1. An Analytical Study of Yoga Philosophy Gopinath Bhatacharya

An Analytical Study of Yoga-Philosophy

M. M. Dr. Gopinath Kaviraj Memorial Lectures, 1983.

GOPINATH BHATTACHARYA

ADVANC MENY OF LEARN

UNIVERSITY OF CALCUTTA

IO Jbu12 First Published, 1985 vdgoaofid I-sgoY

CONTENTS

The Ontological Postulates ... 1

Analysis of Psychical states-normal and super-normal 17

Ethical discipline for Yoga-aspirants 25

Claims to Super-normal Powers 30

AY Price : Rs. 5.00 HTAMITOD

Published by Dr. S. K. Mukherjee, Deputy Registrar ( E & T), Calcutta University and printed by M. K. Mukerjee at Temple Press, 2, Nayaratna Lane, Calcutta-700004.

AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF YOGA PHILOSOPHY

Lectures I & II

The Ontological postulates

Mr. Chairman and other friends present, I feel that I should at the outset pay my introductory homage to Isiaon-iequa bns lemton-a nta tnoiroy to aleylan/ the memory of MM. Dr. Gopinath Kaviraja of Benaras, the great savant in whose honour these lectures have been founded by the University of Calcutta. He was born in 1887 of Brahmana parents at Dhamrai in the Dacca district of East Bengal. He lost his parents in his infancy and was brought up under the care of a relative at Kanthalia in the same district. He passed the Entrance Examina- tion of Calcutta University in 1905 ; but because of his frail health he had to leave Bengal and migrate to Jaypur in distant Rajputana. After graduating from the Maharaja's College at Jaypur in 1910, he came over to Benaras and passed his M. A. Examination in Sanskrit in 1913 from Queen's College under Allahabad University. On completing his formal education, he settled at Benaras on the advice of Arthur Venis who was then the Principal of Government Sanskrit College, Benaras, called Queen's College, and continued his higher studies under the guidance of that distinguished lover of Indian culture. He started his official life in 1914 as the Asstt. Librarian of Saraswati Bhavan, the renowned library of the Benaras Sanskrit College and became its Librarian on the retirement of MM. Vindesvariprasad Dwivedi. He was appointed Principal of the College after the retirement of MM. Ganganath Jha in 1924. He did not however serve the full term of his post and retired prematurely in 1937 inspite of loving pressure from all quarters not to relinquish his post. When the Queen's College became the Varanasi Sanskrit University he was invited by the Government to become its first Vice-Chancellor, but he declined.

At Varanasi he came under the influence of the great scholar-san- speech and learned discourse. The term 'darśana' means in addition

yasi Sivaramakinkara-Yogatrayananda. He got his spiritual initiation to this analysis, sometimes at least as in the present case, a descrip-

from the famous Visuddhananda Swami of Varanasi in 1918. He tion of certain spiritual or psychical practices known as 'Sādhana'.

carried on with rare devotion his sādhanã alongwith his studies in The present lectures will be concerned more with the analysis of

Indian culture till almost the end of his long life. He was a voracious concepts and principles than with a description of some psychic

reader and a prodigious writer in Sanskrit, Bengali, Hindi and Eng- practices.

lish. He inspired and guided innumerable researchers in different branches of Indology and was a living encyclopaedia in matters (2)

relating to Indian culture and specially to Indian sādhanā and The term 'Yoga' as will appear from any Sanskrit Lexicon has

sädhakas. He was not merely a great savant ; he was also a great been used to signify many different things. Not merely that. There

sädhaka and a great man. He lived in his own house at Varanasi, but are really two terms under the garb of the one term 'Yoga'. One of

when he was in failing health during the last years of his life, he was them is derived from the verbal root 'Yuj' (belonging to the Divādi-

persuaded by the great 'Ma Ānandamayi' to come over permanently gana) and the other is derived from the root 'Yujir' (belonging to the

to her äśrama on the Ganga at Varanasi. He lived a simple and aus- Rudhādi-gaņa). According to Pāņini's 'Dhātupātha', the first one

tere life for about ninety years during which time he was afflicted with means 'Samādhi', while the second stands for 'samyoga'. In the

serious physical maladies and suffered heart-breaking family-bereave- expression 'Yoga-darśana', the term 'Yoga' has been used in the sense

ments. He bore them all with unruffled fortitude and passed away at of 'samädhi', but it has not been employed in that sense when 17 out

Varanasi in the year 1976. of the 18 cantos of Bhagavad-gītä have been traditionally described

evij as a kind of 'Yoga'. The very first canto, for instance, has been (1) called 'Arjuna-vișāda-yoga'. But surely, Arjuna's mental despon-

I now pass on to explain the title of the present series of lectures. dency cannot be intelligibly described as a case of 'Yoga' in the sense

As has been announced, I propose to undertake here an analytical of 'samädhi'. The same remark applies to some other cantos of

study of Yoga-philosophy. It may please be noted that these lectures Gītä; e. g. Canto 14 called 'Gunatrayavibhāga-yoga', Canto 16

will embody the results of a 'study' ; and though the subject easily lends called 'Deväsura-sampad-vibhāga-yoga', and Canto 17 called 'Śrad-

itself to pulpit oratory, I have neither the ability nor the inclination dhātraya-vibhāga-yoga'

to do anything of the kind. I have in fact tried to eschew all rhetoric and exhortation, and have attempted only an understanding of a most (3)

respected school of Indian philosophy. The understanding that I have Taking the term 'yoga' in the sense of 'samādhi', it is to be

aimed at is, again, not prompted by any emotional approach to the remarked that there are at least four schools of 'yoga' recognised in

subject but by a cold intellectual attitude. I have tried to give an ana- the Indian tradition : 'mantra-yoga', 'laya-yoga', 'hatha-yoga' and

lysis and examination of the basic concepts and principles that have 'rāja-yoga'. These schools have been traditionally associated with

functioned in the structure of Yoga-philosophy. bris the names of certain great rsi's and yogin's, the first with Bhrgu,

ogo It is to be noted that 'Yoga-philosophy' is not exactly the same igallo Kaśyapa, Marīch etc ; the second with Veda-Vyāsa and others; the

thing as 'Yoga-darśana'. The Sanskrit word 'darśana' does not stand third with Mārkandeya, Goraksanāth etc. the fourth with Dattātreya, for quite the same thing as the English term 'philosophy'. The Patañjali and others. This classification is however a classification

latter has now come to mean primarily, among other things, an ana- of 'yoga' as 'sādhana'. It is not known whether the first three of lysis of certain basic concepts and principles operative in common these schools have their distinctive philosophies represented in any

danit ari omoood of 2 3

systematic treatises. The last school, however, has a specific philo- Patañjali the author of the 'Yoga-sūtra' was however a confirmed sophy represented mainly by the 'Yoga-sūtra's of Patañjali, the 'Yoga- pluralist, and his most distinguished commentator Vyāsa did not Bhāsyam' by Vyāsa, sub-commentaries thereon, the 'Tattva-vaiśāradī deviate from that pluralism. Patañjali, it may be noted, is mentioned by Vācaspati-miśra' and 'Yoga-vārtika' by Vijñāna-bhikșu, the 'Vrtti' in the Sāmkhya Classic 'Yukti-dīpikā' as a prominent thinker of the on the sūtra's by Bhoja-deva. In these treatises we have a definite Sāmkhya school ; and it must not be forgotten that his sūtra's have Ontology, a definite Theory of knowledge and a definite. Code of been described as 'Sämkhya-pravacana'. How can a prominent thinker morals for yoga-aspirants. This school has been traditionally recog- of the Sämkhya school be anything but a pluralist in Ontology ? nised as 'Pātañjala-darśana' or 'Yoga-darśana' comprising 195 sūtra's It is to be noted also that Bādarāyana, the great systemiser of in four sections. Vedānta regards the Yoga-school of philosophy as cognate to the 'Yoga' as psychic practice has in vogue another classification Sāmkhya school of Kapila in so far as both these schools advocate under three heads-'Karma-yoga', 'Bhakti-yoga' and 'Jñāna-yoga'. the 'Svātantrya' or autonomy of Cosmic Processes. It is only this This classification has some connection with the division of the 18 traditional Pātañjala Philosophy that will be the subject-matter of cantos of Bhagavad-gītā under the triad-'Karma-șatka', 'Upāsanā- the present course of lectures. şatka' and 'Jñāna-şatka' popularised by Nīlakaņțha and Madhusū- dana-Saraswati in their commentaries on Gītā. This type of classi- fication is not to be found however in the earlier commentaries like ( 4)

the one by Ācārya Šamkara or by Śrīdhara-Swāmī. The first thing that strikes one about Patañjali's Yoga-philosophy It is to be clarified here that though the four 'sadhana' schools is the extra-frequent employment of the term 'Citta' and its compounds

have 'samādhi' for their major objective, the purpose of that 'samādhi' like 'Citta-bhūmi', 'Citta-vrtti', 'Citta-mala', 'Citta-vikșepa'; 'Citta-

is not the same for all the schools. In Mantra-yoga, and Laya-yoga, parikarma', 'Çittā-ikāgratā', 'Citta-laya', 'Citta-nirodha' and so on.

'samādhi' has for its ultimate goal, the realisation of the identity But, unfortunately, there is hardly any compact analysis of the basic

of the finite with the supreme spirit; in Hatha-yoga, except concept 'Citta' either in the sütra's or in the Bhäsyam. It has been

when it is regarded as an 'adhirohani' or stepping-stone customary to take the term 'mind' as its western equivalent. This

to Rāja-yoga, the objective is the attainment of some super-normal term is however used in a wide variety of senses. Commonly,

powers ; in Rāja-yoga, the goal is the realisation of the 'Svarūpa' it is distinguished from body and like the latter, it is spoken of as

or the true nature of Purusa or the finite spirit as pure something that can have 'states', 'changes' 'qualities', 'activities' and

consciousness and its utter dissociation from the notself or so on. It is sometimes taken to be the subject of consciousness,

prakrti. This difference in the ultimate objective of the four 'sādha- sometimes again as consciousness itself. We speak also of the

na' schools is not however anything of an anomaly. It is related to 'concentration' or 'distraction' of mind. If these usages are taken to

their ontological commitments The sponsors and practitioners of be an index of what a 'mind' is commonly believed to be like, we

Mantra-yoga and Laya-yoga were believers in the Upanisadic 'Advai- have to say that it is a kind of 'substance' in the sense of a

ta-väda' as was to be later developed analytically with superb logical substratum of attributes'. The sponsors of Physicalism or Behavi-

rigour by Ācarya Samkara in his commentaries specially on the ourism would indeed discount the reality of any such entity. But

major Upanişads, the Brahmasūtra and Bhagavad-gītā. In contrast then it must not be forgotten that none of these two ism's is either

to that, the sponsors of Hatha-yoga were, generally speaking, onto- self-evident or again something that stands for any demonstrated logical pluralists. Again, some of the sponsors of Rāja-yoga, truths; they are at best nothing but unproved postulates accepted Dattätreya for instance, were Vedāntists of the pure Advaita type. in some ways of thinking. There is no bar then to taking this

5 D.

Wynana latter is represented by the state of indifference. About affective experi- Citta' also to be one of the postulates of Patañjali's way of ence, however, there are two views. According to one view, it is the thinking. awareness either of pleasure (sukha) or of pain (duhkha); according In this school we find certain commitments about the world or to the other view, it is the awareness either of pleasure or of pain or about the experience of that world. The former is described as 'drśya' of 'stupor' (moha)-'moha' being taken to be a state neither of plea- and the latter as 'bhoga'. I have called these commitments 'postulates' sure nor of pain, nor again of indifference. This latter view is peculiar and since these postulates concern 'Ontos' or reality, they have been only to the Sämkhya and the Yoga schools of philosophy, and its described here as 'Ontological postulates'. By a 'postulate' is meant significance will come out in connection with the analysis of this Yoga here an assumption or a statement which is not proved to be concept of 'guna'. against fact and which may therefore be taken to be true as long To begin now with the analysis of the nature of the entities postu- as it is not proved to be false on examination. lated under (A). It comprises four entities-draștā, purușa, Iśvara and The 'bhoga' or experience just mentioned is possible, according citta. According to Patañjali, the 'drașțā' is a 'purușa', but the 'purușa' to the Yoga-school, with a 'bhoktā', a 'bhoga-karaņa', a 'bhogāya- is not necessarily a 'draștā'. It is known as 'drasțā' only when it seems tana' and a 'bhogya'. 'Bhoga' or experience is either affective or to enter into a relation of identity with 'Citta'. 'Purușa' is said to be non-affective. Affective experience is again of three kinds, accord- pure consciousness (Citimātra-rūpa : Bhāyșam on Y. S. 3/35). This ing as it is of pleasure or of pain or of stupor ; non-affective pure consciousness appears to be identified with a non-conscious experience is of a state of indifference. The 'bhoktā' is the experi- entity called 'Citta'. These potulations are far removed from our encing subject ; the 'bhoga-karana' is what serves as a means or an ordinary notions and require to be analysed and examined before aid to a 'bhoktā' in having its experience ; the 'bhogāyatana' is the they can be accepted as truths We now proceed to that analysis and body where 'bhoga' is referred or localised ; the 'bhogya' is what examination. is experienced. To accept as real the world and its experience is A. (i) Drastā: The term ordinarily stands for an experiencing thus to accept the reality of the experiencing subject, of the means subject. An experiencee, we commonly believe, is owned by somebody to the experience, of the body where the experience is referred that is called the 'subject' of that experience. This subject is called or localised and of the thing that is experienced. It will be seen a 'bhoktā', if the experience is of the affective kind. It is commonly that in each of these acceptances certain postulates are involved. known as self or soul. In the Patañjala-school as also in the other The more important of these postulates may best be discussed by 'āstika' schools of Indian Philosophy it is taken to be a real entity. placing them under the following groups : It is not however taken to be so by the Cārvāka and Bauddha thinkers A. Purușa, Drașțā, Iśvara, Citta; who may be imagined to be the intellectual ancestors of European B. Citta-vrtti, Citta-mala, Citta-vikșepa, Citta-parikarma ; positivists of the last four hundred years. According to them, C. Citta-laya, Samādhi, Viveka-khyāti, Kaivalya; though the reality of experience cannot be repudiated, it is not neces- D. Parināma, Prakrti-Vikrti, Guņa, Pradhāna. sary to postulate any owner of that experience. All that we know with certainty is that some experience occurs, and if we speak of an (5) experience as mine or yours, it is to be taken at best to be just an It is to be noted that though there is virtually no disagreement incorrigible linguistic habit. The postulation of an owner of experience among thinkers about the reality of 'bhoga' or experience, there is a can be dispensed with for two reasons : first, it is not given in any difference of opinion about the ultimate types of that experience. It experience ; in the second place, there is no phenomenon that cannot is agreed that our experience is either affective or non-affective. The 7 6

either be described or explained without the postulation of an owner non-transitory entity is the 'subject' of a conscious state. It comes of an experience. to this then that an unchanging or abiding entity (anvayidharmi) cannot but be postulated to make intelligible the phenomenon of (6) recollection. The phenomenon of 'recognition' is not possible without It must be emphasised however, as Vyāsa has done, that an experi- recollection. It also cannot accordingly be made intelligible without enced phenomenon like recollection or recognition cannot be made the postulation of some owner or subject of the recognitive awareness. intelligible without the postulation of an unchanging or abiding This may be conceded by the positivist. But he may urge that to subject of such experience. To quote his words 'For him who admits prove the reality of an unchanging principle persisting alongwith a only mental states without any persisting entity, there cannot be any stream of transient conscious states is surely not to prove that such a 'recollection', since one cannot recollect what another has experienced. principle has the ownership of the states. How to establish this Again, from the fact of 'recognition' of an object, the reality of an ownership ? It may be said in reply that whenever a particular cons- abiding èntity stands firmly established" ('Yasya tu dharma-mātram cious state occurs, it is referred to some one particular entity and it ėva idam niranvayam tasya ... Smrtyabhāvah ... nānyadrstasya smara- is never at the same time referred to any other entity. In other words, nam anyasya asti' etc. Vastupratyabhijnānāt ca sthita anvayi in our experience there always appears an exclusive referential relation dharmi yo dharmanyathātvam abhyupagatah pratyabhi jñāyate'; between one item of consciousness and one referred entity. Now this Bhāsyam on Y. S. 3/14) exclusive relation is just what is meant by the term 'owning' which To elucidate, the positivist admits only the reality' of conscious obtains between a particular conscious state and a particular thing states and not of any abiding subject or owner of these states. He referred. It is precisely this particular owner that has been called a admits also the reality of the phenomenon or remembrance and 'drașțā' or the subject of a state of consciousness. And as most recognitión. Now, conscious states are admittedly transitory entities. conscious states are affective states, the 'drastā' involved in them is, They last only for a short time and then lapse into oblivion. Again, in most cases, a 'bhoktā' as well. It is not however a 'Bhoktā' when a conscious state like the recollection of x is admittedly dependent on the conscious state in question is a non-affective one like 'indifference' some previous transitory awareness of x. It is not again a fact that or 'mādhyasthya'. It is then a 'drastā' pure and simple. It is to be the remembrance of x always occurs immediately after the previous added that the owner-subject of a memory consciousness of x must be identical with the owner-subject of the previous awareness of x. awareness of x, so that the former might be taken to be an effect of the latter phenomenon. It may occur long after the previous occur- Not to admit this would be to admit that one may recollect what rence. How then does the recollection crop up and from where ? another person has experienced. This however is never a fact of our The positivist under reference does not surely say that it is not an experience. The 'drastā' then cannot be set aside on the score of emergent thing. To explain this fact of emergence, he has to invoke logical economy, but is to be admitted as something real in the same the help of a thing like psychic 'trace' or 'samskāra' which is a non- sense as 'drśi' or consciousness itself. conscious item of reality. This 'race' is the residual effect of the (7) previous experience, and it has to be admitted as persisting from the moment of its origination till the moment of its functioning in recol- What now is the real nature of this 'drasta' ? According to lection. It is thus not as transitory as the awarèness that produces Patañjali it is 'drśimātra' or nothing but consciousness it is 'Śuddha' it.' This 'trace' exists either in a fleeting state of awareness or in some or pure ; it is 'pratyayānupaśya' or the detached spectator of abiding entity. As itself abiding, it cannot exist in anything non- things through the medium of buddhi' or 'Citta' (Drastā drsimātraḥ abiding; it must then exist in something that is not transitory. This 9 8 2

consciousness and a particular object. Is not this consciousness śuddho' pi, pratyayānupaśyaḥ-Y. S. (3/20). It is also called 'Purușa' 'pure' in the sense that it has no admixture of an object ? A similar and described by Vyāsa as 'Citimātrarūpah (Bhāșyam on Y S. 3/35). consideration will show that it has also no admixture of any subject. Drașțā in its real nature then is, according to the school, pure This consciousness is then pure ; how then can it be denied that a consciousness, that is without the admixture of anything other thing like pure consciousness is as a matter of fact given in every than itself. experience of ours ? It is to be concluded that a 'purusa' in Patañ- It may be contended, however, that such a 'purusa' in the sense jali's sense of the term is not a myth but is as real at least as a state of 'pure' c nsciousness is nothing but a myth or unreal abstraction. of consciousness. For any state of consciousness that we may speak of is always the consciousness in some subject of something. In other words, the con- (8) sciousness that we know of is always owned by a subject and has an It has been said before that 'Drastā' as 'drśi-mātra' Y. S. ( 2/20 ) object. Bereft of both these things, it is an unreal abstraction and is is given in every state of consciousness and that in this school it is never presented to us. This contention cannot however be accepted, just another name or 'Purusa' as 'citimātra' ( Vyāsa on Y. S. 3/35 ). for neither of the two parts of the last assertion can be accepted. This 'purusa' has been described by Patañjali and Vyāsa as 'drśi- It is not true that being an abstraction it cannot be anything real ; mātra', śuddha', 'pratyayānupaśya', 'sadājñātavișaya', 'apariņami' again, it is not true that a thing like pure consciousness is never and 'nitya'. To explain presented in any experience. To explain, it need not be denied that a thing like a consciousness that is without a subject or an object is an (a) 'purusa' is drsimatra. In other words, it is nothing but

abstraction ; but then it is to be remarked that a thing like a colour, consciousness.

a shape or a size by itself is no less an abstraction than pure cons- (b) 'Purusa' is Suddha or pure in the sense that it is untouched ciousness, but it is not for that reason condemned as unreal. There by any feature of the 'drśya'. 'Drśya' or the knowable comprises seems however to be no reason why one group of abstractions is to either what is possibly the subject of an awareness or its object. be given a favoured treatment than another. It may be said that the The subject is what appears to be the owner of a state of conscious- favoured abstractions under reference are given alongwith other ness, and the object is what is revealed in that state. To be free perceived entities in our day to day experience, but the so-called from the touch of 'drsya' is to be free its attributes also. If the 'pure consciousness' is never so given. It may be emphasised, how- 'abstraction' that is pure consciousness is presented in every state ever, that far from not being given in any common experience of of consciousness as bereft of a subject and an object, then it must ours, pure consciousness is given in every common experience, while necessarily be described as 'uddha'. This characteristic is then the favoured abstractions are given only in some. How pure as real as the state of consciousness in which its is presented. consciousness is given in every common experience may be shown (c) Puruşa is 'pratyayānupaśya' or the detached spectator of from a simple consideration. I have now, for instance an awareness things through the medium of 'buddhi' or Citta'. What this means of a table before me. This consciousness is surely other than the will be clear later on. For the present, it is to be noted that the table. It is of the table and it is not itself the table. Generalising, expression means in substance that in every case of awareness it may be said that the object of any state of consciousness is other of things, there is the mediation of a 'Citta-Vrtti'. than that state itself, provided only that the preposition 'of' is not (d) Purușa has been described as 'sadājñātavișaya' (Vyāsa on used in any appositional sense. It is evident that at least two Y. S. 3/20) or what always is aware of things. According to elements are present when there is a state of consciousness, to wit, 11 10

Vcaspati by 'always' (sadā) is meant here 'in a state of mind other reva buddhi pratisamveditvam-Vācaspati on Vyāsa-bhasyam on than a-samprajñāta samādhi', when there is no presentation of Y. S. 2/20). Purușa as pure consciousness appears to be the subject anything. In the Advaita view 'Purusa' can have a presentation of of a state of consciousness only when it is reflected on a Citta-vrtti. a thing in two ways ; either through a 'Vrtti' or independently of it. In other words, the knowledge that a 'purusa' has of a drśya is the In the first case, it appears to perceive as a 'bhoktā' and in the knowledge owned by the reflected 'purusa' and not by 'purușa' apart latter case it perceived as 'sākșin'. To explain, 'Purușa' or pure from the reflection. consciousness is always aware of things either as a detached (i) Lastly, since there is an infinite plurality of 'bhoktā's or spectator, or again as an involved or affected subject ; In the former affected subjects and since a 'bhoktā' always involves a 'purușa' there case, it is independent of a 'Citta-Vrtti' and in the latter case it is also an infinite multiplicity of 'purușa's. seems to depend on some 'Citta-Vrtti. The dependence, it is to be noted, is only an apparant one. Had it been a real dependence, The above nine characteristics may be taken to describe the nature then 'purusa' would not have been the changeless or abiding pure of an ordinary 'purusa' as accepted in the Yoga-school of Patañjali. consciousness as it has already been established to be. But there is also the admission of another 'Purusa' called 'Isvara's or parama-purușa. (e) From what has been said already, it is clear that Purușa as 'drśimātra' is changeless (a-pariņāmi). (9) (f) As unchanging it is 'nitya' or permanent. Two kinds of 'nitya' Patañjali's 'Iśvara' is usually taken to be what we mean by 'God'. are recognised in this school-the 'Kūtastha-nitya' and the 'pariņāmi- It is to be remarked however that 'God' in the orthodox Judaic-chris- nitya'. Purușa is 'kūțastha-nitya', and 'drśya' or the knowable is tian-Islamic tradition is endowed with certain attributes which are pariņāmi-nitya. It is to be noted that in common usage the not to be found either in the Pātañjala or in any other school of term 'nitya' stands sometimes for what has neither an origin Indian Theism. In the above-mentioned tradition 'God' is an abso- nor an end, and sometimes again for what has no destruction. In the lutely self-willed and absolutely intolerant creator and regulator of Nyāya and the 'Vaiśesika' schools, the term is found to be employed the universe of spirits and material objects. The 'Isvara' of the in either of these two senses. In the Sämkhya, the Yoga and the Pātañjala school, however, is neither a self-willed nor an intolerant Vedanta schools, however, by the term 'nitya' is meant two other being, and neither a creator nor a regulator of spirits and material things ; the 'Kūtastha' and the 'parināmi'. The former stands for objects. It is desirable therefore not to take the European term what does not suffer any change whatever and the latter for what 'God' as an equivalent of the Indian term 'Iśvara' as employed in does not lose its specific nature inspite of changes (Yasmin vihanya- the Yoga-philosophy. māne tattvam na vihanyate). The former is exemplified by 'purua' Patañjali's 'Iśvara' is a 'purușa' in the usual sense of pure consci- and the latter by 'drśya'. ousness. But he has been described as a 'purusa-viśesa' or an extra- (g) 'Purusa' is not directly revealed in any state of consciousness. ordinary 'purusa' in the sense that while an ordinary 'purusa' very A state of consciousness presupposes a 'purusa' which cannot therefore often appears to be subject to affective experience, this extra-ordinary be any object of that state. 'purușa' never even appears to be subject to any such experience. In other words, while an ordinary 'purusa' very often seems to function (h) 'Purusa' is the 'pratisamvedi' of buddhi (Vyāsa on Y.S. 2/20). as an affected 'bhoktā', 'Iśvara' never even seems to function like that. Vācaspati explains that to be 'pratisamvedi' of buddhi is to be reflected It is not however denied that 'Iśvara' functions as a knowing subject in the mirror of buddhi (buddhidarpane puruşa pratibimba-samkrānti- and as a volitional agent; he has been described in the Yoga-school

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as endowed with 'unexcelled power to know and to act' (niratiśaya- Conclusion : Knowledge is something that has a limit in an unex- jñāna-kriyā-śaktimān). But even when he knows and acts, it is, as celled state, viz., 'Omniscience'. Vācaspati explains, nothing but a seeming to know and to act. The major premise of the argument has a supporting instance in 'Īśvara' is not really involved like an ordinary 'purușa' in that know- its favour, viz., 'extensional magnitude'. Such magnitude has a grada- ing and acting. The ordinary 'purusa' and the special 'purușa' that is 'Iśvara' are alike however in so far as they both function as a tional increase expressed by the phrase 'larger and larger', and it has also its unexcelled limit constituted by the largest magnitude called knower and as an actor; but they are distinguished from one another 'vibhu' or 'parama-mahat parimāna'. This limit is exemplified in the in so far as the ordinary 'purușa' functions under the duress of extensional magnitude of the entity called 'ātman' or again of 'ākāśa' 'a-vidyā', while the extra-ordinary 'purușa' functions under no such constraint. Speaking of the knowledge and activity of 'Iśvara', or of space (dik). The generalisation that figures as the major premise Väcaspati remarks 'tad idam āhāryam asya rūpam na tātvikam'. In has no instances to the contrary and is therefore regarded as unexcep-

Patañjali's words, 'kleśa-karma-vipākāśaih aparāmrstah purușa-viśeșah tionable. The minor premise again states a matter of fact ; knowledge

'Iśvarah'. 'Iśvara' has been conceived in the Yoga-school as 'all-knowing is something that has a gradational increase expressed as 'more and

or 'sarvajña'. But he has not been described as the creator of nature, more', till we reach the limit of the increase in 'omniscience' which is far less of the 'drastā's or 'purusa's. Why then has he been postulated ipso facto unsurpassable. The conclusion of the argument 'knowledge at all ? Nothing like a causal or a teleological argument is offered in is something that has its limit in omniscience' is free from any formal support of the existence of 'Isvara'. It was however be wrong to say defects and is therefore true. The being that is endowed with such that no argument at all is preferred. Vyāsa in his commentary on knowledge is the all-knowing 'purusa' called 'Iśvara'. ("Atra pramāņa- Yoga-sūtra 1.25 appears to present an argument which has sometimes yati-'asti kāștbāprāptih sarvajña-bījasya' iti sādhyanirdeśah ; been described, not quite happily, as an argument from 'continuity'. niratiśayatvam kāsthā, yatah param atiśayavattā nāsti iti ; tena nāva- According to him there is the fact of gradation in the increase of dhimātreņa siddhasādhanam' ; 'sātiśayatvāt' iti hetuḥ : yat yat sātiśa- knowledge whether of the same 'purusa' or of different 'purusa's. An yam tat tat sarvam niratiśayam, yathā kuvalayāmalaka-bilveșu sātiśa- analysis of this fact leads to the postulation of 'sarvajñatā' or omnis- ya-mahatvam ātmani niratiśayam iti vyāptim darśayati 'parimāņatvāt". cience, and the 'purusa' who has this omniscience is the 'purusa-viśeșa' -Vācaspati on Vyāsa-Bhāšyam on Y. S. 1.25) that is 'Iśvara'. Vācaspati clarifies the point by presenting it in the It may be urged, however, that since in this school, a 'purusa' is form of an argument : 'Whatever admits of a gradation in its increase of the nature of consciousness (citirūpa), how can it be said to have has an unexcelled state ; knowledge admits of such increase ; therefore, consciousness ? Isvara as a 'purusa' then cannot have consciousness, knowledge has an unexcelled state. The 'purusa' endowed with such far less consciousness of everything. To claim then Iśvara has unexcelled knowledge is Īśvara'. This argument of Vyāsa and Vācaspati omniscience is inconsistent with the claim, that he is consciousness. requires to be clarified and examined. Now, it cannot be denied that the difficulty seems to be quite genuine. Formally expressed, the argument would stand as follows : But then it is to be observed that a similar difficulty exists also in Major premise : Whatever admits of a gradation in its increase has ap the case of an ordinary 'purusa', and that in the case of Iśvara it its limit in an unexcelled state ; as for instance 'extensional can be removed in exactly the same way as it can be in the case of

magnitude'. an ordinary 'purușa'. To explain. It has been said before that though a 'purusa' in its nature is pure consciousness (citimātra), it Minor premise : Knowledge is something that has a gradation in appears always as the owner-subject of a conscious state. According its increase.

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to theorists of this school, this becomes intelligible if only it is admitted that a 'purusa' as pure consciousness gets identified with a non-con- scious entity called 'citta' or 'psyche' which is as much a real entity as a 'purușa'. It is to be remembered that a state of consciousness is not the same thing as pure consciousness. It cannot be denied Lecture III

tbat a state of consciousness involves something in addition to the pure consciousness that is a real entity present in every conscious Analysis of psychical states-normal and super-normal

state. It involves a subject and an object which are other than (10) consciousness but which appear somehow to be integral to it. A state of consciousness is then an amalgam of 'caitanya' or 'purusa' and 'Citta' seems to be another basic postulate of Patañjali's Yoga-

something else. This other entity is known in the Pātañjala school as philosophy. It is to be noted that the terms 'manas' and 'cetas' have

'citta' or to be more precise a 'citta-vrtti'. In other words, though 'I' on a few occasions been used by Vyäsa for 'citta', the former terms

am not really anything but consciousness, yet a kind of relation to stand in the school primarily for 'indriya' or an organ of affective

'citta' which is something other than consciousness makes me appear experience (bhoga karana) which is stated to be a mere 'vikrti' and

as a 'jñātā' or a subject of consciousness, as a 'bhokta' or a subject not for any 'prakrti-vikrti' like 'buddhi' or 'citta' which is supposed

of affective experience and as a 'kartã' or a volitional agent. It is to be the matrix (upādāna) of 'manas' as an 'indriya'. Every 'purușa'

desirable now to analyse the notion of 'citta' before we take up the is said to have a psyche or 'citta' and one organism is credited with

other attributes ascribed to the special 'purusa' that is Iśvara. only one 'citta'. What now is the evidence for the postulation of an entity like 'citta' ? It has been evident from the previous discussion that a non-con- scious 'citta' or 'psyche' has been postulated to account for the dif- ference between 'pure consciousness' and a state of consciousness. It is not clear however that this non-conscious psyche has also got to be admitted as something abiding like a 'purusa'. Would there be any harm if that is not done, and if one of the two constituents of a state of consciousness is taken to be something that changes from moment to moment ? It has been shown that the constituent that is called 'purușa' must be taken to be an abiding entity. If a persistent 'purușa' is not admitted then it would be impossible to explain the phenomena of recollection and recognition. That seems to be a reasonable thesis. But why should the other constituent of a state of consciousness be also taken to be a persistent entity ? There seems to be no reason for that. Not merely this. If both the constituents of a conscious state were to be permanent, then the state itself could not be non- permanent or changing which it undoubtedly is. The theorist of the Pātañjala school is not however to be deterred by this difficulty. According to him, though 'citta' is a permanent entity, it is in cons-

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tant change and it is the changing state of 'citta' or the 'citta-vrtti' there nothing more substantial for the postulation of an abiding that explains the changing character of a state of consciousness. psyche ? According to Vyäsa, the answer is in the affirmative. The According to the Pātañjala theorist then a state of consciousness evidence for the postulation is furnished by what is called the pheno- which changes from moment to moment is a compound of a change- menon of 'ahampratyaya' or the immediate experience of per- less 'purusa' and a constantly changing 'citta'. The 'purusa' and the sonal identity present through all my changes. It cannot be denied 'citta' are both abiding entities, but while the former is an absolutely that I do have an immediate sense that 'myself' today is the same permanent and changeless entity, the latter is a permanent entity that as the 'myself' of my childhood, boyhood and youth, despite innu- does not lose its identity inspite of undergoing constant changes. In merable changes in the psyche that I call mine. As there is no the language of the school, the former is 'kütastha-nitya' and the evidence forthcoming that this sense or immediate awareness of this latter is 'pariņāmi-nitya'. persisting identity is not authentic, I have to accept it as veridical,

It may be urged, however, that the notion of 'parināmi-nitya' is just as I have to accept the verdict of perception as veridical in

hardly intelligible. If something is 'pariņāmi' or in a state of change, innumerable other cases in my common experience. 'Citta' then is as

it cannot surely be 'nitya' or abiding, and vice versa. How can a much a real entity as 'Purușa' in the Yoga-philosophy of Patañjali.

thing persist and at the same time be changing ? The difficulty ( 11 ) appears to be quite genuine. Yet the fact that there is change in It has been said before that a non-conscious entity 'Citta' has certain things, if not in all, cannot simply be wished away. But how got to be admitted to account for the difference between 'pure to state this fact ? Are we to say that certain things change or that consciousness' and a state of consciousness. This non-conscious certain things are changed ? It is to be remarked here that the former principle is supposed to have a number of characteristics of which statement is prima facie intelligible, while the latter is hardly so. It the following are the more important ones :- may be contended, however, that the first statement also is hardly (a) It is an abiding entity, as much abiding indeed as a 'purușa'. intelligible since it holds a contradiction within itself. Its absurdity The evidence for its permanence is furnished, as we have seen, by the may be shown in the following way. If the world is something that experience of personal identity. changes, there in itself it is to be regarded as an unchanging some- (b) 'Citta' has been described by Vyāsa as 'ākāśa-kalpa' or 'like thing. But then we should be taken to be saying that an unchanging the firmament'. Vacaspati explains that the likeness is in respect of thing changes, and that would be a paradox if not a stark contra- 'vyāpitva' or pervasiveness. 'Citta' is taken to be pervasive because diction. It may be noted however that the edge of the paradox can it helps a 'purușa' to take in the distant stars quite as much as a very be blunted by explaining that the change in question is not inherent near object. It may be objected that since a 'purusa' is admitted to in the thing that changes but that it is only contingent. The state- be 'sadājñāta vișaya' or one who is always aware of an object, it can ment would then mean that certain things which are in themselves take in every object without the help of 'Citta' and that the postu- unchanging undergo changes under the influence of something other lation of a pervasive 'Citta' is, accordingly, quite uncalled for. It is than themselves. And this appears to be quite intelligible to our to be remarked however that the perpetual awareness of things that common reason. a 'purușa' is credited with concerns the 'purusa' only as pure consci- The 'Citta' or the psyche is then an abiding entity that changes ousness and not as a 'bhoktã' or a subject of a state of awareness for without losing its identity. But is there any evidence that it is some- which alone the help of 'citta' is supposed to be necessary. thing abiding excepting the semi-linguistic consideration that the (c) 'Citta' is all-pervasive, but its 'vrtti' is said to be 'samkoca- notion of change implies an unchanging or persisting entity ? Is vikāsaśāli' or susceptible of contraction and expansion. The all- pervasiness of 'citta' is proved by the fact that a conscious subject is 18 19

able to think of every possible thing of the world. A 'vrtti' is said to (a) 'Pramāņa' : It means the 'karana' or the special means of a be 'samkoca-vikāsaśāli' for the reason that a 'citta' as the selfsame 'pramā' and 'pramā' means here the non-reproductive, correct cogni- owner of numberless 'vrtti's can now take the form of a small object tion of things as they are. According to the Pātañjala school, the and then at another moment of a larger object. special means of such cognition is of three kinds : Pratyaksa, Anu- (d) 'Citta' is like a load-stone (ayaskānta-maņi) or magnet in so māņa and Āgama. (i) 'Pratyakșa' has been defined by Vyāsa as the far as it attracts a 'purusa' when the latter is under the influence of 'Vrtti' of a 'citta' when it takes on the features of an external object ʻavidyā'. through a sensory channel. An external object is an amalgam of two (e) 'Citta' is said to be a luminous (bhäsvara) object in as much elements, one a universal and the other a particular. In 'pratyaksa' as it reveals objects like ordinary light. it is the particular that dominates over the universal. The point_to (f) 'Citta' is composed of three elements : 'sattva', 'rajas' and be noted is that in the present account, it is a 'Vrtti' or a changed 'tamas'. This characteristic will become intelligible only after an state of the 'citta' that is taken to be a 'pramāņa', unlike the Nyāya- analysis of the category of 'drśya'. Vaiśesika account where a sense-organ (indriya) or an 'operative (g) 'Citta' is always in change. But it is broadly said to exist in relation' (sannikarşa) is described as the 'pratyakșa-pramāņa'. (ii) two states, in a state of 'vrtti' or in a state of 'nirodha'. The 'vrtti's 'Anumāņa' has been defined by Vyāsa as that 'vrtti' concerning are cognitive, affective and conative in their nature and are prompted a probans which has a 'sapaksa' and no 'vipaksa' and which has a by 'bhoga'; the state of 'nirodha' is represented by the state of probandum that exhibits its universal element more prominently than 'ekāgratā and by the different stages of 'samādhi'. its particular component. (iii) 'Āgama', as defined by Vyāsa, is the 'vrtti' in a hearer's psyche relating to what is sought to be conveyed ( 12 ) According to Vyāsa, a 'citta' have five 'bhūmi's or levels of exis- through a statement by an authoritative and authentic speaker.

tence : unstable (kşipta), stupefied (mūdha), stable (vikșipta), one- ('Indriya-praņalikayā cittasya bāhyavastuparāgāt tadvișayā sāmā- pointed (ekāgra) and suppressed (niruddha). The two extremes stand nya-viśesātmanah arthasya viśesāvadhāraņa-pradhānā vrttih pratyak- respectively for a state of a total restlessness and a state of total rest- șam pramānam ... Anumeyasya tulya-jātīyesu anuvrttaḥ bhinna-jātīe- fulness or quiescence of the psyche. The second level represents a bhyah vyavrttah sambandhah yah tadvișayā sāmānyāvadhāranā vrttih sort of temporary paralysis of the mind ; the third level represents a anumānam ... Āptena drtsah anumitah vā arthah paratra svabodha- state of general restlessness interspersed with occasional restfulness samkrāntaye śabdena upadiśyate, sabdāt tadartha-vişayā vrttih śrotuh (asthemabahulasya kādācitkah sthemā). Of the five levels, the last āgamah' : Vyāsa on Yoga-sūtra 1.7). It is the knowledge through two only are relevant to 'yoga' in the sense of 'samādhi' testimony.

Psyche or 'Citta' is a constantly changing principle. The different (b) Viparyaya: It is the 'Vrtti' that leads to the emergence states of change have been described as its 'rtti's. These 'Vrtti's are of false cognition in the form of illusion and other kinds of incorrect either normal or super-normal. The normal 'vrtti's are those that cognition. It is known also as 'a-vidyā' in the Pātañjala school. make for affective experience and the super-normal ones are those that (c) Vikalpa : It is the 'Vrtti' that does not involve any real thing enable a psyche to free itself from the shackles of 'bhoga'. at all, but which follows a verbal cognition. A phrase like the cons- The normal 'Vrtti's or the changing psychic states in normal ciousness of 'purușa' induces a cognition of the relation of characteri- experience are said to be of five kinds : 'pramāņa', 'viparyaya', sation holding between two entities, 'purusa' and consciousness. It 'vikalpa', 'nidrā' and 'smrti', These are clearly cognitive in their is to be noted however that for one who believes that a 'purusa' is of nature. the nature of consciousness, the distinction between 'purusa' and

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'consciousness' suggested by the term 'of' in the expression under discussion does not exist. Such a person will nevertheless have, on there are others which are varieties of 'viparyaya'. These are hearing the expression, a 'Vrtti' or a changed state in his psyche 'a-vidyā', 'asmitā', 'rāga', 'dveša' and 'abhiniveśa'. They are technically represented by the understanding of the verbal expression. This known as 'Kleśa's. Of these five, the first two are of the nature of 'Vrtti' will not surely be a 'pramã'. Neither can it be described as cognitive dispositions and the next three are emotional dispositions. 'apramã', for such an expression does indeed work in the sphere They are also changing phases of the psyche, but they are much more of linguistic communication (vyavahāra). lasting than the previous group of five starting with 'pramāna'. They (d) Nidrā : Ordinarily, the term means a state of sleeping, both are also far more deepseated. The nature of these 'dispositional vrtti's dreaming and dreamless. Here, however, it stands for the latter vari- may now be briefly described. ety alone. Ordinarily, again, in the state of dreamless sleep, the psyche is (a) 'A-vidyā': The term appears to be a negative one and to mean supposed to be without any 'vrtti'. But Patañjali does not agree. just the absence of 'vidyā' or correct cognition. But Patañjali has not He defines 'nidrã' as a state where the psyche is concerned with used it in that sense. According to Vyāsa, it stands for a positive the cause (pratyaya) of the absence of any of the 'vrtti's of the states entity, for a kind of 'cognition that is opposed to correct cognition' of waking and dreaming. ('Abhāva-pratyayālambanā vrttiḥ nidrā ('vidyā-viparītam jñānāntaram'-Bhāșyam on Y. S. 2.5). It consists -Y. S. 1.10). In other words, the state of dreamless sleep is not a in believing as permanent what is impermanent, as clean what is state of unconsciousness but of consciousness quite as much as a unclean, and as of the nature of happiness what really is misery. state of waking or of dreaming. There is however a difference. In The first mistake is exemplified in the belief that this impermanent states of dream or waking the consciousness is of a differentiated world of ours is everlasting, the second in the belief that the hor- object, while in the state of dreamless sleep the object is the un- ribly unclean human body is quite clean, and the third one is exempli- differentiated matrix, constituted by the three 'guna's to be explained fied in the belief that things which are really the source of misery later on. If now the consciouness in dreamless sleep is of the are the source of unalloyed happiness. A fourth mistaken belief 'guna's, then it must be admitted that there is then the functioning of consists in taking the not-self to be of the nature of self. These, citta' in the form of some 'vrtti'. That in dreamless sleep there is according to Vyāsa constitute the 'catușpadā avidyā', the basic some consciousness is proved by the sleeping person's awakened 'kleśa' which prevents a 'bhoktã' from realising his 'svarūpa' or report that he did have a restful, a restless or a benumbed sleep true nature. as the case may be. This report is based on his remembrance of (b) Asmitā : It is the effect of 'avidyā'. In Patañjali's words, it some such experience, and a remembrance of something implies consists in the identity (ekātmatā) of 'drk-śakti' and 'darśana-śakti', always the previous awareness of that thing. It follows that in the Vyāsa explains that by 'drk-śakti' is to be meant 'purușa' and 'dar- state of dreamless sleep, the sleeper had an awareness of some- śana-śakti' means here ·buddhi'. 'Asmitā' is the indentification of thing. In other words, the psyche of the person concerned did have a 'vrtti' in the state of 'nidra'. these utterly opposed principles. That they are utterly opposed will be evident from the fact that 'Purusa' in itself is an unchanging (e) Smrti : It is a psychic state entirely based on a past state of (a-pariņāmi) principle, while 'buddhi' is a constantly changing entity. awareness. It is also a close copy of the previous state, and as Yet it cannot be denied that affective experience is possible only such here the psyche must be admitted to have a 'vrtti' quite as through a seeming relation of identity of these two opposite entities. much as the original state. 'Bhoga' or affective experience is represented by a state of consci It is to be noted that besides the five 'Vrtti's explained just now, ousness having a subject and an object. In other words, it is not the same thing as consciousness in itself untouched by anything else. But 22

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a state of consciousness involves a subject and an object. This involvement cannot however be anything as real as the entities invol- ved. It is a pseudo-involvement, and unless such a seeming mix-up is postulated, it is not possible to explain the fact of 'bhoga'. (c) Raga : The term stands for attachment. It is the effect of Lecture IV 'asmitā and is constituted by the inclination towards securing happi- ness or the means to happiness. Ethical Discipline for Yoga-aspirants (d) Dvesa : The term stands for aversion. It also is the effect of ( 13 ) 'asmitā' and is constituted by disinclination or repulsion to misery or the means to misery. It has just been said that the non-dispositional 'vrtti's of the (e) Abhinivesa : It is a technical term meaning fear of death (mara- 'psyche' can be suppressed by 'abhyāsa' and 'vairāgya'. Ordinarily, natrāsa). It consists in the hope of every sentient being that its (i) 'abhyasa' means practice. Now, practice is a kind of repeated existence might not be terminated and that it might be prolonged for activity. In the present context, it means the constant endeavour to ever. This also is the outcome of the basic 'avidyā'. preserve the 'sthiti' or equanimity of the mind. Vyāsa defines this According to the Pātañjala school of 'sādhana', the above-men- 'equanimity' as 'the restful flow' (praśānta-vāhitā) of the psyche. If tioned 'Vrtti's have got to be suppressed before one can aspire to the practice is continued for a long time, if it is uninterrupted, and if it is accompanied by austerities, self-control, wisdom and faith then, tread the path of 'yoga'. But the means prescribed by Patañjali for the neutralisation of the two kinds of psychic changes-the disposi- according to Patañjali (Y. S. 1.14) it is quite firmly settled. tional and the non-dispositional-are not the same. For the latter, (ii) 'Vairagya' : The term commonly means absence of craving the prescribed means lies in 'practice' (abhyäsa) and non-attachment, for pleasing objects. Here, however, it means not the mere absence of and for the former the means prescribed is 'kriya-yoga'. We propose attachment to things mundane and extra-mundane, but the positive to take up the analysis of these means in the next section. refusal to succumb to the blandishments of such objects. In other words, it is a state of utter indifference to pleasurable things. It is induced through a realisation that every desirable thing here or hereafter is 'täpa-traya-parīta' or infected by the three-fold pain relating to acquisition, preservation and deprivation. This 'vairāgya' is known as 'vaśīkāra'. But, according to Patañjali, this non-attachment is not 'Vairāgya' in excelsis ; it is subordinate to what is described as 'para- vairägya' or the supreme non-attachment. This latter follows from the repeated contemplation of the true nature of 'purușa' as revealed from testimony, inference and the instruction of the preceptor. This 'abhyāsa' and this 'vairāgya' are said to be the means by which the non-dispositional 'vrtti's can be suppressed. The suppression may be partial or total. In both cases, the psyche is said to be in a state of 'samādhi'. Two kinds of 'samādhi' are mainly described-The 'samprajñāta and the 'a-samprajñāta'. In the former, all the 'Vrtti's of the first three of the five levels of the psyche are suppressed, leaving 24 25

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out only those of the fourth and the five levels. The 'Citta' is mentioned : 'tapas', 'svādhyāya' and 'Īśvara-pranidhāna'. These then devoid not of all states but only of those which are favourable will be explained in connection with the description of 'niyama' as an to 'bhoga'. It is then wholly occupied with things which are directly element of the 'Eightfold yoga'. or indirectly favourable to 'purusa-khyāti' or the realisation of the The third set of prescriptions relate to the 'Eightfold yoga'. It true nature of 'purusa'. In the latter kind of 'samādhi', that is in consists in 'yama', 'niyama' 'āsana', 'prāņāyāma', 'pratyāhāra', 'a-samprajñāta-samādhi', there is total absence of psychic states, 'dbāraņā', 'dhyāna' and 'samādhi'. These are known as 'yogānga's. favourable and unfavourable. That does not mean, however, that The first two represent some moral activities; the next two stand for this kind of 'samadhi' is a state of unconsciousness. For on waking activities mainly physical, and the last four are mainly intellectual in up from this 'samädhi', a person can report that it was all bliss their nature. Brief explanations of all these 'yoganga's are given during that state. below : ( 14) A. Yama : Under it come 'a-himsā', 'satya', 'asteya', 'brahma- Patañjali has described 'yoga' as the suppression of all psychic carya' and 'a-parigraha'. changes connected with affective experience or 'bhoga'. For attain- (a) 'A-himsa' : The term is ordinarily taken to be the equivalent ing this end, certain recipes are laid down by him. There are at of 'non-violence' which commonly means non-injury of human beings. least three sets of prescriptions. The first two sets are preparatory Here it means non-injury of all living beings and not merely of some. and are conducive to 'the cleansing of psyche' (citta-parikarma). Common non-violence, again, makes an exception in the case of The third set lays down the practices known as the 'Eightfold Yoga' criminals and antisocials; this 'yogānga'-non-violence does not make (așțānga-yoga). any such exception. Further, common non-violence concerns only The first set of prescriptions relate to the cultivation of certain the body of human beings; this non-violence concerns the body and attitudes and are cailed 'bhavana's. They are 'maitrī', 'karuna', the soul; it is absolute non-violence. In the words of Vyāsa, it is 'muditā' and 'upekșā'. They ensure purification of the psyche and perpetual, all-embracing and unconditional abstention from the help towards mental concentration. The nature of these 'bhavana's infliction of injury (a-himsā sarvathā sarvadā sarvabhūtānām are as follows : anabhidrohah'-Vyāsa on Y. S. 2.30). (a) Maitri : It consists in cultivating a sense of friendliness (b) 'Satya' : The term commonly stands for truth-speaking or towards all living creatures in their happiness. It is the cultivation of communicating what is correctly known in one's perception or in one's sympathy with the well-being of others. Sympathy for others' suffer- inference. Here it means something more. It means such communi- ing is fairly common; sympathetic sharing of others' happiness is cation with a proviso. The communication must be to 'the benefit comparatively rare. The cultivation of the latter variety leads to a of living beings' (bhūtopakāra) and must not lead to their affliction cleansing of the mind. (bhūtopaghāta). If it leads to anyone's suffering it would be 'satya- bols (b) Karuna: It consists in cultivating kindliness towards living bhāsa' and not 'satya' and would result in sin. beings in their suffering or distress. (c) 'Asteya' : The term signifies what is opposed to 'steya' mean- (c) Mudita : It consists in cultivating a sense of exaltation towards ing theft. 'Theft' is the taking of others' things without the sanction righteousness in others. of 'śāstra's. 'Asteya' as its opposite would then mean taking of (d) Upekșā : It consists in cultivating a sense of indifference others' things with the sanction of 'sästra'. But as this kind of taking towards unrighteousness in others. ' to ababl owT would be identical with 'parigraha', Vyāsa takes the term to mean to The second set of prescriptions are also in connection with 'citta- 'a-sprha' or non-desire. parikarma'. These are called 'kriyā-yoga' of which three varieties are (d) 'Brahmacarya' : It is the total control of carnal desires.

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(e) 'A-parigraha' : It is the non-acceptance of any property with These five 'yogänga's are known as the five 'bahiranga-sādhana's the realisation that possession of property would mean attachment to or the remote conditions of 'yoga' in the sense of 'citta-vrtti-nirodha'. it and the maintenance would entail 'himsa' incidental to its enjoy- The next three 'yoganga's are known as the 'antaranga-sädhana's or ment. the direct and proximate conditions of 'yoga .. According to Patañjali and Vyāsa, these five 'yama's are the 'sār- F. 'Dhāraņā' : It means the direct fixing of the 'citta' either on vabhauma-mahāvrata' for the aspirant to 'yoga' and are absolutely some parts of the body like the tip of the nose, the heart, the lumi- obligatory on him. B. Niyama : Under it come 'śauca', 'santosa', 'tapas', 'svādhyāya' nous spot under the forehead etc., or the fixing of the 'citta' through

and 'Īśvara-praņidhāna'. its 'Vrtti' on different extra-organic objects like a 'devatā', a guru or

(a) 'Śauca' : The term means 'purification'. It is two-fold, either any other object of reverence.

external or internal. The former follows the taking of certain subs- G. Dhyāna : It means the continuous one-point contemplation

tances considered 'purifying' ( medhya ). Internal purification is the of the object fixed on by the mind.

washing-off of 'psychic impurities' ( citta-mala ) like conceit, envy, H. Samādhi : It means the state of Dhyana where the object contemplated appears in its purity and isolated from any psychic self-righteousness etc. (b) 'Santoşa' : It means contentment which consists here in the admixture.

absence of any desire to obtain anything not required for the bare In the present section we have given a description of the three sets of prescriptions laid down by Patañjali in connection with the practice maintenance of life. .(c) 'Japas' : It means, according to Vyāsa, endurance of the 'cou- of Rāja-yoga. They are 'abhyāsa-vairāgya', 'kriyā-yoga' and 'așțānga-

ple's (dvanda) of 'heat and cold', of 'standing and sitting', of 'the yoga'. It has to be remarked that these constitute the ethical discip-

desires to eat and to drink' ; observance of the two varieties of silence line only for the 'yogic'-aspirant and not for mankind in general.

(mauna) viz., 'kāsțha-mauna' and 'ākāra-mauna'; the performance Ethical prescriptions for man in general have been laid down in the

of penances like 'krccha-cāndrayana', 'sāntapana' etc. canonical texts known as 'Dharma-śāstra's. The yogic aspirant is a

(d) 'Svādhyāya' : It means the study of the 'moksa-śāstra's and man first and then an aspirant. Patañjali's prescriptions are not to

meditation of the sacred syllable ( pranava ) or other 'mantra's. be taken therefore to supersede the dictates of the Dharma-śāstra's.

(e) 'Iśvara-praņidhāna' : It means the dedication of every action to Īśvara or the supreme Guru. C. Āsana : It has been defined by Patañjali as 'sthirasukham āsanam'. It is the bodily posture ( samsthäna ) which gives one repose and comfort. Vyāsa gives only an illustrative list of about a dozen of such postures. A more comprehensive list is to be found in the texts of the Hatha-yoga school. D. Prāņāyāma : It means the control of the processes of inhala- tion and exhalation. There are many varieties of 'prāņāyāma' des- cribed in Hatha-yoga texts. E. Pratyāhāra : It means the non-application ( a-samprayoga ) of the sense-organs to their several objects. It is connected with the non-application of the mind or psyche to external objects.

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(e) Aparigraha : The realisation of 'a-parigraha' makes the aspirant aware of what he was before his present birth and what he will be after his death. Lecture V These are the five 'siddhi's which follow the realisation of the five items coming under the first 'yoganga' called 'yama'. The second Claims to supernormal powers. 'yogānga' called 'niyama' has also five items under it. Each of them

(15) has a corresponding 'siddhi'. They are as follows : (a) 'Sauca' : As has been said before 'purity' is either external or In this section, we propose to describe some of the 'siddhi's or internal. The realisation of external purity makes the aspirant supernormal powers claimed to be attainable by the practitioners of 'yoga'. It is to be noted that the acquisition of 'siddhi's is only a by- immune from the pollution from other impure bodies. The realisation of

product of yoga-practice and not its main objective. The acquisition internal purity is followed by the emergence successively of the

is not however without its value. It instils confidence in the mind of purity of the psyche, its well-being ( saumanasya ), its one-pointed-

the yogic aspirant, and if he is not attracted towards the 'siddhi' the ness ( aikāgra ), its control of the senses and then its fitness for the intuition of self. acquisition serves as an encouraging factor. If, however, the aspi- rant gets attached to these powers, then he gets bogged in them and (b) Santoșa : Its realisation by the aspirant confers on him supreme happiness ( anuttama-sukha ). developes conceit which is suicidal to his main objective namely the (c) Tapas : Its realisation gives to the aspirant 'Kāya-siddhi' attainment of 'samädhi'. It is for this reason that Patañjali gives the or control over the body in the form of 'animā', 'laghimā', mahimā' warning that these 'siddhi's are impediments or 'upasarga's in relation and 'präpti'. It also confers 'indriya-siddhi' in the form of vision of to 'samädhi' and that they are valuable 'attainments' only in the non- very distant objects and audition of very distant sounds, and so on. samādhi state. (Te samādhau upasargāh, vyutthāne siddhayaḥ'-Y. S. (d) Svādhyāya : Its realisation favours the aspirant with the vision 3.37). of his adored deity and of different grades of 'devatā's. Patañjali describes seriatim the 'siddhi's that the aspirant ac- (e) Isvara-pranidhāna : Its realisation confers on the aspirant quires in course of his yogic practice of each of the eight 'yogānga's. 'samādhi-siddhi' which enables him to have a correct knowledge of They are as follows : whatever he desires to know. (a) Ahimsā : The realisation (prațișțhā) of 'ahimsā' by an aspirant The third 'yogānga' is 'āsana'. Its successful and effortless per- makes all living beings shed their hostility in his proximity or pre- formance enables the practitioner to overcome the rigours of heat sence. In other words, such a yogin showers peace and friendliness all and cold around him. The fourth 'yogānga' is 'prāņāyāma'. It follows the control of (b) Satya : The realisation of 'satya' by an aspirant confers infal- the 'asana's. Its regular practice wears off the veil of nescience that libility on his speech. In Vyāsa's words 'amoghā asya vāk bhavati'. hides the true nature of self. (c) Asteya : The realisation of 'asteya' by an aspirant brings to The fifth 'yogānga' is 'pratyāhāra'. Its successful performance him every valuable thing that he may have occasion to wish for. gives to the aspirant absolute control over the senses. On the precise (d) Brahmacarya: The realisation of 'brahmacarya' makes the nature of this 'control', Vyāsa records four different views. Accor- aspirant a master of the eight kinds of 'siddhi's and gives him the ding to some, this control means non-attachment to the objects of power to transmit his powers to his disciples. the senses; according to others, it means freedom to operate the sense-organs ; according to still others, 'control' over the senses 30 31

means the detached perception of sense-objects; according to Jaigi- savya, it means non-functioning of the senses due to the one-pointed- ness of the psyche. Vyāsa seems to agree with this last view. The last three 'yogānga's-'dhyāna', 'dhāraņā' and 'samādhi' taken 5-13 together are described by the word 'samyama' employed as a techni- cal term ('tāntrikī paribhāșā'-Vyāsa on Y. S. 3.4). )7-22 It has been said before that it is with reference only to sampra- jñāta-samādhi, that the last three Yogānga's are considered to be 'antaranga-sādhana's. With reference to 'a-samprajñāta' or 'nirvīja- samädhi' however the so-called 'antaranga-sādhana's are held to be 'bahiranga'. Patañjali mentions a large number of quite astonishing 'siddhi's connected with 'samyama' or the last three 'Yoganga's. These need not be discussed here. Those who are interested are referred to the third section of the Yoga-sūtras with commentaries thereon.

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