1. Aesthetic-Experience-according-Abhinavagupta Raniero Gnoli

Geott.l, 539

ISTITUTO ITALIANO PER IL MEDIO ED ESTREMO ORIENTE SERIE ORIENTALE ROMA

'XI SERIE ORIENTALE ROMA

SOTTO LA DIREZIONE DI GIUSEPPE TUCCI RANIERO GNOLI

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE VOLUME XI ACCORDING TO ABHINAVAGUPTA

ROMA Is. M. E. O. ROMA

1956 Is. M. E. O.

CONTENTS

List of Abbreviations . P. XI Preface XIII Introduction xIx Text 3 Translation 29 Appendix I 106 Appendix 1I . 109 General Index 115

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND SYMBOLS

A.Bh. - Abhinavagupta's Abhinasabharati, cf. Preface, p. xm. A.G. D - Abbinavagupta. S.K. De, cf. Proface, p. XV. Dafaripa, Haas = Haas, George C. O., The Dasarapa, A Treatise of Hindu Dramaturgy by Dhanamjaya, Colambia Uni- versity Press, New York 1912. Dasgupta, H. I. Ph. = Dasgupta, Surendranath, A History of Indian Philo-

Do, S.P. sophy, 5 voll., Cambridge 1932-1955. - De, Sushil Kumar, Studies in the History of Sanskris Postics, Lusac, 2 voll., London 1923, 1925. Dh.A. - Anandavardhana's Dhvanyaloka with the Locana and Balapriyd commentarics by Abhinavagupta and Rāmafaraka, ed. by Pandit Pattābhirāma Šistri,

Dh.A.L. Chowkhamba, Benares 1940. Abhinavagupta's commentary (locana) on the Dhva- nyaloka by Anandavardbana. - Kavi's edition of the Abhinavabharatt, cf. Preface, p. Xv. H.C. = Hemacandra's Karyonufdsana, cf. Preface, pp. xII,

Ind. Th. - Chandra Bhan Gupta, The Indion Theatre, Motilal XV.

I.P.V. Banarasidass, Banaras 1954. = Abhinavagupta's Tsvarapratyabhijfavimarsinl, K.S.

I.P.V.V. T.S., 2 voll., Bombay 1918-1921. = Abhinavagupta's Tivarapratyabhijnavivptivimarsint, K. S.T.S., 3 voll., Bombay 1938-1943. J. Jayaratha, the commentator of the Abhinavagupta's

JBORS Tantrāloka.

JBU = Journal of the Bihar and Orissa Research Society. Journal of Bombay University. JOR - Journal of Oriental Research, Madras. K. Ad. = Dandin's Kauyadaria, edited and translated by O.

Kane, S.D.V. Bohtlingk, Leipsig 1890. = Kane, P. V., The Sahityadarpana of Visvanatha (Pa- ricchedas I, II, Arthalankäras); with exhaustive Notes and the History of Sanekrit Poetics, Bombay 1951. K.M. - Rajafokhare's Kavyamimamsa, Gackwad Oriental

K.P. Series, Baroda 1916. - Mammata's Kāuyaprakāsa, cf. Preface, p. xIv.

ABBREVIATIONS

K.S.T.S. = Kashmir Series of Texts and Studice. Mabimabhatta, Vyoksiviveka - The Vyaktiviveka of Mabimabhatta, ed. with a comm. of Ruyyaka and the Madhusndant comm. by Madhusdana Miśra, Chowkhamba, Benares 1936. PREFACE M.C. = Mipikyacandra, cf. Preface, pp. xIv, XV. N.M. The Nyayamanjari of Jayanta Bhatta, ed. by Sarya

N.Ś. Nūrayana Sukla, Benares 1936. - Natya Śāstra, cf. Preface, p. xnI. The commentary by Abhinavagupta on the famous P sūtra by Bharata, vibhāvānubhavavyabhicārisamyogād rasa- Pandey = Pandey, cf. Preface, p. XV. - Pandey, Kanti Chandra, Indian Aesthetics, Chow-

Pandey, A.G. khambo, Banaras 1950. nișpattih (Nātya Šāstra, VI, prose after v. 33) constitutes = Pandey, Kanti Chandra: Abhinavagupta, an Histo- the most important text in the whole of Indian aesthetic rical and Philosophical Study, Chowkhamba, Bona- thought. It forms part of the Abhinavabharati, the com- ras 1935. P.T.V. - Abhinavagupta's Parātrimfikāvivarana, K.S.T.S., mentary written by Abhinava Gupta on Bharata's Natya

P.V. Bombay 1918. Sastra 1). Apart from the teaching of Abhinavagupta, - Dharmakirti's Pramånavārtika with a commentary of Manorathanandin ed. by Rābula Sšokrtyūyana. which is given its most lucid expression in these pages, this work is particularly valuable in that it contains a P.V., svaorti Appendix to JBORS, vol. XXIV-XXVI, 1938-1940. = MS. of the commentary by Dharmakirti on the ch. I (svärthånumänapariccheda) of his Pramånavārtika. summary of the principal theories on poetics enunciated This MS. belongs to prof. Giuseppe Tucci. by the predecessors of Abhinavagupta, whose works have R.T. - Kalhana's Rajatarangint, ed. by M. A. Stein, Bombay been lost or have not yet come to light. 1892. S. Kā. = The Sankhya Kariko of Isvorakrtpa with the Sankhya A great part of later Indian poetics draws its inspi- Tottvakaumudi of Vachaspati Misra, Bombay 1940. ration, in the matter of aesthetic experience, from this Sominanda, Sivadrei - Somunanda's Sivadrii with the orui of Utpaladeva, Śnnagar 1934. commentary. The 4th Chapter in Mammata's Kāvya-

Spandanirnaya = Kşemarāja's Spandanirņaya, K.S.T.S., Srinagar 1925. prakāśa-and, by implication, all the works that stem from Stavacintāmaņi = The Stava-Chintamani of Bhatta Narayapa with com- it-is nothing but an epitome of it. The commentary mentary by Kgemaraja, K.S.T.S., Srinagar 1918. - Abhinavagupta's Tantråloka, with the commentary (viveka) added by Hemacandra, the great Jaina poligraph T.A

Vijflanabhairava of Jayaratha, K.S.T.S., 12 voll., Bombay 1918-1938. (12th century), to his own Kāvyānusasana reproduces it - The Vijfanabhairava with comm. partly by Kpo- word for word (except for a few variations)9. While marija and partly by Sivopādhyāya, K.S.T.S., Bom- bay 1918. V.P - Bhartrhari's Vakyapådtya ed. by Cārudeva Sāstri, 1) The Natyafdetre of Bharata with the commentary by Abhinavagupta Lahore 1939. (the Abhinavabharart) has been edited by Manavalli Ramakrishna. Kavi, Gask- ZDMG - Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenlandischen Gesellschaft. wad Oriental Series, Baroda (Vol. I, no. XXXVI, 1926; vol. II, no. LXVIII, 1934; vol. III, no. CXXIV, 1954. The fourth volume is still to come). The commentary on the aforesaid sttra is to be found in the first volume, pp. 274 to 287. ) The Kavyanufasana of Hemacandro, with the commentaries Alanka- racudamani and Viveka, edited by Rasiklal C. Parikh, Bombay 1938.

[xm ] [ xm ]

PREFACE PREFACE Manikyacandra (13th century) in his commentary on D: the edition of S.K. De1. Mammața's Kāvyaprakasa does no more than copy and simplify, at the very most, the viveka of Hemacandra 1). G: Kavi's edition of the Abhinavabharati9. H.C .: the edition of the viveka by Hemacandra. Abhinavagupta's commentary was edited for the first M.C .: the edition of the Kāvyaprakāsasamketa by time by S.K. De$. This edition is full of mistakes and, Māņikyacandra. in many places, is completely incomprehensible. It was also published a second time in Kavi's edition P: the passages quoted by K. Ch. Pandey in his

of the Abhinavabharati. This edition represents, undoub- Indian Aesthetics.

tedly, a notable adyance on that of De. Nevertheless, Where I was in doubt, I have given the preference, in it contains many mistakes. general, to the reading accepted by the Abhinavabharati's Another edition, in which a great part of Abhinava- edition. I have not quoted the many places where I have gupta's commentary is reproduced, is that of the viveka made changes in punctuation of the earlier editions. These added by Hemacandra to his Kāvyānusāsana. Māņikya- changes speak for themselves. candra quotes several passages from this viveka in his Uptil new manuscript material in a better state of pre- Kāvyaprakāsasa mketa. servation than that available at present has been found, Certain passages of Abhinavagupta's commentary are the collation of the fragmentary and often corrupt MSS. quoted with corrections that are not always very happy now in existence can only be in my opinion of scant help in the sanskrit appendix to K. Ch. Pandey's book, Indian in re-establishing the doubtful passages. It can only con- Aesthetics (Banaras 1950). firm the readings accepted by M.R. Kavi. For this reason, My edition is based, in the main, on that of the Abhi- I have preferred to put my trust above all in the data navabharati and on Hemacandra's viveka. Abhinavabha- banded down by tradition and accepted in other works rati's edition was prepared from several manuscripts all and in a critical study of the text itself. of which were fragmentary. The edition of Hemacandra's viveka-which is nearly always correct-has allowed me to reconstruct, with certainty, several passages whose mean- 1) Where it is not specifically stated otherwise in the critical apparatus ing seemed to have been hopelessly corrupted. In the De's readings agree with those of Kavi or are variations or misprints of no critical apparatus I have quoted the following readings: importnce. ) Some passages of Kavi's edition are enclosed between round or square brackets. I have quoted them in the critical apparatus. With regard to these brackets, Mr. Kavi says: " Wherever corrections are only'sggested tho 1) The Kasyaprakafe of Mammata with the commentary (ossmketa) by letters are enclosed in brackets with a question mark following the incorrect Minikyacandra, edited by Dr. R. Shama Sastry, Mysore, 1922. letters or words and wherever letters or worde are thought to be understood ) The Theory of Rasa, Appendix, Sir Asutosh Mookerjes Silver Jubilee they are merely enclosed in brackets so that the reader may read along ignor-' Volumes, Vol. III, Orientalia, Part II, pp. 240-253. ing the paranthesis ... The square brockets indicate that the portion which they enclose is redundant " (A.Bh., I, Pref., p. 11). [ xIv ] [xv ]

PREFACE PREFACE It is not improbable that a few passages were added to the text under the influence above all of Hemacandra. have a literary and poetic resonance, used twice by Abhi-

The original form of the text is probably that published navagupta in this commentary: katukiman, p. 20, and

by S.K. De. In his edition certain minor passages are sabaliman, p. 22).

omitted and the first words only of some stanzas appear. I owe a profound debt of gratitude to Prof. Giuseppe

The object of these additions was to complete and eluci- Tucci for his innumerable acts of kindness, encouragement

date certain passages. They do not alter in any way the and advice. He allowed me free use of his precious li-

thought of Abhinavagupta. I have therefore considered brary and read with me the proofs of text and translation.

it best to leave them in the text 1). His assistance in helping me to solve some difficult points

In the notes to the translation-the first to appear was invaluable.

of these pages-I have sought to justify my interpretation I would also like to thank most particularly Prof. T.R.V.

of all the most difficult points and to give an explanation Murti, of the University of Benares, who has very kindly

of the concepts involved quoting such texts as appeared given me the benefit of his experience and learning. to me of value for the understanding of the passages in question and, thus, of the aesthetic thought of one of RANIERO GNOLI.

the most profound and keenest minds that India has July 30, 1956.

ever known. As to the brief introduction, I have confined myself to discussing the most salient points of Abhinavagupta's thought. The language used by Abhinavagupta is a splendid example of erudite mediaeval sanskrit. In comparison with the same author's philosophical works, there is to be found in these pages a more studied elegance, both in the choice of words and in the structure of the sentences (cf., for example, the abstract nouns ending in iman, which 1) Passages probably added are: 1) the first two pada of the stansa vivpd- dhatmapy agadho 'pi, p. 4: 2) the two last pada of the stansa dokena krta- stambhas, p. 4: 3) the last three pada of the stansa bhati patito likhantyds. p. 5; 4) the stanza manipradipaprabhåyor, p. 5; 5) the twb stanzas abhidhd bhasand canya (on the position of these two stansas, ef. the critical apparatus, p. 12); 6) the sentence atra hi ... °sabhaveyam iti, p. 16; 7) na vişayavesavaiva- syam and na tåfasthyasphujatsam, p. 25. [ xvI ] [ xvu ] II. - CHOLI, The acshesie enperienro, etr.

INTRODUCTION

In India, the study of aesthetics - which was at first limited to the drama-has its origins in no abstract or disinterested desire for knowledge but in motives of a purely empirical order. The most ancient text that has come down to us is the Natya Sastra (4th or 5th Century A.D .? ), which tradition attributes to Bharata. This is a voluminous collection of rules and instructions concerned, in the main, with the production of drama and the edu- cation of the actors. Drama is considered as a form of synthesis between the visual and aural arts. In it both collaborate at arousing in the spectator, more easily and forcibly than by any other form of art, a state of con- sciousness sui generis, conceived intuitively and concretèly . as a juice or flavour, called Rasa. This Rasa, when tasted by the spectator, pervades and enchants him. Aesthetic experience is, therefore, the act of tasting this Rasa, of immersing oneself in it to the exclusion of all else. Bharata, in a famous apho- rism, which, interpreted and elaborated in various ways, forms the point of departure of all later Indian aesthetic thought, says, in substance, that Rasa is born from the union of the play with the performance of the actors. The essence of this Rasa, of which Bharata speaks, be- came the subject of study and analysis to a whole series of thinkers, each of whom was anxious to contribute to a clearer understanding of the words of the Master. The earliest of these about whom we have any knowledge [xx ]

INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION (Dandin and Bhatta Lollata 1), who lived respectively about which has no relationship with any particular ego. The the 7th and 9th Centuries) thought, curiously, that Rasa aesthetic state of consciousness-whether its material is was none other than an ordinary movement of the mind anger, love, pain, etc .- does not insert itself into the (anger, pain, etc.) developed to the highest degree by texture of everyday life but is seen and lived in complete the combined effect of the play, the production and independance of any individual interest. The images con- the actors, etc. Rasa, Bhatta Lollata declared, is to be templated on the stage or read in poetry are seen by the found in the represented character and, by extension and spectator independently of any relationship with his ordi- then metaphorically only, in the imitating actor. San- nary life or with the life of the actor or of the hero of kuka*, who lived a short time after Bhatta Lollața, disa- the play or poem and appear, therefore, in a generalized grees decisively with the theory of his predecessors. Ac- (sādhāranīkrta, sādhārana) way, that is to say, universally cording to him, Rasa is not an intensified but an imitated and freed of individuality. state of mind. The actor imitates the state of mind of The universality of the aesthetic experience, which the characters he is portraying and this imitated state Bhațța Nāyaka discovered, was accepted and elaborated of mind is perceived by the spectators in the form of upon by Abhinavagupta1. This state of generality, implies Rasa. This perception is free of any relation to the the elimination of any measure of time and space (time concepts of reality and non reality. A horse imitated by a and space belong to discursive thought) and, by implication, painter, Sankuka observes, does not appear to the spec- of the limited knowing-subject, who is conditioned by tator as being either real or false: it is nothing more these but who, during the aesthetic experience, raises than an image which precedes any judgement of reality himself momentarily above time, space and casuality or non reality. and, therefore, above the stream of his practical life, the The theories of Bhatta Lollata and Sankuka were vio- samsära 3. Aesthetic experience marks a definite break lently criticised by Bhatta Näyaka*), one of the most im- portant figures in Indian aesthetic thought. Abhinavagupte son of Narasimhagupta, alias Cukhula, was born in Ka- Aesthetic experience, Bhatta Nayaka says, does not ehmir during the socond half of the 10th. century from a illustrous brahmin depend either upon the intensification nor the imitation family. He is one of the chief representatives of the religions specalatioa. thought and rhetoric in mediaoval India. His most important works in theso of a state of mind. According to him, these two theories fields are 1) the Tantraloka, a vast oncyclopedia, written in verses and dealing (put forward respectively by Bhatta Lollata and Sańkuka) with the religious concepts and the rites of the faivs schools; 2) the Ivarapra- are not enough to justify the special nature of aesthetic tyabhijnldviorticimarfint, a detailed commentary to tho piko of Utpaladova on his own karikas, finished in 1014 A.D .; 3) the Abhinavabharatt, a commentary experience. The essence of Rasa, he says, is a pleasure on the Natya Sastra of Bharata and the Dhoanyalokalocana, a commentary on the Dhvanyaloks of Ånandavardhana. His principal masters wero Sam- 1) Cf. pp. 30-32, below. bhunitha in tantriem, Lakpmanagupta disciple of Utpaladeva in philosophy. Cf. pp. 32 f., below. Bhatta Tota and Bhattenduraje in rhetoric. 3) Cf. pp. 53-56, below. 9) Cf. pp. 63 ff., 112, below.

[xx] [xxI ]

INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION with samsara, which is dominated and conditioned by the law of cause and effect. It opens like a flower born Indian thought always returns with especial interest, is

of magic, without relationship, in time or space, with one of the aspects peculiar to the aesthetic thought of

the practical life which precedes it and which, after it, Bhatta Nayaka and, with a clearer understanding, to that

renews itself and returns to its normal course 1. In this of Abhinava. In India, thinkers have never dissociated

way, Bhatta Nayaka and Abhinavagupta rescued the abstract speculation from a concrete realization of its

idea of Rasa from the primitive and too concrete form complicated metaphysical structure, which they felt them-

which it had been given by Bhatta Lollata and Sankuka. selves attracted by their nature to translate into living

Rasa is not a thing in itself, formed previous to the act reality. This position, at once metaphysical and psycho-

of consciousness by which it is perceived, but the con- logical, led them, with the passage of time, to conceive

sciousness itself (and therefore the perception) which, reality in an idealistic form. Indian thought, following.

freed from. external interference and from all practical different if not opposed lines to those of Western idealistic

desires, becomes Rasa or aesthetic consciousness $. The thinkers, perceived, at a certain moment, that reality is

subject, when immersed in this state, finds, in it, the ful- consciousness or thought and that everything which is

filment of all his desires: in this sense, therefore, Rasa is around us rests, in the last analysis, on the Self. Aesthetic

pleasure, beatitude, rest, lysis. Aesthetic consciousness has speculation, which was born and grew up on the edge of

no end outside itself. It is completely self-sufficient and metaphysical thought, did not omit, therefore, to enquire

is therefore pleasure, bliss, rest 5. Aesthetic experience into the relations and differences existing between it and

postulates, of necessity, the extinction of every practical religious experience. The first. to face this problem was,

desire and, therefore, the submersion of the subject in the in all probability, Bhatta Nayaka, who maintained that

aesthetic object to the exclusion of all else. The appearance aesthetic experience, being characterised by the immersion

on the horizon of consciousness of practical desires and of the subject in the aesthetic object, to the exclusion of all else and therefore by a momentary interruption of ! needs, etc., breaks, ipso facto, the compactness of the aesthetic experience by intruding upon it external and his everyday life is akin to the beatitude of ecstasy or

dispersive elements, i.e., the so-called obstacles, which are the experience of brahman1. Any form of pleasure is an

raised by the disturbing influence of the ego". epiphany, even if distant and colourless, of the divine

The examination of the relationship between aesthetic beatitude, which is the very essence of consciousness 1.

experience and religious and mystic experience, to which Aesthetic experience, being characterised by disinterested and impersonal pleasure, is a modality sui generis of the unbounded beatitude that appears to the yogin in 1) Cf. p. 59, n. 1, below. 9) Cf. pp. 77, 96, etc., below. 3) Cf. c.g .. p. 77, below. 4) Cf. pp. 77 f., below. 1) Cf. pp. 54 ff., below. 9) Cf. p. 87, n. 2, bolow. [xxI ] [ xxm ]

INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION

his ecstasy and, in his eyes, transforms samsāra into nirvăņa. The mysterious conversion of pain into plea- sciousness. Art is not absence of life-every element of

sure, which accompanies the full realization of one's life appears in aesthetic experience-but it is life itself,

own Self, is to be found equally in aesthetic experience, pacified and detached from all passions 1). Further de-

which possesses the magical power of transfiguring votion (which is a preliminary and unaivoidable mo-

the greatest sadness into the disinterested pleasure ment of religious experience) postulates the complete

of contemplation. Pain, which is mobility, inquietude, abandon of the subject to the object of worship, God,

has no place in aesthetic experience, which is rest, lysis Parameśvara9, who, although being immanent and con-

and the fulfilment of all desires-unless it is converted substantial, according to Abhinavagupta, with the thought

( magically into pleasure1. Abhinavagupta, while accepting, which thinks Him, becomes in the religious moment as

on the one hand, the solution put forward by Bhatta if transcendent to it and separate from it 3). The purpose

Nayaka, did not fail, on the other, to show up clearly the of the yogin is to identify himself with this transcendental

boundary lines which separate the state of mystical con- object. Religious devotion implies therefore a constant

sciousness from that of aesthetic consciousness. Religious drive towards an end which is outside it and, as such, is

experience, he argued, marks the complete disappearance the very antithesis of aesthetic experience, which is per-

of all polarity, the lysis of all dialexis in the dissolving fect self-sufficiency.

fire of God: Sun and Moon, day and night, good and evil What is the nature of poetic language? This problem

are consumed in the ardent flame of consciousness. The attracted the attention, in the 9th century, of a rhetorician

yogin remains, as it were, isolated in the compact solitude and philosopher by the name of Anandavardhana ". In

of bis consciousness, far beyond any form of discursive a justly famous book, on which Abhinavagupta was to

thought". In aesthetic experience, however, the feelinge comment a century and a half later, called the Dhvanya-

and the facts of everyday life, even if they are transfigured, loka, Anandavardhana reached certain conclusions which

are always present. In respect of its proper and irriducible were accepted, with some rare exceptions, by all later

character, therefore, which distinguishes it from any form .Indian aesthetic thinkers. Poetic language, he says, is dif-

of ordinary consciousness, aesthetic experience is not of 1) A. Bh., I, p. 340 (cf. Raghavan, p. 104): totra sarvarasānām sāntaprāya a discursive order. On the other hand, as regards its con- māsvādah, visayobhyo sipariorttyā | tent-which is nothing but ordinary life purified and freed 2) The bhakti, religioas devotion, is paramefvaravisayavaivafyasamdvefarüpd

from every individual relationship-aesthetic consciousness (I.P.V.V., I, p. 25). Cf. p. 100, below. ) In the very moment that thought (rimeria, samuit, ete.), which, in is no different from any other form of discursive con- reality, is nothing but subjeet, becomes the object of thought (io., when it is taught, meditated upon, ete.), it transforms itself into the images of Ego (aham), Self (atman), Consciousness (samvid), God (Ttoara, Paramefvara,

1. Cf. p. 90, below. Sioa), ete. This concept is fully developed and discussed in the I.P.V.V. 2) Cf. p. 100, below; 7.P.V.V., III, pp. 850-1. and in the 7.P.V., I, 5, d. 15-17. Cf. also the I.P.V.V., I pp. 55, 56. 4) Cf. p. 59. n. 1, below. [xxIY ]

INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION

ferent from the language of prose: it arouses in the reader further usefulness. The poetic word, on the contrary, is echoes and feelings-in a word, aesthetic experience- an end in itself and, once read and tasted, loses nothing foreign to prose, whose value is purely informative and didactic. The words in a prose text have, according to of its intrinsic value, but remains, as it were, virgin and intact 1). Art, Abhinavagupta says, in contradiction to Indian linguistics, two or, in the view of some writers, Bhațța Näyaka and to tradition in general, is not instruc- three powers, of which the chief one is the power of deno- tive, except indirectly, in so far as it sharpens the ae- tation (abhidha), the faculty, that is, of denoting a given sthetic sensibility and, therefore, the consciousness 2). object. Clearly, the power to arouse aesthetic experience : While the aesthetic experience, which concerns the cannot be reduced to this. Anandavardhana conceives ae- spectator above all, was receiving so much attention, Indian sthetic experience in terms of a power (of a function, vyapara, oftti) which makes manifest, unexpectedly and thought did not neglect to examine the creative moment,

without any noticeable bridge, a new sense, independent in which the poet gives life and breath to his work. The chief thinkers to study the nature of the birth of a work of the conventional sense. To this new sense, which is of poetry were Anandavardhana and Bhatta Tota and later none other than Rasa, this school gave the name, which Abhinavagupta, his immediate disciple. "In the infinite is difficult to translate, of dhvani, sound, or, more speci- sea of poetry "-writes Anandavardhana-"the poet is fically, rasadhvani, the sound of Rasa. In his commentary, the true and sole creator and as it pleases him to create Abhinavagupta goes on to specify the relationship which so the whole grows and is transformed "". The poet exists between the words and Rasa. This is neither a is at once he who sees (the seer, rsi) and he who is naturalistic relationship between cause and effect nor a able to express that which he sees (varnanānipuna)". gnoseological relationship between the communicating sign Rasa, the aesthetic state of consciousness, belongs, in and the thing communicated, but a relationship between reality, to the poet alone; it is nothing but his " genera- what he calle-so as to distinguish the aesthetic fact from lized " consciousness 5). It fills him entirely with itself any other-manifestor and manifested. Rasa is neither and is translated spontaneously into poetic expression, caused nor made known by the poetic word, but is mani- like a liquid which overflows from a vase or like the natu- fested by it. Aesthetic experience, manifested (and not ral or pre-discursive manifestation of a state of mind produced nor expressed) by the poetic word, is not in a (interjections, exclamations, etc.)6). In other words, ar- relationship of cause and effect with that which precedes 1) Cf. p. 59, n. 1, below. and follows it, but marks, as it were, a magical break in 9) Cf. p. 114, n. 2, below. the web of relationships of which everyday life, samsara, ) Dh.A., p. 498.

is woven. The prose word, Abhinava says, is simply an 4) Cf. the stansas by Bhatta Tota, quoted by H.C., p. 432. 5) A.Bh., I, p. 295: kavigatasādhārantbhūtasamvinmūlas ca kāoyapu- instrument of information and, once it has fulfilled its rahsaro nataryāpāras, saiva ca samvit paramārthato rasab | tasks, that is to say, once it has been perceived, has no 6) Dh .. L., p. 86: rasaparipārnakumbhoccalanavac cittavrttinişyandasvabhā- savägvilåpådivac ca ... Poetry, says A.G., is rasasamuccalanasvabhāvā (cf.

[xXVI ] [ xxvII ]

INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION

tistic creation is the direct or unconventional expression of a feeling or passion "generalized", that is, freed may properly be called creative-the poet is fully occupied

from all distinctions in time and space and therefore by the fatiguing necessity to give birth; in the second, he

from all individual relationships and practical interests steps outside himself, as it were, and contemplates his

by an inner force within the poet himself, the creative own work with serenity in the same way as the ordinary

or artistic intuition (pratibha)1). This state of conscious- spectator 1). The force which makes possible the magical conversion ness expressed in the poem, etc., is transferred to the of the passions into Rasa, freeing them thus of time and actor, or the reciter, and to the spectator9. Born in the heart of the poet, it flowers, as it were, in the space, is the creative intuition, pratibha. This power is none other than the same consciousness, the same Self. actor and bears fruit in the spectator3). All three, in In the majority of men it does not succeed in liberating the serene contemplation of the work of art form in itself from the chain of relationships and practical interests reality a single knowing subject, fused together by the which condition and constrict it, but, in the poet, it burns same sensations and the same purified joy ". with a purified light-to shine out finally in all its fullness Some theorists who came after Abhinava say that the in the intuition of the saints 3. The creation of a work moment of creation is not only joy but also toil and inner of art is equal to the creation of a whole world which anxiety and, in this sense, they distinguish two phases, all at once opens in the creative intuition of the poet. In the first of these phases-and this is the moment which 1) Cf. H.C., viveka, p. 4: kaver api bhāvakāvasthāyām eva rasāsvādah sam- Dh.A.L., p. 87). A verse by Bhetta Nayaka, quoted by A.G. (Dh.A.L., p. 87) padyate prthag ova hi kavitoad bhavakatvam | says: M.C. observes (ad K.P., p. 7) that, in the moment of creation, the poet is yavat pürno na caitena tovan naiva vamaty amum | immered in pain, harassed by the thought of his work (kavyarthacintanapara). 1) A. Bh., I, p. 346: kavch varnanānipunasya yah (ecil. bhavo) antargato It is not to be excluded that this concept also goes back to A.G. (it was 'nådipräktanasamskdrapratibhānamayo, na tu laukikasişayajah, desakalādibhe- discussed perhaps in his Kovyakautukavivarana, now lost, which trented fally dåbhäras sarvasädhöraptbhävenåsvädayogyas tam bhövayan asvådayogytkurvan ... of artistic crestion). In the Dh.A.L., p. 96, A.G. says thet the poet cannot The text given by A. Bh. is in a poor state of preservation. The insertions saffer-in the sense that he cannot be a prey to any ordinary passion- sädhåranam tadāpi (for sadharanataya?) after kaves and ragante eva after vifa- but this does not mean to say that he cannot be, at the same time, worried yajah, which I have omitted, are incomprebensible. I have quoted the tert and harassed, as it were, by the effort of creation. as it has been handed down by tradition (cf. Dh.A.L., comm., p. 498). ) This concept is expressed in the T.I., XI, pp. 60-62 (cf. M.V.V., In the A.Bh., II, p. 339, A.G. says that aesthetic sensibility (sahrdayatva, wv. 1031 onwards): literally the consent of the heart) is none other than the capacity to identify oneself with the hcart of the poet (kavihrdayatddatmypattiyogyata). yatha yatha cakrtakam tadrapam atiricyate |

3. Cf. N.S., VI, v. 42. A. Bh., I, p. 295: jato orkşasthaniyam kavyam | tathā tathā camatkāratāratamyam vibhavyate tatra puşpādisthāniyo 'šhinayādivyāpāraņ | tatra phalasthāniyah sāmājikara- ädyamaylyavarnöntarnimagne cottarottare |

sāsvādaț | samkete pūrvapurvāmšamajjane pratibhābhidah 1 4) Cf., for example, the verse by Bhatte Tota, quoted by A.G. (Dh.A.L., ädyodrekamahattve'pi pratibhatmani nighitah |

p. 92): dhruvam kavitvavaktrtvasālitām yanti sarvatah I nāyakasya kaveh srotuh samāno' nubhavas tatab | yavad dhāmani samketanikārakalanojjhite | visrāntas cinmaye kim kim na vetti na karoti ca l1 [ XXVII ] [ xxIx ]

INTRODUCTION INTRODUCTION

This creative intuition is the same conscioussness, in the sciousness and discursive consciousness1). In these stanzas, form of a creative vocality1), which gives life to the life- consciousness is described as being of two sorts; discursive less and withdraws life from the living". It is an inex- ; consciousness, which is consciousness of the universal, and haustible treasure and source of new forms and new fan- direct consciousness, which precedes the activity of the tasies$, no less real, although on a different plane, than mind, transcends the domain of language and is thus those which populate and vary everyday life, the samsara. consciousness of the particular. "The object of direct From this point of view, artistic intuition is a particular perception "-says the last of these stanzas-"is the hypostasis of universal or total intuition, that is to say, particular. This and no other is the object of the lan- of consciousness as a force which creates and continually guage of good poets, gifted with intuition". Intuition renews the Universe1). Three stanzas, quoted by Hema- is therefore a form of direct perception (prajña), says candra and probably taken from Bhatta Tota, clearly another stanza, which-while the poet is completely absor- define the unmistakeable characteristics of intuitive con- bed in the labour and the search that precede poetical creation-is born unexpectedly from contact with the

1. Consciousness in so far as pard vak, voice, supreme vocality, creative thing in se (svarūpa = svalaksana), that is to say, before word; cf. A.Bh., p. 4. any mental construction. In an image borrowed from 9) Cf. Dh.7., p. 498: mystical thought, poetic intuition is described as the third bhānăn acetanăn api cetanavae cetanān acctanavat | eyavahārayati yatheşjam sukavih kavye svatantratayā I eye of Siva, in virtue of which one perceives by direct 8) Pratibha is defined thue in a famous verse by Bhatta Tota intuition, independently, that is, of discursive knowledge, prajfa navanavollekhaālint pratibhā matā | every form of existence, past, present and future". The Pratibha is a form of prajna, intuitive consciousness. Prajña and pratibhā, logical and practical categories of language are a diaphragm, in the ordinary (not aesthetic) sense of the word describe the sudden knowledge an obstacle which comes between the reality and our con- of a future thing (for example, 'Tomorrow I shall see my brother', cf. infra, p. 58). Rajafekhara (K.M., IV) distinguishes between three forme of con- sciousness. The difference between the poetical and the sciousness; smpti, memory, which is the consciousness of things passed; mati, consciousness which refers to things present and prajnta, intuition, which refere 1) H.C., viveka, p. 380: to things future. Aesthetic intuition is like a form of direct perception (pratyak- ucyate vastunas tāvad doairüpyam iha vidyate | pakalpa; on thie term. cf. infra, p. 70, n. 1) of a non-discarsive character (nirvi- tatraikam anyasåmānyam yad vikalpaikagocarah i kalpa); cf. H.C., viveka, p. 380, which derives without donbt from A.G. sa eva' sarvasabdānām vişayah parikirtitab | l) Anandavardhana (Dh.A., p. 91) says that poetic intuition is a particular ata eoabhidhiyante dhydmalam bodhayanty alam form of pratibha (pratibhavisepam). A.G.'s comment (Dh.A.L., p. 92) is: visiştam aşya yad rāpam tat pratyakasya gocarab | pratibhā apūrvavastunirmāņakamā prajnā | tarya viseso sa eoa satkavigirām gocarah pratibhābhuvām 1 rasävesavaişadyasaundaryam kāvyakşamatvam | 9) H.C., viseka, p. 380: The concept of pratibha is identified in faiva metaphysics with that of con- rasånugunasabdārthacintāstimitacetasab | sciousness as creative emission (visarga): cf., p. es., T.I., V., p. 432: kşanam svarūpasparsotthā prajflaiva pratibha kavch # ... sisarganandadharaya | sildam tad eva sad vifvam salvad navana- sā hi cakpur bhagavatas trilyam iti giyate | văyate I yens sakşatkaroty eşa bhavams traikalyavartinab I

[xxx ] [ xxxx ]

INTRODUCTION

ordinary language consists in this, that the former is devoid of these categories and therefore attains the reality before its solidification into the modes of discursive thought. In this sense, the poetical language is related to other un- conventional forms of expression, namely interjections, into- nation of voice and, on the religious plane, the mantras 1). After Abhinavagupta, the study of aesthetics continued in India up po the present day, but without receiving any further creative stimulus. Anandavardhana, Bhatta Nā- yaka, Bhatta Tota and Abhinava are still the most charac- teristic exponents of this subject and their thought, although at times uncertain and ingenuous, reaches, with Abhinavagupta, conclusions which are still valid today and even relatively novel to western thought. The conception TEXT

of art as an activity and an independent spiritual expe- [A. Bh., I, pp. 274-287] rience, freed of practical interest, which the intuition of Kant perceived for the West, was already, in 10th century India, an object of study and controversy. Poetry, said Anandavardhana and Abhinavagupta is inextingui- shable: it exists and will exist for ever. Like love, it has kindled and will continue to kindle the hearts of man with new and pulsing life"; it is an essential and inde pendent part of human nature and the poets, who will never cease to tap its source, far from exhausting it, only purify and enrich it with new and ever-changing expe- riences 3).

1. Cf. P.T.V, p. 202: eta eva hi [scil. svarāh] cittavrttisūcakā nādātmakāh karunāsrngārasāntādikām cittavrttim akrandanacātukastutyādau kevalā vā yoni- varņaniviştā vā tiryaktattadaharjātādişu api prathamata evāpatantab samketa- vighnādinairapeksyeņaiva samvidāsannavartitvāt svarakākvādirūpatām afnuvā- nāh prakāfayanti | 2) Dh.A.L., p. 540. 3) Dh.A., pp. 545-6.

[ xxxI ] * 1. - GnozI, The casthetie experienes, etc.

evam kramahetum abhidhāya rasavişaya'lakşaņasū- tram āha " vibhavanubhavavyabhicārisamyogād rasaniş- pattiḥ "3 | atra bhațțalollațaprabhrtayas tāvad evam vyā- cakhyuḥ' | vibhāvādibhih samyogo 'rthāt sthāyinah, tato rasanişpattiņ | tatra vibhāvāć® cittavrtteh sthāyyātmikāya utpattau kāraņam | anubhāvāś ca na rasajanyā atra vi- vakşitāļ, teşām rasakāraņatvena gaņanānarhatvāt, api tu bhāvānām eva ye 'nubhāvā | vyabhicāriņas ca cittavrt- tyātmakatvād yady api na sahabhāvinaļ sthāyinā, tathāpi vāsanātmateha tasya vivakņitā | drețānte 'pi vyañjanādi- madhye kasyacid vāsanātmakatā sthāyivad anyasyodbhū- tatā vyabhicärivat® | tena sthāyy eva vibhāvānubhava- dibhir upacito rasah | sthayi tv' anupacitah | sa cobhayor api mukhyayā vrttyā rāmādāv anukārye 'nukartari ca națe rāmādirūpatānusamdhānabalād iti 8 | cirantanānām cāyam eva pakgah® | tathā hi daņdinā svālamkāralakşaņe 'bhyadhāyi 10 " ratiņ śņngāratām gatā rūpabāhulyayogena 11 " iti, ity āruhya parām koțim kopo raudrātmatām gatah 18 | ityādi ca" |

1 D; G reads rasavişayam ll " evam ... is omitted by H.C. I . N.S., VI, prose after v. 33 [ G; H.C .: tatra bhaffalollatas tāvad evam vyacakpate || " I prefer; G, ete .: vibhavaś, equally good [ . Cf. N.S., VI, prose after v. 33 (A. Bh., I, pp. 288 ff.). H.C. omits drifante 'pi ... [ [bhava]to anupacitah; D: sthayt bhavary anupacitah I ' H.C .: G: nhây!

'py' anukarye 'nukartary api [ei]cārānusamdhānabalad iti [ ' G, etc .: D: sa cobhayo

nånam ... is omitted by H.C. I . G; ciranto-

gives only: sotha caha dandt ! " G: D: ... dandinapy alankareo: H.C. u K.Zd., II. v. 281: prak pritir darfitā seyam rotih srngaratam gata | rüipabahulyayogena tad idam rasavad vacab | H.C. ro- places Oyogens with oyogatab I " K.Ad., II, v. 283; G: adhiruhya ...; H.C .: druhya ca ... These readings are also admdsaible [! ed by H.C. D 1a G; ityādi ca is omitt-

[3]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

etan neti śrisankukah |1 vibhāvādyayoge sthāyino lingā- bhāvenāvagatyanupapatte, bhāvānām pūrvam abhidheya- hrdayasphuțanabhayārtai roditum 1 abhyarthyate sacivaih | tāprasangāt, sthitadasāyam lakşaņäntaravaiyarthyāt, man- damanda tara mandatamamādh yasthyādyanantyapatteh . ityevamādau na soko 'bhineyo 'pi tv abhidheyab | hāsyarase çodhātvābhāvaprāpteļ, kāmāvasthāsu dasasv asankhyarasabhavādiprasangāt, sokasya prathamam tīvrat- bhati* patito likhantyās

vaņ kālāt tu māndyadaréanam, krodhotsāharatīnām amar- tasyā bāşpāmbućīkarakaņaughab |

şasthairyasevāviparyaye hrāsadarsanam iti viparyayasya svedodgama iva karatala-

drsyamänatväc ca | tasmād dhetubhir vibhāvākhyaiļ kā- samsparfad eşa me vapuşi* |

ryaiś cānubhāvatmabhiļ sahacārirūpais ca vyabhicāribhiķ ity anena tu vākyena5 svārtham abhidadbatā udayana- prayatnārjitatayā krtrimair api tathānabhimānyamānair gataḥ sukhātmā ratiļ sthāyibhāvo· 'bhiniyate na tū- anukartrsthatvena lingabalataņ pratīyamāna sthāyibhāvo cyate | avagamanasaktir hy abhinayanam' vācakatvād mukhyarämādigatasthäyyanukaraņarūpab, anukaraņarūpa- anya | ata eva sthāyipadam sutre bhinnavibhaktikam api tvād* eva ca nāmāntareņa vyapadişțo rasa | vibhāvā hi muninā noktam8 tena ratir anukriyamāņā śrngāra iti kāvyabalād anusamdheyāh', anubhāvāņ fikşātah, vyabhi- tadātmakatvam tatprabhavatvam ca yuktam® | arthakri- 4. .i cariņaņ krtrimanijānu*bhāvārjanabalāt | sthāyī tu kāvya- yapi mithyajnanad drețā 10 | balād api nānusamdheyaņ | ratiļ śoka ityādayo hi sabdā maņipradīpaprabhayor maņibuddhyabhidhavatob | ratyādikam abhidheyikurvanty abhidhanatvena, na tu vācikābhinayarūpatayāvagamayanti | na hi vāg eva vāci- mithyājňānāvićeşe 'pi1 viseşo 'rthakriyām prati18 i

kam api tu tayā nirvīttam, angair ivāngikam | tena | iti | na cātra nartaka eva sukhiti pratipattib, nāpy

vivrddhātmapy agādho 'pi duranto 'pi mahān api | ayam eva rāma iti, na cāpy ayam na sukhīti, nāpi rāmab

vādaveneva jaladhiņ sokah krodhena pīyate6 || syād vā na vāyam iti", na cāpi tatsadréa iti | kim tu samyanmithyasaméay asādrsyapratītibhyo vilakgaņā citra- iti | tathā | turagādinyāyena1 yah sukhī rāma asāv ayam iti pratītir

sokena® krtastambhas ? astiti | yad "5 aha |

tathā sthito yena vardhitākrandaih8 ; ' H.C .; G. D: arditum; D, in a note aditum [ The two last pada of this stansa are omitted by D [ ' Unidentified stanza. a Metre: dryd I

1 G; H.C. and M.C. p. 65 add tatha hi [ . H.C .; G: mandataratama°, · Harga, Ratnåvalt, II, 11 0 D reade: bhati patito likhontyd iti anens

non inadmissible (manda-Ptara-Ptama) I · G, ete .; D: mukhyarāmādigata- tu såkyenn ! saktir hy apagamanat I . H.C .; G: ratisthayt(yir)bhavo l . G; H.C .: nopâttam [ ' G; H.C .: avagamond

sthåyyanukoronaräpatoad 1 . D, H.C .; G: kavyebalonuo ' Unidentified . G; iti ... is omitted

stansa. D omits the two first pada of this stanza | · Motre: aryå || by H.C. [ H.C .; G: mithyajfianadritd; D: mithyajfanddritd = H.C .;

" H.C .; G: krtah stambhab I . H.C .; G: yo 'navasthitakrandaih; D: yo G: ogiseso 'pi I) it in round brackets. 1s P.V., II, v. 57. This stanza is omitted by D; G quotes

'vasthitäkrandaib ! thydo ... is omitted by D U 1a napi ramah ... is omitted by D I " H.C .; G: tod 1e samyańmi-

[4] [5]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. pratibhāti na samdeho na tattvam na viparyayab | dhīr asāv ayam ity asti nāsāv evāyam ity api || mukhyāmukhyāvalokane1 ca tadanukaraņapratibhāsab |

viruddhabuddhyasambhedād 1 avivecitaviplavahª | na ca rāmagatām ratim upalabdhapürviņab kecit | etena

yuktyā paryanuyujyeta sphurann anubhavah kayā |* iti | rāmānukārī nața ity api nirastaņ pravādah | atha nața- gatā cittavīttir eva pratipannā satī ratyanukāra śņngāra tad idam apy antastattvasunyam na' vimardakşamam ity ucyate tatrāpi kimātmakatvena sā pratīyata iti cin- ity upādhyāyāh5 | tathā hy anukaraņarūpo rasa iti yad tyam | nanu pramadādibhiļ kāraņaiļ kațākşādibhiņ kā- ucyate tat 1) kim sāmājikapratītyabhiprāyeņa, 2) uta ryaiḥ dhrtyādibhić ca sahacāribhir lingabhūtair yā laukiki An națābhiprāyeņa, 3) kim vā * vastuvrttavivecakavyākhyātį- kāryarūpā kāraņarūpāa sahacārirūpā ca cittavrttiļ' pra- buddhisamavalambanena yathähur " vyākhyātārah khalv tītiyogyā tadātmakatvena sā națacittavrttiļ pratibhāti | evam vivecayanti®" iti, 4) atha bharatamunivacanānu- hanta tarhi ratyākāreņaiva pratipanneti dūre ratyanu- sāreņa | karaņatāvācoyuktiņ | nanu vibhāvādayo 'nukārye pāra- 1) adyah' pakşo 'samgatah | kimcid dhi pramāņe- mārthikā, iha tv anukartari na tatheti višeşah | astv nopalabdham tad anukaraņam iti śakyam vaktum | evam, kiņ tu te5 vibhāvādayo 'tatkāraņātatkāryātatsa- yathā evam asau surām pibatīti surāpānānukaraņatvena hacararūpāe api' kāvyasikşādibalopakalpitāh® krtrimāḥ payabpānam pratyakşāvalokitam pratibhāti | iha ca nața- santah kim krtrimatvena sāmājikair grhyante na vā | gatam kim tad upalabdham yat sa ity anukaraņatayā" yadi grhyante, tadā taih katham rater avagatih | nanv bhātiti cintyam | taccharīram tannişțham pratićirşakādi ata eva tat pratīyamānam ratyanukaraņam | mugdha- romanca1gadgadikādi bhujākşepacalana"prabhrti bhrük- buddheh· | kāraņāntaraprabhaveşu hi kāryeşu su6i- şepakațākņādikam ca na rates cittavrttirūpatayā1nukā- kşitena 10 tathajnane 1 vastvantarasyānumanam tavad ratvena kasyacit pratibhāti | jadatvena bhinnendriyagrā- yuktam | asusikşitena 18 tu tasyaiva prasiddhasya kä- hyatvena bhinnādhikaraņatvena ca 18 tato 'tivailakşaņyāt | raņasya | yathā1 vrscikaviseşād gomayasyaivānumānam

1 H.C: G, P. p. 417: viruddhabuddhisambhedad " H.C., M.C., p. 67; vrécikasyaiva 1 tat param 15 mithyājūānam | yatrāpi li- G: osamplavah, equally good; some texts (cf., o.g., K.P., Sanskrit Serics, LXXXVIII, p. 107) give opikriyab I Trivandram * On these stansos 1 G; H.C .: mukhyāvalokane [ · G. M.C., p. 70; kāraparāpā is omitt- uco tranalation, p. 38 I 4 na is omitted by D [ . G; D: iy upå- od by H.C. [ . H.C., M.C .. p. 70; cittavrttip is omitted by Gi . G. dhyayah: H.C .: iti bhapatotab I . P.V svavrtti, MS., loaf 23 b, L 2 (cf. Ra. etc .; D: ratyadikaranaiva . H.C .: G: s hi; D: tarhi [ . H.C. (G hnla Ståkrtyāyann's edition, p. 170): sydkhydtārah khale coam vivecayanti na gives the same reading in a note): G, M.C., p. 70, P, p. 418: anantakāranā- eyavahartārak | te tu svlambanam esārthakriyäyogyam manyamanå driyavi- nantakårydnantaschacararüp8 i kolpydo arthas ektkrtya pravartante | This passago belongs to the commentary anukåryafikşādi° " api is omitted by D I . G, etc .; D: · H.C., M.C., p. 70; G: ratyanukaranam buddheb kāra- to stansas 70-72. , G; H.C. adds tatra [ . D, H.C .; G: promdpopa- nam; P, p. 418: ratyanukaranabuddhes kāraņam i 10 H.C .; G adde [na] . M.C .. p. 69, H.C., in a noto; G: tadanukaranatayd: D: sad after sufikpitena; D: fikpitena na ! 11 G: H.C. ojfate ( arukaranatayā; H.C .: yad ratyanakaranatayd; P, p. 417: yad anukaranatayå || labdham 1 astu, fi° | 18 G, ete .; D: tathd I u G, ote .; D: 14 G: gomayasycvanumanam ...; D: " H.C .; G: romdficako° " H.C; G: palana° I 1s G; H.C .: ratef cit- oricikas caisa; H.C .: oricikasyairs ed; P, p. 418 paraphrases: gomoyasyoio8- tosrtirdpayd anu°; M.C., p. 69: cittaoruirüparater anu° 1 1s G; ca is numānam, eršcikasişayatvena tajjiidnam ksvalam mithyājnānam t s G.

omitted by H.C. Q ete .; D: paroo. param - kevalam; cf. I.P.V., II, p. 73: sat [scil. pramdnam] param [= kevalam] mifrtkārepa tepo ābhāsepu grhttagrahi na pramānam I [6] [7]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

ngajñanam 1 mithyā tatrāpi na tadābhāsānumānam yu- etad1 evānusaņdhānam ucyate, tarhi sthāyini sutarām ktamª | na hi bāşpād8 dhūmatvena jñātād anukārapra- anusamdhānam syāt | tasyaiva hi mukhyatvena asminn tibhāsamānād api lingāt tadanukārānumānam ktam5 | dhūmānukāratvena® hi jnāyamānān nīhārān nā- yu- ayam iti sāmājikānām pratipattiņ | yas tu* vāg vācikam8 ityādinā bhedābhidhānasamrambhagarbho mahiyan abhina- pıž guyanukārajapāpuñjapratītir' drşțā | * nanv akruddho 'pi yarūpatāvivekah krtah sa uttaratra svāvasare carcayi- națaļ kruddha iva bhāti | satyam, kruddhena sadršah şyate5 | tasmāt sāmājikapratītyanusāreņa sthāyyanukara- sādrsyam ca bhrukuțyādibhir gor8 iva gavayena mu- nam rasa 6 ity asat | khādibhir iti naitāvatānukāraļ kaścit | na cāpi sāmā- jikānām sādrsyamatir asti | sāmājikānām ® ca na bhāva- 2) na cāpi națasyettham pratipattih rāmam taccitta-

sünyā nartake pratipattir ity ucyate | atha ca tadanukāra- vṛttiņ vānukaromīti | sadṛsakaraņam hi tāvad anukara-

pratibhāsa iti riktā vācoyuktiņ 10 | yac coktam rāmo 'yam ņam anupalabdhaprakrtinā? na fakyam kartum | atha paścātkaraņam anukaraņam, tal loke 'py anukaraņātma- ity asti pratipattih, tad api yadi tadātve' tiniscitam 11 ta- duttarakālabhāvibādhakavaidhuryābhāve katham na ta- tātiprasaktā 8 | atha na niyatasya kasyacid anukārab, api tüttamaprakṛteņ śokam anukaromīti°, tarhi keneti cin- ttvajnānam syāt | bādhakasadbhāve vā katham na mithyā- jñānam | vāstavena ca vrttena bādhakānudaye 'pi mithyā- tyam | na tāvac chokena tasya tadabhāvāt | na cāśrupā- tādinā sokasyanukārah, tadvailakşaņyād ity uktam | iyat 10 jnanam eva syat | tena "viruddhabuddhyasambhedad "" ity asat | nartakantare 'pi ca13 rāmo 'yam iti pratipattir tu syat, uttamaprakṛter ye sokānubhāvās tān anukaromīti |

asti | tatać ca rāmatvam sāmānyarāpam ity āyātam | yac taträpi kasyottamoprakrte | yasya kasyacid iti cet, so 'pi visişțatām vinā katham buddhāv āropayitum sakyab | ya cocyate vibhävāļ kāvyād " annsamdhiyante tad api na evam roditīti cet, svātmāpi madhye națasyānupravişța iti vidmah | na hi mameyam sītā kācid iti pratipattir 15 na- țasya | atha sāmājikasya tathā pratītiyogyāh kriyanta ity galito 'nukāryānukartbhāvaļ "1 | kim ca națaņ šikņāvaćāt svavibhavasmaraņāc cittavrttisādhāraņībhāvena18 hrdaya- samvādāt kevalam " anubhāvān" pradarfayan kāvyam

' D, H.C., M.C., p. 70; G: dhamalingajtidnam ! * G; H.C .: totrâ- upacitakākuprabhrtyupaskāreņa 15 pathams cesțata ity etā- pi ... ayuktam; P, p. 418: tatrapi ... yuktam; D: cbhyasanumanam B . G. ete .: D: bappoo I G, ete .; D: jfánad I . H.C. porapbrases: no hi vanmātre 'sya 16 pratitir na tv anukäram vedayate | kān-

bäşpåd dhälmatvene jiidtād agnyanukārānumnām, tadanukratvena pratibhå- samndd api lingān na tadanukārānumānam yuktam ... ! dhilmdkåratvena G, ete .: D: 1 G; H.C., M.C., p. 71: etdoad ' D; G: yat tu l · Cf. supra,

D: natyo' nukarajabapurpapratitir ' H.C., M.C., p. 70; G: ndtyd(gnya?)japapurpapratitir; . H.C., M.C., p. 71; G: gaur . G, · I propose; G: Ogarbhamahtyan ...; D: bhedaabhidhanasarab ... Mnayabhinaya | " yas tu vag vacikam ... is omitted by H.C. " p. 4 B1 . G: ete .; M.C., p. 71 paraphrases: ato hetoh sabhyanām ... ! 1e G, etc .; M.C., H.C .: rasa l] nātmiketi prasaktā į " G, etc .; D: "prakrtnam l · G, etc .; D: anukara- p. 71 paraphrases: athe ca tadanukdrapratipattir iti svavacanavirodhah i 11, D . H.C., M.C., 71; G: anukarotti 10 G; H.C .: (the ovagraha added by me); G: taddtveti nifcitom: P, p. 458: sadatoe iti nilci- tom; H.C. saddt-ve nifcitam yat tu syat ... I 11 G. etc .; D: obhedoh I cittao || 1 G; H.C .: kevalan 1s G: H.C .: savibhavasmarac-

Cf. sapra, p. 6 0 " D, H.C .; G: obuddhi(ddhyo?)satabhedat. u4 H.C .; G: anubhavān I " G. H.C .; D: kävyasamucitakākuprabhrtyupasamskārena 1 *e G; H.C .: ctåvanmtra- köryad I 1 G; ca is omitted by H.C. and M.C. [ " G, ete .; D: " G; H.C., M.C., p. 71 svatmlyatvena pratipattir B

[8] [9]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

taveşānukāravad dhi na rāmaceşțitasyānukārab | etac ca yena tv abhyadhāyi sukhaduņkhajananasaktiyuktā vişa- prathamādhyaye 'pi darfitam asmābhiļ 1 yasāmagrī bāhyaiva sāmkhyadrsa sukhaduhkhasvabhāvo 3) nāpi vastutvanusāreņa' tadanukāratvam', asamve- rasaņ | tasyāņ ca sāmagryām dalasthānīyā vibhāvāh, sa- dyamānasya* vastuvrttatvānupapatteb | yac ca vastu- mekārakā anubhāvavyabhicāriņah, sthāyinas tu tatsāma- vrttam tad daršayişyāmaļ5 | grījanyā antarāh sukhaduļkhasvabhāvā iti | tena “sthāyi- 4) na ca munivacanam evamvidham asti kvacit sthāy- bhāvān rasatvam upaneşyāma "1 ityādāv upacāram aņ- Ami yanukaraņam rasa® iti | * nāpi lingam atrārthe' muner gikurvatā granthavirodham svayam eva budhyamānena upalabhyate | pratyuta dhruvā®gānatālavaicitryalāsyāngo- düşaņāvişkaraņamaukharyāt * prāmāņiko janab * parirak- pajivanam nirūpaņādi viparyaye° lingam iti samdhyangā- şita iti kim asyocyate | yat tv anyat tatpratītivaişamya- dhyayante vitaniyāmah 10 | " saptadvīpānukaraņam " 11 prasangādi tat kiyad atrocyatām | ityādi tv anyathāpi sakyagamanikam iti | tadanukāre 'pi bhațțanāyakas tv āha | raso na pratīyate, notpadyate, ca kva nāmāntaram kāntaveşagatyanukaraņādau 1ª | nābhivyajyate | svagatatvena hi pratītau karuņe duķkhit- yac cocyate varņakair haritālādibhiņ samyujyamāna eva vam syāt | na ca sā pratītir yuktā sītāder avibhāvatvāt, gaur ityadi, tatra yady abhivyajyamana ity artho 'bhi- svakäntāsmrtyasamvedanāt, devatādau sādhāraņīkaraņā- pretas tad asat | na hi sindürādibhi pāramārthiko gaur yogyatvāt, samudrollanghanāder asädhāraņyāt | na ca tad- abhivyajyate 13 pradīpādibhir iva, kim tu tatsadróah sa- vato6 rāmasya smrtir anupalabdhatvāt | na ca sabdānu- mūhaviseșo nirvartyate | ta eva" hi sindūrādayo gavā- mānādibhyas tatpratītau lokasya sarasatā yuktā® pra- vayavasamnivesasadrśena samniveśavićeşeņāvasthitā go- tyakgād iva | nāyakayugalakāvabhāse hi pratyuta lajjāju- sadrg iti pratibhāsasya vişayo 15 naivam vibhāvādisamūho gupsāsprhādisvocitacittavrtty'antarodayavyagratayā kā ratisadréatāpratipattigrāhyah16 | tasmāt bhāvānukaraņam sarasatvakathāpi syät8 | paragatatvena tu pratītau tāța- rasa ity asat " | sthyam eva bhavet® | tan na pratītir anubhavasmrtyā- dirūpā rasasya yuktā | utpattāv api tulyam etad dūşaņam | 1 eac ca ... is omitted by H.C. Cf. A. Bh., I, p. 37 [ . G; H.C .: G. H.C .; D: tadanusdratoam ! . H.C .; G: o[nu]. 1 N.S., VI, prose after v. 50 (in a note); D: sthoyibhaönurasatvam ityo- samsedyamānasya; D: anusatavedyamānasya l · yac ca ... is omitted by * H.C .: G. P, p. 419: °maurkhyat [ ' G, ete .; H.C .: pra- H.C. Cf. infro, pp. 14 f. månikajanoh l . H.C., G (in round brackets followed by a note of inter- dåo ... I

. G: dhruoa° [ . G: H.C .: rasa I " Corr .: G: lingamā- trärthe rogation): G, P, p. 419: yat to atyantam nah pra°; D: ... tat kim yad atrocya- ch. XIX 1 11 N.S., I, v. 120 [ ' D; G: nirdponadi° 10 A. Bh., III, 1a G; D: tad anukare picatvona- tăm ( . G; H.C .: tattvato. Cf. Dh.A.L. p. 181: na cotsahadiman ramab mantaram (?) ... Text doubtful. kim ca natah ... is omitted by M.C .; napi smaryate ananubhatatoås i . H.C., P. p. 419; G: lokasya (G: Laukosya) lingam atrarthe ... is omitted by H.C. I "a G, etc .; D: gaur iti oyajyate I| saresatå prayuktă I 1s H.C .; G bas gosadrftti, perhaps " G. P. p. 419; H.C .: osoocitaoyti" ! " H.C, etc .; G. P. p. 418: ata era l G: lajjäjugupsāsprhädisvocitacinorrtyantarodayah | avyagratayākāfāsotvam . H.C .:

intended for gosadrsa iti, which reading would be better than that ladopted athåpi syat tan na; D: ... °antarodayamavyagratayākafa (?) rasatvamathāpi by me in the text. P, p. 418: gosadriatapratibhasasya vipayah; M.C., p. 72 paraphrases: gosadrg iti pratibhsam utpādayanti g "e G, etc .; D: sadrfa- sydt; P. p. 419 paraphrases: lajjäjugupsāsprhadisvocitacitavruyantarodayab syat, tan na prattiir. anubhavasmrtyadirüparasasya yukta . H.C .: G säpratigrāhyab I " G, etc .; H.C .: rasd i and D omit this sentence, which hes been probably added by H.C. # [ 10] [11]

R .. GNOLI THE AESTRETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

faktirūpatvena pūrvam sthitasya 1 pascād abhivyaktau gatiḥ syāt | na cāpratītam vastv asti vyavahāre yogyam1| vişayārjanatāratamyāpattiņ | svagataparagatatvādi ca pūr- athocyate pratitir asyaª bhogīkaraņam, tac ca drutya- vavad vikalpyam | tasmāt kāvye8 doşābhāvaguņālaņkā- disvarūpam3 | tad astu, tathāpi na tavanmātram | ramayatvalakşaņena, nāțye* caturvidhābhinayarūpeņa ni- yāvanto hi rasās tāvatya eva rasanātmanah pratītayo vidanijamohasaņkațatānivāraņakāriņā vibhāvādisādhā- bhogıkaraņasvabhāvāņ | sattvādiguņānām6 cāngāngivaici- raņīkaraņātmanābhidhāto dvitīyenāmśena bhāvakatvavyā- tryam anantam kalpyam® iti ka tritveneyatta | 4. B; pāreņa bhāvyamāno * raso 'nubhavasmṛtyādivilakșaņena6 bhāvanābhavya eșo 'pi śrūgāradigaņo hi yat |7 rajastamo'nuvedhavaicitryabalād ® drutivistaravikāsāt- manā' sattvodrekaprakāćānandamayanijasamvidviérānti- iti tu yat8 kāvyena bhāvyante rasā ity ucyate, tatra

lakşaņena8 parabrahmāsvādasavidhena bhogena param vibhāvādijanitacarvaņātmakāsvādarūpapratyayagocaratā-

bhujyata iti | yat saivaha° | pādanam® eva yadi bhāvanam 10 tad abhyupagamyata eva | yat tüktam | abhidha bhavana canya tad bhogikrtam 10 eva ca | abhidhadhamatām yāte sabdārthālamkrtī tatab I| bhävasamyojanävyangyaparasamvittigocarah |

bhāvanābhāvya eșo 'pi śrngārādigano hi yat " | āsvādanātmanubhavo rasab kavyartha ucyate " |

tad bhogīkrtarūpeņa vyāpyate siddhimān narah || 19 iti | iti tatra vyajyamānatayā vyangyo rakşyate 18 | anubha- vena13 ca tadvişaya iti mantavyam | nanv evam katham tatra pürvapakşo 'yam bhațțalollațapakşānabhyupaga- rasatattvam | āstām, kim kurmab | mād eva nābbyupagata iti taddūșaņam anutthanopahatam eva1 | pratītyādivyatiriktać ca samsāre ko bhoga iti na vid- ämnāyasiddhe " kim apurvam etat

mab | rasaneti cet, sāpi1 pratipattir eva, kevalam upāyavai- samvidvikāse 'dhigatāgamitvam | ittham svayamgrähyamahārhahetu- lakşaņyān nāmāntaram pratipadyatām, darfanānumitiéru- tyupamitipratibhānādināmāntaravat | nişpādanābhivyakti- dvandvena kim dūşayitā na lokab |

dvayanabhyupagame ca nityo va 'san15 vā rasa iti na16 trtiyā 1 G: H.C .: astitävyavahärayogyam, admisaible; the author perbaps wrote astttivyavahārayogyam | G: ratyādisvarūpam " G, ete .; D: prattrir iti rasasya i * Read. G, D: tävanta eva rasandtmanah [G adds * H.C .:

1 G, etc .; D: pürvasthitasya [ ' G, ctc .; P, p. 419: kdoyens [ · G. (raså?) after rasanā]; H.C .: tāvatya eva rasātmānah l ete .: P, p. 419: ntyens l · G, etc .; D: osankatanioārana° i . G. nåm (withont sattradio) g · G, etc .; D: gunå- . G, etc .; D: akalpyam I ' H.C., D; cf. etc .; D: 'nubhavas smpty" I · G, ctc .; P, p. 419: rajastomo'nanuvedho°. p. 12, n. 9 g " H.C .; tu ie omitted by G [ nam I "0 G; H.C .: yadi bhaved bhavanam I · H.C .; G: °gocaratåpa- Cf. Dh.A.L., p. 183 1 . H.C .; G, P, p. 419; hrdi vistāravikāsalakpanena; D: ativikasavistara°. Cf. Dh.A.L., pp. 183 and 189 g . H.C., D; G, P, 11 This stansa is quoted in this form in the Vyaktiviveka, p. 74 (read parasamvinto for parisamritio). p. 419: opilaksanena ! . H.C .; G pats the following two stanzas after iti G: samvedanäkhyavyangya(sva)parasamvittigocarah, ete .; D: samvedanākhyavyan- kå tritrencyattå (infra, p. 13). They are omitted by D I 10 G: H.C .: bho- gya[s tu] parasamvittigocarab | āsvādanātmānubhāvo rasah kāvyārtha ucyate [ Cf. gtkrtir, admissible [ 11 G; H.C. replaces hi yat with matah l 18 On P, p. 449. H.C. quotes a different stansa: samsorgādir yathā fåstra ckatvāt these stanzas sce tranalation, p. 57 0 1a G, etc .; D: Opagatam eoa || phalayogata | väkyårthas tadvad evātra šrňgārādt raso matah l| isi | tod asmā- " G, ete .; D: sapy atra prati° p " H.C .; G: 'sad l "0 H.C. etc .; no kam abhimatam coa I 1a G; D: lakpyate I1 1 Metre: indravajrā and upajāti of indravajrā and upendravajra I 1a G; D: anubhāvena || is omitted by G I [ 12 ] [ 13]

R. GNOLI THE ABSTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. ürdhvordham äruhya yad arthatattvam dhī pasyati śrāntim avedayanti1 | vyātmakād api sabdād adhikāriņo 1 'dhikāsti pratipattiņ | adhikārī cātra vimalapratibhānasālihrdayah 8 | tasya ca alam tad ādyaiņ parikalpitānām " grivābhangābhirāmam " iti "umāpi nīlālakā " iti vivekasopānaparamparāņām || "haras tu kimcit "5 ityadivakyebhyo vakyarthapratipat- citram nirālambanam eva manye ter® anantaram mānasī sākşātkārātmikā apahastitatattad- prameyasiddhau prathamavatāram vākyopāttakālādívibhāgā tāvat pratītir? upajāyate | ta- tanmārgalābhe sati setubandha- syam8 ca yo mrgapotakādir bhāti tasya viseşarūpatvā- purapratiņțhādi na vismayāya | bhavād® bhita iti trāsakasya1°pāramārthikatvād bhayam tasmāt satām atra na dūșitāni eva param desakālādyanālingitam, tata eva bhīto 'ham matāni tāny eva tu sodhitāni | bhito 'yam satrur vayasyo madhyastho vetyādipratyaye- pūrvapratişthāpitayojanāsu bhyo duhkhasukhādikrtahānādibuddhyantarodayaniyama- mūlapratięthāphalam āmananti 8 I) vattayā vighnabahulebhyo vilakşanam 1 nirvighnapratīti- tarhy ucyatäm parifuddhatattvam8 | uktam eva mu- grāhyam sākşād iva hrdaye nivisamānam 1 cakşuşor iva ninā, na tv apūrvam kimcit | tatha hy aha "kavyarthan viparivartamānam bhayānako rasah | tathāvidhe hi bha- bhavayantīti bhavāh " iti tat5 kavyartho rasab | yathā ye nātmā13 tiraskṛto na viseșata " ullikhitah | evam paro hi "ratrir asata"6, "tām agnau prādāt' " ityādāv 'pi | tata eva 15 na parimitam eva sādhäraņyam api tu arthitādilakşitasyādbikāriņah pratipattimātrād atitivra- *vitatam, vyaptigraha iva dhumāgnyor bhayakampayor eva A 1 prarocität 8 prathamapravīttād anantaram adhikaivo- vā | tad atra sākşātkārāyamāņatve1 paripoșikā națādisā- pāttakālatiraskāreņaivāste 'pradadāmi' ityādirūpā magri, yasyām vastusatām kāvyārpitānām ca dećakāla- samkramaņādisvabhāvā yathādaréanam bhāvanāvidhini- pramātrādinām niyamahetūnām anyonyapratibandhaba- yogādibhāşābhir 10 vyavahrtā pratipattih 1, tathaiva kā- lād" atyantam apasaraņe sa eva18 sādhāraņībhāvah sutarām puşyati | ata eva sāmājikānām ekaghanataiva

1 G; D: avedayanti s iti tatra vyajyamanatayā ... is omitted by pratipatteḥ sutarām rasaparipoșāya sarveşām anādivāsa- H.C. g . G: H.C .: parifuddham tattvam, equally good at the beginning of the ch. VII. H.C .; G: kavyarthan bhavayanti isi tat ... I| · N.S., prose 1 H.C. parapbrases: evom kåvytmakåd api fabdäs sahrdayasyd° 1 adhi- . G; H.C .: tasmos . Read. G: ratrim dsata; D: ratrir asate [ kart catra ... is omitted by H.C. D * Kālidāsa, Abhijfānasakuntalā, I, 2 || nidentified quotations taken from the sruti. · G; D: pratipattir mätrå- · Kalidāsa, Kumārasambhava, III, 62 [ . Kalidāca, op. cis., III, 67. ity ditror!(P)parocitas I . P. p. 160 (p. 423: pradadati); cf. translation, " umāpi nilalaks " ... is omitted by H.C. D . G, etc .; D: oprattter 11 p. 64, n. 1. G: pradadati; D: pradadani I 1 I propose; G: prati bha- ' G, eto .; D: vibhagat prattsir I . G, etc .: D: viseparapatods i . G. etc .; D: tasyas [ vand°; D: yatha darianam protibhavanādi viddhyudyogādi (?) bhapabhir. The "a G. otc .; D: grahakasyao B . 1s G; H.C., D: vi- integration of P. p. 432, prettrio, according to me, cannot be upheld. Perbaps lakpana° l 13 G, etc .: D: nidhiyamnam Perhaps the true reading is natyansam dtmd " H.C .; G: natyanta(natma?). to read pratyayana (cf. Dh. A. L., p. 62). In my opinion, however, prati "4 G, etc .; D: nirvisegata || is aimply a note by some reader, who has not understood the expression "s H.C .; G: camparo 'pi tata coc ... Perhape to read coam pare 'pi B " I yathdderianam and which later was incorporated in the toxt [ 1 G. "ratrir dsata " ... is omitted by H.C. I 11 yatha hi propose; G: °mdnalvena; H.C., D: °manatoa° (D: °mapatvapoşika) 1 etc .; D: anyonyasambandhabalåd I " G, etc .: D: sa ea ca l [14] [ 15 ]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. nāvicitrīkṛtacetasāņ vāsanāsaņvādāt | sā cāvighnā samvic camatkāraḥ | tajjo 'pi' kampapulakollukasanādir8 vikā- tir eva bhāti | tata eva viseșāntarānupahitatvāt sā rasa-

rać camatkāraņ | yathā nīyā satī na laukiki na mithyā nānirvācyā na laukikatulyā na tadāropādirūpā | eșaiva1 copacayāvasthāstu8 defā- ajja* vi harī camakkai dyaniyantraņāt | anukāro 'py astv anugāmitayā* karaņāt | kaha kaha vi na mamdareņa kaliāim | vişayasāmagry ' apy bhavatu vijñānavādāvalambanāt | camdakalākamdalasac- sarvathā rasanātmakavītavighnapratītigrāhyo bhāva eva chahāim lacchiim amgāim | rasaḥ | tatra vighnāpasārakā vibhāvaprabhrtayaņ | tathā tathā hi sa cātrptivyatirekeņācchinno bhogāvesa6 ity hi loke sakalavighnavinirmuktā samvittir eva5 camatkā- ucyate® | bhuñjanasyādbhuta'bhogātmaspandāvişțasya ranirveśarasanāsvādanabhog asamāpattilayaviśrāntyādisab-

camataņ karaņam8 camatkāra iti® | sa ca sākşātkārasva- dair abhidhiyate | vighnās cāsyām 1) pratipattāv ayo- bhāvo mānasādhyavasāyo 10 vā samkalpo vā smrtir vā gyata * sambhavanaviraho nama' 2) svagatatvaparagatat-

tathätvenāsphuranti1 astu | yad āha | vaªniyamena desakālaviseşāveśah 3) nijasukhādivivaśī-

ramyāņi13 vīkşya madhurāmé ca nisamya 6abdān bhāvaļ 4) pratītyupāyavaikalyam 5) sphuțatvābhāvaļ®

paryutsukbhavati 13 yat sukhito 'pi jantuh | 6) apradhānatā 7) saméayayogać ca | tathā hi

tac cetasā smarati nūnam abodhapürvam 1) samvedyam asambhāvayamānah samvedye samvi-

bhavasthirāni jananāntarasauhrdāni " || dam viniveśayitum 10 eva na éaknoti | kā tatra viérān- tir iti prathamo vighnah | tadapasāraņe hrdayasam- ityādi 15 | atra hi smaratīti yā smrtir upadarsitā sā na vādo lokasāmānyavastuvişayah | alokasāmānyeşu tu 11 ce- tārkikaprasiddhā, pūrvam etasyārthasyānanubhūtatvāt, api şțiteşv akhanditaprasiddhijanitagādhārūdhapratyaya"pra- tu pratibhānāparaparyāyasākşātkārasvabhāveyam iti 16 | sarakārī 13 prakhyātarāmādināmadheyaparigrahah | ata eva sarvathā tāvad eşāsti pratītir, āsvadātmā yasyām ra- nisāmanyotkarşopadesa1vyutpattiprayojane nāțakādau

1 H.C .; G: sa cavighna samvit, camatkāras tajjo 'pi l * G. etc. prakhyātavastuvişayatvādi 15 niyamena nirūpyate 16 | na (cf. N.S., VI, v. 96); D: olasanādivikāras " Metre: drya [I . H.C .; tu prahasanādāv iti 17 | tac ca svāvasara eva vakşyāma G: ajja vi hari camao kai kahakaha vi na mamdarena kaliaim | camdakolākat- ity astam tavat 18 | dalass "chahai lo° chti amgai I| chaya (H.C., p. 504): adyapi haris camotkaroti katham katham api na mandareņa kalitāni | candrakalākandalasacchāyāni lak- : H.C .; G: yathaisa; D: tathaisa ¡myd angani | Unidentified stanse i H.C .; G: bha(bho?)gavesa [ · satha . H.C .; G: "apasthasu I . H.C .;

hi sa ... io omitted by H.C. 0 " G, etc .; D: oadbhuto . P, p. 421; G: anukāro '[py abhāva]nugāmitayā; D: anukāro 'py anubhāvānugāmitayā ka- G: ca manahkaranam. I think the conjecture of P is right; however the reading * G etc .; D: vişayasamagryam t . H.C .; G: samviath

of G is not unadmissible. . H.C. paraphrases: adbhutabhogatmaspandave- D; H.C. adde sapta; G adds sapta in parentheses 1 G:

sarüpo hi camatkārab I " H.C .; G: manass°, admissible (cf. N.S., VI, H.C .: sambhavanaviraharüpå pratipattāc ayogyată I . G; H.C .: svagatapa-

v. 36) 0 11 H.C .; G: tathatvena sphuratya(nna?)stu; D: tathotvenasphuratyas ragatatta° 1

"s Metre: sasantatilaks [ " H.C., ete .: G: paryutsako bhavoti | H.C .; tu is omitted by D . H.C .; G: opaikalyoo | 1 G; H.C .: nivesayitum i = G; H.C .: gödharüdhacitipratyayaº 0 18 G.

u Kalidica, Abhijfānalakuntala, V, 96 8 " G; ityadi is omitted by H.C. " H.C., D: okari° [ u G, ete .; D: skarse 'pi desao I " A. Bh., II, ch. XVIII. D gives nirapayijyate I " G, etc .; D: oadio I|

" H.C .; G brackets atra hi ... iti. D omits this sentence I " Cf. n. 16. toc ca ... is omitted by H.C. 1 1 G. D: prahasanåd ova !

[16] [17] 2. - GHozs, The assthstie axperiencs, afe.

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

2. svaikagatānām ca sukhaduņkhasamvidām āsvāde yathāsambhavam tadapagamabhīrutayā vā tatparirakņā- sādhāraņībhāvasiddhyā1 rasacarvaņopayogitvena parika- rabandhaḥ samāśrita iti tatraiva sphuțībhavişyatīti8 tad vyagratayā vā tatsadrsārjijişayā1 vā tajjihāsayā vā tat- iha tāvan no namanīyam8 | tataļ sa eșa svaparaniya- pracikhyāpayişaya vā tadgopanecchayā va prakārāntareņa va samvedanantarasamudgama eva paramo vighnah | tatāvighnāpasāraņa prakāro vyākhyātah5 | 3)e nijasukhādivivasībhūtas ca katham vastvantare paragatatvaniyamabhājām api sukhaduņkhānām samve- dane niyamena svātmani sukhadubkhamohamādhyasthyā- samvidam viśramayed iti tatpratyūhavyapohanāya prati-

disamvidantarodgamanasambhāvanād avaśyambhāvi vi- padärthanişțhaiḥ sādhāraņyamahimnā sakalabhogyatvasa-

ghnaḥ | tadapasāraņe8 " kāryo nātiprasango 'tra"3 ityā- * hişnubhih sabdādivişayamayair' ātodyaganavicitramaņ- A5. 1 dapapada vidagdhagaņikādibhir uparañjanam samāśritam dinā pūrvarangānigūhanena "națī vidūşako vāpi" yenāhrdayo 'pi hrdayavaimalyapräptyā sahrdayīkriyate | itilakşitaprastāvanāvalokanena ca yo națarūpatādhigamas uktam hi "drsyam eravyam ca "" iti tatpuraņsaraļ6 pratiéīrşakādinā tatpracchādanaprakāro 'bhyupāyo 'laukikabhāşādibhedalāsyāngarangapīțhamaņ- bhävah 10 | 4) kiņ ca pratītyupāyānām abhāve katham pratīti-

dapagatakakşyādi'parigrahanāțyadharmīsahitah8 | tas- min hi saty' asyaiva1traivaitarhy" eva ca sukham 5) asphuțapratītikārisabdalinga1sambhave 'pi 19 na

duhkham veti18 na bhavati pratītiļ | svarūpasya 18 nih- pratitir viérāmyati sphuțapratītirūpapratyakşocitapratya- yasākānkşatvāt | yathāhu “sarvā ceyam pramitiļ pra- navād rūpāntarasya cāropitasya pratibhāsasamvidviśrānti- vaikalyena1 svarūpe vifrāntyabhāvāt satya"tadīyarūpa- tyakşaparā " 13 iti | svasākşātkrta āgamānumānaćatair

nihnavamätra eva paryavasānāt | tathā hy äsīnapāțhya- apy ananyathābhāvasya svasaņvedanāt | alātacakrādau sa- kşātkārāntareņaiva balavatā tatpramityavadhāraņād" iti puşpagaņdikādi loke na drsțam | na ca tan na kimcit, laukikas tāvad ayam kramab | tasmāt tadubhayavighna- kathamcit sambhāvyatvād1 iti sa17 eșa sarvo muninā vighāte 'bhinayā lokadharmī"vrttipravīttyupaskrtāh sa-

: H.C .: G: tatsadrso jijlayā; D: totsadrsajjijtgayā I ' G: H.C .: mabhişicyante | abhinayanam hi sasabdalinga"vyāpāravi-

tadapasarane; D: sadapakarane [ : N.S., V, v. 165: karyo ndtipra- sadṛsam1 eva pratyakşavyāpārakalpam iti nisceşyāmaļ18 | sango 'tra nrttagitavidhim proti | l · D; G: ityādinā pūrvarangovidhim prattti pårearangānigühanena; H.C .: prvarangavidhipratttipārva-rangānigūhe- ' G, etc .; D: "siddhao n . G: P, nana. parvarangavidhim prati is surely an interpolation I . N.S., XX, ' A. Bh., III, chapp. XIX ff. 0

v. 30 ff. (cf. translation, p. 80, n. 1); D gives prastdoandvalokdneno only || p. 433: nonnamaniyom ! ' H.C .; G: vighnapasarana° f s iti satraioa ...

. G; H.C .: tatpurahsara° I ' G; H.C., D: "kakşadi° l . G, ete .: D: is omitted by H.C. D . G; H.C. adds: totha I ' H.C .; G: opipaya- ondfyadharmasahitab ' G, ete .; sati is omitted by DI " G, etc .; D: mayibhi(yai?)r; D: opipayamaytbhir D

" H.C .; G: na bhavati | prattrisvarapasya ... I 1 G, etc .: D: sukhadubkham co ll . N.S., I. v. 11 0 . G; "padao is omitted by H.C. I

tasyaioa B = G, etc .: D: ctasyaisa G; H.C .: pratttis ! 31 G: H.C. clarifcs fabdo-

14 Conjectural reading for lakanalinga° I pratibhösamvidvifrantisaikalyene in G, pratibhasavifrantivaikalysna in H.C. gasambhave 'pi l G etc .: D: katham pratitim sphutayatiti tatkārifabdalin-

gives sa for sarva) i 1 Nyayasttra, Vātsyůyanabhasya, I, 1, 3 (the edited text

(cf. below apradhane ca vastuni kasya samvid vifrömyati, ete.). D reads pra- 14 G; H.C .: opasdrandd, admiseible I " I propose; .

tibhdsandhivifråntivaikalyena I G: bodha(alo?)kadharmi°; D: abhinayabodhakadharmi°; H.C .: lokadharmd° ||

10 tatha hi ... is omitted by H.C. [ us H.C., P. p. 433; G: satye; D: satyam l| 1? sa is omitted by H.C. [ " G; H.C .: sabdalaksanalinga° 1 17 Read. G: "[vi]sadriam; H.C .: "sadrsam |f " A. Bh., II, chapp. VIII E nifcesyamah is omitted by H.C. " [18] [19]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. 6) apradhāne ca vastuni kasya samvid viérāmyati | tasyaiva pratyayasya 1 pradhānāntaram praty anudhā- sa hi kleśasahięņutādiprāņa eva | evam ratyādīnām prā-

vataņ svātmany aviérāntatvāt | ato 'pradhānatvam jade dhānyam | hāsādinām tu sātisayam sakalalokasulabhavi-

vibhāvānubhāvavarge vyabhicārinicaye ca samvidātmake bhāvatayoparañjakatvam iti prādhānyam | ata evānutta-

'pi niyamenānyamukhaprekşiņi* sambhavatīti tadatiriktah maprakrtişu bāhulyena hāsādayo bhavanti1 | pāmara-

sthāyyeva tathā' carvaņāpātram | tatra puruşārthanișthāh prayab * sarvo 'pi hasati socati bibheti paranindam adriyate B

kāfcit samvida iti pradhānam | tad yathā ratiļ kāma®- svalpasubhäşitatvenaª ca sarvatra vismayate | ratyādyań-

tadanuşangidharmārthanişțhā, krodhas tatpradbāneşv gatayā tu pumarthopayogitvam api syād eşām | etadgu-

arthanişthah kāmadharmaparyavasito 'pi, utsāhah sama- ņapradhānabhāvakṛta eva ca daarūpakādibheda iti vak-

stadharmādiparyavasitas, tattvajñānajanitanirvedaprāyab şyāmaḥ* | sthāyitvam caitāvatām eva | jāta eva hi

śamaś ca mokgopāya® iti tāvad eșām prādhānyam | jantur iyatībhih samvidbhiņ parīto bhavati | tathā hi

yady api caişām apy anyonyam guņabhāvo 'sti tathāpi duņkhasaméleşavidveșī sukhāsvādanasādaraķ $ | tatpradhāne rūpake tattatpradhānam' bhavatīti rūpaka- bhedaparyayeņa sarveşām prādhānyam eşam lakşyate | iti nyāyena sarvo riramsayā vyāptaņ svātmany utkarşamā-

adürabhāgābhinivişțadrsā8 tv ekasminn api rūpake nitayā6 param upahasann abhīşțaviyogasamtaptas tad- dhetuşu kopaparavaso 'saktatayā' ca tato bhiruh kimcid prthak prädhānyam | tatra sarve 'mī sukhapradhānāh sva- ujjigīşur8 apy anucita vastuvişayavaimukhyātmakata- samvitcarvaņarūpasyaikaghanasya prakāsasyānandasārat- vät | tathā hy ekaghanaéokasamviccarvaņe 'pi loke strīlo- yäkräntah kimcid anabhīşțatayābhimanyamānas tattatsva-

kasya hrdayaviérāntir antarāyafūnyavisrāntifarīratvāt | parakartavya10darsanasamuditavismayah kimcic ca jihasur

avirāntirüpataiva ca dubkham | tata eva kāpilair duņkha- eva jäyate 11 | na hy etaccittavīttivāsanāsūnyaļ prāņī bhavati | kevalam kasyacit kācid adhikā cittavrttiņ kācid sya cancālyam eva prāņatvenoktam rajovrttim· vadad- bhir ity anandarūpatā sarvarasānām | kim tūparañjakavi- ünā, kasyacid ucitavişayaniyantritā kasyacid anyathā | tat kācid eva puruşārthopayoginīty upadesyā | tadvibhā- çayavasāt keşām api kațukimnāsti sparćo vīrasyeva10 | gakrtag 19 cottamaprakrtyādivyavahāraḥ į ye punar amī

: G; H.C .: pratyeyasya ! · H.C .; G: måtmani vifrantatvåt; D: svdt- moni viframyatvat. Cf. I.P.V.V., III, p. 231: arthantaram pradhānasammatom 1 H.C .; G: bahulyena na hāsädayo bhavanti; D: hāsadayo bahulyena var- ebhilasyati cnudharan na svatmani viframyati yad sod evs rüpam anyonmuk- tante, equally good I ' H.C .; G: alpasukhabharitatvens, equally good |! hasosys I . Read; G: "sampreksini, equally good; D, H.C .: anyasukhao l) " dtadgunapradhana° ... is omitted by H.C. G; H.C .: kame, equally D: ato | . Cf. H.C., Al. Cad., p. 124; . G; D: tathd ca; tatha is omitted by H.C. : Unidentified verse [ ' Cf. D: 'akta[taya]; G: 'faktau, equally good I . H.C., D; G: utkargamanttaya " good I · I propose; G: tattvajnānajanitanirvedaprayo vibhavo (famai co Read; G: ujjijtur; D: is omitted by G and D) mokopaya; H.C. Samaf cs moiopaya (H.C. omits jigtgur 1 . G; D: jitao 10 G; D: osvakartavya° I 11 H.C. para-

tattvajfana*) [ ' D; G: tattatpradhane rapake tattatpradhanam; H.C .: tot- phrases (cf. n. 4): sarvo riramsaya vyaptah svētmany utkarşamānitayā param tatpradhāns rūpake tatpradhānat 1 . G; H.C .: oprtitam I . H.C .; G: odrias; D: bhagadinioi- upahasati, utkarşāpāyasankayā socati, apāyam prati krudhyati, apāyahetupari- 10 Read; G: ka kim nasti | ipario häre samutsahate, vinipdtād bibheti, kimcid ayuktatayābhimānyamāne jugupsate, virasya; D: katubkim nāsti sparšo strarya; H.C .: kajukimnā sparšo 'sti eirasysoa || tattatsvaparakartavyavaicitryadarianād vismayate, kimcij jihāsus tatra vairāgyāe chamam bhajato I "a H.C .; G: tadvibhdoco I [ 20] [21]

R. CNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

glānisankāprabhrtayać1 cittavīttiviseșās te samucitavi- tathā hi glāno 'yam ity ukte kuta iti hetupraśnenāsthāyitā- bhavabhavaj" janmamadhye 'pi3 na bhavanty eva | sya1 sücyate® | na tu rāma utsāhasaktimān ity atra he- tathä hi rasāyanam upayuktavato muner glānyālasyaś- tupraśnam ahuh | ata * eva vibhavās tatrodbodhakāh santah A ramaprabhrtayo nottişțhanti5 | yasyāpi vā bhavanti vibhā- vabalāt tasyāpi hetuprakşaye kīyamāņāh samskārafe- svarüpoparañjakatvam vidadhānā ratyutsāhāder uci- tānucitatvamātram avahanti | na tu tadabhāve sarvathaiva şatām nāvaéyam anubadhnanti | utsāhādayas7 tu sam- te nirupākhyāļ, vāsanātmanā sarvajantūnām tanmayat- pāditasvāvaéyakartavyatayā 8 pralīnakalpā api saņskāra- venoktatvāt | vyabhicāriņāņ tu svavibhāvābhāve nāmāpi feşatäm nātivartante kartavyāntaravişayasyotsāhāder 9 nāstiti vitanişyate caitad yathāyogam vyākhyavasare5 | akhandanāt | yathāba patañjaliļ “na hi caitra ekasyām evam6 apradhānatvanirāsah sthāyinirūpaņaya' "sthayi -. striyām rakta ity anyāsu viraktaļ "10 ityādi | tasmāt bhāvān rasatvam8 upaneşyāma"' ityanayā sāmānya10. sthäyirūpacittavrttisūtrasyūtā evāmi vyabhicāriņah svāt- lakşaņaseşabhūtayā viseşalakşaņanişthayā ca muninā " mänam udayāstamayavaicitryasatasahasradharmāņam pra- kṛtaḥ | tilabhamänā raktanīlādisütrasyūtaviralabhāvopalambhana- 7) tatrānubhāvānām vibhāvānām vyabhicāriņām ca "sambhavitabhangisahasragarbhasphațikakācābhraka19. prthak sthäyini niyamo19 nāsti, bāşpāder ānandākşi1- padmarāgamarakatamahānılādimayagolakavat 13 tasmin rogādijatvadarsanād vyāghrādes ca krodhabhayādihetutvāt sūtre sva"samskāravaicitryam anivećayanto 15 'pi tatsū- śrama"cintāder utsāhabhayādyanekasahacaratvāvalokanāt trakrtam upakārasamdarbham bibhratah1® svayam ca vici- trärthäh sthayisūtram 17 ca vicitrayanto 'ntarantarāsud- | sāmagrī 15 tu na vyabhicāriņi | tathā hi bandhuvināćo

dham api sthāyisūtram pratibhāsāvakāćam upadadhato 18 yatra vibhävab paridevitāérupātādić cānubhāvać 16 cintā- dainyādić ca vyabhicārī, so 'vasyam śoka evety evam 'pi pūrvāparavyabhicāriratnacchāyāsabalimānam avayam samsayodaye 17 śankatmakavighnasamanāya samyoga anayantab pratibhāsanta19 iti vyabhicāriņa ucyante | upāttab | tatra lokavyavahāre kāryakāraņasahacarā1 tmakalin-

1 G: H.C .: ·sańkādhrtyādayas [ is omitted by H.C. [ * G, etc .: D: opibhavaj # ' G; muner is omitted by H.C. I . G: 'pl gadaréane10 sthāyyātmaparacittavīttyanumānābhyāsa eva pāțavād8 adhunā tair evodyānakațākşadhrtyādibhir 91 " G; H.C .: ntsharatyd-

şayaye ratydder i 1· Cf. Yogasiltra, Vydsabhaşya, 2, 4. Vylsa says: naikasydm dayas I . G, etc .; D: fepatantan I : G: H.C .: na bhacanti I . G; H.C., D: Ogpakartavyataya [ . G; H.C .: vastvantaravi- . G; H.C .:

striyām caitro rakta ity anyāsu strigu cirakta isi l satryate I : H.C .; G: opraínena sthāyitāsya; D: opraśne sthoyitosyo l ' G, ete .: D: °paratjakam I G, etc .: D: ity utsahader || 11 G; D: siralabhavo ... ..... " A. Bh., ch, VII; vitanisyate ... is omitted by H.C. · CE. H.C., viveka, bhand° I " G: .D: ogolakadioos I = Conjectural reading: D: odbhro°; G: "kacabhro(bhra?)makao l1 p: 101 g " H.C .: G: 'nirüpanāyam: D: onirupanāyah I .. G; H.C .:

abhinivefayante I " G. etc .: svoo is omitted by D I us G; D: vibhutamas (?) I 2 G: D: sattvam I . Cf. note 102 [ 1 H.C .; samanyao is omitted by G I 1 G. it Read; G: vicitrartha- ote .; munind is omitted by D I " G. ete .: D: sthayiniyamo I sthåyisttram I 1 I propose; G: 'ntarntard fuddham api sthdyisdtram H.C .: ortfe I " G. etc .; D: bhrama° I . "8 H.C .; G adde od " H.C .; pratibhäsdvokdfamupadhayanto [D: upahayanto] 'pi l » H.C. paraphrases: G: °dis to anubhavaf, equally good I " D: °daya® ! " H.C .; G: *saha- tasmāt sthäyirüpacittavruisütrasyütd wdmt såtmdnam udayāstamayavaicitrya- " G; H.C .: °darsanaja° 1 " G; H.C., D: obhyasapatavad | fataschasradharmänam pratilabhamånāh sthāyinam cicitrayantah pratibhāsant || " H.C .; G: orkşadibhir I

[ 22 ] [ 23 ]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

laukikiņ kāraņātvādibhuvam atikrāntair vibhāvanānubhā- kurībhāvenānumānasmrtyādisopānam anāruhyaiva tanma- vanāsamuparañjakatvamātraprāņair ata evālaukikavibhā- vādivyapadeéabhāgbhiņ prācyakāraņādirūpasamskāropajī- yībhāvocitacarvaņāprāņatayā | na ca sā carvaņā prānmānān- tarād1 yenādhunā smrtiļ syāt | na cātra laukikapratya- vanakhyāpanāya vibhāvādināmadheyavyapadeśyair bhā- kşādipramāņavyāpāraḥ | kiņ tv3 alaukikavibhāvādisamyo- vādhyāye 'pi vakşyamāņasvarūpabhedair guņapradhāna- tāparyāyena sāmājikadhiyi samyagyogam sambandham gabalopanataiveyam carvaņā | sā ca pratyakşānumānäga-

aikāgryam cā'sāditavadbhir alaukikanirvighnasamveda- mopamānādilaukikapramāņajanitaratyādyavabodhatas ta- thā yogipratyakşajatațasthaparasaņvittijñānāt sakalavaişa- nātmakacarvaņāgocaratām nīto 'rthas carvyamāņataikasāro yikoparāgasūnyasuddhaparayogigatasvānandaikaghanānu- na tu siddhasvabhāvas tātkālika eva na tu carvaņātirikta- bhaväc ca visişyate, eteşam ' yathāyogam arjanādivighnān- kālāvalambī sthāyivilakşaņa eva rasaļ | na tu' yathā ćań- kukādibhir abhyadhīyata "sthāyyeva vibhāvādipratyāy- tarodayena' tāțasthyāsphuțatvena5 vişayāveavaivaśy- ena6 ca saundaryavirahāt | atra tu svātmaikagatatvani- yo5 rasyamānatvād rasa ucyata" iti® | evam bi loke7 'pi kim na rasab, asato 'pi hi yatra rasanīyatā syāt yamāsaņbhavān na vişayāveśavaivasyam', svātmānu- pravesat8 paragatatvaniyamābhavān na tațasthyasphuțat- tatra vastusatah katham na bhavişyati | tena sthāyipratitir vam·, tadvibhāvādisādhāraņyavaśasamprabuddhocitani- anumitirūpā vācyā°, na rasab | ata eva sūtre10 sthāyigra- jaratyādivāsanāvesavasāc 10 ca na vighnāntarādinām sam- haņam na krtam | tat pratyuta śalyabhūtam syāt | keva- lam aucityād evam ucyate sthāyi rasībhūta iti | aucityam bhava ity avocāma bahuah" | ata eva vibhāvādayo na

tu tatsthāyigatatvena kāraņāditayā prasiddhānām adhunā nişpattihetavo rasasya, tadbodhāpagame 13 'pi rasasam- bhavaprasangāt 18 | nāpi jñaptihetavab, yena pramāņama- carvaņopayogitayā vibhāvāditvāvalambanāt11 | tathā hi1g dhye pateyuh, siddhasya kasyacit prameyabhūtasya rasa- laukikacittavīttyanumāne kā rasatā |* tenālaukikacamatkā- syābhāvāt | kim tarhy" etad15 vibhāvādaya iti | alaukika rātmā rasāsvādah smrtyanumānalaukikasvasam vedanavi- evāyam carvaņopayogi vibhāvādivyavahārah | kvānyatret- lakşaņa eva | tathā hi laukikenānumānena samskrtah pra- tham drstam iti ced bhūgaņam etad asmākam 16 alaukikat- madādi na 13 tāțasthyena pratipadyate, api tu hrdayasam- vasiddhau 17 | pānakarasāsvado 'pi kim gudamaricādięu vādātmakasahrdayatvabalāt pūrņībhavişyad"rasāsvādāů- 1 G, etc .; D: prärthyamānāntarād I ' H.C .; G: kifica; D: kified°, . H.C .; G: °daydt, equally good || ' G, eto; omdtraº is amitted by D I dhyoye ... is omitted by H.C. I ! Read; H.C .: täjasthyahetukåsphutatvena; G: tätasthyasphujatva°; D: osphu- ' H.C., G; na vigoya ... is (nat tu): D: nans ! . H.C .; G: s8° · A. Bh., ch. VII; bhdoa- equally good I ' . G, etc .; D: etdsdm

. H.C .; G: nonu. : G: H.C .: oprotyäyyamano; D: °pratyaydrabhyama- G, etc .: D: opaivalyom omitted by D (G brackets it) I . G, ete .: D: sanupravesat . H.C. notåd rasa ucyata, admissible [ G: laukiko ! " G: iti is omitted by H.C. a ' H.C .: G; na tafasthyasphutatram (in parentheses): tifasthyasphutateam is omitted by D. I think that na vişaydvefavaivasyam and na tafasthydsphujetvam have been pråptă " G; syat is omitted by H.C. [ " G; H.C. adde: munina I . G, etc: D .: oripa

1 H.C .; G: tarhi hi [] u G: H.C .; D: vibhavdditoādi- added by H.C. se G. etc .; D: opegavasas I 11 ity avocama bahutah is lambanāt [ "a G, etc; D: rasa- pramodadir na. Cf. Dh.Z.L., p. 155 1 1 Road; G: pramadādinā; H.C., D:

sible. Cf. Dh.A.L., p. 155 0 " D, H.C .; G: pürpibhavod°, admis- omitted by H.C. " D. H.C .; G: bodhavagame !] sambharas ! 16 G; H.C .: tarhi kim H.C .: bhaşanam asmākam ctad I " H.C .; G: esad dhi l 18 G; 17 G, etc .; D: °siddhch I

[24 ] [25 ]

R. GNOLI

drsța iti samānam etat | nanv evam raso 'prameyaḥ syāt, evam yuktam bhavitum arhati, rasyataikaprāņo hy asau na prameyādisvabhāvah | tarhi sūtre nişpattir iti katham | neyam rasasya, api tu tadvişayarasanāyab1 | tannişpat- tyā ª tu yadi tadekāyattajīvitasya rasasya nişpattir ucyate na kaścid8 atra doşaḥ | sā ca rasanā na pramāņavyā- pāro na kārakavyāpāraņ, svayam tu nāprāmāņikī svasam- vedanasiddhatvāt | rasanā ca bodharūpāiva, kim tu bo- dhāntarebhyo laukikebhyoe vilakņaņaiva, upāyānām vi- bhāvadīnām laukikavailakşaņyāt | tena vibhāvādisamyogād rasanā yato nișpadyate tatas' tathāvidharasanāgocaro lokottaro 'rtho rasa iti tātparyam sūtrasya | A. BL, L. *ayam atra samkşepaķ | mukuțapratićīrşakādinā tāvan națabuddhir ācchādyate | gāhaprāktanasam vitsamskārāc TRANSLATION ca, kāvyabalā nīyamānāpi na tatra rāmadhīr viśrāmyati | ata ° evobhayadesakālatyagah | romāñcādayać ca bhūyasā ratipratītikāritayā dņațās tatrāvalokitā 10 desakālāniya- mena1 ratim gamayanti | yasyam svātmāpi tadvāsanāvat- tvād anupravişțah | ata eva na19 tațasthatayā ratyava- gamah | na ca niyatakāraņatayā, yenārjanābhişvangādi- sambhāvanā | na ca niyataparatmaikagatatayā 1, yena dubkhadveşādyudayab | tena sādhāraņibhūtā samtānavrtter ekasyā eva vā samvido gocarībhūtā " rati śrngārab | sadharanibhavana ca vibhavadibhir iti

1 G; H.C .: sadvigayaya ... i. * G: H.C .: tan na kalcid; D: tena na kvacid1 * H.C .; G: tasmån nigpattya

. H.C., D; G: svayam(sam)vedanao [ G, ete .; co is omitted by D ||

H.C .; G: 'tas, equally good [ · G. etc .; laukiksbhyo is omitted by DB . G, etc: D: obolad & || . G; H.C .: tata l "e H.C .; G: tatrapi laukikao (D: laukikah) li 11 H.C .; G adde tatro l us H.C .; na is omittod by G [ " H.C .: G: gocarabhatd I 1a H.C .; G: niyatapa. ralgajtmakagatatayå l

[26]

After explaining the reason for the foregoing succes- sion1, Bharata states the sutra defining the nature of Rasa: "Out of the union of the Determinants (vibhava), the Consequents (anubhava) and the Transitory Mental States (vyabhicarin), the birth of Rasa takes place"9. This sutra

. 1) N. S., VI, wv. 1-33. N. S., VI, prose after v. 33. Rasa is the traditional torm which designates the acsthetic state of consciousness, the acsthetic plensure. Rasa means both tasting and what is tasted. Bharata accepts eight Rasa, cor- responding to the oight principal feolings of human naturo (sthayibhava, Permanent Mental State): Delight (rati), Laughter (hasa), Sorrow (foka), Anger (krodha), Heroism (utsaha), Fear (bhaya), Diagust (jugupsa), and Astonishment (vismaya). These eight feelings are liable to become the material of aesthetio experience, and the corresponding Rasas are: the Erotic (srngara), the Comio (hdsya), the Pathotic (karuna), the Farious (raudra), the Heroic (vlra), the Terrible (bhayanaka), the Odious (btbhatsa) and the Marvellous (adbhuta). Later speculation generally admits a ninth permanent feeling, Serenity (fama); tho corresponding Rasa is the Quictistic (santa). In ordinary life cach of these mental states is manifested and accompanied by three elements, couses (kd- rana), effects (karya), and concomitant elements (sahacara). The causes are the facts, images, etc., by which it is manifested, the effects the phyrical reac- tions caused by it, and the concomitant elements the accessory mental states accompanying it. The same causes, etc., when represented on the stage or described in poctry, do not arouse the corresponding sentiment, but mako manifest (syanj) a form of consciousness different from it, aesthetic pleasuro or Rase. This particular form of coscionsness is coloured (onuranj) by the characters of these various causes and hence by the nature of tho mental states which they would arouse if they were real, When they are not part of real life but are elements of poctical expression, the canses, cfects, and concomitant elements are called respectively Determinants (oibhava), Consequents (anubhava), and Transitory Mental States (oyabhicaribhara). On the traditional etymology of these terms, cf. infra, p. 95. Vibhova and anu- bhavo are usually translated by the terms Determinant and Consequent (Jacobi tranalates Faktor and Effekt). The Tranaitory Mental States are 33 in nnmber. Discouragement (nirveda), Weakness (glani), Apprehension (fankd), Weariness (frama), Contentment (dhrti), Stupor (jedatd), Joy (harga), Depression (dainya), Cruelty (ugrata), Anxiety (cinta), Fright (trasa), Envy (astyd), Indignation (amara), Arrogance (garva), Recollection (smrti), Death (marana), Intoxication [29]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

has been explained by Bhatta Lollata, etc., in the following sitory Mental States, in so far as they are mental move- way 1) :- By the term " union " Bharata means implicitely the union of the Permanent Mental State with the Determi- ments, cannot accompany simultaneously the Permanent Mental, State, Bharata in this sutra means that the Per- nants, etc .; Rasa is the product of this union. More pre- cisely, the Determinants are the cause of the birth of the manent Mental Movement remains nevertheless in a state of latent impression (vāsana)1). In the example used by mental movement (cittav!tti) which constitutes the Per- manent Mental State (sthdyibhava). In using the term Bharata, again, some flavourings (vyañjana) appear in the state of latent impressions, like the Permanent Mental Consequents, Bharata does not mean the Consequents aris- State, and others in an emergent state (udbhuta), like the ing from the Rasa (since these obviously cannot be consi- Transitory Mental States 3. Rasa, therefore, is simply dered as causes of the Rasa) but only the Consequents the Permanent Mental State intensified (upacita) by the arising from the mental states9. Even though the Tran- Determinants, the Consequents, etc. The Permanent

(mada), Dreaming (supta), Sleeping (nidra), Awakoning (vibodha), Shame (urlda), Mental State in itself has a nature which is not inten-

Epilepsy (apasmara), Distraction (moha), Assurance (mati), Indelence (alasya), sified $. This state is [perceived] in both the person imi- Agitation (dvega), Deliberation (tarka), Dissimulation (avahina), Sickness (oyadhi), tated (anukārya) and the actor (nata), in the person imi- Insanity (unmada), Despair (oigada), Impatience (autsukya) and Inconstancy (capala). On the nature of these feelings sce below, p. 85 E. In the anubhava are incladed the eight " Involantary States " (settvabhava): Paralysis (stambha), Fainting (pralaya), Horripilation (romfica), Sweating (svedo), Change of Colour 1) It is a generai principle of Indian thought that two forms of cognition

(vaivaraya), Trebling (vepathu), Weeping (asru) and Change of Voice (vai- cannot occur simultancously (cf. Nyayasttra, I, I, 16). To avoid a contradic-

sarya). Cf. N.S., VII, proso after v. 91. It ie very diffcult to find the tion of this rule, Bhatta Lollata remarks that there is nothing to prevent the as-

exact Englioh rendering of these terns; in general I have followed the termi- suiption that the Permanent Mental State is presented in the state of a latent impression (samskara, vasana). The word samskora " means the impressione nology proposed by Haas in his DafarBpaka. The relation between the Determinants, the ordinary mental states, and (which exist sub-consciously in the mind) of the objects erperienced. All onr

Rasa is the central problem of Indian poetics. experiences whether cognitive, emotional or conative exist in a sub-conscious

1. Bhatta Lollata fourished in Kashmir in the IXth or Xth centary. Ho states and may under suitable conditions be reproduced as memory (smrti).

wrote a commentary, now lost, on the Natyaidstra of Bharata. Ksemprāja The word sasand (Yogasatra, IV, 24) scems to be a later word ... It comes

(Spandanirpaya, p. 34) and A.G. (M.V.V., v. 778), quote a Bhatta Lollate who from the root "eas " to stay. It is often loosely used in the sense of som-

wrote a commentary (rrtti) to the Spandakarikd of Vasgupta. In my opinion, skåra, and in Vydsabhasya they are identified in IV, 9. Bnt vasand generally

it seems probablo that these two Bhatta Lollata are one and the same person; refers to the tendencics of past lives most of which lie dormant in tho mind.

Bhatta Lollata would, in that case, have lived in the reiga of Avantivarman Only those appear which can find scope in this life. Bat somskaro are the

(856-83 A.D .; Vasngupta lived ander Avantivarman) or in the reign of his subconscious states which are being constantly generated by experience. Va-

successor, Saskaravarman. This change, also, involves a change in the dates sonds are innate samakaras not acquired in this life " (Dasgupta, H.I.Ph., I.

of Saokuka (cf. infra, p. 32, n. 4), who could then be identified no longer with tho p. 263).

poet Sankuka, who was a contemporary of Ajitapida (carly IXth century). ) Bharata' (ch. VI, prose after v. 33) says that an example of what

) Rasa will also produce certain effects in the spectators-it will make happens in the acsthetic fact is provided by the different substances of which

them mutter in fear, make their hair stand on end, ete. These effeots (lit .: a dish at table is composed. Each of these (like the Determinants, etc.) makes

Consequents, anubhasa) cannot, of course, be considered as the causes of a contribution in determining the taste of the whole, and a now flavour

Rasa. The causes of Rasa can only be the effects of the Permanent Mental (rasa) resulte which differs from each of the others takon separntely.

States. Mental State. $) In other words, Rasa, when not intensified, is simply a Permanent

[30] [31 ]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. tated (Räma, etc.) in the primary sense (mukhyayā vļttyā), and in the imitating actor1) through the visualization right, Bharata should first have expounded the Perma-

(anusamdhana) in him of the nature of Rama, etc .-. nent Mental States and only afterwards the Rasa1). c) Be-

This again reproduces without change the opinion of cause the second definition of the Determinants, etc., in

the ancient [students of poetics]. Dandin, for example, in their state of full development, [put forward by Bharata

his definition of the Ornaments, said that " in associa- in connexion with Rasas, which, according to Bhatta Lol-

tion with a number of other elements, Delight is trans- lata, are nothing but Permanent Mental States], would

formed into the Erotic Rasa (śrngara) ", and " on reaching become a useless waste of words9. d) Because every Permanent Mental Movement would come to be subdivid- its extreme height, Anger is transformed into the Furious Rasa (raudra) ", etc. ed into an infinity of different gradations, weak, weaker,

This interpretation, says Sankuka, is mistaken3. Why? weakest, indifference, etc. e) Because, as a result of this fact, there would no longer be six grades of Comic Rasa -a) Because, without the Determinants, etc., the Perma- (häsya)3). f) Because, for the same reason, the ten grades nent Mental State cannot be known, for the Determi- nants, etc., are the characteristic signs, i.e., the logical of love (kama) would include an infinite number of Per-

reasons (linga) by means of which knowledge of it is made possible". b) Because, if the thes is of Lollața is 1) If it were true that the permanent mental states exist before the Rasa. why is it that Bharata explained first Rosa (N.S., chap. VI) and afterwards 1) Thas according to Bhatta Lollata the Rasa is a perception of the Per- (N.Ś., chap. VII) the mental states? manent Mental State of the character represented by the actor. This sthayi- 2) If, as Lollata says, Rasa is no more than an intensified Permenent Men- Shava, intensifed by the Determinants, ete., is presented to the spectator in . tal State, why should Bharata hove taken the trouble to explein the Deter- the form of a Rasa. minants of this mental state twice over, once in connexion with it in its non- ) Dandin (7th, century?) wrote the Kavyadaria (this work may be consul- intensified state (N.S., chap. VII) and once again in connexion with it in its ted also in the translation of O. Bohtlingk, Leipsig 1890). The same thesis of intensified state (N.S., chap. VI)? It is illogical to explain the causes of the Bhatta Lollata is met with in the Agnipurana; cf., for examplo, ch. 339, sl. 4: same thing twice over, once when it is not for from its nascent state and abhimanad ratis sa ca pariporam upoyup! | once when it has reached its fall development. H.C. clarifies: na cotpattau pa- eyabhicāryādisomānyāt srngara iti giyate dārthänām kāranam abhidhāya puryatām punas tadutpattikāranam abhidhāta- 3) Sankuka flourished in Kashmir after Bhatts Lollata. It is doubtful . vyam, vaiyarthyapatteh | whether he should be identified with the poet Sadkuka, author of a poem cal- ) In other words, the intensifcation (upocoya) proposed by Bhatta Lollata led Bhuvanabhyudaye, who, according to Kalbapa (R.T., IV, 705) lived under would necessarily bave to develop in a succession. Bharata mentions (N.S., the reign of Ajitapids (about 830 A.D.). In this case, his predecessor, Bhatta VI, vv. 61, 62) six kinde of laughter: smitam, hasitam, vihasitam, upahasitam, Lollata, can no longer be identified with the commentator, of the same name, apahasitam, and atihasitam. Cf. Dafarapa, Haas, p. 144: " a Gentle Smile on the Spandakarika, and so his period sbould be put back to the end of the (smita) is opening the eyes wide; a Smile (hasita, avahasita) is showing the 8th century and the beginning of the 9th. Cf. above, p. 30, n. 1. Saåknka teeth to some extent; Laughing (vihasita) is making a soft sound; Laughter wrote a commentary to Bharata, now lost, which is frequently quoted by A.G. (upahasita) is the same, accompanied by shaking of the head: Uproarions Laugh- On Satkuka, see De, S.P., I, p. 38; Pandey, A.G., p. 128. ter (apahasita) is [langhter] accompanied by teare; and Convulsive Laughter 4) H.C. adds: na hi dhamam vinā dharādharāntabstho vahnir avagamyate | (atihasita) is [laughter] with shaking of the body. Two of these varieties of " If there were no smoke, the fire which is within a mountain could not bo langhter [are characteristic] of the highor, two of the middling, and two of the

perceived ". lower [characters], in the order named ". On Lollata's thesis, a further infi- nity of species of laughter would have to be assumed. [32] [ 33 ] 3. - CnoLs. The crsthesie osporionre. etr.

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. manent Mental States and of Rasas1). g) Because exactly States through the actor's ability to reproduce on the the contrary would have to be assumed to that which is stage the effects of his own Transitory Mental States (which experienced, i.e., that Sorrow (soka) is at first intense and effects are called Consequents when they are artificial). A.1 is seen to grow weaker with time, and that in Anger But the Permanent Mental State cannot be visualized (krodha), Heroism (utsaha) and Delight (rati) a diminution even through the power of poetry. The words " Delight", is met with when the Indignation (amarsa), Firmness "Sorrow", etc., are, in fact, only able to denote (abhi- (sthairya) and Affection (sevd) decrease 3. dheyikr) the Delight, etc., [to which they refer], - for Therefore Rasa is simply a Permanent Mental State, i.e., this Delight, etc., is nothing but a verbal form (abhi- it consists in the imitation (anukarana) of the Permanent .dhana) -, but they are not able to communicate (avagam) Mental State proper to the person imitated-Rama, etc .; it [in its fullness] - as if they were forms of Verbal Repre- and, just because it consists in an imitation, it is not called sentation (vacikabhinaya) 1). For Verbal Representation a Permanent Mental State but is given the name of Rasa. does not consist merely in words, but rather in what effect This imitated mental state is perceived by means of three the words produce; in the same way Gesticular Represen- kinds of elements, i. e., causes (hetu), which are called De- tation (angikabhinaya) does not consist merely in the move- terminants, effects (karya), which are the Consequents, ment of the limbs but in the effect which this movement and accompanying elements (sahacari), which are called produces 3. In the following stanzas, Sorrow is not an Transitory Mental States. The causes, etc., are brought object of Representation but simply of verbal expression: into existence by the conscious effort (prayatna) [of the " Great, deep, wide, and unbounded, the ocean is neverth- actor], and are thus artificial (krtrima), but [the spectators] eless drunk by underwater fires: in the same way, Sorrow is think that they are real. This Permanent Mental State drunk by Anger "3). Again: "He is paralysed by sorrow, is perceived (and this perception is aroused by the charac- motionless in this state; such Sorrow increases the lamenta- teristic signs already referred to) as being inherent in the tions of his companions, who, filled with the fear that imitating person (anukart!). The Determinants are, indeed; visualized (anusamdhā) 1) In other words, the Permanent Mental States (and hence Rasas) can bo through the power (bala) of poetry, the Consequents through made known only by the intrinsic evocative force of poetry, not by the words the skill (iksd) of the actor, and the Transitory Mental which denote them. On the force of the term " Representation " (abhinaya). cf. the next note. ) Bharata liets four kinds of Representation (abhinaya, art of acting, ete.): odeikabhinaya, sättvikābhinaya, angikäbhinaya, and āhöryabhinaya. The frst 1) Cf note abovo. The ten kinds of love (kama) mentioned by Bharata of these is based on variatione in the intonation of the voice (Ssakuka seenns (N.S., XX, w. 154-6) are Longing (abhildsa), Anxiety (arthacintd), Recollection to underatand it in more or less the same sense as dhoani, the ovocativo (anusmrti), Enumeration of the loved one's merits (gupaktriana), Distress power), etc .; the second on the extrinsecation of certain physical phenomena (udvega), Raving (vildpa), Insanity (unmada), Fever (oyadhi), Stupor (jadata), (sweat, ete.); the third on expressive movement of the limbs; and the fourth and Death (marana). Cf. Dafaripa, Hans, p. 132. on the clothes, etc., which the actor wears. Indignation, ete., are Transitory Mental Movements. 3) Unidentified stanza. [34] [35]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

tears their hearts, beg him imploringly to weep"1). Exam- . the following perceptions is experienced: a) That happy ples may be multiplied. But the following stanza, "This man is really (eva) the actor 1; b) Rama is really (eva) multitude of droplets, fine rain of tears falling while she that man; he is not happy "; c) Is that Rama or not? 5; painted, produces on my body the effect of a perspiration d) That man is like Rama"). On the contrary, the form born from the touch of her hand"9, at the same time that of perception experienced differs from correct (samyak) it expresses what is its own sense", represents, rather than perception, mistaken perception (mithyā), doubt (samsaya), expresses verbally1), the Permanent Mental State of Delight and similitude (sadrsya); what is actually experienced-on (consisting in a form of pleasure [sukha]) proper to Uda- the principle of the painted horse, etc.5)-is the percep- yana5). Representation (abhinayana), indeed, is nothing but a power of communication (avagamanasakti)-this Causal eficiency, the capacity to produce effects (arthakriyā, arthakriyā- power differing from the one of verbal expression. Pre- karitva), is the basic criterion of every form of right cognition, and, thorefore,

cisely for such reasons, Bharata does not mention at all of the real existence of a thing. Whon, for example, a man sees a mirage and, on going near it, does not find the water which he expected to find (and cannot, the word " Permanent Mental State " in the sutra, not therefore, drink, wash himself, ete.), his perception is a mistaken one; the water even in a different grammatical case®). Thus the Erotic which he has seen is not capable of appensing his desires, of carrying out the functions proper to real water. In some cases, however, even the mistaken Rasa is simply the Permanent Mental State of Delight perception is endowed with causal efficiency. In the present case, for instance, imitated; so that it may be rightly said both that it con- it allowe the observing subject to find a jewel which is renl; in other terms,

sists of, and is animated by, Delight, and that it is born it does not delude the expectations of the perceiving subject. Even a mistake, observes Dharmakirti, if it does not delude the perceiving subject, is a source of Delight. It is found, furthermore, that even mistaken of right knowledge. Now, if even a mistaken cognition, observes Saåkuka,

cognition is, sometimes, not without Causal Efficiency can be gifted with causal effciency, then it is all the more reason for a imi- tated cognition, i.e., the aesthetic cognition to be gifted with it. The spectators (arthakriya): " Between two people approaching two lights, do not, in fect, remain deluded by this, but find in the spectacle the accom- the one produced by a jewel, the other by a lamp [without pliehment of their desires.

being conscious of what they really are, but] withi the idea 1) True or real cognition (awareness of having to do with a real thing). The reality of this cognition is indicated in the text by the particle eva (pre- that it is a jewel, there exists a difference in respect of cisely, really, etc.). Causal Efficiency, but not a difference of mistaken cogni- 2) Mistaken cognition. The classical example of mistaken cognition is that of silver and a pieces of mother-of-pearl: a man sees something shine and tion"". Furthertmore, in aesthetic experience none of thinke it is silver, but on approaching this something he finds that, in fact, it is a piece of mother-of-pearl. The first cognition is contradicted, uprooted (badhita, 1) Unidentified stansa. In both these stanzas the word " Sorrow" occurs. unmilite) by the second. In the present case, there is at first the sensation of Thus, in these, Sorrow is in the state of verbal expression. being confronted with Rama in a state of happiness (i ... , when he has found 9) Harga, Ratnavall, II, 11. Sita again, ete.); this is followed by awareness that the actor is not Rama 3) I.c., ite literal meaning. in a state of happiness and that the first moment was thus a form of mistaken, 4) The word " Delight " docs not occur in this stansa. unreal, or illasory cognition. 5) The chief character of the Ratnavalt. $) Sadness, doubt. d) In the genitive; cf. supra, p. 30. 4) Conscionsness of the resemblance of the actor to the character represented. 7) This stanza is taken from the P.V., II, v. 57. It is also quoted by 5) Colours (minium, orpiment, lake, ete.) when put together give birth Mahimabbotto, Vyaktivioska, p. 78. to a thing which is different from each of them taken separately and cannot

[36] [37]

R. GNOLI THE AESTRETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. tion: "This is the happy Rama" 1) -. Sankuka himself cism1). Specifically, from what point of view, we may ask, says: ["In aesthetic experience] there is neither doubt, was Sankuka saying that Rasa has the nature of an imita- truth, nor error; the notion which appears is: 'This [man] tion? 1) From the point of view of the spectators' per- is so-and-so', not the notion: 'This [man] is really (eva) ception, 2) from the actor's point of view, 3) from the so-and-so'. [Aesthetic experience] involves no contradic- . point of view of the mind of the critics (vyakhyatr) who A.Ba. I, tory notion, and thus it is impossible to say that it is a analyse the real nature (vastuv!tta) [of aesthetic experience] form of mistake (viplava = bhranti); it is an immediate (for it has been said that "it is, in fact, the critics who perception (anubhava), evident in and by itself. What analyse in this way")*), 4) or, finally, from Bharata's sort of argument, then, could put it in question? "". own point of view? This thesis too, my masters say3), is without in- 1) The first alternative cannot be upheld. For only trinsic value and is incapable of resisting a close criti- something perceived by a means of cognition can be said to be an imitation). There is imitation, for exam- be identified with any of them. Sankuka says implicitly that an image, a pieture (citra), composed in colours,-to represent a horse, for example- ple, in the case of a person who drinks some milk (this arouse in the beholder a state of consciousness which ie different from the knowledge that he is beholding a real horse, a horse similar to a real horse, 1) Sankuka's mistako consists in asserting that acsthetic experience is illusory, etc. The same thing happens, says Sankuka, with the words in poetry. an experience of a discursive kind (savikalpa; it is an imitation), and at These, put together, bring abont assthetic experience, Rasa. A. G., docs not the same time saying that it differs from every othor kind of discuroive cogni- agree with this conception. He maintains thot a spectator, before a picture, tion. The doctrine which he professes is thue vitiated by an intrinsie contra- has the sensation of seeing a thing which imitates reality, that is to say, the dition. The whole of Bhatta Tota's confutation, reproduced by Abhinavs, reai horse. reduces in the last analysis to a close and often scholastic oxamination of I) In other words: nesthetic cognition differs from every other form of this contradiction. cognition; it is neither real nor unreal (the specifcity of this cognition is indi- 9) This quotation is taken from the svovrtti of Dharmakirti to the war- cated in the text by the absence of the asseverative particle eva, cf. p. 37, n. 1). thånumånapariccheda of the Pramänavörtika (cf. supra, p. 6): vyakhyatårah 9) Aesthetic experience is a form of inner or mental porception (mnasapra- khale evam vivecayanti na oyavahartārah | te tu svālambanam evārthakriyā- tyakga). It is directly perceptible to the mind or inner sense (manab)-in yogyam manyamānd driyavikalpyde arthāv cktkrtya pravartante | Practical the same way as the sensatione of pleasure, pain, ete. Seen in this way, aesthe- life (oyavahara) is based, according to Dharmakirti, on the idontification of tic experience is certain, immediate, self-knowing and cannot be doubted. the thing in se (svalaksana) with its mental imago. The mind spor-imposes "Whatever is known to us by consciousness is known beyond possibility of (arop) on the thing itself the image that it has of it and the subject believes question. What one sces or feola, whether bodily or mentally, one cannot that he is faced with reality. The difference between the thing itself, which bat be oure that one sees or feels. No science is required for the purpose is real, and the illasory character of the mental image which has been super- of establishing such truths; no rules of art can render our knowledgo of imposed upon it, is a theoretical distinction created by the ' critics' and ' phi- them more certain that it is in itself" (J. STUART MILL, A System of Logie, losophers ' (oyakhyatr, tattvacintaka). In confuting this concept, A. G. asserts Intr., § 4). that it is impossible to explain a thing in the theoretical moment by an ex- ) The expression "my masters ", observes H.C., alludes to Bhatta Tota planation which contradicts one's awareness of in the practical moment. (or Tanta), who was the direet master of A.G. and, therefore, lived in Kash- In other worde, the spectators, while they are immersed in the Rasa aronsed mir during the second half of tho 10th century. Bhatta Tota wroto a work by the spectacle, do not know that they are faced with an imitation. The of poetry, the Kovyakantuke, on which A.G. wrote a commentary (sivarana), fact antomatically confutes those who sustain the theory that there is an which has not yet been found. The confutation of Sankuka, given in the follow- imitation. Cf. infra, p. 47. ing pages, goes back, therefore, to Bhatta Tota. $) The explanation is given a few lines below. [38] [39]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. action being directly perceived by the spectator) and says: "Thus did so-and-so drink' the wine ". In this case, the of the actor, which, as perceived by the spectators, ap-

action of milk-drinking imitates the action of wine-drink- pears to them in the very form of an imitation of Delight,

ing. But in the present case what is it that is perceived then we may ask: "Of what, when perceived, does it appear to consist?" This is the problem. Our adversaries will in the actor, which might seem to be an imitation [of the Permanent Mental State]? This is the problem. His body, doubtless reply that the actor's mental movement appears

the headwear, etc., that crown it, his horripilations, his fal- to the spectators to consist of just those characteristic

tering words, etc., the raising of his arms, the waving of signs (causes, such as women, etc., effects, such as ex-

them, etc., his frowns, his expressive glances, etc., certainly pressive glances, etc., concomitant elements, such as Contentment, etc.) which serve to render perceptible an are not taken by anyone for imitations of Delight, which ordinary mental movement. To this contention we may is a mental movement. For a) they are [in themselves] insentient (jada)1), b) they are perceived by senses other immediately reply that, if this were the case, the mental

than those which perceive the mental movements (bhin- movement of the actor would be perceived simply in the form of Delight 1); thus such an argument certainly does nendriya) , and c) their substrata are made up of totally dissimilar things (bhinnadhikarana)", and thus are about not help to confirm the thesis which you wish to defend, namely that there is an imitation of Delight. It might as different from mental movements as it is possible to be replied that the following distinction must be made: imagine. Conscionsness of an imitation presupposes, fur- that from the point of view of the person imitated, the thermore, perception both of the term of imitation and Determinants, etc., are real (pāramārthika), but in the of the thing which imitates; but none of the spectators present case, the case of the imitator, they are unreal. has ever in their lives been in a position to witness directly the Delight of Rama. These arguments suffice to exclude Very well, then! But, even if these Determinants, etc., are not the real causes, effects and concomitant elements of altogether the possibility that the actor is imitating Räma ". the Permanent Mental State of the actor, even if, that If it is answered that the thing called Erotic Rasa, is to say, they are fashioned solely by the power of the the imitation of Delight, is simply the mental movement poem, the skill of the actor, etc., and are thus artificial,

1. I.o., they aro not of a mental or spiritnal naturo. are they so perceived by the spectators or are they per- ) Mental movements are perceived by the internal sense, manah, mind. ceived as real? And, if they are perceived as artificial, All the acts, ete., listed, however, are perceived by the external senses such how would it be possible, through them, to perceive Delight? as sight, etc. ) The body, ete. The mental states are based on the mind. M.C., p. 69. Answer: "But that is just exactly why what is perceived comments: tathā hi najavapurādinām jadatvam cakpurgrāhyatvam, rater eja- is not Delight but the imitation of Delight "! This answer, datoam manograhyatvam ca | pratilirşakādinăm vapur adhikaraņam, rates tus mano 'dhikaranam isi | 4) J.e., these implicitly exclude the second alternative as well; all the same, it is discussed and examined separately (cf. infra, pp. 45 ff.). 1) I.c., there would be a perception of ordinary nature, not acsthetie co- gnition.

[40] [41]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. we reply, could only be made by a man of dull wits 1). For inference from apparently similar effects of their cal reason will itself be invalid. For it cannot be maintained respective causes is only legitimate in the case in which that anyone could infer from mist (whether it be suppo- the effects really are derived from different causes and are sed by the observer to be smoke, or whether he be aware recognised as such by a person of experience. An inex- that it is only an imitation of the true logical reason) perienced person can only infer the more familiar cause something which is an imitation of fire. Obviously, a veil which is recognised by everybody. For example, [an ex- of mist-something which imitates smoke and is reco- perienced person] presented with a scorpion possessing gnised as an imitaion-does not legitimize the inference particular characteristics can readily infer that its cause of a heap of red roses, namely something that imi- is dung; [an inexperienced person], on the other hand, can tates fire.

only infer-and in this case there is nothing but (param) Someone might perhaps reply that, even if the actor A. 5. . a false cognition-that it is the offepring of another scor- is not himself enraged, still he seems to be enraged. True pion. When cognition of the logical reason (hetu)-e.g., enough, we answer, he is like someone who is enraged. But this resemblance is due to a contraction of the eye- smoke-is mistaken, inference based on this apparent logi- brows, etc .- in the same way, that is, that the resemblance between a real ox and another ox-like species is due to the 1) Bhatta Tota's reply (set out in the following lines) may be summa- shape of the muzzle, etc. In other words, no imitation rized: Assuming thet the Determinants, ete., are perceived as unreal or arti- ficial (krtrima), they cannot legitimise the inference of either Delight or an is involved. Again, the spectators are not conscious of imitation of Delight. From a mistaken or apparent logical reason (e.g., a this resemblance; we know that the perception of the cone-shaped cloud mistaken for a pillar of smoke; the cone-shaped cloud does spectators, while they perceive the actor, is not without not stand in any cause-effect relation with firo, and is thus a mistaken logical reason) we cannot infer cither fire (in this case, mistaken cognition would the mental state which he appears to have1). If we are occur) or, still less, anything imitating fire (o.g., as A. G. says, a heap of told that what occurs is not a real but an apparent imita- red roses). A person of experience can undoubtedly infer from two things, which to the layman are apparently the same, the respective causes of tion, this, we answer, is an argument completely without each of them (example: the scorpions. According to tradition there are force [, contradicting the very thesis which you are uphold- two kinde of scorpion, one kind being born from other scorpions and ing]3. Further, Śankuka said that in aesthetic expe- the other kind from dung); but in the present case the logical reason is nevor- thelese mistaken or apparent (the Determinants, ete., are perceived as krtrima) rience there is the perception: "That is Rama". Now, if and as such is an effect neither of Delight nor of an imitation of Delight. this perception, devoid of every doubt during the play, Thus for a person of experience the inference of something which imitates Delight is impossible. The inference of Delight made by an inexperienced is not later contradicted by some form of subsequent person is a form of mistaken cognition. H.C. explains: ayam bhavah pra- cognition which invalidates (badhaka) it, what is wrong siddhād ratilakşanāt kāranād ratyanukaraņam nāma kāranāntaram tatprabha- våf ced anubhavah syuh | tathaiva ea vifeşavida yadi jflāyeran tadā ratyanuka- raņalakıanasya vastvantarasyānumānam samafljasam syā | na caivam, tat ka- 1) In other worde, the spectators are not aware of a resemblance betweon tham iva ratyanukaranapratttih | avifeşavidā ca tathāvidhānubhāvadariane ratir the actor and the character he represents, but only of the fact that the actor evānumtyate tac ca mithyajfianam eveti | is immersed in a certain state of consciousness, shared also by them. ) M.C., p. 71 replaces "iti rikta vacoyuktih" by "iti svavacanavirodhab ]". [42 ] [43]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

with saying it is a true cognition? 1) And, if it is con- the perception of the spectators is concerned, in a pri- tradicted by a subsequent cognition, why is it not a mary sense, precisely with this and is presented in the mistaken cognition?9 In fact, however, even if no inval- form: "That man [is] in this [Permanent Mental State]". idating cognition is subsequently obtained, the case is always [, if we are to keep to Sankuka's point of view,] one The analysis of the nature of Representation made by

of mistaken cognition3). Thus Sankuka's contention, na- Śankuka by the expression, "Verbal Representation ...

mely that this cognition " involves no contradictory notion", merely in words ", etc., will be discussed later at the appro-

is without foundation1). Furthermore, the perception priate time and place. This analysis is very important.

"That is Rama", is repeated as well in the case of other In it, in fact, Sankuka emphasises the diversity [both of

actors; consequently [, accepting Sankuka's thesis,] there the Verbal Representation and of the simple verbal ex-

should be a " Ramaness ", a genus " Rama "5). Nor can pression]1. Thus it is wrong to say, that from the point

his other assertion, "The Determinants are visualized of view of the spectators, Rasa is an imitation of the Per-

through the poetry ", be successfully explained. Indeed manent Mental State.

the actor does not have the perception, "Sita is the woman 2) Nor, again, does the actor have this notion:

I love ", as if, that is to say, Sita was inherent in his own "I am imitating Räma or his mental state". For it is

real life. If it is replied that this is the meaning of not possible to imitate (i.e., to perform actions similar to

the word " visualization ", i.e., that this is how the Deter- those of ... ) someone of whose nature we are ignorant 9.

minants are made perceptible to the spectator, then we If, on other hand, they object that imitation only means

answer that there ought more reasonably to be, instead, the fact of doing something after [somebody else has alre-

a visualization of the Permanent Mental State. Indeed, ady done it], such imitation, we reply, is also found in ordi- nary life". This imitation, they reply, is not the imi- tation of a particular being, but merely the fact of imitat- 1) Cf. supra, p. 37,38. M.C., p. 71 simplifes: yac coktam râmo 'yam ity asti ing the Sorrow[, etc.,] of a man of elevated nature (utta- pratttih, tatrāpi yadi na bādhakodayah tat katham na samyagjnānam, bādhako- dayas est katham ne mithya | maprak!ti). But then-we reply-with what is this imi- 9) Cf. mupro, p. 87, n. 2. tation performed? This is the problem. Certainly not 3) Śaákuka says that aesthetic experience consists of an imitation; there- fore he maintains implicity that it is unreal. with Sorrow, since this is absent in the actor. It is un-

4. Cf. supra, p. 38. doubtedly not done with tears, etc .; for these, as has al- 5) According to A.G. aesthetic knowledge is of a different order from logical knowledge and therefore from the concepts of generality, ete., proper 1) Ch. IX of the N.S., in which A.G. discusses it, bas unfortunately not to the latter. The concept of sadharanys (cf. infra, p. 51, n. 1) is completely yet come to light. Cf. also N.S., ch. XIV. independent of logical generality (samanya). ) The actor does not identify or unite the Determinants taken from tho 9) It has not been perceived before. Every imitation presupposes a pro- poem with the things which are "causes" in his own real lifo. In.other vions perception. words, he does not have the perception that they from part of his real ) In other worde, if imitation is felt in this way, there is an imitation.

life. overy time someono does something which has already been done by somcone elso.

[44] [45]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. ready been said, are of a nature other than that of Sor- row1). Well, they might reply, then let us say that the taveşānukāra) 1). All this we explained before in the first

following perception occurs in the actor: " I am imitating chapter ".

the Consequents of a man of elevated nature". But in 3) Nor can it be said that there is an imitation

this case again, we observe, which man of elevated nature? from the point of view of the nature of things (vastuv!tta).

If the answer is any man of elevated nature, then we reply It is impossible, indeed, that a thing of which one is not that [the image of] such a man cannot be brought into conscious, can be considered as existing from the point of

the mind without further specification". If they say that view of the nature of things 3). We shall explain further in what the nature of things consists 4). the perception one has is that of, "I am imitating some- body who is weeping in this way ", then we reply that the 4) Nor did Bharata ever say in any passage: "Rasa is

actor's Self takes an active part in this Sorrow; so that the the imitation of the Permanent Mental States". Such an A. Bh .. I,

relation of imitated-imitator no longer exist 3). Besides, assertion was never made by him even indirectly by means of the actor's performance takes place only through three an indication. On the contrary, the various sub-divisions

causes: his skill in the art, his memory of his own Deter- of women's dance (lasya), the various musical tempi (tāla) minants, and the consent of his heart (hrdayasamvāda)") and the dhruva songs described by Bharata are an indication aroused by the state of generality (sādhāraņībhāva) of of precisely the opposite5. All this will be explained later the mental states5; in virtue of this, he displays the at the end of the chapter on the sub-divisions of the Junc-

corresponding Consequents and reads the work of poetry tures (samdhyanga)6). The expressions met with in Bha-

with suitable accompanying intonations (kaku) of his voice. rata every now and again, " Drama is an imitation of [all The consciousness of the actor is thus aware of only these the forms of existence in] the seven islands"")), etc., can three things: he has no consciousness of carrying out an imitation. For imitation of the deeds of Rama is diffe- 1) Cf. A. Bh., p. 37. A person in love, according to the Indian rhetors, is sometimes impelled to imitate or repeat every gesture and attitude, etc., of his rent from imitation of the dress of the beloved being (kān- beloved. The aesthetic act has nothing to do with this imitation. H.C., p. 424: vāgveşaceştitaih priyasyānukrtir ttlā 9) A. Bh., ch. I, p. 37. 1) Cf. supra, p. 40. 3) I.c., from the point of view of the analysing mind. Cf. I.P.V., II, p. 179: ) In so far as every cognition is of the particular. samvedanatiraskāriņt kā khalu yuktir nāma anupapattis ca bhāsamānasya kānyā 9) M.C., p. 71 paraphrases: ya evam rodititi cet, tarhi svatmanam api nato bhavişyati | 'nukarotity āyātam tasyāpi rodanasadbhāvād isi galito 'nukāryānukaribhāvah | s) In the statement of his own thesis. "If, they say, there is the notion . he who weeps thus', then, we reply, wo 5) They do not imitate anything in ordinary life; infra, p. 81, n. 4. must assnme thet the actor is imitoting himself as well (for the actor himself 6) N.S., XIX. Dafarupa, Haas, 11: "The Junctures are the structural would have to be really grieving). Thus the imitated-imitator relation would divisions of the drama, which correspond with the elements of the plot and no longer hold". the stages in the hero's realization of his purpose ". The Junctures are divided 4) Cf. infra, p. 65, n. 1. into sixty-four sub-divisions (anga). Cf. Ind. Th., p. 140, etc. 5) Cf. infra, p. 51, n. 1. 7) N.Š., I, v. 120: saptadvipānukaranam nātyam etad bhavişyati |. In other words, drama can be an "imitation " of all the forms of existence in the world [46] [47]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

have also other explanations. Moreover, why is it that to Again, other people say :- Rasa is made up of ple- the imitation of the walk, the dress, etc., of the beloved, asure (suhkha) and pain (duhkha). It is a combination imitation also of [all the forms of existence in] the se- (samagrī) of various elements1). This combination is of an ven islands (tadanukāre), is given another name [i.e., mi- external order and possesses the power of generating ple- micry, play, counterfeit (lila, cf. supra, p. 45, n. 5; vikā- asure and pain. [From this point of view,] this thesis rana, A. Bh., I, ch. p. 37) and not drama]? 1). agrees with Samkhya's doctrine3. In this combination, Some people say: "The pigments-orpiment, etc .- the Determinants take the place of petals. The Conse- undoubtedly compose (samyuj) a cow3) ". Now if the word quents and the Transitory Mental States do duty for that "compose " is understood in the sense of "manifest which garnishes it. Out of it, again, are born the Per- (abhivyaj)", these people are also in error. For we can- manent Mental States. These are made up of pleasure not say that minium, etc., manifest a real (paramarthika) and pain and are internal --. The supporters of this thesis cow like the one which might be manifested by a lamp, etc. maintain that expressions such as, "the Permanent Men- All they do is to produce (nirv?t) a particular aggre- tal States we shall bring to the state of Rasa", etc., must gate (samuha) similar to a cow. The only object of the be understood metaphorically, i.e., they are themselves image, "it is like a cow", is simply this minium, etc., aware that they are in flagrant contradiction with Bha- applied so as to constitute a particular arrangement (sam- rata's text. Thus the student is preserved from falling nivesa) similar to the arrangement of the limbs of a cow. into error by the fact that the mere statement of this thesis In the case of the aggregate of Determinants, etc., the displays garrulously ex ore suo its unsoundness3. What situation is different: this-as we have said-cannot be use is there in replying to such people? Let us rather perceived as similar to Delight 3). Thus it is not true that state the essential points of the other hypotheses, etc., Rasa is the imitation of mental states. arising out of this difficult problem, i.e., what is the nature of aesthetic perception. (the expression " the seven ielande ", refers to the world with its oceans, conti- nents, etc .; cf. A. Bh., I, p. 42: saptadolpabhāvānukaranarūpe nātye ... ). The term "imitation " must be interpreted as a "re-telling" (anukirtana) and 1) The Determinants, etc., are external (i.c., they are not psychic states). therefore as a "re-perception" (anuvyavasaya). On the meaning of this The elements in question are the Determinants, the Consequents, and the Tran- word, see below, pp. 106 ff. sitory Mental States; the latter are also regarded as external in the present 1) Text and translation both doubtful. passago. 2) A cow painted by a painter is considered concretely as a composition 9) According to the Samkhya, external objects are a modification of prakrti, of different colours mixed together and applied to a given surface. which is made up of pleasure, pain and stupor. The external objects are, thus, S) The vienal arts are regarded in this passage as being of a different order also themselves made up of pleasure, pain, etc. Thie conception is emphati- from poetry: the pigments, etc., are material thinge which imitete a material cally confuted by Dharmakirti, P.V., II, 268 ff. thing. Very well then, says A.G .; all the same, it is impossible that the $) According to this theory thero is no longer any difference between poetic expression (consisting of Determinants, etc., i.c., of material cloments) Rasas and Permanent Mental States. Its supporters are therefore forced to could imitate a mental movement, which is of a spiritual nature (the same give a metaphorical interpretation to all the passages in which Bharata di- objection as supra p. 40). stinguishes Rasas from Permanent Mental States. [48] [49] 4 - Cnozs, The ashetie esparienes, ete.

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

have also other explanations. Moreover, why is it that to Again, other people say :- Rasa is made up of ple- the imitation of the walk, the dress, etc., of the beloved, asure (suhkha) and pain (duhkha). It is a combination imitation also of [all the forms of existence in] the se- (samagri) of various elements1). This combination is of an ven islands (tadanukāre), is given another name [i.e., mi- external order and possesses the power of generating ple- micry, play, counterfeit (lila, cf. supra, p. 45, n. 5; vikā- asure and pain. [From this point of view,] this thesis raņa, A. Bh., I, ch. p. 37) and not drama]?1). agrees with Samkhya's doctrine2. In this combination, Some people say: "The pigments-orpiment, etc .- the Determinants take the place of petals. The Conse- undoubtedly compose (samyuj) a cow2". Now if the word quents and the Transitory Mental States do duty for that " compose" is understood in the sense of "manifest which garnishes it. Out of it, again, are born the Per- (abhivyaj)", these people are also in error. For we can- manent Mental States. These are made up of pleasure not say that minium, etc., manifest a real (paramārthika) and pain and are internal -. The supporters of this thesis cow like the one which might be manifested by a lamp, etc. maintain that expressions such as, "the Permanent Men- All they do is to produce (nirv?t) a particular aggre- tal States we shall bring to the state of Rasa", etc., must gate (samūha) similar to a cow. The only object of the be understood metaphorically, i.e., they are themselves image, "it is like a cow", is simply this minium, etc., aware that they are in flagrant contradiction with Bha- applied so as to constitute a particular arrangement (sam- rata's text. Thus the student is preserved from falling nivesa) similar to the arrangement of the limbs of a cow. into error by the fact that the mere statement of this thesis In the case of the aggregate of Determinants, etc., the displays garrulously ex ore suo its unsoundness3. What situation is different: this-as we have said-cannot be use is there in replying to such people? Let us rather perceived as similar to Delight 3). Thus it is not true that state the essential points of the other hypotheses, etc., Rasa is the imitation of mental states. arising out of this difficult problem, i.e., what is the nature of aesthetic perception. (the expression " the seven islands ", refers to the world with its oceans, conti- nents, etc .; cf. A. Bh., I, p. 42: saptadvlpabhāvānukaranarūpe nātye ... ). The term "imitation " must be interpreted as a "re-telling" (anukirtana) and 1) The Determinants, etc., are external (i ... , they are not psychic states). therefore as a "re-perception " (anuvyavasaya). On the meaning of this The elements in question are the Determinants, the Consequents, and the Tran- word, see below, pp. 106 ff. sitory Mental States; the latter are also regerded as external in the present 1) Text and translation both doubtful. passage. 9) A cow painted by a painter is considered concretely as a composition 2) According to the Samkhya, external objects are a modification of prakrti, of different colours mixed together and applied to a given surface. which is made up of pleasure, pain and stupor. The external objects are, thus, 3) The visunl arts are regarded in this passage as being of a different order also themselves made up of pleasure, pain, etc. This conception is emphati- ftom poetry: the pigments, etc., are material thinge which imitate a material cally confuted by Dharmakirti, P.V., II, 268 ff. thing. Very well then, says A.G .; all the same, it is impossible that tho S) According to this theory there is no longer any difference between poetic expression (consisting of Determinants, etc., i.e., of material elements) Rasas and Permanent Mental States. Its supporters are therefore forced to could imitate a mental movement, which is of a spiritual nature (the same give a metaphorical interpretation to all the passages in which Bharata di- objection as supra p. 40). stinguiches Rasas from Permanent Mental States. [ 48 ] [49] 4. - Gnozs. The eshetie esperienes, ete.

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. Bhatța Nayaka says 1) :- Rasa is not perceived (pratī), nor produced (utpad), nor manifested (abhivyaj).' For if it aesthetic experience]1; d) ocean-crossing, etc., are extraordi-

were perceived as inherent in the perceiver, in the Pathetic nary undertakings, and thus fall short of generality (sādha- Rasa he would necessarily feel in pain9. Again, such a ranya) 9. Finally, it cannot be said that what occurs is perception is not admissible. Why? a) Because Sita, etc., simply the memory of Rama, possessing such-and-such does not play the role of a Determinant in the case of qualities $), in so far as he has not been the object of a the spectator 3); b) because no memory of his own beloved 1) a) Generality (sadharanya) is the principal character of aesthetic expe- one does arise in the spectator's consciousness [while he rience. The events and facts of which the Determinants, etc., consist aro looks at Sita]4; c) because [the representation of] dei- independent of any relation with any particular individual and of any parti- ties, etc., cannot logically arouse [in the spectator] the cular association. The situation represented, says Mammata, is independent of the following specifications: "This concerns me"; "This concerne my state of generality (sadharanīkarana) [required for the enemy "; "This concerns a person who is indifferent to me "; "This does not concern me "; "This does not concern my enemy "; "This does not concern a person who is indifferent to me". Generality is thus a state of self-iden- 1) Bhatta Nayaka flourished in Kashmir after Anandavardhana (who was tification with the imagined situation, devoid of any practical interest and, a contemporary of King Avantivarman, 856-883 A.D.), the author of the Dhoan- from this point of view, of any relation whatsoever with the limited Self and nyaloka, whom he refutes. Bhatta Nayaka is, therefore, to be placed round as it were impersonal. The Determinants and Consequents differ from ordi- about 900 A.D. It is not, probably, mistaken to identify him with the brah -; nary causes and effects just on account of this state of generality. The same mapa Nayaka, who lived during the reign of Sankaravarman (883-902 A.D.), feelinge of Delight, Sorrow and Anger which pervade ordinary life appear and who is mentjoned by Kalhana (R.T., V, 159). In the I.P.V.V., III, p. 965 in a completely different manner in the aesthetic state of consciousness. The A.G. quotes a stanza of faive inspiration, which he attributes to Bhatta Nayakes witneesing of a scene of ordinary life (e.g., a love scene) necessarily arouses to which he gives the title of mimamsakagranth (the same title is given by in the spectator a certain serie of feelings (Anger, Envy, Disgust, etc.) pro- A.G., elsewhere, to Kumarila, mimamsskapravara). Another stanza of Bhatt portionate to the closencss of the ties which bind him to the protagonists Nayaka (taken from a stotra) is quoted by Kyemaraja (Spandanirnaya, p. 18) of the scene in question. It may be that he is completely indifferent to I am inclined to think that these two Bhatta Nayaka were ome and the dam the actors in the scene and also to the act which they perform; in this case person. The poetic work of Bhatta Nayaka is the Hrdayadarpana, which E the will be in a state of indifference (tatasthya), which also is at the very oppo- not yet come to light. The opening stanza of this work, which contains lte pole to aesthetic experience, which is characterized by just an active invocation to Siva, has been preserved in the A.Bh., I, p. S. The stansas f Birticipation (anupravefa) of the cogniring subject in the event ropresented. Bhatta Nayaka, which recurr a few lines later, are taken, without any dos The same scone represented on the stage is, on the contrary, devoid of all from this work. The fragments of the poetic work of Bhatta Nayaka E eirticular associations and free from any extraneous interference (vighna)- been collected. by T. R. Chintamani, J.O.R.M., Vol. I, pp. 267-276. hger; Disgust, ete. The spectator is withont any pragmatic requirement, the poetic doctrine of Bhatta Nayaka and the confutation of the dh fof the interests (desire for gain, ete.), by which ordinary life is charac- cf. T. R. Chintamani, J.B.U., Vol. 17, part 2, pp. 267-276. Bhatta;ki. ted. He is immersed in the aesthetic experience to the exclusion of every- ka's theory is also stated with few variations in the Dh. I. L., pp. 180: ai olse; the task of generalisation carried out by the poetic expression Bhatta Nayaka in general, see Kane, S.D.V., pp. 212-215; Pandoy. 'ethe barrier of the limited " I" and eliminates in this way the into- pp. 128-130. demands and aims associated with it. Cf. infra, p. 77 ff. . ) Thus no one would go to ses plays on pathetic, etc., subjects any b) In this passage Bhatta Nayaka maintains that when the Determi- $) The spectators are not Rama, etc., so that it is impossible to ste; are divinity, ete., they cannot be perceived as "gencral "; the that the fortunes of Sita can play the role of Determinant in their net gods are too different from human affairs. d) At the same time, there is no idontification of the image of St etithe last note. This assertion is confated by A.G., infra, p. 71. that of his own beloved. aeraleni, etc. Dh.A.L., p. 181: na cotsahadiman ramah smaryate, ananu-

[50 ] [51 ]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

previous perception. Even if it is supposed that the spec- third party? 1) Our thesis, thus, is as follows 3: Rasa is tator infers the perception of Rama from the words, etc., revealed (bhāvyamāna) by a special power assumed by of which the poem consists, we do not allow that this words in poetry and drama, the power of revelation (bha- implies the occurrence of Rasa-this does not happen even vana)-to be distinguished from the power of denotation- in the case of direct perception (pratyaksa)1). For on the (abhidha) consisting of, and animated by, the action of gene- appearance of a pair of lovers united together, the mind ralizing the Determinants, etc. This power has the faculty 4. %. I. of anyone present rather becomes the prey of conflicting of suppressing the thick pall of mental stupor (moha) mental movements (shame [lajja], disgust [jugupsā], envy which cloaks one's own consciousness 3): in poetry, it is [sptha], etc.); we surely cannot say that the onlooker in such a scene is in a state of Rasa! If, on the other hand, longer be without parts. This second alternative is, therefore, in contradiction

it is supposed that Rasa is perceived as inhering in a third to the very nature of sphota. The same reasoning is applied by Bhatta Nayaka to Rasa and to the words by which it is manifested. party, the spectator should be in a state of indifference The gradual manifestation of the Rasas has also been criticised by Saå- (tatasthya)9. Thus it is not possible to suppose that Rasa kuka, cf. supra, p. 33, 34.

can be perceived-whether this perception be a form of This passage is also to be found, with few variations, in Dh. A.L., p. 182: faktirüpasya hi śrngārasyabhivyaktau vişayārjanataratamyapravrttih syat | The direct experience or a form of memory (sm!ti). The same interpretation given by the modern commentator of this work, Rama Saraka,

errors may be imputed to the thesis which maintains that differs from mine (cf. Dh.A.L., p. 182).

Rasa is produced. If it is supposed that Rasa first pre- 1) Cf. p. 51, n. 1. 2) The thesis of Bhatta Nayaka is briefly as follows. In postic expres- exists in a potential form (Saktirüpatvena) and is later mani- sion, words possess three powers (vyapara): the first is the ordinary power

fested, then the Determinants must necessarily illuminate which they possess in prose as well, the power of denotation (abhidha), i.c., the fact that each word denotes a certain object; the second, which is proper it little by little3). Besides, the difficulties already en- to postry, is the power of revelation (bhavana), i.c., of revealing Rasa. This

countered would recur: is Rasa manifested as inhering in " gencralizes " the Determinants, etc. The third is the power of making the

the subject in which it is manifested, or as inhering in a spectator enjoy a fruition (bhogtkarana, bhegakrtva, bhogtkrti) of tho Rasa which they have revealed: Dh.A.L., p. 182: anyasabdavailakşanyam kavyātma- nah sabdasya tryamsatāprasādāt | tatrābhidhāyakatvam vācyavişayam, bhāvaka- toam rasadivişayam, bhogakrtvam sahrdayavişayam iti trayo ' miabhüta vyāpörb | 1) In other words, if Rasa could arise from a simple inference, all the more " The worde which make up a poem are of a different character from ordinary should it ariso from a direct perception. wordo, in that they have three powers. The first of these, the power of deno- 2) Cf. p. 51, n. 1. tation, is connected with the things signified; the second, the power of revelation. S) This objection repeats, mutatis mutandis, the objection of the Buddhists has as its object Rasa, etc .; the third, the power of bringing about fruition, has and of the mimamsaka against the concept of sphoja, which, according to the as its object all individuals who possess aesthetic sensibility. The words of grammarians (vaiyakarana), is a vocality, eternal and without parts, distinct a poem therefore have three powers". If, says Bhatta Nayaka, poetic ex- from the letters and manifested (uyaj) by these. This eternal vocality causes pression possessed only the power of denotation, there would be not the least the cognition of the meaning. This objection is as follows: is sphofa mani- difference between it and ordinary expression. fested entirely by the first letter of a word or not ?. a) If sphota is manife- S) During aesthetic experience, the conscionsness of the spectator is freo sted in its entirety, the letters which come after are unnecessary. In other from all practical desires. The spectacle witnessed is no longer felt in worde, the first letter would be capable of rendering perceptible the meaning connexion with tho empirical "I" of the spectator nor in connoxion with of the whole word. b) If sphota is manifested gradually, then it could no any other particular individual; it has the power of abolishing the limited

[ 52 ] [53 ]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. characterized by the absence of Defects (dosa) and the presence of Qualities (guna) and Ornaments (alamkara) of (druti), dilatation (vistara) and expansion (vikāsa), and is Expression1; in the drama, by the four kinds of Represen- characterized by a resting (visranti) on one's own conscious- tation2. Rasa, revealed by this power, is then enjoyed ness (samvit), which, due to the emergent state of sattva, (bhuj) with a kind of enjoyment (bhoga), different from direct has the nature of beatitude (ananda) and light (prakāsa)1).

experience, memory, etc. This enjoyment, by virtue of the different forms of contact between sattva and rajah and ta- and sānta; vistara of vira, raudra and btbhatsa; vikāsa, of hāsya, adbhuta and bhayanaka. Cf. Dh.A.L., comm., p. 206. Rajah predominates in druti, tamab mah3), consists of, and is animated by, the states of fluidity in vistara, and sattva in vikāsa. M.C., p. 74: yadā hi rajaso gunasya drutih tamaso vistarah sattvasyātivikāsah tādānim bhogah svariipam labhate | "It is personality of the spectator, who regains, momentarily, his immaculate being not when rajah is in fluidity, tamah in dilatation, and sattva in full expansion yet overshadowed by maya. Moha, stupor, is the specific state aroused by tamah. that fruition is realized ". 1) One classical definition of poetry (H.C., p. 33) says: adorau sagunau sā- 1) a) The expression sattvodrekao is reproduced almost without chango-by lamkarau ca fabdarthau kavyam | " Poetry is word and content withont dofects, Mammața, p. 74: sattvodrekaprakafanandamayasa meidvifrantisatattvena. It has been commmented upon in several ways. I have followed, in the translation, possessing qualities and also (but not necessarily) ornaments". s) Cf. supra, p. 35, n. 2. the commentary of Vidyacakravartin (K.P., Trivandrum Sanskrit Series, 3) a) The light of the Self, of the conscionsness, does not reveal itself, in LXXXVII): sattvodrekåd yau prakafanandau tanmayyam samvidi samadhiortti- the samsarika existence, in immacnlate purity, but is conditioned by the three rüpāyām yā yoginām višrāntir vigalitasakalašramā nistarangenāvasthitis satsadr- constituent elements (guna) of mental substance (buddhi), sattva, light, luminous Sena. M.C., p. 74, comments on: sattvodrekena prakāsah prakato ya ānandas tan- and pleasant, rajah, mobile, dynamic and painful, tamah, inert, obstructive and mayi ya samvit tasyam vifrantih, sa satattvam paramartho yasya sa tatha | A.G. stupid. These three constituent elements are never present in isolation, but says in Dh.A.L., p. 183: rajastamovaicitryanuviddhasattvamayanijacitsvabhāva- mingled together in unequal proportions. The state of emergence of the ele- nirvrtivisrantilaksanah The famous definition of aesthetic experience given by Visvanatha in his Sahityadarpana, adds nothing to the conception of A.G. ment sattva, limpid and mirror-like, coincides with a manifestation, always more distinct and evident, of the light and beatitude proper to the Self- and Bhatta Nāyaka. Višvanātha says: these indeed reflect themselves in sattva. I.P.V.V., I, p. 150: sattvam pra- sattvodrekad akhandasvaprakafānandacinmayah kfarüpam nirmalanabhahprakhyam sarvato jaladapațalena iva varaņātmanā vedyåntarasparsasünyo brahmāsvadasahodarah l1 tamasā samāvrtam āste | tatra ca marutasthantyam pravrttisvabhavam rajah lokottaracamatkarapranah kaiscit pramatrbhih kriyatmakatayā kramena tamojaladam apasārayati niyagbhavayati | " Sattva, svākāravad abhinnatvenāyam asvādyate rasab l1 which is made up of light and is like the immaculato ether, is completely on- shrouded by tamah, the principle of obstruction, as by a blanket of cloud. Ra- "Rasa is tasted by the qualified persons [i.e., qui rationem artis intelligunt]. jah, which is made up of action and io, therefore, imbued with activity, serves It is tasted by virtue of the emergenco of sattva. It is mado up of a full as a wind, which, littie by little, brushes away, dissipates, the cloud-bank of Intelligence, Beatitude and Self-Luminosity. It is void of contact with any samah". The three constituent elements, sattva, rajah and tamah are associated other knowable thing, twin brother to the tasting of brahman. It is animated with three states of consciusness called, respectively, oxpansion (vikasa), pro- by a camatkara of a non-ordinary nature. It is tasted as if it were our very voked by an absolute predominance of sattra, fuidity (druti), determined by being, in indivisibility "! Cf. the translation of A.K. Coomaraswamy, The a contact of sattva with rajah, and dilatation (vistara) determined by a contact Transformation of Nature in Art, Harvard, 1934, pp. 48 ff. Coomaraswamy of sattva with tamah. translates camatkara with "lighting-flash ". According to Visvanatha, sattoa The conception of the three guna, belonging, in particular, to the samkhya is nothing but the mind or inner sense (manah) devoid of any contact with and yoga systems, is accepted, without notable modifications, by the wholo of rajah and tamah. Indian thought. b) The terminology used by Bhatta Nayaka and referred to by A.G. b) Druti, vistara, and vikase are each connected with certain Rasa by later is exactly analogous to that need by Bhoja, in his definition of the sanan- Indian theorists. Druti is the proper state of consciousneas of frngara, karupa dasamādhi: yadā tu rajastamolefanuviddham antahkaraņasattvam bhāoyate tadā gunabhāvāe citisakteh subhaprakāsamayarya sanvasya bhāvyamānasyodrekāt [54] [55 ]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. This enjoyment is of the same order as the Tasting (asvada) himself1): " Poetry possesses three powers: the power of of the supreme brahman1) -. For, as Bhatța Nāyaka says denotation, the power of revelation, and the power of arousing enjoyment [lit., and these being enjoyed]. The samandah samadhir bhavet | (Bhojavrtti, I, 17). " When the matter of concen- tration (bhavana is commented on by Bhoja bhavana bhauyasya vişayantara- ornamenting of the words and of the content form part pariharena cetasi punah punar nivesanam) is the sattva tinged by the rajah of the power of denotation3. The various Rasa-the and tamah proper to the inner sense, then by virtue both of the subordinate state of the self, and of the emergence of sattva, which is made up of bliss and Erotic, etc .- are, according to us, revealed by the power light and is the matter of concentration, that which is called sanandasamadhi of revelation. Enjoyed, they pervade [the consciousness occurs " This passage is also quoted by Pandey, I.Acs., p. 189. of] the qualified man 3) ". e) Vifränti, rest, denotes the fact of our being absorbed in something, im- In this exposition, the theses confuted by Bhatta Na- merged in it, to the exclusion of every other thing (vigalitavedyantarataya), without, that is, having any mental movement, any extrancous desire (in other yaka are not accepted even by us-simply because we do worda no obstacle, vighna), which comes to break into that state of consciou- not accept the thesis of Bhatta Lollata. Thus the errors sness. In acsthetic language, visranti denotes, at the same time, the fact of being absorbed in the aesthetic object, and the sensation of pleasure sui ger confuted by Bhatta Näyaka cannot never be brought to neris which accompanies that state of consciousness. In the saiva metaphysics life again1. vifranti denotes the repose of everything that exists in the " I" (everything that exists is reposing in the conscioueness, but the conscioueness does not is [laboriously] milked by yogins". Cf. also A.Bh., p. 5. On the opinion of A.G., repose in any other thing different from itself, it is reposed in itself) and, impli- infra, pp. 100, 101. Two stansas which reflect the same idea and which are cer- citly, the repose of the limited " I" in the consciousness in its original fullness. The terms "solution" (nirorti), "lysis" (laya), "accomplishment" (samapatti), tainly from Bhatta Nayaka, are quoted by Mahimabhatta (Vyaktiviveka, p. 94):

etc., express the same concept (cf. infra, p. 77). They recur frequently in the päthyad atha dhruvaganat tatah sampūrite rase | works of the faiva schools of Kashmir. Consciousnees manifests and illumi- sadāsvādabharaikagro hreyaty antarmukhah kşanam nates everything. The appearing of all things presupposes the existence of tato nirvişayasyasya svarūpavasthitau nijah | Consciousness, which is, in this sense, light (prakasa). vyajyate hlādanişyando yena trpyanti yoginah i On the concept of beatitude (ananda), sco infra p. 87, n. 2. "The recitation of drama and the dhruva songs which accompany it, feed 1) Bhatta Nayaka was perhaps the first to associate aesthetic experienco the Rasa in all its fullness and, therefore, the spectator, absorbed in the tasting with mystical experience. The aesthetic state of consciousness is no longer of this, and turned in towards himself, feels pleasure for the whole time that associated with the limited " I "; during acsthetic experience the subject is com- the spectacle lasts., He, immersed inside his own being, forgets, therefore, pletely absorbed in the object contemplated, and the whole of the reality which everything (belonging to practical life). In him there manifests itself a fux surrounds him disappears from his view. The same thing, mutatis mutandis, of that pleasure which is inborn, and from which the yogins draw their sati-' occurs in mystical experience; in this sense, aesthetic experience is similar sfaction ". (savidha, sabrahmacarin, sahodara) to experience of the Absolute or of the The association between these two states also appears in the affinitics of brahman. Bhatta Nayaka and A.G. (A.G. also accepts Bhatta Nayaka's the terms which designate them: visrānti, nirvrti, laya, nirvefa, samapatti, camat- opinion; Dh.A.L., p. 190: parabrahmäsvadasabrahmacarisvam caste asya rasāsvā- kāra, etc. dasya), however, do not fail to emphasise the unmistakable characteristics of 1) The two stanzas which follow undoubtedly formed part of tho Hrda- each. Bhatta Nāyaka says (Dh.A.L., p. 91): yadarpaņa. 2) However, from what has been said one would suppose them to be part vagdhenur dugdha stam hi rasam yad bālatrmnaya | of the power of revelation. tena nasya samah sa syad duhyate yogibhir hi yab l 3) Siddhiman is the man who has httained to succese (siddhi) in this enjoy- "This Rasn (acsthetic pleasnre) is poured forth spontancouely by the word, ment, and who thus posseeses the necessary requirements, artistic sensibility, ete. like a cow, for love of her children; for this reason it is different from that which 4) Cf. Dh.A.L., p. 187. The theses confuted by Bhatta Nayaka do not admit the concept of generality; thoy distinguish between one's own percep- [56] [57]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. As for the rest, we do not see what kind of enjoyment the power of generating enjoyment (bhogikarana)1) con- distinguishable from perception, etc., can exist in the world. If, as they say; it is Tasting (rasana), we reply that this sisting in the states of fluidity, etc. Very well, then! But it is impossible that it should consist solely in these three too is a perception 1), and is only called by another name on account of the particular means (upaya)" by which it 1) If, says A.G., the expression 'enjoyment' is understood in the sense of is called into existence. The same thing happens in the perception (so that the power of generating enjoyment becomes the power of generating the aesthetic perception, the Tasting), it may certoinly be accepted. case of direct perception (darsana), reasoning (anumāna), In this sense, the power of generating enjoyment becomes the same as what the revealed word (sruti), analogy (upamiti), intuition 5, followers of the dheani school call the power of evocation (dhvananavyapara).

(pratibhana), etc. [, each of which takes a different name]. Dh.A.L., p. 189: bhogo 'pi na kavyasabdena kriyate, api tu ghanamohandhya- sańkaļatāniorttidvāreņāsvādāparanāmni alaukike drutivistaravikāsātmani bhoge Besides, if we do not admit that Rasa is produced or mani- kartavye lokottare dhvananavyāpāra eva mürdhabhişiktah | tae cedam bhogakrt- fested, we shall be forced to conclude that it is either vam rasasya dhvananiyatve siddhe daivasiddham | rasyamānatoditacamatkārāna- siriktatvad bhogasyoti | eternal or non-existent: no third possibility exists. A The theory of dhuani was first formulated by Anandavardhana, the author thing which cannot be perceived cannot be said to exist of the Dhvanyaloka, who lived in the reigu of Avantivarman (856-883 A.D.). According to Anandavardhana and his followers, among whom was A.G., the at all. The supporters of Bhatta Nāyaka will perhaps words in poetry take on an additional power, the power to manifest (uyanj) reply that the perception of Rasa is just what they call aesthetic experience, or Rasa. They conceive Rasa as a form of resonance or suggested sound, evoked but not expressed, which they called dhoani. To the power itself they gave the name dhvananavyāpāra or syanjanavyāpara', tion and somebody else's. A. Bh., I, p. 292: ata eva ca nate na rasah, kutra the power of evocation or manifestation. It cannot be confounded either tarhi | vismrtiftio na bodhyate | uktam hi defakālapramātrbhedaniyantrito rasa a) with the power of denotation, abhidhavyapara (arising from the fact thas each isi | "*[According to yon], then, the Rasa is not in the actor; where is it, word has a definite corresponding sense) or b) with the power of connotation then?' If this is what you sny, it shows that you are forgetful and not well- lakşanavyāpāra, or, finally, c) with the so-called power of intention, tatparya informed. For it has been said that Rasa is unaffected by any limitations (for the nature of these last two powers, cf., for example, De, S.P., II, p. 185 ff.). of time, space, and knowing subject ". The passage from the words of the poetry (and therefore from the Determi- 1). Dh.A.L., p. 187: rasah pratiyanta ity odanam pacatisivad vyavahārah. nants, etc.) to the acsthetic experience, i.e., Rasa, or, according to the theo- prattyamana eva hi rasah | pratttir eva vifigfa rasand | "The erpression, ' The rists of dhoani, rasadhvani, cannot be distinguished. The convention which Rasas aro perceived *, is merely a manner of speaking; it may be compared with links the sound and the sense serves only to render perceptible the literal . the expression ' He cooks the cooked rice'. For the Rasa ean be perceived only. meaning of the poetic word and not the aesthetic experience, which transcends Tasting is nothing but a particular form of perception". In other wordo, discurive thought and is outside, in this sense, the domain of language. The there does not exist both a Rasa and a perception distinct from it. Cf. infra, word, the poetic expression, once perceived, automatically manifests Rasa. p. 103. The passage from the perception of the words to the perception of Rasa is 9) The Determinants, etc. 3) The term pratibha, pratibhana, is used in several sense [cf. Intr., pp. XI so rapid as to be imperceptible. The poetic word is totally different from the proso word. Dh.A.L., ff. infra, 65, 66, n. 1, b]. In the present passnge is has the sense of "an pp. 158 f .: kāoyātmakafabdanişpidanenaiva taccarvanā driyate | driyate hi tad inexplicable intaition as to what may occur in the fature, for example, ' Tomor- va kāvyam punah punah pathami carvamānas ca sahrdayo lokab | na tu kā- row my brother will come'. It also includes the power of understanding all kinds of sound without effort, all that may be communicated by any animal eyasya tatra · upādāyāpi ye keyā' itinyāyena krtaprarttikasyānupayoga oveti

in the world and also the power of having heavenly visions " (Dasgupta, sabdasyāptha dhvananavyāpārah | ata eoālakryakramatā | yat tu vākyabhedah H.I.Ph., V, 127). This particular form of consciousness is discussed by Jayanta, syåd iti kenacid uktam, tad anabhijfiatayā | fastram hi. sakrd uccāritam samaya- Nydyamanjari (Benares 1936), pp. 97 ff. balenärtham pratipådayad yugapad viruddhānekasamayasmrtyayogāt katham artadvayam pratyāyayet | aviruddhatve vā tāvān eko vākyārthah syat | krameņāpi [58] [ 59]

R. CNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

states. For there exist just as many forms of perception- whose nature, according to you, lies in this very power of elements, sattva, etc., can be found set out in an infinite

generating fruition-consisting of, and animated by, Ta- number of different ways: one may predominate at one

sting, as there are kinds of Rasa. Besides, the constituent time and another at another. Thus it is absurd to limit the forms of Tasting to only three. If the word "revelation'" in the expression, "the Rasa viramyavyāpārāyegah | punar uccārite 'pi vākye sa eva, samayaprakaraņādes are revealed by the poem" (what Bhatta Nayaka says tādavasthyat | prakaranasamayaprāpyārthatiraskārenārthāntarapratyāyakatve niya- mbhava iti is: "The various Rasa-the Erotic, etc .- are, according

tenāgnihotram juhuyāt svargakāma iti frutau | to us, revealed by the power of revelation"), is used in the khadee chvamamsam ity ea narthe ity atra ka prama il sense [of the power, proper to the poem,] to become the iti prasajyate | tatrāpi na kācid iyattety anāsvāsatā ity evam vākyabhedo duşa- matter of a perception, which consists of a Sampling made nam | iha tu vibhavādy eva pratipādyamānam carvanāvişayatonmukham iti samayådyupayogābhāval | na ca niyukto 'ham atra, karavāni, krtārtho 'ham iti up of a Tasting, and which is generated by the Determi- föstriyaprartisadrsam adah | tatrottarakartavyaunmukhyena laukikatvät | iha tu nants, etc., it may be accepted without any question. vibhāvādicarvanādbhutapuşpavat tatkālasāraivoditā na tu pūrvāparakālānuban- dhintti laukikād āsvādād yogivişayāc cānya evāyam rasāsvādah | "Ono notices that this Tasting takes place by virtue, to be exnct, of a squeezing out of (of the trentise), it can be replied that, then, there is no longer any fixed the cesence of the words of the poem. One secs, in fact, that persons ' gifted relation between the word and the meaning. In this way, one falls into the with heart' read, many times over, the same poem and that they tasto it error [denounced by Dharmakirti]: " Therefore, what reason can one adduce

in this way". A poem does not lose its value after it has been perceived. for the fact that, on hearing the phrase, ' He, who desires the sky, must offer

This is in contradiction to the rule: "Those things, which after been accepted the agnihotra', one does not perceive the meaning, 'he must eat dog-flesh?' must later be abandoned, [when their task is accomplished], are called the (P.V., III, v. 318)" Moreover, there would be no limit to the number of means (V.P., II, v. 38)". It is, therefore, necessary to admit that, in ne- possible meanings and there would exist a general state of uncertainty. The

sttetic perception, the worde assume an additional power: the power of evo- fact of admitting that a phrase can bave several meanings is thus a cation. It is precisely because of this that the passage from the conven- fallacy. tional meaning to the poetic meaning is indistinguishable. The objection put In the case of aesthetic perception, on the contrary, there is this: that the

forward by many people, i ... , that, in postry, a phrase would then come to Determinants, etc., once perceived, tend to become an object of Tasting and. have many different meanings, is due solely to their ignorance. (This objection therefore, one has no ulterior application of conventions. Aesthetic cognition

is only valid in the case of didactic works). How, in fact, can a piece from a is not, in fact, the same as the form of perception proper to a didactic work,

didactic work, which has been pronounced once and the meaning of which has i.e., " I am commanded to do this", " I want to do this " and " I have done already been perceived by force of convention, lead one to perceive another what'I had to do". Such forms of perception tend, in fact, to an oxtrinsic

and different meaning. It is impossible, indeed, that the subject shonld remem- end, successive to them in time, and are thus of an ordinary (i.c., practical)

ber, at the same time, several mutually contrasting conventions. And if these nature. In nesthetic experience, what happens is, instead, the birth of the conventions are not contrasting, the meaning of the phrase is, then, one. If Tasting of the Determinants, etc. Such a Tasting is like a fower born of magic;

it is admitted that the different meanings are perceived one after another, its essenco is solely the present, it is correlated neither with what came beforo

then we can reply that the worde, after they have made one meaning percep- nor with what comes after. This tasting of Rasa is, therefore, as different

tible and have thus ceased to be efficacious, have no longer any power to from ordinary tasting as it is from the tasting of yogins ". render perceptible any other meaning. And even if the phrase is pronounced The nature of the dhoani (dhvani becomes identified with Rasa) is ex-

a second time, the meaning remains invariably the same. pressed by Anandavardhana in the following way (Dh.A., I, 4): "In the words Should comeone object that a prose passage con lead one to perceive another of the great posts a new element is to be perceived, different from any other,

meaning, independently of that perceived through convention or the matter which transcende all the separately perceptible parts, like that which in women is called beanty". [60] [61]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC . EXPERIENCE, ETC. However, in the stanza, " Rasa is, it is said, the essence Tireless, the mind of man climbs ever higher to gaze 50.1, of poetry (kavyartha)1); it is a perception (anubhava) consist- on truth. What is the point of dwelling on the doctrines ing of a Tasting (asvadana) and is the matter of cognition which have succeeded each other on the ladder of thought? by the supreme consciousness (parasamvitti), manifested (vyangya) by the union of the Determinants, etc. ", Bhatta The first attempts to establish the reality of things Nāyaka seems to be saying that Rasa is manifested. Thus are, I suppose, doubtful and vacillating: but as we advance in this passage no objection seems to be made to the doc- doggedly along this road, we cease to be amazed by built trine of manifestation ". By the word "perception " we bridges, city foundations, or anything else. must understand that Rasa is the object of a perception of the kind that has been described. A rich and fruitful harvest may be culled by posterity At this point, perhaps, someone might ask: "Then from the inheritance of thought left to it by its predeces- what is the true nature of Rasa?" Well, what shall sors. Thus the doctrines of the sages of antiquity will we do?3) only be refined by us here and not refuted. Why repeat truths disclosed already in the Thought Let us then state what is the true nature of Rasa puri- handed down by Tradition and thus behave as no one has fied of previous mistakes. It has already been stated by behaved before? This double, serious and indissimulable Bharata, and we shall add nothing new. For he has said: error will certainly be imputed to me by audience. "The mental states are called bhava, because they bring into existence (bhav) the essence of poetry"1). Thus Rasa 1) a) The expression kavyårtha is borrowed from Bharata, N.S., VII, p. 343: is simply the essence of poetry. That is to say, immedia- kavyarthan bhavayanttti bhaoah. "[The mental states] are called bhava because they bring into existence (bhao) the essences of the poem". Artha, A.G. tely after the first perception of the literal sense of the commente (A.Bh., p. 344), in this expression does not carry the meaning of sense, following expressions, "They lay by night ", "He gave something expressed (abhidheya), bat means the final cause, the cssence of the it [scil., the omentum] to the fire"9, there occurs (in a poem (arthyante prâdhanyencty arthydh, na to arthafabdo 'bhidheyardct); in other words, Rasa. qualified person [adhikārin], characterized by a certain prag- b) Aesthetic experience is associated with the experience of brahman, matic requirement [arthita], etc., and possessed of a keen with the supreme consciomness, cf. p. 56, n. 2. : 9) The existence of dhvani is explicitly denied by Bhatta Nayaka (cf. the interest in the object of perception involved) a second per- passago quoted by Jacobi, ZDMG, 62, p. 296, Pandey, p. 246 ff.): In somo ception eliminating the temporal data, etc., contained in passages, A.G. points out, he seems, nevertheless, to admit its existence im- the first"). This second perception consists in a transfer plicitly. In thie stanse, Bhatta Nayaka uses, for example, the verb oyaj and therefore admits implicitely the theory of dhoani, the sense manifested, i.c., not expressed, that words assume in poetry. 1) Cf. p. 62, n. 1. $) At thie point A.G. interrupts his examination of rejected doctrines 9) Two quotations taken from revelation (fruti) [from the Taittiriya Bräh- with the four following stanzas, which serve as a sort of prelude to the mapa?j. Cf. p. 64, n. 1. ezposition of hie own thesis. 9) The correct past tense of the two expressions in question. [62] [63]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. (samkramaņā), etc., of the literal sense and is presented in bhana) 1). In such a person hearing the following phrases, the form: " I give", etc. According to different systems, " There he [scil., the deer] is now, gracefully by the bend- this perception is called propulsion (bhavana), command (vi- dhi), order (niyoga), etc.1). A similar thing may be said to 1) a) Not everybody, A.G. observes, has the intrinsic capacity to taste happen in the case of poetry: there occurs in a qualified a poem. Individuals possessed of aesthetic sensibility are called possessed of heart, those who have the consent of the heart (sahrdaya, hrdayasamvadabhak) person a perception trascending the words of the poem". The fact of being posscased of heart is defined in the following way (Dh.A.L., The qualified person is in this case any person whose p- 38): yeşām kāvyānustlanābhyāsavafād viladibhūte manomukure varņaniya- heart possesses a mirror-like power of intuition (prati- VII, v. 10) tanmaylbhavanayogyatå te svahrdayasa moddabhajah sahrdayāh | yathoktam (N.S.,

1. In other words, some scriptural sentences (e.g., those quoted) awaken yo 'rtho hrdayasamvadt tasya bhavo rasodbhavah | in the believer the need to give the omentum to the fire himself, ete. In this fariram vyāpyate tena fuşkam kåştham ivágninā !l sense, their literal meaning undergoes a transformation: the past tense and the " The faculty of self-identification with the events represented [the Deter- third person, etc., used in these sentences are turned into the present tense, etc. minants, etc.,] demande that the mirror of the mind should be made comple- There arises in the heart of the believer the form of consciousness (pratipatti), tely clear, by means of repeated acquaintance with and practice of poctry. "I give the omentum to the fire", etc. This passing from one sense to another The possessed of heart, those who possess the consent of their own hearts, is given the names of propulsion (bhavana), order and command (vidhi, niyoga). are these who have this faculty. For it has been said: ' the tasting of that The termas bhavana, vidhi, and niyoga, are proper to the liturgical speculations which finds the consent of the heart arouses the Rasa. The body is pervaded of mimamsd (the term bhavand used by Bhatto Nayaka was probably taken by it, as dry wood by the fire'". The mind and heart must be mirror-liko from the terminology of the parvamtmamsa). The terms vidhi and niyoga, (visada, vimala), ready to reccive all the images which are refected in them: observes J., T.A., I, p. 167, are used above all by the followers of Prabbakara; vimalamukurakalptbhatanijahrdayah, A.Bh., p. 37. In the T.A., III, 200, Kumarila's disciples prefer instend the word bhovana. The shift of sense invol- A.G. says: ved, of course, presupposes the adherence of the subject to the sacred writings, his deaire to attain certain ende, etc. This shift of sense is clearly explained tatha hi madhure gite sparie va candanādike in three floka quoted by H.C., p. 98 (surely taken from a work on postics mädhyasthyavigame yāsau hrdaye spandamānātā i carlier than A.G., pethaps the Hrdayadarpana of Bhatta Nayaka) ånandafaktiņ saivoktā yatah sahrdayo janab | ārogyam āptavān fāmbah stutvā devam aharpatim | "When the ears are filled with the sound of sweet song or the nostrils syad arthavagatih pūrvam ityadivacane yatha !l with the scont of sandal-wood, etc., the state of indifferenco (non-participation, tatas copāttakālādinyakkārenopajāyate | impersonality, etc.), disappears and the heart is invaded by a state of vibra- pratipattur manasy cvam pratipattir nasamsayah Il tion (spandamanata; for the significance of the term spanda, cf. p. 74, n. I). yah ko 'pi bhaskaram stauti sa sarvo' py agado bhaved | Such a state is precisely the so-called power of beatitude, thanks to which man tasmåd aham api staumi roganirmuktaye ravim l is ' gifted with heart'". According to the faiva of Koshmir, heart is con- "In the sentences .Samba regained his health when he praised the Sun sciousness itself, thought, beatitude, etc. (cf. p. 87, n. 2). God', ete., there occurs at first the perception of their literal sense, and then Elsewhere (A.Bh., II, p. 339), A.G. says that poetic sonsibility is the (and on this there is no matter of doubt) there arises in the mind of the per- faculty of entering into identity with the heart of the poet (kavihrdayatadat ceiving subject a perception which eliminates the temporal data, etc., assum- myapattiyogyata). Of course, people whose nature is "gentlo (sukumra)" ed by the sentence in question. This perception is presented in the following will have a grater feeling for erotic poetry; people of bolder nature will form: . Everyone who praises the Sun regains hie health; so I too will praico heroic poetry, etc. Every individual has a particular nature (tendencies, the Sun, so as to free myself from disense'". Cf. I.P.V.V., I, p. 24; I.P.V., innate instincts, beginningless root desires, vasand), according to which he I, p. 27. will feel himself more drawn to some poets than to othors. " Sensibility" 9) Cf. supra, p. 59, n. 1. (sahrdayatva) also plays an important role in religious experience, but in this [64 ] [65] 5. - GnoLi, The cssthetie euperienes, etc.

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

ing of his neck ... "1), " Even Uma, dropping the golden karņikāra ... "", "The firmness of Hara ... "3), there which completely eliminates the temporal distinctions, etc., assumed by these sentences. In fact, the young deer, etc., appears, immediately after the perception of their literal which appears in this perception is devoid of its par- sense, a perception of a different order (an inner [mānasī] ticularity (visesa), and at the same time, the actor, perception, consisting in a direct experience [sākșātkāra])1) who [, playing the role of the deer,] frightens [the spec- tators] (trāsaka ... ), showing to be afraid, is unreal (apā- case we may not talk of aesthetic sensibility, the more correct term being religious sensibility; cf. P.T.V., p. 45 ff. ramarthika). As a result, what there appears is simply and

b) The word pratibhana (= pratibha) has the double sense of creative solely Fear-Fear in itself, uncircumscribed by time, space, imagination, artistic genius, inspiration (karayitri pratibha) and of aesthetic etc.1). This perception of Fear is of a different order from sensibility, of consent of the heart conceived in the terms of an active power which permits the manifestation of Rasa (bhavayitri pratibha). In this case, the ordinary perceptions ("I am afraid, he-my enemy, pratibha is jast used in this very sense. I translate: power of intuition. The my friend, anybody-is afraid "); for these are necessa- division of the concept of pratibha in karayitri pratibha (creative intuition and intelligence) and in bhavayitrt pratibha (contemplating intuition has first been rily affected by the appearance of fresh mental movements

explicitly stated by Rajasckhara, Kavyamimamsa, IV.) Pratibha means also (of shunning, etc.)", consisting of pleasure, pain, etc., and intuitive cognition, etc., cf. p. 58, n. 3. 1) Kālidasa, Abhijnānasakuntala, I, 2: "There he [scil., the deer] is now, just for this reason are full of obstacles (vighna)$). The

gracefully by the bending of his neck casting a glance ever and anon at the sensation of the Fear above mentioned, on the contrary, chariot which pursues him, by [the contraction of] the hinder half [of his body[ is the matter of cognition by a perception devoid of obsta- repeatedly drawing himself into the fore [part of his] body through fear of tho descent of the arrow; strewing the road with grass half-chewed which drops from bis mouth kept open from exhaustion. See! by reason of his lofty boundings rence to the concept of beatitude, p. 87, n. 2. The mind is the organ of

he goes chicfly in the air, and little on the ground " (Monier Williams, Sakun- tasting; during the tasting the mind must be free of all obstacles, devoid,

tală, Hertford, 1853, p. 9). that is to say, of any other sensory perceptions, etc. The subject is immersed

2. Kālidāsa, Kumarosambhava, III, 62: " Even Uma, dropping the golden in a camatkara set apart from any distinctions of "self" or " others ". Aes- thetic tasting is a " generalised " perception and free, therefore, of obstacles karnikara flowers which glowed among her black tresses, deeply bowed her head (while the flowers which adorned them fell from her ears) before Siva ". (in the A.Bh., I, p. 291 the expression asvadayanti manasa, N.S., VI, v. 36,

$) Op. cit., III, 67: "The firmness of Hara, even, was somewhat shaken- is commented upon in the following manner: a samantat sadharantbhavena

like the sea when the moon is jast about to rise; he cast his eyes in desire towards nirvighnapratipattivafan manasā indriyāntaravighnasambhāvanāšūnyena svāda-

the face of Uma, towards her lips, red as the fruit of the bimba" yanti svaparavivekasünyasvādacamatkaraparavasā. . ... ).

4. Like the sensations of pleasure, pain, etc., acsthetic experience is an 1) In other words, the spectator (and hence the state of consciousness by which he is pervaded) is not in tho real time and space cither of the deer or inner or mental perception (manasapratyaksa, i.c., it is perceived through of the actor as such. In aesthetic experience, these two temporal and spatial the mind or inner sense. Such a perception is selfknowing (svasamvedana- siddha). In the A.Bh., p. 291, A.G. observes that the fact of tasting (dsva- orders cancel each other out. On the one hand, therefore, the deer, etc., is wi- thont any temporal or spatial determination (viz. it is not felt as an element of dana; aesthetic perception being conceived as a particular form of tasting) ordinary life but is perceived in a generalised form); similarly, the actor and is of a mental order: it differs from the fact of cating, which is a purely hence the impression of fear which he suggests is not perceived as a consti- material act (rasanavyāpārad bhojanād adhiko yo mānaso vyāpārah sa evā- madanam). The mind of he who tastes must be ekagra, absorbed in the tuent element of practical life. The state of consciousness which does occur

object of the tasting to the exclusion of all elsc. On the contrary, he State, a Rasa. is, therefore, unaffected by space and time; it is a gencralized Permanent Mental

who eats may be also anyacitta: he can also think of other things, etc. Acsthetic 2) "Shunning, etc. ", i.e., shunning, accepting and disregarding. tasting is of a non-ordinary nature (alaukika), sui generis, cf. infra, with refe- 3) Cf. pp. 77 ff.

[66] [67 ]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

cles (nirvighna), and may be said to enter directly (nivis) into our hearts, to dance (viparivtt)1) before our eyes: etc., thus serves to nourish (paripus) the sensation of hav-

this is the Terrible Rasa. In such a Fear, one's own Self ing the event represented directly in front of one (sk-

is found to be in a state neither of complete occultation of spectators. In other words, when each spectator is conscious that the spec- (tirask!) nor of particular emergence (ullikh) 2; and the tacle is being seen at the same time by a number of other people. T.A., X.

same thing happens with the other Selves. As a result v. 85 ff .:

of this, the state of generality involved is not limited, tathā hy ekāgrasakalasāmājikajanah khalu |

:I (parimita), but extended (vitata)-as happens at the mo- nritam guam sudhāsārasāgaratvena manyate l) tata evocyate malianatapreksopadesane |

ment in which is formed the idea of the invariable con- sarvapramātrtādātmyam pūrņarūpānubhāvakam

comitance (vyapti) between smoke and fire or, in fact, tāvanmatrarthasa mvittitustāh pratyekaso yadi kah sambhūya guņas teşām pramātraikyam bhavec ca kim ! between trembling and fear3). The combination of actors, yadā tu tattadvedyatvadharmasa mdarbhagarbhitam ! tadvastu suşkād prāgrūpād anyad yuktam idam tadā |

1. Viparivrt signifies to move, to vibrate in various ways, to revolve, otc "The spectators who watch, absorbed, a spectacle of dancing, of singing, A.G. comments on the word viparivartamanasya in the following way (I.P.V., etc., feel that it is a real sea of nectar (J. comments: " anyone, in fact, can II, p. 140): vicisratvena vifvasya bhedābhedātmanā parivartamānasya spanda- observe that spectacles seen by many people at the same time generate a grea-

nena sphurato ... 1 ter pleasure than those which are seen by a single individual). It is for this ) In the first case there would not be acsthetic cognition, but mystical reason that those who teach the true nature of spectacles of wrestling and act- cognition, characterized by the total absence of discursive thought and distinct ing, say that, in these, a real state of identity of all knowing subjects takes apprehensions (vikalpa). In the second case ordinary discursive cognition place; this state generates a perception of a full and perfect beatitudo (J. would occur. Cf. pp. 100, ff. comments: pürnarüpeti iyad eva hi pūrnam rūpam yad vigalitavedyāntaratayā 3) The best explanation of this passage is to be found in I.P.V., II, 4, 12: tatraivānanyākānkşatvena parāmarsanam nama). If the mere consciousness of iha tu dariane vyāptigrahanāvasthayam yavantas taddefasambhatyamanasadbha- what they see on the stage (without, that is, the realisation that the apeetacle vāh pramātāras tāvatām cko 'sau dhämābhasaf ca vahnyābhāsas ca bâhyanaye is seen by other people) were suficient to satisfy the spectators taken one by iva, tavati teşām paramefvarenaikyam nirmitan | K. Ch. Pandey, Bhāskart, one, how then can the different state of consciousness, which arises when they

vol. III, p. 178. tranalates: " But, according to this system, at the time of are together, be explained? And how could it still be sustained that a state of forming the iden of invariable concomitance, the images of smoke and firo identity of knowing subjects existe? When, instead, the spectator is aware that are common to all perceivers, who can possibly have their existence at that the spectacle is scen at the same time by all the othere also, one can say place fi.c., in the kitchen, etc.], as according to those who admit the existence with reason that it appears in a different form from the arid aspect it had be- of an external objective world. For, in relation to these images, the Lord fore (this spectacle, then, observes J., takes on another nature which generates a [i.e., Ievara, the unlimited Ego, etc.] has made the subjects one ". In other very high camatkara) ". words two or more subjects which see the same thing are in the same psychic The annullment of every distinction between one's own Self and the Self

condition,etc., i ... , they form a single knowing subject. Such a conception of other people, and the actnation of a generalised state of consciousness also is in contradiction to the doctrine of the vijfonavadin, who maintain that occurs, observed A.G., during certain religions ceremonies (for example, the mental series (samtana) are independent one of the other (I.P.V., I, 5, 4-5). tantric cakra), which must be celebrated in common. T.A., XXVIII, v. 373 ff .: During the aesthetic experience, the practical "personalities " of the specta- tors, different each from the other, are momentarily climinated; to these thore samvit sarvätmikā dehabhedād yā samkucet tu sa |

succeeds a state of consciousness, a "knowing subject" which is unique, "gene- melake 'nyonyasanghaştapratibimbad vikasvara |]

raliged ", not circumscribed by any determination of space, time, etc. Rasa, ucchalannijarasmyoghah samvissu pratibimbitab |

acsthetic pleasure, is simply this new state of consciousness. A.G. observes bahudarpanavad diptah sarvāyctapy ayatnatah l

that the plensure given by a spectacle increases when there are a large numbor ata eva nrttagttaprabhrtau bahuparşadi | yah sarvatanmayibhave hlado na tu ekakasya sah l

[68] [69]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

sātkārāyamānatva) 1; this combination-in which the real limiting causes (niyamahetu) (time, space, the particulari- zed cognizing subject, etc.) on the one side, and those afforded by the poem on the other, cancel each other

ānandanirbharā samvit pratyekam sā tathaikatām | out and completely eliminate each other-readily nouri-

nrttādau vişaye prāptā pūrņānandatvam afnute li shes (pus) the state of generality in question 1). There- irşyāsüyādisamkocakāranābhāvato 'tra sā | fore this very density (ekaghanata) " of the spectator's vikasvarā nişpratigham samvid anandayogint I alanmaye tu kasmimfcit tatrastho pratihanyate perception nourishes the Rasa of all of them readily, be- sthaputasparíavat samvid vijātlyatayā sthite cause the latent impressions of their minds concord with atas cakrārcanādyeşu vijātiyam atanmayam | each other, the minds being varied by beginningless latent naiva pravefayst samvissa mkocananibandhanam I impressions 5). This [form of] consciousness without obsta- "The consciousness, which consists of, and is nnimated by, all thinge, on account of the difference of bodics, enters into a state of contraction. But, in public celebrations, it returne to a state of expansion - since all the compo- (sākşatkara, pratyaka) is in a necessary connexion with the concept of realityf

hents are reflected in each other. The flow of one's own consciousness in cbul- In this sense, aesthetic perception, which is not dependent on the concepts o.

lition (i ... , when it is tending to come out of itself) is reflected in the conscious- reality and nnreality, is not a direct perception, but, A.G. says, is "like"

ness of all the bystanders, as if in so many mirrors, and, inflamed by these, a direct perception (cf. A.Bh., I, p. 43: the drama is pratyakşakalpānuvya-

it abandons without effort its stato of individual contraction. Just for this. vasāyavişayo lokaprasiddhasatydsatyadivilaksonatvat | On the meaning of the

reason, in meetinge of many people (at a spectacle of dancers, singers, etc.), word anuvyavasaya, cf. infra, pp. 106 f.). In other terme, it is a direct

fallness of joy oceurs when every bystander, not only one of then, is identified perception sui generis, free of every relation with practical reality, etc.

with the spectacie. The conscionsness, which, considered separately also, is 1) Cf. p. 67, n. 1.

innatedly made up of beatitude, reaches, in these cireumetances-during the ) The word ekaghanata derives from ghana. "Ghana, from ghan, to strike, hinder, ete., has a primary senso of "donse mass ", implying a con- execution of dances, etc .- a state of unity, and so entera into a state of beati- tude which is full and perfect. In virtue of the absence of any cause for con- densation of multiple factors without extension in opace" (A.K. Coomara-

traction, jealousy, envy, etc. [the causes of contraction are the vighna, obstacles: swamy, The Transformation of Nature in Art, Harvard 1934, p. 209). Henco

cf. pp. 77 f.] the conscionenese finde itself, in these circumstances, in a state ckaghana comes to mean "dense", "compact", "uniform", etc., in the

of expansion, free of obstacles, and pervaded by beatitude. When, on the other sense of a state of consciousness which does not allow the interference of " ob-

hand, one of the bystanders does not concentrate on the spectacle he is looking stacles " (vighna). On the obstacles, cf. pp. 77 ff.

at, and does not ehare, therefore, the form of consciousness in which the other 3) A.G. replics with this argument to the objection of Bhatte Nayaka,

speetators are immersed, this consciousness is disturbed, as at the touch of an according to whom the spectator can identify himself only with a person similar

uneven surfaco. This is the reason why, during the celebration of the cakra, to himself but not with a being of a non-ordinary nature, as Rama, deity, etc.

ete., no individual must be allowed to enter who docs not identify himself with The identification and therefore the state of generality required for the aosthetic

the ceremonies and so does not share the state of conscioueness of the celebranta; experience postulates an affinity of nature (latent impressions, tendencies,

this would cause, in fact, a contraction of the conscionsness ". instinct, ete.) between the spectator and the person represented. A.G. replies

Everything, observes J., T.A., IX, p. 133, is conscionsness, and conscious- to this objection saying that no being (animal or deity) exiets with which man

neas is one. The diversity (bheda) is nothing but an illusion aroused by the has not affinity of nature. The samsara is beginningless and every man,

mayd of Thought, of Siva. In aesthetic experience, ete., when all the specta- before being that which he actually is, has been all the other beings as well.

tors are absorbed in the same thing to the exclusion of all other things, this The conscionsness of the spectator thus possesses (in other words, is varied

diversity ceases momentarily to exist, to give place to the manifestation of by :.. ) the latent impressions of all the possible beinge and therefore is suscep-

nnity, of the unlimited consciousness. tible of identifying himself with each of them. The snme concept is expoun-

1. I.t., that the perception of events represented (in other words, nesthetic ded in the Dh.A.L., p. 187: ramadicaritam tu na sarvasya hrdayasamvādtti

perception) is like a direct cognition (sākşātkörāyamåna - sākşātkārakalpa, mahat sāhasam | citravāsanāvisiştatvac cetasah | yad āha “tāsām anāditvam

pratyakpakalpa, cf. infra, p. 84, n. 3). The direct coguition or experience âfişo nityatvät", " jātidefakālavyavahitānöm apy nantaryam smrtisamskårayor ekarāpatvāt" iti (Yogastitra, IV, 9, 10) | [70 ] [71]

R. GNOLI THE AESTAETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

cles 1) is called camatkara $; the physical effects (trembling, horripilation, vibrations of joy (ullukasana) 1), etc., are

1. Cf. p. 55, n. 1c. The " obstacles " are discussed below, pp. 77 ff. also camatkara3. For example: "Vişnu is still today in 2) The term camatkara means nesthetic experience, the state of fruition a state of a camatkara: how, oh how is it that limbs of of the Rasa. Camatkora is acsthetic experienco or Tasting. This word pervades the whole of Indian nosthetics and religions speculation, from the Lakşmi, which are like the borders of a limb of the moon, Yogavasigtha to the Agnipurana, from Abhinava to Jagannatha. It is com- have not been convulsed by mount Mandara? "$). That pounded of the camat and kora: camat, which occurs only in this expression, is probably no more than an interjection, expressing surprise or wonder, whilo is to say, what is called camatkara is an uninterrupted

kare (from kr) means the act of emitting such an interjection, of finding oneself in this state of conscionsness. This sense of wonder or surprise at the preseace of something which suddenly invades our feld of conscionsness is never absent "self-flashing of thought"). The term camatkara is met with in Agnipu-

from the word camathara (in this connexion cf. for example Ruyyaka's com- rāna, ch. 339, 61. 1-2:

mentary on the Vyaktiviceka of Mahimabhatta, p. 53: alckhyalekhyadau santama- aksaram paramam brahma sanātanam ajam vibhu | sāvasthite pradipādinā prakāsite jhatiti adbhutārthaprakāšanāe camatkāro jāyato sedānteşu vadanty ckam caitanyam jyotir Moaram tadoad rasadau). Traditional etymology prefers the derivation of camat from cam, ānandas sahajas tasya syajyate sa kadācana | taste, eat and hence enjoy (bhuj). According to this interpretation camat is tho vyaktis så tasya caitanyacamatkårarashvayd I present participle of cam. The fact of being camat (camattvam), in this sense, means being immersed in the Tasting or enjoyment of something, partienlarly "It is said, in the vedantas that the brahman is immutablo, snpreme,

of an aesthetie or mystical kind. A.G. accepts both interpretatione, 7.P.V.V., eternal, innato, omnipresent, and unique; it is consciousness, light and lord. III, 251: camatkāro hi iti sātmany ananyāpekse višramanamļevam bhuftjāna- When the innate beatitude of this principle is manifested, this manifestation

tärüipam camattram, tad eva karoti samrambhe vimrfati nönyatrnudhāvatiļcamad is what is colled consciousness, camatkara or Rasa ".

iti kriyavisepanam, akhanda eva să fabdo nirvighnåsvödanavrttib|camad iti od ån- In the philosophical language of the pratyathijfla, camatkara, in the broad

taraspandändolanoditaparāmariamayafabdanāvyaktān ukaranam|kåv yanåtyar asd- sense of the word, may mean every kind of consciousness, the soul of consciou-

dåv api bhävicittasrHyantarodayaniyamåtmakasighnavirahita evsvådo rasantmå sness itself, the element which distinguishes consciousness or spirit from inani-

camatkēra ity uktam anyatre | "The term camatkara means a state of rest in mate matter; P.T.V., 49: sarvato hy acamatkāre jadataiva, adhikacamatkārāvefa one's own self, which is independent of anything else. Thus the stato of eua vtryaksobhåtmā sahrdayatå ueyate, yaryaiva ctadbhogösangäbhyasanivefitå-

being camat is equivalent to the state of being abont to enjoy something. The nantabr mhakaviryabrmhitam krdayam tasyaiva sötifayacamatkriyå |

agent of this action is only doing thie, is intensely (!) thinking of this only and "The complete lack of all cometkaro is the state of inanimateness. The

does not run off towards auything else. Camat designates a particuler action; fact of being possessed of heart [cf. p. 65, n. 1] (which consists in a perturbation

the whole word has the sense of a Tasting, free from obstacles. It may be of the Force [of conscionsness]) is simply, it is said, a state of immersion in

said equally that camas is a non-discursive phonic expression [avyaktānukarana, an intense camatkara; only those whose hearts are nourished by the infinito

lit .: interjection] consisting of a vocality animated by a form of conscionsness nourishing Foree [of consciousness], engaged in the constant practice of onjoy-

which arices from the very rhythm of our interior movement. The Tasting ment [of aesthetio or mystical order], enjoy an intense camatkara".

or Sampling, totally free of limiting obstacles (the apperance of other menta) Aesthetic experience or camatkra reappears in the consciousness every

movemente) which occurs in the Rasn aroused by poetry and the drama, is also time the Determinants, etc. (the poetic expression), by which it is aroused,

a form of camatkara. All this is discussed elsewhere ". Thus camatkora is a state are ovoked. Cf. A. Bh., I, p. 37 (App. II). The example offered by A.G. (of

of consciousness, free of obstacles and without pragmatic requirements. It presup Vigpu who is still under the influence of a camatkara) exemplifies just this

poses the complete elimination of every particular element of one's own perso- character of sesthetic pleasure.

anlity. From this point of view it migh be said that camotkora is a kind of dilata- 1) The term ullukasana is explained by A.G. (A. Bh., I, p. 331) gatrasyor-

tion or expansion of the Self (cf. for ezample Visvanātha, Sahityadarpana, III: dhvar sahlådam .ghurnanam.

camatkäras cittavistārarüpo vismayāparaparyāyeb). Camatkāra is often men- 9) A. Bh., III, ch. XXII, p. 152: iha cittavrttir eva samvedanabhamau tioned, before A.G. and the echool of the pratyabhijna, in the Yogavasigtha samkrantă dcham api vydpneti | "The mental movemente, which are pheno- (cf. the expression cittacamatkara; Dasgupta, H.I.Ph., II, p. 236, translates mena of conscioueness, are also transmitted to the body and pervado it". 3) Unidentified stanza. [ 72] [73]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC: (acchinna) state of immersion (avesa) in an Enjoyment, characterized by the presence of a sensation of inner fullness memory referred to in this stanza by means of the expres-

(:rpti). It might be said indeed that camatkara is the sion, "Does he, perhaps, recall ... ", is not of the same kind

action proper to a tasting (cam) or enjoying subject, i.e., as ordinary memory as recognised by logicians (tārkika).

to a person immersed in the inner movement (spanda)1) The object of such memory, indeed, has never been perceiv-

of a magic (adbhuta) enjoyment". This may be pre- ed in the past. In fact, we might say that its nature is that

sented under the aspect either of a form of mental cogni- of direct perception, i.e., of that form of direct perception

tion (manasadhyavasaya), consisting of a direct perception otherwise known as intuition 1. In any case, it is

(sākşātkāra)*), or of imagination (samkalpa), or of a form of beyond question that it is a form of perception, in which

memory, which, nevertheless, is manifested in a different appears [a Permanent Mental Movement, (in this case]

manner to its ordinary nature. For as Kalidasa has said: Delight) consisting of, and animated by, a Tasting9. For

" Often a man, in the act of admiring in happiness beauti- this reason, i.e., because it is not limited by further speci-

ful shapes or listening to sweet sounds, feels in himself a fications ", this perception can be the object of a Tasting:

strange, intense disquiet. Does he, perhaps, recall, in his which induces conscionsness to deny its original fallness and to crumble in timo soul, affections of his past lives, affections which remain and space, i.e., the dnavamala. 7.P.V.V., III. 252: camatkarita hi bhunjana-

fixed in his spirit without his knowledge?"4). The form of rüpatd svätmavisrantilaksanā sarvatra icchā | kvacit su svåtmavifräntir bhåvan- taram anāgüritavišaam apekya utthāpyate yatra sā icchā rāga ity ucyate, dgüritavifeşatdyåm tu kåma iti | ddigrahandd abhilāramalo yatra bhavāntaram 1) Spanda means movement, vibration, energy, etc. According to the sāmānyākāram api vāsandvafcsamātrenāste yathāha " bhāvasthirāni jananānta- faiva schools of Kashmir, consciousness is vibration, the ceaseless force from rasauhpdani" iti | "The fact of being in a state of camatkara, of being on which springs all that exists. The modes of discursive thought are the fruits the point of enjoying something (characterised by a rest in one's own Self) of the solidification of this first, incandescent principle. This force manifests is, withont any exception, a form of will [the will is the first moment of Con- itself in the instinetive motions of conscioueness (fear, joy, ete.) .. It ie the sciousness, before it crystellizes in the forms of the discursive cognition;]. So- energy that consents to go from word to word, from thought to thought. It metimes sach a rest in one's own Self appears in conneion with an object is the first moment of will (iccha), the initial motion of the spirit, which is in general, without any further determinations; in thie case, the will is called presupposed by any form of cosciousness. Thee terms 'heart' (hrdaya), thought .attachment'. At other times it appears in connexion with a determined object (vimaria), blies (ananda), vibration, (sphurattă, gharni), etc., express the iame and, in this case, there is what is called . love'. By the word, 'etc.', Utpaladeva concept. On consciousness as movement, etc., see, above all, the Spandaka- rika by Kellata, passim; Somānande, Šivadriti, p. 11; I.P.V.V., I, 5, v. 14. hints at the maculation of the desire [tho anavamala, ete .; cf: supra]; it is ob-

In the present case, spanda is the movement, the inner rhythm of the tained when the objectiveness considered is not only indefinite, but in a state

aesthetie experience. Aesthetie experience is an inner perception (manahkāra), of latent impression [that is, when it is not yet developed and appears in a

like pleasure, pain, etc., and, in this sense, is, not of a discursive order state of potentiality; the anavamala is thereforo an unobjectiled desiro, akar-

(vikalpaka). makam abhilaramatram. T.S., p. 75: " The maculation is an cager agitation con-

n Cf. infro. p. 97, n. 1. sisting in the presumption of one's own non-fullness, a mere desiro withont an

$) I.e. it is a mental or inner perception (mönasapratyakja; see supra, objeet, a predisposition to the future limitations "]. For example: " ... the

p. 38, n. 2; p. 66, n. 4. Adhyavasaya is used in the sense of anuoyavasaya affeetions of his past lives ... remain fixod in his spirit ... ".

(N.S., 1, 1. 4): ef infra, pp. 106 f. 1) Cf. p. 58, n. 3.

4. Kalidasa, Sakuntala, V, 96. This stansa is quoted by A.G., also in ) In other worde, characterized by the presence of a generalised Per- 7.P.V.V., III, p. 252. The disquiet, to which Kalidasa alludes, is, observes A.G., manent Mental Stato. (Delight, Anger, etc.). an unobjectified desire; it corresponds to what is, metaphysically, the desire by no obatacic. 3) By no temporal, spatial, individual, ete., specification. In other wordo,

[74] [75]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

. that is to say, it is neither a form of ordinary (laukika) light of the doctrine of the vijnanavadin. From whiche- cognition, nor is it erroneous, nor ineffable, nor like ordinary perception1), nor does it consist of a super-imposition ver point of view it is examined, Rasa is, in any case, sim-

(aropa) of the latter 3). To conclude, we may say equally ply and solely a mental state which is the matter of cogni-

a) that it consists of a state of intensification (upacaya) 5) tion on the part of a perception without obstacles and

using this term to indicate that it is not limited by spatial consisting in a Tasting.

data, etc .; b) that it is an imitation 4)using this ex- The elements which eliminate the obstacles to aesthetic

pression to mean that its operation temporally follows perception are the Determinants, etc. To specify: here,

that of real life; and c) that it is a combination of diffe- the words camatkara, Immersion (nirvesa), Tasting (rasana),

rent elements 5)this conception being interpreted in the Sampling (asvadana), Enjoyment (bhoga), Accomplishment (samapatti), Lysis (laya), Rest (visranti), etc., mean simply a 1) I.e., an imitation of it (Saokuka's doctrine). form of consciousness completely free from any obstacles. 2) A. Bh., I, p. 36: teşu na tattoena dhth, na sādriyena yamalakavat, na The obstacles to Tasting are seven in number1: 1) unbe- bhrāntatvena rüpyasmrtipurvakafuktirūpyavat, nāropena samyagjflānabādhānan- taramithyājfānarüpam, na tadadhyavasāyena gaurvāhtkavat, notprekşyamānat- comingness (ayogyata) of perception, called lack of verisi- vena candramukhaval, na tatpratikptitvena citrapustavat (Read; G: °pastavos), militude (sambhāvanāviraha); 2) immersion in temporal or na tadanukāreņa gurufişyavyākhyāhevākavat, na satkålikanirmanenendrajālavat, na yuktiviracitatadābhāsatayā hastalāghavādimāyāvat, sarveşo cteşu pakşeşu asā- spatial determinations which are exclusively one's own or

dhöranatyā draştur audāsinye rasāsvādāyogāt į exclusively those of another; 3) the fact of being at the " With regard to the personnages moving on the stage, one has neither the mercy of sensations of pleasure, etc., which inhere solely idea of being concerned with reality, nor of being concerned with a similitude- as in the case of two similar things -- , cor with an illusion, as when a piece of in one's own person; 4) defective state (vaikalya) of the mother-of-pearl reminde one of a piece of silver-, nor with a super-impo- means of perception; 5) lack of evidence (asphutatva); 6) lack sition-as when wrong knowledge follows the denying of the right-, nor with an ascertninment-os when one says ' this peasant is a cow [i.c., is foolish poetry ... ". Bhatta Nayakn says that Rasa is not perceived but enjoyed. as a cow]-, nor with a comparison-as between a face and the moon- Well, says A.G., this theory is also true if it is interpreted in the light of the nor with a copy-as in the case of a painted image-, nor with an imitation- vijnanavada,, the idealistic Baddhiem, according to which everything that ns in the case of masters and disciples, who seek to explain the seriptures in the exiets is pure consciousness or perception (according to which, therefore, evety same way-, nor with a sudden apparition-as in magic-, por with a ekilfully fruition, etc., is simply a form of perception). conjured-up apparition-as in sleight-of-hand, etc. In all these cases, that 1) In the following lines A.G. explains the vighne, the obstacles to acsthetic which emerges does not appear, in fact, in a generlized form and, therefore, the eubject does not actively share in what he sees. In consequence, the Ta- perception. The vighna, obstacles, are all the extrancous clements which break the unity of a state of consciousness (desires for gain, worry of all sting of Rasa does not take place". The worde dropa and adhyavasaya are used in the sense given them by kinds, ete.). The same conception is met with in connexion with religious

the Buddhists, according to whom discursive knowledge is an arbitrary and experience. The vighna are defined in the 7.P.V.V., I, p. 18: vighnanti vilum-

illusory super-imposition on reality, on the thing in se (cf. I.P.V., p. 40). panti kartaryam iti vighnāh adhyātmikādayo 'navadhānadoşādayas trividho- paghatāh tadadhisthataras ca devatāvifesāh | "The obstacles obstruct or S) Lollata's doctrine. hinder what one does; this is why they are called obstacles. They are of 4) Sabkukn's doctrine. Cf. A.Bh., p. 38: yadi to evam mukhyalaukikakara- three kinds (inherent in' the perceiving subject, ete.): lack of attention, etc. nānusāritayānukaranam ity ucyate tan na kaścid doşah |. The divinities which preside over them are also called obstacles". Their 5) Bhatta Nayaka's doctrine. The different elemente are the Determi- principal source is lack of attention (anavadhana), ie., the absence of a total nants, etc. Cf. (supra, p. 62) the stanza " Rasa is, it is said, the essence of rest of the whole being on the object of perception.

[76] [77]

R. CNOLI THE AESTHETIC RXPERIENCE, ETC. of preeminence (apradhanata) and 7) the fact of allowing events, etc. This requirement however, is absent in the admission to doubts. That is to say: case of comedies (prahasana). All this will be explained 1) A man who considers that what constitutes the at a suitable time and place1). What has been said will object of cognition (samvedya) [the subject of performance] suffice for the present. 4. Eel is lacking in verisimilitude is obviously not able to immerse 2) One of the principal obstacles regularly occurs (vinivis) his consciousness in it 1). Thus the spectator will when the spectator is at the mercy of the tasting of plea- not be able to rest in it ". This is the first obstacle. The sures, pains, etc., inhering in his own person. This ob- means by which it is eliminated are the consent of the stacle consists in the appearance of other forms of con- heart ) and the representation of an event of an ordinary sciousness, due variously to the fear of being abandoned nature (lokasamanya)1). If there is any question of repre- by these sensations of pleasure, etc., to concern for their senting on the stage events which transcend ordinary life preservation, to a desire to procure other similar sensa- (alokasāmānya), it is necessary to resort to the device of tions, to the desire to get rid of them, give them open bringing on to the stage people whose names are famous- expression, hide them, etc. Even when someone perceives Rama, etc .- to produce in the spectator a flow of trust pleasures, pains, etc., as inhering exclusively in other persons, (pratyaya) deeply rooted in himself, aroused by the unin- other forms of consciousness inevitably arise in him (plea- terrupted fame (prasiddhi) which the character represented sures, pains, mental stupor, indifference [mädhyasthya], etc.) has enjoyed since antiquity5). For the same reason, it which naturally constitute an obstacle. The means of is said that nataka®, etc., whose purpose is the illustra- tion (vyutpatti) and teaching (upadesa) of deeds transcend- 1) A. Bh., ch. XVIII. The appropriate subjeets for the ten kinds of play are described and commented upon in N.S., XVIII. Naoko are plays on ing ordinary life, necessarily requires to deal with famous elevated subjeets. Daferlipa, Haas, p. 4: " [The ten chief varicties of drama] ure: the Nataha, the Prakarana, the Bhana, the Prohasana, the Dima, the Vyayoga, the Samarakara, the Vuht, tho Anka (- Utsritikdnka), and the 1) In other words, to identify oneself with it, to. partake actively in tho Thamrga". Cf. Ind. Th., p. 139 ff. In the A.Bh., p. 27, A.G. makes the gemernl events represented. remark: na ca vartamānacaritānukāro yukto vineyānām tatra rāgadveşamadhya- ) I.e., identifying oncself in it to the exclusion of everything elsc. sthatädina tanmayibhäväbhave priter abhavens vyutpatter apy abhardt, varta- 5) Cf. p. 65, n. 1. månacarite ca dharmādikarmaphalasambandhatya pratyakşatve prayoge vai- 4) An event of an ordinary character finds a more ready response in yarthyam | "It is not fitting to imitate an ovent of actual life; for in this the spectator's heart. caso the spectators would be affected by passions (batred, partisanship, indiffe- 5) If the swme extraordinary events (crossing of the ocean, ete.) which rence, ete.) [extrancous to aesthetie experience] and woald thus be unable to are, in fact, attribnted to a legendary Sgure (Rama, ete.) were referred to an identify himself with the event represented. Pleasure being thus absent, in- ordinary man, they wonld arouse the incredulity of the spectatora. Dh.I.L., struetion wonld be absent as well. Besides, in the case of an actual ovent, p. 331: rămades tu tathavidham api caritam paroaprasiddhiparamparopacito- tho relation between the action (its merit, ete.) and the fruits which resalt sampratyayopārüdham asatyatayā na cakāsti | " But when sach undertakings from it is discerned by direet experience; it is, therefore, aseless to put it on are referred to Rima, ete., they lose ell appearance of falschood; for. thoy aro the stage ". rooted in the spectator's confidence, the cumulative result of the uninter. The word imitation (onukara) must be understood in a broad sense. Teach- rupted fame enjoyed from antiquity by the character in question ". ing or knowledge is an accessory aim (proyojana) of art; its principal aim 6) Cf. p. 79, n. 1. is aesthetic pleasure (priti, ananda, ete.). Cf. App. II, pp. 109 ff. [78] [79]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

eliminating this obstacle are the actor's changing of dress gation both of the real being of the actor and of the real -headwear, etc .- which hide his true identity. This being of the character he is playing1). Indeed, on one is revealed to the spectators both during the prelimina- side there is the negation of the real being of the actor, ries (purvaranga) (cf. the strophe: " It is best not to insist and, on the other, the spectator's consciousness does not too much ... ") and in the initial presentation (prasta- rest entirely on the being represented (pratibhāsa, the vana) (defined in the strophe: "The actress, or the represented image, etc.)", who[se representation] the- jester ... ") 1). It is with the same purpose in view-that refore does not succeed in hiding completely the real of eliminating this obstacle-that [all] the theatrical con- being of the actor3). To specify: dances such as āsina- ventions [nätyadharmi] (including a number of things which transcend ordinary life: the zones [kaksya] dividing pāthya, puşpagandika*), etc., are not met with in ordi- nary life; but, on the other hand, it cannot be said that the pavilion [mandapa], the stage [rangapitha], the various they are nothing, because it is undeniable that they exist types of women's dance, the various dialects [bhāșa], in some way5). For this reason-i.e., with a view to used $), etc.) are brought into play5). For the presence of all these elements eliminates the perception: this particular 1) The time, space, etc., of the actor as such and of the chorocter repre- individual, in this particular place, at this particular mo- sented by him cancel each other out. ment, feels pain, pleasure, etc.") This elimination takes ) Otherwise, acsthetic experience wonld become part of practical renlity.

place is so far as the theatrical spectacle implies the ne- The person represented is seen on the contrary indipendently of the concepta of renlity and irreality.

I) The "preliminaries " (parvarange) inelude the whole body of rites, 3) I.s., the actor does not become Rama, etc. (as Rama really was in em-

ceremonics, ete., celebrated ot the beginning of a play. They end with pirical life). 4) Dafarapa, Hans, 99: "The tenfold enumeration of the sub-divisions the benediction stanza, ndndi. There is a riek of distracting or boring tho (anga) in the Gentle Dance (lasya; I translate: women's dance) is: the Geya- andience by a long-drawn-out performance of these rites. Bhorate himself pada (Song), the Sthitapathya (Recitation by one standing), the Astnapathya recommends that they chould not be too much insisted on (N.S., V, 165-166: (Recitntion by one seated), the Puspagandika, the Pracchedaka, the Trigüdha, "It is best not to insist too much on ritual dances and songe for the very the one called Saindhava, the Dvigudha, the Uttamottamaka, and the Ukta- renson that if the songs, the instrumental music and the dances are performed pratyukta (Amocbean Song)". too long the actors as well as the spectators will get tired of them and, in this Each of these terme is definited by Bharata, N.S., XIX, vv. 119-135. case, they are not able to seise, with all their ovidence, the Rasas and the mentol The dance, A.G. remarks, does not imitate anything in real life but is o self- states which will be represented "). The nandt stansas are immediately fol- subsistent creation, free from any practical aim. It is the natural expression, lowed by the "prologue " (prastavand), giving the name of the play, of the through the movemente of the limbs, of a given state of mind. A. Bh., I. author, etc. The prologue generally consists of a dialogue between the pro- ducer of the play and an assistant (pariparfvika); the latter may be replaced p. 21; nartanam nrttam gātrānām angopāngānām vilāsena kjepo na tu kenacit

by an actress, by the jester, etc. kartavyamfena | The dance of Siva is the natural expression of his complete

1 The term natyadharml (N.S., VI, v. 25; XIII, v. 70 f.) refers to all and perfect bliss, free of all obstacles (nirvāra - nirvighna): sankarasyma bha- gavatah paripürnānandanirbhartbhütadchoccaladäntaranirvårasundaråkårasya .... the specific expedients, etc., of the theatre (scenery, costumes, traditional con- A. Bh., I, p. 21. ventions, ete.). Cf. Ind. Th., p. 15 and Lokodharmi and Natyadharmi, by V. Ra- ghavan, in J.O.R., Madras, vol. VII, pp. 359-375, vol. VIII, pp. 57-74. 5) Thus, even if the character represented is a negation of the actor as

) The different prakyti, etc. Cf. Ind. Th. such and of the real character represented by the actor, it cannot be soid thet

4. In other words, it eliminates the limited subject, space, and timo. he does not exist, that he is a nonentity; his existence in fact is a datum of one's own consciousness.

[80 ] [ 81 ] 6. - Gros, The conherie experiencs, stc.

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. producing a state of generality-Bharata has expo- unded all this system of relative and connected mat- 5) The presence of characteristic signs of a phonic

ters, which serve just to realize the tasting of Rasa. All order 1) is sometimes not enough to make the perception

this will be clarified in the chapters which explain these: rest [on the object represented, to the exclusion of every dances 1), etc. For the present, let us bow to his words. other object]; for they provoke an inevident (asphuta) Thus we have explained the way to eliminate the obstacles, perception. In fact such a resting requires the immediate

consisting of the perception of temporal, etc., data as inher: certainty proper to direct experience, which consists in an

ing exclusively in one's own person or in others. evident perception. For as Vatsyayana has said: "All

3. In a similar way, the consciousness of a person these forms of consciousness (pramiti) are based on direct

who is under the influence of a sensation of pleasure, etc., perception "$). Indeed, it is an immediate datum of self-

cannot rest on anything else. Thus, in order to eliminate consciousness itself (svasamvedana ... ) that what has been

this obstacle, Bharata has shown the necessity of the directly perceived cannot be changed even by all the holy

colouring work " of well accomplished courtesans (ganika), writinge (agama) and all the inductions, etc., in the world.

various kinds of pavilions, instrumental music (atodya), In the case, for exemple, of a firebrand which is being

vocal music, etc. (this work thus consists in various expe- rapidly turned, what excludes the perception that this is a dients, phonic, etc.). All these elements, used at suitable circle of fire (alatacakra), is in fact simply a second direct times and places, are such as to be enjoyed by all the perception, stronger than the first: all this is met with even ik spectatore in virtue of the state of generality [of which in connexion with the forms of ordinary consciousness.

we have spoken]. Thanks to these, even a person who Thus in the case of that which is vitiated by these two

is not in a state of aesthetic receptivity (ahrdaya) reaches obstacles, the method consecrated by tradition to elimi-

a perfect limpidity of heart, as a result of which he becomes nate them is made up of the four modes of Representa-

'possessed of heart""). In fact it has been said "poetry tion ", beautified by the Styles of Procedure (vrtti) 4), the

may be visible or audible"4). 4) Moreover, if the means of perception are absent, solely in one's own Self (svatmany cvocchalanat, P.T.V., p. 48)", i.e., are unable to break the barrier of the limited "I". perception itself will also naturally be absent. 1) I.e., the presenco of the words alone, by means of which the spectator infers the acts narrated, is not enough to make the spectator identify himself with the subject and the characters of the play. To avoid this danger, mays 1) N.S., XIX, f. A.G., recourse is had to visual representation. I.e., which colours the consciousness of spectators and draws their 2) Nyāyasütra, Vâtsyāyanabhâşya, I, I, 3: sa (A.G. reads sarvā) iyam attention. pramitiņ pratyakņaparā | 3) Cf. p. 65, n. 1. 3) Cf. p. 35, n. 2. 4) N.S., I, v. 11. The empirical division of aesthetic beauty into visibile 4) The Styles of Procedare (ortti) are four in number: kaifikt, sattoatt, and sudible is not unfamilier to Indian thought. Only sense data taken in arabhatt and bharatt. Dafarapa, Hass, p. 74: "The Gay Style (kaifikt) [is to through hearing and sight can be tasted, independently of any association be used] in [expressing] the Erotic Rass; the Grandiose Style (sattvatl) in [ex- with the ego, in a generalized way (sadhorantkrta). The other senses " forment preasing] the Heroic Rasa; the Horrific Style (arabhart), on the other hand,

[ 82 ] in [expressing] the Furious and Odions Rase; The Eloquent Stylo (bharant) [83]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

Local Styles (prav!tti) 1) and the Realistic Representation 6) Does there exist a man whose consciousness rests (lokadharmi)". The operation (or power, vyāpāra) of on anything of a secondary order (apradhana)? Such a per- Representation is, indeed, of a different character from ception would find no rest in itself and would thus run that of characteristic signs of a phonic order; on the con- (anudhav) automatically towards something occupying a trary, it is like the one of direct perception (pratyaksavya- pre-eminent position. Thus only the Permanent Mental parakalpa)3). All this will be explained later on. States can be the object of Tasting: the Determinants

everywhero". On the ortti see The Vruis, by V. Raghavan, J.O.R., Madras, and the Consequents which are [in themselves] insentient vol. VI, pp. 346 ff .; vol VII, pp. 33 ff. (jada), and the Transitory Mental States, which, though 1) The local colours (pravrtti) are four in number: avantt, dakşinatya, their nature is consciousness, nevertheless necessarily depend audramagadhs, pāftealt. Cf. N.S., VI, v. 26, 27: XIII, v. 37 and prose, pp. 205-207. Ind. Th., p. 16: "Local usages regarding costumes, langunges, .. on the Permanent Mental State, occupy a secondary posi- manners and professions differ in the different countriee of the world. They tion 1). Among these Permanent Mental States, some can are the provrtti or local colours in drama ". 2) Cf. p. 80, n. 2. be found in a more elevated position than others: these

$) For the best explanntion, see A. Bh., I, 292: tatra ye svabhavato nir- are the forms of consciousness based on the four purposes malamukurahrdayās ta eva samsärocitakrodhamohābhilaşaparavasamanaso na (artha) of life". To specify, Delight is based on Love bhavanti | teşäm tathävidhadafarüipakäkarnanasamaye sādhāranarasanātmakacar- vanāgrāhyo rasasameayo nātyalaksanah (G: olaksana°) sphuja eva | ye to atāthā bhatās teşām pratyakşocisatathavidhacarvanālābhāya natādiprakriyā svagatakro- just at arousing a mental cognition, which is like a direct pereeption. It

dhasokadisankatahrdayagranthibhaftjanaya gitadiprakriya ca muninā viracitā consists of a generalized state of evidence common to all the spectntors

"In this connexion, the mind of those who have by nature hearts like and devoid of every possible obstacle ". Drama is the object of cognition

an immaculate mirror is not at the mercy of the desires, anger, or stupor by an anuvyavasaya (about this word ef. App. I) which is like a direct perception, A. Bh., I, 43. proper to samsarika ezistence [that of everyday lifo]. Tho mere fact of hearing 1) Cf. Dh.A.L., p. 177: taccarvanāpi cittavrttișo eva paryavasarti rasabhā- the play read is rficient [in itself, independently of any acting] to induco in them with the greatest ciearness the perception of the various Resns vebhyo nadhikam carvatyam | "The Tasting of the Determinants, etc., neces-

which animate it; this perception consiste in a Sompling animated by a geno- sarily terminates in the mental movements; thus apart from the bhara (the

rolised Tasting. To make this Tasting (which needs a direct perception) avai- matter of the Rasas) there is nothing else which can be tasted.

lable to people who have not this faculty, Bharata has, on the one hand, explain- A.Bh., I, p. 268: sa ca yady apy anantavibhavātmā tathapi sarveşām jadānām

ed the discipline of the actors, etc., and, on the other, to cut the knots of samvidi tasyās ca bhoktari bhoktrvargasya ca pradhane bhoktari paryavasanan

the heart obseured by Anger, Sorrow, ete., inherent in one's own Self, has er- näyakabhidhanabhoktrvisesasthayicittavrttisvabhavah | "Though [drama, etc.] is

plained the disciplina of vocal music, etc. ". Representation (and therefore conatituted by an infinite number of Determinants, ete., all the elements, which

drama in general which is founded upon Representation) consists of a form compound it, rest, however, in the consciousness [the Permanent Mental State].

of direct perception, is an adhyavasaya (mental cognition, ete .; also vyavasdya, This reats in the enjoying subject [the limited enjoying subjeet, the practical Self] and the whole of the enjoying subjects rests, in their turn, in the princi- anuoyavasāya, cf. App. I) that is like the direct perception (sakötkorakalpa, pratyakşakalpa). A. Bh., XXII, 150: abhinayanam hi cittavrttisadhāranotapat- pal enjoying subject [the generalised knowing subject). Therefore, we may

tipränasākşatkārakalpādhyavasāyasampādanam | " Representation arouses & say that drama consists in a Permanent Mental State of n particular enjoying subject, ealled an actor, etc.". Such a mental state, continues A.G., is unique; mental cognition which is like a direet perception; it consiets in consing the generalised, devoid of the notions "own", "of others", ctc., and, therefore, generalisation of mental movements". A. Bh., XXII, 148: vighnasambhā- it pervades also the spectactore: ata ova sadhārantbhātatayā sāmajikam api vanävihtnasakalasädhöranaspastabhävasakātkarakalpådhyavasāyasampattaye sar- scātmasadbhāvena samāvefayant !... vegom prayoga ity uktam | "It is said that the acting (prayoga = parsadi prakațtkaranam, A. Bh., I, 16) of the four forms of Representation aims ) According to a pan-Indian conception, human life is motivated by four purposes: kama, artha, dharma, and mokşa. Kama is pleasure and love. Artha

[84] [85]

R. GNOLI

and, in the second place, on the forms of Profit (artha) THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

and Right Action (dharma) which may depend on Love seen to be present in the same drama, in various passages,

Anger, in people in which it predominates, is based on in a preeminent position.

Profit-but can also rest in Love and in Right Ac- In this connexion, all Rasas are dominated by plea-

tion. Energy rests in all three, Right Action, etc. Sere- sure; for the essence of light-closely dense (ekaghana) 1)

nity is the means of Liberation; its predominant element is light, consisting of the Tasting of one's own consciousness- the disgust which arises from the knowledge of reality 1). is beatitude 2). For example: in ordinary life also, women,

These four Permanent Mental States are thus to be found in a pre-eminent position. Of course, they will not be found in 1) Uniform, without obstacles (vighna). 2) The intimate essence of conscionsness or the "I", according to the

a predominant position all four together: the emergence of faiva, is beatitude. The absence of beatitude and suffering are due to a need,

one of them naturally postulates the subordination of the privation, or desire for something separated from the Self. Beatitude is the

other three. In every drama these constitute the domi- absence of this desire, the resting in oneself to the exclusion of everything else. The "I" contains all things; everything that exists arises from its

nant elements, but all the same one of them must neces- unconfined liberty. It cannot be the seat of any deprivation and can desiro

sarily be in a leading position. Thus, according to the nothing but itself. Aesthetic experience is the tasting of one's own consciousness and, therefore, of one's own essential bentitude. In this sense, Rasn is singlo. character of the various dramas, all of these may be said This Tasting is coloured (anurafjita, rupita) by latent impressions (vasand,

to be found in a leading position. If, on the other hand, samakara) of the mental proceeses of Delight, etc., aroused by the Determi-

things are more closely examined, all four of them will be nants, ete., i.c., by poetic expression. From this point of view the plurality of the Rasas is due to the diversity of the vibhava (vibhavabhedam rasabhede hetutvena silcayati ... , A.Bh., p. 293). Cf. A.Bh., I, p. 293: asmanmate tu samvedanam evānandaghanam dsvādyate | tatra kā dukhasankhā | kevalam ta- syaiva citratākarane ratifokādisāsanāvyāpāras tadudbodhane cabhinayādicyāpāroh | is material property (economics, politics, etc., are directed to the fulfilment of this end). Dhorma embraces moral and relirious duty. Mokga is the libera- " According to us, that which is tasted ie conscionsness alone which is satu- rated with beatitude. This fact excludes, therefore, any suspicion of pain. tion or redemption of the soul from the corrent of existence; it is the paramartha, Thie consciousness which is single in itself, ie nevertheless differentiated by the supreme purpose of man. For an excellent account of the four artha, see H. ZIMER, Les Philosophies de l'Inde, Payot, pp. 35 ff. The principal forms the operation of the latent traces of Delight, Sorrow, etc., which are awaked

of consciousness (sthayibhava) are those which are necessary to the fulfilment by the operation of the Consequents, etc. (abhinaya = anubhava). For the nature of this "colouring " infased into the consciousness by the mental of these purposes; they are Delight (rati), Anger (krodha), Energy (uisdha), and Serenity (fama). The end of Delight is Pleasure; however, through Plea- processes of Delight, etc., cf. infro, p. 100, n. 4.

stre, it can bring us to the achievement of Profit and Rigth Action (Bha- The beat exposition of the concept of beatitude occurs in I.P.V.V., II.

rata, N.S., XVIII, v. 72 ff., distinguishes three kinds of Erotic Rasa, kama- pp. 177 f .: svarūpasya svātmanah paripārņanijasvabhāvaprakāšanam eva porā-

srigara, arthafrngara, and dharmasrngara). Anger and Energy are associated marsamayatām dadhad ānanda iti ucyate | tatha dehādisarkocakaluşāparipūrna-

with artha and dharma respectively, but both of them may also contribute to pratyagātmāha mbhavaniphatvena farlrasya riktatayā kşudhāturasya vyatirikānnā- bhiläşavivaftkrtamater åtmaparamarso 'yam ekaghanavrttya yato na sambhavati, the realization of all three purposes (cf. Dh.A.L., p. 393: vtraraudrayos to atyantavirodho 'pi nåsti | samanam rüpam ca dharmärthakāmårjanopayogitvam). tato 'yam anānanda iva āste, sati dtmaparāmaršamaye svānande | yadā tu annapa-

Spiritunl Freedom ie the fruit of Serenity. ripūrņajatharatā asya tadā tadriktatodrekarūpā tāvad apūrņatā vinaşā | sam-

1. The characteristics of this sthayibhava are diecussed by A.G. in the skārarüpatayā tu tadāntm yad abhilāşantyam kāntālinganādi parāmarsantyam

A.Bh., pp. 333-42. Abhinava Gupta's text is edited with a commentary by sthitam yad aha guruh patafijalih · na hi caitra ekasyām striyām raktą iti anyāsu

V. RACHAVAN, The Number of Rasas, Adyar, 1940. viraktah' ityādi, tadyogād apūrņo 'yam ânanda iti paramānando 'yam na bhavati | sāmsārikas ca sarvo 'syānando ·lābhe bhāviviyogabhiruh' iti · vişayo vişayān- tarärthitäm janayan vå janayet katham sukham* iti ca nyāyena vyatiriktākānk- [86 ] [ 87 ]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

even when they are immersed in the compact (ekaghana) Tasting of the form of consciousness called Sorrow, find rest in their own heart, in so far as their consciousness, even then, consists of, and is animated by, a rest without

şāvicchedamayatām sarvātmanā na autkurute iti tato 'pi apārņa eva | yas tu ănan- datåmfas titra svātmaparāmarfarāpataiva prayojiketi, tata evoktam such beatitude is incomplete [not full] and, therefore, it is not the supreme

' trailokye 'py atra yo yavān ånandah kaścid tkryate | beatitude. In fact, according to the principle that, 'in the union one fears

sa bindur yasya tam vande devam anandasagaram l the future soparation', and, ' one thing breeds the longing for another; there-

iti srtbhattanårâyanena | tathā ca madhurādau rass audarikābh yavahāravailak- fore how can it be a source of happinese?,' the forms of beatitude which we

şanyena pravrtta idam ittham iti pramātari viframayan pramātrbhāgam eva can enjoy in practical life [i.e., the samsaric beatitades] are unable to cut off

pradhanatayā vimrian bhufjāna iti ucyate | yatrāpy atyantam anyathābhåvam completely the desire of a thing disjoined from one's own Self and this is why

atikramya sukham asvādyate arjanādisambhāvyamānavighnāntaranirāsāt vaişayi- they ore incomplete [not full]. As to tho part . beatitude ' which is in them,

kānandavilakşanam [Read; the printed text has opilakşana°] sragāradau nātya- its determinant clements is, however, as before, the intellection of one's own

kāvyadivişaye tatra oltavighnatvad eva asau rasanā carvana nirortih pratttih Self. In effect, because of this, Bhatta Narayana has said: 'Let ue give a

pramātriāvisräntir eva, tata eva hrdayena parāmarsalakşanena pradhanyat vya- praise to Siva! All the forms of beatitude which may be found here in this

padeiyā eyavasthitasyāpi prakālabhāgasya vedyavišrântasya anādaranāt sahrda- three worlds, are only his drops, belonging to him, who is an ocenn of beati-

yata ucyate iti nirvighnah sadarupa ca rasanatadgocartkaryas cittavrtayo rasā tudel' [Stavacintamani, v. 61]. To specify: he who is tasting a sweet drink,

nava ity ayam artho 'bhinavabharatyam natyavedaviortau vitatya vyutpadito ete., is in a state quite different from the one of a hungry man who eats up

'smäbhir isi tatkutühalt töm evävälokayet | iha tu prakrtavighnakaritvat na vitatab | its food greedily. What there is in his consciousness is just the idea . this is thus' and therefore that which, in his thinking, is in a state of emergence tasmād anupacaritasya samsedanarüpatānāntariyatvena avasthitasya svātantryasya [I propose; the printed text has svatantrasya] eva rasanaikaghanataya parå- is exactly the part . knowing-enbjeet'. He who is in such a condition is

maršaļ paramānando nirvrriš camatkāra ucyate | tasmād yuktam āha · camat- called 'enjoying sabject'. A farther form of pleasure, different from the

kyter abhavāt' | madhurādirasāsvāde tu vişayasparsavyaradhānam | tato 'pi kåvya- former, devoid of any extrinsic modification [obstacles, etc.], is obtained when

nātyādau tadoyavadhanafünyatā tadvyavadhanasamıkörānuvedhas tu | tatrāpi tu one, either by a poem or a drama, ete., is absorbed in the Erotic Rasn, etc.

tathoditavyavadhānā msatiraskriyāsavadhānahrdaya labhanta eva paramanandam Owing to the absence of any possible obstacle (longing for earning, etc.), this

yathoktam plonsure is different from the forms of beatitude of practical life, and just because it is devoid of obstacles, it is called Tasting, Delibation, Solution, Per- 'jagdhipanakrtollåsarasånandavyavasthiteh | ityådi | ception, and Rest in the nature of the knowing-subject. Owing to this very

"What we call beatitude is nothing but a full illumination of one's own fact, the expression which designutes this pleasure more adequately is the heart,

heing, accompanied by a form of intellection which pervades all one's own which, characterised by intellection, is just what predominates in it; at tho

nature, one's own Self. For example: he who is hungry feele a senso of va- game time, the port ' light' which consists and reste in the knowable, though

cuity in his body; his mind (the state in which he is, is due, of course, to continuing to exist, is [in the sesthetic pleasuro] in a stato of non-evidence:

the not full limited egonese, maculated by the contraction of the body etc.) these are the very reasons to which we due the expression ' condition of pos-

is really longing for something (food ete.), distinguiched from himself, and, sessing a heart': The mental movements, devoid of obstacles, consisting of

therefore, the intellection of the Self, of which we have spoken, cannot be veri- a Sampling, made the matter of such Tasting, are the nine Rasas. This subject

fied in him in all its complete fullness. Therefore, it is said that such a per- has been much dealt with by us in Abhinavabharatt, our commment to the Na-

son is devoid of beatitude (beatitude consiste, in fact, in the full intellection tyaveda; those who wants to know more abont it may be satiafied in reading

of the Self). But, when the belly of that very person is full of food, the pre- this treaties: In this work it would represent an obatacle to the matter we

vious state of unfallness, consisting in the emergence of vacuity, ceases to deal with and, therefore, we think that it is much better not to dwell on it.

exist. Soon after, however, he begins to have new longings (he deaires to What is called supreme bentitude, Solution and camatkara is, therefore, nothing

embrace women, ete.) that, until that moment, were in a state of latent im- but Tasting, i ... , an intellection, in nll its compact density, of the realissima

pression; Pataajoli has in fact said: 'the fact that Caitra is in love with [i.e., not metaphorical] liberty, inseparable from the nature of consciousness.

one woman does not imply that he is ont of love with the others', [Yoga- Therefore, Utpaladeva is right in saying: 'because of the lack of comotka-

sütra, Vyasabhårya, 2, 4] ete. Owing to this very contact with other desires, ra ... ' We must not forget that in tasting a juice of eweet ffavour, etc. the relative form of beatitude is perceived through the sereen of a direct con-

[88 ] [89 ]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. obstacles1). Pain is, simply and solely, an absence of rest. This is precisely the reason for which the disciples? reason, Laughter, etc., are mostly encountered in people

of .Kapila, in explaining the activity of rajah, say that of inferior nature (anuttamaprak!ti). Every man of low

the soul of pain is mobility (cancalya)". All the Rasas caste laughs, grieves, is afraid, tends to despise others, and A. B is astonished at the poorest attempt at a fine saying. All thus consist of beatitude. But some of them, on account of the objects by which they are coloured 3, are not free from the same, these depend on Delight, etc., and as such may also be of help in attaining the ends of man1). The divi- a certain sense of harshness; this happens, for example, in the Heroic Rasa. For this consists of, and is animated by, sion between the ten types of drama is itself based on the

precisely the ferm endurance of misfortunes. Delight, etc., different positions occupied by these mental states. All

thus occupy a pre-eminent position. Laughter, etc., again, this will be explained later. The mental states of perma-

also occupy a pre-eminent position; for these-whose Deter- nent nature are solely these nine. Indeed every creature

minants are easily accessible to all types of people-pos- from its birth possesses these nine forms of consciousness. In fact, on the basis of the principle that all beings " hate sess an extremely high power of colouring4. For this very to be in contact with pain and are eager to taste plea- sure "), everyone is pervaded by sexual desires [Delight]; tact with the objecte of the exterior reality. Again, in poetry, in drama, etc., there is not such a screen, nevertheless it remains in the form of latent im- believes himself to be superior to others, whom he is thus pression. Also in these cases, however, those people whose hearts are care- led to deride [Laughter]; grieves when he is forced to part fally devoted to cancel the part which performs the functions of a screen, suc- ceed in reaching the supreme bentitude. In fact, it hes been said: 'The su- from what he loves [Sorrow]; gets angry against the causes preme beatitnde may tako place, diselosed by drinking and enting' [Vijnā- of such separation [Anger]; gets frightened when he finds nabhairava, v. 12. Cf. T.A., III, pp. 218 ff .: Kgemarāja, ad Stavacintāmani, himself powerless [Fear]-but still is desirous of overcom- p. 71: inham ca tattatparimitanande' pi ckigribhavitacitah paramānandam âvi- lati yogijanah ... ]". ing the danger which threatens him [Heroism]; is attacked, 1) The concept is as follows: women, oven when they are being bitten, when judging a thing to be displeasing, by a sense of re- scratched, ete., by their lovers (and therefore experiencing pain) find in the pain itself the fulflment, the realisation of all their desire: "they rest in vulsion directed just towards this ugly object [Disgust]; their bearts " or conscionsness to the exclusion of everything else. There- wonders at the sight of extraordinary deeds done by him- fore, this pain is pleasure, beatitude. Pain occurs only when the conscionsntas self or others [Astonishment]; and, lastly, is desirous finds no rest in what it contemplates, is not totally absorbed in the object of contemplation, i ... , when it desires something different from the thing in which of abandoning certaing things [Serenity]. No living it is and from what it is. These desires, etc., which interrupt the homogeneity creature exists without the latent impression of these and compactness (ckaghanata) of consciousness, are the vighna, the obstacles. mental movements. All we can say is that some predo- The snme concept occurs in the Prataparudriya (Madras, 2th. Ed., 1931) comm., p. 209: ssmbhogasamaye strinām adharadamianādau krtrimaduhkhānu- minate in some people and others in others, and that in bhāvastikāravad atrāpy upapattih | some people they originate from the usual causes and in 1 Cf. S.Ka., 13. $) The Determinants, etc. 4) I.e., they are widely diffused, emsily make an impression on the con- 1) The Comic, Pathetic, Marvellous and Terrible Resns depend on the Erotie, Furions, Heroie and Odious Rasas respectively. sciousness. 9) Unidentified verse. [ 90 ] [91]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC.

others from causes different from the normal. Thus onf threaded on the thread of the Permanent Mental State. some mental movements are such as to realize the purpoge of man1); therefore these are rightly the object of teaching) They rise and set an infinity of times. They may be compar-

The current division of men into men of elevated i ed to beads of crystal, glass, mica, topaz, emerald, sapphire,

ture, etc., is determined by the different position occupie etc., continuously changing their position, threaded, so as to

by these states. Some mental movements (Weakness, Ap be set rather far apart, on a red or dark blue thread1).

prehension, etc.)3, however, can never possibly be mani These beads on such a thread leave no trace of themselves,

fested if the corresponding Determinants do not exist. For but all the same they nourish the ornamental composition

example: a muni who practices rasayana 4) is immune from animated by this thread". Themselves varied, they vary in

Weakness, Indolence, Weariness, etc. Even in one in whomf turn the thread of the Permanent Mental State. Although

by virtue of the Determinants 5), these are present, they the permanent thread does not appear in all its purity,

regularly disappear without leaving any trace of themselves it is still left visible at intervals by them. It nevertheless

when the causes of manifestation cease 6). Heroism, etc., remains obviously affected by the polychrome reflections

however, even when they apparently disappear after their of the jewels, which, being "transitory", follow one another:

tasks are completed, do not cease to remain in the state it is for this very reason that these mental movements are called "transitory ". When, that is to say, someone of latent impressions-for other forms of heroism, inherent in other tasks, remain intact. Indeed, as Patanjali has said, says, "This is a form of Weakness", it is natural to

" The fact that Caitra is in love with one woman does not ask: by what is it provoked? This question shows up

imply that he is out of love with the others", etc.". Thus precisely the instability of this mental movement. But

these Transitory Mental Movements follow one another, in the case of the expression, " Rama is full of Heroism", it is not usual to ask for the cause. The Determinants (the elements which awaken the mental states) are limi-

1. Only the nine Permanent Mental States are able to contribute to tho ted, therefore, to bringing to actuality the Permanent p. 2es

realization of the four ende of man. The Transitory Mental States have not this faculty. Cf. H.C., viveka, p. 139 (certainly a quotation from A.G.): ayam 1) These still allow the thread of the permanent mental state to appear ca nirvedah wayam puruşārthasiddhaye vā utsāharatyadivat, atyantānurafja- here and there. For a similar image, see A.Bh., p. 341: viralombhitaratnan- nāya hasavismayadivan na prabhavattty atyantamukhapreksitvad vyabhicary eva | taralanirbhasamanasitatarasütravat ... The colours (red, dark blue, etc.) of ) The object of the play is to illustrate and teach the means of reali- the thread allude to the sthayibhava. The various Rasas are cach associated ration of the four endo of man. by Bharata with a different colour (the Erotie with green, the Comic with 8) The Transitory Mental States. white, the Pathetic with ash-grey, the Furious with red, the Heroic with orange, 4) Rasayana (the science or art of the rasas or vegetable juices, ote.) is, moro the Terrible with black, the Odious with dark blue, and the Marvellous with or less, the Indian equivalent of alchemy. · yellow). 5) I.e., in virtue of the presence of their causes. ) In other worde, they are the ornamental elements of the threed. Bhr e) I.e., without remnining in the state of latent impressions. pup, nourish; cf. the often-quoted stanza (e.g., Kavyapradipa, comm., p. 61): 1) Yogasütra, Vyasabhasya, 2, 4. Caitra stands for any nome whatever. The some quotation is used in the 7.P.V.V., II, p. 178; cf. supra, p. 87, n. 2. sraksātrabhāvād anyeşām bhāvānam anugamakah | na tirodhiyate sthay! tair asau pusyate param l

[ 92 ] [93]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. Mental States (Delight, Heroism, etc.) corresponding resp tively to their nature-and they do this by infusing rently by a great Delight, a pain in the eyes, etc. A tiger1)

them their own colouring. Even when their correspo may arouse Anger, Fear, etc. As we know, Weariness

ing Determinants are absent, it cannot be said that" (frama) or Anxiety (cinta)3) may accompany the Perma-

Permanent Movements are completely unobservable; fo nent Mental States of Heroism, Fear, etc. The combination

has been said that these, in the state of latent impressiot of these elements, however, has an unmistakable signifi- cance. For example, when the Determinants consist of the are present in all beings. Of the Transitory Mental State however, when their corresponding Determinants are absent death of a friend, the Consequents of wailing, tears, etc.,

not even the names remain-all this will be explaines and the Transitory Mental States are Anxiety, Depres-

more extensively at the suitable time and place 1). In thi sion (dainya), etc., then the Permanent Mental State which

way the necessity of elements occupying a pre-eminent post results cannot be other than Sorrow. For this reason,

tion has been demonstrated. This necessity was also when it appears that a doubt might arise, one has recourse

implicitly, mentioned by Bharata in his description of the to the combination of these elements (simply to eliminate

Permanent Mental States, which begins: "The Permanent the obstacle of doubt).

Mental States we shall bring to the state of Rasas". Thi The Determinants, etc. (which consist of gardens, expres-

description is the consequence of the definition of the gene sive glances, mental states of Contentment [dhtti], etc.), transcend the state of causes, etc., as these are understood ral marks [of Rasas] and constitutes the definition of theif in ordinary life. Their function consists solely in the fact particular characteristics. that they colour [the consciousness of the spectator]; this 7) The Consequents, the Determinants and the function is called vibhāvana, anubhavana, etc.". Thus Transitory Mental States considered separately are in no these take the name, of a non-ordinary character, of Deter- definite relation with a given Permanent Mental State. It is, indeed, found that tears, etc."), may be aroused indiffe: . 1) The tiger is an example of a Determinant. 9) Weariness, etc., are Transitory Mental States. ) The Determinants, properly speaking, awaken in the spectator the

1. In the ch. VIII of the A.Bh. (wbich has not yet come to light). latent traces of the mental movements corresponding to their nature.

1 N.S., VI, proso after v. 50 (in a note). In this sentence, Bharata sayi Aesthetie experience or Rasa is coloured by these latent traces. The

implicitely that only the shdyibhave (i.e., the elements of principal order) exact meaning of vibhdoand, ete., is cxplained by Visvanitha, S.D., III:

and not the a vibharo ete. are bronght to the state of Rasa. The general vibhdoanam ratyader viseşsna dsoådånkuranayogyatānayanam | anubhāvanam roam-

defmition (sdmanyalakana) begins with the sütra: vibhasanubhavavyabhicari- Shütarya ratyddeh samanantoram eva rasādirāpataya bhāoanam | samedranam

samyegad rasanippattih. The particalar definition (vifepalaktana) consists of tathabhatasyaitasya samyak caranam | In other words, according to Vipva-

the description of the characters of each Rasn. Cf. I.P.V.V., I, 57. A.Bh., nlthe, vibhavana is the first manifestation of the germination of Rass; onu-

301: ye sthayino bhand loke cittavrttydtmano bahuprakarapariframaprasavani- Shdsana is the gradual corroboration of the Rasa which is on the point of

bandhanakartasyatåprobandhdbhidhāyinas lān api năma rasatram vifrāntyt- appearing; and samedrana (which is not mentioned by A.G.) is the intensifi-

käyatanatvenopadefadifāncsıydmah | cation or consolidation of Rasa. Samcdrana, according to Vifvanitha, is

3. Tears are Consequents. the specifie operation of the vyabhicdribhava (samcari - vyabhicari). The ela- boration of these three stages is due, of course, to the necessity of allotting [ 94] [ 95 ]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. minants, etc. 1), and this denomination is aimed at express- ing their dependence on the latent traces left by the cor- it does not lean on any time separate from it1). Our thesis is thus different from that of Sankuka, who says that responding preceding causes, etc.$ The particular nature what is called Rasa is simply a Permanent Mental State, of the various Determinants will be explained later $. The operation of the Determinants, etc., presupposes, of course, brought to our knowledge by the Determinants, etc., and that, because this is the object of a Tasting, it takes the that the spectator, in the course of his ordinary life, has not neglected to make a close observation of the characteristic name of Rasa3. For, if things were so, why should Rasa

signs (effects, causes and concomitant elements) of other not exist also in everyday life? For if an unreal thing is

people's mental processes, in other words to deduce the one capable of being the object of Tasting"), a real thing has

from the other. In the mind of such a spectator, the all the more reason to be capable of it. Thus it is legiti-

Determinants, etc. (let us remember that any work of mate to say that the perception of a Permanent Mental

poetry is dominated at times by one of them and at ti- State consists in an inference; but we certainly cannot

mes by another), reach a state of perfect union, connexion rightly say that Rasa is also of this nature. This is the

and identity ". That which, in this state, they make the real reason4) why Bharata has made no mention in the

matter of Tasting-Tasting consisting of a form of con- sutra of the word "Permanent Mental State "; on the

sciousness free from obstacles, differing from ordinary contrary, if he had mentioned it, this would have been a

forms of consciousness-is precisely Rasa. It differs from source of difficulties"). Only by analogy is it said: " The

the Permanent Mental States, and consists solely in this 1) Dh.A.L., p. 160: iha tu vibhavadicarvanā adbhutapuspavat tatkālasāraivo- state of Tasting-it is not, that is to say, something already dită na tu pūrvaparakalanubandhint į "In aesthetic experience, what happens realized )-and lasts exactly as long as the Tasting, i.e.,. is, instend, the birth of the Tasting of the Determinants, ete. Such a Tasting is like a flower born of magic; its essence is solely the present [i.e., it appears specific functions to the vibhava, etc. Rasn is, in renlity, single, nnd its mani- and disappears suddenly], it is correlated neither with what came before nor festation does not have earlier and later stages. This division is of a purely with what comes after". In other words, aesthetic experience is without prag- didactie noture. matic demands, is not directed towards an extrinaic end but is an end in 1) In so far as they are different from ordinary causes. itself. ) The Determinants, etc., erouse the Jatent traces of the mental processos ) Rasa, says A.G., does not consist in the inference (in inferential cogni- of Delight, ete., provoked by ordinary causes. They, thus, demand the pre- tion) of. someone else's mental state (in which case it would be u cognition of sence of these traces and depend upon them. a discursive order, savikalpa), but is a personal experience-the speetator 8) N.S., VII; Abbinava Gupta's commentary on this chapter haa not yet identifes himself with this mental state and lives it himself. This obeervation is aimed at Sadkuka, who maintained that Rasa is simply a Permanent Mental come to light. 4) The word used by Bharata, somyoge, union, implies both that the State deduced by the spectators by means of the Determinants, etc., and that Determinants, etc., unite with each other to form a single whole, and that the mental state perceived in this way is nothing but an imitation by the actor the mind of the epectator is identified with them or participates actively (anu- of the Permanent Mental State of the character he represents. pravif) in the situation which they determine. S) Therefore the imitated Permanent Mental State is unreal. 5) I.c., it is not an already realized, self-subsistent thing which can exiet 4) I ... , Sankuka's reason is not the real one; cf. supra, p. 36. independently of this Tasting. Rasa is simply the particular form of percop- 5) Bharata did not say "The production of Rasa is provoked by tho tion called Taating. union of the Permanent Mental State [of somcone else, i.e., the character repre- sented,] with the Determinante, the Consequents, and the Transitory Mental [96 ] [97] 7. - GHozs, The setletie esperienss, sk.

R. CNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. Permanent Mental State becomes Rasa"1). This analogy, to son assumed to possess latent traces of the ordinary induc- specify, is caused by the fact that the very same things tive processes, will certainly not perceive [the represen- which were previously considered to be causes, etc., inhe- tation of] a young woman, etc.1), in a manner devoid rent in a given Permanent Mental State, now serve to of active participation 2). On the contrary, just in virtue realize the Tasting, and thus are presented in the form of of his possessing heart (the latter quality consisting in Determinants, etc.9. That is, it is quite impossible to say a consent of the heart),3) this perception will be, as it that the inference of an ordinary mental state is a source of were, the seed in him, from which the Tasting of the Rasa Rasa. For this reason, the Tasting of Rasa (which cons- will develop, of the Rasa about to appear in all its fullness ists in a camatkara different from any other kind of ordinary (purnibhavisyat). This Tasting will unfold in complete cognition) differs from both memory, inference and any form of ordinary selfconsciousness3). To be precise: a per- ' t indipendence of every kind of ordinary cognition (induc- tion, memory, etc., and will consist of, and be animated by, a Tasting characterized by a state of identity with Movements". If he had, Rasa would simply be a perception of someone elso's Permanent Mental Movement. the image seen4). This Tasting does not of course arise 1) Bhorata says sometimes (cf. e.g., N.S., VI, prose nfter v. 50 [in a note]) from another cognition previously unfolded; for in that that the Permanent Mental States becomes Rasn; such expressions, A.G. remarks, are only due to the "correspondence (analogy, etc.)". Cf. the next note. case it would be a form of memory. Nor is it the fruit of 9) Dh.A.L., p. 89: foke hi sthayibhave ye vibhavanubhavas tatsamucita cit- the operation of ordinary means of cognition (direct per- tarrttis carvyamåndtmå rasa ity aucityat sthäyino rasatāpattir ity ucyate | " Rasa is simply the Tasting of the mental movement, corresponding, for example. ception, etc.)5). It is aroused solely by the union of the . with the Determinants and the Consequents of the mental state of Sorrow. Determinants, etc., which, as has been said, are of a The expression: ' the Permanent Mental States become Rasas', arises solely, non ordinary nature. Tasting is distinguished a) from therefore, by analogy (= correspondence)". perception of the ordinary mental states (Delight, etc.) 3) Forms of "ordinary selfconsciousness " are, e.g., plensure, pain, etc. Dh.A.L., p. 55: nane evam dhimavagamananantaragnismaranavad vibha- vādipratipattyananantaram ratyādicittavrttipratipattir iti sabdavyāpāra evātra given mental process of an ordinary nature-and this certainly is not Rasa. nāsti | idam tāvad ayam pratttisvarūpajfio mimāmsakah praşavyah | kim atra The Tasting of Rasa-which consiets in a camatkara of a non-ordinary nature- paracittaorttimatre pratipattir eva rasapratipattir abhimata bharatah | na caivam is animated, in fact, by a Tasting of the Determinante, etc., which are of poe- bhramitavyam | evam hi lokagatacittavrtyanumānamatram iti ka rasatå | yas to tical nature. It is quite impossible to identify this Tasting with memory, alaukikacamatkārātmā rasāsvādaļ kāvyagatavibhāvādicarvanāprāņo nāsau sma- inference, etc!". ranânumānādisāmyena khiltkdrapåtrtkartavyab | " Objection: * the perception of 1) "A young woman " is a Determinant; "ete. " here includes the Con- the mental perception processes of Delight, etc., is born, thue, immediately tequents and the Transitory Mental States. after the perception of the Determinants, etc.,-in the same way as the me- 2) Impersonally. Tajasthya or madhyasthya, indifference, is the exact op- mory of fire that is born immedietely after the smoke is perceived. For this posite of anupravela, personal or active participation. Cf. p. 55, n. 1. reason, this perception is not the fruit of the power of the worde [i.s., it is 3) Cf. p. 65, n. 1. not aroused by the power of evocation, dhvananavyapara]". To such an in- 4) I.e., it is perceived in a generalized manner; cf. p. 55, n. 1. quirer, who knowe the nature of perception so well, we wonld put this ques- 5) Dh.A.L., p. 153: na casau carvanā pramănântarato jātă pürvam, yene- tion: do you consider that the perception of Rasa is nothing but the percep- dāntm smrtiņ syātļna cādhunā kutafcis pramāņāntarād utpannā, alaukike pra- tion of another's mental state? One must be careful not to fall into this tyakşādyavyāpārāt | The operation of direct perception, etc., refers only to error. For in this case, there would exiet, indeed, only the induction of a things of an ordinary, i.e., practical nature.

[98] [99]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. aroused by the ordinary means of cognition (direct percep- the contrary, a) the fact of being immersed in complete tion, inference, the revealed word, analogy, etc.); b) from abandonment within the [adored] object, b) the lack of cognition without active participation (tatastha) of the evidence, due to the absence of active participation, and thoughts of others, which is proper to the direct perception c) the presence of obstacles, are absent. The reasons of the yogins1); c) from compact (ekaghana)3) perception for this absence are a) the absence of abandonment to of one's own beatitude, which is proper to yogin of higher one's own self to the exclusion of everything else, b) an orders (this perception is immaculate, free from all impres- active participation in one's own self, and thus the absence sions [uparāga] deriving from external things)3. For these three forms of cognition are without the beauty Aesthetic experience, Rasn, manifested by a poetical description of a beau- tifal woman ie, for example, coloured by the mental state of Delight, which (saundarya), [which is proper to the aesthetic experience]. is aroused by the description itself. Such a mental state is supposed to pre- The causes of this privation are a) the appearance of exist in the spectator in a latent state, in the form, that is, of samakara or other obstacles (practical desires, etc.), b) the lack of tosana. The Determinante, which manifest aesthetic experienee awaken, implicitly and of necessity, these latent traces also. For this concept, cf. supra evidence, due to the absence of active participation, and also, p. 87, n. 2. c) the fact of being immersed in complete abandonment The beauty, the pleasantness proper to nesthetic experience is due to tho colouring of these mental processes: cf. A.Bh., I, p. 291: ... laukikat pratyayad within the [adored] object4. In aesthetic experience, on uparjanādivighnabahulād yogipratyayāc ca vişayāsvādatānyatāparuşād vilakşaņā- kärasukhaduhkhådivicitravdsannuvedhopanatahrdyatātisayasa mviccarvanātmanā 1) Telepathy, the knowledge of other people's minde, is one of the yogin bhufijate budhah ... |" Aesthetic enjoyment consists in the Tasting of one's own powers (Yogasatra, III, 19: pratyayasya paracittajnanam; this sdtra is quoted consciousness; this Tasting is endowed with extreme pleasantness (beauty), and commented by A.G. in I.P.V., I, 4, 5). Thie phenomenon, observes A.G., which it obtains from a contact with the various latent traces of pleasure, is of a totally different order to aesthetic experience. In this, in fact, the di- pain, ete. It differs both from ordinary perception, which is full of obstacles stinction between one's own self and the self of others (svaparavibhaga) con- (pragmatic requirements, ete.), and from the perception of the yogins, which is tinues to exist, while the aesthetic experience postulates the senernlizntion not free from harshneas, on account of the total lack of any tasting of externnl of the mental states and therefore the suppression of every limited self. objects ". Thus, by comparison with aesthetic experience, the compact homo- ) Cf. p. 71, n. 2. geneity (ekaghanata) of mystical experience possesses a certain harehness. Its s) Abbinava Gupta olludes, in this paisage, to the highest degree of pursuit, thet is to say, calls for uncommon force and energy (cf. the concept mystical experience (cf. supra, p. 56, n. 2) which is free of any trace of of otra, hero). Aesthetic experience, on the other hand, is ensily attained. ordinary things. It is particularly suitable for people endowed with "gentle mind " (suku- 4) Mysticnl experience involves the annibilation of every pair of opposites; maramati). In the Dh.Z.L., p. 51, A.G. defines Rasa in the following terms: everything is reabsorbed in its dissolving fire. Sun and moon, night and day, sabdasamarpyamänahrdayasamvådasundaravibhävånubhåvasamucitapragvinivisa- beautiful and ugly, etc., no longer exist in it. The limited "I" is completely ab- ratyadivāsanānurāgasukumāramasamvidānandacarvanāeyāpārarasantyarūpo ra- sorbed into Siva or Bhairava, the adored objeet; everything vanishes from the sah |" Rasa is tasted through the act of tasting the beautitude of one's own field of consciousness. Acsthetic experience, on the other hand, requires the preo- consciousness. Thie tasting ie pleasant [and not parusa, as in mystical ezpo- sence of the latent traces of Delight, etc., (aroused by the operntion of the Determi- rience] in that the conaciousness is coloured by the latent traces of the mental nants, ete.). In other words, aesthetic experience presupposes a pre-conatituted states of Delight, ete., pre-existing [in the minds of the spectatoro]. Such knowledge on the part of the spectator, of the psychic reactions, etc., which are traces are aroused by the corresponding Determinants and Consequents, which- normally felt before a given situntion. This knowledge is, in part, innato (it pleasant [beautiful, ete.,] by virtue of the consent of the heart-are afforded forms, that is, an integral part of human nature) and is, in part, acquired by the words ". Cf: Dh.Z.L., p. 81: anubhdoavibhanasabodhanottaram coa through the experience of one's own reaction and one's observation of the tanmayibhavanayuktyā tadvibhavānubhāvocitacittavrttivāsanānuranjitasvasamvidā- reactions of others. nandacarvanāgocaro 'rtho rasātmă sphuraty eva ... | [ 100 ] [101 ]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. of the character of otherness proper to cognition of the Someone might object: "According to your thesis, thoughts of others, and c) immersion in the latent traces then, Rasa is not an object of cognition; this is a logical left by the mental states of Delight, etc., reawakened by consequence of what you say, i.e., that Rasa consists the corresponding Determinants, etc., which are generali- solely of a Tasting and has not the nature of an object of zed 1). All this has been said over and over again. cognition, etc. How then do you think the expression Thus the Determinants are not the causes of the birth which Bharata uses in the sutra can be justified, when of the Rasa; otherwise, the Rasa should continue to exist he says: 'The birth of Rasa?'" This expression, we even when they no longer fall under cognition. Nor are reply, must be understood in the sense of a birth not of they the cause of its cognition (if they were, they would the Rasa, but of the Tasting which refers to the Rasa. have to be included among the means of cognition); For if the expression "The birth of Rasa " is understood for a Rasa, already realized and standing by itself, which in the sense of the birth of a Rasa, consisting solely of, could function as an object of a cognition, does not exist 3: and animated solely by, the Tasting in question, our thesis What is it, then, which is designated by the expressions is not beset by any difficulty1). This Tasting, in fact, is Determinants, etc .? We reply: the expressions Determi- neither the fruit of the operation of the means of cogni- nants, etc., do not designate things of an ordinary charac- tion nor of the means of action. On the other hand, it ter; they denote what serves to realize the Tasting. Does cannot be said that, in itself, this Tasting is devoid of any such thing occur elsewhere? The fact that it does authoritativeness: for its real existence is an inconfutable not occur elsewhere, we reply, can do nothing but streng- datum of our own consciousness. Besides, this Tasting then the thesis of their non-ordinary character, which is nothing but a form of cognition-which is however diffe- is the thesis we uphold. Does the taste of the Rasa of rent from any other form of ordinary perception. This pānaka perhaps occur in molasses, peppers, etc. [, of which, difference is due to the fact that the means which arouse however, it consists]?" The case is perfectly analogous. the Tasting (the Determinants, etc.) are of a character different from the normal. To conclude: what is aroused 1) The Determinants, etc., are perceived in independance of any associn- by the union of the Determinants, etc., is simply the tion with a particular person, in a generalised way. They eliminate the ' obsta- Tasting; the form of existence, of a non-ordinary cha- cles', (vighna), i.o., the pragmatie needs associated with the limited "I". 9) Cf. supra, p. 58, n. 1; infra, p. 103. 3) The example of panaka is to be found fairly frequently in Indian philo- orpiment, lake, etc., or as a piece of music is different from the various notes sophy. Cf. for example, N.M., p. 341: eram padārthebhyo 'nya eva vakyārthah of which it is composed, so the meaning of a phrase is different from the moan- pānakādivat, yathā pānakam sarkarānāgakefaramarīcādibhyo 'rthāntaram eva ing of the words" yathå ca sindüraharitälalaksådibhyo 'rthäntaram eva citram, yatha så sadjarpabha- 1) I.e., this expression might lend itself to interpretation in the senso gändhäradhaivatädibhyo 'rthäntaram eva grämarågah tatha padebhyo vākyam, that Rasa is something different from the act of cognition by which it is paddrthebhyo vakyarthah |"The meaning of a sentence is different to tho mean- known, so that it wonld bo an object of cognition. A.G.'s reply to this ring of the words (as happens with pdnaka, ete.). Jast as panaka is different objection is that Rasn is the perception itself, and that the word Rasa does from suger, spice, pepper, ete., just as a painting is different from minium, not denote anything distinct from the perception by which it is known.

[ 102] [103 ]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. racter, which is the matter of this Tasting, is called Rasa. This is the sense and purport of the sutra. the outside, nor as if it were linked with a particular [un-

All this may be summarized in the following way: in generalized] cause-for, in this case, intrusion by pragma-

the first place, the identity of the actor as such is concealed tic requirements, interests of gain, etc., would occur-,nor

by tiaras, headwear, etc .; in the second place, the idea that as if it belonged only to a third person-for, in this case,

this is Rama, etc., aroused by the power of the poem, never sensations of pleasure, hatred, etc., would be manifested

theless does not succeed in resting altogether in the being in the spectator1). Thus the Erotic Rasa is simply the

of the actor, for the consciousness of the spectators is inten- mental state of Delight generalized and made into a matter

sely coloured by the latent traces of real life1). Just for of perception by a form of cognition, which may either

this reason, the spectator is no longer living either in the develop consecutively or be single". The task of genera- lization is carried out by the Determinants, etc. space and time of Rama, etc., nor in the space and time of the actor as such3). Acts of horripilation, etc., which 1) Cf. supra, p. 51, n. 1. have repeatedly been seen by the spectator in the course ) In the case of a play, long poem, ete., varions states of sonl occur in of everyday life as indexes of Delight, etc., serve, in this alternation with each other (Delight, Sorrow, ete.); in the case of a short poem there ie generally spenking only one dominant motif. case, to make known a Delight, etc., uncircumscribed by either time or space. In this Delight, just because he possesses the latent traces of it in himself, the Self of the spectator also actively participates. For this very reason, this Delight is perceived neither with indifference, from

1. Therefore he does not seo Rama as a real individunl. If he did, the upectator would be immersed in Rama's own time, space, etc. (wonld bo # contemporary of Rama). Latent traces of his ordinary life, which is affected by particular temporal, spatial, etc., dnta prevent the total immersion of the spectator in Rama's time and apace, ie., prevent him from feeling Rama as part of his real life. The figure of Rima impersonated by the actor is not perceived as an element of real life. "The spectator of a drama has the con- iciousness more or less distinet, more or less clear, that what happens on tho stage is not true, with the truth of real life, but only represented-that what is happening there has no consequence for bim, does not insert itself into his practical life-that the people acting there are not renl persons but just actors " (A. TILCHER, Estetics, Roma 1931, p. 62). Therefore, the spectator is immersed neither in the time and space of the actor as such (and therefore in the time and space connected with his practical life), nor in the time and space of Rama as a real person. 9) Therefore, in the space and time of his own real life.

[ 104 ] [ 105 ]

THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC

place, in virtue of the different kinds of Representation, the presumption of a direct perception of a particular APPENDIX I. actor (Caitra, Maitra, etc.,) and of his particular space and time ceases to exist1); in the second place, since direct The nature of drama and the concept of anuvyavasāya (A.Bh., I, p. 37). perception cannot take place without at least a mini- mum of particularization, recourse is had to such names as anuvyavasäyaviseşavişayīkāryam nātyam | tathā hy āh- Rama, etc. The fact that Rama, etc., are the names of āryaviseşādinā nivītte taddesakālacaitramaitrādinațavise- famous characters eliminates the possibility that one who şapratyakşābhimāne vieşalesopakrameņa ca vinā pratyak- declaims their venerable exploits might provoke [in the şāpravrtter āpāte1 rāmadisabdasyatropayogat prasiddha- spectators] the obstacle of unverisimilitude. Owing to tadarthatayādaraņīyacaritavācakasyāsambhāvanāmātrani - all this, this re-perception is like a form of direct percep- rākaraņenānuvyavasāyasya pratyakşakalpatā ", hņdyagītā- tion. 2) The scene represented is accompanied by plea- dyanusyütatayā camatkārasthānatvād dhrdayānupravea- sure-giving vocal music, etc., and, for this reason, is a yogyatvam, abhinayacatuştayena svarupapracchadanam, receptacle of camatkara3). In virtue of this it has a natu- prastāvanādinā națajnanajasamskarasacivyam, tena ranja- ral suitability to enter the heart ". 3) The four forms kasāmagrimadhyanupravisțena pracchāditasvasvabhāvena of representation hide the true identity of the actor. 4) The präkpravṛttalaukikapratyakşānumānādijanitasamskārasah- prologue, etc., give to the spectator the awareness that āyena națajnanasamskārasacivena hrdayasamvādatanmayī- he has to do with an actor 5). In this connexion, the actor. bhavana'sahakāriņā prayoktrā dršyamānena yo 'nuvyava- is immersed in the colouring combination [of Determi- sāyo janyate sukhadubkhādyākāratattaccittavṛttirūşita ni- nants, etc.]; his real identity is hidden; he possesses mental jasamvidānandaprakāćamayo 'ta eva vicitro rasanāsvāda- impressions arising from direct, inferential and other forms nacamatkāracarvaņa nirvesabhogādyaparaparyayah, tatra of ordinary perception which have occurred in the past; he yad avabhāsate vastu tan nātyam | possesses mental impressions of the awareness of being an actor; and he partakes in creating a state of identity [of 1 G: dyote, quite nonsensical, but my conjecture in the text is hardly * Read the spectators] with the representation, and this through the true reading; I suppose the anthor wrote opravrtiav ayate [! (cf. e.g., A.Bh., p. 43: pratyakşakalpānuvyavasāyavişayo); G: pratyakşakalpand° | their heart's consent. His appearance arouses a [particular ' G: obhävana° n form of] re-perception, which consists in the light and the

Drama is matter of cognition by a special form of 1) Cf. supra, pp. 80, 81. re-perception, (anuvyavasaya)1). Namely, 1) in the first 2) Cf. supra, p. 78. 3) Cf. supra, pp. 72, f. 1) Cf. supra, p. 47, n. 7; p. 84, n. 3. 4) Cf. supra, p. 65, n. 1. 5) Cf. supra, p. 80. [106] [107 ]

R. GNOLI

beatitude proper to consciousness, which is coloured by the various mental states-made up of pleasure and pain-and which is therefore varied1. This re-perception has also other names: Tasting, Sampling, camatkara, De- APPENDIX II. libatio, Immersion, Enjoyment, etc. Drama is nothing but the matter of this form of re-perception ". ' The nature of aesthetic experience and the cognitive value of art (A.Bh., I, pp. 36-37). 1) Otherwise, it would be a form of mystical cognition; cf. p. 68. etad uktam bhavati | etādņam te1 rāmādayo na kadā- 2) Bharata (N.S., I, v. 106 or 107) says that "Drama is the re-telling (anuktrianam) of all the forms of existence in the threo worlds (trailokya- cana pramāņapatham avātaran | yadāgamena varņyante syåsya sarvasya natyam bhavanukirtanam)". According to A.G., the worde tadā tadviseşabuddhir yady api rāmāyaņaprāyād ekasmān "re-telling " and "imitation " (anukarana, anukara), used by Bharata, must mahāvākyād ullasati tathāpi vartamānatayaiva viseșāņām be interpreted in the sense of a "re-perception sui generis" (anuvyavasaya, anuvyavasāyavifesa) and not in the proper sense of anukarana, imitation. sambhävyamänārthakriyasāmarthyātmakasvälakşanya2pa- This anutyasasāya is "like a direct perception " (pratyakşakalpa, sākşātkāra- ryavasānān na ca teșām vartamanatety upagatā tavad kalpa); see supra, p. 70, n. I. viséşabuddhih 8 | kāvyeşv api hrdaya eva tāvat sādhā- The term anueyavasaya is one proper to logic; it defines the activity of the mind which works on data furnished by the senses. It is, therefore, the raņībhāvo vibhāvādīnām jātaļ | tatrāpi kathāmātre sā- mental re-perception (anu - pafcat, afterwarde) of the sensible perception dharanībhavah sambhavati yady api tathapy ‘evam (eyavasaya). 7.P.V.V., III, p. 43; manah (- antabkaranam) anuvyavarāyam säkätkåravimarfasya pascådbhåvinam vimarsam vidadhat kriyāsa mbondhödivişayah ye kurvanti teşām etad bhavati' itivākyavad rañjanā- kalpanā vikalpajiiānāni pramātroyāpāraprādhanyena karoti | The oldest text tisayabhāvān na cittavrttir nirņayagatā bhavati | kavye in which the term anueyavasaya is found is the Nyayasūtra, Vatsyāyanabhaşya, tu guņālamkāramanoharaabdafarīre lokottararasaprā- I, 1. 4: sartatra pratyakşavişaye jnātur indriyena vyavasāyah, pafcan manasā nuoyavasdyas | In sesthetics, anuvyavasaya has come to mean aesthetie re- ņake hrdayasamvādavasān nimagnākārakā tavad bha- perception (without, that is, any association with the concepts of reality and ir- vati cittavrttiḥ | kiņ tu sarvasya pratyakşasākşātkārakalpā reality [cf. supra, p. 70, n. 1] and therefore with the limited "I", but genera- lised) of thinge perceived in practical life. The expressions anukarana, anu- tatra na dhīr udeti | nāțye tu paramārthikam kimcid adya me kirtana, etc., used by Bharata (cf. N.S., I, pp. 36, 40, 43, etc.), observed krtyam bhavişyatītyevambhūtābhisamdhisamskārābhavāt A.G., should not be interpreted literally, in the sense, that is, of imitation, sarvaparişatsādharaņapramodasāra paryantavirasanādara- i.c., of a replica of reality, but in the sense of anuvyavasaya, of aesthetic re-perception of the facts of practical life. nīyalokottaradarćanaśravaņayogı bhavişyamityabhisamdhi- samskārād ucitagītātodyacarvaņāvismrtasamsārikabhāva- taya vimalamukurakalpībhūtanijahrdayah sūcādyabhinayā- valokanodbhinnapramodasokatanmayībhāvab pāțhyākarņa-

1 Rend. G has tai ' Read. G has osalaksanya° * P p. 432 quotes partially this passage; his correction apagata for upagata is wrong. Cf. supra, p. 106: visepalefopakrameņa ca vinā pratyakapravrtter āpôte ... A.Bh., I, p. 43: nirädhârasya vrtasya daršayitum afakyatrāt [| I propose; G: osård° (] [108] [109 ]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. napātrāntarapravećavaśāt samutpanne desakālaviseşāveśā- nālingini samyańmithyāsamsayasambhāvanādijñānavijñe- sonality) being accepted in drama1. This state of gene-

yatvaparāmarsānāspade rāmarāvaņādivişayadhyavasāye rality of the Determinants, etc., occurs also in proper

tatsamskārānuvrttikāraņabhütatatsahacarahrdyavasturū- poems; in this case, it penetrates directly into the heart.

pagītātodyapramadānubhavasamskārasūcitasamanugatata- Even if this state of generality can also occur in mere

duktarüparāmādhyavasāyasamskāra eva bhavan pañcaşair tales (kathamätre), nevertheless in this case (cf. for example

divasaiļ sacamatkāratadiyacaritamadhyapraviştasvātma®- the sentence, "Such-and-such happens to people who do

rūpamatiḥ svātmadvāreņa visvam tathā pasyan pratyekam s0-and-so ") it has only a weak power of colouring and

sāmājiko dešakālaviseņaņāparāmaršena evamkāriņām idam therefore the corresponding mental movement does not

iti lidhātmakavidhisamarpitam samvijjatīyam evärtham 6 obtain a state of convinction (nirnaya). But owing to the consent of the heart every mental movement remains saņvidviseşarañjakaprāņavallabhāpratimarasāsvādasahaca- raramyagitātodyādisamskararasānubhavavaśena hņdayā- completely submersed, in the case of a poem (let us re-

bhyantaranikhātam tata evotpuńkhaśatair api mlānimā- member that poetry is made up of words embellished by Qualities and Ornaments and consists of, and is animated tram apy abhajamanam bhajams tattacchubhāsubhaprep- sājihāsāsatatasyūtavrttitvād eva subham acaraty asubham by, a Rasa of a non ordinary nature)3. Not in every person,

samujjhati| however, does arise through poetry an idea similar to a

• Read; G :. "scatos° | . . The insertion of the word artham (which does 1) a) The perception of the particular names and shapes of Rima, ete. not exiet in the published text) after samvitsajanyam eva seems to me indi- (therefore of their qualifications of time, space, etc.), does not involvo that spensable. Cf. A.Bh., I, p. 288 :... niyatadesakaladyaspriabhata idam phlam they cannot be percoived in a generalised form. A pemsonality, ete., inserts isi vidhisthantyo 'rtho vyutpanim vitarati | itself into our practical life (develops, so to say, his Causal Efficiency) only when it is contemporary with us, ie., connected with the present and thero- fore with the practical intereste, etc., of our own Ego. When these personalitics These personages, i.e., Rama, etc., have never descen- are not contemporany they cannot develop their natural Causal Effcieney. In the aesthetie perception, they are independent from the concepte both of ded into the sphere of our means of knowledge. When reality and non reality and are thus perceived as "genernlized ". In this sense, these [Rama, etc.,] are described in the scriptures, even their particularity (vifera) is not contrasting with the concept of generality. if the idea of the particularity of each of them (tadvise- b) In this context, svalakpanya is a simply synonym of svarapa, one's own form or shape, one's own peculiar nature and thus individuality, etc. sabuddhi) arises from a Great Sentence such as the Rāmā- Svalakranya is commented on by A.G. in this way in the Dh.A.L., p. 538. The yana, etc., nevertheless, only when these are [felt as] Camal Efficiency (arthakriyo; on this concept, cf. p. 36, n. 7) in the senso of practical or pragmatical functionality belongs to the real individuality contemporary (vartamana), do they amount to a real indi- (i.e., contemporary with the spectator) only. The generalized imnge of the viduality (svālaksanya) animated by the power (samarthya) atathetie experience has no practical efficiency, i.e., does not insert itself in of a corresponding Causal Efficiency (arthakriya). Now, practical life. The concept of Causal Efficiency in connerion with the one of individuality (in the sense of a particnlar essence contrasting with the general this contemporaneity does not exist and therefore there essence, the samanyalaksana) has a baddhist origin and, freely interpreted, is no contradiction in the idea of their particularity (per- . became part of the common philosophical vocabulary. 5) Cf. supra, p. 54. { 110 ] [111]

R. GNOLI THE AESTHETIC EXPERIENCE, ETC. direct perception. In drama this difficulty does not arise 1. This cognition is not circumscribed by space and time [What is the true nature of drama?] In drama there is and is free from all notion of the things which are the the absence of the mental trace of the intention, 'Today I matter of real, mistaken, uncertain, probable, etc. 1), must do something practical', and the presence, in its place, forms of knowledge. The spectator is accompanied by the of the intention, 'Today I am going to enjoy venerable impressions of this cognition (whose object is Rama, etc.) for sights and sounds of a non-ordinary character, which arouse; several days; they are evidenced, in their turn, by impres- in the end, a state of freedom from worldly interests". sions of the direct perception of the vocal and instrumental and whose essence is a generalized pleasure shared by all music and of the images of the women". These pleasure- the spectators'. During the spectacle, the spectator for- producing things accompanying the spectacle are themselves gets about the samsarika existence and immerses himself the cause of the continuation of these impressions. The in the Tasting of the vocal and instrumental music which spectator, whose awareness of his own self (svātmarūpa = accompanies the play being acted 3. The heart of such svarūpa, identity, etc.) is lost in the events represented a spectator has, of course, to be as clear as a spotless endowed with camatkara, continues, by means of his own mirror; only if it is, will he be able to identify himself self to see everything in this light3. The spectators, with the mental states of Sorrow, Delight, etc., aroused therefore, remain in possession of a particular from of by the sight of the [four species of] Representation (gesti- consciousnes afforded to them by the following affirma- culation, etc.). By listening to the play which is being tion, which remains, as it were, on their lips to be licked performed the spectator enters into the life of a character. and tasted (lidhatmaka) ": ' Such-and-such happens to different from himself, and, for this reason, there grows people who do so-and-so'. This form of consciousness up in him a cognition whose object is Rama, Ravana, etc.4). is free of every spatial and temporal specification. By 1) Some individaals whose atsthetic sensibility (consent of the heart, etc.) virtue of the perception of Rasa, aroused by the traces is poor need visual illustration of what is suggested by the power of the poem; of all the pleasure-producing things-vocal and instru- such visual illustration (consisting of the actors, etc.) contributes to bring about the immersion of the spectator in the events represented to the exclusion mental music, etc .- which accompany its Tasting (Rasa of everything else. Cf. supra, p. 84, n. 3. colours the consciousness in a special way, differing from ) The type of droma to which A.G. refers in these lines ie the natya, that of the heart's beloved), this form of consciousness which is, in general, inspired by the facte and personnages taken from the Mahabharata and the Ramayana. A.G. observes that the murders, deaths remains deeply fixed in the heart, like an arrow, in such and tragical occurrences which are raccounted, f. i., in the Mahabharata give the reader a feeling of the vanity of human life (cf. Dh.A.L., p. 530: yady api dharmårthakāmnām sarvasvam tödrn nāsti yad anyatra na vidyate, tathāpi 1) Cf. supra, p. 37. 9) Cf. supra, p. 82. paryantavirasatvam atraivāvalokyatām | ). $) Colouring power (ranjakatva) par excellencs belongs to the music accom- S) Cf. Mrechakaşikā, III, S: yat satyam virate 'pi gitasamaye gacchāmi irnoann ive [ "To tell the trath, althongh the song is ended, I seem to car panying the performance of the play. ) In other worde, the spectator lives the lifo of the characters represented it as I walk". (Răma, Răvaņa, etc.). 4) Cf. the verse quoted in the Rasapradipa by Prabhakara Bhatta, Bena- res 1925: sāmājikās tu lihate rasam pātram napo matab | [ 112 ] [ 113 ] 8 - CNots, The assthetie asperienecs, aie.

R. GNOLI

a way that by no possible effort can it be disregarded, let alone extracted"). Thus the subject who enjoys it (and this happens simply because the mind is naturally desi- GENERAL INDEX

rous of attaining to the good and abandoning the bad) The numbers refer to pages. Italic type figures indicate the chief references. does good and avoids evil".

1. I have not beon able to find the word utpunkha in any dictionary. The abkilāpa, cf. Longing. Abhinavagupta, XXI'; et passim. anupravesa, ef. active participation.

sense, howover, shows, without any possibility of doubt, that utpunkhe is a anusamdhâna, cf. visualization.

synonym of utpatana, which denotes the act of extracting an arrow (punkha abhinaya, cf. Representation. anuvyavasāya, cf. re-perception.

is the shaft or feathered part of an arrow). The same expression is to be found abhivyaj, cf. manifest. Anxiety, arthacinta, 341.

in the I.P.V.V., I, p. 37: prasiddhisatapürne jtvaloke kasyacit kacid eva pra- Accomplishment, samapatti, 55 1e, 77. Anxicty, cinta, 291, 95.

siddhih "Itneva pratibimbiteva likhitevantarnikhateva ca (Malatimadhava, 5, 10)" Active partecipation, anupravesa, 51', apahasita, cf. Uproarious Laughter.

. iti nyāyena hrdayabhittau utpatanafatair api hrdayam anunmūlya napasarpati | 99, 100. apasmara, cf. Epilepsy.

) A.G. accepts the traditionel Indian view of art as a means of instruc- adhikarin, cf. qualified person. Apprehension, sankā, 291.

tion, but tonds to give the word instruction a meaning of his own. Such in- adbhuta, cf. Marvellous Rasa. apradhānată, cf. lack of preeminence.

struction, according to A.G. is of a different cheracter form any other, and of an adhyavasāya, 74°. arabhati, cf. Horrifie Stylo.

unmistakable nature. Dh.A.L., p. 190: vyutpādanam ca fāsanapratipādanā- adhyavasāya, ef. ascertainment. arop, dropa, cf. super-impose.

bhyām fastretihāsakrtābhyām vilaksanam | yathā rāmas tathāham ityupamānāti- Aesthetic plensure, priti, ananda, 79". Acsthetic senses, 824. Arrogance, garva, 291.

riktåm rasäsvädopäyasvapratibhävijrmbhårüpåm cyutpattim ante karottti kam artha, cf. Profit.

upalabhamahe |"The knowledge imparted by poetry differs from the injunc- Affection, seva, 34. artha, cf. purposes of man.

tione and instruction of religious treatises and historical narrative. However, agama, cf. Holy writings. artha, its meaning in the expression

if it is meant that poetry ultimately produces instruction consisting in the Agitation, avega, 291. kāvyārtha, 621 .. '

enrichment of one's aesthetic sensibility (this being the instrument which allows Agnipurāna, 32°, 72 *. arthacinta, ef. Anxiety.

of the tasting of Rasa), different from ordinary analogy (as with Rama, so with āhāryābhinaya, 35'. anusmrti, ef. Recollection.

me), we have no objection to make": A.Bh., I, p. 41: nanu kim guruvad upa- Ajitapīda, 301, 32°. arthakriya, cf. Causal Efficiency.

delam karoti, netyāha, kintu buddhim vivardhayati, svapratibham evam tadrstm alamkara, ef. Ornament. Artificial, krtrima, 34, 41, 421.

vitarati | Elsewhere (Dh.A.L., p. 40) A.G. says that the principal element ie alasya, cf. Indolence. Ascertainment, adhyavasāya, 76°.

not knowledge (for in that case there' would be confwsion with worke on alaukika, cf. non-ordinary, passim. āstnapāțhya, 81, 814.

ethics and historiography) but plensare (priti, onanda). The pleasure and amarşa, cf. Indignation. afru, cf. Weeping.

knowledge, both sui generis, aroused by poetry are not distinet from each Analogy, upamiti, upamāna, 58. Assurance, mati, 291.

other but two aspects of the same thing (na caite pritivyutpant bhinnarpe ānanda, cf. beatitude. Astonishment, vismaya, 291, 91.

eva, dvayor apy ekavişayatvat, Dh .. L., p. 336). Ånandavordhano, XXV ff., 501, 591. asūyā, cf. Envy. anavadhana, cf. lack of attention. asvada, ef. Tasting. dņavamala, 741. asvadana, cf. Sampling. Anger, krodha, 291, 32, 34, 84", 86, atihasita, ef. Convulsive Laughter. 91, 95. ätman, cf. Self. anirvacya, ef. Ineffable. audramagadht, 841. anubhava, cf. Consequents. autsukya, ef. Impatience. anubhava, ef. immediate perception. anubhāvanā, 95. avagam, cf. communicate. avahasita, cf. Smile. anukarana, cf. imitation. avahina, ef. Dissimulation. anukirtana, cf. re-telling. avantl, 841. anumāna, cf. inference. Avantivarman, 301, 501, 591.

[114] [ 115 ]

6°. - GnoLt, The authetle expsrianes, ste.

GENERAL INDEX GENERAL INDEX

āvega, cf. Agitation. avela, cf. immersion. cinta, cf. Anxiety. dense or compact, density, ekaghana, Enumeration of the loved one's me- eit, cf. intelligence. o sa, 71, 71 , 87, 87 , 88, 100, 1004. rits, gunakirtana, 341. Awakening, vibodha, 291. cittarrtti, ef. Mental movement. Depression, dainya, 291, 95. Envy, asāya, 291. Beatitude, ānanda, 55, 551, 741, 87, Combination, samagr!, 49, 68, 76. Despair, vişāda, 29 1. Epilepsy, apasmara, 291. Comic Rasn, hasya, 291, 33, 91. Determinants, vibhava, 29, 291, 30. Erroncous perception, 76; cf. mistake. Beauty, saundarya, 100. 87' Communicate, avagam, 35. 32, 321, 33, 44, 44., 46, 48, 481,3, Erotic Rasa, irngara, 291, 32, 40, Benediction stanza, nondt, 801. Comparison, utprekşā, 76°. 49, 491, 50, 50, 511. 52, 53, 58", Bhairava, 100€. Concomitance, vyapti, 68, 68". 61, 62, 72, 76', 77, 85, 851, 90, 57. 61, 83*, 86, 91, 105.

Bhâna, 791. 90*, 92, 93, 94, 95, 95', 96, 97, Essence of poetry, kāvyārtha, 62, 62', Convalive Laughter, atihasita, 33". 63. Bharata, XIII, XIX,, 29, 30, 32', 33, Copy, pratikrti, 761. 98, 99, 1004, 102, 111. Evocation or manifestation, power of, 36, 39, 47, 49, 49', 82, 84", 97. Devotion, bhakti, XXV, 100. dhvananaryāpāra, vyanjanavyāpāra, bharati, cf. Eloquent Style. Command, vidhi, 64, 641. Connotation, power of, lakşanauya- dharma, cf. Right Action. XXVI, 591. bhāşā, cf. dialects. para, 59'. Dharmnkirti, 36', 391, 493, 591. Expansion, vikasa, 54', 55. Bhatta Tota, XXI1, XXVII, ff., 38', Consciousness, supreme, parasamvitti Ecstasy, cf. brahman. 39", 421. 62,621. dhrti, cf. Contentment. dhruva songs, 47, 561. Fainting, pralaya, 29 1 bhaya, cf. Fear. Consciousneso, samvit, XXII, 55, 551, dhvanananyāpāra, cf. evocation. Fear, Bhaya, 291, 67, 91, 95. bhayanaka, cf. Terrible Rasa. 87, 87'. dhvani, XI, 35, 591, 62". Fover, vyadhi, 341. Bhatta Lollata, XX, 30, 301, 311, 32, 321,2,3, 33, 332.3, 76 . Consent of the heart (aesthetic sensi- Dhvanyāloka, 501, 591. bility), sahrdayatva, hrdayasamvā- Dialects, bhapa, 80. Firmness, sthairya, 34. Fuidity, druti, 54, 54', 59. Bhatța Nārāyaņo, 87°. da, XXVIII , 46, 651. Dilatation, vistara, 54', 55. Firmneas, sthairyx, 34. Bhatta Nāyaka, XX f., 50, 501, 52, dima, 791. Fuidity, druti, 54, 54°, 59. 53', 551, 56, 561, 574, 61, 62, 76". Consequents, anubhava, 29, 291, 30, 301, 31, 34, 35, 46, 49, 49 1, 511, 85, Fright, trâsa, 291. bhāva, cf. mental state. Direct perception, pratyakja, the ae- 87', 94, 97 , 98, 1004. sthetic perception is like ... , 701 Function, power, vyapara, vrui, XXVI. bhavand, cf. propulsion. Constituent elements, guna, 54. Direet experience or perception, sa- Furious Rasa, raudra, 291, 32, 834, bhoga, cf. enjoyment. Contentment, dhrti, 291, 41, 95. kşātkāra, pratyākta, 51, 66, 74. 91. bhogtkarana, cf. enjoyment. Discouragement, nirveda, 291. ganikā, cf. courtesan. Bhoja, 551. Correct perception, 37, 371. Counterfeit, vikārana, 48. Disguet, jugupsa, 291, 91. garva, cf. Arrogance. Bhoktr, cf. enjoying subject. Dissimulation, avahittā, 291. Gay Stylo, kaitikt, 83€. bhränti, ef. mistake. Courtesan, ganikā, 82.

Bhuvanabhyudaya, 32". Critic, philosopher, oyåkhyatr, tatt- Distraction, moha, 291. Generality, genoralisation, generalize, vacintaka, 39, 39". Distress, udvega, 341. sädhäranya, sādhārantbhāva, etc., bibhatsa, ef. Odious Rasa. Cruelty, ugrata, 291. Drama, nāļya, nature of, 106 f. XX ff., 444, 46, 50, 511, 53, 53 . brahman, experienca of, XXIII, 55', dainya, cf. Depression. Dreaming, supta, 291. 574, 664, 671, 68, 68°, 71, 75°, 56,561. 76, 82, 824, 84", 851, 105*, 1081, Buddhisto, 76ª. dâkşiņātyā, 841. druti, cf. fluidity. Dance, nartana, nrita, nature of, 81, doşa, cf. Defects. 111.

cakra, 68". 814. Doubt, samsaya, 37. Gentle Smile, smita, 33'. camatkāra, 551, 664, 68°, 72, 72°, Dandin, XX. 32, 321. dvigüldha, 814. Genus, logical generality, sāmānya, 73, 74, 744, 77, 871, 98, 107, 113. 44, 446. cāpala, cf. Inconstancy. Death, marana, 291, 341. ekaghana, °-tă, cf. dense, density. Gesticular Representation, angikabhi- . Causal Efficiency, arthakriya, 36, 36', Defects, doşa, 54, 541. Ego, aham, XXV'; es passim. Deliberation, tarka, 291. Eloquent Style, bharatt, 834. 1111. Delight, rati 291, 32, 34, 35, 36, 40, Enjoying subject bhoktr, 851. naya, 35, 35ª. goyapada, 814. Couse and effect, law of, XXII. 41, 421, 48, 75, 85, 87", 90, 91, 94, Enjoyment, power of gencrating, bho- ghārni, cf. vibration. Change of Colour, vaivarnya, 291. 95, 98*, 99, 104, 105". gtkarana, 53, 57, 59, 591, 60. denotation, power of, abhidha, XXVI, Enjoyment, bhoga, 54, 56, 58, 74, 77, glåni, cf. Weakness. Change of Voice, vaisvarya, 291. Grandiose Style, söttvatl, 834. Characteristic sign, linga, 32. 53, 53*, 591. 108. guna, ef. constituent element.

[116] [117]

GENERAL INDEX GENERAL INDEX

guna, cf. Qualitics. Intention, power of, tatparyafakti, Laughing, vihasita, 33". Mental perception, mānasapratyakıa, gunakiriana, cf. Enumeration, etc. 59' Laughter, hasa, 291, 90, 91. 38 ° Hara, 66, 66". interiections, exclamations, vagvilő- Laughter, upahasita, 33'. Mental stupor, moha, 53, 53', 79. Harga, 36'. Mistake, viplava or samplava, bhrānti, Intoxication, mada, 291. laukika, ef. ordinary. harşa, ef. Joy. pa ... , XXVII, XXXII. laya, ef. lysis. 38. hasa, cf. Laughter. hasita, cf. Smile. Intuition, pratibha, XXVII, ff., 58, Liberation, spiritnnl freedom, mokga, Mistaken perception or cognition, 36, 85 1 36', 37, 37*, 42, 421, 43, 64. hastalāghava, cf. sleight of hand. 64, 65 1b, 75. Involuntary States, sattvabhāva, 291. Mobility, caftcalya, 90. hasya, cf. Comic Rasa. Isvara, XXV', 68" Light, self-luminosity, prakafa, 55,

Heart, hrdaya, 741, 84*, 87', 107. 551, 87. moha, cf. mental stupor. jadata, cf. Stupor. moha, ef. Distraction. Heroic Rasa, vlra, 291, 83*, 90, 91. Itla, ef. play. mokşa, cf. liberation. Heroism, utsaha, 291, 34, 51", 86, 91, Jagennātha, 72° Joy, harşa, 291. linga, ef. logical reason, characteristic sign. muni, 92. 94, 95. Local Styles, pravrtti, 84. Musical tempi, tala, 47. Holy writings, agama, 83. jugupsā, cf. Diegust. Junctures, samdhi, 47, 471. Horrific Style, arabhatt, 83 4. kaisikt, ef. Gay Style. Logical reason, characteristic sign, Mystical experience, 1004.

Horripilation, romaflca, 291. kakşyā, cf. zones. linga, 32. nandt, cf. benediction.

hrdaya, cf. heart and comsent of the kaku, cf. voice's intonation. Logicians, tarkika, 75. nartana, cf. dance.

heart. Kalkaņa, 32', 50'. lokadharmt, cf. Realistic Represento- nāțaka, 78, 791. tion. aāțya, cf. drama. Hrdayadarpana, 501, 571. Kālidāsa, 74, 74°. Longing, abhilāga, 34'. nåtyadharmi, cf. theatrical conventions. iccha, cf. will. Kalkaņa, 741 Love, kāma, 33, 85, 85°, 86. thâm ga, 791. nidra, cf. Sleeping. Illusion, bhrānti, 76", cf. mistake. kāma, cf. love. Lysis, laya, 551e, 77. Naşya Sāstra, XIX; et passim.

Kant, XXXII. mada, cf. Intoxication. nirveda, cf. Discouragement. Imagination, samkalpa, 74. Kapila, 90. Magic, indrajāla, 76 . nirvesa, cf. immersion. Imitation, anukāra, anukaraņa, 34, Mahabharata, 112'. nirvrti, ef. solution. 39, 40, 46, 471, 76, 76', 791. karuna, cf. Pathetic Rasa. Kashmir, 301, 32", 38", 501. 551c, Mahimabbatta, 561. 651, 741. niyoga, cf. order. Immediate perception, anubhava, p. 38. Mammața, 511. Kāvyakautukavivarana, XXIX 1, 38 . Non ordinary, non practical [aesthe- Immersion, avesa, 74. Man of elevated nature, uttamaprakrti tie, religious, ete.], alaukika, passim. Immersion, nirvesa, 77. kāpyārtha, cf. Essence of poetry. 45. Nyāyasütra, 311. Impatience, autsukya, 291. krodha, cf. Anger ._ månasapratyakąa, cf. mental percep- Obstacle, vighna, XXII, XXXI, 51 1c, Inconstancy, capala, 291. krtrima, cf. artificial tion. 5511, 67, 68, 68", 71 , 77, 77 1, 78, Indifference, täļasthya, mädhyasthya, Kşemarāja, 301, 501. mandapa, cf. pavilion. 79, 80, 814, 82, 84', 87', 87, 90, 511, 52, 79, 791, 99". Kumārila, 501. Mandara, 73. 102 1 Indignation, amaras, 291, 34. Manifeat, vyaj, abhivyaj, 48, 50, 52, Odious Rasa, btbhatsa, 291, 834, 91. Individuality, svalaksanya, 110, 111 1. Lack of attention, anavadhand, 771. Lack of evidence, asphujatva, 77. 591, 62, 62ª. Order, niyoga, 64, 641. Indolence, alasya, 291, 92. Lack of preeminence, apradhanata, mantra, XXXII. Ordinary, practical, laukika, passim. indrajala, cf. magic. 78. marana, cf. Death. Ornaments, alamkára, 32, 54, 541, 111. Inoffabie, anirvacya, cognition, 76. Lack of verisimilitude, sambhāvana- Marvellous Rosa, adbhuta, 291, 91. Pain, duğkha, XXIV, 90. Inference, reasoning, cnumana, 42, viraha, 77. mati, cf. Assurance. Painted horse, principle of, 37. 421, 58. lakşanauyapåra, cf. connotation. māyā, 53", 68". Painting, 37, 48, 48'. Insanity, unmāda, 291, 341. Lakşmi, 73. Memory, smrti, 52, 75 pănci, 841. Instrumental music, atodya, 82. lasya, ef. women's dance. Mental cognition, manasādhyavasāya, Paralysis, stambha, 291. Intelligence, cit, 551. Latent impression, etc., tasana, sam- 74. pdramārthika, cf. real. Intensification, intensified, upacaya, skāra, 31, 311, 651, 71 °, 87 *, 100', upacita, 31, 33°, 76. 107, 113. Mental movement, cittavrtti, passim. Mental state, bhava, passim. Parameivara, XXV. para vāk, supreme vocality, XXX1.

[ 118] [ 119 ]

CENERAL INDEX GENERAL INDEX

Particularity. determination, etc., vi- rangapitha, cf. stage. Sorrow, foka, 291, 34, 35, 361, 45.

deşa, 67. 671, 1111. Raso, XIX ff., 29, 29', 30, 30'. 31, sa mbhavanaviraha, cf. lack of verisi-

Potanjali, 92. militude. 46, 84°. 91, 95, 105°.

Pathetic Rasa, karuna, 29', 50, 91'. 31°, 32, 321, 33, 331,2, 34, 37', samdhi, ef. Junctures. Spanda, cf. vibration.

Pavilion, mandapa, 80. 39, 47, 48, 49, 49", 50, 52, 521, 52" samkalpa, cf. imagination. Spandakārikā, 301, 32°.

Permanent Mental States, sthayibhava, 53, 53*, 54, 56 1, 57 . 58, 581. 591, 60, 61, 62, 63, 651. 671. Sümkhya, 49, 49, 54'. Spandanirnaya, Bhatta Lollata quo-

68, 68', 76', 77, 82, 834, 84*, 85'. saikramona, cf. transfer. ted in, 30'; Bhotta Nayaka quo-

291, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 40, 87, 87°, 89, 90, 911. 93, 94, 95 *. samplova, cf. mistake. ted in, 501.

44, 45, 47, 49, 49', 671, 75, 75", 85, 851, 86, 90-92, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97. Sampling, asādana, 61, 77, 108.

Play, Itla, 471, 48. 96, 97, 97*, 98, 981,2,3, 99, 100€. sphota, 52°.

Poctic language, XXV f. 102, 1031, 111, 113. samsāra, XXI f., 71°, 84", 112. sphurattå, cf. vibration. frama, cf. Weariness. rasadhoani, XXVI, 591. somiaya, cf. doubt.

Poetic word, its difference from the rasand, cf. Tasting. samskara, ef. latent impression. frigara, cf. Erotic Rosa. samvit, ef. consciousness. áruti, cf. revealed word.

prose word, XXVI, 591. rasâyana, 92. Stage, rangapitha, 80. Possessed of henrt, sahrdaya, 82. sånandasamādhi, 55 1. rati, cf. Delight. pracchedaka, 814 Ratnāvali, 36 *. fanka, cf. Apprehension.

Practical life, vyavahara, 39", Śsńkaravarman, 301, 501. sthairya, cf. Firmness. stambha, cf. Paralysis. raudra, cf. Furious Rasa sthayibhava, cf. Permanent Mental

prahasana, 79, 791. Ravaņa, 112. Śakuka, VI, 301, 32, 32*, 35", 367, States.

prajna, XXXI. Raving, vilapa, 341. 374, 38, 38*, 39, 391, 43, 44, 44", sthitapāțhya, 81 4. prakarana, 79 1. Real, påramārthika, passim. 45, 761, 97.

Realistic, Representation, lokadharml. fanta, ef. Quietistic Rasa. Stupor, jadatd, 291, 341. prakrti, 491. pralaya, cf. Fainting. sattva, 54, 54*, 55, 61. Styles of Procedure, ortti, 83, 834. 84 Pramānavārtika by Dharmakirti, 36', Reality, tattva, 76". sattvabhava, cf. Involuntary States. Sudden apparition, tatkālikanirmāna, sattvati, ef. Grandiose Style. 76°.

39 *. Recollection, anusmrti, 341. Super-imposition, aropa, 39 1, 76, 76", prastăvana, cf. presentation, 80, 801. Recollection smrti, 291. pattvikābhinaya, 35'.

pratibha, cf. Intuition. Re-perception, anuvyavasaya, 471, 74', saundarya, cf. beanty. supta, cf. Drenming.

851, 106 f. Scorpions, two keinds of, 42, 42 1. svalakpana, cf. thing in so. pratikrti, cf. copy. Pratyabhijnd, 72'. Self, dtman, XXV", 68; et passim. svålakqanya, cf. individuality.

Preliminaries, pürvarariga, 80, 80' Representation, abhinaya, 35, 35', 54, 83, 84, 84°, 112. Serenity, sama, 291, 85°, 86, 91. sveda, cf. Swenting.

Presentation. prologue, prastāvanå, Rest, resting, vifranti, 54, 551c, 77. seod, cf. Affection. Sweating, sveda, 291.

801. Re-telling, anukirtana, 47', 108'. Shoms, ortdå, 291. tāla, ef. masical tempi.

Proft, artha, 85°, 86. Revelation, power of, bhavana, 5 Sickness, vyadhi, 291.

Propnlsion, bhärand, 64, 641. siddhiman, 57". lamah, 53", 54, 54". tarka, ef. Deliberation. 53°. Parposes of man, artha, 92. Revealed word, fruti, 58. Similitude, sādrsya, 37, 76°. Tasting, dsvāda, rasana, 56, 58, 58'.

Right Action, dharma, 85, 86. Sith, 37°, 44, 50, 50 3.4. 591, 61, 62, 664, 701, 72", 75, 76". parvarańga, cf. preliminarics. Siva, XXV'. XXXI, 68', 81 4. 77. 84*, 851, 87, 87', 88, 96, 97. puşpazandikā, 81, 81 4, romåflca, ef. Horripilation. 99, 100°. 102, 103, 104, 108, 112. Qualified person, adhikārin, 63, 64. Ruyyaka, 72ª. Sicadrii, 741.

Qualitics, guna, 54, 541, 111. sådhåranya, cf. generality. Sleeping, nidrā, 291.

sādrsya, cf. similitude. Sleight of hand, hastalāghava, 76'. tätasthya, ef. indifference.

Quietistic Rasa, fanto, 29'. tātparya; cf. intention. tattoa, cf. reality.

rajah, 54, 54°, 90. Rajasekhara, XXX'. sahrdaya, cf. possessed of heart. Smile, hasita, avahasita, 33ª. Teaching, upadesa, 791.

Rima, 32, 34, 37, 40, 43, 44, 45, 46, saindhaca, 814. smita, ef. Gen tle Smile. amrti, cf. memory.

50*, 51, 52, 78, 786, 81°, 1041, dama, ef. Serenity. Telepathy, paracittajnånam, 1001. smrti, cf. Recollection. Terrible Rasn, bhayānaka, 291, 68, 911.

107, 110. samagri, ef. combination. foka, cf. Sorrow. Theatrical convention, natyadharml,

Rimiyapa, 110, 112'. sāmānya, cf. genus. Solation, nirorti, 55 le. 80, 82ª. samavakāra, 791. Somanonda, 741. Thing in se, svalakana, XXXI, 391.

[120] [121]

GENERAL INDEX

Thought, vimaria, XXV*, 68'. vighna, cf. obstacles. Time, space, etc., XXI, 67, 67'. 70, vijnlānavādin, 68., 76 4, 77. 71, 75*, 80, 804, 811. vihasita, cf. Laughing. Transfer, samkraman, 63. Vibration, sphurattā, ghārni, 741. Transitory Mental States, vyabhica- vikara, ef. counterfeit. ribhäva, 29, 291, 30, 31, 34, 35, 49, 491, 92-94. vikāsa, cf. expansion. vilapa, cl. Raving. ADDENDA tråsa, cf. Fright. viparivrt, 68, 681. trigūdha, 81 *. viplava, cf. mistake. Trembling, vepathu, 291. vira, cf. Heroic Rasa. Udayana, 36. vişāda, ef. Despair. P. 19, line 21. Should one read alokao- or alaukikadharmt (- natyadharmi) for udvega, cf. Distress. visarga, XXX4. lokadharmt? In this case tho translation (cf. p. 84) would be "Thes- ugrată, ef. Cruelty. visega, cf. particularity trical Conventions " and not " Realistic Representation". uktapratyukta, 814. vismaya, cf. Astonishment. P. 32. The word antsamdhana is commented upon by Prabhikara, Rasapradtpa. ullukasana, vibration of joy, 73; its Viępu, 73. Benarea 1925, p. 23: anusaidhānam ca kavivivakşitasyārthasya vāsanāpā- definition by A.G., 731. viśranti, cf. rest. favavafat sakrod iva karapam | In my opinion, the best tranalation of Umã, 66, 66". vistara, cf. dilatation. this term is therefore " visualization". unmāda, ef. Insanity. Visunlized, 34, 35, 44; cf. visunlization. P. 34. In thie passage, Firmness and Affection are considered as Transitory upacaya, upacita, cf. intensification. Visualization, anusamdhāna, 32, 44. Mental Movements. They, however, are not in the traditional list of vya- upadefa, cf. teaching. Viśvanātha, 551, 72', 95. bhicaribhava (cf. p. 29). upahasita, cf. Laughter. oithi, 791. upamiti, etc., cf. analogy. Voice's intonation, kaku, XXXII, 46. Uproarious Laughter, apahasita, 33'. erīda, cf. Shame. Utpaladeva, 744, 87". orlti, ef. Styles of Procedure. utprekşā, cf. comparison. vyabhicarin, o-bhava, ef. Transitory utsaha, cf. Heroiem. Mental States. utarıtikārka, 791. vyadhi, cf. Sickness, Fever. uttamaprakrti, cf. man of clevated eyäkhyåtr, tattvacintaka, cf. critic. nature. Vyaktiviveka by Mahimabhatta, 36'. uttamottamaka, 81 4. vyañjanavyāpâra, cf. evocation. vaisvarya, cf. Change of Voice. eyapti, ef. concomitance. vaivarnya, ef. Change of Colour. eyavahara, cf. practical life. vasand, cf. latent impression. Vasugupta, 301. vyāyoga, 791.

Vātsyāyana, 83. Weakness, glani, 291, 92. 93. Weariness. frama, 291, 92. vepathu, cf. Trembling. Weeping, afru, 291. Verbal Representation, vācikābhinaya, Will, iccha, 7414. 35, 35*, 45. Women, 87 ff. vibhava, cf. Determinantes. vibhavanā, 95. Women's dance, lasyo, 47. 814.

vibodha, ef. Awakening. yogins, 561, 591, 100.

Vibration, inner movement, spanda, Yoga, 54'.

651, 741. Yogasütra, 311.

vidhi, cf. command. Yogavasiştha, 72'. Zones, kakąyā, 80.

[ 122 ]

CORRIGENDA

A revision of the book has anfortanately brought some mispriats, eto to light. I bave preferred not to leave them nnnoticed, but to register ail that are of any consequence.

P. XXII, line 12, read: interferences P. xxv, line 24, read: Raghavan, The Number of Rasas, Adyar 1940, p. 104 P. xxx, line 1, read: consciousness P. xxxI, line 28, read: vifintam and rupam. Line 31, read: "fabda" P. xxxII, line 8, read: to P. XXXII, line 16, read: interests P. 5, line 26, read: rakyena P. 8, line 25, read: Orlumānam P. 14, lines 11, 12, read: opratisthapito° and "pratiethao P. 17, line 33, read: H.C .; G, D: prahasanad eva | P. 20, line 14, rend: epäm P. 21, line 27, read: 'sakta[taya) P. 22, laet line, read: "dharmanam P. 23, line 29, read: p. 11, n. 1 (for note 102) P. 25, last line, read: bhūpanam P. 30, line 7, rend: sthayibhava P. 33, lines 2, 15, 16, rend: Rasas P. 39, line 33, read: of it P. 48, line 6, read: ch. I P. 53, line 16, read: Rmogāraka P. 58, line 30, rend: pp. XXVII ff .; P. 59, last line, read: artha° and syat Pp. 60, 61, 65, read: sentence (for phrase) P. 68, line 3, read: that P. 71, line 12, rend: non reality P. 71, line 30, read: instincts P. 72, line 3 and line last but one, read: Yogavasistha. Line 21, read: samrambhe P. 12, line 39, read: might P. 76, add in reference to line 4: Perhaps we must translate: " Nor does it consict of a super-imposition of the foregoing forms of cognition". In other words, acsthetic experience does not consist of an ineffable thing in se (svalaksana), on which one super-imposes arbitrarily the concepts of mistake, reality, similitude, etc. P. 76, line 18, read: asadhdranataya P. 79, line 25, read: obhave P. 80, line 36, after Ind. Th., add: pp. 127 ff. P. 80, rend: stanza (for strophe)

P. 81. line 9, read: puşpngandikå P. 81, line 17. read: non reality P. 86, read: Heroism (for Energy) P. 87, line 4, read: tasra. Line 18: read nåntartyakatrena P. 98, line 25, read: opruio and fabdao P. 106, line 18: reference to note S suppressed P. 109. line 17, read: paromarthikom r. 110. line 10, read: "samarpitom

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