1. Analytic-Philosophy-in-Early-Modern-India Jonardon Ganeri (Article)

PDF version of the entry Analytic Philosophy in Early Modern India http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2009/entries/early-modern-india/ Analytic Philosophy in Early Modern India from the SPRING 2009 EDITION of the First published Tue Mar 10, 2009

STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA Two older Indian philosophical traditions, the Nyāya (grounded in

OF PHILOSOPHY Gautama Akșapāda's Nyāya-sūtra, c. 100 C.E., and dealing mainly with logic, epistemology, and the theory of debate) and the Vaiśeşika (grounded in Kaņāda's Vaiśeșika-sūtra, c. 100 B.C.E., dealing mainly with ontology), developed in parallel until, at some point in the 11th or 12th century, they merged to form a new school, called "Navya-Nyāya", the new Nyāya. Despite its name, Navya-Nyāya incorporates and Edward N. Zalta Uri Nodelman Colin Allen John Perry develops classical Vaiśeșika metaphysics as well as classical Nyāya Principal Editor Senior Editor Associate Editor Faculty Sponsor epistemology. The Navya-Nyāya authors also develop a precise technical Editorial Board language through the employment of which many traditional http://plato.stanford.edu/board.html philosophical problems could be clarified and resolved. Navya-Nyāya Library of Congress Catalog Data techniques proved to be so versatile that they were employed, not just by ISSN: 1095-5054 philosophers, but also in poetics, linguistics, legal theory, and other Notice: This PDF version was distributed by request to mem- domains of medieval Indian thought. The foundational text of this school bers of the Friends of the SEP Society and by courtesy to SEP was Gangeśa's brilliant and innovative Jewel of Reflection on the Truth content contributors. It is solely for their fair use. Unauthorized (Tattvacintāmaņi). The school continued to develop for about four distribution is prohibited. To learn how to join the Friends of the SEP Society and obtain authorized PDF versions of SEP entries, centuries, reaching its heights with the works of Raghunātha, Jagadīsa and

please visit https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/. Gadādhara. The sophisticated use this school made of its technical vocabulary made it increasingly inaccessible, and so, in the 17th and 18th

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy centuries, several manuals or compendia were written to explain in Copyright C 2009 by the publisher simplified language the basic tenets of the school. I will describe the The Metaphysics Research Lab philosophical principles of Navya-Nyāya based on a synopsis of the most Center for the Study of Language and Information Stanford University, Stanford, CA 94305 successful of these, Annambhatta's The Manual of Reason

Analytic Philosophy in Early Modern India (Tarkasamgraha; henceforth TS), together with its auto-commentary, the Copyright 2009 by the author Dīpikā (henceforth TSD). This text was nicknamed Bāla-gādādharī, a Jonardon Ganeri sort of 'Beginners Guide to Gadādhara'. As well as presenting the All rights reserved. Vaiśeșika theory of categories (a mixture of physical theory, metaphysics Copyright policy: https://leibniz.stanford.edu/friends/info/copyright/

ANALYTIC PHILOSOPHY IN EARLY MODERN INDIA JONARDON GANERI

and philosophy of psychology), and the epistemological, methodological, o 6.3 What is a Cause? and logical techniques of the new Nyāya system, The Manual of Reason o 6.4 Causation and Knowledge interjects fascinating discussions on a wide variety of topics of · 7. Perception, Concepts and Sense-Object Relations philosophical interest, making the text an enjoyable and informative o 7.1 'Qualificative Perception' and the Role of Concepts introduction to later Indian analytical philosophy (trans. G. Bhattacharya o 7.2 Types of Sense-Object Relation 1983; for discussion of the text, see also Athalye 1930, Atreya 1948, C. · 7.3 Gangeśa's Criticisms and New Definition Bhattacharya 1966, Foucher 1949, Shastri 1961). · 8. Logical Theory and Gangeśa's Analysis of Inferential Warrant

· 1. The Vaiśeşika System of Categories (vyāpti)

o 1.1 Methodology and Theory of Definition o 8.1 Overview of Logical Theory

· 1.2 What is the Vaiśeșika System of Categories? o 8.2 Definitions of the Pervasion (vyāpti) Relation

· 1.3 The Underlying Structure of the List . 8.3 The 'No Counter-Example' Definition

· 2. Physical Substance · 8.4 Gangeśa's Definition: the 'siddhānta-lakșaņa'

o 2.1 The Five Primary Physical Substances · 9. Meaning, Understanding and Testimony o 9.1 The Language Processing Mechanism o 2.2 Vaiśeşika Atomism o 2.3 The Metaphysics of Number (samkhyā) o 9.2 Semantic Power and the Reduction of Semantic Properties

· 3. Space, Time and Motion o 9.3 Testimony

· 3.1 Space (dik) · 10. The Vaiśeșika Concepts of Universal, Inherence, and Basic

· 3.2 Time (kāla) Differentium o 10.1 Universals · 3.3 Vaiśeşika Dynamical Theory: The Nature and Causes of o 10.2 The Basic Differentia (viśeșa) Motion · 4. Souls: Human and Divine · 11. The Ontology of Nonexistence (abhāva) and the Semantics of

o 4.1 A Causal Argument for God's Existence Negative Statements

o 4.2 An Argument for the Existence of the Human Soul o 11.1 Motivations

· 5. Philosophical Psychology o 11.2 Temporally and Spatially Located Absence

· 5.1 Overview of Philosophical Psychology o 11.3 The Logic of Negation

o 5.2 Memory · Bibliography

· 5.3 Doubt (samśaya) · Navya-Nyāya Texts in English Translation

o 5.4 Tarka "Suppositional Thinking" o General Works

· 6. Causation and the Causal Theory of Knowledge . Other Internet Resources

· 6.1 Overview of Causation · Related Entries

o 6.2 The Three Types of Cause

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1. The Vaiśeşika System of Categories defining trait really is co-extensive with the class to be defined, or whether it is faulty, either by 'over-covering' (cf. ativyāpti; applying to 1.1 Methodology and Theory of Definition things outside the definiendum) or by 'under-covering' (cf. avyāpti; not

Most Nyāya-Vaiśeșika texts are structured in one of two ways. They applying to everything within the definiendum), or both. A properly

either follow a traditional Vaiśesika pattern, in which the categories and defining characteristic has to be, to use modern terms, both a necessary

their various sub-groups are discussed in order, or else they follow a and a sufficient property of the thing to be defined. We see the pattern of

pattern employed by the Buddhist logician Dinnāga, and copied by enumeration, definition, and examination repeated again and again in

Gangeśa, in which each of the sources of knowledge is treated in turn. Navya-Nyāya texts like The Manual of Reason.

The Manual of Reason, however, adopts a style of analysis due to 1.2 What is the Vaiseşika System of Categories? Vātsyāyana (the first commentator on the Nyāya-sūtra). Vātsyāyana stated that: The Vaiśeșika system of 'categories' (padārtha) is an attempt to classify in a systematic way all the different types of existent. Navya-Nyāya lists This [Nyāya] system will follow a three-fold procedure, viz. seven 'categories' of object: substance (dravya), quality (guna), motion or enumeration (uddeśa), definition (lakșaņa) and examination action (karma), universal (sāmānya), particularity or differentiator (parīkșā). Of these, 'enumeration' means the act of referring to (viśeșa), inherence (samavāya), and absence (abhāva). Of these, the first each object [to be analysed] by name; 'definition' means [citing] a six comprise the classical list of categories, found even in the Vaiśeşika- characteristic of the named object which distinguishes it from all sūtra, while the seventh (absence) is a distinctive addition by the later other objects; 'examination' means ascertaining, with the help of school. Most of these types are themselves subject to sub-division: thus, the pramānas, the appropriateness of the distinguishing there are nine types of substance, twenty four types of quality, etc. characteristic for the object defined (Bhāsya before NS 1.1.3). One main question concerning this list of categories is whether we can The heart of this method lies in the use it makes of definitions, conceived discern any underlying structure or organising principle. This is related of as differentiating marks of the thing defined. The Manual of Reason with another important question: just what is a category? The Manual of (TSD 3d) refines the idea: it defines a 'definition' of a class of things as Reason answers this second question by giving the etymological analysis any characteristic which is co-extensive with that class. A defining of the term 'padārtha' (category): 'padārtha' is the artha or meaning of a characteristic of the class 'cow' is the property 'having dewlap'. Note that pada or word. The claim is that the Vaisesika categories are in some way this does not tell us what the essence of the class is-it merely supplies us the metaphysical correlates of linguistic structures. One way to make this with a syndrome or trait by means of which we can identify the thing in claim more precise would be to note the existence of striking similarities question. The Naiyāyikas, we might say, have a 'diagnostic', rather than between the Vaiseşika system and Sanskrit grammar (cf. esp. Faddegon an 'essentialist', conception of definition. The purpose of the 1918). Another way is to observe a distinctive pattern of argument 'examination' now becomes clear: it is to see whether the alleged employed, in which the hypothesis that a certain type of substance,

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quality, etc. exists is supported on the ground that it explains some feature hood (TSD 4) of our linguistic practice (for example, the argument that space exists as it explains our use of directional terms.) Motion (i) that which causes conjunctions (between substances); (ii) that which possesses the universal motion-hood (TSD

An alternative approach would be to seek some purely apriori rationale 5)

behind the list. Athalye (1930: 75) offers one such: Universal that which is eternal, unitary, and inherent in many things

A notion is either positive or negative, and so the external object (TS 82)

of a notion might be 'existent' (bhāva) or 'non-existent' (abhāva). Differentium that which exists in eternal substances and functions as 'Existent' things again are of two kinds, properties and a common their differentiator (TS 83) substratum in which they reside. The latter is 'substance' (dravya). Of the properties, again, some reside in many objects Inherence that thing which is eternal and a relation (TS 84)

conjointly, others in individual things singly. The first is Absence [No general definition given]

'universal' (sāmānya), while the latter class is again divisible into properties that are stationary and those that are evanescent, i.e. There are certain problems with this series of definitions, read as an

'quality' (guna) and 'motion' (karma). The remaining two apriori reconstruction of the categories. In particular, the definitions of

categories, 'inherence' (samavāya) and 'particularity' (viśeșa) are 'substance' and 'quality' seem to be jointly circular, unless we take as

assumed to explain the special theories of the Vaiśeşikas. already given universals such as substance-hood, which make the definitions somewhat vacuous. I will give another reconstruction, one This reconstruction of the Vaiśeșika system is not quite satisfactory, for it which roughly follows the great Nyāya-Vaiśeşika author Udayana (cf. relies on an unexplained and perhaps question-begging distinction Tachikawa 1981). between stationary and evanescent properties, and leaves two of the categories completely unaccounted for. Another reconstruction (also 1.3 The Underlying Structure of the List deficient) is offered by Potter (1977). When we look at The Manual of Reason's own definitions of the individual categories, it seems to be First divide things up into the existents and the non-existents, the latter following this approach. The Manual of Reason's definitions are as corresponding to the category 'absence'. Now take inherence to be a follows: primitive, fundamental relation. Given such a relation, the following three-fold division is exhaustive: Substance (i) that which possesses the universal substance-hood; (ii) that which possesses qualities (TSD 3) a. things which do not inhere in others, but are inhered in, b. things which both inhere in others, and are themselves inhered in, Quality (i) that which possesses universals, and isn't a substance c. things which inhere in others, but are not inhered in by anything. or motion; (ii) that which possesses the universal quality-

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We want group (a) to correspond to the category 'substance'. qualities, because of the Vaiśeșika doctrine that substances do not possess Unfortunately, the Vaiśeșikas claim that wholes are distinct from, and any qualities at the moment when they are created.) inhere in, their parts. The only substances which do not inhere in anything are the atomic substances (which for the Vaisesikas correspond with the 2. Physical Substance eternal substances). Group (c) corresponds to the category 'universal', for universals are said to inhere in things (substances, qualities and motions) 2.1 The Five Primary Physical Substances but do not have anything inhering in them. Group (b) comprises, the non- atomic substances, the qualities and the motions. Let us now divide this Vaiśeșika distinguishes, among nine acknowledged types of substance, a

group into two: those which are inhered in only by universals, and those sub-class of five-earth, water, fire, air and ākāśa-to which it gives the

which are inhered in by other things as well. The former corresponds to name "bhūta" ('physical substance'). A bhūta is defined as a substance

the categories 'quality' and 'motion', for substances are inhered in, not which possesses a specific sensible quality-odour, taste, colour, touch

only by universals, but also by qualities, motions, as well as by other and sound.

substances. Finally, we must find a way to sub-divide the former group into qualities and motions. More traditional Naiyāyikas preserve the It was, perhaps, originally thought that the five physical substances and

distinction by saying that motions, but not qualities, cause the substances the five sensible qualities are directly correlated, each quality residing in

in which they inhere to come into contact with (or break away from) each one and only one substance, odour just in earth, taste just in water etc.

other. This, however, appeals to the idea of 'contact', which cannot itself (such a view is reported by Vātsyāyana under NS 3.1.65-6). This may

be defined in terms of our primitive relation inherence. Some radical give some insight into the origins of the 'five physical substances' theory,

Naiyāyikas (especially Bhāsaravajña) claim that motions are just a kind of but it was realised very early on that it is extremely implausible to

quality, as their properties are so similar. The only remaining category is maintain that earth, for example, is invisible, or else that its colour is

'differentium' (viśeșa), whose members reside in and individuate the always due to intermixture with fire (Bhaduri 1947: 133). The set of

eternal substances i.e. the atoms. The point, perhaps, is that all other correlations between physical substances and sensible qualities is more

things are individuated by the universals and wholes that inhere in them, complex in the Vaiśeşika-sūtras and later texts, and is indicated in the

but two atoms of the same substance are in all respects identical. But if following chart:

objects are individuated by means of what inheres in them, then there odour taste colour touch sound must be something inhering in each atom which distinguishes it from the others-a 'differentium' (see §10.2). earth X X X X

water This is a rough sketch, omitting many technicalities, of how the Vaiśeșika philosophers tried to build their system of categories on logical principles fire

(for an example of such technicalities, see TSD 3(c). The Manual of air

Reason points out that a substance cannot be defined as the substratum of ākāśa X

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The orthodox Vaiśeşika view is that each physical substance is between what we see and what we touch by positing that there must be

characterised by the possession of a particular type of sensible quality and types of things which can be both seen and touched. Likewise, the

the absence of certain others. Thus, earth is the substance endowed with occurrence of tactile sensations with no correlated visual sensations leads

odour, water with taste but not odour, fire with colour but not taste or us to postulate the existence of substances which can be felt but not seen

odour, etc. A drawback of such definitions is that we cannot infer, from (air), and so on for the other substances. It is, after all, the existence of

the detection of a sensible quality, which type of substance is present. such correlations between different sense modalities which grounds an

Later Vaiśeșika therefore looks for a diagnostic set of definitions, one objective conception of the world (phenomena accessible only by one

which seeks to find, for each substance, a particular sensible quality sense are more likely to be thought of as subjective in origin).

whose presence is indicative of that substance. The Manual of Reason (TS 2.2 Vaiśeşika Atomism 10-14): The Manual of Reason (TS 10-14) repeats the conventional Vaiśeșika Earth is (specifally) endowed with odour theory that the first four substances (earth, water, air, fire) are each of two Water is (specifically) endowed with cold touch types, atomic and composite. An atom (paramāņu) is indestructible Fire is (specifically) endowed with hot touch (anitya), indivisible (i.e. non-composite), and has a special kind of Air is (specifically) endowed with touch without colour dimension, called "small" (aņu). The Vaiśeşikas' standard argument for ākāśa is (specifically) endowed with sound. atomism is as follows. It is an empirically established truth that whatever

Thus, although earth, water, and fire are all tactile, only water allegedly is perceived is composite. Thus even the smallest perceptible thing,

has cold touch. It seems that it could find no positive distinguishing trait namely, a fleck of dust in a sun-beam, has parts, which are therefore

for air, and thus reverted to the older style of definition. invisible. The Vaiśeșikas call the smallest perceptible thing a "triad" (tryanuka) and claim that it has three parts, each of which is called a

It is perhaps surprising to find a 'five elements' theory defended still in "dyad" (dyanuka). Does each of these parts itself have parts? Yes-for it

the seventeenth century. Some modern writers have tried to represent is another empirically established truth that the parts of a visible thing these substances as metaphors for different 'states' of matter-solid themselves have parts (e.g. a piece of cloth, whose parts, the threads, are

(earth), liquid (water), gas (air), and temperature (fire). This is, however, themselves composite). The Vaiśeşikas say that a dyad has two parts, each improbable, for it is nowhere said that a particular substance can turn of which is an atom.

from earth to water to air. Perhaps it is a mistake to see the theory as belonging to physics at all; instead, bearing in mind the way the This argument establishes that there are objects too small to be seen, but it

substances are defined in terms of their sensible qualities, we might see it does not demonstate that some of them are non-composite. Why cannot

as an exercise in the logical analysis of the data presented by the various the process of sub-division be continued ad infinitum? The Manual of

sense modalities to construct a (metaphysical) theory of the world. Such a Reason's intriguing answer is that if such were the case then Mount Meru

theory would, for example, explain the fact that there are correlations and a mustard seed would have the same size, as each would have the

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same (infinite) number of constituent parts! An implicit premise here object/s they qualify. The Nyāya say that, in (1), the property of being (articulated by other Vaiseșikas) is that the size of a whole is a function of wooden resides in the legs of the table by the relation of inherence. Can the size, number and spatial arrangement of its parts. we analyse (2) the same way, as stating that a universal property four-

The argument seems to be question-begging, for the implicit premise is hood inheres in the legs? The new Nyāya (esp. Raghunātha and Jagadīśa)

only true if atomism is already accepted. A non-atomist will say that the answer in the negative. For note that (1) entails

size of an object is determined, not by its constituents, but by the spatial 3. Each leg is wooden. boundaries of the 'stuff' it is made of. However, (2) does not entail, 2.3 The Metaphysics of Number (samkhyā) 4. Each leg is four. The Navya-Nyaya account of number has been likened in content and sophistication to that of Frege, and is indeed fascinating. The Manual of The solution offered is to postulate a new relation, 'completion', which

Reason says only that numbers are qualities (guna-s), that they are the relates the property fourhood to the four legs jointly, but not to each leg

ground for numerical judgements, and that they range from 1 to a very individually. Raghunātha remarks that "the 'completion' relation, whose

high number called parārdha (1014. Note here again discomfort with the existence is indicated by constructions such as "This is one pot" and

idea of infinity). The view that numbers are qualities is in fact associated "These are two", is a special kind of self-linking relation." His

with old Vaiśesika, and turned out to be irreconcilable with the structure commentator Jagadīśa adds:

of the Vaiśesika ontological system. We may speak of there being three horses in the field, but also of there being 24 qualities in the Vaiseșika It might be thought that the 'completion' relation is nothing but

system. Yet a quality cannot by definition reside in another quality- inherence ... So Raghunātha states that 'completion' is a another

hence numbers cannot be qualities. This problem led the Navya- relation .... In a sentence like "These are two pots", 'completion'

Naiyāyikas to develop a new account of numbers, based on a new type of relates the property two-hood by delimiting it as a property which

relation called the paryāpti or 'completing' relation. resides in both pots. Otherwise, it would follow that there is no difference between saying "These are two" and "Each one

Here is a summary of their theory. Consider the following pair of possesses two-hood".

sentences: The proposal is that number properties are related jointly to objects by the

1. The table has wooden legs many-one relation 'completion'. I think we can simplify this proposal a

2. The table has four legs. little without losing its essential structure. Rather than saying, in a sentence like "Mars is a planet", that the property planethood resides in The similarity between (1) and (2) suggests that we think of number- Mars by the inherence relation, we would now say that the predicate " ... is words as akin to other adjectives, i.e. as attributing some property to the a planet" is true of Mars, so to speak building the inherence relation (or

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copula) into the predicate. In an entirely analogous way, we can build the completion relation into the number-predicate, which then becomes, if the The Manual of Reason's remarks on the nature of space and time are

number is n, an n-place relation. Thus the sentence "Venus and Mars are sketchy in the extreme. We must supplement them with details from other

two" asserts of Venus and Mars that they stand in a certain 2-place Vaiśeșika and Nyāya authors. Even then, the theories of space and time

relation, the relation which is the number 2. The Nyāya idea, then, is that found in Nyāya-Vaiśeșika texts have been studied very little, and we can

number-adjectives are n-place relational predicates, and that numbers are only form a rough and inadequate picture at the present time. The Manual

n-place relations holding jointly between n distinct objects. It in no way of Reason's observations concerning the notion of space are as follows:

follows from the statement that the relation 2 holds between Venus and Mars, that it holds just with Venus, any more than it follows from the i. Space is a substance (TS3)

statement that X is to the left of Y, that X is to the left, full stop. On the ii. Space is the 'ground' for statements such as "this is east of that" etc. (TS 16) Nyāya proposal, then, it looks as though the troublesome inference is blocked because its conclusion is not even well-formed, since the phrase iii. Space is unique, ubiquitous, and eternal (TS16).

"Venus is two", like the phrase "X is to the left", is an incomplete or iv. Space is an instrumental cause of every effect (TSD16). v. 'Nearness' (aparatva) and 'farness' (paratva) are spatial qualities of unsaturated expression. objects.

The Nyāya, we have seen, distinguish two relations, the inherence and Space is conceived of as that substance in virtue of which statements completion relations. Their motive is, as we might now say, to account for the distinction between collective and distributive properties. For the attributing distance and direction, such as "A is to the east of B" (or "A is near to B","A is nearer to B than to C", etc.) are objectively true or false. recognition that the inference from "These are two pots" to "Each pot is two" is invalid is just the recognition that the predicate two does not Space is thus an explanatory postulate: it is argued that we must postulate the existence of a new (spatial) substance to explain the fact that objects distribute over plural subjects. The Nyāya idea is to analyse collective stand in spatial relations with one another. The problem is to make sense predicates like ' ... are two', not as one-place predicates of aggregates or sets, but as n-place relational predicates, true of n objects jointly. But of this claim. Bhaduri (1947: 216-7) does so as follows (I paraphrase his

since such relational predicates still take objects as subjects, this indeed account):

shows that recognising the distinction between distributive and collective Imagine a sequence of objects A, B, C, D, ... , F, each in contact predicates does not force us to abandon the adjectival view. The Nyāya, with the next, arranged in a line. Now A is to the left of B, and B indeed, have a term for collective properties: they call them vyāsajya- is to the left of C, and since "being to the left of" is a transitive vrtti-dharma or 'properties which occur jointly'. relation, A is to the left of C, etc. But, although A is in contact with B, and B is in contact with C, it is not true that A is in contact 3. Space, Time and Motion with C-contact is atransitive. Thus contact cannot be what

3.1 Space (dik) spatially relates objects. What then? "According the Vaiśeșika, it is space which brings [A and C] into relation. Both are in

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conjunction with space and thus with each other through its is in contact with a nearer part of space than F. mediation. Space is that which turns the relation of conjunction into a transitive relation" (Bhaduri). The Manual of Reason says that space is 'ubiquitous' (vibhu), which it defines as 'being in contact with every sample of earth, air, fire, water This explanation has a problem. It assumes that between any two bodies (and 'mind') (TS14). This raises the question: is space infinite in there is a chain of touching material objects. But, given this assumption, dimension, or the same size as the cosmos? If space is defined in terms of we do not need to postulate a new substance with which everything is in the relations between physical objects, then it would seem to have the contact, in order to create a transitive relation from contact. For we can same size as the cosmos. There are however Vaiseşika arguments that it is define "being to the left of" thus: x is to the left of y iff there are distinct infinite. The Vaiseşikas say that most bodies are either 'long' (dīrgha) or objects p, q, r, ... t such that x is in contact with p, p is in contact with q, 'short' (hrasva) in dimension (TS25, Bhaduri 1947: 118), but that a ... , t is in contact with y. body's having 'long' or 'short' dimension is unintelligible unless it has

Potter (1977: 92) refines the argument. We say that A is nearer to D than bounding, perimeter parts. Space, however, has no parts and hence no

to F because there are more intervening objects between A and F than boundary. Some Vaiśeșikas conclude that space has no finite dimension

there are between A and D. Suppose however that between D and F there (i.e. is infinite); others that it has a special dimension called

is no chain of material objects. How is it that we can still say "A is nearer 'paramadīrgha' or 'maximal length'.

to D than to F"? Potter answers: "In order to provide the material to 3.2 Time (kāla) explain this comparative judgement we must postulate an intervening series of entities, and these must be spatial". Note that this explains, not The Manual of Reason says of time that it is the ground for statements the transitivity of directional relations like "to the left of", but rather the about the past, present and future, that it is unique, eternal and ubiquitous, magnitude of distance relations like "near to". "Near to" is not a transitive and that it is the container of everything and a instrumental cause of every relation. It accepts the basic premise that the distance between two objects effect (TS15+D). The conception of time mirrors that of space: it is that in is measured in terms of the number of intervening entities, and postulates virtue of which statements of the form "A is earlier than B" are a series of "spatial entities" when there are no material ones present. objectively true of false. Time is said to differ from space, and thus not be identical with it, in the following respect: whereas what is spatially near This explanation also has a problem, for space is supposed to be a single or far varies from person to person, what is temporally near or far is the entity. Perhaps it should say that the two objects are in contact with a same for all persons (cf. Bhaduri 1947, Mohanty 1992). But why should 'segment' of space, and spatial segments have magnitude. we restrict our attention only to presently existing persons?

Perhaps the best way to construe the argument is as offering an In the Nyāya-sūtra, Gautama mentions an argument against the explanation of spatial separation without having to postulate a series of mediating bodies. Thus, if A is nearer to D than F, and there is nothing possibility of present time remarkably similar to (and perhaps even derived from) Nāgārjuna's arguments against motion. NS 2.1.39 either between A and D or between A and F, the best explanation is that D

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(paraphrased): There is no such thing as the present time, because, when Fluidity (dravatya) is the non-inherent cause of (initial?) flowing an object is falling to the ground, each point on its descent belongs either (TS 31). to the already-traversed sector or to the yet-to-be-traversed sector. There is therefore, no point on the trajectory to which the present time can be 'Impetus' (vega) is a dispositional property (samskāra), as is 'elasticity' attributed. The present time is an imaginary point of demarcation between (sthitisthāpaka) (TS 80). 'Impetus' is the non-inherent cause of the the past and the future. Gautama replies (NS 2.1.40-42) to this by saying second and subsequent falling motions of a body (TS 30). Elasticity is that (i) that the concepts of 'past' and 'future' are relative to that of the which restores something to its original state after it has been distorted.

'present', and not to each other, and (ii) that the denial of the present has an absurd consequence, that nothing can be known perceptually, as Here is a brief summary of the theory. A moving body possesses, at each

perception functions in the present. The point of (i), perhaps, is that even moment in time, a particular 'motion', which is to be thought of as a

if the present is just a boundary, it is not thereby imaginary. momentary, quality-like property of the body. Motions are defined to be the cause of conjunctions or disjunctions. A conjunction with a

3.3 Vaiśeşika Dynamical Theory: The Nature and Causes of (stationary) body is brought about by displacement in space. We are thus Motion to think of the motion of a body as being either identical with, or else the cause of, its displacement in space between two moments in time. A Beginning with Praśastapāda (6th century C.E.), the early Vaiśeșika motion cannot be caused by another motion (as that would lead to authors took a rational and scientific interest in the behaviour of perpetual motion). A body is set in motion by its possession of a quality projectiles and other moving bodies. Their theory bears comparison with like 'weight' or 'fluidity'. It persists in motion by having a dispositional Philoponus' "impetus" theory, which was responsible for a paradigm shift property, 'impetus' or 'elasticity', which is the continuous cause of in Western scientific thought. The Manual's account substantially agrees subsequent motions. It is brought to rest by coming into contact with with that already found in Praśastapāda, which is partially traceable to the other objects. Vaiseşika-sūtra itself. The content of the relevant stanzas can be summarized as follows: The role of 'impetus' in this account is particularly interesting. It is illustrated with reference to two examples: (i) a fruit falling from a tree; Motion is the non-inherent cause of conjunction and disjunction. It (ii) a javelin thrown obliquely upwards. is of five types, four volitional (throwing upwards, throwing downwards, contraction, expansion) and the fifth comprising all i. At time to the fruit is stationary at place so. Its weight is

non-volitional motion (including falling, rotating, flowing, etc.) counterbalanced by its contact with its stalk. At t1, its stalk breaks

(TS 5,81). and its weight causes it to move to point s1. At this time too there is produced in the fruit a dispostional 'impetus'. At t2, the impetus in Weight (gurutva) is the non-inherent cause of the initial falling the fruit causes a second motion, from s1 to s2, and so on for all motion of a body (TS 30). subsequent times. Note that the 'weight' of the fruit is the cause of its initial motion, but then ceases to be operative. The cause of all

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subsequent motion is the 'impetus' impressed into the fruit by the initial motion. It is this idea, that the subsequent motion of the fruit 4. Souls: Human and Divine is the result, not of an external force, but of the internally impressed vega, which licenses us to describe the Vaiśeșika account as an The eighth of the nine Vaiśeșika types of substance is 'soul' (ātman),

impetus theory. defined as the substratum of mental states such as believing, knowing, etc.

ii. When the javelin is thrown, the initial volitional push imparts into (The ninth is 'mind' (manas), a distinct element in the ontology of the

the javelin an initial motion and an impetus. The upwards impetus mental.) Souls are divided into two types-human (jīva) and divine

counteracts the javelin's weight and causes its upwards motion. (paramātman; īśvara). The Manual of Reason supplies arguments (all When this impetus is exhausted by contact with the air, the javelin's traceable back to earlier authors) for the existence of both types of soul. weight imparts a downwards impetus and the javelin falls. The horizontal motion of the javelin is caused by its having a horizontal 4.1 A Causal Argument for God's Existence

impetus which again decreases as a result of contact with the air. The amount of impetus initially acquired by the javelin is proportional to A properly formulated Nyāya argument has three components: thesis,

the the applied volitional push. Once again, its is the javelin's having reason (hetu) and example (drstānta). The thesis, again, has two

impetus, rather than the action of some external force, which components: the 'locus' (paksa) or place of the inference, and a property

accounts for its continued motion through the air. (sādhya) whose presence in the locus is to be inferred. Thus every Nyāya argument exhibits the same pattern: p has S, because it has H; e.g., d. (For

The Vaiseşikas extend this model to explain certain other kinds of example: "The mountain (= p) has fire (= S), because it has smoke (=

motion. (1) The initial cause of the flowing of water is alleged to result H); e.g. the kitchen (= d). See further §8). A sound argument must fulfil

from a force called 'fluidity' (rather than the weight of the water). The at least three criteria: (i) the reason property must be uncontroversially

subsequent flowing is the result of the water's acquired impetus. (2) present in the locus; (ii) the reason property and the inferred property

Interestingly, the impetus of a body moving in a straight line was thought must be appropriately related, roughly such that wherever the reason is

to be ontologically of the same type as the elasticity of a bent stick-a present, so is the inferred property; (iii) the example must be an

fact which reveals that impetus was thought of as a kind of internal force, uncontroversial place where both the reason property and the inferred

not as inertia. (3) The Vaiśeșikas mention various other kinds of motion: property are present.

the movement of an iron needle towards a magnet, the upward motion of flames, the movement of air, and the initial motion of the atoms at the With this in mind, let us consider The Manual of Reason's argument for

beginning of creation. Given the above model, there must be some 'force' the existence of God:

which initially gives rise to each of these motions, yet none of the 'forces' A dyad of earth etc. has a maker, because it is an effect; e.g. a pot so far isolated (weight/gravity, fluidity, elasticity) will do. The Vaiśeșikas (TSD 17b). therefore speak of a new force, 'adrsta' (the 'unseen' force), alleged to account for such motions. Here, the locus of the inference is a dyad, the smallest composite entity.

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The reason is "being an effect" (kāryatva), and the inferred property is describes the Nyāya as having a "potter model" of God, in contrast with a "having a maker" (kartr-janyatva). The Manual of Reason carefully "spider model", in which God spins the world out of his own essence, or defines what it means by a 'maker': a thing which is non-inferentially a "magician" model, in which the world is an illusion conjured up by aware of the inherent or material cause of the thing to be made, has a God. The argument, however, rests upon an anthropomorphic and desire to make it, and acts accordingly. In this sense, the potter, but not agentive view of causation. The Buddhist Dharmakīrti ridiculed the the potter's wheel or the clay or any other causally relevant feature, is the argument by likening the pot to an anti-hill (another thing made of clay): maker of the pot, for it is the potter who sees the clay (= material cause of should we say that this admittedly complex and intricate construction is the pot), desires to make a pot, and acts accordingly by using the wheel the product of intelligent agents? And even if we do, why should not the and stick. world, like an ant-hill be a product of collective agency, rather than

Comments: (1) Why does The Manual of Reason take dyads to be the produced by a single agent?

locus of the inference? This is, in fact, a clever move. Obviously, we (3) The argument might be thought of as an argument based on induction, cannot take God to be the locus (e.g. God exists, because ... ), for then the induction from the class of artefacts to the class of natural products. What first criterion on a sound inference will not be met-the reason property, licenses the induction from things seen to have a maker to things not so whatever it is, cannot be uncontroversially present in a locus whose very seen? Dharmakīrti (cf. Vattanky 1984: 56-8) says that we are licensed to existence is controversial. We can't take the locus to be "everything in the infer that an object has a maker only if we have seen other objects of the world", for many such things are not effects (e.g. atoms, space) and so same type being made. Thus, we can infer that the Pyramids had a maker, The Manual of Reason's desired reason will again not be unequivocally not because we can see that maker, but because the Pyramids belong to a present in the locus. Hence, we must pick some particular thing. We had type (buildings) other instances of which we have seen made. The better not choose a human artefact, for the inference, even if sound, would Naiyāyika makes a bolder inductive claim, that two object belong to the then establish nothing about God. From the class of non-artefacts, the same 'type', in this sense, if they are both effects. choice of dyads is a good one here, for (a) they are the most basic things made out of the atoms, and hence out of which everything else is made, 4.2 An Argument for the Existence of the Human Soul and (b) if The Manual of Reason can show that these have a maker, then it follows that the maker is aware of everything (from the definition of a Vaiśeșika defines the human soul as the substratum of such psychological

maker and (a) above). Thus, God's omniscience will be a corollary of the qualities as believing, etc., as well as of happiness and other emotions,

proof of his existence. which God does not have. There is an implicit appeal, here too, to the "potter" model of causation: just as, in the sentence "The potter makes the (2) The argument takes the picture of causation used in the "potter-pot" pot", the property " .... making the pot" resides in the potter, so too in "I example and extends it to cover all natural phenomena. God's function is believe that p", the property " .... believes that p" resides in me. Given that to make things out of the given and uncreated ingredients (the atoms, cf. the soul is defined as that substance, whichever it is, in which a person's the clay), which are the products' material cause. Matilal accordingly psychological qualities reside, the question is whether we can identify this

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substance as a physical one, for example, the person's body or their another. senses, or whether we must postulate some new type of substance. Vaiśeșika's argument for the existence of the soul as a new substance is The idea here is that the possibility of recognitive experience presupposes by elimination of two rival candidates. the existence of a unitary enduring self. There are really two arguments compressed here. One is this: I cannot remember an object unless I have (1) The substratum of beliefs, etc. is the person's body. The Manual of seen it earlier-I cannot remember what you have seen (cf. Locke's Reason makes the case for this as follows: If I say, "I am cold", "I am account of personal identity in terms of a continuity of memory running", it is my body to which the predicate applies. Therefore, when I experiences). The other argument is more intricate. The Abhidharma say "I believe that p", the subject likewise is my body. The Manual's Buddhist claims that a person is just an aggregate of experiences, some reply is that if this were true, then visual, some tactile, etc. The problem raised for such an account by the

there would be the difficulty that with the destruction of a hand, a Naiyāyika is that it is possible to make trans-modality judgements, in

foot, etc., there will be the destruction of the body and it will which the deliverances of one sense-faculty are compared with another.

follow that there will also be the destruction of the soul. Suppose that V(01) is a visual experience of an object 01, and T(o2) is a tactile experience of an object 02. It is possible to judge "01 = 02", but

Clearly, I can lose part of my body without ceasing to believe and know this judgement does not belong to the sphere of any one sense-faculty.

things. But losing part of my body does not entail losing my body, as a Hence, it must be located in some other substance. The soul is here

whole. So this argument fails. A better argument is found in the Nyāya- conceived of as that which collates, organises and compares the

sūtra: the very phrase "my body" shows that I am not identical with my deliverances of the individual senses.

body. But this doesn't work either, for I can also say "my soul"! There is no clear argument against physicalism here. This is a convenient place at which to introduce the last of the nine substances, the 'mind' (manas). It is defined by The Manual of Reason

(2) The substratum of beliefs etc. is the person's sense-faculties [recall (TS18) as a sixth sense-faculty, one by which a person 'perceives' their

that every physical substance was divided into three: pertaining to body, inner mental objects (beliefs, pleasure sensations etc.) In other words, it is

sense-faculty, and (inanimate) object]. This rather strange claim might be a faculty of introspection. Naturally, we need an argument why this

taken to include the view of the Buddhists, that a person is reducible to a faculty cannot be identified as belonging to the soul, and the usual Nyāya

stream of momentary mental events, including sense-data etc. The claim is that the soul is the agent of cognising, while the mind is an

Manual of Reason's argument against such a view (a repetition of an instrument for cognising, just as we must distinguish between the axe-

argument already found in the Nyāya-sutra) is a strong one: man, who is the agent chopping the tree, and the axe, which is the instrument for chopping. The Nyäya also claim that the mind has another Were this the case, there would be no re-identifying awareness function, which is to 'switch' between the different sense-faculties, it (anusandhāna), e.g. "I who saw that pot am now touching it", for being assumed that, while we are being subjected to sense-impressions there cannot be any recognition by one of what is apprehended by from different faculties simultaneously, we only attend to one at a time.

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The Manual of Reason (TS 79) says that eight of the Vaiśeșika qualities The term 'cognition' is used by the Naiyāyikas to refer to any intentional

reside only in the soul, and in no other substance. They are cognition, (sa-vişayaka; object-directed) mental state, including states of perceiving,

memory, pleasure or happiness (sukha), pain or unhappiness (dukha), inferring, doubting, guessing, remembering, etc., but excluding desiring,

desire (icchā), aversion (dveșa), merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma) hoping, suffering, etc. (cf. Matilal 1968: 7-8). Because we say that the (TS 73-78). The first two we will discuss later (§§ 5.2-3). As regards subject has such states, they are thought to be 'qualities' (in the technical

happiness and unhappiness, Matilal (1986: 301), summarizes the Vaiśeșika sense) of the soul. The Manual of Reason states that a cognition

Vaiśesika view when he says that "the essential characteristic of pleasure is the "ground for all linguistic practice" (TS 34), reflecting the Nyāya or happiness consists in its being experienced as favourable to us or being conception of language as primarily an instrument for transmitting true

in accord with us, i.e. with our body or mind or our very existential thoughts from speaker to hearer.

situation (anukūla)", which makes it distinct from knowing or perceiving or apprehending something, and that it is an "inner disposition on account From the point of view of epistemology, the most important division,

of which the external world becomes agreeable or desirable". Desire is within the class of cognitions, is between those which are true and the

the state of craving for something. Merit is that which is produces by rest. However, the standard Nyāya classification of the species of

meritorious action (karma). cognition, repeated by The Manual of Reason, begins with another division, between memory cognitions (smrti) and the remainder

5. Philosophical Psychology (anubhava; nonrecollective cognition). The full classification is as follows:

5.1 Overview of Philosophical Psychology cognition

Study of the nature, content and causes of cognition (buddhi, jñāna, upalabdhi) lies at the very centre of the Nyāya philosophical method. In nonrecollective memory

epistemology, the question asked is: how do we distinguish between true (anubhava) (smṛti)

and false cognitions, and under what conditions does a true cognition arise? In logical theory, the issue is: when does one cognition 'follow' true not true 'true' 'not true'

from another, in some suitably articulated sense. In philosophy of (pramā) (apramā) (yathārtha) (ayathārtha)

language, the assumption is that sentence structure mirrors cognitive perceptual false (viparyaya; 4 types)

structure, and hence that an inquiry into sentence meaning proceeds via an inferential doubt (samśaya)

analysis of the cognitions sentences 'express'. The importance of this comparison-based tarka

topic is reflected by The Manual of Reason, for although 'cognition' is testimony-based

technically just one of twenty-four types of quality in the Vaiśeșika schema, its analysis accounts for nearly half of the book (TS 34-74). Nyāya epistemology is in effect a theory of the true nonrecollective cognitions, and their division into four types on the basis of the different

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accredited epistemic means (pramāna-s) by which they are produced. nonrecollective cognition and causes a memory cognition (TS 80). (What about accidentally true cognitions, e.g. the result of a lucky guess? There are well-discussed problems with incorporating them into the above Memories are either 'true' or 'false', as the originating cognition

schema). It is clear that, no matter how generally reliable are our is true or false (TS 74).

epistemic methods, it will always be possible for misfires to issue occasionally in false cognitions (e.g. perceptual illusions, beliefs resulting The general theory is that an initial cognition, e.g. a perceptual experience

from a reporting error, etc.). The Manual of Reason's example (TS 72) is of an object, generates a dispositional mental state, which has the

of the false pseudo-perceptual judgement "This is a piece of silver" on capacity, when certain other causal factors are present, to trigger an active

seeing an oyster-shell. I will discuss the epistemology of perception, memory of that object. (The whole process might be likened to that of

inference and testimony in §§ 7, 8 and 9 respectively. Here, I will someone who, having learned to swim, has a dispositional capacity to

examine in more detail three types of cognition which, though very swim, which they exercise on certain occasions.) The resultant memory

important within the Nyāya framework, are subsidiary to its state has the same content as the originating perceptual experience, and

epistemology. They are: memory, 'doubt' and tarka. (Where do dreams fit can be said derivatively to be 'true' or 'false', depending on whether the

in the schema? TS 70 states that they belong in the category of 'false' original perception was veridical or not. Memory, on this account is

cognitions. This, however, is odd, since they are not the product of any of represented as an entirely infallible faculty: there is no mention of the

the four pramānas misfiring. Neither are they memories or states of possibility of what is called "false memory", i.e. having memories

doubt. According to Praśastapāda, dreams are the result of the free without any originating experience, or of "faulty memory", in which the

movement of the 'mind' when it is not connected with the external sense- content of the memory does not exactly match that of the originating

faculties, influenced by adrsta, 'unseen' forces.) experience.

5.2 Memory Given this account, in which memory is seen merely as reproducing a past knowing experience, there is perhaps a sense in which the memory does

Memory is considered in the western tradition to be an important means not itself count as knowledge, any more than an exact reproduction of a

by which an individual can justify her beliefs about the past. It is striking Picasso counts as a Picasso. The Naiyāyikas state that memories lack

then to note that the Nyāya at the outset separate memory states from 'independence'. The idea, perhaps, is this. In general we establish the

knowledge-yielding beliefs and deny to them the status of knowledge- veracity of an experience by examining the way in which it was caused

hood. The Manual of Reason has the following to say about memory: (my perception of the table is veridical, because my eyesight is good, the lighting is adequate, etc.). In the case of a memory, however, we must go A memory state is one which results solely from a 'mental via the originating experience. Memory is conceived of as a mere disposition' (bhāvanā) (TS 35). surrogate for the original experience, and its veracity is 'dependent' on

A 'mental disposition' is a quality of the soul which is caused by a that of the original. We might think, however, that memory in fact does more than merely reproduce the original experience. It may represent the

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experienced event as happening in the past, and thus have a different contradictory beliefs, there are no beliefs with the same content as doubts. content. 5.4 Tarka "Suppositional Thinking" 5.3 Doubt (samśaya) The term 'tarka' is often used loosely in the sense of hypothetical or The concept of doubt has an important theoretical role in Nyāya, for a reductio-ad-absurdum reasoning, but The Manual of Reason gives it a state of doubt is claimed to be a necessary precondition for any much more precise and technical sense: philosophical enquiry. Doubt is one of the sixteen topics listed under Nyāya-sūtra 1.1.1, which determine the content of the entire text. In Tarka is the 'ascription' (āropa) of the 'pervader' (vyāpaka) by particular, a doubt is the first step in a properly formulated inference: is the ascription of the 'pervaded' (vyāpya). For example, 'if there is

there a fire on the mountain ?- Yes, because there is smoke there. The no fire, then there is no smoke'(TS 73). Manual of Reason gives a very precise definition of a doubt (TS 71): a cognition of two incompatible qualifiers in the same qualificand, for The terms in this definition require explanation. The technical sense of

example the cognition "Is this (dimly perceived or distant object) a person 'ascription' (āropa) is 'counterfactual or suppositional cognition'

or a tree-stump?" Schematically, then, a doubt is a cognition whose (āhāryāropa), defined as a cognition whose qualifier is an property the

content is of the form "x is F or not-F?". opposite of which is known to reside in the qualificand. In other words, it is a counterfactual assumption. 'Pervader' and 'pervaded' are notions

Two points are worth noting. (i) Although doubts are classified as non- taken from the Nyäya theory of inference. When we say that wherever

true (apramā) cognitions, they are not false. A false cognition is one there is smoke, there is fire, this can be re-expressed as that fire pervades

whose content is "x is F" when in fact x is not F. (ii) Doubts are smoke, i.e. that the property of being a smoke-possessing-thing has a

distinguished from other cognitions by virtue of having a special type of narrower extension than the property of being a fire-possessing-thing. So content, rather than by being propositional attitudes of a special kind. The here, fire is the pervader and smoke is the pervaded. Thus, tarka consists

Nyāya do not here say that we can take one of a series of attitudes in a cognition of smoke's absence given the counterfactual assumption

towards the same proposition, believing, disbelieving, doubting, etc. Yet that fire is absent. It is the cognition of a conditional "if p then q", or if the only thing which distinguishes a doubt is its having a content of the "were p to be true then q would be true", assuming that 'p' is false.

form specified in TS 71, then what differentiates the doubt that x is F from the belief that x is both F and not-F? Vardhamāna replies by One main function of tarka is said to be the elimination of doubt.

drawing a distinction between actually having a contradictory belief and Suppose one has the doubt "Is x F?". One might then judge "if x is not F

merely believing that one has a contradictory belief. The former is then x is not G", and if one also knows that x is G, it will follow that x is

supposedly impossible, the supposedly contradictory belief that x is both F. The Naiyāyikas recognise this function but deny nevertheless that tarka

F and not-F is really a belief that I have a belief whose qualificand is x is a source of knowledge (pramāna). Their reason, it seems, is that there

and whose qualifiers are F and not-F. Since there are no genuine is a distinction between citing positive empirical evidence for a thesis and merely eliminating the contrary possibility by a priori methods. This is

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reflected, perhaps, in the fact that no example is cited in arguments based accredited awareness-event (pramā). In the Nyāya tradition, four such on tarka to buttress the inference. The Manual of Reason, it seems, goes pramāņas are recognised: perception (pratyakșa), inference (anumāna), even further and denies that the counterfactual conditional is a true 'analogical identification' or 'comparison' (upamāna) and testimony cognition, which implies, since they are not false either, that (śabda). The accounts given of each of these employ an extremely counterfactual conditionals do not have a truth-value. causalistic idiom, typical questions being 'what causes a perceptual

Udayana claims that tarka is of five types, namely 'self-dependence' experience?', 'what are the distinguishing causal factors of true and false

(ātmāśraya), 'mutual dependence' (anyonyāśraya), 'circle' (cakraka), perceptual experiences?', 'under what conditions does knowledge of the

'infinite regress' (anavasthā), and 'having an undesirable consequence' or premises of an argument cause knowledge of the conclusion?', etc.

reductio-ad-absurdum (aniștāprasanga). These are basically self- The choice of examples undoubtedly influences one's causal theory. The explanatory - the fifth, 'prasanga' is the one used to great effect by Naiyāyikas almost invariably illustrate their discussions with one of the Nāgārjuna and other Mādhyamika Buddhists. Other authors give slightly following three examples: (i) The potter-pot example. The effect is the different lists (see S. Bagchi 1953 for details). finished pot. Some of its causes are the pot-halves (which the potter joins

6. Causation and the Causal Theory of Knowledge to form the pot), the potter, his wheel and stick, the contact between each of the pot-halves, and between them and the stick, etc. (ii) The thread-

6.1 Overview of Causation cloth example. Here the effect is the piece of cloth. Among its causes are the threads from which it is woven, the weaver, the shuttle, the loom,

The study of causation is an important part of Indian philosophical various contacts, etc. (iii) The axe-tree example. The effect, i.e. the felling

thought. One reason for this is the early interest in cosmological of the tree, is caused by the axe, its contact with the tree, the axeman, etc.

speculation: "We should remember that philosophic activity in India arose Some of the questions we would like to ask here are these. Can all

out of the cosmogonic speculations of the Vedas and the Upanișads. The instances of causation be fitted into the general pattern illustrated by these

all-important business of philosophy was to attempt to discover some examples (e.g. is there always an 'agent')? Do the Naiyāyikas have an

simple, unitary cause for the origin of this complex universe" (Matilal adequate account of causation even for these examples (i.e. can they

1985: 287). Another reason is that Indian linguistics (especially the distinguish between those factors which are, and those factors which are

Pāņinian system of 'kārakas' or relations between verb and noun, which not, causes of the effect)? Can both objects and events be causes? Are

greatly influenced Nyāya, Mīmāmsā and Buddhist thinkers) is based on causal relations singular or based on repeatable regularities? Attempts to

an underlying causal model, in which the verb in a sentence designates an answer such questions as these led to increasingly sophisticated accounts

event, for the production of which each such object as is designated by a of causation as the Nyaya school evolved.

noun has a particular causal role. This same model informed and influenced Indian epistemology, and led to the development of the theory 6.2 The Three Types of Cause

of 'pramānas', the causal means or processes leading to an epistemically The Nyāya-Vaiśeșikas traditionally held that, within the total collection

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(sāmagrī) of causal factors leading to an event, there are three shuttle is subsequently destroyed, it will not affect the continued distinguishable types of cause, namely 'substrate' or 'inherence' causes existence of the effect. (samavayi-kāraņa), 'non-substrate' or 'non-inherence' causes (a- samavayi-kāraņa), and 'instrumental' causes (nimitta-kāraņa). This It does not follow from these definitions that anything which inheres in

classification is repeated by The Manual of Reason (TS 43). A substrate the substrate is a non-substrate cause, or that anything which does not is

cause is a substance in which the effect inheres. The substrate cause of a an instrumental cause. In other words, we still need to define "being a

pot would be the pot-halves; of a cloth, the threads. This is because the cause". First, however, two more types of causal factor are distinguished

Nyāya say that a whole inheres in its parts, and, so, if the effect (e.g. the by the Nyāya. These are the 'special' instrumental cause (karana) and the

pot) is a whole, its substrate causes are the parts in which it inheres. If the 'operating condition' (vyāpāra) We often speak of the cause of an effect,

effect is an object's coming to have a new property (e.g. the tree's being and in doing so pick out one factor from the total collection of causal felled), the substrate cause is the object (the tree). Note that, in spite of a factors as being particularly salient or important in bringing about the

certain similarity, the notion of a substrate cause is not the same as effect. Intuitively, the idea is that, even if we have the substrate cause (the

Aristotle's "material" cause, for (i) the parts of an object are not pot-halves), the non-substrate cause (the contact between the halves), and

necessarily identical with the material from which it is composed, and (ii) even some of the instrumental causes (the potter, etc.), we will not get the

even an immaterial substance can be a substrate cause, for example the effect (the pot) unless the potter acts or 'operates' to bring it about. In a soul, which is the substrate cause of epistemic events. sense, then, it is the potter's actually using his stick which is the cause of the pot. The Naiyayikas try to capture this idea by saying that one of the All other causal factors are either 'non-substrate' causes or 'instrumental' instrumental causes is the 'special' (asādhārana) cause of the effect, and causes. A non-substrate cause is one which inheres in the substrate cause. they call it the 'karana'. This notion is particularly important to the Thus, though not being the substrate, it is closely connected with it. The Nyāya epistemology (see below). What constitutes the 'special' nature of conjunction of threads is said to be a non-substrate cause of a piece of this cause? The Navya-nyāya (cf. TS 54) answer is as follows. They cloth. Another example is often cited. The non-substrate cause of the introduce first the notion of an 'operative condition' (vyāpāra), defined as colour of a piece of cloth is the colour of the threads (which colour that cause which immediately precedes the effect. For example, the inheres in the threads, in which inheres the effect, the colour of the cloth). operative condition for a pot is the conjunction of the pot-halves; for the Any other causal factor is called an instrumental cause, for example, the felling of a tree, it is the final contact between axe and tree before the tree weaver's shuttle or the weaver herself. Why did the Naiyāyikas falls. The 'special' cause is defined as that factor which 'brings about' distinguish between non-substrate causes and the remainder? Perhaps it this operative condition. In other words, it is the factor whose operation was an attempt to differentiate between those causes which must continue directly brings about the effect. In the examples, it would be the axe or to exist for the effect to exist, and those which need not. If the threads the potter's stick. These objects are, for the Nyaya, the true instruments by were to lose their colour, then the cloth would lose its, and if the threads means of which the effect is produced. were to become disjoint, the cloth would cease to exist altogether. If, however, the weaver dies, having already woven the cloth, or if the 6.3 What is a Cause?

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The Naiyāyikas build up in this way a model of causation, in which a cause. Its meaning, however, is not quite clear. Literally, it states that a

different causal factors have different types of causal role. The model cause must be 'not established otherwise'. Kalidas Bhattacharya says that

reflects (or is reflected in) the Indian grammatical analysis of causal "an invariable antecedent is irrelevant if knowledge of it is not required

statements, such as "The potter throws a pot with her stick", "The for any anticipative knowledge of the origination of the effect" (see Potter

lumberjack fells a tree with her axe", in which one distinguishes, apart 1977: 67). Matilal says that an antecedent is irrelevant if "it is possible to

from the verb designating the event, an agent (kartr), object (karman), find a reasonable explanation of its appearance" (1985: 290). The Manual

instrument (karana), and so on. We do not yet know, however, how to of Reason states that an antecedent is irrelevant if its antecedence is only

distinguish between causes and non-causes. The Manual of Reason (TS established along with some other entity. We know that thread-colour

41. provides the Navya-Nyāya answer. Given two entities, c and e, precedes cloth only because we know that it occurs with the thread (which we know to precede cloth); hence the thread-colour is irrelevant in c is a causal factor for e iff this sense. This highlights an asymmetry between the two regularities, the i. c exists before e, threadcolour-cloth regularity and the thread-cloth regularity. For while we ii. c exists 'regularly' (niyata) with e, and can establish the latter directly by observing correlations between thread

iii. c is 'relevant' (ananyathāsiddha) to e. and cloth, we establish the former by observing the correlation between threadcolour and thread. Thus the former supposedly depends on the latter The first clause is to prevent self-causation. The import of the second but not vice versa. It is not clear, however, that the dependence does not condition is that entities similar to c must always exist with entities run the other way too. In any case, in using this criterion to block similar to e. There must be an invariable or constant conjunction between transitivity, the Naiyāyikas seem to seeking a definition not of causality c-type entities and e-type entities. This rules out objects which just per se (which most regard as a transitive relation), but rather an epistemic happen to be there, such as, to give the Naiyāyikas' example, a donkey notion of 'causal explanation' or 'causal salience'. happening to wander past the pottery just as the potter goes to work. This feature of the account, the insistence that a causal relation instantiates a 6.4 Causation and Knowledge

regularity, resembles a Humean account of causation. The Naiyāyika, however, recognised the possibility of 'accidental', non-causal Cognitions that are not memories are classified under two headings: true

regularities, such as day always preceding night, or (the example given by and false. If we can find factors invariably preceding true cognitions, then

The Manual of Reason), the colour of the thread always preceding the we will have the beginnings of a causal theory of knowledge. We will be

cloth. Although the occurrence of a cloth is invariably preceded, not just able to say that a cognition is a knowledge-episode iff it is (i) true and (ii)

by threads, but by the presence of thread-colour as well, we would not preceded by a causal factor which invariably precedes true cognitions (i.e.

want to say that thread-colour is a cause of cloth. The third clause is their its truth will not be an accident). The Nyāya (TS 39) claim to find four,

attempt to eliminate such accidental regularities. The same clause is and only four, invariable correlations: perception, inference, comparison,

supposed to stop the cause of a cause (e.g. the potter's parents) from being and testimony. To each they apply the model of causation outlined above. In particular, they isolate, in each case, a 'special' instrumental cause

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(karana), to which they give the name 'pramāna'. In the case of Principle 1: In each case of perceptual experience, the experience perception, for example, it is the senses. Note that an invariable has as its special instrumental cause a 'connection' (sannikarșa) correlation between two entities, in the sense defined above, does not between the object perceived and the perceiver's sense-faculty. entail that whenever the first is present, so is the second-the potter is invariably connected with a pot, but only causes a pot when he is actually All seeings are the product of a sensory connection (of a type to be 'operating'. Similarly, a pramāņa, e.g. the eyes, only causes a true specified) with the thing seen. This basic idea must be embellished in two cognition when it is actually operating. In other words, the pramāna is a ways before it is can serve as a proper a theory of perception: (i) some necessary but not a sufficient cause for true cognitions. To get a sufficient account must be given of the fact that, in all the cases cited above, the cause, the Nyāya (TSD 69 iii) says: content of perception is semantically structured (e.g. that the thing in the corner is a piece of rope), for otherwise perceptual experiences would not The causal condition that is 'special' to true cognition is called a be capable of being true, and hence fail to qualify as knowledge-episodes; 'guna' [an epistemic excellence]; the causal condition that is 'special' to false cognition is called 'dosa' [an epistemic defect]. (ii) an account must be given of the type of 'connection' involved here. Only then can we evaluate the merits of the Nyāya theory. In the perceptual case, the guna [of a true cognition 'x is F'] is the sensory connection with an object [x] possessing a property [F], 7.1 'Qualificative Perception' and the Role of Concepts etc. A structured perception, of an object a as having a certain property f (e.g. This is, in effect, the operative condition for true perceptual cognitions. seeing the thing in the corner as being a piece of rope), is called by the Thus, the occurrence of all the usual factors (substrate causes, non- Naiyāyikas 'qualificative' (savikalpaka = saprakāraka), for it a substrate causes, general instrumental causes, etc.) together with an perception of an object, the 'qualificand' (viśeşya) as having a certain epistemic excellence (guna) is a necessary and sufficient causal condition feature or 'qualifier' (prakāra; viseșaņa) (cf. TS 47). It is alleged by the for the occurrence of a true cognition (see also Philips and Tatacharya Naiyāyikas that any piece of perceptual knowledge must be of this form, 2003). and further that most cases in which we claim just to be seeing an object

7. Perception, Concepts and Sense-Object Relations (e.g. "I see the car") are really cases of seeing something as a car. In a 'qualificative' perception, it is the qualificand which is in sensory connection with the perceiver. How then does the qualifier enter the Noticing something coiled up in the corner of the room, I perceive it to be a piece of rope. Looking out of the window, I see that the sky is blue and picture? The Nyāya claim that:

see also, perhaps, the blueness of the sky. I see too that the air is cold, and Principle 2: In every case of perception, the qualifier is a that there is nobody on the street. What do all these experiences have in previously perceived entity (substance, quality, motion or common, in virtue of which they are all acts of perception? The Manual universal) which is recalled by the perceiver and 'superimposed' of Reason (TS 46) gives the classical Nyaya answer: upon the qualificand

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The intuitive idea is that the qualifying feature is a concept, empirically hallucinate a dagger, the account entails that I am superimposing the acquired by the perceiver, and now used to categorise the object memory of some previously encountered dagger upon the region of perceived. To see that the passing animal is a horse, one must first space in front of me (there must be some qualificand, by Principle 1). possess the concept horse, by means of previous acquaintance with the This is called the 'mislocation' (anyathākhyāti) theory of perceptual type. (Use of the term 'concept' here does not imply that the features are error. Note that, if all error is a product of qualifier-mislocation, then in any sense subjective-for the Nyāya they are objective entities or no error is possible with respect to the qualificand with which one is constructions out of objective entities). The Nyāya thus use their theory in sensory connection. Note too that the Nyāya make no appeal to of memory (initial experience causing dispositional trace causing memory 'images', 'ideas' or any other subjective content to explain illusion- event) as a theory of concept-possession. it is an externalist account of error. This shows that the so-called

Principle 2 has a number of consequences: argument from illusion, from the phenomenal indistinguishability of veridical and non-veridical perceptual experiences to their having a

a. If every case of seeing an object a as f is preceded by a prior shared subjective content, is false. It is not clear, however, that one

perception of f, and if that prior perception were itself of f as can always find a suitable qualificand (is a region of space really

qualified by some qualifier g, we would get an infinite regress. The perceived in a hallucination?) or a suitable qualifier (e.g. when one

Nyāya (cf. TS 47) therefore state that, in addition to qualificative sees a stick as bent, because partially submerged in water, where

perceptions, there are also 'non-qualificative' (nirvikalpaka = does the feature 'being bent thus' come from ?- the Nyāya actually

nişprakāraka) perceptual experiences. In such experiences, on sees claim that it is an objective feature causally produced by the act of

both the object and its qualifier, but not as being qualified by the perceiving!)

qualifier. d. This theory allows the Nyaya to say that locutions like "I see

b. To illustrate the general theory, suppose I perceive for the first time (visually) that the air is cold" or "I see that the mango is sweet", in

a vase having a particular shade of blue which I have never before which the qualifier, though perceptible is not a visible property, are

seen. The theory states that, prior to seeing the vase as being genuine cases of perception. They classify them as a type of 'extra-

qualified by that shade, I first see the vase, together with (but not ordinary' perception, called jñāna-lakşaņā-pratyāsatti. (The other

qualified by) the shade, and then, recalling that shade, impose it upon types of extra-ordinary perception sometimes admitted are

the vase. 'sāmānyalaksana', in which all the bearers of a property are

c. Perceptual illusions, hallucinations, etc., are all explained as cases in perceived by perceiving the property, and yogic perception.)

which a wrong feature is recalled from memory (or the concept e. The Nyāya state that experience amounts to a knowledge-episode

bank). Suppose I misperceive the coiled object in the corner as being when and only when it is true, i.e. when the qualifier actually

a snake. The account given by the Nyaya is that I recall and qualifies the qualificand. The Manual of Reason (TS 69 iii) says that

superimpose the feature snakehood, on the basis presumably of its the guna or special causal factor for perceptual knowledge when the

close similarity with the true feature ropehood. Similarly, if I qualifier imposed by the perceiver onto the sensorily connected

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qualificand is actually present in the qualificand. There may, 6. Qualifier-qualificand relation (viśeşaņa-viśeşya-bhāva). This is an however, be scope for Gettier-style counter-examples to this important one. The Nyāya believe that absences are 'real' objects, definition. e.g. the absence of an elephant in the room now, and that they can be

7.2 Types of Sense-Object Relation perceived. Absences are said to qualify their substrata, and are perceived indirectly, by the perceiver seeing the substratum. The

The Manual of Reason (TS 48) reports the standard Nyāya view, which is Buddhist Dharmakīrti argued that this is really an inference from

due to Uddyotakara, that there are exactly six types of sense-object non-apprehension (anupalabdhi-hetu) running thus: I perceive the

relation which ground perceptual experiences: walls of the room; ; if there were an elephant, I would not see it, and my perceptual faculties are working normally; therefore, there is no 1. Contact or conjunction (samyoga). Ordinary perceptions, e.g. of a elephant"

pot. If by 'contact' we understand some sort of causal relation, then the Nyāya can be said to have a causal theory of perception. 7.3 Gangeśa's Criticisms and New Definition

However, they may mean that the eye is in contact with the object in Gangeśa criticises Principle 1 on three grounds: (a) it entails that every some more literal sense. 2. Inherence-in-the-conjoined (samyukta-samavāya). We noted above awareness is perceptual since every awareness is produced by the

that, in 'non-qualificative' perception, one sees the object and its instrumentality of the 'inner' sense faculty or manas; (b) it fails to

feature together. The relation between the feature and the perceiver include divine perception, which involves no sensory connection; and (c)

is an indirect one-the feature inheres in the object, with which the there is no one type of sensory connection, nor anything obviously in

perceiver is in contact. common to the ad hoc list of six types. Gangeśa therefore offers a new

3. Inherence-in-the-inherent-in-the-conjoined (samyukta-samaveta- definition:

samavāya). If the feature in (2) is a quality (guna), e.g. a particular Principle 3: A perceptual experience is a cognition which has no shade of blue, then inhering in it is a universal, blueness, which can other non-mnemonic cognition as its 'special' instrumental cause itself apparently be perceived. (karaņa). 4. Inherence (samavāya). The Nyāya-Vaiśeșikas have a rather strange doctrine, that each sense-faculty is made out of the type of substance Two objections to this definition are countered. Objection 1: Since every with which it is particularly associated. The auditory faculty is thus qualificative cognition is produced by a prior awareness of the qualifier, made out of ākāśa, and, as sounds inhere in ākāśa, the relation the definition under-extends. Reply: No. The awareness of the qualifier is

between the hearer and the sound is inherence. merely an auxiliary causal factor, the 'special' instrumental cause is a 5. Inherence-in-the-inherent (samaveta-samavāya). By this indirect sense-object contact. Objection 2: Since recognition, which is a type of relation, the hearer is related to properties such as sound-hood perception, does have the prior awareness of the qualifier as its 'special' inhering in sound. instrumental cause, the definition under-extends. Reply: No. The 'special'

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causal factor is the memory of the qualifier triggered by the dispositional has smoke (= H); e.g. the kitchen (= d). A sound argument must fulfil at trace produced by the prior awareness, not the prior awareness itself. least three criteria: (i) the reason property must be uncontroversially

Gangeśa's definition has the virtue of capturing the sense in which present in the locus; (ii) the reason property and the inferred property

perceptual experience is more 'immediate' than other types of experience, must be appropriately related, roughly such that wherever the reason is

and is also applicable both to human and to divine perception. Restricted present, so is the inferred property; (iii) the example must be an

to human perception, it turns into the previous definition (Gangesa says uncontroversial place where both the reason property and the inferred

that the 'inner' sense should not be regarded as perceptual after all). property are present.

8. Logical Theory and Gangesa's Analysis of Certain topics concerning this account are addressed in The Manual of Reason and other Navya-Nyaya texts. Among them are: the conditions Inferential Warrant (vyāpti) under which inference can take place, and the conditions under which the result is a knowledge-episode (TS 49, 54); the correct account of the 8.1 Overview of Logical Theory inference-warranting relation, between the inferential sign and the

Gangeśa's Tattvacintāmani is divided into four parts, one for each of the property-to-be-inferred, called the 'pervasion' or 'vyāpti' relation (TS

four knowledge-sources or pramānas recognised by the Nyāya school. 50); the distinction between inference and demonstration (svārtha- and

The post-Gangeśa scholars focused more and more exclusively on the parārtha- inference) (TS 52, 53); the three-fold classification of inference

second part, concerning inference, and wrote increasingly detailed types, those which are 'universally positive' (kevalānvayin), those which

commentaries on a comparatively small portion of the book, namely the are 'universally negative' (kevala-vyatirekin), and those which are

part where Gangeśa examines the relation between inferential sign and combined positive and negative (anvaya-vyatirekin) (TS 55); the types of

property-to-be-inferred, which is called the vyāpti, 'pervasion' or inferential fallacy (hetvābhāsa) (TS 57-64).

'inference-warranting' relation (Ingalls 1951, Goekoop 1977, Wada I will discuss mainly the definition of the 'pervasion' relation. First, 2007). Even today, in a traditional Indian education, study of these sub- however, a brief note on how the causal model of knowledge is applied to commentaries on various subsections of the vyāpti section of Gangeśa inference. The 'special' instrumental cause (karana) of an inferential forms an essential part of the curriculum. cognition is said to be the inferrer's knowledge of the relevant pervasion

The general structure of a properly formulated Nyāya inference has three relation. The 'operative condition' (vyāpāra) is said to be an awareness

components: thesis, reason (hetu) and example (drstānta). The thesis, that the locus of inference (p) possesses such an inferential sign (h) as is

again, has two components: the 'locus' (paksa) or place of the inference, pervaded by the property inferred (s). This is, in effect, an awareness

and a property (sādhya) whose presence in the locus is to be inferred. which combines the two premises of the argument together immediately

Thus every Nyaya argument exhibits the same pattern: p has S, because it prior to the conclusion being derived, and is called the 'parāmarśa' or

has H; e.g. d. For example, "The mountain (= p) has fire (=S), because it 'consideration'. The 'guna' or 'causal factor responsible for the truth' of the inferential cognition is the condition that this 'consideration' be true,

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i.e. that the locus does in fact possess such a sign as is pervaded by the 8.3 The 'No Counter-Example' Definition inferred property. Another auxiliary causal factor is that the inferrer must either not yet already know the conclusion or else must have a particular The five definitions which make up Gangeśa's 'vyāpti-pañcaka' are all desire to infer (i.e. given, knowledge of the premises, the inference would varieties of what we might dub the 'no counter-example' definition of the normally take place mechanically, but if the conclusion is already known pervasion relation. This states that the inferred property S pervades the e.g. perceptually, then the inferrer has to have a special wish to re- reason property H just in case there is no place/entity where H is located establish it inferentially). This condition is known as 'pakșatā', and but S is absent. Formally: should not to be confused with 'paksadharmatā', which is the name of condition (i) above. V1 Pervades (S, H) iff -(Ex)(Hx & S'x).

8.2 Definitions of the Pervasion (vyapti) Relation where S' is used to denote the complement of S. This definition is traceable both to the early Nyāya notion of a 'deviating' pseudo-reason

Vyāpti or pervasion, is that relation between the inferential sign (hetu) (i.e. one which occurs somewhere where the inferable property S is

and the inferred property (sādhya), which legitimises the inference. It absent), and to Dinnāga's 'triple-condition' theory of the inferential sign,

would typically be expressed by a sentence such as "wherever there is his third condition being that H must not be located in any "disagreeing

smoke there is fire", or "whatever exists is transitory". Knowledge of this case" (cf. 'vipakşa'), i.e. a place where S is absent. In either case, the

relation, according to the Nyaya, is the instrumental cause in the intuition is that a relation expressed by "where there is smoke there is

inferential process-it is that relation knowledge of which, when fire" obtains just in case there is no place where fire is absent but smoke

combined with observation of the inferential sign, will permit us to make is present, i.e. no counter-example. The first definition which Gangeśa

a sound or knowledge-yielding inference. Gangeśa therefore attaches considers is of just this form. It is that S pervades H iff H has "non-

great importance to the precise definition of this relation. He notes as occurrence in the loci of absence of S" (sādhyābhāvavad-avrttitvam), i.e.

many as twenty-one definitions all of which he rejects for some reason or V1.

other, and then he goes on to give seven further formulations, each of which he considers acceptable. Of the definitions he rejects, the first five Why is this plausible-seeming interpretation of the notion of pervasion

came to be known as the 'vyāpti-pañcaka', and inspired a huge literature rejected in Navya-Nyāya? There are two reasons:

both among the Sanskrit commentators and their modern interpreters. The Problem of Partially Locatable Properties. The first problem with the These definitions are traceable to the earlier Buddhist and Nyāya 'no counter-example' definition depends on the Navya-nyāya notion of literature. Two more rejected definitions, known as the 'Lion and Tiger' partial location (avyāpya-vrtti). A property is said to occur wholly or definitions, are apparently due to Gangeśa's Navya-Nyāya predecessors completely in an object if it occurs in every part of that object. For (Wada 2007, ch. 5). The definition Gangeśa finally accepts is called his example, the property of being golden occurs completely in a piece of 'siddhānta-lakșaņa'. (pure) gold; the object is 'saturated' (abhivyāpya) by the property, just as sesame oil saturates a sesame seed. Some properties, however, occur in

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some parts of the object but not others-these are called "partially inference "The mountain has fire, because it has smoke". Suppose we locatable". For example, the property of being molten occurs at the centre find a place where smoke is present, and fire is both absent and also of the Earth but not at the periphery. Note that the same property can be present, e.g. the kitchen. Does this show the inference to be faulty? wholly located in some loci and partially located in others-e.g. redness According to definition V1, it does, because the kitchen will be a counter- occurs wholly in a ruby but partially in a red snooker ball. The distinction example, a place where smoke is present and fire absent. But this is concerns two modes of property-possession, not two types of property. wrong: since fire is also present there, it is not a real counter-example to An important point is that, if a property is partially located in an object, the rule "where there is smoke there is fire". The upshot is that we must then so is its negation. The Naiyāyikas' standard example of a partially examine the "presence ranges" of the reason property and inferred locatable property, viz. " ... is in contact with a monkey" (kapi-samyoga), properties, not their "absence ranges". A real counter-example to rule is a illustrates the point. If the monkey is sitting on a branch of a tree, then the case which is in the presence-range of the reason property but not in the following statements may be true: presence range of the inferred property.

1. The tree is in-contact-with-the-monkey at time t, and Gangeśa's second definition is designed to solve this problem: H's "non- 2. The tree is not-in-contact-with-the-monkey at time t, occurrence in the loci of absence of S which are different from locus of

(2) being true because there are parts of the tree with which the monkey is S". In other words, a locus of absence of S which is also not a locus of S

not in contact. Nyäya avoids the threatened violation of the law of non- should not be a locus of H:

contradiction by relativising the notion of occurrence. (1) is thus analysed V2 Pervades (S, H) iff (x)(Hx & S'x & -Sx). as "the occurrence, of the property being-in-contact-with-the-monkey in the tree, is delimited by (avacchinna) the branch". Since a different The effect of the new clause is precisely to rule out the problem of

delimitor appears in (2), there is no inconsistency between the two partially locatable properties, by specifying more restrictively what

statements. constitutes a counter-example.

The main effect of admitting partially located properties into the system is The Problem of Universally Positive Inference. There are, claim the

that it is no longer the case that a property, P, and its complement, P', are Nyāya, patterns of legitimate inference in which the property inferred has disjoint: they may now intersect. If the inferred property is partially as its extension the entire domain. Such inference are called

located, then the class of "agreeing cases" (sapaksas - places where the 'kevalānvayin' or 'universally positive' (cf. TS 55). The stock Nyāya inferred property is present) and the class of "disagreeing cases" example is the inference "This is nameable, because it is knowable".

(vipakşas-places where the inferred property is absent) overlap rather nameability being regarded as a property of everything. Another example than being distinct classes. To put it another way, a property P should be would be "This exists because it is produced". If such an inference is thought of as having both a "presence range" (P+) and an "absence sound, then its reason property and inferred property must exemplify the range" (P-), and the two may overlap. Consider now the standard pervasion relation. According to the above definition, to say that nameability pervades knowability is to say that any locus of the property

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absence-of-nameability is not a locus of knowability. The problem is that, locus of smoke which is also a locus of the absence of some property, since nameability is a universal property, absence-of-nameability is an coldness say, then coldness cannot be identical with fieriness. That is: uninstantiated (aprasiddha) property, and the Nyāya claim that such properties are ontologically suspect. To put it another way, the statement Pervades (S, H) only if (Ex)(Hx & P'x)-> (P #S). "any locus of the property absence-of-nameability is not a locus of knowability" includes a non-referring expression, "locus-of-absence-of- (There is an implicit quantification over P here). What this says is that

nameability" or "unnameable thing", and hence is not truth-evaluable. there is no place where H is collocated with the absence of S, but it does

The problem does not arise for all uninstantiated properties, for some, e.g. so without actually using the potentially non-referring phrase "absence of

being a sky-lotus, or being a square circle, can be shown to be constructs S", and it thereby avoids the problem of universally positive properties.

made out of simpler instantiated properties. Thus, the statement "The However, although this condition is necessary for pervasion, it is not

square circle is circular" can be taken not as containing a non-referring sufficient, for it is consistent with H (or S) being uninstantiated. So

expression, but as meaning "The circle is square and circular". However, Gangesa insists too that H and S must be collocated:

'unnameable (thing)' is not decomposable into two distinct properties this Pervades (S, H) iff way. i. Ex (Hx & P'x) -> (P # S), and

None of the interpretations of the 'no counter-example' definition ii. Ex (Hx & Sx).

considered by Gangeśa can solve the problem of universally positive inferences, and Gangeśa accordingly rejects them all. His own definition Gangeśa's trick implicitly trades on the theorem "A -> B = (A & - B)". Thus clause (i) is virtually equivalent to V1. This shows too that we do uses a trick to get round the problem. not yet have a definition which can deal with the partially locatable

8.4 Gangeśa's Definition: the 'siddhānta-lakșaņa' properties, for which we need something more like V2. Hence Gangesa's final definition is:

The Manual of Reason reproduces with slight simplification Gangeśa's new definition. It says that S and H are related by the pervasion relation V3 Pervades (S, H) iff

just in case there is collocation of H with S and S is not a property the i. 3x (Hx & P'x & Px) -> (P # S), and

absence of which is collocated with H ii. Ex (Hx & Sx).

(hetusamānādhikaraņātyantābhāvāpratiyogi-sādhyasāmānādhikaraņyam vyāptiḥ; TS 50). Almost the same formulation is found in other Navya- This definition of pervasion is able to handle both universally positive

Nyāya texts, such as the Siddhānta-muktāvali. This definition is supposed properties and partially located properties appearing as inferred property.

to be applicable even if the inferred property S is 'universally positive'. One may wonder why it is that, since a pervasion relation is of the form The idea, roughly, is that if S pervades H then no property whose absence "all Hs are S", the Naiyāyikas did not simply use the notion of universal is collocated with H can be identical to S. If we can find an instance of a quantification in their definitions. The answer, perhaps, is that they were

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in fact trying to define this notion, and to do so only in terms of certain The output of the process, i.e. the effect of the combined causal factors, is other notions which they took to be primitive, especially the notion of co- the hearer's forming a belief, for example belief that location and absence. If this is correct, however, then we must show how to reconstruct the definition without its implicit quantification over a [P] The cat is on the mat.

property P (cf. Goekoop 1967). Just as, in the case of perception, a number of auxiliary causal factors,

9. Meaning, Understanding and Testimony such as there being adequate lighting, the perceiver's sense-faculty being in good condition, the perceiver paying attention, etc., so here too. Nyāya 9.1 The Language Processing Mechanism isolates four such factors for special attention, namely: spatio-temporal 'contiguity' (sannidhi) of the uttered words; the speaker's intention Just as perception and inference are described, in the pramāna system, as (tātparya); 'syntactic expectancy' (ākānkșā); and 'semantic fitness' knowledge-yielding faculties, so too is language. This leads the Nyāya to (yogyatā) (cf. TS 67). The first is self-explanatory: if the words in the formulate a description of the mechanism by which a competent utterance are uttered one at a time over a long period of time, or mixed in language-user is able to decode noise-utterances and derive language- with the words of a distinct utterance, it will be impossible form a proper based knowledge. The description The Manual of Reason gives of this auditory perception of the utterance. The second, 'speaker's intention' is 'language processing mechanism' is as follows (TS 67, 68). The input to appealed to when the sentence contains an ambiguous word- the process is the hearer's auditory perception of a spoken utterance qua disambiguation proceeds via consideration of the speaker's intended uninterpreted noise, and this is identified as the 'special' instrument cause meaning. The Manual of Reason defines 'syntactic expectancy' as 'the (karana). For example, hearing the noise-string inability of one word to produce, without another word, an awareness of

[*] "The" "cat" "is" "on" "the" "mat". the relation between them', and it cites, as an example of an utterance which fails to possess such expectancy, the sentence "horse man

The 'operative condition' (vyāpāra) is the hearer's (tacit) knowledge of elephant". Clearly the idea is at least that the utterance must be

the meaning (śakti-jñāna) of each of the words in the utterance. This is grammatically correct. More than that, there is a suggestion that it is in

what marks off a person who understands the language in question from virtue of the syntactical rules that the unarticulated semantic relations

one who does not (but who may, nevertheless hear the words spoken, between the words are expressed. What makes it the case that someone

without having the capacity to interpret them). For example, knowledge who understands the utterance "the cat is on the mat" grasps a united

tha proposition, and not just a list of items [the cat, the on-relation, the mat]? The idea here, perhaps, is that (knowledge of) the syntactical rules [M1] "the cat" means the cat, generates an awareness of the connecting relations between each of these

[M2] "the mat" means the mat, and items.

[M3] "is on" means the substratum-superstratum relation. 'Semantic fitness' (yogyatā) is an intriguing concept. The Manual of

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Reason defines it as 'the absence of incompatibility among what is admitted (TSD 66a)? (ii) What is the relatum, i.e. with what type of entity signified by the words', and illustrates its definition by contrasting the are words semantically related (TSD 66b, k)? (iii) How do we learn the sentence "He sprinkles the field with water" with "He sprinkles the field meaning of a word (TSD 66c, d). with fire". The idea is that the activity of sprinkling is 'compatible with' (i.e. can only be done with) a liquid like water, and not with a substance (i) The Mīmāmsakas and Grammarians were 'essentialists' about

like fire. It would be like saying "Cathood is on the mat" or perhaps meaning, arguing that the Sanskrit language is a natural entity, Chomsky's "Colourless green ideas sleep furiously". Such sentences, independent of human convention or usage, whose words possess intrinsic

though grammatically correct, do not make sense. This causal factor, then, semantic powers to signify objects, just as fire has the intrinsic capacity to is that an utterance is intelligible only if the proposition expressed is burn. The Naiyāyikas traditionally opposed this view, arguing instead that ontologically possible, by the light of a preconceived ontological system, language is a product of convention, and that it is possible to account for such as the Vaiśeşika system of categories. Some Naiyāyikas, however, a word's semantic power in terms of stipulations governing its use. The impose a more demanding requirement, that to be 'semantically fit' the claim is that we can define (and hence analyse) the meaning-relation thus:

utterance must be true, i.e. that 'fit' = 'true', not merely 'possible', and consequently that an utterance is intelligible only if it is true! In effect, x means y iff there is a decree/stipulation (sanketa) of the form

they identify 'semantic fitness' with the 'guna' or 'causal factor leading "Let utterances of x generate cognitions of y".

to truth', in the language-processing mechanism. We will return to this Now a stipulation or decree is claimed to consist in the decree-maker's dispute a little later. having a certain mental state, viz. a 'desire' or 'will' (icchā) of the form

9.2 Semantic Power and the Reduction of Semantic Properties specified. Thus, the meaning relation is analysed in terms of mental states and their contents, and not as a new type of relation. Who is the decree-

The Manual of Reason's definition of a word is celebrated and often maker? The Manual of Reason states that it is God, but most later

quoted. It says (TS 66) that a word is that which has semantic power Naiyāyikas drew a distinction between words which have belonged

(śaktam padam). A sentence (vākya) is defined as a collection of words. 'endlessly' in the language (introduced by God) and words introduced by

So The Manual of Reason's definition fits with the modern one, according an explicit human stipulation (e.g. the technical terms in Pāņini's

to which a word is a semantically significant sentential constituent. grammar).

Semantic power is that knowledge of which enables the competent hearer to interpret the word, and this, for the Naiyāyikas, consists in the word's (ii) What is the meaning-relatum of a word like "cow", a generic nominal

standing for an object. Thus, someone who understands the word "cat' expression? Here again The Manual of Reason contrasts the Nyāya view

knows something of the form <"cat" means cat>, where "means" is a with that of the Mīmāmsakas. One sub-school of Mīmāmsakas (the

relation between words and objects of some type. The Manual of Reason Bhätta) claim that the meaning of "cow" is the universal cowhood, since

raises three questions about this relation: (i) Is it a new and irreducible sentences like "(The) cow is an animal", or injunctive laws like "Never

type or relation, not reducible, that is, to any of the relations already kick a cow", say something about the entire class of cows, not about any one individual. Thus:

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(Bh) "cow" means cowhood. which they refer, but every token utterance nevertheless shares a common semantic property, viz. " ...- qualified-by-cowhood". The Naiyāyikas in

In reply to the obvious objection, that in many other sentences, such as this way draw a distinction between type- and token- meaning (or, as

"The cow is in the garden", a particular cow is referred to, these some say, between meaning and reference).

Mīmāmsakas appeal to the idea that a sentence can carry an 'implication' (ākșepa) other than its literal meaning. Thus the sentence "The cow is in The other Mīmāmaka sub-school (Prābhākara) claim that, in order to

the garden" may mean literally that cowhood is collocated with explain the fact that, on hearing a sentence, we grasp a unified proposition

occurrence-in-the-garden (i.e. that there exists a cow in the garden), but and not just a list of entities, the meaning-relatum of a word like "cow" is

carries the implication that a certain particular cow is in the garden. The 'an object connected with another' (itarānvita). The meaning-relatum is a

principle here is that a prior awareness of the qualifier (viśeșana) leads to cow along with a 'hook' to link it with other meaning-relata. More

an implicated awareness of the thing qualified (viseşya) (TSD 66b). The precisely, the meaning of the word would be something like

Nyāya reply to this argument proceeds by way of rejecting the principle (Pr) "cow" means a cow-individual, which is ...... cited, for, they say, awareness of a qualifier or universal is possible only via an awareness of the thing qualified. So the sentence "The cow is in the garden" does not just mean the list <cow, being in the garden>, as it would if each word simply designated The Manual of Reason states the modern Nyāya view: the meaning of an an object, but rather the connected proposition <cow-which-is in-the- utterance of the word "cow" is a particular individual as qualified by garden>. The idea, in effect, is that all meaning-relata, are, in Frege's cowhood (jāti-viśişta-vyakti): terminology, 'unsaturated'. To this ingenious suggestion, The Manual of

(Ny) "cow" means a-cow-as-qualified-by-cowhood. Reason replies (TSD 66k) that it is superfluous, for "since it is possible for the relation [between meaning-relata] to be apprehended as what is

The idea is this. Anyone who understands an utterance of the sentence signified by the sentence [as a whole], it is not necessary to postulate a

"(The) cow is in the garden" does so by (a) identifying a certain object as semantic power with reference to the relation". In other words, The

the referent of the word "cow", and (b) grasps that that individual is Manual of Reason claims that general (presumably syntactic) features of

qualified by the property occurrence-in-the-garden. However, one can the sentence are enough to connect the meaning-relata, without needing to

only identify an object by distinguishing it from others, and this involves claim that those meaning-relata themselves do the connecting.

the use of a distinguishing feature. So the individual is grasped in (iii) The Naiyayikas offer the following account (TSD 66c) of language awareness as distinguished/qualified by the feature cowhood. Since the meaning of a word is, by definition, its contribution to the final belief acquisition. The child makes a series of observations concerning the

generated by hearing the utterance containing the word, the meaning of linguistic behaviour of adults. She hears adult A utter a certain noise

"cow" is an individual as qualified by cowhood. Note that, on such a "Bring the cow" say, and sees adult B perform a certain action, bringing

theory, token utterances of "cow" vary with respect to the individual to of the cow. Again, she hears A utter the noise "Bring the horse", and sees B bring the horse, and hears "Feed the cow" and sees the cow being fed.

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Then, by a twin inductive process, of (a) "agreement in presence" the testifier is an authority in this sense or not? (anvaya) and "agreement in absence" (vyatireka)-i.e. noticing the correlation between A making or not making an utterance and B To confuse matters further, The Manual of Reason says that the 'guna',

performing or not performing an action, and (b) 'collection' (āvāpa) and causal factor responsible for the truth of the testifiee's belief, is

'rejection (udvāpa)-i.e. noticing the regularities between utterances of 'yathārtha-yogyatā-jñāna', which can mean either (i) veridical cognition

"cow" and events concerning the cow, utterances of "bring" and bringing of semantic fitness, or (ii) cognition of veridical semantic fitness. In either

events, etc., the child understands that the word "cow" is linked with case, the 'guna' has nothing to do with the speaker's credentials, it seems.

objects belonging the class of cows, etc. Option (ii), however, must be wrong, for it cannot be a condition upon testimony that the hearer already knows that what was said is true. Option This is an empiricist account of language learning reminiscent of the (i), however, would not guarantee that the final hearer's belief is true, account attributed by Wittgenstein to Augustine, and severely criticised unless by 'fitness' The Manual of Reason now intends a rather stronger by him. Apart from the superhuman inferential powers attributed to the notion, according to which the meaning-relata 'fit' together iff they are in child, the problem highlighted by Wittgenstein is that no amount of fact connected, i.e. if the utterance expresses a truth. This is, indeed, how observation can show, for example, that the relevant correlation is some other Naiyāyikas understand the notion of yogyatā, but does not between "cow" and cow-individuals, and not between "cow" and B's accord with The Manual of Reason's own definition. cow-directed-actions, the universal cowhood, heifers rather than cows, etc. (cf. TSD 66d). I propose the following resolution. The language processing mechanism was described above as one which issues in the testifiee believing that 9.3 Testimony which the testifier says. The truth of the testifiee's belief will therefore depend upon whether or not the testifier is speaking truly, and so this The Manual of Reason says that statements are either Vedic or secular. It should be called the 'guna' here. However, we do not always believe adds that (hearing a) Vedic statement is a pramāna, a means of knowing what we hear, especially if we have reasons to suppose that the speaker is that which is stated, because Vedic statements are originally uttered by not likely to be speaking the truth. It is possible, then, that the output of God. (The Mīmāmsakas dispute this. Not believing in God, they say the language processing mechanism is not simply belief in what was said, instead that a Vedic statement is a means of knowing precisely because it but rather belief simply that it has been said. There are, roughly, two sorts has no personal origin, and error in testimony is always a result of human of case when this can happen: (1) if the testifiee judges that the testifier is error in the source!) Hearing a secular statement is a means of knowing deceitful or unreliable or simply uninformed about the topic, and (2) if the only if the speaker is an 'authoritative person' (āpta). An authoritative testifiee knows on independent grounds that what the testifier is saying is person is defined as one who speaks the truth (yathārthavaktā). There is false (which is consistent with the testifier believing it and testifying an ambiguity here: is an authoritative person one who is speaking the sincerely), perhaps on a priori grounds concerning the plausibility of the truth with respect to the particular utterance in question, or one who is assertion. With a little interpretative licence, we might think that these generally truthful? Another question here is: must the testifiee know that two conditions correspond to the two conditions imposed by The Manual

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of Reason on testimony: that the testifier must be an 'authority' (āpta), natural properties according to Nyāya. and that the sentence must be 'semantically fit' (yogya). The six impediments are (1) 'non-plurality'-a genuine universal must be 10. The Vaiśeşika Concepts of Universal, Inherence, plurally instantiated; (2) 'equipollence' (tulyatva)-two co-extensive and Basic Differentium properties cannot both be genuine universals; (3) 'cross-connection' (samkara)-two genuine universals must not partially overlap; (4) 10.1 Universals 'regress'-a property like universality cannot itself be a universal, on pain of infinite regress (universality-hood, etc. etc.); (5) a property like The Manual of Reason reports the standard Nyāya-Vaiśeșika definition of differentia-hood cannot be a genuine universal, for by definition the basic a universal (sāmānya, jāti): differentia share no common universal property; (6) a property like

A universal is something which is (i) eternal, (ii) unitary, and (iii) inherence-hood cannot be a universal, since it does not inhere in its loci.

located in a plurality of things (substances, qualities or motions). Of these six, the last three are there basically to maintain the internal

(TS 82) consistency of the Vaisesika system, and the first is a straightforward consequence of the definition of a universal. It debars a singly-instanced

Universals are thus conceived of as unstructured, objective properties properties such as space-hood from the status of genuine natural kind,

which necessarily reside in individuals. The postulation of such entities in perhaps motivated by the thought that the very nature of a universal

the Vaiseșika schema has explanatory force, accounting for the distinction consists in its grounding judgements of the form "x is of the same kind as

between 'natural' and 'conventional' classifications. Intuitively, this is the y", which presuppose that there are at least two entities.

distinction between groupings such as the class of cows or horses, which reflect natural divisions ("cut nature at the joints"), and those such as the The second and third criteria are the most important, and can be stated

class of Cabinet Ministers or the class of endangered species, which more formally as follows. If P and Q are distinct properties, then

reflect anthropocentric concerns. The Naiyāyikas mark this distinction by (equipollence, tulyatva):

calling natural properties "universals" (jāti) and anthropocentric [P] = [Q]->either P or Q (or both) is not a universal, properties "imposed" or "nominal" properties (upādhi). Correlatively, a semantic distinction is drawn between "natural kind terms" (naimittikī), where '[P]' denotes the extension of P. The contraposed form is:

i.e. terms the basis for whose application is a universal, and "imposed kind terms", terms whose basis for application is an anthropocentric P and Q are universals -> [P]# [Q].

property. Udayana tried to make this distinction more precise by giving a list of criteria for a property to count as natural. Examination of his list Note that this does not entail that universal properties are extensionally individuated or equivalent to classes, as some have maintained. It shows (which are called the "jāti-bādhakas"-impediments distinguishing only that corresponding to each class, there is at most one universal. natural properties) will reveal something further about the nature of the Although, within the domain of universals, a universal is uniquely

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determined by its extension, the distinction between a universal and a co- There is thus some evidence that the Nyāya bias for real generic extensive imposed property (e.g. pothood and conch-shell-like-neck- properties was partly influenced by the Brahmanical concept of an hood) is an intensional distinction. ideal social order where intermixture of classes is not to be

As for the third impediment (sāmkarya), if P and Q are distinct permitted.

properties, then Some Naiyāyikas, especially Bhāsarvajña and Raghunātha, reject the

[P] partially overlaps [Q] -> either P or Q (or both) is not a 'cross-connection' impediment, pointing out the problems encountered trying to apply it to non-biological natural kinds (e.g. redness and universal. greenness overlap, as do pothood and goldhood). Raghunātha suggests

The contraposed form is: that consistent application of this principle would eliminate virtually all universals from the ontology. Udayana's criterion of a property to be P and Q are universals -> [P] C[Q] or [P]D[Q] or [P] n [Q]= 'natural' is thus not a necessary one, and neither is it sufficient: none of Ø. his impediments shows why the pair 'blue-green' is more natural than Goodman's pair 'grue-bleen' (where x is grue iff x is green and examined (The inclusion is strict because of the 'equipollence' constraint.) In other before time t, and is blue otherwise, and vice versa for bleen.) words, genuine universals are arranged in a hierarchy: given two universals, either they are related as genus and species, all instances of The idea that universals are, in some sense, 'located' in particulars one being instances of the other, or else they are completely disjoint, generated two distinctive objections to the theory. Dinnāga trades on the having no instance in common (e.g. cowhood-animalhood, cowhood- spatial metaphor to argue that the Nyāya conception of universals is treehood). The Nyāya say that, if one universal is thus subsumed by incoherent. For, if a universal is 'unitary', it can be located in at most one another, the former is 'lower' (apara) and the latter is 'higher' (para) (cf. place, and thus not 'plurally instanced'. If, conversely, if is located TS 6). The 'highest' universal of all is 'existentness' (sattā), into whose simultaneously at many places, that can only be because it has parts, each extension falls every substance, quality and motion. The demand that located at a different place, and hence is not 'unitary'. This argument universals be organised hierarchically shows that the Nyāya took as their plays on the ambiguity of the notion of 'being located', and pretends that paradigm the biological species, which tend to exhibit this structure. a universal like cowhood is located in individual cows in just the same Bearing in mind that the term for "universal", i.e. "jati" is also the word sense that a cow is located in a field. Nevertheless, it forces the Nyāya to for caste, Matilal (1971: 76) speculates that be more careful in its account of the universal-particular relation. As The Manual of Reason notes (TS 84), a universal is said to reside in its [O]ne might discover in the Nyāya doctrine of generic property a instances by the relation of 'inherence' (samavāya), defined as an remote influence of the socio-religious ideas of the Brahmins. "inseparability" (ayutasiddhi) relation. Of two entities, x and y, Translated into biological terms, the ... principle of 'non- overlapping' becomes a principle which opposes cross-breeding. s inscparable from y ilf x x is inseparable from y iff x cannot exist unless y exists.

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The idea is that a cow cannot exist unless the universal cowhood exists, certain constraints are placed on the range of properties quantified over. and that it is in this sense that cowhood is located in the cow. (The same For example, if the property " ... = y" is permitted, the principle states relation is claimed to occur between non-repeatable 'qualities' (guna) and vacuously that identicals are identical. The Vaiśeșikas implicitly restrict substances, a whole and its parts, and the basic differentia and the atoms.) the principle to intrinsic, non-relational properties of the objects Spatial location, on the other hand, involves a quite different relation, concerned, ruling out, for example, 'being at a certain spatial or temporal namely contact (samyoga). In this way, the term 'location' is location' as being a property capable of discriminating two otherwise disambiguated. identical objects. Thus, the claim seems to be that no two objects,

The other problem is the classic one: what happens to a universal if all its including atoms, can be intrinsically identical. This is how Leibniz

instances are destroyed? Can universals exist without being instantiated? himself appears to have understood his Law, saying that "It is always

The definition of the inherence relation permits this, for the requirement necessary that beside the difference of time and place there be internal

is that cows cannot exist without cowhood, not vice versa. We might say principles of distinction .... thus although time and place serve in

that the cow's existence supervenes on that of the universal cowhood. distinguishing things, we do not easily distinguish them by themselves,"

However, it is not so clear that we can say in the same way that the parts and that "There is no such thing as two individuals indiscernible from

(of a car, say) cannot exist unless the whole (car) exists. each other. Two drops of water, or milk, viewed with a microscope, will appear distinguishable from each other".

10.2 The Basic Differentia (viśeșa) The principle is, admittedly, as strong one. Wittgenstein (Tractatus

The Vaiśeșika traditionally and uniquely accept into their ontology a 5.5302) points out that it entails the logical impossibility of a universe

category of item called 'basic differentia' (viśeșa), from which, some containing two identical spheres; Wiggins notes that it implies the logical

claim, they derive their name. The Manual of Reason defines these items impossibility of even a single sphere (or any other symmetrical object),

as follows (TS 83): "those entities which reside in the eternal substances since it entails the identity of the two hemispheres (and so on until one

[i.e. the atoms] and function as their differentiators are called viseșa". The reaches a geometrical point). More to the point, as the Vaiśeșikas

idea is that, just as a cow and a horse are distinct entities, as they have implicitly realised, it implies the logical impossibility of more than one

distinct properties, so too even two atoms of the same substance, e.g. atom of a given substance (having a certain velocity, spin, etc.). Rather

earth, must differ with respect to at least one property. Each atom, than reject the principle, however, they instead introduced new intrinsic

therefore, possesses a 'differentium' unique to itself, which serves to properties, the basic differentia, thereby avoiding the unpalatable

distinguish it from any other atom of the same type. The assumption, consequence.

then, is that any two non-identical items are distinguished by virtue of 11. The Ontology of Nonexistence (abhāva) and the possessing distinct properties. This is the contraposed version of Leibniz' Law that Indiscernibles are Identical, that (VP)(Px=Py)-> (x=y), Semantics of Negative Statements

where "P" ranges over properties. The principle faces triviality unless 11.1 Motivations

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The later Naiyāyikas develop a remarkable theory of nonexistence. P2 Sentences correspond to facts constructed out of simple or

According to them, the absence of an object or feature at a particular complex entities (i.e. entities like 'a', 'absence of a', 'a-&-b', 'a-

spatial or temporal location is a state of affairs just as objective as the or-b').

presence of the object or feature there. To Kanāda's original list of six The principle entails that one cannot use the truth-functional connectives categories (padārtha) or types of existent, they therefore add a seventh, to construct facts, except where they are equivalent to term-logical 'absence' (abhāva). This ontological doctrine is underpinned by (i) connectives. (For example, the sentence "Rama and Sita are righteous" is phenomenological and (ii) semantic considerations. equivalent to "Rama is righteous and Sita is righteous", but the term-

(i) The phenomenological point was that a negative awareness, say that a connective in "Rama and Sita are married" is not similarly eliminable in

certain person is not in the room, is a kind of awareness phenomenally favour of the truth-functional conjunction "Rama is married and Sita is

distinct from any awareness about what is in the room. Cognition of what married".) The point is that a sentence like "The pot is not on the ground"

is not has an autonomous phenomenology (this idea is notably articulated cannot correspond to a fact of the form '-bRa' (as there are no such facts

by Sartre). The principle appealed to is thus: according to P2), but must rather correspond to a fact of the form 'bRā'. Hence the introduction into one's ontology of negative entities.

P1 Experiences of nonexistence are phenomenally distinct from, and irreducible to, experiences of existents. 11.2 Temporally and Spatially Located Absence

The idea emerges in the Nyaya epistemology with their claim that The Manual of Reason (TS 85-88) reports the usual Nyāya view that

absence is perceived, and that this perception is a sui generis type of there are four types of absence: prior nonexistence (prāgabhāva);

perceptual experience, not reducible to a combination of ordinary posterior nonexistence or 'destruction' (dhvamsa); 'constant' or

perception and inference (cf. the sixth type of sensory connection in 'absolute' absence (atyantābhāva); and difference (anyonyābhāva). Of

Uddyotakara's list). these, the first two refer to possible temporal states of a transient object. Suppose we represent the temporal duration of a person A by the (ii) The semantic point is that the Nyāya espouse a version of the following line (assuming that he lived between 1650 and 1750):

correspondence theory of truth, according to which true sentences correspond to facts. It is alleged that true negative sentences (e.g. "The t1 1650 t2 1750 t3

pot is not on the ground") correspond to 'negative facts'. Facts, however, are all, for the Nyāya, of the same basic relational form, 'bRa' (they are said to have a qualificand-relation-qualifier structure; i.e. they are At any time t1 prior to 1650, A does not yet exist, and at any time t3 later

complexes of existing entities). This restriction on what constitutes a fact than 1750, A no longer exists. In accordance with the above principles,

is expressible via the following semantical principle: Nyāya reformulates these negative existential claims as positive existential statements about negative entities, namely, the 'prior absence of A', '<A' say, and the 'posterior absence of A', 'A>' say. Thus, the first

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reads: the ground at some times but not others. Perhaps the point is that the locus of the absence here is a spatial entity rather than a temporal one. <A exists at t1, For example, the construction "Heat is not in ice" illustrates this kind of

or, since, in the Nyāya idiom, objects are said to be located in time as absence. Perhaps, furthermore, the force of this negation is that the pot is

well as in space, never located on the ground-hence we cannot speak of the prior or posterior absence of the pot (for these concepts are defined in terms of 1. <A is located at t1. times when the pot is present). (E.g. Udayana's definition of a substance as that which does not have a constant absence of qualities.) Similarly, The fourth type of absence, 'difference' (anyonyābhāva), is illustrated by 2. A> is located at t3. the sentence "The pot is not (the) cloth". This is to be read as a non-

What happens at times such as t2? These are times at which A exists or is identity statement.

present (is located). Note, furthermore, that, at t2, there is a posterior The Naiyāyikas thus say that every negative sentence is the negation of a absence of <A (for the prior absence of A is destroyed when A comes into sentence of the form "aRb", and they distinguish between cases where the existence), which we designate by '(<A)>'. There is also a prior absence relation R is the identity relation and cases where it is a relation other of A> (for the posterior absence of A does not yet exist), i.e. '<(A>)'. The than identity. The object a is called the locus of the absence, and the Manual of Reason (TSD 89E) records the older Naiyāyikas' claim that object b is called the 'counterpositive' or 'negatum' (pratiyogin) of the these double absences must be identical with the original entity, on pain absence, i.e. it is the object whose presence in the locus is being denied. of an infinite regress. Thus: This highlights the fact that absences are thought of as a kind of property

(<A)> =< (A>)=A. or 'locatable', rather than as a kind of 'location' (at least when the relation is not identity). For example, the absence of A is located in many

Later Naiyāyikas apparently disputed this natural identity (which places at once. It is not said that there is a distinct absence-of-A at each

corresponds to the Law of Double Negation in classical logic), on the and every place where A is absent. We can now see how the Nyāya parse

ground that double negative constructions contain the concept of negation, negative sentences without using a sentential negation. Take the sentence

and hence are logically more complex. "The pot is not blue". The first-order paraphrase of this would be: It is not the case that the pot is blue (-Fa). The Nyāya strategy is first to say A third type of absence, called 'constant' or 'absolute' absence that every property, such as blueness, has both an extension F (places (atyantābhāva) is illustrated by constructions of the form "The pot is not where it is located) and a counter-extension F' (places where its absence on the ground". The Manual of Reason states (TS 87) that what is located), and then to paraphrase the sentence as: The pot has absence- distinguishes this type of absence is that it is located in the three times- of-blue. Note that a partially locatable property is one for which the past, present and future. This seems odd, as it might be that the pot is on extension and counter-extension overlap-it is possible for a feature to be

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collocated with its absence. 5. (This) pot is not in the room, and

11.3 The Logic of Negation 6. (Any) pot is not in the room

(N.B. they would be expressed by the same sentence in Sanskrit; hence The Manual of Reason (TS 89) makes some very interesting observations about the logical properties of absence or negation. the brackets). To say that there is a specific absence of pot in the room is to say that some particular pot is not in the room, but to say that generic

Reference versus description. It is claimed that there is a distinction absence of pot in the room is to say that any pot is not in the room (i.e. no

between a qualified absence (viśiştābhāva) and a mere absence pot is in the room). The distinction is thus linked to the formulation of

(kevalābhāva). Consider the following pair of sentences: universally quantified constructions. Indeed, in Nyāya logical theory, generic absences are used to formulate the pervasion (vyāpti) relation:

3. Annambhatta is not in the room, and "where there is smoke there is fire" is contraposed to give "where there is 4. The author of The Manual of Reason is not in the room. no fire there is no smoke", and this is expressed by saying that there is a generic absence of smoke in places where there is a generic absence of The idea is that in (3) the 'mere' absence of Annambhatta is located in fire (cf. Ingalls 1951: 54-5). It is clear that (5) and (6) do have distinct the room, whereas in (4) a qualified absence (of Annambhatta as qualified logical forms. In the Nyaya technical language, the distinction is made by authorhood) is located in the room. Do (3) and (4) really have distinct out by saying that the property which delimits the counterpositiveness of logical forms? Perhaps we find here a realisation that nominal expressions the absence (i.e. the pratiyogitāvacchedaka) is this-pot-hood in (5), but such as "The author of The Manual of Reason" have two distinct logical pothood in (6). functions, namely those of referring to an individual and describing an individual via his properties. (4) can thus be read either as asserting the Logical Connectives and De Morgan's Laws. The Manual of Reason same as (3), that Annambhatta is not in the room, or as saying that the touches on the meaning of conjunctive and disjunctive absence, i.e. author of The Manual of Reason, whoever it or she is, is not in the room, absence of (both A and B) (ubhayābhāva) and absence of (either A or B) i.e. that the properties 'being the author of The Manual of Reason" and (anyatarābhāva). It observes that an awareness that two pots are absent is "being in the room" are not collocated. If that is the sense in which (4) consistent with an awareness that one pot is present (and the other involves a qualified absence, then (3) and (4) do have different logical absent). In fact, as Ingalls shows (1951: 63-67) the Nyäya recognised the

forms. validity of two general equations:

Universal Quantification. The Manual of Reason draws another very absence of (both A and B) = (absence of A) or (absence of B), and important distinction, between a specific absence (viśeşābhāva) and a generic absence (sāmānyābhāva). These are illustrated by the following absence of (either A or B) = (absence of A) and (absence of B).

sentences: These are recognisably versions of De Morgan's Laws, that -(A & B) = A v B, and that - (AvB) =A & -B. As an example of the second of

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these laws, consider Mathuranātha's remark (1951: 66) that a 'heap' of Studies in Laugākși Bhāskara's Tarka-kaumudī, trans. Plamen (specific) absences (abhāva-kūța) is equivalent to a generic absence. A Gradinarov. Delhi: Ajanta Books (1991). place which is the locus of generic absence of fire is a place at which · śaktivāda (Gadādhara). Gadādhara's śaktivāda: Theory of the every particular fire is absent, and conversely, if every specific fire is Expressive Power of Words, trans. V. P. Bhatta. Delhi: Eastern Book absent, then fire is generically absent. Thus the 'heap' (conjunction) of Linkers (1994). specific absences of fire, is equivalent to the absence of any fire at all (the disjunction of specific fires). General Works

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Philosophy. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass Publishers. Press, 44-61. · Faddegon, B. (1918). The Vaiceşika System, described with the help · Mohanty, J. N. (1992). Reason and Tradition in Indian Thought. of the oldest texts. Amsterdam: J. Muller. Oxford: Clarendon. · Foucher, A. (1949). Le Compendium des Topiques D' Annambhatta. · Potter, K. H. (1977). The Tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeșika up to Paris: A. Maisonneuve. Gangeśa. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, Vol. II. Delhi: · Goekoop, G. (1977), The Logic of Invariable Concomitance in the Motilal Banarsidass Publishers. Tattvacintāmaņi (1967). Dordrecht: Reidel. · Raja, K. (1966), Indian Theories of Meaning. Madras: Adyar Library · Mullatti,L.C. (1977). The Navya-Nyāya Theory of Inference. and Research Centre. Dharwad: Karnatak University. · Schayer, S. (1938). Contributions to the Problem of Time in Indian . Halbfass, W. (1992). On Being and What There Is: Classical Philosophy, Kraków: Nakładem Polskiej Akademii Umiejętności. Vaiseșika and the history of Indian Ontology. Albany: State · Seal, B. (1915), The Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus. University of New York Press. London: Longmans, Green. · Ingalls, D. (1951). Materials for the Study of Navya-nyāya Logic. · Sen, P. K., ed. (2006), Philosophical Concepts Relevant to Sciences Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass. in Indian Tradition. PHISPC Volume III Part 4. New Delhi: Centre · Mandal, K. K. (1968), A Comparative Study of the Concepts of for Studies in Civilizations. Space and Time in Indian Thought. Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit . Sen, S. N. (1966), "The Impetus Theory of the Vaiśeşika", Indian Series Office. Journal for the History of Science 1, 34-45. · Matilal, K. (1968) The Navya-nyāya Doctrine of Negation: The · Shastri, S. K. (1961). A Primer of Indian Logic according to semantics and Ontology of Negative Statements in Navya-nyāya Annambhatta's Tarkasamgraha. Madras: Kuppuswami Sastri Philosophy. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Mass. Research Institute. · Matilal,, K. (1977). Nyāya-Vaiśeșika. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz. · Siderits, M. (1991). Indian Philosophy of Language. Dordrecht: · Matilal, B. K. (1985). Logic, Language and Reality. Delhi: Motilal Kluwer Academic Publishers. Banarsidass. · Staal, F. (1988) "Means of Formalisation in Indian and Western . Matilal,, B. K. (1986). Perception: An Essay on Classical Indian Logic", in his Universal: Studies in Indian Logic and Linguistics Theories of Knowledge. Oxford: Clarendon. (1988). Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 81-87. · Matilal, B. K. (1991). The Word and the World: India's Contribution · Subbarayappa, B. V. (1968), "An Estimate of the Vaiśeşika Sūtra in to the Study of Language. Delhi: Oxford University Press. the History of Science", Indian Journal for the History of Science, 2: · Mishra, U. (1987 2nd edn). The Conception of Matter according to 24-34. Nyāya-Vaiseşika. Delhi: Gian Publishing House. · Tachikawa, M. (1981), The Structure of the World in Udayana's · Mohanty, J. N. (1966). "Nyāya Theory of Doubt", in his Essays on Realism. Dordrecht: D. Reidel. Indian Philosophy (1993). New Delhi ; Oxford: Oxford University · Thakur, A. (2003). Origin and Development of the Vaiśeşika System.

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PHISPC Volume II Part 4. New Delhi: Centre for Studies in Civilizations. · Vattanky, J. (1984), Gangeśa's Philosophy of God. Madras: Adyar Library and Research Centre. · Wada, T. (2007). The Analytical Method of Navya-Nyāya. Groningen: Egbert Forsten.

Other Internet Resources

· Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, edited by Karl Potter. · Göttingen Register of Electronic Texts in Indian Languages, including several in Nyāya and Vaiśeșika.

Related Entries

atomism: 17th to 20th century I causation: the metaphysics of | Classical Indian Philosophy: perceptual experience and concepts | Classical Indian Philosophy: self-knowledge | cognition: embodied | Dināga and Dharmakīrti | Frege, Gottlob I memory I mind: philosophy of | Nāgārjuna I navya-nyāya I properties I soul, ancient theories of I time

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