1. Advaita Vedanta and Vaisnavism Philosophy of Madhusudana Saraswati Sanjukta Gupta Sunny

Advaita Vedanta and Vaisnavism

The philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī

Sanjukta Gupta

ADVAITA VEDĀNTA AND VAIȘŅAVISM

In Indian philosophy and theology, the concept of Brahman postulated by Vedānta occupies an important position. Hindu religious sects accept the Vedāntic soteriology which believes that there is only one conscious reality, Brahman, from which the entire creation, both conscious and non-conscious, emanated. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, who lived in sixteenth-century Bengal and wrote in Sanskrit, was the last great thinker in the Vedānta tradition. During his time, Hindu sectarians came to reject monistic Vedānta. Although a strict monist, Madhusūdana tried to forge a synthesis between his monistic philosophy and his theology of emotional love for God. This book expounds the main tenets of his extensive and difficult works and represents the only comprehensive study of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's thought.

Sanjukta Gupta taught at Visva Bharati University, Calcutta University and Jadavpur University in India, as well as Utrecht University in the Netherlands. At present she is a member of the Oriental Institute at the University of Oxford. She specialises in Indian philosophy with a focus on the system of Vedānta in Hindu theology, in particular Vaișnavism and Tantra.

ROUTLEDGE HINDU STUDIES SERIES Series Editor: Gavin Flood, University of Stirling Former Series Editor: Francis X. Clooney, S.J., Harvard University

OCHS

The Routledge Hindu Studies Series, in association with the Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies, intends the publication of constructive Hindu theological, philosophical and ethical projects aimed at bringing Hindu traditions into dialogue with contemporary trends in scholarship and contemporary society. The series invites original, high quality, research level work on religion, culture and society of Hindus living in India and abroad. Proposals for annotated translations of important primary sources and studies in the history of the Hindu religious traditions will also be considered.

EPISTEMOLOGIES AND THE LIMITATIONS OF PHILOSOPHICAL INQUIRY Doctrine in Mādhva Vedānta Deepak Sarma

A HINDU CRITIQUE OF BUDDHIST EPISTEMOLOGY Kumarila on perception The 'determination of perception' chapter of Kumarilabhatta's Slokarvarttika Translation and commentary John Taber

SAMKARA'S ADVAITA VEDANTA A way of teaching Jacqueline Hirst

ATTENDING KRSŅA'S IMAGE Caitanya Vaiņava mūrti-sevā as devotional truth Kenneth Russell Valpey

ADVAITA VEDĀNTA AND VAIȘŅAVISM The philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī Sanjukta Gupta

ADVAITA VEDĀNTA AND VAISNAVISM

The philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī

Sanjukta Gupta

OUTLEDCE Routledge Taylor & Francis Group LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2006 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN Simultaneously published in the USA and Canada by Routledge 711 Third Ave, New York, NY 10017

Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business

C 2006 Sanjukta Gupta

Typeset in Times New Roman by Newgen Imaging Systems (P) Ltd, Chennai, India

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Gupta, Sanjukta. Advaita Vedanta and Vaishnavism : the philosophy of Madhusudana Sarasvati / Sanjukta Gupta. p. cm. - (Routledge Hindu studies series) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Madhusudana Sarasvati. 2. Advaita. 3. Vaishnavism. I. Title. II. RoutledgeCurzon Hindu studies series. B133.M184G87 2006 181'.482-dc22 2006006814

ISBN10: 0-415-39535-6 ISBN13: 978-0-415-39535-9 (hbk) ISBN10: 0-203-96970-7 ISBN13: 978-0-203-96970-0 (ebk)

CONTENTS

Preface vii Series preface ix

1 Introduction 1

2 Avidyā 14

3 Knowledge and epistemology 44

4 Brahman 65

5 The sentient world: Iśvara, Jīva and Sāksī 84

6 Material world and cosmogony 100

7 Advaita-vedānta salvation 114

8 Bhakti 119

Glossary 145 Notes 147 Bibliography 167 Index 173

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PREFACE

This book is based on my 1958 PhD thesis written at Visva Bharati University and published in India in 1966. It addressed mainly Indian scholars of ancient Indian Darśana Sāstra (philosophy). For a long time I wanted to re-edit and update it. My great friend the late Mrs Coomee Strooker of Amsterdam started to read it through in order to correct my English, but unfortunately age prevented her from completing the task. That was decades ago. I just mention her to express my deep respect and love for her. To my great surprise Rishi Shaunaka Dasa, Director of the Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies, one day offered to publish this work in his Series of Hindu Religious Studies. I am grateful for this generous offer. He also introduced me to the Centre's secretary, Ms Diane Rollinson, who in her amazing kindness typed up my thesis on the Centre's computer. But for her I would never have been able to reshape my old work on Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. I am also indebted to Dr Sarah Shaw for reading and correcting my thesis and Mr Tamal Matilal whose careful proofreading and many suggestions for improvement have been invalu- able. I thank Professor Francis X. Clooney, S.J., the former chief editor of the Routledge Hindu Studies Series, for accepting my book for publication. I must also thank Professor Godavarisha Misra for his constant encouragement. Ms Dorothea Schaefter, Associate Editor at Routledge has also been most helpful.

Sanjukta Gupta

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SERIES PREFACE

The Routledge Hindu Studies Series, published in collaboration with the Oxford Centre for Hindu Studies, intends primarily the publication of constructive Hindu theological, philosophical and ethical projects. The focus is on issues and con- cerns of relevance to readers interested in Hindu traditions in particular, yet also in the context of a wider range of related religious concerns that matter in today's world. The Series seeks to promote excellent scholarship and, in relation to it, an open and critical conversation among scholars and the wider audience of inter- ested readers. Though contemporary in its purpose, the Series recognises the importance of retrieving the classic texts and ideas, beliefs and practices, of Hindu traditions, so that the great intellectuals of these traditions may as it were become active participants in the conversations of today. Deepak Sarma's Epistemologies and the Limitations of Philosophical Inquiry, John Taber's A Hindu Critique of Buddhist Epistemology: Kumarila on Perception, Jacqueline Hirst's Samkara's Advaita Vedanta: A Way of Teaching, and Kenneth Russell Valpey's Attending Krsna's Image: Caitanya Vainava Mūrti-sevā as Devotional Truth have been the distinguished first four volumes in the Series. Sanjukta Gupta's Advaita Vedānta and Vaișnavism: The Philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī is now published as our fifth volume. It is an exhaustive study of the writings of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, a prominent sixteenth-century Hindu theologian and philosopher who delved deeply and expertly into both Advaita Vedānta and Bengali Vaisnavism. The publication of this work in the Series reflects our recognition that this important figure has been inadequately studied and deserves more attention. Moreover, by studying him we also fill out our understanding of Advaita and dispel exaggerations regarding the relationships and differences between Advaita and Vaisnavism. Our decision to include Advaita Vedānta and Vaișnavism in this Series is also in-keeping with our determination to make available to readers, when the opportunity arises, important works that have long been out of print. Originally Dr Gupta's 1958 dissertation (Visva Bharati University) and published in 1966 as Studies in the Philosophy of Madhusūdana Saraswatī (Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar), Advaita Vedanta and Vaisnavism is still our primary source for detailed and exhaustive information on a most important Hindu thinker. We are also happy

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to note that Dr Gupta has revised and updated her work in order to make it more easily accessible to the contemporary reader. Advaita Vedanta and Vaisnavism is thus a solid and rare resource for the history of Hindu theology. It is, we hope, a basis for additional constructive writing on Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, who deserves still further study, and on Advaita Vedānta and Bengali Vaisnavism as well. Accordingly, the book accomplishes very well goals that are central to a Hindu Studies Series focused on bringing the treasures of the Indian and Hindu traditions into the contemporary conversation of students of Hinduism, theologians and scholars of religion.

Francis X. Clooney, S.J. Routledge Hindu Studies Series Editor 2002-2005 Parkman Professor of Divinity Harvard University

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INTRODUCTION

A sixteenth-century Bengali philosopher of Advaita-Vedānta and theologian of Krsnabhakti

According to the tradition Madhusūdana Sarasvatī of the sixteenth century CE rose to great eminence even during his own life time. Madhusūdana, a monk, was a follower of Samkara's non-dualist school of Vedänta. He was an outstanding polemic writer and wrote many commentaries and independent treatises on non- dualist Vedānta philosophy. He was also a great theologian and composed an extended commentary on the Bhagavadgīta and a commentary on the first verse of the Bhāgavata Purāna and a monograph on the bhakti theology, the Bhakti Rasāyana. He was a renowned philosopher who was proficient in all systems of traditional Indian philosophy. According to tradition he first studied the traditional and contemporary system of logic, Nyāya-Vaiśesika and developed a powerful polemical style popular amongst the philosophers of his time. He was a formida- ble writer on the Advaita-Vedanta dialectics. As a theologian of the Bhāgavata school of bhakti he stands unique even though he was close to the Vaisnava the- ologians of the Bengal school of Vaisnavism promulgated by the followers of Srīkrsna Caitanya of Navadvīpa in Bengal. He seems to have continued the tradi- tion of the bhakti theology of Srīdhara and Bopadeva, (thirteenth century CE), two very important commentators on the Bhāgavata Purāna (BP) who attempted to interpret the religious position of the BP in the light of monism. As the tradition would have it he was a great admirer of Caitanya but there is no mention of him in any of his works. Nor does he indicate any adherence to the special theology of the Caitanya-school. Nevertheless, as part of the intellectual milieu of his time, he must have known Caitanya's life and activities. Madhusūdana's description of a Vaisnava devotee who has achieved a devotee's goal that is, the state of constant enjoyment of ecstatic devotion for Krsna reminds one strongly of the traditional picture of Caitanya in constant ecstasy. I think it is Madhusūdana's intellectual loyalty to Samkara's non-dualistic Vedānta that prompted him to develop his own type of Vaisnava theology. Thus, though he stands alone in his interpretation of non-dualistic philosophy of bhakti based on the Bhāgavata Purāna, he has forged a bridge between the Samkara-school of philosophy and the Caitanya's school of

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INTRODUCTION

theology. I should like here to show the important position of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in the historical development of metaphysical and religious ideas of his period. The works of Madhusūdana reveal him to be a versatile genius, a faithful commentator, an independent writer on Samkara's school of monism as well as an upholder of the concept of bhakti. Not only did he synthesise the different schools of the Advaita-Vedanta, but he also chalked out a new path of his own against the heaviest odds of two different streams of dualism - logicians on the one hand and the Madhva-Vaisnavas on the other. His unique contribution to Indian philosophy is his attempt to visualise a union between absolute monism and devotionalism. Madhusūdana occupies an important position amongst the Vaisnavas of his time. Srīdhara and Vopadeva, already introduced a new wave of Vaisnavism based on the BP, which developed a bhakti mysticism based on the concept of Upanișadic unqualified, immutable, ineffable, Brahman adapted to a personal godhead, Nārayāna or indeed Krsna. The importance of the first verse of BP to its monistic commentators is indeed great and Madhusūdana underscored it by him- self commenting on that verse. But the Vaisnava theology clashed against Samkara's concept of māyā or avidyā which is just a positive category, yet is illusion. It is a category on its own, being neither existent nor, non-existent. It is beginningless but is finite. World is a creation of this illusion, avidyā and not of Brahman, the uniquely existent reality. Being a creation of avidyā (or māyā) the world of living and non-living beings is false. Madhusūdana appeared at the height of the great controversy amongst the Indian philosophers over the question of the illusoriness of the empirical world. Philosophers of all other systems contested the notions of the illusoriness of the world and of māyā/avidyā/ajñana, which is the source of this illusion. The philosophers like the ritualist Mīmāmsakas and the Sāmkhya and the Nyāya Vaiśesika realists, on the one hand, and the theologians of the various sects who believed in the reality of God's creation, on the other, all attacked Samkara's theories based on illusion. Maņdana Miśra, Samkara's contemporary and a follower, refuted many of these attacks on the concepts of avidyā along with Sureśvara and other early non- dualists. The great Nyāya philosopher Udayana launched a severe attack on the concept of non-dualism. His famous work, the Nyāya-kusumāñjali, successfully established the reality of the creation and its material source. One aspect of the importance of Udayana is his great style of disputation based on logical argumentations. Srī Harsa (twelfth century CE) took up the challenge and using the same style of disputation attacked the Nyāya Vaiseşika realism in his work the Khandana-khanda-khādyam. This started the period of Advaita-Vedānta dialectics. One can follow the detailed study of this subject in my teacher Ashutosh Bhattacharya's work the Post Samkara Dialectics. I shall just mention the names and works of those who followed Srī Harsa by writing treatises to continue the

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INTRODUCTION

disputations against the realists who are relevant to our author. Madhusūdana was very much influenced by Anandabodha, the author of, amongst other works, the Nyāya-makaranda. By his time Gangeśa's Tattva-cintāmani started a new trend in the method of argumentation of the Nyāya Vaisesika philosophers. This new phase is called the Navya-nyāya (Neo-logic). By far the most important person for Madhusūdana was Citsukha who also attacked the Navya-nyāya philosophers on their own ground, namely logical argumentations. The interesting point of Anandabodha and Citsukha is their success in adopting the Neo-logicians' perfect technique of logical argumentation. This technique was based on finding fallacy in the opponent's arguments by means of the syllogistic method. In the arena of dialectics the Neo-logicians insisted on using the method of syllogism as the only correct way in a disputation. In case of concepts like Pure Brahman and avidyā, where the main source of experience is not direct cognition, one is forced to use the method of inference to prove the validity of an experience. Since the time of Gangesa1 all traditional philosophers have used this method profusely. In the area of soteriology, the disputants must use the inferential arguments because the spiritual and mystical experiences are extremely subjec- tive. By the sixteenth century CE the Neo-logicians had fine-tuned the method to such a degree that no important philosopher could capture the attention of the discussants of any Indian Brahmanical tradition of metaphysics without excelling in it. Madhusūdana rose to his eminent position because of his perfection in the Neo-logical style of disputation. He had to rise above the attacks coming from the Madhva school of Vaisnavas. Especially, the attacks of the erudite scholar Vyāsatīrtha who was a past master in the style of Neo-logic, had to be answered. This led to Madhusūdana's writing the Advaita-siddhi.2 Even a casual glance at the Advaita-siddhi and Advaita-ratna-raksana reveals his complete mastery over the deft and subtle style of argumentation introduced by the Navya-nyāya school. Perhaps his extensive study of the Nyāya system per- suaded him in later life to think independently without being biased by traditional beliefs. Thus, in the Advaita-siddhi and Gūdhartha-dīpikā, he sometimes boldly differed from Samkara,3 and re-explained the Brahma-sūtra. Sometimes he even interprets the Bhagavad-gīta in a new light.4 But this in no way means that Madhusūdana drifted from the mainstream thinking of the Advaita-Vedānta school. In his delineation of monism, he followed faithfully the views of Advaita as propounded by Mandaņa Miśra, Sureśvarācārya, (Vārtika) Prakāśātma Yati, (Vivaraņa), Vācaspati Miśra, (Bhāmatī) Sarvajñātma Muni, (Samksepa-śārīraka) and so on. Madhusūdana's favourite authors in the Advaita-Vedānta system are Sureśvarācārya, Prakāśātma Yati and Sarvajñātma Muni. He often quotes from the Vārtika of Sureśvara, sometimes giving elaborate explanations of these quotes.5 He even refers to the Vārtika as 'vārtikāmrta', that is, Vārtika, the nec- tar which shows his esteem for his work. The Vivarana is also frequently cited by Madhusūdana, and he has borrowed several of its author's ideas namely the bimba-pratibimba-vāda, the view that ajñāna is one, and so on.6

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INTRODUCTION

Another of Madhusūdana's esteemed authors is Sarvajñātma Muni. He not only commented on Sarvajñātma's Samksepa-śārīraka, but also adopted many of the theories propounded by Sarvajñātma. For example, Madhusūdana explained the view that Brahman is both the locus (āśraya) and the object (vișaya) of avidyā using a quotation from the Samksepa-śārīraka of Sarvajñātma Muni namely, 'āśrayatva viīayatva bhāginī nirvibhāga-citireva kevalā'.7 Sarvajñātma in his turn followed this idea from Prakāśātma Yati's Vivaraņa. Also, in his exposition on the construction of the mahāvākyas (great Vedic statements on Brahman), depicting the akhandārtha (just a single integral object), Madhusūdana follows the style of Sarvajñātma.8 Even Madhusūdana's explanation of eka-jīva-vāda (the theory of a single individual self), is influenced by him. This is why Madhusūdana is said to have followed the Vivarana school of Advaita-Vedānta rather than the Bhamatī school introduced by Väcaspati Miśra. On the other hand, he also argued in favour of Vācaspati Miśra's ideas.9 It is difficult to portray a definite and reliable biography of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, because there are no convincing materials for drawing a systematic history of his life. The main source of information regarding this is the tradition and genealogy preserved in some old Bengali families, and one genealogy of a learned South Indian family provided by a family member in a Sanskrit poetical work.10 Madhusūdana himself remains silent about his family or any description of his activities or residence. He merely states the names of his preceptors and only once in his Advaita-ratna-raksana does he mention an object that grows specifically in Varanasi.1 However, tradition states that Bengal is the native land of Madhusūdana. It is said that his birthplace is Kotālipāda, in the Faridpur district, which now belongs to Bangladesh. His father's name was Purandarācārya. On leaving Kotālipādā, he first went to Navadvīpa to learn Nyāya (the Indian system of logic) and then moved to Varanasi. Most of his life was spent in that ancient and holy city and he wrote all his works there. Varanasi was also the most renowned place for ancient and traditional Hindu scholarship. The city also con- tinued over the centuries to be a great centre for religious debate. His activities were not confined to scholastic studies. He had also, as the legends reported, done much to improve the helpless condition of the Hindu monks. According to this tradition, he visited Emperor Akbar's court through his friend, Todarmal's good offices, and was successful to get justice. Be that what it may, it is his scholastic achievement, which has brought him everlasting fame.12 The political situation in India at that time, especially in the Indo-Gangetic plain, was very favourable for scholastic activities. The Empire of Akbar was by then firmly established, bringing with it a period of civic peace and security. The economic condition was tolerably prosperous and there remained ample scope for the deep meditation needed for the production of such a great philosophical work as the Advaita-siddhi. A new vigour was evident in almost every aspect of litera- ture, poetry, logic, Advaita-Vedānta and devotionalism. It was in this favourable

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INTRODUCTION

climate that India gave birth to her great son, Madhusūdana, one of the last great philosophers of the ancient schools of Indian philosophy.

Tentative biography: date and works

Even though scholars have focused their attention on the date of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, it still remains an open question. The main reason for this uncertainty lies in the fact that none of his books bears any positive evidence which can help us to arrive at a definite conclusion. Rajendra Ghose, in his elaborate preface to Advaita-siddhi,13 has fixed the date of Madhusūdana's birth between AD 1525 and 1530. Though he sometimes mixes up historical evidence and legend, he still supplies us with much reliable material in support. Mm. Gopi Nath Kaviraj has also discussed the question,14 and his conclusion, that Madhusūdana lived in the sixteenth century, is in substantial agreement with Sri Ghose and Pt. Rāmājñā Sarmā Pāndeya.15 Sri P.C. Divanji also dealt with the subject very elaborately in his introduction to Siddhanta-bindu.16 In that article, he mentioned and criticised the views of other scholars, thereby furnishing us with a chronological survey of the attempts made to determine when Madhusūdana lived. According to him, too, that was in sixteenth century. So all these scholars are unanimous on that point. Mm. Gopinath Kaviraj17 has stated that there is a manuscript of Madhusūdana's Siddhānta-bindu transcribed in Saka 1539 (Navāgnivānendumite śakābde) or AD 1617, which means that it was actually written before that and places his birth still earlier. Further evidence is furnished by the date of Viśvanātha Nyāya Pañcānana who wrote Bheda-siddhi as a challenge to Advaita- siddhi. In his Goutama-sūtra-vrtti Viśvanātha himself states his age as Saka 1556, that is AD 1634.18 Decidedly, Madhusūdana precedes this date. There was a disci- ple of Madhusūdana, called Sesagovinda, the son of Sesapandit. Seșapandit may in turn be identified with Krsna Pandit,19 who is the preceptor of Bhattoji Dīksita. So we can suggest the lower limit of Madhusūdana's date. Now we should direct our attention to the other limit of it. It is accepted that Advaita-ratna-raksana was a protest against Samkara Miśra's Bheda-ratna. Mm. Gopinath Kaviraj,20 on the basis of a Ms (in full) of Bheda-ratna transcribed in AD 1462, locates Samkara Miśra in the fifteenth century. Madhusūdana must have flourished later than that time. He also quoted from Pañcadaśī of Mādhavācārya,21 and from the commentary of Sāyanācārya on the Vedas.22 These two authors flourished in the fourteenth century. Varanasi, the accepted place of activity for Madhusūdana, is far removed from Vijay Nagar, the native place of Mādhavācārya and Sāyanācārya, whom Madhusūdana quotes as authorities. It is plausible to think that the fame of these two great scholars may have taken a long time to reach Varanasi. Hence one should have a convenient gap between the dates of Mädhava and Sāyana and that of Madhusūdana. Therefore, the fifteenth century may in all probability be the upper limit of Madhusūdana's date.

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INTRODUCTION

Professor Dinesh Bhattacharya23 has pointed out that there is a list of learned men of Akbar's time in Abul Fazl's Ain-I-Akbari (Ain. 30-book II). They are divided into several groups according to the different fields in which they show their competence. Among these, the first group, described by Abul Fazl, consists of the names of philosophers and ascetics. This list contains nine Hindu names, the first of which is Madhu Sarsati. Prof. Bhattacharya24 shows that the name as spelt in the original Persian text is clearly Mādhava Sarasvatī. The name follow- ing immediately is Madhusūdana. Prof. Bhattacharya25 observes that this name indicates none other than the famous scholar, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī of Varanasi. The other relevant names found in that group are Nārāyaņāśrama, Rāmatīrtha, Nrsimhāśrama and Krsna Pandit. All of them flourished in the sixteenth century.26 The joint occurrence of the names of Mādhava and Madhusūdana can also be counted as evidence that the Madhusūdana referred to here is indeed the famous Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, the disciple of Mādhava Sarasvatī. Abul Fazl wrote Ain- I-Akbari in AD 1597. Prof. Bhattacharya notes27 that most of the Mohammedan names of scholars listed in the book lived early in the reign of Akbar. So it can be conjectured that by the time of Ain-I-Akbari, Madhusūdana too, was an elderly scholar. From this evidence, one may arrive at the conclusion that Madhusūdana was alive at least in the middle of the sixteenth century. At the beginning of his Advaita-siddhi, Madhusūdana mentions Mādhava (Śri-Rāma Viśveśvara-Mādhavānām) as his preceptor and Brahmānanda Sarasvatī, in his commentary on the AdS, introduces Mādhava as Madhusūdana's Vidyā-guru (teacher of the śāstra). Rāmājñā Pāndeya refers to an article by Haraprasad Sastri, published in the Indian Antiquary,28 where there is a statement that a son called Nārāyana Bhatta was born to one Rāmeśvara Bhatta of Deccan, while he was going to Dvaraka in the year 1453 Saka or AD 1514. This Rāmeśvara Bhatta had a disciple named Mādhava Sarasvatī, a resident of Varanasi. Many years after the time of his journey to Dvaraka, Rāmeśvara went to Varanasi and presumably became Mādhava's teacher.29 One may therefore, conclude that Mädhava flourished in the middle of the sixteenth century. It is probable that he was identical with the preceptor of Madhusūdana, whose 'grand-teacher' (paramaguru) also bore the name of Rāma. While delineating the doctrine of Eka-jīva-vāda,30 Madhusūdana mentions two views. One of these corresponds to the Eka-jīva-vāda of Prakāśānanda Sarasvatī, who lived in the fifteenth century.31 It may be said that Madhusūdana was aware of Prakāśānanda's view and that is why, while delineating his own view of Eka-jīva-vāda,32 he mentioned the view of Prakāśānanda as well. Again, Madhusūdana's theory of bhakti33 seems to be very close to the theology of the early teachers of the Bengal School of Vaisnavism. This also indicates that they must have been roughly contemporary. Rūpa Gosvāmī's date is 1554-5 and that of Jīva Gosvāmī is 1578-9.34 Though Madhusūdana's theory of bhakti resem- bles that of the Bengal School of Vaisnavism in many respects, Madhusūdana's treatment of bhakti is quite different from that of the Bengal school, since he places more emphasis on his non-dualist epistemological and metaphysical

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INTRODUCTION

aspects.35 One may, therefore, say that Rūpa Gosvāmī and Madhusūdana are almost contemporaries, and hence there was no chance for either one of them to be influenced by the other. That is why, in spite of their apparent resemblance, Madhusūdana's theory sometimes, in various outstanding points, differs funda- mentally from that of the Bengal School of Vaisnavism, as found in the writings of Rūpa or Jīva Gosvāmī.36 A tradition current among the Indian orthodox scholars holds that Madhusūdana in his old age visited Gadādhara, the great sixteenth to seventeenth Century CE logician of Navadvīpa.37 Again, there is a tradition that Madhusūdana was a friend of the poet Tulsidasa and wrote a verse in appreciation of Tulsidāsa's poetic abilities. The date of Tulsidäsa's death is AD 1623 and that of his composi- tion, Rāma-carita-mānasa, AD 1574.38 Moreover, there is another tradition that Madhusūdana visited the court of Emperor Akbar and was a friend of King Todarmal.39 These also confirm the view that Madhusūdana flourished in the sixteenth century. In the Catalogus Catalogorum,40 Mr Aufrecht has listed as many as twenty-two books under the name of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. These are: Advaita-brahma (?) siddhi,41 Advaita-ratna-rakşana, Ātmabodha-țika, Ānanda-mandākinī, Rgveda- jatādyāsta-Vikrti-vivaraņa, Krsna-kutuhala-nāțaka, Prasthāna-bheda, Bhaktisāmānya-nirūpaņa, Bhagavadgītā-gūdhārtha-dīpikā, Bhagavadbhakti- rasāyana, Bhāgavata-purāņa-prathamaśloka-vyākhyā, Mahimņaḥ-stotra-țikā, Rājñāmpratibodha, Vedastuti-țikā, Vedānta-kalpa-latikā, Šāndilya-sūtra-țīkā, Śāstra-siddhānta-leșa-țīkā, Samkșepa-śārīraka-sāra-samgraha, Sarvavidyā- siddhānta-varņana, (?), Siddhānta-tattva-bindu, Harilīlā-vyākhyā and Bhāgavata- purāņādyaślokatraya-vyākhyā. It is difficult to ascribe to Madhusūdana the authorship of all the above- mentioned books, although some of them possess internal evidence that suggest that they came out of a single pen. Realising this difficulty, Swami Prajnananda42 mentions the names of only those works whose authorship can definitely be ascribed to Madhusūdana. The Advaita-siddhi is the most outstanding work of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. It has made the name of Madhusūdana immortal and has given him his revered position among the highest teachers of the Samkara School of Vedānta. From this book we can gather copious particulars regarding Madhusūdana: for example, that he was a member of the sannyasin order,43 and that his preceptors were Rāma, Viśveśvara Sarasvatī and Mādhava.44 Madhusūdana is traditionally referred to as the author of the Advaita-siddhi. Therefore it is sensible to take this book as the starting point. Besides the Advaita-siddhi, the following books came from the same hand: (1) Vedānta-kalpa-latikā, (2) Advaita-ratna-rakșaņa, (3) Siddhānta-bindu, (4) Samksepa-śārītaka-sāra-samgraha, (5) Gūdhārtha-dīpikā, (6) Bhakti-rasāyana, (7) Bhāgavata-purāņa-prathama-śloka-vyākhyā and (8) Mahimaḥ-stotra-țīkā. In the Vedānta-kalpa-latikā,45 the author mentions the name of Viśveśvara in the introductory lines. This is the name of Madhusūdana's preceptor. Then again

7

INTRODUCTION

the author of the Advaita-siddhi46 mentions the name of Vedānta-kalpa-latikā and states distinctly that as he had elaborately expatiated upon some topics therein, he need not discuss them here any further. Moreover, the colophon of the Vedānta-kalpa-latikā runs thus:47 'Here ends the stavaka ... composed by Śrīmatparamahamsa-parivrājakācārya Madhusūdana Sarasvatī.' This almost exactly corresponds with the colophon of the first chapter of the Advaita-siddhi. Hence it is clear that both the works are by the same author. The Advaita-ratna-raksana is a dialectical work against the empiricist and dualist school of the Nyāya philosophy. Its authorship can also be safely ascribed to Madhusūdana, because the author of this book frequently refers to the Advaita- siddhi as his own work.48 Reference to the Vedānta-kalpa-latika49 as another work by the same author is also found here. Thus, undoubtedly this is also a work of the author of the Advaita-siddhi. The Siddhānta-bindu is a commentary on Samkara's Daśaślokī. At the beginning of the treatise, the author pays tribute to Viśveśvara, whom his commentator Purușottama50 - reputed to be Madhusūdana's direct disciple - describes as the preceptor of the author. The colophon51 of this book resembles almost exactly that of the Advaita-ratna-rakşana,52 and in the Vedānta-kalpa-latika,53 the author mentions the Siddhanta-bindu as a treatise written by himself. Moreover, even in the Advaita-siddhi Madhusūdana mentions this work, stating that in that work he has discussed the subject in question more elaborately.54 So all the evidence points to the fact that the author of Advaita-siddhi also wrote this work. The Samkşepa-śārītaka-sāra-samgraha is a commentary on the Samkșepa- śārīraka of Sarvajñātma Muni. Though it is not mentioned in any of Madhusūdana's other works, nor does it mention them, it still bears evidence that strongly sug- gests that this book is written by the same Madhusūdana Sarasvatī who composed the Advaita-siddhi. First of all, in the second benedictory verse of this commen- tary,55 the author mentions the name of his preceptors, which exactly corresponds to the first portion of the second benedictory verse of the Advaita-siddhi.56 In addition, the colophon of the first chapter57 is very similar to that of the Advaita- ratna-raksana,58 and the colophons59 of the other three chapters have only the words 'Śrīpādaśisya' after 'Srī Viśveśvara Sarasvatī', instead of 'pūjyapādaśisya'. However, the two words are almost synonymous. His largest work on religious philosophy is his commentary on the Bhagavad-gītā. It is very extensive and Madhusūdana here gives expression to his own opinions on various points where he deferred from Samkara's views on the subject. The colophons60 of the chapter herein almost exactly correspond to those of the chapters of the Samksepa-śārīraka-sāra-samgraha61 and Advaita-ratna-raksana.62 The next point, which provides convincing evidence that the author of this work is identical with the author of the Advaita-siddhi, is that the first line of the last verse of this book63 is similar to the second introductory verse of the Advaita- siddhi.64 Moreover, the author here mentions the name of Advaita-siddhi65 as another of his works. In the Advaita-siddhi66 the author often mentions that he has dealt with some topics in the Gūdhārtha-dīpikā.

8

INTRODUCTION

Bhakti-rasāyana is Madhusūdana's most important work on religious philosophy, in which he clearly depicts his views on various topics of emotion and devotion in religion. As this work mentions the names of Siddhānta-bindu67 and Vedānta- kalpa-latika68 as the author's own work, and as Gūdhārtha-dīpika69 states that the topic at hand is further developed by the author in his Bhakti-rasayana, it is definitely a work of Madhusūdana, the author of the Advaita-siddhi. Bhāgavata-purāna-prathama-śloka-vyākhyā is another theological work accredited to Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. As the work mentions the name of Bhakti- rasayana70 as the author's own work, it is doubtless a work of the author of the Advaita-siddhi. Moreover the treatment of the metaphysical topics therein is typical of this author.71 The Hari-līlā-vyākhyā is a commentary on Bopadeva's Hari-līlāmrtam, a synopsis of the Bhāgavata-purāna. The colophon under each of the chapters reads72: 'This is the account of the chapter of Hari-lila composed by the illustri- ous Bopadeva, written by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī.' The last verse of the work also gives the same name for the author. The editors of this book, and Prof. Modi,73 declare it to be the work of the author of the Advaita-siddhi without putting forward any evidence whatsoever to confirm their statement. Abhyankara Sastri asserts that a different Madhusūdana wrote this and several other works.74 But his conclusion is similarly only based on conjecture. This is a simple work. But there are several internal evidences pointing to the fact that our author must have written this commentary. The author mentions in this commentary his own commentary on the first verse of the Bhāgavata Purāna. Moreover, his commentary definitely presupposes his treatment of bhakti and bhakti-rasa in his Bhakti-rasāyana. For instance, his explanation of the words hari and lila in the title of the text bears the hallmark of his style of argumentation. Vopadeva explained that Hari is the bliss (ānanda) and his līla (sports) is also bliss. Madhusūdana in his typically erudite way explains that the word-combination harilīla is to be analysed as the blissful sports (līlā) of Hari the bliss. This does not indicate any duality between līlā (also bliss) and Hari the bliss because the two words are written in the same parts of speech, that is, they have the same semantic value. He as a non-dualist does not accept any real difference between the quality and the qualified. Therefore, for him Hari and his lila are in fact a single entity, the bliss. This is so typical of Madhusūdana's argumentation that I accept this work to be written by him. Mahimnah-stotra-țīkā is a commentary on Puspadanta's Mahimņah-stotra. The commentator explains the hymn in two different ways, showing that both the gods Hara and Hari can be the object of the original verses. In the beginning of the commentary the author pays homage to his preceptor,75 Viśveśvara, and in the colophon he also mentions himself as a bee on the lotus feet of the illustrious Viśveśvara.76 Moreover, Vedānta-kalpa-latikā is here referred to as the author's own work,77 confirming that this work can be added to the list of works ascribed to Madhusūdana. It would not be correct to consider the Prasthana-bheda as a separate work, since it is a part of his commentary on the Mahimnah-stotra.

9

INTRODUCTION

The above-mentioned books are those works whose authorship can be confidently ascribed to Madhusūdana and are thus, the principal sources of his philosophy. We may then turn to the remaining works that go under the name of Madhusūdana. The list submitted by Mr Aufrecht can by no means be regarded as accurate in this respect. For example, although Bhaktisāmānyanirūpana is listed as a separate work, it is merely a name given to the first chapter of the Bhakti-rasāyana. The rest of the list is not from our author's pen. T. Ganapati Sastri, Prof. Modi and Sri P.C. Divanji mention the Hari-līlā-vyākhyā and the Íśvara-pratipatti-prakāśa as works of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. The Íśvara-pratipatti-prakāśa is strongly advocated by both Prof. Modi78 and P.C. Divanji79 as a work of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. They draw this conclusion from the fact that there are some topics dealt with in this tiny work, which correspond to those covered in Madhusūdana's larger works. Prof. Modi shows that these topics80 - the nature of God, the three conditions of the soul and the formation of the mystic word 'Pranava' are covered in works such as Siddhānta-bindu, as well as in this work. But it may be said that similar topics with the same conclusions may be discussed in different books by different authors sharing the same views. Not infrequently, Madhusūdana himself adopts the conclusions and mode of treatment of some particular topics explored by his predecessors. The style of this work does not betray any similarity to the style adopted by Madhusūdana in his other works. Therefore, we cannot cast our votes either negatively or positively. Mm. T. Ganapati Sastri, in his brief preface, throws no light on this subject. The Ānanda-mandākinī is a eulogy of Lord Krsna. It is a metrical work, of which the last verse81 and the colophon82 bear the name of Madhusūdana as its composer. However, the author does not mention the name of his preceptor, which was then customary among the ascetic authors, nor does the work provide any glimpse of the author's scholarship in Vedāntic philosophy. The verses only describe the exquisite beauty of Lord Krsna and his various heroic deeds; there is no sign of the mastermind of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, the author of the Advaita- siddhi. The language of the book lacks any charm and its treatment is lacking in style, while repetition of ideas is often found. So one might discard this from the list of Madhusūdana's works. As to the chronology of Madhusūdana's works, it appears from the nature and style of the composition that the author's first work is the Samksepa-śārīraka- sāra-samgraha. Here, Madhusūdana confines himself strictly to the position of a commentator and seldom expresses his own views. He explains the verses of the Samkşepa-śārīraka clearly and minutely, but the personality of the commentator is always kept in the background and never overpowers the views of Sarvajñātma Muni. Again, this work bears no reference to any of the other compositions of Madhusūdana and possesses none of the author's particular views. It is also never mentioned in any of his other works. The Vedānta-kalpa-latikā and the Siddhānta-bindu come after the Samksepa- śārīraka-sāra-samgraha, and the Advaita-siddhi comes after these works: both

10

INTRODUCTION

Advaita-ratna-rakşaņa and Gūdhārtha Dīpikā mention it, which suggest they came later than the Advaita-siddhi. Among Madhusūdana's devotional works, with the exception of the Mahimņaḥ-stotra-țīkā, the Bhakti-rasāyana comes first in chronological order, since both Gūdhartha Dīpikā and the commentary on the first verse of the Bhāgavata mention the Bhakti-rasāyana. But the position of the Mahimah-stotra-țīkā is somewhat puzzling. Except for the Vedānta-kalpa-latikā, it does not mention any other works of Madhusūdana, and the nature of the treatment of different topics reveals the author as a vigorous follower of Samkara rather than a devotee. Throughout the work the author is preoccupied with the notion of establishing that Hara and Hari are one and the same and should therefore be regarded as the bimba or Íśvara, who is identical with the absolute.83 As the ideas, and often the language,84 used here resemble that of the Advaita-siddhi, its date of composition may be placed somewhere near the time of the Advaita-siddhi, and probably preceding the Bhakti-rasāyana. Therefore, in the light of the above discussion, we come to the conclusion that the works of Madhusūdana may be arranged chronologically in the following way:

1 Samkşepa-śārīraka-sāra-samgraha (SSSS). 2 Vedānta-kalpa-latikā (VKL). 3 Siddhānta-bindu (SB). 4 Advaita-siddhi (AdS). 5 Advaita-ratna-rakșaņa (ARR).

The devotional works are arranged thus:

1 Mahimnah-stotra-țīkā (MST). 2 Bhakti-rasāyana (BhR). 3 Gītā-gūdhārtha-dīpikā (GGD). 4 Commentary on the first verse of the Bhāgavata Purāna. 5 Harilīlā-vyākhyā.

I must hasten to add that these chronological lists are very tentative and open to emendation. Moreover, the last two works on bhakti may have been written any time in his career. I have mentioned that the Advaita-siddhi was a work written to refute Vyāsatīrtha's the Nyāyamrta. Vyāsatīrtha flourished in the period of the last part of the fifteenth and the first part of the sixteenth century CE, in Vijayanagara and was the preceptor of the royalty there. His Nyāyāmrta vigorously attacked Samkara's non-dualism and argued successfully against all the important non- dualists of the Samkara school. Being a follower of the Madhva school of realists, Vyāsatīrtha focused his attack on the notions of avidyā and the unreality/illusoriness of the world.85 The Nyāyāmrta is a detailed work in four chapters in which Vyāsatīrtha quotes almost all early Advaita classics to refute their arguments

11

INTRODUCTION

against realists position. He presents each of the issues clearly, producing arguments for and against the position of the opponents, and then proceeds to show the logical drawbacks or fallacies in the opponents' arguments. He was a great logician and effectively followed the Nyāya tactics of polemics.86 It became imperative for the non-dualists to address this new group of opponents - the Vedāntic Vaișnava realists. Madhusūdana wrote the Advaita-siddhi mainly to answer the Nyāyāmrta. Right from the start he made that clear. His opening benedictory verse asserts that the empirically experienced phenomenal world is false (mithyā), which was a clear response to Vyāsatīrtha's second benedictory verse in the Nyāyāmrta referring Hari to be the creator of a real world. To emphasise his purpose of writing the Advaita-siddhi the author introduces his thesis that in order to establish non-duality he must first of all refute the reality of duality.87 Moreover, he meticulously followed Vyasatīrtha's arrangement of the content of the Nyāyāmrta and refuted each and every argument of the latter. Vyāsatīrtha challenged the Advaita position by putting it in a syllogistic formula. 'The world is illusory' (probandum or the major term); 'because it has the qualities of being perceptible, being unconscious and being limited' (reason or the middle term); 'like the (illusory) shell-silver' that is, a piece of shell mistakenly seen as a piece of silver (example). Vyāsatīrtha then devoted the first chapter of his work to refute every part of this syllogism. Therefore, Madhusūdana's first chapter consists of elaborate refutation of every single point of Vyāsatīrtha's attack. This led him to discuss all the possible questions about the metaphysics of the Advaita-Vedānta school and he discussed these both extensively and intensively. He measured every concept from all possible sides and synthesised the different opinions existing among the teachers of the Advaita school themselves, which had been pointed out by their opponents. This predisposition towards synthesis or harmony is obvious in all his works; especially those concerned with meta- physics. Seen in this light, it is easy to understand why Madhusūdana goes to such pains to explain and justify all the prevailing opinions regarding one issue.88 To that extent, he can be regarded as an eclectic author. But that is only one side of his genius. In order to give a correct and logical interpretation of a question, Madhusūdana often makes a compromise from the views of different authors of his school and sometimes reinterprets or slightly twists the statements of renowned authors to fit in with his own views.89 Madhusūdana always manages to explain each opinion of his predecessors in such a way as to quieten all opposition. That is why the Advaita-siddhi is regarded as a monumental work, for it succeeds in winning a complete victory over the fighting dualists like the logi- cians and the followers of Madhva. It should be noted, however, that in his anxiety to refute dualism, Madhusūdana sometimes puts forward weak arguments, or even shows contradictions in his arguments. By his own admission, he intended mainly to produce a work of disputation (vāda).90 But the overall effect is stupendous and fully serves its purpose (fn. pp. 108 and 86 infra).

12

INTRODUCTION

I discuss avidya first because his handling of that subject secured him his eminence. Although, Madhusūdana's arguments in favour of an indescribable avidyā are what I introduce now, I shall constantly refer to his Advaita episte- mology. Hence I shall discuss his views on the non-dualist epistemology next. Advaita-Vedānta accepts besides Brahman, the pure consciousness, three other conscious categories - God (Íśvara), the cosmic and intuitive consciousness (Sākșī) and the individual consciousness (jīva). Only transcendental Brahman is pure, unlimited and eternally existent. The other three are relevant only on the empirical level and thus are limited in some ways. Their existence is relative to the unconscious phenomena they experience and interact with. Both these conscious and unconscious entities thus belong to the world of experience. I shall discuss these worldly categories next. Finally comes the question of the signifi- cance of all these discussions of sastra of the non-dualists. The significance is to attain liberation (mukti/moksa) from worldly suffering and dissatisfaction. Therefore, mukti is the goal of understanding the teachings of śāstra and its discussion always comes at the end of the śastric discussions. But for a bhakti theologian that is a penultimate goal. My last chapter deals with Madhusūdana's bhakti theology. His is a mysticism of non-dualism and divine love. A philosopher, theologian and fearsome polemist, Madhusūdana stands as a great representative of his time. I have tried to show his views and his methods of argumentation as evinced from all his masterful works. I also have, as far as possible, mentioned his use of the views of his predecessors in the Samkara School, and occasionally I have used his commentators to explain his expositions. It should be noted that I have rarely translated Madhusūdana literally. Whenever I quoted him, in order to make it clear, I often paraphrased it in English. Further, almost all quotations from Upanisads are from Patrick Ollivelle's translations.

13

2

AVIDYĀ

The Vedas (śruti) tell us that Brahman created the universe.91 But if the act of creation is attributed to Brahman, it can no longer remain non-different and devoid of all attributes, as the followers of the school of Advaita-vedānta hold Brahman to be.92 The concept of avidya provides an answer to this criticism. Avidyā is directly responsible for creation. Brahman is said to be the creator of this universe through the instrumentality of avidya.93 In other words, the universe is an illusory projection (vikşepa) of avidyā and Brahman, being related to avidyā as its locus (adhisthāna), is said by ascription, to be the cause of the universe. The concept of avidya is not made very clear in the Upanisads, although several texts suggest this concept when they deal with the term māyā (delusion) or ajñāna (ignorance). Samkara realised this, and used these examples freely to support his views of avidyā, which he exploits to establish his theory of absolute monism. Madhusūdana also followed Samkara's example and used these three terms, namely, avidyā, māyā and ajñāna more or less synonymously. Hence, to follow Madhusūdana's complicated style of argumentation, I shall use the terms avidyā and ajñāna interchangeably. According to the school of the Advaita-vedānta, avidyā is the material cause of all created objects. Madhusūdana,94 following Citsukha, defines avidyā as a beginningless, positive entity, which is destructible by knowledge. Avidyā is beginningless, thus the definition does not cover a knowledge that is refuted by a subsequent knowledge. Such knowledge is positive, and is refutable by the next knowledge. But as it is not beginningless, this definition does not cover it. The adjective 'positive' is given to prevent the inclusion of the absence of a particular knowledge just before its cognition.95 Thus the definition of avidyā does not cover such absence of knowledge. Because even though such non-existence of knowledge is beginningless and it is also refutable by the particular knowledge, nevertheless, it is not positive. It is incorrect for the opponent to claim that all beginningless positive objects are irrefutable like the Self (Ātman), because according to the Naiyāyikas, atoms are beginningless, positive and irrefutable. Thus, the black earth atoms of a black earthen pot should be everlasting. But when the pot is burnt the black earth atoms are destroyed, and we see red earth atoms in their stead. The word 'positive' is

14

AVIDYĀ

taken here in the sense of that which is other than negative (bhāvatvam cātrābhāva-vilakșaņatvamātram vivakșitam). Thus, avidyā is merely different from negativity and not contradictory to it. It is interpreted in this way in order to justify that avidyā is the material cause of both positive and negative objects of the universe. A material cause cannot be contradictory to its effect. At the same time, it cannot be similar to the effect in all respects. A cow cannot be the mate- rial cause of a horse, nor can a pitcher be the material cause of another pitcher. Considering the material causality of avidyā, it is defined as different from both positive and negative objects. The dualists refute this definition in the following way: avidyā cannot always be beginningless because there are exceptions. For example, the ignorance (avidyā) about the true nature of the shell, in the shell-silver illusion, has a beginning. Again, avidyā, being the material cause of the negation (abhāvopādānājñāna) as well, cannot be exclusively positive since by nature, the cause has to be homog- enous to the effect. Madhusūdana answers these objections as follows96: avidya conditioned by the shell is beginningless per se but it is said to have a beginning insofar as its condition namely, the shell has a beginning. Again, avidya is positive, in the sense that it is not a negative concept (abhāva vilakșana). Thus, 'positive' here means that which is neither positive nor negative but a third category which is indefin- able (anirvacanīya). So the question of lack of homogeneity between negation (abhāva) and avidyā (its material cause), does not arise. Moreover, two com- pletely identical entities cannot be mutually causally related. Similarly, two utterly different objects cannot be related as a cause and effect relationship. Therefore, the question of homogeneity is not relevant. The opponents raised an objection in connection with the definition of avidyā: How, they asked, can ignorance (avidyā) regarding Brahman be destroyed by a corresponding knowledge, as the definition of avidyā presupposes? For avidyā regarding Brahman can be discarded only by the cognition (vrtti-jñana) of the same reality namely Brahman? But Brahman can never be the content of cogni- tion because in that case, it (Brahman) becomes illusory like the pitcher, which can be the content of its cognition (vrtti-vyāpya).97 The answer to the objection is this98: Brahman is said to be the content of a vrtti in the sense that vrtti here serves as a distinguishing adjunct (upādhi), to Brahman. That is to say, though pure Brahman cannot be the object of either a cognition (vrtti-jñāna) or avidyā, Brahman conditioned by an upādhi (and there- fore to some extent, impure) can still very easily become the object of both avidyā and an experience (vrtti-jñāna). Thus, Brahman is an object of avidyā when avidyā itself serves as Brahman's conditioning adjunct (upādhi). Brahman can also be an object of an experience (vrtti) when the same vrtti acts as its upādhi. Thus, in both cases, the conditioned Brahman is the object (visaya) and not the pure one. An upādhi is distinguished from an adjective in that while an adjective (viśeșana) becomes integrated into what it qualifies, an upādhi conditions an object without being inherent in it. This means that an upadhi without itself being

15

AVIDYĀ

the object of either avidyā or cognition (i.e. svarūpa-sat) still conditions an entity and thus provides for its objectivity (visayatā) of either an experience or avidyā Such a condition, however, will pursue the conditioned entity for a long time, and thus is distinguished from an upalaksaņā, (a temporary unessential mark), which is just a casual feature of the entity it qualifies.99 Interpreted in terms of upādhi, the same entity, namely Brahman, can very well be the object of both avidyā and cognitive (vrtti) knowledge. When, therefore, Brahman becomes the object of knowledge, ignorance (avidyā) regarding Brahman is destroyed at once. The definition of avidyā thus stands unchallenged. Objections may be raised that the state of a person who achieved liberation in this life, (jīvanmukta), is a challenge to the above-mentioned concept held by the followers of Samkara. Since if a liberated person still retains his/her physical existence, a product of avidyā, clearly this person's self-realisation did bring him/her enlightenment but did not remove all effects of avidyā. The non-dualist answers that in the case of a jīvanmukta, the 'prārabdha karman', that is, the accumulated karman which has borne fruit in the shape of the present body and its inevitable experience of pleasure and pain, forms the obstacle. The actions done by the jīva must be atoned for. True knowledge destroys all karman except for those actions, which have borne fruit. These karmans must be exhausted only by enjoyment (bhoga). For that purpose the jīvanmukta retains his body until the prārabdha karmans are exhausted. 100 Madhusūdana puts forward another definition of avidya, namely that which is the material cause of illusion (bhramopādānatvam). But this definition is only acceptable to those who regard avidya as the material cause of the creation and Brahman as the substratum of such avidya. To those who contend that Brahman, or Brahman aided by avidyā, is the material cause of the creation, it cannot be acceptable. This indefinable avidyā is revealed by the intuitive knowledge of sākșin. In fact, saksin is nothing other than pure consciousness reflected on the mode or vrtti of avidya (avidyā-vtti-pratibimbacaitanyam). Thus sākșī is the intuitive knowledge of self and avidya, being connected to it, is always revealed to it. In other words like Rāhu, avidyā is revealed by the consciousness that it covers (rāhubat svāvrta-caitanya-prakāśyāvidyā).101 As avidyā is thus always revealed to intuitive knowledge, so also are the effects of avidya. Whenever there is cognition of any object, it arises after discarding the particular avidy that so long kept the object covered from the cogniser. Thus the cogniser observes the object as revealed. But avidyā cannot be cognised as such. It is revealed only to the intu- itive knowledge, and the cognising self realises its existence only because this self is identical with the intuitive knowledge. Therefore no proof can be put forward to determine the existence of avidyā, as the scope of all such proof is limited to cognitive knowledge only. Avidyā, on the other hand, is not cognisable. Doubt regarding the existence of avidyā is also impossible for the same reason. Therefore doubt may arise regarding the nature of avidyā, such as its being anirvacanīya, endless, etc .; and four kinds of pramānas (means to valid knowledge),

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are posited to determine its nature. These are direct knowledge, inference, scripture and implication. Avidyā exists because it can actually be perceived. Such undeni- able experience102 as, 'I am ignorant, I do not know myself or anyone else', or 'I do not know the object which you are referring to', bear testimony to avidyā. The first cognition cognises avidya in general while the second posits particular avidyā, that is, avidyā concerning a particular object (e.g. a jar). Likewise, 'I slept peacefully and did not experience anything'103 - a memory at the waking state after the break of dreamless sleep - proves the direct experience of avidya at the state of dreamless sleep. The opponents104 argue that the first experience mentioned above reveals only a negative object, such as the absence of knowledge, and not avidyā as a positive entity, because according to the monists, positive avidya cannot exist in anything except absolute consciousness (citireva kevala). In the cognition, 'I am ignorant' avidyā is presented as existing in the ego (ahamartha), which is not absolute con- sciousness. Therefore it should be recognised that in the above experience the object of cognition cannot be positive avidya. Hence the absence of knowledge should be accepted as the object of such experience. The same applies in the case of the cognition of ignorance regarding a particular object, for example 'I do not know what you are referring to' (the jar, for instance). The same argument, which establishes the first cognition revealing absence of knowledge, also establishes that the second cognition, too, reveals the absence of knowledge. They further argue that so far as the objects are concerned, there is no difference between the two forms of knowledge, namely 'I am ignorant' and 'There is no knowledge in me'. So the object of the cognition, 'I am ignorant' is nothing but the absence of knowledge in general. The summary of Madhusudana's answer to this is as follows: according to the monists, pure consciousness is the substratum of avidyā. On this consciousness mind (antahkarana) is superimposed as identical with the consciousness mentioned above. Therefore, though avidyā is really revealed by sāksin, it is erro- neously attributed to consciousness limited by antahkarana.105 The error arises because both avidyā and antahkarana subsist in the same substratum, namely (individual) consciousness. This justifies the cognition of avidyā as an attribute of ego (antahkarana)106 as presented in the experience, 'I am ignorant'. It is true that both the experiences refer to the same object. But that object cannot be the absence of knowledge, because the knowledge of a negative object cannot arise without the previous knowledge of its positive counterpart (protiyogin). The opponent may then ask what is the object of this particular cognition, namely 'I am ignorant' or 'I do not know'? Is it the totality of absence of all the knowledge taken individually, or the absence of knowledge in general? In both cases, the admission of a previous knowledge of the positive counterpart of the negation contradicts the negation itself, since if there is a single knowledge, it immediately discards the totality of negation or the general negation of knowl- edge. On the other hand, the recognition of positive avidyā in these cases is free from this criticism. In this case avidyā, being a positive entity (i.e. not negative),

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does not anticipate knowledge of the positive counterpart. But how can knowledge refer to avidyā, which is diametrically opposed to knowledge in nature? The answer is that avidyā is revealed by sāksī-jñāna, which, unlike the vṛtti-jñāna, is not opposed to avidyā/ajñāna.107 Even when one argues that sāksī-jñāna reveals avidyā, one is still open to criticism. In the knowledge, 'the blue pitcher' the knowledge of blue, the adjec- tive of the pitcher, is a prerequisite. Likewise, the knowledge of the object of ajñāna is necessary before the knowledge of ajñāna becomes possible. This is because ajñāna is never known in the abstract, but is always known in relation to a particular object. The object thus qualifies ajñana and the knowledge of the qualification is the prerequisite of the knowledge of the qualified. Thus it must be recognised that the knowledge of the pitcher exists before the ajñana about the pitcher is revealed. The knowledge of the pitcher has to be vrtti-jñāna, which has the claim to be pramā-jñāna (valid knowledge) at the same time. So the question is, how can ajñana about the pitcher arise at all in the face of valid knowledge of the same pitcher? And if ajñāna does not exist in this case, then the question of its being known does not arise. So sāksi knowledge cannot grasp ajñāna that thus had already become non-existent. In reply, Madhusūdana admits that ajñāna always appears concerned with an object. He further admits that the previous knowledge of that object is necessary for the revelation of the ajñana concerning it. But the knowledge of the object - and here he differs from his opponents - is not a normal cognition (vrtti-jñāna) at all and hence is not a valid knowledge which is opposed to the ajñana. In fact, like ajñāna, the object too, is revealed by sāksī-jñāna. Whether a cogniser knows the pitcher or not, sākī-jñana reveals the object. Thus, the same sākī-jñāna reveals both the pitcher and its ignorance. In this way, though ignorance about a pitcher requires previous knowledge of the pitcher, previous knowledge of the pitcher, being a sāksī-jñāna, is compatible with ajñāna and its knowledge. It is the nature of sāksi-jñāna that unlike ordinary valid knowledge, it reveals unknown objects as both unknown and known, that is unknown to the individual cogniser and known to sāksin. Whether it comes within the parameters of the valid cognition and the cognising individual, or not, every object is revealed to the sākşin.108 The contention of Madhusūdana's opponents is that the content of the knowledge, 'I am ignorant', is the absence of knowledge and not the indescribable avidya. Since it is merely an absence of knowledge, the question may be asked as to what kind of absence (abhāva) this absence of knowledge (jñānābhāva) can possibly be? Is it the totality of absence of all knowledge taken individually? Is it the absence of knowledge in general? Or is it the prāgabhāva (pre-existing absence) of a particular knowledge?109 Madhusūdana has already refuted the first two alternatives, so his opponents propose the third. In this case the inconvenience of the first two alternatives is removed, as the knowledge concerns a particular prāgabhāva of a particular knowledge rather than of all knowledge. In the absence of all knowledge, the existence of the awareness of that

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absence contradicts the idea of the absence of all knowledge, as the existence of any one knowledge goes against the contention of the absence of all knowledge. But in this case, this prāgabhāva of a particular knowledge allows scope for the existence of any other knowledge except for that particular individual whose prāgabhāva is being experienced. Hence the knowledge of such prāgabhāva does not make the conception wrong. However, there may be another danger in admit- ting this view, since the knowledge of the positive entity that is being negated (pratiyogin), is held to be the prerequisite to the knowledge of its absence. Accordingly, before one experiences an absence of a particular knowledge, the very knowledge of that particular knowledge, that is, the pratiyogin, is necessary. To avoid this criticism of circular argumentation, his opponents state that the req- uisite knowledge of the pratiyogin comprehends the latter in its generic form. That is, the knowledge of the particular pratiyogin which serves as the cause of the knowledge of its prāgabhāva, presents the pratiyogin in its generic form and not individually. The result is that, in such a case, the pratiyogin is not required to be present for the attainment of its knowledge, since, according to the Naiyayikas, the knowledge of generality (sāmānyalaksaņāpratyāsatti), in present case jñānatva, can grasp even past and future knowledge. This obviously cannot be present at the time of such knowledge. Therefore, the object of the knowledge - 'I am ignorant' - is the prāgabhāva of a particular knowledge.110 Madhusūdana answers that: if the object of the above-mentioned experience is the prāgabhāva of a particular knowledge, then it is undeniable that very experi- ence comprehends that particular knowledge, the pratiyogin of the prāgabhāva, in its specific form. Hence, as the prerequisite of the knowledge of the prāgab- hāva of a particular jñāna, the knowledge of the pratiyogin must have to grasp it (pratiyogin) in its specific form. Therefore it cannot be accepted that the requisite knowledge of the pratiyogin comprehends it in generic form. In fact, Madhusūdana does not at all accept the concept of prāgabhāva. He explains that the expression 'the pitcher will come into existence', does not imply the prāgabhāva of the pitcher, but refers only to its future existence (bhavişyattā). The verb 'will become' (bhavisyati) denotes the association of the pitcher with a time which neither contains the pitcher nor its destruction. Likewise, sāmānyābhāva is a false notion.111 For example, in the case of, say, the sāmānyābhāva of a pitcher, the knowledge of such sāmānyābhāva requires the knowledge of its positive counterpart (pratiyogin) namely the pitcher. But the pitcher may be comprehended only when it exists. In that case, the knowledge of the general absence of the pitcher cannot occur in the face of the existing pitcher. Moreover, the concept of prāgabhāva as presented by opponents of this theory ren- ders the concept of sāmānyābhāva untenable, since they state that even the absence (abhāva) of a particular object concerns a pratiyogin qualified by a generic attrib- ute (sāmānyābhāvā vacchinnapratiyogitāka). Hence the concept of sāmānyābhāva cannot be distinguished from the concept of prāgabhāva as both the abhāvas con- cern identical objects as they are delimited by (pratiyogitāvacchedaka) the same generic attribute. If the concept of sāmānyābhāva is accepted as distinct from the

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concept of prāgabhāva, then the concept of prāgabhāva remains to be reinter- preted. Thus, both the acceptance and non-acceptance of the notion of prāgabhāva produce the same effect - the dismissal of the concept of sāmānyābhāva. By such means, Madhusūdana discards both the concepts of prāgabhāva and sāmānyāb- hāva in order to refute the claims of opponents that 'I am ignorant' is an experience of the absence of knowledge. Madhusūdana continues to defend the indescribable nature of avidyā. I have just given a few examples to show his method.112 Having thus analysed the ordinary experience of the waking state, Madhusūdana proceeds to examine the cognition of deep sleep (susupti) in support of ajñāna as a non-negative entity. The retrospective knowledge of the waking state (jāgratparāmarśa) - 'I slept happily, I did not know anything' - is additional evidence as to the existence of ajñana at the time of deep sleep. In response to this, his opponents ask whether this retrospective knowledge (parāmarśa) is an inference, or a case of memory? If it is an inference, then the same inference proves the existence of absence of knowledge and not indescribable ajñāna at the time of deep sleep. The logic of the inference runs thus: 'before' and 'after' have an intermediate time, so between the waking state and the reversion to the same, there is an intermediate time called the susupti, that is, the state of dreamless sleep. At that time, 'I had no knowledge' because (1) I was in a special state, (2) all conditions of knowledge were then absent and (3) the individual self (atman) was invariably not remembered as having knowledge at the time. This retrospective knowledge cannot be a case of memory for want of relevant impres- sion (samskāra), one of the conditions of memory. The reason for this is that previous knowledge produces memory in due course only through the intermediate operation of samskāra. While previous knowledge dies out it leaves the samskāra about its content, which being instigated (udbuddha) by a stimulus, produces memory about the same content. This means that samskāra presupposes for its existence the destruction of previous knowledge, since, unless the knowledge dies, it must be said to continue and will then produce by itself the succeeding knowledge, which in that case cannot be a memory for lack of samskāra. But the knowledge of ajñāna at the time of susupti is a sākșī-jñāna. As such, it cannot be destroyed at the waking state, for sākī-jñāna is consciousness limited by ajñāna. But neither consciousness nor ajñana is destroyed at the waking state. Hence, sāksī-jñāna, being indestructible, does not produce any samskāra and conse- quently no memory is possible about the content of that knowledge. Therefore, opponents conclude, the retrospective knowledge under consideration cannot be a case of memory. And if it is an inference, such inference will establish absence of knowledge (and not ajñāna) at the time of deep sleep.113 Madhusūdana replies that: the inference by which his opponents try to prove the existence of the absence of knowledge at the time of susupti, is open to objec- tion, since it is fallacious. The reasons that is, the middle terms on which this inference is based are faulty and the adjective to the minor term (paksa) is unknown. In the first reason, the special state of atman is nothing but its lack of knowledge (jñānābhāvavatva), although this has not yet been established by valid

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knowledge. In the second reason, the absence of all conditions of knowledge is determined by the absence of knowledge, which is the major term (sādhya) of the syllogism under consideration. Thus, in this case, the middle term (hetu) and the major term (sādhya) become interdependent. The third reason may be interpreted in two ways: either, ätman is never recognised as having knowledge, or, when limited by the time of susupti, atman is not recognised as having knowledge. The first interpretation is impossible, as it is contrary to common experience. In the second case, mere recognition cannot justify the absence of such knowledge. There are some experiences which the cogniser does not care to remember (upeksaņīyajñānābhāva). Only the things that are fit to be remembered are remembered. The knowledge for which the cogniser does not care may arise, but such knowledge is never remembered. So this case, at least, is not covered by the middle term (i.e. the third reason) of the syllogism under consideration. In fact, the absence of knowledge is never proved by the reason of not having been remembered. The absence of knowledge of anything is determined by anupalab- dhi pramāna.114 The retrospective knowledge in question refers to the memory of ajñāna experienced at the time of sușupti. For samskāra, the condition of mem- ory, is possible because sāksī-jñāna is not the consciousness limited by ajñāna (as supposed by opponents) but is consciousness reflected on a mode of ajñāna.115 At the time of suşupti, ajñāna is comprehended by such sāksī-jñāna. With the dis- appearance of susupti the operative mode of ajñāna (which in the view of Vivaraņa is suśupti itself)116 is destroyed, and so the corresponding sāksī-jñāna may be said to disappear. In this sense, the previous knowledge, namely sāksī- jñāna, is capable of producing samskāra, necessary for subsequent memory. Opponents argue that if ajñāna is regarded as being revealed only when its par- ticular mode (vrtti) exists, then at the time of the absence of this specific mode, doubt may arise about ajñāna, since, in the case of an ordinary pitcher, doubt arises about the existence of the pitcher when any cognitive mental mode is absent concerning that pitcher. But according to the Advaita-vedānta, doubt cannot arise about ajñāna, because the existence of ajñāna is never doubted, as it is revealed by sākșin. Madhusūdana answers that the existence of ajñana covering an object is the root cause of doubt about that object.117 Hence, when any cognitive mental mode embracing the pitcher is absent, the pitcher remains covered by ajñāna. In this situation, doubt may arise as to whether the pitcher exists or not. But it is absurd to think ajñāna can cover itself. Therefore, doubt as to whether 'ajñāna exists or not' is impossible. However, it may be said that one doubts the inde- scribable nature of ajñāna. This may lead one to doubt 'is ajñāna indescribable or not?' prompting an investigation into the nature of ajñāna. Recognising that retrospective knowledge such as 'I did not know anything' is a case of ajñāna experienced at the time of deep sleep, opponents now ask how is it possible that this experience of ajñāna is recollected as opposed to knowl- edge as it actually occurs in retrospective knowledge, while at the time of deep sleep, it was not experienced as opposed to knowledge. Madhusūdana replies that like the agent 'I' (aham) revealed in retrospective knowledge, ajñāna's attribute

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of being opposed to knowledge is also revealed only at the time of retrospective knowledge. Thus memory concerns itself with ajñana alone and not other components of that retrospective experience. In fact, the retrospective knowledge under consideration is a consolidated experience (that is, perception-cum- memory), where part of this experience, namely, ego (ahamartha), that is, the subject of the experience and ajñana's attribute of being opposed to knowledge, are presented by perception, whereas ajñana is presented by memory. Again, opponents object that as Madhusūdana holds that ajñana is revealed by consciousness reflected on a mode of ajñāna existing in sāksin, such a mode may be presumed to continue along with ajñana, which does continue at the waking state, since ajñāna is always the same. Madhusūdana admits the problem and answers by identifying this mode of ajñana with the deep sleep condition. Thus when the deep sleep condition is broken at the time of awakening that particular ajñāna-mode is also removed. Thus, at the waking state sāksin continues to reveal ajñāna, but not through its mode of deep sleep. Therefore, even though ajñāna is one and it continuously exists through the states of deep sleep and wakefulness, due to the difference of limiting mode of ajñāna, it is experienced differently. In this way, the experience of ajñana at the time of deep sleep is destroyed at the waking state, leaving behind an impression, which inspires memory of ajñāna cognised at deep sleep.118 As the opponents are quick to indicate, the two early authors of Advaita-vedänta held somewhat contradictory views on this point. The author of Vivaraņa (Prakāśātma Yati)119 states that the retrospective knowledge of ajñāna is a case of memory and Madhusūdana 's explanation follows his view.120 But the author of Vārtika (Sureśvara) states121that the experience of ajñāna in deep sleep is not a case of recollection. These apparently conflicting statements are reconciled by Madhusūdana in the following way: while the author of Vivarana takes the retrospective knowledge of ajñāna to be a case of memory, he is referring to it as limited by the mode of deep sleep on the authority of the Yoga- sūtra of Patañjali (1. 10.). On the other hand, the author of Vārtika takes the experience of deep sleep to be the experience of ajñāna and not a special mode of it because he was explaining the nature of the unmanifest creation while talking about the process of creation. In another context (BrĀU Bhāsya-vārtika 3.4.103) the author of the Vartika accepted the view which was same as the view of Madhusūdana.

Inferential evidence

After adducing perceptional evidence as to the existence of ajñāna, Madhusūdana proceeds to prove it by means of inference. In this connection he quotes122 the inference put forward by the author of Vivarana which runs thus: 'like the first flame of a lamp in darkness, valid knowledge presupposes an entity, because it reveals an object which was so far subject to the usage "the thing is not revealed"; such an entity is, however, (1) other than the antecedent absence (prāgabhāva) of the valid knowledge, (2) opposed to the usage "the object exists and is revealed,"

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(3) liable to dismissal by the said valid knowledge and (4) it exists in the same locus where the valid knowledge is produced. In the case of the first flame, for example, such an entity is darkness (which according to the Vedānta theory is an entity and not just a lack of light), and in the case of the main object to be proved by the inference is nothing but the valid knowledge of ajñāna'. The adjectives of the object to be proved are inserted for the following reason. The prāgabhāva of valid knowledge is opposed to this knowledge, destroyed by the knowledge and exists in the same locus where knowledge is subsequently produced. But a prāgabhāva is not other than prāgabhāva. Likewise, the particular adrsta which produces valid knowledge, is other than the prāgabhāva of that knowledge, is exhausted when the same knowledge, its product, is produced and has existed in the same locus where the knowledge is subsequently produced. But such adrsta is not opposed to valid knowledge. Similarly, a specific adrsta, which is opposed to the valid knowledge, is other than the prāgabhāva of the knowledge and existed in the same locus where the knowledge is subsequently produced. But such adrsta is not discarded by the knowledge in question. Unless the knowledge is produced, there can be no question of it discarding the hostile adrsta. In the same way, the absolute absence of the valid knowledge (jñānātyantābhāva) is other than prāgabhāva of that knowledge, is opposed to that knowledge, and is discarded by the presence of that knowledge, but such absolute absence is not located where the said knowledge is subsequently produced. Therefore, all the four adjectives stated above in connection with the inferable entity (sādhya), that is ajñāna, are necessary so that the inference may not be diverted. It does not apply to prāgabhāva, or to a favourable or unfavourable adrsta, or to the absolute absence of valid knowledge. The words 'valid knowledge' (the minor term in the above inference) include the valid knowledge of absolute Brahman as an epis- temic adjective. Brahman, which has so far been subjected to the usage 'Brahman is not revealed to me', becomes revealed by that cognitive experience. Though Brahman is self-revealed, one still can experience, for instance, 'Brahman is not revealed to me'. Just as the initial light of a lamp instantly removes one's incom- prehension of an object concealed by darkness, so also the valid knowledge reveals an object, having removed the ignorance covering that object. In both cases the process of revelation contradicts the usage namely, 'the thing is not revealed to me'. Therefore, this conclusion does not make Brahman an object of an empirical cognition. This inference proves the general existence of ajñāna. The author of Tattvapradīpikā adduces another inference, also quoted by Madhusūdana,123 which proves the existence of specific occurrence of ajñāna. The inference is thus: a valid knowledge, of Caitra (a particular individual) discards a beginningless entity, which is other than that very valid knowledge, or its antecedent absence; because it is valid knowledge. Like the valid knowledge of Maitra, which does the same thing, namely it discards a beginningless entity (i.e. the antecedent absence) of the valid knowledge of Maitra, which is other than that very valid knowledge or its antecedent absence existing in Caitra. It should be understood that in the case of the valid knowledge of Maitra, such

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a beginningless entity is prāgabhāva of that knowledge, while in the case of the valid knowledge of Caitra, such an entity cannot be anything other than ajñāna. This inference, therefore, results in the recognition of a specific ajñāna, discarded by the valid knowledge of Caitra. Hence, the existence of that specific ajñāna is proved by the inference. Madhusūdana has taken cognisance of the later writers (Navyāh),124 who have suggested further improvements on the inference propounded by the Tattva- pradipika. Their inference runs thus: valid knowledge under consideration destroys a beginningless entity which is other than the absence in general (sāmānyābhāva) of the said valid knowledge, because this valid knowledge is a product (kārya) like a pitcher. A pitcher is a product which also discards a begin- ningless entity, namely its absence immediately prior to its creation, which is other than the absence in general of the valid knowledge under consideration. In relation to the valid knowledge under consideration, such a beginningless entity, other than the absence in general of the valid knowledge under consideration, is ajñāna. Ajñāna, therefore, is established by such inference.

Evidence of śruti

In the eighth chapter of the Chandogyopanisad, it is stated that: 'as a person, who does not know that there is gold buried under a place unconsciously treads the same ground time and again, so this individual always comes in contact with Brahman, yet being covered by anrta, they do not comprehend Brahman.' Madhusūdana125 takes the word 'anrta' to mean ajñāna and therefore, he adduces this śruti as evidence of the existence of ajñāna. His opponents argue that 'anrta' should not be taken to mean ajñana, since the word 'rta' is generally used to mean good deeds, as in, for example, the śruti 'rtam pibantau sukrtasya loke'.126 The word 'anrta' should therefore mean bad deeds (i.e. sin). Madhusūdana answers that the first śruti quoted above goes further, and says that atman is devoid of bad deeds (apahatapāpmā). If anrta is taken to mean 'bad deeds', as these opponents claim, then it should be acknowledged that the first śruti refers to the souls blinded by bad deeds (anrtena-pratyūdha); at the same time, however, this śruti also takes atman to be devoid of all sins, which is an apparent contradiction. If, on the other hand, anrta is taken as ajñāna, the śruti should mean that the soul is generally blinded by ajñana. Therefore, even though it is really devoid of any sins, a soul does not realise it and mistakes itself to be a sinner. Thus the word 'anrta' occurring in the first śruti, should, in addition, mean ajñāna, and not merely bad deeds, because the analogy holds out the ignorance of an ordinary person about the location of treasures beneath his feet. Likewise, an individual soul does not know its true nature, because it is possessed by ajñāna. Moreover, it must be recognised that from time immemorial, people have been labouring under an obstacle to self-realisation. Therefore, such an obstacle must be recog- nised as being removed with the dawning of knowledge. In ordinary experience, knowledge discards ignorance. Therefore, in the world of metaphysics, ignorance

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should be accepted as the beginningless obstacle, which is liable to dismissal by the knowledge of reality. That such an obstacle is dispelled by knowledge is also borne out by the śruti, which says that ultimately (when the knowledge arises) the cosmic illusion ceases to exist.127

The evidence of arthāpatti (inference from circumstances)128

It should be noted here that Madhusūdana tries to give a more practical reason for accepting ajñāna as an object of metaphysical consideration. The evidence of implication also proves the existence of ajñāna as a positive entity. It is a fact that all-bliss Brahman is self-revealed, yet it is equally true that such Brahman is not revealed to an ordinary person. How should such an apparent contradiction be explained? The explanation is found in the recognition of ajñana, which should then be taken as concealing the nature of Brahman from an ordinary individual. Another argument is that as the material cause of illusion cannot otherwise be explained, the existence of ajñana must be accepted as serving as the material cause of illusion. Neither mind (antahkarana) nor Brahman can be taken as the material cause, for mind has to depend on the sense organs to produce a cogni- tion. But the illusory knowledge of the shell-silver is produced independent of sense-object contact. So mind (antahkarana) is helpless in producing that knowl- edge. Brahman being immutable, it cannot be the material cause of anything.129 However, Brahman is taken to be the material cause of the universe only insofar as it is the substratum of ajñana, which is the material cause of all illusion. Thus, all these four kinds of evidence prove the existence of ajñāna as a beginningless, positive entity, capable of being eradicated by knowledge alone. Ajñāna cannot be accepted as revealed by absolute consciousness, that is reality. If it is, the content of absolute revelation, it becomes as real as Brahman itself, and therefore should be taken to exist even at the time of liberation. If, on the other hand, ajñāna is taken as revealed by sākșin, that is the consciousness reflected in a mode of it (avidya-vrtti),130 then from an absolute standpoint such sākșin is as false as its revelation. Ajñāna, being the content of such revelation, naturally becomes false; just as 'Rāhu' is revealed by the sun or the moon encap- sulated by 'Rāhu', so also ajñāna is revealed by a stance of consciousness, (sākșī), which is covered by ajñāna. Ajñāna, as such, cannot be manifest in a cognitive knowledge (vrtti-jñāna). But, as previously demonstrated, vrtti-jñāna can prove the existence of ajñāna as something distinct from the object of illusion. Similarly, it is as liable to destruction as it is beginningless.

Substratum of avidyā

Following Samkşepa-śārīraka,131 Madhusūdana takes pure consciousness to be the substratum of ajñāna. Ajñāna exercises its power (such as duhkhitva, etc.) on the jīva but it does not exist therein. The jīva is, according to Madhusūdana

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(who possibly believed in the existence of a single individual self),132 the reflection of consciousness on a special mode (vrtti) of avidyā. Just as the blemishes on a mirror affect the reflection on it, but not the object reflected, so the operation of ajñāna influences the jīva, but does not influence pure con- sciousness. Consciousness per se is not opposed to ajñāna, but it is so when reflected on a mode. The sun sustains everything by its rays, but when these rays shine through the lens of a magnifying glass, they burn the grass etc. on which they fall. Likewise, ajñāna remains safe in pure consciousness, but when the same consciousness becomes reflected on a special mode of ajñāna, it destroys ajñāna and its products.133 When the jīva is called 'ajña', it only means that avidyā and its effects operates just on the individual soul.134 Madhusūdana's opponents argue that although it is undeniable that illusion arises in the cogniser, such illusion is destroyed by valid knowledge arising in the same cogniser. Hence the cogniser, being the substratum of both error and valid knowledge, should be taken to be the locus of ajñāna, which is nothing but non- revelation of an object. Madhusūdana answers that the cogniser is none other than sāksin identified with the individual consciousness as well with pure Brahman, which is the substratum of ajñana. Thus, where there is identity between the cogniser, sākșin and pure consciousness, ajñāna can very well be said to exist in the cogniser.

Acceptance of Vācaspati's view

Thus, establishing a la Sarvajñātma Muni, that pure consciousness is the substra- tum of avidyā, Madhusūdana further proceeds to justify the view of Vācaspati Miśra, that jīva is the locus (āśraya) of avidyā. According to Vācaspati Miśra, jīva is consciousness limited by ajñāna.135 Opponents object that as a product of avidyā, jīva cannot be its locus, as that would involve interdependency. In other words, jīva, in order to be the locus of avidyā, has to be pre-existent. But how can jīva, which depends on avidyā for its existence, pre-exist ajñāna? Madhusūdana answers that as both avidyā and jīva are beginningless, there is no question of interdependency in their production. Such interdependency does not occur even in the knowledge of either avidyā or jīva, for although avidyā is revealed by con- sciousness, jīva, (which is consciousness itself), does not depend on avidyā for its own revelation. Finally, the fault of interdependency cannot be ascribed to jīva and avidya even in their existence, as although avidya exists in consciousness and depends on it for its own existence, consciousness, that is jīva, does not depend on avidyā for its existence.136

Object or content of avidyā

Pure consciousness is not only the locus (āśraya), but also the object (vișaya) of avidyā. In other words, pure consciousness is somehow connected with avidyā so that one has the usage 'Brahman does not exist nor is it revealed'. Even though

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Brahman as the self-revealed reality may always be revealed as pure existence it is not revealed as pure bliss, due to the operation of avidy,. At least, such usage as 'Brahman is revealed to me as pure bliss' is found wanting, and lack of this usage is due to the operation of avidya. This brings about the false relationship (ādhyāsika tādātmya) between avidyā and Brahman. Such a relationship persists until the dawning of true knowledge. As this contact of avidya with Brahman is beginningless, such questions as 'when did the contact first take place?', 'when was the contact first known?' or, 'when did it first exist?', do not arise.137 Though undifferentiated consciousness cannot be partially revealed by itself, that is as the substratum only and not in its fullest glory, yet due to the special power of avidyā, absolute Brahman is indicated as non-existent, not revealed. It can also be experienced as just real (sat), the locus of the world illusion. Ajñāna thus conceals Brahman from jīva. The problem with this is that just as a pitcher covers a lamp, thereby barring the lamp's contact with another object (non-luminous), similarly avidyā, by covering consciousness, should prevent its contact with another object. But how can avidyā conceal consciousness from another consciousness, namely jīva? Madhusūdana replies that jīva, being limited by mind (antahkarana), is illusorily distinguished from pure consciousness, and avidyā conceals pure consciousness from such illusorily distinguished jīva, which is thus reduced to the status of another object. As both the distinction between Brahman and jīva and the concealment of Brahman from jīva are beginningless, they involve no interdependency.138 Again, one may ask how can self-luminous consciousness be the object (vișaya) of ajñāna? In other words, how can ajñāna be related to consciousness? Like darkness and light, they cannot have a mutual relationship of any kind.139 Madhusūdana answers that pure consciousness, or sāksin, is not opposed to ajñāna. In fact, avidyā, being the illusory creation of consciousness, can easily stay in consciousness like any other created object. For example, an analysis of the experience 'I am ignorant of the object you are referring to', yields the following results: when a person has general knowledge about an object (say, the pitcher) doubt may arise in the mind as to whether it is a pitcher or not. It follows that though the doubt is based on the general knowledge of the pitcher, this doubt itself embraces the pitcher in its specific form (ghatatva). Similarly, in the given experience, the pitcher (the object referred to by the first person) is taken specif- ically, though such knowledge on the part of the second person is based on the general knowledge of the object referred to by the first person. This knowledge, therefore, is a revelation of the object (i.e. the pitcher) referred to by the first person. Such revelation is nothing but the revelation of consciousness as conditioned by the pitcher (ghatāvachinna caitanya prakāśa). But this very revelation reveals ajñāna, as testified by the above experience. This shows that revelation of consciousness (caitanya prakāśa though in the present case such consciousness is limited by the pitcher) is not opposed to ajñāna. In other words, consciousness that reveals its own self also reveals the ajñāna at the same time. In this sense, therefore, ajñāna may be related to knowledge (jñāna), even though

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both Jñāna and ajñāna may be concerned with the same object in the same form. On the other hand, knowledge of an object is found to destroy ajñāna regarding the same object. How is it possible to reconcile these two apparently contradic- tory facts?140 Madhusūdana says that knowledge is not opposed to ajñāna when it is intuitive knowledge (sākşi-jñāna). That is, intuitive knowledge being the sub- stratum of ajñāna is not opposed to it. When, on the other hand, such knowledge is a cognitive knowledge (vrtti-jñāna), it discards ajñāna at once. Such an expla- nation therefore, presupposes a sāksi-jñāna different from ordinary knowledge (vrtti-jñāna). Sākși-jñāna is nothing but sāksin or consciousness, which not being opposed to ajñāna, can have a mutual relationship. In this sense, caitanya may very well be the object of ajñāna.

Avidyā is anirvacanīya

The nature of avidyā cannot be specifically determined. Therefore, avidyā is known as 'anirvacanīya' (indescribable). Reality may be divided into three cate- gories: absolutely real (sat, like Brahman), absolutely unreal (asat, like the horns of a hare) or a compromise between the two. However, avidyā does not belong to any of these categories. If it is real like Brahman, it can never be destroyed. If it is absolutely unreal like the horns of a hare, it cannot be cognised at all. Since a compromise between the two is absurd, avidya cannot fall within this category either. Defying all categories, avidyā is thus said to be indefinable (anirvacanīya) or false (mithya). Opponents raise the objection that the negation of the real world means the assertion of unreal and vice versa; therefore, how can there be an entity that is both real and unreal? Madhusūdana answers that the concept of contradic- tion between absence and its positive counterpart is based on the presumption of reality of both. But in view of the fact that everything other than Brahman is false, such a presumption is unwarranted. Hence, a false thing, that is avidyā, comes under a fourth category, being other than the three mentioned above, namely, the real, the unreal and a combination of both. Avidya is indescribable in this sense.

The falsity of the universe

The universe is the creation of avidyā and as such, it is false (mithyā). To prove the falsity of the universe, Madhusūdana puts forward the arguments of his pred- ecessors one by one. Ananandabodhācārya, advanced the following inference: 'the universe under consideration (vimata) is false (mithyā):

1 because it is the object of cognition (drśyatvāt); 2 because it is insensate (jadatvāt); 3 because it is limited (paricchinnatvāt).

The reason why Madhusūdana starts his answers to Vyāsatīrtha's arguments with his analysis of this syllogism is that Vyāsatīrtha picked up this syllogism

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right at the start of his refutation of Samkara's concept of the falsity of avidyā. In this connection, Madhusūdana has, naturally followed Vyāsatīrtha and adduced the same five definitions of falsity on the basis of those of different foregoing teachers of Advaita-vedānta. Madhusūdana first takes up the major term of the syllogism namely, 'world is false'. So, he asks what is meant by falsity? He then starts answering himself this question by defining falsity.

Pañacapādikā's definition

The first definition is based on that of Pañcapādikā: a false (mithyā) entity is not the substratum of either existence or non-existence (sadasattvānadhikaraņa). That is, existence (sattvā) means freedom from contradiction for all time to come (trikālāvādhyatvam) and non-existence means the ineligibility for being cognised anywhere. From this point of view, Brahman is existent in that it is never liable to contradiction, while the horn of a hare is non-existent because such a thing is never cognised. However, the universe steers through a middle course. While it is discarded by knowledge, it continues to appear in the pragmatic knowledge until the dawning of true knowledge of Reality.141

First definition of Vivaraņa

The second definition of falsity is taken from the Vivarana:142 mithya is an entity that appears in a place where it did not exist, does not exist, nor will exist in the future. Thus Mithyā is not absolutely non-existent like a hare's horn, for unlike it, mithyā appears to exist somewhere. It is not absolutely real either, as its existence is contradicted (vādhya). (Pratipannopādhau traikālikaniședha-pratiyogitvam vā mithyātvam.)143 The question is, therefore, whether the absolute negation of the universe is real (tāttvika) or unreal (atāttvika). Opponents argue that if such negation is real then a second reality other than Brahman must be acknowledged. However, such an admission will put an end to the monist theory. If, on the other hand, such negation is held to be prātibhāsika (illusory), then the opponents agree with this because they also hold such negation to be illusory. In that case, Madhusūdana does not put forward any new ideas. If such negation is said to possess pragmatic (vyavahārika) reality, then that being contradicted (vādhita) would make the uni- verse, the positive counterpart of the negation, real, since a negation, if opposed, re-establishes its positive counterpart. Again, in this case, the śruti 'neha nānāsti kiñcana'144 has to be regarded as yielding a false proposition,145 thus making the universe a reality. Madhusūdana answers that in the case of the negation being ultimately real, it is regarded as being identical with Brahman, the locus (adhisthāna) of such negation. So the reality of negation does not involve dualism. Furthermore, the positive counterpart of a real negation does not need to be real, for the real

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negation of illusory shell-silver does not make it real. On the other hand, such negation may be taken as unreal, that is, the negation is vyavahārika. Though a vyavahārika entity is liable to contradiction (vādhya), such negation does not make the universe, its counterpart, real, since in dream, the illusory negation of an equally illusory object does not result in the confirmation of its counterpart (i.e. the illusory object). So if the negation is contradicted, it does not mean that such negation will confirm the reality of its positive counterpart. Only when the negation possesses a lesser degree of existence (nyūnasattāka) than its posi- tive counterpart, does it fail to oppose the reality of its positive counterpart. In the present case, both the universe and its negation possess the same degree of existence (tulyasattāka) namely, vyayahārika sattva. Such negation need not imply absolute (pāramārthika) existence of the universe, for both the negation and its positive counterpart stand on the same footing, in that both are equally liable to contradiction. This is the case in the destruction of an object, which negates the existence of both the object and its antecedent absence. Both the universe and its contradiction are equally liable to contradiction, because both have a common feature, namely drśyatva. As the śruti 'neha nānāsti kiñcana' asserts the unreality of the unreal object, it cannot be regarded as invalid (apramāņa). Opponents argue that the negation of the shell-silver and that of the universe cannot be on par in terms of their specific attributes (svarūpa),146 since in the case of the negation of silver, the form of the contradictory knowledge is 'here (i.e. in the shell) silver did not exist'. If this knowledge is analysed it reveals that, in this case, the positive counterpart of negation is the real silver. (It should be noted here that 'real' means vyavahārika). It may be said, of course, that the content of the shell-silver illusion was the illusory silver, and thus itself, accord- ing to the rule that the content of illusion should be identical with the content of the contradictory knowledge of that illusion, the counterpart of the negation of shell-silver is illusory silver taken in terms of reality (pāramārthikatva). So the second explanation means 'the illusory silver did not really exist'. But equally this cannot be regarded as the negation of illusory silver per se. If, on the other hand, the contradictory knowledge is taken to negate real silver in terms of illu- sion, then similarly such real silver is not negated as it really is. Therefore, the negation of shell-silver cannot be taken as an example of the negation of an entity just as it is (svarūpataḥ). 147 Moreover, even the author of Vivarana, whose view is followed by Madhusūdana in the present case, states that the positive counterpart of the nega- tion of silver is the ordinary real (laukika pāramārthika) silver taken as it is, and not the illusory silver. The Vivarana also states as an alternative view, that the illusory silver taken as real is negated in the contradictory knowledge, but not at its face value. In such a case, the Vivarana cannot confirm that in the example of the shell-silver contradiction, the positive counterpart is the unqualified illusory silver. So how can the shell-silver contradiction serve as an example for the contradiction of the universe?

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The third objection is that if the universe is negated as it is then, like the sky-flower, the universe also becomes absolutely non-existent. In that case, how can the śruti confirm the creation of the universe, because an absolutely non-existent object cannot be created? Madhusūdana answers that in the first case of contradictory knowledge, the positive counterpart is indeed the illusory silver. In the shell-silver illusion, the illusory silver had appeared as identified with real silver.148 Therefore, the knowl- edge that contradicts it has the illusory silver as its positive counterpart, which appears as identified with the real silver. In other words, the illusory silver 'appearing as identical with real silver' is negated in the experience of contradic- tion, where such illusory silver is taken just at its face value. In such a case, the same silver that appeared in the illusion becomes contradicted by the opposing knowledge. In the second case stated earlier, the content of the aforementioned experience of contradiction, namely, 'here existed no silver', is not merely the illusory silver but the illusory silver 'appearing identical with the real silver'. The statement in the Vivarana should thus be interpreted in the following way: the illusory silver appearing as identical with real silver, as qualified by its special attributes, is negated in the experience of contradiction. Though, as an alternative, the same statement may refer to the negation of illusory silver taken as real. From the form of the sentence used, Madhusūdana adds, it appears that the Vivarana only casually puts forward this alternative form. In fact, the aforementioned Vivarana passage can be formulated as follows: it means that illusory silver taken as iden- tified with real silver is negated in terms of shell-silver's specific attributes (svarūpa) or (and this 'or' shows the dislike of the Vivarana for the second view) in terms of reality. In the third case, the inference: 'the universe is not as unreal as a sky flower, since a sky flower never appears to exist, while the universe does appear to exist until the dawning of true knowledge. Such a universe, which can be cognised, may possess its creation, function, a material cause and destruction, and yet can still be the positive counterpart of its absolute negation. Thus it is just like the shell-silver, which possesses creation etc. and yet can be absolutely negated. In this inference, the analogy lies between the negation of the illusory silver taken per se, and the universe, also confirmed to be negated as per se.149

Second definition of Vivaraņa

The third definition of mithyatva is also based on the Vivarana:150 'mithyā means that which is liable to termination (nivartya) by knowledge (jñānanivartyatvam vā mithyātvam)'. Opponents argue that as the first knowledge is destroyed by the second knowledge, such first knowledge should be regarded as mithyā according to the definition stated earlier.151 Moreover, when a pitcher is smashed it is

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destroyed, but such destruction is not brought about by knowledge, though the pitcher is a mithyā object. Madhusūdana replies that mithyā is to be understood as an entity whose existence in general is liable to contradiction by knowledge. In the case of a smashed pitcher, though such a pitcher is destroyed in its gross form (kāryarūpa), it continues to exist as latent in its material cause.152 Such destruc- tion then does not mean the negation of its existence in general. By the same logic, the second knowledge cannot destroy the existence in general of the first knowledge. The existence of the illusory shell-silver should be acknowledged at the time of its appearance, but the contradicting knowledge negates the existence in general of the shell-silver. Thus, the contradicting knowledge destroys not only the shell-silver but also its material cause, that is, the particular ajñāna creating it. Thus the shell-silver is robbed of its existence in general by the contradicting knowledge.153 Mithyā may also be that which has narrower scope than jñānatva', that is, the generic quality of knowledge. Therefore, it is liable to destruction by knowledge characterised by the same generic quality.154 His opponents raise the objection that memory is also characterised by the generic quality 'smrtitva', which is narrower than jñānatva.155 When a memory takes place, it destroys the mental impression (samskāra) that produces it. Then the definition of mithyātva misses its mark (arthāntara) insofar samskāra is concerned. Madhusūdana answers that the advent of memory does not, in fact, destroy the samskāra producing such memory. However, it does produce another samskāra regarding the same object and thus the number of samskāras is multiplied.156 Alternatively, the definition might be explained as that which is liable to be contradicted by direct knowledge. This interpretation is much simpler than the second interpretation of jñāna-nivartyatva. Hence, the author of the Vārtika states that, 'when the direct knowledge is generated by the śruti "tattvamasi," the avidyā, along with its effect, completely ceases to exist'.

Definition of Citsukha

The fourth definition of mithyā is taken from Citsukha's 'Svāśrayanisthātyantābhāva pratiyogitva' 'mithyā is the positive counterpart of the absolute negation co-existing in the same locus (aśraya) as the object under review'. This is interpreted in the following way: a mithyā is the positive coun- terpart of the absolute negation that is invariably present where the same object appears to 'be'.157 In other words, an object that is invariably absent where it seems to be present is called mithya. His opponents argue that when a pitcher is produced from its halves (kapāla), its material cause, it remains inherent (samaveta) in the kapāla, so how can it be absolutely absent? Madhusūdana answers that both the pitcher and its absolute negation may co-exist at the same time, for example, the pitcher exists in the kapāla at the same time as its absence remains on the floor. Likewise, why are the pitcher and its non-existence unable to co-exist at the same place?158 Though the pitcher becomes absent in its

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material cause in the way stated earlier, the law of causality is not violated thereby. The antecedent negation (prāgabhāva) of a particular pitcher, resting with a particular kapāla, regulates the production of that particular pitcher from that specific kapāla. As in time, so also at the same place (as, for example, in the kapāla in the present case) the antecedent negation as well as the absolute nega- tion of the same object (i.e. the pitcher in the present case) can co-exist. Though such co-existence may not be apparent to us, the authority of the śruti (neha nānāsti kiñcana) establishes such co-existence. Moreover, while the pitcher is a pragmatic reality, its absence is absolute. Therefore, for us, the pitcher and its absence can co-exist (in the kapālas) because each of them has a different grade of reality. The law of contradiction operates only where the absence and its posi- tive counterpart possess the same degree of reality. Obviously for Madhusūdana, this is a more reasonable and direct explanation than the former one, which is somewhat involved. Thus, just as illusory shell-silver and its pragmatically real absence can easily co-exist on the shell, likewise the pitcher and its absence can both be present on the kapāla without any fear of contradiction. Though in this way the universe becomes absolutely absent, it should not be confused with the non-existence of the 'horns of a hare' (asat). They are different because, while the latter never appears to exist at any locus, the former evidently appears to exist in Brahman. So the definition of mithya boils down to this: an illusory object is, in fact, absolutely and invariably absent whenever and wherever it appears to exist.

Definition of Anandabodha

The fifth definition of mithyā is derived from Ānandabodhācārya: 'a mithyā is other than real (sat), yet it appears to be real'. 'Real' is that entity which is estab- lished by a proper means of knowledge, (pramāna). Pramāna is defined as the instrumental cause (kāraka) of knowledge, which is not accompanied by doșa (fault). In other words, 'real' is that which is the object of a valid knowledge.159 Knowledge is said to be valid when its content is never contradicted. According to the Naiyayikas the difference between the shell-silver illusion (bhrama-jñāna) and valid knowledge (pramā-jñāna) of a pitcher lies in the fact that although in both the experiences, the instrumental cause (kāraka, for example the sense- organs) is the same, in the case of illusion such an instrumental cause is accom- panied by some fault. According to Advaita-vedänta, both shell-silver illusion and the knowledge of the pitcher are illusory knowledge, inasmuch as the objects of such knowledge are contradicted (vādhita). Accepting the Naiyāyika's principle of discrimination between an error (bhrama) and valid knowledge, the monists recognise avidyā as the dosa in both the earlier cases. Thus for the Advaita- vedāntin, only knowledge of Brahman is valid, as its content (namely, Brahman) is never contradicted. Though avidya is accepted as the material cause of all the three types of experiences, namely transcendental (Brahma-jñāna), empirical (ghata-jñāna) and false (brahma-jñāna), to justify the illusory nature of the latter two cases, avidyā is recognised there to be an agent (nimitta-kāraņa) as well.

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In the case of transcendental experience, on the other hand, avidyā does not play any role. Hence, experience of Brahman is not an illusion. In other words, the knowledge of Brahman is not accompanied by avidyā-dosa, while both the illusory knowledge of shell-silver and the ordinary knowledge of a pitcher are. Therefore, while the content of the first knowledge is confirmed by a flawless pramana, the contents of the second and third experiences (i.e. shell-silver and the pitcher) are not so. So both shell-silver and the pitcher are false in that they are other than that (i.e. Brahman), which is confirmed by an instrument of knowl- edge unaccompanied by any flaw (doșa). The major premise of Anandabodha's syllogism (P. 26) is, 'the world is false (mithyā)'. Apropos to that, Madhusūdana analyses and defends the defining nature of mithya as forwarded by most of the prominent teachers of Advaita- vedānta. Although only one definition would have been enough, Madhusūdana gives as many as five definitions. The reason for that is that he is answering Vyāsatīrtha who attacked and refuted all the prominent teachers of Advaita- vedānta, preceding him, on their definitions of falsity. Thus the major term (sādhya) of the syllogism intended to establish the falsity of the universe is settled. Madhusūdana next proceeds to examine the three middle terms (hetu) for the same inference. In this connection he puts forward several explanations of the first hetu, drśyatva. Among these, the following deserves primary consi- deration:160 'a drśya is a phenomenon pervaded by a cognitive mode (vrtti)'. Opponents argue that Brahman is also pervaded by a certain vrtti known as akhandākāracittavrtti.161 Madhusūdana answers that pure consciousness (i.e. Brahman) is not the content of that vrtti, but the limited consciousness (upahita Brahman) is - and limited consciousness is mithyā. It may be asked that if pure consciousness cannot be the content of any vrtti, how can the śruti pres- ent such consciousness? The answer is that pure consciousness, being self- revealed and self-valid, does not depend on any external evidence for its establishment. When the śruti states that 'consciousness is pure and self revealed' it implies that impurity pervades all lack of self-revelation and as consciousness is not impure, it does not lack self-revelation. Opponents argue that pure con- sciousness may not be the content of a vrtti, but Madhusūdana admits that the limited (upahita) consciousness can be the content of vrtti. If it is so, then he must admit the validity of the following argument, namely 'as the limitation (viśesana) becomes the content of a vrtti embracing the limited, so also the subject (viśesya) that is limited, becomes the content of the same vrtti. In the present case such a subject is pure consciousness. Hence, in this way, pure consciousness does become the content of vrtti'. Madhusūdana answers that when pure consciousness becomes the subject (viśesya) it no longer remains pure.162 This is because the content then becomes consciousness, limited by a qualifying adjective. His opponents argue that it is a fallacious argument. Because when akhandākara-cittavrtti is intended to embrace limited consciousness, such limita- tion, in the absence of anything else, is the akhandākara vrtti itself. Therefore, the vrtti that embraces the limited, embraces the limitation as well. Thus the vrtti

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inevitably becomes its own content. Madhusūdana cannot accept this position, for the aforesaid vrtti is, after all, a verbal cognition and as such, it cannot concern anything which relevant words (such as, tat tvam asi,) have not presented. Moreover, as this akhandākāra vrtti concerns a vrtti (a product of avidyā) it cannot discard avidyā altogether, as claimed by the Advaita-vedānta. Only such knowledge, which does not concern either avidyā or its effect, can discard them. Madhusūdana, following the author of Kalpataru,163 answers that while akhandakāra vrtti embraces consciousness, the same vrtti, without being its own content, conditions the consciousness. For instance, in the case of sāksin, which is consciousness limited by ajñāna (i.e. ajñāna vrtti), ajñāna is the content of sāksī-knowledge, yet being unconscious it cannot be sāksin. Likewise, con- sciousness limited by vrtti is the content of vrtti, yet the limitation remains out- side this vrtti's own purview. Therefore, opponents cannot raise any objection regarding the vrtti being its own content. From the earlier discussion, Madhusūdana concludes that as the object of the primal ajñana is Brahman, limited by that ajñāna, and the content of akhandākāra vrtti is the same limited Brahman, only this time limited by a vrtti, so both ajñāna and its contradictory knowledge occupy the same content, that is, Brahman. In both cases, the content is limited but it is not the agent of limitation as well.164 So far, Madhusūdana has established the view that pure Brahman is not at all the content of any cognitive vrtti. In that case, he further elaborates, the term 'being pervaded by vrtti', (vrttivyāpyatva), with reference to an empirical object, would mean that it is the object of a cognitive vrtti arising from anything other than only verbal evidence. Thus, Brahman is the content of a cognitive vrtti which is verbal (i.e. the śruti, tat tvam asi), and the non-existing 'horn of a hare', which is also the content of a verbal cognitive vrtti namely, 'the hare's horn is unreal' are equally excluded from the category of drśya, that is empirical phenomena.165 Madhusūdana gives a third explanation of the term 'to be pervaded by a cognitive vrtti (vrttivyāpyatva)', in that a drśya is the object of determinate knowledge (savikalpa-jñāna). Determination is an attribute, which is cognised as existing in the object which is the content of the experience. Thus Brahman, being unqualified, cannot be the object of any determinate knowledge. Likewise, the so-called attribute (e.g. gagana-kusumatva, the attribute of being a sky-flower) of a non-existing sky-flower, (gagana-kusuma), never appears to be really existing. Therefore, none of them can be regarded as drśya. Even abhāva (negation) is grasped as qualified by the existing quality, abhāvatva.166 Drśya may also mean being the object of consciousness, (caitanya). To be the object of consciousness means to be related to the latter by any type of relation- ship. Brahman, being itself consciousness, cannot be related to its own self. Likewise, a hare's horn, being non-existent, can never be related to consciousness. Therefore, neither Brahman nor the non-existing hare's horn can be regarded as drśya.167 A drśya may also be described as an entity which, for its own usage (vyavahāra) is invariably dependent upon knowledge which is not its own self

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(svātirikta).168 The word 'usage' includes both the revelation of the entity and the use of it by means of words (śabda-vyavahāra). This means a drśya is never self- revealed. In other words, it is always revealed by knowledge of itself, which knowledge is other than its own self. On the other hand, consciousness is self- revealed in that without being the content of any knowledge, it can be revealed and be used as existing. The universe does not possess such self-revelation, which is thus a drśya. The second middle term is insensateness (jadatva).169 That which is not sensate is jada and hence it is other than knowledge; is other than self (atman) or, is not self-revealed. Opponents say that if jada is stated to be that which is not knowl- edge, then consciousness will become jada, for knowledge means consciousness connected with a cognitive vrtti. So consciousness by itself is not knowledge, just as vrtti by itself is not knowledge. Madhusuūdana answers that knowledge means the revealing consciousness as marked by an object (arthopalaksita prakāśa). Such knowledge is consciousness itself. As the object is only a temporary marker (upalaksaņā), at the time of liberation, when no object remains, knowledge essentially can and does exist apart from any object. But a material object (jada) cannot exist at that time. The third middle term is paricchinnatva, which means that which is limited. Limitation can be of three kinds: the limitation of time, the limitation of space and the limitation of object. That which is the counterpart of destruction is known as limited by time; that which is the positive counterpart of absolute negation is known as limited by space and that which is the positive counterpart of mutual difference is known as limited by object. Brahman is not limited by time, by space or by object. Hence, it is not paricchinna like the universe. The aforementioned discussion about the three middle terms of the syllogism establishes the validity of the inferential evidence for the falsity of the universe. Although the words of this inference make it clear that it refers to the world as a whole, by the same inference, one may determine the falsity of every pragmatic object, for example, 'the sky is false, because it is a drya like the shell-silver'. Chitsukha puts forward a separate inference to establish the falsity of an indi- vidual pragmatic object: 'This specific cloth is the positive counterpart of the absolute negation (atyantābhāva) existing in this particular thread (that produces the cloth), because it (the cloth) is constituted of several parts (amśitvāt) like other such objects (itarāmśivat).'170 After explaining the inference proving the falsity of the universe, Madhusūdana now states how shell-silver, the example of that syllogism, possesses major term (sādhya), namely falsity (mithyātva).171 It has been stated before that a false object appears as existent in a locus, where its absolute non- existence invariably exists. This experience of existence of such a false object is discarded by direct knowledge that contradicts this. The locus of the false or illusory universe is Brahman and as this universe has illusory contact of identity with Brahman, it appears to exist (sat). In the case of shell-silver, it must also be acknowledged that since shell-silver has a locus where it appears, it has an

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existence. As only direct knowledge can discard shell-silver illusion, it must have been directly experienced in illusion. It has been stated before that an illusory object is invariably absent where it is present (vide the definition of Citsukha). Moreover, when the Vivarana maintains that an illusory object is discarded by direct knowledge (vide the second definition of falsity given by Prakāśātma Yati), it means that the cognition of a false object is also direct knowledge. A direct illusion is discarded by direct valid knowledge only. A direct illusion requires the presence of the object of illusion because direct knowledge is confined only to the object that is present at the time of the direct knowledge. All this shows that even an illusory object has to exist albeit temporarily. The question might be raised as to how the pitcher, as well as the shell-silver, can be recognised as existing in the same sense, because while the pitcher continues to exist until the dawning of ultimate knowledge, the shell-silver is fal- sified within a few moments after its knowledge.172 Madhusūdana answers that the word 'rajata' (silver) is equally applicable to illusory as well as to the real (pragmatically existent) rajata, by virtue of the fact that in the case of the real silver, the generic quality of the silver (rajatatva), which has a pragmatic utility, does in fact exist therein, while it is ascribed to the illusory silver. Likewise, exis- tence (sattā), which really belongs to Brahman alone, is ascribed to the pitcher as well as to the shell-silver. In that sense, both the pitcher and the shell-silver are said to exist. Though in real sense existence is the special privilege of Brahman and is an imposition on the pitcher as well as on the shell-silver, the imposed exis- tence is nevertheless recognised by Madhusūdana as an existence.173 The practi- cal difference between the pitcher and the shell-silver is explained by the assumption that in the case of the pitcher, such imposed existence is pragmatic (i.e. remains uncontradicted until the dawning of ultimate knowledge), whereas in the case of shell-silver it is illusory (i.e. is discarded within a few moments from the knowledge of shell-silver). In this way, Madhusūdana has recognised the experience of shell-silver's temporary existence, even if it is illusory, as is the existence of empirically experienced universe. Hence, shell-silver can serve as a good example in the inference proving the illusoriness of the universe (prapañca). Madhusūdana has drawn upon Samkara's theory of the experience of the inexplicable (anirvacanīya khyāti) to justify such existence of shell-silver, which maintains that the illusory knowledge of shell-silver concerns the illusorily existing silver and not the empirical silver. The Mīmāmsa-school raises the question as to why one should recognise the existence of shell-silver at all. According to them, the experience of shell-silver ('this is silver') is not a single knowledge. One directly perceives only 'this'. The perception of 'silver', as its qualification is in fact a case of memory of empirical silver. One is said to undergo the experience 'this is silver', only so far as one fails to grasp the difference between the two forms of experience - perception in the case of 'this', and memory in the case of silver - and also fails to grasp the difference between the two objects of this knowledge, namely 'this' and 'silver'. So it is not a unitary knowledge and one need not accept the existence of

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shell-silver to justify such knowledge. Such a lack of discrimination between the two forms of mental activities, namely, perception of an object and the memory of its supposed quality of 'silverness' generate reactions in the beholder in the form of his/her rushing towards it. This theory is known as a form of experience that only partially reveals its content (Akhyātivāda). Madhusūdana criticises this theory and argues that mere non-comprehension of distinction between the objects ('this' and 'silver') and between perception and memory, cannot produce any activity regarding the object (silver). The fact is that the comprehension of shell-silver induces one to go to pick it up. So one has to accept such comprehension to be a positivistic knowledge. The Vijñānavādin Buddhists, who maintain that the shell-silver experience is a case of a lack of experience of a real object (asat-khyātivāda) may, of course, say that if one has to accept the experience of shell-silver, even then one need not accept its real existence. Knowledge itself may give the illusion of a form (ākāra) of an object, but such an object does not correspond to reality. The process is that the knowledge projects the form of silver on the 'object at the vicinity' ('this'). This 'object at the vicinity is real', according to Vaibhāsika and Sautrāntika schools of Bauddhists while according to Vijñānavādins, it is illusorily, imagined by the beginningless flow of mental impressions (vāsanā) existing in the individ- uals. But in any case, the silver is a mere projection of knowledge and has no reality (asat eva rajatam abhāt). Madhusūdana answers that if the object is thus reduced to a mere projection of knowledge then it cannot be perceived. Because, in order to perceive an object, a contact between the sense organ and the object is necessary. But this is not possible in the case of the non-existing silver. To this, the followers of the Nyaya-school reply that for perception one need not recognise the creation of the anirvacanīya silver on 'this'. The Naiyāyikas contend that the knowledge - 'this is silver' - is a case of perception. So far as 'this' is concerned such perception is ordinary because the conjunction between the sense-organ and the object at the vicinity - the requisite sense-object contact - is available without any difficulty. Difficulty arises as to the requisite sense-object contact in the case of silver perception: contact between the eyes, on the one hand, and the silver -the object of that very, (mistaken), experience - on the other. The Naiyāyikas maintain that the silver revealed in the said experience is not shell- silver, but an actual piece of silver which the cogniser had actually witnessed at the market. Such previous cognition of real silver seen at the market has left the impression of real silver on his mind. At the sign of brightness in the object at the vicinity (i.e. the shell), the impression of real silver, lying dormant in the mind so far, is awakened, giving rise to the memory of real silver experienced before. Such a memory of real silver is what the Naiyāyikas call 'extraordinary perception of a connection' (jñānalaksaņā sannikarsa) mistakenly attributed to an object of perception. Through the operation of this memory, the sense organ, namely the eyes, are said to perceive the real silver of the market. As such perception is a little out of the way, they recognise it as extraordinary (alaukika).

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So analysis of that experience, 'this is silver', yields the following results: (1) this experience is purely a case of perception; (2) in the case of 'this' such perception is ordinary, while in the case of 'silver' it is extraordinary; (3) as real silver justi- fies such experience, there is no reason to recognise the creation of another kind of silver (i.e. the shell-silver) apart from the real silver.174 Madhusūdana refutes this view175 by stating that 'jñānalaksaņā-sannikarșa' is not acceptable to the Advaita-vedāntins, since in all cases of perception (irrespective of valid knowledge and error) the sense-object contact (visayen- driya-sannikrșa) is a prerequisite. Therefore, in the case of the perception 'this is silver', there is no need to accept any other kind of contact except the same con- junction of sense and the object. Moreover, in the case of shell-silver error, so far as 'this' is concerned, the sense-object contact is available. Therefore, for the sake of economy of conception, one should accept that same contact in the case of silver, as well. Therefore, it is necessary to accept the existence of shell-silver for its perception to occur. As real silver cannot exist in shell, it is necessary to accept the creation of an apparent silver - a new kind of silver (prātibhāsika rajata), created by avidyā covering the shell. The question is therefore: is it necessary to accept illusory silver as separate from the pragmatic silver and if such illusory silver is said to be revealed in error, then what is the positive counterpart of the contradicting knowledge? If the illu- sory silver, taken in that form, is regarded to be the positive counterpart of the contradictory knowledge, then the form of the negative experience should have been 'the silver was produced and is destroyed', and not 'the silver was never present in the shell', which is the purport of the contradictory knowledge.176 Madhusūdana challenges his opponents with a counter question: when do they believe that particular experience occurs?7 Does it occur at the time of the revelation of shell-silver or at its contradiction (vadha)? Such experience cannot occur at the time of the revelation of shell-silver, since at that time shell-silver appears as identified with the shell. Thus it seems to have a continued existence without the question of being created or destroyed. Moreover, before the advent of contradictory knowledge, the beholder has never experienced any real silver to be totally destroyed. At the time of contradiction, on the other hand, the experience of the absolute negation of the silver prevents the existence of the experience, such as the shell-silver is produced and is destroyed. The existence of the experience of the absolute negation of silver prevents the advent of the expe- rience of its being destroyed. Though the experience of the absolute negation is contradictory to the experience of its production, for all practical purposes, such experience has to be accepted for the sake of the nature of experience. This explanation is based on the assumption that the contradictory knowledge negates illusory shell- silver just as such. As an alternative view, it may be said that the content of negation is the illusory silver presented as real (pāramārthika).178 Such reality, existing in the illusory silver at the time of its appearance, is equally illusory. Hence, in the experience of illusory silver's contradiction, the attribute of silver, namely its absoluteness, does not really belong to the illusory silver but

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to something else. Thus the negation that comprises of an object possessing an attribute, which does not really belong to that object, does not invariably require the existence of the experience of its counterpart. In the given experience of the negation of illusory silver, its absoluteness is grasped through the function of memory. Indeed, Madhusūdana does not accept the notion that the content of a negative experience must be presented by that experience. Even the memory of such content is sufficient for the negative experience. In order to justify the actions generated in the beholder, such as trying to go near it etc., one must accept the attribute of some sort of pragmatic reality in the shell-silver. Such an attrib- ute is common to both shell-silver and ordinary silver. Thus he seems to hold a view close to the Naiyayika view. The third most radical explanation given by Madhusūdana is that the real silver is the content of negation.179 It should be remembered that these various explanations are given only to jus- tify the observations of such previous scholars of his school as Prakāśātma Yati; because he wanted to totally refute Vyāsatīrtha's argument attacking the Monistic Vedānta view. But, as previously mentioned, the personal view of Madhusūdana is that the illusory silver is revealed in error as identified with real silver, and the same silver (i.e. illusory silver as identified with pragmatic silver) is negated in the contradictory knowledge. The comprehension of shell-silver (in the form 'this is silver') consists of two parts. In 'this' (i.e. the locus) portion, it is ordinary perception, that is, a mental cognitive mode and in the 'silver' (i.e. the imposed) portion it is sāksī-knowledge, that is, a mode of avidyā. The question is if silver is not perceived, that is, if it does not fall within the purview of ordinary cognitive mode, then can one say 'I perceive the silver' (rūpyam paśyāmi)? Madhusūdana answers that: before the false knowledge of shell-silver is produced, we have the real knowledge of 'this' (idam). That is to say, we have a real cognitive awareness the content of which is 'this'. The content of the avidya-vrtti revealing false silver, on the other hand, has no connection with any sense organ and therefore should not be cognised as a perception. However, it can be explained as follows: since this false silver is produced by the avidyā that exists in the same cognitive consciousness as possessed by the cogniser the latter thinks it to be also perceived. So the perceptibility, which really belongs to the mental cognitive mode, is ascribed to avidya-vrtti.180 That is why we say 'I see silver'. Not satisfied, his opponents raise the objection that if two different vrttis are recognised, how is it possible to maintain unity of the experience 'this is silver'? Madhusūdana gives three explanations for this:181

1 Objects of the two vrttis (namely, 'this' and 'silver') become identified through ascription. Such identification makes for the ascribed identity of the correspondence knowledge. 2 False silver, being the effect of avidya existing in consciousness limited by 'this', appears as identical with the object 'this'. Likewise, the avidyā-vrtti

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presenting the false silver, being the effect of avidyā existing in the same conscious self, whose mental mode, at the time of shell-silver appearance, has as its content the unspecified yet real object 'this', appears as identified with the above mentioned mode of avidya presenting the false shell-silver. In other words, in this procession of illusion, the individual consciousness, influenced by avidyā fails to distinguish between different modes of avidyā and their contents. 182 3 Though the vrttis are different, as both 'this' and 'silver' are revealed by the same consciousness limited by 'this',183 the results appear to be one. As a consequence the knowledge is also one.184 Avidyā-vrtti cannot discard avidyā and hence cannot be regarded as cognitive knowledge. Only a mental vrtti (here in the form of 'this') can discard avidya, and therefore it is knowledge. This means that in the case of idam rajatam, one must accept that both the vrttis of the mind and avidyā are so closely juxtaposed that the experiencing individual fails to distinguish it.

In the case of 'this' - because the eyes have contacted with the object in front, (i.e. 'this') - the mind can go out of the visual sense organ and on reaching 'this', can assume the mode of the latter. But in the case of the silver, no such process is possible.185 Rāmānuja, in his Srī-bhāsya on the Brahma-sūtra severely criticised the notion of avidyā as depicted by the Advaita-vedāntins. Avidyā, or Māyā, is accepted by all dualistic Vedäntins, as a divine power of Brahman. But they do not agree with the Advaita-vedāntic notion of avidyā as a false, beginningless indefinable entity existing in Brahman, the pure existence. In order to refute such avidyā, Vyāsarāja developed and used all these objections, along with those laid down by the teachers of other Vaisnava systems, in countering the Advaita-vedānta views. Madhusūdana answered all the objections put forward by Vyāsarāja. Yet here he chooses to refute the arguments of Rāmānuja against the Advaita-vedānta's notion of avidyā. The reason for singling Ramānuja out, I shall argue, evinces Madhusūdana special regard for Rāmānuja's Vaisnava theology, which to some extent, he even followed in his own bhakti exposition. Rāmānuja's first objection concerns the nature of avidyā as a veil covering con- sciousness. The question may be asked as to whether the avidyā is real or false. If it is regarded as real, then the Advaitins are reverting to dualism. If, on the other hand, it is taken to be false, one has to discover another false entity in order to ascertain the cause of this falsity, thus leading it to endless regression. The answer to this objection is that avidya is indeed a power of Brahman which, being a false entity, is identical with it. The universe is an evolution of this avidyā, which has threefold innate characteristics (gunas), namely sattva, rajas and tamas. Avidyā subsists in pure Brahman and is evolved into the universe. As evolution is the nature of avidyā, it does not need any other power to set it evolving except pure Brahman, its substratum.

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The second objection of Rāmanuja is raised against the view that Pure Brahman is the substratum of avidyā, and that jīva is its object. The inferential proofs given to contradict the first view are:

1 avidya does not subsist in Pure Brahman alone, because it exists in the knower; 2 Brahman is not the substratum of avidyā because it is devoid of the quality of being the knower. Rāmānuja explains objection to this view, because he regarded avidyā as being the absence of knowledge. Moreover, avidyā, being contradictory to knowledge, can never exist in it. Brahman, being absolute knowledge itself, cannot have the absence of knowledge as well. Madhusūdana's answers to such objections are based on the views of both Prakāśātma Yati and Vācaspati Miśra on that issue. With regard to the objec- tion concerning avidyā's existence in knowledge, Madhusūdana states that avidyā is not contradictory to just every kind of knowledge, but only to that of cognitive knowledge, which is not the transcendental Brahman, the sub- stratum of avidyā. Madhusūdana's answer to Rāmānuja's objection concern- ing avidyā's existence in jīva has already been covered earlier in this chapter.

Rāmānuja's third objection concerns the view that avidya covers Brahman or in other words, that Brahman is the object of avidyā. Rāmānuja explains that the absence of Brahman's manifestation means either the lack of creation of such a manifestation or the destruction of it. But neither of these explanations is possi- ble. Self-manifested, absolute Brahman can never be destroyed, nor is it created. Madhusūdana answers this objection by establishing that avidyā falsely pre- vents the manifestation of self-luminous Brahman. Just as the sun, when covered by cloud, is considered as not manifest, likewise self-luminous Brahman, being covered by avidyā, is regarded as being neither existent nor manifest. But just as the cloud covers only the sight of the beholder, so also avidyā covers jīva, pre- venting him from realising the true nature of Brahman. Hence the beholder thinks Brahman is neither existent nor manifest. The fourth objection is against the logical proofs put forward by the Advaita- vedāntins to establish the positive avidyā. This point is very critically considered by Madhusūdana and has been discussed elsewhere in this book. The fifth objection is raised in connection with the indefinable (anirvacanīya) nature of avidyā. In order to establish the nature of avidyā, Madhusūdana discusses the concept of indescribability (anirvācyatva). Anirvācyatva can be defined as:

1 quality of being different from existent, non-existent or both existent and non-existent at the same time; 2 quality of not being proven as either existent or non-existent or otherwise (satvāsatvābhyām vicārāsahatve sati sadasatvena vicarāsahatva; 3 quality of being contradicted where it appears to be existent (pratipannopādhau vādhyatvam).

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Here the words 'existent' and 'non-existent' are used in the normal sense. It cannot be objected that contradiction of one means the existence of the other, because all forms of contradiction are regarded as false in this system. For example, it cannot be claimed that false silver is contradictory to real shell. Therefore, whenever in the definition the term 'contradiction' (nisedha) is used in connection with existence, non-existence and so on, it is done in order to establish the falsity of those objects. Those who consider the destruction of avidya as a fifth category, other than existence, non-existence, both existence and non-existence and the contradiction of both, should add 'the quality of not being existent at the time of liberation' to the definition of anirväcyatva. When it is stated that all contradic- tions are false, this means that both existence and non-existence, as they are nor- mally experienced, are false. Though in the case of real existence and non-existence, the absence of both cannot exist anywhere, but in the case of false existence and non-existence, the absence of both simultaneously is possible in a third object such as avidyā. The conclusion is that although each existence and non-existence co-exists with the absence of the other, neither of these is identi- fied with the absence of the other. This particular nature of avidyā is established by several means of valid knowledge, such as perception, inference, śruti and arthapatti, and is perceived when one experiences the contradiction of the knowledge of false silver (nedam rajatam). The inference supporting the anirvācyatva of avidya runs in the following way: 'the disputed object is something other than existent and non-existent, while it is other than both existent and non-existent together; either, because it is subjected to negation or, its manifestation depends on some false object. That which is not subjected to negation or does not depend on some false object for its manifestation, is none other than existence, etc., such as Brahman' (vimatam sattvārahitatve sati, asattvā-rahitatve sati sattvāsattvārahitam; vādhyatvāt, doșaprayuktabhānatvād vā; yannaivam tannaivam; yathā Brahma). Madhusūdana presents arthāpatti pramāna in the following way: the object of controversy, such as shell-silver cannot be real or it would never be contradicted, nor can it be unreal, for in that case it would never appear to be existent. But the fact is, such silver is contradicted and does appear to be existent. Therefore, it must be acknowledged that such silver is neither real nor unreal, and hence it is anirvācya, or false. Rāmānuja's final point of contention is that nothing can destroy beginningless and positive avidyā. This is based on the assumption that pure, absolute, immutable and indeterminate Brahman is a false conception. For Rāmānuja, Brahman is always qualified (saguna). However, Madhusūdana has fully considered the issue, that and his conclusions are discussed in the next chapter.

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3

KNOWLEDGE AND EPISTEMOLOGY

In Advaita-vedānta, knowledge or consciousness (caitanya) is the only existing reality, which is the essence (svarupa) of Brahman and the only spontaneously revealed entity.186 Objects are by nature non-conscious (jada) and hence not automatically revealed. They are revealed only when they come into contact with knowledge, through a relationship created by avidyā. The transcendental knowledge is absolute and has no real relation with empirical objects, for there can be no relationship between knowledge and the known, insofar as the former is absolute truth, while the latter, being the creation of avidyā, is false. However, to explain the physical universe that has forced itself upon our knowledge, some sort of relationship has to be recognised between knowledge and the known, since if knowledge is totally unrelated to objects of knowledge, then it cannot possibly reveal the object. Thus knowledge, though itself transcendental, somehow becomes connected with the objects which it reveals. 'Knowledge' is used in Advaita-vedānta to mean both absolute knowledge, when left by itself, and pragmatic (cognitive) knowledge, when wrongly related to false objects. Epistemology concerns itself with the latter kind of knowledge as distinct from absolute knowledge, which is a metaphysical entity; although in substance both types of knowledge are one and the same. Philosophers have tried to comprehend ultimate knowledge/reality through empirical knowledge. Although ultimate truth, per se, transcends empirical comprehension, empirical knowledge is useful insofar as it repels ignorance (ajñāna) about ultimate reality (absolute knowledge). It must be noted here that absolute knowledge per se is not antagonistic to ignorance. Since absolute knowl- edge is the locus (aśraya) of ignorance, it is also the locus of all products of ignorance. However, the same knowledge removes ignorance only when it is conditioned by a cognitive mode (vrtti), just as the rays of the sun that usually sus- tain grass, burn it when those same rays are refracted through a magnifying glass.187 Therefore, an object is exposed to knowledge only through the operation of vrtti. Cognition of an object, being empirical knowledge, should therefore involve vrtti. That is why it is called vrtti-jñāna, and is described as consciousness reflected on a cognitive mental mode (vrtti).

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It is common knowledge that some external objects exist, which are not always known to the knower (pramāta). That means the cognisant has ignorance about those objects. Knowledge is the revelation of an object to the cognisant, consequent upon the removal of his ignorance regarding that object. Although the knower is identical with Brahman in substance, still everything is revealed to Brahman, the substratum of creation. Whereas, an object is revealed to the knower, pramātā only when it is covered by a vrtti, which, as will be shown later, is either a mode of the inner sense organ of the knower or a mode of avidyā. Thus it must be acknowledged that for the manifestation of objects, cognitive knowl- edge has to depend on a vrtti. The subject consciousness limited by its inner sense organ (mind) is pramātā, the knower. The manifestation of a hitherto concealed object to the knower through a mental mode (vrtti) is known as pramā-jñāna (valid knowledge). I use the word mental to indicate the inner sense organ that covers the entire field of mind categorised in the Sanskrit terms of buddhi, manas and citta as well as the ego.188 The mental mode that leads to the cognition of an object is called pramāna, or instrument of valid knowledge. Though objects are manifested to the knower by the vrtti-jñāna, their existence does not depend on that vrtti-jñana. That is to say, an object can exist even without being perceived by a person. However, there is another type of empirical knowledge, the object of which does not exist beyond the duration of that knowledge. In this case, as long as those objects exist they are revealed all the time; for instance, a mistaken cognition of silver in place of a shell. In order to distinguish this special type of cognition from ordinary valid knowledge (pramā-jñāna), the Advaita-vedāntin differentiates between the respective modes (vrtti) involved in each case. The revelation of these kinds of objects is a kind of cognition, and therefore one must admit the function of a mode (vrtti) involved in the process of cognition, so that knowledge can take place at all. At the same time, such a vrtti should be recognised as distinct from valid knowledge (pramāna-vrtti). For instance, while an external object stays longer than the moment of its cognition, the object (i.e. shell-silver, the object of illusory knowl- edge) of this second type of vrtti does not usually stay beyond the duration of this vrtti. Moreover, the existence of illusory shell-silver is different in nature from that of an ordinary pitcher, so the vrtti producing the knowledge of shell-silver should be different from the vrtti that produces the empirical knowledge of a pitcher. The direct cause of shell-silver is avidyā, so the vrtti producing the knowledge of shell- silver is also regarded as arising from the same avidya. It is important to remember that the process of any type of cognition, even if it is an error, must involve a modal activity either of the avidya of the knower or, of his/her mind so that a contact is established between the knower and the cosmic revealer sākşin. Similar to the knowledge of shell-silver, the knowledge of feelings like happiness etc. is also contemporaneous with the existence of the knowledge of such feelings. On the basis of this similarity, in the case of knowledge of happiness, the vrtti producing such knowledge is regarded as a mode of avidyā. However, it may be

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noted here that although knowledge of shell-silver and the knowledge of happiness are both brought about by avidya-vrtti, the former is an error while the latter is valid knowledge. In fact, the validity of knowledge depends on the non-contradiction of its content. This is a vital point in the Advaita-vedānta soteriology. Therefore, it is evident that avidya-vrtti can produce valid knowledge without the help of any vrtti of mind. Such is the privilege of avidya-vrtti that it can produce knowledge, even valid knowledge, independent of the operation of the mental vrtti. This avidyā-vrtti can, therefore, be employed to explain knowledge at the time of deep sleep when, with the dissolution of all sense organs, the mental mode cannot possibly operate. That knowledge remains present even in deep sleep and is borne out by the composite knowledge such as, 'I slept happily and did not know anything'. This knowledge is a combination of first, memory of happiness which a person experienced during his/her deep sleep - a vrtti of avidyā that always exists in sāksin, inherent in the cognising person; and second, a cognitive mental vrtti referring to the ego of the same person, which comes back when he/she is awake. But memory presupposes experience. Therefore, the person's experience of entities such as happiness and ignorance (avidyā) must have taken place at the time of his/her deep sleep. One must thus accept this explanation of the simultaneous experience of happiness and a total ignorance during the deep sleep as a case of sāksī-jñāna wherein the sleeper's pragmatic ego-consciousness remains dormant. Besides avidya-vrtti and the vrtti of the mind which generates valid knowledge (pramā-jñāna), there are several other mental modes that are not considered capable of generating any form of cognition. For example, when a person medi- tates on a name of a deity, taking it for supreme Brahman, his meditation consists of a mental exercise. This is not a valid knowledge as such a name is neither Brahman nor an illusory object. It is just a divine attribute ascribed on Brahman. The person knows this fact hence it is not an illusion, for he possesses the con- tradictory knowledge (vādhaka-jñāna) of this illusion. His meditation is therefore a mere mental exercise that operates on the will of mind. The person operates his mind by the Vedic injunction 'nāma Brahmeti upāsīta' (meditate on Brahmā as a proper name), and for that reason also this mental mode is not regarded as knowledge, since injunctions can never be made on knowledge.189 Likewise, 'tarka' (logical argumentation) is also not a form of cognitive knowledge, but a mere mental process, since argument is always based on mental hypothesis and is regulated by the will of the mind. Hence, it is neither valid nor illusory knowl- edge. An example of this is given in the argument that follows the proposition, 'the hill is on fire; because there is smoke' (parvato vanhimān dhūmāt). This hypothesis is based on the argument that 'if there is no fire then there should be no smoke; because smoke is invariably concomitant with fire; in the present proposition, smoke is sighted on the hill, hence one may safely conclude that there is fire on that hill'. In order to prove the presence of fire on the hill, for argument's sake, the absence of fire, which is proved by the absence of smoke, is hypothetically ascribed to the hill by means of the assumption of a hypothetical

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middle term, namely the absence of smoke. It is not knowledge generated by a mental mode, but a hypothetical judgment brought about independently by the mental mode. In Advaita-vedanta the means to attain liberation is through the removal of a person's avidya, which projects the world on the locus of Brahman. Only the realisation of Brahman, the locus, can remove this cosmic avidyā. The true nature of Brahman, the only reality, is instructed by the Upanisads, which is transmitted orally by the enlightened teachers to the pupils. The famous statement of Yājñavalkya to his wife Maitreyī revealing the method of acquiring this gnosis of truth by means of realising one's own true self, atman which is identical with Brahman, the Truth, runs as follows: 'You see, Maitreyī - it is one's self (ātman) which one should see and hear, and on which one should reflect and concentrate. For by seeing and hearing one's self, and by reflecting and concentrating on one's self, one gains the knowledge of this whole world.'190 This statement is split into two. The first part, that is, 'seeing', refers to the Brahma-gnosis which is a direct experience. The second part, hearing etc., shows the method of acquiring this gnosis. This method is threefold - hearing the Upanisadic teaching from an enlightened preceptor, (śravana), reflecting on that teaching (manana) and finally deeply meditating on that (nididhyāsana). Moreover, the second part, indeed a yogic process, leads to the gnosis of Brahman and thereby brings about mukti. Madhusūdana takes this entire Vedic statement to mean Vedāntic discourse (vicara) - which is nothing but a form of deliberation (tarka).191 This is why a Vedic injunction (vidhi) is accepted in modes such as śravana. Had it been a case of cognition, vidhi would have been impossible. It may be noted here that while elucidating the word 'cittavrtti', as it occurs in the Pātañjala-yoga-sūtra I. 2, 'Yogaścittavrtti-nirodhah',192 Madhusūdana states that there are five kinds of such vrtti:

1 Valid cognition Pramāna-vrtti, itself sub-divided into six types, according to the type of pramāna leading to it.195 Direct knowledge, (pratyaksa), inferential, (anumāna), scriptural knowledge (śāstra), analogy, (upamāna), presumption, (arthāpatti) and negation, (abhāva). 2 Viparyaya-vrtti, or false knowledge, sub-divided into avidyā, asmitā, rāga, dvesa and abhinivesash which are explained in the Pātañjala-yoga-sūtra II.3 as sources of transience of individuals. 3 Vikalpa-vrtti, by which non-existent objects like the sky-flower, are used in language. This is not knowledge like perception but merely a mental exercise. 4 Nidra-vrtti which is just the state of sleep and is considered the seat of tamoguna. Hence in this state the individual knows the lack of all the other four vrttis. 5 Smrti-vrtti, which is recollection of previous experience; that is, the knowledge of the impressions left by the store of previously acquired experienced. As smrti embraces the impressions left by the other four vrttis, Madhusūdana leaves it until last.

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It may be noted here that except for vikalpa-vrtti and pramāna-vrtti, all the other are, in fact, avidyā-vrttis. This is why Madhusūdana describes them elsewhere as belonging to sāksi-jñāna.194 Vikalpa-vrtti, on the other hand, is not knowledge at all, but merely a mental operation when mind, by its independent will, uses a word to express a non-existing object such as a sky-flower or a hare's horn. Pramāna-vrtti is, of course, a mental mode, citta-vrtti. In other words it is a modification of mind. Thus, not all five vrttis mentioned above can be taken to be mental-vrttis.195

Genesis of valid knowledge, pramāņa-vrtti or the valid mental mode

As stated earlier, the cause of valid knowledge is a valid mental mode, vrtti. The mind's modification undergoes the following process: A person's mind, which is transparent, reflects on every object it comes into contact with. It moves out through a sense organ if that organ comes into contact with an object which is reflected on the mental mode. This is known as vrtti. Thus the mental mode extends itself from the body up to the object. The portion of mind that remains inside the person is known as his ego (ahamkāra/garva), which is the subject of the experience of the act of knowledge. The portion of mind that stands interme- diate between the object and the ego is known as a mental mode, vrtti and is said to be the cognitive act (kriyā). The mind that pervades the object immediately removes the ignorance of the person that covered that object, and thus reveals it. It should be noted here that the vrtti of mind that flows through a sense organ cannot pervade every object, but only those objects that are capable of being perceived by a mental mode, (yogyān ghațādi vișayam).196 Consciousness limited by the ego aspect of mind is known as pramātā (knower).197 Consciousness lim- ited by the vrtti is pramāna, the instrument of knowledge. Lastly, consciousness limited by the vrtti that pervades the object is called pramiti, that is, cognition.198 The object of knowledge - prameya - is Brahman, limited by a particular object (vişayāvacchinnacaitanya). Brahman is the substratum (adhisthāna) of each and every physical object. Brahman has to be the object of knowledge inasmuch as empirical knowledge of an object always occurs after removing the ajñāna regard- ing that object since, following Sarvajñātma Muni, Madhusūdana contributes to the view that the object of knowledge must necessarily be concerned with the object of ajñāna, and the object of ajñāna is always only consciousness (cit).199 According to him, physical objects like the pitcher become manifest only as the limitation (avacchedaka) of Brahman. The content of a cognition (prameya), when it becomes known through the act of cognition (pramiti), is called phala, or the result of pramā that is, valid knowledge.

Function of the mental mode (antaḥkaraņa-vrtti)

The revealer of an object is the consciousness that is its locus.200 As the substratum of avidyā, Brahman is the material cause of every object. An object is wrongly

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superimposed on Brahman and the relationship between the superimposed object and its locus, Brahman, is that of illusory identification (ādhyāsika tādātmya).201 Such identification regulates the revelation of the object by consciousness in which the object is falsely related in terms of identity, as stated earlier. The consciousness in fact, as the locus (adhisthāna caitanya) reveals itself and thereby the object superimposed on it. In this way, objects are always revealed to their substratum consciousness. One may object that if the substratum consciousness is the revealer of objects how can the knower (pramātā), that is, the individual knows objects? In other words, how can the knower, distinct from locus-consciousness, reveal the object? The answer is that an object may be revealed to the cognising person when this cognising consciousness merges its identity into the substratum consciousness (adhisthāna caitanya). This in fact reveals the object. This identity with the revealed substratum consciousness follows, in all cases, the removal of ignorance from the cognising person with regard to the object. This removal of ignorance is brought about by the mental mode. Therefore, in the individual's perception, there has to be a modal form of the mind. However, the experience 'ghatah prakasate' ('the pitcher is being revealed') as distinct from the experience 'ghatam aham jānāmi' ('I know the pitcher') shows that the revealing consciousness, the locus, of the pitcher is different from a mental mode which operates in an individual's perception of an object. The nature of the functions of vrtti depend upon the conception of jīva, the knower, and its relationship with the substratum con- sciousness, the revealer of the objects. I have been using the phrase 'substratum consciousness' which actually means sāksī-caitanya or just sāksī. Gauda Brahmānanda, Madhusūdana's commentator explains: 'the word means witness to whom every object is always revealed'.202 Very broadly speaking, the individual, jīva, is conceived by the Advaita philosophers in two ways.203 In one view, he is limited by the inner sense organ (antahkaraņa). The sāksī of the objects is then Brahman. In the other, jīva is all-pervasive. The latter view is further divided into two branches: one holds that jīva is all-pervasive, yet it is not the sāksī of the objects; the other, that jīva is all-pervasive and the material cause of the objects, hence is their substratum as well. The authors of the Vivarana, Vārtika and Samkşepa-śārīraka consider jīva to be all-pervasive and not covered by avidya.204 Although all-pervasive, jīva is by nature unrelated to any objects (asanga), so while the objects are revealed to sākșin, their material cause, jīva, (though not covered by avidyā) does not expe- rience them. According to Vācaspati Miśra, however, jīva is limited by avidyā and is the material cause of its universe. Jīva, being the locus (āśraya) of avidya, is considered by him to be the material cause. In this case, jīva, being the material cause, is the cosmic substratum consciousness, the revealer of the objects. However, some contents of experiences like happiness and sorrow are always revealed to jīva, while others, such as a pitcher, are only occasionally revealed to it. This position must be accepted. If it is not accepted, objects (like a the pitcher) would always, like emotions, appear to the jīva.205 Some followers of Vācaspati

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Miśra consider jīva to be limited by the inner sense organ. Being limited, jīva is in this case, distinct from the substratum consciousness of objects which is the all-pervasive consciousness sāksī. According to this view, jīva is not the material cause of the universe either. The functions of vrtti vary according to these concepts of nature of the cognising jīva. When jīva is consciousness limited by its inner sense organ, (the second view of the Väcaspati school), the substratum consciousness of the object, as stated earlier, is distinct from the cognising jīva. So in order to know an object jīva, has to make himself identified with sāksī, to whom all objects are always revealed. The function of the mental mode in this instance is to forge that identi- fication.206 Although avidya-vrtti can forge identification between the conscious knower and the consciousness underlying the object, until the knower's ignorance with regard to the object is removed, it cannot be revealed to him. The complica- tion arises because, from a metaphysical standpoint, even though the conscious- ness underlying each object is Brahman itself, and the cognising jīva, though limited by his inner sense organ, is still fundamentally identical with Brahman. Therefore, if mere identification between the consciousness underlying the object and the conscious knower is enough for the revelation of the objects to jīva, then the objects should have always been revealed to him. Therefore, it should be acknowledged that a mental vrtti, apart from forging an identity between object consciousness and the subject consciousness, removes the veil of ignorance from jīva with regard to the object it reveals by vrtti. According to the view propounded by the authors of Vivarana, Vārtika and Samksepa-śārīraka, the cognising jīva, being all-pervasive, is basically identical with the sāksī of objects. Jīva need not, therefore, be identified afresh with it. Identity with the substratum consciousness of objects connects jīva with the physical objects in a very general way. But being 'asanga' (i.e. not connected with objects other than avidyā, its modifications, the inner sense organ, etc.), jīva lacks special contact with the objects necessary for their revelation to its self. The reason is that, in this view, jīva is not the material cause of the universe. The physical objects are therefore not superimposed on jīva. The function of vrtti here is to remove from jiva the ignorance with regard to a particular object that is its content. The other function of vrtti may be summed up as follows: Vrtti qualifies the otherwise asanga jīva with a capacity to reveal the objects. In this context, Madhusūdana draws upon an analogy from the old school of Naiyāyikas. According to this school, all objects have a general relationship with universals such as cow-hood (gotva), but only the object marked by its dewlap, (i.e. the cow), reveals gotva. Likewise, asanga-jīva reveals an object only when it is marked by vrtti. In this way vrtti provides for a special aptitude in jīva, conducive to the revelation of the object.207 Thus the object becomes revealed to the jīva. According to the other view (i.e. the theory of delimitation of jīva, avacchedavāda of Vācaspati), jīva, being the material cause of its own universe, possesses the special contact with the object conducive to its revelation. However, as stated earlier,

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jīva is also covered by ignorance which prevents the object being revealed to it. Hence the mental mode (antahkarana vrtti ) operates only to remove that ignorance from jīva.208 Madhusūdana's opponents raise the following objections: If ignorance (ajñāna) is regarded as a single phenomenon, and if the mental mode removes this igno- rance from jīva, then a vrtti should bring about jīva's liberation, for liberation means the annihilation of jīva's ignorance. Moreover, if consciousness, as marked by for instance, a pitcher is said to be concealed by ignorance, and if the pitcher is not covered by anything,209 then concealment of the consciousness as marked by the pitcher (viśista) would virtually mean the concealment of pure conscious- ness. In such a case, the vrtti should reveal this pure consciousness. This will tantamount to instant liberation of the jīva, since, as a rule, revelation and concealment occupy the same place.210 Madhusūdana proposes several answers to the first objection. In the Siddhantabindu, he explains the function of vrtti in the following way: Just as in the analogy purported by the Mīmāmsa school, that the burning power of fire (dāhakatā śakti) is suppressed by the presence of a candrakānta gem (supposed to be capable of counteracting burning) and again becomes active when such a gem is removed, likewise vrtti does not destroy ignorance completely, but merely suppresses its power of concealing just one object, which is then revealed to the knower. When such vrtti ceases, the concealing power once again envelopes the object, so there is no question of liberation on the part of the knower by a partic- ular cognition achieved by a mental mode.211 Madhusūdana also draws upon the view of Vacaspati Miśra to answer the same question. Vācaspati classifies avidyā/ajñāna into primordial (mūlāvidyā) and its offshoots (tulāvidyā). While the former is one and its destruction brings liberation, the latter are many and are different from the former, because they are innumerable and occupy only a single object.212 Finally, Madhusūdana mentions a view, which states that vrtti destroys only individual ignorance (avasthājñāna). According to Madhusūdana, these, though identical with mūlāvidyā, are innumerable. Thus a vrtti destroys one particular case of ignorance, while the other such individual cases of ignorance remain intact.213 Madhusūdana also suggests some other views to explain the function of vrtti. Vrtti is said to take away a part (ekadeśa) of the mūlāvidyā that covered the object; or like a coward warrior, avidyā just glides away at the presence of its opponent, the vrtti; or just as a rolled-up mat exposes the object beneath it, so vrtti helps to roll up the avidya a bit at a time revealing a part of the entire phenomenal world while the rest remains concealed. It is apparent that these views draw upon physical analogies that should not apply to an extraordinary entity like avidyā.214 However, all the above views come to a common conclusion that cognition gen- erated by the function of mental mode does not destroy mūlāvidyā and therefore, the question of the knower's liberation does not arise. The answer to the second objection, that an ordinary vrtti should reveal pure consciousness, is that the vrtti of the inner sense-organ taking the shape of an

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object, can remove the ignorance regarding the substratum consciousness as appearing identified with that very object insofar as that object is concerned; however, it does not remove the individual's ignorance regarding pure Brahman. Madhusūdana describes the modus operandi of vrtti as follows: If such vrtti operates through one of the sense organs of the knower then, on the one hand, it has contact with the knower and on the other, the content of his cognition. By its contact with the knower it dispels his ignorance regarding the very existence of the object (asattv-āpādak-āvaraņa). While embracing the object of knowledge (prameya), it discards the cover of ignorance that caused the non-revelation of that very object (abhān-āpādaka-āvarana) so that the object is revealed to the cogniser as a real thing.215 The fact that at any one time an individual knower knows one particular object to the exclusion of others is borne out by the presence of a specific vrtti of a specific knower regarding a specific object.216 Such a specific vrtti establishes a specific identification between the specific individual knower and the object- consciousness that reveals the object. As the specific vrtti arises at a specific moment, the knower of the knowledge, the object of knowledge and the time of knowing the object, all become specific. When vrtti does not operate through a sense organ, that is, when knowledge of an object is indirect (paroksa), as in the case of inferential knowledge, the mental vrtti does not leave the body of the cogniser and so cannot take the shape of the object of knowledge (prameya). In this case, the vrtti resides in the body of the cogniser.217 As the vrtti does not come into direct contact with the object, it cannot remove the concealment of the revelation of that object (abhān-āpādaka- avarana). However, as it is generated in the mind of the investigating person, the vrtti can remove the covering of that investigating person which conceals the existence of the object (asattv-āpādaka-āvaraņa). Thus, as distinguished from aparoksa (direct) vrtti, which produces knowledge such as 'the pitcher exists and it reveals itself to me', paroksa (indirect) vrtti ensures only the knowledge of the pitcher's existence. It may be objected that, if from the standpoint of the opinion that vrtti is necessary for the connection of the cognising consciousness with the object- consciousness, then merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma) and Brahman should also be always revealed to the cogniser as these are directly connected with his mind/inner sense-organ. Because the latter is their locus (āśraya), so no vrtti is necessary for the direct perception of dharma, adharma and Brahman. Madhusūdana answers that, in this view, only those objects that are both trans- parent and uncovered are revealed to the cogniser and vrtti fosters those two qual- ities to its object. Brahman, though transparent, is covered to the cogniser by its ignorance and thus it waits for vrtti to remove that cover and reveal Brahman. In the case of an ordinary pitcher, vrtti removes its covering and also makes it trans- parent by pervading it. In the case of the non-transparent dharma and adharma, they are by their very nature covered so vrtti is able to remove only the cogniser's ignorance covering their existence, thus generating only indirect knowledge of

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them.218 In the case of false shell-silver, the silver is not covered but it is non-transparent. Hence vrtti is necessary to make it transparent. Even though, in the light of what has been said above, vrtti operates differently at different places, generally speaking it establishes contact (uparāga) between the cogniser and the object of cognition so that the cognitional vrtti, receives the reflection of both the cognising consciousness and the object-consciousness.219

Savikalpa and nirvikalpa pratyakșa

There are two kinds of direct knowledge, determinate, or conceptual perception, (savikalpaka pratyaksa) and indeterminate or, nonconceptual perception (nirvikalpaka pratyaksa). The former means the direct knowledge of an object that reveals the substance in terms of its attributes. For example, the knowledge 'the pitcher is red' reveals both the substance - the pitcher - and the attribute - its red colour. It also discloses their relationship with regard to identity. However, in the latter, the experience does not reveal the differentiated nature of the object, for instance, pitcher and its attribute, redness. In other words, nirvikalpa pratyaksa presents the object to the cogniser as an integral whole (akhandārtha) without any reference to its substance and attributes. In the Upanisadic sentence 'tat tvam asi', (you are it), Advaita-vedānta claims, each of the words 'tat', (it) and 'tvam', (you) and the verb to be (asi), produces nirvikalpa pratyaksa and presents an akhandartha, while the whole sentence also generates nirvikalpa pratyaksa knowledge of pure Brahman without any reference to the attributes of either 'it' or, 'you' or to any relationship between them; or any reference to the time, or space of their existence. This is a very important notion because this and three other Upanisadic statements designated as mahā vākya (great sentence) are to produce the gnosis of the unqualified and undifferentiated Brahman by removing the error of all differentiated cognitions. As previously stated, vrtti in general dispels the veil of ignorance embracing an object. As the nature of Brahman, the ultimate reality, is concealed from jīva, a vrtti should legitimately be drawn upon to discard this veil of ignorance. According to the Advaita-vedānta, such a vrtti embraces the identity between jīva and Brahman. This identity is called akhandartha, the integral monolithic meaning. It may be noted here that the vrtti we are concerned with is an aparoksa (direct) vrtti, insofar as it is intended to discard jīva's ignorance regarding Brahman, so that Brahman is revealed to him. Since the veiling ignorance of a person regarding Brahman is direct, the vrtti has to be direct as well, because only the direct vrtti dispels the veiling nescience. For example, in the case of an error regarding direction (dig-bhranti), it is only dispelled by direct knowledge about the direction. Such a direct vrtti is recognised by the Advaita-vedānta to emerge, as referred to before, from great Upanișadic statements such as 'tat tvam asi' and 'aham Brahmāsmi' (I am Brahman). In other words, even though such modal cognition is a type of direct knowledge that dispels primordial avidya, it is still a form of verbal cognition. Therefore an objection may be raised as to how a verbal statement can

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produce direct knowledge. The answer put forward by Madhusūdana is that word (śabda) can indeed produce direct knowledge,220 although it generally generates indirect knowledge. Just as sometimes mind produces indirect knowledge and at other times direct knowledge, so also śabda sometimes produces direct knowl- edge, while at other times it produces indirect knowledge. In connection with sound producing direct knowledge, the following situation deserves considera- tion. Ten people cross a river. When they reach the other side, each one counts the number of heads to check that they have all safely crossed the river. But each one commits the same error of omitting himself from the count. Another person comes along and requests one of the original ten to count again. The man counts, and repeats the same mistake. The other person then says to the counter, 'you are the tenth person' and removes his mistake. All ten people committed the same error of direct illusion (aparoksa bhrama). Such a mistake can be rectified by contradictory knowledge, which is equally direct. Just as the person counting is disillusioned by the criticism of that eleventh person, he has to admit that the statement 'you are the tenth person' has yielded direct knowledge (aparoksa jñāna), which has discarded his direct error. This demonstrates that even though śabda usually produces indirect knowledge, when a statement is applied to estab- lish identity between one meaning of a constituent word and another presented by the word 'tvam', such a statement produces direct knowledge. Seen in this light, sentences like 'you are the tenth' (daśama-s-tvama asi); 'you are the king' (rājā tvam asi), making somebody realise his hitherto unknown royal identity, and 'tat tvam asi' revealing the individual's true identity, will all yield direct knowl- edge. On the other hand, a statement like 'the blue jug' (nīlo ghatah) will produce indirect knowledge. Though this statement produces an identity between the blue colour and the pitcher, neither 'blue' nor 'the pitcher' conveys the meaning of total identity like the sentences shown above. Moreover, this interpretation of those śrutis producing akhandārtha is not baseless. Scriptures such as 'tad-dh-āsya vijajñau', 'tamasaḥ pāram darśayati' and 'vedānta vijnnāna suniścitārtha',221 also confirm that sentences like 'tat tvam asi' produce direct knowledge of an individual's identity with absolute Brahman. The first two scriptural quotations show that only scriptural teaching can generate direct knowledge of the absolute Brahman. In the third, the word 'vijñāna' indicates that Vedantic teaching can produce knowledge of absolute Brahman, while the word 'suniścitārtha' denotes that such knowledge is direct.222 The question is, how can verbal knowledge, that generally embraces a sub- stance in relation to certain attributes, comprehend 'akhandartha', the integral monolithic meaning which apparently disallows all consideration of relationship? Because, every sentence by definition shows the relationship between the different parts of speech in order to produce a coherent sense. To answer this question, Citsukha223 states that when a sentence having non- synonymous words (aparyāya śabda) presents an integrated and monolithic meaning without any reference to their intra-relationship, such as that exists between the parts of speech in a sentence, that sentence is said to have an integral

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sense (akhandartha). In other words, when the constituent words of a sentence denote the meaning of one substance which is looked upon as a mere stem (prāti- padika), without any reference to the syntactical inflexions usual in a grammatical sentence, those words are taken to yield akhandartha. Thus, for example, in the sentence prakrsta-prakāsah candrah (moon, the marvellous light), the word 'prakrstaprakāsah' denotes only the object, the moon, as the stem chandra indicates that it is unrelated to anything. In this light, the words 'tat' and 'tvam' in the sentence 'tat tvam asi' present mere consciousness without any reference to any relation- ship. It may be noted here that such meaning is obtained only with reference to the words' secondary meaning (laksanā).224 Madhusūdana's definition of akhandārtha largely follows that of Citsukha. According to Madhusūdana, 'when non-synonymous words constituting a sen- tence convey an integrated meaning in such a way that the sentence itself does not present any additional meaning of the relationships between the parts of speech as the content of a valid cognition, but only presents the unitary meaning recalled by the powers of the same constituent words, it is said to be a case of akhandārtha'225 ('aparyāya śabdānām padavrttismāritātiriktāgocara pramājanakatvam). Hence, his innovation lies in his mentioning that 'the sentence itself does not present any additional meaning of the relationship as its content' (padavrttismāritātiriktāgo- cara). When a sentence produces verbal knowledge, (śābdabodha) such knowl- edge normally involves inter-relations between the meanings of the words constituting the sentence. Thus, for example, the sentence 'nilo ghatah' presents the cognition that 'blue colour and the pitcher are identical'. Here the relationship between the meanings of the words 'nīla' and 'ghatah' regarding identity is embraced by the sentence 'nilo ghatah'. As to the presentation of the interrelation in the verbal cognition, there are two prevailing theories in the Mīmāmsa school, known as 'anvitābhidhānavāda' and 'abhihitānvayavāda', respectively held by the Prabhākara's school of Mīmāmsakas and the Bhatta Kumārila's school of Mīmāmsakas. According to the former view, the denotative power (śakti) of the words constituting a sentence presents, in the verbal cognition, both the substantive meanings and their interrelations. The process may be described in the following way, using the sentence 'nīlo ghatah' (the blue pitcher), as an example. The word 'nīla', when heard, produces the knowldge that 'nila' denotes blue which is understood as the śakti, power of that word. This cognition of śakti, in turn, pres- ents to the memory the colour blue. According to the Mīmāmsa school, memory not only embraces the colour blue, but this colour in relation to another object (which is in this case the pitcher, 'ghatah'). This is also the case with the word 'ghatah'. Thus the meanings of both 'nila' and 'ghatah' are revealed in the verbal cognition in terms of a special relationship of identity - the colour blue is identical with the pitcher. Furthermore, it is stated that every word in a sentence possesses two śaktis, one revealing its direct meaning-content and the other its relationship with the meaning-contents of other words. A solitary word, com- pletely independent of a sentence, does not convey any proper meaning. While the

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first śakti, being known, presents the substantive, the second śakti by itself, (i.e. without being known), presents the relationship. As distinguished from the first śakti, the second śakti is called 'kubjā śakti' (bent or restricted word-power), since this sakti itself remains outside the verbal cognition. Hence, according to this theory, even though the interrelationship is presented by the sakti of the words, this interrelationship is not recalled (smārita) by means of the cognition of śaktis of the words.226 The abhihitānvayavāda explains the cognition of relationship in verbal knowledge in the following way: Starting with the same statement 'nilo ghatah', they expound that the word 'nila' presents the colour blue to the memory of the cog- niser (but not any relationships). Likewise, the word 'ghatah' presents to the cogniser in a second memory the form of the pitcher (but not its relationship with the other). It may be noted here that even though the first and second memory comprehend the colour blue and the pitcher respectively, the subsequent verbal cognition embraces not only the blue colour and the pitcher, but their relationship of identity as well. The question is how does the relationship of identity appear in the verbal cognition? If verbal knowledge is confined to the meanings presented by the verbal vrtti, then a vrtti has to be accounted for, which gives rise to the aforementioned relationship of identity. The Bhätta-school maintains that while śakti presents the primary meaning of a noun, that is - the colour blue - while its secondary meaning, (laksanā) presents the relationship of identity. According to this school, such a laksaņā is itself a relationship (śakyasambandha) between, on the one hand, the primary meaning presented by sakti and, on the other, the rela- tionship of identity revealed in the verbal cognition.227 Seen in this light - every verbal cognition involves a secondary meaning insofar as it comprehends the relationship that cannot be presented by śakti. Sakti ceases to operate immediately after it has presented the substantive meaning of the word. The secondary mean- ing, however, like the second śakti of the Anvitābhidhānavādins, presents by itself, without any reference to the intended relationship in the verbal cognition. The extent of the function of this secondary meaning is regulated by the expectancy (ākāmksā) existing in the words. Such expectancy determines in the verbal cognition the precise contents, including their mutual relationship.228 Both these views agree that interrelationship (samsarga) between words- constituents of a sentence which a verbal cognition reveals, is not recalled (smārita) by the power of denotation of the constituent words of a sentence. At the same time, however, both views maintain that revelation of relationship in a verbal cognition is brought about by the cognising mental mode, primary meaning (abhidhā) in one view and secondary meaning (lakșaņā ) in the other. The Advaita-vedänta holds that an interrelated meaning is not necessarily conveyed in each and every sentence. There may be some cases of sentences that present a monolithic meaning without any scope of such relationship. In most cases, verbal cognition does involve relationship, but other cases are conceivable where verbal cognition may not involve any relationship at all, but may be strictly confined to the knowledge of a single substantive. The secular statement

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'prakrstaprakāśaścandra', and the Vedic statement 'tat tvam asi', are both illustrations of the latter kind of knowledge. Using the conclusions of both the Mīmāmsā schools,229 Madhusūdana states that while ordinary verbal knowledge comprehends an entity (relationship) which is not recalled to memory by means of 'padavrtti', that is, verbal cognition, the similar knowledge emerging from sentences like 'tat tvam asi' does not comprehend an additional entity, namely, relationship, apart from the meanings of the pure substantive of constituent words. A sentence that does not allow any interrelationship between the meanings of its constituent parts, is said to present an integral meaning, (akhandārtha). Hence any shadow of duality emerging from its verbal cognition is ruled out. Madhusūdana adopts Citsukha's definition of akhandārtha as an alternative one without making any substantial change. The commentator, Brahmānanda, while elucidating on the concept of Madhusūdana on this definition, states that sometimes words, by their secondary connotative meaning alone, produce a ver- bal cognition of just a single substantive (prātipadikārtha).230 It should be noted that the words constituting a sentence that yield such akhandartha must be non- synonymous. For example, the words 'satyam', 'jñanam' and 'anantam' in the Vedic statement 'satyamjñānamanantam Brahma', through their laksaņā-śakti, refer to one substantive, namely pure Brahman, although by their primary meaning they denote different entities. Thus, satyam means reality as marked by the absence of falsity, jñanam means the same reality marked by the absence of ignorance and anantam means the reality as marked by the absence of any limitation. As stated before, akhandartha is the intended meaning of sentences like 'tat tvam asi'. The realisation of such meaning is the goal of the Vedānta teachings insofar as it dispels the primordial ignorance of the knower regarding the true nature of Brahman. However, an analysis of the process of the verbal cognition which comprehends the integral meaning, will disclose that such verbal cognition is dependant upon the cognition of the meaning of 'tat' and 'tvam', the constituent words of 'tat tvam asi'. In other words, the knower must first be sure about the meaning (sakti) of the words 'tat' and 'tvam', before he realises the integral meaning in the verbal cognition arising from the sentence. The determination of the meaning of 'tat' and 'tvam', which is thus a prerequisite of verbal knowledge, is recognised by the Advaita-vedänta school to be another form of verbal knowl- edge. Thus a Vedic statement like 'satyamjñānamanantam Brahma'231 is said to present the knowledge of 'tat', which is undoubtedly a verbal knowledge, and is also stated to comprehend an akhandārtha, namely pure Brahman. This akhandārtha refers to the meaning of a single part of speech in a sentence, in view of the fact that it is the meaning of the word 'tat' of the sentence 'tat tvam asi', though it also denotes the meaning of a whole sentence, being the meaning of the sentence 'satyamjñānamanantam Brahma'.232 It may be noted here that a Vedic sentence like 'satyamjñānanmanantam Brahma' yields an akhandārtha which serves the purpose of understanding the meaning of 'tat tvam asi', which presents a second akhandartha emerging from that sentence. In this way, the first sentence

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sub-serves the purpose of the second and therefore is subordinate to it. Akhandārtha is therefore of two types, the first called 'padartha', that is, the verbal cognition of a word in a sentence, and the second known as 'vākyārtha', that is, the verbal cognition of a sentence.233 As the sentence 'Brahman is truth, knowledge and eternity', (Satyamjñānamanantam Brahma), is a definition of Brahman and is given in answer to the question on the nature of pure Brahman, so this statement has to denote absolute Brahman, which is the meaning of the word 'that', (tat) in the sentence 'that you are' (tat tvam asi). This is the akhandartha belonging to the word 'tat'. Similarly, the sentence 'tat tvam asi' presents an akhandārtha, whose meaning does not itself involve any distinction between the constituent words, 'tat' and 'tvam', as related to one another by, for example, cause and effect, but embraces an identical substantive connoted by the two words, namely, the one and the same Brahman. Hence the meaning of this sentence does not involve any kind of relationship.234 Madhusūdana examines two objections against the conclusion that a Vedic statement like 'satyamjñānamanantam Brahma' presents akhandārtha through laksanā. The first objection is that if the constituent words of a sentence do not present a relationship in the verbal cognition, they cannot constitute a sentence. The words of a sentence must possess ākāmksā (expectancy), yogyatā (congruity) and asatti or sannidhi (proximity), all of which involve relationship.235 The second objection is that if the words in the sentence 'satyamjñānamanantam Brahma' do not involve any relationship, then there can be no secondary mean- ing, laksanā. According to some scholars, lakșanā is the presentation of an object which is revealed in the verbal cognition in relation to another object and which is not the denotative meaning of a word. The root cause of such a presentation is the apparent incongruity of relationship between the denotative meanings of the words.236 Thus laksanā always involves a relationship. Both these objections are based on the description of verbal knowledge held by the Naiyāyikas. In answer to the first objection, Madhusūdana states that all three conditions of a sentence, namely akāmksā, yogyatā and āsatti, exist in the words 'satyamjñāna- manantam Brahma', yet they present the akhandartha, that is, absolute Brahman, in the verbal cognition. Ākāmksā is that condition without which the words can- not present the intended meaning (tātparyārtha) of the sentence. Seen in this light, ākāmksā does not involve any contact (anvaya). This intended meaning may sometimes include relationship (samsrsta) for example, 'the blue pitcher', and sometimes akhandārtha for example, 'satyamjñānamanantam Brahma'. Such ākamkșā exists in the four words of the sentence 'satyamjñānamanantam Brahma', which then present an integral meaning in the verbal cognition, and thus constitute a sentence.237 Likewise, by proximity, Madhusūdana means the presentation of words in a favourable juxtaposition to the verbal cognition.238 Therefore, proximity does not necessarily involve any relationship and can exist in the words belonging to 'satyamjñanamanantam Brahma' without this aspect. On the other hand, congruity (yogyatā), means non-contradictoriness in

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the subject of import (tātparyārtha), hence it may remain even in a case of akhandārtha, which does not involve any relationship. Therefore, Madhusūdana concludes that even though the words belonging to the sentence 'satyamjñāna- manantam Brahma' present an akhandartha in the verbal cognition, they may still possess all three qualities of ākāmksā, yogyatā and āsatti, which enable them to present intended meaning. In answer to the second objection, Madhusūdana states that the secondary meaning is not by itself presented through the intended meaning (laksyārtha), but it is the verbal mode (vrtti) that persists in the relationship (sakyasambandha) between the literal meaning (väcyartha) and the secondary or intended meaning (laksyārtha). As the Advaitins maintain that there is a false relationship subsisting between the väcyrtha and the laksyārtha of the said words, there is no harm in admitting laksaņā here. Moreover, the root cause of admitting a laksaņā is the incongruity in the intended meanings of the words (tātparyārthānupapatti). Thus a laksanā does not necessarily involve interrelated sentential meaning.239

Sākși-jñāna

The discussion has thus far been focused on experiences where the knower is an individual and the experiences are related to the functions of his mind. But beyond the fold of this type of knowledge, remain some other kinds of experience which are regarded by the Advaitins as sāksi-jñāna.240 A pitcher may exist whether or not it is cognised. On the other hand, happiness cannot exist without being cognised at the same time. There is, therefore, a practical distinction between the cognition of a pitcher and the cognition of happiness. The question arises as to what is the difference between these two types of knowledge. The nature of the pitcher or that of happiness cannot be adduced as an explanation for this difference, since the nature itself varies from pitcher to pitcher, or from hap- piness to happiness. Likewise, the knowledge of the pitcher is as distinct from the knowledge of happiness as is the knowledge of cloth. Is it possible to state, there- fore, that the nature of cloth explains the difference of knowledge? If so, then the nature of cloth is a second differential, apart from the nature of the pitcher. So it is clear that there is no one consistent (anugata) criterion that may be held out to distinguish the knowledge of the pitcher from the knowledge of happiness. Therefore, the differential must be found elsewhere. For example, it may be said that the difference between the two types of knowledge occurs because there is a difference between the two types of cognitive mode involved in such knowledge. Thus, while knowledge of the pitcher is brought about by a mental mode, the knowledge of happiness is said to result from a mode of avidyā. As is put forward earlier in this chapter, in ordinary cognition the knower's inner sense organ functions in a way that the ignorance covering the object from the knower's awareness is removed, thereby revealing the object to him. In this sense, the mode of the inner sense organ is called 'valid cognitive mode' (pramānavrtti), which is instrumental to his valid knowledge regarding a particular

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object. On the other hand, as happiness can never be concealed from the individual who experiences it, that which is experiencing such happiness has to be recog- nised as being a different entity from the knower of an ordinary object like the pitcher. The distinct reality that experiences happiness is called sāksī. However, sāksī is not only distinct from an individual but also from pure Brahman. The reason for this is that sāksī-knowledge, for instance, the experience of happiness, is as fleeting as the knowledge of the pitcher and not at all like Brahman-knowledge. The ordinary cognition of an object, say a pitcher depends upon the cognitive mode of the inner sense organ. Brahman-knowledge involves no modal function of any phenomenon; but sāksī-knowledge requires to be con- ditioned (upahita) by the modal function of avidyā, (avidyā-vrtti). However, as it is not ever contradicted sāksī-knowledge is accepted as valid. In fact validity or non-validity is generally associated with ordinary knowledge like the knowledge of a pitcher, sāksī-knowledge is taken to be free from such consideration. Sākşī-knowledge has its parallel in the introspection (mānasapratyakșa) and recognition (anuvyavasāya) of the Naiyāyikas. It corresponds to the intuitive knowledge (prātibhakajñana) of the Saiva school of thought and the dhvani of the school of poetics, in which 'rasa' is cognised as long as it exists.

Knowledge is self-revealed (svaprakāśa)

The function of vrtti is already established as the removal of the ignorance covering the object that it embraces. Besides this, some scholars posit that vrtti forges a contact between the object-consciousness and the knower, while others hold that it produces identity between the object-consciousness and the cognising consciousness. Whatever the function of vrtti may be, it is evident that it is not the revealer of the object. Objects are always revealed by consciousness, as conditioned by vrtti.241 This is known as the knowledge of an object. So who is the revealer of this knowledge? It is stated that knowledge is self-revealed (svaprakāśa). This is the distinction between consciousness and ordinary insen- sate objects. While insensate objects are revealed (drśya) by external conscious- ness, consciousness is not; it reveals its own self as well as the objects that come into contact with such consciousness. Hence self-luminosity (svaprakāśatva) is the basic feature of knowledge. Whenever knowledge is produced, it becomes revealed, just like a lamp which, as well as its own self, reveals the objects that come into contact with it. Madhusūdana defines self-luminosity of knowledge as follows:

While a pitcher requires knowledge for its revelation, knowledge does not require other knowledge for its own revelation. On the contrary, it is self-revealed. Technically speaking, while the pitcher is apt to be revealed by consciousness (phalavyāpya), consciousness does not require this element, so it is called self-revealed.242

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Madhusūdana proposes another definition of the self-revelation of knowledge:

Knowledge does not, for its revelation, require another knowledge; because knowledge by itself provides for such usage as 'knowledge is revealed' (aparokşavyavahārayogyatvam).243 Knowledge is therefore self-luminous insofar as it yields to usage based on direct knowledge, even though it is not comprehended by other knowledge.

Thus, although the pitcher and consciousness seem to be on a par, in that both are liable to direct usage based on direct knowledge, yet, while the pitcher requires a valid vrtti for its revelation, consciousness does not. However, the same con- sciousness cannot be both the knower and the known, for such a relationship pre- supposes a distinction between the knower and the known, which is not true in the case of consciousness.244 Therefore, it is necessary to explain what a valid knowl- edge really is and how it functions. Knowledge is, in fact, the reflection of consciousness on a vrtti. As reflection is identical with the object being reflected, so knowledge is not different from consciousness, that is, pure Brahman. Brahman is self-revealed in the sense that even when not directly known, unlike an ordinary object, it is still liable to be used, as is in the verbal knowledge, 'I am Brahman'. Likewise, though not properly understood to the extent of its real nature, knowledge is still liable to be used as revealed in the form 'I have knowledge of the pitcher'.245 To prove the self-luminosity of knowledge, Madhusūdana proposes two inferences:

1 Knowledge is, by its essence, not the object of consciousness, that is, not pervaded by 'phala' (the result of a valid vrtti), because knowledge is consciousness. 2 Knowledge that is unknown, that is, unrevealed by the 'phala', is still capable of being used, because knowledge is consciousness (anubhūti).

The argument runs thus - 'that which is pervaded by the result of a cognition, or in other words, that which is the content of a cognition, becomes liable to direct usage, yet is not consciousness, e.g., the pitcher'.246 This argument is a case of a syllogism where the middle premise is a negative (vyatireka247) one. The main argument in favour of these inferences is that knowledge, being consciousness, cannot be the object of consciousness; that is, knowledge cannot be the object of its own self or of another knowledge. Opponents of this theory state that there are cases where an entity does become its own object. For example, the mental endeavour (krti) exerted on performing an action (kriyā), is itself an action. Likewise, the knower himself becomes the known, as in the case of the experience 'I know myself'. Such experience shows that the relationship between the object and the subject does not always require the duality of the knower and

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the known. Nor does this relationship require that the two entities must exist when knowledge takes place, since, in the case of knowledge of an object that is destroyed or that of a non-existing object such as a sky-flower, the objects do not exist yet their knowledge is still an undeniable fact. Thus there are some entities, such as those mentioned above, that become objects of their own selves.248 Consciousness is therefore on a par with them. Madhusūdana meets this problem in the following way: It is a fact that usage such as 'this is a jug', is based upon previous knowledge of the jug. An object must be known before a statement is made about it. In order to make this rule applica- ble to the usage - 'this is consciousness' - it has to be presumed that this knowl- edge, the content of this usage, has also been revealed by knowledge. The question then arises, is the knowledge that reveals the first knowledge - the content of the usage - identical with the first knowledge or, is it a separate reality? The admis- sion of a separate reality would raise the same question with regard to the second knowledge as well, and so on, so there would be no settlement of the issue (anavasthā). It should be accepted, therefore, that the so-called second knowledge that reveals the first knowledge is, in fact, not a second knowledge after all, but the self-revelation of the first knowledge. The acceptance of such a position amounts to the admission of a nature (svabhāva) of knowledge, which enables it to reveal itself so that it may be liable to direct usage. Madhusūdana therefore contends that the general rule - 'usage of an object requires previous knowledge of it' - need not be applicable to knowledge itself. Therefore, for the sake of this rule, the revela- tion of knowledge by its own self need not be recognised. Unlike the pitcher, knowledge is self-revealed insofar as it conduces to a direct usage, namely 'this is consciousness', without knowledge being previously known. Thus far, the self-luminosity of knowledge has been discussed on the basis of the presumption that knowledge is basically consciousness itself. However, parallel to this concept of knowledge, another notion exists in which knowledge means valid cognition obtained through the function of a valid mental mode. This raises the question if the validity of the valid knowledge requires some other valid cognition. To avoid this problem knowledge is taken to be self-valid. The self- validity of knowledge may be considered in two ways: First, validity of knowledge is produced by the same conditions that produce the knowledge itself. Second, the knowledge that reveals the first knowledge invariably reveals the validity of the second knowledge. Both issues are dealt with separately in the following.

Self-validity of knowledge in its origin

Validity of knowledge is self-produced in the sense that the conditions for the production of knowledge are the same for the production of validity in that knowl- edge.249 However, when a dosa (fault) affects those conditions of knowledge, it prevents the production of (valid) knowledge and instead produces an error. For example, in the case of a piece of shell taken for silver in the shell-silver illusion,

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although all conditions for the production of knowledge are present, the existence of distance plays the role of dosa and prevents the production of knowledge of shell. In summary, therefore, it is unnecessary to search for a separate cause for the production of validity of knowledge, since whenever knowledge is produced it is valid. On the other hand, error is denied the opportunity to become knowledge, and the existence of a special impediment in the conditions of the production of knowledge is presumed to justify the production of an error.250

Validity of knowledge in the comprehension

The same knowledge that reveals the first knowledge reveals the validity of this knowledge.251 Thus, when a knower has an experience such as 'I know the pitcher', at the same time he also knows that that knowledge he possesses about the pitcher is valid. This is known as the self-validity of knowledge at the point of its revelation. This conclusion may appear inconsistent, as knowledge sometimes grasps even an error. The answer is that knowledge whose validity is under con- sideration is intended here as a cognition involving a mental mode. On the other hand, error is a mode of avidya. Thus, from this standpoint, error is not knowledge at all. Hence, the question of its validity does not arise. That, knowledge in this context refers to the cognition generated only by a valid mental mode, is borne out by the fact that such knowledge is taken here to be contradictory to ignorance.252 Knowledge, which is contradictory to error, cannot be error itself. An objection may be raised that if an error is not knowledge, then how can such an undeniable experience as 'I have an illusory knowledge' be justified? Such an experience unmistakably shows that error is also a form of knowledge. Madhusūdana meets the question in the following way: In the case of the error, 'this is silver' ('idam rajatam') there are two vrttis, one is the mental mode embracing 'this' (idam) and the other, avidya-vrtti, embracing 'silver' (rajatam). The avidya-vrtti embracing 'silver' becomes falsely identified with the mental-vrtti embracing 'this'. The character of knowledge (jñanatva) that exists in mental- vrtti is falsely ascribed to avidyā-vrtti. Thus avidyā-vrtti is not knowledge by itself, merely a semblance of knowledge (jñānābhāsa).253 As stated previously, the question of self-validity of knowledge is a real one when knowledge is taken to mean mental-vrtti. The same question might be taken to be relevant when knowledge is recognised to be consciousness and not merely a mental-vrtti. The answer is that knowledge as consciousness (caitanya) is neither produced nor known, so the question of the self-validity of that knowl- edge, both in its origin (utpatti) and its comprehension (jñapti), does not arise. For such a question to be allowed at all, the answer should be formulated in terms of vrtti, which serves as a condition of consciousness and which entertains the question of validity in the light stated earlier. The self-validity of such vrtti- knowledge in its comprehension is revealed in the knowledge of sāksī, in the sense that every object, consciously or unconsciously, is revealed to the sākșī

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(sarvam vastu jñātatayā ajñātatayā vā sākşi-bhāsyam). But the knowledge of sāksī does not make its object known to the cognising jīva. Thus, even though the validity of knowledge is revealed to the sāksī, along with that knowledge itself, the true identity of knowledge remains unknown to the cognising jīva. In this way, such knowledge remains valid, inasmuch as it presents an unknown object to the jīva.

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4

BRAHMAN

The chapter on knowledge and epistemology introduces the binary division of the world of experience; these are drk, perceiver and drśya, perceived. Brahman as the pure consciousness comes within the first category and so do other forms of consciousness empirically conceived to explain the world and its experience. These are God (Iśvara), the creator and the saviour; Sāksī, totally passive but omniscient consciousness who reveals every phenomenon; and finally, the indi- vidual person who is the subject of every perception. The second category is the phenomenal world that forms the content of an individual's perceptions. At the top of the first category is Brahman, the totally transcendent, unquali- fied and unchangeable consciousness - for Advaita-vedānta the unique reality. For these reasons other forms of consciousness had to be devised. Behind the variegated world stands Brahman, the Absolute Being. Philosophy is the relentless pursuit of truth, and truth, according to the Advaita-vedānta, is Brahman. Thus knowledge of Brahman is the main subject taught in Advaita-vedānta. The truth or reality is absolute and one, infinite and indeterminate. That which 'is' must always be. Existence is absolutely unlimited by any condition. Therefore, Brahman as truth is completely free from any limitation (pariccheda) imposed by time (kāla), space (deśa) or matter (vastu). As any kind of limit spoils the absoluteness of reality, the universe, full of limitations, is held to be unreal. This is also the case with individual selves. As avidyā's creation, they become sub- jected to the limitation of time, space and matter. Being themselves created by Brahman these phases cannot limit Brahman. Absolute Brahman is the root cause of the entire creation and the ground upon which the structure of the universe stands. Brahman is the creator, the sustainer and the re-absorber of the multitudi- nous universe in so far as Brahman is the locus of avidya, which causes these activities. When avidyā is active, pure Brahman is designated God (Iśvara). Brahman, as God (Iśvara), the designer, the origin and the controller of this universe, is conceived of as transcendental as well as immanent. Underlying this phenomenal world, Brahman exists as the very essence of its existence. It pro- vides the illusion of existence to the non-existent universe; but that does not mean that Brahman is exhausted in the universe. While enduring through the universe, Brahman transcends it at the same time. The very name 'Brahman' suggests its

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pervasiveness, its immense reach, whereas the universe is small and inadequate. The essence of Brahman is its oneness and its nature of Absolute Existence, Absolute Knowledge and Absolute Bliss. At the time of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, Brahman's nature as existence and knowledge was already established. The only questions were whether this exis- tence was unique and absolute and whether Brahman could also be regarded as Bliss. This concerned mainly the dualist followers of bhakti theology. Vyāsarāja, the great scholar of Madhva school of Vaisnavas, attacked the Advaita concept of the unqualified Brahman with particular vehemence. With great polemical skill he refuted this view of identity of Brahman with the world of conscious and unconscious beings and established the real difference (bheda) between Brahman and the individuals, on one hand, and with other worldly phenomena, on the other. Madhusūdana answered each point made by Vyāsarāja and refuted this with formal style of argumentation.255 As both Vyāsarāja and Madhusūdana followed the contemporary neo-logicians' style, I have presented here these arguments in somewhat detailed form. Madhusūdana, therefore, starts with the proposition that Brahman is the reality without a second and is the culmination of Bliss.256 The pressing demand of the Vaisnavas at that time was the establishment of the reality of the individual selves and of the outer world. They also stressed the blissfulness of the divine communion between God/Brahman and the individual self as God's devotee. To refute this dualistic theory of devotion cherished by the Vaisnavas and the qualified nature of Brahman, which they held as the highest truth, required great polemical skill and deep knowledge in religious and philosophical śāstras. Madhusūdana argues that the true nature of Brahman can be known from the scriptures alone because the limited knowledge of the individual fails to compre- hend the unlimited and unqualified nature of Brahman, the Absolute.257 The scripture describes Brahman as the omniscient consciousness, unique and unqual- ified (sāksī cetā kevalo nirgunaśca).258 All but one of these features show the real nature of Brahman, with omniscience (Sāksī) held to be only an incidental quality (tatastha laksana). Thus the idea of the qualified Brahman is negated. The contention of the Vaisnavas, with their faith in the qualified Brahman as the highest truth, is that because scripture promotes worship of the self - (ātmetyevopāsīta)259, any texts260 depicting the self to be unqualified and so forth has only a subordinate significance (arthavāda). Therefore, these latter scriptural texts aim only to praise the self and have nothing to teach. On the other hand, there are several scriptural texts that establish the qualified nature of Brahman. For example, the scripture asserts that Brahman possesses great attributes - 'brhanto- 'sya dharmāh'. Vedic passages describing Brahman as attributeless are then ancillary to the passages confirming Brahman's qualified nature. It is there- fore inadmissible that the texts depicting qualified Brahman should be discarded in favour of those describing Brahman as unqualified and without attributes. Passages such as 'ya ātmā'pahatapāpmā ... satyakāmāḥ satyasamkalpa so'nveș țavyaḥ ca vijijñāsitavya'261 clearly show that Brahman does possess real attributes. The scripture states that these qualities are eternal virtues of Brahman. Vedic

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texts, stating that 'the knowledge of Supreme self is eternal, the activity is eternal and its strength is also eternal (jñānam nityam kriyā nityā balam nityam parāt- manah)', clearly establish the eternity of Brahman's qualities. The scripture emphasises that such qualities cannot be conditional (aupādhika) because knowl- edge, activity and strength are natural to Brahman.262 Passages depicting Brahman as one or identical with the individual self263 or positing that the uni- verse is false264 should be taken as just hypothesis offered only to be refuted. So that the assertion that Brahman is 'not without attribute' etc. become understand- able in the light of these passages. Statements contained in Vedic literature, such as 'in the beginning it was indeed nonexistent', 'asad vā idamagra āsit' and 'the two birds ... ', 'dva suparna'265 establish the following:

1 The reality of the universe. 2 The negation of absolute Brahman by denying its reality. 3 The difference between Brahman and the individual self by negating their identity.

Therefore, in order to introduce the positive counterparts of these negations, the śruti must describe them. Thus, by the statement 'neha nānāsti kiñcana'266 the śruti first lays down the falsity of the universe, then negates it by stating - 'Viśvam satyam'. Likewise, the śruti first describes absolute Brahman - 'satyam jñānamanantam Brahma' - only to negate it by the statement, 'asadevedam'. The relationship between jīva and Brahman is posited in the śruti as 'tat tvam asi' in order to negate it in 'dvā suparņā'. Therefore, passages such as 'neha nānāsti, 'tat tvamasi' or 'satyam jñānam', should not be taken at face value. In fact, the śruti always stresses meditation, upāsanā, even of the unqualified.267 Vācaspati also maintains that the Supreme self is suitable for dhyāna, that is meditation and that is, upāsanā.268 Thus the śruti has chosen the qualified Brahman as real and eternal. Indeed, unless Brahman is regarded as qualified there cannot be any enquiry about it, as an enquiry presupposes a subject matter describable in terms of attributes (idamittham). Thus even in the face of the conception of unqualified Brahman as depicted in some Vedic texts, the qualified Brahman is the purport of the scripture. Here ends the opponent's objections. The non-dualist's answers to these arguments are as follows: The Vedic passages such as 'brhanto'sya dharmāh', when referring to the qualified Brahman, are for the purpose of upāsanā only, as it is seen conducive to arrive at the self-realisation that is mukti. Väcaspati also meant that, as his commentator, the author of the Kalpataru explains, 'people who are slow to realize the supreme Brahman, first prepare their minds by the upāsanā of the qualified Brahman. Thus when their minds become purified, therein is revealed the real self of absolute Brahman, devoid of all limitations'.269 Evidently the qualified Brahman, as described by the śruti, must be regarded as possessing conditional reality, while absolute Brahman is unconditional and absolute. However, this is not apparent in the following passages

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taken from two particular śruti: 'sadeva saumya idamagra āsiť'270 and 'asad vā idamagra sit' 271 In each case the word idam refers to the universe, meaning that before creation the universe was identical to the ultimate and unmanifest reality; thus although manifested after the creation, the universe is unreal. Therefore, the śrutis cannot mean that both qualified Brahman and unqualified Brahman are ultimately real. To avoid mutual contradiction within the śrutis272 Madhusūdana concludes that qualified Brahman possesses empirical reality whereas unquali- fied and unlimited Brahman has absolute reality. Therefore, śrutis such as 'brhanto'sya dharmāh' and 'kevalo nirgunaśca' cannot be condemned as commu- nicating contradictory theories. As for the śruti establishing the eternality of Brahman's knowledge, strength and activity (as in 'jñānam nityam', for example), the knowledge of Brahman forms the very core of Brahman, thus it is identical with Brahman. The eternality of Brahman's strength and activity is stated only figuratively because these attributes are not ultimately real. They are said to be eternal inasmuch as they persist until the dawning of ultimate realisation of the true self. Hence, empirically they are eternal, because so long as the concept of time exists, they also exist. The opponents of this theory contend that:

1 The śruti, 'neha nānāsti kiñcana,' do not establish the falsity of the universe, but merely supply the positive counterpart (abhāva pratiyogin) of the negation of falsity of the universe purported by the śruti 'viśvam satyam'. 2 The śruti 'tat tvam asi' instead of testifying the identity between jīva and Brahman merely provides the positive counterpart, which is negated in the śruti, 'dvā suparņā'. 3 The śruti, 'satyam jñānam' does not evince the validity of the absolute Brahman. It only supplies the positive counterpart that which is negated in the śruti 'asadeva idamagra āsiť' 273

Madhusūdana answers these criticisms by stating that the śrutis such as 'all these are just Brahman' (Brahmaivedam sarvam)274 and 'neha nānāsti kiñcana' estab- lish the falsity of the universe, demonstrating that the śrutis are inclined towards the view that the world is not real. Moreover, 'viśvam satyam' is not a negative statement therefore it is unnecessary to put forward a positive counterpart to it. The same can be said for 'dvā suparnā', where again the śrutis, for example 'tat tvam asi',275 and 'aham Brahmāsmi',276 establish the idea that jīva and Brahman are identical. Therefore, the meaning of 'dvā suparnā' cannot be the duality of jīva and Brahman. Moreover, Madhusūdana mentions that the 'Paimgī-rahasya-Brāhmana'277 explains the śruti 'dvā suparņā' as positing the difference between the mind (buddhi) and jīva. The third point made by his opponents is that the theory of the non-existent Brahman does not stand up to scrutiny, as no śruti has ever established this fact. For example, 'sarvam khalvidam Brahma'278 states that Brahman is the locus of the universe. An unreal thing cannot be the locus of any object. It should therefore be

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acknowledged that śrutis such as 'asadevedam agra āsiť' do not convey the idea of Brahman's non-existence. These śrutis merely inform that before its origina- tion the universe was implicit in Brahman. It is therefore incorrect to consider that the śruti 'kevalo nirgunaśca',279 which establish Brahman's unqualified nature, is not authoritative. The attributes described by śrutis such as 'brhanto'sya dharmāh' or 'parāsya śaktirvividhaiva śrūyate' in the context of Brahman, are merely pragmatic and the śrutis describe them only for the purposes of negating them against Brahman. When the śruti describes a false object as false it cannot be unauthentic for saying so. When the śruti states that Brahman's knowledge, activity and strength are 'natural' to it (svābhāvikījñānabala kriyā ca) it does not mean that these qualities are innate within it. The śruti conveys only the idea that while knowledge of jīva is accidental, it is a permanent feature within Brahman so long as ajñāna exists. For the knowledge of Brahman is its omniscience which, being a modification of ajñāna, is co-existent with the latter. It cannot be said that through association with false omniscience, Brahman also becomes false. Although Brahman is asso- ciated with false omniscience, still it may be real. Two realities of differing degrees can remain side by side without affecting each other by their respective peculiarities. Brahman and its omniscience mutually differ in that while omnis- cience is liable to negation, Brahman is not. Moreover, it must be noted that the śruti 'yah sarvajñah'280 refers only to the quality of omniscience, and does not establish its reality as well.281 The nirguna śruti, 'kebalo nirgunaśca', claims supremacy over the saguna śruti, namely, 'brhanto'sya dharmāh' inasmuch as it conveys the absolute truth and is the only means for the attainment of the ultimate knowledge of Brahman. Nevertheless, the sagnna śrutis should not be regarded as valueless. As I have stated elsewhere, they are meant for upāsanā or meditative worship, which requires a qualified object. The unqualified is beyond the reach of upāsanā. Upāsanā of the unqualified Brahman282 is but knowledge in the form of deep meditation. Referring to Kalpataru's remark quoted above,283 the object of upāsanā is Brahman as symbolised in om, consisting of three syllables, a, u and m. Therefore, the statement in Bhāmatī does not go against the contention of the Advaitins, namely that only the nirguna Brahman is the purport of the entire Vedänta literature. The knowledge of the nirguna Brahman brings absolute bliss, the salvation from and the cessation of worldly bondage and sorrow. The upāsanā of the saguna Brahman cannot bring ultimate salvation, which comes only when Brahman is revealed as the absolute, unconditional and unqualified reality, that is, when complete identity is established between jīva and Brahman. The salva- tion that can be attained by the upāsana of the qualified Brahman is only relative (avāntara).284 Upāsanā makes the mind of the worshipper fit for receiving the final knowledge derived from the great Vedic statements such as 'tat tvam asi' and 'aham Brahmāsmi'. However, the unqualified nature of Brahman does not make it unsuitable as an object of discussion, for that purpose can be served by assuming false qualities in Brahman.285 Likewise, absolute Brahman is completely formless.

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Even though the śruti sometimes describes Brahman as having thousands of limbs and other characteristics peculiar to the body,286 they are used only figuratively, either to express Brahman's all-pervasiveness or to indicate its self-luminous nature. The śruti seeks to establish the reality of Brahman so their emphasis is on Brahman alone, while all other things are described insofar as they corroborate that idea. When the scripture287 observes that Brahman must be visualised, stress is laid on the revelation of Brahman and not on the reality of the form of Brahman. The notion of any form of Brahman is against the doctrine of the Vedānta as held by the Samkara's school, since the very idea places a limitation on Brahman and accordingly its absolute nature is nullified. The idea of a partic- ular form is necessary only for the purposes of upāsanā and the utility of upāsanā lies in the purification of the worshipper's mind. However, the necessity for a qualified Brahman does not end here. Illogical as Brahman the Absolute is, it naturally violates all ideas that come under the umbrella of logic. It is the logical mind that prompts human beings to seek an explanation of this creation and its cause. Where does the universe come from? What is its material cause? On whom are we to bestow its efficient causality? If Brahman is to be regarded as the substratum of everything and the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe,288 then how can it remain unqualified? Whenever Brahman is described in relation to the universe, it becomes qualified by that relationship. Thus the qualified Brahman is to be looked upon as both the material and efficient cause of the universe. According to Madhusūdana, Brahman is the material cause of the universe, being the substratum of the ignorance that transforms into the universe. In fact, according to Madhusūdana, Brahman is the material cause of the universe insofar as, being the locus of avidyā, it is responsible for the world illusion.289 As the object of avidya, Brahman no longer remains unqualified, but serves as the material cause by becoming the reservoir in which the universe is created.290 Hence, the qualified Brahman can be regarded as the material cause. The text 'He who is omniscient' (yah sarvajñah)291 may be considered in this connection, wherein it is also indicated that the omniscient God is the creator of the universe. This omniscient God is no other than Brahman itself in its qualified condition. Likewise, Brahman may be regarded as the efficient cause insofar as Brahman created the universe with a desire to create it. Brahmānanda defines efficient cause as that possessing the knowledge conducive to the generation of the effect.292 That is why the scriptural text mentioned above states that Brahman, as omniscient, created the universe.293 Thus the concept of the qualified Brahman is not regarded as completely worthless. This qualified Brahman is, however, none other than the Absolute viewed as such as long as the creation persists. When the universe is no more, the Absolute Brahman is revealed as unqualified. Just as māyā or avidyā is beginningless, so is the qualified Brahman. So long as avidya exists, the qualified Brahman, as the locus294 of avidyā, must also exist. When this avidyā ceases to exist, the unqualified Brahman shines in its pristine glory as Absolute Knowledge, Absolute Bliss and unique, divorced from all kinds of duality. This is salvation.

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Brahman as knowledge

Unlike the Naiyāyikas, the Samkara's school contends that knowledge is not a special attribute of Brahman, since that conception leaves room for duality. At the same time, however, the reality of knowledge cannot be denied, because the ulti- mate goal of humans is to achieve a state of consciousness of absolute, unceasing blissfulness or anandatva.295 Therefore, at the time of self-realisation, when an individual completely identifies himself with Brahman, consciousness and bliss must be recognised as existing. That is why the scripture describes them as constituting the very nature of Brahman.296 So what sort of knowledge includes self-realisation? Madhusūdana explains knowledge as that which reveals objects.297 However, Vyāsarāja contends that at the time of salvation, when all objects have vanished, knowledge, if any, has to remain without an object, thus negating Madhusūdana's definition. Brahman by itself cannot be regarded as serving as the object of knowledge, for knowledge, according to the Advaita school, is the essence of Brahman and so Brahman cannot become its own object. Madhusūdana replies that knowledge reveals an object in the sense that such knowledge leads to the practical usage of that object; for example, the use of a pitcher is based on the revelation of the object in the mind of the speaker. Thus, knowledge is characterised by this revelation. Revelation is consciousness reflected on a mental mode (citta vrtti), which dispels the ignorance of the cog- niser regarding the existence of that object. Knowledge, therefore, is conscious- ness, limited by a mental mode. In other words, knowledge is nothing but Brahman conditioned by a vrtti. Such a mental mode may embrace an object or it may embrace pure Brahman. In this way, knowledge of Brahman is possible. It then follows that knowledge in order to maintain its character, need not always be associated with an object. It is sufficient to say that it occasionally reveals an object but certainly not always. Therefore, in the state of salvation, knowledge may exist without an object as its content.298 It should be noted here that Brahman is not affected by the result of knowledge (phalavyāpyatva). The meaning of phalavyāpyatva is the nature of being per- vaded by the result (phala) of vrtti-jñāna. Such a result is the revelation of the object of vrtti-jñāna.299 Unconscious objects await such a result for their revela- tion. Brahman, being self-revealed, does not need the help of such a result to reveal itself. However, vrtti-jñāna is essential for the removal of ajñāna, which covers the real nature of Brahman from jīva. Hence, vrtti-jñāna may embrace Brahman, but the result of such vrtti-jñāna cannot.

Brahman as bliss

Bliss is also Brahman's essence. This means that Brahman is the object of uncon- ditional desire.300 According to Brahmänanda,301 this means that bliss is sought for its own sake. Even though, from the ultimate viewpoint, both knowledge and bliss are identical, both words are used in the śrutis302 on the presupposition of

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two apparently different characteristics, blissfulness, (anandatva) and being of the nature of knowledge, (jñānatva). In order to avoid attaching any positive attribute to Brahman the non-dualist explains these two essential characteristics of Brahman in a negative way. They are explained to be contradictions of the very lack of blissfulness and not being essentially ignorant, nirānandatva and ajñānatva, respectively. Brahman is knowledge and bliss and so it is distinct from the world that consists of ignorance and suffering. Thus it becomes clear that the two words are semantically different, although the object indicated by them is one and the same - Brahman. Hence, when both words are used in the context of Brahman, they are not mere repetitions. Being only indicatory marks (upalak- sana), however, they do not make Brahman qualified.303 Brahman therefore is bliss insofar as it is the state of unconditional desirability. That essence of Brahman is indicated by the word 'desirability' (paramapremaspadatvam),304 and as this essence is experienced at the time of liberation, liberation is also bliss.305 Brahman, as existence, knowledge and bliss, is regarded as being absolute and eternal. It is one, devoid of all kinds of duality. The śruti 'na tu taddvitīyamasti'306 states that Brahman is without a second. This means that Brahman is marked (upalaksita) by the absence of a second. It may be contended that if this absence of a second is regarded as real, then this very absence becomes a second to Brahman. If, on the other hand, it is regarded as unreal then Brahman cannot claim to be without a second because of the presence of the universe.307 Madhusūdana avoids this dilemma by accepting the view of the Prabhākara school of Mimāmsa, that the absence of a thing is the same as the substratum of that absence. For instance, the absence of a pot on the earth is nothing other than the earth itself; so also the absence of a second in Brahman is real because such an absence amounts to Brahman, the substratum of the absence. However, Madhusūdana also justifies the absence of a second in Brahman even when the absence of a second is regarded as different from Brahman, its substratum. He observes that the reality of the absence of a second does not enforce reality on its positive counterpart as well. The counterpart can be the object of real negation just as a dream object is negated when the dream gives way to waking states.308 The main purpose of the scripture is to establish the reality of Brahman, as indi- cated by the absence of a second, 'dvitīyābhāva'. In order to establish this reality the empirical reality of all worldly objects is accepted for the purpose of negation. Empirical objects may indicate the absolute, and for this purpose they need not possess the same degree of reality as possessed by Brahman indicated by them.

Brahman is self-revealing

Absolute Brahman, being knowledge itself, is self-revealing (svaprakāśa). Brahman is self-revealing in the sense that not being known like an ordinary object, it is still liable to be used as 'revealed' in the form 'I am Brahman' (aham Brahmāsmi).309 The author of Pañcadaśī compares the self-revealing nature of Brahman to that of a burning lamp. While it is burning, the lamp reveals everything

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but does not require a separate light to reveal its own self. This nature of Brahman to be automatically revealed (vyavahārayogyatā), Madhusūdana interprets in terms of negation; therefore, no question of duality (i.e. the existence of a quality of Brahman) arises. This establishment of a direct relationship between the known and the knower is called phalavyāpyatva. It is stated that Brahman cannot be regarded as an object of knowledge in this sense, for such a relationship presupposes a distinction between the knower, which is after all consciousness, and the known. Brahman, being consciousness itself, cannot simultaneously be split into the knower and the known.310 Even though, in this way, Brahman cannot be an object of conscious- ness, still it reveals itself when the ignorance regarding its nature is dispelled by 'akhandākāra citta vrtti'.311 Brahman is self-revealing in that by itself, it provides for its own usage. In other words, it does not require another knower for its usage, as is the case with all ordinary objects, such as a pitcher. Brahman is self-revealing and being consciousness itself, is not an object of consciousness.

The identity between jiva and Brahman

According to the Advaita-vedānta, truth is one and unique, and that truth is Brahman, which is consciousness itself. Thus consciousness is truth. From this standpoint the jīvas, the conscious individuals, cannot be false. However, the admission of the reality of jīva robs Brahman of its absolute existence as one and devoid of all kinds of differences, whether homogenous (svajātīya), external (vijātīya) or internal (svagata). If the existence of jīva is not denied, absolute identity between jīva and Brahman cannot be established. In fact, the apparent difference between the two is created by avidyā. As avidyā is false, so the difference brought about by avidya is equally false and non-existent from the ultimate view- point. By veiling from jīva the true nature of Brahman, which is self-revealing, eternal and absolute, avidyā subjects the individual self to illusion and provides enjoyment for it. Thus jīva undergoes pleasure and pain accordingly, as it achieves merit and demerit. However, jīva, as marked by empirical life brought about by ultimately non-existent avidyā, also does not exist. That is not to say that jīva by itself is non-existent. On the contrary, as consciousness, jīva is identical with Brahman and as such it is bliss per se. The limitation of jīva and its misery are caused by avidyā and so they persist while avidyā persists. Salvation (mukti) means the realisation of jīva's true nature as bliss. In order to attain salvation it is necessary to realise jīva's identity with Brahman. Such realisation of a person's actual self dispels avidya along with its limitations and automatically the person is released (mukta).

Arguments in favour of difference, bheda

This is a concept the bhakti-theologians especially the Vaisnavas, cannot accept. Dualists such as Madhva and his followers challenge the above view. Among the

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five distinctions recognised by them to be absolute,312 one is that of jīva from Brahman, that is, God. This distinction is proved by perceptional evidence. Ordinary knowledge of jīva fails to recognise Iśvara as distinct from jīva, because Īśvara is not the object of ordinary knowledge. However, jīva always feels its distinction from God as evident from such experiences as: 'I am not omniscient like God', 'I am subjected to sorrow', etc. Furthermore, if jīva were identical with God, it would possess omniscience, which again should be experienced. As there is no such experience, jīva does not possess omniscience. Moreover, unless the cognition of distinction (bheda) is accepted, the Advaitins cannot negate it as such negation requires a pre-affirmation of the negated subject (prasaktapratiedha). The statement of God in the Bhagavadgītā, 'I know all my previous births but oh, Arjuna, you do not know them',313 implies that God, (Iśvara) always perceives His distinction from the jīva. Therefore, the distinction of Iśvara (i.e. Brahman) from the jīva is established by the infallible perception of God. Distinction (bheda) can also be established by following three inferences:

1 Jīva and Iśvara are mutually different; because they are substrata of mutually conflicting qualities; the qualities of the jīva are in total conflict with those of Iśvara, just as fire and snow are opposed to each other. 2 Brahman, being omniscient is, in fact, different from the jīva, as that which is not omniscient is none other than jīva; for example, the jīva itself. 3 Iśvara is the locus of the difference, the positive counterpart (pratiyogin) of which is the jīva; because Iśvara is omniscient, omnipotent, the agent of all activities and independent; the negative example (vyatireki-drstānta) is the jīva.

The scripture also proves this fact. Thus the śrutis, such as 'dvā suparņā,'314 'ye ātmani tişthan,'315 and 'Ajo hyeko jușamāno'nuśete jahatyenam bhuktabhogama- jo'nyah,316 confirm the difference between the jīva and Brahman. Moreover, in order to establish identity the Advaitins must at first choose one of three options:

1 accept the existence of the jīva as known by direct knowledge and then establish its identity with Brahman; 2 accept the existence of Brahman, known from the scripture, as distinct from jīva and then establish its individualness (jīvatva); 3 accept the existence of both of them separately and then establish their identity.

In all of these cases, however, before the Advaitins establish the identity between the jiva and Brahman, they are forced to accept their distinct existence. Therefore, the realisation of identity depends upon the realisation of the distinctiveness of Brahman and jīva. As the latter is the fundamental meaning of the scriptures, it possesses greater strength than the former; thus, the theory of identity, which is based on such a foundation, does not stand up to logic.

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The validity of the scriptural statement confirming duality is further emphasised by the fact that from the introduction of the Mundaka Upanisad and the concluding portion thereof, it is evident that the main thesis of this scripture is to establish duality. For example, it begins with 'the two birds' (dvā suparna)317 and ends in 'attains great harmony' (paramam sāmyamupaiti).318 Moreover, the same view is repeated over and over again in the same scripture in order to make the conclu- sion free from all doubts.319 Further, as the śruti has to present a novel idea (apūrva), which in this case is difference (bheda), its validity is unquestionable. The knowledge that establishes the distinction of Iśvara from the jīva presupposes knowledge of Iśvara, the positive counterpart of such distinction. Only the śruti present both these forms of knowledge. Again, knowledge of duality is not fruit- less inasmuch as it helps to discriminate between merit and demerit. Therefore, the validity of distinction between the jīva and Brahman goes uncontested whereas the view of their identity, being contradictory to that of the former, cannot be accepted.320

Refutation of the experience of difference (bheda)

Madhusūdana critically examines all the arguments of the dualists and nullifies them by following counter-arguments: Realisations such as 'I am not omniscient or 'I am not devoid of sorrow' do not establish jīva as being distinct from absolute Brahman. However, they do indicate the difference between consciousness lim- ited by a person's internal faculties (antahkarana) and consciousness unlimited by this. Scriptures emphasising the difference between Iśvara and the jīva, pres- ent only the difference between the individual and the Lord (Iśvara) both of whom have limited consciousness. However, it does not establish the difference between the jīva and Brahman, the unlimited consciousness. The scriptures estab- lishing their identity (abheda śruti) may indeed establish the absolute identity between the jīva and Brahman on the mere presumption of distinction (bheda), but bheda as an absolute fact is not the prerequisite for such śruti.321 It is not possible to assert that the difference between Brahman and the jīva is proved by perception. Madhusūdana explains that pure Brahman, as such, is beyond the reach of ordinary perception. Any conscious entity (jīva or Iśvara) is Brahman itself, since Brahman is the consciousness and allows no division. The apparent difference between the jīva and Iśvara lies in the nature of limitation (upādhi). Limitation is the creation of avidyā, and as avidyā is false, the difference created by it is also false.

Refutation of opponent's inferences about bheda

Inferences put forward by the opponents are all fallacious. Thus, the argument establishing the difference between jīva and Iśvara, on the basis of their being loci of contradictory qualities, is invalid, since neither of them possess contradictory qualities such as sorrow and absence of sorrow. The reason for this is that they are

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all qualities of mind.322 Moreover, as the presence and absence of sorrow are found in the same locus, the differences between qualities cannot establish the differences of their locus. If the dualists accept difference to be false, the Advaitins also do the same. If difference is claimed to be real, the probandum (sādhyā) is yet to be proved. Other inferences are equally erroneous. In all cases the difference cannot be said to be real (tattvika) for its reality is not yet established.323

Refutation of scriptural evidence on difference

Even the sacred scriptures on bheda have to be construed otherwise. The śruti 'dvā suparņā' is stated by the Paingī-rahasya Brāhmana as a description of buddhi (intelligence) and the jīva,324 and not of jīva and God, as claimed by the dualists. Therefore, this śruti cannot be accepted as evidence of difference (bheda) between the jīva and Iśvara. What about the other śrutis such as 'Yah ātmani tisthannātmānamantaro yamayati,325 'cetanaścetanānām,'326 and 'ajo'nya'327, which seem to emphasise the relationship between the container and the contained, between jīva and Iśvara? To posit the specification of one out of many (nirdhārana) and to posit bheda can be justified by the assumption of an empirical bheda, which, nevertheless, need not be real. Moreover, reality of dif- ference (bheda) would go against the śrutis, which establish the identity between jīva and Brahman.328 Therefore the 'bheda śrutis' may be interpreted as expressing only empirical difference, (vyavahārika bheda). They are just 'arthavāda śrutis'329 and thus they do not possess any independent validity apart from those giving injunction and prohibition. The 'bheda śrutis' concern themselves with empirical intercourse only. In fact, according to the Advaitins, all the sacred texts depict directly or indirectly the sole existence of unlimited, unqualified and absolute Brahman. Madhusūdana holds that the scripture and Smrtis describing bheda, the existence of enjoyment and the difference between Iśvara and jīva and so on, are meant for upasanā of the qualified Brahman, which is an indirect means for attaining salvation. However, that does not mean that knowledge of bheda is neces- sary for salvation. Such śrutis provide the preliminary steps for the purification of mind. Final and absolute salvation comes when complete identity between the jīva and Brahman is realised. Such realisation follows the cognition of the meaning of the scriptural statements such as 'tat tvam asi',330 or 'aham Brahmāsmi'.331 Vedic statements, such as 'tat tvam asi' or 'aham Brahmāsmi' are called 'great sentences' (mahāvākya) because they distinctly establish perfect identity between jīva and Brahman, which is the purport of the Vedas. Madhusūdana states332 that these great sentences generate directly the correct knowledge of the aforemen- tioned identity. In elucidating this statement of Madhusūdana, Brahmānanda, the commentator333 says that these sentences, namely 'tat tvam asi', etc., are the instru- mental cause (karana) for the generation of direct knowledge of identity between jīva and Brahman. Even though it is verbal knowledge, it is direct because the object of this knowledge is nothing but Brahman. According to Brahmānanda, direct knowledge is that whose content is not generally covered by ajñāna. In

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other words, in direct knowledge the essence of an object is so exposed that knowledge reveals it at once in all its bearings. Although insentient objects like the pitcher never directly become objects of ajñāna, since ajñāna operates only with reference to Brahman, nevertheless, the consciousness limited by the pitcher becomes the object of ajñana. Being the limitation of such consciousness the object, namely the pitcher, is falsely regarded as covered by ajñāna. When a sensuous mode of mind (cāksușādi vrtti) reaches the object, here a pitcher, the consciousness limited by the pitcher no longer remains covered. Thus the cover of ajñana having gone, the pitcher can be said to be an object of direct knowledge.334 Being the limitation of such consciousness, it may be stated that such objects have been embraced by ignorance, (ajñana).335 The mental mode arising from 'great sentences' (mahāvākyas) embraces the identity of jīva and Brahman, and thereby dispels the knower's ignorance regarding Brahman. In this way, the identification between jīva and Brahman is the content of the mental mode, this mode being called direct even though it is derived from a sentence. Thus the knowledge imparted by the sentence 'tat tvam asi' is direct. The sense conveyed by a sentence depends upon the knowledge of the sense conveyed by the words constituting that sentence. As the senses imparted by the words 'tat' and 'tvam' are not obtainable from any other source, they are also furnished by the scripture. For example, the senses of Vedic words like 'yūpa' (sacred post) and 'āhavanīya' (the ritual fire) can only be known from the scriptures. These two expressions are found in Vedic statements such as 'the sacrificial animal is to be tied to the post' (yūpe paśum badhnāti) and 'sacrifice is made in the ritual fire' (āhavanīye juhoti). The meaning of 'yūpa' is sacrificial post made of bamboo, which has been cut and properly shaped. This meaning is found in Vedic state- ments such as 'yūpa takşati336 and 'yūpamastāsrīkaroti'. Likewise, āhavanīya refers to a domestic fire that has been duly sanctified by offerings made during the daytime. This meaning is given by the śruti as 'vasante brāhmano' gninādadhita, naktam gārhapatyamādadhāti divāhavanīyam' 337 In the case of 'tat' and tvam', their sense is expressed in several Vedic state- ments. Thus, the word 'tat' directly means the omniscient God, who is the creator. This meaning is derived from the śrutis; for example, 'that from which all created beings are born, by whose efforts the created beings continue to live' ('yato vā imāni bhutāni jāyante, yena jātāni jīvanti')338 and 'that which is omniscient and is aware of all' (yah sarvajñah sarvavit.)339 However, the secondary meaning of the word is pure Brahman as described in the śruti 'satyamjñanamanantam'.340 The primary sense of the word 'tvam' is stated in śrutis such as 'like a great fish that swims along both banks (of a river) alternately' (tadyathā mahā matsya ubhe kule anusanncarati)'341 and means limited jīva. The secondary sense of 'tvam' is, however, the pure consciousness (or self) as expressed in śrutis such as 'it is this person - the one that consists of perception among the vital functions, the one that is the inner light within the heart' (yo'yam vijñānamayah prāņesu hrdantarjyotiḥ purușah)342 and 'you can't see the seer who does the seeing' (na drsterdrastāram paśyeḥ).343

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If the primary meanings of 'tat' and 'tvam' are adopted, then the sentence 'tat tvam asi' becomes incongruous, because the jīva, being of limited consciousness, can never be identified with God, the Omniscient Creator. Therefore, for the sake of consistency, 'tat' and 'tvam' must be taken in their secondary meanings.344 Madhusūdana explains this process as follows. First, the primary sense of the words 'tat' and 'tvam', as stated above, are apprehended; then the disagreement between the two primary senses is felt, since the limited jīva can never be identi- fied with unlimited God. This disagreement gives rise to the recollection of the secondary meanings of 'tvam' and 'tat' - pure self and Brahman. This is recol- lection rather than direct knowledge, the knowledge of pure self and Brahman having already been acquired through Vedic statements such as 'satyam' etc. Thus although jīva, because it is limited, cannot prima facie be the same as the Omniscient, Omnipotent Creator, as pure self and Brahman they can be identical. The relationship between the pure self and Brahman is experienced in deep sleep (sușupti), thus giving credence to the purport of 'tat tvam asi'. Here both 'tat' and 'tvam' are taken in their secondary senses (laksyārtha). The lakśanā herein is known as jahadajahatsvārthā (that which has partly abandoned its primary sense and partly retained it). Although both words denote qualified consciousness, and the difference in meaning between them lies in the difference of the limitation (upādhi) of consciousness, by their secondary power (laksaņā) they just indicate Brahman, which is devoid of all attributes. Thus both words abandon the adjective (viśeșana) parts of their senses and retain the nominal (viśesya) portion.345 In this way, by establishing complete identity between the jīva and Brahman, the sentence imparts the integral sense in relation to Brahman, which is the true nature of the self (atmatattva).346 Although both 'tat' and 'tvam', by indication, mean one integral object - pure self - there is no question of repe- tition,347 since their primary senses are different. It cannot be said that acceptance of the secondary sense (laksanā) in both the words, constituting the sentence 'tat tvam asi', is courting defeat. As the purport of the sentence is identity, it is logical to admit more than one laksanā to support this. It should also be borne in mind that the power of the constituent words in a sentence are guided by the purport.348 Therefore, the Vedic statement 'tat tvam asi' establishes complete identity between the jīva and Brahman.349 The dualists350 claim that at the beginning and the end of the Mundaka Upanisad, which is included in the Atharva Veda,351 by the repeated mention of the difference existing between an individual person and the Lord,352 and further, by the description of the fruit of the knowledge of difference, it is evident that the Mundaka has established the validity of the knowledge of palpable difference between the jīva and Iśa. However, this conclusion is not tenable. In the first mundaka, (chapter),353 of that Upanisad, 'Saunaka, a wealthy householder, once went up to Angiras in the prescribed manner and asked: 'What is it, my lord, by knowing which a man comes to know this whole world?' This is what Angiras told him: Two types of knowledge a man should learn - those who know Brahman tell us - the higher and the lower.

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The lower of the two consists of the Rgveda, the Yajurveda, the Sāmaveda, the Atharvaveda, phonetics, the ritual-science, grammar, etymology, metrics and astronomy; whereas the higher is that by which one grasps the imperishable.354 'What cannot be seen, what cannot be grasped, without colour, without sight or hearing, without hands or feet; what is eternal and all-pervading, extremely minute, present every where - that is the immutable, which the wise fully perceive'.355 This statement is the real answer to the question put by Saunaka.356 Therefore, it is evident that the identity of jīva and Brahman is the subject on which the Upanisad begins, otherwise the answer would become irrelevant. In the second Mundaka, the same point is again dealt with in the statement 'all this is simply that Person - rites, penance, prayer (Brahman), the highest immortal. One who knows this, my friend, hidden within the cave, cuts the knot of ignorance in this world'.357 At the end of the third Mundaka, it is observed, 'the knower, freed from name and appearance; reaches the heavenly Person, beyond the very highest. When a man comes to know that highest Brahman, he himself becomes that very brahman.'358 Thus scriptural extracts found in the three Mundakas clearly estab- lish the validity of identity (abheda). Therefore, all the places where seemingly the MuU is making a dualistic statement one should not mistake that for the scripture's true purport. Moreover, the statement 'he attains the highest identity' ('paramamsāmmyamupaiti')359 confirms that the scripture really teaches total identity between the individual and Brahman. Therefore, the Mundaka Upanisad does not establish any difference.360 The opponent raises a query. This identity is the very essence of the self. Just as the self is revealed, so is identity. How then, can justification be given for the daily intercourse on the part of the self, when the root of intercourse - avidyā - can never appear in the face of this everlasting sense of identity? The answer is that this identity per se is not opposed to avidyā, which then envelops the identity until it is dispelled by the undifferentiated and integral cognition (akhandartha vrtti) embracing Brahman. Until that vrtti arises, the pragmatic intercourse, based on duality, is not considered to be void (śunya). This is contrary to the view of the Buddhists who hold that the śunya does not possess any essence, whereas the self does. Madhusūdana observes that jīva is identical to Brahman, in the sense that Brahman has become the essence of jīva in such a way that no attribute that is irrelevant to Brahman can be relevant to jīva.361 Neither can it be argued that the mere fact that the concept of identity depends (upajīvya) on the presupposition of the concept of difference makes the latter of greater validity. Although knowledge of difference is a pre-requisite for the knowledge of the significance of the scriptures depicting non-difference (abheda śruti), the latter does not require the scriptures depicting difference (bheda śruti) to yield the knowledge of real difference in order to prove its validity.362 The real- ity of bheda need not be taken as the basis for scriptures depicting non-difference (abheda śruti). When in the case of the cognition that contradicts the false expe- rience of shell-silver, the non-dualists do not accept that the negative experience required the shell-silver negated here should be ultimately real (like Brahman).

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Inference also proves that the individual is, in fact, non-different from Brahman. The syllogistic formula runs thus:

The jīvas are not really different from the highest self (paramātman) by virtue of their being the self (i.e. it possesses self-hood). As the highest self, being self (i.e. possessing self-hood) does not differ from the highest self, so also the individual, being self, is identical to the highest self. It should be noted that even though the theory of uniqueness of self (atman) makes the idea of any class conception of self-hood (ātmatva jāti) impossi- ble, yet the idea is used here by assuming its relative reality (vyavahārika sattā).

Jiva is not a part of Brahman

Rāmānuja and his school of Vaisnavas hold that the jīva is a part of the self of Brahman, another part being the universe. The doctrine purports that Brahman is the whole, having the universe and jīva as integral parts; this is known as 'Viśiștādvaita vāda'. The idea is confirmed by several texts from the śruti and other religious texts of authority. For instance one may cite Vedic statements like: 'one quarter of him (Brahman's) comprises of the universe and the selves ... ' ('pādo'sya sarvā bhūtāni')363; 'In this world my own part has become the eternal jīva' (mamaivāmśo jīva-loke jīvabhūtahsanātanaḥ),364 and so on. In order to refute this theory, Madhusūdana proves that these scriptural quotations in fact depict identity. The jīvas cannot be component parts of Brahman. As Brahman is beginningless, limited jīva cannot be regarded as the fragments that construct its whole being; nor can they be the dividing parts, because Brahman is indivisible. The conception of the part and the whole invariably refers to a form. Brahman, having no form, cannot be conceived in terms of the part and the whole. As Brahman is devoid of any parts, its parts, if any, have to be imagined. It is igno- rance that produces the concept of false limitation. For example, though space is unlimited, one falsely imagines it to be limited by objects that sometimes enclose the space. The space inside a water jug is not really a part of the unlimited space; because, when the jug is full of water the space inside it becomes just the great space. Therefore, when the sacred scripture states that jīva is part of Brahman, the word 'part' is not to be understood in its literal sense. To avoid this apparent contradiction in the scripture (śruti), the secondary sense of this word, that is, illu- sory part, should be accepted to be the real meaning.365 Even in the sūtra 'amso nānā vyapadeśāt'366 the difference implied by the word 'part', amsa, is taken in its secondary sense in order to be congruous with the scriptures on identity (abheda śrutis). The dualist may ask whether the Advaitins consider the jīva to be part of pure Brahman or as part of the Lord, Isvara. The first option does not correspondent with the meaning contained in the śruti and smrti (sacred literature elaborating

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scriptures) mentioned earlier, because the scripture and the smrti statements quoted here clearly refer to Iśvara. If the second option is accepted, the conclu- sion becomes irrelevant for the present discussion, because Iśvara is not pure Brahman. In addition, the second option also goes against the Advaita view, since according to the Advaitins, Iśvara, being limited consciousness, stands almost on the same footing with the jīva. That is to say, both Iśvara and jīva, being distinct from pure Brahman, are illusory entities; so jīva cannot be regarded as being part of Iśvara. In reply to this, Madhusūdana states that the pronoun used in the afore- mentioned quotation, that is, tat, indicates pure Brahman only.367 Now Madhusūdana starts to defend the theory of identity between the individual and Brahman. Jiva is reflection of Brahman on the individual's internal organ (antahkarana), which is inherently transparent due to the predominance of sattva guna.368 The reflection (pratibimba) and its prototype (bimba) are always identi- cal. Even though they may appear to be different, close scrutiny reveals their identification with each other. When an object is reflected on a clear mirror, the reflection exhibits almost complete identification with the reflected object. The appearance of difference between the two is brought about by the attributes of the mirror falsely imposed on the reflection. The reflection should not be taken as the shadow of the reflected object. Shadow means contradiction or absence of light, but a reflection is not opposed to light. Therefore reflection and shadow are different. When the mirror is blurred the reflection appears quite different from the object reflected. This analogy shows that the defects of the inner organ of every person affects the person by imposing false affectations, but that does not in reality affect the individual, jīva. Hence one must admit that jīva, being a reflection of Brahman, is identical with Brahman. Identity between the reflection and the object reflected can also be established by formal inference.369 The reflection is identical with its prototype for one of three reasons:

1 Because it possesses the attributes peculiar to its prototype. 2 Because it does not possess any attributes contradictory to its prototype. 3 Or, because it is not produced by any cause which has not produced its prototype.

This last reason (middle term/hetu) is put forward in accordance with the view of the Pratyagatman, who held that bimba-consciousness is Iśvara, while jīva is His reflection. The second reason may be open to criticism on the grounds that jīva possesses several virtues that are diametrically opposite to the essence of pure Brahman. It may be said in answer to this criticism, however, that these contra- dictory virtues do not really belong to jīva, but are superimposed on it by its lim- iting inner organ, a product of avidyā. Hence they are false, so none of them are natural to jīva.370 It may further be objected that if bimba is regarded as identical with its pratibimba, how can one of them be subjected to the cycle of birth and death while the other is free? In answer, it has been said that as the specks of dirt

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on the mirror spoil the beauty of the reflected face, so also the attributes of the limitations enwrap the pratibimba with false attributes, although the blemishes of the mirror do not affect the bimba.371 So jīva is in substance identical with Brahman. Anything that can be called real in jīva is its consciousness, which is nothing but Brahman. Every other aspect and attribute of the individual, jīva - its mind or body, its birth or death, its instincts and impressions - are nothing but creations of avidyā. Thus the existence of jīva, being extremely relative, conditional as well as limited, cannot be regarded as real. Hence real, absolute existence belongs solely to Brahman. Brahman mani- fests itself through avidya in two aspects: the enjoyer, that is jīva, and the object of enjoyment, that is the universe. But the perception and the enjoyment, being the creation of avidyā, are as false as avidyā itself. Thus, the reality that subsists free from these objects, names and forms, is Brahman - the absolute existence, the absolute consciousness and the absolute bliss.372 Likewise, from an ultimate point of view, this universe does not exist at all. This is because Brahman is the only existing reality and it possesses no difference or duality (bheda) whatsoever. Furthermore, as the universe is identical with Brahman, there is no place for any duality. Madhusūdana wrote a separate trea- tise, the Advaita-ratna-raksana to refute the views of the dualist Naiyāyikas. By his own confession Madhusūdana followed Srī Harsa, the author of the polemical work Khandanakhanda-khadya.373 It is argued there that duality does not exist because it cannot be cognised. Madhusūdana critically analyses the Naiyāyika view of determinate knowledge arising from direct experience, which according to the logicians, is said to yield duality.374 He shows how their arguments are full of fallacy, and therefore this view is not logical. It then follows that duality is never perceived. The appearance of bheda is merely illusion and moreover, bheda is practically identical with the locus (adhikarana). The idea that the pitcher is not cloth in fact denotes that the pitcher is the negation of cloth. Therefore, distinction cannot be determined and determinate knowledge cannot manifest it either. Likewise, difference is also never grasped by indeterminate knowledge, since it only concerns itself with the essence (svarūpa) of an object. Therefore, such knowledge cannot be employed to prove either difference or non-difference, and as this knowledge comprehends only the unqualified essence of the object, it should be regarded as evidence of non-difference, abheda.375 In this way, difference cannot be confirmed by any kind of evidence. Hence the theory of identity advocated by the scripture remains unchallenged. Therefore, difference is non-existing as neither determinate nor indeterminate knowledge can prove its existence. The advocates of the concept of difference cannot establish it as the reciprocal negation of identity (anyonyābhāva) or, as the essence (svarūpa) of objects. Since the concept of difference cannot even be determined, little remains to speak of the existence of differentiated objects. This universe is non-different from Brahman. In fact, there exists the complete nega- tion of the universe in Brahman. The Vedānta never contradicts the pragmatic

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existence of differences, nor does it negate the pragmatic existence of the universe. As in the case of the rope-snake illusion, the snake exists so long as it appears and ceases to exist when the rope, that is, its locus (adhisthāna), is cognised as such. Likewise, the universe remains so long as the avidyā remains and ceases to exist when the integral and undifferentiated cognitive mode (akhandākāra-citta-vrtti)376 reveals Brahman, the locus of the universe. Hence, like the illusory snake, the universe is also identical with its substratum, Brahman. The scripture also confirms that the world has no separate existence from Brahman. It states that 'there is no plurality in the universe'.377 The negation of Brahman's pervasion prohibits any real contact of Brahman with the universe. Brahman is the absolute truth and consciousness itself, whereas the universe, being created by false avidya, is itself false and unconscious. Therefore, Brahman can never be influenced by the illusory qualities of this illusory world, just as a desert never bears the water that a mirage suggests is there.378 The negation of the universe is Brahman itself, as Brahman is the substratum of the false identity between the universe and Brahman. Thus, when every object of the universe becomes negated in Brahman, only Brahman remains as eternally and absolutely existent.379 It may be noted here that a non-dualist does not regard difference (bheda) to be absolutely non-existent. This is because, as Madhusūdana explains, the concept is necessary for the daily intercourse of human life. The non-dualists accept three kinds of existence. Brahman is absolutely existent (pāramārthika sat), the shell-silver is illusorily existent (prātibhāsika sat) and the physical universe is pragmatically existent (vyavahārika sat). Thus the Advaita-vedānta school accepts the empirical, vyavahārika existence of bheda.380 To answer Vyāsarāja's objection to the concept of three types of existence, Madhusū-dana answers that the quality of non-refutability (avādhyattva) is common in all three types of existence. Even the superimposed object, though subjected to contradiction at other times, is not contradicted at the time of its exis- tence. The prātibhāsika phenomenon too, should be recognised as being just as incapable of being contradicted as the vyavahārika, at least for the time being. Unless this is done, it is impossible to explain why a person, when he mistakenly sees a shell-silver, would react in exactly the same way, as he would do when confronted by empirical silver.381 The distinction between vyavahārika reality and prātibhāsika reality lies in the fact that while the former is contradicted only by akhandākāra-citta-vrtti, the latter is contradicted by ordinary empirical knowledge.

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5

THE SENTIENT WORLD: IŚVARA, JĪVA AND SĀKȘĪ

Having established that Brahman is the only immutable eternally real consciousness, Madhusūdana turns his attention to other conscious entities mainly belonging to the empirical level of experience, namely the individual person, jīva, Iśvara, the Lord and Creator of the world of phenomena and Sāksī, the revealer of all objects of perception. The Vednta divides the pragmatic world of experience into two categories - perceiving consciousness and the perceived (drg-drśya). The pure Self, in accordance with the nature of its false relationship with the primordial avidyā, is viewed as, Iśvara, Jīva and Sāksī.382 In reality, pure self is the essence of all three of them. On this point, there is unanimity amongst different teachers of the Advaita-vedänta school. However, there are sharp differences among these teachers when it comes to the nature of their relationship with avidya and the type of avidyā. Broadly speaking, there are two views: those who regard jīva to be many (aneka jīva-vāda) and those who hold that there is only one jīva (ekajīva-vāda). The former is further sub-divided into ābhāsa-vāda, or the theory of semblance; pratibimba-vāda, or the theory of reflection; and avacceheda-vāda, or the theory of delimitation.383 According to ābhāsa-vāda, the self, when reflected on the primordial avidyā, becomes identified with that avidya. It must be noted here that pure Self does not, in fact, become identified with the avidyā, but only the reflection-self (pratibimba ātmā), limited by avidyā, becomes identified with its limitation. This limited self is not the pure Self. However, due to this failure of apprehending this distinction between the two, the limited self is regarded to be the ever-abiding essential self (Antaryāmin), the witnessing-self (Sāksī) and the Creator-self (Iśvara) though they are all in fact pure Self. Likewise, the pure Self (atman) being reflected on the mind (buddhi) becomes limited by it. Thus, the limited, reflection-self becomes identified with mind, and due to the absence of the knowledge of dif- ference between the pure Self and this limited self, the limited self is regarded as the person (jiva), the agent, the enjoyer and the knower. As the mind is different in each body, and there are innumerable bodies, the semblances of the self in the minds are also many. Since the self is undifferentiated from the semblances it too appears to be many. The avidya being one, however, means that the reflection of the pure conscious Self in it (cidābhāsa), undifferentiated from avidyā, always

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appears to be one.384 As the semblance is quite distinct from the pure Self, the semblance of Self is false.385 The identification between jīva, a false entity, and Brahman, occurs only when the jiva aspect of the Self is totally eliminated by true knowledge of the real nature of Self dispelling the primordial avidyā. Madhusūdana provides another interpretation of this view, that is, ābhāsa-vāda.386 He observes that the pure Self, reflected upon the primordial avidyā, is Iśvara, a reflection of Self misunderstood through the primordial avidya as the creator-self. Likewise, this same Self, when reflected upon the mind, which is then falsely identified with the reflection-self, is the individual (jīva). Pure Self is real, while its qualifying adjuncts (upādhis), avidyā, in the case of Iśvara, and mind in the case of jīva, are unreal. Thus, once the upadhis are removed through the removal of ignorance the identity between jīva and Brahman can be established without any further problem. The main conclusion is jīva as Pure consciousness, eternally exists.387 In the first interpretation of the ābhāsa-vāda, pure Self as the prototype (bimba) of the two reflection selves, Iśvara and jīva, is the Sāksī (witnessing-self), while the self that has no reference to either Iśvara or jīva, is the pure (śuddha) consciousness. In the second interpretation, Sāksī cannot be separated from Īśvara. Therefore, both the concepts of Sāksī and Iśvara become merged in the Iśvara concept. In considering the second interpretation, Madhusūdana remarks that the author of the Vārtika - the upholder of ābhāsa-vāda - does not separate Sākşī from Iśvara.388 It should be noted that Antaryāmī is never differentiated from Iśvara. According to pratibimba-vāda, followed by the Vivarana school, Iśvara is the Self limited (upahita) by the primordial avidyā, the source of samsāra, transient life. As we shall shortly see, avidya with the aid of the five subtle cosmic ele- ments, produces mind. At the time of deep sleep, the mind remains dormant in its cause (kāraņāvasthā), while during the states of waking or dreaming it remains manifest (kāryāvasthā). The reflection of Iśvara on avidyā conditioned by mind (dormant or manifest), is called jīva.389 Sākșī here is the pure Self (śuddhātmā) that pervades both Iśvara and jīva. Sarvajñātma Muni suggests some modifications in the theory of reflection. He holds that pure consciousness limited by avidya is the prototype (bimba). This bimba reflects itself on avidya and this reflection-self is Iśvara. On the other hand, when the same bimba is reflected on the mind that reflection-self is jīva. As there are count- less minds, jīvas are similarly countless. In this view, the bimba-consciousness is Sāksī. Thus, according to both the Vivarana and Samksepa-śārīraka schools, the bimba-consciousness is the Sāksī.390 The pratibimba-vāda differs from the ābhāsa-vāda in that while in the latter view the reflections are absolutely false, according to the former they are not so, since in pratibimba-vāda, the prototype and its reflection are one and the same. The reflection-consciousness is non-different in substance from the prototype- consciousness. This being so, the reflection is as real as its prototype. The differ- ence between the views of the Vivarana and the Samksepa-śārīraka mainly lies in

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the fact that while the former regards Iśvara as the prototype-self which is limited by the primordial avidyā, the latter considers even Iśvara a mere reflection- consciousness, just like jīvas. The prototype limited by the primordial avidyā and common to both jīva and Iśvara is the witness-consciousness, Sākșī. According to the Avaccheda-vāda held by the Bhāmatī-school, Iśvara, or pure consciousness, is the object (visaya) of avidyā, while jīva is the locus (āśraya) thereof. Jīva is regarded as the locus of avidyā because its empirical understand- ing and behaviour are based on that understanding namely, 'Brahman does not exist,' based on ignorance (avidyā). As both such false understanding and behav- iour (vyavahāra) exist in jīva, avidyā which causes such false understanding and behaviour also rests in jīva for both cause and effect should exist in the same locus. According to this view, jīvas are many because empirical avidyās (tulā) are also many. Jīva as delimited (avacchinna) by avidyā is the material cause of the universe. As there are many jīvas, each jīva is therefore the creator of a sepa- rate universe. Thus the jīva, as delimited by avidyā, is the creator of a personal universe and as the locus of avidyā, such creator-jīva is deluded (bhrānta). Even though these universes are strictly personal, each jīva seems to perceive the same universe due to the extreme similarity of the universes. The fact that jīvas ascribe to Iśvara the act of creation is because basically Iśvara is the locus of the cosmic avidyā along with jīvas and their worlds.391 The aforementioned theories are founded on certain fundamental presumptions. The first of these is that although Brahman has to be recognised as the ultimate and single immutable Reality, the cosmic process of diversity, looming large in our everyday experience, has to be accounted for. Avidya is an explanation of that diversity. Philosophers of the Advaita school tried to visualise Brahman empirically in terms of avidyā; though, there being nothing real besides Brahman, no real connection can be recognised between the two. Still a working relationship (vyavahārika sambandha) has to be allowed to exist between the two. The differ- ence of nature in the relationship has been responsible for the emergence of four types of consciousness: Brahman, kūțastha, (i.e. Sākșī), Īśvara and jīva (respec- tively, Pure consciousness, immutable consciousness, the creator consciousness and the individual consciousness). However, the number of these concepts varies due to other considerations. To justify these concepts, the philosophers have further introduced the ideas of the limiting adjunct, (upādhi), agent of delimitation, (avacchedaka) and secondary, remote and modified sense of a word, (upalaksaņā). While upādhi and upalaksaņā circumscribe the nature of consciousness without being really related to it, the avacchedaka affects the nature of consciousness.392 Thus avidyā is the avacchedaka of jīva, which thereby becomes involved in empiricism, while it is the upādhi of Sākşī which leaves the latter unaffected by empiricism. Upalaksaņā differs from upādhi inasmuch as it has only a casual reference to its referent (upalaksita). For example, the crows, which were once temporarily perched on a house, may serve as the upalaksanā of the house. Upādhi, however, continues as long as the qualified

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object (upahita) exists. For instance, a red object reflected on a piece of glass makes latter look red. Distinguished from both upalaksanā and upādhi, avacchedaka is the adjective and so co-exists with the object it qualifies (avacchinna) and is included in the nature of it for instance, a red flower. That is why in the theory of avaccheda the state of consciousness as jīva is co-existent with avidyā. The theory of reflection (pratibimba) has also contributed to the formation of some of these other theories. However, the mutual differences among philosophers who believe in the theory of reflection are based on the question as to whether reflection and its prototype are identical with each other or whether they are mutually different. In the case of identity, the reflection is recognised to be as real as the prototype, while in the case of their mutual difference the reflection is held to be false. Avidyā, the reflection of consciousness thereon, avidyā as the avacchedaka, upalakșanā or upādhi, the falsity or reality of reflection - all these concepts in various combinations have formulated the different theories stated above.

Eka-jīva-vāda

In the theory of a single individual self (eka-jīva-vāda) of Madhusūdana, the three concepts of upādhi, avacchedaka and reflection work simultaneously. Unlike the other three theories mentioned earlier, the eka-jīva-vāda (as the name suggests) holds that jīva is one and not many, because the upādhi of jīva is the collective (samasți) ignorance (avidyā) and not the individual effects (kārya) of avidyā such as, antahkarana, etc. The upholders of this view are divided into two branches.393 One holds that self, limited by (upahita) avidyā, is Iśvara. Thus, Iśvara as the prototype is reflected on avidya while the reflection-consciousness is jīva. The second branch, on the other hand, holds that Iśvara is the pure consciousness (śuddha caitanya), which is not limited by avidyā, while jīva is the consciousness, limited by avidyā. It is evident that in the latter view, Iśvara is totally removed from the relationship of avidyā as well as its creation, and is identified with pure consciousness. The jīva, independent of Iśvara, creates the universe through its avidyā.394 Prakāśānanda, in his Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvali, expounds this view. Appaya Dīkșita also gives a survey of both these views in the Siddhanta-lesa-samgraha.395 Madhusūdana accepts the first view,36 that Iśvara is the consciousness whose qualifying adjunct is avidyā and is the prototype, while jīva is the reflection of Īśvara on avidyā. Thus jīva, covered by avidyā, becomes the material cause of the universe, both subtle and gross.397 Only the unmanifest creation (avyākrta),398 being beginningless, is omitted from the domain of jiva's creative acts. Jiva is the agent of the universe because it is the substratum, (adhisthāna) and as such possesses knowledge favourable for creation (srstyanukulajñānavattva).399 This jīva is the chief one, as it is the collective jīva (mukhya samastyābhimānī jīva). The individual jīvas are in fact semblances (jīvābhāsa) of this chief jīva and they are delimited by different minds, existing

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in countless gross bodies. The chief jīva, being falsely identified with different minds, due to false superimposition (adhyāsa), is known as 'aham' ('I') in each body.400 When any individual jīvabhasa enters the state of deep sleep, the other jīvābhāsas may remain in a waking state, for the collective, or cosmic, jīva itself remains in a waking state along with other jīvābhāsas. Superimposed by these, and with the help of the avidyā, the cosmic jīva continues to imagine the external world and the jīvābhāsas. The state of deep sleep of the cosmic jīva is known as the dissolution in the source matter (prākrta-pralaya). At that time, due to the absence of minds, the universe and jīvābhāsas and their minds remain dormant in primordial avidyā. During his deep sleep, the cosmic jīva remains covered with the primordial avidyā.401 The concept of the above-mentioned cosmic jīva corresponds to the common concept of Iśvara, as Omnipotent, Omniscient and Omnipresent. The cosmic jīva possesses Omniscience and the agency of all activities402 and, as the substratum, pervades each worldly object as well as the semblance-jīvas.

Drsti-srsti-vāda

In order to appreciate the neo-vedāntic drsti-srsti-vāda, that is, the view that holds the world just existing as long as there is a person, (jiva) experiencing it, the con- ventional view of creation, which accepts the existence of the created world before the individual selves experience it, (i.e. srsti-drsti-vāda), deserves first consideration. According to this latter view, Iśvara creates the world, common to all the percipient jīvas. As creation is the result of God's voluntary effort, God observed, (thought), (tadaiksata)403 before He created. This 'being conscious of' the imminent creation, is His innate virtue, so that God observes that is, is aware of the creation even before His act of creation. Such consciousness therefore is not ordinary knowledge dependant on an object, but belongs to the very nature of God (svarūpabhūtajñāna). Besides God's cosmic creation, the traditional non-dualist view recognises jīva's creation as well. This is jīva's world of errors - the individual illusion that takes place frequently in its pragmatic life. The conventional view has analysed such illusion on the part of jīva. Jīva is possessed by avidyā, which, sometimes conceals from the jīva an object such as a rope. Consequent upon such conceal- ment its avidyā creates an illusory snake there for that deluded jīva. Simultaneous with this creation of the snake, avidyā creates a mental mode comprehending that illusory snake. This mode helps in the revelation of the snake to that jīva and continues to exist so long as the illusory snake is not contradicted by valid knowl- edge disclosing the true nature of the rope. The result is that the illusory snake is perpetually revealed to the jīva as long as it exists. From this standpoint, jīva possesses constant knowledge of its own creation, parallel to the knowledge of God with regard to God's creation. The ekajīva-vāda has substituted jīva for God, the creator, so that God's srsti-drsti-vāda is replaced by jīva's drsti-srsti-vāda. In other words, the

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conventional theory of illusion has been exploited in such a way that God's creation has lost its identity in the creation of jīva.404 The results of such exploitation are twofold:

1 The conventional difference between the pragmatic existence (vyavahārika- sattā) of God's world and the illusory existence (prātibhāsika-sattā) of jīva's world, has been effaced. All creation - whether it is that of the mountain, the pitcher or the illusory snake - is stated to be illusory (prātibhāsika). The practical difference between the pitcher and the illusory snake is then a mat- ter of the durability of the object of illusion. The knowledge of rope, although illusory in this view, may very well contradict the equally illusory snake,405 as a dream object is discarded in dream by another dream object. 2 As God's knowledge has been replaced by jīva's cognition based on a mode of ignorance regarding its 'illusory' creation, jīva, by means of this cognitive act, continues to know its own creation, as long as the creation lasts. This means until jīva's avidyā is not dispelled by the knowledge of ultimate reality, jīva enjoys omniscience in its own sphere of creation.406

Madhusūdana has thus tried to explain drst-srsti-vāda in terms of his eka-jīva-vāda. But he has also assigned an important place to the theory of reflec- tion in this context. For him, the principal individual (mukhya-jīva), whose creation is the universe, is a reflection of Iśvara on avidyā. Distinguished from the ābhāsa-vāda, Madhusūdana's theory of reflection considers both the reflection and its prototype to be identical and equally true. Thus jīva is at the same time both identical with, and a reflection of, God. Madhusūdana's theory of reflection, along with his drsti-srsti-vāda, leads to the conclusion that he omitted from the fold of drsti-srsti-vāda several Vedāntic realities namely, the six conventional categories that are recognised as beginningless.407 Thus, while the drsti-srsti-vāda of Madhusūdana has exploited the conventional theory of illusion, even as an explanation for the cosmic creation, it has significantly left God untouched. It is interesting to note in this context, that Prakāśānanda, who preceded Madhusūdana, took drsți-srsti-vāda to its furthest extreme. He proposed that not only the cosmic creation, but also God, jīva and avidyā - in fact, all five begin- ningless entities except the Pure consciousness - are the creation of jīva's imagi- nation (drsti). The other extreme is referred to above by the conventional theory of illusion. Madhusūdana steers clear of these two extremes. He enlarges the scope of the conventional theory of illusion to comprehend the cosmic creation of God. But he stops at that, and thus leaves out the conventional Vedantic postulates such as God and avidyā. Perhaps the theism of Madhusūdana leaves God to His sovereignty, without reducing Him to a figment of jīva's imagination. While describing different forms of the Lord, Madhusūdana recounts the conventional holy triad, Brahmā, Vișnu and Rudra. He further expressed his opinion with regard to divine

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incarnations (avataras) who are, according to him, directly descending from Iśvara, who out of His boundless compassion for His devotees manifests them, for their liberation.408 However, Brahmananda, the commentator of Madhusūdana, has shown his approval for Prakāśāananda's point of view.409 Critics of the ekajīva-vāda argue that if it is accepted, then the sacred scriptures, as well as the preceptor's knowledge of the absolute truth, become reduced to fiction. Moreover, in these circumstances, jīva will never seek liberation from an individual body. If the scriptures are imaginary, then jīva imagines them without knowing the absolute truth. The knowledge of absolute truth puts an end to all imagination. If the scriptures are intended to impart such knowledge, then they cannot be the creation of jīva's imagination. Again, when jīva imagines the exis- tence of a preceptor who can impart true knowledge, then he must also imagine the true knowledge belonging to the preceptor. It means that jīva, at that time, possesses the knowledge of truth for the purpose of his imagination. As jīva is already wise, the necessity for a preceptor becomes superfluous. Again, if one jīva is encased in all the bodies, then release from a particular body does not ensure a better lot for the jīva, for other, innumerable bodies remain intact and perpetuate the suffering of jīva as before. So jīva's endeavour to rid itself of a particular body is useless. Madhusudana, however, answers all these objections.410 First of all, he states that the validity of the śastras does not require that they should be based on valid knowledge. The śastras impart knowledge inasmuch as the content of that knowl- edge is never contradicted (avādhita vișayatva). The śāstras are valid because they supply us with the knowledge of Brahman, and as Brahman is the only existing truth, this is never contradicted.411 His answers to the second objection are that jīva is able to imagine its preceptor by a general knowledge that the preceptor possesses knowledge of absolute truth; that jīva can possess the knowledge of truth unknown to itself; or, that jīva may possess previous indirect knowledge of Brahman so that the preceptor can say 'tat tavam asi' (that are you). This expla- nation should be accepted, he claims, even by the dualists, otherwise the charges would revert against them since, according to them, a disciple must somehow be convinced that his preceptor possesses true knowledge, which means that the disciple must know what true knowledge is before he meets the preceptor. But what benefit will he derive from meeting the preceptor, when he already possesses the knowledge of truth?412 Madhusudana's answer to the third objection is that even though one jīva is common to all the physical bodies, it is subjected to ego, which is peculiar to each body. Such individual ego gives rise to the notion, 'I am in bondage.' The endeavour for liberation from a particular body is useful in the sense that that knowledge eradicates that particular ego, and the consequent notion with reference to a particular body.413 In fact, Pure consciousness is unaffected by worldly diversity, but being covered by avidyā, which possesses two powers of concealment and projection (āvarana and viksepa), it appears to be subjected to birth and death, to be the author of world imagination, and to be aspiring for liberation.414

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The theory of a single person (ekajīva), as propounded by Madhusūdana, throws light on the five different aspects of consciousness: Iśvara, Sākşī, Brahman, jīva and jīvābhāsas. Of these, the first four are held to be real while jīvābhāsas are said to be illusory. Jīva means here, the cosmic person, which, with the aid of avidyā, creates the physical universe. Jīva is the reflection of con- sciousness on avidyā; Iśvara is the consciousness that is reflected on avidyā; Sākșī is the consciousness that endures through both Iśvara and jīva; Brahman is absolute consciousness, free from all reference to jīva, Iśvara or even Sākșī. As consciousness is one and absolute, there exists no real difference among these four aspects of consciousness. Jīvābhāsas, as depicted by drsti-srsti-vāda, are different from the above-mentioned four conscious realities, being the false appear- ance of cosmic jīva, delimited (avacchinna) by individual inner sense organ or mind. This brief summary makes it clear that Madhusūdana combined the avaccheda-vāda with ābhāsa-vāda in his concept of pseudo persons (jīvābhāsas). Therefore, these being conditioned by mind and also being just appearances (ābhāsa), are not real. In this way, in the drsti-srsti-vāda of Madhusūdana, we have a combination of pratibimba-vāda, ābhāsa-vāda and avaccheda-vāda. The concept of Sāksī comes from the śruti 'sāksī cetā kevalo nirgunaśca',415 which describes pure and absolute consciousness to be the witness of every object as distinguished from, say, the individual person, who has limited perception. One must remember that Sāksī is the immutable consciousness with an emphasis to its distinctive revealing nature (prakāśa). Sākșī is therefore consciousness that always reveals everything. In other words, Pure Conscious Self is designated 'witness' with reference to the empirical phenomena. Vidyāranya, author of the Pañcadaśī takes Sākșī to reveal every empirical object including its knower and the cognitive knowledge of it.416 Citsukha explained that Pure consciousness, Sākșī and jīva, are essentially one and the same. Both Sākșī and jīva are part of the empirical process of cognition. However, their distinction, being based on the conditioning of avidyā, is a false one.417 As these two conditions are mere qualifying adjuncts (upādhis), Sākșī and jīva can still be one and the same. Therefore, the basic identity between the Pure consciousness, Sāksī and jīva remains undisturbed. It may be noted in this context, that following Sarvajñātma Muni, Citsukha too holds the view that Brahman indeed is both the locus and object of avidya.418 A cognitive mode can focus only on such an object which is pervaded by avidyā, so all cognitive modes whether producing ordinary experience or, ultimate knowl- edge of Brahman, have to concern themselves with Brahman only, as the sole revealing entity. Thus, when Brahman becomes pervaded by a cognitive mode (ordinary or otherwise), it is called Sāksī. It may also be noted here that the treat- ment of Sāksī in light of the above, indicates that Citsukha has recognised Sāksī as an epistemological reality. That is to say, Brahman is called Sāksī when it becomes related to a cognitive mode (vrtti). Such a neutral concept of Sāksī seems to run counter to the concept of the essential Controller (Antaryāmī) as found in the 'antaryāmī Brāhmaņa', since the Upanișadic Antaryāmī, as the name indicates,

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seems to be vitally concerned with the act of controlling jīva. Citsukha anticipates this objection and takes Upanişadic Antaryāmī to mean Sākī, which pervades all. In other words, Sāksī is Antaryāmī insofar as Sākșī is the only all-pervasive exis- tence. Thus the so-called existence of jīva has no separate existence apart from that of Sāksī. This concept of Sāksī removes all distinction between the Lord (Īśvara) and Sāksī. Madhusūdana's concept of Sāksī reveals two apparently distinct realities. In the first, Sākșī is presented as a metaphysical reality, while in the other it represents an epistemological truth. Metaphysically speaking, Sākșī is consciousness that endures through both Iśvara and jīva.419 Sāksī is not Īśvara (the prototype), jīva (the reflection) or Brahman (the Pure consciousness); it is consciousness limited (upahita) by a cognitive mode of avidyā and thus free from either being a prototype or, a reflection. In trying to visualise Sāksī from the perspective of his ekajīva-vāda, Madhusūdana draws upon the metaphysics of the Vivarana school, which he prefers above the others. On the other hand, when elucidating Sāksī as an epistemological concept, Madhusūdana states that Sākșī is the consciousness limited by either just avidyā or a mode (vrtti) of avidyā.420 The first definition, that Sāksī is consciousness limited by avidyā, is apparently the reaffirmation of the metaphysical definition of Saksī as given in the Siddhānta-bindu and referred to above. For practical purposes Madhusūdana, in his epistemological context, confined himself to the second definition, that Sāksī is consciousness limited by avidyā vrtti. In order to appreciate Madhusūdana's concept of Sāksī as an epistemological reality, it is necessary to compare Sāksī-knowledge with ordinary knowledge. The points of similarity in both are as follows:

1 a vrtti is required for the revelation of an object; 2 consciousness limited by such a vrtti is taken to be a form of cognitive knowledge; 3 the vrtti has a double function to discharge; first, it takes away the veil of ignorance covering an object and second, it establishes a kind of relationship between the object on the one hand and the cognising consciousness on the other.421

Though consciousness, as the all-pervading reality, is always related to the object, such a relationship is not enough for the revelation of that object to a person. Had it been so, jīva, as consciousness, would be Omniscient. Therefore, it should be acknowledged that vrtti forges a special type of contact between the object and the conscious individual, so that consciousness immediately reveals that specific object to the cognising self. On the other hand, these two forms of knowledge (i.e., sāksī-knowledge and ordinary knowledge) differ from each other in the following ways. Ordinary knowledge is consciousness conditioned (upahita) by a cognitive mode (vrtti)

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comprehending an external object. Such vrtti, however, is a mode of the inner sense organ (see Chapter 3). In this view, the cognising subject (pramātā) is con- sciousness reflected on the inner sense organ and hence is circumscribed by the physical body.422 In the eka-jīva-vāda under consideration, the cogniser is a mere appearance (jīvābhāsa) of the primary jīva (mukhya-jīva), which is the reflection of Īśvara on avidyā. In sāksī- knowledge, however, the requisite vrtti is not a mode of the inner sense organ, but a mode of avidyā. This explains the memory in the waking state namely, 'I slept happily' (sukhamahamasvāpsam), based on what one feels about one's experience in deep sleep (susupti). In deep sleep, when the inner sense organ loses its identity, only avidyā remains. If this avidyā is recognised at that stage as having a vrtti embracing the happiness that arises in deep sleep, then one is able to recall that experience of happiness in the waking state. Likewise, in the experience of happiness during the waking state, the same avidya vrtti, for the sake of economy of concept (laghavāt), is also able to grasp that pleasure. Thus in both these types of experience (one in deep sleep, the other in the waking state) a mode of avidyā, (and not a mode of mind/inner sense organ), may be said to operate in such a way that pleasure is exposed to consciousness which then, on the basis of a special contact between the object (pleasure) and itself, reveals that object. It would follow from this analysis that the epistemological Sāksī that is, the sākșī-knowledge of Madhusūdana is consciousness conditioned by a mode of avidyā, as distinguished from ordinary empirical knowledge, which is conscious- ness conditioned by a mode of mind. Even though in the eka-jīva-vāda, as shown earlier, the cognising person is a mere appearance, from the metaphysical point of view such a condition is basically identical with Sāksī. Therefore, the experience of pleasure that really belongs to Sāksī is ascribed to the experiencing person, and he feels happy. Although sāksī-knowledge is thus identical with Sāksī itself and is therefore prima facie eternal, according to Madhusūdana, consciousness (caitanya) becomes Sākșī, that is, revealer (drastā) only when it is conditioned by avidyā-vrtti. The result is that, although by itself consciousness is eternal, its power of reveal- ing an object (drastrtva) is contemporaneous with the avidya-vrtti.423 Hence, with the disappearance of the avidya-vrtti, consciousness' power of revelation of an object is kept in abeyance. The destruction of avidyā-vrtti is thus called, from a broad point of view, the destruction of Saksī. In other words, in this way sāksī-knowledge, though identical with Sāksī, may be said to be liable of destruc- tion. In this way, even the sāksī-knowledge can produce a mental impression (samskāra) most conducive to subsequent memory as in the case of the experience of happiness and lack of knowledge during deep sleep remembered in the waking state.424 Although the metaphysical concept of Sāksī as the all-pervasive reality, conditioned by avidyā and free from the bimba-pratibimba condition, and the epistemological concept of Sāksī, as consciousness limited by avidyā-vrtti, seem

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mutually different, Madhusūdana accepted both the concepts to be equally plausible. For him the apparent difference may be merged in the following way. Avidyā-vrtti is, after all, a special form of avidyā itself. Thus if the metaphysical Sāksī is taken to be consciousness limited by avidyā in general, then such a concept certainly includes the epistemological Sāksī, which is but consciousness limited by a special type of avidyā; in other words, avidyā in the state of having a vrtti, a special mode. Indeed, according to Madhusūdana, all experiences, whether cognitive knowledge of jīva, the knowledge of Sāksī or, bhakti, must be considered in terms of vrtti, since knowledge is consciousness reflected on the vrtti of avidyā. This vrtti may be primordial, in the case of Sākșī, or conditional, in the case of ordinary cognition or bhakti. Advaita-vedānta establishes absolute identity between all types of conscious entities and Brahman. However the importance of the jīva, the percipient person and enjoyer of the universe, is undeniable. Brahman is the only existent and absolute reality, yet in the empirical world the individual person is the pivot around which the universe revolves. Moreover, the teachings of the Vedānta are meant for the jīva, in order to bring about his liberation. So Madhusūdana ascribes primary importance to the individual and clarifies his notion of the 'person' and its relation to the creator God.425 It is equally important to understand the notion of Sāksī, because without it, the non-dual epistemology is impossible to understand. It is not easy to discover the real nature (svarūpa) of jīva, the support (ālambana) of 'I' consciousness (aham-pratyaya). Scrutiny of the nature of jīva raises serious controversies amongst philosophers. Thus gross materialists like the Cārvakas take the body or the senses for the jīva. The Buddhists regard the jīva as the momentary conscious entity. In fact, the philosophers give different expositions of the jīva's nature according to the views peculiar to the individual systems to which they belong. According to the Advaita-vedānta, jīva, being ultimately iden- tical with Brahman, is devoid of all limitations, eternal, and essentially identified with consciousness and bliss. The existence of jīva, or the individual person, can be proved by the experience of deep sleep (susupti). When the body and the mind are called into inactivity, the individual still exists and enjoys the pleasure of deep sleep. The individual self, being identical with the ultimate Self, is always existent. Which means, it is not limited by time, space or matter (kalā-deśa-vastu- pariccheda-śūnya). That the jīva is not limited by time is proved by the absence of its previous non-existence (prāgabhāva) and destruction (dhvamśa). Since the individual is the self (ātman) of the experiencing person, he cannot witness its non-existence.426 Likewise, as existence itself, the self persists everywhere, so it cannot be limited by space.427 The pattern of argumentation runs in the following manner: As the self is identi- cal with Brahman, it alone exists; that which is not self is non-existent. Anything that is not self is the creation of avidyā and therefore illusory, like avidyā itself. These non-existing objects appear to be existent due to their superimposition (adhyāsa) on the self. Superimposition establishes a false identity between the

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self and objects, although the self, being consciousness, cannot be bound down to a single non-conscious object. These arguments also prove the validity of the view that jīva is in essence kūtastha (unchangeable, immutable) consciousness. The witnessing self (Saksī), however, continues to be the same, even though the knower, the instrument of knowledge, the act of knowledge and the objects of knowl- edge may vary, (māt-māna-miti-meyāņām vyabhicāritve'pi avyavhicārāt). 428 It may be argued that the knower, who is the locus of valid knowledge (pramāśraya), is the agent (kartā) and the enjoyer (bhoktā), and this knower (pramātā) reveals other objects as well as its own self, just like a lamp. Therefore, it is unnecessary to imagine a separate witnessing-self as the revealer to the knower. The answer to this criticism is that all these attributes of the knower, the agent or the enjoyer, are modifications of avidyā. Jīva, being a combination (granthi or, knot) of consciousness and these attributes, cannot by itself be the ever-revealed witness. This would mean that not only consciousness but also the aforemen- tioned attributes, which are undoubtedly objects of cognition (drśya), would attain the status of being recognised as witness-consciousness. This would mean that they would be taken to be like consciousness itself. Hence consciousness divested of the capacity of becoming an object of knowledge (drśyatva), that is, the immutable self, (kūțastha ātmā) is the witness of every object. The scriptures also confirm this view by statements such as 'tameva bhāntamanubhāti sarvam tasya bhāsā sarvamidam vibhāti,' (Him alone, as he shines, do all things reflect; this whole world radiates with his light); 'Na drsterdrastāram paśyeh' (You cannot see the seer who does the seeing), and 'adrsto drastā, ... nānya'to'sti dratā.' (Unseen He sees, ... there is no one besides him who sees).429 The quali- ties of knowing, agency and enjoying belong to the mind, which is not the self. The mind, being transparent due to the predominance of sattva guna,430 is capa- ble of receiving the reflection of cosmic consciousness (cit). At that time the mind, being superimposed on the individual consciousness, becomes falsely iden- tified with it. By mutual superimposition between the consciousness and mind, each is then influenced by the characteristics of the other, which enables the mind to receive valid knowledge (pramājñāna).431 The formlessness of the cosmic con- sciousness, or Self, is not opposed to its reflection on the mind. Even in ordinary experience, the space, (akāśa) which is unperceivable and formless, is seen to be reflected on water. The reflection of akāśa on water explains the appearance of depth in shallow water.432 Scriptures such as 'rūpam rūpam pratirūpo babhuva' (Of every form of every being, the likeness he has assumed), 'ekadhā bahudhā caiva drśyate jalacandravat' (like the reflection of the moon on the water, he, though single, appears manyfold),433 also confirm the reflection of the formless Brahman. Moreover, unless this view of reflection is accepted, such Scriptures as 'sa eșa iha pravistah'(He it is who has penetrated this body), and 'tat srstvā tadevānuprāviśat' (After emitting it, he entered that very world),434 become meaningless because Self being totally devoid of any action the verb to pene- trate/enter cannot mean any positive action and must be explained as just being reflected.

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Thus, jīva is essentially unlimited Self but is superimposed by the mind and becomes limited as the knower, the agent and the enjoyer. The argument in favour of this superimposition can be summarised as follows: The commonplace per- sonal experience such as 'I am a man, the agent and the enjoyer' shows the indi- vidual self to be attributed with manhood, agency and enjoyment. This experience can neither be regarded as recollection nor valid knowledge (pramājñāna). It is not a recollection because it is direct knowledge.435 It cannot be valid knowledge because scriptures contradict it in such statements as 'yo'yam vijñānamayah prānesu hrdyantarjyotih purușah' (It is this person - the one that consists of per- ception among the vital functions, prana, the one that is the inner light within the heart); 'ayamātmā Brahma', (Brahman is this self, ātman); and 'yo'śanāyāpipāse śokam moham jarām mrtyumatyeti' (He is the one who is beyond hunger and thirst, sorrow and delusion, old age and death).436 Moreover, the experience 'I am a man' means that the self is a body; but the self cannot be a body, since a body is subject to changes (vikāra) and is a limited object. Changes and limitations are characteristics of objects that are not self. Furthermore, the body cannot be the self, for the self is the subject of knowledge that has the body as its object. Again, the body, being the object of knowledge, cannot be related to the self, which is knowledge itself. Thus, it is evident that the body cannot be regarded as being identical with the self. Likewise, the agency of the self cannot be taken as real, as in that case agency would persist even at the time of salvation. As agency is the cause of all worldly bondage, cessation from it would never be possible. Since the self is self-revealing, it can reveal other objects; otherwise, the worldly objects would never have been revealed. The self is the object of great love437 because it is bliss in nature. Therefore, the self is by nature attributeless, eternally existent, self-revealing bliss.438 The knowledge, 'I am the man, the agent and the enjoyer' is false and, as already discussed, is caused by avidyā. Due to the beginningless avidyā, the non-self is superimposed on the self. Failing to distinguish between the self and non-self, man experiences such illusions as 'I am the man, the agent and the enjoyer.'439 Following the conventional concept, Madhusūdana describes the triad forms of jīva, namely, viśva, taijasa and prājña, representing jīva's three states of existence: waking (jägrat), dreaming (svapna) and the deep sleep (susupti). The waking state of jīva takes place when, through the individual body and its senses, jīva enjoys the gross material objects of the universe. Thus this state presupposes the existence of the gross bodies, and also contact between the jiva and the gross bodies.440 As it is based on superimposition (adhyāsa), this contact is illusory. The contact of the self with the gross body occurs in the following way. At the outset, avidyā is superimposed on the consciousness as ignorance. This ignorance then produces ego (ahamkāra) and the inner sense organ etc. and these, along with their qualities are also superimposed on the consciousness producing the individual jīva sensing such uncharacteristic personal experience as 'I am igno- rant'. Due to the false identification between jīva and ego etc. the attributes of antahkarana such as agency (kartrtva), power to enjoy (bhokrtva) and cognisance

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(pramatrtva) are superimposed on this limited consciousness. Lastly, the gross body is superimposed on consciousness, where the qualities of the senses are already attributed. It may be noted here that in this series of superimpositions, in each case the superimposition of qualities (dharmādhyāsa) is preceded by the superimposition of the subject qualified (dharmī-adhyāsa), except in the case of the attribution of the qualities of senses. In this case, the senses are not previously superimposed.441 In this way, jīva becomes connected with the gross body and through it makes contact with the gross external objects. At that time, jīva becomes limited by the gross body and the gross external world and goes by the name of 'Viśva'(the world). In the state of dreaming, jīva becomes possessed by a special vrtti of avidyā known as sleep, (nidra)442 where tamas guna dominates. In that state, the gross physical body merges into the subtle body. Due to the absence of a physical body, the gross senses become inactive. At that time avidyā, with the aid of vāsanā, that is, impressions left in the mind by past actions and thoughts, produces objects called dream-objects. Just like the illusory objects of the waking state, these dream-objects also become known through the vrtti of avidyā that produces them. The difference between the ordinary cognition and dream-cognition lies in the fact that in ordinary cognition, mind flows through the sense organs into the external objects and assumes the shape thereof (vrtti). In dream-cognition, how- ever, the sense organs cease to function. The vrtti revealing dream-objects are, therefore, taken to belong to avidyā. Thus knowledge of dream-objects also belongs to Sāksī. Even though avidyā creates the dream-objects, they are strictly personal because the special vāsanā of the individual mind is included among the causes of dream-objects. Jīva in this state is called 'Taijasa' (dynamic). From this state of dream, jīva enters the state of deep sleep. In this state its mind, along with the vāsanā imprinted on it, lies dormant in its cause, the avidyā. Madhusūdana quotes the author of Vivarana,443 who maintains that at the time of deep sleep there exists only one vrtti and that also of avidya, manifesting the wit- nessing consciousness (Sāksī), happiness and this special avidyā also contains the individual's mind and its vāsanās both of the waking state and the dreaming state, albeit in a latent condition (samskāratāpannam). It also embraces the beginning- less objects.444 But there is another conventional theory adopted by Madhusūdana in Siddhānta-bindu, which holds that in susupti there exist three vrttis of avidyā, namely, the vrtti of the particular avidyā mentioned earlier, the vrtti of happiness and the vrtti of sāksī-knowledge. According to the traditional point of view, these vrttis cannot be reduced to one. The vrttis in deep sleep embrace the afore- mentioned three objects without any reference to their particular characteristics. Therefore in the state of deep sleep, the comprehension of the three objects are indeterminate, as distinguished from the perception of objects in the waking state and in dream, which is always determinate. Thus if one vrtti is substituted for the aforementioned vrttis, and if the objects thereof become interrelated under one vrtti, then the resulting knowledge cannot be indeterminate. Moreover, as ego

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(ahamkāra ) is absent in sușupti, there can be no determinate knowledge at that stage. This is because in all cases of determinate knowledge, ahamkāra is a prerequisite condition. Therefore, these vrttis cannot be replaced by one vrtti, co-ordinating the happiness and the particular mode of avidyā present as deep sleep.445 It may be noted here that the reduction of these vrttis to one, does not necessarily mean the existence of an interrelationship among the objects of knowledge, as presumed by the traditional view, as the named vrtti can embrace the three entities connected with one another (samūhālambanātmika jñāna). If such a position is accepted, then there is no harm in accepting one vrtti instead of three.446 This is the view of the Vivarana.447 The presence of vrtti distinguishes sușupti from pralaya (total dissolution of creation), when avidyā is left to itself without any vrtti. Jīva in deep sleep (suşupti) is known as prājña (wise). Madhusūdana describes three states of jīva from the conventional point of view, which is evident from his method of treating them without any reference to drsti-srsti-vāda. So, in sușupti, only a part of the inner organ, where its cognitive power predominates, becomes dormant. The vital airs of the inner organ continue unaffected. This explains the existence of respiration etc. in the individual jīva at the time of deep sleep.448 Otherwise, from the drsti-srsti viewpoint, this explanation is unnecessary, since according to that view the experience of respiration in a person in deep sleep is only illusory.

Refutation of jiva's anutva (atomic nature)

As a part of Iśvara, the Pervading Creator, jīva is held by the dualist Vaișnavas to be of atomic dimension (anu parimāna). It goes totally against the view of Advaita-vedänta, which holds the jīva to be essentially identical with Brahman. As the abiding essence of the universe, Brahman is the all-pervasive reality and jīva, as identical with it, is also all-pervasive (vibhu). When the scripture449 describes jīva to be of a very small dimension, it is merely to emphasise the fact that the nature of jīva is very difficult to comprehend. Objections may be raised against the conclusion that the scripture often describes the movement of jīva.450 Again, according to the scripture,451 jīva, after leaving the body, attains the Brahman. All these statements indicate that jīva possesses a limited dimension. Had jīva been all-pervasive, it could never move from one place to another, nor could it reach Brahman. Madhusūdana answers that jīva by itself has no movement, but the aforemen- tioned scripture indicates the movement of jīva, as limited by its inner sense organ. Apart from this limitation jīva is, as described in the scripture,452 as well as in the Bhagavadgīta,453 eternal and all-pervasive self. As regards the scriptural statement denoting jīva's approaching Brahman (sa enān Brahma gamayat) the meaning of the scripture, taken in its primary sense, is absurd. A limited object can approach another limited object, but unlimited Brahman being all-pervasive

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need not have any object to move towards It, nor can It, being the unique reality, find another existent entity. Therefore, how can this scriptural statement really mean to say that the individuals are lead to Brahman? Thus the underlying meaning of the scripture is that jīva, by removing the limitation (of avidyā) that differentiated it from Brahman, becomes identified with Brahman. Moreover, if jīva is regarded as being of an atomic dimension, how can we feel it pervading the entire physical body? Hence, jīva must be regarded as all-pervasive, like Brahman itself. The opponent may argue that just as a lamp placed in a corner illuminates the entire space falling within its range, so the atomic jīva, abiding in a space within the body, may be said to pervade the whole body through its attrib- ute of feeling (anubhūti). However, this solution is not tenable. As an attribute of jīva, feeling cannot exist apart from jīva. How, then, can feeling pervade the entire body while the jīva is left in a corner? An attribute must always remain with the subject. Moreover, from this standpoint, the light of a lamp cannot be regarded as an attribute of the lamp when the light wanders and the lamp is left behind. Thus the analogy of a lamp does not stand up to scrutiny.454 Hence, the jīva cannot be regarded as possessing an atomic dimension.

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Having dealt with the empirical world of the perceiving conscious entities (drk), Madhusūdana next concerns himself with the contents of their experience (drśya). Madhusūdana, in his Siddhānta-bindu,455 has enumerated the views of the various Vaisnava sects and of the Pasupatas concerning the status of the empirical world. This is interesting for our purpose of recounting how Madhusūdana, a great devotee of Lord Krsna, refuted the theistic view of the reality of the created world. First of all Madhusūdana discusses the different theories of causation held by the various schools of Indian philosophy. Following Sarvajñātma Muni, he states, that the cosmological theory of evolution (parināma ) of the Sāmkhya philosophy is acceptable as far as men of ordinary limited intelligence are concerned. It implies that in order to prepare their mind and intellect for initiation to the Advaita-vedānta theory of illusory transformation (vivarta), which is a difficult concept to realise, one has to, as a preliminary step, understand the theory of parinma. Moreover this theory is useful for contradicting other views, such as that held by the realist Naiyāyikas, as well as those that are completely idealistic, such as the views of the Buddhists.456 The main difference between the Advaita- vedānta and Naiyāyika theories is that the former totally denies the cause and effect relationship, since from the monistic viewpoint the relationship presupposes a difference between the two which they do not accept. Hence no relationship can exist between a cause and its effect. According to the Nyãya-school, before its creation, the effect is non-existent, that is, the cause produces a completely new object, which, begins (ārambha) to exist only just at the moment of its creation. Prior to that moment, there exists that object's antecedent absence (prāgabhāva) in its cause. Madhusūdana construes that this produced object can neither be existent nor non-existent before its production. In the first case, because the effect remains previous to its production, the causes become useless. In the second case, it is illogical because non-existent objects, like horns of a hare, cannot be brought into existence by any means. It may be said that the latter objection is based on an incorrect analogy.457 The Naiyayikas state that the non-existence of a horn of a hare is an instance of absolute non-existence (atyantābhāva), whereas the non-existence of a pitcher,

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which is produced by joining its constituent two halves (kapāla), in either of those two halves in their separated states, is an instance of its antecedent non-existence (prāgabhāva). Hence there is no similarity between the two cases. To that argument Madhusūdana answers that according to the Vedāntins, prior to the creation of an object, its non-existence cannot be specified as a case of prāgabhāva, because Advaita-vedānta does not recognise this notion. Naiyāyikas may further argue that antecedent non-existence must be accepted as a really specified non-existence. Because, this particular non-existence of an object includes in its connotation the imminent creation of that object which is now non-existent, from its inherent material cause (samavāyī kāraņa) where its antecedent non-existence is located. Madhusūdana458 contends that the concept of samavāyī kārana, that is, the material cause that inheres in the effect is invalid, for the relation of inherence (samavāya sambandha), which the Naiyāyikas accept to be existing between the constituent material cause and its effect, is not valid. Such a relationship cannot possibly exist between an existent (sat) cause and a non-existent (asat) effect. Moreover, knowledge cannot arise about a non-existent object for nothing can exist between the knowledge and the non-existing object that might be known. Naiyāyikas may argue that without the acceptance of prāgabhāva, one of the auxiliary causes, that produce an effect, the particular combination of other causes will go on producing an unceasing recurrence of effects. However, if the concept of prāgabhāva is accepted as a cause, this inconvenience cannot arise since with the production of the first effect, this cause no longer exists. Madhusūdana replies that it is a nature or quality of any causal system that a particular set of causes should produce a single effect.459 Therefore, the above- mentioned disadvantage of not accepting the prāgabhāva cannot hold good. For the sake of simplification it is better to imagine the existence of a quality than imagining a new phenomenon like prāgabhāva. Moreover, after the production of the effect, the particular adrsta460 which is a part of the auxiliary causes of it, is destroyed. Therefore, as no relationship can exist between the cause and the non-existent effect, neither one can be the regulator of the other. Hence, the whole Naiyāyika notion of the cause and effect relationship is baseless and invalid. The upholders of the theory of parinama hold that the effect exists even before its production (sat-kārya), when it lies dormant in its material cause. Hence, the effect is sat or real, that is, it exists even when it is not manifest; but not eternal, that is, existing endlessly. Madhusūdana refutes this theory by proving this conclusion as logically fallacious.461 He asks whether, before the process of its creation, this dormant effect exists in its causes, partly or entirely? The former is impossible because no other part than the causal one can then exist. However, if this proposition is accepted, the fallacy of self-dependency (ātmāśraya) will arise. The latter theory is also unworkable because if the effect exists in each part of the cause, then each part should have the same utility as the whole effect. It may be contended that the idea of the theorists of sat-kārya is that the effect exists in

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the cause as the cause, in which case the question of partial or entire existence does not arise at all. However, such contention is futile, because just as one may question as to whether 'cow-ness' (gotva) exists in each particular part of the cow or in the entire cow, and endless argumentation cannot really prove anything either way. So also in this case nothing can be settled beyond any doubt. It is use- less to argue that just as 'cow-ness' exists in each cow so the effect exists in each cause, since experience does not confirm this theory. Anything that is completely different from its effect cannot be its material cause.462 Therefore, the theory of parināma is as illogical as the theory of arambha. The nihilistic theory of śūnyatā also does not stand scrutiny. Thus, none of the above-mentioned theories of causation is rational enough to be acceptable. On the other hand, the view that Brahman is the material as well as the efficient cause of the universe appears to be more logical. Brahman creates the universe through the medium of avidyā. Thus, avidyā, in this sense, is regarded as the instrumental cause of the universe. Just as a magician projects illusory objects by his magical power, so Brahman projects this universe by its avidyā or māyā power. Questions may arise as to how Brahman can be the material cause of the universe, because a cause must evolve into the effect. Since Brahman is unchangeable, it cannot be seen as the material cause, a view accepted by Madhusūdana himself.463 Reiterating the view of Prakāśānanda, he states that Brahman is not the evolving cause of the universe (pariņāmī kārana), rather it is the base or locus where false transformation (vivarta) is projected. Advaita-vedānta accepts avidyā as the pariņāmī kārana of the created universe; to be more exact, it is the material cause of the universe and Brahman, being the locus of avidya, is accepted as the indirect cause. The śrutis - such as 'yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyane ... '464 - confirm the view that Brahman is the material cause of the universe. Brahman is the material cause of the universe because it is the substratum of all appearance (vivarta). The world is produced in Brahman by avidyā.465 If both Brahman and avidya are regarded as the material causes of the world appearance then, Vyāsarāja observes, this can be in three ways:

1 If both are considered to be equally responsible for the creation of this universe then the scripture should not have portrayed Brahman as unchange- able. Moreover, just as a piece of cloth made of two different colours has the threads of both colours running through it, so should the universe made of Brahman and anirvacanīya avidyā be both real and anirvacanīya.466 Madhusūdana may argue that the relationship of Brahman with the universe, being illusory, does not make the universe real. By the same logic, the rela- tionship of avidya with the universe may also be illusory. Hence, the universe should not be regarded as anirvacanīya. Brahman and avidyā cannot be equally regarded as the material cause of this world appearance.467 2 If Brahman, with its māya power, is regarded as the material cause and the scripture depicting the changelessness of Brahman is likewise interpreted in that light, the monists still cannot escape criticism. If Brahman undergoes

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change in its contact with māyā then it becomes as evolving as the clay producing the earthen pot. If Brahman is regarded as qualified by māyā, then the scripture confirming unqualified monism becomes invalid. On the other hand, if Brahman is regarded as unqualified, the scripture cannot cite it as the cause of the universe. It cannot be said that as qualified, Brahman is regarded as the evolving cause whereas as pure, Brahman is regarded as the vivarta cause, because even in pure Brahman the imposition of changeability is nec- essary for the sake of appearance. If it is acknowledged that pure Brahman, being the object of avidyā, serves as the material cause of appearance, then it should be also acknowledged that the change in the form of the destruction of that quality is also manifested in pure Brahman. Hence the scripture depicting Brahman as unchangeable becomes meaningless,468 so this theory must also be rejected. 3 The third probable explanation is that Brahman is the material cause of the world-appearance through māyā, in the same way as fibre is considered to be the cause of a piece of cloth through the threads spun of it. That is to say, Brahman is the material cause of māyā and māyā is the material cause of the universe. However, this explanation is also unacceptable, because Brahman is not the material cause of māyā. Therefore, it is evident that Brahman can- not be regarded as the material cause of this universe.

Madhusūdana replies, that although both Brahman and avidyā are equally con- sidered to be the material causes of the universe, Brahman is the cause through appearance (vivarta) while avidyā is the evolving cause (pariņāmī kāraņa). Therefore, the vivarta cause Brahman remains unchangeable, whereas avidyā as pariņāmī kārana undergoes change. The reality of Brahman469 does not make the universe real because the rule that the effect must have the same degree of reality as possessed by its evolving cause, is not applicable here, inasmuch as Brahman is not the evolving cause of the universe. Hence the universe need not possess the same degree of reality as Brahman does. Thus Brahman, having a different cate- gory of reality, may remain unchanged. Nevertheless, the conception of avidyā as the ancillary material cause is necessary, because in common experience the conception of an evolving material cause is inevitable. The earthen pot has its material cause, clay, which evolves into that very object.470 It may be argued that not all the appearances require an evolving cause. For example, the shell-silver appearance does not possess an evolving cause because the material cause, which evolves into an effect, always produces an empirically real object (satyarūpāpatti). In the case of shell-silver, however, the unreal effect means that satyarūpāpatti does not take place. Hence it may be presumed that shell-silver does not possess any evolving material cause. As the Advaita-vedāntins regard the existence of the universe as an appearance only, the supposition of avidyā as its evolving material cause is superfluous.471 Madhusūdana further argues that according to Advaita-vedānta, evolution does not mean changing into a real form (satyarūpāpatti), because in this system both the

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evolving cause and the effect are equally non-existent. Moreover, as a changing (vikārī) cause, avidyā must be regarded as the material cause of the universe. Brahman cannot be a material cause in this sense because, in that case, the destruction of the world-appearance by the knowledge of the truth would not be possible. The knowledge of absolute truth can destroy the ignorance covering the truth (Brahman) and all evolving effects of ignorance (ajñāna-pariņāma) can be destroyed immediately.472 Vyāsarāja objects that Brahman cannot be regarded as the creator of this false universe, just as no creator (or agent) is found to produce the false silver. But Madhusūdana construes that such objection does not stand scrutiny because even false silver is a creation of Sāksī.473 Vyāsarāja further argues by raising the question 'what is really meant by agency (kartrtva)?'474 It cannot be the quality of the substratum, nor can it be the quality of being the observer of the illusion, that is, a person who takes an illusion to be real, because such a person cannot be the agent of illusion if he/she as the agent, sees it as illusion before creating it. It cannot even be the quality of creating illusion for others, like a magician, because, in this case, unless the cre- ator is aware of the existence of the jīvas who will be illusioned, there is no need for the creator to possess this quality. On the other hand, if the creator is seen as being conscious of the existence of the jīvas, he also becomes merged into illusion. It cannot be said that this illusion is imposed on the creator, for that conclusion gives way to the fallacy of reciprocal dependency; that is, to justify illusion one has to presuppose illusion. Moreover, this notion goes against the scripture which states, 'I shall change into name and form,'475 because a magician, before projecting his illusion, resolves not to 'make' it but to 'show' it to the spectators. Moreover, the three alternatives mentioned earlier cannot justify the omniscience of the creator.476 A fourth alternative might be that the creator is he who possesses the volition which is favourable to the evolution of the material into the effect.477 However, this theory is also open to criticism because in the case of illusion, such evolution is impossible. Madhusūdana states that the fourth alternative is free from all criticism. Agency means the possession of knowledge favourable to creative activities.478 The omniscience of Brahman is justified because Brahman possesses the required knowledge as a vrtti of māyā, which is the material cause of the universe. Thus Brahman, by the vrtti of māyā, is directly connected with all physical objects and directly knows every object.479 Therefore, Brahman is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe. Scriptural evidence, such as 'yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante yena jātāni jīvanti yat prayantyabhisamviśanti',480 establishes Brahman as the locus of the creation, existence and disappearance of the universe, thereby making it the material cause of the universe. The scripture also states, 'I establish the distinctions of name and appearance',481 conveying the idea that Brahman is the agent of this universe. Other scriptural evidences include 'After emitting it, he entered that very world.

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And after entering, he became [both] visible and invisible [phenomena]'.482 He had this desire: 'Let me multiply myself. Let me produce offspring.'483 'In the beginning this world was the non-existent, and from it arose the existent.'484 Vyāsarāja further objects that tejas, etc. cannot be the creation of Brahman, 485 as they possess, like God, the power of observation and creation and as such, are conscious phenomena. Hence, Brahman cannot be their material cause, for Brahman cannot be the material cause of any conscious entity. To this, Madhusūdana's reply is that as consciousness per se cannot be created, when the scripture describes the creation of the elements, it refers to the revela- tion of consciousness as limited by those elements. The śrutis, such as 'the heat thought to itself' (tattejo aiksata) and 'it created water' (tadāpo' srjata),486 merely say that consciousness limited by the preceding element is responsible for the cre- ation of the successive element. For example, consciousness limited by space (ākāśa) is the creator of wind (vāyu), consciousness limited by vāyu is the creator of fire (tejas), and so on. As consciousness is thus recreating itself in the sense stated earlier, śruti states 'tadātmānam svayam akuruta' ('it created itself.'),487 indicating that Brahman is the material cause of creation. The preceding sentence from this śruti, which states 'tato vai sadajāyata'488 ('from that, all this mani- fested world comes into being'), indicates that Brahman is equally the efficient or agent cause. In this way, the śruti cannot be accused of repetition.489 In justification of his view Madhusūdana quotes a syllogism suggested by the author of Vivarana, which is based on the scriptures, and confirms the view men- tioned earlier.490 Moreover, both Sureśvara in his Vārtika491 and Sarvajñātma Muni in his Samksepa-śārīraka support the view of Brahman's being the material cause of the universe through avidya.492 Madhusūdana's interpretation of this the- ory closely resembles that of Prakāśānanda Sarasvatī.493 Prakaśānanda states that the actual evolving material cause is avidya, as the material cause is that which evolves into effect. It is impossible to ascribe such causality to Brahman, in which no change is possible. For Brahman to be the material cause, it has to be indirect, as the Vārtika states. Avidyā, the direct material cause, has Brahman as its locus. Thus Brahman creates the universe by projecting the universe-illusion through the instrument (kāraņa) of avidyā. Avidyā may therefore be seen also as the instru- mental cause, a view shared by Sarvajñātma Muni. It may be conjectured, there- fore, that the active evolving cause of this world-illusion is avidyā. This avidyā, by virtue of its twofold power, creates the world on the one hand and the percip- ient individual, jīva on the other. By its concealing power (āvaraņa śakti), avidyā hides the real nature of Brahman as unlimited, infinite and unchangeable, and causes it to be seen as limited and finite, subjected to the worldly bondage of birth and death. Ignorance is the cause of jīva's non-recognition of its own self-revealed, unlimited and transcendental nature. By its projecting power (viksepa śakti), avidyā creates this universe on Brahman, just as a false snake is projected on a rope by human-error. Brahman is therefore necessary as the substratum of illusion and for imposing a false existence on these illusory objects, derived from their illusory identification with Brahman.

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Advaita-vedānta cosmogony

Avidyā, which manifests itself as the varied world, is timeless (kālātīta) in the sense that it creates the notion of time and thus is superior to time. This view encompasses dik or directions in the concept of space, (ākāśa) and the concept of time (kāla) in primordial avidyā, which contains all in its fold. Thus, acceptance of time as a distinct category is superfluous. Although time and the directions are included in this ontology, unlike the Naiyāyikas, they are not placed on a similar footing. Time is one of the primal causal factors from which everything, includ- ing space and quarter, is produced. Space, however, is considered as the starting point of all other phenomenal appearances. Time, as explained by Purusottama, the commentator of Madhusūdana,494 is conceived as consciousness conditioned by avidyā, which is thus identical to Iśvara. Therefore, time is the first creation of avidyā. It is interesting to note that in the Pañcarātra theology time is equated with Aniruddha who creates the empirical world.495 It is the first admixture of real and unreal, providing the impetus for creation. Its conscious portion is real but its avidyā portion is unreal. Hence kāla is also a phenomenal appearance (anirvacanīya). Apart from jīva, Īvara and ajñāna, all objects come within the fold of time and so are manifested as related to time. That is, the pragmatic world exists as long as time exists. The drśya - the universe viewed apart from the percipient jīva - is the world of names and forms. The author of Digdrśyaviveka distinguishes clearly between the perceiver and the perceived (drk and drśya) in that while drk possesses exis- tence, revelation and bliss, drśya is characterised by names and forms only (nāma and rūpa). Drśya is divided into three groups: unmanifest (avyākrta), subtle (amūrta) and gross (mūrta). Avyākrta is the primordial avidyā, which is the root cause of both the subtle and gross universe. It is co-existent with Iśvara, the rela- tionship between avidya and consciousness, the difference between jīva and Iśvara, and the jīva. They are all unmanifest and beginningless on a similar basis. As avidyā exists they also exist, but when avidyā is removed they too cease to exist. Avidya, being inert, cannot by itself evolve into the universe. The potential influence of the consciousness and the existence of jīva's karma make ajñāna create the universe. It is Iśvara, Himself, who supplies potentiality to avidyā.496 In this way, Madhusūdana accepts Iśvara as the creator. The inert, primordial avidyā, having been associated with the reflection of caitanya, proceeds to produce the universe. Primordial avidyā consists of three constituents called gunas: sattva, rajas and tamas. The five cosmic subtle elements that directly emerge from avidyā possess the nature of all three gunas. These five elements, having the predominance of sattva, produce in combination a category that is extremely transparent and pure. This category has two aspects, showing the power of knowledge or intelligence and the power of action, respectively.497 The scriptures state that the māyā-sakti of Brahman has three powers: knowledge (jñāna), volition (bala) and action (kriyā).498 However, Madhusūdana accepts

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only two of these, as bala and kriyā may be merged into one kriyā-śakti. When jñāna-śakti predominates, the category is known as antahkarana, whereas when kriyā-śakti predominates the category is called prāna. Antahkarana, having two different aspects, is further divided into manas and buddhi. Prāna consists of five elements - prāņa, apāna, vyāna, udāna and samāna.499 Dharmarājādhavarīndra states that antahkarana has four modes (vrttis): doubt, samśaya; determination, niścaya; pride, garva; and recollection, smarana. According to these vrttis, antahkarana has four aspects known as mind, manas; intelligence, buddhi; ego, ahamkāra; and, thought, citta, respectively. They are not different from antahkarana but have acquired different designations only because each of them shows a distinct state of antahkarana.500 Furthermore, while describing the genesis of the universe, Dharmarājādhvarīndra enunciates that the five subtle elements, characterised by their sattvaguna, collectively produce manas, buddhi, ahamkāra and citta. That means these four aspects of mind collectively are taken as equivalent to antahkarana (obviously consisting of jñāna-śakti). Vidyāraņya Muni501 states that ahamkāra is the embodiment of jñāna-śakti and kriyā-śakti. He further identifies it with antahkarana, which ascribes transient life, samsāra to jīva.502

Ahamartha or ahamkāra

The notion of ahamkāra or ego has differed to a considerable extent at the hands of the philosophers of the Advaita-vedānta school. Dharamarājādhvarīndra describes ahamkāra as a special mode of antahkarana, where the element of garva (ego) predominates. In this sense, ahamkāra is merely an aspect of antahkarana, as are manas, buddhi and citta.503 Vidyāraņya Muni, in his discussion of the concept of ahamkāra, reiterates two different views. He begins his discussion of ahamkāra by stating that it is the cre- ation of avidyā with the addition of both jñānaśkati and kriyāśakti.504 He further identifies it with antahkarana. However, in the course of further elucidation of the concept of ahamkāra, Vidyāraņyta Muni takes it to mean the Upanișadic hrdaya granthi,505 which he explains as the combination of cit (consciousness) and jada (insensate). By cit, he means the self, which is the locus, and by jada he means antahkarana. However, when looking at the notion of ahamkāra, Vidyāranya seems to vacillate between antahkarana and hrdaya-granthi. Madhusūdana dispels this uncertainty by accepting ahamkāra as the combination of consciousness and the unconscious that is, Vidyāranya's alternative interpreta- tion. However, while, according to Vidyāranya, ahamkāra is the unity of the unconscious mind (antahkarana) and its conscious locus, Madhusūdana takes it to be the combination (or mutual identification) of antahkarana and the consciousness limited by that antahkarana. Thus, ahamkāra, or ahamartha (the phenomenon 'I') as described by Madhusūdana, is neither just pure consciousness nor antahkarana, but a 'third' entity brought about by the mutual identification

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between the consciousness and the unconscious antahkarana (cidacidgranthira- hamkara).506 Thus the entity aham, 'I' cannot be combined within the category of antahkaraņa. Madhusūdana justifies such a concept on the basis of a common experience, 'I cognise and am the agent' (aham anubhavāmi karomi ca). If the aham anubhavāmi aspect of the experience is analysed separately, it may be concluded that the sensation (anubhuti) is not merely the mental mode encompassing a particular object, it is consciousness reflected upon the mode. Therefore if 'I' is taken to be the consciousness, then the experience 'I am experiencing' (ahamanubhavāmi) would mean 'I am identical with the consciousness reflected upon the mental mode containing a particular object.' Such an interpretation would lead to the conclusion that aham in aham anubhavami is consciousness itself. This would also lead to the conclusion that the aham karomi aspect of the experience means 'I am the locus (āśraya) of the agency,' when, in fact, this is antahkarana. Therefore, aham in aham karomi should mean just the antahkaraņa itself. It is apparent that aham in both aspects - 'I feel' (aham anubhavāmi) and 'I act' (aham karomi) - refers to two different entities: consciousness in the first instance and the inner organ (antahkarana) in the second. Viewed in this light, it is difficult to see how aham - as in aham anubhavāmi karomi ca - could be inter- preted as a form of consolidated knowledge. Apparently aham, as expressed here, seems to refer to an entity that is neither mere consciousness nor mere inner organ (antahkarana). According to Madhusūdana, aham in this consolidated knowledge should be recognised as a third entity distinct from both consciousness and the unconscious antahkarana.507 However, Madhusūdana wants to conceive this third entity in terms of aham meaning both consciousness and the unconscious antahkarana. In other words, Madhusūdana takes the 'I'-entity, (ahamartha) of the consolidated knowledge to arise from the mutual superimposition (anyo'nyādhyāsa) of both phenomena. He says that 'the knotted state of conscious and unconscious is ego while antahkarana is just unconscious' (cidacidgranthirahamkāraḥ, acinmātramantaḥkaraņam). The primordial avidya, being charged with activity by the reflection of Iśvara, and with the help of the impressions of the actions of jīva in its previous birth (pūrva karmasamskāra), produces five cosmic elements: space or ether, air, fire, water and earth (ākāśa, vāyu, tejas, ap and ksiti). However, each preceding ele- ment transfers its specific characteristic into the succeeding element because avidyā, having evolved into the preceding element, is taken to be the material cause of the succeeding element. For this reason, a subtle sound can be found in the category of air, a tactile subtle element can be found in tajas, and so on.508 It may be noted that according to the Sämkhya School, these elements are called 'the five tanmätras', all of which are independent of each other, while the Advaita-vedänta school sees them as connected with each other by a relationship of cause and effect.

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From the primordial avidyā, positive and physical phenomenon of darkness is produced, thus demonstrating that darkness is not merely the absence of light. The only characteristic of darkness lies in its being liable to immediate destruction by light: it quickly appears from avidyā and disappears into it. Being subject to creation and destruction, darkness should be regarded as one of the positive empirical objects. The opponent asked when describing the genesis of the uni- verse, none of the scriptures mention darkness as being generated, it is difficult to see why the author is describing its creation here. In reply, Madhusūdana states that the main subject matter of the scriptures is Brahman.509 Other subjects are dealt with in the Vedas insofar as they are relevant to the discussion of Brahman. For example, the percipient self (jīva) with its physical body is discussed in the Vedas in order to establish the identification of the jīva with Brahman. While describing jīva's physical body, its genesis is also discussed as a relevant topic. As darkness makes no contribution to the creation of the body, it is omitted in that context. However, its absence does not amount to non-recognition.510 As stated earlier, the inner organ (antahkarana), the collective product of the five subtle elements, possesses both the power of knowledge (jñāna śakti) and the power of action (kriyā śakti). Therefore, each of these subtle elements must be recognised as having the power of both knowledge and action. Hence, from each of the subtle elements, taken individually, emerge two organs of knowledge and action. The organ of knowledge is the product of the particular element when sattva dominates therein, whereas the organ of action is produced with the preponderance of rajas. Thus from ākāśa, the sense of audition and speech are created. The sense of touch and the organ of the hands are created from vāyu. Tejas creates the sense of sight and the organ of the feet. Water evolves into the sense of taste and the organ of excretion, while earth creates the sense of nose and the organ of procreation. Corresponding to the products stated above, the deities are quarters and fire, wind and Indra, the Sun and Visnu, Varuna and Mitra, and the two Aśvins and Prajāpati, respectively.511 The combination of five sense organs, five action organs, and five vital airs, mind (manas) and intelligence (buddhi),512 constitute the subtle body (linga-śarīra). Hence this subtle body is dominated by cognitive power; it is called hiranyagarbha and sūtrātmā (the pervader). The relationship between the cosmic subtle body and the cosmic gross body is similar to the relationship between the individual linga-śarīra and the individual gross body. Essentially, Hiranyagarbha and Sūtrātmā are identical. The name hiranyagarbha suggests that in this aspect, the cosmic jīva is the self-revealing knowledge that illumi- nates everything. It is called sūtrātmā because, just as a string of a gem necklace endures through all the gems, so Hiranyagarbha endures throughout all empirical existences and guides their actions.513 Just as primal avidya is the limitation of Īśvara, so is the subtle (amūrta) creation - consisting of the five subtle elements and the linga-śarīra - the limitation of jīva, both in its cosmic and individual aspects.

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The empirical world: Mūrta prapañca

In order to create the gross body as well as the gross physical world, the five subtle elements undergo a special kind of mutual admixture. The process involved herein is known as the quin-quepartite process (pañcīkaraņa prakriyā). The special feature of this process is that each gross element created by pañcīkarana prakriyā possesses all five elements in disproportionate degrees. This is achieved in the following way. Each subtle element is divided into two equal portions; one part is further divided into four equal parts and is then distributed equally among the intact halves of the other four elements. Thus, each gross element arising out of this process possesses one-half of one element and one-eighth of each of the other four elements, with the gross element being named according to the element that predominates it. However, there is an alternative theory that instead of the quin-quepartite process described above, a tripartite process takes place. This view is based on the śruti,514 which states 'each of them will be divided into three by me'. However, as the latter theory begins with tejas and excludes both space and wind from the fold of creation, pañcīkarana prakriyā should perhaps be regarded as, even if later, the more widely accepted explanation. These gross five elements in combination create a single effect that is the seat of all organs and the instrument of all empirical enjoyment of jīva. Such an effect is known as the gross body (sthūla śarīra). Bodies are of three kinds. Those dominated by sattva guna are known as divine bodies; those dominated by rajas guna are known as human bodies; and those dominated by tamas guna belong to inferior animals and plants. All three bodies, although made of the same five elements, vary in nature and dimension according to the variation of the proportion of elements. The external world is also from each of the individual gross ele- ments. The external universe consists of fourteen worlds, all with their particular objects. These worlds are situated high above, down below or in the middle and the objects therein vary according to the proportion of the three gunas within each. All the creations of the five subtle elements - the gross body, the fourteen worlds and the objects therein - are inert and gross, and are known in combina- tion as the Brahmanda delimiting the consciousness known as Virāt (the vast). The process of evolution can thus be summarised as follows.515 The un-evolved (avyākrta) evolves into un-manifest (amūrta) and amūrta that is, the five elements, evolves into manifest, mūrta, creation. A combination of avidyā and conditioned consciousness is the material cause of the entire creation. In other words, it is the semblance (abhāsa) of consciousness, and not real consciousness, that is the material cause of the universe. Avidya is the evolving cause and the evolution is caused by cidābhāsa. However, kūțastha caitanya remains inert throughout and unaffected by the process of creation. The process of involution follows the same sequence, but in reverse order. Thus, the gross creation merges into amūrta and amūrta merges into avyākrta.516 When the mūrta merges into the amūrta creation, the consciousness correspon- ding to it - Virat - merges into Hiranyagarbha, which is the consciousness limited

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by the cosmic subtle body. This process is known as daily pralaya. When the amūrta merges into avyākrta, Hiranyagarbha merges into Iśvara (the conscious- ness qualified by avidyā). This is known as the prākrta pralaya. The unmanifest creation, being timeless, has no inert material cause therefore it has no state of dis- solution in the sense that there is no material cause wherein it might dissolve. This is because the definition of laya is existence in a latent form within the material cause. The ultimate dissolution (atyantika pralaya) occurs through the true knowl- edge of Brahman as identical with jīva, which discards avidyā. This absolute destruction is the eradication of all objects, since avidyā (the material cause of the universe) is itself destroyed and the universe disappears once and for all.

The doctrine of karma

The doctrine of karma has been drawn up by the Advaita-vedanta as a corollary to the conception of a moralistic universe. It is taken to be actions, and the results of those actions, which pursue the performer of that action in his later birth. It continues to do so until it is exhausted by the resulting pleasure or pain. Thus, jīva's experience of pleasure and pain is determined by the quality of karma in his previous birth and also controls his future course of action. To that extent, it prevents lawlessness and settles man into a disciplined expression of conduct. Although pleasure or pain represents the fruition of karma, such pleasure or pain is also dependant on other factors. For example, it requires a gross physical body, an organic instrument and a physical universe which can serve as its object. To make this possible, karma has to assist the primordial cause, avidyā, in its creation. This is called adrsta. In the case of the theory of creation from a person (drsti-srsti-vāda), karma lies in the avidyā of the individual person which then has the nature of individual karma. In the case of creation from God having māyā as His limiting adjunct (upādhi), as distinguished from avidyā of jīva, the totality of karma lies in māyā while individual karma exists in individual avidyā. Such totality helps māyā. While an individual transmigrates from one gross body to another, karma abides in his/her subtle body (linga sarīra) with which it enters into a fresh gross body. When an individual person attains enlightenment all his karmas, except prārabdha, are destroyed before they can produce pleasure or pain. Prārabdha, the karma that has produced the existing gross body of the enlightened person, continues for some time until it is entirely exhausted. Preceding such exhaustion the individual continues to exist, although it is no longer subject to illusion and is therefore called jīvanmukta (liberated while still continuing to live). Thus karma, accumulated in numerous previous births, produces the experience of pleasure or pain. To make that experience possible it helps avidya in producing the world, consisting of the gross body, the sense organs and the physical objects necessary for the realisation of pleasure and pain. In this enjoyment of pleasure or pain a person (jīva), in the state of waking, has to accept the help of his sense organs, for it is through these organs that a person's

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inner sense organ conveys the physical world to him or her. These senses are created by avidyā having Brahman as its substratum (adhisțhāna). When jīva's store of karma (that produces the physical objects of enjoyment) becomes exhausted, the false identification between the gross body and jīva is temporarily removed by a modification of tamo-guna known as sleep (nidrā). At this time, divested of the superintendence of the presiding deities, the sense organs cease to operate. Jiva then enters into another world known as the world of dreams (svapna prapañca). The dream condition means the state in which objects are cognised by virtue of the mind's latent impressions (vāsanā) of the individual's waking experiences.517 There are two views as to the source of the dream-objects. The first (which appears to be influenced by Buddhism) holds that they are the modifications of the mind cognised by avidya-vrtti. According to the other, avidyā evolves both into the objects of dreams as well as the cognitive vrtti thereof. Madhusūdana accepts the latter view because it favours the generalisa- tion that in all cases of adhyāsa, including dreams, avidyā may be regarded as the material cause.518 It is believed by some that jīva, limited by the mind should be regarded as the locus (adhisthana), while others hold that the adhisthāna is Brahman qualified by ajñāna. The argument in favour of the first view is that as the error of dreams is contradicted by knowledge of the waking state, the locus of the dream illusion has to be taken as known at that time, since illusion is removed only by the knowledge of adhisthāna. However, if Brahman is regarded as the adhisthāna of dreams, when that illusion is removed in the waking state the waking state itself cannot exist, since knowledge of Brahman is always followed by total disappearance of the universe. Therefore, it must be acknowledged that jīva is the adhisthāna of dreams and in the waking state knowledge of jīva removes dream illusion. If the waking state removes dream illusion, such illusion is explicable by the assumption of a special avidyā which might serve as the material cause of such illusion. This particular kind of avidyā is removed by the waking consciousness (jāgrat bodha).519 As this conditional avidyā (i.e. avasthājñāna) is limitless, when one dream illusion is removed by ordinary knowledge, there is a possibility that another will take its place. As in the case of the shell-silver illusion, the removal of one such illusion does not guarantee that a similar illusion will not occur again in the same person. Those who hold that Brahman limited by primordial ajñāna is the locus of dream-objects argue that just as the illusion of the 'rope-snake' is removed by another illusion, that of the 'rope-stick' (rajjudanda), so also the dream illusion may be removed by the knowledge of waking state, which itself is an illusion. In both cases, the knowledge of the locus is unnecessary. Although the locus is the same Brahman, the dream-objects of each jīva vary according to the various latent impressions (vāsanā) of the individual mind. Thus both views are justified and as such, either jīva or Brahman would adequately serve as the locus of dream-objects. Tiring of enjoyment in the waking and dream states, jīva sometimes enters into a third state known as susupti which means deep sleep. The proof of the existence

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of this state is the waking experience of the jiva of having had a pleasurable dreamless sleep. At that time, the inner sense organ of the person, which is limited by jñānaśakti and retains all the impressions (vāsanā) latent within it, merges into its material cause, avidyā. At that time, there exist only Sāksī and vrttis of avidyā, that is, vrttis in the forms of personal ignorance, (ajñāna) and happiness.520

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The ultimate goal, a Sästra aims at to teach is the liberation from suffering. But for Madhusūdana, it also brings about transcendental bliss. We must not loose sight of Madhusūdana's love for Krsna which I shall be discussing soon. For him bliss is Brahman and hence is desired and loved (cf., parama premāspadatvāt). In Advaita-vedānta, liberation, is not the resultant state that jīva should attain. According to this school, liberation (mukti/moksa) is an ever-accomplished fact; it is nothing but Brahman itself. It is the revelation of absolute bliss.521 Absolute cessation of misery, which precedes liberation, implies the blissfulness of libera- tion, and jīva aspires to achieve it for that bliss. Vedāntic moksa is thus not mere cessation of misery. It is absolute bliss.522 Madhusūdana maintains that liberation is in fact identical with one's own real self, atman, which is integral, all-blissful, non-dual consciousness. It is pure and transcendental existence.523 Such libera- tion is, however, indicated by (upalaksita) knowledge, known as the special cognitive mode that presents an integral, monolithic undifferentiated and non- conceptual content (akhandākāra cittavrtti), which comprehends the unity between jīva and Brahman. This true knowledge dispels avidyā and the cessation of avidyā by knowledge leaves ātman the only existent entity. There is therefore no question of a second reality, namely the state of cessation of avidyā, apart from Brahman.524 Although liberation of the soul is an established fact and therefore does not require any effort, the spiritual endeavour prescribed by Vedānta is far from useless. Because it is prescribed in the Vedic injunction embodied in the śruti, ātmā vā are śrotavya etc.525 Śravana, brings about realisation, embracing the unity between jīva and Brahman. With the dawning of such knowledge, the primordial ignorance absolutely ceases to exist and the self, being free from the cloud of ignorance, bursts forth in its pristine glory. This self-revelation of the self is liberation. A question arises challenging the operation of knowledge to terminate all igno- rance. The Advaitins hold that knowledge brings about the cessation of avidyā, but this contention seems to be unwarranted, since the external world does not furnish any evidence to that effect.526

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Madhusūdana maintains that though no ordinary illustration may be available to bear upon this issue, evidence can still be drawn upon for that purpose: The śruti states that jīva can become identical with Brahman by knowledge of Brahman.527 To attain such identification, one has to remove the ignorance which, as the śruti itself states, separates Brahman from jīva.528 Hence, on the authority of śruti it is proved that knowledge of Brahman removes ignorance regarding Brahman. Ignorance conceals truth from jīva but this veil of ignorance is discarded forever by the dawning of the ever-shining truth, that Brahman is identical with jīva. This knowledge, which finally breaks down the wall of ignorance in respect of the knowledge of the identification of jīva with Brahman, is imparted by great scriptural statements such as, 'That thou art' (tat tvam asi)529 and 'I am Brahman (aham Brahmāsmi).'530 These great sentences generate direct knowledge of Brahman, at once destroying ignorance, and Brahman thus becomes revealed. They communicate one undifferentiated, integral meaning, namely ātman or Brahman. Though all the Vedäntic texts indicate Brahman, these statements directly shatter the ignorance standing between jīva and Brahman. Hence they are regarded by the Advaita-vedāntins as principal Vedāntic statements. The exposition given by Madhusūdana on the Vedic statement 'ātmā vā are drastavyah śrotavyo mantavyo nididhyāsitavyah etc.' throws an interesting light upon this issue. Madhusūdana takes it to mean that 'darsana, that is, direct experience of Brahman' is the goal of this statement. Such seeing produces akhandākāra cittavrtti. Hearing, reflecting and meditating, as prescribed by the aforesaid śruti, are useful inasmuch as they remove impurities from the mind. Thus, śravana means vicāra (discussion) that results from the determination of the intended denotative meanings of the constituent words of the Vedic statements producing knowledge of identity. Such determination discards doubt from the mind as to whether the Vedic statements can establish any identity between jīva and Brahman, insofar as the Vedas, according to the Mīmāmsā school, cannot be other than a prescription of an act or its prohibition. This identity, being a fact, does not fall within the purview of either prescription or prohibition.531 Manana is the discursive thinking that reaffirms the subject matter which in the present context, is the identity between jīva and Brahman. It removes from the mind the distractive misgivings about this identity. Concentration of mind is dependant upon the removal of doubts regarding the reality of Brahman and its identity with jīva. Nididhyāsana is deep contemplation, that is, an intense mental effort (prayatna) regarding the identity between jīva and Brahman. Such contemplation brings about, in due course, a preparedness of mind for the uninterrupted flow of akhaņdākāra cittavrtti regarding this identity. Nididhyāsana removes from the mind the deep-rooted impression based on the false identity between the physical body and the individual soul. Nididhyāsana therefore must be conceived to cul- minate in knowledge which contradicts the false knowledge of identity between jīva and its body.532 Such knowledge, however, precedes and is therefore differ- ent from, akhandākāracittavrtti, which is the special contribution of Mahāvākyas.

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In this way, śravana establishes that the great sentences have their final import in the identity of jīva and Brahman. Manana reaffirms the same truth by disabusing the mind of all misgivings and doubts that might arise from the logical plane of mind regarding the stated truth. Nididhyāsana ingrains the same truth so deeply in the mind that the false identification of jiva with the physical body, which has pursued the person from time immemorial, becomes shaken. In this way, when the mind becomes free from all misconceptions regarding the identity between jīva and Brahman - in other words, when the mind becomes adequately receptive - then the great Vedāntic statements present to the mind akhandākāracittavrtti, which brings avidya to its end.533 Since most of the discussion of how such real- isation can remove primordial ignorance has already been dealt with in previous chapters I shall only mention the fact that Madhusūdana makes a departure from both the Vivarana and Bhamatī schools of thought regarding this issue.

Sevenfold steps leading to liberation

We have seen that in the Advaita-vedānta soteriology deep meditation on one's self and its identity with Brahman leads to the salvific gnosis of truth. Madhusūdana recognises seven steps of yogic stance leading to the realisation of the true nature of self and for these he draws upon the Yogavāsistha.534 The names of these steps given by Yogavāsistha are:

1 śubhecchā; 2 vicāraņā; 3 tanumānasā; 4 sattvāpatti; 5 asamsakti; 6 padārthabhāvinī; 7 turyagā.

Madhusūdana explains them as follows. The first step, namely śubhecchā, is the fourfold preparatory practice namely, (1) discriminatory knowledge of what is permanent and what is transitory; (2) total indifference to the this worldly and other worldly enjoyment; (3) acquiring physical, psychological and moral self control; (4) true desire for salvation, (nityānityavastuviveka, ihāmutraphalabhoga virāga, śamadamādisādhanasampat and mumuksutva), which represent the gen- eral preparedness of the mind. The second stage, vicāranā, consists of śravana and manana. This means the meaningful discussion of Vedāntic statements, under the guidance of a preceptor. The third stage is tanumānasā, which is when the aspirant meditates deeply upon Vedāntic teachings. This meditation concentrates his mind and enables it to realise subtle realities. The first three states described above, therefore, mean the fourfold Vedāntic preliminary practice, 'sādhana'. Moreover, śravana, manana and nididhyāsana are included in this list and are also considered to be the means for the attainment of liberation. Madhusūdana

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makes a further equation. As these three states presuppose knowledge of a pluralistic world, which are characteristic of a waking state (jāgrat avasthā), they are called the waking state of a seeker of salvation (mumuksu). The fourth state is called sattvāpatti, when reality (sattva), namely the identity between jīva and Brahman, becomes revealed to the aspirant by an indeterminate form of knowl- edge (nirvikalpaka jñānam). This is for Madhusūdana equivalent to the dream state, in that the aspirant realises the falsity of the universe. The last three of the seven states are the different stages of a person who is released even when he is alive, jīvanmukta. Of these, the fifth stage is asamsakti. In this state, the 'jīvanmukta' practises 'savikalpaka (determinate) samadhi' and by that practice his mind experiences 'nirvikalpaka (indeterminate) samadhi' marked by complete detachment (asamsakti). This Madhusūdana called the state of deep sleep, susupti, insofar as the aspirant voluntarily returns from there to the world of everyday life.535 The sixth stage is known as padārthabhāvinī. In this state, the jīvanmukta lives for a long time in samädhi. He returns to the waking state only when he is aroused only when some other person intervenes. He is held to be worthier than the jīvanmukta of the previous stage, for he is more advanced towards final emancipation.536 In the seventh state ('turyagā avasthā'), the jīvanmukta remains completely at ease and besides meditation gives up all physical efforts and responsibility towards himself. God keeps him alive and well while the ordinary physical func- tions are discharged with the help of others. Such a jīvanmukta remains settled in integral and transcendental pleasure. After this stage, the jīvanmukta never returns to the ordinary world of action. This state results in salvation at death, videhamukti, when, with the total exhaustion of his prārabdha karman, his phys- ical body falls away.537 At the seventh stage, the jīvanmukta already becomes identical with Brahman, the absolute bliss.538 It is interesting to note that in this connection Madhusūdana accepts the theistic view that at the seventh stage the bodily functions of a jīvanmukta are carried out by God Himself. In this connection, Madhusūdana cites the Bhāgavata to establish that, at this stage, the jīvanmukta possesses no consciousness concerning his/her body.539 Thus, Madhusūdana classifies the seven stages of the Yogavāsistha in a set scheme. This reveals his close acquaintance with the Yogavāsistha method of yogic practice. Even when he was deeply influenced by the Caitanya-school of bhakti, he never moved from his tradition of non-dualist Vedāntic yoga and its practice.540

Jīvanmukta

It is perhaps necessary to add a few words about the concept of jīvanmukta (achieving salvation in this life). In the jīvanmukta state - when, by the ultimate knowledge of identity between jīva and Brahman, the avidyā of the person comes to an end - all the previously acquired karma of that person together with his future karman, are destroyed. However, even then he cannot be completely free

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from the influence of avidyā, since even this ultimate knowledge cannot destroy his prārabdha karman, which is exhausted only by enjoyment (bhoga).541 Thus, although the concealing power (āvarana-śakti) of avidyā becomes discarded by ultimate knowledge, the viksepa-śakti of avidyā continues to operate so that the jīvanmukta has to retain the body to exhaust his prārabdha karman. So it cannot be said that a jīvanmukta aspirant immediately completely merges into Brahman. From the time when the mumuksu's self-realisation takes place, he is considered to be jīvanmukta. But he is considered really released (para-mukta) only when he leaves his body and finally merges into Brahman, the ultimate bliss. The state of jīvanmukta is the intermediate stage, lying between a person's self-realisation and the ultimate merger into Brahman. At the jīvanmukta stage, even though a per- son's avidyā does not remain, its impression (samskāra) does. This impression is termed avidyāleśa, which Madhusūdana explains as the ākāra, that is, a form of avidyā. This is the power of projecting illusory objects (viksepa śakti) of avidyā which continues until the end of jīva's prārabdha karman - the final emancipa- tion from the bodily bondage.542 The final stage of a jīvanmukta is the seventh state of knowledge as described earlier. The culmination of this state is disembodied liberation (videha-mukti).543 Videha-mukti is not described as a separate state of knowledge because at that time no separate existence of the jīva can be detected, since jīva completely merges into Brahman, the absolute bliss. For Madhusūdana even this seventh stage can be called videha-mukti, insofar as the jīvanmukta has no consciousness of his physical body and surroundings; and all his physical functions are performed with the help of others. At this stage, the existence and non-existence of the physical body do not feel any different to the jīvanmukta. Indeed, the pluralistic world and the sense of all diffentiation become non-existent to him.544 Madhusūdana does not believe in the Madhva's view of different gradations of mukti, namely sālokya, sāmya, sārūpya and sāyujya (considered to be the most superior of the four). Madhusūdana contends that of these four, only sāyujya-mukti is para-mukti, the others being only conditional emancipations (aparā-mukti).545 As stated in the śruti 'He who knows Brahman attains ultimate reality' (brahmavidāpnoti param).546 This attainment means identification of jīva with Brahman, so sāyujya should also mean being Brahman itself.547 It may be noted here that the Bhāgavata Purāna accepts these different grades of salvation to be identical with Brahman.548 But for Madhusūdana, the non-dualist Vedäntin, these concepts are unorthodox and so he rejects these. Even when explaining his concept of bhakti, which very much follows the Bhāgavata, he remains silent on this topic.

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The concept of bhakti

In the previous seven chapters I have given a synopsis of Madhusūdana's own exposition of the philosophy of non-dualistic Vedānta. I have purposely elabo- rated on his views on the concept of avidyā, that is, mistaken knowledge, because the dualist Vedantins refused to accept Samkara and his followers' view of non-duality and refuted the notion of avidya. For the opponents it is but a negation of valid knowledge and not an ontological phenomenon as non-dualists suppose it to be. Madhusūdana defended avidyā. It should now be clear that Madhusūdana, a great philosopher of non-dualist Vedänta, took over the responsibility of rescuing his system from the damaging criticisms of all dualist philosophers who considered non-dualism to be incoherent and going against the teaching of the Scriptures. He specially addressed the Mādhva teacher and philosopher Vysatīrtha. His fierce attack against the non- dualist Vedäntins almost shattered the upholders of this latter school of Vedānta. Vyāsatīrtha in his Nyāyāmrta attacked every important argument, proposed by the non-dualist school in favour of the existence of avidyā/ajñana and thereby demolished the theory of non-duality of the Samkara school. Madhusūdana accused the Mādhva Vaisnavas to be false Vaisnavas.549 However, it is obvious that he considered himself a Vaisnava, albeit, the right type of Vaisnava. Clearly the concept of bhakti played a vital role in the philosophy of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. As a prominent teacher of the non-dualist vedānta philosophy, he was anxious to uphold the monistic views of that school of soteriology. He firmly upheld that the realisation of Brahman is the immediate source of salvation. Such realisation instantly removes all experience of duality and the idea of a self as a separate entity from Brahman.550 But paradoxically, he was personally deeply influenced by his contemporary Vaisnava views, which was a dominant religion in Bengal where Krsna Vāsudeva is held as the supreme God. He obviously knew Srī Caitanya's teachings as well as the teachings of the Bhāgavata Purāņa (BhP). In his exposition on bhakti in the Bhakti-rasāyana he used the Bhāgavata Purāna as his scriptural source and illustrated each of his views with extensive quotations from that text.

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We do not know if he ever met Rūpa Gosvāmī or his brother Sanātana Gosvāmī or their nephew Jīva Gosvāmī. Nor do we know if he ever read any of their works. He expanded the BhP theory of bhakti-rasa (aesthetic enjoyment of bhakti), in the conventional literary way,551 as did the above-mentioned three exponents of the Gaudīya Vaisnava school of bhakti. Thus it is clear how deeply BhP influenced Madhusūdana's Vaisnava theology. His commentary on the first verse of the BhP shows an independent approach to the non-dualistic metaphysics and does not quite resemble Srīdhara. Probably he was familiar with the exposition of bhakti in the Muktāphala by Vopadeva along with Hemādri's commentary. The BhP amalgamated the Alvär and other south Indian Vaisnava traditions as well as the Pāñcarātra theology and philosophy.552 The bhakti propagated by the BhP is focused on Vāsudeva Krsna. Madhusūdana's chosen deity was also Gopāla Krsņa or Väsudeva.553 But one should not forget his philosophical background, and, although it was passionate love for his deity he sought after, he still followed Rāmānuja's bhakti-yoga or upāsanā in his attempt to define bhakti. However, his personal feelings was clearly always closer to the passionate love for Gopāla Krsna than to the sedate bhakti-yoga of the earlier Pāñcarātra tradition.554 A brief review of the historical development of the later concept of bhakti, which influenced Madhusūdana most, may make my point clear. I start with the most important work on bhakti, namely, the Bhāgavata Purāna, which has influ- enced almost all later theologians of Vaisnava bhakti. The BhP has defined bhakti in such a way that this mystical and often, passionate experience is elevated to the position of the 'goal' that a follower of bhakti aspires to achieve.

The BhP concept of bhakti

The BhP has defined unqualified (nirguna) bhakti as a stream sweeping the mind (manogati) along towards the Supreme Person (Purusottama), that is, Nārāyana.555 This stream begins to flow at the slightest reference to the Lord and having begun, cannot be interrupted by any extraneous consideration. Just as the water of the Ganges flows uninterruptedly and inevitably towards the ocean, so the mind flows inexorably towards Krsna Vāsudeva. This flow is not motivated by any expectation of reward nor is it vitiated by any awareness of duality. In fact, such unqualified bhakti is like the instinctive reaction to a stimulus. Totally devoid of any motive (ahaitukī) and uninterrupted (avicchinnā), it is a spontaneous (svābhāvikī) and innate (avyavahita) experience of Reality.556 Unlike the unconditional flow of the mind, which operates from instinct alone, worship of God is usually a voluntary act. A particular goal might motivate such worship, or a higher sense of duty may bring it into operation.557 In either case it is still voluntary; though worship that also acts as a fulfilment of a duty is of a higher order than that prompted only by personal motives. Compared to the instinctive and unqualified (nirguna) bhakti, bhakti as a voluntary process is of inferior quality insofar as it depends upon the voluntary will of the worshipper and does not flow towards God automatically, without stress or strain. In other

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words, in the former the worshipper's ego remains active whereas in the latter it is merged into the personality of God. The BhP further classifies bhakti into two categories; borne out by an observation of the BhP that bhakti itself produces bhakti.558 The commentator Srīdhara explains the first bhakti as a process (sadhana), that is, the practice of bhakti and the other as the premalaksaņā bhakti (bhakti that is defined as passionate love), that is, the bhakti that is a devotee's soteriological goal (sādhya).

Concept of bhakti in the Bhakti-sūtras

There are two famous Bhakti-sūtras - the Šāndilya-bhakti-sūtra (ŚBhS) and the Nārada- bhakti-sūtra (NBhS). We can infer that the SBhS preceded the NBhS because while the latter refers to the former with some reverence a number of times, there is no mention of NBhS in the SBhS. Like the BhP and BhG, these two are sometimes taken as authoritative works on bhakti. I take up these two Bhakti-sūtras, not because of their antiquity, (they are obviously late and certainly later than BhP), but because they have made an attempt to introduce bhakti as a Sastra in the model of the six Darśana. These two sūtras are the first systematic presentation of the doctrine with definitions, etc. They depicted bhakti with reference to God Väsudeva and described Him as the object of supreme loving attachment (parānurakti). Bhakti is defined in the SBhS as the supreme love for the Lord (Isvara).559 The commentator Bhavadeva explains that the love, whose object is Iśvara, is of the highest kind.560 When the object of love is a limited and imperfect human being, then that love also remains limited and imperfect. Conversely, when the object of love is the absolute and infinite Iśvara, it then becomes the greatest of all forms of love. Thus bhakti is primarily the supreme love for the Divine, a view confirmed by Nārada, who takes bhakti to mean supreme passionate love (parama-prema).561 Śāndilya-bhakti-sūtra also accepts another sense of bhakti, which he calls the secondary (gaunī ) sense of the term 'bhakti'. In its secondary sense the term includes such devotional acts of piety as listening to the Lord's glory (śravaņa), singing God's eulogy (kirtana) and so forth as listed in the group of ninefold acts of bhakti in the BhP.562 These devotional acts are quite distinct from 'bhakti', in the primary sense of the term, namely, supreme love for the Lord (parānurakti). The devotional acts are deemed secondary because they only purify the devotee, which help to make him/her ready for receiving divine grace. Only then the devo- tee is capable of feeling the passionate love for the Lord. This is the goal of a devotee's devotional acts and aspirations. Once the love is dawned, gradually it saturates him/her through and through. Totally immersed in God, all other empirical awareness recedes from the devotee's mind.

Bhakti as conceived by the Gaudiya (Bengali) Vaișnavas The Bengal school of Vaisnavism, was propounded by the followers of Śrī Krsna Caitanya - the Gosvāmīs who mainly resided in Vrndāvana, a place near Mathura

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and haloed by the mythological exploits of Krsna, the Lord of all. A quick look at their definition of bhakti should put Madhusūdana's views in proper perspective. I shall mainly deal with the Bhakti-rasāmrta-sindhu, a monumental work by Rūpa Gosvāmī, one of the eldest of these Vrndāvana Vaisnava scholars and his nephew Jīva Gosvāmī, the great commentator of the BhP and other important works of theology of this school.563 The best type of bhakti, according to Rūpa Gosvāmī, is constantly practising with one's body, speech and mind, only such actions that just concern Krsna and are agreeable to Him (ānukūlyena krsņānuśīlanam).564 Jīva Gosvāmī explains that this constant practice involves both ordinary actions and mental disposition. These should have no selfish motive. It is not vitiated by the dry metaphysical vision of ultimate Truth, nor is it restricted to the performance of duties enjoined by religious texts (anyābhilāșitāśūnyam jñānakarmādyanāvrtam).565 This mental disposition is simply a natural and innate state of a devotee's personality. Such spontaneous bhakti cannot be cultivated in the ordinary way as one may cultivate an attitude of mind. Such a disposition of devotional mind appears only through the divine grace and indeed a manifestation of God's essential power (svarūpa-akti). Thus, bhakti is totally different from ordinary emotional feelings in that these are manifestation of māya, God's power of delusion. Bhakti is there- fore, according to this school, an eternal principle operating in the devotee for all time to come.566 As creatures are essentially not distinct from God, and as bhakti is identical with God's intrinsic power, bhakti as the essential divine principle always abides in all individuals. But they are not usually aware of this fact. After realising this principle through divine grace the devotee thenceforth, never loses sight of it. Bhakti grows spontaneously until the individual is completely immersed in it. It should be remembered that this bhakti is in fact prema-bhakti (passionate love for God), the taste of which is the goal of all devotees. Rūpa Gosvāmī classified bhakti into three categories: (1) sādhana-bhakti, that is, bhakti that is instrumental to generate true bhakti, the goal of a devotee; (2) bhāva-bhakti, that is, a permanent mental state of the devotee's love for God; and (3) prema-bhakti, that is, ecstatic love for god which is a devotee's ultimate goal.567 It should be noted here that the second and the third categories are but two aspects of their soteriological goal, sadhya-bhakti, which are in fact a person's innate nature. Bhakti as religious practices (Sadhana-bhakti) originates through the purposive operation of the sense-organs emulating feelings of respect and total trust in God's mercy. In other words, sādhana-bhakti consists in physical acts of the devotee to express his/her feelings of bhakti, that is, actively pursuing devotional acts which are instrumental in achieving direct realisation of sādhyā-bhakti. Although expressions of sādhana-bhakti of Rūpa Gosvāmī are psycho-physical acts, yet an attraction (śraddhā), of the devotee's mind towards Lord Krsna endures through them all. It may vary according to the personality of the devotee, but śraddhā is the seed of all bhakti.568 Jīva Gosvāmī describes such a focusing

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of mind on God as tatsāmmukhya (approaching Him face to face). He further states that the term sāmmukhya is the same as upāsanā, which encapsulates both worship and deep meditation on God. The purpose of upāsanā is to realise God, which is the first stage of prema-bhakti and thus bringing about an end to suffering.569 Sādhana-bhakti is of two kinds, vaidhī and rāgānugā. Vaidhī-bhakti covers the performance of rites prescribed by the religious texts (śastra). The devotee per- forms these out of respect to the sastras and out of devotional faith and a sense of duty, but not through personal and impulsive attachment (rāga). Rāgānugā, on the other hand, is inspired by and akin to the devotional love which the mythical people of Vrndāvana possess for Krsna. The latter is called rāgātmikā-bhakti, the strong attachment and passionate desire a lover possesses for the object of his/her love.570 Rāganuga-bhakti not only follows this type of love but also seeks to share the bliss experienced in rāgātmikā-bhakti. Jīva Gosvāmī maintains that such activities as śravaņa, manana and nididhyāsana, that is, the soteriological practices of the seekers of the realisation of Brahman, are included in upāsanā. As such they are also included in the sādhana-bhakti. But the bhāgavata-dharmas such as śravaņa, kīrtana, etc. are close to sādhyā- bhakti than the Upanisadic injunction on śravana, manana, etc. because these only lead to the revelation of the true nature of Brahman, the reality, but do not move the realising person into any passion.571 Constantly practising sādhana-bhakti, the devotee may feel the dawning of bhāva-bhakti and this bhakti is a manifestation of the intrinsic power (svarūpa- śakti) of Lord Krsna and is co-terminus with God pervading the creation and creature as their essence. Individuals are not aware of the presence of this śakti, nor of God innate in them. Sādhana-bhakti, especially the rāgānugā type, opens the practising devotee's mind, which becomes receptive to the emotions of attrac- tion and desire for Krsna, the first stage of emotional love (bhāva or rati). Lord Krsna's intrinsic power is the same as prema-bhakti and has bliss as its essential nature (hlādinī). Therefore, when the devotee's mind receives the vague inkling of this love it softens and saturates the mind not only with the desire to obtain the Lord's attention, but also to be prevailed upon by Him and to develop ever-increasing intimacy with Him. The devotee falls in passionate love with the Lord. That is why it is also termed rati, or, sexual desire. Though rati being an experience, is self-revealed, it also appears as an object of revelation: it is itself a pleasure to be enjoyed. Nonetheless, it is also the cause of enjoyment for Lord Krsna.572 One should however, keep in mind that not merely the prac- tice of sadhana-bhakti can bring about the realisation of rati. Lord Krsna's grace is the essential prerequisite for that. Sometimes, through the special grace of the Lord, this rati dawns in the devotee's mind even without any practice of sādhana-bhakti. Rati culminates in passionate love for God, (prema-bhakti). Jīva Gosvāmī calls this type of intensely passionate bhakti as prīti. In other words, when bhāva-bhakti completely saturates the mind through and through and deepens in

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such a way that a bond of an intimate relationship is established between God, the object of that love, and the devotee, it assumes its mature form, known as prema or prīti.573 Here also Rūpa Gosvāmī describes two causes that generate prema-bhakti. One is bhāva-bhakti, deepened by the constant and passionate practice of the sādhana-bhakti such as śravana, kīrtana, etc. The other is Lord Krsna's great divine grace (atiprasāda), expressed in His granting His compan- ionship to His favoured devotees. The company of Lord Krsna is said to have generated fully matured prema-bhakti among the gopīs (cowherd maidens) of Braja, even though they never practiced any sādhana-bhakti or experienced any first sensation of love in the form of rati. Theirs were from the very beginning prema-bhakti for Krsna.574 Jīva Gosvāmī states that priti has two aspects. On the one hand, it means sukha, or pleasurable experience, an indeterminate rapture, which is too diffuse and indefinable to be attributed to any one object. On the other hand, prīti means priyatā, a rapturous feeling derived from three conditions. These conditions are (1) enlightenment as to the true nature of love; (2) perpetual submissiveness of the mind to the object of love; and (3) an ever-increasing craving springing from this malleability of the lover's mind.575 In this way Jīva Gosvāmī elucidates the twofold aspect of prīti. One aspect is an enjoyment coupled with knowledge; the other exhibits a voluptuous desire for and attachment to the object of love. His understanding of the interrelation between sādhana-bhakti and prema-bhakti may be described thus: sādhana- bhakti generates the knowledge of the supreme Lord. This knowledge, once arisen, automatically destroys all misery. It then generates the consummate love for the supreme Godhead, marked by intense attachment to and desire for Him.576 Rūpa Gosvāmī's own explanation of the three stages of a devotee's bhakti runs as follows: The primary requisite of the devotee is a well developed trust in God, śraddhā, which leads the votary to the company of Vaisnava saints and practi- tioners. Their example then induces the devotee to the practice of sādhana-bhakti. These practices remove all causes of misery, so that the devotee becomes settled (nișthā) on God. It can be deduced from this description and from Jīva Gosvāmī's commentary that this really indicates bhakti-yoga of the Bhagavad-gītā as well as the BhP, III.25.25. This constant dwelling upon God (bhagavad-nistha) in turn leads to an automatic inclination towards passionate bhakti. Gradually this incli- nation starts to operate spontaneously, which is conducive to the first awakening of bhāva/rati that is, passionate love for God. This then culminates in prema-bhakti. As bhāva and prema are both manifestations of one and the same hlādinī-śakti or, divine bliss (ananda) it gradually engulfs the devotee in rapturous enjoyment of this blissful bhakti.577 Rūpa Gosvāmī, naturally drew extensively on the ancient Indian literary theory of rasa that is, the aesthetic enjoyment. In his work on dramaturgy and allied subjects entitled the Nātya-śāstra, Bharata, (c.300-400 CE), introduced the rasa theory. Since ninth century CE the theory took its important position amongst the

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authors on literary theories and philosophy of religions in Kashmir who dealt with literature and its aesthetics. The names of Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta top the list and from there it spread all over India. In theology, rasa theory has been thoroughly developed and popularised by the BhP.578

Madhusūdana's concept of bhakti

In his exposition of bhakti, Madhusūdana follows faithfully the definition of bhakti in the BhP, which has been mentioned previously. For he, too, regards bhakti as a mental mode (vrtti) corresponding to the manogati of the BhP. Such a mode is a continuous flow (avicchinna) of mind's awareness of God (bhagavad) that arises in a mind that has become totally melted (drūta) by love for God. Though the BhP does not expressly referred to this state of the mind as arising at the same time the love for God does, Madhusūdana develops the BhP analogy that compares the mind to the water of the Ganges. Madhusūdana maintains that, passionate bhakti springs in the mind by constant practice of bhagavaddharma which is the same as sādhana-bhakti of the Gaudīya Vaisnava theology. At the same time, bhakti melts the mind of the devotee due to his/her great passionate desire for and attachment to God. As a result, the devotee's experience of passionate bhakti has a deeper and lasting impact on him/her than any other form of experience. His authority is the BhP where it says that such melting of the mind is caused by constantly listening to God's praise. Madhusūdana takes this to be the same as the nine types of sādhana-bhakti, namely, śravana etc., which he terms bhagavaddharma. Finally he explains that such bhakti only concerns the Lord.579 I should point out that Madhusūdana never really admits that the realisation of sādhyā-bhakti is his soteriological goal. The goal remains the self-realisation. Only there is a difference in the mental condi- tion of the individual who experiences the dawning of the final realisation of Brahman as identical with self and the realisation of the true nature of God (bha- gavān). In the case of the akhandartha-citta-vrtti revealing Brahman's identity with self, the experiencing individual's mind is completely free of any emotion. But in the case of bhakti-vrtti revealing God, the experiencing individual's mind is saturated by divine love. Moreover, Brahman, the bliss is actually the passionate love (prema) the individual experiences. Two elements of this definition are noteworthy: (1) the melting of the devotee's mind which results from the practice of Sravana etc .; and (2) bhakti is a mental mode and hence a cognitive process that captures God's reflection (pratibimba). Further, it is a constant flow of this awareness towards God. The first element is important to understand the rasa theology of bhakti while the second one is close to the notion of bhakti-yoga greatly elaborated in Madhusūdana's commentary on the BhG. Rāmānuja (eleventh century CE) introduced the latter concept of bhakti580 and since then it has exercised wide influence on the Vaisnava theology. The former concept was widely explored by Vaisnava theologians nearer to

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Madhusūdana's time - for instance, the followers of Srī Krsna Caitanya. Thus our author tried to combine the notions of emotional devotion and upāsanā that included, perhaps, the ritual practices, but heavily emphasised on the practice of one-pointed meditation. He insisted on combining upāsanā with ecstatic experience of love. We shall try to see how far he was successful in this effort. Madhusūdana's own exposition of bhakti may be summarised as follows: by the practice of ninefold bhakti, śravana, etc. the votary's mind melts. Such a melted mind spontaneously develops an uninterrupted flow of consciousness fixed on the Supreme Lord. This constant flow of one-pointed mental awareness of God drives away all other empirical knowledge with their source māyā, thus removing all sufferings. The devotee's innate propensity for loving God increases by the intimate knowledge of God's divine blissful nature, and swiftly brings about in him/her the ecstatic state of divine aesthetic enjoyment of bhakti. This is the sote- riological goal of a devotee. The devotee not only realises God's true nature but also enjoys that realisation . Although, this may imply a notion of separate identity of the devotee from his/her beloved God, yet Madhusūdana employs all the argu- ments of his non-dualistic stand to identify the bhakti experience and the content of that experience that is, Lord Krsna to be one and the same. Therefore, in both cases, the experience is the identity of one's self with the supreme Reality, be it Brahman or Krsna, the embodiment of blissful love. He differentiates between the realisation of self as Brahman which, according to Advaita-vedānta, releases one from sufferings (mukti), and the realisation of bhakti of the Krsna-devotee which is an ecstatic experience. His explanations run as follows: Bhakti is the soteriological goal of a theist just as gnosis of the true nature of one's self is the soteriological goal of the Advaita Vedäntin. Both the realisations of self as Brahman and bhakti are forms of experience appearing in one's mind, which is trained into a special mode. The difference between the two modes is that: for the mental mode called bhakti melting of the mind is a precon- dition and there exists an element of enjoyment in that experience, whereas, the akhandākāra-citta-vrtti, which realises the self as Brahman, is free from all differentiation.581 Madhusūdana introduces an interesting analogy to explain the process of the melting of the mind, which serves as the condition for the rise of bhakti-vrtti that is, the cognition of bhakti. He compares the mind with sealing wax. The sealing wax is solid by nature but it melts when it comes into contact with fire. Similarly, the experiencing mind is, normally, not in a state that readily develops a passion. But when it is stirred by some internal stimuli such as love, anger, fear, affection, joy, grief or compassion, it melts and becomes prone to develop a passion. In other words, the mind is emotionally deeply moved and has the potential for great lasting passion for the object of those emotions. In adopting these stimuli into his discourse, Madhusūdana, once again follows the BhP as his authority, where it is said that kindled by any of these, the mind melts.582 But Madhusūdana puts a note of caution here. He points out that this state of mind requires intensity of feeling and thus should be distinguished from a mere slackening (śithilībhāva) of the

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mind brought about by temporary conditions, which are not adequate to produce the really lasting and overwhelming passionate love for God, (prema-bhakti).583 Madhusūdana further explains that when the melted mind of a devotee receives the impression of his/her beloved God with all His transcendental qualities, the impression abides in his/her mind for all times to come, even when the mind is not conscious of any special stimulus. Once imprinted on the melted mind, the divine impression (pratibimba) becomes its permanent attribute. So much so, that even when the mind becomes hard afterwards, or, may even make excursions into other objects, that impression persists.584 This permanent imprint of the mind is described in four ways: samskāra (permanent impression), vāsanā (latent impres- sion of the mind), bhāva (mode of mind) and bhavanā (constant contemplation). All four expressions show different aspects of the experience of bhakti. Samskāra and vāsanā mainly express the quality of the experience being innate to the mind. The expression bhāvanā naturally connects the mental state to the idea of bhakti-yoga. The term bhäva is interesting in connection with the concept rasa or aesthetic enjoyment.585 Bhakti-experience reveals God in his glorious full form. This revelation being a reflection, is identical with its prototype, and is therefore itself all-bliss. This bliss- ful permanent mood (sthāyi-bhāva) of mind is, for Madhusūdana, comparable to the mind of an aesthete, which climaxes in rasa. Similarly, bhakti-bhāva through practice of bhakti, reaches its climax in ecstatic enjoyment of bhakti-rasa.586 When Madhusūdana brings in the concept of aesthetic enjoyment (rasa) to explain the nature of bhakti-rasa , he confronts a few problems. Rasa is, states the Natya-śastra (NS), produced through the interplay of various fleeting moods (vyabhicāri-bhāva), (generated in the mind of the main character of the play, which reinforces his/her dominant mood). This dominant and permanent mood (sthāyi-bhāva) is aroused and sustained by the determinants (vibhāva) - first, the person who is the focus of the dominant mood, and then other congenial elements and expressed through various psychological and physical reactions (anubhāva). Vibhāva is divided into two categories - the support, that is, the object (ālambana-vibhāva) of the dominant mood and the elements of excitement (uddīpana-vibhāva).587 To apply this formula to bhakti-rasa, Madhusūdana admits that the supporting vibhāva of bhakti is Krsna. Therefore, if he claims that the dominant mood that is, bhakti is identified with Krsna, the rasa theory becomes inapplicable. For instance, it is impossible to say that one's feeling of love is identical with one's beloved. Therefore, divine love and the focus of that love, that is, the divine, must be separate entities. Madhusūdana answers this as follows: It is true that both the ālambana-vibhāva and the sthāyi-bhāva of bhakti share substantially the same identity in the case of both being all-bliss Bhagavat. Still Bhagavat as the ālambana-vibhāva is the prototype (bimba) whereas Bhagavat, revealed in the bhakti-experience is His reflection (pratibimba). Hence though these are the same entity, in appearance they are as it were, separate. Much the same way as the individual (jiva) and the Lord (Iśvara) though basically one, are treated for all practical purposes as two

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different realities.588 As the bhakti-sthāyi-bhāva (rati) is thus all-bliss, it is only one further step to conceive it as developing into the all-bliss rasa, which again is the manifestation of Bhagavat in all His glory and sweetness.589 Out of allegiance to the literary theory of rasa, Madhusūdana tried to establish a link between ordinary rati, which develops into śrngāra-rasa, and Bhagavad- rati, which develops into bhakti-rasa. In the case of ordinary experience of rati for a person, the experience embraces the person as the essential consciousness (cit) conditioned by the illusory qualities making up the individuality of the beloved person. Thus in epistemological terms, the lover is experiencing rati for the beloved as a form of object-consciousness (visayāvacchinna caitanya).590 Ordinary rati, therefore, differs from Bhagavad-rati insofar as the former is a reflection of object-consciousness, while the latter is a reflection of pure con- sciousness in its all-bliss glory, that is, Bhagavat Himself. But both are rati, being the reflection of consciousness on the mind that has already been melted by the heat of passion. Very interestingly, Madhusūdana's sequence of reaching the all- consuming experience of passionate love for the Divine is initially to realise the true nature of the glorious God. This leads the devotee to a state of total detach- ment (kaivalya) from all empirical phenomena, including his/her individual ego. Both these states fully depend on God's grace. Having reached kaivalya, the devotee is capable of the realisation of true prema-bhakti. Thus, Madhusūdana clearly states that both rati and bhakti are in fact a single experience arising in a special mode of mind (citta-vrtti). But this remains a determinate experience where the revealed God appears as an attribute of the mind in a special state. Clearly it is not just the mental mode, as we have been previously told.591 We may assume that the author first followed the Bhāgavata tradition of explaining bhakti-rasa. There as we have seen, bhakti is a constant flow of a state of mind (manogati). But as he continues to follow the course of daring exploration into the region of metaphysics and the literary theory of rasa, he lands himself into a spiritual territory whereby bhakti becomes Bhagavat Himself rather than a mere state of mind. This shifting of position can be attributed to his anxiety to see that bhakti should be understood as all-bliss - the experience and the experienced just one integral entity. The concept is not basically different from the experience that reveals Brahman. In both cases, a determinate process of cognition reveals an indeterminate and transcendental experience. Only in the case of bhakti the determinate process of cognition produces the transcendental experience of all-bliss God producing an ecstatic state. Bhakti differs from the revelation of Brahman in that in the latter the experience is undifferentiated while in the former it is a differentiated experience of ecstatic joy.592 Nevertheless it is transcendental and beyond the reach of mind which is a product of māyā. Does bhakti-rasa qualify to be called a form of cognition, a gnosis? For our author it certainly does. His description of Bhagavat is 'essentially gnosis and bliss' (bodha sukhātmakaḥ). He is self-revealed, not just as consciousness but also as all-bliss. Hence bhakti-rasa as identical with Bhagavat is also a self-revealed experience as well as being all-bliss.593

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In Madhusūdana, therefore, we come across something of a climax in the concept of bhakti. In the BhP, bhakti is a mental mode focused incessantly on God. It is an experience of spontaneous ecstatic joy. In the bhakti-sūtras, bhakti is taken as love and attachment, but the precise metaphysical and epistemological implications of this were left unexplored. In the Bengal school of Vaisnavism bhakti is a rapturous knowledge. It was also recognised as an expression (vrtti) of God's innate blissful power (śakti). Following the Vivarana, Madhusūdana accepts that, every cognition is a reflection of consciousness on the mental mode rather than the mode alone. Therefore, he arrives at the conclusion that bhakti in its mature state is a revelation of the glo- rious all-bliss God - a revelation that is not different from what it reveals. He takes a bold step to equate bhakti gnosis with the brahma gnosis and thus he shows a logical distinction between bhakti as a soteriological means (sādhana) and bhakti as the soteriological goal, the sādhyā or prema-bhakti. What is then the epistemologial process of the bhakti-cognition? It is the reflec- tion of Bhagavat on a mode of the melted mind of the cogniser. The difference between the bhakti-cognition and the cognition of self as identical with Brahman lies in the nature of Brahman and Bhagavat. The latter is transcendent and yet qualified with what Rāmānuja called God's auspicious qualities (kalyāna guņa) as well as with the transcendental qualities (bhaga), while the former is totally devoid of any quality. Therefore, unlike the realisation of Brahman, realisation of Bhagavat, that is, bhakti is a differentiated knowledge. Thus bhakti-experience not only arises in a melted mind, not only it is identical with Bhagavat, but addi- tionally it is a differentiated experience. Being a strict Advaita-vedāntin, Madhusūdana did not recognise the existence of an innate divine power. He also left alone the question of the enjoyer of the ecstatic bhakti-experience, leaving it to the realm of mysticism. Coming back to the actual mental process of grasping the form of Bhagavat; Madhusūdana explains the genesis of the comprehension of Bhagavat by the mental mode (bhagavat-ākāratā) in the following way: In every empirical cognition the image in mind has two aspects. As far as the basic comprehension of the indeter- minate part of the grasping goes it comprehends 'something' which is the locus of all phenomena. But the other aspect of such comprehension is the determinate knowledge of the object as say the cognition of a pot. As far as the indetermi- nate comprehension is concerned (i.e. in our example 'this is something'), it is a true knowledge because it indicates something existing is grasped by the mind as the locus of the content of the comprehension. The mind grasps the pot as an existing phenomenon, and Brahman as existence is indeed the locus of that phenomenon. For the devotee Bhagavat as identical with Brahman can replace the latter. The error of cognition occurs in grasping the determinate part of the cog- nition, namely, a pot, as the pot is a mere product of illusion (māyā). When the illusion is gone by grasping the real nature of existence as Brahman or, Bhagavat, the locus of the pot, the pot disappears. Thus grasping the bhakti-experience, which is Bhagavat, the locus of all erroneous experiences caused by māyā, the

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devotee emerges out of the influence of maya which caused all his sufferings, and he/she attains salvation. Madhusūdana further elaborates on the subject of this experience. That leads him to claims that, like the experience of Brahman, bhakti embraces Bhagavat exclusively as just bliss free of any qualification. This experience of bliss is similar to the experience of bliss in deep sleep.594 He asserts that the mind natu- rally grasps the reflection (akara) of Bhagavat. But in the empirical cognition the reflections it grasps are caused by such external causes as the sense organs and the latent impressions retained by the mind of previous experiences and thus the reflection becomes distorted. Mind is able to grasp the reflection of Bhagavat because it is a product of avidyā which has Brahman/Bhagavat as its locus. Besides, Bhagavat is the inner controller (antaryāmī) of all phenomena and pervades (anusyūta) all. Thus once the identity between Brahman and Bhagavat is accepted there is no incongruity in accepting the mind to grasp Bhagavat.595 In the empirical state, though the mind grasps Bhagavat in all its cognitive acts, it is not opposed to the appearance of other forms in mind. By the practice of devotional acts (sādhana bhakti) a devotee purifies the mind of all these other farms and impressions. Cleared of all such erroneous forms the mind finally grasps the unimpeded form of Bhagavat. In other words the mind directly expe- riences Bhagavat. Prior to that the mind, during the devotional practices, gets only an indirect reflection of God. The direct revelation totally settles the mind in God.596 In saying this, Madhusūdana has created a new synthesis in which the doctrines of monism are reconciled to devotional theories. He recognises sādhana bhakti as a means of eradicating avidyā, a removal that leads to ultimate self-realisation. Bhakti, for Madhusūdana, is as effective as activities such as śravana and manana, advocated by the Advaitins.597 As bhakti is a form of experience that leads to sal- vation through self-realisation, knowledge serves, both in the theory of devotion and in the monistic view on salvation (moksa), as the direct cause of salvation from worldly sufferings and from their cause, avidyā, the wrong knowledge. But according to the tenets of devotion, salvation is not the summum bonum of human life. Following the BhP, Madhusūdana puts divine love above salvation, where divine love at its climax places the devotee in a state of perpetual ecstatic bliss. The devotee enjoys at that stage the ecstasy of supreme love for Bhagavat. As has already been noted, such an ecstatic experience is regarded, by the followers of the BhP, as the highest goal of a person. Madhusūdana accepts this view.598 The endeavour of the Advaitins ends in achieving identity with Brahman, Brahma-kaivalya, which Madhusūdana calls parā-mukti, or supreme salvation.599 But in the context of bhakti, this indeterminate experience lacks the element of enjoyment (rasa). The successful devotee achieves the determinate experience of the enjoyable All-bliss God, Bhagavat. We shall soon see that the author puts this experience above the experience of undifferentiated Brahman. In this context, Madhusūdana reinterprets Vaișnavite terms such as sālokya and sāyujya to fit in with monistic thought. He equates sāyujya with a lack of

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differentiation (bhedābhāva) between jīva and Brahman. In relation to the highest stage of beatitude (sāyujya) he refers to the attainments such as sālokya as limited salvation (apara-mukti).600 Monistic kaivalya is the identity with Brahman achieved after death, videha-kaivalya where even the tiniest remnant of mistaken knowledge (avidyā-lesa), which causes the continuance of the gross body of the jīvanmukta, is exhausted. In the description of different stages of the spiritual evolution of the devotee (bhakti-bhūmkā) in his/her pursuit of bliss, jīvanmukti is described as the sixth stage, but videha-kavalya is avoided in order to enjoy the bliss of divine love, bhakti. In order to justify the exposition of the theory of bhakti, Madhusūdana points out the difference between bhakti and Brahma-vidyā, the goal of the Advaita school. The differences are as follows:601

1 Brahmavidyā (i.e. akhandākāra-citta-vrtti) is an undifferentiated mental mode (nirvikalpaka-manaso-vrtti), comprehending the non-dual reality (Brahman). Bhakti, on the other hand, is a differentiated savikalpaka mode of a melted mind, having Bhagavat as its content. 2 While the great sentences such as 'tat tvam asi' produce Brahma-vidyā, activities involving ninefold devotion (navadhā-bhakti), that is śravaņa, kīrtana and the like, are said to bring about bhakti. 3 Brahma-vidyā results in the eradication of primordial avidya, the root of all suffering. But bhakti reaches its climax in supreme love (prema) for Bhagavat. 4 Brahma-vidyā is a special privilege accorded to some rare individuals, who have achieved four states of mind (sādhana-catustaya;).602 Bhakti, however, is open to all. The melting of the mind is the only prerequisite for the dawning of bhakti.603

Though Madhusūdana has thus drawn a series of distinctions between Brahma-vidyā and bhakti, his syncretic mind has yet managed to assimilate Brahma-vidyā into the texture of bhakti and has equally integrated it into the hierarchical evolution of bhakti in its different stages. Madhusūdana's thinking starts its movement in this direction in his commentary on the Bhagavad-gītā, where he says that jīvanmuktas, being purified by knowledge, develop love for Bhagavat.604 In this Madhusūdana again confirms the place of the BhP as his main authority.605

The eleven stages of bhakti

However, this syncretic attitude assumes a fully fledged form only in the Bhakti rasayana, where he expressed his views by assigning a slightly lower place to Brahma-vidyā as a stage in the evolution of bhakti. In order to bring this into a clearer perspective, and also to appreciate the workings of the syncretic mind of Madhusūdana, we now propose to deal with the stages of bhakti that culminate in the highest flight of divine love (prema prakarsa). Madhusūdana enumerates the

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stages as follows:606

prathamam mahatām sevā taddayā-pātratā tatah. śraddhātha teşām dharmeșu tato harigunaśrutih. tato ratyamkurotpattiḥ svarūpādhigatistataḥ. prema-vrddhih parānande tasyātha sphuranam tataḥ Bhagavaddharamanişthātaḥ svasmimstatgunaśālitā. premno'tha paramā kāsthetyuditā bhakti bhūmikā.607

Stage 1: service to the great (mahatām sevā). By the great, Madhusūdana608 means primarily Bhagavat Himself and, secondarily, the devotees of God. Stage 2: acquisition of the grace of the great (taddayāpātratā). Such grace may require endeavour or it may be spontaneously achieved. Stage 3: a favoured votary develops a taste (ruci) for the practice of spiritual methods (śraddhātha teșām dharmesu) consisting of the ninefold devotion. Stage 4: the actual practice of the ninefold devotion according to one's capacity (harigunaśruti).

These four stages are exclusively means (sādhana) to achieve the end (sādhya); the following stages are achievements (sädhya), though they allow for still higher stages. In other words, the following stages consist of both sādhya and sādhana:

Stage 5: reception of the reflection of Bhagavat by a mode of the melted mind. This stage is bhakti in its narrower sense, which Madhusūdana has already presented in his definition of bhakti, while the other stages that follow represent the hierarchical maturity of this stage. Stage 6: svarūpādhigati. This stage is practically the same as the Brahma-vidyā of the Advaita school and allows three hierarchical sub stages: (1) the realisation of the true nature of jīva as distinct from the gross and the subtle bodies; (2) the realisation of the identification of the true nature of jīva and Brahman, the all-pervading Self; and (3) the realisation of such identification which strengthens detachment (vairāgya) to reach its climax (paravairāgya). Stage 7: increase of love in God is when with the dawning of paravairagya the votary becomes overwhelmed with divine love in its ever-increasing intensity.

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The stages that follow are ends, as distinguished from the above group of stages, which are, more or less, means.

Stage 8: tasya sphuranam means the direct revelation of Bhagavat, the reality that is all-bliss. Stage 9: Bhaghavaddharmanisthā is the total absorption of the votary in Bhagavat, when all his senses are completely dedicated to the service of Bhagavat. Stage 10: svasmimstadgunaśālitā is when due to the devotee's total absorption in God his/her body manifests the majesty of Bhagavat. Stage 11: premnah paramā kāsthā is the climax of divine love, characterised by extreme intolerance of separation, and resulting finally in the surrender of life (prānaparityāgāvadhi virahāsahisņutārūpā).609

It is evident that bhakti, as defined by Madhusūdana at the beginning of his Bhakti-rasāyana, is the fifth stage which he describes as the dawning of love and attraction for the Divine (ratyankurotpatti): in other words, Madhusūdana has taken the first four stages preceding this stage as purely the means (sādhana) for the attainment of the experience of bhakti, the fifth stage. Therefore, the usage of the word 'bhakti' for the first four stages is secondary. Madhusūdana gives recognition first to service to the great, which according to him leads to the showering of divine grace on the votary. In this way, Madhusūdana introduces the doctrine of divine grace in the delineation of his own theory of devotion. Though in conventional Vaisnavism, divine grace is taken to be spontaneous, it appears, from Madhusūdana's exposition, that he believes that as a general rule, service to the great is the cause of divine grace. In some cases, however, Madhusūdana admits variations within this rule.610 Through divine grace the votary develops a taste (ruci) for the practice of spiri- tual methods consisting in the ninefold devotion (navadha-bhakti). Elsewhere in his BhR Madhusūdana observes, in the context of the exposition of one verse of the BhP, that the practice of karma-yoga, consisting in the performance of daily (nitya) and occasional (naimittika) rituals of an initiated devotee, may also bring about the above-mentioned taste (ruci or śraddhā). He further states that karma-yoga can lead to both the path of knowledge and the path of devotion.611 Those aspirants whose minds become melted, follow the path of devotion, while the others develop detachment and follow the path of knowledge. Though Madhusūdana does not mention karma-yoga in his description of the stages of bhakti, in the light of these comments one might say that he considers karma-yoga and divine grace as the alternative cause of śraddhā. But his silence over karma-yoga in the context of the description of the stages of bhakti may be interpreted as his inclination to divine grace in preference to karma-yoga. Madhusūdana may be said to have reaffirmed the convention when he thus declared the sovereignty of divine grace in the path of devotion. Madhusūdana holds that out of śraddhā the devotee begins to perform spiritual exercises

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consisting of the ninefold devotion described by Pralhada.612 This ninefold devotion is the immediate cause of ratyankurotpatti - the sprouting (of the nucleus) of passionate love (for God). When the Reality that is all-bliss becomes manifest to the devotee, he naturally becomes overwhelmed by such an occurrence. He no longer remains conscious of the external Bhakti, the fifth stage which Madhusūdana described at the begin- ning of the BhR for the purpose of definition. This is elaborated in his enumera- tion of the next three stages in an interesting manner. First, the sprouting of the divine love (ratyankurotpatti) gains increasing intensity of love for Bhagavat, resulting in His direct revelation in the mind of the votary. Then, between the stages of the first dawning of rati and the development of intensity of love, Madhusūdana inserts the realisation of Self (atman) of the Advaita-vedānta. That means, according to Madhusūdana, that rati is intensified by the realisation of the Self. This realisation is not the manifestation of Bhagavat, the reality that is all-bliss, but is the knowledge of reality as pure existence. For, Bhagavat becomes manifest only after the love of Bhagavat has gained intensity. The process whereby the mind receives the form of Bhagavat falls into four hierarchical phases: (1) the sprouting of rati; (2) the realisation of the Self; (3) the intensification of love for Bhagavat; and finally, (4) the manifestation of Bhagavat as all-bliss. When the reality that is all-bliss, becomes manifest to the devotee, he naturally becomes overwhelmed by such an occurrence. He no longer remains conscious of the external universe and all his activities are absorbed in Bhagavat. As a result of such complete concentration (tanmayata) on Bhagavat, the majesty of Bhagavat becomes manifest in the devotee. In this way Madhusūdana recognises the sārsti mukti of the Vaisnavas in his description of the stages of bhakti. The Bhagavat-rati, resulting in the manifestation of Bhagavat, is further crystallised by the spontaneous performance of Bhagavaddharmas and culminates in the per- fection (parā kāstha) of divine love. The climax of divine love is bhakti-rasa and, according to Madhusūdana, it is the manifestation of the entirely blissful nature of Bhagavat in all His splendour. The final stage of bhakti, which Madhusūdana describes as premnaḥ parā kāșthā, or the climax of divine love, deserves some consideration here. Madhusūdana does not expressly say in this context whether at the time of reali- sation of this stage the devotee becomes completely identified with Bhagavat, or whether some sort of distinction still remains between the two, as is generally believed in different Vaisnava schools. Madhusūdana leaves it to his readers to guess the truth. He does state that long before rati develops into rasa, in fact before rati gains intensity, some process of identification between the devotee and reality is necessary. In other words, he takes this process of identification to be an inevitable prerequisite in the development of bhakti. It can therefore be presumed that the realisation of prema inextricably involves the experience of identification as well. It may be said that while the realisation of this shared identity, associated with the development of rati, was the identification of the devotee with reality manifested as pure Existence (sanmätra Brahma) so it is the case in the realisation

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of rasa. There is one difference, however, in that in the latter case the devotee finds himself in perfect union with the Reality, manifested as pure Bliss. A confirmed monist like Madhusūdana could not have admitted to any other concept. One could take this identification with Bhagavat as a higher type of sāyujya-mukti than the sāyujya achieved previously when the devotee realised his/her identity with the Reality as pure Existence. That identification is the substance of such realisation of the climax of divine love, as borne out by another fact: Madhusūdana describes the climax of prema as marked by the most poignant intolerance of separation from the beloved. In other words, he takes it as the deep- est intensity of the sentiment of love, dissolving into what may be described as the perfect union between the devotee and Bhagavat. Indeed, for Madhusūdana, intolerance of separation is a basic feature of love in all its manifestations, rang- ing from rati613 to rasa.614 Underlying all of these emotional stages of intense love, Madhusūdana's conception of bhakti as rasa presupposes a mystical identi- fication of the devotee and Bhagavat. It may be noted here that intolerance (of separation) at its climax, disclosed at the final stage of bhakti, is also recognised as such by Jīva Gosvāmī. In his Prīti sandarbha, he called this state mahāb- hāva615 - that is the climax of bhava - a word which has its parallel in the word rati employed by Madhusūdana. It is also interesting to observe that Madhusūdana, by recognising the identification of the devotee with Bhagavat, the Reality, pledges his allegiance to the literary theory of literary sentiment (rasa). This requires the identification of the enjoyer of rasa with the focus of the aesthetic sentiment (nāyaka) as a prerequisite for the revelation of aesthetic sentiment (rasa). Of course, in the case of the literary theory of the enjoyment of sentiment such identification is forged between the substratum (āśraya) of rati (for instance, Rāma) and the enjoyer (pramatā).616 In the case of bhakti-rasa, however, the process of identification is intended to occur between the devotee, who enjoys, and the object of rati (ālambana). However, it may also mean that in the case of bhakti-rasa the sub- stratum, of rati, and its object, are one and the same Reality: Bhagavat. In other words, Bhagavat is all-bliss, in that He Himself realises his own intrinsic sweet- ness and beauty. Here our author parts company of the Caitanya's theology by absolutely refusing to acknowledge any distinction (bheda) between God and His devotee. In his conception of hierarchy in the stages of bhakti Madhusūdana relies mainly upon the authority of the BhP. It appears that the structure of his eleven stages of the development of bhakti (bhakti bhūmikā), is based on one verse of the BhP.617 Here the Bhagavata clearly states that in the company of the great, one can hear the praises of Bhagavat. These praises, once heard, lead to the unfolding of śraddhā, rati and bhakti in progressive order. Thus here we find the hierarchical order of (1) sat prasanga, which is equivalent to mahatām sevā of Madhusūdana; (2) śraddhā; (3) rati; and (4) bhakti, which Madhusūdana calls premnah parākāsthā. Elsewhere the BhP maintains618 that divine grace is the prerequisite of śraddhā and the performance of Bhagavaddharma, consisting of

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listening to the eulogy of Bhagavat, etc. Hence divine grace underlies all stages of devotion. Again, the BhP states that the performance of paradharma - that is, Bhagavaddharma - is the direct cause of bhakti - that is, rati.619 These dharmas consist in the ninefold devotion as described in the BhP.620 Madhusūdana further maintains, on the basis of the BhP,621 that divine grace is achieved by resorting to the great (mahat), who are compassionate by nature. The compassionate great, out of pity, shower grace on the devotee, which enables the devotee himself to obtain divine grace. We therefore come upon the following hierarchical stages that result in the advent of rati:

1 service to the great, which enables the devotee both to hear the praise of Bhagavat and to obtain divine grace; 2 divine grace; 3 śraddhā in bhagavaddharma; 4 actual performance of such dharma.

In this way, all preliminary sādhana stages, including rati, are found illustrated in the BhP. Madhusūdana, by drawing them together and by employing his syncretic genius, knits them into distinct stages whereby their internal hierarchy is brought into a perspective that is logical and clear. The stage after rati is described by the BhP in the verse 'Like a child who received a toy becomes engrossed in it being oblivious [of everything else] (nyastakrīdanako vālo jadavat tanmanastayā' etc.622 Madhusūdana takes this as the stage of premadādhya, where an ever- increasing intensity of love finds expression in the devotee's being totally uncon- scious of the external world. In between the stages of rati and premadādhya he places the stages of self-realisation, which are described in the BhP623 as the spontaneous development of total detachment and the understanding (of the truth as against falsity, cf. Yogasūtra I.15 and II. 25), which comes after the dawning of the divine bhakti. Here also Madhusūdana exhibits his originality through his arrangement of the succession of stages after rati. While describing the rasalila, it is also stated by the BhP that the realisation of the all-pervading self as identical with the devotee leads to the heightening of love in the manifestation of Bhagavat.624 But the illustration of the intense love of the gopis for Bhagavat, mentioned in this context,625 is used by Madhusūdana to illustrate the climax of love, the final stage of the devotee. After the manifestation of Bhagavat the votary becomes completely absorbed in Bhagavat. This condition is stated by the BhP while describing the condition of Ambarīsa.626 As a result of such total absorption in Bhagavat the majesty of Bhagavat becomes manifest in the votary. This state is also described by the BhP as more or less a by-product of the stage of total absorption.627 Such absorption culminates in the climax of divine love, which is the goal of the votary.628 Though Madhusūdana shows his dependency on the BhP for the condition of the votary in the last three stages, their order as a progression is his own innovation.

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Rasa concept of bhakti

Madhusūdana accepts prema-bhakti, the climax of divine love, to be a rasa. Hence, to that extent, he has to accept the postulates of the literary theory of rasa. Following the tradition he has described the permanent mood (sthāyī-bhāva), vib- hāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāribhāva of the bhakti-rasa. Madhusūdana takes Bhagavat-rati as the sthāyi-bhāva of that rasa.629 He further explains that the melting (drūti) of mind invests the mind with the capacity to receive a form, in this case the reflection of Bhagavat. Madhusūdana recognises the following psychological factors to be independent causes of such melting:630 sexual love (kāma), wrath (krodha), fear (bhaya), affection (sneha), delight (harsa), afflic- tion (śoka), compassion (dayā) and total detachment arising from complete self-control, Vaśīkārākhyā vairāgya.631 The mind, when influenced by these emotions, receives the form of the object that excites that emotion. In his conception of the agents of heating (tāpaka) that melt the mind Madhusūdana draws upon the BhP,632 where the same factors are recognised as exciting devotion. These psychological factors regulate the nature of melting. The mind varies according to the variation of this melting. Such variation in the nature of the mind itself explains the qualitative variation in the reflection that Bhagavat makes upon it - that is, bhakti as rati.633 Thus, due to the variation in the nature of the mind, the receptacle of the reflec- tion of Bhagavat, the quality of bhakti also differs in each case. Due to different causes of melting (täpaksa), there are several types of melted mind, and the number of permanent moods (sthāyi-bhava) that develop into rasa vary according to the number of types of melted mind.634

1 Thus when love (kama) consisting in desire for union melts the mind two types of sthāyi-bhāva, the sambhoga-rati and vipralambha-rati, arise according to whether the object of love is present or absent. 2 Wrath635 generated from jealousy (irsya) excites the mind. Such excitement may cause two types of melting, causing also two types of desire: the wish to destroy the object of such excitement and the wish to incur pleasure in an excited mind. In both cases the melting of the mind may receive the form of Bhagavat. In the first case the sthāyi-bhāva is known as animosity (dveșa), while in the second it is known as rati, resulting in what the commentator points out as vipralambha śrngāra of the māna (the lovers' tiff,) type.636 3 Fear (bhaya), marked by mental perplexity (vaiklavya), melts the mind; the rati in such a melted mind is known as timid love (bhaya-rati).637 4 Affection (sneha) can be of three kinds: when it concerns a son or daughter it is characterised by the nature of protector and the protected. The second type is marked by the nature of servant and the served. This nature can be indicated by servitude (dāsya) or by friendship (sakhya). The third variety of sneha is known as miśra, where both dāsya and sakhya exist in combination. The mind, melted by the emotion such as a protector felt for the protected

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(pālyapālaka) develops an indulgent affection (vatsala-rati) concerning Bhagavat. Out of the affection between servant and the served (sevya sevak- abhāva sneha), preyo-rati arises. The rati arising in the mind, melted by misra rati, is known as prīti-rati.638 5 Harsa is marked by exultation of the mind. It is of four kinds. The first kind consists in supreme bliss in the mind that produces the knowledge of the majesty of Bhagavat. The mind melted by such delight (harsa) contains pure rati for Bhagavat. The second kind, is generated by unusual gestures and speech brought about by bashfulness (of a timid person in love). The mind melted by such exhibition of suppressed delight receives the sthāyi-bhāva known as harsa.639 Observing an extraordinary and magnificent object gen- erates the third kind. Such delight melts the mind, enabling it to receive the sthāyi-bhāva known as harsa. When the heroes are elated by victory they experience the fourth and last kind of delight. The mind, melted by such harşa, receives the sthāyi-bhāva known as enthusiasm (utsāha). 6 When, due to the destruction of the beloved, the mind becomes full of sorrow, it melts the mind. The absence of delight in such melted mind is called affliction (śoka).640 7 Dayā means disgust (ghrna), enhanced by the knowledge of the futility of the object of sensual knowledge. It arises when one sees some awful form of human sufferings. In the mind melted by such disgust three kinds of aversion (jugupsā) are generated: stressful (udveginī), agitating (kșobhinī) and pure (śuddhā). 8 Madhusūdana mixes dayā with harsa and thus reinterprets the three tradi- tional concepts of dāna-vīra rasa, dayā-vīra rasa and dharma-vīra rasa. The mind melted by a sense of pity (dayā) and attended by enthusiasm of harsa, receives the sthāyi-bhāva, dayotsāha. Again, the melted mind, prone to great generosity, receives the sthāyi-bhāva, that is, dānotsāha. When the mind melts by the noble desire to protect one's own religion, it receives the sthāyi-bhāva known as dharmotsāha. 9 Detachment (vairagya), marked by lack of desire, melts the mind, and the sthāyi-bhāva existing in such mind is known as śama.

Madhusūdana makes a list of eighteen types of sthāyi-bhāvas, each emerging from an independent tāpaka. There are three more sthāyi-bhāvas caused by (most probably) a combination of two stimulants, such as delight and compassion. He classifies them in three groups: narrow (samkīrna), mixed (miśrita) and pure (śuddha).

Samkīrņa: Among the sthāyi-bhāvas mentioned above, only a limited number can concern Bhagavat. There are some others that cannot be developed into bhakti rasa. For even though some of them may concern Bhagavat, they do not arouse any pleasing sensation of desire. The rest do not concern Bhagavat at all. These last two types are call

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samkīrna. Accordingly, ferocious (raudra), ferocious and frightening (raudra-bhayānaka), heroic and righteous (dharma-vīra), heroic and kind (dayā-vīra), loathsome (vibhatsa) and equanimity (śānta) are samkīrņa rasas. Of these, the emotions raudra and raudra-bhayanaka are not pleasing, while the rest do not concern Bhagavat at all. Interestingly, Madhusūdana strongly disagrees with Abhinavagupta with regards to śānta-rasa and does not accept it as a rasa. Miśrita: when more than one basic bhāvas combine as one sthāyi-bhāva, it is known as miśrita and the resulting rasa is also known as miśrita. Among the miśrita sthāyi-bhāvas Madhusūdana recognises seven which concern Bhagavat and develop into bhakti-rasa. These seven bhakti- rasas are classified as kevala-miśra. These are: erotic love (śrngāra), compassion (karuņā), esteem (prīti), fearful, (bhayānaka), fantastic (adbhuta) and heroic generosity (dāna-vīra). The remaining two miśrita-rasas, comic (hāsya) and heroic (vīra), Madhusūdana does not recognise as bhakti-rasas, because their sthāyi-bhāvas cannot concern Bhagavat. When a miśrita-rasa concerns some other object, it is termed as samkīrņa-miśra. Śuddha: There are three sthāyi-bhāvas that concern Bhagavat only and so are known as śuddha. The rasas are called viśuddha-bhaktirasas. These are śuddha-bhakti-rasa, preya-bhakti-rasa and vatsala-bhakti-rasa.

Rati

Madhusūdana generally uses the term rati for the sthāyī-bhāvas that develop into bhakti-rasa. He thus underscores the two emotions love and desire as the basis of a permanent mood of mind that develops into bhakti-rasa. Therefore, grief (śoka), the permanent mood of sad or tragic (karuna)-rasa, is specifically mentioned as arati, or contradictory to rati. Wonderment (vismaya) and enthusiastic generosity (dānotsāha), the sthāyī-bhāvas of marvellous (adbhuta-rasa) and heroically gen- erous (dāna-vira-rasa), respectively, are not mentioned as rati the sthāyī-bhāva of the bhakti-rasa. Madhusūdana lays down two conditions for the generation of rati: First, that the mind must be melted and second, that it must be free from the influence of rajas and tamas; only sattva-guna should occupy the mind.641 Raudra and raudra-bhayānaka rasas are not bhakti-rasas, because their basic sthāyī-bhāvas do not arise in a melted mind,642 and also, because they remain under the influence of rajas and tamas. The sthāyi-bhāvas śoka, vismaya and dān- otsāha, are not called rati, possibly because in those cases too the mind remains influenced by rajo-guna and tamo-guna. It follows that the sthāyi-bhāvas devel- oping into bhakti-rasa, as described by Madhusūdana's scheme, must be sāttvika that is, possessing only sattva-guna. Madhusūdana defines rati as a mental state of affection and esteem (priti) arising out of incessant thought of the object of love. It is a pleasurable sensation marked by intolerance of separation.643 The predominance of sattva-guna places rati in a high position and the bhakti-rasa

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developing from such rati is held to be higher than the bhakti sentiment where rajas and tamas are still present.644 Among all kinds of bhakti-rasa, śrngāra-bhakti-rasa is held by Madhusūdana to be the best. Because the sthāyī-bhāva of this rasa, that is, rati is of great inten- sity and the pleasure derived is indeed the highest.645 Madhusūdana classifies rati as of two kinds: pure, (śuddha) and mixed (vyamiśrita). Suddha rati is the unqual- ified and totally selfless feeling of the devotee (nirupādhika) and it emerges from listening to the eulogies of Bhagavat. It dawns spontaneously in the mind and develops into bhakti-rasa, without being adulterated by any other rasa. The other type of rati is qualified by having some ulterior motive (sopādhika). It is of three kinds: rati generated by sexual love (kāma), rati generating from social relationship (sambhandha) and rati generated by fear (bhaya). When bhakti is mingled with the sentiment of love, it is kāmaja (borne of sexual desire). Both affectionate love (vatsala) and love marked by friendliness and eager helpfulness (preyo-bhakti)-rasas are known as sambhandaja (borne of social relationship). Prīti and bhayānaka-bhakti-rasas are bhayaja (borne of respect and deferential fear). If all the four types of emotions, that is, śuddha, kāmaja, sambhandaja and bhayaja, combine in a rasa, it becomes extremely delightful.646 Such rasa is present in the minds of Krsna's lady companions at Vraja (Vrajadevīs). A votary aspiring to attain the highest kind of bhakti-rasa should try to imitate the minds of the Vrajadevīs.647 In this way Madhusūdana explains the highest kind of bhakti and suggests the means (sadhana) for the attainment of such bhakti. The Bengal school of Vaisnavism calls this highest bhakti of the cowherdesses of Vraja (Vrajagopis), the rāgātmikā-bhakti and a devotee's imitation of their mental state undertaken in order to attain true bhakti, is called by them Rāgānugā-bhakti.648 It is clear that Madhasūdana's concept of rati is different from the literary concept of rati. The literary rati is the sthāyī-bhāva of śrngāra-rasa only. But for Madhusūdana the sthāyi-bhāvas of even bhayānaka, prīti and śuddha-bhakti-rasa are ratis, when they concern Bhagavat. Again, Madhusūdana admits that with the exception of raudra and raudra-bhayanaka-rasa, the mind must melt in all other kinds of rasa. But according to the literary school649 the mind melts only in the cases of śrngāra, karuna and śānta-rasa, whereas in the cases of other rasas the mind becomes inspired (dipta). The commentator650 on the Kāvya-prakāśa states that dīpta consists of mind's expansion (vistāra) and exultation (vikāśa). In the cases of heroic (vīra), violent (raudra) and disgusting (vibhatsa)- rasas, the mind only expands, while in the cases of comic (hāsya), fantastic (adbhuta) and fear- some (bhayānaka) the mind also exults. Locana, on the other hand, states that in addition to erotic love (śrngāra), sad or tragic (karuņa) and quiescent (šānta)- rasas, comic (hāsya), fearsome (bhayānaka) and disgusting (vibhatsa)-rasas may sometimes arise in a melted mind.651 Madhusūdana admits the idea but only in case of those sthāyi-bhāvas known as miśrita.652 Thus he accepts the view of the literary school in a limited way and reinterprets it in a new light. He must have been inspired by the famous Purānic characters, such as Prahlāda.

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Rasa

Madhusūdana proceeds next to explain the nature (svarūpa) of rasa, its locus (aśraya), the cause of the manifestation of rasa and the nature of its manifestation. The permanent mood, in association with vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhicāri- bhāva, becomes manifested as bliss and is termed rasa. Rasa is therefore bliss per se, and hence is Bhagavat. Scriptural sayings such as 'raso vai sa' and 'ānanda Brahmeti vyanjānāt',653 confirm that bliss is Bhagavat Himself. Though, in this way, other rasas too, like the bhakti-rasa, have the same nature - that is, bliss, only in bhakti-rasa the reflection is of the pure Bhagavat, while in other rasas Bhagavat is reflected on the melted mind, as conditioned by some attributes such as being the beloved (kānta), etc.654 But how can rasa, which is all-pervasive Bhagavat Himself, have a locus, that is, the mental mode? The answer Madhusūdana gives is that the mind of the audi- ence (sāmājika) is regarded as the container of rasa insofar as rasa is manifested as a reflection in their mental mode.655 Madhusūdana then explains the causes of the manifestation of rasa. The permanent moods belonging to characters such as Rāma, represented in works of literature, are known to be common (laukika). But when the audience listens to or visualises the external behaviour of these characters, it develops within itself, by virtue of intense contemplation of these characters, extraordinary moods corresponding to the ordinary moods of the characters themselves. The permanent moods in characters of literature introduce both the senses of joy and sorrow. The corresponding moods of the audience, however, are a perpetual source of happiness.656 That is why even tragedy (karuna) can be a rasa, and is enjoyed as such by the audience. The extraordinary permanent moods, such as rati, of the audience develop into rasa through the collective operation of vibhāva, anubhāva and vyabhacāri- bhāva.657 Vibhāva is the direct cause of excitement of characters in literature. It is of two kinds: alambana and uddīpana. In the case of ordinary rasa, for instance, śrngāra, the ālambana is the prop of rati, while uddīpana is the objects like moon, the backdrop that prepares and excites the mind. In the case of bhakti-rasa the ālambana vibhāva is Krsna while the leaf of tulsi, sandalpaste, etc., are uddīpana vibhāvas, inasmuch as they excite rati. Anubhāva is the external expression of the person in whom the permanent mood is excited. These expres- sions indicate the progressive development of the mood in the person concerned. In the case of bhakti-rasa, features such as the tears, and the choked and broken voice of the devotee, are all regarded as anubhāvas. Vyabhicāri-bhāva are the fluctuating moods that help in the further development of the permanent mood, for example, in the case of bhakti-rasa, the mood of detachment (nirveda) is regarded to be vyabhicāri-bhāva.658 According to Madhusūdana, the worldly causes of feelings such as love, when presented through literature, assume the sta- tus of sthāyī-bhāva. But they are still to be regarded as ordinary. Distinguished from these elements of vibhāva, etc., are the corresponding elements also called

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vibhāva, etc. of the enjoying public (sāmājikas). Unlike the ordinary ones, such vibhāva, etc. are deemed as impersonal and they help in the manifestation of rasa, which is enjoyed by the audience.659 From the psychological point of view, an illuminating and pure (sattva-guna pradhāna) vrtti is generated in the mind of the enjoyer. Such a mental mode (vrtti ) not only grasps the sthāyī-bhava, but also the three auxiliary bhāvas, all of which are consolidated (samūhālabana) in the same vrtti.660 Such vrtti reveals at once ecstatic pleasure which is rasa. Madhusūdana points out in this context the views of his predecessors, who have taken the revealing vrtti to be the rasa.661 A literary composition presents the merits (guna), figures of speech (alamkāra), style (rīti) and the vibhāva, etc., and through these factors manifests rasa, with the power of suggestion (vyañjana-vrtti) inherent in such composition. Though the knowledge of rasa is inspired by a literary composition, it is still a direct knowledge. The knowledge of self-revealing rasa is the revelation of the highest Reality in its undifferentiated, blissful nature.662 In conclusion, I again emphasise the following observations made throughout this work: The study of Madhusūdana reveals two distinct aspects of his personal- ity. In one, Madhusūdana is the great scholar of the Advaita-vedānta, a vigorous dialectician, determined to shatter every attempt at minimising the tenets of the Advaita-vedānta. He was determined to not only to save Samkara's non-dualistic vedānta but elevate it to a great philosophical system. In his other aspect, he reveals himself as a great devotee of Lord Krsna and a mystic. Though a strict adherent of the Advaita-vedānta philosophy he repeatedly declared his total ecstatic devotion to and love for Krsna, as for instance in the concluding verse of his commentary on the BhG, Madhusūdana admits that he does not know any higher Reality than Krsna, who carries a flute in his hands, who is as dark as the (monsoon) rain-cloud, who wears yellow clothes and whose lips are as red as a ripe bimba fruit; whose face is as beautiful as the full moon and whose eyes are like lotus (petals):

vamśīvibhuitakarānnavanīradābhāt pītāmbarād-aruņabimbaphalādharost- hāt./ pūrņendusundaramukhād aravindanetrāt Krsnāt param kimapi tatvamaham na jāne.//663

So to gain a complete picture of Madhusūdana's achievement it is imperative to discuss both these aspects. He proves that monistic metaphysics and devotionalism go hand in hand in the search for perfection and unlimited bliss. In the introduc- tory verses of his commentary on the BhG, Madhusūdana gives a full description of the nature of spiritual pursuit. In order to purify the mind the devotee should perform religious and social duties (karma) without any ulterior purpose. At the same time he must perform such activities as japa (repetition of the divine name or mantra) so that through constant meditation on the Divine and practice of devotion for the Supreme Being may stimulate his/her mind and brings about the dawning of real and spontaneous divine love in his/her mind. Thus purified, the mind acquires the discriminating knowledge of what is true and what is false

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(viveka buddhi). Such knowledge leads to extreme detachment. Being desirous of liberation, the devotee takes refuge in a guru who teaches him true knowledge. He gains thereby the knowledge of falsity of empirical knowledge, which is the first step towards the achievement of unlimited bliss. The devotee realises for the first time that the worries, privations, woes and afflictions of this life are but illusions and the cause of this illusion is the beginningless false knowledge (avidyā). Once this knowledge settles in the mind, he enquires as to the process by which this false universe has been generated. How to account for the entire creation? This leads to the discussion of the genesis of the universe in its different phases. Next, there comes the enquiry about Brahman, the only truth that endures throughout eternity. The knowledge of Brahman, devoid of all duality, is the primary requisite for the ultimate knowledge of the identification between the devotee, that is jīva, and Brahman. The knowledge of Brahman enables the devotee to know the real nature of his own self, that is, the real self of jīva, and the explanation for jīva's outward expression. When the devotee knows the real nature of Brahman, as well as his own real self as identical with Brahman, ultimate bliss dawns in the mind of the devotee. These constitute the preliminary stages of devotion. The next stage is the true pursuit of the devotee for the attainment of unlimited ecstatic love for the Supreme Being, which is bliss in itself. Here, there is no need for the knowledge of identity or the knowledge of anything else. The field of love for the Supreme Being excels the field of pure knowledge, because pure knowledge merges the pursuer into the Truth, the Knowledge and the Bliss, whereas divine love transports the devotee in the realm of ecstatic enjoyment of that love. To underscore his point Madhusūdana concludes his commentary on BhG IX with the following verse:

śrī Govinda-padārabindamakarandāsvādaśuddhāśayāh samsārāmbud- himuttaranti sahasā paśyanti pūrņam mahaḥ./ vedāntairavadhāyanti paramam śreyas-tyajanti bhramam dvaitam svapnasamam vidanti vimalām vidantic-ānandatām.//

In this verse he acknowledges that the devotees who have tasted the nectar of their love for Govinda acquire pure minds. They easily get across the ocean of transient existence and fortuitously perceive the supreme Plenum and Joy. By understand- ing the Upanisadic statements they realise their supreme goal. [At the same time] they remove their wrong perception of the world of duality and regard their [empirical experiences] as dreams. They realise that their experience of [divine love] is pure Bliss. Without making any qualitative distinction between the philosophy of Advaita-vedänta and the theology of pure love for Bhagavat, the Supreme Being, he simply makes a synthesis between the two without losing sight of the concept of the non-dual Reality. His originality is most advantageously expressed in his exposition of the BhG. In his commentary on the final verse he contradicts Samkara by taking the term dharma to mean social duties. Samkara took the term to mean karma in general, and explained that it means total renunciation of all

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actions whether social or religious. But Madhusūdana does not agree with Samkara because he is not going to leave out his spontaneous acts of devotion. That is why, in spite of being a great non-dualist Vedāntin, Madhusūdana admits the paradox of his personality:

kurvanti ke'pi krtinaḥ kvacidapyanante svāntam vidhāya vișayān- taraśāntimeva./ tvat pādapadma-vigalanmakarandabindumāsvādya mādyanti muhurmadhubhinmanome.//664

Some successful persons (i.e. yogīs) may have extinguished their mind's craving for other objects by fixing (their mind) on some eternal Reality. Oh Destroyer of Madhu!665 My mind constantly tasting the nectar dripping from your lotus feet, keep on acting like a drunk. Yogic instacy is not enough for Madhsūdana, he rejoices in the ecstasy of his love for Krsna.

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GLOSSARY

abhāva Absence, non-existence. abhihitānvaya-vāda The theory of verbal knowledge where the sentence when uttered presents first the primary sense of the words and then their grammatical interrelations. adhisthāna Locus. adhyāsa Superimposition. One object appears another like a piece of rope appearing like a snake. adrsta The previous action (karma) causing the production of an object. ahamartha; ahamkāra Ego which is an ontological category. akhaņdākāra Undifferentiated and integral. anirvacanīya Undefinable. antakaraņa Mind, inner sense organ. anubhāva Physical reaction of a mood. anuvyavasaya In the epistemology of the Nyāya system complete cognition has two parts. The first part is called vyavasāya where the knower has sense- contact with an object. In the second part, which immediately follows the first part, the subject also appears in the cognition. This is called anuvyavasāya. For instance, vyavasāya part of seeing a water jug presents 'something the eyes are contacting'; the second part presents the cognition as 'I am seeing a water jug.' anvitābhidhāna-vāda The theory of verbal knowledge in which a sentence when uttered presents the meanings of not only the words in it but also their grammatical interrelations. anyonyābhāva Mutual absence that means A is not B. apūrva Result produced by the performance of Vedic rituals (karma) - a Mīmāmsā term. Vedānta calls it karma-phala; Vaiśeșika calls it adrsta; Nyāya calls it dharma and adharma. asanga Unrelated. asat Non-existent, unreal. āśraya, adhisthāna Container, substratum, locus. avaccheda Delimitation. avāntara Relative.

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avidyā; ajñāna; māyā; bhrama Illusion; false knowledge; mistaken appearance. bhāva Mental mood. bimba-pratibimba-vāda The theory of identity between the reflection and the object reflected. citta-vrtti Cognitive mode of mind. drk Subject of comprehension. drśya Object of comprehension. jada Insensate. jīva Person, individual. jñāna Knowledge; experience. kartā Agent. kartrtva Agency. mithyā False, mistaken cognition. nirvikalpa Indeterminate, non-conceptual. pariņāma Evolution. pramā-jñāna Valid knowledge. pramāņa Means of valid knowledge. Advaita-vedānta accept six pramāņas: direct knowledge (pratyaksa); inference (anumāna); scripture (śabda); analogy (upamāna); presumption, or, deduction from circumstantial evidence (arthapatti) and lack of experience (anupalabdhi). prameya The content of valid knowledge. pramiti The process of valid knowledge. prārabdha karma Karma, accumulated in previous lives of a person that has already started to produce result. pratiyogī Positive counterpart of a negation. rati Sexual love. Sādhya Inferable entity. Sākșī The omniscient pure consciousness. sat Existent, real. savikalpa Determinate, conceptual. sthāyi bhava Abiding or permanent mood. upādhi Limiting adjunct, temporary limitation. upajīvya Dependant. upalaksaņā Secondary, remote or modified sense of a word. uparāga Connection. vibhāva Stimulants for mental mood. vivarta Illusory transformation. vrtti Mode; for example, a mental mode. vṛtti-jñāna Cognitive knowledge; cognition. vyabhicāri bhāva Discordant moods.

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NOTES

1 INTRODUCTION

1 Gangeśopādhyāya belonged to the thirteenth C.E. His great work the Tattva-citāmani started a new era for the classical Indian logicians. Daniel H.H. Ingalls, Materials For The Study Of Navya-nyāya Logic, pp. 1-5ff. 2 S.N. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy; Volume II; pp. 116-227. 3 AdS, pp. 435-6. Madhusūdana here explains Brahma-sūtra 2.2.28-9 in a new light. 4 AdS, p. 846. 5 AdS, p. 467; SB, pp. 113-15; Gaekwads Oriental Series. 6 AdS, pp. 486-7. 7 AdS, p. 577. 8 SB, pp. 9-14. 9 Eliot Deutsch and J.A.B. van Buitenen, pp. 242ff; 252ff. 10 See, Kāśyapa Vamśa-bhāskara. Ed. by Sītānāth Siddhāntavāgīśa; Introduction (Beangali), by Rajendranath Ghosh. Ed. Advaita-siddhi, part I. 1931, pp. 84-201; James Benson, Samkara Bhatta's Family Chronicle: The Gādhivamśavarņana , paper in The Pandit: Traditional Scholarship in India, ed. Axel Michaels, Festschrift Parameswara Aithal, South Asian Studies No. XXXVIII, South Asia Institute, New Delhi Branch Heidelberg University. 11 AdRR, p. 44. (Nirnayasagar edision); and GGD, on BhG.6.33-4. 12 See preface to Advaita-siddhi., ed. Mm. Yogendra Nāth Tarka Sāmkhya Vedānta- Tīrtha, and 'Introduction to SB' by P.C. Divanji, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Vol. LXIV. 13 Advaita-siddhi, Part I, Ed. Yogendra Nāth Tarka Sāmkhya Vedānta Tīrtha, p. 115. 14 Sarasvati Bhavana Studies, Vol. VII, p. 177. 15 Introduction to Vedānta-kalpa-latikā, Sarasvati Bhavana text no. 3 (1920). 16 Introduction, Gaekwad Oriental Series, Vol. LXIV. 17 Sarasvati Bhavana Studies, Vol. VII, p. 177. 18 Preface, Advaita-siddhi, Part I. Ed. Yogendra Nath Tarkatirtha, p. 91. 19 Sarasvati Bhavana Studies, Vol. VII, p. 178. See also Benson. 20 Sarasvati Bhavana Studies, Vol. VII, p. 178. 21 SB, p. 38. 22 AdS, Nirnayasagar edition, p. 423. 23 I.H.Q., Vol. XIII, 1937, p. 31. 24 I.H.Q., Vol. XIII, 1937, p. 31. 25 I.H.Q., Vol. XIII, 1937, p. 31. 26 See Benson. 27 I.H.Q., Vol. XIII, 1937, p. 31.

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28 Ind. Ant., 1912, p. 9. 29 Introduction to VKL, Sarasvati Bhavan Text, No. 3. Cf. Benson. 30 SB, pp. 117-8. See below. 31 Vedānta darśan: Advaita-vāda, p. 442. 32 See Chap. 5. 33 See Chap. 8. 34 Bānglā Sāhityer itihāsa, Vol. I, by Sukumar Sen, p. 166. 35 See Chap. 8. 36 It may be noted here that Dinesh Ch. Sen mentioned that Jīva Gosvāmī went to Varanasi and became a disciple of Madhusūdana Vācaspati. This Vācaspati title may be a mistake for Sarasvatī as Jīva desired to learn Advaita-Vedānta from his precep- tor. Hence Jīva Gosvāmī may be regarded as a junior contemporary of Madhusūdana. However, this conclusion is based on no real evidence (Brhat Banga, p. 744). 37 Preface to Advaita-siddhi. Ed. By Mm. Yogendranāth Tarka Sāmkhya-Vedānta-Tīrtha, p. 94. 38 Ibid., p. 93. See also the preface to VKL, Sarasvati Bhavana Texts, No. 3. 39 Introduction to SB by P.C. Divanji, Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Vol. LXIV, p. XXI. 40 C.C, Part I, p. 427. 41 This is a mistaken form of Advaita-siddhi. 42 Vedānta-darśaner-itihāsa, Part III, p. 763. 43 AdS, p. 8. Nirnayasagar ed. 44 Ibid., p. 8. 45 VKL, p. 93. 46 AdS, p. 678. Nirnayasagar ed. 47 VKL, p. 93. 48 AdRR, pp. 9, 24, 26, 28, 37 and 44. Nirnayasagar ed. 49 Ibid., p. 44. 50 Gaekwads Oriental Series, Vol. No. LXIV, Part 1. Sans Sec. 51 Ibid., p. 83. Sans Sec. 52 AdRR., p. 46. 53 VKL, p. 87. 54 AdS, p. 490. 55 SSSS, Ch. I, p. 1. Kasi Sans Series, Vol. 18. 56 AdS, p. 8. 57 SSSS, Ch. I, p. 398. 58 AdRR, p. 46. 59 SSSS, Ch. II, p. 144, Ch. III, p. 352, Ch. IV, p. 392. 60 GGD, pp. 282, 1251, etc. 61 SSSS, Ch. I, p. 498, Ch. II, p. 144, Ch. III, p. 352 and Ch. IV, p. 392. 62 AdRR, p. 46. 63 GGD, p. 1251. 64 AdS, p. 8. 65 GGD, p. 118. 66 AdS, p. 750. 67 BhR, p. 52 68 Ibid., p. 48. 69 GGD, p. 1239. Ch. XVIII, 66. 70 BPPS, V, p. 31, Vol. I. Ed. Nityasvarup. 71 The discussion on the Päñcarätra at the end of this work is interesting in that it con- tradicts Saskara's explanation of the Vyūha theory and gives his own. 72 HLV, p. 10. 73 Translation of Siddhānta-bindu, p. 37.

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74 SB. preface, Government Oriental Series, Class A, No. 2, p. 27. 75 MST, p. 20. 76 Ibid., p. 81. 77 MST, p. 76. 78 Translation of SB, p. 46. 79 Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Vol. LXIV, p. XII. 80 IPP, pp. 7-10. 81 Kāvyamālā, Part II, p. 154. 82 Ibid. 83 MST, p. 45. 84 Ibid., p. 72. 85 The polemical style of philosophical works was already fixed by the Logicians (Naiyāyikas). Vyāsatīrtha's predecessor Jayatīrtha followed the style in his Vādāvalī where he refuted Samkara's Advaita-Vedānta. Vādāvalī By Jayatīrtha: a criticism from Dvaita standpoint of the doctrine of theillusoriness of the universe. (mithyātva-khaņdana), Ed. and Tr. P. Nagaraja Rao, M.A. Adyar Library Series No. 40 Adyar 1943. 86 Vyāsatīrtha, Nyāyāmrta, editor's Introduction, passim. Dasgupta, opus citum pp. 118-25; 373-92. 87 AdS, p. 8. 88 Cf. AdS, pp. 577, 583 and 585. 89 Ibid., p. 664. 90 Madhusūdana declared in the fourth verse after the three benedictory verses at the beginning of the Advaita-siddhi that the purpose of his writing this work was 'to refute (the arguments) of the opponents of the theory of non-dualism' (vādivijayāya); See Dasgupta Opus citum pp. 225-7.

2 AVIDYĀ

91 'That from which these beings are born; on which, once born, they live; and into which they pass upon death - seek to perceive that! That is brahman!' (Yato vā imāni bhūtāni jāyante ... ); TaiU, 3.I. 92 The word śruti here specifically refers mainly, to the Upanisadic statements, though occasionally it includes other Vedic statements. 93 For details, vide Ch. 6. 94 AdS, p. 544 (Nirnayasagar edition), anādi bhāvarūpatve sati jñānanivartyattvam). 95 Every knowledge or cognition is a fresh one and must not be known to the knower just before it arises. Otherwise, it cannot be taken as a knowledge. It is just a form of recognition. 96 AdS, p. 544. 97 Madhusūdana discusses this point elaborately in his Advaita-siddhi, while putting forward the topic of cognisability (drśyatva), of all empirical objects as evidence proving their falsity. AdS, pp. 233-94. See next chapter. 98 AdS, (vrttivyāpya) pp. 261-3. 99 For further details, vide Ch. 6. 100 Ibid. 101 According to Puränic legend the son of the Asura Vipracitti cheated Visnu while the latter was distributing the divine amrta to the gods only and not to the Asuras, by sit- ting with the gods. The Sun-god and the Moon-god detected him and informed Visnu who beheaded the Asura. But having consumed amrta he could not be killed but lived on. As the head he is called Rähu and as the body he is called Ketu and are counted amongst the sacred nine planets (graha). The Asura is invisible until Rāhu tries to

149

NOTES

devour the two informers, the Sun and the Moon. When this happens we see their eclipse and the dark body of Rahu covering the luminaries. VisnuP, 1, 90, 80-111. 102 (a) 'Ahamajño māmanyam ca na jānāmi.' (b) 'Tvaduktamartham na jānāmi.' 103 'Etāvantam kālam sukhamahamasvāpsam na kiñcidavedișam.' 104 AdS, p. 548. 105 AdS, p. 548. 106 For detailed treatment on the subject, vide Ch. 3. 107 For details, vide Ch. 5. 108 See Ch. 5, Brahman is the undifferentiated and unlimited consciousness. The three other categories of conscious entities are sāksin, Iśvara (God) and jīva (individual self). While the latter two possess cosmic and individual agency, the first one is there just to ensures that every phenomenon is revealed to the consciousness irrespective of being content of any pragmatic knowledge. 109 According to the Naiyāyikas there are three categories of absence (abhāva) viz. prāgabhāva, dhamśābhāva and sāmānyābhāva. The first means absence of an entity just prior to its coming to existence. The second means absence of an entity when it has been destroyed. The third means total non-existence of an entity. The positive aspect of an object when its absence is stated is known as pratiyogin. 110 AdS, p. 552 111 AdS, p. 553. 112 See Mm. Jogendra Nath Bagchi, Advaitavāde avidyā. Passim. 113 AdS, p. 557. 114 According to Advaita-vedänta, there are six means of valid knowledge the last of which is lack of experience (anupalabdhi) which conveys to a person that there is an absence of an object. See Appaya Dīksita. 115 AdS, p. 557. 116 AdS, pp. 558-9. 117 AdS, p. 557. 118 AdS, p. 558. 119 AdS, p. 558 120 AdS, p. 558. 121 Sureśvara, 1.4.300-01, on BrĀU, 1.4.7. 122 AdS, p. 562. 123 AdS, p. 566. 124 AdS, p. 567. 125 AdS, p. 570. ChU, VIII.3.2. 126 KathaU., I.3.1. 127 'Bhūyaścānte viśva māyā nivrtti.' ŚveU I.10. 128 In addition to the three universally accepted pramāna, (means of achieving a valid knowledge), viz. perception or direct experience, inference and the śruti (verbal authority), Advaita-vedānta accepts three more means of valid knowledge, viz., expe- rience based on analogy, inference from circumstance and non-apprehension. However, the fourth and the last are not relevant in that avidyā/ajñāna is unique and absent only at the moment of the realisation of Brahman. See Dharmarājādhvarīndra, Vedānta-paribhāșā ch. 1. 129 AdS, p. 573. 130 AdS, p. 575. 131 AdS, p. 577. cf. 'āśrayatva-vişayatva-bhāginī nirbibhaga-citireva kevalā'.(The indivisible consciousness alone is both the locus and object of avidyā); Samksepa-śārīraka 1.319. 132 AdS, p. 577. See Ch. 5. 133 AdS, p. 577.

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134 Ibid., p. 578. 135 AdS, p. 585. cf. Kalpataru, pp. 2-3 and pp. 126-7, Brahma-sūtra: Nirnayasagar. 136 AdS, p. 585. 137 AdS, p. 587. 138 In the Advaita-vedanta philosophy following six categories are accepted as having no beginning: jīva, Iśa, pure consciousness, the difference between jīva and Īśa, avidyā and its (false) connection with the consciousness. 139 AdS, p. 586. 140 AdS, p. 587. 141 AdS, pp. 48-51. 142 AdS, p. 94. 143 Ibid., pp. 98-100. 144 BrU. 4.IV.19. 'there is here nothing diverse at all'. 145 AdS, p. 96. 146 AdS, p. 121. 147 Ad.S, p. 123. 148 Ad.S, pp. 123-4. 149 AdS, pp. 139-40. 150 AdS, p. 160. 151 Each experience lasts only for a moment. 152 AdS, p. 162. 153 AdS, pp. 166-8. 154 Ibid., p. 171. 155 AdS, p. 178. 156 Ibid., p. 168. 157 AdS, pp. 182-3. 158 AdS, p. 186. 159 AdS, pp. 115-8. (Sadviviktatvam vā mithyātvam; pramā-jñāna vișayatvam; avā dhitavişayatvam pramātvam). 160 AdS, pp. 239-41. 161 'Undifferentiated cognitive mode', According to the Advaita-vedanta epistemology, verbal exerience produced by meditating on śrutis like tat tvam asi, produce an undifferentiated experience of Brahman. See, Chs 3, 4 and 5. 162 AdS, p. 249 163 AdS, p. 259. Kalpataru is a famous commentary by Amalānanda Sarasvatī on Vācaspati Miśra's commentary, Bhamatī. Bhāmatī is a commentary on Samkara's commentary on the Brahmasūtra. Cf. S.N. Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy, part II (1965), pp. 51-3. 164 AdS, pp. 261-4. 165 AdS, p. 268. 166 AdS, p. 269. 167 AdS, p. 273. 168 AdS, p. 276. 169 AdS, pp. 295-7, 305. 170 AdS, p. 322. 171 The Indian system of making a syllogistic formula for inferential evidence is complex. See S. Kuppuswami Sastri, A Primer of Indian Logic, pp.188-202. 172 AdS, p. 657. 173 AdS, p. 658. 174 This view is known as anyathākhyātivāda, vide Bhāmatī on Adhyāsa section of Samkara's commentary on the first aphorism of the Brahma-sūtra. Also, see S. Kuppuswami Sastri, (3rd edition), 1961, pp. 121-7. 175 AdS, p. 647.

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176 AdS, p. 648. 177 AdS, p. 648. 178 AdS, p. 648 179 AdS, p. 648. 180 AdS, p. 652 181 AdS, p. 653. 182 AdS, p. 653. 183 Whatever may be the mode of revealing agent, mind or avidyā, the revelation is always consciousness reflecting on that mode. This consciousness is called sāksin and this consciousness is in fact totally identified with the individual cogniser. 184 AdS, pp. 653-4. 185 For a thorough discussion of the process of direct perception cf. the Vedānta Paribhāșā Ch I and Bina Gupta's Perceiving in Advaita Vedānt: Epistemological Analysis and Interpretation, pp. 34-91 and pp. 201-50 (Indian edition 1995).

3 KNOWLEDGE AND EPISTEMOLOGY

186 (a) Satyam jñānamanantam Brahma, TaiU, 2.1.1. (b) 'Tameva bhāntamanubhāti sarvam tasya bhāsā sarvamidamvibhāti.' Kau.U, 2.5.15. 187 AdS, p. 577. 188 See Vedānta-paribhāșā, Ch. 1. Cf. Bina Gupta, pp. 225-31. 189 SB, on verse 8 of Samkara's Daśaślokī. (p. 198. SB, Advaita Manjari series). 190 BrÃU, 2, 3, 5. tr. Patrick Olivelle. 191 SB, on Samkara's Daśaślokī, verse 8, See also Brahmānanda's commentary thereon. 192 Cf. GGD, on BhG VI, 2, (p. 492). 193 See notes 53 and 109. 194 SB, (p. 193). 'Smrti samśaya viparyayānām sākși-caitanyāśrayatvaniyamāt.' 195 GGD, (p. 492). 'Pramānaviparyaya vikalpanidrāsmrtayah iti vrttayah pañcavidhaḥ.' 196 SB on the verse 8 of Samkara's Daśaślokī. This means that only the object that has contact with sense organs can be perceived by vrtti. See Bina Gupta, pp. 201-24. 197 Here ahamkāra means merely a part of the mind, explained in the Vedānta paribhāā as garva. 198 SB on Daśaślokī. 199 AdS, p. 577. 200 Ibid., p. 384. 'Prakāśakam tāvat adhisțhānacideva.' cf. 'Him alone, as he shines, do all things reflect; this whole world radiates with his light'; MundakaU II.2.10. 201 AdS, pp. 481 and 483; and Gauda Brahmānnada's commentary thereon. 202 Brahmānanda's commentary on AdS, p. 183. 'sāksī cit prakāśikā.' 203 AdS, p. 478. 204 AdS, p. 483. Brahmānanda's commentary. 205 See Brahmananda's commentary on AdS, p. 479. 206 AdS, p. 479. 207 AdS, p. 479. 208 SB, op.cit. AdS, p. 479. 209 Madhusūdana draws upon the view of Sarvajñātma Muni who holds that both the support and object of ignorance is consciousness alone. Madhusūdana himself cherished the same view. Cf. 'āśrayatva -visayatva-bhāginī nirvibhāga-citireva kevalā", Samkşepa-śārīraka, I, 319. 210 AdS, pp. 486-7.

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NOTES

211 SB, p. 144. 212 Brahmananda's commentary on AdS, p. 487. 213 Ibid., p. 487. 214 Ibid., p. 487. 215 SB, on Daśaślokī and AdS, p. 490. 216 AdS, p. 430.

217 SB, pp. 147-8. NB: The object-consciousness is always sāksī and its revelation, the sāksī-jñāna.

218 SB, pp. 137-8. See also Brahmānanda's commentary thereon. 219 Brahmānand'a commentary on AdS, p. 479. 220 VKL, pp. 77-8. 221 ChāU, 6.16.3; Ibid., 7.26.2; MuņdU, 3.2.6. 222 AdS, p. 875. 223 Aparyāya śabdānām samsargāgocara pramiti-janakatvam akhaņdārthatā/ Samsargāsangī samyagdhihetutā yā girāmiyam/saivākhandārthatā, yadvā tat prātipadikārthatā//, p. 109. Tattvapradīpikā. Nirnayasagar edition. 224 The Sūtra of Pāņini, namely 'prātipadikārtha linga parimāņavacanamātra' states that the stem 'ghata' does not refer to any relationship of the pitcher with any object or suffix. Likewise, the meaning of the word 'Brahman' in 'aham Brahm- asmi' only expresses the meaning to which the stem 'Brahma' refers, namely pure Brahman. 225 AdS, p. 664. 226 AdS, p.673 227 Vide Brahmananda's commentary on AdS p.673. 228 Ibid. 229 AdS, p. 673. 230 Vide Brahmānanda's commentary on AdS, p. 674. 'śaktilaksaņānyatararūpā lakșa- nārūpā vā yā ekā nāmnorvrttiḥ, tajjñānajanya smrtivisayāny-āvișayaka pramā janakatvameva lakșaņam.' 231 TaiU, 2.1.1. 232 Brahmananda's commentary, on AdS, p. 662. 233 Ibid., p. 662. 234 AdS, p. 675. 'Akāryakāraņadravyamātranisthatve sati samānādhikaraņatvāt.' 235 Ibid., p. 689. 236 Ibid., p. 691. 237 'Tātparyāvişayānvayānubhavakatvamev ākāmksā vācyā.' AdS, p. 689. 238 'Āsattirapi avyavadhānena śābdabodhānukūlapadārthopasthiti mātram.' AdS, p. 689. 239 AdS, p. 691. 240 See below. Cf., Bina Gupta, pp. 66-72 and 167-200. 241 Vide, Brahmānanda's commentary on AdS, p. 296. 242 AdS, pp. 771-2. 243 Ibid., p. 772. 244 Ibid., p. 774. 245 Ibid., p. 773. 246 Ibid., p. 770. 247 Cf. Kuppuswami Sastri op. Cit. 248 AdS, p. 774. 249 AdRR, p. 34. 250 AdRR, p. 35. 251 Ibid., p. 33. 252 Ibid. 253 Ibid.

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4 BRAHMAN

255 Vide Vyāsarāja, Nyāyāmrtam, ch 2. It should be remembered that for the Vaișnavas Brahman and Visnu/Nārāyana are the same divinity. 256 Advitīyaparamānanda bodharūpam ca Brahmeti siddham, SB, on Daśaślokī 4. p. 155. 257 AdS, p. 739. 258 Sve, 6.XI. '(Brahman is) omniscient consciousness - unique and unqualified.' 259 BrÃU, I.4.7. 'One should meditate upon the self alone.' 260 For example, 'sāksī cetā kevalonirguiaśca.' 261 ChaU, 8.1.5. 'That is the self free from evils .... the self whose desires and intentions become real that's what you should try to discover, that's what you should seek to perceive.' Ollivelle. 262 One hears about his highest and truly diverse power, which is part of his very nature and is working of his knowledge and strength'.(Parāsya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate svābhāviki jñānabalakriyā ca). ŠveU, 6.VIII. 263 'Tat tvam asi', ChaU. 6, VIII.7. 264 'Neha nānāsti kiñcana', Br. 4, IV.19. 'There is no plurality in this world.' 265 Taittirīya, 2.VII.1 and Mundaka, 3.X.1. 266 BrĀU, 4.IV.19. 267 'Ityayamtadbrahmātmikā? saccidānandākhya ityupāsītavya'. RāmottaratāpanīoU, Anandasram series No. 29, p. 532. 268 Bhāmatī, on BrS, 1.1.20. 269 Kalpataru on BrS, 1.I. 20.

nirviśeşam param Brahma sākșātkartumanīśvarāḥ/ ye mandāste 'nukampyante saviśesa nirūpaņaih// vaśīkrte manasyeyam saguņa Brahmasīlanāt/ tadevāvirbhavet sākșāt apetopādhi kalpanam'// 270 ChaU, 6.2.1. 271 TaiU, 2.7.1. 272 AdS, p. 720. Madhusūdana holds that the śrutis depicting unqualified Brahman are especially privileged to serve a distinct purpose, that is, the attainment of salvation, the highest goal of human life. They are therefore to be regarded as authoritative. On the other hand, śrutis, describing qualified Brahman do not serve such a purpose. Hence they should be regarded as auxiliary to the former type of śrutis. 273 ChaU, 3.XIX.1. 274 MundakaU, 2.II.11. 275 ChaU, 6.VIII.7. 276 BrAU, 1.IV.10. 277 AdS, p. 726. 278 ChaU., 3.XIV.1. 279 ŚveU, 6.11. 280 MundakaU, 1.1.9, 281 AdS, p. 721. The śrutis describing unqualified Brahman are called nirguna śruti. Those describing qualified Brahman are saguna śrutis. 282 'ātmetyeva upāsīta', BrU, 1.IV.7, 283 See above. 284 AdS, p. 731. 285 Ibid., p. 738.

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NOTES

286 'Aditya varņam tamasah parastāť', ŚveU, I.3. VIII. Also cf. the Purușa sūkta., RV, X. 90. 287 'ya eşo'ntarāditye hiraņmayah puruso drśyate.' ChāU, I.6.6. 288 See Ch. 5. 289 'Vivartādhisțhānatayopādānatvasambhavāť, AdS, p. 757. See also, 'Ekasya eva avidyopahitatvenopādānatvasyāvidyāpariņāmechākrtādyāśrayatvena nimittasyāpi sambhavāt.' AdS, p. 759. 290 'Ātmani kāryajanihetutvasyaiva upādāna laksaņatvāť', AdS, p. 757. 291 MuU, 1.1.9. 292 'Kāryānukulajñānavattvam', Laghucandrika on AdS, p. 759. 293 MuU, 1.1.9. 294 SB, p. 44. 'Māyayā ca sarvajñatvādiviśistam jagadupādānam nimittam ca.' 295 Bhāmatī on Šamkara bhāsya in BrS, 1.1.1. 296 'Sākşī cetā kevalo nirgunaśca,' ŠveU, 6. XI. 'Anando Brahmeti vyājānāt.' TaiU, 3.VI. 297 'Arthaprakāśatva.' AdS, p. 750. 298 Laghucandrikā and AdS, p. 750 299 See the chapter on knowledge and epistemology. 300 'Nirupādhikesțatva rūpatvāt.' AdS, p. 751. ' ... because Brahman is unconditionally desired.' 301 Langhucandrikā on AdS, p. 751. 302 (a) Satyam-jñānam-anantam Brahma, TaiU, 2.I.1. (b) 'Ānanda Brahmeti vyājānāt.' TaiU, 3, VI. (c) 'Vijñānam-ānandam Brahma.' BrĀU., 3.IX.28.9. 303 AdS, p. 751. 304 AdS, p. 752. 305 It is remarkable how Madhusūdana explains bliss in clear terms of bhakti. He even uses the term prema to explain the Advaita idea of liberation and bliss. 306 BrÃU, 4.III.23. 307 AdS, p. 752. 308 AdS, p. 752. 309 AdS, p. 768. 310 AdS, p. 769. 311 'undifferentiated and integral mode of mind.' Ibid., p. 288. 312 According to the followers of Madhva, there are five kinds of real differences (bheda): that is, those between jīva and jada, (matter); jīva and jīva; jada and jada; jīva and Isa (God) and jada and Isa. In their view, Brahman is identical with Iśa, since they do not believe in the existence of attributeless, unlimited, absolute Brahman. 313 BhG, 4.5. 314 MuU, 3.I.1. 315 As quoted in Samkara Bhāsya on the Brahma Sūtra, 2.3.41. 316 SveU, 4.V. 'One of the unborns joyfully lies with her (i.e. continually remains involved with prakrti ) while another (unborn) having enjoyed her (prakrti) abandons her.' When one person entangled himself with the material world, prakrti, remains involved, another (enlightened ) person having had his involvement with the world of enjoyment renounces all. 317 MundakaU, 3.I.1. 318 Ibid., 3.1.3. 319 For example, 'the other, not eating, looks on'. (tayoranyah anaśnanabhicakāśīti') or 'The other who is the Lord.' (Anyamīsam). Ibid. 3.I.1 and 3.1.2. 320 The real purport of a scriptural discussion is decided by following clues. (1) introduction, (2) conclusion, (3) drift of the argumentation, (4) repetition of one theme, (5) the novelty of the subject and finally (6) the fruitfulness of the subject. 321 AdS, p. 810.

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322 AdS, p. 511. 323 AdS, p. 118. 324 AdS, p. 522 325 BrS. Samkarabhāşya, p. 620. Nirnaya sagar edition. 326 KathaU, 5.X.III. 327 ŚveU, 4.V. 328 AdS, p. 822. As, for example, the śrutis, such as 'tat tvam asi', 'aham Brahmāsmi', etc. 329 The śrutis are divided by the Mīmāmsakas into two groups (1) vidhi and (2) arthavāda. Vidhi means Vedic injunction or prohibition. The Vedic texts that neither lay an injunc- tion nor, a prohibition are known as 'arthavāda vākyas'. According to the Mīmāmsā Sūtra - for example, 'āmnāyasya kriyārthatvāt', Su, 1.2.1 - only those śrutis that direct activity are valid, and those which do not are not valid by themselves. They further state that the Vedic statements of approval or disapproval (arthavāda vākyas) are valid insofar as they co-operate with the idea of corresponding Vedic injunction or prohibi- tion, by presenting either praise or abuse of the theme of the injunction or prohibition. 330 ChaU, 6.VIII.7. 331 BrÃU, 1.IV.10. 332 SB, on the verse 1 of Samkara's Daśaślokī, (p. 11. Advaita Manjari series.) 333 Ibid., p. 9. 334 SB, pp. 9-10. 335 Ibid., p. 9. 336 Samkşepa Sārīraka Sāra Samgraha, 1.290, p. 218. 337 'In spring a Brahmin should (ritually) stoke the fire; at night he should stoke the gārhapatya fire and at daytime the āhavanīya fire.' 338 Tai, 3.I.1. 339 MuU, 1.1.3. 340 TaiU, 2.1. 341 BrAU, 4.III.18. 342 Ibid., 4.III.7. 343 Ibid., 3.IV.2. 344 SB. On verse 1 of Samkara's Daśaślokī; ( p. 14. Advaita Manjari series). 345 Samkşepa Šārīraka 1.2.58-61 and Sāra-samgraha thereon. 346 SB. p. 35. 347 AdS, p. 832. 348 AdS, p. 832 349 See Chapter 00, for further discussion on the subject. 350 Vide Nyāyāmrta. 2.17. 351 'Two birds ... ' (Dvā suparņā); and ' ... attains the highest identity' (paramamsāmyam upaiti), MuU, 3.I.1 and 3. 352 For example, ' ... the other of the two, not eating ... ' (tayoranyah anaśnan ... ), ' .... he other who is the Lord' (anyamīśam ... ) ibid., 3.I.1 and 2. 353 MuU, I.I.3. 354 MuU, 1.1.4. 355 Ibid., 1.1.6. 356 AdS, p. 827. 357 MuU, 2.1.10. 358 MuU, 3.2.8-9. 359 Ibid., 3.1.3. 360 It has been accepted that the true meaning of a scripture is known by six characteristics of its discussion:

What it proposes to discuss at the beginning and how cogently the discussion 1 ends. 2 Whether the same topic has been repeated within the text.

156

NOTES

3 Whether the subject matter is new. 4 Whether the resulting knowledge makes all other things of the world clearly understood. 5 When the scripture praises the theme, and 6 When the topic is discussed with proper argumentation. Bhāratī Tīrtha, Vai-yasika-nyāyamālā, 1.1.4. 361 AdS, p. 823. 362 AdS, p. 830. 'Although in order to grasp their semantic meaning these two, (difference and non-different) are interdependent, (the latter) being self-evident does not depend on any other (evidence to prove its validity) - 'Saktigrahādau tayorupajīvyatve'pi svaprameye anupajīvyatvāt.' 363 ChaU. 3.XII.6. 364 BhG. 15.7. 365 AdS, p. 845. 366 Ibid., p. 846. See also BS, 2.III.43. 'Individual is a part (of the Lord) because many (śruti) show that fact'; this quotation is the first part of the sutra. The second part refutes this opposing opinion by saying: 'there are other śruti conforming identity'. See commentaries of Samkara and Vācaspati Miśra on this aphorism. 367 AdS, p. 846. 368 The explanation is based on the theory of reflection (pratibimbavada) offered by Prakāśatman and other followers of Samkara. The theory states that pure conscious- ness, being reflected on the internal organ, becomes the jīva and as this internal organ differs in different bodies, jīva is considered to be many (one in each body). 369 AdS, p. 848. 370 Ibid., p. 848. 371 Ibid., p. 850. 372 GGD, pp, 910-14. 373 AdRR, p. I. NB: At the time of Sri Harsa, philosophical thought was greatly influenced by the Naiyayikas on the one hand, and by the dualistic Vaisnavas on the other. At that time, all philosophers preferred the highly technical and subtle method of argumentation of the Naiyāyikas. Therefore, Srī Harsa and his followers adopted the same polemical style for the exposition of their Advaita doctrine. 374 AdRR, p. 8. 375 Ibid., p. 9. 376 See Ch. 3. 377 BrĀU. 4.4.19, 378 AdRR, p. 5; cf. Samkşepa śārīraka, 3. 25. 379 This conclusion shows that Madhusūdana rejects the view of Citsukha that the nega- tion of the universe is a fifth category. Madhusūdana draws upon the Mīmāmsaka view that the negation of an object in its substratum is identical with the substratum, to prove that the universe is identical with Brahman. See also AdS. p. 467. 380 This shows that the Advaita-vedānta school is not a nihilistic school (śūnyavādin). 381 AdS. p. 657.

5 THE SENTIENT WORLD: ĪŚVARA, JĪVA AND SĀKȘĪ

382 SB, on Daśaślokī 8. 383 Ibid. 384 Ibid. 385 Ibid. 386 Ibid.

157

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387 SB, on Daśaślokī 8, see also, Brahmānanda's commentary. 388 Ibid. 389 Ibid. 390 Ibid. 391 Ibid. 392 Vedānta paribhāsā, pp. 26-7: upādhistu kāryānanvaya vyavartaka vartamānaśca. 393 SB, on Daśaślokī 8. 394 VSM, Ed. Late Col. Arthur Venis, M.A., p. 16. 395 SLS, pp. 105-7, Advaita Manjari series. 396 AdS, pp. 533-42. 397 Ibid. 398 SB, The non-dualist school of Vedānta accepts six beginningless phenomena, of which five are not endless. They are, therefore, not the transcendental Reality, that is, the pure consciousness. This six are: Pure consciousness; the primordial avidyā; Iśvara; jīva; the difference between Iśvara and jīva; and the relationship of avidyā with the individual self. 399 AdS, p. 539. 400 Ibid., p. 539. 401 Ibid., pp. 539-40. 402 Ibid., p. 541: 'Because one accepts that the collective person is Omniscient, and Omnipotent', (samastyabhimānino jīvasya sarvajñatva-sarvakartrtva-svīkārāt). 403 ChāU, 6. II.3. 'Tadaikşata vahusyām.' '(It thought to itself: "Let me become many")'. 404 AdS, p. 534. 405 AdS, p. 534. 406 Ibid., p. 535. 407 See note 394. 408 SB on Samkara's Daśaślokī 8. 409 AdS, p. 534. Brahmānandī. 410 AdS, p. 541. 411 AdS, p. 541. 412 AdS, p. 541 413 AdS, 541. (a) 'prati śarīramahamahamikayā'; (b) 'vaddho'ham'; iti niścayasya svānubhavasāksikatvena pravṛtti sambhavāt.' 414 AdS, pp. 541-2. 'Suddhacitah ekatvena vastuto 'samsāritve'pi āvaraņa-vikșepaśaktid- vayasatis-v-āśritāvidyā-vatsamsāritva-kalpakatva-mokșārtha-yatamānatvā- dyupapatti.' 415 Śve.U, 6.II. 416 Pañcadaśī, p. 393. 417 Citsukhi, p. 382. 418 Citsukhi, p. 376. 419 SB on Daśaślokī 8. 'Bimba-pratibimbamukhānugatamukhasvarūpavat jīveśvarānugatam sarvānusandhātr caitanyam sāksītyucyate' 420 AdS, p. 754. 421 'Caitanye anāvrta-visayasambandho'vidyāvrtttidaśāyāmeva', Gauda Brahmānanda on AdS, p. 755. 422 SB on Daśaslokī 8. 423 Bramānanda on AdS, p. 755. 'Avidyāvrttyabhāvakāle sāksyabhāvāt.' 424 Ibid., pp. 754-5. NB: The knowledge of Sāksī is indifferent to either valid knowledge or illusion. Among the objects of exclusively sāksī-knowledge, the pleasure, conditional ajñāna and Sākșī in the state of deep sleep, and the pleasure, pain, avidyā, illusory objects and even empirical cognitions in the waking state, are included. It is interesting to

158

NOTES

note that the anuvyavasāya, (after-cognition, in which the subject also is presented), of the Naiyāyikas are regarded by the Advaitins as a sāksī-knowledge when they include empirical cognitions in the list of the objects of sāksī-knowledge. 425 SB on Daśaślokī 8. 426 Ibid. 427 Ibid. 428 Ibid., Cf. KathaU, 2.2. 429 ŚveU, 6.XIV; BrAU, 3.IV.2 and 3.VII.23. 430 Avidyā as the un-manifest material source of the creation is called avyakta prakrti. Following the Sāmkhya cosmology, Advaita-vedānta too, names it to be the primor- dial evolving source of the created world. Avyakta prakrti has three constituents called, guna. These are sattva, which is pure, bright and transparent; rajas, which is energetic, intrepid and dynamic; and, tamas, dark, gross and inactive. 431 SB on Daśaślokī 1. 432 SB on Daśaślokī 8. 433 BrÃU, 2.V.19 and Bra.bindu U, 12. 434 BrÃU, 1.IV.7 and TaiU, 2.VI.1. It is interesting to note that this type of evidence is known as 'śrutārthāpatti'. 435 SB on Daśaśloki 8. 436 BrÃU, 4.III.7, 2.V.19 and 3.V.1. 437 SB on Daśaślokī, 1. 'paramapremāspadatvena ca tasyānandarūpatvāt'. 438 Ibid. 439 Cf. 'satyānrte mithunīkrtya ahamidam mamedamiti naisargiko'yam lokavyavahāraḥ', Brahma-sūtra, adhyāsa-bhāsya, by Samkarācārya. 440 SB on Daśaślokī 8. 441 Ibid. 442 Following Yogic ideas, Madhusūdana adopts this view, which also Vivarana follows. AdS, pp. 558-9 443 AdS, p. 558. The author of the Vivarana, follows the Yoga-sūtra (I. 10), 'sleep is the supporting mode of absence', [and thus] accepts the condition of deep sleep to be a form of the [avidyā-] mode which is characterised by tamas guna and the quality of covering [everything]. ('Vivaranakāraistu, "abhāva-pratyayālambanavṛttirnidrā" itiyogasūtrāņusāreņatamogunātmakāvaraņamātrālambanakācidvrtti sușuptirityab- hipretya', etc. 444 Brahmānanda's commentary on SB, on Daśaślokī 8. 'avasthājñānākāram samskārat- āpannajā-gratsvapnavisayakam anādi jīveśabhedādivișayakam ca yadavasthārūć pam-ajñānam tadviayakam'). 445 Ibid. 446 Ibid., 'samūhālambanaikavrttyā nirvāhe vrtti-trayakalpane gauravāt.' 447 AdS, p. 558. 448 SB on Daśaślokī 8. 449 'When the tip of the hair is split into a hundred parts, and one of those parts further into a hundred parts - the individual soul (jīva), on the one hand, is the size of one such part, and, on the other, it partakes of infinity.' SveU, 5.9. 450 'Crossing across this [gross] body, he goes to that region' (so'smāccharīrādutkramya amūmlokamadhigacchati), etc. AdS, p. 851. 451 ' ... he leads them to Brahman.' (sa etān Brahma gamayati). ChāU, 4.15.5. 452 'And this is the immense and unborn self' (sa vā eșa mahānaja ātmā) etc. BrĀU, 4.4.25. 453 'He is this eternal, who pervades all, is static and devoid of movement . He is always

454 AdS, p. 853. existent' (nityaş sarvagatah sthānuracalo 'yam sanātana.) BhG, 2.24.

159

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6 MATERIAL WORLD AND COSMOGONY

455 SB on Daśaślokī 4, 9 and 10. 456 AdS, p. 503. For understanding Madhusūdana's argumentations establishing the falsity of the created world three concepts of the causal relationship between the material cause and the resultant object is necessary. The Naiyākas believe that an object does not exist prior to its creation from its material cause. This is known as ārambha-vāda. The Sāmkhya philosophers believe that an object remains dormant in its material cause, which evolves into the resultant object. This theory is known as pariņāma-vāda. Advaita-vedānta holds that an object is a distorted projection of its cause, mistakenly considered to be a created object. This view is known as vivarta-vāda. See Ninian Smart, Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy, pp. 189-94 and 235-40. 457 AdRR, p. 2. 458 Ibid. 459 Ibid. (Eka sāmagri ekameva kāryam janayalīti svabhāvasya kalpanāt). 460 Adrsta is the karmic predestination that always regulates every worldly event. 461 AdRR, p. 2. 462 Ibid., p. 3. 463 AdS, p. 757. Also cf. Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvali, p. 117. 464 TaiU, 3.I. 1. 'That from which these beings are born; on which, once born, they live; and into which they pass upon death - seek to perceive that. That is Brahman.' cf, Tai, 2.7.1. 'In the beginning this world was the non-existent, and from it arose the existent. By itself it made a body (atman)' (asat vā idamagra āsit, tato vai sadajāyata tadātmānam svayam akuruta.) 465 Vide. Siddhānta leśa-samgraha, p. 61. 'possessing within oneself the cause that produces an effect' (svātmani kāryajani hetutvam). 466 AdS, p. 757. 467 Ibid. 468 AdS, p. 757. Also the commentary Laghucandrikā thereon. 469 AdS, p. 758. 470 Ibid. 471 Ibid. 472 Lagucandrikā on AdS, p. 758. 473 AdS, p. 759. 474 Ibid. 475 'Iestablish the distinctions of name and appearance.' (Nāmarūpa vyākaravāni), ChāU, 6.III.2. 476 AdS, p. 759. 477 Ibid. 478 AdS, p. 759, 'Possessing the knowledge that is conducive to create objects.' (Kāryānukula jñānavattva). 479 AdS, p. 79. This is, in fact, Sksī, the revealer of the physical objects. 480 TaiU, 3.I.1, 'That from which these beings are born; on which, once born, they live; and into which they pass upon death ... 481 ChaU, 6.III.2. 482 TaiU, 2.VI.1. 483 Ibid., 2.VI.1. 484 Ibid., 2.VII.1. 485 AdS, p. 762 486 ChaU, 6.II.3; Ibid. 6.II.3. 487 TaiU, 2.VII.1. 488 Ibid., 2.VII.1.

160

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489 AdS, p. 763. 490 'The cosmic elements are emitted from an existent entity'. [The reason for this conclusion is that:] 'These are characterised by [both] having identity with the Real [i.e., existent] and having various changes.' (Mahabhūtāni sadvastuprakrtikāni, satsvabhāvānuraktatve sati vividhavikāratvāt). 'Just like an earthen ware, which always retains its nature of earthen-ness even when it may take a variety of shapes', (mrdanusyūtaghațādivat), AdS, p. 764. 491 'Brahman is said to be the (material) cause (of all) because It always abides in igno- rance, which is the material cause of the illusion of duality' (asya dvaitendrajālasya yadupādāna-kāraņam / ajñānam, tadu-pasritya Brahma kāraņamucyate). Quoted in AdS, p. 757. 492 Samkşepaśārīraka, 1.319. 493 VSM, p. 117. 494 Purusottama's commentary on SB, 54, (GOS). Cf. BhāP, 3.26.16-18 ('antahpu- ruşarūpena kālarūpena yo vahiḥ); and BhG, 10.33 ('ahamevāksayah kālo'). 495 S. Gupta, Lakşmī Tantra, p. XXIII. 496 SB on Daśaśloki 8. 497 Ibid. 498 'One hears about his highest and truly diverse power - his natural knowledge, strength and actions' (Parāsya śaktir vividhaiva śrūyate svābhāvikī jñānabalakriyā ca), ŚveU, 6.VIII. 499 Vedānta-paribhāsā, ch. 1, p. 23. Anantasaranasanskrtagranthāvali, Vol. 5. 500 Ibid. 501 Vivarana-prameya-samgraha. Vizianagram Sans series, Vol.V, p. 62. 502 Ibid., p. 63. 503 Vedānta-paribhāsā, p. 23. 504 Vivarana-prameya-samgrapha, pp. 62-3. 505 Cf. 'the knot of heart is unravelled' (Bhidyate hrdaya granthi), MuU, 2/8. 506 AdS, p. 603. 507 AdS, pp. 597-603. (Ahamkāro hi anubhavāmītyātmānubandhyanubhavasyāham kartetyacidanubandhikartrtvādeścāśrayah cidacitsamvalanātmakatvādadhyastaḥ). 508 SB, pp.179-80. 509 SB, p. 180. 510 The phenomenon darkness is important in the Advaita-vedanta's argumentation for recognising avidyā as a positive phenomenon and not just the negation of knowledge. At the introductory sentence of his commentary on the BrS. Samkara makes an analogy between avidyā and darkness. 511 SB, 9, p. 181. According to some philosophers the sense of speech is a product of light because there is a statement in the Upanisad confirming that view ('tejomayī vāk' ChU VI.5.4). However, Madhusūdana states that as it manifests the sense of sound, which is the essence of space, this organ should be a product of space. 512 Ibid., p.183. The seventeen organs in combination are known as the linga, because by this combination the existence of self in indicated. This self remains ignorant and undergoes the cycle of birth and death. 513 Vide, GD, on BhG VII. 7. 514 ChāU, 6.III.3. Trivrtam trivrtam ekaikam karavāni. 515 SB on Daśaślokī 8. 516 Ibid. 517 SB on Daśaślokī 8. 518 Ibid. 519 Ibid. 520 See discussion on the person (jīva) and on knowledge above.

161

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7 ADVAITA-VEDĀNTA SALVATION

521 AdS, pp. 302-3; 'At that time [i.e. the time of self realisation], the revelation is itself bliss; it is not the revelation ofbliss.' (tadā hi ānandam eva prakāśo' na tu ānandasya prakāśatvam). 522 AdRR, p. 23. 523 VKL, p. 28. 'Therefore it is said that, having realised that self is un-differentiated Bliss, the one and only existent reality, [one gets one's] ignorance removed.' (tasmād akhandānandādvitīya caitanyasanmātra ātmā jñātah san avidyānivrttirityucyate. atraiva sarvapumārtha viśrānti). 524 As mentioned before, this shows that Madhusūdana himself does not believe in the theory of a fifth kind of reality belonging to the cessation of avidyā. AdS, p. 467. 525 BrAU, VI.5.6. 'It is one's self which one should see and hear, and on which one should reflect and concentrate. For by seeing and hearing one's self, and by reflecting and concentrating on one's self, one gains the knowledge of this whole world'. 526 VKL, p. 64. 527 MuU, III.2.9. 'He who comes to know that highest Brahman, he himself becomes that very Brahman.' 528 ChaU, 8.3.2. 529 ChāU, 6.8.7. 530 BrĀU, 1.4.10. 531 VKL, p. 91. 532 VKL, p. 91. 533 VKL, pp. 91-2. 534 GGD, on BhG. III. 18. 535 Ibid. See also Patañjali's Yogasūtra, books 2 and 3. 536 Ibid. 537 Ibid. 538 This gradual development of the degree of intensity of meditative trance (samādhi) is described in the Yoga-sūtra of Patañjali book 2 and 3. 539 BhāP, 3.29.37-8. 540 GGD, on BhG. III. 18. 541 AdS, pp. 891-2. 542 AdS, pp. 890-2. 543 GGD on BhG. III. 18. 544 Ibid. 545 AdS, pp. 893-4. 546 TaiU, 2.I. 547 AdS, p. 895. 'Brahmvidāpnotiparam'ityādau avāpter Brhma-rūpatvāt sāyujyasyāpi tadrūpatayāngīkaraņīyatvāt.' 548 The Bhāgavata holds that there are five kinds of mukti, namely sālokya, sārsti, sāmīpya, sārūpya and sāyujya or ekatva. Sālokya means sharing the same living place with God; sārsti means possessing powers similar to God; sāmīpya is living near to God as His companion; sārūpya is attaining God's form marked by conch, disk, mace and lotus; ekatva or sāyujya means being identical with God. Two verses from the BhaP may be quoted in this connection:

(a) 'Sālokyasārstisāmīpyasārūpyaikatvam apyuta Dīyamānam nagnhante matsevanam janah.' 3.29.13. (b) 'Naikātmatām me sprhayanti kecit Matpadasevābhirata madīyaḥ

162

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ye'nyo'nyato bhāgavatāh prasajya sabhājayante mama paurușāni.' 3.25.34.

8 BHAKTI

549 SB on Daśaślokī 9. 550 See chapters five and six. 551 For the historical background see Hardy, pp. 560-2. 552 See Hardy, p. 561. 553 In Varanasi where he spent most of his life, there still exists a temple of Gopāla where tradition alleges, Madhusūdana did his daily worship. 554 S. Gupta, 1991; See the GGD on BhG XII. 3-4; also cf. 'O slayer of Madhu! Tasting the mead oozing from your lotus feet my mind remains intoxicated.' GGD on the BhG, X.42. 555 BhP, III. 29.11-12.

madguņa śrutimātreņa mayi sarva-guņāsaye manogatiravicchinnā yathā gangāmbghaso 'mbudhau. 556 BhR, I. 3. and annotations thereon. Cf. BhP, I. 7. 10. 557 BhP, III. 2. 8-10. 558 BhP, XI. 3. 31.

Smarantah smārayantaśca mitho' ghaughaharam Harim Bhaktyā sañjātayā bhaktyā bibhratyutpulakām tanum. See Srīdhara's commentary on this statement. 559 ŚBhS, 1.1.2. 560 Commentary on SBhS, 1.1.2. 561 NBhS, 276. 562 BhP, VII. 5. 23-24. These are śravana, kīrtana, smarana (incessantly remembering Vișnu), pādasevana ( serving His feet), arcana (worshipping Him with offerings), vandana (singing His laudation), dāsya (becoming His bond slave), sakhya (cultivat- ing his loving friendship) and finally atmanivedana (totally dedicating one's own self to the Lord). 563 See P.C.De, Bengal Vaishnavism, passim. 564 BhRS, I.1.11. 565 Ibid. 566 Jīva Gosvamī's commentary on BhRS, I.1.11. 567 BhRS, I. 2. 1; see also Jīva Gosvāmī's commentary thereon. 568 BhP. III. 25. 25.

satām prasamgāt mama vīrya-samvido bhavanti hrtkarņa-rasāyanaḥ kathāḥ tajjosanād-āśvapavarga vartmani sáraddhā-rati-r-bhakti-r-anukramișyati. 569 Commentary on BhRS, I. 2. 2 .; and Satsandarbha, p. 450 570 BhRS, I. 2. 4-5; I. 2. 69-71. 571 Satsandharbha 451. 572 BhRS, I. 4. 1ff. 573 Ibid., I.4.1. The prema-bhakti is defined by Rūpa as: samyammasrņitā-svānto mamatvātiśayāmkitaḥ bhāvaḥ sa eva sāndrātmā budhaih premā nigadyate.

163

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When one's mental disposition is saturated (by love) and developed a great sense of the object of love being one's very own, it is called bhāva, (meaning a permancent disposition of mind). When this mental disposition becomes dense and saturates the whole personality of the devotee, the learned calls it prema. 574 Ibid., I. 4. 2. 575 Satsandarbha, p. 718. 576 Ibid., p. 450. See Jīva's commentary on BhRS I. 4. 2-5. 577 Satsandarbha, p. 718. See also BhRS, I. 4. 9-12, and Jīva's commentary thereon. 578 See Gerow Paul, David Haberman and Gerald Carney passim. 579 BhR, I. 3. drūtasya bhagavaddharmād-dhārāvāhikatām gatā/ Sarveśe manaso vrtti-r-bhakti-r-ityabhidhīyate//. 'Bhakti is that mode of mind which due to the practice of bhagavaddharmas has melted, and which is constantly flowing towards the Lord of all.' Cf. the Brahma- vaivarta Purāna, Srīkrsnajanmakhanda, part 2, Anandashrama Sanskrit series nr. 102, ch. 34, 7-16, p. 608, which gives a graphic description of how perfect aesthetic enjoyment melted not only the minds of the celestials at Vaikuntha, who had been listening to Siva's song and music, but their entire personalities became fluid. Lord Nārāyana collected the liquid inside his heaven and then restored the celestials back to their normal selves. The accumulated liquid became the river Gangā. 580 Rāmānuja's commentary on Brahma-sūtra 1.1.1 and IV. 1.1. 581 See previous chapter. 582 BhP, X, (first half). 29. 14-15. 583 BhR, I. 7. 584 BhR, I. 8. 585 See Nātyaśāstra ch. VI. 586 BhR, I. 9-10. 587 Vibhāvānubhāva vyabhicārisamyogād rasanispattiḥ. NŚ, VI. 32. 588 See Chapter 5. 589 BhR, I. 10. 590 It may be noted that Madhusūdana is here exploiting the epistemological concept of vrtti-jñana to explain the experience of bhakti. Cf. Chapter 3. 591 BhR, I. 3. 592 See Chapters 3, 4 and 7. 593 Although Thomas A. Forsthoefel does not mention Madhusūdana and his exposition on the experience of bhakti, his work on the epistemology of religious experience in the non-dualist context is very interesting. 594 See Chapters 2, 3 and 4 for explanation of the experience in deep sleep. 595 Auto-commentary on BhR I.13. 596 BhR, I. 13 and the autor's self-commentary. 597 VKL, p. 65. 598 GGD, on BhG XVIII. 66. 599 AdS, p. 893. 600 AdS, pp. 894-5. 'The word sayujya, however, indicates the state of difference.' (Sāyujya śabdastāvat vibhaktatvabhāvābhiprāyaka). 601 BhR, I. 1. Self- annotation on it 602 These are knowledge to distinguish between real and false experiences; total disinclination to any form of enjoyment; acquiring the mental stability and peace to follow the way of a righteous, and finally deep craving for salvation. See, Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy Vol. I. C.U.P. Reprint 1969. pp. 489-90.

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NOTES

603 BhR, p. 4. 604 GGD on BhG IV. 10. 605 BhP, 1.7.10. 606 It may be noted that in his exposition of the stages, he corroborates everywhere his own viewpoint by apt quotations from the Bhāgavata Purana. 607 BhR, p. 79. 608 BhR, p. 63. 609 BhR, p. 116. 610 BhR, pp. 83-90. 611 BhR, p. 4. See GGD, Introductory verses 3-10, and S.K. Gupta (tr.), p. XIV. 612 BhP, 7.5.23-4. 613 BhR, p. 156. 'Virahāsahisnutātmā prītiviśeșah-ratirnāma.' 614 BhR, p. 116. 615 Satsandarbha (prītisandarbha), pp. 738 and 741. 616 Dhanyāloka, (kasi samskrit series), p. 38. 617 BhP, 3.25.25.

'satām prasangān-mama vīryasamvido bhavanti hrtkarnarasāyanah kathāḥ tajjoanādāśvapavargavartmani śraddhā-ratir-bhaktiraņukramisyati'

618 BhP, 3.9.38. 619 BhP, 1.2.39. 620 BhP, 11.3.32-3. 621 BhP, 11.11.29-31. 622 BhP, 7.4.36-7. 623 BhP, 1.2.7. 'Vāsudeve Bhagavati bhaktiyogaprayojitah janayatyāśu vairagyam jñānañca yat ahaitukam.' 624 BhP, 10.31.4, 10.31.15, 10.32.2.

(a) 'na khalu gopikānandano bhavān akhiladehinām-antarātmadrk', etc. (b) 'ațati yadbhavān anhi kānanam truțiryugāyate tvāmapaśyatām', etc. (c) 'Tāsāmāvirabhūcchaurih', etc. 625 BhP, 10.31.15 and BhR, p. 116. 626 BhP, 9.4.18-21. 627 BhP, 3.25.37; 11.9.21-3. 628 BhP, 10.19.16; 10.31.15; 10.29.9-11. 629 BhR, pp. 105 and 119. 630 BhR, p. 26. 631 See Yoga-sūtra, I.15. 632 BhP, 10.29.15 and 7.1.29. 633 BhR, p. 121. 634 BhR, p. 137. 635 BhR, p. 121. 636 BhR, pp. 124-5. This means the sentiment of love (śrngāra) in separation (vipralambha) due to peeve (māna). 637 BhR, p. 127. 638 BhR, pp. 127-8. 639 BhR, p. 129. 640 BhR, p. 130.

165

NOTES

641 See Ch. 6. 642 BhR, II. 29-30. 643 BhR, II. 59 644 BhR, II. 59-60. 645 BhR, II. 34. 646 BhR, II. 68-69. 647 BhR, II. 72. 648 BhRS, 1.2.131-52. 649 Kāvya Prakasa, Poona, Bhandarka edition, pp. 474-5 and Dhanyaloka, Benaras edition, pp. 207-8. 650 Kavyaprakāśa, p. 474. 651 Dhanyāloka, op.cit. 652 BhR, pp. 129, 130 and 134. 653 TaiU, 2.6. and 2.9. 654 BhR, pp. 35-7. 655 BhR, p. 168. 656 BhR, III. 4-5.

'kāvyārthanişthā ratyādyah sthāyinah santi laukikāḥ tatbodhrnisthastvapare tatsamā' pyalaukikāḥ bodhya-nisthā yathāsvam te sukhaduhkhādi hetavah bodhrnisthāstu sarve' pi sukhamātraika hetavaḥ.' 657 BhR, III.9-10. 658 BhR, III. 7-9. 659 BhR, III.11. 660 BhR, III. 12. 'Bhāvatritaya-samsrsta sthāyibhāvāvagāhinī samūhālambanātmaikā jāyata sāttvikī matiș.' 661 BhR, III.12. 662 BhR, III.22.

'nityam sukhamabhivyaktam "raso vai sah" iti śruteḥ pratītiḥ svaprakāśasya nirvikalpasukhātmikā.' 663 The concluding verse 1 in GGD on BhG, XVIII. 664 GGD, on BhG, X. 42. 665 Note the pun in the expression 'destroyer of Madhu' which is also his own name.

166

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Sanskrit texts

Aitareya Upanişad (AiU), ed. Patrick Olivelle, The Early Upanișads: Annotated Text and Translation. Bhāgavata Purāņa (BhP), with the commentary Bhāvārthadīpikā by Srīdhara Svāmī, ed. Pandeya Ramateja Sāstrī, pub. Pandita Rādhemohana Pāņdeya, Paņdita-pustakālaya, Varanasi 1963. Brahmabindu Upanişad (BraBU), in Dr Paul Daussen, Upanishads des Veda, Leipzig 1897. Brhadāranyaka Upanişad (BrĀU), Olivelle, The Early Upanișads: Annotated Text and Translation. Chāndogya Upanişad (ChāU) with commentary by Samkarācārya, ed. Gambhirananda, Mayavati 1983. Īśa Upanişad (IU), ed. Dr Sitanath Goswami, pub. Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta 1960. Katha Upanișad (KațhaU), Anandasram Sanskrit Series No. 72, Poona 1915. Kauşītaki Upanișad (KauU), ed. Henk Bodewitz, Groningen Oriental Studies, vol. XVI Groningen 2002. Kena Upanişad (KenU), Dr Sitanath Goswami, pub. Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, Calcutta 1964. Mahā Narāyņa Upanișad (MNU), ed. Colonel G.A. Jacab, Bombay Sanskrit Series, Bombay 1887. Māndukya Upanişad (MaU), Olivelle, The Early upanisads: Annotated Text and Translation. Mundaka Upanişad (MuU), Olivelle, The Early upanișads: Annotated Text and Translation. Rāmottaratāpani Upanișad, The Vaisnava-Upanisads with the Commentary of Śrī Upanişad-brahma-yogin, ed. Pandit A. Mahadeva Sastri, The Adyar Library Series No. 8, Second edition, Adyar Library, Madras 1953. Śvetaśvatara Upanişad (SveU), Olivelle, The Early upanișads: Annotated Text and Translation. Taittirīya Upanişad (TaiU), Olivelle, The Early upanișads: Annotated Text and Translation. Ānandavardhana, Dhvanyāloka, A critical edition with Introduction, English translation and notes, by K. Krishnamoorthy, Karnataka University, Dharwar 1974. Appaya Dikşīta, Siddhānta-leșa-samgraha (SIS), with an English translation by S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri, pub. Department of Indian Philosophy, University of Madras, Madras 1935-7. Citsukhācārya, Tattva-pradīpikā, ed. Svāmiyogīndrānanda, Udasīnsamskrtavidyālaya, Kāśī (Varanasi) 1956.

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Citsukhācārya, Tattvapradīpikā (Citsukhī), with a commentary by Srīmatpratyaksvarūpa, translated with notes by Srīmadudāsīnapravarasvāmi yogīndrānanda, pub. Udāsīnasamskrtavidyālaya, Kāśī (Varanasi) 1956. Dharmarājādhvarīndra, Vedāntaparibhāsā (VP), ed. K. Sāmbaśivaśāstī, Anantaśayanasamskrta- granthāvali, No. 93, Trivandrum 1928. Jīva Gosvāmī, Șat-sandarbha with a commentary by Baladeva Vidyābhușana and by Rādhāmohana Gosvāmī, ed. Šyāmlala Gosvāmī 1957. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, Advaita-siddhi; with commentary and notes by Mm. Ananta Krşna Sāstrī Vedāntaviśārada, pub. Pandurang Jāwajī, 'Nirņaya-sāgar' Press, Second edition, Bombay 1937. Advaita-siddhi, vol. 1-3, with Gurucandrikā, ed. D. Srinivasachar, Government Oriental Library Publication, Mysore 1933-40. Advaita-siddhi part one, The First Definition of Falsity, critically edited with commentary and Bengali translation, by Srī Yogendranātha Tarkasāmkhyavedāntatīrtha with an introduction Rajendranath Ghosh (general editor), pub. Srīksetrapāl Ghosh, Kalikātā 1931. Advaita-siddhi, (Chapter 1, the section on the five definitions of avidya and the con- clusive remarks of the author), text translated and explained by Karuna Bhattacharya, ICPR Translation of Indian Classics, pub. The secretary Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi 110002 1992' ISBN 81-85636-00-1. - Advaita-ratna-raksana, ed. with commentary and notes by Mm. Ananta Krsna Sāstrī Vedāntaviśārada, pub. Pandurang Jāwajī, 'Nirņaya-sāgar' Press, Second edition, Bombay 1937. - Advaita-siddhi, Chapter 1, with the commentary Balabodhinī by Mm. Dr Yogendranath Bagchi D.Litt., Taerka-sāmkhya-vedāntatīrtha, ed. Dr Sitansusekhar Bagchi, M.A., LL.B., D.Litt., vol. 1, part 1 and 2, pub. Tārā Publications, Varanasi 1971. Ānanda-mandākinī, Kāvyamālā series. - Bhāgavata-purāna-prathama-śloka-vyakhyā, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series No. 411, The Harililamrtam by Śri Bopadeva, with a Commentary by Śri Madhusūdana Sarasvatī and Śrimad Bhāgavata Purāņam (1st śloka) with the Paramahamsapriyā com- mentary, by the same commentator, ed. with introduction etc. by Sahityopadhyaya Parajuli Pandit Devidatta Upadhyaya, Benares 1933. Bhakti-rasāyanam, with the author's won commentary on the first chapter, edited, translated into Bengali and with a commentary on the second and third chapter by Mm. Srīyukta Durgācaraņa Sāmkhya-Vedantatīrtha, published by Šrīsurendranātha Bhattācārya kalikātā Bengali era 1340. Gītā-gūdhārtha-dīpikā, a commentary on the Bhagavadgītā, ed. Šrīyukta Nalinīkānta Brahma, M.A. P.R.S. PhD, translated into Bengali and with a commentary by Pandita Śrīyukta Bhūtanātha Saptatīrtha, pub. Krishna Brothers, Kalikātā Bengali era 1345 (1937). - Hari-līlā-vyākhya, ed. Īśvara Chandra Sastri and Haridasa Vidyāvagisa, Calcutta Oriental Series 3, Calcutta 1920. Īśvara-pratipatti-prakāśa , Anantaayanagranthāvaliḥ: No. 73, Trivendrum 1921. Mahimna-stotra-țīkā, in Mahimnaḥ-stotram tathā Karpūrādi-stotram, (by Pușpadanta and Mahākāla respectively), ed. Šrīmadgurunatha Vidyānidhi Bhattācārya, pub. Sanskrita Book Depot, Kalikāta 1945. Samkşepa-śārīraka-sāra-samgraha, Kāśī śanskrit series called Haridāsa-samskrta- granthamāla 18, Vedanta section No. 4, pub. Jai Krishna Dass Gupta, Vidya Vilas Press Banares City 1924.

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Sidhānta-bindu, P.C. Divanji, (ed. and tr.), Gaekwad's Oriental Series vol. LXIV. Baroda 1933. - Siddhānta-bindu, Sanskrit text, ed. and commented by V.S. Abhyankar, Second edition, ed. K.V. Abhyankar, Bhandarkar oriental Research Institue, Poona 1962. Government Oriental Series, Class A, No. 2. Siddhānta-bindu, ed. T. Sastri, Kasī Sanskrit series called Haridāsa Samskrta- granthamālā 65, Vedanta Section, 8, with two commentaries, Gaudabrahmānanda's Nyaya-ratnāvaī and Narayaņa Tīrtha's Laghuvyākhyā, pub. At Chowkhamba Sanskrit series Office, Benares City 1928. Siddhänta-bindu, English translation P.M. Modi, with a foreword by Zimmerman, pub. Vohra, Allahabad 1985. Vedānta-kalpa-latikā, ed. Rāmājñā Pāndeya Vyākaraņopadhyāya, Sarasvati bhavana text no. 3. pub. Government Sanskrit Library, Benarea 1920. Mammata, Kāvyaprakāśa, ed. Sivaprasad Bhattacharya with Srīdhara's Commentary, Calcutta Sanskrit College Research series, vol. 1 and 2, Calcutta 1959 and 1961. Nārada-bhakti-sūtra: The Secrets of Transcendental Love, with translation by His Divine Grace A.C. Bhaktivedanta swami Prabhupada and his disciples, The Bhaktivedanta Book Trust Los Angelis London etc. 1991. Padmapāda, Pañcapādikā with two commentaries and Pañcapādikāvivarana with two commentaries, Madras Government Oriental Series, No. CLV; ed. Sri. S. Srīrāma Sāstrī and Sri. S.R. Krishnamurthi Sāstrī; Government Oriental Manuscript Library, Madras 1958. Prakāśānanda Yati (Sarasvatī), Vedānta-siddhanta-muktavalī (VSM), with English transla- tion and notes by Arthur Venis, M.A. (Balliol College), Gokuldas Sanskrit Series, No. 4, Chaukhamba Orientalia, Second edition, Varanasi 1975. Rūpa Gosvāmī, with commentaries Durgamasangamanī by Jīva Gosvāmī, Artharatnālpadīpikā by Mukundadasa Gosvāmī and Bhaktisāra-pradarśinī by Viśvanātha Cakravarti and Bengali translation by Haridāsa Dasa, Second edition, Kalikāta 1961. Bhakti-rasamrta-sindhuh (BhRS), vol. I with Sanskrta Text in Devanāgarī script, English transliteration, English translation with comments by Tridandī Swamī Bhakti Hrdaya Bon Mahārāj, Rector Institue of Oriental Philosophy, pub. Institue of Oriental Philosophy, Vrindaban 1965. Śāndilya-bhakti-sūtra, with a Sanskrit commentary and Hindi translation by Muralīdharaśarma rājavaidya, pub. Kalyāna Mumbai 1916. Srīharsa, Khandana-khanda-khādya, ed. Srīkrsņapantaśāstrī Sāhityācārya and Srīgovinda- narahari-vaijāpurakara, M.A. Nyāya-vedāntācarya, tr. into Hindi by Late Pandita Srīcandīprasādasukula, pub. Acyuta granthamālā Office, Kaśī (Varanasi) 1962. Śrīmadvidyāraņya Muni, Pañcadaśī with commentary by Rāmakrsna and an introduction by Srīmatparamahamsa parivrājakājakācārya maheśvarānanda girimahāmaņdaleśvara, ed. Narāyaņa Rāma ācārya 'Kavyatīrtha, Seventh edition, pub. Nirnayasāgara, Mumbai 1949. Vādarāyana, Brahma-sūtra (BS) with the commentary, (bhāsya) by Samkara and the commentary, (Bhāmatī ) by Vācaspati Miśra's, ed. Anantakrsna Sāstrī, Nirnayasagar publications, Mumbai 1938. Vyāsatīrtha, Nyāyāmrtam, ed. Prof. K.T. Pandurangi, pub. Dvaita Vedanta Studies and Research Foundation, Bangalore 1994. Yoga Philosophy of Patañjali: Containing his Yoga aphorisms with Vyāsa's commentary in Sanskrit and a translation with annotations including many suggestions for the practice

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of Yoga, by Sāmkhya-Yogāchārya Swāmi Hariharānanda Āranya, rendered into English by P.N. Mukerji, C.B.E.R.B.M.A. Published by SUNY, Albany, NY, 1983. Yogavāsiştha Rāmāyana, Hindi and Sanskrit, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Pratisthana, Varanasi 1988.

Works in English

Ali, M. Athar, The Perception of India in Akbar and Abu'l Fazl, in ed. Irfan Habib, Akbar And His India, Oxford India Paperbacks, OUP Oxford New York, third impression 2002, pp. 215-24. Āraņya, Swāmi Hariharānanda, Samkhya-yogāchārya, Yoga Philosophy of Patañjai: Containing his Yoga Aphorisms with Vyāsa's commentary in Sanskrit and a translation with annotations including many suggestions for the practice of Yoga, Rendered into English by, P. N. Mukerji, C.B.E. R.B. M.A, New edition by SUNY, Albany 1983. Bartley, C.J., The Theology of Rāmānuja: Realism and Religion, Routledge Curzon Taylor & Francis Group London 2002, ISBN 0-7007-1459-6. Benson, James, Samkara Bhatta's Family Chronicle: The Gādhivamśavarņana , paper in The Pandit: Traditional Scholarship in India, ed. Axel Michaels, Festschrift Parameswara Aithal, South Asian Studies No. XXXVIII, South Asia Institute, New Delhi Branch, Heidelberg University 2001. Carney, Gerald. Rasa Theology: The Drama of Divine Love, in Vaisnavism: Contemporary Scholars Discuss the Gaudiya Tradition, ed. Steven J. Rosen, FOLK Books New York 1992, pp. 295-303. Chari, S.M. Srinivasa, Vaisnavism: Its Philosophy, Theology and Religious Discipline, Motilal Banarasidass Delhi reprint 2000, ISBN 81-208-1098-8. Comans, Michael, The Method of Early Advaita Vedanta: A Study of Gaudapāda, Sankara, Sureśvara and Padmapāda; Delhi 2000, ISBN 81-208-1722-2. Dasgupta, Surendranath, A History of Indian Philosophy, vol. III, CUP (reprint) Cambridge 1968. De, Sushil Kumar, Early History of the Vaisnava Faith and Movement in Bengal, Second edition, Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyaya, Calcutta 1961. Deutsch, Eliot and J.A.B. van Buitenen, A Source Book of Advaita Vedanta, The University Press of Hawaii, Honolulu 1971 Forsthoefel, Thomas A., Knowing Beyond Knowledge, Ashgate Publishing Company, UK and USA 2002, ISBN 0-7546-0625-2. Gerow, Edwin, Indian Poetics, Otto Harrassowitz Wies Baden 1977. Gupta, Bina, Perceiving in Advaita Vedanta: Epistemological Analysis and Interpretation; Delhi 1995, ISBN 81-208-1296-9. Gupta, Sanjukta, From Bhakti to Prapatti - The Theory of Grace in the Pāñcarātra System, Sanskrit and World Culture, SCHR.OR. 18, Berlin 1986, pp. 537-42. Bhakti of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, in Prajnājyoti: Prof. Dr Gopikamohan Bhattacharya Commemoration Volume, eds, Prof. Dr Debabrata Sen Sharma and Dr Manabendu Banarjee, pub. Nirmal Bose Agency, Kurukshetra (India) 1991, pp. 233-43. Gupta, Sisir Kumar, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī on The Bhagavad Gītā: Being an English translation of his Commentary Gūdhārtha Dīpikā, pub. Motolal Banarasidass Delhi Varanasi Patna, Delhi 1977. Haberman, David, Acting as a Way of Salvation: A Study of Rāgānugā Bhakti, OUP, New York, 1988.

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Hardy, Friehelm, Viraha Bhakti: The Early History of Krsna devotion in South India, Delhi Oxford University Press, Oxford New York 1983. Hiriyana, M., Outlines of Indian Philosophy; First Indian Edition: Delhi 1993, ISBN 81-208-1099-6. Indich, William M., Consciousness in Advaita Vedanta, Motilal Banarasidass Reprint, Delhi 1995, 2000, ISBN 81-208-1251-4. Ingalls, Daniel H.H., Materials For The Study of Navya-nyaya Logic, Harvard Oriental Series 40, First Indian Reprint, Motilal Banarasidass, Delhi 1988. King, Richard, Indian Philosophy: An Introduction to Hindu and Buddhist Thought, Edinburgh University Press, Edinburgh 1999, ISBN 0-7486-0954-7 (paperback). Narain, Dr K., An Outline of Madhva Philosophy, Udaya Publications, Allahabad 1962. Olivelle, Patrick, Upanisad: A New Translation. World Classics OUP Oxford, New York 1996. Sharma, Dr B.N.K, M.A., PhD, D.Litt., Advaitasiddhi Vs Nyāyāmrta: An Up to Date Critical Re-appraisal, pub. Anandatīrtha Pratisthāna of the Akhila Bhārata Mādhva Mahamandala, Bangalore 1994. Smart, Ninian, Doctrine and Argument in Indian Philosophy, George Allen & Unwin Ltd. UK second impression 1969. Thrasher, Allen Wright, The Advaita Vedanta of Brahma-Siddhi; Delhi 1993, ISBN 81-208-0982-3.

Works in Bengali

Sāstrī, Dr Aśutosa Vedānta Darśana - Advaitavāda, Part 1, Second edition, Part 2, and Part 3, Calcutta University publication, Calcutta University Press, Calcutta 1942, 1949 and 1961. Sen, Dineshchandra, Brhatbanga, Calcutta University Publication, Calcutta 1935. Sen, Sukumar, Bānglā Sāhityer Itihāsa, vol. 1. pūrvārdha, Fourth edition. Eastern Publishers, Kalikātā 1963. Sītānāth Siddntavāgīśa ed., Kāśyapa-vamśa-bhāskara, publisher and date not known.

Journals

Bhattacharya, Prof. Dinesh, Indian Historical Quarterly, vol. XIII, 1937. Hardy, Friedhelm, Madhavendra Purī: A Link between Bengal Vaiśnavism and South Indian Bhakti, The Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1974. Kaviraj, Gopinath, Sarasvati Bhavana Studies, vol. VII, miscellaneous papers, ed. Gopinath Kaviraja, Benares 1929. Nelson, Lance E. Bhakti-rasa for the Advaitin Renunciate: Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's Theory of Devotional Sentiment, in Religious Traditions, A Journal in the Study of Religion, vol. 12, 1989. Sastri, Haraprasad, Indian Antiquary, 1912.

Catalogue

Mitra, R.L., Notice of Sanskrit Mss 1875. Theodore Aufrecht, Catalogus Catalogorum: An Alphabetical Register of Sanskrit Works and Authors, German Oriental Society, Leipzig 1891, p. 427.

171

INDEX

Ābhāsavāda 84-5, 89, 91 Arthāntara 32 Abhāva (vilakșaņa, pratiyogī) 15, 18, Arthāpatti 25, 43, 47 19, 35, 47, 68 Arthavādaśruti 66, 76 Abhāvopādānajñāna 15 Asat 28, 33, 38 Abhidhā 56 Asa-khyātivāda 38 Abhihitānvayavāda 55 Asamga 49-50 Adharma 52 Asamsakti 116, 117 Adhikarana 82 Āśraya 4, 26, 32, 44, 49, 52, 86, Adhisthāna 14, 29, 48, 49, 83, 108, 135, 141 87,112 Atyantābhāva 23, 36, 100 Ādhyāsikatādātmya 27, 49 Avacchedaka 86-7 Adrsta 23, 111 Avaccheda-vāda 86, 91 Ahamartha 17, 22, 107-8 Avāntara 69 Ahamkāra 48, 96, 98, 107-8 Āvaraņa(śakti) 105, 118 Ahampratyaya 94 Avasthājñāna 51, 112 Ākāmksā 56, 58-9 Avidyāleśa 118 Akhandākāra-citta-vrtti 83, 126 Avidyāvrtti 16, 25, 40-1, 46, 48, Akhandārtha 4, 53-5, 57-9, 79, 125 50, 60, 63, 93-4, 112 Akhyātivada 38 Avyakta 87, 106, 110-11 Alambana 94, 125 Ālambanavibhāva 127, 141 Bhāgavata Dharma 3, 125, 134, 135 Ānandabodhācaryā 28, 33 Bhaktibhūmikā 132, 135 Anekajīva-vāda 84 Bhaktivrtti 125, 126 Anirvacanīya 15-16, 28, 38, 42, Bhamatī School 4, 69, 86, 116 102, 106 Bhavabhakti 122-4 Anirvacanīya khyāti 37 Bhāvanā 127 Anirvācyatva 42-3 Bhaya 137, 140 Anrta 24 Bhedaratna 5 Antahkarana 17, 25, 27, 75, 81, 87, Bhedasiddhi 5 96, 107-9 Bhrama 3, 7, 41 Anubhūti 61, 99, 108 Bhramajñāna 33 Anuvyavasāya 60 Brahmānanda Sarasvatī 6 Anvitābhidhāna-vāda 55 Anyonyābhāva 82 Caitanya (consciousness) 28, 36, 45, 65, Amūrta 106, 109-11 86, 88, 94, 117, 127 Appaya Dīkşita 87 Caitanya (Srīkrsna Caitanya) 1, 119, Apūrva 75 121, 126 Ārambha-vāda 100, 102 Cārvakas 94

173

INDEX

Catalogus Catalogorum 7 Kāla 65, 94, 106 Citsukhācarya, Citsukha, Citsukhī 3, 14, 32, 37, 54-5, 57, 91-2 Kalpataru 35, 67, 69 Kāma 137, 140 Kapāla 32-3, 101 Dāna-vīra 138 Kārana 76, 105 Dānotsāha 138 Dāsya 137 Karman 16, 111, 117

Dayā 138 Kartrtva 96, 104 Kārya 24 Dayāvīra 138 Kāryakāranasambandha 140 Dayotsāha 138 Deśa 65, 94 Khandanakhandakhādya 90 Kriyāśakti 48, 61, 69, 106, Dharma 52 Dharmarājādhvarīndra 107 107, 109

Dharmavīra 138 Krodha 137

Dharmotsāha 138 Kubjāśakti 56

Dhvani 60 Dik 106 Laksanā 55-6, 58-9, 66, 78

Divanji, P.C. 5, 10 Lakşyārtha 59, 78

Dosa 33-4, 62-3 Lişgaśarīra 109, 111

Drk 65, 100, 106 Drsti-srsti-vāda 88-9, 91, 98, 111 Maddhvācārya 5

Drśya 35, 36, 84, 95, 100, 106 Māddhva Vaisnava 2, 3, 66, 119 Mahābhāva 135 Drśyatva 28, 30, 34, 95 Mahāvākya 4, 76-7, 115

Eka-jīva-vāda 4, 6, 84, 88-93 Manana 47, 115-16, 123, 130 Mānasapratyakșa 60 Mandana Miśra 2, 3 Gańgeśa 3 Manogati 120, 125, 128 Garva 107 Gaudīya Vaisnava 12, 120, 125 Māyā-vāda 6

Gautama-sūtra Vrtti 5 Mīmāmsā School 51, 55, 115 Mūla 51 Gopī 124, 136 Mūrta 106, 110 Gopinath Kaviraj 5 Guņa 81, 95, 110, 139 Nārada-bhakti-sūtra 121 Navadhā-bhakti 131, 133 Harsa 137-8 Hiranyagarbha 109-11 Navya-nyāya School 1-5, 8, 12, 38,100 Hrdayagranthi 107 Nididhyāsana 47, 115-16, 123

Īrșyā 137 Nidrāvrtti 47 Nimitta-kārana 33 Nirvikalpaka-pratyakșa 53 Jadatva 28, 36 Jagannātha Paņdita 5 Niścaya 107

Jāgrat 96, 112, 117 Nrsimhāśrama 6 Nyāyamakaranda 3 Jahadajahatsvārthā 78 Nyāyāmrta 11-12, 119 Jayatīrtha 12 Jīvābhāsa 87, 88, 91, 93 Padārtha 58 Jīva Gosvāmī 6-7, 120, 122-4 Padārthabhāvinī 116-17 Jīvanmukta 16, 111, 117-18, 131 Jñānābhāsa 63 Pañcabhūta 109 Pañcadaśī 5, 72, 91 Jñānabhūmikā (steps of Yogic stance) 115-17 Pañcapādikā 29

Jñānalakșaņā-sannikarșa 38-9 Pañcaprāņa 107 Pañcīkaraņaprakriyā 110

174

INDEX

Parāmarśa 20 Saguņabhakti 43, 69 Pāramārthika 30, 39, 83 Saiva School 60 Parānurakti 121 Sakhya 137 Parāvairagya 132 Sāksī 13, 18, 21-2, 25-7, 35, Pariccheda 65, 94 40, 45,49 Paricchinna 28, 36 Sākșijñāna 18, 20-1, 28, 45, 59 Parināmavāda 100-2 Sakyasambandha 56, 59 Parināmikārana 102-3 Sālokya 118, 130-1 Parokşavrtti 52 Sāmānyābhāva 19-20, 24 Pāśupata 100 Sāmānyalaksaņā pratyāsatti 19 Phalavyāpyatva 71, 73 Samkara Miśra 5 Prabhākara 55, 72 Sāmkhya 1 Prāgabhāva 18-20, 22-4, 33, 94, Samksepaśārīraka 4, 25 100,101 Samsāra 107 Prājña 98 Samskāra 20-1, 32, 93, 97, Prakāśānanda Sarasvatī 6, 105 118, 127 Pralaya 111 Sāmya 118 Pramājñāna 18, 33, 45-6, 95-6 Sāndilya-bhakti-sūtra 121 Pramāna 21, 34 Sannidhi 58 Prameya 48, 52 Sānta 139-40 Pramiti 48 Sārūpya 118 Prārabdha 16, 111, 117-18 Sarvajñātma Muņī 3-4, 8, 10, 26, 48, 85, Prasaktapratisedha 74 91, 100,105 Prātibhakajñana 60 Sattāpatti 116-17 Prātibhāsika 29, 39, 83, 89 Sattva 29-30, 41, 43, 81, 95, 106, Pratibimba-vāda 3, 84-5, 91 109-10, 117, 139 Prātipādika 55, 57 Sautrāntika 38 Pratiyogin 19, 68, 74 Savikalpa-jñāna 35, 53 Pratiyogitāvacchedaka 19 Savikalpa-samādhi 117 Prīti 123-4, 138-40 Sāyanācārya 5 Priyatā 124 Siddhāntaleśasamgraha 87 Purandarācārya 4 Smrtivrtti 47, 80 Purușottama 8, 106, 120 Sneha 137-8 Soka 137-9 Rāgānugā bhakti 123, 140 Sraddhā 122, 124, 133, 135 Rāgātmika bhakti 123, 140 Sravana 114-16 Rajas 41, 106, 109-10, 139-40 Śrībhāsya 41 Rājendra Ghose 5 Srīharsa 2, 82 Rāmājñā Sarmā Pāņdeya 5 Srgāra 128, 137, 139-41 Rasa 124, 125, 127-8, 130, 134-5, Srsțidrstī-vāda 88 137-8,140-2 Sthāyibhāva 127-8, 137-42 Rasagangadhara 7 Subhecchā 116 Rāsalīlā 136 Sūņya-vāda 102 Rati 123-4, 128, 136-8 Sureśvarācārya 3 Raudra 139 Sușupti 20-1, 78, 93-4, 96-8, Raudrabhayānaka 139-40 112, 117 Rūpa Gosvāmī 6-7, 120, 122, 124 Svaprakāśa 60, 72

Sabda 54, 55 Taijasa 96-7 Sābdabodha 55 Tāmasa 41, 97, 106, 110, 139-40 Sādhanabhakti 122-5 Sādhya 21, 23, 34, 36, 76, 121, 129 Tamoguņa 47, 112, 139 Tanmātra 108

175

INDEX

Tāpaka 137-8 Vibhatsa 139-40 Tattvacintāmanī 3 Vicāranā 116 Tattvapradīpikā 23-4 Videhamukti 117 Tāttvika 29, 76 Vijñānavādin 38 Tulā 86 Vikalpavrtti 47-8 Tūryagā 116-17 Vikşepa 14, 90, 105, 118 Viparyayavrtti 47 Upādhi 15-16, 75, 78, 85-7, 91, 111 Virāt 110 Upahita 34, 60, 85, 87, 92 Viaya 4, 15, 26-7, 86 Upajīvya 79 Viayatā 16 Upalaksaņā 16, 36, 72, 86-7 Viśesya 34, 78 Uparāga 53 Viśistādvaita-vāda 80 Upāsanā 67, 69-70, 76, 120, 123, 126 Viśva 96-7 Viśvanātha Nyāyapancānana 5 Vācaspati Miśra 3-4, 26, 42, 49, 51 Vivarana 3-4, 7, 21-2, 29-31, 37, 49-50, Vācyārtha 59 85, 97-8, 105, 116, 129 Vaibhaşika 38 Vivarta 100, 102-3 Vaidhi bhakti 123 Vrttijñāna 15, 18, 25, 28, 44-5, 71 Vaiklavya 137 Vrttivyāpya 35 Vaiśesika 1-3 Vyabhicāribhāva 127, 137, 141 Vaisnava School 120, 134 Vyāsarāja 41, 66, 71, 83, 102, 104-5 Vākyārtha 58 Vyavahārayogyatā 73 Vartika 3, 22, 49-50, 85, 105 Vyavahārika 29-30, 76, 80, 83, 86, 89 Vāsanā 38, 97, 112-13, 127 Vytirekidrstānta 74 Vaśīkārākhya vairāgya 137 Vastu 64-5, 94 Yogavāsistha 116-17 Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvali 87 Yogyatā 58-9

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