satkhyati of Ramanuja and this theory (cf. "Anyastu manyate'), coupled with the use of singular in 'Kana-bhaksaksa-caraņa-paksa-patina" seems to suggest that this view was upheld by a single scholar with few followers behind him. And since this view clearly postulates a third unitary cognition, this must be the view

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referred to by Vimuktatman and his scholiast. So, Prof. Hiriyanna's view seems to be unfounded. But, a die-hard wrangler might still raise his voice of disapproval against this conclusion and point out that the word 'grhyamanayoh' in the above passage disaffiliates this view from the view of a third unitary cognition referred to by Vimuktatman and his scholiast. But, one who reads between the lines of the above passage will surely conclude that one of the two 'grhyamana's' here is an exact replicum of smaryamana', with difference in nomenclature only. So, we feel sure that we can safely reiterate our present conclusion without any fear of well-meaning contradiction.

I confess I cannot resist here the temptation of presenting the refutation of this theory by Jayatirtha, though it mostly shares the defects of Vlvekakhyati and is already refuted by the arguments levelled against that theory. For, Jayatirtha has lent much zest in the additional argument of refutation he advances against it. The protagonist of this theory might declare that he rules out Viparyaya from all cognitions lest it defiles the vedic knowledge. To this Jayatirtha says that this theorist cannot then accept even vivekagraha ("Tatha sati Vivekāgrah- asyapi anangīkaryatvapatat"). For, the vedic sentences are no authority either in matters of semantics or in the syntactical relation of words inasmuch as they are derived from other sources. So, a neophyte who learns from the behaviour pro- mpted by Asamsargagraha and apprehends it also through that non-cognition of difference will nurse misgivings even in regard to the knowledge imparted by the Vedas. If the opponent redargues that this doubt would be dispelled by the fact of the Vedas being 'apauruseya', then this fact may serve as well to dispel doubts in regard to vedic knowledge despite Viprayaya be accepted. So, there is no reason why Viprayaya should not be given the seal of reality that it naturally claims from all dis putationists. ("Tathahi, Na tīvat veda-vākyaun padartheșu pramāņam etc.").

CHAPTER XIII

ANYATHĀ-KHYĀTI

Now, it is time for us to switch over from the twilight. of psychological realism to the noontide of logical realism, from the somnolence of feeling to the self-conscious rumination of thought, from Vivekakhyati to Anyatha-khyati. This Anyatha-khyati is a theory which has drawn the sympathies of the major bulk of the philosophers of India from the ancient times down through the middle ages to the present days. Indeed, Vacaspati Misra, that colossal scholar, though personally championing the cause of Anirvacaniya-khyati, had to admit the antiquity of the theory by making the significant statement 'anyatha-khyatiriti brd- dhah' (NVTT., P. 54, Vizi. Skt. Series). This theory was advocated by the Bhattas, the Nyaya-vaisesikas, the Patanjalas (the yoga-philosophers), the Madhvas, the Jainas and even by the latter Ramanujists and by a certain section of the Advaitins in a limited sphere. It seems not very unlikely that even some . Buddhists of the Sarvasti-vadin school might have advocated this theory. The Bhavanyathatva theory of Dharmatrata1, the Laksananyathatva theory of Buddhadeva and the Avasthanya- thatva theory of Vasumitra though concerned with a different problem, seem to suggest such a hypothesis, though one cannot be sure of it until further materials on this point are available. The theory is sometimes called Viparitakhyati by its adherents2. The great Sankara also seems to suggest this name of Viparīta- khyati when he records one of the definitions of adhyasa as 'viparīta-dharma-tva-kalpana's, though his scholiasts interpret it otherwise. Venkatanatha, however, draws a line of distinction between the two terms and points out that a viparyaya is called anyathakhyati or Viparita-khyati according as it is characterised by 'dharmantara' or 'dharmyantara'. The former has scope in

1. Cf. "Avastha-phalam samagryam, na dravyaphalam iti siddhāntaḥ" (Kośasthana v, ka. 24, Sphu!artha). 2. Vide. NM, of Jayanta, SVR. of Vadideva, PKM of Prabhacandra, SD. of Parthasarathi etc. etc. 3. "Anye tu yatra yad-adhyasah tasyaiva viparīta-dharmatva-kalpanām acakșate". (SB., P. 2, Vāņī Vilās Ed.) 11

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cases like 'a yellow conch-shell' where there is 'sathsargaropa',. while the latter occurs in experiences like the rope-snake which depends upon 'tadatmyaropa'. Venkata further observes that rajas is at the root of anyatha-khvati, while Tamas brings about Viparita-Khyati4. But, no such distinction is found to be adhered to in practice and the terms are used as being readily interchangeable. Without disputing the analysis of Venkata, it may be pointed out that to a modern mind the former term may seem to emphasise the psychological aspect, while the latter brings into bold relief the ontological aspect.

Though scholars of different schools advocate this theory of Anyatha-khyati, they are widely at variance with one another in enunciating and proving their theory, not only in matters of detail, but also sometimes in essentials. So, there are practically as many variants of the theory as there are schools sponsoring: it. Not only that ; one is apt to come across an older version of the theory as opposed to the latter one as is clearly evident in the Nyaya school.

In the circumstances, it grows difficult even to hit upon the G.C.M. of the different variants unerringly. For, to call it even Sat-khyati, which is perhaps common to almost all the variants, will be flatly contradicting the essentials of the Madhva variant. So, it will be but a truism if we call these variants different theories appearing under the same name. We shall, therefore, do well to present the variants separately generally in an ascen- ding order of complexity in the following pages.

The yoga theory of Anyatha-khyati is propounded in the ys. "Viparyayo mithya-jnanam atadrupa-pratiștham" (Ys. I. 8). Error, according to the yoga, is a kind of vrtti called viparyaya .. It is false knowledge which has its basis not on the presented datum. The Vyasa-bhasya cites as an example the cognition of the double moon which is corrected by the subsequent cognition: of a single moon. The latter recanting cognition, the bhāsya. points out, is a Pramana, since it has something existent as its cognitum. The clear implication seems to be that the content

4. "Viparyayam eva dharmantara-dharmyantara-bhedat anyathakhyati- viparītakhyāti-bhedena kvacid vyavaharanti. Yathā pīta-śauka-rajju-sarpa- bhrame. Tayośca rajastamasī mūlam iti gīyate" .. (NP., P. 55, Chowkhāmbā).

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of an invalid cognition is a nonêtre i.e. an asat. The negative particle in 'atad-rupa-pratistham' seems also to suggest such a hypothesis, thus flinging open the gate for Asat-khyati. But, such an interpretation has not been put forward by any of the noted mediaeval scholars. Indeed, Vijñanabhiksu asserts that the yoga view of error is Anyatha-khyati as against the Aviveka of the Samkhya. He argues that this anyatha-khyati is clearly implied in the sūtra "Anityasuci-duņkhānātmasu nitya-śuci- sukhatmakhyatiravidya" (Ys. II. 5). The Bhiksu further points out that unlike the Vaisesikas who advocate that an external object like the silver is superimposed upon the presented external object, the yoga holds that an internal cognition is grafted on the presented datum. For, to assume the distant silver etc. as the cognitum instead of the contiguous nacre etc. is to court prolixity of assumption. The vaisesika view cannot further explain the substantive sublation in cases like 'It was seen in a dream ; now it is not"5. The point of the matter is that the yoga is essentially realistic in its epistemology and is tethered to the doctrine of Sat-karyavada wherefore Asat-khyati is anathema to its system.

To elucidate the standpoint of the yoga further : Viparyaya is not Pramana, because it does not take the form of the presen- ted datum ; it is not Vikalpa, since it does not arise merely from verbal cognition. Neither can it be equated with Nidra which has negation as its content. Nor is it of the nature of Smrti which has a pre-cognised entity as its content. But, at this point we should take a pause and probe into the Vyasa-Bhasya on Ys. I. 11. Therein it is stated that Smrti is of two kinds according as it occurs in dream or in wakeful consciousness; in the former case, it is 'bhavita-smartavya' i.e. its memory- content is such as may be in conformity with some fancied cognition, and in the latter, it is 'abhavita-smartavya'e. In both the cases, however, it is different from Viparyaya. Is then.

5. Vide yoga-varttika of Vijnānabhiksu, p, 27, Jivananda's ed. 6. "Sā ca dvayī bhāvita-smartavyā cābhāvita-smartavyā ca, svapne- bhavita-smartavya, jagrat-samaye tu abhavita-smartavyeti" (Vyā. Bhā. on Ys. I. 11). According to vacaspati the former is productive, while the latter is reproductive. But, Bhiksu differs and takes the former to mean 'prognos- ticative of the future' ('bhāvyartha-sūcaka').

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dream something different from invalid cognition ? In other words, is it then neither valid nor invalid simply because it does not add to our stock of knowledge? But, we know that a dream-cognition is almost universally condemned as erroneous and the yoga also cannot do otherwise. Why, then, is a dream erroneous according to the yoga ? Though the point does not seem to have been raised and discussed by any of my fore-runners in the field, I venture to submit that error pertains to the bhavita' element in dream; this element is responsible for construction and/or spatio-temporal relation between fact and fiction, or simply super-imposition. If this explanation be at all acceptable, then the question arises how viparyaya differs from a dream-cognition ; for, it can be easily shown that Viparyaya thrives on 'bhavita-smartavya' smrti. It will not do to point out that Viparyaya is 'atad-rupa-pratistha', while dream is not ; for, that is merely a negative qualification which cannot positively account for the genesis of error. Moreover, there are erroneous or self-discrepant dream-cognitions even like erroneous wakeful cognitions. If it still be maintained that Viparyaya has nothing in common with dream, it boils down to this that Viparyaya does not necessitate an element of Smrti for its occurrence. In that case, the yoga assumption of vasana or sa nskara being at the root of all metaphysical illusion becomes indefensible7. Anyway, it is well nigh impossible to settle this issue for want of sufficient materials in this regard. One thing, however, that may be asserted with emphasis in regard to the yoga Viparyaya is that the form of the correction will be 'nedam jnanam tadrupa-pratistham' as against 'natra rajatam' as advocated in the Nyaya-Vaisesika school. So, according to the yoga, the reality of (say) the silver, which is presented as unpresented in correction, is out of the question. The yoga-sutras, including the Vyasabhasya, nowhere indicate the exact role of the presented datum, say, a piece of nacre, in the genesis of an erroneous cognition, say, of the silver. The only thing that can be made out and safely affirmed is that it occasions the subsequent recanting cognition. And, in this

7. Cf. "Tathājātīyakā samskāra vrttibhireva Kriyante Samskāraiśca vrttaya' iti, evam vrtti-samskāra-cakram anisam āvartate" (Vyā. Bhā. on Ys. I. 5.)

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regard at least, the theory alienates itself from the Buddhist theory of Ätma-khyati. But, one thing must be submitted here. The yoga definition of Viparyaya as discussed above cannot possibly bring within its fold cases of 'Sopadhika bhrama' like the red crystal and seems to be too narrow in this regard. For, a red crystal is. certainly 'Tadrupa-pratistha' ; and all the metaphysical errors. on different levels of the yoga are of this 'sopadhika' type .. Hence, 'tad-rupa' has to be explained differently. It is to be taken to mean the real nature of form or appearance of an entity. And 'anyatakhyati'za is to be taken as the recanting cognition that fights out anyatha-khyati. In that case, 'ekatma-ta- khyati'7b should be the positive description of the nature of an illusion and this also may very well be termed anyatakhyati as. opposed to the Anyakhyati of the vallabhaites from the stand- point of 'tadrupa'. Now, let us present the Anayathakhyati theory of the: Ramanujist school. It has already been noted that Ramanuja in his Sri-bhasya yields his palm to all the three theories of Sat- khyati, Anyathakhyatl and Akhyati. It has also been noted that a majority of the followers of Ramanuja has rallied round. the theory of Anyathakhyati. Indeed, Ramanuja defines an illusion as 'anyasya anyathava-bhasah' and points out that all. the theories of illusion must ultimately call into request an otherwise apprehension to explain the phenomenon ("Khyatyan- tarāņām tu sudūram api gatvā anyathāvabhāsa asrayaņīyah" .. (P. 135, Sahitya Parisat ed.). The point of the mattcr is that every theory of illusion presents a contradiction between the. initial psychological presentation and the subsequent logical. assertion, thus admitting the unwitting cognition of something. as some other thing. Thus, something is taken as real which is, in fact, unreal in the Asat-khyati theory ; similarly, in Ātma- khyati, a cognition is taken as an external object ; in Akhyati,. the adjunct of one is taken to be another's adjunct and two cognitions are taken as one8. Similarly in Anirvacanīya-khyati,. a prātibhasika entity is taken as vyavahārika.

7a. Cf. "Sattva-puruşānyatā-khyātimātrasya etc." Ys. III. 49. 7b. Cf. "Drg-darśana-śaktyorekātmatevāsmitā" Ys, II. 6. 8. "Asat-khyati-pakse sadātmanā, Atma-khyātipakse ca arthātmanā,.

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Venkatanatha asserts that Anyathakhyati is the irreducible minimum which must be accepted ungrudgingly by all the disputationists in order that a sensible explanation may be offered of the facts of illusion, its conative corollary and the flnal recantation ete.,. The scholiast Srinivasa-dasa says that bhrama, pravrtti and badha do not stand to reason unless one assumes that the nacre-silver cognition is different from the normal oognition of silver. So, the otherwiseness of an illusory cognition from its valid counterpart is undeniable and the con- notation of the word 'bhrama' is apprehension of a characteristic different from what is presented1o. Thus it transpires that the Ramanujist Anyathakhyati has two different strands : first, it points out that no theory of error can rule out the logical any- athatva of a psychological presentation ; and, secondly, it affirms the factual anyathatva of an invalid cognition from its valid counter-part, which fact only can successfully explain the occur- rence of illusion, the consequent volition and the subsequent recantation as a continuous process. But, Venkata himself refutes this Anyathakhyati in his TMK. in the following manner : In cases of samnvadi bhrama, the cognition of a gem in its rays prompts one to the gem itself which one seizes, though the cognition does not refer to the gem at all. Here, then, Anya- thakhyati has no scope at all. Because nacreness is different from silverness, a piece of nacre can by no means appear as a piece of silver ; moreover, an invalid cogniticn qua cognition is certainly valid and there can be no talk of any cognition being contradicted. Furthermore, the champion of Anyatha-khyati cannot let himself off from the clutches of full-blooded Asat- khyati; for, he asserts the apprehension of the identity of silver in or of the silverness being related to a piece of nacre which is a reality neither there, nor anywhere else. If it be argued that this much of Asat-khyati may well be harboured, then it leads to prolixity of assumption. So, the armsman for

akhyati-pakse'pi anya-viśesanam anya-visesanatvena juana-dvayam ekatvena ca" (Srī-Bha., pp. 195-196, Sahitya Parisat ed.) 9. "Ātma-khyātyādi-vādesu anyathātvam avaritam/Bhrama-pravrtti- badhaderanyatha na hi sambhava" (NP., P, 39). 10. "Tadetat sarvam yathārtha-rajata-jnānāpeksayā suktau rajata-jňā- nasya vailaksanyabhave na samgacchate ..... bhrama-pada-pravrttinimittatvena cāvidyamāna-prakārāvagahitvam avarjanīyam" (NS., p. 39).

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Anyathakhyati should advisedly remain tongue-tied against Asat-khyati, or should not brandish his weapons to safeguard the position of Anyathakhyati11. Some Advaitins like Dharmar- ajadhvarindra accept Anyathakhyati in cases where the super- imposed entity is contiguous to the locus of superimposition and their view may be taken to be analogous to the Ramanujist theory in the sense of 'avidyamana-prakaravagahitvam'. Now, let us present the Anyathakhyati of the Jainas. The Jainas generally call it Viparita-khyati. By way of explaining the term, they point out that the theory does not mean an appre- hension to the effect 'this is a different entity'. On the contrary, it means the apprehension of something in some different thing. The Jainas assert that in erroneous cognitions like the nacre- silver, the silver presented through recollection or even the nacre, with its own characteristics screened and those of the silver assumed, becomes the cognitum. The latter alternative, however, is more to their liking12. By 'alambana' the jainas mean what is pointed at with the finger etc. and which is the generator of cognition. This holds good in the case of nacre. Otherwise, the said erroneous cognition might arise even in the absence of nacre. Furthermore. if the nacre be not the cognitum, then the subsequent recognition in regard to it and the contradiction would become unreasonable13. The jainas hold that every entity is real in its own intrinsic aspect and unreal in some other aspect14. So, the nacre here is real in its own aspect, though unreal in some other aspect, and it appears as silver through some defect13. Prabhacandra in his NKC. refuses to accept such erroneous cognitions as mere perception. He holds that such cogntion

11. See TMK , Ch. IV, sls. 12 and 13 and the gloss on the latter. 12. "Sthagita-nija-vapurupagrhīta-rajatarūpā śuktikaiva hyatra prakāśate iti syādvādinām mudrā. (Syad. Vā. R., P. 108). Also "Tatah sthitam smrtyupasthapitam rajatam asyāh pratīterālamba- nam iti, nigūhita-nijākarā parigrhīta-rajatākāra suktikaiva va." (NKC., P. 65, M. Sastrī's ed). 13. "Angulyādinā hi nirdisyamanam etc'" (Syād. Vā. R., pp. 138-139). 14. Perhaps this view which ultimately matured into the sevenfold pre- dication is but an adaptation of the Bhatta view-point as elucidated in SV. 15. "Taddhi svarūpeņa sat para-rūpeņa cāsat dosavaśāt kala-dhautatayā pratibhatīti" (Ibid., pp. 131-132).

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presents a conglomeration of the previously perceived entity and the entity that is being perceived at present and, as such, it is of the nature of recognition even like the cognition this is that Devadatta'. He further assures us that such a position is not incongruous with the basic principles of the Jaina system in as much as cognitions like 'this is a tree' are classed under recognition in itt6. Prabhacandra suggests such a position also in his PKM., while refuting the theory of Vivekakhyati. He asserts there that defects do not destroy the potency of an entity. On the contrary, the potency of defects is such that eyes etc. can generate cognition of things that are not. This should not, however, be construed as paving the way for Asat-khyati ; for, as Prabhacandra assures us, similarity also is a causal condition of invalid cognition. The form of the silver that is presented in an invalid cognition is not of the cognition itself ; for, it is supplied by impressions (of past experience). The fact is that defects assisted by impressions make the form of the previously cognised silver appear on the presented datum. But, that does not make the cognition appear as 'this is that silver' ; for, through defects the form of the silver in absentia appears on the. presented datum in complete identity with it17.

It is easy to discover here the affinity of this Jaina theory with the Smrti-pramosa or vivekakhyati of the Prabhakaras. The difference between the two theories in this regard is that the former assumes that the erroneous cognition appears as one knowledge of the type of pratyabhijna, while the latter holds that it appears as though it were one knowledge. Be that as it may, the Jainas further point out that after recantation arises another recognition to the effect 'This is that piece of nacre which I previously apprehended as silver 1s. But what is

16. "Pratyaksa-rūpatvābhāvāt tasya, pratyabhijrāna-svarupam hi tat drsta-drśyamānārtha-samkalanātmakatvāt 'sa evāyam devadattaḥ' ityadijnā- navat ...... na casya pratyabhijnanatvabhyupagame apasiddhanta-prasanga, 'vrkso'yam' ityadijnananam pratyabhijoanatvena vaksyamanatvat". (NKC., p. 65). Prabhacandra does not, however, call viparyaya a case of recognition in his PKM. 17. "Dosanam cedam eva samarthyam yat tat-sannidhane'vidyamane. pyarthe jñānam utpādayanti cakșuradīni ete." (PKM., p. 56, NS. ed) 18. "Badhaka-pratyaya-samanantaram yadeva śuktiśakalam Kala-

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recuntation and what is recanted and who is the recantor ? Vadideva Surī and Prabhacandra are very clear in their decision on this point. They hold that only what has scope and provenance may be negated (Kinca prasaktam pratisidhyate. Sya. Vit R., p, 135). So, it is not sane to argue, as a Sankarite does, that an ordinary or empiric silver is negated, though what is apprehended be a supranormal or a pratibhasika silver. But, then, the question arises whether the subsequent cognition or the entity pressented in it as content is the sublator. Further- more, it is to be decided whether this sublator negates the former cognition, or its content or its consequence. To this their general reply is that the cognition which reveals a content contrary to that of the previous cognition, which is demonstrated to have revealed something non-existent, is what is sublated19. Prabhacandra points out that the subsequent sublation of a previous cognition only purports to damn it, though bygone, as false. In some cases, however, the sublation serves an additional purpose of thwarting the activity consequent upon the valid cognition20. Prabhacandra, however, does not subscribe to the view that the sublator negates the content of the previous cognition ; for, he remarks sarcastically that it is the nature of kings, not of cognitions, to take away a 'Visaya' ('Property" and 'Content')21. But, Vadideva Surī differs and holds that the sublator may be said to negate the content also ; but, that does not mean that the content did not appear in cognition at all ; On the contrary,. it demonstrates that the content that was intuited was non- existent. He, however, is at one with prabhacandra in accepting phalapahara' as an additional import of 'badha'22. Still, he

dhauta-rupena maya prak pratyakalitam tadevedam iti pratyabhijnanam ātmānam anubhavad anubhūyate." (Syā. Vā. Ra., p. 110). Also "Badhottara-Kalam hi pratisandhatte sthanurayam me purusa ityevam Pratibhata īti". (PKM., P. 52). 19. "Jnanam eva hi viparītartha-khyapakam badhakam abhidhīyate, pratipaditasadartha-khyapanam tu badhyam". (PKM. P, 76). 20. "Etadeva hi mithyājñānasya atītasyāpi bādhyatvam yad asmin. mithyatvapadanam ; Kvacit punah pravrtti-prati-sedho' pi phalam". (PKM., P. 76). 21. "Visayapaharasca rajnam dharmo na jnanānām" (P. 75, Ibid). 22. "Vişayāpahārastu bādhah svīkriyate. Visayasya ca na pratipannat --

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does not accept the sublation of the previous cognition by the latter one. But, the difference between the two scholars is more apparent than real; for, Prabhacandra indirectly accepts 'visayapahara' by maintaining that the sublated cognition is 'pratipiditasadartha-khyapanam'. Vadideva also, in his turn, implies by his acceptance of false content that the cognition apprehending it is false. Anyway, the Jaina theory is a medley of Smrti-pramosa and Asat-khyati and it is certainly more akin to Asat-khyati than to the generally current Anyathakhyati. But, strangely enough, the Jainas seem to concede even to the Nyaya type of Anyatha-khyati in which an elsewhere entity is assumed to be the cognitum which is intuited by the senses not, however, through 'jnana-laksana' contact, but through the contact of defects ('dosa-pratyasatti')23. Thus, it appears that the Jainas evince great eclectic zeal in formulating a theory of error. But, it's a pity that their theory turns out to be a medley of diversified thoughts not integrated by any necessary apperception. Mandana Misra, the great Mimamsist of the Bhatta school, is an advocate of Anyatha-khyati ; but, his position in this regard seems to be much at variance with that of the Bhattas. His general philosophic position makes him a bold champion of the pre-sa nkara advita doctrine which differed but little from the full-fledged Advaita of Samkara. The doctrine of Maya upon which hinges the Samkarite theory was already recognised by Mandana as some irrational entity which served to explain all inexplicabilities 2 4. He too like Samkara characterises it as anirvacaniya', it being neither real, nor unreal2 5. He further holds that duality cannot be proved by perception. He asserts that the fact of experience, which rests on the duality of the subject and the object, can be explained only on the assumption

vam apahriyate Kintu pratipannasya asattvam khyapyata ityapaharārthah. Asattvam api nedānīm upanatam asya khyāpyate api tu tadaiva tadasat iti prakāśyate ... Phalāpaharo'pi bādhaḥ sambhāvyate eva"(Syā. Vā. Ra., P. 140), 23. Cf. "Atad-deśa-kālasyāpi kaladhautasya doșa-mahimnā sannihitatvena pratibhasa-visayatopapatteḥ". (Syā. Vā. Ra., P. 138). 24. Cf. "Na hi mayayam kacid anupapattih. Anupapadya-manārthaiva hi mayā" (Br. Si.) 25. "Tasmāt nāvidya sati nāpyasatī" (Br. Si., P. 9, Kuppuswāmī's ed.)

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that there is no real duality, that there is, in fact, only the subject which transforms itself into the sundry objects of experience26. Basing his arguments on such a theoretic position, Mandana in his Brahma-siddhi condemns an illusory presenta- tion as neither real nor unreale 7. That is why Mm. Kuppu Swami remarks : .. when the nature of the object of erroneous cognition is examined, this theory has to be reduced inevitably to a form in which it becomes hardly distinguishable from the anirvacaniya-khyati of the Advaitins" (P. XXVII, Kuppu Swami's Introduction to his ed. of Br. Si.). It is quite understandable that Mandana might hold the one view onto- logically and the other view (i.e. anyathakhyati) psychologically, even like the great Ramanuja. But, we hardly find any corroboration of this statement in the writings of Mandana, particularly in his brochure entitled 'Vibhrama-vivekah'28. The most interesting fact in this regard is that Mandana dis- cusses in his said brochure the theory of Anirvacaniya-khyati of the Vedantists ( Brahma-vidah')29 and rejects it not, however, with much show of reason 30. Though betraying his partiality fcr the Advaita in the metaphysical sphere, he nevertheless champions the cause of Anyathakhyati or Viparīta-khyati as it is more often called by the Bhattas. He points out that if the object of illusory cogni- tion be existent, there is no scope for error ; on the contrary, if it be non-existent, it cannot be presented in cognition. Since these two alternatives fit in well with Anyathakhyati only, the ancient thinkers had approved of this theory only31. He then refutes in detail the prabhakara theory and points out, inter alia, that not all cases of invalid cognition are occasioned by mental

26. "Ekatva evayam drastr-drsyabhavo'vakalpate, drastureva cidāt -. manaļ tathā tathā vipariņāmād vivartanād vā". (Ibid.) 27. "Avabhasamane'sati tad-avabhaso'pi satyato durnirupah" (Ibid.). 28. Mandana discusses the problem of illusory cognition in the Niyoga- kanda of his Brahma-siddhi also, the metrical karikas whereof are mostly identical with those of the Vibhrama-viveka. 29. Cf. "Ato'nirvacaniyatvam varam brahmavido viduh" (Sl. 28). Also "Vibhramesu vivartatvamato brahmavidam matam". (Sl. 36). 30. Cf. "evam nirvacanīya ca navidya parihasyate/Avidyatvam yato' nyasya sanyarupa-prakasika. Also "Nanirvacyataya matiḥ" (S1. 154). 31. Cf. "Ekānta-sattve ka bhrāntirasattve kim prakāśatām/Dvayānuguņ- yad Vrddhanam sammata khyatiranyatha". (S1. 46)

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defect necessarily ; there are cases like the optical illusion where the organs only are at fault. These are certain kinds of abiding illusiong2. He then refutes Asatkhyati and argues that if the Madhyamika pleads that the non-existent appears as existent, it clearly leads to Anyathakhyati psychologically. If the Madhyamika still argues that even then that apparent existence is nothing but 'Sunya', then it need not have any occasion to be recanted subsequently. So, argues Mandana, 'Sunya' here does not mean void, but any whatsoever divorced from its real spatio-temporal context33. Now Mandana anticipates an objection from the opponents. It may very well be argued against Anyathakhyati that if it pleads for apprehension in an entity of a mode which does not characterise its existence, then the theory gets into the tight grip of Sunya-khyati. For, even if that mode be somehow real, its relation with the cognitum in question is certainly a nou-être34. But, Mandana here, following kumarila3s, asserts that, rather than with any modal difference, we are here concerned with two distinct entities, one of which by its negation implies the other ; and there is no question of any relation between the two in as much as no relation appears in our experience. In fact, negation rests upon positivity and is not wholly non-existent and inexpressible. Avidya serves its purpose by revealing: something as some different thing. When a cognition is contradicted, its cognitum is rightly said to be false. The recanting does not, however, discard the externality of the cognitum, nor does it establish its indescribability. But, it simply indicates that the external object so perceived does not belong to that particular spatio-temporal context3 6. Maņdana

32. Cf. "Buddhyamāno vivekañca pasyāmīndriya-dosata h/ Dvitradirupan dīpadīn iti lokah prabhāsate/ Indriyanam dosa-bhedanniyata-bhranti-darsanam/ (Sls. 73-74). 33. Cf. "Ato'tad-desakālam yanmātra-vādyeva Sūnyatā". (S1. 123). The text is highly cryptic and hopelessly corrupt in many places and it's. a job to make out the intended meaning in many places. 34. "Prakarantara-samsargo nanvasanneva bhasate" (S1. 130). 35. "Bhavantaram abhavo hi etc." (S1. 129). 36. Cf. "Tena yavadbādhanīyam tāvanmithyeti yujyate//. Bhranti-jneye ca bahyatvam bādhakairna nirasyate/. Na gamyate' ntarvartitvam nānirvācyatayā matiḥ// Kintvatad-desakalatvam gamyate bahyavastunah" (Sls. 153-155).

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concludes by remarking that the recanting cognition leads to the conclusion that though the object is otherwise, it appears in the form of our consciousness 37. Hence, from the above, it follows that, according to Mandana, the object of invalid cognition, though false in that particular context, is not an utter naught and is far less an indescribable entity. So, it seems to us that Mandana's view does in no way smack of Anirvacaniya-khyati. On the contrary, it is more akin to the view of Vacaspati Misra 3 8. Another variant of Anyathakhyati in which is postulated the real transformation, say, of a piece of nacre into a piece of silver is generally fathered upon Bhatta Bhaskara, a dualist Vedantist. Thus, Dr. Bratin Sen Gupta confidently says : "This alternative of real transformation ('anyatha parinate vastuni jnanam') of the substratum into the illusory object is the very old view of Anyathakhyati as advocated by Bhagavad Bhaskara, who admits both difference and non-difference ('bhedabhedau') in every relational knowledge". (P. 63, A critique on the vivarana School). Even the great Bengali Pundit Mm. Jogendranath in his Bengali exposition of Advaitasiddhi asserts that Bhatta Bhaskara advocated such real transformation of the substratum, and held that the so-called illusory object of an invalid cognition was real3 9. But it's a pity that we do not find any corroboration of such an assertion in the Bhaskara-bhasya on the Brahmasutras. It is easy to discover statements scattered throughout his bhasya to the effect that objects of illusory cognition are false40 and are in certain cases recollective recreation of what was cognised in some other time and place41. So, it seems that this view is the result of pure subjective abstraction on the basis of the general

37. "Taduktam bīdhaka-juānād vacoyuktiriyam bhavet/ Arthe' nyathapi satyesa dhiyakāra pratīyate//" (SI. 161). 38. Cf. "Svarupeņa marīcyambho mrsā Vacaspatermatam/ Anyathakhyatiristasyetyanyatha jagrhurjanah"// (Kalpataru, P. 24, NSP) Amalananda, however, means to imply that vacaspati holds Anirvacaniya- khyāti. 39. Vide p. 122, Advaitasiddhi, Vol. I ed. by Mm. Jogendranath. 40. Cf. " ...... Sukti-rajatavad āgamāpāya-dharmītvācca an!tam ...... " (P. 93) ; "Nanu sarvatra svapnadāvapi parata eva mithyatvam gamyate na svato na hi rajata-jnane tad-gata-mithyatvam grhyate". (P. 124, chow.) 41. Cf. "Desantara-Kalantaranubhuta-smara nat" (P. 161, Chow.)

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metaphysical position of Bhaskara which need not necessarily and: does not in fact always square up with his epistemological. position. It is highly significant that Jayatirtha in his Nyayasudha refers to such a view, while explaining the different possible meanings of Anyathakhyati, but does not father it upon anybody ('Yadi tavad anyatha pariņate vastuni Khyatiranyatha khyatiḥ'). Vidyaranya also refers to such an alternative interpretation2: but is silent about its champion and rather alienates it from Bhedabheda-vada. Pratyag-rupa-bhagavan in his Nayana- prasadini on Citsukha's Tattva-pradipika refers to the theory of illusion of the Bhedabheda-vadin in the following manner : "Ubhayatmakam iti : tu bhedabheda-vadino' nyathakhyati- viśesasya" (P. 70). Prakasatman also refers to the Anyathakhyati view of the Bhedabheda-vadin43, but this has nothing to do with 'parinama'. To my mind, this bhedabhedavada refers to the Bhatta view which we shall discuss presently. Kumarila Bhatta, the founder of the Bhatta School of Mima nsa clearly speaks of Anyatha-khyati in the following Ślcka :- "Tasmad yadanyatha santam anyatha pratipadyate/ Tanniralambanam jnanam abhavalambananca tat"// (Nira. V.a, Sl. 117, S. V.) Here 'niralambanam' does not signify absolute absence of an 'alambana' ; for, kumarila himself says elsewhere that every- where cognition has some manner of external object as its 'alambana', though divorced from its proper time and place44 .. 'Abhava' also does not here mean absolute negation, but some other positive entity ('bhavantaram'). Kumarila is a pluralist and an advocate of the self-validity of knowledge. Cognition qua cognition and left to itself is valid, according to Kumarila, and it is negated only by the tainting cognition of the otherwiseness of the object under reference. To him negativity is a fact of

42. "Vastunyapi Katham anyathatvam Kim śuktikāyā rajata-tādātmyam Kimvā rajatākāreņa pariņamah" (P. 207, VPS., Beng. ed.). 43. Cf. "Atha bhedabheda-vadī samsarga-satyatam bruyat etc." (P. 28, Vivaranam, Vizianagram Skt. Series). 44. "Sarvatralambanam bāhyam deśa-kālānyathātmakam" (SV.,. Nirā. Va.)

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positivity ; negation is simply the position of something else4s : Indeed, an entity, according to him, is not a fixed concept, a self- identical entity, but a changing constant, a multiform entity that has the ynamicity of appearing now in one form and then in an altogether different form,c. It is a one-many, an identity-in- difference. It is and also is not at the same time. It is as it- self, but it is not as something else ; and cognition may present to us either of these two aspects at any time47. So, what appears in an invalid cognition is that a nacre, for example, appears in the form of a silver which is its negation. The fact of the matter in that here silver is taken as the negation of nacre ; for, as already stated, Kumarila thinks that negation is but position of some other entity 4 8. So, the nacre is not here in the form of silver. But, the silver is not non-existent on that account. It is assuredly a fact that the silver is not present here in the form of nacre ; but, then, it is present in its own form elsewhere even like the pitcher that is here negated. Hence, it is that Kumarila asserts that even in dream-cognitions, some kind of external object is not completely denied. On the contrary, in every case of invalid cognition there must be an external cognitum of which the spatio-temporal relations are perverted49. Thus in the cognition of fata morgana, precognised house etc. and clouds serve as the objective basis of the cognition. Similarly, the water previously apprehended and the desert heated by the solar rays give rise to the experience of a mirage. But, then, Kumarila makes a statement which, as I read it, is highly significant and reveals his mind to us with perfect clarity. It is here that he seems to be faithfully followed up by Mandana and Vacaspati, though scholars might refuse to accept it with a severe nod of their heads. He now says that the

45. Cf. "Bhavantaram abhavo'nyo na kascid anirupanad' and "Bha- vantaram abhāvohi kayācit tu vyapeksayā" (Both SV.) 46. "Thanaikantikam vastu ityevam jnanam suniscitam" (Va. Va., SV) 47. Cf. "Svarupa-pararupābhyām nityam sadasadātmake/ Vastuni jñāyate Kincid rupam Kaiscid kadācana//" (ŚV.) 48. Cf. "Rupyasya suktyabhavatvat. Rupyam hī Sukterabhavah, bha- vāntarasyaiva abhāvatvāt etc." (IS, P. 46). 49. "Svapnadi-pratyaye bahyam sarvatha na hi nesyate/ Sarvatralambanamn bahyam desa-kalanyathatmakam//" (ś. V.)

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conception of a hare's horn is based on the conceptions of the hare and of the horn of some other animal being dovetailed together s0. A hare's horn is almost universally condemned by philosophers and laymen alike as an utter naught like the son of a barren woman, the sky-flower etc. He thus seems to draw no line of demarcation between a hare's horn etc. and a nacre-silver and the like and this supposition is clearly borne out by him in the concluding line of this discourse which runs as follows; "Vastvantaraika-samsrstah padarthah sunyata-dhiyah" (S. V.). Are not then cognitions of the nacre-silver type false according to him ? Certainly they are; for, he himself asserts that in the erroneous cognition of a red crystal, the attribute of redness is certainly falses1. Earlier he makes a statement from the Buddhist standpoint which implies that water experienced in a mirage is unreal, (" ...... Bhavatyadhyasya dhistasmat mrga- trsnadibhih sama"). The falsity is due to adhyasa"s2. In the case of adhyasa based on similarity, an element of smrti is involved and the recollected entity is superimposed upon the presented datum. But, that does not bring the erroneous cognition into line with determinate cognition which is woven partly of the fabric of recollection. For, as Kumarila points out, genus, qualities etc. which go to make a cognition determinate, are never found in exclusion as apart from the particular entity, which is their substratum ; but the 'this' representing nacre etc. in an invalid cognition, is generally experienced as divested of the 'what' representing silver etc. Hence, a determinate cognition is valid, while a cognition of the nacre-silver type is invalid and its content is false,3. So, Kumarila certainly acquiesces in the fact that the silver is non-existent in the nacre. But, he does not press this fact so much as to bring it to the fore, and, guided by his irrepressible realistic bias, he asserts that this falsity is not the whole truth, nor the major truth of the

50. "Dravyāntare visāņanca śasasyatmā ca Kāra nam/ Saśa-śruga-dhiyah ...... "(Ibid). 51. "Sphatikādau tu lākşādisvarūpā ya matirbhavet/ Avyutpannasya sa mithya ...... //" (SV.) :52. "Ātmādhyāsastu sādrsyad uparagacca drśyate/" (Ibid). 53. "Na tu jātyādi-nirmuktam vastu drstam kadācana/ 'Tad-vimokena Va tani laksadi-sphatikadivat//" (SV.)

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situation. For, the reality of this falsity can only be vouched for when its correlate, the truth, is within our experience. Hence he pleads that the silver, though non-existent and false here in the nacre, is certainly an elsewhere and elsewhen reality which only can impart the reality and cognisability of falsity. To Kumarila, then, an invalid cognition is a unitary cognition, perceptual in character54, composed of presentative and representative elements fused together into one integral whole (Cf. "Vastvantaraika-

But, the followers of Kumarila,-Mandana and Vacaspati excepted,-could not present this theory in its pristine purity. They mixed it up more and more with other theories. Thus, Parthasarathi Misra in his Sastra-dipika avers that the nacre- silver cognition is not perception. In such cognitions, he says, the eye apprehends those properties of the nacre which are shared also by the silver and fails to grasp due to sensory weakness the specific properties of the nacre. Then through the waking of impressions, the silver is recollected and now the nacre is :apprehended through defect in the form of the recollected silver5 5. He further points out that in an invalid judgment the subject and the predicate are both equally real ; only the relation between them is non-existent;6, though apprehended due to defect. This is the situation everywhere whether it is a cognition of a barren woman's son, or of the double moon, or of the yellow conch-shell 5 7.

Gaga Bhatta in his Bhatta-cintamani asserts that in the cognition of nacre-silver something that is related to one thing is apprehended as related to some other thing. He explains the perception of silver in nacre by assuming 'jñana-laksana pratyasatti' of the Nyaya. As an alternative to this supranormal intercourse, he assumes 'pramusta-tattaka-smrti' of the

54. Cf. "Tenendriyartha-sambandhe vidyamane smarannapi/ Vikalpayan Svadharmena vastu pratyaksavan narah//" (Ibid) 55. "Na hi Suktikayam rajata-jnanam indriya-sampra-yogajam etc." (P. 30, SD). 56. "Sarvatra samsarga-matram asadeva avabhasate. Samsargiņastu santa eva". (P. 39, SD.) 57. "Tatha bandhya-sutadisvapi etc." (Ibid). 12

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Prabhakarasss. So. the existence of the external object, say a silver, being undeniable, the cognition also is not false, but is only contradicted being occasioned by a defective cause. Much of this is not in accord with the theory of Kumarila. Be that as it may, Gaga Bhatta then points out that the Prabhakara view of asamsargagraha' can by no means explain 'pravrtti', which can be satisfactorily explained only by assuming 'sarsarga-graha' or a wrong synthesis of the presentative and the representative elements (Cf. "Vastvantaraika-samsrstah padarthah Sunyata- dhiyah" SV.). Hence, in the invalid cognition of the nacre- silver, one apprehends 'this' as characterised by silver-ness. Now Gaga Bhatta raises an interesting point. Suppose Maitra infers that Caitra has the cognition of silver (in a nacre), on ground of the latter's cognition of 'Karyata' or serviceability in it and this inference may lead him to action in regard to the silver. In that case there would arise the unwelcome contigency of cross- activity or parallel activity between Caitra and Maitra. Though such a situation is certainly very common in our experience, Gaga disapproves it and says that Maitra's volition will have no scope because of contradiction ; for, he argues that Maitra will take a little bit of time before he himself can really have the cognition of 'this' as characterised by 'silver-ness' and this short span of time would reveal to him the invalidity of the cognition. Then he offers another explanation. He gives the ruling that activity will result only from a wrong synthetic cognition and not from the cognition of such wrong synthetic cognition. As a third alternative, he asserts that when the erroneous judgment has its subject characterised and determined by the determinant of the predicate, then only can follow any activity59. This explanation is hollow and the whole discussion is a fantastic nonsense, particularly because it has avowedly no direct bearing upon the point at issue. From the above discussion it follows that, according to the Bhatta theory, defects are not privative in nature ; they do not waylay and atrophy ; they rather propel and can give rise to a

58. "Jñāna-laksaņāyah pratyāsatteraugīkārāt. Pramusta-tattāka- smaraņāugīkarād va na dosah" (P. 26, Bhā. ci., Choukhāmbā). 59. "Na caivam Caitro rajata-jnanavan karyata-ji anavattvāt etc." (P. 27, Bhā. Ci., Choukhāmbā).

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positive effect. Another point that emerges here is that though the 'that' and the 'what' of an illusory judgment are both equally real, the relation of 'tadatmya' (identity-in-difference) or sarnsarga', as some later Bhattas prefer to put it, subsisting between them is unreal. Kumarila, however, puts it differently by saying that though the 'what' is real in itself as an elsewhere and elsewhen entity, it is unreal in the sphere of the 'that' under reference. Another feature of this theory is that it makes room for a subjective element in it. As Prof. Hiriyanna remarks : "It overflows the given so to speak, and the overflowing element points to nothing". (P. XIX, Introduction to Is.). But, is the 'what', say, a silver, a subjective element to Kumarila ? Probably it is not. The two ślokas "Tenendriyartha-sambandhe etc" (Foot note54) and 'yadi tvalocya samm ilya netre Kaścid vikalpayet /Na syāt pratyaksata tasya sambandhananusarataḥ//' of kumārila do not seem to warrant any such idea of subjectivity. Apart from the fact that there is no overflowing, but only scraping across the given, Kumarila might assert that the object is as the subject does it, that the 'what' of an invalid cognition is a subjective object (as opposed to a trans-subjective object) which is a nonêtre for all practical purposes. He might hold that an object undergoes change (not merely the change of Jñata-ta being born to it) through perception and that the so-called illusory object is but an objective joint property of the mind and the physical object as in the views of Broad, whitehead and other modern realists. Yet another point to be noted in this view is that the Bhattas speak of samsarga-graha as opposed to the asamsargagraha of the Prabhakaras. But, the latter is nothing but the former according to the 'bhavantaram abhavah' dictum of the Bhattas. Still, they adhere to the former because it embodies a psychological truth which is of greater importance than the truth arrived at through logical equation. That is why though the silver is present there in its asad-rupa' as nacre, yet it is said to be false in that context. Let us now attempt a refutation of this Bhatta theory, particularly in those aspects in which it differs from its analogues. Vinuktatman in his Is. waxes eloquent in refuting this Bhatta theory. Besides refuting the theory in common with other theories in the first and second chapters, he devotes three successive Chapters from III to V almost exclusively to the

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refutation of this Anyathakhyati theory. In chapter III he refutes the dogma that a cognition may be 'anyatha-Khyapaka'. In the Chapter IV he refutes the 'anyathatva' of 'Khyati and in the 5th Chapter he refutes the Bhatta anyatha-khyati. Vimuktatman points out that in any form of Satkhyati, the content of the illusory cognition, say, a silver, cannot be taken to be sublated by any means. The Bhatta cannot argue to the contrary as follows :- Since the silver is false, its cognition is invalid ; hence, the negating cognition is valid and this valid cognition sublates the silver. For, why is the silver false ? The Bhatta must answer that it is sublated. This train of reasoning, then, is fallacious on grounds of interdependence. So, the Bhatta must concede the reality of the nacre-silver even like the ordinary silver, because it is supposed to exist and has probative cognition. Otherwise, even the ordinary silver might turn out to be false. So, when tho Bhatta assumes that both the nacre and the silver are real, the silver cannot be proved to be false, invalid and recantable, even though the identity of the two be held to be false, invalid and recantable. For, otherwise, the nacre might also be equally damned as false etc. So, the silver cannot be sublated. Nor is the identity of the nacre and the silver apt to be recanted. For, the recanting cognition does not arise in the form 'there is no identity'. The mutual identification of neither the nacre and the silver, nor the 'this' and the silver may be said to be recanted. For, mutual identification depends upon the cognition of difference which cannot exist at the time of the erroneous cognition. In fact, vimuktatman argues, the cognition of difference or negation has no scope to sublate the fallacious identity. If the Bhatta points out that here 'identity' means only 'negation', the question will naturally arise as to whose negation it is. If it be the negation of the nacre and the silver both, then the negation, whether prior or posterior, will not be cognised at the time of the cognition of identity. If, however, the negation is of the type of numerical ditference, then the erroneous cognition would take the form 'this is not silver' and the recanting cogni- tion would be 'this is silver' and the whole scheme would be turned upside down. The whole argument boils down to this that an 'abhavajnana' may inform, but cannot annul; it may be 'bodhaka', but can never be 'badhaka'. So, the Bhatta cannot prove that the cognition 'this is silver' is invalid. Hence, he must

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either hold that there is no error, or that all cognition is erroneous 6 1 . Now, Vimukt itman tries to prick the bubble of the elsewhere existent silver as assumed by the Bhatta. If the Bhatta argues that, though the silver do s not appear in cognition as being elsewhere, still it is so assumod because of its contradiction in the 'this', he treads a wrong track undoubtedly. For, if the silver appears in the 'this' as non-existent, the appearance cannot warrant the assumption of its existence. If the appearance brings in the assumption of existence, then it is in the fitness of things that the existence should be assumed in the locus of appearance in as much as the appearance of the non-existent does not stand to reason. If the Bhatta now redargues that the existence is not assumed in the locus of the appearance for fear of contradiction, then he cannot assume it even elsewhere in the absence of its apprehension there ; if, then, the existence is assumed even without apprehension, then all regulative principles of cognition will be cast to the four winds. For, why should not one assume the existence of a hare's horn etc. instead of, say, a silver, non-apprehension being common to both ? If the Bhitta pleads in favour of the silver to the effect that it is apprehended somewhere, while the other is not, then why not assume the existence of a horn in a hare, since it is apprehended in a cow ? The Bhatta may now try to save his skin by arguing that he assumes the existence of the silver elsewhere only because it is contradicted here, while the situation is different in the case of the horn. But, then, the question will arise as to where the silver is negated-whether in the locus of its existence or elsewhere. The first alternative will lead to the negation of the horn even in the cow and to the consequent assumption of its existence elsewhere-an absurd proposition. The second alternative, again, will negate the silver elsewhere and encourage the assumption of its existence here. If, now, the taciturn Bhatta argues that, though the silver is existent else-

61. "Athocyeta rupyasya mithyatvat tajjnanasya apramanatvat etc." (Is., P. 103). Also "Tasmāt Sukti-rupyayoh, dvayorāpi sattve etc." (P. 107, Is.). Also "Api cedam bhavān prastavyaḥ-Kim śukti-rūpyayoņ itaretarā- bhavo badhyah etc." (P. 109, Is.). Also "Napi aikyam abhāva eva. Yadya- bhavaņ, Kasyāsau etc." (Pp. I12-113).

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where, it appears as being existent here, he has to explain how such appearance is at all possible. He cannot assuredly explain it with the help of the recanting experience. For, recantation cannot repudiate a thing in its locus. Hence, the silver cannot be assumed to be existing elsewhere6 2. Then, again, the Bhatta assumes a relation of 'tadatmya' between, say, the nacre and the silver. But, in that case, the cognition of the nacre-silver ought to be valid even like the cognitions 'khando gauh', 'mundo gauh' etc. or all such cognitions should be damned as invalid 6 3. An invalid judgment has three constituents. viz. the subject and the predicate i.e. the two relata and the relation between them. To the Bhatta these three do not enjoy the same ontologi- cal status ; for, according to him, the relata are real, while the relation is false. It is really difficult to understand why the falsity of the relation should not overflow and deluge the relata outright. Apart from this illogicality, there is another lapse of thought in the fact that the falsity of the relation affects the two relata differently. The recanting cognition reafflrms the existence of the subject in its apprehended locus, but not that of the predicate which is supposed to be existing elsewhere. It follows from this that the relata are not real in the same sense. Does not then the Bhatta feel constrained to close up ranks with the Advaitin who also thinks that the relata cannot be unreal ? Now, we shall present the fiercest diatribe of Vimuktatman against the Bhatta. The Bhatta practically assumes two different counter-parts of the same predicate in explaining error - One that is immediately intuited in the locus of the subject and the other that is remembered. But, neither of the two may be taken as the negatum of the negative judgment 'this is not silver'. If the remembered silver, for example, be the negatum, the silver apprehended here will outlive the negation; if, however, the former be the negatum, the negation will not help establish the

62. "Sattam cet kalpayet khyatih etc." (Pp. 130-132, Is.) 63. Cf. "Khaņdo gaurityādivat sarvasya *bhedābhedāt na kvacidapi bhranti-badhau sarvatra va tau syatam ityarthah" (P. 28, PPV., Vizianagram Skt. series), Also "Bhedabheda-pakse tu khando gauritivad abhrantiḥ syāt" (P. 207, VPS., Vasumatī ed.)

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existence of the silver elsewhere. For a 'nacreine' (Suktyatma) silver cannot surely exist elsewhere. So, the silver will ultimately turn out to be false. Thus, the Bhatta is thrust into the two horns of a dilemma : If the silver be real, it cannot be negated and the knowledge is not invalid. If, again, it be negated, the knowledge will be invalid, and it will not be real. The Bhatta might say that the apprehended silver is the negatum in the form of the nacre ; but, then, it can be negated not in the nacre, but elsewhere and it would be non-existent there. But, in the nacre it would be existent; for, it is not negated, not being contradicted64. So, it transpires that reality and negation cannot go hand in hand. Prof. Hiriyanna attaches great historical importance on this lastmentioned argument of Vimuktatman. As he himself says, "It is obviously to avoid this difficulty that the Naiyayika holds that the apanastha rajata is itself presented, though through alaukika sannikarsa" (P. XiX, Footnote, Intro. to Is.). Though the argument might have but faintly suggested an orientation of the Anyathakhyati theory to the Naiyayika, the explanation hardly seems to discover the real psychosis of the neo-logician. For, the logical necessity for a novel theory is to be sought else- where. The logician does not accept any mixed mode of menta- tion ; he does not even like William James admit of any inter- mixture of mental modes. So, he cannot consistently mix up perception with recollection, presentation with representation. Moreover, he thinks that, owing to the atomic nature of the mind, there cannot be any simultaneity of psychoses. That is why he has to press forward the immediate intuition of, say, the 'apanastham rajatam' through supra-sensuous contact called 'jñana-laksana pratyasatti', which latter is postulated by him with a view to explaining cases of acquired perception. But, this matter will come up for discussion at a later stage. For, there are a 'before' and 'an after' in the Nyaya theory of Anyathakhyati. The old logicians and the neo-logicians are at variance in expound- ing this theory. And we shall first present the old logicians' view of Anyathakhyati. This variant of Anyathakhyati of the old logicians is to be found in the writings of Udayana, Jayanta Bhatta, Sridhara and

64. Vide IS., P. 95.

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such other scholars, including, of course, Vacaspati Misra in his Nyaya treatises. We shall here give a brief summary of what Vacaspati and Jayanta have to say on this theory. Vacaspati in his Ny iya-Vairttika-tatparya-tīka asserts with much conviction that similarity ('sarupyam') is at the root of all kinds of erroncous cognitions. Nobody, indeed, superimposes 'rupa' etc. or an elephant upon a fly. Even in erroneous cognitions like 'the yellow conch-shell', 'the bitter mollasses' etc., this similarity is certainly in operation. Though 'Asainsargagraha' or 'asambandhagraha', as he himself puts it, is incipiently present in the process of erroneous mentation, there is also present an element of sambandhagraha along with it and these two together prepare the stage for 'similarity' to play its role in bringing about superimposition which brings in its wake an invalid judgment6 5. The point of the argument is that if once it can be proved that similarity is at the root of all error, the stage will be decidedly set for Anyatha-khyati. For, similarity is 'tad-bhinnatve sati tad- gata-bhuyodharma-vattvam' and hence an error will be nothing but taking something for something else which is the import of Anyathakhyati. That is why the advaitins like Prakasatmayati have studiously endeavoured to discard this hypothesis of similarity and install in its place Ajnana, which is an eveready 'open sesame' for their metaphysical edifice. Jayanta Bhatta opens hls discussion on the subject by repudia- ting the Buddhist theory that the indeterminate cognition of the presented datum gives rise to the determinate cognition unaided by sense-contact. He asserts that an erroneous cognition is assuredly sensuous ; for, one cannot apprehend a mirage without opening one's eyes. There is also an entity as its cause ; for, the non-existent cannot be apprehended. As regards, however, the 'alambana' of such invalid cognition, the masters have recourse to three different courses. Some hold that in the invalid cognition 'this is water' the solar rays, with their own characteristics shrouded and taking on the form of water, are the 'alambana'. Others hold that the 'alambana' here is water presented through recollection occasioned by the preception of

65. "Sarvatra hi rajatodakādibhrame śukti-rajatayorvā maru-marīcikā- salilayorva sarupyameva nimittam pasyamah etc." (P. 52, NVTT., Vizi. Skt. Series.)

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its similarity with the presented datum in front. In this view an 'alambana' is what appears in a cognition-not the one that is present in front. Since the sky-flower and such other totally non-existent entities cannot be apprehended, the water present elsewhere becomes the 'alambana' by its presentation through recollection. Others, again, hold that an 'alambana' is different from what appears in a cognition. In this view an 'alambana' is what generates knowledge though not as its Karta or Karana. In cases of 'niralambana' error, the form presented by recollection is the 'alambana'. Thus, whatever the circums- tances, what is totally non-existent cannot generate cognition66. Jayanta then points out that an invalid cognition is a single unitary cognition even like recognition and, though there is. assuredly an element of akhyati in the form that recollection does not appear as such during the invalid cognition, still the Prabhakara view cannot be accepted. On the contray, Viparita- khyati based on any of the three alternative alambanas referred to above is the only logical theory that can satisfactorily explain the phenomenon of error. Jayanta further points out that, in conformity with the view of Viparīta-khyati, 'badha' may be taken to mean only 'visayapahara' to the exclusion of other alternative imports of 'sahanavasthana', 'samskaroccheda', 'phala- pahara' etc. 'Badha' does not repudiate the cognisedness of the 'visaya' ; it merely proclaims the non-existence of the appre- hended object 6 7. The position of Jayanta may best be explained by a reference to his and sridhara's analysis of the phenomenon of acquired perception. Śridhara holds that the visual perception of 'the fragrant sandal' is generated by the visual organ, which appre- hends the substantive sandal only, in collaboration with the previous olfactory perception of fragrance6s. Jayanta is more

66. "Tasyendriyartha-janyatvam siddham tadbhava-bhavatah, Na hyanunmīlitaksasya marau salila-vedanam//etc." (P. 95-101, NM., Pt. II, Beng. ed.) 67. "Visayapaharah tavadastu badhah, visayasya ca na pratibhatatvam apahriyate, Kintu pratibhatasya asattvam khyapyate ityapahararthah" (P. 171, Ibid). 68. "Ghrāņena gandhe grhīte pascat tad-grahaņa-sahakāriņā caksusā kevala-viśesyalambanam evedam viśesya-jnānam janyate ityakāmenāpi abhy- upagantavyam" (N.M.).

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clear on the point. He maintains that the fragrant sandal is not perceived by the visual organ, but by the mind69. This is, according to him, a new type of a synthetic unity of apperception. With this we may further line up what he says about recognition. He contends that recognition is a single psychosis of the type of a qualified perception. The content of recognition is an entity that is existing at present and is still qualified by the past time (Cf. "Atītakālaviśisto vartamāna-kalavacchinnaścārtha etasyām ava-bhasate" NM). So, it seems that, according to Jayanta, an error is the result of a synthetic unity of apperception of the presentative and representative elements.

It is generally maintained by scholars that, according to Vacaspati and other old Naiyaikas, the relation between the subject and the predicate of an invalid jndgment is false and to that extent they acquiesce in Asatkhyati,o.

Gangesa also thinks that the older Naiyayikas held asat- samsarga-Khyati71. But, here the neo-logicians part company and they are not ready to harbour any kind of asat-khyati even as verbal knowledge. Thus Jagadīsa in his tīkā on Vyāpti- pancaka-dīdhiti says: "Saduparagenapyasatah samsarga-mary- adaya bhananangikarat". This marks the dividing line between the old logicians and the neo-logicians beginning from Gangeśa. The neo-logician is a die-hard realist and his sense of realism, that fights shy of Asat-Khyati, impels him to find out for him- self a novel explanation of the phenomenon of error. He takes his stand on the perceptual character of the erroneous cognition and maintains that this psychological phenomenon of percep- tuality cannot be explained unless one can establish the occur- rence of intercourse with the object, say, a silver. He brings in,

69. "Locana-gocare' pi kunda-kusume tadavişaya-gandha-visesite bāhyen- driya-dvaraka-grahanam aghatamanam iti manasam eva surabhi kusumam tit jnanam" (N.M.). 70. Cf. "Vācaspati-miśrāstu śuktau idam rajatam iti jñāne prasiddha- śuktī-rajatatvayoralīka eva samavayo bhasate ityasatkhyatim angīcakruḥ" (S. C., P. 19) See also Mm, Jogendranath's Beng. exposition of AS., Vol. I, P. 294. 71. "Pracastu-Tadātmya-samsargayoḥ asatoreva manyante visayatām (Pp. 546-537, Tc.)

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therefore, a supra-sensuous intercourse to bear upon the problem and holds that, though there is no silver normally present in the locus of the nacre, yet the percipient has intercourse with an elsewhere silver, say, an apanastha rajata' which is real in every sense. So, what occurs in an invalid cognition, say, of a nacre-silver is that the perception of the nacre brings forth through similarity the recollection of a pre-cognised silver and this recollection itself serves as the cognitional contact with an elsewhere and elsewhen silver. Hence, the neo-logician argues that both the subject and the predicate of the invalid judgment 'this is silver' are equally existent and real and are equally well perceived by the percipient. But, the cognition is called any- atha-khyati simply because the nacre appears invested with a different characteristic. 'Anyatha-tva' simply means apprehen- sion of something as characterised or delimited by a 'hetero- locative' adjunct' ("Anyatha prakārāntareņa vyadhikaraņa- dharmeņa khyatih anyatha-khyatiriti tad-vivaraņāt" N. Kau. of Mahadeva, P. 79). The neo-logician avers that pravrtti cannot be explained unless a qualified unitary cognition is assumed as the propelling force as is in evidence in all valid cognitions. This qualified cognition must needs be accepted as a hard psychological fact, and, in deference to this fact, he assumes the supranormal cognitional contact. But, that does not lay the theory open to the charge of prolixity of hypothesis ; for, the prolixity here bears the desired fruit and is as such not prejudicial to the rationale of the theory72. He further points out that the Prabhakara cannot discard qualified cognition and yet explain an invalid cognition like 'these are two pieces of silver', or 'these are two pieces Of zinc', where the eye has contact with a piece of zinc and a piece of silver, only with the help of 'bhedagraha'. Moreover, when a piece of zinc and a piece of silver in juxtaposition give rise to an invalid cognition of the form "these are a piece of silver and a piece of zinc" through reversal of the order of juxtaposition, the Prabhakara. cannot do without admitting simultaneous volitional activity and its arrest. For, if he accepts the apprehension of difference from

72. "Itthañca rauge rajatatva-viśista-buddhyanurodhena jñāna-laksaņa- pratyasatti-kalpane' pi na Ksatiḥ. Phalamukha.gauravasya adosatvat" (P. 238, Si. Mu. of Viśvanātha.)

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zinc in zinc itself and the apprehension of difference of silver in silver itself, that will lead him inevitably into the groove of Anyathakhyati73. Moreover, the Prabhakara may easily be thrust into the horns of a dilemma. If 'bhedagraha' be the eause of inference, then, on grounds of non-cognition of difference from what has smoke pervaded by fire, there will be inference of fire in a lake and this inference will be nothing but anyathakhyati. If, however, to avoid thls contingency, he assumes qualified cognition as the cause, then he is compelled through the exigencies of inference to assume the inferential cognition of smoke as pervaded by fire in a red-hot iron-ball,. thus leading again to anyathakhyati. So, the neo-logician. concludes that the Prabhakara position is unsound and that anyathakhyati is proved by perception itself. For, the invalid cognition of the zinc-silver after recantation gives rise to the after-cognition "I took the piece of zinc as characterised by silver-ness 74. A certain section of neo-logicians finds fault with 'jnana -- laksana pratyasatti' in this context and holds instead that defect (dosa) itself may serve as the requisite contact between the sense and the object7 5. These scholars thus endeavour to rule out the supranormal cognitional contact which involves prolixity of hypothesis and is too unrealistic to be grafted on the realistic: gystem of Nyaya. But, this hypothesis of supposedly omnipotent. dosa, which evinces the growing influence of the Advaita doctrine of Ajñana to which it may favourably be likened, again makes the neo-logician weigh anchor from the realistic moorings of their system and yields the palm to the queer suspension of

73. "Kiñca yatra rauga-rajatayorime rajate rauge vā iti jřanam jatam, tatra na Kāraņa-bādho'pi. Apica yatra rauga-rajatayoh ime rajata-range iti jnanam tatra ubhayatra pravrtti-nivrttī syatam. Rauge rauga-bheda -. grahe rajate rajata-bhedagrahe' nyatha-khyāti-bhayāt" (Pp. 238-239, Ibid). 74. "Kincānumitim parti bhedāgrahasya hetutve jala-hrade vahni- vyapya-dhumavad-bhedagrahat auumitiḥ nirabadha. Yadi ca visista-jnanam karanam tada ayogolake Vahni-vyapya-dhumajnanam anumityanurodhat. apatitam. Seyam ubhayatahpasa rajjuḥ. Itthaoca anyathakhyatan. pratyaksam eva pramanam. Raugam rajatatayā avedisam ityanubhavāt iti samksepah". (pp. 239-240, Ibid.) 75. Cf. "Na ca dosa eva pratyasattirastu iti vacyam". (P. 219,. Tattvanu. On Ad. Cin. Kau of Mahadevananda Sarasvatī). Also "Na ca dosa eva pratyasattih" (p. 17, Ad. Cin. of Raugojī Bhatta).

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reason in explaining experience. Be that as it may, the neo- logicians make the most of the argument of simplicity of hypo- thesis and take infinite pains to prove that the theories of the Prabhakaras and the Advaitins are fraught with the incorrigible defect of prolixity of hypothesis and are therefore doomed to damnation7c. In brief, the neo-logician thinks that the nacre- silver is an 'upanita-bhana' object cognised through the normal and the supra-normal contacts operating simultaneously. The supra-normal contact, however, has to function in co-operatian with the organ of sense in action 7 7. Hence, there is no question really of simultaneity at all since the two functions are integrated into a complex whole. Now, let us present the arguments that have been put for- ward by the scholars of the rival schools against this theory. At the outset it may be pointed out that even in this theory recollection has an important and decisive role to play. Indeed, when the Prabhakara points out that the Nyaya theory also makes room for two distinct cognitions whose unrelatedness remains uncognised and that it makes room for pramusta-tatta- kasmrti' also, the neo-logician cannot justfiably say anything to the contrary. For, his 'jnana-laksana-sannikarsa' presupposes recollection and that, again, the perception of, say, the nacre as 'this'. Hence, he practically assumes a third unitary cognition as discussed in the previous chapter and as upheld also by Jayanta, though he, unlike Jayanta, studiously avoids calling it a mental cognition. Many scholars of the Advaita and other schools object to the postulation of Jnana-Laksana pratyasatti by the neo-logician. They, to start with, point out that such a postulation dislodges Inference from its position and confiscates its pasture outright. For, every case of inference may be explained by perception with

76. Vide Nyaya-Kaustubha of Mahadeva, Pp. 89-94. 77. "Ayam ca jnana.laksanah sannikarsa, şadindriya-sahakārī iti sampradaya-vida ahuh, Manasa eva sahakarī iti sula-pani-miśrah amany- anta". (p. 9, Tarka-kaumudi of laugāksi Bhāskara.) So, Sūlapāni differs and affiliates it to the mind. 73. Cf. "Tvanmate' pi visista-vaisiśtya-gocara-janya-prataksasya viśesaņa- tāvacchedaka-prakāraka-jūānādi-janyatvena anuvyavasāyasya ca vyavasāya- rūpa-visaya-janyatvena trtiya-ksanadaveva tadrsanubhavasya sambhavat" (Pp. 3-4, Ad. Si. Vid.)

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the aid of this supra-normal contact79. The neo-logician might argue that he does in no way rule out the scope of inference .. For, he does not hold that every cognition necessarily serves as a supra-normal contact to yield supra-normal perception ; on the contrary, he maintains that when a cognition brings in its wake a perception devoid of any normal sense-object contact, that cognition itself is taken by him to be a supra-normal kind of contact giving rise to perception. But, this subterfuge does not help the neo-logician very much. For, if he, as a realist, lays particular emphasis on and holds fast to the psychological peculiarity of the invalid experience, he must consistently do it as a whole. That is to say, he must not only aver that the- experience is a perception, but also that it is a normal kind of perception arrived through normal sense-object contact. But, he neglects these two aspects of the psychological fact about invalid cognition and his tenacity to stick to the aspect of perceptuality seems, therefore, unreasonable. Hence his assum- ption of supra-normal contact is unfounded and all the more unreasonable. Moreover, the neologician cannot establish any causal relation between this supra-normal contact and perception. For, if there be any, this contact would generate perception everywhere, leaving no room for inference to operate. And in the absence of any causal relation, the supra-normal contact will be an unjustified assumption. Hence, this contact, which has been assumed on seeming grounds of anyathanupatti, turns. out to be a hollow platitude.

Granting, however, for argument's sake, this kind of supra- normal contact, the Advaitins argue that a cognition may serve,. if at all, as a contact only when it is presented in its original characterisation. But, a silver has never been experienced. before as characterised by a nacre. Henee its cognition cannot serve as a supra-normal contact to generate the cognition of a

79. "Evam tarhi jñanam eva sannikarso' stu iti cenna : ati-pra -- sangat". (P. 218, Tattvanu. on Ad. Cin. Kau). Also "Na ca rajatanubhava-janyah samskarab smrtīrvā pratyasattiḥ, Tatha sati vahnyanubhava-janya-samskara-smrtyoh parāmarsasya va sattvena parvato vahnimān iti pratyaksa-prasangāt. Na cānu-miti-sāmagryā tat -- pratibandhaḥ -...... Samane visaye pratyaksa-samagryah prabalatvāt". (Pp- 21-22, Bra. Vi. Bha.).

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nacre-silvcrgo. Moreover, Mahadevananda points out that the cognition arrived at through such supra-normal contact cannot be called perception. For, if contact between the sense and the substantive (i.e. the 'this' in 'this is siver') be assumed te be the cause of perception, that will lead to prolixity of assumption. So, the contact between the sense and the object as a whole must be assumed to be the cause, which would then include contact with the 'visesana' also. But, since the object of error is an elsewhere entity, it can have no contact with the sense and, as a result, the cognition cannot be yielded by perception9 1. If, however, 'dosa' is taken to be the requisite contact, the invalid inference will have no scope anywhere ("Dosasya Prat- yasattitve bhramanumityuccheda-prasangat"-P. 47, Ad. Cin.). Besides, such an assumption would be prejudicial to the theory of alter-invalidity of knowledge as accepted by the Naiyayikas ; for, dosa becomes included, then, in the aggregate of causes of cognition and its invalidity will nolonger depend upon anything outside the aggregate of causess 2.

Then, again, this neo-logician's theory suffers damnably from , the double peychological inconsistency in assuming the silver being perceived elsewhere through the supra-normal contact and yet being present here. Moreover, his theory suffers from the logical inconsistency of not affirming any relation between, say, the silver and the 'this' in the absence of which the two relata can never be related to form a unitary whole. He must assume that there is 'tadatmya' between the silver and the 'this'.

80. "Apica yatra yadanubhavah tatra vā yad-avacchedena yasyānub- havaḥ, tadavacchedakavattayā upasthite vā samskārā-derupanayatvam. Suktau tu rajatatvam prau nanubhutam. Napi sukti-gatedantvavacchedena iti Katham tatropanīyeta". (P. 22, Bra. Vi. Bha). Also "Kinca yadavacchedena etc." (P. 219, Tattvanu.). Also "Samskara-Laksana pratyasattih rajatatve' pi astītī cenna. Pūrvānubhūta-rajata-tādātmyasya samskārabhavat Ukta-doșa-tādavas- thyat" (P. 559, Kha. Kha. Khã.), 81. "Kinca visesyendriya-sannikarsatvena Kāraņatve gauravāt vișayen- driya-sannikarşatvena tad vūcyam etc." (Ibid.) 82. " ...... aprāmānyasya paratastvam api lupyeta, dosasya pratyāsatti- tayā juāna-sāmanya-samagrī-pravistatvena apramāyah tadatirikta-kāraņa- janyatvābhāvāt". (P. 47, Ad. Cin).

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And this 'tadatmya' must either come into being heress, or else must somehow appear though non-existent. In the first alter- native, he should rather assume the origin of the silver also in the 'this' ; in the second alternative, however, he has to accept the relation as 'asat' and thus swallow the humble pie. But, a few neo-logicians assert that even this relation is an elsewhere existent which is uprooted and transplanted wholesale along with the elsewhere silver upon the 'this'g4, According to Gangesa, the adjectival part of the invalid cognition is certainly existent, but its relation with the substantive (i.e. the relation of, say, rajatatva with the 'this' of nacre) is, though non-existent, not apprehended as such at all34a. On this Vyasatirtha argues that this position of the neo-logician implies that the invalidity and its correction have nothing to do with this 'Vaisistya' (i.e. relation), but only with the Visesana, which is 'sat' to them-an absurd position (Kinca yadvai-sityamasat na tadarse tvan- mate badhah tat-prayukta-bhramatvamn va sambhavati etc." (P. 171, Ta. Ta. of Vyasatīrtha).

Here, then, arises the question how the neo-logician arrives at the assumption of an elsewhere existent silver. This matter has been impugned already while refuting the Bhatta theory. In brief, it may be stated that neither the invalid cognition nor the recanting cognition warrants such an assumption. More- over, a nacre-silver may be existent, if at all, in the locus of the nacre and nowhere else. But, if it be existent in the locus of the nacre, it cannot then be repudiated. So, the nacre-silver is not 'sat', but, since it appears, it cannot be even 'asat'. Hence, it is anirvacaniya-thus the Advaitin would argue.

Vimuktatman then asserts that 'anyathatva' of cognition is not at all a psychological concept. A cognition can by no means appear as an otherwise cognition. So, anyathakhyati,

83. "Yenāpi hi deśāntara-stham rajatam bhasata ityucyate, tenāpi śukti-rajatobhaya-nirupitam tadātmyam atraiva utpadyate ityavaśyam abhypeyam". (P. 22, Bra. Vi. Bha). 84. Vide, Gadadharī on Pratyaksa-khaņda of Tc. 84a. Also Cf. "Api ca tvanmate bhrame' pi yasminnamse bhramatvam tad rajatatvādikam visesanam sadeva. Vaišiş.yain tu asadapi asat- Khyati-bhītasya tava mate na bhati". (P. 170. Ta. Ta. of Vyasatīrtha. Here 'tvat' refere to Gaugesa.

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to say the least, is as untenable as the statement 'my mother is barren 95. Neither is 'anyathatva' logically ascertainable. For, the neo-logician cannot assuredly define what he factually means by 'anyathutva'. Thus, is it a new emergence (arambhah), or transformaticn, or a special kind of identity-in-difference ? And, again, in regard to these alternatives, it may be asked whether they pertain to a qualified substantive i.e. a qualificand, or a mere adjunct, or a mere substantives6. Now, if they be affirmed of the qualificand, then from the nacre in contact would emerge the silver even like the emergence of a jar from clay, or the nacre would be transformed into silver in the manner of milk being transformed into curd ; or again, it would comprise silver- ness even as a bar of iron assumes the nature of gold through its contact with the philosopher's stone. And then the silver would persist as such and its cognition would also be valid. If the adjunct gives rise to a new emergence or transforms itself, then, nacreness, for example, would turn out to be a substantive and would be relieved of its genus-ness. Again, if the adjunct lends itself to 'tadatmya', the supposition suffers from the additional defect of the cause of 'tadatmya' being indescribable. The other alternative of a mere substantive giving rise to a new emergence etc. does not hold good ; for, in that case also the cognition of the nacre-silver type would be valid and even after the perception of the specific properties of, say, a nacre, the silver would continue to be apprehended8 7. That the concept of anyathatva is utterly illogical may be demonstrated in a slightly different manner also. For, does this anyathatva appertain to cognition or to its effect, or to the cognitum ? The first alternative is extremely hollow. For, it means that a cognition having the form of silver depends upon

85. "Yanna khyāti natat khyāti yat khyāti na tadanyathā/ Anyatha-khyati-gīstasman mata bandhya mametivat//" (SI. 116, Ch. III, IS.) 86. "Kimidam anyathātvam nāma ārambho vipariņāma tādātmya- viśeso vā ? So'pi viśistasya vā viśesyasya veti?" (P. 122, Khyātivādaḥ of Purușottama). 87. "Samprayuktasya śuktyadeh mrdo ghatasyeva rajatasya ārambhe dugdhasya dadhirūpeņeva rajatākārena pariņāme vā lohādīnām sparsamaņi- sparśe etc." (Ibid). 13

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a nacre as the external object occasioning it. But, the nacre cannot serve as an 'alambana' either by investing the cognition with its form or by becoming the object of conation prompted by cognition. The first alternative is absurd. The second alternative will lead to the assumption of scimitar, javelin, bow etc. as 'alambana' of tiger-cognition, since these weapons are objects of conation prompted by the sight of a tiger8. Anyathatva can neither appertain to the effeet of cognition. For, the effect of cognition is revelation which is the same in all cognitions, valid or invalids9. The other alternative has already been disposed of. So, anyathukhyati is not easily ascertainable, o. Furthermore, the neo-logician can hardly account for the mutual confusion of synchronous objects like 'ranga' and rajata'9 1. Brahmananda in his Advaita-siddhanta-vidyotanam takes great pains to show that the nyaya theory hopelessly suffers from the charge of gaurava and that the advaita theory has the addi- tional merit of laghava92. [Incidentally, I beg to submit that the argument based on Laghava ('Simplicity of hypothesis') and Gaurava ('Prolixity of hypothesis') has only a tentative probative : value and that also only when it is kept within certain limits. Beyond that limit it becomes a fantastic nonsense which weakens the fibre of philosophical thought and ushers in an age of deca- dence. The hey-day of scholastic Navya Nyaya was also an age of despair in this sense. This age gave progressive prominence to this argument of Laghava and Gaurava and reduced philosophic disquisitions to a vagrant series of Laghava Tarkas. The preced- ing age was refreshingly an age of 'anyathanupapatti' which may be said to have roughly begun from the time of Srīharsa. It is with this caustic attitude towards such casuistry of Laghava Tarka which opened up wild carnivals of fantastic hypotheses

88. "Kim juane' nyathatvam, Kimva phale, uta vastuni. Nadyah. Rajatākāra-ji.ānam suktim ālambate iti hi jňāne' nyathātvam vācyam. Tatra sukteraiam-banatvari nama etc." (VPS., P. 206, Vasumati ed.). 89. "Napi phale' nyathatvam. Phalasya sphuranasya bhrāntau samyag- jñane vā svarūpato vaisamyādarsanat". (Pp. 206-207, Ibid). 90. "Tasman nanyathakhyati sunirupā" (P. 207 Ibid), 91. Vide As., P. 647, NSP. 92. Vide P. 7 et seq.

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that I disengage myself from the task of presenting here such arguments of Brahmananda against Anyathakhyatigsl. Finally, it may be pointed out that the neo-logician defines 'aprama' as 'tad-abhavavati tat-prakara-katn juanah bhrama ityarthah' (P. 299, Sid. Mu. Kunjabihari's ed.), but, actuated by sectarian zeal, shuts out the inevitable logical deduction from it, For, 'tad-abhava-vati' as opposed to 'tadvati' occurring in the detinition of Prama, definitely affirms the absence or non- existence of, say, a silver in a nacre (or more properly in a 'this') ; but, this logical fact of non-existence is dishonestly smuggled off from the field of discourse. And this non-existence is made into existence through the wanton assumption of the 'jñana-laksana pratyasatti'. Even here the logician takes no note of the logical predicament of affirming non-existence and existence at the same time in an identical locus. Moreover, if 'tad-abhava-van' becomes 'tadvan' through the supra-normal contact, why should the invalid experience be at all damned as such ? For, in the ultimate analysis, it also turns out to be 'tadvati tat-prakarakami jnanam'. Evidently, the blame must be laid at the door of the supra-normal contact which would thus appear to be suspect to the extent of being completely abandoned. Thus, it becomes crystal-clear that the neo-logician intends to deliver us goods of realism aboard a chariot whose wheels are unrealistic with the result that his realism has to face the grim realism of wallowing in the azure dust of fantasy. His inordinate realism paradoxically leads him to unrealistic pastures. His theory is at best a lcgical appraisal of a psychological fact sprayed with an ontolegical effervescence from a safe distance.

The Madhva dualists, however, are fully alive to these charges made out against such types of Anyathakhyati and refuse to accept any of the variants discussed above. They, on their part, offer a new kind of Anyathakhyati which generally goes by the name of 'sad-uparaktasat-khyati'. Finding fault with all other kinds of Anyathakhyati except their own, they point out that all those kinds are fraught with logical inconsistencies on divers counts. For, Anyathakhyati cannot mean the apprehension

93. The refrain of Brahmananda's arguments in the presently referred book is 'mama tu laghavam, tava tu gauravam' which makes one wonder if 'laghava' is the index of truth and reality.

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of a transmuted entity. Because, that would render the cognition of all evolved entities like a pitcher invalid. Moreover, if this transformation be without a cause, it would not be occasional. If it has a cause in the shape of defective organ or organic defect, then the silver, for example, should be apprehended by all and sundry even after the removal of the defect ; for, the destruction or absence of an efficient cause does in no way spell disaster for the effect. Nor is it reasonable to explain Anyatha- khyati as signifying the apprehension of an entity in terms of another entity. For, is this entitative otherness real or unreal ? The first alternative rules out both illusion and its recantation and leads to the unwelcome contingency of everything being apprehended by anyone as every other thing. If, however, it be unreal, it cannot be apprehended and if it be said to be apprehen- sible, it's no use taking the silver of the nacre-silver judgment as real. Nor, again, can it mean a cognition invested with a different form. For, even a valid cognition has a form different from that of the object in this that the former is internal, while the latter is external. Neither can it mean a cognition exhibiting one form, while depending upon a different one as the external cognitum ; for, it is plainly self-contradictory 9 3. What, then, is an illusion according to the Madhvas ? It is avowedly anyathakhyati ("Anyatha-vijnanam eva bhrantih"- Pramaņa-paddhati of Jaya-tīrtha) ; but it has a new ring all about it. This anyathakhyati is to be defined as a cognition that males into its object something in terms of some other thing ("Anyad anyatmana vişayīkurvad jnānam anyathākhyatirityan- gikarat" NS.). In an illusion the non-existent appears as existent and the existent as non-existent. It may be asked here whether the 'anyasya anyatmata' is real or unreal. Jayatirtha promptly replies that it is unreal and hence the predicate of an invalid judg- ment, say, a silver, is unreal. That the silver is unreal is clearly demonstrated by the recanting cognition to the effect "asadeva rajatam pratyabhat" and no one has any right to minimise the importance of this recanting cognition. So, what occurs in an invalid cognition of the type of nacre-silver is that the defective organ, aided by the manifest impression of silver, gives rise to a

93. "Yadi tāvad anyatha pariņate vastuni khyatih anyatha-khyātiņ etc." NS

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cognition which apprehends in terms of the totally non-existent silver the 'this' of the nacre with which it is in contact,. The Madhva does not accept the external object as the immediate cause of a cognition ; instead he avers that the sense-object intercourse is the immediate cause of it ("Na saksat sakşatkaram prati kiranatvam arthasya, kintu indriya-sanni-karsasyaiva" NS.). So, according to the Madhva, there being no sense-contact with the non-existent silver, the nacre is the external object ('visaya) of the invalid nacre-silver cognition and this nacre itself appears as the silver which is an utter naught. The M.idhva does not accept that an object of knowledge is that which somehow affects its production ("Nanu janakasyaiva sakşāt-kāri-pratyaya- vişayatva n drstm ...... Maivam" NS.). On the contrary, he holds that a cognition has for its object ('visaya') that in contact with which the organ produces it ("yad-vijnana n yat-sannikrsta- karaņena janyate sa tasya vişaya ityangīkarāt" NS). If it is urged that it is flagrant contradiction to hold that the silver- cognition has the nacre as its visaya, the Madhva would burst forth into a derisive chuckle. For, to him the 'silver-cognition' means 'the cognition exhibiting silverness' and, as such, the cognition apprehends the very nacre in a different form. If it still be urged that the silver must have some kind of objectivity ('drsyata'), the Midhva would argue that it has only a semblance of objectivity, which has no relation with the subject ('paksa') of the judgment. In fact, it has a semblance of objectivity only by way of its superimposition and not as 'phala-vyapya', or 'Vrttivyapva'95. In reality, as Jayatirtha emphatically says, the nacre-silver cognition and the like are apprehended either as auto-illuminative presentations or as being intuited by the Saksin even like a normal, valid cognition ("Puro-vartini rajate idam iti Visista-vişayam ekam eva vijnanam Sva-prakaatayaiva va

94. " ...... udbuddha-rupya-samskāra-sacivam dustendriyam sannikrstam śuktīdamamsam atyantāsad-rupyātmanā grhņāti ityanyathākhyātireva yuktā' (P. 423, NM., Vol. II).

95. "Nanu tarhyapi rajate' sti Kathañcid drśyateti. cenna. Tasya drśyatvabhāsatvāt. Tādrśasya pakse' nanvayāt; Kiñca rajatasya phala- vyāpyatayā vrtti-vyāpyatayā vā drsyatvam ? Nobhayam api, adhyastatayaiva tat-siddhyabhyupagamat". (Vadavalī of Jayatīrtha) p. 42.

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manasa-pratyaksataya va saksiņa va avabhasate. Tathedamapi" NS.)96. Is then the predicate of an invalid judgment always unreal ? It is not, says Jayatirtha. Where the illusion is 'sopadhika' i.e. where the superimposed entity is contiguous to the locus of superimposition, only the identity between the two is unreal. But, in cases of 'nirupadhika bhrama' like the nacre-silver, the rope-serpent etc. (which are much unlike the yellow conchshell, the red crystal etc.), both the identity and the superimposed entity are equally unreal9 7. But, the Madhva logician has. to prove that a non-existent may be apprehended. Not only that; he must prove that it may be apprehended immediately. Jayatirtha instantly rises equal to the occasion and says that the fact that we have knowledge of past events and refer things to past persons (as for example, 'Kurunam Ksetram', 'Guruņam tīka' etc.) proves indubitably that an 'asat' is amenable to mediate apprehension. But, that it is capable of immediate apprehension also may be proved by the following reasoning :- Is the apprehension of 'asat' as 'sat' denied by the opponent ? It cannot be ; for, then one has to give up all talk of error and illusion. If, however, the apprehension of 'asat' as 'asat' is denied, all usage of 'asat' will have to be given up 98. To put the arguments of Jayatirtha in a nutshell :- The Advaitist, whatever course he might adopt, cannot avoid accept- ing immediate apprehension of 'asat'. The illusory cognition it- self proves it. For, at the time of an illusory cognition, the Advaitist certainly does not apprehend the indescribable silver as such, but as an empiric silver. But, this empiric silver is assuredly denied in the nacre by him. So, he has immediate apprehension of an empiric silver which is non-existent in the nacre. Hence, immediate awareness of 'asat' is sanctioned by logic and by

96. The Madhva does not subscribe to the Advaitic scheme of 'phala- vyapyatva' and 'vrt!i-vyapyatva'. As Madhva himself says; "Sudrdo niścayo yatra jneyam tat sāksi-darsanam" and "yat kvacid vyabhicāri syād darsanam manasam hi tat" (quoted in TT., P. 120). 97. "Tat kim sarvatraropyam atyantasadeva etc." (NS). 98. "Asatcenna pratīyeta ityatra asato'sattvena pratītiḥ nisidhyate sattvena vā. Adye' sad-vyavahāra-prasaugaḥ; Dvitiye bhrānti-vyavahāra- lopa-prasangah (Vādāvalī, P. 10).

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experience. So, our experience itself proves that illusion is anyathakhyati in which the predicate of the illusory judgment is 'asat'. The word 'anyatha' in the Madhva Anyathakhyati means 'improper', 'inapposite' ("Vijnatasya anyatha asamyag vijnanam ... .'NS). To explain, the relation between the 'this' of nacre and the silverness, or that between the silver and 'thisness' is 'anyathatva' ("Tatra yad anyathatvam suktikedamamsasya rajatatva-sarnsargo rajatasya idantasamsargah ...... "NS). This anyathatva is due to the defective organ, its defects being of various types like jaundice, cataract, distance etc. Similarity also serves as a defect even like cataract etc. ("sadrsyan tu kacadivad dosataya upayujyate" "NS). Hence, R. Nagaraja Sarma is definitely wrong when he says that in an illusion there is nothing wrong with the sensory stimuli, the sensory mechanism and the afferent and the efferent nervous tracts, but 'the incoming stimuli are wrongly interpreted' (Reign of Realism). Nor does Dr. M. N. Sircar fare any the better when he says that, according to Madhva, "falsity consists in wrong localisa- tion, and the localisation is due to defective vision". (P. 81, Comparative Studies in Vedantism). For, it clearly smacks of the Nyaya theory which assumes the superimposed entity to be an elsewhere entity and in which the recantation ought to be logically of the form 'The silver is there, not here'. Madhva certainly declares in quite unambiguous terms that there can be no error or illusion ('nirupadhika' of course) without two real and similar objects ("Ato na kutrapi sadrsa-satya-vastu-dvayam vina bhramah" Tattva-nirnayah). A hare's horn, as Jayatīrtha says, is nowhere superimposed. But, this reality serves merely as a background of superimposition and can in no way influence the ontological status of the nacre-silver. For, an elsewhere existence of silver does in no way help its apprehension in the nacre ("Na hi anyatra sattvam atra pratīteḥ upakāri". NS.). Nor does this elsewhere existence follow from the illusory cognition or the subsequent recanting cognition. Hence, though the silver be existent elsewhere, this fact is out of bounds for tle invalid cognition, and the nacre-silver must be taken as unreal and imaginary, while recantation as absolute negation should mean the rejection of this absolute unreality. In other words, absolute negation here would be the negation of a sheer nothing.

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Thus, while the nacre-silver has psychological reality (for,. it is apprehended as real), its ontological reality is denied outright by the Madhva. It thus appears-and this matter has been emphasised by Jayatirtha time and again-that the Maidhva makes room also for Anyatha-khyati as a psychological pheno- menon. This theory is called sad-uparaktasatkhyati' to demarcate it from the Buddhist Asat-khyati which denies both the subject and the predicate of the invalid judgment. This denomination is explained as the apprehension of the non-existent in the locus of the existent (or as supported by the existent). But, it seems better to explain it as the apprehension of the non-existent as determined (or literally 'tinged') by the existent. For, the word 'upa-ranjaka' means in philosophy an adjunct which need not have any excluding implication ('vyavrtti') to both the contending parties at the same time. The 'uparañjaka' 'sat' here is the silver itself, for example, as an elsewhere existent or as a psychological existent within the domain of the invalid experience itself.

But with regard to dream-cognitions the Madhvas entertain an altogether different notion. To them, dreams, which are as a rule substrate-less, are real. Dreams i.e. dream-objects are created and are destroyed afterwards. They enjoy a very short. span of life even like the lightning and so have no chance of being cognised before and after the actual occurrence of dreams. The material cause of these dream-objects is 'vasana' (i.e. appetencies and aversions) which is supra-sensuous and as such it cannot be perceived after the end of dream. The efficient causes of dreams are adrsta (unseen desert), God and the like9 9. So, according to the Madhvaites, dreams are real and are created by God from the materials of 'Vasana' in accordance with the merit or demerit of the individual experient.

The Madhva theory makes an improvement upon the other theories at least in two respects ; first, it has the candour to accept an element of Asat-khyati as a fundamental basis of invalidity. Secondly, it tries to ascertain the exact 'visaya' of an invalid cognition. But, it has its drawbacks too. It puts greater emphasis upon the recanting cognition of the form

99. "Tesam satyatvat ...... utpatti-vinasangīkarat etc." (Vadāvali, P. 76)

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asadeva rajatam atrabhat' (which form may perchance be a subject for controversy) than upon the form of the original invalid cognition. But, as cognitions, both of them should logically enjoy an eqnal status. If it is argued that logie itself dictates that the contradicting cognition should naturally hold sway over the previous cognition, how will one decide the issue when there is recrudescence of the previous cognition by way of recantation of the recanting cognition ? Hence, if he chooses to be guided by experience, the silver, for example, should have to be taken by him to be both 'sat' and 'Asat' at the first instance which may subsequently be given a coherent shape through reason. Moreover, we are to scrutinise why the Madhva calls the silver of the nacre-silver cognition an 'asat'. Certainly, a silver is not on a par with a hare's horn etc., according to the Madhva, in matters of reality or unreality ; nor does he accept any degree of reality or unreality. Still, he calls this silver an 'atyantasat', thus relegating it to the realm of the non-existent hare's horn etc. The fact of the matter is that the Madhva does not take the silver here as divorced from the complex situation of the nacre-silver, but as an integral part of the situation. In other words, the silver here means the silver in the locus of the nacre and such a silver is certainly nowhere existent. But, in deference to the same course of reasoning, it may be said that the nacre also as the locus of silver or silverness is nowhere existent and as such 'asat' ; for, it also is an equally integral part of the complex experience. Hence, if the silver be 'asat', the nacre also (or the 'this') is 'asat'. For, the nacre-silver is but the silver-nacre turned upside down. Then, if the silver be 'asat', does not this unreality prejudice the reality of the world and make it suspect ? For, the world-experience may very well be explained as a complex cognition in which the world appears in the locus of God or Brahman, that is 'Sat', and is an utter naught as a superim- posed entity even like the nacre-silver. As the background of this superimposition, in conformity with the Madhva postulate "Ato na Kutrapi sadrsa-satya-vastu-dvayam vinā bhramaḥ" (tattvanirnayah), the world may be taken as real, not in its superimposed character, but as a potency of Brahman, whether it be called Maya or something else. So the Madhva theory

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ultimately seems to lead to the abandonment of the dualistic philosophy and of the inviolable reality of the world to which the Madhvas are inalienably wedded. But, the Madhva exposition of dreams itself is an open challenge to his theory of illusion which, in all logical fairness, is thrown overboard by it. For, if God can create momentary dream-objects out of 'vasana' of individuals in accordance with their desert, there is no reason why he should fail in creating a nacre-silver etc. in the same manner. So, if dream-objects are real, a nacre-silver also must be real. The Madhva cannot take the plea that he calls dream-objects real only on the authority of scriptures. For, he explains the scriptural position with arguments which are equally applicable to the nacre-silver etc. The 'dream-cosmology' may very well be brought to bear upon the nacre-silver experience. To argue still that dream- objects are real, while the nacre-sllver is not is to fancy con- tradictory effects from the same cause and thus to cast causality asunder. So, the Madhva brand of Anyatha-khyati too has to give way before logical scrutiny and the holocaust of reason spares it mot a life of security and integrity.

CHAPTER XIV

ANIRVACANIYA-KHYĀTI

Now, we shall deal with the theory that steers a middle course between satkhyati and Asat-khyati,-or better a dialectical synthesis of the two extremes with a negative predication-, that discards the psychological being with the help of logical being and finally casts the latter aside with the logic of illogicality (Cf. the Concept of Maya)-the theory of Anirvacaniya-khyati. The theory is fathered upon the great Samkara, the illustrious protago- nist of the Advaita school of vedanta. In his brilliant Adhyasa- bhasya Sa nkara offers his own definition of adhyasa, or, in other words, of Error, besides recording other definitions given by his predecessors belonging to different schools of thought. And his scholiasts come forward with their never-failing, illuminative exegsis to demonstrate that Samkara upholds the theory of Anirvacanīya-khyati. 1f Samkara ever held such a view, particularly in the full-blooded form in which it has been passing current since a century or so after him, is extremely doubtful. But, his followers nevertheless try to logically deduce the theory from his writings. This endeavour of theirs gives rise to different sub-schools within the Advaita discipline itself, more important of these being the Varttika sub-school, the Vivarana sub-school and the Bhamati sub-school. The essential features of the Advaita doctrine are too well- known to be recounted here. The prima donna of the Miracle play of the Advaita is Maya or Avidya, the primal and persistent nescience, the elusive nuances of whose inscrutable dance brings forth the world of phenomena on the ground of Brahman, an integer of existence-intelligence-bliss continuum. The nature of Maya is a profound puzzle which defies all logical see-saw. It is neither sat, nor Asat, neither empiric, nor metempiric and is still something positive which is the matrix and the crema- torium of the world of multiplicity. This Maya or Ajuana is not the antipodes of pure consciousness or Brahman-consciousness and may and, in fact, does co-exist with it without any prejudice to either. Indeed, its very existence is intuited by the Witness- consciousness. But, it is contradicted by Vrtti-jñana which it fights shy of. The conception of Maya as co-existing peacefully

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with pure consciousness and without violence to the basal Advaita doctrine and to the essential nature of either may seem queer .. The confusion is worse confounded when one hears that both the subject and the object of Ajnana is Brahman (as Padmapada and Praks itman hoid), or the subject is the Jiva, while the object is Brahman (Vacaspati). And the confusion reaches its zenith when it is said that Miya or Ajñana, a complex of two different potencies, screens Brahman with its first potency called 'Avarana' and, then* with its second potency called 'Viksepa', it generates the world of phenomena in the locus of Brahman. Padmapida, author of Paucapidik i, makes no distinction between Maya and Avidya ; but, Prakasitman points out in his Vivaranam that Maya has predominantly the potency of Viksepa, while Avidya has that of Avarana. Some hold that this Maya, which has an abundance of rajas, pertains to isvara, while Avidya pertains to Jīva. Vidyaranya, however, asserts that Maya has an abundance of pure sattva, while the Sattva of Avidya is dcfiled by rajas. and tamas ("Sattva-suddhyavisuddhibhya u mayavidye ca te mate" p. 9, PD). The relation between Maya and Brahman is conceived in three different ways. Some hold that Maya and Brahman entwine each other like two pieces of rope. In this. view Maya is taken as the Upadhi' of Brahman. Others hold that Maya is the potency of Brahman. Some others hold that Brahman is the ground and support of Maya, which is the material cause of the world. The material cause is of two kinds. according to the Samkarites. It may be mutative or non- mutative. The latter is called vivarta. Brahman is the non- mutative material cause of the world, while Maya is the mutative cause. Brahman as the non-mutative material cause is unquali- fied ('nirguna'), while the qualified Brahman is its efficient cause. But, Vidyaranya, who holds a slightly different view, asserts that the qualified Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe being related to the 'tamasi Maya' and 'Śuddhasattva Maya' respectively1. The Jiva-phenomenon is also explained differently by different scholars. According to the 'avaccheda' doctrine of Vacaspati,

There is really no 'then' in the process. The two functions operate simultaneously according to the Advaitins. 1. "Jagato yad upadānam māyam ādaya tamasīm/Nimittam Suddhasatt- vam tam ucyate Brahma tad-gira//" (P. 21, PD).

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the consciousness that is the seat and subject of nescience, being delimited by it ('ajñanavacchinna') is the Jiva, while the con- sciousness, that is object of nescience, is iśvara. Sureśvara, the champion of 'abhasa-vada,' holds that the consciousness qualified by the adventitious adjunct ('upadhi') of nescience is isvara, while the consciousness qualified by the Upadhi of buddhi is Jiva. Some, following abhasa-vada, hold that the sum-totality of nescience is the upadhi of iśvara, while the individual nescience is the 'upadhi' of Jiva. Sarvajnatman holds that consciousness reflected in nescience is isvara, while that in Buddhi is Jiva. Prakasatman, however, thinks that isvara is the consciousness qualified by the 'upadhi' of nescience, while Jiva is the conscious- ness reflected in nescience as delimited by the mind and its impressions. In Advaita metaphysics caitanya all-pervasive is the sole reality. Every other entity is but the fancied delimiting adjunct of caitanya. In Advaita epistemology we come across three kinds of caitanya : Vişaya-caitanya, anta-karaņa-caitanya, and vrtti-caitanya. These are otherwise known as Prameya-caitanya, Pramatr-caitanya and Pramana-caitanya. The bare perception or sensation of an object involves the identification of the visaya- caitanya with the pramana-caitanya. But, the perception of the object as object involves further the identification of the latter with the Pramatr-caitanya. An apperception or anu-vyavasaya of Nyaya further involves the identification of the pramatr- caitanya with the Saksi-caitanya, which is the caitanya having ajñana or (according to some) antah-karana as the 'upadhi' (as distinguished from 'visesana') (Cf. "Ghato'yam ityasāvukti-rāb- hāsasya prasādataḥ/Vijñāto ghata ityuktirbrahma-nugrahato bha- vet//P. 278, PD). The perceptual character of a cognition does not depend on its sensuousness, but on its immediacy which is achieved by the identification of the visaya-caitanya with the Pramana-caitanya2. Every perception is ontologically the perception of caitanya. (Cf. "Sarva-pratyaya-vedye'smin Brahma- rupe vyavasthite" quoted in khyativada of S.C. Bhāratī). The Samkarites advocate that the criterion of truth is

2. "Nahīndriya-janyatvena jñānasya sāksāttvam, anu-mityaderapi mano- janyatayā sāksāttvāpatteņ ...... kim jnāna-gatasya pratyaksatvasya prayojakam prcchasi, kim vā vişaya-gatasya ? Adye pramāna-caitanyasya visaya-caita- nyabheda iti brumah". (Ve. Pa., Pp. 41 & 44, Cal. Uni. ed.).

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non-contradiction (Cf. "Satyatvain badha-rahityam" PD. P. 78). What is contradicted cannot be sat', and whatever is 'sat' can never be contradicted whether in the past, the present or in the future. Brahman, which knows no lapse or contradiction, is the only 'sat'. The sky-ilower, a barren woman's son and the like are never immediately apprehended (though apprehended. mediately through words) and as such may be said to be eternally contradicated and so 'asat'. But, these two together do not exhaust the province of discourse ; albeit, they are not contradi- ctory, but only contrary. For, there are entities that are cognised, but subsequently contradicted. That they are cognised. is undeniable and so the Advaitins bank upon this epistemological realism, though upholding thorough-going idealism in metaphysics. Indeed, contradiction presupposes apprehension ; and a sky- tlower is contradicted only in the sense that it contradicts all thought-activity ; it is apsychological and alogical. Hence the Advaitins maintain that there are grades of reality and that there are relative truths. Brahman is 'paramarthika sat', the world of our experience is empirically or pragmatically real. ("vyavaharika sat'), and the nacre-siiver is 'pratibhasika sat' .. Thus, we arrive at as many as four ontological categories :- Asat, paramarthika sat, vyavaharika sat and pratibhasika sat of which. the fourth one is generally called 'anirvacaniya' from which the third one is distinguished on pragmatic grounds. But, they seem. to accept another category which would be characterised as. 'sadasat'. Even beyond this they accept a sixth category-they call it the fifth-while explaining the nature of the cessation of nescience ("Na sat nasat na sadasat nanirvacyo' pi tat-ksayah" NMak.). Be that as it may, the 'anirvacaniya' is otherwise called 'mithya' by these philosophers. They iurther maintain that there are three different standpoints of assessing the reality of. this panorama of existence. From the 'laukika' or common-sense standpoint, everything is real ('vastavi'), from the 'yauktika' or logical standpoint, everything (not excluding the entities. having pragmatic reality) is 'anirvacaniya', and finally, from. the view-point of the scriptures, everything of this multiplicity is an utter naught ('tuccha')s.

3. "Tucchānirvacanīya ca vastavī cetyasau tridha/Jueyā maya tribhir- bodhaih Srauta-yauktika-laukikaib//" (PD., P. 146, Vasumati ed) Here the word 'maya' implies its evolutes also.

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The Advaita philosophers, armed with the above doctrines, put forward their theory of error called Anirvacaniya-khyati. The one point that they fight studiously against is the general assumption of similarity being the principal cause of super- imposition and error. This serves as the negative background of their theory of error ; for, if they can dislodge similarity from its proud position of glory, where it has been installed by many of the rival philosophers, they can, on that very account, discredit ontological Anyathakhyati almost to its perdition. So, they take courage in both hands to assert that similarity, or objectivity ('visayatvam'), or psycho-physical defects cannot explain unaided any illusory phenomenon. They are only ancillary factors, or, at best, efficient causes, adventitious and variable. For, it is quite clear that a 'sopadhika bhrama' like the red crystal does not necessitate the assumption of any factor of similarty for its explanation. In 'nirupadhika .bhrama' also, the Advaitins point out, similarity cannot be proved as the one indispensable, invariable antecedent. For. the cognition of similarity is a common experience which helps extension of our knowledge to unknown fields. The joint Method of Agreement and Difference, on the contrary, prove that nescience is the one indispensable material cause of any manner of error4. Hence, one is constrained to call into request Maya with a view to accounting for error. So, the beginning-less nescience pertaining to (say) a nacre is the material cause of the nacre-silver and its cognition. ("Ata anadikasyaiva śuktyajñānasya śukti-rūpyatajjñano- pādānatā nyayyā, na tvanyasya Kasyacit". P. 56, IS. Also 'Mithyajñanameva adhyasopadanam nātmāntaḥ-karaņakācādidoșā iti sūktam". Viv., P. 12, Vizi. Skt. Se.). Thus the Advaitin sets the stage for his Anirvacaniya- khyati and then proceeds to explain the psycho-physical process which leads to an illusory cognition. The defective organ, say, the eye, has intercourse with the object, say, the nacre in front and this gives rise to a psychosis of the form of 'this' and of glitter'. Then the consciousness delimited by 'idam' ('this") is reflected in the psychosis and there occurs the immediate identity of the three grades of consciousness, namely that delimited

4. "Na vişayatvam sadrsyam vā adhyāsa-hetuh; Kintu anvaya-vyatire- kavad ajñānam etc." (P. 6., Pra. Vi., Vol. I, Cintāmaņi's ed.)

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by 'idam', that by 'vrtti' and that by the 'antahkarana' Now, the nescience in tho ground of consciousness delimited by 'idam' is perturbed through defect and, then, through the co-operation of the impression of silver awakened through the cognition of similarity, is transformed into the form of an objective silver. Simultaneously with this operation, the nescience in the ground of consciousness delimited by Vrtti becomes transformed into the Vrtti taking the form of silvers. This vrtti is not of antahkarana, but of nescience ('avidyaka- vrtti) and no intorcourse with an object is necessary for its generation. The above two transformations are revealed by the witness-consciousness and thus they are apprehended. The apprehension cf the silver is called perception because the origin of the silver is assumed to be in the locus of the Pramana- caitanya as identified with visaya-caitaya and as delimited by "idam'. This pratibhasika silver is the transformation ('parinama') of Avidya, though 'vivarta' of caitanya. It is to be noted here that this illusory silver is not made of the stuff of ordinary silver, but of the stuff of Avidya herself. The avidya in the ground of consciousness delimited by 'idam' envelopes the nacre with its potency called viksepa'. Some Advaitins, however, do not postulate any avarana-sakti' of Avidya, particularly with reference to the not-self ('Jada') group of objects and explain 'adhyasa' with the help of 'viksepa' only (cf. "Sacana jadesu vastuşu tat-svarupavabhasam pratibadhnati. p. 108, Pañ. Pa.). Also "Tadevam bhava-rupajnanam anatmanam anavrtyaiva tatra viksepa-matram janayti, atmanam tu avrtya tatraham ida n mamedam ityevam vyavahāra-yogyān adhyāsān api janayati". p. 163, VPS., Vasumati ed.). The nacre-silver does not exist before its cognition and hence it cannot serve as defining consciousness ; so, it follows that it can have no nescience enveloping it. Since then it is unenveloped, no psychosis is necessary here to remove the veil of nescience which

5. "Prathamam dosa-sahitena indriyeņa idantāmātra-visayā antaḥkara- navrttiņ janyate; tata idantāyām tad-grāhaka-vrttau ca caitanyam abhivya- jyate, taccaitanya-nisthā cāvidyā dosavaśāt samksubhnāti, tatredamamsāvacc- hinnacaitanyasthāvidya samksubhitā satī sadrsyād udbodhita-rupya-sams- kārasahāya-vasāt rūpyākāreņa vivartate. Vrttyavacchinna-caitanyasthā avidyā tu rūpya-grahi-vrtti-samskarasahakrta vrttirupena vivartate" (P. 216, VPS.) .See also Mm. A. K, Sastrin's ed. cf VP, Pp. 110-111.

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is absent in this case. The witness-consciouness reveals it with the help of Avidya-vrtti only. The Advaitin points out that, though he accepts two separate vrttis, namely idam-vrtti (or antah-karana-vrtti) and rajatakara-vrtti(or avidya-vrtti), his theory does not suffer from the defect of assuming two discrete cognitions, as the Prabhakara's does, to explain error. For, the consciousness reflected in both the vrttis is one and the same and this indivisible unity is imposed upon cognition also (" ... jñānaikyam api upacaryate" P. 217, VPS). Also "Na ca jnana-dvayangīkarad akhyati-prasamgah. Idamamsavacchinna-saksi-caitanyasyaiva adhisthāna-jñāna-phala-bhūtasya svamāyavivarta-rajatādi-siddhi- tvāt. Antaḥkaraņa-vrtti-lakșaņa-jnanadvayānan-gīkarāt." p. 64, T. Pra.). If it is asked how the illusory silver, which is in the locus of consciousness, may be in apposition with 'idam', the Advaitin says that this occurs simply because the silver is in the locus of consciousness as delimited by 'idam'. This silver, in the ultimate analysis, is superimposed upon the witness-conscious- ness ; still, one does not have the cognition of the form 'I am silver' even like 'I am happy' simply because the creation of this nacre-silver by avidya is assisted by the impression of the previous cognitions of the form 'this is silver'. The difference between the phenomenal objects and the pratibhasika objects is that the former are caused by avidya alone, while the latter are brought into being by avidya in co-operation with adventi- tious defects. Hence, the dream-objects, whose creation is facilitated by the defect in the shape of sleep, are pratibhasika. The dream-objects like the elephant, the chariot etc. are, according to some, direct transformation of Maya, while, according to others, they are transformation of Maya through the instrumentality of the psyche.

Some Advaitins are of the opinion that 'sopadhika-bhramas' are to be explained as anyathakhyati, the rest being called anirvacaniya-khyati. Thus the cognition of the red crystal, the yellow conchshell etc. may be easily explained with anyathakhyati. There is no necessity here of assuming any anirvacaniya redness or yellowness. This seems to be the view preferred by Advaitananda as it transpires from his Brahma- vidyabharaņam (cf. "Santi ca kevala-samsargādhyāsāh, yatha

14

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darpane mukhadhyasah. Tatrahi darpaņaii mukhain vā parasparam adhyasyata iti nanirvacanīya-khyatau vaktum sakyam etc." (p. 17). Indeed, some of the older Advaitins seem to advocate anyathakhyati in cases of 'sopadhika bhrama' or 'saihsargadhyasa', as it is designated by some ; but, they hardly bring the matter into limelight. In cases of paroksa- bhrama', however, it is generally accepted on all hands that the older Advaitins adhere to anyathakhyati (cf. "Siddhi-granthasya paroksa-bhramasthale pratibhasikanabhyupa-gantr-pracīna- vedanti-matabhiprayakatvat." P. 3, Nyayabhaskara-khandanam). The first writer, who categorically and positively asserts anyathakhyati, is Dharamarajadhvarindra, author of vedanta -. paribhasas. Sudarsanacarya in his Advaita-candrika7, Mm. A. K. Sastrin in his comm. on VP.s, Sri S. C. Bharati in his Khyativada, and some others stand by him in this regard. And it is refreshing to refer here to the law of pratibhasika adhyasa as laid down by Padmapada and Prakasatman to the effect that such an adhyasa always necessitates the mixing up of two grades of reality, phenomenal and illusory, or trans-cendental and phenomenal quite in consonance with Samkara's pithy remark 'satyanrte mithunikrtya'. Still through-going meta- physicians of the Advaita school such as Apyaya Dīksita in his sub-gloss Parimala10, Advitānanda in his Brahma-vidyabha- ranam (cf. "Parvato Vahniman ityanumiti-rupa-bhrame tu doşa-vasād vahnirutpadyate iti na kutrapynyathakhyātiḥ" p. 23), Brahmananda in his Advaita-siddhanta-vidyotanam (vide . Pp. 71-73) and also in his Laghu-candrika and Subrahmanya Sastrī in his Nyaya-bhaskara-khandanam refute such a position and hold fast universally to the theory of anirvacaniya-khyati.

6. "Yatraropyam asannikrstam tatraiva pratibhāsika-vastutpatte-rangi- kārāt. Ata eva indriya-sannikrstatayā japākusumagata-lauhityasya spha- tike bhanasambhavat na sphatike'nirvacaniya-lauhityotpattih" (Pp. 135- 136, VP., Cal. Uni.ed.). 7. Vide P. 38 8. Vide Paribhāsā-prakāsikā tīkā on VP., P. 136. 9. "Na ca japa-kusuma-sannidhye sphatike lauhityānyathā-khyāti- Svīkāravat etc." (P. 69, khyātivāda). 10. Cf. "Tatradarsa-mukhayoh adhāradheya-bhavasya anirvacanīyasya utpattya' nyatha-khyati-vaisamyat. Anyatha anyesu anubhuyamānāropesu ka gatiḥ" (P. 31, Mm. A, K. Sastri's ed.).

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These scholors are afraid that if once anyathakhyati is given quarter, it would eventually signal the complete doom of anirvacaniya-khyati. Their zeal in this regard is the delight of a die-hard systematizer, but the despair of realistic epistemology. Vidyaranya in his VPS. makes a searching analysis of the cognition of red crystal and concludes that the "redness" in the crystal is 'mithya'. He argues that the redness cannot be explained by assuming refraction of optical rays from the crystal towards the red flower, nor by assuming the reflection of the colour only of the flower or the pervasion of the crystal by the lustre of the flower, or new redness being generated in the crystal by that lustre. So, the redness in the crystal must be taken to be 'mithya' occasioned by the flower as 'nimitta'. (Pp. 88-91, VPS., Vol. II, Vasumatī ed.)

We have seen that the nacre-silver is, according to the Advaitin, the 'parinama' of Avidya, but the vivarta of Brahman (i.e. consciousness). But, extreme subjectivists like Prakāśānanda, who advocate drsti-srsti-vada and outright dispense with the pragmatic difference between 'vyavaharika' and 'pratibhasika', hold that the nacre-silver is a mere vivarta. A vivarta is not something beyond the substratum. For, the substratum itself, appearing in a different form, is called vivarta. If it is asked whose different form it is, Prakasananda would reply that, in fact, it belongs to no entity. If then it is redargued that this is but veiled asatkhyati, he would rejoin that the khyati itself is super-imposed because of the apprehension of something unqualified as qualified11.

Barring a few such glorious exceptions (Gaudapada is one and what else is Samkara himself ?), the Advaitins en masse accept the somehow objective existence of the illusory silver etc. in the locus of the nacre etc. in order to do justice to the perceptual character of cognition in these cases. They, therefore, speak of arthadhyasa' beside 'jnanadhyasa' (cf. "Dvividho hyadhyaso jnana-visisto'rtho'rtha-visistam jnanam ceti. p. 174, VPS., Vasumati ed.). When an entity, similar to the recollected entity,

11. "Na hi adhisthāna-svarūpātiriktam vivarto nāma kiñcid vastu asti, yadāśritya Kārtsnyaikadeśa-vikalpāvatāraḥ syāt; Kintu adhisthānam eva dosa-vaśāt vilaksaņākāreņa bhāsamānam vivarta iti ucyate" (P. 274, VSM.).

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is apprehended in something else, it is arthadbyasa. But, when there is apprehension, similar to recollection, of something as some other thing, it is jnanadhyasa (Vide. PPV., p. 22, Vizi. Skt. Se.). Though any one of these two-fold adhyasa implies the other, still the two are separately mentioned lest the definition of arthadhyasa alone be too narrow to include the other one. (vide TD., p. 162). The latter seems to be more fundamental with the older Advaitins. For, they hold that an objective existence can be vouched for only through presentation in cognition and not vice versa (Vide. PPV, p. 21)12- Some, however, explain jnanadhyasa and arthadhyasa as samsargadhyasa and svarupadhyasa respectively13. The later vedantins take long ingenious strides to assert that in the case of an adhyasa (say) of the nacre-silver type, the creation of the silver and of its cognition will not suffice ; there will also come into being 'rajata-visayatvam' and 'rajata-tadatmya-visayatvam 14. Need we call it objectivity with vengeance ?

Now, we are to understand the ontological status of the pratibhasika phenomenon from the Advaita stand-point. We have seen above that the nacre-silver etc. has a large amount of 'given-ness' and is not subsistent. But, it cannot be taken as real; for, then, no error and its subsequent recantation can find any scope. It cannot be called unreal either ; for, then again, its apprehension and subsequent reprehension become unaccountable. The Advaitin does not accept the immediate apprehension of the non-existent. He only concedes the mediate verbal cognition of the non-existent. So, it follows that if the nacre-silver be non-existent, it cannot be apprehended at all. It is, therefore, neither sat, nor asat. It can neither be sat and asat at the same time ; for, that involves contradiction. So it must be taken to be

12. But, does not Samkara hold a diametrically opposite view when he says, "Na hi tat purusa-tantram, vastutantram eva hi tat" ? (P. 595, ŚBhā. on BS,, Sri Vaņi Vilās Press). 13. Cf. "Keşucid granthesu jñānasya Brahmaņo' dhyasta-pratiyogikata- yādhyasa eva jnanadhyasa-sabdena vyavahrtah etc." (P. 66, KV. of Mr. Bharati). 14. Cf. "Na Kevalam rajatādi-bhrame jnana-rajatayoreva Utpattiriti mantavyam, visayatī api jayante" (P. 67, Ibid).

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'anirvacya', in other words, 'mithya'15. Presumption itself proves that unless the apprehended nacre-silver be taken as 'mithya', its subsequent sublation does not stand to reasonte. As we have already said, the Advaitin does not take reality and unreality as mutually contradictory, but make room for a third category in between them. This third category is 'mithyatva' and it does not appear illogical to them17. Madhusudana Sarasvatī advances an inferential evidence of the 'mithyatva' of the prati- bhasika entity1s. Thus, through various means of proof the Advaitins arrive at the conclusion that the nacre-silver etc. is mithya. And if the cognitum be 'mithya', the cognition must necessarily be 'mithya'; for, otherwise, they argue it would no longer be the cognition of that 'mithya' cognitum. (Cf. "Na hi jűeyasya anirvacanīyatve taj-jnanasya nirvacanīyatvam nyayyam, tajjnanatva-hanat jnanantaravat" IS., p.48). This 'mithyatva' pervades the whole of the universe, in the ultimate analysis, excepting Brahman, which is pure sat, and the sky- flower etc., which is pure asat. The world is the architecture of the 'mula avidya' (i.e. primal nescience), while the nacre- silver etc. is the creation of 'tula avidya' (i.e. individual nescience) which is but 'purva-purva-vibhrama-sauskara' according to Amalananda. The individual nescience is certainly temporal and has a beginning ; still, it is called beginningless because it is grounded in consciouness which is eternal19. That the whole ponorama of existence is 'mithya' is quite in the fitness of things; for, Avidya, its material cause, is 'Mithya, being 'sadasadbhyam anirvacaniya'. If it be asked, following up this logic of causality, whether the nacre-silver etc. is 'bhava-

15. Cf. "Sattve na bhranti-badhau stam nasattve khyati-badhakau etc.' (P. 47, Is.) Also "Vimatam rūpyādi saccet etc." (P. 630, AS., Nirnaya Sāgar). 16. "Drs!ārthāpattiḥ yathā suktāvidam rajatam ityanubhūyamānasya rajatasya nedam rajatam iti badhyatvam drstam tasya mithyātvam antareņa satyatve' nupapannam sat mithyatvam kalpayati" (Pp. 215-216, Ad. ci. Kau.). 17. Cf. "Gotvāsvatvayo paraspara-viraha-vyāpyatve' pi tadabhāva- yorustradau ekatra sahopalambhat" (P. 52, AS., Nirņaya sagar). 18. "Vimatam sattva-rahitatve sati asattva-rahitatve sati' sattvāsattva- rahitam, badhyatvat dosa-prayukta-bhanad va, yannaivam tannaivam, Yatha Brahma" (P. 627, Ibid.). 19. "Jñaśrayam hi tat, jñaścānādiḥ" (P, 56, IS.)

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rupam' like its matrix avidya, the Advaitins will assert that avidya also is not really 'bhavarupam' ; It is called 'bhava-rupam' only to imply its difference from 'abhava' (cf. 'Bhavatvam catra abhava-vilaksaņa-tva-mātrat vivakșitam" (p. 544, AS.). In fact, it is neither 'bhava', nor 'abhava', but is 'anirvacya' even in this regard 2 0. It is not clear, however, whether the nacre-silver etc. is 'anirvacya' not only in regard to its existence or non- existence, but also from the point of its positivity or negativity. The predication of the 'mithyatva' of both the erroneous cogni- tion and its cognitum is, however, necessary ; for, the reality of the one cannot co-exist with the 'mithyatva' of the other21.

Now, arises the important question whether this all-out 'mithyatva' is real, or 'mithya'. The question is generally raised in regard to the cosmic illusion, though it may be very reasonably extended to cover the illusions of the nacre-silver type as indicated by Madhusudana Sarasvati. The Advaitin points out, at the outset, that this question cannot reasonably arise at all inasmuch as it involves a kind of fallacious wrangle known as 'nitya-sama jati'. For, it rides roughshod over the speci- fication ('vaisistyabhanga') of the attribute of 'mithyatva' in- hering in the world. Still, the Advaitin faces the question and answers that the 'mithyatva' of tbe world as also of the nacre- silver etc. is again 'mithya' ; but, that does not make them real as somc might be deluded into thinking. What the Advaitin means to imply is that the 'mithyatva' of the world etc. has the same kind of existence as the world possesses. He does not in the least concern himself with the question whether this 'mithyatva' is sublated or not. For, it is patent that so long as the world lasts, its attribute 'mithyatva' will also last, and when it will be sublated, the latter also will be sublated. In fact,

Also "Rūpyopadanam ajnanam api anadi-caitanyaśritatvat anadyeva, udīcyam śuktyadikam tu tad-avacchedakam iti na tatravyaptiḥ" (P. 544, AS., Nirņayasagar). 20. "Avidyā bhavabhava-vilaksanam yatkincid vastu sattva-rahitatve sati asattvarahitatve sati sadasattva-rahitatvat" (Ibid.). 21. "Yathā jñeyasya satyatve nānrtam jňānam isyate/Tathā jnānasya satyatve nanrtam jneyam isyatam//Parasparanrta-tvena parasparanrtatvatab/ Ato dvayanrtatvam hi vaktavyam bhranti-rupakam//" (P. 155, Vārttika of Nārāya na Sarasvatī on SB).

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the point of the argument at bottom is that the substantive, the world, being itself 'mithya' cannot have any attribute, say 'mithyatva', which is real. So, it must also be 'mithya'. Further- more, the Advaitin argues that of two opposite attributes, the reality of one is assured by the mithyatva' of the other only when the determinant of the negation ('nisedhyatavacchedaka') does not abide in both of them. But, in the case under reference, the determinant of negation is 'drsyatva' (i.e. 'cognisability) and it abides equally in both 'satyatva' and 'mithyatva', the two opposite attributes. Hence, the negation of one does not imply the affirmation of the other. So, according to the Advaitin, the world and the nacre-silver etc. have 'mithyatva' which is 'mithya 22 . Now, we are to discuss what the Advaitin means by 'badha', what its object is and what the result of 'badha'. 'Badha' or contradiction means, as Prakasananda says, that the super- imposed entity is not,-a cognition which follows immediately in the wake of the apprehension of the substratum of super- imposition23. It is not mere negation, as is held by some, but a tri-temporal negation in its accredited locus, or, to state it more metaphysically, in its material cause2 4. Badha, which literally means contradiction, practically implies the demonstration that a certain thing has existential lapse in consciousness, that the 'what' of a cognition ceases to be predicative of its 'that'. This 'badha' may be of two kinds. The first, which is 'badha' properly so called, arises out of the direct apprehension of the substratum of what is contradicted. Through its operation the contradicted entity along with its material cause is done away with. The second, which is occasioned by a contrary psychosis or through the cessaticn of defect, is called 'nivrtti'. If the nacre-silver be taken to be the transformation of the personal nescience residing in consciousness delimited by the nacre, then the cognition of the nacre will effect the 'badha' of the silver

22. "Mithyatva-mithyatve' pi prapanca-satyatvanupapatteh.etc." (Pp. 212-213, AS., Nirņaya Sagar). 23. "Saksat-krte tvadhisthane samanantara-nisciti/Adhyasyamanam nastīti badha ityucyate budhaih" (P. 127, VSM). 24. "Badhaśca ekavacchedena svopādāne traikaliko'bhavah" (P. 19, Bra. Vì. Bha).

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along with the nescience. But, if it be taken to be the transfor- mation of the cosmic nescience, the cognition of the nacre will only bring about the cessation of the silver even like the cessation of a pitcher through cudgelling2s. Badha' par exeellence, then, reduces the apprehended entity to its substratum only 26. This 'badha' is effected by a subsequent cognition, whlch is universally called the 'badhaka-juana'. This contradicting cognition is assumed to annul the object of erroneous cognition by some, the erroneous cognition itself by others, the volition consequent upon the erroneous cognition by some others and all alike by yet other scholars. But, the Advaitin holds himself apart from all these views and asserts that a cognition can do none of these things directly. He points out that it is ludicrous to maintain that one cognition cancels another. For, then, all cognitions, arising as they do, only one at a time, will be equally both 'badhya' and 'badhaka' and as such 'invalid' and 'valid" at the same time ("Sarva-jñananam badhya-badhakatvāt bhrānty- abhrantitva-prasangah" P. 112, IS). It is, again, silly to argue that a cognition is annulled by another cognition having a contrary cognitum. For, the one clearly has no bearing upon the other. It would, however, be the height of foolishness to argue now that a cognition contradicts another cognition having a similar (or rather identical) cognitum ("Na ca bhinnarthayoḥ abhinnarthayośca jnanayoh badhya-badhaka-bhavo rūpa-rasa- jñānayo rūpa-jnānayoriva ca ityuktam". P. 134, IS). In fact, one cognition may be quite different from another in its logical import or may simply confirm another ; but it can never serve to annul another cognition. Nor does a cognition annul the cognitum of another cognition ("Na hi jnana-praptam rūpyadi jnanantaram nisedhati ...... iti matpaksah" Pp. 126-127, IS). Indeed, a contradicting cognition cannot negate an entity ; it only serves to reveal the true nature of a thing27. It can only be 'bodhaka' and never 'badhaka'. It can only remove the veil

25. "Kārya-vināso hi dvividhah-kaścid upādānena saha. Kaścit tu vidyamana eva upadane. Adyo badhah, dvitīyastu nivrttiḥ etc." (Pp. 128- 130, VP., Cal. Uni. ed.) 26. "Badhena hi ... rajatasya, ... adhisthana-matra-parisesata-sampadanat". (P. 2I, Bra. Vi. Bha.) 27. "Na hanti badha-dhīrvastu sa hi tattva-prakasika" (P. 154, IS.).

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of nescience pertaining to an unknown object and reveal it. This nescience is the logical contradictory of vrtti-jnana and the latter annuls this 'ajnana' onlyes. But, since this ajnana is the source of the illusory silver etc. and its cognition too, it may be said to cancel them indirectly 29. In this indirect manner, the contradicting cognition may be said to contradict 'vyavahara' also.

Now, arises the question as to what should be the verbal form of the contradicting judgment. The Advaitin points out that it should not be of the form (say) 'natra rajatam, kintu apanadau', or 'nedam rajata-vyavaharah' inasmuch as the existence of the silver as an elsewhere entity and the contra- diction of 'vyavahara' do not find favour with him; nor does he accept it being either 'antarajatam, na bahih', or 'asadeva rajatam pratyabhat'. He, on the contrary. maintains that the contradicting judgment may take three different verbal forms : "nedam rajatam', 'mithyaiva rajatam abhat' and 'nastyatra. rajatam'. The first form registers a negation of the anyony- abhava (i.e. numerical difference) type, while the last one of the atyantabhava type30. According to vidyaranya, the first form of negation arises with the cognition of nacre, the substratum of the illusory silver. Thereafter occurs the third form of negation, which is of a tri-tempornl character ; the second form occurs as the final stage of recantation31. The ontological difference between the first negation and the other two is that while the latter directly express the illusoriness of the silver, the former only implies it. Some Advaitins, however, are reluctant to accept the third form as a representative form of negation from the stand-point of Anirvacaniya khyati. They point out that this form cannot

28. "Tasmājjnānānām abadhya tvāt ajnānam eva badhyam ityanye paksā niryuktika iti siddham", (P, 134, Ibid.) 29. " ... ajnatam artham bodhayat jnānam tadajnānam nivartayati, tan- nivrttau ca tajjam rūpyādi nivartate tantu-nivrttāviva pata iti" (P. 127, IS). 30. "Nedam rajatam" iti vākyābhilapya-pratīteḥ anyonyābhāva-visayat- vam eva ... "Nātra rajatam" iti vākyābhilapyā tu pratītiḥ atyantābhāvavi- saya". (P. 515, AS, Vol. II, Mm. Jogendranath's ed.) 31. "Evam ca sati uttarakālīno nāstyatra rajatam iti pratyayaḥ para- mārtharajata-vişayo mithyaiva rajatam abhāt iti pratyayaśca mithya-rajata- visaya ityubhayam api upapadyate". (P. 180, VPS, Vasumatī ed.)

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maintain unity of substratum as between 'bhrama' and 'badha' ; on the contrary, it brings in difference in substratum ('Vaiya- dhikaranya) which is a positive defect 32. But, what is contradicted by the contradicting judgments stated above ? What, indeed, is the negatum of negation ? Prakasatmayati and other earlier Advaitins in general, vidyaranya not excepted, hold that the phenomenal silver is the negatum of negation ("Traikalika-nisedha i prati svarupeņa apaņastha- rupyam ... pratiyogi" Vivarana quoted in AS., P. 482, Mm. Jogendranath's ed.)33. Vidyaranya argues that such a view is not committed to the charge of negation of one that has no scope (i.e. of the unpredicated-'aprasakta-pratisedha') inasmuch as the phenomenal silver is proved to have scope here by the volitional activity of the erring percipient34. He asserts that both the first and third forms of negation negate the phenomenal silver. The second form of contradicting judgment is, however, an affirmation and it pertains to the 'illusory' silver. But, in the teeth of such a time-honoured view, Madhusudana Sarasvati asserts that the illusory silver is really the negatum of both the first and third forms of negation. He points out that the acceptance of the phenomenal silver as the negatum would lead to mutual 'hetero-locativity' ('vaiyadhikaranya') of 'bhrama' and 'badha' and to the negation of the unpredicated. Then, he, however, adopts an ingenious interpretation of the words of Prakaśatman, following citsukha, with a view to accommodating it into his view. He says that the illusory silver as apprehended in identity with the phenomenal silver is the negatum3 ;. In

32. "Anirvacanīya-khyatyapagame sāmānādhikarauyena bādhākārāsam- bhavat ... tatra rajatam iti na tvatra iti tadakarah syāt" (Ad. Br. Si., P. 179). Also "Natra rajatam iti samsarga-badha-pratītyapattesca. Na caivam drśyate". (P. 83, Vārttika of Nārāyaņa Sarasvatī). 33. Also Cf. "Taduktam Tattva-pradīpikāyām-"Tasmāt 'laukika-paramār- tharajatam eva nedam rajatam iti nisedha-pratiyogi" " (P. 515, As., Vol. II, Mm.'s ed). Also "Tasya nişedhasya loka-prasiddha-paramartha-rajata-visayatvat"'. (P. 180., VPS., Vasumati ed.) 34. Vide P. 180, VPS. 35. "Na ca tatra laukika-paramārtha-rajatam eva svarūpeņa niședha- pratiyogi iti vacyam, bhrama-badhayoh vaiyadhi-karanyapatteh, aprasakta- pratisedhāpatteśca ... Asya ācārya-vacasaḥ pāramārthika-laukika-rajata-tādāt-

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 219

other words, to state it in a scholastic manner, the 'pratiyogin' of negation is the phenomenal silver, but its. 'anuyogin' is the illusory silver (Cf. P. 534, As., Mm.'s ed.). To state it differently, the negatum is the illusory silver, though the delimiting adjunct of its 'pratiyogita' is phenomenality, or 'svarupa, or even 'para- marthikatva' ("Tat ca svarūpeņa pāramarthikatvena vā ...... " (P. 482, As., Mm,'s ed.). Dharmarajadhvarīndra also says that the illusory silver as characterised by the 'vyadhikarana' attribute of 'phenomenal silverness' is the negatum36. But, Madhusudana retraces his steps in his Advaita-ratna-raksanam and asserts that even the phenomenal silver, presented to the mind through recollection, may be the negatum. But, then, the phenomenal silver is the negatum of the negation of the 'anyonyabhava' type, not of the atyantabhava type37.

But, here a question arises quite in conformity with the complex Advaitic gradation and cross-connection of reality. Is the negation of the nacre-silver etc. the negation of the para-marthika' reality of the nacre-silver, or its phenomenal reality, or again, its illusory reality ? Mm. Jogendranath, developing a pithy remark of Madhusudana99, says that 'mithyatva' is that kind of tri-temporal negation which does not possess a lower degree of reality than that of the negatum39. So, the negation may be of any degree of reality which does not fall short of the reality of the negatum. Thus 'mithyatva' will -occur in all the following cases which conform to the condition of 'anyuna-sattakatva' :- (a) The transcendental ('paramarthika') or phenomenal negation of the phenomenal negatum.

myena pratītam pratibhasikam eva rajatam pratīyogi ityarthah" (P. 482, AS., Mm.'s ed). 36. "Na hi tatra rajatatvāvacchinna-pratiyogitākābhāvo niședha-dhīvisa- yaḥ, Kintu laukika-pāramārthikatvāvacchinna-prātibhāsikarajata-pratiyogitā- kaḥ, vyadhikarana-dharmavacchinna-pratiyogitākabhavābhyupagamāt. (Pp. 131-133, V. P., A. K. Sastri's ed.) 37. Vide P· 28, Advaita-ratna-raksa ņam. 38. "Nisedhasya badhyatvam paramarthika-sattvavirodhitve na tantram, kintu nişedhyāpeksayā nyūna-sattākatvam" (P. 386, Vol. II, AS.) 39. "Tathāca pratipannopādhau traikalika-nisedhasya pratiyogyanyūna- sattakatvam vacyam" (P. 414, T'ika of Mm. Jogendranath, AS., Vol. II).

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(b) The transcendental, phenomenal or illusory negation of the illusory negatum. So, the negation may be either transcen- dental, or phenomenal, or illusory without doing any injury to mithyatva'. The negation will be transcendental when it is taken as merely the substrate-consciousness ; it is phenomenal when looked at as delimited by the substantive (say) 'ldam' (of the erroneous judgment) which serves as the delimiting adjunct of substrate-ness ('adhisthanatavacchedaka') ; and it is illusory when taken as Qualified by 'nirupitatva' of the illusory pheno- menon40.

Now, we shall present a refutation of this theory by the. philosophers of rival schools. In this connection we shall have to bear in mind the all-important fact that the theory holds. good equally in matters of ontology as in epistemology.

Let us at the outset present a refutation of the philosophic: foundation of the theory. Madhavamukunda in his Para-paksa- giri-vajra raises a pointer to the effect that it cannot be proved. that a cognition does only remove illusory nescience ; for, it is. common experience that any cognition destroys its prior absence ('pragabhava') which is real ; a pitcher-cognition rules out a real cloth-cognition, a recognition evaporates a correspon- ding real impression and so on and so forth. So, it must be accepted that what is contradicted may be real and as such the nacre-silver and the world are also real. Moreover, it is a. general experimental truth that the recanting agent and the object of recantation are of the same order of reality. Hence, it transpires that nescience must be of a phenomenal nature just Tike its removal (which must be held to be phenomenal because it is effected by the psychosis, as the Advaitin says), and not illusory. Indeed, a phenomenal rejection of an illusory silver is not admissible at all; for, the two have no contradiction. Moreover, it is agreed on all hands that a cognition and its object, a substratum and the defect tainting it must always be of the same order of reality. Hence, it must be accepted that nescience is real even like Brahman. Further, the Advaitin cannot explain the volition of isvara who is omniscient according. to him also (cf. "Mayā-Bimbo Vasīkriya tam syat sarvajña,

40. Vide P. 429, Mm. Jogendranath's Tatparya, Vol. II, AS.

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 221

Isvarah" P, 9, PD) ; for, one who sees the true nature of the nacre, which is the substratum of the so-called illusory silver, cannot be prompted towards seizing the nacre-silver. Hence, isvara, who always sees the true nature of all things, should not devote Himself to the maintenance of a world that is illusory 41.

Madhavamukunda goes deeper still in the earlier sections of his treatise and tries to prove that the grand cosmic superim- position ('adhyasa') is impossible. He points out that the world cannot be a super-imposition on Brahman. Flrst, it is impos- sible because Brahman, who is devoid of all 'visesa' and 'samanya', as the Advaitin avers, cannot become the substratum of superimposition. For, a thing to be such a substratum must be partially or generally known, and partially or specifically unknown ("Samanyato juatatve sati ajnāta-visesa-vattvasya adhisthanatva-prayojakasya nirvisese nihsamanye ca Brahmaņi asambhavat". P. 84, PPGT; Also "Adhisthanasya kartsnyena bhane' bhane ca na bhramah/Bhatābhatakrti-bhida saviśesatva- sadhika" P. 227, Nyaya-Siddhanjana of Venkata.) Secondly, in the absence of any thing other than Brahman, one can conceive nothing that can be super-imposed on the latter. For, whatever is super-imposed is bound to be existent elsewhere whose impression through previous cognition makes super-imposition at all possible. Verily, the impression of a silver previously cognised (technically called 'pradhana') makes possible the super-imposition of silver upon nacre. But, since the Advaitic Brahman is the Sole reality, devoid of all manner of difference (namely, 'svagata', 'sajatīya' and 'vijatīya), the world-illusion is impossible for want of a pradhana' in this regard. The Advaitin cannot argue that 'adhyasa' necessitates impression only as its pre-condition and not also the reality of the impre- ssing object. For, he does not accept any cognition of the

41. "Kiñca na hi jrānam ajñānasyaiva mithyābhūtasya nivartakam iti niyamaḥ ; Jñāna-mātreņa ... satyasya taj-jnana-pragabbavasya, gha!adi-jnanena pa!ādi-jñānasya, pratyabhijnādinā samskārasya ... satyasyaiva nivrttidarsanāt ... kinca loke nivrtti-nivartyayoh samana-sattākatva-niyamāt ajnana-nivrtti- vat ajnānam api tāttvikam syāt. Prātibhāsikasya rupyasya pradhvamso vyāvahārikaścet tayoņ virodho' pi na syāt ... kinca jnāna-jneyayoh doșādhiș- thanayośca samana-sattakatva-niyamat Brahmavad ajnnam api satyam syat ... Adhyaste pravrttih adhis!hāna-saksāt-kārābhāva-vata eva purusasya drśyate ghalate ca etc." (Pp. 655-59, PPGV.).

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non-existent, which, therefore, cannot make any impression what- soever. If the world-illusion is endeavoured to be accounted for only with the help of defect (i.e. nescience), that must at least be taken to be real in order that it may be cognised. Thirdly, the assemblage of causes and conditions of adhyasa', namely, samskara', 'sadrsya', 'samprayoga' (sense-inter-course) etc., are conspicuous by their absence in the case of world- illusion. For, 'samskara', if available at all, must be held to be real contrary to the Advaitic hypothesis. Then, Brahman cannot be the seat of 'samskara' lest it loses its purity. Nor can the Jiva, who is the effect of 'adhyasa', be its resort. If it is argued that the Jiva is beginningless, being merely con- ditioned by nescience ( 'mayaprayukta' ), and not created by it ('maya-janya')42, then redemption from Jivahood would result from the removal of its cause and not of nescience. Moreover, the Advaitic postulate that the cognita are super-imposed upon the mental mode by shaping it in their likness, seems to founder in the case of the final psychosis before liberation since Brahman, an unknowable, according to the Advaitin, cannot shape it. Furthermore, the definition of 'adhyasa' of the Advaitin cannot be applied to the 'adhyasa' of 'mula avidya'. Indeed, no one has the cognition 'this is avidya' just like the- invalid cognition 'this is silver'. Neither has avidya any similarity with any other thing. Hence 'adhyasa' of the Advaitic conception is an impossibility 4 3.

Jayatirtha argues that, granting that the world is super- imposed upon the self, it follows that the world should, then,

42. "Jīva īśo viśuddhā cit vibhāgaśca tayordvayob/ Avidya-taccitoryogah sadasmākam anādayab//" (Quoted in Tika on AS., P. 500, Vol. II, Mm.'s ed.) 43. "Atha aropyasiddhyāpi adhyasasiddhiņ, yat yat āropitam tat tat sapradhanam drstam, sukti-rupyadivat" etc. (P. 88). "Na cārope tadvisa- yaka-pratīti-mātram evāpeksitam, na tu tadvisayasya satyatvamapīti vācyam, asata pratīterevasambhavāt ... dosatmaka-kāraņasyāpi asattva-samyena tava. pakse pratīti-laksa ņa-kāryotpatterasambhavāt". (P. 91) "Atha adhyasa-samagryabhavadapi tadasiddhiḥ. Samskāra-sadrsya- samprayogadinam adhyase hyavasyakanam abhavena katham adhyasopapat- tiriti bhavah. etc." (P. 93) "Carama-vrttau Brahmano' dhyasasambhavena jňeyādhyāsa-niyama-bhangācca". (P. 105) "Mulavidyadhyase tad-asam- bhavasya durvaratvāt. (P. 116)

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 223

not be perceptible as different from the self just as the nacre- silver is not perceived as different from the nacre. But, since it is porceived as separate and different from the self, it is not super-imposed upon the latter (Cf. "Kiñca yadi jagad atmani Sropitath syat tada atmeno bhinnatvena na drsyeta etc." P. 78, Vadavali). Exploiting the situation of the argument in a different way, we may point out here that if the world were a super-imposition upon the self, the world only would have been perceptible and not the self also just as the nacre-silver alone is perceptible and not the nacre also.

Madhvacarya points out that since, according to the Advai- tin, what is 'mithya' is different from both 'sat' and 'asat', it follows that 'truth' is that which is non-different ("sad-vilak- sanatvam asad-vilaksanatvam ca mithyeti avilaksanameva satyamn syat'. P. 242, Tattvoddyota). He further points out that if a psychosis removes nescience pertaining to an object, then a jar, being cognised by one, should not remain uncognised by others ("Visayaśrayarn cedajnanam nivartate tarhi ekena jñātasya ghatasya anyaih ajnatatvam na syat" Ibid). [For, if one removes darkness of a room by bringing in a lamp, all become capable equally of seeing the things of that room]. Jayatirtha further asserts that as the Advaitin concludes that the world has neither reality nor unreality, because they are unascertainable, so it might be maintained that the world is neither 'anirvacaniya' since that too is unascertainable (' ...... ta- tha anirvacaniyataya api durnirupatvena tadabhavo dhruvaḥ syat" p. 5, vadavalī). Further, he points out that the presump- tive evidence put forward by the Advaitin to establish the indescribability of the nacre-silver etc. is unsound. For, in his thesis 'sat cetna badhyeta', what does he mean by the word 'sat' ? Does it mean 'existent', or 'uncontradicted', or 'of the nature of Brahman' ? All the three alternatives are equally inadmissible. In the first alternative, since the world, which is existent, is contradicted, the invariable concomitance between existence and absence of contradiction as proposed by the Advaitin falls through. The second alternative assumes what is desired to be

"Idam rajatam iti pratītivat iyam avidyā iti kasyacit kadācidapi pratītya- bhāvat" (P. 117) "Kinca avidyā-sādrsyam kasmin vartate iti vaktavyam' (P. 118).

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proved and the third only proves the proven. The other thesis 'asat cet na pratiyeta' also shares the same fate. For, does he deny the cognition of 'asat' as 'asat', or as 'sat' ? The first alternative cuts at the root of all usage of 'asat' and the second proposes to gag all talk of error 44. Venkatanatha in his Nyaya-siddhanjana argues that the Advaitin takes the world as different from sat and asat and, then, denies even that difference and thus makes it 'sadasat' ("Sadasad- vyatiriktasya siddha sadasadātmata" p. 92). He points out, in this context, that the Advaitin cannot maintain the general vedantic hypothesis of universal knowledge through the knowledge of one i.e. Brahman in as much as the cognition of 'sat' will certainly exclude that of 'other than sat and asat'. He boldly asserts that if the illusoriness of the world or the nacre-silver etc. be false, the illusoriness will be not and likewise the reality of an entity will be established only when the reality is real. What he means to say may be conveniently summed up in the words of 'Tarangini, the celebrated commentary on Nyayamrta of Vyasa- tīrtha, "If once a degree of reality be admitted, infinite regress will necessarily follow; for, one might ask whether the absolute reality is absolutely absolute or relatively absolute". In this connection, we may refer to the very cogent argument of Purusottama Prasada in his Srutyanta-sura-druma where he says that once the Advaitin accepts three degrees of reality, he is compelled to accept many others also. For, the invalid cogni- tion of a silver in a dream-nacre necessitates the hypothesis of a reality lower than pratibhasika and the cognition of the cessation .of nescience, which is neither phenomenal nor transcendental, requires the postulation of another reality higher than the phenomenal, though lower than the transcendental45. Venkata further asserts that invariable constancy ('anuvrtti') and variability are not the grounds of reality and unreality respectively as proclaimed by the Advaitin. For, now a rope

44. "Yatha khalu sattvasattve bhavanmate durnirupatvāt na jagato vidyete, tatha anirvacaniyataya api durnirupatvena tad-abhavo dhruvah syat" (P 5, Vadāvalī), Alsa "Saccet na bādhyeta ityatra kimidam sat vivakșitam etc." (Pp. 9-10, Ibid). 45. "Svapna-Suktau bahya-rupyāde upasamgrahāya prātibhīsikadapi nikrstasya etc." (P. 174, SSD.).

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appears as a snake and then a piece of bamboo appears as a snake. Here the snake is an invariable constant and still it is not ; but, the rope and the piece of bamboo, which are variable, are still real. If invariability be the test of reality, even 'difference' and 'negation' would be real, contrary to the ruling of the Advaitin+G. Veukata further castigates the 'shameless ardour', as he says, of the Advaitin to establish 'anirvacyatva (and thereby define it) through the rejection of four extremes of reality. He boldly lays bare the hollowness of the conception of 'anirvacya' which is neither something different from the expressible, nor something devoid of expression, nor something different from sat and asat, nor something different from both Brahman and the utterly naught. The Advaitin refutes all definitions and concludes that everything is, therefore, unde- finable. But, here Venkata objects and takes the plea that the Advaitin cannot define 'anirvacaniya' and hence, it being not established, everything may be equally well said to be definable. Further, the Advaitin cannot define his refutation of 'definability' and hence the definability of the world remains unhurt. (kiñcā-nirvacanīyatva-khaņdanoktyaniruktitaḥ/viśva- nirvacanīyatvam akhaņditam apeksyatām" (p. 418, TMK.). Vacaspati Miśra in his Nyāya-Vārttika-Tātparya-tīka asserts that indefinability does not involve the unreality of an experienced fact ("Anirvacyam api anubhūyamānam aśakya- pahnavam'). Ramanuja's vitriolic diatribe against the Mayavada -of the Advaitins as summed up by him in his celebrated thesis styled 'seven-fold inconsistencey' has really been never satis- factorily countered47. But, among the later dualists, Vyasa- tirtha seems to deal the final death-blow to Mayavada beyond all hope of revivifying it except through cavilry and unmeaning sophistical claptrap. In his Nyayamrta he tries all the five definitions of 'mithyatva' as offered by the Advaitins and

46. "Vyavrttyanuvrtti-matram tu na mithyatvadi-prayojakam; Tathā hi-Vyavrtte' pi hi satyatvam rajju-vamsadike sphu!am/Tatraiva cānu- vrttasya mithyatvam api bhoginab// ... //Sat sad ityanuvrttya cet satah Satyatvam isyate etc. (P. 94, Nsi.). 47. The 'saptadha anupapattih of Ramanuja is as follows :- (1) Avidyāsvarūpānupapattih, (2) Āśrayatvānupapattiņ, (3) Tirodhānā- nupapattih, (4) Pramananupapattih, (5) Anirvacaniyatvanupapattih, (6) Avi- dya-nivartakanupapatti, (7) Avidya-nivrttyanupapattiḥ. 15

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dismisses them as unsound. He argues that the tri-temporal negation of the world as proposed by the Advaitin may be either real, or phenomenal, or illusory. The first alternative. leads to dualism since, besides Brahman, there will occur the reality of the negation also. If it is argued by the Advaitin that the real negation would be but Brahman itself, then this 'mithyatva' being identical with Brahman would be uncognisable contrary to the general Advaitic postulate that only illusory entities are cognisable. If the negation be phenomenal, the world would turn out to be real and if it be illusory, the Advaitic inference will be open to the charge of proving the proven and the world would again be real48. However, is this negation a negation of the world or the nacre-silver etc. in its own intrinsic nature ('svarupa') or as transcendentally real ? The first alternative is admissible only if the negatum be 'asat' ; for, tri- temporal negation of something different from 'asat' is inad- missible. So, if the 'anirvacya' suffers tri-temporal negation in its own intrinsic nature, it becomes indistinguishable from 'asat'. The second alternative will lead to the fallacy of inter- dependence and to the negation and consequent 'mithyatva' of the self also ("Rupyadestattvikatvena nisedha-stvatmano' pi ca" P. 84, Nyayamrta, Mm.'s ed.). Vyasa-tīrtha now, for argument's sake, takes for granted any account of 'mithyatva' and asks whether it is uncontradicted or not. If it is uncontradicted i.e. real, this 'mithyatva' of the world would be another real beside Brahman, thus damaging the Advaita theory. If, however, it is contradicted, the world would be real even like the self ("Mithyatvam yadyabadhyam syat, sad-advaita-mata-Kşatih/Mithyatvain yadi badhyam syāj- jagatsatyatvam apatet" 'P. 112, Ibid.). The Advaitin cannot reasonably raise the charge of 'nitya-sama jati' against this argument ; for, this argument neither involves any self-contradic- tion, nor does it lay violent hands on the specific quality of the qualificand ("Svavyaghatadeh abhavat" Loc. cit.). The Advaitin might argue here, as he really does, that since the qualificand is. illusory, its qualification of 'satyatva' and 'mithyatva' would

48. "Traikālika-nisedhasya tāttvikatve advaita-hāneḥ, prātibhāsi-katve siddha-sādhanāt, vyāvahārikatve' pi tasya bādhyatvena tāttvika-sattvāvirodhi- tvena arthantarat". (P. 53, Nyayamrta, Mm.'s ed).

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equally be illusory and the negation of one would not affirm the other ; for, the negation of one of the contradictory qualities means the affirmation of the other only when the qualiticand is real lest the negation of blackness of a barren woman's son mean the affirmation of his blondness 49. To this Vyasa-tirtha retorts that negatum-hood ('pratiyogitvam') as a qualification does not depend upon the reality of the qualificand like other qualities. The unreality of the qualiticand makes the qualification unreal only when the latter depends upon the reality of the former. Here, however, 'mithyatva' is antagonistic to the reality of the qualificand, the world. Hence, the Advaitin's plea is hollow. Moreover, the argument of the Advaitin will lead him to inter- minable difficulties. For, if, as the Advaitin holds, the 'mithyatva" of the silver, though not negated in its locus, be illusory simply because of its connection with the illusory silver, then the qualities that are denied of the real Brahman would be real, thus leading to dualism. Similarly, the nacre, which is the locus of the illusory silver, would be illusory ; the difference from the real as pertaining to the nacre-silver and the world would be real and the difference from the unreal would likewise be unreal ; furthermore, if the silver and its 'mithyatva' both be 'mithya', then the silver-cognition (i.e. error) and the cognition of its 'mithyatva' would both be invalid thus shutting out all scope for recantation. So, the Advaitic standpoint is fraught with interminable inconsistencies and is completely indefensible5o. Vyasa-tirtha further discredits the Anirvacaniya view by poin- ting out that one never intuits that the silver is destroyed by the nacre-cognition, nor does one have the cognitions 'suktya-

49. "Nanu rūpya-dharmo mithyātvam api mithvaiva ... Dharmiņo mithy- ātve viruddhayorapi dharmayo mithyātvāt. Paraspara-viruddhayoḥ ekasya abhave anyasya sattva-niyamastu yatra dharmī satyah tatraiva. Na hi Vandhya-sutasya syamatvadyabhave gauratvam satyam". (P. 104, Nyayamr- ta, Mm.'s ed) 57. "Na ca pratiyogitvam dharmantaravat dharmi-sattāpeksam ... Dhar- myasattve dharmasattvam tu dharmi-sattāsāpeksa-dharma-visayam, mithyāt- vam tu tat-pratikulam ... kinca pratipannopādhau anisiddham pratyuta bādhaka-jnanena vihitam api rupya-mithyatvam yadi pratibhasika-rupya- sambandhamatrena pratibhasikam, tarhi sati Brahmani nisiddha api dharmah santah syuh. Rūpyādhisthana-suktirapi prātibhasiki syāt etc. etc." (P. 104, Ibld.)

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jnanath nasīt' and 'bhramo nasīt' after the recanting cognition of the nacre. The former proves that there was really no silver to be destryed by the nacre-cognition and the latter shows that 'ajmuna' and 'bhrama' are real like their substratum. The Advaitic postulate that if the cognitum be illusory, the cogni- tion would also be so, is unsound on his own showing. For, according to him, the real witness-consciousness is the cogniser of false pleasure and pain ; so, error need not be illusory, though the nacre-silver be such 5 1. Madhavamukunda (and Vyasa-tīrtha too) raises an interes- ting pointer against the Advaita view in the following manner :- The Advaitin holds that the psychosis characterised by the pitcher removes the individual nescience pertaining to the consciousness delimited by the pitcher, though the cosmic nescience still persists. But, this is inadmissible; for, if the consciousness, which is the object of the psychosis, be real, it can no longer be cognisable ('drsya') i.e. an object of a cognition ; if, however, it be unreal, it cannot be the substratum of the super-imposed pitcher inasmuch as it possesses no greater reality than the pitcher. Moreover, though the individual nescience is removed, the cosmic nescience still persists to veil the pitcher ("Na ca suddha-visayaka-mūlājnānānivrttau api ghațādyākāra- vrttyā tūlajñāna-nivrttya ghata-prakasopapatti-riti vācyam, ghatākāravrttyā vişayīkrtasya cetanasya satyatve dršyatvasya vyabhicarapatteh. Mithyātve ca adhyastādhika-sattakatvābhā- vena adhisthānatvāsambhavāt. Ksudrājnāna-nivrttāvapi mahāj- ñānavrtasya aprakā-sakatvācca." (P. 103, PPGV.)

The Advaitic theories of reflection ('pratibimba-vada' ), of adjunctive semblance ('abhasavada') and of delimitation ('avac- cheda-vada') also have been violently impugned by the rival philosophers. The sovereign argument against all these theories is that Brahman, who is devoid of all limiting adjuncts and specification and is formless, can on no computation accommo- date itself to these theories. We do not like to embark on the traditional arguments against these theories, but we shall here refer to only one argument of Rakhaldas Nyayaratna from his Mayavada-nirasah. The theory of reflection may somehow

51. Vide Pp. 86-87, Nyāyāmrta, Mm.s ed.

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explain the various visual forms ; but, it cannot explain the diverse kinds of olfactory, tactual, auditory and gustatory sensations ; for, no one apprehends in a reflection any odour,. sound etc. So, the world, which lends itself to all the five senses, is a direct challenge to the theory of reflection ("Tat- pratibimbesu rasanasparsana-deh katham api nirvahasambhavat ; na hi rasadika' kasminnapi pratibimbe ko'pi sāksāt-karoti. Etena Pratibimba-vado' pi nirakrtah"). Jayatirtha in his Nyayasudha asserts that whatever inference the Advaitin might hatch up to prove the illusoriness of the nacre-silver etc., that would invariably be found to be fallacious .. Presumptive evidence ('arthapatti'), which is called into request. by the Advaitin to prove the point, is also unavailing. For, the negation of both 'sat' and 'asat' separately as demonstrated by them does not stand to reason. And perception, particularly the recanting perception, proves to the contrary that it is merely 'asat'." So, its illusoriness cannot be logically proved ("Nanuma- nāt śukti-rajatadeh anirvacyata- siddhih. Khyati-bādha- nyathanupapattiśca anenaiva nirakrta veditavya"). The invaliď cognition of the nacre-silver cannot be said to be generated by nescience as defect. For, the cognition of the substratum as. 'this' is through the psychosis and as such it is valid, not being: generated by defect ; the cognition of the predicate 'silver' is. due to defect certainly, but it is not 'cognition', being apprehendedi through avidya-vrtti ; And the witness-cognition is not generated at all. The Advaitin cannot explain why the illusory silver should, contrary to its illusoriness, be apprehended as real at the time of its cognition and as unreal at the time of recantation. Moreover, if the nacre-silver be the transformation of avidya,. ... which pertains to the self, it should be apprehended as 'I am silver' (or, at least, 'in me is silver'). If it is argued that, the self as consciousness being ubiquitous, the silver, which is the transformation of avidya pertaining to the consciousness delimited by the nacre, is apprehended in identity with the latter where- fore it appears not as 'I am silver', the retort would be that, in the circumstances stated, there would arise the contingency of the entire nacre (or even the whole world of things) being apprehended ('Tatha sati sarvopalabdhi-prasangat.). The nacre- silver, again, cannot be assumed to be apprehended through sense-contact ; for, its apprehension is said to be synchronous.

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with its creation. Nor can it be apprehended through (the revival of! impressions ; for, our intuition does not dictate such a conclusion, nor can it be said to be apprehended by the witness-consciousness since that would cut across the servicea- bility of sense-operation in this regard. It may be argued against this position that though the silver is apprehended directly by the witness-consciousness, it is apprehended in identity with the nacre which is intuited through the sense. So, sense-operation is not shut out. But, Jayatirtha here replies that there is nothing to warrant the regulation that the silver thus apprehended should be apprehended in identity with the nacre ("Sukti-sambheda-pratītiniyame niyamakabhavat").

Further, if the silver and its substrate be apprehended respec- tively by the 'saksin' and the visual organ, it would affiliate the Advaitin's position to the Prabhakara Akhyati and post-cogni- tional volitional activity would be inexplicable (" ...... akhyāti- matanumati-prasangena pravrttyadyanu-papattih"). If it is argued that the saksin apprehends also the identity of the silver with the nacre, even then the theory suffers from the defect of assuming two discrete cognitions contrary to our experience. If, now, it is urged that the two cognitions have an identity of result ('phalaikyat') in the witness-conciousness through apper- ception, Jayatirtha would demur to the effect that this scheme of the operation of Saksin as drawn up by the Advaitin is wholly wide of the mark and unjustifiable (cf. "Sudrdho nirnayo yatra jneya n tat saksi-darsanam" Madhva quoted in Tarka-tandavam of Vyasatīrtha, p. 120).

We may submit in this connection that if this scheme of Saksin's operation be admissible, then any two succeeding cognitions, whether direct and/or indirect, mediate and/or immediate severally may be integrated by the Saksin to form one cognition ; the invalid cognition and the subsequent recanting cognition may thus be integrated with the result that the unified cognition would take the form of a doubt which rocks between a pair of alternating certitude-an absurd situation. It is clear that if we extend this our humble argument in the field of cosmic illusion, it would be proved that the world can never be sublated : for, this sublating cognition would always remain unified with the previous uncontradicted experience of the world.

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So, the contingency of two discrete cognitions, contrary to our experience, and the consequent absence of volitional activity is unavoidable.

That is why Nrsimha Bhatta, a later Advaitin, denies the existence of the psychosis 'this' before the emergence of the invalid psychosis. For, he thinks that the assumption of its previous existence leads to the admission of two discrete cognitions, contrary to our experience. ("Na tavad bhrama-rupa- vrtti-vyatirekeņa idamākārā vrttiranubhava-siddha jñana- dvitvananu-bhavat". p. 38, SLS). He points out that the subject of the erroneous judgment cannot be cognised as apart from its predicate. This remark holds good particularly in the case of the invalid judgment 'the conch-shell is yellow' ; for, in this case, the eye cannot apprehend the conch-shell as apart from its colour ("Tathi sati pita-sankha-bhrame cakşuranapekşa- prasangat ...... rūpatn vina kevala-śankhasya cakşu-rgrāhyatvā- yogat" p. 41, Ibid.). He, therefore, suggests a single psychosis through sense-contact which comprehends the silver in identity with 'this' (vide p. 43, SLS). Against this, however, we need only say that this is pathetically absurd and symptomatic of die-hard bigotry.

Jaya-trtha now directs his offensive on Anirvacaniya-khyati in another direction in common with many other scholars. The question is :- does the illusory silver of the Advaitic conception appear in the invalid cognition as illusory, or as existent, or as non-existent ? It is clear that the last two alternatives, apart from other defects, lead to an admission of Anyathakhyati ; for, the illusory appears not as illusory, but as real or unreal. The first and the third alternatives are contrary to our experience and, even if conceded, will signal the complete absence of any volitional urge. So, in deference to our experience and the consequent volition, the silver must be taken to appear as existent. Certainly there can be no cognition which steers clear of both affirmation and negation. Hence, the silver must appear as real. But, now the question arises :- is this reality or existence real, unreal or illusory ? The first alternative contradicts illusoriness and is, therefore, inadmissible. If the third alternative be welcomed, that is to say, if the reality apprehended be illusory i.e. merely apprehensional, then it boils down to this that the illusory silver

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appears as real, whose roality is, again, illusory i.e. mere appea- rance. Naturally, then, there will again arise the contigency of absence of volition (Tasya Sattvasya anirvacaniyatve pratitikatve. tathaiva pratītau svarūipa-matra-pratītau va syadevanavas- thitih/avyavasthitih/pravrtteriti sesah" NS.) (To my mind, it appears that 'anavasthiti' here means infinite regress also ; for,. to avoid the contingency of absence of volition, the illusoriness. of the apprehended reality of the illusory silver must be taken to appear as real, whose reality again would be illusory and so on). If, however, the second alternative be accepted, the Advaitin will have to give his seal of approval on the 'asat' being even immediately apprehended. But, the Advaitin might worm out of this impasse by asserting that the reality apprehended in the illusory silver is real, the real reality of the nacre being trans- ferred to it. So, according to him, the mutual relation between. 'this-ness' and 'silver-ness' and the relation of the reality of 'this' with the silver are both indescribable i.e. illusory. But Jayatīrtha would readily retort that this would also lead to infinite regress ("Idanta-rajatatvayoh itaretara-sarnsargasya tatha rajate suktika-sattva-samsargasya anirvacanīyatve" ngīkriyamane anavasthitih syat" Ibid.). For, here also it might be asked whether this 'anirvacaniyata' of the two-fold relation appears as 'pratibhasika' or 'vyavaharika'. The first alternative cuts at the root of 'pravrtti'. The second alternative gives rise to the following question :- Is this phenomenality real or unreal? The first is absurd, since it contradicts illusoriness and the second leads to the acceptance of 'asat' as being imme- diately apprehended. If, however, the phenomenality be again illusory, then the whole array of arguments against the theory will have to be rehearsed, thus leading to infinite regress.

Madhavamukunda points out that nescience cannot be taken as the material cause of the object of invalid cognition. For, had it been so, then the super-imposed yellowness of the conch- shell would not have outlived the removal of nescience pertaining to whiteness of the conch-shell. The plea that the adventitious adjunct ('upadhi') is responsible for this is unsound ; for, the cessation of the material cause means the cessation of its effect (vide PPGV., p. 657). The argument may be advanced from the other end also. It is common knowledge that a man with

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jaundiced eyes sees a conch-shell yellow though he knows quite well its real colour. So, here the origin of the yellowness is not certainly caused by nescience ("Adhisthana-jnane'pi sankha- pītimotpatteh adhisthana-jnanasya utpadakatvayogat". p. 47, BhE. Ci.). Mahadeva punatamakara argues that the admission of the illusory silver cannot prompt any purposive activity. If the Advaitin explains activity by assuming the cognition of identity between the phenomenal silver and the illusory one, Mahadeva. will argue that in the case of the erroneous zinc-silver ('ranga- rajatam'), it would be more apposite to assume the cognition of identity between zinc and silver. This would be all the more welcome because it would not encourage the complex assumption of the origin of infinite series of silver, its destruction and its. causes and conditions. Now, I shall take the liberty of trying to say something in my humble way against the theory of Anirvacaniya-khyati. It has already been shown, following the scholars of the opposite camp, that since the 'anirvacaniya' silver appears in intuition as real and is subsequently recanted as characterised by the hetero-locative ('vyadhikarana') attribute of 'vyavaharikatva', the Advaitin must acquiesce in psychological Anyathakhyati at least. But, now I would try to show that Anyathakhyati is: at the very root of Anirvacaniyakhyati. The advaitin holds that the 'anirvacya' nescience creates all illusion and error with the help of its two potencies. The first called 'avarana' screens an entity, while the second called 'vlksepa' makes it appear as something else. A discerning mind will not fail to notice here that the potency called 'viksepa' has but the function of anya- thakhyati. So, it is quite clear that the concept of Viksepa. itself is the unswerving guarantee for ontological anyatha-khyati. So, when the Advaitin refutes that theory and dubs it as illogical and unpsychological, he cuts at the very root of his own theory also. Next, it is difficult to understand how the two potencies of nescience, namely, avarana and viksepa, may operate on the same entity simultaneously or successively. For, what is screened cannot reveal itself, whether in its own or in some different from. Moreover, why should not this screening potency

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shut out the transforming potency from operating on the entity ? It may be argued that ajuana lies embedded in the entity itself, and, though the entity be screened, the viksepa-potency may very well funetion from within it. But, even then the result of viksepa will not be perceived, the entity being screened by the ivarana-potency. So, when there is avarana', viksepa cannot operate, and when 'avarana' is absent, viksepa has no scope at all. It may further be asked here if there is any causal relation or any other necessary concomitance between the two poten- cies. If not, one may not follow the other, and the cessation of one may not signal the cessatfon of the other. If, however, they are somehow causally related, the universal process of invo- lution or dissolution demands that the effect (i.e. the viksepa here naturally) should go first, unless the two be something like a screen and its shadow. But, the Advaitin postulates in many cases a straggling viksepa, particularly in the case of the world- illusion, which would be unreasonable.

The next question that may be raised against the theory is as to when the two potencies operate on an entity. Do they operate when the entity is perceived, or when it is not ? If they operate when the entity is not perceived, their operation will remain absolutely in the dark ; for, the moment it is perceived, they will cease to operate. It further means that our perception will give proper shape and form to an erstwhile distorted entity, though its previous distortion will not be known to us. A cogni- tion, then, will always be a rectifying cognition and there will be no erroneous cognition. If, however, they operate when the entity is perceived, it will really not be perceived, or else its trans- formation will be perceived, if at all. In other words, our act of perceiving will transform the entity. So, we shall never come to know the real entity and, for the matter of that, the transformed entity as transformation. Hence the potencies postulated will remain unknown and unknowable. If the Advai- tin has still the hardihood of arguing that nescience will be intuited by the witness-consciousness, we shall point out that it should be known as unknown and unknowable and that also only when it is previously ascertained to be existent. Otherwise, why should not the Advaitin accept the immediate cognition of 'asat' ?

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Now, it may be asked how the illusory silver is produeed. Apart from the theistic objection that no individual other than God Himself can create anything-even Vidyaranya accepts this position (Cf. "ia-Kürya n jivabhogyamn jagad dvabhyah saman- vitam" P. 90, PD.)5 2-and also apart from the objection that Ajñana cannot immediately evolve into a silver in the absence of its material constituents and suitable environment, I want to point out here that the very supposition of the erroneous silver evolving from the 'this'-delimited nescience is inadmissible. For, the mental mode generated through sense-contact with the 'this' certainly removes its nescience, which, therefore, is non-existent at the moment. Here the removal of nescience must signify the removal of its viksepa-potency ; for, the majority of Advai- tins do not postulate any avarana in insentient entities ("jadesu avaraņānangīkare na Ko'pi dosah" P. 151, VPS). This, again, proves that viksepa would pre-exist sense-contact, thus making the theory open to the charges put forward in the previous paragraph. But, that apart, no nescience is available here which would evolve into the silver. The advocacy of Vidyaranya that the charge may be successfully countered by holding that the form as 'this' is known, but as 'nacre' is unknown (vide P. 149, VPS) is ludicrous and may be dismissed unceremoniously. So. nescience cannot evolve into silver. Moreover, the Advaitin cannot cite another instance where nescience directly evolves into material objects. Again, in the case of 'sopadhika bhrama' like the yellow conch-shell, the recanting mental mode cannot remove viksepa, the other potency of nescience being non-operative on it ; for, the experience persists even after the recanting cognition. Hence, it must be conceded that a mental mode cannot remove nescience. But, the Advaitins, far from being silenced by these arguments53, would exhibit superb calisthenics and conjure up

52. Vidyāranya says in the next śloka : "Maya-vrttyatmako hīsa-saukal- pah sadhanam janau/Mano-vrttyatmako jiva-saukalpo bhoga-sadhanam//" (P. 90, PD). So, God creates and not jīva. Again, Vidyāranya says : "Mrnmayo mana-meyah syat saksi-bhasya-stu dhīmayah" (P. 94, PD.). This shows that the illusory silver is only 'dhimayah' i. e. mental. 53. Aptly does Rakhaldas Nyayaratna say : "Advaitavādinam trptirna syad yuktisatairapi/Na bhūri-vāriņa samyet pipāsa sannipātiki"//

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a new line of defence. Now, they would say that ajnana may be of three kinds according as it resorts to the existence-part,. knowledge-part or bliss-part of consciousness, though they would: caution in the same breath that 'Satta', 'caitanya' and 'ananda" are not three different attributes. So, the mental mode may very well remove the first two varieties of ajnana, while the third may straggle on till liberation and create a silver etc. But, this is clear dualism, however much the Advaitins might assert to the: contrary. Moreover, if this third variety, the material of silver,. persists till liberation, the silver also must share its lot ; if,. however, it is removed earlier, bliss will be experienced ; but,. it is not. Therefore, the position does not stand scrutiny.

Then, we may point out another incongruity to the following effect :- The silver persists so long as the cognition of nacre does not arise. But, how can the cognition of nacre arise at all, the nacre being now screened by the silver ? All subsequent vrttis, that would arise, should, therefore, necessarily take the form of silver and the nescience of the nacre will not be removed at all. Even if the nescience be removed somehow, the avidya- vrtti should not cease to function since it is supposed not to depend on sense-contact with the object. It cannot be argued. that since two vrttis cannot operate simultaneously, the. avidyavrtti will not withstand the emergence of the nacre-vrtti. For, this may hold good in regard to mental modes ; but, avidya- vrtti, being different from antah-karana-vrtti, and being cognised by the witness-consciousness which is different from the mind- delimited consciousness that apprehends the mental mode, should in all fairness to logic, not cease to exist. Hence, the silver would persist even after the intuition of the nacre, its substratum.

The Advaitin holds that the nacre-silver is indescribable and hence its cognition also is indescribable (Cf. "Na hi jneyasya anirvacanīya-tve taj-jnanasya nirvacanīya-tvam nyayyam" .. p. 48, IS.). But, this does not stand to reason. The cognition may only be called 'indescribable' in the sense that its object is 'indescribable' ; but, it cannot mean.that it itself is 'indescrib -- able' i.e. devoid of being ascertained as 'sat' or 'asat'. One cannot certainly argue that since the cognitum is black or white, the cognition also is black or white. So, it cannot be"

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proved in the manner of IS. that the cognition of the nacre- silver is also 'mithya'.

In fact the word anirvacya' itself proves that there is no :logical category between real and unreal which two are incontro- vertibly contradictory, not merely contrary. Moreover, the Advaitin distorts the temporal frame of reference to arrive at the fetish of 'anirvacaniya'. For, the non-existence of an entity today need not logically injure its existence yesterday. If the Advaitin says that the recanting cognition takes the form 'rajatam nasit'-which, however, is extremely doubtful-, then we must say that the silver is in that case a clear non-entity. So, the Advaitic acrobatics does not transport the theory to an inviolable sphere.

The Advaitin holds that the 'Pratibhasika' reality is rejected by the 'vyavaharika' reality, which latter again, is sublated by the 'paramarthika' reality. But, how can the Advaitin prove thgt the reality coming third in the ascending order is really paramarthika' and will not be rejected by a subsequent reality ? Hence, it is clear that the Advaitin's supposition leads to infinite regress and thus shuts out all possibility of arriving at the ulti- mate, indubitable truth. The Advaitic analysis of 'Jagrat', 'svapna' and 'susupti' states with a view to proving the invariable, non-remittent pervasion of consciousness through all these states and its consequent reality to the exclusion of others is open to question, 4. For, analysis shows that not 'jnana' merely, but 'jnata' also, pervades all these states and he also should, therefore, be called real-a position which would be the undoing of the Advaita. The Advaitin holds that the 'mithyatva' of the world is itself 'mithya'. It means that the 'mithyatva' of the world is not ascertainable in terms of 'sat' and 'asat'. Now, when the 'mithyatva' is 'asat', the world will be real again. The Advaitin might demur that he does not affirm existence and non-existence in turn, but only negates them both. But, this has already been shown to be unsound. It can be proved further by rebutting the Advaitic presumptive argument "Sat cet na badhyeta, asat cet na pratiyeta" in the manner : "pratiyate iti sat, badhyate iti

54. Vide vidyaranya's PD., Pp. 2-4, Beng. ed.

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asat". So, according to our argument, which stands, the world would sometimes remain real even after sublation.

I like to bring this array of objections of my own making to. close with humourous addendum. Suppose I mistake somebody else's wife (I do devoutly avoid calling her Advaitin's) for mine ; then, according to the Advaitic theory, my wife would be created upon that somebody else's wife. But, why should not that other good lady at least feel the weight of my wife's body, granting she cannot see her since the nescience is not hers ? So, the Advaitin has to face such ludicrous situations if he obdurately holds fast to his illogical theory of Anirvacaniyakhyati.

Finally, we may submit that the theory denies appearance, and in so denying, it denies itself, which is a part of that appearance. Without appearance no objectivity is possible, and when objec- tivity evaporates, thinking follows suit. To deny thinking is to deny all philosophy. In the circumstances, the theory cannot be. even asserted. In fact, the Advaitic maya, the matrix of all manner of inconsistencies, was assumed by the Advaitin to salvage his philosophy from the sea of inimical diatribes by stupefying the logical thinking of his rivals, but, ultimately it has landed him in interminable contradictions and paved the way for its final undoing.

CHAPTER XV

ACINTYA-KHYĀTI

Now, I shall briefly present a theory which is metaphysically perhaps the nearest approach to Advaitavada, excluding its mayavada, and is at the same time ethically its deadliest enemy. This theory of error is called Acintya-khyati by its protagonist, Jīva Gosvamin, a devout ascetic follower of Sree Caitanya, the founder of the Bengal School of Vaisnavism characterised by (so-called) emotional abandon. This theory of error is based on the metaphysical theory of Acintya-bhedabheda as propounded orally by Sree Caitanya and then transmitted into writing by Jiva Gosvamin in his sat-sandarbha and Sarva-Sambadini. This theistic school holds that non-dualistic consciousness is the ultimate all-sustaining truth which manifests itself in the ascen- ding order in the forms of Brahman, Paramatman and Bhagavan1. The first two are only imperfect truth, while the latter is the whole of Truth, because it conserves within itself the other two forms. The world is not an indescribable phantasy, but a reality, though transitory. The Jiva also is not 'mithya', but a real infinitesimal manifestation of the potency of God. God has three potencies :- Cit-śakti, Jīva-Sakti and Maya-Sakti. The Jivas and the world are the real transformation of the second and the third potencies, respectively. So, they are real. This transformation of God's potency does not make him mutable in nature. The omnipotent God is unchangeable just like the philosopher's stone. God is possessed of infinite benefic qualities and is 'savisesa', though Brahman is 'nirvisesa'. The relation between God and Jiva is acintya-bhedabheda ; for, God and Jiva are both 'saccidananda'; but, God is ubiquitous and the lord of Maya, while the Jiva is infinitesimal and under the thraldom of Maya. This 'bheda' and 'abheda' conceived together is 'acintya'. The relation between the potency and the potentate also is one of 'acintya-bhedabheda'. Scholars generally think that 'acintya' and 'anirvacaniya' are interchangeable terms. But, that is furthest from the truth.

1. The word is 'sambadini' from the root /bada Sthairye, and not from the root vada, as is generally misunderstood.

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When the facts of experience or scriptural knowledge are related one to the other without pruning or distorting them through logical see-saw and are found to be contradictory, both are accepted together and this rolation of the contradictories is called 'acintya'. But, 'anirvacaniya' starts and ends by denying the facts of experience through logic and affirms none of the extremes. Moreover, anirvacaniya' means a grade of reality, while 'acintya' has no such sense. While explaining the quatrain 'Vikalpah khyati-vadinam' of the 24th śloka of the 11th Skandha of Bhagavatam, Jiva Gosva- min says the following: " ...... te ca vikalpa mama śaktimaya eveti na parasparam adyapi vyucchidyante. Tatastat-pratipadya- sya sakteścācintyatvam vijnāpya tanmayatvat sarvatra acintya- khyatitvam eva pratipaditam" (Krama-sandarbha). It is difficult to ascertain what Sri Jiva exactly means by the expression 'acintya-khyatitvam' here. It may mean that all the 'vikalpas' i.e. the different conflicting khyati-vadas are to be accepted together with a view to making amends for the deficiencies of the one by the others ; Or, it may mean that the logical antipodes must fraternise to explain an invalid cognition. We shall pre- sently see, while going into details, that Sri Jiva has a fancy for Anyathakhyati mixed with a type of Anirvacaniyakhyati (if that term be at all applicable here) in the field of epistemological error ; still, his view may be called acintya-khyati in the sense that all kinds of apprehension (not only the invalid ones) are 'acintya' from the stand-point of logical categorisation (Cf. "Saktayah sarvabhavanam acintya-jnana-gocarah" VP.).

Jiva Gosvamin introduces his discussion of error with the assertion of three pre-conditions of error, which are as follow :- (1) Error pertains to determinate cognition and to a 'savisesa' entity, not to indeterminate cognition and to an entity devoid of all characterisation (Nirvikalpa-pratyaye bhramabhavat savisese eva pravartate" P. 98, Sarvasambadinī, vangīya Sahitya parisat ed.), (2) That alone may be superimposed which has an existence somewhere ("Anyatra-siddhasya vastuna eva anyatrāropo mithya- kha-puspaderaropasambhavāt" P. 248, sat-sandarbha), and (3) error generally thrives on similarity. From the first pre-condi- tion it follows that the attributeless Brahman of the Advaitic conception cannot be the object of error. The second condition

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 241

coupled with the third implies that error depends upon super- imposition of an existent entity upon another through cognition of similarity. A totally non-existent entity like the hare's horn cannot be super-imposed anywhere. The perception of a mirage, he says, is due to the awakening through similarity, of the psy- chosis, having the form of water, which was generated previously through the perception of water and lay so long latent. So, water is not an utter naught ; nor is the water-psychosis, which is a recollection, and the mirage which is similar to water, 'mithya'. But, the superimposition in identity is 'mithya ("Kintu tadabhedona aropa evayatharthatvat mithya P. 248"). So, there is no entitative falsity ; but, falsity pertains only to the superimposition ("Tasmat vastutastu na Kvacidapi mithyāt- vam" Ibid). So, according to Sri Jīva, there is no objective falsity, but mere subjective falsity. He does not hesitate to assert that superimposition of (say) a silver, which exists elsewhere, is possible only in a locus (say, a nacre) where it is really not in all the dimensions of time ("Yatra hi yannāsti kintu anyatraiva drsyate tatraive tadaropah siddhah" P. 290; Also "Yadyapi tasya trikalameva so' rtho nasti". P. 271, saț-sandarbha). So, the silver in the locus of the nacre is 'mithya' i.e. non-existent. The nacre-silver has mere cognitional existence, but has no pur- posive activity. According to Sri Jiva, that alone is real which may be apprehended and may prompt purposive activity ("Suk- tyādāveva prātītika-mātra-sattākan rajatadikam mrşā. Anyatra yatra ubhayam pratītimarth-kriyā-kāritvañca yunakti bhajate tatra na tatha mrseti" P. 257, Ibid.). The points to be noted here are the following :- (1) Sri Jiva generally uses the word 'mithya' in the sense of 'asat', though sometimes he may doubt- fully seem to use it in the Advaitic sense of 'sad-asad-bhyam anirvacanīyam'2, (2) the nacre-silver is 'pratītimatra-sattakam' 'i.e. has only apprehensional existence and that also in 'śuktya- daveva' ; outside nacre, however, it has objective existence. It is not 'pratīti-samaya-sattaka' as the Advaitins aver. So, accor- ding to Sri Jiva, there is no question of alternating negation of existence and non-existence of the silver. Indeed, he clearly asserts that the nacre-silver is not created from the nacre, but is

2. Perhaps the second sense in which he uses the word 'mithya' is not the Advaitic sense, but is 'svatantryena anirupya'. 16

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superimposed upon it ("rajatam na suktyuttham, kintu tasmin adhyastam eva". P. 147, Sarvasambādinī).

Dream-objects also are not creations ; nor are they 'mithya' in the Advaitic sense. Even the dream-cognition of being beheaded is nothing but the super-imposition by the Maya of God upon the cogniser of a similar situation that occurred elsewhere. The world is neither 'mithya' in the Advaitic sense, nor 'asat', but is merely transitory, though real. So, according to Sri Jiva, the world is not a tissue of Advaitic 'mithyatva', nor is the Jiva- hood 'mithya'; but, identification of the body and the self and such other kinds of super-imposition are alone 'mithya' in the Advaitic sense. The point needs being stated once again in clear terms that the nacre-silver is 'mithya' only in the sense of 'asat', while the super-imposition here is 'mithya' in the Advaitic sense. Hence, the theory partly adopts an intermixture of Anyathakhyati. and Asatkhyati and partly Anirvacaniyakhyati. Here the cog- nition of superimposition is anirvacaniya, though the cognitum is not so, being clearly 'asat'. But, the world, the identification of the body and the self etc. are 'mithya' in a deeper metaphysical sense. God is different from the world, the Jiva etc., but the latter are non-different from Him, being manifestations of His potency. So, when these latter are viewed as different from and independent of God, they are 'mithya'. But, this mithyatva means 'unascertain-ability as an independent entity' i.e. 'acintyatva'. It is from this meta- physical stand-point that one may speak of acintyakhyati in all the spheres of human experience. In the narrower field of errors, acintyakhyati is applicable in the sense that all these errors are due to Maya, a real potency of God, which baffles and is beyond all thinking ("yā ca nayena tarkeņa viruddhyate tarkātītatayā seyam api acintya" P. 270, Sat-sandarbha),

CHAPTER XVI

TOWARDS A THEORY OF ERROR

Now, I shall try to construct a theory of Error, according to my poor lights and poorer power of cerebration. This my endeavour may smack of blinking prudery, may seem to betray vaulting vanity, or, at its worst, may appear diabolically blasphemous to diehard bigotry. But, as a sincere and meek seeker after truth, I must assert that Platos are dear, but truth is dearer still. And I must further submit, though very modestly, that I have an advantage over the illustrious galaxy of philosophers whose views have been presented here. I am a freelance, owing no allegiance to any particular system of thought, and, in trying to formulate a theory of Error, am not going to fit it into an all-out philosophical system of my own. So, my theory would offer the least scope for self-contradiction and, consequently, for dogmatic assertion. The theories discussed previously suffer mostly from their sectarian bias. Their methodo- logy also, which thrives mostly on the discovery of self-contradic- tion of the rival theories and on Laghava Tarka, are highly suspect. For, self-contradiction need not necessarily disprove the conclusion ; the conclusion may very well be factually right, though the premises be wrong. Likewise, 'Laghava' may lead us to extravagant falsity, while 'Gaurava' may be shown in many cases to represent reality precisely (Cf. "Kiñcaivam antya-tantu- samyoga-paryanta-karana-kalapam upādaya pato'pi nāngīkara- ņīyah ; tanmātrena sarvasya upapatteh" NS). I shall, there- fore, carefully avoid such methodology and shall try to base my arguments on experience so that they may not make wild excursion into unrealistic abstraction of thought. The phenomenon of the invalid cognition of the form 'this is silver' when analysed, yields the following facts :- A nacre is in front of the perceiver. His eye has contact with it and he perceives certain features of the nacre that are present in a silver also. But, before he perceives the specific features of the nacre, the cognition of the features common to the nacre and the silver arouses in his mind the latent impressions of silver previously cognised and the recollected silver is now super- imposed upon the nacre, thus giving rise to the cognition 'this

244 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

is silver'. The 'this' here refers to the nacre, which must be taken as the 'alambana' of the cognition, no matter whether we take 'alambana' in one sense or the other. For, 'arthapatti' or anvaya-vyatireka' proves indisputably that the nacre must be the 'alambana' here, in the absence of sense-contact with which the cognition would not arise at all. The cognition as 'this' is not an indeterminate cognition ; for, the 'this' does not appear uncharacterised ; it, on the contrary, appears characterised, though only by properties common to both the nacre and the silver. So, it cannot be called indeterminate cognition according to the Sankarite, the Bhatta, the Prabhakara, the Nyaya- vaisesika or the Samkhya-yoga or the Vaisnavite views. It is, therefore, determinate ; still it is devoid of recognition and this fact, to my mind, draws the line of demarcation between such invalid cognitions and valid determinate cognitions. Recognition is absent here since the cognition of the common attributes instantly revives the latent impressions of silver which is immediately ideally projected upon the nacre with the result that its specific properties remain undiscovered. From the above discussion we may conclude that an invalid cognition involves an element of smrti, projection of the recollected entity upon the presented datum and absence of recognition. Now, two questions will arise : First, if it be smrti, why do we seem to perceive the silver ? Secondly, the invalid cognition being a complex of two discrete cognitions, perception and recollection, how do we have the cognition as being one and how, again, is volitional activity possible from these two discrete cognitions ? The answers to these, as I understand them, are not far to seek. The time-scheme of the invalid cognition may be presented thus :- At the first moment my eye has contact with the nacre. At the second moment the eye perceives the nacre characterised only be the features that it shares in common with the silver. At the third moment there is recollection of silver and at the fourth moment follows unawares the super-imposition of this silver upon the nacre. Finally, at the fifth moment, I have the cognition 'this is silver'. The above objections are raised on the misconception that the cognition of the first moment combined with the recollection of the silver and its super-impo- sition at the third and fourth moments gives rise to the invalid cognition. But, that is not a fact. The sense-object-contact

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 245

and the cognition of 'this' persists through all these moments and it is the perception of the fifth moment which gives rise to the invalid cognition. So, it is out and out a single perception and not a complex of perception and recollection as urged above. So, there should not be any bar to volitional activity. From this we can make two deductions ; First, the silver, which is really a recollected entity, does not appear as such thus leading to Akhyati i.e. non-apprehension of the recollective character. Secondly, this recollected silver is apprehended as a perceived one, thus paving the way for Anyathakhyati. Thus psychologically, every invalid cognition involves both Akhyati and Anyatha-khyati. But, what is the ontological position of the invalid silver ? Clearly the silver cognised in the nacre is non-existent even at the time of its cognition. For, the silver cognised is nothing but a mental construct projected out- wards upon the nacre. So, it may be said to have only subjec- tive objectivity, not objective objectivity. The Madhvas rightly point out that the recanting cognition 'asadeva rajatain pratya- bhat' proves that the silver is 'asat'. The Advaitin is right when he says in regard to it that 'sat cet na badhyeta'; but, he definitely contradicts himself when he says 'asat cet na prati- yeta' ; for, he himself asserts almost in the same breath that the recanting cognition proclaims the tri-temporal negation of the silver. And this tri-temporal negation is possible only of an 'asat'. To assert that 'sat' and 'asat' are mere contraries and not contradictories, is to commit oneself to the charge of confusing two different provinces of discourse and their temporal frame of reference. So, the silver must be taken to be 'asat'. Hence, the invalid cognition ontologically involves Asat-Khyati and, so psychologically too. But, the silver is not unqualified 'asat' like the hare's horn. Really a totally non-existent entity cannot be super-imposed upon anything. Super-imposition presupposes the existence of the super-imposed entity elsewhere. Hence, the silver, though non- existent in the nacre, is existent elsewhere in the jeweller's shop etc. So, the invalid cognition may be called sad-asat-khyati from two different spatio-temporal standpoints considered toge- ther. It may also be called Anyathakhyati ontologically, where 'anyathatva' will mean 'spatio-temporal distortion' or 'charac- terisation by heterolocative attributes'.

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Incidentally I beg to submit that I do not find much weight in the current contention that the hare's horn, the sky-flower, the barren woman's son etc. should be distinguished from the nacre- silver, the rope-serpent, the yellow conch-shell etc. In this regard I am toeing the line of no less a philosopher than Kuma- rila himself who makes no distinction between the two (Vide Ch. XI). Indeed, both the above two groups involve equally the mental operation in the shape of super-imposition. What, for instance, is a hare's horn but the result of superimposition of an elsewhere horn upon a hare in which it is not ? Just as a nacre- silver is nowhere super-imposed, so a hare's horn also is not super-imposed. Perhaps the distinction between the two groups is asserted because the hare's horn and the like are taken as simple phenomena, though factually they are complex. It would not do to point out that the hare's horn is never perceived and so it forms a separate class. For, the error may be merely concep- tual. But, the sky-flower may be called perceptual illusion also. So, the distinction does not stand to reason. That is why the nacre-silver is said to be 'asat' in the locus of the nacre by many just like the hare's horn.

The efficient cause of invalid cognition is defect of various kinds which has been discussed in the Introductory. But, ajnana as conceived by the Advaitins cannot be taken even as its efficient cause, it being the material cause being completely out of the question. Defects are not privative in nature. They may distort and pervert, but cannot rule out the effect. When the defect is removed, the illusion no longer exists. The illusions like the yellow conch-shell, the bent stick, the parallax etc. persist, even though they are known to be otherwise, simply because the defects on which they depend are not removed. This proves that ajnana is not any cause of illusion, nor does its removal mean the cessation of the illusion.

Badha on the psychological or factual plane is effected only when the defect is removed. But, mere conceptual badha may occur through the knowledge of the proper nature of the illusory phenomenon. So, the Advaitic dogma of knowledge removing nescience only may be conceded, if at all, in the sphere of concep- tual badha only. But, psychological badha only makes one infer

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 247

that the defect has already been removed. So, it contradicts the previous cognition and its cognitum also. It appeare pretty sure to me that Sankara, left to himself, must have held a view which does not essentially differ from the view outlined above. Sankara says that disputationists are all at one in accepting 'adhyasa' as the cause of illusion. Whilo explaining the genesis of 'adhyasa', he asserts that it is due to false knowledge ('mithya-juana-nimittah') and occurs through the pairing of truth and falsity ("satyanrte mithunīkrtya"). He further says that the 'adhyasa' is mithya ("adhyaso mithyeti bhavitum yuktam"), not the 'adhyasta' i.e. the super-imposed entity. Indeed, nowhere does Sankara say that a prātibhāsika silver is generated (Cf. "na tu ahibuddhikale tad-apagama-kale ca vastunaḥ kaścid višeşaḥ syāt" (SB., P. 239, Vol. I, vāņī Vilās press). Instead he says that the super-imposing cognition is false. His definition of adhyasa as 'smrtirupaḥ paratra pūrva- drstavabhasah' clearly points to the elements of smrti, anyatha- khyati and asatkhyati as going together to form adhyasa. This point becomes further clear when he says that adhyasa means 'atasmimstadbuddhiḥ' and anyasya anyadharmavabhasatā'. Though the commentators explain Sankara's expression 'mithya- jñana-nimittaḥ' as 'mithya-ajnana-nimittah', we cannot accept it. For, a few pages afterwards Sankara himself says 'adhyaso mithya-pratyaya-rupah'. That he admits an element of akhyati also is clear from his following statement : "Tathapi anyonyasmin anyonyatmakatām anyonyadharmamśca adhyasya itaretarāvive- kena etc." (P. 2, SB., Vāņī Vilās Press). So whatever the commentator might say, we think that Sankara gives his seal of approval on akhyati, anyathakhyati and asat-khyati equally, but does not seem to advocate anirvacanīya-khyati as advanced by his followers. Now, from the stand-point of Sri Jiva it may be said that since an invalid cognition makes room for akhyāti, anyatha- khyati and asat-khyati equally, it may very well be called acintya-khyati ; for, to explain it by excluding any of these khyatis is impossible and to affirm them necessarily together involves 'acintyata'. But, nevertheless it is 'atmakhyati' also ; For, the silver is nothing but cognitional. Thus, we see that an invalid cognition

248 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

shall have to be explained by calling into request anyatha-khyati, akhyati, asat-khyati and atma-khyati, all taken together. Anir- vacaniya-khyati, however, is an atrocity of logic in the back- ground of illogicality and definitely has no scope here. So, the truth about illusion seems to us to be of an eclectic nature which disapproves extreme, logical hair-splitting that generally turns out to be abortive. I do not undermine logical thinking, but I only want to make myself conscious of the inherent contradictions of thought ; I beg to submit that thinking, which normally feeds on experience, commits the most monstrous atrocities and brings about its own undoing, when it becomes divorced from experience. When logic straightaway denies apprehension, it kills not only the apprehension, but kills itself too. The abstractionist tendencies of thought must be kept under check so that it may be of any use to us. Thinking, which moves in a world of relations, may transcend itself only by negating everything as the Advaitin does, but thereby it negates negation. The bias for a simple system is what generally vitiates the out- look of a philosopher an! encourages him to discard experience and take refuge in abstract logic. Truth need not necessarily yield to a simple system ; it may be a unity-in-diversity like all physical organisms. A forced and forged system, that does not answer to reality, is a travesty of Truth. If, then, somebody complains that my thesis makes a philosopher's occupation gone and his empire liquidated, I must assert that the genocide of experience, that he has committed, justifies the liquidation of his empire and that he would be rehabilitated in his rightful occupa- tion the moment he realises the sovereign principle of peaceful co-existence, divested of all coercion and expansionism. So, we conclude that to say that an erroneous entity is in every sense unreal is as much pernicious as calling it real in every sense ; but, the most pernicious is to deny both reality and unreality of it. Hence, it must be adjudged real in one sense, unreal in another and 'acintya' from a synthetic standpoint. An invalid cognition, therefore, must resolve itself into (general) sat-khyati, anyatha- khyati, akhyāti, atma-khyati, and asat-khyati without prejudice to one another and consequently to acintya-khyati, which is not the negation of thought, but its crowning realisation in and through the pasture of experience.

THE END

Appendix A Ref .- Nirviaya-khyāti (Ch. II)

Venkata in his TMK. refers to a Buddhist theory (SI. 28 in Ch. IV), which may possibly be interpreted as offering a variant of Nirvisaya-Khyati discussed above. He says there that a certain section of Buddhist realists, though denying any form to both cognition and the external object in themselves, affirms it as consequential upon the contact between cognition and the object. To explain, an object left to itself has no definitive character ; it is neither (say) a nacre, nor a silver, but a mere 'it' or 'that'. It, however, assumes the particular form of a nacre or a silver only when it has intercourse with cognition. This particular form is the objective joint property of cognition and the physical object as is also advocated by Broad, Whitehead and other modern realists in regard to illusory phenomena. So, the illusory cogni- tion of silver cannot be explained as being occasioned by a nacre as the sense-datum ; for, the nacre even like the silver is not a pre-existent entity in this theory. So, there being no definitive sense-datum to occasion a particularised cognition, the cognition in question becomes a Nirvisaya-Khyati, an emergence even like that of redness from an admixture of betel-leaf and betel-nut. But, Venkata refutes this theory which he condemns as 'puga- tambula-nīti'.

Appendix B Ref .- Niradhişthāna-khyāti (Ch. III)

The Pancapadika and the Vivaranam on it offer an altogether different argument for the above theory from the Madhyamika stand-point. It may be argued that an illusory cognition need not necessitate a substratum outside the cognitional sphere; for, there may be mutually existing loci of cognition and cognitum and the illusory silver may very well be the ground of cognition and the latter again may serve as the ground of the former and so on even like the seed-and-sprout series. But, the Advaitin points out that such an argument involves the fallacy of inter-

250 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

dependence which is absent in the seed-and-sprout series where the causality at every antecedent stage is formed by a new seed and a new sprout. It cannot be argued now that cognition would have silver for its ground and the latter would have the antecedent cognition for its ground and this one again would be grounded in its cognitum which would have the preceding cognition for its substratum and so on thus relieving it of the charge of interdependence. For, the Advaitin would then opine that such an assumption would go against the Madhyamika postulate of momentariness and would be open to the charge of infinite regress not sanctioned by experience. Moreover, a sublation never assumes the form of a mere negation, but refers to something positive as its substratum. So, a groundless error is an utter impossibility. (Vide Pp. 63-65, Pañca-padika and Pp. 186-187, PPV .- Madras ed.)

Appendix C

Ref .- Sadasat-klıyati (Ch. VIII)

In the 'Bhumika' of the Madras Government edition (1958) of the Panca-padika it is stated that Nagesa, while treating of 'sphota', discussed at length in his Vaiyākaraņa-laghu-mañjūșā the traditional Anirvacaniya-Khyati theory, disaffiliated it in many respects from the views of Sankara which latter he then equated with the Sadasat-Khyati of the Samkhya. I did not go through this 'Bhumika' earlier and so I wrongly surmised that the Mañjūsa was a gloss on the Samkhyasutras by Nagesa. But, now that the source-book of Nagesa's theory is identified, I present here a brief summary of his deliberations in point. Nagesa starts the discussion with the assertion that just as a conceptual sphota-word only has the potency of denotation, so also does the word denote a conceptual something only, without referring to its external existence ("Evam sakyo'rtho'pi buddhi- sattā-samāvista eva na tu bahya-sattāvistah".). Hence the words like 'bandhyasuta', 'sasa-śrnga' etc., which are non-sensical, can take case-terminations and form into sentences. So, our linguistic usage refers to such conceptual objects at least at the first instance and such a contention is quite in accord with the

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 251

Yoga-sūtra "Sabda-jnananupatī vastusunyo vikalpah". In this connection Nagesa criticises the Advaitic concept of beginningless, positive Ajnana and the dogmas of the creation of the illusory object and of arthadhyasa. He points out that ajñana is nothing but non-apprehension and false knowledge along with its reten- tum and it is in no way something positive as the Advaitins aver. Arthadhyasa and the dogma of the creation of (say) an illusory silver are also unnecessary assumptions which merely complicate the situation without rhyme or reason and he thinks that in this regard he is fully borne out by the great Samkara himself. Nagesa asserts that 'anirvacaniya' cannot mean some- thing different from both sat and asat. On the contrary, an illusory silver turns out on scrutiny to be both sat and asat, since it is asat being different from sat and is again sat being different from asat. So, the Sadasat-Khyati theory of the Sam- khya stands to reason. But, if one subscribes to the view of the creation of an illusory object, one has to suppose transformation in Brahman thereby even as clay is transformed through the creation of a jar. Our experience, on the contrary, shows that an error does not transform and vitiate the object, for, the impassioned apostrophes of the lover do not change the beloved even a whit. Moreover, when the Advaitin asserts the creation of silver in nacre even in the absence of its material cause only on the strength of the potency of ajñana, why does he not accept the origin of the cognition through that potency even without the presence of the object ? Even if the creation of an illusory silver be conceded, the cognition will not be erroneous in as much as that silver has silverness inhering in it. As a matter of fact, a nacre-silver is merely a conceptual reality ('buddhi-sadva tat'). Its reality is superimposed, while factually it is unreal ('Tasmad- aropitam sattvam paramarthatastu asattvam ityeva yuktam'). Nagesa sums up his discussion in the following manner :- The object of both empiric and illusory cognition is equally unreal and as such it has neither creation, nor destruction, nor externa- lity. All these are only superimposed by maya which reveals the unreal. This type of Anirvacaniya-Khyati is called 'Sadasat- Khyati' in the Samkhya-sutras.

A SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY WITH ABBREVIATIONS;

(A) SANSKRIT

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A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 253

Nyaya-bhaskara-khandanam by Subrahmanya Sastrin. Nyaya-bindul by Dharmakīrti-NB. Nyaya-bindhu-tika by Dharmottara-NBT. Nyaya-kandalī by Srīdhara. Nyaya-Kaustubhah by Mahadeva Punatāmakar. Nyaya-kumuda-Candrah by Prabhacandra-NKC. Nyāya-Kusumāujali by Udayanācārya. Nyaya-līlavatī by Vallabhacarya-NLV. Nyaya-makarandah by Anandabodha with Citsukha's Com. Nyaya-manjarī by Jayanta Bhatta-NM. Nyayamrtam by Vyasatīrtha with Tarangini-NMr. Nyaya-parisuddhih by Veukatanatha-NB. Nyaya-Sara (Com.) by Srinivasadasa-N. SA./Ny.S. Nyaya-Siddaujanam by Venkatanatha-NSi./NSj. Nyaya-Sudha by Jayatirtha-NS. Nyaya-Sutrani by Gotama-NSu. Nyaya-tatparya-dīpika (Com.) by Jayasimha Surī on Nyaya-sāra by Bhasarvajna-NTD. Nyaya-Varttikam by Uddyotakara-NV. Nyaya-Varttika-tatparya-tika by Vacaspati Miśra-NVTT. Pañcadasī by Vidyāraņya-PD Pañcapādikā by Padmapāda. Pañcapadikā-vivaraņam by Prakasātmayati-PPV. Para-paksa-giri-vajram by Madhava Mukunda-PPGV. Parīksā-mukha-sutram by Manikya Nandin-PMS. Prakaraņa-pancika by Salikanatha-PP. Praka!artha-vivaraņam-PV/Pra. Vi. Pramāņa-candrika by Salāri Seșacārya-PC. Pramana-naya-tattvalokalaukarah by Vadideva Suri. Pramāna-paddhatiḥ by Jayatīrtha. Pramāņa-varttikam by Dharmakīrti-PVa. Prameya-kamala-martandah by Prabhacandra-PKM. Prameya-ratnarnavah by Balakrsna Bhatta-Pr. R. Praśasta pāda-bhāsyam-PBh. Prasthana-ratnakarah by Purusottama-PR. Raja-martanda-vrttih by Bhojaraja-RMV. Ratnapra bha (Com.) by Govindananda on the Brahma-sutras. Rjuvimala (Com.) by Salikanatha on Brhati-RV./Rju. Rjuvivaraņam (Com.) by Visņubhattopādhyāya. Sad-darsana-samuccayah by Gunaratna. Sāmkya-Sūtras-SSū. Samkhya-pravacana-bhasyam by Vijnanabhiksu-SPB. Samkhya-sutra-vrttih by Aniruddha-SSV.

254 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

Sainksepa-Sarirakam by Sarvajoatmamuni-Sam. Sā. Sankara-bhasyam on the Brahma-Sutras-SB. Sanmati-tīkā-SM. Tīkā. Sarva-darsana-samgrahah by Madhavacarya-SDS. Sarvartha-siddhih (Com.) by Venkata-SS./SAS. Sastra-dīpika by Parthasarathi Miśra-SD. Sat-sandarbha by Jīva Gosvamin. Siddhanta-Kaumudī by Bhattojī Dīkșit. Siddhanta-lesa-samgrahalı by Apyaya.Dīksit. Siddhanta-muktavalī by Visvanatha-Si. Mu. Subodhini (Com.) by Vallabhacarya. Suddhadvaita-martandah by Giridharaji Maharaj with Prakāśa Com. Śloka-varttikam by Kumarila Bhatta-SV. Śri-bhasyam by Ramanuja on the Brahmasutras-Sri. Bhā./S. Bh .. Śrīmadbhāgavatam by Vedavyāsa. Śruta-prakāśikā (Com.) by Sudarśanācārya. Srutyanta-sura-drumah by Purusottamaprasad-SSD./Sr. Su. Dru. Syadvada-ratnakarah by Vadideva Surī-SVR./Syād. Vā. R. Tantra-rahasyam by Vadihamsambuvaha. Tarka-Kaumudī by Laugaksi Bhaskara. Tarka-Tandavam by Vyasatīrtha-Ta. Tā. Tattva-cintamanih by Gangesa-Tc. Tattva-Dipanam (Com.) by Akhandananda-TD. Tattva-mukta-kalapah by Veukatanatha-TMK. Tattva-nirnayaļ by Madhavacarya. Tattva-pradipika by Citsukha-TP./Tat. Pra. Tattvartha-śloka-varttikam by Vidyānandi. Tattva-samgrahaņ by Santaraksita with Pañjikā-by Kamalaśila-TS. Tattva-trayam by Lokācārya. Tattvoddyotah by Madhvacārya. Tattvopaplava-simhah by Jayarasi Bhatta-TPS. Upaskāraḥ by Samkara Miśra-UPA. Vādāvalī by Jayatīrtha. Vadāvali by Purușottama. Vaiśesika Sūtras by Kaņāda-V. S. Vanīvilasa Press-VVP. Vātsyāyana by Nārayana Sarasvati. Vātsyāyana Bhāsyam-Vā. Bhāsya. Vedanta-Kalpataruh by Amalananda-VK. Vedānta-Kalpataru-parimalaḥ by Apyaya Dīksīta-VKP. Vedanta-Karikavalī by Purusottama Prasad-Ve. Kār./VKa.

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 255

Vedanta-paribhāsa by Dharmarajadhvarīndra with Paribhāsa- prakasika Com .- Ve. Pa. Vedanta-siddhanta-muktavalī by Prakasananda-VSM./V. Si. Muk. Vedanta-siddhanta-sargrahah by Vanamali Misra. Vedanta-tattva-bodhah by Anantarama-VTB. Vibhrama-vivekal by Mandana Misra-VV. Vivarana-prameya-sarngrahah by Vidyaranya-VPS/Vi, Pra. Sa. Viveka-vilāsa. Vyasa-bhasyam on yogasutras-V. Bha./Vya. Bha. Vyomavatī vrttih by Vyomasivācārya-VVr./Vyoma. Vr. Yatindra-mata-dipika by Srinivasadāsa-YMD. Yoga-Sutras by Patanjali-Ys. Yoga-Vārttikam by Vijnāna bhiksu.

(B) English & Bengali

Dr. S. N. Das Gupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, 5 Vols. do Philosophical Essays. Dr. J. N. Sinha, A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I. do Indian Psychology. do Indian Realism. Dr. S. Radhakrisnan, Indian Philosophy, 2 Vols. Dr. Satkari Mookherji, The Buddhist Doctrine of Universal Flux-Flux Dr. Asutosh Bhattacarya, Studies in Post-Samkara Dialectics-SPSD. K. C. Bhattacarya, Studies in Philosophy, 2 Vols. M. Hiriyanna, Outlines of Indian Philosophy-OIP. Dr. M. N. Sircar, Comparative Studies in Vedantism. Gopinath Kaviraja, Sarasvati Bhavan Studies-Sara. B. S. R. Nagaraja Sarma, Reign of Realism. Dr. A. Roy Choudhury, The Doctrine of Maya. Dr. Nathmal Tatia, Studies in Jaina Philosophy. Dr. Bratin Sengupta, A Critique of the Vivarana School. Ananta Kr. Bhattacarya, Vaibhāsika Darsana. Mm. Jogendranath, Vivarana on AS. Daksinaranjan Sastri, Cārvāka Darsana. Mm. Phaņibhūsan Tarkabāgisa, Nyaya-darsan. Journal of Oriental Research, Madras (193Q)-Joor., Madras. Proceedings of the First Indian Philosophical Congress (1925). Vizianagram Sanskrit Series-Vizi. Gaekwad Oriental Series-G. O. S. Nirņayasagara Press-N. S. P.

256 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

(C) Books Consulted

Advaitamodah by Vasudeva Sastrin. Ātmatattvavivekaļ by Udayanācārya. Brahma-mimāusa by Śrīkantha. Nyaya-nirnayah by Anandajuana. Pramāņa-Parīksā by Vidyānanda. Brhadaranyaka-Varttikam by Suresvara. Vedanta-darsan-Advaitavada (Beng.) by Dr. Asutosh Bhattacarya, 3 Vols. Ajnana by Dr. Malkani and others. Alternative Standpoints in Philosophy by Dr. Kalidasa Bhattacarya. Buddhist Logic by Prof. Stcherbatsky. Buddhist Philosophy by Prof. A. B. Keith. Buddhist Psychology by Mrs. Rhys Davids. Introduction to Purva-mīmamsa by Dr. P. D. Sastri. Jaina Philosophy of Non-absolutism by Dr. Satkari Mookherji. Madhva Logic by Dr. S. K. Maitra. Nature of Truth by Joachim. New Realism by Holt. Nyaya-Vaisesika Metaphysics by Dr. Sadananda Bhaduri. Purvamimamsa in its sources by Dr. Ganganath Jha. Space, Time and Deity by Alexander, 2 Vols. The Awakening of Faith by Suzuki. The Cultural Heritage of India, Vol. II. The Philosophy of Advaita by T. M. P. Mahadeva. The Prabhakara School of Purva-mimamsa by Dr. Ganganath Jha. The System of the Vedanta by Paul Deussen. (translated into English by Geden).

INDEX

Abadha, 53 etc. (A) Critique of the Vivarana Acintyabhedābheda, School, 59 etc. Acintyakhyati, (The) Cultural Heitage of India, Adhipati-pratyaya, 63 49 etc.

Adhyāsa, 2, 9, 13, etc. Dharmakīrti, 1, 2, 5, 9, 10, 78.

Advaitacandrika, 28 etc. Dharmottara, 10

Adrsta, 10 ete. Dignāga, 5.

Akhyāti, 19, 24-27, 49, 50, 73, 89 (The) doctrine of Maya, 57, 69 etc.

etc. Geeta, 50, 56. Alātacakra, 8 (Mm.) Gopīnāth Kavirāj, 24. Amalananda, 9, 19, 60 etc. Gotama, 3. Anadhyavasāya, 1 etc. Gunaratna, 69. Anekānta, Anaikāntika, 70, 71 etc. (Prof.) Hiriyanna, 49, 69, 91 etc. Aniruddha, 52, 53, 55, 58 Istasiddhi, 12, 67, 73, 74, 88. Anyāsaktadrsti-nyāya, 20. Jayanta Bhatta, 5, 7, 8, 9 etc. Apavāda, 63, 77. Jayarāśi, 24, 26, 80. A pyaya Dīksita, 10, 59, 62 etc. Jayasimhasūrī, 8, 13, 29. Arthādhyasa, 9, 85 etc. (Dr.) J. N. Sinha, 69 etc. (Dr.) A. Roy Choudhury, 59, 69 Jñānādbyāsa, 9, 85. etc. Jñanottama, 68 etc. Asambhāvanā, 2. Joint Method of Agreement and Asat-samsarga-khyati, 55, 79 etc. Asat-triksaņa-samāropa, 77. Kalpanā, 5, 6 etc. difference, 66.

Asiddha, 70, 71 etc. Kalpanāgaurava, 57 etc. Avidyā, 1, 2, 58, 68, 80, 91, 83, 86, Kant, 7 87 etc. Kevalādvaita, 78 etc. Aviveka, 49, 50 etc. Ālambana, 26, 28, 65 etc. Khyati, 12, 16 etc.

Ālambana-Pratyaya, 21 etc. KKK, 82n etc.

Ālaya-vijñāna, 64, 78. Kumārila, 2, 29, 54 etc.

(Dr.) Asutosh Bhattacharya, 11 etc. K. C. Bhattacharya, 51.

Bādha, 18, 53, 84 etc. Lankāvatāra, 77.

Bhavanatha, 24 etc. Lāghava, 8 etc.

Bhāmatī, 59, 68, 72, 87 etc. Lloyd Morgan, 72. Mañjūșā, 57 Bhaskara, 2 etc. (Dr.) B. Sen Gupta, 59 etc. Madhva, 2 etc.

Bhattas, 79 etc. Madhusudana Sarasvatī, 60, 90 etc.

Bālakrsņa Bhatta, 14 etc. Mahadeva Punatamakar, 60 etc.

Bhojarāja, 3 etc. Mandana, 26 etc. Manana, 64. Brahmasutras, 56 etc. Candrakirti, 91. Manas, 63.

Cārvāka, 24, 25, 79, 80. Manovijñāna, 63.

Carveth Read, 4. Mādhyamikas, 19, 21, 22, 26, 59,

Citsukha, 2, 87 etc. 60-62, 64, 79-83, 85-87, 89-91 etc.

258 A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA

Maņikyanandin, 1. Pramāņanayatattvālokālankāra, Mithyasamvrti, 77, 78, 81. 24 etc.

Murāri Misra, 29. Prameyakamalamartanda, 13, 24, Nimbarka, 2 etc. 25, 32, 72, 73m, 76n etc. Nyāyabindu, 5. Prabhakara, 2, 19, 24 etc. Nyayakandali, S. Pravrtti, 2. Niralambana, 16 etc. Pratyabhijňā, 2. Nirvikalpaka, S etc. Pramāna, 1, 6, 24, 26 etc. Nirupādhika, 8. Pūrvamīmāmsā, 2, 24. Nyāyakumudacandra, 24, 25, 29, Prasthānaratnākara, 1, 8 etc. etc. Nyayakaustubha, 60, 62. Praśastapāda, 16, 17.

Nyaya, 2, 26, 64 etc. Prasastapādabhāsyam, 16.

Nyayamañjari, 5 etc. Pra. Vi., 71n etc.

Nyāyakusumāňjali, 79 etc. Pravrttivijñāna, 64, 78.

Nyayaparisuddhi, 16, 17, 21, 22, (Mm.) Phaņibhūsaņ Tarkavāgīśa,

61, 68 etc. 64, 90, 91 etc.

Nāgeśa Bhatta, 52, 58-60, Prakāśānanda, 79n,

Nyayasiddhāňjana, 16, 21 etc. Prama, 9 etc.

Nyāyasāra, 17, 21, 61. 68 etc. Rāmānuja, 2, 12, 14 etc.

Nyayasudha, 67, 83n, 86n etc. Rangoji Bhatta, 28 etc.

Nyāyasūtra, 3. R, Nāgarāja Sarmā, 8 etc,

Nyāyavārttika, 66. Reign of Realism, 8,

Nyāyatātparyadīpikā, 8. Radhakrsnan, 91.

NVTT., 72, 83n etc. Rājamārtandavrtti, 3 etc,

Pañcasikha, 49. Sautrāntikas, 13, 59-61, 63, 64,

Paratantra, 77. Śuddhadvaita, 14 etc,

Parallax, 9, 10. Śūnyatāvāda, 90

Parikalpita, 77. Śrīharsa, 89n etc,

Parīksāmukhasūtram, 1. SDS, 65, 81,

Parinispanna, 77. Śrīnivāsadāsa, 17, 18, 21, 61, 62

Parimala, 59. SSD., 87n etc. etc,

Patañjali, 1, 2, 4, 14, 17 etc. Perception, 3 etc. Sarvarthasiddhi, 19, 21, 60-62 etc. Śālikanātha, 24 etc. Purandara, 79. Purușa, 56, Smrtipramoșa, 24 etc.

Purușottamaprasad, 87n etc. Sūnyavāda, 25, 59, 90.

Purușottamaji Mahārāj, 1, 8 etc. Syādvādaratnākara, 24, 25, 29, 71

Prakrti, 56. Samkara, 2, 9, 13, 90 etc. etc.

Prātibhāsika, 57, 77 etc, Śrījīva, 2 etc. Prāpyakāritā, 26. Samkhya, 2, 14, 24, 49-52, 56, 64. Pramāņavārttika (PV.), 82n. Samśaya, 1, 3, 4. Prabhācandra, 13, 24, 26, 28, 29, Svapna, 1 etc. 30, 32,72. Samāropa, 63, 77.

A CRITIQUE OF THE THEORIES OF VIPARYAYA 259

Śrīdhara, 8. Vasubandhu, 64, GS. Sahopalambhaniyama, 65, 70. Vipāka, 64. Sadhyasamata, 70 etc. Vișayavijñapti, 64. Samkhyapravacanabhasyam, 52. Vāsanā, 68, 71, 75 etc. Samkhyasūtravrtti, 52 Vivaraņa, 68 etc. Saduparaktāsatkhyāti, 53, 79 etc. Vimśatikā-kārikā, 68 etc. Sense-datum, 2, 3 etc. Viruddha, 70 ete Smrti, 3 etc. Vijñānādvaita, 71, 78. Svalaksana, 5, 6 etc. Vidyāraņya, 75, 76, 84, 00. Solipsism, 69. VPS., 75, 76", 84, 85" etc. Sad. Dar. Sam., 69n. Vaibhaşīkas, 13, 59-63. Samkara Miśra, 3. Vādideva Sūri, 13, 24, 26, 29, 30, Sāntarakșita, 6 32 etc.

Samvrtisatya, 7, 77, 81. Vallabhacārya, 1, 14.

Salambana bhrama, 7 etc. Vyomaśivācārya, 16, 26.

:Savikalpaka, 8 etc Vyomavati vrtti, 16, 26

Sopadhika, 8 ete. Vaiśeșikasūtras, 16.

Samvādī, 1, 77, 78. Vivekavilāsa, 61.

(Dr.) S. Mookerji, 5, 6, 7. Vātsyāyana, 90 (Dr) S. N. Das Gupta, 11, 17, 90, Vyāsa, 90.

Studies in Post-Samkara 91 etc. Vaināśika, 90.

dialectics, 11 ete. Vedanta, 2 etc.

Sudarśanācārya, 28 etc Vallabha, 2 etc.

(Mr.) S. C. Bhāratī, 57, 59, 60. Veūkatanātha, 2, 14, 16, 17,

(Prof) stcherbatsky, 64. 19-21, 60-63, 76, 90 etc.

Triputisamvid, 29 etc. Viparyaya, 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 16,

(Dr.) Tātiā, 49, 50, 51. 17 etc,

Tattvopaplavavādins, 24, 79. Vidyā, 1 etc.

Tattvamuktākalāpa, 16, 19, 21, 60, Viparyāsa, 1 etc.

62 etc Vrtti, 1, 4, 19, 54 etc. TP , 87n etc. V8M., 79n.

Tattvārthaślokavārttika, 79n. Vikalpa, 3-7, 17 etc. Tattvopaplavasimha, 80. Viśvanātha, 3, 90 etc. Tarka, 4 etc Vācaspati Miśra, 4, 9, 49, 59, 60, Tattvasamgraha, 6. Vyāsa-bhāsyam, 4 etc. 63,72

Upādhi, 8 etc. Udayana, 79. Visamvādi, 9, 77, 78,

Vyāvahārika'57, 77 etc. Vimuktātman, 12, 73, 75, 88, 89 etc Vibhramaviveka, 26 etc. Vedāntakalpataru, I3, 59, 60 etc. Vifñānabhiksu, 52, 54, 56, 58, 90. Yoga, 50, 51, 52, 58, 79. Vijñānasantāna, 78. Yogasūtra, 1, 2, 4, 90. Vaitaņdika, 79, 80, 89. Yogācāra, 13, 56, 59, 60, 61, Vyāsatīrtha, 90 etc. 63-72, 74-78,80.