1. A History of Pre Buddhist Indian Philosophy Ancient India Benimadhab Barua MLBD

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A HISTORY OF

PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

A HISTORY OF PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

By BENIMADHAB BARUA M.A. (Cal.), D.LIT. (Lond.)

MOTILAL BANARSIDASS Delhi :: Varanasi Patna

OMOTILAL BANARSIDASS Indological Publishers & Booksellers Head Offics : 41-U.A., Bungalow Road, Delhi-110 007 Branches : 1. Chowk, Varanasi-I (u.P.) 2. Ashok Rajpath, Patna-4 (BIHAR)

First Edttion : Calcutta 1921 Reprint : Delhi 1970, 1981 Price : Rs. 125

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PREFACE

The present work is substantially my thesis "Indian Philosophy-its origin and growth from the Vedas to the Buddha," submitted in 1917 to the University of London and approved in the same year for the D. Lit. degree. I can no longer regard it as the same Doctorate thesis, since it has been revised, altered and enlarged, though slightly, in the light of subsequent research. Consequently the title of the original thesis has been done away with and replaced by the present title "A History of Pre-Buddhistic Indian Philosophy." The Supplementary Discussions in Ohapter XII, the Post- Script in Ohapter XXI and the whole of the concluding chapter are later additions. None the less, the original thesis remains almost intact in this work in that the changes made therein are immaterial, the general arrangement of its chapters and sections as well as its main conclusions having suffered no violent alteration. It would no doubt have been of some advantage to me, a novice that I am, to get the thesis printed and published in its approved form with the stamp of the University of London upon it. I could not really have made up my mind to publish the thesis in its present form, with certain additions and altera- tions specified above, but for the precious suggestions from Professor T. W. Rhys Davids and the kind encouragement of the Hon'ble Justice. Sir Asutosh Mookerjee, the President of the Council of Post-Graduate Teaching in Arts and the present Vice-Chancellor of the Calcutta University. I have neverthe- less the satisfaction of seeing the work now published with the stamp of my former Alma Mater, the University of

vi PREFACE

Calcutta, and it has been to me not a little matter of pride that I found myself on my return from England in the midst of a band of arduous and talented researchers in the vast field of ancient Indian literature, history and culture, brought together from different parts of the world to advance the cause of learning under the guidance of so eminent a leader, scholar and educationist as Sir Asutosh. Nothing indeed could give me greater satisfaction than the relief I had felt on being back in the midst of my community which has not regarded me as an outcast, as well as my University which has not failed to afford me facilities for work; for, however rebellious in spirit one may be in matters of one's social and religious views, and however insignificant may be one's attainments abroad, nothing can be more painful and disappointing, I think, to a man than to find himself a stranger at home, What this strangeness of situation means to an Indian returning home from foreign sojourn and to an Indian student of ancient Indian literature, history and culture returning to the institutions of his country can better be imagined than told. Just fancy what chagrin a sensible man is apt to feel when after long absence he returns home only to find that his parents, brothers, sisters and others whom he regards as very dear and near to him, are all reluctant, because of the fear of society, to receive him back freely in their midst, or how depressing is the atmosphere to a student who finds, in spite of his earnestness, that in the educational institutions of his country the subjects generally neglected and undervalued are precisely those which are productive and really matter most. Happily the times are being changed. While I leave the book to be judged for what it is worth, I must say that it is not a dissertation on the history of Buddhism or of Buddhist philosophy, the subject being re- served for a separate work. The investigation in it has been closed at a point where the philosophical thoughts and

PREFACE vii

scientific speculations of ancient India reached a stage of development, advanced enough to provide for a necessary antecedent condition of the rise of a powerful movement of thought, wholly Indian in origin and character, seeking to evolve a system of religious philosophy with the theory of causal genesis as its mainstay or fundamental and central idea. But the genetic connection of this work with Buddhism is twofold: (1) that it embodies the results of an investiga- tion which was at first undertaken, at the instance of the late Rev. Gunalankara Mahathera of Chittagong, to ascertain the immediate historical background of Buddhist thought; and (2) that the original data for the conception of a chronology of early Indian philosophy were derived from the Buddhist canon. It was mainly by the light of the evidence of the Tripitaka that I came to perceive three great synthetic divisions in the development of earlier thought. It was again a close comparative study of the first volume of the Digha Nikaya, published by the Pali Text Society, and the six Upanisads, edited and translated by Pandit Sitanath Tattva- bhusan, that first suggested to me the prospect of a very fruitful study of Buddhism, keeping it in constant relation to the earlier and contemporary Indian thoughts in the midst of which it arose and without reference to which its true historical significance and value could not be properly comprehended, even if there were a hundred Buddhist commentators and exegetists like Buddhaghosa to write powerful expositions thereon. Further, I chanced upon a number of parallel passages in the Buddhist Pitakas, the Jaina Angas and the Mahabharata, having bearing upon many daring philosophical ideas now found embodied in the older Upa- nisads, the Aranyakas and a few selected later hymns of the Rig and Atharvavedasamhita. The evidences of these autho- rities have been found invaluabfe as throwing abundant light upon a very obscure but highly important period of throught evolution that had immediately preceded the rise of Jainism,

PREFACE

Buddhism and other later systems of Indian thought. An independent study of the Upanisads and the canonical works of the Jains and the Buddhists made it increasingly clear to me that the so-called traditional interpretation of the ancient Sanskrit, Pali and Prakrit texts had much in it which was an after-thought on the part of the learned scholiasts who, as it seemed to me, were guided more by an etymological conjecture than by a true spirit of research which one must always understand as a quest of truth for its own sake. That there are immense possibilities of modern historioal rescarches in the field of ancient Indian literature, history and culture can be accepted as a truism. When these researches will advance far enough, one is sure to find that the idea that has hitherto been formed of ancient Indian life and civilisation on the basis of traditional interpretation is in many regards misleading. I can say that this work is to a large extent the result of an attempt to interpret the texts in their own light and inter-connection as well as to trace up the development of early Indian philosophy on divergent lines, out of a common background and substratum, and that in defiance of the persistent endeavours of the Indian commentators to prove that in the Vedic hymns and the Upanisads there are to be found only the unsystematised ideas of Vedanta. But to minimise the importance of their works in all respects would be to push off the ladder whereby one climbs up; for the indirect value of their writ- ings as a mine of historical information and suggestiveness is immense. The present work, when judged as a whole and contrasted with the previous works on the subject, will, I think, appear in many respccts new of its kind. But here again to overlook the importance of the spade work done by the pioneers will be to show oneself wanting in gratitude for the invaluable services they have jointly and severally rendered. It is so easy for an unthinking youth to run into a mood of irreverence and to think that he is wiser than all his

PREFACE ix

predecessors. My experience is that whenever a man begins to think he has discovered a new truth, he will be surprised some day to find that he was in some way or other anticipated by those who had gone before him. It is also my firm belief that no attempt is made in vain, and no work is useless if we know how to make proper use of it. In a sense this book is the first definite expression of a dominant will to do some useful work in the world, regardless of the consideration of personal circumstances and equipment, no doubt under the belief, turning with every new success into stronger and stronger confidence, that present ciroum- stances may be unfavourable and equipment nil, yet the very desire to do something and constant acting up to it render at last what was once thought impossible, possible. That is to say, it is the first visible fruition of a series of attempts on the part of a student to fulfil in all earnestness the expectations entertained of him by his teachers and many benefactors, Indian and English, who have in manifold ways helped his will to follow its natural bent. Looking into the genesis of the work, that is, back into my own life, I find that I am just one of the many students of modern Bengal whom Sir Asutosh gave, by timely concessions and patronage, the opportunity of working out the innermost scholarly ambition of their lives. I am doubly indebted to Sir Asutosh for the arrangements he so generously made for the publication of the work by the Calcutta University and the opportunity he gave me for continuing my research work in Caleutta. I am one of those persons who, though born in poor circumstances, have been able to struggle in the race of life with the kind help and encouragement of their kinsmen and countrymen. Almost from the beginning of my schcol career the Government have liberally helped me by the grant of free-studentship and special scholarships in prosecuting my studies in India and in England. I need hardly say that but for such generous help from Government

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the desire that impelled me to move in this direction would have been baffled. The foremost among those whose sympathy was of great service to me in securing Government help, particularly in obtaining a special State scholarship in 1914 for the scientific study of Pali in Europe is the Hon'ble Mr. H. Sharp, Secretary to the Education Department of the Government of India. In connection with this State scholarship my gratitude is also due to H. E. Sir Harcourt Butler, then Education Member of the Governor General's Oouncil and Sir E. Denison Ross, Keeper of Imperial Records, Calcutta, now Director of the School of Oriental Studies in London, who made out a special case for the Buddhist community of Bengal on the representation of its interests by the Chittagong and Bengal Buddhist Associations. Among my Indian teachers, the late Mahamahopadhyaya Dr. Satis Chandra Vidyabhusana, Principal of the Sanskrit Oollege, Calcutta, had always fostered my literary aspirations and tried in every possible way to make my path smooth. His unexpected death has left a gap in the ranks of Oriental scholarship that will yet take a long time to be filled up in Bengal. I owe a very deep debt of gratitude to Professor T. W. Arnold, then Secretary, in the India Office, for Indian students, for it was mainly through bis kind guidance and keen personal interest that I was able to complete my course of studies in England leading to the D. Lit. degree. I am also grateful to him for procuring for me permission of the authorities of the London County Council to use its library and see the working of the primary and secondary schools under its control. Here I must also mention the names of Mr. N. O. Sen, then Local Adviser to Indian Students in London, Mr. R. E. Field, Warden at 21, Oromwell Road and Miss E. J. Beck, Honorary Secretary to the National Indian Association, who by their sympathy and encouragement helped me a great deal in peacefully carrying on my research work. I would pay but a scanty tribute

PREFACE xi

to Dr. Mabel H. Bode, then Leoturer in Pali, University College, London, were I merely to say that she ably guided me in my work, for she really helped me in a hundred other ways, particularly by placing me into close touch with many erudite scholars. I am ever so much indebted to Professor T. W. Rhys Davids and Mrs. Rhys Davids, neither of whom failed to guide me in my researches by their precious suggestions and constructive criticism. The fourteen discourses of Professor Rhys Davids on the scientific method of investi- gation, delivered at the instance of the India Office for my guidance, helped me considerably in imbibing the modern western spirit of research. But it is Dr. Dawes Hicks, Senior Professor of Philosophy, University College, London, who had initiated me in the present historical method of the study of philosophy. I must acknowledge that his lectures on Greek philosophy and modern European thought from Descartes to Kant were found much helpful to me. A deep debt of grati- tude is due also to Professor L. T. Barnett, Keeper of Oriental Manusoripts in the British Museum, for he was the first to rouse in me an interest in the study of Jaina literature, and he helped me also considerably by calling my attention to a few important Tamil works bearing upon my subject. I do not find words to express my obligation to Dr. F. W. Thomas in whom and in whose wife I found much hospitality, the door of whose cottage was open always to the Indologists hailing from all parts of the world. Dr. Thomas never failed to show me kindness in allowing me, in the midst of his arduous duties as Librarian of the India Office Library, to read to him the successive chapters of my thesis as they were written out. I derived much benefit from discussion of several disputed points of interpretation and history, with him and with Dr. Barnett. Professor L. T. Hobhouse has placed me under a deep obligation by revising the thesis from the European point of view, particularly in regard to the interpretation of Greek Philosophy, before it was handed

xii PREFACE

over to the press. The points in which he has differed have been mentioned in the foot-notes. The kind words of en- couragement from Mr. H. M.Percival, late Professor, Presidency College, Oaloutta, my friend Dr. Pramatha Nath Banerjea, Minto Professor of Economics, Oalcutta University, then in England, the late lamented Sir Henry Cotton, Dr. Carveth Read and Sir Thomas Gregory Foster, Provost, University College, London, served as a great stimulant to my research work especially at its inception. Vivid in my mind is the memory of the goodness of Mr. and Mrs. Grubb, under whose roof and beneficent care I revised my work and profitably spent the last year of my sojourn in England in seeing something of the present social, religious and political life of the country. Sir Michael E. Sadler, late President of the Calcutta University Commission, has done me much honour by his courtesy in going through portions of the thesis and offering me some fruitful suggestions. In this connexion I have also to express my deep sense of gratitude to Mr. P. J. Hartog, Vice-Chancellor of the Dacca University, who as the then Academic Registrar of London University, had done all he could to see me established in Calcutta. Mr. W. R. Gourlay, Private Secretary to H. E. the Governor of Bengal and Rai Dr. Ohunilal Bose Bahadur, Sheriff of Calcutta, are two of those kind-hearted gentlemen who have hitherto taken a keen interest in me and my research works at the Caloutta University. I must also put on record my deep sense of gratitude to H. E. Lord Ronaldshay, Governor of Bengal, who has very generously shown genuine sympathy with my researches in the field of early Indian Philosophy, particularly in that of Buddhism. His Excellency enjoys the reputation of a great champion of the cause of Indian Philo- sophy in that he has always tried to impress the importance of the subject on the minds of the framers of the University education scheme, and expressed it as a profound anomaly that the subject has not been given any place in Indian colleges.

PREFACE xii

My gratitude is also due to Mr. W. C. Wordsworth, Officiating Director of Public Instruction, Bengal, for the encouragement I received from him and his kind enquiries concerning the work I had done in England. He himself is interested in the study of Indian philosophy as he expressed to me in course of a conversation, and he too regretted the absence of any provision for the proper study of this subject in this country. Some important additions to the original thesis, made in this work, were kindly suggested to me by Kabibhaskar Sreejut Sasanka Mohan Sen, "Gopaldas Chowdhury " Lecturer in Bengali, Calcutta University, in whom I have found a great Bengali poet and a thoroughbred student of Hindu literature and philosophy. My sincere thanks are also due to my friend and colleague Professor Sailendranath Mitra, and to Rai Saheb Dineschandra Sen, the historian of Bengali litera- ture, Mr. Johan Van Manen, Librarian of the Imperial Library, Calcutta, and my friend Babu Prabhat Chandra Chakra- bartty, Lecturer in Sanskrit, Calcutta University, for kindly aiding me by reading occasionally through the proofs of the book and offering me some valuable suggestions. I am thankful to my pupil, friend and colleague Babu Prabodh Chandra Bagchi, Lecturer in Ancient Indian History and Oulture, for the kind help he has rendered me by preparing the Indexes. Lastly, 1 must offer my sincere thanks to Mr. A. C. Ghatak, Superintendent of the Calcutta University Press, and his assistants for the keen personal interest they have taken in seeing the book through the press.

BALLYGUNGE,

The 27th July, 1921. B. M. BARUA.

CONTENTS

Pages Praface v-xiv

PART I

VEDIC PHILOSOPHY

Introductory 1-7 ... ...

OHAPTER I

Aghamarsana ... 8-12 Prajāpati Parameșthin 12-16 ... Brahmaņaspati 17-24 ... ... Anila 24-25 ... ... ... ...

CHAPTER II

Dīrghatamas and Nārāyaņa ... 26-83

CHAPTER ITI

Hiranyagarbha and Visvakarman ... 34-38

PART II

POST-VEDIC PHILOSOPHY

Introductory ... 39-50 ... ...

CHAPTER IV

Mahidāsa Aitareya 51-87 ... ...

xvi CONTENTS

CHAPTER V Pages Of the Thinkers before Uddalaka 88-96 ... ... A .- Suravīra-Sākalya ... 89 ... ... Māņdukeya-Kaunțharavya 89 ... ... Raikva 89-90 ... ... ... Badhva 90-91 ... ... Sāņdilya 91-92 ... Satyakāma Jābāla 92-93 ... Jaivali ... 98-96 ... ... ...

CHAPTER VI

B .- Gārgyāyaņa ... ... 97-110 ...

OHAPTER VII

0 .- Pratardana ... ... 111-123 ...

CHAPTER VIII

Uddālaka ... 124-142 ...

OHAPTER IX

Varuņa 143-150 ... ... ...

CHAPTER X

Balāki and Ajatasatru 151-152 ... ... ...

CHAPTER XI

Yājñavalkya ... ... ... 153-181

CHAPTER XII

Supplementary Discussions ... 182-187 ...

CONTENTS xvii

PART III

PHILOSOPHY BEFORE MAHĀVIRA AND BUDDHA Pages

Introductory ... 188-196 ... [1. The Metaphysicians- 196-198.]

CHAPTER XIII

[Exponents of] the Doctrine of Time ... ... 199-212

CHAPTER XIV

Āsuri 213-225 ... ...

CHAPTER XV

Pippalāda ... 226-236 ... ...

OHAPTER XVI

Bhāradvāja ... 237-263 ... ...

CHAPTER XVII

Naciketas 264-276 .. 4 ...

CHAPTER XVIII

Pūrņa Kāšyapa 277-280 ...

CHAPTER XIX

Kakuda Kātyāyana 281-286 .. ...

CHAPTER XX

Ajita Keśakambalin 287-296 ... ... ...

xviii CONTENTS

CHAPTER XXI Pages Maskarin Gosāla ... 297-818 ...

[2. The Sceptics -- 318-324.]

CHAPTER XXII

Sañjaya 325-332 ... ... [3. The Moralists- 332-336.1

CNAPTER XXIII

Teachers of Erotic Morals 837-341 ... ...

CHAPTER XXIV

Teachers of Political Morals 842-356 ...

CHAPTER XXV

Teachers of Juristic Morals 857-361 ...

PART IV

PHILOSOPHY OF MAHĀVĪRA

Introductory ... 362-371

CHAPTER XXVI

Mahāvīra 372-404 ... ...

CHAPTER XXVII

Conclusion ... 405-421 ... ... Notes and Appendix ... 422-424 Indexes ... 425-444 ... ... Bibliography 445-448

PART I

VEDIC PHILOSOPIY

Introductory

Rightly or wrongly, it has long been doubted if we can speak of a system of Vedic philosophy. In Is there a system of Vedic philosophy ? order to avoid modern associations of the words "system " and "philosophy," the Vedic scholars have resortod to such expressions as "Vedic mythology," "Vedic cosmogony," and so forth. However, Dr. Lucian Scherman published in 1887 a German translation of a number of hymns belonging to the two collections called the Rig-Veda and the Atharva-Veda, under the title "Philosophische Hymnen aus der Rig-und Atharva-Veda Sanhita." Some seven years later was published the " Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie" by Dr. Paul Deussen. In this latter work, Dr. Deussen freely employs the expression "Erste Periode der indischen Philosophie," by which he means, of course, Vedic philosophy. Here the rcader might be referred to an excellent treatise, "The cosmology of the Rig-Veda" by Mr. Wallis. The works of such writers as Kaegi, Frazer and others deserve special notice. The aim of the writer of these pages differs from that of Scherman and Deussen. The principal The aim of the work, object with which both the scholars seem to have started is to estimate the standard of philosophical speculations, embodied in a few hymns of the Vedas, belonging mostly to the tenth or last book of the Rik. Our aim is, on the other hand, not only to estimate such a standard, but also to bring out the individual element in each of these hymps. That is to say, we principally seek to show that each mode or system of speculation is a crcation of individuality.

2 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPIY

No one knows yet, and there is little chance of knowing

The authors of the ever, who the real authors of all these hymns Vedic hymns, speci- were. Tradition attributes them to a number ally of the pliilosophi- cal ones, are not all of names, such as Aghamarsaņa, Prajāpati known. Parameșțhin, Brahmaņaspati, etc., most of which are in fact names of the deities to whom the hymns were addressed. It does not, however, make much difference whether the names, as given in these pages, be taken as fictitious or real, so long as we know that there is behind the expressions of each of these hymns an individual. If we go by the dictum, that to doubt is to philosophise, it will not be easy to say exactly when the Indo-Aryan sages were not philosophers, for their inspired utteranees, which still survive in the form of hymns and psalms, contain many and Philosophy various inquisitive questions as to whence, doubfing procees of the human mind is oternal. whither, when, and how. Philosophy, viewed As a structure of thou- ght it has its begin- as a mere doubting process of the human ning. mind, knows indeed no beginning of its own. If by philosophy is. understood a structure of thought, which we consider permanently established where we find consciousness of the ultimate categories and also terms to express these, then we may suppose philosophy to have had its beginnings somewhere with individual thinkers, and with those individual thinkers in whose words we trace this consciousness. Philosophy is the fruitful result of reflections on the riddle of existence. These reflections become possible, as Prof. Erdmann holds, only when "the heroic struggle to acquire A penceful timo the conditions of existence has been followed following upon the atruggle for existence by its enjoyment." The reflective movement ia favourable to philo- sophical reflections, as a whole starts from the mythical stage, which start at first and it is only after many serious efforts from a mythienl basis. on the part of the earlier thinkers that it succeeds afterwards in gaining an independent position.

VEDIC PHILOSOPHY 3

This holds true of Greek thinking, and no less of carly Indian philosophy. It is gonerally agreed among the historians of Greek philosophy that the lines of development which proceed from such a mythical basis may be distinguished as the cosmological and the psychological. As to the difference between mythology and philosophy,

Difference between the following observations of Prof. Adamson mythology and philo. are here worth quoting. "The problem of sophy. cosmological speculation differs from the aim of mythology in this : that while the latter represented the connexions between its assumed ground and existing realities after the crude fashion of temporal sequence, the more philosophical view raised the question, -what is the permanent element in real existence and of what are actual things composed ? The change of question implied a restriction upon the frec play of imagination, which constitutos the difference between philosophy and mythology."! The attitude of later thinkers towards the Vedas was far from being one of warm appreciation. In Tho attitudo uf Jator thinkers towards a well-known passage of the Bhagavad Gita the Vedas. (II. 42) the Vedic hymns are compared to lovely flowers, lovely only in appearance. In the Tevijja Sutta (Dīgha-nikāya, I. No. 13) Buddha distinguishes between the later Brahmana teachers and the earlier Vedic sages. Among these sages, again, he regards just ten as the ancient, and as the real authors and reciters of the mantras." But they are all spoken of as those whosc duty it was only to inyoke several deities, such as Indra, Soma, Varuņa, Isana, Prajapati, Brahma, 'Mahiddhi' (=Tvaștar ?) and Yama.

1 The Development of Greek Philosophy, p. d. a The ten sages mentioned by Buddha are-Aştaka, Vamaka, Vamadeva, Visrāmitra, Yamadagni, Angiras, Bharadvaja, Vasistha, Kssyapa and Bhrigu, This list differs to some extent from that given in the "Laws of Mann" (1-85). The Intter gires-Marici, Atri, Angiras, Palastys, Pulaha, Kratu, Vasiatlia, Pracotas, Bhrign and Narada, Elsowhere only the first sevon are mentioned.

4 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Regarding the Brahmana teachers, such as the Aitareyas,1 the Taittiriyas, the Chandogyas, the ' Chandavas' and the Balıvricas,' Buddha holds in agreement with The Brahmana Rchools mentioned in the Brahmin youth Vasistha, a disciplo of the Tevijja Sutta. Puskarasadi,3 that they taught various paths leading to a state of union with Brahman (God). An interest- ing account of this transition of thought from the earlier Vedic sages to the later Brahmana teachers is also given in the Dīgha-nikaya, Mahagovinda Suttanta. In the Patika Sutta,' however, Buddha said to Bhaggava, "There are, O descendant of Bhrigu, some sramans and Brahmans to whom the teachers who Bnddha's estimate of cosmnological ape- culation, ascribe creation to the hand of Isvara,-to Brahma (God) appear as the foremost of thinkers (agranya)." "But I, too, know, Bhargava, this mode of cosmological speculation. I know this, and also know other things far beyond; and having known this, I do not tarnish my knowledge." It is very remarkable that the speculations which Buddha alluded to and described in this connexion, correspond to those set forth in some of the later hymns of the Rig-veda and restated, explained and elaborated in the Atharva-veda, the Brahmanas, and in other such texts. Furthermore, Buddha thought that these earlier specula-

The problems for cos- tions were concerned chiefly with the pre- mological speculation. ens or first beginnings (Pubbanta) and the post-ens or the other end (aparanta), that is to say, with the

' Pali 'Addhariya 'Sanskrit 'Adhvaryus.' Prof, Walleser identifies the Addhariyas with the Aitareyas, In the Aitareya Aranynka (III. 2-3-12) the Bahvricos, the Adhvaryus and the Chundogyas are alluded to apparently as three separate schools. If so, the sugges tion of Prof. Rhys Davida would seem more acceptable. Sec Dialogues of the Buddha, Vol. II. p, 303, # Ibid Dialogues, p. 803. Another rending of ' Bavharija' is 'Brahmacariya' 3 Sutta nipita, Vasettha-Sutta. Digha-nikiya, III. 28: "Santi Bhaggava eke samana-Brahmanē Issara-kutlam Brahma-kattom Acariyakam aggafifam panffaponti." " Aggafifam câham Bhaggava pajunūmi, tato ca uttaritornn pajanami, tuien pajananam na paramosami". ep, ibid, I, 16-17.

VEDIO PHILOSOPHY 5

problems as to the beginning and the end of the world as a whole.' In other words, the main problems of the Vedic specu- lation were: How does the world originate ? In what manner are individual things created? By what have these their unity and existence? Who creates, and who ordains? From what does the world spring up and to what again does it return ? These earlier speculations are to be called, in this sense, Purāņa, Lokayata, or the like. The immediate background of Indian Philosophy is to be found in the cosmogonic hymns of the ancient and early Vedic sages. The first philosophic reflections received The cosmogonio hymne of tho Rig-veda impetus from the daily experience of things, constituto the imme- diate background for changing into one another, and appearing Indian Philosophy. and reappearing at their appointed seasons. Such constant mutations of things of experience must have very early roused wonder in a people, so lively and such keen observers and so much at homc with nature as the Indo- Aryans. Not confined to any particular orders of Brahmans or warriors,-of householders, ascctics, or hermits, there arose a body of men who came to be known in the later literature as Brahmarsis. To Vedie Indians

Philosophy and the they were known by the name of Poets Philosophers. (Kavis), and Poets were the divine philoso- phers of ancient India. According as the Poets were the philosophers, philosophy itself was called Hymn (Uktha),a and hymn-chanting (udgitha)' denoted the act of philosophising. Indeed, there was no other name for philosophy in India than Hymn (Uktha or Udgītha) up to a certain late date, that is to say, until it was replaced by other epithets more suitable.

1 Digha-nikāya, I, 12, 30; Dhammasażgani, 1819, 1820. = Rigveda, I. 164, 6; X, 129, 4. · Ibid, X. 82, 7, op, Aitareya Āraņyaka, II. 1, 2, 1. * Chandogya Upanigad, I, S. 1, eto,

6 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

"Prajapati Paramesthin " seems to speak of philosophy as search carried on by the Poets within their heart Defnibion "Hymn" of or phi- for discovering in the light of their thought losophy. the relation of existing things to the non- existent, i.e., primordial matter.1 Dirghatamas suggested altogether a different conception. For him philosophy was just 'ignorance for the sake of knowledge,' and knowledge consisted but in ascertaining the nature of the onc, single, original cause to which the plurality of all known causes might be reduced." Philosophy with " Visvakarman " is " sampraśnam,"8 "information," "doubt," " true doubt," that is to say, doubt, as distinguished from that of a sceptic,-enlightenment, as distinguished from the ignorance of an agnostic. And if philosophy consists in rightly doubing, and if the immediate background for it was formed by the cosmo- gonic poetry which is interspersed throughout the Vedic hymns,

When could philo- conceivably it was only when, as Prof. sophical qnestion Windelband would maintain, in course of time arise P individual views were frecly developed that the question at last arose as to "the unity and abiding original ground of changing things." The question, as formulated by a Vedic philosopher, was: what is the tree or wood (vriksah vanam) out of which the visible universe was fashioned ? 4 Partly because of the legend of the flood in the time of Manu, which lived so deep in the mind of the Indo- How was the ques- Aryans, and partly because of the ordinary tion answered P experiences concerning the existence, changeability, circulation, distribution, and mighty foroe of water in the world, the answer that naturally suggested itself was-Water. Water is the elementary matter or abiding original ground of things.

1 Rig-veda, x. 129, 4': Sato bamdhūn asati. 2 Ibid, I. 164, 6-7: Acikitvāň cikitugah a Ibid, x, 82, 8. + Rig-veda, x. 81, 4.

VEDIC PHILOSOPHY 7

From this the furthor question emergod as to whatcame into being immediately after water, and before all created things. A furthor question, As to the answer to this particular question, and nnewers, the Vedic thinkers differed from one another. Aghamarsana's reply was-the Year (Samvatsara, the time- principle, the natural seasons); "Prajapati Paramesthin" said, Cosmie Desire (Kama, Eros); "Hiranyagarbha" said, the Golden Germ; and "Narayana's" word was the Indivi- dualised Sun (Purușa). A still further question had to be faced, and that was, from what did water itself spring ? To this Aghamarsana's

A still further answer was, from Night or Chaos (Tamas) ; quostion. "Prajāpati Parameșthin" said, "I know it or perhaps I know it not;" " Brahmanaspati's" answer was-from Nothing; "Anila's "-from Air; and so forth. The cosmological speculations of the Vedas are of the greatest historical importance as exhibiting Indian philosophy in the making. Infinitcly great was their The historical signifcance and influence upon later thinking, whether Brahma- value of Vedic specnlations. nic, Jaina or Buddhistic; Vedic philosophy supplied abundantly rich food for later thought, so much so, indeed, that subsequent Indian philosophy might be viewed as a mere systematic carrying out of the general plan of a structure, tacitly implied or imperfectly conceived.

CHAPTER I

AGHAMARSAŅA

We know nothing of the life-history of Aghamarsana, regarded here as the first philosopher of Aghamarşana, the first philosopher of India, beyond the fact that he, like India. Visvamitra and other great sages, is said to have been a famous founder of family or school. He may be credited with having formulated the views which came to be known in later ages as 'the doctrine of time' (Kala-vada). The hymn X. 190 of the Rig-veda is ascribed to Agha- marsana. It is recommended in all the Comparison of Aghamarşnņa'a hymn Brahmin Law-books1 as one of the purifica- with that of " Prajapati Parameșthin." tory texts. Aghamarsana's hymn was, in no case, later than the hymn X.129, which is ascribed to "Prajapati Paramesthin," and devoted to the same subject of creation. Rather judging from the more crude fashion in which it presents its author's doctrine, it ought to be placed a little earlier than the latter. The common feature of both the hymns is that their authors derive their idea of creation of the visible world from the action of Warmth,-Crea- tive Fervour (Tapas), in the primitive substance called Water. But elements of difference in the two hymns are noticeable. The great peculiarity of the former is that in it the author, the poet Aghamarsana, allots, in one sense at all events, the principal part of creation to that which he calls the Year (Samvatsara), while in the latter the same part is attributed, in the same sense, to what its author calls Cosmic Desire (Kāma).

' Gautama, XIX-12, XXIV-10-12, Baudhayana, III-5, IV-2-5, IV-1v-7, Vasiştlia, XXVI-8 Mann, X1-260-261. Yajñavalkya, 1II-359.

AGIIAMARSAŅA 9

Aghamarsana laid down a theory of creation, involving what is known in history as the doctrine of His dortrine. time. But his is an exceedingly short thesis from which nothing, by way of a clear statement, can be elicited. Nor do we know either what led him to spcak of the Year as being the lord, great creator, preserver and destroyer of all things, until we come to look through some of the older cosmogonic hymns which we understand to have constituted the immediate background for Indian philosophy, as well as through some of the latter Brāhmaņas. First, in those earlier Vedic hymns we see that Season or Seasons (Ritu, Ritus) are personified, and Conception of time or sensons in tho that things are said to have been done and cosmogonie hymus, also to have been revived, or readjusted at their due seasons. The Indo-Aryans used to perform sacrifices, and to drink soma-juice at seasons.1 In two of them ' their authors recognise that Dawn (Usa) and Varuna are ' the ever new,' and 'born again and again.' Regarding Dawn we further learn that 'like a dancing girl' she is adorned, and 'adorned always with the same colour.' 'As a cow gives milk, as a cow comes forth from its stall, so opens she her breast, so comes she out of darkness.' Again, "as a player conceals the dice, so keeps she concealed the days of a man; daughter of Heaven, she wakes and drives away her sister (Night)."3 In the hymn VII, 6-1 the sun (Surya) is considered to be the 'lord of all that lives and dies.' We can even easily trace a Platonic view in many hymns, where Indra is represented as Tvastar,-the Artificer who repeatedly creates through his magio the world of generation.

1 Rig-veda, I. 16, II, 37, eto. " Ibid, I. 113, 1-4, X. 85-17. ' Religiona of India, p. 70. 2. Taittiriya Bidhmana, I. 6-2.

10 PRE-BUDDRISTIC INDIAN PIILOSOPHY

Secondly, in a passage of the Taittiriya Brahmana we are told that the godly Aryans-both priests Exposition in the Bruhmanas. and peasants, were employed thrice in the year, that is to say, during the threc sensons -winter, summer and the rains. In the same passage Prajapati is conceived as the year because it was by the Year that he generated living beings. Similarly, in a passage of the Satapatha Brahmana (X. 4.2.2) the Year is said to have beon Prajapati, the creator of all things, whether animate or inanimate,-and of both men and the gods. As a sort of explanation, it is added that in the beginning the universe was water, and nothing but water. Water desired to produce individual things. It was stimu- lated into energy, and in consequonce, a Golden Germ (solar body) came into existence. This foated abont in spucc for the period of a year. In the courso of a year the Sun (Purusa) was born from the Golden Germ. This Sun was Prajapati. A woman, or a cow, or a mare brings forth within a year. A human child endeavours to speak in a year. For these reasons the year is to be regarded as Prajapati, the lord of beings.1 Now Aghamarsana's views are not so childish as their Aghamarşana's doo exposition in the Satapatha Brahmana. His trine continued. hymn reflects a mind which had the clear perception of things. His thesis is too short for the purpose of elaborate exposition. But he plainly tells us that warmth (Tapas) is the first creative principle from which oternal law and truth were born. From these was produced the Night (Tamas). The Night produced water, and from water origi- nated the Year (Samvatsara) or the time-principle. The Year formed 'in due order' the sun and the moon, the heaven and the earth, the firmament and light, and ordained the days and nights. The year is the lord of life and of death.

1 Satapatha Brūhmaņa, X. 1.6.1, #.

AGIAMARSAŅA 11

Two points are worthy of nole : (1) Aghamarsana's natural- istie conception of the universe, and (2) his emphasis on the eternal existence of law and order in the universe. According to Aghamarsana's view, then, chance has no place in the creative evolution of nature. So far tho doctrine of time is extremely crude, and the term used, whether in Aghamarsana's hymn or in its exposi- tion in the Brahmanas, is Year. In the hymns of the Atharva-vedal the Year (Samvatsara) The doctine of time was replaced by a more general and com- in the Atharva-veda, prehensive term Time (Kala). But the doctrine of timc, as set forth in these hymns of the Atharva- veda, does not show originality of conception, except as regards a vague notion of infinity of time, or rather, of eternity of the time-principle. It is a curious mixture of the thoughts of soveral earlier hymns, addressed to the Sun, Death, Indra, Brahma, Prajapati, and what not! Further, as Dr. Deussen points out, the Atharvana concoption of time is naive fatalism.' Here is a summary of the doctrine of time as collected from the Atharva-veda :- Rohita- the radiant Sun, came into existence as Timc. In the beginning the Sun was the lord of beings.3 Time is no other than the Sun which is thousand-eyed, undecaying, a horse with seven reins or solar rays, the primal deity in the sense that the sun is the source of life, light and heat. Time has seven rolling wheels, mcaning perhaps the seven divisions of 'the year, solstice, season, month, fortnight, day, night, hour.' The seven wheels of Time have seven naves.+ Time

' Atharva-veda, XIII. 2; XIX. 53, 54. ª All. Gesch, der Philosophie, pp. 200, ff. Atharva-reda, XIII. 2: "Rohitah Kilo abharad, Rohitôgre Prajapntih." ' Dr. F. W. Thomns undorstands by ' seven naves' the seven planets. Dr. Ehni, in hie Der Mythus des Yamo, pp. 116-117, suggests that "the seven wheels are the seven worlds which constituto the universe ; the seven naves are the seven sensons which are prodnced by the annnal course of the sun bronght abont by timo; and the axle represents the world of immortality which remains firm and unmoved through all changes of time and season."

12 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN POILOSOPHY

is the creator who creates the worlds of life, and Time again is the Death who destroys them all. Time was formerly the father of the Sun, the lord of beings, and subsequently became the son of those of which Time was tho father, Time is Brahma, the highest, the lord of all. Time is the eternal substance out of which all things are formed, and in which everything lives, moves and has its being. Time is indeed God supreme.

"PRAJAPATI PARAMESȚHIN "

For various roasons, after Aghamarsana we turn to "Prajapati Parameșthin" whose naturalistie " Prajnpati Parn- mesthin" or the Thales views and sceptical attitude are clearly set of India. forth in the hymn X. 129 of the Rig-veda.' Speaking in the most general terms, he may be called the Thales of India. It appears from the above-mentioned hymn that the His conception of thinkers of " Paramcsthin's " time were original matter. divided on these two opposite theories, that Being came out of non-Being, and' that Being came only out of Being. In his speculation on nature, "Para- meșthin " seems to have taken the middle course by rejecting both the theories; for him the original matter comes neither under the definition of Being nor under that of non-Being.ª "Paramesthin," like Thales, offered Water (Salila) as the The original matter fundamental principle of explanation. From is oalled Water : the point about which he Water all things are formed; Water is the was sooptical. original substance of all that exists. He refused accordingly to push his enquiry beyond water, and it was towards this particular question that his attitude was invariably sceptical.

1 Sankara calls it the Nasadiya-sukta according to its theme. The subject of the hymn is Brahman. By this hymn Sankara seoks to eatablish that Prana or spirit is unereated. Ses his commentary on Vedanta-sutra, II. 4-8. * Rig-veda, X. 129, 1 : "Niand āsin no sadāslt tadānīm"

PARAMENȚIIIN 13

His fundamental thesis was :- there was then neither non-existonce nor existence. Then the Hlis fundamental proposition and its existent was not; by this he denied of course import the existence of all concrete things in the beginning.' In his own words, there was then no realm of air, no sky beyond it.2 There was then neither death nor immortality, no visible sign wherewith to distinguish between days and nights,3 that is to say, between light and darkness. If the existent was not in the beginning, is it, then, that The condition of the existont sprang from the non-existent ? cosmie mattor. No, even not that-was his reply. The reason is that the primitive element falls neither under the conception of the existent nor under that of the non-existent. And if he were asked, what was that primitive substance which is to be called neither Being nor non-Boing, his answer would have been Water. There was then water, the unfathomable depth of water (gahanam gambhiram), and nothing but water. " Water was that one thing, breathless, breathed by its own nature," There was darkness (tamas), and concealed at first in this darkness was Water in its indiscriminated or unmanifested form (apraketam). Water was all that existed (sarvama idam). Water, we may suppose, changed itself into the variety How the concrete of things, and changed those things back existence proceeded from the universal into itself. "Paramesthin" did not draw substancc, any distinction between matter and motive power. He identified Being with existence, i.e., change. Water transformed itself into particular things by some inherent principle to which he gave the name Kama, Cosmic

' According to Sūyaņa, tadānīm-pralaya-dastyăm avasthitam (while in the stata of envelopment) ; no sat=naiva sat atmavat gattrena nirvacyam asit (i.e., no individnal thing); in other words, no sad iti paramerthika sattvasya nigedhah. * "Lokā rajāmsi neyamta iti Yāakab," saya Sāyaņa, a " Nasid rajo no vyoma na tarhi na ritrys ahņn asīt praketah." + "Ānidavatam avadhaya tad okam, tasmad-dhanyan na porab kimcan nāsa."

14 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PIITLOSOPIY

Desire. This 'will-to-be' or motive force was not distinet from the material substratum itself; it was regarded by him as the primal germ of Mind or Soul (manaso retal). For "Paramesthin" Kāma was not the will of God, as Sayana understands, although undeniably he thought the inherent reason for change was identical with that which is the greatest and most divine in nature, and with Mind or Soul. Moreover, the meaning of the term, Mind or Soul, is far wider with "Paramesthin " than with us, rather cosmical, and it is no other than the principle of change in general. We shall now endeavour to show "Paramesthin's" notion of gradual development. The cause by which His theory of pro- the series of transformations is produced in gression. water is called Warmth (Tapas). This original principle of change is superseded, in process of time, by a higher principle, such as Kama or 'the will- to-be' (Sayana's sisriksa-the desire-to-crente), which is one, and that by a still higher principle, such as Manas or Mind,-Intelligence or consciousness. Whilst every- thing was void 1 and shapeless, by the power of Warmth was born that unit' called Kama. Kama was the motive force of the changing universe,-the first germ of Mind (manaso retah), and this Mind was no other than the Sun "whose eye controls this world in highest heaven."3 The gods-heavenly beings or godly men-were produced later than this world, and people naturally attribute the creation to the sun, the first-born, self-conscious, individual being in the visible universe .*

1 " Tuochyenamvapihitam." It is dificult to say if by this "Paramegthin" meant to convey exactly the ides of void space, especially in view of the fact that he dietinctly states there was then ' no eky beyond the mays of water' (no vyoma paro yat). In Sayana's interpretation tucchyona =sad asadvilakçaņena bhavarupajn&nens. * Aocording to Sayana, ckam-eklbhūtam kāranam. ' 'Rig-veda, X. 129. 7 : Yo asyadhyaksa parame vyomun." * Ibid, Iyamh visriętir yato sbabhivo.

PARAMESTHIN 15

It will be noted that the philosophical position assumed by "Paramesthin" was that of a naturalist, and that his conception of nature was entirely dynamic. His dynamistio theory of nature, Accordingly, for him the principle of move- ment or development is inherent in matter itself, and involved in the vast processes of nature. In other words, the world evolves from the immanent energy of nature (svadhaya) ; the movement as a whole is self-determined. It must also be recognised that the cosmic process in general is far earlier than the formation of the present sun from whom we derive life and light. He questioned, therefore, very candidly if the sun was the maker of the whole universe. It will be noted here that "Paramesthin's" conception of water and its inherent principle of movement can in no way be identi- fied with the full-fledged Samkhya doctrine of Prakriti and Purusa. But one might perhaps say with better justification that the former exhibits the latter in tho making. Aghamarșana, who is here considered to be a prede- cessor of "Paramesthin," formulated, as we saw, a proposition, but offered no explanation. His proposition was : "From Fervour kindled to its height " Paramegthin's" ex- planation of his eternal law and truth were born."1 As predecessor's thesis. "Paramesthin " seems to have understood it, the action of energy immanent in matter or nature is at its highest at the initial stage of the creative process, as also perhaps on the eve of destruction of the world- system. So he said : when, in course of time, the line of the firmament was extended across water, dividing the heaven from the earth, what was above it, and what below P There were to be seen below the firmament, i.e., on the earth, generating factors (retodha) or mighty forces (mahiman) at work, and free action or self-determined movement (svadha). The heaven above the firmament was the scene of the action 1 driffth's Rig-veda, X, 190.1,

16 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

of dynamic energy (prayati). Thus, indeed, is to be appre- hended the connexion of the existent with the non-existent, i.e., the primitive matter (sato bamdhun asati). It is important also to note that "Paramesthin"

His scepticiem. started his inquiry with water, and did not extend it beyond water. Whenever the question of looking beyond water did press itself upon him, he broke forth quite naturally and sincerely in scepticism. The world-process is far earlier than the thinkers among men, nay, earlier even than the sun, the seer who can view all that happens in this world from the highest heaven. Therefore, who indeed knows, and who can truly say, from what other element than water this universe came into existence ? Even in the case of the sun, the first individual being we may conceive of, and who is generally believed to be God, it is as yet doubtful whether he formed it all, or did not form it,-whether he knows it all, or does not know it (veda yadi va na veda). In a later interpretation of "Paramesthin's" cosmical speculation in the Satapatha Brahmana1 we notice that water is altogether forgotten, and Mind is substituted for it. A later exposition. There was then neither non-existence nor existence, because Mind was at the time neither the existent nor yet the non-existent. The Mind being developed, wished to manifest itself. It sought after itself, toiled hard and swooned. It found 36,000 of its own fires, i.e., suns, made up of mind, established by mind. Mind produces voice, voice produces breath, breath produces eye, eye produces ear, ear produces work, and work produces sacrificial fire. There may be some definite philosophical conception behind this exposition, but the language is too fantastic to make out of it any such meaning.

1 X. 5.3.1 foll.

BRAHMAŅASPATI 17

"BRAHMAŅASPATI"

"Paramesthin" treated water or matter as the ultimate reality, and disavowed all possibilities of knowledge of the ultra-material substratum, if there be any. The historical rela- tion of " Brahmanas- He refused to extend his metaphysical pati to "Parameş- thin." enquiry beyond matter, and when the queg- tion of getting beyond matter suggested itself to his mind, he indulged, as all open-minded naturalists usually do, in arguments which ended inevitably in scepticism. Moreover, in the expressions about his doctrine there is im- plied, as we have seen, a two-fold antithesis, the first of which has reference to the hypothesis that in the beginning Being came out of non-Being.1 From this it would follow that the date of "Brahmanaspati " as a thinker was earlier than that of "Paramesthin." But we do not know whether it was precisely the doctrine of " Brahmanaspati" that "Para- mesthin " was acquainted with. The utmost we can say is that some such theory was ourrent in his time.

Whether of an earlier or of a later thinker, " Brahmanas- pati's" doctrine must be regarded as representing a much more advanced stage of abstraction, on the ground " Brahmaņaspati " that he, like Anaximander, conceived the and Anavimander. cosmio matter far beyond experience.

" Brihaspati " is the name by which "Brahmanaspati" is traditionally known. He is said to have embodied his views about the origin of the world in the His hymn. hymn X. 72 of the Rig-veda. It presup- poses several earlier hymns. The hymn must be considered as one of the most unintelligible, and it would be vain to attempt to bring out anything very definite from it. So much is quite certain, however, that the main

1 Rig-veda, K. 72. 2: "Asatah sad ajtyata."

18 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

object of " Brahmanaspati " was to proclaim ' with tuneful skill ' the order of generation of the gods. His fundamental And it was in this connexion that he set problem. himself to inquire into the nature of the world-ground, and its condition prior to the generation of heavenly beings and all elemental forces. " Brahmanaspati," so far as the philosophical side of his hymn goes, postulated the genesis of Being from non-Being. He Hiel postalate of non-Being: its signifi- nowhere tells us expressly what he meant cation, by the terms Being and non-Being, though tacitly it is implied that the separation which he contemplated between these two was not exactly the strict logical distinc- tion that is now possible for us to draw between what we term thing and nothing, existence and non-existence. As we now define the term non-Being implies nothing, abso- lutely nothing. With " Brahmanaspati," on the other hand, the non-existent (asat, non-ens) was the very world-ground,- the permanent foundation of all that is existent (sat, ens) and of all that is possible and yet non-existent (asat).' For " Brahmanaspati," we may take it, non-Being was and is the very genetrix of law or principle of order (rita, dharma)' in the universe.

The existent originally sprang from the non-existent 3 this is the fundamental proposition which "Brahmanaspati"

His principal thesis, laid down. By the term, non-existence, he denoted apparently the Infinite,-Aditi, corresponding almost to Anaximander's aratoy.+ Like aralov, Aditi is an ambiguous term of which we have not a precise explanation from "Brahmanaspati." Dakşa, the cosmie force,

• Ssyaņa also points out that Asat does not menn non-existent as a cause (asab karagatva). It is, on the contrary, tne adhisthana, the generating cause of the gods. ef. Rig-veda, X. 5-7. Asacca sacca. ... junmannaditer upasthe. 1 Rig veda, I. 1,8, I. 2.8, I, 844, ete. For dharma, ibid, VIII, 86,18, Ibid, X. 72. 2. * Deumaen's All, Geach, der Philosophie, pp. 145.146.

BRAHMAŅASPATI 19

is born of Aditi, and yet Aditi is said to be generated, in her turn, from Daksa.1 The term, Aditi, is explained by Sayana as Earth; by Prof. Muir, as Nature; by Prof. Roth, as freedom or security ; The interpretation and by Prof. Benfey as sinlessness (anāgas)." of the term Aditi. The better interpretation would seem to be that of Prof. Max Muller. He says, "Aditi, an ancient god or goddess, is in reality the earliest name invented to express the Infinite; not the Infinite as the result of a long process of abstract reasoning, but the visible Infinite, the endless expanse beyond the earth, beyond the clouds, beyond the sky."93 The point in which we fully agree with Prof. Max Müller is that Aditi, in one sense, is nothing but the visible Infinito, the endless expanse beyond the earth, beyond the Critivism of Max Mul- clouds, beyond the sky. This spatial Infinite ler's interprotation. is mighty, sinless, immortal, unchangeable, pure and free.4 The earlier antithesis of Aditi is Nirriti, whom Sāyana calls wicked goddess (pāpadevata)6; and the later antithesis is Diti whom Sayana identifies with Niștigri." Nirriti is decay, decrepitude and old age; Aditi growth, development and youth. Nirriti is death, Aditi immortal life; Nipriti is bondage, Aditi freedom ; Nirriti is the mother

Aditi and Nirriti. of darkness, disorder, drunkenness, drought, ill-luck, sin, corruption, and so forth; Aditi the mother of light, eternal law, temperance, shower, good luck, virtue, continence and the like.

1 Big-veda, X, 72,8: "Aditer Daksdjāyata, Dakşād n Aditiņ pari," Yāska cannot make ont how this is possible. "They may have had the same origin; or according to the nature of the gods, they may have been born from sach other,-hence derived their substance from one another." Muir's Original Sanskrit Texts, IV. 13. " Grifith's ' Rig-veda,' I. 24,1. Max Maller's translation of the Rig-veda, I. 280 Rig-veda, I. 24,1 ; I, 24,15 ; etc. 5 Ibid, I, 249 ; I. 20.6; V, 41.17; VI, 742; efo, Ibid, V. 62,8; "Aditim Ditin ca; X. 101.12,

20 PRE-BUDDHISTIO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Aditi as the endless expanse beyond the sky seems to have been desoribed by "Brahmanaspati" as the daughter of Dakşa- Aditi the visible the potent energy, the Oosmic Force, the Infinite. genetrix of the immortal gods.1 But Aditi denotes also the Earth, meaning the endless expanse of the horizon. Aditi as the endless expanse of the horizon is said to have sprung from Uttanapada, a term of which the meaning is uncertain. From this Aditi were born the regions or quarters of the horizon.2

ADITI.

ADITI.

EARTH.

ADITI.

That which is generated from the infinite is infinite in

The contrast nature, and that which is infinite in nature, Indnity with Anite of

thinga. is immortal in life. The regions are accord- ingly infinite and immortal, and so too are the seven sun-gods (Adityas). The sun, from whom we derive light and heat is known as Sūrya or Mārtanda. He was recognised by "Brahmanaspati" as the last born among the sons of the Infinite, and as the first-born among the finite things of experience. The visible sun being finite in nature, is different in appearance from his elder brothers,- Mitra, Varuna, etc., who are all infinite, and considered there- fore to be the darlings of their mother Aditi-the Infinite.3

1 Rig-veda, X. 74.5. Ibid, X. 72.4. 1 Rig-veda, X, 72.8

BRAHMAŅASPATI 21

The gods' who were born after Aditi, daughter of Dakşa, as sharers of immortal life, brought forth the visible sun who

The procoas of was lying hidden in the sea. As " Brahma- generation. naspati " put it picturesquely, they " kicked up in dancing" the particles, which formed all existing things. Originally, they were " in yonder deep close-clasping one another," and it was therefore only by a process of separa- tion that they attained their respective existences. The sun-gods, although represented as brothers, denote in & sense the ancestry of the visible sun. They were born, as we are told in the Taittiriya Brahmana," at different times from the body of the Infinite, by the grace of the mighty gods of old.4 From Daksa-the Oosmic Force-was born Aditi-the endless expanse beyond the sky. The order of genora- tion of the gods After her were born the Sadhyas or Ele- mental Powers, Potentialities. With the help of Elemental Powers Aditi brought forth the eight sun-gods at different times. Similarly, from Uttanapada ("Produotive Power") sprang Aditi-the endless expanse of the horizon, and from that the regions. This is the order, this the mode, in which the gods were generated. We agree with Prof. Max Muller that the conception of Aditi as the daughter of Daksa or Uttanapada was not the result of a long process of abstract reasoning. Aditi -- an abstraot conception. But it cannot be denied that in " Brahma- naspati's" conception of Aditi as the mother of Daksa we reach a pure abstraction,-" a last remembrance of the religious home in which scientific reflection arose."

1 Probably the SEdhyas whose dwelling place is the aky according to Yaska .. Rig- veda, I. 164,50, ! Wallis : Cosmology of the Rig-veda, p. 48; Rig-veda, X. 72.6. 1 I. 1.9.1 foll. * The Sadhyas-Fire, Air, eto. Deusson says: "Die erste und alteste Philosophie eines liegt in seiner Religion." The first and oldest philosophy of a people lies in their religion. All. Gesch. der Philesophie, p. 77,

22 PRE-BUDDHISTIO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Aditi as the daughter of Daksa was conceived as existence, while Aditi as the mother of Daksa was conceived as non- existence. For " Brahmanaspati" Aditi as Aditi and Diti: Non-Being and Being. the endless expanse beyond the sky did approximate to the conception of Aditi as non-existence.1 Indeed, the former notion seems rather to have been represented by Diti, representing the bounded space beyond the heaven and the bounded horizon on the earth."

ADITI.

DITI.

DITI.

ADITI. EARTH ADITI.

DITI.

ADITI.

Thus] "Brahmanaspati " postulated Aditi or Infinity as the primitive matter which is non-existent in the world of

1 Rig-veda, X. 72,9. ' Ibid, V. 62.9. By Aditi Sayana understands the earth as an indivisible whole, and by Diti the individual beinga and things. According to Prof. Muir, the two words-Aditi and Diti, together denote " the entire aggregate of visible nature." Original Sanskrit Terte, V, pp. 42-43. Here we have followed Griffith's interpretation.

BRAHMAŅASPATI 23

experience. This primitive matter was called by him the Infinite, for, were it finite, it would have ex- Why is Aditi called the non-existent! hausted itself in the ccaseless activity of pro- duction. But he had seen that the predicate, non-existent (asat), is essential to theconception of the Infinite. In calling Infinity the non-existent, he had probably meant only to insist that there is nothing in the universe of ex- perience which corresponds to it, the fact being that it can be only approximately expressed by Diti or the so-called visible Infinite. Infinity is, according to " Brahmanaspati," the permanent world-ground from which we must derive all changes or existences, actual and possible (sacca asacca).' Thus he transferred the cosmic substance beyond experience, and in so doing he sought naturally to satisfy the The ntility of the conception of Aditi. demand made by the coneeption of the Im- mortal, Unchangeable, Pure and Free. Though no object of oxperience corresponds to it, he insisted that for explaining experience it is indispensable to assume such a conception behind experience. This seems to have been the meaning implied in the postulate of " Brahma- naspati," that in the beginning Being came out of non- Being. A passage of the Taittiriya Brahmana2 furnishes a later exposition of " Brahmanaspati's" doctrine, now intermingled with that of " Paramesthin." The interest The Brahmanic ex- of this exposition is that it throws some position of " Brahma- paapati's" doctrine. light on the mode in which the sun-gods were conceived as generated from the Infi- nite. Stripped of Brahmanie fanoy, the exposition is as follows :- The universe was at first non-existent. There was neitber the heaven nor the earth, nor the mid-air. Being non-existent, 1 Rig-veda. 2 T. 11.2.9.1. foll.

24 PRE-BUDDHISTIO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

it desired to be, and thus the cosmic process set in. Conse- quently, smoke was produced. Smoke was followed by fire, fire by light, light by flame, flame by rays or radiance, that by blaze, which became gradually condensed like a cloud or vapoury mass The cloud poured down rain which appeared as water, fluid. From water were formed the earth, the mid- air, and the sky. Mind (Manas) was, in like manner, generated from the non-existent. Mind created Prajapati, and he the world of beings. On Mind rests all that is. Mind is there- fore called Brahma, the Divine.

" ANILA "

The doctrine of " Anila," like that of " Paramesthin," was

" Anila's " doctrine: kept within the bounds of experience. For ita defeot. "Anila " the principle of things (ritava) was Air (vayu, anp).1 This principle, like that of Anaximenes, possesses the inherent capacity for movement. Air was con- ceived accordingly by "Anila" as the monarch or ruling forue of the universe (bhuvanasya raja). He called Air the friend of water,-the first born, endowed with the gonerating principle.2 Air travels, we are told by " Anila," without rest or sleep, on the paths of the firmament. Air is the soul or vital spirit of the gods, in air lies the origin of the Universe, Air wanders ever as it listeth.8 Air has no visible form (na rupam), but it has a voice of thunder. Its voice is heard, and by that its existence is made known to us. " Anila " attempt- ed no solution of the main problem as to the source from which Air itself came into being.4 Once more we meet with the doctrine of " Anila" in a Vedic hymn, namely, the hymn XI. 6 of the Atharva-veda, and this time in a rather more developed and mystical form. 1 Rig-veda, X. 168. : "Apăm sakhs prathamajs ritovs," Big-veda, X, 168.8, "Atmi devanam bhuvanasya garbho yathavasam carati deva esah." Big-veda, X 168.4. · "Khasvijjőtab kuta ábabhūra." Rig-veda, X. 168.8.

ANILA 25

In this hymn the term Vital Breath (Prana) is substituted for Air (vāyu). We are told that the vital breath is the controlling power of all that we perceive, the vital breath is Anila's doctrine as expounded the the lord of all, on the vital breath everything Atharva-veda, in rests.' It is in obedience to the thundering voice of the vital breath that the plants are feoundated, that they conceive and multiply. When the season arrives, the vital breath causes the rejoicing of whatever is upon the earth. It is when the vital breath waters the earth with rain that the plants and all kinds of herbs spring forth. The vital breath, clothes the creatures, as a father his dear son. The vital breath, indeed, is the lord of all,-of all that is animato or inanimate.2 The vital breath is known, in respect of the universe, as Air (vala) or wind (Matarisvan, Air in motion), while as to man, it denotes in-broathing (prana), the opposite of which is called down-breathing (apana). Without doubt, air is the substance that a man breathes in (inhales) and also breathes out (exhales) while in the womb, and it is when the vital breath quickens the embryo that it is delivered forth. While a man sleeps, the function of breathing is carried on cease- lessly. It is therefore said that a man sleeps while the breath keeps guard over his vitality without sleep or rest. All that is (bhuta) and all that will be, truly, are supported upon the vital breath. But the vital breath is also death; it is fever (takman). The gods worship it,3 for it shall place the truth-speaker (satya-vadina) in the highest world. It is the guiding power (virat destri), it is the sun and moon, and the lord of beings (Prajapati).

1 " Prūņāya namo yasyn sarvam idum vaso. yo bhūln sarvasyesvaro yasmin sarvem prntigthitnm." Atharva-veda, XI. 6. 1. : Ibid, XI. 6. 10: Pritnohn sm vaayesvaro yacee pranati yacen na, The gods rogard Prana is bhuti or being, while the demons regnrd it as ahhiiti or non-boing. Aitareya Arnuynkn II. 1. 8. 6-7. 4

CHAPTER II.

DIRGHATAMAS AND "NARAYANA." The strongest movement of Vedic thought is, as we have seen, in the direction of deriving philosophic The central point of interest for Vedic ape. abstraction from the world as experienced. culation. A strikingly familiar example of this is afforded by the conceptions of the sun. From the very earliest times the sun was recognised " as at once the germ and the creator of the universe."' While these prehistoric notions were tending steadily towards a definite end, Dirghatamas gave out his speculations about the visible universe and the position of the sun in the whole system.2 Dirghatamas 8 seems to have maintained.4 that all living

His conception of the beings rest and depend ultimately on the sun, sun. He compared the sun to a chariot, fitted with one wheel, which revolves with its axle heavy-laden, but not heated, and with its nave unbroken from time im- memorial.5 The wheel has twelve spokes, representing the twelve months. A year with twelve months consists of seven- hundred and twenty days and nights together,' and the additional days and nights go to form the intercalary month. The year is divided into a certain number of seasons.

1 Wallis : The Cosmology of the Rig-vede, p. 80, " Dr. Deussen observes that ihe theme ot both these hymns-X. 129, and I. 164-is the same. The unity in the plurality of the phenomena of the universe (Walterschoinungen),- except so far As the method goes, the latter is more analytic, and the former more synthetie than the other, All. Gesch. der Philos, p. 105. 3 Dirghatamas in alluded to in the hymns of the Rig.veda (I. 160. 6; IV. 4. 13; VIIT. 9. 10), as a fomous sage. He was the son of Ucathya, and his mother's name was Mamatu. He died probably at the age of sevonty (Rig.veda, I. 160. 6). He lest hia eye-sight at an early age, nnd remained blind during the remaining years of his life, A protty long legendary account of his life is to be found in the Mahabhirata. We do not kuow ezactly the cause of his blindneas. So far as it may bo premised from the hymn I. 100, he was a warrior-a charioteer who was east by his enemics, bound hand and foot, in n river. Bnt mysterionsly his life was snved. + Rig-veda, T. 164. 12. 5 Ibid, I. 164, 2. 18, 4 Toid, T. 104. 48,

DIRGIIATAMAS AND NĀRĀYAŅA 27

Dirghatamas speculated about the nature and the cause of

The cauge of the the motion of the sun, The sun, held up and motion of the sun. propelled by its inherent force (svadha),' goes backward and comes forward,' and clad in accumulative and diffusive splendour, travels without stoppage within the worlds.' Like a herdsman, the sun never stumbles as it moves on its fixed and familiar path across the sky. The sun and the moon move ceaselessly in opposite directions.

His account of the relation and the phases of the sun and

The contrast botween the moon shows some acuteness. The sun the phases of the sun is boneless, the moon bony, and the bonc- and the moon. less supports the bony.3 The moon is called bony, perhaps, hecause the bonelike apots are visible on its orb, and the sun boneless obviously for the reason that no such spots on its diso are visible to the naked eye. The sun is said to be born an immortal, the moon a mortal, and the relation between the immortal and the mortal is that of two brothers.® The sun is said to bę immortal, because it does not apparently wax and wane, and the moon is said to be mortal, because its phases do change very often. Men can always mark the one, and are unable sometimes to mark the other.

Far more important is what Dirghatamas said of the

Tho component ele- component substance of the sun. The sun ment of the sun; its relation to Bre and is composed, we are told, of a grey coloured lightning. substance (palita), and so too are lightning and fire. Indeed, the sun, lightning and fire must, so far as their component substance goes, be looked upon as three brothers.

1 Rig-veda, I. 164. 80. a Ibid, T. 104. 31. a jbid, I. 164. 31. 4 Ibid, I. 161. 3R. 5 Ibul, I. 164. 4. f. lrillebrindt's Vedische Mythologie, 1, p. 338, " Big-veda, I. 164. 30. " Amartyo maityena sayonih."

28 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPIIY

Of them, the sun is the first brother, lightning the second, and fire the third.' Fire is that brother whose back is sprinkled with ghee (ghritapristha); lightning is that brother who lies enveloped in his mother's bosom (cloud)"; and the sun is that brother whose body is effulgent, who possesses the seven rays, and who rested during his infancy "in the dank rows of cloud."s The grey-coloured substance of which the sun, lightning

The primitive sub- and fire are composed is "the lovely germ of slance, whatever it plants,-the germ of waters."+ It is to the may be, is one. one and the same substance or principle that the savants give many a name.5 They call it Agni, Yama, Matarisvan. They call it sometimes Indra, Mitra, Varuņa, Agni, Garutman. The sun delights men with rain in season. The tempest clouds (parjanya) infuse life into the earth The aun's part in the life-procoss of the in the form of rain, and various kinds of world. fire reanimale the heaven. The clouds are formed by water, rising up in uniform manner and falling in the course of time again." The clouds form the waterfloods, and low like a buffalo. From the clouds water descends in streams, and from this water the world of life derives its being or sustenance. Indeed, water is the imperishable substance wherefrom cloud and rain are formed .? The heaven (Dyaus) is our father, this great earth our

The hive roois of mother, and tho mother shares the genera- things. ting principles with the father. Obviously, the generating principles are, according to Dirghatamas, these three-water, fire, and air. But it is also implied that the

1 Ibid, I. 164. 1, lightning-aśnah. # Ibid, I. 164 82. 8 Thid, I 164. 9. + Ibid, I. 164. 52. " brihamtamh apăm garbham darsatam oşadhīndm." . nid, I. 164. 40. "Ekom gad vipra babudha vađamti." Ibid, I. 164. 41. T Tbid, I. 164. 42. inrperishuble=akşara, " tatah kşaratyākşarumn, tad visvam upajīrati."

DIRGHATAMAS AND NĀRĀYAŅA 29

roots of things are these five in all, earth, waver, fire, air and heaven, and that all these are reducible to one and the same primitive substancc.

The farthest limit of tho earth can be represented geo- His ignoranco o1 metrically by the ciroumference of the altar, agnosticiem. and the centre of our world by the sacrifice laid on the altar. It is conceivable that Brahman is the word (Vak), the resting place of which is the highest heaven .! We can also conceive that the multiform principles of things are traceable in one and the same cosmic matter. And yet we have to confess "what thing I truly am I know not clearly: mysterious, fettered in my mind I wander." If it can be reasonably supposed that we are from the same primitive substance of which the sun, lightning, and fire are composed, or bricfly, if the sun be "tho germ and the creator of the universe," even theu we must bo prepared to answer the question which Dirghatamas brought into the foreground, with a view to dispel his own doubt.3 His question to all the great and wise thinkers was-What is that one original abiding element which, manifested in the form of the unborn sun, has established and upholds this world-system ?

"Hence the trend of thought," as Dr. Henry Stephen would have put it, "is towards the idea of single absolute and self-subsistent principle which is infinite in the sense of being inexhaustible power; and towards the view that all finite things and products of the self-evolution of correlated

1 Big-veda, I. 164. 35, "Iynmh vedi paro wntah prithivyā, ayata yajño bhavanaaya nåbhih-Bralmayam Vacah parnmam ryomn." The altar is the image of the carth or world. The signifoation of this dictum is twofold. In the language of art, it means thnt the altor is symbolical of the idea of the universe Geometrically, it is the rapresentatiou of the configuration of the earth. " Ķig vedn, I. 104, "na vijānāmi yadi vedam asmi niņyaų enmnaddho maunaā carāmi." * Ibid, I. I64, 6 " acikitrūn cikituyné cidntrn Kavin pricchāmi vidmano na vidrīn."

30 PRE-BUDDIIISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

factors of one universal system and plan, and that the world therefore is a unity."1 It is all very interesting to observe by way of retros- pect that the attitude of Dirghatamas towards the deepest problem of philosophy savours of agnosticism. But he per- sistently tends to derive the many from the one single, ordaining, sustaining, co-ordinating self-existent principle of which all known forces, laws, and movements are various manifestations. The nature of ultimate reality is however unknown, and probably unknowable. Tho world of expe- rience is conceived as a systematic unity, the whole of nature being a sort of Divine machine evolving and work- ing itself to an end by some fixed and uniform laws of motion, interaction, and so forlh. All physical phenomena, states and processes can bo accounted for by the principles of mechanics and physics, while the final question of their origin and interaction remains ever. insoluble. There is nevertheless to be felt bchind all these the presence of an unseen hand at work, the play of a deep mystery that ever eludes man's grasp. Although the mysterious is always the mysterious, Dirgha- tamas advanced far enough to suggest that it is the un- born, unchanging cause of the ever-ficeting show of created things, and that whatever its real nature, it seems to partake more of the material and less of the spiritual. The world as a whole is guided on towards a path of progress by two principles-active and passive, compared to two birds roosting on the same world-tree. One of them eats fruits, while the other does not ent, but silently reflects only.' It is thus that the whole of nature is moving along the road to an end. These principles are however emanations from the same unborn, energising force. These are inseparable comrades. ' The Problems of Metaphy sics, 5th editiou, p. 811 1 Big-veda, I, 164 20, Yāska, Nirnkt, XIV 80.

DIRGHATAMAS AND NĀRĀYAŅA 31

(2) "Narayana."-The theoretic desire to determine the nature of the first cause of the world was very keen among the Vedic thinkers, and conceivably it grew keener

Dirghatamas's anti- when Dirghatamas formulated it into a cipation of "Narhya- definite problem. Dirghatamas himself could na's" viewe. quite realise that in order fully to apprehend the nature of the first cause of the world, it is not enough to accept the postulate of oneness of the cosmic matter as a mere truism. Assuming that the present sun is the source of life and light, the enquiring mind wants yet to have a clear and definite knowledge of that one original, undivided, universal being from which the sun derived its life, or of which the sun is the present representative. The view of "Narayana" is embodicd in the hymn X 90 of the Rig-veda.1 This hymn has two sides-the philoso- phical and the social. As regards its philosophical side, this hymn exhibits "Narāyana's" philo- clearly the mode in which "Narayana" a ophy. attempted for the first time to form the conceptions of God, soul and their relation. "Narayaņa" conceived the visible sun, whose diameter is ten fingers,ª as the soul (Purusa) of The sun is the soul of the universe; its the universe, and that soul as the principle Ciemeter. of all that is and of all that is to be.8 The sun as the soul of the universe was described by him as " The lord of immortality.'" Far greater than Purusa the visible sun was Purușa the

The original sun or original sun." This latter Purusa was posited solar body : it is God. by "Narayana " as the one-the first cause of the universe, nay, the universe itself.

1 See also Atharva-veda, XIX. 6. ' Rig-veda, X. 90. ì: " dasôhguloth." 3 Tbid, X. 90. 2: " Purugo evôdarh sarvam yed bhūtam yao ca bhavyam." * Ibid, X. 90. 2: "nmritatvasyfino." Ibid, X, 90. 3

32 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPIIY

The visible sun and the original solar body were called alike

The idontity of God Purusa, because both were regarded by and Soul. "Narayaņa " as identical in all respects save in size. According to "Narayana," the sun from which we now derive light and heat must be viewed only as the present relic or representative of the original solar body.

"Narayana " also conceived the original solar body as split up, somehow or other, in two. Three-fourths of it went up, and the one-fourth remained here.1 From the three-fourths which went up was produced Viraj,ª the 'The process in which luminous body of which the sun, the moon, this universe was gra- dually formed from the the planets and the myriads of stars are so primitive solar mass. many offshoots, And from the one-fourth which remained here below was formed, through the process of cooling, this earth with all animate and inanimate things. Thus in "Narayana's" conception Purusa (God) is the first cause of the universe. It is from Purusa that the sun, the moon, the earth, water, fire, air, the mid-air, the sky, the regions, the seasons, the creatures of the air, all animals, all classes of men, and all human institutions had originated.

But since it is implied that cause and effect are identical in essence, Purusa must also be viewed as the universe or totality of things. As every particular thing is from Purusa, so the

God, World, and sum-total of all particular things is Purusa. Soul. True, that Parua and the visible universe are identical in substance, which is a constant quantity. And yet this universe cannot be called Purusa, inasmuch as it is so transformed that it no more resembles the original solar body. If there be anything in the visible universe which has claim to the name of Purusa, it is the sun. The sun must then be considered to be the soul of the universe. This soul is in the universe; yet it is not the

1 Rig-vedn, X. 90. 3; X.90 4. * Ibid, X, 90, 5,

DĪRGHATAMAS AND NĀRĀYAŅA 33

universe, but something totally different in its nature. Indeed, the sun is but the eye of the universe. It is thus made increasingly clear that the famous Purusa Sūkta of the Rigveda is far from presenting us with a Samkhya doctrine of Purusa and Prakriti, Soul and Matter. A mere analogy of two words cannot be held as a definite proof of the identity of two doctrines.1 "Narayana's" social theory is an accidental secondary feature of his doctrine. As a philosopher, his object was to establish that everything in this universe " Nar&yana's" theo- retic dofence of the is from Purusa. He found the four classes system of closs-distine- tions in society of men-Brahmaņas, Rajanyas, Vaisyas, and Sudras-already existing in his time within the pale of the Indo-Aryan community. He does not seem to have taken the least trouble to enquire whether the distinction of four classes was based originally upon a mere division of labour or otherwise. Taking these classos as he found them, he asserted that the Brahmana was the mouth, the Rajanya waa made of the arms, the Vaisya was the thighs, and the Sadra was produced from the feet of Purusa,3 and this was all that he said by way of illustration of his main dootrine. But it is clearly implied in his expressions that his views were absolutely in favour of the existing caste- system or class-distinctions. The ground on which he defend- ed the theory of caste was that such a system obtains in the organisation of the universe, and why not, then, in human society ? If there may be class-distinotions among the gods, then why not among men ? Hence the Purusa-Sukta may be rightly considered as the first theoretic basis of the Catur- varnya system of the Brahmans.8 I The view criticised nbore is to be fonnd in the Maudgalopaniged which is a com- montary on the Puruşa-Sūkta Rıg-Veda, X. 99. 12. "Brīhmandaya mukhnnı Esıd bēhu Rajanya krita, urī tad asya yad Vaisyah padbbyum Sudro ajāyata " Cf Manu-Samhit&, 1. 81. ' Of. Poroşavidha-Brāhmaņa in the Brihad Aranyake Upanisad,

5

CHAPTER III. " Hiranyagarbha" and " Fisvakarman." It has been observed by Dr. Windelband that the incli- nation of philosophers to view " Deity " as the highest concep- tion is a phenomenon which constantly Necessity for the conception of God. recurs in history.' There arises an unavoid- able necessity for uniting religion and philosophy in fruitfal and indissoluble marriage. The chief aim of philosophy, as modern usage understands it, is to ex- plain the world, and the religious consciousness leads man to rise above all that is multiform, finite, mutable, earthly and brutal in him to that which is one, infinite, immutable, celestial and divine. And it is thus that a need arises to- build up a philosophioal theory on a theistic bisis. "Brahmanaspati's" Aditi, as well as Anaximander's Infinity, was undoubtedly "the first philosophic conception of God, the first attempt, and one which 'The development of the idea of God. remains still entirely within the physical, to strip the idea of God of all mythical form."" Almost in the same stage were " Narayana's" con- ceptions of Purusa-God and Soul. The conceptions of "Hiranyagarbha" and " Visvakarman" show, as it seems, a considerable advance in the direction of the idea of God. But it also appears that the conceptions of "Hiranya- garbha" and "Visvakarman" themselves differ fundamentally

Distinction between from each other in that the one is dominated "Hlranyagarbha" and by what may be called the religious motive, "Vifvakarman". while on the part of the other we perceive a motive which is philosophical, 1. A History of Philosophy, p. 34. In reference to Brabmaņaapati's view, Madame Blavataky pointedly says, "The whole range of physionl phenomena proceeds from the primary of Aather- Akssh-as dual-natured Akteha proceeds from the undifferentiatod chaos -- so called, the latter being the primary aspect of Mulaprakriti, the Root-matter and the tret abatract ides one can form of Parabrahman." The Secret Doctrine I. p. 585,

HIRANYAGARBHA AND VISVAKARMAN 36

The main question with " Hiranyagarbha" was, what God should we adore with oblation other than God (Prajapati)?1 Evidently it contained for him both an answer and a contention, namely, that there is no other god but God whom we should thus adore. "Visvakarman", on the other hand, urged this thoughtful enquiry, what is the tree or wood out of which the universe was fashioned?8 Thereby he did not intend, to be sure, to add anything further to his knowledge, but just to open the eyes of those who were in doubt to see for themselves that the world-tree was God. It will be remembered, however, that the religious element, too, is not entirely absent from "Visvakarman's" idea of God, in the same way that " Hiranyagarbha's" doctrine is not devoid of the philosophical element.

I. As to " Hiranyagarbha's" doctrines there is nothing very surprising about it. It stands mid-way between the doctrine of "Paramesthin " on the one hand, and that The special featuru of hie doctrine. of "Narayana," on the other. As Mr. Wallis points out, Hiranyagarbha viewed the un, called metaphorically the golden germ, as the great power of the universe, from which all other powers and existences, divine and earthly, are derived, a conception which is the nearest approach to the later ...... conception of Brabma, the Oreator of the world." The sun was thus conceived by "Hiranyagarbha" as the one (eka),-the sole ruler of all that breathes, and of all that sleeps (does not breathe). The sun is the lord of all beings (bhuta), the lord (Isa) of the bipeds and the quadru- peds. He is "the giver of vital spirit, of power and vigour."4

1 ig-veda, X. 121. 1. "Kaemai devaya havişi vidhema P" We have followed above Ludwig's interpretation. a Rig.veda, X. 81.4. : Rig-veda, X. 121. * Rig reda, X. 121,2, (Grifilth's translation) : "stmad& baladk,"

86 PRE-BUDDHISTIO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

His is death, and his shadow again is life immortal.' These snowy mountains, and what men call seas His conception of God. and rivers are his possession ; the regions (pradisa) his arms. It is he who fixed and holds up the heaven and the earth. Here by the term, Sun, "Hiranyagarbha" did not exactly mean the sun as we commonly understand it, but what he called the Golden Germ. This germ is

Fire. The solar essence is Fire,' for Fire constitutos, according to him, the solar essence,-the generating principle of the universe. But this Fire itself was contained at first in water. Thus, like "Paramesthin ", "Hiranyagarbha" thought water to be the primitive substance of all that is. But he realised at the same time that to explain the "Hiranyagarbha" and "Paramosthin". world it is not enough to say that water is the first principle in itself, for conceivably there is a higher principle behind it. It is Prajapati, and Prajapati is the God of gods, and none beside him.3 Prajapati brought forth water,+ and it is he who provided the generating principle and the ordaining power of things. All this leads back to the question, what other god should we adore with oblation than God P3 II. Now we turn to " Visvakarman", whose contribution to the Vedio thought was the abstract or metaphysical conception of God. It is a noteworthy fact that "Visvakarman " offered his view not so much in the form of a tenet as Bis case againat the sceptios. in that of a case against others. The chief object of his attack was, of course, "Para- mesthin ", who refused in the traditional manner of a sceptic Rig-veda : X.121.2. "yasye chayamritam yasya mritynh." 3 Jbid, X.T21.7 3 Ibid, X,121.8. + Ibia, X.121.9. Nbia, X.121.1.

HIRANYAGARBHA AND VISVAKARMAN 37

to carry his research beyond water. From the point of view of "Visvakarman " it is a quite inadequate and unsatis- faclory explanation to posit water as the primitive substance of all that is, and then to derive from it this world as a whole by giving it an inherent power of movement. If water be the primitive substance which is endowed with the inherent principle of change, we have yet to account for that from which water derived its being, and derived the motive power, the generating principle, the elemental forces, the laws, and all the rest.1 Here " Visvakarman " said, that is God, God is the first

God is the univereal and the last. He is earlier than the visible gubatancc, the frst universe ; he had existed before all the causo of things. cosmic forces came into being." He is the sole God who created and ordained this universe.ª He is yet again the tree or wood from which this universe was fashioned.4 God is one, and only one (eka eva). He is the unborn one ,aja) in whom all the existing things abide." He is that one who is mighty in mind and supreme in power.e He is the maker, the disposer, the most lofty presence .? God : hie attributes. As father he generated us, and as disposer he knows the fate of all that is.ª It is from him that water derived its being, and received the motive power or generating principle.' He alone gave names to the gods, and it is he whom we all "seek for information," -- for explanation of the world.10 The hymn-chanters or philosophers who doubt his 1 Rig-veda, X.82.6: "Kam svid garbham prathamami dadhra apo yatra dey& samapas- yamta viere." " Ibid, X.82.5 : "paro divă para enā prithivya." a Tbid, X.81,8. * Ibid, X.81.4. Ibid, X.8,26, Ibid, X82.2. ' Ibid, X.82.5 : "dhata vidhats paramota samdrik." a Ibid, X.82.8 : "yo ual pitt janito yo vidhata dham&ni veda bhuvanani visv&." Ibid, X.82.6. 10 bid, X.82.8 : "yo devauām nāmadhā eka eva tam samprafnem bhuvanā yamtyanya

38 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

existence wander, benighted as they are by the mist of ignor- ance and speak with faltering voice.1 Thus in accordance with "Visvakarman's" view, God is omnipresent, omnipotent, omniscient (paramota samdrik)

How to know God ? and one. But we cannot see him, because he is invisible, and we cannot find him because another thing-this delusive universe P-has appeared before our eyes.ª To know him or to apprehend his nature, therefore, we, as thoughtful men, must only inquire within our heart, i.e., deeply think.8 We must know him, for without knowing him, we cannot arrive at a satisfactory, all-comprehensive explanation of the world; and we must apprehend his true Why should we kuow God P nature; for without apprehending it, we cannot establish that immutable ground of the unity of things upon which to fall back constantly. We must know God as the first principle of things,-the first cause in relation to which this universe must be conceived as the effect; and we must apprehend his true nature as identical in pith or essence with that of tho universe. "Visvakarman's" doctrine is of immense historical im-

The hietorien! impor- portance. In it we see all the basic ideas of tance of "Visvakur. Vedanta in the making. Moreover, we perceive man's" doctrino. the two distinct conceptions or different points of view. One is logical, and the other ontological. In the first place, God conceived as the first cause of the

The two points of universe is logically distinguishable from the view : logical and conception of the universe; and in the ontalogicnl. second place, God, viewed as identioal in substance with the universe, is the universe. Rig-rada, X.82.7 : "nihareua provrita jolpyā ...... UkthapAgaế curamti." nīhāreņa pravrita=" enwrapt in misty cloud" -- (Griflith). * Ibid, X.82.7: "na tam vidāthn ya imā jnjånānyad yuşmekam amtaram babhuva," 3 Ibid, X.81.4.

PART II.

PoST-VEDIC PHILOSOPIY.

Introductory. (The name Post-Vedic period may require a word of explanation. It is possible that its upper limit can be fixed as far back as the last seer of the Rig-veda or even a little earlier. In any case, here we shall restrict the use of the name to the period covered by the history of the Aitareya, the Taittiriya, and a few other important Brahmana schools,1 who were counted by Buddha as being among the oldest. The period thus chosen might be brought, for our present purposes, within smaller compass from Mahidasa Aitareya to Yājñavalkya. The Post-Vedic period as a whole may be best dis- tinguished from the Vedic by the fact that the intellectual centre is no longer the Brahmarsidesa, bui what is generally known as Madhya-desa, the Mid-land. It is situated between the Himalayas on the north, and the Vindhya The historical fen- mountains on the south. It lies to the tuses of the period east of Prayaga (Allahabad) and to the west of Vinasana ("Manu-smriti," II. 21), Kuru, Pañchāla, Matsya, Surasena, are four among the well-known republies, and Kasi, Videha, and Kośala are three among the most powerful monarchies of the time. During this period-Benares the oldest of the three monarchies-is said to have changed its name many times (Jātaka, No. 460) The transition from the Vedic to the Brahmanic period must have taken place gradually. Yet in The contrast bct- leaving the one for the other, the historian ween the Vedns and the Brahmapns. turns his back upon the freshness of poetry only to face the dullness of prose. In the language of Dr. Hopkins, "With the Brahmanas not only 4 Digha Nik&ya, I, p 237.

40 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

is the tone changed from that of the Rig-voda, the whole moral atmosphere is now surcharged with hocuspocus, mysticism, religiosity, instead of the cheerful, real religion which, however formal, is the soul of the Rik. In the Brahmanas there is no freshness, no poetry. There is in some regards a more scrupulous outward morality, but for the rest there is only cynicism, bigotry, and dullness. It is true that each of these traits may be found in certain parts of the Rig-veda; but it is not true that they represent there the spirit of the age, as they do in the Brahmanic period."1 But this careful observer adds: "Such is not altogether the case. It is the truth, yet it is not the The judgment of of Brahmapic religion whole truth, that in these Brahmanas religion by Hopkins. is an appearance, not a reality."2 Dr. Hopkins seeks to establish the link betweon the animis- tic worship of the Rig-veda and the stringent ritual of the Brahmanas in the person of the priest, as his position is set forth in the liturgical hymns of the Yajur- The Sema ard the veda. This seems plausible, yet not very Yajurveda are of the least importance from important to us. To us, in fact, the Saman the point of view of philosophy, and the. Yajur, however voluminous they may be in size, are but two large collections of excerpts from the older Rik. The important text for us is the divine Rik, and also to some extent, the Atharva. It is conceivable that there is a long interval separating the last sage of the Rig-veda from the thinker whom we may rightly take as the first philosopher of the The transition period Post-Vedic period. Probably, as may be defined. easily deduced from the long string of names appended to some of the Brahmanas, at this intermediate period a great many persons were born who kept alive the philosophic traditions of the past, and represented 1 Raligions of India, pp. 176-177. * Religione of India, p. 180.

POST-VEDIC PHILOSOPHY 41

the highest wisdom of the time. From our point of view, this intermediate period is the one into which we can peep through the portals of the Brahmana sections of the Brahmaņa texts, as distinguished from the Aranyakas and Upanisads. It seems that the thinkers of the time kept things going, just in the same way that musicians play on various tunes to indicate that the performance is not over yet, only the scene is changing. The historical value of this.intermediate period consists chiefly in its being the period of transition from the Vedic to

Ita intrinsio value the Post-Vedic. At this period, philosophy, iu the history of phi- losophy. no less than Prajapati,' was thinking her- self "emptied" or exhausted in the activity of production. But the creative impulse led her to ponder over the minds of men, just as Prajapati was brooding over the cosmic matter. Whilst thus Prajapati and philosophy were toiling hard, and fainting in the struggle for existence, theology was not in any way less active on her own side. While Prajapati was fusing the races of men, theology was spinning out the rituals in detail, while The peculiarities of the transition period, philosophy was busy, we saw, with inter- mingling Vedic thoughts; consequently the. intermixture of blood among men, the painfully minute elaboration of rituals, and the intermingling of the doctrines of the earlier thinkers-these are among the most noticeable features of the transition period in question. So far as philosophy is concerned, it is just in this pro- cess of intermingling of the earlier thoughts that we can trace in India the origin of a something The Bopbistio maxim : how did it equivalent to that Sophistic maxim, that originate ? man is the measure of all things. Prajapati generated man from his soul, therefore ' Man is all the

Śatapatha Brāhmaņa, III. 9. 1. 1; Taittirīye Brāhmaņa, II. 2. 4. eto. 6

42 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

amimals,1 i.e., man is the prototype of living beings- such is, however, the precise Jndian maxim and its argu- ment. And we must note bere that as soon as this maxim came to clear recognition, the course of philosophy was changed. Beyond a doubt, this transition from the geocentrism of Vedic speculations to the anthropocentrism of the Post- Vedic took place gradually, as well as har- The transition from cosmologionl to psy- moniously. The chief interest of the earlier chologital specnlations is natural and inevit- thinkers was centred upon the physical able, world as a whole, and the later thinkers were chiefly concerned with the organic world and man. The order is perfectly natural. Further, in spite of the fact that there are in the scheme of the earlier thought but ' very feeble indications of a zeal for knowledge applied to the organic world and The Post-Vedio thougut is implied or man,' we have seen that in the speculation nnticipated in the Vedio. How P of Dirghatamas was foreshadowed the whole character of Post-Vedic philosophy; his doctrino disclosed to us in an eminent degree as to what would be the exact lines on which the development of Vedic philosophy must proceed in future. It was Dirghatamas who considered the sacrificial altar as the navel or centre of our world, and set himself to inquire, What am IP And so it was Dirghatamas whose some- what paradoxical doctrine of Indra and Soma' (sun and moon, or heat and light) as the active principle and the passive spectator of the visible universe contained the later concep- tions of the relation between life and soul. Besides Dirgha- tamas, there is another Vedio sage whose name must be mentioned in this connection. She is "Sūryā". "Sūrya" conceived the son as the reproduction of the father,

1 Satapatha Brahmana, II. 1, 4. 11 ff. Professor L, T, Ipbbouse points ont that " this does not seem to have any real anulogy with the principle of Protagorus." ' Rig-veda, I. 164, 19.22,

POST-VEDIC PHILOSOPIIY 43

since a man is born in the womb of his wife in the form of a seed.1 Inspite of the faot that this came to be regarded later as a popular view,' it will be remembered that " Surya's " was the first attempt to formulate a scientific theory about the origin and continuity of human life. We have further to admit here that " Surya's " speculations gave rise to the theory of heredity as expounded in the Post- Vedic literature.3 All this is true, and yet the fact remains that the primary concern of the Vedic thinkers was the world, The conditions under which the qnestion not man. Therefore the question "Who " Who am I"? per- manently Arose. am IP" could permanently arise only in the wake of the consciousness, that 'man is all the animals.' Once more, this one question " Who am IP " brought in its train many other questions, and here it is Post-Vedie thought interesting to remark that almost all the is juet tho repelition of the Vedio, in so far fundamental questions raised by the Vedio as the types of pro- blema nre concerned. thinkers with regard to tho world were re- peated in the Post-Vedic thought with regard to man. In this respect Post-Vedic philosophy may be looked upon as simply the repetition of the Vedic, although this repetition does not mean imitation, but continuation and development, in the truest sense of the terms. In the opinion of Buddha the period which closely followed upon that of the Vedie worship was religious- The fundamental problem of the period, philosophical in character, the main problem aocording to Boddha. of this period being "How can I hold communion or unite with Brahman ?"4 The judgment thus summarized by Buddha may not be wholly true in the letter, yet it must be said to be true in the 1 Rigveda, X. 85. 40 ; "ātmā vai jāyate putra, " Kauşītaki Upanigad, II, 1. 1. Aițareya Āraņyaka, II. 5. 1. 2. ff, : Vedanta-săra, (ed. Jaoob), p. 32. : Kauşītaki Tpanişad, II. 15. Brihad Āraņyaka Upanişad, I. 5. 1. 1. - Brahmānam Sahahyats, (Sanekrit, svabhavyatā ?) Tevijja-sutta, see Dial. B. II. pp. 806 ff ; M thu-Govinda-suttanta, D. N. II,, p. 240 ff.

44 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPITY

spirit, considering that the highest religious aspiration of man toapproa ch and unite with what he looks Justifloation Buddha's epinion. of up to as the supreme, the mighty, the divine, the infinite, the immortal, the sinless, the merciful, the benutiful, the one, the all, was never absent, from the Vedie or Indo-Aryan minds. This truly religious aspiration of man to unite with what is divine in nature found its earliest expression in one of the hymns of Sunahsepa. He aspired to know who among the immortal gods had the power to restore him to Aditi-the visible Infinite, that he might realise the nature of his father and mother (heaven and earth), and the reply that came to him was-Fire (Agni alone is powerful to do so).ª In the case of "Brahmanaspati's " hymn, too, we could not but see the eagerness of the finite (è.e., the bounded space beyond the heaven and the bounded horizon on the earth) to approach Aditi-the real Infinite. And yet again it was only in the views of Dirghatamas that we had the first definite indication of the unity of man in essence with the rest of the universe,-with the whole. We know, however, that in the conception of Dirghatamas this world- essence is no other than what he called the solar essence, that is to say, identical with the fire-easence. Thus all these are inter-connected, and their connection came about in natural, historical order.

Now in conformity with our theory, that in India as in Greece, the first philosophic reflections . arose out of religion, we may hold with Buddha that the Further demonstra- tion of the main pro- main question with the early Post-Vedic blem of Post-Vedio Philosophy. thinkers appertained to Yoga-the inner culture of faith and intollect. It seems pro- bable even then, that from the question "How can I unite with him P" emerged these two apparently distinct problems for philosoyhy-(1) Who is he with whom I shall 1 Big-Veda, X. 88. 16 ; I. 126.5; X. 107. 2, a Jbid, I, 24, 1-2,

POST-VEDIC PHILOSOPHY 45

unite ? and (2) Who am I who shall unite with him? Of these the former has already been answered by the Vedic thinkers, and now the latter must be answered by their successors. In reality, however, both of these problems are there for the Post-Vedic thinkers, and they are to them not exactly two distinct problems, but two aspects of one and the same problem. To them he is logically distinguishable from me as the object from the subject. But from the Yoga point of view, if I know him, I know myself, and if I know myself I know him. Thus the two questions-" Who is he? " and " Who am I? " are capable of being answered briefty by " I am he (so' ham)." In other words, according to the Yoga postulate, the two questions are reducible to this one Who is he ? or, Who am I? To the question-Who am I? the answers are given in an ascen ling series. The interest of these answers lies partly in the roughly outlined stages of transition, The interest of the problem. first, from the physical world to the organic; secondly, from the organie world to embryoni man; thirdly from embryonic to physiological man; fourthly, from physiological to psychological man ; fifthly, from psycho- logical to metaphysical man; and lastly, from metaphysical to religious-ethical man. Accordingly, the reply to the question-Who am I? The solation of the may be stated in the following order :- problen. (a) I am an individual heing, as all the animals of the earth and all the creatures of the air are. All organic beings and all inorganic things, said " Narayana," are formed from Puruşa-the sun or solar substance. (b) I am annamaya-embryonic man, a man in the process of formation, that is to say, a seed or sperm, composed of food or fivo elements,1 produced from the essence of food digested by the father, communicated to the mother and established in the womb. 1 According to Buddhn's ennmeration, the elemenis are fonr in mimber.

46 PRE-BUDDHISTIO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

(c) I am pranamaya -- physiological man, a man born of the parents, brought forth by the mother, a living body, that is to say, a body imbued with life, composed of food or elements, nourished by food, ' reduced at death to an anatomical man, a corpse dissolved hereafter into the elements or returned to the physical world. (d) I am manomaya-psychological man, a conscious indi- vidual, who can perceive through the senses, who dreams, imagines, thinks, fecls, wills, and who perceives duality and plurality among things, perceptual and conceptual. (e) I am vijnanamaya % metaphysical man, a thought- free, but conscious man who is beginning to sleep and sleep- ing a sound sleep, a man who is endowed with nothing but the inherent conscious sentient principle or soul-a thinker who realises the unity of cause in the variety of appearance. (f) Lastly, I am anandamaya-spiritual or religious- ethical man, who is enjoying the bliss of sound sleep, un- crossed by dreams, untouched by eares,-a blessed soul, united with the divine.$ According to the earliest, demoniac, or materialistie mode, I am the bodv; according to the later, corporeal or realisitic mode, I am the mind: and according to the last, incorporeal or idealistic mode, I am the soul,1 So far regarding the contemplative side of the Post-Vedic literature. But in dealing effectively with the subject of Indian philosophy, we must also The dialectical aspect take into consideration another side of it, of Post-Vedic philo- sophy. which is of as much intellectual importance as the contemplative. Logic and dialectic (tarka, mīmamsa), formed the two wings of discussion, carried

1 Pali,-kabalinkāra-Thara-bhakkho. $ Psli,-sañnEmaya. Taittirīya Upaniend, II. 1-5; Dīgln-nikīya, I. p. 34. * Ohandogya Upanignd, VIII, 7. 1. ff (S.B.E.); Potthapide snttn, D.N. I, p. 195 ; eto., Deusgen's All. Gesch der Philosophie, pp 89-90

POST-VEDIC PHILOSOPHY 47

on by the Wanderers generally, and discussion involved, as a rule, a sort of " wrangling " in the learned circle. As Buddha described it humoronsly, the lenrned recluses and Brahmans meet together, discuss problems, and wrangle in this manner: " You don't understand this doctrine and discipline, I do. How should you know about this doctrine and discipline ? You have fallen into wrong views. It is I who am in the right. I am speaking to the point, you are not. You are puiting last what ought to come first, and first what ought to come last.' What you've excogitated so long, that's all quite upset, Your challenge has been taken up.ª Yon are proved to be wrong.' . Set to work to clear your viows." Disentangle yourself if you can." The problem in theological cireles was concorned with the divine revelation of Word, or the Vedas, and duties enjoined therein. In other circles the subject was Tho four Inwe of thonght. either philosophical or seientific. Whatever that might be, the happy result of this mode of discussion or " wrangling " among the learned Wanderers was that in the time of Buddha the four laws of thought were recognised as a matter of course. These are in their applica- tion to propositions :- (If A is B), A is B, A cannot be both B and not-B. A is either B or not-B. A is neither B nor not-B.

1 Dīgha-nikaya, I. p. 8; Majhima-nikāya, II. 3; see Dial, B, II, pp. 14-15. 2 " Putting the cat before the horse" Aropito te vedo. The alternativo rendering suggested by Rhys Davids is-" Issue has beon joined againat you." Niggahitosi. Noto tho term nigraha. " Oara vāda-pamokkhāyu.

48 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

These are implied in such interrogative propositions as are met with throughout the Buddhist canonical texts. İs there another world ? Is A B? (The reply being, No). Is it, then, that there is not another world ? Is A not-BP (The reply being still, No.) Is it, then, that there both is and is not another world? Is A both B and not-B? (The reply being as before.) Is it, then, that there neither is nor is not another world ? Is A neither B nor not-B P! In reality this reference ought to have been discussed in the introduction to Part III. For all ancient documents at our disposal bear evidence to the fact that the recognition of four laws or principles was rather the outcome of a further penetrat- ing analysis on the part of thinkers other and somewhat later than Post-Vedic. It was not possible until Sophistic activities in the country were in full swing. So far as Post-Vedic philosophers are concerned, they seem only to have vaguely and occasionally referred to these three laws, vis., laws of Identity, Contradiction, and Double Negation. Yajnavalkya's "No-No Doctrine" affords no doubt the best example of Double Negation. Those who think merely of the forms of questions may not accept our interpretation in its principle or in its detail. Rather they might go so far as to assert that Indian minds were so illogical from the beginning that they could, and as a matter of fact did, with impunity set all the fundamental laws of thought at nought. But the critic, in order to avoid being one sided, must carefully examine the forms of interrogation, the modes of rejoinder, and above all, their motives. The example given, is of a controversy in the form in which it was carried on in the sixth century B.C., if not earlier. It is evident that the motive of the interro- gator is to scek a dialectical advantage over the interlocutor who, as a professed sceptic, secks to ovade the position where he might commit himself to a flagrant logical absurdity. 1 Dialogues of the Bnddhu, Vol. II, pp. 39-40

POST-VEDIO PHILOSOPHY 49

[ Let us produce here at random the specimen of a controversy which dates as late as the third century B.C., for examination. "Th,-Does the past exist? A .- It exists on this wise, it does not exist on that wise. Th .- Does the past, as you describe it, both exist and not exist,? You deny, then affirm-for you must affirm. And if this same past both exists and does not exist, then is also existence non-existence and conversely, then is the state of being a state of non-being and conversely, then are " is " and "is not" convertible terms, identical, one in meaning, the same, same in content and in origin ? And this of course you do not admit." (Pointa of Controversy, P. T. S., pp. 108-9). The Syadvada or Antinomian dootrine of the Jainas and of the Sarvastivadins and their followers might be calculated to be a defiance of the established laws of thonght. But this is not really the case, the doctrine being of a hypothetical character only. To affirm that A may be B in one sense, from one standpoint, and not B in another sense, from another standpoint, is not to deny the Law of contradiction, which teaches that A cannot be both B and not-B at the same time, and in the same sense. We might here refer the reader to a sigoificant pronouncement of Buddha on he subject of the Law of Identity in its application to categorical , ropositions : "that which has passed away, ceasad to be, completely changed, is to be designated, termed, judged as "something that was," and neither as "something that is" nor as " something that will be"; and so on (Samyutia, III, pp. 71-3).] Later texts can furnish numerous passages giving us an insight into the exact use to which the fourth Law was put, that of Double Negation. It is implied that this is applicable to two extreme cases: either (1) to the conception of something which is really nothing, that is, non-existent as a fact in the world of experience, but possible as a product of fancy, viz., "a barren woman's son," "the horns of & hare," "flowers in the sky;" or (2) to the conception of that which is the real of all that is relatively real, viz., Brahman, Ātman, Nirvana, that is, the Absoluto. The significance of the Neti Neti doctrine of Yajnavalkya is that Brahman is definable only by negation of all the predicates assignable to the finite things of experience.1

1 Of. Brahma-Satra, III, 2.22 : Prakritaitavattvam hi pratigedhati tato bravīti oa bŁāyaḥ.

50 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Now we sum up the result of the older Brahmanic activity on the theological side. The overwhelming The theologicol aide of the older Brahma- energy applied to the systematization of nic activity. Its effect on the course of phi- Vedic rituals was not without its salutary losophy. effect upon the course of philosophy itself. The oldest Vedie wisdom knew no division at all, nor the older Brahmanic. But the arrangement and re-arrangement of current hymns and customary rites under various artificial heads, revealed in course of the Post-Vedic period the way in which the concrete sciences and practical philosophy might be separated from theology proper, and from theoretic philosophy.

OHAPTER IV

MAHIDĀSA AITAREYA

We begin the Post-Vedic philosophy with Mahidasa Aita- reya, to whom tradition rightly points as the Mahidaea: a short account of his life. founder of the Aitareya school. It appears from a reference made to him in the Ohan- dogya Upanisad1 that he lived to the age of one hundred and sixteen years. The first twenty-four years of his life were spent as student, the next forty-four years as householder and the remaining forty-eight years as hermit or forest-dweller. The same Upanisad lays stress on the fact that the singular regularity which Mahidasa observed throughout enabled him to attain such a long life, free from illness and from weaknesses. We do not know whether Mahidasa was a Brahman or a

He was in all pro- warrior by birth. The historical evidence bability & Br&hman. seems to be to the effect that he was born in His parentage. a Brahman family. From a relatively late account of his life' it appears that he was the son of a sage who had many wives, among whom Mahidasa's mother, Itara, was one. In it we are told that the sage preferred the sons of his other wives to Mahidasa, and did not scruple to insult him openly once by passing him over when he took all his children in his lap. Mahidasa was, however, by far the most blessed in other respects. He was endowed with a natural aptitude for learning, and had the beneficent care of his mother. By dint of his genius he rose to eminence, while his half-brothers sank into oblivion for all their father's doting partiality.

1 III. 16.6. ' Sayana's introdnction to the Aitareya Brihmana. Vide The Brahmanas of the Vedaa, p. 13. See for other legende the Upanishads (S.B.E.), Vol. I, pp. XOIV-XOV.

52 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

The system of Mahidasa was evidently named after his mother Itara. It may be inferred from His works: their jaterconnexion. The Sayana's account that while a house-holder he historioal interest of the third' division of composed the Aitareya Brahmana, consisting the Aitareya-Aran- yaka. of forty sections, and while a dweller in the forest he embodied his philosophical views in the Āranyaka of the same name. But the Aitareya Āranyaka as we now have it, does not seem to have been actually com- posed by Mahidasa: it may no doubt be asoribed to his school. Further, this Aranyaka consists of three divisions, the second and third of which are comprised under the general title of the Bahvrica, the Mahaitareya, or simply, the Aitareya Upa- nișad.1 It also should be mentioned that the inter-connexion of the first and second divisions is far closer than that of the third with either. This being the case, it is particularly from these two divisions that a knowledge of his doctrine must be derived. These two stand moreover to each other in such a relation as to show how a certain dootrine passed from an immature to a mature stage. But the third division, too, is not without some special historical interest in that it con- tains views2 other than those of Mahidasa. The main problem with which Mahidasa heroically grap- pled was but the problem of the origin of life A few preliminary remarka concerning and the development of consciousness. Again, his main problem, ser. vioes to soience and an instructive feature of his system is that philosophy, and dimculties. defeots

is the incipient Aris- He instead of a fantastic presentation, we obtain

totle of India. with it a real fruitful synthesis of Vedie spe- culations. For a due appreciation of his system of speculation it will be worth while to take into con- sideration the supreme effort which Mahidasa had to make in order to get over the difficulties as to language and method at a time when Indian philosophy was just passing out of its

3 Upanishads, S.B.E., Vol. I, p. 200. ' Snch as those of the Mandükeyas, Sakalya, the elder Sakalya, Tarukayn, Kann- tharavya, Pabchlacande, Badhva, the Kavaseyas, eto,

MAHIDĀSA ATTAREYA 53

infancy, in the close environment of mythology and popular theology. But, in spite of the fact that his initial defects are in soientifie nomenclature and methodical treatment of pro- blems, when we fully consider his fundamental conceptions, and carefully compare them with those of Aristotle, we can- not help coming to the conclusion that, generally speaking, Mahidasa is the incipient Aristotle of India. If such be the case, we have further to note that, in India, Mahidasa, who compares favourably in a great number of points with Aris- totle, preceded Gargyāyana, whose doctrine of immortality and theory of ideas lead us to think of Plato.

Now, as to Mahidasa's philosophical investigation, we The division of his propose to summarise it under these four philosophy. heads-metaphysics, physics, psychology and ethics.

I. Metaphysios,-As a preliminary to our estimate of the value of Mahidasa's metaphysics, we must repeat the general statement that we nowhere meet with a systematic grouping or clear-cut division of his doctrine, taken as a whole. Hence it must be understood that the method of arrangement adopted in these pages is chiefly our own, whereas the conceptions are those of Mahidasa. A general explanation of the theoretic side of Mahidasa's metaphysies or science of first principles might be offered as follows.

(1) To begin with, Mahidasa desired to point out that the task of philosophy is to explain experi- 'Experience' in Mahi- dasa, ence, and by experience he understood evidently the physical universe, the organic world, a partioular thing, a living substance, the heaven, the earth, the firmament, the sun, the moon, water, earth, fire, air, a metal, a plant, an animal, a man, a seed, a sperm̧.

54 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

If it be the principal task of philosophy to explain experi- The limits of know. ence, then all philosophical investigations ledge. ought to he kept entirely within the bounds of experience. The axiom which Mabidasa laid down for himself in this connexion may be rendered thus : I know the universe and myself as far as I know the gods, and I know the gods as far as I know the universe and myself.1 In his phraseology, however, the mythological term "gods" The five eloments or is convertible into the theological term material attributes "hymns" (uktha), and that, in its turn, into the philosophical term " elemonts " (bhutani). Thus, if we say with Mahidasa, "I am the five-fold hymn," this generally means that I am built up of these five-water and earth, fire and air, and space." In other words, our ordinary, intuitive, unphilosophic, or objective knowledge of a particular thing of experience, taken as a whole, is divisible into the five subjeo- tive elements or material qualities enumerated also by him in the order of earth, air, space, water and fire (jyotis).3 It follows that, in accordance with Mahidasa's methodo-

Two methods of in logy there are these two methods of philoso- vestigation: conven- phical investigation-objective and subjec- tional and philosophic tive, called later conventional (sāmvritika, vyavaharika), and philosophic (paramarthika) respectively. That which we regard, therefore, from the subjective point of view as the five qualities are, when looked at from the objective point of view, but five elements or great beings (mahabhūtāni), Taking man as the most typical of particular things, the

How to explain expo- question now rcaches the point, how are we riance > The five nutu- to explain experience ? Mahidasa's reply to rial qualities defned. this is-By means of these five principles called water and earth, fire and air, and space, besides Life 1 Aitaroa Āranyaka, II. 17. 3.7; II. 1.82 I Nd, II 12 1.10; II 31 1-2) II, 8.4.2. Ibid, 1I, 81.1,

MAIIDĀSA AITAREYA 55

or the living principle (Prana). Of these, water and earth are conceived as "food" or substance, for all food, Mahidasa thought, consists of these two; fire and air are conceived as "the feeder" or something which is related to the living principle, for by means of them a man cats all food; and space is conceived as "the bowl," for all that exists is con- tained in it.1 From the five-fold hymn,2 called otherwise the embodi- His fundamontal the. ment of Prana, the living soul, springs, and sis : it is materialistio. The propositions und to it returns all that is-such is apparently axiome. tho fundamental thesis of Mahidasa. But he insisted often that for working it out in detail the follow- ing propositions and axioms are essential. In the first place, man is to be conceived as the miniature

Nan is a microeos- universe, so that what is in the ono, is in mos, and so is every the other. His axiom is-"whatever there is living eubstance. belonging to the son, belongs to the father; whatever there is belonging to the father, belongs to the son."3 If so, our concepts of the universe are translatable at last into those of man,' and vice nersd; and what is true, in this respect, of man, also holds of every living substance or particular thing, down to its very root, seed, germ, or atom.3 Mahidasa's assumption is that a finite thing of experience, taken as a whole, is not only a part of the sum- total of things, but in a sense, that is, in essence, the whole itself. In this casc, the position of Mahidasa may be defined by such an axiom as-I as a living monad am the universe. But from this it does not necessarily follow that, according to Mahidasa, the universal completely explains the particular;

1 Aitaroya Arnnynkn, II. 3.1.2. ! Aitareya Arnnyakn, II. 3.1 1. In his language "He who knows himself as the ive-fold hymn is elever." # Ibid, II. 1.8.1., S.B.E., Vol I., p. 212 * Of. Sakalya's views, Aitareya Arauyaka, III. 12. 6-7. s Of. Erdmann's History of Philosophy, Vol 1 .. p. 151.

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it may be of course that the universal explains only that in the particular which is not different from the universal. And it would again be a mistake to suppose that No difference of kind, but of degree, between Mahidasa contemplated any hard and fast these three-the phy. sloal universe, the line of distinction between the two. For organio world, and that would be incompatible with his con- man, ception of nature or cosmos as an inter- connected whole. We might affirm, without doing violence to his position, that there is no difference in kind either between the physical universe and the organic world, or be- tween the organic world and man. The fundamental difference, if any, which would be admitted by Mahidasa, is what may be described as the difference in intensity or degree of growth, that is all. Admitted this, a so-called non-living thing is definable as an undeveloped man, in the same way that a man may be defined as a developed thing. It will be remarked that in Mahidasa's language, the word development (avis- tara āvirbhava) is used rather in a limited sense ; it means no more than the manifestation (prakatatvam) in the particular of that which is hidden in the universal. Thus Mabidasa's theory of developmeut or specialisation exactly corresponds to Aristotle's conception of a transmission of the potential into actuality. Now the second proposition which forms the key to the whole philosophy of Mahidasa is this. The things of experi- ence are explicable only in the terms of Cnuse and effeot are identical in easence, "root" (cause) and "shoot " (effect).1 These two called root and shoot are logically and for all practical purposes, distinguishable from each other, but identical in substance or essence. (2) We have endeavoured so far to bring out that the philosophical investigation of Mahidasa is concerned with the problems as to the visible universe, the organic world, ' Mülu and tüla. Aituroyn Aranyaka, II. I 8, 1.

MABIDASA AITAREYA 57

and man. Of these, the visible universe is a living form, man is a living thing, and the connecting link between the two is what is termed the organic world. His general theory of knowledge. According to Mahidasa's general theory of knowledge, if we know the one, we know all the three. As a naturalist he perceived the difference subsisting between the things of experience, whereas, as a philosopher, he realised only the immutable ground of unity in the midst of all changes.1 Here by the visible universe Mahidasa understood the physical world as a whole, and under the organic world he included the vegetable kingdom, the animal The definition of, and distinotion between, kingdom, and man. The distinction he thus the physical universe and the organic world. implied between these two-the physical world and the organic-is no more than that which we now rather sharply draw between so-called "dead matter" and living matter. All these shining gods- the sun, lightning, the moon, the planets and the stars, and all these five great beings (mahabhutani)-the earth, air, the sky, water and fire-belong to the physical world ; the herbs and trees, to the vegetable kingdom ; the reptiles, birds, horses, cows, elephants, etc., to the animal kingdom; and a man naturally belongs to the animal kingdom, and is generally classed among the animals.2 By the word difference he implied, first, the difference in form, habit and strength, and secondly, the difference as to the gradual development of self, that is, of Difference is two- fold : in type of exist- life in the world as a whole, particularly of ence, and in degree of a thinking soul in man. growth.

With regard to the first kind of difference, he insisted that there are beings developed from this or that kind of seeds,

1 Aitareyn Arapyaka, II. 3. 8, 2. * Aitareyn Arnuyaka, II. 6. 1.5; I.5. 1. 9. 8

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such as those born from eggs (oviparous), born from the womb (viviparous), born from sweat (moisture-sprung), and propagated from germs (plants); that there The four classes of beings. are beings movable and immovable.1 Among the birds, the parrot is the one that is the most gluttonous, and the hawk that swoops on other birds is the strongest of all. Among the higher animals again, the two-footed man surpasses all the quadrupeds in strength. Therefore, the quadrupeds, such as cattle, horses and elephants obey man's commands." Regarding the second kind of difference, too, Mahidasa

The theory of the maintained that the soul or intelligent prin- gradnal development ciple develops gradually in the world as a of soul whole. In herhs and trees, for example, sap (life) only is seen, but thought (citta) in the widest sense is in the higher forms of life. Among the latter again, some show both vitality and intelligence, while others are devoid of intelligence. Among animals, man alone has the capacity for acquiring higher wisdom, yet in him, too, the soul develops gradually. A man differs from a lower animal in these respeots : "He says what he has known. He knows what is to happen to-morrow, he knows heaven and hell. By means of the mortal he desires the immortal-thus he is endowed."? With other animals, on the contrary, hunger and thirst (instincts and impulses) only are a kind of understand- ing; they possess voice, but no speech; mind, but no prudence."*

' Ibid, II. 6. 1.5. ' Ibid, I, 5, 1. 9. Aitareya Āraņyaka, S.B.E., Vol. I, p. 222. + Thid, II 8.2. 1-5; of. "The Questions of King Milinda," S.B,E., Vol XXXV, pp. 50-61, According to Nagasena, rudimentary reason (manasikara) is one thing, and reasoned kmow- ledge (panns) ie another. Sheep and goata, oxen and buffaloes, camelsand asses possess rudimentary renson but ressoned Imowledge they have not.

MAHIDĀSA AITAREYA 59

(3) Nature. It has already been noticed that as a naturalist Mahidasa, like Aristotle, conceived nature to be "a system The Lwo-fold con- ception of nature: as of fixed types of existence," and recognised & system of numier- oue gradstions the difference which subsists between these existence. of types. Accordingly the heavenly bodies, the five elements, plants, creatures, animals, and men are all regarded as living things: they are taken to form a gradually ascending scale of concrete existents. The heavenly bodies are not included in the realm of constant change. Rather in his conception of nature as a gradation of fixed types of existence, Mahidasa assigned to the heavenly bodies a place which does not strictly come within the general scheme of existence; each one of them is therefore taken to represent a separate type in itself. The same applies to each one of the five elements. On the other hand, as a philosopher Mahidasa conceived nature as an inter-connected whole, and As an inter-connee- realised the immutable ground of unity in ted whole, the midst of all changes. He conceived the physical universe as a living form, which consists of the heaven, the earth, and the Heaven, earth, and firmament.' In his language, the heaven firmament. denotes that from the gift (heat) of which arises all that exists; the object of its praise is the sun (aditya). The sun is regarded not only as the luminary of the heaven or the germ of the gods (deva-retah), but also as the central, unifying power, nay, the soul (purusa) of the universe. The earth is similarly defined as that from which springs all that is; the object of its praise is fire (agni).ª Fire is identical in essence with the sun. In fact, like Dirghatamas, Mahidasa conceived the sun and fire as but two

' Aitareya Āranyaka, L. 2, 3. 6; (bid, II. 1.2.4. * Ibid, Il. 1. 2. 1-2.

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forms of one and the same thing, that is to say, like " Hiranya- garbha," he maintained that these two, called the sun and fire, are developed from what is known as the golden germ or primal form of heat. In the same way, the firmament is defined as the space between heaven and earth ; the object of its praise is air (vāyu).1 The earth is pervaded and puri- fied by air. As to the former, we are told by Mahidasa that the uni- verse, in its present form (mūrti) is co-exten- The extont and du- ration of the physioal sive with the earth and fire, heaven and the universe. sun, the cardinal directions and moon, water and the ocean, and that as long as these do not decay, so long the universe does not decay.' The relation between the two, called heaven and earth, is described thus. All that dies on earth is The inter-connexion of heaven and earth. consumed by heaven, and all that returns from heaven is consumed by earth.3 Thus a sort of give and take is the guiding principle of the oper- ation of nature, viewed as an inter-connected whole. More- over, the axiom laid down by Mahidasa in this connexion is : "No one possesses that which he does not eat, or the things which do not eat him," that is to say, the feeder and food are in reality food. Thus food may be described as that which feeds and is fed.4 (4) God and Matter. Lastly comes the question of the assumed ground of unity. Mahidasa seeks for unity in the conception God is the ground of unity, and Matter of God, the divine, immortal being. But is the ground of plu- rality. evidently the predicate of unity assignable to the Divine implies only the negation of the plurality which is the characterstic feature of the concrete realm of change. Further, if God be conceived as the ground 1 Aitaroya Āraņyaka, II. 1.2.8; I, 2, 8. 6. ' Ibid, II. 1 7. 1-7. * Ibia, IT. 1. 2. 15. b II. 1. 2.16.

MAHIDÂSA AITAREYA 61

of unity or singleness of cause, we may in accordance with Mahidasa's view take Matter1 to be the ground of all plurality. In order to arrive at a concrete estimate of Mahidasa's con- ception of God, we must first of all take into account his conception of Matter. A. Matter and Form. From the foregoing analysis, it follows that Mahidasa's picture of nature displays throughout his The real is that which is capable of notion of development as alone real in the development or tran- sition from the hid- Concrete world of generation. But other- den to the mani- Cested. wise, there is nothing real but that which is actualised. As we saw, Mahidasn understood by development nothing but a transition from the hidden to the manifested, that is, to put it in Aristotle's phraseology from the potential to the actual. And when his idea of deve- lopment is carefully analysed, it yields us Aristotle's broad proposition: " Each existent in the realm of change comes to be from something, by something, to something." Taking "seed" in Mahidasa's language to denote the something in Aristotle's proposition, it might be added that, according to Mahidasa's theory, a seed is developed from a seed by the process of change or natural transformation. This process of change presents itself in the form of a rope8 or chain of development, consisting of Numerous gradations exist between the fral numerous links of relation between food and matter and the fnal form : the more devo- the feeder, the material and the individual, loped a thing is, the more individnal it ig. the potential and the actual, the indetermi- nate and the determinate. There is, then, this broad distinction between the seeds. A developed seed is more individual, more actual, more deter-

' Mahid&sa did not coin a new term for Matter, but employed the Vedic term Water in the sense of matter. Vide Aitareya Āraņyaka, Il. 1.8. 1, II, 4.8. I. * The Development of Greek Philosophy, p. 158. * Aitaraya Āranyaka, II, I, 6. I.

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minate, and more an object of knowledge,' than that from which it is developed. But the higher form often presup- poses the lower. Moreover, in order to attain the higher form, a seed is bound to lose all its individuality, though not necessarily its materiality. Hence the individual also pre- supposes the material. But in this case the reverse is true as well. For, according to Mahidasa's axiom, no one possesses that which he does not eat, or the things which do not eat him. The meaning of this axiom is that the two notions- food and the feeder-are correlative. What we therefore call this moment food, may appear the next moment as the feeder. It admits of another interpretation. As Prof. Adamson puts it in the case of Aristotle, "In the complete gradation there is thus, as it were, a scale of ascent and descent, descending towards privation of all that is determinato, and ascending towards completed actuality."2 The vital concern for us, is the process of development. It is conceived thus: the seed' reduced to the state of food (or potentiality) develops to a seed elevated The reason for ehange lies alwaya in an to the rank of a feeder (or actuality) and individual ngent. The agent itself martici. this development is effected through a pates in the general process of change. living, active, individual agent,-say, the present feeder on the food. Thus Mahi- dasa's conception of the gradation of natural development is quite in accordance with, and furnishes enough justification of, his conception of the graduated scale of the types of exist- ence. A living, individual agent is with Mahidasa but one of many knots in the rope or chain of development; in other words, one of the many names given by speech* or conven- tion to those forms which matter assumes, or is capable of assuming." An agent, so regarded, must be said to stand in İbid, II.8. 6. 15. * Development of Gregk Philosophy, p. 156. 3 Aitareya Āranyaka, Il. 1. 3. 1. + Ibid II. 1.6. 1. Ibid, II. 1. 3. 1.

MAHIDĀSA AITAREYA 63

relation to two consecutive seeds as at once a destroyer and a oreator. But it must not be forgotten that, in bringing about the change necessary for the development of a seed from a seed, the agent itself must enter into motion, or under- go a certain form of change. Now, to follow out Mahidasa's conception of development a little further, a chain or rope has two extremities, two ends,-the two ultimate knots either way, between which all other knots fall, and which, therefore, determine the length of the whole change. These two ultimate knots are repre- sented by Prajapati and Brahman in the God is the Arst and the last cause, case of the universe, and by Prana and Prajna in the case of man, as we shall see; and in the case of Aristotle, by causa effioiens and cansa finalis. But it should be borne in mind that what we call metaphorically two knots are really two aspects of one and the same first and last knot, i.e., of the Divine. Thus God as Prajapati is the efficient cause, the first unmoved mover; but he is again just Brahman the final cause or end, the very perfection on whioh all turn their thoughts,' after which all things strive. "The seed of Prajapati is the goods; the seed of the goods is rain; the seed of rain is herbs; the seed of herbs is food; the seed of food is living creatures; the seed of living crea- tures is the heart; the seed of the heart is the thinking mind; the seed of lhe thinking mind is the thoughtful speech; the seed of the thoughtful speech is the thoughtful action; aud the thoughtful action done is this reality in man (puruşa), the abode of Brahman."' The prevailing tone of thought is teleological. Finally, we must inquire into Mahidasa's conceptions of Matter and Form. If his conception of development be strictly adhered to, it must be conceived as a transition from 1 Aitareya Āraņyaka, I, 8. 4. 8. " Ibid, IL 1.8. 1,

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something to something, from something yet hidden or poten- tial to something manifested or actual, That is to say, there is no transition from nothingness into Being, but only from that which is not yet, the matter or poten-

Difterence between tiality. Indeed, matter is, according to Matter and Form: Mahidasa, that out of which a thing be- Form is the manifest stion of Matter, and comes, that from which form (mūrti) or Matter is that which is capable of mani- purposive order is brought forth.1 Thus fostation. matter is related to form as the root to the shoot2, and form is related to matter as that which manifests it. The more formed matter is, the more manifested, and thus the more recognisable it becomes. Mahidasa gave an illustration: " A whispered voice is just breath, hut if spoken aloud, it is form (sarira). If whispered, it is as if hidden, for what is formless is as if hidden, and breath is formless. But if spoken aloud, it is form, and therefore it is perceptible, for form is perceptible."8 By this Mahidasa seems to have meant that speech in itself is a kind of form, the materialised breath by reason of which a purpose, such as that of express- An illustration: its bearing on the distine- ing thought, is carried out. Breath is in tion Mahidasn drew between the frat and this case the root of speech. In like manner, the final matter: the former is incoguin- breath may be regarded as a form in relation able, the latter is cog- to air. Going in this way backward from nien ble. form to matter, shoot to root, or perfection to presupposition, we are sure to arrive at the first or pure matter, which being entirely devoid of form, is incognisable in itself. On the other hand, going forward from matter to form, root to shoot, presupposition to perfection, we shall reach the ultimate matter which becomes so united with form that it is no more capable of separate manifestation.

1 Aitareya Åranyakn, TI. 4.8.1. a Ibid, II. 1.8.1. * Tbid, LI, 8.6.15,

MAHIDĂSA AITAREYA 65

In agreement with the Vedic thinkers, particularly " Para- meșthin," Mahidasa posited water' as the original matter, the first root of which this purposive order, the universe of concrete existence, is the shoot. But this does not mean that matter in itself is the concrete existent. True, that it is the root which has the capacity of becoming the shoot. The relation between the frst matter and However, Mahidasa nowhere tells us in the first mover. what relation this first matter stands to the first mover, except in a passage2 where he seems to regard matter as a passive principle, that on which form is imposed, something which requires to be energised, in order that it may become manifested Under this aspect, matter is also to be conceived as the substratum of change. It is evident from his view of the chain of development that Mahidāsa did not look upon change as a series of isolated events. The world of generation has a unity of its own, and this unity implies obviously the identity and continuity of a common substratum of change, i.e., matter. Thus matter is the ground of all plurality of forms, just as speech is the ground of all multiplicity of names. B. God. The point in which Mahidasa effectively opposed "Para- meșțhin " is that the reason of transition from the hidden to the manifested is not in matter, the principle of passivity. Matter does not come within the definition of either being or non-being.ª Hence the principle of motion is in something other than matter; in God, the satyam of satyam,4 the most real of all things real. God as Prajapati is the lord of beings, the father and friend of all living creatures. He who is both individual and universal "brooded over "5 the first matter, and thus stirred it up into motion or energy. The Deity 1 Aitareya Āranyaka, II. 1.6.1. Ibid, II. 4.3.1. 3 See ante, Paramesthin's viewe, Pt. I. * Aitareya Aranyaka, II. 3.6.2; ibvd, II. 1.8.7. Ibid, II. 48,1.3; ibid, 1.8.8.6. 9

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is a name which is "the best and without a flaw."! The

Mabidasa's theology. Divine essence is in its nature ' im- material, immortal, eternal, imperishable. The Divine essence is one, and unity of God can best explain the singleness of character which the world of generation presents within itself in very varied degree.ª God excludes all idea of passivity, and therefore, of plurality. The yes and no of language, do not apply to God, for the Divine nature is eternally free from all that is hard and cruel.8 Brahman enjoys bliss eternally. In order, therefore, to contemplate the nature of the Divine one must transcend the yes and no of language and all that is hard and cruel. Nevertheless, God may be conceived under these two aspects. In one aspect, God is Prana, spirit, or the living principle of the universe, the pure vital energy and activity. In the other aspect, God is Prajna (voue) the pure intelligence, the eternally active self-conscious reason (prajnana) .* The whole realm of change is led by Brabman, the self-conscious reason (prajña-netra). (5) The Soul (Atma). Like Aristotle, Mahidasa seems to have conceived soul as the complement of a living body. Soul is that single

The psychological element in our existence which comes directly sapeot of Mahidaga's from the Deity, or in and through which mstaphysios. we can approach the Divine. The function of reason (Prajnana) is in the soul. The faculty by which we see form, that by which we hear sound, that by which we perceive odours, that by which we utter speech, that by which we taste food, and all that which comes from the heart and the mind, namely, apperception, comprehension, understanding, cognition, intellect, insight, retention, judg-

1 Aitareya Āranyaka. I. 3,3.6. * Ibid, II. 8.8.2. foll, Ibid, II, 8.8.4. + Tbid, II. 8.1.5-8.

MAHIDĀSA AITAREYA 67

ment, reflection, receptivity, remembrance (or memory), con- ceiving, willing, breathing, loving, desiring,-bear in varying degrees the name of Reason (prajnanasya namadheyyani).1 On the other hand, soul is in its essence just the vital principle (prana) in virtue of which we can discharge our funotions as living beings. Thus for Mahidasa, as for Aristotle, the complete fact is this life, and the central fun- damental function of a fully developed organism is breathing or respiration. For even during sleep, when all sensations and all mental activities cease, the process of life, i.e., res- piration, goes on still the same. As there are infinite gradations of types of existence, so there is a graduated scale of functions of the soul. The lowest function discharged by the soul is nutritive; the first desire felt by the soul is that for food; and the first feeling experienced by the soul is hunger and thirst. The next higher function of the soul consists of sense-perception and such motor activities as action, locomotion, excretion and reproduction. The functions which stand still higher in the scale are grouped, as we saw under the mind and the heart, the latter including what we now call the funotions of under- standing and reason. Once more, as there is no difference of kind between the types of existence, so between the various functions of the soul.

(6) Speech (Vak). Like matter or mind, speech is conceived as being a continuous structure. It is compared to a The logical aapeot of Mahidasa's meta- rope with many knots, a chain with many physlcs. links (vāk tanti nāmāni dāmāni)." The knots or links are the names or concepts, corresponding to existent forms. The rope or chain runs,in a straight line. It has a

1 Aitareya Aranyakn, II, 6.2. * Ibid, II. 1.6. 1.

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first and a final knot, representing the first and the final cause respectively. Thus Mahidasa, like Aristotle, avoided the absurdity of an infinite regress in proof. The difference between the first or the final knot and any intermediate knot is that the latter admits of the yes and no of language (i.e., the law of contradiction), while the former does not. Mahi- dasa, in agreement with all post-Vedic thinkers, found perfect correlation between thought and speech. "As far as speech goes, so far goes Brahman "] was his maxim. Further, he identified concepts with concrete facts, knowledge with exis- tence.

II. Physios .- Mahidasa started his physical inquiries by advancing as a general axiom, that man is a microcosmos, just as, on the other hand, the visible world as a whole is but a universal man.ª Both are, so far as their organic constitution

The bearings of the goes, complete individuals, and so are all maxim, that every individual thing is a known and unknown living bodies which form microcosmos, on the investigation of phy- scale of intermediaries between them. This a sies, means that between the one and the other of these fixed types of concrete existents, there is no differ- ence in kind, but merely in intensity. The whole of nature is a purposive order, 'a system of ends.' In this great and eternal order of the universe there is nothing which does not partake of the Divine nature, and no point at which we cannot perceive a continual striving after perfection.

• Altareys Āranyaka. T. 9. 8, 91 " Yavad brahms vietitam tāvatī vagiti; yatra ha kvs ca brahmă tad v5g, Yatra vš vak tnd vă brahmêti." ' Ibid, II. 1.2, 6-12; II. 4. 2.4; ete. In a passage of the Brihad Aranyaka Upanigad (1. 1) the solar universe (ie., "Narayana's" Parnga) is compared to an ever-ronning horse, a horse fit for sacriflce, that is to say, subject to recurrent cycles of change, to envelopment and development. The dawn is desoribed as im head, the sun as the eye, the wind as the breath, and the year as the body (corporeal form) This is followed by & further deacription of the anstomy of the organised universal horse. The henven is ite back, the aky its abdomen, the earth its thorax, the quarters ils extremities, the interme- diate quarters its ribs, the seasons its organs of sense, .... the balf-digested food is the sand, the rivers its intestines, and ao on and so forth.

MAHIDĀSA AITAREYA

As Sakalya puts it in agreement with Mahidasa, and with more definiteness in expression than the latter, every indi-

Bakalya's view of vidual being is like an egg, that is to say, the rasemhlance be- tween the physionl very similar to the oval-shaped, spherical constitution of the Universe and that of universe. Like the visible universe, the individual beings. trunk of an animal is divisible into three parts. The heaven corresponds to the skull, the mid-air to the thorax, and the earth to the abdomen. As there are three luminaries attached to the three-fold division of the universe, so there are three luminaries joined to the three parts of the trunk. The sun in the heaven resembles the eye in the skull; lightning in mid-air is the heart (vital breath) in the thorax; and fire on earth is the seed in the propagative organ.1 But Sakalya omits or overlooks a few pointa of scientific interest in Mahidasa's cosmology. For in Mahidasn's cosmo- logical dootrine. accordance with the latter's view, we are to recognise that the formed universe is surrounded by Ambas (waters)," termed elsewhere the ocean,3 denoting the concentrio circle of Varuna (Neptune), a notion reminding us at once of "Brahmanaspati's" Aditi, or Anaximander's arepor. By the circle of Varuna, then, Mahidasa understood not certainly any void space (sūnyā- kaśa, the notion of which was altogether foreign to post- Vedic thinking), but that eternally unmoved region of pure, unmixed and fiery ether of immeasurable brilliance (amitaujas, to use Gargyayana's expression) from which energy is constantly generated, and transmitted in the form of a flash of lightning or solar ray to the formed universe, first, to the outermost part of space called heaven, the region of lights (maricis), and then from that to lower regions. The energy or stimulus which is thus imparted from the circle of ' Aitareya Ārapyaka, TII, 1, 2, 6-8. * Ibid, II. 4. 1.4. * Ibid, II. 1. 7.7.

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Varuna sets the heavenly bodies, air, and all the rest in motion. This circle of Varuna or Infinity is conceived by Mahidasa apparently as something similar to Saturn's ring. It lies above the formed universe, and yet is supported upon and encloses the universe within itself. As Yajñavalkya seems to have thought, the Oceanic ring surrounding the Earth (Prithivi, i.e., Extension, the border of the formed universe) on every side, is twice as large as the Earth. The space separating the one from the other hardly exceeds the edge of a razor or the wing of a mosquito.1 However, the notion of severance of the two concentric circles must by no means be lost sight of, inasmuch as it has most important bearings on the ontological views of Mahidasa and other post-Vedic thinkers. The mental picture thus drawn of the eternal separation and inter-connexion (amounting to an inter-dependence) of Infinity and Finiteness (Aditi and Diti, ananta and santa) enabled them to conceive of a first unmoved mover. And all this is but to repeat the general view, that "Brahmanaspati's" Aditi, like Anaximander's arapov, WaS the first philosophic conoeption of God, and one remaining yet entirely within the physical. Now, enclosed entirely within the Ocean or Infinity is the outermost border of the formed universe called Heaven, studded with lights (maricis). The number of these lumi- naries (stars and all the rest), as given in the Satapatha Brahmana, is 36,000. Mahidasa gives no number. And Gargyayana, following an unknown but earlier thinker,ª conceives heaven as the council-hall skilfully built by Vibhu,3 a term corresponding to Vedic Visvakarman (universal architect), now degraded evidently from a highest Deity to a mere god (devaputra). Further, Gargyayana speaks, in agreement with Mabidasa, of two door-keepers-Indra, the wielder of thunder,

1 Brihad Araņyaka Upanigad, III. 8, 2, Ohandogyn Upanişad, VIII. 5. 8 "Prabhn-vimitam hiruņmaam." " Kauşītaki Upanigad, I. : "Vibhu-nāmakam pramitam sabhšsthalam."

MAHIDĀSA AITAREYA 71

and Prajapati, the sun1-that is to say, of two gates opening apparently on two ways. and serving as the channels of com- munication between infinity and the finite. Yājnavalkya omits Prajapati.2 Heaven surrounds this mortal earth (mara) on every side. The earth supports mid-air or the atmosphere filled with vapours above it,-the mid-air which is the scene of light- ning (electrical phenomena), and itself is supported upon and encircled by waters (Ap-world, hell) beneath it.3 A thin plenum of ether+ divides the heaven from the mid-air. Strictly, this is the circle of Varuna bolow which lies the dominion of Indra, and above the dominion of Prajapati. The earth is placed like a ship 3 lying at anchor in the midst of waters. It has nevertheless a local motion of its own, compared by Mahidasa to that of a swing (prenkha"). The sun rises in the eastern ocean and sets in the western. Pandit Sāmaśrami Satyavrata Sarmā has collected a few interesting references from the Brahmanas and other sources, pointing to a different conclusion, viz., that in the view of the Aitareyas and other Brahman philosophers 'the sun neither rises nor sets, but stands alone in the centre.'7 But it is to be doubted if we are really justified in drawing such an inference as that days and nights are caused by rota- tion of the earth. The passage quoted is this: "He (the sun) never sets nor rises. Whon people think he sets, it means that he having reached the end of day, conceals himself."8 The belief in cither revolution or in rotation of the earth does not

· Aitareya Āraņyaka, II. 6. 1. 5; KauşĪtaki Upanişad, I. 3. a Brihad Araņyuka Opanięad, III. 3. 2. ' Aitareya Āranyaka, II. 4. 1. 4. + Brihad Āraņyaka Upaniņad, III. 3. 2. " Aitareya Aranyaka, I 2. 4. 6. Prenkka seema to denote also the whole physical universe, divided into three parts ibid, I, 2. 8. 4. 1 Chendogyu Up., III. 11. I. 3; "nalrôdetā nāstametā, ekala eva madhye sthats, Altareya Brâhmaua, III, 4. 6: " Sa vi ese nu kadscansstam eti nodeti. Tam yadastam ettti manyante, ahna eva taduntam itva athAtm&nam viparyasyate ; rstrim eva avastāt

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The only perplexing point in Mahidasa's physics is whether he conceived the vital spirit (prana) as a principle separate

An ambignity and from the five elements or not. In one place its historical impor- he definitely states that so far as a living tance. body is concerned, the vital principle has no separate existence from the five elements,1 while in another place he considers Prana as a principle in itself, a principle which is not altogether dependent on the body or material conditions.' However, the ambiguity thus involved in his physical conceptions is important to bear in mind, as it led at a later period to the opposition between Kakuda Katyayana's doctrine of soul being distinct from the body (añno-jiva- añnam-sarīra-vada) and Ajita Kesa-Kambalin's doctrine of soul being identical with the body (tam-jiva-tam-sarīra- vāda).

Biology .- The chief point to notice in Mahidasa's biological speculations is his view of the gradual development of intelli- gence (oitta) in the living world (prana-bhritsu)." But to putit in this way would be to define rather too narrowly the broad proposition he himself laid down. His proposition is-" Know the gradual development of individual things" (atmanam avistaram veda4). We say "too narrowly" because, as he clearly points out, the development is not merely psychical, but also physical. And yet there is no statement from which it might be concluded that, according to his view, sense itself is developed into reason, or a plant becomes a man by gradual evolution. As to the first point, he considers that sense-per- ception and reasoning, considered as mental functions, are not different in kind but only in intensity. Indeed, according to him, the mental functions ranging from bare sensation (as we may say) to comprehension bear the name of Reason (prajnanasya

1 Aitareya Araņyaka, II. 3,1 I. # Ibid, II. 1. 8. 12-18: "The immortal dwella with the mortal." * Ibid, Il. 8.2.2. According to Sayaņa, citta=cidrūpa. * By švistāram Sšyaņa understanda " atišayena prakatam."

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namadheyyani).1 As regards the second point, he seems to have thought that the types of existence are almost as eternal as the world itself. It is needless here to repeat his classifica- tions of living beings. But it is, at all events, interesting to note that he includes earth, water, fire, air and heaven among living things. Maskarin Gosala and Mahavira, as we shall see later, grouped earth, water, fire and air together with plants under beings with one sense, the fundamental sense of touoh.

Mabidasa mentions plants as forming a type distinot from those of five elements. As Sayana rightly interprets his view, in earth, stone and such other unconscious objects mere exis- tence can be conceived to prevail. They do not come under the strict definition of living beings.ª They are, in other words, organic things as distinguished from organic beings. Plants and herbs in general can be distinguished from organic things by sap (rasa)8 or moisture (ardratvam) which the former possess. But like organic things the plants, too, are immovable (sthavara).+ Those that are higher in the scale can move from place to place at their will. They are called, therefore, mov- able (jangama). Physically and mentally men are the best of created things." But the difference is a mere question of degree. Embryology-In forming an idea of Mahidasa's achieve- ments in embryology, we must keep constantly in mind his classiflcation of living beings. Proceeding from the theory of gradation in types of existence, Mahidas had to assume a similar gradation in the modes of generation. In this point Mahidasa and Aristotle agree. With both, the highest

1 Aitareya Āraņyakn, VI, 1.8. ' "Avirbhavopadhayas totra acetanegn mrit-pasdnidisu snttvamatram avirbhavati na stmano jivarupatvam." : Aitareya Āraņyaka, II. 3.2.8. + mbid, II. 6.1,5. s Ibid, II. 42.2.

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in the scale are those beings which are generated by means of separate sexes. From the observation of the phenomena of nature, especially the phenomena of animal life, Mahidasa was led to recognise it as a universal law (and perhaps Aristotle had to do the same), that a third something is always the Reprodnction is the sequence of two opposed facts. The expres- and process by which seed blood become united. sion "opposed" is not very happily chosen, considering that no opposition amounting to the notion of a difference of kind exists for Mahidasa in the world as a whole. Prof. Erdmann observes in connexion with Aristotle's doctrine that in the act of generation, " the altogether more imperfect female supplies the matter in the menses and the male the form in the seed, which con- tains an ether-like breath. And as in the act of generation, so in its product also, the corporeal element is to be derived from the maternal, and the psychical from the paternal ele- ment."] The same holds true of Mahidasa's view of genera- tion, or propagation of species. The difference thus involved between the two elements called the paternal and the maternal is not of kind, but of degree. Thus Mahidasa was led to think that the mother's blood is a form of fire (agni), and the father's seed is a form of the sun (aditya). But fire and the sun are not different in kind, their common essence being heat. Hence to Between saed and blood there is no dif- say that life originates from the union of ference of kind: both are species of the same sexes would really mean, according to Mahi- genus heat, dasa, that the vital spirit is called forth into existence by the mutual reaction of two forms of heat or calorio energy .? Indeed, in agreement with all earlier thinkers, Mahidasa maintained that the tertium quid of the origin of animal life is the combination of two elements

• History of Philosophy, Vol. I, p. 162. ' Aitareya Aranyakn, II, 37.8,

MAHIDĀSA AITAREYA 77

-maternal and paternal. The two elements become united, and develop into a fœtus in the woman.1 Thus in the act of generation, the father and the mother have almost equal shares. As Mahidāsa also put it paradoxi- cally, "This self gives her self to that self, Mahidasa's paradoxi- cal axiom : its bearing and that self gives his self to this self. on a later scientiflo view of generation. Thus two selves thrive together." It is not easy now to make out the precise meaning of this paradox. But it seems to have prepared the way for a later view, that the paternal element gives rise to fat, bone and marrow, while from the maternal element are formed skin, blood, and flesh."

We have no right to read this later viow back into Mahi- dasa's axiom, especially as it seems utterly irreconcilable with his view expressed elsewhere, which is :- Led by hunger and thirst, the father eats food. From food digested in the stomach is formed ultimately the seed (or manas, the psyche, as Uddalaka calls it). He bears the seed as a self in his self (body). When he commits it to the mother, he causes it to be born. This is called the first birth of a man.

Thereafter the seed becomes the self of the mother, as though one of her limbs. It does not therefore do any harm to her. She bears and nourishes the germ, or fotus, her husband's self (not hers) within her, and brings forth the child in due course of time. This is said to be the second birth of a man.8 Historically this view is that of the Vedic thinker

' Aitareya Aranyaka, I. 4.2.11, " In the legal philosophy of ' Manu' (X.70-72) we are referred to these two opposed views of generation-(1) That the seed (the psychical element derived from the father) is more important than the 'Beld' (the matter in the menses), and (2) that both-the seed and the field-are of equal importance, Being consistent with his rather unhappily chosen mataphor of seed and fleld, the unknown expositor of Manu's aystem favoured the former view, although the analogy enabied him to insist so far at leset, that as, on the one hand, a seed caunot grow apart from the fertility of the soil, so, on the other hand, a fertile ground withopt a seed sown in it is virtnelly barren, > Aitareya Āraņyaka, II. 5.1,2-7

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"Surya," who mentions four stages through which the foetus passes.1 Anatomy .- Mahidasa's knowledge of anatomy is far from exhaustive, as compared with that of modern writers. But the bare outlines which he leaves behind him of his study of the human frame would seem more than enough to have marked an epoch in the history of Indian anatomical science. Mahidasa speaks of a human body as built up of the trunk and the extremities. The principal part of the body is of course the trunk, which is divided by him The threefold divi- sion of the trunk which broadly into three portions-the skull, the is essential to onr existence. thorax, and the abdomen.' He insists more than once that the trunk is indispensably necessary for our organic existence, because a man is seen to live even when he is deprived of hands, legs, eyes, ears, speech, consciousness, or sound mind, but life without the trunk as a whole is inconceivable.8 The trunk is therefore called the Self (atma), the physical aspect of real being. Of the three parts of the trunk, the abdomen seems to have been distinguished from the skull as Abdomen, the mortal or lower centre from the immortal or higher centre.4 The abdomen is represented sometimes by a numerical figure, "The Twenty-one" (Ekavimsa)" for the reason that there are twenty-one separate parts in it. Three organs of sense (pranah) are said to be joined with the abdomen.ª These are apparently the legs or organ of locomo- tion, the organ of excretion, and the organ of repro- duction. The abdomen contains the intestines which are of irregular shape, some are large, some small ; some are long,

1 Rig-veda, X. 88,40. * Aitareya Aranyaka, I, 5 1.2-7. * Ibid, II. 14, 9-16. . Ibsa, IT. 1,4, 2-6, * Joid, I. 6.1.2-8. · Ibid, I. 6.1.7,

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some short.1 From one point of view, that is, as the support or source of nutriment, the abdomen is considered to be the chief of the three parts,ª while from another point of view, that is to say, from the point of view of the development of intelligence, the skull is regarded as the chief of all. The thorax stands mid-way between the two There are two organs of sense, contained in, or joined Thorax. with the thorax, to wit, the heart or the central organ, and the hands or the organ of action. The special function of the heart is called breathing. In the skull or head is located, as we said, the immortal or higher centre of organism. It is the abode or centre of aotivity of the higher self, consisting of 8kull. sight, hearing, mind, speech, and breath.4 The exact position of this brain-centre is just below the open- ing of the suture of the skull." The two centres called the mortal and the immortal are physically connected by a main branch of the artery, as well as perhaps by the nerve fibres, while their physiological connection is maintained through the contral uniting function of the heart. The organs of sense are in this way connected with the brain-centre and with the heart." The skull is associated with seven organs of sense,' the two eyes, the two ears, the two nostrils and the tongue. The extremities comprise two upper and two lower limbs. Each one of the two upper limbs consists of Extremities. five fingers, of four joints each, two pits in the elbow and arm, the shoulder-blade, and so on. In like manner, the parts of each one of the two legs are to be

1 Aitareya Aranyaka, I.5,1.4-5. Ibid, I. 6.1.8; Cf. I. 1.2.9 : The heart is the vital centre; the stomaoh performs tho nutritive functiona. Ibid, I. 5.1.7. * Ibid, II. 1.4.7. " Jbid, II. 4.3.7-9. "Viditri." 4 Ibid, I. 5.1.6. ' nia, I. 5.1.7.

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enumerated. All these being added to the trunk make a total of one hundred and one. But when the parts of the extremities are not sepa"ately counted, the total is just twenty-five.1 The two thighs consist of two large bones.2 A man stands firm on two feet, and animals stand on four. Though a man is a biped (dvipada), he is generally placed among the quadrupeds (catuspadas).3 Like men, the birds are called bipeds. The tail is the main support of a bird, just as the abdomen is that of a man. The left wing of a bird is larger than its right wing because it contains one feather in excess.+ A woman is physically weaker than a man because of some organic defect." Upon the whole, the human anatomy is the same as that of the beasts and birds." Physiology .- A living body is a body that is organised, and has the vital principle (prana) for its potentiality. It must be sharply distinguished from The living body is a purposive order, and a dead body because a body without life as such it is different from a dead body or joined to it, so to speak, is but a decay- corpBe. ing corpse (sarira).' Whereas a living body is a self working mechanism of natute, a system, nay, a body-politic (to put it figuratively) which is composed of several members skilfully joined together or united into a complete whole. The members, apart from their corporate life, are said to have a distinct place, function, or purpose of their own in the organism. Each member is perfect in its place,4 while out of place, it is useless. Besides, each member has a function so peculiar to itself that no other member can take its place. The eye, for example, 1 Aitareya Āraņyako, I, 1.2.7; 1. 1.4. 20-21; I, 2.2.20; ete. * Ibia. I. 5.1.8. : Ibid, I. 1,2.6; I. 5.1.0. * Ibid, I, 4,2,5 ; I. 7.8.9. * Ibid, 1. 4.2.4. . Ibid, 1. 42,8; ep, lf. 1.4.1: what people call the tips of the feet in man are but hoofs and claws in other animxls. ' Ibid, I1. 1.4,12 ; 1I. 1.8.18. * Ibid, I. 5.1.7.

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cannot hear, the ear cannot see, the stomach cannot think, the mind cannot digest.' Thus the functions are distributed among the members, as if, on a wise principle of the division of labour. Each member exercises its own function inde- pendently, in harmony and co-operation with other mem- bers, while the unity of the whole organism is maintained by the vital principle. The mouth, for instance, speaks, the nose smells, the eye sees, the ear hears, the skin feels, the mind thinks, the stomach digests, and the organ discharges virile matter .? In order to participate in the general function called 'life,' the relation between the members should not only be that of a mere physical contact (to put it in a modern fashion), but also that of a physiological connexion. That is to say, each member of the organism must be animated by the same spirit, and stimulated into activity by the same motive. For, as a later thinker, Uddālaka, expounded it, no sooner does the animating principle leave a branch of a tree than it begins to wither;8 or, as Aristotle steadfastly maintained, " a hand or arm when cut off ought not to have applied to it the same name which it bears when the same portion of matter is varitably an integral part of the living whole."4 It is also worth while to bear in mind that according to Mahidasa, all the members of an organism are not absolutely necessary for its existence. Mahidasa seems to have thought that a living body is a system which is divisible into a number of The five systems into which organic fono- component systems, The division of these tiona are to be divided. systems varies according to the centre in reference to which we study the funotions of animated bodies. Mahidāsa tells us that the Sarkaraksyas ("The 1 Aitarsya Āraņyaka, II. 4.8.2-8. * Ibid, II. 4.8.6. " Obandogya Upanigad, VI. 11.2. + The Development of Greek Philosophy, p. 164. 11

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Sugarsighted ") meditated on the stomach as Brahman, the Arunis on the heart, while he himself meditated on the head (i.e., the brain).' But he makes it quite clear in many places that he considered the stomach to be the centre of nutritive functions, the heart of vital' and the head that of psychical functions. Thus we may designate them respectively as the nutritive centre, the vital centre, and the intellectual centre. From the gradual embryonic development of man, these three centres are regarded as successive in order of time.3 In the name of five-fold air (prana), and with reference to the vital centre, Mahidasa divides the physiological functions of the body into the following five systems. (1) Prana-The up-breathing or respiratory system. (2) Apana-The down-breathing or alimentary system. (3) Samana-The back-breathing or metabolism. (4) Udana-The out-breathing or special senses, (5) Vyana-The on-breathing or ciroulatory system. So far as the intellectual centre goes there is one system

The nervous system only, namely, the physio-psychological or ia not separately enu- nervous system, as represented by sight, merated. hearing, mind, and speech. This latter sys- tem is included under the respiratory and alimentary systems on the ground that its existenoe depends on them. Here we must not misconstrue Mahidasa's doctrine. For what he really means is that all the systems are interdepen- dent, just as the living body is an inter-connected whole-an order which is as much purposive as the universe itself. It will also be noted that in assigning the name air or breath (prāņa) to the systems above mentioned, Mahidāsa seems to have two purposes in view: first, to bring home that the working of the systems depends ultimately on the vital breath; and, secondly, to point out that the functions of the body, 1 Aitaraya Āraņyaka, II. 1.4., 5-6. a Ibid, I. 1.2,9. * Ibid, II. 1.4. 1-7.

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such as eating, digestion, excretion, circulation, and the like, stand in need of the help of air, or atmospheric pressure, as we now say. III. Psychology .- The details of Mahidasa's psychology, have already been discussed under the preceding heads. Here we have to note just a few points which have not been clearly brought out. Mind is that faculty in an organised body which thinks.' All desires dwell in the mind, for it is with the mind that a man conceives all desires.ª Mind is that faculty in us which thinks, wills, and feels. All that is thought or conceived in the mind is expressed in speech. Thus in order of time, or at least logically, thought is always prior to speech.3 In another place he distinctly states that thought and speech are interdependent (van me manasi pratișthita, mano me vāci pratișthitam) .* IV. Ethics .- In the background of Mahidasa's ethics are his metaphysics and biological speculations. The former can he best understood when it is considered in constant relation to the latter. We have to recall in the first place that, accord- ing to his view, the whole of nature is a system of ends, and in the second place, that the self develops gradually in the living world (pranabhritsu). The ultimate aim of man's life, and of life as a whole is perfection, which consists of knowledge (prajñā), bliss (nandana), and immortality (amritatvam). The continual advance is one from Life (Prana) to Reason (Prajña"), from Prajapati to Brahman, that is to say, from bondage to freedom of action.G The first and obvious sign of freedom is the power of free bodily movement, the power of which the stocks and stones, nay, the plants and herbs

' Aitaraya Aranyaka, II. 4-3-8. * Ibid, I. 8-2-2. * Ibad, 1. 8-2-6. * Ibid, II. 7. * Ibid, II. 6-1-6: prajta or prajdana. "Bervantat prajodnetram, prajnane pratiethitam prajřišnetro loka prajšāpratişths prajñēnam Brahma." " Ibid, II. 1-8-1: " Karma tadidam karmakritamayam purngo, Brahmano lokab."

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(the sthavaras as discriminated from the jangamas) are deprived. The second test of freedom is to be applied to the thighs (uru) or the power of generation by means of separate sexes, i.e., by mithuna. The next higher test is by the stomach (udara), that is, the choice of food and power of assimilation, and so on, while the final test is applicable only to the head (Sirsah), or to the powers of heart and mind" (hridayam manas), by which a man is endowed with knowledge, says what he has known, sees what he has known, knows what is to happen to-morrow, knows heaven and hell, and desires the immortal by means of the mortal. The highest in the scale of development is man who alone is endowed with the faculty of reason (prajñanena sampanna- tama). His highest aspiration is the attainment of the immortal by means of the mortal, and his principal means is prajñana. In performance of duty lies humanity which is the Brahma-world. The highest duty of man is of course the contemplation of the Divine manifesting or realising itself through various forms and in varying degrees. In order to enjoy full freedom, a philosopher or a god must transcend in his thought all material conditions of existence, and rise above the sensuous. But what is the real significance of his phrase, to desire the immortal by means of the mortal (martyena amritam ipsa) ? All forms of life eat and drink. All lower animals propa- gate the species, Even the plants, when they are grown up, bear fruits.1 This alone cannot be the whole duty of a human being who is endowed with the extraordinary faculty of reason by cultivating which he can acquire wisdom, build up his moral self, and perfeot his conduct. This is however no reason why we should forego like some of the ascetics the legitimate pleasures of the sense, legitimate in so far as these are in harmony with the purpose of the whole of nature, that 1 Aitareya Arpyaka, I. 2.4, 14,

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is, in so far as these subserve the real end for which these are meant, and no other. Take, for instance, the question of the propriety of marriage on which the opinion of the time is divided. Marriage in popular usage of the term means the union of father and mother, whereas scientifically viewed, it is just the union of "sced " with " blood," that is, a mutual reaction of two forms of heat, energy in its solar (aditya) and its fire (agni) stage of manifestation.1 The Aitareya views exprensed in an older document, the Aitareya Brahmana (VII. 3. 1), are here worth considering. The extract is from the story of Hariscandra, the interest of which is that it fully exhibits how the Aitareyas, and with them all the Brahman schools, came into sharp conflict with those for whom the road to the Brahma-world lay through ascetic practices : "What is filth, what is goat's skin. what are beards, what is penance (in comparison with the son 2) ?" " The father always overcomes by a son darkness in large measure. The son is the self in whom the father himself is reproduced.8 He is like a vessel carrying ample provision of food to the father ....... The Brahman should desire a son, since he himself makes a blameless world. Food is the sub- sistence of life, protection is afforded by a garment,4 benuty is gold, the animals are marriages, the comrade is wife, poverty is the daughter, and the son is a luminary shining in the highest heaven." "To one without a son the world is (as if) non-existent " (nAputrasya lokosttti). All the lower animals are conscious

1 Aitareya Arunyakn, TI, 8. 7, 3. : " Kin nn malam kim ajinam kimn fmafrūņi kimh tapnh ?" Filth, goat's ekin, beards, and penance-these fonr are the charncteristic symboln of an asoetic. But Sayana takes them as the characteristic maiks of the 'four estates,' " atha malnjina imnarntapab sabdaih aeramacatnştayom vivakitam." Of. Bnddhn's pronouncement ngainst nsceticiem : " Kinte dummedha jatšhi, kinte ajina sstiyt | Abbhantnrn te gnhannm bāhiram pari- majjasi | ! ". 3 Śaávat putreņa pitaro atyūyan hahnlem tamaļ, ātma hi jajša štmanab aa irāvati atitāriņi ...... ", . * Baranar hi vasa, (Aitaraya Brēhmaņa, VII, &, 1).

86 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

of this truth, and for this reason even a son amongst them rides upon the mother and sister in the excitement of sexual passions." Elsewhere the Aitareyas declared : "All human arts, vis., elephant, brass-work, garment, works in gold, mule and chariot, are an imitation of Divine arts or works of nature. All skilful worka that appear in this light are to be regarded as arts; self-building is one of the arts by which the devotee should so build up his self that it becomes chandomaya, self-building inclusive of the art of reproduction," Marriage is a sacred human institution which must be res- pected by all mortal baings. It is good in so far as it subserves the Divine purpose, which is the preservation and better- ment of the race. All that the Aitareyas wanted to say might be summed up in the expression: Live the life of nature. The art of self-building or the art of conduct is to be based upon the art of the Divine, that is, to be in complete accord with the general laws of nature. Nothing is bad in ita right place, and everything is useless when out of its place. Everything gains in value and significance in so far as it discharges its proper function and in proportion it con- tributes to the general well-being of the whole system of which it is an integral, organic part. The eye, for instance is good, as long as it discharges the function of seeing for which it is intended, and remains an integral part of the organism. "The eye cannot hear, the ear cannot see, and so on." When out of place, it is absolutely useless. Thus Mahidasa Aitareya and his school left many inferen- ces relating to practical life to be drawn from their atudy of the human organism or of the constitution and working of tne physical universe. The family or the society or the state should be so constituted that each will appear as an organism in which all the parts will be harmoniously related together.

MAHIDĀSA AITAREYA 87

Each member will be given a free soope for a proper dis- charge of his or her function, or for the proper use of his or her capacity. As for practical life, Mahidasa thought life is altogether imperfeot and bitter without marriage and children.' A happy life is said to be that which is lived for a hundred years in health, strength, and brightness (indriye, viryye, tejasi). The greatest virtue of man is truth (satya), the flower and fruit of speech. The tongue that utters what is not true dries up and perishes like an uprooted tree .* The term truth had a far wider connotation with him than with us. Truth means a perfect harmony in conduct be- tween one's thought, speech and deed, as in philosophy between knowledge and reality.

! Aitareye Aranyako I 3. 4 12-13. : Ibid, II. 3. 6. 9-10,

CHAPTER V

OF THE THINKERS BEFORE UDDĀLAKA

We have seen in the last section that there are few problems, so familiar to ns in philosophy and natural science, which Mahidasa did not touch upon. We may now conclude on a careful examination Mahidsse is the of the mode in which he endeavoured to find fnther of Jndiun philo. sophy. the solution of those problems, that it was he who prepared the way for almost all the thinkers who succeeded him in India, just as, on the other hand, it was he who made a profitable and scientific use of the earlier types of Vedic thinking. Mahidasa must be recognised, therefore, as the father of Indian philosophy. Of the thinkers who preceded Uddalaka and cume immedi- ately after Mahidasa, the two most distinghished in history are Gargyavana and Pratardana. There Mahidden's sueces- sors : The charactar- were undonbtedly a great many other think- istic featores of their ers. It will be presently shown that they apeoulations. did not apparently succeed in evolving any new system of philosophy. However, they were engaged in their own humble way in shaping the destiny of Indian think- ing. The constant topie of discussion among the thinkers of Mahidasa's time was whether the vital or the intelligent is the first principle of change. One party, headed by Suravīra Māndukeya, the Elder The vitalists versus the paychologists. Sakalya, Raikva, and others maintained that the vital principle-Life (Prana)-is the highest principle in man, and in the world of generation at large, while the other party, headed by Badhva, Sandilya, and

OF THE THINKERS BEFORE UDDĀLAKA 89

others, contended that the highest principle is the intelligent principle -- Brahman. And Mahidasa, as we have seen, tried to reconcile the two views by teaching that the soul is the manifestation of life, and indeed in essence, just life. But whenever there arose occasion for him to pronounce judgment upon the relative importance of the two principles, he was inclined in favour of the vital.' The view of thinkers who preceded Uddalaka can be summarised as follows :- I. SURAVĪRA-SĀKALYA, First of all, it was stoutly maintained by Suravira Mandukeya that the vital breath is the beam.' The argument came from tho Elder Sakalya, Sāravīra Māņdūkeya who held the same view on the ground that aud Sthavira lya. Saka- the eye, the ear, the mind, the speech, the breath, in short, the whole self or whole tabernacle of individual existence rests ultimately on the vital principle.8 MĀŅDUKEYA-KAUŅĮHARAVYA. This brings us to consider other thinkers-Hrasva Man- dukeya and Kauntharavya. In their views are embodied the gorms of the later physiological theory, that seed is formed from marrow as marrow from bone. In Hrasvu Māndūkeyd Hrasva Mandukeya's enumeration the parts of and Kauntharavya, our body are altogether 720,+ while according to Kauntharavya, these are 1,080 in all." However that may be, the Elder Sakalya and Kauntharavya fully agreed in viewing the higher self in man as consisting of sight, hearing, æsthetie faculty," mind, and speech. RAIKVA. Of this class of thinkers, Raikva must be said to be the chief of all. From a brief account of his life given in the 1 Aitareya Āranyaka, II. 1. d. 9-15. : Ibid, III, 1. 4, 1. Ibid, III. 2. 1. 1. Ibid III. 2. 1. 4. B Ibid, III. 2, 2. 7. Ibid, III. 2. 1. 5; III. 2. 2. 8. Their category for asthetie faculty is chbandas or harmony. 12

00 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Chandogya Upanisad we learn that he lived under the patro- nage of King Mahavrisas.' The part of the country where he lived became famous under the name of Raikva-parna villages. Raikva was a far-famed teacher in his time." As regards his philosophical views, they bear a close relation to the doctrine of " Anila." For Raikva, as for Raikva's doctrine. " Anila," the fundamental fact is Air (Vayu). But there is again this difference between them. "Anila" held that the principle is one: Raikva, that the principles are two- Air as energy with relation to the universe, and the Vital Breath with regard to man. But Air and the Vital Breath are with Raikva identical in substance. When fire is extinguished, he said, it goes into air; when the sun goes down, it goes into air; when the moon goes down, it goes into air; and when water dries up, it goes into air. Similarly, when a man sleeps, speech, sight, hearing, mind-all these active faculties go (to be absorbed) into the vital breath.ª

II. BĀDAVA. Opposed to the view, that the vital principle is the first principle of things, was the view, that that Badhva's pantheistie dootrine. principle is the conscious principle. Among the earlier supporters of this latter view, the name of Badhva ought to be mentioned first. According to Badhva, the animating principle of the body is the corporeal or animal soul, the essence of which is the incorporeal or nöetie soul, comprising sight, hearing, æsthe- tic faculty, mind, and speech .* Badhva goes the length of maintaining that the incorporeal, conscious principle in us is what the solar essence is to the universe. Thus he takes the solar essence to signify the soul of the universe, namely, that soul which is in this earth, in heaven, air, ether, water, herbs, trees, moon, stars, in fact, in whatsoever that exists.

Chūndogya Upanigad, IV. 2.5, * Ibid, IV. 1. 4 ' Ibid, IV. 2. 5 * Ibid, III. 2. 8, 1-18.

OF THE THINKERS BEFORE UDDĀLAKA 91

This soul must be viewed under all conditions as Brahman, the conscious, teleological principle of the universe. SAŅDILYA. Far more important, as far more advanced in abstraction, are Sandilya's speculations about God and Soul. We learn on the authority of Pravahana Jaivali that the nick-namo of Sandilya was Udara-Sandilya.1 He was a disciple of Atidhanvan Saunaka, who taught him that like ether (akasa), Brahman is greater than the great, and without limit. It should be borne in mind that this statement of Jaivali is in perfect agreement with the doctrine of Sandilya which is frequently quoted in the Vedanta texts" as Sandilya-Vidya.s A later book of aphorismis on the doctrine of Faith or Devotion (Bhakti) is ascribed to Sandilya.4 Whether the tradition that Sandilya is the originator of Bhaktivada is true is reserved for discussion elsewhere, As a fitting introduction to his main theory, Sandilya dis- posed of the question why a knowledge of His doctrine of fnith. the absolute being is necessary. His motive was religious philosophical. It is indispensable that we should form a definite and clear idea of the nature of the absolute being, inasmuch as without such an idea it is impossible for us to be free from doubt, to elevate our moral boing or attain eternal life. In his own words, a man is a creature of will (kratumaya). As he wills or believes here, so will he be hercafter. He should therefore have this will and belief :- That God (Brahman), in the first place, is all that is. In God the universe has its origin, consummation and existence. IIe whose teleological aspect is intelligence,5 he whose mecha- nical aspect is life," whose form is light,' whose will is true, whose nature is infinite and all-pervading like space, he from Ch&ndogya Upanişad, I. 9. 2-8. " Vedanta-aūtra, IlI. 3.81. 3 Cf, "tha Sandilyah Seudilyah." Chšndogya Upanişad, III, 14. 4, + Sundilya Sutras, treusiated by E. B. Cowell, Caloutta, 1878, · Manomaral. d Prāņa-farīrah. * Bhāriipaļ.

92 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

whom all works, all desires, all odours, all tastes proceed, he who embraces within his infinite nature all existences, who does not speak and has no partiality,' such a Divine, absolute being is indeed God. Secondly, that in relation to man the absolute being is the soul within our heart, smaller than a Soul is the Divine grain of rice, smaller than a grain of barley, element in man. smaller than a mustard seed, and greater than the earth, greater than the sky, greater than all these worlds. And thirdly, that we shall obtain him from whom all

Realisation of the works, all desires, all odours and all tastes Divine nature is the anpreme end of man's proceed, and who is the soul within our life. heart, the smallest of the small, the greatest of all that is great.ª

III. SATYAKĀMA JĀBĀLA. Among the immediate successors of Mahidasa, Philalethes Jabala deserves to be considered before all. Jabila and Udds. The Brihad Āranyaka Upanisad provides us Jaka. with a list of six teachers, headed by Udda- laka Āruņi. The list is spurious; in it Jabala is represented as the last of the six, and also as the disciple of a Janaki Āyasthuna.8 As we learn from an older document in the Chandogya Upanisad,4 Jābala's teacher was Gautama Hāri- drumata, and not Janaki Āyasthuna. Even in another list of teachers given in the Brihad Āranyaka Upanișad," Jabāla is mentioned as an rarlier thinker. This view is warranted by the close inter-connexion which exists between the doctrine of Jabala and the philosophy of Mahidasa.

' Ansdaral. * Chandcgye Upanigad, III. 15. 1-4, Brihad Aranyaka Upaniand, VI, 3. 7-11; cf. Ibid, IV. 1. 6, where Jenaka alludes to Jabale's concoption of Mind (manas) as Brahman. * Chāndoya Upanigad, IV. 4. 3. foll. ' Brihad Aranyaka Upanişad, IV. 6. 2: " Uddalekayana from JābllAyana."

OF THE THINKERS BEFORE UDDĀLAKA 93

The fundamental assumption in which Jabala stands nearest to Mahidasa is that the vital principle is the highest principle in man. Even their expressions are the same. Jabala's doctrine exhibits a crude notion of the immortality of soul, and the trinity of God. Such a notion was but an historic derivation from Mahidasa's philosophy. Jabala thought there is in the corporeal form an incor- poreal person (Purusa)-the soul or the Jubale's osohatalogi- cal view of the pro- immortal, fearless Brahman. When a man gress of sonl from light to light. dies, this soul in him, made up of light (Jyotismat) as it is, goes to light, thence to day, from day to the bright half of the moon, from that to the six months when the sun goes to the north, thence to the year, from the year to the sun, from the sun to the moon, and from the moon to the lightning. There is a super-human soul (purusa=person) that receives the human soul, and es- corts it to Brahman, the Supreme Being. In short, soul conceived as a luminous form, passes from light to light, from the light lesser, to the light greater, till it is merged or absorbed in Brahman, who is the eternal source of all life and light. This is the path of the gods, the path that leads to Brahman.

IV. JAIVALI.

Silaka of Salavati, Dalbhya of the school of Cikita, Pra- vahaņa Jaivali, King of Pañcala, are described in the Chando- gya Upanişad as three contemporaries.' The same Upanișad refers to a discussion held between them Jaivali and his con- temporarien touching the origin of the world. Silaka found the solution of this great problem in water; Dalbhya in heaven; and Jaivali in space or ether (akasa). Moreover, in support of his theory, that from infinite space proceed and to it return all existing things,

1 Chāndogya Upanişad, I 8 1.

94 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Jaivali quoted an ancient view, from which it follows that he was born later than Udara Sandilya.' Not only that. As a thinker, Jnivali came even after Philalethes Jabala. Our main authority for Jaivali's views is an interesting dialogue put into the mouth of Jaivali and Uddālaka Āruņi." The points noleworthy in connection with Jaivali's speculations are three in number. These are,-(1) the doctrine of the immortality of soul ; (2) the first philosophic recogni-

The remarkable fen- tion of the popular belief in rebirth and tnroa of Jaivnli's retribution,-in heaven and hell; and (3) philasophy. the virtual denial of soul and its immortality in lower animals. But, on the whole, his speculations presuppose Jabala's doctrine of immortality and remind us of the views of such Vedic seers as "Damana" and "Murdhanvan."3 Thus according to Jaivali's view, when a man dies, his friends carry him, i.e., the dead body, to the Jaivali's esrhatalogi- cal view of the sonl. funeral place, where it is consigned to fire, from which it came originally into being. Now if that man be one of those wise, godly and saintly philosophers who had deep insight into the reality of things, and who as forest-dwellers cultivated faith and practised the inner culture of intellect, his soul as a luminous form passes from light to light, from the light lesser to The rational or transcendental sonl. the light greater, exactly in the same way as described by Jābala, until it reaches Brahman, the Divine Being. This is the path of the gods, the path that leads to Brahman. In other words, this is the process onward, carrying the soul up to immortality, as distinguished froni metempsychosis.

1 Chāndogyn, 9, 1, 3. : Ibid, V. 3. 1 fr. Cf. Brihad Aranyaka, VI, 2. : Rig-veda, X. 10 ; 1. 5; X. 88.

OF THE THINKERS BEFORE VDDĀLAKA 95

Secondly, if that man be one of those worldly men who

The mundane soul. performed sacrifices, and works of public utility and practised penances, his soul goes to smoke, thence to night, from night to the dark half of the moon, from that to the six months when the sun goes to the south. His soul does not reach the year, but goes straight off to the world of the fathers, from that to the ethereal region, and from that to the moon. Having dwelt there till the reward of his good works is consumed, his soul returns to the region of ether, from that to air (atmosphere). Having become air, it becomes smoke; having become smoke, it becomes mist; having become mist, it becomes cloud; having become cloud, it comes down as rain. Then it is born as rice and corn, herbs and trees, sesamum and beans. These are eaten by men as food; from food is formed the seed; from seed, the germ; from that it is at last born as a man, and so on. Here again is this distinction. If that man's conduct was good, he will attain the birth of a Brahman, of a warrior, or of a trader; and if otherwise, he may be born as a dog, or a hog, or a Candala. This is the path of average worldly men, the ascent and descent, as it were, which brings the soul back to a new round of mundane existence.

Thirdly, should that man be one of those who were in the habit of, or in any way associated with, The infernal soul. stealing gold, drinking spirits, violating the teacher's bed, or killing a Brahman, the soul is doomed to hell, So far as to men.

Fourthly, with regard to lower creatures, deprived as

The auimal soul. they are of the higher self or soul, the door of immortality is closed to them. It may be said of them that they continually "live and die," and nothing more.

94 PRE-BUDDHISTIO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Jaivali quoted an ancient view, from which it follows that he was born later than Udara Sandilya,' Not only that. As & thinker, Jaivali came even after Philalethes Jabala. Our main authority for Jaivali's views is an interesting dialogue put into the mouth of Jaivali and Uddalaka Āruņi.ª The points noteworthy in connection with Jaivali's speculations are three in number. These are,-(1) the doctrine of the immortality of soul ; (2) the first philosophic recogni-

The remarkablo fen- tion of the popular belief in rebirth and Enres of retribution,-in heaven and hell; and (8) philasophy. Jnivnli's the virtual denial of soul and its immortality in lower animals. But, on the whole, his speculations presuppose Jabala's doctrine of immortality and remind us of the views of such Vedic seers as "Damana" and "Murdhanvan."3 Thus according to Jaivali's view, when a man dies, his friends carry him, i.e., the dead body, to the Jaivali's eschatalogi- enl view of the soul, funeral place, where it is consigned to fire, from which it came originally into being. Now if that man be one of those wise, godly and saintly philosophers who had deep insight into the reality of things, and who as forest-dwellers cultivated faith and practised the inner culture of intellect, his soul as a luminous form passes from light to light, from the light lesser to The rationol or transcendental sonl. the light greater, exactly in the same way as desoribed by Jabala, until it reaches Brahman, the Divine Being. This is the path of the gods, the path that leads to Brahman. In other words, this is the process onward, carrying the soul up to immortality, as distinguished from metempsychosis.

I Ohöndogya, 9, 1, 3. * Ibil, V. 8. 1 fr. Cf. Brihnd Arnnynkn, VT. 2. Rig-veda, X. 16 ; 1. 5; X. 88,

OF THE THINKERS BEFORE UDDĀLAKA 95

Secondly, if that man be one of those worldly men who performed sacrifices, and works of public The mundane soul. utility and practised penances, his soul goes to smoke, thence to night, from night to the dark half of the moon, from that to the six months when the sun goes to the south. His soul does not reach the year, but goes straight off to the world of the fathers, from that to the ethereal region, and from that to the moon. Having dwelt there till the reward of his good works is consumed, his soul returns to the region of ether, from that to air (atmosphere). Having become air, it becomes smoke; having become smoke, it becomes mist; having become mist, it becomes cloud; having become cloud, it comes down as rain. Then it is born as rice and corn, herbs and trees, sesamum and beans. These are eaten by men as food; from food is formed the seed; from seed, the germ; from that it is at last born as a man, and so on. Here again is this distinction. If that man's conduct was good, ho will attain the birth of a Brahman, of a warrior, or of a trader; and if otherwise, he may be born as a dog, or a hog, or a Candala. This is the path of average worldly men, the ascent and descent, as it were, which brings the soul back to a new round of mundane existence.

Thirdly, should that man be one of those who were in the habit of, or in any way associated with, Tho internal soul. stealing gold, drinking spirits, violating the teacher's bed, or killing a Brahman, the soul is doomed to hell. So far as to men.

Fourthly, with regard to lower creatures, deprived as they are of the higher self or soul, the door The auimal soul. of immortality is closed to them. It may be said of them that they continually "live and die," and nothing more.

96 PRE-BUDDHISTIO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

In this quaint fancy of Jaivali's there is nothing more to comment upon than the ethical bearing The etbical bearing of Jaivari's dootrine. or moral consequence of his doctrine of immortality. There is implied in his doctrine something of a Socratic maxim, such as knowledge is virtue. But Jaivali would insist that knowledge is not the only virtne, it being just one of many. That is to say, knowledge or inner enlightenment, taken by itself, is not enough. The argument practically comes to this. Knowledge cannot be regarded as virtue in itself, unless it be coupled with the higher moral condition of soul, and consistent throughout with man's spiritual outlook on life. Jaivali tends to main- tain in the same breath that such an ideal life as this is not within the reach of those who are not wholly detached from the world, The best that a worldly man can possibly do is to observe the rules of outward morality, and to be pious patriotio, and spiritually minded. Jaivali by his dootrine of immortality and general eschatological theory tried to answer the question why the world of generation is never full. Further, these afforded a metaphysical basis for his rules against the "five fires of immoral conduct (pancagni)." "Hence let a man take care to himself.1 A man who steals gold, who drinks spirits, who dishonours his Guru's bed, who kills a Brahman, these four fall, and as a fifth he who associates with them. But he who thus knows the five fires is not defiled by sin evon though he associates with them. He who knows this is pure, clean, and obtains the world of the blessed." Herein one can trace the origin of Parsvanatha's doctrine of. four-fold restraint (cāujjama samvara), Mahavira's five great vows (pañca mahāvvayas) and of Buddha's five moral precepts (nañca-silas). Ohandogya Up. V. 10. 8-10. Mux Muller's tranelation: 'Let a man take care to himself' is hot a literal translation of Jugupsati.' The commontators suggest "fear" (vIbhatsota) or "hate" (ghrini bhavel). "Fear, therefore (such n wretched stute of existence)," would seem rather nearor the mark.

CHAPTER VI.

V. GĀRGYĀYAŅA,1

Jaivali's speculations on the fate of soul after death oocur again, with certain variations, yet on the whole with the same Jaivali and GEr. purpose, in the Kausītaki Upanişad, in a gyiyaņa. dialogue between Gārgyāyaņa and Uddālaka. There is involved in Jaivali's speculations, we saw, the dis- tinction so sharply drawn between the two main roads by which souls proceed on their destined course. The roads are described in the Chandogya Upanisad as the Deva-yana and the Pitri-yana; they are sometimes called the right and the left, or the southern and the northern, Prof. Max Muller observes that "The northern or left road, called also the path of the Devas, passes on from light and day to the bright half of the moon: the southern or right road, called also the path of the fathers, passes on from smoke and night to the dark half of the moon. Both roads therefore meet in the moon, but diverge afterwards. While the northern road passes by the six months when the sun moves towards the north, through the sun, (moon) and the lightning to the world of Brahman, the southern passes by the six months when the sun moves towards the south, to the world of the fathers, the ether, and the moon."" "The great difference, however, be- tween the two roads is that while those who travel on the former do not return again to a new life on earth, but reach in the end a true knowledge of the unconditioned Brahman,

' The full name of Gargy&yana is Citra Gargyayana The name is spelt also as Gargyayani and Güngyayani, Prof. Weber in his Indische Studien (I. 395, II, 395) adopts both the forma. Prof. Cowell prefers GongySyani to Gergylyani. Here we have followed the anthority of the Brihad Aranyaka Upanisad (IV. 6. 2): "GArgylyana from Uddsiakeyana." In the Kaugftaki Upanigad (I. 1-2) Gargyayana is mentioned Re e contemporary and teachor of Uddalake. Like Jaivali, Gurgyayana was of a warrior family. Nothing more is known of his life. : S. B. E., Vol, I, p. 272, 13

98 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

those who pass on to the world of the fathers and the moon return to earth to be born again and again." According to Jaivali and Gargyayana, there are these two paths open to men after death-that of immortality, and that of mortality or metempsychosis. The godly men who travel on the former reach finally the Ideal world, the world of Brahman, while the average men who pass by the latter are reborn on this earth, according to their deed and thought, as a worm, an insect, a fish, a bird, a lion, a bear, a serpent a tiger, a man, or as something of the kind.1 Though there is in regard to the problem of future existence so close a resemblance as botween Jaivali Görgyayana's ques- tion as to soul, and and Gargyayana, the main task which the answers. latter set himself to fulfil was rather to answer the more serious question, viz., who am IP! To this question Gargyayana's answer was:ª "I am a living body, consisting of fifteen parts, brought forth originally from the moon who orders the seasons, and is the home of my ancestors. That is to say, I am he who is connected by blood and traditions with the long line of ancestors through the father's seed. The seed itself was called forth into existence in the father's body by the elemental forees. The father was then a living energetic man, when he was united with the mother, and the seed was through a natural process trans- ferred from him to her. In this manner I was born in a family of men so that I might acquire the knowledge of Brahman, the Divine being." "What Brahman is, that am I." This is apparently the

The identity of Soul simple metaphysical answer offered to the and the Divine ea- question by Gargyayana. But in finding an sence. answer for one question, he had to face these two separate questions-Who is he? and Who am I?

1 Kengītaki Upanişad, 1. 2. ª Ibld, I. 6. · Ibia, I. 2, Ibid, I B.

GARGYĀYAŅA 99

First, as to " Who am I"? said Gargyayana, "I am a season (ritu, animus, caloric energy), a child The generic charac- ter of soul. of the seasons, brought forth from the, womb of endless space, and generated from light or luminous Brahman,' In short, I am tyam, meaning he who is from Brahman." Who is Brahman? He is light, the luminous, golden germ,2 the primal form of heat, which is the origin of the year (seasons, time-principle), the past, the Brahman. present, the all." In short, Brahman is sat, i.e., Being or existent .* "I am from Brahman, Brahman is Being, I am, therefore, Being." What is Being or existent ? It is that which is different from the gods-such as Fire, Air, Varuņa, Indra, Prajapati5- and from pranas-living beings. In relation to Being Gargyayana insisted on the conception of The Divine being 1s hoth sat and tyam- the gods and animated bodies as tyam, Univereal and indivi- dual. meaning that which is from Being. Here is implied again the logical syllogism : the gods and pranas are from Brahman, Brahman is Being, the gods and pranas are, therefore, Being. It follows that Brahman is not only sat, but both sut and tyam-Being and all that is derived therefrom. In truth, then, Brahman is all that is (sarvamidam) .? We imagine Gargyayana proceeded on these assumptions to conceive two sets of two Brahma-worlds. Two Brahma-worlds. In the first set are the world of Brahman the universal spirit and that of Brahman the individual spirit; in the second set are the world of Brahman the unconditioned and that of Brahman the conditioned.

1 Kausttaki Upanięad, I 1. 6. = Ibid, I. 3. $.4 Ibid, T. 6. # Ibad, I. a. · Ibia, I. 6. 7 Ibid, I. 7.

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Following the line of thought of "Paramesthin," and to

His view of the a certain extent, that of Mahidasa, Gar- world of generation, It is incompatible gyayana understood by the world of univer- with his Dootrine of sal spirit, Water,1 and by that of individual Immortality. spirit, what we may call intelligible corpore- ality. There is no difference of kind between the universal spirit and the individual. For the former is conceived to be a primal form of heat, the latter a form of ritu ; both are in essence heat. Thus it is implied in this wholly mechanical conception of the universe that primal heat is the unchanging principle of all change. By the power of primal heat, water- the eternal imperishable substance-is developed from "the potential stage of existence " (manasa) to that of " completed actuality " (cākşușa). Before water can become evolveđ into multitude of developed forms, it has to pass through various stages, and in this connexion Gargyayana felt like Mahidasa the necessity of introducing the gods-Fire, Air, Varuna, Indra, Prajapati-as the intermediaries. We understand with Gargyayana that the cosmic matter water in itself is eternal, imperishable and that the cosmic energy heat in itself is unchanging, indestructible. In other words, the world of generation is actually existent, and eternally present. And yet we do not see clearly enough how Gargyayana can eliminate the notion of mutability from that of immortality. Here the position of Gargyayana may be approached from two points of view, viz., that of the changing Oritioiam of the last point. individual, and that of the changing universe. As long as the caloric energy which informs a partioular intelligible corporeality can maintain itself as such in the continual change from the coming-to-be into the ceasing-to-be so long there is metempsychosis for the individual; and as soon as that energy is completely absorbed into the universal

1 Kauņūtaki Ľpanișed, I. 8.

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spirit-the primal form of heat-the individual attains immortality. We may make this admission with Gargyayana that, from the one point of view, the immortality of the variable parti- cular is but its total absorption into the relatively invariable universal. Our difficulty is, the immortal life being thus attained, how to conceive it preserved from the smuggling, deceitful hands of mutation or change ? For it is in the very nature of the universal spirit to render itself actual and effectual in the individual. Such being the case, the difference that can be conceived to subsist between the two notions of metempsychosis and immortality is nothing but this. In the case of metempsychosis the change takes place from the particular to the partioular, while in the case of immortality the change is from the individual to the universal. More- over, in the former case some sort of continuous personal identity is conceivable, while in the latter case, it is not. Thus the fact remains that the universal is not immune from mutation. In the second set of two Brahman worlds are included the world of Brahman the uncon- Being and change. ditioned, and that of Brahman the con- ditioned. By the former Gargyayana meant, we may take it, "the non-temporal, unchanging realm of absolute exis- tence," and by the latter, " the temporal, changing cycle of merely relative being." Strictly, however, the latter com- prises the first set of two Brahma-worlds which we might perhaps describe here, for convenience' sake, as the heavenly world and the world of man. In the Kauşttaki Upanişad1 we have from Gārgyāyaņa a semi-mythical, semi-philosophical description of the heavenly world, as contrasted with the world of man. It will not be an exaggeration to say that this particular conception of Kauşitaki, I. 8-5.

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Gargyayana deserves the name of "a philosophical romance," couched for the most part in allegorical terms. It is diffieult to read into these terms which he employs the exact meaning they conveyed to him. Perhaps much more or perhaps much less was meant by these terms than we can make out now with our limited knowledge. We are forced to realise the difficulty of judging Gargyayana, born as we are too late, or it may be, too soon, to be able to place ourselves wholly at his point of view. What little seems obvious to us is that in assigning to the heavenly world these two predicates-undecaying and uncon- querable-(vijara, aparājita), Gārgyāyana kept in his mind something of a sharp antagonism between the world of con- crete existents (pranah) on one hand, and that of the gods (devas) on the other. The former is in its nature mutable, while relatively to it the latter is of an immutable nature. Reducing, then, all our concepts pertaining to the world of generation to these two opposite correlatives-the mutable and the immutable, we might perhaps hold with Gargyayana that there is a third, so to speak, which is different from either and yet embraces them both. This is what was called the world of absolute existence which in itself is neither this nor that- Brahman the unconditioned, who is neither good nor evil, neither death nor immortality, in fact, to use a familiar expression of Mahidasa, who is beyond the yes and no of language,' beyond all contradictions, beyond all correlatives, beyond all descriptions. This is the perfect model of which the soul must be a perfect copy. It is this Brahman the un- conditioned towards whom soul, the knower of Brahman, should advance by being trained to the highest excellence, by shaking off, as Gargyayana puts it, the good and the evil, by looking at all pairs of correlative opposites-day and night, joy and sorrow, eto., with perfect indifference." 1 Aitarera Āraņyaka, TI. 3. 8.4. ' Kanşītaki Upauişad, I. 4.

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Now in taking the world of generation as a whole, and on contrasting it, if any contrast is possible, with the Ideal world, we find ourselves again in the midst of the same opposites from which Gargyayana always recoiled. The one is cbaracterised throughout by change and multiplicity, the other is not. It is reasonable to allow that to render the world of genera- tion intelligible we require a ground beyond it, namely, that which has just the opposite attributes. But the question arises, how to connect the one with the other? If we sepa- rate them widely, how can we solve the problem ? Is it pos- sible, following Gargyāyana, to postulate first the realm of change, then, by a second process of thought, to take the world of absolute existence as starting point and from it de- duce the world of change? Is this deductive construclion of absolute existence justifiable? In what way can the world of Brahman the unconditioned and the world of Brahman the conditioned be brought into the closest possible connexion ? It has to be acknowledged that the gulf between the world of absolute existence and the world of gene- His faflure. ration is too wide to bridge over so easily. Being fully aware of the difficulty in connecting the one with the other except in Idea, Gargyayana interposed-and we learn from our authorily that Plato did the same-the soul and space as intermediaries. It is then doubtful in Gargyāyana, as in Plato, if the world of generation is necessarily impli- cated in the realm of absolute being. Here the position of Gargyayana is so exactly similar to the position of Plato that nothing perhaps would be better than that we should quote Prof. Adamson with regard to the latter. "His nearest approach thereto is in the correlation he quite empirically makes between Reason (vous=prajña)' the one function of which is the contemplation of the Ideas,' ......... and soul. Reason, he tells us, is in soul; he almost

1.a Kanşītaki Upanişad, I. 5; I. 7.

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lays down the general proposition that reason is actualised only in soul. The indestructibility of soul doubtless enables it thus to serve as that concrete in which the eternal reason is made actual."1 The knower of Brahman should advance towards Brah- man. This proposition enables us to see further resemblance between Gargyayana and Plato. For, in the first place, both of them contemplated some finest distinction between the eternal Reason and Soul. So, in the second place, both, as we know, generalised soul and conceived it to be the principle of all change. In order to clear up our position, we quote once again Prof. Adamson. " But now and again, one must say, on empirical grounds, it is assumed that in the process by which the principle of change unfolds itself it follows the direction prescribed in and by contemplation of the Ideas. But the soul shares also the nature of the mutable; and in this finally Plato has to find a solution for that deviation from the perfect model which cannot but be allowed in the world of generation; so much so, indeed, that, as we saw, ...... , he is ready even to distinguish between the good and the bad soul. Finally, the soul as principle of change, as working out a copy of absolute existence, has to operate under conditions that are so far foreign to its own nature."2 First Ideal Theory in India -- On taking leave of Gargyayana's doctrine of immortality, we should call attention to the fact that it is Development of the

lity. Doutrine of Immorta- not in the history of post-Vedic thought altogether new. The root conceptions of which it was a development in the fullest sense are to be found in the thoughts of his predecessors. As a matter of fact, Mahidasa and Jaivali were the principal sources from which Gargyayana drew largely the materials for his thought.

' The Development of Greok Philosophy, p. 131. 9 Ibd, p. 182.

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Yet it must be conceded, in justice to Gargyāyana, that he made the doctrine of Immortality entirely his own by giving a definite form to it. It was chiefly at the hands of Gargyayana that the doctrine of Immortality came to occupy so prominent a place in Indian philo- sophy. Even those who are fascinated by the Buddhist conception of Buddha Amifabha and of Sukhuvati, the Buddhist Land of Bliss or Paradise cannot but note with profft Gārgyayana's conception of Brahman as Amitaujas (of infinite radiance) and his eternal abode. One may rightly question whether we are justified in attaching any very great importance to Gargyayana's doetrine

Gargyäyann is the of Immortality for its own sake. Far from incipient Pinto of that. In truth, the importance of his doc- India. trine of Immortality lies in the intimate relation in which it stands to his theory of Ideas. In Gargyayana, these two-the doctrine of Immortality and the theory of Ideas-are so closely connected that it is impossible to separate them. The doctrine of Immortality is historically the basis of the theory of ideas, whereas logi- cally the former is but a dednction from the latter. If originality be denied to Gargyayana on the side of his doctrine of Immortality, it does not materially affect his position as an original thinker, the incipient Plato of India, on the side of his theory of Idens. Gargyayana's was, so far as evidence goes, the first ideal theory in India. It must be carefully noted that in his phraseology the word Idea (manasa) does not convey the Platonic sense of the eternal relation of things but just the existence of a thing as an idea in the divine mind before its actualisation. Turning at last to Gargyayana's theory of Ideas, we

The theory of Ideas. have to confess, at the outset, that it is not within our power to bring out from his scanty expressions anything beyond a few fundamental points which are as follows: 14

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In the first place, the general problem with which his Ideal theory is concerned seems to have been the Antagonism betweon Muhidasa and (Brgys- life of soul and its relation to reason (prajña). yaņa. It is moreover the point in which Gārgyāyana was chiefly indebted to Mahidasa, and yet came into direct conflict with him. But it is in the light of this conflict between tlie two thinkers that we can best road where the real defect of each is, From the metaphysical position which he assumed, Mahi- dasa was driven to the concoption of soul as a part of actuality, i,e., change or process. According to him, what is given in the life of soul within the world of generation is not so much an object known as the mode of cognition. Thus he was led to view every mental fact in the light of an act of cogni- tion. Further, in accordance with his view, we should try to understand not what we know, but how we know. In fact Mahidasa maintains that soul as a principle of all change lends its name to the active exercise of the function of reason (prajnana) which is directly connected with the mode of cog- nition, and only indirectly connected through it with the object cognised. In this respect, he drew no distinction of kind between abstract reasoning and sense-peroeption. Just the reverse was the conclusion reached by Gargyayana. For according to him our concern should be not so much how we know as what we do know or ought to know. According to him, the essence of the life of soul is eternal Idea (manasa) in contemplation and actualisation of which is the true function of reason (prajña). Soul has three names, whioh are expressive of the three aspects under which the absolute being is conceived by a finite mind. The masculine name is obtainable, i.e., can be represented, by vital breath or life (pranena), the feminine name by speech or language (vaca), and the neuter name by mind or thought (manasa). Under the masculine aspect, Gargyāyana held in common with Mahidasa that soul is in essence but life itself. But

GARGYĀYAŅA 107

it is the neuter or neither-masculine-nor-feminine name which brings us nearest to the realm of pure idea, through idea human to idea divine. In the scale of ideas, the lowest are the joy, delight and offspring, obtainable, i.e., can be actualised, by way of reproduction, and the highest is the idea of absolute existence by way of philosophic contemplation. Loeomotion, action, sight, sound, odour, taste, touch, thought-all these are in various measures but divine ideas translated into the terms of actuality ; all these therefore belong to the realm of divine ideas, to soul the divine in man. For Gargyayana the really existent are ideas, although not in the Platonic sense of relations but things, and the function of reason has meaning-is existent, only through its realisation of the various shades of ideas; the mode of cognition exists only for the sake of ideas. According to him, as eternal reason in man is directly connected with the object known or idea realised, and connected only indirectly through it with the mode of cognition. Lastly there lies in the background of Gargyayana's theory of Ideas the identification of knowledge with real existence. Ethics .- Gargyayana's ethical doctrine is generally on the same level with that of Jaivali save where he strikes a loftier note by his lofty metaphysic. As conceived by him, the highest duty of man, or the only duty of the divine philosopher, is to copy the perfect model of absolute being known by the contemplation of eternal idea. For this he must be above all distinctions which obtain in the world and society, and must abandon all works and sacrifices which have nothing but material gains or heavenly joys in view. Gargyayana unlike Mahidasa found no coordinating link between the transcendental order and practical life save in the generic character of soul, the contemplator of absolute being. However, as for practical life, he maintains that the best thing is to act according to the Divine purposc as manifested in the phenomena of nature. For nothing is good which conflicts with that purpose. Thus it is implied that

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a knowledge of the constitution of tho visible world,' no loss than the study of the physiology of man,' will at once reveal the art of building cities, governing kingdoms, and regulating life and society. Art is no art unless it actualises what is in the Divine mind, or in other words, the Divine purpose is realised in and through it. Accordingly, all objective knowledge must be deduced from the idea of the universal being. This idealistic conception of art implied in Gargyayana's expression "mānasī pratirūpā cākșusī," "the visible or actual is but a reflection of the mental," is different from and yet follows closely on the line of Aitareya philosophy which regards all human arts, including the art of generation, as an imitation in some way of the works of nature, the Divine arts. "The Divine arts," the Aitareyas proolaim, " are praised as arts indeed. All human arts, via., brass-work,8 garment, works in gold,' and such toys as elephant, mule and chariot, appear to be but a reproduction of nature .* All skilful works that appear in this light are to be known as arts, self-building is comprised in those arts by which the Yajamana should so build up his self that it becomes chandomaya,5 endowed with harmony, i.e., in tune with the whole of nature, or vedamaya, endowed with intelligence as Sayana interprets the same. The generation of offspring is such an art.""

1 Kanştiaki Upanişad, J. 3. : Of. Brihad Āranyaka Upanisad, IV. 3. 38; IV. 4. 22. Note the conception of state as an organism of suvon limbe in Kantiliya Artha-Sastra, VI. I. See for other referencea Banerjea's "Publio Adminintration in Ancient India," p. 63. * Sayana tukes Kamen in the sonse of darpanoh, mirror. · Hiranyūni=Suvarņābbaraņ&ni (Sāyaga). All Brohman gchools took tho name viow of urt, e.g., "Yadvai pratirupam tacohilpam," ie., "whatuver is a facsimile is art" (Satapatha Br., III. 2, 1.5); " divab silpam avatatam," t.e., " art has descended from heaven " (Taittiriya Br., II. 7. 15). See other roferences collected by Pandit Satyabrata Semneramf in his Aitareyalocanam, p. 117, Altareyn Brabmana, IV. a Aitareya Brahmana, VI. 5. 1; Silpani Sumsanti dovasilpāni etesān vai Šilpānām anukpiti ha Silpam adhigamyate hastī kariso voao hiranyam asratari rathab Silpāni. Silpari hūsmiu adhigumyate ya evnri veda yadava Silpāni, Ātmasarskritirvāra Silpāni chandomayam vā etair yajamāna atmonam ssmsknrute ..... " The above rendering ia rather free and condensed,

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Thus the Aitareya conception affords on the whole a mechanical, not to say a materialistic, explanation of art as teaching that art is but an imitation of nature, or conforma- tion of human action to the established order of things. If so where is the free play of imagination in art cxcept in finding out the hidden reason manifesting itself through works human and divine? It is therefore in Gargyayana's view that we obtain the first reference to an attempt at defin- ing art in terms of mind which is a divine element,-a faculty which imposes its own form upon nature. Never- theless, the historian can trace the background of this Kşatriya Idealism in art in the Brahman teleological view of nature as a purposive order of things, to conform to which is to act according to a set purpose in consonance with the whole. Gargyayana's conception of art itself is not as yct stript of its cosmical implication as it presumes the existence of a divine order actualising itself thiough the mysterious manifestations of nature. This defect of his theory was to some extent made good by the Buddha who came to regard art as a product of human imagination, a representation of ideas conceived in the mind of the artist. The difference in so far as Gargyayana's view is concerned is that Buddha precluded all idea of a Divine Being external to man. Thus in speaking of a famous picture of his time, Buddha pro- nounced that the carana-citra was really conceived by the mind.1 The Buddhist Commentator Buddhaghosa explains Buddha's theory as follows: "In the world there is no finer artmanship than that which is displayed in a piece of paint- ing, and of paintings the one called Curana is admitted to be the very best. In drawing this class of pictures the thought arises in the mind of the painters: "Such and such kinds of figure are to be drawn in this picture." By this thought the drawing of outline, colouring, polishing, and

1 "Cmanam cittam citten eva crutitam " Satyutta, Khandha-Somyntta, 5. 8., quoted m the Atthasslint, p. 64

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such other detail works of drawing follow, in conse- quence whereof a wonderful figure appears on the carana- citra.1 "Let that go above this figure, let this go below that" -the finishing touch is given afterwards to the picture according to thought. Similarly whatever products of art there are in the world, all are wrought by the mind."" The Buddha introduced this psychological view of art by way of analogy of his explanation of the diversity of the forms of life and of their experiences. Hence there can be no doubt that Buddha's was a later development on psychological lines of Gargyayana's ideal theory.

' According to Buddhaghosa, carana-vicarana, i. e., "rambling" or "wandering." He adde by way of explanation : "Serkhs hrihmapa pāsandikā honti, patakoțthakam katva tatthe nauappakarī sugati-duggsti-vasena sampatti-vipattiyo lekhspetra idam kammam katvā idam patilabhati, idom katvā idanti dassentā tam cittam gahetvā vicaranti." (SArabtnappakisini, Ceylonese Ed., p. 469.) * "Oitten'eva cintitanti cittakarena cintitvit katntta, cittena cintitam năma," (Tbid, p. 469).

OHAPTER VII

VI. PRATARDANA.

Passing over Kauştaki, Painga, and others who declared themselves to be among the upholders of the theory of life as the first principle of things (nihsreyas, neplus-ultra),1 we come to Pratardana, son of Divodasa, King of Kasi. Pratardana and liia In post-Vedio philosophy many thinkers predocessors. worked out Mahidasa's line of thought but none perhaps achieved so grand a result as Gargyāyaņa and Pratardana did. Both were warriors, royal princes, and so, too, was Jaivali, King of Pancala. Gargyayana's achievement was metaphysical, and Pratardana's was psychological, broadly speaking. But Pratardana owed his philosophical knowledge to both Mahidāsa and Gārgyāyaņa, so much so indeed, that we may regard him as a richer combination of the two. And though his achievement was psychological, his main task was really one of meta- physics. The Kauşītaki Upanisad* speaks of Pratardana as the

The doctrine of Inner famous institutor of a new system of self- Offering. control (samyamana), generally known by the name of Inner Offering (antaram agnihotram), It is said that he introduoed this new system as an improvement on the prevailing mode of Vedic sacrificial offering. We think the fact is historically true, since the reference given comes in purely by accident, though at the same time, we have reason to deny the exclusive right of Pratardana to this honour. For we learn on an earlier authority, such as that of the Aitareya Aranyaka, that the Kāvaseyas (one of the earlier schools) were the first to raise a voice against the

1 Kauşītaki Upnnigad, II. 14. · II. 5,

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existing system of Vedic sacrifice, and to think of a better system. So they asked, saying, " Why should we repeat (the Veda), and why should we sacrifice ? We offer as a sacrifice breath in speech, or speech in breath. What is the beginning (of one), that is the end (of the other)"! The Kauşītaki Upanisad itself bears evidence to the fact that the doctrine of Inner Sacrifice was not invented by Pratardana.2 His own teaching was :-- (1) That whatever other forms of offering there are, they have an end, for they consist of work; which, in common with all works, has happiness for its end, but the system of Inner Offering does not aim at any such material or sensuous end. (2) That breath and speech are the two inexhaustible and immortal oblations that a man may offer always, whether he is awake or asleep. (3) And that it is by offering breath in speech, and speech in breath, that a man can withdraw himself from the senses and the sensuous, and exercise perfect control over his passions and emotions. Here the third argument is of great importance. In working it out Pratardana arrived at a psychological truth quite unforeseen. When a man speaks, he The bearing of the third argument upon cannot breathe, and when he breathes, he Pratardana's psycho- logy cannot speak. For, as he discovered, when a man speaks, he offers all the while his breath in his speech, just as when he breathes, he offers all the while his speech in his breath. It is evident from a dia- logue in the Kausitaki Upanişad (which is our sole authority for Pratardana's doctrine) that this truth was generalised by him and applied to every act of cognition. Thus he came

1 Aitareya Aranyakn, III 2,6.8. S. B. E., Vol. I, pp. 265-266. * "The ' ancients, knowing this better form of offering, did not offer the ordinary sacrifice." This is Max Muller's rendering of Kausitaki passage (II. p).

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to lay down almost as a general proposition when we see we cannot hear ; when we hear, we cannot think, at the same time, at he same moment. I. Psychology. Pratardana's psychological doctrine is not, in principle and detail, new, and yet it is new in the sense that it cast the two older doctrines of Mahidasa and Gargyayana into a new mould and orystallised form of its own. He combined the two antecedent views in his system, not in a mechanical mixture but in a chemical union. There must be no mistake about that. Even while admitting that he Indobtedness consti- tutes his greatness. shared with Mahidasa and Gargyayana all their fundamental metaphysical ideas, and brought them to bear on his psychology, we have suffi- cient reason to hold that, in this respect, his indebtedness goes only to testify to his greatness. For the very fact of his aoquaintance with the earlier views explains clearly enough how he could make an advance upon them. A great intellect ought not to be judged, at all evenis, by his indebtedness. That is to say, in judging the merit of a philosopher, we should never forget two things : the ciroum- stance, however little an incident it may be in its own nature, that stimulates him to reflection, and the conception that lies nearest to his heart, that by which 'he achieves a real contri- bution to philosophy as a whole. To judge of Pratardana's originality we must return to his conception of what he called, in contradis- Pratardana'a claims to originality. tinction to the ordinary vedic sacrifice, the system of Inner Offering. For this led, it might be per acoidens, to his important psychological con- ception of the central sense or uniting function of Prāna (vitality and sensibility in the soul), and of the unity of the conscious principle (prajñatman). But we have two further reasons for calling Pratardana's psychological

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In the first place, Pratardana defined the province of psy- chology within narrower limits by restricting its investigation to the human mind, and this enabled bim certainly to prepare the way for Yajñavalkya, Buddha, and other later psycho- logists. Besides, this gave him an advantage over Mahidasa (whose psychology is of far wider scope) that he could there- by be more precise in his language, and more rigorous in his treatment of problems than the latter. However, what he did was but to fulfil the brilliant work of his two predecessors Mahidāsa and Gārgyāyaņa. In the second place, we call his psychological doctrine new, because it is with the help of this doctrine that Pratardana was able to insist, for the first time in India, in regard to the theory of knowledge, that cognition in the widest sense is impossible, except, as it were, by way of a subject-objeot- relation, involved in the common process of consciousness.' A. The uniting function of Prana-the physiological aspect of Pratardana's psychology. In expounding his doctrine of Inner Offering as a sacrifice of breath in speech, and of speech in breath, Pratardana eventually made a psychological discovery, which is : so long as a man breathes, he cannot speak, just as, conversely, so long as he speaks, he cannot breathe.' Carrying the investigation over to every act of sense-perception or cognition in general, Pratardana arrived always at the same result.3 Being in this way convinced that no one can at the same time see a form with the eye, hear a sound with the ear, and think a thought with the mind, but that he can apprehend sight, sound, odour, taste, touch, thought, one by one, cach as a unit Pratardana, like Aristotle,' set himself to inquire, how is it so?

: Kaugitaki Upanigad, III. 8. * Ibid, II. 5. n Joid, III. 2. . The Development of Greek Philosophy, pp. 204-213. According to Prof. L T. Hob- house, ' Artstotle with his Koun aionos rather implies the opposite view."

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First, we must consider his enumeration of the senses called pranas. There are the eleven senses corre- The senses and ob- jects, lated with the sensibles as the subject with the object: (1) vital breath and breathing,1 (2) speech and word, (3) nose and odour, (4) eye and sight, (5) ear and sound, (6) tongue and taste, (7) hands and action, (8) body and pleasure-and-pain (i.e. sensation of touch, muscular sensations, hunger and thirst, etc.), (9) propagative organ and delight joy-and-offspring, (10) feet and locomotion, and (11) mind and thoughts-and-desires.ª Historically this enumeration of the senses belonge to Gargyayana.3 There is nevertheless a little difference between the two enumerations. Gargyayana regarded what he called the vital breath (prana), speech (vak) and mind (manas) as three names expressive of the three aspects (masculine, femi- nine, and neuter) of the faculty or functional activity of the soul. Pratardana, on the contrary, discriminated the vital breath from the remaining ten senses. Moreover, Gargyāyana assigned as functions thinking and willing to Reason (prajna), while Pratardana assigned them to Mind (manas). There is something perplexing in both the enumerations. With regard to the subject, there is apparently a con- fusion between the organ of sense on the one The defect of termi. nology hand, and the sense-faculty or aotive exercise of it on the other. And as to the object, there is involved a general confusion between the object of sense on the one hand, and the awareness and discrimination4 of the active exercise of a faculty on the other. But in the case of Pratardana, too, there is a clear way of ascaps from this confusion, and that is to

1 Kauşītaki Upanişad, III. 2. " Ibid, III. 6. See for Sunknrn's views about the enumeration of the senses Thibaut's "VedEnta-sutras," S. B. E., Vol. XXXVIII, II. 4. B-10. * Ibid, I. 7. * Prajñpona, vijijžnies,

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In the first place, Pratardana defined the province of psy- chology within narrower limits by restricting its investigation to the human mind, and this enabled him certainly to prepare the way for Yajnavalkya, Buddha, and other later psycho- logists. Besides, this gave him an advantage over Mahidāsa (whose psychology is of far wider scope) that he could there- by be more precise in his language, and more rigorous in his treatment of problems than the latter. However, what he did was but to fulfil the brilliant work of his two predecessors Mahidāsa and Gārgyāyaņa. In the second place, we call his psychological doctrine new, because it is with the help of this doctrine that Pratardana was able to insist, for the first time in India, in regard to the theory of knowledge, that cognition in the widest sense is impossible, except, as it were, by way of a subject-object- relation, involved in the common process of consciousness.1 A. The uniting function of Prana-the physiological aspect of Pratardana's psychology In expounding his doctrine of Inner Offering as a sacrifice of breath in speech, and of speech in breath, Pratardana eventually made a psychological discovery, which is : so long as a man breathes, he cannot speak, just as, conversoly, so long as he speaks, he cannot breathe. Carrying the investigation over to every act of sense-peroeption or cognition in general, Pratardana arrived always at the same result.' Being in this way convinced that no one can at the same time see a form with the eye, hear a sound with the ear, and think a thought with the mind, but that he can apprehend sight, sound, odour, taste, touch, thought, one by one, cach as a unit Pratardana, like Aristotle,* set himself to inquire, how is it so?

1 Kauşitaki Upanişad, III. 8. Ibid, II. 5. * Jbtd, III. 2, * The Development of Greek Philosophy, pp. 204-218, According to Prof. L T Hob- house, ' Artatotle with his Kown aiconous rather implios the oppusite view."

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First, we must consider his enumeration of the senses called pranas. There are the eleven senses corre- jeots. The genges and ob- lated with the sensibles as the subject with the object: (1) vital breath and breathing,1 (2) speech and word, (3) nose and odour, (4) eye and sight, (5) ear and sound, (6) tonguo and taste, (7) hands and action, (8) body and plcasure-and-pain (i.e. sensation of touch, muscular sensations, hunger and thirst, ete.), (9) propagative organ and delight joy-and-offspring, (10) feet and locomotion, and (11) mind and thoughts-and-desires." Historically this enumeration of the senses belongs to Gargyayana.3 There is nevertheless a little difference between the two enumerations. Gargyayana regarded what he called the vital breath (prana), speech (vak) and mind (manas) as three names expressive of the three aspects (masculine, femi- nine, and nouter) of the faculty or functional activity of the soul. Pratardana, on the contrary, discriminated the vital breath from the remaining ten senses. Moreover, Gargyāyana assigned as functions thinking and willing to Reason (prajña), while Pratardana assigned them to Mind (manas). There is something perplexing in both the enumerations. With regard to the subject, there is apparently a con- fusion between the organ of sense on the one The defeet of termi- hand, and the sense-faculty or active exeroise nology. of it on the other. And as to the object, there is involved a general confusion between the object of sense on the one hand, and the awareness and discrimination4 of the active exercise of a faculty on the other. But in the case of Pratardana, too, there is a clear way of escaps from this confusion, and that is to

1 Kauşītaki Upanişad, III. 2. " Ibid, III. b. See for Sankara's views abont the enumeration of the senses Thibaut'a "Vedantn-sutras," S. B, E., Vol, XXXVIII, II. 4. 5-10. * Ibid, I. 7. 4 Prajñāponn, vijijňlyū.

PRE-BUDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPIY QTT

restrict, as hs' was ready to do,' the meaning of the term subject to a special faculty and its aotive exercise, and the meaning of the term object to the content of perception and of thought. Pratardana's enumeration of the senses and the objects of sense is defective. But the defect lies merely in the detail. Essentially, there is no reason why we should not appreciate his discovery of the uniting function of Prana, the central sense. He conceives that there are the special senses (such as the eye, the ear, ete.,) each of which is 'bound up' (sahâpyeti, goes together), or correlated with the specific sensibles (sight, sound, etc.,) as the subject with the object. Conversely, there are the specific objects defining the faculties of the special senses. Every process of sense is an act in some measure complete in itself, according as every sense apprehends its own object, and apprehends it as a unit, even with regard to the time, tho moment at which the sense- operation takes place.ª Hence it must be said that every act of sense-perception is in its own nature a mode of cognition. Pratardana presses nevertheless the inquiry : are not the special senses with their plurality of functions and multiplicity of modes in some way expressions of a common central sense ? If the special senses are expressions of a common central sense, then further questions are bound to emerge, what is it ? and what is the nature of that relation in which the function of each special sense stands to the common central activity ? And if, on the other hand, they are not expressions of a common central sense such as Prana, then how is it that life pulsating, all the specinl senses are enlivened, i.e., stimu- lated into action (pranam pranantam sarve prāņā anuprananti) P Similarly if they are not animated and unified by a common prinoiple, then how is it that the special senses oin not exercise

1 Kauşftaki Upanişad, IIT. 8. 3. Aa Sankara anyr, "ekasmin kale sīkemn anoyngrenn Gntapatravedhanavad aspantn vibhinna kalāni vyākhyeyāni."

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their funotions all at the same time, at the same moment, but that they can do so only one at a time, each as a unit (ekaikam) ? What does this striking fact of our mental life point to ? All this consideration forced upon Pratardana this conclusion : Each special sense, in the exercise of its function becomes in some way united with the rest.1 Oonclusion as to the unity of mental life. Eren mind, the functions of which are thinking and willing, is not an exception to this rule. The uniting function thus involved in the process of sense, nay, in all forms of mental process, is assignable to nothing but Prani-vitality and sensibility in the soul. Vor, proceeding from an empirical foundation, we cannot but admit, first, that the complete fact of our cxistence is Life (Prana),ª and secondly, that the fundamental funotion of a living body is breathing or respiration. In regard to the former truth Pratardana, following Mahidasa and others, argued that the organ or faculty of epeech, sight, hearing, thinking, action, or locomotion is not essential to or absolutely necessary for organic existence. For we see there are dumb men who cannot spenk, blind who cannot see, deaf who cannot hear, infants who cannot think, and so on, whereas the notion of a living body without life is impossible.ª And as to the latter truth, that respiration is the fundamental function of life, he calls upon us to consider these two facts of common oxperience: (1) The presence of the function of breathing during dreamless sleep, that is to say, during the periodical cessation of all sensations, nay, all forms of mental activity.

1. Kanęītaki Upaniņad, TII. 7; "ekabhuyāni vai prāņa bhotvaiknikam etāni sorvāni prajn Ipayattti." By ekaikam (one by one) Sankara understands that when any one of apecial sensesi ,"svavyaptrh kurvat sarve prāņs nikhilūni indriyāni ...... .. eka-helayā vyapsrăm knrvanti." Cowell follows in his translation the interpretation of Sankara. But Max Muller seems to have taken a diametrloally opposite view, when he transiates the passage thna : "The pranas become one, for (otherwise) no one could at the same time make known a name by spench, see a form with the eye, hear o sound with the ear, think a thought with the mind, eto., eto." ". Kanşitaki Upanigad, 1I1. 2; III. 8. a, lbid, III, 3; S.B.E., Vol, I, pp. 294-95.

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(2) The final cessation of all sensations and all active funotions of the mind previous to death, and the presence of the process of respiration till the last moment.1 Pratardana was thus inclined to maintain that what we call breathing is but an active manifestation of what vital breath is potentially, just as vital breath, in its turn, is the potentiality of an organic body. This remark Life, sonl and the holds good of every special sense, for the senses. operations of the senses are no more than manifold expresions of one and the same activity that charac- terises Life itself. And what we call the vital principle is just again the animating drinciple. All the organs of sense are but so many animated parts of the animated body taken as a whole. This is eridently the reason that led Pratardana to give the general name prana to all the senses. It is made clear that the metaphysical foundation of Pratardana's psychology lies in the earlier views of Mahidasa. The complete fact of our existence is Life. In other words, Life is the potentiality of a living body. It is besides the one fact which is conceivable as outlasting the dissolution of body, and without which a living being is inconceivable. Life is therefore the first principle of things, and that which is the first cause is again the final cause or end and vice versa (yo vai prānah sā prajna, yā vā prajnā sa prāņaļ). Life as the first cause is not many, but one, So conceived, the self or soul presents within the realm of change its two-fold aspect. In one aspect, it is the vital principle-the principle in virtue of which we can discharge all functions as living beings ; and in the other aspect, itis Reason inherentin the soul-Reason, in virtue of which we can discharge all functions as rational beings. Under the former aspect, Life represents the central sense, by the uniting function of which we can account for the common feature exbibited by manifold activities of the animated organism. It is natural, then, to assume that Pra- I, Ranattaki, III. 3.

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tardana considered the heart to be the central organ of sense ; the faculty of the central sense is the vital breath, and the active exercise of this faculty goes by the name of breathing. Each special sense can exercise its function, can realise its object, only in co-operation with the central sense described here as life or vitality. The view which Pratardana thus took of life is the teleological. B. The unity of Prajñatman-the cognitive aspect of Pratardana's psychology. Sentience or consciousness in general was viewed by Pratardana as but one of the two aspects of the self which here represents the concrete subject in reference to which we form all judgments concerning the physical and psychical activities ; its other aspect is vitality. Pratardana is right to observe that the mere active exercise of a faculty does

Theory of attention. not complete the work of the sense. For beside it, or in it, there is involved another function, which may be described as the passive impression of the object of sense on the conscious sentient soul. The function thus described may be simply the awareness of the process of thought or the knowledge of the content of thought, or the discrimination of the objeots of sense-percep- tion. How can we account for this function but by the unity of the conscious sentient soul ? For, were there no such unity, then why should a man sometimes say, " My mind being absent, attending elsewhere, I did not apprehend that vision with the vision, that sound with the hearing, and so forth ?"1 This common sensibility, as distinguished from the specific sensibility of the special senses, belongs The relation of objocta to Prajño. ultimately to the conscious self.1 The conscious self must be in its own nature all-embracing so as to comprehend all differences within 1 Kauşītaki Upanirad, IIL. 7. "anyatra mo manobhud ityha naham etăn nāma prajfl&aignm."

120 PRE-BUDDIISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

its unity. It represents the same element of conscious- ness or reason (prajña) in special forms of expression. The so-called objects are directly related to this common element of consciousness-to Prajña, the innate discriminating reason in the soul. Pratardana perhaps thought, in agreement with Gargyayana, that it is the inherent desire of the eternal Reason to expross itself that calls forth the thinking faculty of the soul into an active exercise. It may be said that the impression of a specific object on the sentient soul is account- able at last for the active exercise of the function of a special sense. It is noteworthy that Pratardana's ground for the disorimi- nation of the sensibles from one another is teleological. For he repeatedly insisted that we should not attempt to investi- gate so much the knowledge of what speech is, as of who speaks, -not so much the knowledge of what odour is, as of who smells, and so on.' The teleological view of the conscious subjeot which Pra- tardana thus adopted was not free from ambiguity but lent itself naturally to the interpretation that the mode in which the senses receive impressions from the objective world is passive. The theory of the passive receptivity of impressions is discarded by Nagasena.ª It is doubtful whether the theory is reconcilable with Pratardana's central conception. Perhaps the following remarks of Prof. Adamson on Aristotle's view will throw some light on Pratardana's position. " Sense-per- ception, for example, taken as a whole, is the actualisation of what the organ of vision is potentially, and in strictness the

. Of. Baddha's theory of mind as a senaus communis or a codrdinsting factor in sense : "these five senses ... have different fleids, different ranges ; they do not share each other's teld and range, Of thom thus mntually independent, mano is their resorl, aud mano pertakes of, enjoys, the field and range of them all." Mrs. Rhye Davida, "Buddbiat Paychology," pp. 68-69 .. * Kanaftaki Upanigad, III. 8. "The Questions of King Milinda," I. pp. 86, 188. The gist of Nagasena's contention against the theory of sonl (Vedagu) as tho knower is that "thero is no agent in sensation independent of the apecific functioning of each sense," Seo Mrs Rhys Davids, "Buddbist Paychology," p. 164.

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concrote subject about which predicates relating to vision may be made is here neither tho eye taken in abstraction nor the activity of seeing taken in abstraction, but the seeing. eye."1

2. Theory of Knowledge. One of the principal ends to which Pratardana directed his specnlative efTorts was to explain away the opposition implied between the views of his two predecessors Mahidasa and Gargyayana. To Mahidasa that which is fundamental or integral to the life of soul, taken as a part of actuality, is the subject or act of knowing, and accordingly the object or content of knowledge comes into existence only for the sake of the subject. To Gargyayana, on the contrary, that which is fundamental to the soul, conccived as the self- conscious subject, is the object, and accordingly the subject exists only for the sake of the ohject. Pratardana found that both of them were right, and that both of them were wrong. For, as he thought, there can be no subjects apart from or independent of objects, as there can be no objects apart from or independent of subjects. For on either side alone knowledge is impossible, a theory of cognition that was latterly developed by Buddha and his disciples to its fullest possibilities. The object is generally said to be placed outside or external to the subject (parastat prativihita). But the distinotion is only in our own mind. They are really not separable the one from the other, representing as they do two aspects The aubjeot nd the objeot are not separ. of one and the same act of perception or able from or indepen. dent of ench other. cognition. Taking the objeot to mean the content of perception, and the subject to

1 The Development of Greek Philosophy, pp. 202-208. : Kauşītaki Upanigad, III. 8; " yaddhi bhutamiatrā na syur na prajoāmstrāb syur yad va prajfišmštrā na syur na bhūtamatrāh syur na hyanyntarato rūpam kiocane sidhyan no ... " Of. Buddhs's theory of knowledge ; " Becanse of sight [lit, eye] and visible matter (ripa) nrises visual conscionsness, ele." Mrs. Rhys Davids's "BuddhisL Payohology," p. 68 foll. 16

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mean the act of peroeiving, it may be said that the content is a mental fact not separate from the perception itself. In other words, it is in the actual exercise of the funetion of the con- scious subject that we can realise both perception and what is perceived. Pratardana gave the following as an illustration of his point. "As in a car the circumference of a wheel is placed on the spokes, and the spokes on the nave, thus are the objects (circumference) placed on the subjects (spokes), and the subjects on the Prana."1

3. Ethics. There is seemingly a marked contrast in tone between Pratardana's psychological doctrine and its ethical conclusions. Prana the substratum of consciousness or cognitive soul (prajñatman) is the sustainer of the world, the supreme monarch, the sovran Lord of all, and alike the individual ego 'bodiless, changeless and deathless,' and so substantially untouched by moral consequences of action which passes in the world by the name of good or evil.' By no deed of a person is "his life harmed, not by the murder of his mother, not by the murder of his father, not by theft, not by tho killing of a Brahman. If he is going to commit a sin, the bloom does not depart from his face."s Prana as a universal principle is the creator of circumstances that lead a person to do good or evil.4 This theory of Pratardana which runs apparently counter to Jaivali's doctrine of five Fires was subsequently developed and followed in its letter and spirit by Naciketas, Pūrana Kassapa, Pakudha Kaccayana and the nuthor of the Bhagavad Gita. And the same was subsequently criticised by Mahavira, Buddha and Svetasvatara as Yadricchavada or Chance-theory of action. 1 Kanņitaki Upanięnd, III. B. # Jbul, III. 9 3 Jbid, III. 1. + Ibrà, III. 9,

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Some of Buddha's expressions in two Dhammapada verses "mataram pitaram hantva, etc."1 reminds one of Pratardana's actual words "na matrivadhena na pitrivadhena, etc." The very language of the Dhammapada verses indicates that Buddha was remembering some such theory as that of Pratardana while contrasting with it his own theory, meta- phorically inculcating the moral excellence of an Arahat through the killing of his desires and other sundry causes of moral bondage.

Dharnmupndu, Pakioņakuvaggn, va. 5-6,

CHAPTER VIII.

UDDĀLAKA.

With Uddālaka Āruņi Indian wisdom seems to have taken a turn which may, for want of a better expression, be called systematic. Both in his tendenoy towards Uddālaka, Anaxn- goras and Pythugoras. biological speculations and in his concep- tions of Matter and Spirit Uddālaka shows a close resemblance to Anaxagoras. Like Pythagoras again, he seems to have conceived a tripartite (tțivrit) universe, or contemplated a three-fold division of the formed universe into the region of the element of fire, that of water or air, and that of food or earth. Uddālaka was born in a Brahman family. He was son of Aruna and father of Śvetaketu, a famous Vedic scholar of his time. In fact the whole His life and works. family of the Arunis is distinguished in history for Vedic learning.' In the Chandogya Upa- nişad' Uddalaka is described as a youuger contemporary of Jaivali. In another passage of the same Upanisad" we have mention of Aupamanyava+ of the old sehool (Pracina-sala), Pauluşī Indradyumna, Šārkarāksya," Budila-Āsvataraśvi,8 and Aśvapati Kekaya as being among the contemporaries of

1 Oldenberg pointedly says : "When the time shall have comu for the inquiries, which will have to be made to crente order out of the chnotic mass of names of tenchers and other celebrities of the Brahmanu priod, it may turn out that the most important centre for the forniatiou aud ditfusion of the Brithmana doctriue will havo to be looked for in Aruni and in the circles which surround him. The most diveryeut lines of tradition meet in the peraon of Udd&luku Aruni."-"Buddha," trousluted hy W. Hooy, 1882, p. 300. * Chandogya Upanigad, V, 8-10; ep. Brihod Aranyuku Uponiyud, VI. 2, 1-10. a Ibid, V. 11, 1-4. * In the Jaina RajavErttiku, VIII. 1,-Aupamanyuva ia clussod umong the Vinaye-Vudins (Moralista). arunis and Sarkurskeyas are mentipnod in the Ailaroya Aronyake, JI. 1.45. " In the Brihad Aranyaka Upanisnd, V. 14-8, As-alarnéri is referred to as u contom- porary of King Janaka, that is, of Yajnsvalkya.

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Uddālaka. The Kaușītaki Upanisad1 alludes to him as a con- temporary of Gargyayana, while the Brihad Araņyaka Upa- nișad refers to him in several places as a contemporary of Yajñavalkya.3 It also appears from two separate lists of teachers in the latter Upanisad that Yajñavalkya was one of the successors and pupils of Uddalaka or of his son Śvetaketu. Among the Buddhist records, the . Uddālaka Jataka 3 has a very special interest for the historian, as it adds some new information regarding the life of Uddalaka. The Uddalaka Jataka associates the origin of the name Uddālaka (Sk. Auddālaka=Śvelaketu),+ with the Uddāla tree under which he was conceived, and would have us believe, among other things, that Auddalaka or Śvetaketu was the fruit of an illegal union of his mother with a wise, learned Brahman who was the prime-minister to the then King Brahmadatta of Benares. The account is not only false, but categorically malicious Dvidonce of Udd&. laka-Jātaka. There is nevertheless a truth behind it, namely, that the Buddhist historian evident- ly confounded Auddalaka with Philalethes Jābala.5 It is recorded in the Uddalaka Jataka that Auddalakn was educated at Takkasila in Gandhāra. In the Chāndogya Upauisad" Uddalaka himself clearly points to Gandhara as a famous seat of learning, and his is perhaps the earliest mention of Gandhara as a seat of learning in Sanskrit literature. We further learn from the above Jataka that Auddālaka, giving up ascetic life, entered the service of the King

! Kuuşītaki Upanigud, 1. 1. * Bribad Aranyuku Upanişud, VI. 5.8; VI. 3.7. No, 487. Truusluted by Mr. House, and also in Fiok, Sooiule Gliederung zu Buddhieb zeit, p. 13 If. * Pali Uddalaka is equiraleul to Sauskrit Auddaiaka, he., the son of Uddaluka, Vide Setakeln Jatuka (No. 377) in which Seinkelu ia reprenented as the son of a Udicca.Brahomn, Bralitan of Norlheru India, ic., of Uttura Pahcala, ef. Fausboll's JAtaka, 1, p. 401. ! Ohandogya Upanişud, IV, 4. 1-5. n Ibid, VI. 14, 1-2.

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of Benares as a sub-minister under his father. As we also

Auddalaka or Svetn- learn from the Upanisad under reference, he ketu was probably the was generally addressed by his family-name author of the Gautama- Dharma-qutra in its Gautama. From this a question is apt to older formn. arise if Uddalaka's son Śvetaketu was the author of the legal treatise, ehtitled the Gautama Dharma- sutra in the sense that the existing Dharma-Sastra of this name was a later compilation mainly based upon an older manual by Auddalaka or Svetaketu. It seems very likely that he was so. Without dogmatising, however, on so diffi- cult a question as this, we shall urge here a few points in support of our hypothesis. (1) The following quotation from Mr. Rouse's translation of the Uddalaka-Jataka shows how Auddalaka's social and ethical views might be influenced by his father's philosophy, embodied in the Chandogya Upanisad (VI. 1.). The quota- tion is from a conversation between Auddalaka and his father the primeminister of Benares. The former inquires. "What makes the Brahmin P how can he be perfect P tell me this. What is a righteous man? and how wins he Nirvana's bliss ?" The latter replies, " He has no field, no goods, no wish, no kin, Careless of life, no lusts, no evil ways ; Even such a Brahmin peace of soul shall win, So as one true to daty men bim praise." The former again asks, "Khattiya, Brahmin, Vessa, Sudda and Candāla, Pukkusa, All these can be compassionate, can win Nirvilpa's bliss : Who among all the saints is there who worse or better is ?" The other replies, "None among all the sainte is there who worse or better is." Auddalaka retorts,

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"You are & Brahmin, then, for nought : vain is your rank I wis."

Now in his further reply, the prime minister strikes the key-note of Uddalaka's philosophy :

"With canvas dyed in many a tint pavilions may be made : The roof, a many-coloured dome : one colour is the shade.1 Even so, when men are purified, so is it here on earth : The good perceive that they are sRints, and never ask their birth."

(2) The Brihad Aranyaka Upanisad ' rofers to a doctrine, called the doctrine of Mortar (Mantha). Uddalaka is said to have been its original author. The interest of the Mortar- doctrine is two-fold, first, that it illustrates Uddalaka's con- ception of original matter as the finest mixture of things-of all that is qualitatively distinct. It has also an interesting ritualistic aspect and touches on the general topics of the Grihya and Dharma-sutras. Uddalaka's one invariable ory in regard to his Mortar-doctrine is marriage, and the same ory we hear, more or less, throughout the Gautama Dharma- Sastra. In the Jaina Raja-varttika, the Manthanikas are classed among the Kriya-vadins. The Asvalayana Grihya Sutra seems to have cited this Mantha-doctrine in the Brihad Āranyaka as a canonical basis of its rules regarding the practi- cal application of the principles of eugenics. It is not impro- bable that Erotic science (Kama-sutra) developed on the lines of Uddālaka's Mantha-doctrine. The Vātsyāyana Kāma-sūtra singles out Svetaketu as the first human originator of the Indian Erotic science. It is also likely that the Upanisad passages, no less than the Uddalaka Jataka, confounded Uddālaka with bis son Auddālaka, i.e., vetaketu, and mixed up their doctrines. The Mahabharata tradition that Svetaketu was the first institutor of marriage seems to point indirectly

1 Fausboll's Jotakn, IV, p. 304 : Nondrattehi vatthehi vimūnam bhavati chaditam, Na tesom chyā vatthanam, so rāgo anupajjatha. 1 Brihad Āraņyaka Upanişad, LII, 7, 1. * Ibid, VI 3, 1,

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to the same conclusion, riz., that Śvetaketu was the originator of Erotic science. (8) Among the existing Dharma Sutras and Sastras Gautama'sis theleast philosophical, and this fact can be explained on the hypothesis that the author of an older Dharmasūtra, pro- bably bearing the same title, was no other than Śvetaketn who, although a talented Vedic scholar and honoured in the Apas- tamba Dharmasutra as a srularși, is said to have been puzzled whenever a question touching the genesis of life or the naturo of soul was put to him. The Vriddha-Gautama-samhita ex- pressly mentions a legal manual prepared by Uddālaka (Ud- dalaka-kritā-dharmā, Oh. I), and it is not impossible that the Samhita supplies us just with another instance where the father has been confounded with the son. In addition to the Mortar-doctrine another view is ascribed to Uddalaka in the Chandogya Upanisąd.1 Uddalaka said to Asvapati Kekaya, "The earth (prithivi) Othor viewe of Uddslaka referred to is the self, the essential part of the solar in the Milinda, system (vaisvanara-atma)." The king could not agree with Uddalaka, that he considered the earth to be the feet or resting-placc (pratistha) of the solar universe, the world of life, the soul of the solar universe being the sun. Uddalaka elsewhere designates earth as food (anna)2 on which the world of life depends for sustenance. Some such view as this was in the mind of King Milinda, when he refers to the view, that the earth sustains the world,3 and wrongly attribntes the same to Purana Kassapa. In the Jaina Sutrakritanga Sudharman, the chief disciple of Mahavira, calls attention of Jambusvāmin and in he Sutra- kritānga. to a current philosophical view, which may be aptly described as a type of material- istic pantheism. The view seems to have a direct reference 1 Chandogya Upanişad, V. II, 1, fr. * Ibid, VI. 2, 4, ef. Thibaut's " Vedanta-shtras," S. B. E., Vol. XXXVIII, II, 3.12. a "Pathavi ... lokam paleti." Vide The Questions o" King Milinda, S. B, H., XXXI. p, 9. + Sntrakritāůga, I. 1.1. 7-9.

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to the philosophy of Yajnavalkya,' and onry an indirect reference to the philosophy of Uddalaka. "Some foolish philosophers say that there are these five elements-earth, water, fire, air and ether These are the five original principles of things. From them emerges one (imperish- able, intelligible essence.2) On the disintegration of the five elements, the materiality of the embodied soul vanishes. But just as the earth, though it is but one mass,8 presents manifold forms, so the intelligent principle appears under various forms."4 All the existing records, whether Brahmanical or not in

Uddēlaka's thirst origin speak of Uddalaka as a life-long after knowledge, and student: one who was old in years, but simplioity of character. never too old to learn. This would seem to be true, because the verdict is so unanimous. He was an earnest seeker of truth, and an intense lover of wisdom, He sought after truth without stopping for a moment to consider from whom he might learn it, His conduot, in this respect, was in harmony with his philosophy. By his personal example he tried to establish a common- wealth of thought and oulture, whioh admitted of no distinotion of age or colour. The boy Śvetaketu goes to learn, but his father stops him, saying, " Wait, we shall both go." The charm of Uddalaka's character is no doubt his native simplicity, the simplicity with which we are all born, and which never left Uddalaka. All his words which now survive are impregnated with this one element of his personality. It surprised Jaivali, King of Pañcala, to see Uddalaka, though a teacher of high renown, coming as a pupil, with his son Svetaketu. Gārgyāyana, too, well remarked, when he said, "You are worthy of Brahman, the Divine knowledge, O

' Brihad Aranyaka Upanigad, IV. 4.4; IV. 5.18. * Śilańka explaing " aga" aş "ekaļ kaścid cidrūpaļ bhātavyatfrikta &tmā." 3 " Ahateșim vinšsenam vināso ho-i dehino." + "Jaht ya pudhair thubhe ege nanthi disa-i, evam bho kasine loe viņnu nanahi disa-i." 17

182 PRE-BUDDHISTIO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

first root, that is, the Deity.1 Thus when we come to the Deity, all grounds of distinction between Mind and Matter dis- appear. For these two- Mind and Matter-are no more than two aspects of one and the same Deity, the manifestations of the same single Being. 1. Physics. Uddalaka's Deity (Devata), which occurs here and there in Mahidasa's phraseology,' is a most baffling term. But nothing is more certain than that it is on The metaphysical nnity of Deity is the the whole a physical conception. We may ground of explenation for the duality be- suppose that in the realm of change the term tween matter and spirit. applies to Matter or the material, as distin- guished from Prann, the Universal Spirit which is a living principle in a concrete existence (jivatma). This admitted, it would follow that the metaphysical unity is with Uddālaka but a mere presupposition or ground of explanation for the duality which obtains in the empirical world between what we call Matter and Spirit. Accordingly, in dealing with his physics we shall understand by the metaphysical Deity the original Matter which is pure and unmixed, one and indivisible, universal and unmanifest- ed,-the Deity or whatever it is which lies wholly outside the material, and from which motion is generated and imparted to the material universe. Or, at best, we might interpret the term Deity as meaning that highly concentrated or attenuated form of matter which admits of no distinotion whatever from mind, spirit or energy,-a condition in which matter is transformed into energy, acts as the vivifying principle, and therefore not distinguishable from motion itself. For the present we must leave aside any further consideration of the metaphysical Deity of Uddalaka, and shall concentrate pur attention on his conceptions of Matter and Spirit. ' Ch&ndogya Upanigad, VI. 8. 4-6 .; Of. Buddhist India, p. 257, Udd&laka's influence on pantheistio thonght, " Aitareya Araņyeka, II. 4. 2. 1-2

UDDĀLAKA 133

A. Matter. Uddalaka had no other expression for Matter than Deity (Devnta). The three preponderating elements which

Three prepondera- Matter presents to experience are Fire ting elements: Fire, Water, and Barth. (tejas), Water (apa), and Earth (anna).1 All these are called deities (devatas) because all are, according to Uddalaka, inhibited, inspirited, animated and motivated, in various measures, by one and the same Spirit,3 that is, the Deity or living principle (prana),-because, in other words, the will-to-be-many (bahu-bhavitum-iccha)8 is inherent in each of them, in all things. In the case of the physi- cal world, the subtilest or finest condition of Fire is ether (akasa -aditi, ampov), the material foundation of sound; of Water the subtilest condition is air, the material foundation of motion in general; and of Earth, the subtilest condition is food or fertility (anna), the material foundation of life at large. In regard to an organism, the subtilest condition or particle (anistha dhatu) of Fire (oily substance swallowed) is ether, the material basis of voice or speech (vak); the intermediate condition (madhyama dhatu) is marrow (majja); and the grossest condition (sthavistho dhatu) is bone (asthi). Of Water (liquid substance drunk), the subtilest condition is air or vitality (prana), the material basis of all bodily func- tions; the intermediate condition is blood (lohita); and the grossest condition is urine (mutra). Similarly, of Earth (solid food eaten), the subtilest condition is virility, the material basis of germ, psyche or mind (manas); the intermediate condition is flesh (mamsa), and the grossest condition is fæces (purīșa) .* Here three points deserve special notice. (1) That in Uddã- laka's theory, as in that of Anaxagoras, the ultimate fact is 1 Chandogya Upanigad, VI. 2. 3-4. Of. Sankara's opinion, Thibaut's ' Ved&ntasutras,' S. B. E., Vol. XXXVIII, II. 3. 12. Ibid, VI. 8,2. ' Implied in "aikgata bahu syăm," did, VI. 2. 3.4. * Ibrd, VI. 5. 1-4; VI.6. 1-5.

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that things are all qualitatively distinct from one another- (dhātus).1 (2) That the parts into which each Thinga being quali- tativoly distinot, can- qualitatively distinct thing is divisible are not not transform into one only three, but infinite. (3) That in adopting another. a doctrine of Being similar to the Eleatic, Uddalaka could not reasonably maintain that things become or qualitatively distinct kinds of matter are transformed into one another. As Prof. Adamson explains the position of Anaxa- goras, " If then an empirical fact, such as the assimilation of nutriment, appears to show us the conversion (say) of corn into flesh and bone, we must interpret this as meaning that the corn contains in itself, in such minute quantities as to be imperceptible, just that into which it is transformed. It veri- tably consists of particles of flesh, and blood, and marrow, and bone."" It is very curious, indeed, to discover that the resemblance between the two thinkers of two distant countries should be so close, or that their expressions should be almost identical. But Uddalaka gave another illustration. Take, for instance, the case of curds. When curds are churned, the minutest portion rises upwards, and becomes butter.3 From this it does not follow that curds are transformed into butter, but that the seed of butter is already contained in curds, and so as to everything else. In other words, things are contained in one another. It is clear that Uddalaka conceived the Deity or Matter as a continuous, indivisible whole, in which are mixed up all things which are infinitely divisible, and Matter is a complete mixture of various qualitatively distinct.+ His conception of kinds of seeda. the All must, under all conditions be elicited from what is generally kncwn as the Mortar-doctrine. According to Jaimini's interpretation, "Various things i "Attano sabhavam dheretiti dhatu," saye Buddhaghosa ' The Development of Greek Philosophy, p. 50. a Chindogya Upanisad, VI 6. 1: "dadhnah somya mathyamanaaya yo anima sa urddhab umudişati tat sarpirbhavati." . Cf. Sankars' disoumions in Thibaut'n Vedinta Sutra, S. B. E., Vol. XXXVIII, HI.8.7.

UDDĀLAKA 135

are put into it, pounded and mixed-such is the 'meaning of the term mortar (mantha)." 1 As Uddalaka himself puts it, "Just as in a mortar various kinds of cultivated seeds-rice, barley, sesamum, and so forth-are pounded and mixed, and moistened, first with curds, boney and ghee, and finally with clarifed butter (ajya), so as to make a smooth paste," s0 is Matter.ª Matter consists of innnmerable seeds of things (bijani), or minds (manas, monads?), so mixed together that there is no void space. The image is appropriate. By curds, honey and ghee he signifies three preponderating elements, or secondary deities, as he also calls them-namely, Fire, Water, and Earth. And by clarified butter he signifies the Deity or pure, unmixed Matter or Spirit. In establishing his conception of the nature of Matter as a complete whole, without having in it any absolute parts, as well as his notion of the immutable rela- Two objections to Uddelaka's theory of tions of things among themselves, Uddā- Matter, and how he met them. laka had to give satisfactory answers for these two questions, First, if there be no void space in the material, how can we conceive motion P Uddalaka's simple answer is, it is a motion within, a churning motion, corresponding to what Anaxagoras describes as the whirling or vortex motion. And secondly, if the things be so mixed together and contained in one another, how to account for the development or manifestation of names and forms (namarupam), i. e., of individual things? Things emerge out of things by the aid of the ohurning motion within the material, by the gradual spontaneous unfolding of nature. B. Spirit. Besides the ambiguous terms Being and Deity (Sat, Devatā), Uddālaka uses other expressions to denote universal Spirit in various degrees of manifestation These are vital

' "dravyadravye prakgipta mathitah saktarab." (quoted by Max Mtiller, B. B. E., XV, p. 210). ' Bțihad Āraņyaka, VI. 3. 4 ; VI. 3 13

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spirit (prana), living principle (jīvatma), and mind or

Sankara's interpre- psyche or monad (manas) It is remark- tation of the doctrine able that the so-called Mortar doctrine' of of Mortar. Two prin- ciples of things. Uddālaka was interpreted by Sankara as the vision of life (prana-darsana). Like some of his predecessors, notably Mahidasa and Jaivali,2 Uddalaka observed in the general scheme of existence the working together of two principles,-combination and scparation, so to speak, of two elements-the feminine and the masculine, the material and the spiritual or psychical. From this we may further presume that his speou- lations, no less than those of Anaxagoras, were influenced by his observation of nature, especially the phenomena of animal life, and represent thus a landmark in the history of Sankhya ideas of Puruşa and Prakriti. By the term living principle (jīvātmā) Uddālaka under- stood the atom of atoms, so to speak, or that pure, unmixed and indivisible matter which acts as the animating principle (anima) of things which are mixed together The living principlo and divisible into an infinite number of parts. For him it is in every resprct identical with universal spirit, except that it is individual or connected in some mysterious way with concrete things. The living principle is, in other words, for Uddalaka, as for Mahidasa, the potentiality of living bodies,-the real seed of things. It is, for example, that potentiality or vitality in an infinitesimally small seed from which a huge banyan tree springs into existence.8 Thus we are to understand that a living body is an animated whole, and that it is one and the same spirit which animates all its parts. When this spirit ' leaves any branch of a tree, that withers,

' The earlier torm of the doctrine is to be found in the Ohandogya Upnniead, V.2 4. Its rndiments are also to be traced in the Kanaītaki Upanigad, II, 8. * Chendogye Upanigad, V 4-9. # Ibid, VI, 12. 1-2. * It is in Saokara's phraseology " Mukhya pr&pn," soe hia comments on the Vedanta- sTtra, 11, 4 17.

UDDĀLAKA 187

i.e., ceases to be an integral part of the living whole. When it leaves another branch, that too withers. And when, in this way, it leaves finally the whole tree, the whole tree withers and perishes. But the living principle never dies. According to Uddalaka, there are chiefly beings of three origins1, while Mahidasa spoke of four. These are described as the oviparous, the viviparous, and those which are propagated from germs (i.e., plants). All these are in various degrees animated by the living principle, that is to say, there are the mani- festations of the same universal Spirit. The living principle being of an imperishable nature, whether a lion, or a wolf, or a boar, or a worm, all are born again and again.' Prana (spirit) is what is really existent in the universe. The func- tions of the mind die ut with the body. He tells us explicitly that mind is joined to life, and that sleep results from the absorption of the mind into Prana. Mind is linked to Prana which is its abode (ayatana) or resting place (upasraya), i.e., substratum. While a porson sleeps, his mind subsides in its bond the Prana like a string-bound bird oblaining no other shelter resorts at last to the chain itself.8 The main question remains yet to be answered. What was the original condition of Matter, and how were concrete things gradually formed from it? Uddalaka's reply to this is exactly similar to that of Anaxagoras. Matter was at first a chaotic mass, like the juices Uddilaka, Kätyű. yana, and Kanāda of various trees indiscriminately blended together in honey.' In order to develop names-and-forms, to discriminate things from one another, or to set them in order, the universal Spirit came not in its universal form, but as the living principle, and eutered into Fire, Water, and Eurth. After separating their component Chandogyu Upnniand, V1. 3 1: " bhutanam trini eva bhani." Note that three is for Uddalaka e numher of encredotal charnetor. * Ibid, VI, 10, 2. # Ibid, VI. 8. 1. * Tbid, Upanişod, VI. 9 1-2. 18

138 PRE-BUDDIISTIC INDIAN PHTLOSOPIIY

lut qualitatively distinct parts (dhatus), it made numcrous new combinations of them.1 By propounding the theory of combination and separation of particles, Uddalaka anticipated the atomic theory of Kanada, as by maintaining that all things are qualitatively distinct, he prepared the way for Kakudha Kātyāyana (Pakudha Kaccāyana).

2. Theory of knowledge. In accordance with his physical dootrine, Uddalaka pro- pounded an empirical theory of knowledge. Henceforth let

Uddālaka's empiri- no one speak, he asserts, of anything but that cal theory of know- which is heard, perceived or cognised.9 He ledge. Hie method of inquiry is inductive. seems repeatedly to point out :- The only The truths. right method of scientific investigation into the nature of reality is that of inference by way of induction. He defines the method of induction as that procedure of reasoning which enables the knowing subject to infer the nature of the All from the observation of the nature of any one of particular objects. Hence the process of inference by way of induction lies from the particular to the universal, from the contingent to that which is necessary (to put it in a little more modern fashion), from species to the genus, or from appearances to reality. In his own words, " As by one clod of clay all that is made of clay is known, or as by one nugget of gold all that is made of gold is known, or as by one pair of nail-scissors all that is made of iron is known, the difference being only a name, arising from speech, but the truth being that all is either elay or gold or iron,"8 so is the method of inference by way of induction, And the truths that Uddalaka thus sought to establish are these two :- (1) That there is nothing unmixed in nature but the Spirit Prana, (jīvatma), or that the material is the one continuous 1 Chindogye Upanigad, VI. 3. 2-8. Ibid, VI. 45. Ibid, VI. 14-6. In this translation of Prof, Max Muller " differonce" does not soem to be a very happy rendering of "Vikaro." Nor does Saukarn's interpretation "na

UDDĀLAKA 139

whole in which qualitatively distinet particles of matter are mixed together; and (2) That there really exists in nature that Spirit or living principle which animates all kinds of matter in varying degrees, and yet in itself is immaterial and imperishable-both immanent and transcendent by its nature. With regard to the first truth that there is nothing unmixed in nature but the Spirit, Uddalaka holds that we, following the common usage of naming things, assign such names to the various objects of experience as the sun, the moon, the lightning, and the like. All these names, established by convention and ourrent in the daily use of men, indicate or denote, at most, the notions or judgments that the knowing mind forms of external objects perceived according to this or that preponderating element which this or that particular object presents actually to our sense-experience. But there is sufficient reason for questioning the validity and cogency of all these ordinary popular notions. For there is nothing in nature, according to Uddalaka's theory, alike the theory of Anaxagoras, which is unmixed. All things are mixed, but not the elements (dhatus). The things are mixed, and yet the particles of which they are composed are qualitatively distinct from one another. Onoe more, the things themselves are so mixed together that there can be conceived no absolute parts to exist in nature, in the life of the All. That is to say, the material, inspite of the qualitative distinctness of the particles of matter and inspite of the difference of degrees perceivable between the

vikoro nima vaatvasti paramarthato" commend itself to us as absolutely a true one. We think that Uddalaka meant by Vikara transformation, transfiguration of Matter or the material, in short, phenomenal changes. We perceive in him no consoions attempt at explaining away all objective ohanges by saying like a Buddha or a Sankara that " It is a mere name arising from current language, and nothing more." Ho did not certainly deny the reality of change, change in respeot of form, not of matter, otherwise what in the force of "namarupe vyskarot" (Chandogyn, VI. 3,3), vyAkarot, a verbal form of Vikāro. We take accordingly the pessage to mean that it bears a name, a linguistio expression, corrosponding to a palpable formal change in mattor.

140 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PIIILOSOPHY

types of existence, is a continuous indivisible whole. Such is the sum and substance, as we saw, of what is known as the Mortar-doctrine. This doctrine of Uddalaka Uddiaka's Mortar- dootrine is the anti- anticipates in history the Sankhya theory cipation of the Senkhya theory of Prakrti and of Prakriti or Primordial Matter with all its the Buddhist paycho- logioal theory of mind. potentialities, and the antecedent of the Buddhist psychological doctrine according to which Mind is a mixture of numerous states and distinct processes of the mind,-a mixture so fine and complete that it renders impossible the effort to distinguish any one of these states and processes absolutely from any other, as well as fron the whole-illustrated in the Milinda 1 and other later Buddhist works by similar examples. If the ultimate fact of nature be, according to Uddalaka's theory, that there is nothing unmixed in it. Then the question arises, how is it possible for the Uddālako neither truste nor yet distruete thinking subject to cognise that fact ? Can the avidence of the sense-perception give us the knowledge of nothing being unmixed ? To this Uddalaka's answer is that the senses do not give us the knowledge of nothing being unmixed. The knowledge is in a sense subjec- tive, being possible in thought. But Uddalaka neither trusts the testimony of the senses nor quite distrusts it. This is a most important point to remember in Uddalaka's theory of knowledge. According to his own showing the senses furnish us with sufficient indications from which the knowing mind can easily infer the nature and relations of things in themselves. In this connection Uddalaka raises a question for the first time which constitutes one of the fundamental problems of knowledge. As preceding the Analytical or Oritical philosophy (to render perhaps loosely the term vibhajja-vada) of Buddha, the question is of great " The Questions of King Milinde," p. 97 ; op. the simile of the royal cook mixing the ingredients of a sauce. The doctrine was originated by Mahs Kotthita. See Majjhima- niksya, I 202-203; "Ima dhamma samsatths no visansattha, na Jabbha ..... nana.karanam paññāpetum,"

UDDĀLAKA 141

importance historically. What can perceive of objects through the senses ? And to this his answer is nothing but sensations, no more than impressions. We can become aware, for example, of the sensation of colour through vision. Leaving asido other senses, Uddālaka only dealt with the organ of sight. The impression of Fire on the organ of vision produces or is followed by the sensa- tion of red; the impression of Water produces the sensation of white, and the impression of Earth is followed by the sensation of black. Whenever therefore there is an occasion of the sensation of red, we must infer, that it is due to the impression of Fire on the organ of vision ; whenever there is an occasion of the sensation of white, that it is due to the impression of Water; whenever there is an occasion of the sensation of black, that it is due to the impression of Earth; and whenever there is an occasion of the sensation of a combination of red, white and black, that it is due to the impression of a corresponding combination of Fire, Water and Earth in the external object. The impression produced by each external object on the organ of vision is followed by the sensation of a combination of all these fundamental colours. Therefore everything is mixed; Sun, Moon, etc., are all similar in substance to other things of experience, to this mundane mixture-the earth. The second truth relates to the existence of Spirit or living principle. The living principle is that which actually exists in nature and is identical in almost every respect with the universal Spirit. It animates in varying degrees all kinds of matter and yet in itself is immaterial and imperishable; but the proof of its existence is beyond sense-cognition. It is possible only in reasoning, but only in that kind of reasoning which is based upon actual sense- perception or observation of facts. In support of his theory he examines an atomically small seed of the banyan tree. Break it, though you perceive nothing there and yet

142 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPIY

you know that this tiny seed as a whole is pervaded by a subtle spirit, the real potentiality of the seed. It is that potentiality of the seed without which the seed is no seed, the potentiality by virtue of which the seed can grow into a huge banyan tree.1 It is needless to repeat here other illustra- tions which he gives.8 Another important point to notice in connexion with Uddalaka's theory of knowledge is that the power of human cognition is limited and does not extend beyond the domain of mind and ceases on the complete absorption or recess of mind in Prana. This is illustrated by the gradual cessation of mental process and consciousness of the dying man.8

Ohandogya Upanişad, VI. 12. 1-3. Ibid, VI, 11. 1; VI. 13. 1-8. Ibid, VI. 15. 1-2.

CHAPTER IX.

VARUŅA.

Varuna, father of Bhrgu Varuni,1 may rightly be regarded as the best exponent of the Taittiriya system. He resembles Diogenes Apollonius in his marked ecleotic Four poiots in Varuņa's philosophy. tendenoy. He sought to combine the His contributiona. principle8 of his immediate predecessor with that of an earlier thinker. In his case the immediate predecessor was Uddalaka, and the earlier thinker Mahidāsa. Varuna offers us four conceptions which we may call four developmental gradations. Of these, the first is physiological, being the gradation of a natural development from chaos to man; the second is psychological, being the gradation of functions of the soul from nutrition to philosophic contemplation. These two gradations form the subject-matter of the third chapter of the Taittirīya Upanisad. entitled Bhrigu-valli. The third gradation is spiritual, being the gradation of degrees of happiness from the mere satisfac- tion of appetite to a participation in the eternal bliss of the Divine. This forms the subject-matter of the second chapter of the Taittiriya Upanisad, fittingly described as Brahmananda- valli. The fourth gradation is educational, heing a serial enumeration or systematic statement of various duties of a person of good breeding, particularly of a Brahmacarin who has been trained up in the Taittiriya school. This important subject is treated of in the first chapter of the Taittiriya Upanişad, known as Šikşāvallī or Šikşopanișad. We shall take up these four points and four gradations, one by one. I. Physiological Aspect of the Taittiriya System,- The first point connects Varuna with Uddalaka. The

1 Taittirīya Upanişad, III. 1; III, 6, : The Developmont of Greek Philosophy, p. 64.

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latter, like Anaxagoras, based his conception of the material as a continuous whole on this Varuņa and Uddo- laka. principle: out of nothing comes nothing.' At the same time Varuna, whom we take to be the best exponent and representative of the Taittiriya system, unreasonably tends to differ from Uddālaka in attempting to accommodate to the Eleatic principle 2 a non- Eleatic thesis; out of nothing comes something.3 However, the difforence involved hore between the two thinkers is a verbal rather than a material one. The reason perhaps is that Varuna does not apparently attach the same meaning to the word nothing in each case. In the former case he seems to understand by nothing the opposite of something, meaning Existence, Being, Reality, Brahman, Uddalaka's Deity; and in the latter case, the opposite of something, meaning Order, System, Cosmos. Accordingly, we must interpret the Eleatic principle as meaning to Varuna: the multiplicity of concrete existence comes only out of Brahman; and the non-Eleatic thesis as meaning: the Cosmos comes out of the chaos- Aditi or Infinity. In the second place, Varuna unites with Uddalaka against Mahidasa by holding that Brahman in order to create out of himself a purposive order of the universe hitherto non- existent broods over himself (tapam tapati),' and certainly not over Water, as Mahidasa thought. And in the third place, for Varuņa, as for Uddālaka, nature is a system of spontaneity, a self-evolving autonomy, so to speak. Therefore, the principle of Ouusality is not antagonistic to tho movement in general, the reason of develop- spontancity of nature. ment from one into many is inherent in Brahman, as well as in things themselves. In things

1 Taittiriya Upanisad, II. 6. ' Prof. Hobhouse notes :- "I am doubtful about the use of the term Eleatio here. The Eleatic principle may be takon as that of unity eucluding ull multiplicity. : Taittiria Upaniaad, II. 7. + Ibid, II. 6.

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themselves, becauso they are, according to Varuņu and Uddālaka, inhibited, inspirited, animated, motivated in various degrees by one and the same eternally existent Being, i.e., Brahman, the first cause of things. Further, in the view of both Varuņa and Uddalaka, the theory of spontaneity does not exclude causality. Both of them seem rather to have thought that causality has its rigbt place only in the spontaneity of nature. There is nevertheless this slight difference between them.

(a) With Uddalaka three preponderating elements are' Fire, Water and Earth. Of these, in order of time, Fire has its root in the Deity, Water has its root Differeuco beineon Uddalaka and Varuņn. in Fire, and Earth has its root in Water. Besides, of Fire, the subtilest or finest condition is ether, the material hasis of sound; of Water, the subtilest condition is air, the material basis of vital breath ; and of Earth, the subtilest condition is food, the material basis of germ or psyche (manas).

(b) For Varuna, on the other hand, the elemenis are these five-Ether (akasa), Air, Fire, Water, and Earth. Of these, in order of time, Ether springs from Brahman ; Air from Ether ; Fire from Air; Water from Fire; Earth From Water; herbs from Earth; food from herbs; seed from food; and man from seed.' Such is the physiological scale, the teleological gradation of a natural development from Ether2 or " Brahmanas- pati's" nothing to man. II. Psychological Aspect .- Varuna's agreement with Mahidasa and Aristotle is beyond question. For, as we

' Taittiriya Upaniad, II. t. Op. Thibaut's ' Vedanta-Sutras, S. B. E., Vol. XXXVIII, IL. 3, 8 Ibid, II. 7. The order of auccession involved in the conception of the gradual unfolding or retraction of relatively unreal elements of exporionce into the self-snbsisting, single reslity is enusal or logical Cp. the views of Badrayana and Sankara in the Vedonte Sutros. Ibid, IT. 3.10 14 19

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know, Varuna's conception of Brahman is but a pure activity of thought, of thinking upon Varuņa and Mahi- desa. nothing but himself (tapam tapana). It is thus indeed that Brahman enjoys bliss (ananda) eternally. The nature of the Divine, as conceived by Varuna, is absolutely free,-fearless, invisible, incorporeal, undefined, unsupported by anything material. Brahman is the first cause; he is one, the one from fear of whom the wind blows, and the sun rises. He is again just

Varana's Theology. the final cause, the end, the best. The end consists in an eternal enjoyment of bliss by thinking upon nothing but his own nature. This end is beyond all principles. The best thing for the soul to do is to approach Brahman, to unite with the God, to participate in the eternal bliss of the Divine, by contemplating on. its eternal nature. But the first requisite, Varuna insists at this point, for such a contemplation on the part of the soul is to be completely free from fear, and to transcend all kinds of distinction, obtaining in this world or in our mind. With regard to the functions of the soul, too, Varuna's resemblance to Mahidasa and Aristotle is indisputable. For in Varuna's opinion, the soul is but a form Graduated functione of Soul. of the living body, a complement of the organism. The soul is therefore capable of development, that is to say, there is a gradation of functions of the soul. The lowest grade of activity of the soul, the activity which is fundamental to life, is nutritive (annamaya).' In this respect man is in the same predicament with the rest of material nature. Life depends on food, the soul depends on life, and what do we find in nature at large but "food resting on food" (annavan annado) ? So Varuna declares: Life is food, the body eats this food. The

' Taittiriya Upanişad, II. 7, 8. B. E., Vol. XV, p. 59. "abhayu, adrišye, auālmya, auirukta, unilayanu." Ibid, III. 2.

VARUŅA 147

body depends on life, life depends on the body. This is the food depending on food. Let a man therefore by all means acquire such food, and let him never refuse hospitality to a guest, although a stranger. "If he gives food amply, food is given to him amply. If he gives food fairly, food is given to him fairly. If he gives food meanly, food is given to him meanly.'"1 The next higher forms of activity of the soul are prana- maya2'sense-perception and motor-activity.' Still higher in scale are manomaya8-psychical activities in general, those of which sense-perception is in some way the foundation. Higher than these are Vijmanamaya+-a group of aotivities called by the general name of understanding. And at the top of the scale is anandamaya" the philosophic contempla- tion of the eternally blissful nature of Brahman-the Divine.8 III. Mystical, Ethical or Æsthetic Aspect .- Varuna's original contribution is the conception of Happiness is the end of concrete activitics happiness (ananda) as the end of all of life, and Bliss the kinds of activity in man and in the world summum bonum. of nature at large. As regards men, begin- ning with the enjoyment of food, ending in the enjoyment of contemplative joy, and including as the intermediate the delight in action, locomotion, wife, children, cattle, wealth, society, friendship, power, pomp, learning, fame, and the rest, all are in various measures but bliss divine.' Thus we see how the teleological instinct which prompted the ancient thinkers of India and Greece asserts itself with full force in Varuna's conception of bliss which admits of degrees but of no difference of kind. This supreme end, the enjoyment of bliss, is not con- fined to human nature. The whole of external nature has 1 Taittiiya Upanigad, III. 7-10. S. B. E., Vol. XV, p. 67. : Literally, consisting of activities of the senees * Lit. consisting of actirities of thonght. * Lit. consisting of activities of understanding. 5 Lit. blissful. * Taittirtya Upanişnrl, II. 2 .- TTI G. 7 Ibid, ITT. 10, 1-2.

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her due share in this divine blessing; delight in rain, power in lightning, light in the stars, generation, immortality and joy in the ether or Infinite, all these are expressi in various measures of the same bliss divine.1 This explains clearly the reason why Varuna, "in giving the various degrees of happiness, ... gives us at the same time the various classes of human and divine heings." & Suppose there is a noble-looking young man who is learned, healthy and wealthy. Varuna reckons this as one measure of human bliss. One hundred times this human bliss is said to be one measure of the bliss of human Gan- Grndations of bliss. dharvas (musicians,) and likewise of a great seer who is free from sensual desires. One hundred times this bliss of human Gandharvas is said to be one measure of the bliss of celestial Gandharvas, and likewise of a great seer who is free from passions. The comparison being thus continued, extends up to Brahman and the greatest seer among men, con- ceived as the highest pinnacle of blissful nature. Varuna tells us that the blissful nature in man and the blissful nature in the sun, aro both one.9 This adhidaivata-adhyatmika-macro-micro-cosmical, cosmo- anthropological or physio-psychological parallelism between bliss divine and human, can be traced back in its germinal- form to the Vedic conceptions of the dual personality of the gods, and it is but a corollary of the Soham or Taitvamasi doctrine of post Vedic philosophy. The Taittiriva doctrine recurs with certain minor changes in the teaching of Yajña- valkya,' and seems to have afforded a basis for the Jaina and Buddhist cosmographies, introduced by way of analogy with the progressive course of a person aspiring to attain Arahatship.

1 Taittirīya Upanigad, III. 10. 2-8, : S. B. E., Vol. XV, p. 61, f. n. 2. * Taittiriya Upanişad, II. 8. 1-5. + Brihad Āranyaka, IV, 3.33.

VARUŅA 149

IV. Sikgacalli-Educational, Religious or Moral Aspect .- The first chapter of the Taittiriya Upanisad is a connected discourse on the various duties of a religious student who has been brought up in the Taittiriya tradition, and a pos- teriori, of a person who desires to be faithful to the religious instincts of his Aryan forefathers. The eclectic tendency which characterises the Taittiriya system as a whole is no less promi- nent in its practical aspect. The historical significance and value of this Siksôpanisad is that it seems to reveal for the first time a conscious attempt to conceive a structure upon which the entire Brahmanic or orthodox system of the Smritis was subsequently super-imposcd. It is a literary as well as a doctrinal synthesis of the Vedangas, and on the other hand it appears to be the first synthesis of the Varņasrama ideal in its social and religious aspects. This spirit of synthesis is enunciated by the Tuittiriyas as a law of the universe which is manifest everywhere in nature striving to maintain a harmony or autonomy in things, keeping them in a working order. This law is observed by them in its five-fold jurisdictions (pañcasu adhikaraņeşu), viz .- I. In the material world (adhilokam), 2. In the shining things (adhijyautisam), 3. In the world of knowledge (adhividyam), 4. In the world of generation (adhiprajam) and 5. In individual life (adhyatmam). The relations of things are illustrated under these five heads. To quote their own examples :-- 1. Earth denoting the anterior side of relation (pūrva- rupam), and Heaven the posterior (uttararupam), Void or Firmament is the connecting link (sandhi), and Air the in- coming, inhibiting, cohesive and mobile element (sandhana). 2. Fire denoting the anterior, and Sun the posterior, Water is the connecting link and Lightning the in coming and in-dwelling element.

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3. Teacher denoting the anterior and Pupil the posterior, Knowledge is the conneoting link and Instruction the func- tional, feature. 4. Mother denoting the anterior and Father the posterior, Offspring is the connecting link and Generation the process of creation. 5. Lower maxilla denoting the anterior and upper maxilla the posterior, Voice is the connecting link and Articulation the out-coming result. These five-fold relations furnish a logical mould into which all Brahmanical thoughts can be cast, e.g :- (a) Relating to syllogism-there must be a purvarūpa or major premise, a uttararupa or minor premise, a sandhi or middle term to connect the'two, and a sandhana or outcoming conclusion, (b) Relating to varnAsrama-there must be a pūrvarūpa or natural social order of varnas with their distinet functions, a uttararupa or natural development of individual in unison with the developmental stages of life (asramas), a sandhi or man in natural development and a sandhana or performance of duties in accordance with varnasrama ideal. (c) Relating to asrama ideal-there must be a pūrvarūpa on lower functions of life, annamaya, prānamaya, etc., a uttara- rupa or higher functions such as vijnanamaya and ānandamaya, a sandhi or religious man in the making, and a sandhana or perfection of human life. The duties to be gone through by the Taittiriya man in the making are reserved for disoussion in Part III in connexion with Mundaka philosophy. Here it remains only to note that the Taittiriya teaching which serves as the foundation of entire Brahmanism, promulgated in the Sutras and Smpitis is logical, consistent and comprehensive. If there are any defects in it, those pertain to their defective observation of facts rather than to their mode of reasoning.

CHAPTER X.

BĀLĀKI AND AJĀTASATRU.

Gargya Balaki was known as a thoughtful scholar who lived among the Usinaras, the Satvat Matsyas, the Kuru- Pancalas, and the Kasi-Videhas. Balaki was a Brahman, Ajataśatru a warrior. Bālaki was a contemporary of Yājñavalkya, Ajātasatru that of Janaka, King The contrast ba. of Videha, King. Janaka was a patron of tween a Brahman think- or and & Warrior. The philosophy. King Ajātaśatru was a philo- former seeks for soul in overything, while the sopher. It is said that a philosophical discus- latter limits ita exis- tence to living bodies. sion was held between Bālāki and Ajatasatru. The Kauşītaki Upanisad' and the Brihad Aranyaka ' furnish two accounts of the same. These are not without some important variations, as Prof. Max Müller notices, but on the whole to the same purpose. It is evident from both the records that the main object of the discussion was to determine the nature of soul and its abode in the universe and in man. Further, in the self-same discussion, Bālāki plays the part of a philosophical mauiac, and Ajatasatru that of a doctor, a physiologist, who oures him. Bālaki, for instance, meditates on the soul (purușa) in the sun, while Ajatasatru regards the sun only as a great, power- ful, shining object of nature, the source of life and light. Balaki begins then to meditate on the soul in the moon, while Ajatasatru regards the moon only as the source of animal seed. Bālāki comes next to meditate on the soul in lightning, while Ajatasatru regards lightning only as a brilliant form of

1 TV.1-20 ! L1, 1-20.

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fire or heat (electrical phenomenon). Passing over the soul in ether, air, fire and water, Balaki fastens his mind for a while on the soul in the mirror (adarsa), while Ajatasatru regards that only as a reflection (pratirupa). After meditating on the soul in the echo, in the sound that follows a man, in the shadow, Balaki concentrates his mind on the soul, embodied (sarirah), on the self-conscious reason (prajña), on the soul in the right eye, on that in the left eye, one after the other. But having failed to convince the King, Balaki demands at last an answer from him. Ajatasatru offers this answer to Bālāki: The complete fact of a living being is Prana-Life. Praņa is to be conceived as the embodied soul (sarīrah). Prajña, or Reason is in Life, just as a razor is filted in a razor case, or as fire in the arani wood. There are arteries (nadi) of the heart called Hita, small as a hair divided a thousand times. These arteries are filled with a thin fluid of various colours-white, black, yellow, red, and extend from the hcart towards all parts of the body, even to the very hairs and nails. During sound sleep the living, conscious soul dwells in these arteries of the heart. This is the answer of Ajatasatru according to the Kauşītaki version of the above Dialogue. The Brihad Aranyaka version is silent about fuid and colours, but adds that there are 72, 000 arteries. During sleep the soul moves forth through these arteries and rests in the surrounding body. Its move- ment is analogous to that of a spider along its thread. Lastly, there is a parallel passage in the Chändogya Upanigad which is equally silent about the thin fluid, but adds that there are 101 arteries in all. One of these pene- trates the crown of the head, thus conneeting the mortal or lower centre with the immortal or higher centre. Besides, according to this passage, the arteries of the heart consist of a brown (pingala) substance, of a white, blue, red and yellow substance. The sun, too, cousists of a substance of these five colours.

CHAPTER XI.

YĀJNAVALEYA.

The pronouncement of Erasmus about Seneca applies very well to Yajnavalkya. Judged by the standard of post-Vedic period, Yajnavalkya is pre-Buddhistic and Hie predecessore and successors. later, by that of pre-Buddbistic and later times, he is post-Vedic. It may truly be said, therefore, of Yajnavalkya that with him the thought of the post-Vedic period is closed, and that of subsequent ages is implied. Manifold interests-religious, speculative, moral, social-centre round his person. On the one hand, Uddālaka's biological speculations,1 Ajatasatru's physiological researches,2 Varuna's conception of bliss (ananda) as the summum bonum of life,3 Dadhyac Athar- vana's doctrine of honey (madhu-vidya),* Pratardana's psycho- logy' and transcendental ethics,' Sandilya's views on will and belief,' Jabala's conception of Brahman as light,8 Jaivali's distinction between the good and the bad soul, Gargyayana's doctrine of immortality,10 Mahidasa's conceptions of matter and form,11_all these make a fitting introdnction to, and are harmoniously combined in Yajnavalkya's Doctrine of Double Negation, of "No No" (Nêti Nêti),1 * Brihad Āraņyaka Upanişad, III. 9. 28. * Ibid, IV. 8. 20 ; IV. 4 9. 3 lbid, IIT 9. 28 ; IV. 3. 32-83. * Ibid, II, 5. 1-10, : Ibid, IV. 3, 23-30: Sight is inseparable from the seer; smelling from the smeller ;...... knowing from the kuower, " Ibid, IV. 4. 22; Sonl as the immnrtul, intelligible essence does neither wax by good worke nor wane by evil. r Ibid, IV. 4. 5. Thia, IV. 4.7. * Tbid, IV. 4. 4.8. 10 Tbid, IV. 4. 25. 11 Ibid, IV. 3.32 12 [bid, Il 3,6; III. 9. 26; JV, 4. 22; 1V. 6, 15. 20

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And on the other hand, Yajñavalkya anticipates the Epi- cureanism of Ajita,' Buddha's conception of Sunya, the Vedānta of Bādarāyaņa, the Māya doctrine of Sankara, and the ethical and social problems of Mahavira and Buddha. The fact need hardly be mentioned that with Yajñavalkya is immortalised the name of King Janaka Vaidcha, the most renowned patron of philosophy.ª It is moreover with Yajna- valkya that the names of two Indo-Aryan mothers-Gärgi Vacakņavi and Maitreyi-are so intimately associated. Of them, Maitreyi was one of the two wives of Yajñavalkya, his other wife being Kātyayani. Katyayani did not so much care for her husband's speculative dream as Maitreyi. She was content and oconpied with her household problems and domestic polities. In the estimation of the author of the Yajnavalkya-Upanisad, Gargi's was a more philosophically trained mind than Maitreyi's. However, hoth Gargi and Maitreyi prove that women of India were not altogether indifferent and inactive at the time, when the whole kingdom of Janaka, nay, the whole of northern India was resounding with the clash of philosophic battles. It is 'said that the eloquent Gargi engaged Yajnavalkya twice" in such a contest. The two questions which she put to him seem to have been very skilfully " warped and woofed." On the other hand, the tender-hearted Maitreyi was bewildered at a covered attack of materialism on the part of her husband. The Brihad Aranyaka Upanisad records a great many names of others who gave battle to Yajnavalkya. Among them, Sakalya is said to have asked Yajñavalkya this ques- tion: Where does the heart abide?+ Yajnavalkya said: O

1 Brihad Aranyaka, II. 4. 12; IV. 6. 15: "Idam mahed adbhūtam anantam aparam vijnsna-ghana evaiteblyo blūtebhyaļ samutthāa tāuyevauu vinnáyati; na pretya samjns aattti." * Kanşītaki Upanişad, IV. 1 ; Brihad Āraņyaka Upanigad, II, 1. 1; TII. 1. 1; IV. 1.1, ff. ' Brihad Aranyako Upanigad, III. 6. 1: II[. 8. 1-12; "Then Vacnknavi said ; Voner- able Brahmanas, I shall nsk him two qnostions. If he will answer them, none of you, I think, will defeat him in any argumant conuerning Bralmau." * Ibid, IIL 9.24

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Ahallika! if the heart were anywhere but in us, then either dogs might eat it or birds might tear it. This is apparently a story, a story that reminds us of the Sumsumara Jataka, in which a big-bellied but poor-witted crocodile is censured by an intelligent monkey in these words: O fool! if my heart were suspended from the fig-tree, it would have been smashed to pieces as I go up and down the tree. In treating of Yajnavalkya's philosophy, it is fundament- ally necessary to sift the sources of informa- The sourees of in- tion. Our main authority is the Bpihad formation, Āranyaka Upanisad of which there are two somewhat different recensions now extant. There is besides a whole Upanisad entitled the Yajñavalkya-Samhita, consist- ing of some twelve chapters. It is written entirely in verse, and from beginning to end is a Dialogue between Yajnavalkya and Gargi. It is evidently a later oomposition, embodying the later development of Yajnavalkya's speculations. Another text, generally known as the Yajñavalkya-Smriti contains a number of semi-legal, semi-moral injunctions of Yajnavalkya. This text, as its title shows, belongs to the Smriti class, and ranks almost with the Institutes of Manu. Perhaps, in one respect, its place is higher than that of the Manu-Smriti, if we consider the wide infuence which Mitaksara, the commentary on the Yajñavalkya-Smriti, exercises all over India, except Bengal, where the Dāyabhaga system appears in some respects to be a powerful rival. But the Smriti, as we now have it, seems to belong to a later period than that to which Yajnavalkya himself may be supposed to belong. Nevertheless, it does not seem impos- sible that some of the important injunctions which this Smriti embodies may have come originally from Yajñavalkya himself. For the Brihad Aranyaka Upanisad embodies what Yajnavalkya had taught before his retirement from the world. Supposing that the age for his retirement was between fifty and

156 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PITILOSOPHY

fifty-five, and that he was alive some ycars after it,' is it not reasonable to surmise that a great mind such as Yajñavalkya should leave a few legal and moral injunctions for the guidance of his posterity ? The long-cherished tradition which ascribes the injunctions to Yajnavalkya may bring home, we believe, one great truth regarding his philosophy, namely, that it is dominated throughout by a kind of practical or ethical end. But there are points in which his philosophical predilection is stronger than his ethical tendency. Now, as regards the Brihad Aranyaka Upanisad itself, we have much reason to question the reliability of its evidence here and there. The work is not a homogeneous whole. At the most it is a compilation. What concerns us is that it puts a world of views into the mouth of Yajnavalkya. But his own views are so deeply stamped with his personality that we can discriminate at once those which are personal to him from those which are not. We are inclined to consider the Dialogue between Yajnavalkya and Maitreyi as our best and safest authority to rely upon. This Dialogue occurs twice in the same Upanisad.

HIS PHILOSOPHY,

When we read and ponder over the famous Dialogue be- tween Yajnavalkya and his wife Maitreyi, the first impression, and that which remains, is that Yajfavalkya's is the practi- oal mind of Socrates proceeding to the abstract thinking of Plato, or it may well be that his is a Platonio mind learning to be Socratio. In formulating " a pure dogma of soul, " he naturally seeks to combine all that is visionary with all that is vivid, and all that is subtle with all that is ennobling. In every direction we find that he endeavours to prepare for the mind the steps leading up from the lowest to the highest, from

The Y&joavalkya Upanisad seems to contain certain views of Yajfavalkya which he formylated during his Aranyska life.

YĀJNAVALKYA 157

the worst to the very best. And as we advance step by step, we feel as though it were a journey from darkness into light. But once we have reached the ethereal height of the eternal light, and look down, we find, to our great wonder, that now even the very darkness partakes of the nature of light, false- hood of truth, ignorance of knowledge, enmity of love, theft of honesty, sorrow of joy, pain of bliss, and death of immor- tality. Such is the charm of Yajnavalkya's doctrine of soul! 1. Self-love (atma-kāma). Now we proceed to consider the above-mentioned Dialogue between Yajnavalkya and Maitreyi. This Dialogue opens really with the problem of self-love.' Yajnavalkya seems to have maintained that self-love lies at the foundation, is the spring of all kinds of love. Love is therefore in its nature egoistic : it begins with the love of Between the in- stinct of solf-preservn- self,-(with the instinct ofself-preservation,") tion and love of Olod there is no difference and reaches a termination in the love of of kind but of degree. Self, that is, of God (Brahman). Conjugal love, the love of children, wealth, cattle, class, society, gods, creatures, religion and scripture, patriotism, philanthropy,-all are in various degrees the same love of self,-the self-love in special forms. . Love is for Yajnavalkya the cheerful heart that finds everything cheerful in the world. As Yajnavalkya puts it, a wife is not dear (priya) that we may love the wife; but because we love the self, therefore a wife is dear ; and so as to everything else. Even the love of God is not an excep- tion to this rule. As for the love of God, however, there is this differance that, while in all other forms of love, the object is something other than the self, the love of God does not recognise anything but self for its object. The love of God is what may be called in modern phraseology love for love's sake, in as much as God dwells, according to · Brihad Āraņyaka Upanigad, Il, 4. 5 ; IV. 5. 5, ' Ibid, IV. 1. 3 ; IV. 1. 5,

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Yājñavalkya, in love (kāma-āyatana), nay, God is love (Kāma).' Moreover, in all other forms of love, therc being no complete gratification of desire, perfect bliss (paramananda) is not attainable by them. Whereas, in the love of God, there being nothing more to wish for, the result is perfeot bliss. The love of God is in its nature all-embracing, it comprehends within itself all other forms of love. Thus this altruism, the love of God, is just the expansion or consumma- tion of self-love.

2. Desire (Kama).

With Yajnavalkya this altruism, the love of God,-love for love's sake, is not different in kind from the self-love which is implanted in our nature. For every Between sensunl de- sires and the desire for form of love is in itself a type of desire,- a higher life thers is no difference of kind. desire the gratification of which is happiness (and the non-fulfilment of whioh is sorrow). For instance, when a man desires a woman, and a son resem- bling him is born of her, it is happiness.ª In all other types of desire the consequence is either happiness or sorrow. Whereas, in the case of the desire for the self, there being no fear of disappointment, the result is always happiness. There- fore, giving up all kinds of sensual desire, we should desire only to love, to seek, to know the self. For to love the self means to love God, and to love God means to desire knowledge, bliss and immortality, because God is all this. Negatively, then, not to love the self means not to love God, and not to love God means to welcome ignorance, doubt, delusion, hunger and thirst, and sorrow and pain and decay and death.8 We must seek the self. For to seek the self is to seek God, and

1 Brlhad Āraņyaka Upanişad, TIT. 9. 11. ª Ibid, IV. 1. 6. Ibid, IIT. 5. 1

YĀJNAVALKYA 159

to seek God is to seek for knowledge and bliss and immorta- lity. We must also know the self. For to know the self is to know God, and to know God is, on the one hand, to shako off doubt and ignorance, to risc above all desires for sons and wealth and worlds1 ; and, on the other hand, to know, to seek, to obtain, to enjoy all that is desirable. Once more, we must know the self. For in Yajnavalkya's opinion, he who knows it, does not attach himself to evil action; but being un- perturbed, subdued, restrained, patient, and collected, he sees self in self, and all of self. Evil does not overcome him, he overcomes all evil. Evil does not burn him, he burns all evil. Sinless, stainless, doubtless, he becomes a Brahman. This is (the attainment of) the Brahma-world." Now, knowledge and ignorance, bliss and sorrow, immorta- lity and denth, being contradictory of each other, in seeking the one, we must abandon the desire for the other. 'l'o seek knowledge or bliss or immortality is to seek God, to desire the self, that is, to be above all desires for sons and wealth and worlds. Thus when we desire the self, then we seek, reach the state of God, that is, the end of all desires, of all seeking (eşaņā). Here the expression 'the end of all desires' is ambiguous. Obviously it means to Yajnavalkya that when we reach the end of all desires, then the mind no more God is the oltimate desires sons or wealth or worlds. But end of all desires. There may be an end it does not certainly mean to him that the of desires, but no end to the act of dosiring. mind ceases at any time from desiring or the act of seeking. The mind then desired other objects, and now it is desiring itself; that is all. Besides, in

' Worlde are enumerated generally as throe-that of men, that of fathera, that of gods. The first can be gained by a son, the second by Karma or sacrifico (yajns), and the third by vidy& or knowledge. Brihad Aranyakn Upanigad, I. 6, 16. Yijdavalkyu adds the Brahma-world to thene three. Ibid, IV. 4. 23 : na lipyate karmaņā pāpakênėti tasmād evam vicchāņto dānta uparatas titikşu samēhito bhutatmanyav&tmanam aarvam Atmanam pafyati ...... vipupo virajo vicikitso Brāhmaņa bhavstyāş Brahma-lokah.

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this transition-if transition we may call it, from desiring other objets into desiring the self, there is elimination of this or that object, but not of the thought-activity called desiring or the act of seeking. He is therefore He, desiring is desiring, and it makes no difference to the thought-activity called desiring, whether we desire this or that,-sons or wealth or worlds or Brahman. In accordance with Yajnavalkya's view, then, the Deity is like Aristotle's aotus purus, the pure activity of thought, the thinking upon thought, the desiring of the desirable, the knowing of the knowable, the enjoyment of the enjoyable, and so forth. This being the case, that which is given into our power, that which is in our free-will, is not to eliminate from the mind the thought-activity called desiring or the act of seeking, but only to eliminate one object by substituting for it another. And it is in this process of elimi- nation and substitution, indeed, that the idea of gradual sublimation consists. So Yajñavalkya said to Kahola Kauşi- takeya: A desire for sons is desire (esana) for wealth, a desire for wealth is desire for worlds. These two are desires indeed. A Brahman, therefore, after he has completed his Vedic studies -after erudition (panditya), wishes to indulge in folly1 (i.e., to be wise by marrying); after he has accomplished the duty of a father, and, previously that of a student, he wishes to become a Muni-silent thinker ; and after he has done with the duty of a Muni, and previously those of a father and a student he wishes to become.& Brahman, a philosopher who appre- hends the nature of Brahman, the Divine. By whatever means, he becomes a Brahman, he remains such indeed. Everything except this highest contemplation of the Divine nature is of evil.ª This reminds us at once of Mahidasa's pithy sentence: Man is an ever-swelling sea (esa purusah samudrah).8 I Belyena tinthati. Thia expression is explained in the Sub&lopanigad as meaning "he lives with the ohild-like simplicity of ontlook on life (balasvnhhavo)." · Brihad Ārenyaka Upaniņad, III. 5. 1. * Aitareya Āranyako, LI. 3, 8.1.

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Whatevor he reaches, he desires to go beyond. When he reaches the heaven, the celestial region, he desires to go beyond. If he should roach the heavenly world, he would desire still to go beyond.' Mahidasa's meaning is that this desiring of the immortal by the mortal constitutes the greatness of man and his ultimate aim.

3. Good and Evil (Punya-Papa). In inquiring into Yajnavalkya's conceptions of good and evil, we must by no means lose sight of the distinction which

A man of deaire and he draws between a man of desire and a a man of no desire man of no desire, that is to say, between defined. a bad and a good, a mortal and an immortal soul. A man of desire is he who desires sons or wealth or the worlds of men, fathers and gods, while a man of no desire is he who desires only the self, that is, only the world of Brahman. In the Brahma-world there is nothing material, nothing conditional, but whatever there is, is immaterial and absolute. None the less, there is belween the Brabma-world and other worlds no difference of kind but of degree. According to Yajnavalkya, whatever lands us in doubt, darkness, delusion, dualism and ignorance, and increases hunger, thirst, sorrow, pain, decay and death Definition of good and evil is evil; and that which makes us free from all these, and leads to knowledge, bliss and immortality is good. A man is like this or like that-noble or wicked, virtuous or sinful-according as he acts and behaves.1 It is therefore well said: A man is of desire. As is his desire, so is his will. As is his will, so is his Eig doctrine of Karma, action. And as he acts, so he attains.2 In this connexion Yajnavalkya also quotes the 3Brihad Aranyaka Upanişad; IV, 4. 5. Tad yad etad idem mayodemaya iti, Yathūkari yathacārī tathā bhavati; sādhukārī sādhu bhavati pāpakarī pāpo bhavati ... .... " Jbid, IV. 4, 5: Atha khalvahuh : kāmameya evūyam puruşa iti. So yathākamo bbavati tat ritur bhavati. Yai ritor bhavati tat karma kurute. Yat karma kurute tad abhisam. padyate. 21

162 PRE-BUDDIISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPIY

following maxim from some unknown source: A man attains with his action the object to which his mind is attached. And after having reached the end (reaped the fullest consequence), of what was done here, he returns again from that world to this world of action .! This applies to a man of desire, one who desires sons or The highest good is wealth or the worlds of men, fathers and above both good and evil as oommonly gods, that is to say, one who is involved in understood. materiality and conditionality,-is in the midst of knowledge and ignorance, joy and sorrow, death and immortality. He is not fitted, as Gargyayana pointed out long before, for the Brahma-world, the realm of absolute knowledge, bliss and immortality. For it is only he who does not desire, who is free from desire (niskama), who has obtained the desirable (apta-kama), or who desires only the self (atma- kama), being Brabman goes to Brahman.' Hence it follows that, according to Yajnavalkya, the highest good is something beyond both good and evil, both knowledge and ignorance, joy and sorrow, death and immortality. Yajnavalkya's conceptions of bliss are essentially the same as those of Varuna. The points of difference Yzjdavalkys and Varuņa. are these: Varuna's list of gods begins with Gandharvas, while Yajnavalkya's list with Fathers. For Varuna a Srotriya among men should be free from desires (akama-hata), while Yajnavalkya adds a new element: he must also be free from fault or sin (avrijino).ª Yajnavalkya gives a beautiful illustration of his conception of the final blias, of the enjoyment of the enjoyable: " As a man, when embraced by a beloved wife, knows nothing that is without, nothing that is within. "+ 1 Brihad Aranyaka Upanigad, IV. +. 6. Tad eva saktab saha Karmaņā lingam mano yatra nisaktamasya: prāpyantam karmaņos tasya yat kiāccha karotyayam, tasmāt lokāt punar etyāamin loka ya karmaņe iti. : Ibid, IV. 4. 8. a fbid, TV. 8. 33. This new element shews that Yajniavalkya's conception is later thon that of Varuņa. . Ibid, IV. 8.21,

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4. Knowledge (Vidya).

Yajnavalkya's conceptions of Vidya and a-Vidya, know- ledge and ignorance are in a sense diametrically opposed. For knowledge is to him faith (sraddha), Knowledge and ig- norance contraated. while ignorance is doubt (vicikitsa); know- ledge is light (jyotis), ignorance is darkness (tamas) ; knowledge is truth (satya), ignorance is falsehood (anrita) ; knowledge is virtue, ignorance is sin ; knowledge is bliss (ananda), ignorance is sorrow (soka) ; knowledge is im- mortality (amritatva), ignorance is death (mrityu). To this we may add : knowledge is universal, ignorance is conditional; knowledge is necessary, ignorance is contingent. In fact, knowledge implies in Yajnavalkya's language the knowledge of God, that is to say, the knowledge of know- ledge, for God is all knowledge (jñana, Definition of term knowledge. the prajña) ; and ignorance implies that which is not such knowledge, the opposite or want of the knowledge of God. Gol is whal really is (satya), and not-God is what is not (anrita). That which really is, is oneness (ekata), the unity of God and soul. Therefore, the true knowledge consists in the full recognition of the trnth " I am He" (soham). What is really not P That which is really not is duality, the distinction between self and not-self, between good and evil, desire and not-desire, anger and not- anger, dear and not-dear, between knowledge and not-know- ledge, truth and falsehood, right and wrong, justice and injustice, moral and immoral, between God and soul, world and men, a father and not-a-father, worlds and not-worlds, gods and not-gods, Vedas and not-Vedas, a thief and not-a- thief, a murderer and not-a-murderer, a Candala and not-a- Caņdala, a Paulkasa and not-a-Paulkasa, a recluse (sramaņa) and not-a-recluse, a hermit (tapasa) and not-a-hermit.1

1 Brihad Āranyaka Upanigad, IV. 3, 22 ; eta.

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This dualism, this logomachy, the verbal distinction of this from that, is recognised by, or rather is the creation of logic, and logic is with Yajnavalkya that Psychological theory of one-nesa in regard wrangling about words which "is mere to knowledge. weariness of the tongue " (vaco viglapanam). The ultimate knowledge is beyond the reach of mere logic. It is clearly implied in his expressions that the greatest logical doctrine is the principle of contradiction. But this principle which admits of no application to his conception of ultimate knowledge -- the doctrine of " No No." He certainly means to say that knowledge is not possihle except in and through reason. What he seems to have maintained, on the other hand, is that the ultimate psychological fact is the one-ness of mental processes. For, considered from the psychological point of view, even what we call doubting is in itself a process of the mind, a seeking after truth,-an act of thinking which is not different in kind from the pure cognition or thinking upon thought. The real fact is this eternal activity of thought,' and the truth is that all activities ranging from the bare sensation to the pure cognition are in various degrees the same activity of the Divine thinking in man, or as Yajñavalkya would have expressed it, the self-activity in special forms. Viewed under this aspect, ignorance becomes trans- muted into knowledge, doubt into faith, darkness into light, falsehood into truth, multiplicity into unity. Furthermore, viewed in this light of the knowledge of God, language, liter- ature, scripture, history, fables, myths, cosmogony, Upanisads, Sutras and expositions, all appear to be, in themselves, a kind of knowledge.' These are the various manifestations of know- ledge, the subjects of study, the objeots of knowledge, and all are breathed forth from, are revealed by, and are therefore the expressions of the self-same eternal activity of thought.3 1 Brihad Amnyaka Upanignd, IV. 8. 14; "There is no intermission of the knowing of the knower." * Toid, IV. 1. 2, * Ibid, IV. 5. 11.

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Whether by the study of the Veda or by sacrifice, penance and fasting, the Brahmans seek to know Brahman.' But we must not forget that with him the highest knowledge consists in the universal recognition of the truth of the dictum " I am He" (sôbam).

(a) God (Brahman).

If knowledge be rightly conceived as the knowledge of God, we ought to inquire, who is God ?. To Yajnavalkya God is the Deity (devata), the Unity (advaita), the Thoology. Light, the Divine, the Knowledge, the Bliss, the Immortality. The Deity is the first root, the first cause, the principle of all motion, the reason for all change, tho creator (visvakrit), the protector (bhuta-pala) the undecaying one (aksara), at whose command heaven and earth stand apart, at whose command the rivers flow, and by whose ordination men praise the charitable, the gods follow the sacrificer, and the fathers love the darvi-offering.' In the imperishable one there is nothing either rough or refined, short or long, red or white. The Divine is without shadow, without darkness, without air, ether, toughness (touch), taste, smell, eyes, ears, speech, mind, breath, and yet the Divine is the life of life, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, the mind of the mind.8 The immortal is immeasurable, has no within or without.4 God is undecaying time, is eternity : He is one, one only without a second. Brahman is Being (sat), the most real of all things real. The Brahma-world is the realm of absolute existence. But Brahman is also tyad, that which emanates from Being. The nature of Brahman is eternally free,-free from all fear, doubt,

1 Brihad Aranyaka Upanigad, III, 5. 1. ! Ibid, III. 8.9, # Jbid, IV. 4. 18. Ibid, III. 8.8. # Ibid, IV.4. 16.

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delusion, ignorance, hunger, thirst, sorrow, pain, decay and death. That is to say, Brahman is pure knowledge, pure bliss, pure immortality. Moreover, the Divine essence is one (eka). Therefore the diversity of things finda its best explanation in this unity of cause. If experience brings home that the prin- ciple of life (prana, spirit) animates a living body, a tree, for instance, that principle itself requires an explanation, and the explanation is in God, and not in Matter, because apart from God Matter is altogether lifeless. The Divine is besides all- embracing in its nature, like an ocean, all finite things are contained within its infinity, all small things within its great- ness. In the Deity there is nothing passive, no imperfection, and accordingly no idea of Matter attaches to him. God is immanent (antaryamin), for he is in all things, as all things are in him. God is transcendent, for he is above all duality, all plurality, all inorease and decrease,1 all that is material. Lastly, God is a pure activity of thought : "Unseen, but seeing; unheard, but hearing; unperceived, but perceiv- ing; unknown, but knowing." Like Locke's Substance, Yajfavalkya's conception of God is a bundle of negations. All predications therefore that one may reasonably make about God are negative, God is unknowable by a finite mind. How No No (neti neti)," neither this nor that. This to know God P view being logically worked out, comes to this. The infinite is beyond the comprehension of a finite mind. It is therefore only an infinite mind, a mind without any idea of the many or plurality,4 that can indeed comprehend the infinite. There is only this one way of apprehending the eternal Being that can never be proved" or measured, namely, to know that it is pure, beyond ether or space, the unborn one,

1 Brihor Aranyaka Upaniad, IV. 4. 28. Ibid, III. 7.23; 1II. 8. 11, S. B. B., XV, pp. 136, 188. = Tbid, IV. 4. 20. 4 Ibid, IV. 419 manasaivānudrastavyam nēha nānāati kimenna. Op. Katha Upanigad, IY. 10-11. . Aprameyam, ibid, IV, 4, 20.

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great and immutable.1 This implies a negative way of know- ing God, namely, not to indulge in many words, "for that is mere weariness of the tongue."" But we must know God, because without a knowledge of him, we know really nothing. We must know God, because when weknow God, nothing more remains Necessity of & knowledge of God to be known. We shall know God, because he is that perfoct model of knowledge, bliss and immortality which the mind may copy, in order to complete our knowledge, to perfect our conduct, to confirm our faith, to stimulate our charitable feeling, to increase our joy, and to save us from death. In other words, we shall know God, because he is not only the first, but also the best (prathamottama)-he ie the end. The end is, as we saw, threefold,-knowledge, bliss and immortality. With Yajnavalkya, too, knowledge is first, for without knowledge life is of no use. If the good be such, it would further follow that we must know God, because no one desires to be in doubt, to be ignorant, unhappy, and mortal. But how shall we know him? First, as Mahidasa and Aris- totle did : God is the pure activity of thought; and secondly, as Uddalaka did : The Deity is one, one only, without a second. Above all, we must recognise with Yajnavalkya this dictum: "I am He " (Sôham).

(b) The Soul (atma). Like his conception of God, Yajñavalkya's conception

Life and Soul. of soul is a synthesis of the speculations of previous thinkers, and yet not without an original stamp of its own. In agreement with the earlier thinkers, and also to a certain extent, with his contem- porary Ajātaśatru, Yajnavalkya radically distinguished, in one sense at all events, Prajna, the intelligent principle, from

1 Virajub parā škasād aja timā mabān dbruvab. : Brihad Āranyaka, IV. 4. 21,

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Prana, spirit, breath, the principle of life. Life is called Sarīra, the embodied soul,-a term corresponding to jīvātmā, the living principle. Life or the embodied soul is compared by an earlier thinker to "a horse attached to a cart."! Life is joined to the body, just as a horse is yoked to a cart. This means that Life is in its nature something totally different and accordingly separable from the body. Life is the essential form of the soul. That is to say, apart from the conscious activities, the soul is just this principle of Life. Ajātasatru maintained, as we saw, that Prajña is in life, just as a razor is fitted in a razor case, or as fire in the arani wood.' In the language of Yājñavalkya, Life is sur- mounted by, loaded with, Prajña vovs, 8 And we may put it thus: the soul is something superadded to Life. With Yajña- valkya, the fundamental fact is this Life, the embodied soul, and the soul in the strict sense is a pure mass of con- sciousness (vijñana ghana),+ the intelligible essence of a living body, and also, as we might express it, a pure activity of thought. Together with Prana and Prajna, Yajnavalkya inherits from the past the conceptions of Purusa, the incorporeal reflex or shadowy double of the corporeal, the immortal essence of the mortal, the immaterial soul in the material body. The pupil of the eye may be taken as a visible pattern of this soul, the divine person. As we observed in connexion with Balaki and Ajatasatru, some of the thinkers of the post-Vedic period did not succeed, in spite of their great wealth of philosophi- An animistic no- tion of soul. cal abstractions, in getting rid of a partly animistic and partly poetic notion of the soul, But when we seriously inquire into the-root of such a notion, we can discover that nothing but their defective

1 Ohandogya Upanişad, VIII, 12. 3. : Kanşītaki Upanişad, IV. 20. * Bpihad Aranyake Upanignd, IV. 4. 35. * Ibid, IV. 5. 18.

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physiological knowledge is accountable for it. Just as there is a person, the seer, in the eye, so there is a person in every organ of sense, in every particle of marrow, in every living cell. Thus the soul is the seer, while the eye is the instrument of seeing; the soul is the speaker, the tongue is the instru- ment of speaking; the soul is the hearer, the ear is the instru- ment of hearing; the soul is the thinker, the mind is to it the Divine vision.1 In other words, the soul is the life of life, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear, the mind of the mind.8 The Divine person, whose breath is life, body is intelligence, form is light, and the eye is the mind, is conceived as the master of a house, the ruler of all.3 This person is the same as that in the dise of the sun, It is sometimes compared to a tiny, lonely bird (hamsa), which, like Wordsworth's skylark, soars up, during sleep (susupti), into the ethereal region of eternal light, and descends, when the sleep is over, to its lower nest,4 this material world, the perishable body. The ethereal region of eternal light is the heart (hridaya) " which is also conceived as the city of Brahman (Brahma- pura).' In this city there are two lakes, Ara and Nya. There is a third lake called Airammadiya between these two. There is in the city of Brahman an asvattha tree which showers down soma, and there is in this third lake a lotus which is the seat of Brahman. The city of Brahman is unconquerable (aparajita), and the hall of Brahman is built by Prabhu or Vibhu. This account of the city of Brahman occurs in the Chandogya Upanisad,7 and recurs with some variations in the

' Chandogya Upauişud, VIII. 18. 4.5. a Brihad Aranyaka Upanigad, IV. 4. 18. # Ibid, IV. 4. 22. * Ibid, IV. 8. 12. " Chandogya Upanişnd, VIIT, 3. 8, * Of. Leibnitz'a "Oity of God " as distingnished from St. Augustine's civitas Dei, The Monadology (R. Latta'a translation), p. 267. ' Chandogya Upanişad, VIII. 5, 8. 22

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language of Gargyayaņa.1 Yajnavalkya himself alludes to a playground' (arama), and affirms: one may see the playground of soul, the Divine person, but never itself. This means that soul is incorporoal or immaterial. Now to return to the simile of the bird. During sound sleep, when all sensations cease, and all fancies, foolish imaginings, and representative cognitions of the mind are over, Soul, the lonely bird, The theory of sleep. living in the cavity of the heart, rises above the material, gets beyond the sensuous, and moves about in serenity (samprasada) in the ethercal region of eternal light, assuming its true form, singing its own music, viewing its own vision, hearing its own voice, smelling its own scent, enjoying its own bliss, thinking its own thought. Hitherto the soul is unconscious (asamjñi), in the sense that it is above all duality, i. e., not conscious of anything material, conditional, perishable, painful, and delusive. But immediately after the sleep is over, the soul awakes, becomes conscious (samjñana), and then, as the master of the house, it commands all the members, the senses, to awake and arise. This latter function of the soul was described by Mahidāsa as commanding (ajñāna) .* The communica- tion is the easiest possible. For the arteries, capillaries, veins, and also perhaps nerves extend from the heart towards all parts of the body, even to the very hairs and nails." With the awakening of ihe cognitive consciousness (vijñana), all previous cognitions, sense-perceptions, motor-activity and actions, and also the reminiscence or past impressions (pūrva- prajña) overtake the soul. The soul then becomes, in the language of Mahīdāsa, prajñāna."

1 Kansitaki Upanigad, 1. 3. " Brihad Āraņyaka Opanisad, IV. 8. 14. Toad, IV. 8. 15-30. * Aitareya Āranyaka, 1I 6. 8. * Bribad Aranyaka Upanignd, IV. 3. 20. * Ibia, IV. 8. 0.

YĀJÑAVALKYA 171

Yajnavalkya broadly conceivos three states of the soul, Waking, dream and corresponding to three worlds. The three aleep compared to birth, last moment states are the waking state (jagrat), and death. that of dream (svapna), and that of sleep (sușupti). The three worlds are enumerated as this world, the intermediate world, and the world beyond.1 The connexion or continuity of these three states, and of these three worlds is songht in the life of the soul. Yajnavalkya accepis and explains this expression of an unknown but earlier thinker': The soul is a bank and a boundary." The soul is a bank and a boundary. Yajnavalkya's interpre- tation of this dictum is very simple. Just as a fish swims along two banks of a river, so does the soul move along the two states-slecping and waking .* Or, as a falcon or any other bird, aftor it has roamed about in the air, becomes tired, and folding its wings, descends to its nest, ao does the Soul hasten from the waking state to slecping. Between these two states there is an intermediate state, the dreaming." In the waking state, the soul becomes united with all evils, senses, desires, and all the rest, in fact, works under conditions foreign to its nature." When in the intermediate state, the soul finds itself in between Dreaming. the waking state and sleeping.7 Indeed, the dreaming soul moves along these two states, ' as if thinking, as if moving.' Going up and down in its dream, the soul imagines manifold shapes for itself, either rejoicing with women, or laughing with friends, or witnessing

Ohandogya Upanisnd, VIII. 4. 1 9 Setn = litorally, bridge, embnnkment. Bank is the rendering of Max Muller. Maryādő. 3 Samjnšnam anvavnkmmati sa eşa jnnb savijfiano bhavati (MAdhynndinn reading). Ibid, 4,2. * Brihad Arnnyaka Upanignd, IV. 3. 18. " Ibid, IV. 3. 19. @ Ibid, IV. 3.8 ? Ibid, TV. 3, 9. * Ibid, IV.3. 7.

172 PRE-BUDDHISTIO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

terrific sights.1 The soul is then out from the chamber of the heart for sport, and passes along the arteries, capillaries, veins, and also perhaps nerves, connecting the heart with various organs of sense. Now while dreaming, the soul sees, as if, some one kills it, some one overpowers it, as if, an elephant chases it, as if it falls into a well.2 All these are the mere fancies, the vain imaginings of the soul, due to ignorance (avidya), or, as we now say, due to hallucina- tion and illusion of the mind. Here Yajnavalkya shows a genuine psychological insight, when he admits that the soul fancies in dream only that fear which it sees in waking." This is in accord with a current, earlier view to which Yajnavalkya refers elsewhere, provided that we may sup- pose Yajnavalkya to have used the word " asleep " (supta) in that passage rather loosely, in the sense of one who is dreaming. Dr. Deussen translates the passage thus : "There- fore it is sard : It (sleep) is to him a place of waking only, for what he sees waking, the same he sees in sleep. Thus this spirit serves there for his own light." Dr. Roer and Prof. Max Müller take, in agreement, with Sankara and Dvivedaganga, altogether a different view. According to them, the passage implies a very serious contention on the part of Yajñavalkya : the sleeping state is not the same as that of waking, for the soul, when asleep, becomes self-illuminated.8 That the passage does or does not imply a contention on the part of Yajnavalkya depends on the sense in which he employs the word " asleep " (supta). If it is meant in the sense of one who is dreaming, there is no ground for dispute ;

Brihad Arayaka Upanişad, IV. 8. 12, * Ibid, IV, 8. 20, Ibid, IV. 3. 20; yad eva jagred bhayam patyati tad atravidyayā manyate, + Ibid, IV. 3. 14; jagaritn defa evăsyaișa iti yāni hyêvn jograt padyati tāni mupta ityAtruyami purugah svayarjyotir bhavati." * " Vedanta," p. 206. See fer Sankara's interprotation-S. B. E., XV, p. 165, f. n. 8.

YAJNAVALKYA 173

and if in the sense of one who is sleeping, as distinguished from dreaming, i.e., imagining only what is experienced in waking, then there is ground for dispute. It may well be, as Dr. Deussen seems to think, that Yajnavalkya cited this older view simply in support of his own opinion. In fact, the point which goes on the side of Deussen, and contrary to Max Muller's view, is that Yajnavalkya repeats the same view on his own account. The soul fancies in dream that fear which it experiences in waking. But there is again a point which goes against Dr. Deussen. For, evidently, Yajñavalkya is not ready to admit that the mere imagining of & fear which has been previously experienced in waking completes the function of dreaming. In dreaming, according to Yajña- valkya, the souldisplays something more than such an imagina- tion, something of a prophetic vision,' that is Dreams may be pro- phetic. to say, something relating to, and determining the nature of its future career ; imagination is not only reproductive, but also productive. This vision comes to the soul with the dawn of the consciousness (prajñana) .- T am this or that,-a god or a king. With the dawn of such a consciousness dreaming is over and sleeping begins. The soul is then fully awareof itself, reaches the highest world (parama loka),' assumes its true form (rupam), becomes in the language of an earlier thinker the best soul (uitama purusa).8 The sleeping state (susupti) is the end of dreaming

Sleeping. (svapnanta), and is a state between the end of dreaming and the state of waking (buddhanta) .* In this sleeping state, the soul transcends all that is material, fanciful, terrifying and painful, and becomes whole (samasta), and serene (samprasanna),"

2 Brihad Aranyaka Upanigad, IV. 8. 20. * Ohandogya Upanigad, VIII. 12. 3. Bşihad Āraņyaka Upazigad, IV 8. 18. 4 Ohāndogya Dpanişad, VIIL 11. 1. " Ia, cf. Thibaut's " Vedantasutias," III. 2. 4; K. O. Bhaltacharyya's " Studies in Vedantism," chapter on " Approach through prychology ;" ef. Thera Naganena's theories

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and self-illuminated. Embraced by its self-consciousness, as though by a beloved wife, the soul knows nothing that is within, nothing that is without. Thus transcending all duality, and reaching this unity with itself, the soul thinks upon its own thought, sees its own vision, hears its own voice, smells its own scent, tasies its own bliss.1 Blissful indeed is this sleeping state, when the soul becomes immortal, of an immaterial nature as it is. Now, just as a dreaming state precedes sleeping, in the same way a dreaming state prevails on the eve of death. Besides, just as during sleep all Death and after. sensations cease so at death. Hence, to all appearance, death is the same as the state of dreaming (and partly that of sleeping), and re-birth is the same as the state of waking. Thus to complete the analogy, this world is the state of waking, the intermediate world is the state of dream- ing, and the next world is the state of slecping. We do not know whether Yajñavalkya cared to study, like Badhva,2 the premonitory symptoms of death. He thought that at death the soul recollects A psychological theo- ry of denth and re- all that it has known and done in this life, birth. and according to its knowledge and action, a consciousness dawns upon the mind: I am a father, or a Gandharva, or a God, or a Prajapati, or a Brahman. With this consciousness settled upon the mind, the soul departs, mounted on spirit (prana), retaining in some mysterious way the reminiscences or impressions of the past (pūrva- prajña).8 Here Yajnavalkya's idea of soul is thoroughly Platonio.

of dreams in the Milinda.patiho, pp. 208-800 (Bhys Davida' translation, ii, pp. 159-61). See also Shwe Zan Aung's Introdnetory Essay in the Compondinm of Philosophy, P. T.S., 1910, pp. 48-49. 1 Brihad Āraņyaka Upanigad, IV. 3. 18, ff. * Aitareya Aranyaka, IJI. 2. 7-17. " Brihad Aranyaka Upanigad, IV. 4. 2. The Madhyandina recension reads : samjnanam anvavakramati so oşn jinh anvijnRnn hhavnti. The KEpvas read : savijoano bhavati, savijffnam evânvavakramati.

YĀJÑAVALKYA 175

Sandilya left behind him this dictum: A man is a creature of will. As is his will in this world, so will he be hereafter.' A passage in the Chāndogya Upanișad2 adds, with clear consciousness, a new element-desire (kama). And now Yajnavalkya introduces a third element-action (karma), and completely works out the view thus: A man is of desire. As is his desire, so is his will. As is his will, so is his action. And as he acts, so he attains. To put it otherwise, a man attains with his action the object to which his mind is attached. And after having enjoyed the full benefit of his deeds, he returns again from that world to this world of action. Although the soul is never born in the sense of becoming, a bad soul is bound to embody itself, owing to the inflexible law of action (karma). Karma draws the The effecl of the law of action upon the soul back into a new corporeality. In the soul. language of Yajñavalkya, "as a grass-leech" after having reached the end of a blade of grass, and after having made another approach (to another blade), draws itself together towards it, thus does this self, after having thrown off this body and dispelled all ignorance, and after making another approach (to another body), draws himself together towards it. And as a goldsmith, taking a piece of gold, turns it into another, newer and more beautiful shape, so does this self, after having thrown off this body and dispelled all ignorance, make unto himself another, newer and more beautiful shape, whether it be like the Fathers, or like the Gandharvas . . . or like Brahman, or like other beings."4

1 Chandogya Upanişad, III, 14. 1. kratumayah puruşo: yathā kratur oamin loke puruşo bhavati tathetah pretya bhavati. Ibid, VII. 2. 1-9. 3 Prof. Max Muller translates trinu-jalayuka as caterpillar, which does not seem to be correct. Thongh the St. Petereburg Dictionary and Monier Williams in his latest edition, translate the term as caterpillar, this is not the geometer caterpillar so well known in Burope, the German Spannruupe, but a leech, moving in a somewhat similar way and familiar to visitora of the northern hilla in the rainy season. * Brihad Āranyaka Upanigad, iv. 4. 3-4

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It is conceivable that even a bad soul remains for a time totally unconscious or forgetful of this world of action. But with its awakening from a slumber of death (samjfana), the soul becomes conscious of a tendency to rebirth (savijñanah bhavati). And with it, the potentiality of action, and the reminiscences or impressions of the past overtake the soul. Thus it returns to this world. " And as policemen, magis- trates, equerries, and governors wait for a king who is coming back, with food and drink," so do all the elements wait on the soul when it returns.1 The oase of a good soul (uttama purusa) is however differ- ent. As it is above all desires for sons or wealth or worlds, and having no other desire but for itself, karma cannot touch it, the law of action can exert no influence upon it. Con- sequently, the soul being Brahman, goes to Brahman beyond ether. Thus the mortal becomes immortal indeed.2 Here we must point out that, for Yajñavalkya, as for Mahidasa and Aristotle, the immortality of soul does not mean corporeality or individuality, but simply immateriality. The soul is, therefore, in a sense, mortal or immortal as the body in which it is. In truth, there is an expression of Yajñavalkya's which is utterly irreconcilable with his general theory of re-birth. The expression is: The soul, con- ceived as a pure mass of consciousness (vijnana-ghana), rises out from the elements, and perishes on their dissolation. (It may be in the sense, as Prof. Max Müller suggests, that it "vanishes into them"-tanyevanu-vinasyati.) And after death there is no more consciousness, In the opinion of two later critics, Śrlanka8 and Madha- vācārya*, Yajnavalkya laid in this expression the foundation of materialism. The expression occurs in the dialogue be- tween Yajñavalkya and his wife Maitreyi, referred to above.

1 Brihad Åranyaka Upariçad, IV. $ 38. * Ibid. IV. 4 7, * Sītrakritāūga (ed, Dhanapati), pp. 290; Serradarionasengraha, p. 2.

YAJNAVALKYA 177

This dialogue shows that even Maitreyi was utterly bewildered at such an utterance on the part of her husband. Yajnavalkya offered to her this explanation :1 The soul is of an imperish- able, indestructible nature. And yet the soul Karma and Matorial- ism. must be said to be unconscious after death, in the sense that it transcends then all duality, that is to say, rises above all material conditions, and is, therefore, unaffected by the fate of a living body. It is not unlikely that some such idea is referred to and criticised by Buddha in the Brahmajala and several other Suttas under the types of eschatalogical views: "After death the untouched soul (arogi atta) is unconscious."" This corresponds exactly to Yajnavalkya's expression-pretya samjñā nāsti. Nevertheless, the great philosopher himself seems to haye felt more than once the difficulty of maintaining his theory of rebirth or doctrine of karma in the face of all overpowering physical laws. This point is well brought out in a dialogue in the Brihad Aranyaka Upanisad.3 A thinker named Artabhaga says to Yajñavalkya, "If the speech of a dead man passes into fire, breath into air, ......... the blood and seed are deposited in water, where is then the soul?" Yajnavalkya thereupon says, "This question is not to be discussed in public." The point which they discussed, we are told, was the mysterious effect of Karma.

(c) The Mind (Mamas). As with some of the earlier thinkers, so with Yajna valkya, the mind is the Divine thinking in the soul. If the soul can

1 According to Prof. L. D. Barnett, Yajfavallyn's exprossion is that of a materialist, but the argument is that of an idealist. According to Sankara's interpretation, Yajnavalkya meant only the dissolution of the limiting adjuncts (the mind, intellect, eta) of the sopl, but not the dissolation of the soul itself. Of. Vedanta-Sutras TI. 8. 17.

JI. 2. 18. 23

178 PRE-BUDDIISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

act at all, it acts in and through the mind. It is only in the power of an infinite mind to apprehend the Mind is the Divine thinking in man. absolute. Indeed, we may say that, as regards the realm of change, the mind is the soul. The soul is an ever active mind. It, therefore, always thinks, wills or feels. But as there cannot be thinking without an object to think upon, the mind thinks, in the absence of any other object, upon itself. Strictly, the best soul is nothing but this thinking upon thought. Sense-perception and the higher functions of the mind are not different in kind; all are in various degrees the same thinking upon thought. Yajnavalkya accepts in his system Mahidasa's three-fold division of the functions of mind into sense-perception and the functions of heart and mind. The senses and The sonsos and ob- jects. objects are conceived as the seizer (graha) and the seized. Yajñavalkya conceded to Uddā- laka that by the organ of vision we can only perceive the sensation of colour. The testimony of the senses is in general untrustworthy. The true knowledge is in the heart. The following is the enumeration of subjects and objects: Skin and touch; tongue and taste; nose and smell; eye and sight; ear and sound; mind and concepts (sankalpa); heart and knowledge (vidya); hands and action; organ and delight; anus and excretion ; legs and locomotion.1

(d) Matter (Rupa). In agreement with his predecessor Uddālaka Āruņi, Yājña- valkya allows no difference of kind between mind or spirit on the one hand, and matter on the other. No difference of kind between Mind and For, according to his view, matter is in Matter, various degrees the manifestation of the same Actus Purus, the endless activity of thought. Matter consists

1 Brihad Aranyaka Upanisad, IV. 5, 12.

YĀJNAVALKYA 179

of the clements (bhutani), of which the number is nowhere given. In one passage,' he speaks apparently of these four elements: earth, water, air, and (heated) ether (akasa). But fire, too, is referred to elsewhere. As Yajnavalkya seems to have thought, the extension of earth, the flow of water, the motion of air, the burning of fire, the flash of lightning, all these natural phenomena which are of daily occurrence are activities, the same in kind as the higher vital and psychical functions. Like Uddālaka and other earlier thinkers, Yajnavalkya had to recognise the presence of two distinct elements, mas- culine and femininc, ' in the phantasmagoria of nature. Of these, the masouline element is called spirit (prana) or the

The correlation be- psychical principle,-soul (atma), and the tween sonl and mat. feminine element constitutes matter, the ter. principle of passivity, the substratum of change. The existence of spirit is not dependent on material conditions. But in order to create individuality, the soul is bound to unite with matter. Matter supplies the soul with nutrition.3 As matter supplies the soul with nutrition, so the soul transforms matter into various types of existence, in the same way that a goldsmith fashions a piece of gold into various shapes .* In passage of the Brahmajala Sutta,' Buddha gives an analysis of the current views of his time on the finiteness or infinity of the world. He reckons them as four in number, and catalogues them all under the name Antanantika-Vada. Elsewhere he enumerates them under Loka-cinta (Thoughts regarding the world of existence). In the Sthananga (IV. 4), as Dr. Schrader points out, Mahavira calls them Mita-vada.

' Brihad Āranyaka Upaniod, IV. 4 5. : Ibid, I. 4. 8. Ibid, IV. 8. 87 (S. B. E.) Ibid, IV. 4. 4. Dīgha-nikāya, J, pp. 22-24. e, y. Anguttara nikāya, Vol. II, p. 80.

180 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPRY

The passage in the Brahmajala-sutta presupposes a few pas- sages in the Brihad Aranyaka Upanisad (III. 3; III. 6; TII. 8 ), the dialogue between Bhujyu Lahyāyani and Yajñaval-

Infinity and Anitenoss. kya, and that between Yajñavalkya and Gargi. The four views are stated by Buddha as follows :-- (1) Finite is the world, so that a boundary may be con- ceived round it, 1 (2) Infinite is the world, and limitless. (3) The world is limited above and below, but infinite across. (4) The world is neither finite nor infinite.2 Finite is the world, surrounded by a boundary. This re- minds us at once of a Pythagorean view put into the mouth of Yajnavalkya in a dialogue of the Brihad Aranyaka Upanişad (III. 3.). Lāhyāyani, the interlocutor of the dialogue, asked Yajavalkya: What are the ends or limits of the worlds (lokanam anta)? and where are gone the Pārīkșitas ? (an old royal family, who are believed to have disappeared from the face of the earth). Yajnavalkya said in reply: "Thirty- two journeys of the car of the sun is this world, " * that is to say, the boundary of this world is equal to thirty-two times the orbit of the sun. It is surrounded + on all sides by Pri- thivi (Extension, the boundary of the formed Universe P), twice as large. Prithivi is surrounded on all sides by the Ocean (samudra=varuna), twice as large. The space between the zone of Pyithivi and that of the Ocean hardly exceeds the edge of a razor or the wing of a mosquito. This space is filled with air (vayu). The Pariksitas are gone there where people go who have performed a horse sacrifice, i.e., to the region of Air. I "antavi ayam loko, parivațamo." Rhys Davids translates parivatumo by "so that & path ean be traced round it. $ Dial., B. II, p. 360. * Max Muller's translation of "dvatrimsst vai devarathanhyānvayam lokah." paryeti=literally, surrounds; op. parivatumo, Digha-nikaya, I, 23.

YĀJNAVALKYA 181

This doctrine does not seem to be an integral part of Yajnavalkya's system. Besides, the passage in which the doctrine is set out is corrupt. But the doctrine has some historical connexion with Uddalaka, who, like Pythagoras, divided the formed universe into the three regions (Trivrit) of Fire, Water, and Earth.1 (Infinite is the world, and without limit. This view is opposed to that which is disoussed above.) The world is limited above and below, but infinite across. This reminds us of the views of Gargi Vacaknavi and Yajña- valkya, as set out in two dialogues of the Brihad Aranyaka Upanişad (III. 6; III. 8.). In the first of these dialogues, the clever Gargi lays down a proposition which is fully work- ed out by Yajnavalkya: Everything on this earth 'is woven, like warp and woof' (ota-prota) in water. The view is briefly put thus in the second dialogue: In space or ether (akāsa = aditi, aregov) is 'woven, like warp and woof,' all that is 'ahove the heavens, beneath the earth, embracing heaven and earth, past, present, and future' (bhūta, bhava, bhavisya). And space or ether is woven in like manner in Brahman, the Imperishable One (Akşara).

Chēndogya Upanisad, V1. 2.

CHAPTER XII

SUPPLEMENTARY DISCUSSIONS.

In closing the history of post-Vedic philosophy with Yājñavalkya it is necessary to draw the reader's attention to a few Upanisads dealing more synthetically as well as syste- matically certain aspects of post-Vedic philosophy, as also to a Chandogya Dialogue which may be said to serve the purpose of a glossary to the philosophical views hitherto considered., These are highly important as indicating the possibility of an internal chronology of the Upanisad litera- ture, taken as a whole. The Upanisads under reference are the Mandūkya, the Subala and the Paingala, to leave out of account the Arunika and the Yajnavalkya which inculcate the duties and ideals of recluse life, The dialogue forms the seventh chapter of the Chandogya Upanisad, and it appears to embrace in its terminology a compendium, so to say, of post-Vedic philosophy. Here we shall be content with mentioning only some salient features of these Upanişads and the Dialoguel 1. Māndukya .- The Upanişad of this name seems to belong to the same age as the Mundaka, the Katha, etc., and probably it embodies, like them, the views of a school of wanderers which went by that name, It remains to be seen whether the Māndukya was derived from a Paribbajaka teacher who is described in the Majjhima Nikāya1 as Samaņa Mandika-putta or Recluse who was the son of Mandikā. The most notable point in the teaching of this Upanisad, considered apart from the Gaudapada-Karika, is that instead of the three states of consciousness, recognised by Yajñavalkya

1 Majjhima, II, 24. p,

SUPPLEMENTARY DISCUSSIONS 183

and other previous thinkers, it speaks of four planes (catuspada), viz. :- (i) Jagarita-sthana or waking plane, corresponding to Yajnavalkya's waking state (jagrat). (ii) Svapna-sthana or dreaming plane, corresponding to Yajñavalkya's dreaming state (svapna). (iie) Suşupta-sthana or sleeping plane, corresponding to Yajnavalkya's end of dreaming state (svapnanta) which is not separately counted as a stale by itself but considered as the sleeping state in its inception. (iv) The fourth plane, dosignated in the later Upanisads as Turiya, which corresponds to Snsupti proper in Yajña- valkya's phraseology. Though the Mandukya has no claim to originality, the conception of four planes being distinetly implied in Yājña- valkya's definition of threc states, its treatment of the subject is douhly significant in history, first, that it made clear and definite what was vague and indefinite in earlier thought, and secondly, that it shows an advancement in mystical perception of reality. No less remarkable is the faot that the Mandukya definition of four planes was a fruitful synthe- sis of Yajnavalkya's psychological doctrine of three states and Varuņa's pañcakoșa doctrine : (i) Annamaya and Pranamaya souls coming under the Māņdukya's waking plane. (ii) Manomaya under the dreaming. (iii) Vijñanamaya under the sleeping. (iv) Anandamaya under the fourth. Buddha's representation of the Taittiriya doctrine in the Brahmajala Sutta precisely follows the Mandukya line. Further, we need hardly mention that the Mandukya concep- tion of four planes of consciousness is closely connected with the Buddhist discrimination of four planes, kamavaoara, rūpāvacara, arūpāvacara and lokuttara. The Māņdūkya conception also may be said to have afforded a basis for

184 PRE-BUDDIISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPIIY

the four-fold modes of meditation, analysed and amplified differently by the Jainas, the Buddhists and the Palanjalas. Buddha's conception of four kinds of food, material, sensuous, intellectual and so forth, also can be traced back to the Māņdūkya doctrine. 2. Subala .- This Upanisad, as its name implies, inculcates a religious ideal of ohild-like simplicity of outlook on life. Bālyena tisthūsed bala-svabhavo asango niravadyo.1 Like the Mandukya, the Subala, too, seems to embody the religious and philosophical views of a school of wanderers, and possibly those of the Mandukyas themselves, as may be surmisod from a Majjhima Discourse2 where the Buddha sharply criticises a similar view, ascribed to the wanderer Uggahamana, son of Samaņa-Mandika. Uggahamāna is said to have maintained that ' child is the very model of moral perfection (sampanna- kusala).' The Upanisad under reference seems to be later, in point of date, than the Chandogya, the Brihad Āranyaka, the Mundaka and the Katha, and even it may be post-Buddhistic. It is throughout an imaginary dialogue between Raikva and Prajapati. The chief interest of this work lies in its synthetic treatment of Vedic and post-Vedie philosophy, particularly of the teachings of the Purusa-Sukta and Purusavidha-brah- mana and the philosophical views of Uddālaka, Yajnavalkya, the Mundakas and the Gotamakas identified in Part III with the Kathas. The Subala upholds Yajnavalkya's theory of the reveal- ed character of Vedic literature and connects the same historically with the teachings of the Purusa-Sukta and Purușavidha Brahmaņa.ª It is important to note that in the Subala list of the Vedic texts and systems which are said to be breathed out or revealed by the Supreme Being, we have the mention of Nyaya, Mimamsa and Dharmasastras, replacing

I Subāla, 18. ' Majjhima, II, pp. 24-26, * Subola, 1-2.

SUPPLEMENTARY DISCUSSIONS 185

Sutras in the list of Yajnavalkya. This goes not only to prove that the Subala, as we now have it, is later than the Brihad Aranyaka containing the views of Yajnavalkya but also to indicate that the Nyaya, the Mimamsa and the Dharma- sastras as three separate systems of thought were but fruitful results of a gradual differentiation of the three aspects of one and same older system. The Subala is just one of the many Upanisads which furnish the historian with sufficient evi- dence to justify the hypothesis that like the Vedanta, the Samkhya-Yoga,1 an expression applied probably to the Samkhya, the Yoga, the Nyaya, the Vaisesika and the Mimamsa in their undifferentiated forms were developments out of the philosophy of the Upanisads. Yajnavalkya's expression balyena tisthati, which lent itself to different interpretations, is explained in the Subala as 'living with the child-like simplicity of outlook and purity of life, an ideal which a European writer, unacquainted with the history of Indian thought, would be easily tempted to attribute to the Christians, In interpreting the theory that something came out of nothing (asuto snt ajayata) we pointed out in connexion with "Prajapati" and " Brahmanaspati " hymns, as well as in con- nexion with Taittiriya philosophy, that the term nothing (a-sat) does not denotenothing in the abstract but the cosmic substance or first cause of the universe which is non-existent in the sense that it cannot be delined except by the negation of all predications applying to concrete things of experiencel The Subala fully corroborates our iuterpretation of the theory in a significant passage * which throws abundant light on the Mundaka view & of the prima causa. One must admit that Sankara's interpretation of the Mundaka view is similar to

Subāla, 9. - Ibia, 3. Mundaka, I. 6. 24

186 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

that in the Subala and it is not improbable that his interpreta- tion was actually based upon the Subala. Among other notable points the Subala will always be highly valued as indicating the process of the development of the conception of Nirvana in its Buddhistic as well as in the Gita sense out of and on the lines of Yajnavalkya's concep- tion of the Susupti state of soul. The Subala has no claim to originality of conception, and its chief interest lies in its application of the fundamental truths of post-Vedic philosophy to life. 3. Paingala .- It may turn out that the Upanisad of this name contains certain advanced philosophical views of Yajña- valkya, those which he formulated after his withdrawal from the world, i.e., during his Aranyaka life. This Upanisad, as we now have it, is composed of four separate dialogues between Yajnavalkya and Paingala of which the fourth seems to be in style much later than the first three. The future student of the Upanisads has to decide whether the Paingala borrowed from Sankara's Vedanta commentaries or Sankara borrowed from the Paingala. The point which is of importance to us is that the Upanisad clearly bears out our views that Uddalaka's conception of matter and of tripartite universe afforded a basis for the Sankhya conception of Prakriti, characterised by three qualities. 4. Chandogya Dialogue .- This forms the seventh chapter of the Chandogya Upanisad, and like the dialogue forming its eighth or last chapter, it differs by its imaginary character from other dialogues where wo feel throughout personal touches of the interlocutors. The dialogue under reference supplies us with a general glossary of philosophical terms and embraces in its terminology the entire philosophy. of post- Vedic period. The terms explained are logically connected and arranged in an ascending order of importance to human interests, though the logical sequence established between them does not seem to be a very happy one, when judged

SUPPLEMENTARY DISCUSSIONS 187

from our modern standpoint. It is diffcult for us to under- stand how water is more potent or important a factor than food, and food than strength, unless we study this termino- logical discussion in the light of Vedic and post-Vedic philosophy to which it applies. The terms explained are 23 in number, headed by Nama and ending with Bhuma: Nūma, Vak, Mana, Sankalpa, Citta, Dhyāna, Vijnāna, Bala, Anna, Āpa, Teja, Ākāsa, Smara, Asā, Prāna, Satya, Vijijnāsa, Mati, Śraddha, Nistha, Kriti, Sukha, and Bhuma, All these terms are explained in a pantheistic vein and in their practical and religious bearings. It will be going beyond our present purpose to enter into a detailed discussion of the terminology which is better suited for a separate treatise. It is enough to say that there are matters in this dialogue which throw light on the development of Logic, and ideas which were followed up and expanded in later popular literature.1

E.g., the ideas of Mans, Sankalpa and Oitta are found elaborated in the frat three chapters of the Dhammapada, and that of Ard in the Theragstha, vE. 530-582, the Mahs- vastu, III. p. 108.

PART III.

PHILOSOPHY BEFORE MAHAVIRA AND BUDDHA. (Circa 800-600 B.C.)

Introductory.

The title chosen for the third part had its origin in a well- known remark of Dr. Jacobi, who says:' "The records of the Buddhists and Jainas about the philosophical ideas cur- rent at the time of the Buddha and Mahavira, Origin of the title. meagre though they be, are of the greatest importance to the historian of that epoch. For they show us the ground on which, and the materials with which a religious reformer had to build his system.". In commenting upon this remark of Dr. Jacobi, Dr. Rhys Davids adds these words: "The philosophical and religious speculations contained in them (the Buddhist and Jaina records) may not have the originality or intrinsic value, either of the Vedanta or of Buddhism. But they are never- theless historically important because they give evidence of a stage less cultured, more animistic, that is to say, earlier. And incidentally they will undoubtedly be found, as the portions accessible already show, to contain a large number of important references to the ancient geography, the political divisions, the social and economic conditions of India at a period hitherto very imperfectly understood."! Throughout the Buddhist texts, earlier as well as later, there are numerous references to, and a number of direct and side attacks upon a body of six famous founders of schools,

1 Introduction, Jaina Sūtras, II, S. B. E., p. XXVII. " Baddhist India, pp. 183-164. See also Schrader's Ther den stand dor Indischen Philesophie zur zeit Mahaviras und Buddbas, Strassburg, 1902, for & useful claseifica- tiop of pre-Buddhistie philosophicnl notions,

PHILOSOPHY BEPORE MAHĀVĪRA AND BUDDHA 189

all opposed to the Buddhists.1 On the one hand, they are olassed by the Buddhists as the six Heretics or Sophists (cha titthiya). And on the other hand, they are The six Sophists. distinguished from Uddaka Ramaputta and Alara Kalama, who are recognised as the two successive teachers of the young ascetic Siddhattha. In all probability, the designation Sramana (recluse, religieur) which came into vogue at least as early as the time of Yajñavalkya was also applied to them-the titthiyas or Tirthankaras. Further, to all appearance, these teochers, whether Brahmans or not by birth, ' were in their general attitude as anti-Vedic and anti-Brahmanic as perhaps the Buddha himself. Indeed, Buddha often thought that he had been all along fighting and reconciling these two great oppo- nents-the Sramans on one side, and the Brahmans on the other. But the same may very well be said, positively, of Mahavira, and negatively, of Sanjaya the Sceptic. Now these six teachers are mentioned in the oldest Bud- dhist records (which are all in Pali) in this order: Pūrana Kassapa, Makkhali Gosāla, Ajita Kesa-Kambala, Pakudha- Kaccayana, Sañjaya Belatthaputta, Nigantha Nata-putta.8 Of them, the last-mentioned is identified by Profs. Jacobi and Hoernle (giving strong reasons on their side) with Mahavira, the founder of Jainism, or better, of Kiriya-vada-the doctrine of free-will activity, Dynamism. The title " Philosophy before Mahavira and Buddha " will show that we exclude, contrary to the Buddhist scheme, the name of Mahavira from the company of six Titthiyas. Besides the teachers above mentioned there Three orders of teachers : are others who represent a period of thought which is not precisely post-Vedic, but later than it, i.e., neo-Vedic. The oldest Jaina and Buddhist

: Sakya.puttiya-samanas. " Sutta-nipata, p. 79; " mundiipi hi idha ekacce brihmaņā bhavanti." " E.y., Dīgha-nikāya, I. 48-40.

190 PRE-BUDDHISTIO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

records, together with Panini's Aphorisms and Patañjali's commentary give, indeed, evidence of a continued existence of the old order of things at a time when many new orders have sprung up. Thus, for instance, in the Tevijja Sutta, Buddha says to Vasețtha (Vasistha): "The Brahmans of to-day chant over again or repeat (the mantra, sacred verses), intoning or reciting exactly as has been intoned or recited (hy the Risis of old)."1 Secondly, the levijja Sntta makes mention of the following Brahman schools as representatives of the post-Vedio order: the Aitareyas, the Taittiriyas, the Chandogyas, the ' Chandavas' and the Bahvricas.9 Lastly, the same Tevijja Sutta introduces us to "many very distinguished and wealthy " Brahmans of the neo-Vedio order, such as Kanki (Canki), Tārnkkha (Tārukşya), Pokkha- rasāti (Pușkarasādi),4 Jānussoņi (Jānaruti),5 Todeyya (Taudeya),4 and others. With the close of the post-Vedic period, we enter upon a third period which is so far removed from the ancient Vedio that people have begun to doubt if there is any longer a Risi (Brahmarsi, divinely favoured seer) among them. Apastamba in his Dharmasutra' states that no sages are born among the men of later ages.8 It is, then, merely by way of courtesy, or as a recognition of the worth of religion and Vedic learn. ing that Apastamba concedes to Svetaketu" and others the title of a Risi-like scholar (srutarși).10 Again, in a passage of - DiaL, B., II. 804. Of. Panini's list of Vedie Rigis, Aph. II. 4. 65- * Of. Panini's list, Aphs, IV. 3. 102, 209. 3 Aitareya Āraņyaka, III, 6 1-4, ete. * Āpaatamba, I 10, 28, 1; I, 6, 19, 7. 5 Of. Janagrnti Pautrāyana, Ohandogya Upanigad, IV, 2, 1. · Dial, B., Vol. II, pp. 300-801 ; Majjhima-nikāya No. 48-Sattanipāta, III. 9. Of. Paņini, IV. 3.94, " I. 2. 5. 4-5. * Bühler's Āpastamba, S. B. E., II, p XXXVII. · Son of Uddalaka Aruni, grandson of Aruga. 10 Åpastamba, T. 2, 5, 6.

PHILOSOPHY BEFORE MAHAVIRA AND BUDDHA 191

the Satapatha Brahmana,1 it is alleged that Svetaketu was a contemporary of Yajnavalkya. The last mentioned facts give some support to our assump- tion that Yajnavalkya is the great landmark between the post-Vedie period and the neo-Vedic and later ages. In the history of Indian literature the period with which we are deal- ing is unanimously called the Sutra period. In the history of Indian religions the same may be designated as the period of Sramans and Brahmans. And it is remarkable that Yajna- valkya, so far as we know, is the first among the post-Vedic thinkers to have called attention to Sramans. Besides the Śramans Yajnavalkya expressly refers to the Tapasas (Hermits). In point of fact, we regard the period in question as that which shows the germs, the beginnings of all that we find later. The most remarkable feature of Indian life at this period, which bears upon the progress of thought and the develop- ment of social life, is the existence of various orders of teachers, both Vedic and anti-Vedic. These orders represent differing groups or schools of thought. These groups may roughly be divided into either Sramans and Brahmans or Hermits and Wanderers. The following note of Professor Rhys Davids applies to the Hermits (Tapasas) in general: "In the Hermits. forests adjoining the settlements, the dis- ciples of the various schools, living & hermit life, occupied themselves, according to the various tendencies of the sobools to which they belonged, either in meditation or in sacrificial rites, or in practices of self-torture, or in repeating over to themselves, and in teaching to their pupils, the Suttas contain- ing the tenets of their school. Much time was spent in gathering fruits and roots for their sustenance ............ And there was difference of opinion, and of practice, as to the comparative importance attached to the learning of texts. 1 History of Anciont Sanakrit Literature, p. 421,

192 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

But the hermitages where the learning, or the repeating, of texts was unknown were the exceptions." 1 As regards the wanderers (parivrajakas) we can add little

Wanderers. to what Prof. Rhys Davids in his Buddhist India (pp. 141-160) has said concerning them. This important body or order of teachers was not known in India much before the rise of Buddhism. Apart from, and other than, the order of the Hermits, the institution of the wanderers was held in great respect throughout the country. Like the Greek Sophists, the Indian wanderers, too, differed in many respects, in attitude, opinion, intelligence, earnestness and purpose. As Professor Rhys Davids describes them, "They were teachers, or sophists, who spent eight or nine months of every yeara wandering about precisely with the object of engaging in conversational discussions' on matters of ethics and philosophy, nature-lore and mysticism." The system of education then prevalent in India demanded of every student, every learner, to travel, after he had finished his course under a certain teacher, or in a certain institution, in order to acquire experience, to better his conduct, to seek a more proficient teacher, to carry on learned discussions with others who were well-versed on the subject in which he was interested, in short, to further his own knowledge. There was no question raised as to rank, age, sex, or colour. He who was defeated or convinced in the discussion openly declared himself to be a disciple of the disputant who baffled him by his argument and superior wisdom. It is a generally accepted opinion that a spirit of toleration is one of the fundamental features of the religious life of India. As the existence of an institution, such as that of the wanderers, proves, this spirit of toleration was not confined to

1 Buddhist India, pp. 140-141. Also pp. 248.7, ' Bthler's Gautama III. 18: "He must not change his residonce during the rainy tason," cf. III. 21. * Vitaņda, Tarke, Nyāya, Mimkrn5.

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religion or matters of belief, but permeated also every depart- ment of life and thonght. Even we have instances where in the same family the members (as is now the case in Japan) were adherents of different schools and yet lived happily together. Now to turn to Indian philosophy, the neo-Vedic period was so far removed from the ancient Vedic that thinkers had in course of time ceased to feel the fascination of, and cherish admiration for, Vedic learning and Vedic rites. Some of the rightminded philosophers, with their later successors, were all ranged against the Vedic theologians, the Brahman priests. All of them agreed in viewing Vedic study in the light of not-knowledge or ignorance (avidya),' in estimating the four Vedas and the Vedie Sciences as the lower knowledge,' in

Anti-Vedio movement, teaching that the Self (atman) was not obtainable by the study of the Veda,' in holding that the three Vedas were subject to the three qualities (gunas4), in questioning the divine origin of the Vedas" and all efficacy of the sacrifices, funeral oblations, or the gifts to the priesthood, enjoined in the Vedas," and in stoutly maintaining that the obsorvance of moral precepts and the contemplation, knowledge, and realisation of the nature of Brahman were far superior to the performance of Vedie sacrifices, and the acquisition of Vedie learning .?

1-ª Muņdakôpanişad, I. 1. 4-6 : "apară vidyā." 3 lbid, III. 2. 8; Kathôpaniņad, I. 2. 23. Bhagavad-gita, II. 4. 5; "Traiganya visaya veda nistraigunyo bhavărjuna" Of. the Semkhya-k&rik#, 2. . " Na hyáptavado nnbhaso nipatanti." Vişņupuroņs. . The viewa of Ajita Keta-Kambalin, and of those of his school. Here is the summary of the Buddha's views on saorifices. The sacrifce performed with ghee, oll, butter, milk, honey, and augar only is better then that at which living crea- tures are slanghtered. Better than this mode of saorifice is chartty, espeolally that which is extended to holy and upright men Better still is the putting np of monasteries. But better than this is certainly the observance of moral precepts, And the best of all sacri. flces is the four fold meditation or philosophio contemplation. See Dial, B. II. 160-183. Of. Bhagavadgits, IV. 88 . "Śreyēn dravyamayat yajnaj jAtns-yajoah parantapnh"; Sebkara's Vivekacūdāmaņi, 2; The Jaina Uttaridhyayana Sūtra, XIV. 12,

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The history of such a revolt against the Vedic modes of learning and sacrifice goes back to ancient times. It can be traced, at least, as far back as the celebrated hymn on Frogs,1 which is hurled, according to Prof. Max Müller,' as a satire at the Vedic priest-hood, or better, at the system of hymn-chant- ing. But, as we saw, it was the school of thinkers called the Kavaseyas who were the first to raise this question: "Why should we repeat the Veda or offer this kind of sacrifice ps Their views were, later on, worked out by Pratardana .* In the meantime, Mahidasa asked himself this important ques- tion : $People say-Hymn, Hymn (uktha, uktha) ! But do they know what Hymn means ? " A little earlier than Pratar- dana's view, that like all ordinary works, the sacrificial obla- tions have an end, some unknown thinker felt himself bound to express this view : "What people call sacrifice (yajña),e that is really holy life (brahmacarya)."" Although the neo-Vedic period is so far removed from the ancient Vedic, the task of philosophy is not, as The end of philo- sophy not yet realised yet, accomplished. This fact is nowhere so olearly brought out as in the famous episode of Indra and Prajapati, contained in the Chandogya Upanișad.8 The gods deputed Indra to Prajapati to gain a knowledge of the Self,-Brahman the source of immortality and fearlessness. Indra lived with Prajapati as a pupil for thirty-two years. The first answer of Prajapati was : The body is the self (atma),- the immortal, fearless Brahman. Indra was satisfied in his heart for the time being. But on further reflection, his faith was shaken, and he began to think, if the body be the self or

3 Rigveda, VII. 168. ' History of Ancient Sanskrit literatnre, pp. 494 #. 3 Aitareya Aranyake, III. 2.6.8, * Kanşitaki Upanişad, II 5. · Aitareya Arapyaka, II. 1.2.1. * Chendogya Upanignd, III. 18.1 "Man ie sacrifce," 1 Ibid, VIII. 5.1. ' Jbid, VIII, 7-16,

PHILOSOPHY BEFORE MAHAVĪRA AND BUDDHA 195

the organism be the highest reality, where is then immor- tality ? So he came again as a pupil to Prajapati, and lived with him another thirty-two years. The second answer of Prajapati was-The dreaming, imagining mind is the Self,-the immortal, fearless Brahman. It satisfied Indra for the time being. But he began again to feel doubt. Though the dreaming, imagining mind is not entirely dependent on the body or affected by material condi- tions (like the senses), yet it is not altogether unconscious of pleasure and pain. If so, where is immortality'or fearlessness (amritam abhayam) ? The third answer given by Prajapati was-The soul, whole and serene in the state of dreamless sleep, is the Self,-the immortal, fearless Brahman. Indra remained content with it for a while. But further reflection led him to feel doubt. The soul in the state of dreamless sleep knows neither itself, nor other existent things (bhutani), It goes then into utter annihilation (vinasam evapito bhavati)1 If this be the case, there is no good in it. So he came again as a pupil to Praja- pati. This time Prajapati plainly told Indra that his know- ledge did not reach further. However, he asked Indra to stay another five years. Prajapati did not mean to express any further opinion, but just to offer an explanation (anuvyakhya) of that which he had said before. This episode poetically illustrates the fact that the thought of the post-Vedic period was troubled by the consciousness of failure in its quest of immortality and fearlessness (amritam, abhayam). Only the material or physical, or the mental or psychical had been assumed as the ultimate ground of immortality., The neo-Vedic thinkers sought, therefore, to ' See for the analysie of this Upanigad passage by the Buddha, first, the Potthapāda Sutta in the Digla-pikaya, I, p. 195 (Dial. B II. 259-260), and then, the Brahmajala Sutta, Dīghn-nikayn, I, p. 34 (Dial, B, II, pp. 46-49). See also D' Alwis's "Bnddhist Nirvana," p. 47; and Jacobi's Joina Satras, II, 238, 839. Note carefully why Buddhe catelogues the viewa under the name of Annihilationism (Uechedea, vindsam).

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establish it on the basis of puro metaphysics or logical abstraction. We must call attention here to the method adopted by

Method of srrange. Mahavira and Buddha in dealing with the ment. philosophies of the period. In contradistinc- tion to his own system called Kiriyam or Kiriyavada, Mahāvira, as his disciples tell us, broadly divided the philosophical views of his time into three groups-(1) Akiriyar, (2) Annanar, and (3) Vinayam.1 Buddha's division into (1) Sakkāya-ditthi, (2) Vicikiccha, and (3) Silabbatam' is almost identical, as we shall see, with that of his predecessor. According to this grouping, we propose to consider the teachers of the philo- sophies in question under these three heads-(1) Metaphy- sicians, (2) Soeptios, and (3) Moralists.

I. THE METAPHYSICTANS.

(Akriyāvadins.) By the term Akiriyam or Akriyavada Mahavīra understood a theory of life and existence, or any mode of speculation, which was in some way antagonistic to, or which did not fit well into, his own doctrine, rightly described as Kiriyam or Kriyavada- the doctrine of free-will activity, Dynamism.3 Kriyavada is otherwise called implicitly in the language of Mahavira,4 and explicitly in the language of Buddha," Kammavāda or the Doctrine of Action. Accordingly, the term Akiriyam may be held as equivalent to Akammavada or the Dootrine of

1 Uttaradhyayana Sutra, XVIII, 23 ; Sutrakritdiga, X. 12.4.t .; ete. * Ratana-Sutta; Dhammasangani, 1002 ; etc. * * Acohitti Kiriya-vadi vayanti, nacchitti Akiriyn-vāđiy& The Kriyāvādins speak of existence, whilo the Akriyaradins of non-existence." Quoting this verse from a canonical sonrce, Silanka says : Kriys Jivādi padšrthôstitytdikem vaditum sflam yeşām te Kriyāvādinah, Etad viparynstā Akriybvādinah. Lokāyatikab Sakyādayāi ca tesām &tmaiva niati kutas tat kriyū tajjanito va karmabandha iti," Sūtrakritinga (ed. Dhanapati), p. 456. ' Angottara-nikāya, I, p. 286.

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non-Action. As Suddharman, the chief disciple of Mahavira, expounds his master's view,1 the Akriyavadins or pure Meta- physicians teach the annihilation of good actions by denying the potentiality of Karma in future existence .. Referring obviously to the Mundakas, the Gautamakas, the Katyayanas, and others, Suddharman adds: They declare that the sun does not rise there (in the Brahma-world), nor does it set. The moon does not wax, nor does it wane. No rivers flow there, nor do any winds blow." The whole world is said to be barren, eternal and solid .? Just as a blind man, surrounded though he be with light, does not see objects because of his blindness,' so the Akriyavadins having a perverted intelleet (niruddhapanna), do not apprehend the laws of action, though they really exist4 In the Sthananga (IV. 4), Mahavira alludes to eight classes of thinkers all under the same name of the Akriyavadins, viz., (1) Ekkavadins or Monists, Theists, Monotheists; (2) Apikka- vadins or Pluralists; (3) Mitavadins or Extensionists; (4) Nimmitavadins or Cosmogonists; (5) Sayavadins or Sensualists ; (6) Samucchedavadins or Annihilationists; (7) Niyavadins or Eternalists; and (8) Na-santi-paralokavadins or Materialists. " In the Brahmajala Sutta (Dīgha-nikaya, I. 12-89), Buddha adopts almost the same method of classification. Omitting the Eel-wrigglers or Sceptics (Amara-vikkhepakas), Buddha mentions (1) Sassatavadins or Eternalists; (2) Ekacoa- sassatavadins or Semi-eternalists; (3) Antanantikas or Exten- sionists; (4) Adhicca-samuppannikas or Fortuitous Originists; (5) Uddham-aghatanikas or Eschatologists including Saññi- vadins, Asaññi-vadins, and Neva-sañni-nasañni-vadins ; 1 Sütrukritānga, I. 12 4. "Laviva samkiy& nnagnchi no kiriyam Rharhsn Akdriys- vadi." Snsaka wrongly interprots Lavire samkiyi as meaning the Loksyatas and the Sakays (Buddhists), and others. The expression lavâva sam-kiy& : laya eva satkriy&. * Of. Mundaka-Upanişad, II. 2. 10; Kutha, V. 16, Śvetâsvatara, VI. 14, Bhagavad Gitā, IX. 15 6. ' Katha Upanişad, I, 2. 13; Bhagavad Gītu, IT. 19-20, etc. * Muņdaka Upanişad, 1. 2. 8; Katha, II. 5. ' Schrader's Indischen Philosophie, pp. 54-57.

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(6) Ucchedavadins or Annihilationists; (7) Dittha-dhamma- nibbanavadins-the Sensualists or Positivistic Hedonists.1 Śīlanka in his Ācāranga-Țīkā (ed. Dhanapati, p. 14), gives the following six types of Akriyavada, each considered from two standpoints-subjective and objective (svatah, paratah). (1) Kāla-vāda ; (2) Īśvara-vāda ; (3) Ātma-vāda; (4) Niyati- vāda; (5) Svabhava-vada; and (6) Yadricchā-vāda. A similar classification can be traced in several older texts.2 The historical value of this mode of classification is very slight. Instead of enlightening us, it serves in many places only to confuse us. The terms sometimes overlap one another in their denotation, and are hardly used with precision of mean- ing. The significance is not at all clear, unless they are studied in constant reference to those individual thinkers to whose views they actually apply.

• Of. Kathsratthu-commentary, p. 6. - E.g., Sretafvatara Upanişad (I. 2) gives Kala-vada, Svabhāva-vāda, Niyati-vāda, Yadriocha-vado, Bhuta-vada, Puruşa.voda, und Isvara.voda. Afvaghomn in his Baundarănanda Kavya(XVI. 17) adds to these Prakriti-vuda; cf. Buddbacarita, IX. The text of Snirnta (ed. Onleutta, p. 256) refers also to Parinbma-vada. Of. Brihat-Sarahits, I. 7. The Maha- bodhi Jltaka (No. 528) gives them as Aheto.rsda, Issnra-korana-vāda, Pubbekata-vāda, Uochedo-vada, besides Khatta-vijja-vade; ef. tho samc in Aryafura's Jstakamāla. See aleo Anguttara-nikēyn, I, p. 173 f .; Sutrakritangu I. 12, II.

CHAPTER XIII.

THE DOCTRINE OF TIME.

(Kāla-vāda.) The Doctrine of Time, as set forth in the Atharva-veda, is restated in the Mahabharata more than once, and with some important variations indicative of its later development. The doctrine, so far as it can be traced, here and there, in the words of some of the post-Vedic thinkers, such as Badhva, Yajnavalkya, and others, may be said to have followed the lines of Aghamarsapa's hymn in the Rig-veda.1 Their expres- sion, be it remembered, like that of Aghamarsana, is not exactly Time (Kala) but rather tho Year (Samvatsara). It is of great historical importance to notice that the conception of post-ens (aparanta-kappana) or specula- tion concerning the future (aparantanuditthi)e plays no important part in the earliest types of Indian thought. No doubt, among the post-Vedic thinkers, many spoke of Prajapati as the Year. But Badhva was perhaps the first to maintain : The Great Person is the Year, which causes some beings to fall together, and causes others to grow up."s And Yajnaralkya only added that from Brahman the speechless Year revolved with the days.+ We have speculations of several .earlier thinkers, since Mahidasa, about the future of man. As regards the future of the world-system The earlier specula- tions were not much as a whole, it is merely implied in the hymn concerned with the future of the world. of " Paramesthin" that the generating principles, the elemental forces, the self- determined movement and the dynamic energy, from which

1 Rig-reda, X. 190. ' Dīgha-pikāya, I. 30; Dhammasabgaņi, 1820 Aitereya Aranyaka III. 2. 3. 7. (S. B. E, Vol. 1). + Brihad Aranyaka Upaniged, IV. 4, 16; " Yasmad arvāk sarvatsaro ...... pari- vartate,"

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the cosmos originates, reduce it, now and again, to a state of chaos or shapeless water.1 A vague notion of the recurrent cycles of change also prevails in the hymn of "Brahmanaspati," where we are told how the gods, raising the cosmic dust by dancing, and by a process of combination and separation, cause all existent things to spring from non- existence (Chaos), and how the visible Infinite with ber first-born seven sons goos to meet the primeval age of the gods, that is to say, Chaos or the real Infinite (Aditi)" With regard to the duration of the Cosmos, Mahidasa alone, among the post-Vedic thinkers, expressly said this : As long as the earth and fire, the firmament and air, the heaven and the sun, the quarters and the moon, or water and Varuna exist, so long the world does not decay.ª But he says nothing whatever regarding the recurrent cycles of change. As re- gards the future of man, Jaivali was the first to teach that travelling on the Southern road, the bad souls of those worldly men who followed the path of their ancestors, reached after their death the moon as the highest point, and returned thence, by a kind of gradual natural transformation or ascent and descent, to this earth, in order to pass through new cycles of mundane existence; while, travelling on the Nor- thern road, the good souls of those holy men who followed the path of the gods or divine philosophers, reached as far as the sun, or perhaps beyond the solar region, but returned no more to this dark spot which men call the eartb. From these passages, the conclusion is obvious. The con- ception of post-ens, or the speculation concerning the future of the world is far later than the Vedic period, but pre- Buddhistic and pre-Jaina. That is to say, the enveloping aspect of nature did not so much engage the attention of the earlier thinkers as her developing aspect.

1 Rig-veda, X. 129. 5. 9 Ibid, K. 72, 6-9. ' Aitareya Ārnnyaka, II. 1.7.

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If the Atharvana doctrine of time be closely examined, we hardly find any emphasis laid on the side of cessa- tion, destruction, dissolution, disappearance, or absorp- tion.1 Almost all that is said in the hymns of the Atharva- veda regarding time relates to its eternal exis- The Epic doctrine of Time contraated with tence, and its creative and ordaining power. the Atharvana. On tho other hand, the Epic doctrine of time seems to lay the whole stress on the destructive phase of nature; in other words, the optimism of earlier thought is overshadowed by the pessimistic gloom of later speculations. Moreover, the Atharvana doctrine of time is cosmological in its main conception, while the Epic doctrine is anthropologi- cal, being concerned chiefly with the fate, or the joy and sorrow, weal and woe, of the individual. The point in which the two doctrines show a resemblance to each other is that both are garbed in naive, poetic or unsystematic expressions. I. The Epic Doctrine of Time. A systematic exposition of the Epic doctrine of time is attempted, with considerable success, by Dr. Schrader.1 According to his exposition, time is conceived, in the Maha- bharata, under its various aspects, (1) As Dista or the Determined comprising the natural, and that which is willed by the individual. The life-term of living beings is called the determined, i.e., natural time.ª When the time-factor is brought into play by the will or act of man it is said to be willed by the individual.3 (2) As Daiva or the Fateful. The state of time, which prevails due to the works of the gods, demons, or such natural causes as cold, heat, rain, hunger, thirst, and disease, goes by the name of Daiva. The Daiva may be distinguished from the Dista as the non-human or super-human from the human (paurusa), the pre-destined or unforeseen from the foreseen, 1 Indisohen Philosophie, pp. 21-27. ' Atharva-voda, X. 3. 16 ; XII. 3. 55: "Pürs distāt pursyugah ; dietam nôtra jarase hi nesat." ' Mahabharaı, V. 77. 10: "yad anyad dista-bhavasya puruşasya svayari-kritam." 26

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or as the ante-natal from that which belongs to the present existence.1 (3) As Hatha ' the Fortuitous or Accidental. (4) As Bhavya 8-Bhavitavya-the Inevitable or that which must happen in the future even in defiance of the series of natural causation. (5) As Vihita4 or that which is regulated (niyata) by men, for instance, the time to sit, the time to lie down, the time to walk, stay, eat and drink. (6) As Bhagadheya or that which acts as the cause of happiness and misery in the world. There are many passages of the Mahabharata illusrating this aspect of the doctrine of time. For instance, in the Santi-parva Bali says to Sakra :9 All beings, whether strong or weak, handsome or ugly, fortunate or wretched, are swept away by time. Time is too deep to be fathomed. It is like an ocean without any island in it. Endless is the ceaseless flow of time. Time ordains all things, and destroys all creatures. As it produces everything, so it takes away everything. Time works upon all things, and it is through time that all things reach a termination. Time protects, time shatters. Bali's viewa of Time. Persons well-versed in the Vedas conceive time as Brahman. The months and fort- nights are its body, which is invested with the days and nights as its garments. The seasons are its senses, and the year is its mouth. Time as Brahman has neither beginning

1 " Pūrva,janma-kritam karma tad dalvam iti kathyate," Hitopadesa, Prastāvank, 82. dalva-purva-krita (purva-daihika), at Manu, VII, 166, XI. 47, and Yajnavalkya, I. 348, ' Hatha-Kākatallya, yādricchika, ākasmika, akārana, ahetuka, adhicca-samuppanna. According to Nilakantha, "acintitasy&tarkitasya ca lsbho hathah." ' Of. "avasyam bhavino," Kama-Sutra, II. 81. * Of. paripanita-kalah, Kauțiliya Arthasostra, VII, 5. III: "Tvam etdrantam ktlam ceştasva, ahami etāvantam kālam ceștisva iti" paripanitakalab; ibid, VI. 1. 13. Tasodhara in hie commentary on the Kamasūtra, II. 81, reads palayati instead of plavati. : Santi-parva, sectiona 223-225.

THE DOCTRINE OF TIME 20

nor end ; it is eternal. Brahman in the form of time is the refuge of all creatures. Who can go beyond time ? Time cannot be evaded by running or standing still. Some say that Brahman is fire ; some that it is Prajapati; some that it is the seasons or the month, or fortnight, days, hours, morning, noon, evening, twinkling, or moment. Thus people speak diversely of time which is one. Time is Brahman, the eternity. Secondly, from an important passage in the Adiparva we learn : Time is the root cause of all that are and are to be, and of pleasure and pain. Time creates, time destroys. Time is vigilant while all are asleep. Time is uncon- querable.1 II. Criticism of the Epic doctrine of time. The Buddhist Jataka (No. 245) offers, a criticism of the Epie doctrine of time. In former ages, when king Brahmadatta reigned in Benares, there lived a Brahman who was well-versed in the three Vedas and became a far-famed teacher. He had five hundred pupils under him. It happened that in course of time his pupils began to think, "We know as much as our teacher : there is no difference." The teacher knowing this, put to them a question-a paradox, in order to tame them, proud and stubborn as they had all become. The question was this-Time consumes all things, including even itself. Can you tell me who consumes time-the all-consumer ?2 Strange to say, there was not one amongst them who could answer it. It came to them as a riddle of the Sphinx. Seeing that none succeeded in solving the riddle, the

" Kālah pacati bhūtani, Kalah samharate Prajsh, Kālab gupteşu jāgarti, KEiôhi duratikramah." This verse is quoted in Silsnka's Acirkngatika (ed, Dhanapati, p. 14), cf. "Kalat prasutim bhutanam," Gandapida-Kariks; "Tatah Ksla-vassd eva"; Mukti Upanigad, 1. 43 ; etc. - "Ktlo ghasati bhūtāni, sabbinêva sahattanā, Yo ca kālaghaso bhūto so bhūts- pacanir pocati."

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teacher said in a bitter tone of irony : "Do not imagine that this question is in the three Vedas. You think that you know all that I know !" Here the Brahman is represented as a Vedic thinker, but he was rather a Bodhisattva or a pre-Buddhistic thinker on Buddhist lines who opposed the Vedic or Epic doctrine of time. According to the Vedic theory, time not only consumes everything, but also itself in the sense, as the commentator points out, that even the time-before-meal and the time-after-meal do not abide (na papuņati). Accord- ing to the Bodhisatlva's view, an Arahat is the consumer of time (kalaghaso), inasmuch as he is not bound to be reborn. Having completely rooted out the inherent tendencies to sensuality, eternalism, orthodoxy and ignorance, he is released for ever from metempsychosis. A second, but far more philosophical criticism is offered by Śvetasvatara.1 Some wise men, deluded, speak of time as the first cause of everything. But time cannot be regarded as the first cause. For God is the first cause, while time, like nature, fate, chance, and soul, is but one of the proximate or secondary causes. It is God by whose power (Sakti) and might the Brahma-wheel is made to revolve. God covers this world. He is the knower, the time of time (kala-kala).2 It is at the command of God that this world unfolds itself,- the world constituted of earth, water, fire, air, and ether. God is the beginning. It is God who produces the causes uniting the soul with the body. God is above the three kinds of time-past, present, and future; He is without parts. God is beyond all forms of time; He is the other, from whom this

• Śvethávatara Upanigad, I. 2-4; VI. 14-16, The time of timo the dostroyer of time. Vijuenatman expleins Kals-kals a3 "Kalasya niyanta, upaharta-the ordniner, regnlator of time." Sankarinanda explains the same as "Kelah sarva-vinsto-korl, tasydpi vinsfa-karah "-time is the destroyer of all, even of that God is the destroyer." This is a common sentiment in the later liters. ture, e.g4 The Mahindrayana Upanigad says: "I am time, but of time I am nob." (Ahameva kālo, nAbarh kālasya.)

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world moves round. God makes all, God knows all; He ig the self-caused, the knower (jna), the time of time. Asvaghoşa criticises the view according to which time is the root-cause of weal and woe. He maintains that the pain of existence, the pain as a common accident experienced (pravrittiduhkha), is due to our craving, and other such mental causes, but not to time. It is, in other words, on account of craving (trisna), and not on account of time, nature, or the like, that men, imbued with passionate and delusive qualities (sarajastamaska), become subject to death, while those who are without these qualities are not reborn.1 The author of the Samkhya-sutra2 maintains : Bondage does not befall man because of time. For time being all-pervading and eternal in its nature, is equally and also perhaps eter- nally associated with all. Or, as the commentator puts it, "The bondage of man is not caused by time; because if it were the cause, there could be no separation such as that of the liberated and unliberated, because time, which applies to everything, and is eternal is at all times associated with all men, and must, therefore, bring all into bondage, if any."8 "Everything is caused by time. Time alone determines men's prosperity and adversity, victory and defeat, and happi- ness and misery. By time Bali is made Indra. By time he is removed elsewhere.+ And by time again he will be restored to his former position. All are due to time."" Vatsyayana discards this view, and holds, on the contrary, that manly strength, self-help, or free-will activity is the principal means and cause of success in all matters.ª 1 Saundarananda-kovya, XVI, 17. I. 12 : "kala-yogato vyapino nityasya sarvo-sanibandhat." Bellantyne'a Strnkhyn Aphorisms of Kapila, I. 12, Cf. Bühler's " Vishnu" XX, 48: "Kala (time) is no one's friend and no one's enemy." * Vyavaropita-pātāle niyojita-Oommentator. .5 Kāma-sūtro, II. 27-29. · Ibid, II, 30: "puruse-kāra (=prayatna) pūrvakatvāt sarra-pıavrittinām upāysb pratyayah."

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Canakya's view secms, in this respect, reconciliatory rather than polemical. Of strength, place and time, strength is superior to the rest. Such is the view of some teachers. Some give predominance to place on the ground that on land a dog baffles a crocodile, while in water a crocodile defeats a dog. There are some teachers with whom time is predominant. Their reason is this. At day-time a crow kills an owl, while during night an owl kills a crow. But according to Canakya's view, the three factors-strength, place and time, are auxiliary to one another.1 We have no criticism whalever of the doctrine of time from Mahavira and Buddha. But Kriyavadins (Dynamists) as both of them were, it may be safely imagined that their views would have been identical in their general spirit with those attributed to Vatsyayana and others. Their general attitude is clear, at any rate, from the manner in which they have attacked the hypothesis of any efficient causc, such as God, Fate, Chance, or the like .* III. Defence of the Epic doctrine of time. The Vedic or Epic doctrine of time, was not without its strong defenders among the philosophers, the chief of whom was Sakayanya in the Maitri Upanisad.8 As a later thinker, Sakāyanya deals with various questions as to the form, manifestation, division, existence, and infinity of time, But the main problem with which his speculations are concerned is whether time is the original cause of everything or not. In the language of Sakayanya, Time (Kala), Death (Yama) and Life (Prana) are, in a sense, identical. Like fire, air, sun, food (anna, earth), Brahma, Rudra, and Vişnu, time is one of the chief manifestations of Brahman, the highest Deity.

1 Kantilyn-Arthnsastra, IX. 1. 135-138 : " paraspara-sadhakā hi sakti-desa-ktlah." Satra-Kritsuga, I. 12; 1I. 2-79 ; I. 6-27; I. I0-17; Auguttaranikāya, III. 185; Mahabodhi Jstaka in Fausboll's Jataka and in Aryasūra's Jatakn-mēlā. * Maitri Upanigad, IV. 5.6.

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He quotes several earlier views1 in support of his own theory, but curiously enough some are quite contradictory. His quotations are these :- (1) Food (anna) is the cause of all that is time of food, and the sun is the cause of time. The visible form of time is the year, consisting of twelve months, made up of twink- lings (nimesas) and other measures. (2) As many portions of time as there are, the sun moves through them. He who meditates on time as Brahman, from him time moves far away. (3) As from time all beings flow, so from time they grow, and in time they rest. Time has form, and time is formless.2 (4) "Time ripens and dissolves all beings in the Great Self, but he who knows into what time itself is dissolved, he is the knower of the Veda." Sakayanya's personal views are given as follows. Time in itself is imperceptible by the senses. The progress of the sun, for instance, is the evidence of its existence. There are in fact two forms of Brahman, time (kala) Sakdyanya's views of Time. and non-time (akala). That which had existed before the sun came into existence is non-time. Non-time is without parts, i.e., indivisible. That which originates from the sun, aud has parts (i.e., is divisible) is Time. Of time that is divisible, the year is the form, from which all creatures are born. As they are generated irom the year, so they return to rest in the year. Thus the year is Prajapati, is time, food, the ombodiment of Brahman, nay, Brahman himself, the self. This manifest time is the great ocean of beings. The sun, the source of all life (Savitri), dwells in it. The moon, stars, planets, the year, and the rest

• Maitri Upanişad, VI. 14-16. * "Kalo murtir amurtiman." Max Muller translates "time ie visible (eun), and invisible (moments)."

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are generated from it. These are, in their turn, the causes of all that is good or evil in this world. Therefore, Brahman is the Solar Self, the soul of the sun, and the sun must be conceived under the name of time. In the second place, all that human imagination can depict of time is to be found in a passage of the Yoga-Vasistha Ramayana, the date of which is evidently far later than that of the Mahabharata and the Maitri Upanisad. This passage is put into the mouth of Rama, the mystic interlocutor of the dialogue, in order perhaps to keep the view quite distinct from the real system of the Yoga-Vasistha-Rāmayana, as expounded by Vasistha. Of three long chapters (38-35) of the first book called Vairagya-prakarana, we shall be content with giving a brief summary :-- Time is known under three names as Daiva, Kala and Kritanta.1 Time is called the Universal Soul because it

Rama's viewa of time. swallows the universe within itself. Time is all-pervading, but it has no perceptible form of its own, except that it is imperfectly known by the names of years, ages (yugas) and aeons (kalpas).ª Time is divided, though in itself indivisible; consumed, though in- combastible; perceived, though imperceptible in its nature. Time is the subtlest of all things. Time has no other charac- ter or function but that of action and motion.3 It is by its action and motion that the existence of time is made known to us. Thus according to mystic Rama, as according to Zeno and Chrysippus, time is to be defined as "the extension of the motion of the world,"a ceaseless motion of the universe, an endless succession of external events.

' Yoga-Vasiştha-RAmdyane, I. 25. 1, 5: "Daivam Kalab ca kathyate,-Tritiysh oa Kritanteti nāma." * Yoga-Viniştha I. 18.7: "Ynga-vatsara-kalpâkhyaiļ kiñcit prakatata gatah. Rupairaia- kęyarūpātma sarvam skramya tięthati." 3 Ibid, L 25, 2: " Kriyam atradrite yaaya svaparispandarūpinab. Ninyad dlakşyate rūpam pa karma na samšhitam." * Zeller's " Stoica, Epioureans, and Sceptics," pp. 186-187.

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The function of time consists in the act of creating and dissolving the world-system. Time stands the foremost of all deceitful players, the artificer who, sporting for the period of an aeon, loses his own existence in the eternity of Brahman, the spirit of spirits. But time after a short rest, as it were, reappears as at once the creator, the preserver, and the des- troyer of the world,-as the remembrancer of the past. Ac- tion (karma), also described as Fate (niyati), isto time as a wife to a husband. Time is the souroe of all hatred and greed,-the cause of misfortunes and vicissitudes. Hundreds of great kalpas may even pass away, yet there is nothing to move eternity to pity or to stop its course. At the olose of an aeon (kalpante), time dances about, like a skull-bearer (kapalika), with a long chain of the bones of the dead. Time then assumes its terrifying form of fire (pralayagni), to dissolve the world in empty space, or to reduce the cosmos to a chaos. Even Brahma, Indra, and such other gods cease then to exist. Although thus the world is destroyed and renewed alternately and endlessly, the seeds of things are never destroyed. From these seeds arise in course of time the four types of existence (the oviparous, the viviparous, ete.). These types of concrete existence are to be regarded, contrary to the modern view of evolution, as eternally fixed. IV. Infinity of Time: The constant cyole of eristence. Although a later authority, the Sukranīti makes us under- stand that matters with which a Purana deals broadly fall under two heads : cosmology and history.1 The creation of heaven and earth and firmament, the up- Two aspects Purina: Oosmologi- of heaval of land from water, the distribution cal and historical. of mountains, plains and waters, the appari- tion of the sun, the moon, the stars and the planets, the formation of clouds, the circulation of water, the exchange

1 Šākranīti, IV. 3. 104-105. 27

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of heat and cold between land and sea and sky, the origin and propagation of species from the primordial (or, proto- plasmic) matter, the evolution of social grades and all other human institutions, the elevation and degradation of the moral sense, etc., form the subject-matters of a Purana.' In the language of Buddha, Puraņa, Lokayata, or cosmology con- sists of speculations 'about existence and non-existence' (bhava-kathā, vibhava-kathā).' A Purāņa in its historical aspect is sharply discriminated from an Itihasa or legend as we generally understand it. Strictly, Purana is not history, but rather the philosophy of history.3 It is not the aim of a Purana or "Universal History" to produce any record of 'hard facts' associated with fixed dates, but to indicate philo- sophically, or perhaps scientifically, the successive stages of natural evolution,-to speculate, in other words, about the oycles or epochs of events, natural and historical, physical, psychical, social and individual, in their uniform and endless succession. The two aspects of a Purana are so closely interconnected that it is impossible to separate them. In the history of Indian literature, after the Vedas are to be Literary signifcanca of the term PorEna. placed the Brahmanas (including the Forest- The earlier speo mona of Paraņas. books and Upanişads) ; after the Brahmanas, the Itihasa-Puranas; after these, the six Vedangas with which the Sutra-literature begins ; and after the Vedangas, the Angas, the Pitakas, the Niti-sastras, the Dharma-sastras, the Epics, and all the rest. Among the Vedangas, the Kalpa-sutras and the Jyotișas have to deal with divisions of time. The same holds true of the Niti- sastras and the Dharma-sastras. At first the name Purana denoted cosmological speculations embodied in the Brahmanas.

1 Mann, I.21-34. * Digha-nikaya, I, pp 8-8. ' Ibid, p. 178. Buddha's expression 'loks-akkhuyiks' correaponds almost to Huxley's "history of the earth' or ' Universal history.'

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Later on, a class of literature arose to which the use of the name Puraņa came to be restricted. The earlier specimens of Puranas are to be found in the Vedic hymns, the Brahmanas, the Aggañna sutta, the Manu-smriti, the Mahabharata, and the like. There is a great deal of truth behind the tradition that the Puranas are Upa-vedas-'Those which stand close to the Vedas.' For in the Vedic speculations we find nothing but the bare outlines of the Puranas. Towards the close of the post-Vedic period, Nidhi appears in a list of science.1 Nidhi or the so-called The science of Time. sciences of time is in reality nothing more than a systematised division of time. It is incorporated in the Kautiliya Artha-sastra,' the Manu-Smriti, the Maha- bharata, the Brihat-samhita, and several other later texts. A practical division of time into year, half-year, five or six seasons, months, fortnights, is indeed as old as the Vedas. In the earlier reckoning, however, the greatest limit of time does not seem to have extended beyond a year (samvatsara), and a hundred winters.8 Evidently, then, the conception of four yugas (ages) : Satya (Krita), Treta, Dvapara, and Kali-is post-Vedic, and occurs for the first time in the Taittiriya Brahmana.+ Still later, we have the conceptions of Man- vantaras (intervals of Manus) and Kalpas or Mahakalpas (Epochs, Aeons, Cycles, or Millenniums). When the Greek ambassador Megasthenes visited India in the fourth century B.C., he found the yuga-measurement of time already in existence. The Kauțiliya Artha-sastra bears testimony to the same fact. But it can be proved on the evidence of the Jaina and Buddhist texts, that the conception of Kalpas and Maha- kalpas, not to say of yugas, became prevalent in the country 1 Ohandogya Upanişad, VII, 2, 1; VII. 7.I. * The divisions of time as given in the Kautiliya Artha s5stra (II. 20. 38; IX. 1. 135 136) differ in certain rospects from those in the Manu-Smtiti (I. 63-64), the Mahahharate (XII. 232. 12-31; X11. 238. 4-7), and the Institutes of Vignn (XX. 1-20). " Rig-veda, X, 190. 8, VIL, 66, 11, 16 ; eta. + See Rules of human saorifice.

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sometime before the rise of Jainism and Buddhism. The conception played some part not only in the teachings of Mahavira and Buddha, but also in those of Gosala,' their common predecessor, the reputed leader of the Ājivika school. Thus the date of the conception of Kalpas and Mahakalpas may be safely placed somewhere in the neo- Vedic and pre-Buddhistic-period. Further, it would seem that the conception of Manvantaras (Manu-intervals)" is histori- cally later than that of Kalpas, just as the theory of Incarnations (Avataras)' is posterior to the conception of Manvantaras. In connexion with these ancient cosmological speculations we have to note three points of philosophical importance. (1) That they all imply a certain reference to infinity of time and eternity of the world of generation. (2) That they involve something of a Stoic notion of the infinite divisibility of time, -the notion which forms the basis of the atomic theory of time in the Jaina Dravya-samgraha (V. 22). (3) That in their purely cosmological aspect they seem to be either Platonic or Aristotelian in character. "Platonic" because they have reference to the notion of a Player," who, sporting as it were, or of an artificer (mayin), who by his artifice (sva-māyaya)," repeats the world again and again ad infinitum. And "Aristotelian" because they presuppose a fully real individual as the originator of all changes.

1 Dial, B. 11, p. 72 : "8,400,000 perioda" (Mnha-kappas). See my 'Ājivikas,' I, p. 25. * Manu, I. 79-80. There is no reference to Incarnations. " Macdonald's ' Bruhmanas of the Vedas,' p. 90 f. * Dovelopment of Greek Philosophy, pp. 115-116; 161-285. * Manu-smpiti, I, 80. · Śvetśratara Upaniąnd, IV. 9-10.

CHAPTER XIV.

ĀSURI.

Yajñavalkya's speculations led to the development of a theistic doctrine (Isvara-vada), which was strongly opposed by both Mahavira and Buddha. It was in fact an old Brah- manic belief for which Yajnavalkya's philosophy afforded a fresh ground. An account of this theistic doctrine is given in the first chapter of the Brihad Āranyaka Upanisad, divided into six sections, each of which is called a Brahmana. The doctrine, as we now have it, is interwoven with cosmological speculations, and reminds us, in many points, of the Mosaic doctrine of Genesis. And the Upanisad-passage1 in which the doctrine is inculcated is historically important as forming the basis of all later cosmologies, especially those which are embodied in the Brahma-jala and Agganna suttas, the Manu- Smriti2 and the Malabharata. It is a generally accepted opinion that the Manu-Smriti contains not one, but two distinct doctrines of creation. The accounts in the Brahma-jala and the Aggañna suttas also differ. In point of fact the origin of this difference or discre- pancy is in the Upanisad passage itself. The first three sections set forth a theory of creation which is different from

1 Brihad Āranyeka Upanişad, I. 3. 27: "Lead me from the unreal to the real! Lead me from darkness to light ! Lead me from death to immortality !" (Max Müller). " Asato m& sad gamaya! Tamaso mš jyotir gamaya ! Mrityor mi amritam gamaya !" See Deusen's Vedanta, p. 86. This passage contains the famons prayer-formula (stotra) of the Brahmo Sambi, founded by Raja Ram Mohan Roy (1880 A.D.). Muir's "Sanskrit Texts," IV. 26.

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that embodied in the romaining three. The fourth section in particular is called the Purusa-vidha Two theorles of creu- tion. Brahmaņa by the Madhyandinas. As its name implies, the fundamental problem with which the Brahmana is concerned is the generation of things from Purusa or the universal soul. The Brahmana in ques- tion is of the greatest imporlance for the historian of Indian juristic thought, and of the Samkhya views. In it we dis- cover the immediate background for Puranic Samkhyam, an expression by which we must understand here only an attempt at a rational theory of the universe, inclusive of all human institutions,-such Samkhya views as we find, for instance, in the Manu-Smriti and the Mahabharata. It seems to us possible that we may find here one way to answer the question whether the Samkhya system is prior to the advent of Buddha or not. We learn from the concluding verse of the Samkhya- Kärikā which is the first systematic exposition of the Sāmkhya dualism, that Kapila, Asuri, Pancasikha and Isvara-Krisna were the four most renowned teachers of Sämkhyam. In tracing back the develop- Four prehistorio stages of the develoj- ment of the Samkhya doctrines from the ment of the Puranio Sorkhya. Samkhya-Kārika to the Vedas, we shall take these four names however mythical they may be, to denote the four traditional landmarks or stages. The first stage of Samkhyam will then be represented by the Puruşa-sukta in the Rig-veda, the second stage by the Purusa- vidha-Brahmana in the Brihad Aranyaka Upanisad, the third stage by Pancasikha's views in the Santiparva, and the fourth stage by Isvara-Krișna's views in the Bhagavad-gīta. The traditional author of the Purusa-sūkta is " Narayana " or "Kapila."1 The author of the Purusa-vidha-Brahmana is unknown, but we may suppose that it was Asuri. ' Note that in the Sretasrntara Upanigad, Kapila (The Fiery) is regarded as the wise son of Brahmi, This is in agreement with tho legende in the Santiparva, where Eapila in desoribed as the Mind-begotten son (manssa-putra) of Brahma. The Mudgala Up. sttesta that Parusa Sukta was the starting point of Samkhyam.

ÃSURI 215

In the Samkhya tradition Asuri is hardly more than a name or passing shadow. But his name occurs in all the three gencalogies of teachers and pupils Aguri in the Sam. khya tradition. given iu the Brihad Āranyaka Upanișad.1 The first two of these lists mention Asuri as a pupil of Bharadvaja, while from the third list it appears that he was the immediate successor of Yajnavalkya, though not necessarily his pupil. This is one of our reasons for ascribing the Purusa-vidha-Brahmana to Asuri. The other reason is this. The views which this Brahmana embodies can be traced to "Narayana's" hymn in the Rig-voda, and Yajnavalkya's philosophy. Admitting this, the next step towards the solution of the question will be to observe how from the time of Asuri to that of Pancasikha in the Santiparva the Samkhya nomenclature was gradually coined. In the meantime we must inquire whether or no, such a nomencla- ture was in use in the time of the Buddha. There are two fragments of Buddha's tenching which throw light on the views of Asuri. The two fragments are

Bnddha's speonla. taken from the Brahma-jala and the Aggañia lations on tho origin of sutta. In accounting for theistic notion in theistic notions. general Buddha says:" There comes a time, now and again, when, after the lapse of a long long period, the world-system (loka, cosmos, the fleeting visible universe) passes away (samvattati). When this happens, living beings (including the gods .- the sun, moon, etc.,) are ' mostly reborn in the World of Radiance' (ūbhassara-kaya), that is to say, assume luminous forms or nebular bodies. In this state they persist for a long long period of time, made of consciousness (manomaya) feeding on joy, self-luminous, traversing the sky (whizzing in the air as dynamio forces),3 and full of splendour. ' II. 6. 3; IV. 6.8: VI, 5.2. * Digha Nikayn, I. 18-20. cp. The story of Bakn-Bralmi, Majjhima Niksya, I, 326. 381; Samyutta-nikaya, I. 142-144; Jatnka No. 405, Bnt ene Dial. B., II, pp. 80-81 " Cf. The Upaniped-expressiona " Prabhu-vimita," and "vibuurimita" in the Ohandogya, VIII, 6.3. and Knuşitaki, 1. 8,

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Thereafter comes also a time, when, sooner or later, the world system begins to develop or re-evolve (vivattati). When this happens the Brahma-mansion (Brahma-vimana, the Formed Universe) makes its appearance. But it is at first empty (suñña)-of inhabitants. In course of time, some one of those beings, either at the end of its existence, or because of the exhaustion of its merit (by accident, as we now say), falls from the nebular state, and comes to life in the Brahma- mansion, within the visible universe (say, as the sun). In this latter state the conscious being spends a long long period of time, feeding on joy, self-illuminated, traversing the sky, and shining in glory. But from the ciroumstance of 'dwelling there so long alone,' the being begins to feel "a dissatisfaction and a longing : O! would that other beings might come to join me in this place !"1 Just then, as chance would have it, other beings, descending from the nebular state, come, by a similar process, to life within the formed universe (say, as the moon, the visible stars, and the planetary bodies), which are of a shorter duration, less glorious, and less powerful than the sun. As time goes on, some of those conscious beings, descend- ing from their solar or lunar or planetary ancestors (pheno- menal antecedents) are reborn at last as men on this earth. And among men again, there may be some.one who begins to reflect upon the problem of existence,-the speculation about the origin and development of the life-process. In tracing his existence backward from his present birth to that which he imagines to be his very first, he perceives that his knowledge does not go beyond the sun, the first-born individual in this formed universe,-the first dweller in the solar home. From this thought he is led naturally to the conelnsion :- "He is Brahma, the Great God, the Supreme Being, the Almighty (or, the Omnipresent), the Omniscient, the Ruler, ' Rhys Davids' transiation of " Aho vata anfiepi satta itthattam agaccheyyanti P"

ĀSURI 217

the Lord, the Creator, the Maker, the Best ('Chief of all'), the Ordainer, the Ancient of days, the Father of all that are and are to be. He, the maker of all these beings, is stedfast, immutable, eternal, unchangeable, and the same for ever and ever, 1 Whereas we, who are made by him, are come here, to this world, being impermanent, mutable, and limited in our term of existence. But on what grounds are we to call him the Creator and us the created ones? We must call him the Crea- tor because when he thought of us,-on his mental resolve (i. e., by the power of his will, mano-panidhi), ª we all came here into existence. We must have been created by him because, as we see, it was He who was here first, and we came after him."" The passage of which a summary is given above, seems to have reference to the Purusa-vidha-Brahmana. In the guise of an historian Buddha posed himself as a Buddha's criticism of the doctrine. oritic of the notion of a personal author of our mortal being or an individual unmoved mover of the Brahma-wheel (the universe),-a notion which was shaping itself in his time permanently into a legal and moral creed. Proceeding as he did from change or causal genesis as the fundamental fact, Buddha could not conceive any such unchangeable and omnipotent individual as being fully real by himself. For him the world of generation was a constant cycle of change (rather than existence),-a continuous process of evolution and revolution, -of envelopment and development. Buddha is speaking to two young Brahmans, Bharadvaja and Vasistha, who having disregarded caste-prejudices, are come to join his order : There comes a time when the visible

"Brabmu, Mahobrahme, abhibhu, anabhibhuto, ninad atthu-daso, vasavatti, issaro, kattă, nimmitā, settho, sanjitā, vasi, pitā bhūta-bhavyanam .... (so) nicco, dhuvo, sassato, avipariņāma-dhammo, sassati-samo," * Of. The Buddhist Sanskrit expresaion "pranidhona," 28

218 PRE-BUDDHISTIO INDIAN PIII OSOPIY

universe passes away, and consequently beings are roborn elsewhere in the nebular sphere. This is duly succeeded by a lime when the world begins to develop anow. All is then water, and enveloped in darkuess, a darkness that blinds. Those beings, falling from radiant worlds, are reborn within the formed universe, made of consciousness, sustained by joy, floating in space, and shining in glory. The formed universe, the juicy earth (rasa pathavi 'emerges from the waters like a scum of milk or ghee, odorous and sweet.' Having come in contact with it, feasting thercon, those beings become soli- dified, and lose thereby part of their own luminance. Thus the sun, the moon, and the stars and planets appear once more, and the natural seasons come into existence. Mean- while the cooling process goes on. As the juicy earth gradu- ally becomes hardened, it loses its flavour and sweet taste, 'but vegetation, first of low, then higher grade ovolves.' Man descends at length from his heavenly ancestors-from the vital sun, or the reflective moon. The human race vary in degrees of comeliness. The fair despise the ugly, the white the black men. Thus a colour distinction arises. Men at first feed on rice grown in abundance without cultivation. But with the gradual loss of fertility of the soil, tilth becomes necessary. In the beginning sex-differences are unknown among the human race, As time passes on, sex-differences evolve, resulting in great social and moral upheavals. From sex-connexion households originate. 'Rice is stored, land is enolosed, and with the rights of property arise dishonesty, strife and injustice.' This leads men at last to think of estab- lishing a ruler,1 chosen from the best among them, to administer justice. The ruler is supporied by the ruled, and he is, to begin with, but a patriarchal or feudal chief, recognised as the lord of the fields (Khetta-pati). From these emerge a class of men, who become known as princes or nobles, upholding a certain standard of morality and social virtue. On the other i Mann, VII. 3; Stnti Parvn, Rajadharma, Seotion 59; Arthasagtra, I 18.

ĀSURI 219

hand, certain human beings, distressed at the sins of society, leave home-life, retire into woods to meditate, or dwell outside the towns, compiling sastras - literary treatises. Putting away evil, these come to be distinguished as Brahmans, who uphold a certain standard of humanity in thought, word and deed. Among others, those who lead household life, develop certain industries, and thereby set up a different standard of morality, come to be called Vessas (Tradesmen). There are others again who take to minor or low orafts, and become known as Suddas, differing from other classes by a certain standard of law.1 In this second fragment-taken from the Agganna sutta -- Buddha cites an ancient cosmology (Porana) in support of his opinion that social distinctions among the Aryans were origin- ally based upon moral rather than upon any racial grounds.

The historical impor- This cosmology, which Buddha indirectly tance of the second made his own or utilised for his own purpose, fragment. presupposes the passage of the Brihad Aran- yaka Upanişad referred to above. The main point in which the two accounts differ is that in the Agganna Sutta Buddha does not attack the theory of creation, as he does in the Brahmajala and other Suttas. Although, as Prof. Rhys Davids observes, "a continual note of good-humoured irony runs through the whole story "" in the Agganna Sutta, we must not forget the reason of it. Prof. Rhys Davids also rightly points out that this dialogue froms 'a kind of Buddhist Book of Genesis,' and that, in it Buddha replaces an older, but current 'Brahman legend.' This explains clearly enough why Buddha does not mention the name of God at all when he restates or remodels the Brahmanic cosmology on his own account. The historical importance of the Dialogue is indeed very great. It stands mid-way, in point of date, between the Brihad Aranyaka Upanisad, on one side, and the 'Laws of Manu' and the Mahabharata on the other. Mrs. Rhys Davids

' Mrs. Rhya Davide' Buddhism, pp. 288-238. ' Dial. B. II, p. 107,

220 PRE-BUDDHISTIO INDIAN PHILOSOPIY

judges it to be "a striking specimen of archaic soience attempting a rational theory of the origin of human insti- tutions."1 Moreover, it will be noted that both the Upanisad- passage and the Agganna sutta, with all their differences in other respects, agree in exhibiting the doctrine of genesis in its intimate relation to Vedie and post-Vedic thinking, whereas we find in the 'Laws of Manu,' as well as in the Mahabharata that the doctrine has become. altogether what is generally described as the Puranic Samkhyam. As to the teaching of the Purusa-vidha Brahmana, in the first throe sections we find a most interesting exposition of "Brahmanaspati's " doctrine, combined with the views of Aghamarşana, "Paramesthin," and "Narayana." In the second Brahmana we read that in the beginning there was nothing else than Death (Mrityu). Everything was in the womb of chaos concealed by Death, by hunger; for Death is hunger (food-principle). Death The philognphical views of Asnri, is called Aditi because whatever it brings forth, that it tends to devour agnin. Now Death thought of having an organised body, and so it began to move about, being stirred up with energy. Thereupon water was produced. All was water for the time being. From water was formed gradually froth (sara,' proto- plasmio matter ?), which being hardened, appeared as the earth. Thereon rested Death (fiery ether) and from it proceeded Fire (Agni), full of splendour. This luminous mass of fire divided itself into three portions ; one portion became Aditya (the sun), one portion became Vayu (the air), and the third portion be- came this earth, the home of animated beings (Prana). Death wished to have a second body, and it prodnced the seed which became the Year, Before that time there was no Year, -- there were no natural seasons. By natural seasons, all existent

: Buddhism, p. 285, See also the Mahbvastu, ed, Senart, I, pp. 888-348; and Bock- hill's "Life of The Buddha," chap. I. " Of. Pali rask pathavi.

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things-men, animals, scriptures and religious ceremonies- were brought forth. As organic beings evolved, the senses developed, and the thinking principle (mind) was already in the living body. In man the mind runs free as a horse fit for sacrifice, while other animals are enslaved by the senses. The real philosophical views of Asuri are embodied in the fourth and fifth sections of the Upanisad. In view of the imperfection of his terminology it is difficult to judge whether his expressions are those of Pantheism or Dualism. Perhaps they imply both, or neither. Supposing they imply both, this would mean that Dualism furnishes the best ground for expla- nation of experienor, while Pantheism expresses his real philosophical standpoint. In the beginning Soul (Atma) alone was the existent, and Soul was in the form of a self-conacious, self-centred, undivided, individualised, and absolutely pure mass of solar essence (Purușa). There being nothing but itself, Soul had no cause to fear a rival. But being alone, Soul felt no delight. It wished for a second. With this thought Soul divided its own body in two, thereby creating a male and a female. The male is called the heaven and the female the earth. It is from the union of these two-heaven and earth-that all beings are born. In this connexion a view of Yajñavalkya is quoted to establish the universal truth that a third somothing is always the seqnence of two opposed facts. Yajnavalkya said: "We two-man and wife-are to each other 'like the half of a split pea' (v,ijala)."1 Woman (earth) is produced originally from man (heaven). Sex-differences exist among all beings from men down to the ants. Cattle, horses, goats, sheep,-all these were created in pairs, as male and female., Soul knew that it was the creator of all that exists, nay, that it was the creation (sristi). Indeed, soul itself became the creation. Therefore whatever thing is found here, or whatever god is worshipped by men is but a partioular manifestation of * Brihad Aranyaka Upnnigad, I. 4.3 cf. IV. 8.21.

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the universal spirit. The gods or heavenly bodies are the best creations of this spirit. Now every particular thing was at first in an indetorminate condition (avyakrita). The concrete existent became deter- minate by ' name and form ' (nama-rupa), by individuality. The world is pervaded by Soul,-every limb of a living body is animated by the same spirit. Soul is in everything, in every living substance as a razor put into a razor case, or as fire in arani wood. Soul is beyond the apprehension of the senses. The senses can represent Soul only in parts or fragments. For instance, when Soul breathes, we assign to it the name of breath (prana); when it speaks, we assign to it the name of speech (vak); when it sees, we assign to it the name of sight (cakşu); when it hears, we assign to it the name of hearing (srotra); and when it thinks, we assign to it the name of thought (manas). But ho who conceives one or other of these, taken alone (ekai- kam), to be the Soul, does not know what Soul is. For, as Asuri maintains in agreement with Mahidasa, all these represent only the names of one or other funclion of the soul (asya etāni karmanam anyeva); that is to say, breathing, speaking, seeing, hearing and thinking, all bear in varying dogrees the name of one and the same act of reasoning (prajianasya namadheyani). Again, like Pratardana, Asuri holds that the soul acts always as a whole soul. As a whole it breathes, as a whole it speaks, and so forth; and in this sense breathing, speaking, sceing, and other special functions of the soul find unity in it. In fact, the soul, as conceived by Asuri, is the footstep or foundation (padaniya) of all the functions which we discharge as living thinking beings. It is, by the power of soul, that we know everything. Apart from such a unity, identity and continuity in the soul or mental life, all mental acts would appear to be but so many disconnected events,1 In his further investigation into the unity of mental lite Āsuri 1 Brihad Aranyaka Upanisad, I 4, 7.

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made an important discovery, namely that the elements of cognition are not confined to understanding, but are involved also in the act of perceiving in general. Even when a man is touched on the back, he becomes aware of this through his mind. Desire, will, doubt, faith, want of fith, retentiveness, forgetfulness, shame (prudence), refleotion, fear-all these are constituents of mind.1 Speech or language is to thought what a wife is to her husband. The main problem with which the fifth section of the Brahmana is concerned is how comes it that the world never perishes, in spite of the reckoned cycles of change which it undergoes. In this connection we may recall that Jaivali's question was: How comes it that the world is never full ? Strange to say, the answers given by both Jaivali and Asuri reach ultimately the same truth. The purusa, or the Universe is imperishable. The universal spirit generates the world again and again. We shall finally consider the social and ethical views of Asuri. It is important to bear in mind that his views are derived partly from the philosophy of Yajnavalkya, but mostly from that of "Narayana." His original contribution is the theory of the origin of society. God or Soul is nearer to us than anything else: dearer than a son, dearer than wealth, dearer than all the rest. One must, therefore, regard Soul alone as dear. Soul being the true Self, if a man loves soul, he is never disappointed. The highest duty of man is to seek the knowledge of God. But for this reason, Asuri warns us, we are not to negleot other duties of life and society. According to his view the whole duty of a man may be summed up under these three heads, the Brah. man, the sacrifice and the world. A man should carry on the works-social, intellectual and spiritual, of his ancestors. And

1 Brihad Aranyaka Upanigad, I. b. 8: Kamn, samkalpa, vicikits& fraddha, afraddhs dhriti, adhriti, hri, dhi, bhi. The Buddhists came to treat these ap mental properties (cetasikā dhammā).

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there are the three worlds of duty to fulfil-the world of the Gods, the world of the Fathers, and the world of Men. The world of Men is to be gained by a son only, and not by any other work. The world of the Fathers and that of the Gods are to be gained by sacrifice and knowledge respectively. As regards his social views, Asuri maintains that originally Åsuri's somial and there were no class distinctions among men. moral viewa. But society being one or homogeneous did not flourish. With a view to the welfare of society class distinctions were introduced gradually among them, as similar distinctions obtained also among the gods. As society became organised, such distinctions were established permanently .. Like "Nārāyaņa" Āsuri is of opinion that class distinctions and division of labour are necessary for a healthy organisation of society, and are a clear sign of social strength. The moral justification of such distinctions is that some sort of distinc- tion can be found equally among the gods. Briefly, then, homogeneity is as bad for a society as an ill-defined hetero- geneity. This is of course a common sentiment in all juristie and theological circles:1 The establishment of class-distinctions, or the thorough organisation of the division of labour was not enough for the strength of the community. Brahman, therefore, created at last the most excellent Dharma-Law, Righteousness, Justice. Dharma is protected and administered by the ruling class, and Dharma is the Ksatra of Ksatras,-the king of kings, there being nothing higher than the Law. Since the establishment of law or moral justice, a weak man can con- trol one who is physically stronger, by the aid of the Law, as with the help of a king, But Dharma is again Truth, and that which is true is just, The Law and Truth thus being identical, to declare the one is just to proclaim the other. Later developments on Kautilian, Buddhistic and Vedantic lines of this conception of Dharma as kşatrasya ksatrab, or * See Manu-Smriti, I. 31; Bhagavud Git&, IV. 18; XVIII, 41-44.

ĀSURI 225

rañño raja as Buddha puts it, are to be met with in the Kautiliya Arthasastra, the Rajavagga of the Anguttara, Part III, and the Rajadharma and Gita sections of the Great Epic. This idea of Dharma, together with the programme of duties of the kings, as set forth in the texts mentioned above, appears to have been realised through the administrations of Candragupta Maurya, King Asoka, and the Gupta Kings respectively. Asuri holds that belief in future life is essential to man's moral and spiritual existence. For it alone Asnri's religions views. furnishes a stimulus to all his endeavours. To believe in futuie life is for him to recognise the law of action, that is to say, to recognise the truth of the maxim that a man reaps as he sows, here as well as hereafter. A man is what he thinks himself to be. He who knows that he is Brahman actually becomes Brahman.1 If a man worships any other deity, thinking that he is differ- ent from Brahman, the highest Deity, is ignorant. In faot, he who worships a god other than God is no more than a beast fit for sacrifice to the gods.

1 Brihad Aranyaka Upaniead, I. 4 10 "Ya evamb vedsham Brahmasmiti sa idam sarvari bhavati." 29

CHAPTER XV.

PIPPALĀDA.

The philosophical views of the venerable seer Pippalada are preserved in the Prasnopanisad consisting of six dia- logues. Each one of these dialogues contains but an answer of Pippalada to the questions put to him, one by one, by his six contemporaries, who are all said to have been devoted to philosophy (Brahmapara), fulfillers of ideal life (Brahma- nistha-para), and seekers of divine knowledge (Brahmanve- șamana). The six contemporaries are-Sukeśas Bhāradvāja, Šaivya Satyakāma, Sauryāyanin Gārgya, Kausalya Āsva- layana, Bhargava Vaidarbhi, and Kabandhin Katyāyana.1 The name of Pippalada does not occur in the three separate lists of teachers given in the Brihad Aranyaka Upanișad. In one of them we have mention of two Gargyas and of one Gargyayana. Gargyayana is evidently Gārgyāyani, a contem- porary of Uddalaka.ª We know of one Gargya, i.c., Gārgya Balaki, who was a contemporary of Yajnavalkya. The second Gargya is perhaps the Sauryayanin (Astronomer) Gargya, who was a contemporary of Pippalada. If this be true, we might surmise that Pippalada belongs to a period later than that of Yajñavalkya. Probably Pippalada's date was not far from the Buddha. Among the six contemporaries of Pippalada, one is Kabandhin Katyayana. The early Buddhist records frequently allude to a philosopher named Kakuda Kātyāyana (Pakudha Kaccāyana), who is said to have been one of the elder contemporaries of the Buddha. The two names, Kabandin Kātyayana and Kakuda Katyayana, are practically one and the same. When Buddha was a young man, Knkuda Katyayana was getting 1 Praénopanind, I. 1. " Brihad Ar. Up., IV. 8. 2.

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on in years, just as when the latter was a young man, Pippa- lada had already reached a venerable age. We suppose that the two names are identical because the real name of the philosopher was merely Katyayana. The epithet Kabandhin or Kakuda was attached to his name for no other reason than to distinguish the philosopher Katyayana from others of his name. Besides, it is obvious that both Kabandhin1 and Kakuda have reference to the same physical deformity of the man. This identity, though at first sight hypothetical, is supported by philosophical grounds, as we shall see later. One thing is certain amid all uncertainty, namely, that we do not know much about Pippalada's life. In the com- mentary on Umasvati's Tattvartha-sutra (VIII. 1.) Pippalada is classed among the ignorant heretics (ajnani-kudristi's), and in the Prasnopanisad he is referred to as a venerable sage, and as a contemporary of Sukesas Bharadvaja and others. He was an Atharvanika, the compiler of a recension of the Atharva Veda, recognised as canonical perhaps within a century before the rise of Buddhism." The Garbhopanisad and the Sariraka, the Parabrahma and the Sarabha also embody his views, and time may come when it will be admitted that he was the historical founder of the Samkhya philosophy of which natural causation and yoga were the two cardinal features. This is all that we can say regarding Pippalada. Only one more trifling point which we might add (from an etymological speculation on his name) to our knowledge of Pippalada, would be this, He was extremely fond of eating pippala (fruit), in the same way that Kanada, the reputed founder of the Vaisesika school of philosophy, was an eater of kana ('the particles of rice). 1 A friend suggosts that the name implies a heudless trunk, i.e., a person having little brain-power or intelleot, ª In the phraseology of Yajnavalkya the Atharva is not a Veda but Angirasa, Brihad Ar. Up. VI. 5 11. Of. Chandogya VII. 1, where the Atharya is referred to as the fourth Vedo. Tho Buddhist expression Ithasa pancamam (Digha, I. p. 88) points to the samo conelnsion (seo Sumaugale-Vilzsint, I. p. 247: Athabbang-Vedam catuttham).

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HIS PHILOSOPHY.

So far as Pippalada's philosophy is concorned, we shall vainly go to him for any new ideas. Among the thinkers of the period in question he is perhaps one of the least original. But,the precision with which he restated the views of his predecessors was not without its marvellous effect upon the development of the method of systematic thinking and the separation of the Samkhya-Yoga ideas from the older Vedanta. We propose to review, in this light, the following five points, connected with five out of his six answers. (1) The first dialogue is the answer of Pippalada to Kabandhin Katyayana's question : How and from what are creatures born ?1 In giving his answer, Pippalada calls the attention of Katyāyana to the distinction to be drawn be- tween two Brahma-worlds (Brahma-lokah),-This (esa) and That (asau),2-Lower and Higher, Material and Spiritual. This Brahma-world is the world of generation (praja-loka), and that Brahma-world is the ideal world. Pippalada adopts besides a new term Rayi for Matter, replacing the older term Water. Pippalada's answer in brief is this : Oreatures are generat- ed from Prajapati, the lord of creatures,-the creative prin- ciple of the universe. Prajapati is the universal Person (Vaisvānara Purușa),-the sun whose essence is Fire. Desir- ous of creating, Prajapati meditated on his Pippaladu's viowe of generntion, own essence, thereby producing out of his own body a pair (mithuna)-Matter (Rayi) and Spirit (Prana)-the notions similar to and anticipating the Samkhya Purusa and Prakriti. The world of concrete existence results, indeed, from the union of these two elements called Matter and Spirit. By

1 Prafnopanipad, I. 8: " Bhagavăn kuto ha vai imāh prajsh prajšyanta iti." = Ibid, I. 15, 1B.

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Matter Pippalada understands that element which is dark and passive and feminine, and by Spirit that element which is bright and active and masculine. All that has form and is formless, all that is organised and disorganised-falls under the category of Matter. The formed body is therefore to be called Matter.1 Matter is that upon which form is imposed by Spirit,-the psychical element. When Spirit is not in close embrace with Matter, the form at once breaks down, that is to say, Matter becomes disorganised. Pippalada here calls upon us to witness with him the constant play of two opposed phenomena throughout this formed universe,- the sun and the moon, the bright-half and the dark-half of the month, day and night, and the sex-differences, for instance. Now according as men live in This or That Brabma-world, they are said to travel on the two separate paths of life's journey,-the paths which lead eilher to repeated death, or to the everlasting home of immortality. Pippalada is thinking, of course, of the two paths-the southern, ancestral or mate- rial path, and the northern, divine or spiritual path-so well marked out for the first time by Jaivali. But his language is more concise than that of Jnivali and of Gargyayana, the immediate suocessor of Jaivali. Besides, it is worthy of note that the earlier expressions for the two paths were Pitriyana and Devayana, while Pippalada invented two other expres- sions-the southern (daksina) and the northern (uttara)- for them. And it is not unlikely, as the late Mr. Tilak has sought to maintain, that in the contrast so sharply drawn between the two roads there is a reminiscence of the original home of the Aryans in some northern region especially when the Vedas and later Indian literature abound in Trans-Himala- yan reminiscences. As Pippalada says, to travel on the southern, ancestral or material path is to marry a beautiful

• Praśnopanigad, I. 5: " etat sarvam yan mūrtauca amūrtofica tasmān murtireve Bayih." 9 Ibsa, I. 9. 10,

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girl, to generate the race, or, at best, to believe, as some good householders do, in sacrifice and charity,-the two words which sum up the whole duty of a worldly man. Those who do so follow but the rule of Prajapati,' the mundane or prolific god. To them belongs only This Brahma-world here. Those again, who travel on the northern, divine or spirit- ual path by means of penance or meditation, abstinence or pure life, faith and knowledge,2 reach at length that spotless (viraja) Brahma-world which is the dwelling place of the spirits, immortality, fearlessness, the end of the transcendent- al road,-the world of absolute existence from which there is no return to Rayi-the world of matter. This is the cessation (nirodha)8 of all materiality, that is to say, of all impurity, and mortality. Such a Brahma-world exists only for those divine sages ' in whom dwell penance, abstinence, and truth,' and in whom there is nothing crooked, nothing false, and no guile.'4 Here the expression nirodha deserves special notice. (2) The first answer of Pippalada has shown how a living body is generated from the parents, from the union of Matter and Spirit, and originally from God. In the second dialogue the question is changed, and that partly because the inter- locutor is a different man-Bhargava of Vidarbha. His question is a physio-psychological one: What are the gods (principal things) of which an organised body is constituted, and by which it is preserved and manifested (prakasita) and, which is the best (varistha) of them ? To this Pippalada gives the following reply :- A living body is constituted chiefly of ether (akasa), air, fire, water, earth, speoch, mind, breath, eye, and ear. By ' Prasnopanisad, I. 15 : " Tad ye bn vai tat Prajaputi-vratam caranti te mithunam utpdayante." * Tapask, bruhmucaryyona, śraddhayu, vidyaya. 8 Praénopanişad, I. 10 " etad vai priņānūm āyatnnam etad amrita nbhayam etat parsyanam etasman ne punar āvartanta ityūga nirodhah." * Ibid, I. 16. 16 ; " yeşam tapo brahmacaryyum yeşn satyam pratiathitam; "na yeşn jihmam amritam na mēyu cêti. "

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these the organism is preserved and manifosted (developed) The best of them is to be known as Prāņa, Hlis physiological viewe. the vital principle. For, when life departs, all other gods are bound to leave the body. Thus Pippalada holds with Mahidasa and. others that the essential fact is this life, and, therefore, the highest principle is the vital. It is besides the one principle which pervades the universe, and through which wo may see the unity of man with the rest of created things. The essence of life itself is Fire or Heat. One of the images by which he illustrates his point indicates his study of nature. The simile is: 'As bees go out of the hive when their king1 leaves it, so when life, etc.' (3) In the third dialogue Āsvalāyana of Kosala asks an even more important question, on a problem having a bearing upon both metaphysios and physiology. As Pippalada under- stands Asvalayana, his problem is at onco the origin, the entry, the place, the supremacy, the five-fold distribution, and the intrinsie fate (subjective condition) of Prana,2 a term mcaning life, a living body, its functions, as well as the soul. Asvalayana asks: From what is Prana (the principle of life) itself born (javeta) ? How does it come into body? Where does it dwell in a fully-developed and fully-active body? Into how many systems are functions of life to be divided ? How does the soul leave the body (utkramate) ? How again does it bind itself to external objects (bahyam abhidhatte) ? And how does it maintain its inner essence or subjective elements (adhyatmam abhidhatte) ?

1 Should be quoen, not madhukara rajn. " Prnenopanişad, IIT.12: "Utpnttim Ayatim athanam vibhatrafcniva paucaddha. Adhyut- mafoniva pranaaya ... " Max Maller translates 'adhyatma' by "internal state." But naither "internal state" nor 'intrinsic fato' convey the exact connotation of the term, In philosophical parlanre 'sabjective' is the word which comes nearest to 'adhyatma' and 'objective' to 'bahya.' Unforlunately these words, too, aro used not in the same sense by all the philosophers. See for Dr. Stirling's historical note upon this snbject, Spinoza's Ethic, translated by W Rale White, 1910, Preface, pp. VII-VIIT.

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Pippalada cannot help remarking that these questions are all more diffcult than one can possibly His Motaphysioal Views, answer (atiprasna). However, he attempts to answer them all, sceing that Asvalayana is very earnest. The spirit, solar self, or principle of lifo is generated from the psyche, soul, or ego, that is to say, from itself, from its inner essence. The soul is in life, just as the reflection imaged in the sun.1 It is by the work of the mind, that is to say, from its inherent desire to be, that the soul comes into body." As regards the sovereignty (vibhutva) of the vital soul, it is in an organised body, as though a supreme monarch (samrat) who 'commands official, saying to them : Rule these villages or those.' In other words, all separate or special (prithak prithak) functions of the organism are subservient to the central function of life, The above simile is evidently taken from Yajñavalkya.8 The soul dwells in the heart from which extend 101 arteries and nerves (nadi) towards different parts of the body. In each of these there are a hundred branches, and for each of these branches there are 72,000 (capillaries and nerve- fibres ?). It is through all these channels that the supreme ruler sends forth command to his officials who are stationed in various centres of activity, and who are doing special works for the healthy upkeep of his kingdom. Such an enormous number as Pippalada gives of arteries, veins, oapillaries, and nerves was not conceived before the time of Yajnavalkya.4 In agreement with Mahidasa, Pippalada divides the physio- logical functions of the body into five systems (pancadha),

• Prafnopaniçad, IlI. S: "ātmanā eşo prano jiyate. Yatheiga puruge chayā etasminn. etad ātatam." ' fbid, III, 8; "manokņiteng šyatyasmif charire." " Brihad Aranyaka Upanignd, IV, 422, IV, 888. + See Ohündogya Upanişad, VI.5.8; Kauşitaki Vpnnişnd, IV.20; Katha Upanişad V1.16; and Brihad Aranyaka Upanigad, II.1.19; IV.3.20,

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to wit, (1) Prana-the respiratory system, (2) Apana-the alimentary system, (3) Samana-Metabolism, (4) Vyana-the ciroulatory system, and (5) Udana-the special senses. The Soul leaves the body by death. Pippalada maintains that at the time of death, as perhaps at the time of rebirth, the sense-faculties become or remain absorbed in mind.' The soul departs free from sense-apprehension and representative cognition, and proceeds towards a world-good, bad, or mixed,-heavenly, infernal, or human-as willed before death (yatha sankalpitam lokam). The path of the soul is lighted by its own light, and it is borne by the vital energy inherent in its life. To our utter disappointment, Pippalada's expressions are too enigmatic and terse to be intel- ligible without having a constant reference to Yajnavalkya's views.2 (4) The fourth problem is entirely psychological. It was formulated by the celebrated astronomer His psychological views. Gargya, who was perhaps an elder contem- porary of Agnivesya.ª And so far as Pippa- lada's answer goes, there is little in it that is either very new or very peculiar to him. His views remind us at every turn of Yajñavalkya. And yet Pippalada must be credited with having employed almost all the principal categories of the later Samkhya system. It is indeed in his phrasæology that we come across for the first time such terms as Prāna for Puruşa, Rayi for Prakrti, Mūrta for Vyakta, Amūrta for Avyakta, and Matra for Tanmatra, the terms Bhuta, Manas, Buddhi, Ahankara, Sense-faculties (Indriyas) and Sense-objects heing all common.4 We must note that the original problems

1 Prafnopanignd, III. 9; "Punarbhavam indriyair manasi abhiaampadyam&naih." · Brihad Āranyaka Upanişad, IV, 4. 1-4, a Ibid, IV. 6. 2. Was Agnivelya the traditional writer on medical subjecta P Sae Oarako-Samhita. In any case, we have mention of Aggivessa in the early Buddhist recorda as a family name or dosignation of a school, perhaps of thinkers who were interested in the study of medioine, · Praśnopanigad, IV.8. 30

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of the Sämkhya type of thinking were two: (1) the genesis of life and the development or manifestation of its poten- tialities, and (2) the attainment of the highest condition of soul through yoga. The solution of the first problem is offered in the light of natural causation, the terms Amurta, Mūrta, Buddhi, Ahankāra, etc., constituting a series of cause and effect, best understood when studied in reference to the formation of 'sperm' and blood,' the development of the foetus in the womb, and the subsequent growth of the organism and the thinking powers, the subject is well dealt with in the Garbha and Sartraka Upanisads and latterly in the Sarīra and Indriya Sthanas of the Caraka-Samhita which is said to have been a later recast of Agnivesya's medical treatise.1 Gargya inquires: What are they that periodically cease during sleep, and are awakened when a man is awake? What is the deity (deva) that sees dream ? Who experiencos the highest happiness (sukha) during dreamless sleep? And on what first cause are all these dependant ultimately P Pippalada's reply is that sensations cease. Sleep in general

The theory of aleep. may be defined psychologically as the cessa- tion of sensations, or rather the absorption of sensations in the mind. When a man sleeps, as they say, he does not hear, see, smell, taste, touch, speak, take (act), enjoy by way of pleasure, excrete, and move about (walk). It is most interesting to notice that Pippalada is well aware of the fact of his interlocutor being an astro- nomer,-a student of the solar system, that is to say, a Sauryayanin Gargya. Thus he gives for an illustration of his point this simile. "O, Gargya, as all the rays of the sun, when it sets, are gathered up in that dise of light, and as they, when the sun rises again and again, come forth, so is all this (all the senses) gathered up in the highest faculty (deva), the mind."2

1 Mra. Rhys Davids has ably sought in her Buddhiam to establish a similar interpretu tion of the 12 nidanas conceived by the Buddhists on the Sanikhya lines. z Prasnopanigad, IV. 2.

PIPPALĀDA 235

Pippalada next takes up the problem of dream, and by

Theory of droam. dream he understands the state of sleep which is to be carefully distinguished from the dreamless state called Sușupti. The above definition of sleep applies strictly to the dreaming condition of the mind. Mind is the deity that sees the dream. Pippalāda upholds here the theory of Yajnavalkya, when he maintains that in the state of dreaming, the mind not merely recalls the accumulated impressions of the past, or previous sense-images, but also sees, imagines, or envisages something quite novel or prophetic. In other words, the mind at the stage of dreaming is both a representative and a purely imaginative faculty.1 When the mind is overpowered by light (tejasa abhibhuto), then it no longer dreams. And it is then, and then only, that true happiness (sukha) arises in its body.2 Pippalada, then, goes on to say that the state of dream, is followed by that of sleep. Between these two he seems

Soul is defined as a to have contemplated an intermediate or pure cognitive con- transitional state, when the dream is just over sciousness. and the mind is conscious of nothing but itself. Such a thought-free but self-conscious and blissful state of the mind is the condition of soul (Purusa), whose essence is pure consciousness or pure cognition (vijñanātma). Soul as such underlies all sense-perceptions and sense-aotions, and all lower and higher functions of the mind. In this sense Pippalada regards Soul as that which sees, touches, hears, thinks, understands, and acts.8 As sleep deepens, the mind transcends even the state of pure cognitive consciousness (citta=vijnanatma),* and thereby 1 Prafna, IV. 5: "Driętafica adrigtenon, frutažca, afrutanca, enubhūtafca, ananubhū- tadca, sat oa asat ca-sorvam pasyati." " Ibid, IV. 6. Ibid, IV. 9: "Eea hi drast& praşt& ghrātt, rasayit&, mantā boddha karta vijdnatmi purugaḥ." Cf. Buddhe's three terme in "cittam ibi pi mano iti pi viffinam," Samyutta-nikaya, tI. p. 94; " That which is called condoiousness, that is, mind, that is, intelligence." Mre. Bhys Devids, " Buddhist Psyohology," p. 14.

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reaches its highest condition -a condition in which the mind reaches the Divine state, the imperishable God denotes the state of mind lying beyond essence of onr being (para akşara ātmā). pure ongnition. During sound sleep, when all sensations cease, all imaginations end, and when the mind loses even the cons- ciousness of its own existence, what else can we conceive as existing but the highest indestructible being in which the cognitive soul, together with all the higher faculties of the mind, and all the senses, and the elements, rests? It is there- fore on God, who is shadowless, incorporeal, colourless and bright, that all these ultimately depend for their existence. He who knows it, becomes omniscient (sarvajña), com- prehends all. The point on which Pippalada leaves us in doubt is that he does not say, as Yajnavalkya does, whether the mind is active or passive during sound sleep. The last point to mention is Pippalada's enumeration of the 'sixteen phases" (şodasa kalā) denoting Pippalsda's view of tho phenomenal world. the sixteen successive changes, i.e., Sodasa Vikārā in later Sāmkhya nomenclature. He compares, in agreement with his predecessors, the phenomena of nature to passing phases of the moon, and the abiding element to the sixteenth digit. The world of generation, with all individual beings and particular things, may appear and disappear, while Purusa (universal soul) abides for ever. The world develop by ' name and form' (nama-rupa). But as soon as the world is absorbed into the imperishable essence, which is one, all names applied to forms or qualitatively distinct things, such as ether, air, fire, water, etc., pass out of use.

Praena VI. Kaneitaki Upanisad, 1. 2

CHAPTER XVI.

BHĀRADVĀJA.

(Muydaka Philosophy.) The Mundakopanisad is our sole authority for Satyavaha Bharadvaja's philosophy, which is honoured in the text itself with the name of the Divine Science (Brahma-vidya), also described as, the foundation of all knowledge The tenchers of the Mundaka sohool. (sarva-vidya-pratiștha).1 The said Divine Science is fancifully traced from Brahmā, the Divine Being himself, down to the great teacher (mahāsala)2 named Saunaka. According to this gonealogical tradition, the dootrine was handed down in an unchanged condition from Brahma to his eldest son Atharvan, from Atharvan to Satyavaha Bharadvaja, from him to the sage Angiras, and from Angiras at last to Saunaka.8 The form in which the Upanisad now reaches us shows that it is no more than a spectrum of all contradictory views. In truth, no one can tell in how many ways the text together with the doctrine which it zealously preserves had undergone changes till it was finally recast. As to the origin or precise historical bearing of the title of the Mundakopanisad, we may quote the following Origin and historical significance of the observations of Prof. Max Muller. "The name Muņdake. Upanishad is called Mundaka-Upanishad, and its three chapters are each called Mundakam. Native

1 Mundakopanişad, I. 1.1. ' Max Muller translates Mahassla "the great householder." It is evident from the Mahagovinda Suttanta of the Digha-nikaya (Vol. II) that Mahatsis (or rather Brahmana. mahsfela) waa a technical name for the Snataka-institution (Post-graduato College, to nse a modern phrase). Hence the epithet Mahassla would show thet Sounakn was the head (principal) of anch an institution. * Maņdakôpanigad, I. 1.2.

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commentaiors explain it as the Shaving Upanishad, i.e., the Upanishad which cutc off the errors of the mind, like a razor. Another Upanishad also is called Kshurika, the Razor, a name which is explained in the text itself as meaning an instrument for removing illusion and crror. The title is all the more strange because Mundaka, in its commonest acceptation, is uscd as a term of reproach for Buddhist mendicants, who are called ' Shavelings,' in opposition to the Brahmans, who dress their hair carefully, and often display by its peculiar arrangement either their family or their rank. Many doctrines of the Upanishads are, no doubt, pure Buddhism, or rather Buddhism is on many points the consistent carrying out of the principles laid down in the Upanishads Yet, for that very reason, it seems impossible that this should be the origin of the name, unless we suppose that it was the work of a man who was, in one sense, a Muņdaka (i.e., a Buddhist monk), and yet faithful to the Brahmanic law."! We can not fully agree with Prof. Max Müller because there are no Brahman works known to us in which the epithet 'Shaveling' is used as a term of reproach for the Buddhist monke only. In these works the Buddhists are commonly represented by such names as ' Saugalas,' Sakyas,' ' Bauddhas,' and sometimes reproachfully, in common with the Jainas and Lokayatas, mentioned as Demons and Atheists (Daityas, Asuras, Nastikas), but certainly not as Mundakas. The early Buddhist records themselves reveal that Buddha was addressed by his contemporaries as 'Samana Gotama' except in one instance2 where a sacrificing priest Aggika Bharadvaja describes him as a mundaka, samana and vasala, and that as the result of his orthodox prejudice not only against the Buddhist Bhikkhus but against the Sramans in general. And 'Samana' (Recluse) was a designation applied

1 S. B. E. II, Introd., pp, XXVI-XXVII. * Sutt nipāto, p. 21; Aggika-Bhāradyāja mays : "Tatrivamuņdaka tatrēvasamaņako,"

BHĀRADVĀJA 239

to all those who distinguished themselves from the Keśins or Jatilakas,1 who wore either long loose locks or hair in braids, and from the Sikhis, who wore a forelock,3 by seeking to live a pure life as Brahmacarins, by begging food as bhiksus (mendicants), and by shaving their head clean as mundakas (shavelings). When Buddha said,' Not by reason of shaving alone a man becomes a recluse' (na mundakena samano),3 he had, in all probability, kept in his mind the 'Shavelings' other than his own followers. In the list of religieux, given in an important passage of the Anguttara- nikāya,4 Buddha unmistakably refers to the Muņda-Savakas ("disciples of the Shaveling ") as a school distinct from the Magandikas, Tedaņdikas, Ājīvikas, Aviruddhakas, Nigaņthas (Jainas), and such other recluses, mendicants or shavelings. Following Buddhaghosa, Prof. Rhys Davids conjectures that the Munda-Savakas were " perhaps some special sub-division of Jains." But as their name implies, the Muņda-Savakas were the disciples or followers of Munda,-the school after whom perhaps the Upanisad in question was entitled Mun- daka. Dr. Schrader tells us that in the Jaina Rajavarttika, a commentary on Umasvati's Tattvartha Sutra (VIII. 1.), a Munda is classed among the Kriyāvādins.0 Neither the Rsis or Munis, nor the Kesins or Jatilakas, striotly so called, were medicants or shave- Śramans. lings. They were hermits (tapasas) or ascetics (sannyasins), without question. In course of time, in the days of Yajnavalkya who alludes to both Sramans and Tapasas, and also perhaps not long before the rise of Buddhism, a new order of religieux was formed, who called themselves 1 Bihler's Cautama, III. 84. On this anthority Rhys Davids, in hia Dialoguee of the Buddha, Vol. II, p. 221, identifles the Jatilakas with those Vaikhanasas (" orthodox hermits") who used to wear, as a rule, their hair in braide, > Gantama, ITI. 22, : Dhammapada, XIX, 6. * Dialogues of the Buddha, Vol. II, p. 220. 5 Ibid, p. 221. * Indisoh. Philoso h

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Śramans (to distinguish themselves both from the hormits who practised penance and sacrifice in the wood and the Brah- mans who were householders). They shaved their head clean, and begged their food, instead of feeding like the Munis or Kesins on pot-herbs, wild rice, nivara-seeds, water-plants, the powdored grains of rice (kana),1 the discarded soum of boiling rice, the flour of oil-seeds, grasses, cow-dung, fruits, roots, water, air, or ether.3 They became known perhaps from the practice of begging, as Bhiksus (mendicants). The origin of this order of religieuw is now obscure or uncertain. But we might safely hold with Prof. Rhys Davids that the Bhiksu order of homeless persons evolved originally from the Brahmacarins8 who did not enter upon the stage of the house- holder,' and who customarily begged their food." According to the Asrama-theory of the leading Brahman jurists, the life of a member of the twice-born ranks or the three upper classes of the Indo-Aryan people ought to be divided into four periods, representing the four stages of effort or training-intellectual, moral, legal and spiritual, in short, both mundane and transcendental. The names and ennmerations of these stages vary with the authorities." But a passage in Baudhayana's legal manual gives just three stages, omitting

' It would seem that Kandda, the founder of the Vaifesika syatem, received hia name from the circumstance of eating Kana. * Dial. B. II. p. 230 ; Gantama, III. 26, 29; Baudhayana, III. 8. 1-14. The word Brabmacarl ocours once in the Rig-veda, hymn X. 109: "The Brahma. chari goes engaged in daty. he is a member of the gods' own body." Cp. Atharra- veda, XI. 5. * Âpastamba, II. 9. 21. 8; Gantama, III, 2; Manu, VI. 36; Yajoavalkya, III, 5857. ' Āpastamba, I. 1. 3. 28; Manu, II. 49; Yajnavalkya, I. 27; Aâvalšyans Grihya- cūtra, I. 22. 10: Manava-Grihya Būtra, I. 1. 2. . For exumple, (1) Yajuavalkya gives them as Panditya, Balya, the Muni and the Brihmana (Brihad Aranyaka Upanipad, 1I1.5.1.); (2) Apastamba, as Garhasthyam, Actrya-kulam, Maunam and Vsnaprasthyam (II.9.21.1): (3) Gantama, as the Brahma- cari, the Grihaatha, the Bhikqu and the Vaikhanasa (III.2; op, Baudhsyana, II,6.11,12) ; (4) Manu, as the Brahmacari, the Gribastha, the Vanaprasthe and the Yati (V.137; VI.87); and (5) Vasistho, as the Brahmactri, the Gribastha, the Vinaprastha and the Parivrājaka (VII.2).

BHĀRADVĀJA 241

the Bhiksu.1 The same we find also in a passage of the Manusmrti.ª The omission of the Bhiksu-stage is interpreted differently by Prof. Rhys Davids.3 While fully cognisant of the weight of his opinion, we think the absence of the name from those passages might well be due to the fact that the stages or periods of training were recognised originally not as four, but as three.+ It also should be borne in mind that the enumeration of three stages belongs neither to Baudhayana nor to Manu, but to some older authority, named Asura Kapila (i.e., Asuri), son of Prahlada.5 There are, moreover, the later recaste of a few older Sutras where the Asrama-theory plays no part, and which might be judged as an evidence of the fact that it was engrafted at some late date on the Caturvanya system, though before the rise of a Buddhism.6 Prof. Rhys Davids also says: " ..... the rules (regarding the Four Efforts) are admitted to be obsolete now. Sankara says these were not observed in his time' And the theory seems to be little more than a priestly protest against the doctrine, acted upon by Buddhists, Jains, and others, and laid down in the Madhura-sutta, that even youths might go forth without any previous Vedie study."8 But we must understand that the rule enjoined in the Madhura-sutta9 is in fact far earlier, earlier even than Gautama's work,10 and most probably laid down in the Vaikhanasa-Dharma-sutra, also known as the Śramanaka

1 Baudhayane, II.6.11.28. : Manu, IL.280. # Dial. B.II., pp. 215-217. * Chandogya Upanişad, III.16 1-7. ' Baudhayana, II.6. 11,28; Brıhad Āranyaka Upanigad, I.5.10. E. G. Samkha and Likhita Sambitss. The names of these two ancient juriste became proverbial in the time of the Bnddha, as may be jndged from the latter's erpreseion, Saikha-Likhsta Brahmacariya (Digha, I, p. 68). Buddhaghone has entirely lost sight of the historical significance of the expresmon. ' Deussen's ' Vedanta,' p. 40. . Dial, B. II., p. 217. " See Chalmer's translation in J.R.A.S., 1894. 10 IIL 1, 31

242 PRE-BUDDHISTIO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Sutra1 And there is no evidence of the rules of Asramas being binding or valid, at any time, for all individuals. Thus we can see how the youths had left home-life, and passed straight from schools into the life of homeless recluses, how, in other words, the order of Sramans or Bhiksus originated from the Brahmacarins. Now among the Sramans, all of whom, in one way or another, broke away from past traditions, revolted against the older Vedic system of sacrifice and self-mortification, or dissented from the later form of Brahmanic Opposition between Sramans on one hand, religion, superstition and mysticism, there and Br&hmans and Ascetics on the other. were various sects or groups or schools. The revolt showed itself in every possible manner. For example, the Sramans as a body shaved their hair and beard, ceased to appeal to the authority of scripture, listened to nothing but their own conscience, sought for innor purity and enlightenment rather than external religiosity, and embraced the wider cause of humanity instead of observing the caste-distinctions which obtained in society.2 But pre- sumably this battle was a mere question of personal temperament before it became a world-wide phenomenon. And perhaps Bharadvaja was the first to organise a regular war (the process of which is as old as the Kavaseyas, if not older), to make a firm stand against the champions of ancient rites and usages. He distinguished himself even outwardly from them by shaving his hair and beard. From this latter circumstance we may suppose, his personal name was gradually forgotten, and his nickname, Munda or Shaveling, 1 See allueions to the Bramanaka Sutra in Gautama, I1I.27; Vasigtha, IX.10; Baudhayana, 1I.6.11.14-15; III.8.15-18: Haradatta's commontary on Apastamba, II.B,21,21; Buhler's 'Manu,' p. XXVII. Pandit S. Sankar has recently translated the Vaikhanaea Dharma-prasna. PAnini refers to the Parasara Bhiksu-Sutra. ' The Suttanipata-comy (Paramatthajotiks, II, 1, p. 175) explains the cause of Br&hmanic apathy for the Sramans. It is said that they did not worship the deities and Brahmans (deva-brahmanapujako na hoti); that they did not foater self-mortifcation (kaya-kilesam na vanneti); that they received recru'ts from all grades of society and per- mitted commensality with all.

BHĀRADVĂJA 243

took its place. Although following his example, now established as a custom of the land, the Sramans of other schools shaved their hair and beard, yet the designation 'Shavelings' (Mundakas) remained a birth-right for his school only.

HIS PHILOSOPHY.

Bharadvaja's fundamental views are two. One of these is closely linked with a question, having Two pointe of inves- tigotion in BharadvĒjn. considerable bearing on moral philosophy in general, and on juristic and social theory in particular. The question is whether, to what extent, and in what manner the transoendental order can be conceived to accord with the concrete activities of life and society. The second view falls within the depart- ment of knowledge, and is but a corollary from the first. Here we find an attempted solution of one of the ultimate problems of knowledge, whether the infinite being is within the apprehension of a finite mind, whether the ultimate reality is accessible to ordinary cognition.

I. Transcendentalism1 versus asceticism and worldly life.

In the systems of the leading Brahman jurists we find certain judgments on the two contrasted types : the life of the householder and the life of the anchorite. Again, in the Samañiaphala-sutta the question arises as to the reward (in this present conscious existence) of the life of the recluse; and an answer is given by the Buddha. It is apparent from the

1 The term is not usod here in the Kantian senge of the investigation of that which ie a priori in human cognition, but approximately in the sonse best associated with Emersion. It implies a sort of reaction against the barbarity of ascetic prectices and against all so. called self-centred social morality, polity, prejudices and superatitions, Bharadvsja's predilection for the hermit life being atronger than his aversion for asceticiem, we prefer to call him a transcendentalist rather than a rationalist 1-2. Dial. B. II.pp. 48-69;op. the Uttarsdhya ana Satra in Jacobi's Jaina-sutras, part 2, pp. 61-69,

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manner in which king Ajatasattu of Magadha put the ques- tion to Buddha that the efficacy of the hermit-life was doubt- ed in the country, especially by those who were immersed in worldliness. But neither was Buddha the first nor Sankara the last to favcur the life of renunciation, and at the same time to denounce asceticism. If we be not mis- taken, Satyavaha Bhāradvāja was one of the pioneers among those thinkers who bravely faced the problem, upheld transcendentalism against both asceticism Bharadvāja Buddha. and as largely praotised by the Vedie ascetics and worldly life as regulated with Puritanic strictness by the Brahman priests and jurists. He thus prepared the way for the rationalism of Buddha who enun- ciated the Middle-path, and sought for a via media of thought, conduct and intellectual training. Prof. Rhys Davids has justly said, "The intellectual movement before the rise of Buddhism was in large measure a lay movement." For one reason or another, some of

dişti, and Mandgelya's in the order of householders, or life REthitara, Paura- the great thinkers of Indin had found

viowa, as actually lived in society, nothing in common with the transcendental sphere of existence, the Brahma-world, that is to say, the higher plane of human activities. At the very dawn of intellectual life in India a problem appeared on its horizon, namely, what is essentially and absolutely necessary for a way to the immortal state (amritatva). The Taittiriyas tell us that a Truth-speaker or Realist (Satya-vacas) named Rathitara termed it Truth. An intellectualist (Taponitya) named Paurasisti thought that the only thing necessary to the higher life was meditation or constant cultural practice. In the view of Maudgalya, the seeker of rewards in heaven, the essential duty of a man is the study and interpretation of the Vedas (svadhyāya- pravacanam).1 ' Taittirīya Upanisad, I. g,

BIĀRADVĀJA 246

The Taittiriyas themselves, on the other hand, could be content with nothing less than a faithful observance of all these and other duties of man's life. To them, therefore, good principle, truth, the inner culture of The ethical of the Taittiriyas views faith and intellect, the study and interpre- tation of the Vedas, self-control or subjuga- tion of the senses, tranquillity or imperturbability, the fires (deities and ancestors), inner offering or prayer, guests (hospitality), fellow men (charity), fellow beings (humanity), marriage and offspring only fall under the various heads1 of man's duty in the world, home, school, society and solitude. The command, the instruction, or the rule of conduct is presented by them in another form, and accepted and ela- borated by all Brahman legal and moral philosophers. The teacher would say to the pupil who is brought up strictly in Brahmanic traditions :- "Speak the truth. Walk in righteousness (dharma). Study the Vedas and Vedic sciences. Render pecuniary help to thy leacher. Do not cut off the lineage, spiritnal or mundane (prajatantu). Be not thoughtless (na pramaditavyam) as to Truth. Do not swerve from good principles. Do not depart from what is morally good and helpful (kusala). Do not neglect living beings2 (cattle, etc.). Be not inattentive to the study and interpretation of the Vedas. Do not deprive the godsand ancestors of offeringa and oblations due to them. Honour father, mother, teacher and guests like a god. Esteem only those actions which are blameless (anavadya), and not others. Perform only those good works which have been performed by us (predecessors), and not others. Receive the Brahmans (wise men) with respect, faith or eagerness, grace, gentleness,

1 Taittiriya Up I. 9: ritam (dharma), satyam, tapas, svadhyaya-praracanom, daman, samab, agnayah, agnibotrab, atithayab, manusam, prajah, prajanab, prajstih. ep Baudhayana, II. 6. 11.8-4; Apastamba, II 9. 24. 7 8. " Max Muller translates bhutani greatness.

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fear and close attention.1 Act and behave in donbtful cases2 as the Brahmans of ripe judgment (sammarsinah) are wont to act, avoiding meanness and aiming only at righteous- ness (alūksa dharmakāmah), and so, too, in matters exciting the public feeling (abhyakhyatesu). The points about which the Taittirtyas, and with them all Brahman legal and moral philosophers seem extremely keen are these: (1) the learning and teaching of Vedic literature; (2) an implicit obedience tocustom and convention, or so-called revealed laws in the scripture; (8) a gradual advance from professed to realised faith; (4) the worship of deities and ancestors ; and (5) marriage. The first two points mean that we should not care so much to originate new ideas or formulate new rules of conduct as to make explicit what is implicit in the revcaled texts,-to go on, in other words, putting new wine continually into old bottles. The third point implies that we should first readily accept what is given in the soripture, and then, if we have time and ability and inclination enough, humbly ask whether it is true or false, in order finally to confirm our faith. The last point relates to marriage or union of the sexes. The Brahman thinkers in general, and the legal and moral philosophers in particular, viewed, contrary to the warrior thinkers, the idea of celibacy and childlessness with a peculiar dread. Under- lying their view of marriage, there is the notion of a kind of heredity, immortality, identity, continuity and progress. Thus nothing is of greater importance for them than this last point relating to marriage. Referring to the four Asramas or orders of men, Gautama who is one of the oldest and least philosophical among the writers on legal subjects, declared that the married householder was the source of all other orders of men, obviously for the ' Braddhayă, friyš, hriys, bhiyā, samvidh. Cp, Asuri's expreasions in the Brihad Aranyaka Upanişad, I. 5, 3, > Karma-ricikitaā vā vritta-vicikitss vă syāt.

BHĀRADVÀJA 247

reason that men of other orders did not genarate children.1 Following Gautama, Baudhayana maintains The legal writors' viow of marriage. The that there is, forsooth, one order only, antinomian dochine ot Vasiştha. the order of the householder. Other orders cannot be conccived as existent because they do not beget offspring.' Renouncing good works recommended in the Vedas, severed from the worlds both celestial and mundane, and devoted exclusively to the transcendental sphere of Brahman, these orders of men become at length dust and perish (rajo bhutva dhvamsate). The other three orders had not existed in the country before a demon named Kapila, son of Prahlada, disagreeing with the gods, i.e., Brahmans, introduced them. No wise men, therefore, should take any notice of them. For in accordance with the rule and purpose of Prajapati, the lord of the world of genera- tion, it is our duty to study the three Vedas, to undergo moral discipline, to marry, to profess and realise faith, to offer sacrifices, and to show liberality to those who deserve it. Quoting an ancient authority,3 Bandhayana and Vasistha sought to establish their views, that by a son a man conquers the worlds, by a grandson he obtains immortality, and by a great-grandson he rises up to the highest heaven. But we must not put out of sight Vasistha's judgment of the moral value of conduct (achra) as far outvaluing the mere formal study of the Vedas togcther with the six Angas and other supplementary works .* Baudhayana's arguments were fur- ther worked sout later by Apastamba," as originally derived from the Taittiriyas in the main Thus Vasistha leads us

1 Gautama, III. 3; III. 36. * Baudhoyana, II. 6. 11. 27; Il. 0. 11. 26, 84. ' Taittiriya Sabita, VI. 3. 10. 5 , Satapatha Brohmana, I. 7. 2, 11; Byihad raņyaka Upaniçad, I. 5 4 16. "A Brahmana is born loaded with three debts: he owes studontehip to the sages ; sacrifices to the gods, and a son to the manea" (Buhler). Haudhayans, II. 9. 16.6; Valiştha, XVII. 5. * Vasiştha, VI. 1-8; cp. Manu, IV: 165-158; Vişnu, LXXI. 92. * BaudbAyana, II, 6, 11. 34.

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back to those who avowedly underrated the moral value of Vedic learning, that is, to the Mundakas, and Baudhayans leads us to Apastamba and Āpastamba back to the Taittirīyas. " Abandoning truth and falsehood, pleasure and pain, tho Vedas, this world and the next, one should seek the universal Soul. For an insight into that alone is the attainment of security (kşemaprāpanam)."1 Āpastamba Apastamba Gargyēyana. and considered this Gargyayana or Platonic view to be quite the contrary of his own. Strange to say, in one section of his work,' if it be not a later inter- polation, the same Apastamba speaks in the Gārgyāyana vein, when like a good philosopher he recognises nothing higher than the realisation of Atman (atma-labhan na param). However, the whole contention of Apastamba centres round the word "alone." Were security attainable by knowledge alone, then the sceker of it ought not to feel any pain in this life.8 But the very fact that he feels some sort of pain is enough to prove that insight into truth alone is not enough for security. Apastamba upholds this view elsewhere,4 and this time with far greater force. But his reasoning is dialectical, very similar to that of a Purva-mimamsin. Aud the doctrine is at best that of a popular materialist and theologian. He introduces the point of controversy thus: Those who vehemently disparage the order of housc-holders assert : Desiring children, a man travels on the southern path of the Aryaman (sun); and desir- ing no children, he proceeds along the northern path. The southern path leads to the crematorium and 'charnel fields' (smasanam), while the northern path leads to immortality. Moreover, he who travels on the latter path, can accomplish 1 Āpastamba, II. 9, 21. 18-14. Gp. Kauşītaki Upanişad, I. 4 ª Ibid, J. 8. 22 ; I. 8. 23 : The section comes in abruptly. It shows no organio connoo- tion with what immediately precedes and with what follows. In any case, the author admits that the views are taken ovor trom some older authorities. The commentator Haradatta thinks it is extracted from an Upanisad ; we suppose, from the Katha. Ibid, II, 9, 21. 16. * Ibid, TI. 0, 28. 8-9; II. D. 24, 1-15.

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his wishes merely by his will. But their statement is absurd from beginning to end. With us who are well-versed in the three-fold knowledge (traividya-vriddhah) the Vedas are the supreme authority (pramanam). We maintain accordingly that the works enjoined in the Vedas ought to be performed, and a rule of conduct (acara) which is opposed to those works is of no authority. Now it is declared in the Vedas : offspring is man's im- mortality (prajatih amritam). In other words, the father is reborn in the son, and this is the true immortality of the mortal (martyam amritam). That the father is just repro- duced separately (virudhah prithak) in the son is perceivable even by the senses (pratyaksena upalabhyate). For the likeness (sarupyam) of both is so very apparent that it requires no other evidence to prove it; their bodies are two separate entities, that is all. The son naturally outlives the father, and fulfilling the duties taught in the Vedas, increases the fame and heavenly bliss (kirtim svargam) of his predecessors. In this way each succceding generation contributes to the glory and happiness of the preceding ones. It follows that the immortality which the unmarried hermits, ascetics or recluses strive to achieve is but a pure metaphysical fiction. That is to say, those deluded wise men who seek for immortality by means other than marriage ' become dust and perish.' There may be among them some who are good men. But for this reason we are not justified in saying that every one of them is either an intellectual or an ethical superior to every one of the householders. And why should we neglect what is so visible, excellent and concrete for something which is incapable of proof, imaginary or abstract ? The arguments which the Taittiriyas brought forward in favour of their opinion were all drawn, as we The throe points of argument of the Tait. saw, from the armoury of Mahidasa, that is, tiriyas. from the philosophy of the Aitareyas. Their arguments are three in all: (1) That the eternal greatness 32

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of the Divine being (Brahman) is neither increased by works, nor diminished, and the soul that knows or realises in and through itself the nature of that greatness is not stained by evil deeds. (2) That the development of soul or the mani- festation of the Divine essence in and through the world of generation is gradual. And (3) that there is no difference of kind but of degree between varied functions the soul has to discharge in its gradual advance from imperfection to com- leted actuality. Thus we see that the opposition is ultimately between two great combatants in history, Mahidasa and Gārgyayana1,

The real opposition and that the real point at issue is whether between Mahidesa and or no there is any correlation between the Gargyayand, Brahma-world and the concrete activities of life. In accordance with his view of development, Mahidasa found perfect harmony between the two, whereas proceeding from his view of Idca, Gargyayana found no other co ordinat- ing link than the generic character of soul-the soul which alone has the power to contemplate and realise in and through itself the eternal reason of the Divine, or through which the Divine Idea (manasa) becomes actualised (cākşuşa). In Yajñavalkya we saw something of an attempt at a reconciliation between the views of Mahidasa and Gargyayana. And in making such an Ambiguity in Yajoa- valkya and its bearing attempt he involved himself apparently in on the antagonism between the Mundakas self-contradiction. While speaking for and the Vajasaneyas. himself, he was on the side of Gārgyāyana, as he found, like his predecessor, no harmony between his idea of the Brahma-world, on one hand, and the actual customs and usages of social life, on the other. Society allows, and is perhaps bound to allow, all sorts of distinction between this and that-a thief and not-a-thief, gods and not-gods, and so forth-while the greatest truth is, according to Yajnavalkya,

1 The dialogue in the Uttar&dhyayana, XIII, belween Citra and Sambhuta reminds us of Citra Gergyāyaņa,

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thai there is no ultimate ground to justity any such distinctions. Thus he was forced at last to leave home to become a homeless recluse or hermit. For, as is clearly implied by him, we cannot serve both God and Mammon at the same time. Being a god, in other words, we can be among the gods, just as, on the other hand, being a Brahman, we can approach Brahman. Therefore, wishing for the Brahma- world only, the Bhiksus leave their homes. That is to say, a divine philosopher, rising in thought and conduct above all material conditions of existence, rending asunder all worldly fetters and even putting aside all hankering after heavenly joys, attainable through works, Vedio or sacrificial, adopts the life of a mendicant (bhiksacaryam carati).1 When he spoke for others, Yajñavalkya was on the side of Mabidasa. As a Brahman theologian himseff, he could hardly get away from his inherited belief in the scripture. It need not surprise us, therefore, when we find that in his estimation the study of the Vedas and Vedie literature was not only useful but essential. The same applies equally to his views on sacrifice, penance and other hum-drums of Brahmanie religion-the beliefs and practices which the Sramans in general, and the warrior philosophers in particular, either openly condemned, or at least viewed with great suspicion. As a Brahman, too, he endeavoured to justify on a ground more or less psychological the Divine revelation in the Vedas. It was on a similar ground that he attempted also to defend all existing practices of Brahmanic religion. As a law- giver, he taught that a Brahman ought to pass through these four stages of life's training-Erudition (panditya), Folly (balya), Silence (maunam) and the Divine knowledge (brah- manatvam). As a philosopher again, he maintained that the eternal greatness of the Divine being neither increases nor decreases by any kind of work." The view was borrowed I Brihad Āraņyaka Upanişad, IV. 4 22. * Tbid, IV. 4, 22-23,

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either from the Taittiriyas or from Pratardana. Supposing that, the view was obtained from the Taittiriyas, we can show that the psychological explanation which Yajnavalkyn offered was far more definite and clear than that of his predeces- sors. Given an eternally active soul, it was very easy for Yajnavalkya to eliminate from the thinking subject an object by substituting for it another, and finally to eliminate from it every object which is foreign, i.e., not-self. When applied to his asrama-theory, Yajnavalkya's psychological explanation would appear as follows: At the first period of his life, a Brahman desires Vedic scholarship. Then comes a period when, after accomplishing this object, he desires a wife, by her offspring, and through them immortality, preservation of the race, maintenance of social and religious institutions, and furtherance of knowledge. At the third period again, he, giving up even this object, desires to contemplate in silence the nature of the ultimate reality of things, while at the fourth his mind is intent on nothing but itself. But if, keeping his mind always intent on itself, a man does any work, no evil thereof can attach to his soul. And if it be possible for a man to enjoy all things and perform all life's functions without degrading his nature thereby, then it would certainly be unwise, according to him, to renounce the world and man's various duties in it at an early age. As for the question, to study or not to study the Vedas, to marry or not to marry, or to be or not to be a monk, his answer was this :- "After erudition, a Brahman persists in folly (balyena tisthati). After that, he contemplates in silence. And finally he becomes a perfect philosopher." Here his expression "persists in folly" refers to marriage, which is the foundation of all social life, and admits of a two-fold inter- pretation. It may be interpreted either (1) as implying a bitter irony against those recluses or ascetics who looked upon marriage as a mere act of folly or childishness, or (2) as meaning that it is really foolish, even according to Yajñavalkya,

BHĀRADVĀJA 258

to enter upon the life of a house-holder. The same ambiguity of meaning attaches to his sentence-" Everything else is of evil." It may mean either (1) everything except philosophic contemplation, or (2) everything except living in accordance with the asrama-theory. This ambiguity of Yajnavalkya's expressions is most important historically, since we may suppose that out of it emerged later two dis- tinct and mutually opposed schools of opinion, namely, that of the Mundakas, and that of the Vajasaneyas. By the term folly (balya) the former understood foolishness, childishness or ignorance, while the latter understood just the opposite of ignorance, that is, wisdom.

A. The Mundakan view. Bharadvaja is distinguished in history from Rathitara as a Truth-bearer (satya-vaha) from a Truth-speaker (satya- vacas) or pure Transcendentalist. The real difference between the two thinkers lies in the fact that the former explicitly blends, like Yajnavalkya, moral considerations with his con- ceptions of the transcendental. Two among Bhiradvaja differs from Rsthitara in that the predicates assigned by Bharadvaja to he blends moral con- siderations with his God (Brahman) are without family and conceptions of the transcendental. without caste (agotrah, avarnah).1 By these he clearly implies his detestation of the existing caste-system. But Bharadvaja has no views to offer other than those of Yajnavalkya save that by which he discountenances the usual ascetic practices of the time. As among the predecessors of the Buddha who is best known as the propounder of the middle-path, it cannot but be of greatest interest to note in Bharadvaja that as, on the one hand, he was anti-Brahmanic in his social and religious views, so, on the other, he discouraged unnecessary physical torture, annihilation of the senses, and other ascetic monstro- sities. "This self (the ideal self-existence) is not attainable

' Moņdakôpanigad, I. 1. 6.

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by the Veda, nor by mere intellect, nor by much learning. He whom the self chooses, by him it can be obtained ...... nor can it be obtained by one who is devoid of strength, thoughtfulness, and right meditation. It is only when a wise man strives after it by means of strength, thoughifulness or earnestness, and right meditation, that he finds himself at home with Brahman."1 And we must bear in mind that Bharadvaja was neither an ascetic or hermit, nor a Brahman house-holder, priest or jurist. He was a recluse (sramaņa), mendicant (bhiksu), or shaveling (muņda). Bharadvaja's hostile attitude towards Brabmanic religion and laws (with which we are mainly concerned) can well be brought out in his own words summarised as follows :- There are two kinds of Knowledge (vidya): the higher or transcendental (para) and the lower or mundane (a-para).

Bborndvja's Attitnde The knowledge mundane comprises the four towarda religion, Brahmanic Vedas and six Vedic sciences, while the knowledge transcendental is that by which the Undecaying (Aksara) is rendered accessible-realised or apprehended,2 "Come hither, come hither!" call the priests, the worshippers of the gods, the preachers of heavenly joys, " This is indeed thy holy well-merited Brahma- world."3 But fluid and unsteady are those eighteen sacrifices in the form of which the lower ceremonial has been told. Fools who hail these with joy as the highest good (sreyah) are sure to undergo decay and death again and again. Fools who are lodged in ignorance,4 but consider themselves pro- foundly wise, and look down upon others, stagger to and fro, like the blind led by the blind. Ohildren (balah) who are lodged in manifold ways in ignorance, consider themselves

' Mundakopanipod, III. 2. 3-4: "Nayam &tmo pravacanenn labhyo, na medhayt, ......... Nayam stm balahinena labhyo, na ca pramādat tapaso yāpyalivigāt, ...... eșa štmā visate Brahma-dhāmg." ' Ibid, 1. 1. 5 : "parb yayt tad Akgaram adhigamyate." * Ibid, I. 2. 6 : " ega val punya snkrito Brahma-lokah." * Mundaka Upanigad, I. 2. S : " avidyayam antare vartamanšh."

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happy. Vedie sacrificers who are liko children know not owing to their passions (ragat) that they will fall and feel miserable, when their life's light is extinguished. Estimating sacrifices and ceremonials as the best (varistha), these blind fools know no bettor. They having fully enjoyed happiness on the height of their well-merited heaven (naka-pristhe sukrite), re-enter this world (of men), or a lower one (of animals and insects). But those venerable sages who meditate in the wood, cultivate faith, and live on alms (bhikşacaryam carantah), proceed, unperturbed, wise and stainless as they are through the solar gate to the region where dwells the immortal, inexhaustible (avyaya) Person, the supreme Brahman.1 He who conceives desires in his mind (kamān yah kāmayate manyamanah), is reborn here and there, according to his desires. But from him whose desires are fulfilled in that his true sell is realised (kritatmanah), all desires fall away even here, in this very life or presont consciousness. "Two birds, insepa- rablo comrades, are attached to the same tree. Of them, one cats sweet fruit, while the other does not eat but watches. Sunk in the same tree by his own impotence (anīsaya), a man dwells, overwhelmed with grief. But when he sees the other lord (isa)-the contented and omnipotent Soul, then he over- comes grief. When a seer sees the lordly creative Reason (kartaram īsam), the resplendant soul, having the same origin or close kinship with the Divine (Brahmayonim) then he is truly wise. Shaking off both good and evil, and devoid of all material colouring of the soul (nhanjanah) he reaches the highest unity with himself (paramarh samyam upeti)."2 Like Gargyayaņa and Pippalada, Bhāradvāja was a Brahmavadin. By the simile of two birds, borrowed from Dirghatamas,' Bharadvaja controverted the position of the Prāņa-vādin. "The vital spirit (prana) shines forth in

1 Mundalja Upanigad, I. 2. 9-11. ' Ibid, III, 1.1-8. : Rig veda, I.164.20; Yaska'p Nirakta, XIV. 80.

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all beings. Recognising this truth, one may be wise cnough, but not a first-rate philosopher (nMivadin).' Bharadvôja'g caae against Vitalists 01 He who revels in soul, delights in soul,and Mocbanists, having performed the higher functions of the soul remains firmly established in his knowledge of Brahman, is indeed the best of philosophers (Brahmavidam variştha)." ? In the same tree or world of generation there are two birds or principles. These are Prana and Brahman, spirit and intelligence, life and soul. The functions and tendencies of these two principles aro diametrically opposed, and yet they cannot be conceived to exist independently of each other. They are inseparable companions. Apart from Brahman, the intelligent principle of things, Prana or vital apirit is altogether a blind power, just as apart From soul, the element of rationality, the living principle is but an animal soul, guided (as we now say) by mere instinets and impulses. Of life and soul, the former is an active principle, in so far as it tends to inorease animality by seeking constantly after the objects of sense, and the latter is a passive factor, in so far as it tends to arrest the growth of animality by refraining from the enjoyment of sensual pleasures. But soul, too, must be said to be active in its own sphere, in so far as it perseveres in developing its rationality or freewill by reflecting upon its own nature, viewing its own purity, i.e., by realising itself. This self-realisation enables soul to rise above all material conditions of its existence, or to reach in this present conscious- ness the immortal, immaterial Brahma-world, where 'the sun does not shine, nor the moon and the stars, nor lightnings, and much less fire.18 Bharadvaja's conception of the Brahma-world is not that of a material heaven. It is a subjective state of the mind

: Cf. Chardogya Upanişad, VII. 15-16. : Muņdaka Upanigad, III. 1.4. 3 Idid, II. 2. 10; cf. Katha, V.15; Śvetšératara, V. 14; Bhagavad Gitā, IX. 15, 6.

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lying far above sense-perception and imagination. This highest condition of soul is indeed the true self of man, and it can be gained by truth, meditation, right knowledge and pure life, that is to say, by purging the mind of all its distracting and contaminating factors. For such a self- realisation as this neither Vedic learning, nor marriage and offspring, nor sacrifices and penances are at all necessary. It would be a great mistake to suppose that the path to self- realisation involves for Bharadvaja only a negative process of the mind. He tcaches rather that the path-process as a whole is constituted by the mutual counteraction of numerous opposite factors.

B. The Vajasuneyan view .. Bharadvaja ropresents the common case of all who called

Śramans veraus Brěh- themselves Sramans against all who were mans. known as Brahman theologians and law- givers. During the long-drawn battle between the philo- sophers and the theologians, lasting for centuries, the orthodox defenders of Brahmanic religion were always on the defensive. But the new movement evoked such a cry for reformation on all sides that it was impossible for them to remain passive. And whether or not the movement was successful in the long run, its influence penetrated even into ancient orthodoxy. There can, perhaps, be, no better evidence of this than the antinomian doctrine of Vasistha. Perhaps from the beginning the recluse philosophers made a mistake in that they placed themselves out of touch with the people, first, by renouncing the world, and, secondly, by discouraging marriage, which was reasonably viewed as the real foundation of social life. It is doubtful if they really meant to discourage marriage in the case of all. And whether they actually meant it or not, the clever Brahmans attacked the weak point in their opponents. Chiefly by this one point they were in a 33

258 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

position to keep the majority of the people on their side, till they succeeded in slowly and steadily remodelling their own systems with materials obtained from their opponents and other philosophic sources. As the recluse philosophers attempted to interpret the Brahmanic notion of immor- tality in the light of rebirth and re-decease, so, on the other hand, the Brahmans interpreted their opponents' conception of immortality or immateriality as virtually amounting to a total extinction of the human race. Nothing could be more an object of dread to the popular mind than this notion of utter annihilation. All this we have noticed in connexion with Apastamba, Baudhayana and other legal writers. The Vajasaneyas were, perhaps, the first to answer the charge of the Mundakas. Their reply is contained in a Upanisad, generally known as

The Taopanişad; its the Vajasaneya or Isopanişad. It forms the commentators and ex- concluding chapter of the White Yajur-Veda. ponents. But for this reason we are not prepared to allow with Prof. Max Muller its claim to a ' very early age,' partioularly an age prior to that of Yajnavalkya. For, as seems to us, the author of this Upanisad was a Vajasaneya or a later exponent of Yajnavalkya's philosophy.1 Strictly speak- ing, the Upanisad in question represents no philosophical view which is peculiar to itself. Its historical importance is that it contains, in common with the Kenôpanisad, an answer or opposition to the Mundakan criticism of Vedic sacrifices, Brahmanic religion and asrama-theory. A bitter tone of irony prevails throughout this Upanisad, and this cannot be satisfactorily accounted for otherwise than by supposing that it was evoked by the grave charge which the Mundakas, and with them many other schools of recluse philosophers framed against the upholders of the asrama-theory and of the system of sacrifices.

Cf. Téopanişad, 12: "na karma lipyate nare" with Brihad Āraņyaka Upanisad, IV.423 : "na lipyate karmaņā pāpakena."

BHĀRADVĀJA 259

The Mundakas said: The sun does not shine there (na tatra suryo bhati), that is to say, the Brahma-world is not the Vedic material heaven, where the sun shines forth. To this the Vajasaneyas replied: If that world be sunless (asuryah), then it must be covered with blinding darkness.1 The Mundakas thought that the highest duty of a man is to gain the Brahma-world by truth, meditation, right know- ledge and pure life or celibacy. The Vajasaneyas, on the other hand, considered the action of those who sought for the Brahma-world only by such means as suicidal.9 The Mundakas considered generation of offspring as ignorance (avidya), and self-realisation as knowledge (vidya). The Vajasaneyas, on the contrary, thought: Death is overcome through such ignorance, while immortality is obtained through such knowledge. This olearly explains why the Vajasaneyas considered the conduct of unmarried recluses as suicidal. As they seem to have understood in agreement with Yajnavalkya, immortality is of two kinds: physical and psychologioal. Immortality in the physical sense is possible only through the perpetuation of the race. And immortality in the psychological sense is not more than a state of self-realisation-a state of the mind when it thinks of itself.8 In the latter sense, then, the term immorta- lity implies but the immortality of soul. Whilst thus controverting the Mundakan view, the Vajasaneyas did not intend to undervalue in any way knowledge by way of self- realisation. The real point of their controversy was that in seeking philosophic knowledge one ought not to neglect the duties of life. So they taught: Those who persist in ignorance enter into blinding darkness, but those who delight only in

1 Žšopanigad, 3. ª Ibid, 9. This seems to be the historioal interpretation of the axpression atmdhano janāh ' Note that by the term Immortality Buddha understood the extinotion of passion, the extinction of hatred, and the extinction of dullness. "Yo kho .. vuccati ragakkhayo dosakkhayo mohakkhayo idam vuccati amatarh." Samyutta, V. 8.

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knowledge enter, as it were, into greater darkness.1 He who experiences, therefore, both knowledge and not-knowledge, overcomes death through not-knowledge, and obtains immor- tality through knowledge,8

II. The nature and knowledge of God.

Far more significant than the first is the second point in Bharadvaja's Divine Science (Brahma-vidya, metaphysics), as it brings out his definite philosophical view rather than a hostile criticism of polytheistic and juristic errors, committed gene- rally by the professed eustodians of Vedic religion and Indian society. It is besides the one point in which he seems to stand nearest to Xenophanes, the reputed teacher of Parmenides. Bharadvaja's criticism of the Brahmanic view of life was The Mundakas versus refuted, as we saw, by the Vajasaneyas. the Keniyas. Concerning both the points, and particularly with regard to the second point, his opponents were the Keniya Jatilas whose views are preserved, we think, in the Keno- panişad.' The contention was not as to the nature of Brahman, but as to the possibility of a knowledge of God. Following a train of thought of the earlier thinkers, which is very pronounced in Mahidasa, Gargyāyana, Uddālaka 1 Tšopanigad, 9. * Īsopanişad, II. "Vidyšm ca avidytm cn yas tad vedôbhayom saha Avidyayā mrityum tirtva, vidyay& ampitam asnute." In the Baddhist Selssutta (Snttanipata, No, 88) Keniya or Keniya is a Jatila who Hived with his family and kinsmen in a hermitnge, built up on the banks of the Mabl- mahigangs (Paramatthajotikt, II. 2, p. 437). In the text itself the locnlity ia referred to as Anguttarlpa. Keniya ia introduced as a contemporary of the Buddha, and a friend of the Brähtnan teacher Sela. On an ocrasion he antortained in his hermitage the Buddha with hia 1250 followera The commentator points ont that Buddha's words Aggihuttamukha yanna, Savitts chandaso mukham were much appealing to Keniya, e hermit as be was. After reading the Keng Upaniand we cannot but feel that a cnse has been made out in favour of the Tapaan religion. The very frst question-" Kenesitni patati presitam manah kena pranah prathamah praits yuktah ?" is full of rominiscence of an airama whero a resident papil wonld disonss the deep questions in this sweet and genial manner with the Riși. Thus elsewhere (Snttanipsta, Sutta No. 56) we meet with & pupil of the hermit Bevari who nska the Bnddha in n similar wny: " Kena-ssu nivuto loko, Kena-ssu na-ppa- kasats ?"

BHĀRADVĀJA 261

and Yajñavalkya, Bharadvaja maintained that the one which is the source of many is knowable by the cognitive mind. According to the Keniyas, on the contrary, " The know-all does not know at all."! " Brahman is the ear of the ear, the

The scepticism of the mind of the mind, the speech of the speech, Keniyas. the breath of the breath, and the eye of the eye ...... The eye does not reach it, nor speech, nor mind. Without knowing or cognising it, how can anyone instruct others about it ?" Referring evidently to "Visvakarman,"2 they add: "We have heard from the teachers of old that Brahman is different from that which is known (to our sense-experience), and even beyond that which is known (thought by the mind)."" "That which is by its nature inexpressible but by which speech itself is expressed, that which is by its nature unthinkable but by which thought is rendered thinkable, ... ..... or that which is by its nature inaudible but by which the hearing itself is made audible is the real Brahman, not that which people here worship." One of the favourite maxims of Mahidasa was: "As far as Brahman reaches, so far reaches speech."4 Discarding this maxim, the Keniyas affirmed: Should anyone ask us, what form of Brahman (Brahmano rupam) is in itself, and what form of Brahman in the gods do you judge to be known, as it were, to you? our reply would be this: "I do not think I know it well, nor do I know that I do not know it. He among us who knows this, he knows it, nor does he know that he does not know it. He by whom it is not thought, by him it is thought; he by whom it is thought, knows it not. It is not understood by those who understand it, it is understood by those who do not understand it."" 1 Kendpanigad, II, 1: "Yadi manyase suvedeti dnbhram evapi nunam tvam vettha"=Lit. "If thon thinkest thou knoweat it well, then thou knowest surely but little." Rig-Veda, X. 82,7. 3 Kenopanisnd, 1.4: "anyad eva tad viditsdatho aviditad ndhi." + Altareya Aranyaka, I. S. 8. 9. " Kenôpanişad, II. 2-8: "nāham manye savedeti no na vodeti veda ca, Yo nas tad veda tad voda no na vediti Veda cn ..... " (Max Muller'a Tranglation).

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This sarcasm has been variously explained by the com- mentators and modern scholars. But the goneral trend of thought or argument seems to be this. Brahman is in essence unknowable. Hence those who boast that they have power to apprehend it are ignorant. But those who are fully aware of their incapacity to apprehend it, and do not endeavour to apprehend it by neglecting the duties of life are wise indeed. " (The Mundakas, for instance are) of opinion that Brahman is known by an inner awakening or a kind of intuition (prati- bodha-viditam matam) and that by such knowledge we obtain immortality. (If it be true that) by knowledge we obtain immortality, (even then it must not be forgotten that) by the self (physical being, living body) we acquire strength (virya, to overcome real death)."1 The gods are powerless without Brah- man. True. But it must be remembered that the gods, such as Fire, Air, Lightning and others, are nearest unto Brahman.ª (The worship of these is, therefore, not altogether worthless.) There is every reason to believe that here the Keniyan Sarcasm applies to the Mundaka opinion according to which Brahman is knowable only by inner understanding or intuition (pratibodha-viditam). For it is explicit in Bharadvaja, although not so explicit as in Naciketas, that "a man, whose nature is purified Acoording to the Mundakns God can by the grace of knowledge, alone can be known by pare cognition, see God, meditating on him as without parts-as a whole. The infinitesimal self is to be known by cetas (pure reason) or vijñana (pure cog- nition)." God is invisible, incomprehensible, without family, without caste, without eyes, ears, hands and feet, the eternal, the really existent, the omnipresent, the infinitesimal, the inexhaustible, and the origin of all beings.4 Just as the 1 Kendpanigad, II, 4. a Ibid, III. 1-12, IV. 2-8, 3 Muņdukôpaniçad, III. 1, 8-9: "Jfāna-prasādena visuddha-sattvas tas tu tam pasyate nişkalam dhyšyamanab." + Ibid, I, 6.

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spider spreads and winds up uts thread, or as plants grow on the earth, or as hairs spring forth on the head and body so does everything originate from the inexhaustible. The Divine Person is devoid of form, unborn, without breath, without mind, pure (subhra), undecaying, higher than the high (parat parah). From him is generated breath, mind, all organs of sense, ether, air, fire, water, and earth.' The earth is the support of all, while the Divine Person is the inner self of all that is (sarvabhuta-antaratma). In the physical world there is no god-the sun, the moon, lightning, or the like- who can be conceived as God. In man God is the soul that assumes the nature of mind and acts as a guide to the senses. That which is the purest in external nature and that which is the purest in our inner life are one. That is to say, God and Soul are indentical in nature. That which is uncreated (akrita) cannot be gained by that which is created (krita). And that which is pure cannot be obtained by that which is impure. Neither God in nature nor God in man can be apprehended by the study of the Vedas and Vedic sciences or by the senses. The sacrifices to the gods and ancestors and penances and fasting cannot purify our nature. The rivers cannot wash off our sins. The best means of apprehending God or purifying our nature is Yoga-medita- tion or inner culture of faith and intellect When the wise apprehend God, and realise the immortal in them, which is full of bliss, then the fetter of their heart is broken, all doubts are solved, all their works perish.ª And when they die, the elements are dissolved, and the sense-faculties vanish in a similar way, but soul, the imperishable element, becomes united with God.4 In this connexion Bharadvaja quotes a Pippalada view, vig .- "Just as the flowing rivers disappear in the sea, so a wise man, freed from individuality, goes to the Divine Person."

1 Mundakôpanişad, II. 1. 8. * Ibid, II. 2.8. # Ibid, II. 2. 7. * Ibid, III, 2. 7-8.

CHAPTER XVII.

NACIKETAS.

((folamaka Philosophy.) The place of Naciketas in Indian philosophy is very similar to that of Parmenides in the history of Greek thought. The precise position assumed by both is that of an Position of Nacikelas and Parmenides mn the Absolutist' as opposed to that of a Mechanist.2 history of philosophy. The analogy between the views of the two thinkers is in certain points very close.3 But we shall not for this reason be justified in supposing one of them to have been a borrower from the other.4 Even as to the point of close resemblance between them, Mrs. Rhys Davids seems more doubtful than we are, when she says, "Nor, in the absence of any fuller statement of the former extreme (That everything is) alluded to by the Buddha, can we say whether that view coincided with the position taken by Parmenides." She readily grants, however, the probability of some coincidence. Prof. Max Müller, on the other hand, dis- covers some points of similarity between Naciketas and Plato, especially in regard to the simile of the chariot in the Katho- paniad, although he, too, is not ready to presume that the latter borrowed the simile from the former. Instead, then, of raising any question of borrowing, we might observe with profit that in India Naciketas thought on the lines of Gargyayana; in Grecce Plato thought on the lines of Parmen- ides. In India Uddālaka, who resembles Anaxagoras, was a predecessor of Naciketas. Furthermore, the immediate

1 Brabma-vadin, Atma-vadin. Prana-vādin. Bhūto-vūdin, 1 Alt. Gesch, der Philos .. p. 121. Mrs, Rhy > Davids, Buddhiam, p, 88.

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predecessor of Naciketas was Bharadvaja as that of Parmenides was Xenophanes. It is a received opinion that the historical reality of Naciketas is extremely doubtful.1 In the Historical interpre- tation of the descent Taittiriya story he is introduced as a Gautama, of Naciketas from Uddālakn Aruņi. The the son of Vajasravasa,2 while in the Katha Gotamaka viewa in the Knthn Opaniad. The version of the same story he appears as a Gotamaka philosophy Gautama, the son of Auddālaka Āruņi, i.e., in relation to the Mundake and the Nyaya philosophy. of Vajasravasa the son of Uddalaka and the grandson of Aruna.3 But however fictitious the ascribed descent of Nacikotas from Uddalaka of the Gotama clan may have beon, it is of the greatest historical importance as affording a legendary basis for the chronology of the philosophy of Uddalaka and the teaching of the Katho- panisad, centred round Naciketas. The name of Naciketas is no more than a suitable designation for referring to the particular individual behind that teaching, and we are inclined to think that this particular individual was but an influencial leader of a school of wanderors whose origin can be traced back to Uddālaka Āruni. We might, indeed, go so far as to identify this band of Bhiksus with the Gotamakas* ap- pearing in the Anguttara list of religieux, nlong with the Muņda-savakas whose views have been discussed in the previous chapter. The positive advantage of this identification is that we are enabled thereby to account for the close resemblance between the teachings of the two Upanisads, the Mundaka and the Katha, in both of which we cannot help being struck by a spirit of reaction against Vedic ritualism. The truth of a common legendary descent of Uddalaka Āruņi

: Vedio Index, I, p. 482. * Taittiriya Brāhmana, III, 1, 8. Kathopanişad, I. I. 11. + Prof. Rhys Darids thinks that the Gotamakas were either the followers of Devadatta or the followers of a Brabman of the Gotaun clan (Buddhiat India, pp .. 146-146; Dial. B. TI, pp. 220-22). Bndhoghosa says that Ehe Gotamakna were a schnol of non-Buidhiatio teachers or a elass of herelics, which is really saying nothing about thent. 34

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and Naciketas is clearly brought home to us as we realise how closely is bound up the Naciketa dootrine of Being with the logical postulate of Uddalaka's philosophy. And the same is still more clearly brought home to us when we see how the Katha dialogue between Naciketas and his father was constructed on the model of the Chandogya dialogue between Śvetaketu and Uddalaka. The difference between Bhāradvaja and Naciketas, considered as representatives of the Mundaka and the Katha or Gotamaka philosophy, is of such a nature as is inevitable when one teacher thinks on the lines of the other. Speaking generally, it is such & difference as exists between Xenophanes and Parmenides in Greek thought. On the other hand, in the light of the legendary descent of Naciketas from Uddalaka it is easy to understand the process of the growth of a Gotamaka philos- ophy which in its Chandogya, Katha or Gita stage is but the same theistic doctrine (isvara-vada) in a special form. The time may come, and we firmly believe that the time will come when the historian will be able to prove beyond dispute that the Nyaya system of Gautama Aksapada which is in its ultimate analysis a theistic doctrine was the consummation of the Gotamaka attempts to establish a valid theory of the singleness of cause (eka-vada) by the method of induotion by way of inference.

HIS PHILOSOPHY.

The most authentic document now available for the philo- sophy of Nacikeast is the poem of the Kathopanişad. It has been translated into Persian, French, Latin, The source of infor- mation. German, Italian and English by many dis- tinguished scholars. The first translation is that in Persian, and associated with the name of the enlightened Mogul Prince, Dara Shukoh, the eldest son of Shah Jehan. And the view bas been generally maintained since Prof. Weber that the said poem consists of portions

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or fragments some of which are older than others. Even actual attempts have been made to separate the more modern from the more ancient portions. But Prof. Max Müller finds no justification for an attempt on the part of modern scholars to ransack the Upanisad in its present form. "In its original form," he says, "it may have constituted one Adhyaya only, and the very fact of its division into two Adhyayas may show that the compilers of the Upanisad were still aware of its gradual origin. We have no means, however, of determining its original form, nor should we even be justi- fied in maintaining that the first Adhyaya ever existed by itself, and that the second was added at a much later time. Whatever its component elements may have been before it was an Upanisad, when it was an Upanisad, it consisted of six Vallis, neither more nor less."1 But one important point seems to have escaped the great scholar's notice, namely, that the poem of Naciketas, precisely as that of Parmenides, consists not of two parts but of three. The first part serves as an introduction, the second part treats of 'the way of truth,' and the third part of ' the way of opinion.' We propose to examine these parts separately, one after another.

J. Introduction. There are two versions of the first part now extant, and it furnishes 'a peg on which' hangs the whole philosophy of Naciketas. The prose version of which the date is unknown is given in the Taittiriya Brāhmana (III. 1. 8); the poetic ver- sion forms the first chapter of the Kathopanisad. This part introduces Naciketas as the son of Vajasravasa, descendant of Uddalaka. Vajasravasa wishing for heavenly rewards, spent all his wealth on performing a cow-sacrifice to the gods, and on giving presents to the priests. When the sacrifice

• S.B.E., XV. p. zxiji,

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was being porformed and the presents were being given, a conviction arose in the heart of Naciketas, and he began to think "Unblessed (ananda), indeed, are those heavenly worlds to which a man goes by sacrificing cows, old and sterile,-too old to be able io drink, eat, give milk, or to calve."1 The boy Naciketas questioned thrice his father saying, "Enther, unto whom wilt thon give me?" The father replied rather angrily, " Unto Death (Yama)." Here the two ver- sions differ in some respects. The Taittiriya version intro- duces a third interlocutor, Voice or Wisdom, saying to Naciketas, as he was waiting for further reply from his father: " Thy father asked thee to go to the house of Death-Death to whom he has offered thee. Go, therefore, to Death while he is away from his house, and stay there three nights without eating. When Death inquires of thee, 'How long hast thou been here?' then say, 'For three nights.' If he asks thee, What didst thou eat all the while? say, " I ate the first night thy offspring, the second night thy cattle (animals for sacri- fice), and the third night thy good works (sacrifices)." According to the Katha version after listening to his father's words, Naciketas said, "Father, T go as the first, at the head of many who are still to die, and I go as one of many who are now dying. But how will Yama, the king of the dead, dispose of me ?" The father replied, 'con- sider what has happened to those who have gone before thee, or what will befall those who are still to come. Verily a mortal ripens like corn, like corn he springs forth anew.ª Metempsychosis is, in other words, the lot of a mortal on this earth,"3 The prose version of the introduction further relates that Naciketas, following the voice of Wisdom, came to the house 1 Kathopanisad, I. 1 3 * Kațha, I. 1. 6: " Šasyam iva martyaļ pacy ate éasram ivšjāyate panah." ' The last sentence is our own addition and it is meant to som up Vajafravnea's viewa about metempaychosis on the anelogy of the animation of corns,

NACIKETAS 269

of Death when the latter was not at home, and did all the rest exactly as he was instructed to do. Seeing that Naciketas consumed his offspring, cattle, sacrifice, in short, all that tie a man down to mortal existence, Death showed respect to him instead of subjecting him to his rule, and granted him three boons. The first boon chosen by Naciketas was the kuowledge of the way of returning alive to his father: the second was the knowledge of the way of rendering one's good works imperishable; and the third was the knowledge of the way of conquering death itself for ever. Death's reply to Naciketas was, by means of the three-fold Naciketa-fire or zenl for truth as distinguished from the three-fold fire, kindled generally by Vedic sacrificers or Brahman priests, by way of marriage, penance and sacrifice. The poetic version only sets forth in detail what is given in the earlier prose version in a concise form. The interest of the introduction is two-fold : (1) That it sets forth the attitnde of Naciketas towards Brahmanic religion and laws. (2) That it gradually leads up to the real philosophical stand-point of Naciketas. And upon the whole, it shows that the subject of his investigation is neither the world of generation or realm of repeated birth and death, nor the heavenly world or the realm of relatively unchangeable being. The latter point is very clearly brought out in a verse of the Kathopanisad (I. 1. 12-13), where Naciketas, referring to the ordinary popular belief in the happiness of celestial beings, says: "In the heavenly world (svarge loke) there is no fear (they say). Thou art not there, O Death, and no one need be afraid owing to decay. Leaving aside hunger and thirst, and out of the reach of sorrow, all rejoice in heaven. Vedic fire-sacrifice leads us to heaven. But tell me, if thou knowest, whether the lovers of the heavenly world obtain true immortality or not." Thus Naciketas in his introductory statement implies a sharp distinction of the realm of one absolute heing, which is his immediate task to investigate, from the world of constant changes, as also from

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heaven, the realm of relatively unchangeable being. As the absolute being is in his view far beyond the sensuous, no idea of change or relativity can attach to it.

II. The way of Truth. The second part of the Kathopanisad really begins (I.1.20) where the Taittiriya version of the introduction ends (I.1.19). It is ontirely a dialogue between Naciketas and Death. Scan- ning this part closely, we can perceive that it was added at a later period to the first part. A similar relation may be said to exist betweon the second and the third part. Whatever that may have been, dealing as il does with the way of truth, none can dispute that the second part alone gives us the real view-point of Naciketas, the doctrine of Being, presupposed or implied in what is known in the Buddhist literature as Sakkaya-ditthi or Atmanistic philosophy,1 and in the Sāmkhya literature as Sat-karya-vāda. Mabāvīra and Buddha seem to have described it as a type of Eternalism,ª or rather of the doctrine of oneness" or Semi-eternalism .* It is somewhat dificult to distinguish. between what Buddha calls Eternalism and what he calls Semi-eternalism. So far as we can judge from his language, Eternalism has direct reference to the philosophy of Kakuda-Katyavana, and Semi-eternalism to the philosophy of Naciketas.' The doctrine of Being con- stitutes the logical standpoint of the philosophies of Naciketas and Kakuda Katyayana. Not less important is the distinction drawn by Buddha between the two types of Eternalism: Intui- tional and Sophistic, Physical and Logical.e In reference to the first type of Eternalism, Buddha thought that the absolutist

1 Atta-vida; Attēnuditthi. ' Niya-vâda; Sassata-dițthi. * Ekkā-vāda.

' Dial, B. II. 26-35. * Dial, B. II. 27-29,

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position, that everything is (sabbam atthi), was reached from the notion of the world of generation. " For one who views in the light of right insight the coming-to-be of the world, as it really is, there is no such thing in the world as non-Being (natthita). (Thus his mind fastens upon this one extreme: Everything is.)"! Buddha's opinion is expressed elsewhere, in a passage of the Brahmajala Sutta. There by the term everything Buddha understands the soul and the world, the self and the not-self (atta ca loko ca). In this passage Buddha clearly states that a full recollection of former existences leads a man to the following conclusion : "Eternal are the soul and the world. These are barren, stedfast as a mountain peak, as a pillar firmly fixed. And though living beings continually run in transmi- gration, decease from ono state of existence to be reborn into another, yet they exist eternally and are for ever the same." The position taken by Naciketas was different from that of an Eternalist. In truth his was the point of view of a Semi- Eternalist or Monist. Accordingly, his fundamental thesis was not that 'Everything is,' but only that ' He is' (astiti). As we have seen, the introduction ascribes the former view to Vajaśra- vasa, father of Naciketas. The point gains in importance as it clearly shows how Naciketas made a wide departure from his predecessors-"Paramesthin ", Uddālaka, Varuņa, and others. "Paramesthin" approached the notion of Being entirely from the physical world: whatever is, springs from that which neither is nor is not. Although Uddalaka's doctrine of Being was in the same stage, it was in his hands that the doctrine came to be distinctly formulated as a logical postulate: How can there be transition into Being but from Being? The way in which Uddalaka asked himself this question shows that he made a great advance upon "Paramesthin" as to the actual formulating 1 Samynila-nikāya, 11.17; IIT.136. Of. Mrs. Rhys Davids. Buddhiam, p, 88. : Digha-nikāya, Il, pp. 14 foll .: "sassato aitā ca loko ca vašjho kntaitho ..... elthitvevs sassati somanti."

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of the doctrine Gargyayana, too, paved the way for Naci- ketas by defining Being (Sat) as that which is different from the gods and the sentient beings. Now Naciketas said to Death, "There is the doubt (viciki- tsa) as to man's eristence after death. Some say, he is; others, he is not. This would I like to know, taught by thee. This is the third boon which I ask of thee. Naciketas does not choose any other boon but this."1 Death said, "The good is one thing, the pleasant another; these two, having different objects, chain a man. It is well within him who clings to the good; he who chooses the plea- sant, misses his end. The good and the pleasant approach man: the wise goes round about them and distinguishes them. Yea, the wise prefers the good to the pleasant, but the fool chooses the pleasant through greed and avarice."8 "Wide apart and divergent are these two: ignorance and what is known as knowledge. Fools who are lodged in ignor- ance, consider themselves profoundly wise and look down upon others. They stagger to and fro, like the blind led by the blind. The existence after death never appcars in the vision of the careless child (ignorant fool), deluded by the possession of wealth. This is the world, he thinks, there is no other. Thus he subjects himself repeatedly to my rule." (There can be no doubt that the verse relating to the doctrine of Being is missing from the Kathopanisad as we now have it. We supply it from the Bhagavad Gitā (II. 16) seeing that the Gita-slokas relating to the doctrine of Being are all quoted from an Upanisad which is no other than the Katha,) "Being is, non-Being is not, Being cannot come out of non-Being nor can there be non-Being, when there is Being."3 "Being is not born, it does not die. As it sprang from

1 Katopanind, I.1, 20-29. Tbia, T.2. 1-2 (Max Muller's tranelntion). Bhagavad Gita, II.16: " nlato vidyate bhavo nlbhavo vidyato satab."

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nothing, so nothing sprang from it. Being is anborn, eternal, immutable, ancient. Being does not perish when the body perishes. If the killer thinks that he kills, if the killed thinks himself killed, both of them are ignorant; the one does not kill, nor is the other killed ...... He who has rot ceased from his wickedness, who is not tranquil, and subdued, or whose mind is not composed, cannot obtain the Being (even) by know- ledge."] Being is, non-Being is not. Nothing comes out of nothing, there is no becoming. Birthless it is and deathless. Being is the self, the immaterial in the material, the changeless among the changing. Such is the doctrine of Being as propounded by Naciketas, an Eleatic postulate of Being which Bergson aptly describes as a paradox. The important point to observe is that all the predicates assigned by Naciketas to Being are negative in character.

III. The way of Opinion. The second part of the Kathopanisad comprises the second section of its first chapter, and the third part covers the third section of the same chapter. Such being the case, the whole second chapter would seem redundant and unnecessary. In- deed, its usefulness is that it furnishes a detailed exposition of all that is expressed by way of opinion in the third seotion of the first chapter. The question has been raised with respect to the Parmen- idean conception of Being, whether it has in its background anything material or that which occupies space or not. Prof. Zeller, who is supported by many modern scholars, maintains that Parmenides, like all previous Greek speculators, kept in his mind the general structure of nature. Prof. Adamson and Prof. Dawes Hicksa contend that Parmenides approached the 1 Kathopanişad, I. 2. 18, ff. ' Senior Profestor of Philosophy, University College, London. Here the reforence is to his lecture notes. 35-

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notion of Being entirely from an abstract point of view. In other words, the postulate of Being was for Parmenides alto gether a logical doctrine. In such case Parmenides could not append to his truth any opinion-application of truth to exper- ience-without doing violence to his own position. A similar question is apt to arise in the case of Naciketas or Gotamaka philosophy, especially when the connexion between the second and the third part of the Kathopanisad is so mechanically maintained. The philosophy of Naciketas, no less than that of Parmenides, begins and ends with the definition of Truth. As regards the Naciketa or Gotamaka philosophy, the truth of the logical postulate of Being can be realised psychologically through Yoga, and not by reasoning (tarka). And as to opinion, Naciketas had nothing to say which is new, that is, nothing that neither Pippalada nor Bharadvaja had said. However, the precise way in which he stated his opinion is interesting enough. Another point of intorest in his opinion is the definition of the term Yoga. We sum up below his opinion: There are two principles, dwelling in the same cavity of the heart. One is life; the other is soul. The knower of Brahman distinguishes between them as Unity of God and Sonl. shade and light (chaya-tapau). The true self of man is soul which sits in the chariot called the body. Intellect or the faculty of understanding (buddhi) is the charioteer, the mind (manas) is the reins, the senses (indriyani) are the horses, and the sense-objeots are the roads. When Soul is united with the body, the senses and the mind, then it is called by the wise the Enjoyer (bhokta).' He who has no understanding (vijnana), and he who is weak-minded, his senses run riot like vicious horses of a charioteer. But he who has understanding and is strong-minded, his senses are well 1 Kathopanigad, I. 3. 8-4: "Atmanam rathinnm viddhi, sariram ratham eva tu. Buddhim tu srathin viddhi, mana pragraham evu ca. ludriyāni hayān shur vişayam steşu gocšrān. Atmendriya-mano-yuktari bhoktôtyāhur manīșinah."

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controlled like good horses of a charioteer. Ho who is without understanding, and he who is thoughtless and impure (asuci), never reaches the immortal immaterial stale, but enters into the round of births. But he who has understanding, and he who is thoughtful and pure, reaches indeed (in thought) that state (tat padam) from which there is no return to the realm of change. It is he who reaches the destination of his (mind's onward) journey, the highest state of Visnu. Beyond the senses there are the impressions or the contents of perception (artha), beyond them there is the mind (the inner sense), beyond it there is the intellect or the Yoga is the subjective or meditative mode of faculty of understanding (buddhi), beyond it attaining to God or reaching unity of self. there is the great soul (mahat, pure cognitive consciousness), beyond it there is avyakta- the indeterminate and heyond it there is the Divine Person (Purușa). Beyond Purusa there is nothing or no other state of consciousness. Thus Godhood is the goal, the highest condition. This ideal self-existence cannot be gained by the Veda, nor by more intellect, nor by much learning. God is hidden in all beings, the inner self of man (antaratma). Subtle seers can see God by their sharp and subtle intuition. In fact, knowledge is to be obtained by the mind (manasa vedam aptavyam)-a mind that is purified and elevated through Yoga. By the term Yoga we are to understand, with Naciketas, 'the firm holding back of the senses' (sthiram indriya-dhara- nam) a mode, in other words, of reaching unity with ourselves. As in the process of meditation the mind rises higher and higher from one state to another, the realm of absolute exis- tence appears at length in the mental vision of the Yogin, like an imuge reflected in a mirror. Such a knowledge of God as this cannot be reached by speech, mind or sight. God can be apprehended by none but he who recognises the truth of the dictum "He is" (astiti). There is no better expression according to Naciketas, for God than that "He is."

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One can hardly fail to notice in these views the Yoga or psyco-religious aspect of the Samkhya philosophy in the making. The cosmological or biological aspect of the same philosophy is altogether absent from the Katha Upanisad and in this respect the teaching of the Katha ditfers from that of the Praśna. Before we take leave of Naciketas, it is necessary to men- tion that the whole of his philosophy is beautifully roproduced in a section of Apastamba's legal manual (I. 8. 22-23). This fragment of Āpastamba has besides some points in common with the Mahsgovinda Suttanta of the Digha-nikaya. The dialogue between Kesi and Gotama in the Jaina Uttaradhya- yana Sutra (XXIII), too, reminds us, here and there, of the older dialogue between Yama and Gautama in the Kathopa- nişad. In the Brahmajala sutta again Buddha gives an analysis of a view, similar to that of Naciketas. It is presented partly in a mythical garb. Nevertheless, it is obvious that the terms- the gods 'spoilt by play' (khidda-padosika) and the gods 'debauched in mind' (mano-padosika)-as Buddha employs them, have reference to such passages in the Kathopanisad as: "the careless child" (I. 2. 6.); " Children follow after outward pleasures"; and the like. The fourth passage in Buddha's analysis is: "The sentient soul comprising eye, ear, nose, tongue and body, is impermanent, mutable, limited and change- able, while the self called thought, mind or cognitive conscious- ness (citta, sañña, viññana) is permanent, stedfast, eternal and immutable."

CHAPTER XVIII.

PŪRŅA KĀŠYAPA.

(Pūrana Kassapa.) The Buddhist records1 speak of Purana Kassapa as an old, experienced and venerable teacher, the head of a religious order, the founder of a school (tittha-karo), one who was fol- lowed by a large body of disciples and honoured throughout the country. According to a fabulous legend of Buddhist origin, Purana Kassapa drowned himself near Sravasti, the capital of Kosala, in the sixteenth year of Buddha's career. We may infer from this that Kassapa died in 572 B.C. if the traditional date 543 B.C. of Buddha's demise be accepted as true. On the other hand, in the Samaññaphala sutta, Kassapa is referred to as a contemporary of King Ajatasattu of Magadha. But he is similarly alluded to in the 'Questions of King Milinda' as a contemporary of Milinda, Buddhaghosa tells us that Pūraņa Kassapa was a naked ascetic (acelaka). He apparently confounds Acelaka Kassapa2 with Pūrana. Buddha- ghosa further tells us that Kassapa was formerly a slave, that he completed the number of one hundred slaves of a family, and that from this circumstance he came to be known as Purana. Apparently this is not true, for, as his name shows, Kassapa was born in a Brahman family. The true significance of the Pali epithet Purana seems to be that Kassapa claimed to have attained perfeot wisdom (purņa jfana), or that his disciples believed that he was replete with perfeot wisdom. This is borne out by the passage

1 Sematfa phale-sutta, Digha-NikEye, I. 47 (Dial, B. II. 66); Milinda pašhb, p. 4; Rockhill's ' Life of the Baddha,' pp. 80, 98 foll. ' Digha-Nikaya, I, p. 161. " Sumahgala Vilaeini, I, p. 102,

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of the Anguttara Nikāya (IV, p. 128) where two Lokayatika Brahmans are said to have stated that according to Pūrana Kassapa's theory fonly an infinite mind can comprehond the finite world, whereas according to Nigantha Nataputta's theory, the finite world can only be a content of finite knowledge. Ouriously enough, in a passage of the Anguttara-nikāya1 Ānanda ascribes part of Gosala's doctrine to Pūraņa Kassapa. In this paesage Kassapa comments upon Kasyapa and Gošlla Gosāla's term Chalābhijātiyoe (six classes of beings). Buddhaghosa's explanation' of this term was evidently based on the Nikaya passage above referred to. The primary object of Ananda was to label Kassapa's philosophy as the doctrine of non-causation (ahetu-vada), and so far he was perfectly right, This leads us further to think that the first portion of the doctrine aseribed to Gosala in tho Samañña-phala-sutta ought to be separated from the rest on the ground that the doctrine of non-causalion or the hypo- thesis of chance does not fit well into the deterministic theory of Gosala, We think there is no other conclusion to be drawn from the significant passage in the Samyutta-nıkaya (V, p. 126). Ārya-Sura also identifies the doctrine of non- causation with that of nature (svabhava-vada) .* A later text, the Milinda, ascribes to Pūraņa Kassapa a puerile doctrine, that the earth rules or sustains the world. Whereas an older authority, the Samañña-phala-sutta, applies the name Akiriya-vada, the doctrine of non-action, to the philosophy of Kassapa, Buddhaghosa also admits that Kassapa discarded the theory of action.". The Jaina Sutra- kritangae furnishes a parallel passage, where the doctrine

1 III, p. 883 foll. = Dīgha-Nikāya, I, p. 64. 1 Sumangala-Vilfemi, I, p. 162 + Jotaka-māla, pp 148-149 : Kammam pațibāhati,-Snmangala-Vilāsinī, J, p 166, I. 1, 1. 18 (Silańka's commentary).

PURNA KĀŚVAPA 279

under discussion is expressly called Akiriyavāda. Śīlāńka culls it Akāraka-vāda.' Thus our authorities for the philosophy of Pūraņa Kassapa are two,-the Sutra-kritauga and the Samanna-phala-sutta. And we must give preference to the evidence of the former, as the Buddhist document does not make perfectly cloar the real position taken by Kassapa,-a position which can truly be indicated by the term Akiriva-vāda. From these authorities we learn that according to Kassapa's view, when we act or cause others to act, The doctrine ol pnssivity of soul. it is not the Soul that acts or causes others to act .: The Soul is, in other words, passive (nişkriya).' This being the ense, whether we do good or bad, the result thoreof does not alfect the soul in tho least. Kasspa's view is rather exaggerated by King Ajatasattu." That ultimate roality is beyond both good and evil, is a view which has been upheld, more or less, by all the previous thinkers, The immediate hackground of Kassapa's theory of the passivity of soul must be sought in the philosophy of Bharadvaja and Naciketas, who maintain that contrasted with the functions and tendencies of the living principle, the soul is passivo. It is interesting to see that Silanka identifies Kassapa's doctrine with the Samkhya view. It seems that the Buddha, in the Brahmajala-sutta, distin- guished the logical standpoint of Pūrana Kassapa from his own, as a hypothesis of fortuitous origin Kasyupa's logical standpoint. (adhicca-samuppada) from what he called the theory of causal-genesis (paticca- samuppada).4 Elsewhere he describes the former as a theory of non-causation (ahetu-appaccaya-vada).5 According to the

' I. 1. 1. 13 (Sflaoka's commentary) Situ-Kritsnga, T, 1 1 18, "Kuvvnm en kūrayam cevu, sayvam kavvau na vijjai: evam akuinn apph." fbid, II. 2, ' Dial., B. 1I, 69-70 * Tbad, 11 41-42, 1 Samyutta Nikaya, IlI, p. 09.

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hypothesis of fortuitous origin, something comes out of nothing, whereas according to the theory of causal-genesis, nothing comes out of nothing.' From this it is clear that the logical standpoint of Kassapa's philosophy was diametrically opposed to that of Naciketas; A similar doctrine was pro- pounded long ago by "Brahmanaspati" and re-appears in the teaching of Varuna. But the Buddha draws distinction between the two types of the postulate of non-Being: the Vedio and the Sophistic, the physical and the metaphysical, In the case of Purana Kassapa, we can interpret the doctrine as meaning that the caused comes out of the uncaused.

Digha, I, pp. 28-29.

CHAPTER XIX.

KAKUDA KĀTYĀYANA.

(Pakudha Kaccāyana.)1 Kakuda Katyāyana was an elder contemporary of the Bud- dha,-a Sophist (titthiya) of whom the Buddhist annalsa speak in the same terms as of Purana Kassapa and others. A Wanderer named Sakula Udayi informs the Buddha that in days gone by Anga and Magadha seethed with sophistio diseussions.3 That these two countries were among the centres of intellectual activities in northern India is evident also from the Samañña- phala acoount of King Ajatasattu's interview with six sophistic teachers. The interview of King Milinda alluded to in the Milinda-panho is evidently the outcome of a naive plagiarism on the part of a later Buddhist writer. We have reason even to doubt if King Ajatasattu could have had the opportunity to meet those teachers, considering that he usurped the throne of Magadha only eight years before Buddha's death, On the other hand, it is manifest from Udayi's statement, that the memory of those teachers became a thing of the past even in the life-time of the Buddha. This is confirmed by the mention of Kakuda Katyāyana in the Prasnopanisad as a younger contemporary of Pippalada. The author of the Upanisad applies to the name of Katyayana, the epithet Kabandhin which like Kakuda points to a physical deformity of the philosopher, Their significance is that Katyayana had a hump on his neck or shoulder Thus the

1 Of. Samyutta-nikāya, I, p. 66: " Pakudheko KEtiyāno," * Simande-phala-sutta, Dīghe-nikāya, I, p. 48; Majjhima-nikāya, I, p. 198; I, p. 260; eto, The Tibetan veision of the Semanfia-phala-sutta confounds Eatyayans with Ajitm Gofsla and Sanjaya. See Rookhill's Life of the Buddha,' pp. 102.104, 257. ' Majjhime-nikāye, II, p. 2. 36

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philosopher was distinguished by his contemporaries from all his namesakes. Kātyāyana, like Pūraņa Kassapa, came of a Brāhman family. Buddhaghosa tells us that Katyayana avoided cold water,' ard used hot water, whenever possible. All that he says respecting Katyayana amounts to this-that the religious order founded by Kātyayana betrayed its ascetic tendenoy in matters of external conduct.

HIS PHILOSOPHY.

In order to get an insight into Katyayana's philosophical views we must leave aside the trivialities of later traditions. It is quite sufficient for our present purpose to know that he was a younger contemporary of Pippalada and an elder con- temporary of the Buddha. As he has left us no records of his own, we have to depend for a knowledge of his doctrine entirely on the mercy of those, the Jains and Sources of informa- the Buddhists, who were not his friends but tion. opponents. The author of the Praśnopanişad tries to maintain an air of neutral dignity, but that, too, is a mere false pretence, his real hero being Pippalada. However, it is important to note Kātyayana's question to Pippalāda as to the roots of things? He was told that the roots were Matter (Rayi) and Spirit (Prana). Besides the Prasnopanișad, there are two other authorities for his philosophy, vis., the Buddhist Samanna-phala-sutta and the Jaina Sutra-Kritanga." In the former his philosophy is desoribed as the doctrine of (seven categories (satta-kaya-vada), and in the latter, as the doctrine of soul as a sixth (atma-sastha-vada), The fragment of the Sutra-Kritanga would seem in a sense more important and interesting than the passage of the Samanfia-phala-sutta, 1 Sumangala-Vilesini, I, p. 144. " Sit-ndaka-pațikkhitto ega , . nispirika-laddhiko esa." Digha-Nikūya, I, p. 57. * Satra-Kritānga, I. 1. 1. 15-18. (See Šījēnka's Commentary.)

KAKUDA KĀTYĀYANA 283

as it clearly shows that Kātyayana adopted the Gotamaka or Eleatic postulate of Being that nothing comes out of nothing (noye uppajja e asam).' It appears from both the fragments that the term Eternalisme was strictly applied by Mahavira and Buddha to the doetrine of Katyayana, It also comes under the definition of what Mahavira calls Pluralism (Aņikka-vāda).3 Śilanka identifies the doctrine of soul as a sixth with the doctrine of the Bhagavad Gita, as well as The relation between Kātyyana's pliloso- with the Samkhya and some of the Saiva phy and the system of the Bhagavad Giti and systems.4 He is so much struck by the the Ssmkhya. close resemblance between the expressions of Katyayana and the second chapter of the Bhagavad Gita that he actually quotes passages from the latter in support of his opinion. Although Silanka is not justified in idontifying Katyavana's doctrine either with the system of the Bhagavad Gita or with the Sarkhya system, we cnnnot deny that there is some sort of historical relationship between them. In this connexion the testimony of an earlier anthority like Asvaghoșa is of some interest .. The latter in his Buddhacarita" attributes to Kapila a view which he seems to have described by the name of the doctrine of soul as a sixth. In Katyayana's six or seven categories, considered as the permanent elements of thought and existence, one may trace a background of the Vaiseșika categories, six or seven, which were in their main conceptions but so many logical predicaments and existences. As regards the broad outlines of his philosophy, Kātyāyana 1 cannot be denied his rightful claim to be singled out as the Empedooles of India. Following Uddālaka, Kātyāyana, 4

1 Of. Nutra Kritänga, II. 2: Sato n'atthi viņāso, asato n'etthi sambhavo, 2 Sthananga, IV : Dighn-Nikaya, T. 18-17. s Ibid, IV. 4. * Thasmin Sorhsure ekesām veda-vedingm serhkbyantm saivadhiksrinam on. * Ruddhacarita, XTI. 17. Hf.

284 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDTAN PHILOSOPHY

maintained that the elements of being are so distinet qualita- tively from one another that there is no Kaknde and Empe- transition from the one into the other. docles compared. Empedocles upheld the same view in agree- ment with Anaxagoras. Again, just as Empedocles is called, justly or unjustly, an Eleatic,' so is Katyayana called an . Eternalist, and an Eternalist is but an Indian Eleatic, Both agree with the Eleatics or Gotamakas, when they maintain unchangeable Being as opposed to the coming into existence. In the view of both becoming is impossible, Both conceive Being as a plurality of unchangeable elements, while with the Eleatics or Gotamakas Being is one, one only, without a second. According to both, the four roots of all things are the four elements, earth, water, fire and air. These are in their nature permanent, that is to say, they know no qualitative change. In addition to these unchangeable substrata, Empedocles conceives Rome ground or canse of change, This ground of change or this formative principle is two-fold: "Love "-the force which combines; " Hatred "-the force which separates, Over and above the four elements, Katyāyana regards in like manner Pleasure and Pain (sukha, dukkha) as two principles of change, Finally, they resemble each other in admitting that there are pores (vivara) in organio bodies, and they also deny the void, They found the conception of void space incompatible with the postulate of Being upon which their doctrines were based. We see, moreover, in Katyayana, no less than in Empedocles, that metempsychosis takes the place of immortality. According to the interpretation of both Mahavira and Buddha of the eternalistic thesis, the elements of being are eternal, imperishable and immutable by their very nature. They are neither created, nor can be caused to be created. But they produce again nothing new but are

1 Hrdmann, Ristory of Philosophy, I, under Empedooles. Prof. L. T. Hobhouse says, " The philceophy of Empedooles is in the main one of change and evolution." ' Buddhaghosa paraphrases vivara by " chiddo," Sumangala-Vilasini, I, p. 167,

KAKUDA KĀTYĀYANA 285

barren, steadfast as a mountain peak, as a pillar firmly fixed.' Hence concrete individual beings may come and go without affecting in the least either the nature or the existence of the substrata of change. The only point of difference between the two thinkers of two distant countries is that in the case of Empedocles it is unknown whether he left any room for the conception of soul in his scheme of existence, whereas in the case of Katyāyana it is positive that he did. It is important to bear in mind that the passage of the Sūtra-Kțitanga is silent about the grounds or principles of change. It also difters from the fragment of the Samañña- phala-sutta as to the number and enumeration of the substances. The former gives them as earth, water, fire, air, ether or space, and soul; the latter gives them as earth, water, fire, air, pleasnre, pain, and soul or the living principle." The terms kāya, sukha, dukkha, and jīva which Kātyāyana is said .to have employed in the Samañña-phala-sutta require some explanation. As for the word kaya,3 it does not mean for Kātyayana what Gosala and Mahavīra called Sigaifcanco of tho terms employed by body or group or species, but corresponds Kātyāyana. to Uddalaka's term dhatu (a thing with its distinctive properties or characteristics), or what Asvaghoșa terms Sthirasattvah (permanent elements of being). In the phraseology of Katyāyana the terms sukha and dukkha (pleasure and pain) are far more general in meaning than with us. They imply, so far as their specific sense goes, exactly what Mahidasa and Varuna conveyed by Hunger and Thirst. We may infer from this that Katyayana agreed with his predecessors in conceiving a relation of food and feeder between the five elements of being. The elements combine, in other words. into unity by their inherent tendency to eat one another, and separate by a contrary tendency that

1 Dīgha, I, p. 56: Satta ime ... kāyā akalš akaļavidhi animmitā anjmmātā, etc. ' "Pathavi-kayo Epo kayo tojo kayo vayo kayo sukhe dukkhe jive sattame." " Buddhaghosa understends by Kaya 'samuha,' or ' group.'

286 PRE-BUDDHISTIO INDTAN PHIILOSOPTY

porpetually disunites them. Lastly the term soul or living principle (appa, jiva) bears almost the same sense as Mahidasa's term Prāņa or Uddālaka's term jivātmā The question may perhaps be asked, why is it that Mahavira and Buodha considered Katyayana's doctrine to be a doctrine of non-action (akiriya-vada)? With regard to this question, we cannot do betier than examine the ethical bearing of his metaphysical speculation. The theory of non- action involved mn If the elements of being be eternally existent Katyayana's philo- and unchangeable by their very nature, if sophy. they mechanically unite or separate by Pleasure and Pain, inherent in each of them, if there be, in other words, no volitional activity of consciousness, then where is the ground for the conception of or distinction between good and bad, between knowledge and ignoranco, and so forth ? From a literal interpretation of his oxpressions it at once follows that in reality thore is no act of killing or hearing or knowing or instruoting. The act of killing, if it is possible at all in the world, means nothing but the aot of separating from one another the elements of being in their organic unity. "When a man with a sharp sword cleaves a head in twain, he does not thereby deprive anyone of life, a sword has only penetrated into the interval between seven elementary substances."1 These expressions oocur, more or less, in the language of three previous thinkers- Pratardana,9 Naciketas' and Puraņa Kassapa,+ and are repeated in the Bhagavad Gita .* It would seem that they were suggested by a long state of war, which existed in the country at the time. ' Dial. B., II, p. 74. The Cartesiana in Europe declare that there is no sin in taking the life of lower animala, because they do not possess a sonl; whereas Katydyana and others in India inspired men to dismember their fallow beinga, because they could not destroy either soul or any component element of heing. And Pancal anys, "I cannot forgive Descartes," · Kauşītaki Upanigad, III. 8 : Kathopanișad, I. 2. 18-25. + DiaL B., II, p. 70. : II, va. 16-24.

CHAPTER XX.

AJITA KESA-KAMBALIN.

(Ajita Kesa-Kambala.) Since the illustrious Colebrooke many Indian and European scholars have dealt with the subjeot of Indian Atheism or Materialism. As far back as A.D. 1862, Prof. Muir in an instructive article1 was concerned to show that there was freedom of thought in ancient India, giving as proof extracts from a few later texts illustrating materialistie tenets. But we are far from having anything in the Introduotory. Ajita's relation with Oarvitka shape of a complete treatise on the subject. and Brihaspati. In 1907 Dr. Pizzagalli has published an excellent work, the "Nastika Cārvāka e Lokāyatika." The way for this work was prepared by Prof. Rhys Davids in his valuable introduction to the Kutadanta Sutta.ª Regarding the sources we must use discrimination as to the actual position of Indian materialistic thinkers. The later works ascribe materialistic utterances to a mythical figure to whom they give the name Carvaka (Demon). In the Sarva-darsana-sangraha, Oarvāka is represented as a disciple of Brihaspati, another mythical figure. The Mahabharata alludes to a Carvāka rakșasa, disguised as a Brahman who had the courage in the midst of the flattering Brahmans, to condemn civil strife .* Sāyaņa-Madhava in his Sarvadarsana-samgraba actually quotes a few sayings of Brihaspati which are ascribed in the Vișnupurapa to Delusion the Great (Maha-moha, i.e., the

1 J. R. A. S., Vol. XIX, 1862, art, xi. * Dial. B., II, 160-172, a fantiparva, Ohaps, XXXVIII and XXXIX. Note that Carvakarokpass is said to be a bhiau or a parivrājaks, nay, & Brāhman Tridandin.

288 PRE-BUDDIISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Buddha), and in the Ramayana to Jabala.1 Similar but earlier utterances can be traced in the Bhagavad Gita, where they are characterised as the Demoniac-Estate (Asura-sampatti). The Sarvadarsana account of Carvaka philosophy is a curious com- bination of the materialistic views of Ajita and Payasi, the biological theories of Makkhali Gosala and others, the political tenets of Brihaspati and the naive .hedonism of the common folk. There is no other good grounds for ascribing the so-called Carvaka or Demoniac philosophy to Brihaspati than the fact that in his political views as cited in the Kautiliya Arthasastra and embodied in the Brihaspati Sutra, recently edited and translated by Dr. F W Thomas, we find the application of the principles of Ajita's metaphysie to politics and morals. We must draw the same conclusion from Brihaspati's morals cited by Draupadi, in a dialogue of the Mahabharata' in favour of the Pandavas going to war with those members of the Kuru clan who had humiliated her in publio. The Carvaka of the Great Epic has nothing to do with Brihaspati or his school. On the other hand, as a Brahman wanderer and mendicant and an advocate of the doctrine of non-killing, he seems to have a close historical connexion with Ajite. In point of fact, the name Carvaka doctrine denotes no more than a type of the materialistic view of soul which has been condemned throughout the Sanskrit literature as asura or demoniac but very popular (lokayata), Passing over these works and mythical figures, we shall confine our attention to Ajita, the historical founder of Indian Materialism .: The oldest known Jaina and Buddhist works furnish us with some stereotyped extracts relating to two materialistic thinkers, Ajita of the Hair-garment and Payasi, The latter was a royal chieftain, while the former was the head of a religious order and was the founder of a system of philosophy. Ajita was an elder contemporary of the Buddha, while Payasi

3 REmāyana, II, Canto 108. * Mahabharate, III, Chap, XXXII

AJITA KESA-KAMBALIN 289

belongs to the first century of Buddha's demise. Ajita is classed by the Buddhists with such Sophists as Purana Kassapa, Kaccayana and others. In a passage of the Anguttara-nikāya the Buddha seems to have confounded Ajita, as Mrs. Rhys Davids points out, with Makkhali Gosala. The passage is: "Just as ...... of all kinds of woven robes, a hair-garment is known to be the least desirable-cold in cold weather, hot in hot, unpleasant to the touch, so of all the many assertions by recluses, the Makkhali theory is the most undesirable."1 It is evident from this that Ajita was distinguished in his life-time from his namesakes by the hair-garment which he wore. It is also probable that his disciples followed his example by wearing similar garments, and that from this circumstance they came to be known as Kesa-kambalins.3 After the manner of the Mundakas and the Gotamakas, the Kesa Kambalins were opposed as Śramans The Kefs-kambalina and the Epioureans to the Brahman priests and jurists. Perhaps compared. among the successors of the Mundakas no other school was so contemptuous of Brahmanic religion as that of the Kesa-Kambalins. All older and later accounts of the Lokayata doctrine agree on this point. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to suppose that their mission was only to oppose the dogmas of the Brahmanic faith. They were equally opposed to all those idealistic thinkers who, feeling extreme distrust for the senses and sense-objects, revelled in the knowledge of the universal; giving up the simple joys of life, sought to obtain the joy born, of contem- plation; and neglecting this present existence, strove conti- nually to fix their attention upon the unknown future. In this respect they may be best compared with the Epicureans. Indeed, like the Epicureans the Kesa-Kambalins with their

Ahguttara nikāya, İ. 286; Buddhism, p. 86 | Oldenberg's " Buddbe," p. 70. Dīgha-nikaya, I, 167, Majjhima-nikāya, I. 77, 238; IL 161, Anguttura-nikāye, I. 240, eto, Dial. B., II, 231 Note that in these passages there are references to a olass of ascetios who used to wear hait.garmente. 87

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later designation, the Lokayatas or Carvakas, have generally been misunderstood by their contomporarios and posterity. As a matter of fact, both Ajita Kesa-Kambalin of Indin and Epicurus of Greece were good men at heart, lovers of simple living and high thinking. Thanks to modern research, we are now in a position to be able to fully appreciate the teachings of Epicurus. And it was Bacon who was the first to define an Atheist as one who thinks, In India it was Raj Krisna Mukhopadhyaya who in his 'Miscellaneous Essays' ( Nana- prabandha), attempted to appreciate the value of what he calls the philosophy of Carvaka. Not less remarkable it is that even in olden times the Buddha did not fail to accord due attention to the view of one whom he always regarded as his opponent. Now the result of modern research is that we are all prepared to investigate the causes which compelled a Carvaka to teach us to eat ghee even though we run into debts, or a Preacher to eat and drink and be merry, or an Omar Khayyam to fill the cup.

HIs PHILOSOPHY.

As to Ajita's philosophy, we have evidences, supplied by the Buddhists, the Jains and the Brahmans. The The souroes of in- formation. best known Buddhist passage on Ajita's doctrine is that which is incorporated in the Samanna-phala Sutta,1 In the Patisambhida-magga and Dhamma-sangani* the passage has been broken up in two portions. The same breaking up reappears in the Tibetan and Chinese versions of the Samañña-phala Sutta.3 However, these earlier fragments are the same to all intents and purposes. Thus the passage of the Samañna-phala Sutta may be taken as the most typical of the oldest Buddhist records, and compared

1 Digha-nikāya, I, p. 55 ; ef. Majjbima, I, p. 515 ; Samyuita, III, p. 807. * Dhamma-sadgapi, 1215, 1862, 1864. ' Rookhitl's Life of the Buddha, pp. 100-101 ; 256-267.

AJITA KESA-KAMBALIN 291

with a parallel passage in Oandrakirti's commentary on the Madhyamika Sutra,' As a departure from the older authority, the fragment of Candrakirti is attributed to the Lokayatas and it is said that the Lokayatas compared the origin of intelli- gence from the chemical mixture of four olements to that of generation of the inebriating power of liquor from a kindred mixture of its ingredients. The simile which Candrakīrti adds as a new element to our knowledge ocours in all later Buddhist, Jaina and Brahman works,' and not in the texts which are older.3 The philosophical views of Payasi are to be found in a Buddhist Suttanta named after him,4 and in the Raya Paseni, the second Jaina Upanga. Besides numerous scattered fragments, the Jaina Sutra-Kritanga" contains a parallel passage,, where the expressions and arguments of Ajita and Payasi seem to have bcen mixed up. The Bhagavad Gita, in common with the older Buddhist and Jaina authorities, differs from the Ramayana,' the Visnu-purana and the Sarvadarsana-sangraha in that it does not allude to the analogy employed by the materialists as an argument against the practice and utility of.offering food to the dead. Their argument is : If it be possible that food set for the dead can feed them, then why not prepare food for those who are away on a journey in the belief that it can appease their hunger ? The later texts differ again from the Ramayana and the Vișnupurana in referring to the dialectical and epistemo- logical aspect of the Materialist doctrine., The Visnupurana" 1 Ed. Bibl. Buddhion, IV, p. 336. ' E.g. The Temil Mani-Mekhalai, XXVII ; Śnsāka's Sūtrakritāngațīkā: Sapta- bhangatarangini ; Yoga-Vasiatha Ramiyana ; Sarva-dariano sangrahe. 3 E.g. Bhagavad Gita, XVI; Ramayana ; ete. + PEyūai Suttanta, Digha-nikāya, II. . II. 1. 18. · XVI. ' Ayodhya-kande, Canto 108. ' E.g. Vaišeşika Butra, III. 2 17; Samkhya Sutra; Vedānta-sāra; Siva-jnana-siddhiyar; Alberuni's India ; eto. ' Wilson's trapalation, III, Chap. XVIII,

INDIAN PHILOSOPIY

in particular lays stress on the rejection of the doctrine of revelation of the Vedas by the Materialists in common with the Jainas and Buddhists. "The recoived or anthori- tative word (apta-vakya) does not fall from the sky." The discussion of the same problem finds its place in all the philosophical Sutras, notably Jaimini's Pūrvamīmasa. Three other characteristics of the later Brahman works are: first, thatin them the Materialist doctrine is interpreted as implying pleasure (kama) to be the sole end of life's activities1; secondly, that the Materialists are said to worship in common with the political writers the king as the supreme lord, present in his corporeal form *; and thirdly, that Materialism, better known in former ages as Annihilationism (Ucchedavada), is harmoniously combined with Naturalism. The first of these three characteristics cannot be directly inferred from the extracts on Ajita and Payasi, as supplied by the Buddhist and Jaina canonical texts. As to tho second characteristic the process which resulted in intermingling the Materialist doctrine with the rules of polity (niti) can be seen in its initial stage in a passage of the Maitri Upanisad (VII. 8-10) where Brihaspati transformed as Sukra misleads the demons. But in the Kautiliya Artha-sastra3 Materialism (Lokayata) together with the Samkhya and Yoga systems is scrupulously distinguished from the doctrine of polity as something speculative (anvīksaki) from a practioal way of life (loka-yatra). In the Mahabodhi Jataka,4 too, the dootrine of annihilation is kept separate from Khatta-vijja, which means literally the Militarist doetrine according to which a man ought to seek his own advantage even by killing his parents. The term Ksatravidys occurs in a list of sciences given in

' E.g., Bhagavad Gite, XVI. 8. 11-12. ef. Sirajd&nasiddhiyar (Nellasami's translation), pp. 18-14 * Pratyakya-siddhab-rijā Paramesrarah.

• Fausboll's Jataka, V. 489-400.

AJITA KEŚA-KAMBALIN 293

the Chandogya Upanisad,1 and is explained by Sankata as the science of archery (Dhanurveda). Buddhaghosa and Aryasura understand by it the science of government (niti- sattha, nīti-kauțilya).2 The examination of the sources of information leads us to the conclusion that the rather long and eveniful history of Indian Materialists, like perhaps the history of the Stoics, may be divided into many periods, but our concern being here the doctrine of Ajita, we shall regard the passage of the Samañna-phala Sutta as our principal authority. Our next task is to determine the positive thesis or cons- tructive aspect of Ajita's doctrine. Vit is remarkable that his categorical assertions (abhinivesa)8 are all negative in form: There is no such thing as liberality shown to the priests; no such thing as sacrifice; as offering food to the dead; as reward or retribution; as future life, as Two aspects of Ajita's philosophy-negativo father or mother after death; as 'chance- and positive, born beings' (opapalika satta), no perfect saint who can instruct us about future life or existence of individuality after death. All this may be summed up in the expression : There is no individuality after death. "A living body is constituted of the four elements of existence. When a man dies, earth returns to the earth, water to the water, heat to the fire, air to the air, and the sense faculties pass into space. It is a doctrine of fools, the talk of existence after death (atthika-vada), for all alike, fools and the wise, on the dissolution of the body, are cut off, annihilated, ceasing to be after death."4 Ajita in the negative aspect of his doctrine shows a resemblance to Epiourus, while on the posi- tive side of his speculations, he seems to be more a Stoic than an Epiourean, his fundamental point being that nothing is real but that which is corporeal, 2 VII 1, 2 2 Dial. B. II 18. op, Sikşa-samucoaya, p. 192. * Patisambhidā-magga, I + Dial, B, II. 73-74,

294 PRE-BUDDHISTIO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Again, referring to the passage of the Samanna-phala-sutta, we can see that Ajita was neither a political writer like a Bribaspati or a Sukra, nor a sensualist like a Vatsyayana or a Ghotakamukha, nor a naturalist like a Gośala. As contrasted with the point of view of Gosala, the stand-point of Ajita seems

Ajita the critio of purely subjective, As the passage of the Katyayana and other Bhagavad-Gita1 seems to imply, the term dualistic thinkers. Naturalism or Atheism is applicable to the demoniao doctrine only because it teaches that a living being comes into existence by a natural process of reproduction. Ajita only reproduced what other previous thinkers had said in so many words. Even then we should bear in mind that Naturalism, so far aa it is implied in Ajita's doctrine, was not the subject of his main investigation. The problem with which Ajita and Payasi, his immediate successor, were confronted was rather epistemological. That is to say, their main contention was not so much against the dogmas of the Brahmanic faith (which may appear at first sight) as against the doctrine of Kakuda Katyayana and others who made a hard and fast distinction between the body and the soul, matter and spirit, in short, who conceived soul as an entity exist- ing independently of anything corporeal or material. From this point of view his doctrine was described by Mahavira and Buddha as Tam-jiva-tam-sarira-vāda, in contradistinction to the dortrine of soul being distinot from the body.(Añfiam- jīva-annam-sarira-vada). Thus in one sense like a Stoio he identified the corporeal with the mental, and in another sense he did not. His intention was not to identify body with soul, judged as concepts, for what he sought to establish was that the real fact of experience is always a living whole, a whole which the apprehending mind can conceive in its various aspects." Hence the distinction which Kakuda Katyayana made between the elements of being is in the view of Ajita untenable, the 1 LXVI, 8: "jagad dhur anisvaram." > Cf. Vedānta-săra (d, Ooweli), p. 32.

AJITA KESA-KAMBALIN 295

distinction being only an act of our mind. No such distinc- tion exists in the living concrete individual, taken as a whole. This view of Ajita was made more intelligible by Pāyasi. The soul is not an entity distinot from the body. As a man drawing a sword from the scabbard can say " This is the sword and that is the scabbard," so we are not able to separate the soul from the body, pointing out, this is the soul and that's the body.' Without multiplying the references, we may add that Payasi's argument implies a serious protest against the proposition of all earlier dualistic thinkers, who held that "Soul is in body, as fire in the arani-wood," a proposition corresponding to Aristotle's formula, Universalia in Re-the Universal in things. Ajita and Payasi viewed the corporeal from the point of view of self,' on the ground that form cannot exist apart from matter. According to Mahavira's opinion, Ajita denying the future life, taught men to kill, burn, destroy,3 and enjoy all the pleasures of life. The truth seems quite the contrary. He taught us, as we may infer from a Upanisad The moral dodue- tions of Ajitn's theory of self. passage forming the background of his views, to believe rather in life than in death, to show proper regard to persons when they are alive rather than showing honour to them after death.+: It was the Eterna- lists, as we saw, who, maintaining a theory of. the unchange- able being, appeared to inspire man to take life. In another Jaina passage we are told that Ajita was an Akriya-vadin, as he upheld the doctrine of non-Being. On the other hand, Buddha distinguished the Annihilationists from the Eternalists, that is, he distinguished those who by right insight saw the

1 Jacobi's Jaino Sutras, part 2, pp. 340-341 ; Dial, B, III, 358-861. "Rupam attato samanupassati." Jecobi's Jaina Sotras, part 2, p. 341. Qf. Chendogya Upanisad, VII, 15, 2-8: prapo hi pita prano mota ...... sa yadi pitaram va metaram vă ...... kimcid bhritam iva pratytha dhiktvuatvityevaisam shuh "pitribā vai tvam asi mūtrihā vai tvam asi ...... Atha Yadyapi enan utkrăntaprāņon sūiena sam&sam vyatişam dahen naivainam brūīyah: "pitrihasfti na mātrihastti ....... "

PKE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

ceasing-to-be of the world, as it really is, from those who saw how the world comes to pass. Thus in the estimation of the Buddha, the Annihilationists were as much wise, or as much in error, as the Eternalists themselves. The fault which he found with both was that both were extremists and dogmatists. The basis of Ajita's doctrine, as of Katyayana's, is in the philosophy of Mahidasa, who formulated the proposition : "I am the five-fold hymn." The study of the views of Silanka and Sayana Madhava leads us to think that the foundation of Ajita's doctrine was laid in a statement of Yajnavalkya which is-that the intelligible cssence emerging from the five elements vanishes into them at death.

CHAPTER XXI.

MASKARIN GOSĀLA.

(Makkhali Gosāla.)1

Maskarin Gosala is best known as the third or last Tirthan- kara of the Ajivika School. The school is thrice mentioned in the edicts of King Asoka whose grandson Dasaratha gave them some cave-dwellings.ª Among modern scholars who have dealt with the philosophy of the Ājivikas, the Goldla and tho Ājīvikas. chief is Dr. Hoernle. But his account paints them in rather shocking colours, as he is in- fluenced by the Buddhists and the Jainas, who were bitter oppo- nents of the Ājīvikas. The Ājivikas cannot be identified entirely with the Acelakas (naked ascetics) alluded to in numerous Buddhist texts. For the Acelakas as described in the Buddhist literature do not certainly represent one single corporate body but several religious orders. Part of the description of the naked ascetics in the Buddhist texts applies to them. This part emphasizes only the Ajivika sense of self-respect, conscientiousness, continence, and very tender regard for animal and all forms of life.8 We learn from the Majjhima-nikāya+ that an Ājivika never incurred the guilt of obeying another man's command. He refused to accept food which was especially prepared for him. He did not accept food from people when they were eating, lest they A separate Monograph on Makkhali's philosophy has been written by the author. Those who are interested to know the resuits of hie later investigations into the subject must read this Monograph "The Ajivikas " (Calcutta University pablication). * See Senart, ' Insoriptions de Piyadasi,' II. 82, 209. Digha-nikāya, I, 166. This is a stock pnasage; sce Dial. B. 2, 227. Atguttara-nikāya, III, 888, foll. ; cf. Sumangala-Vilssint, I, p. 162, Jaina Sutrns, Part 2, XXXI. Majjhima I, pp. 238, 524, · Majjbima-nikāya, I, p. 238. 38

298 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INMIAN PHILOSOPTY

should go short or be dislurbed. Te did not accept food collected in time of drought. He did not accopt food where a dog was standing by, or flies wore swarming, round, lest they should lose a meal. He did not eat fish, or meat, nor use intoxicants.1 Even from this meagre account we may infer that the Ajivikas were men of right living and that in this mode of right living they were followed by both the Jainas and the Buddhists. A certain amount of mystery hangs round the name and life of Maskarin Gosala. In the Jaina records the name is given ag Gosala Mankhaliputta,-Gosala the son of Mankhali. He was born at Saravana near Savatthi. His Flis vame and life. father was Mankhali and bis mother's name was Bhadda. His tather was a Mankha, that is, a dealer in pictures. Gosala himself followed his father's profession before he became a monk.ª In the Buddhist records the name is spelt differently as Makkhali Gosala. According to Ruddha- ghosa's comment on the name, Gosala means one who was born in a cow shed, and Makkhali means one who stumbled in the mud. Buddhaghosa hands on the tradition that during the early years of Gosala he was employed as a servant, who, while carrying an oil-pot stumbled from carelessness, and from the fear of his employer fled away naked, leaving his garment behind (acelako hutvā).8 Neither of these accounts is historical, The true name of the philosopher seems to be Maskarin, the Jaina-prakrit form of which is Mankhali, and the Pali form Makkhali. The term Maskarin is explaincd by Panini1 as meaning one who carries a bamboo-staff (maskara). A Maskarin is also known as Ekadandin. According to Patanjali's comments5 the name

1 Dial. B., II, pp 227-229. "Hournie's extruot from the Bhagarati, XV. 1, Uvasago-dasdo, p. 1. ' Sumangala-Vilasini, I, pp. 143-144. + Psuini's Grammar, VI. I 154. Patanjali's Mahabhasya (ed. Kielhorn) III. 06 See Hoornle's " Ajivikas" in the Encyclopedip of Religion and Ethics, Ind, Ant., Vol, XLI, 1912, p. 289.

MASKARIN GOSĀLA 299

indicates a school of Wanderers or Sophists who were called Maskarins, not so much because thoy carried a bamboo staff about them as becanse they donied the freedom of the will. Thus in the estimation of Patañjali, as also in that of Mahavira and Buddha, the Maskarins were fatalists or determinists, We know next to nothing of Gosala's early vears. We do not know exacily when he was born or what led him to re- nounce the world. In the absence of any record left us either by him or by his disciples we can only say that it was perhaps in the fashion of his day that he left home-life to be a home- less wanderer, Dr. Hoernle's extract from the Bhagavati sulra1 shows that Mahavira had withdrawn himself from the world shortly before Gossla, and that in his second year he received the latlor as a disciple. Nalanda was their meeting placo. They livod happily together for six years at Paniya- bhumi, and afterwards soparated owing to a doctrinal differ- ence. They never met again bnt once after the lapse of sixtoen years in Savatthi, where Gosala had founded a separate school of thought. The doctrinal, difference which the Bhagavati sūtra alludes to was that according to Gosala thero is no matter unformed and nothing without life, while Mahavira distinguished between the concrete and the abstract. This account regarding the chronology of Gosala and Mahavira does not agree with the authority of the Kalpa-sutra,2 where we are told that Mahavira spent the first twelve years of his monkhood not as a teacher (jina) but as a mere learner or pupil, Even in the malicious Bhagavati account it is stated that Gosala predeceased Mahavira by sixteen years, and was recognised as a teacher sometime before the latter. Gosala's death was coincident with a great political event, namely the war "which King Kuniya (Ajatasattu) of Magadha waged with King Chedaga of Vesali." From this it follows that the statement with regard to Gosala's position as a disciple of 1 Appendix to Uvasāga-dasão, pp. 2.4, Jacobi's Kalpasutra, Introd., p. 9.

300 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PRILOSOPHY

Mahavīra is disputable. The Buddhist records,' too, invariably distinguish between Gosala and Mahavira, and allude to both as the renowned leaders of two separate religious orders, and of two distinct schools of thought. The order of the Ajivikas or Maskarins is of oldor standing than that of the Jainas or the Buddhists. Gosala was not a disciple of Mahavira, but the latter was in all likelihood either a disciple of, or at least in some way connected with, the former. The Kalpa- sutra which is one of the most authoritative works on Mahavīra's life informs us that immediately after his renun- ciation Mabavira spent more than a year as a clothed monk, while in the second year he became a naked ascetic .. Dr. Hoërnle says that the two teachers separated because of their difference of 'character and temper,' and 'owing to the insincerity and trickery of Gosala/ Here we cannot agree with Dr. Hoernle, as we find in his extract from the Bhagavati Sutra that the cause of their separation was a difference of opinion between the two thinkers. In a passage of the Sutra-kritanga' Gosala is confounded with a Sensualist, as in a passage of the Anguttara-nikaya" the Buddha appears to have confounded Makkhali with Ajita Kesa-kambalin. On the authority of the Uvasaga-dasão* we may add that Sravasti was the head-quarters of the Ajivikas or Maskarins, and that Gosala was there held in great respeot by the people. To sum up: Maskarin Gosala predeceased Mahavīra by sixteen years, and spent his whole life in biological re- searches. The tender regard which he showed for every form of life was a natural ontcome of his philosophical doc- trine. It appears from the evidence of Asokan edicts and Patanjali's commentary on Panini that his school survived after him, and were known as the Maskarins or " Idlers." 1 Dial. B, II. p 66. * Satra-Kritānga, IT. 6. * Anguttara, I. 286. + Uvāsags Dasāo, VI-VII.

MASKARIN GOSALA 301

I. Physics. Gosala's philosophy may conveniently be divided into- two sections: Physics and Ethics. In dealing with the former, we have to determine at the outset the historical relationship of Gosāla to Mahāvīra. With regard to this point we ought first of all to examine the fragment of the Bhagavati Sutra (XV. 1) The relationship of Goésia and MabErira which clearly sets forth the relative position as thinkers, of the two thinkers. In it we are told that Gosala and Mahavira were once travelling together from Siddhatthagama to Kummagama. On their way they passed a large sesamum shrub which was then in full bloom (tila- thambhae pupphie). Gosala inquired of Mahavira whether the shrub would perish or not, and what would be the fate of its seeds, if they had perished. To this the latter's reply was that the shrub would perish, though the seeds would be formed in seed-vessels. Disbelieving what Mahavira had said, Gosala uprooted the shrub and dislocated it. As chance would have it, just then a shower of rain fell, enabling the shrub again to take root and flower, The result of it was that shortly afterwards the seeds were formed in the seed-vessels, as Mahavira had predicted .. Thereupon Gosala concluded that just as the sesame seeds after having completely perished, i come to life from their inherent force or will-to-be, so are all ,living beings capable of reanimation1 Mahavira was unable to accept Gosala's general theory of the perpetual reanimation of things,ª seeing that in the above case the shrub revived not because its soul having left it came back to it again, but only! because it had not altogether perished. The difference of opinion which thus ensued led ultimately to their separation. 1 "Tile-puppha-jīva uddaittā uddaitš ...... ajjhattie jēra samuppajjittha evam khelu sabbajivāvi pauțta pariharam paribaramti." The passage is rather obacure, The term puppha-jiva is literally the flower-souls, the commentators take uddaitta as equivalent to mritvā. Pautța=parivarta. It seery more accurately=pravritta. Cf. Katha, I. 1. 6, quoted ante p. 268, f. n. 2. 1. ' Parivarta-vada, the doctrine of transformation.

302 PRE-BUDDHISTTO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

It is somewhat difficult to understand the exact significance of Gosala's view or of Mahavira's contention. We cannot believe that in Gosala's opinion the shrub having been uprooted, either perished altogether, or having perished came to life again. Perhaps the passage means that according to Gosala's theory, there is nothing without life or nothing that is not capable of transformation, while from the point of view of Mahavira there are not only living substances (jiva), but also things which are non-living (a-jiva). If so, the importance of the above passage is that for Gosala the ultimate category is one,- jiva or conerete living things, while for Mabavira they are two: jiva or concrete facts and a-jiva or judgments about things. Proceeding on this assumption, we may also note that historically the two categories of Mahavira were derived from the ono category of Gosala, his predecessor. Striotly, we may suppose that all the- various classifications of living beings adopted by Mahavira belong not to him but to Gosala. With regard to the relation, personal as well as doctrinal, between Gosala and Mahavira, Prof. Jacobi observes: "The relation between them probably was different from what the Jainas would haye us believe .... The fact that these two teachers lived together for a long period, presupposes, it would appear, some similarity between their opinions .... the expres- sions sabbe satta sabbe pana sabbe bhuta sabbe jtva is common to both Gosala and the Jainas, and from the com- mentary we learn that the division of animals into ebendriyae, dvindriyas, etc., which is so common in Jaina texts, was also used by Gosala. The curious and almost paradoxical Jaina doctrine of the six Lesyas closely resembles, as Prof. Leumann was the first to perceive, Gosala's division of mankind into six classes; but in this particular we are inclined to believe that the Jainas borrowed the idea from the Ajivikas and altered it so as to bring it into harmony with the rest of their own doctrines."t Here the last point of Prof. Jacobi's remark 1 The Jeina-sutras, Part 2, pp. XXIX-XXX,

MASKARIN GOSĀLA 303

requires a little modification. It is the Buddhists who tell us that by the term ' six classes' Gosala meant the six types or classes of men, whereas in point of fact the division is in accordance with Gosala's view not only applicable to men, but to all beings .. As a matter of fact, the idea of such a division seems to have been inherited by Gosala from the teaching of Pārśvaņātha, as may be inferred from the expression cha jiva-nikaya of Mahavira's parents who were lay followers of Parsvanātha 1 Now as to the historical relation between Gośala and Mahavira on one hand, and Kanada on the other, we shall provisionally take it for granted that the Vaisesika system of Kaņada has many points in common Gosâla, Mahāvira, Kanads and the Stoics. with the early Stoic philosophy, as also with the Atomistic theory of Democritus. Uddalaka by his doctrine of the mixture and infinite divisibility of things prepared the way for the Atomistic doctrine of Kanada; and Katyayana's doctrine of six substances which are all qualitatively distinct was not without its marvellous effect upon the development of the Vaiseșika system, The two points which Kanada seems to have derived from Gosala relate to his two grounds of explana- tion : nature peculiar to each type of existence, and fate or necessity.ª And Mahavira, who thought on the lines of Gosala and partly adopted the hypothesis of nature or necessity, prepared further the way for the development of Kanada's doctrine, As Prof. Jacobi points out, the doctrine of Mahavira in common with that of Kanada or Hindu Zeno is to be dis- tinguished from the view of Katyayana as the doctrine of action (kriyāvāda) from that of non-action (akriyāvada). Ķriyāvāda is the doetrine according to which the soul acts and is acted upon.& Supposing Ajita's doctrine that the real is throughout 1 Ayoramga Sutta, II. 15. 16. " Gough's Vaisesika Sūtra, VI 212-13: adriştat, joti-višeșāt. 3 Jacobi's Jaina-sutras, Part 2, p. 240. "Things depend partly on fate, and partly on human exertion" (niyayAniyaya).

304 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

single and corporeal corresponds to the Stoic theory of knowledge, we may perhaps say that Gosala's doctrines roughly represent the Stoic physics and ethics. Moreover, the substrata of Gosala's doctrine are in the philosophy of Mahidasa, just as perhaps the real basis of the Stoic physics is constituted by the philosophy of Aristotle. In other words, just as Gosala's view is thoroughly post-Vedie, so the Stoic philosophy at its first stage of development is thoroughly Greek. The fundamental thesis of Gosala's physies is Stoio in its nature. It is summed up in the Jaina Bhagavati Sutra and its commentary as the doctrine of transformation (Pautta

Goátla's fundamental parihara-vāda), and in the Buddhist texts thesis and ite signifoa- as the "theory of purification through tion. transmigration" (samsra-suddhi).' The term employed by Gosala himself is transformation,-pariņama implied in parinata.ª In the Buddhist phraseology, purifica- tion is the equivalent of 'the end of pain' (dukkhassanta), and the word transmigration hy which Prof. Rhys Davids translates samsara, signifies the passing of soul from one state of existence to another. In reference to Gosala's physics, however, we must interpret the expression "purification through transmigration " as meaning perfection through trans- formation, -- transformation which implies for him not only the process of constant change, but also a fixed orderly mode of progression and retrogression. According to Gosala's view, the law of change is a universal fact, because all types of things and all species of beings" are individually capable of transformation, that is, of elevation or degradation in type. Judging from this point of view, his fundamental thesis would seem to be rather too narrowly

1." Dīgha-nikšya, L 54; Jataka, V. 489; Dial. B., II. 72-78. Buddhaghosa explains parinats as ninappaksrattam patta, "diversifted or made manifold,-attaining different conditions of axistence." ' Sabbe satta, sabbe pana, sabbe bhuta, sabbe jivi. See Hoernle's tranalation of the extract from Buddhaghosa's Sumangalu-vilksini, I. Ifl, in Appendix II, Uvasaga DAdao; Jacobi's Jaina-stitras, Part 2, p. XXVI.

MASKARIN GOSALA 305

stated by the Buddhists when they state it thus: Both fools and wise alike shall reach perfection by gradnal transforma- tion. In strict accordance with his view the thesis ought to be stated in a more general form: All beings, all lives, all existent things, all living substances attain, and must attain, perfection in course of time. In Buddhaghosa's explanation the term " all beings " denotes for Gosala all kinds of animals, camels, cows, asses, éto .; "all lives" comprise all sensitive things and sentient creatures, divided into those with one sense (ekendriyas), those with two senses, and so forth; "all existent things" are living beings divided into generic types, to wit, those which are produced from an egg, or born from the womb, or (sprung from moisture, or propagated from seeds); and the term " all living substances" is used with reference to rice, barley, wheat, and the like. In the absence of the recorded words of Gosala or of his disciples, one may reasonably ask, are we justified at all in

The reliabllity of relying upon Buddhaghosa's exposition, and Bnddhaghone's exposi- tions. using it as an argument in favour of the opinion that the division of living beings into those with one sense, those with two senses, and so forth, is common to both Gosala and Mahavira ? With Prof. Jacobi we are convinced that there is after all no reason for disputing Buddhaghosa's comments. In this particular case, we can safely regard him as our best authority. Buddhaghosa drew on some older authorities. There can be no better evidenoe of this than that his comments upon Gosala's expression 'six classes' are traceable in an identical form in the Anguttarani- kāya (III. 383-884). Nevertheless his explanation of the terms all beings, all lives, etc., seems ingenious enough, but not quite in accord with Gosala's own enumerations and classifications of living things and beings. But the passage of the Samañfia- phala Sutta itself is corrupt and disjointed ; it has, moreover, the critical purpose of making Gosala's doctrine collapse.

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" There are fourteen hundred thousands of principal genera and species (pamukha-yoniyo), again six thousand others, and again six hundred. (Thus the sum total is 14,06,600.)" "There are forty-nine hundred Ajīvakas,1 hundreds of Wanderers or Sophists (Parivrajakas), hundreds of Naga- abodes-or-species, two thousand sentient creatures (vise indriya- sate), three thousand infernal states, thirty-six celestial, mundane or passionate grades (rajo-dhatuyo),ª seven classes of animate beings (sannigabbha) or beings having the capacity to generate by means of separate sexes, seven of inanimate produotion (a-sañnigabbha), seven of production by grafting (niganthi-gabbha), seven grades of gods, and of men, and of devils, etc." Buddhaghosa found it a hopeless task to explain this passage. However, what he says with respect to Gosala's three expressions sanni-gabbha, a-sanni-gabbha and niganthi- gabbha is very instructive: "Camels, cows, asses, goats, sheep, deer and buffaloes are generated by means of separate sexes. Rice, barley, and fiveother cereals are of inanimate production. Sugar-cane, bamboo, reeds, etc., propagate from joints.' The above passage indicates that for Gosala there are infinite gradations of existence. In his view each individual thing has eternal existence, if not individually, at least in type. He has definite conceptions of numerous grades of beings, celestial, infernal and mundane, as also of the infinity of time and the recurrent cyoles of existence. In particular the expression twenty thousand sentient creatures (vise indriya-sate) shows that Gosala had in mind something of a division of animate things according to the number of senses each type possesses. In order to render his views and classifications of beings intelligible, it is necessary to take into consideration the classifications that we find in previous thinkers, and in his successors. ' Of. The Tibetan version of the Somadsaphaja Sutta in Rookhill's Life of the Baddha, p. 108. · Following Buddhaghosa, Hornle translates it " dust-depositorien."

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Buddhaghosa's explanation of the term "all existent things" (sabbe bhuta) shows that Gosala adopted Mahidasa's division

The two-fold olassi- of the animate world. The latter, as we saw, fication of the animate vaguely conceived a two-fold classification : worla, physical and psychological. In his physical division the heavenly beings stand highest in the scale. Below them come the five elemental beings (panca mahabhūtani). All these are to be regarded as sui generis. The sentient beings are divided into the movable and the immovable (jangama, sthavara), the viviparous, the oviparous, the moisture-sprung, and plants. According to his psychological division, all forms of life up to plants possess life but hardly any sensation. Among higher forms of life, some possess intelligence (citta), while others do not. The highest among the animals is man who alone possesses inteliect, prudence and moral sense. Among men again the most perfeot is the philosopher who can sesk immortality by means of the mortal. In turning to Gosala's classifications we shall assume that they are essentially the same as those of Mahavira. The two- fold olassification of living things is found in many Jaina texts, earlier as well as later.1 Here we shall consider only one text, the Uttaradhayayana Sutra, in which the classifications are given in an elaborate manner. The noticeable point in the biological olassifications of Gosala and Mahavira is that the living things are divided according to the number of senses each type possesses. Those with one sense comprise the four elemental groups and the vegetable kingdom.2 This one sense is the fundamental sense of touch. The four elemental groups are the Earth- group (Prithivikaya), the Water-group (Apa-kaya), the Fire- group (Teja-kaya) and the Wind-group (Vayu-kaya). Of these, the first two groups are distinguished from the other two as the

1 Satrakritānga, II. 2.5; Bhagavatī-sūtra, I. 1; Utterădhyayana Būtra, X; XXXVI. 74-77. 9 Of. Paramatthajotikā, II, Vol. I. p. 8; rnkkham ... ekindriyam, .. jivau,

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immovable or passive from the movable or active, or to uso Mahidasa's phraseology, food from the feeder. Each of these groups is further divided into the developed and the undevelop- ed. In the Earth-groupare placed clay and dust of different colours, rocks, minerals, metals, and other inorganie things. The Water-group comprises rain, dew, fog, ete. The Fire- group includes flame, lightnings, sparks, etc. Gentle breezes, hurricanes, cyolones, monsoons, ete., form the Wind-group. All these differ in size, shape, colour, motion, force and so forth. The plant-life or vegetable kingdom, like the elemental life, is possessed of only one sense, the sense of touch. Gosala admits, however, that plants in general stand higher in the scale than elemental lives. All plants are organic beinge, capable of reanimation. We should note that in the Maha- bharata one can meet with a criticism of this view. It is maintained that the plants possess the same number of senses as we possess. "The trees bear flowers and fruits, drop their leaves, wither and die. Therefore they are sensible to touch .... A creeper, for instance, winds round a tree on all sides. Had it been blind how could it find its way ? eto., eto."1 Next in the scale are the creatures with two senses-touch and taste-animalculæ, worms, etc. Above these are placed those with three senses-touch, taste and smell-such as ants, bugs, moths, ete. Still higher are those with four senses -- touch, taste, smell, and sight, e.g., mosquitos, gnats, scorpions, locusts, butterflies, etc. Highest in the scale are beings with five organs of sense. They are sub-divided into infernal beings, animals, men, and the gods. In all these divisions we have to suppose a graduated scale of existence. Living things and beings differ in their physi- cal formation, strength, and duration of life." * Mahebharata, Sentiparra, Makțadharma, Canto 184, IV. 8 foll. " Oarefully compare Manu'e olnssiflcations, 'Laws of Manu,' I. 87-89; I. 40-60, XII. 4 foll.

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In dealing with Gosala's psycholngical classification we need only to explain the significance of his term Kaya or Mabavīra's term Lesya. In commenting upon Gosala's ex- pression six-classes (chalabhijatiyo), the Buddhist authorities tell us that it has reference to his division of mankind into six colours : the black, the blue, the red, the yellow, the white, and the supremely white. In the black class are placed all the workers of iniquity such as sheep-butchers, boar-hunters, thieves, murderers, and so forth, while in the supremely white class are the three Ajīvika Tīrthankaras. This is what the Buddhists say of Gosala's doctrine. With- out denying that this division is, in accordance with Gosala's view, applicable to human beings, we have reason to think that the division is in fact of a far wider application. Colour hore is a metaphorical expression corresponding to Manu's term Quality (guna).1 In a passage of the Majjhima-nikāya we have from the Buddha a short note on the term Colour (kaya or lesya) as employed by Gosala and Mahavira: Just as a piece of cloth absorbs the colours or impurities from different dyes, so does the mind become tinged or tainted by its different tendencies and associations.2 The term Lesya is explained in the Uttaradhyayana-sutra' in a similar way, i.e., in the sense of "Seelen-typus " or "Soul-type," as Prof. Weber explains it.ª Both these explanations indicate that in the conception of Gosala and Mahavira soul is in its nature absolutely pure. The colouring is the effect of actions on its life. Putting it otherwise we can say that soul has a colour of its own which is supremely white, and it is discoloured when it is affected by things which are foreign to its nature." ' Majjhima-nikāya, I, p. 86. "Vattham sankilittharà malaggahitam ..... pariønd- đham pariyodētar , .... yadi nilakāys yadi pītakāys ... " ' Manu, XII. 12-14; aleo I. Uttaradhyarana, 49-50; XII. 4. : XXXIV. * Leumann's Aupapatika Sutra, Glossary. The Stoio and Lookean notions of soal or mind as tabula rase ware very common among Indian thinkera, earlier and later. For erample, Yajnavalkya predionted "aelf-luminons" (svayam jyotis) of soul; Bhāradvaja predicated "white" (fubhra). Baddha assigned the

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Particularly we can observe in Gosala's theory how soul is acted upon by things external. Gosala's classifications of living things are essential to the disoussion of the theoretical aspect of his physios. So far as this aspect goes, he offers for his theory of perfection through transformation three grounds of explanation : Fate or Neces- sity, Olass or Species, and Nature (niyati-sangati-bhava-pari- ņatā).1 I. Fate (Niyati),-Like the Stoics, Gosala maintains that in the world as a whole all comes about by necessity; fate regulates all. As Mahavira, Buddha and others' interpret his doctrine, there is no such thing as power, energy, strength or vigour. All beings, all lives, all existent things, all living substances are without force and power of their own. They are bent this way and that by their fate. That which is to be, must be; that which is not to be, cannot be. All things are unalterably fixed. Fixed are the periods of existence, the properties of things, and the functions of the senses. The nature of action, fortune, wisdom and death is fixed in the case of a being even while he is in the womb, so to speak. Just as when a ball of string is cast forth it apreads out just as far as, and no farther than, it can unwind, so every being lives, acts, enjoys, learns and dies in the manner in whioh it is destined to do so.8 Following Mahidasa, Gosala conceived the world as a rational purposive order, a system in whioh everything has that place and function assigned to it which contribute to the well-being of the whole. It is to one and the same order that we may give the name fate, necessity, nature, destiny, providence, reasou. It is the system in which chance has no

predicate "radient" (pabhassara) to mind (oitta), or rather to the life-continuum (bha- nanga-citta). Anguttara-nikāya, I, p. 10, 1 Dıgha-nikāya, L 58, ' Uvenga Dasão (with Abhayadeva's commentary), VI-VII; SEmaddaphala-sutte (with Buddhaghons's commentary); Hitopadefa, Introd., 17-10. " Dial. B. II, 72-73.

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place, and which admits of no other cause whatever for the depravity or purity of beings than all that is implied in the word Fate or Destiny.1 Il. Class or Species (Sangati) .- The attainment of a certain peculiar condition, and of a certain peculiar character on the part of all things, all lives, all beings, depends in part on the class or type or species to which they belong. It is partly according to their position in this class or that that they possess certain special properties, that they have certain physical characteristics, that they inherit certain peculiar habits, develop certain faculties, and so on. Thus for example fire is hot, ice is oold, water is liquid, stone is hard, a thorn is sharp, a peacock is painted, the sandal tree possesses fragrance, the elephant's cub, if it does not find leafless and thorny creepers in the green wood, becomes thin; the crow avoids the ripe mango, etc.2 III. Nature (Bhaoa) .- Buddhaghosa explains Gosala's term nature as 'the peculiar nature of each being.'3 With reference to Naturalism Asvaghoșa speaks of Nature (prakriti) as being a property or tendency (pravritti), such as heat is of fire, and fluidity of water. We have the same explanation from Sankaracarya, Silanka and others.5 Aryasura, following some older Buddhist authority, speaks of a Non-Causalist (Ahetu-vadin) as professing the view that "the universe is self-caused, self-generated " (svabhavikam jagad idam)." 1 Niyati, drieta, doiva, Pubbekata-hetu, of. Gough'a Vaiscgika-sutro, pp. 189-100: A certain desire or aversion arises through destiny. In illnstruting this the commentator refars to these two facts: the need of youth for love, without previoua axperienoe, and natural aversion towards snakes. : Buddhacarita, 1X. 47, 48, 52; Silanka'a Sūtrakritānga Țīkā, p. 80; Sarvaderśana- sadgrabe, p. T. The same is the view of Kanūda (vide Vaisegika sutra, VI. 2. 18: A certain desire or aversion arises through partionlarity of race or species (jativifesat), and also of the Buddhist Naturalists of Nepal (vide Illustrations of the Literature and Religion of the Buddhists, by Hodgson, pp. 105-110. * Sumangala Vilāsini, I. 161 : "bhāvo ti sabhāvo." * Bnddhacarita, IX. 47. Oomy. on the Svethévatara Upanisad, I. 1 : avabhāvo.padarthinām pratiniyatā saktiķ ; Sūtra Kritāngo.tīkā, 8. · Jabaka-mala, p. 146.

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Thus according to Gosala's view the world originates and develops from its inherent force or immanent energy. It is also probable that he sought for the explanation of the diversity of appearance, characteristies, habits and behaviour of things in nature. He conceived Nature as a self-evolving activity. Nature has two modes of operation : by one mode things come to pass and by the other they cease to be (pravritti and nivritli). More accurately, he seems to have understood by Nature the specific faculties or characteristics of a living substance other than those which it possesses in common with the race or species.

2. Ethics.

The details of Gosala's ethics are unknown. But the little that we know enables us to say that there are many points of similarity between him and the Stoios. We may preface our discussion of Gosala's ethics with the following remarks of Prof. Adamson on the Stoic Physics. " The Stoics will not admit in the universe any element of chance, nor any element of freedom of will. It is true ...... that the wise man ... is at the same time called free; but what the Stoics meant by " free' in this connexion is best explained by the one illustra- tion which they employ-a dog tied under a chariot." "Their emphasis on the mechanical side tends to give great promi- nence to the Stoic notion of the fate under which all things operate. The difficulties for their moral system involved in that conception they endeavoured to evade by giving equal emphasis to the teleological interpretation. The world is not only a mechanical system but a system of reason." Among the views of the Sophists, Buddha regarded the fatalistic doctrine of Gosala as the least desirable. In his opinion the doctrine of fate, like the doctrines of chance, Providence, and so forth, does not afford a rational ground

: Develapment of Greak Philosophy, pp. 273-274.

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upon which to base a moral philosophy.' Buddhaghosa in particular draws a distinction between the moral effect of Gosala's doctrine on oue hand, and that of the doctrines of Pūraņa Kassapa and Ajita on the other. Pūrana by pro- pounding a theory of the passivity of soul denied action. Ajita by his annihilationistic theory denied retribution. Whereas Gośala by his doctrine of fate or non-causation denied both action and its result.2 Mahavira's criticism is in effect the same. For ho too thinks that if all things be unalterably fixed and there be no such thing as strength or power or exertion, then where is the ground for moral distinetions between good and evil, or where is the ground for our moral responsibility or free- dom.ª (This criticism will be modified later.) Gosala had to say something regarding the many paths of virtue (patipada). He spoke of eight kinds of action, five of which are sensuous and the rest are mental, vocal and bodily. He perhaps distinguished mental acts from word and deed as half-action (upaddha-kamma). The asroma-theory of the Brahman jurists was based on a notion of the gradual development of self. As a Brahman mathematician (Ganaka) told Buddha, the The gradual develop- ment of self. Brahmans laid down their moral injunc- tions in an ascending order (anupubba-sikkhā), as a mathematician counts the numbers, one, two, three, and so on. But it was at Gosala's hands that the Brahmanic darama-theory came to be distinctly formulated as a biological principle of evolution in its application to education.4 Babyhood begins with the day of birth, and lasts for a period of seven days. It is the dull or semi-conscious stage of Anguttara-nikāyn, I, 288 ; TII. 61. " Somangala-VilaeinT, I. 166. OvAsaga Dasdo, VI.VIT. Majjhima-niklyn, III, 1. See Dentsen's note on Kramamukti in his All, Gesch. der Philosophie. 40

814 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPIY

a man's life. Pabyhood is followed by the play-time, and that again by the trial-time, when the child attempts to walk. The trial-time is duly succeeded by the ercet-time, when the ohild is able to walk. When he becomes older he is sent to learn under a teacher. In course of time he renounces the world and masters, sooner or later, all that his teacher knows. Subsequently comes a time when he realises that what his teacher taught was not all, that in fact it was nothing (na kiñci aha). These are the eight developmental stages (attha purisa-bhumiyo) through which every man must pass in order to rench perfection, to become a Jina,' It is not difficult to understand that Gosala's doctrine of the cight developmental stages of man was a physical antecedent of Buddha's doctrine of eight higher spiritual ranks (attha purisapnggala). In Gosala's division an infant is placed in the lowest stage of development, while in Buddha's division the lowest rank is filled by a Sotapanna, i.e., a recluse who has advanced in his religious efforts far enough to be sure of his final success. The contrast between the two doctrines is important historically as indicating a transition from a biological division to a moral or spiritnal one.

3. Post-script. The results of our Jatest investigations into Makkhali's views are thus summed up in our paper on "The Ajivikas," Pt. I, pp. 28-27, together with a short account of the sources of information :- 1. Jaina Sources-(a) Suyagadamga (I. 1. 2. 1-14; J. 1. 4. 7-9; II. 1. 29; II. 6) with Silanka's Țīkā. (b) Bhagavati Sutra (Saya XV, Uddesa I) with Abhaya- deva's Commentary.

1 Dial. B. II, p. 72; Appendix to Hoernle's Uvasagn-Dnato, IT, p. 24. The eight atnges are : mandn bhūmi, khidds bhūmi, rīmamas bhūmi, ujngata bhūmì, sekhe bhumi, samana bhumi, jino bhumi, panpaka bhuml. Qf. Fansboll's Tatakn, IV, pp 498-97: mande-dasaka- bhavam, khiddsdesakabhavam, vannadasakabhāvari, etr.

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(c) Bhagavati Sūtra (Saya XV, Uddesa I) with Abhaya- deva's Commentary. (d) Leumann's Das Aupapatika Sūtra (Secs. 118 and 120). 2. Buddhist Sources-(a) Samannaphala Sutta (Dīgha, I, pp. 53-54) with Buddhaghosa's Commentary. (b) Samyutta Nikaya, III, p. 69, ascribes the first portion of the Samaniaphala account of Gosala's vicws, N'atthi hetu, n'atthi paccayo, etc., to Puraua Kassapa. (c) Anguttara Nikāya (Pt. I, p. 286) with the Manora- thapurani confounds Makkhali Gosala apparently with Ajita Kesa-kambala. (d) Anguttara Nikāya (Pt. III, pp. 383-84) with the Manoratha-Purani represents Kassapa as if he were a disciple of Makkhali Gosala, (e) Mahasaccaka Sutta (Majjhima I, p. 231), cf. also I, p. 36. (f) The Chinese and Tibetan versions of the Samañña- phala Sutta, translated in Rockhill's Life of the Buddha, where the doctrines of the six Heretics are hopelessly mixed up. (g) Trenckner's Milinda Pañho, p. 5. (h) Mahābodhi-Jātaka (No. 528), of. Āryasura's Jataka- Mālā, XXIII. 1. Gosala was, to start with, the propounder of a ' doctrine of the change through re-animation' (pauttapariaharvada),1 or, better, of a theory of natural transformation (parinamavada),2 which he came to formulate from the generalisation of the periodical re-animations of plant life. This is the central idea of his system according to the Bhagavati account. 1 The term is ao rendered by Prof. Leumann. See his translation of the extracta from the Bhagavati, XV, in Rockhill's Life of the Buddha, Appendix 1I, p. 261. * The têrm implied in the adjective parinato, ef. the Digha, I, p. 53.

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2. The basic idea of this theory as explained and illustra- ted in the Bhagavati and in the Samaññaphala Sutta implies a process of natural and spiritual evolution through ceaseless rounds of births and deaths,' i. e., samhsara-suddhi, as the doctrine is aptly summarised in the Majjhima " and in the Mahābodhi Jātaka.3 3. The Parinommavada seeks to explain the diversity of the organic world by these three principles- (a) Fate (niyati=niyai)* (b) Species (sangati=sangai"=pariyaya)" (0) Nature (bhava=sabhava)? "Niyati-sangati-bhava-pariņatā."8 4. The organic world is characterised by six constant and opposed phenomena, viz., gain and loss, pleasure and pain, life and death. "Savvesim pāņāņaim savvesim bhūyaņaim Savvesim jīvānaim savvesim sattāņaim imāim sanaikkamaņiaim vāgaraņāim vagarai-tam labham, alabham, suham dukham jiveyari, maraņam."0 5. The Parinamavada involves a conception of the infinity of time with the recurrent cycles of existence, and the same theory conveys a great message of hope by inculcating that even a dew-drop is so destined as to attain in course of natural evolution to the bighest state of perfection in humanity.

1 Dīgha, I, p. 54: sandhāvitvū somearitvo dukhass' antnmi karissanti, ef. the Bbagavatī text quoted by Trof. Lenmann (Rookbill's Life of the Buddha, App. II, p. 258, f. n. 8) :- anepuvveņniů khavaitta pacchá sijjbanti bujjhanti java amtam karemti. * Majjhima, I, p. al. ' Frusboll's Jataka, V, p. 228. * The Prakrit form of niyati occurs lu the Biyngadanga, I. 1. 2. 4. 3.^ The forms enugai and pmiyaya are to be found in the Suyngednugo, I, 1, 2.8; I. 1.4.8. ' Acoording to Baddhaghosa's comment, bhivo-sabhavo, Sumaugolavilasini, I, p. 181. * Digha, I, p. 58. Buddhnghoan explains pariruta as menning diversifed (nūnšppak#. ratb patta). : The passago is an oxtract from the Bhogovatf, Snya, XV, Uddesa. J.

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6 The longest period or duration fixed for the evolution of life from the meanest thing on earth to the greatest in man covers 84 hundred thousand mahakulpas.' 7. This necessitates a division of time into mahakalpas, balpas, anturakulpas and so forth, during which the universe of life progresses onward along the fixed path of evolution." 8. The theory of progression itself necessitates the classi- fication of the living substances on different methods, and groups them on a graduated scale in different types of existence which are considered as unalterably fixed. 9. The Parinumavada seeks to establish, even by its fatalistic creed, a moral government of law in the universo where nothing is dead, where nothing happens by chance, and where all that is and all that happens and is experienced are unalterably fixed as it were by a pre-determined law of nature. 10. It teaches that as man is pre-destined in certain ways and as he stands highest in the gradations of existence, his freedom, to be worth the name, must be one within the operation of law, and that the duty of man as the highest of beings is to conduct himself according to law, and so.to act and behave himself as not to trespass on the rights of others, to make the fullest use of one's liberties, to be considerate and discreet, to be pure in life, to abstain from killing living beings, to be free from earthly possessions, to reduce the necessaries of life to a minimum, and to strive for the best and highest, i.e., Jinahood, which is within human powers.8 11. The fatalistic creed which is a logical outcome of Parinamavada confirms the popular Indian belief that action

' Bhagarati text quoted by Prof. Ledmann. See Rockliill's Life of tho Buddha, App. II, p. 258, f. u 3, Dīgha, I, p. 54, : Rockhill's Life of the Buddha, App, IJ, 253-54; Digha, I, p. 64. : Digha, I, p. 54; Anguttara, 1ll;pp, 383-84; Majjhima, I, p. 288; awpapātikn Sutra, Sẹc. 120.

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has its reward and retribulion and that heaven and hell are the inevitable consequonces hereafter of merits and demerits of this life. 12. In accordance with the deterministic theory of Gosala, man's life has to pass through eight developmental stages or periods (atthapurisabhumiyo),1 at each of which the physical growth proceeds side by side with the development of the senses and of mind with its moral and spiritual facultiesª; and from this underlying theory of interaction of body and mind it follows that bodily discipline (kaya-bhavana)8 is no less needed for purification of soul than mental (citta- bhavanā). 13. The division of mankind, or, better, of living beings, into six main types (abhijatis) involves a conception of mind which is colourless by nature and falls into different types- nlakaya, pitakaya, etc. -by the colouring of the different habits and actions, and hence the supreme spiritual effort of man consists in restoring mind to its original purity, i.e., rendering it colourless or supremely white by purging it of all impurities that have stained it."14

II. THE SCEPTICS.

(Ajnana-vādins.)

Mahavira's expression Annaniya or Ajñauika has reference to Sañjaya and his school5; Buddha's expression is Amara- vikkhepika, or 'Eel-wriggler,' its alternative form being Vaca-vikkhepika, Equivocator or Prevaricator.° The former

1 Dfghu, I, p. n4. " Sumangala- Vilasinl, I, pp. 162-163 * Majjhimn, I, p. 238. . Dīgha, I, 63 ; Anguttarn, II1, pp. 383-84; Snmangola-Vilšsinī, I, p. 102; Majjhima, J, p. a6, · Ottaridhyayana Sütra, KVIII, 22-23, ef. Sütre-kritaign, I. 0, 27; I 12, 1-2; 11, 2, 79, Digha-nikayn, I. 24-28 ; J. 58 (Dinl. B. 11I. 37-41; 7h) . Suinangoln-vilasini, I, p. 168; " Safjaya vādo Amarī-vikkhepe vatta-nayo eva "

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expression has been freely translated by Prof. Jacobi as Agnostic,1 a term coined by Huxley in 1869. The correspondonce botween the two terma In spite of the fact that the two terms Ajhanikas and Agnos- Ajñānikas and Agnostics are the same tios. both etymologically and morphologically, we must be cautious in using a modern English term as a synonym for an ancient Indian expression. In India it was "Visvakarman " who was the first to define an Agnostic or a Sceptic,2 as one who is "enwrapt in misty cloud" (nīharena praviita), and "with lips that stammer" (jalpya).3 "Visvakarman" had evidently in mind one or all of these hymn-chanters or Vedic thinkers: (1) Those who doubted the existence of Indra 4; (2) " Paramesthin" who saw no possibility of knowing any cause or reality beyond the original matter: "who verily knows and who can here declare it, whence it was born and whence comes this creation? The gods are later than the world's production. Who knows then whence it first came into being ?...... (the Sun) verily knows it, or perhaps he knows not "b; (3) Dirgha- tamas who was ignorant for the sake of knowledge of the nature of a first cause.s In the language of subsequent thinkers we come across these two expressions: Avidya or ignorance and Vicikitsa or perplexity. The connotation of the term Avidyā, as employed by the Mundakas and Vajasaneyas, is anything but transcendental knowledge (paravidya), the knowledge of Brahman (Brahma-vidya), and anything but that which is conducive to an ideal self-realisation. The Mundakas employed another term samsaya or doubt, probably in reference to the Keniyas who were of opinion that the know all does not know at all, while the know-nothing knows everything. In Asuri's opinion Perplexity (vicikitsa) Faith

1 The Sanskrit word for Agnostic er Sceptio is not to be found in Visrakarman hymn. Jacobi's Jatna-shtras, Part 2, p. XXVI, Grifith'e Rig-veda, X 82, 7. +.º Grifith's Rig-reda, VIII. 89, 3; X. 120, 0-7 ; I, 184, 6.

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(Sraddha), want of Faith (asraddha), and the rest, are all mind or mental states1; and in the teaching of Naciketas Vicikitsa is a philosophic doubt as to man's existence after death: Some say, he is; others, he is not." In Mahavīra's definition the Agnostics (aņņīniya) are those who pretend to be intelligent, but are in fact unfamiliar with truth and have not got rid of perplexity or puzzlement (vitigicchatinna). They are ignorant teachers who teach ignorant pupils, and without proper investigation or examina- tion of knowledge speak untruth.3 Mahavira employs two terms Ignorance (annāna) and Perplexity (vitigiccha) to convey almost the same sense, and Srlanka speaks of various types of ignorance or doubt.4 Buddha's expression ' Eel-wriggling' (amara-vikkhepa) corresponds to King Ajata-sattu's term ' manner of prevari- oation' (vacavikkhepa). Both are connected with the name of the Sceptic Sanjaya, and signify a sort of indifferent or neutral attitude of some thinkers toward certain problems of metaphysical speculation,-suoh problems as those which are concerned with prr-ens, post-ens, the first cause, the final cause, future life, retribution, and so forth. However, both of these ferms are rather vague in their connotation, and we need not feel wonder if they are replaced elsewhere by such terms as Perplexity (vicikitsa), Doubt (samsaya), and the like.5 In the Buddhist literature we have mention of three types of Perplexity: the hindrance-type (nivarana), the fetter-type (samyojana), and the Orambhagiya fetter-type. The first type can be put away by an ordinary reflective mind by means

1 Brihad Ārenyaks Uponisnd, I 5, 3 * Kathopanişad, I. 20: "yiyam preie vicikitai manuşye: astftyeke nâyam nsttti oniko." 3 Sūtra-kritīhga, I 12. 2 .: " Aņnāniyā te knsalāvi samtā, nsnrāthnyā no vitigicchatiņnā. Akorij& abu akoviyehim, nnannvi-ittn muanm vaynmti" Of. Jacobi's translation. ananuvyAta=Pali snanuvicoa. * Stlanka's commentary on ibid Dhammasangani, 425; Vilhniga, pp. 255-258 ; Mrp, Rhys Davids' Bnddhiet Paychological Ethics, pp. 1:5-116.

THE SCEPTIOS 821

of faith (saddha) and discursive judgment (vicara); the second can be got rid of only by an unwavering faith and a deep insight into truth; and the third by the power of faith and introspection. Nivarana is generally defined as that state of mind which acts as a hindrance to higher life and insight.1 It is otherwise called ceto-khila or something that locks the door of the heart, manovilekha or something that scarifies the heart,-in other words something that steels the heart against all tender and higher feelings and aspirations. The number of Hindrances is generally caloulated to be five, the fifth being 'Perplexity.' The Abhidhamma texts on the other hand, give them as six, the fifth and sixth being 'Perplexity' (vicikicchā), and 'Ignorance' (avijja) respectively.ª "In the Sutta Pitaka," says Mrs. Rhys Davids, " the Hindrances form a category of five, ignorance being excluded .. ... This discrepancy is not noticed by Buddhaghosa,"8 The category of six hindrances was only an extension of the category of five,-the outoome of a further analytical distinc- tion of the fifth-Perplexity-into Doubt proper and Igno- rance. Patanjali's Yogasutra and Vacaspati's gloss throw further light on the point, for obviously Buddha's term 'hindrance' (nivarana) is the same as Patanjali's term 'ob- stacle' (antaraya). Patanjali, in agreement with Buddha, defines an obstacle as that which causes distractions to the mind (citta-vikșepa).+ Patañjali's category of obstacles includes two terms-Doubt (samsaya) and Erroneous view (bhrantidarsana)," corresponding to Buddha's category of

1 Buddhist Paychological Ethios, IX. 310: "The Hindrances are to be understood as states which muffle, enwrap or trammel thought." Cf. Compendium of Philosophy, p. 172 ' The Dhammasangani, 1152, The Oompendium of Philosophy, p. 172. The Buddhist Peychological Ethics, p. 810. + Yoga-sūtra, I. 80. * Of. Vatsyâyana bhasya on the Nyšya-sūtra, IV. 3. 41

822 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPIIY

six hindrances which includes the two terms Doubt and Ignorance. Vyasa's Comments on the Yogasutra (I. 30) is practioally the same as Buddhaghosa's on Buddha's expressions, Neither Vyasa nor Buddhaghosa determines the nature of the psycho- logical relation between Doubt and Ignorance, Scepticism and Agnosticism. In the commentary of Vacaspati on the Yoga- sutra the point has been properly threshed out. According to Väcaspati, Doubt and False-knowledge do not differ much from each other, aud yet the former is separately mentioned with a view to specifying its preoise signification. The special charac- teristic of doubt is the touching and evading of both sides of a question,1 indeed in this respect doubt may be regarded as a sub-head of false-knowledge. Now in accordance with the general Buddhist view the difference between the Hindrance and the Fetter type of doubt, as that between the Fetter and the Orambhagiya type, is one of degree rather than that of kind. In the Abhidhamma Books the two pairs of words are set forth in definition in identical terms, although it is not to be supposed that their underlying conceptions are identical. An 'average man' can put away the Hindrance by a professed faith in the Teacher, the Doctrine aud the Order; a young inquirer by an implicit faith in the system which he aspires to be acquainted with; a reflective student by his discursive judgment (vicara). A 'stream-attainer' can, on the other hand, put away the Fetter by his faith unwavering (avecoappasada) and insight philo- sophie (dassana), while an Aryan in a higher stage of spiri- tuality can put away the Fetter inherent in the lower nature (orambhagiya) by the power of faith (saddha-bala) and introg- pection (bhavana). Thus each type has two sides-religious comprising the emotional and volitional, and intellectua! comprising the metaphysical and psycho-ethical. The religious

› Of. Nydyn Sūtrns, I 1. 23; TV. 2.4.

TLE SCEPTICS 323

doubt can be got rid of by the faith professed, artioulated or confirmed, and the intellectual by disenrsive judgment, philo- sophic insight or introspection. The religious aspect of the Hindrance is technically called cetokhila or 'bolt of the heart," a term similar in meaning to the Jaina duhasejja or ' bed of suffering'2; the intellectual aspect is known as lamas or ' darkness.'8

Cetokhila is not far removed from, and touches indeed in many essential points assaddha, "the absence of faith" or "irreverence " as defined in the Vibhanga (p. 371). Similarly tamas can be shown not to differ much from avijja or annana (ignorance) as defined in the Dhammasangani (1152, 1162), both being at bottom grounded in the lack of understanding, the lack of knowledge. The same remark holds true of other higher types of doubt, the Fetter and the Orambhagiya fetter. Thus in this analysis the sceptic appears as an enemy 'of the divines and the gravest philosophers.' But the Fetter type might be brondly distinguished from the Hindrance as doubt 'consequent to science and inquiry' from scepticism ' ante- cedent to all study and philosophy.' It needs no mention that tamas as defined in the Vibhanga (p. 371) denotes a philo- sophic doubt or Scepticism proper, or that ovijja or annāna as defined in the Dhammasangani (1152, 1162) denotes Agnosti- cism even as we now understand it. Moreover it may be seen from the views of Sañjaya that the same philosopher tends to be an Agnostic when he freely confesses his inability to know

' Majjhima, I, p. 101 ; Dighe, III, Saugiti Suttanta, sub voce cetokhila; eta. ª Sthänkuga (ed. Dhanapati), p. 269. a Vibbangu, p. 307. Cf. Hume's distinction between two types of sceptioism, "Thore is a species of seepticism [such as the Cartesian doubt], antecedant to all study and philosophy." "There is another species of scepticism, consequent to science and inquiry when men are supposed to have discovered either the absolute fallaciousness of theu mental faoulties or their unitness to reach any fixed determination in all those curious subjects of apeculation about which they are commonly employed." An Inquiry concerning Human understanding, section XII.

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the ultimate beginning and end of things which is virtually the same as admitting that these are unknown and unknow- able; and a sceptio when he doubts or hesitates to admit the correctness of all bold assertions about matters beyond human cognition.

CHAPTER XXII.

SAÑJAYA.

In the Buddhist annals Sañjaya is best known as a Sceptic. It is not clear from the existing accounts if he is the same personage as Sanjaya the wanderer, the previous teacher of Sariputta, the chief disciple of Buddha. The Buddhist records on the latter's life are all

life. An aocount of his based upon the account in the Mahavagga.1 There we are told that Sariputta was before joining the Buddhist school an adherent of Sañjaya. One may reasonably object to the identification of Sanjaya the sceptic who is designated in the Samaññaphala Sutta as Sañjaya Belattha-putia (or Belaithi-putta) with Sañjaya described in the Vinaya Mahavagga and the Dhammapada commentary as a Paribhajaka. The historical justification of such an identification is that scepticism is associated in the Buddhist records with the name Sanjayn. We must also remember that the Mahavagga is at least a century later than the portions of the Buddhist canon where the name of the Belattha-putta occurs in several connexions and where one can expect to find not a single reference to Sañjaya Paribbajaka. We have also to consider that the Belattha- putta, too, was a wanderer and the founder of a religious order and of a school of thought in Rajagaha. The story of Sariputta's conversion to the Buddhist faith is of consider- able importance as it shows how ripe was the intellect of the disciple of a sceptic to welcome the Buddhist theory of causation which lay at the root of a critical method of inquiry.

1 MahEvagga, I. 28-24, Of. The Aggastvakavatthn in the Dhammapada-Commentary, I.

326 PRE-BUDDIIISTIO INDTAN PHILOSOPIY

The Buddhists tell os that when Sariputta, accompaniod by Moggallana and two hundred and fifty other disciples, left the school of Sañjaya, the latter fainted, bled and died. Sariputta joined the Buddhist school in the second year of Buddha's career. Neither the Jaina nor the Buddhist account seems wholly true. In the Samañnaphala and other Suttas, Sañjaya of the Belattha clan is spoken of in the same terms as Purana and other Sophistic teachers. Buddhaghosa, although a later authority, furnishes some useful information. He informs us that a certain Wanderer named Suppiya was a disciple of Sañjaya Paribbājaka.1 In the Brahmajāla Sutta Suppiya is referred to as a teacher who was opposed to the Buddhist school and who disparaged the Buddha and his doctrine and disciples.ª King Asoka dedicated a cave-dwelling to a school of Wanderers, namely the Suppiyas,ª In the list of the Anguttaranikaya (ITI. 276) Buddha expressly mentions the name of the Aviruddhakas (Un-inimicals or Friends) as a school of thought distinct from the Munda-savakas and others. The two names-Friends or Good-natured ones seem to have been applied by Buddha and the Buddhist emperor Asoka to one and the same school, namely, that of Sañjaya of the Belattha clan. The disciples of Safjaya were from the point of view of their philosophical doctrine known as Agnostics, Scepties or Eel-wrigglers, and from the point of view of their moral conduct as Friends or Good-natured ones. If so, we may conclude that the school of Sañjaya survived long after his death, at least, till the reign of King Asoka, i.e., 3rd century B. O. Sañjaya was an elder contemporary of the Buddha. He was the Pyrrho of India,-a famous wanderer and founder of school, highly honoured in the country. No further details of his life are known.

1.º Sumnigala Vilasini, I 8ố; Dinl. B. 1I, p. 1. ' The Oave Insoription, No, 3,

SANJAYA 327

HIS PIILOSOPIIY.

In the estimation of Mahavira and Buddha, partioularly of the latter, the Eternalists and the Annihilationists, the Extensiouists and the non-Extensionists,-all The Dogmatista and the Seeptica contraat- are Dogmatists (Ditthi-vadins, Ditthigatas), ed. their cant being: ' Nothing save the doctrine we uphold, nothing save the dogmn we preach, is true." These Dogmatist philosophers were divided in opinion on such knotty questions of metaphysics as these : Is the world eternal or is it nou-eternal ? Is the world finite or is it infinite? Is there another world or is there not ? ls soul after death subject to decay or not, corporeal or incorporeal, conscious or uncon- scious ? Is there or is there not any reward or retribution? Are there any ' chance-born ' beings or are there not P Does a perfect man continue to exist after death or not? Whilst thus a fierce battle was raging in the country there arose a school of thinkers, who kept themselves aloof from all thoye conflicts of speculation, and cultivated an attitude of indifference or suspended judgments as the best way of seour- ing the imperturbability of mind. They were the Friends or Good-natured ones, the disciples of Sanjaya, who agreed with the Eternalists and the Annihilationists in regarding happiness as the end of life's activities. But they differed from the latter as to ways and means. Whereas for the Dogmatist philosophers the path lo happiness lay through the heroic grappling with problems and ascertainment of truth, for the Sceptics the path was just the reverse, being the evasion of problems and suspension of judgment. In all these points the disciples of Sanjaya are at one with

Sanjaya and Pyrrho. the disciples of Pyrrho, notably Timon. Sañjaya, like Pyrrho, raised scepticism to a scientifio doctrine, and thus prepared the way for a critical

1 SthAnanga, IV. 4; Sūtra-Kritabga, I I. 2. 21; Digha-nikāya, I. 13-89; Majjhima- nikāra, I. 483-489; Kosala-Sariyntta; ete. " Idam eva saccnti, moghumatūonti evam ditțhi,"

328 PRE-BUDDIISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPILY

method of investigation in philosophy. Sañjaya diffecod from Dirghatamas, who was ignorant for the sake of knowledge, (and from the Keniyas who made this definite statement that the know-all does not know at all, while the know-nothing knows everything), just as Pyrrho differed from some of the Acudemic Sceptios who doubted in order to know. As the former with the Eternalists and Annihila- tionists, so the latter together with the Stoics and Epioureans, marks a distinot period of thought and furnishes a connecting link in the movement of philosophy. Again the former was an Indian, and the latter is said to have accompanied Alexander in his Indian campaign, Pyrrho of Elis "studied philosophy under Indian Gymnosophists and Chaldean Magi." Colebrooke identifies the Gymnosophists in Greek accounts with the Jains, but they should be identifed rather with the Suppiyas, the disciples of Sanjaya. Lastly, the little that is known of Pyrrho's tenching is summed up by Prof. Zeller in the three following statements: "We can know nothing about the nature of things: Hence the right attitnde towards tbem is to withhold judgment: The necessary result of sus- pending judgment is imperturbability." Now let us sum up Sanjaya's dootrino in the words of two critics-Buddha and Śrlanka. First, Buddha says: "There is a school of thinkers, who are Eel-wrigglers (Amara-vikkhepikas). When they are asked a question on this or that, they equi- Buddha's account of Safjaya's doctrine, vocate and wriggle like an eel (or slip throngh like quick-silver), and their reason is one or another or all of the following four :-- (1-2) We neither know the good (kusala) nor the evil (akusala), as it really is. In such case, if we make a positive declaration either with regard to good or to evil, we may be

' Rolleston's "Tenching of Hpictetus," p XXI. * The Stoics, Eplonreans and Scephics. Reichel's translation, p 492.

SANJAYA 329

led away by conceit or pride,1 or influenced by ill-will and resentment." Under these conditions we may be proved wrong (musa), and that may cause us the pain of remorse and ulti- mately a hindrance to the tranquillity we aim at. Or, in the second place, we may fall into a grasping conditior of heart (upadana), which will culminate in a similar disturbance of peace. (8-4) We neither know the good nor the evil as it really is, There are persons who are clever, subtle, expert, contro- vorsialists, hair-splitters (vala-vedhi-rups), who go about, as it were, shattering the dogmas (ditthigatas) of others. But we, on the other hand, are dull and stupid. Hence if we make a definite statement with regard to good or evil, they may join issue with us, ask us for reasons, and point out our errors. This may cause us, as before, the pain of romorse and disturb our im perturbability. Thus fearing and abhorring the being wrong in an ex- pressed opinion, the falling into a grasping condition of heart, or the joinder of issue, we declare nothing to be either good or bad; but on a question being put to us on this or that, we answer thus: Is A BP No. Is A not-BP No. Is A both B and not-B? No. Is A neither B nor not-B? No. (1) " I don't take it thus -- evam pi me no. (2) But I don't take it the other way-tatha ti pi me no. (3) But 1 advance no different opinion-aññathā ti pì me no. (4) And I don't deny your position-iti ti pi me no. (5) And I don't say it is neither the one nor the other- no ti ti pi me no."8 1 Chando va rago vă. Rhys Davids translates this "feelings or desires." We hare followed here Buddhaghosa, ' Doso vE patigho ve, According to Buddhaghosa's comments, the two terms meau wounded vanity or revongeful feeling. ' Buddbaghosa says that by (2) the Eel-wrigglers rejected the dootrine of Eterna- liam (sassatn-vhda); by (3) that of modifled Eternalism (Ekacca sassata-vida) ; by (4) that of Annihilation (Ucchodam); and by (5) the view of the Dialeoticians (Takkivida Somangala-Vilēsini, I, p. 116, Dial. B, IL. 87-41. 4.9

330 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Secondly, Śilanka says : Literally, the 'Agnostics' are those in whom there is 'ignorance,' or' who walk about in ignorance.' They think : "Even if we avowedly maintain a

Śtlanka's account view-'That this is good ' (kusala), we arecon- scious that we are not acquainted with truth, the matter is not familiar to our knowledge. Indeed we have not as yet got beyond 'perplexity'-perplexity which is blindness and delusion of the mind (cittasuddhi, cittabhranti) "Some conceive the existence of an all-seeing soul, while others controvert it. Some speak of an all-pervading self (sarvagatAtma); others contend that the body being such an entity, it cannot be all-pervading. Some estimate that soul is equal to a digit in size, while others say that it is equal to a grain of rice. Some posit a soul that has a material form (murtam), while others maintain that it is formless (amurtam). Some point out that the heart is the seat of soul, while others oppose them by saying that the forehead would be the right place ...... " How can there be an agreement of views among these philosophers ?...... Many moral injuries (bahudosab) may re- sult from the issues of such antagonistie blunders. (Hence let us keep far from the madding crowd and ignoble strife). For us ignorance is far better than these follies."1 The underlying motive of the above accounts is to make Sanjaya appear as an intellectual coward. These are correct only in so far as we are told that his studious evasion of certain great questions of human mind and Criticiem of the Baddhist and Jainn equivocal statements of his own position were acconnts of Sanjaya's position. His place apt to produce an intellectual torpor. But in the history of In- dian philosophy and his views were probably not so confounding of philosophy gene- rally. as they appear in the Buddhist or the Jaina representation thereof. If the matters were so simple as his opponents would have us believe, they might

1 Sūtra-Kritanga-țikā, pp. 451-452.

SANJAYA 331

have been completely ignored. The very fact that his oppo- nents were compelled to put his views to the hardest test argues that these could not be so easily shelved. Sañjaya had a large following in Northern India, a fact which goes at once to prove that there was some truth in his teaehing that could appeal to so many thoughtful men. It is clear that he hnd studiously suspended his judgments only with regard to those great questions of which a decisive answer will ever remain a matter of speculation. Indeed the effect of his teaching on the course of Indian philosophy seems to have been twofold: first, that he by suspending his judgments on certain great questions of human mind came to indicate that their final answer lay beyond the domain of speoulation; and secondly, that he called away the attention of the philosophers from fruitless inquiries and directed it towards the Summum bonum which is the attainment and preservation of mental equanimity. Thus he came to be a true precursor of Mahavira who propounded a dootrine of antinomies (syadvada) and of the Buddha who advocated a critionl method of investigation (vibhajyavada). Both Mahavira and Buddha were unanimous in deolaring that there are certain mooted questions of cos- mology, ontology, theology and eschatology on which a man is unable, constituted as he is, to pronounce a bold, authoritative or dogmatic opinion. And the questions which they put aside as inscrutable dilemmas are precisely those with regard to which Sanjaya had deliberately suspended his judgments. The main point in which his successors differed from him is that like him they did not consider those questions as fruitless inquiries. The inculcation of a Buddhist theory of cansal genesis (paticcasamuppada) afforded a new scientific way of approaching those questions. 'T'his fact is nowhere so clearly indicated as in the story of the conversion of Sāriputta, for- merly a disciple of the veritable sceptic, to a system of philo- sophy which judges things critically in the light of a partly a priori principle, namely, the principle of causation. If it be

332 PRE-BUDDHISTIO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

admitted that Pyrrho of Elis had imbibed his seoptical bias from an Indian school of sceptics, one can at once see that the sceptical propaganda such as those of Sanjaya were the ante- cedents of critical philosophies alike in India and in Europe.

3. THE MORALISTS. (Vinaya-vādins) According to Mahavira's definition, the Vinaya-vadins are those who consider truth to be untruth and call a bad mau good. They are those various upholders

Vinaya-vAda. The defnitian of of the doctrine of discipline who, without comprehending the truth (anovasamkha), expound their tenets briefly as follows: "The objeots of desire (attha) are realised by us by means of vinaya alone."1 The dootrine of discipline, no less than the doctrines of non-aotion and ignorance, is opposed to the Jaina dootrine of free-will activity (kiriya-vada).' In commenting upon Mahavira's definition Silanka says: The Moralists (Vainayikas) act according to the principles of morality or moral discipline. They seek to gain a better future existence by set moral precepts alone.' Corresponding to Mahavira's Vinaya-vada we have from the Buddha the expression Stlabbata-paramasa, which is generally translated the affectation of moral vows, but really signifies the doctrine of moral discipline. In the

Silabbata-paramasn. Dhamma-sangani the above term is defined as that doctrine of teachers other than the Buddhists according to which the purity of character

1 Sitra-kritango, J. 12, -4. ' Ibid, II. 2. 79; UttarAdhyayano Satra, XVIII. 28. Note that Jacobi translates Vinaya-vada as "idolatry." 1 Sūtra kritanga-țikā, p. 447: " Vainayikānām vinajsd eva kevalāt paralokam apic- chataah." Siisnke quotes from some older authority : "Vinsitt& Vinayavadi." * Dhamma-sahgaņi, 1005, 1119, 1188, eto: " Ito bshidda samana-brohman&nam silena suddhivatena suddhi-silabbatena suddhtt[- erarupa ditthi-ayam vnccati silabbata-parsmiso."

THE MORALISTS 333

is attainable only by morality, the observance of moral precepts, the fulfilment of the vows of chastity. Buddha- ghosa says that by' purity' we are to understand purity both moral and mental, ordinary and philosophic,' and that the term 'moral vow' includes the bovine vow, the canine vow, and such other vows, resorted to by some of the ascetics and penitent Brahmans.2 In the Vinaya texts Buddha is asked by a Brahman if he was a Vinayavadi or mere Moralist. Apparently according to the Brahman, a Moralist was one who cared only for a blind adherence to an accepted code of moral discipline. Although Buddha's answer was in the affirmative, his meaning was different from that of his interlocutor. He was ready to be called a Moralist only in the sense that he taught the subjugation of all immoral ten- dencies, that is to say, of all that is rooted in greed, hatred and delusion. Buddhaghosa wrongly takes the term vinayavadi to mean the destroyer of all moral laws of society. The doctrine of outward morality or Formalism, along with Atmanistic philosophy (also called Sakkaya-ditthi) and Perplexity, yields under the critical analysis employed by the Buddha three pairs of opposite errors. The Atmanistic philosophy, for instance, involves such a pair of opposed blunders as Eternalism and Annihilationism, the speculations about the finiteness and infinity of the world and the like. The pair of blunders involved in Perplexity comprises 'Agnosticism' and ' Scepticism.' Now the two extremes (dve anta) to be avoided or reconciled in regard to the Buddhist system of morals are briefly described by Buddha as 'the frivolity of worldly life' (kamasukhallikAnuyoga) on the one hand, and ' the barbarity of asceticism' (attakilamathAnuyoga) on the other.8

1," 'Atthastlinf, pp. 848, 355, 977, ete. : " suddhtti kilean suddhi paramattnaanddhi bhutam va nibbinam eva," Sco for Govate, Kukkura-vata, eto., Majjhima-nikāyn, I, 397. ' Dhamma-cakka-pavattana Sutta; ef. Majjhima-nikayn, I. 106 foll,

334 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPIY

All these dogmatic errors can be overcome by a true insight into truth,1 The doctrine of outward morality was regarded by Buddha both as an erroneous dogma and a The fundamental false path. The real meaning of the term rules of conduct common to both the Silabbata or Vinava-vada, as contrasted with Jains and Buddlists: contrast with the the doctrines of Mahavira and Buddha, can be codes of other schools, gleaned from the fragment on Morality (Sila- kkhandha) incorporated in the first thirteen suttas of the Digha-nikaya.2 Throughout this fragment Buddha's object is to make it quite clear that he was not a Moralist in the accepted sense of the term. Buddha says that the uninstructed might praise him only with regard to things trivial, matters of little value, and mere morality (stla-mattam). They might say, for example: "Abandoning slaughter and destruction of life, he is compassionate and kind to all living creatures: Abandoning theft, he takes only what is given and lives in honesty and purity of heart, and so forth." "It is not with regard to these things, but mainly with regard to matters more profound, subtle, comprehensible only by the wise, that he could be rightly praised (or blamed)." This fragment containing a statement of the moral precepts of the Buddhists occurs in a scattered form in the four corners of the Jaina and Buddhist literatures, and enables us to determine the moral teachings of other schools as contrasted with the ethical views of both Mahavira and Buddha, The fragment is divided into three sections . the short, the medium-length and long para- graphs on conduct. The rules of conduct contained in the first section were those observed by the Buddhists, Jains and other recluses. Each of these rules implies an antithesis which relates to the moral conduct of others. The following two sections are only an elaboration of the first, The details have reference to manifold practices and activities of the time, These may

2 Dhamma-saàgani, 1009. 9 Dial. B., pp. 8-26.

THE MORALISTS 335

be brondly arranged under the following heads (1) Religious, comprising rites and ceremonies-performance of various sacrifi- oes; polytheistic worship (deva-dhamma), such as the worship of the sun, moon and earth, the invocation of Siri, the goddess of luck; making vows to the gods and paying them when the wishes are fulfilled ; pilgrimage to holy places; bathing in the rivers in order to purify one's soul; oracular answers from the gods; ets. (2) Sciontific, comprising the mathematical, the astrological, and the medical: foretelling the eclipscs and aberrations of the hoavenly bodies, the occurrences of earth- quakes, the rainfall, the food-supply, the general conditions of existence and health, fixing lucky days for marriage, hostilities and other purposes; counting numbers, summing up large totals ; practising as an oculist or as a surgeon, or as a doctor for children, etc. (3) Artistic, comprising architeoture (vatthu- vijja), painting, music, poetry, ete. (4) Popular practices- games, sports, amusements, festivities, and so forth. (5) Social, moral and political. For our present purpose the fragment with its counterpart in the Jaina Aupapatika Sutral has value only in so far as it illustrates the moral teachings and practices prevalent in the country before and during the time of Mabavira and Buddha. These teachings may be taken to represent three systems of moral discipline: first, the system as ex- pounded in the Dharma-sutras and Grihya-sutras; secondly, that elaborated in the existing Niti-literature; and thirdly, that embodied in the Kama-sutras. The first system is concerned with the discussion of general prinoiples of social morality, justice, and the duties of individuals in various capacities. The subject matter of this system is Dharma or juristic morals providing a standard mainly for the Brahman. The second system is concerned with questions of polity and government, and the object which it seeks to secure is Artha-material advantage or prosperity. It provides a 1 Secs. 62-180.

336 PRE-BUDDHISTIO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

standard mainly for the King. The third system aims at teaching us how to regulate our individual and natural desires for ploasure (Kama); it provides a standard mainly for tho lover. Thus all these systems are distinguished from a system of speculation (anviksaki) of which the subject of investi- gation is Moksa or final relcase, Ānviksaki provides a standard mainly for the dispassionate recluse. Accordingly, we propose to make a brief survey of the moral standards of the time under Kama (Erotic morals or Hedonism), Artha (Political morals or Utility), and Dharma (Juristie morals or Equity). These three systems were, according to tradition,' later developments out of a common mass of Vedic lore and their inter-dependence in secular Brahmanism is amply borne out by the fact that the general principles of morality which they inculcate are embedded in the treatises of veritably the same Brahmanical writers or achools. These systems can olaim a place in the history of Indian philosophy on the ground that their teachings rest upon two accepted ideas of Brahmanical philosophy: (1) that all human arts inclusive of all human institutions such as those of marriage and the rest must be an imitation of or a conformation to divine arts as manifested through the purposive order of nature8: and (2) that all human systems must be conceived on a graduated scale in accordance with the fundamental truth of the gradual development of self-consciousness.3

1 Cf. Komasutra by Vatayßyana, Chap. I, and Mablbharatn, Santiparra, Canto 9, V. 28. Soe Mr. HI. C. Chakladar's paper on Vatsyayans (Calentte University Journal of the Dept. of Letters, Vol, IV). 1 See Erhies of Mabidsa Aitnreys. a Bee the Taittirlya philosophy under Varuna

CHAPTER XXIII. TEACHERS OF EROTIC MORALS.

Since Mahidasa it has been recognised by many thinkers that happiness is the one end of all things. What we call bliss (ananda) or contemplative joy is nothing but a culmination

À gross hodonistio of the happiness resulting from satisfac- end implied in Erotic Morala. tion of various desires (kama). Hence as of existence, so of happiness there are infinite gradations. The lowest form of desire or feeling is uppetitive. The next higher form is sensual in its varying degrees. It seems that Mahavira's expression Sensualism (sāya-vāda)1 has direct reference to the sensualistic principles such as those expounded in Vatsāyana's Kāma-sūtra, (Abhaya-deva identi- fies saya-vada with the Buddhist system.) Buddha has a similar expression, Panca-kāma-guņa-dittha-dhamma-nibbāņa- väda.ª It is defined as an opinion of some teachers aecording to which the soul attains Nirvana, i.e., the fulfilment of all desires, through full indulgence of the five pleasures of sense. The term 'sensual desiros' (kamacchanda)3 which is explained in numerous Buddhist texts, and considered as a hindrance to higher life (nivarana), has bearing upon the system of Kāma-sūtra. The Buddhist Kama-sutta4 presupposes treatises on Erotic or Eugenic Morals, latterly systematised in the Kama-sūtra ascribed to Vatsyayana. The date of this work in its present form is unknown.ª In its general structure it seems to resemble the Kautiliya Arthasastra. It is particularly remarkable that

1 Sthandhgo, IV. 4. Dial. B., II. 49-60. 3 Mahāniddesa, p. 2. + Suttanipate; Mahaniddoso, 1-22, s, Mr. Chakladar has placed the date of the Kumasutra in the Srd century A.D., and sought to prove that there is a wonderful agreement between the Kamasutra and the Kalpasūtra of Apastemha. 43

338 PRE-BUDDHISTIO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

the two works have each a chapter called ' Aupanişadikam' dealing with modicine and charms. The following fragment of Buddha seems to have reference to such Atharvana doctrine: "Some recluses and Brähmanas make use of charms to make people lucky or unluoky, to procure abortion, to bring on dumb- ness ...... cause virility, deprive a man of potency .. 331

In the concluding verses of the existing Kamasūtra we are told that Vatsyayana wrote a systematic Vštayāyana and his treatise on the subject of Erotie Morals predeceseors. after the due consultation of older treatises of Babhravya and others. And in the introductory chapter we have mention of Svetakctu, the son of Uddalaka, Bābhravya of Pancāla,2 Dattaka, Cārīīyaņa, Suvarņanābba, Ghotaka-mukha, and others as teachers who left only fragmentary works, of these Svetaketu is referred to as the earliest of them. In the body of the text their opinions are quoted and discussed. Ghotaka-mukha is mentioned in the ancient Buddhist records as a Brahman tencher who had some conversation with the vencrable Udena while the latter was staying at Benares. He plainly told Udena that.hc could not believe that there could be a virtuous hermit (n'atthi dhammiko paribbūjo). In the Majjhima-nikaya we have mention of four Vaochas or Vatsyas, all of whom were Wanderers and one was named Tevijja-Vacchagotta. Tevijja-Vacchagotta had a philosophi- cal discussion with Buddha as to whether it is possible for a worldly man with worldly ties to make an end of suffering after death, i.e., to attain immortality. Buddha answered in the negative, but he added that he knew of one within his experi- ence who, even being a worldly man, succeeded in obtaining eternal life. Buddha did not give the name of the person,

1 Dial. B., 11. 23.25. ' Sce Mr. Chakladar's remarka about Vābhravya (C. U. J. D. L., IV, pp. 87-89). Ilis surmise a bout the association of the early history of Erotie Science with Panctla seoms quite sound.

TEACHERS OF EROTIC MORALS 339

but merely mentioned him as an upholder of the doctrine of action, a believer in free-will activity (kamma-vādi kiriya-vadi).1 But there is also mention of a Wanderer, Pilotika Vacchayana. It would show that there was at the time a distinct school of Wanderers, known as the Vacchayanas.ª His question clearly shows that he was interested in mundane matters. According to Hemacandra, Vatsyayana was one of the names of Canakya, the traditional author of the Kautiliya Artha-sastra. This is at variance with the account of the Pañcatantra, which tells us that the Dharma- Iater-connexion of Kama-aiitra and saatras belong to Manu and others, the Arthn-sustra. Artha-sāstras to Cāņakya and others, and the Kama-sastras to Vatsyayana and others." Nevertheless Vatsyayana's Kama-sūtra sbows, in its general structure and style, a rosemblance to the Kautiliya Artha-sastra. It is expressly mentioned in the two works that the systems which they embody are, as contrasted with a philo- sophical system, allogether a practical way of life (lokayātra). The point in which they differ is that the former lays the whole stress on Kama or Ploasure, and the latter on Artha, Material advantage.+ But we must remember that Kautilya assigns due place to pleasure in his system, when he says: One ought to enjoy pleasure or happiness, in so far as it does not conflict with the principles of law and polity; none should be deprived of happiness. Pleasure, advantage and righteousness form a category of three (trivarga). They are of equal (practical) value, and inter-dopendent. When one of them is not cultivated the other two are impaired thereby."

1.ª Majjhima-nikšyo, II. 158. Majjhima-nikšye, II. 483 ; I. 175. : " Tato Dharma-sastrini Manvadīni, Artha-sostrani Coņakyādīni, Kama-sostrāni Vat- syayanadini." Quoted by Shoma Shastry, Indroduction to Kautlliya Arthassatra, p. VIII. The personal name of Vatsy8yana probably was Mallanaga. ' Arthasastra, I. 7; XV. 1: "Arthe eva pradhana "; "Artha-mulam hi dharma-kams iti." ' Įbid, I. 7; XV. 1: "Dharm&rthavirodbena kāmamh sevete, na nisrnkhe ay5t."

340 PRE-BUDDIISTIO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

And we must note in jnstice to Vatyynyana that in his introductory statement and concluding words he points out that the ultimate aim of his work is to teach the subjuga- tion of the senses or self conquest (indriya-jaya). With regard to this point his position is similar to all the Niti-karas, the writers on Polity. Particularly in his introductory chapter, he teaches us not to indulge in semsuality. Ie admits that of the three-good principle, advantage and sensuality, the first two are far superior to the last-mentioned object. He warns us of the dangers we have to meet on the way of pleasure : the loss of friendship with the good, association with obnoxious people, waste of fortunc, impurity, fear, nervous weakness, distrust, and fall in puhlie estimation. We may hear of many persons who brought ruin upon themselves and their families by their subjoction to sonsual desires. Yet sense-indulgences, like daily food, are required for the pregervation of the body. Good principlo and advantage are at the root of desired result which is happiness,' Another point in which Vatsyayana agrees with the Niti-karas is that he is not a believer in a Deity or in over ruling Fate, but only in manly strength (purusa-kara). The ethical value of Vatsyayana's doctrine, judged as a summary of Hedonistic morals, is slight. However, it contains matters which may interest the students of modern science of Eugenics, the division of men and women into four sexual types, for example. Following his prede- cessors, Vatsyayana divides man's life into three periods: boyhood, youth and old-age According to his view, boyhood

Votsyāyan's doetrine should be spont in learning, youth in summing ap Hedoms- enjoyment of pleasures and riches, and old- tio morals age in good principle and detachment from all material concerns. He defines pleasure (kama) as the activity of the special senses-hearing, touch, sight, taste and

' Kāma-sūtia, TI.

TEACHERS OF EROTIC MORALS 341

smell-which is brought into exercise by their natural affinity for the specific objects, and the pleasurable feeling which results therefrom.1 The senses are inseparable from the self and are all based upon the mind. From this is apparent the appropriateness of the name-the doctrine of pleasures of the five senses-given by the Buddha to such a view as this. The name is a descriptive one-panca-kamaguna-dittha-dhamma- nibbana-vada, and the implied sense is that we can realise Nirvana, the summum bonum, the fulfilment of all desires, in this present consciousness, by indulgence of the senses. No doubt Vatsyayana speaks of self-conquest or subjugation of the senses, but his real view is that we should proeeed through indulgence to achieve this end of desires. Thus we see that his teaching was in a sense a mockery of selfconquest. If the Kamasutra be studied in relation to the voluptious life of Indian princes and rich bankers and to the general immo- rality of human society, one cannot but agree with Dr. F. W. Thomas that it does not represent after all any vicious system. Its primary object, as set forth in the closing chapter of the Brihad Āranyaka Upanisad, is to teach a way of life which is essential to the preservation and betterment of the race, and as such the system forms an integral part of Brahmanic ethics. The system as a whole emanated undoubtedly out of the Brahmanic theory of art (see Aitareya ethics, p. 83 f.) None should fight shy of claiming ancient Indian treatises of erotic science as a rich heritage.

1 Kāme-sātro, II: "grotra-tvak cokşur-jihrā-ghrānandn atmasamyuktena manassdhis. thitAņām sveşn sveşu vişayeşvanuknlyataļ pravrittų kāma ............ "

CHAPTER XXIV.

TEACHERS OF POLITIOAL MORALS.

By the term Artha,-Wealth or Material Advantage, Vatsyayana understands the acquisition and increase of

Defmtion of Artha good in general, land, gold, cattle, furniture, etc. The science which treats of the subject of wealth is called Varta. Commerce and agricul- ture fall within the province of Varta, the science of Wealth or Economics. Brihaspati is traditionally known as the first author of the science of wealth (artha- sāstra).1 The above definition of wealth is implied also in Buddha's Kama-sutta+ "If the desire cherished by a man be fulfilled, the mortal becomes glad-hearted indeed, obtaining what he desired. On the other hand, his desires being unfulfilled, he feels himself distressed, like one pierced with an arrow. The thoughtful man who renounces all ambitious desires, as one runs away from a snake, overcomes the torments of desire. The man who hankers after land, houses, gold, cattle, horses, slaves, women, friends and various other possessions, allows these minor things to overpower him and enemies-internal and external-to trample him down. 192

According to Kauțilya the Sciences (vidyas) are four: Philosophy, the three Vedas, Economics, and the Science of

1 Kāmo-sūtra, I, 7; II, 8-9. 2 Commentnry on Ksma-sutta in the Mahaniddesa, 1-22,

TEACHERS OF POTITICAL MORALS 343

Administration.1 Philosophy, he says, is the light or guide to all other branches of knowledge, to all particular sciences, it opens the way for all our activities, Placa of Dandaniti among the Sciences. and it is the foundation of all principles, the giver of eternal life.' The three Vedas, together with all supplementary works and sciences, lay down the general rules relating to men of four castes and of four 'estates' or orders of training. So by the three Vedas Kautilya really means the Dharma-sastras. The subjects of enquiry of Varta, the science of wealth, are agriculture, cattle- rearing, trade and commerce. The science of Administra- tion (Dandaniti) enables a man to gain what is not gained, to protect what is gained, to increase what is protected, and to benefit public institutions therewith.

Although from one point of view Kautilya accords the highest place to Metaphysics and from the other point of view he gives the same place to Danda-the science of Administra- tion. In fact, he considers Danda to be at the root of other three sciences. Vinaya or Discipline is at the root of Danda. His definition of Vinaya is that which provides a safe-guard for all living beings. Discipline may be either cultivated or natural. For instance, Nature governs substances-living individuals-not non-substances (kriythi dravyam vinayati

' Kauțilya tells us that the Manavas regarded philosophy as n particular phase of the three Vedas. Those of the Brihaspati school recognised only two Sciences, Economics and the science of Govornment, They considerod the three Vedas to bo a mere system of moral conduct, that is to say, a mere way of life. Ausanasas, on the other hand, recog- nised only one science, namely the science of Goreroment. The three philosophical systoms recognised by Kautilya are Samkhyam, Yoga and Lokiyata. The three Vedas investigate the good and bad principles; Economies prosperity and adversity ; and the science of Government the good and the bad policy, From bis further disoussion it apponrs that he accords the highest place to Philosophy. Brihaspeti-sutra, I.3: "Dandanitir eva vidy," The Barhaspatyas recognised only the science of Govemment as tho science. However, the statement is modifed elsowhere, in the luler portions of the sūtia, III, 9 following. z "Pradīpah sarva-vıdyānām upāya sarva karmaņām. Afrayah sārvadharmānām šāiva- dānvikşaki mata." Arha-Sistra, I.I.

344 PRE-BUDDHISTIO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

nådravyam). Discipline which is cullivated includes reverence for the teacher, attention, receptiou, retontion, understanding, and so forth.1

The same broad division of the soience of utility (Artha- sastra), also known as the science of polity (Niti-sastra, Raja- sastra), into Economics (Vārtā) and Polities (Danda-nīti) is adopted by all the leading political writers.2 Kama-sastra and Niti-eastra -Sensual- It is clear from Kautilya's division and ism and utiltarian morahty compared. definition that the principles of utility, no less lhan the principles of self-perfection, rest ultimately upon Vinaya,-order, discipline, restraint, social organisation or moral culture in tho widest possible sense. But we must nol lose sight of the difference between a Käma- sastra and a Niti-sastra, or between Sensualism and Utility. With regard to the firsl difference, we are told in the Sukra- niti that whercas an Arthasastra enumerates the publie and private functions of kings in accordance with the dictates of Śruti and Smriti, a Kama sastra des cribes the characteristic marks-physical and mental-of living beings, both male and female." In addition to this scientific difference we have to consider the difference in the moral means by which the sensualist and political teachers seck to realise their objects, pleasure and material advantage. As we have seen, with the former the royal road to happiness is the full indulgence of the five senses. According to the latter, sense-indnlgence cannot be conducive to material advantage. Hence all poli ical teachers insist on self-conquest (indriya-jaya) as the essential duty of the king and his servants. But they concede this much to the sensualist view that a man should enjoy the pleasures of life in so far as they do not conflict with the principles of good conduct, justice and economy, and that none

1 Artha-Siatra, I. 1-2. * Brihaspati-sutra, I-8, II.I-A; Sūkra-nīti, I.303-316, › Śūkma-nīti, TV.3.110.114. cf. Dial. B. 71.19,

TEACHERS OF POLITICAL MORALS 345

should be deprived of happiness. Thus we see that Sensualism and Utility agree in considering happiness to be the highest good. These early developments of political theory have a real and close connexion with the progress of philosophy and ethics. Divergent as the traditions are, they seem to Development political speculations of agree on this point, namely that they all previous to Kaulilya's Arthusāstra. mention Caņakya, Kanțilya, or Vișņugupta as the greatest landmark in the development of Indian political science and literature. A fairly large number of works are associated with the name of Canakya, the prime minister of king Candragupta Manrya of Magadha. The best known of these works is the Artha-sastra, discovered a few years ago in South India by Pandit Shama Shastri of Mysore. Prof. Jolly considers the Kautiliya Artha-sastra to be "ono of the most important discoverics ever made in the whole range of Sanskrit literature," as it has thrown a flood of light "on the political condition of India in the very times when Megasthenes visited it." While scholars are unanimous in their verdict on tho great historical value of the work, they are divided in opinion on the question as to its real author. There are three schools of opinion. Prof. Hillebrandt,' who is supported Three schoole of opinion as to the by Prof. Jolly, maintains that it was the authorship of Kauțiliya Arthaśtatra. the work of Kautilya Canakya's school, rather than of himself. Pandit Shama Shastri and Prof. Jacobi' maintain an individual authorship of the work.

1 Niti-fataka; Niti-sara; Laghu-cāņakya-rajaniti-stetra; Vriddha-chņakys-rtjanīti- šāstra, Cāņakya-śloka; Cšņakya sūtma; Hitopadeśa. ' Uber das Kautilyn-sastra und Verwandtes, Broslan, 1908. As to the progress made by scholars in the study of the Indiau scionce of polity previous to the discovery of the Kautiliya Artha-festra, Dr. Thomas points out that "The propaga- tion of the polloy in fable (the Fables of Pilpay) was first adumbratod by Sir William Jones-, In its tochnienl form the Indian seiesee firat becamr known by the pubkention of the Kamandaki-Nitiern-, The next stage is reprosentod by two valuable publications of Prof, Formichi-," Brihaspati-sutra, p, 181. ' Uber die Bohtheit des Kautiliya in Borhn Academy Sitzungberichte, 1911 nnd 1912. 44

346 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Prof. Keith, on the other hand, holds "that the Artha-sastra is based on his (Kautilya's) teaching, though not by his own hand."1 Prof. Rhys Davids agrees with Prof. Keith in saying that "the maxims [of state-craft in the Artha-sastra] constantly refer to Chāņakya under the suggestive name of Kautilya (" cunning," "deceptive"), as if one were to speak of Machiavelli as " the trickster." They refer also to Ohina, and they refer to royal mints in constant work. Neither of these was possible till long after Chanakya's time (4th centary B.C.). They breathe, too, the spirit of a later time, the time in litera- ture of the writing of manuals, and, in politics, not of a great empire like Chandragupta's, but of contending states."8 It would be idle on our part to speculate here whether the Artha-sastra in question was composed by Kautilya himself, or by his school, or by someone else. The work in its present form embodies the views of Kautilya along with those of others, and thus enables us to discriminate the opinions which are strictly Kautilya's own from those which are not his, i.e., which are older. And so long as we can do that it is immaterial to enquire when the work was written or by whom. As Pandit Shama Shastri and Prof. Jacobi point out, in the body of the work the opinions of Kautilya's predecessors are frequently quoted and discussed. They inolude both schools and individuals. The schools are the Manavas, Kautilya's predo- Barhaspatyas, Ausanasas, Ambhiyas (of oessors. Taxila ?), and the Parasaras; and the indivi- duals are Bharadvāja, Kaņinka Bhāradvāja, Visālākșa, Pisuna, Pisunaputra, Katyāyana, Kaunapa-danta, Vāta-vyādbi, Bāhu- danti-putra, Kinjalka, Dīrgha Cārāyaņa, and Ghoțaka-mukha. Some of these names ocour in the Mahabharata : Vaisālakșa, Manu Indra, Bahudantaka, Bārhaspatya, Kavi (Usanasa),

1 J. R. A. S., Jabuary, 1918. The Deonomic Journal of the Royal Economie Bociety, Dec., 1D18, p. 51D.

TEACHERS OF POLITICAL MORALS 347

Gaurasīras, etc .; two in Vātsyayana's Kāma-sūtra : Cārāyaņa and Ghotaka-mukha;1 one in the Manasāra-Vāstusastra: Visā- lākșa. With regard to the predecessors of Kautilya, our conclusions are : (1) That the schools referred to were not strictly and exolusively political schools, but legal and ethical schools who had certain opinions on political and artistic matters. Law in ancient times was mingled with religion, morality and politics. The existing legal manuals, both ancient and modern, " devote some of their chapters to disoussions of political subjects like the duties of kings, public finance, civil and criminal laws, and judicial procedure."2 (2) That the allusion to Dirgha Carayana and Ghotaka- mukba in Vatsyāyana's Kāma-sutra and the Kautiliya Artha- sostra throws light on the close relations between Sensualism and Utilitarian morality. Dirgha Carāyana (Dīgha Karāyaņa) and Ghotaka-mukha wore both youngor contemporaries of Buddha. Of thom, the former was a near attendant of king Pasenādi of Kosala.8 (3) That the individuals who placed the science of royal polity on an independent footing by gradually separating its province from that of the older legal systems were mostly known as Parivrajakas,-the wanderers as distinguished, on one hand, from the Hermits, Ascetics and Recluse philosophers, and on the other hand, from the Brahmans with kingly powers, the ministers and officers of state, the Mahasalas or teachers of various sciences and arts, and the priests. In the early Buddhist records+ we have frequent mention of a number of such Wanderers, all of whom were the contemporaries of Buddha, e.g., Pottha-pāda, Digha-nakha, Sakula Udāyi,

Of. Thomas' Brihaspati-sutra, p. 182. ª Publie Administration in Ancient India, p. 8. " Majjhima-nikaye, 11.118. * Dīgha-nikāya, I 178; Majjhima-nikāya, I, 359, 481, 483, 189, 401, 501, 518 ; II. 1, 22, 29, 40; III; 207. Anguttare nikūya, II, 30. 1 ; II. 185. 1 ; eto,

848 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Anna-bhara, Varadhara, Potaliya or Potali-putta, Ugga- hamāna, Vokhanassa Kacoāna, Magandiya, Sandaka, Uttiya, three Vaccha-gottas, Sabhiya, and Pilotika Vacchayana. Besides these Wanderers we bave to take into account many celebrated Brahman teachers of Buddha's time, such as Pokkharasāti (Pukarasadi), Sonadaņda, (Saunadanta or Śau- naka), Kutadanta, Lohicca, Kanki (Canki), Tarukkha (Taru- kşya), Jānussoņi (Jatasruti), Todeyya, Todeyya-putta or Subha, Kāpatņika Bhāradvāja, Aggika Bhāradvāja, Piņdola Bhāradvāja, Kasi Bharadvaja, Vasetțha, Assalāyana, Moggal- lāna, Pārāsariya, Vassakāra and others.1 The best way of distinguishing between the Wanderers, strictly so called, and the Recluse philosophers-who were in a sense a class of Wanderers is probably this. We may here suppose that in speaking of "harsh language " (parusa- vaca) or " wrangling phrases," Buddha had in mind the disci- ples of such Recluse philosophers as Purana Distinction between the Wandorors and the Kassapa, Kakuda Katyāyana, and others, Recluse philosophere. while in speaking of "vain conversation " (samphappalapa) or "manifold beastly talk" (aneka-vihita tiracchana-katha), he had in mind chiefly the disciples of the Wanderers. The disciples of the six famous Recluse philo- sophers would say to one another; "You don't understand this doetrine and discipline, I do. How should you know about this dootrine and disoipline? You have fallen into wrong views, It is I who am in the right ........ "2 The disciples of the Wanderers, rather of Brahmana-paribbajaka as dis- tinguished from auñatitthiya-paribbajaka, were addicted to such vain and low conversation as talk abont kings, robbers and rebels, ministers of state, war and warfare; talk about foods and drinks, clothes, beds, garlands, perfumes; talk about relations, equipages, villages, towns, cities, and coun- tries; tales about women, heroes, strects, departed spirits;

1 Dīgha-nikāya, I. 87, 111, 127, 224, 234 , Majjhima-nikāya, I. 16, 164, 175, oto. * Dial. B, II. 14-15. Majjhimn-nikāya, II. 3.

TEAOHERS OF POLITICAT. MORALS 349

miscellaneous talk; speculations about the origin of the world including human institutions, the apparition and distribution of land and water, or briefly, about the successive phases of existence and non-existence."1 The above list given by Buddha of low topics is of great

The historion) impor. importance from the historical standpoint. tance of the list of low First, it sums up the manifold topics telks. which fall within the province of the science of utility or royal polity. Secondly, it sets forth the view of Buddha and other Recluse philosophers on politics. Politics was to them mere gossip or foolish talk. And thirdly, it shows that although with the Wanderers in general the subjects of constant and habitual discussion comprised all social and political questions and though the discussion of philo- sophical problems was but a hobby, so to speak, they were not altogether indifferont to the great spiritual striving which was going on in the country all round, side by side with its intellectual and material progress. The Buddhist accounts of the Wanderers are extremely meagre, and appcar in places too symmetrical to be suscep- tible of historical proof. For instance, almost all the Wanderer teachers are represented as having three hundred foilowers each. Nevertheless they place before us a few broad facts relating to the Wanderers. In the first place, the Buddhist records agree with the Brahman law-books in representing the The BrEhman Wande. rars fornished a con- Wanderers as those Brahmans who cut off necting link betweon the Recluses and the connection with the world, and passed into a Brahmans. new mode of life which admitted of no caste- system or class-distinctions.2 In this they were in no way different from the Recluse proper. Another point of resem- blance between them and the Recluses is that they sought to

1 Dial B. pp. 18-14. This is one of the atock.paasagos in the Jaina Angas, * Sankaro in his comments on the Vodtnta-sutra, II, 8. 15, saroastienlly remarks : " Ag sometimes the Parivrajakas are distinguished from the Brahmans,"

350 PRE-BUDDIIISTIO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

build up a system of moral philosophy entirely upon a human or rational ground rather than on a theocratie basis. They differed, however, from the latter by the strong moral justi- fication which they offered for the current Asrama-theory of life, and other social laws and usages. Thus we can easily see that the Wanderers proper by their views and ways of life furnished a connccting link between the Recluses, on one hand, and the Brahmans on the other, the Recluses who were inspired with ideas of sweeping reform in religion and philosophy, and the Brabmans who, in their various capacities, governed society, and were naturally anxious to safeguard their interests and influence against every dangerous change. Hence is the justification of the significant name Brahmana-paribbajakā. Further, understanding this connect- ing link we can see near relation in which ethios and politios, or a Dharma-Sastra and an Artha-sastra stand to each other. In the second placc, it is manifest from these records that travellers as the Brahman Wanderers were, they were in a position to learn the languages, customs and usages of the people living in different parts of the world in which they themselves lived. And we must remember that in those early ages of civilisation when there was neither any printing press nor any easy means of communication between one country and another, elements of knowledge could be gathered, disseminated or utilisod for scientific purpose by no better means than such travelling. The Brihaspati-sutra, therefore, rightly insists: "Manliness consists in rising superior to one's weaknesses. A man learns endurance by residence in other countries. A prince should acquire know- ledge of all powers, times, countries, conciliations, natures (views, ways and temperament), strengths, exercises and ages."1 It is hardly necessary to mention that even in the time of Buddha the knowledge of different languages (desa-

' Of Thomaa' Brihaspati-suta, IJI. 1-3.

TEACHERS OF POLITICAL MORALS 351

bhașa-vijñana) and usages (desadi-dharma) was recognised sciences or branches of learning. And in the third place, we may learn from these records that the Brahman Wanderers were known to their contemporaries generally by some nick- names. Let us consider, for instance, the names Pottha-pada, Uggahamana, and Dīgha-nakha. The name Pottha-pada literally means one who was a prostha or pusta-pada,-sufferer from elephantiasis. The name Vata-vyadhi (The rheumatio) given in the Kautiliya Arthasastra is a similar example. Another name is Uggahamana, which literally means one who gazes upward, one with rolling eyes, that is to say, one who is goggle-eyed (Visalaksa). Similiarly the name Digha-nakha signifies one with long nails. By the nick-names we trace some of the teachers whose views are quoted and discussed in the Kauțiliya Arthasastra as Wanderers mentioned in the oldest Buddhist records. Furthermore, from the discussions reported by the Buddhists we find traces of the personal views upheld by the Wanderers. These views may be arranged under three heads: philosophical, ethical, and political. Of these we need only consider the philosophical and the ethical. As regard's their philosophical views, the Brahman Wan- derers seem to have drawn inspiration from post-Vedio

philosophical philosophies rather than neo-Vedic or pre- The views of the Wan. Buddhistic. The problems with which dorers. Pottha-pāda, Aggi-Vacchagotta and Uttiya (Atreya) were confronted were these : Is the world as a whole enternal or not ? Is the psychical identical with the corporeal, or are the soul and the body two separate entities? Does a human being who has by his enlightenment and charaoter reached the highest conceivable standard of perfeotion conti- nue to exist after death or not ? All these problems may be reduced to one: Is there an incorporeal and extra-mental soul or not? Aggivessana Digha-nakha is said to have maintained this view: Nothing of me abides (sabbam me

852 PRE-BUDDHISTIO INDIAN PHILOSOPIY

na khamati). Buddha said in reply: If it be, as you say, that nothing of yours abides, then it follows that the dogmatie assertion which is yours also does not abide.' Sakula Udayi who declared himself to be a disciple of Mahāvira (Nigantha Nataputta), was of opinion that soul is the highest self or entity which remains untouched after death, and that our real self-existence is one of unmixed happiness (ekanta- sukha),-the absolute bliss which can be ralised by means of moral restraint and religious pcnance (tapoguna).' A fuller discussion of the philosophical views of the Brahman Wanderers appears in the Pottha-pada Sutta. It is a dialogue between Pottha-pada and Buddha, which adopts, as Prof. Rhys Davids points out, the Socratic method of seouring a dialectical advantage over opponents' views. This dialogue reminds us of the episode of Indra and Prajapati in the Chandogya Upanisad. In it we are told that the Wanderer Pottha-pada or Vata-vyadhi was a believer in three grados of soul : the gross or corporeal (Olarika, i.e, sthūla or bhūtama); the mental (manomaya), and the incorporeal, immaterial or purely cognitive (arūpa or sanñāmaya, i, e., vijñānātmā).8 Turning to the ethical views of the Wanderers and other ancient Moralists (Vinaya-vadins), we observe that they all

The ethical views of conceived unmixed happiness (ekanta-sukha) the Wanderers and as the highest good. Accordingly, all efforts other Moralists. of life should be directed to this one end. But their method of self-training was imperfect or defective. Indeed, the fault which Buddha, in agreement with his predecessor Mahavira, found with their method of self- training was that it emphasised only the negative or privative side of virtue. In other words, the Moralists attempted to regulate outward conduct or behaviour of man rather than build up his character by developing all active moral

1 Majjhima-nikāya, I. 407 2 tbid, II. 85-37 * Dial. B. II, 241-264.

TEACHERS OF POLITICAL MORALS 353

faculties. "A Bhiksu shall not possess any store. He must be chaste. He must not change his residence during the rainy season .... He shall abandon all desire for sweet food. He shall restrain his speech, sight and actions. He shall not take parts of plants and trees .... Out of season he shall not dwell a second night in the same village .... He shall avoid the destruotion of seeds. He shall be indifferent towards all creatures, whether they do him an injury or a kindness, He shall not undertake any work for his livelihood." Such are the rules which are laid down in the Brahman law- books, and which apply to the Wanderers and Recluses. The Wanderer Sakula Udayi, as we saw, maintained that the formulated path (akaravati patipada) to the realisa- tion of unmixed happiness is twofold: abstention from killing, robbing, adultery and lying, and various penances.' The Wanderer Uggahamāna or Visalāksa, son of Samaņa-maņdikā, was of opinion that a person may be said to have performed all his moral duties (sampanna-kusala), if he does not commit any sin or crime by way of deed, does not utter any harmful speech, does not entertain any sinful thought, and does not follow a wrong mode of living.3 When this view of Uggaha- mana was brought to the notice of Buddha by the Architect named Pañcakanga, Buddha said, "Well, if that be so, then & baby must be regarded as one who has performed all his moral duties, who is extremely clever, who has attained the best of attainments or who is a Recluse without a rival. For such a baby has even no body, and what to say of his committing any sin by way of deed; he has even no language, and what to say of his uttering any sinful word; he has even no mind, strictly speaking, and what to say of his cherishing any sinful

1 Bühler's Gantama, III. 11-25. 3 Of. Bandhayana, II. 10. 18. 1-8: The precepts to be observed by a Samnyssin are- Abatention from injury to living beings, from falsehood and theft or diahonesty, confinence, liberality, freedom from anger, obedience to the Guru, avoidance of rashnesa, cleanli- nees and purity in eating. a Majjhima nikāya, II. 24. 45

354 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

thought; he has even no profession, and what to say of his wrong mode of living!" From Buddha's further criticism it appears that mere avoidanne of sinful acts cannot exhaust man's moral functions, and cannot lead to unmixed happiness. The result of absti- nence or self-restraint is not unmixed Baddha's oriticiam of the views of the happiness, but something which is mixed Wanderers. (sukha-dukkha).1 In his opinion, therefore, the path to unmixed happiness is threefold; avoidance of all that is evil, rooted in greed, hatred and ignorance, perform- ance of all that is good, rooted in disinterestedness, love and knowledge, and inner enlightenment. Buddha declared action to be volition (cetanā vadāmi kammam). His definition was anticipated by Yajnavalkya who said, " As a man's will is, so is his act ". According to this definition, an act whether good or bad is an act only when it has reference to man's will, is prompted by a certain motive, and carries out a certain defi- nite purpose or intention. This definition of an act was open to misunderstanding. A Wanderer named Potali-putta took it to mean that in Buddha's view a true act is that which is mental (manokammam), and neither that which is vocal nor that which is bodily.' Another view of Buddha, which was misunderstood by some of the Wanderer teachers is this: "Painful is the life of a house-holder, and free is the life of renunciation (sambadho gharavāsā,-abbhokāso pabbajjā)." The Brahman law-givers, on the contrary, extolled the life of a house-bolder and denounced the life of renunciation. In this respect, neither Buddha nor the Brahman law-givers were extremists. When Subha, the son of Todeyya, con- sulted Buddha on the Brahman view, Buddha frankly confessed that he had no reason to judge every house- holder an ethical or intellectual superior to every hermit, and every hermit an ethical or intellectual superior to

1 .* Majjhima-nikāya, II

TEAOHERS OF POLITICAL MORALS B55

every house-holder. In such case the best thing would be to judge every person, whether he be a house-holder or & hermit, individually, on his own merits.1 Similarly, although it might appear that they with one voice ex- tolled the order of house-holders, and with one voice denouno- ed the order of hermits, a careful examination of their systems as a whole would reveal that this was really not the case. By extolling the order of house-holders they did not mean in their heart of hearts to disparage the spiritual life which the hermits sought to live. The point which they insisted on was that in seeking the higher life, we should not neglect the humbler, preliminary but useful functions of man's life. However, taking literally Buddha's general opinion, that painful is the life of a house-holder, and free is the life of a recluse, the Wanderer Magandiya ' judged Buddha to be an exterminator of the human race (bhunahu, bhrunahan), in the same way that the Vajasaneyas judged the Mundakas to be self-murderers (atmahano janah). Now to return to Uggahamana. Although his was a negative definition of goodness, it is most remarkable histori- cally, as it exhibits a rational attempt on his part to form a distinct and clear notion of what goodness is. That hia con- ception of good implies a lofty morality is unquestionable. We shall perhaps be not far wrong in holding that the Brahman Wanderers, in conjunction with the Recluse philo- sophers, effected a transition from the older conventional standards of judgment of conduct to later rational or soienti- fic standards. The determining fact with the Wanderers, as with all later political writers, is psychogenetically will or volition (sankalpa, cetana), and ethically the end to which activities are directed. In their teachings God, Time, Fate, Chance, or the like has no place. Manliness or self-reliance

1 Majjhima-nikšya, II, 198. ' Ibid, 1. 502. As the name implies, Magandiya was either sa adherent of the Mandukeya, er the fonnder of the Markandeya (Magandika) achool,

356 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPIY

(purusakara) is the raison d'etre of their othics1 Thus they thought it necessary first to investigate which of the current theories of life was adequate to furnish a high and at the same time attainable standard of ethical or moral judgment,

Mayhıma-nıkaya, 1 &13 foll Brihaspatı-sūtza, II , ete

CHAPTER XXV.

TEACHERS OP JURISTIC MORAIS.

As employed in the Vedic literature, the three terms Truth (satya), Good Principle (rita), and Righteousness

Satya, Rita, Dharma. (dharma) appear to be almost synonymous. Of these, the term Rita is of more frequent occurrence than the other two. A Vedic sage conceived Truth as that on which the universe rests. Truth was, in other words, for this sage Rita, the law, principle or order of things.1 In the view of Aghamarsana Rita is the eternal law and order of the universe.ª Following these earlier thinkers, Āsuri ansigned a Divine origin to Dharma. In his phraseo- Jogy, the term Dbarma implies the most excellent law, right or justice which is protected, exercised or administered by the ruling class,-by the State-of which the origin is equally divine. He declared Dharma to be the Kșatra of Ksatras,-the king of kings, there being nothing higher than it. Since the establishment of Government, of which the main weapon is law or justice, one who is physically weaker is able to control another who is physically stronger, who follows the simple rule of might. For Asuri again justice is truth, just as conversely that which is true is just. Thus we see that the term Dharma in its narrowest sense signifies just what we now call justice. But we are here concerned with Dharma, as understood in the Dharmasutras and Dharmasastras, As Canakya points out, the term Dharma is employed by writers on equity in the sense of Varņāsrama- dharma,-the discipline which considers man's actions or duties

Big-Veda, X. 85. 1. " Ibid, X. 190 1.

358 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

from the point of view of social grades and periods of life. The literature which embodies such a discipline is briefly known as Trayi, the three Vedas, whereas, strictly speaking, it includes the four Vedas, Itihasas, Puranas, and the six Vedangas.1 The author of the Sukrantti, in agreement with Caņakya, derines a Dharmasastra or Smriti as that system of discipline which investigates the nature of castes and the duties enjoined by the revealed texts, and which sets forth the social and economic principles.2 The Buddhist expression for the system is even more interesting : Anussava or Itiha-itiha- paramparā-pițaka-sampadā Dhamma,R-a system of moral discipline which is based upon customs, usages, or traditions handed down from time immemorial. The dialectical defenders of these partly-religious, partly-social, partly-moral, partly-legal systems were known as Mimamsins whose views were later systematised in the Purva-mimamsa of Jaimini. In the Buddhist The Dherma Sutra- karas and the Mimum. literature they are referred to as Takkis gakas. and Vimamsins. With regard to this close alliance or kinship between the Dharmasutrakaras and the Mimamsakas, the following observations of Dr. Buhler are instructive. Referring to Apastamba, one of the oldest known writers on Indian law, Dr. Bühler says,+ "In two passages he settled contested questions on the authority of those who know the Nyaya, i.e., the Purva-Mimamsa, and in several other cases he adopts a line of reasoning which fully agrees with that followed in Jaimini's Mimamsa-sutras. ........ The wording of the passage in the two works does not agree so closely that the one could be called a quotation of the other. But it is evident, that if Apastamba did not know the

1 Kauțliya Arthaśāstra, I 8. " Sukra nīti, IV. 3. 106-107. * Majjhima nikšya, I. 520. * Buhler's Apa stamba, XXVII; II. 4, 8, 13; II. 6, 14, 18 ef Mimams&sūtras, 1, 8. 8-4

TEACHERS OF JURISTIC MORALS 359

Mīmamsasutras of Jaimini, he must have possessed some other very similar work." In dealing with the subject of Dharma, we have first to consider that branch of Vedic literature which is called the Kalpa. The Kalpa in its purcly literary sense is but a com-

The Kolpa-sūtras; mon designation applied to a number of their relation to the Sutras or codes, such as Srauta-sūtras, Dharma-sutros. Dharma-sutras, Grihya -- sutras and Sulva- sutras Of these, the Dharma-sutras may be regarded as the essence of each Kalpa. How many Kalpas there were in all we do not know, but presumably their number was large. Probably each Kalpa represented the manual of a separate school of Brahmans, who were the legislators of life and society, the teachers of morals. The Kantiliya Arthasastra quotes and discusses the opinions of five schools: the Manavas, the Barhaspatyas, the Ausanasas, the Ambhiyas and the Parasaras. Panini in his grammar alludes to two schools : the Parasariyakas and the Karmandinas. The Manavas and Parasariyakas are mentioned in the Manasara Vastusastra as being recognised authorities on architecture and kindred arts; the names of Vasistha, Narada and other Dharmasutrakaras, too appear in the list of such authorities. Baudhayana and Vasistha quote in their legal manuals the opinions of Gautama, Manu, Katyayana, Harita, Aupagandhini and other ancient teachers of Dharma; Apastamba cites the opinions of Eka, Kāņva, Kunika, Kutsa, Kautsa, Pușkarasādi, Varşyāyani, Śvetaketu and Harita. Dr. Buhler tells us that Kāņva, Kautsa, Puşkarasadi and Vārșyāyani are quoted by the expositors of Panini as authorities on phonetics, ety- mology and grammar. A string of names also appears in the existing Grihya-sutras. And we must not be surprised when those who are quoted in one group of texts as authorities on law and morals should be quoted in other groups as authorities on other subjects-medicine, astronomy, and astro- logy, for instance.

360 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPIY

The Dharmasutrakaras were Brahmans by birth But for historical purposes we should remember that The philosophers and the couneillors there were two distinet types of Brahman teachers, namely, the Dharmasūtrakāras and the Wanderers. Megasthenes was inclined to represent the philosopheis as a class of Indian population quite distinct from those to whom he applied the name of the councillors, But although the philosophers were not necessarily either householders or hermits and recluses, the one characteristic fact about them was that none of them cared for material gains. The point may be illustrated by reference to Uddālaka and his son Svetakelu. The former was a philosopher or original thinker; the latter was a famous Vedic scholar, a writer on the subject of Kama and Dharma. Svetaketu was proud and conceited, as Vedic scholars generally were and are, and he lacked originality of thought.' The Dharmastitrakaras as distinguished from the philosophers were thone Brahmans who held high social positions. They were either ministers of state, councillors, or served the state in other capacities. Besides these Brahmans, there were others who were established in different parts of the country as land-holders by Royal Grant. Some idea of their position may be formed from the modern Mohantas, from whom they differed, however, in that they were married householders' and their position and rights were hereditary. They are known in the Upanisad literature as Mahasalas or heads of Vedic institutions. Also they were diplomats of ancient times, and knew exactly where to draw the line between theory and practice. It is a remarkable fact that several discussions which Buddha had with these Brahmans all turned upon the subject of caste system. The only question they discussed was: " who

1 Ohāndogya Upaniçad, VI 1. e Dial. B 1I, 150

TEACHERS OF JURISTIC MORALS 361

is a Brahmin and who is not"? This is the main point in their cthical teachings to be specially noted. For other points we refer the reader to the chapters on the Taittiriya system and Muņdaka philosophy.

46

PART IV.

PHILOSOPHY OF MAHĀVĪRA.

Introductory.

It is not part of our plan to undertake in these pages so large and important a task as an enquiry The aim and scope. of Part IV. into the philosophy of the Buddha. We content ourselves with a general survey from within of the development of what is known as the Dynamistic philosophy of Mahavira. And our object will be attained if we succeed to any appreciable extent in indicating the nature of the precise historical relation in which Mahavira stands to his predecossors as well as to the Buddha, his younger contemporary and far-famed successor. A distorted picture of history has been the inevitable result of attempts to represent Jainism, Buddhism, or Hinduism as a system, complete once for all and in all its aspects. The reason is obvious. No one of these three names de- Review of modern stadies in Jainiem: notes any one system of thought, but several. Laok of historical method, For example, Jainism, taken as a whole, presents to us a long and eventful history not of one individual thinker but of many. And if we may rightly suppose that no two individuals are exactly alike in their views, character, outlook and environment, then it fol- lows that the development of Jainism is unintelligible when considered apart from those individual thinkers to whom it is mainly or largely due. In such case the subject of our investigation should be not what Jainism as a whole is, but who Mahavira was, what his teachings were, how his doctrines were expounded after his death by Sudharman, and others.

PHILOSOPEY OF MAHĀVĪRA 363

There remains much to be done because scholars have hitherto sought to measure the philosophical views of India not by the standpoint of the philosophers themselves, but in part by those of later commentators and in part by what they call modern, European or Christian standpoints. Referring to this latter mode of judgment Mrs. Rhys Davide acutely observes, " A specific tradition in knowledge, and a vehicle of expression that has not coincided in its growth of that knowledge should make us wary in estimating another tradition, another standpoint, other modes of expression. We may fancy that we are measuring other views by standpoints that are not only absolutely true, but the only standpoints possible or conceivable. But in fact we are measuring, by what is relatively true ..... .. a different range of standpoints, which have come to hold good, analogously and equally, for other sections of humanity."I Again the point where modern exponents of Indian philo- sophy show want of historical insight is that they have hitherto directed all their energetic efforts towards ascertaining what a particular system of thought is, instead of answering at the same time the question why the system should be what it is, and not otherwise. That is to say, they have failed to display the necessity lying behind the evolution of a system of philosophy. According to the modern scientific theory of history, it is not the primary concern of the historian to furnish expositions of any system, but to bring out, so far as is practi- cable, the parts played by three factors in the appearance of a system and its supersession by another which went ahead. The factors, as enumerated by Prof. Windelband, are the pragmatic or logical, the oultural, and the individual, while in the view of Hegel, who was the first to make the history of philosophy a genuine science, the factor was just one, namely, the prag- matic or logical. Oorresponding to these three factors, in dealing with a system it is the task of the historian to render 1 Bąddhism, p. 16.

364 PRE-BUDDRISTIO INDIAN PHILOSOPIY

an account of the threefold necessity arising, first, from the existing types of spoculation; secondly, from the prevailing education of the time; and thirdly, from the personality of the individual thinker. Nevertheless, the fact remains that " we are now begin- ning to reap the harvest sown by certain pioneers." With regard to Mahavira's philosophy in particular, it may be observed that the firsi gatherings of a har- Acknowledgment of debts to the Jaina vest rich in promise are to be found in Prof. scholars, Jacobi's introduction to the Jaina Sutras, Part II. It is most remarkable that Prof. Jacobi, relying largely as he did upon guesswork, could raise in his introduction all the fundamental problems with which we are confronted in the following pages, and also vaguely point out the nature of their solutions, Among earlier treatises Prof. Bhandarkar's ' Report on the Search for Sanskrit Manuscripts,' Prof. Weber's Indischen Studien, and Prof. Leumann's paper in the Actes du VI Congres des Orientalistes are particularly worthy of note. Colebrooke's Essays do not contain much information about the early history of the Jains. The principal authority with which the illustrious scholar was acquainted is a work by Hemachandra. However, the references to Gymnosophists in Greek accounts, collected by Colebrooke, are interesting enough. Prof. Hopkins' chapter on Jainism in his Religions of India is contaminated by prejudice, and utterly destitute of broad intellectual sympathy. M. Barth's review of our knowledge of Jainism in the Bulletin des Religions de l'Inde does not enlighten us in any way either. Mr. Barodia's History and Literature of Jainism, Dr. Buhler's Indian Sect of the Jains, M. le Milloue's Essai sur la Religion des Jains, Dr. Hoernle's Annual Address to the Asiatic Society of Bengal and his article on the Ajivikas,8 and other good works by previous

• Indian Antiquary, IX, 158 foll. 1 Enoyelopadia of Religion and Ethics

PTITLOSOPIIY OF MAIIAVIRA 365

scholars may be read with interest and profit, though not for definite historical knowlodge of Mahavira's philosopby. The chief among later writers who have considerably widened our knowledge of the early history of Jainism is Prof. Rhys Davids. He has, more than any one else, tried to hold before our eyes a picture of Indian society at the time of Mahavira and Buddha, which is as vivid as perhaps true to fact. Mrs. Stevenson in her Heart of Jainism, seems to think that if Jainism possesses a heart at all, it is empty-an Indian faith "in which death, not life, is the prize, cessation, not development the ideal."' Although she is not without reverence and sympathy for an Indian faith, her observations only prove how difficult it is for a Western mind to comprehend the inner meaning of the spiritual life of India. But when we speak of MahavIra and Buddha, we have to think with Dr. F. Otto Schrader of an age " seething with speoulative ferment," or with Mrs. Stevenson of the times "ripe for revolt." We have to imagine a A general refection on Indian life in tho time when there was no organised religion time of Mahavimn and Buddha. or established church in the country to interfere with the freedom of speculation by imposing upon its adherents its professed dogmas, and when conversion implied in the case of a learner or truth-seeker no more than a transition from one mode of sell-training to another which he deemed more suitable to his temperament. Nor even in the case of a layman did it ever demand that un- flinching devotion or that profession of blind faith which leads men by imperceptible steps to harbour bigotry, to become religious fanatics, and to shut the gate of benevolence upon every fellow being who is a stranger.2 A religion there was,-a natural religion, later known as Brahmanism or Hinduism, bound up with polytheism, animistic

The Heart of Jainiam, p. I. a Majjhima-nikāya, 1. 380.

366 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

beliefs, popular superstitions, ancestral worship, rituals, core- monies, law, morality and mythology. Tt was at once a form of nature-worsbip, a way of life, a rule of conduct, a principle of righteousness, a civil and criminal procedure, and a conventional standard of ethical judgment. So long as people who lived within its jurisdiotion conformed to the established rules of society and did not infringe the laws of the state, it did not matter much what were their personal beliefs. And that religion, if religion we may call it, with all its defects, cherished within itself polite literature, poetry, musie, and various other useful sciences and arts. The philo- sophers were left entirely free to indulge in any amount of speculation and argumentation. In the tradition of the time there was known only one sage, Mandavya, a con- temporary of Krigna Dvaipāyana or Vyasa, who was impaled1 for reasons other than his bold theories. In fact, this part of our reflection upon ancient Indian society may be made clearer in the light of Hume's reflection upon the history of ancient Greece and Rome. "The singular good fortune of philosophy," says Hume, "which, as it requires entire liberty above all other privileges, and chiefly flourishes from the free opposition of sentiments and argumentation, received its first birth in an age and country of freedom and toleration, and was never cramped, even in its most extravagant prin- ciples, by any creeds, concessions, or penal statutes. For, except the banishment of Protagoras and the death of Socrates, which last event proceeded partly from other motives, there are scaroely any instances to be met with in ancient history of this bigoted jealousy with which the present age is so much infested. Epicurus lived at Athens to an advanced age in peace and tranquillity; Epicureans were even admitted to receive the sacerdotal character, and to officiate at the altar in the most sacred rites of the established religion. And the publie encouragement of pensions and salaries was afforded ' Fausböll'e Jőtaka, IV, pp. 28.20.

PHILOSOPHY OF MAHĀVĪRA 367

equally, by the wisest of all the Roman emperors, to the professors of every sect of philosophy."1 To return to India : Mahavira's life-time, which coincides with the greater part of Buddha's career, marks a short period when peace began to smile over the whole land after centuries of war, resulting in the final overthrow of the power of Kasi by the Kosalans, and in the ascendency of Magadha. Or rather it was a period when civil war ceased for a while, yielding place to fights for civic rights and higher ethical ideals. The appearance of this new factor, the kingdom of Magadha, was full of presage, as it was destined to determine to a large extent the future of India. According to a Jainn tradition, recorded by Prof, Jacobi, the Licchavi and Mallakis were once the chiefs of Kāśi and Kosala.' But during the period under discussion the descendants of the Licchavi were just one of the eight small clans or powers, constitnting together the strong Vajjian confederacy of Vaisali." The influence of the Mallas, on the other hand, was confined to Kusinara and Pava.+ As the researches of Prof. Rhys Davids have shown, in the time of Mahavira and Buddha there were in Northern India four powerful monarchies, while the remaining powers were represented by a number of small states and oligarchies of various description. The ruling chiefs of the time were often united by matrimonial alliances. The inhabi- tants of South India were till that time looked down upon by the Aryans or Northerners as the unclean or barbarians. The inference from this fact is that till the time of Mahavira and Buddha the Dravidian countries, situate for the most part below the Godavari, did not come within the pale of Aryan civilisation. We need hardly emphasize the importance of the existence of these independent powers or states to the historian of

' Au Enqurry concerming Human Understanding, seotion X1. - Jaiua-sotras, Part 2, p. 321. .+ Mahsperinibbne-suitautu, chaps, I and V1.

368 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PITTOSOPHY

Indian religion, philosophy, politics, language, literatnre,

The bearing of poli- sciences and arts. For it was under the tical history npon the auspices of one or other of these states thnt progregs of thought ahd the development various sects of religion and contending of langnage. schools of philosophy flourished side by side in the country. Each power left the indelible marks of its specific traditions, language, laws and principles. While each city wall enclosed within itself a royal capital with all its grandeur, outside it might be seen the headquarters of this or that school. In the language of the Mahaparinibbana- suttanta, a King of kings within, a King of kings without, both were heroes, although in different senses, and both equal- ly worthy of a memorial mound, Dagaba or national shrine (thūpa, cetiya) ' In the absence of any fixed residenor, royal parks, public halls and potters' premises generally afforded shelter to the recluses, all of whom were, in one sonse at all events, travellers in the boundless realm of knowledge, the seckers of truth divine, and above all, the teachers of humanity. Other places accessible to these homeless Wanderers were an open meadow, a distant wood-land, a solitary forest, a deserted house, a cave, and a crematorium or a charnel-field. The continual coming aud going of the Wanderer teachers had somcthing of a spectacular elfect upon the mind of an observer. The founders and leaders of Wanderer schools are best known to posterity-to modern historians, as religious re- formers, whose vehicle of expression was the language of the people, instead of Sanskrit, the language of the learned. Their intellectual activities thus soon led to the development of vernacular literatures. As Professor Rhys Davids has pointed out, the Recluse teachers of the time carried on their religious and philosophical discussions in a language intelligible

Buddhist suttns, S. B. E, XI, pp XVIILXIX, pp. 03-04.

PHILOSOPNY OF MAHAVĪRA 369

to the people to whom they partly addressed their views, and thus gradually raised the conversational dialects to a literary status. This is proved by the existence and survival of two special languages, Ardha-Magadhi or Jaina Prakrit and Suddha Magadhi or Pali, in which the teachings of Mahavira and Buddha respectively are embodied. Even the short extract of Gosala's doctrine, preserved by the Buddhists, conclusively proves that his vehicle of expression was neither Ardha-Magadhi nor Pali but something allied to both.1 With the progress of thought, the growth and enrich- ment of colloquial dialects proceeded side by Uninterrupied growth of Sanskrit. side with the growth of Sanskrit which was never interrupted. Sanskrit never ceased to be a langnage of the country, as Brahmans -the ministers of the state and teachers of many publie institutions, never ceasod to be a power. The direct influence of political history of the time over the course of philogophy was even greater than we usually suppose. Although, as we said, peace followed upon centu- ries of war, the gloom cast over the mind of ignorant people by terrible expuriences and painful recollec- The origins of poesi- mism, tions of the past was too deep to be so easily removed. As the contemporary lit- erature vividly paints it, within the living memory of the people many places, which were in former days populous, prosperous and closely situated, had so fallen into ruin that now villages appeared to be no villages, countries no countries, and cities no cities. The devastation was partly a periodical work of the hand of nature, being brought about by famine, disease and other natural causes, and partly by war, tyranny, lawlessness, and general immorality.ª If we think of the misery of the people, the domination of one caste over another, of men over women, and of masters

' Our 'Ajivikas,' Pt. I, p. 46 f. * Anguttara-nikšye, I. 159 f. 47

370 PRE-BUDDEISTIC INDIAN PHIOSOPHY

over slaves and servants, the ruthlessness of criminal laws,

The problem of mi- the system of usury, and such other corrupt sery and othes ethical social practices, we may almost say that the problems. general conditions of society brought the problem of misery to the forefront. The problem really arose iong before, and was still awaiting solution. It was bound up with all ethical problems. The most disputed question of the time was: Is there any valid metaphysical ground for moral distinctions ? When this last question forced itself upon Pratardana, he naively suggested that we are just so many puppets in the hands of Chance or Providence and that there is no sin whatever in killing a Brahman or parents and teachers. 'The Gotamaka paradox of Being left the question entirely in the dark: If the killer thinks he kills or the killed thinks himself killed, both are ignorant. In Pürana Kassapa's view, the soul is absolutely passive, and not affect- ed in the least by our sense-experiences. It is therefore all the same whether a person makes " all the living croatures on the earth one heap, one mass of flesh," or he gives alms, shows liberality, and practises generosity, self-mastery, and so forth. Kakuda Katyayana's eternalistic theory was even more surprising : "There is neither slayer nor causer of slaying, hearer or speaker, knower or explainer. When one with a sharp sword cleaves a head in twain, no one thereby deprives anyone of life, a sword has only penetrated into the interval between seven elementary mbstances." Ajita Keśa-Kambalin opposed to this eternal- istic error, an error which is of an annihilationist character. Denying future existence and retribution, he deprived human life of all its zest. Maskarin Gosala's biological researches supplied the thinkers with a strong argument in favonr of the doctrine of non-injury to every form of life, but he sold men altogether to fate, nature and heredity. Another belief which took possession of people's mind is that time is the first and only cause of our happiness and sorrow.

PHILOSOPITY OF MAHĀVĪRA 371

At the time when these philosophers indulged in all sorts of extravagant theorics, pernicious in their moral consequences and detrimental to the source of distinctions between 'truth and falsehood, vice and virtue, beauty and deformity,' Sañjaya embarked upon a vigorous sceptical campaign against them all. Seeing that the current views were so widely opposed as to defy every attempt at their reconciliation, and at the same time so remote from the sentiments and comprehension of common men, he considered suspension of judgment the best pathway to peace. Thus Sanjaya's attitude served to throw speculative philosophy into disrepute, and it remained for Mahavira and Buddha to rectify by means of sounder methods of examination the current belief that abstraction has no con- nexion with ethical self-development. Another great service rendered by Sanjaya to philosophy was this. Most of the philosophors of his time adopted a dogmatic method of investigation, whereas the exploitation of the sceptical method Joosened the bonds of affirmative philosophies and paved the way for a critical method. With the awakening of new ethical consciousness the hypothesis of time, Provi- dence, Chance, Fate, Nature or Sonl as the first cause of our happiness or misery was abandoned and the thinkers concentrated their attention upon manly strength. But we are yet far from having a conception of positive good.

CITAPTER XXVI.

MAHĀVĪRA.

The time is now past when we should give a detailed account of the life of Mahavira. But a few salient facts regarding it will be deemed necessary for an introduction to our discussion of his philosophy. To begin with, Mahavira-the Great Hero-was not the personal name of the thinker. He was better known to his

A short aecount of contemporaries as Nigantha Nata-putta- Mahavira's life: his Nigantha of the Nata or Naya clan. He is names and birthplaca sometimes alluded to as Vardhamana and Vesslie (Vaisaliya),1 the latter being evidently a local name which signifies that Vaisali was his birthplace. As we noticed, the government of Vaisali was a confederation of eight small clans, powers or states collectively known by the name of the Vajjis. Dr. Hoernle describes it as "an oligarchic re- public," the government of which "was vested in a sonate, composed of the heads of the resident Kșatriya clans, and presided over by an officer who had the title of King and was assisted by a viceroy and a commander-in-chief." Presum- ably the Natas, Nayas or Jnatris were one of these eight clans. It is important to record that Buddha, too, came of a similar republican clan, the Sakyas of Kapilavastu, as in the light of this fact we can easily trace the source from which both Mahavira and Buddha derived their democratic tendencies. The Jaina tradition places the birth of Mahavira in the year 599 B. C. His father, Siddhartha, was an influential

His parentage. the member of the well-known Nata clan, who source of his anti- married the daughter of the then king of Brahmanicel feelings Vaisali. She was a Kșatriya lady, Trisala by name. Obviously then the family in which he was bor was 1 Uttaradhyayana-sūtra, VI. 17. : J, R. A. S., 1808, p. 40; Heart of Jeinism, p. 22,

PITLOSOPIY OF MAHĀVĪRA 373

anything but ' heggarly or Brahmanical." Even the whole of Vaisali, his birthplace, was removed from the centres of Brahmanical influence. This latter fact may well explain in the case of Mahavira, as also in the case of Buddha, why his attitude towards Brahmanic religion was not quite friendly. Aocording to a Svetambara tradition, Mahāvira, no less than Buddha, fully entered into the experience of the world in

Morriage that he married Yasoda, a Ksatriya lady, and thus experienced what Striveda or 'amorous enjoyment" is. A daughter was born to them, Anojja or Priyadarsana by namc. She was married to Jamali, a kşatriya 'who, after becoming one of Mahavira's followers and fellow-workers, ended by opposing him.' All the Jaina authorities agree in relating that when Maha- vira was about thirty years old, he withdrew himself from the world. There are good reasons to believe Renuneintion, Parsyn- natha and Mahi. that he joined at first, and remained for a vira, year with, the religious order founded by Parsvanatha, who is said to have lived some two hundred and fifty years before Mahavira. The members of this ancient order used to cover their nakedness by wearing clothes, and were noted for their fourfold vow (caujjāma).8 We learn from the Kalpa-sutra that Mahavira was a mere learner during the first twelve years of his monkhood, and that

Gosāla and Mahāvīra. in the second year he became a naked monk. In the fifteenth chapter of the Bhagavatī- sutra we are told that in the second year Mahavira received Gośala Mankhali-putta as a disciple at Nālandā. They lived in concord for six years, after which they separated on account of a doctrinal difference. After this

1 Of. Bthler's Baudhayana, II. 2. 4. 26; Malabhorata, I. 78 A Kşatriya princess says to the daughter of a Brahman: "Thou, forsooth, art the daughter of one who praises (others), who begs and accepts (gifts); but I am the child of one who is praiced, who gives gift and does not accept them," * Sūtra-kritknga, I. 4. 1-200 ; Uttertdbyayana sūtra, XXIX, 5. itthi-ređe Uttarâdhynyana sutra, XXIII. 12

374 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHTLOSOPHY

separation they never met in sixteen years but onve in Savatthi. Gosala predeceased Mahavira by some sixteen years, and it follows from the account in the Kalpa-sttra that he was recognised as a teacher at least two years before the latter. Another discrepancy between the accounts of the Bhagavati and the Kalpa-sutra is pointed out by Dr. Höernle as follows: " According to the former, Mahavira spent six years in Paniyabhūmi (in the company of Gosala), while the latter gives him only one year in that place, but six years in Mithila."' The inference from these two somewhat contradictory accounts seems to be this-that in the second year of his monkhood, Mahavira left the religious order of Parsvanatha, and joined the school of Gosala. And when six years afterwards the difference of opinion led Mahavira to leave that school, he founded a new school of his own and organised a religious order mainly after the model of that of Parsvanatha. The only innovation which he made was the introduction of the vow of chastity in addition to the fourfold vow of Parsvanatha, and that was perhaps suggested by the moral corruption of the naked ascctics. However, the fact that he retained all the vows of the latter induced his old friends, the followers of Parsvanatha, again to meet him, nay, to accept him as their teacher. But although the two orders were thus amalgamated, and Mahavira was recognised as the common spiritual father and leader, the followers of Parsvanatha could not but be shocked at the sight of nudity. This furnished a psychological cause of difference, which led at last immediately after the teachar's death to a dissention among his disciples." The after effect of it was of course the appearance of two rival sects, the Digambara or sky-clad and the Svetambara or [white-clad, This schism may accordingly be viewed in a sense

• Uvisaga Dasão, p, 111, * Digha-nikāya, III, 17, Majjhima-pikāya, II, 248,

PHILOSOPHY OF MAHAVIRA 375

as a 'reversion' to the original separation between the two orders, referred to above. Mahuvira died in 527 B.C. at Pava, after a successful career of thirty-five years as a teacher. Among his disciples, Gautama Indrabhūti was the 'earliest and greatest.' He survived his master for twelve years. Sudharman is another great disciple who survived Mahavira, Among other notable facts we have to record, first, that the main centres of Mahavira's activity were Rajagriha, Campa, Vaisali and Pava; secondly, that Prince Abhaya, the son of Bimbisara, was the chief patron of his order1; and thirdly, that from the beginning the lay supporters of his order were merchants and rich bankers.

HIs PHILOSOPHY.

I. In dealing with Mahavira's philosophy it is necessary first to discriminate the sources of information which broailly fall under two heads; the direot and the collateral. The former comprise documents preserved to us by the Souroos of informa- Jains themselves; the latter represent frag- tion. ments proourable from the Buddhist records.ª Of the Jaina authorities, some are older or more authentic than others, By older authorities we mean of course the twelve Angas, and by later authorities the twelve Upingas and other works. In pursuing our present investigation, nothing perhaps would be wiser and safer than to draw our information chiefly from the twelve Angas, the last of which, the Dristivada, containing fourteen discourses or sections (purvas), has been lost. The loss is great, because, as its name implies, this particular text, perhaps more

1 Naylidhammakah&, BI f. Cf. Majjhima-niküyn, I. 802. : 8. Samanfaphale and Pesadika sūttas in the Dīgha nikāya: Saconka, Upāli, Sakula- Udāyī, Abhaya-Rajakumdra, Dovudaha and Sāmagima suttas in the Majjhima-nikiya; Anguttara, III. 70. I.3; eto,

376 PRE-BUDDIISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPIY

than any other, contained a systematie criticism of pre-Jaina philosophies, And yet we have reason to believe that the remaining eleven Angas, which still survivo together with the Upangas and other exira-canonical works, cannot fail to give us a fairly definite idea of the content of the Anga now lost. The existing Angas do not seem to have been put together at one time. Their growth was gradual. None the less, the date of composition of the main bulk of Jaina canonical litera- ture must be placed between the life-time of Mahavira on one side, and the reign of Chandragupta Maurya (4th oentury B.C.) on the other. For, according to a well-founded tradition, the Jaina canon was fired for the first time at the council held at Patna under the auspices of Sthulabhadra, who was prime minister to the ninth or last Nanda king. On the other hand, it will be wrong to suppose that Jaina litorature sprang up suddenly, without a causal connoxion with earlier pro- cesses, dating from the life-time of Mahavira onward. We also have reason to suspect that the Angas, as we now have them, underwent considerable changes, here and there, at later redactions, or in the course of being handed down orally. The second Anga-the Sutra-Kpitanga for instance, which is supposed to have been composed originally in Ardha-Magadhi, has in its present form a section1 contain- ing many Sanskrit words. Similarly, although the Samava- yanga is generally enumerated as the fourth in the list of Angas, even a superficial acquaintance with the text will reveal that, a synthesis or summary as it is of all the Angas, it is really not the fourth but the very last Anga. In view of such uncertainty of chronology, it would certainly be a mistake to accept the evidence of any particular text. The best we can do under the circumstances is first to conceive the historical data upon the collective evidence of the Angas now available, and then to test them further by the

1 II. 4.8 f.

PIILOSOPHY OF MAHĀVĪRA 377 collateral evidence of the Buddhist literature, as well as to verify them in the light of later development of the Jaina doctrine. The task is not so difficult as may appear at first sight, considering that the existing Jaina texts, in common with those of the Buddhists, abound in stock or parallel passages. Evon then in order to achieve this oritico-philological task, the historian will have to disoriminate the passages ascribed to his disciples from those ascribed to Mahavira himself. Let this suffice for an introduction. II. The doclrine to which modern nsage freely applies the name Jainism was designated by its author as Kiriyam or Kriyavada. Its upholders, the Kiriyam or Kriyl- vodn was the original Kriyavadins, who are now called Jains, name of what ig now known as Jainism, were then goncrally known as Niganthas. The designation Arhatas for the Jains is of frequent occurrence in the medieval literature of the Brahmans. Mahavira himself was best known to his contemporaries as a Nigantha or Nirgrantha,-the unfettered Significance of the one,-he who is free from all worldly bonds name Nigantha. In which sense Parsva or mundane desires. The name has been may be calledn pre- oursor of Mahuvira, applied to the religious order of Parsva whom the Jains idolise as the last Tirthankara (school-maker) but one. Here a question is apt to arise if we are really justified in regarding Parsva as a precursor or philosophic predecessor of Mahavira. Evidently we are not. There is not, as yet, a single proof that he was in any sense a philosopher. A predecessor Parśva nevertheless was, but that in quite another sense. He was an ascetio of the ancient hermit type, who, like the king Nimi of Mithila, Ariștanemi, and other common predecessors (Jinas, Bodhi- sattvas) of Mahavira and Buddha, strongly favoured the life of renunciation. It appears that Mahavira, on leaving home- life, joined a religious body who followed the rule of Parsva. 48

378 PRE-BUDDHISTIO INDIAN PHLLOSOPHY

The whole clan of Natas,' or at any rate Mahavira's parents,' were among the lay supporters of this body of ascetics. If so, we can casily imagine how Mahavira's attention was naturally turned to Parsva's order.3 Prof. Jacobi has thrown light on the exact relationship between Parsva and Mahavira as teachers.' He is the first to discover that there were at first two separate The original Niga- Nigantha orders, having nothing in common tha order. save the 'four vows' or 'four restraints,' and to assume that this original diversity between the two orders 'ripened into division, and in the end brought about the great schism.' He has agsin clearly perceived that a dootrine attributed to Mahavira in the Buddhist Samaññaphala sutta 'properly

Parfva's doctrino. belonged to his predecessor Parsva,' of course, in so far as the mere expression catuyāma- Samvara is conoerned. The doctrine is that, according to Mahavira, the way to sell-possession, self-command, and imperturbability consists of ' a four-fold self-restraint ' such as restraint in regard to all water, restraint as regards all evil, and restraints by way of the purification of sin and feeling a sense of ease on that account." Buddhaghosa interprets the first restraint as meaning that Nigantha Nata-putta did not use cold water, believing it to be possessed of life (satta-saññi)," and remarks that although founded upon an erroneous view of life, the doctrine of four restraints was in some measure favourable to moral discipline. Prof. Rhys Davids seems to have misunderstood Prof. Jacobi when he says that in the opinion of the latter "the

: Uršsnga Dasão, p. 6. · Åotronga, II. IB. 16. 1 Heart of Jeiniam, p. 8l, Jaina-sütraa, Part 2, pp. xix-xxil. * Of. Din. B., Il, pp, 74-70. . Sumadgala-VilasinT, I. 166, ep. Rhys Davida' ' Milinda,' II. 85-01.

PTITLOSOPHY OF MAHĀVĪRA 379

four restraints are intended to ropresent the four vows kept by the followers of Parsva." Prof. Jacobi Modorn interprotn- tion of the torm catu- howhere maintains that the four restraints, as yāma samvara. enumerated in the Samannaphala-sutta and explained by Buddhaghosa, correspond to the four vows as enumerated in the Jaina texts, notably the Sutra-Kritanga.1 On the other hand, he shows that the term Catuyama-samvara, employed in the Buddhist dialogue, is but the Pali equivalent of the Prakrit Caujjama, a well-known Jaina term denoting the four vows, which, aocording to the testimony of two followers of Parsva, Kesi and Udaka, were held binding upon their fraternity.' We are thns convinced with Prof. Jacobi that the enumeration of four restraints in the Samafinaphala-sutta is wrong, and that the doctrine attributed to Mabavira in the same sutta is neither an accurate reprosentation of his opinion, nor that of the view of his predecessor, though at the same time it contains nolhing alien from either. For even apart from the convincing proofs adduced from the Jaina authorities, we learn from a sutta in the Majjhima-Nikaya3 that in Mahavira's view the established path to the realm of highes; bliss lies through abstinence from killing, abstinence from thefty from adultery, from lying, and such austere practices (tapoguņa) as nudity, penance, confession, and the rest.4 That these five modes of self-restraint correspond to the five great vows' (panca mahavvaya) of Mahāvira is beyond question. And if so, we may conclude on the authority of both Jaina and Buddhist texts that the first four of these precepts were

Sutra-Kritānga, II. 7. 17. " Ibid, II, 7. 39: Uttartdhyayana-sūtro, XXIII. 12. ' II. 35-86 Cf. Digha-nikaya, III, pp 48.51, where Buddha interprets the term catu yama-saiwvara as meaning four moral precepts, considered each nnder three serial heads. This is the meaning the Buddha wishes to pnt on the phrase, * Of Bamyntta-nikēyn, I. 60 · Åctrsůga, IT. 15 (1-6).

380 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHTLOSOPIY

originally laid down by Parsva, while the fifth was added later by Mahavira himself. We can now see the contrast between the two time- honoured Jaina teachers, Parava and Mahavira, or whore we can attempt to give a definite answer Contraat bet veen Pariva and Mabavīra: to the question whether the former might be the former was f mere religions tenchor, regarded as a philosophic predecessor of the the latter a religious philogopher. latter. The scanty account we now have of Parsva clearly shows that he was a man of practieal nature, remarkable for his organising genius. The religious order founded by him enjoyed the reputation of a high and rigid standard of conduct, verging upon the Stoic or ascetic. He made four moral precepts binding upon his followers, precepts which were later enforced by Mahuvira and Buddha among their followers. We shall, howover, not judge Parsva aright if we suppose that his rules were con- fined to theso four precepts. Conceivably, they embraced many other practical rules laid down for guidance of the fraternity and laity. We might even go furthor and maintain that all the fundamental rules of the Nigantha community were due to Parsva and his followers. But this set of rules, taken by themselves, constituted just another system of austere moral discipline (vinaya-vada or sīlabbata) which Mahavīra and Buddha deprecated with one voice. That is to say, Parsva's rules of conduot, however good they were, needed a philosophie justification in order that they might not appear in any sense arbitrary, or be confounded with the conventions of society. The Uttaradhayana sutra furnishes a dialogue shedding abundant light on this obsoure point. The interlocutors are the two leading representatives of the Nigantha orders of the time. Keśi, who was a follower of Parsva's rule, asks Gautama, who was one of the chief disciples of Mahavira: "When the four precepts promulgated by the great sage Parsva are held equally binding upon our two orders, what is the cause of

PIILOSOPHY OF MAHĀVĪRA 381

differenco between us ?" The latter replies, " Wisdom recog- nises the truth of the law and the ascertainment of true things. The first saints were simple but slow of understanding, the last saints prevaricating and slow of understanding, those between the two simple and wise; hence there are two forms of the Law. The first could only with difficulty understand the precepts of the Law, and the last could only with difficulty observe them, but those between them easily understood and observed them."' Here the purport of Gautama's reply is that Parsva's was a mere religious order, while Mahavira's was not only a religious order, but also a distinet school of thought. III. If neither Parsva nor any one among his followers were the philosophic predecessor of Mahavia, who then was

Mahdvia'q philo- there in India who might be honoured with sopbio predccessor was that name? The reply must go against the Gosaln. Jaina tradition which represents Gośāla as a disciple of Mahavira. We have sought to show that Gosala was the one among his many predecessors or elder contemporaries with whom he was most intimately associated for a number of years. In connection with the ecclesiastical history of the Jainas these are the three important questions: Three questions re- How was it that there were originally two lating to the eoclesias- tical hiatory of the Nigantha orders instead of one ? When were Jainas, and their abswers. the two amalgamated into one, to be sepa- rated again after Mahavira's death? What benefit did the followers of Parsva derive from such an amalgamation ? We may attempt to answer these questions by assuming that Mahavira, after undergoing Parsva's discipline for a year joined the Ajivikas, who, as we saw, cultivated a high sense of dignity and independence. This naturally brought him

3 Jaina sttraa, Part 2, pp, 122-128,

882 PRE-BUDDIISTIC INDIAN PHTLOSOPHY

into close contact with Gostla whose biological speculations created a sensation in the country. There is evidence enough that his naturalistic researches were soon followed by others upon social and moral problems of varied description. In religious circles the burning questions of the day were: Is there any moral justification for killing living beings? Can we, on the other hand, literally avoid, while we live, the act of killing ? And what is the proper way of dealing with those fellow beings who sin against society and morals ? Although the religious bodies did not all actually keep to a vegetarian diet, it was recognised universally that every object of nature should be handled gently and treated with the utmost tenderness. As Buddh& expressed it, "Living beings are all desirous of happiness," " all are afraid of the rod, all fear death. Thus, comparing oneself with others, one should cease from tho act of hurting or killing." In order to avoid killing, some of the hermits used to sub- sist upon the ilesh of animals which had died. There were a few others, the Hatthi Tapasas,1 for instance, who with a view to lessening the slaughter of living beings, killed for food each year one elephant instead of destroying many lives daily and hourly. It is from Gosala that Mahavira first learnt to think philosophically as it was afterwards mainly in opposing this teacher's deterministio theory that he was led gradually to the discovery of nine categories (nava tattva). The opposition led to the severance of the tie that bound them for a period of six years. We do not know by what name Mahavira was known during the time when he associated himself with the Ajīvikas or Maskarins. Subsequently he assumed his old epithet Nigantha, though he did not actually go back to Parsva's order. The epithet proved very useful to him owing to the popularity which the Niganthas of the old order had so long enjoyed.

Sütra-Kritanga, II. 6. 52,

PHILOSOPHY OF MAHĀVIRA 388

When in course of time Mahavira succeeded in founding a new Nigantha order and in organising it partly after the model of the Ajivikas and partly after that of Parsva's fol- lowers, some sort of distinction between the two orders became inevitable. It is implied in the dialogue between Udaka and Gautama 1 that the followers of Parsva were known as Nigantha Kumara-puttas, while Mahavira's disciples were known as Nigantha Nata-puttas.2 Thus we can see how two rival orders arose. Whilst the intellectual superiority of the new order was throwing the old order into the shade, the adherents of the latter were compelled to think of some way of maintaining their existence and prestige. Obviously the best means was not rivalry, but reconciliation. The dialogue between Kesi and Gautama in the UttarAdhyayana sutra shows that there was a time when Parsva's followers were contemplating an amalgamation of the two orders. Kesi was perbaps the Nigantha of the old order who is designated by Buddha as Digha-tapassi. If so, the Digha-tapassi-sutta belongs to a time when the two orders were actually amalgamated into one school of philosophy. The Pasadika and Samagama suttas again take us to a time when, soon afler Mahavira's death, his disciples were divided into two contending parties. However, the benefit which Parsva's followers derived from the amalgamation was the philosophy of the new school. IV. The Kiriyam of Mahavira, in common with the vibhajja-vāda of the Buddha, denotes a Definition of Kiriyam. doctrine which is diametrically opposed to Akiriyam, and also sharply distinguish- able from Annanam or Vicikiccha and Vinayam or

1 Satra-Kritānga, Il, 7. ' In the Buddhist recorde (Anguttera-niksya, III. 888, Sumangale-Vilasini, I. 160-165) the Niganthas are alluded to as reclnees of " the red olass " (lohit&bhijati), also as "those with one garment " (ekasstaka). The term Wearers of whita clothes (odsiavasana or fvetimbarna) ie applied to the lay adherents of the Ajivikas.

384 PRE-BUDDHISTIO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

Silabbatam. In a passage the Sutra-Kritanga1 we read that the upholders of this doctrine gaining a true view of the world, maintain that misery is caused by oneself, and not by others-time, providence, fate, chance or soul (sayamkadam ņannakadam ca dukkham). Liberation is obtainable by knowledge and good conduct (vijja-caraņam pamokkham). Thus they teach a path which is conducive to man's moral and in- tellectual progress. They declare the world of generation to be eternal (sasaya), because beings live in it for ever and ever, and because sinners are subject to repeated births and deaths. Again, while recognising the inflexibility of the law of action, the Kriyavadins maintain that fools are unable to stop the course of their evil actions by actions which are equally evil. The wise saints can arrest the course of evil only by abstaining from all wrong-doing.ª For they believe that those who have overcome greed (lobha) and are contented, cannot commit sin ; they are indeed wise and happy. Averse to slaughter of life, they neither kill nor incite others to kill. Keeping always the senses under control, these pious men become heroes, armed with the weapon of knowledge. A Kriyavadin regards all beings, large and small, and the whole world as like to himself. He comprehends the immen- sity of the universe, and thus awakened he guards himself among the careless or unguarded. He who knows himself and the world, who knows the nature of mau's future existences and immortality, who knows what is eternal and what is not, and so forth, alone is entitled to expound the Kriyavada, since he is unattached to the pleasures of the senses, free from desires as to life and death, and self- controlled. It is not easy to elicit from this verbose and obscure passage any clear-cut definition of Kiriyam. However, in attempting

1 Sūtra-Kritānga, J. 12. 11-22. · Ņa kammaņā kamma khavemti bālā, akatnmaņā kamma khavemti dhiro,

PHILOSOPHY OF MAHĀVĪRA 385

a definition of this significant term we shall do well first to consider the light in which Buddha viewed the doctrine of his predecessor.

V. The Psycho-ethical aspect of Kiriyam. Buddha, in agreement with Mahavira andcontrary to the deterministic theory of Gosala, expounded the doctrine of Karma, dynamism, or the moral effect of manly strength. It was again following his predecessor that Gosala, Mahovira and Buddha judged Gosala's to be the worst of Buddha. all doctrines, subversive of the ground for all moral distinctions, responsibilities and freedom.1 Besides this hostile attitude towards Gosala's fatalistie doctrinc, Mahavira and Buddha had many points in common. They werc, for instance, both nobles by birth, and came of two republican clans. They classified the philosophers of their time as unmoral metaphysicians, ignorant eel-wriggling sceptics and selfish pleasure-seeking moralists. They pursued neither a dogmatic nor a sceptical method of investigation. And yet Buddha often appears to think that his doctrine of causal genesis (paticca-samuppada) was in some way antagonistic to Mahavira's dynamistic philosophy or doctrine of free-will activity. Buddha understood that Mahavira, in opposition to current beliefs that our happiness and misery are caused by others- determined wholly and solely by external Buddha's interpre- tation and eriticism of factors and conditions-formulated a new Muhavīra's dootrine. theory, namely, that they are caused by the individual agent of our free-will. That our weal and ill are conditioned solely by or dependent upon external causes is one extreme, and by opposing to this a new individualistic theory, 1 Anguttara-nikāya, I. 173-174, 286-287; Uvusaga Dasšo, VI. 108; VII. 190-200: " Mahšvirassa dhamma-paņvatti : atthi utțhane iva. .jāra parakkame iva, sniyayā sabba- hhaya." 49

386 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDTAN PHTLOSOPIY

Mahavira ran to the other extreme, neither of which can a man of true insight reasonably accept.1 Buddha is right in ascribing to Mahavira the individualist position above-mentioned. His expression in the original is practically identical with the Jaina affirmation in the Sutra- Kritanga.2 It must be noted here that this particular Jaina text contains several disconnected passages where, according to the testimony of Sudharman, Mahavira, like his successor Buddha, throws into clear relief the contrast between existing philosophical notions and his own theory. And important as they are, these passages can be rendered intelligible only when we consider them in reference to those individnal theorisers to whom they actually apply. First, with regard to ancient Vedic thinkors, Mahavira said : "Some of the seers thought that the world has been created and

Mahavira's criticism is governed by tho gods ; others by Brahma. of pre-Jaina and oon- Some of them have ascribed to the hand of temporary philngo- phers from the stand" Isvara, the mundane Lord, the creation of point of his ethics. this universe of beings and things, with its manifold vicissitades; in the opinion of others, this phenomonal world is but the outcome or gradual manifestation of primitive undifferentiated matter (pahana = pradhana). Some main- tain that the world emanates from a self-existent being; its origin is spontaneous and it appears to be non-eternal and unreal because of the illusion (maya) thrown over man's mind by Death (Mara); according to the view of others, the world is produced from a primeval germ,-the original solar body.

' Angattara-nikāya, TIJ. 440; "Abhabbo ditthisampenno puggalo sayamkatam ankha- dukkham paccigantam, abhabbo ditthisampanno puggalo pararākatam sukha-dakkhath paccăgantum." Of. Samyutta, II. 22. ff. We are indebted to Dr. M. H. Bode for these valuable references. Cf. Petakopadesa, opening paragrapha. "Sayam kotam param katanti ... eto., dve ante." * Pali-Sayamkntan sukhe-dukkham, (na) paramkntam sukha-dokkham. Prakrit- sayamkadam pannakadar ca dnkkham.

PHILOSOPHY OF MAHĀVĪRA 387

I do not, however, see how these cosmological speculations can afford a rational, clear and distinot theory of misery or its origin and cessation."1 Secondly, as to Post-Vedic thinkers (e.g., Yajnavalkya and Uddālaka), we are told: "Some of the philosophers postulate these five gross elements-earth, water, fire, air and ether-as the five roots of things. It is from them that another-the in- telligent principle or soul-arises, inasmuch as on the dissolu- tion of the body living beings cease to exist. However, as the earth, though it is but one mass, presents manifold forms so the intelligent principle appears under various forms or mani- fests itself in varying degrees of development. Such is the pantheistic view of some teachers, which, verging as it does upon materialism, fails to explain how and why an individual wrong-doer should suffer pain due to his iniquities."2 And lastly, among his elder contemporaries, Purana Kassapa was evidently the first object of Mahavira's attack: "There is a class of philosophers who maintain that when a man acts or causes others to act, it is not his soul which acts or causes to act, But how can those who hold such an opinion account for the moral distinctions as known in our daily experience ?"8 "There is another class of philosophers (say, the Kātya- yanas) who regard five elements as the five permanent substrata of change. To these they also add soul as the sixth substance. What is, is imperishable,-eternally existent; nothing comes out of nothing. On these grounds thoy who make a hard and fast distinction between mind and body, view life and death as a kind of recurrent mechanical combination (samavaya) and separation of the elements of existence. The moral inference

1 Sutra-Kritange, I. 1. 3. 6-9. See for literal tranalation, Jacobi's Jaina-sutras, Part 2, pp. 244-245. Ibid, I. 1. 1. 7-10. Ibod, I. 1. 1. IB.

388 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

drawn from these delusive metaphysical arguments is that whether a man buys or causes to buy, kills or causes to kill, he does not thereby commit any sin."1 "There is a third class of philosophers (say, the Kesakam- balins) who oppose to the dualist or pluralist doctrine above mentioned a theory which goes to identify the mental with the corporeal, They maintain that the real is always a living whole,-an individual who comes into existence from the union of four or five elements and passes out of existence after death. Life ends here, there is no world beyond, say they. Thus these murderers teach men to kill, slay, burn, cook, cut and destroy. Denying the hereafter and the efficacy of all social institutions founded upon beliefs in the future existence of man, the annihilationists cannot inform us whether an action is good or bad, virtuous or vicious, well-done or otherwise, whether it is in man's power to reach perfection or not, or whether there is a heaven or a hell."2 " The Maskarins or Fatalists are the next to be considered. They represent a class of philosophers who admit that there are infinite numbers and grades of concrote existents,-of living beings who, as individuals, experience pleasure and pain and pass by death from one state of existence to another which is better, equal or worse, but they deny that our happi- ness and misery, weal and ill, are caused by us individually or determined by any other cause except what they term fate or necessity (niyai). All things are pre-arranged by nature and unalterably fixed. Some beings are capable of bodily move- ment, others not; it depends upon certain conditions whether they are in the one state or in the other (sangai). Proceed- ing from these erroneous notions, they deny all exertion, struggle, power, vigour or manly strength. Those who boldly

1 Sulra-Kritanga, I. 1.1 16 ; IZ. 1. 22.24. a Ibid, I. 1. 11-12; 11, 1. 16.17.

PHILOSOPIY OF MAHĀVĪRA 389

proclaim these opinions are really deluded. They, too, cannot account for moral distinctions."1 "There are yet again a class of philosophers$ who maintain that the soul has power to attain the highest state of purity or sinlessness, but just as distilled water may again be defiled on coming into contact with impurities, so may be the soul defiled by pleasant excitement or hate. In upholding such a view these philosophers really deny the possibility of the soul attaining an undecaying or immaterial condition (nijjara) within its living experience, and final release (moksa) after death. They betray, in other words, just their faulty notion of immortality here and hereafter."8 " The philosophers hitherto considered differ from one another in intellect, will, character, opinion, taste, undertak- ings and plans, but their views in their moral effect are the same, being actuated by the same motive, prompted by the same unmoral sentiments. We may take for instance the views of Pūraņa Kassapa and Gosāla Mankhaliputta. The former denies causation in that he denies activity on the part of soul; the latter, on the other hand, assigns fate as the cause of everything. What is the difference between the two, in so far as the moral bearings of their doctrines are concerned ? When these philosophers are judged from the ethical standpoint of a Kriyavadin, all appear in one sense or another as so many unmoral metaphysicians-(akriyavadins)."+ "Those who, besides unmoral metaphysicians, are in some way opposed to a Kriyavadin are the sceptics and moralists. The former, ignorant as they are, do not themselves apprehend truth, how then can they teach it to others ? To follow their lead is to be as a man who has lost his way in a strange

1 Sūtra-Kritānga, I. 1. 2. 1-5 ; I. 1. 4, 8-9 ; II, 1. 32; Uvāsaga Dasšo, VI. 166. " According to S nlanka, they are the follovrers of Gossia and later Jaina Trafiraikas. ' Sūtra-Kritānga, I. 1. 3. 11. * Tbd, II. 1. 30; II. 1. 34; Sthēnānga, IV. 4

390 PRE-BUDDIISTIO INDIAN PHTLOSOPHY

wood and follows a guido who also does not know it. Their views are, in short, no good."! "The mcralists are those teachers who seek to govern society by set rules, compose treatises directing people how they should gratify their amorous passions, en- courage acquisition of wealth, tolerate all superstitions and corrupt social practices, judge meu by thoir outward conduct, bohaviour and circumstances, do not recognise the rights of individuals as individuals, and so forth."" "It is chiefly, then, in opposition to the views of unmoral metaphysicians and selfish moralists that a Kriyavadin recog-

The fundamontal nises that there is virtue (punna), that there catagories and maxm is vice (papa), that there are 'channels,' that of MahAvira's ethics. there is in-flux of sin (assava), that there are restraints (samvara), that there is bondage (bandha), that there is the path to freedom (nijjara), and that there is final liberation (mokkha). These are the tive catogories of his ethics. The standpoint from which he judges the standard of conduet is that of an individualist, his fundameutal maxim is : I am the maker of my own happiness and misery, and not others." Now we must modify Buddha's interpretation of Mahavira's ethical position just as we must modify Mahavira's interpretation of pre-Jaina philosophies. Modification of Buddha's interpreta- We have endeavoured to show that Mahavira, tion of his predeces- sor's fundamental in direct antagonism to Purāņa Kassapa's ethicol thesis, and of MabSvira's interprota- doctrine of non-causation or theory of the tion of pre-Jaina pbilosophies. inactivity of soul, put forword this proposi- tion: " When I suffer, grieve, repent, grow feeble, am aflicted, or experience plain, I have caused it, and when another man suffers in a similar way, he has caused it.

1 Sūtra-Kritānga, I. 1, 2, 17-19. * Tbid, I 1, 4. 3; I. 4. 1. 20-23; II. I. 46-46; Sthānāóga, IV. 4; etc.

PHILOSOPHY OF MAHĀVIRA 391

Pleasures and amusements are not able to help or 'save me. They are one thing, and Iam another; they are foreign to my real being. Even the friends and relations who are more intimately connected with me cannot experience, still less take upon themselves, the pains 1 actually undergo. That is to say, as an individual a man is born, as an individual he dies, as an individual again he deceases from one state of existence to be reborn into another. The 'passions, consciousness, intellect, perceptions and impressions' of a man belong to him exclusively." If we compare these expressions of Mahavira word for word with those of Buddha, it is hardly possible for us to detect any difference between their opinions. For Buddha, too, declared that evil is done by oneself, born of oneself, pro- duced from oneself, affects oneself, and that while self is the lord of self, there is no other lord but self.' In the same vein he instructed Ananda to be zealous in his own behalf and to devote himself to his own good.3 The question then arises, where lies the real point of difference between their views P We must first examine the Buddhist fragment-the Deva- daha sutta of the Majjhima-where Buddha sharply criticises the ethical position of Mahavira, as represent- Difference between the views of Mahavirn ed after his death by his disciples, the Nigan- and Buddha, and thas.4 This dialogue throws some light upon the correlation of Niyativada and Kriy&- the signification of Mahavira's terse expres- vāda. sion: "Fools cannot annibilate works by works; the wise can annihilate works by abstaining from works."3 Buddha says to the Niganthas, "Are you, friends, of this opinion, is it your view: Whatever a living individual

1 Sutra-Kritānga, II. 1. 31 ; II. 33-41, Atta-vaggo, Dhammapada, > Rhya Davide' Buddhiat Suttas, p. 91. * Majjhima-nikšya, II. 218. s Sūtra-Kritanga, I. 12. 15 : " Na kammaņā kamma kheverti bals, akammaņā kamma khevańti dhĩro,"

392 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPIY

experiences in this life, whether it be pleasant or painful or neither pleasant-nor-painful, all that is predestined by fate, due to works of a previous life. Because of the exhaustion of former works through austerities, and because of the abstention from new works, (there is) arrest of the influx of sin in futuro. Because of that, the extinction of karma. Because of that, the extinction of pain. Because of that, the extinction of misery, Thus the entire body of ill perishes P"1 The latter replying in the affirmative, Buddha goes on,' " You admit, then, that our pleasure and pain, happiness and misery, depend in part upon fate or actions of the past exist- ence and in part upon free-will activities of the present life?" The reply being in the affirmative, "If so, I must ask you, Do you positively know whether you, as pre- sent individuals, had existed in the past or not? Whether yon had committed such and such sins or not ? Have you any definite idea of the quantum of pain alroady exhausi- ed, or of the quantum of pain still to be exhausted, or of the quantum of pain which being exhausted, the entire body of ill will be exhausted? Above all, are you acquainted with any right method of avoiding all that is ovil in the negative and of performing all that is good ? The answer being, "No" " If not, then how can you maintain your premises ...... I also should like to know from you, my good Niganthas, if you intend so to change the course of action by means of your initial effort and vigorons exertion that it should produce its result in the future instead of at present, and vice vers ?...... " The answer being still in the negative, " If not, where then is the utility of your energetic moral efforts ?"

1 * Yamh kıleâynm purisa-pnggnlo patisamvedeti , sabbam tam pubbekata-hotu; iti püāņānom kammānanı tapasā vyanti-bhšvā, navunam kammilnam nkaraņī, Byatim anavas- savo; Eyatim anavassava kammakkhayo; kammakkhayā dukkhakkhayo, dukkhakkhnya vedanskkhayo, vedanšk khaya sabbam dokkham nijjiņnam bhavisvattti!" ' The translation of following paragraphe of the discourse is not literal owing to the great length of the original; and the anbstance only has been given.

PHILOSOPHY OF MAHĀVĪRA 393

The sceptic Buddha at last concludes b saying: "If it be true that living beings experience pleasuie and pain as predetermined by actions of their past lives, then the Nigan- thas must have been all great sinners formerly in that they now undergo such painful austerities. Or if it be true that living beings expcrience pleasure and pain according as they are created by a God, then the Niganthas must have been created by a wicked God (papakena Issarena). Or if living beings be happy or miserable because of the species (sangati) to which they belong, then the Niganthas must have been of a very low specics ; or if because of their mentality (abhijati) then they must have been persons of the worst possible mental type, ete., etc."1 In accordance with Mahavira's view I am not, as a think- ing subject, wholly and solely the maker of my moral being, but I am partly a creature of circumstances. This important point is well brought out in a passage of the Sūtra-kritanga where Mahavira, in criticising Gosala's doctrins, declares that "things depend partly on fate, and partly on human exer- tion." The proposition is significant. It illustrates his antinomian theory (syad vada) that has its full play throughout Kriya-vada. It may be that in one sense, look- ing from one point of view, A is B. It may be that in another sense, looking from another point of view, A is not-B. It may be that looking from a third point of view, A is both B and not-B, and so forth. In other words, the Dynamism of Mahavira leaves room enough for determinism, or the hypothesis of time, providence, nature, chance.

VI. The biological and psychological aspects of Kiriyam. "There are things which are determined, and there are things which are not-determined (niyayaniyayam samtam).""

1 Majjhima-nikāya, II. 216-222. abhijāti=,īvavarna (Mbh. XII. 279, 32). - Sūtra-Kritanga, I. 1. 2. 4. (Jacobi's tranelation). 2 Ibsd, I. 1. 2. 4, 50

394 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PIULOSOPnY

Following the commentators Prof. Jacobi translates it- "Things depend partly ou fate, and partly on human exer- tion." But keeping to the actnal words of the rommentators, we must interpret the dictum as meaning that " onr happiness and misery are wrought parily hy fate, soul, time, God or nature, ana can be regulated partly by our personality or manly strength." This shows that in the view of Mahavira, as later in the view of Kanada, we are in some respects bound and in some respects free. Here Mahavira appears to be in sharp antagonism with Gosala. But the supposed antagonism between the two thinkers

The category of Jiva may easily break down the moment the historian can prove that it rests upon a difference of standpoints. This brings us to Mahavira's important category of Jing, a term which we take to donote the biological and psychological aspeets of Kiriyam. Gosala also taught that all living beings experienco pleasure and pain, each individually But Mahavīra differed from Gosala in teaching that the sole determining factor of our entire existence is not fate or anything of the kind but the individual agent of our free will. A dialogue in the Uvasaga Dasso' embodies Mahavira's moral contention raised against Gosala's fatalism or denial of free-will activities. Mahavira asks Saddaluputta, a lay ad herent of Gosala, who was a rich potter, " How is this pot made ? Is it made by dint of exertion and manly strength or without them ?" The latter replies: "It is made without them, becanse, according to our master's view, there is no such thing as exertion or manly strength, everything being unalterably fixed." "Supposing, Saddaluputta, some one of your men should behave in an improper manner, how would you deal with him ?" " I would punish him as severely as I could or

1 " Kimoid niyati-kptam oa paruşa-kaldsvara-svabhāva-knrmsdi-kritam tatra katharcit sukha dukkh&deh poiuga-kma-sudhyatvom apyneriynto' ' Hoernle's Uvisaga Draslo, VII 196-200.

PIILOSOPHY OF MAHĀVĪRA 395

should." Thereupon Mahavira retorts: "But what moral reason have you for doing so, when, as you say, there is no such thing as exertion or manly strength, but all things are unalterably fixed ? According to your belief, the man behaved in such a manner because he could not help it, ruled as he was by an overpowering fate." It is difficult even to imagine that Gosala really intended to bring arts such as pot-making within the operations of the laws of fatc. It is likewise difficult to think that he actually Gosala's Determinism meant to deny all moral distinctions, respon- did not exelude the notion of freedom of sibilities and freedom as enunciated by Maha- the will, nor did Mahd. vīra's dynumism alto. vīra himself. On a close examination of his gother set aside the doctrine as a whole, we can soon discover that rule of fate. his determinism did not exelude Mahavira's notion of freedom of the will, just as. on the other hand, Maha- vira's Dyuamistie philosophy did not altogether set aside Gosala's rule of fate. They are complementary, one being imperfect and uniutelligible without the other. We conceive nevertheless that in attempting to banish the possibilities of chance from the world of fact, and of belief and reason, Gosala carried his determinism rather too far, and that in conseq uence he confused or at least did not keep quite distinot the two standpoints-the biological and psychological, or the physical and ethical. Accordingly the task which Gosala had left for his immediate successor was to draw a sharp distinction between these standpoints by employing the sober method of analysis of the laws of action (Karma) and their effects in the world of experience. The problem was discussed by Buddha also. The three Gośtle Mah&vira teachers handled it differently and found a and Buddha : traasition from w biological to a different selution. Gosala set himself to show psychological, or from a physicul to an ethicnl how we, as living individuals and in common standpoint. with the rest of sentient existence, are acted upon by various natural causes and manifold external conditions. The main object of Mahavira was to determine

396 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPIY

how we, as living individuals and thinking subjects, are both acted upon and capable of acting of our own accord. Buddha sought to show how we, as rational beings, can act according to the laws or principles of reason itself. That is to say, the main standpoint of Gosala was biological or objective, that of Mahavira both objective and subjective, and that of Buddha psychological or subjective. The following argument will perhaps give some support to these general observations. As we know, Gosāla, Mahāvira and Buddha, in common with the Moralists, Threofold division of actions into deed, word; followed a threefold division of actions into and thought, Deed, Word and Thought, or into Thought, Word and Deed. The same threefold division is to be found in the existing Zend-Avesta, but there is as yet no proof that anyone of them horrowed it from the ancient Persians. There is, on the other hand, sufficient evidence to prove that Gosala laid stress mainly upon Deed and Word, Thought boing to him & mere half action (upaddhakamma)'; that Mahavira laid almost equal stress upon the three-Deed, Word and Thought, while the whole emphasis was laid by Buddha upon Thought (mano- kamma),* has very definition of action being volition (cetana vadāmi kammam).3 Mahavira laid almost equal stress upon Deed, Word and Thought. This point is so important that if we loose sight of it we are apt to ignore half the significance of Kiriyam and the whole of the significance of Mahavira's psychology and ethics. In order to establish it, we may separately examine two lines of evidence, the Jaina and the Buddhist. In the first place, the Jaina Sutra-Kritanga preserves a dialogue where Adda, a disciple of Mahavira, discusses a view put into the mouth of the Buddhists: "If a savage thrusts

1 Digna-nikāya, I. 64, * Majjhima-nikāya, III. 2. 7, Anguttara, IlI, p. 416. Of. Mrs. Rhys Davids' " Buddhist Paychology," p. 93.

PHILOSOPHY OF MAHĀVĪRA 397

a spit through the side of a granary, mistaking it for a man; or through a gourd, mistaking it for a baby, ard roasts it, he will be guilty of murder." " If a savage puts a man on a spit and roasts him, mistaking him for a fragmert of the granary; or a baby, mistaking him for a gourd, he will not be guilty of murder." "If anybody thrusts a spit through a man or a baby, mistaking him for a fragment of the granary, puts him on the fire and roasts him, that will be a meal fit for Buddhas to breakfast upon." Adda, then, turns upon the Buddhists with this powerful argument: " Well-controlled men cannot accept your denial of guilt incurred by (unintentional) doing harm to living beings ..... It is impossible to mistake a fragment of the granary for a man; only an unworthy man can say it. How can the idea of a man be produced by a fragment of the granary ? Even to utter this is an untruth . ...... They kill a fattened sheep, and prepare food for the sake of a particular person; they season the meat with salt and oil, and dress it with pepper. You are irreligious, unworthy men, devoted to foolish pleasures, who say that partaking heartily of this meat you are not soiled by sin ...... In compassion to all beings, the seers, the Jñati- putras, avoid what is sinful; afraid of it, they abstain from food specially prepared for them."1 The same text contains a few other passages in which the Kriyavadin view is contrasted apparently with the Buddhist view of delicts and crimes. We learn from one of them that for a Kriyavadin " He who intends to kill a living being, but does not do it by an act of his body, and who unknowingly kills one, both are affeoted by that act through a slight contact with it only, but the demerit in their case is not fully developed."2 And in the second place, the Buddhist Upali-sutta records that of the three measures of sin and crime, the bodily (Kāya- danda) had greater weight with Mahavira than cither the vocal or the mental, while that which weighed heaviest for Buddha 1 Jacobi's Jainu-sutras, Part 2, pp. 414.416; cf. ibid, I. 1. 2. 28. * Ibid, p. 242.

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was the mental. "Even in his coming and going a Nigantha is apt to cause the slanghter of many animaleules. What does Nigantha Nataputta consider to be the moral consequence of such an act?" When this question was pressed home by Buddha to Upali, then a lay disciple of Mahavira, the latter replied : "Our master does not attach the notion of any great sin to an unintentional (unavoidable) act, but only to an act which is intentional." "Then you see, Upali, the main determining factor of an act is the volition, motive or intention (cetanā)."! The most important of Buddhist documents to consider as to the doctrine of Kiriyam is the Maha-Saccaka-sutta in which the practice of the Ajivikas has been contrasted with that of the Buddhists as follows: "Whereas the former devote themselves to culture of the body, neglecting culture of the mind, the latter devote themselves to enlture of the mind, neglecting culture of the body." Saccaka cloarly implies that the followers of Mahavira cultivate equally both the modes of self-training on the ground that which affects the body, affects the mind, and vice vers (kayanvayam cittam hoti, cittanvayo kāyo hoti).2 We can casily understand from this that the theory of interaction of mind and body was the physio-psychological ground by which Mahavira sought to justify austerities in religious practice, bodily restraints in daily life, and corporeal punishment in criminal justice. The main question remains yet to be answered. What are the things which depend on fate, necessity, time, providence, nature and the like? Which are determined by natural causes and general conditions of existence ? Thoe is phyaical doterminiam Soul is and what are again the things which are not in ita nuture abaolute- ly puro. determined in a similar way ? Mahavira's answers may he summed up in the modern expression, that there is physical determinism. He agreed with 1 Majjhimu-nikāya, 1. 377. * Ibid, I 237-288.

PHILOSOPHY OF MAIIĀVĪRA 399

Gosala in many respects. For instance, he accepted the classi fications of living beings and things as given by the latter. He too believed that there is no matter unformed, nothing in nature which is dead. It was readily granted by him that our duration of life, physical formation,' number of sense-faculties, certain mental qualities and tendencies and intellectual and spiritual powers depend upon the species or types of existence (sangati) to which we belong; that nature (sabhava) implants in our breast certain passions and emotions which develop as we grow up, or that as we advance in life we pass through many ups and downs, experience many agitations of passion; as in the life of a finite individual, so in the life of the whole, the duration of existence is limited, the duration of the world as a whole is marked by periods which succeed each other alternately and uniformly, showing the predominance of good (su, corresponding in some way to love of Empedocles) over evil (du, corresponding to Iate), on the predominance of evil over good, on the equipoise of both in an ascending or a descending, a progressive or a retrogressive (utsarpini and avasarpini) order2; and so forth. The one point which Gosala left in obscurity and which Mahavira and Buddha brought into prominence was that soul or mind is in its nature supremely white or absolutely pure. The various pleasures and amusements, passions and emotions, thoughts and impressions which stain it with this or that colour, give to it this or that habit and disposition, are quite foreign (agantuka) toits nature The realm of soul is in other words the realm of absolute bliss.3 The soul is not only open to the influx of sin, but also has that peculiar capacity of its own by which it can regain its native purity by shaking off all alien elements. There, indeed lies the scope for our manly strength, the value of education, nay, the foundation

Sūtra-Kritanga, II. 3. 37, Jaina-sutras, Part 2, p. 227 f .; Heart of Jainiam, pp. 272-276. ' Majjhima-nikāya. I. 36; 1I, 31-36; I. 483,

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of our whole moral freedom. For it is in resisting and rising superior by the goodness and wisdom of the soul to all natural forces and tendencies, passions and emotions, that we build up our moral self, and attain immortal life. This doctrine of soul belongs historically to Yajnavalkya, whom Buddha seems to have esteemed as the upholder of Kiriyāvada.'

VIL. The Epistemological aspect of Kiriyam.

As we have seen, the Bhagabati Sūtra attributes the separa- tion of Gosala and Mahavira to a doctrinal difference, while the former maintained that there is nothing in nature without life, no matter unformed, the latter contended that there are certain things which do not strictly come under the category of life (jiva). This contention on the part of Mahä- The category of Ajiva: its significa- Vīra may perhaps be interpreted in two ways: tian. either (1) that Mahavira tried to modify Gosala's general hylozoistic theory by pointing out that there is as a matter of fact death for every living individual; or (2) that he implied that there are besides the objeots of nature or others which are of a purely subjective origin. Accept- ing one or other of these two interpretations, we see that whereas for Gosala the category was just one, that of Jiva, for Mahavira the categories were two, that of Jiva and that of Ajiva. This was an advance on the part of the latter. We propose here to take the category of Ajiva to denote the epistemological aspect of Kiriyam, as distinguished from the biological and physical aspects. The first thing which Mahavira was anxious to do in con- nexion with his theory of knowledge was to see clearly what the problems of knowledge are. He seems The problems knowledge, to have felt in common with Buddha that the question could be settled only by first settling what cannot be the problems of knowledge.

' Majjhima-nikāva. I. 36; II. 81-36; I, 488.

PHILOSOPHY OF MAHAVĪRA 401

So far as this latter question was concerned, the seeptic Sanjaya had already suggested the lines of its answer. The Bañaya, Mahavia questions with regard to whieh Saňjaya sus- and Buddha. pended judgment were in fact the questions to be excluded from the problems of knowledge. Is the world eternal, or is it non-eternal ? Is it both eternal and non- eternal, or is it neither eternal nor non-eternal ? Is the world finite or infinite? Is there any individual existence of man after death, or is there not? Is the absolute truth seen face to face by a seer, comprehended by a philosopher, part of real tangible existence or not? It was with regard to these and similar questions that Sañjaya refused to put forth any affirma- tive proposition, To avoid error he contented himself with the four famous negative propositions : A is not B. A is not not- B'; A is not both B and not-B, A is not neither B nor not-B. It is with regard to the self-same questions that Mahavira declared : "From these alternatives you cannot arrive at truth; from these alternatives you are certainly led to error."2 "The world exists, the world does not exist. The world is unchange- able, the world is in constant flux. The world has a beginning, the world has no beginning. The world has an end, the world has no end, etc. The persons who are not well-instruoted thus differ in their opinions, and profess their dogmas without reason."3 And these were precisely the questions which Buddha regarded as unthinkable (acinteyyani) on the ground that those who will think about them are sure to go mad, without ever being able to find a final answer, or to reach apodeictic certainty.4 However, even with regard to these problems Mahavira differed from Sanjaya, and Buddha from both, if not in any

1 Dial, B. II, pp. 39-40; 75. > Sitro-Kritongn, II. 6. 8: "Dehim dobim thanehim varabaro na vijjei. Eehim dobim hanehim anayuram tu janae." (Jacobi's translation') > Ãokranga, I. 7-3. * Anguttara-nikāya, II. p. 80. 61

402 PRE-BUDDHISTIO INDIAN PHLILOSOPHY

other respect, at least in attitude. For the cowardly manner in which Sanjaya tried to evade them shows that ho did not himself feel certain whether error lay on his side or on that of others. As a successor and younger contemporary of Sañjaya, Mahavira's position was somewbat better, something inter- mediate between that of an ignorant sceptic and that of an enlightened philosopher of the critical school. His was the standpoint of the antimonian (syadvadin), who is represented by later Jaina writers1 and Buddhist Sarvastivadins (Syadvadins) of the rd century B.C.ª in the following manner: If he has to answer any. questions touching " matters of fact," he should answer them by saying, contrary to both a Syādv&da. dogmatist and a sceptic: "It may be that in one sense, looking from one point of view, A is B. It may be that in another sense, looking from another point of view, A is not-B. It may again be that looking from a third point of view, A is both B and not-B. It may equally be that when viewed from a fourth point of view, A is neither B nor not-B." It is then clear that in the vicw of Mahavira and Buddha metaphysics could not be a science, and also that the sceptic Sanjaya had prepared the way for both of them, Prof. Jacobi thought that "in opposition to the Agnosticism of Sañjaya, Mahavīra has established the Syadvada." Besides Gosala, Sanjaya is a great land-mark in the development of the philosophy of Mahavira and Buddha. It is remarkable that Sariputta, formerly the chief disciple of Sañjaya, the founder of the sceptical school, became later the chief disciple of Buddha, the founder of the analytical school,-a fact which Prof. Jacobi was the first to emphasize, and which has almost the same force as Kant's famous dictum that the

1 Soe Sysdvada-manjari; Sapta-bhangi-taraugini; Bhandarkar's Report for 1888-84, p. 95 f. Jacobi's Jeina-sūtras, XXVII-XXIX: "Syad asti; syad n&sti; syad asti nhsti; ry&d avaktavyab; syād asti avaktavyah, syād nūsti avaklavyab; syēd aati nāsti avakta- vyah." ' Kathevatthn, I. 6. 55 58.

PHILOSOPHY OF MAHĀVĪRA 403

sceptic is the true school master to lead the dogmatic specu- lator towards a sound criticism of the understanding and of reason.1 To return to our main question : if the problems stated above cannot be the proper subjects of investigation of know- ledge, then what were for Mahavira the real problems ? The problems were; what and in what manner can we become aware in and through our mind of ourselves and of others who are finite individuals like us ? What are the modes of cognition, or categories of thought ? What are, in other words, ' demonstrable facts' relating to a concrete individual as dis- tinguished from the 'probable' ? According to the view, the demonstrable facts are these five (pañca asti-kāya) : Dharoma (sense-data), Paāca asti-Kāya. Adhamma (data other than those furnished by the senses), Agasa (space), Jiva (soul or finite conscious- ness), and Puggala (Matter or the material).ª Each one of these facts is to be understood according to the following categorics8: Subslance (dabba), Attribute (guna), Field of action (khetta), Time (kala), Sequence or causal relations (pajjava),* Division (padesa), and Transformation (parinama), In view of the fact that there is nowhere to be found in the older texts any systematic exposition of Mahavira's theory of knowlodge, we shall here content ourselves with urging two points regarding it. First, in a passage of the Samavayanga, the five demonstrable facts (panca asti-kaya) are spoken of as being immutable, permanent or eternal elements of knowledge to which no notion of temporal relations can attach; they are above time-past, present and future, and yet hold good universally and for all times. The great interest of the

1 Max Moller's translation of Kant's Oritique of Pure Renson, Vol. II, p. 659. 1,= Samaviyihga, 15; 198; 199. It also refers to similar passages in the Sthendiga and the Bhagavati-sutra. According to later Jaina writere, pajjava=Sanskrit paryirab. But it seems that the word equates with the Pali paccaya or Sanskrit pratyayah.

404 PRE-BUDDUISTIC INDIAN PHTLOSOPIY

passage is that it enables us to see the sharp contrast between the views of Mahavira and Kakuda Katyayana. Whercas the latter identifed the concepts of a finite mind with concrete things existing eternally in space and time, the former did rot. Secondly, Mahavīra so far agreed with Kakuda Kalyayana that he too.conceived a plurality of substances. In dismiss- ing the notion of a single universal soul, Mahavira's object was to protest against subjective idealism which was continu- ally tending to make the 'transcendental self' into a sort of entity. In dealing with Mahavira's philosophy as a whole it must be borne in mind that there are in its background Gosala s biological speculations.

CHAPTER XXVII.

CONCLUSION.

Here we have to close the rather incomplete survey from within of the development of Indian philosophy before the advent of the Buddha. Incomplete, because according to our original plan, the history was to have been brought down to the time of Sayana-Madhava (14th century A.D.). We could hardly realise, until experience actually revealed, the vastness of the field chosen even for a rapid survey, and the immensity of the task to achieve with materials requiring a careful sifting and necessitating in places a great deal of historical reconstruction. Consideration of practical difficulties happily suggested curtailment of the scope of the work, with the result that we had to be satisfied with a modest plan, bring- ing the history down to the 6th century B.O., and closing it with Mahavira. But the plan, however modest, covers cen- turies of thought-evolution which in respect of antiquity and importance merits the deepest reflections of the modern student, whether in the East or in the West. We must say with Dr. Oldenberg that "hundreds of years before Buddha's time movements were in progress in Indian thought, which prepared the way for Buddhism, and cannot therefore be separated from a sketch of the latter," or with Dr. Paul Deussen that "the thoughts of the Upanishads led in the post-Vedic period not only to the two great religions of Bud- dhism and Jainism, but also to a series of philosophical systems."e Buddha's analytic method of enquiry (vibhajja- vada) imparted a great synthetic landmark to the history of Early Indian Philosophy. A perusal of the foregoing pages will have, we hope, made it abundantly clear that the synthetic ' Buddha, Hoey's translation, p. 6. - Ontlines of Indian Philosophy, p. 34.

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development presupposes a large numhor of philosophical thoughts that constituted its immediate background-negative as well as positive. It has also been indicated how Buddha grouped the current philosophical notions under four pairs of extremes (anta) comprising thesis and antithesis and how he ondeavoured by his system of the Middle Path to avoid as well as reconcile them without jeopardising his own position. These four pairs of extremes, as presented in Buddhist literature, are :- 1. (a) Eternalist thesis-that everything exists (sabbam atthsti). This is one extreme. (b) Annibilationist antithesis-that nothing exists (sabbam n'atthiti)-This is another extreme,1 Between these two extremes lay whole centuries of metaphysical evolution. 2. (a) Determinist thesis-that everything is pre-detor- mined (sabbam pubbekatahetn). This is one extreme, yielding the postulate of Being-what is is ; something comes out of something; nothing comes out of nothing. (b) Fortuitist antithesis-that nothing is caused and conditioned (sabbam ahetu-appaccaya)-This is another extreme,' yielding the postulate of non- Being-What is not comes to be (ahutva hoti); something comes out of nothing. Between these two extremes lay whole centuries of logical evolution. 3. (a) Individualist thesis-that weal and woe are caused by the moral agent of an act (sukhadukkham sayamkatam). This is one extreme. (b) Fatalist antithesis-that weal and woe are caused by agents other than self (aukhadukkham param- katam) .- This is another extreme.8

Samyutta, II, pp. 17, 90; III, p. 135. 3 Ante, p 386, f. n. 1, - Angattara, I, p. 173 f .; Digha, I.

CONCLUSION 407

Between these two extremes lay whole centuries of ethical evolution. 4. (a) Hedonist and Utilitarian thesis-that adherence to pleasures of the sense constitutes the path to the goal (kamesu hamasukhallikanuyoga). This is one extreme. (b) Ascetic antithesis-that self-mortification consti- tutes the path to final release (attakilamatha- nuyoga). This is another extreme.1 Between these two lay whole centuries of socio-religious evolution. The mental attitude implied in Buddha's analytic method of enquiry differs merely in degree from that implied in Mahavira's antinomian2 mode of reviewing the many dogmatic but conflicting assertions of philosophers about the origin, existence and destiny of the world and of life as a whole. These two methods lead us back to Sanjaya of the Belattha clan, whose scepticism suggested the suspension of judgment as the best path-way to peacc. The questions on which he suspended his judgment, whether for or against, embraced, as we have seen (p. 331), a number of problems of meta- physical and theological character. We have further seen that the sceptical or agnostie attitude can as well be traced in the speculation of earlier thinkers. In the Kathopanisad, for instance, there is reference to doubt entertained by some school of thinkers regarding the possibility of future existence of man. The teaching of the Kena Upanisad has a ring of agnosticism, and it is clearly brought out in the paradoxical assertions about the incognisability of mental events whereby objects are cognised. If we carry our enquiry back to the philosophical hymns of the Rig-Veda we should not be astonish- ed to find a similar seeptical or agnostie attitude in them. As a matter of fact, we read in Hymn X. 129 that the sun shining in the highest heaven being later in origin than the cosmic process I Dhammacakkapavattana Sutta. * The word has been used here to donote a dialectie method uf judging two sides of a questiou.

408 PRE-BUDDIISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

as a whole, no one can say whether the sun himself knows the genesis of the cosmos or not (veda yadi ra na eda). In another hymn (I. 164) the Risi Dirghatamas proclaims in an agnostic vein : "What thing I truly am I know not clearly: mysterious, fettered in my mind I wander." If we push our enquiry farther back to the mythological poetry which consti- tuted the immediate background of the philosophical hymns, it is curious that there too we would find indication of some school of risis doubting the existence of Indra.1 The pursuit of this one line of enquiry lays bare the fact that there is no abrupt beginning in history. In every age there have been sceptics and agnostics, though not technically so called. Although from the psychological point of view the sceptical or the agnostic attitude has expressed itself in every age, it has differed from time to time in regard to the subject of speeu- lation and the mode of expression. In the mythological poetry the doubt was entertained with regard to the existence of Indra; in the philosophical hymns, with regard to the know- ledge of the single, the first cause of the Universe, and the knowledge of the genesis of the cosmos; in a subsoquent age represented by the older Upanisads, the same doubt arises with regard to the cognisability of mental events and the future existence of man, while we find that scepticism came to be formnlated as a definite method of philosophic investigation in the hands of Sañjaya who was an elder contemporary and common predecessor of Mahāvira and Buddha; it also came to be exercised over a wider range of problems. Thus investigating a known period of history from the Vedas to Mahavira, we could discover certain broad divisions, characterised each by the predominance of some special problems, that is to say, that with every change of problem a now epoch had commenced. The divisions thus marked out are three, vis., (1) Vedic, (2) Post-Vedic, (3) Neo- Vedic-and-Sophistic. The main problem of Vedic thought Rig-veda, VIII '80, 3.

CONCLUSION 409

is cosmological, that of the Post-Vedic period is Physico- Psychological and that of the Neo-Vedic-and-Sophistic, logico-ethical. Each of these synthetic divisions follows upon a cruder stage of mythology, casuistry or sophistry. The cruder slage intervening two synthetic landmarks is naturally a transitional period during which the cosmological problem tended towards the physico-psychological or the latter towards the logico-ethical. The general movement of thought was continuous. This is not to say that newer ideas did completely supplant the older ones and in their turn were replaced by still newer ones. On the other hand, it is clearly manifest from many instances that an idea of a certain period never became extinguished, although it had given rise to and was superseded by a newer one. In fact, cvery period has contributed to the multiplication of philosophic thought, and the older ones exist side by side with newer offshoots and modifications. The whole process, viewed in one way, would scem to be a gradual unfolding of philosophic consciousness of a certain section of humanity, and viewed in another, it would appear to be a process of supersession and supplementation. This two-fold process of evolution was instrumental to the accumulation of myriads of conflicting views and dogmas, differing from each other in slight shades, blurring the intellectual vision, towards the close of the 7th century B.C. It was at such a stage that Sanjaya entered upon his vigorous sceptical campaign and paved the way for Mahavira, who adopted a new antinomian test to judge the current theories and dogmas and religious practices in their ultimate logical, ethical and practical issue. It remains to be seen how these diverse issues came to be handled by the Buddha and what the result was that followed upon the introduction of an analytic method of enquiry and true valuation of concepts and things in the light of the Buddhist theory of causal genesis.

52

410 PRE-BUDDILISTIC INDIAN PHTLOSOPHY

II Though we have said that there is no abrupt or absolute beginning in history, it is indisponsable that for historicnl purpose we have to define the poriod chosen for investigation in respect of time and place, in order to conceive a beginning and an end, an upper and a lower limit. To our purpose, the hymn of Aghamarsana marks the commencement of Indian philosophy, for it is here that we find that not only a problem has been clearly stated but also that it has been definitely attempted. It is this test of clearness and definiteness in statement and handling of problems which we have taken to distinguish philosophy from its background of mythology and popular casuistry. Although the innumerable hymns com- posing the vast collection of the Rig-Veda aro full of inquisitive questions as to the what, the whence, the how, tho whither, of things, none of the earlier bymns are so definitoly philo- sophical as the hymn aseribed to Aghamarsana It was not to our purpose to set up an enquiry into the time and place of the composition of these earlier hymns, the task being left to those who would study them from the antiquarian point of view. In Part I dealing with Vedio philosophy we have considered only those hymns which have been recognised by Vedic scholars as of philosophic interest, and almost all of which are to be found in the tenth or last Book of the Rig-Veda. We hold that the Xth Book and some of the philosophic hymns scattered in the lst Book were added at a later date to an earlier redaction of the Rig-Veda, and it is quite possible that the latest hymn may be separated from the most ancient by a long interval of time. The philosophieal hymns with which we are concerned must be relegated to the closing period of the Rig-Veda, which judging from the chrono- logy of thonght may not be dated belore 1500 B.O. In respect of place, they seem to have been composed or uttered in the land of the Seven Rivers or, more precisely, in that

CONCLUSION 411

tract of land which was bounded on the north-west by the Sindhu and the Sarasvati, and on the north-east by the Jamuna and the Ganga. Roughly speaking, tnis tract is taken to comprise the region covered by the Punjab and the North- western Frontier Provinces. So much about the upper limit of our history in regard to time and place. The internal investigation as to the chronology of the philosophical hymns has been carried on muinly in the light of the chronology of thought, and the grneral trend of thought has been judged by the test, how far it has represented the development of the idea of God, of course, on the cosmo- logical basis. The chronology of the philosophical hymns thus conceived is merely tentative and provisional. It is left to the future historian to test this chronology by considering the inter-rolation of those hymns in the light of some other problem, niz., a problem other than that of the development of the idea of God. Vedic philosophy commenced, as set forth in Part I, with an enquiry into the nature of the first cause or cosmic matter and of the cosmic process and its successive stages, and the unity and order of the visible universe. The attempted solution of the questions which arose on cosmo- logical plane goes to prove that the Vedic seers differed widely from one another, although their speculations all tended to the conception of the singleness of the first cause, whether it be Water, or Air, or Fire, or the Solar Substance, and to the recog- nition of a wonderful order, a rhythmic progress of things in the physical universe. Thus their speculations supply a number of ancient types of cosmological theory, more varied and numerous than the types supplied by Greek philo- sophy in its first stage. The instances of close resemblance have been noted in their proper place. As to the striking points of resemblance, we have noticed that first philosophic reflections originated in India and Greece in religion ; that a peacefnl time was a necessary condition of pondering over the riddles of existence; and that the first

412 PRE-BUDDHISTIO INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

conception of God was within the realm of the physical. But Vedic philosophy wont far ahoad, culminating in the abstraet conception of onc God, represented as the Divine Architect. In these cosmological speculations, the importance of which has been indicated in its proper place, lay the germs and possi- bilities of later Indian thought and the basis upon which the structure of Hindu society was built. For instance, Aghamarsana's hymn contains the first philosophic conception of the Year, which can be traced in a developed form in the Atharva Veda, the Mahabharata and the Puranas as a Doctrine of Time which influenced the popular mind so largely as to become a by-word of faith. The famous Purusa-sūkta yields a conception of the universe as an organic whole, constituted by different groups of beings and things with distinet places and functions, all inter-connected, and it supplied a philosophic exposition of the Calarvarnya system which, with the progress of civilisation and advancement of thought, had a supergrowth in the asrama theory of individnal training and culture. But everything is so vague and inde- finite. One may as well go back to the Brahmanaspati and Visvakarman hymns for the origin of the Vedantic conception of Brahman, as also of the Nyaya conception of God. The Upanișadic tradition traces, as we have seen, the origin of the Sankhya conception of Purusa to the Purusa-sūkta ascribed to Narayana, but one may as well derive the whole cosmological aspect of Sankhya philosophy from the Nasadiya- sukta (X. 129) where the cosmic changes have been conceived as gradual transformation of the primitive matter (Water), due to the influence of the creative fervour (Warmth), immanent in it, and where the terms sattud, rajas and tamas denoting vaguely the threefold divisions of the physical universe are met with.

CONCLUSTON 413

III

We have closed the first part-the Vedie philosophy-with the abiding impression that Vedic thought was in its funda- mental character geo-centric, and its main interest lay in speculations about the physical world. But taking a retros- pective view and scanning the hymns we discovered that the problems of the subsequent period, called post-Vedic, was anticipated in Dirghatamas' hymn (I. 164) in the expression "What thing I am I know not clearly," and a few other detached hymns embodying the concoption of Truth (Satya) and Right (Dharma) as rita denoting the eternal order of things (X. 85); the conception of Faith (sraddha) as the yearn- ing of the heart for better condition of existence (X. 85); the vague notion of the four stages of the dovelopment of the fœtus in the womb (X. 85); and the equally vague notion of rebirth and the two paths, denayana and pitri-yana, along which the soul after death proceeds to its destination. In the conflict between the worshippers of Indra standing for absolute power and Varuna standing for order, and in Dirghatamas' conception of two birds, i.e., of the play of two opposed factors of active vitality and passive mentality in the cosmos, we find anticipated the subsequent antagonism between the Brahman philosophers upholding social order and the mechan- istic conception of life (pranavada) and the Ksatriya philosophers advocating the idea of renunciation and up- holding the rationalistic view of soul (Brahmavada). The Brahmana portion of the older Brahmanas disclosed to us a transitional stage marked hy a fusion of racial elements, an intermingling of Vedic speculations, admixture of philosophy, mythology and popular casuistry, elaboration of rituals and interpretation of the Vedic hymns. It is in the Brahmanio efforts that we find the beginning of various sciences and arts, of the method of classification and systematization, and of the growth of the consciousness that man is the best of

414 PRE-BUDDIITSTIC INDIAN PHTLOSOPIY

creatures. With the dawning of this consciousnoss we find that the attention of the philosophers came to be concen- trated upon the problem of man in his rolation to the matcrial world, the organic world, to socicty, to hiv sensos, mind and soul. The Second Part denling with post-Vedio philosophy covers the period from Mahidasa Aitareya to Yajnavalkya. Going by the Pauranic tradition about the age of Pariksit1 who lived just a generation before Yajna- valkya, the lower limit of the post-Vedic period can be brought down to 1300 B.C. But judging from the process of thought-evolution the limit may as well bo brought down nearer to Buddha, say, to 000 B.C. Another point to be noted is that the centre of Aryan activity and culture was shifted to the land of Kuru-Pañcala, which retained it importance down to the time of Pariksita or Janmejaya. No doubt, it was under the patronage of Pārīkșita and his forefathers that post-Vedie philosophy flour- ished so much. A prominent landmark in philosophy of this period was reached in Uddilaka Aruni. Towards the close of this period, with the death of Janamejaya and Uddalaka, the centre of Aryan influence and culture was shifted further south-east to Videha, where Yajñavalkya, the last landmark of post-Vedic philosophy, successfully pursued his philosophio career under the patronage of King Janaka, challenging in philosophical controversies, great thinkers, especially those hailing from Kuru-Pancala; and it was now that the Aryan sovereignty spread over the greater portion of Northern India from Gandhara to Videha and Kasi. The history of the post-Vedic period has been built up with materials drawn mainly from the works of a few ancient Brahman schools such as the Aitareyas, the Chandogyas, the Kaușītakeyas, the Taittiriyas and the Satapathas. A distino- tion had to be made between the chronology of literature and a The date of Partksit, in roond numbers, is 1400 B O. Ray Chaudhari's ' Horly Fistory of the Vaishnara Sect,' p. 38. Cf. Pargiter's ' Dynnatics of the Kali Age,' p. 58,

CONCLUSION 415

that of thought especially where a particular text like the Chandogya Brahmana-Upanisad is a compilation, containing the views of several teachers, differing in content from one another. The Aitareya Brahmana and the Aranyaka, omitting the Upanishad portion, represent together a homogeneous body of doctrines which may be judged as the system of a parti- cular individual or of a particular school of thought, say that of Mahidasa Aitareya or of the Aitareya school. The case of the Upanisad is different, as it contains the views of many individuals and schools other than those of the Aitareyas. This holds true of the Kausītaki and the Brihadaranyaka Upanișads, while the Taittiriya represents the views of one and the same school, viz., that of the Taittiriyas. In cases where the texts do not represent coherent systems, we have analysed their component elements. and arranged them on internal evidence in a chronological order. We have shown how the post-Vedio period commenced with the Aitareya system, which was the greatest synthetic landmark in pre- Buddhistic Indian thought. In tracing the development and exposition of the doctrine of "so'ham"-"Iam He"-i.e., of the identity of the individual with the universal self in its morpho- logical, physiological and psychological aspects, we have noticed how different lines of investigation issued forth from one common substratum, leading to the scientific conceptions of astronomy, anatomy, physiology, embryology, biology, logic, psychology and ethics. During this period we came across different types of thought, some with old Vedie characteristies, some resembling Pythagorean and Anaxagorean, the predomi- nant types being Aristotelian and Platonic. Indian philo- sophy took a systematic turn in the teachings of Uddalaka, for it is here that we find that different lines of thought branched off to give rise in later times to the fundamental conceptions of Vedanta, Bauddha, Sankhya, Yoga, Nyaya and Vaisesika systems. In this period Indian philosophy would appear to be on the whole a lay movement, almost all the

416 PRE-BUDDHISTTC INDIAN PHTLOSOPDY

teachers being married householdors. We have noticed that the antagonism prevalent during this period was betweeu Brah- mans and Ksatriyas, and thai Brahmanic thonght tended to justify the civic duties of man on the ground of the gradual development of self or gradual manifestation of the potentia- lities of life, while the Ksatriya thought tended contrarywise to give preference to the subjective mode of attaining true self-hood and living an ascetic life in the foresi, practising penance and cultivating inner culture and faith. The develop- ment of Aranyaka life which commenced during the closing period of the Rig-Veda is one of the prominent features of the post-Vedie period. One of the mooted questions of philosophy was whether the bigher plane of man's activity coukl be co- ordinated or harmonised with the lower functions that a man has to discharge as a living body and social being. In the development of many psychological theories of the senses, the mind, and the soul and their funclions and inter-relations wo notice the basis of the fundamental conceptions of Buddhist psychology which holds a unique position in ancient human thought, especially in the whole of Indian philosophy. The period closed with the philosophy of Yajñavalkya in whose teachings we discovered a conscious attempt to compromise the claims put forward by the Brahman and Ksatriya thinkers. It is again in his teachings that we could discover the logioal trend of entire post-Vedic thought tending towards the psycho- ethical. Yajñavalkya's psychological speculations about the waking, the dreaming and the sleeping states of soul, and his theories about birth, death and rebirth laid the foundation of the Jaina, the Buddhist and the Hindu doctrines of Karma.

IV

With the close of post-Vedic thought we entered upon another period which may be designated in history as the neo- Vedic-and-Sophistic. During this period the principal com-

CONOLUSION 417

batants in philosophy were no longer the Ksatriya and Brahman householders, but the Sramans and Brahman wanderers, who were divided into numerous religious orders and schools of thought. In the light of the evidence of Buddhist literature one can see that no less than 50 orders and schools of recluses and wanderers, some anti-Brahmanic in their attitude and the majority in favour of the Brahmanic system of morals yielding the Hedonistic, the Utilitarian, the Juristic and the Ascetic standards of judgment. It seems that these religious orders and schools of philosophy arose as if to bridge over the gulf widely separating the two modes of thought, the two modes of life, the two modes of expression. The centre of activity was shifted farther eastwards towards Gaya, Campa and Vesali. This period closes with Mahavira. The prominent feature of its political history, as may be ascertained from the ancient Jaina and Buddhist texts, is the existence of many independent Aryan or semi-Aryan powers in Northern India divided into 4 monarchies and a number of oligarchies of various descrip- tions. Since Yajñavalkya there seems to have been a long state of war which resulted in the conquest of Kasi by the Kosalans, Videha by the Vajjis and the ascendancy of the kingdom of Magadha. As may be inferred from the Epio kernel of the Mahabharata, the absolute powers had developed from a tribal stage and gradual subjugation of one tribe by another. The powers were generally related to one another by matrimonial alliances, and, according to the Jaina evidence, the alliance of 18 eastern tribal powers existed down to the demise of Makkhali Gosala and Mahavira. The influence of. these independent powers and warring factors upon the course of Indian philosophy and on the development of Indian language, literature, sciences and arts cannot be overstated, for it was under the auspices of one or other of these prinoes that the religious orders and schools of philosophy flovrished. The main characteristic of this period, so far as philosophy is concerned, were the freedom of thought and the general 53

418 PRE-BUDDIISTIC INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

spirit of toleration. The philosophical controversios carried on in a spoken language by the recluses and wanderers on mattors ethical, social, religious and philosophical, served to enrich Sanskrit language, and give rise to Vernacular litoratures. Every shade of opinion was advocated with the utmost subtlety of reasoning and sophistry, with the result that gradually all the pre-historic conditions of the development of logic and dialectic as a scienoe made their appearance. One can easily discover that some of the conflicting opinions emerged out of the ambiguity in the earlier thoughts. Although in most cases we do not find the discovery of a new truth, the interest of the period as a whole lies in the emphasis laid upon certain logical consequences of earlier thoughts dis- criminated and tested with utmost logical acumen. Through this conflict of opinions two facts come to be emphasized. (1) That there is a higher self which has got the power to rise above material conditions and can arrive, by its own efforts, to a condition where it is not touched by our sensuous experiences. (2) That this ideal state of self, reachable by a subjective mode of effort, constitutes the supreme goal of man. As a result of the antagonism between the Sramans and Brahman wanderers the asrama theory came to be synthesized with the earlier caturvarnya system, But the possibility of such a coalition was clearly indicated in the Tailtiriya philo- sophy, just as the beginnings of Sophistic movements can also be traced in the personal example set by Uddalaka Āruņi and in the many philosophical controversies between Yajnavalkya and his contemporaries. It is not at all surprising that the earlier thoughts of the Upanisads were continued in the intellectual activity of the period with many ramifications and newer scientific and artistic developments. It is in the teachings of the Philosophers and Sophists of this period that we begin to see a clearer differentiation of earlier thoughts, some proceeding towards Sankhya-Yoga, e.g., the views of Pippalada, Pūrana

CONOLUSION 419

Kassapa and Pakudha Kaccāyana; some towards the Vaiseșika philosophy, e. g., the views of Pakudha Kaccayana, Gosala and Mahavira; some towards Vedanta and Nyaya, e.g., the views of the Mundakas and the Gotamakas; and some towards Bud- dhist philosophy, e.g., the views of Pakudha Kaccayana, Ajita, Sanjaya, Gosala and Mahavira Here again we fnd a close resemblance between the Ancient Indian and the Greek types of speculation, e.g., between the views of Naciketas and Parmenides; between the views of Pakudha Kaccayana and Empedocles; between those of Ajita and Epicurus. One very important point has been emphasized iu Part III, viz., that the Isa, the Katha, the Kena, the Mundaka and such other texts which have hitherto been considered as the oldest among the Upanisads have been all found to be later in point of date than Yajnavalkya. The records of most of the schools of re- cluses and Brahman wanderers have not come down to us, but we have found reason to believe that the views of these schools can still be found in one or other of these later Upanisads in the vast accumulation of the Mahabharata and the Puranas, but we leave all these surmises to the future historian of Indian philosophy to test.

V

In dealing with the history of Indian Philosophy before the rise of Buddhism we have to move in a period when it is diffi- cult to speak of a system of philosophy in its later technical sense, but mainly of some daring and far-reaching speculations forming the earlier landmarks or stages of later schools of philo- sophy, whether Brahmanic, Jaina or Buddhistic. We trust that we have not failed to indicate, wherever possible, the types of speculation which tended towards one or other of the six schools of Hindu philosophy. The subject, however, requires a closer investigation and independent study, which is quite out of place in our work. Only a word remains to be said regarding

420 PRE-BUDDHISTIC INDTAN PHILOSOPHY

the comparison we have instituted, here and there, between Indian philosophy and Greek thought. It was really not our purpose to bring Greek philosophy under our survey and raise any question of borrowing. Wherover we havo resorted to a comparison, we have done so with no other end in view than orientation of Indian thoughts themselves. 'The point of pre- historio contact between the Indian and the Greek thought is generally sought in the Pythagorean doctrine of transmigra- tion of soul, but, having no conclusive evidence to hand, we have refrained from dealing with that disputed point. But it has been pointed out that with Alexander's Indian campaign in the 4th century B. O. an intellectual connection came to be established through Pyrrho of Elis who is said to have studied philosophy under the Indian Gymnosophists and Chaldean Magi, or, as we hold, who imbibed his aceptical bias from the followers of Sanjaya, the Soeptic. The Greek ambassador Megasthenes, as is well-known, was much impresHed by the prevalence in northern India of philosophical views similar to those of Plato and Aristotle when he visited the court of Ohandragupta shortly after Alexander's departure. " The East is East and the West is West." This has already passed into a maxim of our time, Although it would not be easy to say how far the diotum is literally true, we concede that one can derive from it, if not a truth, at least a precious warning which is-one must not hold comparison between two countries, nations or races, and much less between their cherished teachers until one has discovered a common trait to judge and appreciate them. A comparative study of Greek and Ancient Indian philosophy, attempted in our work, has yielded cases of resemblance, more or less close. Those who are still in doubt as to the possibility of a history of philosophy as a genuine science can discover in the history of Indian philosophy a great world of ideas furnish- ing many interesting parallels to western thought. Should such a time ever come for a thorough comparative study, those of

CONCLUSION 421

wider outlook can find in its light what is commonly given in the human reason, and how that original gift develops as time goes on in manifold forms. It will doubtless set forth the same human spirit manifesting itself among different peoples in different climes and exhibit certain eternal problems pre- oooupying the thoughtful section of humanity of all ages, However looking back to the past, the hisorian cannot but be impressed by the fact that however ancient the Semitic and Chinese civilizations may be, the Indo-Aryans and the Greeks with their Roman neighbours stand out in history as the originators of philosophy and scientific thought. The peculiar interest of the study of Indian philosophy is that from the Vedas onwards we have almost a continuous record, in the light of which a mighty movement and progress of human thought can be visualized. It is certainly not our object to oxtol the past which is in a sense dead and therefore indifferent to praise and blame. We have taken pains, there- fore, to judge history as it is and not as it ought to be, with reservation-so far as practicable. In fact, with Lord Acton we have searched earnestly and sympathetically certain past re- cords of mankind to learn wisdom for the present, to study the lives and teachings of ancient Indian teachers on theie purely human and historical side. Much has been said and much remains yet to be said. But the process of evolution of Indian thought, as discovered in our investigation, has served to supply us with the key to the development of other aspects of Indian culture.1

' Our " Asoka's Dhamma-a Landmark of Indian Literature and Religion ". which is a joint-work, is an instance of what an invstigation on the same lines has done. The work will be published soon by the University of Oalentta,

NOTES AND APPENDIX

1. Complement or Entelechy (p. 66)-The meaning attached by Aristotle to this expression is that soul is nothing but a complement of the living body, i.e., something addled to life. We do not know of any Sanskrit equivalent of the expression, but there is a passage in the Aitareya Araņyaka (III, 12), where it is clearly stated that soul enters (or is inserted) into the body, after it has reached an advanced stage of embryonic development, through the suture at the top of the skull. Of. Taittiriya Up. (I. 6.1). Note Rhys Davids' observa- tions in his Buddhist India, p. 253. 2. Pūrņa Kasyapa The Pali epithet Pūraņa has been Sanskritized on p. 277 as Pūrna, which seems incorroct. Nowhere in the Buddhist Sanskrit Texta Purna has been used as the Sanskrit equivalent of it. Paranah would have been the right cquivalent. In the Mahabharata Puranah ocours as the name of a distinguished teacher. This does not affect our remark that the meaning and derivation of the epithet are very different from those suggested by Buddhaghosa. 3. Supiya, Suppiya (p. 326)-This word supiga, as we are informed by a friend, occurs in some of the Kharosthi incriptions, edited by Rapsou, (e.g., No. 272) apparently as the designation of an itinerant body of ascetics. It would be worth while to investigate whether any .new light could be thrown thereof on the interpretation of the word. 4. Gymnosophists (p. 328)-It is not at all olear from either Strabo's description or Plutarch's Life of Alexander that the Gymnonosophistae or Naked sophists formed a compact or

NOTES AND APPENDIX 423

homogeneous body of Indian philosophers. They are re- presented no doubt as in some way attached to a royal court, though not precisely in service of the state. No definite clue to their identilication either with the Ajivikas, Jains, or with Sanjaya's followers can be elicited from Plutarch's account of the replies of ten Gymnosophists to the ten questions severally put to them. 5. Pannaka-bhumi (p. 314 f. n. 1)-We have sufficient reasons to dispute Buddhaghosa's explanation of this ex- pression and accept Hoernle's interpretation that it denotes the Prostrate stage of an Ajīvika saint-(App. to the Uvasaga- Dasão, II. p. 24). This was a common practrice of Indian ascetics, particularly that of the Ajivikas and the Jainas, as has been shown elsewhere (The Ajivikas Pt. I. p. 53), that they committed religious suicide. It is all the more interesting to note that the word Parnaka, which is a Sanskrit equivalent of the Pali Pannaka, is used in the Vedic texts in the sense of a human-victim at the Purusa- medha (Vedio Index, sub voce Parņaka). 6. Interpretation of the Isa Upanişad (p. 259)-in the light of the anciont Sanskrit and Pali texts.

(d) ईशावास्यमिदं सव यत् किंच जगत्यां जगत्। तैन व्यशेन भुख्जोथा मा गध: कस्य खिवनम् ॥१॥ कुवंब्रेवैद् कर्मापि जिजौविषेच्छत' समा। एवं त्वयि नान्यथेतोडस्ति न कर्म लिप्यसे नरे A२॥ (I6a)

of. Brihad Aranyaka Up., III, 7.23 नान्योऽनोऽस्ति ट्रषट नान्योऽनोऽस्ति योता ... मन्ता ... विद्वाता"; IV. 4.23:"तस्येव ख्यात्पदवित्तं विदिला न लिय्यते कर्मणा पापकेनेति"।

(b) असूर्य्या नाम ते लोका भन्धेन तमसाहता:। तांखे प्रेत्याभिगककुन्ति ये के चावहनो जना: ॥३॥ (Isa)

424 NOTES AND APPENDIX

Of. Brihad Āranynka Up: IV. 4. 11 धनदा नाल से लोका अन्धेन तमसासता: । तांखे प्रेत्याभिगच्छन्यवद्दांसोऽबुधो जना:। Being the apt rejoinder of the Mundakn, 11. 2. 10; Katha, II. 6. 5; Śvetāśvatara, VI. 14 न तभ सूर्य्यों भाति, न चन्द्र तारकं, नेमा विद्यतो भान्ति, कुतोऽ्यमग्नि: ? तमेव भान्तमनुभाति सवे, तस्य भासा सर्वमिद विभाति। Udāna, I p. 9: न तत्थ गुक्का जोतन्ति, आदिच्ी नप्पकासति, न तत् चन्दिमा भाति, तमो तत्थ न विज्जति। यदा च पनावेदि सुनि मोनेन ब्राहमणो पथ रूपा भरूपा च सुख-दुक्खा पसुच्धति॥ Katha, I. 1. 3: पोलोदका जग्वतणा दुग्धदोड़ा निरिन्ट्रिया: । भनन्दा नाम तें लोकास्ान म गर्च्कति ता ददस्। For the significance of the exprossion atmahano janah, of. Baudhayana's (or, Bodhayana's) expression "rajo bhutoa dhoamsute," discussed on pp. 247-49. Also ascertain what led the Brahman wanderer Magandiya (Markandeya ?) to call Buddha a Bhunahu, Sk. Bhrunaha (Majjbima, II. p. 108) (०) चविद्यया मृत्युं तोरलां विद्ययानृतमश्ृते ॥११। (Iśa, Brihad Āraņyaka) For the meaning of avidya and vidya of. the Mundaka I; the Katha I. 2; the Prasna I, 18 : सव्े इ वे तत्प्रजापसिव्रत चरन्ति ये मिथुनसुत्यादयन्ते तेवामिवैष ब्रह्मलोको; येषां तपो ब्रम्मचय्यं, येपु सत्यं प्रतिष्ठितम्, तेषाससी विरजी ब्रह्मलोको।

SUBJECT INDEX

AGHAMARSANA-the first philosopher of India, 9-the formulator of 'the Doctrine of Time' (Kala-vada), 9-comparison of his hymn with that of Prajapati Parameșthin, 9-his dootrine, 9, 10-the conception of Time and Seasons in the cosmogonic hymns, 9- its exposition in the Brahmanas, 10- a parallel of the Doctrine of Time in the Atharva-Veda, 11. AJATASATAU, 151-his philosophical discussions with Balaki, 151. 152-his difference on the conception of soul with Balaki, 151, 152. AJITA KESA-KAMBALIN-(Ajita Kesa-Kambala), 287-Ajita's relation with Carvaka and Brihaspati, 287, 288, 239-the Kesa-Kambalins and the epicureans compared, 289, 200. His philosophy, 290-the sources of information, 290, 291, 292, 293-two aspects of Ajita's philosophy, 293,-Ajita the critic of Katyayana and other dualistic thinkers, 294, 295-the moral deductions of Ajita's theory of self, 295, 296. ANAXAGORAS, 124-Uddalaka compared with him, 124-agreement in their doctrines, 188, 134-similarities in their views on the original condition of matter, 187-agrcement in their theory of knowledge, 139. ANAXINANDER-his conception of the cosmic matter, 17-comparison with Brahmanaspati, 17-his amcpov, 69, 70. ANAXINENES, 24-compared with Anila, 24. ANILA-his doctrine, 24-its defect, 24, 25-his doctrine as expounded in the Atharva-veda, 25. ARISTOTLE, 52-Mahidasa compared with him, 52, 58-similarity of Mabidass's theory of development to Aristotle's conception of a transmission of the potential into actuality, 56, 61, 62-Aristotle's causa eficiens and causa finalis in relation to Mahidasa's con- ception of God, 63-conception of soul, 86-logical aspect of Mahidasa's metaphysies compared to that of Aristotle, 68-simi- larities in their embryological doctrines, 75, 76-agreement in their physiological dootrines, 81-his actus purus in connection 54

426 SUBJECT INDEX

with the doctrines of Yajnavalkyo, 160,-176, 178-Aristotelion character of the Dortrine of Time, 212-Aristotle', formula of Universaha in Ne, 205. AsUm, 818-Asuri in the Samkhya tradition, 214,-tho aseription of the authorsbip of the Purusa-vidha-Brahmana to him, 215-two of Buddha's speculations shedding light on the views of Asuri, 215, 216, 217, 219-the philosophical views of Asuri, 290, 221, 222- his agreement with Mahidasa and Pratardana, 222-his philo- sophical views continned, 228-his social and ethical views, 223-his indebtedness to Yajnavalkya and Narayana, 223, 224- his social and moral views continued, 224the Kautilian, Buddbistic and Vedantie developments of the conception of Dharma, 225-his religious views, 225. BADHVA, 90 -- his pantheistic dootrine, 90, 91. BALAKI, 151-his discussion with Ajatasatru, 151, 152-he seeks for soul in everything, wrereas Ajatasatru seeks in living bodies only, 151, 152. BrARADVAJA-the exponent of the Mund ka philosophy, 237-the teachern of the Mundaka School, 287-origin and historical signifioance of the name Mundaka, 287, 288, 289-the Sramans, 280, 240, 241, 242-the opposition between Sramans on one hand and Brsh- mans and ascetics on the other, 242, 248. His philosophy, 243-two points of invostigatiou, 248, (1) Transcendentalism rersus asceticiem and worldly life, 243-Bharadvaja and Buddha, 244-Rathītara, Paurašișți and Maudgalya's views, 244the ethical views of the Taittiriyas, 245, 246-the legal writers' viow of marriage; the antinomian doctrine of Vasistha, 247 -- Apastamba and Gargyāyana, 248, 249 -the three points of argument of the Taittiriyas, 249, 250-the real opposition between Mahidasa and Gargyayana, 250-ambiguity in Yajnavalkya and ita bearing on the antagonism between the Mundakas and the Vajasaneyas, 250, 251, 252, 258-the Mundakan view, 258-Bharadvaja's difference with Rathitara, 258, 254-his attitude towards Brahmanie religion, 254, 255, his case against the Vitalists or Mechanists, 256, 257-the Vajasaneyan view, 257, 258, Isopanișad-its commentators and exponents, 258, 259, 260. (2) The nature and knowledge of God, 260-the Mundakas versus the Keniyas, 260-the scepticism of the Keniyas, 261, 262 the Mundakan view that god can be known by pure cognition, 262, 268.

SUBJEOT INDEX 427

BRAHMAŅASPATI-his historical relation to Paramesthin, 17-similarity of his position with that of Anaximander, 1 -his hymn, .17- his fundamental problem, 18-his postulate of non-Being and its significance, 18-his principal thesis that the existent originally aprang from non-existent (Aditi), 18-the interpretation of the term Aditi, 19-the criticism of Max Muller's view, 19-Aditi and Nirriti, 19,-Aditi as the visible Infinite, 20-the contrast of Infinity with finite things, 20 -- the process of generation according to Brahmanaspati, 21-the order of generation of the gods, 21- Aditi, an abstract conception 21-Aditi and Diti as non-Being aud Being, 22-why is Aditi called Non-existent, 23-the utility of the conception of Aditi, 23-the exposition of Brahmapas- pati's doctrine in the Taittiriya Brahmana, 23, 24. BUDDHA-his statement of the fundamental problem of the post-Vedie period, 43-justification of his opinion, 44- his five moral precepts (pancastlas) in relation to Jaivali's doctrines. 93-improvement on Gargysyana's doctrines, 109, 110-his improvement on Pratardana's theory of cognition, 121, 123,-bis eriticism of Asuri's doctrine, 217-Bharadvaja and Buddha, 244-his account of Sanjaya's doctrine, 328-his criticism of the views of the wanderers, 354, . 355-Mahavīra and Boddha,-365, 385-Buddha's interpretation and criticism of Mahavira's doctrine, 885-difference between the views of Mahavira and Buddha, 390, 391, 392, 398, 895, 401. DIRGHATAMAS, 26-his conception of the Sun, 26-the cause of the motion of the Sun, 27-the contrast between the phases of the Sun and the Moon, 27-the component element of the Sun: its relation to fire and lightning, 27, 28-the primitive substance or whatever it may be is one, 28,-the Sun's part in the life process of the world, 28-the fire roots of things, 28-his ignorance or agnosti- cism, 29, 30-his anticipation of Narayana's views, 31. Empedocles, 284-Kakuda Katyayana compared with bim, 284, 285. Epicurus, 289-the followers of Ajita Kesakambalin compared with his followers, 289, 290. GARGYĀYANA, 97-Relation to Jaivali, 97, 98-his question as to soul and answer, 98-identity of soul and the Divine essence, 98,-the generie character of soul, 99-Brahman, 99-the universal and the individual, 99-Two Brahma-worlds, 99-his view of the world of generation-its incompatibility with his doctrine of immortality,

428 SUBJEOT INDEX

100,-oriticism of this point, 100, 101 .- Being and Change, 101, 102, 108,-his failure, 103, 104, -- dovelopment of the doctrine of immortality, 104, 105-Oargyayana as the incipient Plato of India, 105-his theory of Ideas, 105-antagonism between Mahidasa and Gargyayana, 106, 107-his ethical doctrines, 107, 108, 109 110. HIBANYAGARBHA .- The distinction between him and Visvakarman, 84- the special feature of his doctrine, 35-his coneeption of God, 36-Fire as the solar essence, 36-comparison of his dootrine with that of Paramesthin, 30. HRASVA MANDUKEYA, 89-the germs of later physiological theories in his doctrines, 89-his enumeration of the parts of human body, 89. KALA-VADA-the Doctrine of Time, 199 -- the earlier speculations not much coneerned with the future of the world, 199, 200-the Epic doctrine of time contrasted with the Atharvana, 201,-the Epie doctrine of time-Schrader's exposition of it, 201, 202-Bali's views of Time, 202, 208. Criticism of the Epie doctrine of time, in the Jataka litera- ture, 208, 204-in the Svetasvatara Upanigad, 204, 205-in the Saundarānanda-Kāvya of Aśvaghoșa, 205-in the Sāmkhyasūītma of Kapila, 205-in the Arthassetra of Canakye, 206. Defence of the Epie doctrine of time, 200-Sakayanya as the chief defender in the Maitri Upanisad, 206, 207-Sakayanya's views of time, 207, 208-Rama's views of time in the Yoga- vāsișțha, 208, 209. Infinity of time: the constant cycles of existence, 209-two aspects of Purana: cosmological and historical, 209, 210. Literary significance of the term Purana-the earlier specimens of Puranas, 210, 211-the Science of Time, 211, 212. KAUNTHARAVYA, 89-his relation with Sakalya, the Sthavira, 89-his enumeration of the different parts of human body, 89. KAKUDA KĀTYĀYANA,-(Pakudha Kaccāyana)-281, an elder contemporary of Buddha and a sophist, 281-he as depicted in the Buddhist liter- ature, 281, 282. His PHILOSOPHY .- 282-sources of information, 288, 212-the relation between his philosophy and the system of the Bhagavadgita and the Samkhya, 283-Kakuda and empedocles compared, 284, 285- significance of the terms employed by Katyayana, 285-the theory

SUBJECT INDEX 429

of non-action involved in Katyayana's philosophy, 280-his views com pared with those of Mahavira, 404. MAHAVIRA, 362-A short account of Mahavna's life, 372-his names and birthplace, 372-his parentage : the source of his anti-Brahmanical feelings, 378, 373-his marriage, 378-his renunciation, 273- Parsvaņātba and Mahavira, 373-Gosala and Mahavira, 873, 374, 375. His philosophy, 375-source of information, 375, 376, 377- Kiriyum or Kriyavada as the original nane of Jainism, 377- significance of the name Nigantha, 377, 378-the original Nigantha order, 378-Parsva's doctrine of Catayama Samvara, 878, 379-contrast between Parsva and Mahavira, 380, 381- Mahavīra's philosophic predecessor, 381-three questious relating to the ecclesiastical history of the Jainas and their answers, 381, 382, 383-the definition of Kiriyam, 383, 384,-the Psycho-ethical aspect of Kıriyam, 385. Gosala, Mahavira and Buddha, 385- Buddha's interpretation and criticism of Manavira's doctrine, 385, 386-Mahavira's criticism of pro-Jaina and contemporary philo- sophers from the stand-point of his ethies, 386, 887, 388, 389, 390-the fnndamental categories and maximr of his ethics, 390- modification of Buddha's interpretation of his predecessor's funda- mental ethical thesis, and of Mahavira's interpretation of pre-Jaina philosophies, 390, 391-differenco between the views of Mahavira and Buddha and the correlation of Niyativada and Kriyavada, 391, 392, 398- the biological and psychological aspects of Kirigar, 398, 394- the category of Jiva, 394, 395-the notion of freedom of the will in Gosala's determiniem and the rule of fate in Mahavira's dynamism, 895,-Gofala, Mahavira and Buddha-transition from a biologioal to a psychological or from a physical to an ethical stand-point, 895, 396-threefold division of actions into deed, word and thought, 896, 397, 398-a physical determiniem-the pure nature of soul, 898, 399, 400- the epistemological aspect of Kirigam, 400-the category of Ajiva, its signification, 400-the problems of knowledge, 400- Sanjaya, Mabāvīra and Buddha, 401, 402-Syādvāda, 402, 408- Pafca asti-kēya, 408, 404. MAHIDASA AITAREYA .- A short account of his life, 51-his parentage, 51- his works and their interconnexion, 52-preliminary remarks

430 SUBJEOT INDEX

concerning his main problem, services to science and philosophy, defecte and difficulties, 52-he as the incipient Aristotle of India, 62, 53-the division of bis philosophy into metaphysios, physies, psychology and ethics, 58 -- I. Metaphysics, 53-'experience' according to him. 53-the limits of knowledge, 54-the five elements or material attributes, 54-two methods of investigation : conventional and philosophic, 54-axplanation of experience, 54, 55-bis fundamental thesis: the propositions and axioms, 55-man and all other living substances as microcosmos, 55-the difference between the phy- sical universe, the organic world and man, 56-the essential identity of cause and effect, 56 - bis general theory of knowledge 56, 57,-the definition of and the distinetion between the physical universe and the organio world-57-a two fold difference in type of existence and degree of growth, 57-the four classes of beings, 58-the theory of the gradual development of soul, 58. Nature, 59-the twofold conception of nature, aa a system of numerous gradations of existence, and as an inter-couneoted whole, 59-heaven, earth and firmament, 59-the extent and duration of the physical universe, 60-the inter-connexion of heaven and eartb,.60- God and Matter, 60-God as the ground of unity and Maiter the ground of plurality, 60, 61-Matter and Form: the numerous gradations between the first matter and final form, 61- on the process of change and development, 61, 02-God as the first and the last cause, 63-difference between matter and form, 64-its illustration, 64-the relation between the first matter and the first mover, 65-Mahidasa's theology, 65, 66 -- The soul (Atma), 68-the psychological aspect of Mahidasa's metaphysics, 66, 67- Speech (Vak)-the logical aspeot of Mahidasa's metaphysics, 67,68. II. Physics, 68-The bearings of his maxim on the investi- gation of physies, 68-A parallelism of this maxim in Sakalya's views, 69-Mahidasa's cosmological dootrine, 69, 70, 71, 72-the development of the motion of Brahmacakra, 72, 78-the five elements, 73-an ambiguity and its historical importance, 74. Biological speculations of Mabidāsa, 74, 76-

SUBJECT INDEX 481

Embryological speoulations, 75, 76-reproduction as the process by which seed and blood become united, 77-no difference of kind between seed and blood, 76-Mahidasa's paradoxical axiom and its bearing on a later scientifie view of generation, 77, Analomy, 78-the threefold division of the trunk which is essential to our existence, 79-abdomen, 78-thorax, 79-skull, 79-extremities, 79, 80. Physiology, 80-the living body as a purposive order, 80, 81 -the five systems into which organio funotious are to be divided, 81, 82 -- the nervous system, 82. III, Payohology, 83. IV. Ethics, 83, 84, 85, 86, 87. Mahidasa as the father of Indian Philosophy, 88-his sue- cessors and the characteristie features of their speculations, 88, 89-antagonism with Gargyayana, 106, 107. MASKARIN GOSALA (MAKKHALI GOSALA), 297-Gosala and the Ajivikas, 297, 898-bis name and life, 298, 299-A historical estimate of the traditions regarding him, 299, 300-his relation to Prana Kasyapa, 278 Hia Physics, 801-the relationship of Gosala and Mabavira as thinkers, 301, 302, 303, 381, 385, 895,-Gosala, Mahāvīra, Kagāda and the Stoics, 303, 304-Gosala's fundamental thesis and its signification, 304, 305-the reliability of Buddhaghosa's exposi- tions, 805, 306-the two-fold olassification of the animate world, 307, 308, 809, 310 -- the three grounds of explanation for it, 810- Fate (niyati), 810, 31]-Clasa or species (sangals), 311-Nature (Bhava), 311, 312. His Ethios, 312, 313-the gradual development of self, 318, 814. Post-soript, 814, 315, 317, 818. METAPHYSIOIANS (AKIRIYAVADINS) .- 196-an introductory account of them, 196, 197-a list of them, 197, 198. MORALISTS (VINAYA-VADINS), 332-the definition of Finaya-Vada, 332- Stlabbata-paramasa, 382, 838-the fundamental rules of conduct common to both the Jainas and the Buddhists: contrast with the codes of other schools, 334, 336, 336. NACIKWTAS, 264-the exponent of the Gotamaka philosopky, 264-his position compared with that of Permenidee in the history of philosophy, 264-historical interpretation of the descent of Naciketas from

482 SUBJEOT INDEX

Uddalaka Āruni, 265-the Gotamaka views in the Kathopanigad, 265-the Gotamaka philosophy in relation to the Mundaka and the Nyaya philosophy, 265, 266. His phtlosophy, 266-the souree of information, 266, 267- introduction to it, 267, 268, 289-the way of truth, 270, 271, 272, 278-the way of opinion, 273, 274-Yoga na the subjective or meditative mode of attaining to God or reaching unity of self, 275, 270. NARIYANA, 31-bis relation to Dirghatamas, 31-his philosophy, 31- the sun is the soul of the nniverse : its diameter, 31-the original sun or solar body: it is God, 31-the identity of God and soul, 32-the process in which this universe was gradually formed from the primitive solar mass, 32-God, world and soul, 32, 33-his theoretie defence of the system of class-distmetion in society, 39. PERMENIDES, 264-the similarity of his position with that of Naciketas in the history of philosophy, 264, 205. PHILOSOPHY-philosophy as a doubting process of the human mind, 2- as a structure of thought, ?- the time favourable for philosophical reflection, 2, 8-difference between mythology and philosopby, 8. I. Vedic philosophy, I-the question whether there is a system of Vedie philosophy, 1,-the authors of the Vedie hynns, specially of the philosophical ones, 2-the attitnde of later thinkers towards the Vedas, 3-the Brahmana schools of philo- sophy mentioned in the Tevijja Sutta, 4-Buddha's estimate of cosmological speculations, 4-the problems of cosmological speeu- lation, 4, 5-the cosmogonic bymns of the Rig-Veda as the immediate back-ground for Indian philosophy, 5-philosophy and the philosopher, 5-Definition of Hymn or Philosophy, 0 -- when could philosophical questions arise? 6, 7-the historical signi- ficance and value of Vedic speculations, 7, the central point of interest in Vedic speculations, 24, II. Post-Vedic philosophy, 39-the explanation of the title, 89-the historical features of the period, 39-the contrast between the Vedas and the Brahmaras, 89, 40-Hopkins' judgment of the Brahmanic religion, 40-the value of Sama and Yajurveda from philosophic view-point, 40,-the transition period defined, 40, 41- ite intrinsic value in the history of philosophy, 41-the peculiarities of the transition period, 41-the sophistie maxim-its origin, 41, 42-the natural and inevitable transition from cosmological to

SUBJECT INDEX 438

psvchological speculations, 42-the anticipation of the Post-Vedic thought in the Vedic, 42, 48-the post-Vedie thought is just the repetitior of the Vedic, in so far as the types of problems are concerned, 43-the fundamental problem of the period accord- ing to Buddha, 48-justification of Buddha's opinion, 44-further demonstration of the main problem of the post-Veaie philosophy, 44, 45-the interest of the problem, 45- -the solution of the problem, 45, 46-the dialectical aspect of the post-Vedie philo- sophy, 46, 47, 48, 49-the theological side of the older Brabmanic activity-its effect on the course of philosophy, 50-supplementary discussions on certain aspects of the post-Vedic philosophy, 182, 183, 184, 185, 186, 187. III. Philosophy before Mahavira and Buddha, 188-origin of the title, 188-the six sophists, 189-three orders of teachers, 189, 190,-hermits, 191-wanderers, 192, 198 -- anti-Vedic move- ment, 193, 194-the end of philosophy aot yet realized, 194, 195, 196 -- method of arrangement, 196. PIPPALIDA,-226-his contemporaries 226,-his age, 227-he as an Athar- vanika or a compiler of a recension of the Athava-veda, 227-as the historical founder of Samkhya, 227. His philosophy, 228, 229, 230,-his physiological views, 280, 281,-his metaphysical views, 231, 232, 233,-his paychological views, 238, 234,-hie theory of sleep, 234,-his theory of dream, 235-definition of soul as a pure cognitive consciousness, 285,- god as denoting the state of mind, 286,-his view of the phenomenal world, 236. PLATO, 53,-compared with Gargyayana, 108, 104, 105,-156,-Platonic character of the Doctrine of Time, 212. PRAJAPATI PARAMESTHIN-The Thales of India, 12-his conception of original matter, 12-the point about which he was sceptical, 12- his fundamental proposition and its import, 13-the condition of cosmic matter, 18-how the concrete existence proceeded from the universal substance, 13-his theory of progression, 14-bis dynamistie theory of nature, 15-his explanation of Aghamarșana's thesis, 15-his scepticism, 16-a later exposition of it in the Satapatha Brahmana, 16,-comparison with Hiranyagarbha, 36. PRATARDANA-Hie relation to his predecessors, 111,-the doctrine of Inner offering, 111, 112-bearing of other doctrines on his psychology, 112, 118. 56

434 SUBJEOT INDEX

His psychology, 113,-indebteduess constitutes his greatness, 118-his claime to originality, 118, 114,-the physiologirul aapeet of his paychology, 114,-the genses and objerts, 115-the defeet of terminclogy, 115, 116-conclusion as to the unity of mental life, 117,-life, souì and the senses, 118, 119 ; the rognitive uspret of his paycholugy, 119, theory of attention, 119,-the relation of objeots to Prajna, 119, 120, 121. His theory of knowledge, 121, the subject and the object are not separable from or independent of each other, 121-122. His ethical dootrine, 122, 123, PRAVAHANA JAIVALI, 93-Jaivali and bis contemporaries, 93, 94,-the remarkab'e feature of hie philosophy, 94his eschatological view of the soul, 94-the rational or transcendental soul, 94,-the mundane soul, 95-the infernal soul, 95-the animal sonl, 96- the ethical hearing of Jaivali's doctrine, 96. PŪRAŅA KĀSYAPA (Pīraņa kassapa), 277-his date, 277,-he, as known to the Buddhist literature, 277, 278,-his relatiou to Makkhali Gosala, 278,-his doctrine of the passivity of soul, 270-his logi- cal standpoint, 279, 280. PYTHAGORAS, 124,- Uddalaka comparod with him, 124. PYRRHO,-327, 328,-the doctrines of Sanjaya compared with his, RATEVA, 89,-his doctrine and its relation to that of Anila, 90. SANTAYA, 325,-an account of his life, 825, 326-his philosophy, 327,-the dogmatists and the scepties contrasted, 827,-Sanjaye and Pyrrho, 327, 328,-Buddha's account of Sanjaya's doctrine, 328, 329 -- Śilodka's account, 830, oriticism of the Buddhist and Jaina accounte of Safijaya's position, 330-his place in the history of Indian philosophy and philosophy generally, 830, 831, 832,-his views compared with those of Mahavira and Buddha, 401,-his influence on Mahavira, 402, 403. SATYAKAMA JABALA, 92,-his teacher, 92-his relation to Mahidasa, 93,- his eschatological view of the progress of sorl from light to light, 98. SKKALYA,-the Sthavira, 89-his relation with Mandūkeya, 89,-his view of the resemblance between the physioal constitution of the uni- verse and that of individual beings, 69. ŚIyDILYA, 98,-his niokname of Udara Sandilya, 91,-Pravāhaņa Jaivali's account of him, 91-he as the originator of Bhakti-vada, 91-his

SUBJEOT INDEX 435

doctrine of faith, 91, 92-soul as the divine element in man, 92 -- realisation of the divine nature as the supreme end of man's life, 92. SOEPTIOS (AJNANAVADINS), 318-the two terms, Ajnanikns and Agnostics, $19, 320-an introductory note on them, 321, 822, 823, 324. SURAVĪRA MAŅDUKEYA, 89,-his relation with Sthavira Sakalya, 80. TEAOHERS OF EROTIC MORALS, 837-a grose hedonistic end implied in Erotie morals, 337,-Vatsyayana and his predeuessors, 388, 839 -- interconnexion of Kamasutra and Artha-sastra, 889, 340-Vātsyā- yana's doctrine summing up Hedonistie morals, 340, 8$1. TEACHERS OF JURISTIO MORALS, 357-Satya, Rita, Dharma, 357, 358- the Dharma-sutrakaras and the Mimamsakas, 358-the Kalpa- sutras; their relation to the Dharmasutras, 359-the philosophors and the councillors, 360, 361. TEACHERS OF POLITIOAL MORALS, 342,-definition of Artha, 842-place of Dandaniti among the sciences, 348, 344-Kamasastra and Niti- sastra-sensualism and utilitarian morality compared, 344- development of political speculations previoue to Kautilya's Arthasastra 845-three schools of opinion as to the authorship of the Kautiliya Arthas&stra, 845 346,-Kautilya's predecessors, 346 347, 848-distinction between the wanderers and the reoluse .

philosophers, 848, 849-the historical importance of the list of low talks, 849,-the Brahman wanderers furnished a connecting link between the Recluses and the Brahmans, 849, 350, 851- the philosophical views of the wanderers, 351, 358-the ethical views of the wanderers and other moralists, 352, 368,-Buddha's criticism of the views of the wanderers, 354, 355, 356. UDDALAKA 124-compared with Anaxagoras and Pythagoras, 124-his life and works, 124, 125-evidence of Uddalaka-Jatąka, 125, 126. Auddalaka or Svetaketa was probably the author of the Gautama- Dharma-sutra in its older form, 126, 127, 128-other views of Uddalaka referred to in the Milinda and in the Sutrakritanga, 128, 129-his thiret after knowledge and simplicity of charaoter, 129, 180. His philosophy, 180-Uddslaka and Mahidasa compared, 180, 131-the task of Uddalaka was to transcend dualism, 181, 182. His physics, 132-the metaphysieal unity of Deity ae the ground of explanation for the duality between matter and spirit, 182-Matter,-three preponderating elements: Fire, Water and

436 SUBJROT INDEX

Earth, 183-things being qualitatively distinet, eannot tranaform into one ancther, 134-matter as a complete mixture of varions kinds of seeda, 141, 135-two objections to Uddalaka's theory of matter ard how he met them, 185-Spirit, 135-Śankara's interpretation of the Doctrine of Mortar-two prineiples cf things, 136-the living principle, 180, 187-his relation to Kātyšyana and Kaņāda, 137 Hie theory of knowledge, 138. Inductive method of his inquiry, 138-the truths, 188, 180-bis Mortar-doctrine as the anticipation of the Samkhya theory of Prakriti and Buddhist paychological theory of mind, 140-his views regarding the evidences of the senses, 140, 141, 142. VARUNA,-143,-the best exponent of the Taittiriya systom, 143-the four pointe of his philosophy-his contributions, 148- The physiclogical aspect of the system, 143, 141-his relation to Uddalaka, 144-causality not antagonistie to the spontaneity of nature, 144, 146-difference between Uddalaka and Varupa, 145. The phaychological aspect, 145-his relation to Mahidasa, 146-Varunr's theology, 146,-graduated function of soul, 146,- The mystical, ethical or aesthetic aspect, 147-happiness ns the end of concrete activities of life, and bliss au the sammum donum, 147,-graduations of bliss, 148 .- The Siksavalli-edncational, religious or moral aspect, 149, 150. VISYAKARMAN-His case against the sceptics, 36-God as the universal substance, the first cause of things, 87-the attribute of gods, 37-how to know God, 38-the necessity of the knowledge of God, 88-the historical importance of Visvakarman's doctrine, 38-the two viewpoints-logical and ontological, 88. YAJNAVALKYA, 163-his predecessors and successors, 158, 154, 155,-the sources of information, 155, 156 .- His philosophy, 156, 157 self-love (atma-rama), 157,-no difference of kind but of degree between the instinet of self- preservation and love of God, 157, 158, Desire (Kama) 158,-no difference of kind between sensual desires and the desire for a higher life, 158, 159,-God as the ultimate end of all desires, 159, 160, 61-Good and Evil (Punya-Papa), 161-a man of desire and a man of no desire defined, 181, definition of good

SUBJECT INDEX 437

and evil, 161, his doctrine of karma, 161, 162, the highest good is above both good and evil as commonly understood, 162 -his relation to Varuna, 162-knowledge (vidya), 168-knowledge and ignorance contrasted, 188-definition of the term knowledge, 168-psychological theory of one-nese in regard to knowledge, 164, 165-God (Braman), 165-theology, 165, 166, God as un- knowable by a finite mind, 166-necessity of a knowledge of God, 167-the soul (atma)-167-life and soul, 167, 168, an animistie notion of soul, 168, 169, 170,-the theory of sleep, 170-waking, dream and sleep compared to birth, last moment and death, 171, dreaming, 171, 172, 173,-the prophetio character of dreams, 178-sleeping, 178, 174-death and after, 174-a psychological theory of death and rebirth, 174, 175-the effect of the law of action upon the sonl, 175, 176-Karma and materialism, 177- the mind (manas), 177,-mind as the divine thinking in man, 178-the senses and objects, 178,-matter (r@pa), 178,-no difference of kind between mind and matter, 178, 179-the correlation between soul and matter, 179, 180-infinity and finiteness, 180, 181.

INDEX OF SANSKRITIO WORDS

A Antarakalpas, 317. Antaryāmin, 160. Abhijati (=jīvavarņa), 398. AnupubbasikkhE, 318. Acelaka, 298. Aparājita, 102, 169. Acinteyyāni, 401. Aparanta, 4. Adbarma, 463. Apāna, 25, 82, 233. Aditi, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, €3, 84, Artha, 342, 330, 339. 44, 69,,170, 181, 200, Arūpa, 352. Adhiccasamuppāda, 279. Aripāvacara, 188 Adhiccasamupannika, 197. Asañfigabbha, 806. Advaita, 165, Asat, 18, 28, 185. Agni, 59, 76, 85. Assava, 890. Agnihotram, 111. Asraddha, 2238. Agranya, 4. Asthi, 183. Ahetuvāda, 278. Atthivāda, 293. Ahetuappaccayavāda, 279. Avarsarpini, 89A. Aja, 87. Avatāras, 212. Ajiva, 302, 400, Aivdys (Avijja), 172, 193, 259, Ajñanavādins, 818. 821, 823. Akiriyam (Akiriyavada), 196, 279, Avrijino, 162. 286, 803, 809, 383. Avyaya, 255. Akiriyāvādins, 196, 197, 295, 389. Avyakta, 275. Akşara, 165, 181, 254. Ābhassara-Kāyā, 215. Amarāvikkhepikas, 828. Ācāra, 247. Amitaujas, 69. Àdarsa, 152. Amritatvam, 83, 163, 244. Āditya, 20, 59, 76, 85. Amritam abhayam, 196. Āgantuka, 399. Anekavihita-tiracchānakatha, 848. Ājya, 155. Anna, 128, 187, 206, 207. Ākėdah, 36, nl, 73, 91, 93, 145, 179, Annamaya, 45, 146, 150, 183, 181, 187, 230, Annanam. 196, 883. Akāravati-pațipadš, 853. Anikkavādins, 197, 289. Ānanda, 158, 887 Anrita, 168. Ānandamaya, 46, 147, 150, 83.

INDEX OF SANSKRITIC WORDS 439

Ânvikşaki, 29%, 336. Brahmavada, 413. Āpa, 133, 187. Brahmavidyā, 260, 319. Āpakāya, $09. Buddhanta, 173. Āptakāma, 162. Buddhi, 274, 275. Āptavākya, 292 Ārāma, 170. Ardratvam, 75. C

Āsā, 187. Candāla, 95, 163. Āsrama, 240, 241, 246, 313, 412, 418. Carana, 109. Åsurasampatti, 288. Caraņacitra, 109, Ātman, 49, 66, 78, 179, 193, 194, Caksu, 222. 221. Ātmakāma, 157, 162. Cākşuça, 100, 108, 250. Catuspdas, 80. Ātmașaşțhavāda, 282. Ātmavāda, 198. Caturvarnya, 38, 241, 412, 418. Cātujāma samh vara ( cānjjāma Āyatana, 137. sainvara), 378, 379. Cetana, 96, 854, 398.

B Cetas, 262. Cetiya, 368. Bandha, 390. Cetokbila, 32., 323. Bahu-bhavitum-iechā, 133. Cha jīvanikāyo, 30. Bala, 187. Chaļābhijātiyo, 309. Bālya, 251, 258. Chandomaya, 86. Bhakti, 91. Cha titthiyā, 189. Bhaktivāda, 91. Citta, 58, 94, 187, 235, 276, 307, Bhava, 181. Cittavikşepa, 321. Bhavya-bhavitvya, 202. Bhava-Katha, 210. Bhāgadheya, 202. D

Bhokta, 274. Dabba, 403. Bhūmā, 187. Daiva, 201. Bhunahu, 355. Daņda, 348, Bhūta, 25, 35, 54, 179, 181, 195, Dakșa, 19, 20, 21, 22. 302, 305. Dakşiņā, 229. Bījāni, 185. Desa-bhesa,-vijnana, 851. Brahmacakra, 79. Desādi-dharma, 351. Brahman, 49, 91, 157, 165, 202, Devas, 102. 203, 250. Devadbarma, 385. Brahmapura, 169. Devatā, 131, 132, 133, 185, 165.

440 INDEX OF SANSKRITIC WORDS

Devaputra, 70. H Devayāna, 96, 413. Dharma ( Dhamma), 18, 335, 86, HIamsa, 169. 357, 358, 859, 4C3. Hatha, 202. Dhanurveda, 299. Hridaya, 169. Dhatu, 194, 188, 189, 285. Dhyana, 187. Dişta, 201. I Diti, 22, 28. Ditthadhamma-nibbanavadins, 198, Indriya, 87, 233, 274. Dițțhivadins, 327. Indriyajaya, 340, 44, Ditthigatas, 327, 329. Isa, 35, 255. Dvapara, 211 Iśvaravāda, 198, 213, 266. DvIndriyas, 302. Dvipada, 180. Dyaus, 28. J

Jańgama, 75, 807. Jāgrat, 171. Jina, 299, Ekah, 35, 166, Jīva, 281, 302, 304, 315, 400. Ekacca-sassata-vādins, 197. Jīvātmā, 182, 186, 138. Eka eva, 37. Jña, 205. Ekavimśa, 78. Jyotis, 54, 163. Ekaikam, 117. Jyotismat, 93. Ekata, 163. Ekanta-sukba, 352 Ekavada, 266. K Ekkavādins, 197. Ekendriyas, 802. Kali, 211. Eșaņã, 159, 160. Kalpa, 196, 208, 210, 211, 817, 359. Karma (Kamma ), 175, 209, 385, 396.

G Kala, 11, 206, 408. Kālavāda, 8, 198, 199. Gaņaka, 913, Kāma, 7, 8, 18, 14, 158, 175, 288,n, Garita-prisțha, 28. 292, 336, 387, 389, 340, 407. Graha, 178. Kamacchanda, 887. Guna, 198, 309. 403. Kāmāvacara, 188.

INDEX OF SANSKRITIC WORDS 441

Kamasukhallikânuyoga, 883. Māyā, 386. Kāya, 285, 309. Mimamst, 46. Kāyadanda, 397. Mitavadins, 197. Kāpālika, 209. Mithuna, 84, 328. Khetta, 403. Mokşa (Mol:kka), 388, 390. Khettapati, 218. Khiddāpadosikā, 276. Mrityu, 168, 220. Mundakas, 230, 242. Kiriyam ( Kīriyāvāda ), 303, 332, Mūrti, 60, 64. 377, 383, 384, 385, 398, 394. Kīriyāvādi, 206, 839, 389, 390, 397. Kratumaya, 91. N

Krita, 263. Nandana, 83. Kriti, 187. Na-santi-paraloka-vāda, 197. Kşatrasya Kşatra, 224. Nava tattva, 882. Nādi, 152, 282

L Nāma, 187. Nāmarūpam, 135, 222, 236. Lohita, 183. Nativādins, 256. Loka, 215. Nêti nêti, 49, 158, 166. Lokāyata, 291, 292. Nidhi, 211. Lokuttara, 188. Niganthi-gabbha, 806. Niḥereyas, 111.

M Nijjarā, 389, 390. Nilakāya, 318. Madhuvīdyā, 158. Nimeșas, 207. Mahat, 275, Nimmitavadins, 197. Mababhūtam, 54, 57. Nirañjanah, 255. Majjā, 133. Nirodha, 230. Manas, 1, 14, 24, 77, 83, 84, 115, Nirriti, 19. 133, 135, 145, 187, 274 Niştigri. Mantha, 127, 135. Nişthā, 187. Manomaya, 147, 183, 346, 352. Niyati ( Niyai ), 209, 318, 310. Manopadesikā, ¥76. Niyavādins, 197. Maricis, 69, 70. Nivarana, 321, 337. Maskara, 298. Mati, 187. 0 Mamsa, 133. Manasa, 100, 105, 106, 108, 177. Oļārika, 352. Māra, 886. Opapātika Sattā, 293.

56

442 INDEX OF SANSERITIO WORDS

Orambhagiya, 322, 823. Prāņamaya, 46, 160. Ota-prota, 181, Praņa-vāda, 97, 418. Prithivi, 70, 198.

P Prithivīkāya, 307. Pubbanta, 4. Padesa, 408. Puggala, 403. Pahāna (Pradbāna), 386. Puņņa, 390. Pajjava, 408. Purușa, 10, 31, 32, 93, 34, 45, 59, Panica-asti-kāya, 403. 63, 68n, 9, 93, 186, 150, 186, Pafica-Mahavvyaya, 96, 379. 228, 275. Pafica-Kamaguņa-dițțha dhamma Puroşakāra, 840, 356. nibbānavāda, 341. Pūrvaprajñā, 170. Pañca-sīlas, 98. Pūrvas, 375. Pañcāgni, yB. Pürvarūpam, 149. Paramarthika, 54. Parināma, 403. Pariņāmiavāda, 316, 317. R

Parivrājakas, 192, 306. Rajas, 78, 412. Parjauya, 28. Rasa, 75, Pațicca-Samuppāda, 381, 385. Rayi, 128, 282, Pāņditya, 160, 251. Rājanya, 33. Papa, 161, 890. Retodhã, 15. Pharusa-văca, 348. Ritava, 24, Pingala, 152. Rita, 18, 359, 413. Pitriyāna, 418. Ritu, 9, 99. Prajñā, 63, 66, 83, 84, 108, 106, 118, Rohita, 11. 120, 167, 171 Rupam, 178, 178. Prajña-netra, 66. Rūpavacara, 183. Prajnatman, 118, 119, 122. Pramāņam, 249 Prakriti, 39, 136, 140, 186, 228, 311. Sakkāyadițthi, 196, 270, 338. Pratişțhā, 128. Śakti, 204. Pracīna-sala, 124. Salila, 12. Prāņa, 25, 55, 63, 66, 67, 74, 78, Samavāya, 387. 80, 82, 88, 88, 102, 114, 115, Samjfšna, 170, 176. 116, 117, 118, 122, 138, 137, Samkalpa, 178, 187, 355. T66, 170, 187, 208, 220, 228, Samphappalapa, 848. 238, 255, $82. Sampanna-kuśala, 353.

INDEX OF SANSERITIC WORDS 448

Samprasada, 170. Samuchodavadins, 197. Sukha, 187, 294.

Samudra, 180. Susupti, 171, 173, 188.

Samvņitika, 54. Svabhāvavāda, 198, 399. Svadha, 15, 27. Samvara, 390. Samvatsara, 7, 8, 10, 11. Svapaa, 171.

Samyamana, 1ll. Syādvāda, 831, 893, 402.

Samāna, 82, 233. Sandhi, 491, 150. T

Sandhāna, 149, 150. Takkis, 358. Sangati (Sangai), 311, 398, 389, Takman, 26. 399. Śarīra, 64, 80, 152. Tamas, 10, 78, 163, 328, 412. Tam-jiva-tam-Sarīra-vāda, 74, 294. Sassatavādins, 197. Tapam, 4, 8, 10, 144, 146, Sat, 18, 99, 135, 165, 27%. Tapoguna, 79, 352. Sattakāyavāda, 282. Tarka, 46, 27. Sattasaññi, 378. Tattvaması, 148. Sattva, 73, 412. Tapasa, 163, 191. Satya, 65, 87, 163, 187, 211. Tejas, 131, 138, 187. Satyavacas, 244, 258. Trayi, 358. Satyavādina, 25. Treta, 211. Sadhyas, 21, Trişna, 205. Sarüpyam, 249. Trivrit, 72, 124, 181. Sāyavāda, 387. Tyam, 99. Sāyavādins, 197. Silabbata-parāmāsa, 196, 332, 334, 380, 384. U

Śtręah, 84. Ucchedavāda, 292. Smara, 187. Ucchedavadins, 198. So'ham, 45, 147, 163, 165, 167, 415. Udāna, 82, 288. Śoka, 163. Śraddbā, 228n, 320. Uddhamāghātanikas, 197. Uktha, 54, 194. Sristi, 221 Upādāna, 829. Śrutarşi, 128, 190. Upāśraya, 137. Sthāvara, 75, 307. Uru, 84. Stri-veda, 369. Śubbra, 263. Uttamepurușa, 176. Uttānapāda, 20, 21. Sadra, 33. Uttararupam, 119, 150. Sukhadukkha, 354, 406. Utsarpiņi, 399.

444 INDEX OF SANSKRITIC WORDS

V Vijfiānamaya, 46, 147, 160, 188 Vijñāna, 170, 187. Vainayikas, 332. Vinaya, 196, 348, 344, 888. Vaisvānara-ātmā, 128. Vinayavada, 382, 334, 380. Vaisyas, 33. Vinayavādin, 382, 333, 352. Varņas, 150. Virāj, 32. Varņāśrama, 150. Viraja, 230. Varişțha, 230. Vyavahūrika, 54. Vatthuvijjā, 885. Vyna, 82, 238. Vartā, 342, 344, Vāyu, 24, 25, 60, 90, 180, 220, Vak, 29, 67, 106, 133, 222. Y

Vessas, 219. Yajamāna, 108. Vibhajjavāda, 140, 383, 405. Yajña, 194. Vioikitsā (Vicikiocha), 163, 196, Yama, 206. 223n, 388, Yoga, 227, Vidya, 178, 342. Yugas, 208, 211.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

(1) STANDARD WORKS

Adamson-The Development of Greek Phitosophy. Banerjea, Dr. P. N .- Public Administration in Ancient India. Barth-Religions of India. Barua, B. M,-Ājīvikas (Calcutta University publication.) Blavatsky, Madame-The Secret Doctrine, I. Deussen, Dr. Paul-Allgemeine Geschichte der Philosophie. Outlines of Indian Philosophy. The Philosophy of the Upanishads (Eng. transl.) Erdmann-History of Philosophy, Vols. I, II (Eng. transl.) Frazer-Indian Thought-Past and Present. Hillebrandt-Vedische Mythologie. Hopkins-Religions of India. Hume -- An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. Kant-Critique of Pure Reason (transl. by Max Müller). Max Müller-A History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature. Six Systems of Indian Philosophy. Macdonald-The Brahmanas of the Vedas. Muir-Original Sanskrit Texts. Oldenberg-Buddha (transl. by Hoey). Rhys Davids, Mrs. C. A. F .- Buddhist Psychology (Quest Series). Buddhism, Manual of Buddhist Psychological Ethics. Points of Controversy (a joint work with Mr. Shwe Zan Aung).

446 BIBLIOGRAPIIY

Rhys Davids, T. W .- Buddhist India. Dialogues of the Buddha, Vols. I, It. Rockhill-Life of the Bnddha. Scherman, Lucian-Philosophische Hymnen ans der Rig- und Atharvaveda-Samhita. Schrader-Uber den Stand der Indischen Philosophie zur Zeit Mabaviras und Buddhas-Strassburg, 1902. Stevenson, Mrs. Sinclair-Heart of Jainism. Wallis-Cosmology of the Rigveda. Windelband-A History of Philosophy (Eng. transl.). Zeller-Stoics, Epicureans and Sceptics (Eng. transl.).

(2) SANSKRIr TEXTS AND TRANSLATIONS. Somhita- Rig-Veda (with Sayana's Commentary) Ed. Max Miller-translations by Wilyon and Griffith. Atharva Veda (with Sayana's commentary)-tran- slations by Griffith and by Whitney and Lanman. Caraka (Calcutta Ed.).

Brahmana- Aitareya (with Sayana's commentary)-translation (Bengali) by Ramendrasundar Trivedi (Sahitya Parishat publication). Śatapatha. Taittiriya (Bibl, Ind.).

Āranyaka -- Aitareya (with Sayana's commentary). Bibl. Ind, -- translation in S. B. E. Taittirīya (Bibl. Ind.).

Upanişad- Brihad-Aranyaka (with Sankara's commentary)- translation in S. B. E.

BIBLIOGRAPHY 447

Chandogya (with Sankara's commentary)-transla- tion in S. B. E. Kauşītaki (with Sankara's commeniary)-transla- tion in S. B. E. and by Cowell. Śvetasvatara (with Sankara's commentary). Taittiriya (with Sankara's commentary)-transla- tion in S. B. E. Maitri (Bibl. Ind.). The minor Upanişads, viz .- Isa, Katha, Kena, Muņdaka, Paingala, Subāla, Āruņika, Yājñavalkya, Šarabha, Sārīraka-(Nirņaya-Sāgar Press Ed.); English translation of Isa, Katha, Kena, Muņdaka in S. B. E. Mahabharata (with Nilakantha's commentary), Bangabasi and Nirnaya Sagar Press Editions, Bhagavad Gītā. Rāmāyaņa-Nirņaya Sagara Press Edition. Yoga-Vasistha Ramayana and its English translation.

Smriti -. Manu (Ed. Jolly)-translated by Bühler in S. B. E. Yajñavalkya. Samkha. Likhita. Vișņu Purana (Bangabasi Ed.)-transl. by Wilson. Brihaspatisutra-Ed. Dr. Thomas. Vedāntasāra (Ed. Cowell). Vedantasutras-Translated by Thibaut in S. B. E.

Dharmasūtras -- Ãpastamba. Gautama. Baudhayana-translations in S. B. E. Sandilya Sutras-Ed. Cowell. Arthasastra of Kautilya-translation by Shamashastry.

448 BIBLIOGRAPHY

Vātsyāyana-Kāmasūtra, Sarvadarsana Sangraha (Oal. Ed.)-transl. by Cowell and Gough. Vaiseşika Sutras-transì. by Gough. Sukra-niti-transl. in the Sacred Books of the Hindus.

(3) BUDDHIST TEXTS AND TRANSLATIONS. Pali texts and commentaries consulted are publications of the Pali Text Society except otherwise mentioned. Divyavadana (Ed. Oowell and Neil). Buddhacarita-Ed. and transl. by Cowell. Madhyamika-Vritti (Bibl. Buddhica). Milinda-Panho (Ed. Trenckner)-transl. by T. W. Rhys Davids in S. B. E. Jataka (Ed. Fausboll)-transl. by Cowell, Rouse, elc. Āryasūra's Jātakamālā (Ed. Cowell).

(4) JAINA TEXIS AND TRANSLATIONS. Aupapatikasutra-Ed. Leumann. Ayarangasutta (P. T. S. Ed.)-with Silanka's commentary (Dhanapati Ed.)-translation by Jacobi in S. B. E. Kalpasutra-with commentary-translation by Jacobi in S.B.E. Rāyapaseņi (Ed. Dhanapati). Samavāyanga (Ed. Dhanapati). Sthananga-(Ed. Dhanapati). Sutrakritanga-with Silanka's commentary (Ed. Dhanapati)- translation by Jacobi in S. B. E. Uttaradhyayana (Ed. Dhanapati)-translation by Jacobi in S,B.E. U-vasaga Dasao-(Bibl. Ind.)-translation by Hoernle.

(5) TAMIL TEXT AND TRANSLATION, Sivajoanabodha and Siddhiyar-Translated by Nallasami.

CHAPTER EIGHT

THE SHAMAN, A SIBERIAN SPIRITUALIST

WITGHES ARE all evil, and hide themselves from common men; they are "secret, black and midnight hags"; fell creatures, they hypocritically put on the mien of ordinary folk, the better to stalk and strike their prey unknown. But there are other men and women with extraordinary powers of their own, who have no need to skulk, because their purposes are good, and who are given public recognition and respect. The type specimen of such people is known under the Tungus word shaman, and the shaman is a figure of importance among the aboriginal people of Siberia and the Eskimos, among most of the American Indians, and to a lesser extent among various other primitive tribes elsewhere in the world. He has been sometimes called a witch doctor, especially with reference to Africa. A shaman is a medium and a diviner, but his powers do not stop there. He differs from men in general, and resembles a witch, because he can shift gears and move in the plane of the supernatural. He can go at will to the other world, and he can see and treat with souls or spirits, meeting them on their own ground. And that is his business. He differs from a witch, who exists solely in the heads of the victimized, in that he is an actual person, who not only conducts his profession publicly, making the people think that he goes on brave errands among ghosts and goblins, but in many if not most cases really believes he has the powers he claims. This, of course, would be something difficult to get the truth of. None the less he acts as though he can and does do the things which are traditionally his to do, and the public believes and acclaims him. That is the im- portant thing. His duties are to ride herd on the souls of the departed and to discover the general disposition of other important spirits, according as it is swayed by the behaviour of human beings. He

I20 THE HEATHENS

may do only a little of this; among some people there is a shaman in every family, who simply makes contact with the spirits from timc to time to flatter them and assure himself of their serene humour, as we look at a barometer. Elsewhere he may do it as his trade : general divining, diagnosis of sickness, and ghost chasing. And he may be the most important person of the village, as well as the centre of religion; this position he has in easternmost Siberia and among the Eskimos. With such people communities are small and religion is otherwise crude, and the people look to the shaman to take care of their relations with the supernatural both public and private. While he thus acts for them much as does a medicine man or a diviner, he is no magician. He does not endeavour to find the formula to the supernatural, working it as though it were made up of wires and joints, while remaining on the outside; instead, he boldly enters it himself and meets its inhabitants man to man. Nor is he a priest, who leads the pcople in supplication and represents them before their gods. He may work in their behalf, but he does not represent them; he is acting on his own hook, and through skill and power, not through supplication. The stronghold of the shaman is among the reindeer herders and fishers of north-east Asia; the Yakuts and the Tungus, two widespread groups of tribes, and others living around the eastern shore of the Bering Sea; the Chuckchis, the Koryaks, the Gil- yaks, and the Kamchadals of Kamchatka. Some of these live nomadically in felt tents and others in wooden villages, and in the long Arctic nights of their bleak environment the comfort and entertainment that the shaman gives them are very well re- ceived. Typically it is believed that there are three realms of Nature: an upper one, of light and of good spirits; a middle one, which is the world of men and of the spirits of the carth; and a lower one, for darkness and evil spirits. Men of the usual sort can move about the middle realm, and have some dealings with its spirits, but only a shaman can go above or below. A shaman also has the power of summoning spirits to come to him. Thus he can speak directly to spirits and ask what they want, which is his form of divining. Not only this, but a shaman deals with sickness in various ways through these same powers. If you have a disease spirit inside you, he can detect it and he knows how to send it off, perhaps by having a personal contest with it.

THE SHAMAN, A SIBERIAN SPIRITUALIST I21 Or you may have lost your soul-this explanation of illness turns up almost everywhere in the world-and the shaman gets it back. It has probably been enticed against its will by a stronger demon, and taken to the lower regions, and only the shaman can go after it, sec it, identify it, and return it. Both in Asia and America shamans, like witches, are generally believed to have familiar spirits, or animal souls, which are the things that give them their peculiar qualities and powers. A Yakut shaman has two or three.1 One, called emekhet, is the shaman's own guardian angel, which is not only a sort of impersonal power, like mana, but also a definite spirit, usually that of a shaman already dead. This spirit hovers around its protégé, guiding and protecting him all the time, and comes at once when he calls for it, and gives him the advice he needs. Another spirit, the yekyua, has more character but is less accommodating. This one is an external soul, which belongs both to the shaman and to a living wild animal, which may be a stallion, a wolf, a dog, an cagle, a hairy bull, or some mythical creature, like a dragon. The yekyua is unruly and malevolent; it is dangerous and enables the shaman to do harm, rather like a witch, so that the people are in awe of him, but at the same time it has no consideration for the shaman himself and gives him continual trouble and anxiety, because his own fortunes are bound up with it. It is independent and lives far away, rather than upon the immediate tribal scene, and only another shaman can see it anyway. "Once a year, when the snow melts and the earth is black, the yekyua arise from their hiding-place and begin to wander."2 When two of them meet, and fight, the human shamans to whom they are linked undergo the evil effects and feel badly. If such an animal dies or is killed, its shaman dies as well, so that a shaman whose yekyua is a bear or a bull can congratulate him- self that his life expectancy is good. Of this phantasmal zoo the least desirable soul partners to have are carnivorous animals, especially dogs, because the shaman must keep them appeased, and if they go hungry they are not above taking advantage of their connection with the poor shaman to gnaw at his vitals to 1 M. A. Czaplicka, Aboriginal Siberia. A Study in Social Anthropology (1914). I. M. Casanowicz, "Shamanism of the Natives of Siberia", Smithsonian In- stitution Annual Report (1924). 2 Czaplicka, op. cit.

I22 THE HEATHENS stay their appetites. When a person takes to shamanizing, the other shamans round about can tell whether a ncw yekyua has made its appearance far away, which will cause them to recog- nize the new shaman and accept him into the profession. Siberian shamans all dress the part, as do so many shamans and medicine men of North America. The north-eastern Asiatics wear clothing which is made of skin and tailored. A shaman has a cap and a mask, but it is his coat which dis- tinguishes him like a collar turned round. It is a tunic made of hide-goat, elk, etc .- and usually comes down to his knees in front and to the ground behind, and is decorated to the point of being a textbook of shamanistic lore. On the front may be sewed metal plates which protect him from the blows of hostile spirits which he is always encountering. One of these plates represents his emekhet, and usually two others suggest a feminine appearance, since shamans have a hermaphroditic character, as we shall see. All over the tunic are embroidered or appliqued the figures of real and mythical animals, to repre- sent those he must face on his travels in spirit realms, and from the back there hang numerous strips of skin falling clear to the ground, with small stuffed animals attached to some of them, all this alleged to be for attracting to the shaman any spiritual waifs of the vicinity, who might like to join his retinue. The whole get-up would remind you of the unusual headdresses and paraphernalia in which medicine men are turned out among Indians of the Plains and Canada. Siberian shamans have a tambourine drum whenever they are working, and this is true of Eskimo shamans as well. It is a round or oval drum, covered like a tambourine on one side only, and decorated with the same kind of symbolism as the coat. It is held by a cross-piece or strips of hide in the frame, and is beaten to accompany all the invocations of spirits.

When a shaman goes into action the result is not a rite but a séance, which is full of drama and which the people enjoy im- mensely. A typical performance is a summoning of spirits, and is carried out in the dark (for the same reasons as among our- selves-i.e., to hide the shenanigans), in a house, a tent, or an Eskimo igloo. The people all gather, and the shaman says what he is going to do, after which he puts out the lamps and the fire,

THE SHAMAN, A SIBFRIAN SPIRITUALIST 123 being sure that there is little or no light. Then he begins to sing. There may be a wait, and he beats his tambourine drum first of all, an immediate dramatic effect. The song starts softly. The sense of the song is of no consequence as far as the listeners are concerned; it is often incomprehensible, and may have no words at all. Jochelson1 knew a Tungus shaman who sang his songs in Koryak. He explained that his spirits were Koryak and said that he could not understand Koryak himself. Jochelson found this last suspicious statement to be quite true; the shaman had memorized the songs subconsciously when he had first heard them. As the singing goes on, other sounds begin to make themselves heard, supposedly made by animal spirits and said to be re- markably good imitations. The shaman may announce to the audience that the spirits are approaching, but he is apt to be too absorbed or entranced himself to bother. Soon voices of all kinds are heard in the house, in the corners and up near the roof. The house now seems to have a number of independent spirits in it, all moving around, speaking in different voices, and all the time the drum is sounding, changing its tempo and its volume; the people are excited, and some of them who are old hands help the shaman out by making responses and shouting en- couragement, and the shaman himself is usually possessed by a spirit or spirits, who are singing and beating the drum for him. The confusion of noises goes on increasing in intensity, with animal sounds and foreign tongues as well as understandable communications (among the Chuckchis, the wolf, the fox, and the raven can speak human language), until it finally dies down; the spirits give some message of farewell, the drumming ceases, and the lights are lit. Often the shaman will be seen lying ex- hausted or in a faint, and on coming to he will assert that he cannot say what has been happening. This is all a combination of expert showmanship and man- agement and of auto-hypnosis, so that while the shaman knows perfectly well he is faking much of the performance he may at the same time work himself into a trance in which he does things he believes are beyond his merely human powers. He warns his audience strictly to keep their places and not try to 1 W. Jochelson, "The Koryak", Memoirs of the American Museum of Natural History, Vol. 10 (1908).

I24 THE HEATHENS

touch the spirits, who would be angered and assault the offender, and perhaps even kill the shaman. When the show starts, the shaman produces his voices by moving around in the dark and by expert ventriloquism, getting the audience on his side and rapidly changing the nature and the force of the spirit sounds he is making. He may allow the impression that some of the visiting spirits are possessing him and speaking through his mouth and beating on his drum, but he may hide the fact that he is using his own mouth at all. A shaman need not perform only in the dark. He carries out some of his business in full view, especially when it is a matter of his going to the spirit world himself, rather than summoning the spirits to this world. The idea seems to be that he is in two places at once; i.e., his soul is travelling in spiritdom while he himself is going through the same actions before his watchers. He docs a furious dramatic dance, rushing about, advancing and rc- treating, approaching the spirits, fighting them or whecdling them, all in a secming trance. He may foam at the mouth and be so wild that he must be held for safety in leather thongs by some of the onlookers. After vivid adventures in the other realms, portrayed in his dance, he will accomplish his purpose, which may be to capture a wandering soul or to get some needed information from his spectral hosts. Then he becomes his normal self again and gives an account of what he has donc. After a death it is a regular thing for a Mongolian shaman to be called in to "purify" the yurt (felt hut) of the deceased's family, by getting rid of the soul of the dead, which of course cannot be allowed to hang around indefinitely. The mourners assemble late in the day, and at dusk the shaman himself comes, already drumming in the distance. He enters the yurt, still drumming, lowering the sound until it is only a murmur. Then he begins to converse with the soul of the newly departed, which pitifully implores to be allowed to stay in the yurt, be- cause it cannot bear to leave the children or the scenes of its mortal days. The shaman, faithful to his trust, steels himself and pays no attention to this heart-rending appeal. He goes for the soul and corners it by means of the power in his drum, until he can catch it between the drum itself and the drum-stick. Then he starts off with it to the underworld, all in play acting. Here at the entrance he meets the souls of other dead members

THE SHAMAN, A SIBERIAN SPIRITUALIST I25 of the same family, to whom he announces the arrival of the new soul. They answer that they do not want it and refuse it ad- mission. To multiply the difficulties, the homesick soul, which is slippery, generally makes its escape from the shaman as the two of them are on the way down, and comes rushing back to the yurt, with the shaman after it; he catches it all over again. It is lucky the people have a shaman! Back at the gate of the lower world he makes himself affable to the older souls and gives them vodka to drink, and in one way or another he manages to smuggle the new one in.

Europeans who have seen Siberian shamans perform say that it is tremendous and exciting melodrama for them, and it must therefore have still more of an impact on the natives, whose be- lief and intcrest are greater. Aside from ventriloquism and his- trionics, shamans use other tricks to heighten their effects, and even give small magic shows to maintain the awe of the popu- lace. They arc masters of prestidigitation, especially con- sidering that they must work with little apparatus-no trap doors or piano wire. In their séances they can make it appear that there are spirits in several parts of the yurt at once, mis- chievously throwing things around. Many stick knives into themselves and draw them out again, making the wound heal immediately (all faked, of course). Or they will have them- selves trussed up, like Houdini, and call on their spirits, who will set them free. Bogoras saw a Chuckchi woman shaman take a rock between her hands and, without changing it in any way, produce a pile of smaller stones from it, and to defy the sceptics she wore nothing above her waist. She repeated the trick at Bogoras's request, but he could not find out what she did.1 The shamans know, of course, that their tricks are impositions, but at the same time everyone who has studied them agrees that they really believe in their power to deal with spirits. Here is a point, about the end justifying the means, which is germane to this and to all conscious augmenting of religious illusion.2 The 1 W. Bogoras, "The Chuckchee", Memoirs of the American Museum of Natural History, Vol. 1I (1904-9). Saint Joan: 2 Shaw has the following to say about it, through two characters in

THE ARCHBISHOP: A miracle, my friend, is an event which creates faith. That is the purpose and nature of miracles. They may seem very wonderful

126 THE HEATHENS shaman's main purpose is an honest one and he believes in it, and does not consider it incongruous if his powers give him the right to hoodwink his followers in minor technical matters. If shamanism were a conspiracy or a purposeful fraud, it would attract only the clever and the unscrupulous, interested in their own aggrandizement, and the public would shortly see the snare, being no bigger fools than we are. But shamanism is an institution, and the things that kecp the public from rejecting it are religious characteristics: shamanism does something to help them, and the shamans themselves are inside the system and believe in it, too. A sick shaman will call in a superior shaman to cure him. Actually, shamans are among the most intelligent and earnest people of the community, and their position is one of leadership. Evans-Pritchard has the same thing to say about Zande witch doctors,1 who do shamanizing of a less distinct type. They divine for the people, usually dancing in a group, A question will be asked one of them, and he will "dance" to it, very vigorously, working himsclf into a transport or half frenzy, throwing himself on the ground and perhaps gashing himself. In this state he begins to make an answer to the question, at first tentatively and in a far-away voice, but then more certainly, and finally in loud and arrogant tones, although the terms of the answer remain a little obscure, with no names mentioned, and probably phrased in such a way that only the questioner can gather up the meaning. They do not claim to be guided by spirits, and they could be accused of making any answer they chose. It is unlikely, however, that they do such a thing con-

to the people who witness them, and very simple to those who perform them. That does not matter; if they confirm or create faith they are true miracles. LA TREMOUILLE: Even when they are frauds, do you mean? THE ARCHBISHOP: Frauds deceive. An event which creates faith does not deceive; therefore it is not a fraud, but a miracle. Elsewhere the archbishop says: "Miracles are not frauds because they are often-I do not say always-very simple and innocent contrivances by which the priest fortifies the faith of his flock. When this girl picks out the Dauphin from among his courtiers, it will not be a miracle for me, because I shall know how it has been done, and my faith will not be increased. But as for the others, if they feel the thrill of the supernatural, and forget their sinful clay in a sudden sense of the glory of God, it will be a miracle and a blessed one. And you will find that the girl herself will be more affected than anyone else. She will forget how she really picked him out ... " 1 Op. cut.

THE SHAMAN, A SIBERIAN SPIRITUALIST I27 sciously; actually they possess a knowledge of the village and its people, and of the background of any question asked them, so that they have a good basis for judgment, and they juggle all these elements loosely in their heads until, under the stimulation of their abandoned physical activity, they feel struck by an in- spiration, an effect which they would not experience without the dancing. These witch doctors also cure by sucking intrusive magical objects out of their patients, if that is the cause of illness, and at their dances the doctors who are not busy dancing to a question will stage contests of shooting the same kind of thing- bones or beetles -- into one another, or into the spectators, if they are unruly, and then removing them again. This is generally known by the Azande to be nothing but sleight of hand, good as it is, and the doctors will admit it, saying that their success is really due to their medicines; the people are also often sceptical of them to the point of laughing outright at them, because a doctor may fail complctely when tested by so simple a question as what is hidden in a pot. None the less Evans-Pritchard feels that these doctors, who do not occupy as responsible a position as the Asiatic shamans, are basically honest; and also that they are usually above the average mentally. In spite of their higher intelligence, and their awareness of their own trickery, they be- lieve in their magic and their powers as much as anyone else, and the people, laugh as they may, always go to them when taken sick. In Asia and North America some tribes think that shaman spirits run in the family, and that a boy or young man will sooner or later be seized by such a legacy. This is the usual thing on the North-west coast of America, so that normally only the descendants of shamans become shamans. However, a man with none of them in the family tree may nevertheless be- come one by going to the bier of a newly dead shaman, which in the northern region was set out in a hut on a point of land, and there he will sit and bite the dead man's little finger all night long. This will offend the departed soul, who will react by sending a small spirit to torment the offender, and the latter, if he is courageous and has his wits about him, may capture the spirit for his own ends, and so become a shaman. The most general belief as to recruitment is simply that a spirit appears to anyone at all, and insists on the person's be-

128 THE HEATHENS

coming a shaman, which is tantamount to accepting the spirit as an internal boarder, whether it is wanted or not. Being a shaman is considered dangerous and burdensomc, becausc you are committed to it and have to observe certain tabus, and so people generally try to avoid it. If you play on a drum, or show yourself in any way receptive, you are laying yourself open, and anyone not wishing to become a shaman will be careful to do no such thing. Usually the spirits pick out young men. In Siberia there are as many woman shamans as men, and they are by no means subservient to their male colleagues. In this area also there is something of an assimilation of male and female shamans; the former, as I said, wear some marks suggestive of femininity, and may braid their hair, and vice versa, female shamans acting somewhat like men. They may go so far as to marry someone of their own sex, a woman getting a wife to keep house for her. This is considered strangc, as you might think, and it is not approved of by right-thinking people, but right-thinking people do not like to antagonize shamans and so they keep their mouths shut. Actually, shamans are not thought of as bisexual so much as sexless.

This is one significant thing about the temperamental nature of individuals who become shamans. Another is the reason often given as to why they do so deliberately. A Siberian will say that he became ill, and that in desperation over being melancholy, or on the verge of dying, he began to solicit a spirit and prepare for a shaman's career, whereupon he got well; he now has a bull by the tail, however, and must continue to shamanize or fall ill again. He has to undergo a long training, under the tutelage of an older shaman, and during this period he is subject to mental suffering and sickness; but once he is a practising shaman he regains his balance, and no shamans suffer from in- sanity. Europeans report that they can distinguish a shaman by his expression, which is nervous and bright compared to that of ordinary people. Furthermore, the Buriats allege that a future shaman can be told, while he is still a child, by certain signs: he is meditative and likes to be alone, and he has mysterious dreams, and sometimes fits, in which he faints. - It is clear from these clues that shamanism is a calling for a certain psychological type: those who are less stable and more

A ZANDE OF THE BELGIAN CONGO CONSULTING HIS RUBBING BOARD

A ZANDE TEEDING A CHICKLN WITH BENGE

SHE LOVES ME-SHE LOVES ME NOT

A CHEYENNE INDIAN WITH THONGS IN HIS BACK, IN PREPARATION TOR THE SUN DANGE

DANCING IN A STATE OF POSSESSION, ASHANTI, WEST AFRICA

SHAMAN'S COAT, GOLD TRIBF, SIBERIA

A YAKUT SHAMAN IN HIS ROBES OF OFFICE

A KORYAK WOMAN SHAMAN PERFORMING

WIDOWS GOING OUT OF DOORS IN WANIGELLA, NEW GUINEA, GUIDED BY A SCRATCH ON THE GROUND

A WIDOW IN DEEP MOURNING, IN COIRA, SOUTHERN NEW GUINEA. SHE IS COVERED IN WHITE PIPECLAY, WHICH SHE WEARS FOR A YEAR

AN AUSTRALIAN INITIATE HAVING A TOOTH KNOCKED OUT

CULT MEMBERS AND INITIATES LYING ON A SMOKING FIRE DURING INITIATION CEREMONIES

WITCHETTY GRUB TOTEMIC CEREMONY, CENTRAL AUSTRALIA

CUL MEMBERS IN TOTEMIC REGALIA

ONANDAGA (IROQUOIS) TAISE TACT SOGIETY DANCERS LXORCISING DISEASF SPIRITS

HUMIS KACHINAS IN THE HOPI NIMA'N CEREMONY NOTICE "WOMAN" AT LOWER LEFT OF PHOTOGRAPH TURNED ABOUT, SHOWING MASKETTE

THE SIAMAN, A SIBFRIAN SPIRITUALIST - 129 cxcitable than the average, but who have at the same time in- telligence, ability, and what is vulgarly called "drive". They are familiar to'us, perhaps most so in what we think of as the artistic temperament; they fail of the balance and solidity and self-confidence, not to say aggressiveness, that are necessary in a business executive, or a politician, but their mental powers and their quickness demand expression, goaded by their dissatis- faction at being somewhat maladjusted socially. We are given to calling them introverted, and think them somewhat difficult. They find the expression they need mainly in the arts. Now of course I do not mean that every artist must have bats in his belfry, but only that there is some relation between one variety of human temperament and the insistence of artistic expression. There are plenty of placid and well-adjusted artists; neverthe- less, we often say that artists are temperamental people, actually meaning that it is temperamental people who become artisis. So it is with shamans, who have in their profession a socially useful exhibitionist release, and a device by which they can discipline their own nervous tendencies by orienting them according to a defined pattern. We have a somewhat stereo- typed parallel in people who soothe their nerves by playing the piano; and Conan Doyle made Sherlock Holmes (who was such a bad case that he was addicted to the needle) play the violin. Some of the native diviners of South Africa, of either sex, are much the same as shamans, being recognized as people of a special type.1 They enter into this life because of an illness, or hallucinations, or spirit possession; and since the novitiate in- volves months of solitude, training, and medical treatment by an older diviner, few go into it voluntarily, and most will try to resist it as long as possible. When they come out of this phase they are believed to have second sight and spirit connections, and have developed a peculiar far-away look. As elsewhere, the profession automatically picks out people of a highly strung tem- perament and appears to give them social satisfaction and psychiatric help. Shamanism is the more adapted to Siberian and North American native cultures because hysterical tendencies seem 1 Winifred Hoernlé, in The Bantu-speaking Peoples of South Africa (1937), edited by I Schapera.

130 . THE HEATHENS to be common among the peoples of the Arctic, giving rise to the term "Arctic hysteria".1 Hysterical seizures, cramps, and trances are the simpler expressions of it. Eskimos will suddenly run wild, tearing off their clothes and rushing out, plunging into a snow-bank and sometimes freezing before they can be caught. In Siberia, victims fall into a state, generally on being startled, in which they lose command of themselves and cannot help re- peating the words and actions of others. Jokers used to tease known sufferers by tricking them in this way into throwing their belongings into the water, and a Russian colonel was once faced with a troop of natives who had gone hysterical in a body, and were helplessly roaring his orders back at him, and his curses, too. A native boy, who knew two older men were both subject to this failing, managed to get them each repeating the other, which they kept up until they both collapsed. I do not know what the basis for this is-i.e., whether it is culturally suggested, like running amok among the Malays-but it is not as merry for the people concerned as it sounds, and is a disturber of the normal social welfare of a group. The contribution of shaman- ism is not only that it exhausts the special tensions of the shaman himself, and makes him a figure of consequence rather than a slightly psychopathic social liability, but also that it drains off the potential hysteria of the whole community, through the excitement and the drama of the shaman's per- formances. Shamans scem to flourish, as might be expected, mainly among people whose religion is not highly organized and whose social structure is also simple and loosely knit. Something that can be called shamanizing often exists in other cultures and cults, but when it does, it is apt to be subservient to some higher political or religious authority. A true shaman is a lone wolf, following his own dictates, and so a well-developed cult, with important gods in it, cannot tolerate any such freebooting approach to the supernatural, and is bound to restrict this kind of activity, and to deprecate the importance of shamans, mediums, and their like. Two generally similar examples will show this. I have already described the kaula of the Poly- nesians, the prophet who was temporarily occupied by a god, 1 For this and the following, see Czaplicka, op. cit., and W. Jochelson, "The Yukaghir and the Yukaghirized Tungus", Memoirs of the American Museum ,of Natural History, Vol. 13 (1926).

THE SHAMAN, A SIBERIAN SPIRITUALIST IgI and who then spoke with the voice of the god, often going into violent frenzics while possessed. These prophets also held séances of an entirely shamanistic kind, conducted in a dark house, with ventriloquism, sleight of hand, and all the other appurtenances of shamans as I have described them. Handyl refers to a well-known story about a Maori priest whom a missionary was assiduously trying to convert: he stopped the missionary in his tracks by holding up a sprig of dry brown leaves and causing it to turn green before the good man's eyes. The report does not say whether the missionary saw the light and became a Maori. At any rate, the public business of the Polynesian prophets was limited to divining-the primary overt, if not actual, office of all shamans-and in their public appearances at Tahitian feasts they were kept under the thumb of the pricsts proper, who received the word of the gods in the indistinct mutterings and shouts of the kaula, and then inter- preted it themselves and divulged it to the people. A good parallel to this exists in female functionaries, called woyei (singular woyo) by the Ga of West Africa,2 and common to many tribes of the same region. It is an area of polytheistic cults, in which worshippers are free to choose their favourite god, with each god having his own temple, manned by a priest. Such a god enters and possesses certain women, who will therefore be officially appointed to his temple; and their duty is to dance and become possessed at any ceremony, and while possessed to speak for the god. They show various typical signs of possession, and dance in a semi-abandoned manner. If a practising woyo becomes possessed while no ceremony is going on, a dance is organized at once in order to maintain the pos- session and get the message which the god is transmitting. Such a woman generally has her first seizure at a dance, having an apparently genuine fit, and acting bewildered and abstracted, talking incoherently. This is a sign that the god has chosen her, and she must leave home and go into training. Eventually she becomes able to deliver the words of her god with more co- herence. Sometimes one has been found to talk in languages of other tribes, which she once knew but can no longer speak in her ordinary conscious states. On completing her training she re- sumes her normal life, and may be appointed to a temple, 1 Op. cit. 2 Field, op. ctt.

132 THE HEATHENS

serving under the priest at ceremonies, and becoming possessed; or else she may practise free lance, as she sces fit. I have not seen any comments of the same sort on Polyncsian kaulas, but Miss Field states that Gã women who become woyei are, like shamans, individuals of a more nervous and less stable temperament than the average, and that the satisfactions of office, together with the licence to throw a periodic fit of prophy- lactic hysterics, actually result in their living more serene, well- balanced, and happier everyday lives than perfectly "normal" women. If you follow native philosophy, shamanism can be made to look something like witchcraft, as I said earlier. And it also resembles witchcraft, as we have seen, in the psychological benefits it bestows. Both of them relieve certain kinds of ten- sions in individuals, such as can be harmful to the social climate, and both of them do it dramatically, which means artistically, which in turn means in a manner calculated to give emotional satisfaction. Shamanism should be the more successful, because witchcraft is more of a fantasy and brings its own difficulties, while shamanism is a real emotional exercise, with practically no drawbacks. It allows some of the people to let off steam by indulging in uninhibited antics, while it allows the others to enjoy these antics and at the same time to make use of some of the shaman's real gifts.