1. A Phenomenological Inquiry in to the Upanishadic Concept of Self Realization Sebastian V.T. Thesis

Barcode

: 5990010098598

Title

• a phenomenological inquiry in to the upanishadic concept of self realization

Language

• english

Pages

• 190

Publication Year

• 1984

Barcode EAN.UCC-13

A PHENOMENOLOGICAL INQUIRY IN TO THE

UPANISHADIC CONCEPT OF SELF-REALIZATION

A Thesis Submitted

In Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements

for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

by

SEBASTIAN V. T.

to the

DEPARTMENT OF HUMANITIES AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

INDIAN INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY, KANPUR

OCTOBER, 1984

To

My Parents : Thomas and Chinnamma

and

My Sister : Leela ( Sr. Mary Tara S. N. D. )

Who taught me

WHERE TO LOOK

HOW TO SEE.

18 DEC 1987

CENTRAL LIBRARY

Acc. No. A 99187

MSS-1904-D-SEB-PHE

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that the thesis "A Phenomenological Inquiry into the Upanishadic Concept of Self-realization"

submitted by Sri Sebastian V.T. in partial fulfilment of

the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the Department of

Humanities and Social Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology,

Kanpur is a record of bonafide research work carried out by

him under my supervision and guidance. The results embodied

in this thesis have not been submitted to any other

University or Institute for the Award of any Degree or

Diploma.

Dated October 27, 1984.

S.N. Mahajan

Professor of Philosophy

HSS Department

I.I.T. Kanpur

iii

CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that Mr. Sebastian, V.T. has

satisfactorily completed all the course requirements in

the Ph.D. Programme in Philosophy. The courses include

Phi - 769 Indian Philosophy I

Phi - 765 20th Century Philosophy II

Phi - 757 Moral Judgement

Phi - 782 Existentialism

Phi - 771 Indian Philosophy

Phi - 753 Modern Logic

Phi - 794 Advanced Topical Seminar.

Mr. Sebastian, V.T. was admitted to the candidacy

of the Ph.D. degree on July, 1980 after he successfully

completed the written and the oral qualifying examinations.

( R. Prasad )

Head

Dept. of Humanities and

Social Sciences

I.I.T. Kanpur

( S.A. Shaida )

Convenor

Departmental Post-Graduate

Committee

I.I.T. Kanpur

iv

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Although my interest in phenomenology started while

I was a student of M.A., it was not until I came to I.I.T.

Kanpur that I was given the impetus to express this interest

(in a book form) for a detailed study. The initial attempt

to gauge the feasibility of making this study rested with

Prof. S.N. Mahajan, my thesis supervisor. I acknowledge him

with a profound sense of gratitude for the guidance and

valuable suggestions rendered by him at various stages of the

preparation of this study. Also I found the academic

atmosphere under him intellectually as stimulating, for, he

never interfered in my channel of thought. Instead he

fostered my ideas by his suggestions and timely recognition.

I should like to express my deepest gratitude to

Prof. S.A. Shaida whose friendly criticisms, suggestions and

modifications have saved me from some of the more disastrous

blunders into which a work of this sort can so easily fall.

I owe him more than I can possibly express.

I could hardly exaggerate my indebtedness to my teachers

Professors, R. Prasad, (Mrs.) M. Mullick and R.S. Mishra, who

have been a source of help and encouragement at various stages

of this work.

I owe thanks to my former teachers, Professors

Ramachandra Gandhi, Suresh Chandra, Y.N. Chopra, S.A. Zaidi

and Rev. Dr. James Chavely. Also I am thankful to Prof.

Dr. A. Schöpf of W.Germany and Prof. Max Deutscher of

Australia and Mr. J.N. Misra, for the interest they showed

in this thesis.

I wish to acknowledge each one of my fellow scholars

at I.I.T. Kanpur. They are Sayeed, Preeti, Behra, Raghu Rama

Raju, Vinay Kumar, Popat, Kanaujia, Patra, Vanlalanghak, Nizar,

Nayak and Raghunath. My special thanks are due to my friends

Raghu Rama Raju, Vinay Kumar, George Kurian and Ganesh Bagaria.

My wife and myself owe a special debt of gratitude to

Mrs. Zeb Shaida, Mrs. Usha Mahajan, Salmeen, Deepti and

Ritcha for the solicitude they showed for our welfare. We

are especially thankful to Mrs. Zeb Shaida and Salmeen for

the help they extended to us during the hour of our need which

was well beyond the call of their duty.

I gratefully remember my parents, brothers - Mamachan and

Saju - Sister, Leela and grand parents whose silent prayers

encouragement and concern unknowingly helped me in the

completion of this thesis even before the prescribed time.

I must also put on record the concern and richness of

affection showed to me by my in-laws especially Mr. Babukutty

Joseph and particularly my father-in-law, Shri C.T. Joseph.

vi

Let me mention gratefully the help, love and support that

came from my wife Lucy Not only did she take great pains

in making for me "a home away from home" but also proved to

be the source of great strength to me even though she herself

was passing through a most trying period, waiting with

anxiety, for the birth of our first offspring.

I acknowledge Mr. V.N. Katiyar for the clean typing

of this manuscript and Mr. Sudama for the cyclostyling.

Finally, let me make use of this space to remember

my newly born child.

Sebastian, V.T.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER

PAGE

SYNOPSIS

ix

I. INTRODUCTION: SELF-REALISATION AS THE HIGHEST VALUE IN THE UPANISHADS

1

II. PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

41

III. THE TWO EGOS

65

IV. THE AGENT-EGO

86

V. THE AGENT-EGO AND THE VALUE-OUGHT

118

VI. THE SUBJECT-OBJECT POLARITY

136

VII. CONCLUSION

152

BIBLIOGRAPHY

166

viii

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Ait.

Aitareya Upanishad

Brih.

Brihad-Āranyaka Upanishad

Chānd.

Chāndogya Upanishad

Is'ā

I's'ā Upanishad

Katha

Katha Upanishad

Kaush

Kaushitaki Upanishad

Kena

Kena Upanishad

Maitri

Maitri Upanishad

Mānd.

Mānd'ūkya Upanishad

Pras'na

Pras'na Upanishad

S'vet.

S'vetās'vatara Upanishad

Tait.

Taittiriya Upanishad

SYNOPSIS

A PHENOMENOLOGICAL INQUIRY INTO THE UPANISHADIC CONCEPT

OF SELF-REALIZATION

A Thesis submitted by Sebastian V.T. in

partial fulfilment of the requirements for

the Degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY to the

Indian Institute of Technology, Kanpur.

The present thesis is an attempt to present a

phenomenological study on the question of the highest value

experience in the Upanishads. The Upanishads are the most

important source of philosophical and ethical thought of

India and the goal of Self- realization forms the centre of

Upanishadic wisdom. As such, through this study, we hope

to make some contribution to an appreciation of the Indian

philosophical tradition. The perspective provided by

phenomenology which represents a strong current of contem-

porary philosophical thinking will hopefully shed some new

light in this area and render this endeavour somewhat

additionally fruitful. Many questions such as the relation-

ship between the superstructure of values and the philosophical

foundations of a metaphysical system, the nature of transcen-

dental ego, the ego and agency, awareness, reality and

action have been raised and discussed in the light of

phenomenological analysis.

Chapter 1

First chapter of our thesis is an inquiry into the Upanishadic concept of highest value. We have attempted

to show in this chapter that the Upanishadic highest value

is the realization of self as Self. We have taken up

twenty four diverse concepts which have been at one place

or the other considered as the highest value in the Upanishads

and grouped them into six. Thus we find a new perspective

of a hierarchical order of value experience and of an inner

harmony of such experiences in the Upanishads. Further, we

have elucidated the question as to what trans-subjective

value the Upanishadic Rshis commit themselves. We have

explained that the arrangement of value notions the Rshis

advocate is not a classification of 'goods' but rather a

classification of attitudes towards such 'goods' in terms of

degree of reflection and philosophical insight. On that

account, the Rshis were concerned with an advance from

subjective individualism of phenomenal experienced entities

to a social collectivism and from social collectivism to a

philosophical/critical attitude toward the concept of value.

The critical attitude led toward a metaphysical unity and

reached its climax in the realization of one's own true self

as the highest value. Reflection upon the quest for highest

value - 'Self-realization' - leads to the ideal of a non-

contradictory experience in which all other value considera-

tions are harmonized. To that end, the Upanishadic Rṣhis

may be interpreted to have recognized a comprehensive

criterion which involves a movement from material possessions

to moral and intellectual excellences resulting in the

attainment of Self-realization. Briefly, the first chapter

regards the principal fourteen Upanishads with a view to

find out the meaning and place of Self-realization as the

highest value.

Chapter II

Having elucidated the view that Self-realization

is the highest value experience in the Upanishads, second

chapter of our thesis sets out the phenomenological pers-

pective. Understanding of Self-realization from the

phenomenological point of view proceeds from an introspective

analysis of man's subjective states. Phenomenologically

Self (Ātman) becomes relevant to the human condition of

existence and is to be understood in terms of our experiences

of Self (Ātman). We have described this lived experiences

of Self and its realization as the that which I am non-

focally aware of. Our description on Self-realization

brings to light certain structures of it by making use of

Husserlian phenomenologico-eidetic reductions. Thus we

have re-described Self-realization as openness to one's own

true self. To this purpose, we have developed the Husserlian

intentionality thesis by explaining that intention not only objectivates, identities, connects and constitutes the

objects with the consciousness but it also identities consciousness with the experiencing self (Jīvātman). These

considerations on Self-realization suggests that "the phenomenological understanding of values is eidetic in its

Husserlian form. That is, it is developed to operate abstractively with values as ideal objects". Hence the

ideal object - Self-realization - and the experiencing of it are inseparably related for the simple reason that

whatsoever I contemplate becomes an object of value for me only by virtue of my experiencing it. Looked at this way,

Self-realization as the value-ought cannot be attained without a value-experiencing and value-realizing subject.

Further, realization is experienced not only as a subjective psychological state but is also experienced as pointing to

a fulfilling objective viz. transcendence of the empirical self.

Chapter III

The third chapter of our thesis is an exposition of the structural characteristics of Self-realization in view

of the Upanishadic concepts of Paramātman (Transcendental Self) and Jīvātman (empirical self). The intentionality

of the self-self being directed upon the self reveals as

genuine object, ideal essence which constitutes a special

value realm; the value- realm of Self-realization. Pheno-

menological analysis makes it plain that the empirical

self (Jīvātman) should not be understood as a distinct self

that merges with the Universal self (Paramātman). There are

two paradoxes here (a) Openness to one's own true self is

to become realized or to become everything (b) and to

experience everything as the self is equivalent to nothing.

The resolution of the above paradox lies in a proper

understanding of Paramātman as an ego oriented set of

'Erlebnisse' with its worldly contents and jīvātman

doxically entertaining the world of practical activity.

The distinction in other words is between two 'Einstellungen'

or basic orientations, the phenomenological attitude and the

natural attitude. Thus openness to one's own true self is

an expanding that encompasses everything. But this is not

simply a transcendental realm, rather it is bipolar. The

two poles, the noesis and noema are mental acts and processes

and their worldly contents. The phenomenological analysis

suggests that the individual self (Jīvātman) ultimately

discovers that in essence it already is Paramātman, the

Universal Self. Further, in this chapter we have explicated

that phenomenologically our triad is empirical ego, Cogitatum

and transcendental ego i.e., Jīvātman, the object of

enjoyment and Paramātman. These reflections suggest that

the value-realm of Self-realization cannot be described

without referring back to the individual self as he is.

It is also understood that Husserl's doctrine of the

transcendental ego is also reminiscient of the Upanishadic

concept of Paramātman.

Chapter IV

The fourth chapter of our thesis is an exposition

of the claim that Self-realization is a genuine human

endeavour and Jīvātman, the individual self, accomplishes

realization by acts, it is guided by ends to be attained

and motivated by experiences. This chapter concerns itself

with the agency of Jīvātman. The agency of the self is

manifest in some actual or possible first person experiences.

We have shown further that, for the Upanishads, an agent is

required to have any experience at all and Jīva is the

agent of these experiences. Our elucidation revealed that

Jīva does not remain as a mere adjunct as in epiphenomenalism

but plays an effective role in the life of an individual as

the agent/experiencer.

In part two of chapter four, we have discussed

Śaṅkara's position regarding the nature of self as a witness

(sākṣin). We have argued that accepting Śaṅkara's position

was amount to the view that the agent-self has no power to

direct or oppose its drives. Moreover, if the agent-self is

only a witness to its actions, then there is no reason as

to why the agent-self should seek its true nature and be

guided by realization as the end.

Chapter V

Chapter five of the thesis is an exposition of the

agency of Jīvātman. We have explained that by virtue of

the fact that Jīva presides over its experience, Jīva

achieves a unique kind of relation with its actions. This

leads us to the position that there is not only a relation

between the agent-self and actions but there is also an

intrinsic relation between Self-realization and action. We

have clarified our position by explaining that Jīva is related

to Self-realization in two different ways: existentially

Self-realization is experienced in action by the empirical

ego (Jīva), while transcendentally Self-realization is

awareness of self by itself in action as transcendental

correlate of transcendental ego (Paramātman). In brief, at

the empirical level efforts for realization point to the

Jīvātman as the one who has to strive for it while at the

transcendental level, it points to Paramātman as the eternally

realized Self.

Jīva as the causer of action suggests that Jīva

causally contributes to (a) one's acts and (b) to the things

to which one's acts contribute. Thus our elucidation suggests

Self-realization as a metaphysical basis and summation for

a value-ought. We do not talk of an ought in the Kantian

sense. Realization as the value-ought leads to the triumph

of Jīva's unison with the absolute reality - Paramātman.

Our theory is based on the phenomenological analysis of

experience and the analysis has abided strictly for solution

exclusively from the stand-point of what we experience

ourselves as selves. The self in its experiences not only

relates itself with the object of experience (physical and

mental) but also experiences its own reality as the abiding

core of the experiencer. Jīvātman as pure ego in its

intentional and intuitive functions involves universal

logical structures. Jīvātman is the empirical ego in so far

as it is a concrete psychological being with unique chara-

cteristics (of experiencing action) and Jīva is the

transcendental ego in so far as it can bracket the world.

Chapter VI

In the sixth chapter of our thesis, we have shown

that Self-realization as the value-ought in the Upanishads

presupposes the unfolding of acts by Jīva, the empirical self.

We have argued further that Jīva's unfolding of acts not

only involves Jīva as the subject which responds in specifiable

ways to an object situation or condition but it also points to

Jīva as the one who elicits response in it. Thus we have

explicated that Jīva's experiences of acts are in their very essence transactional. This subject- object polarity

is inescapable in any value-theory.

We have suggested that Jīvatman discovers and actualizes the ideals of a value-ought in and through action.

Further, the value-ought of Self-realization cannot possibly rest on feelings, desires and inclinations.

It has also been shown in this chapter that the Upanishadic Ṛshis regard that a person's actions are to

be systematized by his desires, feelings and motivations. That is to say that the individual's feelings and desires

are to be significantly related to the degree of organization of his motivational system. Looked at in this way, the

value-ought of Self-realization lies in the proper relation of Jīva to its acts. Evil is a logical contradiction at

the realm of Paramatman. Thus if we attempt a survey at this circuit - ātman, desire, will, choice, action, knowledge

and realization - we would find that evil proves to be a contradiction in the value-realm of realization. The chapter

is devoted to an attempt to unravel the immense complexity of the concept of Self-realization as the value-ought placed

in the Upanishads.

In the present thesis then, we have formulated mainly two things: (a) Phenomenologically, the highest Upanishadic

xviii

value-Self-realization - is relevant to the human condition

of existence and is to be understood in terms of our

experiences of Self. Thus the question of highest value is

strategic to the question of individual self (Jīva) and

Jiva strives for its realization through its actions.

Looked at this way Self-realization as the value-ought cannot

be attained without a value-experiencing and value-realizing

subject. (b) The individual self (Jīva) is related to Self-

realization in two different ways : Existentially, Self-

realization is experienced in action by the empirical ego

(Jīva) and transcendentally realization is awareness of self

by itself in action as transcendental correlate of transce-

ndental ego (Pāramātman). Thus the individual self in its

experiences not only relates itself with the object of

experiences (physical and mental) but also experiences its

own reality as the abiding core of experiencer. We have

adopted the phenomenological method in unravelling the

complexity of the highest value because phenomenology is in

an excellent position to ground a truly 'reflexive' criterion

for a meaningful value theory, as it does begins with a basic

unity between experience and meaning. Phenomenological

reduction is the technique phenomenology offers toward this

end.

Verily, if there were no speech, neither right nor wrong would be known, neither true nor false, neither good nor bad, neither pleasant, nor unpleasant. Speech, indeed, makes all this known.

• Chāndogya Upanishad

... of making many books there is no end; and much study is a weariness of the flesh. Let us hear the conclusion of the whole matter: Fear God, and keep his commandments; for this is the whole duty of man.

• Ecclesiastes

Phenomenology demands of phenomenologists that they shall forgo particular closed systems of philosophy, and share decisive work with others towards persistent philosophy.

• Edmund Husserl

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION: SELF-REALIZATION AS THE HIGHEST VALUE IN

THE UPANISHADS

The concept of the highest value is developed in an

extremely complex manner in the principal Upanishads. There

appears to be more diversity than agreement. But these

diversities can be subsumed under Self-realization which

is the maximal realization of all other value potentialities

and which as the highest value forms the cornerstone of

the Upanishadic ethical wisdom. In this chapter we attempt

to show that Self-realization or realization of Self

constitutes the highest value accepted and developed in the

Upanishads.

The problems with which we are confronted cannot be

eliminated by linguistic analyses or by clarification of the

common usage of terms. Such linguistic endeavours can provide

at best only the tools requisite for our undertaking. They

do not, in themselves, contribute to a better understanding

of the nature of value.

In the approach adopted here, we shall draw heavily

on all relevant sources, but shall at all times keep in the

foreground of our considerations the facts of individual

experience as they are disclosed in phenomenological analysis.

Our presentation seeks to offer, as far as possible, a

dependable outline of the essential nature of the Upanishadic

reflection on the experience of the realization of one's

self as the highest value and its status within the context

of the supreme reality itself.

But having said this, we still have not answered

the crucial questions which any value theory must face.

What is value? What are standards of value? Do value

judgements have objective validity? And if so, what is the

basis of that validity? As we know, to these and similar

questions various answers have been given in the course of

time, (and especially in our own days) each answer depending

upon a particular approach to the whole of human experience

and, more specifically, upon the interpretation of the

cognitive aspects of that experience.

It is possible to illustrate many approaches to the

problems of value to explain the great variety of inter-

pretations ranging from Ayer's contention that value

statements are but emotive utterances and have no cognitive

significance 1 to Munsterberg's essentially metaphysical

orientation? 2 It may be stated that nothing is regarded as

valuable except as it is related to some actual or possible

first-person experience of an affective-conative nature.

Further it can be said that the experienced fusion of

feeling and attitude is indispensable to all our valuings

and valuations. 3

It may be important, however, to point out for the

present context that value experience includes judgements

of preference. One value is higher or greater than another.

And this fact entails the complex problem of a value scale

and of suitable criteria. When all values are considered,

we face not just a simple scale of higher-lower, but a realm

of complexly inter-related values and of many dimensions and

dependencies. No one criterion will be sufficient to deal

with all of them. But as we are primarily concerned with

the experience of the highest value, the most appropriate

approach to unravel the complexities of such an experience

appears to be the phenomenological approach.

With these introductory remarks, let us find out

the nature and place of the experience of the highest value

in the Upanishads. As stated earlier, we find in the

Upanishadic literature more diversity than agreement on

the nature of value. There is an underlying assumption

in the Upanishadic literature to the effect that all that

is good and valuable in the life of an individual is

discovered or re-discovered by himself and that the

individual self in its true nature is the source, the

ground and the measure of all that is good. Although the

prevailing diversity of thought in the Upanishadic literature

poses problems in the articulation of a general Upanishadic

theory of value, yet some remarks in this direction may

help. For instance, the rshis were conscious of the fact

that values are the standards we live by and the goals we

hope to achieve. Further, they upheld the view that values

are basic to our preferences and decisions and that they

give direction and meaning to all that we do. With this

in the foreground, if we disregard the Upanishadic diversity

concerning the principle of value, we can hope to clear the

way for an explicit awareness of the core on which there

is agreement in the Upanishadic literature. We can

characterize this agreement of Upanishadic considerations

as the following:

1. There is a unity of the individual self-Jīvatman-

with the universal self-Paramātman. As a living organism,

Jīva is never merely a static unity. It is constantly in

a process of equilibrium, in a process, that is, of

maintaining itself in the midst of, and despite, identifies

with the universal or cosmic Self. The individual self

(Jīva) is active and expansive in ways in which the

universal Self is. In other words, the individual self is

directed towards the universal Self as a being that can

say 'I' (I am Brahman) to itself.

O Nourisher (Pūṣan) , the Sole Seer, O Controller

(Yama) , O Sun, Offspring of Prajāpati, spread

forth thy rays! Gather thy brilliance! What is

thy fairest form - that of thee I see. He who

is yonder, yonder person (Purusa) - I myself am he!...4

In Taittirīya Upanishad the seer says that the knower of

the unity of the human person with the personality in the

world reaches the Self consisting of bliss.

"Both he who is here in a person and he who

is yonder in the Sun - he is one. He who

knows this on departing from this world,

proceeds on to 'that self which consists of

food, proceeds on to that Self which consists

of breath, proceeds on to that Self which

consists of mind, proceeds on to that Self

which consists of understanding, proceeds on

to that Self which consists of bliss". (That

is, within the Self, there are various selves,

but the true knower must advance to the

highest Self).

2. Jīvātman, the individual self, is not only aware

of itself as acting, as being engaged in various situations,

but also as determining in a large measure its relation

with Paramātman in acting. In and through acting, the

individual self realizes himself. That is to say, Jīva

exists essentially as a becoming rather than as a mere being,

as a task to be fulfilled through its own acts rather than

as something definitely given or conditioned by factors

beyond its control.5

3. There is a harmony of macrocosm and microcosm -

between Paramātman and jīvātman - and this harmony is

involved in the dynamic unity of the both.

As a unity only is It to be looked upon -

This indemonstrable, enduring Being, spotless,

beyond space, The Unborn Soul, Great, enduring.6

It does mean, rather, that, in the end all of jīva's

differentiated modes of experiencing (and acting) are but

functional unfoldings of its basic potentialities directed

toward Paramātman which is the essence of Self-realization.

It is this peculiar nature of individual self as a self-

directed becoming which paves way for man's search for

values.

4. The individual self- jīva- acquires knowledge and

knowledge being one of the objects of value provides unison

with the supreme Self.

That Eternal should be known as present in

the Self (ātmasamstha) Truly there is nothing

higher than that to be known…7

However, knowledge itself is essentially dual in nature,

involving as it does, a context or realm of objects and

the knowing of these objects as an awareness of, a being

concerned with, an intending, discerning, meaning and acting.*

5. Jīva as a minded organism is the agent in all

conscious experience and control of mind is a means of

obtaining realization. Although actions are directed

towards objects or situations as recognized, yet they are

never quite without a feeling- tone involving the goal.8

Jīva attains realization with the fulfillment of

its drive toward the unification with the universal Self,

although jīva is patterned by individual purposes, aims,

intentions, motives, desires and the like.9 This drive for

realization, as it necessarily involves the unification of

the jīva with Paramātman, is not simply a drive for more

life in the purely quantitative meaning of more, but a drive

toward qualitatively distinct manifestations of life. Each

jīva in and through this striving achieves an order or

system of values. Further, it is a drive which permeates and

overreaches jīva with the supreme condition of soul. In

this supreme condition of soul the distinction of good and

evil is blurred.

When a seer sees the brilliant Maker, Lord,

Person, the Brahma - source, Then, being a

knower, shaking off good and evil, stainless,

he attains supreme identify (Sāmya).10

It might seem that the characterizations given above

emphasize various aspects of a single underlying conception

of the principle of value. But is it possible to maintain tha

the seemingly diverse conceptions of value mentioned above

point to a single underlying conception? We may hope that

by combining all these characterizations into a single

totality, a uniformity which underlies as formulating the

Upanishadic highest value can be achieved. A study of the

Upanishadic literature may seem to pose serious obstacles

to such an undertaking. The difficulty is increased in

view of the fact that while propounding one of the above

characteristics as the ultimate, the Upanishads reject all

others explicitly. For example, those who define the highest

value as 'knowledge' (of the supreme) explicitly exclude

from their definition other characterizations explained above.

Therefore, a complete and rational approach demands a careful

consideration of the formulation in penetrating beneath the

verbal forms and accidental contextual implications to the

deeper strata of Upanishadic reflection on highest value.

We shall study the subject of 'highest value' in the kind

of background in which it is found in the principal

Upanishads.

II

When we look into the Upanishadic passages, we see

as many as twentyfour apparently different conceptions of

the highest value. These refer to (1) Ātman (Self)

realization, (2) Buddhi, (3) character or conduct, (4)

Desire, (5) Duty, (6) Faith (Śraddha), (7) Freedom, (8)

Happiness, (9) Intelligence, (10) Karman, (11) Knowledge,

(12) Light, (13) Mind, (14) Mōkṣa (liberation), (15) Pleasure

(16) Plenum, (17) Power, (18) Scripture, (Vēdās), (19) Space,

(20) Sun/Moon, (21) Thought, (22) Rta , (23) Prāna and

(24) Yoga. These twenty four - postulates may be discussed

by certain references to some scale or ladder of values.

That is to say that value experience does not occur in

isolation.

It is always in context - having retrospective

as well as prospective connections and being

interwoven with the social and historical

setting of the community of which we are members.

It is this context, in other words, which provides

the basis for our preferential judgements of

'better than' and 'best of all' being intrinsic

to the experience itself and therefore terminal

but not absolute in any objective sense.11

Here arises in a new perspective the idea of a

hierarchical order of value experience and of an inner

harmony of such experiences - not as a replacement, however,

but as a supplement to the order or system of felt values.

Involved here is also the individual in his existential

being as a person. But he is involved, not at the level

of biological or psychological drives, but as a being who,

on the basis of his understandings and insights, can

legislate for himself, can restrain and direct his impulses

and desires, his basic drives, and can become a project for

himself 12 (to use Ortega Gasset's term). Life now means

fulfilling a task, and self-fulfillment, so understood, is

not a psychological but a normative concept.

As Werkmeister says:

"In the total context of value experience we now realize a dual aspect of that experience. There are (a) the felt satisfactions, the joy of creation, the happiness that comes from having achieved what we ought to do. There are, in other words, all the basic levels of felt-value experiences. But at the level of insight and self-legislation there is also (b) the value placed upon what is being achieved - a value which transcends the immediately felt values. And because of (b) (a) may be purely coincidental. In other words, we must distinguish between (b) being motivated by (a) and being motivated by (b). This distinction, we believe, is crucial for any value theory, for it is (b) which opens up a whole new dimension of our value experience."13

The real problem now is this: What is the highest value possible? To what trans-subjective value the Upanishadic rshis commit themselves? An answer to this question will emerge clearly at the end of this chapter. Still, in anticipation of the argument yet to come, we may reformulate and make more explicit the value-ought advocated by the seers. We may say that the value-ought or value imperative for the Upanishadic seers is this: Act so as to realize your own true self. With this aroused aim let us group the twenty four conceptions of value under the following table.

1. Value of fulfillment : Ātman realization, Mokṣa

2. Values of enterprise : Mind, Knowledge, Thought, and creation Prana, Intelligence

3. Values for well-being : Karman, Freedom, Rta , Scripture, Yoga

4. Values for gratification : Desire, Pleasure, Happiness,

of appetites Power, Plenum.

5. Values of Sense : Space, Light, Sun/Moon

pleasures

6. Values for communal : Character or Conduct,

living Buddhi, Duty, Faith

It may be said that these twenty four conceptions

of value are inter-related in manifold ways. As stated

earlier, in the total context of value experience, we

realize a dual aspect of that experience. There are (a)

the felt satisfactions of value and (b) the value which

transcends the immediately felt values. The objective

significance of value that inheres in Self-realization

as the highest one as stated in table 1 , is realized by

an individual when through action he sees through his jīva

nature and passes on to the transcendental that is the

Paramātman. Through action, at the first stage, the full

knowledge of the empirical self leads through an

understanding of its background and conditions to the Self

that is beyond the empirical self. In this way, the identity

of the empirical self with the transcendental self

(Paramātman) is fully realized. This realization is

experienced as the climax of action and the highest point of

fulfilment . Thus the true objective significance of

Self-realization as the value-ought is experienced. That

is to say that the empirical self in its fulness realizes

that the transcendental self is the matrix of the empirical

self.

The above table of groupings further emphasize that

the highest value (Self-realization) is neither a quality

constitutive of the nature of the object nor a self-existent

ideal entity. It means that the highest value is encountered

in experience and thus the reference to a subject cannot be

eliminated. Now the question is on what grounds can we say

that Self-realization is the highest value? The above six

table of groupings except the first one cannot serve as a

standard of any kind because it varies with the needs and

moods of particular individuals in particular situations.

Although all values of things and events are values for us

and are experienced by the valued object elicits in us, but

they are true and objectively valid values only when our

experience is in harmony with the assumed experiences of a

universal and lasting ideal which transcends the immediately

felt values. In the Brihad-āranyaka Upanishad, the

conversation of Yājnaval tya and Maitreyī concerning the

all pervading Self emphasize the above point. Yājna-valkya

urges to the fullest achievement of 'value' which is to be

attained by the knowledge of Self which is higher than everything. Further, he explains that everything is dear

to an individual only because he considers his self as the highest one. That is to say that 'it is the self that

should be seen, that should be hearkened to, that should be thought on, that should be pondered on because in the

self's being seen hearkened to, thought on, understood, this world all is known'. 14

The above elucidation obviates the necessity of treating the highest value experience as not a causal

connection between an object of pleasure, desire or happiness and our feelings, but a judgement that such and such an

'object' does or does not exist. It is an existential judgement, in other words, that sets up the relation between

value feeling and a value-sought.

A closer look at, and a careful investigation into, the function of the aforesaid groupings of value leads to

a number of general conclusions. The first is the acceptance by the Upanishadic rshis of the intimate relation between

popular and philosophical considerations on the problem of value. Individual value-considerations such as pleasure,

happiness, knowledge and the like represent certain individualistic value-judgements. But in the whole of the

Upanishadic literature, these individualistic value-

considerations pave way for a highest one which is

considered universal. Understood in this way, value-scales

in the Upanishads have the kind of significance which is

attached to universal experience as opposed to merely

private and individual experiences. The highest value for

the Upanishadic rshis rests upon a broader basis than the

fluctuating value-judgements of individuals. Although there

is a value-hierarchy, yet the highest value penetrates into

the nature of experience by which the individual can

estimate his degree of development toward value by reference

to the highest one.

We may also note here the immense variety of

attitudes taken towards the relation between popular and

philosophical thought.15 The Upanishadic seers, by

conserving and re-interpreting the popular belief, rather than

rejecting it, converged the individual beliefs towards a

unity. In Chāndogya Upanishad specially we see an attempt

to converge the individual beliefs towards a unity.16 Five

learned house holders - Prācināśala Aupamānyava, Satyayajna

Paulushi, Indradumna Bhallavega, Jana Sarkarakshya and Budila

Asvatarasvi, - greatly learned in sacred lore (srotriya)

came together and discussed. "Who is our Ātman?" "What is

Brahman?" These five decided to resort to Uddālaka Aruni

who had the reputation of understanding that Universal Ātman.

15

But he was reticente. The six then approached the famous

Asvapati for instruction. Asvapati elicits from each of

them his present conception of Universal Ātman. One says

that he venerates the sky as the Universal Ātman. Asvapati

commends the conception and gives assurance that he is

shining like the sky, but a great deal more. The sky would

be only his head. The others in their turn enunciate their

conceptions all of which are accepted as true, but taken

as total false. The Universal Ātman is indeed the sun,

but the sun is only his eye. He is indeed the wind, but

the wind is only his breath. He is indeed the space, but

the space is only his body. The Universal Ātman is indeed

water, but water is only his bladder. He is indeed the

earth, but the earth is only his feet. Then Asvapati

taught the six Brāhmaṇas the noble truth about the

Universal Ātman as no other than their own Self. In

conceiving of Ātman as something apart from themselves,

they were committing an error.17 Such an attempt is made

by Yājnavalkya to Ushastas.

"He who breathes in with your breathing in

is the Soul (Ātman) of yours which is in all

things. He who breathes out with your breathing

out is the Soul of yours which is in all things.

He who breathes about with your breathing

about is the Soul of yours which is in all

things. He who breathes up with your breathing

up is the Soul of yours which is in all things."18

16

Further we see these attempts in Brihadāranyaka and

Taittirīya Upanishads too.19 Varied views of individuals

have been brought to a unity by the rshis as per the

following:

(a) Varying and fluctuating value-norms of the

individuals which hold that Sun, prāna, water, earth,

mind and the like to be the highest value:20 acceptance

of the group norms (or value) by the rshis as expressing

partial truth but false.21

(b) The philosophical (reflective) attitude towards the

phenomenal group standards taken by the rshis for a deeper

basis for truth in an ideal world: this is partly clear

from Chāndogya Upanishad.22 Svetaketu did not know, even

though he had been away from home and had studied for

twelve years all the Vedas, had thought himself learned.

Svetaketu Aruneya could not answer his father's question

regarding that "whereby what has not been heard of becomes

heard of, what has not been thought of becomes thought of,

what has not been understood becomes understood."23

(c) The quest for ultimate truth merges with the

quest for Moksa or liberation - for a state beyond fears,

griefs and evils of mortal life, a state usually characterized

by the attributes of Sat-Cit-Ānanda. It can be termed as

soteriological.24

(d)

Finally the Unity which has been searched for by

the Upanishadic seers is reached. In Brihadāranyaka

Upanishad e.g.,

"As all the spokes are held together in the

hub and felly of a wheel, Just so in this

Soul all things, all gods, all worlds, all

breathing, things all selves are held together."25

In Chāndogya Upanishad it is stated thus :

"Ātman alone is the whole world."26

Again in Brihadaranyaka,

"This Brahmanhood, this ksatrahood, these

worlds, these gods, these beings, everything

here is what this Soul is."27

It becomes clear from the above that the rshis

were not primarily concerned with the individual grouping

of values. By the individual grouping of values we mean

the popular belief among individuals concerning certain

'things ' as objects of value. It may be argued further

that it is the reflection/attitude rather than the norm

that concerns the seers. Hence the arrangement of value

notions they advocate is not, primarily, a classification

of goods but rather a classification of attitudes towards

such 'goods' in terms of the degree of reflection and

philosophical insight manifested by the attitude. On that

account the rshis were concerned with an advance from

subjective individualism of phenomenally experienced

entities to collectively held views of values. They further

argued for an advance from collective morality to a

philosophical/critical attitude toward the concept of value.

A further advance was called for from this philosophical/

critical attitude towards a higher metaphysical unity

to enable man the attainment of the highest. Thus they

provided for the attainment of liberation resulting in a

unification with the Absolute. Yājnavalkya, for instance,

emphasizes the value of 'Ātmanic experience' and righteous

conduct as opposed to the acquisition of material possessions.28 He convinced Maitreyi that these worldly goods

are not the pathway to the Self. We see such a view in

Taittirīya Upanishad too.29

Upanishadic passages pertaining to the experience

of the highest value acclaim 'Self realization' as the

highest of all- and thereby exhort the aspirant to renounce

the narrow horizons, the selfish interests for worldly

goods. The Brihadāranyaka tells us that when the individual

Self (Soul) (Puruṣa) is embraced by the all embracing

spirit (Prajñānatman) he attains his proper form in

which his desire is fulfilled (Āptakāman) in which his

desire is the spirit (Ātmakāman) ; he is without desire

(Akāman) apart from grief (sokāntaram).30

19

Let us now consider the nature and aim of this

new shift from phenomenal entities to a more philosophical

and metaphysical one. Here we are not discussing the

evolution of values from phenomenal entities to a meta-

physical one. There was a predominant notion among the

individuals to consider the phenomenal entities as the

supreme value. Later this view was changed by the

Upanishadic rshis to a more reflective one. Thus in the

later period we see a quest among the people to discard

the old views and substitute Ātman as the unitary world

ground. Man seeks value in every phase of phenomenal

experience. We have seen earlier that there were many

conceptions regarding the highest value among the individuals

in Upanishadic times.31 We understand that these individual

value conceptions were brought towards a unity by the ṛshis

by extracting some universal essence of value from the

individual conceptions. Reflection upon what is involved

in this quest for value leads inevitably to the ideal of a

non-contradictory experience for all individuals in which

the individual value considerations are harmoniously and

completely realized. This ideal of maximal realization of

value considerations is the highest value experience or

the highest principle of value. In Brihadāranyaka Upanishad

we see an attempt in this direction. Here, king Janaka was

instructed by the great seer Yājnavalkya regarding six

partial definitions of Brahman, concerning the Soul, its

bodily and universal relations. Finally Yājnavalkya

instructed him that the light of man is the Soul.32 Insight

into this principle is clearly superior in value to common

ungrounded opinions as to what constitutes 'the value' not

only for individual citizens as, for instance, Maitrēyi

but also for the administrator who is charged with the

guidance of the destiny of the community. For example, the

king of Vāranāsi approaches Yājnavalkya and seeks his

help for the attainment of the highest principle.33

Such approaches to the nature of value, present

in the whole of Upanishads, are grounded in great exalta-

tion of metaphysical truths at the expense of mere pleasure34;

or mere power35. In other words, the Upanisads exaltate

the cosmic and the individual self at the expense of wealth

and bodily pleasures. Finally, we find in them the

exaltation of a universal idea - Realization of Self at the

expense of many fluctuating particulars, of rta as

opposed to chaos, of self as opposed to body, of prāna

as opposed to the other parts of the body, of reality at

the expense of sense appearances. This shift in the

general attitude towards value is characteristic of the

rshis and thereby raise the human life out of a meaningless

treadmill.

21

Thus the Upanishadic rshis advocate 'realization

of Self' as the highest value. It is precisely because of

the reason that all other individual considerations of

value are realized in this single consistent system that

individual value considerations are turned down as the

highest by this principle of metaphysical ideal. Thus the

'individual' considerations, are converted into a higher

metaphysical principle.

After the individual considerations including the

(hedonistic ones) have thus been converted to the true

ideal - the ideal of Self realization - the various value

approaches are standardized so as to express the ideal

valuation implicit in the final understanding of the highest

principle of value. A single comprehensive criterion for

'the highest value' is recognized, evolving from material

possessions to moral excellences 36 and then to the

intellectual (knowledge) excellences 37, and culminating

in the attainment of Self-realization. In this way the

Upanishadic genius synthesizes the elements of good which

are present in diverse value considerations. Thus they

raise every phase of individual and community life to the

spiritual level at which life begins to acquire significance,

reality and true value. 38 Thus:

"when the individual spirit realizes his divine nature and acts from it, he transcends the distinction of good and evil. Not that he can do evil and yet be true from sin, but that it is impossible for him to do wrong, for evil presuppose the basis of egoism... by the constant practice of goodness is finally attained the highest form of existence in which man becomes capable of the experience of union with the Universal Soul."39

However, as the Katha Upanishad tells us that 'he who has not ceased from immoral conduct cannot obtain god through intelligence'. For Mundaka Upanishad, that pure being can be apprehended only by those 'whose nature is purified.'40 According to the Brihadāranyaka good is both truth and virtue.41 Only when one's whole nature is purified, are the bonds released which keep the self (Soul) from God, thus declares the Chandogya.42 The Brihadārnyaka exhorted that the immortal man overcomes both the thoughts 'I did evil and I did good'43 'Good and evil, done or not done, cause him no pain. Thus the abandonment of the cosmic powers as the highest (principle) of value, the individual returns to the self (ego) and thereby identifies himself with a fuller life and consciousness.44

So far we have been seeking for the background and setting in which conceptions for the highest value in Upanishads are found. It becomes clear from the above investigation that the postulates such as individual and

cosmic self, knowledge and rta will be adopted rather

easily by the seers. But such candidates as pleasure,

plenum, wealth, power, and the like will need to be re-

interpreted before it will be possible for the seers to

accept even these as reasonable candidates.

Earlier we stated that there are apparently twenty-

four items as the claimants for the status of the highest

value which may be found in the Upanishads. By a careful

investigation we may succeed in reducing them. Let us

take two important items knowledge and mind- with a view

to obtaining a proper understanding and appreciation of the

concept of Self-realization as the highest value.

Knowledge

The worth and efficacy of knowledge occupies an

important place in most Upanishadic literature. Some of

the Upanishadic passages attempt to arrive at a satisfactory

definition of the above concept. Thus in Mundaka Upanishad,

we see two kinds of knowledge: the tradition of religious

and the knowledge of the eternal. A preliminary investiga-

tion of the scope, validity and efficacy of knowledge in

the Upanishads as one of the objects of value lead, however,

to the irresistable conclusion that knowledge is a means

for obtaining one's ends.

24

Knowledge involves three chief elements, viz., the

one who knows; the thing one knows; the act by which one

knows.45 The one who knows is called the subject of knowledge,

the knowing subject or simply the subject. The thing which

the subject knows is called the object of knowledge, or

simply the object. The act by which the subject knows the

object is called cognition. To sum up: The chief elements

of knowledge are subject, object and cognition. When

subject, object and cognition come together, the result is

a 'piece of knowledge' in the subject. We say a 'piece of

knowledge' and not simply 'knowledge' because the latter

term is usually employed to designate all or some of the

fruits of the subject's cognitions, and not the single

product of a single act of cognition.

It may be helpful at this point to understand the

sense and meaning of knowledge which the Upanishadic seers

advocate. Knowledge, ultimately, for the Upanishadic seers,

is the inner grasp and possession of one's own inner reality -

the self. Such an inner reality or entity is the object of

knowledge in the widest sense of the term. The object of

knowledge is the thing known. Thus 'self' as an object of

knowledge is the 'thing' known to the subject. This object

may be purely subjective or it is trans-subjective. If

the object of knowledge is either knowledge itself or its

elements, accidentals and dependents, then it is an object purely subjective; that is, it belongs to the subject and

has no existence apart from the subject as knowing. Thus if I make my own ideas the object of my cognizance or knowledge

the object is purely subjective, for my ideas have no existence as such apart from my knowledge; they are elements

of my knowledge. So much for the subjective objects of knowledge, that is, for knowables that have no existence

apart from the knower. We come now to consider the extra-subjective objects that do have or can have existence apart

from the knower himself.

The objects of knowledge which have their being and existence independently of knowledge are called trans-subjective.46

Trans-subjective objects do not depend upon the knowing-subject objectively; that is, they are not projected out of the mind itself as though they are

knowables. They are not dependent on the knowing subject subjectively, for their own proper being is not being known.

Self as it is described in the Upanishadic literature is in the trans-subjective world. We call it trans-subjective to indicate the fact that the subject must,

inorder to possess this world by knowledge, go across (Latin trans = "across") the chasm that lies between the

physical and psychical. It is called trans-subjective because it is a world that is knowable and hence has reference to the knowing-subject.

In view of these general considerations let us bring out the scope, validity and efficacy of knowledge as it is described in the Upanishads. It is illustrative that they acclaim 'not much learning' but the understanding of metaphysical truths. Thus they advocate the problem of knowledge 'not only in connection with philosophical speculation, but also in the practical affairs of life.47

Hence the seer exhorts: "He who knows (Brahman) as the real, as knowledge, as the infinite... He obtains all desires"48. Knowledge, thus, is one of the supreme means of liberation from bondage. Brahman being the Ātman, one should see Ātman, hear it, reflect and meditate on it, because it is the dearest of all, and by knowing it, the whole world is known. This Ātman is not to be obtained by instruction, nor by intellect, nor by much learning'

but he is to be obtained by' such a one that Ātman reveals his own person (tanum svam), i.e., the Ātman is revealed to the mind which is pure, endowed with pure knowledge.

Such a state of the mind is realized when it is purged of all attachments, aversions, passions and desires.49

27

The Upanishads, in this way, advocate the efficacy

of true knowledge (vidyā) that discriminates between the

eternal and the non-eternal, consists in intuition into

the real nature of things and into the Absolute, untouched

by time and space or change. While ignorance (a-vidyā) is

the cause of bondage and transmigration, true knowledge

(vidyā or Jnāna ) liberates one from bondage.50

Thus knowledge, ultimately, leads to the attainment

of identity of the individual self with the absolute Self.

Knowledge then is the intuitive realization of one infinite,

eternal, universal spirit; it is becoming Brahman (Brahma-

bhavanā) becoming all (Sarvābhavana); it is the vision

of the self of the Universe. (Sarvātmā darśana); the

vision of one Self in all (ekātmā darśana); it is the state

of identity (sāmya, ekātva) of the individual self with

the supreme Self. It is free from love, hatred, delusion,

joy, sorrow and fear; a state of freedom from demerits

and merits, a state of super moral transcendent purity.51

Knowledge leads to immortality52, leads to the Brahma-

world and procures fulfillment of desires53, frees from

all fetters54, influences one's re-incarnate status55

over comes karma and re-birth56, the supreme knowledge,

thus, for Upanishadic seers is the knowledge of the supreme.

But they insist that the 'eternal should be known as present

in the self (ātmasamstha) and 'truly there is nothing higher than that to be known.' Thus 'when one recognizes

the enjoyer, the object of enjoyment, and the Universal Actuator, All has been said...'57 In this supreme

knowledge there is no duality between the subject and object. In his discourse with Maitreyi, Yājnavalkya

propounds this view. "For where there is duality (dvaita) as it were (iva) there one sees another; there one

smells another; there one hears another; there one speaks to another; there one thinks of another; there

one understands another. Where, verily, every thing has become just one's own self, then whereby and whom would

one see?..."58 This same view is propounded in Chāndogya Upanishad in the following way.

"Where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, understands nothing else -- that is a plenum.

But where one sees something else -- that is the small. Verily, the plenum is the immortal; But the small is

the mortal."59

In this way the rshis indicate directly that knowledge-seeking tendencies should be trained and directed so as

to recognize and accept the supremacy of Self-realization,

not merely as an external force, but as something within one's own true nature. The reform, through knowledge,

suggested is thus a reform of the self. In this way the

Upanishads substitute the philosophic/critical spirit in

knowledge in place of the materialistic and sensualistic

attitude.

We have examined the claims of knowledge for the

place of the highest value. The investigation suggests

that knowledge is valuable, but in the context of knowledge

of self. We can sum up the discussion thus.

(1) Knowledge ultimately determines the actual and

particular character of Self-realization in every

possible form.

(2) Knowledge, in its turn, is determined by the

knowledge of the realization of Self.

(3) Knowledge recognises the individual's ability to

know his self i.e., knowledge of one's true self

leads to realization which consists in knowing the

ultimate reality as dwelling in the heart. It is

described as having access to Brahman, as being

merged with Brahman.60

(4) Knowledge, thus, rests upon the individual's

partnership in the (spiritual) possession of self.

(5) The knowledge that brings realization is not, of

course, empirical knowledge. Some passages suggests

that it is bestowed on the individual by the Supreme

30

Self through its Grace.

Knowledge, then, is a process to know the self

and it ends with the realization of Self where there is no

duality. Understanding in the Upanishadic spirit, knowledge,

that may be considered as an object of value only in so

far as it leads to the realization of Self.

Mind

One of the difficulties in discussing the concept

of mind as an object of value in the principal Upanishads

is that the reader may fail to be struck by its significance

as a value at all. The reason is that the passages in which

mind is discussed in the Upanishads falls into certain

groupings.

(1) There are passages which suggest mind as the agent

in all conscious experiences.

(2) Others describe control of mind as a means of

obtaining liberation.

(3) At still other places mind is said to be produced

by the supreme person and is likened to the reins

of a chariot.

The Upanishads advocate that Prajāpati made three

things for himself- Mind, Speech and Breath. It is with

mind that one truly sees. It is with the mind that one

hears. Desire, imagination, doubt, faith, lack of faith,

steadfastness, lack of steadfastness, shame, meditation,

fear-all this is truly mind. Therefore even if one is

touched on his back, he discerns it with the mind.61

According to this analysis mind is disclosed as an equipment

to be used. This does not mean that mind is first discovered

as an object and then assigned a use for specific purposes.

This is the force of the rshis well known allegorical

description of the mind as the form of a person. The rshis

phenomenally portrayed that the Yajur Veda is its head, the

Rig Veda its right side, the Sama Veda, the left side,

teaching, the body (ātman) the nymns of the Atharvans and

the Agirases, the lower part, the foundation.62 Further, they

have liked mind to the reins of a chariot-driver.63 For

them, mind is higher than the senses64 and the suprasensible

person is framed by the heart, by the thought, by the mind.65

The Upanishadic seer gives a clear account of mind as the

following:

"The mind is said to be two fold. The pure

and also the impure... by making mind all

motionless... then that is the supreme state.

So long the mind should be confined, till in

the heart it meets its end... with minds stains

washed away by concentration what may his joy

be who has entered Ātman-impossible to picture

then in language. Ourself must grasp it with

the inner organ."66

It is clear that in this context the rshis advocate that

initiation of motion, thought and the like provide clear

examples of the mind. That is why, when Bhrgu Varuni,

approached his father Varuna in order to acquire the

knowledge of Brahman, he was taught to regard it as food

as breath, as sight, as hearing, as mind, as speech.67

Kausitaki Upanishad, while dealing with the correlation of

the individual's function with the facts of existence exhorts

thus "... The mind is one portion there of taken out.

Thoughts and desires are its externally correlated exis-

ntial elements."68 Mundaka Upanishad discusses mind as the

source of the human person and of the cosmic elements.69

We see similar explanations of mind in other Upanishads too.70

The above passages suggest that the Upanishadic seers

have projected their conception of mind not only as a

conscious agent in all experiences but also as an organizing

principle in all fluctuating experiences within the individual.

It is clear from Maitri Upanishad that the reform of the

mind in the way of controlling it, gives forth the true

ideal, the ideal of the realization of Self-paving way to

the destruction of materialistic and sensualistic attitude

of body.

Our exploration of the Upanishadic conception of

mind as one of the conceptions for highest value paves way for

a variety of considerations that enter into the working

out of a theory which proposes mind as an object of value.

We have not attempted to articulate these in a fully satisfying

fashion, but have only sketched the notion of mind and its

role within the value spectrum in the Upanishads. We can

sum up the discussion by pointing out the following:

(1) In the Upanishadic literature the mind has been viewed

as the agent, in, and more than that as an organizing

principle of, all conscious experiences.71

(2) Further, there is an advance from the view of mind

as an organizing principle to a conception of it as

the source of the human person as well as the cosmic

elements.72

(3) A philosophical and critical advance was called for

from this reflection on the nature of mind to a

conception of it as a metaphysical reality conceived

as the source of every human thought.73

(4) Mind as a metaphysical reality and as a source of

every human thought is immaterial and antithetical

to the physical.

(5) As considered above, there is a view of the mind

being pure and impure. And when the impurities of

the mind are eliminated by concentration, the

individual attains the joy of realization (which

is not other than self-realization). This joy is

said to be indestructible.74

x x x x

As we look over the nature of the highest value

examined above, we understand that the arrangement of the

nature of value experience the rshis advocate is not a

classification of 'goods' but rather a classification of

attitudes towards such goods in terms of the degree of

reflection and philosophical insight manifested by the

attitude. Thus any thing regarded in the individual level is

thought to have its felt- value. Earlier we have noted

the Upanishadic advance from subjective individualism to

philosophical/critical and a higher metaphysical unity, which

culminated in the highest goal of Self-realization. In

this way the Upanishadic genius synthesized diverse elements

of value into one integrated whole. We have considered here

in some detail, knowledge and mind, two of the chief items

for the highest value to determine in what way the two

have been regarded as constituents of the highest value

experience. The attainment of the highest value is directly

proportionate to the degree of insight. Where the insight

is little, value is little and where the highest level of

insight has been reached, the highest degree of value is

attained. This insight is the realization of one's own

true self in which all value conceptions are harmoninusly

and completely realized. This ideal is realized only when

the felt-value experiences and the empirical motives becorn

shot through with a more transcendental insight. Thus the

felt-value experiences lose their empirical character and

passes over to the transcendental and transmutes it into a

perfect order and harmony of the ideal realm. This, however,

is the life which we describe as the life of Self-realization.

Looked at this way, this highest value achieves the character

of completeness which no other positive value can possibly

replace or rival.

36

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Ayer, A.J., Language Truth and Logic, (London, Gollanez, 1946).

2. Münsterberg, Hugo, The Eternal Values, (Boston and New York, 1909).

3. Valuing does not occur in isolation, but is connected with objects, persons and activities i.e., valuings are themselves activities and as such are open to observation. It means that valuings are capable of objective treatment. But evaluation is a judgement which has been determined by the cognitive activities and which applies to reality in the existential sense. For a further reference to this point, see Eames, S. Morris, "Valuing, obligation and evaluation" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 24, pp. 318-328.

4. Brih. 1. 4.7, 1. 5.15; 3. 4.1; 2.5.15; 2.4.6–7. Isa 16. Maitri 6.17; 7.7. Tait 3.10.4. Chand.3.12.7–9.

5. Brih. 3.7. 1–23.

6. Brih. 2.5.1–13; 4.4.5. Chand. 3.18; 6.3.2; 6.11.3. Ait. 1.3.13; 1.2.4. Katha. 1.3.7. Isa 16.

7. Brih. 1.3.28; 1.4.17; Chand. 1.2.8. Katha. 3.7–8. Tait. 2.1

*. This point is elaborately discussed in the later section of this Chapter.

8. Brih. 1.5.3. Jīva as the conscious agent and the experiencer is established in Chapter four of the present thesis.

9. A Jatasatru explains to Gargya regarding Ātman as the intelligent principle through the examples of waking, dreaming and deep sleep status. He emphasizes that it is this principle.

Brih. 2.1.20. Chand. 7.26.2.

** All Upanishadic quotations in this thesis are taken from the translation of Hume, Robert Ernest, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads. Translated from the Sanskrit with an outline of the philosophy of the Upanishads and an annotated bibliography. Second edition, Revised (Oxford Univ. Press, Ely House, London W1).

10. Mund. 3.1.3. Katha 2.14. Chand. 7.2.1; 6.14.2; 6.8.6. And also Sankara Bhāsya on Chand 6.14.2.

11. Werkmeister, William Henry Man and his Values, Lincoln, Univ. of Nebraska Press (1967), p. 126.

12. Ibid., pp. 126–127.

13. Ibid., p. 127.

14. Brih., 4.5. 1-15.

15. Ranade, R.D. A Constructive Survey of the Upanishadic Philosophy; being an introduction to Bharatiaya Vidya Bhavan, 1968. Chapter I.

16. Brih., 4.1-2. Tait., 3.1. Chand., 5.11-18.

17. Ibid., 5.11-18.

18. Brih., 3.4.1.

19. Brih., 4.1-2. Tait., 3.1

20. Yājnavalkya's discussion with king Janaka; Uddālaka Aruni's reflections with the Six Brāhmanas.

21. Chand., 5.11-18.

22. Ibid., 6.1.1-3.

23. Ibid., 6.1.1-3. Mund. 1.1.3. Chand., 7.1.1-2; Brih., 4.4.21.

24. Ranade, R.D., Op. cit., Chapter 1 & 2.

25. Brih., 2.5.15.

26. Chand., 7.25.2.

27. Brih., 2.4.6; 4.5.7.

28. Brih., 2.4.5.

29. Tait., 3.1.

30. Brih., 4.3.21.

31. One of the examples is in Chand., 5.11-18.

32. Brih., 4.1.2 to 4.3.7

33. Ibid., 2.1.20.

34. Chānd., 7.23.

35. Brih., 1.4.8. Chānd., 8.7.1.

36. Yājñavalkya's exhortation to Maitreyi.

37. Naciketa's quest for knowledge.

38. Mund., 3.1.3. Brih., 4.4.22. Ibid., 5.10. Tait., 2.9 Chand., 7.2.1; 8.4.1-2

As Hume says, "The world of reality, the Brahma-world to which the true knower is admitted, is devoid of all distinctions, pleasant and unpleasant which empirically real but transcendentally unreal"

Hume, Robert Ernest The Thirteen Principal Upanishads. Op. Cit. ( introduction )

39. Radhakrishnan, S., Indian Philosophy (London, G. Allen and Unwin Ltd.,) N.Y. The Macmillan Company (1958), Vol. 1, p. 103.

40. Mund., 2.2.4.

41. Brih., 2.5.11.

42. Chānd., 5.10.7.

43. Brih., 3.4.

44. Sankara on Brih., 3.8.12.

45. Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards, Collor Macmillan Ltd., London (1967), Vol. 4, p. 345.

46. Rt: Rev: Msgr: Glenn Paul J., Criteriology; (B. Herder Book Co.,) p. 35.

47. Hume, R.E., op. cit., p. 58.

48. Tait., 2.1.

49. Isa 6. Katha. 1.2.8, 9, 12, 24; 2.3.9, 14; 1.3.7-9. Mund., 1.2.13; 2.2.3; 3.1.5, 8, 9; 3.2.2, 6.

50. Jsa 9.11 Katha. 1.16; 1.2.4,5.

51. Jsa 6.7. Katha. 1.21; 2. 12; 2.3. 14,15; Mund. 2.1.10; 3.2.7-9. Tait 3.10.5.

52. Brih., 4.4.18. Chand., 8.5.4.

53. Mund., 3.2.2.

54. Katha., 6.6-8.

55. Kaush., 1.2. Katha., 5.7; 3.15.

56. Mund., 1.2.7, 9, 10. Svet., 1.11

57. Ibid., 1.12.

58. Brih., 2.4.14.

59. Chand., 7.24.1.

60. Svet., 1.7; 6.10.

61. Brih., 1.5.3. Maitri., 6.30.

62. Tait., 2.3.

63. Katha., 3.3.6.

64. Ibid., 6.7.

65. Ibid., 6.9.

66. Maitri., 6.34.

67. Tait., 3.1.6. Ait., 3.5.1

68. Kaush., 3.5; ibid., 3.6, 4.20. Kena., 1.4.5; 3.3.6; Katha., 3.10 & 6.7-9.

69. Mund., 2.1.8.

70. Prasna., 4.2; 4.8 & 3.9 Maitri., 6.5 & 6.30.

71. Brih., 1.5.3.

72. Mund., 2.1.8. Prasna., 4.2. Maitri. 6.5 & 6.30.

73. Kaush., 3.5.6. Katha., 6.7-9.

74. Maitri., 6.34. Ait., 3.5.1.

CHAPTER II

THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVE

It has been shown in the first chapter that the

concept of Self-realization is the centre of Upanishadic

reflection on value. The present chapter deals with this

concept from the phenomenological perspective. In the

phenomenological analysis every thought experience as also

its descriptive content and its causes and effects are

viewed empirically. As a result, the phenomenological analysis

enters into the bustle of life and exercises its genetic

functions. The understanding of the concept of Self-realiza-

tion from the phenomenological perspective, then, is related

to views about the nature, good life and actions of the

individual. A study of this concept leads to an examination

of man's deeply felt- problems and higher aspirations. We

shall focuss on what phenomenology has to offer to the

reformulation and consequent justification of the above

concept.

Phenomenology has been a force in philosophy since

Hegel wrote his 'Phenomenology of Mind' in 1807. But its

most valuable formulation as a philosophic method was given

by Edmund Husserl (1859-1938). Husserl provided the

methodological background and theoretical justification not

only for phenomenology but also for much of what is known

as the existentialist philosophy today.

Phenomenology holds that all knowledge about ourselves

and about the world must be founded on our personal experi-

nce. As a consequence "a phenomenology of values would be

an account of the way values appear in experience. It could

be construed empirically, on the ground of natural existence,

and thus be a title for the descriptive analysis of values

manifested in the process of experience. The concern would

be with concrete events in that case, with conceptual devices

viewed as aids. It could also be construed on the basis of

pure subjectivity, with attention directed upon essential

structures and relations."1

Phenomenology concentrates on descriptions of

experience. The descriptions of Self-realization as the

highest experiencing value give us a valid understanding

of the nature and place of man in realizing his own true

self. For, in phenomenological descriptions, more credi-

bility and trust are placed in the subjective experiences

than in the objective projections. Looking at this way,

phenomenological approach to the concept of Self-realization

develops its own categories of description. These categories

of descriptions have a dual advantage.

(1)

They facilitate the structural analyses of value

experiences in uncommon detail.

(2)

They justify the disclosures of these value experiences

on philosophical foundations that are far sounder

than the traditional approach of natural theology.

The above statement needs an explanation.

The

phenomenological approach would reject as a point of

departure, the commonly accepted sharp distinction between

soul, body and the world.

It endeavours, instead, to

discover that integral concrete human experience of which

the notions of 'Soul' 'realization', 'absolute unity' and

the like are abstractions.

Phenomenologically, we wish to

understand the concept of Self-realization as arising from

the introspective analysis of man's subjective states.

Hence phenomenology studies the concept of self-realization

(as the highest experiencing value) by describing how it

feels to be in an 'Atmanized Absolute'12.

This approach not

only fulfills the demands of presuppositionless investiga-

tions, but it also examines the most direct and private

data about Ātman, body, world and the human existence to

which we have access.

In this way, phenomenological

categories of descriptions disclose the structural analyses

of value experiences in uncommon detail.

Phenomenology contends that ordinary categories of

descriptions are philosophically unwarranted and consequently

misleading with regard to the analysis of Self-realization.

The reason is that they involve a host of assumptions about

the nature of the individual and the world. Also the non-

phenomenological approach to the concept of Self-realization

presupposes that Self-realization is something external to

the individual in the sense that a force which is external

to him is operated for the attainment of realization. This

separation is arbitrary and does not give us satisfactory

ground of the actual structure of value experiences. Thus

fact and value, 'is' and 'ought', are clearly separable in

non-phenomenological approach. But in the phenomenological

approach, this distinction is blurred because it does not

deal with certain ambiguous fringes of experience, rather

it concentrates on descriptions of value-experience centred

around the individual. Thus the phenomenological approach

justifies the disclosures of value experiences more adequately.

Phenomenological investigations which the concept of Self-

realization have given rise to are also significant in two

ways:

(1) They help to clarify and deepen our understanding of

the concept.

(2) They help to re-awaken an understanding of this

Upanishadic concept and aid us in giving a new

interpretation.

The above considerations suggest that the understanding

of Self-realization from the phenomenological point of view

proceeds from an introspective analysis of man's subjective

states. Phenomenologically, Ātman becomes relevant to the

human condition of existence and is to be understood in terms

of our experiences of Ātman. Hence the important aspect of

phenomenological approach to the concept of Self-realization

is to re-interpret and re-describe the term.

The real character of this central Upanishadic

concept, should well be brought out by a succinct account

of its meaning. In attempting to characterize the meaning

and nature of Self-realization, we must proceed cautiously,

giving full recognition from the beginning to that which

separates this concept as unique and different from all

other Upanishadic concepts. The Upanishad exhorts us in

the following way regarding the nature of man's inward being

or his self. "God created man with senses outward; man

knows, therefore, only external objects, but not his self,

only the brave one knows the self by turning the senses

inwards."3 The Upanishad thus instructs man to attain the

knowledge of the Self and not merely the objects that can be

known by the senses. This same knowledge is imparted to

Maitrēyi by Yājnavalkya in Brihadāranyaka Upanishad.4

Yājnavalkya states the following…. "It is the Self (Ātman)

that should be seen, that should be heartened to, that should

be thought on, that should be pondered on…. , with the

seeing of, with the hearkening to, with the thinking of

and with the understanding of the self, this world–all is

known. It means that the knowledge of self is the pre-

requisite to realize human perfection. In Upanishadic words

'through understanding of what, pray, does all this world

become understood."5

When we consider the Upanishadic passages in which

the Seers advocate the 'transcendent' and 'distinct'

character of the nature of Self-realization, we understand

that they have returned to the immediate realm of the lined

experiences. This lined experience includes the individual's

feelings, desires, emotion, cognition, will and the like,

but it is not fully confined nor described in terms of

feelings, desires, and emotions. It is dynamic interplay

of his felt needs, urges, desires, wishes, interests,

cognitions, emotions, attitudes and more. Man experiences

this 'lined experiential' as the innermost reality of

himself in and through the re-discovery of himself as the

ground of all his experiences. Thus this lined experience

points to something more than the dynamic interplay of his

felt needs and urges. It can best be described phenomeno-

logically as the that which I am non-focally aware of at

any moment. Let us elaborate.

In all experiencings of the objects, - mental and

physical- the objects become the focal point of our

awareness. Where as in the question of self, it is the

essential subject for all our experiencings of the psychical

events and physical objects. That is, the Self is the that

which we are non-focally aware of at particular moments

while we experience the objects. In Brihadāranyaka Upanishad

the seer says the following. As, when a drum is being beaten,

one would not be able to grasp the external sounds but by

grasping the drum or the beater of the drum the sound is

grasped; as, when a conch-shell is being blown, one would

not be able to grasp, the external sounds, but by grasping

the conch-shell the sound is grasped; as, when a lute is

being played, one would not be able to grasp the external

sounds, but by grasping the lute or the player of the lute

the sound is grasped - So by comprehending Ātman or Brahma

everything is comprehended.6 It is said in Chandogya

that, through the grasping of this subject-self "whereby

what has not been heard of becomes heard of, what has not

been thought of becomes thought of, what has not been under-

stood becomes understood"7.

The above elucidation suggests that a close analysis

of the experience points to the external objects or to

the mental facts which we are aware of and at the same time

it reveals that the self is the pure subject to whom the

mental facts and physical objects are 'given'. Every

experience thus reveals not only the object which we

experience but also the essential subject as the abiding

core of all experience.8

In Chāndōgya Upanishad,9 we have a conception of

Self-realization on the above lines. The five Brāhmanās

conceived of Ātman as something apart from themselves. But

this universal Ātman is referred to as one's own true self

by the Upanishadic seer.10 Such an approach is evident in

king Janaka's search11 and Nachikētā's inquiry12 regarding

the ultimate reality. As Kena Upanishad has put it 'the

eyes cannot see it, nor speech approach it, nor the mind

comprehend it, it is different from what has been instructed

into, it is not what we know, it is not what we know not.13

With these considerations let us enquire phenomeno-

logically into the validity of the concept of Self-realization

as that which I am non-focally aware of at a particular

moment. We can bring to light certain structures of Self-

realization as stated above by making use of Husserlian

phenomenologicoeidetic reductions. The main function of

49

phenomenological reduction is to free the phenomena from

all trans-phenomenal elements, notably from all beliefs in

trans-phenomenal existence, thus leaving with us what is

indubitably or 'absolutely' given.... The target of the

phenomenological reduction is the characteristic of being

or existence; hence it concerns only that aspect of our

world which is the object of the "General thesis" of beliefs

in an independent reality. 14 The process of reduction

transcends the world in every respect and that which is

left after reduction is transcendental. This transcendental

some thing, however, does not belong to the world of objects

but is my own essential self and thus exhibits the certainty

of my 'self'. This, in turn, means that every particular

positing or negating presupposes a universal basis: belief

in the self, certainty of the Self. This reflection suggests

the Upanishadic truth that man in search of his highest

experience of value is in effect seeking his own true self.

Ultimately, this 'self-seeking' is a reaching out from

the centre of personality to a still more internal reality.

Looking at this way, the phenomenological reduction which

has been rightly considered as a methodological device

leading to a radical and radically justified philosophical

knowledge 15 suggests that the that which I am non-focally

aware of at a particular moment, is in other words, openness

to one's own true self. Thus under the phenomenological

reduction, openness to one's own true self as an act16 of

consciousness is considered as the experience of the self

by the individual through his relating himself with the

object.

In the light of our foregoing discussion let us

have a re-look at the famous intentionality thesis advocated

by Husserl. All conscious acts, for Husserl, have a funda-

mental directional character. They point toward some

object, whether objectively real or not. Thus all thinking

is thinking of or about something, all remembering is

remembering of something, all imagining is imagining of

something. All consciousness, then, is consciousness of

something. Consciousness is intentional in the sense that

it has as its essential character this projective or

directional activity. What Husserl says is true enough.

However, it should be mentioned that while consciousness

points to an object, it also reveals the essential subject

as the that of which one is non-focally aware of . The

analysis is of the lived experience of man thus gives us rich

insight into the nature of consciousness as such which

points to the essential subject-self as the abiding core

of all experiences. Thus the famous intentionality thesis

can be stretched by stating that intention not only

objectivates, identifies, connects and constitutes the

objects with the consciousness but it also identifies the

consciousness with the experiancing self. Consciousness,

in turn, is the experiancing self. Hence the nature of self

is essentially the same as of consciousness.

These considerations suggest that scientific

psychology, so far, has hardly advanced beyond an inventory

of mental acts and their associative connections. Scientific

psychology pretends to study the subject- self but in result

studies only the mental facts and not the essential subject.

For this reason scientific psychology remains merely

scientific in the sense that it gives an enigmatic and

superficial account of the acts of consciousness and not

consciousness as such. But our analysis goes further than

the merely enigmatic approaches of scientific psychology

and thus avoids the limitations of psychology. Rather, the

phenomenological analysis adopted here, unravels the

essential structures of the subject-self.

Let us now take a closer look at the structure of

intentional acts. Within the structure of the intentional

act, Husserl recognizes two polar, though interrelated

aspects: a subject and an object dimension. The former

he calls the noetic aspect of intentionality, the latter

the noematic aspect. Noesis and Noema correspond to

subjective and objective sides of intentional experience.

and exploits it to the full. Thus the awareness of the

experience of subject- self as the abiding experiencer and

realization are at bottom related. (This aspect is

elaborately discussed in Chapter five).

The above considerations on realization as the

highest experiencing Upanishadic value suggest may be

related to that the phenomenological understanding of values

as eidetic in its Husserlian form. As Spiegelberg says,

"it is developed to operate abstractively with values as

ideal objects."19 The problem of eidetic reduction deserves

emphasis. The eidetic approach like phenomenological

reduction is no more than another methodological device of

investigation. The principla of this method is as follows.

Let us assume that on the table before me, there lies a

black pen of 2" dimension. In the natural attitude, I

perceive this object- pen- as unquestionably real which has

the qualities and characteristics as mentioned above. In

the phenomenologically reduced sphere, the phenomenon pen-

the pen as it appears to me- keeps the same qualities as

an intentional object of my perceiving act. But supposing

I am interested in finding out the qualities common to all

pens. I do not want to do so by method of induction which

not only presupposes the existence of similar objects but

also implies certain unwarranted logical assumptions. I

have before me only this single object perceived. I

transform this perceived object in my fancy, by successively

varying its features, - its colour, size, the material of

which it is made, its surroundings, background and so on.

Thus I may imagine an infinite number of varied pens. But

these variations do not make any difference regarding the

characteristics common to all imaginable pens. This set

of characteristics, unchanged among all the imagined

transformations of the concrete thing perceived, is the

kernel or the essential characteristics of the pen; or

using a greek term, the eidos of the pen. No pen can be

thought of apart from these essential features. Hence, the

eidetic investigations do not deal only with concrete real

things but also with possibly imaginable things. It is in

this sense that we understand Husserl's frequently criticized

dictum that phenomenology has to do not only with objects

perceived but also with objects imagined and that the latter

are even greater importance for the phenomenological

approach."20

Realization as the value- as the 'ought-object' -

is experienced by the individual in the sense that the

individual necessarily seeks realization i.e., the individual

is conscious of realization as a value, as an 'ought-object'. 21

Hence the ideal object- realization- and the experience of it

are in inseparable relation for the simple reason that

whatsoever I contemplate or speak about becomes an object

of value for me only by virtue of my experience of it. Thus

to be an object for realization is to be an object for

experience, and to experience means to experience something

as object. For this reason the 'object simply' of the

natural attitude becomes an 'ought-object' experienced in

the higher stage. Thus realization (of Self) as the ought-

value cannot be attained without a value-experiencing and

value-realizing subject. (This point is elaborately discussed

in Chapter four).

The above elucidation suggests that realization always

involves the polar duality of realization and something

describable as 'object' of realization. The difference is

but a matter of emphasis. It pertains, then, to the

cognitive nature of 'realization' that in every act it has

an object or that it possesses an intrinsic reference to

an object which is other than the act itself. Being

intrinsic to the act, 'this objective reference' is such

that no act can properly be described without specifying

what object it is 'of'. In describing an act, in our

context, - Realization of Self - therefore two things at

least must be specified,

(1) We must state its mode, that is, whether it is a

perception, or a recollection, or an anticipation

or a conception and so on.

(2) We must carefully state its specific objective

reference.

Let us elaborate. Phenomenologically, realization is

examined from within as an experience, not as an inference,

nor as a hypothesis for a future life. It has two salient

features:

(1) It is not an immediately present experience like

the pain of a pin prick but an experience of anti-

cipation. The phenomenological analyses of realization

must therefore focus on what that experience anticipates

and what promises it claims to fulfill.

(2) Careful phenomenological disclosure of the experience

of the anticipation of realization indicates that it

points to something beyond ordinary human conscious-

ness. It is experienced as pointing to a transcendent

condition.

As discussed in the previous chapter the individual

through his action sees through his jīva nature and passes

on to the transcendental that is the Paramātman. At the

first stage, the full nature of jīva is apprehended through

action. On the second stage, this full knowledge of the

empirical self leads through an understanding of its back-

ground and conditions to the Self that is beyond the

empirical self. This realization of the transcendental is

experienced as the climax of action and thus becomes the

highest point of fulfillment.

To understand the above structure of realization, we

should examine how the need for it arises out of human

condition. In the Upanishads, Maitreyī, Uddālaka Āruni,

Ajātaśatru etc. wanted to reach at some perfection which

is 'immanent' in their personal egos i.e., they wanted to

reach an important otherness. The third wish of Nāgiketas

was to acquire knowledge concerning the effect of dying.

In Katha Upanishad we read thus: 'He who knows this

experiencer, as the living self (Ātman) near at hand, Lord

of what has been and of what is to be - He does not shrink

away from him."22 The reflection in Katha Upanishad23

affirms the Upanishadic truth that man in his highest

experience of value is in effect seeking transcendence of

his empirical self. Thus the Upanishadic seer praises the

immanent self by declaring that it is Brahmā, Vishnu, Rudra,

Prajāpati, Agni, Vayu, Indra, Moon, food, Yamā, Earth etc.

He continues "For nature's sake and for its own, Is existence

manifold in thee.... The Soul (Self) of all causing all acts,

Enjoying all, all life art thou! Lord of all pleasure and

delight!..."24 Ultimately this quest for the transcendence

of the empirical self is a reaching out from the empirical

self to an inner reality i.e., transcendental Self. And

this transcendental Self is consciousness as such or

consciousness of consciousness in its ultimate generality.

This Self is the phenomenological ground and source for

the individualized consciousness. Further, the phenomenolo-

gical understanding of Self-realization as ought- value is

possible in virtue of the discovery and disclosure of the

transcendental sphere. In Husserl's words: "Consciousness

in itself has a being of its own which in its absolute

uniqueness of nature remains unaffected by the phenomenological

disconnection. It therefore remains over as a 'phenomeno-

logical residuum', as a region of Being which is in principle

unique, and can become in fact the field of a new science-

the science of phenomenology".25

Now let us bring to light the problem of 'specific

objective reference'. Here the phenomenological notion of

intentionality arises. To say that realization is the

anticipation of the experience/awareness of 'something' is

to say that realization is intentional, or to say that

realization has an objective reference is the same as saying

that anticipation of experience necessarily has intentionality.

"The word 'Intentionality' has been investigated as oriented

towards objects and its structure has been described as

the condition of possibility for the constitution of objects.

Intention means, etymologically, a stretching or reaching

toward or at implying an exertion of will. Its aim is to

grasp and bring to awareness the object intended.26

Intentionality, in other words, is precisely 'this universal

fundamental property of consciousness', to be consciousness

of something. Intentionality in the anticipation of

experience of realization is accordingly a descriptive

characterization of the basic situation in consciousness in

which there is an attentiveness to a meaning on the part

of the subject.

Here we may distinguish the two poles of this

situation, namely subject in its attentiveness and the

object under attention. The subject is manifest purely by

its attending or intending, act, while the object is always

seen in one or another of possible aspects. Consequently

a phenomenological study of Self-realization and value

experience will consider the subjective pole under the

aspect of the particular intending action while the object

will be considered according to the particular sense or

meaning- aspect within which it shows itself. Thus two

correlative avenues are involved in phenomenological

description of an act of intending consciousness. One

concerns the attending or intending action and the other

is concerned with the attended or intended sense, or the

meaning through which an object is attained. Husserl calls

the first as the noetic analysis dealing with the subject

(noesis) involved. The second he terms as noematic analysis,

dealing with the noema or noematic sense involved. A word

of caution is necessary here. Phenomenologically 'object'

does not mean 'thing' existing in a given universe

independent of consciousness (the so called objective world).

It means rather 'object', something up against something

else, namely up against a subject. Absolutely every

meaning is an 'object' (or objectivity) in the phenomeno-

logical sense and gives a meaning - for the subject.

Under this caution, the phenomenological account of

intentionality can and should be drawn a little further to

our context of Self-realization as the value-sought. With

the above caution, we can speak of the experiencing subject-

pole as the empirical ego - an ego known precisely only

as the subject - pole of the intentional act and not as

some kind of abiding substance. In the exercise of the

reflective description, the ego recognizes a field of

experience in which the ego is the activating centre. This

field is precisely my consciousness and it is a consciousness

only as mine, viz., as activated by the subject-pole that

is the empirical ego. Any thing that makes its appearance

does so in my consciousness, in my experiencing. So also

the anticipation of realization is experienced as the value-

ought by the empirical ego in my consciousness because a

meaning is set up or formulated in my attention to it by

the empirical ego. Thus the experience of the empirical

ego intends the 'object' naively and directly. What we

mean by the objective reference, then, is this intending

of an 'object' by the empirical ego, through its intentional

duplicate. The empirical ego, in this stage, sees through

its empirical nature and passes on to the transcendental

that is Paramātman. And this is the second stage. Until

the transcendental stage takes place, the empirical ego

experiences realization as an anticipation.

So far we have been examining the concept of Self-

realization phenomenologically. It has been shown that

the phenomenological analysis of the above concept is the

examination of the structure of every day experience. The

phenomenological structure of Self-realization as the

repository of highest experiencing Upanishadic value is,

ultimately, the openness of oneself to his own true self.

Looked at in this way, realization is experienced not only

as a subjective psychological state but also as pointing

to a fulfilling objective viz., transcendence of the empirical

self. Thus there arises two important questions: (a) How

is it possible that the individual self (Jīvātman) accomp-

lishes Self-realization by meaningful acts, that he is guided

by ends to be attained and motivated by such experiences?

(b) What is the structure of consciousness to which concepts

of realization, of meaning, of ends, of acts, refer? We

shall answer these questions in our next Chapter. Phenomeno-

logical analysis of Self-realization hitherto has opened

an avenue for answering these questions and has in fact

already made a beginning in providing analysis through

this avenue.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Farber, Marvin, "The Phenomenological view of Values" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 24, p. 552.

2. The point of reference of 'Ātmanized Absolute' is jIva's realizing its true nature and passes on to the transcendental. Thus jIva reveals itself as the absolute. For a further clarification see page pp. 56-ff

3. Katha., 4.1 (The Self-existent (Svayambhū). Pierced the openings (of the senses) outward; therefore one looks outward, not within himself (antarātman). A certain wiseman, while seeking immortality, Introspectively beheld the Soul (Ātman) face to face).

4. Brih., 2.4.5.

5. Mund., 1.1.3.

6. Brih., 2.4.7-9.

7. Chānd., 6.1.1-3.

8. Spiegelberg says that the pure phenomenological treatment of values proceeds from feelings, desires, and insights as such manifested in experience by persons as such, all viewed abstractively and 'essentially'. Spiegelberg, Herbert., 'Phenomenology of Values', Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. 24., p. 559.

9. Chānd., 5.11-18.

10. Ibid.,

11. Brih., 4.1.1 - 4.3.6.

12. Katha., Upanishad.

13. Kena., 11(3) It is conceived of by him by whom of, knows It not. It is not conceived by those who (say they) understand It. It is understood by those who (say they) understand It not.

14. Spiegelberg, Herbert., The Phenomenological Movement.

A Historical Introduction, 2nd ed., Martinus Nijhoff.,

Hague, 1965, p. 134.

15. It is thus interpreted by Marvin Farber. The

Foundation of Phenomenology; Edmund Husserl and

the quest for a rigorous science of philosophy

(2nd ed.), N.Y., Paine Whatman Publishers, 1962.

16. Husserl defined "acts" not as psychological activities

but as intentional experiences. Farber, Marvin;

Op. cit., pp. 343 ff.

17. Op. cit., p. 15.

18. Husserl, Edmund., Formal and Transcendental Logic,

Halle, 1929, section 59, quoted from Op. cit., p. 19.

19. Spiegelberg, Herbert "Phenomenology of Values",

Op. cit., p. 558.

20. Natanson, Maurice Alexander., (ed.), Essays in

Phenomenology, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1966

p. 37.

21. Spiegelberg says that ethical objects are not

to be held primarily being- objects; they are

rather ought- objects i.e., they necessarily press

on to realization. Spiegelberg, Herbert "Phenomenology

of Values", Op. cit., p. 553.

22. Katha., 4.5.

23. Ibid., 5.12.

24. Maitri., 5.1.

25. Husserl, Edmund., Ideas , London, 1931, p. 113.

CHAPTER III

THE TWO EGOS

In the earlier chapter we have discussed the

concept of Self with reference to that which I am non-

focally aware of. It has also been noted that the

phenomenological structure of realization as highest value

may be understood in terms of openness of oneself to his

own true self. Thus realization as a value is experienced

not only as a subjective psychological state but also as

pointing to a fulfilling objective: the individual self

(Jīvātman) opens itself to itself through the unfolding

of acts. The openness involves "atmanizing of experiences"1

i.e., it installs the self above the parochial manifestation

of events of the psyche, and things of the outer world.

Further, it may be pointed out that, it is not our feeling-

states as such- no matter of what quality they may be- which

determine this openness. It is rather the intentionality

of self- self2 being directed upon the Self3 - that reveals

as genuine objects and ideal essences, which constitutes

a special value-realm i.e. the value realm of Self-

realization. We thus face the individual self which

mediates between the value-realm of Self-realization and

the things that it experiences. Therefore our enquiry

points us to unfolding the structural analysis of realiza-

tion with reference to the Upanishadic conception of

jīvātman as the empirical ego and Paramātman as the

transcendental ego. Let us begin this analysis by referring

to Husserl's notion of the transcendental ego through which

we may be provided with the basis for an understanding of

the structural characteristics of realization that has been

described as the identity of jīvātman with Paramātman.

Husserl's doctrine of the transcendental ego is also

reminiscent of the Upanishadic concept of Paramātman.

The paradigm of the intentionality of consciousness

mentioned in the earlier chapter can serve as a basis for

a brief explication of the transcendental ego and its

implications to Self-realization.

When we focus our attention on any object of

apprehension - a physical object, an abstraction, a feeling,

an anticipation - no problem regarding the nature of ego

appears. But when the intentionality of consciousness

directs itself on the ego proper, when I explore my own ego,

then the analysis of consciousness demands that we postulate

two different egos in experience, the ego that is perceived

and the ego that does the perceiving or apprehending. For

Husserl, as also for the Upanishads, the transcendental

ego is the ultimate core of consciousness. It cannot be

apprehended in the manner of an object, since it is the

perennial subject. But it is nevertheless present in

experience. Svetāsvatara Upanishad depicts the Universal

and the individual self (transcendental ego and the

empirical ego) thus: "Two birds, fast- bound companions,

clasp close the same tree. Of these two, the one eats

sweet- fruit; the other looks on without eating"4 Pheno-

menological analysis makes it plain that the individual

self-Jīvātman - turns to the ultimate foundations of

consciousness (Paramātman) when it experiences realization

and thus becomes a non-focal point of all experiences.

Furthermore, the individual self, the experiencer, is

'constituted' - by the 'acts' within his consciousness.

Thus in the fifth meditation Husserl says that even when

I apply doubt to others and am alone, still my 'ego', from

within its own proper being, can, somehow 'constitute' the

other. He proceeds: "If I try to limit my transcendental

experience to what is strictly mine, abstracting from any

outside spirituality, nothing remains but my body and my

psycho-physical unity and personality... The reduced

world is interior to the self, while within this world the

self is one of the "exteriorites".5 In this way the

subject withdraws from the objects of the world into zones

of its own self awareness. Thus the individual self,

through its openness to its true self, shares the

immediacy of the Universal self. (Paramātman). To put it

clearly, the individual ego (Jīvātman) looks upon itself

and in fact this "reflexivity" ultimately brings it face

to face with Paramātman, the Universal self or Transcendental

ego.6 As Mundaka Upanishad has stated, "in this stage, the

seer sees the brilliant maker, by being a knower, shaking

off good and evil, stainless he attains supreme identity

(sāmya) (with Him)."7 Let us explain it. The transcendental

self (or transcendental ego) manifests itself in consciousness

in a manner altogether distinct from ordinary objects of

experience. A description of the appearance of transcendental

Self discloses it to be the 'Inner Self'. Let us elaborate

by pointing out the following.

(1) The transcendental Self is the Source and summation

of the empirical self: this is experienced in Self-

realization. That is to say that whenever the individual

experiences realization which is the highest fulfillment

of the empirical self, it points to 'something' beyond the

empirical ego, the Self transcends the empirical self.

I experience my anxiety, my joy, my feeling, my desire and

the like. The 'I' that does the experiencing is structurally

different from that which it experiences. That which I

experience is my anxiety, my joy etc. The empirical self

may be understood as constituted. The properties of the

transcendental ego cannot be those of the empirical ego,

as the latter is itself experienced. This amount to

saying that the transcendental Self is a non-experienced

locus in empirical consciousness and that locus is and

remains as the ultimate subjectivity. That is why the

Upanishadic Seer depicts this Transcendental Self- Ātman

as the unperceived all-functioner and universally immanent

Inner Controller. The seer Says:

"He is the unseen Seer, the unheard Hearar,

the unthought Thinker, the ununderstood

Understander. Other than He there is no Seer.

Other than He there is no hearer...."8

Consequently the language of objectivity cannot legitimately

make reference to the transcendental self. If we now assume

that an exposition of the transcendental Ego is one clue

to the phenomenological understanding of self- realization,

then we may make sense of many of the manifestations of

realization. The Upanishadic view that knowledge of Ātman

can be evoked only by designating what he is not (Neti,

Neti)9

"But the soul (Ātman) is not this, it is not

it (neti, neti). It is unseizable, for

it cannot be seized. It is indestructible,

for it cannot be destroyed. It is unattached,

for it does not attach itself. It is unbound.

It does not tremble. It is not injured...."9

Corresponds to the fact that the transcendental Ego is

not accessible to ordinary forms of experiencings and their

linguistic equivalents. Negative statements are needed

not only for the description of transcendental Self, but

for an apprehension, suggestion and appreciation of that

Self.

(2) The transcendental Self is the matrix of the

empirical self. That is to say that the transcendental

Self is the continuous background of changes in the empirical

self. These changes in the empirical Self are shifts in

mood focus, growth, outlook, attitudes, desires and so on.

In the midst of such chaos, the empirical self experiences

itself to be the same throughout leads to our next point.

(3) The conception of both the death and the birth

(i.e., the non-existence) of the transcendental Self is

impossible. It requires the transcendental Self to think,

imagine or conceive the death and birth of an ego. It also

takes the transcendental Self to think of sleep or unconscious-

ness of the empirical self. The ego whose death is antici-

pated and the ego whose birth is thought is the empirical

ego. Birth and death are properties of objects and apply

only to the empirical ego. But the transcendental Self is

given as the essential subject i.e., "... Him who is

called Om, a leader, brilliant, sleepless, ageless, deathless,

sorrowless. "10

(4) Transcendental Self is outside of both space and

time. Space and time are cogitata, that is intentions

and constitutions of the empirical self. As space and time

are cogitata to the empirical self, they are not coeval

with the transcendental Self. Several elements within our

experience clearly exclude the representation of space -

numbers, ideals, propositions of logic and in general

universal concepts, - although the exclusion of time is

not equally and immediately obvious. As the Upanishad

says:

"Everything in this world go back to space

and every thing in this world arise out of

space. They disappear back into space, for

space alone is greater than these..."11

and

"From time flow forth created things. From

time, too, they advance to growth. In time,

too, they disappear. Time is a form and

formless too. These are assuredly two forms

of Brahma: Time and the timeless. That which

is prior to the Sun is the Timeless (a-kāla),

without parts (a-kāla). But that which begins

with the Sun is Time, which has parts..."12

The above passages from the Upanishads disclose the

transcendental Self to be non-temporal and non-spatial.

Both time and space are observed and meant by the objects.

Space and time are intended to apply to the physical

universe but the transcendental Self cannot be intended in

space and time.

(5) These considerations suggest that transcendental

self and its realization may be described phenomenologically

as the 'experience' of an empty consciousness. Consciousness

is there, but the contents are gone. The particular

determinations and differentiations have been eliminated

in this experience. Such is the 'experience' of the

transcendental Self. That is the realization of one's own

true self. Husserl has designated it as the "Pure look",

the outward gaze without objects. Such a vacuous "look"

such an empty universe is depicted in the Upanishads too.

The subject-object duality in experiences do not have any

meaning at all in this unique experience. As Yājnavalkya

asks: 'Where, verily, everything has become just one's

own self, then whereby and whom would one smell....'13

(6) The transcendental Self has close affinity and

may be considered identical with the transcendental realm

of the 'experience' of Self-realization (which is the

unison of the jīvātman with Paramātman). As is shown

in the first chapter of our thesis, all values are related

to a single core, the realization of Self in which all

other value potentialities are harmoniously and completely

realized. This assertion of the ideal of Self-realization

and of the transcendental Self describes the nature of

transcendental Self with special emphasis on its relation

to the subjective centre of experience that is jīvatman, the

empirical self. (We have described this aspect in our first

Chapter).

(7) The seventh characteristic of the transcendental

Self is its complete freedom and autonomy. The idea that

the Ātman- world or the world of the transcendental Self is

free from evil or sin, free from impurity, blameless

spotless also receives an etymological justification.

'In the beginning this world was Soul (Ātman) alone in the

form of a person (Puruṣa)... since before (pūrva) all this

world he burned up ( us ) all evils, therefore he is a

person (Puruṣa ).14 Among the many Kantian ideas which

Deussen finds in the Upanishads, there is a striking one

in this connection, namely, that the final goal and perfect

condition of the soul is its autonomy. Chāndogya Upanishad

speaks about the meaning of 'Svarāj ' in the following way:

'Verily, he who sees this, who thinks this,

who understands this, who has pleasure in the

Soul, (Self) who has delight in the Self, who

has intercourse with the Self, who has bliss in

the Self - he is autonomous (Sva-rāj ); he has

unlimited freedom in all worlds. But they who

know otherwise than this are heteronomous

(anya - rājan ); they have perishable worlds,

in all worlds they have no freedom.'15

Taittirīya Upanishad declares: '... He obtains self- rule

(Sva-rājya)16. The conception of autonomy hold in the

Upanishads is very different from the idea that an

autonomous person is in such full control of self that he

never by passion disobeys the moral law. The idea of

autonomy is that of unhindered liberty to do what one wills,

the same as the condition of perfect bliss described at

Taittiriya 3.10.5 - a condition in which the successful

aspirant 'goes up and down those worlds, eating what he

desires, assuming what form he desires.'17 These considera-

tions on the autonomy or freedom of the transcendental Self

suggest one common answer to the problem of the meaning of

life. To experience the infinite bliss is to experience

the transcendental Self. This ultimate meaning of life,

i.e., Self-realization is attained only through the

understanding of the transcendental Ego.

In the light of the independent characteristics of

the Universal self above mentioned, it may be understood

that, for the Upanishadic seers, Universal self (Ātman) is

no cogitatum. For them Ātman is the subject in all

objective knowledge, but itself, as unitary, can never be

an object of knowledge.18 In Śvetaśvatara Upanishad we

read thus: That eternal should be known as present in the

self (ātmāsastha) truly there is nothing higher than that

to be known. When one recognizes the enjoyer, the object

of enjoyment, and the Universal Actuator, All has been

said..."19 Thus phenomenologically, our triad is empirical

ego, Cogitatum and Transcendental ego, i.e., Jīvātman .

Phenomenological analysis makes it plain that the

Universal self (transcendental Ego) manifests itself in the

empirical self (Jīvātman) in a manner altogether distinct

from ordinary objects of experience. The understanding of

that separate and distinct character of Jīvātman requires

a new explanation of what awareness is. As David Loy says,

"... No longer do 'I' as the locus of

consciousness, see something external; rather,

the self luminous nature of the thing stands

revealed."20

The above view is expressed by Yājnavalkya to Maitreyi

in the following way.

"For where there is duality (dvaita) as it

were (iva ) there one sees another; there

one smells another; there one hears another;

there one thinks of another; there one understands another;

where, verily, everything has become just

one's own self, then whereby and whom would

one smell?" 21

As the spokes are held together in the hub and felly of a

wheel, just so in this soul (self) all things, all gods,

all worlds, all breathing things, all these selves are held

together.22 This transformed world is not far from Husserl's

notion of the 'transcendental motif' that is of self discovery

and self understanding, for, it is only with such shifts in

one's manner of involvement that the perspective of vision

and freedom of thought necessary for attaining realization

are achieved. For Husserl's use of 'transcendental' in the

'broadest sense' is

"the motif of inquiring back into the ultimate

source of all the formations of knowledge;

the motif of the knower's reflecting on himself

and his knowing life in which all the scientific

structures that are valid for him occur

purposefully, are stored up as acquisitions,

and have become and continue to become freely

available."23

Husserl stresses here the everyday character of his

transcendence: '.... An attitude is arrived at which is

above the pre-givenness of the validity of the world, above

the infinite complexity whereby in concealment, the world's

validities are always founded on other validities, above

the whole manifold but synthetically unified flow.... above

the universal conscious life (both individual subjective

and inter subjective) through which the world is there.24

It is evident from the above considerations on the

transcendental 'motif' that the empirical self (Jīvātman)

phenomenologically should not be understood as a distinct

self that merges with the universal self (Paramātman). To

realize the individual self, (Jīvātman) in essence, is to

realize the Universal Self (Paramātman). In Kausītaki

Upanisad we read: "... He is my Self (ātman) - this one

should know"25. In Brihadāranyaka Upanishad it is stated:

"He who has found and awakened to the Self (soul), that

has entered this conglomerate abode.... As the Lord of

what has been and of what is to be - one does not shrink

away from him."26 In fact the two words - Jīvātman and

Paramātman - are used interchangeably in some Upanishads.

David Loy says:

"Although the two terms serve a function,

since they emphasize different aspects of the

absolute Brahman, that it is the ultimate

reality; Ātman, that it is my true nature."27

There are two paradoxes here (a) Openness to one's

own true self is to become realized, or to become everything

(b) To experience everything as the self is again equivalent

to nothing - although a different sense of nothing.28 But

these difficulties could be resolved by

(1) Conceiving of empirical self (Jīvātman) not

as distinct from Universal Self(Paramātman ) but

as an aspect or reflection of one Universal self.

(2) Conceiving of Universal self (Paramātman) not as

distinct from the unified experiencing self, but

as an ideal of the empirical self.

The resolution of the above paradox may be in

understanding Paramātman as an ego- oriented set of

'Erlebnisse' with its intended worldly contents, and the

Jīvātman as doxically entertaining the world of practical activity. The distinction in other words is between two 'Einstellungen' or basic orientations, the phenomenological attitude and the natural attitude. What is bracketed in phenomenological analysis is a certain attitude or orientation and not Paramātman as the Reality. Linked at in this way, openness to one's own true self is expanding to encompass everything. But this is not simply a transcendental realm, but is a bipolar realm. The two poles, the noesis and noema29 are mental acts and processes and their worldly contents. A hint is seen in Chāndogya Upanishad.

"Now when the eye is directed thus toward space, that is the seeing person (caksusa purusa); the eye is (the instrument) for seeing. Now, he who knows" - that is the Self (Ātman); the nose is (the instrument) for smelling. Now, he who knows "Let me utter this" - that is the Self; the voice is (the instrument) for utterance. Now, he who knows 'Let me hear this' - that is the Self; the ear is (the instrument) for hearing. Now, he who knows - 'Let me think this' - that is the Self; the mind (manas) is his divine eye (daiva saksu). He, verily, with that divine eye the mind, sees desires here and experiences enjoyment."30

The above passage from the Upanishad suggests that openness of oneself to his own true self is a transcendental realm only in the sense in which the ego cogito is given its worldly contents and world horizon. As Husserl says :

transcendental means isolated consciousness, the pre-worldly subjective possibility and condition for the world.31

To sum up: openness of oneself to one's own true

self is the best description of Self - realization. The

true abode of Paramātman is in the Jīvātman, the

experiential self. The phenomenologically disclosed content

of the empirical self (Jīva) is the deeply felt practical

(rather than the purely logical, intellectual and theoretical)

extinction of individual experience/ human existence in the

world. The phenomenological analysis suggests that, the

individual self (Jīvātman) ultimately discovers that in

essence it already is Parmātman, the Universal Self.

As we proceed, another structural characteristic

of the concept of Self-realization emerges. The Upanishadic

seers have the notion of a Universal Ātman who is intimately

connected with the spatiality of Jīvātman. "The Ātman does

not reside in Sun, Breath, Water etc., rather it inhabits

the space of one's own self."32 The twelfth Kanda of

Chāndōgya Upanishad affirms this Upanishadic truth. The

Upanishad says:

"Verily, what is called Brahman - that is the

same as what the space outside of a person is.

Verily, what the space outside of a person is -

that is the same as what the space within a

person is. Verily, what the space within a

person is - that is the same as what the space

here within the heart is. That is the full, the

non-active. Full, non-active prosperity he

obtains who knows this."33

The same view is expressed by Gārgya to Ajāthasatru in

Brihadāraṇyaka Upanishad.34 These passages suggest that

the spaces in which we live and move and experience have

characteristic aspects not only with the varied patterns of

our bodily capacities to perceive and act upon the world

around us, but also to transcend it. "That is the full,

the non-active".35 The transcendence of which Husserl

speaks is a movement across from the "natural stnight

forward living towards objects" to a reflective attitude -

in which, for a time, we do not focus on the objects of our

perceptual and other intentional attitudes. Instead we

pay reflective attention to the intentions, and more exactly,

to ourselves in forming and having them. Husserl says:

"... we are subjects for this world... experiencing it, contemplating it, valuing it,

relating purposefully, ... it has an ontic

meaning given by our experiencings ... which we

can realize at will." There are two attitudes;

in one, the perceptive, we are" ... directed

straightforwardly toward the object... our

gaze passes through the appearances towards

what continuously appears through their continuous

unification.... In the reflective attitude (by

contrast)... the sequence of appearances

themselves is thematic, rather than what appears

in them..."36

The reflections suggest that the value- realm of

Self-realization cannot but be described without referring

back to the human person as he is. Paramātman (Universal

Self) and Jīvātman (Individual self) are integral and

mutually determining from the outset. Their differentiation,

but never a separation, is unified at this stage of openness.

As Upanishad says: "That is the full, the non-active."37 To

be opened to one's own true self, therefore, means to

be involved in, engaged in, concerned about and affected

by the experience that is evoked by the self.

The human person referred above is not only my

'thing body' weighing 50 kgs., consisting of a thalamus,

hypothalamus, Cortex etc. nor nerve ganglia, nor is it the

spiritual body of the mystics. It is rather the immediately

experienced and experiencing, lived and living body of my

every day life."... A body which shows itself in experience

to be 'the living envelope of my character' - a body

comprised of organs of action and organs of expression."38

These considerations on the phenomenology of Self-

realization shows that Paramātman as the transcendental

Self is the passive observer and jīvātman as the empirical

ego is the active constituter. The different levels of

experience of empirical ego - jīvātman, (the enjoyer in

Upanishadic terms) thus represent and designate an ideal

ought i.e., the ideal ought of Self-realization. The Greeks

held a view of this ideal ought in which the end is outside

and above man, Plato in the form of Good and Aristotle in God

as the unmoved mover of stars. As Knox says:

"This led to an intellectualism which placed

knowledge first, with the result that no

proper place was left for action."39

But for the Upanishadic seers, the ideal ought of Self-

realization is not outside of the individual but is located

within the individual. Hence our investigation partly

paves way for an initial description/definition of the

Upanishadic concept of Self-realization. Self-realization

is neither a thing nor an event; it is rather the condition

as the possibility of a metaphysical basis and summation

for an ethical ought, the ethical ought of realizing one's

own true self. The above description focusses on the point

that there is an intrinsic relation between the notions

of Self-realization and action. We shall see in our next

Chapter as to how jīvātman - the empirical self- through

actions opens itself to itself and thus realizes and

objectifies the ideal ought of Self-realization.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. The empirical self (Jīva) by realizing its true nature passes on to the transcendental. Thus the empirical self (Jīva) reaches its goal.

2. Self - Jīvātman, the empirical self.

3. Self - Paramātman, the Universal self.

4. Svet., 4.6., Mund., 3.1.1.

5. Husserl, Edmund., Cartesian Meditations., trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague 1960), Section 44.

6. The confrontation with consciousness is described phenomenologically in Martin Buber's timeless I and Thou Also cfr., Luyster, R.W., 'The Concept of the Self in the Upanishads', Philosophy East and West., Vol. 20.

7. Mund., 3.1.3.

8. Brih., 3.7.23.

9. Brih., 4.2.4.

10. Maitri., 7.5.

11. Chānd., 1.9.1.

12. Maitri., 6.14-15.

13. Brih., 2.4.14.

14. Brih., 1.4.1.

15. Chand., 7.25.2.

16. Tait., 1.6.2.

17. Ibid., 3.10.5.

18. Maitri., 6.7 (last part), Brih., 2.4.14.

19. Svet., 1.12. Brih., 2.4.5.

20. Loy, David., 'Nirvana and Moksa', Intemational Philosophical Quarterly, March, 1982., p. 71.

21. Brih., 2.4.14.

22. Ibid., 2.5.15.

23. Husserl, Edmund., The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Philosophy, Tr. Quentin Lauer, N.Y., Harper Torch Book, 1965.

24. Ibid., p. 150.

25. Kaush., 3.8.

26. Brih., 4.4.13-15.

27. Loy, David., Op. cit.

28. The possible explanation for this different sense of nothing is that in this experience the self does not have any objects before it. Further it should be mentioned that in this experience there is no duality between the subject and the object. Phenomenologically, any perceptual thing is always a thing in front of its objective background. The concrete nature of an object stands before our eyes involving such co-meanings: i.e., a background of objects consciously and explicitly meant along with it. Hence the 'table' is a 'table in the room', 'in front of the window' 'in my house' etc. Thus every particular datum involves references to perceptions. Whereas in this experience i.e. experience of everything as the self, there cannot be a reference to a perceptual object, because the perceiving subject and the perceptual object become one and the same viz., the Self.

29. See the earlier description of 'Noesis' and 'Noema' Chapter 2.

30. Chānd., 8.12. 4-5.

31. Farley, Edward., "Phenomenological Theology", Man and World - An International Philosophical Review. Vol. 12, No.4, 1979, pp. 498-508.

32. This contention is made in some of the Upanishads especially in Chandogya Upanishad, 7.13.1-2.

33. Chānd., 3.12. 7-9.

34. Brih., 2.1.5-6.

35. Chānd., 3.12.9.

36. Husserl, Edmund., Crisis, Op. cit., p. 105.

37. Chānd., 3.12.9.

38. Moss, D.M., 'Brain, Body and World Perspectives on Body Image'. In R.S. Valle & M. King (eds.), Existential-Phenomenological Alternatives in Psychology, N.Y., Oxford Univ. Press, 1978.

39. Knox, Malcolm Sir., 'Action' George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1968, p. 184.

CHAPTER IV

THE AGENT-EGO

Let us now gather together the threads of our discussion to take stock of the position reached so far.

We stated that apparently twenty four conceptions as the claimants for the position of highest value are found in the principal Upanishads. After careful scrutiny, we set aside all of them except Self-realization as the highest Upanishadic value. As we examined the concept of Self-realization from the phenomenological point of view, our interest focussed on what phenomenology has to offer in support of the reformulation and consequent justification of the concept of Self-realization. As a consequence, our study may be taken as an examination of man's deeply felt problems and higher aspirations.

Phenomenology examines life from 'within' and locates the experiences within the human situation. Similarly, Self-realization as the highest Upanishadic value is examined from within as an experience of anticipation, not as an inference nor as a hypothesis for a future life.

The phenomenological understanding of Self-realization is not reductionistic: the experience of anticipation of realization may not be reduced to mere feelings, nor to

psychological, sociological or anthropological frame of

reference.

The phenomenological structure of realization demands

as to how the need for it arises out of human condition.

We understand from the Upanishads that the individuals like

Maitreyi, Uddalaka Aruni, Ajatasatru, Naciketas, Svetaketu

etc. wanted to reach an important 'otherness' in the

sense that they wanted to transcend their empirical egos.

Thus the structure of realization that emanates from the

phenomenological disclosure is that, ultimately, Self-

realization means the experienced oneness of the empirical

self (Jivatman) with the transcendental Self (Paramatman).

Since the transcendental self is experienced as continuous

with the empirical self1, the goal of union is a hope, an

anticipation and a possibility.

If the phenomenological understanding of values is

'eidetic' in Husserlian form, that is, if it is developed

to operate abstractively with values as ideal objects, then

the notion of Self-realization may be phenomenologically

termed as the one which I am non-focally aware of at a

particular moment. Looked at in this way, we showed that

the phenomenological understanding of realization as the

repository of the highest Upanishadic value is openness of

oneself to his own true self. Hence realization is experir

not only as a subjective psychological state but is also

experienced as pointing to a fulfilling objective and

transcending condition, which are reached by the jīvātman

through the unfolding of acts. Thus we attempted to

describe/define the concept of Self-realization not in

terms of an event, nor a thing but in terms of the absolute

possibility of a metaphysical basis for a value ought.

Self-realization is attained by genuine human endeavour

because jīvātman, the empirical self, accomplishes

realization by acts which are motivated and guided by this

goal. Our discussion in this chapter concerns the agency

of jīvātman. In the following pages we would like to

unravel the position of jīvātman, the empirical self, as

the agent in an individual's various functions.

The Upanishadic conception of self as an agent

includes the following elements.

(1) The Upanishadic seers have conceived of self as

non-created, that is, it has no beginning. It does not

produce itself nor it did come into existence by the operati-

of natural process. Thus in Katha Upanishad we read :

"The wise one (i.e., the soul, the ātman, the self) is not

born, nor dies. This one has not come from anywhere, has

not become anyone. Unborn, constant, external, primeval,

this one is not slain when the body is slain."2 Thus the

seer advocates that the self is incomprehensible except

as existent. It cannot be apprehended by speech, nor by

mind and not by sight. It can only be comprehended other-

wise than by one's saying, 'It is'.3 Further, when it has

been comprehended by the thought 'It is', its real nature

manifests itself.4 Looked at in this way, it may be said

that self as the agent is not fashioned by any human agent.

It is stated in Mundaka Upanishad that this agent-self is

the source of all forms of existence5, the source of the

activity of the senses6, the Source of the world- the

immanent Soul of things7(It may be noted here that in

Taittiriya Upanishad there is a view of the original self

developing non-existence of self8 but this theory is

controverted in Chandogya Upanishad.9).

(2) It is said to be a spirit,a spiritual substance.

Brihadāranyaka Upanishad says: ".... This shining, immortal

person who is in this Soul (self) and, with reference to

oneself, this shining, immortal person who exists as soul-

he is just this soul, this immortal, this Brahma, this

all."10 It is also stated in Katha Upanishad that it is

immanent in all the universal entities whether they are

big or small. Although it is dwelling in the body, it is

bodiless. It is associated with changing things, but it

is unchanging.11 Thus the everlasting, beginningless,

that the self is active and thus responsible for its

acts is incompatible with either the claim that it is

passive or that its activity produces no effects. Thus

Yājnavalkya says: Whatever one desires, so one becomes.

Jīvatman being the ray of Paramatman can become as he

thinks. This is clearly brought out in the following

words of Yājnavalkya:

"Verily, this soul (self) is Brahma, made of

knowledge of minds, of breath, of seeing, of

hearing of earth, of water, of wind, of space,

of energy and of non-energy, of desire and of

non-desire, of anger and of non-anger, of

virtuousness and of non-virtuousness. It is

made of everything. This is what is meant by the

saying 'made of this, made of that'. According

as one acts, according as he conducts himself,

so does he become. The doer of good becomes

good. The doer of evil becomes evil. One

becomes virtuous by virtuous action, bad by bad

action."15

The above consideration suggests that the Self is responsible,

answerable, for all his activities. Yājnavalkya reiterates

a similar view while debating with Arthabhaga.16

(4) It is said to be obscurely related to the body.

As is stated in Katha Upanishad, the limiting adjuncts of

the mind and senses having the capacity to incorporate the

intelligence of the all-pervasive principle, give rise to

an individual consciousness, called Jīvatman or Bhokta.17

It is called the shadow of the supreme person as this

individual self is a reflection of the supreme person in the

mind and senses. Individual self is, basically, the

supreme self. The individualization is due to one's

ignorance of one's true nature.18 This relation of the

self with body is clearly expressed in the Brihadāranyaka

Upanishad in there words: "Citadels with two feet he

did make. Citadels with four feet he did make. Into

the citadels he, having become a bird - Into the citadels

(puras) the person (purusa) entered....19 Sankara,

remarking on this mantra, says that Ātman Himself is

manifested, internally, (in the form of jīvātman, agent)

and, externally, in the form of body and worldly objects.

(Kāryakāranarūpēna). This mantra, for, Sankara preaches

the oneness or extreme non-duality of Ātman (Self).20

(5) It is said to be immortal, to survive the death of

its body. In Katha Upanishad, Yamā exhorts Naciketas

that the knowing self is not born and he does not die.21

He has neither sprung from anything, nor he is modified

into something birthless, eternal, everlasting and ancient.

It is not killed when the body is killed.22 In Brihadāranyak-

Upanishad the imperishability of agent - self is asserted

in this manner:

".... O Gargi, Brāhmanās call the imperishable

(aksara). It is not coarse, not fine, not

short, not glowing (like fire) not adhesive

(like water), without shadow and without darkness,

without air and without space, without stickiness,

93

(intangible) odourless, tasteless, without eye, without ear, without voice, without mind, without energy, without breath, without mouth, (without personal or family name, unaging, undying, without fear, immortal, stainless, not uncovered, and without outside. It consumes nothing so ever. No one soever consumes it." 23

This imperishable principle cannot be defined and thus is called the unqualified principle. This Ātman (Self) is thus an imperishable and unqualified one. For the Upanishadic seer, this is the only real subject. All the world objects and our mind and intellect are other than the subject. They fall in the category of object. The subject can know the object but the object cannot know the subject.24

That is why Yājnavalkya says "... Across this imperishable, O Gargi, is space woven, warp and woof." 25

(6) It is said to be free or to have free will. This is a claim that when it does something, it could have done otherwise. Thus in Katha Upanishad the seer propounds that the wise man chooses the better rather than the pleasanter. Free and responsible agent is a traditional phrase. It is impossible to enter here into a discussion of these very intricate problems. The following Upanishadic passage suggests that the individual self when it attains the unity with the universal Self is unhampered by any particular desires or will. He who knows that, on departing

from this world, proceeding on to that Self which consists

of food, proceeding on to that Self which consists of

breath, proceeding on to that Self which consists of mind,

proceeding on to that Self which consists of understanding,

proceeding on to that Self which consists of bliss, goes

up and down these worlds, eating what he desires, assuming

what form he desires."26 The Upanishads as shown above

speak of the kind of freedom which is free from the

limitations that ordinarily go with being human. Thus the

Upanishadic claim concerning freedom implies that it is

a state of positive experience i.e., the positive experience

of getting identified with the supreme Self. The individual

self has here transcended his empirical limitations by

being identical with his essence, that is Paramātman, and

that is freedom. In this state of freedom the individual

self-Jīva-finds that to realize the Self is to realize his

own ultimate nature which is real and thus that is to be

willed.

(7). It is said to be an identity, a continuant, an

identical substance. This is a way of saying that the

agent-self can be present in different activities and at

different times. In Katha Upanishad this view of the

agent-self is conceived as the substratum of everything.27

In a noteworthy passage in Brihadāranyaka Upanishad it is

stated that the Self is performing a piece of supernatural

magic in appearing as many. He became corresponding in

form to every form. This is to be looked upon as a form of

him. Indra by his Magic powers (Maya) goes about in many

forms, Yoked are his ten hundred steeds."28 Thus the

agent-self should be looked upon as a unity in diversified

forms and names.29 Katha Upanishad solves this apparent

conflict between the one and the many in the following way.

"As the one wind has entered the world and becomes corres -

ponding in form to every form, so the one inner Soul (Self)

of all things is corresponding in form to every form, and

yet is outside."30

(8) Note must also be taken of the dual aspects of the

self. In Svetasvetara and Mundaka Upanishads we read:

"Two birds associated together, and mutual friends, take

refuge in the same tree. One of them eats the sweet fig;

the other abstaining from food, merely looks on."31 The

two birds were explained as the vital spirit and the supreme

spirit. The tree is the human body. The bird that eats

the fruit is the self that enters fully into the experience

of physical life. It participates in eating, drinking,

waking, sleeping, breeding, suffering and dying. It enjoys

the fruits of the life of the body. The bird that does not

eat the fruit but merely watches the activity of the first

bird is the second Self which accompanies the first in

all its experiences and doings. The second Self refrains

from any entanglement in bodily pursuits. It only

contemplates on the life of physical activity. The second

Self does not ensure the first for its enjoyment of the

life of the body, but when the first self compares its

own helplessness with the greatness of the second Self,

it grieves and turns its back to the life of sorrow and

bondage. The same duality comes through in a straight

forward manner in other parts of the Upanishads. "Two

there are who dwell within the body, in the buddhi, the

supreme ākasa of the heart enjoying the sure rewards of

their own actions"32 (Buddhi is the intellect associated

with the heart. Ākasa is the pure space within the heart).

The Upanishadic seers thus postulated two selves: lower

self and higher self, or empirical self and transcendental

self. The empirical self lives in the bodily activities and

the transcendental Self transcends these activities. The

two selves are closely related and seem to be harmonious

while associated with the body. Thus in Maitri Upanishad

the self is described as "the immortal leader in all

activities." As perceiver, thinker, goer, evacuator,

begetter, doer, speaker, taster, smeller, seer, hearer- and

he touches - the All pervader ( i.e. the soul, the ātman,

the self) has entered the body33.

Thus the self is clearly considered as the agent

by the Upanishadic seers. The living and eventually dying

human being is understood as that Self from which all

functions are derived as abstractions. On the other hand,

self as the agent in various functions of an individual is

an abstraction as well. The agent-self and supreme self

are not merely parts of one conglomerate, this is evident

by the considerations of their mutual requiredness34. Agency,

in this way, gives identity and function to the individual

self. It gives identity in the sense that our acts of

choice and thought are given content and direction by our

habits, desires, feelings, motivations, thoughts and so on.

Thus in Aitareya Upanishad it is stated that our actions

have bearing upon the self, the agent35. Aitareya Upanishad

talks about self as follows.

"Self is the one whereby one sees, or whereby

one hears, or whereby one smells odours, or

whereby one articulates speech, or whereby one

discriminates the sweet and the unsweet; that

which is heart (hrdaya) and mind (manas) - that

is consciousness (Samjnana) perception (ajana),

discrimination (vijnana), intelligence (Prajnana),

Wisdom (Medhas), insight (Drsti), Steadfastness

(drti), thought (Mati), thoughtfulness (Manisa),

impulse (Juti), memory (smrti), conception

(Samkalpa), purpose (Kratu), life (asu), desire

(Kama), will (Vasa), All these indeed are

appellations of intelligence (Prajnana)."36

98

These functions of the individual self are recognizable

experiences that do not gain in precision by being taken

all-together- at once. It also suggests that the agency of

Jīvātman not only includes sensory experiences of objects

but conceptual knowledge, memory, imagination, thought,

desire will and the like. As the seer states, these are

only appellations (of intelligence). Hence it is no

overstatement to say that Jīvātman as the agent produces

affective and cognitive action tendencies. We can conclude

by stating that the self being the agent may be said to

have an intrinsic structure characterized by the following:

(1) Jīvātman - the Individual self- as the agent in an

individual's activities is ontologically dependent upon the

existence of Paramātman - the supreme Self.37

(2) Jīvātman, the agent-self, has the capacity to

originate action of both cognitive and volitional sorts.38

II

In the foregoing section we have sought to explicate

and evaluate the agency of Jīvātman, the individual self.

Some comments on the non-agency theory are in order.

First of all we shall consider in brief Sankara's view

on the Individual self.

99

Sankara's view on the individual self is most

striking, for, he was the only one of the commentators on

Bādarāyana's Vedānta Sūtras who did not interpret the

individual self to be in reality an agent. Since the

existence of the self is a presupposition of all reasoning,

argued Sankara, any attempt to prove the existence of the

self in one sense cannot but fail "Just because it is the

self, it is impossible for us to entertain the idea even

of its being capable of refutation. For the knowledge of

the self is not in any person's case, adventitious, nor

established through the so-called means of right knowledge:

it rather is self established"39 The doubter cannot doubt

that he as doubter exists. As Bradley has put it ".....

either in endeavouring to deny it, or even in attempting

to doubt it, we tacitly assume its validity."40

For Sankara, Jīva or individual self is a subject.

The significance of this observation can be revealed in

noting three rejections which are implied in the statement.

In the first place, if the Jīva is a subject it cannot be

an object. The knower as knower cannot be known. The 'I'

that is known is not 'I' but 'me'. The self cannot be

known in the usual subject-object form of knowing. Secondly,

the self as subject cannot be a creator of the world.

Sankara says that the self is the witness (Saks.in). It

reveals objects of knowledge, it does not fashion them.

Things of the empirical world are discovered by the self;

they are not dependent on the self for their existence,

although they do owe their meaning and significance to the

self. These things do not become known except as they are

witnessed by the self. Thus the self is a necessary

condition for objects of knowledge, not, for the existence

of things, just as light is necessary for objects of sight,

not for things themselves. To be conscious of, or to know,

is to witness, not to create. In the third place, the

self as subject cannot be unconscious. Consciousness is

not an adventitious quality of the self as it was for the

Nyāya-Vaiśesika philosophers, nor is the self essentially

unconscious as it was for the Sānkhya philosophers: rather

consciousness is the essence of the self. The spiritual

unity which underlies the plurality of Jīva is called Ātman.

Jīva is the Ātman endowed with a psycho-physical organism.

It is consciousness which appears in the form of an internal

organ. (Antakarana)41.

For Sankara, the self cannot be considered as an

agent; it is the witness. The Individual 'soul' is an

agent only so long as it is associated with the upādhis.42

The Brahma-Sutras 2.3.16-53 deal with the nature of self

and its relation to Brahman. All except Sankara interpret

these sutras to mean that the self is atomic, an agent.

Sankara says that the atomicity and agency are not the

Jīva's real nature but its nature as a Samsārin-

(transmigrating entity) and that in reality it is all

pervasive and identical with Brahman. There are different

statements about the nature of Jīva and these he reconciles

in this section, showing thereby that in its real nature

it is not created and is identical with Brahman, but as a

samsārin, it is an effect, atomic, an agent and a part of

Brahman.43 Thus it is evident that although Sankara accepts

the identity of Jīva with Brahman, he argues that Jīva

is not the agent but a sākṣin (witness).

x x x x

It may be of interest to note here that, while,

human agent has often been thought of as 'active' by the

Western philosophers in the sense that he can start chains

of events in the world, many have on the other hand, denied

agency to the self. For them the self is a bundle of

perception44 (Hume) or a thought requiring no thinker45

(W. James), a group of cognita46 (R.G. Collingwood), a set

of relations47 (B. Russell), a grammatical fiction48 (Whately,

Carington), a grammatical mistake49 (B. Mayo), an activity50

(H.J. Paton) and so on (the list is, of course, not exhaustive).

It is held by these philosophers that self implies activity

but activity does not imply agency. It appears that they

do not allow the proposition that activity implies an

agent as they desired to avoid the traditional notion

of self which necessarily brings the notion of causation

with agency. The theory of agency is that every action

involves direct causation of an event by an agent. "Some...

causal chains... have beginnings," writes Taylor, "and they

begin with agents themselves". Thus Richard Taylor argues:

"If I believe that something not identical with myself was

the cause of my behaviour- Some event wholly external to

myself, for instance, or even one internal to myself, such

as a nerve impulse, volition, or what not- then I cannot

regard that behaviour as being an act of mine, unless I

further believe that I was the cause of that external or

internal event."51 It is not surprising to find many

theories which propound the view that actions are determined

by contexts, volitions, impulses, or cravings of various

kinds. Hence, let us indicate briefly what the theory

of agency is and also some of those theories which propound

the theory of agency.

The theory of agency involves three theses. 52 The

first thesis is that in any human action there is some event

involved in the act that is caused by the agent whose action

it is. Thus if I perform the act of raising my arm then

it is the case that some event involved in my action is caused by me.

The second thesis is the agency theory's most distinctive and controversial thesis. To understand this thesis it will be helpful to distinguish between immediate and remote causation. Some thing or event is a remote cause of event e provided that it does not cause e but there is some other thing or event it causes which causes e. Thus if some event in my brain causes my muscles to contract, and the muscle contraction causes my arm to rise, the brain event is a remote, but not an immediate cause of my arm rising. What this thesis then proclaims is that in addition to causation by events, there is another kind of causation that cannot be reduced to event - causation; namely agent-causation. When an agent acts he causes some event to occur that has no immediate cause other than the agent.

The third fundamental thesis of the theory of agency concerns the question of what it is for an agent to perform an act freely and thus be responsible for what he does. Here the theory holds that if the agent performed a certain act freely then not only that there is an event involved in the act that is immediately caused by the agent but it is also true that nothing else caused the agent to cause that event. Briefly, the third thesis claims that if I am

responsible for my act then it must be true not only that

I immediately cause some event involved in my act but also

that no event is a remote cause of that event, no event

causes me to immediately cause that event.

Having kept the fundamental theses of the theory

of agency, let us now briefly sketch some of the theories

which propound the 'agency' view but differ with regard

to whether it is my 'self' that acts as the cause of my

action, or whether it is something other than the self,

something external or internal to myself that is the cause

of my action.

Contextual theory

For the contextual theorists, the action is quite

clearly embedded in a larger context of goal- directed and

rule-governed activity. Lawrence H.Davis gives an

example for this theory the following. Sue stepped on the

brake when a child suddenly darted out in the path of the

car.53 In this example the agent is driving a car, an

activity generally aimed at reaching some definite destina-

tion, and subject to a huge structure of formal and informal

rules of the road. Understanding this we can understand

the motion of her foot against the pedal as fitting into

a familiar pattern. The contextual theory then asserts that

1

An agent has done an A, and his doing so was an action,

just in case an E

occurred in a context such that it

fits into some intelligible ( e.g. goal-oriented or rule-

governed) pattern of activity in which the agent is engaged.

54

The Volitional Theory:

The versions of the

contextual theory appeal to philosophers and psychologists

suspicious of alleged references to "inner" phenomena in

the things we say and believe about ourselves and others.

Our beliefs are expressible in language, and language is

learned and taught publicly; how could such references have

crept in, or be important even if they are present? Elabora-

tion of this question and possible responses to it would

entail a thorough survey of recent philosophy of language

and philosophy of mind. The volitional theory suggests that

I am accepting a hypothesis about something "inner" - however,

not a state- and an unknown mechanism linking it to the limb's

motion. This event shall be called a volition. The

volitional theory then postulates 'volitions' and asserts that

an agent has done an A, and his doing an A is an action, just

in case an E

occurred as the result of a volition of the

agent.

55

The Prolific Theory

Advocates of the prolific theory of individuation

tend to an abstract conception of actions and events in general.

The type of an action is regarded as a property of the

agent; the action itself is the agent's exemplifying that

property at the time. If the agent exemplifies two such

properties at the same time, then there are two exemplifyings-

by-him of properties, which is to say, that there are two

distinct actions. A single action cannot then be of more

than one type. There is a problem of how types are to be

individuated. Is praising 'Sue' of the same type as

'praising some one' or 'praising a woman'? We shall not

try to solve this problem. Sam's saying 'very good', his

praising Sue, and his making her happy are, it is fairly

clear, actions of three different types and so according to

the prolific theory they are three distinct actions.56

A Moderate Theory

Many writers are unhappy with the prolific theory

because it prolifirates the number of actions performed by

an agent on a given occasion. Thus Sam's saying very good

to Sue becomes many actions: his uttering two English

words, his saying something to Sue, his changing her mood

and so on, indefinitely. There is no clear limit to the

number of distinct actions performed by Sam on this occasion

according to this theory.

107

An alternative theory enjoying considerable popularity in effect sees the distinction between causal and non

causal gunration as crucial. According to the prolific

thenry, no action causally generates another. Moderate

thenry agrees with the prolific theory in this regard but

the moderate theory insists that there is only one action in

Sam's praising Suc by uttering very good and making her

happy. The prolific theory implies that one action

non-causally generates another, the moderate theory does

not.57

The Austere Theory

According to this theory if an agent does an A by

doing a B, his doing an A and his doing a B are in all

cases the same action. A and B are simply two different

types: exemplified by one action. An implication of the

austere theory is that actions are confined to the space

occupied by their agents and occur only during such time

as their agents are actually doing something.58

In the light of the foregoing discussion, now

let us have a re-look at the agency of Jīvatman. Earlier

while talking about the Upanishadic conception of self as

an agent, we have attempted to show that the Upanishadic

conception of self as an agent includes the following elements

It is not created, but a spiritual substance, obscurely related to the body, active, free and immortal.

It follows that both act and agency are necessary components of jīva, but in a distinctive sense the jīva as the agent-self may be considered primordial because jīva experiences the acts.

The agent and act are mutually implicative of Jīva. This means that the fact of human action establishes the existence of an agent aspect of the Self.

In view of the above considerations let us show that the structure of the act so understood as reflexive of Jīvātman demands the existence of a ground in the human being other than the body and the personality and that therefore man must be allowed a role distinct from these.

We have called it in the Upanishadic context Jīvātman, the empirical Self. Douglas Browning establishes the existence of an 'agent-self' in the following way.

"An act cannot exist as a self-sufficient and autonomous spontaneity, for such an event could exist only as a datum for our acknowledgement, whereas an act is non-datal.... In other words, an act is neither a spontaneity nor a natural occurrence in the world. It is thoroughly dependent for its existence and character upon grounds which have their locus in a being of the sort which we as man are.... It cannot exist for me, as a datum for a subject; it can only exist by me, as act by an agent.... By virtue of his body and personality, man is at least partly datal in nature. As a personality, he has dispositions, traits, and passions. As a physiological organism, he embodies nutritive,

sensory, and locomotive functions. If this were all, man could behave but he could not act. Human conduct cannot be exhaustively studied from the point of view of the processes of personality and protoplasm, for all that can grow out of process is process, whereas human conduct has a distinctive volitional or active dimension. Acts of choice both claim and possess grounds in the human being, and hence the self must serve not only as originator of behaviour but as originator of choice. The conclusion that must be drawn is that the human being not only has a body and a personality but in addition possesses a capacity to serve as agent. The existence of action, which cannot be denied, is thoroughly dependent upon the existence of the agent."59

The above elucidation of the existence of an agent-self ( in our context Jīvātman ) reveals that unless this were so, the moral and cultural aspect of human beings would be an impossibility. As Upanishad says: 'Accordingly, those who are of pleasant conduct here - the prospect is, indeed, that they will enter into a pleasant womb, either the womb of a Brāhman, or the womb of a Kshatriya, or the womb of a Vaisya. But those who are of stinking conduct here - the prospect is, indeed, that they will enter into a stinking womb, either the womb of a dog, or the womb of a swine or the womb of an outcast.'"60 As the Upanishadic passage suggests, that morality requires act and thus the door of the acts. An act is as Browning says how we give ourselves to others and to the world for logical and moral assessment, and hence is the exteriorization of the agent,

but the transaction is completed only through its cultural

and behavioural issue in life, for as an inside, it too

requires its proper public face.61 Looked at in this way,

we can say that self as the agent gives moral identity

and function to the individual. It also stresses that

the empirical self-Jīva- is responsible for the action it

does, (as the locus). For, while acting jīva places himself

in and through the acts. That is why the Upanishad

declares;

"Born along and defiled by the stream of

qualities (Guna), unsteady, wavering, bewildered,

full of desire, distracted, this one goes on

to the state of Self-conceit (abhimānatva).

In thinking 'This is I' and 'That is mine'

he binds himself with his self, as does a

bird with a snare."62

This Upanishadic text points to the fact that the agent-

self not only owes the responsibility of his acts but also

exercises ownership in and through the acts.

As noted earlier, it was argued by Sankara that

the Self revealed in our self-disclosing experience is but

a witness, a sakṣin. Sankara's position implies that the

agent-self has no power to direct or oppose our drives.

Such a contention, however, is in harmony neither with the

facts of man's purposive behaviour, his deliberately planned

and controlled actions nor with the many occasions of self-

control. Moreover, if the agent-self is only a witness to its acts, then there is no reason as to why the agent-self should seek its true nature guided by realization as the end to be attained and motivated by such experiences.

Certain aspects of self as the agent stands out rather clearly from the foregoing sections.

(1) Jīvātman or bhokta is the karta or the agent which manifests itself as an active and self-regulatory living being. It is active because it is the enjoyer (experiencer) of actions. It is self-regulatory, for, its true nature is to attain unison with Paramātman- the transcendental self.

(2) This unity with the transcendental self makes inevitable the agent-self's unique mode of existence as a self-directed becoming, a fact which is essential to his search for Self-realization, the highest value; for it is only in terms of values that it draws from itself.

(3) It is at this level of existence only that Jīva becomes in principle an essentially rational agent. It is at this level that Jīva, as the agent, is aware of the potentialities and capabilities to know its true nature even while indulging itself in various activities.

(4)

To consider the agent-self only as a witness, as

held by Sankara, amounts to saying that it has no power to

direct, re-direct or oppose any drives which is unacceptable.

(5)

Thus it must not be presumed that Jīva is merely

passive or can be just a witness in order to attain the

unison with Paramātman. On the contrary, the process is

essentially an active equilibration and thus in a radical

sense Jīva's experiences/awareness as agent enables Jīva

to attain the realization of its true nature.

(6)

This drive toward realization is rooted in Jīva's

acts because action is at the core of jīva. Although jīva's

actions are neither rigidly nor narrowly predetermined for

Jīva is free or has the free will, its general direction

is fixed to the goal of unison with Paramātman. There is

thus in each jīva an inner force- a force which intensifies

Jīva's urge to become a task unto itself. For, it is Jīva

when is 'engaged' in its attainment of realization.

(7)

In this task of Self-realization, Jīva subjects

itself to a self- image for which Jīva has to direct its

actions in such a way that it leads to the realization of

Self. To fulfill the same Jīva as the agent overcomes the

empirical limitations such as drive for power, for possessions,

for sensuous pleasures, for aesthetic enjoyments, for

intellectual achievements and so on.

(8)

These considerations establish that any theory of

Self which does not accord proper place to Self as agent have

to be rejected as inadequate. Thus the theories like

contextual, volitional, prolific, moderate and austere

theories are rejected for this reason.

On the basis of the above, with reference to the

question of agency of Jīvātman we may re-affirm the point

that there is an intrinsic relation between the notions of

Self-realization and action. This conclusion is supported

by the phenomenological analysis of experience. This analysis

has been undertaken from the standpoint of what we experience

ourselves as selves. We shall take up for further discussion

and elucidation those and related problems in the next

chapter.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Śvet., 4.6.

2. Katha., 2.15.

3. Ibid., 6.12.

4. Ibid., 6.13.

5. Mund., 2.1.7

6. Ibid., 2.1.8.

7. Ibid., 2.1.9.

8. Tait., 2.7.

9. Chānd., 6.2.1-2.

10. Brih., 2.5.14.

11. Katha., 2.20.22.

12. Ibid., 3.15.

13. Ait., 5.1.1.

14. Maitri., 6.7.

15. Brih., 4.4.5.

16. Ibid., 3.2.13.

17. Katha., 3.4.

18. Ibid., 3.7.

19. Brih., 2.5.18.

20. Sankarābhāsya on Brihadāranyaka Upanishad 2.5.18.

21. Katha., 2.18.

22. Ibid., 2.19.

23. Brih., 2.5.19.

24. Sharma, Baldev Raj, The Concept of Ātman in the Principal Upanishads, Dinesh publications, New Delhi, 15, 1972, p. 123.

25. Brih., 3.8.11.

26. Tait., 3.10.5.

27. Katha., 3.15-17.

28. Brih., 2.5.19.

29. Ibid., 4.4.20.

30. Katha., 5.10; Brih., 1.6.3.

31. Svet., 4.6; Mund., 3.1.1.

32. Katha., 3.1.

33. Maitri., 6.7.

34. Mund., 3.1.1., Svet., 4.6.

35. Ait., 5.1.1.

36. Ibid., 5.1-2; Katha., 4.3.

37. Mund., 3.1.1; Svet., 4.7.

38. Maitri., 6.7; Ait., 3.1.1; Ibid., 5.1-2.

39. Vedanta Sutras, 11.3.7; Thibaut translation SBE, V1. 38, p. 14.

40. Bradley, Francis Herbert., Appearance and Reality, New York, The Macmillan Company, 1893, p. 120.

41. Organ, Troy Wilson, The Self in Indian Philosophy, London, Mouton, 1964.

42. Vireswarananda, Swami., Brahma-Sutras, Advaita Ashrama, 5 Delhi Entally Road, Calcutta-14, (see the introduction).

43. Ibid., (introduction).

44. Hume, David., A Treatise of Human Nature., Book 1, Part IV, Section VI, (1739).

45. From Scattered pages in William James', Principles of Psychology, (N.Y. Holt, 1890, Chap. 10, Consciousness of Self).

46.a.R.G. Collingwood., Religion and Philosophy, (London, Macmillan, 1916).

b.R.G. Collingwood., The Idea of History (Oxford, the Clarendon Press, 1946), p. 222.

47 a. Russell, Bertrand., The Analysis of Mind, (London, Allen & Unwin, 1921), p. 18.

b. Russell, Bertrand., A History of Western Philosophy, (N.Y. Simon & Schuster, 1945), pp. 201-202.

48. Carington, Whately., Matter, Mind and Meaning, Preface by H.H. Price (London, Methuen 1944), pp. 182-186, and 226-230.

49. Mryn, Bernard., The Logic of Personality, (London: Jonmthan Cape, 1952), Chap. 6, Section 1.

50. Patnn, H.J., The Good Will, (N.Y. Macmillan, 1927), pp. 58-63.

51. Taylor, Richard., Metaphysics, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.H.: Prentice Hall Inc., 1974), p. 55. See also pp. 44-45, and 56-57. Taylor presents his position at length in his Action and Purpose , (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, Inc., 1966).

52. Rowe, William, L. "Two criticisms of the agency theory" Philosophical Studies, 42 (1982), pp. 363-378.

53. Davis, Lawrence H., Theory of Action, (Prentice Hall, Inc., Englewood Cliffs, N.J. Foundations of Philosophy Series), p. 12.

54. Contextual Theorists include A.I. Melden, Free Action, (N.Y. Humanities Press, Inc., 1961), R.S. Peters "The Concept of Motivation" (London, Routledge and Keagan Paul, 1958), and Joseph Margolis, Knowledge and Existence, (N.Y. Oxford Univ. Press, 1973), pp. 146-179). Also cf. Lawrence, H. Davis, Op. cit., p. 12-14.

55. Davis, Lawrence H., "Theory of Action" Op. cit., p. 15.

For an elementary survey of the aforesaid theory, cf: Op. cit., pp. 15-25.

56. A somewhat elaborate account of this theory is given by Lawrence. H. Davis in Theory of Action, Op. cit., pp. 29-32.

57. Ibid., pp. 34-36.

58. The Austere theory has been defended by Donald Davidson in a number of important papers including "Actions Reasons and Causes" Journal of Philosophy, Vol. LX (1963), pp. 685-700.

Davidson, Donald - is perhaps the leading exponent of causation as a relation strictly between events. See for example his "Causal Relations"; Journal of Philosophy, LXIV (1967), pp. 691-703.

59. Browning, Douglas, Act and Agent, An Essay in Philosophical Anthropology, (Univ. of Miami Press, Coral Gables, Florida 1964), pp. 50-51.

60. Chānd., 5.10.7; Svet., 5.11-12, Katha., 5.7; Mund., 1.2.7, 9, 10.

61. Browning, Douglas, Op. cit., p. 116.

62. Maitri., 3.2.

CHAPTER V

THE AGENT-EGO AND THE VALUE-OUGHT

In the preceding chapter we saw that the Upanishadic seers have postulated a basic principle, Jīvātman, as the agent. In this conscious complex is named at one place in Brihadaranyaka Upanishad as Samjna1; and at another place it is expressed as ‘Samanāh sān’2 and again at another place it is connoted by Sarira ātma3 and lingopādhirāatma4.

It is this entity (Bhāva) which undergoes waking, dream and deep sleep states and which is known as the agent (Karta) of the actions and the enjoyer (bhokta) of their fruits.

This principle, Jīva, is the controller and master of the body. Yajnavalkya explains to King Janaka the difference between the gross body and its subtle controller.5 It is just the subject and object aspects of Jīva which Yājnavalkya wants to hint at here from the two names (of Indhā and Virāj)6.

In Svetasvatara Upanishad, the seer expounds that, “In this (self) which vitalizes all things, which appears in all things, the Great-In this Brahma-wheel the soul (Hamsa i.e., individual self) flutters about, thinking that itself (ātmanam) and the actuator are different.”7 As the Upanishadic seer declares,

“… when breathing, he is called the vital force, when speaking voice, when seeing the eye, when thinking the mind. These are merely the

names of his acts. Whoever worships one or

another of these - he knows not, for he is in-

complete wich one or another of these. One

one's self (ātman) for there in all these

become one. That same thing, namely, this self,

is the trace (pādanīya) of this All, for by it

one knows this All...."8

The above Upanishadic passages obviate the necessity

of treating the self (Jīva) as something known in and

through his acts. That is to say that Jīva is aware of his

actions and the fact that he is the agent. This reflection

concerns the status of the act as well as the agent. It

also means that the act-agent relation may be understood

as an exemplification of the relation between Jīva and his

experiences. Act is what is done, what is experienced as

being done or having been done. We see colours, we smell

odours, we feel pain but we perform actions. Acts like

colours can only be known by direct experience. However,

following Browning, we can say of colours that they are

the sorts of things one runs across in observation. One

does not run across acts,9 but one does them. Whatever

the status of experience, experience of act is fully

conscious. One does not experience the pain unconsciously,

also one does not experience his action unconsciously. As

action is experienced, as a doing, not found as a datum

which is sensed. The Jīvātman is the doer and experiencer

of actions. The Upanishad affirms this,

120

"Verily, he who is the doer is the elemental soul. The causer of action through the organs is the inner person. Now, verily, as a lump of iron, overcome by fire and beaten by workmen, passes over into a different form - so, assuredly, indeed, the elemental soul, overcome by the inner person and beaten by qualities passes over into different form."10

As the one experiencer of his manifold acts, Jīva holds: by them together. As the Upanishad declares

"As all spokes are held together in the hub and fully of a wheel, just so in this soul (self) all things, all gods, all worlds, all breathing things, all these selves are held together."11

That is to say that Jīva's awareness and integrity of experience (the two being inseparable) not only makes Jīva aware of its experiences but it also carries with it an equal insistence of Jīva's experiences of itself to itself.

It means that there is a relation not only between jīvātman and action but there is also an intrinsic relation between Self-realization and action. This brings us back to our earlier discussion of Self-realization as openness of oneself to oneself. Let us make this relation more clear.

As remarked earlier a reflexive phase is implied in all conscious experiences. Thus all object-consciousness is also (although only implicitly) self-consciousness. A trivial example may illustrate the point. My frequent exhibition of bad temper may well be a conscious experience,

but it is not yet the consciousness for me that 'I am

bad tempered'. Reflection in this self- consciousness when

it is achieved discloses the possibility of choosing either

to be bad tempered or to cure this failing. This advance

in reflection (which is an advance in moral experience too)

may well be considered as the beginning of openness to

myself. Openness to myself therefore alters what was there

before. In virtue of my developing this openness, I achieve

atleast a measure of understanding/realizing myself.

Therefore openness to oneself is the avenue toward freedom

which leads to the possibility of a (metaphysical) source

and summation for a value-ought. Hence the precept of the

Upanishadic truth - 'Everything in the world is of value as

leading to the realization of One's self' - finds confirmation

as the fundamental truth for a healthy life.

To restate Jīvātman is related to Self- realization

in two different ways:

(1) Existentially, (empirically) Self-realization as the

repository of the Upanishadic highest value is

experienced through action by the empirical ego

(Jīvātman).

(2) Self-realization is awareness of self to self as

transcendental correlate of the transcendental ego

(Paramātman). Self-realization, in brief, is thus

empirically related to Jīvātman and transcendentally

related to Paramatman.

It may be useful for purposes of emphasis to state

this problem in the form of a paradox. Self-realization is

experienced in action and action obstructs Self-realization.

The paradox, however, is quite transparent, for the word

experience is used obviously in different senses, the one

being the everyday familiar sense and the other an obscure

phenomenological sense requiring clarification.

To substantiate, it is important to trace the

phenomenological understanding of the concept of experience.

As shown below, the phenomenological concept of experience

includes all those ingredients which are suppressed by

philosophy but which give the word 'experience' its

comprehensive meaning in everyday discourse. The phenomeno-

logical concept of experience allows us to grasp precisely

that 'thing itself' which is meant by the word experience.

Let us first indicate how the concept of experience

is developed by Husserl from his critique of Locke. Locke's

essential contribution, thought Husserl, was that he set

out a history of human interiority in which the content of

consciousness (ideas) is traced back to that which is

ultimately and simply given. These are the objects of

sensation and reflection for Locke.12 All of our knowledge

stums from experience. All of our ideas have their origin

in it.13 Thus there are only two sources of our ideas,

sensation and reflection. The sensations convey into the

mind several distinct perceptions of things according to

those various ways wherein those objects do affect them.14

And the other foundation from which experience furnishes

the understanding with ideas is the perception of the

operations of our minds within us….15 According to

Husserl, Locke has simply taken over the Cartesian distinction

between 'res cogitans' and 'res extensa' and thus presupposed

that it was self- evident. Thus Husserl objected that Locke

could not carry out his programme of uncovering the origin

of all of our ideas. Briefly, Locke failed to integrate

the distinction between inner and outer concerning its

origin.

The philosophical concept of experience, for Husserl,

retains in itself the distinction between outer and inner

(experience). The phenomenological analysis of the concept

of experience that is determinative for our understanding of

the intrinsic relation between Self- realization and action

has to present a concept of experience that resolves the

cleavage between the philosophical concept of experience

and the meaning of this concept in everyday discourse. Let

us follow the phenomenological analysis that Husserl sketched

for the solution of nur problem.

The first volume of 'Ideas' begins with the

introduction of the concept of experience. Natural cognition

commences with experience and abides in experience. In the

theoretical attitude, the entire horizon of possible research

is designated with one word. "It is the world". The world

is the totality of everything intramundane and perception

is the "original object- giving experience".16 Later in

'Experience and Judgement' Husserl says, "Evidence of

individual objects makes up the concept of experience in

the widest sense".(P.12) These remarks require no further

explanation. Thus all natural cognition commences with

experience. When Mr. X says that he has experienced some-

thing, he means that he has gained information about a

factual affair in a particular place at a particular time

by means of his senses. In this sense, all natural cognition

starts with experience. When Husserl said that "perception

is the original object-giving experience", it means that

all our experiences are procured for us in an original manner

through the senses or to speak with Locke, through sensation.

Evidence of experience therefore, is the consciousness of

'possessing the thing itself' (Selbsttaabe) of "the

existence of the thing itself (Selbstdasein).

125

With this we have only described what we mean when

we say that we compose our experience with the things in

the world. But the Upanishad goes further and speaks of

the implications of the indispensableness of consciousness

for all facts and experience.17 The Upanishad asserts that

apart from intelligence, no thought (dhi) whatsoever would

be affected; nothing cognizable would be cognized. It

means that Jīvātman (self) is not a mere succession of ideas

of sensation and reflection. That is to say, for Upanishads

Jīva is more than this simple presence of a sensation, or

the simple experiencing of an act.

What Jīva experiences is not an impression which

factually appears, but it is an act which contains in itself

an indication of possibilities and potentialities. That is

why the Upanishadic seer speaks about the absolute correla-

tivity of knowing and being. "For truly, if there were no

elements of being, there would be no elements of intelligence.

Verily, if there were no elements of intelligence, there

would be no elements of being."18 A child first learns to

master his motor movements, With this he initiates experience

in a double direction: he has experience of himself and his

corporeal functions are inseparable from this, he has an

ever widening experience of his surrounding world. Thus

each new experience of Jīva is at the same time a new

experience in terms of its capabilities and potentialities.

As the Upanishadic seer points out, this is not a diversity.

"But as of a chariot, the felly is fixed on

the spokes and the spokes are fixed on the hub,

even so those elements of being (bhuta-matra) are

fixed on the elements of intelligence (Prajñana-

matra) and the elements of intelligence are

fixed on the breathing spirit (Prana). The same

self" (Prajñanatman).19

So far we have been speaking on the basis of Husserl's

thesis is that the traditional distinction of inner and outer

experience is not adequate enough to grasp everything meant

in everyday pre-philosophical discourse with the word

'experience' of Jīva (self). The phenomenological analys is

of experience includes more than what is meant by the normal

use of the word 'experience'.

We have earlier maintained that all experience is

impossible without a self that experiences the things of the

outer and events of the inner world.20 It was also held

that experiences are impossible without sensuous perception.

But sensuous perception, the acquisition of sensations, is

not possible without the 'I can'. This 'I can' is an

experience about things and about one's own capabilities and

potentialities through which Jiva cognitively and practically

makes things its own.21 For the experiencings of acts, Jīva

is much more than a static thing. It is, as Husserl said,

"the absolute zero-point in the system of co-ordinates

in which each acquires an experience of the world that, at

the same time, is experienced as a world shared in common

with others.22 The phenomenological analysis of experience,

therefore, is a description of our world as that world in

which we in common find each other as living, thus of our

'life-world' which we make our own through experience.

It may be clear from the above that Jīva's awareness

of itself and experiences in acts are no passing thoughts,

for, the experience of acts itself is no particular thing or

event. Jīva experiences its acts and its existence is

revealed to itself in all the manifold acts it performs like

the light of the day which though itself is unseen, is

apparent in all the shapes and colours, it illumines.

By virtue of this fact that Jīva experiences the

acts, Jīvātman achieves a unique kind of relation through

the acts it performs/experiences in realizing its own true

nature. In this way Jīva is aware of a principle while

acting even if Jīva is not confronted with it at the

experiential level. This reality is immanent in the

individual and also transcends him.23 As Husserl points

out,

"by phenomenological epoche I reduce my natural

human ego and my psychic life- the reality of

my psychological self-experience- to my

which has put the world in bracket and is concentrating

its attention on its logical functions as involved in its

cogitations. What is revealed is certain structural

characteristics (see for example, Chapter Three) of an

eidetic nature by the help of which Jīva intuits the essence

of whatever it is experiencing. But if we push our analysis

further what we come upon is the bare principle of Jīva

(self) with its awareness of itself. And this reflection

is not different from the transcendental aspect.

These above considerations suggest that jīvātman

is pure ego in so far as its intentional and intuitive

functions involve universal logical structures. Jīvātman

is the empirical ego in so far as it is a concrete psycholo-

gical being with unique characteristics (of experiencing

its acts). And jīvātman is the transcendental ego or subjec-

tivity itself in so far as he can bracket the world (acts

too) and conceive of himself as an ideal of the transcendental

self-experience. Husserl says "If the Ego, as naturally

immersed in the world experiencingly and otherwise, is called

'interested in the world' then the phenomenologically altered

attitude consists in a splitting of Ego. In that the

phenomenological Ego establishes himself as 'disinterested

onlooker' above the naively interested ego.25 Looking at

this way, we may state that the Husserlian transcendental

ego and the Upanishadic concept of 'Paramātman' refers

to the presence in man of a principle which so functions

that it can be aware of the world (acts) as well as of

itself. To quote Husserl

"... the transcendental subjectivity which

for want of language we can only call again,

'I myself', 'we ourselves' cannot be found

under the attitude of psychological or natural

science, being no part at all of the objective

world, but that subjective conscious life itself,

wherein the world and all its content is made

for 'us', for 'me'. We that are indeed, men,

spiritual and bodily, existing in the world,

are, therefore, 'appearences' unto themselves,

parcel of what 'we' have made. The 'I' and

the 'we' to whom they are present."26

So far we have been attempting to unravel the

relation between Jīvātman, its acts and Self-realization.

The phenomenological analysis of 'experience' provides a

unique realm for an intrinsic relation between Self-

realization and action. Our thesis accords with the

'experiential character' of jīvātman in that it does not

lead to a self which is a mere construct. A word of caution

is necessary here. The intrinsic relation we propose is

not a theory of the 'empirical self' in the Kantian sense.

We have not attempted to identify the self as object (the

'me' as opposed to the 'I' as William James puts it). We

have held that jīva, acts, and Self-realization are

intrinsically related. It is a relation of the subject of

consciousness with acts. The position is that Jīvātman is experiential, but is not on that account an object of experience. The major implication of our claim leads to the fact that the self (Jīva) is not an object of experience, but it does not follow that it is non-experiential. The self is experiential in two different ways: (a) Experience of the self not only relates itself with the object of experience (physical and mental), (b) But it also experiences its own reality as the abiding core of experiences. Looked at in this way, Self-realization as the highest Upanishadic value is intrinsically related with the acts and experiences. That is why we earlier stated that empirically Self-realization is experienced in action by the empirical ego.

It also leads to the point that self is aware of itself in action as transcendental correlate of transcendental ego (Paramātman). That is, why Self-realization is empirically related with Jīvātman and transcendentally related with Paramātman. It is empirically related with Jīvātman because Jīva is the 'doer' and experiences acts. It is transcendentally related with Paramātman because Jīva is aware of a principle apart from itself in acting. That is to say that Jīva's experiences of acts although are immanent in it yet transcends it.27 As Husserl says, it comes to the fore only with transcendental phenomenological epochē.28

132

now let us take stock of our position so far

reached in this chapter.

(1) We stated that there cannot be an experience without

an experiencer. Ultimately it means that we are

postulating a self which experiences its experiencing/

acts and thus becoming an agent in the various

functions of the individual.

(2) By virtue of this experience of the agent-self, the

agent-self (in our context, Jīva) achieves a unique

kind of relation with acts.

(3) This leads us to the position that there is not only

a relation between the agent self (Jīva) and acts

but there is also an intrinsic relation between Self-

realization and action. Thus we stated that Self-

realization is related to action in two different

ways: existentially, Self-realization is experienced

in action by the empirical ego and transcendentally

Self-realization is awareness of the self by itself

in action as transcendental correlate of transcendental

ego.

Our claim that Jīvātman is the doer suggests that

(a) Jīva causally contributes to one's acts and (b) to the

things to which one's acts causally contribute. It suggests

self-realization as a metaphysical basis for a value- ought.

We do not talk of an ought in the Kantian sense.

The

uniquely characteristic nature of this value-ought is

Jīva's experience of an unqualified and universally binding

ought i.e., the ought of realizing one's true self as the

highest experiencing value.

For Kant, the 'ought' expresses

a kind of necessity which is found nowhere else in the whole

of nature "except in a rational free will."29 In our

context, Self-realization as the value-ought leads to the

triumph of Jīva's unison with Paramātman- the Absolute

Reality.

We shall discuss these and similar problems in

our next chapter.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Brih., 2.4.12.

2. Ibid., 4.3.7.

3. Kaushi., 4.20.

4. Brih., 4.3.35.

5. Ibid., 4.2.1 - 4.3.6.

6. Ibid., 4.2.2 & 3.

7. Svet., 1.6.

8. Brih., 1.4.7.

9. Browning, Douglas., Op. cit., p. 13.

10. Maitri., 3.3.

11. Brih., 2.5.15.

12. Essay., 1.1. 2.

13. Ibid., 3.

14. Ibid., 3.

15. Ibid., 4.

16. Husserl, E., Ideas 3.10 f

17. Kaush., 3.7.

18. Ibid., 3.8.

19. Kaush., 3.9.

20. It has been sufficiently discussed in the previous Chapter.

21. Kaush., 3.7-8 may thus be interpreted.

22. We see a view similar to this in Kaush., 3.8.

23. Brīh., 2.4.11; 3.4.1.

24. Husserl, Edmund, Cartesian Meditations, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1960), p. 26.

25. Husserl, E., Ibid., p. 35.

26. Husserl, Edmund. The Idea of Phenomenology. (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1964), pp. xviii-xix.

27. Brīh., 2.4.11 & 3.4.1. may be understood in this way.

28. Husserl, E., Cartesian Meditations, Op. cit., p. 26.

29. Kant, Immanuel, Critique of Pure Reason, Trans. with an introduction by Norman Kemp Smith, unabridged ed., N.Y., St. Martin's Press, pp. 472-73.

CHAPTER VI

THE SUBJECT-OBJECT POLARITY

In the previous chapters we have been concerned with elucidating the nature of jīvātman as the doer. Now we shall argue that unless we kept in view the nature of jīvātman as actor, Self-realization as the value- ought could not claim the status of a genuine human endeavour,

More specifically, we shall argue that Self-realization as the value-ought in the Upanishads presupposes the unfolding of acts by Jīvātman, the empirical self. Indeed, it may be argued that Jīva's experiences of acts is the basis and anchorage for all that Jīva knows, values and does. However,

it also points to the fact that the empirical self, i.e. Jīvātman, cannot be described exhaustively as the agent who knows, values and does. This is so because Jīva's unfolding of acts not only involves Jīva as the subject which responds in specifiable ways to an object situation or condition but also to the fact that Jīva elicits response in it. Hence we may say that Jīva's experiencing of acts is in its very essence transactional. This subject-object polarity is inescapable in any value-theory.

Our discussion so far has thus led to the idea that Self-realization may be regarded as the value-ought only if

the empirical self (Jīva) is related to some actual or

possible first-person experience. What remains now to be

seen is the immense complexity of the concept of Self-

realization as the value-ought placed in the Upanishads.

Earlier in the first chapter we have stated that in the

total context of value experience we realize a dual aspect

of that experience. We quoted Werkmeister by saying that

"there are (a) the felt satisfactions, the joys of creation,

the happiness that comes from having achieved what we set

out to do. There are, in other words, all the basic levels

of felt-value experiences. But at the level of insight and

self-legislation, there is also (b) the value placed upon

what is being achieved - a value which transcends the

immediately felt values. And because of (b), (a) may be

purely coincidental. In other words, we must distinguish

between being motivated by (a) and being motivated by (b).

This distinction, I believe, is crucial for any value theory,

for it is (b) which opens up a whole new dimension of our

value experience."1 In view of (b) we exercise restraint

over merely subjective drives and desires and that we

subordinate ourselves to value considerations of a trans-

subjective nature. Looked at in this way, the objective

significance of Self-realization as the value-ought emerges

only in the context of Jīvātman striving to realize its true

nature through identification with Paramātman, the supreme

Self in all actual/possible experiences.*

As discussed in the first chapter Jīvātman the

individual self, is not only aware of itself as acting, as

being engaged in various situations, but also as determining

its relation with Paramātman in acting.2 In and through

acting, the individual self- realizes its true nature,

for, acts are providers of experience to Jīva.3 As stated

in Maitri Upanishad,

"Atman has a dual nature for the sake of

obtaining this experience…. For the sake of

experiencing the true and the false, the

Great Atman (Soul, Self) has a dual nature-

Yes the Great Atman has a dual nature."4

Now the important question arises as to what is this

dual nature of Ātman oriented to the attainment of value

experiences, and the truth and falsity of value experiences.

The phenomenological analysis of the facts of experience

reveals the importance*of the subject which values a given

object or situation as an end. Experience shows that nothing

is being valued if it is of no value to the person valuing

it. In other words, in a given situation, an object elicits

in us a value-feeling which prompts our valuing of it. Let

us elaborate the dual nature of Ātman in order to understand

the objective significance of Self-realization as the value-

• We have talked about this objective significance of

value-out in the first Chapter.

ought placed in the Upanishads.

In all felt- value experiences there is involved

an object experienced as true or false and the subject-

centred act of experiencing it. In the felt- value

experiences, the response of the subject to the property of

an object is decisive. The felt-value of an object depends

upon the feeling elicited by the property of the object.

Apparently, therefore, it is the subject which is the pre-

condition of felt-valuations and thus of felt- values. If

there is no experience of the subject, then there is no felt-

value. Looked at in this way, the existence of the subject

as an indispensable presupposition of felt-values, is itself

a value and is in fact a value superior to the felt- values.

This duality of experience viz., (1) the experience of felt-

value by the subject and (2) the value which transcends the

felt-values - explains the meaningfulness of Self-realization

as the value-ought placed in the Upanishads. This value-

ought of Self-realization arises only when a development

from felt-values to the level of insight and self-legislation

by the subject takes place. The different levels of

experience on which choice is exercised and felt-value is

attained, take place in the first stage where Jīva apprehends

its full nature. But in the second stage, this full knowledge

of the empirical self leads through an understanding of its

background and conditions to the self that is beyond the

empirical one. This realization is experienced as the

climax of action and the highest point of fulfilment. The

felt- values like pleasure, utility and the like are all

goods. But they differ from one another in degree and

therefore in kind as well. The degree of goodness in each

of these felt-value experiences corresponds to the extent

to which the ideal of Self-realization is exemplified in

each. From the values of sense- pleasures to the values

for communal living is an advance of Jīva is its moral

experience.5 The advance takes place because in the

conscious experience of each stage, reflection supervenes,

and an advance is made to a higher stage by rejecting the

one so far reached. Rejection is necessary because reflection

discovers that what has so far been achieved is inadequate

to the ideal i.e., the ideal of realizing one's own true self.

The driving force for the whole process is the ideal of the

highest value- Self-realization. The Greeks held a view of

this kind, but they placed the end outside and above man,

Plato in the 'Form of Good', and Aristotle in God as the

'unmoved mover' of the Stars. This led to an intellectualism

which placed knowledge above all, with the result that no

proper place was left for action. Whereas in the Upanishads,

the end is within the individual or one may say that he

himself is the end. It is thus that the objective significance of Self-realization as the value-ought gets its meaningfulness. That is why it assumes importance to say that the Great Ātman for the sake of experiencing true and false has a dual nature.

The ignorant Jīva, being bound to the three Gunās of Māya or Prakrti goes on doing deeds with desires and stands responsible for the results of these deeds. The Jīva thus moves according to his deeds 6 (Karman). But in its true nature, Jīva is none else but Īśvava; The infinite Jīva is above all qualifications and attributes of Greater (linga) 7 .

It is with respect to the body of male or female sex that he is described as a man or woman. 8

Jīvātman being the aspect of Paramatman can become as he thinks. As Yājnavalkya says whatever one desires, so one becomes’. He can become Brahman/Ātman from which he is not different esoterically. This is clearly brought out in the following words of Yājnavalkya.

"Verily, this soul (Jīva) is Brahma, made of knowledge, of mind, of breath, of seeing, of hearing, of earth, of water, of wind, of space, of energy and of non-energy, of desire and of non-desire, of anger and of non-anger, of virtuousness and of non-virtuousness. It is made of everything. This is what is meant by the saying ‘made of this, made of that’. According as one acts, according as one conducts himself, so does he become. The doer of good

becomes good. The doer of evil becomes evil.

One becomes virtuous by virtuous action, bad

made (not of acts, but) of desires only'. In

reply to this I say, 'As is his desire, such

is his resolve, such is the

action he performs. What action he performs,

that he procures for himself, (or into does he

become changed).9

Yājnavalkya reiterates a similar view while debating with

Arthabhāga. It is the will and Karman (deeds) which decide

the lot of a Jīva."....The two (Yājnavalkya and Arthabhāga)

went away and deliberated. What they said was Karma (action)

what they praised was Karma. Verily, one becomes good by

good action, bad by bad action"10 Our action is based on

the facts of situation but our recognition of the facts

lead to the character of their being good or bad.

The objective significance of Self-realization as the value-ought placed in the Upanishads is its own reward. It

is the realization of the subjective potentialities of the

empirical self leading to the triumph of its unison with

the Absolute Reality (Paramātman). This unison of the

empirical self with the transcendental self takes place when

the empirical self in and through its acting realizes its

ultimate nature and thus identify itself with the Absolute

Reality. In and through acting Jīvatman (empirical self)

discovers and actualizes the ideal of a value-ought as Self-

realization. This may well be the discovery that the felt-

143

values are transcended and the end is not the felt-value experiences. Brihadāranyaka Upanishad illustrates this experience in the following way.

"This verily, is that form of his which is beyond desires, free from evil, without fear. As a man, when in the embrace of a beloved wife, knows nothing within or without, so this person, when in the embrace of the intelligent soul, knows nothing within or without. Verily, that is his (true) form in which his desire is satisfied, in which the soul is his desire, in which he is without desire and without sorrow.

There a father becomes not a father a mother, not a mother, the worlds not the worlds, the gods, not the gods, the Vedas, not the Vedas, a thief, not a thief, There the destroyer of an embryo becomes not the destroyer of an embryo, a cāndāla (the son of a sudra father and a brahman mother) is not a cāndāla, a paulkasa (the son of a sudra father and a Ksatriya mother) is not a paulkasa, a mendicant is not a mendicant, an ascetic is not an ascetic. He is not followed by Good, he is not followed by evil, for then he has passed beyond all sorrows of the heart. It is not, however, a second thing, other than himself and separate that he may see."11

As is shown above, when the Jīva realizes its own subjective potentialities in and through acting, he objectifies the highest ideal of a value-ought, the value-ought of (Self) realization. That is why the Upanishadic seer points out that this state is not 'a second thing, other than himself and separate that he may see'. The same views are advocated in Katha 12, Maitri 13 and Aitareya 14 Upanishads.

144

The above Upanishadic passages suggests that Self-

realization as the value-ought cannot be described as a

triangle san. It is the highest experiencsing value developed

through various stages. Thus in Katha Upanishad we see a

demarcation between the better and the pleasanter. The seer

says "Both the better and the pleasanter come to a man.

Going all around the two, the wise man discriminates. The

wise man chooses the better, indeed, rather than the

pleasanter. The stupid man, from getting-and-keeping (Yoga-

ksema) chooses the pleasanter."15 What is expressed here

is the inner conflict between the better and the pleasanter.

For the Upanishadic seers, that which is pleasant is not

better enough. Even if, there were general agreement on

the nature of 'pleasanter' as the value-ought, such accidental

harmony would not suffice as the basis for an objectively

valid ought for them. The calculus of pleasure, utility,

right and the like do not yield an objectively necessitating

ought. Hence Self-realization as the highest experiencsing

value-ought cannot possibly rest on feelings desires and

inclinations. Thus to describe Self-realization as the

value-ought is to describe its various degrees and kinds

(of choice).

We do confer some kind of goodness on things that we

experience, for we talk of a pleasant party, a useful tool etc.

145

But the value-ought of realization as the highest Upanishadic

value is not found in finite satisfactions. As Radhakrishnan

says "The love of the finite has only instrumental value,

while love of the eternal has intrinsic worth." The value-

ought of self-realization ultimately belongs to the

empirical self (Jīvātman). It cannot be ascribed to mental

facts alone, for, Self-realization consists in attaining

the absolute reality and it is correlative to realizing

one's own true self. As Radhakrishnan says, "The end we

seek is becoming Brahman or touching the eternal.... This

is the only absolute value".16

These reflections suggest that Self-realization as

the value-ought is attained by the individual self whereas

value of any means is its efficiency as a means to an end.

Moreover, Self-realization as the value-ought cannot be

ascribed to an activity alone, if by activity we mean only

its outer moment i.e., something occurring external to the

individual and not within the individual. In Chāndogya

"Verily, when one is active, then he grows

forth. Without being active, one does not grow

forth. Only by activity does one grow forth.

But one must desire to understand activity (Krti)".17

Jīva, in subjecting itself to realization, thus

chooses and acts for the better rather than the pleasanter.

146

In and through acting Jīva realizes its subjective poten-

tialities and opens itself to itself as pointing to the

condition as the possibility of a metaphysical basis for a

value-ought. The different levels of experience on which

choice is exercised and action is developed are levels at

which the value-ought of Self-realization is achieved. From

pleasanter to the better is an advance in Jīva's value

experience. This advance is made to a higher stage by

rejecting pleasanter and choosing the better. Rejection

is called for because Jīva opens to itself in the experiences

and thus discovers that what has so far been achieved as

pleasanter is inadequate to the ideal, the ideal of value-

ought. The ideal- the value-ought- is the identification

of Jīva with Paramatman. In this identification, Jīva

looses its individuality (name and form). This positive

direction in all the experiences in action is Self-realiza-

tion in which all subjective potentialities are harmonized.

This positive and affirmative actualization of the subjective

potentialities of Jīva by going beyond the Jīva nature

contains in itself both as source and summation. It is the

source because Jīva is the experiencer of the acts. It is

the summation because "everything in the world is of value

as leading to the realization of Self"18 Thus realization

of one's own true self is the value-ought which is in accord

with action. As the seer says "In this (Self) which

vitalizes all things, which appears in all things, the

Great- In this Brahma wheel, the soul (Hamsa) flutters about,

thinking that itself (atmanam) and the actuator are

different.19 This view is expressed in Maitri,20 Chandogya21,

Brihadaranyaka22 and Mundaka23 Upanishads.

It is clear from these pages that the Upanishadic

rshis affirm that a person's actions are systematized by

his desires, feelings and motivations. That is to say, the

individual's feelings and desires are significantly correlated

with the degree of organization of his motivational system.24

The best example for the above is Yājñavalkya's exhortation

'As is his desire, such is his resolve, as is his resolve,

such action he performs'. It points to the fact that choice

and good are correlative and different sorts of choice are

correlative to different sorts of value, but not to the

value-ought of Self-realization. As Radhakrishnan says,

"All ethical goods bound up as they are with the

world of distinctions, are valuable as means to

the end. While self-realization is the absolute

good, ethical goods are only relatively so. The

ethically 'good' is what helps the realization

of the infinite and the ethically bad is its

opposite."25

The problem of choice inevitably envisages the

problem of knowledge. As Hume, says "Knowledge, not much

learning, but the understanding of metaphysical truths

was the impelling motive of the thinkers of the Upanishads."26

Thus Taittiriya Upanishad exhorts: "He who knows Brahma

as the real, as knowledge as the infinite.... He obtains

all desires."27 But this desire is on a far higher level

than immediate craving and is distinct from the ordinary

sense of desire which always seeks for objects. This

desire is rooted in the level of self-consciousness.

The above reflections suggest that all actions lead

to the value-ought of Self-realization provided a person's

actions are systematized by desires, feelings and motivations.

That is to say, Jīva acts in such a way by which the

desires feelings and the like are significantly correlated

with the degree of organization of the motivational system.

But it takes place only at the second stage wherein Jīva

passes over its Jīva nature.

Looked at in this way, the value-ought of Self-

realization lies in the proper relation of Jīva to its

actions. And because of this reason evil is a contradiction

at the realm of Paramātman. The conditions of duality

cannot be applied to Good and evil. Hence there is no

distinction between Good and evil for the individual who

has attained this value-ought of Self-realization. As

Chāndogya Upanishad declares: The infinite is bliss, there

is no bliss in finite things.28 If we consider the

circuit - ātman, desire, will, choice, karman, knowledge,

and realization - we can say that evil is a contradiction

in the realm of Self-realization. Thus the Upanishad says :

"one's deeds (Karman) cease when He is seen both the higher

and the lower."29

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Werkmeister, William, Henry, Man and His Values, Op. cit., p. 127.
   

2. Svet., 4.6.
   

3. Brih., 3.7.1–23.
   

4. Ihitri., 7.11 (7&8).
   

5. See, for example, the table of values suggested and explained in Chapter 1.
   

6. Svet., 5.7.
   

7. Sankara bhāsya on Ibid., 5.9.
   

8. Ibid., 5.10.
   

9. Brih., 4.4.5.
   

10. Ibid., 3.2.13.
    

11. Ibid., 4.3.21–23.
    

12. Katha., 2.19.
    

13. Maitri., 6.7.
    

14. Ait., 5.1–2.
    

15. Katha., 2.2.
    

16. Radhakrishnan, S., Indian Philosophy, Op. cit., Vol. I., p. 553.
    

17. Chānd., 7.20.
    

18. Brih., 4.5.6.
    

19. Svet., 1.6.
    

20. Maitri., 6.7 & 2.1.
    

21. Chānd., 7.18.
    

22. Brih., 2.5.15.
    

23. Mund., 2.2.8.

24. But this a contingent and variable matter on which the facts must be obtained by psychological investigation. While the topic of motivation in connection with values has been of perennial philosophical interest, the greatest emphasis, particularly in recent decades, has been on one or another motivational concept, especially intending and wanting. Philosophers have paid very little attention to question about the overall structure of a person's body of motives. As Robert Audi says some of these questions prove to be both intrinsically interesting and connected more closely than one might expect with current problems in epistemology on one side and cognitive psychology on the other.

25. Radhakrishnan, S., Indian Philosophy, Op. cit., Vol. II, p. 614.

26. Hume, R.E., Thirteen Principal Upanishads. Op. cit., p. 58.

27. Tait., 2.1., Kashi., 1.7.

28. Chānd., 7.18.

29. Mund., 2.2.8.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

In our thesis we have formulated mainly two things.

(a) Phenomenologically, the highest Upanishadic value -

Self-realization - is relevant to the human condition and

existence, and is to be understood in terms of our experiences

of self. Thus the experience of Self-realization as the

highest value from the phenomenological perspective arises

out of the human condition. In Upanishads, Maitrēy'i,

Uddālaka Āruni, Ajātasatru, Nacikētas, Svetakētu etc.

wanted to reach an important otherness in the sense that

they wanted to transcend their empirical egos. The structure

of realization that emanates from the phenomenological

disclosure is that, ultimately, Self-realization means the

experienced oneness of the empirical self (Jīva) with the

transcendental Self (Paramātman). As the transcendental

Self is experienced as continuous with the empirical self1

the goal of union is a hope, an anticipation and a

possibility. Looked at in this way, the question of the

experience of the highest value which the Jīva is striving

for realization through its actions is strategie to the

individual self. In that case Self-realization cannot

possibly be conceived of independently of the empirical self.

Hence there can hardly be any thing like knowing, loving,

feeling, desiring, choosing, valuing or any other intentional

act unless there is a subject or Self which knows, loves,

feels, values etc. That is to say that the self or subject

is precisely that which acts and therefore is not to be

regarded as a unity of pre-existing acts. Self with its

intentionality, therefore, is extrinsically related to a

world of 'objects ' and intrinsically related to itself. It

is this world that it experiences and it is this world which

it is directed which gives it content. It is therefore,

absurd to picture the self as though it were some sort of

enclosed monad within the body.

(b) The individual self (Jīva) is related to Self-

realization in two different ways: Existentially, Self-

realization is experienced in action by the empirical ego

(Jīva) and transcendentally realization is awareness of

self by itself in action as transcendental correlate of

transcendental ego (Paramātman). Thus the individual self

in its experiences not only relates itself with the object

of experience (physical and mental) but also experiences

its own reality as the abiding core of experiencer. In

this way, the self is a moral entity, among other things,

an entity which exists in a moral atmosphere and which is

constituted by its urge for value. But if we take only

the feeling aspect of value as the ultimate, then value

becomes a datum for cognitive consciousness and ceases to be

value and collapses into facts. The full knowledge of the

empirical self leads through an understanding of its back-

ground and conditions, to the Self that is beyond the

empirical self. This realization is experienced as the

climax of action and the highest point of fulfilment. Thus

the true objective significance of Self-realization as the

value-ought is experienced by the individual self.

We have adopted the phenomenological method in

unravelling the complexity of the highest value because

phenomenology is in an excellent position to ground a truly

'reflexive' criterion for a meaningful value-theory,

as it does with a basic unity between experience and meaning.

Meaning is directly experienced from the phenomenological

perspective. As Husserl says:

"Phenomenology is concerned with the experiences

that can be grasped and analysed in intuition

in their essential generality, but not with

empirically apperceived experiences as real

matters of fact, as experiences of experiencing

people or animals in the appearing world posited

as a matter of fact of natural experience. The

essences directly grasped in essential intuition,

and the connection based solely upon the essences,

are brought to expression descriptively in

concepts of essence and lawful statements of

essence. Every such statement is an a priori

one in the best sense of the term."2

At this point it may be well to recapitulate in

brief the position of phenomenology, its method and procedure

and its contribution to a clear understanding of the

phenomenology of Self-realization as the highest experiencing

Upanishadic value.

A cursory view of Husserlian phenomenology supports

the contention that it is an epistemological enterprise. In

Cartesian Meditations, Husserl makes an explicit attempt to

renew Descartes' programme of a systematic reconstruction

of knowledge which would render it immune to skeptical doubt.

Thus Husserl explicitly acknowledged that "phenomenology

seems rightly to be characterized as transcendental theory

of knowledge"3

Like Kant, however, Husserl considers the theory of

knowledge to be inseparable from the philosophy of mind or

more precisely, from a philosophical account of the ego

qua knowing subject. Thus Husserlian phenomenology is not

only "transcendental theory of knowledge" but also a "science

of concrete transcendental subjectivity"; it is not only

epistemology but is also at the same time "a pure egology"4

That is to say that the "transcendental subjectivity" or

"transcendental ego" of which Husserlian phenomenology is

ultimately the science, is not the 'I' of ordinary experience,

rather it is the ego as subject of one's pure cogitationes"5

Husserlian phenomenology essentially involves the

performance of what Husserl terms a "phenomenological reduction"

and it further involves distinguishing between ordinary

experience and "transcendental experience" and also between

the "natural standpoint" and the "phenomenological standpoint"

Phenomenology proper is characterized by Husserl as "critique

of transcendental experience."6 Transcendental experience

is said to be a new kind of experience7, distinct from

ordinary experience; and the phenomenological reduction is

held to be the operation through the performance of which

this 'new kind of experience' becomes accessible to us.

Husserl observes that when I occupy the natural

standpoint "I experience myself... as 'I' in the ordinary

sense of the term , as this human person living among others

in the world."8 I take for granted my embodied existence

"in an objective, spatio-temporal nature".9 I may, however,

adopt a different standpoint. I may determine to set aside

all judgements which are not absolutely certain, and this

means that I must at least for the time regard every thing

I experience as nothing more than phenomena in my "flow

of experience." In short, I may 'bracket' all judgements

involving explicit or implicit reference to existence

independent of my "flow of experience" and restrict myself

to the consideration of the phenomena which constitute my

'flow of experience' qua phenomena.

This, very briefly, is what the phenomenological reduction involves. Having made this reduction, I leave

the natural standpoint and adopt the phenomenological standpoint; and my experience, thus reduced, becomes what

Husserl terms 'transcendental experience'. It is only at this point that Husserlian phenomenology proper begins.

The above explanations suggest that the phenomenological method consists in performing an explication of the ego with

the phenomenon of the world as a guiding thread. In order to assure the neutrality of givenness, the phenomenologist

begins, therefore, by setting in obedience his common-sense belief in the existence of the real world. We shall see

what Husserl means by the methodological suspension of what he terms the 'general thesis' of the natural standpoint.

Husserl writes:

"The general thesis according to which the real world about me is at all times known not merely in a general way as something apprehended,

but as a fact-world that has its being out there, does not consist of course in an act proper, in an articulated judgement about

existence. It is and remains something all the time. The standpoint is adopted, that is,

it endures persistently during the whole course of our life of natural endeavour."10

Phenomenological suspension or to use Husserl's term,

'epoché' consists in making explicit to consciousness the thesis which unconsciously underlies every individual judgement

made within ordinary life about reality. Suspension means

first of all coming into awareness of the very meaning of

the natural attitude itself. The phenomenologist, in

suspension, places in phenomenological doubt (which is not

psychological doubt) his traditional common-sense taking for

granted of the very reality of the world within which things

and events are noted and appraised. As Dorion Cairns says:

The fundamental methodological principle of phenomenology

may… be initially formulated as follows: No opinion is

to be accepted as philosophical knowledge unless it is seen

to be adequately established by observation of what is seen

to be itself given "in person". Any belief seen to be

incompatible with what is seen to be itself given is to be

rejected. Toward opinions that fall in neither class -

whether they be one's own or another's - one is to adopt an

"official" philosophical attitude of neutrality.11

With epoche' methodologically effected, the next

step in phenomenological procedure involves a series of

"reductions". The first step consists of what Husserl calls

the eidetic reduction. This consists in moving from matters

of fact to essences, from empirical to essential universality.

The eidetic reduction is a method by means of which the

phenomenologist is able to attend to the character of the

given, setting aside that which is contingent and secondary

and noting that which shows itself as Universal.12 Husserl

speaks of this operation as a 'reduction', a reduction from

particularity and individuality, from 'any kind of empirical

condition including existence to that of pure essence

generality' (Wesensallgemeinheit).

The second step in phenomenological procedure is

what Husserl calls the transcendental reduction. Husserl

writes: "I no longer survey my perception experiences,

imagination - experiences, the psychological data which my

psychological experience reveals: I learn to survey trans-

cendental experience. I am no longer in my own existence.

I am interested in the pure intentional life wherein my

psychically real experiences have occurred. This step raises

the transcendental problem... to its true level.... The

transcendental problem is eidetic. My psychological

experiences, perceptions, imaginations, and the like remain

in form and content what they were, but I see them as

"structures" now, for I am face to face at last with the

ultimate structure of consciousness.13 In this way the

process of reduction transcends the world in every respect

and the reduced sphere is in the very meaning of the word

a transcendental one. What remains after the performance

of the transcendental reduction is nothing less than the

universe of our conscious life, the stream of thought in its

integrity, with all its activities and with all its cogita-

tions and experiences, ( both terms being used in the

broadest - the Cartesian sense which includes not only

perceptions, judgements, but also acts of will, feelings,

dreams, fantasies etc.)14

Transcendental phenomenology thus consists in a

number of related enterprises, all of which presuppose that

the phenomenological reduction has been made. The first

involves the careful description of 'the stream of experience'

or the 'phenomena of consciousness' precisely as experienced.

as has been observed, Husserl does not consider this to be

phenomenology proper. The second enterprise is epistemological;

and because it is eidetic, it is a part of Husserlian

phenomenology proper. It consists in the analysis of

intentional objects with a view to the discernment of the

essential types of intentional objects of which particular

ones are instantiations.

The third enterprise is 'egological' in Husserl's

phrase. It is the other part of Husserlian phenomenology

proper, and it too is eidetic in that it is concerned with

the 'essential structures' of the transcendental ego. Here

one turns from the investigation of the 'ideas' or 'essences'

in the sphere of intentionality to the ascertainment of their

subjective counterparts, namely, the essential structures of

the ego which they presuppose. Any 'objective' 'object'

Husserl says, meaning any 'idea' or 'essence' (eidos)

'points to a structure, within the transcendental ego, that

is governed by a rule."15 In this way what Husserl calls

"the critique of all transcendental cognition" gives rise

to a theory of the nature of the transcendental ego, or a

"pure egology."16

Accordingly, a phenomenology of values would begin

with phenomenological reduction. The reduction is a

technique designed by Husserl to get rid of the presupposi-

tions consciousness naturally attaches to its perceptions.

Husserl calls this conglomerate of presuppositions the

"natural attitude."17 The reduction does not deny that

consciousness might be materially explainable, but it does

purposefully refrain from allowing such a supposition to

contaminate our direct experiencing of counsciousness.

Looked at in this way phenomenology of values in a broad

sense "would be an account"of the way values appear in

experience." The above indicate the potential of phenomenology

for a thorough understanding of values. The experience of

value arising from an alert and non-interfering observation

of the stream of consciousness reveals the interrelations

of meanings. In the perception of a green tree, for

example, the meaning "green", subjectively experienced, is

connected with the meaning "tree". We can then view the

meanings themselves intentionally, devoid of presuppositions

about what they are. Thus the meaning of the word "green"

would appear as derivative from direct experiences. By

"subjectively experienced" here we mean simply the direct

having of a state of consciousness - the immediate knowledge

of a subjective quality as opposed to an objective thing

adjudged as existing independently of consciousness.

Here arises an important question. How does the

phenomenological method provide us with an insight into a

value theory as was done in these pages? Certainly, it is

not done by the route of making a distinction between meaning-

ful versus meaningless classes of sentences, as is done in

some empiricist formulations. We find, rather, an attempt

to delineate authentic from inauthentic experiences of meaning.

In this light we have elucidated Self-realization as the

highest value-experience. The adapting of the phenomenological

method/attitude leads us to focus on the fact that each person

is placed in experiencing (knowing, understanding) only through

their own feelings intentions, perceptions and the like. It

underlines that Self-realization as the highest experiencing

Upanisḥadic value is concerned with human conduct and thus

with questions of agency, potentiality, motivation, and

responsibility. As values also deal with the normative

significance of human conduct, it presupposes a world of

contingent values (we named it as felt-values) which are

dependent on human conduct. It is because values can be

augmented or diminished, created and destroyed, and individuals

can be benefited and harmed, that our actions have value

significance. Otherwise it would be ethically indifferent

what we did. The articulation of self-realization as the

highest experiencing value requires the subsistence of

contingent values.

We have pursued in this thesis, to some measure, the

metaphysics of value and self-realization. A study, such as

the present one when combined with an understanding of human

agency, responsibility and motivation vis-a-vis values, may

yield important results for a value-theory. That task, of

course, lies beyond the scope of this thesis. This work has

focussed on an understanding of Self-realization as the highest

Upanishadic experiencing value from the phenomenological

perspective. As such we have been concerned with two main

questions: (a) The enquiry into the nature of transcendental

ego- Paramātman - and the problem of self-realization bearing

on it; and (b) the constitution of self-realization as an

objective value with reference to its subjective source i.e.

the empirical self - Jīvātman.

In discussing these questions from the phenomenological perspective, hopefully, we have made some contribution to a clearer and better understanding of these and related issues. Any degree of success attained in this task may be taken as a vindication of the approach adopted in this thesis.

NOTES AND REFERENCES

1. Svet., 4.6.

2. Husserl, Edmund., (Logische Untersuchungen, 11, Part 1, 2), Translated by Marvin Farber in the Foundation of Phenomenology (Cambridge, Mass., 1943), p. 198.

3. Husserl, Edmund, Cartesian Meditations, Trans. D. Cairns (New York: Humanities, 1960, p. 81).

4. Cartesian Meditations, Op. cit., p. 30.

5. Cartesian Meditations, Op. cit., pp. 2-3.

6. Ideas, Op. cit., p. 29.

7. Ibid., p. 27.

8. Ibid., Op. cit., p. 7.

9. Ibid., Op. cit., p. 8.

10. Ideas., Op. cit., p. 107.

11. Cairns, Dorion, "An approach to Phenomenology" in philosophical essays in memory of Edmund Husserl (ed. by Marvin Farber), Cambridge, Mass., 1940, p. 4.

12. The 2nd Chapter of the thesis deals with the same.

13. Husserl, Edmund; Article on phenomenology in Encyclopoedia Britanica, 14th edition, 1927, XVII, p. 701.

14. Natanson, Maurice, Op. cit., p. 29.

15. Cartesian Meditations, Op. cit., p. 53.

16. Cartesian Meditations, Op. cit., pp. 29-30.

17. Husserl, Ideas, Op. cit., pp. 91-100.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

Anscombe, G.E.M., "Intention", Proc. Arist. Soc., 57 (1956-57), 321-332.

Baier, Kurt, "Action and Agent", Monist, 49 (1965), 183-195.

Benson, John, "The Characterization of Actions and the Virtuous Agent", Proc. Arist. Soc., 63 (1962-63), 251-266.

Bowes, Pratima, Consciousness and Freedom, Three Views, Methuen & Co. Ltd., 11 New Fetter Lane, London EC 4, 1971.

Brandt, Richard and Jaegwon Kim, "Wants on Explanations of Actions", J. Phil., 60 (1963), 425-435.

Browning, Douglas, Act and Agent: An Essay in Philosophical Anthropology, (Univ. of Miami Press, Coral Gables, Florida 1964).

"The Moral Act", Phil. Quart., 12 (1962), 97-108.

Care, Norman, S. and Charles Landesman, (eds.) Readings in the Theory of Action, Bloomington, University of Indiana Press, 1968.

Castaneda, H.N., "The Logic of Change, Action, and Norms", J. Phil., 62 (1965), 333-344.

Castaneda, H.N. (ed.), Intentionality, Minds and Perception Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1967.

Casteneda, H.N., and George Nakhikian, (eds.) Morality and the Language of Conduct, Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1965.

Castell, Alburey, The Self in Philosophy, New York: Macmillan, 1965.

Chakravarthi, S.C., The Philosophy of the Upanishads, Seema Publications, Delhi.

Chisholm, R.M., "The Descriptive Element in the Concept of Action", J. Phil., 61 (1964), 613-625.

Chopra, Y.N., "The Consequences of Human Action", proc. Arist. Soc., 65 (1964-65), 147-166.

Danto, Arthur, "Basic Actions", Amer. Phil. Quart., 2 (1965), 141-148.

Davidson, Donald., "Actions, Reasons and Causes", J. Phil., 60 (1963), 685-700.

Davis, Philip, E., "'Action' and 'Cause of Action'", Mind, 71 (1962), 93-95.

Daya, M., "The Moral and Axiological Ought - An attempt at a Distinction", J. Phil., LIII (1956).

Evans, C.O., The Subject of Consciousness, George Allen and Unwin, Humanities Press, Inc., 1970.

Ewing, A.C., O.S. Franks, and J. Macmurray, "Symposium: What is Action?", proc. Arist. Soc. Supp., 17 (1938), 69-120.

Falk, W.D. See Barnes, Falk, and Duncan Jones, 1945, "Action- Guiding Reasons", J. Phil., 60 (1963), 702-718.

Findlay, J.N., Values and Intentions, London, George Allen and Unwin, 1961.

Fisk, Milton, "Causation and Action", Rev. Metaph., 19 (1965-66), 235-247.

Geach, P.T., Mental Acts, New York: Humanities Press, 1957.

Gean, W.D., "Reasons and Causes", Rev. Metaph., 19 (1965-66), 667-688.

Grant, C.K., Belief and Action, Durham: University of Durham, 1960.

Griffthas, A.P., "Acting with Reason", Phil. Quart., 8 (1958), 289-299.

Hampshire, Stuart, "Critical Notice of the Concept of Mind by Gilbert Ryle", Mind, 59 (1950), 237-255.

Hampshire, Stuart, Thought and Action, London: Chatto and Windus, 1959.

Hare, Richard M., The Language of Morals, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952.

Hempel, Carl, G., "Ratinal Action" proc. and Addresses of the APA, 35 (1961-62), 5-23.

Hook, Sidney, (ed.) Determinism and Freedom in the Age of Modern Science, First Collier Book edition, 1961.

Hudson, W.D., The Is/ought Question, Macmillan

Hume Robert Ernest, The Thirteen Principal Upanishads Translated from the Sanskrit, 2nd ed. Revised, 7th Impression, Oxford University Press, 1968.

Husserl, Edmund., The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology, Trns. by David Carr., Evanston, Northwestern Univ. Press, 1970.

Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, Trans. by D. Cairns, New York: Humanities, 1960.

Formal and Transcendental Logic, Trans. by D. Cairns. New York: Humanities, 1969.

The Idea of Phenomenology, Trans., by W.P. Alston and G. Nakhikian, New York: Humanities, 1964.

Ideas : General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, Trans., by W.R. Boyce Gibson, New York: Macmillan, 1931, Pub., ed., New York: Collier, 1962.

Logical Investigations, 2 Vols., Trans., by J.N. Findlay, New York: Humanities, 1970.

Phenomenology, Ency. Britannica, 14th ed. 1929.

Kading, Daniel, "Moral Action, Ignorance of Fact, and Inability", Phil. Phenomenol. Res.,

25 (1964-65), 333-355.

Kenny, Anthony, J., Action, Emotion and Will, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963.

"Intention and Purpose", J. Phil.,

63 (1966), 642-651.

King, H.R., "Professor Ryle and The Concept of Mind",

J. Phil., 48 (1951), 280-296.

Knox, Sir Malcolm, Action, George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.,

Kotarbinski, T., "The Concept of Action", J. Phil.,

57 (1960), 215-222.

Ladd, John, "The Ethical Dimension of the Concept of

Action", J. Phil., 62 (1965), 633-645.

Louch, A.R., Explanation and Human Action, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966.

Macintyre, Alisdair and P.H. Nowell Smith., "Symposium: Purpose and Intelligent Action", Proc. Arist.

Soc. Supp., 34 (1960), 79-112.

Macintyre, Alisdair, "Pleasure as a Reason for Action",

Monist., 49 (1965), 215-233.

Macmurray, J., The Self as Agent, New York: Humanities

Press, 1957.

Madell, Geoffrey, "Action and Casual Explanation", Mind.,

76 (1967), 34-48.

Malcolm, Norman, "Explaining Behaviour", Phil. Rev.,

76 (1967), 97-104.

Mario Von Cranach and Rom Harre (ed.) The Analysis of

Action, Cambridge Univ. Press., 1982.

Mclaughlin, R.N., "Human Action", Austl. J. Phil., 45

(1967), 141-158.

Melden, A.I., "Action", Phil. Rev., 65 (1956), 523-541.