1. Abhidha Vritta Matrika Mukula Bhatta Ed. Venugopalan K

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BHATTA, MUKULA, Abhidhavrttimatrka (translated and edited by K. VENUGOPALAN) , 4 (1976/1977) p.203

MUKULA BHAȚȚA

ABHIDHĀVRTTIMĀTRKĀ

Edited by K. VENUGOPALAN

(0.1) iha khalu bhogapavargasādhanabhūtānām tadviparyayaparivarjanaprayo- janānām ca padārthānām1 niścayam antareņa vyavahāroparohitā nopapadyate. tathā hi,sarvāņi pramāņāni prameyāvagatinibandhanabhūtāni niścayaparyava- sāyitayā prāmāņyam bhajante2 .pramāņanibandhanā ca bhogāpavargasādhana- bhūtānām tadviparyayaparivarjanaprayojanānām ca padārthānām avagatiḥ ato niścaya eva tesām padārthānām vyavahāropārohe nibandhanam. niścayaś ca śabdasambhedenārtham gocarīkaroti.abdasya ca mukhyena lākșaņikena vā'bhidhāvyāpāreņā3 'rthāvagatihetutvam iti mukhyalāksaņikayor abhidhāvyāpārayor atra vivekaḥ kriyate. (0.2) Kaḥ punar mukhyo lāksaņiko vā'bhidhāvyāpāra ity āśankya vișayo- padarśanadvāreņa mukhyalāksaņikau śabdavyāpārāv upavarņayitum āha. ŚABDAVYĀPĀRATO YASYA PRATĪTIS TASYA MUKHYATĀ ARTHAVASEYASYA PUNAR LAKSYAMĀNATVAM ISYATE (I) (I.1) śabdavyāpārād yasyāvyavadhānāvagatis4 tasya mukhyatvam.sa5 hi yathā sarvebhyo hastādibhyo'vayavebhyah pūrvam mukham avalokyate tadvad eva sarvebhyaḥ pratiyamānebhyo'rthāntarebhyaḥ pūrvam avagamyate. tasmān mukham iva mukhya iti śākhādiyadantena6 mukhaśabdenābhidhīyate. tasyodāharaņam, 'gaur anubandhya' iti.atra hi gośabdavyāpārād yāgasādhanabhūtā gotvalaksaņā jātir avagamyate.atas tasya mukhyatā. tad evam śabdavyaparagamyo mukhyo'rthaḥ. (I.2) yasya tu śabdavyāpāragamyārthaparyālocanayā'rthāvagatis tasya lāksaņikatvam.yathā, pūrvasminn evodāharaņe vyakteḥ.sā hi na śabdavyāpā- rādavasiyate. 'viśesyam nābhidhā gacchet kșīņaśaktir viśeșane'8 iti nyāyāc chabdasya jātimātraparyavasāyitvāt.jātis9 tu vyaktim antareņa yāga- sādhanabhāvaņ na pratipadyata iti śabdapratyāyitajātisāmarthyād atra jāter āśrayabhūtā vyaktir ākșipyate.tenāsau lāksaņikī.evam ayam mukhyalākșaņi- kātmakavisayopavarņanadvāreņa śabdasyābhidhāvyāpāro dvividhaḥ pratipā- dito nirantarārthavișayaḥ10 sāntarārthanisthaś ca. (I.3) samprati mukhyasya cāturvidhyam abhidhīyate(pradarśayati). TATRA MUKHYAŚ CATURBHEDO JÑEYO JĀTYĀDIBHEDATAH (II) (II.1) tayor mukhyalākşaņikayor madhyān mukhyasyārthasya catvāro bhedāḥ jātyādibhedāt. catustayī11 sabdānām pravrttir bhagavatā mahābhāsyakāreņo- pavarņitā jātiśabdā guņaśabdā kriyāśabdā yadrcchāsabdāś ceti.tathā hi

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sarveşāņ śabdānāņ svārthābhidhānāya pravartamānānām 12 upādhyuparañjita- visayavivekatvād upādhinibandhanā pravrttiḥ. (II.2) upādhiś ca dvividhaḥ, vaktryadrcchāsanniveśito13 vastudhar- maś ca. kaścit khalu vaktrā tasmiņs tasmin vastuny upādhitayā sanniveśyate. kaścit tu vastudharma eva.tatra yo vaktrā yadrcchayā tattatsamjñivișayaśak- tyabhivyaktidvāreņa tasmims tasmin samjñini sanniveśyate sa vaktryadṛcchā- sanniveśito yathā ditthādīnām śabdānām antyabuddhinirgrāhyam14 saņhṛtakramaņ svarūpam. tat khalu tām tām abhidhāśaktim abhivyañjayatā vaktrā yadrcchayā tasmiņs tasmin samjñini upādhitayā sanniveśyate.atas tannibandhanā yadrcchāśabdā ditthādayaḥ.yeșām15 api ca dakārādivarņavya- tirikta-samhrtasvarūpābhāvān na ditthādisvarūpam samhrtakramam samjñisvadhyasyata iti darśanam teșām api vaktryadrcchābhivyajyamānaśak- tibhedānusāreņa kālpanikasamudāyarūpasya ditthādeś śabdasya tattatsaņjñābhidhānāya pravartamānatvād yadrcchāśabdatvam ditthādīnām upapadyata eva.tad evam pūrvam upadarśito yo vaiyākaraņanayas tadāś- rayeņopādhir vaktryadrcchāsanniveśitasvarūpākhyo vyākhyātah.

(II.3) yasya tu vastudharmatvenopādher avasthānam tasyāpi dvaividhyam sādhyasiddhatābhedāt.tatra sādhyopādhinibandhanāḥ kriyāśabdā16 yathā pacatīti. siddhasya tūpādher dvaividhyam jātiguņabhedāt.kasyacit khalu siddhasyopādheḥ padārthasya 17 prāņapradatā yathā jāteḥ.na hi kaścit padārtho jātisambandham antareņa svarūpam pratilabhate.yad uktaņ vākya- padīye 'na hi gauḥ svarūpeņa nāpy agauh gotvābhisambandhāt tu gauḥ'18 iti. kaścit punar upādhir labdhasvarūpasya vastuno viśeșādhānahetuḥ19 yathā śuklādir guņaḥ.na hi śuklāder guņasya pațādivastusvarūpapratilambhanibandha- natvam. jātimahimnaiva tasya vastunaḥ pratilabdhasvarūpatvāt.ato'sau labdhasvarūpasya vastuno viśeșādhānahetuḥ.ye'pi20 ca nityā paramāņutvādayo guņās teșām api sarveșām guņajātīyatvād evamprakāratvam eva.tad evam prāņapradopādhinibandhanatvaņ yasya śabdasya sa jātiśabdo yathā gavādiḥ. yasmāl labdhasvarūpasya vastuno viśeşādhānahetur arthaḥ pratīyate sa guņaśabdo yathā śuklādiḥ.

(II.4) nanu21 sarvesām api guņakriyāyadrcchāśabdābhidhānām jātinibandha- natvam. tathā hi guņaśabdānām tāvac chuklādīnām payasankhabalākādy- āśrayasamavāyena ye śuklādilaksaņā guņā vibhinnās tatsamavetasāmānyavāci- tā.evam kriyāśabdānām api gudatilataņdulādidravyāśritā ye pākādayo' nyānyatvenāvasthitāḥ kriyāviśeșās tatsamavetam sāmānyam eva vācyam. yadṛcchāśabdānāņ tu ditthādīnām śukaśārikāmanusyādyudīritesu bhinneșu ditthādiśabdeșu samavetam dittha śabdatv ādikam sāmānyam eva yathāyogam

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samjñişv adhyastam abhidheyam.yadi vopacayāpacayayogitayā ditthādau samjñini bhidyamāne'py abhidyamāno yanmahimnā dittho dittha ity evamādirūpatvenābhinnākāraḥ pratyayo bādhašūnyaḥ samjāyate tat tathā- bhūtam ditthādisabdāvaseyavastusamavetam eva ditthatvādisāmānyam eveș- țavyam.tac ca ditthādiśabdair abhidhīyate. ataś ca guņakriyāyadrcchāśabdā- nām api jātiśabdatvāc catustayī pravrttir nopapadyate.

(II.5) atrābhidhīyate22 guņakriyāśabdasamjñivyaktīnām eva tattadupā- dhinibandhanabhedajusām ekākārāvagatinibandhanatvam na tu jāter iti bhagavato mahābhāşyakārasyātrābhimatam.yathā hy ekam eva mukham tailakhadgodakādarśādīnām pratibimbāvagatinibandhanānām bhedān nānākāratvena pratyavabhāsate tathaikaiva śuklādivyaktir deakālāvacchinnā tattatkāraņasāmagryupajanitaśankhādyāśrayaviśeșavaśena nānārūpatayābhi- vyaktim āsādayantī vaicitryeņa sphurati.ataś ca tasyāḥ śuklādivyakter ekatvāj jāteś ca bhinnāśrayasamavetatvāc chuklatvādijātyabhāvān na śuklādiśabdānām jātiśabdatvam.evam pacatītyādau ditthaśabdādau ditthādau samjñini ca vācyam. atrāpy ekasyā eva pākādikriyāvyakter ditthādiśabdavyakter ditthādeś ca saņjñino yathākramam abhivyanjakānām pākādīnām tathā dhvanīnām vayo' vasthāviśesānām kaumarādīnām ca yo bhedas tadvaśena nānāvidhena rūpeņāvabhāsamānatvāt.23 sthitam etac chabdapravrttinimittānām catusțvān mukhyaḥ śabdārthaś caturvidha iti.

(II.6) adhunā lāksaņikasya dvibhedatvam upadarśayitum āha.

SUDDHOPACĀRAMIŠRATVĀL24 LAKSANĀ DVIVIDHĀ MATĀ (III)

(III.1) lakşaņāyā dviprakāratvam śuddhatvād upacāramiśratvāc ca.śuddhā tāval lakşaņā 'gangāyām ghosa'25 iti.atra hi ghoșam prati srotoviśeșasyādhāratā nopapadyata iti gangāśabdah svābhidheyasya srotoviśeșasya yaḥ samīpabhūtas tațas tam laksaņayāvagamayati. upacāramiśrā tu yatra vastvantare vastvantaram upacaryateyathā 'gaur vāhīka'26 iti.atra hi gośabdo vāhīkaśabdenānupapadya- mānasāmānādhikaranyād bādhitamukhyārthah san gogatā ye jādyamāndyādayo guņās tatsadṛśavāhīkagatajādyamāndyādiguņalakșaņadvāreņa gogatajādyamān- dyādiguņasadrśajādy amāndyādiguņopete vāhīka upacaritaḥ. teneyam upacāramiśrā lakșaņā.evam śuddhopacāramiśratvabhedena lakșaņāyā dvaividh- yam uktam. (III.2) idānīm tu śuddhāyā api lakșaņāyā dvaividhyam darśayati.

UPĀDĀNĀL LAKSAŅĀC CA ŠUDDHĀ SĀ DVIVIDHĀ MATĀ (IV)

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(IV.1) yeyam lakşaņā śuddhā pratipāditā sā dvividhoktā.kvacit khalv arthāntaropādānena laksaņā pravartate, kvacit arthāntaralaksaņena.

(IV.2) kim punar arthāntarasyopādānam, kim vā tasya lakșaņam ity āha.

SVASIDDHYARTHATAYĀKSEPO YATRA VASTVANTARASYA TAT UPĀDANAM LAKȘAŅAM TU TADVIPARYĀSATO MATAM (V)

(V.1) yatra svasiddhyarthatayā vastvantarasyākepo bhavati tatropādānam. yatha 'gaur anubandhya'27 iti. atra hi gotvasya yāgam prati sādhanatvam sābdam vyaktyāksepam antareņa nopapadyata iti tatsiddhyarthatayā vyakter ākșepaḥ. yathā ca 'pīno devadatto divā na bhunkta'28 iti. atra hi divādhikaraņa- bhojanābhāvaviśistatayāvagamyamānam eva kāryatvāt svasiddhyarthatvena kāraņabhūtam rātribhojanam āksepād abhyantarīkaroti.na hi pīnatvasya rasāyanādyupayogajanyatā pramāņāntareņa tadabhāvāvasāye saty etasyodāharaņa- tvāt. pīnatvasya ca dinādhikaraņabhojanābhāvaviśistatvena rasāyanādyupayo- gabādhahetutvāt29 atra ca rātrau bhunkta ity etacchabdākșepapūrvakatayā pramāņasyāparipūrņasya paripūraņāc chrutārthāpattitvam30 bhavatv atha vā kāraņasyaiva rātribhojanasyāksepa iti. sarvathā svasiddhyarthatvenārthān- tarasyāksepapūrvakatayāntarbhāvanād upādānatvam upapadyate.yatra tu pürvoditopādānarūpaviparyāsasamśrayān na svārthasiddhyarthatayārthāntara- syāksepaḥ api tv arthāntarasiddhyarthatvena svārthasamarpaņam tatra laksaņam. yathā pūrvam udāhrtam 'gaņgāyām ghosa' iti. atra hi taț asya ghoșādhāratayā dhāraņakriyānvitasya gangāśabdena svasamarpaņam kriyate.ato'rthāntarabhūtam tațam avagamayitum(tā) gangāśabdena svav ācyabhūtas srotoviśeso'tra samarpyata ity arthāntarasiddhyarthatvena svārthasamarpaņam.evam cātra pūrvoditopādānarūpaviparyāsāl laksaņatvam.evam śuddhā laksaņā dvividhā pravibhaktā. (V.2) idānīm upacāramiśrām caturbhedatvena nirūpayitum āha. ĀROPĀDHYAVASĀNĀBHYĀM SUDDHAGAUŅOPACĀRAYOH PRATYEKAM BHIDYAMĀNATVĀD UPACĀRAS CATURVIDHAH (VI) (VI.1) dvividha upacāraś śuddho gauņaś ca.tatra śuddho yatra mūlabhūtasyopa- mānopameyabhāvasyābhāvenopamānagataguņasadrśaguņayogalaksaņāsam- bhavāt kāryakāraņabhāvādisambandhāl laksaņayā vastvantare vastvantaram upacaryate yathā 'āyur ghrtam' iti.atra hy āyusah kāraņe ghrte tadgatakārya- kāraņabhāvalaksaņāpūrvakatvenāyustvam kāryam tacchabdaś cety ubhayam upacaritam.tasmāc chuddho'yam upacāraḥ. gauņah punar upacāro yatra mūlabhūtopamānopameyabhāvasamāśrayenopamānagataguņasadrśaguņayogalak- saņām purassarīkrtyopameye upmānaśabdas tadarthaś cādhyāropyate.sa hi

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guņebhya āgatatvād31 gauņasabdenābhidhiyate.yathā 'gaur vāhīka' iti.atra hi gogatajādyamāndyādiguņasadrśajādyamāndyādiyogād vāhīke gośabdagotvayor upacāraḥ.kecit32 tūpacāre śabdopacāram eva manyante nārthopacāram. tad ayuktam. śabdopacārasyārthopacārāvinābhāvitvāt.evam ayam upa cāraḥ śuddhagauņabhedena dvividho'bhihitaḥ.

(VI.2) tasya ca pratyekam dvaividhyam adhyāropādhyavasānābhyām. 33 yatrāropyāropavisayayor bhedam anapahnutyaiva vastvantare vastvantaram upacaryate tatrānapahnutasvarūpa eva vastvantare vastvantarasyādhikasyāropya- māņatvād adhyāropaḥ.yathā pūrvoktayor udāharaņayoh.tathā hi 'āyur ghṛtam' ity atra nāyurlaksaņakāryāntarlīnatayā kāraņabhūtasya ghrtasya pratipattiḥ svarūpeņaiva tasya pratipatte.svarūpeņaiva tasya pratīyamānasyāyușkāra- ņatvād āyustvam pratīyate.tenātrādhyāropah. evam 'gaur vāhīka' ity atrāpy upamānopameyasvarūpānapahnavāt.tad evam yatropacaryamāņenopacaryamāņa- vişayasya svarūpam nāpahnūyate tatrādhyāropah. yatra tūpacaryamāņa- vişayasyopacaryamāņe 'ntarlīnatayā vivaksistatvāt svarūpāpahnavaḥ kriyate tatrādhyavasānam.tatra śuddhopacāre'dhyavasānasyodāharaņam 'pañcāla' iti.atra hi pañcālāpatyanivāsādhikaraņatvāj janapade lakșitalakșaņayā34 pañcālaśabdaḥ prayujyate.pañcālenāpatyānām laksaņād apatyaiś ca sva- nivāsādhikaraņasya janapadasya.na35 cātropacaryamāņārthavișayasyopacarya- māņād bhedena pratipattiḥ.upacaryamāņārthanigīrņatayaiva tasya pratīteḥ. tenātropacāratvaņ rūdhimāhātmyād bhrastam iva laksyate.ato'trādhyavasānagarbhaś śuddha upacāraḥ.gauņopacāre tv adhyavasānasyodāharaņam rājeti.rājaśabdo hy atra śūdrādau prayogadarśanāt kşatriye mukhyayā vṛttyā prayuktas sann anyatra sūdrādau36 kșatriyagatajanapadapuraparipālanasadrśajanapadapurapa- ripālanayogalaksaņāpūrvakatayā gauņyā vrttyā prayujyate.na cātra jhagity eva gauņatvasyāvagatiḥ.vicāraņāvyavasthāpyatvāt.tenātra gauņatvam jhagity evāpratīyamānatvād bhrastam sad vicāraņaya37 samadhigamyate.ato 'trādhyavasānagarbho gauņa upacārah.tad evam upacāraś caturvidhaḥ pravibhaktaḥ.etena caturvidhenopacāreņa saha pūrvoktau dvau laksaņā bhedau38 samkalayya satprakārā laksaņā vaktavyā.

(VI.3) esa39 ca laksana triskandha suddhatvad adhyaropad adhyavasanac ca.tatra śuddhaskandhasya dvaividhyam upādānalaksaņābhyām uktam. adhyāropādhyavasānaskandhayor api pratyekam dviprabhedatā pratipāditā śuddhagauņopacāramiśratvāt.tatraitesām trayāņām visyavibhāgam pradar- śayitum āha. TAȚASTHE LAKSAŅĀ SUDDHĀ SYĀD AROPAS TV ADŪRAGE NIGĪRŅE'DHYAVASANAM TU RUDHY ASANNATARATVATAH (VII) (VII.1) yaişā40 laksaņā śuddhopādānalaksaņātmakatvena dviprabhedā

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pratipāditā sā laksakārthānuparaktatvāt tațasthatayā pratīyamāne lakşye'rthe drastavyā.na hi tatra lakșakārthoparaktatayā laksyasyārthasyāva- gatiḥ. tatha41 hi 'gangāyām ghosa' ity atra ghosādhikaraņabhūtatațopalaksaņā- bhisaņdhānena 'gangāyām ghoșo na vitastāyām' itigangāśabde prayujyamāne tațasya srotoviśesopalakșakatvamātropayuktatvenoparāgo na pratīyate. tațasthatvenaiva tasya tațasya pratyayāt.evam42 upādāne' pi vācyam.yathā 'pīno devadatto divā na bhunkta' iti.

(VII.2) yadā tu gangāśabdābhideyasya srotoviśeșasyā'vidūratayā tațam anapahnutasvarūpam srotoviśesoparaktatayā vivaksitam bhavati tadā pūrvasminn udāharaņe'dhyāropo bhavati.srotoviśeșoparaktasya yayasya pratīteḥ srotoviśeșāvidūravarttitvāt srotoviśearūpe tațo ghoșa iti. yadā tv atyantam āsannatām ghoșam prati srotoviśeșasya pratipādayitum etadvākyam srotoviśesanigīrņatayā tațam apahnutya prayujyate 'gangāyām eva sākșād ghoso na tv anyatre'ti tadādhyavasānam.yathā caitac śuddhopacāraniștha- tayādhyāropādhyavasānayor udāharaņam uktam tathā gauņe'py upacāre vācyam. yathā 'gaur vāhīka' iti, 'gaur evāyam sāksād' iti ca.atrāpi ca yathākra- mam gogataguņaśadrsaguņayogadvāreņa gor avidūravartitve vāhīkasya gotvādh- yavasānam. yathā cāsannataratvenādhyavasānam pūrvam pravibhaktaņ tathā rūdhitvenāpi pravibhaktavyam.yathā pūrvopadarśitayor udāharaņayoh, pañcalā iti, tathā rājeti.tad idam uktam rūdhyāsannataratvataḥ iti. rūdhitvād āsannataratvāc ca nigīrņe' rthe' dhyavasānam syād ity arthaḥ.

(VII.3) nanu43 mukhyārthe śabdasya sambandhāvadhāraņāt pratipādakat- vam upapadyate na tu lāksaņike tadviparyayāt.tathā hi sambandhāvadhāraņa- samaye vyavahartrgatayos tāvac chabdaprayogārthapratipattyor avibhaktodde- śavākyavākyārthanisthatayā pūrvam hetuphalabhāvāvasāyo bhavati.tadanantaram ca tricaturādidarśanebhyo'nvayavyatirekābhyām vākyavākyārthoddeśapra- vibhāgagate ye śabdaprayogārthapratipattī tannișthakāryakāraņabhāvā- vadhāraņam.taduttarakālam ca vyavahartrgatapratipattyanyathānupapattyā śabdārthasambandhāvagatiḥ.sā ca mukhya evārthe jātyādau caturvidhe na tu lākşaņike sadvidhe.na hi lākșaņikenārthena saha śabdasya sambandhaḥ. mukhyenaivārthena paridrśyate.tathābhave sati tasya mukhyatvam eva syānn na lāksaņikatvam.atha sabdasya mukhyo yo'sāv arthas tena saha sambandho lakşyamāņasyārthasya drsta iti taddvāreņa śabdāt tasyāvagatir ity abhidhīyate. evam sati yadi nirapekșaḥ svārthapratipādanadvāreņa laksyamāņam artham avagamayati sarvadā tam artham avagamayet.atha sāpeksaḥ kim tasyāpekșaņī- yam ity āśankyāha.44

VAKTUR VĀKYASYA VĀCYASYA RŪPABHEDĀVADHĀRAŅĀT LAKȘAŅĀ SATPRAKĀRA ISĀ VIVEKTAVYĀ MANĪȘIBHIH45 (VIII)

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(VIII.1) yaḥ pratipattaye vākyam uccārayati sa vaktā.sākānkșāņām padānām ekārthaḥ samūho vākyam.śabdena mukhyam lāksaņikam abhidhāvyāpāram āśritya yad gocarīkriyate tad vācyam.etesām trayāņām vyastasamastabheda- bhinnānām desakālāvasthāvailaksanyagatasamastavyastabhedasamyojitānām yas svabhāvabhedaprapañcas tata eșā șatprakārā laksaņā parāmarśakualair vivecanīyā.tathāvidhavaktrādisāmagryapeksayaiva śabdānām svārtham avagamayatām svārthadvāreņa lakşyamāņārthasambandhasya vr ddhavyava- hāreņāvadhāritatvāt.etad uktam bhavati.na śabdānām anavadhāritalākșaņikā- rthasambandhānām lāksaņikam artham prati gamakatvam.nāpi ca tatra sāksāt sambandhagrahaņam.kim tarhi.vaktrādisāmagryapeksayā svārthavyavadhāne- neti. yad uktam ācāryaśabarasvāminā

(VIII.2) 'katham46 punaḥ paraśabdaḥ paratra vartate. svārthābhidhāneneti brūmaḥ' iti. atra hi svārthadvāreņa laksyamāņārthābhiniveśitā śabdānām uktā.punaś cāsāv evāha 'lakșaņāpi laukiky eva'47 iti. atra48 hi sambandhāvadhāraņasāpeksāņām abdānām laksyamāņe'rthe pravrttir uktā. vyavahāropārūdhāni hi pratyaksādīni pramāņāni lokasabdenābhidhiyante. loka eva viditā laukikī, vyavahārāvagamyā.parigrhītasambandhaśabdanisthā ity arthaḥ.tad uktam bhațțakumārilena

'nirūdhā laksaņāḥ kāścid sāmarthyād abhidhānavat kriyante sāmpratam kāścit kāścin naiva tv aśaktitaḥ.'49

iti.tatra nirūdhā laksaņāḥ 'rāje' tyādikāḥ. sāmpratam kriyante yā vrddhavyava- hāre vaktrādyapekşayā tathāvidhe'nyatra vișaye paridrstasvabhāvāḥ. yathā

snigdhaśyāmalakāntiliptaviyato velladbalākā ghanā vātāh sīkariņah payodasuhrdām ānandakekāh kalaḥ; kāmam santu drdham kațhorahrdayo rāmo'smi sarvam sahe vaidehī tu katham bhavișyati ha hā hā devi dhīrā bhava.50

atra51 hi liptasabdaḥ kānteḥ kunkumādival lepanasādhanatvābhāvād bādhita- mukhyārthaḥ.atas tena svārthagato yo'sāv īsattirodīyamānatvādidharmaḥ pratipāditaḥ tatsadrśesattirodhīyamānatvādidharmayogāt kāntisamprkto' rtho laksyate.evam suhrcchabdenāpi payodānām acetanatvena maitrīsambandhā- bhāvān mukhyasabdārthabādhe sati suhrdgatā ye te sāmmukhyādayo dharmās tatsadrśasāmmukhyādidharmayoginaḥ payodābhimukhā mayūrā laksyante rāmaśabdasyāpi pratipannatvāt samjnino mukhyaśabdārthabādhaḥ.atas tenāpi rājyabhramśavanavāsasītāpanayanapitrmaraādayah svābhidheyabhūtārthaika- gāmino'sādhāraņaduḥkhahetavo dharmā viistasāmagryanupravistena lakșitāḥ. tad evamādīnāņ laksaņānām sāmpratam kriyamāņatā. yāsām52 tu lakșaņānām

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na vṛddhavyavahāre drstatā, na ca yesu śabdeșu rājaśabdavad darśanam nāpi ca tajjātīyesu śabdāntaresu liptādiśabdavat sāmpratam kriyamāņatvam tāsām aśakyatvād akriyamāņatvam eva.yathā madhye samudram kakubhaḥ piśangir yā kurvati kāncanabhūmibhāsā turangakāntānanahavyavāhajvāleva bhittvā jalam ullalāsa.53 atra54 hi turangakāntānanahavyavāhaśabdo vadavāmukhāgnau laksaņayā prayu- ktaḥ.na cāsau vadavāmukhāgnau nirūdho nāpi ca tajjātīyaḥ śabdo viśista- sāmagryanupravistatayā tathāvidhārthāvagahitvena55 paridrstaḥ. (VIII.3) nanu56 dvirephādīnām śabdānām rephadvitayānugatabhramarādiśab- dalaksaņadvāreņa yathā satpadādau pravrttis tathā turangakāntānanahavyavā- haśabdasyāpi vadavāmukhāgnau vadavādilaksaņadvāreņa katham pravrttir na syāt.tajjātīye dvirephādau śabdalaksanāyāh paridrstatvāt. naitat.yato vṛddhavyavahārābhyanujñātesveva śabdesu tajjātīyaśabdadarśanāl laksaņātvam abhyupagamyate, na tu sarvatra.anyathā sarvesām eva yena kenacij jātileśena sarvān arthān prati laksaņāśabdatvasya vaktum śakyatvāt.na kaścic chabdaḥ kaņcid arthaņ pratyagamakaḥ syāt.vrddhavyavahārābhyanujñānābhyanujñā- bhyām tu visayavibhāge'nģīkriyamāņeturangakāntānanahavyavāhetyādīnām57 asati prayojane dustatvam eva, sati tu guptārthapratipādanādiprayojanasambhava evamvidhānām api laksaņānām adustatvam. tathāvidhavisaye vrddhavyavahāreņa tāsām abhyanujñātatvāt. tad evam vaktrādisāmagryanupraveśena śabdānām svārtham arpayatām arthāntaram prati vrddhavyavahāre svarūpadvāreņa sajātīyaśabdadvāreņa vā gamakatayā58 'vadhāritānām laksakatvam iti sthitam. (VIII.4) tatra vaktrnibandhanatvena yatra lāksaņikārtho'vagamyate tatro- dāharaņam.59 drsțim he prativeśini ksaņam ihāpy asmadgrhe dāsyasi prāyo naiva śisoh pitāsya virasāh kaupīr apaḥ pāsyati ekākiny api yāmi tad vanam itaḥ srotas tamālākulam nīrandhrā vapur ālikhantu jarathacchedā nalagranthayaḥ.

atra hi parapuruşasambhogānubhavecchayā sanketasthānam yuvatir vrajantī svapravrttiprayojanam viśistasanketasthānādhāram parapurusasambhogātmakam tathā sambhogacinhāni nakhadaśanaksatāni gātrasamlagnatayā śankyamānā- virbhāvāni yathākramam bhartrpipāsānivrttiksamanādeyasarasapānīyānayanena cirachinnanalagranthiparusajarjaraprāntajanayisyamāņena ca gātragatavikāravi- śesodgamenāpahnutyābhidhatte.sā cātrāpahnutir asādhvyā vaktṛtvam paryālocyāvagamyate.apahnavasya cālīkavastvabhidhānātmakatvād alīkasya ca satyārthaviparyāsakāritvād alīkenārthena tu satyo 'rthah60 svasidhyarthatve- nāksipyate.tenātra vaktrviśesaparyālocanayā satyārthe nisthayā upādānātmi-

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kāyā laksaņāyāḥ pratipattiḥ. na hy atra vākyavācyaych sāmarthyam.sādhvyā vaktṛtve sati tayor evaņvidhārthāksepāsamarthatvāt.

(VIII.5) vākyagatarūpaviśesaparyālocanayā tu yatra lāksaņikārthaparigrahas tatrodāharaņam. prāptaśrīr eşa kasmāt punar api mayi tam manthakhedam vidadhyāt nidrām apy asya pūrvām analasamanaso naiva sambhāvayāmi setum badhnāti bhūyaḥ kim iti ca sakaladvīpanāthānuyātas tvayy āyāte vitarkān iti dadhata ivābhāti kampaḥ payodheḥ.61 atra hi cāțuślokenopaslokyate yo nrpatis tadīyabalabharaksobhyamāņasvāvas- thasya samudrasya yaḥ kampo'tiśayoktyopavarņitas tasya samudrakartrkavitar- kadhāraņahetutvenotprekșitam iti vitarkān dadhata iveti. te ca vitarkāḥ prāptaśrīr ityādinā bhagavadvāsudevasya vyāpāraviśesavisayāḥ. yāvac ca tasya nṛpater bhagavadvāsudevatā na samasti tāvat katha tađīyesu vyāpāraviśesesu samśayaḥ samupajāyate. ato'tra yad etadbalabharākrāntatvena samudrasyākam- pamānasyāpi kampamānārthasādrśyāt kampamānatvam adhyavasitam tad adhyavasānagarbhagauņopacāraḥ.akampamānasyāpi tasya kampamānārthat- venādhyavasitatvāt.ata eva ceyam bhede'py adheda ity evamātmikātiśayoktiḥ. vikalpavaśād yaś cetanānām mūrdhakampo bāhulyena paridṛśyate cetanagata- saņśayahetukamūrdhakampasādrśyāt tadbhāvo'sya kampasyopacaryate. evam cātrāpy abhyavasānagarbho gauņa upacārah. iyam api can vibhinnayor api kampayor adhedenādhyavasānād bhede'py abheda ity evamātmikātiśayoktiḥ. tannibandhanaiva cāyam utpreksā iti vitarkān dadhata iveti.atra hi kāryabhū- takampadarśanāt kāraņabhūtam vitarkadhāraņam mithyājñānasvarūpayot- prekşayotpreksyate.atrāpi ca vitarkān iva dhārayato'pi (?dadhato'pi) payodher vitarkadhāraņopanibandhād bhede'py abheda ityātmikā 'atiśayoktir garbhī- k?tā.yad uktam utpreksālak șaņe

sāmyarūpavivaksāyām vācyevādyātmabhiḥ padaiḥ atadguņakriyāyogād utpreksā 'tiśayānvitā.62 iti.sambhāvyamānasya guņakriyāyogāt. tenātrāpy adhyavasānagarbho gauņa upacāraḥ.prāptaśrīr ityādisu tu trișu vitarkesu bhagavadvāsudevavișayeșu yathayogam tattatkāryanirākaraņahetugarbhatayā pravartamāneșu nrpater bhagavadvāsudevatā'ksiptā.tenātropādānātmikā laksaņā.bhagavad- vāsudevatayā cātra ņpater adhyavasānād adhyavasānagarbho gauņa upacāraḥ. etac63 cātra sarvam vākyopāttapadasamanvayānyathānupapattyāvagamyata iti vākyanibandhanā'tra lakșaņā.

(VIII.6) vācyanibandhanā tu yathā

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durvārā madaneșavo diśi diśi vyājrmbhate mādhavo hṛdyunmādakarā śasānkarucayaś cetoharāḥ kokilāḥ uttungastanabhāradurdharam idam pratyagram anyad vayaḥ sodhavyah sakhi sāmpratam katham amī pañcāgnayo duhsahāḥ ity atra smaraśaraprabhrtīnām pañcānām adhyāropitavahnibhāvānām athavā 'dhyavasitavahnisvabhāvānām asahyatvam vākyārthībhūtam.atas tasya vācyatā tatparyālocanasāmarthyāc ca vipralambhaśrngārasyākșepa ity upādānātmikā lakşaņā vācyanibandhanā.na hy atra vaktrsvabhāvapariśīlanasya śab darahi- tasyopayogaḥ.nāpi ca vākye padānām vipralambhaśrngārāksepam antareņa anvayopapattiḥ.vācyasvarūpavicāreņa tatra vipralambhaśngārākșepād upādānātmikā laksaņā vācyanibandhanā. vipralambhaśrngārasya cākșipya- māņasyāpi vācyāpekşayā prādhānyam. sahrdayahrdayāhlādahetutayā prādhān- yenākşepāt.hrdyunmādakarā ity atra satyapi śasānkarucīnām strītve64 hetutācchīlyānulomyāņām65 avivakșitatvāt țapratyayābhāvenā'cpratyayānta- tvād ikārābhāvaḥ.pūrvam cātra karmasambandhasyāvivaksitatvād66 aņpratya- yābhāva ity acpratyayaḥ 'śivaśamaristasya kara'67 itivat.ata eva hetvādivivakșā- yām api țapratyayābhāvād adosaḥ68. evam vaktrvākyavācyānām ekaika- samāśrayeņa ye'tra trayo bhedā bhavanti te tāvad udāhrtāḥ.anye'pi ca

(VIII.7) ye vaktāram vākyavācyayor anyatareņa samyojya tathā vākyam vācyena saha samuccitya dvikabhedās trayas, tathā trikabhedaś ca vaktṛvākya- vācyānām trayāņām api parasparasamyojanayā caika ityevam catvāro 69 bhedā dṛśyante te svabuddhyā satprakāralaksaņāvisayatvena manīșibhir udāhāryāḥ. teşām ca deśakālāvasthāsvālaksaņyagatasamastavyastabhedaprapañcayojanā lakşye anveșaņīyā.

(VIII.8) tad evam caturvidho mukhyo'rtho nirņītaḥ.laksaņāyāstu șaț prakā- rā uktāļ. idānīm abhihitānvayo'nvitābhidhānam tatsamuccayas tadubhayābhā- vaś cety evam ye catvāraḥ70 paksās teșu lakșaņāyāņ kakșāvibhāgam darśayitum āha

ANVAYE'BHIHITĀNAM SA VĀCYATVAD URDHVAM IȘYATE ANVITĀNĀM TU VĀCYATVE VĀCYATVASYA PURAS STHITĀ (1X) DVAYE DVAYAM AKHAŅDE TU VĀKYĀRTHAPARAMARTHATAH NĀSTY ASAU KALPITE'RTHE TU PŪRVAVAT PRAVIBHAJYATE71 (X)

(X.1) iha keşām cid anvayavyatirekāvaseyasāmānyabhūtasvārthamātraviś- rānteșu padeșu padārthākānkșāsamnidhiyogyatāmahimnā vākyārthasyānabhi- dheyabhūtasya harșaśokādivad72 avaseyatvam eva.yathā hi 'brāhmaņa, putras te jātaḥ', 'brāhmaņa,kanyā te garbhiņī ti yathākramam putrajanmakanyāgarbhi- ņītvanimittau harșaśokau svaśabdenānabhihitāv api sabdābhidheyabhūtavastu-

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sāmarthyād akşipyete.evam vākyānabhidheyabhūtasyaiva padārthāksepyatvam drastavyam.esām caivaņvidhānām matenārthānām abhihitānām uttarakālam parasparānvayād abhihitānvayaḥ.

(X.2) apare73 tv āhuḥ.vrddhavyavahārāc chabdārthasambandhāvasāyaḥ .sa ca vrddhavyavahāraḥ pravrttinivrttirūpah.pravrttinivrttī ca viistārthanișthe. ato viśista evārthe padānām sambandhāvadhrtiḥ.tataś ca viśistā eva padārthā na tu padārthānām vaiśistyam.evam ca parasparānvitānām vākyārtharūpatāpan- nānāņ tattatsāmānyāvacchāditatvena grhītasvavācakasambandhānām padaiḥ pratyāyanād anvitābhidhānam iti.

(X.3) anyeşām74 tu mate padānām tattatsāmānyabhūto vācyo'rthaḥ, vākyasya tu parasparānvitāḥ padārthāiti padāpeksyā'bhihitānvayo vākyā- pekşayā tv anvitabhidhānam.evam caitayor abhihitānvayānvitābhidhānayoh samuccaya iti.

(X.4) akhaņdavākyavākyārthavādinas tvā huḥ.viśistasya75 vastuno vākyārtha- tve'bhyupagamyamāne viśeșasyānanvitatvena tadviparītasāmānyaviruddhat- vān na paramārthasvabhāvasāmānyabhūtārthāvacchāditarūpatayā (viśeșas- yānanuyāyitvena tadviparītasāmānybhūtārthāvcchāditatayā) viśesāņām svavā- cakaiḥ sambandhagrahaņam upapadyate.ataḥ paramārthato vākyavākyārthayor akhaņdatvān nā bhihitānvayo nāpy anvitābhidhānam.na ca tatsamuccayo yujyate.padārthānām avidyamānatvāt.kalpitapadārthanisthatvenobhayam api vyastasamastarūptatayā kalpyata iti.

(X.5) tatra ca yadā tāvad abhihitānvayas tadā svavācakair abhihitānām padārthānām abhihitottarakālam ākānkșāsannidhiyogyatāmāhātmyād viśeșa- ņaviśesyātmake parasparasamanvaye sati sā laksaņā padārthānām sāmānya- bhūtānām yad vācyatvam tasmād ūrdhvam vākyārthe padārthasāmarthyād avagamyamāne sati'syate. 76

(X.6) anvitābhidhānapakse tv anvitānām višistānām eva padārthānām vācyatvam abhidheyam na tu padārthānām sāmānyabhūtatvenābhihitānām vai- śistyam. tatra viśisyamāņānām (viśistānām) vastūnām padārthatvam na ghațate. yāvat sakalavākyārthānuyāyitvena pratipannasyāvyabhicaritasvavācakasamban- dhasya sāmānyarūpasya nimittabhūtasyārthasya sampratyaye sati tattadvāk- yārthavișayatayā yathāvișayam satprakārā laksaņā nāvirbhavati. ato'nvitābhi- dhāne viśistānām padārthānām vākyārthasvabhāvānām yad vācyatvam tasya puras tasmāt pūrvanimittāvasthāyām laksaņā'vasthitā.77

(X.7) abhihitānvayānvitābhidhānasamuccaye tu pūrvoditanyāyadvitayasan- kalanayā padāpeksayā vācyatvottarakālabhāvinī lakșaņā bhavati, vākyārthotta-

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rakālam78 tasyāḥ pūrvam avasthānam. tad idam uktam dvaye dvayam iti. dvaye'bhihitānvayānvitābhidhānasamuccayātmake dvayam vācyatvād ūrdhvam prāghbāvaś ca lakșaņāyā ityarthaḥ.

(X.8) akhaņde tu vākyārthe'sau laksaņā paramārthena nāsti.bhinnānām padārthānām paramārthato'bhidheyabhāvasyānupapadyamānatvāt tadāśritat- vāc ca lakșaņāyāḥ.kalpitapadārthasamāśrayeņa tu sā laksaņā yathāruci pūrvavad abhihitānvayānvitābhidhānatatsamuccayakalpanayā vibhaktanyag bhāge nivedyā79 parasparasya deśakālāvachedenāśesavyavahartrnisthatayā rūdhatvāt.evam abhihitānvayādipaksacatustaye laksaņāyāh kaksāvibhāgo nirūpi- taḥ

(X.9) idānīm80 etasyā laksaņāyā yatra mukhyārthāsambhavas tatra muky- ārthāsannavastuvișaye, sati prayojane, pravrttim upadarśayitum āha. MUKHYARTHĀSAMBHAVĀT SEYAM MUKHYĀRTHĀSATTIHETUKĀ RUDHEH PRAYOJANAD VAPI 81 VYAVAHĀRE VILOKYATE (XI)

(XI.1) yā ceyam satprakārā laksaņā pūrvam uktā sā mukhyasyārthasya pram- āņāntarabādhitatvenāsambhavāl laksyamāņasya cārthasya mukyārthapratyāsa- nnatvāt sāntarārthagrahaņasya ca saprayojanatvād ityevamvidhakāraņatritayā- tmakasāmagrīsamāśrayaņena vrddhavyavahāre paridrśyate.yac82 ca tanmukhy- ārthāsannatvam tat pañcaprakāratayā ācāryabhartrmitreņa pradarśitam. abhidheyena sambandhāt sādrśyāt samavāyataḥ vaiparītyāt kriyāyogāl laksaņā pañcadhā matā.82 iti ślokena.prayojanasyāpi83 dvaividhyam.kimcid dhi sāntarārthaparigrahe prayojanam anādivrddhavyavahāraprasiddhyanusaraņātmakatvād rūdhy- anuvṛttasvabhāvam yathā dvirephādau.dvirephaśabdena hi rephadvitayayogi- bhramaraśabdalaksaņādvāreņa rūdhyanuvrttir eva kriyate.aparam tu rūdhy- anusaraņātmakam yat prayojanam uktam tadvyatiriktam, vastvantaragatasyā- 'samvijñānapadasya84 rūpaviśeșasya pratipādanam nāma, yathā pūrvam udāhṛtam 'rāmo' smi' iti. etac ca prayojanadvitayam mukhyārthāsambhave sati mukhyārthapratyāsannatayā pūrvopadarśitena sambandhapañcakenāva- gamyamāne laksaņike'rthe yathāvisayam anusartavyam

(XI.2) tatra sambandhalaksaņā yathā, 'gangāyām ghoșa'85 iti.atra hi gańgā- śabdābhidheyasya srotoviśesasya ghosādhikaraņatvānupapattyā mukhyaśab- dārthabādhe sati yo'sau samīpisamīpabhāvātmakaḥ sambandhas tadāśrayeņa tațam laksayati.atra hi lakșaņāyāḥ prayojanam tațasya gangātvaikārthasama- vetārthāsaņvijñānapadapuņyatvamanoharatvādipratipādanam.na hi tat puņyatvamanoharatvādi svaśabdaiḥ sprastum śakyate.avyāptyativyāptipra- sangāt.86

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(XI.3) sādrśyalakșaņāyām udāharaņam bhramara bhramatā digantarāņi kvacid āsāditam īkșitam śrutam vā vada satyam apāsya pakșapātam yadi jātīkusumānukāri puspam. atra hi bhramarapuspaśabdau sambodhanānyathānupapattyā®7(sambodhanādy- anupapattyā) bādhitamukhyārthāvabhidheyasādrśyāt tadgataguņasadrśa- guņaprayuktam arthāntaram lakşaņayāvagamayataḥ.prayojanam cātra bhram- aratvapuspatvaikārthasamavetakriyāguņasadrśānām asamvijñānapadānām kriyāguņānām pratipādanam.

(XI.4) samavāyato lakșaņā yathā 'chatriņo yānti'ti.atra bahuvacanaprayo- gān mukhyaśabdārthabādhaḥ.na hy ekasmimś chatriņi bahuvacanasya prayoga upapadyate.ato'tra gamanalaksaņāyām chatriņā saha yo'sau chatra- śūnyānām samavāyaḥ88 sāhacaryam tadvašāc chatriśabdena chatrašūnyā api lakşaņayāvagamyante.prayojanam cātra chatrašūnyānām sarvātmanā chatropetasvāmyanuyāyitayā pratipādanam.

(XI.5) vaiparītyāl lakșaņā yathā 'bhadramukha' iti.atra hi bhadramukhaśab- dasyabhadramukhe prayogāt svārthabadhaḥ.ato'sau vācyabhūtabhadramukha- tvaviparītatvād abhadramukhatvam viparītanibandhanayā pratyāyayati. atra ca laksaņāprayojanam guptā satyārthapratipattiḥ.gupto hi atra satyo' rthas tattadabhiprāyavaśena prāyeņa prayoktrbhiḥ pratipādyate.

(XI.6) kriyāyogāl laksaņāyām udāharaņam yathā 'mahati samare śatrughnas tvam asī' ti.atra hy aśatrughne śatrughnaśabdaprayogān mukhya- śabdārthabādhaḥ. śatrughnaśabdaś cā 'satrughne śatruhananakriyākar- trtvayogāl laksaņayoktaḥ. prayojanam cātra śatrughnaśabdābhidheyanrpatirū- patāpratipādanam.tathā ca

pṛthur asi guņaiḥ kīrtyā (mūrtyā) rāmo nalo bharato bhavān mahati samare śatrughnas tvam ksitau janakas sthiteḥ iti sucaritaiḥ khyātim bibhrac cirantanabhūbhṛtām katham asi na māndhātā deva trilokavijayy api. iti śatrughnarūpatayā nrpatitvam upaślokyamānam asyanājño varnitam.tad evam nibandhanatritayasamudbhavatā laksaņātrayasyoktā.

(XI.7) idānīm pañcavidhasambandhanibandhanāyām āsattau pūrvopavar- nitāyām kvacid vācyasyā'titiraskāraḥ kvacid vivakșitatvam kvacic cā'vivakşitatvam ity evamvidham trayam89 yat sahrdayair upadarśitam tasya vişayavibhāgam upadarśayitum āha

SADRSYE VAIPARITYE CA VACYASYATITIRASKRIYĀ

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VIVAKȘĀ CĀVIVAKSA CA SAMBANDHASAMAVĀYAYOH Y(XII) UPĀDĀNE VIVAKȘĀ'TRA LAKSANE TV AVIVAKSITAM TIRASKRIYĀ KRIYĀYOGE KVACIT TADVIPARĪTATĀ (XIII)

(XIII.1)'abhidheyenasambandhād' ity atra yad āsattirūpam pañcakam uktam tatra sādṛśye vaiparītye ca vācyasyātyantam tiraskāraḥ.tathā hi sādrsyaniban- dhanāyām laksaņāyām upamānavācina padasyopameyaparatvād upamānāt- makam vācyam atyantam tiraskriyate.yathopadarśitam 'snigdhaśyāmalakānti- lipte'ti 'payodasuhrdām' iti ca.atra hi liptasuhrcchabdayos svārthopamitavastu- paratvāt svārthasyātyantam kārye'nanvitatvam.

(XIII.2) vaiparītyasamāśrayāyām api tasyām arthāntarasya vācyaviparītasy- opādeyatvād vācyasyātyantam tiraskāraḥ.yathā, 'bhadramukhe' ti.atra hi bhadramukhatvam abhadramukhatvād atyantam tiraskṛtam.evam sādrśyavai- parītyayor atyantatiraskṛtavācyatā.

(XIII.3) sambandhasamavāyayos tu vācyasya vivakșitāvivakșitatve na tasyātyantam (na tv atyantam) tiraskāraḥ.tatra91 hy upādānātmikāyām vāc- yasya vivakşitatvam.tathā hi tatra vivakşānyaparatā sahrdayaiḥ92 kāvyavartma- ni nirūpitā.lakşaņe tu vācyasyāvivakșitatā'rthāntarasankramitatvāt.

(XIII.4) tatra sambandhanibandhanāyām laksaņāyām upādāne vācyavivakș- āyām udāharaņam 'pīno devadatto divā na bhunkta' iti.atra hi dinādhikaraņa- bhojanābhāvavisistatayā pīnatvalaksanam kāryam vivaksitam eva sat svasiddhyarthatvena sambandhanibandhanayā laksaņayā rātribhojanatmakam kāraņam ākșipati.

(XIII.5) samavāyanibandhanāyām tasyām upādāne vācyasya vivakșitatvam yathā 'chatriņo yānti'92a ti.atra hi yadā chatrī bahutvopetatvāt svagatabahu- tvānvayasamsiddhyarthatvena chatraśūnyān apy āksipati tadā samavāyaniban -. dhane chatraśūnyānām upādāne kriyamāņe vācyaś chatrī vivaksitah.tad evam sambandhasamavāyanibandhanayor upādānātmikayor lakșaņayor vācyasya vivakşitatvam uktam.

(XIII.6) lakşaņātmikayos tu tayor vācyasyāvivaksitatvam,93 na tv atyantam tiraskāraḥ. lakşyamāņadvāreņa kathamcit tatkārye'nvitatvāt.tatra sambandha- nibandhanāyām laksaņāyām avivakșitavācyatve udāharaņam, 'rāmo'smī' ti. atra hi rāmasabdavācyam dāśarathirūpam vyangyadharmāntarapariņatatvāt94 svaparatvenānupāttam95, tasmād avivakşitam,na tv atyantam tiraskrtam. vyangyadharmadvāreņa6 vākyārthe kathamcid anvitatvāt.evam97 gangāyām ghoșa' ityādāv apy unneyam.

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(XIII.7) samavāyasambandhanibandhanāyām tu lakșaņāyām avivakșitavāc- yatā 'chatrino yāntī ty atraivodāhāryā.tathā hi yadā chatritvam bahutvānva- yānyathānupapattyā samudāyaparatayopādīyate tadā samudāyasya vivaksitat- vād vācyasyāvivakșā.evam api ca samudāyāntarbhūtatvāt samudāyad- vāreņa chatriņo'pi kriyānvayaḥ sulabha eva.ata eva cātra vācyasya nātyantam tiraskāraḥ. samudāyarūpāntarbhūtatvena kriyānvitatvāt.tad evam sambandha- samavāyanibandhanayor lakşaņayor vācyasya vivakșitatvam avivakșitatvam ca,na tv atyantatiraskāra iti sthitam.

(XIII.8) kriyāyoganibandhanāyām lakanāyām śabdagatāvayavaśaktya- nusaraņe śabdaśaktimūlatā laksyamāņasyārthasya.tatra ca vācyasyārthasya tiraskriyā yathā 'purusaḥ purusa"8 iti.atra hy ekena purușaśabdena viśiștajātī- yasyārthasyopāttatvād aparaḥ purusaśabdaḥ svavācyavyatirekeņaiva kriyāyoganibandhanayā lakșaņayā punar atiśayitrtvam upādatte.yatra tu nimittasadbhāvād vācye'rthe vivaksita eva tasyārthāntarasya śabdaśaktyantara- mūlatayā vyavasthitasyāvāpaḥ kriyate tatra tadviparītatā, vācyārthakriyāvaipa- rītyam.na khalv atra vācyasyārthasya tiraskriyā, api tu vivakșitatvam eva. yathā 'mahati samare śatrughnas tvam asi'iti.atra hi śatrughnaśabdaḥ śatruhananakriyāyāh kartrtvam kriyāyoganibandhanayā laksaņayāvagamayann api svārtham dāśarathim upamānatayāpi pratipādayati.tena tasya vivakșita- svārthatāpi.yady api99 copameyaparatvenopamānasyopādānād evamvidhe vişaye' tyantatiraskrtavācyatā sahrdayair angīkriyate tathāpi kriyāyoganibandha- nalakşaņāvasare tāvad vācyasyopamānatvenāngīkrtatvād atiraskṛtavācyatāpi bhavati.tad evam kriyāyoganibandhanāyām antaḥsankrāntanānārthavaśataḥ kvacid vācyam tiraskriyate kvacit tu vivakșyata iti sthitam.etac ca sarvam bahuvaktavyatvād iha na nirūpyate: lakșaņāmārgāvagahitvam100 tu dhvaneḥ sahrdayair nūtanatayopavarņitasya vidyata iti diśam unmīlayitum idam atrok- tam.etac ca vidvadbhiḥ kusāgrīyayā buddhyā nirūpaņīyam.na tu jhagity evāsūyitavyam ity alam atiprasangena.tad evam vācyasya tiraskrtavivakșāyām vișayavibhāgo nirūpitaḥ.

(XIII.9) idānīm sakalaśabdāvibhāgātmakasya101 śabdatattvasya yadā śab- dārthasambandhatritayarūpatayā rajjusarpatayā (rajjos sarpatayā?) vivarta- mānatvam tadaitad abhidhāvrttam daśavidhavyavahāropārohitayopapadyate na tu samhrtakramavāk tattvavisayatayeti102 darśayitum āha.

VIVARTAMĀNA VĀKTATTVAM DASADHAIVAM VILOKYATE SAMHRTAKRAMABHEDE TU TASMIMS TEȘĀM KUTO GATIH (XIV)

(XIV.1) sakalaśabdāvibhāgātmanaḥ śabdatattvasya pramātrpramāņaprameya- pramitirūpeņa prakāracatustayena pratyekam vācyavācakatatsambandhaprapa-

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ñcabhājo rajjusarpavad vivartamānasya nirūpitaivamvidhadaśavidhābhidhā- vrttasambandhitvam.103,103 a pratyastamitasakalavikalpollekhopaplavatve tu kramabhedasamhārena tasmin vāktatve'vivartamāne104 teșām daśānām abhidhāvrtānām kuto gatih.naiva prasara ity arthaḥ.

(XIV.2) idānīm prakaraņārtham upasamharati.

ITY ETAD ABHIDHĀVRTTAM DASADHĀ'TRA VIVECITAH (XV)

(XV.1) mukhyasyābhidhāvrttasya prakārāś catvāro lākşaņikasya tu șad ity evam daśaprakāram abhidhāvrttam atra vivecitam.

(XV.2) adhunā phalam etasya darśayati.

PADAVĀKYAPRAMĀŅEȘU TAD ETAT PRATIBIMBITAM YO YOJAYATI SĀHITYE TASYA VĀNĪ PRASĪDATI (XVI)

(XVI.1) padāvagatihetutvāt padam vyākaraņam.vākyasyānvayāvasāyahetutvād vākyaņ mīmāņsā. pramāņapratipattikāritvāt pramāņam tarkaḥ.eteșu padavāk yapramāņaśāstreșu caturvargopayogisarvavidyādhigamopāyabhūteșu trișu pravibhajyamānesu sankrāntānan taranirūpitasvarūpapratibimbam105 daśavi- dham abhidhāvrttam yaḥ sāhityādau sakalalokavyavahāradarpaņaprakhye samcārayati sa vāci krameņa prasīdantyām vāgīśvaro bhavati.daśavidhenānenā- bhidhāvrttena samagrasya vākparispandasya vyāptatvād anena vyākaraņamī- māmsātarkasāhityātmakeșu catursu śāstreșūpayogāt taddvāreņa ca sarvāsu vidyāsu sakalavyavahāramūlabhūtāsu prasāraņād asya daśavidhasyābhidhāvrtta- sya sakalavyavahāravyāpitvam akhyātam.

BHAȚȚAKALLAȚAPUTREŅA MUKULENA NIRŪPITĀ 106 SŪRIPRABODHANĀYEDAM ABHIDHĀVRTTIMĀTRKĀ (XVII)

iti śāradācaraņarajaḥkaņapavitritasthalavāstavyaśrībhațțakallațātmajabhațța- mukulaviracitā abhidhāvṛttimātṛkā.

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MUKULA BHAȚȚA'S

ABHIDHĀVRTTIMĀTRKĀ*

Translation

K. VENUGOPALAN

(0.1) In this world any object1 that is a means to worldly experience or final deliverance and useful in avoiding what is contrary to either of them is not of practical use in day to day worldly activity unless it is known with certainty. For, all means of knowledge which are instrumental in the cognition of things attain validity2 by resulting in certitude. And comprehension of things which lead to worldly experience or final deliverance and to the avoidance of what is opposed to them is dependent on valid means of cognition. Hence this certainty alone is the cause of things being useful in practical worldly activities. This certainty brings to one's purview the object as inseparably connected with words. Words are the source of the cognition of objects (i.e. the sense) through their significative capacity or function3, either primary or secondary, and so in this treatise the two functions, primary and secondary, are distinguished.

(0.2) Now the question arises: what then is this primary and secondary func- tion (of words). In answer the author proceeds to describe the two functions of words, primary and secondary, by describing their objects.

THAT SENSE THE COMPREHENSION OF WHICH ARISES DIRECTLY FROM THE VERBAL FUNCTION IS THE PRIMARY SENSE, WHILE THAT WHOSE COGNITION IS FROM THE PRIMARY SENSE IS THE SECONDARY. (I)

(1.1) The sense which is comprehended directly4 from the verbal function is primary. This (Primary Sense) is comprehended before all other senses are conveyed just as the face5 is perceived before all the limbs such as the hands. Therefore it is called 'primary like the face' (mukhya), the word being derived from 'mukha', face, with the addition of the suffix 'yat' prescribed for the class of words 'sakha' etc. in the sense of likeness6. The example for this is 'the cow is to be sacrificed'. In this example what is cognised is the universal 'cowness'7 which is the means for the performance of the sacrifice, through the function of the word 'cow'. Thus the primary sense is what is cognised through the direct verbal function.

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(1.2) The sense which is understood through a consideration of the sense derived (directly) from the verbal function is the Secondary; for example, (the cognition) of a particular cow given in the previous example. This (secondary sense, viz. the particular) cannot be derived directly from the word (from the word through the verbal function) because the word ceases to function after giving the sense of the universal and because of the maxim 'the verbal function cannot reach the qualified (particular) when its power is exhausted in expressing the qualifying factor (universal)'8. The universal, apart from the particular, is not useful for the sacrifice9. Hence the particular which is the substratum of the universal is implied through the power of the universal which is known through the word (directly). Therefore this is secondary. Thus the twofold verbal func- tions have been explained by means of describing the primary and secondary senses. These are respectively 'that which has a reference to the sense having no intervention' and 'that which is based on a sense with the intervention (of the primary sense)'.10

(I.3) Now the author goes on to mention the fourfold nature of the Primary Sense.

THE PRIMARY SENSE IS OF FOUR KINDS AS DISTINGUISHED BY THE 'UNIVERSAL' ETC. (II)

(II.1) Of the two senses, the Primary and the Secondary, the Primary has four varieties, viz., 'the universal' etc. The revered author of the Mahābhāsya has described the denotation of words as fourfold: i.e., words denoting universals, words denoting qualities, words denoting action and words denoting proper names.11 Thus the denotation of words is dependent on limiting attributes 12 since in the case of all words which operate to denote (their senses) one can distinguish their objects as accompanied by limiting attributes.

(II.2) Limiting attributes are of two kinds: that which is imposed (upon the object) by the speaker of his free will13 and that which is innate to the object. Some attributes are imposed on the object as determinants, some are natural to it. Of these, the one imposed on the object by the speaker is where the determining attribute is imposed by the speaker of his free will on the various objects in order to bring out the significative capacity (of the respective words)

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in regard to these objects. For example, in the case of words 'dittha' etc., their specific form is what is cognised at the utterance of the final phoneme and which is a totality wherein the serial order of the utterances (of the phonemes) remains unperceived.14 This final form (of the word as such) is imposed on a given object as a determining attribute by the speaker by utilizing the capacity of that word to denote these so-named objects. Therefore words like 'dittha' etc., depend on that (viz., the upädhi, i.e., the pure form of the word). Even in the case of those persons 15 who consider that there is no imposition of the form of the word 'dittha', etc., as a totality devoid of the perceptible order of the utterance, for the reason that there is no such total and specific form different from the separate phonemes 'd' etc., - even in the case of these persons - the 'dittha' words as arbitrary words are applicable because these, as mental reconstructions and unitary forms in accordance with the different capacities indicated by the free will of the speaker, are used to signify the respective objects by name. Thus in accordance with the method of the grammarians as stated above, a limiting attribute in the form of something that has been imposed (on the object) by the speaker has been explained.

(II.3) Of the limiting attributes that belong to the object by nature there are two kinds: the already existing one and that which is to be accomplished (i.e. that which comes to it by some external action). Of these, those that depend on the attribute to be achieved are 'action-words'.16 For example, 'he cooks'. The already existing limiting attribute is twofold, distinguished as a 'uni- versal and a 'quality'. Some of the already existing attributes have the character of giving life to the object,17 such as 'universals'. For, nothing can attain its form without the association of a 'universal'. So it has been said in the Vākyapadīya:18 "An object like a cow is not a cow by virtue of its very nature, nor is it not a cow (by virtue of its very nature). It is a cow only through its connection with 'cowness'". Some limiting attributes are means of specifying the thing which has already attained its form. For example, a quality like 'white' etc.19 The quality 'white' is not a cause of the cloth etc., attaining its form. The cloth has attained its form by virtue of the 'universal' (clothness). Hence it is a specifying factor of the thing which has already come into existence. Even in the case of 'atomicity', etc., which are qualities and are eternal, the same argument holds good because of the fact that they belong to the same class called 'quality'.20 Thus

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the word which depends on the limiting attributes which give life to the thing (they refer to) is a class-word such as 'cow' etc. But that word, the sense of which is the cause of assigning a particular attribute to an already existent thing, is a 'quality-word' such as 'white' etc. (II.4) Objection:21 Is it not true that in all words referring to qualities, actions, and proper names, there is the basic nature of a reference to the universal? For example, in the case of quality-words such as 'white' etc. there is reference to the universal (whiteness) which inheres in each example of a white colour, differ- ent as they are, inhering in their different substrates such as milk, a conch, a crane, etc. So too the denotation is the universal in the case of the action-words that inhere in all the different types of cooking which are different from each other on the basis of the substances such as lumps of sugar, sesame, rice, etc. The denotation of proper names such as 'dittha' etc., is a universal in the form of "being the word 'dittha'", which inheres in the different utterances of 'dittha' etc., as uttered by a parrot, a mynah, a man etc., and is imposed on the thing referred to (i.e. the thing named). Or (as an alternative explanation) even if from the point of view of growth or decay, there is a difference in the (same) substance 'dittha', the universal 'ditthaness' alone as inhering in the thing to be known by the utterance 'dittha', is to be sought (as the denotation), by virtue of which (universal) there arises the uncontradicted and uniform type of cognition, viz., "(This is) dittha, dittha, etc." This universal is meant by the word 'dittha'. And hence the fourfold division of words in regard to their function as specifying qualities, actions and proper names is not appropriate since they all denote universals.

(II.5) To this the answer is:22 The cognition of the same form is due to the one particular quality, action, and the proper name appearing as many because of the respective differentiating factors, and not due to any universal. This is the opinion of the revered author of the Mahabhasya. For, even as one and the same face appears differently owing to differences in the sources of cognition of its reflections, such as oil, a blade of a sword, water, a mirror etc., so too the one particular quality 'white', delimited by time and place and circumscribed by a specific substratum such as a conch, etc., which are the products of various causal aggregates, appears to be of many forms and hence different. Thus, since the colour white is a single individual entity, and since the 'universal' exists in more than one substratum, consequently there can be no universal such as whiteness, and quality-words cannot be class-words. In the same way

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should one view the words 'cooks', 'dittha' and the entities 'dittha', etc. For, in these cases, it is only one and the same (individual) act of cooking that appears as many owing to differences exhibited by the different substances exhibiting the act of cooking; it is only the word (i.e., the name) 'dittha' that sounds many in the utterances of different speakers, and it is only the same individual entity 'dittha' that appears as many in its various stages of youth etc., due to age, stage of life, etc.23 Thus it is established that the Primary Sense is of four kinds because of the four kinds of significative bases of these words.

(II.6) Now the author proceeds to show the twofold nature of the Secondary Sense.

THE TWOFOLD NATURE OF THE SECONDARY SENSE IS DUE TO ITS BEING 'PURE' AND 'RELATED' (III

(III.1) The twofold nature of the Secondary Sense is due to its being 'pure' and 'related'. The pure type of Secondary Sense is 'the village on the Ganges'25 In this statement the village cannot have as its support a particular current of water, and hence the word 'Ganges' by secondary function implies the bank which is close to the current, which is its own sense. The 'related' Secondary Sense is where one thing is said to be another thing on account of their similarity, as in 'The vahīka is a bull'26. In this sentence the word 'bull' is not compatible with the word vahīka as referring to the same substratum. So, having its Primary Sense contradicted, it is related to the word vähīka through the qualities of stupidity, sloth etc., existing in the bull and similar to the qualities of stupidity etc., found in the vāhīka. Therefore this type of Secondary Sense is called the 'related". Thus the twofold nature of the Secondary Sense has been stated.

(III.2) Now the author shows the twofold division of even the 'pure' Secondary Sense.

THE PURE TYPE OF SECONDARY SENSE IS SAID TO BE OF TWO KINDS: (1) INCLUDING WITHIN IT ANOTHER SENSE AND (2) IMPLYING ANOTHER SENSE. (IV)

(IV.1) This Secondary Sense explained as pure is said to be of two kinds. In one case the sense proceeds from including (within the Primary Sense) a different sense, and in the other case by implying a totally different sense.

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(IV.2) In explaining what this inclusion of a different sense is and what implying a totally different sense is, the author says:

INCLUSION IS WHERE A DIFFERENT SENSE IS IMPLIED IN ORDER TO JUSTIFY (I.E. THE PRIMARY SENSE). IMPLICATION (OF A DIFFERENT SENSE THROUGH THE ABNEGATION OF THE PRIMARY SENSE) IS JUST THE REVERSE OF THIS. (V)

(V.1) Where there is the inclusion of another sense in order to establish itself (the Primary Sense), there we have 'inclusion' as in: 'The cow should be sacrificed'27. In this the direct verbal sense (Primary Sense) 'cowness', being use- less as an object of sacrifice, is inapplicable apart from the individual (cow) being implied. Thus in order to establish itself (cowness) as the object of sacrifice, the 'individual' is indicated. The other example is 'Fat Devadatta eats not during the day28.' In this case the fatness, which is specified by the absence of eating during the day and which is an effect (of eating), in order to establish itself, includes within itself its cause viz., eating at night. This fatness is not the result of the use of tonic, etc., because it is pointed out that only when there is the absence of it (the use of tonic) on the basis of other means of proof, can this be an illustration of Secondary function. And this fatness is specified by the absence of eating during the day and so is the reason for denying the use of tonic, etc.29 In this instance, let there be the case of 'verbal implication' (śrutārthāpatti) by supplying the phrase 'eats at night' in order to complete the means of proof which otherwise is incomplete; or let there be the implication of the cause itself, viz., eating at night 30. In any case since there is an inclusion of another sense through implication in order to establish the Primary Sense, it is a case of the inclusive type of Secondary Sense. But in a case where there is no implication of a different sense for self-establishment as in the aforesaid manner, but rather on the contrary, there is the replace- ment of one sense by another through abnegation (of the Primary Sense), then we have total transfer: as previously stated in the example 'the village on the Ganges'. In this case the word Ganges subordinates its own sense to the (sense) 'bank' which is associated with the act of supporting (the village) by in fact being the support of the village. Therefore the word Ganges subordinates its own Primary Sense, viz., the current, in order to convey 'the bank', which is a totally different sense; and so there is here the subordination (by the word) of its own sense by establishing a sense totally different from it. So there is the nature of total transfer (laksanam) because of its being contrary to the aforesaid

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inclusive Secondary Sense. Thus the pure type of Secondary Sense has been divided into two.

(V.2) Now the author proceeds to explain the 'related' Secondary Sense in its fourfold nature.

THE RELATED SECONDARY SENSE IS OF FOUR KINDS BY DIFFEREN- TIATION INTO 'SIMPLY RELATED' AND 'QUALITATIVELY RELATED', EACH AGAIN BEING DIFFERENTIATED BY 'SUPERIMPOSITION' AND 'SUPPRESSION'. (VI)

(VI.1) The 'related'Secondary Sense is of two kinds, simple and qualitative. The simply related is where one thing is related to another through the assumption of the cause-effect relation. This occurs when there can be no Secondary Sense based on a similarity of qualities obtaining between that which is to be compared (upameya) and that which serves as the standard of comparison (upamāna) because of the very fact that the basic relationship (upameyopamānabhāva) is itself absent. For example, 'clarified butter is long life'. In this case 'length of life', the effect of clarified butter, and the word 'long life' are both related to 'clarified butter' which is the cause of long life, through the cause-effect relation. Therefore this related Secondary Sense is 'simple'. The qualitative type of related Secondary Sense is where the word referring to the upamāna and its sense is related to the upameya on the basis of the similarity of qualities that obtains between the upameya and upamāna. It depends upon the basic relationship upamānopameyabhāva. This Secondary Sense is called the qualitative because it arises through the qualities31 (of the two things constituting the metaphor). For example, 'the vāhīka is a bull'. In this example on the basis of the qualities of stupidity, sloth, etc., (in the vahika) similar to those found in the bull, the word 'bull' and 'bullness' are related to vahika. Some32 accept only the relation of the word and not of the sense in the (metaphorical) relation. This is not correct. Because the relation of the word never exists without the relation of the sense. Thus the related Secondary Sense has been stated to be twofold as 'simple' and 'qualitative'.

(VI.2) Each of these two is again twofold due to 'superimposition' and 'suppression'. In a case where one thing is related to another without completely suppressing the (idea of) distinction33 between the two, the superimposed and what is superimposed upon, there we have the superimposed type of Secondary

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Sense, because one additional sense is superimposed on the other without its original form being suppressed. See the above mentioned examples ('clarified butter is long life' and 'the vāhīka is a bull'). For, in the case of 'clarified butter is long life,' the cognition of the sense of clarified butter which is the cause (of long life) is not concealed within its effect, viz., 'long life' because it is cog- nised as itself; and this clarified butter cognised as clarified butter is then cognised as 'long life' since it is the cause of 'long life'. So in this case there is the superimposition (of longevity on the clarified butter). In the same manner in the case of 'the vāhika is a bull' (there is superimposition) because of the absence of concealment (of the related things); they are related as upamāna and upameya. Thus where the object of superimposition, (i.e., vāhīka) is not completely suppressed by the thing superimposed, we have the 'superimposed' Secondary Sense. But where the intention is complete suppression of the ob- ject of superimposition as if it were contained within the thing superimposed, we have the 'suppressed' Secondary Sense. The illustration for the simple, related Secondary Sense where there is suppression is the word 'pañcala'. Here the word 'pañcala' is used to refer to the city by the double implication34 of its being the residence of the descendants of pañcala. For the word 'pañcāla' indicates the descendants and (again) the city which is their residence. There is no cognition in this of the object of superimposition 35 as distinct from the thing superimposed because it is cognised as completely obliterated by the superimposed sense. Therefore (the character of) the relation here appears to have been lost owing to the power of established usage. Hence there is here the simple related Secondary Sense where there is the suppression (of the Primary by the Secondary). In the case of the qualitative related Secondary Sense the example for the suppressed type is the word 'raja'. The word 'raja', which is seen used in respect of a sudra (member of the fourth caste), having primarily the sense of a member of the Warrior caste, is applied qualitatively to a sūdra based on implication by the association of a sūdra with the qualities of protecting a city or country similar to those of a king in protecting a city or country.36 In this case the qualitative relation is not cognised instantaneously because it is based on and arrived at by a long logical thought process, i.e., reflection. Hence the qualitative relation, lost because of not being cognised instantaneously, comes to be cognised by reflection.37 And therefore we have here the qualitatively related Secondary Sense which has the suppression (of the visaya of superimposition by the thing superimposed). Thus we have the fourfold division of related Secondary Sense. With these

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four varieties of 'related' Secondary Sense added to the previously stated two varieties38 (of the pure type) we have in all six varieties of Secondary Sense.

(VI.3) The Secondary Sense is of three stems39 due to being (1) simple (2) superimposition and (3) suppression. We have already given a twofold classifi- cation of the 'simple' stem into the 'inclusive' and the 'abnegating' (of the Primary Sense). In the case of the stems 'suppression' and 'superimposition' also we have shown the two varieties of each, the 'simply related' and the 'qualitatively related'. The author now proceeds to explain the distinction in scope of all these three stems.

SECONDARY SENSE IS 'SIMPLE' WHEN IT IS ALOOF (FROM THE PRIMARY SENSE). 'SUPERIMPOSITION' COMES WHEN THE DISTANCE, (I.E., THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN THE PRIMARY SENSE AND THE SECONDARY SENSE) IS NOT FAR. 'SUPPRESSION' IS WHEN THERE IS A COMPLETE SWALLOWING UP (OF THE PRIMARY SENSE BY THE SECONDARY SENSE) BECAUSE OF THE CLOSENESS OF THE TWO AND DUE TO LONG ESTABLISHED USAGE. (VII)

(VII.1) Secondary Sense of the pure type, explained as of two kinds, viz., the inclusive and the abnegating, should be construed when an implied sense is cognised as aloof because it is not associated with (lit., coloured by) the implying sense (i.e. the Primary)40. In such a case obviously the cognition of the implied sense is not associated with the implying sense. For instance, in the case 'the village on the Ganges,' when the word 'Ganges' is used with the intention of referring to the bank as the support of the village in the manner 'the village on the Ganges, not on the Vitasta,' the sense 'bank' is merely pointed out by the specific current and is not connected with it. For its cog- nition is brought about in an aloof manner.41 In the same way42 one should explain the case of the inclusive type of Secondary Sense; as in 'fat Devadatta eats not during the day'.

(VII.2) In the above illustration, when one wishes to express the bank as associated with the particular current, but without its own specific form being suppressed because of its (i.e. bank's) closeness to the current which is the (Primary) sense of the word 'Ganges', then we have a case of 'superimposed' Secondary Sense. Because in this case there is a cognition of the bank associated with the particular current. Due to its being close to the current (there arises the cognition): the village is on the bank, which takes the form of the current.

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But when this statement is uttered to inform (another) of the very close proximity of the current to the village, and so the sense 'bank' is suppressed as completely contained within the sense the 'particular current' and a cognition being of the form 'the village is on the current of the Ganges and not anywhere else' arises, then we have the suppressed type of Secondary Sense. Even as we have stated these examples in the case of the 'superimposed' Secondary Sense based purely on the simple relation, so must we do likewise in regard to the qualitative Secondary Sense. For example, 'the vāhīka is a bull' and 'this one is exactly a bull'. In these cases too we have superimposition and suppression respectively as follows: (In the first case) when vāhīka is implied by intention as not far removed (i.e., different) from the bull through an association with qualities similar to those of the bull, there is the superimposition of the 'bullness' (on vāhīka); (in the second case) because of the greater importance or impressiveness of the qualities of the bull (than those of the vāhika), there is a case of suppression of vāhīka by bullness. So there is 'suppression.' As in the aforesaid cases 'suppressed' Secondary Sense was distinguished (from others) on the basis of greater contiguity, so can it also be done from the point of view of conventional usage. For instance, in the case of the aforesaid examples 'pañcāla' and 'rājā'. Therefore in the kārikā it is said 'through greater contiguity and long usage'. The sense is: there can be suppressed Secondary Sense when the subject (under consideration) is completely swallowed up (by the suppressing object) on the basis of their extreme closeness or popular usage over a long time.

(VII.3) Here is an objection.43 Since in the case of the Primary Sense there is the cognition of the direct relation (of the word and the sense), it is proper to accept the word as the denoter (of the sense). This is not so in the case of the Secondary Sense, because it is otherwise. For, in the process of cognition of the relation there is first of all a general notion of a causal relationship between the utterance of a speaker and the understanding of a hearer, but without any specific knowledge of the difference between the sentence uttered and its meaning. In the next stage, upon hearing the sentence three or four times and watching, through a process of inference, one distinguishes clearly the utter- ance of a sentence and its meaning as two separate things based on a division between the sentence itself and its sense; and one then realizes the causal relation between sentence utterance and comprehension of meaning. Finally, because one cannot otherwise explain the understanding of the hearer, there is

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the final cognition of the relation (of the word and sense). This sense is only with reference to the Primary Sense as the universal and not to the Secondary Sense. For there is no relation between the word and the Secondary Sense; such a relation is seen only with the Primary Sense. And in that case there will be only the primary character of the sense and not the nature of being secondary. If then the implied sense has its relation with that sense which is the Primary Sense of the word and through this relation of the two senses we have the cognition of the Secondary Sense from the word, then the word when it is independent of any extraneous factors would lead to the cognition of the Secondary Sense through the denotation of the Primary Sense. This gives rise to the contingency that a word will always, (without exception), indicate the Secondary Sense. But if we hold that it depends on some extraneous factors, what are these factors which it depends on?44 To this the author replies: THE SECONDARY SIGNIFICATION IS OF SIX KINDS BASED ON THE DISTINCTIVE NATURE OF THE SPEAKER, THE (ACTUAL) STATE-

THE WISE.45 MENT, AND THE SENSE (OF THE SENTENCE). THIS IS THE VIEW OF (VIII) (VIII.1) The speaker is one who utters a sentence for another to understand A sentence is a group of words which together convey a single sense or idea. The sense (i.e. the purport) is what is conveyed by the Primary or Secondary significative capacity. Those wise enough to perceive minutely can distinguish the natural distinction in the three aforesaid: speaker etc., taken separately or together and coupled with, either separately or together, place, time and circumstances. Words which primarily denote their own senses are related to their Secondary Senses only through their own (i.e. Primary) senses with reference to the extraneous factors such as the speaker, the specific statement, and the intended sense; and this is so because of such observations from the usage of older people. This is what is meant: Words, the connection of which with the Secondary Sense is not determined, (i.e., already known precisely) are not the indicators, (i.e. connoters), of the Secondary Sense. Nor is there any direct relation between them. What is it then? It is through the intermedi- ary in the form of the Primary Sense based on the causal aggregates, viz., the speaker etc. For it is said by the teacher Śabarasvāmin: 46 (VIII.2) 'How is one word meant to signify a meaning different from its own? We say it is through the Primary Sense'. Here the power of words to signify the Secondary Sense is said to be through their Primary Sense. He again says: 'The Secondary signification is resorted to in ordinary speech'47. Here it is stated that

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words which are dependent on the cognition of the relation (between word and sense) are used in the Secondary Sense. By the word 'loka', i.e. ordinary speech, is meant the means of cognition such as perception, etc. which are used in practical day to day activities. 'Laukika' means what is known through perception, etc., i.e. known from day to day activity; that is, what depends on words the connection of which (with the sense) are already known.48 It is said by Bhatta Kumārila:

Some metaphors are old and deep-rooted, expressive of the Secondary Sense as if it were the primary sense; some are modern (newly coined) and can be freshly created; still others are impossible since they are incapable of expressing the Secondary Sense.49

A deep-rooted metaphor consists in the words like 'raja, etc. Those which are modern and newly coined are based on the usage of elders and are found in similar cases based on the specific speaker, etc., as for instance:

Let there be the clouds which shine with gently moving cranes and which have completely smeared the sky with their shining black colour; let there be the chill winds; let there be the sweet crackling cries of the peacocks, the friends of the clouds. I am Rama with a hard heart. I can bear everything. But Vaidehi! How will she feel? O, dear, take heart.50

In this verse the word 'smeared' has its Primary Sense contradicted for the reason that the shining lustre (of the clouds) is not a means of smearing unguents like saffron etc. Therefore the character of 'slightly veiling', (i.e., the object with which it comes in contact) which is included within the Primary Sense is related to the same kind of 'slightly veiling' (by the clouds) in the word 'colour' and hence there is a Secondary Sense.51 Likewise, in the word 'friend', the Primary Sense is inapplicable because the cloud, being an in- animate object, is incapable of friendship. This being the case, qualities such as 'favourable nature' etc., which exist in the 'friend', by relation to similar qualities of the peacocks which greet the clouds (at their advent), suggest by Secondary implication the peacocks as friends. So also the word 'Rāma' has lost its denotative sense because it is well known that Räma is the subject here. Therefore it implies by secondary function, through the specific (causal) factors

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(such as speaker etc.) the things which are the causes of extra-ordinary grief like the loss of the kingdom, exile in the forest, abduction of Sīta, death of his father, etc., which inseparably go along with its Primary Sense. All such cases of Secondary Senses come under 'newly coined' metaphors. But 52 in cases where Secondary Sense has not been in use by elders, where there is no implication of the type found in the word 'raja', nor any possibility of coining a new Secondary Sense in words of the same class as in 'lipta', etc, - in such cases - because of their incapacity to imply any Secondary Sense, words cannot take on any Secondary Sense. For example:

The city, which by the (golden) hue of its grounds makes the quarters red, appeared as if it were the flames of the submarine fire bursting out of the waters at the centre of the ocean.53

In this verse the word 'turangakantananahavyavaha' is used54 in the Secondary Sense of the submarine fire (vadavāmukhāgni). This word is not sanctioned by usage nor does it belong to that class of words which are seen to be capable of implying such a Secondary Sense55 by means of the penetration of the specific causal factors (such as the speaker etc.).

(VIII.3) Here is an objection:56 Words like 'dvirepha' (two 'r'ed) connote the sense 'bee' by means of implying the word 'bhramara' which has the same feature of having two 'r's. So also why could not the word 'turangakantananahavyavaha' connote the sense 'submarine fire' through the transference of the words 'turanga', 'kāntā' etc. to 'vadavā', 'mukha' etc .? This should be possible because in the case of the word 'dvirepha', which belongs to the same type, it is possible. (The answer is) Not so. For the Secondary Sense is acceptable only in such words which are accepted as belonging to a similar class according to the usage of elders, and not in all cases. Otherwise there would be no word which could not convey any sense, because there is the possibility of attributing the charac- ter of secondary signification to any word to mean anything through even the slightest similarity. But when the distinction is made on the basis of the accep- tance or nonacceptance of usage by elders, the usage of the expression 'turangakāntānanahavyavaha' and such others is faulty when there is no specific motive5 7 (behind this usage). When, (however), there is any definite purpose, such as a veiled reference, etc., in such cases there is no defect or faulty usage. Because in such cases their usage has the approval of time-

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honoured practice. Thus for some words which subordinate their Primary Sense due to the influence of the speaker etc., there is a figurative capacity, because they are understood in established usage 58 as indicators of a different sense either by virtue of their very form or by belonging to a certain class.

(VIII.4) Now the illustration for the Secondary Sense based on the speaker is.59

O, my neighbour, please look after my house for a while. This child's father will scarcely drink the tasteless water of the well (in the house). Though alone I go to the nearby forest where there is a river flowing by a thick growth of tamala trees. I do not mind the joints of the reeds broken long before, scratching my body.

In this verse a certain woman is going to a rendezvous with a desire to make love with a paramour. She utters these words to conceal the motive of her going out to the specific place of here appointment. The motive consists in her sexual dalliance with a paramour. The young woman further suspects that she will return bearing marks of the sexual act, such as bruises made by the nails and teeth. Concealment is made by her saying she will bring the tasty water of the river in order to quench the thirst of her husband, and that her body will be scratched by the tips of the hard and old reeds which have been broken long back. This concealment is understood on the basis of the speaker being an unchaste woman. It consists in expressing what is not true, the untrue being what makes a perversion of the true, and so the false sense by virtue of its trying to establish itself indicates the truth60. Therefore in this verse there is a cognition of the Secondary Sense of the nature of the 'inclusive' metaphor, leading to the real sense through a consideration of the specific speaker. For, neither the statement nor the sense is capable of conveying this idea, since when the speaker is a chaste woman the same statement and the sense cannot denote this kind of situation. (VIII.5) Here is an illustration for the cognition of the Secondary Sense through the consideration of the sentence of a specific nature:

Why should this person inflict on me the pain of being churned when he has already achieved his glory (Laksmi)? Nor do I imagine that he was asleep previously because his mind was alert. Will he again build

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a bridge when he is already followed by the rulers of all the islands? Thus was the ocean in doubt, as it were, trembling when you, O King, came close.61

Here a king is praised by flattery. The natural agitation of the ocean due to the disturbance caused by the king's large army is fancied to be the mental agitation of the ocean in the form of the various fancies, and is implied by the phrase 'having, as it were, doubts'. These fancies refer to acts of Lord Vāsudeva as implied by the phrase 'who has obtained glory (śrī)', etc. As long as the character of the king does not coincide with Väsudeva's, where can there be room for doubt with regard to the deeds of Vasudeva? So then, because of the superimposition of agitation on the unagitated ocean, due to its similarity to something agitated while being crossed by the army, we have a qualitative suppressed metaphor - for the unagitated ocean is understood by super- imposition to have been agitated. Hence this is a type of hyperbole where, even though there is a distinction between two things, they are conceived as with- out distinction. The nodding of the head is true of sentient beings generally when they are in doubt. In this case the agitation (of the ocean) is imagined to be of that character because of its similarity to the nodding of the head caused by doubt in sentient beings. Thus here, too, we have a qualitative suppressed metaphor. This too is a case of hyperbole where two distinct things are conceived as identical because of the identification of the two distinct agitations. The phrase 'possessing, as it were, doubts' shows that this poetic fancy is based on that identification. For seeing the effect, viz., agitation, one fancies doubt as its cause. This fancy is of the nature of a superimposed cognition. Here again, hyperbole, consisting in the identification of distinct entities, etc., is implied by the description of the ocean as having doubts. For it has been said:

When there is an intention to state two (different) things as similar by means of associating (the thing to be described) with the qualities and actions not actually possessed by it, by employing words such as 'like' etc., then we have the figure of expressed poetic fancy based on hyperbole.62

Hence we have a qualitative metaphor with suppression contained in it. But in the three lines 'praptasrih', etc. expressing doubt and containing reasons

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negating the respective deeds as they relate to Väsudeva, we have the implied sense that the king is Väsudeva. Therefore we have an 'inclusive' Secondary Sense. The king being of the nature of Vasudeva, we have a suppressed metaphor in the gaunī laksana. And all this 63 is cognised by the 'otherwise inapplicability' of the logical connection of the words in the sentence as a whole. Hence the metaphor depends on the whole sentence.

(VIII.6) An example (of the Secondary Sense) depending on the expressed sense is:

Cupid's arrows are unassailable; in all directions spring blossoms forth, the rays of the moon create madness in the heart; the cuckoo steals the heart; and this tender age is made unbearable with the burden of lofty breasts. O, my friend, how can I bear these five unbearable fires?

Here the unbearable character of cupid's arrows, etc., on which are superimposed the character of the five fires, or which have been suppressed by fiery nature, is the meaning of the whole sentence. Hence it is also the direct sense of the sentence. By means of reflection over the import we have the implication of 'love in separation' (vipralambhaśrngāra). Hence we have upādāna laksaņā based on the sense of the sentence. Here we have nothing to do with the consideration of the speaker's character without any regard to the words. Nor would the words of the sentence construe without the implication of vipralambhasrngāra. Because the vipralambhaśrngāra is implied by consideration of the actual sentence meaning in its real form, we have upādāna lakșanā based on the sense of the sentence. This vipralambhasrngara, though implied, predominates over the sense of the sentence because it is implied principally as being what appeals to the sahrdaya (one with a receptive heart). In the case of the word 'unmadakarā', even though64 there is the feminine gender in 'sasānkaruci', because the causal relation, the nature of having causal habit, and the favour- ableness of being are not being intended,65 there is no 'ta' affix, but there is the 'ac' affix and hence there is no 'i' affix. And since there is no intention of the objective case relation initially,66 there is no 'an' affix and thus there is the 'ac' affix as in the rule 'sivasamaristasya kare'.67 Therefore even when cause etc. are intended there is no fault because there is no 'ta' affix.68

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(VIII.7) Thus have been illustrated the three different kinds (of the Secondary Signification) based on the speaker, (his) statement and the sense (of the sen- tence) of the other four varieties69, three groups of two each are made by grouping the speaker with the sentence, the speaker and the sense (of the structure), and the sentence and the sense together. The fourth consists of the three i.e., the speaker, the statement and the sense of the sentence. They are to be illustrated by the intelligent by the application of their own intelligence as coming within the range of the six kinds of Secondary signification. And the division into the various varieties of such a Secondary Sense based on place, time, state, and natural characteristics should be looked into.

(VIII.8) Thus the fourfold Primary Sense is proved. Secondary Sense also has been stated to be sixfold. Now the author goes on to explain the four views70, viz. (1) wherein words, with their meanings having been already expressed, enter into syntactic relation; (2) wherein words first of all have a meaning only in a sentence and through such a syntactic unity then have individual meaning; (3) wherein there is a combination of the (above) two (views); and (4) wherein there is the negation of both, and the operation of the Secondary Significa- tion in them.

SECONDARY SIGNIFICATION COMES AFTER THE EXPRESSED SENSE WHEN THERE IS THEIR MUTUAL RELATION AFTER THE SENSE OF THE WORDS ARE EXPRESSED. WHEN THE EXPRESSED SENSE IS AFTER THE MUTUAL RELATION (OF THE SENSE OF THE WORDS), SECONDARY SIGNIFICATION COMES PRIOR TO THAT. IN THE CASE OF THE COM- BINED THEORY IT IS BOTH. IN THE VIEW OF THOSE WHO HOLD THE SENTENCE TO BE A UNITARY WHOLE IT DOES NOT EXIST BECAUSE THE SENTENCE MEANING AS A WHOLE IS WHAT IS REAL, AND IN THE ARTIFICIAL SUBDIVISION THE PREVIOUS ARRANGEMENTS HOLD GOOD.71 (IX, X)

(X.1) Certain people hold that the meaning of a sentence72 cannot be uttered but can only be known like joy or sorrow, through the power of expectancy (ākānksā), proximity (sannidhi), and compatibility (yogyatā) belonging to the individual meanings of the words, when the words themselves have ex- hausted their power in expressing their individual senses in the form of the universals cognised by affirmative and negative reasoning. For example, in (the statements) 'O, brahmin, you have a son born' and 'O, brahmin, your unmarried daughter is pregnant' even though the joy and sorrow caused respectively by the birth of a son and the unmarried daughter's pregnancy are not expressed by the mention of the words joy and sorrow, they are indicated

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by the power of the idea which is the sense of the words (of the sentence). Thus we see the sentence-meaning, which is not what is expressed (by the words), implied by the word-meaning. In view of those who argue thus there is 'abhihitänvaya' because there is a sense arising from logical construction subsequent to the expression of the respective sense by each individual word. (X.2) Others hold73: The cognition of the relation of the word and its sense is obtained through the usage of elders. This (usage of elders) is of the nature of application to activity and cessation from activity. This application and cessation depend upon objects and ideas that are connected with each other. Therefore the cognition of the relation of a word to its meaning is made only with respect to objects or ideas already associated with each other. Conse- quently these connected objects or ideas are themselves the meanings of the words and there is no subsequent connection of the word senses. Thus 'anvitabhidhana' is the conveying by words of objects which are connected with one another, which have attained the status of the sentence meaning and the relationship of which to their respective words we grasp with the aid of the respective universals. (X.3) In the opinion of still others74 the sense of words is what is conveyed by words as related in a general way. But the sense of a sentence is the sense of the constituted words in their syntactic relation. This is 'abhihitānvaya' from the point of view of words. From the sentence point of view it is 'anvitabhidhāna'. Thus we have a certain combination of both the 'abhihitanvaya' and 'anvitabhidhāna'. (X.4) Those who hold the view that the sentence meaning is an indivisible unit say: If the unitary concept (i.e., the connectedness of sense) is accepted then there cannot be the cognition of the relation of the particulars (i.e., of the word and the sense) as being shaded by the universals which are really their sense, because of the particulars not being connected in a sentence and because of their distinctiveness from these universals. Therefore there is neither 'abhihitānvaya' nor 'anvitabhidhāna'75, since there is the indivisibility of the sentence and the sentence meaning. Consequently there is no combination of these two, the reason being the unreality of the word-meanings as such. But by the assuption of the word-meanings (for practical purposes), both theories are assumed as distinct and combined. (X.5) Now, in the case of the 'abhihitänvaya' doctrine, the Secondary function is invoked at the time of the cognition of the sentence meaning through the medium of the word-senses but after the word-meanings have been expressed by the corresponding words (in the sentence) and through the power of

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'expectancy', 'contiguity', and 'compatibility'; then there is the logical construction amongst the word-meanings forming themselves into a relation of the nature of the qualified and the qualifying and thus there is (the completeness of) the expression of the universals as the word meanings.76

(X.6) In the case of the 'anvitabhidhana' doctrine on the other hand, the express meaning (of the sentence) consists of word-meanings which are (already) connected (syntactically) with each other, (it does) not (consist of) the connectedness of the universals (already) expressed by the words. In this case, the objects which are in the process of being connected through qualifi- cation do not constitute word-meanings. For, when one, who understands and follows the meaning of the whole sentence, understands (also), as the grounds (for application) and meanings, the universal-forms which are invariably connected with the denotation of words, there the six types of secondary significance do not appear. Hence in the doctrine of anvitābhidhāna, Secondary signification comes in at the stage immediately preceding the denotation of the connected ideas which by themselves are the meaning of the whole sentence.77

(X.7) In the combined theory of the 'abhihitanvaya' and the 'anvitābhidhāna', through the application of the principle of combination as stated before, the Secondary signification comes after the denotation (of the words) from the point of view of the words ( in the sentence) and before the denotation (from the point of the sentence meaning), but subsequent to the sentence meaning 78 as given by the words (themselves having only the connected sense). That is why it has been stated (in the kārika) 'In the combined theory it is both'. The sense of this is that the Secondary function is both before and after the denotation in the case of the combined theory of 'abhihitānvaya' and 'anvitābhidhāna'.

(X.8) In the case of the theory of the unitary character of the sentence meaning, really speaking there is no scope for Secondary function at all, since there is admitted in reality no denotation of different meanings, and Secondary significance is dependent on these meanings. But this is assumed79 (for practical purposes) on the basis of arbitrary words in the lower stages of the divisions of the arbitrarily assumed doctrines of 'anvitābhidhāna', 'abhihitānvaya' and the combination of both; because this arbitrary subdivision of the sentence and its meaning has been established by force of long usage on the basis of the persons communicating (through speech), and on the basis of time and place and other

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things. Thus has been explained the distinct operation of the Secondary function in the four theories, viz., 'abhihitānvaya' etc.

(X.9) Where there is an incompatibility of the Primary Sense there is the operation of the Secondary function in regard to the sense which is close to the Primary Sense, provided there is a purpose.8 In order to show this the author says:

THIS SECONDARY SENSE IS SEEN TO BE RESORTED TO IN WORLDLY USAGE; (I) BECAUSE OF THE INCOMPATIBILITY OF THE PRIMARY SENSE; (2) BECAUSE IT IS CLOSE TO THE PRIMARY SENSE; AND (3) BECAUSE OF SOME SPECIAL MOTIVE AND LONG AND ESTABLISHED USAGE.81 (XI)

(XI.1) The aforesaid Secondary Sense which is of six kinds has been seen used in worldly speech since long ago for three reasons, viz., the inapplicability of the Primary Sense because of its being contrary to other valid means of cognition; the implied sense's being very close to the Primary; and, the indirect application of the Secondary Sense's being motivated by some purpose. The closeness of the Secondary Sense to the Primary is shown to be of five kinds by the teacher Bhartrmitra:82

Connection with the Primary Sense, Similarity, Association, Contrariety, and Connection with an Action - based on these five relationships, the Secondary Sense is divided into five.

Even the motive 83 (for resorting to the Secondary Sense) is of two kinds. Some- times it is of the nature of Conventional metaphor, and needs the intervention of another (i.e., the Primary) sense, being based on established usage of elders from time immemorial as in the case of the word 'dvirepha'. By this word 'dvirepha' (lit. two 'r' s) there arises the established metaphorical sense of 'bee' through its (dvirepha's) association with the two r's and thus referring to the word 'bhramara' (which also possesses two r's) by implication. The other type is different from the motive of adopting the aforesaid 'rüdhi' (the conventional metaphor established by usage) and consists in conveying a different sense by the word's not causing the direct cognition of the sense 84 (required). An example is the (word) 'ramo'smi' cited before. These two types of motive should be adopted with respect to the Secondary Sense, which is known through the aforesaid five kinds of relationship, and is very close to the Primary Sense, when the Primary Sense is inapplicable in the context.

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(XI.2) The example for the Secondary Sense through connection with the Primary Sense is as in 'the village on the Ganges'.85 Here there is the contradiction of the Primary Sense because the sense 'current', which is the sense expressed by the word 'Ganges', is inapplicable as the support of the village. But it then indicates figuratively the bank, through a relation which is of the form of samīpa-samīpi-bhāva (i.e. nearness and the entities which are near each other). In this case the motive of the Secondary function is to convey the sanctity and the beauty (of the village) which are not conveyed by the cognitive word but are intimately connected with the same sense 'Ganges'. It is not possible to convey this 'purpose' namely 'purity' and 'beauty' by the actual words, because of the defects of a wider and narrower application of the definition86

(XI.3) The example for the relation based on 'similarity' is: O, bee, have you ever seen or heard or found anywhere in all your wanderings to the ends of the quarters a flower equal to the jasmine? Speak, without partiality, the truth'.

Here since the words 'bee' and 'flower' are inapplicable (in the sentence and context) because of not being fit objects of address etc.,87 their Primary Sense is contradicted. Hence, through similarity to the expressed sense, they convey by Secondary Sense different things associated with qualities similar to their qualities. The purpose is to convey the action and qualities which are connected by the words (not directly by the cognitive words) and similar to the acts and qualities inherent in the same things as 'being a bee' and 'being a flower'.

(XI.4) The Secondary Sense based on the relation 'association' is as in the example 'the men with umbrellas go'. Here the plural contradicts the Primary Sense. For, the plural is not proper in the case of one person with an umbrella. Hence we have association88 of the non-umbrella-holders with the one umbrella-holder, based on the action of 'going' (together). Because of this relation even those without umbrellas are indicated by the word 'one with an umbrella'. The purpose of this is to convey the fact that all those without umbrellas follow their master with the umbrella.

(XI.5) The Secondary Sense based on the relation of 'contrariety' is as in the example 'O, lovely-faced'. Here the Primary Sense is inapplicable because of the word's being used with reference to one with an ugly face. Hence this statement conveys by implication the ugly-faced one based on 'contrariety'

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because it is contrary to the Primary Sense, 'auspicious-faced'. The purpose of this is the cognition of the sense of truth in a veiled manner. For, a true or real sense is conveyed in a veiled manner by the speaker mostly when he has various intentions (i.e. purposes) in mind.

(XI.6) The Secondary Sense based on 'connection with action' is as in the statement 'You are Satrughna in the great battle'. Here the Primary Sense is contradicted because of the use of the word 'satrughna' for one who is not Śatrughna. The word 'satrughna' is employed to refer to a person in the Secondary Sense through the association of his being the agent of the act of killing enemies. The purpose of this usage is to convey the character of kingliness in the case of the individual referred to by the word śatrughna. For, in the verse: 'You are by your qualities Prthu (and great); in fame (or in physical appearance) Räma (attractive); Nala and Bharata (through your responsibilities to the kingdom); in the great battle you are Satrughna (killer of enemies); in the world you are Janaka (and the bringer or producer of happiness) through the established order. Thus possessing the name and glory of the ancient kings merely out of your own actions, how is it, O, Lord, you are not Māndhātā (and my sustainer) in spite of being victorious in the three worlds?" We have in this verse the description of a king being praised in the form of being Satrughna. Thus Secondary Sense has been described as arising from the three causes (contradiction of the Primary Sense etc.).

(XI.7) Now in the Secondary Sense, the close connection of which to the Primary Sense is based on the above five kinds of relations, the author proceeds to show the classification of its scope; that is, in some cases there is the absolute discarding of the expressed sense, in some cases the expressed sense is intended (but subservient to the Secondary Sense) and in some cases it is shifted to another sense. 89 IN THE RELATIONS (OF THE PRIMARY SENSE WITH THE SECONDARY) BASED ON SIMILARITY AND CONTRARIETY, THE PRIMARY SENSE IS COMPLETELY DISCARDED. IN THE RELATIONS BASED ON CONJUNCTION AND ASSOCIATION THERE IS THE INTENDED AND UNINTENDED LITERAL SENSE RESPECTIVELY. IN THE CASE OF THE INCLUSIVE METAPHOR, THERE IS THE INTENDED PRIMARY SENSE. AND IN THE CASE OF THE TOTAL TRANSFER THERE IS THE

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UNINTENDED PRIMARY SENSE. IN THE RELATION BASED ON ASSOCIATION OF ACTION SOMETIMES THERE IS THE TOTAL DISCARDING OF THE PRIMARY SENSE AND SOMETIMES THERE IS THE CONTRARY (I.E., THE UNINTENDED). (XII, XIII)

(XIII.1) Of the five types of close connection or relation stated in the stanza 'connection with the Primary sense ... ', in the two relations of similarity and contrariety, the Primary Sense is completely discarded. For in the case of the Secondary Sense based on similarity, the word expressing the standard of comparison attains the nature of expressing the thing compared and hence the standard of comparison which is the sense expressed (by the word) is completely discarded as shown in the case of (the words) 'snigdhaśyāmalakāntilipta' and 'payodasuhrdām'. In these instances, because the two words 'lipta' and 'suhrd' refer to things which are compared with their own senses, their Primary Senses are absolutely unconnected with their resulting senses.

(XIII.2) Likewise in the usage based on the relation of contrariety also, the Primary Sense is discarded because a sense different from and contrary to the Primary is taken into account as in the example 'the auspicious-faced', where the character of having an auspicious face is set aside because of the intended meaning 'inauspicious-faced'. Thus we have the discarding of the Primary Sense in the relations of the Primary Sense with the Secondary Sense based on similarity and contrariety.

(XIII.3) In the relations of conjunction and association, the Primary Sense is not completely discarded, it is either intended or unintended90. In the Secondary Sense of the type of Inclusion the Primary is intended (but subordinated to the implied sense 91 ). The 'sahrdaya'92 has illustrated the intended nature of the Primary Sense in the domain of poetry. In the case of the Secondary Sense of the type of total transfer (of the Primary Sense), the expressed sense is unintended because it is shifted to a different sense.

(XIII.4) In the case of the Secondary Sense based on conjunction and which is of the Inclusive type where the expressed sense is intended the illustration is 'Fat Devadatta eats not during the day'. In this example the effect consisting in the fatness specified by the absence of eating by day is intended; and so in order to establish itself (in the syntactic unity) it implies, by Secondary signification based on the connection (of cause and effect), its cause consisting in eating at night.

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(XIII.5) In the case of the Secondary Sense of the Inclusive type based on the relation of inherence, the example for the intended expressed sense is 'the umbrella-holders go' 92a. Here the word 'umbrella-holder' has the plural number and so in order to justify the syntactic relation of the plural in it, it implies also those who do not hold the umbrella. In such a context the word 'umbrella-holder' is intended by resorting to the inclusion in it of the sense of non-umbrella-holders, through the relation of inherence. Thus in the case of the two types of Inclusive Sense based on connection and inherence, the intended nature of the Primary Sense (by the inclusion of it with the implied sense) has been described.

(XIII.6) But in the case of the two Secondary Senses of the nature of abnegation of the Primary Sense through Subordination, the Primary Sense is not intended but not absolutely rejected93 (it is subordinated to the implied one) because it is logically connected to the resultant sense, (i.e., of the implied sense) by means of Secondary signification. The illustration for the Secondary Sense based on conjunction where the Primary sense is unintended by shifting to another sense is 'I am Räma'. In this the expressed sense of the word Rāma, i.e., the son of Daśaratha, having been transformed into a different sense, viz., the suggested,94 is not employed in its own sense.95 Hence it is not intended, but not completely discarded either, because it has somehow a connection with the sentence meaning by means of the suggested sense.96 One has to infer the same thing for the 'village on the Ganges' etc.97

(XIII.7) In the case of Secondary Sense based on association where the expressed sense is not intended, we have the illustration in 'the umbrella- holders go'. In this example when the word 'chatrin' is in the sense of the whole crowd (collectively), because it is inapplicable otherwise in the plural, we have the sense of collectivity intended and the expressed sense not intended. So also the word 'umbrella-holder' is easily construed with the sense of the whole collectivity because of its being included in the whole and thus its association with the action (of going) is easy. Therefore, here too, the Primary Sense is not discarded, because it is connected with an action through being included within a collectivity. Thus in the case of the Secondary Sense based on connection and association it is established that the Primary Sense may be intended or not intended but never discarded.

(XIII.8) However, in the case of the Secondary Sense based on an association with action, the implied sense is understood through the significative capacity of the expressed word in accordance with the

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etymological significance of the word (lit. based on the capacity of the component parts of the word). In that there is the rejection of the Primary Sense as in the example 'the man is a man'.98 Here one word 'man' takes on the sense of a man as belonging to a specific class. Therefore the other word 'man' has to be distinct from its Primary Sense and so takes the sense of being excellent through the Secondary signification based on the relation of association of action. But when, because of certain factors, the Primary Sense is intended and a different sense is taken up (included) on the basis of a different significative capacity, we have the opposite of the rejection of the Primary Sense (i.e., the non-rejection of it). For, indeed, in such a case we do not have the discarding of the Primary Sense; it is intended (but subordinated), as for instance in 'You are Satrughna in the battle field'. There the word 'satrughna', though it signifies through its Secondary function based on the association of action, the sense of the agent of the act of killing enemies, it also explains its own Primary sense, viz., the son of Daśaratha as the standard of comparison. Therefore the intended sense includes the Primary Sense. Even if in such a case the sahrdayas accept99 the variety 'atyantatiraskrtavācyatā' (the rejection of the Primary Sense completely), because of the fact that the upamana is used to signify (only) the upameya, in the context of signification based on association of action, since we have made our argument on the basis of the Primary Sense being the upamāna in the present instance, we have the non-rejection (of the Primary Sense) also. Thus it is established that in the Secondary Sense based on the association with action, because of the various meanings intermixed with one another, sometimes there is the rejection of the Primary Sense, and sometimes it is intended. Since there is much to be said in this matter it is not explained here (in detail). This much has been stated here simply to indicate in a very superficial manner how the nature of Dhvani (Suggestion) described as something new by sahrdayas falls within the scope of the Secondary function of words.100 This however has to be scrutinized by the learned with keen intellect (lit. intellect as sharp as the tip of the blade of kuśa grass). And one need not find fault with it at first sight. There we stop lest there be much prolixity. Thus we have proved the classification of the Primary Sense in its rejection, in its retention (with its subordination to the implied), and its non-intendedness (though not rejected).

(XIII.9) When the principle of speech, which is of the nature of a unity101 of all types of speech-sounds, begins to be manifest as three, viz., the spoken word, the sense, and the relation (between them), even as the rope appears as a serpent, then we have this significative function, useful in wordly transaction, in

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its tenfold division (four primary and six secondary). This is not so when the speech principle is of the nature of a unity where there is no sequential order102 of the utterances of the phonemes. In order to show this the author says:

THE PRINCIPLE OF SPEECH IS THUS CONSIDERED AS TENFOLD (ONLY) WHEN IT IS IN THE STAGE OF APPEARANCE. HOW CAN IT (THE TENFOLD DIVISION), EXIST, WHEN THE (SAME) PRINCIPLE IS IN ITS UNITARY NATURE, WHEN THERE IS NO SEQUENTIAL ORDER OF THE UTTERANCE OF PHONEMES? (XIV)

(XIV.1) This association of the principle of speech in its unitary character with the significative function of the ten kinds as explained 103 above, occurs when the unitary speech principle appears, as the rope in the serpent, as many in the form of the knower, the means of knowledge (pramāna), the object of knowledge and the act of knowing (pramiti), each having the variety of the expressive word (väcaka), the expressed sense (vacya), and their relation (tatsambandha). But when the principle of speech is not manifest 104 because of the withdrawal 103a of the sequential order into a unitary one because the faults of all concepts and names have completely disappeared, is there the possibility of these ten kinds of significative function? That is, there is no expression (of the principle of speech into the audible speech-sounds). (XIV.2) Now the author proceeds to conclude the subject matter of the treatise (in the following verse):

THUS THE TENFOLD SIGNIFICATIVE CAPACITY HAS BEEN DISTINCTIVELY EXPLAINED IN THIS TREATISE. (XV)

(XV.1) That is, four types of the Primary Significative capacity, and six kinds of the Secondary - thus the tenfold kinds of the signification (abhidhāvrtti) has been stated in detail.

(XV.2) Now the purpose of this is shown:

IN GRAMMAR, MIMĀMSĀ, AND NYĀYA (LOGIC) THIS IS REFLECTED. HE WHO APPLIES THIS TO LITERATURE, HIS SPEECH BECOMES VERY LUCID. (XVI)

(XVI.1) 'Pada' means grammar because grammar is the means of knowing (the nature of) words. 'Vākya' means Mīmāmsa because it helps to understand the sense of the sentence through logical connection. 'Pramāna' means logic as it is based on the valid means of cognition through proofs. He who applies

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this tenfold significative function to literature, etc., which is like a mirror to all worldly transactions or activity, this function whose real nature is reflected105 in these doctrines of grammar, Mīmāmsā, and logic, which are the means of acquiring the entire knowledge leading to the four goals of human existence, will become the lord of speech, with his speech becoming very lucid. By this tenfold significative capacity the whole world of activity of speech is permeated and it is useful in the sastras of four types, viz., grammar, Mīmāmsā, logic and poetry. Through these (sastras) it permeates all the other (branches of) learning which form the basis of all sorts of worldly activity. Hence this significative capacity is said to pervade all human activity.

THIS TREATISE ON THE SIGNIFICATIVE CAPACITY (OF THE WORD) - 'ABHIDHĀVRTTIMĀTRKĀ' - WAS EXPOUNDED BY MUKULA, SON OF BHAȚȚA KALLAȚA, FOR THE ENLIGHTENMENT OF SŪRI.106 (XVHI)

Thus ends the Abhidhavrttimātrkā composed by Bhațța Mukula, son of Bhatta Kallata, a resident of the holy place purified by the dust of the feet of śrī śāradā.

NOTES

I should like to acknowledge the assistance of Dr. P. Granoff, Dr. B. K. Matilal, and Dr. J. Masson in preparing this article.

1 Padārtha means 'thing' i.e. both 'the sense of the word' and the 'object it denotes'. Every concept is intimately connected with a word (sabda, pada). The idea is similar to the philosophic term 'nämarupa' which denotes the name and the shape (the objective- thing), which constitutes the essence of things, the whole world of objects. For a correct understanding of the world of things therefore a precise knowledge of names and what they point to is essential. Without such a knowledge there can be no understanding nor can vyavahara be possible. See Dandin: idam andham tamah krtsnam jāyeta bhuvanatrayam yadi śabdāhvyam jyotir āsamsārān na dīpyate.

2 The reading in the printed text is prädhänyam bhajante. Though this reading is in a way correct, the argument is how pramāņa can have validity (prāmānyam) unless it leads to certitude. The sabdavyaparavicara of Mammata, in which many of Mukula's statements are refuted and which follows closely the present text from the beginning to the end in a very concise manner reads prāmāņyam: iha heyopādeyānāņ hānopādāne pramāņād eva.tac ca niścayātmatayā prāmāņyam bhajante ... Hence the reading pramanyam bhajante is preferred. 3 Mukula uses the word abhidha in the general sense of the significative capacity or function of the word, (i.e., sakti). This covers both the Primary and Secondary functions of a word. Later writers have restricted this word to mean only the Primary function.

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4 Śabara on M.S. III.2.1. has: kaḥ punar mukhyaḥ ko vā gauņa iti.yaḥ śabdād evāvagamyate sa prathamo'rtho mukhyah ... On this Kumārila glosses: sabdārthasyaiva mukhyatvam ... sarva eva śabda uccārite' bhidhīyamānatvād ananyagatiḥ śabdaśaktikalpanām kurvann arthāntareņvyavahitatvāt prathamam eva mukham iva bhavatIti mukhyah. Mammața in his K. P. II.7. has : ... sanketasahāya eva śabdo'rthaviśesam pratipādayatīti yasya yatrāvyavadhānena sanketo grhyate sa tasya vācakaḥ. See also Locana on Dh. Ā. (p.419): vācakatvam hi samayavaśād avyavadhānena pratipādakatvam, yathā tasyaiva śabdasya svārthe; ... vācyatvam hi samayabalena nirvyavadhānam pratipādyatvam, yathā tasyaivārthasya śabdāntaram prati ... On the strength of these statements I have inserted the word 'avyavadhānena'. This has the support of one of the manuscripts used for this edition of this text.

5 Sabara on M.S.III.2.1. mukham iva bhavatfti mukhyah. Kumārila thereon: sabdārthasyaiva mukhyatvam mukhavat prathamodgateh arthagamyasya gaunatvam gunagamanahetukam. (see also note 4 abovc).

6 The rule referred to is Pāņini V.3.103 'śākhādibhyo yat'. While the Kāśikā and the Nyāsa read the suffix 'yat', the Siddhāntakaumudī reads 'yah'. Kumārila has 'yah' in gloss: śākhādibhyo ya ity evam ivārthe mukhya ity ayam (M.S.III.2.1). (In this verse the reading 'yah' could be altered to 'yad' without any change in the metre). Cf. Patañjali under Panini V.1.2. It seems that the reading of the printed text 'śākhādiyāntena' is wrong and the proper reading should be śākhādiyadantena.

7 The view here taken by Mukula is of the Mimāmsaka. According to the school of Kumārila Bhatta, all words denote only the generic property. The earlier writers on Mimamsa and Vedanta use the term 'akrti' in the sense of the universal.See Kumārila on the use: jātim evākṛtiņ prāhur vyaktir ākriyate yayā. Later writers use the word 'jati' for the universal. In Section 9 of M.S.I.3. (especially sūtra

the universal. 33) called the äkrtyadhikarana, the Mfmāmsaka establishes that the word denotes only

Though Mukula here takes the view of the Mimāmsakas (or jātivādins) later on he accepts the view of the Grammarians that a word denotes not only the ākrti but also 'quality', 'action', and 'proper names' (guna, kriya and yadrcchasabda) according to the classification of words. This same line of thought is also followed by Mammata and later writers on Alańkāra.

8 viśesyam nābhidha gacchet kştņaśaktir viśesaņe. This quotation is used by many early writers to illustrate the view that the denotation

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of a word is only the universal. It is not traceable as such in any text earlier than this. Practically all texts on Alankāra quote it. Kumārila in many places in the Tantravārttika mentions the maxim (similar to the one under discussion) called 'nagrhftaviseșanā-nyāya': viśistagrahaņam nestam agrhītaviśeșaņam abhidhānabhidhāne tad na kenacid ihasrite. agrhītaviseşane viseşyabuddhir nopajāyata iti tadgrahaņam ādartavyam. viśesaņād vinā neșto visesyapratyayodbhavaḥ. The quotation seems to be an adaptation of various references in the Tantravārttika,

9 See M.S.1.3.34 & 35 and the bhāsya of Sabara thereon. Kumārila in his vārttika on M.S.I.3.33 elaborates his argument for the establishment of the particular obtained from the word through laksana. See also his argument in the Slokavarttika on this. According to the Mimamsaka view, if the word is accepted to mean the particular, then, nantya and vyabhicara would follow. See the summarised argument Pārthasārathi Miśra in his Sāstradīpikā under I.3.10. According to the Advaita-vedantins (who generally follow the Bhatta school) even though there is no absolute reality for the distinction between jäti and vyakti, which are mere mental concepts, on the basis of phenomenal reality jäti is the Primary Sense of the word. The particular is understood because of the cognition cognising both the attribute and the substantive, or through laksana. The third alternative according to this school is that the particular is 'svarūpasati' and jāti is 'jnātā satī'. (See Vedāntaparibhāsā in this

According to the old Naiyāyikas, the denotation of a word is jāti, vyakti and ākrti. See connection.)

N.S.II.2.65: vyaktyākrtijātayah tu padārthāh. Some of the modern Naiyāyikas hold that the sense of a word is the particular as characterised by the universal.

10 Since the Primary Sense is the direct sense of the word through its sakti without vyavadhāna between the word and the sense, the mukhyavyapara is that vyapara which gives the sense 'not delayed by anything else'. sāntararthanistha: This is the laksyavyapara. For, between the word and the Secondary Sense there intervenes the Primary Sense. So it is 'that which is based on the intervention of the Primary Sense between the word and the Secondary Sense'. In this connection compare K.P. II.9 vrtti.

11 catusțayt sabdānām pravrttiḥ: This is from the Mahābhāsya of Patanjali on the śivasūtra ' !! k' According to this, not all words denote universals, but only some. The others denote 'qualities' or 'actions' or 'the particular names of things'. This is in refutation of the view that a word signifies only the individual. Otherwise statements such as 'gauś śuklaś calo ditthah' will mean that each word denotes the same individual and there will not be any difference between them. Consequently the concept 'gotvajatimān śuklatvaviśiştaḥ calanakriyāvān ditthanāmā vyaktih' will not arise in the cognition. Further the Mīmamsaka view that words denote only universals is controverted through this fourfold classification further on.

12 Upādhi is the determinant factor which is the pravrttinimitta of the word. It is the limiting attribute of the individual. In order that a word signify a thing, it has to be characterised by certain features like jāti, guņa, kriyā and a proper name. Without these limiting adjuncts, as in the above example 'gaus śuklaś calo ditthah, there will not be a proper cognition of the thing that is meant. All the words in that case would mean the same thing and so there would be no distinction between one word and another.

13 Yadrcchā means vaktur icchā. On this see Kaiyata in his commentary on the M.Bh.on 'īļkʼ sūtra.

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14 This is the sphota of the grammarians set forth in an elaborate manner by Bhartrhari in his Vākyapadīya. According to the Mfmamsaka and others, the denotation of a word is the combination of all the phonemes that are pronounced: pūrvavarņajanitasamskārasahito'ntyo varņaḥ pratyāyakah. Sabara on M.S.I.1.5) i.e., the meaning of a word is conveyed by the last phoneme aided by the impressions produced in the mind by the preceding phonemes. The cognition thus produced is a complex one, wherein all the uttered phonemes figure and produce the sense. But according to Bhartrhari, the uttered phonemes produce a unified cognition through the final phoneme, and what is cognised is something without the order in which the phonemes are uttered, but a complete unit wherein the order disappears. This indivisible unit of utterance thus signifies the real sense (or object) the word is supposed to signify. See Vākyapadīya 1.73 and the vrtti thereon. pade varņā na vıdyante varņeșv avayavā na ca vākyāt padānām atyantam praviveko na kaścana. varņapratipattinirbhāsābhyo bahvībhyaḥ pratipattibhyah samudāyavişayasya prayatnasya bhedāt saty api padābhivyaktivişayasya dhvanerbhede sādrśyānugamāt varņavibhāgapratipattyupāyā pade pratipattir utpadyate. Tat tv akramam apūrvāparam ekam eva nityam abhedyam varņaturīyopapādita ivaikātmā. In this connection see also the Locana of Abhinavagupta on Dh.Ā.I.13 (pp.133-134): śrotraśas kulīm santānenāgatā antyāḥ śabdāḥ śrūyanta iti prakriyāyām śabdajāḥ sabdāḥ śrūyamāņā ity uktam. teșām ghaņțanuraņanarūpatvam tāvad asti.te ca dhvaniśabdenoktāḥ. yathāha bhagavān bhartr hari: yaḥ samyogaviyogābhyām karaņair upajāyate sa sphota śabdajah śabdāh dhvanayo'nyair udāhrtāh. evam ghan tadinirhrādasthāniyo'nuraņanātmopalaksito vyangyo' py artho dhvanir iti vyavahrtaḥ. tathā śrūyamāņā ye varnā nādaśabdavācyā antyabuddhinirgrāhyasphoț ābhivyañjakās te dhvaniśabdenoktāḥ ...

15 This refers to the Mfmamsakas, and others who do not accept sphota. 16 Kriya is defined in the following manner yāvat siddham asiddhaņ vā sādhyatvenābhidhīyate āśritakramarūpatvāt sā kriyety abhidhhfyate. jāti is defined as 'nityam ekam anekānugatam sāmānyam'. guņa is defined by Patañjali as: sattve nivisate'paiti prthag jātisu drśyate ādheyaś cākriyājaś ca so'sattvaprakrtir gunah. (M.Bh.II.p.217) upaity anyad jahāty anyad drsto dravyāntaresv api vācaka sarvalingānām dravyād anyo gunah smrtaḥ.(M.Bh., ibid.) 17 'The universal is eternal, though the individual or the particular in which it inheres and which manifests it is transitory. The universal requires the individual for its manifestation. Before the latter is produced, it already exists in its causes and it prompts, as it were, these causes to bring the individual into existence'. (K. A. S. Iyer, Bhartrhari, p. 245.) Se also Vākyapadīya: na tad utpadyate kimcid yasya jātir na vidyate ātmābhivyaktaye jātiḥ kāraņānām̧ prayojikā. (IlI.jātisamuddeśa, vs. 25) 18 Mukula has said that this is a quotation from the Vākyapadtya. So too Mammata and all the later Alankārikas. I am not able to trace this from the Väkyapadfya as such either in the Kārikās or the vrti. But a similar statement appears in the commentary of Helārāja on 'Vākyapadīya. IIl (sambandhasamuddeśa), verse 52. It reads:

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samsargadarśane svato gaur na gauḥ gotvābhisambandhāt gaur iti brahmakalpam sāksāt avyavahāryam eva paropādhīyamānarūpaviśesam vyavahāram anupatatı. This controverts the view of the vyaktivādins and the apohavādins. 19 It is first the universal that brings life to a thing and it is the quality that comes thereafter that distinguishes the individuals of the same class from one another and also one individual of a particular class from another of a different class. 20 Cf. Mammța, K.P.II.8,vrtti: paramāņvādīnām tu guņamadhyapațhanāt pāribhāşikam guņatvam. According to the Vaiśeşika system, paramāņu, paramamahat, etc., are viseșaguņas and so these words should be, in the present context, classified as guņavācakaśabdas. But Mammata thinks that these are in fact jātivāckaśabdas and their inclusion under the guņavācakașabdas is because of the Vaiśeșika technical classification under the guņas expressing parimāņa. Mukula does not seem to favour this view. His view appears to be that these words are really gunavācakas since these express what really fall under the category guna. One of the manuscripts reads 'yady api' instead of 'ye' 'pi' and this reading seems to be better and makes the sentence clear. 21 Cf. Kaiyața on Patañjali's 'kim punar ākrtih, padārthah āhosvid dravyam ? ubhayam ity āha ... He says: jātivādina āhuḥ - jātir eva śabdena pratipādyate, vyaktīnām ānantyāt sambandhagrahaņasambhavāt. sā ca jātih sarvavyaktisv ekākārapratyayadarśanād astity avasīyate.tatra gavādayaḥ śabdā bhinnadravyasamavetām jātim abhidadhati.tasyām pratitāyām tadāveśavaśāt tadavacchinnam dravyam pratīyate.śuklādayaḥ sabdā guņasamavetām jātim ācakşate. guņe tu tatsambandhāt pratyayaḥ dravye sambandhisambandhāt.samjnāśabdānām apy utpattiprabrty āvināśāt piņdasya kaumārayauvanādyavasthābhede'pi sa evāyam ity abhinnapratyayanimittā ditthatvādikā jātir vācyā.kriyāsv api jātir vidyate, saiva dhātuvācyā. pațhati, pathatah, pațhanti ityāder abhinnasya pratyayasya sadbhāvāt tannimıttajātyabhyupagamaḥ .. (M.Bh.,II,p.56) The grammarian answers this objection by saying that there is no ekākārapratyaya of quality or action or samjña but all these are vyaktis and seem to be different because of the different substrata of the same vyakti. (See para II.5 following). 22 In para.Il.4. above the objector refers only to the three, viz., guna, kriya and yadrcchāsabda. But in the answer in para. II.5 we have guņa, kriyā, sabdasamjñā and vyakti. The objection is that there are only jātivācakaśabdas and not four divisions. For in the case of guna, whiteness (suklatvajāti) is what inheres in all white colours in different white things. In the case of action, pākatva, as jāti, is what inheres in all pākakriyā. So too in respect of proper names (samjñā) like dittha, ditthatvajāti inheres in all the utterances of that samjñāsabda. And finally even though the vyakti, (dittha), appears to be the same in all its stages of growth, from infancy to old age, ditthatva as a jäti inheres in all the stages giving the vyakti the idea of sameness. To this the grammarian's reply is: In all these cases there is only one vyakti as guna, kriyā, samjñā, or samjnin, and the various abodes in which this vyakti inheres give it the appearance of difference. For instance, there is only one 'white' as a vyakti but the difference in white colours in a conch, a crane, etc., is due to the variety of substrates (couch etc.), and so there is no question of positing a jāti as whiteness etc. The reading therefore, śabdasamjñi in the phrase guņakriyāśabdasamjnivyaktīnām

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appears to be incorrect and confusing. In conformity with the four things mentioned in the objection and the answer, it would be better to emend the reading to guņakriyāśabdasamjñāvyaktīnām as referring to the four: guņa, kriyā, śabdasamjñā

23 (= samjñāśabda) and vyakti. I insert a danda (i.e., a full stop) after avabhāsamānatvāt. The printed text reads continuously without this stop. The reason is this: The sentence beginning with atrāpy ekasyā eva ... forms the explanation for the argument in the previous sentence beginning evam pacatītyadau ... sthitam onwards the sentence is the statement of the siddhanta, from the grammarians point of view, supporting the division of the words into the four classes. 24 On the use of the word 'upacara' see Poona Orientalist, I.1. 26-33. From what Mukula states about the division of the varieties of upacāramiśralaksanā, it is seen that 'upacāra' means some sort of relation of the two otherwise incompatible things, the relation being brought about through either the kārya-kārana-bhāva or sādrśya, etc. See kārikā VI and para VI.I. below. 25 This is an oft quoted example for laksana. The same is cited again for the subvariety called laksanalaksanā below in para V.I. 26 The purpose of this is to show that Mukula does not use the distinction between gauņīlaksaņā and laksitalaksana but brings both under the class of upacaramisra. In this connection it is useful to compare Kumārila on laksanā. In his introduction to the tatsiddhi-adhikarana (M.S.I.4.23) in the Tantravārttika he distinguishes laksana from gaunīvrtti. He says: abhidheyāvinābhūte pravrttir laksaņesyate laksyamānaguņair yogād vrtter iștā tu gauņatā. tatra yathaivākrtivacanaḥ śabdas tatsahacaritām vyaktim laksayati tathaiva yastimañcāśvādayas tatsambaddhapurusalaksaņārthā bhavanti.agnir mānavaka iti tu nāgnitvāvinābhāvena mānavakah pratīyate.kim tarhi ? vahnitvalaksitād arthād yatpaingalyādi gamyate tena māņavake buddhiḥ sādrśyād upajāyate.

233-249. On the views of the various schools on laksana see Indian Theories of Meaning, pp.

27 Mammata both in his K.P. and Sabdavyāparavicāra refutes the improperiety of the examples given by Mukula for the upādānalaksaņā. gaur anubandhya ityādau śruticodicam anubandhanam katham me syād iti jātyā vyaktir ākșipyate na tu śabdenocyate. 'viśesyam nābhidhā gacchet ksīņaśaktir viśesaņe' iti nyāyād ity upādānalaksaņā nodāhartavyā.na hy atra prayojanam asti, na vā rūdhiḥ.vyaktyavinābhāvāt tu jātyā vyaktir āksipyate, yathā kriyatām ity atra kartā, kurv ity atra karma, praviśa piņdīm ity ādau grham bhaksayetyādi ca. This is because of the basic difference in the standpoint of the definition of each on laksaņā. For Mammața the necessary conditions are three, i.e., (1) mukhyārthabādha, (2) tadyoga and (3) prayojana in some cases or rudhi in others. But Mukula, following Kumarila, defines laksana as that which arises from the mukhyarthabadha i.e., anvayanupapatti of the mukhyartha. For Mammata this prayojana is through the vyanjanavyapara: and the laksanā is without the suggested sense in the case of rudhi and with the suggested sense when there is the prayojana. sā ca 'vyangyena rahitā rūdhau sahitā tu prayojane'. prayojanam hi vyañjanavyāpāragamyam eva. (K.P.II.8 and vrtti). The whole question of the scope of prayojana in laksaņā is discussed by Mukula under kārikā XI and the examples fall under the avivaksitaväcyadhvani of the followers of the

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dhvani school. The author of the Dhvanyāloka, and Abhinavagupta in his Locana thereon, have dealt, in detail, with the distinction between Bhakti (i.e. laksaņā) and Dhvani.See Dh.Â. I.14 - 19 and the vrtti and the Locana thereon. In the case of laksaņā,. even when there is prayojana, if it is not of an appealing nature, there is no dhvani according to the Dhvani school. Anandavardhana is specific about the difference by saying: vācyavyatiriktasyārthasya vācyavācakābhyām tātparyeņa prakāśanam vyangyaprādhānye sati dhvaniḥ.upacāramātram tu bhaktiḥ. And the prayojana should be of the nature of cārutvātiayaprakāśana. The difference between these two views is purely form the point of view of definition. Even Ananda accepts laksaņā as a separate function. In laksanās where there is no mahatsaustavam but there is upacaritaśabdavrttyā prasiddhyanurodhapravarttitavyavahāra, we have only laksanā and not dhvani (Dh.A.I.14, vṛtti). 28 Mammata again refutes this by saying: pīno devadatto divā na bhunkte ity atra ca rātribhojanam na laksyate, śrutārthāpatter arthāpatter vā tasya visayatvāt. (K.P.II. vrtti) Kumārila specifically mentions this as a case of śrutārthāpatti:

pīno divā na bhunkte cety evam ādivacahśrutau rātribhojanavijñānam śrutārthāpattir ucyate. tām arthavisayām kecid apare śabdagocarām kalpayanty āgamāc cainām abhinnām pratijānate. Slokavārttika, arthāpatti

Even though the case of 'gaur anubandhyah' can be justified in some way or other as a (VV 51-52)

case of upadanalaksana, it is difficult to bring under this the present statement which clearly falls under the pramāna called arthāpatti. In all cases of laksaņā of this upādāna type, the word or the phrase that is the laksaka of the Secondary Sense, through its inapplicablity in its primary capacity, gives rise to laksanā. But in the case of arthāpatti there is the upapādya-upapādaka relation, and there is always the kalpanā of some extrancous phrase through which the sense is understood. Here, for instance, the fatness of of Devadatta is justified by invoking the fact of his eating at night which is not indicated by 'divābhojanam' as such. While laksana falls under the province of the import of words, arthapatti lies within the province of pramanas. To make both identical is confusing and apart from Mukula no one has brought arthapatti under laksaņā. 29 Pīnatvam can be due to two factors, i.e., eating or use of tonic. In the case of arthapatti of this kind, the use of tonic is set aside because proof - either pratyaksa, or anumāna etc. - is available. Hence arthāpatti as a pramāna is resorted to. This is mentioned in the previous sentence beginning 'na hi pinatvasya rasāyanādyupa- yogajanyatā pramāņāntareņa tadabhāvavasāye sati'. The author brings again another argument against the use of tonic. He says: "whether there is any other pramana or not for the absence of the use of tonic, let us not worry about it. The very fact that the phrase 'during the day' as qualifying the bhojanabhava, is employed in the sentence, sets aside the possibility of the use of tonic. Because one can assume the use of tonic in a statement like 'fat Devadatta does not eat'. It means that in spite of not eating Devadatta remains fat; so he must be using some tonic. But in a statement such as the one under consideration, the very mention of 'during the day' annuls the use of tonic and gives rise to an assumption of 'eating at night' in the absence of which the fatness cannot be explain- ed. In this manner the 'absence of eating' qualified by the specific statement 'during the day' justifies the assumption of the rātribhojanavākya and thus leads to arthāpatti". 30 See note 28 above and the statement of Kumarila. 31 In this connection see Kumārila in Tantravārttika on M.S.III.2.1

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śabdārthasya mukhyatvam mukhavat prathamodgateḥ arthagamyasya gaunatvam gunāgamanahetukam. .. paraguņānām paratrābhāvād avaśyam guņebhya āyāta ity evam aksaņam gauņatvam. The word gauna is formed from Pānini IV.3.74 'tata āgataḥ'. 32 It is not known who holds this view. 33 yatrāropyāropavisayayor bhedam anapahnutyaiva ... Mammata gives the following examples for the four types of laksanā:

śuddhā sāropalaksaņā: āyur ghrtam śuddhā sādhyavasāna- ayur evedam gaunā sāropalaksanā gaur vāhīkah gauņā sādhyavasāna- gaur ayam

Mukula's examples are: śuddhā sāropalaksaņā śuddhā sādhyavasāna- āyur ghrtam pañcālāh gauņā sāropalaksaņā gaur vāhīka gauņā sādhyavasānā- rājā

While in the case of the suddhāropalaksanā, Mammata agrees with Mukula in the matter of cognition of distinction between the two things superimposed, in the case of the gauna types he mentions that the loss of the cognition of the distinction (tadrūpyapratīti) is the prayojana (in accordance with his definition of laksanā), whereas Mukula does not take this into account. 34 This is one of the varieties of earlier writers though Mukula has neither defined it nor given a separate place for it in his classification. In para. VIII.3., he refers to it, and seems to bring it under the class of nirūdhalaksaņā. Laksitalaksaņā is defined as: yatra vākyaparamparāsambandhenārthāntarapratītis tatra lakșitalakșaņā, yathā dvirephapadasya rephadvayaśaktasya bhramarapadaghatitaparam- parāsambandhena madhukare vrttih; yathā'simho mānavaka' ity atra simhaśabdavācyasambandhikrauryādisambandhena māņavakasya pratītih. (Vedāntaparibhāsā IV.22) For these vedantins even the gaunīvrtti falls under this type. 35 This is the same as upacaryamānavisaya. The use of both artha and visaya seems to be redundant. 36 In the printed text we have only '- janapadaparipālana -'. In this connection see Sabara on M.S.II.3.3, page 585: nanu yo yo janapadapurapariraksaņam karoti tam tu loke rājaśabdenābhid- adhati ... On the basis of this, I have inserted the word pura in the text. 37 The distinction between the two, viz., pañcāla and rājā, is that in the former the relation is ādhāra-ādheya-bhāva, and in the latter it is the śādrśyākhyasambandha, i.e., the quality of ruling a country. 38 The two are the upādānalakanā and lakșaņalaksaņā. 39 esā ca laksanā triskandhā. Mukula, in dealing with laksana in detail, has looked at it from various angles. The following is the second of the same 6 types defined before: Up till now the classification was:

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Lakșaņā

śuddhā upacāramiśrā /

/upādānam laksaņam śuddhopacāramiśrā gaunopacāramiśrā 7

sāropā sādhyavaānā sāropā sādhyavasānā

Now the same six varieties are readjusted in a different manner on the basis of suddhā, sāropā and sādhyavasānā:

Laksaņā L śuddhā / adhyāropā adhyavasānā

upādānam laksanam śuddhā gauņā śuddhā gaunā

This is to show how the Primary Sense is related to the Secondary in a gradual degree of the intensity of the relation between them.

Mere connection where the proximity of the Primary to the Secondary is just felt; śuddha type Not far removed, i.e., closer proximity: āropa type Closest proximity: adhyavasāna type

40 Cf. K.P.II.5. vrtti: anayor bhedayor laksyasya laksakasya ca na bhedarūpam tātasth- yam. tațādīnām gangādiśabdaiḥ pratipādane tattvapratipattau pratipipādayișitaprayo- janasampratyayaḥ. gangāsambandhamātrapratītau gangātate ghoșa iti mukhyaśabdā- bhidhānā laksamyāh ko bhedah. (See also Sabdavyāpāravicāra p.3.) Mukula's view is that there is no abheda between the laksaka (i.e., vācya) and the laksya (i.e., the laksyärtha). But Mammata's view is that there is the idea of identity because of the purpose i.e. the phala of the laksana (in this case coolness, purity etc.). 1 According to Mukula in the example 'gangayam ghosah', the use of the Secondary function is only to point out the situation of the village and it has no other significance. Hence 'gangāyam ghósah' means only 'gangayām ghosah na vitastāyām', i.e., the idea of conveying that the village is situated on the bank of the Ganges, and not on the bank of Vitastā, thus giving the situation and nothing more, such as coolness, etc. The idea of the purpose in the laksanā is discussed by Mukula in kārikā XI, and the same example conveying the purpose of coolness and purity is discussed in para, XI.2 under the relation of sambandha between the two senses. 42 The anuparaktatva is merely the anupapatti (between the laksaka and the laksya). In this case the rätribhojana which is the laksya has nothing to do with the pinatva as divādhikaranabhojanābhavavisista; i.e., while fatness is certainly connected with eating, fatness as accompanied by the absence of eating during the day has nothing to do with the eating at night.

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43 This is the general view of the relation of the word to its sense. It is discussed in a similar manner by almost all the śāstrakāras. The whole objection forms a prelude to Mukula's contention of the vyañjanāvyapāra as a separate function of words. 44 The objection from 'nanu' to kim tasyāpeksanīyam' boils down to this :- (1) A 'word' can have its relation to the primary sense only, which consists of jāti, guna, kriyā and proper name. (2) The Secondary sense is arrived at because of the anupapatti of the Primary Sense and so the relation between the secondary sense and the word is only indirect, i.e., through the Primary Sensc. (3) But we have seen that some words have been used from long established usage in almost a conventional sense, which in reality is the secondary sense. These can be called nirūdhalaksanā words. But in the province of poetry, similar words are used which do not have the Primary Sense in the context, but have what we can call Secondary Sense. If we accept the relation of the sense got by Secondary signification to be through the Primary Sense, and also hold the opinion that this relation is nitya, then the contingency results that all words which certainly have a Primary Sense shall have to convey a Secondary Sense - which is not true. Therefore for some words (used in poetry), there are some extraneous factors, (like the speaker, the particular construction of the sentence and the specific sense of the sentence) that play an important role in giving to the word a significance other than the Primary Sensc. In such cases the word definitely is in need of something, (i.e., säpeksam) in the form of these factors. These are explained by the author in the following kārikā. 45 Cf. Mammata's K.P. III. 1.2. vaktrboddhavyakākūnām vākyavācyānyasannidheḥ prastāvadeśakālāder vaisistyāt pratibhājusām. yo'rthasyānyārthadhīhetur vyāpāro vyaktir eva sā. As already pointed out, the implied meaning obtained from these factors through laksanā, according to Mukula, is ascribed to the function of the vyanjana by Mammata. In his Sabdavyāpāravicāra, Mammata gives three different examples for these three kinds and also finds fault with Mukula's examples. These will be pointed out in the following notes. 46 Sec Sabara on M.S.I.4.23 (adhikarana 12). page 355.356. According to this the Secondary Sense of a word is through the mediation of the Primary Sense, as set forth by Mukula in the beginning. 47 laksanāpi hi laukiky eva. See Sabara on M.S.I.2.22. Also Sabara on M.S.I.4.2. page 324, line 12-13. 48 What Mukula means here is that the relation of words to their senses is understood from vrddhavyavahāra, by one seeing the activities of a person enjoined by statements of the one and the corresponding activities of the other. Through this, by the process of āvāpa and udvāpa, he deduces the relation. This process is through perception, inference, etc. Then, based on this relation and meaning, the Secondary Sense is arrived at. In some cases this Secondary Sense is itself so long used that it is almost in the linguistic usage the Primary Sense of that word, as in the case of words like raja, etc., where not only the kșatriya is called rājā, but any one who administers a country or town etc., by virtue of that etc. 49 This is by Kumārila on M.S.III.1.12 (p.643). This is so common that Mukula does not give any example. 50 The same verse is cited by Anandavardhana in his Dh.A.II.1. and also by Mammata in his K.P.IV., verse 112. While the Dhvanyaloka and Locana thereon cite this only for the arthāntarasamkrami- tavacyadhvani in the word 'rama' Mammata considers the words lipta and suhrd as

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atyantatiraskrtavācya, and rāma as the arthāntarasamkramitavācya. For Mukula all three come under the laksana of the newly coined variety. In para. XIII.1., he states that this laksaņā constitutes atyantatiraskāra. 51 The idea is this. The sky is imagined as 'lipta' i.e., smeared (by the colour of the clouds). Liptatva applies only when some substance as an unguent is used and 'colour' (kanti) cannot function this way. Hence the quality of 'being veiled' which goes with 'being smeared' (i.e., when something like a hand is smeared with an unguent like saffron the hand is veiled a little) is related to the black colour which can veil the sky. So there is laksaņā here. 52 The printed text reads 'yāsām ... na ca tasmin śabde ... akriyamānatvam eva. The words na ca tasmin sabde appear to be wrong in the syntactic construction, when lakșaņā is in the plural. Hence I have changed these to the plural by reading yesu śabdesu. 53 This is Māgha Siśupālavadha III.33. turangakāntā =badavā ānana =mare =face =mukha havyavāha =fire =agni 54 Though the sentence seems to mean that there is laksana in this, since according to Kumārila and Mukula, the present usage of the words cannot have the capacity of Secondary signification, there can be no laksanā. Hence the ascription of laksanā in this passage (laksaņayā prayuktah) is with reference to someone other than Mukula. Here it is only a question of changing the words with their synonyms and there is no laksanā according to the definition. 55 The printed text reads viddhāviddhārthāvagāhitvam. This means nothing. One of the manuscripts consulted reads tathāvidhārthavagāhitvena which means the implication of such (i.e., previously described) Secondary Sense. Hence the emendation. 56 See Note 34 ante. Even as the words 'dvirepha' (meaning two r's), first implies the word 'bhramara' (which also has two r's), and through this implies 'bee' so too the phrase 'turangakāntānanahavyavāha' can imply 'submarine fire'. But Mukula's answer is that this cannot be, because such cases have to be attested by linguistic usage, which is the basic authority for such usages. Unless this is kept up, any one canuse any word to mean any- thing by mere shade of similarity. Apart from the attested usage there should be some motive in the use of similar words coined specifically for the purpose. Freedom in usage is restricted to special cases alone. 57 It is exactly here that Mukula begins to accept the motive in the metaphor. It will be interesting to note in this connection the view of Anandavardhana on Dhvani and Bhakti (another term for laksana). In I.16 he says that rudhi sabdas and rudhi senses do not fall within the purview of Dhvani. The function in these cases is due to upacāravrtti. But even in some cases of these there is Dhvani, but it proceeds from a different angle of view. In the next kārikā (i.e.I.17) he specifically says that in cases where a sense is purported to be conveyed through the gunavrtti, there the word conveying this sense should not lose its Primary Sense altogether (skhaladgati). In the vrtti to this kārikā he explains: atra hi cārutvātiśayaviśistārthaprakāsanalaksaņe prayojane kartavye yadi śabdasyāmukhyatā tadā tasya prayoge dustataiva syāt. See also Abhinava in his Locana on these kārikās. As already noted before, where there is a purpose in resorting to laksaņā, this is attributed by the Dhvanikāra to vyañjanāvyāpāra. But, for Mukula, whether there is a purpose or not, this is only laksanā. Where there is a purpose, it is only incidental, due to the speaker etc. (vaktrādisāmagrī). 58 See in this connection Dhvanyāloka, page 416-419.

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59 See Mammata's Sabdavyāpāravicāra, p.5. See also his K.P. II.9-11. and the vrtti theron. Mammata's own illustration in this case in his Sabdavyāpāravicāra is: upakṛtam bahu tatra kim ucyate sujanatā prathitā bhavatā param vidadhad Idrśam eva sadā sakhe sukhitam āsva tatah śaradām śatam. 60 The text reads 'tvasatyoktah' which can be interpreted as 'said by a false woman'; but since the sentence has no subject, and the context refers to 'the true sense', I have emen- ded the text to read' satyo 'rthah'. 61 This verse is quoted by Anandavardhana in Dh.A. II.27. in the context of alankāradh- vani. He says: ... yatra tu vyangyaparatvenaiva vācyasya vyavasthānam tatra vyangyamukhe- naiva vyapadeśo yuktah.yathā ... ityevamvidhe visaye'nuraņanarūparūpakāśrayeņa kāvyacārutvavyavasthānād rūpakadhvanir iti vyapadeśo nyāyyah. The Locana explains that the vācya is the sankarālankāra of sasandeha and utprekșā and the vyangya is the rüpakälankāra consisting in the identification of the king with Vāsude- va. According to Mukula the verse indicates a sense wherein there is the suppression of the distinction between the king and Väsudeva, through the identification of the similar qualities and actions, and so there is the utpreksā assisted by the figure atisayokti. This atiśayokti is, according to Ubhata: nimittato yat tu vaco lokātikrāntagocaram manyante'tiśayoktim tām alankāratayā budhāh. (KASS II.11). I.e., a statement with the express mention of a certain cause and which purports to imply something surpassing the common perception of people. In this the cause can be of four kinds: (1) Imposition of identity between two things which in reality are different. (2) Differentiation where really there is no difference. (3) Imagining something unreal as real. (4) Inversion of the cause-effect relation. In the present verse we have, according to Mukula, the first and the last varieties of atiśayokti. Thus this verse is a case of gauņopacāra. 62 This is Ubdhata's KASS III.3. In utpreksa, even though it is not simile, there is the express mention of the upamavacaka- śabdas such as iva etc. This is different from the vyangyotpreksa dealt with by Udbhata in III.4. In this connection see Induraja's comments on this verse. 63 The printed text reads 'etac cātra sarvavākyopātta ... '. The idea of this sentence is to impress on the reader that all these aforesaid meanings are arrived at by the import of the words in the whole verse without reference to any one word. The phrase 'sarvavakyopatta-' does not bring this out forcefully. Hence I emend the text to read 'etac cātra sarvam vākyopātta-'. 64 I am unable to understand the use of the word 'api' in 'satyapi'. The argument follo- wing is about the absence of the feminine suffix 'I' in the word 'unmādakara' as qualifying the substantive 'sasankaruci' which is in the feminine. Possibly the author thinks that the word 'unmadakara' can be construed in the masculine plural, and the word sasankarucayah can also be construed to be in the masculine plural. In order to remove this doubt the author has inserted the phrase. Or 'satyapi' can mean 'in spite of and the author wishes to point out that in spite of 'sasankaruci' being in the feminine, 'unmadakara' should also have the feminine ending in 'r' (?)' 65 This is Pānini III.2.20. 'krño hetutācchilyānulomyesu'. 66 This is Panini III.2.1. 'karmany an'. The printed text reads the suffixes wrongly.

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67 This is Panini IV.4.143. 68 The whole argument is as follows: The word 'unmādakarā' is in the feminine as qualifying the word 'sasankarucayah'. If this were an upapada-samāsa it should be governed by the suffixes 'an' or 'ta' and the feminine forms should end in I. Unmādam karoti = unmādakāra, unmādakara in the masculine, and unmādakārī or unmādakarā in the feminine. If the rule 'karmany an (Pan.III.2.1) is applied then we have the suffix 'an.' The rule for the feminine is governed by Pan.IV.1.15, where the form would be 'unmādakāri'. Hence we have to assume that the objective case relation of the upapada is not to be applied. If we have to apply the rule 'krño hetutācchīlyānulomyeșu' (Pan.III.2.20) then we have the masculine from 'unmādakara' but the feminine under Pān.IV.1.15 should be 'unmādakari'. So in this case also we cannot assume the three factors of hetu, täcchilya and ānulomya for unmāda. The only way to support the form in a is the enjoining of the suffix 'ac' in which case only we have the a ending for the feminine. But this could be only in cases of roots falling under the group 'pacadi' under the rule 'nandigrahipacādibhyo lyuninyacah' (Pān.III.1.134). But the root kr does not fall under the class covered by pac. The Kāśikā says that pacādi is an ākrtigaņa and quotes a verse ajvidhih sarvadhātubhyah pathyante ca pacādayah aņbādhanārtham eva syat sidhyanti svapacādayah. So too KaumudI accepts pacādi as ākrtigana and says: śivaśamaristasya kare' 'karmaņi ghațo' tac'iti sūtrayoh karoter ghatés cā' cprayogāt. That is, even though the root kr does not fall within the pacadi class and as shown above specific suffixes are enjoined for it, by bringing it under the class of pac we have the ac suffix and have the feminine form in ä. To bring kr under the pacadi we have the sanc- tion of Panini himself as he has used the word 'karah' as a derivative of kr in the sūtras quoted above. Hence the form 'unmadakara' is grammatically correct even as 'svapaca'. 69 The four varieties formed out of the combinations of the speaker, sentence and the sentence meaning are the following:

speaker + sentence speaker + sentence meaning Three groups of two each

sentence + sentence meaning (dvikabhedās trayaḥ) speaker + sentence + sentence meaning - One group of three (trikabheda ekah) 70 Of the four views, the first one refers to the Mimāmsā school of Kumārila Bhatta, the second to the Mimamsa school of Prabhakara, the third is not known, and the fourth one refers to the Grammarian school, particularly of Bhartrhari. It should be noted here that Mukula up to now has not brought in the purpose in the operation of laksanā. But from now on he stresses it as one of the criteria for laksanā, because the purpose comes in only when the sentence meaning, or tatparya, comes into question. We have already seen under para. VIII.3, that Mukula was specific in the case of using the läksanika words as sanctioned by usage. The context under which he makes this statement is where one takes into consideration the speaker, sentence and the sentence meaning along with time, place etc. This means that the motive comes in only when there is the tatparya, but this is not so when individual words are laksanikas. The main point is where there is anvayānupapatti there is mere laksanā without motive. In this connection see Vedāntin's dictum 'laksanabIjam tu tatparyanupapattir eva, na tv anvayanupapattih'. Mukula introduces this topic of the operation of laksana in the sentence meaning at this stage to contradict the theory of Dhvani as a separate power and this he does in his kārikās XII and XIII and the vrtti thereon. We have already pointed out before that while

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for the Dhvanivadin the purpose is the fruit which is due mainly to the operation of vyañjanā, Mukula attributes it to the function of laksanā alone. According to Abhinavag- upta, tatparyasakti (which is the same as the vakyartha of the abhihitanvayavadin) stands as the second in the four different functions of the word, their order being abhidha, tātparya, laksaņā and vyañjanā. Therefore to him the suggested sense is the ultimate fruit of the utterance and this is followed by Mammata. Anandavardhana never accepts tātparyasakti, and therefore he has only the other three functions. 71 See Mammata's Sabdavyāparavicāra, pp. 7-8. uktānvaye ca sā paścāt anvitoktau punah purah dvaye dvayam akhande tu vākyārtho nāsti satyatah.

For a detailed exposition of the theories of the sentence meaning from the point of the views of the Mimamsaka (both the Bhattas and the Prabhakaras), the Naiyāyikas, and the Grammarians see 'Indian Theories of Meaning' by K.K.Raja, and 'The philosophy of Word and Meaning' by Gaurinath Sastri. 72 According to the basic definition of laksaņā by Mukula, the laksyārtha is arthavaseya and this is 'aksipta' by the samarthya' of the 'abhidheya'; see kārika I and para. I.2. Here too he says that the 'vakyartha' is not 'anabhidheya' and is obtained through the operation of laksana through the medium of the 'padartha' in a sentence. It is clear from Mukula's statement that he considers the joy and grief in the two sentences as the intended sense, i.e., the 'phala' resulting from the sentence meanings, viz., 'the birth of a son' and 'the pregnancy of the unmarried daughter'. According to the abhihitānvaya theory of the Bhatta school, in the strict sense the 'vakyartha' will be only the 'birth of a son' and the 'daughter's pregnancy', and the hearer's joy or sorrow should be the resulting factor, i.e., the 'phala' of the "vakyartha'. Hence this will be a case of 'prayojanavati laksama'. Even Kumārila seems to accept that, though 'prayojana' is not the 'vākyārtha', it automatically follows (in certain cases) the 'vākyārtha': na hi prayojanāpetam vākyam uccāryate kvacit prayojanaksamam nāpi ākhyātavarjitam. (S.V. Vā. 346)

And Mukula also says in the subsequent lines following this that the 'birth of a son' and 'the daughter's pregnancy' are the 'nimittas' for joy and sorrow respectively. 73 This is the view of the Prabhakara school. In this connection see the verses quoted by Mammata in his K.P.V.3, in the vrtti: śabdavrddhābhidheyāmś ca pratyaksenātra paśýati śrotuś ca pratipannatvam anumānena cestayā anyathānupapattyā tu bodhec chaktim dvayātmikām arthāpattyāvabodheta sambandham tripramāņakam. See also para. VII.3 and note 43 ante. The view expressed here is opposed to the one expressed in the previous para. While in the case of abhihitānvayavādin, the word has a meaning of its own, (i.e. the universal), and this in a sentence through means of expectancy, compatibility and contiguity signifies the particular, i.e., the sentence meaning through the operation of laksana, in the view of the anvitābhidhana theory, a word does not have any sense of its own apart from its stand in a sentence, and so the meaning of each word of the sentence is itself the meaning of the sentence. Hence there is no logical connection of the word-meanings as such, but the wordmeanings are the logically connected sense. That is, the word expresses a sense which is always connected with another in a sentence. 74 This is the view of the combined theory which can be related to some of the Grammarians.

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This theory seems to be a via media between the above two theories advocated by Kumārila and Prabhākara. If we accept the word as having a sense of its own apart from its place in a sentence, then we have to accept the abhihitanvaya. If, however, we accept the sentence meaning as something from which alone words derive their denotation for themselves, then we have the anvitābhidhāna. Mammata does not refer to these theorists even though he refers to the other two. The only difference is that Mammata refers to abhihitanvaya, but it seems to be really the Naiyyayika's theory of judgement. In this connection see pp. 220-222, The Philosophy of Word and Meaning', by Gaurinath Sastri. 75 The meaning of the sentence is not quite clear. Even the variant line from one of the manuscripts does not give any sense. I have therefore added a negative (na) to the variant line and translated the sentence. The idea of the author is to refute the doctrines of the abhihitanvaya and the anvitabhidhana both together, invoking the inadmisibility of the word-sense relation which is eternal from the point of view of the Mīmamsaka. In the theory of the akhandavakyärtha, all the divisions of the sentence and its meaning into any minor subdivisions is asatya and due to avidya. The eternal verbum is the only reality In the vyavahara stage, speech is something phenomenal and has no intrinsic reality. The oft quoted dictum of the theorists is that from the false we reach the truth. asatye vartmani sthitvā tatah satyam samīhate In this connection see Vākyapadtya II.15: sāmānyārthas tirobhūto na viśese' vatisthate upāttasya kutas tyāgo nivrttah kvāvatisthatām. iha sāmānyavrttir uccārito devadattaśabdo sāmānyārthasambaddha eva tirobhavati.tatra yena śabdenāvirbhāvakāla cva viśisto 'rtho na sa śabdah sāmānyārthas tirobhūto viśese 'vasthātum na punar utsahate.na ca sāmānyavisésayor vivaksā yugapat sambhavati. viśesavivaksāyām hi sarvasyāniyamena sāmānyād avacchedo vijñāyate.tatra upāttasya nitye śabdārthasambandhe kutas tyāgah ... 76 The position of the abhihitanvaya is as follows. When a sentence is uttered the words in the sentence separately convey their own senses (padārthasvarūpa) in the form of universals. These universals are at this stage unrelated to one another. But due to ākānksā, sannidhi and yogyatā, these combine together in a sentence. When by the aid of the Secondary function, they transform themselves into particulars, conveying along with them the relation, one understands the Vakyartha. Laksanā in this case, is not because of the anupapatti of the primary meaning of the words themselves, as it is in the case of the word 'Ganges' in the sentence 'the village on the Ganges'. As already defined in the first instance by the author, laksana is what is obtained through the Primary sense. That is, between the word and the laksyärtha, there is the intervention of the Primary sense. So too here between the väkya, (which is a padasam- abhivyāhrti) and the vākyārtha, there is the intervention of universals. Kumārila has: vākyārtho lakșyamāno hi sarvatraiveti naḥ sthitiḥ. sāksād yady api kurvanti padārthapratipādanam varņās tathāpi naitasmin paryavasyanti nisphale vākyārthamitaye tesām pravrttau nāntarīyakam pāke jvāleva kāsthānām padārthapratipādanam.

77 In this connection see Note 73 ante. This is almost an explanatory paraphrase of what is said in para X.2 above. 78 The reading of the printed text (vākyārthottarakālam taysāḥ pūrvam avasthānam) is confusing and unintelligible. In para. X.3 which gives the same idea in general, we have padāpeksayā and vākyāpeksayā put in contrast for the samuccayavāda. So too here we

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should expect the two phrases to distinguish the two doctrines of abhihitānvaya and anvitābhidhāna The idea is this. In the abhihitänvaya as explained above we have first the väcya of the padas in their universal aspect, and then because of the akānksa etc., there arises the samsarga. Before this point we have the laksana to give us the vakyartha. But in the anvitbhidhāna, because words as such have no sense except in the context of a sentence, there are no padärthas as such other than the anvitapadärtha, which by itself, is the sen- tence meaning in a general way. After this we have laksanā by which we get the sense of the padas. Vākyārthotttarakālam here means possibly the anvitapadārtha in a general way. If this is acceptable there is a possibility of interpreting the text as it is with the mere addition of the phrase vākyāpeksayā. 79 vibhaktanyagbhage nivedya. The printed text has nivesya instead of the amended reading nivedyā. But nivesya does not give any sense in the sentence construction. I have also put a full stop after laksanāyāh in the previous line as against the printed reading, to make proper sense. 80 The printed text reads 'evam abhihitānvayādicatustaye laksaņāyā'. But in the context of the discussion this does not fit in properly. Hence the reading given by another manuscript is accepted. As already pointed out, this is the first time Mukula brings in the prayojana in the definition along with the mukyārthabādha. The original definition of laksaņā as given by Mukula is only as a Sense which is äksipta by the primary sense. The question of its anupapatti is not even mentioned by him. Even in the case of laksanalaksaņā, he only mentioned that the Primary Sense has the nature of svasamarpaņa to the laksyārtha.

Kāvyaprakāśa. The present definition of laksanā is almost bodily taken over by Mammata in his

81 Laksanā is resorted to on two accounts, on the basis of the words which have been used in the läksanika sense, which have by the passage of time lost this sense as lāksanika, but which has been understood in the world as if it were the Primary Sense itself, and, when there is a definite purpose. The former comes under the term nirūdhalaksanā and the latter comes under the 'newly coined ones' according the dictum of Kumārila, see para VIII.2 ante. 82 Apart from the anupapatti of the Primary Sensc, which is the prime condition for the Secondary function, the other condition is the association of the Secondary Sense with the Primary Sense. This association or relation is given in different ways by different schools. Gautama, in the Nydyasūtras, gives ten different kinds. sahacaraņa-sthāna-tādarthya-vrtta-mānadhāraņa-sāmīpya-yogasādhanādhip- atyebhyo brāhmaņa-manca-kata-rāja-saktu-candana-gangā-śāțakā-'nna- puruseșu atadbhāve'pi tadupacāraḥ. (N.S.II.2.62) Patañjali gives four such relations: caturbhiḥ prakārair etasmin sa ity etad bhavati, tātsthyāt, tāddharmyāt, tatsāmīpyāt, tatsāhacaryād iti (M.Bh. II.p.218) Jaimini gives six types in his MImāmsāsūtras: tatsiddhi-jāti-sārūpya-praśamsā-bhūma-lingasamavāyā iti guņāśrayāh (M.S.I. 4.23). The verse of Bhartrmitra is mentioned and discussed by Abhinavagupta in his Locana(p. 153). Instead of sādrśyāt Locana reads sāmīpyāt. So too Mammața in his Sabdavyāpāra- vicāra.

3 The printed text reads 'tena' in the beginning.I omit it on the authority of one of the manuscripts since it makes no sense.

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84 The printed text and the manuscripts read only samvijñānapadasya etc. In this connec- tion see V.P.I.119 and the vrtti thereon: sadjādibhedah śabdena vyākhyāto rūpyate yatah tasmād arthavidhāh sarvāh šabdamātrāsu niścitāh. samvijñānapadanibandhano hi sarvo'rthah smrtinir- ūpanayā abhijalpanirūpaņayā ākāranirūpaņayā ca nirūpyamāņo vyavahāram avatarati .... i.e., everything depends upon a word which causes its cognition and everything enters into the realm of usage or linguistic discourse when grasped through remembrance of it as inter- twined with its word. In the case of the Primary Sense we have the word from which there is the direct cognition of the sense. But in the case of the Secondary Sense, the word that exists is not that from which there is the direct cognition of the laksyārtha. The laksaka word has the same form of the word which otherwise would have given rise to the Primary Sense. Hence it is asamvijñanapada. For in the instance cited by Mukula, we have the word 'räma' which directly denotes only the sense 'the individual who is the son of Dasaratha'. But in the context where there is the laksyärtha, the sense is 'the same individual who is not only the son of Dasaratha, but also who has suffered many extraor- dinary miseries'. Here we have the same form of the word 'rama' but in the lāksanika sense it has a rupavisesa which has additional meanings beyond those which arise from the direct word causing the denotation. 85 Gangāyam ghosah is given by Mukula as the example for the relation of abhidheyena- sambandha, whereas Abhinavagupta gives it as an example of sāmipya, though the laksa- nā is brought through the samIpa-samIpibhava in the view of Mukula. 86 According to Mukula laksanā is resorted to with a motive in cases other than the nirudhalaksanā. In the example under consideration this motive is the sanctity, purity etc. of the village. Unless this motive is not there the laksana loses its importance. If one says that along with the indication of the sense 'bank' the word 'ganga' indicates the sanctity and beauty etc. which are intimately connected with it the defects of wider and narrower application appear. For supposing the Indicated sense 'bank' means 'sanctimonious, pure, etc. bank' then in the case of such a use as 'yamunayam ghosah' the sense 'bank' would have the same sanctity and beauty as in the case of 'gangayam ghosah' which is not true. This would mean a narrower sense than the actual one of 'bank'. Likewise in the usage 'tadāge ghosah' the same sense 'bank' would include all the sanctity and beauty etc. which it originally included and so this is a case of wider application which is not intended. The author of Dhvanyaloka, however, explains that the motive element is not the purview of laksaņā but of vyañjanā. See Dh.A.I.15 and the vrtti there on. Also Locanā on this and K.P.II.9,14-18. Mānikyacandra, while repeating Mukula's very words, however, reads 'śabdāntaraih' instead of 'svaśabdaiḥ'. 87 The printed text reads as such. But one of the manuscripts gives the variant 'sambo- dhanadyanupapatti' which is better. This inapplicability of addressing objects which cannot be addressed gives an opportunity to resort to the Sccondary function with respect to these two words. 'Bee' refers to the 'connoisseur of sexual love' and 'flower' to the 'woman who is best for enjoyment'. The qualities of the bee and the flower, consist in the search for the best in taste and softness. Attractiveness and retention of the capacity for enjoyment are the common qualities of both the things denoted by the Primary Sense and the Secondary sense. 88 Samavāya in this case is association (sāhacaryam). The action of going is the main thing with which both the persons with and without the umbrella are connected. The acchatrin is also associated with the chatrin.

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89 Dhvani has been principally divided into three classes viz. atyantatiraskritacvācya, arthāntarasamkramitavācya and vivaksitānyaparavācya. Mukula terms these three in the following way, viz., atitiraskriyā or tiraskriyā, avivaksā and vivaksā. The scheme of the application of the sambandhapancaka of these three in laksana is as under: sādrśya atitiraskriyā vaiparītya atitiraskāraḥ abhidheyena sambandha vivaksā (but only in the case of upādāna laksaņā) avivaksā (when there is laksaņalaksaņā) samavāya vivaksā (only when there is upādānalaksaņā) avivaksā (when there is laksanalaksanā) kriyāyoga atitiraskriyā and vivakșā

90 The printed text reads' .... vivaksitāvivaksitatvena tasyātyantam tiraskārah'. But this is obviously wrong because when there is antyantatiraskriya the other two varieties do not come in at all. Both the manuscripts consulted give the proper reading though slightly different in wording. 91 The printed text reads 'tatra hy upādānātmikāyām laksaņāyām upādāne vācyasya vivaksāyām vācyasya vivaksitatvam' and the phrase 'upādāne vivaksāvām' is redundant. Hence it is omitted. One of the manuscripts does so as well. 92 This is a clear reference to the author of the Dhvanikārikās. Mukula here definitely accepts the view of Dhvani indirectly. That laksanā (gunavrtti or bhakti according to the Dhvanikāra) and dhvani are poles apart has been dealt with at length by Anandavardhana in the third uddyota of the Dhvanyāloka (vide pp.405 et seq.). In the upādānalakșaņā, the Primary Sense not being discarded, and the prayojana in resorting to laksana also being accepted, it has been impossible for Mukula to refute dhvani of this variety. This point of the väcakatva and vyangyatva existing in dhvani and the upādānalaksanā is dealt with by Anandavardhana. He finally established the svarūpa- bheda and visayabheda between the two at pp.427 - 433. According to him though in the case of avivaksitavācyadhvani laksanā (i.e. bhakti or gunavrtti) is operative, it is only a means for the vyangya and not identical with it. Mukula's statement shows an indirect acceptance of this view. 92a The same example is taken as illustative of both the 'upādāna' and 'laksaņa' laksaņās based on association. In one case the plural suffix implies the non-umbrella-holders and includes within it the singular umbrella-holder also through the relation of association between the two. In the other case the singular umbrella-holder is subordinated to the collective non-umbrella-holders, and thus there is the discarding of the primary meaning, even though through kriyanvaya these umbrella-holder(s) are included in the collectivity. See para. XIII.7 below. 93 The printed text reads ' .... vācyasya vivaksā na tv .... '. The vivaksā is only in the case of upādānalaksanā and so the reading is wrong. One of the manuscripts gives the correct reading as given. As we have already seen, Mukula distinguishes the upādānam from laksanam from the point of view of the Primary Sense; in the former case it exists along with the Secondary Sense, while in the latter the Primary Sense gives way to the Secondary Sense. In the latter case he is specific in saying that the primary sense is not at all applicable. For in- stance in para. V.1. he says: sarvathā svasiddhyarthatvenārthāntarasyāksepapūrvakatayāntarbhāvanād upādānatvam upapadyate.yatra tu pūrvoditopādānarūpaviparyāsasamśrayān na svārthasiddhyarthatayārthāntarasyāksepah api tv arthāntarasiddhyart- hatvena svārthasamarpaņam tatra laksaņam.

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It is therefore quite clear that the two are opposed to each other. See also para. VII.1. It is difficult to understand how the two kinds of relations, viz., samavāya and abhidheyena sambandha in the case of laksanalaksanā come under the category of avivaksita. The case of avivaksitavācya dhvani is described by the Dhvanikāra in such a way that the vācya transforms into another sensc and this is glossed by Locanakāra saying that the svārtha is not discarded. This goes against laksanalaksanā. Yet Mukula has brought this kind of laksaņā under the avivaksita. This is intriguing. 94 The printed text reads ' ... vyangyam dharmāntaraparinatatvat'. This is obviously wrong because what is suggested (or implied according to Mukula) is not 'dāśaratharūpam' but something else. In this connection Anandavardhana quoting the verse says: ity atra rāmasabdaḥ. anena hi vyangyadharmāntarapariņatah samjñī pratyāy- yate, na samjñimātram. Abhinava glosses here 'vyangyam dharmāntaram prayojanarūpam' At. p.424 of the Dhvanyāloka, in differentiating between gunavrtti and vyañjanā, Anadavardhana says: ayam cāparo rūpabhedo guņavrttau yadārtho'rthāntaram upalakșayati tadopalaksaņiyārthātmanā pariņata evāsau sampadyate. According to Abhinavagupta, 'pariņata' means 'svena rūpeņānirbhāsamānah'. 95 Mukula is accepting here the position that the Primary Sense of the word 'rama' is not taken into cognisance and is yet not discarded absolutely. When the anupapatti of the Primary Sense is the first criterion for the operation of Laksana, how can this stand? Mukula circumvents the issue of accepting the doctrine of Dhvani. 96 Here also it appears Mukula is tacitly accepting the Dhvani theory. 97 In distinguishing guņavrtti from vyañjanā, (vide passage of Dhvanyāloka quoted in note 9293 above), Ananda specifically says that when there is the transformation of one (the Primary) Sense into another which is implied, then the Primary Sense is not there, as in the case of 'gangayam ghosah'. That is, the sense of 'ganges' as the 'river' is transformed into the sense 'the bank' suggesting purity etc., and so, in the sentence the Primary Sense does not exist. This is exactly avivaksitavācya through the operation of laksanā. But Mukula is confusing. The whole question of the propriety or otherwise of equating Dhani with Laksana as done by Mukula is examined in detail below. 98 The exact idea of the sentence is not clear. What possibly the author means by 'Person is only the Person' is that if one calls any one as Person, only the Person as the best amongst that category and not as distinguished from anything other than a person is meant. But such instances, according to the doctrine of Dhvani, fall under the category of arthāntarasamkramitavācya, where the Primary Sense transforms into a different sense but the Primary Sense still forms the base for the vyangya. The reading of one ms. 'purisayitrtvam' or 'purisayitrtvam' for 'punar atisayitrtvam' is unintelligible and complicated. 99 There is no actual reference to this view or such an assumption in the Dhvanyāloka. This appears to be only an assumed possibility. of our author himself. 100 In this connection see Mammata; nanu 'rāmo' smi sarvam sahe' iti 'rāmenapriyajīvitena tu krtam premņan priye nocitam' iti 'rāmo' sau bhuvanesu vikramagunaih prāptah prasiddhim parām' ityādau laksaņīyo' py artho nānātvam bhajate viśesavyapadeśahetuś ca bhavati tadavagamaś ca śabdārthāyattaḥ prakaraņādisavyapeksaś ceti ko'yam nūtanah pratīyamāno nāma. ucyate.laksanīyasyārthasya nāņātve'pi anekārthaśabdābhidheyavan

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264 ABHIDHĀVRTTIMĀTRKĀ

niyatatvam eva na khalu mukhyenārthenāniyatasambandho laksayitum śakyate.pratifyamānas tu prakaranādiviśesavasena niyatasambandhah aniyatasambandhah sambandhasambandhas ca dyotyate. Possibly this is a reference to Mukula's statement under question. 101 The printed text is wrong. The same phrase occurs in para. XIV.1. below properly. properly. 102 Here too the printed text reads 'samhrtartha ... '. The present reading is adopted on the basis of the following kārikā. 103 The printed text reads continuously after sambandhitvam and also compounds the word nirüpita with evamvidha ... Also after sambandhitvam we have in the printed text apratyastamita ... The whole argument of this paragraph in accordance with the kārikā to which it is the vrtti, is that the väktattva comes into linguistic usage through avidyā and the defilement of upädhis and hence we have the various distinctions such as words, vrtti etc. But in its pure state, without entering into the world of speech, the principle is undifferentiated. Hence we should have a full stop after sambandhitvam and the next sentence begins with only 'pratyastamita .... 103a In this connection see Bhartrhari V.P. III (sāmbandhasamuddeśa verses 57 and 58 and vrtti thereon). 104 The printed text is wrong without the negative. In the pure state of the

abhidhāvrttam. principle of speech when there is no vyavahära naturally there is no question of the

105 See the vrrti on V.P.III.57 cited above. 106 Does suri mean the name of Mukula's disciple or does it mean only 'the wise"? It is not clear.