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Indl 3225.36 *

FROM THE ESTATE OF

PROF. CHARLES ROCKWELL LANMAN

HARVARD COLLEGE LIBRARY

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361 THE

APHORISMS

OF THE

NYAYA PHILOSOPHY

BY

GAUTAMA,

WITH ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMENTARY

BY

VIŚWANÁTHA.

IN SANSKRIT AND ENGLISH.

PRINTED, FOR THE USE OF THE BENARES COLLEGE, BY ORDER OF GOVT. N. W. P.

-0000-

ALLAHABAD: PRINTED AT THE PRESBYTERIAN MISSION PRESS. Rev. Jos. WARREN, Superintendens. 1850.

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Ind L 3225.36

HARVARD UNIVERSITY LIBRARY March5,19'+1

F 1487 37

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PREFACE.

-000-

THE great body of the Hindu Philosophy is based upon six sets of very concise Aphorisms. Without a commentary the Apho- risms are scarcely intelligible, they being designed not so much to communicate the doctrine of the particular school as to aid, by the briefest possible suggestions, the memory of him to whom the doctrine shall have been already communicated. To this end they are admirably adapted; and, this being their end, the ob- scurity, which must needs attach to them in the eyes of the un- instructed, is not chargeable upon them as a fault.

For various reasons it is desirable that there should be an ac- curate translation of the Aphorisms with so much of gloss as may be required to render them intelligible. A class of pandits, in the Benares Sanskrit College, having been induced to learn Eng- lish, it is contemplated that a version of the Aphorisms, brought out in successive portions, shall be submitted to the criticism of these men, and, through them, of other learned Brahmans, so that any errors in the version may have the best chance of be- ing discovered and rectified. The employment of such a version as a class-book is designed to subserve further the attempt to de- termine accurately the aspect of the philosophical terminology of the East as regards that of the West. J. R. B. Benares College, 5th January, 1851.

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THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

INTRODUCTION.

a. [The Nyaya-sútra-vritti, or " Explication of the Aphorisms of the Nyaya," commences with the following exordium.] b. Salutation to the illustrious Ganesa! c. May he, the splendour of whose gracefulness of person sur- passes ten million of Cupids ;- who made the joy-and O how delightful it was !- of the bevies of the dames of Vraja ;- whose body is dark as the teeming rain-cloud, and who haunts no tem- ple save the mind ;- may he, the some one [whom, as the well known Krishna, I need not name], promote the felicity of the in- habitants of the three worlds .*

d. In order to produce great good-luck, we meditate on the beau- ty of the toe-nails of Bhavaní, which [beauty], taking an exquisite aspect as it was associated with the ruddy lustre of the newly ap- plied lac-dye, seemed a sort of lovely ornament of Siva's head- when his head was bowed down [at her feet] to deprecate her haughty displeasure-eclipsing [-as the beauty of the toe-nails

• श्री गणेशाय नमः । वपुली लालच्मीजितमटनकोटिर्वजवधू जनानामानन्दं कर्माप कमनीयं विरचयन्। स कोर्दपि प्रेमाणं प्रथयत मनोमन्दिर चरस्त्रिलोकी लोकाना सजवजवदश्यामसननु:।१॥

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4 APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

then did-] the resplendent beauty of the twilight Moon* [which is the usual ornament of Siva's head.]

e. I reverence him [-meaning GAUTAMA-], the resplendent, who has eyes in his feet [as well as in his head-though how, or to serve what purpose, does not seem to be known-], by means of the rays of whose dialectics [-meaning thereby the body of doctrine which he bequeathed to the world-]the virtuous get over the whole darkness that was within them.t

f. We reverence our father, VIDYÁNIVÁSA [the abode of learn- ing], who is as it were a combination in one-of the two gods of wisdom and of justice, the ornament of the globe of the fair earth, a masculine form as it were of the goddess of eloquence, the pro- ducer of confident scholarship [in those enjoying the advantage of being his pupils], in liberality like another Karna incar- nate, towards the wretched ingenious in his kindness, whose fair fame prevades the universe.t

g. I make the dust of my preceptor's feet my pilot [in the voy- age on which I am going to adventure-for I am] seeking to promote skill, and resolved in mind that even the dull-witted shall [be supplied at all events with the means to] understand-

*संयुक्तां युक्तरूपामभिनवनिहितालक्नकारक्भासा सन्ध्यापौयूष- भानारतिरुचिरतरां चूर्णयन्तीमभिख्यां। मानव्यामोकनम्त्रत्िपुर- हरशिरोरम्यभूषाविशेषं भूया भव्यं विधानुं चरणनखरूचं भावयामो भवान्या:।।२।

• यदीयनर्ककिर पीरान्तरघुन्तसन्ततिं। सन्तस्रन्ति भाखन्तमच्त- पादं नमामि तम्॥ ३॥ + भद्टनं गुरुधर्म योरिव लसम्व्ामण्लीमख्न रूप किश्चन पौरषं गिर दरव मागल्म्यसम्पादकं। दाने कर्णमिवावतीर्णमपर दोने दवा- दश्षिणं तानं विभ्वविसारिचाकयधसं विद्वानिवासं नुमः ॥४॥

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BOOK I. SECTION 1. 5

withont much effort, and the intelligent as mere play,-the wide [and all-embracing] system of the Nyaya .* h. May this work of VISWANATHA the son of VIDYANIVASA con- duce to the gratification of the sage the fine-witted and the un- envious.t i. Now the on-lookers do not engage [in any study offered to their attention] without having come to feel an interest in the motive [-i. e. in the end, to the attainment of which the study is calculated to lead]; therefore the end is to be mentioned first.t [The end proposed is the escaping from liability to transmi- gration, and the attainment of tranquil and eternally uninter- rupted beatitude :- and, as the declaration of this end is re- quisite in order to gain attention at the ontset-] therefore, for the declaration thereof, the venerable one who has eyes in his feet [-see e .- ] aphorises in the first place as follows.§

SECTION I. THE END OF THE PROPOSED ENQUIRY.

Enunciation of the things, the right no- tion of which leads to Bentitude. निग्रहस्थानानां तत्वच्ञानाव्विःश्रेयसाधिगम:॥२।

*अलसमातिरपोद विस्तृतं न्यायशास्त्रं विरद्दितबज्यत्ना लौलया वेशु विज्नः। इति विनिहितचेता: कोशलं कर्भुकामो गुरुचरपरजो 5हं कर्ण धारोकरोमि । ५ ॥ विद्यानिवाससनो: क्वतिरेषा विश्वनाथस्। विदुषामतिसत्त्- धियाममत्राणां मदे भविता। ई । 1 पयोजनमनभिसन्धाय पेचावन्ा न प्वर्भन्ते। अ्रतः प्रथमं प्रयो- जनमभिधानीयम् । 8 पनसततपरतिपादनाय भगवानस्पाद: प्रथम सबयति।

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6 APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

No. 1 .- Proof [-i. e. the instrument of right notion- 8. a .*- ]; that which [-as having & proof-] is the object of right notion; doubt; motive; familiar fact; scholastic tenet; confutation; ascertainment; disquisition; controversy; cavil; semblance of a reason; perversion; futility ; and unfitness to be argued with ;- from knowing the truth in regard to these [six- teen things], there is the attainment of the summum bonum (ni'śreyasa.) a. But then [-there is no denying-] the knowledge of truth is not the immediate cause of Beatitude. Beatitude-to consider it apart-is of two kinds through the distinction of the 'higher' [attainable only on quitting the body], and the ' lower.' Of these the 'lower,' in the shape of ' emancipation while yet in life' (jí- vanmukti), takes place immediately on the attainment of the knowledge of truth [-the sign of a man's having attained to which is his exhibiting a perfect indifference to all that passes around him]. This, moreover, is attained by him who has ascer- tained the truth in regard to Soul, whose false notions have been removed by incessant application, and who is yet experiencing [-in appearance at least-for, though apparently exposed to hard- ships, he is generally supposed to feel nothing-the fruit of] past deeds ;- but the 'higher' [is attained by him] by certain degrees. To explain the order thereof is the purpose of the following aphorism.t

The order of the steps towards Beati- tude. पाये तदनन्तरापायादपवर्गः ।२। * ममाया: करणं म्रमाणम्। वेद० परि° । + ननु तवच्ञानस् न साचादेव निःश्रेयसहेतुत्वं। निश्रेयसं तावटू् द्विविद्धं परापरभेदात्। तत्रापरं जीवन्मुक्िलच्णं तच्वम्ञानानन्तर-

मारव्ं कर्मापभुख्जानस्स। परन्तु क्रमेण। तज क्रमपतिपादनायेदं सन्नमिति।

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BOOK I. SECTION 1. 7

No. 2 .- Pain (du'kha), birth (janman), activity (pravritti), fault (dosha), false notions (mithyá-jnána),-since, on the successive annihilation of these in turn, there is the annihilation of the one next [before] it, there is [on the annihilation of the last of them] Beatitude (apavarga). a. [That is to say-] among Pain and the rest [in the forego- ing list], whichever are subsequent in order [to others in the list], on the annihilation of these [subsequent ones], since there is the annihilation of the next one-i. e. of the one immediately next it and preceding it-, there is [-in the end-when Pain, the last in the list thus read backwards, has been annihilated,] Beatitude .* b. Although[-as some one may object-] Beatitude does not come from the absence of Pain, but is it-still [there is no fault in the form of expression employed in the aphorism, for] the sense of the 5th case here is that of indifferencet [-i. e. the absence of any difference between the what and the whence]. c. So much-in the 'Explication of the Aphorisms'-for the topic denominated 'that relating to the motive't [for pursuing the enquiry proposed]. d. [The remembering of the order of the steps, in § 2., may be facilitated, to some readers, by availing one's self of the distribu- tively cumulative form of exposition employed in the nursery tale of "The House that Jack built." Thus- 1. Du'kha .- This is the ' pain' that the man had. 2. Janman .- This is the 'birth' [again renewed] that gave room for the ' pain' that the man had.

• दुःखादोनां मध्ये यदुलरोभरं तेषामपाये तदनन्तरस् तत्ब्धि हितस्स पर्व्वपर्व्स्ापायादपवर्गः । + यद्यपि दुःखापायान्नापवर्गः किन्तुस एव सः तथाप्यभेद एव तज पस्चम्यर्थः ॥ # इति सूबदती समयोजनाभिधेयमकरणम्।।

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8 APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

Pravritti .- This is ' activity' (-requiring reward-) that led to the 'birth' (again renewed) that gave room for the 'pain' that the man had.

4. Dosha .- This is the 'fault' (-of ' desire' or ' dislike'- alike to be shunned-or 'stupidity'-) which (-in the man who, if wise, had done nothing at all,-) begot the 'activity' (requir- ing reward) that led to the 'birth' (again renewed) that gave room for the ' pain' that the man had.

5. Mithya-jnana .- This means the ' wrong-notions' (of that man unversed in the truth-teaching Nyaya Philosophy) which (-since the man knew no better-) gave rise to the ' fault' (of ' desire' or ' dislike' or ' stupidity') which (-in the man who, if wise, had done nothing at all-) begot the 'activity' (requiring reward) that led to the 'birth' (again renewed) that gave room for the 'pain' that the man had.

6. Apavarga .- This last is 'beatitude'-promised as fruit of the truth-teaching Nyaya Philosophy, which gives us right ones instead of the 'wrong notions,' which gave rise to what GAUTAMA styles a 'fault,' inasmuch as it mischievously begot the 'activity' carefully shunned by the wise-for 'activity,'-shaping itself in acts that are good or bad, and require reward of a like descrip- tion,-occasions a man to be born again,-and 'twas this same ' birth' that gave room for the 'pain' that the man had.]*

*Mr. Colebrooke, in his celebrated essay on the Nyáya, (see Essays, vol. 1) stating concisely the Nyáya view of the attainment of beatitude, descrihes (at p. 290) soul as " not earning fresh merit or demerit by deeds done with desire." Here he makes, as GAUTAMA does, the 'desire' (which is one of the three meant by the technical word dosha ' fault'-see the Essay, p. 290. 1. 1 .- and the present work §18. a .- ) to be the producer of acts, from which acts, in turn, arise merit or demerit. But, at p. 289, when he says "From acts proceed faults(dosha); "including under this designation, passion or extreme desire ; aversion or loath . "ing ; and error or delusion (moha)," he adopts an order the reverse of that en- joined in $18 .- sec Note on $18. b. If the passage in the Essay be correctly edited, it would seem as if Mr. Colebrooke, when giving to his Essay a final re- vision after having laid it aside for a time, had been struck with the oddness of the expression that " from faults proceed acts," and had reversed it without ad . verting to the technical definition of ' faults,' in the same sentence, as the pas- sions which give rise to action. GAUTAMA, the votary of Quietism, gives to

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BOOK I. SECTION 2. 9

d. Now, since a definition will be looked for [of each of the things enunciated in the aphorism §1] in the order of enunci- ation, he defines, and divides, Proof-the first enounced .*

SECTION II.

THE INSTRUMENTS AVAILABLE IN PROSECUTING THE ENQUIRY.

What are the in- प्रत्य च्ानुमानोपमानशव्दा: प्रमाणानि ।। ३ ।। struments of right no- No. 3 .- Proofs [-i. e .- see §1-instru- tion. ments of right notion-] are (1) the deliver- ances of sense; (2) the recognition of signs; (3) the recognition of likeness; and (4) words.

What is meant by 'right a. There, by the root má 'to measure, notion' or knowledge κατ' έξοχην. peculiarised by the emphatic prefix pra [-and thus giving the word prama-sci- licet ' what takes the very measure of its object'-] there is signi- fied a notion [-not dubious, or erroneous,-for notions may be both of these ;- but the 'right notion' denoted by prama is a knowledge] in the veriest manner determined [-or distinguished from the bare knowledge that ' this is something'-] by the de- terminate nature of that which [-being the object of the know- ledge-] possesses such and sucht [determinate nature .- It is, the passions the name of ' faults' with a significance akin to that which the word bore in the remark of Talleyrand on the murder of the Duc D'Enghien-"ce n'etait pas une crime c'etait une faute;"-it was an absolute blunder. The wise man, according to GAUTAMA, is he who avoids the three mistakes of ha- ving a liking for a thing, and acting accordingly ; or of having a dislike for a thing, and acting accordingly; or of being stupidly indifferent, and thereupon acting; instead of being intelligently indifferent, and not acting at all. * ऋथ यथादेशं लक्षणस्ापेच्ितत्वात् प्रथमोहिष्टं प्रमाणं लक्षयति शभिजतेच। पत्र तदूति तत्प्रकारकत्वरूपप्र कर्षविशिष्ट ज्ञानं प्रशव्दविशिष्टेन माधानुना प्रत्यांय्यते।। B

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10 APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA. in short, the knowledge of a thing as it is,-or, in the words of Butler,

"To know what's what ;- and that's as high " As metaphysic wit can fly."]

b. That-in virtue of which any thing is the instrument of such [right notion as has been just defined]-is what constitutes any thing a Proof* [or instrument of right notion.]

c. And the knowledge intended to be spoken of here is notion other than memory ;- so that this [definition of ' Proof' just given] does not extend [where it ought not] to the instrument of recol- lectiont [-which we may have to treat of hereafter.]

d. At this point the Explication of the [first] three Aphorisms is completed.t

e. Now he begins to define, in their order, the [several kinds of 'Proof' which, in the preceding Aphorism, were] divided.§

. f. [The four kinds of ' Proof' are usually spoken of as ' Percep- tion,' 'Inference," 'Comparison,' and 'Testimony.' We may have occasion in the sequel to explain why we think proper to depart from the accustomed from of rendering].

What is meant by इन्ट्रियार्थसचिकषात्पवं ज्ञानमव्यपदेश्यमव्यत्ि a deliverance of sense. चारि व्यवसायाम्मकं प्रस्यक्षम्।। ४ । No. 4 .- By a deliverance of sense is meant knowledge which has arisen from the contact of a sense with its object,-[and this * तत्कर पत्वं प्रमाणत्वम्।। + ज्ानञ्ात्रानुभवो वि्वचचितस्तेन स्ृतिकरणे नातिव्यापिः। इति विसूनीष्टनि: समाप्रा। त्रथ विभक्कानि यथाक्रमं लक्षयितुमारभते।

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BOOK I. SECTION 2. 11

knowledge may be] indeterminate [-as when one in consequence perceives 'this is something'-we know not, or think not, what; -but] not erroneous [-for, if erroncous, it would be no ' instru- ment of right notion:'-or it may be] determinate [-such a de- gree of attention having been exerted as to determine that 'this is so and so' and not any thing else.]

a. [Now] he defines and divides the 'recognition of a sign.'*

What is meant by अ्रथ तत्पर्थ्वकं त्रिविधिमनुमानं पूर्वववच्केषवत्षा the recognition of a sign. मान्यतो हष्टक्च॥ ५ ॥ No. 5 .- Now the recognition of a sign, which is preceded thereby [-i. e. is preceded by a deliverance of senset-§4- else the recognition of the sign were impossible-] is of three kinds-(1) having [as the sign] the prior, or (2) having [as the sign] the posterior, or else (3) [consisting in] the perception of komogeneousness.

a. [By ' prior'-as explained in our Lecture on the Sankhya Philosophy, $101, &c .- the author means a ' cause,'-from which, when recognised, its effect may be inferred as about to follow. So again, by 'posterior' he means an 'effect'-from which, when recognised, one can infer that such and such a cause has been at work. By the 'perception of homogeneousness' he means the re- cognition of the subject as being referable to some class, and as being thence liable to have predicated of it whatever may be pre- dicable of the class. The three ' signs' belong to the three argu- ments 'à priori,' 'à posteriori,' and 'from analogy.'] b. He [now] defines the 'recognition of likeness.'t

• अनुमानं लक्षयति विभजतेच। + तत्पूर्ष्वकं म्रत्थ च्पूर््व कम्। + परसिदृस्य पर्वपमितस्य गवादेः साधम्यात् मादृश्यात् नञ्ज्ञानात् साध्यम्य गवयादिपद्वाच्यत्वस्य साधनं सिद्धिरपमानम्।।

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12 APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

What is meant by the recognition of like- ness. No. 6 .- The 'recognition of likeness' is the instrument [in the ascertaining] of that which is to be ascertained through its similarity to something [previously] well-known.

.a. [That is to say] the 'recognition of likeness' is the instru- ment [in the ascertaining]-or [-for the Sanskrit term, not strictly defined, stands for either-] it is the ascertainment itself of the signification, which we wish to determine, of a word, such as gavaya for example-through the perception of likeness or si- milarity to something perfectly well known, i. e. of which we have previously obtained a right notion,-as a cow for example.

b. [A man is told that the gavaya, or 'bos gavaeus,' is an ani- mal like a cow. Going to the forest, he sees an animal like & cow. By means of the instrumental knowledge above describ- ed, he arrives at the conviction that 'this thing is what is meant by the word gavaya.'] c. [The term 'recognition of likeness'-upamána-is to be em- ployed throughout to denote the instrument; and the commenta- tor notices two etymological views, either of which will justify that employment :- thus] it may denote the instrument, if we suppose an ellipsis, and that it stands for 'that from which the recognition of likeness' is obtained; or it will be the name of the instrument, if we suppose the word to be formed by the affix of instrumentality-viz. lyut [-Pánini, III. 3, 117 -* ] which marks the instrument of something to be established or effected.t

What is meant by d. [Now] he defines a 'word.'$ a 'word.' आापोपदेशः शब्दः।७।। * करण्राधिकरणयोय तष्ट। + उपमितिर्यत दत्यव्याहारेण च करणलक्षणं। ब्रथवा साध्य साधनमिति करपख्युटा करणलचणमेवेटम्। + शन्दं लक्षयति।

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BOOK I. SECTION 2. 13

No. 7 .- A 'word' [kar' egoyny] is the precept [or instructive assertion] of one worthy [to have his words implicitly accepted as an authority.]

a. By saying ' A word'-he mentions what is to be defined. It means [-as used here by Gautama-not a mere sound, &c. but] a word which is an instrument of right notion. ' The precept of one worthy'-such is the definition .* b. Or the expression given as the definition may mean ' a right [or fitting] precept [or instructive assertion ;]'-that from which [correct] knowledge ' verbally communicated' (sabda) arises.t

c. He now divides this :-

स द्विविधो दृष्टादृष्टार्थत्वात्।८॥

No. 8 .- It is of two kinds, in respect that it may be that ' whereof the matter is seen,' or that ' whereof the matter is un- seen.'

a. 'It'-i. e. a word that is an instrument of right notion.t

b. By 'that whereof the matter is seen' he means that [word] the thing declared by which is accessible to instruments of know- ledge other than words themselves or any instrument [-such as that spoken of under §6, a .- ] dependent thereon§ [-i. e. de- pendent on words.] c. By 'that whereof the matter is unseen' he means that [word]

• शन्द दूति लक्षयकथनं। तदर्थः प्रमाणशब्द इति। आभापदेश दूति वचणम्। + त्रथवा। आप्ा यथार्थ उपदेशः। शव्दवोधो यममानत्।

1 स प्रमाणशन्द:।

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14 APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA. the thing declared by which is accessible only to words or to in- struments of investigation dependent thereon .*

d. And thus, through the distinction of 'the being that where- of the matter is seen' and ' the being that whereof the matter is unseen,' there is a twofold character of words that are instruments of right notion-such is the meaningt [which may be put into plain English thus ;- Assertions are of two kinds-capable of ve- rification, and incapable of verification.]

e. Here the topic of the definition of the instruments of right notion is concluded.t

f. He next divides and defincs the objects which are fitted to supply right notions.§

SECTION III. .

THE OBJECTS ABOUT WHICH THE ENQUIRY IS CONCERNED.

What things furnish आ्राम्मशरीरेन्ट्रिया र्थबुड्धिमन. प्रष्टत्तिदोषप्रेव्य the objects of right no- tion. भावफन्मदुःखापवर्गस्तु प्रमेयम् ।।८।। No. 9 .- But soul, body, sense, sense-object, knowledge, the mind, activity, fault, transmigration, fruit, pain, and beatitude, are what are fitted to supply right notions. a. [And it is not to be objected that this enumeration is not exhaustive]-for the expression 'fitted to supply right notions,' * शृब्दतदुपजीविप्रमाणमानगम्यार्थ को दृष्टार्थकः॥ + तथाच दष्टार्थंकत्वादृष्टार्थ कत्वभेदातप्रमाणशब्दस्य दैविध्यर्ममव्यर्थ: + समानं प्रमाणलक्षणप्रकरणम्।। 8 प्रमेयं विभजते लक्षयतिच।

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BOOK I. SECTION 3. 15

like the word 'disquisition' or the like, [see §1-which is employed in this work with a sense technically limited-] is spe- cially appropriated, as a kind of technical term, to these twelve* [things enumerated in the aphorism.]

b. Among these [twelve things enumerated in the aphorism,] having named,-as these take the precedence,-the set of six which are in the shape of causes ; the set of six, ' fitted to supply right notion,' which are in the shape of effects, are mentioned [after these.] On this point [-viz. the order of arrangement to be observed in enunciation-] they tell us that "the enunciation first of each one foremost [in respect of those that follow it] is re- gulated by its superior dignityt [in comparison with those that follow it."]

c. Among these [enounced in §9] he defines the one first enounced-viz. Soul.

Soul defined. इच्काछू.षप्रयत्नमुखदुःखज्ञानान्याम्मनो लिप्रम्॥१०॥

No. 10 .- Desire, Aversion, Volition (prayatna), Pleasure, Pain, and Knowledge, are the sign of the Soul.

a. Here [-some one may object-] your saying the 'sign' (inga) is incongruous, because the soul [is not inferred by means of a 'sign'-but] is intuitively recognised.t [This objection would be a sound one if the word ' sign' were here employed in its technical sense, of Tekunpiov,-the 'reason' in a syllogism ;-

• प्रमेयशब्दा हि वादादिशब्दवत् षरिभाषाविशेषेष द्वाटशसु पवर्जते।।

• भ्रत्र प्राधान्यात्कारणरूपषट्कमभिधाय कार्य्यरूपप्रमेयषट्कम- भिहितं। तब पूर्व्वपूर्वस्य प्राधान्यात् मथममुदेश इति बदन्ति।

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16 APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA. but it is not so]-for the word 'sign' (linga) here means [nothing more than] a 'characteristic'* (lakshana.)

b. He next defines ' body' [-the topic, among those enunci- ated in §9-] which presents itself next in order.t

Body defned. चेष्टेन्द्रियार्थाश्रयः शरीरम् ॥ ११॥

No. 11 .- The body is the site of [muscular] action (cheshtá), of the organs of sensation (indriya), and of the sentiments [of pain or pleasure experienced by the soul.]

a. And the nature of the [muscular] action (cheshta) is this- that it is a peculiar species [of action] the constitutive peculiari- ty of which is its being the result of volition (prayatna).t b. The word artha [which has been rendered by .' sentiment'] in the expression " the site of the sentiments of pain or pleasure," is not intended [-as it is in §9-] to denote colours and the like [objects of sense], for then the fact of being the site thereof [-instead of its being what we intend to speak of-viz. a distinct- ive characteristic of the body-] would extend, beyond where it ought, to jars, &c. ;- but it is intended to denote pleasure or pain alternatively. Therefore the Bháshya [or commentary by Vát- syáyana] tells us " In what tabernacle there prevails the consci- ousness of pleasure and of pain, that is [what we mean by] the site of these-and that is the body."§

• लिङ्गपद्स्स लच्णार्थतात्।

• क्रमप्रापं शरीरं लच्चयन॥

1 चेष्टात्वच् प्रयत्नजन्यतावच्रेद को जातिविशेषः॥ अरथात्रयत्वमित्यत्रार्थशब्दो न रूपादिपरस्तदाश्रयत्वस्य घटादाव- तिव्याप्े: किन्तु सुखदुःखान्यतरपरः। अत एव भाष्यं। यस्तिवायनने सुखदुःखया: प्रतिसंवेदनं प्रवर्नते स एषामात्रयस्तच्करीरमिति॥

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BOOK I. SECTION 3. 17

c. He divides and defines the organs of sensation (indri- ya) .*

What are the घाणरसनच क्ुस्च कूत्राज्ाप्ीन्द्रियाणि भूतेभ्यः।।१२।। organs of sense. No. 12 .- The organs of sensation [originating, or not differing,] from the Elements [§13], are Smell, Taste, Sight, Touch, and Hearing. a. Although the Mind also certainly is [as declared by the Sankhyas-see Tattwa-samasa §29-] an 'organ' (indriya), yet, since we employ the term not as being exclusively applicable to the Smell, &c., there is no fault [to be found with our employment of the term.] But, in reality, by 'organs' [in this place] we mean [exclusively] the external organs; and hence there is no incon- gruousness in [the addition of] the expression "from the Ele- ments,"t [-which would be incongruous if we intended to in- clude Mind].

b. Do the Smell, &c., originate [as held by the Sankhyas-see Tattwa-samasa $26 and §27-] from one of the 'producers'? As there may be an expectation [that this question should be re- solved,] he says-"from the Elements." Hence it is not to be held that the organs of sensation originate in that productive agency termed ' self-consciousness' [-see Tattwa-samása §54-]. And this will be explained in the 3rd Lecture.t

c. What are the Elements? As there will naturally be an ex- pectation [that he should explain what he means by the expres- * इन्द्रियं विभजते लच्चयनिच।। + यद्यपि मनसो 5पीन्ट्रियत्वमल्थेव तथापि घाणेत्यादेरुपलक्षण- परत्ाव्न दोष:। वस्तुतस्चिन्द्रियाणीव्यस् वहिरिन्द्रियाणौव्यथः। तेन भूतेभ्य इत्यस्य नासङ्गति:॥ 1 घापादीनि किं प्रक्वतिकानीवाकाङ्कायामाह भूतेभ्य इति। मेनेन्द्रियाणामद्यद्ारमक्यतिकत्वं नेति मन्तव्यं। C

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18 APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

sion in question-employed as it is in the definition laid down in the aphorism §12,-therefore] he says -*

What are the एथिव्यापस्ेजवायुराकाशमिति भूतानि । १३ ॥ Elements. No. 13 .- Earth, Water, Light (tejas), Air, Ether,-these are the Elements (bhúta).

a. He next divides and defines 'sense-object' [-the topic, among those enunciated in §9,-] which presents itself next in order.t

What are the ob- गन्धरसरूपसारशशब्दा: एथिव्यादिगुणास्द- jects of the senses. था: ॥ ९४ ॥

No. 14 .- Their 'objects' (artha) are the qualities of Earth, &c. [see §13,] viz., odour, savour, colour, tangibility, and sound.

a. By the word ' their,' the external organs of sensation [§12,] are referred to.t b. To define 'understanding' (buddhi), he says-§

Understanding or' knowledge. No. 15 .- Understanding (buddhi), appre- hension (upalabdhi), knowledge (jnána) these are not different in meaning.

a. 'Not different in meaning'-i. e. synonymous.[| b. He next defines the Mind-T * भूतान्येव कानोव्याकाङ्कायामाढ्। + क्रमप्राप्तमर्य विभजते लच्षयतिच। + तच्कब्देन वहिरिन्द्रियाि परामश्यन्ते।। 5 बुद्धिं च्यितुभाह। ! ॥ अनर्थान्तरं समानार्थकम्। १ मनो उच्चयति।

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BOOK I. SECTION 3. 19

What is the यु गपत् म्ानानृत्पत्तिम नसो लिङ्गम् । १६। Mind. No. 16 .- The sign [-conf. §10, a .- ] of the Mind (manas) is [that habit in virtue of which] it does not give rise simultaneously to notions [more than one]. a. 'Simultaneously'-i. e. at one time. [Of course] you must supply "in a single soul"* [-if you speak of the mind generical- ly, and not of an individual mind]. b. The meaning [of the aphorism] is-that the sign-meaning the characteristic-of Mind is that property, viz., the atomic na- ture of the intellectual organ, from which it happens that there do not arise notionst [more than one at once in one and the same soul].

c. He next defines and divides Activityt (pravritti).

Energy No. 17 .- Activity is that which originates the [ut- defined. terances of the] voice (vák), the [cognitions of the] understanding, and the [gestures of the] body.

a. Since the expression ' which originates,'-heard [in the apho- rism] immediately after the Dwandwa compound,-is in construc- tion with each term severally [in the compound], Activity is of three descriptions, according to the division into ' that origina- ting the [utterances of the] voice,' &c.§ * युगपत्। एककाले। एकात्मनीति पूरणीयम्।। + वानानामनु पन्तियतः स एव धर्मो जानकरणाणुत्वं मनसो िङ्गं लक्षण मित्यर्थः । 1 प्रष्टत्तिं लच्षयति विभजतेच।। 8 छन्दानन्तरस्ुतारभ्भपदस्य प्रत्येकमन्वयाद्दामारम्भादिभेदेन वि- विधा प्रष्टति:।

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20 APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

b. By the word 'understanding' (buddhi) here, the Mind (manas) is meant ;- and the word 'body' (sarira) is common to the hands and other members [as indicative of each and all of these] in so far as these have the power of muscular action* [-see §11, a.].

c. Thus [-to explain-] an effort tending to utterance is [what we mean by] ' that which originates the voice' :- an effort the site of which is the body, or [more properly] which tends to gesture [or bodily movement] is [what we mean by] 'that which originates the [gesture of the] body' ;- an effort distinct from both of these is [what we mean by] 'that which originates the [cognitions of the] understanding.' And this [last one], tending to [the act of] vision, &c., is accomplished in the mere dawning of attentiont [-attention alone being required in order that the re- velations of the external world may flow into the understanding through the appropriate channels of the senses]. d. He now defines [the failings or weaknesses to which he gives the name of ] Fault (dosha).t

प्रवर्भनालचण दोषा: ॥१८॥

The passions No. 18 .- Faults [or failings] have the character- what. istic that they cause Activity. a. The employment of the plural, in the expression 'Faults," is intended to make one aware of [not a single species, but of] a

• बुद्धिशब्देनाज मन डरभिप्रेतोमिति। शरीरशव्दय चेष्ठावचेन इस्तादिसाधारण:। + तथा वचनानुकूलयत्नो वागारमाः। शरीरगोचरो यत्रभेष्टान कलयत्ना वा शरीरारभः। एतरयभिन्ना यत्रा मुख्धारमः। स घ ध्यानोदयादेव दर्शनाद्यनुकूल: पर्थ्यवस्यति। * दोषं बच्चयात।

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BOOK L SECTION 3. 21 triad of things to be defined [as faults or failings]-in the shape of Affection (rága), Aversion (deesha), and Stolidity (moha) *- [each of which is regarded as a fault or defect, inasmuch as-see §20-it leads to actions, the recompense of which, whether good or evil, must be received in some birth or state of mundane exis. tence-to the postponement of the great end of entire emanci- pation- see §2]. b. The word pravarttana means the being a producer of Ac- tivity. Those of which just this is the characteristict [are what we mean by Faults]. c. He now defines [our mortal life or the state of] transmi- grationt (pretyabhava).

पुनरुत्पत्ति: प्रेत्यभाव: ॥१८।

Mortal No. 19 .- Transmigration means the being produced life. again [and again].

a. The word pretyabháva is formed out of pretya ' having died' and bhava 'the becoming [born into the world again']. As, by the expression "again," here habitualness is meant to be impli- ed-there is first a birth, then death, then a birth-thus [the state of ] transmigration, commencing with [one's first] birth,

• दोषा इति बज्वचनं रामद्वेषमोहावाकलत्यचयच्ञापनाय। + प्रवचना प्रष्टत्तिजनकत्वं। तदेव लक्षपं येषाम्। Mr. Colebrooke appears to have viewed the term here rendered 'the being a producer of Activity as signifying 'the being & product of Activity,'-for, with reference to this, GAUTAMA's definition of ' fault' (dosha), he says (-see Easays, vol. I. p. 289 .- ) "From acts proceed faults (dosha) : including un- der this designation, passion," &c. The word 'fault' (dosha), as technically employed by GAUTAMA in the sense assigned to it in §18. a., is not to be con- founded with adharmma ' demerit' which latter does proceed from acts. See further in our note on §2. d. + मेन्यभावं लक्षयत।

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22 APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA. ends [only] with [final] emancipation. And this knowledge is conducive to the 'relinquishment of all passions' (vairágya),- therefore it was not needless [-as some persons may think, on reading the aphorism and reflecting that the condition called pretyabhava is just the condition of us men, and might as well have been called bhava ' condition' simply ;- it was not needless, we say,] to add the word pretya ' having died'* [-a word sugges- tive of the fleeting character of this mortal life, and which, com- bined with the word bhava, 'state,' gives the compound term pretyabháva to denote our mundane existence]. b. He next defines Fruits (phala)t- प्रष्टत्तिदोषजनितार्थः फलम ॥ २०॥

Retri- No. 20 .- Fruit is that thing which is produced by bution. Activity and by [the originaters of Activity-viz. our constitutional faults or] Failings-[see §18]. a. And amongst these [fruits] the fruit that is denoted by the word primarily is the fruition of pleasure or of pain; and so the Bháshya tells us "Fruit is the consciousness of pleasure or of pain." And since one's [unwise] Activity in engaging either in duties or offences is the causer thereof, and the Failing again [-whether of passion or mere folly-see §18-] is the cause of that, therefore he says "produced by Activity and by [the origi- * प्रेव्य मृत्वा भावो जननं प्रेत्यभावः। तब पुर्नारत्यनेनाभ्यास- कथनात् प्रागुत्पत्तिस्ततो मरणं तत उत्पननिरिति प्रेत्यभावो जननादिरपवर्गान्तः। पतत् ज्ञानञ्व वैराग्य उपयुज्यत इति प्रेन्थेनि न व्यर्थम्।। Hence Mr. Colebrooke's definition of pretyabhuva as "the condition of the soul after death" (-see Essays, vol. I. p. 290-) while it is literally correct, may mislead the reader if he does not bear it in mind that this, according to Hindu notions, is the condition of every man now alive-for, as we are all sup- posed to have lived and died no one knows how often, we are each of us always in the condition " after death." + फलं सच्चयनि।

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BOOK I. SECTION 3. 23

naters of Activity-viz. our] Failings." But the definition, [-if we regard the nature instead of the origin of Fruits] is 'the ex- periencing of pleasure or pain-one or other.' But by 'fruit' in a secondary application of the term, we mean every thing [mun- dane] beginning with the body .* b. He next defines Pain (du'kha)t-

वाधनालच्णं दुःखम् । २१॥

Pain No. 21 .- Pain is that which is in the shape of Vexa- defined. tion. a. The word ' pain,' in the ' secondary application't of the term, is employed to denote the body, the senses, and their objects, since these are the instruments of pain, and to denote pleasure, because of its being ever closely connected with pain. And only therefore [i. e. since the one term 'pain' implies the whole of these] is 'pain' referred to, in the aphorism following, by the term 'that.'§ b. He now defines emancipation|| (apavarga). * तञ्रच मुख्यं फलं सुखदुःखोपभोगः। तथाच भाष्यं। सुख- दुःखसंवेदनं फलं। तबच धम्माधममाष्टत्तेः प्रयोजकत्वान्तनच दाषस् हेतुत्वात् प्रष्टनतिदोषजनितेत्युत्तं। उच्षपन्तु सुखदुःखा- न्यतरसाक्षात्कार इति। गौएं फलन्तु शरोरादिकं सर्व्वमेव।। + दुःखं लच्यति॥ tThis is what is to be understood by the varieties of evil which Mr. Cole- brooke (Essays vol. 1. p. 290) mentions as "primary or secondary." It is not degrees of evil that are to be understood as thus referred to; but, the author, we are told, chooses to employ the word 'pain' technically-in a 'transferred sense'-to denote the causes of pain also, as well as pain itself. 8 शरोरेन्ट्रियार्थेषु दुःखसाधनत्वातुखेच दुःखानुषङ्गात् दुःख- व्यवहारो गौए इति। अत एवागिमसत्रे तत्पदेन दुःखपरा- मर्शः ॥ ॥ तपवर्ग लच्चयतति।

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24 APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

तदव्यन्सविमोचो 5पवर्ग: ।२२।

Beatitude No. 22 .- Absolute deliverance from that is Eman- what. cipation. a. 'That'-i. e. pain [-as understood in its widest accepta- tion-see §21. a.] b. ' Absolute deliverance'-i. e. the annihilation of the pain which has the same locus as one's self, [i. e. one's own pain], and [an annihilation thereof ] not synchronous [with the pain that belongs to each moment of our mundane state ;- for each mo- ment, as it passess, sees the extinction of its own quantum of pain; but what is so " devoutly to be wished" is the absolute an- nihilation of one's troubles once for all] .*

c. Here is completed the topic of the Definition of the things that furnish the objects of right notiont [§9]. d. He now defines ' doubt' (sansaya) which presents itself next in ordert [in the list given in §1].

SECTION IV. COMPLETING THE TOPIC OF THE PRE-REQUISITES OF REASONING. समानाने कधरम्भेपपस्े विप्रतिपल्ेवपलब्ध्यनुपलब्ध्यव्यवस्थातक वि. शेषापेक्षा विमशः संशयः।२३॥

Doubt No. 23 .- Doubt is a conflicting judgment [in regard to defined. one and the same object] respecting its distinction [or precise character ;- this conflicting judgment arising] from un- steadiness in the recognition [of some mark which, if we could

• श्रव्यन्त विमोचः ससमानाधिकरणटुःखासमानकालौनो ध्वंसः। + समानं प्रमेयलच्णप्रकरणम्।। क्रममामं संशयं सच्चयति।

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BOOK I. SECTION 4. 25

make sure of it, would determine the object to be so and so] or [from unsteadiness] in the non-recognition [of some mark which, were we sure of its absence, would determine the object to be not so and so ;- this state of things, moreover, resulting] from the recognition [in the object] of [only such] properties [as are] common [to a variety of things, and therefore not distinctive,] or of several properties [such as cannot really belong to one and the same thing,] or from conflicting testimony. a. "Doubt:"-here is the statement of what is to be defined .*

b. "A conflicting judgment"-(vimarsha) :- here the prefix vi signifies 'confliction,' and the root mris signifies 'knowing.' "In regard to a single object"-is to be supplied. So that Doubt means, in regard to any single object, Knowledge distin- guished, contradictoriwise, by the [simultaneous] presence and the absencet [of some given nature].

c. [The commentators are not unanimous in their interpreta- tion of this aphorism, some holding that there are five kinds of doubt referred to, and others that there are only three. We have preferred the latter view. Of the first kind of doubt an exam- ple is furnished by the case of an object, in the twilight, of which we can discern nothing more than that its size is that of a man, a property which may belong to a post as well as to a man.$ We have an example of the second kind in the dubious and dis- puted question whether Sound is a substance or a quality or an action.g It cannot be more than one of these, yet it presents

• संशय इवि लच्यनिहेश:। विमर्श इत्यब विशन्दा विरोधार्थः। मशिर्ध्ानाथः। एक- सिन् धनिमणीति पूरणीयं। तेन। एकधिणी विरोधेन भावाभावप्रकारकं भ्ानं संशय:।। 1 खानुवी पुरुषो वा। 5 मन्दा द्रव्यं गुण: कर्षम बेति । D

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26 APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

characters which furnish plausible grounds for contending that it is each of the three. The third kind of doubt is, of course, such as arises when, of two witnesses (presumed equally trust-worthy) the one asserts what the other denies.] d. He now defines [the fourth in the list (1-viz.] .Motive' (prayojana), which next presents itself .*

यमर्थमचिक्वत्य प्रवर्तते तत्प्रयोजनम्। २४॥

No. 24 .- What thing having set before one, one proceeds to act-that [thing] is the ' Motive' [of the action.] a. 'Having set before one,'-i. e. having proposed [to one's self -as something to be gained or avoided.] And so what consti- tutes any thing a Motive is its being the object of desire, which [desire either of attaining or escaping] is the cause of one's ac- ting.t b. He now defines [the fifth in the list §1 .- viz.] ' familiar case of a fact' (drishtanta) which next presents itself.t

लोकिकपरोयकाणां यम्िवर्थे बुद्धिसाम्यं स दष्टान्त:। २५।

No. 25 .- In regard to [some fact respecting] what thing both the ordinary man and the acute investigator entertain a same- ness of opinion, that [thing] is called a 'familiar case' [of the fact in question.]

a. The ' Ordinary man,'-i. e. one to be informed-who has not attained that superiority of intellect which is the result of conver- sancy with books ;- such is the sense of the term [-among the

• क्रमप्रापं प्रयाजनं लक्षर्यत। अ्धिष्त्य उदिश्य। तथाच मषत्तिहेत्विक्काविषयत्वं मयो- जनत्वम्। 1 क्रममापं दष्टापमं लच्चर्यत।

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BOOK I. SECTION 5. 27

varions senses that might be given to it-] that will be found of nse .*

b. The ' acute investigator'-i. e. the informer [of the ordinary .man §25. a.]-one who has attained superiority of intellect through conversancy with books ;- such is the sense of the term that will be found of use.t

c. Here closes the topic of the pre-requisites of Reasoning.t d. He now defines [the sixth in the list §1-viz.] 'Tenet' (sid- dhánta), which next presents itself.§

SECTION V.

OF POSITIONS, NOT FAMILIAR, THAT MAY BE EMPLOYED IN BEA-

SONING WITHOUT REQUIRING TO BE EACH TIME DEMON-

STRATED.

तचाधिकरणाभ्युपगमसंस्थिनिःसिद्धान्त:। २६।

No. 26 .- A 'Tenet' (siddhánta) is that, the steadfastness of the acceptance of which rests on a treatise [of weight and autho- rity.] a. He next divides|| [the 'tenets' thus characterised generally.] *

फवितार्थ:। + परोचक: शासत्रपरिथोलनमाप्तवुद्तिमकर्षः मतिपादक इति फचिताथेः।

8 क्रममानं सिद्धान्तं सच्तर्यात। ॥ विभजते।

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28 APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

वात्॥२७।

No. 27 .- ['Tenets' are divided into the species that are de- scribed in the suoceeding aphorisms] through the difference be- tween a 'Dogma of all the schools,' a ' Dogma peculiar to some school,' a ' Hypothetical Dogma,' and a 'Dogmatic corollary.' a. It is of four kinds-such is the remainder [required to sup- ply the ellipsis in the aphorism]. The meaning is this that it is so through the difference of its owing its steadfastness to anl the schools [or to only one,] &c .* b. He now defines a ' Dogma of all the schools' (sarwvatantra- siddhánta.)t

No. 28 .- That [position or tenet] which is not in opposition to any of the schools, and which is claimed [as a tenet] by [at least] some one school, is [what we mean by] & 'Dogma of all the schools.'

a. He next defines a ' Dogma peculiar to some school' (prati. tantra-siddhánta./t

No. 29 .- That [position] which is [held] established in the same school, and which in another school is [regarded as] not esta- blished, is [what we mean by] a ' Dogma peculiar to some school.' * स चतुर्विध इति शेषः। सर्वतव्वादिसंस्ितीनामर्थान्तरभावात्। भेदादित्यथँः । + सर्व्वतच्सिद्धान्तं लच्चर्यात। मतितच्सिद्दान्तं लच्चर्यत।

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BOOK I. SECTION 6.

a. The word 'same' [in the expression ' established in the same school'] means ' one.' So the sense is 'established in one school.' The complete sense is 'established in its own school.' So the sense in which we shall find it useful to employ the term [-since, in a controversy, we may imagine each school to be represented by a single partisan-] is this, that whatever is assented to by only one or other of two disputants is the peculiar dogma of that one of the two,-as, for example, the eternity of sound is [a pe- culiar dogma] of the followers of the Mimansa school .* b. [Thus the pratitantra-siddhánta is what supplies the materi- al for the argumentum ad hominem in the disputations of the schools.] c. He next defines a ' Hypothetical Dogma' (adhikaruna-sid- dhánta.Mt

No. 30 .- That, if which be [held] established, there is the es- tablishing of another point, is [what we mean by] a 'Hypotheti- cal Dogma.' a. The meaning is this-that, that position [-for which no evi- dence is offered in the first instance-] is a hypothetical dogma [or a hypothesis] only on the establishment of which taking place {-by being conceded-] does the establishment take place of another proposition under consideration.t * समानशब्द एकार्थस्तनैकतच्चसिद्द इत्यर्थः। सतरचसङ् दूति पर्य्थवसितो ऽर्थः । तथा वादिपतिवाद्येकतरमात्राभ्युपगतस्तदेक नरख प्रतितवसिद्धान्त इति फलितार्थः। यथा मीमांसकानां शद्द- निव्यत्वम्। + अधिकरणसिङ्वान्तं लच्षयति। + यस्यार्थस्य सिट्दो जायमानायामेवान्यस्य प्रकरपस प्रसुतस्स सिद्धिर्भवति सो उधिकरणमिद्वान्म इव्यर्थः ।

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30 APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

b. He next defines a ' Dogmatie corollary.'

प रोचि ताम्य पगमात्तद्विशेष परी क्षणमभ्युनगमसिद्वान्तः । ३१।

No. 31 .- A 'Dogmatic corollary' is the mention of a particn- lar fact in regard to any thing, not expressly declared in an apho- rism, [our knowledge of the fact coming so immediately] from what is recognised, [by the maker of the aphorisms, as to render a demonstration superfluous-the fact being thus entitled to rank not as a deduction but as a dogma.]

a. "Not expressly declared in an aphorism"-such is here the meaning of the term aparikshita .*

b. "The mention of a particular fact"-such is here the mean- ing of the expression visesha-parikshana.t

c. And thus a 'Dogmatic corollary' [or an implied dogma] is what is received as a tenet [or first principle] without being ex- pressly laid down in an aphorism,-as, for example, [the tenet] that the Mind is an organt [of the Soul,-which is recognised as one of the tenets of the Nyaya, although nowhere expressly as- serted by GAUTAMA.] Here ends the topic of the definition of the scholastic tenets that take their place in argumentation.§ He next divides, with a view to defining, the members [of a demonstration] which present themselves next in order|| [among the topics-see §1-].

• भ्र०रोवितस्य साच्ादस्तनितस्य। + विशेषपरीक्षणं विशेषधर्समकथनम्॥ 1 तथाच साच्ादसविताभ्युपगमा डभ्युपगमसिद्दान्तः । यथा मनस इन्ट्रियत्वमिति ।

।। क्रममान्नानवयवांखलयितं विभजने।

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BOOK I. SECTION 6. 31

SECTION VI. THE METHOD OF ARGUMENTATIVE EXPOSITION.

पति ज्वा हेत दा हर णेोपनय निगमनान्यवयवा:।३२॥

No. 32 .- The members [of a demonstration] are (1) the Pro- position, (2) the Reason, (3) the Example, (4) the Application, and (5) the Conclusion.

a. He defines the Proposition* [to be proved.]

साध्यनिर्ईश: मनिज्ञा। ३३॥

No. 33 .- The Proposition is the declaration of what is to be established.

a. Of what is to be established-the declaration-this is the Proposition :- and "what is to be established" is this, that such a thing as a hill is possessed, for instance, of fire.t

b. He defines, and then, by two subsequent Aphorisms divides, the Reason, which presents itself next in ordert [-of those enu- merated in § 82].

उदाहर एसाधम्म्यात्ाध्यमाधनं हेतु: तथा वैचग्यात्। ३४।

No. 34 .- The Reason is the means for the establishing of what is to be established; [and this it is] through the Example's having the nature, or in like manner through its having the re- verse of the nature, [implied in the Reason :- in other words-

• प्रतिज्ञां सचर्यान। + साधनीयस्यार्थस यो निर्हशः स मतिक्वा। साधनीयच र्व्ि मचादिना पर्वतादि:। * ऋ्ममरानं हेतुं वच्तयतत बिभजतेच सजाभ्याम्।

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32 APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

through the Reason's being distributed, affirmatively or nega- tively, in the Major Premiss]. a. Here the generic definition is this-that "The Reason is the means for the establishing of what is to be established." By "the means for [the establishing of] what is to be established," is meant [not exclusively the assigned Reason itself but] that [second member out of the five-see $32-] which informs us [by its use of the 5th case-affix] that such and such has the pow- er of giving information leading to the establishing of what is to be established .* [For example, when we say, 'The hill is fiery- because there is smoke',-the 'smoke' is the Reason of our knowing that the hill is fiery, but the whole clause ' because there is smoke' is also technically called the Reason].

b. He declares that it is of two sorts when he says " through the example's having the nature, or in like manner through its having the reverse of the nature [implied in the Reason]." By the possession of the same nature is meant [what is elsewhere spoken of as] 'agreement' (anwaya), and by the possession of the reverse of the nature is meant [what is elsewhere spoken of as] ' contrariety' (vyatireka). The meaning that will prove ser- viceable [when we speak of this agreement and contrariety] is that of 'invariable attendedness' (vyapti) of the one or the other description.t [Thus when we speak of the 'agreement' of fire with smoke-the smoke being adduced as the Reason for holding that there is fire, we mean to speak of the invariableness of smoke's being attended by fire :- and when we speak of the contrariety of fire and a lake-the lake being adduced as the Reason for holding that the vapour rising from the place is not smoke, we

• शच साध्यसाधनं हेतरिति सामान्यलच्ष। साध्यसाधनं साध्य सिज्ानुकूसज्ञापकत्ववाधकं इत्यर्थः। + मस्य वैधम्र्यमाह। उदाहरणसाधम्म्यभथा वैधम्यादिति। साधम्मर्यमन्वयः । वैधम्यं व्यतिरेकः । ताडपव्पाभिरिति फलितार्थ: ।

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BOOK I. SECTION 6. 33

mean to speak of the invariableness of a lake's being devoid of fire.]

c. He now defines the Example, which presents itself next in order* [-of those enumerated in §32-].

साध्यसाधम््यात्तह्मभावी दष्टान उदाहरयम्। ३५।

No. 35 .- The Example is some 'familiar case of the fact'- [see §25-], which, through the [suggestion of the reason's] inva- riable attendedness by what is to be established, causes that na- ture [or property] to be [admitted to belong to the subject] which is to be established [as belonging to the subject].

a. The definition [-expressed generally-] is this-viz. "The Example is some familiar case of the fact." Here the [elliptical] expression ' familiar case of the fact' means that Member [of the five-membered exposition-see §32-] which is appropriated to the mention of the familiar case of the fact :- hence there is no harm if, seeing that some familiar case of a fact is only tempora- rily so [-i. e. employed as an Example-], it is not invariably sot [-the terms not being co-extensive in their application, for a fact remains a fact even when not cited as an Example-].

ò. [But the Example is of two kinds-see §34 b .- so,] to com- plete this [definition in §35] we must add that it is the Example where we have a case of invariable attendedness* [that we are here speaking of].

• क्रमपाभमुदाहरएं लक्षर्यात। + दष्टान उदाहरणमिति लच्षणं। दृष्टान्तत्रचनं द्ष्टान्तकघन- योम्यावयत्र इ्यर्थः । तेन दृष्टान्तस्य सामर्यिकत्वेना सार्थ्वतिकत्च ऽपि न चति:। + ऋन्वय्युदाहरणमिति शेष: । E

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34 APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

c. He next defines the Example where we have a case of in- variable abandonedness .*

तद्िपर्य्ययाद्वा विपरोतं व्यतिरेक्यदाहरसम्। ३६। No. 36 .- Or inversely [-as regards the 'invariable attended- ness' spoken of in §35-] the Example, on the contrary, may be one where we have a case of invariable abandonedness.

a. [As when we argue-see §34, b .- that the vapour seen ri- sing from a lake is not smoke, because a lake is invariably devoid of fire.] b. He next defines the Application, which presents itself next in ordert [-of those enumerated in $32 -. ]

उदाहरणापेक्षस्तथेत्युपसंहारो न तर्थेति वा साध्यस्ोपनय: ।२७। No. 37 .- The Application is the collecting [or bringing under simultaneous view] with respect to the Example, what is to be established as being so, or not so. a. And the Application is of two kinds, through the distinction of (1) that where we have [in the Example-] a case of invariable attendedness, and (2) that where we have a case of invariable abandonedness. "So" [-or "in like manner"-] such is the expression when the Application involves a case of invariable at- tendedness. "Not so" is the expression when the Application involves a case of invariable abandonedness.t [In other words- "and so is this" (tatha-chayam) is the form of expression when * व्यतिरेक्युदाहरणं लक्षर्यात। + क्रममाप्तमुपनयं लच्षयति। सचापनया द्विविधा एन्वयिव्यतिरेकिभेदान्। तरथेति साध्यस्ा- पमंहारो उन्वय्युपनयः । न नथेति साध्यसयोपसंद्ारो वयनिरेकाप- नयः।

..

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BOOK I. SECTION 7. 35

the Minor Premiss is affirmative; while "and not so is this" (na-chayan tatha) is the form of expression when the Minor Pre- miss is negative.]

The conclusion b. He next defines the conclusion .* defined. हेत्वपदेशात्प्रतिज्ञाया: पुनर्वचनं निगमनम् ॥ ३८।

No. 38 .- The conclusion is the re-stating of the Proposition because of the mention of the Reason [which now authorizes us to prefix the illative ' Therefore'].

a. Here concludes the topic of the form of demonstration.t b. He now defines Confutation, which presents itself next in order.t

SECTION VII.

CONCLUDING THE TOPIC OF DEMONSTRATION.

अविज्ञातखे उर्थे कारणेपपत्ितस्तनज्ञानार्थम् हस्तर्कः॥ ३८॥

Confutation, or reductio No. 89 .- Confutation-[which is intended]

ad absurdum. for the assertaining of the truth in regard to a question, the truth in regard to which is not accurately apprehended-is reasoning from the supposition of [the cessation of ] the cause [to the cessation of the effect- for, on the admitted cessation of the causc, the observed result- ing phenomenon ought of course to cease also].

a. [In other words, confutation consists in our directing a per- son, who does not apprehend the force of the argument as first * निगमनं लच्षयत॥ + समाभं न्यायसरूपप्रकर णाम्। 1 क्रममामं तर्कें लच्चर्यात।

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36 APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

presented to him, to look at it from an opposite point of view. For example-to take a simple case, which, simple as it is, cor- rectly represents the generic form to which all the logical errors of man are reducible suppose a person admits that there is smoke in the hill, but denies that there is fire,-having previous- ly granted that where there is smoke there is fire, we confute him-and put him in the way of coming to a 'right notion'-by remarking of the hill that] if it were without fire, it would be without smoke .*

b. He now defines Ascertainment, which presents itself next in order.t

विमृश्य पक्चप्रतिपच्ाभ्यामरथावधारणं निर्णय:॥ ४० ॥

Certainty arrived at No. 40 .- Ascertainment is the determina- by hearing both sides. tion of a question by [hearing] both what is to be said for and against it, after having been in doubt.

a. Here closes the topic [-see § 25. c .- ] of the latter divi- sion of Reasoning.t

b. So much for the first diurnal portion of the first Lecture of the commentary composed on the Aphorisms of the Nyaya, by the venerable VISWANATHA BHATTACHARYYA.S

• निर्वे्ञि: साबिर्धूमः स्यादिति।

• क्रमप्रामं निर्णर्यं च्षयति।

++

8 इति श्री विश्वनाथभट्टाचार्य्यकायां न्यायसनष्टन्ा प्रथमाष्या- यस्थ प्रथममान्रिकम्।

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BOOK I. SECTION 8. 37

THE SECOND DIURNAL PORTION. SECTION VIII.

THE TOPIC OF CONTROVERSY.

c. He now defines Discussion .*

Deflnition of a fair discussion.

No. 41. Discussion is the undertaking [-by two parties res- pectively-] of the one side and the other in regard to what [con- clusion] has been arrived at by means of the five-membered [pro- cess of demonstration already explained-see §32 -; this proce- dure] consisting in the defending [of the proposition] by proofs [on the part of the one disputant] and the assailing it by objec- tions [on the part of the other,-the discussion being conducted on both sides] without discordance in respect of the tenets [or principles on which the conclusion is to depend].

a. [Such is the discussion that takes place between a preceptor and his pupil, when the latter brings forward objections, which the other, having a clearer view of the matter, is able to remove -there being no dispute between the two in regard to the data].

The prime requisite b. The persons competent for [this honest

in an honest disputant. style of ] discussion are those who are really desirous to get at the truth ;t-and it is not necessary that there should be a Moderator in such a discussion, becanse the debate is here conducted without passiont [or shab- by ambition of victory].

• तब वादं लच्चयति। + वादाधिकारिणस्तु नव्ववुभुववः। 1 साच वादे नावश्यकी वोतरागकथात्वादिति।

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38 APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

c. He defines wrangling .*

Definition of No. 42 .- Wrangling, consisting in the defence or

wrangling. attack [of a proposition] by means of frauds [see §50], futilities [see §58], and what procedures de- serve [nothing but an indignant] rebuke [see §59], is what takes place after the procedure aforesaid [-that is to say, after a fair course of argumentation,-supposing this to have failed to bring the disputants to an agreement].

The aim of the a. By the expression " frauds," &c. it is inti-

wrangler. mated that this kind of talk [viz. wrangling] is that of the person who is desirous of victory, for it is the man desirous of victory [instead of being desirous of truth], that makes use of frauds, &c. And so the meaning is this, that Wrangling is the discourse of him who aims only at victory, [he being quite indifferent] whether this [discourse of his] establishes either side of the questiont [provided only he can make out a pretext for bragging that he has said something to the point]. b. He now defines Cavilling, which next presents itself.t स प्रतिपच्यस्थापनाहीनो वितण्डा। ४३।

Definition of No. 43 .- That [-viz. Wrangling, §42,-], when Cavilling. devoid of [any attempt made for] the establishing of the opposite side of the question, is Cavilling.

a. [The man shabbily eager for the semblance of a victory, sometimes, see §42, a., attempts to prove something by disinge- * जल्पं लच्चयति॥ + छलेत्यादिना विजिगीषुकथात्वं बाध्यते विजिगीषुर्रिक्कलादिक करोति। तथाचे।भयपक्षस्थापनावतौ विजिगीषुकथा जल्प इव्यर्थः॥ 1 वितएडां क्रममाप्तां लक्षर्यत॥

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BOOK I. SECTION 9. 39

nuons artifices. He is then said to wrangle. If he attempts to establish nothing, but confines himself to carping disingenuously at the arguments of the other party, he is said to cavil]. b. Here the topic of controversy is concluded .* c. He now defines and divides the Semblances of a reason, which next present themselves.t

SECTION IX.

OF FALLACIES, OR WHAT ONLY LOOK LIKE REASONS, BY MEANS

OP WHICH A MAN MAY DECEIVE HIMSELF OR ANOTHER.

सव्यभिचारविरुङ्गप्रकरएसमसाध्यसमातीतकाला हेत्वाभासाः ।।४४।

Banmeration of the No. 44 .- The Semblances of a reason are (1) Fallacies. the Erratic, (2) the Contradictory, (3) the Equal- ly available on both sides, (4) that which is In the same case with what is to be proved, and (5) the Mistimed.

a. He now defines the Erratict [semblance of a reason.]

अनेकान्तिक: सव्यभिचारः।४५॥

The argument that No. 45 .- That [semblance of a reason] is proves too much. Erratic which arrives at more ends than the one [required.] a. For example [suppose one were to argue that] Sound is eternal, for it is not the object of touchg-[-the reason alleged would bring us to more conclusions than we want; because the * समाप्तं कथाप्रकरणम्।। + क्रममाप्तान् हेत्वाभासांख्लच्षयत विभजतेच। + सव्यभिचारं लक्षर्यात॥ 5 यथा शब्दा निव्यः। निःसर्शवात्।

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40 APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

quality of Conjunction or of Disjunction for example, is not the object of touch, yet no one argues for its eternity.] b. He now defines the Contradictory [semblance of a reason] which presents itself next in order .*

सिद्धान्तमभ्युपेव्य तद्धिरोधी विरुद्व:॥४६॥

The argument that No. 46 .- That [semblance of a reason] is proves the reverse. the Contradictory which is repugnant to what is proposed as that which is to be established.

a. 'Which is to be established,'-such is the meaning here of the term siddhanta.t

b. And so the meaning, as it may be most profitably regarded, is this, viz .- after having proposed, or stated, that which is to be established, [a Contradictory reason is] one employed which is opposed thereto, or invariably attended by the negation of what is to be established; as, for instance, [if one were to argue], 'This is fiery, because it is a body of water.'$

c. He now defines that [semblance of a reason] which is Equal- ly available on both sides-this next presenting itself.§ यम्मात्प्रकरणचिन्ता स निर्णयार्थमपदिष्टः प्रकरणसमः॥४७॥

The argument that No. 47. That from which a question may

tells equally both ways. arise as to whether the case stands this way or the other way, if employed with the view of determining the state of the case, is [a mere semblance

• क्रमप्राप्ं विरुद्धं लक्षयति॥ + प्तच सिद्धान्तं साध्यम्। तथाच साध्यमभ्युपेत्य उदिश्य प्रयुक्तास्तद्विरोधी साध्याभावव्याप् इनि फसितार्थः। यथा र्वन्हिमान् द्रदत्वार्दिति। 8 क्रमपरापतं प्रकरएासमं लच्षयति।

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BOOK I. SECTION 9. 41

of a reason-being] equally available for both sides [of the dis- pute].

a. [According to the commentator]-That reason employed, or adduced, for the ascertainment of one's own proposition or the negation of the other's proposition, is called ' the same for both sides:'-but which reason ?- with regard to this he says-' from which a question'; i. e. from which two opposite views may arise; -such is the account given in the Bhashya .*

b. [For example-suppose a man argues that Sound is eternal because it is audible, the reason here alleged will just provoke the question whether audibleness is any proof of eternity, and the opponent may with equal propriety argue that Sound, because it is audible, is not eternal].

.c. He now defines that [semblance of a reason] which is in the same case with what is to be proved,-this presenting itself next in order.t

The argument that stands No. 48 .- And it [the alleged reason] itself i need of proof. is in the same case with what is to be proved, if, in standing itself in need of proof, it does not differ from that which is to be proved.

a. [As the commentator remarks]-for if the reason stands in need of being proved too, just as the proposition stands in need of being proved, then it is said to be 'in the same case with what is to be proved ;' and therefore the expression 'unestablished'

• स हेतु: ससाध्यस् परसाध्याभावस्य वा निर्णयार्थमपदिष्टः मयुक्ः प्रकरणसम उच्यते। स क इत्याकांचायामाह यस्ात्ाकरणं पक्चपतिपक्वाविति भाव्यम्। + क्रमप्रामं साध्यसमं सच्च्यत। F

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42 APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

(asiddha) is employed [in speaking of such a reason]; and this ['uncstablishedness' or unreality] is of three sorts, through the distinction of the unreality of the locality [or subject of the al- leged property], the unreality of the character [as regards the subject whereof it is assumed to be predicable], and the unreali- ty of the universality* [assumed in the major premiss. Exam- ples of these are given in our Lecture on the Tarka-sangraha]. b. He now defines the Mistimed [semblance of a reason] which next presents itsslf.+

कालात्ययापदिष्टः कालातोतः । ४८।

The argument that is op- No. 49 .- That [semblance of a reason] posed by the evidence of the is Mistimed which is adduced when the Senses. time is not [that when it might have availed.] a. [For example,-suppose one argues that] Fire does not con- tain heat, because it is factitious,t [his argument is mistimed if we have already ascertained, by the superior evidence of the sens- es, that fire does contain heat].

b. Here concludes the topic of the Semblance of a reason.§

c. He now defines Fraud [or unfairness] which next presents itself.||

• यथाहि साध्यं साधनीयं तथा हेतुरपि चेत्ाव्यसम इत्युच्यते।

• क्रमप्राप्तमतीतकालं लच्चयति। वन्िरनुष्ण: रतकत्वादिति। 8 समानं हेत्वाभासप्रकरणम्।। । क्रमप्राप्त छलं लच्चयति।

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BOOK I. SECTION 10. 43

SECTION X.

OF THE TRICKS EMPLOYED BY THE DISHONEST DISPUTANT

TO THWART THE OTHER PARTY.

वचनविघातो ऽर्थबिकल्योपपत्याच्कलम्॥। ५ू० ॥

Wilfully unfair No. 50 .- Unfairness [in disputation] is the objections. opposing of what is propounded by means of as- suming a different sense [from that which the objector well knows the propounder intended his terms to convey].

a. For example-in such a case of argument as this, that ' The man has come from Nepaul, because he has a new (nava) blan- ket [such as the country of Nepaul supplies],'-the declaring that this is not established, on the assumption that the meaning was nine* [blankets, instead of a new blanket,-the word nava meaning both new and nine,-is unfair].

b. He now divides Fraud, which he has just defined.t

नाच्तिविधं वाककलं सामान्यच्कलमुपचारच्लख्व॥ ५१॥

No. 51 .- It is of three kinds, (1) Fraud in respect of a term, (2) Fraud in respect of a genus, and (3) Fraud in respect of a trope.

a. Of these he now defines the 'Fraud in respect of a term.'t

• यथा नेपालादागतो एयं नव कम्बलबच्वादित्यत्र नवसंख्यापरत्व-

• उचितं छलं विभजते।। + तज् वाक्च्छूल लच्च्यात।

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44 APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

अ्विशेषाभिहिते ऽर्थे वक्तुरभिम्रायादर्थान्तरकल्पना वारु- कलम् ॥५२॥

The fraudulent No. 52 .- 'Fraud in respect of a term' is the misunderstanding --. assuming a meaning other than [the objector of a term. well knows] was intended by the speaker when he named the thing by a term that happened to be ambiguous.

a. [An example of this has been given under §50. a.].

b. He next defines 'Fraud in respect of a genus.'*

सन्भवता थस्यातिसामान्ययोगादसम्भूतार्थकल्पना सामान्यच्- लम् । ५ ३ ॥

The fraudulent over- No. 53 .- 'Fraud in respect of a genus' is straining of an assertion which was obviously not the assuming that something is spoken of in ---- meant of the whole ge- respect whereof the thing asserted is impos- nus. sible, because [forsooth] this happens to be the same in kind with that of which the thing asserted is possible. a. For example, on some one's saying, 'This is a Brahman,- he must be possessed of learning and conduct' ;- the other, as- suming that he here deduces the possession of learning and con- duct from the fact of being a Brahman, says-'How can that be ?- for, the possession of learning and conduct, if deducible from the fact of being a Brahman, would be found, where it can- not, in his childhood.'t [The other, of course, meant, as the ob- jector very well knows, to speak of a Brahman who has lived

• सामन्यच्कसं लच्षयति। + यथा ब्राह्मणा 5यं विद्याचरपासम्पन्न दत्युते ब्राह्मणतेन विद्या- चरणसम्पदं साधयनीति कल्पयित्वा परो वदति कुतो ब्राह्मणतवेन विद्याचरणसम्पद्वात्ये व्यभिचारात्।

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BOOK I. SECTION 10. 45

long enough in the world to render it possible for him to study, in which case the probability is that he will have studied].

b. He now defines ' Fraud in respect of a trope.'*

धर्थविकतनिर्देशे ्र्थपङ्गावपषेध उपचारच्कलम्॥। ५ू४॥

No. 54 .- 'Frand in respect of a trope' is The fraudulent ac- ceptance of the meta- the denial of the truth of the matter, when phorical literally, and the assertion was made in one or other of the vice versa. modes, [viz. literal or metaphorical,-which it suits the purpose of the objector to invert].

a. For example, in the case of such an assertion as 'The scaf- folds cry out' [-somewhat analogous to the English phraseology 'The pit and gallery applauded'-]; or 'The jar is blue'; [a dis- honest opponent will say,] ' It is only those standing on the scaf- folds that cry out, but not the scaffolds' ;- and, in like manner, [he will say,] ' How can a jar be the same thing as blue-which is [not a substance but] a colour ?'t [In these cases the objector knows perfectly well that the assertion was not meant literally of the scaffolds, and that the jar was not asserted to be the co- lour blue, but a blue substance].

b. So too [conversely] it is a fraud in respect of a trope, when the assertion ' I am eternal' has been employed literally, to ob- ject 'How canst thou be eternal that was born of so and so?'$

• उपचारचलं लच्षर्यत। + यथा मच्चा: क्रोशन्ति नीलो घट इत्यादा मन्स्था एव क्रोशन्ति नतु मस्ा:। एवं घटस्य कथ नीलरूपाभेद:। + एवं अद्दं निव्य इति शक्त्ा प्रयुन्ने श्मुकस्ादुत्पव्वरवं कथं नित्व इति प्रतिषेधो डय्युपचारचलम्।

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46 APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

[Here the objector is supposed to know very well that the speak- er employed the term 'I' to denote, what is regarded as the di- rect object of its denotation, the eternal spirit within him, and not his body, which he can only metaphorically call himself, and which, as the temporary prison-house of his soul, very possibly was born of so and so].

c. [If you ask why it is exactly that] a Fraud [such as has been described in §51, &c.] is not a valid reply, [it is] because it does not assail what the speaker meant to say .* [In the phrase- ology of European logic, it is a wilful ignoratio elenchi or miscon- ception of what it is that is to be opposed].

d. And it must not be said that it is the speaker who is to blame for employing terms with a double meaning or with a me- taphorical application; because the speaker is not to blame in employing a term that is notoriously understood as expressive of this or that meaning; else there would be an end put to every thing like reasoning by such objections as the following-viz., when a man says 'The mountain is fiery,' [the opponent, choos- ing to suppose that the term employed was not vahniman 'fiery,' but a-vahniman 'not fiery'-the form, by the rules of euphonic combination in Sanskrit, being here the same in either case, might say] 'How is it that [you say] this mountain is not fiery ?'t

e. He next takes a primà facie or incorrect view of Fraud

• वाद्यभिप्रेतार्थस्यादूषणेन छलस्यासदुभ्तरत्वम।।

• नच श्विष्टलाक्षणिके प्रयोगाद्वादिन एवापराध: स्यार्दिति वाच्यं तत्तदर्यंबोधकतया मसिङ्स्य शब्दस्य प्रयोगे वादिनो Sनपराधात्। श्रन्यथा पर्व्वता वव्िमानित्युक पर्ववतो 5यं कथमवन्िमानित्यादि- दूषणेनानुमानाद्युच्केद: स्यान्।।

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BOOK I. SECTION 10. 47

[-as it is one that is likely to occur to some readers, and one that may as well be disposed of ] whilst we are on the subject .*

वाकक्कलमेवोपचारच्लं तदविशेषात्॥५५॥

No. 55 .- Fraud in respect of a trope [§54 The varieties of Fraud not to be confounded -some one may fancy at first sight-] is becanse they partially just Fraud in respect of a term [§52], for it agree. does not differ therefrom.

a. The meaning of this doubt is, that Fraud is only of two kinds, but not of three kinds ; for Fraud in respect of a trope is just Fraud in respect of a term, seeing that these do not differ in being the assumption of a word's being used in another senset [than that in which it was well enough known that the speaker did use it].

b. [This doubt] he clears upt [as follows]. न तदर्थान्तरभावात्॥ ५६।

Things, though par- No. 56 .- It is not so [-as supposed in tially agreeing, may §55-] because they do differ [although, it may yet differ. be, agreeing in the respect just mentioned]. a. Since they may agree in some respect or other, even while they differ through the characters abovementioned [in §52-54] which have led to their being treated as separate, there would be no distinction anywhere [if we were to adopt the principle which would remove the distinction here], because there is everywhere

• प्रसद्गाच्छलं पर्व्वपच्तयति।

• कलस्य द्वित्वमेव नतु वित्वमिति शुङ्गार्थ:। 1 समाधने।

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48 APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

no difference so far as regards a character common to the things severally* [-a man and a monkey, for erample, or a jar and a web, being alike in so far as regards their being substances, but still requiring to be distinguished in respect of that in which they differ].

b. So, with the intention of showing that the opposite view in- volves an absurdity [such as has been noticed in §56. a.], he sayst [as follows].

No. 57 .- Or if there were no distinction where there is any si- milarity of character, we should have but one kind of Fraud.

a. That is to say-if no distinction is to result from any pro- perty whatever provided there be some similarity of nature, then Fraud, inasmuch as each variety thereof has a common charac- ter so far forth as each is a Fraud &c., would not be even of two sorts as you imagine [-see §55 a.], but of only one.t

b. Here concludes the topic of Fraud [in disputation.]§

c. He now defines Futility, which next presents itself.I|

• पूर्व्वोक्तभेदकधर्म्मेण भेदसन्वेदपि यत्कि्चि द्वर्ष्भेणाभेदे सामान्य- धर्म्भेद्याभेदस्य सर्व्वन्र सभ्भवाद्िभाग: कुत्रापि न सयादिति।

• विपच्ने बाधकमभिप्रेत्याह।

• यत्किस्चिड भदविशेष किश्चि साधम्याच्वत्वादिरुपाच्सेकं सयाब्न तु त्वदभिमतं द्वित्वमपौति भाव:।

5 समापं क्वलप्रकर पाम्।।

।। क्रमपाप्तां जाति वक्षयति॥

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BOOK I. SECTION 11. 49

SECTION XI.

OF FUTILE OBJECTIONS AND HOPELESS STUPIDITY.

साधम्येवेधम्याभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानं जातिः।५८॥

Futility, in an No. 58 .- Futility consists in the offering of objection, what. objections founded on [some mere] similarity or difference of character [-without regard to the question whether the fact asserted bears any invariable rela- tion to that character].

a. The expression 'founded on similarity or difference of cha- racter' is a definite one [-intended to convey just so much, and to exclude everything beyond-]; therefore the meaning is this, that Futility consists in objecting, or taking exception, on the ground of a similarity or difference of character without respect to invariableness of association or dissociation* [between the cha- racter and that whereof it is taken as a sign of the presence or the absence. For example, if it were propounded that ' The man is unfit to travel, because he has a fever,' it would be futile to object that ' The man is fit to travel, because he is a soldier'- there being no invariableness of connection between the being a soldier and the being fit to travel].

b. [As a syllogism with the Major premiss not universal but particular has no force at all]-so, [in consideration of the want of universality referred to in §58. a.,] it is implied that the futile reply-differing from a Fraud [§50]-is one that is powerless as an objection, [-whereas the objection, in the case of ignoratio elenchi, has power against the ' man of straw' which is fraudulent-

• साधम्यवेधम्याभ्यामिति सावधारण निर्देशस्तेन व्याप्तिनिरपे- साभ्यां साधर्भ्यवेधर्माभ्यां प्रत्यवस्थानं दूषणाभिधानं जातिरित्यथः॥ G

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50 APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

ly substituted for the argument of the opposite party-], or it is a reply that is self-destructive .*

c. He now defines Unfitness to be argued with-the topic which presents itself next in order.t

विप्रतिपलिरप्तिपततिस्व निग्रहस्थानम्॥ ५६।

The limit at which it be- No. 59 .- Unfitness to be argued with comes useless to argue fur- ther. consists in one's [stupidly] misunder- standing, or not understanding at all. a. The term here rendered ' Unfitness to be argued with' sig- nifies literally the place, i. e. the suggester, of censure or re- buke ;t [-for if a man stupidly misunderstands you or does not understand you at all, and yet still persists in trying to make a show of opposition, then the matter has come to that point where there is nothing left for it but to rebuke him as a blockhead, and to turn him out or quit his company].

b. In order to prevent the mistake, [into which some might fall, of supposing] that there is no subdivision of Futility and Unfit- ness to be reasoned with, [-the subdivisions of which will be stated in their proper place-] he says,§ [as follows].

No. 60 .- Since they are of various kinds, there are many

• छलादिभिब्रदूषणासमर्थमुत्तरं सव्याघातकमुन्तरं वा जातिरिनि स्रचितम्।। + क्रमप्ात्तं निग्रहस्थानं लक्षयत।

1 निग्रहस् खलीकारस् स्थानं ज्ापकं निग्रहस्थानम्। 8 जातिनिग्रहस्थानयोवविभाग नासीति समो मा भूदित्यत श्राह।

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BOOK I. SECTION 11. 51

sorts of Futility and Unfitness to be reasoned with [-see §59. b.].

a. [But as other questions are more pressing] their subdivision is not made at present ;- such is the import *[of the apho- rism].

b. [Here ends the First Book of the commented Aphorisms of the Nyáya.]

• नेदानों तद्िभाग: क्रियत इति भाव:॥

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52 APPENDIX TO THE

APPENDIX

TO THE

FIRST LECTURE.

Review of Gau- a. Before going further, let us bestow a re-

tama's Ist Lecture. strospective glance on this Lecture in which GAUTAMA lays down the plan of the whole Nya- ya system ; and let us enquire whether GAUTAMA's exposition is obnoxious to such a charge as is brought against it, for example, by Dr. Ritter, who says, (at p. 366, Vol. IV. of The method of the Nváya libelled the English version of his History of Philoso- in Europe. phy), " In its exposition the Nyáya is tedious, loose, and unmethodical. Indeed the whole form of this Philoso- phy is a proof of the incapacity of its expositors to enter into the intrinsic development of ideas, whatever knowledge they may have possessed of the external laws of composition." Setting aside the latter of these sentences, which has possibly been mis- translated, we venture to say that the Nyaya-up to the point that we have here reached in GAUTAMA's exposition of it-can be

Reasons why it tedious only to him who does not understand

is libelled. it or who has no taste for philosophical enqui- ries; that it can appear loose to any one only as the chain cable heaped upon the deck of a man of war appears loose in the eyes of the landsman who never saw it stretched; and that it can appear unmethodical only to him who has failed to discern its method. We blame no one for having failed to discern its method, but we do blame those, including Dr. Ritter,

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FIRST LECTURE. 53

who, having failed to discern it, take upon them to deny its ex-

Attempt to show istence. The method in GAUTAMA's exposition why it ought not is, one might think, sufficiently clear. Let us to be so libelled. try to make it if possible clearer. Aiming at this, we shall now give our Synopsis of GAUTAMA's method, noting, as we go along, the Aphorism to which our statements have re- ference.

Estimate of Gau- b. GAUTAMA starts with the grand question tama's order of pro- of all questions-the enquiry as to how we cedure. shall attain the summum bonum,-the 'chief end of man,' as the Westminster Catechism literally represents the Sanskrit paramapurushartha. The general answer to this he states in his first aphorism-where he lays down further the posi- tion that deliverance from evil can be reached only through know- ledge of the truth, [see §1].

c. Few are likely to dispute this first position [-those few be- ing such as are to be remitted to the category noticed under §59], and the next question is,-have we instruments adapted to the acquisition of a knowledge of the truth? According to GAU- TAMA we are furnished with four instruments adapted to this pur- pose. [These he enumerates in §3, and describes severally in §4-8].

d. But, if we have instruments, let us know what are the objects, in regard to which it is worth while obtaining a correct know- ledge by means of the appropriate instruments. [These he enu- merates in §9, and he defines them severally in §10-22].

e. But the bare enunciation and definiton of these Objects does not ensure a correct and believing knowledge of them. [The state intermediate between hearing and believing, viz. Doubt, he defines in §23]. f. But how is a man to get out of doubt? He will be content to remain in doubt if there be no motive for enquiring further.

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54 APPENDIX TO THE

[Here-§24-he takes occasion to explain what constitutes a Motive].

g. But, in every enquiry, to reach the unknown we must start from the known ;- there must be data. The knowledge which, in any enquiry, we may treat as requiring no demonstration, is either popular-being that on which the unlearned and the learned are at one -- the only ground available in dealing with the unlcarned, [see §25]; or it is scientific-belonging to the schools, [see §26]. This latter, again, is divisible into four-viz., tenets received in every school [§ 27]; tenets peculiar to particu- lar schools, and furnishing the grounds of argumenta ad hominem only [§29]; tenets postulated, and available only where the hypothesis is conceded [§30]; and tenets which, though not ex- pressly laid down by the founders of the schools, are yet so clearly implied as to require no special demonstration, being in- evitable Corollaries [§31].

h. The data being determined, it is proper to determine the order of procedure in demonstrating thereby something not granted. [This order of procedure is intimated in §32 and ex- plicated in §33-38].

i. But, thus far, we have been shown an arrangement for hear- ing only one side of the question,* and how can we be sure that the opposite side is not the right one? [Before making up our minds we must hear both sides-§39-40].

j. But an honest enquirer may have heard both sides and still be in perplexity. Is he to be turned adrift ? Not at all. Honest discussion, with one who holds the same first principles, is open to him [§41].

k. There are yet others, besides honest enquirers, that are not utterly to be rejected. A person, not hopelessly irreclaimable, * Prov. XVIII, 17.

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FIRST LECTURE. 55

may shabbily wrangle for the sake of a seeming victory. [Here, therefore, he defines wrangling, §42].

1. A person, not perhaps hopelessly irreclaimable, may descend to even a lower depth of shabbiness than the wrangler, and may carp at others without undertaking to settle any thing himself. [Here, therefore, he defines cavilling, §43].

m. Wranglers and cavillers, in default of good reasons, must take up with bad ones-with what look like reasons; and even an honest enquirer may mislead himself by taking the semblance of a reason for a real one. [The various possible semblances of a reason he, therefore, defines and divides §44-19].

n. But, whilst there are fallacies by which a man may deceive himself as well as others, there are other frauds which are em- ployed only dishonestly for the deception of others. [These frauds he defines and divides, §50-57].

o. Descending a stage lower, an opponent may employ objec- tions so futile as to be capable of deceiving no one. It is well to know in what consists the futility of such objections. [This he shows-§ 58.]

p. Finally, an opponent, sinking even below the former one, (who knew what he was opposing though he could make none but a futile opposition), may be unable to understand the proposition [$59-60]. Here GAUTAMA's patience is exhausted, but not before. Against everything but that invincible combination of the spirit of contradiction with stupidity, he seeks to arm himself at all points. An objection the most frivolous-or even futile-provi- ded it be tendered by one who understands the proposition-he

How it happens that does not refuse to deal with. The objection very frivolous objec- might perplex some honest enquirer, and tions are gravely treat- ed in the Nyaya. therefore GAUTAMA, or the follower who has imbibed his spirit, does not consider himself entitled to consult his own ease by scouting it, though he himself

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56 APPENDIX TO THE FIRST LECTURE.

may see its futility plainly enough. It is fair to remember this when we meet with ludicrously frivolous objections gravely treat- ed in a Nyaya work. The author is not to be supposed to have invented the objection. It was offered to him-offered very pos- sibly for the purpose of vexatiously puzzling and perplexing,-and the Naiyayika will not allow himself to be puzzled and perplexed. The most cavilling opponent is not to be allowed the semblance of a victory; he shall not be allowed to boast even of having put the philosopher out of temper. This single triumph-such as it is-is reserved for the absolute blockhead.

g. Now, we should like to learn from the undervaluers of the method of the Nyaya, how could that method be much improved?

The undervaluers of You are not to imagine that you have answer- the Nyaya invited to ed this question when you have shown that state where the order of procedure is mis- there are some important matters not here no- arranged, or what im- ticed by GAUTAMA. You must be able to show portant matter there is for which the sys- either that there are important matters for tem provides no place. which his system provides no place, or that he misarranges the order of procedure. We have explained his or- der of procedure, according to our own view of it. The enquiry whether there is any thing within the range of conception, for which his system does not furnish its appropriate place, we re- serve for a separate essay.

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THE APHIORISMS

OF THE

NYÁYA PHILOSOPHY

0 F

GAUTAMA

WITH ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMENTARY.

BOOK II.

PRINTED, FOR THE USE OF THE BENARES COLLEGE, BY ORDER OF GOVT. N. W. P.

ALLAHABAD: PRINTED AT THE PRESBYTERIAN MISSION PRESS. REV. L. G. HAY, Superintendent. 1853.

[1ST EDITION, 550 COPIES .- Price 15 annas.]

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1

CORRIGENDA.

In Aph. 71, read "because of its proving too much;" and so throughout the section, where the term so rendered recurs. In page 36, 1. 19, delete the "that," and also the clause " As, by the".

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THE

APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

BOOK II.

INTRODUCTION.

a. I devote myself to the brilliant Second Book of the Nyaya, [and I'worchip] Hari, with fhis four] arms tried in contests, [ahd -if you apply my remarks to the Institute itself, which suggested this comparison,] with its [four] Proofs [-the conquerors in all logical contests-] which every one knows .*

b. Now the Proofs, &c. [B. I. §1], that have been defined, having to be submitted to ordeal [with the view of determining the pertinency of the several definitions], since there is no room for trial without [there be] Doubt, in the first place Doubt itself must be put on trial.t * प्रमाण: प्रथितैदाभिर्विवादेषु परीचितैः। इिं द्विती- यमध्यायं भासमानमइं भजे। + अथ प्रमाणादिषु लचचितेषु परोक्णीयेषु संशयं विना परी चाया वसम्भवादादो संशय एव परीकणीय:।

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2 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

c. Some say that the purpose of the [Second] Book is only the trial of the Proofs [-the first in Gautama's enumeration of topics-], because [-they argue-] this is in accordance with the pupil's desire of knowledge [-he wishing to know first the whole truth respecting what is enunciated first-], and according to the rule of the needle and the frying-pan [-the smith, to whom the two are brought simultaneously for repair, polishing off the sim- pler first-], and since thus the trial of [the definition of] Doubt is subservient to the trial of the Proofs, &c .*

d. But in reality, since [the definition of ] Fraud has been put on trial [in Book I. §655-57], and since 'That which is the object of right notion' [-the second in Gautama's list of topics -] is to be put on trial in the Third and Fourth Books, and Futility in the Fifth, the purpose of the [present] Book is the examination of such of the topics as are other than these ;- for [although Motive, &c., is not examined expressly, yet] the ex- amination of Motive, &c., also will be made here by substitu- tiont [-i. e. by saying-as in Aph. 7-"Now substitute Motive for Proof, and the same rule will apply"]

e. Here the aim of the first Diurnal Portion [or half of Book Second] is the examination of just such topics as aforesaid, ex- clusive of the examination of Proof with reference to the divi-

• शिव्य जिन्ञासानुसारात् सचीकटाइन्यायाच्चातः संगय- परीचाया: प्रमाणादिपरीकोपयोगित्वात् प्रमाणपरी वेवा- ध्यायार्थ इति वदन्ति।

वसुतसु च्कलस्य परौक्षिततवात् ततीयचतुर्ययो: प्रमे- यस्य प्चमे जाते: परोक्ष्यमाणत्वात्तदतिरिक्रयावत्पदाथ परीक्षेवा धयायार्थ: प्रयोजनादिपरीचावा अप्यनेवानिदेशेन करिष्यमाणत्वात्।

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BOOK II. §1. 3

sion thereof* [-Proof itself being put on trial, with other things, in the first Diurnal Portion, and the question of the propriety of its fourfold division being remitted to the second].

f. Among these, for the trial of [the pertinency of the defini- tion of] Doubt [assigned in B. I. §23], there is an Aphorism sta- ting the prima facie viewt [as follows]-

THE FIRST DIURNAL PORTION.

SECTION I.

THE ACCOUNT GIVEN OF DOUBT EXAMINED. सभानानेकधर्मा घ्यवसायादन्यतरधर्माव्वसायादा न संगय: ॥९॥

The assigned origin of Aph. 1 .- Doubt does not arise-[perhaps Doubt. some one will say->] from the consideration of characters common [to more than one] or several [such as can- not really belong to one and the same thing], nor [again] from the consideration of [mutually exclusive] characters under the as- pect of an alternative.

a. Some explain the intention of the maker of the apho- rism to be as follows,-that here, for fear of a regressus in infini- fum, Doubt is not an element in the examination of [the perti- nency of the definition of ] Doubt, because no doubt is entertain- ed by the maker of the apborisms. But this [accoant of the im- port of the aphorism] is not correct, for it is not the [definition

• तब विभागसापेच्प्रमाणपरी वातिरिक्रोत्रयावत्पदा- र्थपरोचा प्रथमाक्ञिकार्थः। t तन संशयपरीक्षणाय पूर्वपचस्नम्।

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4 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

of] the nalure of Doubt that is put on trial, from which there would be a regressus in infinitum [-whereas Doubt is the pri- mordial source of all enquiry-] but it is the cause of Doubt, as set forth in the aphorism defining it [B. I. §23] :- and thus the doubt-" is Doubt produced from the beholding of similar cha- racters, &c., or not?"-is quite feasible .*

b. But, since there belongs to the maker of the aphorisms certainty [in respect of everything that is set forth in his insti- tute], Doubt is not exhibited with a view merely to the refuta- tion of prima facie views, [-as if these had ever had any weight with the author,-but for the purpose of explaining what are the sources of doubt in the minds of other men ;- ] and so too in the examination of [the pertinency of the definitions of] Proof, &c. It is this that is declared in the Bhashya where it is said-"In an institute, and in discussion [between a teacher and a pupil,-see Book I. § 41] there is no Doubt." Such is the fact.t

c. Doubt does not arise [-says the supposed objector in the aphorism-] from the beholding of 'characters common,' &c., because these [two alleged causes of Doubt] severally wander

*ग्रच सबकता संशयस्यादर्शनातंशयपरीच्चायां संशयो नाङ्गमनवस्थाभयादित्याशयं सबक्तो वर्णयन्ति। तदसत्। म ह्ब संशयखरूपं परीक्ष्यते येनानवस्था स्यात् अपितु लच्पसचोत्तं संशयकारणं। तथाच संशयः समानधर्म- दर्शनादिजन्यो नवेति संशय: सम्भवत्येव।

परन्तु सबकतो निर्णयसत्वात् पूर्वपचनिरासमानस्या- पेच्षणात् संशयो न दर्शित एवमेव प्रमाणादिपरीच्ायामपि। तदेवाभिद्ितं भाष्ये शास्त्रे वादेच विमर्शवर्जमिति तत्वम्।

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BOOK II. $1: 5

away [-so that if the first be present, when there is Doubt, the other is absent, and if the other be present, the first is absent; and how can that be the cause of a given phenomenon, which is alsent when the phenomenon presents itself?] Moreover, Doubt does not arise from the beholding of these [two] combined under the relation of an alternative. For, when taking cognizance that " This [object] has the same character as a post," or " This has the same character as a man," one does not doubt whether it be a post or not,-because, since resemblance implies differ- ence, it is quite competent to one to apprehend the difference [-and not to doubt whether the object be the one or the other -] s0 soon as one takes cognizance of its possessing the charac- ter of something different from it .* [In short, when we say "This is like a post," it is implied that it is not a post, but e. g., a man; and again, when we say " This is like a man," it is im- plied that it is ast a man, but, e. g., a post ;- things not being said to be "like" themselves, but only "like" to something other than themselves].

d. [Having enunciated an objection to two out of the five causes of Doubt assigned in B. I.§ 23,] he objects to the three [remain- ing alleged kinds of] Doubts arising from 'conflict of opinion,' &c.t

*समानादिधर्मदशनान्न संशयः प्रत्येकं व्यभिचारात्।

साणुधर्मसमानधर्मायं पुरुषधर्मसमानधर्मायमिति वा जानन् स्ाणुनवेति सन्दिग्धे समानत्वस्य भेदगर्भत्वाद्विघ- धर्मतेन चाते तज्गेदग्र इस्येव समभवात्।

विप्रतिपत्यादिजन्यसंशयचयं प्रतिच्चिपति।

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6 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

विप्रतिपत्त्य व्यवस्थायाच्त।२।

The objection Aph. 2 .- Nor [-perhaps some one will say- further. does Doubt arise] from conflict of opinion, nor from unsteadiness fin the recognition of criteria as present or absent].

a. 'Nor does Doubt arise,'-so much is to be supplied* [from §17.

b. The meaning is, that the production of Doubt does not depend upon ' conflicting opinion,' or 'unsteadiness' in the re- cognition [of some mark which, if we could make sure of it, would determine the object to be so and so], or unsteadiness in the non-recognition [of some mark which, were we sure of its absence, would determine the object to be not so and so], be- cause these severally wander away, [and every one of them in turn may be absent while Doubt is present].t

c. There is another aphorism to convey an objection to Doubt as the result, exclusively of other causes, of 'conflict of opim ion'.t

विप्रतिपत्ताच सम्पतिपचे ।३।

The objection Aph. 8 .- And [the origin of Doubt is not to further. be found-some one may say-] in 'oonflict of opinion,' because there is [in the minds of the disputants and the hearers, no Doubt, but rather dogged] conviction.

• न संशय दत्यनुवनेते। + विप्रतिपत्तेरुपलग्ध्व्यवस्थाया बानुपलन्य व्यवस्ायाच्ष न संशयजनकत्वं प्रत्येकं व्यभिचारादित्र्यः।

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BOOK II. $1. 7

a. The import is,-that the cause of Doubt is not to be found in the 'confliot of opinion,' because there is no conflict of opini- on ;- there is assurance,-assurance both in the case of the two disputants and of the umpire :- and since assurance is, there is no room for Doubt .*

b. Here follows an aphorism intended to demur to the two kinds of Doubt-from (1) unsteadiness in regard to recognition, and (2) in regard to non-recognitiont [B. I. § 23].

अ्रव्यवस्थात्मनि व्यवस्ितत्वाच्चाव्यवखाया:।४।

The objection Aph. 4 .- And [-some one may say-Doubt is further. not the result] of 'unsteadiness,' because in 'un- steadiness' itself there is steadiness, [-just as, when you are really mistaken, there is no mistake about your mistake]. a. The power of generating Doubt might then belong to ' un, steadiness in recognition' and to ' unsteadiness in non-recogni. tion,' if there were unsteadiness also in [that unsteadiness,] it- self, [for there can be nothing in the product that did not pre- exist in the cause ;] but this is not the case ; and so how can that [unsteadiness] which is ateady in respect of itself, have the cha- racter of unsteadiness in respect of something else? Such is the meaning.t • विप्रतिपत्ता व संशयद्ेतुत्वं सम्प्रतिपत्तेः। निश्चयात्। वादिनोर्मेथयत्थस्यच निश्ुयसच्वात्। सति च निश्चये संशया- योगादिति भाव:। + चपलन्नुपसम्मव्यवख्ातः संशयद्दयनिरासाय स नम्। 1 उपलग्धव्यवस्थाया मरानुपलन्यव्यपस्तायाच् संगय-

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8 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA. b. He states another objection .*

Further objection. Aph. 5 .- [And some one may perhaps say that Doubt cannot arise from ' unsteadiness,'] because, if so, there would be endless Doubt, because of the suitableness of its pro- ducer to be continual. a. ' If so,'-i. e., if it were so,-if ' unsteadiness' [in the recog- nising of criteria,] were the cause [of Doubt]. Some say that this expression 'if so' does not belong to the aphorism, but is a part of the Bhashyat [incorporated with the aphorism by mistake]. b. 'Endless doubt,'-i. e. there would be no cessation of doubt,-'because of the suitableness to be continual,'-i. e., be- cause of the continual possibility,-'of its producer,'-i. e., of its generator,-viz., the beholding of cognizability and other characters commont [to all things whatsoever]. c. He states the tenets [of the Nyaya system, in regard to this question]. जनकत्वं तदा स्यात् यदि खत्निश्नप्यव्यवस्थितत्वं स्यात्। मत्वेवं तथाच खात्मनि व्यवस्थितायासस्या: कथमन्यचा- व्यवस्थात्वमित्यर्थ:। * दूषणान्तरमाइ। t तथा तथा सति। अ्व्यवस्थाया हेतुत्वे सति। तथा- शब्दो 5यं म सचान्तर्ग तो ऽपितु भाव्यस्य द्रत्यन्ये। + अत्यन्तसंशयः संशयानुच्केद: स्ात्। तद्वर्मस्य तञ्जन- कस्य ज्ानत्वादिसाधारणधर्मदर्शनस्य सातत्ोपपन्ते: सर्वदा सम्भवाद। ६ सिद्धान्तमाइ।

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BOOK II. §1. 9

यथोक्तायवसायादेव तद्विशेषापेचातंशये नासंशया मात्यन्तसंशयो वा । ६।

The fact as regards Aph. 6 .- Just from consideration as afore- Doubt. said,-from one's not discerning the differ- ences of this or that,-there being Doubt, neither is there no Doubt, nor is there endless Doubt. a. 'From consideration as aforesaid,'-i. e., from the behold- ing of common characters, &c. ;- ' of this or that,'-i. e., of the fact of being a man or something else ;- 'the differences,'-i. e., the character which distinguishes a thing from other things ;- the ' discerning', or beholding, of that being absent [-such is the analysis of the word apeksha here]; from that non-discerning of the differences, [Doubt arises ;] such is the meaning .* b. And so, since it is agreed that Doubt may arise from such sources as the recognition of characters common [to several things] accompanied by the non-recognition of any differences, it is neither the case that there is no Doubt, because [forsooth -as has been contended in §1-4-] there is no cause of it,-nor that there is endless Doubt, because [forsooth-as pretended in Aph. 5-] anything whatever may be the cause of it ;- such is the meaning.t c. And, since the recognition, for example, of characters com. mon [to different things] may produce some separate instance

• यथो का ध्यवसायात् साधारणादिधर्मदर्भनात तस्य पुरुषत्वादेयों विशेष दतरव्यावर्नको धर्मसस्यापगत ईच ईचं ततः विशेषादर्शनादित्र्य। + तथाच विशेषादर्शनसद्ितसाधारण धर्मदर्शनादितः संगये खोकते न कारणाभावादसंशयो नवा यत्किन्वित्कार- ससस्वादृत्यन्तसंगय र्त्यर्थ: । B

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10 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

of Doubt, there is no harm though this should [-as alleged by the objectors-] wander away [and not be found in every in- stance present] as regards Doubt simpliciter ;* [-there being nothing absurd in a " Plurality of causes". A man may die of a gunshot wound, though we do not find & gunshot wound wherever we find death].

d. And [Doubt may arise] in a 'conflict of opinions,' because we understand the doubt, raised by the speeches of the dispu- tants, to belong only to the umpire.t

e. And as for your saying [at § 1 .- ] "How can Doubt arise from the recognising of characters common [to different things], seeing that likeness implies differences ?"-this also is not [a right account of the matter]; for the cause [of Doubt] is not the cogniz- ing this or that as having a character similar [to what something else has], but the perceiving that it has a character which belongs to both [of the things of which we doubt whether this be the one or the other]; so that there is no such fault [in our defini- tion] as you allege.t

f. Now, by means of this same examination of [the pertinen- cy of the definition of] Doubt, suggesting by substitution [-see

• साधारणधर्मदर्शनादेश्न संशयविशेषे जनकत्वात् संग- यत्वावच्छ्िव्न प्रति व्यभिचारेडपि म चति:। + विप्रतिपत्ता च वादिवाक्याम्यां म्यस्स्ेव संशयोप- गमात्। + यच्चात्रं समानधर्मदर्शनात् कथं संशयः समानत्वस् भेदगर्भत्वादिति तदपिन। नहि समानधर्मलेन तज्ज्ञानं हेतुरपितु उभयसइचरितधर्मवत्वच्ञानं तथेतुत्तदोषा- भावात्।

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BOOK II. §1. 11

Intro :- d.], the examination of the other topics [enunciated by Gantama in his opening aphorism], he says *:-

The same rule to be applied Aph. 7 .- Where there is [room for] thronghout. Doubt, thus you are to deal in respect of each [case of it] in succession.

a. 'Thus,'-i. e., in the manner aforesaid ;- 'in respect of each in succession,'-i. e., in respect of the [several] applications [of the present rule to the matters to which it is applicable], 'you are to deal with,' i. e., your are particularly to meddle with, -i. e., you are thus to understand the relation of examinationt [to the definition of this or that, the pertinency of which may call for examination].

b. What, then,-is Motive also to be put on trial? He replies -nay,-'when there is [room for) Doubt,' [and here there is none]. If there were any doubt as to the definition of that, then that also would be put on trial,t [-but this is not the case].

c. Or [-to give another explanation of one portion of the aphorism-] the meaning may be, that, dialogwise, i. e., in the form of speech and reply, you are to deal with each, i. e.,

• सम्प्रति संशयपरीच्षयेव परेषां पदाथानां परोक्षाम- निदिशबाइ।

• एवमु तरीता उत्तरोत्तरेषु प्रयोगेषु प्रमङ्ग: प्रहष्टः सङ्: परीचाया: सम्बन्वो बोद्ूव्य:। + तल्किं प्रयोजनमपि परीक्षणीयं। नेताइ। यब संशय पति यदि तह्च्णार्थसंशयसदा तदृपि प्ररीक्षणीयम्।

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12 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

you are to make, in respect of the thing donbted, the examina. tion whichs [ought to be made] in respect of it .* d. Here ends the section on the examination of Doubt.t

SECTION II.

THE EXAMINATION OF PROOF IN GENEBAL. e. Now, since there is room for it, he states a prima facie view, in order to the examination of Proof in generalt.

A denial that Sense, &c., Aph. 8 .- [Perhaps some one will say] are Proofs. the nature of a Proof does not belong to Sense, &c., for it cannot be so at any of the three times [into hich Time is divided]. a. That is to say,-the nature of Proof does not belong to Sense, &c., because it cannot be said that, even at any of the three times [past, present, or future], is 'correct knowledge' (pramá) established by [that to which the Nyaya gives the name of Proof-or] 'the instrumental cause of correct knowledge' (pra- mána)§. * सथवा उत्तरोत्तरं उत्तिप्रत्युत्तिरूपं ततपसङ्ग: तत्र या परीचषा संशयिते यें कर्न्तव्येत्यर्थः॥ + समान्नं संशयपरी चाप्रकरणम्। + ददामीमवसरतः प्रमाणसामान्यपरीवणाय पूर्वपच यति। कालनयेदपि प्रमाणात्ममाया: सिद्धेर्षक्रुमशय्पलात् प्रत्यचादीनां न प्रामाणयमित्वर्थ:॥

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BOOK II. $2. 13

b. By a triad of aphorisms he explains how it cannot be so at any one of the three times .*

पूर्व द्ि प्रमाणसिद्वा नेन्द्रियार्थसब्िकर्षात् प्रत्यक्ष- सिद्धि: ॥९।

The anteriority of Proof to Aph. 9 .- For, if Proof existed an- knowledge denied. teriorly, Perception could not "arise from the contact of a Sense with its object."

a. The anteriority, in the first place, of Proof [to the know- ledge which, you allege, results from it,] cannot be; 'for,' i. e., be- cause,-'if Proof existed anteriorly to knowledge,' i. e., if Proof were an existing thing,-it would not be the case [as asserted in B. I. §4] that " Perception takes place from the contact of the Sense with the object,"-because [-on the hypothesis-] the Proof existed anteriorly to the Sense-knowledge. For, what is meant by being a 'Proof' is the being the instrumental cause of right knowledge,-and, anteriorly to our getting the right knowledge, how, moreover, can anything be called the cause of the right knowledge [which we have not even got]? If its existence even anteriorly to the right knowledge must be acquiesced in, how is it "from the contact of the Sense with the object" ?- [how is] the production of Perception-the production of Perception, &c.,-from contact of the Sense with the object, &c., ?t [-an

• िस्र व्या बैकाष्यासिदृत्वं व्यत्पादयति। + प्रमाणस्य पूर्वत्ं तावन्न सम्भवति दि यतः प्रमाया: पूर्व प्रमाणसिद्वा प्रमाणसतत्वे दन्द्रियाथसत्निकर्षात् प्रत्यसं विद्चनीति न खात् प्रत्यक्तप्रमात: पूर्वमेव प्रमाणस्य सख्यात्। प्रमापत्वं दि प्रमाकरणतं। पूर्व प्रमाया बालामे प्रमाकरपत्वमपि कथं स्ात्। पूर्वमेव प्रमाया: सिद्धिरपे-

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14 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

account of the matter apparently inconsistent with the anterior existence of the thing so spoken of]. पश्चात् सिद्धो न प्रमाणेभ्य: प्रमेयसिद्विः॥१०।

The posteriority of Proof to Aph. 10 .- If the existence [of tho knowledge denied. alleged instruments of right know- ledge] were subsequently, then the objects of knowledge would not be known through the instruments of knowledge.

a. If the existence of Proof were [not anterior but] subsequent to right knowledge, the fact of a thing's being rightly known would be settled anteriorly to the Proof,-so that the produc- tion of right knowledge, and the cognizance of a thing rightly known, would not come from [what you call] 'the instruments of right knowledge' *. युगपत्िद्वा प्रत्यर्थनियतत्वात् कमटत्तित्वाभावो बुद्धीनाम्। ११।

The simultaneousness of Proof and Aph. 11 .- If the existence [of knowledge denied. Proof] were simultaneous [with that of the corresponding knowledge], there would not be, in the cognitions, [-e. g., in the case of inference-] that order of succession which results from their being conversant about sepa- rate objects. a. If Proof and the knowledge 'were simultaneous,'-were to arise simultaneously,-there would not be that ' order of suc-

येति कथमिन्ट्रियार्थसच्चिकषादितः प्रत्चोत्पत्ति: प्रत्चा- सुत्पत्ति:। • प्रमाणस्य प्रमात: पक्चात् सिद्धा विषयस्य प्रमेयत्वं प्रमा- वात्पूर्वमव सिद्धमिति न प्रमापतः प्रमाया उत्पत्ति: प्रमे- यस्य प घप्रिरिति।

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BOOK II. §2. 15

cession' which there really is in consequence of the cognitions' being conversant about separate objects. For, the apperception of a word [e. g.,] has the sound for its object, being in the shape of an auricular intuition,-but the verbal knowledge [-the know- ledge conveyed by the word-] has the sense of the word for its object, being in the shape of something unperceivable [by Sense], and generically different [from the other object] ;- so that these two cannot be simultaneous, because, since they have the relation of canse and effect [-which the Naiyayika will not deny that they have-], they can really be in the order of succession *.

He states the tenett [of the Nyaya, on the point]. बैकात्यासिद्े: प्रतिषेधानुपपत्तिः॥१२॥

The sceptic's argument Aph. 12 .- [If there be no such thing as retorted. Proof, ] because [forsooth] nothing can be such at any of the three times, then the objection itself cannot be established.

a. If the establishment of matters rightly known, by means of Proof, is not to be admitted, because [forsooth] there can be no such thing at any of the three times, then, at that rate, thy objection also [to the possibility of Proof] cannot be establish ed; so that it is a futile objection :- such is the importt.

• प्रमाणप्रमेययायुगपत्पच्वे युगपदुत्पत्ता बुद्धीनामर्थ- विशेषनियतत्वाद्यत्कमटत्तित्वं तब्न सात्। पदधानं दि शन्दविषयकं सवणप्रत्यचरूपं शान्दबोधन्व पदार्थविषयकः परोवरूपो विजातीय रत्यनयोन यागपद्यं सम्भवति कार्य- कारणभाववस्वात् क्रमिकत्वेनैव सिद्धेः। विद्ान्तमाढ्। यदि बैकाल्यासिद्या प्रमाणात् प्रमेयसिद्धिनापेयते

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16 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

b. Again, hostile evidence, moreover, going to the denial of all evidence, cannot be admitted; and so how could the denial be substantiated? So he says* [as follows]. सर्वप्रमापप्रतिषेधाच्च प्रतिषेधासिद्वि:।१३।

This shown Aph. 18 .- And the denial itself cannot be esta- further. blished, because [by the denial] all evidence is denied. a. And if a refutative Proof be admitted, how are all proofs disproved ?- so he sayst [as follows]. तत्मामाएये वा न सर्वप्रतिषेध: ।१४ ।

And still fur- Aph. 14 .- Or if that one have the nature of ther. a Proof, then all [Proof ] is not excluded. a. "But then [-the sceptic may rejoin-] according to my way of thinking, there is no use in establishing realities; since the Universe is a void, the relation of Evidence and [consequent] Knowledge is also unreal; and it has been shown that according to thy view it is impossible that this [character of being a Proof] should exist in any of the three times [-before the knowledge, with it, or after it-]:" therefore he solves thist [as follows].

तदा तट्रीता खदीय: प्रतिषेधोऽप्यनुपपत्र इति जातुत्तरमे- तदिनि भाव:। * किञ्न्व सर्वप्रमाणप्रतिषेधे प्रतिषेधकं प्रमाषमपि ना- भ्युपगन्तव्यं। तथाच कथं प्रतिषेधसिद्धिरित्ाइ। + यटिच प्रतिषेधकं प्रमाणमुपेयते तदा कथं सर्वप्रमाण- प्रतिषेध द्त्याइ़। + ननु मन्मते वसुसिद्धिनापेचिता विश्वस्य शून्यत्वात् प्रमा- पाप्रमेयभावो Sपि न वासविकर्वनाते व नैकाल्यासिद्रियत्री वेत्यमसदुदरति।

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BOOK II. §2. 17

The antecedent cxistence of Aph. 15 .- And this [fact, that there Proof illustrated. may be things entitled to the name of Proof ] is not to be denied as regards all the three times, because, as [the antecedent existence of] a drum is proved by the sound, so is this proved. a. The denial that this [character of a Proof] could belong to a thing during any of the three times, was asserted [by the scep- tic, at §8] ;- but this [denial] is not competent ;- Why ?- so he replies, 'by the sound,' &c. As an antecedently existent musical instrument, a drum or the like, is proved, or known, [to exist,] by the sound which takes place subsequently [to the formation of the instrument]; or as, from the antecedently existent sun, the chronologically subsequent illumination of things [may be inferred]; or as the existence of fire follows from the smoke which is synchronous with the fire; so here also, from 'right knowledge,' which is, in every instance, posterior to the ' cause of right knowledge,' is really [demonstrated] the prior existence of a ' cause of right knowledge,' such as Sight or the like *.

b. It is not to be supposed, however, that this [-Proof-] has antecedently got the ' right knowledge' associated with it; for a thing may be entitled to the character of a Proof merely through its association, from time to time, with 'right knowledge,'; just

*बैकाख्यप्रतिषेध उक्तः। स न सम्भवति। कत द्रत्यत ब्राइ शव्दादिति। यथा शब्दात् पश्चाङ्वाविनः पूर्वसिद्धस्था- तोद्यस्य मुरजादे: सिद्धिर्ष्प्निःयेथा वा पूर्वसिद्धात सर्यादुन्- रकालीनवस्ुप्रकाशनं यथा वा व्गिसमकालीनाटूमाइक्कि- सिद्धितयाचापि प्रमात: सर्वन प्रमाणादुत्तरभाविन्या एव प्रमाणस्य पक्तुरादे: पूर्वभावित्वम स्येव।।

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18 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

as, for example, one may [without inaccuracy] say, "Bring the cook," [-giving to some man, though perhaps not cooking at the time, that name-] just because of his being from time to time engaged in the act of cooking :- such in the import .*

c. In the Tattwaloka it is here asserted that that [portion of the aphorism] which ends with cha does not belong to the apho- rism; but, in reality, from the tenour of his own comment, among the rest, [it is clear that] it does belong to the apho- rism.t

d. But then [-some one may say-] the dealing with ' Proof and 'Object of right knowledge,' just since this [relation] is not a fixed thing, is not an absolutely correct procedure; just as, in the case of a rope, the dealing with it [-under a mistaken im- pression-] as if it were a serpent, for instance: 80, in regard to this doubt, he sayst :- प्रमेयताच तुलाप्रामाएयवत् ।१६। Proofs, by heing objects of knowledge, are not debarred from being cuuses of Aph. 16 .- And the fact of knowledge. being an object of right know- ledge [does not destroy the character of a proof], as the judicial character of a balance [is not disproved by the fact that you can weigh the balance itself in another pair of scales].

• पूर्व प्रमावेशिष्यन्तु तस्थ नेपेयते। यदाकदाचित् प्रमासम्यन्वेनेव प्रमाणत्वसमवाद्यदाकदाचित् पाकसम्बन्धे- नेष पाचकमानयेत्यादिवदिति भाव:।

• अच चकारानं न सबाम्तर्गतमिति तत्वालोके। वसु- तस ट्ोकादिखरसात् सबान्तर्ग तमेव। + नम्मनियतत्वादेव प्रमाणप्रमेयव्यवद्दारो म पारमा-

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BOOK II. §2. 19

« As a balance is dealt with as an 'instrumental canse of right knowledge,' because it is what decides the weight of gold, or the like,-and is dealt with as an object of knowledge whed we decide, by means of another balance, the amount of its own weight ;- so also, by reason of the entrance of twe eauses [for our taking two separate views of the same thing], the Senses &c. are dealt with both as causes of knowledge and as objeets of knowledge *.

b. Here is an aphorism, with a prima facie view, intended te op. pose [the possibility of any thing's being a Proof ], on the ground of the regressus in infinitum.t

प्रमाणतः सिङ्गे: प्रमाणानां प्रमाणान्तरसिद्टिमसग्ग॥१७।

Another sceptical objection to Proof. Aph. 17 .- Since it is by Proofs that the eristence of Proofs is established, the existence of other Proofs presents itself [for demonstration].

a. Sinee it is agreed that it is by Proof that the Proofs are es- tablished [as being Proofs], you must agree that there are other Proofs [in addition to any number that can be assigned]. To ex- plain ;- a Proof, in the first place, is not self-established, for then we should have a case of a thing's supporting itself, [-and, as remarked elsewhere, a man-"however clever"-cannot sit upon bis own shoulder, and thus convey himself dry-shod across a river,-J therefore another Proof must be admitted ;- and since thene two, if they were to be the establishers mutually of one

•वर्याि तुलाया: सुवशादिगुरुत्वपरि च्ेदकल्वात्

मेयव्यवहारसथा निमित्त द्वयसमावेशादिन्ियादेरपि प्रमा-

• सक्वखया प्रतवखनपरं पूवेपचलनम्।

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20 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

another, would present a case of reasoning in a circle [-or, lite- rally, of 'resting on one another mutually,'-as when two boats, by laying hold of one another, vainly expect to avoid being drift- ed out to sea], therefore there also another Proof [of the Proof of the Proof ] must be admitted,-and so on without coming to any stand-still :- such is the import .* b. But then [-the sceptic may rejoin-] a Proof may be es- tablished, as such, without a Proof :- so he states thist [objection in the following aphorism]. तद्विनिष्टत्तेवी प्रमाणसिद्विवत् तलिद्वि:।१८। If Proof need no cause, may Aph. 18 .- Or in the absence there- not knowledge need no cause ? of,[-i. e., of Proof,-since Proof may, in virtue of itself, be Proof,] then, just as Proof is established [inde- pendently], so may this [-viz., right knowledge, independently of any cause of it,] be established. a. And if 'in the absence' of Proof,-i. e., without Proof,-it be agreed that Proof is,-then, just in the same way let it be agreed that that [-viz., 'right knowledge'-] may exist. What is the use of acknowledging a cause of right knowledge? And thus the whole world is an unsettled question, so that we end in the void [of absolute scepticism] :- such is the import.t

• प्रमाणानां प्रमाणतः सिद्धेः खीकारे प्रमाणान्तरखौ- कार: स्यात्। त्यादि प्रमाणस्य तावन्न खतस्मिद्धिरात्मा- अयापनेरतः प्रमाणान्तरं खीकायें। तयोस परस्रसाधकते

मनवस्ेति भाव: । + ननु प्रमाणसिद्धि: प्रमाणं विनेव स्यादित्यनाइ। यदिच प्रमाणविनिषृटत्तितः प्रमाषव्यतिरेकात् प्रमाव-

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BOOK II. §2. 21

b. He states the tenet* [of the Nyaya system, on this point].

Proof illuminates without reguiring to be illuminated. Aph. 19 .- It is not so [-that an end- less series of Proofs of Proofs are re- quired-], because it [viz., Proof,] really is, just as the light of a lamp is.

a. For, as, by the light of a lamp, a jar, or the like, is illumi- nated, so are the ' causes of right knowledge' the illuminators of what things are rightly known. Otherwise, then even the lamp would not be the illuminator of the jar, for fear [forsooth] of the regressus in infinitum,-viz., that the lamp is [in the first place,] the illuminator [or revealer] of the jar, and the Sight [in the second place,] is the revealer of the lamp,-and something else makes us aware of it, and so on.t

b. Here ends the section regarding the examination of Proof in general.ț

सिद्धिः खोकियते तदा तद्ददेव तत्मिद्वि: खोक्रियतां किं प्रमाणाङ्गीकारेण। तथाचाव्यवस्थितमेव जगत् स्यादिति शून्यतायां पर्यवसानमिति भाव:। *सिद्ान्तमाइ।

• यथाहि प्रदीपालोकाड्कटादिप्रकाशतया प्रमाणनां प्रमेयप्रकाशकत्वमन्यथा प्रदीपस् घटप्रकाशकत्वं प्रदीप- प्रकाशकं पचुक्उज्ञापकमन्यदित्यनवस्थाभयात प्रदोपो 5पि म घटप्रकायक: स्ात्।

++

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THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

SECTION III.

THE EXAMINATION OF THE DEFINITION OF SENSE. c. After the examination of Proof in general, the separate kinds of Proof having to be examined, the one first enumerated, viz., Sense, falls to be [first] examined. And, in respect of this one, the definition given before [-at B. I. §4-] was through its fruit [and not in respect of itself] :- so one objects to that definition of the fruit, as laid down .* प्रत्यचल जणामुपपत्तिरसमग्रवचनात् ।२•। Objection to the definition of Perception. Aph. 20 .- The definition of Percep- tion [-says the Bauddha-]is untenable, because not of the whole [that ought to have been stated] is there a statement.

a. That which has been given as the definition of Pereeption, -viz., its being what results from the conjunction of a Sense with its object,-is untenable, 'because it does not state the whole.' The meaning is this :- of [the species of knowledge called] Perception, a definition, made up of its cause [-viz., the conjunction of a Sense with its object,-] has been laid down: in this case the insertion [in the definition,] of the totality made up of the assemblage of causes would prevent the undue exten- sion [of the definition, to things not intended by it], and this [enumeration of the whole assemblage of causes] has not been set down. For, 'not the whole'- i. e., only the fact of being produced by the conjunction of a Sense with its object, is set down [in the definition] ;- but the conjunction of Soul with

• प्रमाण सामान्यपरीचानन्तरं प्रमायविशेषेषु परीकषयी- येषु प्रथमोहिषं प्रत्यव परीक्षणीयं। तवप फयवारकमेव लक्षणं पूर्वमु त्तमत: फललचर्ष यथामुतमाच्चिपति।

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BOOK II. §3. 23

Mind, [and of the Senses with the Mind,] and so on, has not been set down ;- and so it [-the definition of Sense-] extends unduly to Inference &c., seeing that these [also] result from the conjunc- tion of a Sense-organ [-viz., the Mind-] and an Object [- viz., the Sonl-] in the shape of that conjunction of Soul and Mind [-which is the ' non-intimate cause' of all knowledge what- soever] :- such is the meaning .* b. But then, since there may be a doubt that the conjunction of Soul with Mind is not really a cause [of Perception,-in which case the foregoing objection of the sceptic would go for nothing], he [the sceptic,] sayst [as follows]. नात्ममनसो: सब्रिकषाभावे प्रत्चोत्पत्ति:।२१। An indispensable to Per- Aph. 21 .- There is no Perception pro- ception. duced in the absence of the conjunction of the Soul with the Mind. a. The conjunction, which takes place with the Mind, of Soul divided off [from the universal Soul] by a body,- in the absence of that [conjunction] since there is no Perception produced,-there- fore [-says the sceptic-on the Naiyayika's own principles-] it * प्रतवस् य्क्षणमिन्द्रियार्थसवनिकर्षात्पन्नत्वं तब्रोप- पद्मतेऽसमग्रवचनात्। व्रयमर्थः । प्रत्यचस्य कारणघटितं सचपमभिष्टितं। तब कारणकलापघटिताया: सामग्रा विनिवेशनमतिव्याप्निनिरासकं तच्च नाभिद्ितं। असमग्रं

गादिकन्तु नाभिष्टितं। तथाचातममनसंयोगरूपेन्रियार्य-

• नन्वातामनोयोगादे: कारणत्वमेव नालीताशड्ाया- माह।

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24 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

is indispensable that the conjunction of Soul and Mind should be one [element in the] cause of Perception [-and so it ought to have been recorded in the definition]. ' The production of Perception' is what is here specified; but it is the production of [right] knowledge [in any shape] that is meant* [to be impugned by the sceptic]. b. But then [-some one may object to the sceptic-if the definition is bound to specify everything which is a condition of the production of Perception, or of knowledge in general, then] Space &c. must be causes of it :- so he propounds this doubtt [as follows]. दिग्देशकालाकाशेव्वप्येवं प्रसङ्ग: ।२२। Whether Space &c. are Aph. 22 .- And were it so, then also in causes of Perception. the case of Direction, Space, Time, the Ether, &c., we should find this to be the case, [viz., that these should be enumerated among the causes of Perception]. a. Since there really is, in the case of these also, in a manner, the relation of priority and posteriority [-these being necessa- rily antecedent to any cognition, and therefore to be reckoned among its causes or conditions-], if [you say that] these are inoperative, then the same is the case with the thing in questiont [-viz., the conjunction of Soul and Mind, which, however, the Naiyayika cannot regard as inoperative in the matter]. * शरीरावच्छ्िव्नस्यात्मनो मनसा यः सव्निकर्षसदभावे न प्रत्यच्तोत्पत्तियतो 5त व्रात्ममनसंयोगस्य कारणतवमाव- श्यकं। प्रत्यच्ोत्पत्तिरिति प्रकृतं। ज्ञानोत्पत्तिरिति विव- चितम्। + नन्वेवं दिगादीनामपि कारणलं स्ादित्याशङ्कते। + यथाकथश्चित् पौवीपर्यस तवापि सत्वात् तेषाम-

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BOOK II. §3. 25

6. In order to declare the answer in regard to this point, he says* [as follows].

वानलिङ्गलवादातानो नानवरोध:।२३।

Knowledge im- Aph. 23 .- The Soul is not excluded [-in our plies Soul. definition of Perception, or any other kind of knowledge-], because knowledge is the Sign thereof.

a. 'The Soul is not excluded,'-i. e., is not omitted to be ta- ken in as one of the causes. How ?- 'because knowledge is the Sign thereof.' That of which knowledge is the Sign, is so [-i. e., is implied as one of the causes in the production of knowledge, in the shape of Perception or otherwise]; for Knowledge, be- ing a positive product, establishes [the existence of ] a subject of inherence,-and this [subject of inherence], in the ultimate re- sort [-when nothing else remains to which we can assign the character], is Soul alone; and there is no proof that Space and the rest are causes [of knowledge] :- such is the import. And thus it is established, also, by the sense of the terms, that the conjunction of Mind, with Soul, the Intimate Cause, is the non- intimate causet [of knowledge in general].

b. Since it may be asked why the non-intimate cause [of

• ब्ातनो नानवरोधो ऽसङ्गइः कारणतेनेति न। ऊतः। शनलिङ्गत्वात्। धनं लिङ्ग यस्य तत् तथा। ज्ञानं द्ि भाव- काये समवायिकारणं साधयति। तब्व परिशेषादातमेव। दिगादीनान्ज कारणते न मानमिति भाव:। दत्यञ् सम- वाविकारपस्यात्मनो मनसा सयोगे। Sसमवायिकारषमित्य- प्यर्षात् सिद्म्। D

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26 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

knowledge] is not the conjunction of Soul and Body, or the like, -therefore he states an argument for the preeminence of the Mind* [among the joint causes with Soul].

The function of the Aph. 24 .- The Mind [is not excluded, in Mind in subservi- ence to Soul. our estimate of the causes of knowledge], be- cause that by which we recognise it [-the Mind-in the case of our cognitions-] is the fact that these [cognitions] are not simultaneous.

a. The expression 'is not excluded' is supplied [from the pre- ceding aphorism].t

b. It is indispensable that the Mind also be reckoned one of the causes, because, through the conjunction of the Senses and the Mind, this [Mind] regulates the non-simultaneousness of cognitions [-acting, in short, the part of Attention, which is conversant about only one thought at a time-]; and it is not by the conjunction of Body with Soul, or the like, that this is regulated :- such is the import. And thus it is fitting that the conjunction of the Soul with the Mind should be the non-inti- mate causet [of knowledge]. * म्रात्मशरोरादिसंयोगस्य ऊतो नासमवायिकारपत- मित्तो मनसः प्राधान्ययुक्रिमाइ। + नानवरोध पृत्यनुवर्त्तते। + रष्ट्रियमनोयोगद्वारा ज्ानायोगपद्यनियामकलवानान- सोऽपि हेतुत्वमावश्यकमिति। शरीरात्मयोगादेश्व न तञ्चि- यामकत्वमिति भाव:। दत्यच्ाताम नसंयोगस्यासमवायि- कारणत्वं युक्तम्।

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BOOK II. §3. 27

c. The aphorism conveying the tenet. *

प्रत्यचनमित्तत्वाच्चेन्द्रियार्थयो: सव्विकर्षस्य पृथग्व- चनम् । २५॥

Justifcation of Aph. 25 .- And, because of its being the cause the definition. of Perception, is there separate mention of the conjunction of the Sense and the Object. a. 'Because of its being the cause of Perception,'-i. e., be- cause of its being a cause peculiar to Perception.t

b. The meaning is as follows. In the aphorism regarding Perception [B. I. §4], the mention of the conjunction of a Sense with its Object is not indeed with the view of mentioning the canse [in all its completeness], in which case the not mention- ing the conjunction of Mind with Soul &c. would have been a deficiency ; but it was for the purpose of marking it [by a cha- racter peculiar to itself] : and since, in such a case, it is as proper to mention a characteristic consisting of the peculiar cause as one consisting of the whole set [of causes], and since the pecu- liar cause [in the case of Perception,] is the conjunction of a Sense with its Object, it was mentioned separately. The men- tion was proper, seeing that it constitutes a characteristic, with- out reference to such things as the conjunction of the Mind with the Soul, which are causes commont [to all kinds of knowledge as well as Perception].

• सिद्धान्तस्बम्। + प्रत्यचनिमित्तत्वात् प्रत्यचासाधारणकारणत्वात्। + अयमर्थः। प्रत्यचव्त्चे दन्द्रियार्थसत्निकर्षाभिधानं हि न कारणाभिधितया येनात्ममनोयोगाद्यनभिधानेन न्यूनत्वं अपितु लच्णाभिप्रायेष। तनच सामग्रोघटितस्येवासा-

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28 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

c. He mentions another way of settling the dispute .*

त्वात्। २६। Another defence of the Aph. 26 .- And [the conjunction of the deflnition. Sense and the Object is the principal pecu- liarity in Perception,] because the conjunction of a Sense with its Object is the cause [of knowledge] in the case [even] of those who are asleep, or whose minds are not attending. a. 'Of knowledge'-is to be supplied.t b. The fact that the conjunction of a Sense with its Object is the main thing [in producing Perception], is proved by the pro- duction of knowledge, quite instantaneously, in the case [even] of those sleeping and those whose minds were not attending, by the conjunction of the organ of Hearing with the thundering of a cloud, for instance; or by the conjunction of the organ of Touch with fire, for example.t c. He mentions another argument.§ धारणकारणघटितस्ापि लक्षपस् सुवचत्वादिन्द्रियार्थसत्नि- कर्षस्य चासाधारणत्वात् पृथग्वचनं। आ्रात्ममनसंयोगादि- साधारणकारणाद्यवच्क्विद्य लक्षणघटकतया वचनं युक्तम्। * ममाध्यन्तरमाह़। जानस्थेति शेष:। + सुप्रानां व्यासक्रमनसाच्च घनगर्ष्जितादिना भोबस- ब्विकषाद्द्यादिना त्वक्सन्निकर्षाच द्रागेव वानोत्पन्तेरि- न्द्रियार्थसच्निकर्षस्य प्राधान्यम्। 5 युत्तयन्तरमाइ।

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BOOK II. §3. 29

त्चापदेशो ज्ञनविशेषाणाम्।२७।

Another reason. Aph. 27 .- And by these [conjunctions of Sense and object] are excluded the [other] kinds of knowledge. a. The kinds of knowledge [other than Perception] are ' ex- cluded,'-i. e., distinguished,-set aside,-by ' these,'-i. e., the conjunctions of Sense and Object. For the conjunction of Soul and Mind, or the like, does not exclude ;- for the fact of being produced thereby is common to the other kinds of knowledge [as well as Perception]. In like manner, the fact also of its re- sulting from conjunction of a Sense-organ with the Mind would not serve as the characteristic, because this would not extend to the mental* [i. e., to internal intuition, in which case the Sense- organ, so called, is the Mind itself ;- and the definition of pra- tyaksha must extend to internal as well as external Perception].

b. He ponders a doubt, with reference to whether the conjunc- tion of a Sense and its Object is not the cause [of Perception], because this may be present unattendedt [by any resultant Per- ception].

व्याइतत्वादहेतु: । २८।

Sensation unattended by Perception. Aph. 28 .- This is not the cause [of Perception-some one may perhaps say-], श्नविशेषाणां तेरिन्द्रियार्थसत्निकर्षैरपदेशो विशे- षणं व्यादत्तिः। आ्रात्ममनोयोगादिकं दि न व्यावर्नकं तञ्ज- न्यत्वस्य मनान्तरसाधारणलात्। एवमिन्द्रियमनोयोगज- स्वमपि न लच्षणां मानसे Sव्याप्रे:।

थेन शङते

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30 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

because this [Perception] is debarred [in instances where the conjunction of a Sense with its Object was present].

a. The meaning is, that [some one may perhaps say that] the conjunction of a Sense with its Object is not the cause [of Per- ception], because, at the time, e. g., of listening to a song, though there really be the conjunction, e. g., of the Sight and a jar, the visual perception of it, e. g., is debarred .*

b. He clears up this doubt.t

नार्थविशेषप्राधान्यात्। २६।

Solution of the Aph. 29 .- Nay,-it is from the preeminence puzzle. of the particular Object.

a. The song, e. g., is heard, because of the engrossingness,- the desire to attend to it, of some particular object, e. g., the song; and because thus the desire of hearing the song is an ob- stacle, e. g., to [our taking note of] sensations of Sight, and because it is the absence of obstacles that brings about the effect; and the fact of being the cause belongs to the conjunction of a Sense with its Object in cooperation therewitht [-i. e., in co- operation with the absence of obstacles] ;- therefore the prima facie view [here referred to] is not right.t

• गोतत्रवणादिकाले चन्तुर्घटसंयोगादा विद्यमाने 5पि वाचुषादेव्यीइतत्व रन्रियार्थसंयोगो न हेतुरित्यर्थः। + समाधने। + चर्थविशेषस्य गीतादे: प्राबल्यात् बुभुत्सितत्वाद् गीता-

प्रतिबन्वकाभावस्य व का्यार्जकल्वात् तक्षइकारेणपेन्द्रिया- र्यसचिकर्षस्य हेतुत्वमतः पूर्वपचा न युक्त पति।

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BOOK II. 63. 31

b. But then [the objector, taking another line of objection, may say-] if Perception were a different kind of Evidence [from the others], the investigation of its definition would be fitting,- but it is really no such thing :- which doubt he next ponders .*

प्रत्यक्षमनुमानमेकदेशग्रइ्णादुपलब्धेः ।३०।

Whether Perception be not Aph .- 30. Perception [some one may a case of Inference. say-] is [none other than] Inference, becanse the apprehension [to which we give the name,] is through the apprehending of a part, [which is to us a Sign of the whole]. a. What we regard as a Perception, e. g., the cognition of a jar, is an 'inference,' i. e., a conclusion ;- because we apprehend it after apprehending ' a part,' viz., the part in front; and thus the cognition, e. g., of a tree, is an inference, because it results from the cognition of a Sign-[this Sign] consisting in the ap- prehension of a part [of the tree] :- such is the meaning.t b. He clears up this doubt.t

न प्रत्यच्ेष यावत्तावदुपलम्भात्॥३१।

Perception not a case of Aph. 31 .- Nay,-because by Perception Inference. is apprehended so much as is so. * ननु सति प्रत्यचस्य प्रमाणान्तरत्वे तन्नन्पस परोचा सङ्गच्कते तदेव तु नायीत्याशङ्कते। + प्रत्यव्ततेनाभिमतं घटादिज्ञानमनुमानमनुमितिरेक- देशसय पुरोभागस्य ग्रइणानन्तरमुपलब्धेसथाचकदेशग्रइ-

• समाधनेो

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32 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

a. That Perception is Inference is not the case,-that is to say, so far forth as it is a Perception, it is not a Conclusion .* b. 'Because so much is apprehended [through Perception] as is so,'-i. e., because, even by thee it is admitted that there is [really such an] apprehension; since ' so much as is so,'-i. e., some portion or other,-is apprehended by Perception,-i. e., by Sense.t c. It is to be understood, moreover, that this is but low ground -[that we have taken up ;- for we might have argued that] Per- ception simply is not excluded [by your argument to prove its being a case of Inference], because it [-your argument-] does not exclude Sounds, Odours, &c.,t [-which are apprehended, by Sense, in their totality,-though the objects of Sight might, at first sight, seem to afford a handle to the objector, by being ap- prehended through the apprehension of a part].

d. He censures, moreover, [as follows,] even the assertion that the cognition of a tree or the like, is a case of Inference.§ नचकदे शापलव्धिरवयविसङ्गावात्। ३२।

• प्रत्य चमनुमानमिति न। प्रत्च्त्वावच्छेदेनानुमितित्वं नेत् र्थ.। + यावन्तावदुपलम्भात्। यावत्तावतो डपि यस् कस्- चिद्भागस्य प्रत्यच्षेणेन्द्रियेणोपलम्भादुपलसभस् त्वयाप्यभ्युप- गमात्। + दूदमुपलच्णं शब्दगन्वादिप्रत्व्स्यावारणात् न प्रत्य- नमाचनिषेध दृत्यपि बोध्यम्। ६ यदपि वक्ादिज्ञानस्यानुमितित्वमिति तदपि दूष- यति।

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BOOK UI. 64. 33

A thing is perceived, when a part of it is perceived. Aph. 32 .- And there is not [-in the case, e. g., of the cognition of a tree, -] the apprehension [merely] of a part,-because that which is made up of the parts [-i. e., the whole-] is a reality. a. ' And not,'-i. e., neither .*

b. Neither is it proper, moreover, to say that there is the ap- prehension of a part only [-in the case, e. g., of a tree's being apprehended by vision-],-' because that which is made up of the parts is a reality'-i. e., because what is made up of the parts is [there]; so that, at the time of the perception of the part, the perception of that also which is made up of the parts is not ex- cluded,-inasmuch as there is the conjunction of the Sight with it also [-that which is in conjunction with a part, being, even thereby, in conjunction with that to which the part pertains-]: -sch is the import.t [See the Tarka-sangraha, §47.] c. Here ends the Section on the Examination of Perception.t

SECTION IV.

AS TO WHAT IS MEANT BY A WHOLE.

d. He begins a section on the subject of [a whole, or] ' what is made up of parts' (avayavin),-for there is pertinency in his

• नच नवेत्यर्थः॥ + नवकदेशसेवोपलन्धिरित्याप युत्तं। अ्रवयविसङ्जा- बात्। यतोदि अववव्यस्ति वतसदवयवप्रत्यचकाले डवय- बिनोदपि प्रत्यथ न व्याइतं तेनापि सद पच्ुसांयोगादि- सत्वादिति भाव:। + समान्नं प्रत्यवपरी चाप्रकरणम्।

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34 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

analysing this [conception] with a view to establishing the rea- son [to be no fiction, which was assigned in §32, viz.], ' because what is made up of parts is a reality.'*

साध्यत्वादवयविनि सन्देक्: । २

Whether there be any Aph. 33 .- [Perhaps some one will say] sholes. there is a doubt as regards ' what is made up of parts,' because it requires to be proved [that there is anything to which the name of ' a whole' is appropriate].

a. The meaning is this :- there is a doubt in regard to ' what is made up of parts,'-' because it requires to be proved,'-i. e., pecause that is not a reality ;- that is to say, the reason alleged, viz., 'because what is made up of parts is a reality,' is incompe- tent because doubtful.t

b. And, as regards this, it is impossible that ' what is made up of parts' should be one,-because there may belong to it contra- dictory characters, in the shape, for instance, of shaking and not shaking, redness and not redness, hiddenness and unhiddenness. To explam :- as far as regards the branches, a shaking, and again, as far as regards the trunk, the absence thereof, is beheld [in a tree]; and it is impossible that there should exist simultaneous- ly, in one and the same thing, a couple of contradictory charac- ters. Therefore parts alone are such [-i. e., are realities-], and not any other thing 'made up of the parts,'-for there is no evidencet [in support of the latter].

विप्रकरणमारभते। + चयमर्थः। अवयविनि साध्यत्वादसिद्लवात् सब्दद- डवयविसद्भावादित्ुत्तहेतु: सन्दिग्धासिद्ध दव्वर्थः। + तबच सकम्पत्वाकम्पलरक्लवार कलाटतलानाहतला-

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BOOK II. 4. 85

c. In like manner is this to be gathered from observing that a cloth, of which a part a reddened by safflower, is not red as re- gards the ends [which were not dipped into the dye],-and so too from observing that, as far as regards the surface [presented to us], &c., a thing is not hidden [-while it is hidden as regards its other parts] :- such is the prima facie view of the Bauddhas. And here the prima facie aphorisms of the Bauddhas, and the things penned by the author of the Vártika, are not written, for fear of prolixity .*

d. The aphorism containing the tenet.t

Proof that there are Aph. 84 .- Were wholes unreal, everything wkoles. would be imperceptible.

a. If the whole ['made up of parts'] were not a reality, all its qualities, actions, &c., would be imperceptible; and thus

दिल चण विरुद्वधर्माध्यासादेको डवयवी न सम्भवति। तथा- दि। शाखावच्छेदेन कम्पो मूलावच्केदेन तदभावो Sप्युप- लम्घते नचकस्मिद्चेव ट्रव्ये एकदेव विरुद्धधर्मदयसमावेश: सनभवति। तम्माट्वयवा एव तथाभूता न त्वन्यो 5वयवी मानाभावात्। एवं महार प्तनर तकदेशस्यांशुकस्य दशावच्छ्केदेमारक्रका लोपलम्भादेवं यावत्पृष्ठादेरनादृटतत्वोपलम्मादवसेवे। रत बोदानां पूर्षपच्ः। बबच मोद्ानां पूर्वपचसनाणि बार्टिक- कता लिखितानिच विसरभयाव् लिखाने। + विदान्सन्रम्।

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36 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

even a thing's being shaking or not shaking, red or not red, would not be perceptible,-because these [characters,-according to the objector,-] belong to the Atoms [or absolutely small 'parts' of things], and the [indispensable] condition of percep- tion is bulk,* [-which does not belong to Atoms].

b. He states another reason.t

Another Aph. 35 .- And [there must be 'wholes,'] becanse proof. holding and pulling are [-only on that supposition-] reasonable.

a. A whole is something other than the parts [of which the whole is made up], because, it being so, the holding and pulling [of masses] involves no abxurdity ;- while, were it the fact, on the other hand, that only heaps of Atoms exist [-constituting no wholes-], then it would not be the case [-as, however, it is-] that, by holding a part, we hold the whole, and, by pulling a part, we pull the whole :- such is the meaning.t

b. You must not say this, [-with well-intentioned but misdi- rected zeal-] that that, "As, by the ['There are such things

• अवयविनो Sसिद्रा तह्ुषकमादीनां सर्वेषामग्रइ्षं तथाच सकम्पाकम्पतरक्तारक्त्वाटिकमपि न सुग्रई पर- माणुगतत्वात् प्रत्यचे मइस्वस्य हेतुलात्। t इेलन्तरमाइ। + ववयवेभ्यो वयव्यतिरिच्यते तथा सति धारवाकर्षेव- योरुपपन्तेरन्यथा परमाणुपुन्तलवे पैकदेशधारमेन सकल- धारणमेकदेशाकर्षसेन सकलाकषेषन्त न सादित्वर्यः।

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BOOK II. §4. 37

as wholes] because then this [pnlling, &c.] is reasonable,' as, by the pulling of the boat, the person standing in the boat is pulled, -and as, by the holding of the pitcher, the curds in the pitcher is held ;"-[you must not say this,] because it is altogether in virtue of a peculiar conjunction [-quite different from that of a boat and the person standing in it-] that the relation of parts and whole, or its absence, comes to exist. Therefore, holding that only the previously assigned argument [in §35,] is the proper one, he [the author], pondering the solution in respect of this matter offered by some one else, condemns it* [as follows].

& plausible argu- Aph. 36 .- If [any one should say] it is like men! disowned. the case of an army, or a forest, [we reply that] it is not so,-because Atoms are supersensual. a. If [any one says], though a very distant man, or single tree, or the like, is imperceptible, yet, as an army, or a forest, or the like [aggregate of things separately imperceptible], is perceived, -so too, though a single Atom be imperceptible, a collection of them, in the shape of a jar for example, may be perceptible,- [we reply, that] this too is not so,-'because Atoms are super- sensual.' What is meant is this, that, since bulk is the [indis- pensable] condition of Perception, the perception of an army, or a forest, or the like, is fitting [-inasmuch as the constituents of the aggregate have bulk themselves-]; but not [so is it] in the case of Atoms, because these have no bulk.t * पदमवद्यं नोकाकर्षप्ेन नौकास्थाकर्षणवत् कष्धा-

वयवावयविभावाभावे ड्युपपन्तेरतः पूर्वोत्तां युत्रिमेव साधीयसी मन्यमानसन परोत्ं समाधानमाशडा दूषयति। 1 चतिदूरखेकमनुष्यैकट चादेरप्रत्यव्तलवेडपि सेनावनादि-

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38 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA. b. Here ends the section on the eramination of 'wholes' .*

SECTION V. THE DEFINITION OF INFERENCE EXAMINED. c. Since this is the proper place for it, in order to test [the definition of] Inference, whose turn has arrived, he states a pri- ma facie view.t रोधोपघातसादश्येम्यो व्यभिचारादनुमानमप्र- माणम्।३७। The evidence of Infer- Aph. 37 .- [Some one may say that] In- ence impugned. ference is no Proof, because it wanders away in the case of (1) the embankment, (2) the damage, and (3) the likeness. a. That Inference is of three kinds, has been stated already [B. I. §5]. If the [whole] three kinds of this be proved not to be the causes of right knowledge, it will be settled, by the sense of the terms, that Inference is no Proof ;- in reliance upon which, thist [is propounded which is propounded in the aphorism]. प्रत्यचवटेकपरमाणोरप्रत्यच्त्वे Sपि तक्षमूहरूपघटादे: प्र- त्वचं स्यादितिचेन्न तदपि अपूनामतीन्ट्रियत्वात्। प्रत्यचे मइतवस्य हेतुत्वात् सेनावनादिप्रत्यचं युञ्यते मतवणूनां मइत्वाभावादिति भाव:।

• अवसरेण क्रमप्राप्रमनुमानं परीचितुं पूर्वपच्तर्यात। + चनुमानस्य नेविषं पूर्वमुत्तां। तज निविधस्याम्रामाखवे

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BOOK II. 5. 39

b. Inference,-admitted to have the character of inference,- is no ' Proof',-i. e. no cause of right knowledge,-because of the fact that the reason [assigned in any case of inference] is one that wanders away,* [and presents itself where what it ought to certify is not found to accompany it].

c. Among these three kinds [of Inference, thus all alike im- pugned,] he exhibits the wandering away [of the Sign from the thing signified] by saying 'through the damming up,' &c.t

d. [According to the objector,] the inference of rain, as tri- partitely exemplified,-from the swelling of the river, the carry- ing off of their eggs by the ants, and the screaming of the pea- cocks,-cannot be, [-i. e.' cannot be an absolutely certain means of right knowledge,-] because there may be a disjunction [be- tween the Sign and the thing signified], inasmuch as the swell- ing of the river may have depended on the damming up of the river,-and the ants' carrying away their eggs may have result- ed from their nest's having been damaged,-and the sound like the voice of a peacock may have been uttered by a man.t

e. He clears up this doubt.§ नैकदेशचाससादृश्यभ्यो S्यान्तरभावात्। ३८।

अनुमानं अगुमानत्वेनाभिमतं न प्रमाणं प्रमितिकरणं व्यभिचारि देतुकलवात्। + तब निविधे व्यभिचारं दर्भयति रोधेतयादिना। + नदीटय्ा पिपोलिकाण्डसच्चारेण मयूररुतेन प ह्यनु- मानं चिविधमुदाइरणं न समभवति। नदीरोधाधीननदी-

कटटकम यूररुतसदशरु तेन व्यभिचारात्। 5 समाधने।

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40 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

Inference really a means of right knowledge. A ph. 38 .- Nay [-it is not to be deni- ed that the recognition of a Sign is a cause of right knowledge-], because that [which we mean by a Sign, ] is something else than the part, and the fear, and the like- ness, [referred to by the objector]. a. That the recognition of a Sign is not a means of right know- ledge is not the case. There is no fault [-in the Signs, the re- cognition of which we say leads to right knowledge-], because the swelling of the river, and the rest, which are Signs, are some- thing other than that swelling of a river which results from the damming up a part of it, and that carrying off of their ep the ants which results from fear [-when their nest has been dis- turbed], and that scream which was [only] like the scream' of dhe peacock. And there is not, in every instance, the"doubt" ofttte wandering away [of the Sign unaccompanied by the thing signi- fied] ;- and where this [doubt] does occur, since it cen be remqved by redargution [B. I. $89], there is no fault :such is the imn- port . ¿. Here ends the section on the examination of Inference.t

SECTION VI. THE EXAMINATION OF TIME PRESENT. c. [Perhaps some one will say-] that is not proper, which * मनुमाना प्रामा एयं न युक्तमेकदेशरोधजनदीरद्रेखा-

नां नदीदद्यादोनां भिन्नतान्न दोषः। नच सर्वेच व्यभि- चारशङ्गा। सत्याच्च् तस्यान्तर्केण तदपनयनाब् दोष रत्या- शय: । + समाप्रमनुमानपरीचषाप्रकरणं।

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BOOK II. $6. 41

you imagine, that the recognition of a Sign has reference to the three times [-past, present, and future,. see B. I. §5], because, since there is no present,-because there is neither past nor fu- ture, the conception of which is dependent on that [-i. e., on the present, which is a nonentity], the receptivities-in the shape of the triad of times do not exist ;- so, with reference to this, commencing a section for the examination of time present, he [-in the character of the objector-] demurs to time present .* समानाभाव: पततः पतितरपतितव्यकालोपपते: ॥३८। The coeptic denies time Aph. 89 .- There is no present time [- proaat. mays the sceptic-], because, of a thing fall- ing, we can demonstrate [only] the time through which it has fallen and that through which it has to fall. a. 'There is no present time,'-i. e., there is no kind of time other than past and future. He explains this, saying ' of a thing falling,' &c. Of a thing falling, a fruit for instance, there is the distance fallen, a certain space, the limit of which is the tree; and there is a certain distance to be fallen through, the limit of hich is the ground ; but there is no concernment also with a pre- sent :- sch is the import.t • बनुमानस चिकाखविषयत्वमभिमतं नन्न युत्ां वर्तमा-

मतकविषयाभावादित्याययेन वर्ममानपरी चाप्रकरपमा- रभमाणे वर्जमानमाचचिपति। + वर्जमानाभाव: अतीतानागतभिन्नकालत्वाभाव: । व्यु- त्यटवति पवत कति। पततः फलादेईवावधिक: कश्वन देय: पतिताधा भूम्यवधिक: कशन पतितव्याघा नतु वर्त- मानख प्रसक्ो Sपोति भाव:। F

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THE APHORISMS OF THE NYKYA. 3. He clears up this doubt .* सवोरप्यभावो वर्तमानाभावे तदपेच्लात्।४०। Proof that there must be Cime present. Aph. 40 .- Those two also [viz., the past and future] wonld not be, if the present vere not; becanse they are relative to it. e. If the present were not, thon 'those two,'-the past and the' fature, wonld also not be ;- 'because they are relative to it,'-i., e., because what is meant by being past is the being the coun- tarpert to the destruction of the present; and because what is meant by being future is the being the connterpart to the anto- cedont non-existonce of the present : such is the import.t i. But then [the sceptic may rejoin that], since those two are rubstantiated just by their mutual relation, they have no rela- tion to a [needlessly postulated] present :- therefore he says :t-

Past and future not imme- day related. Aph. 41 .- The past and fnture are not substantiated by mutual reference. a. That is to say, because this would be a case of mutual de- pendency,§ [-or of reasoning in a circle]. * समाचजे। + वर्जमानाभावे तयोरतीतानागतयोरप्वभाव: खात् तवोबदपेचलात्। वर्जमानध्ंसप्रतियोगितं घनीतत्वं वर्ज- नानप्रामभावप्रतियोगितं हनागतत्वमिति भाव:। * ननु तथो: परसरापेक्यवैव सिदेर्न वर्णमानापेजेवत

सन्योग्स्त्रवत्वादिति भाव:।

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BOOK II. 56. 43

&. What were the loss [-enquires the sceptic-] if these two also [-past time and future-] did not exist? Therofore he states another argument .*

वर्समानाभावे सर्वाप्रइषं प्रत्यचानुपपजे.।४२।

Proof that there is & Aph .. 42 .- Were there no present, there prmeat. would be no cognition of anything, because perception would be impossible.

a. If there were no present, perception could not take place* becanse time present is the receptivity of perception. For this reason he [Udayanáchśrya] says, "By the sight, &c. is appro- hendod what is adapted [to the sense], and present [in time]." And if there were no perception, there would be no ' cognition' -or knowledge,-of anything; because the other kinds of know. ledge have their root in perception :- such is the import.t

. But then [the sceptic may say], if what is meant by being past is the being the counterpart of the destruction of the pre- sent [-see §40, a-], and what is meant by the being future,. the being the counterpart of the antecedent non-existence of the present, then, in the case of a jar which erists only in the pfe- sent, how comes the notion " It was black, and [-after baking' in the kiln-] it will be red?" To this he replies.t

• तवोरप्यभावे का चतिरतो युत्यन्तरमाइ। 1 वर्समानाभावे प्रत्चं नोपपवते प्रत्चस वर्तमानवि- बवस्वात्। अत एवाड सम्बदधं वर्जमानन्न शृद्दाते पचुरा- हिनेति। प्रत्यचाभावे व सर्वमेव ग्रहणं ज्ञानं न खात् पत- क्मूचकत्वाहितर ज्ानामामिति भाव:।

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44 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

How a thing present may be spoken of in the past or fu- Aph. 48 .- It [-the jar .. ] may be ture tense. conceived in both ways [-i. e., both as past and future,-] because the faote of heving been made and of having to be made, are conceivable [in respect of its past and future qualitios].

'a. That is to say,-since, of the black and red colours, for er- ample, of a jar or the like, though this exist only in the presont, the facts of having been made and of having to be made, i. e4 the facts of their being past and future, are conceivablo, there- fore the jar or the like also may be spoken of as past or 'future, through its being connected mediately* [-with the past and the future, through its past and future qualities].

b. Here ends the section on the examination of time prenent.t

SECTION VII.

THE EXAMINATION OF THE PROOP DRAWN FROM LIKENESS. c. Now, as the occasion presents itself, in order to test [the प्रागभावप्रतियोगित्वच् भविष्यसं तहा वर्गमान एव बटे कयं श्याम भासीद्रक्को भविष्यतीति धीरत चाद। * वर्नमानस्यापि घटादेः ग्यामरतरूपाटीनां जतता- कर्नव्य तयोर तीतताभिष्य सवोदपप सेर्वटाटेरप्यीतानान- तत्वेन व्यवहार: परम्परासम्बन्वादित्वर्य।

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BOOK II. $7. 45

pertinency of the definition of] the ' Proof drawn from Likeness' (upamana), he sets forth a prima facie view, as follows .*

Thi Proof from liks- moes objected to. Aph. 44 .- An argument from Likeness is not substantiated either through complete, consi- derable, or partial similarity.

.. a. It was stated [at B. I. §6], that [the proof called] Compari- son (ipawane) ariscs from a previously known similarity. This faccording to the sceptic] is not right, because [as regards the matter in question] similarity will not suit, whether it be com- pleto, considerable, or slight. For, on the ground of complete cunilarity, it is never argued that " A cow is like a cow;" nor, on the ground of considerable similarity, that " A buffalo is like a cow ;" nor, on the ground of there being some similarity, that "A mustard-seed is like monnt Meru." And the comparative proof drawn from dissimilarity is in like manner to be refusod admission, bocauso similarity implies this in addition.t

è. He clears up this doubt.t *अयावसरेव कममाप्रोपमानं परीचितुं पूर्वपच्तयति। + प्रसिदसाधम्यादुपमानमुत्नं। तब् युत्नं बतः साधर्मय मात्यन्तिकं प्रायिकमैकदेगिकं वा न समभवति। न दाल- निकसाधर्म्धेष नारिव नारित्युपमानं प्रवर्सते न वा प्राबि- कसाधर्म्बेय नरिव मदिष कति न प यलिम्िजिताधर्मर्देष नेररिव सर्वप कति। साधर्म्यत्यधोपय चमत्ा ऐैधम्योपमा- ननप्येवं सचनीवम्। समाधने।

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46 THE APHORISMS OP THE NYAYA.

पाति:।४५।

Riply to the objcotion. Aph. 45 .- Since an argument from Likeness is substantiated through previously known similarity, the aforesaid objection fails.

a. 'Previously known'-[or, as it may be explained, diffe- rently from the way in which it is explained under B. I. 86-] that similarity which is known, in & high degree [-m likeness to a cow exists, in the Bos Gavaeus, in a high degree] as contzadis- tinguished from a buffalo or the like, since the knowledge of this is the instrumental cause of a ' conclurion from reeemblanse' (upamiti), there is no fault, [such as the sceptic objeets to us]. And the similarity consists in this or that [-e. g., shape colour, size, &c., &c.], according as the case may be, &c .*

6. He states, as a doubt, the opinion of the Vaiseshikas [-ap- parently, therofore, anterior to himcelf-] that thore is no other kind of Proof, such as the 'argument from rosemblance,' sinco the end is attained by 'Inference,'t [of which this is only a cane].

Kanóda's opinion. Apk. 46 .- [The case is not different from or- dinary Inference,] because it is [-like any

• प्सिद्ध प्रकषेय मदिषाहिव्याटत्या सिव जानं बल् साधर्मे तञ्ज्वानसोपमितिकरवत्वात्र दोष:। सापमम

• चनुमानेन परिताये नोपमानं प्रमावान्तरमिति पैके षिकमतमायकते।

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BOOK II. 67. 47

other case of Inference-] an establishing of the unperceived by means of the perceived.

C. 'By means of the perceived,'-i. e., by the species of re- mblance to a cow,-since there is [nothing else than] an inferw ece of what unperceived [animal] is meant by the word Bos Gavaeus,-there is no other proof such as Comparison .*

b. He replies to this.t नाम्रत्यजे गवये प्रमाणार्थमुपमानस पशयाम:।४७। How Comparison differs from Inference. Aph. 47 .- It is not in respect of a Bos Gavaeus unperceived-that we see the need of 'the recognition of Likeness' (upamana) as the instrument of right knowledge.

a. That is to say,-it is not in respect of what is ' unperceived,' -i. c., not perceived inasmuch as it is [in relation to us only as] something possessed of a Sign (vyapya)-[which Sign, say, is perceived],-since that [we grant you] would be a case of In-i ference,-that we see ' the need of this as the instrument of right knowledge,'-i. e., the subserviency of ' the recognition of Like- neas' to right knowledge.t

b. Or the meaning is,-we do not regard as a case of Infer- ence the object of the evidence called Comparison,-that right Imowlodge,-vis., the right knowledge due to Comparison,-'in

• प्रत्यनेव मोसाइभ्यविदयेषेय नप्त्यचस गवयपटवाच- वसानुमितेनापमानं मानानरमिति। + बयोत्तरयत। + अप्रामसे व्याप्यवजवा Sपत्चे बनुमानलेन प्रमावायें प्रमाप्रयोजनमुपमानस न पशयाम इत्यर्थः।

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THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

respect of the Bos Gavaeus,'-i. .. , in respect of what belongs to the Bos Gavaeus,-vis., that 'unperceived thing,'-i. e., the fact of being what is meant by the word Bos Gavaeus. The im- port is, [that this is not a case of Inference,] because there is not the knowledge of 'constant attendedness,'* [-which,-see the Tarka-sangraha,-is what constitutes anything a Sign from which alone something else can be said to be inferred].

c. But then [it may be objected]-let it be granted that the knowledge of ' constant attendedness' is indispensable [to Infer- once :- have we not it here also ?]-so, with reference to this, he itates another argument.t

This shown further. Aph. 48 .- It is not the case that it is not different [from Inference], because, through the compendi- ous expression " So," it is settled that there is [a special kind of evidence called] the ' Argument of Likeness'.

a. It is not the case that the ' recognition of Likeness' is not different from the 'recognition of a Sign;'-hecause, 'through the compendious expression ' So,'-i. e., from the information that " As is a cow, so is a Bos Gavaeus,"-it is settled by the 'Argument of Likeness,'-i. e., the ' conclusion from Likeness' (upamiti) is settled, iu dependence on the ' Argument of Like- ness' (upamána). And in like manner it is settled by conscious-

• अथवा मब्ये मवयटती चप्रतवचे गवयपट्वाच्ले उपमामस् प्रमावाथे प्रमा उपमानजन्यां प्रमां सनुमानलेग न पश्याम उत्वर्थ:। व्याप्निज्ञानाभावाहिति भाव:।

रमाइ़।

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BOOK II. §8. 49

ness that the"" conclusion from likeness' is dependent on a know. ledge of likeness, without reference to any knowledge of 'con- stant attendedness.' Moreover, we do not say [-ih the case of the recoguition of the Bos Gavaeus-] "I infer" (anuminomi), but "I conclude from its likeness [to a cow]" (upaminomi):and so it is impossible that the 'conclusion from likeness,' thus rigo- rously ascertained [to be a specifically separate species of evi- dence], should be redargued :- such is the import .*

8. Here ends the section on the examination as to whether! the "Argument of Likeness' be a [separate] kind of evidence.f

SECTION VIII. EXAMINATION OF VERBAL EVIDENCE IN GENERAL. c. With a view to testing [the pertinency of the definition of] verbal evidence, which presents itself next in order, he states a primA facie view, as follows.t

बनुमामादुपमांनस्य नाविशेषः। तथेतुपसंदारात्।

नोपमितिरितयमुभवसिद्रं। किश्व्व नानुमिनोमि किन्नूप- मिनोमीत्यनुव्यवसायसिद्वोपमितिनापलपितुं शक्यत ररत्या- शय:।

नामप्रापं शब्दं परीचितुं पूर्वपच्तयति।

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50 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

A doubt whether testimony Aph. 49 .- Verbal evidence [-perhaps be other evidence than In- ference. some one will say-] is a case of infer- ence, because the thing, inasmuch as it is not perceived, must [-if known at all-] be inferred.

a. The complete sense is,-that verbal evidence consists in the 'recognition of a Sign,' so that its consequent ' knowledge de- rived from verbal evidence' (iábda-bodha) is an inference. And thus verbal evidence is, as a species of Sign, the instrumental cause of inferences,-because 'the thing' revealed by verbal evidence, as it is not 'perceived,-i. e., is not an object of per- ception,-must be one inferred. And so the import here is, that 'knowledge derived from verbal evidence' is an inference,-either because its object is unperceived, or because it is different from what is perceived .* b. He mentions another reason,t [in support of the prima facie view].

उपलब्धेरद्विप्रत्तिलवात्। ५ू०।

Another reason. Aph. 50 .- [Knowledge derived from verbal evi- dence is not other than an inference,] because the apprebension [in the two cases] is not of two kinds. a. 'The apprehension,'-whether regarded under the charac- ter of verbal evidence, or regarded as an inference. 'Because it

• शन्दो Sनुमानमित्वस्य शन्दबोधो Sनुमितिरिति पयक- सितार्थलयाच शन्दो लिङ्गविधयानुमितिकरणं अर्थस रन्दप्रतिपाद्यस्य वानुपलव्धेरप्रत्यचलात् अनुमेयत्वादिति। तथाच शाव्दचानममुमितिरप्रत्यचविषयत्वात् प्रत्यचभिन्नत्वा- द्वेतन तात्पर्यम्। t ऐलन्तरमाइ।

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BOOK II. 8. 51

is not of two kinds,'-or is not engaged in two ways. [Hence] to be an inference, and to be the result of verbal evidence, is not to be two [separate] kinds of things ;- because, inasmuch as it is as a species of Sign, that a word conveys knowledge, it [-viz., knowledge resulting from verbal evidence-], being like know- ledge resulting from any other Sign, is not generically different .* b. He states another reasont [in support of the prima facie view.] सम्बन्वाच् ॥.५१॥

Another reason. Aph. 51 .- And [knowledge derived from verbal evidence is not other than an inference] because of the connection [between the Sign and the thing signified, which is the same in the case of words and in that of other Signs]. a. 'Because of the connection,'-i. e., supplying the ellipsis, -because of the invariable concomitancy recognised. For a word conveys information inasmuch as it has reference to an ap- pereeption of invariable concomitancy [between word and mean- ing, just such as exists, in the case of inference, between Sign and thing signified]. Hence knowledge derived from verbal evidence is an inference :- such is the import. * उपलब्धे. शान्दलेनाभिमताया बानुमितित्वेनाभिमता- याक् अद्विप्रषत्तित्वात् अद्विप्रकारतात् अनुमितत्वं शन्द- त्ञ्च न जातिद्वयं शन्दस्य लिङ्गविधया बोधकत्वाच्विङ्गान्त-

t इेखवन्तरमाड। + सम्बन्वाभियमसम्बन्वात् चायमानादिति शेष:। शन्दो द्ि व्याप्रिग्रइसापेच्ो बोधयति। तेन शान्दवोधा Sनुरमिति रिति भाव:।

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52 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

b. The aphorism conveying the tenet [of the Nyáya, on this point, here follows] .*

आप्रोपदेशसामय्याच्करव्दार्ये समात्यय: ।५२।

Reply to the objection. Aph. 52 .- There is reliance on the mat- ter evidenced by words, through the virtue of the enunciation of one worthy [to be trusted.]

a. 'Of one worthy,'-i. e., of one devoid of error, &c. ;- what 'enunciation,'-i. e., verbal evidence ;- what 'virtue' there is in that,-viz., the fact of being qualified by 'grammatical coherency' (ákánkshá), 'adaptation of means to ends' (yogyatá), &c. [-see the Tarka-sangraha; $70]-from thist [it is, that we mean that certainty may be arrived at].

b. "By verbal evidence I know this,"-such is the phrase,- but not " I infer."t

c. He declares further, that a word and its meaning are not connectedg [as in the physically established relation of Sign and thing signified]. पूरषदाइपाटनामुपपचेश् सम्बन्धाभाव: । ५१। The sense not necessarily associated with the sound. Aph. 53 .- And there is no [invariable] connection [between the sound and the thing meant], because we do not find filling, burning, and split -. ting, [to accompany the words food, fire, and hatchet]. * सिद्रान्तसमम् । + खाप्रस्य मादिशूम्यस्य य उपदेश: गव्दवन वत् सा- मथ्यें व्राकाङ्ायोग्यतादिमखवं ततः। + शन्दादमुमयं प्रत्येमि मत्वनुमिनामोति। ९ रन्दार्थयो: सम्बन्वाभाव रत्वप्याइ।

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BOOK II. §8. 53

". The thing is not connected with the word ;- i. e., there is no constant attendedness [of the word by the thing]. He states the reason, saying, ' filling,' &c. If a word were constantly at- tended by what is meant by it, then by the words ' food,' ' fire,' and 'hatchet,' there should be a filling of the mouth,-a burning of the mouth, and a splitting of the mouth,-because, since [-on the hypothesis-] the word, viz., the thing constantly ac- companied, is present, the thing also, viz., the food, &c., must be there also .*

¿. How then,-does a word acquaint us even with a thing not connected with it? Were it so, then more things than enough would present themselves :- so he ponders this doubt.t

Relation between sound Apk. 54 .- Since there is a special alloca- and sense mooted. tion of words to meanings, [some one may suppose that] there is no nogation [of their being mutually con- nected; just as, in physics, are the Sign and the thing signified].

a. 'There is no negation,'-i. e., it is not to be denied that there is a relation between sound and sense ;- 'since there is a special allocation of words to meanings;'-for only some one word denotes some one thing,-not every one everything. And since it is agreed that in this way there is a connection, constant • पन्देन सह़ार्थल सम्बन्वाभाव: व्याश्तभाव:। हेतुमाइ। पूरर्येति। यदि शन्दस्यार्येन व्याप्रि: स्यात् तदाब्ाग्रिवासी- मन्हेमुखपूरयमुखदाइमुखपाटनानि सु: गव्दस्य व्याप्यस सर्वेनाब्रादेरर्यव्यापि सच्वात्। + तत् किं शब्दो Sसम्बदमेवार्य प्रत्याययति। तथा सत- निमयत् पत्यायकते।

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54 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

attendedness also is necessary through that connection ;- and that connection does not [-nevertheless-] necessitate the fill- ing of the mouth [when the word ' food' is uttered], &c :- such is the import* [of the doubt].

b. He replies.t न सामयिका व्कन्दार्थसम्प्रत्ययस् । ५५ ।

This point determined. Aph. 55 .- Nay,-for it is through its be- ing conventionally qualified that the mean- ing of a word is understood.

a. In my opinion also words and meanings are not without their allocation [each to each]; for they have a relation in the shape of power, since the word is conventionally qualified to call up the meaning which belongs to it,-i. e., it is dependent on our apprehension of the power [-else the word calls up nothing]. And this is not fa case of ] constant attendedness, because that is dependent on the relation which [-not conventionally but physically-] determines the [actual] conditions [of things] Such is the import.t जातिविशेषेचानियमात् । ५६। *अप्रतिषेध: शन्दा्थया: सम्बन्वप्रतिषेधो न शन्दार्थयो- व्यर्वा्थितत्वात् कश्िदेव दि शब्दः कन्विदेवार्थे बोधयति न सर्ष: सवमिति। पत्यम् सम्बन्वे लीक्लते तेन सम्बस्धेन व्याप्निरप्यावश्यकी सच सम्बन्धो न मुखपूरणादिनियामक इति भाष: । t उत्तरयति। + मन्मनेद्रपि शब्दाथयारव्यवस्ा न शब्दस्याधीनस्यायं- सम्प्रत्ययस सार्मयिकत्वात् शत्रिग्रहाधीनलात् ्ाक्तिरूप-

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BOOK II. §8. 55

No essential connection bet- Aph. 56 .- And [a word is not natu- ween sound and sense. rally connected with its sense], because it is not restricted to [the denotation of ] any particular species.

«. There is no natural connection of any sound with any sense, 'because it is not restricted to any particular species,'- i. e., because we see that a word has not [-in the mouth of every one-] one [and the same] determinate sense .*

b. For, by the word yava, the Hindus understand a kind of long-awned [grain], but the barbarians panic-seed. But if there were a restriction [of each word to one and the same meaning], every one would understand every one [in the same sense as his neighbour]. But this is a matter of chance [-that two persons, of different countries, should use a word in the same sense]; because, even in the case of there being several powers [assigned to a word in a given language] in whichever of the senses each one understands it, that is the meaning of it which presents itself to him.t

c. Here ends the section on the examination of [the perti- nency of the definition of ] verbal evidence in general.t

सम्बग्वेन। नच व्याप्रिसस्या दृच्तिनियामकसम्बन्वाधीमता- दिति भाव:। * रन्दसा्येन सड न खाभाविकः सम्बन्वः जातिविशेषे

• खाया दि यवशन्दाद्ीर्घशूकविशेषं प्रतिर्यन्ति सेच्कास ककुमिति। नियमे तु सवेः सर्वे प्रतोयात्। ब्ापाततवेदं नानाशक्कावपि यतर यस्य यत्रिग्र इसस्य तद्योपस्यिते:। समाप्रं शब्दसामान्यपरीच्ाप्रकरणम्।

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56 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

SECTION IX. EXAMINATION OF THE VARIETIES OF VERBAL EVIDENCE.

d. It was stated [-B. I. $8-] that verbal evidence is of two sorts, accordingly as it has reference to the seen or to the un- seen; and, of these, with a view to try [the pertinency of the de- finition of ] that verbal evidence, viz., the Veda, which has refer- ence to the unseen, he states the prima facie view .*

Authority of the Veda Aph. 57 .- That [-vis., the Veda-] is questioned. no instrument of right knowledge, becauso of its faults of untruth, self-destructiveness, and tautology. a. That verbal evidence, which is other than what has refer. ence to the seen, viz., the Veda, is no instrument of right know- ledge. Why ? Because it has the faults of untruth, &c.t

b. And among these [faults of the Veda], there is antruth ; because when the sacrifice for the sake of a son, or the like, has been made, we sometimes see that the fruit is not produced.t

c. 'Self-destructiveness' is a contradiction between a prior and a subsequent [enunciation]. For example,- "Let him sacrifice

• शन्दस उष्टाइषटार्थकलवेन द्ेविध्यमुतां तबचारषार्यक- पन्दस्य वेदस प्रामाएं परीचितुं पूर्वपचथति।

ऊमः। अमतत्वादिदोषात्। + तनच पुर्वोषषटकायादा कृचित् फलानुत्यज्तिदर्बंनार- छतलम ।

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BOOK II. 69. 57

when it is risen ;" [and again] " Let him sacrifice when it has not risen."*

d. The aphorism conveying the tenet.t

How the promises of the Veda fail to be fulfilled. Aph. 58 .- Nay,- [the default of the fruit is not in consequence of the untruth- fulness of the Veda, but it comes] from some disqualification in the performance, in the operator, or in the instruments. a. It is not the case that the Veda is no instrument of right knowledge, because the absence of the fruit arises 'from some disqualification in the performance, in the operator, or in the instruments.' Disqualification 'in the performance,' i. e., in the [sacrificial] act, consists in its not being according to rule, &c. Disqualification ' in the operator,' consists in his not being a learned man, &c. Disqualification 'in the instruments,' i. e., in the butter, &c., consists in their not being [duly] sprinkled, &c. For if the fruit were awanting when the thing was done as directed, then [indeed] there would be a case of untruthfulness; -but it is not so :- such is the import.t

• व्याघातः पूर्वापरविराध:। यथा। उदिते जुदोति। सनुदिते जुद्ोति। + सिद्धान्तक्षबरम्। न वेदाप्रामाएयं कर्मकर्साधनवेगुएयात् फलाभावो- पपनेः। कर्मषः क्रियाया वैगुएयमयथाविधित्वादि। कर्तु-

त्वादि। यथो क्कर्मपः फलाभावे ह्यावतत्वं नचैवमसीति भाव: । H

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58 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

è. He repels [the charge] of Self-destructiveness .* अ्रम्युपेत्य कालभेदे दोषवचनात्॥ ५८। Consistency of the Veda Aph. 59 .- [There is no inconsistency,] asserted. though you might allege the charge in res- pect of a different time from that which was intended. a. Supply-"there is no self-destructiveness."t b There is no self-destructiveness [implied in the two appa- rently contradictory injunctions], though you might allege the charge aforesaid if, at the time of taking the fire, having intend- ed, i. e., having agreed upon, the sacrifice after sunrise, for ex- ample, one were to perform the sacrifice before sunrise, or the like :- such is the meaning.t c. He repels [the charge of ] tautology.§

The Veda denied to be tautological. Aph. 60 .- And [-the Veda is not charge- able with tautology, though things are re- iterated in it-] since re-inculcation is suitable. a. The "and" here has the sense of "again." 'Since re- inculcation is suitable,' again, there is no tautology. For it is when there is no motive [for the reiteration] that reiteration is a fault.|l

· व्याघातं परिइरति। t न व्याघात इति शेष:।

मुदितदोमादिकरणे पूर्वोक्तकदोषकथनान्न व्याघात द्रत्यर्थ:। 8 पानरतयं परिइरति। । पः पुनरये। अनुवादोपपत्तेः पुमर्न पौनरत्रां। निष्न्- योजनत्वे दि पौनरुत्तं दोष:।

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BOOK II. 69. 59

&. He declarea that the utility of re-ineulcation is a settled point in the world .*

वाक्यविभागस्य चार्षग्रइषात्। ६१।

Re inculcation Aph. 61 .- And because the utility is admitted not needless. of this division of discourse.

a. 'Because the utility is admitted,' i. e., because it is agreed, -supply " by the learned,"-that there is a motive,-'of this division of discourse,' i. e., of discourse divided [from the other species of discourse] by the character of re-inculcation. For the learned, having divided discourse according to the distinctions of enactive, re-inculcative, &c., hold that the re-inculcative also has its reasons. So is it in the case of the Veda :- such is the import.t

b. He shows the division of discourse in the ease of the Veda.t

Discourse Aph. 62 .- Because speech is distributed into in- divided. junction, persnasion, and re-inculcation. a. Through the distinetion of hymn (mantra) and ritual fbrah- mana) the veda is of two sorts. Of these, this division [-viz., *अनुवादस्य सार्थकत्व लोकसिद्धमित्याइ्। + वाक्विभागस अनुवादलेन विभक्तवाववस्यायग्रह्ट- वात् प्रयोजनखीकारात्। मिष्टेरिति शेष:। शिष्टाहि विधायकानुवादकादिभेदेन वाक्यं विभज्या नुधादकस्यापि सप्रथोजनतवं मन्धने। वेदेडय्येवमिति भावः। + वेदे वाक्यविभागं दर्शयति।

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60 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

that stated in the aphorism-] belongs to the ritual portion. Because the Veda is ' distributed,' i. e., divided, accordingly as the speech is an injunction, or as the speech is one of persuasion, or as the speech is one of re-inculcation. Or,-'because it is distributed,'-i. e., because of the distinction ;- and so, through the distinction of injunction, &c.,-supply " the ritual-portion is tripartitely divided."* b. Among these he states the characteristic of an injunction (vidhi).t

विधिर्विधायक: । ई३।

An injunction what. Aph. 63 .- An injunction is that which enjoins. a. An injunction is a speech in which there is articulated an affix indicative that something is the means of good :- e. g., "Let him that desires Paradise perform the fire-sacrifice."t b. 'Persuasion' (arthaváda) is the setting forth of the end, i. e., of the motive ;- that is to say, it is a speech intended to com- mend the object of an injunction. For a persuasive speech, by means of laudation, &c., commends the object of an injunction

• मन्त्रब्राह्मपभेदाडिधा वेदसच ब्राह्मणस्थायं विभाग:। विधिव चनतवेनार्थवादवचनलवेनामुवादवचनलवेनच वेदस विनियोगात् विभजनात्। कथवा विनियोगात् भेदात्।

• तन विधिलचषमाइ।

बभिशेन्रं जुहयात् खर्गकाम इत्यादि।

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BOOK II. 69. 61

with a view to our quickly engaging* [in the performance of the ceremony enjoined].

c. With reference to this, he divides Persuasion according to the distinction of Landation, &c.t

सुतिर्निन्दा परक्कतिः पुराकल्य दूव्यर्थवाद:॥ ६४।

Topics of per- Aph. 64 .- Laudation, - Blame, Warning, and suasion. Prescription,-such are [the topics of] Persuasion.

a. Laudation (stuti) is speech directly calculated to commend the purpose of an injunction.t

b. Blame (ninda) is that which urges the motive of the injunc- tion by means of acquainting us with the undesirableg [conse- quences of neglecting it].

c. Warning (para-kriti) is the mentioning of something mutu- ally opposed to what belonged to some particular person, || [-and which "act of that other," as having led to bad consequences, ought to serve as a warning]. d. Prescription (purákalpa) implies the mention of something

• अर्थवाद: अर्थस्य प्रयोजनस्य वदनं। विघर्थप्रशंसा- परं वचनमित्यर्यः। अर्थवादा दि सुत्यादिद्वारा विधरय शीघ्ं प्त्तये प्रशंसति। तन् सुत्यादिभेदादर्थवादं विभजते।। + सुति: साचाद्विप्यर्थस्य प्रशंसार्थकं वाक्यं। 5 अनिष्टबोधनद्वारा विध्र्यप्रवर्नकं मिन्दा।

पुरुषविशेषनिष्ठमियोविरुद्धकथनं परक्वतिः।

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62 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

as having been handed down by tradition,* [and commended by this " conjecture of its antiquity"]. e. He states the characteristic of re-inculcationt (anuváda). विधिविद्ितस्यानुवचनमनुवाद:। ६५।

Re-inculcation what. Aph. 65 .- Re-inculcation is the mention- ing subsequently of what has been enjoined by an injunction. a. The mentioning 'subsequently,' i. e. afterwards, of what has already presented itself, with a motive [for the reiteration], is Re-inculcation :- such is the generic character. Its peculiarity is [its being the reiteration] ' of what has been enjoined by an in- junction ;'-that is to say, there is the re-inculcation of the in- junction, and the re-inculcation of what was enjoined.t b. And this division of Persuasion and of Re-inculcation belongs to passages which are enounced as injunctions ;- therefore, though it does not include theological passages, which are in the shape of statements of fact, there is no defect.§ c. He ponders a doubt.|l * ऐतिह्यसमा चरिततया कोर्ननं पुराकल्प:। + अनुवाटलचणमाइ। + प्राप्स् अमु पश्चात् कथमं सप्रयोजनमनुवाद इति सामान्यलच्णम्। तद्विशेषो विधिविद्ितस्ेति विधनुवादो

5 वयन्नार्थवादानुवादविभागा विधिसमभिव्याइतवा- क्यानां तेन भूतार्थवादरूपाणां वेदान्तवाक्यानामपरिय्रहाव न्यूनता। । शङ्ते।

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BOOK II. §9. 63

Whether Re-inculcation differ from Tautology. Aph. 66 .- [Perhaps some one will say,] there is no difference between Re-inculca- tion and Tautology, because what presents itself [in either case] is a repetition of some expression.

a. That is to say, Re-inculcation is not different from Tauto- logy; because ' what presents itself,' i. e. what there really is [in the one case as in the other] is a 'repetition of some expres- sion,' i. e., a repetition, or employment over again, of an ex- pression, the sense of which has been already communicated .*

b. He clears up this doubt.t

शोघरतरममनोपदेशवदभ्यासाद् विशेष: । ६७।

Re-inculcation not Aph. 67 .- Since there is a re-employment, tautological. like the instruction to go faster, it [-viz., re- inculcation-] does differ [from mere reiteration].

a. It is not the case that Re-inculcation does not differ from reiteration; 'since there is a re-employment,' i. e., since there is a motive for the re-employment. He states an illustration of this,-saying ' faster,' &c. As in the world, after having said "go on," one says over again " go on, go on," &c., for the pur- pose of signifying that there should be no delay in the action, or the like,-so is it in the case in question.t *शव्दाभ्याससा बोधितार्थकशब्दख यो Sभ्यासः पुनः प्रयो- गससयोपपत्ते: सत्वात् अनुवाद: पुनरुत्तान्न भिद्यत दत्यर्थ:। + समाधन्ते । +. अनुवादस्य पुनरु क्राम्रा विशेषः। अभ्यासात्। ब्रभ्यासस्य सम्रयोजमखात्। तब दष्टान्तमाइ शौघ्रेति। यथा लोके

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64 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

b. Having thus repelled what would go to prove that it [-viz, the Veda-] is no instrument of right knowledge, he demon- strates that it is an instrument of right knowledge .*

Argument for the au- thority of the Veda. Aph. 68 .- And the fact of its being a cause of right knowledge, like the hymns and the medical science, follows from the fact that the fit one [who gave the Veda] was a source of right knowledge.

a. Since a fit person, a maker of Veda [-i. e., of knowledge -], is a cause of right knowledge,-i. e., is a teacher of what is true, it may be gathered from the sense of the terms that the Veda was delivered by such a one. By means of this reason it is to be inferred that the Veda is a cause of right knowledge. He states an example in respect of this-'like the hymns and the medical science.' A hymn [or spell] counteracts poison, &c., and a portion of the medical science exists in the Veda. Since these, by universal consent, are held to be causes of right know- ledge, by means of this example, in so far forth as anything is Veda, its being a cause of right knowledge is to be inferred.t गम्यतामितुत्ता पुनर्गम्यतां गम्यतामित्यादि कमाविलम्बा- दिबोधार्थमुच्यते तथा प्रक्ृतेऽपीति। * एवम प्रामाएयसाधकं निरस्य प्रामाएयं साधयति। + आाप्रस्य वेदकर्तु: म्रामाएयात् यथार्थीपदेशकत्वात् वेदस्य तदुक्तत्वमर्थाबनव्वं। तेन हेतुना वेदस्य प्रामाएय- मनुमेयं। तब दष्टानमाइ मम्वायुर्वेदवदिति। मन्नो विषा- दिनाशक: आयुर्वेदभागन्न वेदस्य एव। तब संवादेन प्रामा- एय ग्रद्दात् तद्दष्टान्तेन वेदत्वावच्क्केदेन प्रामाएयमनुमेयम्।

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BOOK II. 69. 65

b. Some [explain it otherwise, and these] say :- that is [-in accordance with the etymology called] Veda where the fact of being a cause of right knowledge is found, or admitted ;- and by its having such character of l'eda, the fact of its being a cause of right knowledge is to be inferred .*

c. Here ends the section on the examination of the varieties of verbal evidence.t

d. So much for the first daily portion, entitled "The Exami- nation of Proof and its Subservients, without reference to the eramination of its division," in the commentary, on the Apho- riams of the Nyaya, composed by the venerable Viswanatha Bhattáchárya.t

THE SECOND DIURNAL PORTION. e. Now the examination of Proof with reference to its divi- sion ; and this it is that is the matter of this Diurnal Portion. And in this there are four sections. Among these there is, in the first place, the section of the enquiry whether they be four; and the others will be mentioned in their several places. On this point [-of the kinds of evidence being four-] we have an aphorism of objection.§ * वात्रं गृद्दीतं प्रामाएयं यब स वेदसादशेन वेदलेन प्रामाएयमनुमेयमिति केचित्।

++ विभागपरी चानिरपे चसाङ्रप्रमाणपरीक्षणं नाम द्वितीय-

तथ विभागसापे चप्रमाण परीक्षयं तदेवपाल्िकार्य: । I

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66 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

SECTION X.

ON THE QUESTION WHETHER THE KINDS OP IVIDENCE ARB FOUR IN NUMBER.

Whether the kinds of eridence be four. Aph. 69 .- [The Mimansaka will say-] they are not four [only], because Rumour, Conjecture, Probability, and Non-existence, are [also] causes of right knowledge. a. The kinds of evidence 'are not four,'-i. e., the fact of being a cause of right knowledge is not invariably attended by the fact of being one or other of the set of four aforesaid [-see B. I. §3-]; because it belongs to others than those stated .*

b. In regard to this, he explains how it belongs to others, say- ing 'Rumour' &c. A rumour (aitihya) is what is expressed in this way-"thus indeed people say," &c. For it is an assertion which has come from one to another, without any first assertor being indicated :- for example, "In every Bengal fig-tree there is a goblin," and the like. And this is not included under ver- bal evidence, because there is no certainty of its having been declared [in the first instance,] by one worthy [of credit] :- such is the import.t चत्वारिचाब प्रकरणानि। तत्रादी चतुष्टपरीचाप्रकरणं। अन्यानिच तन्र तन्न वच्यन्ते। तब्राचेपसनम्। * प्रमाणानां न चतुष्टूं। प्रमापलवं नोततचतुष्कान्यतम- त्वव्याप्यं। उक्तान्यदत्तिखवात्। + तत्रान्यदत्तित्वं व्युत्पादयति ऐतिह्येत्ाहि। ऐतिह्वं इति दोचुरितनेम प्रकारेंख यदुचने। तद्ि वनिर्दिष्टप्रव-

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c. Conjecture (arthápatli) is, from a thing unaccounted for, the imagining the producer of it; for example, from rain, the know- ledge of [there having been] clouds. Since the cloud is not in the same place with the rain, this is not an instance of constant attendedness; and therefore the case does not fall under the head of Inference .*

d. Probability (sambhava) is knowledge dependent on frequent concomitancy. For example :- "it is probable that there is learning in a Brahman,"-"it is probable that among a thousand there are a hundred." And here there is no reference to con- stant attendedness [-which would bring the case under the head of Inference-] ;- such is the import.t

e. But [the proof from] Non-existence is, in dependence on the knowledge of the absence of one opposite, [out of two], the con- jecturing of the other opposite :- for example, on our knowing that the iehneumon is absent, the eonjecturing of the ichneu. mon's adversary, the snake. Here also there is no reference to constant attendedness :- such is the iport.t मृकं परम्परागतं वाक्यं यथा वटे वटे यच इत्यादि। तस्य चाप्नोक्तत्वानिश्वयान्न शब्दे Sन्नभाव पति भाव:।

एृथा मेघशानं। हथ्ा सड़ मेघस्य वैयविकरएयन् व्याप्निरिति नानुमाने एन्तर्भाव:। समभावो भूयसाइचाराधीनज्ञानं। यथा। समवति नाश्मणे बिद्या। सम्भवति सइस्रे शतं। ब्रबच व्यात्रिनापे- चितेत्यायय:।

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68 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

f. Or the import may be, that [the proof from] Non-existence is, from the knowledge of the absence of the cause &c., the [consequent] knowledge of the absence of the effect &c .; for it is only constant attendedness belonging to something positive that is subservient to Inference .*

g. The aphorism conveying the tenet.t

The kinds of evidence not Aph. 70 .- Since Rumour is nothing more than four. else than verbal evidence, and since Con- jecture, Probability, and [the argument from] Non-existence, are nothing else than Inference, there is no opposing [our division into four].

a. There is no opposing the quaternion of Proofs, since Ru- mour is nothing else than verbal evidence, i. e., is included un- der it. Although generally there may be the knowledge whe- ther the assertion were that of one worthy, yet in reality the knowledge of the assertion's being that of one worthy is not a cause in respect of what [knowledge in general] is derived from verbal evidence, but [the cause is] the knowledge of the interde- pendence &c. [of the words,-see Tarka-Sangraha, $70 ]; and right knowledge derived from verbal evidence is dependent on

यथा। नकुलाभावज्ञाने नङ्लविरोधिनो व्याजस कव्पनं। चनापि व्यान्निनापेचितेत्याशय:। * खथवा कारणाभावादिना कायाभावादिच्ञानं बभाव:

• सिद्रानसनम्।

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right knowledge of the 'fitness'* [of the things spoken of, to produce the fact asserted :- see, further, Tarka-Sangraha, §73 ]. b. Conjecture &c. are included under Inference; because, withont an idea of constant attendedness, the supposition of a producer is impossible. Moreover, in the [fact of a portion of water's] being rain, for instance, there really is constant attend- edness, by the fact of being produced from a cloud.t c. Probability also, as it has its root in constant attendedness, is Inference; and if it have no reference to constant attended- ness, then it has not the character of evidence, because it may stray awayt [where the thing which it vouches for is not present]. d. In like manner, Non-existence [-as furnishing evidence-], having respect to constant attendedness, is Inference. And, since constant attendedness does belong to a negative [-as well as to things positive,-notwithstanding what is alleged under §69, f-], there is no inconsistency in its being one member [in the subdivision] of Inference :- such is the import.§

• न प्रमापचतुष्टयस्य प्रतिषेध: शब्दे ऐतिह्यस्यानर्थान्त- रभावादन्नभावात् सामान्यत वाप्ोत्तत्वव्वानसम्भवाद्दसतुत आात्राकत्वच्ञानं म शन्दे कारणं किन्नाकांचादिज्ञानं योग्य- ताप्रमाधीनाच शान्दप्रमेति। + बर्थापत्यादेरनुमाने Sन्तर्भावः। उपपादककल्पनं दि बिना व्यापिज्ञानं म समभवति। ष्टितादार्वपि मेधजन्यतव- व्याप्रिरस्येव। समभवो Sपि व्याप्रिमूलकत्वादनुमानं। व्याश्ननपेचचलवे व व्यभिचारादपरामाएयम्। एवमभावो व्याप्निसापेचो Sनुमानं। ग्रभावनिष्ठव्याप्रे- वानुमानाङृले न विदोध पति भाव:।

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70 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA. e. An indifferent person [-neither a follower of the Nyaya nor of the Mimansa-] propounds the following doubt,-that there might be a question whether it [viz., Conjecture,] were not in- eluded, or were included [under Inference], if Conjecture were any cause of right knowledge,-but that it really is not so .* अथापत्तिरप्रमाणमनेकान्तिकत्वात्। ७१।

A doubt whether Conjecture Aph. 71 .- Conjecture [-says some be any cause of right know- ledge. one-] is no cause of right knowledge, because of its indeterminateness.

a. A case of Conjecture (arthápatti) is this, that, since there is no rain when there is no cloud, where there is a cloud there is rain :- and here [-says the objector-] there is not the charac- ter of producing right knowledge, because of indeterminateness; because, even when there is a cloud, there is [frequently] no rain.t

b. He clears up this doubt.t

Conjeeture defended. Aph. 72 .- [Indeterminateness does not ne- cessarily belong to Conjecture,] because [when you allege this fault,] you suppose that to be a [legitimate] Con- jecture which is no [legitimate] Conjecture.

• सत्यर्थापन्ते: प्रामाएये वचिर्भावान्तर्भावचिन्ता तदेव तु नासोति तटख्: शङ्ते। + असति मेघे दष्टिर्न भवतीत्यनेन सति मेघे दृष्टिर्भवती- त्यर्थापत्तिविषयस्ब् च न प्रामाएयं सत्यपि मेघे हथभावा- दनेकान्तिकत्वात्। + समाधने।

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BOOK II. §10.

a. Indeterminateness does not [necessarily] belong to Conjec- ture :-- 80 much is awanting* [to complete the aphorism]. b. And, in regard to the example [§71, a] " Where there is a cloud there is rain, because there is no rain where there are no clouds,"-we agree that the knowledge of [the existence of ] a cloud [may be gained] by rain ;- but where the notion of [the existence of] rain [is deduced] from [the existence of] a cloud, there we have the mistake of [supposing that there is what we here render] a Conjecture when it is no [legitimate] Conjecture.t c. And this is not inconsistent with its [viz., Conjecture's] character of being a cause of right notion, because [if this were enough to debar anything's being a cause of right notion, then] we should find that even Inference is no cause of right notion .- for we see that there are also erroneous inferences through error in regard to the constant attendedness [-leading to the formal error of Non-distribution of the Middle Term-], &c.t d. Some write, at the commencement of this aphorism, the expression " Indeterminateness does not belong to Conjecture," [which is, in truth,] the introduction [of the aphorism] in the Bháshya.§

• वसत्मु मेघेषुन दष्टिरित्यनेन सति मेधे दष्टिरिति तबच रथा मेघज्ञानमभिमतं। यबच मेधेन दष्टिच्ानं तबानर्था-

सचादो केचििखन्ति।

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72 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

e. He states also a bar* [to the objection].

The objector's argument Aph. 78 .- And [if the argument al- retorted. leged at §71 were valid,] the objection would be invalid, through its indeterminateness.

a. According to your showing, your objection also would be in- valid, through indeterminateness ;- because nowhere can we manage to set aside the charge of indeterminateness, since there is [on your showing, in respect of every argument that could be made use of, for that or any other purpose, the fault of ] indeter- minateness.t

b. Now, if you [-the objector,-in reply to this retort,-] say, the fact of indeterminateness is not ererywhere a fault, but in respect of itself [it is a valid mode of argumentation], then [by parity of reasoning] Conjecture also is not invalid :- s0 he says as follows :- t तत्मामाएये वा नार्यापत्यप्रामाएयम्।७४।

Another retort. Aph 74 .- Or, if that be valid, then Conjecture is not invalid.

a. If you hold that your own argument is valid, becanse what is indeterminate is sufficient in respect of itself [-i. e., is & * प्रतिबन्विनमप्याइ। खदुत्तरीता तदीयप्रतिषेधस्याप्यप्रामाएयं स्ादनैका- न्तिकत्वात्। यन कचचिदनैकान्तिकत्वस्य प्रतिषेधासाधक- त्वादनेकान्तिकत्वात्। + अथ यज कुनचिदनैकान्सिकतवं न दोषाय किन्नुख- विषये ऋति यदि तदार्थापत्तेरपि नाम्रामाएयमित्वाइ।

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mfficiently good form of argument where that particular form of argument is under trial-], then Conjecture also is valid in respect of itself,* [-and an argument from Conjecture may as fairly be employed to establish the validity of arguing from Con- jecture, as an argument that proves indeterminately can be em- ployed to invalidate forms of argument alleged to prove indeter- minately]. b. An indifferent person propounds the doubt that Non-exist- ence is not included among the causes of right notion.t नाभावप्रामाएयं प्रमेयासिद्वेः।७५।

A doubt whether Non- Aph. 75 .- Non-existence [says some one,] eristence be any cause is no cause of right notion, since no object of of right knowledge. such knowledge exists. a. There might then be a cause of right knowledge called Non-existence, if there really existed, in respect thereof, any ob- ject of right knowledge; but there is really none such :- that is to say, since Nonentity is mere emptiness, we cannot deal with it as if there were here a cause of right knowledge.t b. The aphorism conveying the tenet.§ लचितेव्वलक्षपलच्चिततवादलचितानां तत्प्रमेय- सिद्धि:। ७६। *अनैकान्तिकत्वस्य खविषये साधकत्वाद्यदि खेतो: प्रामाएयं मन्यसे तदार्थापकेरपि खविषये प्रामाएयमिति। + बभावस न प्रमाणे एन्तर्भाव इति तटख: शङते। + अभावनामकं प्रमाणं तदा स्ाददि तस्य प्रमेयं सिद्येत् तदेव तु नासि। अ्रभावस्य तुच्छ्त्वान्र तन्र प्रमाणप्र- दत्तिरिति भाव: । 5 सिद्रान्तसयम्। J

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74 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA. How Non-existenee serves to mark out. Aph. 76 .- By their not being marked by the mark [that is found] in things [thereby] marked, it [viz., Non-existence,] has, as its objects of right knowledge, the things not [thereby] marked. a. Although Non-existence cannot be marked by a Quality, an Action, &c., still it is marked by the absence of a mark ;- for, when we say "Bring the one which is not blue," the absence of blueness, by excluding others [which are blue], is a mark :- therefore Non-existence is not invalid evidence : such is the im- port .* b. Hinting an objection, he clears it up.t असरव्ये माभाव दूति चेन्नान्यलक्षणोपपत्तेः॥७७। An objection to Non- existence dioposed of. Aph. 77 .- If you say that where the thing exists not, its Non-existence is not,-it is not so ; because the mark is possible elsewhere. a. You eannot [-says an objector-] talk of a Non-existence (abhava) where there is no counter-entity (pratiyogi); and where there is the counter-entity, how can there be its Non- existence ? If any one says this, it is not so,-because 'it is pos- sible,' i. e., the Non-existence is possible through there being elsewhere the 'mark,' that is to say, the actual existence of the eounter-entity. For it is not looked for that the counter-entity should actually be in that very placet [where its Non-existence is]. * यद्यप्यभावस्य गुणकमादिभिर्लचणं न समभवति तथा- प्यलच्पेनेव तव्वच्चितं भवति। अ्रनीलमानयेत्युत्तो नीखा- भावो दि दूतरव्यावर्त्तकतया लच्षणं। अतो Sभावी नाप्रा- माणिक दति भाव:। t क्राचिप्य समाधन्ते।। + असात प्रतियोगिन्यभावो वत्ता न शक्त्रते सतिष प्रति-

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b. He ponders a doubt .* तत्िद्वेरलचितेव हेतु: ।७८। Whether the absence of a mark can mark. Aph. 78 .- Though it effect that, [where it, viz., some mark, is present,] yet [some one may object,] in what things are not marked, it [vis., the Non- existence of the mark,] is no cause [of precision]. a. Though some mark, in things that are marked, ' effect that,'-i. e., effect discrimination, yet, in what things are not marked, 'it is no cause,' i. e., non-existence [of the mark] is no canse, is excluded as a cause ;- that is to say, what has no essence, for there is the absence of the mark, cannot define.t

b. He clears up this.t

This doubt disposed of. Aph. 79 .- Nay,-[a Non-existence is not ineffectual as a mark,] because it does exist in relation to the presence of the [positive] mark [of which it is the absence]. a. The prima facie view [taken in §78,] is not right, because such a thing [as the Non-existence that we speak of, ] does exist

योगिनि कथं तदभाव इति चेव्न। अन्यन लचगोन सख्वेना- यात् प्रतियोगिनः। उपपनतेरभावोपपन्तेः। न दि नजैव प्रतियोगिन: सख्मपेचितम्। · शङत। + लचितेषु लक्षणस् तत्िद्वे: व्यावर्नकत्वसिहेरलचि- नेषु अ्रधेतु: ग्रहेतुत्वं व्याटत्तहेतुत्वं अ्रभावस सच्तणाभावा- वि:सरुपस् न व्यावर्त्त्य त्वमिति भाव:। + समाधन्े।

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76 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

in relation to the presence, i. e., the existence, of the character which is its counter-entity. The meaning is this. Since it is only through the knowledge of the nature of some counter-entity that it is possible to describe the nature of any Non-existence, we are not to expect any mark of the Non-existence [itself] :- such is the import .*

Non-existence when discernible. A ph. 80 .- And [there really is what may be rightly known thereby,-i. e., by means of a Non-existence as a mark,] because we find the Non-existence an- tecedently to the production [of its counter-entity].

a. 'There really is what may be rightly known,'-so much is supplied, by a frog-leapt [-not from the aphorism immediately preceding, but from §76]. b. Because every one has a preception the object of which is such an antecedent Non-existence as [is implied in the expres- sion] "There will be a jar" [which as yet is Non-existent in the halves which are destined to compose it]; because 'we find,' i. e., we perceive, the Non-existence 'antecedently to the produc- tion'-viz.,-of the counter.entity :- such is the import.t * पूर्वपचो न युक्त: प्रतियोगिनो लक्षणस यदवश्ित- मवस्थानं तस्यापेचया तादृश सिद्वेः। अयमर्थः। प्रतियोगिख- रूपज्ञानादेवाभाव खरूपनिरूपणसन्भवान्नाभावल नापेच्षेति भाव:। -- + प्रमेयसद्विरिति मण्डूकपुत्यानुवर्त्तते। + प्रतियोगिन उत्पन्ने: प्राक् अभावस्य उपपत्तेः उपल- मभात् घटो भविष्य तीत्या दिप्रागभावविषयकप्रत्यवस्य सावे- लकिकत्वादिति भाव:।

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BOOK II. §11. 77

c. By the 'and,' it is included that also Emergent Non- existence and the others are established by perception,* [-the fact that the jar, on being broken, has ceased to exist, being a matter of ocular cognizance]. d. [Since gestures also may communicate right knowledge, it may be remarked that,] if Gesture had no modus operandi [-as a Sign, e. g., produces knowledge through the special operation of syllogizing-parámaria-], then it would be no species of evi- dence :- but, in reality, since, like alphabetical characters, &c., it is a conventional thing, it also is included under Inference or under Verbal Evidence.t e. Here ends the section on the question whether there be a quaternion of kinds of evidence.t

SECTION XI. RESPECTING THE NON-ETERNITY OF SOUND. f. There being the doubt, that the authority of the Veda is established by the authority of one worthy [of credit], and that this is inconsistent, since the Veda is eternal,-he [therefore,] commences the subject of the non-eternity of Sound, on the ground that, since letters are not eternal, how can the Veda, which is in the shape of an aggregate of these, be eternal? In regard to this, the aphorism conveying the tenet§ [here follows]. * चकारेण ध्वंसादेरपि प्रत्यक्षसिद्वत्वं समुचीयते। पेष्टाया निव्यापारतेन न प्रामाएयं वसुतो लिप्यादि- वत् सा्ङ्गतकत्वात् तस्या अप्यनुमाने शब्दे वान्तर्भाव दति। + समाप्नं प्रमाण चतुष्टप्रकरगम्। 8 वेदसय प्रामाएयमाप्रपामाएयात् सिद्धं नचेदं युञ्यते वे- दस नित्यत्वादित्याशङ्कायां वर्णानामनित्यत्ात् कर्थ तक्र-

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78 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA,

The cternity of Sound denied. Aph. 81 .- From its having an origin, from its being cognizable by sense, and from its being spoken of as factitious, [Sound is not eternal].

a. Sound is not eternal, &c., 'from its having an origin,' i. e., from its having a cause. But then [-some may argue-] it has not a cause, because it may be accounted for, [not only by causal origination, but,] moreover, by manifestation, [-see the Mímansa Aphorisms, B. I .- ] through the impact &c. of the throat, pa- late, &c. : so he adds 'from its being cognizable by sense.' 'From its being perishable,' i. e., from its being destructible, like anything artificial .*

b. He considers the doubt whether there be not a fallacy in the arguments in the precedingt [aphorism]. न घटाभावसामान्यनित्यत्वाच्चित्येश्वप्य नित्यवदुप- वाराच॥ ८२॥

The preceding arguments Aph. 82 .- Nay, because the Non-exist- questioned. ence of a jar, and its genus, are eternal, [though the arguments in the preceding aphorism, if valid, would

मुदायरूपस्य वेदस्य नित्यत्वमित्याशयेन शब्दानित्यतप्रकर- पमारभते। तत्र सिद्धान्तसनम्। * शन्दोडनित्य उत्यादि: म्रादिमत्वात् सकारणकत्वात्। ननु न सकारणकत्वं कष्ठतालाद्यभिघातादेरव्यश्त्रकत्वेना- प्युपपन्तेरत ब्राइ एन्द्रियकत्वादिति। कृतकेति। छतके घटादा। यथास्ुते हेतूनां व्यभिचारमाशङ्गते।

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BOOK II. §1I. 79

apply to them,] and eternal things also are spoken of as if un- eternal. a. The aforesaid are not [valid] reasons. The fact of having a beginning strays away [from things uneternal, of which you imagine it to be exclusively characteristic], -because 'the non- existence of a jar,' i. e., the destruction of a jar [-which had a beginning when the jar was broken-], is 'eternal,' i. e., inde- structible. The fact of being cognizable by sense belongs unduly [-so far as your argument is concerned-] to Genus, [-for, when a jar is seen, its Genus, i. e., the fact of its being a jar, is visible also ;- yet Genus is eternal]. 'Because eternal things also are spoken of as if uneternal,'-as when it is said, "The jar's space is produced" [-whereas only a certain portion of eternal space is now divided off and oceupied by the newly pro- duced jar-],-" I have become happy" [-though the "happy I" has not just come into existence, having existed always], &c .* b. He repels the [charge of] fallacy.t

The first objee- Aph. 83 .- Through the distinction of the diver- tion repelled. sity between the real and the dependent, there is not the fallacy [alleged in §82]. a. Through the ' distinction,' i. e., the difference, of the ' di- versity,' i. e., the severalty of 'the real,' i. e., the absolutely ex- istent, and the ' dependent' [or not substantially existent], there is no straying away [of the alleged character of things uneternal + नोक्ता छेतवः घटाभावस्य घटध्वंसस्य नित्यत्वादवि- नाशित्वादादिमख्तं व्यभिचारि। ऐन्द्रियकवं सामान्ये व्यभिचारि। नित्येव्वप्यनित्यवदुपचारात् यथा घटाकाश- मुत्पन्नं अहं सुखी जात दरत्यादि। व्यभिचारं परिइरति।

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80 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

to things eternal]. For, in the case of destruction [on emergent non-existence], its being produced [certainly] implies its having a beginning ;- but, the fact of not having that eternalness which consists in the fact of.belonging to the three times [-past and present as well as future-], is really to be not eternal. That & thing is eternal because indestructible [-while not having exis- ted from eternity-] is a figure of speech. Therefore there is no straying away* [as alleged].

b. Or the meaning is, that, by 'having a beginning' is meant the fact of being an entity, this being specialized by the fact of having previously not existed ;- and a Non-existence is not [such a thing as] this.t

[reason]. c. He refutes [the charge of] fallacy in respect of the secondt

सन्तानानुमानविशेषणात्। ८ु४। The second objection repelled. Aph. 84 .- Because, in the inference of a son, [it is] through a distinction.

a. 'In the inference of a son,' i. e., in the making the con- clusion [that " This is such a one's son"], it is through the dis- tinction of some token [and not through our directly perceiving in him the generic character of sonship,] that the son is regarded * तत्त्वस्य पारमार्थिकस्य भात्तस्य च नानात्वस्य भेदस्य विभागात् विवेकाव्न व्यभिचारः। धंसे दि उत्पत्तिमखवं

र्वेव। स्विनाशित्वा ्वित्यत्वमौपचारिकम तो न व्यभिचार:। + आदिमत्वं प्रागभावावच्किविन्नसख्वं नचैतदभाव कति वाथे:। + द्वितीये व्यभिचारमुद्वरति।

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BOOK II. §11. 81

as a son,-recoguised as peculiarized by that single character. Therefore, according to the maxim " Since there is the posses- sion of the genus," &c., there requires to be a distinction,*[-and this is not the case with the perception of Sound, which is di- rect and simple]. b. He sets aside the [charge of ] fallacy in respect of the thirdt [reason]. कारणद्रव्यस् प्रदेशशन्देनाभिधानात् । द५ । The third objection repelled. Aph. 85 .- It is through a causal [ungenera. ted] substance's being designated by the term Position, [that it comes to be spoken of as a thing produced]. a. There is really no cause of [the Ether or] Space; but the treating of Space as if made up of positions is figurative ;- be- cause, by the word Position, a thing that is [only] a cause gets the name of a thing that has a cause ;- and Space is not such a thing.t b. So in the example " I have become happy," &c., it is only the production of the happiness, &c., [and not of the percipient soul,] that is the matter [of the proposition] :- such is the im- port.§ * सन्तानानुमाने ऽनुमितिकरणे लिंङ्गविशेषणात् सन्तान: सन्तन्यमान: एकधमीवच्छ्िव्वतवेन चायमानः। तेन सामान्य- वच्वे सतीति विशेषणीयमिति। + हतोये व्यभिचारं वारयति। + आकाशे हेतुनीसथेव आ्रकाशे प्रादेशिकत्वव्यवहारसु गाष: प्रदेशशब्देन कारणद्रव्यस्य कारणवतो ट्रव्यस्याभिधा- नात्। नचाकाशं ताद्शम्। 5 एवं सुखी जात द्त्यादो सुखादुत्पत्तिरेव विषय पति भाव:। K Digitized by Google

THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

c. And it is not the cate that there was nothing to call for [the enunciation of] the aforesaid reasons, because they are refn- ters of the opposite opimion, as he deelares as follows .* प्रागुचारणादमुपलम्ादावरणाद्यमुपलब्ेः। ८ू६। Application of the pre- Aph. 86 .- [Sound is not eternal,] be- vious arguments. cause it is not perceived antecedently to pronunciation, and because we do not perceive any veil, &c., [s0 that it might exist unperceived]. a. If sound were eternai, then it would be perceived before pronunciation, because [being admitted to be a quality of the all-pervading Ether,] it is actually in contact with the organ of hearing. And there is here no obstacle [to its being heard, if it existed]; so he says ' any veil,' &c. :- because 'we do not per- ceive,' i. e., we are certain of the non-existence of, any 'veil' &c., as an obstruction,t b. But since Sound has no limits, its going [from one place] to another place is not possiblest [-se that its not being per- ceived, while yet existing, is not to be explained on such a sup- position]. c. The hypothesis that Sound is not eternal is decidedly sim- ple in comparison with the hypothesis of there being innumerable imperceptible hinderers [of its being perceived at all times] :- such is the import.§ * नयोक्तदेतूनाम प्रयोजकत्वं विषन्वाधकमसादित्याइ। + शन्दो यदि नित्: स्यादुभारणात् मागुपलम्येत बोच-

बावरवाहे: प्रतिबभ्कसानुपलन्था Sभावनिषथात्। + दशान्तरगमनन्तु शब्दस्याभूनत्वान्न सम्भाव्यते।

त्यत्व कल्पनेव लघीयसीति भाव:।

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BOOR H. §11. 83

d. A couple of aphorisma, having reference to the prima facie iew of some mistaken person .*

A futile suggestion. Aph. 87 .- [Perhaps some one will say,] we do perceive the veil [by which Sound is hid- den], because we do not perceive the non-perception thereof [spoken of in $86].

a. It is not made out, by the non-perception thereof, that there is no veil, just as non-perception actually exists notwithstanding the non-perception [of that non-perception]. Just as you allege that, because of the non-perception of the veil, it Ethe veil,] does not exist ; so, since that non perception of the veil is not perceived, there must be the absence of that-[i. e., there must be the absence of the non-perceptian of the veil, or, in other words, there must be] just the perception of the veil. Or if [you say that,] notwithstanding the non-perception of the non. perception of the veil, the non-perception of the veil does not cease to exist, then also, by the veil's not being perceived, it is not made out that the veil does not exist :- such is the meaning.t b. The aphorism conveying the tenet t * भान्तसय पूर्वपचपरं सवद्यम्। + जनुपजमादनुपस भिसद्वामवद्ावरवानुपपत्तिरनुप- सम्मात्। तथा तया बावरणसानुपलन्या ब्रभाव इतु- चते तथा आवरवानुपलन्धेर मुपवस्धात् तटभाव करावर- घोपलव्धिरेव सात्। वदि वा आावरणा नुपलन्धेरनुपजस डपि नावरणानुपलब्धेरभावसदा आवरणसानुपजम्ादपिं

• विदान्तवजम्।

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84 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

Its refutation. Aph. 88 .- This is no reason, because the non- perception consists of non-perception. a. To say that the veil is perceived, because the non-percep- tion of the veil is not perceived, is a futile answer,-'no reason,' -i. e., no means of setting aside my opinion ;- because 'the non-perception,' i. e., the non-perception of any veil, ' consists of non-perceptlon,' i. e., consists of the absence of perception ;- and since this [want of perception of anything] is readily appre- hended by the mind itself, the non-perception thereof [-i. e., the non-perception of the want of perception-] is nothing real :- such is the import .* b. He ponders the doubt whether it be not a case of equally balanced arguments.t ब्स्पर्शतात्। न्द। Another doubt, in favour of the eternity of Sound. Aph. 89 .- Because it is intangible. a. That is to say [-suggests some one-], Sound is eternal, because it is intangible, like the Ethert [or Space]. b. It is not a case of equally balanced arguments, because your argument is indeterminate ;- so he says.§- * त्ुत्तरं अहतुः। न मव्मतप्रतिषेधसाधनं। अनुपलब्धेराव-

व मनसेव सुग्रइतवात् तदनुपल्धिरसिद्वेति भाव:। + सत्परतिपचमाशङ्गते। शन्दो नित्वः व्रस्पर्शताङ्गगनवदिति भाव:। 5 न सन्पतिप चल्वदीय इेतोर मेकान्तिक त्वादित्वाइ।

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BOOK II. §11. 85

न कमानित्यलात्। ६० ।

Its refutation. Aph. 90 .- Nay, because Action is not eternal. [-although intangible]. a. Intangibility does not establish the eternity of Sound, be- cause, in the case of Action, it [viz. intangibility,] presents itself straying away* [unaccompanied by eternalness]. b. [But some one perhaps may say,] even what is indetermi- nate may still prove [the point] ; so in regard to this he says.t नाुनित्यलात्। ९१। A plea in demur re- Aph. 91 .- Nay, because an Atom is eter- jected. nal, [but might be proved otherwise if we were to admit this]. a. Were what is indeterminate allowed to prove anything, then an Atom, i. e., an indivisible part, would not be eternal ;- because we should then find arguments, for its uneternalness, in its possessing Colour, &c., [which stand in the same category with Intangibility] :- such is the meaning.t ò. He ponders a doubt.§ सम्ग्रदानात्। ९२।

Another doubt, in favour of the eternity of Sound. Aph. 92 .- By reason of traditionary teaching, [suggests some one, Sound must be eternal].

• बस्पर्शतं न शब्दनित्यत्वसाधकं कर्मणि व्यभिचारात्। + वनैकान्तिकमपि साधकं स्यादवाइ। + अनकान्तिकस्य साधकत्वेऽणोः परमाणोरनित्यत्ं न न्ाद रूपवस्वादिना तनानित्यत्वानुमानापत्तेरित्यथ। 8 गहते।

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86 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

a. By reason, i. e., of the handing down of knowledge by the preceptor to the disciple ;- and thus the antecedent existence of Sound [-or of the words in which the knowledge is conveyed-] is proved ;- and so its eternity is proved by the sense of the terms [or self-evidently], according to the maxim " The thing has been permanent for so long,-and who, afterwards, will not acknowledge this [as having been eternally thus]?" Such is the import .* b. An aphorism conveying a tenet.t तदन्तरालानुपलब्धेर हेतु:। ६३।

Its refutation. Aph. 93 .- This is no reason, because it is not perceived in the interval.

a. The disciple being seated near him, the preceptor lectures him; and, if Sound were eternal, then, immediately on the arri- val of the disciple, even before the lecture, sound would be per- ceived ;- so, as it is not perceived, there is no sound [antece- dently to utterance]: hence what you have alleged [in $92,] is no reason. b. An aphorism conveying a prima facie view.§

• गुरुणा शिष्याय विद्याया: सम्प्रदानात् तथाच गन्दस प्राक् सत्वं सिद्धं तथाच तावतकाल सिरं बेनं का पक्ाब्ाम्य सिष्यतीति न्यायाव्चित्यत्वमर्थसिद्धमिति भाव:। सिद्वानस्नम्। + शिव्ये उपसब्ने गुरुरधापर्यात यदिच शब्दो नित: स्ात् तदा शिव्यायम नानन्तरमध्यापनात् पूर्वमपि व्द उप- लभ्येतेत्यनुपलम्याच नासि मन्द प्र्यमस्वदुक्को व रेतु:। 5 पूर्वपचस्तजम् ।

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BOOK IL §11. 87 खधापनादप्रतिषेध: ।६४।

The objection Aph. 94 .- You are not to set aside [my argu- reiterated. ment, -says the objector-] becanse there is the lecture. a. That is to say,-the setting aside of my argument is not right ;- why ?- 'becanse there is the lecture' :- if, during the intermediate time, sound [or the words to be employed in the lecture,] did not exist, how could the lecture take place ? But the non-perception of sound is accounted for by the absence of its manifesters, in the shape of the concussions of the throat, the palate, &c.,* [as the non-perception of a jar is accounted for by the absence of a lamp or other light to reveal it]. b. An aphorism conveying a tenet.t उभया: पचयारन्यतरस्याय्यापनादप्रतिषेध्:। ६५।

us further refutation. Aph. 95 .- One or other of the two alter- natives is not set aside by [that argument of the lecture. a. Supply as follows :- the objection, against one or other al- ternative demonstrating the non-eternity of Sound, which is drawn from the 'lecture,' does not hold ;- becaase the fact of the 'lecture' is common to both alternatives, [which are the contradictories of one another ;- so that, being no peculiarity of either, it must needs be irrespective of what is to be proved by either the one or the other]. For a lecture consists in pronoun- cing after the pronunciation of the preceptor, or in pronunei- * मदीयदेतो: प्रतिषेधो न युक्तः । ऊतः। व्धयापनाता यद्यन्तरालकाले शब्दो न स्यात् कथमध्यापनं घटेत। अनु- पखन्धिु शब्दस कण्ठताएमाद्यभिघा तरूपन्य प्नकाभाबा हुप- पथने इनि भाव:। + सिद्दान्तस्नम्।

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88 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

ation conducive to the pupil's pronunciation ;- and this, which is the case alike on the alternative of the permanency or the non-permanency [of Sound], can furnish no corroboration of the eternity of Sound. For a lecture is not a bestowal [of the language employed], so that, with an eye to the relinquishment of one's own property in it, and the making over of it to another, its permanency need be contemplated :- nor is the thing possible, -for it is a contradiction that a thing should simultaneously be the property of many, and one cannot make over the property of another ;- but it is just a case of direction, as in the case, e. g., of teaching to dance, [-where you will scarcely contend that the pirouettes, taught to the pupil, had & persistent previous exist- ence] :- such is the import .* b. An aphorism conveying a prima facie view.t सभ्यासात् । ९६। Another objection, in favour of the eternity of Sound. Aph. 96 .- [Sound must be permanent, says some one,] because it is dwelt upon. a. For that which is permanent is perceptively dwelt upon : for * अन्यतरस पच्स्थानित्यतसाधकस्याध्यापमात् यः प्रति- षेधः सन समभवति उभयो: पचयोरध्ापनस्य समानत्वा- दिति शेष:। क्राध्यापनं दि गुरुआारणानूचारणं शिव्योचा- रणानुकूलोच्चारणं वा। तच् खेयाेर्यप जयोस्तुखयं न शन्द- नित्ताया: सहायकं विधातुमलं। न हथ्ापनं दानं थेन

समभवति वव्हनामेकदा खत्वविरोधात् परखत्वापादनासमा- वाच्च। अपितु उत्याध्ापनादाविवोपदेशमानमिति भाव:। + पूर्वपचक्षन्रम्।

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BOOK II. 611. 89

example, one looks ten times at some colour [which is a persis- tent thing] ;- in like manner, one recites a chapter [of the Ve- da] a hundred times ;- so that, 'because it is dwelt upon,' Sound is permanent :- such is the import .*

b. He replies.t कान्यत्वे Sप्यभ्यासस्योपचारात्। ९७।

Its refutation. Aph. 97 .- [Nay,] because even were they other [or numerically different], the dwelling upon them might take place.

a. The prima facie view is not right :- why ?;- because 'even were they other,' i. e., even were the words [numerically] differ- ent, the dwelling upon the lecture ' might take place,' i. e., were possible. For a ' dwelling upon' [or repetition] does not esta- blish persistency,-for we see a 'dwelling upon' the thing [or a practice of it,] even where there is a [numerical] difference, in such cascs as " He sacrifices twice," " He dances thrice", &c. :- such is the import.t

b. An indifferent person here proposes the doubt how there

• यद्धि खिरं तदभ्यस्यमानं हष्टं। यथा दशकत्वो रूपं पश्यति। एवं शतक्वत्वो Sनुवाकमधीत रत्यभ्यासात् खेयें रन्दस्ेति भाव:। + उत्तरयति। + पूर्वपक्षो न युक्तः। कुतः। अभ्यत्वे भेदेऽपि शब्दानां सध्यापनाभ्यासस्य उपचारात् सम्भवात। न हम्यास: खेयं साधयति द्विजुदति बिर्ष्टेततीवादीी भेदेऽप्यभ्यासदर्शना- दिति भाव:। L

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90 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

can be 'practice even when there is difference,' seeing that there is really no such thing as difference [or ' otherness'] in the world .*

Whether there be such a thing as ' otherness.' Aph 98 .- There is no such thing [says some one,] as 'otherness,' because what is [called] other than some other, is not other, because of its not being other [than itself ].

a. That which is called other than something else, is not other than itsel/ ;- so how is it other,-since it is a contradiction to be both other and not other? Such is the import. The heart [or essential point in this argument,] is this, that it is impossible for a thing to be other than itself;t [and if it can, with truth, be said that a thing is ' not other,' how can it be said, with truth, that it is 'other'?]

b. He clears up this.t तदभावे नाध्यनन्यता तयोरितरेतरापेच्सिद्वे:।९६।

' Otherness' is relative. Aph. 99 .- Though this [-viz., other- ness,] may be absent [in the relation of a thing to itself], it is not the case that there is no [such thing as] otherness, because these two [-viz., otherness and identity,] exist with reference to one another. * अन्यतैव जगति नासीति कथमन्यत्वे Sप्यभ्यासोपर्पात्त रिति तटस्य बशङते। यदन्यस्मादन्यदुचते तत् खस्नादनन्यदभिव्नं। तत् कथमन्यद्वेदाभेदयोविरोघादिति भाव: । खाभेदस्यावश्य- कत्वमिति इृदयम्। + समाधन्ते।

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BOOK II. (11. 91

a. 'Thongh this may be absent,' i. e., though otherness may be absent, it is not further the case that there is no otherness; because 'these two,' i. e., otherness and identity, exist through mutual reference to one another; because, in reality, either, i. e., any one of two,-e. g., identity,-exists in respect of the other {e. g., in respect of otherness], because it [viz., identity,] is such that it exists with reference to the knowledge of otherness, i. e., of [numerical] difference [-the word same having no meaning to him who does not understand the word other] :- such is the meaning .* b. He ponders a doubt.t

Another ohjection in favour of the eternity of Sound. Aph. 100 .- [Sound, says some one, must be eternal,] because we discern no cause why it should perish.

a. [For the reason alleged,] sound is eternal, &c. Non-discern- ment means either absence of perception, or absence of know- ledge,t [such, e. g., as might come by inference ;- see §102, a].

b. In the first place he states what debars this.§

• तद्भावे Sन्यत्वस्याभावे Sनन्यतापि नाकि तवारभेदा- भेदयो: सिद्वेः परसरसापेच्षलात्। वसुततु तयोरमथ इत- रस एकतरस्य अरनन्यत्वस्य दतरापेर्यसिद्वे: पतरत्वस् भेदय जानापेजा सिद्धिर्यसय ताडशत्ादित्वर्यः। + शङ्मे। + शब्दो नित् इत्यादि:। बनुपलन्विरप्रत्चमच्ञानं वा। 5 वाद्ये प्रतिबन्विमाइ।

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92 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

The argument proves Aph. 101 .- [Were non-perception suffici- too much. ent to prove non-existence,] we should have constant audition, because of our not perceiving any cause why we should not hear. a. If non-existence were established by non-perception, then, as we perceive no cause of our not hearing, we should not cease to hear ;- that is to say, we should find that there is hearing constantly .* b. But, in the second place, he says.t उपलभ्यमने चानुपलब्धेरसत्त्वादनपदेश: ॥१०२। The argument refuted Aph. 102 .- And, since the non-perception otherwise. is not a fact, inasmuch as it [viz., the cause of the cessation of hearing,] is discerned, this [argument of yours] proves nothing. a. The cause of the cessation being gathered by inference, &c., since there is not non-perception of it, your reason 'proves no- thing,'-i. e., does not establish,-because it is itself unsound. The fact is, that we conjecture the perishableness [of Sound] from the fact of its being & product.t b. Another aphorism of the author of the tenets.§ * वद्यप्रत्य वत्वाद भार्षम द्विसदान्रवण्कारणस्ाप्रत्यष त्वादत्रवणं न स्यादिति सततन्रवणप्रसङ्ग पत्ययेः। 1 द्वितोये त्वाइ। अनुमानादिमा उपलभ्यमाने विनाशकारणे बनुप- लब्धेरभावात् लवदीयो हेतुरनपदेशः असाधक: चसिद्ध- त्वात्। जन्यभावलेम विभाशकत्पनमिति भाष: । 5 सिद्ान्तिन: सबान्तरम्।

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BOOK II. §11. 93

पाणिनिमित्तप्रश्नेषाच्छन्दाभावे नानुपलब्धिः ॥१०३। One cause of the cessa- tion of Sound. Aph. 103 .- There is not non-perception [of the cause of the cessation of Sound], sound ceasing on the application of such a cause as the hand.

a. When a gong, or the like, is sounding, since the cessation of sound is perceived ' on the application,' i. e., on the contact, of a cause-in the shape of the hand, there is not a non-percep- tion of any cause of the cessation of Sound .*

ò. But then, since the contact of the hand with a bell or the like, stops the sound, [some one may say] the sound must really reside in the bell, or the like, [and not in that imaginary sub- stratum of Sound, the Ether]; so, in reference to this doubt, he says :t-

व्रस्पर्शत्ादप्रतिषेध: ।१०४। The substratum of Sound Aph. 104 .- This objection will not intangible. hold, because it [the ethereal substratum of Sound,] is intangible.

a. Complete thus :- the alleged objection does not hold, be- cause the substratum of Sound is intangible [and cannot there- fore be the tangible bell, or the like]. For Sound is not a dis- tinguishing quality of what things possess tangibility,-for it is not a product following from any such quality in its [substantial

• पन्दायमाने कांखादा पाणिरूपनिमित्तस प्रश्लेषात् संयोगाच्कन्दाभावे उपलभ्यमाने शब्दाभावकारणस्य मानु- पबन्धिरिति।

• ननु घष्टादिपाणिसंयोगस्य शब्दनिवर्कत्वे घष्टाद्या-

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94 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

cause], not being the result [e. g.,] of contact with fire as the non substantial cause :- such is the drift .* [To explain ;- if we suppose the tangible bell to be the substantial cause of Sound, then the non-substantial cause is that contact of something with the bell, which elicits the Sound :- but then fire is tangible, no less than a bell; yet contact with fire does not produce Sound.]

b. In order to explain this same point, he says:t- विभत्तयन्तरोपपनेश्व समासे।१०५।

d peculiarity of Sound. Aph. 105 .- And [Sound is not one] in an assemblage [of qualities belonging to some tangible substratum], because there really are various di- visions [of Sound apparently belonging to the same object]. a. It is not proper to say, that, 'in an assemblage,' i. e., in a compound of tangibility and other [properties], Sound exists in combination,-' because there really are various divisions', i. e., several varieties of acute and grave, &c. The meaning is this ;- in one single conch-shell, or the like, various sounds, acute, grave, &c., are produced; but [we do not observe anything of this kind in the case of what are really qualities of the shell, or the like; for] Odours &c. do not alter without contact with fire, {whereas the Sound alters without any alteration of the shell]: -auch is the import.$ *उक्: प्रतिषेधो न समभवति वस्पर्शलात् शन्दाग्रय- स्ेति शेष: । शन्दो दि न सपर्शवद्धिशेषगुव्य: अ्रभ्िषंयोगा-

गय:। + एतदेव व्युत्पाद यितुमाइ। + समासे सपर्शादिसमुहाये साहित्येन शब्दो वर्शत भति

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BOOK II. $12. 95

b. Here ends the section on the non-eternity of Sound .*

c. Since this is its appropriate place, in order to censure the opinion that Sound changes, he displays a doubt.t

SECTION XII.

ON THE CHANGES OF SOUNDS. विकारापदेशोपदेशात् संशयः॥१०६।

Whether letters change. Aph. 106 .- From the injunction under the character of a change, there arises a doubt.

a. Some explain, that, by the rule [P. VI., 1, 77,] "Instead of the vowel i, &c., when a vowel follows, let there be a semivowel," &c., it is meant that the letter y, &c., is a modification of the letter i, &c. But others explain the direction thus, that, whereas an i was to be employed, a y is to be employed [instead]. And hence arises the doubt whether letters are changeable or not.t न युत्तं विभत्यन्तरस्य विभागान्तरस् तारमन्दादेरुपपत्तेः। अ्रयमर्थः । एरकस्तिन्नेव शङ्गादी तारमन्दादिनानाशन्दा जायन्ने गन्वादयसु विनाग्निसंयोगं न परावर्त्तन्त इति भाव:।

• समान्नं शब्दानित्यत्वप्रकरणम्। + प्रसङ्गाच्कन्दपरिणामवादं दूर्षयतुं संशयं प्रदर्शयति। + एको यम्मचीत्यादिना एकारादेविकारो यकारादि- रिति केचित व्याचचते। परे तु दकारे प्रयोक्रव्ये यकारः

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96 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

b. And by change is meant the origination of another sub- stance, whether with destruction or without destruction of na- ture [in that from which it originates], as the origination of curds, &c. from milk, &c. and the origination of a tree, &c. from a seed, &c. Moreover, even when there has been the des- truction of a mass, e. g., of gold, through the destruction of the union of its parts by the blows of a hammer, there originates a bracelet ; while a jar, or the like, originates without the des- truction of the nature of the bowl-shaped halves &c.,* [which are put together to form it].

c. An aphorism to set aside [the theory of ] a change in this case.t

प्रक्यतिविदृद्वा विकार विट द्रेश् । १०७।

An argument against Aph. 107 .- And, by reason of increased change of letters. bulk in the original, there would be increased bulk in the modification.

a. Letters are not changeable; for, were such the case, we should find increased bulk in the modification, in accordance with increase of bulk in its original, i. e., in that which is re- प्रथोत्व्य दत्यादेशमादिशन्ति। अतक्न वर्ण विकारिणे न वेति संशयः। * विकारश्व सरुपस् विनाशेडविनाशे वा ट्रव्यान्तरारमा- कत्वं यथा दुग्धादेई प्याद्यारम्भकत्वं बीजादेहैचाद्यारम्भक- त्वञ्न। सुवर्णा देरपि लोडाघातजन्यावयवसंयोगनाशाद- वर्यावनो नाशे सत्येव कुण्डलारम्भ: कपालादेश खरूपा- विनाशेम घटाद्यारमकलम्। + तब विकारनिराकरणाय सषतम्।

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garded as its material,-just as largeness or smallness belongs to that mass which originates from [aliquot] parts, large or small. That is to say,-in comparison with the letter y which origina- ted from a short letter i, the letter y which originated from a long letter i shou 1 e greater :- therefore the side [of the argu- ment which advocates the theory] of substitution is the better: -such is the import .*

b. Some one objects.t

Objection to the foregoing Aph. 108 .- This [says some one,] is no argument. reason, for we find modifications less than, equal to, and greater than [the original material]. a. The alleged argument is not right, because ' we find,' i. e., we see, that modifications are smaller, equal, and greater, in comparison of the original material ;- as, in comparison with the bulk of the cotton, the thread formed of it is of small bulk; or as, from a cocoa-nut, which is larger than the seed of a Banian- tree [or Ficus Indica], a cocoa-nut-tree, smaller than a Banian- tree, is produced,-and a bracelet or the like, equal in bulk to the gold or the like; or as, from two cocoanuts, smaller and larger, two equal trees; or from two seeds of the Banian-tree, * न वर्षा विकारिणसथा सति तत्मकृतेरु्पादानत्वाभि- मतस्य विद्टद्या विकारस्यापि विद्टद्यापत्ते: महदल्यावयवार- व्वावयविनो महदल्यत्ववत्। डुसेकारारव्धयकारापेच्षया दीघेकारारव्वयकारस्य विदृद्धि: स्ादित्यर्यः। तम्मादादे- अपचः श्रेयानिति भाव:।

t साच्चिपति।

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98 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

smaller and larger, two equal trees; and, from the seed of a Banian-tree, small in bulk, a large Banian-tree .* b. He clears up this.t नातुस्यप्रऊ्ृतीनां विकारविकल्पात्। १०६। The objection disposed of. Aph. 109 .- Nay,-because it was the difference of the products whose original material is unequal [that I spoke of]. a. The foregoing decision is not right, because what I spoke of was the ' difference,' i. e., the discrepance of those products ' whose original material is unequal,' i. e., whose original mate- rial is different. For the smallness or greatness, &c., of a tree or the like, does not proceed from the smallness or greatness, &c., of the seed or the like; but, moreover, there is, in this case, an entire difference from that which I spoke of [-which was not a seminal principle, but a mass to be operated upon-]; and so thy remark is a fallacy through a figure of speech :- such is the import.t * उक्रा हतुर्न युत्त: विकाराणं प्रहृत्यपेच्या न्यूनत्वस् समत्वस्याधिकत्वस्य चोपपत्तेरदर्शनात्। यथा तूलकपरिमा- पापेच्षया तद्विकारसन्तुरल्यपरिमाणः। यथा वा न्यगरोध बोजादुत्कृष्टेन नारिकेलीबीजेन न्यग्रोधादल्यो नारिकेली- तरुर्जन्यते कनकादिसमपरिमाणं कटकाटिच। यथा वा न्यूनाधिकनारिकेलीबीजाम्यां समा दृक्षा न्यूनाधिकपरि- मापवटबोजाम्यां समो दक्षा न्यूनपरिमाणाच वटबीजात् मह्ान् वटतरुरिति। t समाधत्ते।। + नोतं समाधानं युत्तं। अतुष्यप्रक्कतीनां भिन्नप्रक्कती-

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BOOK II. $12. 99

b. He ponders a doubt .*

Whether the changes of different letters may not Aph. 110 .- There may be no difference be the same. in the modifications of [different] letters, just as [conversely,] there may be differ- ence in the modifications of substances.

a. As there is an inequality in the products, though, so far forth as it is substance, there be equality in the original material, of Banian-fig-trees &c .; just so [conversely,] there is nothing nmaccountable in there being 'no difference,' i. e., an identity of form, in the letter Y, which is the modification whether of a long or of a short [vowel] :- such is the meaning.t b. He clears this up.t न विकारधर्मानुपपत्ते: ।१११।

The foregoing sugges- Aph. 111 .- Nay, for the charaeter of a tion not in point. modification does not exist [in this case]. नां दि विकाराणां विकल्य: वैलचएयं मयाभिद्टितं। न हि. बोजादेर्डसटशादिना टचादेषीसटद्यादिकं प्रक्रान्तं मदुत्त- वैलचएयन्तु तचाप्यस्ति तथाच लदुक्मुपचारच्कलमिति भाव: । * शङ्ते। + टूव्यतवेन न्यग्राधादिप्रक्ृतीनां तुल्यलवेऽपि विकारवै- षम्घं यथा एवमेव वर्णलेन तुल्ययोरपि डुखदीरघेयेोय। विकारो यकारसस्य काविकल्प ऐकरूप्यं नानुपपन्नमित्र्यः। + समाधन्ते।

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100 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

a. There is not, in this case, a resemblance to the modifications of substances; for this is the character of [what are really] modifications, viz., that they follow their original; so that, where this is different, they are different : and this does not present it- self in the present instance,-seeing that there is no difference in the result, [viz., the semivowel,] although the original [vowel] differed in being long or short, &c .* b. And hence it is not a change [of one letter into another] :- so he says.t

How it cannot be that Aph. 112 .- Because what things have un- letters change. dergone a change do not again return [to their original formj.

a. The original form of what has undergone a change is not seen again. Curds, verily, do not attain again the state of milk; but the letter i, having reached the condition of the letter y, does again reach the condition of the letter i :- for, when one has said "curds here" (dadhyatra), still again one does say [-with a return to the original unchanged vowel-] " curds here" (dadhit atra) :- such is the import.t

• नाच टरूर्व्यविकारतुख्यता। विकाराणां दि कयं धर्मो यत्परहृत्यनुविधानं त्वेदे भेद कति प्रक्ते तदनुपपाि:। डखत्वदीर्घतादिना प्रक्कतिभेदेऽ्वपि कार्यभेदाभावात्। + इतश् न विकार रत्या। + विकारप्राप्रस्य न पुनः प्रक्वतिरूपता हष्टा। न सलु दधि वीरतां पुनरापद्यते। इकारसु यकारतां प्राप्त: पुनरिकारतामापद्यते दथ्यनेतुक्तापुनरपि दधि यानेत्युच्त एवेति भाव:।

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BOOK II. §12. 101

b. Some one throws out an objection .*

सुव्णादीनां पुनरापत्तेरहेतु: ॥११३॥ An objection to the pre- Aph. 113 .- This [says some one,] is no ceding argument. reason, because [ ornaments of ] gold &c. do appear again [as before]. a. The foregoing argument [says some one,] is not right; be- cause gold or the like, having left the condition of a bracelet, and having assumed that of a ring, again does assume the condition of a bracelet :- such is the import.t

b. He repelst [this objection].

न तद्विकाराखां सुवर्भावाव्यतिरेकात् ॥११४।

The objection repelled. Aph. 114 .- Nay, because its modifica- tions do not relinquish the nature of gold. a. For, in the case of the modifications of gold, it is through its nature as gold &c., that it serves as a material, but not through its nature as a bracelet or the like. In that instance, [of the golden bracelet's becoming a ring, and that again be- coming a bracelet,] neither of them relinquishes the nature of gold. For if, having relinquished the nature of gold, it had attained the nature of a bracelet, and the nature of gold had come back again, then [but not otherwise,] there might have been a fallacy [in my argument, such as you charge upon it]. And it is not the same with the case in hand :- that which, having relinquish- ed the character of the letter i, had even attained the character *सचिपति। 1 उक्रो हेतुर्न युक्त: सुवर्षादिकं दि कटकीभावं विदाय रद्छचतामापननं पुनः कटकतामापद्यत एवेति भाव:। + निराकरोति।

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102 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

of the letter y, really does resume the character of the letter i; -which is an objection [to the appositeness of your instance,] that you will hardly get over :- such is the import .* b. He states the fundamental argument for there being no changet [of letters]. नित्वत्वे Sविकारादनित्यत्वेचानवस्थानात् ॥११५।

The theory, that letters Aph. 115 .- Because, if it [viz., an alpha- change, reduced to a betical sound,] be eternal, it cannot change; dilemma. and, if it be not eternal, then it does not abide [long enough to furnish the material for a change]. a. Since letters, if eternal, are incapable of change, and since, if they be not eternal, immediately after the perception of the letter i, from its abiding for no length of time, the letter i pe- rishes, there can be no such thing as a change [of the i to y] :- such is the meaning.t b. To this the assertor of change, founding on the opinion of the eternity [of letters], objects.§ *सुवर्णविकारखले हि सुवर्णत्वादिना प्रक्वतिता न तु कटकत्वादिना। तवोभयमपि सुवर्णभावं न जहाति। यदि हि सुवर्णतामपहाय कटकतामापन्नं पुनः सुवर्षता तदा व्यभिचारः शक्येत। नचवं प्रक्ते। इकारतांहित्वा यका- रतां प्राप्स्थापोकारतापत्तिर ख्येवेति दोषो दुःपरिहर कति भाव:।। + अ्विकारे मूलयुक्तिमाइ। + वर्णानां नित्यत्वे विकारासन्भवादनित्वत्वे चाचिरख्ायि-

९ वत्र विकारवादी नित्यत्वमतमालम््य परिरति।

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BOOK II. §12. 103

नित्यानामतीन्द्रिय त्वा द्गर्मविकल्ाच् वर्णविकाराणाम- प्रतिषेध: ॥११ ६।

An attempt to meet one horn of the dilemma. Aph. 116 .- Since [some] eternal things are beyond the grasp of the senses, and since there is a difference of character, [in others,] the changes of letters [-argues some one-] are not to be denied.

a. The denial of the changes is not proper; because eternal things have a ' difference of character,' i. e., the characters are of several sorts; because some are 'beyond the grasp of the senses.' By the "and" the fact that some are cognizable by sense is included. For, as, although such eternal things as the Ether are beyond the grasp of sense, the nature of a cow &c. is eternal [and perceptible]; so, too, though other eternal things be unchangeable, letters may be susceptible of change .*

b. Founding on the non-eternity [of letters], he [the same objector,] says :- + अ्रनवस्थायित्वेच वर्णापलब्धिवत्तदुपपत्तिः ॥११७॥ An attempt to face the se- cond horn of the dilemma. Aph. 117 .- And, though they be unper- manent, yet, as there is the perception of letters, this [change of them also] is possible. a. Though letters be unpermanent, yet, as the perception of * विकाराणं प्रतिषेधो न युक्तः नित्यानां धर्मविकल्पा- दर्मस्य नानाविधत्वादतीन्द्रियत्वात् चकारेगेन्द्रियकत्वं समु- चोयते। यथा हि नित्यानामाकाशादीनामतोन्ट्रियत्वे डपि गोलादीनां नित्वत्वमेवमन्येषां नित्यानामविकारित्वे डपि वर्णानां विकारित्वं स्यादिति। + अनित्यतवमालम्व्य स ब्राप्ट।

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104 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYXYA.

them takes place, so also a change of them [-as from i to y-] may take place :- such is the import .* b. He replies to botht [of these attempts to save the credit of the objection]. विकार धर्मित्वे नित्त्वाभावात् कालान्तरे विकारोप-

The reply. Aph. 118 .- The objection will not do, because eter- nalness is not where there is that which has the cha- racter of a modification, and because the modification [-if we are to call it so-] presents itself at a subsequent time [to the destruction of the alleged material]. a. The alleged objection is not proper, because it is impossible that there should be eternalness where the case is one of what has the character of a modification ;- for modification here means the assumption of another nature, with abandonment of one's own nature ;- and because, when such is the state of things, there is the reverse of being eternal. For, in the instance in question, it cannot be as when bowl-shaped halves or the like constitute the materials of a jar or the like ;- because, during the time of the letter y, there is no perception of the letter i, [ -- whereas, during the existence of the jar, its constitutive bowl- shaped halves are equally patent]. On the alternative also of non-eternity, [in alphabetic sounds,] the objection is not proper; for the perception of the letter, at the second instant, [-the an- tecedent first instant being that of its presentation to the sense -] is feasible, but its modification, belonging to a subsequent time, is not feasible ;- because, immediately after the sound of dadhi ('milk'), it is [on the hypothesis,] annihilated by, e. g., the * अमवस्थायित्वे Sपि वर्णानां यथा प्रत्यचं भवतेवं पि- कारो डपि स्यादिति भाव:। + उभयचोत्तरयति।

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BOOK II. $12. 105

sound of atra ('here') ;- such is the import,* [-so that dadh- yatra cannot be a modification of dadhi + atra]. b. And he states how there cannot be a change [in the case of letters,] for the following reason.t प्रहृत्यनियमात। ११६। An argument against there being change of letters. Aph. 119 .- Because there is no fixed rule as regards the original material. a. For, in the case of [what really are] modifications, there is a fixed rule as regards the original material. For example, milk and curd have the fixed relation of material and modification, but not conversely ; but, in the instance in question, the letter i is the original of the letter y in dadhyatra ('curd here'), &c .; but in vidhyati ( 'he wounds,') &c., the letter y (e. g., of the root vyadh,) is the original of the letter i :- such is the import. *उत्तः प्रतिषेधो न युक्त: विकारधरमित्वे नित्यत्वासम- वात्। विकारो ह्यन खरूपपरित्यागेन रूपान्तरापत्ति: तथात्ेच नित्वत्वविरोधात्। न हि घटादे: कपालाद्युपा- देयत्ववत् प्रक्ते सम्भवति यकारकाले इकारानुपलब्धे:। वनित्वलपचे Sपि प्रतिषेधो न युक्त: प्रत्यचंदि वर्णस्य द्विती- यकणे युज्यते विकारस कालान्तरीयो न युज्यते दधीति शन्दानन्तरमनेत्ादिंशन्देन तस्य नाशादिति भाव:। + रतक् विकारानुपपत्तिरित्ाइ। + विकाराणं हि प्रक्ृतिनियमो यथा चीरदधो: प्रद्व- तिविकारभावो न तु वेपरीत्ं। प्रऊ्वते तु दध्यवेत्यादावि- कारो यकारप्रक्ृतिर्विष्यतीत्ादा तु यकार दकारप्रक्वति- रिति भाव:।।

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106 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

b. In respect to this, a sophist expresses a doubt .* अ्रनियमे नियमाब्नानियम:॥१२०॥

A quibble. Aph. 120 .- There is no want [says some one,] of a fixed rule, because the fixed rule consists in there being no fixed rule. a. That is to say, that absence of a fixed rule, which is alleged [in §119], is not right ;- why ?;- because it is fixed that there shall be nothing fixed.t

b. He clears up this.t नियमानियमविरोधादनियमे नियमाच्चाप्रति- षेघ: ॥१२१।

The quibble disposed of. Aph. 121 .- And this is not to be set aside by saying that the fixed rule consists in there being no fixed rule; because. a fixed rule and the ab- sence of a fixed rule are contradictories.

a. The objection made by thee to the absence of a fixed rule where there is no fixed rule, is not right ;- 'because a fixed rule and the absence of a fixed rule are contradictories' ;- for the absence of a fixed rule is the non-existence of a fixed rule, and when there is this, it is impossible there should be a fixed rule : -such is the import.§ * कबच्कूलवादी शङ्गते। + अ्नियमो य उत्तः स न युक्तः। कतः। अ्रनियतत्वख नियमादित्यर्थः ॥ + समाधने। अ्नियमे यस्तयानियमप्रतिषेधः कतः स न युक्त।

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BOOK II. §12. 107

b. Having thus, then, rejected the opinion that letters stand in the relation of original material and modification, he justifies the employment, on his own side, of [the term] change* [as ap- plied to letters]. गुणान्तरापत्यु पम दड्डा सट्द्विले शक्ले वेभ्यस्ु वर्णविका- रोपपत्तेवर्णविकार: ।१२२।

Senses in which the term change of letters may be employed. Aph. 122 .- But there is [what may allowably be called] change of letters, because such change of letters does occur through the attainment of another quality, substitution, abbreviation, pro- longation, contraction, and augmentation. a. The word 'but' here means 'again.' For these [reasons], again, 'since change of letters does occur,' i. e., since there does occur ' a change,' i. e., by the employment of one letter the force of another letter,-the term 'change' is employedt [allow- ably]. b. He states these same [reasons,]-' other quality,' &c. The 'attainment of another quality,' is the arrival of a different cha- racter while the subject really remains,-as when the grave ac- centuation befalls what was acutely accented. ' Substitution' is the employment of another subject, the [previous] subject कुतः। नियमानियमयोविरोधात्। अ्रनियमो दि नियमा- भावसस्मिन् सति नियमासमभवादिति भाव:। * तदेवं वर्णानां प्रक्ृतिविकारभावं निरस् खपचे विका- रव्यवहारमुपपादयति। तुशब्दः पुनररथे। एतेम्यः पुनवषविकारोपपन्तेरवणे- विकारस्य एकवर्णप्रयोगेष वर्णन्तरप्रयोगस्य उपपन्तेवर्ण- विकार कति व्यर्वा्डियते।।

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108 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

having been set aside,-as bhú ('be') for as ('be'). ' Abbrevia- tion' is the shortening of a long. ' Prolongation' is the lengthen- ing of a short. 'Contraction' is diminution, as the omission of the letter a of as ('be'). An ' augment' is an addition. For these reasons the term ' change' [of letters] is employed* [by those who do not allow that one letter turns into another].

c. Here ends the section on the changes of sounds.t

d. Since, of knowledge due to verbal evidence, the cause is the advent of the word-meanings produced by the words, and since, in order to demonstrate this, we must explain in what consists the meaning of a word, he in the first place describes a word.t

SECTION XIII.

THE INVESTIGATION OF THE FORCE OF A WORD.

ते विभत्तयन्ता: पदम् ॥१२३।

A word what. Aph. 123 .- These, having an affix at the end, form a word.

तानेवाइ। गुणान्तरेति। गुणान्तरापत्तिर्धमिषि सत्येव धर्मान्तरापत्तिः यथोदान्ते Sनुदान्ततवं। उपमदो धर्मिनि- हत्ता धर्म्यन्तरप्रयोग: यथासेमू। द्रायो दीर्षस डुखतं। दद्वि: डुखस्य दीर्घत्ं। लेशः बल्पतं यथा असेरकार- लोप:। श्ेष आ्रगमः । एतेः कारणेषिकारव्यवहार कति। + समात्रं शन्दपरिणामप्रकरणम्। + शान्दबोधे पदजन्यपदार्थेपस्वितेहेतुलवात तहुपपाट- नाय पदार्थे निरूपणीये पदमादा निरूपयति।

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BOOK II. 613. 109

a. 'These,' viz., letters, 'having an affix at the end, form a word.' We do not mean to say that there must be a plurality [of letters,-for a word may consist of a duality, or of only one]. And the actual presence of an affix is not [necessarily,] to be looked for, [-a word, logically, if not grammatically, being a word, independently of inflection]. And an affix is an inflection of case or tense, [-see the Layhu Kaumudi, §144]. But, in reality, it is not this [bare] word that is conducive to the know- ledge due to verbal evidence, but it is this with the nature of ' expectancy,' [i. e., so qualified as to keep the sense in suspense until combined with other words in a sentence :- see Tarka-San- graha, 71]. Or [-to explain the expression, in the aphorism, vibhaktyantah, differently-], the word rendered 'affix' may mean 'function,' and the word rendered 'ending' may mean 'relation ;' so that what is meant by being a word will be the 'possession of a function,'* [-which does not belong to mere arbitrary or accidental aggregates of letters]. b. Having described a word, what its meaning consists in, i. e., what the sense of a word consists in, has been explained [in our commentary]. Moreover, since among these [meanings of words,] there is no dispute as to what is meant by a verbal root, &c., in order to explain the meaning of such a word as " cow," he says.t तदर्थ व्यत्त्याऊ्वतिजातिसब्निधावुपचारात् संशय:।१२४।

• ने वर्णा विभन्तयन्ताः पदं। बहुत्वमविवच्चितं। विभ- क्रेच सखमनपेचितं। विभतित्त सुप्िडरूपा। वसतुतसतु नेदं पदं शान्दवोधोपयोगि किन्विदमाकाङ्काखरूपमथवा विभ- क्रिर्टतिरन्त: सम्बन्वसेन दत्तिमखवं पदत्वमिति। + तब पढे निरूपिते तद्दाच्यत्वं पदार्यत्वं निरूपितं। तवापि धात्वाद्यर्थस निर्विवादलवाद्गवादिपदाथ निरूप- यितुमाइ।

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110 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

The question what a Aph. 124 .- As to what is meant by it,- substantive directly since we recognize this in company with indi- denoles. vidual, form, and genus,-there is doubt.

a. 'Individual,' viz, cow, or the like; 'genus,' viz., cowhood, or the like; 'form ;' i. e., any particular collocation of parts ;- the ' company' of these, i. e., their vicinity, their association where this [association] is; 'because we recognize,' i. e., we take note of [the import of this or that word]. And so, since we perceive the three simultaneously, there is the doubt,-pray, are these severally what is meant by the word, or these aggregative- ly ?- such is the meaning .* b. Some say that this [aphorism] is [a part of the Bháshya]; but, in reality, from its difficult style, &c., it is decidedly an ap- horism. Yet the portion " As to what is meant by it" seems to have been supplied by the author of the Bhashya.t c. In regard to this [doubt as to what is directly designated by a substantive], he states the opinion of him who alleges that the 'individual' is what is meant.t या शब्दस मूद़त्यागपरि ग्रद् संखयाटटड्यपचयवर्णसमासा- नुबन्धानां व्यक्तायुपचाराद्यक्ति:।१२५।

• व्यत्तिर्गवादिः जातिर्गोत्वादिराक्कतिरवयवसंख्थान- विशेषः। तेषां सव्निधिः सामीप्यं मेलनं। तब सति। उप- चारात् जानात्। तथाच तयाणां युगपत् प्रत्ययात् किमेतेषां प्रत्येकं पदार्थ उत समसमति संशय द्रत्यथे:॥ + इदं भाव्यमिति केचित्। वसुतसु दुर्बोधादिखरसात् सून्मेव। तदर्थ दत्यंशसु भाव्यऊवतः पूरणमिति प्रति- भाति। + तच् व्यक्तिशक्रिवादिनो मतमाइ।

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BOOK II, $13.

Erroneous opinion that Aph. 125 .- {The meaning of the word, says an appellative denotes some one, is] the individual, because [only] the individual. in respect of an individual can be under- stood the term "go," or a collection, or the giving, taking, num- ber, waxing, waning, colour, [grammatical] composition, or birth. a. Supply 'is the meaning of the word.' Because the said things ' can be understood,' i. e., can be employed. The word anubandha here means birth. 'Go,' i. e., such an expression as "The cow goes." Only 'in respect of an individual,'-because genus and form are insubstantial,-because thus it is only in res- pect of an individual that such expressions can be employed as "A collection of cows," " He gives the cow," " He accepts the cow," "Ten cows," "The cow waxes," "A lean cow," "A red cow," " Cow's blood," " The bull born," &c .* b. If the word samasa be held to mean "abiding properly," or "relation," then the [penultimate] exemplification should be "The cow abides," or " The cow's face."t c. He condemns this.t तदनवस्थानात्। १२६।

• पदार्थ दति शेषः। उक्तानां उपचारात् व्यवहारात्। म्नुबम्ध: प्रजननं। या गर्गच्क्वतीत्यादिव्यवद्ारः। व्यक्ता- वेव जात्याऊ्ृत्योरमूर्नल्वात्। एवं गवां समूइः गां ददाति गां प्रतिगृष्ठाति दश गाव: नैविर्द्वते कशा गै: कपिला गै: गोलोडितं ग: प्रसत दत्यादिव्यवहाराणं व्यक्तावेव समा- वात्। + समास: मम्यगासनं सम्बन्ो वेतर्थे गारासे गोर्मुख- मित्युदाइरणीयम्। + तद्दषयति।

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112 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

The opinion refuted. Aph. 126 .- [An appellative does not denote an individual,] because there is no fixation thereof. a. The meaning does not pertain to the individual, because there is no ' fixation' of an individual simply,-it is indetermi- nate,* b. For, if it were an individual simply [-without reference to the kind of individual-] that in meant, then, in consequence of the word " cow," or the like, any individual [of any kind] what- soever might present itself ;- therefore what is meant [by the word " cow"] is [not an individual simply, but] an individual distinguished by cowhood. And so, [some one may ask,] agree- ably to the maxim " Cognition which does not apprehend the dis- tinction, cannot infer [the exact nature of ] what is to be dis- tinguished," let the meaning apply only to the genus :- how, then, does it acquaint us with an individual? To this the follow- ing aphorismt [replies].

शकटाब्रपुरुषेष्वतङ्गावे डपि तदुपचारः।१२७।

Indirect employment of speech. Aph. 127 .- Though its meaning be not so and so, it is figuratively so employed, in the case of (1) a Brahman, (2) a scaffold, (3) a * न व्यक्ना शत्रिव्यक्रिमावस्यानवस्थानात् व्राव्यवस्था- नात्। + व्यत्तिमावस्य शक्यत्वे हि गवादिपदाद्यत्किम्विय्य तोर- पस्ितिः स्ादतो गोत्वविशिष्टा व्यक्तिवाच्या। तथाच ना- गृद्दोतविशेषणान्यायात् जातावेव शतिरतु कथं तर्दि व्यत्रिबोध द्ृत्यग्रिमसरन्रम्।

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BOOK II. $13. 113

mat, (4) a king, (5) meal, (6) sandal-wood, (7) the Ganges, (8) a cart, (9) food, and (10) a man,-in consideration of (1) associa- tion, (2) place, (3) design, (4) function, (5) measure, (6) contain- ing, (7) vicinity, (8) conjunction, (9) sustenance, and (10) supre- macy.

a. 'Though it be not so and so,' i. e., though such be not the direct meaning of the word; 'it is figuratively employed,' i. e., the word is used indirectly ; for example, the word "staff" &c. is employed for a Brahman &c., because of association &c. In consequence of 'association,' which is a species of conjunction, in this example " Feed the staff," the word staff is employed in the sense of the Brahman who bears a staff .*

b. In like manner, from the 'place,' "The seaffolds shout" means the man standing on the scaffold. From the ' design,' "He makes a mat" implies his aiming after a mat; for the mat, inasmuch as it is a thing non-existent [until made], can have [- at the time when one is spoken of as making it-] no maker. Because his ' function' is that of Yama, [the judge of the dead], viz., chastising &c., the word Yama is used to mean a king. By reason of the 'measure,' meal measured by a bushel is called a bushel of meal. By reason of the 'containing,' sandal-wood placed in a vessel is called a vessel of sandal-wood. Because of 'vicinity,' they say "The cows are feeding on the Ganges." Be- canse of the conjunction of some black substance [in the shape of paint,] with the cart, the expression " A black cart" may be instanced. Because it is the ' sustenance' of life, food is called life. In the expression " Of course his family is a king," we un-

• बतङ्भावे Sपि तत्पदाशक्यतवेऽपि तदुपचार: तच्क्न्दव्यप- देगे यथा सहपरवादितो ब्राह्मषादी यश्ादिपद प्रयोग:। सचपरणात् संयोगविशेषाद्यष्टिं भोजयेत्न यष्टिधरब्राह्मये

O

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214 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

derstand [by family,] the head of the family,-becanse of the headship* [implied in this elliptical expression]. c. And thus, as, from the word Ganges &c., we understand the bank of the Ganges &c., so, from the word cow &c., we un- derstand that to be indicated which possesses the nature of & cow.t d. He lays down the opinion that the form alone is what is meantt [by an appellative].

Erroneous opinion that the Aph. 128 .- The form [-says some form is what is denoted by one, is what is meant by the word], be- an appellative. cause it is with reference thereto that the determination of the entity is settled. a. The form is what is meant by the word ;- why ?- because, -'of the entity,' e. g., of an animal, as a cow, ' the determina- * एवं ख्थानाव्न्ना: कोशनीति मन्नसपुरुषे। ताद- श्योत् कटं कगतोति कटार्यकवीरणे कटस्यासिद्धतेन कारकत्वायोगात्। यमस्य टत्तादनुशासनादितो राजनि यम दति। मानात् वाढकेन मिता: सक्तव ग्राठकसत्तव दति। धारणात् तुलया धतं चम्दनं तुलाचन्दनमिति। सामीप्याद्ड्गायां गावशवरन्नीति। कृष्णद्रव्ययोगात् शकटे कष्णः शकट रतुदाइरणीयं। प्रापसाधनादव्नं प्राप रति। आाधिपत्याद्रानवासय ऊलमति ऊल्ाधिपति: प्रतीयते। तथाच यथा गङ्गादिपदाङ्गक्गातीरलवाटिना बोधसया गोपदादितो गोत्वविभिष्टस्य लक्षपया बोध:। + ब्राऊृतिरेव शक्ेति मतमुपन्यस्यति।

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BOOK II. §13. 115

tion is settled,' i. e., there is the settlement of its being suoh and such a determinate thing,-' with reference thereto,' i. e., with reference to the form :- that is to say, the form alone is what is meant, because it is with reference to the form that the expression "This is a horse," "This is a cow," is employed .* b. He censures this, by means of its fruit,t [i. c., by showing the absurd consequenee to which it leads]. व्यक्याऊ्यतियुकऽप्यप्रसङ्गात् प्रोचणदीनां सद्दवके जातिः॥१२८। Absurd consequence of the opinion. Aph. 129 .- [Were thie so, then,] in an earthenware cow, where, though it possess individuality and the form, we do not find immolation &c., we should find the genus. a. Since, in an earthenware cow, though it possess individuali- ty and the form [of a cow], we do not meet with its being im- molated &c., [as happens to real cattle], the genus of this or that is [at least neeessarily ineluded in] the meaning of a word: -otherwise, we should find the earthenware cow also, inasmuch as it is an individual and it has the form of a cow, getting ccremonially immolated :- such is the import.t

• म्राऊ्ति: पदार्थः। कुतः। सत्वस्य प्राणिनो गवादे- व्ये वस्था नसि द्वेव्य व्थि तत्वसिद्वेमद पेक्षलादाऊत्पे च्त्वादय-

क्येत्यर्थः । + फलतसडूषर्यात।

नज्जातिः पदार्थ दतरथा मृट्टवकस्यापि व्यत्तित्वाद्टवाद्यति- सत्वाच्च वं ध्रपोव्णादिप्रसद्गाहिति भाव:।

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116 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

b. Having set aside the opinion that the meaning [of a word] is only the individual or the form, he sets aside the opinion that what is meant is the genus alone .*

नाऊतिव्यत्त्यपे चताव्जात्यभिव्यक्र:।१३०।

The genus alone is not Aph. 180 .- Nay [-it is not the genus what is conveyed by alone that is meant directly by an appella- an appellative. tive-] because it is in referenee to the form and to the individual that there is the manifestation of the genus. a. It is not the genus alone that is meant by the word. Since the 'manifestation of the genus,' i. e., the knowledge, commu- nicated verbally, of the genus, has 'reference to the form and to the individual,' i. e., is determined by its having some form and individual as its object,-these two also are necessarily expressed [directly by the word], because it is impossible that they could be recognised except by the direct meaning,t [seeing that they could not be conveyed by 'Indication' or 'Suggestion,' if not directly denoted. See Sahitya-Darpana, §II., 13 and 23]. b. And thus it is settled that all three are expressed directly : -so he says.t जाताऊ्कतिव्यक्रयस्तु पदार्थ:।१३१।

• केवलव्यत्त्याऊ्ृतिशक्रिपक्षं निराक्ृत्व केवलजातिश- क्रिपचं निराकरोति। + न जातिमाचं पदार्थः। जात्भिव्य त्रेणातिशा्दबो-

तयोरपि वाच्यतवमावश्यकं शत्रिं विना तञ्घानासम्भ- वात्। + दत्यच्च चयाणामपि वाच्यलं सिद्धमित्याइ।

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BOOK II. $15. 117

What is really meant bg an appellative. Aph. 131 .- But the meaning of a word is the genus and the form and the individual.

a. By the word 'but,' that only one of these is what is meant by a word, is excluded. But the expression 'the meaning of a word' is in the singular, to acquaint us that, though there are three, the power [or direct significance of a word,] is but one .*

b. Though the power [or direct significance of a word,] be in- divisible, sometimes one or other [of the three things signified] may [more prominently] present itself. Though the meaning be equal, [in its reference to each of the three,] the pre-eminence belongs to the individual, since it is the subjectt [of which the others are the attributes ;- so that the word, more strictly, de- notes the individual and connotes its generic properties &c]. c. Since it may be asked, among these what are [what you call] the individual &c.,-he says.t

Definition of an Aph. 182 .- An individual is something definite, individual. the abode of particular qualities.

a. He defines form.§

• तुशव्देनैकमाचपदार्थत्वव्यवच्क्ेदः। पदार्थ दत्येकव- चनन्तु तिसृष्वप्येकेव शक्रिरिति सचनाय। + विभिव्नशक्रा कदाचित् कस्यचिदुपस्थिति: सात्। शत्रे- सुख्यत्वे Sपि व्यक्रविशेष्यतात् प्राधान्यम्। + तब के व्यत्त्यादय रत्याकाङायामाइ। 5 बाऊतिं लचयति।

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118 THE APHORISMS OF THE NYAYA.

Definition of form. Aph. 183 .- The form is what is called the token of the genus.

a. That of which the name is 'the token of the genus:'-for, of the genus cowhood, for erample, the token is a certain collo- cation of dewlap &c.,* [whereby the cow is recognised].

b. He defines genus.t

समानप्रसवात्िका जातिः ।१३४ ।

Definition of genns. Aph. 134 .- Genus is that whose nature is to produce the same [conception]. a. That of which the 'nature,' i. e., the essence, is 'to pro- duce,' viz., to produce knowledge,-'the same,' i. e., of the same form, [-knowledge, illustratively, being regarded as ta- king the form of the object known,-as water takes the form of the receptacle into which it flows) :- and so the meaning is-a fitness to produce knowledge of the same description.t

b. Here ends the section on the Examination of the Meaning of a Word, and the second Diurnal Portion of the Second Book, namely the Examination of Evidence and its Subservients, by means of the examination of the division thereof.§

*जातिलिङ्गमित्यासा यखा जातेगालादेईि सासा- दिसंस्जानविशेषो लिग्रम्। 1 जातिं लचर्यत। समान: समानाकारक: मसवो बुद्धिजननं व्रात्मा सरूपं यस्ाः सा। तथाच समानाकारबुद्टिजममयोग्यतव- मथेः। 8 समापनं शन्दर्थक्तिपरीचाप्रकरग्म्। द्वितीवाज्ायस

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BOOK II. §13. 119

c. The commentary composed by the venerable Viswanatha Bhattacharya, on the Second Book of the Aphorisms of the Nyaya, is finished .* द्वितीयमाक्रिकन्त विभागपरी काद्ारकसाङ्गप्रमाणपरीचणं नाम। * रति श्ीविश्वनाथभट्टाचायकृता न्यायसनटत्ता द्विती- याध्यायदत्ति: समाप्ता।

END OF BOOK II.

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13

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LIST

OF DR. BALLANTYNE'S PUBLICATIONS FOR THE USE OF THE BENARES COLLEGE.

1. A Grammar of the Persian, .. anna | Urdú. 2. English Primer, .. 1 do. English. 3. Introduction to Logic, .. 8 do. Ditto. 4. Lectures on Chemistry, 12 annas Ditto. . 5. Outlines of Metaphysics, 8 do. Ditto. 6. Paraphrase of Macbeth (Shakespeare's) .. 1: 8: 0 Ditto. 57. Bháshá Parichchheda and Siddhanta Muktávalí,

Elements of English Grammar, .. .. Part 1, 7 annas Sanskrit & English. 8. .. 12 do. Ditto Ditto. 9. Laghu Kaumudi, Part 1, .. .. .. 8 do. Ditto Ditto. 10. Ditto Ditto, « 2, .. .. 8 do. Ditto. 11. Ditto Ditto, 3, .. .. .. Ditto .. 8 do. Ditto Ditto. 12. Ditto Ditto, 1, .. 8 do. Sanskrit & Hindf. 13. Lectures on the Subdivisions of Knowledge, Parts 1, 2, 3, & 4, .. each 4 annas Sanskrit & English. 8 do. Sanskrit & Hindi. 15. Reprints for the Pandits, Parts 1, 2, 3, 4, & 5, 14. Outlines of Sanskrit Grammar, .. ..

.. .. respectively, 4 as. 8 as. 12 as. 8 as. 8 as. English. G 16. Lectures on the Nyaya Philosophy, .. 8 annas Sanskrit & English. 17. Ditto on the Sankhya Philosophy, .. 7 do. Ditto Ditto. 18. A Lecture on the Vedanta Philosophy, 8 do. Ditto Ditto. 19. First Lessons in Sanskrit Grammar, .. 4 do. Ditto Ditto. G 20. Hitopadesa, Book I, 4 do. Hindí. 21. Sketch of Operations in the Benares Sanskrit College, 4 annas English. = 22. Aphorisms of the Nyáya, .. 8 do. Sanskrit & English. -23. Ditto of the Vaiseshika, Part 1, 7 do. Ditto Ditto. -24. Ditto of the Mimánsá, 7 do. Ditto Ditto. 25. Ditto of the Sankhya, Ditto of the Yoga, Parts 1 & 2, .. .. 12 do. Ditto Ditto. ~26. each 8 as. Ditto Ditto. .27. Ditto of the Vedanta, Ditto Ditto. 28. Tarka Sangraha, .. 7 annas 8 do. Sansk., Hindi, Eng. 29. 30. Synopsis of Science, Vols. I. & II., R. 1, & 14 as. Sanskrit & English. Ditto Ditto, Book 1, .. 6 31. Bacon's Novum Organum, Part 1, .. .. 8 annas Hindi & English.

32. Lectures on the Nyaya Philosophy, 2d Ed. revised, 12 do. Sanskrit & English.

Elements of Logie, .. 10% annas, Ditto Ditto. 1: 2: 0: English.

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मैजय छाहित सुसकों के ताम जो श्ोयुत पेकरफ न साहिब से बनो हैं पाठशाला के उ़फरसे।6?

मरिपश्ञोक नाम रुपया आाना पाईसस्यानाम १ इुङ्गिष म्रिमर : इयिल्राडकशंन टु लाजिक : ३ लेकपुर्श भान कि ससत्री :: १२ 1.B तथा ४ मइ्वाइन श्राफ 35 .. मेमफज़का तथा e s ५ पेरोजेश ्ाफ़ मक्- 15.4 बेठ [शेक्सपोर्ज़] गई भषापरिच्ेद औैरि चिसहृरतमु कावली म भार .. LE -टस्परवर भाग पीजमिएटस् न्राफ़ इद्ग. विश ग्रामर ८ सघुकेोमुदी पहला भांग १ : भाग २ :

१० TIF भाग ३ : ११ तर्धक्रप् भाग

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संस्कृत ग्रामर बार्ईे : संस्कृन औौर

हडीपस्ट्स् फार दि : .. पा्लित्स बाग भाग :

१६ भाग १७ भाग १८ भाग ५ १८ लेनपुर्ण आान दि] 4.2 न्याय फिलासोफीवा ना गह नकसंगह RFलज़ो रकसज़े भान दि सांख्य फ़िलासेफ़ो वा शहिसमास २१ तथा वेदान्त F .. LE २२ फरजोसंज़ इन्: तथा .. संस्कृछ्न यामर of श चितमहेश भाग १= 50 IC बंकराैपं बाफ़ पापरे-7 शंज इन् दि बनारस x २ ज्यासबन एकउर संखान क्राप्रेजो

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W

..

२६ बोमडन भान धर २ मबेद १• वेदान्सुच .. 9 ११ नजसंपर ..

१२ विमाशिस चाक़ वेवंर] .. .. न्यायकीमुदी भाग १९ भाम २ .. १• नया भाम ९

१५ बेकन्तू नोवस् मनम् बेकनीवसुन बासान १६ पुनः शोथित और। नड्रिम तर्जसंदर : १ ०

१ :

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THE APHORISMS

OF THE

SANKHYA PHILOSOPHY,

KAPILA

WITH

ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMENTARIES. 4.

PRINTED FOR THE USE OF THE BENARES COLLEGE BY ORDER OF GOVT. N. W. P.

ALLAHABAD: PRINTED AT THE PRESBYTERIAN MISSION PRESS. Rev. L. G. HAY, Sup't. 1852.

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PREFACE.

THE great body of Hindú Philosophy is based upon six sets of very concise Aphorisms. Without a commentary the Aphorisms are scarcely intelligible, they being designed not so much to communicate the doctrine of the particular school, as to aid, by the briefest possible suggestions, the memory of him to whom the doctrine shall have been already communicated. To this end they are admirably adapted; and, this being their end, the ob- scurity, which must needs attach to them in the eyes of the un- instructed, is not chargeable upon them as a fault.

For various reasons it is desirable that there should be an ac- curate translation of the Aphorisms, with so much of gloss as may be required to render them intelligible. A class of pandits, in the Benares Sanskrit College, having been induced to learn English, it is contemplated that a version of the Aphorisms, brought out in successive portions, shall be submitted to the criticism of these men, and, through them, of other learned Brahmans, so that any errors in the version may have the best chance of being discovered and rectified. The employment of such a version as a class-book is designed to subserve further the attempt to determine accurately the aspect of the philosophical terminology of the East as regards that of the West.

These pages, now submitted to the criticism of the pandits who read English, are to be regarded as proof-sheets awaiting correction. They invite discussion. J. R. B.

Benares College,

5th January, 1852.

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THE

SANKAYA APHORISMS

OP

KAPILA

INTRODUCTION.

a. Salutation to the illustrious sage Kapila !*

b. Well, the great sage Kapila, desirous of raising the world [from the Slough of Despond in which he found it sunk], per- ceiving that the knowledge of the excellence of any fruit, through the desire [which this excites] for the fruit, is a cause of people's betaking themselves to the means adapted to the attainment of the fruit], declares, as follows, the excellence of the fruit [which he would urge our striving to obtain].t

The subject Aph. 1 .- Well, the complete cessation of pain proposed. [which is] of three kinds is the complete end of man. * मी र्कपलमुनये नमः। + अथ जगदुदिधीषुर्म हामुनिः कपिलः फलसन्हर्य- शञनस्य फलेष्काद्वारा साधनप्रष्टन्ती कारणतं पभ्यन् फर- सोन्दर्यमाइ।

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6 TIE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

a. The word ' Well' serves as a benediction*[-the particle atha being regarded as an auspicious one].

b. By saying that the complete cessation of pain, which is of three kinds-viz. (1) due to one's self (ádhyátmika), (2) due to products of the elements (ádhibhautika), and (3) due to superna- tural causes (ádhidaivika)-, is the complete end of man, he means to say that it is the chief end of man among the four hu- man aims [-viz. merit, wealth, pleasure, and liberation,-see Sahitya Darpana §2,-]t because the three are transitory, whereas liberation is not transitory :- such is the state of the case.

A question whether the c. But then, let it be that the above- end may not be attained by ordinary means. mentioned cessation [of all the three kinds of pain] is the complete end of man, still, what reason is there for betaking oneself to a doctrinal system which is the cause of a knowledge of the truth in the shape of the knowledge of the difference between Nature and Soul, when there are easy remedies for bodily pains, viz. drugs, &c , and remedies for mental pains, viz. beautiful women and delicate food, &c., and re- medies for pains due to products of the elements, viz. the residing in impregnable localities, &c., as is enjoined in the institutes of polity, and remedies for pains due to supernatural causes, viz. gems [such as possess marvellous prophylactic properties], and spells, and herbs of mighty power, &c.,-and when [on the other hand], since it is hard to get one to grapple with that very diffi- cult knowledge of truth which can be perfected only by the toil * अथ शब्दो म ङ लार्थः।

दुःखस्य अत्यन्तनिवृत्तिरत्यन्नपुरुषार्थः चतुर्षु पुरुषार्थेषु मध्य श्रेष्ठः पुरुषार्थ रत्वर्थः। चयाणां चयित्वामांचस्या- चययत्वादिति भाव:।

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BOOK I. 7

of successive births, it must be still more hard to get one to be- take himself to the doctrinal system [which treats of the know- ledge in question] ?- therefore [-i. e. seeing that this may be asked-] he declares as follows *:-

The end is not to be attained by ordinary means. Aph. 2 .- The effectuation of this [complete cessation of pain] is not [to be expected] by means of the visible [-such as wealth, &c .- ], for we see [-on the loss of wealth, &c .- ] the restoration [of the evil] after its cessation.

a. 'The visible'-in the shape of the drugs, &c., above-men- tionedt [§1. c].

b. 'The effectuation of this'-i. e. the effectuation of the com. plete cessation of pain.t

• नन्वसूक्निदत्तिरत्यन्तपुरुषार्थसथापि सत्त्वपुरुषान्य- ताखातिरूपतत्त्वज्ञानछेतुशास्त्रप्रदटत्ता को हेतुः शारोर- दुःखनिवर्त्तकानामाषधादीनां मानसदु:खनिवर्त्तकानां वर- स््रोमिष्टाव्नादोनां आधिभातिकदुःखनिवर्न्तकानां नीति- शासत्रोपदिष्टनिरत्ययस्थानाध्यासनादीनां आधिदैविक दुःख- निवर्नतकानां मणिमन्त्रमशषधादोनां सुकर।यां सतत्वेनाने- कजन्मपरम्परायाससाथे तत्वज्ञाने Sतिदुष्कर प्रत्तेर्दुर्लभ-

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8 THE SANKIIYA APHORISMS. c. Why is it not [to be thus effected]? Because, after the ces- sation,-the cessation of pain is understood,-we see its restora- tion,-the springing up again of pain in general* [-from which- ever of its three sources-§1 b]. d. The state of the matter is this :- not by the expedients abovementioned is there such a removal of pain that no pain arises thereafter; for when, by this or that expedient, this or that pain has been destroyed, we see other pains springing up. Therefore, though it be not easy [§1. c.], the knowledge of truth [as a complete remedy] is to be desired.t e. But then,-Grant that future pain is not debarred by drugs, &c., [employed to remove present pain], still, by again and again obviating it [as often as it presents itself], there may be the cessation of future pain also :- this doubt he states as fol- lows:t- प्रार्त्या इकक्षुत्म तीकारवत्तत्प्रतीकार चेष्टनात्पुरुषार्थत्वम्। ३। The question whether the Aph. 3 .- [Let us consider the doubt] end may not be attained by the recurrent use of that the soul's desire [the cessation of ordinary means. pain-may result] from exertions for * न भवत कुतः। निषृत्तेर्दु:खनिष्टन्तेरन न्तरमिति शेष : अनुदत्तिदर्शनात्। दुःखजातीयोत्पत्तिदर्शनात्। + अयं भाव:। नो तरूपायेर्दुःखानुत्पत्तिविशिष्टा दुःख- निर्षान्तर्भवति तत्तदुपायेक्षत्तद्ःखेषु नष्टेव्वपि दुःखान्तरोत्प- न्िदर्शनात् तम्मादसुकरत्वे Sपि तत्त्वज्ञानमेषितव्यमिति। + ननु मा भृदाषधादिभिर्भाविदु:खनिषत्तिः तथापि पुनः पुनः प्रतीकारकरणे तु भाविदुःखनिषत्तिरपि खादिति शङ्गते।

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BOOK I. 9

the obviation [of pain], as is the case with the obviation of daily hunger.

a. When pain shall arise, [let us suppose one to argue] then it is to be obviated; and thus there is the soul's desire, the ces- sation of pain, just as one should eat when there is hunger, and thus there is the soul's desire of the eater, viz. the cessation of hunger. In regard to this [doubt] he states the recognised de- cision .*

सर्वासम्वात्ममभवे Sपि सत्वासमभवाद्ेय: प्रमाण- कशलैः ॥४ ॥

This suggestion Aph. 4 .- This [method of palliatives, §3], is negatived. to be rejected by those who are versed in evi- dence, because it is not everywhere possible [to employ it at all], and because, even if this were possible, there would be an im- possibility as regards [ensuring] the perfect fitness [of the agents employed].

a. For there are not physicians, &c., in every place and at all times; and [to rely on physicians &c., would not be advisable] even if there were the possibility,-i. e. even if these were [always at hand], since physicians are not perfect [in their art],-for pain cannot with certainty be got rid of by means of physicians, &c., with their drugs, &c. ; moreover, when corporeal pain has depart- ed, there may still be that which is mental, &c., so that there is not [under such circumstances] in every respect liberation from pain ;- for these reasons such a soul's aim [as that which con-

• यदा दुःखमुत्पत्स्यते तदा तत् प्रतिकर्तव्ं तथाच दुःखनिषत्तिः पुरुषार्थ: यथा यदा चुन्तदा भोत्तव्यं भुन्ना- नस्य नुमिषत्तिः पुरुषार्थ दति सिद्धान्तयति। B

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10 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

tents itself with temporary palliatives] is to be rejected by those who are versed in evidences* [-i. e. who are acquainted with authoritative treatises].

b. He mentions another prooft [of his assertion].

उत्कर्षादपि मोच सर्वोत्कर्षसुतेः।५॥

Scriptural evidence in favour of this view. Aph. 5 .- Also [an inferior method ought not to be adopted] because of the pre-emi- nence of Liberation [as proved] by the text [of scriptare decla- ratory] of its pre-eminence above all else.

a. One ought not to endeavour after the removal of this or that pain by these and those expedients [§1. c.], since Libera- tion (moksha), by being eternal, is transcendant as a remover of all pains. Moreover one ought to endeavour only after the know- ledge of truth, which is the means thereof [-i. e. of Libera- tion-] because the Scripture tells its pre-eminence above all [other objects of endeavour] in the text "There is nothing be- yond the gaining of Soult [-with the utter exclusion of pain]." * नि सर्वम्मिन् देशे सर्वस्मिन् काले वैद्यादयसन्ति। सम्भवे डपि सच्वे डपि वैद्यादीनां सत्वाभावात्। मद्ि वैद्या- दिभिरपि अवभ्यमोषधादिना दुःखं रातुं शक्यते। किन्न शारीरदुःखापगमे मानसादेसस्य समभव द्वति न सर्वथा

इति।

• युत्नयन्तरमाइ। + न तैखेरुपायेकत्तछुःखोच्छेदे यतितव्यं मोचस नित्-

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BOOK I. 11

b. But then, [it may be suggested]-when you say liberation, we understand you to mean from bondage; and is that bondage essential, or is it adventitious? In the former case, it is incapa- ble of destruction; if it come under the latter head, it will pe- rish of itself [like any other adventitious and therefore transito- ry thing] :- what have we to do with your 'knowledge of truth,' then? To this he replies as follows *.

An objection met. Aph. 6 .- And there is no difference between the two.

a. There is no difference in the applicability of liberation on either of the suppositions, that the bondage is essential or that it is adventitions, [-supposing it were either ;- see §19.b.]. That is to say, we can tell both how the bondage takes place and how the liberation takes place.t

b. Now, with the view of demonstrating [the real nature of]

विद्यत दति सर्वोत्कर्षश्रुतेरपि तल्ाधने तत्वज्ञान एव यति- तव्यम्। * ननु मोच इतुतो बन्वादिति प्रतीयते। सच बम्बः किं खाभाविक उतागन्ुक: । वाध्ये नाशायोग: बन्चे चेत्खत एव नंच्यति किं तत्वचानेनेत्यत ब्राइ्।

• उभयो: बन्वस खाभाविकागन्नुकत्वयोमेा वसयोपादे- वले सविशेष:। यथा बन्वसोपपत्िर्वथाच मोचस तथा व्यं वत्तां शक्कुम रत्र्थ:।

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12 THE SANKHYA APIIORISMS.

Bondage and Liberation, he declares, exclusively, in the first place, the objections to Bondage's being essential* [55 b].

न खभावनो बद्दस्य मेचसाधनोपदेशविधि:।

Liberation must be possible, else the means would not Aph. 7 .- There would be no fitness in have been enjoined. the enjoining of means for the liberation of him who is bound essentially.

a. Since Liberation has been stated [§1] to result from the complete cessation of pain, [it follows that] Bondage is the junc- tion of pain :- and this is not essential in man; for, if that were the case, then there would be no rule-i. e. no fitness-in the scriptural or legal injunction of means for liberation ;- such is what must be supplied [to complete the aphorism],-because-to explain our meaning [-by an illustration],-fire cannot be libe- rated from its heat which is essential to it,-since that which is essential exists as long as the substance exists.t

b. And it has been declared in the Divine Song [the I'śwara Gitá,], "If the soul were essentially foul, or impure, or changeable,

• अथ बन्मोचयोरुपपत्यर्थ व्ादी तावल्लाभाविकले बन्वस्य दूषणान्याइ।

• दुःखातन्तनिटृत्तेर्मेाचलाइम्वो दुःखयोगः। सच पुरुषे न खाभाविक: तथा सति मोचाय साधनापदेशस श्रीतस् सर्नस्यच विधिरनुष्ठानं न घटत इति शेषः । नह्यगे: खाभाविकादाषायान्ाचयनभवति साभाविकस्य वावहव्य- भावित्वादिति भाव:।

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BOOK I. 13

then its liberation could not take place even through hundreds of successive births."*

c. [Since some one may be disposed to say] " Grant that there is no fitness [in the scriptural and legal injunctions-§7. a.],- what have we to do with that ?"-therefore he declares as fol- lows :- t

Scripture would be nugatory if pain were inevitable. Aph. 8 .- Since an essential nature is imperishable, unauthoritativeness, be- tokened by inappropriateness, [would be chargeable against the scripture, if pain were essential to humanity].

a. That is to say,-since the essential nature of any thing is impcrishable,-i. e. endures as long as the thing itself,-it would follow [-on the supposition that pain is essential to hu- manity-] that, since Liberation is impossible, the Scripture which enjoins the means for its attainment is a false authority, inasmuch as it is inappropriatet [in its injunctions. And this is out of the question,-Scripture being assumed here, as in all the others of the six systems, to be an exact measure of truth].

b. But then, [some one may say]-let it be an injunction [to use means for the attainment of an unattainable object] on the

*उत्तश्वेश्वरगीतायां। यद्यात्मा मलिनो 5सच्छो विकारी सात्खभावतः । नष्ि तस्य भवेन्युत्रिर्जन्मान्तरशतैरपीति। + भवत्वननुष्ठानं किमेतावतेत्यत ब्राइ।

++

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14 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

mere strength of Scripture :* [-and, since Scripture is an un- questionable authority, we may be excused from asking or an- swering the question why the injunction is given :- ] to this he replies as follows :-

नाशक्योपदेशविधिरृपदिष्टे डप्यनुपदेशः।।

An impracticable injunc- Aph. 9 .- There is no rule where some- tion is no rule. thing impossible is enjoined; though it be enjoined, it is no injunction.

a. There can be no fitness or propriety in an injunction with a view to an impossible fruit, seeing that, though something be enjoined, or ordered, [to be effected] by means that are impracti- cable, this is no injunction at all, but only the semblance of an injunction ;- because it stands to reason that not even the Veda can make one see sense in an absurdity :- such is the meaning.t

b. Here he comes upon a doubt.t

A doubt whether the essen- tial be not removeable. Aph. 10 .- If [some one says]-98 in the case of white cloth, or of a seed, [-something essential may be not irremoveable; then he will find his answer in the next aphorism].

• ननु श्रुतिबलादेवानुष्ठानं स्यान्तबाइ। + अशक्याय फलायोपदेशस्य विधिरनुष्ठामं न समभवति यत उपदिष्टे विदिते डपि अाशक्योपायेन उपदेश एव न भवति किन्नूपदे शाभास एव। बाधितमर्य वेदो डपि न बोय- यतीति न्यायादित्यर्थः ॥ + बब शङते।

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BOOK I. 15

a. But then [the doubter is supposed to argue]-the destruc- tion even of what is essential [-in spite of what is stated under § 7-] is seen; as for example, the essential whiteness of white cloth is removed by dyeing, and the essential power of germina- tion in a seed is removed by fire. Therefore, according to the analogy of the white cloth and the seed, it is possible that there should be the removal of the bondage of the soul even though it were essential. So too there may be [without any impropriety] the enjoinment of the means thereof. Well-if [any one argues thus] ;- such is the meaning* [of the aphorism, to which he pro. ceeds to reply.]

b. He declarest [the real state of the case with reference to the doubt just raised].

शतयुद्गवानुङ्गवाभ्यां नाशक्योपदेशः ॥११॥

Decision that an essential Aph. 11 .- Since both perceptibleness property may be kidden but not removed. and [subsequent] non-perceptibleness may belong to some power [which is indestruc- tible], it is not something impracticable that is enjoined [when one is directed to render some indestructible power imperceptible]. a. In regard even to the two examples abovementioned [§ 10] people do not give an injunction for [the positive destruction of] * ननु खाभाविकस्थाप्यपायो दश्यते यथा शुक्पटस्य साभाबिकं शोकां रागेणापनीयते यथाच बीजस लाभावि- काहुरशक्ति रगिनापनीयते। वतश्शुक्पटवद्दीजवच्च खाभा- विकस्ापि बन्वस्यापायः पुरुषे सम्भवतीति तद्ददेव तत्ाघ- नोपदेशः स्ादिति चेदित्यर्थः । + समाधने।

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16 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

something essential, which is indestructible [§ 8]. Why [do we say this]? Because in these two instances of the perceptibleness and non-perceptibleness of a power [-the powers, namely, of appearing white, and of germinating-see § 10. a .- ] there are merely the manifestation and [afterwards] the hiding of the whiteness, &c., but not the removal of the wbiteness or of the power of germination ;- because-that is to say-the whiteness of the dyed cloth and the germinating power of the roasted seed can again be brought out by the processes of the bleacher, &c., [in the case of the dyed cloth,] and by the will of the Yogi [-the possessor of supernatural powers,-in the case of the roasted seed-] &c .* b. Having thus disproved the notion that Bondage is essential [to man], wishing to disprove also the notion that it is the result of some [adherent] cause, he rejects the [various supposable] causes, viz., Time &c.t न कालयोगतो व्यापिनो नित्वस्य सर्वसम्बन्वात्। १२ ।

Time, which applies to all, Aph. 12 .- Not from connection with cannot be the cause of the bondage of a part. time[does bondage befall the soul], because this, all-pervading and eternal, is eternal- ly associated [with all, and not with those alone who are in bondage].

• उत्तदृष्टान्तयोरपि अशक्याय खाभाविकायोपदेशो लो- कानां न भवति। ऊतः। शतयुद्गवानुङ्गवाभ्यां दष्टान्तइ्ये शुक्कत्वादेराविर्भावतिरोभावावेव भवतः नतु शाक्यस्याहुर- श केश्वापायः। रजकादि व्यापारैयोंगिसङ्गल्पादिभिन्न रत्ताप- टभृष्टबीजया: पुनश्शाक्यस्याङ्कुरशत्ोश्षाविर्भावादिति भावः॥ + एवं बन्वस्य खाभाविकत्वं निराऊृत्व नैमित्तिकत्वमपि निराकरिष्यब्निमित्तानि कालादीनि निराकरोति।

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BOOK 1. 17

a. The bondage of man is not caused by time, because [if that were the case] there could be no such separation as that of the liberated and un-liberated, because time, which applies to every- thing and is eternal, is at all times associated with all men* [-and must therefore bring all into bondage if any].

न देशयोगतो प्यम्मात्॥ १३।

Place, for the same reason, Aph. 13 .- Nor [does bondage arise] cannot be the cause. from connection with place either, for the same reason.

a. That is to say,-bondage does not arise from connection with place. Why ? ' For the same reason,'-i. e. for that stated in the preceding aphorism,-viz. that, since it [viz. place] is con- nected with all men, whether liberated or not liberated, bondage would [in that case] befal the liberated also.t

नावख्ातो देड़धर्मतान्तस्ा:॥१४।

The soul is not kept in bondage by its being hampered among Aph. 14. Nor [does the bondage of circumstances. the soul arise] from its being condi- tioned [by its standing among cir- cumstances that elog it by surrounding it], because that is the habit [not of the soul but] of the body.

• न काखनिमिन्तक: पुरुषस्य बन्धः व्यापिनो नित्स कालस्य सगेः पुरुषेकर्वकालावच्क्ेदेन सम्बन्धात् मुक्तामु-

• देशयोगतो ईप न बन्वः। कतः। अ्म्मात्। पूर्वसनो- कान्। मुकामुकसर्वपुरुषसम्बन्वात् मुत्स्यापि बन्धापन्ते- रिवर्थ:। C Digitized y Google

18 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

a. By 'condition' we mean the being in the shape of a sort of 'association. The bondage [of the soul] does not arise from that, because that is the property of the body [and not of the soul] ;- + because-that is to say-bondage might befal evon the liberated [-which is impossible-} if that which is the habit of another could occasion the bondage of one quite different .*

b. But then [some one might say,] let this conditioned state belong to the soul. On this point [to prevent mistakes] he de- clares:t- अ्रसङ्रेा Sयम्पुरुष दरतति। १५ ।

The sout is altogether Aph. 15. [Itis not so] because this soul is salitary. unassociated [with any conditions or circum- stances that could serve as its bonds]. a. The word iti here shows that it [i: e. the assertion conveyed in the aphorism] is a reason,-the construction, with the pre- ceding aphorism, being this, that, since the soul is unassociated, it belongs only to the body to be [hampered] among circumstan-

The fruit of works belongs not to the soul. Aph. 16 .- Nor [does the bondage of soul arise] from any work, because these * अरवस्ा। संघातविशेषरूपता। ततो न बन्वः । तस्या: हेद्वर्मत्वात्। ग्रन्यधर्मस साज्ादन्यबन्धकावे मुकस्यापि बन्धापत्तेरिति भाव:। + ननु पुरुषस्ेवावस्था स्थान्बाइ। + उतिहेता। पुरुषसासङतादवस्ाया देइमावधर्मत- मिति पूर्वस्रवेषान्वय: ॥

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BOOK 1. 19

are the property of another, and because it would be, eternal fif the ease were as you imagine].

a. That is to say,-moreover the bondage of the soul does not arise from any work, whether enjoined or forbidden, because works are the property of another, i. e. not the property of the soul [but of the mind ]; and if, through a property of another, the bondage of one quite distinct could take place, then bondage might befal even the liberated* [through some acts of some one else].

b. But then [some one may say], this objection does not ap- ply if we hold that bondage may arise from the acts of the as- sociate [-viz. the mental organ] ;- 80, with allusion to this, he states another reason,-'and because it would be eternal'-i. e. because bondage, in the shape of connection with pain, would occnr [where it does not] even in such cases as the universal dis- solutiont [of the phenomenal universe, including the mental or- gan but not the soul].

A doubt whether the bondage c. But then [some one may say], if also belong not to something else than the soul. that be the case then let the bondage too, in the shape of connection with pain, belong [not to the soul but] to the mind alone, in accordance with the principle that it have the same locus as the works [to which * न विद्वितनिषिद्कर्मणापि पुरुषस्य बन्वः कर्मणो एन्यधर्मत्वाद नात्मधर्मत्वादित्र्थः। म्रन्यधर्मेण साचादन्यस्य वन्वेच मुक्त्तस्यापि बन्धापत्तेः। ननु खोपाधिकर्मणा बन्धाङ्गोकारे नायं दोष पत्या- प्रयेन देलन्तरमाहातिप्रसक्रक्षेति। प्रलयादावि दुःख- योगरूपबन्वापचेस्वे व्वर्थ: ॥

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20 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

it is due]; and, since it is an established point that pain is an affection of the mind, why is bondage [i. e. connection with pain] assumed of the soul also? With reference to this doubt he declares as follows :-*

Why it is to the soul that the bondage must belong. Aph. 17 .- If it were the property of any other, then there could not be diverse experience.

a. If bondage, in the shape of connection with pain, were the property of another, i. e. a property of the mind, there could be no such thing as diverse experience,-there could be no such different experience as one man's experiencing pain and another man's not [-for, it must be remembered, it is not in point of mind bnt of soul that men are held by Kapila to be numerically different-]; therefore it must be admitted that pain is connect- ed with the soul also. And this [pain that belongs to the soul] is in the shape merely of a reflection of the pain [that attaches to its attendant organism], and this reflection is of its own attendant [organism] only, so that there is no undue rewultt [deducible from our theory.] * नन्वेवं दुःखयोगरूपो Sपि बन्वः कर्मसामानाधिकर- एयानुरोधेन चित्तस्यैवासु दुःखस्य चित्तधर्म तायासिद्तवाभ किमथे पुरुषस्यापि कल्यते बन्ध दताशड्गायामाइ। + दुःखयोगरूपबन्वस्य म्रन्यधमत्वे चित्तधर्मत्वे विचिच्न- भोगानुपपत्तिः कश्विदेव दुःखभोत्ता कश्विश्रेति विचिचभो- गानुपर्पात्तः। अतः पुरुषे पि दुःखयोगः लीकार्यः। सच दुःखप्रतिविम्बरूप एव प्रतिविम्बन्च खोपाधेरेव भवतीति नातिप्रसङ्ग दरति।

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BOOK 1. 21

b. He rejects also the notion that Nature (prakriti) is directly the cause of bondage .*

Nature is not the immediate cause of the soul's bondage. Aph. 18 .- If [you say that the soul's bondage arises] from Nature as its cause, [then I say] no,-[because] that also is a dependant thing.

a. But then [some one may say] let bondage result from Na- ture as its cause :- if you say so, I say no,-becanse that also, i. e. Nature also, is dependent on the conjunction which is to be mentioned in the next aphorism,-because if it [Nature] were to occasion bondage even without that [conjunction which is next to be mentioned], then bondage would occur even in such cases as the universal dissolutiont [when soul is altogether disconnected from the phenomenal].

b. If the reading [in the aphorism] be nibandhand [in the lst case and not in the 5th], then the construction will be as fol- lows :- "If [you say that] the bondage is caused by Nature," &c.t

c. Therefore, since Nature can be the cause of bondage only

• ननु प्रक्ृतिनिमित्ताइ्म्वो भवत्विति चेन्व यतकस्थापि प्रहतेरपि उत्तरक्षचे वक्ष्यमापसंयोगपारत्त्रं तेन विनापि बम्वकत्वे प्रलयादावपि बन्धप्रसङ्गात्।

निबख्वमा पेदिति पाठे प्रक्ृतिनिबम्वना बहूता भेदिति योज्यं।

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22 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

as depending on something else [-i. e. on the conjunction to be mentioned in the next aphorism], through this very sort of conjunction [it follows that] the bondage is reflectional,-like the heat of water duc to the conjunction of fire,* [-water being held to be essentially cold, and only to seem hot while the heat continues in conjunction with it].

d. He establishes his own tenet, while engaged on this point, in the very middlet [of his criticisms on erroneous notions in re- gard to the matter,-for there are more to come].

न नित्यश दब इमु क्खभावस्य तद्योगसद्योगादतेतु। १६॥

What really is the relation of its bondage to the soul. Aph. 19 .- But not without the conjunc- tion thereof [i. e. of Nature] is there the connection of that [i. e. of pain] with that [viz. the soul] which is ever essentially a pure and free intelligence.

a. Therefore, without the conjunction thereof,-i. e. without the conjunction of Nature,-there is not to the soul any connec- tion with that,-i. e. any connection with bondage :- but, more- over, just through that [connection with Nature] does bondage take place.t

b. In order to suggest the fact that the bondage [of the soul] is reflectiunal [-and not inherent in it either essentially or ad-

• कतो यत्परतन्त्रा प्रक्ृतिर्वन्वकरणनवेत् तम्मादेव संयोगविशेषा दापाधिको बम्बो डग्रिसंयोगाव्लोष्णवदिति। + खसिद्वान्तममु नेव प्रसक्रेनान्तराल एवावधारयति। # तद्योगाढवते प्रक्ृतिसंयोगं विना न पुरुषस्य तद्योंगो बन्वसम्पका Sस्त। अपितु तत एव बन्बः ।

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BOOK 1. 25

ventitiouely-] he makes use of the indirect expression with a double negative [-"not without"]. For if bondage were pro- duced by the conjunction [of the soul] with Nature, as colour is produced by heating [-in the case of a jar of black clay which becomes red in the baking-], then, just like that, it would con- tinue even after disjunction therefrom [-as the red colour re- mains in the jar after the fire of the brick-kiln has been extin- guished,-whereas the red colour occasioned in a crystal vase by a China-rose, while it occurs not without the China-rose, ceases on the removal thereof]. Hence, as bondage ceases on the dis- junction [of the soul] from Nature, the bondage is merely reflec- tional, and neither essential [§5. b.] nor adventitious* [$11. b].

c. In order that there may not be such an error as that of the Vaiseshikas-viz. [the opinion that there is] an absolutely real conjunction [of the soul] with pain, he says ' which is ever,' &c. [§19]. That is to say,-as the connection of colour with essen- tially pure crystal does not take place without the conjunction of the China rose [-the hue of which, seen athwart the crystal, seems to belong to the crystal-], just so the connection of pain with the soul, essentially pure, &c., could not take place without the conjunction of some accidental associate. That is to say, pain, &c., cannot arise spontaneouslyt [-any more than a red colour can arise spontaneously in the crystal which is essentially pure].

*बन्वस्योपाधिकत्वलाभाय नञ्रइयेन वक्रोकि:। यदि पि.बमः पाकजरूपवत्प्र क्ृतिसंयोगजन्यः स्ान्तदा तद्वदेव तद्ियोगे प्यनुवन्ेत। अरतः प्रक्ृतिवियोगे बन्वाभावादी- पाधिक एव बन्धो नतु खाभार्विको नैमित्तिको वेति। + वशेषिकाणामिव पारमार्थिको दुःखयोग वृति भरमो माभूदितेतदर्थ नित्येतादि। यथा खभावशुटस्फटिकस्य

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THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

d. This has been declared in the Saura as follows :- "As the pure crystal is regarded by people as red in consequence of the proximity of something [as a Chma-rose] that lends its colour, in like manner the supreme soul* [is regarded as being affected by pain]." e. In that [aphorism 19] the perpetual purity means the being ever devoid of merit and demerit; the perpetual intelligence means the consisting of uninterrupted thought; and the perpe- tual liberatedness means the being ever dissociated from real pain :- that is to say, the connection with pain in the shape of a reflection is not a real bondaget [any more than the reflection of the China-rose is a real stain in the crystal].

f. And so the maker of the aphorism means that the cause of its bondage is just a particular conjunction [§19. c.],-and now enough as to that point.t रागेो न जगयोगं बिना घटते तथैव नित्शु दादिखभावस पुरुषस्योपाधिसंयोंगं बिना दुःखसंयोगोन घटते। खतो

• तदुन्नं सारे। यथादि केवलो रक्ः स्फटिको लक्ष्यते जनेः। रक्नकादुपधानेन तदत्परमपूरष कति। + तब नित्यशुद्धत्वं सदा पुएयपापशून्यत्वं। नित्यबुद्दत्वं अशुप्रचिद्रूपत्वं। नित्यमुत्तत्वं सदा पारमार्थिकदु:खा- युक्तत्वं। प्रतिबिम्बरूपदुःखयोगस्तवपारमार्थिका बन्व दति भाव:।

• तथाच संयोगविशेष एवाज बन्वहेतुतया सबकदभि- प्रेत रत्यलम्।

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BOOK I. 25

g. Now he rejects [§18. d.], certain causes of [the soul's] bondage preferred by others .*

नाविद्यातो डप्यवस्तुना बन्धायोगात्। २०।

The Vedantic tenet on this Aph. 20 .- Not from Ignorance, too, point disputed. [does the soul's bondage arise], because that which is not a reality is not adapted to binding.

a. The word 'too' is used with reference to the previously mentioned 'Time,' &c.,t [-$12-which had been rejected, as causes of the bondage, antecedently to the statement, in §19, of the received cause].

b. Neither, too, does [the soul's] union with bondage result directly from 'Ignorance,' as is the opinion of those who assert non-duality [or the existence of no reality save one,-see Vedán- ta-Sára §20. b], because, since their ' Ignorance' is not a real thing, it is not fit to bind ;- because, that is to say-the binding of any one with a rope merely dreamt of was never witnessed.t

c. But if 'Ignorance' be a reality [as some assert], then he declares as follows.§

• ददानीमन्याभिप्रेतान बन्धदेतून् निरस्यति। अपिशब्द: पूर्वेोक्तकालाद्यपेच्चया। + अविद्यातो पि न साक्षाद्वम्वयोगो Sद्वैतवादिनां तेषा- मविद्याया अप्यवसुलवेन तया बन्वानाचित्यात्। र नाइ खप्न- रज्ज्वा बन्धनं दष्टमित्यर्थः।

5 स्रविद्याया वस्तुत्वे त्वाइ। D Google

26 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

वस्तुत्वे सिद्धान्तहानिः ॥२१॥

The Vedanti cannot evade the objection without stulti- Aph. 21. If it [ 'Ignorance'] be [as- fying himself. serted by you to be] a reality, then there is an abandonment of the [Vedántic] tenet [by you who protess to follow the Vedanta].

a. That is to say ;- and if you agree that ' Ignorance' is a re- ality, then you abandon your own implied dogma [see Nyáya Aphorisms §31-] of the un-reality of ' Ignorance',* [-and so you stultify yourself ].

b. He states another objection.t

The Vedanti cannot evade Aph. 22. And [if you assume ' Igno- the objection witkout con- ceding a duality. rance' to be a reality, then] there would be a duality through [there being] some- thing of a different kind [from soul,-which you asserters of non-duality cannot contemplate allowing].

a. That is to say,-if 'Ignorance' is real and without a begin- ing, then it is eternal and coordinate with Soul :- if [therefore] it be not soul, then there is a duality through [there being] some- thing of a different kind [from soui; and this the Vedantis can. not intend to establish] because these followers of the Vedánta, asserting non-duality, hold that there is neither a duality through

• यदिचाविद्याया वसुत्वं खोकियते तदा खाभ्युपगत- स्याविद्यावतत्वस्य हानिरित्यर्थः।

• दूषणान्तरमाइ।

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BOOK I. 27

there being something of the same kind [with soul] nor through there being something of a different kind .*

b. He ponders a doubt.t

विरुद्धेभयरूपा चेत्॥ २३॥

The Vedanti must not allege that ' Ignorance' is at once Aph. 23. If [the Vedántí alleges, re- real an d unreal. garding ' Ignorance,' that] it is in the shape of both these opposites, [-then we shall say Nay, for the reason to be assigned in the next aphorism].

a. The meaning is,-if [the Vedanti says that] 'Ignorance' is not real, else there would be a duality through [there being] something of a different kind [from soul,-which a follower of the Vedanta cannot allow]; and moreover it is not unreal, be- cause we experience its effects; but it is in the shape of some- thing at once real and unrealt [like Plato's ov kal un ov-see Ve- dánta-sára §21 ;.

न ताडकूपदार्थाप्रतीते:। २४॥

• यद्यविद्या वसुभूता अनादिसदा नित्या आत्मतुल्या। खनात्मत्वे विजातोयद्वैतत्वं। तेहि वेदान्तिनो Sद्वैतवादिन- सजातोयविजातीयद्वैताभावं मन्यन्त दवति।

t शङ्ते।

• अविद्या न सतो येन विजातीयद्वैतापत्तिः। नाप्यसती कार्यापलस्भात्। किन्तु सदसट्रपा चेदित्वर्थः।

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28 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

Aph. 24. [To the suggestion that ' Ig- There is no such thing as a thing at once real and un- norance' is at once real and unreal, we real. say] no,-because no such thing is known [as is at once real and unreal.]

a. That is to say,-it is not right to say that ' Ignorance' is at once real and unreal. The reason of this he states in the words 'because no such thing' &c.,-because any such thing as is at once real and unreal is not known. For, in the case of a dis- pute, it is necessary that there should be an example of the thing [-i. e .- see Nyaya Aphorisms §25-a case in which all parties are agreed that the property in dispute is really pre- sent-], and, as regards your opinion, such is not to be found [-for, where is there any thing in regard to which both parties are agreed that it is at once real and unreal, as they are agreed that fire is to be met with on the culinary hearth ?]-such is the import .*

b. Again he ponders a doubt.t

न वयं षट्पदार्थवादिनो वैशेषिकादिवत्। २५।

A question whether the Ve- Aph. 25. [Possibly the Vedantí may dánti is bound to avoid remonstrate-] " We are not asserters of self-contradiction. any Six Categories like the Vaiseshikas and others."

*सदसद्रूपा अ्रविद्येति न युक्नमित्वर्थः। तब्र हेतुमाइ तादगिति। सदसट््पस्य कस्यचिदपि पदार्थस्थाप्रतीते:। विवादास्पदे हि वसुनि दष्टान्त आवश्यक: सच भवब्रये Sप्र- सिद्ध इति भाव:।

• पुनः शङते।

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BOOK I. 29

a. "We are not asserters of a definite set of categories [-like the Vaiseshikas who arrange all things under six heads, and the Naiyayikas who arrange them under sixteen-); therefore we hold that there is such a thing-unknown though it be [to peo- ple in general]-as 'Ignorance' which is at once real and unreal, or [if you prefer it] which differs at once from the real and the unrea! [-see Vedánta-sára §21-], because this is established by proofs,* [scriptural or otherwise, which are satisfactory to us, although they may not comply with all the technical requisitions of Gautama's scheme of argumentative exposition,"-see Nyaya Aphorisms §35].

b. By the expression [in the aphorism] 'and others,' are meant the Naiyáyikas, for the Naiyáyika is an asserter of sixtcen cate- gories,t [-see Nyaya Aphorisms §1].

c. He confutes thist [pretence of evading the objection by disallowing the categories of the Nyaya].

क्रनियतत्वे Sपि नायाक्रिकस्य संग्रशो Sन्यथा बालोन्म- त्तादिसमत्वम्। २६॥

The self-contradictory is altogether inadmissible. Aph. 26. Even although this be not fixed [that the categories are six or six- teen], there is no acceptance of the inconsistent, else we come to the level of children and madmen and the like.

• न वयं नियतपदार्थवादिनः । अरतो Sप्रतीतो Sपि सद- सदात्मक: सदसद्विलक्षणे वा अविद्यापदार्थ दत्य द्गोकर्मः मानसिद्धत्वात्। t. ब्दिपदब्ियायिक: सहि षोडसपदार्थवादोति। + परिहरति।

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30 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

a. Let there be [accepted] no system of categories [such as that of the Nyaya-§25], still, since being and not-being are con- tradictory, it is impossible for any disciples to admit, merely on your worship's assertion, a thing at once real and unreal, which is inconsistent,-contrary to all fitness; otherwise we might as well accept also the self-contradictory assertions of children and the like ;- snch is the mcaning .*

b. Certain heretics [-deniers of the authority of the Vedas-] assert that there exist external objects, of momentary duration [individually, each being, however, replaced by its fac-simile the next instant, so that the uninterrupted series of productions be- comes something equivalent to continuous duration], and that by the influence of these the bondage of the soul is occasioned. This he objects to as follows :t-

नानादिविषयोपरागनिमित्तको Sप्यस्य॥२७।

The heretical theory of a suc- Aph. 27. [The bondage] thereof, cession of objects from all eter- nity, as causing the soul's bon- moreover, is not caused by any in- dage, rejected. fluence of objects from all eternity.

a. 'Thereof,'-i. e. of the soul. An eternal influence of ob- jects,-an influence of objects the effect of which, in the shape

• पदार्थनियमो मासु तथापि भावाभावविरोधेन यात्िकस्य युत्रिविरुद्स्य सदसदात्मकपदार्थस्य संग्रशो भवद्ूचनमाबाच्छ्िव्याणां न सम्भवति अन्यथा बालकालु- तस्ाप्ययाक्रिकस्य संग्रइः स्यादित्यर्थः॥ + केचिव्वासिका ब्राङ्: सन्ति बाह्यविषयाः वषिका: तेषां वासनया जीवस्य बन्ध इति तहूषयति।

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BOOK I. 31

of a continued stream, has had no commencement,-not by this either is it possible that the bondage [of the soul] has beeu oc- casioned ;- such is the meaning .*

b. He states the reason of thist [impossibility].

न बाह्यान्तरयोरु परज्योपर्न्कभावा डपि देशव्यवधा- नात् स्ुन्नस्थपाटलिपुत्स्थयोरिव। २८।

A thing cannot act Aph. 28. Also [in my opinion as well as in where it is not. yours apparently] between the external and the internal there is not the relation of the influenced and the in- fluencer, because there is a local separation, as there is between him that stays at Srughna and him that stays at Pataliputra.

a. In the opinion of these [persons whose theory we are at present objecting to], the soul is circumscribed, residing entirely within the body; and that which is thus within cannot stand in the relation of the influenced and the influencer as regards an external object. Why? Because they are separated in regard to place, like two persons the onc of whom remains in Srughna and the other in Pataliputra ;- such is the meaning. Because the affection which we call 'influence' (vásana) is seen only when there is conjunction,-such as that of madder and the cloth [-to which it gives its colour-], or that of flowers and the flower-baskett [-to which they impart their odour.] *अस्यात्मनः। अनादिविषयोपरागः प्रवाइरूपेणाना- दिकार्य्या विषयवासना तश्रिमिन्तको Sपि बन्धो न सम्भवती- त्यर्थः ।

• वब हेतुमाइ। + तन्मते परिच्कियो देदानरख एवात्मा तस्याम्यन्तरस

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32 THE SANKIIYA APHORISMS.

b. By the word ' Also,' the absence of conjunction [between the soul and objects-see §15-], &c., which he himself holds, is connected* [with the matter of the present aphorism].

c. Srughna and Pataliputra [-Palibothra, or Patna-] are two several places far apart.t

d. But then, [these heretics may reply] "The influence of ob- jects [on the soul] may be asserted because there is a contact with the object, inasmuch as the soul, according to us, goes to the place of the object, just as the senses according to your worship." Therefore he declares as follows :t

इयोरेकदेशलब्धोपरागाव्न व्यवस्था।२६॥

On the heretical view the free Aph. 29. [It is impossible that the soul would be equully liable to bondage. soul's bondage should arise] from an influence received in the same place [where the object is, because, in that case,] there would be no distinction between the two [-the bond and the free].

न बाह्यविषयेण सहोपरज्योपरश्न्रकभावो Sपि सम्भवति। कतः। स्तुघ्नस्थपाटलिपुचस्थयोरिव देशव्यवधानादित्यर्थः। संयोगे सत्येव हि वासनाख उपरागो ष्टः। यथा मन्ज्िष्ठा- वस्त्रयोर्यथा वा पुष्पपुटकयोरिति।

*अपिशन्देन खमते संयोगाभावादिससमुच्चीयते। + स्ुन्नपाटलिपुत्रा विप्रहष्टदेशविशेषा। + ननु भवतामिन्द्रियाणामिवास्मराकमात्मनो विषयदेश- गमनाद्विषयसंयोगेन विषयोपरागो वत्तव्यसबाइ।

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BOOK 1. 33

a. To complete the sense we must supply as follows :- 'It is im- possible that the bondage should arise from an influence received in one and the same place with the object.' Why ? Because there would be no distinction between the two, the soul bound and the soul free, because bondage would [in that case] befal the libera- ted soul also [the free soul, according to this hypothesis, being just as liable to come across objects as any other-], such is the meaning .*

b. Here he ponders a doubt.t

The heretic's attempted defence. Aph. 30. If [the heretic, wishing to save his theory, suggests that a difference bet- ween the two cases-see §29-does exist] in virtue of the unseen [-i. e. of merit and demerit,-then he will find his answer in the next aphorism].

a. That is to say [-the heretic may argue-] " But then, granting that they [the free soul and the bound] are alike in respect of their coming into contact with objects, when they become conjoined with them in one and the same locality, yet the reception of the influence may result merely from the force of the unseen [-i. e. from the merit or demerit of this or that soul,-the soul that is liberated alike from merit and demerit be- ing able to encounter with impunity the object that would en-

• एकस्मिन्विषयदेशे लव्धादुपरागाइन्वो न सम्भवतीति शेष: । कतः । यम्मात् इयोरबड्मुक्तातनार्न व्यवस्था मुत्ास्या- पि बन्वापर्न्तेरित्यर्य:।

• चब गडते।। E Digitized Google

34 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

chain one differently circumstanced,]"-if* [this be urged, then we look forward].

a. This he disputes, as follows:

Each back must bear its own burden. Aph. 31. They cannot stand in the relation of deserver and bestower, since the two do not belong to one and the same time.

a. Since in thy opinion, the agent and the patient are distinct, and do not belong to the same time [-believing, as thou here- tically dost, not only that objects-see §26. b .- momentarily per- ish and are replaced, but that the duration of souls also is of a like description-], there is positively no such relation fbetween the soul at one time and its successor at another] as that of de- server and bestower [or transmitter of its merits or demerits]; because it is impossible that there should be an influence of ob- jects [§27] taking effect on a patient [-say the soul of today-] occasioned by the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] belonging to an agent [-say the soul of yesterday-which, on the hypothesis in question, is a numerically different individual-] ;- such is the meaning.t

• नन्वेकदेशसम्बन्धेन विषयसंयोगसाम्ये ऽपि मरदष्टवशा- देवोपरागलाभ इति चेदित्वर्य:।

• परिषरति। + तब मते कार्षभोको र्भेदात् एककालासम्यम्वाच नैवेरप- कार्योपकारकभावः। नहि कर्वनिष्ठाउटेन भरलृमिष्ठो विषयोपराग: समभवतीतर्यः।

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BOOK 1. 35

b. He ponders a doubt .*

पुचकर्म्मवदिति चेत्। ३२ । Whether merit may or may not be imputed. Aph. 32. If [the heretic snggests that] the case is like that of the ceremonies in re. gard to a son, [-then he will find his reply by looking forward]. a. But then [the heretic-admitting the principle that the merit or demerit of an act belongs entirely to the agent-may urge that] as the son is benefited by ceremonies in regard to a son,-such as that [ceremony-see Colebrooke's Hindu Law, vol. 3. p. 104-celebrated] in anticipation of conception,-which [no doubt] belongs to the father [who performs the ceremonies to propitiate the gods],-in like manner there may be an influence of objects on the experiencer [-say the soul of to-day-] through the ' unseen' [merit or demerit] that belongs even to a different subject [-say the soul of yesterday-]: such is the meaningt [of the heretic].

b. He refutes this by showing that the illustration is not a fact.t

नासि द्ि तन स्यिर एक वात्मा यो गर्भाधानादिना संसिकियेत। ३३।

This will not help the Aph. 83. [Your illustration proves no- heretic's argument. thing,] for, in that case, there is no one per

• महते। + ननु यथा पिवनिष्ठेन गर्भाधानाढिना पुचरक्रर्मणा पुनशसोपकारो भवति तह्तू व्यधिकरमेनवाद्ष्टन भोत्तृवि- षयोपराय: व्यादित्यर्यः। उष्टान्तासिद्या परिहरति।

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36 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

manent soul which could be consecrated by the ceremonies in anticipation of conception, &c.

a. 'In that case'-i. e. on thy theory too the benefit of the son, by means of the performance of the ceremonies in antici- pation of conception, &c., could not take place,-'for,' i. e. be- cause, on that theory there is not one [self-identical] soul, con- tinuing from the [time of] conception to the birth, which could be consecrated [by the ceremonies in question] so as to be a fit sub- ject for the duties that pertain to the time subsequent to birth [-such as the investiture with the sacred thread, for which the young brahman would not be a fit subject if the ceremonies in anticipation of his conception had been omitted-]; and thus your illustration is not a real one* [on your own theory ;- it is not a thing that you can assert as a fact].

b. And according to my theory also your illustration is not a fact, seeing that it is possible that the benefit to the son should arise from the 'unseen' [merit] deposited in the son by means of the ceremony regarding the son, for it is an implied tenet [of my school] that it [the soul] is permanent [in its self-identity], and there is the injunctiont [of Manu- ch. 2. v. 26 .- , with regard to the ceremonies in question, which proceeds on the same grounds].

• तब तव्मते गर्भाधानादिकर्मणापि पुनसथोपकारो न घटते। हि। यम्मात्। तब्र गर्भाधानमारम्य जन्मपर्यन्त- सायो एक ब्रात्मा नासि यो जन्मोत्तरकालीनकर्माचिका- राय संस्किरियेतेति। तथाच दष्टान्तासिद्वि:। + अस्व्ते ऽपि सैर्याभ्युपगमादचनाच्च पुच्रकर्मणा पुत्र-

त्यर्थ: ।

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BOOK 1. 37

c. Some other heretic may encounter us on the strength of [the argument here next stated, viz.] "But then, since bondage also [like every thing else] is momentary, let this bondage have nothing determinate for its cause, or nothing at all for its cause*"-[which view of matters is propounded in the next aphorism].

सिरकार्यासिद्रे: चणिकत्वम्। ३४।

Whether bondage may not be Aph. 34. Since there is no such momentary and so require no canse. thing as a permanent result [-on the heretical view],-the momentariness [of bondage also is to be admitted].

a. 'Of bondage'-this must be supplied [to complete the aphorism].t

b. And thus the point relied on is that it [i. e. bondage] have no cause at all. And so this is the application [of the argu- ment-viz .- ]:

(1) Bondage, &c., is momentary :-

(2) Because it exists :-

(3) [Every thing that exists is momentary] as the apex of the lamp-flame, or the like.t

• ननु बन्वस्यापि वणिकत्वादनियतकारणको Sभाव- कारणको वा बन्धो डस्त्वत्याशयेनापरो नासिक: प्रत्यव- तिष्ठते। + बख्वस्थेति शेष:।। नथाचाकारणक एवास्त्वत्याशयः। तथाचायं प्रयोग:। बश्ादिकं वणिकं। सच्वात्। दीपशिसादिर्षादति।

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38 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

c. And [-continues the heretic-] this [reason-viz. 'exis- tence'-] does not extend unduly [-as you may object-] to the case of a jar or the like, because that also [in my opinion] is like the subject in dispute [in being momentary]. This [in fact] is precisely what is asserted in the expression 'Since there is no such thing as a permanent result :' -* [§34].

d. He objects tot [this heretical view].

न प्रत्यभिज्ञाबाधात्। ३५ ।

The fact of recognition Aph. 35. Nay-[things are not momen- proves that things are not momentary. tary in their duration], for the absurdity of this is proved by recognition.

a. That is to say ;- nothing is momentary, because the absur- dity of its being momentary follows from the opposite argument [to that under §34. b.], taken from such facts of recognition as "What I saw,-that same do I touch,"-[an argument which may be stated as follows]-viz. (1) Bondage, &c., is permanent ;- (2) Because it exists :- (8) [Every thing thet exists is permanent]-as a jar, or the like.t

• नय बढादा व्यभिवार: तम्ापि पचसमलात्। एत-

• दूषयति। न कस्यापि वषिकत्वं यदट्रायं तहेबाइं प्पृनामीत्यादि-

प्रत्यनुमानेन चचिकववस बाधाहित्यर्थः ।

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BOOK 1. 39

श्रुतिन्यायविरोधाच्च । ३६॥

That things are momentary is contradicted by Scripture Aph. 36. And [things are not mo- and reasoning. mentary] because this is contradicted by Scripture and by reasoning.

a. That is to say,-nothing is momentary, because the gene- ral principle that the whole world, consisting of effects and causes, is momentary, is contradicted by such texts as this-viz. " All this, O ingenuous one, was antecedently existing,"-and by such scriptural and other arguments as this, viz. " How should what exists proceed from the non-existent ?"* दष्टान्तासिद्वेस्। ३७ ।

The heretic's illustration Aph. 37. And [we reject the argument is not a truth. of this heretic] because his instance is not a fact.

a. That is to say,-the general principle of the momentari- ness [of all things] is denied, because this momentary character does not in fact belong to the apex of the lamp-flame, &c., the instances [on which thou, heretic, dost ground thy generaliza- tion,-§34. b.] :- moreover thou quite errest in regard to mo- mentariness in that instance from not taking account of the minute and numerous instants [really included in a duration which seems to thee momentary] :- such is the import.t

*सदेव साम्येदमग्र आसीहित्यादिभ्ुतिभि: कथमस- तम्व्नायेतेत्यादिय्रीतादियुत्तिभिन्न कार्यकारणात्मकाखि- सम्रपच्छे नविकत्वानुमानस्य विरोधान्ञ वणिकत्वं कस्या- पोत्यर्थः । t दशने दीपशिखादा वषिकत्वस्यासिदेः न वषिक-

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40 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

If things were momentary b. Moreover, if the momentary dura- there could be no relation of cause and effect. tion [of things] be asserted, then there can be no such thing as the relation of cause and effect in the case of the earth and the jar, and the like. And you must not say that there is no such thing as that [relation of cause and effect], because it is proved to be a reality by the fact that otherwise there would be no such thing as the efforts of him who desires an effect [-and who therefore sets in operation the causes adapted to its production]. With reference to this he declares as follows :*

युगपज्जायमानयोर्न कार्यकारणभावः। ३८।

The causal relation is not Aph. 38. It is not between two things between things that arise simultaneously. coming simultaneously into existence that the relation of cause and effect exists.

a. Let us ask,-does the relation of product and [material] cause exist between the earth and the jar as simultaneously com- ing into [their supposed momentary] existence, or as successive? Not the first,-because there is nothing to lead to such an in- ference, and because we should not [in that case] find the man who wants a jar operating with earth, &c., [with a view to the jar's subsequent production]. Neither is it the last,-in regard to which he declares as follows:+

त्वानुमानमित्वर्थः। किन्व सरक्ष्मानेकक्षणानाकलनेन चषि- कत्वभ्रम एव तब तवेति भाव:। * किञ्व चणिकत्ववादे मृद्घटादिखले कार्यकारण- भावो नोपपद्यते। नच नास्येव स ति वाच्यं कायार्थिन:

• किं मृद्घटयोयुगपव्जायमानयो: कार्यकारपभाव: किं

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BOOK I. 41

पूर्वापाये उत्तरायोगात्॥ ३६॥

A product cannot survive Aph. 39. Because when the antecedent its substantial cause. departs, the consequent is unfit [to arise and survive it].

a. The relation of cause and effect is further inconsistent with the theory of the momentary duration of things,-because, at the time when the antecedent, i. e. the cause, departs,-the consequent, i. e. the product, is ' unfit,' i. e. is not competent to arise ;- because, that is to say, a product is cognized only by its inhering in [and being substantially identical with, however form- ally different from] its substantial cause,* [and is incapable therefore, of surviving it]. b. With reference to this same topic-viz. the substantial cause, he mentions another [the converse] objectiont [to the theory of the momentary duration of things], तङ्गावे तदयोगादुभयव्यभिचारादपिन॥। ४०॥ The co-existence of sub- stance and product is imr Aph. 40. Moreover not, [on the the- possible if things be mo- ory of the momentary duration of things, mentary. can there be such a relation as that of cause and effect,] because while the one [the antecedent] exists, the other [the consequent] is incompatible, because the two keep always asunder. वा क्रमिकयोः। नाद्ः विनिगमकाभावात् घटार्यिनो मृदा- दिप्रटत्त्यनुपपन्तेश्व। नान्य दरताइ। * पूर्वस्य कारणस्यापायकाले उत्तरस् कार्यस्यायोगा- दुत्पत्यनाचित्यादपि न वणिकत्ववादे सम्भवति कार्यकारण- भाव:। उपादानकारणानुगततयेव कार्यानुभवादित्यर्यः।

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42 THE SANKHYA APIIORISMS.

a. To complete the aphorism we must say,-'moreover, [on the theory objected to] there can be no such relation as that of cause and effect, because at the time when the antecedent exists, the consequent cannot co-exist with it, the two being mutually ex- clusive.' The two suggesters of the relation of cause and effect are (1) this concomitancy of affirmatives-that while the product exists, the substance thereof exists, and (2) this concomitancy of negatives-that when the substance no longer exists, the product no longer exist :- and these two [conditions-on your theory-] cannot be, because, since things [in your opinion] are momentary in their duration, the two [-viz., the substance and the pro- duct-], inasmuch as they are antecedent and consequent, belong to opposite times* [-and cannot therefore co-exist,-for the product-according to you-does not come into existence until its substance has perished, which is contrary to the nature of the causal relation just defined].

b. But then [the heretic may say-do not let the co-existence of substance and product be insisted upon as indispensable to the causal relation between the two-but] let the nature of a cause belong to the substantial cause, as it belongs to the instru- mental cause, in respect merely of its antecedence. To this he re- plies.t * पूर्वस्य भावका ले उत्तर स्यासम्बन्धा दुभयव्यभिचारदपि न कार्यकारणभाव इति शेष:। यदोपाढेयं तदोपादानं यदोपादानाभावसदोपादेयाभाव द्ृत्यन्वयव्यतिर की उपा- देयोपादानयो: कार्यकारणभावग्राहकी ताच चणिकत्वेन क्रमिकयोसयोर्विरुद्कालत्वान्न सम्भवतः॥

कारगातास्त्वति तचाइ।

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BOOK I. 43

पूर्वभावमात्रे न नियम: ॥४९ ॥ Antecedence to the product does Aph. 41. If there were merely an- not distingwish the Matter from the Instrument. teceaence, then there would be no determination [of a substantial or material cause as distinguished from an instrumental cause].

a. And it could not be determined that this was the substance [of this or that product] on the granting of nothing more than its antecedence [to the product], because antecedence constitutes no distinction between it and the instrumental causes ;- for [-as we need scarcely remind you-], that there is a distinction be- tween substantial and instrumental causes, the whole world is agreed :- such is the meaning .*

The question whether any thing erists besides Thoughts. b. Other heretics say-"Since no thing [really] exists except Thought, neither does Bondage, just as the things of a dream [have no real existence]. Therefore it has no cause, for it is absolutely false." He rejects the opinion of theset [heretics]:

न विज्ञानमावं बाह्यप्रतीते:॥४२॥

Aph. 42. Not Thought alone exists, be- We have the evidence of Intuition for the External cause there is the intuition of the exter- as well as the Internal. nal.

• पूर्वभावमान्राम्युपगमेच ददमेवोपादानमिति नियमो न स्थात् निमित्तकारणानामपि पूर्वभावाविशेषात्। ईदगेव षि निमित्तोपादानयोर्विभागो सर्वलोकसिद्ध द्रत्यर्थः। + अपरे नाकिका आ्ङः। विज्ञानातिरिक्रवस्त्वभावेन बन्धो Sपि खप्नपदार्थवत अतो Sत्यन्ं मिथ्यात्वेन न तब कार- पमसीति तन्मतमपाकरोति।

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44 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

a. That is to say-the reality is not Thought alone, because external objects also are proved to exist, just as Thought is, by intuition .* b. But then [these heretics may rejoin]-"From the example of intuitive perception in dreams [see Butler's Analogy, Part I. ch. I.], we find this [-your supposed evidence of objective reality-] to exist even in the absence of objects !" To this he replies :- t तदभावे तदभावाच्कूम्यं तहि। ४३ ॥

The denial of the external Aph. 48. Then, since, if the one does amounts to Nihilism. not exist, the other does not exist, there is a void [-i. e. nothing exists at all].

a. That is to say ;- if external things do not exist, then a mere void offers itself. Why? Because if the external does not oxist, then thought does not exist. For it is intuition that proves the objective, and if the intuition of the external did not esta- blish the objective, then the intuition of thought also would not establish [the existence of ] thought.t b. "Then let the reality be a mere void ;- and therefore the searching for the cause of Bondage is unfitting, just because a * न विज्ञानमानं तत्वं बाह्यार्थानामपि विज्ञानवत् प्रतीतिसिद्धत्वादित्यर्यः॥ + ननु खप्नप्रतीतिटष्टान्तेन विषयाभावे Sपि तदुपपत्ति- रिति तबाइ़। + ्ताई बाह्याभावे शून्यं प्रसज्येत। कुतः। बाह्याभावे विज्ञानाभावात्। प्रतीतिषि विषयसाधिका बाह्यप्रतीतिश्वेच्न विषयं साधयेद्विंज्ञानप्रतोतिरपि न विज्ञानं साधयेदिति भाव:।।

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BOOK I. 45

void is all:"-with such a proposal [as recorded in the next sphorism] does [some one who may claim the title of ] the very crest-gem of the heretics rise up in opposition .*

शून्यं तत्त्वं भावो विनश्यति वस्तुधर्मत्ाद्दिना- शख ॥४४॥

The heretic goes the length of asserting sheer Aph. 44. The reality is a void; what is, Nihiliom. perishes,-because to pcrish is the habit of things.

a. The void alone [-says this prince of heretics,-or the fact that nothing exists at all-] is the reality [-or the only truth-]. Since every thing that exists perishes, and that which is perish- able is false, as is a dream, therefore as of all things the begin- ings and endings are merely nonentities, Bondage, &c., in the midst [of any beginning and ending], has merely a momentary existence,-is phenomenal and not real. Therefore who can be bound by what ?- this [question] is what we rest upon. The reason assigned for the perishableness of whatever exists is 'be- cause to perish is the habit of things,'-because to perish is the very nature of things. But nothing continues after quitting its own nature [-so that nothing could continue if it ceased to pe- rish],-such is the meaning.t

वसु तर्ाई शून्यमेव तत्त्वमतश्च बन्धकारणान्वेषपम- युत्तं तुच्क्ृत्वादिति नास्िकशिरोमणिः प्रत्यवतिष्ठते। + शून्यमेव तत्त्वं। यतसर्वेर Sपि भावो विनश्यति यञ्च विनाशी स मिय्या खप्नवत्। अतसर्ववसूनामाद्यन्तयोर- भावमानत्वात् मध्ये वणिकसरवं सांवित्तिकं न पारमार्थिक बन्वादि। ततः किं केन बध्ेत इत्याशयः । भावानां

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46 THE SANKHYA APIIORISMS.

b. He rejects* [this heretical view].

अपवाटमात्रमबुद्दानाम् । ४५ ॥ Aph. 45. This is a mere counter-assertion of unintelligent persons.

The indiscerptible is indestructible. a. 'Of unintelligent persons'-i. e. of block- heads, this is ' a mere counter-assertion,'-i. e. a mere idle counter-assertion, that a thing must needs be perish- able because it exis!s; [and such an assertion is idle] because things that are not made up of parts, since there is no cause of the destruction of such things, cannot perish.t

b. But what need of many words? It is not the fact that even products perish, for, just as by the cognition that 'the jar is old' [we mean that it has passed from the condition of new to that of old], so too by such a cognition as this that 'the jar has pass- ed away,' it is only settled that the jar, or the like, is in the con- dition of having passed away.t

विनाशित्वे हेतुर्वस्तुधर्मत्वाद्विनाशस्येति विनाशस्य वसुखभा- वत्वात्। खभावन्तु विहाय न पदार्थखिष्ठतीत्यर्थः॥

• परिह़रति। + अबुद्वानां मूढानां अपवादमानं भावत्वाद्दिनाशिख- मिति मिथ्यापवाद एव नाशकारणाभावेन निरवयवद्रव्यानां नाशासम्भवात्।। + किं बहना। कार्याणामपि न विनाशसिद्िः। घटो जीर्ण द्ति प्रत्ययेनेव घटो Sतीत इत्यादिप्रत्ययेनापि घटाढे- रतीतास्थाया कावस्थाया एव सिद्धेः॥

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BOOK I. 47

c. He states another objection* [to the heretical view]. उभयपचसमानच्षेमत्वादयमपि ॥ ४६॥

Nikilism is open to the same ob- jections as both the Momentary Aph. 46. Moreover this [uihilistic and the Ideal theories. theory is not a right one] because it has the same fortune as both the views [which were confuted just before].

a. This view moreover [§44] is not a good onc, because it has the same fortune as-i. e. is open to similar reasons for rejcction as the theory that external things are momentary [§26. b.], and as the theory that nothing exists besides Thought [§+1. b]. The reason for the rejection of the theory that things are momentary in their duration, viz. [-as stated at §35-] the fact of recogni- tion, &c., [-which is at least as little consistent with Nihilism as it is with the momentary duration of things], and the reason for the rejection of the theory that nothing exists besides Thought, viz. [-as stated at §12-] the intuition of the external, &c., apply equally here [in the case of Nihilism] :- such is the im- portt.

b. Moreover, as for the opinion which is accepted by these [heretics]-viz. " Let the mere void [of atsolute nonentity] be the soul's aim [and summum bonum], since herein consist at once the cessation of pain [-which cannot continue when there is absolutely nothing]-and also the means thereof [-since there

• दूषणान्तरमाह।

• यणिकब्राह्मपचेण विज्ञानमात्रपचेण सह समानच्ेम- त्वात् तुव्यनिरसन हेतुकत्वादयमपि पचो न सम्यक्। वषिक- पचनिरासदेतुः प्रत्यभिन्वादिः। विज्ञानपचनिरासदेतुबाह्य- प्रतीत्ादिक्यानापि समान दति भाव:।

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48 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

can be no further means required for the removal of any thing if it be settled that the thing positively does not exist],"-this too can hardly be,-so he declares as follows :* अ्पुरुषार्थत्वमुभयथा। ४७।

The soul's aim is not Aph. 47. In neither way [-whether as a annihilation. means or as an end-] is this [annihilation] the soul's aim,

a. "Let the void [of mere nonentity] be the soul's aim, whe- ther as consisting in the cessation of pain, or as presenting the means for the cessation of pain"-[says the heretic] :- and this cannot be, because the whole world agrees that the aim of the soul consists in the joys, &c., that shall abide in it,-that is to say, because [they hold, while] you do not hold that there is a permanent soul [-see §33-in respect of which the liberation or beatification should be possible or even predicable].t

b. Now certain other things also entertained as causes of [the soul's] bondage by [imperfectly instructed] believers, re- maining over and above those [proposed by unbelievers and] al- ready rejected, are to be set aside.t * यदृपि दुःखनिषत्तिरूपतया तत्वाधनतयाच शून्यस्यै- वासु पुरुषार्थत्वमिति तैर्मन्यते तदपि दुर्घटमित्याइ। + दुःखनिटृत्तिरूपतया दुःखनिटत्तिसाधनतया वा शून्यस्य पुरुषार्थत्वं स्यात्। तच्च न घटते। खनिष्ठत्वेनैव सुखादीनां लोके पुरुषार्थत्वावगमात्। सििरस्य पुरुषस्यानङ्रीकारा- दित्यर्थः। + इदानी पूर्वनिर सावशिष्टान्यास्िकसम्भाव्यान्यप्यन्यानि बन्वकारणानि निरस्यन्ते।

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BOOK I. 49

न गतिविशेषात्। ४८ ।

It is by no movement that Aph 48. Not from any kind of motion the soul gets into bondage. -[such as its entrance into a body-does the soul's bondage result.].

a. 'Bondage' [-required to complete the aphorism-] is un- derstood from the topic* [of discussion].

b. The meaning is,-that the soul's bondage, moreover, does not result from any sort of motion-in the shape, for instance, of its entrance into a body.t

c. He states a reason for this.t

निष्कियस्य तदसन्भवात् । ४९॥

What is all-pervading does Aph. 49. Because this is impossible for not change place. what is inactive [-or, in other words, without motion].

a. That is to say,-because this is impossible-i. e. motion is impossible-in the case of the soul which is inactive [because] all-pervading [-and therefore incapable of changing its place].§

• प्रकरणाद्दन्वो लभ्यते।। + गतिविशेषात् शरीरप्रवेशादिरूपादपि पुरुषस्य न बम्व दत्यर्थ: ।

अच देतुमाइ। 5 निष्कियस्य विभो: पुरुषस् तदसम्भवात् गत्समवा- दित्यर्थः । G

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50 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

b. But then [-the objector may say]-"Since, in the books of scripture and of law, we hear of its going and coming into this world and the other world, let soul be [-not all-pervading, as you allege-but] merely limited [in its extent]; and to this effect also is the text 'Of the size of the thumb is the soul, the inner spirit', and the like" :- but this conjecture he repels *.

Were the soul limited Aph. 50. [We cannot admit that the soul it might be perishable. is other than all-pervading, because] by its being limited, since it would come under the same conditions as jars, &c., there would be a contradiction to our tenet [of its imperishableness].

a. That is to say,-and if the soul were admitted to be, like a jar, or the like, limited, i. e., circumscribed [in dimension], then, since it would resemble a jar or the like, in being made up of parts, and [hence] in being perishable, &c., this would be contrary to our settled principle t [-that the soul is imperishable].

b. He now justifies the text [see §49. b ] referring to the mo- tiont [of the soul,-by showing that the motion is not really of the soul but of an accessary].

• ननु श्रुतिमृत्योरिइलोकपरलोकगमनागमनत्रवण- त्पुरुषस्य परिच्छ्विन्वत्वमेवासु तथाच श्रुतिर्राप कङ्गष्ठमाच: पुरुषो Sन्तर। त्मेत्यादिरित्याशङ्कामपाकरोति। + यदिच घटादिवत् पुमान्मूर्नः परिच्छिन्नः लोकियते तदा सावयवत्वविनाशित्वादिना घटादिसमानधर्मापत्ता- वपसिद्धान्त: स्ादित्र्यः।

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BOOK 1. 51

Soul moves not, any more than Space. Aph. 51 .- The text regarding the mo- tion [of the soul], moreover, is [applicable only] because of the junction of an attendant, as in the case of the Ether [or Space, which moves not, though we talk of the space enclosed in a jar, as moving with the jar]. a. Since there are such proofs of the soul's unlimitedness as the declaration that ' It is eternal, omnipresent, permanent', the text regarding its motion is to be explained as having reference to a movement pertaining [not to the soul but] to an attend- ant ;- for there is the text-' As the Ether [or space] included in a jar, when the jar is removed,-[in this case] the jar may be removed, but not the space,-and in like manner is the soul which is like the sky [incapable of being moved]' ;- and be- cause we may conclude that the motion [erroneously supposed to belong to the soul-49. b .- ] belongs to Nature [-see Vedanta Aphorisms, Part I, §4. 1 .- ], from such maxims as this that ' Na- ture does the works the fruits of which are blissful or baneful, and it is wilful Nature that in the three worlds reaps these' ;- such is the import .*

b. It has already been denied [§16] that the bondage [of the soul] is occasioned by works-in the shape either of enjoined or नित्वस्सर्वगतस्सापुरित्यादिमा प्रमाणेनातानो Sपररि- च्छ्िव्नत्वे गतिश्रुतिरापाधिकगतिपरा व्याख्येया। घटरंदृत- माकाशं नोयमाने घटे यथा। घटो नीयेत नाकाशं तह्जोवो नभोपम पति खुतेः। प्रक्ति: कुरुते कर्म शुभा- पुभफलात्मकं प्रकृतिक्न तदभ्राति विषु लोकेषु कामगे- त्यादिसृत्या गते: प्रक्ृतिनिष्ठत्वावगमा्चेति भाव:।

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52 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

of forbidden actions. Now he declares that the bondage more- over does not arise from the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] result- ing therefrom .*

Aph. 52. Nor moreover [does the The bondage of the soul is no result of any merit or demerit. bondage of the soul result from the merit or demerit arising] from works, because these belong not thereto.

a. That is to say-the bondage of the soul does not arise directly from the 'unseen' [merit or demerit] occasioned by works. Why? Because this is no property thereof,-i. e. be- cause this [merit or demerit-see §16. a .- ] is no property of the soul.t

b. But then [some one may say]-" Let it be that the bond- age resulting from the ' unseen' i. e., the merit [or demerit] even of another should attach to a different person," ;- whereupon he declares as follows.t

Else bondage might cling Aph. 53 .- If the case were otherwise even to the emancipated. [than as I say], then it [the bondage of the soul] might extend unduly [even to the emancipated].

• पूर्व विद्ितनिषिद्धव्यापाररूपेण कर्मणा बन्धो निरा- तः। ददानी तव्जन्यादष्टेनापि न बम् द्रत्याइ। कर्मण अरटष्टेनापि साचान् पुरुषस्य बनधः। कुतः। अ्रतद्वर्मत्वात् पुरुषधर्मत्वाभावादित्यर्यः॥ + मन्वन्यधर्मेषप्यदष्टेनान्यस्य बम्वः सान्तवाड।

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BOOK I. 53

a. That is to say,-if the case were otherwisc-if bondage and its cause were under other conditions [than we have declared them to be]-, then there might be an undue extension,-bond- age would befal even the emancipated* [-for the same reasons as those stated under §16. a].

b. What need of so much [prolixity]? He states a gencral ob- jection why the bondage of soul cannot result from any one or other [of these causes]-beginning with its essence [-see §6.b-] and ending with its [supposed] works [-see §16-], inasmuch as it is contrary to scripturet [that any one of these should be the cause].

A single tert of scripture upsets Aph. 54 .- And this [opinion equally all the heretical notions of the soul's relation to bondage. that the bondage of the soul arises from any of these causes alleged by the heretics] is contrary to such texts as the one that declares it [the soul] to be without qualities ;- and so much for that point.

a. And if the bondage of the soul arose from any one or other of those [supposed causes already treated of] among which its essential character [§6. b.] is the first, this would be contradic-

• अन्यधर्मत्वे। बन्वतत्कारणयेरन्यधर्मत्वे। व्रतिप्रसत्रि- मेत्तस्यापि बन्धापत्तिरित्र्यः।

t किं बडना। खभावादिकर्मान्तैरन्येन वा केनापि पुरुषस्य बन्धोत्पत्तिर्न घटते श्रुतिविरोधादिति साधारणं

वाधकमाड़।

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54 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

tory to such texts as "Witness, intelligent, alone, and without the [three] 'qualities' [is the soul];"-such is the meaning .*

b. The expression 'and so much for that point' means that the investigation of the cause of the bondage [of the soul] here closes.t

c. The case then stands thus,-since all other theories are overthrown by the declaratory aphorisms "There would be no fitness in the enjoining" [see §7], &c., it is ascertained that the immediate cause of the bondage [of the soul] is just the conjunc- tion of Nature and of the soul.t

d. But then, in that case, [some one may say],-this conjunc- tion of Nature and of the soul [§54. c.], whether it be essential or adventitiously caused by Time or something else [55. b.], must occasion the bondage even of the emancipated. Having pondered this doubt, he disposes of it as follows :§

तद्योगो Sप्यविवेकान्न समानत्वम्। ५ू५्।

How the true cause of bondage affects not the emancipated. Aph. 55 .- Moreover the con- junction thereof does not, through non-discrimination, take place [in the case of the emancipated],

• खभावाद्यन्यतमेन पुरुषस्य बन्धोत्पत्ती साची पेताः

• इतिशन्दो बन्वदेतुपरीचासमाप्रैी। + तदेवं न खभावतो बन्वस्थेत्यादिना प्रदर्शकेनेतरप्रति- षेधतः प्रक्तिपुरुषसंयोग एव साचादम्वदेतुरवधारित:। 5 ननु तब प्रक्कतिपुरु षसंयोगो Sपि खाभाविकत्वे काया-

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BOOK I. 55

nor is there a parity [in this respect between the emancipated and the unemancipated].

a. 'The conjunction thereof'-i. e. the conjunction of Na- ture and of the soul ;- this conjunction moreover does not take place again 'through non-discrimination'-i. e. through the Want of a discrimination [between Nature and soul] in the eman- cipated [who do discriminate, and who thus avoid the con- junction which others, failing to discriminate, incur, and thus fall into bondage]; such is the meaning :- and thus the the emanci- pated and the bound are not on a level [-under the circum- stances stated at §54. c.],-such is the import.

विपय्ययाइ्न्वः । ५ू६।

The true cause of bondage, Aph. 56 .- Bondage arises from the in other words non-discri- mination. error [of not discriminating between Nature and soul].

a. Having thus declared the cause of that [bondage] which is to be got rid of, he declares the means of getting rid of it.t

दिनिमित्तकत्वे वा मुक्तस्यापि बन्वापादक द्त्याशंक्य समा- धन्ते। * तद्योगः प्रक्वतिपुरुषसंयोगो पि अ्रविवेकात् मुत्तो अ्रविवेकाभावात् न पुनस्ंयोगो भवतीत्र्यः। तथाच न

• एवं देयहेतुं प्रतिपाद्य दानीपायं प्रतिपादयति।

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56 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

Non-discrimation is remove- Aph. 57 .- Its removal is to be able by discrimination alone. effected by the regular [and appro. priate] means, just like darkness.

a. The regular means, established throughout the world, in such cases as 'shell-silver' [i. e. a pearl-oyster shell mistaken for silver], viz. the immediacy of discrimination,-by this alone is 'its removal'-i. e. the removal of the non-discrimination [bet- ween Nature and soul] to be effected, and not by works or the like ;- such is the meaning :- just as darkness-the dark-is re- moved by light alone* [and by no other means].

b. " But then [some one may say]-if merely the non-discri- mination of Nature and soul be, through the conjunction [of the two, consequent on the want of discrimination,] the cause of bondagc, and if merely the discrimination of the two be the cause of liberation, then there would be liberation even while there remained the conceit of [one's possessing] a body &c .; and this is contrary to scripture, to the institutes of law, and to sound reasoning." To this he replies.t

प्रधानाविवेकादन्याविवेकस्य तद्वानं हानम्। ५८।

The discrimination of Nature, as other than soul, involves all Aph. 53 .- Since the non-discri- discrimination. mination of other things [from soul] results from the non-discrimina- *शुक्तिरजतादिस्थले लोकसिद्वं यब्नियतं कारणं विवेक- साच्षात्कारसत एव तदुच्क्वित्तिरविवेकोच्कित्ति: न करमादि- भिरित्यर्थः। यथा वान्तमन्वकार: प्रकाशेनेव नश्यति। + ननु प्रक्ृतिपुरुषाविवेक एव चेत्ंयोगद्वारा बन्वदेतुक्- योर्विवेक एव मोचदेतुरखाई देष्ादभिमानसत्त्वे Sपि मेोच: स्थात् तच्च ्रुतिस्मृतिन्यायविरुद्दमिति तबाइ।

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BOOK I. 57

tion of Nature [from soul], the cessation of this will take place on the cessation of that [from which it results].

a. By reason of the non-discrimination of Nature from the soul, what non discrimination of other things there is-such as the non-discrimination of the understanding [as something other than the soul],-this necessarily ceases on the cessation of the non-discrimination of Nature; because, when the non-discrimi- nation of the understanding, for example, [as something other than soul] does occur, it is based on the non-discrimination [from soul] of that cause to which there is none antecedent [viz. Nature], since the non-discrimination of an effect [-and the 'understanding' is an effect or product of Nature] is itself an effect* [and will of course cease with the cessation of its cause].

b. The state of the case is this ;- as, when the soul has been discriminated from body, it is impossible but that it should be discriminated from the colour and other properties-the effects of the body [which is the substantial cause of its own properties], -so, by parity of reasoning,-from the departure of the cause- when soul, in its character of unalterableness &c., has been dis- criminated from Nature, it is impossible that there should remain a conceit of [the soul's being any of] the products thereof ti. e. of Nature], such as the 'understanding' and the like, which have the character of being modificationst .[of primal Nature, while the soul, on the other hand, is a thing unalterable].

*पुरुषे प्रधानाविवेकात्कारणात् यो न्याविवेका बुद्याद्य- विवेको बुद्याद्यविवेके जाते कार्याविवेकस्य कार्यतया अना- दिकारणाविवेकमूलकत्वात्तस्य प्रधानाविवेकड़ाने सत्यवश्यं हानमित्र्थः ।

• यथा शरीरादात्ानि विविक्रे शरोरकार्येषु रूपादिव्य-

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58 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

c. But then [some one may say]-"What proof is there that there is a conceit [entertained by people in general] of a Nature [or primal principle] different from the conceit of an ' under- standing' &c. [which you tell us are products of this supposed first principle] ?- for all the various conceits [that the soul falls into], such as 'I am ignorant' and so on, can be accounted for on the ground simply of an 'understanding' &c. [without pos- tulating a primal Nature which is to assume the shape of an 'understanding' &c.]:"-well, if any one says this, I reply, No, -because, without there were such a thing as Nature, we could not account for such conceits as the following,-viz .- "Having died, having died, again when there is a creation let me be a de- nizen of Paradise and not of hell;"-because no products, such as the 'understanding,' when they have perished, can be created anew* [-any more than a gold bracelet, melted down, can be reproduced, though another like it may be produced from the materials].

The soul's confounding itself with Na- ture is logically antecedent to its con- d. Moreover it is inadmis- founding itself with anything else. sible to say that men's con- ceit of [the identity of them- selves with their] 'understanding' &c., is [the primary cause of the soul's bondage, and is] not preceded by any thing,-because 'understanding' and the rest [-as you will not deny-] are

विवेको न सम्भवति तथा कूटस्थत्वादिधर्मेः प्रधानात्पुरुषे विवित्ने तत्कारयेषु परिणामादिधर्मकेषु बुद्यादिष्वभिमानो न ख्ातुमुत्इते तुल्यन्यायात्कारणनाशाच्चेति भाव:।

• ननु, बुद्याद्यभिमानातिरिक्रे प्रधानाभिमाने किं प्रमाणमइमन् दत्यादयखिलाभिमानानां बुद्यादिविषयत्वेने- वोपपन्तेरिति चेन्न मृत्वा मृत्वा पुनः सष्टा खर्गी स्ां माच

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BOOK I. 59

effects. Now while it is to be expected that there should be some predetermining agency to establish a conceit of [ownership in, or of one's identity with] any effects, it is clear that it is a conceit of [ownership, &c.,] in respect of the cause, and nothing else, that must be the predetermining agency ;- for we see this in ordinary life, and our theories are bound to conform [deferentially] to ex- perience. For [-to explain-] we see, in ordinary life, that the conceit of [the ownership of] the grain, &c., produced by a field, results from the conceit of [the ownership of] the field,-and from the conceit of [the ownership of ] gold the conceit of [the ownership of] the bracelets or other things formed of that gold. And by the removal of these [i. e. the removal of the logically antecedent conceits that the field or the gold is one's proper- ty], there is the removal of those* [i. e. the removal of the conceits that the grain &c., and that the bracelets &c., the cor- responding products or effects of the field and of the gold, are one's property :- and so the soul will cease to confound itselt with the 'understanding' when it ceases to confound itself with Nature, of which the ' understanding' is held to be a product].

नारकोत्याद्यभिमानानां प्रधानविषयत्वं विनानुपपत्ते: वातो- तानां बुद्यादयखिलकायाणां पुनः सध्यभावात्। * किञ्च बुद्यादिष पुरुषाणामभिमानो Sनादिवत्र न शाक्यते बुद्यादीनां कार्यत्वात्। कार्येव्वभिमानव्यवस्थारये नियामकाकाड्ायां कारणाभिमान एव नियामकतया सिद्ध- ति लोके दष्टत्वात्कल्पनायास् दृष्टानुसारितात्। दृष्टोहि लोके च्षेताभिमानात्वेबजन्यधान्यादिष्वभिमान: सुवर्णाभि- मानात्तव्जन्यकटकादिव्वभिमान: तयोर्निटत्त्याच तयोरनिट- निरिति।

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60 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

e [And if it be supposed that we thus lay ourselves open to the charge of a regressus in infinitum, seeing that, whatever we may assign as the first cause, we may, on our own principles, be asked what was the 'predetermining agency' in regard to it,-or if it be supposed that we are chargeable with-reasoning in a cir- cle when we hold that the soul's confounding itself with Nature is the cause of its continuing so to confound itself, and its continuing so to confound itself is reciprocally the cause why it con founds itself,-we reply that] there is no occasion to look for any other 'predetermining agency' in the case of the conceit of [the identity of the soul with] Nature, or in the case of the self-continuance thereof [i. e. of that error of confounding one's self with Nature], because these two are [alike] without antecedent-like seed and sprout *- [of which it is needless to ask which is the first,-the old puzzle " which was first-the acorn or the oak?"-being a frivolous question].

f. But then [some one may say]-if we admit the soul's bond- age [at one time] and its freedom [at another], and its discrimi- nation [at one time] and its non-discrimination [at another], then this is in contradiction to the assertion [in §19] that it is " ever essentialy a pure and free intelligence:"-and it is in con- tradiction to such texts as this-viz.,-"The absolute truth is this, that neither is there destruction [of the soul], nor produc- tion [of it], nor is it bound, nor is it an effecter [of any work], nor is it desirous of liberation, nor is it indeed liberated [-see- ing that that cannot desire or obtain liberation which was never bound]." This [charge of inconsistency] he repels.t * प्रधानाभिमानतद्वासनयोश्व बीजाङ्गुरवदनादित्वान्न तदभिमाने नियामकान्तरापेक्चेति। + मनु पुरुषस्य चेद्दन्वमोजी विवेकाविवेकाच खोकती ताि नित्यशुद्धबद्तमक्तत्वोत्तिविरोधः। तथा न निरोधो

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BOOK I. 61

वाङ्मात्रं नत तत्वं चित्तस्थिते: ॥५९॥

The bondage of the soul is Aph. 59 .- It is merely verbal, and merely verbal. not a reality, [this so-called bondage of the soul,] since it [the bondage] resides in the mind [and not in the soul].

a. That is to say,-since bondage &c. all reside only in the mind [and not in the soul], all this, as regards the soul, is merely verbal-i. e. it is 'vox et praeterea nihil,,'-because it is merely a reflection, like the redness of [pellucid] crystal [when a China- rose is near it]; but not a reality, with no false imputation, like the redness of the China-rose itself. Hence there is no contra- diction to what had been said before [-as the objector under §58. f. insinuates-], such is the state of the case .*

Whether Testimony or Inference, with- b. But then, if bondage out Perception, might not avail to dis- sipate the soul's bondage. &c., as regards the soul, be merely verbal, then let it be set aside by hearing [that it is merely verbal], or by argument [esta- blishing that it is so] :- why, in the Scripture and the Law, is there enjoined, as the cause of liberation, a discriminative know- नचात्पत्तिन बद्दो नच साधक:। न मुमुच्तुर्न वे मुत्त द्रत्येषा परमार्थतत्यादिश्तुतिविरोधक्वेति तां परिहर्रतत।

• बख्ादीनां सर्वेषां चित्त एवावस्थ्ानान्तसर्वम्पुरुषे वाङ्मानं शब्दमानं स्फटिकलाद्ित्यवत्प्रतिबिम्बमात्रत्वात् मतु तत्त्वं बनारा पितं जवालाहित्यवदित्यर्थः । अातो नोक- विरोध रति भाव:।

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6:2 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

ledge [of Soul as distinguished from Not-soul] going the length of immediate cognition ?- To this he replies .*

युक्तितो Sपि न बाध्यते दिडमूढवदपराच्षाहते।६०।

The truth must be directly discerned, Aph. 60 .- Moreover it is and not merely accepted on the ground of Testimony or of Inference. not to be removed by argu- ment, as that of the person perplexed about the points of the compass [is not to be removed] without immediate cognition.

a. By 'argument' we mean thinking. The word ' moreover' is intended to aggregate [or take in-along with ' argument' -- ] 'testimony't [-or verbal authority-which, no more than ' ar- gument,' or inference, can remove the evil, which can be re- moved by nothing short of direct intuitive perception of the real state of the case].

b. That is to say-the bondage, &c., [of the soul], is not to be removed by merely hearing, or inferring, without perceiving ;- just as the contrariety in regard to the proper direction, in the case of a person who is mistaken as to the points of the compass [and hence as to his own bearings], is not removed by testimony or inference without immediate cognition, i. e. without his di- rectly perceivingt [how the points of the compass really lie,-to * ननु बन्वादिकं चेत्पुरुषे वाङ्मानं ताई त्रवणेन युक्या वा तस्य बाधो भवतु। किमर्थ श्रुतिमृत्यो: साच्ात्कारपर्यन्तं विवेकज्ञानमुपदिभ्यते मोचदेतुतया। तबाइ। + यक्िर्मननं। अरपिशब्द: त्र्वणसमच्चयार्यः। वाङमायमपि पुरुषस्य बन्वादिकं त्रवपमननमाचेष न बाय्यते अपरोचादते साच्षाकारं बिना यथा दिख्मूढ-

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BOOK I. 63

which immediate perception 'testimony' or 'inference' may con- duce, but the necessity of which these media or instruments of knowledge cannot supersede].

c. Or it [-Aph. 60-] may be explained as follows :- viz .- But then [seeing that] it is declared by the assertion [in Aph. 57] viz. that "Its removal must be through the appropriate means," that knowledge in the shape of discrimination [between soul and Nature] is the remover of non-discrimination [in regard to the matter in question],-tell us-is that knowledge of a like nature with the hearing [of Testimony], &c., or is it something peculiar? A reply to this being looked for, he enounces the aphorism [§60] " Moreover it is not to be removed by argument," &c. That is to say,-non-discrimination is not excluded, is not cut off, by argument or by testimony, without there be discrimi- nation as an immediate perception,-just as is the case with one who is bewildered in regard to his direction ;- because the only thing to remove an immediate error is an immediate individual per- ception* [of the truth. For example, a man with the jaundice

जनस्य वाङ्मात्रमपि दिग्वेपरीत्ं ्रवणयुतिम्यां न बाध्यते साचात्कारं विनेत्यर्थः।

• अ्रथवेत्यं व्यास्येयं। ननु नियतकारणात्तदुच्कित्ति- रितयनेन विवेकज्ञानमविवेकोच्छेदकमुत्ां तत् ज्ञनं किं अवणादिसाधारपमुतासि कश्िद्धिशेष दत्याकाङ़ायामाड युक्कितो 5पीत्यादि सनम्। अ्रविवेको युकितः श्रवणतन्न न बाध्यते नोष्किद्यते विवेकापरोच बिना दिडमोइवदि- त्यर्थः। साचात्कारिसमे साक्षात्कारिविशेष दर्शनस्येव विरो- वित्वादिति।

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64 TIE SANKHYA APHORISMS. perceives white objects as if they were yellow. He may infer that the piece of chalk which he looks at is really white; or he may believe the testimony of a friend that it is white; but still nothing will remove his erroneous perception of yellowness in the chalk except a direct perception of its whiteness].

d. Having thus, then, set forth the fact that Liberation results from the immediate discrimination [of soul from Nature], the next thing to be set forth is the 'discrimination,'* [here referred to].

e. This being the topic, in the first place since, only if soul and Nature exist, liberation can result from the discrimination of the one from the other, therefore-that 'instrument of right know- ledge' (pramána) which establishes the existence of these [two imperceptible realities] is [first] to be set forth.t

ग्रचाक्षुषाणामनुमानेन बोधो धूमादिभिरिव वज्े:॥ ६१॥

The evidence for things im- Aph. 61 .- The knowledge of things impercepti- perceptible. ble is by means of Inference, as that of fire [when not directly perceptible] is by means of smoke, &c.

a. That is to say-'Of things imperceptible,'-i. e. of things not cognizable by the senses,-e. g. Nature and the Soul,-' the knowledge'-i. e. the fruit lodged in the soul,-is brought about by means of that instrument of knowledge [which may be call- * तदेवं विवेकसाचातकारान्मोचं प्रतिपाद्यातः परं विवेक: प्रतिपादनीय:॥

• तबादा प्रकृतिपुरुषसिद्धा हि नद्िवेकासोचः साद- तसत्मिद्गा प्रमाणमुपन्यस्यते।।

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BOOK 1. 65

ed] 'Inference' (anumána) [-but which-see Nyaya Aphorisms -55-is more correctly 'the recognition of a Sign'], as [the knowledge that there is] fire [in such and such a locality where we cannot directly perceive it,] is brought about by the ' recogni- tion of a Sign' occasioned by smoke, &c .*

b. Moreover, it is to be understood that that which is [true, but yet is] not established by ' Inference,' is established by Revela- tion ;- but since ' Inference' is the chief [among the instruments of knowledge] in this [the Sankhya] System, ' Inference' only is laid down [in the aphorism] ae the chief thing,-but Revela- tion is not disregardedt [in the Sankhya system-see §89-].

c. He next exhibits the order of creation of those things among which Nature is the first, and the relation of cause and effect [among these severally], which subserves the argument that will be [afterwards] stated.t

सश्वरजसमसां साम्यावस्था प्रक्ृति: प्रक्ृतर्मदान् मढ- तोडदद्वारो Sइद्ारात्पञ्न तन्मावाणि उभयमिन्द्रियं

अचानुषाणां अप्रत्यचाणां प्रक्ृतिपुरुषादोनां बनु- मानेन प्रमाणेन बाधः पुरुषनिष्ठ फलं सिद्धं भवत यथा धूमादिभिर्जनितेना नुमानेन वज्ेः सिद्धिरित्यर्थः॥ + अनुमानासिद्ूमपि आ्रगमात्िद्यतीत्यपि बोध अख शालस बनुमानप्राधान्यान्तु केवलानुमानस्य मुख्यतयैवोप- न्यास: नत्वागमस्यानपेक्षेति। + प्रक्ृतादीनां सष्टिकमं वच्यमाणानुमानोपयोगिकार्य- कारणभावञ्त दर्शयति। I

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66 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

तन्माचेभ्यः खूलभूतानि पुरुष ति पञ्चविशति- गय: । ई२ ।

The twenty-five realities Aph. 62 .- Nature (prakriti) is the enumerated. state of equipoise of Goodness (sattwa) Passion (rajas) and Darkness (tamas); from Nature [proceeds] Mind (mahat), from Mind Self-consciousness (ahankára), from Self-conscionsness the five Subtile Elements (tanmátra), and both sets [external and internal] of Organs (indriya), and from the Subtile Elements the Gross Elements (sthula-bhuta). [Then there is] Soul (purusha) :- such is the class of twenty-five.

a. 'The state of equipoise' of the [three] things called ' Good- ness' &c., i. e. their being neither less nor more [-one than another-], that is to say the state of not being [developed into] an effect :- and thus 'Nature' is the triad of ' Qualities' (guna) distinct from the products [to which this triad gives rise] ;- such is the complete meaning .*

b. These things, viz. 'Goodness' &c., [though spoken of as the three Qualities], are not 'Qualities' (guna) in the Vaiseshika sense of the word, because [the 'Qualities' of the Vaiseshika system have themselves no qualities,-see Kanada's 16th Aph .- while] these have the qualities of Conjunction, Disjunction, Lightness, Force, Weight, &c. In this [Sankhya] system, and in Scripture, the word ' Quality' (guna) is employed [as the name of the three things in question] because they are subservient to Soul [and therefore hold a secondary rank in the scale of being],

• सस्वादिद्रव्याणां या साम्यावस्था कान्यूनानतिरिक्ता- वस्था तकार्यावस्थत्यर्यः । एवञ्च कार्यभिन्नं गुणन्रयं प्रक्कति- रिति पर्यवसिता Sर्थः।

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BOOK I. 67

and because they form the cords [ -- which the word guna also signifies-], viz. 'Understanding' &c., which consist of the three [so called] 'Qualities,' and which bind the brute-beast [-so to speak-] the Soul .*

c. Of this [Nature] the principle called 'the great one' (ma- hat), viz. the principle of ' Understanding' (buddhi), is the pro- duct. 'Self-consciousness' is a conceit [of separate personality]. Of this there are two products, (1) the 'Subtile Elements' and (2) the two sets of 'Organs'. The 'Subtile Elements' are [those of] Sound, Touch, Colour, Taste, and Smell. The two sets of ' Organs,' through their division into the external and the internal, are of eleven kinds. The products of the ' Subtile Ele- ments' are the five ' Gross Elements'. But ' Soul' is something distinct from either product or cause. Such is the class of twen- ty-five,-the aggregate of things :- that is to say, besides these there is nothing.t d. He next, in several aphorisms, declares the order of the in-

• सत्वादोनि द्रव्याणि न वैशेषिका गुणा: संयोगविभाग- वस्वा सधुत्वबलव त्वगुरुत्वादिधर्मकत्वाच् तेव्वच शास्त्रमुत्ा- दाव गुपशन्द: पुरुषोपकर पत्वात्पुरुषपशुबन्वक चिगुणात्मक- महदादिरन्नुनिर्माहत्वाच् प्रयुज्यते। + तस्या: कारय महत्तत्वं बुद्धित ्तवं। ब्रहङ्गारो Sभिमान:। तस्य कार्यइयं तव्मावाणि उभयमिन्द्रियञ्व। तम्मावाषि शब्दस्पर्शरूपरसगन्वाः। उभयमिन्द्रियं बाह्याभ्यन्तरभेदे- नैकादशविधं। तन्मानाणां कार्याणि पञ्च खुलभूतानि। पुरुषस्तु कार्यकारणविलक्षण रति। इत्ंवं पञ्चविंशतिगय: पदार्थव्यूह: एतदतिरित्तः पदार्था नासीतर्यः।

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68 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. .

ferring* [the existence of these principles-the one from the otherJ;

The eaistence of the ' Subtile Elements' Aph. 63-[The knowledge is inferred from that of the ' Gross'. of the existence] of the ' Sub- tile Elements' is [by inference] from the ' Gross Elements.'

a. 'The knowledge-by inference'-8o much is supplied,t [to complete the aphorism, from Aph. 61]. b. Earth, &c., the ' Gross Elements,' are proved to exist by Perception; and thereby [-i. e. from that Perception,-for Per- ception must precede Inference, as stated in Gautama's 5th Apho- rism-] are the 'Subtile Elements' inferred-[the oroixeia oTolxeiov of Empedocles] ;- and so the application [of the process of inference to the case] is as follows :-

(1). The Gross Elements, or those which have not reached the absolute limit [of the atomic], consist of things [-Subtile Ele- ments, or Atoms,-] which have distinct qualities, [-the earthy element having the distinctive quality of Odour, and so of the others] :

(2). Because they are gross :- (8). [Everything that is gross is formed of something less gross, or in other words more subtile,] as jars, webs, &c.,t [-the gross web being formed of the less gross threads, and so of the others]. * अनुमानक्रममाइ सब:। + बनुमानेन बोध इत्यनुवर्च्तते। खूलं प्ृथिव्यादि प्रत्यचसिद्धं। तेन तव्माचाणामनु- मानं। तथाच चप्रकर्षकाष्ठापम्नानि खूलभूतानि सविशेष- गुपवद्व्योपादानकानि खूलस्वात घटपटादिवदिति प्रबोग:।

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BOOK I. 69

बाह्याम्यन्तराम्यां तेश्वाइद्दारस। ई४।

And thence that of Aph. 64-[The knowledge of the existence] self-consciousness. of Self-consciousness is [by inference] from the external and internal [organs] and these [Subtile Elements'- §63].

a. By inference from [the existence of] the external and in- ternal organs, and from [that of] these 'Subtile Elements,' there is the knowledge of [the existence of such a principle as] Self- consciousness .*

b. The application [of the process of inference to the case] is in the following [somewhat circular] manner :-

(1) The Subtile Elements and the Organs are made up of things consisting of Self-consciousness :-

(2) Because they are products of Self-consciousness :-

(3) Whatever is not so [-i. e. whatever is not made out of Self-consciousness-] is not thus [-i. e. is not a product of Self-consciousness]-as the Soul [-which, not being made up thereof, is not a product of it].t

c. But then if it be thus [i. e. if it be, as the Sánkhyas declare, that all objects, such as jars, are made up of Self- consciousness, while Self-consciousness depends on 'Intellect'],

नुमानेन बोध: ।

कार्यद्रव्यत्वात् यम्जवं तम्जैवं यथा पुरुष इति प्रयोग:।

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70 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

then [some one may object, that,] since it would be the case that the Self-consciousness of the potter is the material of the jar, the jar made by him would disappear on the beatification of the potter whose ' Intellect' then surceases; and this [-the objector may go on to say-] is not the case, because another man [after the beatification of the potter] recognizes that ' This is that same jar* [which you may remember was fabricated by our de- ceased acquaintance].'

d. [In reply to this we say] it is not thus,-because, on one's beatification, there is an end of only those modifications of his internal organ [-'intellect', or 'inner man'-] which could be causes [as the jar no longer can be] of the emancipated soul's experiencing [either good or ill], but not an end of the modifi- cations of his intellect in general, nor [an end] of that intellect in its essence:t-[so that we might spare ourselves the trouble of further argument so far as concerns the objection grounded on the assumption that the intellect of the potter surceases on his beatification :- but we may go further and admit, for the sake of argument, the surcease of the 'intellect' of the beatified potter, without conceding any necessity for the surcease of his pottery. This alternative theory of the case may be stated as follows] :- * नन्वेवं कलालाइङ्ारस्थापि घटोपादानत्वापत्या क- लालमुत्ता तदन्त:करणनाशे तभिर्मितघटनाश: खात्। न- पैतत् युत्तां पुरुषान्तरेण स एवायं घट रति प्रत्यभिन्ायमा- नत्वादिति। + मैवं मुक्तपुरुषभोगहेतुपरिणामसेव तदन्त:करणे मो- वोत्तरमुच्केदात् नतु परिणामसामान्यस्यान्त:करपलरूपस वाच्केदः।

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BOOK I. 71

e. Or [-as Berkeley suggests in his Principles of Human knowledge, ch. vi.] let the Self-consciousness of the Deity be the cause why jars and the like continue to exist, and not the Self-consciousness of the potter &c .* [-who may lose their Self-consciousness,-whereas the Deity-the sum of all life- Hiranya-garbha-see Vedánta-sara §62-never loses His Self- consciousness while aught living continues]. तेनान्त:करपास् ।६५ ।

And thence that of In- Aph. 65 .- [The knowledge of the ex- tellect. istence] of Intellect is [by inference] from that [Self-consciousness-§64].

a. That is to say,-by inference from [the existence of] 'that' -viz. Self-consciousness-which is a product, there comes the knowledge of ' Intellect' (buddhi)-the great ' inner organ' (antah- karana) and hence called ' the great one' (mahat),-[the exis- tence of which is recognised] under the character of the cause of thist [product-viz. Self-consciousness].

b. And so the application [-again rather circular-of the process of inference to the case] is as follows :-

(1) The thing called Self-consciousness is made out of the things that consist of the mood of [mental] assurance :-

(2) Because it is a thing which is a product of [mental] assu- rance :-

*स्रथवा घटादिव्वपि हिरएयगर्भाहद्दार एव कारण-

मसु न कुलालादइङ्गार:। + तेनाइद्ारेष कार्येष तत्कारणतया मुस्स्यान्तःक- रपस्य महदास्रस्य बुद्धेरनुमानेम बोध द्रत्यर्थ: ।

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72 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

(3) Whatever is not so [-i. e. whatever is not made out of mental assurance-], is not thus [-i. e. is not a product of mental assurance-] as the Soul [which is not made out of any- thing antecedent], &c *

c. Here the following reasoning is to be understood. Every one, having first determined any thing under a concept [i. e. under such a form of thought as is expressed by a general term,-for example, that this, which presents itself, is a jar, or a human body, or a possible action of one kind or other-], after that makes the judgment "This is I,"-or "This onght to be done by me,"-and so forth :- so much is quite settled [-and there is no dispute that the fact is as here stated]. Now, having in the present instance, to look for some cause of the thing called 'Self-consciousness' [which manifests itself in the various judg- ments just referred to], since the relation of cause and effect subsists between the two functions [-the occasional conception and the subsequent occasional judgment which is a function of Self-consciousness-], it is assumed, for simplicity, merely that the relation of cause and effect exists between the two substrata to which the [two sets of] functions belong,-[and this is suffi- cient] because it follows as a matter of course that the occur- rence of a function of the effect must result from the occurrence of a function of the causet [-nothing, according to the Sankhya, being in any product except so far and in suchwise as it pre-exis- ted in the cause of that product].

• तथाचायं प्रयोग: ब्रहङ्गारद्रव्यं निश्चयटत्तिमद्योपा- दानकं निश्चयकार्यद्रव्यत्वात् यन्नैवं तम्नवं बथा पुरुषादि- रिति।

+अवायं तरका बोथः। सर्वो डपि लोक: पहार्थमादा सरूपता निश्षित्य पश्चादभिमन्यते कायमहं मपेहं कर्तव्यमि-

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BOOK I. 73

ततः प्रक्ते: ॥६६।

And thence that Aph. 66 .- [The knowledge of the existonce] of Nature. of Nature is [by inference] from that ['Intel- lect'-§65].

a. By inference from [the existence of] ' that'-viz. the prin- ciple [of Intellect] termed 'the Great one'-which is a product, -there comes the knowledge of [the existence of] Nature, as its cause .*

b. The application [of the process of inference to the case] is as follows :-

(1) Intellect, the affections whereof are Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness, is produced from something which has these affections,- of Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness :-

(2) Because, whilst it is a product [and must therefore have arisen from something consisting of that which it itself now consists of ], it consists of Pleasure, Pain, and Dulness :-

(3) [Every product that has the affections of, or that occasions, Pleasure, Pain, or Dulness, takes its rise in something which con- sists of these,] as lovely women, &c.t

झायां वत्त्यो: कार्यकारणभावेन तदाश्रययोरेव कार्यकारण- भावो लाघवात्कलप्य ते कारणस्य दत्तिलाभेन कार्यटनिला-

• ततो मइन्चात् कार्यात् कारणतया प्रक्तेरनुमानेन

• अयं प्रयोग:। सुखदुःखमोइधर्मिणी बुद्धि: सुखदुःख-

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74 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

c. For, an agreeable woman gives pleasure to her husband, and therefore [is known to be mainly made up of or] partakes of the quality of 'Goodness;' the indiscreet one gives pain to him, and therefore partakes of the quality of 'Foulness ;' and she who is separated.[and perhaps forgotten], occasions indiffer- ence, and so partakes of the quality of 'Darkness.'*

d. And the appropriate refutation [of any objection] in this case is [the principle] that it is fitting that the qualities of the effect should be [in every case] in conformity .with the qualities of the cause.t

e. Now he states how, in a different way, we have the evidence of inference for [the existence of ] Soul, which is void of the re- lation of cause and effect that has been mentioned,t [in the four preceding aphorisms, as existing between Nature and its various products].

संहतपरार्थत्वात्पुरुषस। ६७।

The argument for the existence Aph. 67 .- [The existence] of of Soul. Soul [is inferred] from the fact that

मोइधर्मकद्रव्यजन्या कार्यते सति सुखदुःखमोहात्मकत्वात् कान्तादिविति।

• कान्ता दि भन्तुः सुखदेति सात्विकी। अविनया दुःख- देति राजसी। विरझन्इदेति तामसी भवति। + कारणानुसारेणैव कार्यगुणाचित्यच्चाचानुकूलसक:। + अ्रथ यथोत्तकार्यकारणभावशून्यस्य पुरुषस्य प्रकारान्त- रेणानुमानमाइ।

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BOOK I. 75

the combination [of the principles of Nature into their various effects] is for the sake of another .[than unintelligent Nature or any of its similarly unintelligent products].

a. 'Combination'-i. e. conjunction which is the cause [of all products,-these resulting from the conjunction of their con- stituent parts] :- since whatever has this quality-as Nature, Mind, and so on, [unlike Soul which is not made up of parts]- is for the sake of some other,-for this reason it is understood that Soul exists :- such is the remainder* [-required to com- plete the aphorism]. . b. But the application [of the argument in this particular case is as follows] :-

(1) The thing in question-viz. Nature, the 'Great one,' and the rest [of the aggregate of the unintelligent],-has, as its fruit [or end], the [mundane] experiences and the [eventual] Liberation of some other than itself ;-

(2) Because it is a combination [or compages] ;-- (3) [Every combination,] as a couch or a seat, or the like, [is for another's, use, not for its own, and its several component parts render no mutual service].t

c. Now, in order to establish that it is the cause of all [pro- ducts], he establishes the eternity of Nature (prakriti).t * संहत: कारणीभृतसंयोगलद्दतो Sव्यक्तमइदादेः परा- र्थत्वा द्वेता: पुरुषस्य बोध रति शेषः। + प्रयोगसु विवादास्पदं प्रक्ृतिमदादिकं खेतरख भोगापवर्गफलकं संहतत्वाच्छ्यासनादिवदिति।

यति।

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76 THE SANKHYA APIIORISMS.

मूले मूलाभावादमूलं मूलम्। ई८।

Argument for the eternity of Nature. Aph. 68 .- Since the root has no root, the root [of all] is root-less.

a. Since 'the root' (múla),-i. e. the cause of the twenty- three principles [-which, with Soul and the root itself make up the twenty-five realities recognized in the Sankhya,]-'has no root'-i. e. has no cause ;- the 'root'-viz. Nature (pradhana)- is 'rootless'-i. e. devoid of root :- that is to say, there is no other cause of Nature, because there would be a regressus in in- finitum* [if we were to suppose another cause, which, by parity of reasoning, would require another cause, and so on without end].

b. He states the argument [just mentioned] in regard to this, as follows.t

पारम्पर्य्ये Sप्येकच परिनिष्ठेति संज्ञामान्रम्। ६६।।

The employment of the term Primal Agency, or Nature, is Aph. 69-Even if there be a succes- merely to debar the regressus sion, there is a halt at some one point, in infinitum. and so it is merely a name, [that we give to the point in question, when we speak of the root of things under the name of ' Nature'].

a. Since there would be the fault of regressus in infinitum if there were a suecession of causes-another cause of Nature, and

• मूले जयोविंशति तत्त्वानां कारणे मूलाभावात्कारणा- भावान्मूलं प्रधानममूलं मूलशून्यं बनवस्थापत्या प्रधानस

• बच युक्तिमाइ।

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BOOK I. 77

another cause of that one again,-there must be at last a halt, or conclusion, at some one point, somewhere or other, at some one uncaused, eternal thing ;- therefore, that at which we stop is the Primal Agency (pra-kriti),-for this word prakriti [usually, and conveniently, rendered by the term Nature,] is nothing more than a sign to denote the cause which is the root .*

b. But then [some Vedántí may object,-according to this view of matters]-the position, that there are just twenty-five realities, is not made out; for, in addition to the 'Indiscrete' [or primal Nature] which [according to you] is the cause of Mind, another unintelligent principle, named ' Ignorance' [sec Vedánta- sara-§21-] presents itself. Having pondered this doubt, he declares as follows :t

समान: प्रक्ृतेईयोः॥७०॥

He meets a Vedantic ob. Aph. 70 .- Alike [is the opinion] of jection. both [of us] in respect of Nature.

a. In the discussion of the Primal Agent [Nature]-the cause which is the root [of all products]-the same side is taken by us both, the asserter [of the Sankhya doctrine] and the opponent [Vedantí]. This may be thus stated :- As there is mention in

• प्रक्वतेरन्यतकारणं तस्थाप्यन्यदिति कारणपारम्पये डप्य-

परिनिष्ठा पर्यवसानं भविष्यतीत्यता यब पर्यवसानं सेव प्रक्ृतिरिति हि मूलकारपास्य संज्ञामाज्रमित्यर्थः। + ननु पर्ञ्चावंशति तत्वानीति नोपपद्यते। मइत्तत्त्वकार- बाव्य कापे चया Sविद्यासजडतत्वानरापत्तेरिता शंक्याइ।

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78 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

scripture of the production of Nature, so too is there of that of Ig- norance in such texts as this-viz .- "This Ignorance, which has five divisions, was produced from the great Spirit." Hence it must needs be that a figurative production is intended to be as- serted in respect of one of these [-and not the literal produc- . tion of both, else we should have no root at all-], and of the two, it is with Nature only that a figurative production, in the shape of a manifestation through conjunction with Soul, &c., is congruous. A production [such as that metaphorical one here spoken of ], the characteristic of which is conjunction, is men- tioned, for there is mention of such a figurative origination of Soul and Nature in a passage of the Kaurma Purána beginning "Of action [or the Primal Agency] and knowledge [or Soul]," and so on. And as there is no mention in scripture of the origin of Ignorance as figurative, it is not from eternity. And Ignorance, which consists of false knowledge, has been declared in an apho- rism of the Yoga to be [not a separate entity but] an affection of the mind. Hence there is no increase to the [list of the twenty-five] Realities* [in the shape of a twenty-sixth principle to be styled ' Ignorance']. * प्रक्ृतेमूलकारणविचारे द्योवीदि प्रतिव।दिनोरावयो: समान: पचः एतटुक्तम्भवति यथा प्रक्ृतेरुत्पत्तिः ्रूयते एव- मविद्याया अपि अ्रविद्या पञच पर्वैषा प्रादुर्भूता मदात्मन दत्या- दिवाक्ये ग्रत एकस्या अवश्यं गौ एयुत्पन्तिर्व तव्या तबच प्रक्ृते-

संयोगलच्षणेत्पत्तिः कथ्यते कर्ममज्ञानयोरिति कौर्मवाक्ये

गाएयत्पत्त्यश्रवणात्तस्या अनादिता। अ्रविद्याच मिथ्या- ज्ञनरूपा बुद्धिधर्म रति योगे सत्रितमतो न तस्वाधिक्यम्।

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BOOK I. 79

b. Or [according to another and more probable interpretation of the aphorism] the meaning is this, that the argument is the same in support of both, i. e. of both Soul and Nature .*

c. But then, there being [as has been shown] a mode of ar- riving by inference at [a knowledge of the saving truth in regard to] Nature, Soul, &c., whence is it that reflection, in the shape of discrimination [between Soul and Nature], does not take place in the case of all men? In regard to this point he states as fol- lows :- +

अधिकारिचैविध्यान् नियमः।७१॥

It is only the best kind of people that are fully amenable to rea- Aph. 71 .- There is no rule [or

SOn. necessity that all should arrive at the truth-] because those who are privileged [to engage in the enquiry] are of three descrip- tions.

a. For those privileged [to engage in the enquiry] are of three descriptions through their distinction into those who, in reflect- ing, are dull, mediocre, and best. Of these-by the dull, the [Sankhya] arguments are frustrated [and altogether set aside] by means of the sophisms that have been uttered by the Bauddhas, &c. By the mediocre, they [are brought into doubt, or, in other words,] are made to appear as if there were equally strong arguments on the other side, by means of arguments which really prove the

• अ्रथवा दयो: प्रक्वतिपुरुषया: समान एव न्याय रत्र्थ. ।

• ननु प्रक्तिपुरुषाद्यनुमानप्रकारसतत्वे सर्वेषां विवेक- मननं कुतो न जायते तन्राइ।

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80 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

reverse [of what these persons employ them to prove], or by ar- guments which are not true; [-see the section on Fallacies in the Tarka-sangraha]. But it is only the best of those privi- leged that reflect in the manner that has been set forth [in our exposition of the process of reflection which leads to the discri- minating of Soul from Nature] ;- such is the import. But there is no rule that all must needs reflect in the manner so set forth ;- such is the literal meaning .*

b. He now, through two aphorisms, defines 'the Great one' and ' Self-consciousness't [-the reader being presumed to remem- ber that Nature consists of the three 'Qualities' in equipoise, and to be familiar with the other principles, such as the ' Subtile elements :'-see §62].

महदाख्मादयं कार्य तन्मनः।७२॥

By ' the Great one' is meant Aph, 72 .- That first product [of Mind. the Primal Agent, Nature,] which is called ' the Great one,' is Mind.

a. 'Mind' (manas). Mind is so called because its function is 'thinking' (manana). By 'thinking' is here meant 'judging' (nischaya) :- that of which this is the function is 'intellect'

• मनने दि मन्दम्यमोत्तमभेदेन त्रिविधा अधिकारि- पसन मन्दैबाद्रायुत्तकतर्केरनुमानानि बाध्यन्ते। मध्यमै- रविरुद्वारसाचुङ्गः सत्प्रतिपच्ितानि क्रियनने। उत्तमाधिका- रिणामेव तूकरीत्या मननमिति भाव: । सर्वेषामेव तूक्र- रीत्ा मनननियमो नेतचरार्थः॥

• महदहङ़गारयो: सरूपमाह सनाभ्याम्॥

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BOOK 1. 81

(buddhi) ;- and that is the first product-that called ' the Great one' (mahat) :- such is the meaning .*

चरमो Sइङ्घारः।७३।

The relation of Self-consciousness Aph. 73 .- ' Self-consciousness,' to Mind. is that which is subsequent [to Mind.]

a. 'Self-consciousness,' the function of which is a conceit [that " I exist"-"I do this that and the other thing" -- ], is that which is subsequent ;- that is to say ' Self-consciousness' is the next after ' the Great one't [§72].

b. Since ' Self-consciousness' is that whose function is a con- ceit [which brings out the Ego in every case of cognition, the matter of which cognition would else have lain dormant in the bosom of Nature-the formless Objective]-it therefore follows that the others [among the phenomena of mundane existence] are effects of this [Self-consciousness] ;- and so he declares as follows :t-

तत्कार्यत्वमुत्तरेषाम्। ७४ ।।

• मन दति। मननवत्तिकं मनः। मननमत्र निश्चय- सदृत्तिका बुद्धिसन्मइदाख्यमादं कार्यमित्यर्थः॥ + ग्रहङ्वारो Sभिमानवृत्तिक: पदार्थश्वरमो मइतो उनन्तरो Sदद्दार द्त्यर्थ:। + यतो Sभिमानदृटत्तिको 5इद्गारो Sतक्षतकार्यत्वमुन्तरेषा-

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82 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

All products, save Mind, result Aph. 74 .- To the others it be- from Self-consciousness. longs to be the products thereof [-i. e. of Self-consciousness].

a. 'To be products thereof,' i. e. to be products of Self-con- sciousness ;- that is to say, the fact of being products thereof belongs to the others, the eleven 'Organs' (indriya), the five 'Subtile elements,' and, mediately, to the [gross] Elements also -the products of the Subtile elements .*

b. But then, if it be thus, [some one may say],-you relinquish your dogma that Nature is the cause of the whole world. There- fore he declares as follows :t

वादडेतुता तद्दारा पारम्पर्ये ऽप्यणुवत्। ७५।

Nature, immediately the cause of Mind, is mediately the cause of Aph. 75 .- Moreover, mediately, all other products. through that [i. e. the 'great one' §72-], the first [cause-viz. Na- ture-] is the cause [of all products], as is the case with the Atoms [-the causes-though not the immediate causes-of jars &c].

a. ' Moreover, mediately'-i. e. moreover not in the character of the immediate cause ;- 'the first'-i. e. Nature-is the cause, of 'Self-consciousness' and the rest, [mediately] through 'the

म्वतन्मानाणां पारम्पर्येष तन्माचकार्याणामप भूतानां नत्कार्यत्वमित्यर्थः ।

• ननु यद्येवं ताई प्रधानं सर्वजगत्कारणमिति सिद्धान्त- हानिरत ब्राद।

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BOOK 1. 83

Great one,' and the rest ;- as, in the theory of the Vaiseshikas, the Atoms are the cause of the jar or the like, only [mediately] through combinations of two atoms, and so on ;- such is tho meaning .*

b. But then, since both Nature and Soul too are eternal, which of them is [really] the cause of the creation's commen- cing? In regard to this he declares as follows :t-

पूर्वभावित्वे इयोरेकतरस्य डाने Sन्यतरयोग:।७ह। Why Nature is the sole Aph. 76 .- While both [Soul and Na- cause. ture] are antecedent [to all products], since the one [viz. Soul] is devoid of this [character of being & cause], it is applicable to the other of the two [-viz. Nature].

a. That is to say-'while both'-viz. Soul and Nature-are pre-existent to every product,-still, 'since the one'-viz. Soul- from the fact of its never being modified [into anything else- as clay is modified into a jar-] must be ' devoid of,' or lack, the nature of a cause,-'it is applicable'-i. e. the nature of a cause must belong to the other of the two.t * पारम्पये Sपि साचाद येतुत्वे Sपि बाद्ाया: प्रकृतेर्दतुता ्रदङ्गारादिषु महदादिद्वारासि यथा वेशेषिकमते डपूमां घटादिद्ेतुता दणुकादि द्वारवेत्यर्यः। + ननु प्रक्ृतिपुरुषयोई्योरपि नित्लातृआ्ादा कस्य कारणत्वमित्यत ब्रइ।

पुरुषस्ापरिणामिलवेन हाने कार पताहान्यामन्यतरस्य योग: कारणतासमभव रत्यय:।

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84 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

b. But then [some one may say]-let Atoms alone be causes, since there is no dispute [that these are causal]. In reply to this he says :-*

परिच्छ्विव्वं न सर्वोपादानम्।७७।

Why the theory of a plastic Nature is preferable to that Aph. 77 .- What is limited cannot of Atoms. be the substance of all things.

a. That which is limited cannot be the substance of all things, as yarn cannot be the [material] cause of a jar ;- therefore it would [on the theory suggested] be necessary to mention separate causes of all things severally, and it is simpler to assume a single cause; therefore Nature alone is the cause,-such is the meaning.t

b. He alleges scripture in support of this.t

Scripture declares in favour of the theory. Aph. 78 .- And [the proposition that Nature is the cause of all is proved] from the text of scripture that the origin [of the world] is therefrom,[-i. e. from Nature].

• नन्वविवादात्परमाणूनामेव कारपत्वमसित्यत आ्रइ।

• यत्परिच्छिन्नं न तत्सवोपादानं यथा न तन्तुर्घटस्य कारणं तम्मात्पदार्थानां पृथक पृथक् कारणं वत्तव्यमेक- कारणत्वेच लाघवं तम्मात्म्रधानस्येव कारणत्वमित्वर्थः। + श्रब श्रुतिं दर्शयति।

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BOOK 1. 85

a. An argument, in the first instance, has been set forth [in §77-for, till argument fails him, no one falls back upon authori- ty]. Scripture, moreover, declares that Nature is the cause of the world, in such terms as "From Nature the world arises" &c .*

b. But then [some one may say],-a jar, which antecedently did not exist, is seen to come into existence ;- let, then, antecedent non-ezistence be the cause [of each product], since this is an in- variable antecedent,-[and hence a cause-"the invariable ante- cedent being denominated a cause," if Dr. Brown, in his 6th lecture, is to be trusted]. To this he replies :t-

नावसुनो वसुसिद्धि:। ७६।

Ez nihilo nihil Aph. 79 .- A thing is not made out of no- ft. thing.

a. That is to say,-it is not possible that out of nothing-i. e. out of a nonentity-a thing should be made-i. e. an entity should arise. If an entity were to arise out of a nonentity, then, since the character of a cause is visible in its product, the world also would be unreal ;- such is the meaning.t

• युक्तिस्तावत्प्रोक्ता स्रुतिरपि प्रधानस्य जगत्कारणता- माह प्रधानाज्जगज्जायत इति।

• ननु प्रागसतो घटस्य भवनं दृश्यते। नियतपूर्वभा- वित्वात् प्रागभाव: कारणमस्तित्यत आइ।

• अवसुनो Sभावाद्दसुसिद्धि: भवोत्पत्तिर्न सम्भवती- त्वर्थः। यद्यभावाङ्गवोत्पत्तिः ताई कारणरूपं कार्ये दृश्यत इति जगतो Sप्यवस्तुत्वं स्यादित्यर्थ:। Digitized by Google

86 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

b. Let the world too be unreal,-what harm is that to us? [-if any ask-] he therefore declares as follows :*-

Reasons why the world is not Aph. 80 .- It [the world] is not unreal, to be supposed unreal. because there is no fact contradictory [to its reality], and because it is not the [false] result of depraved causes [-leading to a belief in what ought not to be believed].

a. When there is the notion, in regard to a shell [of a pearl- oyster, which sometimes glitters like silver], that it is silver, its being silver is contradicted by the [subsequent and more correct] cognition that this is not silver. But, in the case in question [-that of the world regarded as a reality-], no one ever has the cognition 'This world is not in the shape of an entity,'-by which [cognition-if any one ever really had such-] its being an entity might be opposed.t

b. And it is inferred that that is false which is the result of a depraved cause,-e. g. some one's cognition of a [white] conch- shell as yellow, through such a fault as the jaundice [which de- praves his eye-sight]. But, in the case in question [-that of the world regarded as a reality-], there is no such [temporary or occasional] depravation [of the senses], because all, at all times,

• भवतु जगदप्यवसु का नो हानिरित्यत बराइ।

• शुक्का रजतमितिज्ञाने नेदं रजतमितिघ्ानादरूजत- बाधः। नचाच नेदं भावरूपं जगदिति कस्यापि ज्ञानं येन

भावरूपबाधः खात।

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BOOK 1. 87

cognize the world as a reality; therefore the world is not an un- reality .*

c. But then [some one may suggest]-let a nonentity be the cause of the world, still the world will not [necessarily therefore] be unreal. In regard to this he declares as follows :t

भावे तद्योगेन तत्िद्विरभावे तदभावात्कुतसरान्त- लिद्धि:।८१ ।

The product of something is some- thing, and of nothing nothing. Aph. 81 .- If it [-the substan- tial cause-] be an entity, then this would be the case [that the product should be an entity], from its union [or identity] therewith :- but if [the cause be] a nonentity, then how could it possibly be the case [that the product should be reall since it is a nonentity [like the cause with which it is united in the relation of identity] ?

a. If an entity were the substantial cause [of the world], then, since [it is a maxim that] the qualities of the cause present themselves in the product,-'this would be the case'-i. e. it would be the case that the product is real,-'because of union therewith'-i. e. because of the union [of the product] with the reality [which is its substratum] :- But since [by parity of rea- soning], if a nonentity [were the substantial cause], the world wonld be a nonentity, then, by reason of its being a nonentity- i. e. by reason of the world's being [on that supposition] necessa.

• दुष्टकारषजन्यत्वाच्च मिथ्येत्यवगम्यते यथा कामलादि- दोषात् पीतशंखज्ञानं कस्यचित्। अ्रत्च जगज्जानस्य सवेषां सर्वदा सत्वान्न दोवा Sस्ति तम्माभनावसु जगदिति।

• नन्वभाव: कारणमस्षुतथाथ्यभावत्वं न जगतो भविष्य- तीति तबाइ।

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88 THE SANKIIYA APHORISMS.

rily a nonentity [like its supposed cause],-how could this be the case* [that it should be real] ? b. But then [some one may say], since [it would appear that] nonentity can take no shape but that of nonentity, let worke alone be the cause of the world ;- what need have we of the hy- pothesis of 'Nature'? To this he replies.t

न कर्मण उपादानायोगात्। ८२।

Action cannot serve as a Aph. 82 .- Nay,-for works are not substratum. adapted to be the substantial cause [of any product]. a. Granting that ' the unseen' [merit or demerit arising from actions] may be an instrumental cause [in bringing about the mundane condition of the agent], yet we never see merit or de- merit in the character of the substantial cause [of any product], and our theories ought to show deference to our experience. ' Nature' is to be accepted, because Liberation arises [-see §57. a. and §84-] from discerning the distinction between Nature and the Soul.t

• भावे उपादानकारणे। कारणगुणा: कार्य दति तद्योगेन भावयोगेन तत्विद्धि: कार्यस्य वसतुत्वसिद्धि: अभावे जगतो

रिति। + मन्वभावस्याभावरूपत्वात् कमेव जगत्कारपमसत किं प्रधानकल्पनयेत्यत ग्राइ। + निमित्त कारणमद्ष्टमसु धर्माधर्मयोसु उपादान- कारणत्वं न कृचिद्ृष्टं। कल्पना हि दष्टानुसारेगीव भवति।

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BOOK 1. 89

b. But then [some one may say]-since Liberation can be attained by undertaking the things directed by the Veda, what occasion is there for [our troubling ourselves about] Nature? To this he replies .*

षार्थलम्।८३।

Saloation is not to be obtained by ritual observances. Aph. 83 .- The accomplishment thereof [i. e. of Liberation] is not, moreover, through. scriptural means :- the chief end of man does not consist in this [that is gained through such means], be- cause, since this consists of what is accomplished through means, [and is therefore not eternal], there is [still left impending over the ritualist] the liability to repetition of births.

a. 'Scriptural means'-such as sacrifices-are so called because they are heard [from the mouth of the instructor in scripture]; -not thereby, moreover, is 'the accomplishment thereof-i. e. the accomplishment of Liberation. 'Because one is liable to repetition of births by reason of the fact that it [the supposed Liberation] was accomplished by means,'-i. e. because the [thus far] liberated [soul] is still liable to repetition of births inasmuch as this [its supposed Liberation] is not eternal, just because it is [the result of] act ;- for this reason the chief end of man does not consist in thist [that is gained through ritual observances].

• नु वेदोक्तार्यानुष्ठानादेव मक्तिसमवात् किं प्रक्ृत्वे- त्यत ब्राड़।

• वेदादमुशूयत त्यानुश्रविको यश्ादि:। तम्मादपि न तत्िद्धि: मोचसिद्रि:। साय्लेाटत्तियोगात् कर्मलेना- नित्वत्ाभु कस्य पुनः संसारादन्तियोग: तम्ाटपुरुषायंत्म्!

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90 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

b. He now shows what does constitute the chief end of man .*

In regard to the attainment of the chief end of man the Scripture Aph. 84 .- There is scripture concurs with the Sankhya. for it that he who has attained to discrimination in regard to these [i. e. Nature and Soul] has no repetition of births.

a. 'In regard to these'-i. e. in regard to Nature and Soul,- of him who has attained to discrimination, there is a text declaring that, in consequence of his knowledge of the distinction, there shall be no repetition of births ;- the text-viz .- "He does not return again," &c.t

b. He states an objection to the opposite view.t

दुःखाहुःखं जलाभिषेकवन्न जाअविमोक:।८५।

Pain can only lead to pain, not to liberation from it. Aph. 85 .- From pain [occasioned, e. g., to victims in sacrifice] must come pain [to the sacrificer,-and not liberation from pain], as there is not relief from chilliness by affusion of water.

a. If Liberation were to be effected by acts [such as sacrifi- ces], then, since the acts involve a variety of pains, Liberation itself [-on the principle that every effect includes the qualities * पुरुषार्थत्वं दर्शयति। + तब प्रक्वतिपुरुषयो: प्राप्तविवेकस्य विवेकशनादना- दृत्तिश्रुतिः न स पुनरावर्न्तत इति श्रुतिः।

• विपचे दोषमाइ।

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BOOK 1. 91

of its cause-] would have a variety of pains; and it would be a grief from the fact that it must eventually end :- for to one who is distressed by chilliness the affusion of water does not bring li- beration from his chilliness but rather [additional] chilliness .*

b. But then [some one may say], the fact that the act is pro- ductive of pain is not the motive [to the performance of sacri- fice]; but the [real] reason is this, that the act is productive of things desirable :- and, in accordance with this, there is the text "By means of acts [of sacrifice] they may partake of immortali- ty," &c. To this he replies.t

काम्ये Sकाम्ये Sपि साध्यत्वाविशेषात्। ८६।

The character of the end makes no difference in regard to the tran- Aph. 86-[Liberation cannot arise sitoriness of what is effected by from acts] because, whether the end borks. be something desirable or undesir- able, this makes no difference in regard to its being the result of means [and therefore not eternal but transitory].

a. Grant that pain is not what is [intended] to be accomplished by works done without desire [on the part of the virtuous sacri-

• यदि कर्मसाथ्यो मोचा भवेत् कर्मणो दुःखबहललात् मोचडि दुःखबङल: स्ात्। अन्नतः चयितेनापि दुःखं स्यात्। नहि जाडयारन्तस जाउविभोको जलाभिषेकात् प्रत्युत जास्यमेवेति।

• मनु दुःखस्य कर्मसाध्यतमप्रयोजकं किन्तु काम्यकर्म- साध्यतं हेतुः। तथाच स्रुति: कर्मभ्यो Sमृतत्वमानशुरिति तवाइ़।

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92 THE SANKHYA A PHORISMS.

ficer], still, though there is a difference [as you contend] between [an act done to secure] something enjoyable and an act done without reference to enjoyment, this makes no difference with respect to the fact of the Liberation's being produced by acto[- which, I repeat, permanent Liberation cannot be-] :- there must still again be pain, for it [the Liberation supposed to have been attained through works,] must be perishable because it is a pro- duction. The text which declares that works done without desire are instruments of Liberation, has reference to knowledge [which, I grant, may be gained by such means], an'd Liberation comes through knowledge,-so that these [works] are instruments of Liberation mediately ;* [-but you will recollect that the pre- sent enquiry regards the immediate cause].

b. [But then some one may say]-supposing that Liberation may take place [as you Sankhyas contend] through the know- ledge of the distinction between Nature and Soul, still, since; from the perishableness [of the Liberation effected by this means as well as any other means], mundane life may return, we are both on an equality [-we whose Liberation you Sankhyas look upon as transitory,-and you Sankhyas, whose Liberation we again look upon as being, by parity of reasoning, in much the same predicament]. To this he replies.t

• मा भून्निष्कामकर्मसाथं दुःखं तथापि काम्यान्निष्काम- कर्मविशेषे डपि मोचस्य कर्मसा्यतमविशिष्टं साचलात् चयितेन पुनरषि दुःखं सात्। निष्कामकमणो मेबसाव- नत्वश्रुतिः शनाय। शनाच्च मोच दति पारम्पयेव मोद साधनलम्॥

• यदि प्रक्तिपुरुषविषेकज्ञानाभाद्तो भवेत्तवापि नवि- त्वात्युनरपि संसार दत्यावयोखुख्यत्वमित्यत बाइ। Digitized by Google

BOOK 1. 93

निजमुक्तस्य बन्वध्वंसमाचे परं न समानतम्।८७।

The right means effect Libera- tion once for all. Aph. 87. Of him who is essenti- ally liberated, his bonds having ab- solutely perished, it [i. e. the fruit of his saving knowledge] is absolute :- there is no parity [between his case and that of him who relies on works].

a. Of him 'who is essentially liberated'-who in his very essence is free-there is the destruction of bondage. The bond [-see §56-] is Non-discrimination [between Nature and Soul]. By the removal thereof, there is the destruction-the annihila- tion-of Non-discrimination ;- and how is it possible that there should again be a return of the mundane state when the de- struction of Non-discrimination is absolute ? Thus there is no such similarity* [between the two cases as is imagined by the objector under §86. b].

b. It has been asserted [in §62] that there is a class of twenty- five [things which are realities] :- and since these cannot be as- certained [or made out to be true] except by proof, therefore he displays thist [-i. e. he shows what he means by proof].

धकतमं यन्तत्। दर।

• निजमुत्तस्य खभावमुत्तस्य बन्वव्वंसः। बन्धो Sवि- वेकसद्विरोधेनाविवेकव्वंसा नाथः। अरविवेकनाशस्यच प्रध्वंसतवात् ऊनः संसारस् पुनरावर्त्तनमिति न समल्म्। + पच्चवियतिगण रत्युत्तां तल्िडिस न प्रमापेन विनेति तदर्थयति।

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1

94 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

What is meant by evi- Aph. 88. The determination of some- aence. thing not [previously] lodged in both [the Soul and the Intellect] nor in one or other of them, is ' right notion' (prama). That [is what we mean by proof, or evidence- pramana-] which is in the highest degree productive thereof [-i. e. of any given 'right notion']. a. 'Not lodged'-i. e. not deposited in ' one rightly cognising' (pramátri),-in short, not previously got at. The ' discrimina- tion', i. e. the ascertainment [or right apprehension] of such a thing, or reality, is 'right notion' :- and whether this be an affection 'of both'-i. e. of Intellect and also of Soul [as some hold that it is], or of only one or other of the two [as others hold], either way, that 'which is in the highest degree produc- tive' of this 'right notion' is [what we term proof or] evidence (pramana). Such is the definition of evidence in general [-the definition of its several species falling to be consisted here- after] :- such is the meaning .* b. It is with a view to the exclusion of Memory, Error, and Doubt, in their order, that we employ [when speaking of the re- sult of evidence] the expressions 'not previously known' [which excludes things remembered], and 'reality' [which excludes mistakes and fancies], and 'discrimination't [which excludes doubt]. * असब्निक्ृष्टः प्रमातर्यनारूढो Sनधिगत इति यावत्। एवमातस्थार्थस्य वसुनः परिच्छ्ित्तिरवधारणं प्रमा। साच दयोबुद्विपुरुषयोरेव धर्मा भवतु किंवेकतरमात्रस्य उभय- येव तस्या: प्रमाया यत्माधकतमं तत्प्रमाणमिति प्रमाणसा- मान्यलक्षपमित्यर्थः । + सृतिब्रमसंशयव्युदासाय क्रमेणानधिगत इति वसुन दति अवधारषमिति।

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BOOK 1. 95

c. In regard to this [topic of knowledge and the sources of knowledge], if 'right notion,' is spoken of as located in the Soul [-see §88. a .- ], then the [proof or] evidence is an affection of the Intellect. If [on the other hand, the 'right notion'] is spoken of as] located in the Intellect, in the shape of an affec- tion [of that, the affections of which are mirrored by the Soul], then it [the proof or evidence-or whatever we may choose to call that from which 'right notion' results,] is just the conjunc- tion of an organ [with its appropriate object,-such conjunction giving rise to sense-perception-], &c. But if both the Soul's cog- nition, and the affections of the Intellect, are spoken of as [cases of ] 'right notion,' then both of these aforesaid [-the affection of the Intellect in the first case, and the conjunction of an organ with its appropriate object, &c., in the other case-] are [to receive the name of] proof (pramana). You are to understand that when the organ of vision, &c., are spoken of as 'evidence,' it is only as being mediately* [the sources of right knowledge]. d. How many [kinds of ] proofs are there? To this he replies.t चिविधं प्रमाणं तत्मिद्वा सर्वसिद्वेनाधिक्यसिद्वि:।८। There are three kinds of evidence. Aph. 89 .- Proof is of three kinds :- there is no establishment of more, be- cause if these be established then all [that is true] can be estab- lished [-by one or other of these three proofs].

• अब यदि प्रमारूपं फलं पुरुषनिष्ठमुच्यते तदा बुद्धि- दृत्तिरेव प्रमाणं। यदि बुद्धिनिष्ठ दत्तिरुपं तत् तदेन्ट्रिय- सच्निकषादिरेव। यदि तु पौरुषेयबोधो बुद्धिर्टन्तिद्वोभय- मपि प्रमेतुचते तदाक्नमुभयमेव प्रमाणं भवति। चचतुरा- दिषु प्रमाणव्यवहार: परम्परयैवेति बाध्यम्। + कति प्रमाणानीत्वत ब्राइ।

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96 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

a. 'Proof is of three kinds;'-that is to say, 'the use of the senses' (pratyaksha), 'the recognition of signs' (anumána), and 'testimony' (sabda), are the [three kinds of] proofs .*

b. But then [some one may incline to say,] let ' comparison' [which is reckoned in the Nyaya a specifically distinct source of knowledge,] and the others [-such as 'Conjecture,' &c., which are reckoned in like manner in the Mímansa-], be instruments of right knowledge [as well as these three] in [the matter of] the discriminating of Nature and Soul :- he therefore says ' because if these [three] be established,' &c. And, since, if there be the three kinds of proof, everything [that is really true] can be esta- blished [by means of them] there is no establishment of more,'- no addition to the proofs can be fairly made out,-because of the cumbrousness [-that sins against the philosophical maxim that we are not to assume more than is necessary to account for the case-]: such is the meaningt.

c. For the same reason Manu also has laid down only a triad of proofs-where he says [-see the Institutes, ch. xii. v. 105 -]" By that man who seeks a distinct knowledge of his duty, these three [sources of right knowledge] must be well under- stood-viz. Perception, Inference, and Scriptural authority in its various shapes [of legal institute, &c]". And 'Composition' and 'Tradition' (aitihya), and the like, are include under Inference and Testimony; and 'Non-perception' (anupalabdhi), and the

• निविधं प्रमाणमिति प्रत्यच्ानुमानशन्दा: प्रमाधानी- त्यथ:।

• ननूपमानाद्यपि प्रक्वतिपुरुषविवेक प्रमापमस्लित्वत ब्राइ तत्तिद्वाविति विविधप्रमापसिद्ाच सर्वस्ार्थस सिद्धे- नाधिक्यसिदिर्न प्रमाणाधिवयं सिध्यति गौरवाहित्वर्यः।

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BOOK I. 97

like, are included under Perception* [-for, the non-perception of an absent jar on a particular spot of ground, is nothing else than the perception of that spot of ground without a jar on it].

d. He next states the definitions of the varietiest [of proof,- having already,-$88,-given the general definition].

यत्मम्बद्ं सत्तदाकारोल्लेखिविज्ञानं तत्प्त्यक्षम्॥०।

Perception defined. Aph. 90 .- Perception (pratyaksha) is that discernment which, being in conjunction [with the thing perceived], portrays the form thereof.

a. 'Being in conjunction'-[literally] 'existing in conjunc- tion ;'-'portrays the form thereof'-i. e. assumes the form of the thing with which it is in conjunction [-as water assumes the form of the vessel into which it is poured-]; what ' discern- ment'-or affection of the Intellect-[does this], that [affection of the Intellect-see Yoga Aphorisms, §5 and §8. b.] is the evi- dence called Perception ;- such is the meaning.t

b. But then, [some one may say] this [definition of Perception

• अत एव मनुनापि प्रमाणचयमेवोपन्यखं प्रत्चमनु- मानञ्न शास्त्रन्न्न विविधागमं त्यं सुविदितं कार्य धर्मशुद्धि- मभीपतेति। उपमानैतिह्यादोनाच्चानुमानशन्दया: प्रवेश अनुपलन्धादीनाञ्च प्रत्यचे प्रवेश दति। + विशेषलक्षणमाइ। + सम्बदधं सत् सम्बद्धं भवत्। तदाकारोल्लेखि सम्बद्ध- वस्त्वाकारधारि भर्वात। यद्विज्ञानं बुद्धिटत्तिसत्प्रत्वं प्रमा- पमित्यर्थः ॥ M Digitized Google

98 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

$90-] does not extend [as we conceive it ought, and presume it is intended, to do] to the perception, by adepts in the Yoga, of things past, future, or concealed [by stone-walls or such inter- vening things as interrupt ordinary perception], because there is here no 'form of the thing-in conjunction' [with the mind of him who perceives it while absent] :- having pondered this doubt, he corrects it by [stating as follows] the fact that this [supernatural sort of perception] is not what he intends to define .*

योगिनामवाह्यप्रत्य सत्वाब्र दोष:। १ ।

The definition not to be blamed though it should not apply to the Aph. 91 .- It is not a fault, [in perceptions of the mystic. the definition, that it does not apply to the perceptions of adepts in the Yoga,] because that of the adepts in the Yoga is not an external perception.

a. That is to say,-it is only sense-perception that is to be here defined, and the adepts of the Yoga do not perceive through the external [organs of sense] ;- therefore there is no fault [in our definition],-i. e. there is no failure to inclade the perceptions of theset [because there is no intention to include them].

b. [But, although this reply is as much as the objector has any right to expect,] he states the real justificationt [of the definition in question].

सम्बद्धवस्त्वाकाराभा वादित्याशंक्य तस्ताप च्यलेन समाधने।

वतो न दोपो न तत्प्वचे Sव्यात्रिरित्यर्यः।

• वालवं समाधानमाइ।।

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BOOK I. 99

But the definition does apply to the perceptions of the mystic. Aph. 92 .- Or, there is no fault [in the definition] because of the con- junction, with causal things, of that [mystical mind] which has attained exaltation.

a. Or, be it so, that the perception of the Yogi also shall be the thing to be defined, still there is no fault [in our definition, §90], -it does not fail to extend [to this also], since the mind of the Yogi, in the exaltation gained from the habitude produced by concentration, does come into conjunction with things [as exist- cnt] in their causes* [whether or not with the things as developed into products perceptible by the external senses].

b. Here the word rendered "causal" (lina) denotes the things, not in conjunction [with the senses], alluded to by the objector [in §90. b] :- for we, who assert that effects exist [from eternity in their causes before taking the shape of effects, and likewise in these same causes when again resolved into their causes], hold that even what is past, &c., still essentially exists, and that hence its conjunction [with the mind of the mystic or the clairvoyant] is possible.t

Objection that the definition does not apply to the per- c. But then [some one may say]- ceptions of the ' Lord.' still this [definition] does not extend to the Lord's perceptions, because, * अ्रथवासु योगिप्रत्यक्षमपि लक्ष्यं तथापि न दोषो नाव्यापि:। यतो लीनवसुषु लव्धयोगजधर्मजन्यातिशयस योगिचित्तस्य सम्बन्धो घटते। + बब लीनशन्दः पराभिप्रेतासचिकष्टवाची। सत्ार्य- वादिनां हनीतादिकमपि सरूपतोSगीति तकम्बन्वकमभवे- दिति।

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100 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

since these are from everlasting [-past, present, and future, being, as regards Him, indifferent-], they cannot result from conjunc- tion. To this he replies :*-

ईश्वरासिद्वे: ॥९ ३।

That any ' Lord' erists is Aph. 93 .- [This objection to the de- not proved. finition of Perception has no force] be- cause it is not proved that there is a Lord (iswara).

a. That there is no fault [in the definition of Perception] be- cause there is no proof that there is a Lord-is suppliedt [from §91].

b. And this demurring to there being any 'Lord' is merely in accordance with the arrogant dictum of certain partisans [who hold an opinion not recognised by the majority]; therefore, it is to be understood, the expression employed is ' because it is not proved that there is a Lord,'-but not the expression ' because there is no Lord.'t

c. But on the implication that there is a 'Lord,' what we mean to speak of [in our definition of Perception-§90-] is merely the being of the same kind with what is produced by conjunctiong [of a sense-organ with its object,-and the percep-

• ननु तथापीश्वरप्रत्यचे Sव्याप्िसस्य नित्यत्वेनासच्निकर्ष- जन्यत्वात्तवाह। + ईश्वरे प्रमाणाभावाददोष दत्यनुवर्न्तते।। + अयश्वे्वरप्रतिषेध एकदेशिनां प्राढवादेनैव अ्रत एवे- श्वरासिद्वेरितुत्तं न त्वौश्वराभावादिति बोधयम्। 8 ईश्वराम्युपगमे तु सभ्निकर्षजन्यजातीयत्वमेव विर्वाच् तम्।

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BOOK I. 101

tions of the 'Lord' may be of the same kind with such percep- tions, though they were not to come from the same source].

d. Having pondered the doubt ' How should the Lord not be proved [to exist] by the Scripture and the Law [which declare his existence] ?'-he states a dilemma which excludes this .*

मुत्तबद्धयोरन्यतराभावान्न तत्िद्वि:॥६४।

A dilemma to exclude proof that there is any ' Lord.' Aph. 94 .- It is not proved that He [the ' Lord'] exists, because, of free and bound, He can be neither the one nor the other.

a. The ' Lord' whom you imagine,-tell us-is He free from troubles &c., or is He in bondage through these? Since He is not,-cannot be,-either the one or the other, it is not proved that there is a ' Lord :'-such is the meaning.t

b. He explains just this point.t

The force of the dilemma. Aph. 95 .- Either way He would be inefficient.

a. Since, if He were free, He would have no desires which instigate Him to create; and, if He were bound, He would be *श्रुतिमृतिम्यां कथमीशो न सिद्येदित्याशंक्य तर्कवि- रोवं बाधकमाइ। + ईश्वरो Sभिमतः किं केशादिभिमक्रो वा तैर्बद्दो वा

• तदेवाइ़।

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102 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

under delusion ;- He must be [on either alternative,] unequal to the creation &c .* [of this world].

b. But then, [it may be asked,] if such be the case, what be- comes of the scripture texts which declare the 'Lord?' To this he replies.t

मुक्तात्मनः प्रशंसा उपासा सिद्धस्य वा॥६६।

The import of the texts which speak of the ' Lord.' Aph. 96 .- [The scriptural texts which make mention of the 'Lord,' are] either glorifications of the liberated Soul, or homages to the rocognised [deities of the Hindu pantheon].

a. That is to say :- accordingly as the case may be, some text [among those in which the term ' Lord' occurs,] is intended-in the shape of a glorification [of Soul] as the 'Lord' fas Soul is held to be,] merely in virtue of junction [with Nature]-to incite [to still deeper contemplation],-to exhibit, as what is to be known, the liberated Soul-i. e. absolute Soul in general :- and some other text, declaratory, for example, of creatorship pre- ceded by resolution [to create], is intended to extol [-and to purify the mind of the contemplator by enabling him to take a part in extolling-] the eternity, &c., of the familiarly known Brahma, Vishnu, Siva, or other non-eternal ' Lord,'-since these, though possessed of the conceit [of individuality] &c., [and in so far liable to perish] have immortality in a secondary senset [-seeing that the Soul in every combination is immortal, thongh the combination itself is not so]. * मुक्तते सष्टिप्रयोजकरागाद्यभावाद्दद्वत्वेच मूढलाव सृध्ादि क्षमत्वमित्वर्यः। + नन्वेवमीश्वर प्रतिपादकम्पुतीनां का गतिखनाइ। यथायोगं काचित् श्रुतिमु क्तालन: केवलालसामान्यस

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BOOK I. 103

b. But then [some one may say], even if it were thus [as alleged under §96], what is heard [in scripture-viz .- ] the fact that it [viz. Soul] is the governor of Nature &c., would not be the case,-for, in the world, we speak of government only in re- ference to modifications [preceded and determined] by resolu- tions [that so and so shall take place], &c. To this he replies .* तत्व्निधानादविष्ठाहतं मणिवत् । ६७।

Soul, like the loadstone, acts not by resolve but through Aph. 97 .- The governorship there. prozimity. of [i. e. of Soul over Nature] is from its proximity [thereto,-not from its resolving to act thereon-], as is the case with the gem [-the load-stone-in regard to iron].

a. If it were alleged that its [Soul's] creativeness or its gover- norship were through a resolve [to create or to govern], then this objection [brought forward under §96. b.] would apply ;- but [it is not so-for] by us [Sankhyas] it is held that the Soul's governorship, in the shape of creatorship, or the like, is merely from its prorimity [to Nature]-"as is the case with the [load- stone] gem."t

जेयताविधानाय स्निधिमात्रेश्चयेण सुतिरूपा प्ररोचनाथा काचिच्च सङल्यपूर्वकस्तध्टृत्वादिप्रतिपादिका श्रुति: सिदधस्य

• नठु तथापि प्रक्ृताद्यधिष्ठाहत्वं स्रूयमाणं नोपपद्यते लोके सङल्पादिना परिणमनस्येवाचिष्ठानव्यवह़ारादिति तनाइ़। + यदि सङल्ेन सषटत्वमविष्ठात्वमुचते तदायं दोष:

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104 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS. b. As the gem, the load-stone, acts as an attracter of iron, merely by proximity, without resolving [so to act], so, by the mere conjunction of the primal Soul, Nature is changed into the principle called the ' Great One' [or Mind-see §62-]. And in this alone consists [what we speak of as] its acting as creator to- towards that which is superadded to it :- such is the meaning .* c. And thus it is declared [in some one of the Puranas]-" As the iron acts whilst the gem [the loadstone] stands void of voli- tion, just so the world is created by a deity who is mere Exis- tence. Thus it is that there is in the Soul both agency [seem- ingly], and non-agency [really] :- it is not an agent, inasmuch as it is devoid of volition; and it is an agent, merely through ap- proximation [to Nature]."t d. In respect of worldly products also, animal souls overrule merely through their approximation [to Nature]; so he declares as follows.$ स्यात्। अ्रम्माभिस पुरुषस्य सव्निधानादेवािष्ठाहृत्वं सट्ट त्वादिरूपमिष्यते मणिवत्। * यथायसकान्तमणे: साम्निष्यमाच्रेष लोडाकर्षकत्वं सङ्क- ल्पादिना विना तथेवादि पुरुषस्य संयोगमात्रेष प्रक्ृतेमंइ- नत्वरूपेण परिणमनं। ददमेवच खोपािस्रषटृत्वमित्र्थः। + तथाचोत्तं। निरिच्के संख्िते रत्ने यथा लोड: प्रव- नेते। सत्तामाब्रेष देवेन तथैवायं जगज्जनिः। अरत आत्मनि कर्नृत्वमकर्तत्वच्त संस्थितम्। निरिच्क्वत्वादकनासी क्त्ता स्विधिमाचत द्रति। + लौकिककार्येव्वपि जोवानां सविधिमाचणवाचिष्ठाट- त्वमित्याइ।

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BOOK I. 105

विशेषकार्येव्वपि जीवानाम्।९८।

Embodied souls do Aph. 98 .- In the case of individual products not energize. also, [the apparent agency] of animal souls [is solely through proximity].

a. 'The agency is solely through proximity,'-so much is supplied* [from §97].

b. The meaning is this,-that, in the case also of particular productions,-the creation, &c., of things individual [as contra- distinguished from that of all things in the lump-see Vedanta- sara §67], animal souls-i. e. souls in which the intellects [of individuals] reflect themselves [-see §100. a.]-over-rule mere- ly through proximity, but not through any effort,-seeing that these [animal souls] are none other than the motionless Thought.t

c. But then [some one may say], if there were no eternal and omniscient ' Lord', then, through the doubt of a blind tradition [obviated by no intelligently effective guardianship], the Vedas would cease to be an authority-[a possibility which, of course, cannot be entertained for an instant]. To this he replies.t

• सधिष्ठाळृतवं सव्िधानादेवेत्यनुषज्यते।।

• विशेषकार्येषु व्यष्टसथ्यादिव्वपि जीवानां अन्तःकरण- प्रतिबिम्बितचेतनामां सव्निधानादेवाधिष्ठाळत्वं नतु केना- पि व्यवहारेण कूटखचिनाजत्ादित्र्यः। + मनु नित्वसर्व शश्वराभावेद्वपरम्पराशक्या वेदाप्रा- माएयं स्यादत ब्राइ। N Digitized Google

106 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

How the Vedas need not the ' Lord' to authenticate them. Aph. 99 .- The declaration of the texts or sense [of the Veda, by Brahmá for example], since he knows the truth-[is authoritative evi- dence].

a. To complete the aphorism we must say-" since Hiranya- garbha [i. e. Brahma] and others [viz. Vihnu and Siva], are knowers of what is certain-i. e. of what is true-, the declara- tion of the texts or sense of the Vedas, where these are the speakers, is evidence* [altogether indisputable].

ỏ. But then, if Soul, by its simple proximity [to Nature-$97 -], is an overruler in a secondary sense [only] of the term, [-as the magnet may be said, in a secondary sense, to draw the iron, while the conviction is entertained that actually, and literally, the iron draws the magnet,-] then who is the primary [or ac- tualJ overruler ? In reference to this he says.t

खम् ॥ १००॥ It is in the shape of the internal Aph. 100 .- The internal organ, organ that Nature affects Soul. through its being enlightened thereby [-i. e. by Soul-] is the over-ruler,-as is the iron [in respect of the magnet].

• हिरएयगभादीनां सिद्धरूपस्य यथार्थस्य बोड्डत्वात्तइ- कृको वेदवाक्यार्थेापदेशः प्रमाणमिति शेषः। + ननु पुरुषस्य चेतत्निधिमात्रेण गणमचिष्ठातत्वं ताईि

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BOOK 1. 107

a. The internal organ, i. e. the understanding, is the over- ruler, through its fancying itself to be Soul, [as it does fancy] by reason of its being enlightened by the Soul, through its happening to reflect itself in [and contemplate itself in] Soul ;- 'just as the iron,'-that is to say-as the attracting iron, though inactive, draws [the magnet] in consequence of its mere proximi- ty .*

b. He now [-having discussed the evidence that consists in direct peroeption-] states the definition of an inductiont (anu- mána). प्रतिबन्वदश: प्रतिब द्वच्ञानमनुमानम्॥१०१॥ Aph. 101 .- The knowledge of the con- An Induction defined. nected, through perception of the connec- tion, is an induction.

a. That is to say,-an induction [or conviction of a general truth] is [a kind of] evidence consisting in a mental modification, [which is none other than] the knowledge of the connected, i. e. of the constant accompanier, through the knowledge of the con- stant accompaniment :- by 'connection' (pratibandha) here be- ing meant 'constant attendedness' (vyapti), and through the perception thereoft [it being that the mind has possession of any general principle]. अन्तःकरणस्य बुद्धे: पुरुषच्कवायापत्या तेन चैत्येनो- जृलितत्वाच्चेतनत्वाभिमानादविष्ठाषत्वं लोइवदिति यथा- कर्षको लोडो निष्कियो पि सश्िधिमाचेण कर्षतीति।

• खनुमानलचगमाइ।

• प्रतिबन्धो व्याप्रिसडदशः व्यापिज्ञानात् प्रतिबद्धस्स व्या- पकस्य ज्ञानं टन्तिरूपममुमानं प्रमाणमित्वर्थः ।

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108 . THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

b. But an inference (anumiti) is knowledge in the soul *- [whilst the Induction-so far forth as it is an instrument in the establishment of knowledge deducible from it-is an affection of the internal organ, or understanding,-see §88. c.].

c. He next defines testimonyt (sabda).

Valid Testimony defined. Aph. 102 .- Testimony [such as is en- titled to the name of evidence-] is a fit declaration.

a. Here 'fitness' means 'suitableness ;'-and so the evidence which is called 'Testimony' is the knowledge arising from a suit- able declaration ;- such is the meaning :- and [while this be- longs to the understanding, or internal organ,-see §101. b .- ] the result is that [knowledge] in the Soul which is called 'know- ledge by hearing't (śabda-bodha).

b. He next volunteers to tell us what is the use of his setting forth [the various divisions of j evidence.§

उभयसिद्धि: प्रमाणात्तदुपदेशः॥१०३।

Why the kinds of Evidence have been here set forth. Aph. 103 .- Since the establishment of both [soul and not-soul] is by means

*अमुमितिसु पौरिपेयो बोध कति। + शब्दं लचयति। + आप्िरव योग्यता। तथाच थोग्यपशन्दसव्जन्यध्ञानं

8 प्रमाणप्रतिपादनस्य खयमेव फलमाइ्।

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BOOK 1. 109

of evidence,-the declaration thereof [i. e. of the kinds of evi- dence, has been here made].

a. It is only by means of evidence that both Soul and not- soul are established as being distinct [the one from the other] ;- therefore has this, viz. evidence, been here declared ;- such is the meaning .*

b. Among these [several proofs] he now describes that one by which especially-viz. by a proof which is one kind of inference -Nature and Soul are here to be established discriminatively.t

सामान्यता दृष्टादुभयासद्ि:।१०४।

The eristence of Soul and Na- Aph. 104 .- The establishment ture argued from analogy. of both [Nature and Soul] is by analogy.

a. [Analogy (sámányato-drishta) is that kind of evidence which is employed in the case] where, by the force [as an argument] which the residence of any property in the subject derives from a know- ledge of its being constantly accompanied [by something which it may therefore betoken], when we have had recourse to [as the means of determining this constant accompaniment,] what is, for instance, generically of a perceptible kind,[where-under such cir- cumstances-we repeat-] anything of a different kind-i. e. not cognizable by the senses-is established :- as when, for example having apprehended a constant accompaniment [-e. g. that an * उभयोरात्मानात्मनोविवेकेन सिद्धि: प्रमाणादेव भवति व्रतसस्य प्रमाणसोपदेश: कृत इत्यर्थः ।

• तब्र येनानुमानविशेषेण प्रमाणेन मुख्यतो 5च प्रक्वति- पुरुषो विविष साधनीयौ तद्दर्षयति।

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110 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

act implies an instrument-] by taking into consideration such instruments as axes, &c., which are of earthy and other kinds, a quite heterogeneous, imperceptible, instrument of knowledge,-viz. [the instrument named] Sense-is established for inferred to ex- ist] :- such is what we mean by Analogy; and it is by this [spe- cies of inference] that Nature and Soul are proved to exist,-such is the meaning .* b. Of these [viz. Nature and Soul] the argument from analogy for [the existence of] Nature is as follows. The great Principle [-viz. Understanding see §62. c.] is formed out of the things [called] Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion [-to the aggregate of which three in equipoise-see §62-the name of Nature is giv- en-], because, whilst it is [undeniably] a production, it has the characters of Pleasure, Pain, and Delusion ; just as a bracelet, or the like, formed of gold, or the like,t [has the characteristic properties of the gold, or the like, and is thereby known to have been formed out of gold or the like]. c. But [as regards the argument from analogy in proof of the existence] of Soul-[it is, as stated before, under §67, to the following effect] :- Nature is for the sake of another, because it is something that acts as a combination,-as a house, for instance, * यब सामान्यतः प्रत्यच्ादिजातीयमादाय व्याप्निग्रड़ा- त्पच्धर्मताबलेन तद्विजातीयो Sप्रत्यचार्यसिथ्यति यथा पृथिवोलवादिजातीयं कुठारादिकरणमादाय व्याप्निं गृह्डीता तद्िजातीयमतीन्द्रियं ज्ञानकरणमिन्द्रियं साध्यत इति तत् सामान्यतो दष्टं तक्ादुभयो: प्रक्तिपुरुषयोस्सिद्विरितर्थः। + तब प्रक्ृतेससामान्यता दष्टमनुमानं। यथा। महत्तरवं सुखदुःखमोइट्रओ्योपादानकं कार्यत्वे सति सुखदुःखमोड- धर्मक त्वात्म वर्णादिजकण्डलादिविति।

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BOOK I. 111

[which is a combination of various parts combined for the benefit of the tenant]. In this instance, having gathered, in regard to houses, &c., the fact, established on sense-perception, that they exist for the sake of [organised] bodies, for example,-something of a different kind therefrom [i. e. from Nature]-viz. Soul-is inferred [by analogy as something other than Nature, &c.,- [which, as being a compound thing, is not designed for itself] ;- such is the meaning .*

d. But then [some one may say]-since Nature is eternal, and exertion is habitual to her, [and the result of her action is the bondage of the Soul,] there should constantly be experience [whether of pleasure or of pain], and hence no such thing as thorough emancipation. To this he replies:t- चिद्वसानो भोग:॥१०५ ।

When it is that experience Aph. 105 .- Experience [whether of ceases. pain or pleasure] ends with [the dis- cernment of] Thought-[or Soul, as contradistinguished from Nature].

a. By 'Thought' we mean Soul. Experience [whether of pain or pleasure] ceases on the discerning thereof. As ' antece- dent non-existence,' though devoid of a beginning, [-see Tarka- sangraha §92-] surceases [-when the thing antecedently non- existent begins to be-], so eternal Nature [-eternal as re-

*पुरुषस्य तु प्रधानं परार्थे संत्यकारित्वाङ्गडादिवदित्यन प्रत्यचसिद्धं देह्ादयर्थकत्वं ग्रृद्तादिषु ए्ृष्दीत्वा तद्विजातीय: पुरुष: प्रधानारदिपरत्वेनानुमीयत कति। ननु प्रक्ृतेर्नित्यतातमद्टत्तिशीलत्वाच्च सर्वदा भोग र्रत्य- निर्माच: स्ादित्यत ब्राइ।

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112 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

gards the absence of any beginning-] continues [no further than] till the discernment of the difference [between Nature and Soul] :- so that experience [whether of pain or pleasure] does not at all times occur :- such is the state of the case .*

b. [But some one may say]-if Nature were the agent, and Soul the experiencer, then it might happen that another should be the experiencer of [the results of ] the acts done by one diffe- rent. To this he replies :t-

अ्रकतुरपि फलोपभोगो Sवाद्यवत् ॥९०६। The fruit of the action is not always the agent's. Aph. 106 .- The experience of the fruit may belong even to another than the agent, as in the case of food, &c.

a. As it belongs to the cook to prepare the food, &c., and to one who was not the agent, viz. the master, to enjoy the fruit thereof [-i. e. the fruit of the cook's actions-], so is the case here.t

b. Having stated a practical maxim [-which may serve in practice to silence, by the argumentum ad hominem, him on whose

• चिदात्मा। तद्विवेकावसानो भोग:। यथानादिरपि प्रागभावो नश्यति तथा नित्ाया: प्रक्वतेर्विवेकज्ञानपर्यन्नतः प्रसर दति न सर्वदा भोगापत्तिरिति भाव:। यदि कर्नृ प्रधानं भोत्ता पुरुषर्साई अन्यऊतस कर्मयो डन्यो भोक्रेति स्यादित्याइ। + यथा सपकार स्याब्रादिकर्वत्वमकतुरीव्वरस्य पलोपभो- ृत्वं तथाचापीति।

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BOOK I. 113

principles it may be valid-], he now declares his own doctrine* [in regard to the doubt started under §105. b].

स्रविवेकाद्ा तत्िद्रे: कर्तु: फलावगम:।१०७।

Nature is agent but Aph. 107 .- Or [-to give a better account not patient. of the matter than that given in §106-], since it is from non-discrimination that it is derived, the notion that the agent has the fruit [of the act, is a wrong notion].

a. The soul is neither an agent nor a patient, but, from the fact that the Great Principle [-the actual agent-see 99 b.] is re- flected in it, there arises the conceit of its being an agent. ' Or, since it is from non-discrimination, &c.,'-that is to say,-because it is from the failure to discriminate between Nature and Soul that this takes place,-i. e. that the conceit takes place that it is the agent that experiences the fruit :t [-whereas the actual agent is Nature, which, being unintelligent, can experience neither pain nor pleasure].

b. The opposite of this [wrong view referred to in §107] he states as follows.t

नोभयन्त तखवास्याने॥१०८॥

Soul is neither agent Aph. 108 .- And when the truth is made nor patient. known, there is [seen to be] neither [agency, in Soul, nor experience].

• न पुरुष: कर्त्ता न वा भोत्ता किन्मु मडस्तखप्रनिबिम्बि- तत्वात् कर्ळत्वाभिमान: । अविवेकाद्ेति प्र्लतिपुरुषयोर्षि-

• एतदतिरेकमाइ। 0

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114 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

a. 'When the truth is told' [and discerned], i. e. when, by means of evidenoe, Nature and Soul are perceived [in their en- tire distinctness one from the other], 'there is neither'-i. e. neither the condition [as regards soul] of an agent or a patient .*

b. Having discussed [the varieties of] evidence, he now states the distribution of the object-matter of evidence.t

विषयो Sविषयो Sप्यतिदूरादेडानोपादानाम्या- मिन्द्रियस॥ १०६।

What is peroeptible under Aph. 109 .- [A thing may be] an certain circumstances may be object [perceptible] and also [at another imperceptible ander others. time] not an object, through there be- ing, in consequence of great distance, &c., a want of, or [in the absence of opposing causes] an appliance of, the sense.

a. An object [is a perceived object], through the proximity, or conjunction, of the sense [with the object]. A thing may be not an object [perceived], through the want of the sense, i. e. through the want of conjunction [between the sense and what would otherwise be its object]. And this want of conjunction [may result] from the junction's being prevented by great dis- tance, &c.t

• तत्वाख्थाने प्रमाणेन प्रक्तिपुरुषयोखाच्ारकारे नोभवं न कर्हत्वं न भोकृत्वमिति।

• प्रभागमुक्ता प्रमेयव्यवस्थामाइ। * रन्द्रियशोपादानात् सम्बन्वादियः। इव्ध्रियम इामात् सम्बन्याभवादविषय:। नयम्यन्वातिदूराटेरयो म्यतात्।

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BOOK 1. 115

What may prevent percep- b. [To explain the "&c.," and ex- tion. emplify the causes that may prevent the conjunction, required in order to perception, between the thing and the sense, we may remark that]-it is in consequence of great distance 'that a bird [flying very high up] in the sky is not perceived :- [then again] in consequence of extreme proxi- mity the collyrium located in the eye [is not perceived by the eye itself] :- a thing placed in [the inside of, or on the opposite side of,] a wall [is not perceived] in consequence of the obstruc- tion :- from distraction of mind the unhappy, or other [agitated person], does not perceive the thing that is at his side [-or un- der his very nose-] :- through its subtilty an Atom [is not per- ceived] :- nor is a very small sound when overpowered by the sound of a drum :- and so on .*

e. How [-or, for which of the possible reasons just enumera- ted-] comes the imperceptibleness of Nature? In regard to this he declares:+-

सौख्षयान्तदनुपलबिधि:।११०।

The subtilty of Nature. Aph. 110 .- Her imperceptibless arises from her subtilty.

a. 'Her'-i. e. Nature's-imperceptibleness is from subtility. By subtilty is meant the fact of being difficult to investignte,

• अ्तिदूराद्वियति पच्ची नोपलभ्यते। अतिसामीप्याछ्टो- चनस्ान्जनं। व्यवधानात्कुड्यसं वसु। मनो Sनवस्थाना- कोकादिग्रसस्य पार्व्लवस्वग्रणं। सौक्यादणे:। ब्रभि- भमात् मईलधुनिना सस्पधुनेदिव्ादि।

• प्रक्कते: कथमनुपलब्धिरित्यत ब्राह।

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116 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

not [-as a Naiyayika might perhaps here prefer understanding the term-] the consisting of Atoms,-for Nature is [not atomic, in the opinion of the Sankhyas, but] all-pervasive .*

b. How then [it may be asked] is [the existence of] Nature determined? To this he replies:t-

कार्यदर्शनान्तदुपलब्धे॥ १११॥

Nature inferred from the cristence Aph. 111 .- [Nature exists] be- of productions. cause her existence is gathered from the beholding of productions.

a. As the knowledge of [there being such things as] atoms comes from the beholding of jars, &c., [-which are agglomera- tions-], so the knowledge of Nature comes from the beholding of products which have the three Qualities;t [-see §62. a .- and the existence of which implies a cause, to which the name of Nature is given, in which these constituents exist from eternity]. b. Some [-the Vedantins-]say that the world has Brahma as its cause; others [-the Naiyayikas-] that it has atoms as its cause; but our seniors [-the transmitters of the Sankhya * तस्या: प्रक्ृतेरनुपलन्धिसाछ्छयात्। दुरूइलं सच्षयं म त्वपुत्वं प्रक्ृतेर्विभुत्वादिति। + कयं ताई प्रकृतिव्यवस्थेत्यत ब्राइ।

• यथा घटादिदर्शनात्परमाणुश्नं तथा निगुषकार्य दर्शनात् प्रक्वतिज्ञानमिति।

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BOOK 1. 117

doctrine-] that it has Nuture as its cause :- so he sets forth a doubt [which might naturally found itself ] thereon .*

वादिविप्रतिपत्तेसदसिद्विरिति चेत्। ११२ ।

A doubt thrown on the eristence Aph. 112 .- If [you throw out of Nature by the contradiction of dissentients. the doubt that] it [-viz. the ex- istence of Nature-] is not esta- blished, because of the contradiction of asserters [of other views, then you will find an answer in the next aphorism].

a. 'Because of the contradiction of asserters [of the Vedanta or Nyáya], it is not established,'-i. e. Nature [-as asserted by the Sankhyas-] is not established.t

b. But then [-to set forth the objection of these counter- asserters-], if a product existed antecedently to its production [as that product,] then an eternal Nature [such as you Sankhyas contend for] would be proved to exist as the [necessary] substra- tum thereof,-since, you will declare that a cause is inferred only as the invariable accompanier of an effect; butit is denied by us asserters [of the Vedánta, &c.] that the effect does exist [antece- dently to its production-well] if [this doubt be thrown out] ;- such is the meaningt [of the aphorism].

• ब्रह्मकारणं जगदिति केचित् परमाणुकारणमित्यन्ये मधानकारणकमिति दृद्वा दति तच संशयमाइ। + वाटिनां विप्रतिपन्तेसदसिद्ि: प्रधानासिद्वि:। + ननु कार्य चेदुत्पन्ते: प्राक सिद्धं स्थात तदा तदाधार- तया नित्या प्रक्ृति: कार्यसाहित्येनव कारणानुमानवच्य-

त्वर्थ.।

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118 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

c. He states his doctrine on this point .*

तथा त्वेकतरदथा एकतरसिद्रेनीपलाप:॥११३।

Mutual denials settle nothing. Aph. 113 .- But since thus each [doctrine] is established in the opi- nion of each, a [mere unsupported] denial is not [decisive].

a. If one side were disproved merely by the dissent of the oppo- nent, then [look you] there is dissent against the other side too,- so how should it be established? If the one side is established by there being inevitably attendant the recognition of the constant accompanier on the recognition of that which is constantly ac- companied by it, it is the same with my side also ;- therefore my inference from effect [to cause] is not to be deniedt [in this pe. remptory fashion].

b. Well then [-the opponent may say-], let [the inference of ] cause from effect be granted, how is it that this [cause] is Nature-and nothing else [-such as Atoms, for instance]? To this he replies.t

• सिद्धान्तमाइ।

• यदि वादिविप्रतिपत्तिमाच्रेष पक्ासिदत्वं बिपयेडपि विप्रतिपनतिरतीति कयं तलिद्विः। वदि व्यायशनाद व्यापकज्ञानस्ाविनाभा वितात्य चसिद्धिरखा ममाप्येवमति म कार्यादनुमानापलाप:।

• ननु कार्यात्कारणमसु तच्च प्रक्ृतिरेवेति कथमित्वत

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BOOK I. 119

Nature the only hypothesis con- sistent with what appears. Aph. 114 .- Because [if we were to infer any other cause than Na- ture] we should have a contradiction to the threefold [aspect which things really exhibit].

a. Quality is threefold [see §62. a.]-viz. Goodness, Passion, and Darkness :- there would be a contradiction to these,-such is the meaning .*

b. The drift here is as follows :- If the character of cause [of all things around us] belonged to Atoms, or the like, then there would be a contradiction to the fact of being an aggregate of plea- sure, pain, and delusion, which is recognisable in the world ;t [- because nothing, we hold, can exist in the effect which did not exist in the cause,-and pleasure, pain, &c., are no properties of Atoms].

c. He now repels the doubt as to whether the production of an effect is that of what existed [antecedently] or of what did not exist.t नासदुत्पादा सष्टङ्गवत् । ११५।

What never was will never be. Aph. 115 .- The production of what is no entity, as a man's horn, does not take place.

• चिविधो गुणख्त्वरजसमांसि तद्विरोध हत्र्थः। + इदमचाकूतं यदि परमाषादीनां कारवरं तदा जम- त्युपलभ्यमानस्य सुखदुःखमोददात्मकत्वस्व विरोध: स्यादिति। + रदानी कार्यस सत उत्पन्तिरसतो वेनि संशयं निरसयि।

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120 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

a. Of that which, like the horn of a man, is not an entity, even the production is impossible ;- such is the meaning. And so the import is, that that effect alone which [antecedently] exists is [at any time] produced .*

b. He states an argument, why an effect must be some [previ- ously existent] entity.t

उपादाननियमात्॥११६॥

A product cannot be of nothing. Aph. 116 .- Because of the rule that there must be some material [of which the product may consist].

a. And only when both are extant is there from the presence of the cause the presence of the effect :- otherwise everywhere, and always, every effect might be produced,-[the presence of the cause being, on the supposition, superfluous]. This he states as follows.t

सर्वच सर्वदा सर्वासमवात्॥ ११७॥

Else any thing might occur at any time anywhere. Aph. 117 .- Because every thing is not possible every where, always.

a. That is to say,-because in the world we see that every thing is not possible, i. e. that every thing is not produced,

• नरश्टक्रतुख्यस्यासत उत्पादो डपि न समभवतीत्र्थः तथाच सदेव कार्यमुत्पद्यत र्रत्याशय:। + सात्कर्ये न्यायमाइ। + कारणसम्बन्वात्कार्यसम्बन्वन्न विद्यमानयोरेव। बान्यथा सर्वज सर्वदा सर्वोत्पत्तिस्सयात्। एतदेवाइ।

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BOOK I. 121

'evary where,' i. e. in every place,-' always,' i. e. at all times .*

b. And for the following reason also, he declares, there is no production of what existed nott [antecedently].

शत्तस शक्यकरणात्। ११८।

Efects pre-exist Aph. 118 .- Because that which is possible potentially in their caxses. is made out of that which is competent [to the making of it.]

a. Because the being the material [of any future product] is nothing else than the fact of [being it potentially, i. e. of] hav- ing the power to be the product; and this power is nothing else than the product's condition as that of what has not yet come to pass ;- therefore, since that which has the power, viz., the cause, makes the product which is capable [of being made out of it], it is not of any nonentity that the production takes place :- such is the meaning.t

b. He states another argument.§

• सर्वन सर्व्मिन् देशे सर्वदा सर्वस्मिम् काले सर्वासमा-

• इतस नासदुत्पाद इत्याइ। + कार्यशक्रिमखवमेव छुपादानलं शक्रिच् कार्यसयाना- गतावशेवेति शत्रस्य कारणस्य राज्यकारयंकरषादृपि मासत उत्पाद ड्रव्र्थ: ।

5 खपरं न्यायमाइ। P Digitized by Google

122 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

कारणभावाच्च। ११६।

The product is nothing Aph. 119-And because it [-the pro- else than the cause. duct-] is [nothing else than] the cause [in the shape of the product].

a. It is declared in scripture, that, previously to production, moreover, there is no difference between the cause and its effect; -and since it is thereby settled that a product is an entity, pro- duction is not of what [previously] existed not :- such is the meaning .*

b. He ponders a doubt.t

न भावे भावयोगश्चेत्॥१२०॥

A doubt whether that which Aph. 120 .- If [it be alleged that] is can be said to become. there is no possibility of that becoming, which already is-[then the answer will be found in the next aphorism].

a. That is to say,-but then, if it be thus [-that every effect exists antecedently to its production-], since the effect [-every effect-] must be eternal [without beginning], there is no pos- sibility of [or room for] the adjunction of becoming,-the adjunc- tion of arising,-in the case of a product which is [already, by hypothesis,] in the shape of an entity,-because the employment of the term ' arising' [or the fact of being produced] has refer-

• उत्पन्ते: प्रागपि कार्यस्य कारणाभेद: स्रूयते तसाच्च सत्कार्यसिद्या नासदुत्पाद द्रत्र्थः॥

• शङते।।

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BOOK 1. 123

ence solely to what did not exist [previously] :- if this be urged :- such is the meaning .*

b. He declares the doctrine in regard to this point.t

नाभिव्याक्तिनिबम्धना व्यवहाराव्यवहारी। १२१।

Production is only manifestation, and so of the opposite. Aph. 121 .- Nay,-the employ- ment and the non-employment [of the term 'production'] are occasioned by the manifestation [or non-manifestation of what is spoken of as produced or not].

a. 'Nay'-i. e. the view stated [in §120] is not the right one.t

b. As the whiteness of white cloth which had become dirty is brought manifestly out by means of washing, &c., so, by the ope- ration of the potter is the pot brought into manifestness ;- whereas, on the blow of a mallet, it becomes hidden,§-[and no longer appears as a pot].

• नन्वेवं सति कार्यस्य नित्यत्वे सति भावरूपे कायें भाव- योग उत्पत्तियोगो न सम्भवति कासत एवोत्पत्तिव्यव हारात्

सिद्धान्तमाइ। + न नोतपचो युक्त र्त्यर्थः। 5 यथा शुक्पटस्य मलिनस्य चालनादिना शुक्कत्वमभि- व्यञ्यते तथा कलालस् व्यापाराद घटो Sभिव्यज्यते मुद्रा- भिघातात्तिरोभूयते।

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124 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

c. And manifestation [is no fiction of ours, for it] is seen ;- or example, that of oil, from sesamum-seeds, by pressure; of milk, from the cow, by milking; of the statue, that resided in the midst of the stone, by the operation of the sculptor; of rice from the rice in the husk, by threshing; &c .*

d. Therefore the employment or non-employment of the [torm] the production of an effect are dependent on manifestation -dependent on the manifestation of the effect :- that is to say, -the employment of [the term] production is in consequence of the manifestation [of what is spoken of as produced], and the non-employment of [the term] production is in consequence of there being no manifestation [of that which is therefore not spo- ken of as produced],- but [the employment of the term pro- duction is] not in consequence of that becoming an entity which was not an entity.t

e. But if [the employment of the term] production is occasion- ed by [the fact of] manifestation, by what is occasioned [the employment of the term] destruction? To this he replies.t * दष्टाचाभिव्याक्त: पीडनेन तिलेषु तलस् दोइनेन गवि

धान्ये तण्डुलस्ेत्वादि।

ना कार्याभिव्यक्रिनिमिनका। अभिव्यक्रित उत्पत्तिव्यव- हारो Sभिव्यत्वयभावाचोत्पत्तिव्यव दाराभावा नत्वसतसन्तये- त्यर्थः । + अभिव्यत्रिनिबम्धनानूत्पत्तिः कित्निबन्धनो विनाश प्रत्यत ब्राड।

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BOOK 1. 125

नाग: कारणलय:।१२२।

What is moant by destruction. Aph. 122 .- Destruction [of any thing] is the resolution [of the thing spoken of as destroyed,] into the cause [from which it was pro- duced].

a. The resolution, by the blow of a mallet, of a jar into its canse [-i. e. into the particles of clay which constitnted the jar],-to this are due both [the employment of] the term 'destruc- tion', and the kind of action [or behaviour] belonging to any thing* [which is termed its destruction]. b. [But some one may say]-if there were [only] a resolu- tion [of a product into that from which it arose], a resurrection [or waMuryeveais] of it would be seen, and this is not seen :- well [-we reply-] it is not seen by blockheads, but it is seen by those who can discriminate. For example, when thread is destroyed, it is changed into the shape of earth [-as when burned to ashes] :- and the earth is changed into the shape of a cotton-tree; and this [successively] changes into the shape of flower, fruit, and thread [spun again from the fruit of the cotton- plant]. So is it with all entities.t

• मुदराभिवाताद् घटस्य कारणे यो लयः ततिबम्धनो नाश. इति शन्दार्थकियाभेदी। + यदि लयः पुनरुद्ववो दश्येत मच दश्यत कति मूटन रशयते विवेचकैर्दश्यत एव। तथादि। तन्ती नष्टे सृद्रूपेण परिणाम: । मृदश्न कापासटन्तरूपेण परिषाम:। तख पुष्पफसतन्तुरूपेण्य परिणामः। एवं सर्वे भावा इति।

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126 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

c. Pray-[some one may ask]-is this manifestation [that you speak of under §121] something real, or something not real? If it be something real [and which, therefore, never ceases to be] then the effect [during this constant manifestation] ought con- stantly to be perceived; and if it be not real, then there is an end of your ' existent product' [§115 b.], because, also of this [manifestation-as being not from eternity-] there must be [in order to give rise to it] another manifestation, and of this another, and so on without end, [-seeing that a manifestation can be the result of nothing else than a manifestation,-on the principle that an effect consists of neither more nor less than its cause]. To this he replies .* पारम्पर्यतो Sन्वेषणाहीजाङुरवत्॥१२३।

How manifestation may occur Aph. 123 .- Because they seek without being an entity. each other reciprocally, as is the case with seed and plant, [-manifestation may generate manifesta- tion from eternity to eternity].

a. Be it so, that there are thousands of manifestations, still there is no fault, for there is no starting point,-as is the case with seed and plant,t [-which we may suppose to have served from eternity as sources one to another reciprocally].

b. He states another argument.t

• किमभिव्यक्ति: सती असती वा। सती पेत् नित्का- यापल्धिः स्ात्। असती चेत् सत्कार्यहानि: तस्या अपि अ्रभित्यत्तिरन्या तस्या ्रप्यन्येत्यनवस्थेत्यत क्राइ। + भवत्वभिव्यत्रिसइस्रं तथापि न दोषो Sनादित्वात् बीजाहुरवदिति। + युतयन्तरमाइ।

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BOOK I. 127

उत्पत्तिवद्दा डदोष: ।१२४ :

The objections to the theory Aph. 124 .- Or, [at all events, our of manifestation retorted. theory of ' manifestation' is as] blame- less as [that of ] 'production'.

a. Pray [let us ask],-is production produced, or is it not? If it is produced, then of this [production of production] there must be production ;- so that there is a regreseus in infinitum, [such as you allege against our theory under §122. c]. If it be not produced, then, pray, is this because it is un-real, or because it is eternal ? If because it is un. real, then production never is at all, so that it should never be perceived, [as you allege that it is]. Again, if [production is not something produced] because it is eternal, then there should be at all times the production of [all possible] effects,-[which you will scarcely pretend is the case]. Again, if you say,-since ' production' itself consists of produc- tion, what need of supposing an ulterior production [of produc- tion] ?- then, in like manner, [I ask,]-since 'manifestation' it- self consists of manifestation, what need of supposing an ulterior manifestation [of manifestation]? The view which you hold on this point is ours also, *- [and thus every objection stated or hinted under §122. c. is capable of being retorted].

• किमुत्पत्तिरुत्पद्यते न वा। उत्पद्यते चेत् अस्या उत्प- निरितयनवख्ा। नोत्पद्यते चेत् किमसत्त्वान्नित्यत्वाद्वा। यद्यसच्वात्कदाचिद प्युत्पत्तिनासीति सर्वदानुपलमभः स्ात्। क्रथ नित्यत्वात् सर्वदा कार्येात्पत्तिः स्ात्। अ्रथोत्पत्तेः

तच यसव सिद्धान्त: सोSस्माकमपि।

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128 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

6. He now states the community of properties [that exists] among the products of Nature mutually .*

हेतुमदनित्यमव्यापि सक्रियमनेक्रमान्रितं लिङ्म् ।९२५।

The characters common to all products. Aph. 125 .- [A product of nature is] caused, un-eternal, mutable, not all-per- vading, multitudinous, dependent, mergent.

a. 'Caused'-i. e. having a cause. ' Un-eternal,'-i. e. de- structible. 'Not all-pervading,' i. e. not present everywhere. 'Mutable'-i. e. distinguished by the act of leaving [one form] and assuming [another form]. It [the soul] leaves the body it had assumed, [and probably takes another]; and bodies, &c., move [and are mutable, as is notorious]. 'Multitudinous'-i. e .- , in consequence of the distinction of souls, [everything is pro- portionately multitudinous,-each man-e. g .- seeing a separate rainbow, though it be called but one]. 'Dependent'-i. e. [de- pendent] on its cause. Mergent,-that is to say, it [i. e. each product, in due time,] is resolved into that from which it origina- ted].t

b. [But some one may say],-if realities be the twenty-five [which the Sankhyas enumerate-see §62-and no more], pray, are such common operations as knowing, enjoying, &c., absolute- ly nothing ?- [if you say that they are so] then you give up

• प्रक्वतिकार्याणामन्योन्यं साधर्म्यमाइ।

• रेतुमत् कारणवत्। बनित्वं विनाशि। ब्रव्याप्य- सर्वगम्। सक्रियं त्यागोपादामादिक्रियाविशिष्टम्। उपान- ेहं त्यजति शरीरादयक्ष सपम्दन्ने। ब्रनेकं पुरुषभेदात। सा्रितं लकारणे। लिक्र सकारणे लयं गच्छनीति।

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BOOK I. 129

what yon see-[in order to save a hypothesis, with which that which you see is irreconcilable]. To this he replies .*

ब्रान्तस्यादभेदतो वा गुणसामान्यादेख्षतिद्धि: प्रधान- व्यपदेशाद्वा। १२६॥

The qualities of the Nyaya are Aph. 126-There is the establish- implied in the term Nature. ment of these, [which you fancy that we do not recognise because we do not explicitly enumerate them,] either by reason that these ordinary qualities [-as con- tradistinguished from the three Qualities of the Sankhya-] are truly nothing different; or [-to put it in another point of view-] because they are hinted by [the term] Nature [-in which, like our own three Qualities, they are implied].

a. Either from their being nothing different from the twenty- four principles-'truly'-really-quite evidently,-since the cha- raeter of these [twenty-four] fits the ordinary qualities, &c., [which you fancy are neglected in our enumeration of things,]- 'there is the establishment of these'-i. e. there is their esta- blishment [as realities] through their being implied just in thoset [twenty-four principles which are explicitly specified in the San- khya].

b. The word ' or' shows that there is another alternative [reply, in the aphorism, to the objection in question]. 'Or because

• यदि पञ्चविशति तत्वं किं ज्ञानसुखादोनां सामान्य- कम गामभाव एव तदाच दष्टपरित्याग दत्यत ब्राह।

• व्रान्न्स्यात् सरूपतः प्रत्यक्षत एव वा चतुरविशति-

वान्तर्भावात् सिद्धि:। Q Digitized by Google

130 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

they are hinted by [the term] Nature :'- that is to say,-the qualities, &c., [such as Knowledge,] are established [as realities], just because they are hinted by [the term] Nature, by reason that these qualities are, mediately, products of Nature,-for there is no difference between product and cause ;- but the omission to men- tion them [explicitly] is not by reason of their not being at all .*

c. He next mentions the pointa in which Nature and ber products agree.t

निगुषाचेतनत्वादि इयो: ॥१२७।

The characters common to Nature and her products. Aph. 127 .- Of both [Nature and her products] the fact that they con- sist of the three Qualities [§62. a.] and that they are irrational -[is the common property].

a. Consisting of the three qualities, and being irrational,- {such in the meaning of the compound term with which the aphorism commences]. By the expression " &c." is meant their being intended for another, [-see §67-]. 'Of both'-i. e. of the cause [viz. Nature], and of the effects [-viz. all natural products-], such is the meaningt.

• वाशन्दः पचान्रं सचयति। प्रधानव्यपदेशाद्दा। मुखानां पारम्पयेष प्रधानकार्यलेन कार्यकारपयोरमेदाता धानव्यपदेशादेव गुणादिसिद्विर्नत्वभावादननुकीर्न्तनमिति।

• मिगुषत्वमचेतनत्वं। ब्रदिशन्दात् परार्थतं। इयो- रिति कार्यकारणयोरितर्थः।

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BOOK I. 131

b. He next states the mutual differences of character among the three Qualities which [see §62] are the [constituent] parts of Nature .*

प्रीत्यप्रोतिविषादा द्येगुणानामन्योन्यवधर्म्यम्। १२८।

In what the three Aph. 128 .- The Qualities [§62] differ in Qualities differ. character, mutually, by pleasantness, unpleas- antness, lassitude, &c., [in which forms severally the Qualities present themselves].

c. 'Pleasantness,'-i. e. Pleasure. By the '&c,' is meant Goodness (sattwa), which is light fi. e., not heavy,] and illumi- nating. 'Unpleasantness,'-i. e. Pain. By the '&c.' [in refer- ence to this,] is meant Passion (rajas), which is urgent and rest- less. 'Lassitude,'-i. e. stupefaction. By the '&c.' is meant Darkness (tamas), which is heavy and enveloping. It is by theso habits that the Qualities, viz :- Goodness, Passion, and Darkness differ ;- such is the remaindert [required to complete the apho- rism].

b. At the time of telling their differences, he tells in what respects they agree.t

• प्रोतिः सुखम्। आदिशन्दाव्घु प्रकाशकं सच्वम्। अ्पोतिर्दुःखम्। आादिशन्दादुपष्टम्भकं चलञ्न रजः। विषादो मोइ:। आदिशन्दाद्ुरुवरणकं तमः। एतर्धमर्गुणानां सत्वरजसमसां वैधम्यमवतीति शेष:।

• तेषां वैधर्म्यकथनावसरे साधर्म्यमाइ।

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132 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

लघादिधर्मै रन्योन्यं साधम्यें वधम्यें गुणानाम्।१२८। In what respects the Qualities agree as well as differ. Aph. 129 .- Through Lightness and other habits the Qualities, mu- tually, agree and differ.

a. The meaning is as follows. The enunciation [-in the shape of the term laghu 'light'-is not one intended to call at- tention to the concrete-viz. what things are light,-but] is one where the abstract [-the nature of light things-viz. 'light- ness'-laghutwa] is the prominent thing. 'Through Lightness and other habits,'-i. e. through the characters of Lightness, Restlessness, and Heaviness,-the Qualities differ. Their agree- ment is through what is hinted by the expression 'and other.' And this consists in their mutually predominating [one over the other from time to time], producing each other, consorting toge- gether, and being reciprocally present [-the one in the other-], for the sake of the soul .*

b. By the expression [ -- in § 125-] 'caused,' &c., it was de- clared that the 'Great one' [or Mind], &c., are products. He states the proof of this.t

उभयान्यत्वात्कार्यतं महदादेर्घटादिवत्।९३०।

Proof that Mind, &c., are products. Aph. 180 .- Since they are other than both [Soul and Nature-the only two un-

*. अयमर्थः। भावप्रधानो निर्हेशः । लघुदिधर्मेर्ल- घुचलनगुरुत्वगुणणानां वधर्म्यम्। ब्रादिपदसचितेन साथ म्यम्। तच्च पुरुषार्थमन्योन्याभिभवजननमिथुनद्टत्तितम्। + हेतुमदित्यादिना महदादीनां कार्यतमुत्तम्। मच प्रमाणमाइ।

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BOOK I. 133

caused entities-], Mind, and the rest, are products, as is the case with a jar or the like.

a. That is to say,-like a jar or the like, Mind and the rest are products, because they are something other than the two which [alone] are eternal, viz., Nature and Soul .* b. He states another reason.t

परिमाणात्। १३१। A second Aph. 131 .- Because of their measure, [which is a proof. limited one].

a. That is to say, [Mind and the rest are products] because they are limited in measure,t [while the only two that are un- caused, viz. Nature and soul, are unlimitedj.

b. He states another argument.§

समन्वयात्।१३२।

A third proof. Aph. 132 .- Because they conform [to Na- ture].

a. [Mind and the rest are products] because they well [follow and] correspond with Nature, i. e., because the Qualities of Na- ture [§62] are seen in all things :|| [and it is a maxim that there is nothing in the effect that was not in the cause].

• नित्ाभ्यां प्रक्वतिपुरुषाम्यमन्यत्ात् घटादेरिव मड- दादेः कार्यत्वमित्यर्थः। + इेलन्रमाइ। + परिमितत्वादितर्यः । 5 अपरां युक्तिमाइ। ।प्रधानेन सह सम्यगन्वयात् प्रधानगुणानां सर्वपदार्येषु द र्शनात्।

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134 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

b. He states the same thing* [in the next aphorism].

शक्रितक्चेति। १३३।

A fourth proof. A ph. 133 .- And, finally, because it is through the power [of the cause alone, that the product can do aught].

a. It is by the power of its cause that a product energizes [- as a chain restrains an elephant only by the force of the iron-1 so that Mind and the rest, being [except through the strength of Nature] powerless, produce their products in subservience to Nature ;- otherwise, since it is their habit to energize, they would at all times produce their productst-[which it will not be alleged that they do.

b. And the word iti, in this place, is intended to notify the completion of the set of [positive] reasonst [why Mind and the others should be regarded as products].

c. He next states [-in support of the same assertion-] the argument from negatives,§ [i. e. the argument drawn from the consideration as to what becomes of Mind and the others when they are not products].

• एतदेवाइ।

• कारणशत्या कार्य प्रवर्त्तत इति महदादय: बीषा: सन्तः म्रहृत्यनुसारेण कार्य जनयन्ति। ब्रन्यया पदत्ति शीजलात्र्वदा कायें जनयेयुः।

8 व्यनिरेकमाइ।

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BOOK I. 135

तद्ाने प्रक्ति: पुरुषो वा । १३४।

Proof of the same from Aph. 134 .- On the quitting thereof negatives. [-quitting the condition of product-], there is Nature or Soul, [into one or other of which the product must needs have resolved itself].

a. Product or not-product,-such is the pair of alternatives. ' On the quitting thereof,'-i. e. when Mind and the rest quit the condition of product,-Mind and the rest [of necessity] en- ter into Nature or Soul,*[-these two alone being not-products].

b. [But perhaps some one may say that] Mind and the rest may exist quite independently of the pair of alternatives [just mentioned). In regard to this he declares as follows.t

तयोरन्यत्वे तुच्कलम्।१३५।

Mind and the rest would not be at all, if neither product nor not-product. Aph. 135 .- If they were other than these two they would be void.

a. If Mind and the rest were other 'than these two,' i. e. than product or not-product [-§134-], they would be in the shape of what is 'void,'-i. e. in the shape of nonentity.t

• कार्यमकार्यव्वेति कोटिद्यं। तद्वाने महदादे: कार्यता- हाने प्रह्ता पुरुषे वा महदादीनां प्रवेश इति। + उभयकोटिविनिमुत्ता एव महदादयो भविष्यन्ीताइ। + तथो: कार्याकार्ययोरन्यतवे महदादोनां तुच्करूपतम- भावरूपलवम्।

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136 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

b. Well now, [some one may say,] why should it be under the character of a product that Mind and the rest are a sign of [there being such a principle as] Nature ? They may be [more properly said to be] a sign merely in virtue of their not occurring apart from it. To this he replies .*

कारयात्कारणानुमानं तत्ाहितात्। १३६।

What kind of causes can be inferred from their effects. Aph. 136 .- The cause is inferred from the effect [-in the case of Na- ture and her products-], because it accompanies it.

q. This may indeed be the case where the nature [or essence] of the cause is not seen in the effect, as [is the case with] the infe- rence-from the rising of the moon-that the sea is swoln [into full tide,-rising, with maternal affection, towards her son who was produced from her bosom on the occasion of the celebrated Churning of the Ocean. Though the swelling of the tide does not occur 'apart from' the rising of the moon, yet here the cause -moon-rise-is not seen in the effect-tide; and consequently, though we infer the effect from the cause, the cause could not have been inferred from the effect]. But in the present case, since we see in Mind and the rest, the characters of Nature, the cause is inferred from the effect. ' Because it accompanies it'- i. e. because, in Mind and the rest, we see the properties of Naturet-[i. e. Nature herself actually present, as we see the clay which is the cause of a jar actually present in the jar]. * अ्रथ किमर्य महदादय: कार्यलेन प्रकृतेर्लिङ्गं । वि- नाभावादेव लिङ्गमभविष्यन्तीत्यचाइ।

t भवत्वेवं यत्र कारणरूपं काये न दृश्यते यथा चन्द्रो- दयात्मुद्रदद्यनुमानम्। अ्रत्न तु प्रधानरुपस मइदादा

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BOOK I. 137

b. [But it may still be objected,-] if it be thus, then let that principle itself-the 'Great one' [or Mind]-be the cause of the world :- what need of Nature ? To this he replies .*

अ्रव्यक्तं विगुषाव्विङ्गात। ९३७ ।

How Mind must have an Aph. 137 .- The undiscrete, [Nature, antecedent. must be inferred] from its effect, in which are the three Qualities, [which constitute Nature].

a. 'It goen to dissolution'-such is the import of the term lin- ga, here rendered ' effcct.' From that [effect],-viz. the ' Great' principlc [or Mind]-in which are the three Qualities, Nature must be inferred. And that the ' Great' principle, in the shape of ascertainment [or distinct intellection], is limited [or discrete], and perishable, is established by direct observation. Therefore [-i. e. since Mind, being perishable, must be resolvable into something else,] we infer that into which it is resolvable,t [-in other words its 'cause,'-here analogously termed lingin, since 'effect' had been termed linga].

b. But then, [some one may say,] still somcthing quite differ-

दर्शनात् कार्यात्कारणानमानमेव तत्ाहित्यात प्रक्ृतिरूपस्य मइदादी दर्शनात्।

• एवं चेत् मइन्तत्वमेव जगत्कारणमस्तु किं प्रधानेने

त्यत आइ।

• लयं गच्वतोति लिङ्ग कार्यम्। तम्मात त्रिगुषात मडनत्वात् प्रधानमनमातव्यम्। महत्तत्त्वच्चाथ्यवसायरूपं व्यक्तं विनाशि प्रत्यचसिद्गम। तेन लिंग्यनमानम्।। R

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}38 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

ent may be the cause [of all things] ;- what need of this Nature of yours? In regard to this he remarks as follows .*

सत्कार्यतसति दविर्नापलाप:॥१३८।

Why Nature, and nothing else, nust be the root of all. Aph. 138 .- There is no denying that it [-Nature-] is, because of its effects, [-which will be in vain attributed to any other source].

a. Is the cause of this [world] a product or not a product? If it were a product, then, the same being [with cqual propriety to be assumed to be] the case with its cause, there would be a re- gressus in infinitum. If effects be from any root [-to which there is nothing antecedent-], then this is that [to which we give the name of Nature]. 'Because of its effects,'-that is to say, be- cause of the effects of Nature. There is no denying 'that it is,' -i. e. that Nature is.t

b. Be it so-[let us grant-] that Nature is; yet [-the op- ponent may contend-] Soul positively cannot be,-for [if the existence of causes is to be inferred from their products, Soul eannot be thus demonstrated to exist, sceing that] it has no products. In regard to this he remarks as follows.t * ननु तथाप्यन्यदेव कारणम्भविष्यति किं प्रहतेत्नाइ। + तत्कारणं कार्यमकार्य वा। कार्यते तत्कारपस्थापि तथात्वे सत्यनवस्था। मूलकार्यतवे तदेव सेति। ता्कार्यंत रति प्रक्ृतिकार्यत रत्यर्थः । तत्तिद्वेः प्रक्कतिसिद्धेनाप- लाप: ।

भवतु प्रक्ृतिसिद्धि: पुरुषस्य सिद्धिसतु न स्यादेव। न. दि तस्य कार्यमसीतन्ाइ।

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BOOK 1. 139

सामान्येन विवादाभावात् धर्मबन्र साधनम्॥१३६।

It is not from any effect that soul Aph. 139 .- [The relation of is inferred. cause and effect is] not [alleged as] the means of establishing [the existence of Soul], because, as is the case with [the disputed term] ' merit,' there is no dispute about there being such a kind of thing, [though what kind of thing is matter of dispute]. a. There is no dispute about ' there being such a thing'-i. e. as to there being Soul simply -since everybody, who does not talk stark nonsense, must admit a Soul, or self, of some kind-]; for the dispute is [not as to its being, but] as to its peculiarity [of being],-as [whether it be] multitudinous or sole, all-pervading or not all-pervading, and so forth. Just as in every [philosophi- cal system or] theory there is no dispute as to [there being some- thing to which may be applied the term] 'merit' (dharma) ; for the difference of opinion has regard to the particular kind of {thing,-such as sacrifices according to the Mimansa creed, or good works according to the Nyaya,-which shall be held to in- volve] 'merit.'*

b. 'Not the means of establishing' that [-viz. the existence of soul] :- i. e. the relation of cause and effect is not the means of establishing it. This implies-" I will mention another means of establishing it."t * सामान्येन तावदातनि विवादो नासि विशेषे दि विवादो बनेक एको व्यापको Sव्यापक दत्यादि। यथा सर्वस्मिन् दर्शने धर्म दत्यविवाद: धर्मविशेषे ि विप्रति- पत्ति:।

t न तक्ाधनं। न तत्र कार्यकारणभाव: साधनम्। सन्यत्ाधनं वच्यामीत्यभिसन्वि:।

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140 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

b. [But some one may say-] Souls are nothing else than the body and its organs, &c. ;- what need of imagining anything else? To this he replies .*

शरोरादिव्यतिरिक्त: पुमान्। १४०॥

Materialism scouted. Apk. 140 .- Soul is something else than the body, &c.

a. [The meaning of the aphorism is) plain.t

b. He propounds an argument in support of this.t

संहतपरार्थत्वात्। १४१॥

The discerptible is subservient Aph. 141 .- Because that which to the indiscerptible. is combined [and is therefore dis- cerptible,] is for the sake of some other [not discerptible].

a. That which is discerptible is intended for something else that is indiscerptible. If it were intended for something else that is discerptible, there would be a regressus in infinitum.§

b. And combinedness [-involving-sce §67-discerptible- ness-] consists in the Qualities' making some product by their state of mutual commixture ;- or [to express it otherwise-] combinedness is the state of the soft and hard-[which dis- tinguishes matter from spirit]. And this exists occultly in Na-

• देहेन्द्रियादय एवात्मान: किमन्यकल्पनयेत्यत ब्राइ।

• व्यक्तम्।

• अत न्यायमाइ।

8 यामं इतं तदमंइतपरायें संइतपरार्थत्वे Sनवस्ा स्यात्।

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BOOK 1. 141

ture and the rest, because, otherwise, discerptibleness would not prove discoverable in the products thereof .*

c. He elucidates this same point.t

चिगुणादिविपर्ययात् ॥१४२॥

Soul presents no symptom of being material. Aph. 142 .- [soul is something else than the body, &c.], because there is [in Soul] the reverse of the three Qualities, &c.

a. Because, in Soul, there is ' the reverse' of the three Quali- ties, &c.,-i. e. because they are not seen in it. By the ' &c.' is meant-because the other characters of Nature also are not seen fin Soul]t.

b. He states another argument§.

अंधिष्ठानाच्चेति ॥१४३॥

Another proof that soul is Aph. 143 .- And [Soul is not material] not material. because of its superintendence [over Na- ture].

• संइतत्वञ्न गुणानामन्यन्यमिथुनभावेन कार्यकरणं अ्रथवा द्रवकठिनता संइतत्वं। तच्च प्रह्त्ादा तिरोभूत- मस्ति अन्यथा तत्कायेषु संइततादर्शनप्रसङ्गात्। + तदेव स्पष्ट्यतति। + पुरुषे विगुणादिविपर्ययात् तददर्शनात्। ब्रादि- शन्दादन्येषां प्रक्ृतिधर्माणामप्यदर्शनादिति।

5 न्यायानारमाइ।

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142 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

a. For a superintendent is an intelligent being, and Nature is unintelligent,-such is the meaning *.

. He states another argumentt.

भोक्ृभावात् । १४४।

Another proof. Aph. 144 .- And [Soul is not material] becaase of its being the experiencer.

a. Nature it is that is experienced ;- the experiencer is Soul. Although Soul, from its being unchangeably the same, is not [re- ally] an experiencer, still the assertion [in the aphorism] is made because of the fact that the reflection of the Intellect befals itt [-and thus makes it seem as if it experienced :- see §59. a].

b. Efforts are engaged in for the sake of Liberation. Pray, is this [for the benefit] of the soul or of Nature-[since Nature, in the shape of Mind, is, it seems, the experiencer]? To this he re- plies.§

कवष्याय प्रटत्ते: ।१४५।

For Soul, not Nature, is Aph. 145 .- [It is for Soul and not for liberation wanted. Nature,] because the exertions are with &

• चेतनो हविष्ठाता भवति प्रक्ृतिक्व जडेत्वर्थः ।

• युळ्यन्तरमाइ। + भोग्या प्रक्ति:। भोक्ता पुरुषः । यद्यपि कूटस्सता- दातनो भोगृतवं नासि तथापि बुद्धिच्छ्वायापत्त्येत्वर्थः। मोचाये प्ररन्तिः। सा किमातन: प्रक्ृतेवा दत्यत

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BOOK I. 143

view to isolation [from all qualities,-a condition to which Soul is competent, but Nature not].

a. The very essence of Nature cannot depart from it [so as to leave it in the state of absolute solitary isolation contemplated], for the three Qualities are its very essence, [the departure of which from it would leave nothing behind]; and because it would thus prove to be not eternal [-while in reality it is eternal]. The isolation (kaivalya) of that alone is possible of which the qualities are reflectional [and not constitutive-sce §59 a .- ] and that is Soul .*

b. Of what nature is this [Soul]? To this he replies.#

The nature of Aph. 146 .- Since light does not pertain to the the Soul. unintelligent, light, [which must pertain to something or other, is the essence of the Soul, which, self-mani- festing, manifests whatever else is manifest].

a. It is a settled point that the unintelligent does not shine- [it is not self-manifesting]. If Soul also were unintelligent [- as the Naiyayikas hold it to be in substance-knowledge being by them regarded not as its essence or substratum but as one of its qualities-], then there would need to be another light for it ;- and, as the simpler theory, let Soul itself consist essentially of lightt.

• तिगुणखभावत्वात् प्रक्वतर्न खभावप्रतव: बनित्यत्व- प्रसङ्गाच्च। यस्यापाधिकगुणासस् केवव्य समावति सचात्येति। + स किंरूप दत्यत ब्रइ। + जडो न प्रकाश दति सिदूम्। वद्यात्मापि जउः स्थात्

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144 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

b. And there is scripture [in support of this vicw :- for ex- ample the two following texts from the Vrihadáranyaka Upani- shad ] :- ' Wherewith shall one distinguish that wherewith one distinguishes all this [world] ?' ' Wherewith shall one take cogni- zance of the cognizer ?'*

c. [But the Naiyayika may urge-] let Soul be unintelligent [in its snbstance], but having Intelligence as its attribute. Thereby it manifests all things, but it is not essentially Intelli- gence. To this he replies.t

निगुणतान्न चिद्धमी॥१४७॥

Soul has no Aph. 147 .- It [Soul] has not Intelligence as quality. its attribute, because it is without quality.

a. If soul were associated with attributes, it would be [as we hold everything to be that is associated with attributes] liable to alteration, and therefore there would be no Liberation,t-[its attributes, or susceptibilities, always keeping it liable to be affect- ed by something or other ;- or, the absolutely simple being the only unalterable]. तस्याप्यन्येन प्रकाशेन भवितव्यं लाघवाच्चातमेव प्रकाशरूपो

• श्रुतिश्व। येनेदं सवैं विजानाति तं केन विजानीयात्। विज्ञातारमरे केन विजानीयादिति। + जडाड्रप्यात्मासु चिङ्वर्मा तेन जगत्प्रकाश्यति न तु चिट्रप दूत्यत आइ। + यद्यात्मनो धर्मयोग: सात् परिणामित्वं स्यात् तनक्ा- निर्माच इति।

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BOOK I. 145

b. He declares that there is a contradicton to Scripture* [in the view which he is contending against].

सुता सिद्स्य मापलापसत्परत्यचवाधात्।१४८।

Scripture higher evidence than Aph. 148 .- There is no denial [to supposed intuition. be allowed] of what is established by Scripture, because the [supposed] evidence of intuition for this [i. e. for the existence of qualities in the Soul] is confuted [by the scriptural declaration of the contrary].

a. The text-'For this Soul is un-companioned,' &c., would be confuted if there were any annexation of qualitiest [to Soul :- and the notion of confuting Scripture is not to be entertained for a moment].

b. But the literal meaning [of the aphorism] is this, that, the fact, established by scripture, of its [i. e. soul's] being devoid of qualities, cannot be denied,-because the scripture itself confutes the [supposed] intuitive perception thereof,-i. e. the [supposed] intuitive perception of qualities, &c.,t [in the soul].

सुषुप्रयादसाचिलम् ॥१४६।

Argument against the soul's being unintelligent. Aph. 149 .- [If soul were unintelli gent] it would not be witness [of its own comfort] in profound [and dreamless] sleep, &c. *स्रुतिविरोधमाइ। ससके हयम्पुरुष रत्यादिश्रुतिगुणयोगे बाधिता सात्। + अचरार्थनु त्ुत्ा सिदस् निर्गुणलादेरमीपलापः समभावति तत्प्रत्यचस्य गुमादिपरृत्यकस्य सुतैव बाधादिति। Digitized by Google

146 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

e. If soul were unintelligent, then in deep sleep, &c., it would not be a witness-a knower. But that this is not the case [may be inferred] from the phenomenon that 'I slept pleasantly, &c.' By the ' &c' fin' the aphoriam] dreaming is included. .

b. The Vedantins say that 'soul is one only'; and so, again, 'For Soul is eternal, omnipresent, changeless, void of blemish .'- 'Being one [only], it is divided [into a seeming multitude] y Nature (sakti)-i. e .- Illusion (máya),-but not through its own essence, [-to which there does not belong multiplicity].' In regard to this he says as follows.t जन्मादिव्यवस्थात: पुरुषबङलवम्। १५०। There is a multiplicity Aph. 150 .- From the several allot- of soul. ment of birth, &c., a multiplicity of souls [is to be inferred].

a. 'Birth, &c.' By the ' &c.,' growth, death, &c., are included. 'From the several allotment' of these, i. e. from their being ap- pointed-[birth to one, death to another, and so on]. 'A mul- tiplicity of souls,'-that is to say, souls are many. If soul were one only, then when one is born, all would be born, &c.t * सुषुभ्ादी असाचित्वमज्ञात्वं स्यात् नचैवं सुखमखा- पमिति प्रतिभासनात्। आदिभन्दात् खप्रग्रइणम्। एक एवात्मेति वेदान्तिनः । तथाच नित्सर्वगती छाता कूटखो दोषवर्जितः। एक एव स भिद्यते रतया मायया न खभावत पत्यबाड़। + जन्मादीति बादिना उपचयमरणादि ग्रृह्ममे। तद्यवस्थातः तत्नियमात पुरुषबहत्वं बहव आत्मान दत्यर्थ:। यद्येक एवात्मा एकस्म्रिन जायमाने सर्वे जायेरन्निति।

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BUOK I. 147

b. He ponders. as a doubt the opinion of the others* [-viz. of the Vedantins].

उपाधिभेट्रेडप्येकस नानायोग व्राकाशसेव घटा-

दिभि: ॥१५९।

The view of the Vedanta Aph. 151 .- [The Vedantins would on this point. have us believe that] there being a differ- ence in its investmente, moreover, multiplicity attaches [seem- ingly] to the one [Soul], as is the case with Space by reason of jars, &c., [which mark out the spaces that they occupy].

. a. As Space is one, [and yet] in consequence of the difference of adjuncts,-jars, &c .-- when the jar is destroyed, it is [familiar- ly] said 'the jar's space is destroyed'-[for there then no longer exists a space marked out by the jar] ;- so also, on the hypothe- sis of there being but one Soul, since there is a difference of cor- poreal limitation, on the destruction thereof [-i. e. of the limi- tation occasioned by any particular body-], it is merely a way of talking [to say] 'The soul has perished.' [This indeed is the case] also on the hypothesis that there are many souls; other- wise, since soul is eternal [-without beginning or end-as both parties agree-], how could there be the appointment of birth and death ?t

• परमतमाशङते।

• यथेकमाकाशं घटादुपाधिभेदात् घटे मष्टे घटाकामं नष्टमिति व्यपदिश्यते तथेकातमपचद्रपि देहवच्छेदभेदात् वभ्नाये वाता नषट इति व्यपदेशमानम्। नानातपयोपि बन्चथा आलनो नित्वलात कय जन्ममरवव्यवसेति।

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148 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

b. He etates [what may serve for] the removal of doubt* [as to the point in question].

उपाधिर्भिद्यते न तु तह्ान्। ९५२।

Refutation of the Vedanta on this point. Aph. 152 .- The investment is differ- ent [-according to the Vedantins-], but not that to which this belongs, [-and the absurd consequen- ces of such an opinion will be seen].

a. 'The investment is different'-{-there are diverse bodies, of John, Thomas, &c.]; 'that to which this belongs'-i. e. that [Soul] to which this investment [of body in all its multiplicity] belongs,'-is not different [-but is one only-]; such is the meaning. And [now consider], in consequence of the destruc- tion of one thing, we are not to speak as if there were the des- truction of something else,-becanse this [evidence of a thing's being destroyed] would present itself where it ought not-fthe . destruction of Devadatta presenting itself as a fact when we are considering the case of Yajnadatta, who is not for that reason to be assumed to be dead] ;- and, on the hypothesis that Soul is one, the [fact that the Vedanta makes an] imputation of inconsistent conditions is quite evident, since Bondage and Liberation do not [and cannot] belong [simultaneously] to one. But the conjunc- tion and [simultaneous] non-conjunction of the sky [or space] with smoke, &c., [of which the Vedantin may seek to avail him. self as an illustration,] are not contradictory, for it is not the na- ture of Conjunction to abide in something wholly pervaded by itt; [-whereas, on the other hand, it would be nonsense to speak of Bondage as affecting one portion of a monad, and Li- beration affecting another portion, as a monkey may be in con-

• समाधानमाढ़। + उपाधिर्भिद्यते तद्दामुपाधिमाम् न भिद्यत त्वर्य: । नचान्यनाशादन्यन नाशव्यवहारो Sतिप्रसद्गात्। एकामा-

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BOOK I. 149

junction with a branch of a tree without being in conjunction with the stem].

b. "What may be [proved] by this?" To this he replies .* एवमेकलेम परिवर्न्तमानस्य न विरुद्धधर्माघ्यास: ।९५३। The Sankhya is free from the charge of absurdity to which the Vedanta is open. Aph. 153 .- Thus [-i. e. by taking the Sankhya view -] there is no imputation of contradictory conditions to [a Soul supposed to be] everywhere present as one.

a. 'Thus'-i. e. [if you regard the matter rightly] according to the manner here set forth,-there is no 'imputation,' or attri- bution, of incompatible conditions, Bondage, Liberation, &c., to & soul existing ' everywhere,' throughout all, as a monad.t b. [But the Vedantin may contend]-we see the condition of another attributed even to one quite different, as-e. g .- Na- ture's character as an agent [is attributed] to Soul-which is one other [than Nature]. To this he replies.t

Imputation is not proof. Aph. 154 .- Even though there be [im- puted to Soul] the possession of the con-

पचेच व्यक्त एव विरुद्धधर्मा घ्यास: एकस्यबन्वमोचाभावात्। आ्राकाशसय तु धूमादियोगायोगावविरुद्वा संयोमस्याव्या-

• एतेन किं स्यादित्यत ब्राइ। + एवमुत्रीत्ा एकतवेन परितः सर्वतो वर्नमानस्यातानो बन्वमो चादिविरुद्ध धर्माणामप्यास वारोपो न भवतीत्र्थः। + अरन्यधर्मस्याप्यन्यवारोपो दष्टो यथा प्रक्ते: कर्जतं पुरुषे एन्यभेतवनाइ।

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150 THE SANKnIA APHORISMS.

dition of another, this [-that it really posseaves auch-] is not established by the imputation, because it [Soul] is one [absolute ly simple unqualified entity] .. a. [The notion] that Soul is an agent is a mistake, because, that Soul is not an agent is true, and the imputation. [of agency to Soul] is not true, and the combination of the true and the untrue is not real. Neither birth nor death, or the like, is com- patible with Soul, because it is un-companioned,* [-unattended either by qualities or by actions]. b. [But the Vedantin may say]-and thus there will be an opposition to the scripture,-for according to that-" Brahma is one without a second ;- there is nothing here diverse ;- death after death does he obtain who here sees as it were a multipli- city." To this he replies.t नाङ्तश्रुतिवितोधो आतिपरखात्।१५५।

Scripture, speaking of Soul as one, is speaking of it generically. Aph. 155 .- There is no op- position to the scriptures [declara- tory] of the non-duality [of Soul], because the reference [in such texts] is to the genus [or to Soul in general].

a. But there is no opposition [in our Sankhya view of the matter] to the scriptures [which speak] of the oneness of Soul, because these [scriptural texts] refer to the genus. By genus we * पुरुषकर्टत्वं भ्रान्तं पुरुषाकर्त्वस्य सत्त्वात् आरोपस्या- सत्यत्वात्। नच सत्यासत्ययोस्सम्बन्वसात्विको भवति। असङ्गित्वादात्मना न जन्ममरणादि सम्भवति। + एवञ्च श्रुतिविरोध: स्यात् तथाचेकमेवाद्वितीयं ब्रह्म नेह नानासि किश्वन सृत्यासस मृत्युमाप्नाति य दह नानेव पश्यति। बब्राइ़।

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BOOK I. 151

mean sameness, the fact of being of the same nature ;- and it is to this alone that the texts about the non-duality [of Soul] have reference. It is not the indivisibleness [of Soul,-meaning by its indivisibleness the impossibility that there should be more souls than one,-that is meant in such texts-] because there is no motive [for viewing Soul as thus indivisible] ;- such is the meaning .*

b. But then [-the Vedantin may rejoin-] the Bondage and Liberation are incompatible of any single soul [-and yet these may coexist according to the opinion] of him who asserts that souls are many. To this he replies.t विदितबन्धकारणस्य हष्या तद्रपम्। ९.५६। The compatibility of Bondage and Freedom. Aph. 156 .- Of him [i. e. of that soul] by whom the cause of Bondage is known, there is that condition [of isolation, or entire libera- tion], by the perception [of the fact that Nature and soul are distinct, and that he really was not bound even when he seemed to be so].

a. By whom is known 'the cause of Bondage'-viz., the non- perception that Nature and soul are distinct,-of him, 'by dis- cerning it'-i. e. by cognizing the distinction,-there is 'that condition'-viz., the condition of isolation, [-the condition, see §145, to which the soul aspires. The soul in Bondage which is ne real bondage, may be typified by Don Quixote hanging.in

*आतमेक्यश्रुतीनां विरोधसु नासि तासां जातिपरत्वात्।

नाखण्डलं प्रयोजनाभावादित्य। + नन्वनेकात्मवादिना Sपि एकस्यात्मनो बन्धमोजी विरु- दावित्यवाइ।

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152 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

the dark from the ledge of a supposed enormous precipice, and bound to hold on for his life, from not knowing that his toes were within six inches of the ground] .* b. [Well, rejoins the Vedántin,] Bondage [-as you justly observe-] is dependent on non-perception, and is not real :- it is a maxim that non-perception is removed by perception :- and, on this showing, we see the [force of the] reasoning on the hypothesis that soul is one, but not on that of Soul's being mul- titudinous. To this he replies.t

He jeereth the Vedintin. Aph. 157 .- Nay-because the blind do not see, can those that have their eyesight not per- ceive ?

a. What,-because a blind man does not see, does also one who has his eyesight not perceive? There are many arguments fin support of the view] of those who assert that souls are many, [-though you do not see them-]: snch is the meaning.t

b. He declares, for the following reason also, Souls are many.§

• विदितं बन्वकारणं प्रक्ृतिपुरुषविवेकादर्शनं यख् तस्य दथ्ा विवेकश्ानेन तट्रपं कैवल्यरूपम्। + विवेकादर्शननिमित्तो बन्धो न ताख्विक:। दर्शनाद- दर्शनं निवस्वत दति युक्ति:। एवश्ेकातापच एव न्वायं पश्यामो न नानात्मक इत्यनाइ। बम्ो न पश्यतीति किं चनुभानपि नोपचमते। मानात्मवादिनामनेके न्यायासन्तीतर्यः। 8 कतो Sपि मानात्मान रत्याइ।

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BOOK I. 153

वामदेवादिमंक्रो नाहैतम्।१५८। Scripture proof that Souls Aph. 158 .- Vámadeva, as well as are many. others, has been liberated, [if we are to believe the scriptures, therefore] the non-duality [asserted in the same scriptures] is not [a fact,-if we are to understand it in the sense of the Vedantins].

a. In the Puranas, &c., we hear-"Vamadeva has been libe- rated," "Suka has been liberated," and so on. If Soul were one, since the liberation of all would take place on the liberation of one, the scriptural mention of a diversity [of separate and successive liberations] would be self-contradictory .*

b. [But the Vedantin may rejoin]-on the theory that Souls are many,-since the world has been from eternity [without be- ginning], and from time to time some one or other is liberated, 80, by degrees all having been liberated, there should be a uni- versal void :- but on the theory that Soul is one, Liberation is merely the departure of an adjunct-[which, the Vedantin flat- ters himself, does not involve the inconsistency which he objects to the Sankhya]. To this he replies.t

As it has been, so will it be. Aph. 159 .- Though it [-the world -] has been from eternity, since *पुराणादी सुतं वामदेवो मुत्तर्शुका मुक्त इत्यादि। यद्येक एवात्मा एकमुक्का सर्वमुत्तरभेंदभुतिबाध: स्यात्। नानालापचे Sनादी संसारे कदापि को ऽपि मुचते पनि क्रमेष सर्वमुत्ता सर्वशून्यता सथात् एकात्पचे तु उपा- धिविगम एव मोच पत्चाड!

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154 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

there, up to this day, has not been [an entire emptying of the world], the future also [may be inferentially expected to be] thus [as it has been heretofore].

a. Though the world has been from eternity, since up to this day we have not seen it become a void, there is no proof. [in support] of the view that there will be Liberation* [of all Souls, so as to leave a void].

b. He states another solution of the difficulty.t ददानीमिव सर्वन नावनोच्छेदः॥१६०।

The stream of mndane things will fow on for ever. Aph. 160 .- As now [things are, so] everywhere [will they continue to go on ;- hence there will be] no absolute cutting short [of the course of mundane things]. a. Since souls are [in number] without end, though Libera- tion successively take place, there will not be [as a necessary consequence] a cutting short of the world. As now, so every where,-i. e. in time to come also,-there will be Liberation, but not therefore an absolute cutting short [of the world], since of this the on-flowing is eternal.t b. On the theory also that Liberation is the departure of an adjunct [§158. b.], we should find a universal void,-so that the

• बनादी संसारे एद्य यावच्कून्यताया बदर्शनात् भवि- व्यति मुक्िरिति पचे नाव्ि प्रमाणम्। समाधानान्तरमाइ। + चनन्ततादालनां क्रमेष मुत्रिरपि ख्यात् संसारोक्ेटो 5पि न सात्। ददानीमिव सर्वच भविष्यस्काखे ऽपि मुत्िर्भं- विष्यतीति नातनोच्छेदो 5स प्रवाइनित्यलात्।

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BOOK 1. 155

doubt is alike [in its application to either view]. Just as there might be an end of all things on the euccessive liberation of many souls, so since all adjuncts would cease when [the fruit of] works [-this fruit being in the shape of Soul's association with body as its adjunct-] came to an end, the world would be void* [on the Vedanta theory as well as on the Sankhya one].

c. Now-[if the Vedantin says,] there will not be a void, be- cause adjuncts are [in number] endless; then it is the same on the theory that Souls are many too ;- for therefore, while those get liberated who become knowing [in regard to the fact that Nature and Soul are different], there will not be a void, because there is everlastingly no end of multitudes of souls in the universe.t

d. Pray [-some one may ask-] is Soul essentially bound or free? If [essentially] bound, then, since its essence cannot de- part, there is no Liberation ;- for if it [the essence] departed, then it [Soul] would [cease with the cessation of its essence and] not be eternal. If [on the other hand, you reply that it is essen- tially] free, then meditation, and the like, [which you prescribe for the attainment of liberation] is unmeaning. To this he re- plies.t * उपाधिविगमो मोक् दति पच्े Sषि सर्वशून्यताप्रसङ्ग इति तुख्धो ऽनुयोगः। यथा नानातनां क्रमेष मुक्रा सवो- जेद: तथा कर्माच्छेदे सवीपाघिनाशाष्नगच्छूम्यं स्ात्। + बथोपाधीनामनन्तताव्न शून्यता नानातपचेऽपि तुख्य- मत एव दि विद्वत्ु मुच्यमानेषु सन्ततं ब्रझ्माएजीवलोका- नामनन्तत्ाद शून्यता। + किमात्मा बड्रो मुक्ो वा। बद्ूत्वे खरुपस्या प्रच्वा- हनिमांच: प्रथवे Sनित्यत्वम्। मुत्तत्वे व्यर्यो थ्यानादिरितत

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156 THE SANKHYA APHORISMS.

व्याटटभो भूयरूप: ।१६१। Soul is ever free, though it may seem bound in all sorts of ways. Aph. 161 .- It [Soul] is al- together free, [but seemingly] multiform [through a delusive semblance of being bound].

a. It is not bound, nor is it liberated, but it is ever free; [see §19]. But the destruction of ignorance [as to its actual freedom] is effected by meditation, &c.,* [which are therefore not unmean- ing, as alleged in §160. d].

b. It has been declared that Soul is a witness. Since it is a witness [-some one may object-] even when it has attained to discriminating [between Nature and Soul], there is no Libera- tion,-[Soul, on this showing, being not an absolutely simple entity but something combined with the character of a spectator or witness]. To this he replies.t

How Soul is a spectator. Aph. 162 .- It [Soul] is a witness through its connection with sense-organs [-which quit it on Liberation].

a. A sense-organ is an organ of sense. Through its connec- tion therewith, it [Soul] is a witness ;- and where is its connec- tion with sense-organs [-these products of Nature-see §62-]

• न बड्डो नायं मुचते किन्मु नित्यमुत्तः। ब्रचाननासु ध्यानादिना क्रियत दति।

• आात्मनस्ाचित्वमुक्तम्। प्राप्तविवेकस्यापि साचिलवे डनिर्मोच दत्यबाइ।

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BOOK 1. 157

when discrimination [between Nature and Soul] has taken place ?* b. [Well-some one may ask-] at all times of what nature is Soul? To this he replies.t नित्यमुक्ततवम्। १६३।

The real condition of Soul. Aph. 163 .- [The nature of Soul is] constant freedom.

a. 'Constant freedom,'-that is to say, it is positively always devoid of the Bondage called Pain [-see §1 and 19-], because Pain, and the rest, are modifications of Understandingt-[which -see §62-is a modification of Nature, from which Soul is really distinct]. मोदासोन्यच्चेति ।१६४।

Soul's indifference. Aph. 164 .- And finally [the nature of the Soul is] indifference [to Pain and Pleasttre alike]. a. By 'indifference' is meant inaction. The word iti [render- ed 'finally'] implies that the exposition of the Nature of Soul is completed.§ * वचमिन्द्रियं तत्मम्बन्वात्माचित्वं विवेकेच क्रेन्द्रियस- म्वन्ध दति।

• सर्वदा किंरूप आत्मेत्यत ब्राइ। नित्यमुत्तत्वं सदेव दुःखास्य्रनन्वगूम्यत्वं दुःखादेवुद्धि- परिणामत्वादित्वर्थः। 5. योदासीन्यमकर्तृत्वम्। इतियन्द: पुरुषधर्मप्रतिपादन- समात्ना।

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158 THE SXNKHYA APHORISMS.

b. [Some one may say]-the fact of Soul's being an agent is declared in Scripture :- how is this [-if, as you say, it be not an agent]? To this he replies .*

How Soul, which is not an agent, is yet poken of as such. Aph. 165 .- Its [-Soul's- fancy of] being an agent is from the proximity of Intellect, from the proximity of Intellect. a. Its 'being an agent'-i. e. its Soul's fancy of being an agent, is 'from the proximity of Intellect,'-i. e. from the influ- ence of Naturet [-see §19-of which Intellect-see §62-is a modification].

b. The repetition of the expression 'from the proximity of Intellect' is meant to show that we have reached the conclu- sion : for thus do we see [practised] in the scriptures,t-fe. g. where it is said in the Veda-"Soul is to be known, it is to be discriminated from Nature: thus it does not come again, it does not come again"].

c. So much, in this commentary on Kapila's aphorisms de- laratory of the Sankhya, for the First Book-that on the [topics or] object-matterg [of the Sánkhya system].

• गातनः कसृत्वं सूयते तत्कथमित्यत ब्रा। 1 चित्ात्निययेन प्रकृत्युपरागादातानः कतृत्वं कर्मृत्वा- भिमान: । चिताब्रिधादिति वीशा परिसमात्रा। सुता तथा हरतवादिति। 8 दति कापिलसांस्यप्रवचनसूबट्टता विषयाच्ाय: प्रथम: ।। END OF BOOK I.

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THE APHORISMS

OF THE

YOGA PHILOSOPHY,

OF

PATANJALI

WITH

ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMENTARY

BY

BHOJA RÁJÁ.

PRINTED FOR THE USE OF THE BENARES COLLEGE BY ORDER OF GOVT. N. W. P.

ALLAHABAD: PRINTED AT THE PRESBYTERIAN MISSION PRESS. Rev. L. G. HAY, Sup't. 1852.

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PREFACE.

THE great body of Hindu Philosophy is based upon six sets of very concise Aphorisms. Without a commentary the Aphorisms are scarcely intelligible, they being designed not so much to communicate the doctrine of the particular school, as to aid, by the briefest possible suggestions, the memory of him to whom the doctrine shall have been already communicated. To this end they are admirably adapted; and, this being their end, the ob- scurity, which must needs attach to them in the eyes of the un- instructed, is not chargeable upon them as a fault.

For various reasons it is desirable that there should be an ac- curate translation of the Aphorisms, with so much of gloss as may be required to render them intelligible. A class of pandits, in the Benares Sanskrit College, having been induced to learn English, it is contemplated that a version of the Aphorisms, brought out in successive portions, shall be submitted to the criticism of these men, and, through them, of other learned Brahmans, so that any errors in the version may have the best chance of being discovered and rectified. The employment of such a version as a class-book is designed to subserve further the attempt to determine accurately the aspect of the philosophical terminology of the East as regards that of the West. Google

( ii )

The translation of this first portion of the Yoga Aphorisms has been attended with peculiar difficulties, among which it may suffice here to mention that no pandit in these days professes to teach this system. That the version should, in its present state, be found faultless, is therefore very unlikely. These pages, now submitted to the criticism of the pandits who read English, are to be regarded as proof-sheets awaiting correction. They merely moot the subject, on which they invite discussion. J. R. B. Benares College,

8th Sept. 1851.

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THE

YOGA APHORISMS

OF PATANJALI.

INTRODUCTION.

a. Salutation to Ganesa! May that union of the twin-persons of Siva and his spouse,-by the recollection of which one enjoys emancipation, hard as it is to attain,-produce for you all bless- ings !*

b. From such passages of scripture as this-viz .- "NACHIKETA having received this science [viz. the Vedánta] declared to him by Yama, and all the rules of the yoga, having arrived at the Su- preme Soul, became passionless and immortal :- whosoever else also thus knows the Supreme Spirit, &c.,"-it is inferred that the rules of the yoga ought to be understood and practised by those who are desirous of emancipation. Therefore the venerable PA- TANJALI, being about to exhibit the rules of the yoga, in order to gain the attention of his disciples, states as follows what doctrine it is that is going to be entered upon.t

• श्री गणोशाय नमः। देहाईयोगशशिवयोसस श्रेयांसि तनोतु वः। दुष्प्रापर्मप यत्मृत्या जनः केवल्यमश्नते।। + मृत्युप्रोत्तां नाचिकेतो Sय लब््वा विद्यामेतां योगवि- विम्नक््सं ब्रह्मपाप्नो विरजो Sभुद्विमृत्ुरन्यो Sप्येवं यो वेदा A

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2 THE YOGA APHORISMS.

कथातो योगानुशासनम्। १॥ The suhject proposed. Aph. 1 .- Now, then, the exposition of Con- centration [is to be made].

a. The expression ' Now, then,' intimates [that] a [distinct] topic [here commences]; and it serves as a benediction* [-the particle atha being regarded as an auspicious one]. b. The word yoga, from the root yuj 'to keep the mind fixed in abstract meditation,' means such a restraining of the exercise of the mind, or Concentration.t

c. An 'exposition' is that whereby something is expounded, or declared, through its characteristic marks, its nature, &c. An 'exposition of the yoya,'-[such is the meaning of the compound word] yogánuśásana. This [-viz. the expounding of the nature, &c., of Concentration-] is to be understood to be the topic even to the end of this Institutet [of PATANJALI's].

d. But what is Concentration ( yoga) ? To this he replies:§-

ध्य.तमेवेत्यादिश्ुतिषु मुमुचतूषां योगविधिरनुष्ठेयलवेन द्ेय तयावगम्यते 5तो योगविधिमुपदिदि चुर्भगवान् पतन्नलिदिश व्यावधानाय तच्छास्त्रारमां प्रतिजानीते। * सथशन्दोऽधिकारदोतको मङ्गलार्थन। + युत्रिया गसमाधानं। युज समाधा। + अनुशिष्यत व्यास्यायते लच्षण सरूपादिभियन तदनुशा सनं। योगस्यानुशासनं योगानुशासनम्। तदाशासत्रपरिस मात्रेरधिऊतं बो द्रव्यम्। 5 को योग दतत ब्रार।

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BOOK 1. 3

Conoentration definod. योगश्वित्तसिनिरोध ।२ ।

Aph. 2 .- Concentration (yoga) is the hin- dering of the modifications of the thinking principle.

a. That is to say,-Concentration is the hindering, or the pre- venting, of the modifications-to be described hereafter [see §5] -of the Mind or internal organ [-to which modifications the internal organ is liable when allowed to come into contact with objects, as will be explained further on-]; and this 'hindering' is a super-sensual species of effort which is the cause of the des- truction of these modifications .*

b. But then [a doubt may here occur]. It is a tenet [-see Nyaya Aphorisms No. 31-] both of the Sankhya and the Yoga that the soul just consists of the knowledge which has as its ob- jects the modifications [in question-the two being united] like fire and the wood [or fuel of the fire] :- on the destruction of the modifications, then, the Soul too should be annihilated, as the fire is in the absence of the fuel :- and therefore, at the time of Concentration, what is the soul concerned about? With refer- ence to this he declares as follows:t-

Condition of the soul तदा दूष्ट: खरुपे वस्थानम्। ३। during concentration. Aph. 3 .- Then [i. e. at the time of Con- centration] it [the Soul] abides in the form of the spectator [with- out a spectacle.]

• चित्तस्यान्त:करणस्य वच्यमाणा या त्तयसासां निरो धो निवरजनं योग इत्यर्थः। निवर्चतन ्वातीन्द्रिय: प्रयत्नविशेषो

• गमु दत्तिविषयकबोधखरूप एव पुरुष: काष्ठाभरिवदिति

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4 THE YOGA APHORISMS.

a. 'Then' ;- i. e. at that time .*

b. ' In the form of the spectator;'-i. e. of soul [-see Tattwa- samasa §3-], in the form of Thought simply [without any ob- ject thought of]. 'Its state is' :- such is the force of the term avasthánat [rendered 'it abides,' &c.]

c. And so the definition [of Concentration] is this, that concen- tration is the hindering of the modifications of the internal or- gan [§2], which [prevention of its being modified] is the cause of the abiding in the form of soul simply.t

d. What then is the form of this [Soul] when in a state other than that of Concentration? To this he replies:§-

Condition of the soul at other times. Aph. 4 .- At other times [than that of Concentration] it [the soul] is in the same form as the modifica- tions [of the internal organ-§ 2. b. and 5.]

a. 'At other times;'-i. e. at another time than that of Concen- tration. The 'modifications' are those that are to be described सांस्ययोगयो: सिद्धान्तो दृत्तिविलये पुरुषोडपि नश्येत्काष्ठा पायेडगरिवत्ततक्च योगकाले कः पुरुषार्थ रत्याकाङायामाइ। * तदा तस्मिन् काले। + द्रषट: पुरुषस्य खरूपे। चिन्माचखरूपे। ब्रवख्ानं। सितिर्भवति।

तथाच दषटु: सरूपावसतिदेतुन्िभटन्तनिरोधो योग इति लचपम् । ६ व्युत्थानदशायां तस्य किं सरूपमित्यत बाइ।

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BOOK I. 5

[see §5]. To be 'in the same form' as these-means to consist of these. The meaning [of the whole] is this, that when the inter- nal organ [or Mind], through the senses, is affected [or modified] by the form of some object, the soul also [viewing the object through its organ the Mind] is as it were altered into that 'form, as the moon [reflected] in the moving ripples of the water, is like as if it were [itself] moving .*

b. Well, then :-- it was stated that the modifications [of the in- ternal organ] are to be hindered. Of how many kinds, then, are these [modifications], or what are they like? To this he replies :t-

The modifications of वृत्तय: पञ्चतय्य: क्रिष्टा बकिष्टाः ।५। the thinking principle, how many and what like. Aph. 5 .- The Modifications [of the inter- nal organ] are of five kinds, [and they are either] painful or not painful.

a. 'Modifications' ;- i. e. various altered states of the internal organ. 'Of five kinds,' or of five sorts. 'Painful' ;- i. e. inva- ded by vexations which will be defined in the sequel. 'Not painful' ;- i. e. the reverse thereof.t

• इूतरब योगादन्यस्सिन्काले। त्तयो वच्ष्यमापलचणा:। नाभिख्ारूप्यं तट्रूपत्वं। अ्रयमर्थअत्ते दन्द्रियद्वारा विषया- कारेण परिणते सति पुरुषसदाकार दव परिभाव्यते यथा जलतरङ्गेषु चलत्मु चन्द्रस्नलभ्निव भवति तद्ददिति। + बनु दृत्तयो निरोदव्या इरत्युत्तां। ताः पुनः कियत्प्रकारा: कीदृश्यो वेताकाङ्गायामाइ्।।

दृत्तयश्चित्तपरिणामविशेषा:। पञ्चतय्य: पञ्चप्रकारा:।

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6 THE YOGA APHORISMS.

b. Which are those five Modifications? With reference to this, he states :*_

These Modifications specifed. Aph. 6 .- [The modifi ations of the internal organ are] evidence [or right notion], misconception, fancy, sleep, and memory.

a. [All this is] clear.t

b. He defines these [modifications] in their order.t

Right प्रत्यचानुमानागमा: प्रमाणानि। ७। notions. Aph. 7 .- The evidences [§6.] are Perception, Infer- ence, and Testimony.

a. Here [-it will be observed-] without stating the defini- tion of the several kinds of evidence, this being so familiarly known, he has only divided them. [Lest, however, the reader should require the information, we may remark, in passing, that] the evidence called Perception is that modification of the internal organ which takes the form of assurance in respect of some ob- ject not previously apprehended. Inference is the modification of the internal organ produced from a correct notion of a general proposition, &c. [-respecting objects previously apprehended-

किराः केशर्व च्यमापल चणेराकान्ता:। बक्िष्टासद्विपरी-

AT: I

• सषम्।

• बासां क्रमेण लचणान्याइ।

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BOOK I.

as explained in the works of the Nyaya]. And the evidence cal- led Testimony is [what produces] that modification of the internal organ which arises from the words of one worthy* [to be received as an anthority].

b. Having thus spoken of the modification of the internal or- gan which consists in evidence [-or, as we should rather say- which consists in the correct state of cognition resulting from good evidence-], he mentions that which is in the shape of mis- conception.t

Misconception what. Aph. 8 .- Misconception is incorrect notion, not staying in the [proper] form of that [in respect whereof the misconception is entertained].

a. [That is to say-] misconception is a notion arising, in res- pect of something that is not so and so, that it is so and so; as, in the case of mother o'pearl, the notion of silver. 'Not staying in the [proper] form of that' ;- that is to say, which does not abide in that form which is the form of that thing [in respect of which the notion is entertained],-which amounts to its not re- vealing the form [or real nature] which belongs to the thing.t

*बनातिप्रिद्धत्वात् प्रमाणानां लक्षणमनुततृष विभाग: ऊतः। तजानधिगतार्थनिक्वयरूपा चित्तत्ति: प्रत्यवं प्रमाणं। व्याश्यादिप्रमाजन्या दत्तिरनुमानं। योग्यशन्दजन्यः रत्तिव रन्द: प्रमाणमिति।

• एवं प्रमाणरूपां दत्तिं व्यास्याय विपर्ययरूपामाइ।

• बतयाभूनेऽयें तयोत्पद्यमानं शनं विपर्ययः। यया

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8 THE YOGA APHORISMS.

b. [To illustrate this language of our author, we may here state the theory of the Understanding which he adopts, as we find it laid down in the Vedanta Paribhásha. The internal organ is there compared to water, in respect of its readiness to adapt itself to the form of whatever mould it may enter. " As the water of a reservoir, having issued from an aperture, having entered, by & channel, the basins [or beds with raised edges formed in the fields that require irrigation-] becomes four-cornered or other- wise shaped just like these; so the manifesting internal organ [or Mind,] having gone, through the sight or other channel, to where there is an object, for instance a jar, becomes modified by the form of the jar or other object. It is this altered state [of the internal organ] that is called its modification."* This 'manifes- ting internal organ,' whilst it is regarded as moulding itself upon the object, is regarded as at the same time manifesting it-or re- vealing it as a mirror does. To a considerable extent this theory of the Understanding is analogous to the theory of vision enter- tained by those who regard the retina as reflecting to the intelli- gent principle those visible forms of which the retina itself is un- cognisant; whilst the intelligent principle itself is cognisant of things visible only inasmuch as they are reflected to it by the retina. The 'modifications' are akin to Locke's 'ideas']. शक्रिकायां रजतज्ञानं। अतद्टपप्रतिष्ठमिति। तस्यार्थस यद्रूपं न तम्िन् रूपे प्रतिष्ठते। तस्यार्थस्य यट्रपं न तत्प्रति भासयतीति यावत्। * यथा तडागोदकं क्विद्राभिर्गत्य कुल्यात्ना केदारान प्रविश्य तद्ददेव चतुष्कोषाद्याकारं भवति तथा तैजसमन्तः करणमपि चच्ुरादिद्वारा घटादिविषयदेशं गत्वा घटादि- विषयाकारेण परिणमते। स एव परिणामो त्तिरितुच्यते। वद० परि०॥

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BOOK I. 9

c. Doubt also-for example whether the object be a man or a post-is incorrect notion [§ 8], inasmuch as the real nature of the object is not thereby revealed .*

d. In order to declare what modification [of the internal or- gan] is fancy-he says as follows :- t

Fanciful notions what. शब्दज्ञानानुपातो वसुशून्यो विकल्प:॥९।

Aph. 9 .- A fancy is [a notion] devoid of a thing [in reality corresponding thereto], following upon knowledge [conveyed] by words.

a. 'Knowledge produced [or conveyed] by words:'-[such is the sense of the compound] sabda-jnána. 'That, the habit whereof is to follow this [verbal information],' is what is so nam- ed [viz. fancy]. The meaning is-that a fancy is a conception, without a thingt [corresponding to it].

b. Eramples of this are such notions as 'The head of Rahu,' and ' The soul's Thinking,'-and ' Something like the horns of a a hare,' &c. Even after [discovering] the absurdity [involved in such notions], people yet deal with verbal knowledge [as if it were strictly receivable] in such senses, [-and it depends upon

पुरुषो वेति।

• विकल्प्टत्तिं व्याख्यातुमाइ।

• शब्दजनितं ज्ञानं शब्दज्ञानं। तदनुपतितं शीलं यस्य स तथोक्तः। वक्षुशून्य: प्रत्यया विकल्प रत्र्थः। B

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10 THE YOGA APHORISMS.

circumstances whether any serious error is to result from this or not.]*

c. [As a hare has no horn, the notion of a hare's horn is a fan- ciful one, 'devoid of a thing in rerum naturd corresponding to the notion.' A person hearing the expression 'The head of Ráhu' naturally proceeds to fancy that there is some Ráhu to whom this head belongs ;- but Rahu is all head-being a bodiless monster who is held to cause eclipses by swallowing the sun and moon, which emerge from obscuration when they come to the end of his dissevered gullet. The notion, therefore, raised by the expression 'The head of Rahu,' that there is any more of him besides the head, is a fancy-equally with that of the hare's horn-'devoid of a thing corresponding to the notion.' So again, a person hearing the expression ' The soul's Thinking,' naturally proceeds to fancy that there is some Soul to whom this Thinking belongs,-whereas the Soul is nothing besides the Thinking. Although, according to the commentator, such expressions are liable to suggest fancies that have nothing in reality correspond- ing to them, yet the employment of the expressions does not ne- cessarily mislead if we carefully bear. in mind what is the real state of the case. Much on the same principle people in Europe continue to speak of the sun's rising and setting, though, hold- ing the heliocentric theory, they do not really fancy that the sun either rises or sets].

d. In order to declare what is sleep, he sayst-

अस्योदाइरणानि। राहोश्शिरः। पुरुषस् पैतन्यम्।

रगव्दशाम रूपो व्यवहार: क्रियत पति।

• निट्रां व्याख्यातुमाइ।

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BOOK I. 11

Definition of sound गभावप्रत्ययालम्बना दत्तिर्निट्रा॥१०। sleep. Aph. 10 .- Sleep is that modification [of the internal organ] which depends on the conception of nothing.

«. Of what modification [of the internal organ] the ground is the conception of nothing, this is what is so called* [-viz. sleep].

6. This may be [also] stated as follows :- Sleep is that modifi- cation [of the internal organ] which takes place on the quitting of all objects, through [the quality of] Darkness's getting every- where the upper handt [-to the exclusion of the other two qua- lities, which,-see Lecture on the Sankhya § 96,-are held to be constituents of the phenomenal universe].

c. And the fact that this [dreamless sleep] is a modification [of the internal organ, and not a mere blank,] is [proved] by our seeing that one recollects [on arising from profound and dream- less sleep] that ' I slept pleasantly ;'-and there could not be a recollection if there had not been a state of consciousnesst [to furnish the matter of the recollection. Conf. Lecture on the Ve- dánta § 33]. d. In order to describe memory, he says§-

• अरभावप्रत्यय म्रालम्बनं यस्या टत्तेखा तथो का।

• एतदुत्तं भवति। या सन्ततमुट्रिक्त्वात्तमससमस विषयपरित्यागेन प्रवर्न्तते वत्तिस्ता निद्रेति।

ससयाम्त सुखमहमलाभमिति मृतिदर्शनात् मृतेश्चानु- भव्यतिरे केप्ानुपपन्तेरट्ट नित्वम्। 5 सृतिं व्याख्यातुमाइ।

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12 THE YOGA APHORISMS.

ब्नुभुतविषयासम्प्रमे.षः सृतिः॥११। Memory defined. Ah. 11 .- Memory is the not letting go of an object that one has been aware of.

a. [That is to say]-memory [or recollection] is the not letting go-or, by means of the self-reproductive quality [of the Soul -see Tarku Sanyraha p 55]-the arising, in the understanding, of that which has been cognised through evidence* [of the senses, for example ;- see § 7].

Waking, sleeping, and dreaming. b. Of these [modifications of the in- ternal organ, the three following, viz.] right notion [§ 7. a.] misconception [§ 8.] and fancy [§ 9.] are waking states. When just these [impressions-in the absence of the objects or of what gave rise to them] are sensible, through the force [or vividness] of the impression, then there is dream. But [dreamless] sleep [§ 10] is without any object cognised. And Recollection may take its rise either in a right notion, in a misconception, in a fancy, or in [dreamless] sleept [-see §10.c.]

c. Having thus described the modifications [of the internal organ], in order to explain the prevention of these [§ 2. a.], with the means thereof, he sayst-

• प्रमाणेनानुभूतस्य यो डयमसम्प्रमोषः संस्कारद्वारेष बुद्दावारोइ: सा समृतिः। + तब्र प्रमाणविपर्य्ययविकल्या जाग्रदवख्थाः। त एव यदा- नुभवबलात्प्रत्यचायमाणासदा रूप्रः। निद्रात्वसंवेद्यमान- विषया। सृतिक्व प्रमाणविपर्य्ययविकल्पनिद्रानिमित्ता। + एवं दृत्तीव्याखाय सोपायं निरोधं व्याख्यातुमाइ।

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BOOK I. 13

सभ्यार वैराग्याम्यां तविरोध:॥१२ ।

Aph. 12. The hindering of these Asceticism and mortification the means of repelling the transient. [modifications of the internal organ -§ 2-is to be effected] by means of exercise and dispassion.

a. 'Exercise and dispassion' will be defined [in § 13 and 15]. By these [viz. exercise and dispassion], the repelling of those modifications of the internal organ which [modifications, at diffe- rent times] have the form of revealing, energising, and obstructing, -this is the ' hindering'-[which is to be striven after, and which is tantamount to] the resting [of these modifications], in a potential shape, in their cause, viz: in the internal organ* [without taking an actual shape as products of the internal or- gan modified.]

b. Of the two [viz. exercise and dispassion, §12,] it is from 'dispassion,' which originates in our discerning the perniciousness of the objective, that aversion thereto arises. And, by 'exer- cise,' confirmed steadfastness [in the indifference towards all objects] is produced. So, by these two, the internal organ is hindered from undergoing modification.t

*सभ्यासवेराग्ये वच्यमापलक्षते। ताम्यां तासां प्रकाश- प्रदृत्तिनियमरूपाणं चित्तटत्तीनां यत्प्रतिहननं स निरोध:। सकारण एव चित्ते शक्िरूपतयावस्थानम्।

• तब विषयदोषदर्शनजेन वैराग्येष तद्वैमुख्यमुत्पाद्यते। सान्यासेनच डढं सैर्यमुत्पाद्यते। दत्याभ्यां भर्वत चित्तवत्ति निरोध:।

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14 THE YOGA APHORISMS.

d. In order to describe ' exercise' [ §12] he says .*-

Ascetic effort what. तब स्थिता यत्रो Sम्यास: ॥१३।

Aph. 13 .- 'Exercise' is the [repeated] effort that it [-viz. the internal organ-] shall remain in its [unmodified] state.

a. The condition of the internal organ, when free from modi- fication, existing only in its own [unmodified] form, is what we mean by its [unmodified] state. And what we mean by 'exer- cise' is the effort, or endeavour, again and again to reduce the internal organ to such a conditiont [of freedom from modifica- tion].

b. He next mentions a special character of this samet [exer- cise, or persevering effort].

स तु दीर्घकाल नेरन्तर्यसत्कार सेवितो दृढभूमिः॥१४ ।

Aph. 14 .- But this [exercise-§13 -- ] is a firm position ob- served out of regard [for the end in view, and perseveringly ad- hered to] for a long time unintermittingly.

a. That is to say :- it [-exercise-] is a firm ground [or state of steadfastness],-to be firm [we may remark in passing] is to be steadfast,-this [state of steadfastness] being assiduously attend-

*अ्रभ्यासं व्यास्थातुमाइ। + त्तिर्राितस्य चित्तस्य खरूपनिष्ठः परिणाम: सितिः। तसाच्च यत्र उताइ: पुनः पुनसथालेन पेतसि विनिवेश- ममभ्यास दतयुच्यते। + तस्ैव विशेषमाइ।

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BOOK I. 15

ed to, during a long time unintermittingly, ont of the excess of regard* [which one entertains for the end to be gained]. b. He now mentions the definition of ' dispassion't [§12].

दृष्टानुश्रविक्कविषयवितृष्पस् वशकारसं- Dispassion defined. ज्ञा वैराग्यम्॥ १५। Aph. 15. Dispassion is the consciousness of having overcome [one's desires,-this consciousness being that] of him who thirsts after neither the objects that are seen [on earth] nor those that are heard of [in scripture]. a. Object is of two kinds-'seen' (drishta) and 'heard of' (ánusravika). One 'seen' is onc apprehende i here [on earth]- such as a Sound [or other object of sense]. One 'heard of' means one in the world of the gods or elsewhere [where it cannot be seen by us]. The Veda is called anusrava because it is [not first read by the young student, but is] listened to (srúyate) from the mouth of the preceptor [-and heard after, or consequently on, the teacher's utterance,-as the prefix anu implies]. What [ob- ject] comes [to our knowledge] therefrom [i. e. from the Veda] is what we mean by one ' heard of't (nusravika).

b. What is called ' dispassion' is the reflection " These [objects -whether of this world or of the one beyond-§15. a .- ] are my *बहकालं नैरन्तयेणादरातिरयेन सेव्यमानो दढभूमिः खििरो भर्वात दादयाय भवतीत्यर्थः। + वैराग्यस्य लक्षणमाइ। + द्विविधो विषयो दृष्ट आ्नु्रविकश। दष्ट दववोप- लम्यमानश्शन्दादिः। देवलोकादावानुत्नविकः। बमुसूयते गुरुमुखादित्यनुश्नवो वेदसत आगत व्ानुञ्विक:।

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16 THE YOGA APHORISMS.

subjects; I am not their slave,"-this 'consciousness of having overcome' entertained by h m who, from discerning the insipidity of the results of both of those [classes of objects] has dismissed all eagerness about them .*

c. He next mentions a peculiar aspect of this samet [i. e. of ' dispassion.'] Dispassion carried तत्परं पुरुषस्थातेगृणवैळष्णयम्। १६। the length of indif- ference to all ob- jects. Aph. 16 .- This [viz. 'dispassion,'] carried to the utmost is indifference regarding the ' qualities' [i. e. every- thing else than Soul], and this indifference arises from a know- ledge of Soul [as distinguished from the ' qualities.' See Lec- ture on the Sankhya §49]. a. 'This :'-i. e. ' dispassion,' 'carried to the utmost :'-i. e. elevated [to its utmost]. The first [degree of 'dispassion,'-see §15-] has regard to [ordinary] objects ;- but the second [ 16], has regard tu the 'qualities' [from which, according to the Sankhya, ordinary objects arise]. This arises only from famili- arity with the distinction between the ' qualities' and Soul [-or the objective and subjective]. From its extreme conduciveness to abstract meditationt [it ranks above the dispassion which has regard only to the grosser objects].

• तयोईयोरपि परिणामविरसत्वदर्शनाद्विगतगर्द्वस्य या वशोकारसंज्ञा ममैत वशाः नाइमेतेषां वश दति यो डयं विमर्शसद्दराग्यमुच्ते।। + तस्थैव विशेषमाह॥ + तद्वैराग्यं। परमुकृष्टं। प्रथमं वैराग्यं विषयविषयं द्वितोयन्ु गुणविषयमुत्यन्नगणपुरुषविवेकस्यातेरेव भवति निरोधसमाधेरत्यन्तानुकूलत्वात्।

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BOOK I. 17

b. Having thus stated the nature of concentration (Yoga), he [next] mentions the difference between the nature of [medita- tion, which is of two kinds-viz.] that 'in which there is distinct recognition,' (samprajnáta) and that 'in which distinct recogni- tion is lost,'* (a-samprajnáta).

Meditation, with an objcct. Aph. 17 .- [Meditation-of the kind called] that 'in which there is distinct recognition' [arises, in its fourfold shape,] from the attendance of (1) 'argumentation' (vitarka), (2) 'deliberation' (vichára), (3) 'beatitude' (ánanda), and (4) 'egotism' (asmitá).

a. The word ' Meditation' is required to supply the ellipsis in the aphorism.t

b. Meditation 'in which there is distinct recognition' (sam- prajnáta) is a kind of 'pondering' (bhávaná) whereby the nature of that which is to be pondered is known thoroughly and well- apart from either doubt or error. This meditation 'in which there is distinct recognition' excludes every modification of the mind [or every idea-see §8. b] other than what is to be pon- dered :- it is, in short, meditation with its seedt [i. e. with the * एवं योगस्य सरूपमु का सम्प्रन्नातासम्च्ञातखरूपभेद· माइ। + समाधिरिति शेष:। + सम्घक संशयविपर्ययरह्िततवेन प्रचायते प्रकर्षेण चायते भाव्यखरूपं येम स सम्रज्ात: समाधिभावनाविशेष:। ध्ेयातिरिक्कसक लटन्तनिरोधसमरभ्वाोजमिरिति यावत्। C

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18 THE YOGA APHORISMS.

object, in the effort to apprehend which exclusively the medita- tion originates].

c. This [meditation 'in which there is distinct recognition'- 17-], through its division into the 'argumentative' &c., is of four kinds, viz. (1) the 'argumentative,' (2) the 'deliberative,' (3) the ' beatific,' and (4) the ' egotistical.'*

d. As for ' Pondering' [§17. b.], this means the taking into the mind again and again, to the exclusion of all other objects, that which is to be pondered. And that which is [a suitable ob- ject] to be pondered is of two kinds, being either the Lord (is- wara) or the twenty.five principles[-see Tattwa-samasa §37-]. These [twenty-five principles] also are of two kinds, through their distinction as senseless and not senseless. Twenty-four [of the principles, including Earth, &c.], are senseless :- that which is not senseless is Soul.t

e. Among these [objects suitable for being pondered-$17 d .- ] when, having taken as the object the Senses and the Ele- ments which are gross [in comparison with the Subtile Elements next to be spoken of ], pondering is engaged in, in the shape of the investigation as to which is antecedent and which is conse- quent [-i. e. whether the Senses generate the Elements or the

• स सवितर्कादिभेदाच्चतुर्विध: सवितर्कसविचारस्ानन्द

• भावना तावत्। भाव्यस्य विषयान्तरपरिदारेण चेतसि पुनः पुनर्निवेशनं। भाव्यन्च द्विंधा ईश्वरसत्वानिच पञ्न विशतिः। तान्यपि द्विविधानि जडाजडभेदात्। जडानि चतुविशतिरजड: पुरुषः ।

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BOOK I. 19

Elements generate the senses-] then the Meditation is [techni- cally said to be] 'argumentative' (savitarka) .* f. When, having taken as the object something subtile, as the Subtile Elements and the Internal Organ, pondering is engaged in, in so far as regards the where and the when thereof,-then it [-the pondering-] is [technically said to be] 'deliberative' (savichára).t g. But when the ' pure element' (sattwa-see Sankhya Lecture §50) of the Internal Organ, commingled with somewhat of [the two other elements,-viz.] 'passion' and ' darkness' [-Sankhya Lecture §51 and 52], is pondered, then the meditation is [techni- cally termed] 'beatific' (sánanda-§17 c.), because the 'pure ele- ment' then pondered, which consists in the manifestation of joy [Sánkhya Lecture §50], is predominant-inasmuch as the intel- lectual faculty is then [-i. e. in this particular case of ponder- ing-] a secondary matter.t h. After that [pondering of the 'pure element' commingled with the two others -- § 17. g .- ], the meditation which is engag- ed in, having, as that on which it rests, the clear 'pure element' unaffccted by even a little of 'passion' or 'darkness,' is called 'egotistical' meditation [§17. c.], because, here, [personal] ex-

• तत्र यदा महाभूतेन्रियाणि स्थूलानि विषयत्वेनादाय पूर्वापरानुसन्वानेन भावना प्रवर्न्तते तदा सवितर्कसमाधि:। + तन्माबान्त:करणलक्षणं सक्षं विषयमालम््य तस्य देश- कालधम्मावच्छ्ेदेन यदा भावना प्रवर्न्तते तदा सविचार:। + यदातु रजसमोलेशानविद्गमन्त:करपसत्वं भाव्यते सदा गुणभावाचिच्कत्तोसुख प्रकाशमयस्य सत्त्वस्य भाव्यमान- सोट्रेकात्ानन्दसमाधिर्भवति।

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20 THE YOGA APHORISMS.

istence only remains, since the intellectual faculty becomes now predominent inasmuch as the ' pure element' which is to be ap- prehended [as the object of the meditation] is here disregarded* [as the mere stepping stone to higher things]. i. Among these [four kinds of 'meditation, where there is dis- tinct recognition' of an object,-§ 17. c.], the first, the 'argu- mentative' meditation [§ 17. e.] includes all [that belongs to] the four. The second, the ' deliberative,' leaves out the ' argumenta- tion' [of the preceding] :- the third, the ' beatific,' leaves out the deliberation [of the second] :- the fourth, consisting in mere self- consciousness, leaves out that [beatitude which belongs to the third] :- and all these [four] are meditations with something to rest upont [as the object pondered ;- the soul of the ascetic, like the body of the young swimmer, requiring supports to begin with, which are successively laid aside as power and confidence are gained by practice]. j. He next tells what is meant by that [meditation] 'in which distinct recognition is lost't [§ 16. b .- the practised ascetic hav- ing parted with every vestige of object, as the practised swimmer with his last cork or bladder].

• ततः परं रजसमोलेशानभिभूतं शुद्धं सत्वमालम्बनी कत्य या प्रवर्न्नते भावना तस्यां ग्राह्स्य सत्त्वस्य न्यग्भावात् चि. च्कत्तरट्रेका क्षत्तामाचावशेषलेन समाधिस्ता स्तितदतचते। + तच प्रथमश्नतुष्टयानुगतसमाधिसवितर्कः । द्वितीयो वितर्कविकलसविचारः। दतौयो विचारविकलसानन्दः। चतुर्थसद्विकलो Sस्नितामाच इति सर्व एते सालम्बनासमा धय दति।

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BOOK I. 21

विराम प्रत्ययाभ्यास पूर्व्वस स्कार शेषो न्यः ॥१८।

Meditation without an object. Aph. 18 .- The one [kind of medita- tion jnst described] is preceded by the exercise of thought in the shape of repose ;- the other [-inde- pendent of any fresh antecedent-] is in the shape of the self- reproduction [of thought, after the departure of all objects]. a. By 'repose' (virama)we mean that whereby one is rested,- the abandonment of all anxiety about argumentation, &c. [§ 17.]. Well-'thought' in the shape of this 'repose' is what we mean by the compound expression virama-pratyaya ;- and what we mean by the 'exercise' (abhyása) of this, is the reiteratedly dwelling mentally thereon, and constantly rejecting with a nega- tive [as a delusion and an unreality] whatever 'modification' [or idea,-see § 5 .- ] springs up there [to interfere with it] ;- such is 'the exercise of thought in the shape of repose.' This [as re- marked in the first half of the aphorism] produces meditation 'in which there is distinct recognition'* [§17 :- and we have now to consider that kind of meditation which differs from this]. b. The other [kind of meditation] has nothing left but the self-reproduction of thought. It is different from that [above de- scribed]; that is to say, it is [as contra-distinguished from medi- tation 'in which there is distinct recognition,'] that 'in which distinct recognition is lost.' Here there is nothing to be thought of or accurately apprehended [-as it was necessary that there should be in the former process-] ;- it is meditation without a * विरम्यते कानेनेति विराम:। वितकादिचिन्तापरि- त्याग: । विरामन्नासी प्रत्ययन्न विरामप्रत्ययः। तस्याभ्यास: पान: पुन्येन चेतसि निवेशनं तबर याकाचिद्ृत्तिरुप्सति तस्यां नेति नेतीति नैरन्नर्येण पर्यु दसनं विरामप्रत्ययाभ्यास:।

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22 THE YOGA APHORISMS.

seed* [-i. e. without any object-see §17 b .- in any effort to confine one's self to the apprehension of which the meditation has been entered upon]. c. Well, having thus stated the [two] distinctions [§18] in the nature of Concentration [§2], and having compendiously men- tioned its methods, the author proceeds to speak of these me- thods more fully, first premising some account of the spurious semblance of concentration.t

भवप्रत्ययो विदेषप्रक्वतिलयानाम्॥१९।

Spurious somblan- ces of abstract Me- Aph. 19 .- Of [the meditative state attained ditation. to by the two classes of aspirants, technically called] 'the unembodied and resolved into Na- ture,' the world is the cause.

a. By 'the unembodied and resolved into Nature' we mean to speak of [those technically called] 'the unembodied' [as one set], and ' the resolved into Nature' [as another set]. Of these the Meditation is caused by the world,-that is to say, it is such that the cause, or instrumental agency on which it depends, is the world-the creation-[-the phenomenal-beyond which the vision of these extends not to the discrimination of pure Spirit, and the uncreated energy Nature].t * संस्कारशेषो Sन्यः तद्विलच्षणः। ब्रसम्प्रन्वात रत्र्थः। न सवच किश्नि द्वेद्यं सम्प्रज्ञायत दत्यसम्प्रज्ञातो निर्बोजसमाधि:। + तदेवं योगस सरूपभेदं संचेपेणोपायन्वाभिधाय विस्त रेणोपायं योगाभासप्रदर्शनपूर्वकं वत्तुमुपक्रमते। + विदेहान्व प्रक्ृतिलयाश्च विदेइप्रक्ृतिलयाः। तेषां समाधिर्भवप्रत्यय: भवसंसार एव प्रत्ययः कारणं यस् ताडशे भवतीत्यर्थः ।

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BOOK I. 23

b. The meaning is this-that, only while the world is manifest, are these men participators in such [inadequate] meditation [as we have described]. And this is a mere false semblance of me- ditation, because these do not discern the ultimate Reality. Hence, by him who desires emancipation, effort is to be made for [attaining to] the knowledge of the ultimate Reality, and for pondering that* [instead of the lower things pondered by those of narrower ken, whose vision cannot pierce the phenomenal, and discriminate the spectator Soul, and the natura naturans]. c. And, of the persons spoken of in the aphorism, those who, having their energies directed to ' beatific' meditation [§17. g.], do not discern any other Reality, in the shape of Nature or Soul, these are they who are meant by the term the ' unembodied' (videha), because their body and their self-consciousness are de- parted [-but they are not further advanced towards emancipa- tion]. And those who [going just one step further] are content with the 'egotistic' meditation [§17. h.] but do not discern the Supreme Soul, and whose intellect has been resolved into [the natura naturans which is] its cause, these are they who are called the 'resolved into nature't (prakritilaya)-[See Sánkhya Lec- ture, §15 and 54]. * अयमर्थः। आ्विर्भूतमात्र एव संसारे तथाविधस मा- विभाजो भवन्ति। तेषां परतत्वादर्शनात योगाभासोऽयं। व्रतः परत्त्वज्ञाने तज्गावनायाच्च मुक्तिकामेन यत्रो विधेय इति। t अ्रचच ये सानन्दसमाधा बद्मष्टतयसख्वान्तरं प्रधान पुरुषरूपं न पश्यन्ति ते विगतदेश्दाइ ङ्वारत्वाद्विदेह्शन्द- वाच्ा:। येच साम्मितसमाधा ऊतपरितोषा: परं परमा- त्ानं न पश्यन्ति येषाञ् चेतस्खकारणे लयमुपगतं ते प्रक्व- तिलया दरत्युचन्ते।

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24 THE YOGA APHORISMS.

d. But of others than those* [whose inadequate style of medi- tation has been stated in aphorism 19, the meditation is as stated in the aphorism here following].

The genuine order of ab- Aph. 20 .- [In the practice] of others, stract Meditation. this [Meditation] is preceded by Faith, Energy, Memory, Meditation, and Discernment. a. "Of others"-i. e. of Yogis other than [those called] the 'unembodied' [§ 19. c.] and the 'resolved into nature't [§ 19. c.]. b. "Preceded by Faith, &c." To complete the sense, we must supply the word 'Meditation.' 'Preceded by Faith, &c.,'-that is to say-the means antecedent [and conducive] to which are Faith, &c. And these, 'Faith, &c.,' acting in the relation of means to an end, constitute the means [or appliances] for Medi- tation 'in which there is distinct recognition't [-§ 17.].

Faith defined. c. Among these [antecedents enumerated in the Aphorism], 'Faith' (sraddha) means a mental ap- proval of Concentrationg [as a worthy and possible aim]. Energy. d. 'Energy' (vírya) means perseverance.|l

• तदन्येषानु। + इतरेषां। विदेइप्रक्वतिलय त्र्यतिरिक्कानां योगिनां। + अद्वादिपूर्वकः। म्द्यादय: पूर्व उपाया यस्य स प्रद्दा- दिपूर्वकसमाधिरिति शेष:। तेच प्द्ादय उपायोपेयभावेन प्रवर्न्तमाना: समत्ञातस्य समाधेरूपायतां प्रतिपद्यन्ते। 5 तच प्द्ा योगविषये चेतसः प्रसाद:। · वीर्यमुल्ाइ:। : .

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BOOK I. 25

Memory. e. 'Memory' [or ' Recollection'-smriti] has already been explained,* [-see § 11].

Meditation. f. 'Meditation' (samádhi) means intentness on a single point.t

Discernment. g. 'Discernment' (prajná) means thorough discri- mination of that which is to be known.t

Reason for h. Among these [antecedents,-to account for the this order of order of statement adopted in the aphorism, we may statement. remark, that]-of him who has 'Faith' there arises ' Energy,'-he becomes persevering in meditation ;- and to one thus persevering the 'Memory' of past subjects springs up; and his mind becomes absorbed in ' Meditation' in consequence of the recollection thereof; and he whose mind is absorbed in medita- tion arrives at a thorough ' Discernment' of the matter pondered.§

i. Such are [according to those whose practice is recorded in §20.] the means of that Meditation ' in which there is distinct re- cognition' [§ 17.]. The [still higher step-the] Meditation 'in which distinct recognition is lost' [§ 18.] is arrived at through diligent practice [§ 13.] of this ['in which there is distinct recog-

*मृतिव्याख्याता। + समाधिरे काग्रता।

• प्रज्ा ववातव्यप्रविवेक: । 8 तन्र त्रद्दावतो वीयें जायते योगविषये उम्राइवान् भवति सोताइस्यच पाच्चात्यासु भूमिषु सृतिरुपजायते तत्सारवाच्ेतसमाधीयते समाहितचिन्तक्त भाव्यं सम्यग्वि- जानाति। D Digitized by Google

26 THE YOGA APHORISMS. nition' of some object pondered], and through extreme ' Dispas- sion'* [§ 16].

j. He next mentions the subdivisions of Yogis, adopting the abovementioned means, according to the difference of method adopted by them.t

Ascetics divisible accord- Aph. 21 .- [The attainment of the state ing to their method of pro- cedure. of abstract Meditation is] speedy in the case of the hotly impetuous.

a. To complete the aphorism, the words The attainment of the state of abstract Meditation' require to be supplied.t

b. By 'impetuosity' (samvega) is meant a more energetic self- reproducing impulse, which is a cause of action. Those persons in whose ' transcendent' methods [§ 22.] this [impetuosity] is violent, are close upon the attainment of abstract meditation and the fruits of meditation ;- that is to say, this is, in their case, ra- pidly brought about.§

• त एते सम्प्रज्वातसमाधेरुपायाः। तस्याभ्यासात्पराच

• उक्रोपायवतां योगिनामुपायभेदाज्ेदानाइ। + समाधिलाभ इति शेष:।

8 संवेग: तियाहेतुर्दढतरसंस्कार: स तीव्रो येषामधि- मायोपायानां तेषामासन्नसमाधिलाभसमाधिफल्ासन्रं भवति शोघ्रमेव निष्पद्यत दत्र्थः ।

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BOOK I. 27

c. Who are those 'hotly impetuous' [§ 21]? To this he re- plies .*

मुदुमध्याधिमाचत्वान्ततोडपि विशेषः ।२२ ।

Aph. 22 .- Through the ' mild,' the ' medium,' and the ' tran- scendent' [nature of the methods adopted] there is thence also a distinction [among the ascetics who adopt the methods].

a. Through the diversity of these various methods, viz. the 'mild' &c., there is a distinction of those who employ the methods. The divisions of method are the 'mild' (mridu), the 'medium' (madhya), and the 'transcendent' (adhimatra). These are severally threefold from their being severally subdivided into the ' mildly impetuous,' the 'middlingly impetuous,' and the ' transcendently impetuous.' And in accordance with this division there are The nine dioisions of ascetics. nine classes of followers of the Yoga. Thus- there is the 'mild method'-[the follower of which may be] the ' mildly impetuous,' the 'middlingly impe- tuous,' or the 'transcendently impetuous.' Then there is the 'medium method'-[the follower of which may be] the 'mildly impetuous,' the 'middlingly impetuous,' or the ' transcendently impetuous.' And there is the 'transcendent method'-[the fol- lower of which may be] the 'mildly impetuous,' the 'middlingly impetuous,' or the 'transcendently impetuous'. And great en- deavours ought to be made after the ' transcendent method' and after warm impetuosity [in following out the same]. So much for the declaration of the distinctionst [among the followers of the Yoga].

• के ते तीव्रसंवेगा रत्यत बाइ।

• सेम्य उपायेम्यो मृद्दादिभेदभिन्नेम्य उपायवतां विशेषो भवति। मुदुर्मच्योधिमान दत्युपायभेदा। ते प्रत्येकं मृदु-

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28 THE YOGA APHORISMS.

b. By 'mildness' [as we learn from Bhavaganesa] is here meant 'smallness'. The meaning of 'middlingness' is the fami- liar one. By 'transcendentness' is meant the exceeding of all measure,-excessiveness, in short *.

c. Now he mentions a method which differs from these me- thods in being an easy one.t

ईश्वरप्रणिधानाद्वा। २३।

The devotional method. Aph. 23-Or by profound devotedness towards the Lord, [the ascetic may attain to the state of abstract Meditation].

a. By "the Lord" (fswara) we mean what will be defined [in §24]. By " profound devotedness" towards Him, we mean a kind of devoted attachment, a peculiar serving of Him, the con- signing of all one's actions to Him. The person [under the in- fluence we speak of ] desiring no fruit [of his actions] in the shape of enjoyment of sense-objects, or the like, makes over all his ac- संवेगमध्यसंवेगतीव्रसंवेगभेदाच्िविधाः। तङ्वेदेनच नव यो- गिनो भवन्ति। मृदूपायः। मृदुसंवेगो मध्संवेग: तीव्र संवेगस्न। मध्योपायः। मृदुसंवेगो मध्यसंवेग: तीव्संवेगक्त। अ्रधिमानोपायः। मृदुसंवेगो मध्संवेग: तीव्संवेगन्न। अधिमाचोपाये तीव्रेच संवेगे महान् यत्र: कर्मव्य इति भेदोपदेशः। * मृदुखमल्यता। मध्यत्वं प्रसिद्धम्। अधिमाचतवमति- प्रमापत्वमतिशयितत्वमिति यावत्। दति भावागषेशः। + रदानीमेतदुपायविलच्णं सुगममुपायान्तरमाइ।

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BOOK I. 29

tions to Him, the pre-eminent guide. This 'profound devoted- ness' is a pre-eminent means of abstract Meditation and of the attainment of its fruits .*

The devotional method has reference to the b. It has been just stated that abstract ' Lord' Meditation may be attained through pro- found devotedness towards the Lord. With reference to this, he now proceeds to declare, in order, the nature, [$24] the proofs [§25], the pre-eminence [§26], and the name [$27], of the Lord, the order of His worship [§28], and the fruit thereoft [§29].

केशकर्म विपाकाशयेरपरामृष्टपुरुषविशेष ईश्वरः। २४।

The term ' Lord' defined. Aph. 24 .- The Lord is a particular Spirit (purusha) untouched by troubles, works, fruits, or deserts.

a. 'Troubles'-i. e. things that distress,-such as ignorance &c., which will be spoken of [in the 2nd section]. ' Works'-i. e. [actions involving] merit or demerit. 'Fruits'-i. e. what ripen out of works, as birth, life, or whatever is experienced [by mortals as the consequences of their actions. By ' deserts' are

• ईश्वरो वच्यमापलच्षणः । प्रणिधानं तत्र भक्तिविशेषा विशिष्टमुपासनं सर्वक्रियाणामपि तच्ार्पणं विषयसुखादिक फलमनिच्छम् सर्वा: क्रियासस्तिन् परमगुरावर्पयति तन्म शिधानं समाधेसत्फललाभस्यच प्रक्रष्ट उपायः। + ईश्वरस् प्रणिधानातमाधिलाभ इत्युत्ं। तनेश्वरख् सरूपं प्रमाणं प्रभावं वाचकमुपासनाक्रमं तत्फलब्न कमेब वत्तुमाइ। Digitized by Google

30 THE YOGA APHORISMS.

meant thuse self-continuant conditions, or tendencies [-leading to their inevitable consequences-], which take the name of asaya [-from the root si 'to sleep,-] because they rest on the tablets of the mind until their fruit shall have ripened. [The Lord, to whom no such things are attributable, is declared to be] ' Untouched' by these-i. e. not affected by them during any of the three times, [-past, present, or future] .*

b. A 'particular Spirit,'-i. e. one who is different from other spirits ;- such is the force of the term here rendered ' particu- lar.'t

The Lord upholds all things c. 'The Lord' (iswara)-i. e. [-from by His mere will. the root si ' to possess power'-]who is accustomed to rule,-who is able to uphold the world by his mere will. Such is the nature of 'the Lord.'t

d. Having thus stated the nature of the Lord, he now [§23. b.] states the proofsg [that such a Being exists].

• क्विश्नन्तोति केशा अविद्यादयो वच्यमाणा:। कर्म धर्माधमा। विपाका: कर्मफलानि जन्मायुभागा:। ब्रफल- विपाकात् चित्तभूमा शेरत रत्याशया वासनाख्ा: संकारा। तेरपरामृष्टः चिष्वपि कालेषु न संस्पृष्टः। + पुरुषविशेषः। अन्येभ्यः पुरुषेम्यो विशिव्यत दति विशेष:।

• ईशरः। ईशनशील:। इच्छामाचे सकलजगदुदूरण- नम द्रति खरूपमीश्वरस्येति।

९ एवमोश्वरस् खरूपमभिधाय प्रमाषमाइ।

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BOOK I. 31

तच निरतिशयं सर्वज्ञबीजम्। २५।

Proof that there is such a Being as the Aph. 25 .- In Him does the germ of the Lord. omniscient become infinite.

a. 'In Him'-i. e. in that divine Being. The germ of omni- science is the less or more of the knowledge of the past, the fu- ture, &c. This is the germ, because like a germ it is the root [of what springs from it]. This [knowledge which in others is less or more] in Him, is infinite, or reaches its extreme limit. [And it is held to be a fair inference that Knowledge reaches the limit of Omniscience somewhere], for, properties that are capable of degrees, such as Parvitude and Magnitude, are [in particular in- stances] seen to have reached their extreme limits,-Parvitude, for example, in an Atom, and pre-eminent Magnitude in the Ether. So too Knowledge and the like, properties of the intel- lect, are seen admitting of degrees. They reach their extreme limit somewhere, and He in whom they are infinite is the Lord .*

b. Having thus declared the nature of the Lord, and the proof that such a Being exists, he next [§23. b.] declares His pre-emi- nence.t

• तन्र। तस्निन् भगवति। सर्वन्ञत्वस्य यद्वीजं अतीता नागतादिग्रइण स्याल्पत्वं मइत्वन्न मूलत्वात् बीजमिव बीजं। तत्तत्र निरतिशयं काष्ठाप्राप्नं। दृष्टाह्यल्पत्वमहख्वादोनां धर्माणां सातिशयानां काष्ठाप्रापिर्यथा परमाणावल्पत्वस्य व्राकाशेच परममइत्त्वस्य। एवं ज्ञानादयो Sपि चित्तधर्मा- सारतम्ेन परिद्ृश्यमाना: कचिश्चिरतिशयतामासाद्यन्ति यबचैते निरतिशयास ईश्वर दति। + एवमीश्वरस् खरूपं प्रमाणन्नाभिधाय प्रभावमाइ्ट।

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32 THE YOGA APHORISMS.

स एष पूर्वेषामपि गुरुः कालेनानवच्केदात्। २ ६।

The pre-eminence of the Lord. Aph. 26 .- He is the preceptor even of the first, for He is not limited by time.

a. 'Of the first ;'-that is to say, even of the earliest [of cre- ated beings], such as Brahma, &c. He [the Lord] is the precep- tor, or instructor; for He is not bounded by time, since He is without beginning,-and these, on the other hand, are limited by time because they had a beginning .*

b. Having thus declared the pre-eminence [of the Lord], he declares His name [§ 23. b.], with a view to its employment in devotion.t

तस्य वाचक: प्रपदः ।२७।

The mystical name Aph. 27. His name is Glory. of the Lord.

a. 'His,'-i. e. of the Lord as thus defined [§24], the name, or appellation, is 'Glory' (pranava), [which is the technical term employed in speaking of the mystical name] ' Om.'t

b. And of the two [-i. e. of the Lord and this name-] the relation, as ' denoted and denoter,' is eternal. It is convention-

• पूर्वेषां। आ्राद्यानां ब्रह्मादीनामपि स गुरुरुपदेष्टा यतस कालेनानवच्छिय्यते बनादिल्ात्। तेषां पुमरादि- मस्वादसि कालेनावच्छेद:। + एवं प्रभावमुक्तोपासनोपयोगाय वाचकमाइ। + रत्यमुक्तखरूपस्य तत्येश्वरस्य वाचकोSभिधायक: प्रवव बोडार।

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BOOK 1. 83

ally declared,-but not made by any one. Just in like manner as the actual relation between a father and his son is declared [and not created ] by some one who says "This is that one's fa- ther, and that is this one's son."* c. He next speaks of worshipt [-§23. b.] तव्नपसदर्थभावनम्। २८। How the name of the Lord is to be used in Aph. 28 .- Its repetition [should be made, worship. and also] reflection on its signification. a. 'Its',-i. e. of this mystical name, consisting of three and a half prosodial moments [viz: (a=2) +(«=1) + (m=})= (om=3$)], the repetition, or proper pronunciation; and reflection on, or re-iterated mental attention to, its signification-viz : the Lord,-is a means of concentrating the thoughts; therefore it is here stated that the follower of the Yoga ought to repeat the mystical name and to reflect upon its import, with a view to the effecting of abstract Meditation.t b. He next mentions the fruits [§23. b.] of such worship.§ * तयोक्ष वाच्यवाचकभावलचणसम्बन्धो नित्यः। सङ्ेतेन प्रकाश्यते नतु केनचिल्कियते। यथा पिटपुतयोरविद्यमान सम्बन्धो 5स्यायं पितास्यायं पुत्र दति केनचित्प्रकाश्यते। + उपासनामाड़। + तस्य सार्दृनिमानस्य प्रपावस्य जपो यथावदुच्चारवं तद्टाचस्येन्वरस्य भावनं पुनःपुनश्वेतसि निवेशनं एकाग्र- ताया उपायो Sतममाधिसिद्ये योगिना प्रपवो जप्यस्- दर्थश्न भावनीय दृतुत्तां भवति। 5 उपासनाया: फसमार। E Digitized by Google

34 THE YOGA APHORISMS.

Aph. 29 .- Thence comes the knowledge of the rightly intelli- gent [Spirit], and the absence of obstacles.

a. 'The righily intelligent [Spirit]'-i. e. the Spirit possessed of knowledge,-He being an intelligence who rightly knows,-i. e. who knows in an opposite, or inverse way, [as contradistinguish- ed from mortals, whose understanding-as explained under § 5 .- is supposed to flow out and become modified by objects. Such a process of gaining knowledge, being regarded as undesirable in the case of mortals, is not to be imagined to belong to the Lord, who is therefore said to know in some opposite way]. There accrues to him [the ascetic] a knowledge, a complete apprehen- sion, of Him,* [through the practice recommended in §23].

b. The obstacles [to the attainment of the end in view] will be mentioned. The absence of these means the exclusion of their power.t

c. Now, which are those obstacles? This being a point in doubt, he proceeds to remark as follows.t

• प्रतीपं विपरीतं अ्रञ्च्वति विजानातीति प्रत्यक्। स चासा चेतनश्चेति प्रत्यक्चेतनो विद्वान् पुरुषः । तस्य अधिगमो ज्ञनं सरुपतो एस्य भवति।

• अरन्तराया वच्यमाणालेषामभावः शक्रिप्रतिबम्धो भवति।

• अथ के ते Sन्नराया दत्याशकायामाइ।

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BOOK 1. 35

व्याधिस्यानसंशयप्रमादालस्या विरतिभ्रान्तिदर्शनालब्धभूमि- कत्वानवस्ितत्वानि चित्तविचेपासे उन्तरायाः ।३०।

The obstacles of the Aph. 30 .- Sickness, languor, doubt, care- ascetic. lessness, laziness, addiction to objects [of sense], erroneous perception, failure to attain any stage [of ab- straction], and instability [in the state when attained],-these distractions of the mind are obstacles [in the way of the ascetic].

a. These nine, prevailing throngh the power of the passionate and dark qualities [-the two which are opposed to the element of pure or good in the phenomenal world-] become distractions of the mind :- that is to say, the mind is distracted by these which are opposed to the mind's concentrating itself on any point .*

Sickness. b. Among these, 'Sickness,' is a fever, or the like, caused by disorder of the humours.t

Languor. c. 'Languor' is the mind's inactivity.t

Doubt. d. 'Doubt' is a [sort of] notion that leans to both alternatives. As, for example, [where one hesitates] "Is the Yoga practicable [e. g. for me the doubter], or is it not ?"§ * नवेते रजसमोवशात् प्रवर्त्तमानाश्वित्तस् विच्ेपा भर्वन्ति। तरेकाग्रताविरधिभिश्चित्तं विचिप्यत दूत्यर्थः। + तन् व्याधिर्धातुवैषम्यनिमिच्चो व्वरादि:। + र्यानमकर्मएयता चित्तस्य। 5 उभयकोदालम्बनं विज्ञानं संशयः। योगसाधस्साद्वा नर्वेति।

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36 THE YOGA APHORISMS.

Carelessness. e. 'Carelessness' is a habit of inattention, -& listlessness about the effecting of abstract meditation .*

Latinest. f. 'Laziness' is a heaviness of the body and mind, which causes a want of exertion in the department of ab- stract meditation.t

Addietion to objects. g. ' Addiction to objects' (avirati) is a gree- diness consisting in attachment of the mind to objects of sense.t

Erroneous perception. h. ' Erroneous perception' is a mistaken no- tion [§8. a.] such as the notion that the thing is silver when it is mother o'pearl.§

Failure to attain any stage of abstraction. i. By ' failure to attain any stage' we mean the failing, for some reason or ano- ther, to attain to, or arrive at, the state of abstract meditation. Il

Instability. j. 'Instability' is, even when the state of abstract meditation has been reached, the mind's not continuing steadily therein.

• प्रमादो Sनमुष्ठानशीलता समाधिसाधने मादासीन्यम्। बालसं कायचित्तयोगुरुत्वं यागविषये प्रष्टत्यभाव- हेतु: । + अविरतिश्वित्तस्य विषयसम्प्रयोगात्मा गर्द्ः। 5 भान्तिदर्शनं शुक्तिकायां रजतत्ववद्विपर्ययज्ञानम्। । अलव्धभूमिकत्वं कतच्चिष्निमित्ताक्षमाधिभूमेरलाभ क्रा. सम्ग्राप्ि:। १ अनवस्छितत्वं लव्यायामपि समाधिभूमा चित्तस्यतु तबाप्रतिष्ठा।

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BOOK 1. 37

k. These [§ 30.] are called ' obstacles' because, as they present themselves, they oppose concentration or meditation .* l. In order to declare other obstacles also, which cause distrac- tion of mind, he sayst :-

दुःखदार्मनस्याङ्गमेजयत्वन्नासविचेपस इभुवः।३१। Aph. 31 .- Grief, Distress, Trembling, and Sighing, are ac- companiments of the distractions.

a. When, from whatever cause, distractions [such as enume- rated in § 30.] have arisen, then these, viz. Grief, &c. [§ 31.] come on.t

Grief. b. Among these [§ 31.] ' Grief' is a modification of mind, resulting from [other] mental affections and characterised by annoyance, in consequence of which annoyance sentient crea- tures exert themselves for its removal.§

Distress. c. 'Distress' is a tremulousness of mind, arising ei- ther from external or internal causes.|l

• एते समाधेरेकाग्रताया यथायोगं प्रतिपक्ततादन्तराया रत्युचने। + चित्तविचेपकारकानन्यानप्यन्तरायान् प्रतिपादयितु- माह। + कतश्विग्निमिन्तादुत्पन्नेषु विच्ेपेषु एते दुःखादयः प्रव- नन्ते।I 5 तब दुःखं चित्तस्य रागजः परिवामो वाधनालचणो यद्ाधात् प्राणिनसदपघाताय प्रवर्भन्ने।। । दार्मनयं बालाम्यन्तरैः कारणैर्मेनसचान्तत्यम्।

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38 THE YOGA APHORISMS.

Trembling. d. ' Trembling' (angamejayatwa) is a shaking of the whole body which prevents steadiness either in prescribed postures or in mind .*

Sighing. e. 'Sighing' (swása) is an excessive entrance of air into the body. An excessive expiration of air from the body, is what is meant by praswasa.t

f. These [§ 31.], prevailing along with the distractions [enu- merated in § 80.], are to be excluded by means of 'exercise' [5 13.] and 'dispassion' [§ 15.] as aforesaid; and therefore it is that they are mentioned here.t

h. He now mentions another method for the prevention of the obstacles [§ 30.] together with their supervenients [§ 31.].§

Means of combating Aph. 32 .- For the prevention thereof let one distractions. truth be dwelt upon.

a. For the prevention, or hindrance, of these distractions, one should dwell upon, or again and again confine the attention, to अद्गमेजयत्वं सर्वाङ्गीणो वेपथुरासनमनस्खेययोबी

• खवासो देशान्तवायोरधिक: प्रवेशः। प्रच्नासो देहाायो रधिकनिर्गम: ।

• त एते विधेपैयाइ प्रवर्न्तमाना यथोदिताभ्यासवैरा- ग्याम्यां निरोद्व्या रत्येषामुपदेशं।

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BOOK 1. 39

one truth,-some accepted truth,-by force of which, when con- centration on one point has taken place, the distractions sub- side .*

b. He next states another method, premising some mention of purifying processes which conduce to the perfecting of the mind.t

मेत्रीकरुणामुदितपचाणं सुखदुःखपुयापुएयविषयाणां भावनातश्वित्तप्रसादनम्॥ ३३॥

Amiable habits Aph. 33 .- Through the practising of benevo- recommended. lence, tenderness, complacency, and disregard to- wards objects [i. e. persons who are respectively in possession] of happiness, grief, virtue, and vice, the mind becomes purified.

a. 'Benevolence' is good-heartedness; ' tenderness' is compas- sion; 'complacency' is sympathetic joy; 'disregard' is indiffer- ence. He should exercise these, respectively, towards the hap- py, the grieved, the virtuous, and the vicious. That is to say, when people are happy, he should show benevolence, saying, "Blessings on their joy !",-and not [show] envy. When people are grieved, he should show tenderness, saying " By what means, verily, can they be freed from their grief ?"-and not [show] a disposition to stand aloof. And when people are virtuous, he

• तेषां विचेषाणां प्रतिषेधार्थ निषेधार्थमेकस्तिन् कम्िं- चिदभिमतं तत्वे अभ्यासश्वेतसः पुनःपुनर्निवेशनं कर्य्यात यहलात् प्रत्युदितायामेकाग्रतायां विचेपा: प्रशममुपयान्ति। + रदानी चित्तसंसकारापादकपरिकर्मकथनपूर्वकमुपा- यान्तरमाइ।

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40 THE YOGA APHORISMS.

should exhibit complacency, by sympathetically rejoicing in their virtue,-and not [show] averaion by saying "What !- are theee forsooth virtuous ?" And in regard to the vicious he should prac- tise simply indifference, showing neither sympathy nor aversion .*

b. In the aphorism, by the words 'happiness' ' grief', &c., are denoted those to whom these belong. So, in this manner, by the purifying influences of friendliness, &c., the mind being ren- dered cheerful, the production of abstract meditation takes place readily.t

c. This purifying process is an external one [and not an inti- mate portion of the Yoga itself]. As, in arithmetic, in effect- ing the calculations of questions of Alligation, &c. the operations of Addition &c., are valuable [not so much in themselves, but] as aids in effecting the important matter, so by exercising benevo-

मेजी सहाई। करुणा ऊपा। मुदिता इर्षः। उपेच्चा *

म्रादासी्यं। एता यथाकमं सुखितेषु दुःखितेषु पुषयवल अपुएयवत्ुच विभावयेत्। तयाहि। सुखितेषु साध्येषां सुखित्वमिति मेती कर्य्यान्नत्वीष्याम्। दुःखितेषु कथमु नामेषां दुःखविमुत्ति स्यादिति कपामेव कय्याब्न ताटस्य्यं। पुषयवससुच पुएयानुमोदनेन इर्ष' कय्याव्ृतु किमेते पुएयवन्त दति द्वेषं। बापुएयवत्ुचादासीन्यमेव भावयेध्वानुमोदनं न द्वेषम्।

• सचे सुखदुःखादिशब्दैसद्न्तः प्रतिपादिता। तदेवं मेव्यादिपरिकर्मणा चिने प्रसोदति सुखेन समाधेराविर्भावो भवति।

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BOOR I. » 41

lence, &c., which are [moods of mind] opposed to aversion and covetousness, the mind, in which composure has [thereby] been produced, becomes fitted for meditation-that 'in which there is distinct recognition of an object' [§ 17.], &c. Covetousness and aversion are the very chief raisers of distractions :- if therefore these be radically extirpated, then, through its composure [and freedom from distraction], the mind [the more readily] becomes concentrated on one point .*

d. He mentions another expedient.t

प्रच्कर्दनविधारणाम्यां वा प्रापस। ३४।

Another expedient for combating Aph. 34 .- [Or, he may combat distraction. distractions] by forcibly expelling and by restraining the breath. Regulation of the breath. a. The ' expelling' of the breath is the vo- miting or emitting it [by a slow but complete expiration]. The 'restraining' it, is the stopping it [by shutting the mouth and. closing both nostrils with the fingers of the right hand]. And this, we mean to say, takes place after inhalation [-though men-

• परिकर्मचैतद्वाहयं कर्म। यथा गणिते मिश्रकादिव्यव- हारगष्ितनिष्पत्तये संङलितादिकरमोंपकारकलवेन प्रधान- कर्मनिष्पत्तये प्रभवति एवं द्वेषरागादिप्रतिपच्भूतमैव्यादि- भावनया समुत्पादितप्रसादं चित्तं सम्प्रज्ञातादिसमाधियोग्यं सम्पद्यते। रागद्वेषावेव मुख्यतया विच्ेपमुत्पादयतः। ता वेकमूलमुभ्भूलिता स्ातां तदा प्रसन्नत्वावनसा भवत्ेवे काग्रता! + उपायान्तरमाइ। Digitized y Google

42 THE YOGA APHORISMS.

tioned in the aphorism as if immediately following espiration-] becanse, after expelling the breath, it is impossible to restrain it vithout [having made a previous] inhalation. Thus, then, the regulation of the breath [pránáyáma], being of three descriptions according to the distinction of 'expiration' (rechaka), ' inapira- tion' (púraka), and 'restraining' (kumbhaka), causes steadiness of the mind, and its concentration in a single direction .*

b. He states another means of steadiness.t

विषयवती वा प्रवत्तिरुत्पन्ना स्थितिनिबन्विनी। ३५।

Another ezpedient. Aph. 35 .- Or a sensuous immediate cognition, being produced, may serve as a cause of the steadiness [of the mind].

«. To complete the sentence, we must supply ' of the mind.'t

b. Objects of sense are odour, savour, colour, tonch, and sound. Wherever these exist as fruits, that case of perception, or especi- ally immediate cognition, is sensuous :- and this, when it is ex- cited, causes fixation of the mind.§

*प्रापास्य प्रष्कदनं वमनं रेचनमिति यावत्। विधारखं अमभर्कं। तच्चार्यात् पूरकानन्तरं। रेचकोप्र पूरकं विना विधारणासन्भवात्। तदेवं रेचकपूरककम्भकभेदेन विविध: प्राणायार्मान्यतस्य स्थितिमेकाग्रतां निबप्राति।

• मनस दति वाक्यशेष: ।

६ विषया गन्वर सरूपस्पर्शशन्दरासे विद्यने फललेन यस्ां

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BOOK I. 43

Mystical sense-perception. c. To explain :- in the case of him who fixes his mind on the tip of his nose, there arises a perception of celestial odour. [Ifhe fix his mind] on the tip of the tongue, in like manner, there is a perception of savour ; on the fore-part of the palate, a perception of colour ; on the middle of the tongue, a perception of the touch; on the root of the tongue, a perception of the sound. Thus, then, through this or that or- gan, the perception arising of this or that celestial sense-object becomes a cause of the mind's concentration in one direction .*

d. He mentions another expedient of the like description.t

विशोका वा ज्योतिषती। ३६।

Another expedient. Aph. 36 .- Or a luminous [immediate cogni- tion, being produced,] free from sorrow, [may serve as a cause of the steadiness of the mind].

e. To complete the aphorism, we must supply 'an immediate

सा विषववतो प्रत्ति: प्रक्ृषा साचाकाररूपा रल्ति:। चात्पव्ना मनसरखैयें करोति।

*त्थाहि। नासाग्रे चित्तं धारयतो दिव्यगन्वसंविदुप जायते। ताटश्येव जिल्काग्े रससंवित्। ताल्वग्रे रूपसंवित्। जिङ्कामय्ये स्पर्शसंवित्। जिङ्कामूले शन्दसंवित्। तदेवं तर्जादद्रिवद्वारेय तस्िम् तस्तिन् दिव्ये विषये जायमाना संवित् चित्तस्े का य्रताया इेतुर्भवति।

• एवंविधम वोपायानरमाइ।

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44 THE YOGA APHORISMS.

cognition, being produced, may serve as a cause of the steadiness of the mind.'*

b. Here, by the word 'lumen' (jyotis) is meant the light that consists of the Pure element [out of the three elementary quali- ties that constitute the phenomenal]. A luminous immediate cognition [§ 35. b.] is that in which this [Pure element] is excel- lent, abundant, exceeding.t

c. ' Free from sorrow,'-that is to say, that cause of the stea- diness of the mind in respect of which [agency] all sorrow, which [-see Sánkhya Lecture, § 61 .- ] is a modification of the Pas- sionate [or foul element of the phenomenal universe], is removed by virtue of the exercise of the 'beatific't [degree of medita- tion-§ 17. g.,-where the ascetic, not yet liberated from the phenomenal, is nearly freed from the two coarser of its three chains].

Dwelling on the inner light of the heart. d. The meaning is this, that, on the disap- pearance of all ' modifications' [§ 5.] through the beholding of perfect knowledge, steadiness takes place in the mind of him who, in the midst of the lotus-cup of his heart, broods on the Pure element of thought [spread out in the heart] like the milky ocean when its waves are stilled.§

• प्रदृत्तिरुत्पन्ना चित्तस् स्थितिनिबन्विनीति वाक्यशेष:।

• खन ज्योतिःशन्देन सात्विक: प्रकाश उच्यते। स प्रशसो भूयानतिशयवांस् विद्यते यस्यां सा ज्योतिषती प्र्ति: ।

• विशोका विगतसुखमयसस्वा्यासवद्ञात् शोको रजः- परिणामरूपो यस्या: सा पेतसः स्ितिनिबन्विनी।

5 अयमर्थः। इत्पन्पुटमथ्े प्रशान्तकश्ञोलचीरोदषि-

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BOOK I. 45

e. By means of exhibiting another expedient, he declares an object [worthy of being meditated] in the meditation 'in which there is distinct recognition of an object' *- [§ 17].

वीतरागविषयं वा चित्तम्। ३७।

Dwelling on Aph. 37 .- Or the thought, taking as its object admirable some one devoid of passion, [may find what will eramples. serve as a cause of the steadiness of the mind].

a. To complete the aphorism we must supply 'may [find what will] serve as a cause of the steadiness of the mind.'t

b. 'Devoid of passion,' i. e., who has abandoned all desire for objects of sense,-like Sanaka and others. [The mind, we re- peat, may be steadied by the expedients previously mentioned,] or the thoughts of the Yogí, directed to this [-i. e. to one devoid of passion as Sanaka was-], becomes fixed ;- that is to say, the unimpassioned thought becomes more firmly steady through re- flecting on one whose thoughts are devoid of passion.t

प्रस्वं चित्तसख्वं भावयतः प्रघ्ालोकात् सर्वदत्तिचये चेतसः सैर्यमुत्पद्यत दति। * उपायान्तर प्रदर्शनद्वारेण सम्प्रचातसमार्धेविषयं दर्श- यति।

• मनसः स्तितिनिबम्वनमभवतोति वाक्यशेष:।

वीतराग: परित्यत्विषयाभिलाषसनकादिः। तद्वि- षयकं वा योगिचिनं निबद्ध भवति विर त्ाचित्तस् भावनया विरत्नां चिनं दृढश्थितये भवतोत्यर्थः।

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46 THE YOGA APHORISMS.

c. He mentions another expedient of this description .*

खप्ननिद्राजनालम्बनं वा। ३८।

Recourse had to dream- ing and sleeping. Aph. 38 .- Or the dwelling on know- ledge [that presents itself] in dream, or in sleep, [may serve as a cause of the steadiness of the mind].

Dreaming defined. a. 'Dream' is that wherein the soul is af- fected through the mind alone, when the modifications of the ex- ternal organs of sense have departed.t

b. 'Sleep' has already been definedt [-see § 10.].

c. [We say, then, that] knowledge dependent on dream, or de- pendent on sleep, when dwelt upon, causes steadiness of mind,- [there being in either case nothing to distract the attention].

d. Since [different] men have different tastes, on whatever thing the Yogi places his faith, by meditating on that same thing he may attain what he wants [-viz. steadiness of mind] :- in or- der to declare this, he states as follows.l

• एवंविधमुपायान्तरमाइ। + प्रत्समितबाह्येन्ियट्नने: मनोमानेशेव वब भोकृख् मात्मन: स खप्न:॥

• निट्रा उक्रलचणा। 5 खप्नालम्बनं निद्रालम्बनं वा भानमालम््यमामं पेतस: स्थितिं करोति।

। नानारृचित्वातमाधिनां यसिन् कषिसिदसुनि यो

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BOOK I. 47

यथाभिमतध्यानाद्वा। ३६॥

Anything you please may be dwelt upon to steady the mind. Aph. 39 .- Or [the steadying of the mind may be effected] by pon- dering anything that one approves.

€. [That is to say] the mind becomes steadied when any object that one prefers is pondered,-whether external, as the Moon or the like, or internal, as a congeries of arteries or the like .*

The fruit of meditation. b. Having thus exhibited the means [of ac- complishing meditation], in order to exhibit the fruits, he pro- ceeds to remark.t

परमाणुपरममहत्वान्ता Sस वशीकार:॥४०।

To apprehend the infinitely Aph. 40 .- His mastery extends to the small or great. atomic and to the infinite.

a. The ascetic, effecting, by these methods, steadiness of mind, obtains, through meditation on subtile objects, unresisted maste- ry as far as the Atoms ;- that is to say, his mind, in [dealing with] subtile objects, even as far as the Atoms [which elude the cog- nizance of ordinary perspicacity], is nowhere baffled. In like

गिनः श्रद्ा भवति तस्य ध्यानेनापि भवतीष्टसिद्विरिति प्रतिपादयितुमाइ। * यथाभिमत वसुनि बाह्ये चन्ट्रादावाभ्यन्तरे नाडी चक्रादा वा भाव्यमाने चेतः स्थिरीभवति।

• एवमुपायान् प्रदर्श्य फलप्रदर्शनार्थमाइ।।

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48 THE YOGA APHORISMS. manner no mental obstacle arises anywhere to him meditating the gross, even to the extent of infinite magnitude,-as the Ether, for example ;- but everywhere he is uncontrolled,-such is the meaning .*

b. Of the mind thus by these methods rectified, what is the aspect [or actual condition]? To this he replies.t

वोपटृत्तेर भिजातस्येव मणेर्ग्रदीटग्रइणग्राह्येषु तत्व-

The state of the mind Aph. 41 .- To that [mind] whose 'modi- properly intent on a fications' [-all save that there remains some single object. one object of meditation-] have disappeared, there occurs, as [occurs] to a noble gem [-e. g. rock-crystal, when brought into conjunction with a coloured substance-], when intent on any one out of these-viz .- the perceiver, the percep- tion, and the perceivable,-a tingeing thereby.

a. That is to say-to that [mind] whose 'modifications' [§ 5.] *एभिरुपायेश्वित्तव्ैर्यम्भावयतो योगिन: सस्मविषयभाव- नाद्वारे परमापवन्तो वशोकारो Sप्रतिघातरूपो जायते कचित् परमाणुपर्यनते सस्मे विषये बास्य मनो न प्रतिइन्यत प्रतर्थ:। एवं स्थूलमाकाशादिपरममइ््त्वपर्यन्तम्भावयतो न कचिच्ेतःप्रतिघात उत्पद्यते किन्तु सर्वत्र खातक्व्यमभवती- त्यर्थः ।

• एवमेभिरपायसत्कृतस्य चेतस: कीडमं रूपसभावती त्याइ।

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BOOK I. 49

have disappeared, which has repelled all modifications except that which has to be pondered,-which has accomplished that con- centration 'in which there is distinct recognition'* [of a single object to the exclusion of all others,-§ 17.].

b. ' Out of [the three viz.] the perceiver, the perception, and the perceivable'-i. e. Soul, the organs of sense, and the [five] elements.t

c. 'To it [-the thought-] intent on any one [of these §41, b .- ]there occurs a tingeing thereby.' By 'being intent there- on' we mean attending to that alone. 'A tingeing thereby,'- i. e. the [thought's]coming to consist thereof [by taking the co- lour or character of the object as its own] ;- the coming to be of the same description ;- that is to say, it [-the thought-] be- comes modified into the aspect of thatt [which is thought upon].

d. He mentions an illustration. To the noble-i. e. pure [transparent and colourless]-gem, such a gem as rock-crystal or the like, there occurs this or that colour in consequence of its being the receptacle of this or that colour, [-as when the red or other colour of flowers has place within a crystal vase-]. In like manner, to the stainless pure element of thought [§36. d.]

वीणा दृत्तयो यस्य तस्य निरुद्धधेयातिरिक्कटत्तेः

• ग्रहोळग्रइणग्राह्येषु पुरुषेन्द्रियभूतेषु।

• तत्खतदञ्ज्ननतापन्ि:। तत्खलं तदेकाग्रता। तद- ज्नता तवयलं। तथाविधा समार्पनिः तद्रपपरिणामो भवतीत्यर्थ:। G Digitized by Google

50 THE YOGA APHORISMS. there occurs the hue of this or that, through the adjacent hue of .this or that thing which is meditated upon .* e. 'The perceived, the perception, and the perceiver'-such is the inverse order in which these are to be understood [-instead of the order adopted in the aphorism-], because it is on 'the perceived' [-the external or objective-) that meditation is first fixed,t [-see §17. e. &c].

f. He now states [in three aphorisms] a fourfold division of the abovementioned [§41] changet [of the mind into the like- ness of what it ponders].

शब्दार्थ ज्ञानविकल्पैमद्गीणी सवितर्का ॥ ४२।

The first stage of the mind Aph. 42 .- This [change of the mind properly intent. into the likeness of what is pondered- §41-], when mixed up of the fancy of the 'word,' the ' mean- ing,' and the 'knowledge,' is [technically termed] the 'argu- mentative.'

a. A 'Word,' is what is apprehended by the organ of hearing, or [in the technical language of the grammarians] a manifesta- tion§ (sphota). * दष्टान्तमाइ। ब्रभिजातस्य निर्मलस्य मणे: स्फटिका- दिमणे: तत्तद्रूपात्रयवशात् तत्तदरपापत्तिः। एवं निर्मलख चित्तस त्वस्थ तन्नङ्गावनीयवसूपरागात् तत्तद्रपापसि:। + ग्राह्मगहणग्रदीटष्विति व्यत्यासेन योजनीयं यतः प्रथमं ग्राह्यनिष्ठ एव समाधिरिति। + इदानीमुक्ताया एव समापचेश्नतुर्विधभेदमाइ। 5 श्ोबेन्द्रियग्राह्य: स्फोटो वा शब्दः।

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BUOK I. 51

b. The ' Meaning' i. e. the thing meant by a sound or word] is a genus [-such as 'cow,' 'horse,'-] &e.,* [see Sáhitya Dar- pana §12].

: c. 'Knowledge,' is a modification of the understanding [-see §5 and 6-] where the quality of Purity prevailst [-to the sup- pression of the elements of Passion and Darkness,-see §17. g].

d. A 'Fancy' has been already definedt [in Aph. 9].

e. 'Mixed up of these'-i. e. in which the three-viz. the ' Word,' &c., [§42],-by mutually commingling, appear in an [ambiguous and] fanciful shape,-in the shape fat once] of the word ' cow,' [for example], the thing 'cow,' and the notion ' cow,'- this is what is called [technically] ' the argumentative' (savitarka) changes [of the mind reflecting a mixed object of thought- while the attention is divided among the sound, the thing signi- fied, and the knowledge of the thing].

f. He now mentions that 'non-argumentative' [affection of the mind] which is the opposite of the one just defined|| [§42].

• अथो जातादि:।

• मानं सख्वप्रधाना बुद्धिर्रत्ति:। + विकल्प उत्तलच्ष:। 5 तेसहीथा। यस्ामेते शन्दादय: परसराधासेन विकल्परूपेण बयः प्रतिभासन्ते गारिति शन्दो गारित्यर्था गारिति शनमित्यनेनाकारेष या सवितर्का समापनिरित् चते।

। उक्ल कषष विपरीतां निर्वितकामाह।

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52 THE YOGA APHORISMS.

सृतिपरिशुद्धा सरूपशून्येवार्थमाचनिर्भाषा निर्वि तर्का।४३॥

The second stage of the mind Aph. 43 .- On the clearing off of the properly intent. memory [of the word and the sense at- tached to it by convention], the [mental] display only of the thing itself as if of something indefinite [and no longer re- ferred to any term-no longer regarded as being what is meant by the word 'cow,' or what is meant by the word 'horse,' &c .- ], this [affection of the mind which no longer re- flects a mixed object of thought-$42-] is that which is called [technically] the 'non-argumentative.'

a. 'Of the memory'-i. e. of the memory of the convention as to the sense of the word. 'The clearing off'-i. e. the de- parture. When this takes place, the change [of the mind] when it reveals the thing itself alone, as if devoid of any character [which would suggest a term as applicable to it],-when it [the mind in its changed state-§41-] is employed about the object to be pondered alone [without regard to its having any name], and thus clear of 'fancy' [-nothing being pondered but the actual thing itself-], is what is called the 'non-argumentative' [affection of the mind]; such is the meaning .*

b. In order to declare another division, he says:t-

*मृतेः। शन्दार्थसङ्ेतमृतेः। परिशुद्धिरपगमसखां सत्यां सरूपशून्येब नर्थमाचनिर्भाषा थयेयार्थमानावगादिमी विकल्पशून्या समापत्तिर्निर्वितर्कसंत्ेत्यर्थः। + भेदान्तरं प्रतिपादयितुमाइ।

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BOOK I. 53.

एतयेव सविचारानिर्विचाराच सक्ष्मविषया व्या

खाता॥४४ ॥

The third and fourth stages Aph. 44 .- Just by this [mental affec- of the mind properly intent. tion under the two aspects explained in Aphorisms 42 and 43], that which is [technically termed] ' deli- berative' (sa-vichára), and [that termed] 'non-deliberative' (nir- vichára), where the object [pondered,-instead of being gross as in these two preceding cases-] is 'subtile,' has been [sufficiently] explained; [-the distinction between this pair, out of the four referred to at §41 f., being the same as that between the other pair]. a. Just by this mental affection, in the shape of the 'argu- mentative' [§42] and the ' non-argumentative' [§43], where the object is a ' gross' one [as contradistinguished from the ' subtile' objects,-see §44 b .- ], the pair of mental affections also, in the shape of the 'deliberative' and the 'non-deliberative,' where the object is 'subtile,' has been explained .*

b. What sort [of mental affection] is that where the object is subtile ? That [mental affection] is so called, the object whereof, such as the 'subtile elements' or the ' organs' [§17. f.], is subtile. By this [mention that the object, in the case of the latter pair,- §44, a.,-as 'subtile'] it is declared that in the former [pair] the object is 'gross,'-for [in truth] it is on the gross elements that it [-the former pair §42-43-] is dependent. That is [called] the ' deliberative' [§44] in which the 'subtile object' appears whether as the object of a question as to the name, the meaning, and the notion [§42], or apart from any such question, but yet as qualified by the characters of space and time, &c. That [on the * एतयैव सवितर्कनिर्वितर्करूपया स्थूलविषयकसमा- पच्या सक्ष्मविषयापि सविचारनिर्विचाररूपसमापत्तिद्यी व्याखाता।

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54 THE YOGA APHORISMS. other hand] is [called] the 'non-deliberative' [$44], in whieh the ' subtile object,' in the shape of the Subtile Elements or the Or- gans, independently of the properties of space and time, &e., is presented simply as the thing itself. It is of this [pair of mental modifications] alone that the objects are ' subtile'* [-and not of the other pair,-see §44. a].

c. In reply to the question how far [the term] ' where the ob- ject is subtile' [§44] [extends], he says :- t

The limit of analysis. Aph. 45 .- And 'the having a subtile ob- ject' ends with the Indissoluble. A1 ai a. This fact that has been mentioned of the ' deliberative' and the ' non-deliberative' mental affections [§44], that their object is a 'subtile' one [§44. b.], ends with the Indissoluble,-meaning, by the 'Indissoluble,' Nature, [that primordial principle-see Sankhya Lecture §7-] which is nowhere resolved [into any thing underlying it],-or which [to take another etymological * कीदृशी सृत्ष्मविषया। सत्ष्मसन्माबेन्द्रियादिविषया यस्यासा तथोक्रा। एतेन पूर्वस्यां खूलविषयत्वं प्रतिपाहि तम्भवति साहि महाभूतालम्बना। शब्दार्थज्ञानविकल्प विषयत्वेन तद्रहितत्वेनच देशकालधर्माद्यवच्किन्न: सक्ष्मो ऽर्थः प्रतिभाति यस्यां सा सविचारा। देशकालधर्मादिर दितर धर्मिमात्रतया सक्ष्मो Sर्थसन्माब्ेन्ियरूपः प्रतिभाति यस्यां सा निर्विचारेत्यर्यः । अस्या एव सक्ष्मविषया। + किम्पर्यन्तसूक्षविषय इत्याइ।

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BOOK I. 55

explanation] declares or suggests nothing. It is at this point that 'the having a subtile object' ceases* [-seeing that, beyond this, there exists nothing more subtile lying further back].

b. To explain :- in the modification of the Qualities there arise four divisions-(1) that which has a diversified character, (2) that which has an undivcrsified character, (3) that which merely has a character, and (4) that which has not a character. [By] 'that which has a diversified character' (visishta.linga) [is meant] the [gross] elements [Sankhya Lecture §33]. [By] ' that which has an undiversified character' (avisishta-linga) is meant the sub- tile elements and the organs [S. L. §25]. [By] 'that which merely has a character' (linga-matra) is meant Intellect [S. L. §8]. [By] ' that which has not a characteristic attribute' (alinga) is meant the First Principle [S. L. §7] beyond which there is nothing subtilet [underlying or originating it.]

c. He next mentions, as the topic presents itself, the motive fer.fvaluing] these mental affections [or tinges, §41.]t

ता एव सबोजसमाधि:॥४६।

तदलिङ्गपर्यवसानं। न कचिष्ठीयते न वा किम्निविष्विङ्गति गसयतीत्यलिक्ं प्रधानं। तत्पर्यन्मं सक्ष्मविषयत्वमिति।

न तथादि। गुणानां परिणामे चत्वारि पर्वाणि विशिष्ट- लिंङ्गमविशिष्टलिङ्धं लिङ्गमात्रमलिङ्गन्वेति। विशिष्टलिङ्गं भूतानि। अविशिष्टलिङ्गं तन्मात्ेन्द्रियाणि। लिङ्गमा्च्रं बुद्धिः। अलिङ़ं प्रधानमिति नातः परं सस्ममतीतुत्तां भवति। + एतायां समापनीनां प्रक्वते प्रयोजनमाइ।

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56 THE YOGA APHORISMS.

What the aforesaid mental affections constitute. Aph. 46 .- These themselves comstitute 'Meditation with its seed' [§17. b].

a. 'These themselves,' i. e. the mental affections above de- scribed. Meditation 'in which there is distinct recognition' [§17. b.] is called [meditation] ' with its seed'-i. e. that which is with a seed or with something to rest upon-because all these [varieties of mental affection which we have been treating of] have something to rest upon* [-which-see $17. i .- must even- tually be deserted].

b. Now he states the fruit of the 'non deliberative' [mental affection], seeing that, of the other mental affections, this ' non- deliberative' one [§44] is the fruit.t निर्विचारवैशारय्ये उ्थातप्रसाद:।४७।

The fruit of this. Aph. 47 .- When wisdom has come, through the ' non-deliberative' [mental affection], there is spiritual clearness. a. What we mean by ' non-deliberative' has been already plainedt [-§44]. b. 'Wisdom' here stands for ' purity'.§

ता एवोक्रजच्णासमापत्तयः। सह बोज़ेन आ्लम मेन वर्गत इति सबोज: समपजात; समाधिक थते सर्वासं सालम्बनत्वात्।

• अथेतरासां समापनीनां निर्विचारफयकताभिमि

राया: फलमाह। + व्यास्थातं निर्विचारत्वम्। 5 वैशारधं नैमख्यम्!

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BOOK 1. 57

c. In comparison with the 'argumentative' [mental affection], when the object is a gross one, the 'non-argumentative' is the su- perior. In respect of that too the 'deliberative,' whose object is a subtile one, [is the superior]. In respect of this again the 'non-deliberative' [where the object is subtile, is the superior]. And when, in virtue of pre-eminent practice of this, there has arisen wisdom, or purity, then there is spiritual clearness. By "spiritual' we mean what resides in the soul, or in the understand- ing. Such clearness [viz. spiritual clearness] arises [from the 'non-deliberative' mental affection with a subtile object]. And it is just this spiritual clearness which we mean by the firm stead- fastness* [attained on the removal of distractions-§32].

d. [Well],-this having been attained, what next? To this he replies.t

कटतम्भरा तब प्रजा। ४८ ॥

From spiritual clearness Aph. 48 .- In that case there is know. -comes right knowledge. ledge which holds to the truth.

a. By 'knowledge which holds to the true' we mean that

• सवितकां स्थूलविषयाम द्व्य निर्वितकायाः प्राधाम्यं। ततो 5पि सक्ष्मविषयाया: सविचारायाः। तता ऽपि निर्षि- चारायाः। तस्यासु प्रहष्टभ्यासवशाद्वेयारवे नैर्मख्ये सति पधात्मप्रसाद:। आातनि बुद्धा वन्नंत रत्यथ्ातां। ताडय: प्रसादसमुपजायते। एतदेव चिन्तस् वैशारवं यत् द्ितो दाउर्यमिति।

• तस्मिन् सति किभभवतोत्याइ। H Digitized Google

58 THE YOGA APHORISMS.

knowledge which is never overshadowed by error,-which holds to the truth-i. e. to the real .*

b. 'In that case'-i. e. when spiritual clearness has been attain- ed, this [true knowledge] takes place.t c. And, through this rightly intelligent view, regarding every thing as it really is, the Yogi attains to pre-eminent Concentra- tiont [§2]. d. He now states the distinction of this from other [forms of] correct knowledge.§

श्रातानुमानप्रज्ञाम्यां सामान्यविषयाविशेषार्थतात्। ४७।

This knowledge differs from Aph. 49 .- [This kind of knowledge ordinary knowledge. differs] from the knowledge due to tes- timony and inference because the object of these two is not par- ticulars but generals.

a. By 'testimony' we mean scriptural information. By 'in- ference' we mean what has been already defined [at §7 a]. The knowledge which arises from these two [sources of knowledge] has generals [and not individuals] as its object; for, neither tes- timony nor a [logical] sign [ Tekunplov is able, like a sense-or- gan, to convey a knowledge of particularities|| [meaning thereby the ultimate and no further explicable distinctions that exist be- tween individuals generically similar and numerically different]. * ऋतं सत्यं बिभर्नति कदाचिद पि न विपर्ययेणाछ्कादते सा कटतम्भरा प्रज्ञा। + तत्र। म्रध्यात्मप्रसादे सति भवतोत्यर्थः। तम्ममाच प्रजालोकावर्व यथावत्पभ्यन् योगी प्रक्मषं योगं प्राप्नोति। ६ अस्या: प्रज्ञान्तराइवैलचामाइ॥ । श्रीतमागमज्ञानम। अ्रनुमानमुक्तलंच्णं। ताम्यां या

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BOOK 1. 59

b. On the other hand this meditative knowledge-that associ- ated with the clearness which comes through the ' non-delibera- tive' [mental affection-§47]-differs from these two kinds of knowledge [§49 a], in its having individualities as its objects ;- that is to say, [it differs from them] because its object is the in- dividual ' subtile element' or the individual Soul itself .* [And so this knowledge, since its object is the particular, has an objeet other than that which belongs to testimony or inference].

c. Moreover, when this has been attained, one can discern with one's ordinary organs 'even] minute things, hidden or very far off.t

d. The states the [especial] fruit of this correct knowledge.t

तव्जसंस्कारो Sन्यसंस्कारप्रतिबम्ी । ५ू०। One train of thought with one object, is to put an end to all Aph. 50 .- The train [of self-re- other trains. productive thought] resulting from this puts a stop to other trains. a. The [self-reproductive] continuous flow [of thought-§18] produced by this [meditative] knowledge [§49] prevents other जायते प्रज्ञा सा सामान्यविषया। नि शब्दलिङ्गयोरिन्ट्रि- यवद्विशेषप्रतिपती सामथे। * दूयं पुननिविचारवैशारद्यसमुपेता समाधिप्रता ताभ्यां प्रज्ञान्यां विलच्णा विशेषविषयत्वात्। विशेष: भूतसत्त- गतः पुरुषगतो वा विषयो यस्य तस्वादित्र्यः। किन्वास्यां सत्व्यवदितविप्रकष्टस्य वस्तुनो जोकप्रत्य

Ir + बयया: प्रचाया: फबमार।

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60 THE YOGA APHORISMS.

trains, whether they arise during relaxation or concentration ;- is to say, it makes them incapable of producing their effects. It is for this reason that it is directed that one should addict him- self to this kind of knowledge alone .*

b. Having thus described Meditation where there is distiuet recognition [of an object §17], in order to declare that in which the distinct recognition is dropped [§17.j.], he says :- t

तस्थापि निरोधे सर्वनिरोधा ब्रियोजसमाधि: ।५१॥.

Finally this last train of Aph. 51 .- On the removal of this thought is to drop its object. also, since there is removal of all [the mental modifications], the Meditation is ' without a seed.'

a. On the removal, i. e. on the dissolution, of this also,-i. e of the meditation where there is distinct recognition of an object [§17],-when all the modifications of the mind [$5] have been resolved into their causes [or sources-as a jar, when broken, is resolved into the earth which it was made of-], so that there arises merely a continuous train [of thought self-reproductive] thereupon, as there is nothing but the negation 'This is not'- 'This is not,'-meditation appears with relinquishment of the seed [§17. b] ;- on which taking place, the Soul is said to abide in its own nature pure-alone-emancipated.t

• तया प्रचया जनितो यसंस्कारसा Sन्यान््युत्यानजान् समाधिजांश्न संस्कारान्प्रतिबभ्नाति कार्यकरणाच्मान्क रोतीत्यर्थः। अतसामेव प्रज्ञामध्यसेदित्युत्तं भवति॥

• तस्यापि सम्प्रद्ातस्यापि निरेश्धे प्रवलये सति सवासी पिनटत्तोनां सकारणे प्रविलयाद्या या संखारमानन

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BOOK 1.

Recapitalation. b. Well then [-to recapitulate briefly-], having set forth the definition [§2] of 'Concentration' which is the subject of the work [$1], the explanation of the terms ' Mo- dification of the mind' [$5] and the 'Prevention' thereof [§12], the definition of 'Exercise' [$13] and 'Dispassion' [15], and having thus stated the nature of and the difference between these two expedients; then having stated the division of Concentra- tion, into principal and secondary, by distinguishing it as ' Medi- tation in which there is distinct recognition' [§17] and that 'in which distinct recognition is lost [§18]; then having exhibited diffusively [§20-22] the expedients [for attaining to concentra- tion], after premising an exposure of the ' Spurious semblance of concentration,' [$19]; then, with a view to exhibiting an easy method, having determined the nature of the Lord [§23-24], the proof of His existence [§25], His pre-eminence [§ 26], His name [$27], the order of His worship [§28] and the fruits thereof [§29]; then having described the distractions of the mind [$30] and their supervenients, grief &c. [§31], and diffu- sively, the means of combating these-viz. the dwelling upon some one truth [§ 32], the practice of benevolence &c. [§ 33], the regulation of the breath [§34], and other such means-viz. 'sensuous immediate cognitions &c.' [§35-39]-as are condn- cive to Meditation with or without distinct recognition of an ob- ject; having declared the mental affections [§ 41], with an eye to the winding up, with their definitions [§42-44], their fruits [§ 46-48], and their object [§49]; then by finally summing up, in regard to the Meditation with distinct recognition and that without distinct recognition of an object,-in words to the effect that Meditation without a seed is preceded by that which has a

रुदेति तखां नेति मेति केवलं पर्युदसनाभ्निनो जसमाधिरा निर्भवति यर्िन् सति पुरुष: लरूपनिष्ठरशुद्ध: केवलो मुत्र रत्युन्यत इति। Digitized by Google

62 THE YOGA APHORISMS. seed §51 , the chapter on Concentration has been expounded* [by Pantanjali.] c. Thus is completed the First Book-that on Meditation-of the commentary, composed by the illustrious great king and go- vernor King Bhojaraja, on the Aphorisms of Patanjali's System of the Yoga.t Remarks. d. The commentator, it will be observed [-noe Introduction, b .- , justifies Patanjali's undertaking to expound the Yoga, by citing a passage from the Veda [-the Náchikets तदबाधिकवतस्य योगस्य लच्षपं चित्तवत्तिनिरोधप- दानां व्यास्ानं अभ्यासवैराग्यलक्षणं तस्योपायद्दयस्य खरूपं भेदच्छाभिधाय सम्प्रज्ञातासम्प्रज्ञातभेदेन योगस्य मुखया मुख्भेदमुक्ता योगाभासप्रदर्शनपूर्वकान् विस्तरेणोपायान् प्रदर्श्य सुगमोपायप्रदर्शनपरतयेश्वरस्य सरूपप्रमाणप्रभाव वाचकोपासनाक्रमतत्फलानि निर्णोय चित्तस्य विक्षेपान् तत्मइभुवस्न दुःखादीन् विस्रेण च तत्प्रतिषेधोपायानंक तत्वाभ्यासमेव्यादीन् प्राणायामादीन सम्प्रज्ञातासम्प्रज्ञात पूर्वर ङ्ग-भूतविषयवतीप्रत्तिरित्यादीना खायोपसंहारद्वारेष समापत्तीसलक्षणा: सफला: खखविषयसहिताक्षोक्ता सम ज्ञातासम्प्रज्ञातयोरुपसंहारमभिधाय सबीजपूवको निर्बो जस्माधिरिति व्याख्यातो योगपाद:। + दति श्रीमहाराजाधिराजश्रीभोजराजदेवविरचिता यां पातञ्ज्रलयोगशास्त्रस्त्टत्तौ प्रथम: समाधिपादः समाप्र:।।

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BOOK 1. 63

Upanishad-] recommendatory of the Yoga. The Yoga, there- fore, under that name, was recognised antecedently to Patanjali, and is not to be regarded as an invention of his.

e. The term Yoga, we are told [$2], implies the hindering of the modifications of the thinking principle. All the six Hindu systems, five of which we have already partially examined, agree in regarding the distinction between Subject and Object as the most momentous of facts, and the emancipation of the former from all entanglement with the latter as the one desirable end. In their treatment of the Objective the systems differ, at least in appearance, more widely than in their treatment of the Sub- jective. The Vedánta denies reality-or most grudgingly allows any thing of reality-to the Objective. The Nyaya accords to it a reality co-ordinate with that of the Subject, giving imparti- aly the name of Substance to both. The Sankhya steers a mid- dle course between these two. It treats the Objective as an ag- gregate of qualities, which exist as such but not as substances. In this respect, the Sankhya comes even nearer than the Vedan- ta to Bishop Berkeley. The Yoga, as far as we have seen, con- ours with the Sankhya on this point. While the systems thus differ in regard to the objective or Material, they all agree, on the other hand, in regarding the Subject (atman)-call it Soul, or Spirit,-as a self-dependant reality. The only dispute here is, whether Soul, or Spirit, is one or manifold. The Vedanta holds that it is one; the other systems, so far as we have yet seen, that it is manifold. It is to be observed that nowhere in any of the systems does the notion of a created spirit present itself. The Vedánta, availing itself of a sufficiently loose analo- gy, speaks of one Soul pervading all bodies as one thread might pervade a necklace of golden, silver, and earthen, beads; while the Sankhya urges the objection that if Soul were but one, then all would be happy when one is happy, all would die, when one died, and so on, which is contrary to experience, [Sankhya Lec- ture §48 and 45]. But, whether Soul be one or manifold, every one of the systems holds it to be sclf-dependant. Soul is the Google

64 THE YOGA APHORISMS.

substance-beneath which there stands nothing ;- and the pity, in the estimation of Hindu philosophy, is, that anything should stand above it,-any more than beneath it. It ought to stand alone-apart from everything phenomenal.

f. In order to repel the transient or phenomenal, according to the Yoga [§ 12] we must have recourse to exercise and dispas- sion, or asceticism and mortification.

g. By means of ascetic exercises and the mortification of all desires, the mind is supposed to attain to a state of undisturbed Meditation [§ 17], where some one single object is pondered, to the exclusion of all others. But as the practised swimmer parts with his last cork or bladder, so the soul of the ascetic must in due course part with every object, and at length meditate with- out any object at all [§ 18]. To effect this being a matter of difficulty, devotion to the Lord [§ 23] is recommended as a com- paratively easy method. In admitting the existence of a Divine Being (iswara) in whom the good qualities belonging to man reach their limit, the Yoga, hence named the seśwara sankhya, differs from the Sankhya of Kapila, which is known as the niriśwara.

h. As the ascetic is exposed to obstacles, these are discussed by Patanjali [§ 30-31], and means for combating them are in- dicated [§32-39]. i. When all obstacles have been thus removed, the mind is supposed to be as free from all contamination of the phenomenal as the pure crystal is free from the red colour which seems to be- long to it while a rose is seen athwart it.

END OF BOOK I.

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THE APHORISMS

OF THB

YOGA PHILOSOPHY,

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PATANJALI

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BHOJA RÁJÁ.

BOOK II.

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BOOK II.

a. May that three-eyed Lord of the World, by whom were shown the several means for securing the difficultly attainable riches of Concentration (yoga), be [adjuvant] for the attainment of what is desired !*

b. Thus then having declared, in the First Book, the Concen- tration, along with its means, of him whose mind is abstracted [from all objects] ;- how, preceded by the practice of means, does the concentration of him whose mind is not abstracted, ad- vance to accomplishment? [Since this question presents itself-]

*ते ते दुष्पापयोगर्द्विसिद्धये येन दर्शिता उपायास जगन्ायस्थचो सु प्रार्थिताप्नये। A Digitized Google

YOGA APHORISMS.

in order to set forth the practice of what is instrumental thereto, he declares the practical [part of] Concentration .*

तप: खाध्यायेश्वरप्रषिधानानि क्रियायोग: ॥१।

Practices conducive to Concentration. Aph. 1 .- The practical [part of] Con- centration is mortification (tapas), mutter- ing (swádhyáya), and resignation (pranidhána) to the Lord.

a. The penances and fastings enjoined in another Institute [-viz. the Dharma-sástra-], are what are meant by ' mortifica- tion.' 'Muttering' is the muttered repetition of formulæ pre- ceded by the mystic name of the deity [B. I. §27]. ' Resigna- tion to the Lord' is the consigning to Him, the Supremely Vene- rable, without regard to fruit, all one's works. These are what are called the practical [part of] Concentration (kriya-yoga).t

b. For what purpose is this ?- He replies.t-

समाधिभावनार्थ: केशतनूकरणार्थक्। २।

• तदेवं प्रथमे पाढे समाद्ितचित्तस्य सोपायं योगमभि- धाय व्युद्धितचित्तस्य कथमुपायाम्यासपूर्षको योगसाध्यता मुपयातीति तक्षाधनानुष्ठानप्रतिपादनाय क्रियायोगमाइ। 1 तप: शास्त्रान्तरोपदिष्टं ऊच्कुषान्ट्रायपादि। खाध्यायः म्रणवपूवाणां मन्वावां जपः । ईवरप्रिधानं सर्वकियाणां तस्िम् परममुरा फर्मानरपेचनया समर्पपम्। एतानि क्रियायोग दृतयुचने।

• स किमर्थ दतत ब्राइ।

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BOOK II. 3

The purpose of such Aph. 2 .- It is for the purpose of esta- practices. blishing meditation, and for the purpose of extenuating afflictions.

a. The ' afflictions' (klesa) will be mentioned [under §3]. The 'extenuating' of them, is the opposing their producing their effects. 'Meditation' is what has been already defined [B. I. 20,f]. The ' establishing' of it, is the repeatedly taking into one's thoughts [the thing to be meditated upon]. That the purpose, or motive, of which is this, is what is so called [-i. e. is what is spoken of in the aphorism] .*

b. That is to say,-these, viz., penance, &c., being practised, rendering inert the 'Ignorance' and the other afflictions [§8] that assail the mind, sustain the part of subservients to Medita- tion. Therefore it is to the practical [part of ] Concentration that the Yogi should first direct his attention.t

c. 'For the purpose of extenuating affiiction,'-this has been stated [in §2] ;- what are here meant by afflictions ? He replies.t

• केशा वच्यमाणासेषां तनूकरणं खकार्यकरवप्रति- बन्ः। समाधिरुत्ालचण: । तस्य भावना पुनः पुनश्वेतसि विवेशनं। सोऽर्थः प्रयोजनं यस्य तथात्रः। + एतदुक्रस्भवति। एते तपः प्रद्ृतयो Sभ्यस्यमानाशिन- गतानविद्यादीन् केशान् शिथिलीकर्षन्तः समाधेरुपका- रतां भजन्ते। तम्मात् प्रथमतः क्रियायोगावधारणपरेण योगिना भवितव्यमिति। + केशतनूकरणार्थ रतुत्नां। ने 5न के सोना रत्याइ।

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4 YOGA APHORISMS.

Aflictions to be alleviated by Aph. 3 .- The afflictions are Igno- such practices. rance, Egotism, Desire, Aversion, and Tenacity [of mundane existence].

a. And the ' afflictions,'-Ignorance and the rest,-the defini- tions of which.will be stated [in the sequel], are five; and these, giving rise to distress, the characteristic of which is its being obstructive [to what we miserable mortals wish], are called 'afflictions,' because they, operating in the mind, consolidate that modification of the [three] Qualities which is recogniaed as mundane existence* [-the state of existence which it is the aim of the Yogi to eschew].

b. Although these are all equal in respect of being afflictions, yet, in order to declare that 'Ignorance' (avidya), from its being the root, is the principal one, he says.t

अविद्या चेजमुन्तरेषां प्रसुप्नतनुवि्किन्नोदाराणाम्। ४। Aph. 4 .- Ignorance is the field of The source of the aftictions. the others, whether they be dormant, extenuated, intercepted, or simple.

a. 'Ignorance' means delusion; the notion, in short, that what is not Soul is Soul. This is the 'field,'-the place of origin,

• केशाक्ाविद्यादयो वच्यमाणलच्णा: पच्च। तेच बाधमालचणं परितापमुपजनयन्त: केशशन्दवाच्या भर्वान्ति। तेडि चेतसि प्रवर्न्तमाना: संसारलचणं.गुषपरिणामं ट्रट- यन्ति।

• सत्यपि सर्वेषां तुख्ये केशले मूखभूतत्वादविद्याया: प्राधान्यं प्रतिपादयितुमाइ।

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BOOK II. 5

of the others, viz., 'Egotism,' &c., which are severally fourfold through the division into 'dormant,' &c. Therefore where Ig- norance, in the shape of a mistaken notion [that what is not soul is soul], becomes inoperative, there the springing up of the 'af- flictions' is not seen; but, since, where this mistaken notion really exists, they are seen to spring up, it is quite settled that it is Ignorance that is the source .*

b. 'The dormant, extenuated, intercepted, and simple!'-among these, those ' afflictions' are called ' dormant,' which, deposited in the site of the mind, do not give rise to their effects for want of something to wake them up ;- as in the state of childhood ;- for the child's ' afflictions,' though present in the shape of men- tal deposits, are not developed for want of something to assist in awakening them.t

c. Those ['afflictions'] are the 'extenuated,' which, through one's meditating something that is opposed to each severally, their power of producing their effect having been rendered inert, abiding in the mind as a species of mental deposit, are incapable • स्विद्या मोहः। बनात्मन्यात्माभिमान इति यावत्। सा क्षेत्रं प्रसवभूमिरत्तरेषामस्तमितादीनां प्रत्ेकं प्रसुप्रादि- भेदेन चतुर्विधानां। वतो यजाविद्या विपर्ययज्ञानरूपा शिथिलीभवति तब केशानां नोङ्गवो दश्यते विपर्ययज्ञान- सङ्गावेच तेषामुङ्गवदर्शनात् स्थ्वितमेव मूलत्वमविद्यायाः।

भूमा खििता: प्रबोधकाभावे खकायें नारभन्ते ते प्रसुत्ना प्रयु- चन्ते। यथा बा्यावस्ायां। बालस दि वासनारूपेण ज्िता चपि कोशा: प्रबोधसइकार्यभावेन न व्यज्यने।

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6 YOGA APHORISMS.

of giving rise to their effects without an ample apparatus [of auri- liaries] ;- for example [such are the 'afflictions'] of the ascetic Yogí .*

d. Those ['affiictions'] are the 'intercepted,' which abide with their power overpowered by some strong 'affliction,'-as desire [is overpowered and 'intercepted'] when there is the condition of aversion, or aversion when there is the condition of [an over- powering] desire ;- for those two, mutually opposite, cannot simultaneously co-exist.t

e. Those ['afflictions'] are the 'simple,' which operate their se- veral effects when the things with which they co-operate are be- side them ;- [such are,] for example, the things adverse to Con- centration at all times during the state of non-abstraction.t

f. 'Ignorance,' though standing moreover as the root of these four kinds [of 'afflictions'] severally, is recognised as [also] at-

• से तनवो थे खखप्रतिपचभावनया शिथिलोक्कतकार्ब- सम्पादनशक्यो वासमाविशेषतया चेतस्वस्िता: प्रभूतां सामग्रीमन्तरेण न सकार्यमारव्ुं चमा:। यथा सभ्यास- वता योगिन: ।

• ते विच्छिन्ा ये केनचिद्वलवता कोशेनाभिभूतशक्रय- सिर्ष्ठान्त। यथा द्वेषावस्थायां रागो रागावस्थायां वा द्वेषः। न ह्यनयो: पर स्परविरुद्धयोयुगपत् समभावोस। + ते उदारा ये प्राप्नसइकारिसव्निधयः खं खं कार्यमभि- निर्वर्न्तयन्ति। यथा सर्वदैव योगपरिपन्थिनो व्युत्यानद- शायाम।

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BOOK II. 7

tending them; for nowhere is there found the nature of 'afflic- tions' having the character of being irrespective of the attend- ance of error; and when that, being a falsity, is removed by right knowledge, these ['afflictions'], like burnt seeds, never spring up again; hence it is ascertained that Ignorance is their cause and Ignorance is their attendant. Therefore they all par- take of the name of Ignorance; and, since all the ' afflictions' eause distraction of mind, the Yogi must cut these off at the very ontset .*

g. He defines ' Ignorance.'t

अनित्ाशुचिदु:खानात्मसु नित्यशुचिसुखात्मख्या- तिरविद्या। ५।

'Ignorance' defined. Aph. 5 .- Ignorance (avidyá) is the no- tion that the uneternal, the impure, evil, and what is not soul, are [severally] eternal, pure, joy, and soul.

• एषां प्रत्येकं चतुर्विधानामपि मूलभूततेन स्थिताप्य- विद्या अन्वयित्वेन प्रतीयते। नि कचिदृपि केशानां विप- र्वयान्वयनिरपेव्रूपाणां सरूपमुपलभ्यते। तस्याञ्च् मिथ्या- भूतायां सम्घक शनेन निवर्नितायां दग्धबीजकल्पाना- मेषां न कचितरोको 5लीति अरविद्यानिमित्तववम विद्यान्वय- सषां निशीयते। वरतः सर्वे Sप्यविद्याव्यपदेशभाजः सर्वे- पाञ्न शेशनां चित्तविचेपकारित्वाद् योगिना प्रथममेव तदुच्छेद: कर्त्तव्य पति।

अरविद्याया लक्षषमाइ।

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8 YOGA APHORISMS.

a. The definition of ignorance in general, is this,-that, igno- rance is the notion that what is not this is this. The declaration of the varieties of that same [is made in the aphorism]. The notion that there is eternalness in things uneternal, such as water-jars, is called ' Ignorance.' So too the notion that things impure, such as the body, are pure; and the notion that objects which are evils are joy ; and the notion that the body, which is not the soul, is the soul, [-as when a bumpkin fancies that his eye sees, or a phrenologist that his brain thinks-]. This ex- plains the mistake of vice for virtue, and of the useless for the useful .*

b. In order to define ' Egotism', he says.t

हग्दर्शन शत्योरेकातमत वाम्मिता। ६।

Aph. 6 .- Egotism (asmitá) is the identi- ' Egotism' defined. fying of the power that sees with the power of seeing.

a. The 'power that sees' is Soul. The 'power of seeing' is a modification of the Quality of 'Purity' [-see Sankhya Apho- risms, B. I. §62,] unobstructed by 'Passion' and 'Darkness', in the shape of the internal organ [or Mind]. What is called

• अतस्तिन् तत्प्तिभासो Sविद्येत्यविद्याया: सामान्यल- नणं। तस्था एव भेदप्रतिपादनं। चनित्वेषु घटादिषु नित्व- त्वाभिमानो Sविद्येतुचते। एवमशुचिषु कायादिषु शुचित्वा- भिमाना दुःखेषुच विषयेषु सुखत्वाभिमानोSनात्नि शरोरे म्ात्मत्वाभिमान:। एतेन कापुएये पुएयधमा Sनयेंचार्यध्रमो व्याय्यात: । + बस्मितां लचयतुमाइ।

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BOOK II. 9

'Egotism' is the notion that these two things, entirely different as being the experienced and the experiencer-the unintelligent and the not unintelligent,-are one and the same. For example, -Nature, though really neither agent nor experiencer, fancies "I am agent,-I am experiencer" :- this blunder is the ' affiic- tion' called ' Egotism.'*

b. He states the definition of ' Desire' (raga).t

सुखानशयी रागः।७। Desire defined. Aph. 7 .- Desire is what dwells on pleasure.

a. ' Dwells on pleasure'-i. e. reposes on [-or is the affection of the mind when the thought rests on-] joy. This 'affliction', named ' Desire,' is a longing, in the shape of a thirst, for the means of enjoyment, preceded by [-or, in other words, conse- quent on] the remembrance of enjoyment, on the part of him who has known joy.t

b. He states the definition of ' Aversion' (dwesha).§

• दक्शक्तिः पुरुषः। दर्शनशक्ती रजसमोभ्यामनभि- भूत: सात्त्विक: परिणामा Sन्नकरणरूपः। तयोर्भोग्यभोक्रृ- ल्वेन जडाजडत्वेनचातन्तं भिन्नयोरेकताभिमानो Sस्म्ितेत- चते। यथा। प्रक्वतिर्वसततः क्नृत्वभोक्तृत्वरद्ितापि कव्येडं भोतयइमित्यभिमन्यते सो यमस्रितासथा विपयासः केशः। + रागस्य लक्षणमाइ। + सुखमनुशेते इति सुखानुशयो। सुखन्नस् सुखानु- सृतिपूर्षकः सुखसाधनेषु ृष्णरूपो गड्डों रागसञ्तः केगः। 5 देषस्य लचषमाइ। B Digitized by Google

10 YOGA APHORISMS.

दुःखानुशयी द्वेषः। ८। Aversion defined. Aph. 8 .- Aversion is what dwells on pain.

«. 'Pain' is what has been already defined [-B. I. §31. b]. Of him who has known it, disliking what things occasion it, in consequence of his remembrance of it, the feeling of disapproval is the 'affliction' called ' aversion' .*

b. He states what is 'tenacity of life't (abhinivesa).

सरसवाड़ी विदुषो ऽपि तन्वनुबन्धो डरभिनि- वेश: ॥६।

The clinging to mundane Aph. 9 .- Continuant through its self- existence. reproductive property, even on the part of the wise, attachment to the body is 'Tenacity of life.'

a. Continuant 'throngh its self-reproductive property ;'-that is to say, it flows on by reason of its own nature, just by reason of its being welf-oontinnant. The ' affliction' called 'tanacity of life' is what prevails in the case of every one, from the worm up to Brahma, without any concomitant cause [in addition to its own self-continuant property], in the shape of the constant clinging [which expresses itself in such terms as], "May I not de separated from the body and things sensible, &c.,"-this springing up in the shape of dread, through the force of the im-

*दुःखमुक्तलचणं। तदभिन्नस्य तदनुस्ृतिपूर्वकं तत्वा धवेसु अनभिलवतो थो 5ुयं निष्दाक्ाकः य द्वेषलच्तष:

• अभिनिषेशमाइ।

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BOOK II. 11

pression from the experience of the pain of a death that took place in a previous life .*

b. Since thus, then, non-abstraction is made up of the ' afflic- tions,' the ' afflictions' are at the outset to be removed by the prac- tice of intentness on a single point ;- such is the import.t

c. And not without their being known can these be removed ; therefore having, with a view to the knowledge of them, declared their name, source, division, and characteristic, he now states the division of the methods for the removal of these bipartitely gross and subtilet.

ते प्रतिप्रसवडेया: सक्ाः॥१०॥

The Subtile ' affictions' how to be evaded. Aph. 10 .- These, when subtile, are to be evaded by an antagonistic production.

*खस्य रसेन संस्कारेण्ेव वइतीति खरसवाही। पूर्व- जन्जातमरणदुःखानुभववासनावलात् भयरूप: समुप- जायमान: गरोरविषयादिभिर्मम वियोगो मा भूदित्यन्वइ- मनबन्वरूप: सर्वस्ेवाक्कमेर्त्रह्मपर्यन्तं निमिन्न विना प्रवर्स- मानो Sभिनिवेशास्र: हेशः। + तदेवं व्युत्थानश सेशाताकल्वाट् एकाग्रताभ्यासेन प्रथम केशा: परिशर्त्तव्या रत्याशय: ।

• नवाच्ानानां तेषां परिदार: सच्य: वाजुनिति लन्ब्रा- नाय तेषामुद्देशं चेनं विभागं सचयनभिधाय सूबसत- भेदभिन्नानां तेषां प्रडाणपायविभागमाइ।

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12 YOGA APHORISMS.

a. These subtile ' afflictions,' which, abiding in the form of mental deposits, do not occasion any change, in the shape of a 'modification' [-see B. 1. 5,-stored in the mind, like Locke's 'ideas' while not objects of attention-], these are ' to be evaded,' to be avoided, 'by an antagonistic production,' by an alteration adverse to them. When the understanding, with its deposits, having done its work, lapses into its cause, viz., egotism, then how should these ['afflictions'], being deprived of their root, pot- sibly continue ?*

b. He now mentions the method for the removal of the 'gross' ones.t

The gross ' affictions' how to be got rid of. Aph. 11 .- Their ' modifications' [- when the 'afflictions' modify the mind by pressing themselves upon the attention-] are to be got rid of by meditation.

a. The ' modifications,' in the shape of pleasure, pain, or in- difference, which consist of these ' afflictions' that have set in ope- ration their effects,-these are ' to be got rid of,' to be quitted, by means of meditation, i. e., by intentness of the mind on a single point ;- such is the meaning.t

• ते सत्मा: केशा ये वासनारूपेणावस्थिता न दत्तिरूपं परिणाममारभन्ते ते प्रतिप्रसवेन प्रतिलोमपारणामेन हेया- स्यक्व्याः । सकारणाम्मितायां कताये सवासनं चिनं यदा प्रविष्टं भर्वात तदा कतसेषां निर्मू लकानां समभवः। + खूलानां दानोपायमाइ। तेषां केशानामारव्यकार्याणं या: सुखदुःखमादा-

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BOOK II. 13

b. These 'from their being gross, can be removed by the mere practice of what purifies the mind [-see B. I. §33, c-], as the coarse gross dirt on clothes and the like is removed by mere washing ; but that subtile [impurity] which is in them can' be re- moved only by such [more recondite] expedients as bleaching, &c .*

c. Having thus mentioned what the 'afflictions' are he re- marks as follows, with the view of mentioning the stock of workst [that stands at each man's credit or discredit].

केशमूल: कर्माशयो डष्टादष्टजनावेदनीयः।१२॥

One's merits and demerits. Aph. 12 .- The stock of works, whose root is the ' afflictions,' is what is to be had fruition of in this visible state, or in that unseen.

a. By 'the stock of works' the nature of this [that he is speaking of] is set forth, for works exist only in the shape of mental deposits.t

त्िका उृत्तय: ता ध्यानेन चित्तेकाग्रतालचणेन हया इातव्या रत्यर्थः।

• चित्तपरिकर्माभ्यासमानेशैव सथूलतान्तासां निट्टन्तिर्भ- वति यथा वस्त्रादा घनः खूलो मलः प्रचालनमानेगैव निवरनते यसु तब्र सत्: स तेसैरपायेवन्तापनप्रभृतिभिरेव निवर्नतययितं शक्यते। + एवं केशानां तत्वमभिधाय कर्माशयस्याभिधातुमाइ। + कर्माशय र्रत्यनेन तस्य सरूपमभिच्ितं यतो वासना- रूपाएयेव कमाणि।

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14 YOGA APHORISMS.

b. By 'whose root is the afflictions' the cause is set forth, since the 'afflictions' alone are the cause of acts .*

c. By 'what is to be had fruition of in this visible state, or in that unseen,' the fruit is declared. What is to be experienced in this present state, is 'what is to be had fruition of in this vi- sible state.' What is to be experienced in another life, is ' what is to be had fruition of in that unseen.'t

d. Thus some meritorious acts, such as the worship of the gods, performed with excessive impetuosity [-see B. I. §21, b-], bestow, even in this life, fruit in the shape of rank, years, and enjoyment,-as distinguished rank [-that of a demigod-], &c., accrued, even in this life, to Nandiswara, through the force of his worship of the divine Maheswara. So to others, as Viśwa- mitra [-who, according to the Rámáyana, from being a Kshattri- ya was raised to the rank of a Brahman-], through the efficacy of penance, rank and long life [have accrued]. To others [has accrued change of] rank only,-as the change to another rank, &c., of those doing wicked acts with hot impetuosity, such as Nahusha [who was changed to a snake], and Urvasi [-the nymph who was punished] by her metamorphosis into a creeper in the grove of Kartikeya. In this way is the rule to be ap- plied, according to circumstances, distributively or collectively,t

• केशमूल रत्यनेन कारषमभिद्ितं यतः कर्मणां केशा एव निमित्तम्। + दष्टाउष्टवेदनीय इत्यनेन फलमुक्तम्। बरस्तिश्वेव जन्मनि बनुभवनीयो दष्टजन्मवेदनोयः। जन्मान्तरानुभवनीयो दष्टवेदमीयः। + तर्थादि कानिचित्पुएयानि कमाषि देवताराधना- दोनि तीव्रसंवेगेन कतानी ऐेव जवन फलं जात्वायुर्भांग-

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BOOK II. 15

[-each well-deserving or ill-deserving person being understood to receive rank, or years, or enjoyment, one or more of them, or all of them, or none of them,-and so on through the string of permutations and combinations possible].

e. Now he mentions the fruit of the stock of works divided according to its division* [into merit and demerit].

सति मूखे तद्ियाको आात्यायुर्भोग:।१३।

The fruit Aph. 13-While there is the root, its fructification of works. is rank, years, and enjoyment.

a. The ' afflictions' above-mentioned are the 'root;' whilst these remain unsubdued, of these acts, virtuous or vicious, 'rank, years, and enjoyment,' are the 'fructification,' i. e. the fruit. 'Rank' means the being a man [or a god, or a beast,] or the like. 'Years' mean abiding for a long time in the body. ' En- joyments' mean sense-objects, the senses, and the aggregate of pleasures and pains, because the word bhoga [-here rendered 'enjoyment'-] is formed [from the root bhuj] so as to denote the object, the instrument, or the statet [of enjoyment].

लक्षणं प्रयच्कन्ति यथा नम्दीश्वरस्य भगवन्महेत्वराराधनब- लादिहैव जन्मनि जात्ादयो विशिष्टाः प्रादुर्भूता:। एव- मन्यषां विश्वामित्रादीनां तपःप्रभावाव्जात्यायषी। केषा- स्विन्नातिरेव। यथा तोवसंवेगेन दुष्टकर्मकतां नहषादोनां जातयनरादिपरिणाम उर्वश्याक्च कार्नितिकेयवने लतारूप- तया। एवं व्यससमसरूपलेन यथायोगं योज्यम्। इदानी कर्माशयस्य सभेदभिन्नं फलमाइ। .

• मूलमुक्लचपा: केशाः। तेव्वनभिभूतेषु सतु तेषां Digitized by Google

16 YOGA APHORISMS.

b. The gist of this is this, that the mental deposits of works, collected, from time without beginning, in the ground of the mind, as they by degrees arrive at maturation, so do they, exist- ing in lesser or greater measure [-the sum of the merit being lesser than that of the demerit, or conversely-], lead to their effects in the shape of rank [raised or lowered-], years, and enjoyment* [or experience of good or ill].

c. In respect of the 'rank,' &c., that have been declared to be the fruit of acts, he states, according to the works that are the cause of each, which is the efficient of which effect.t

ने ड्ादपरितापफला: पुएयापुएयहेतुत्वात्। १४।

Aph. 14 .- These have joy or What works have what fruits. suffering as their fruits, according. ly as the cause is virtue or vice.

a. 'Joy' means pleasure; 'suffering' means pain. Those the fruit of which are joy and suffering, are what are so named [-i.

कर्मणं कुशलाकशलरूपाणां विपाक: फलं जात्ायुभागा भवन्ति। जातिर्मनुष्यत्वादिः। आ्रयुश्विरकालं कायसम्बन्धः। भोगा विषया इन्द्रियाणि सुखदुःखसंविच्च कर्मकरणभाव- साधनव्युत्पत्या भोगशब्दस्य। * ददमत तात्प्यें चित्तभूमावनादिकालसन्विता: कर्म- वासना यथा यथा पाकमुपयान्ति तथा तथा गुपाप्रधान- भावेन खिता जात्ा युर्भांगलचणं खकार्यमारभन्ने। + उक्रानां कर्मफललेन जात्यादोनां खकारणकर्मानु सारेण कार्यकर्तृत्वमाइ।

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BOOK II. 17

e. are what are denoted in the aphorism by the compound term here analysed]. By 'virtue' (punya) is meant any good deed; by ' vice,' its opposite. Of what things these two, viz., virtue and vice, are the causes, the nature of these things [is what is meant by the compound term punyápunyahetukatwa; and it is] thereby* [-or accordingly as the cause is virtue or vice, that the effect is joy or suffering].

b. What is asserted is this, that the rank, years, and enjoy- ment, originating in good works, are pleasant fruits; and what originate in evil acts are painful fruits.t

c. This twofold character [of the fruit of works] is in respect of mortals simply ; but to the Yogí all [mundane experience] is sorrow, as he proceeds to state.t

सर्व विवेकिन: ।१५।

Pleasare and pain alike Aph. 15 .- And, to the discriminating, all verations to the Yogi. is grief simply, since the modifications due to the Qualities are adverse [to the summum bonum] through

• ड्वाद: सुखं। परितापो दुःखं। ड्वादपरिताप फर्ल येषां ते तथोक्ाः। पुएयं कशलं कमे। तद्विपरीतमपुएयं। ते पु्यापुएय कारणे येषां तेषां भावसस्मात्।

• एसदु क्तसभवति पुएयकर्मारव्धजात्यायुर्भोगा डादफला:। अ्पुएवारब्धा: परितापफला:॥ # एतस्य प्राणिमाचापेक्षया द्वैविधं योगिनसु सर्व दुःख- मित्ाइ़। C Digitized by Google

18 YOGA APHORISMS.

the vexations of the various forms [of Nature], and of anxiety and of impressions self-continuant.

a. That is to say,-[in the opinion] of him who understands discriminatively the ' affections,' &c., every instrument of experi- ence [whether of pleasure or of pain] that comes under his view, is, like food with poison in it, a grief only,-something felt to be against the grain .*

b. Since the Yogí who has become a complete adept is distressed even by the slightest pain,-as the eye-ball, and no other member, experiences great pain from the mere touch of a thread of wool, 80 the discriminating [votary of Quietude] is averse to the ad- herence of even a very little pain ;- how is it [that he shrinks from such pains]? To this he replies, 'through the vexations of the various forms, and of anxiety, and of impressions self-continu- ant.t

c. Since there is increase of desire in proportion as more ob- jects are enjoyed, and since these [objects] are causes of other pains occasioned by their non-attainment, they are really nothing else than griefs [-according to the principle that the nature of the cause is not other than the nature of the product-]; thus

• परिधातक्केशादिविवेकस परिद्ृश्यमानं सकलमेव भोगसाधनं सविषान्वत् दुःखमेव प्रतिकूलवेदनीथमि- त्यर्थः।

• यस्मादत्यन्ताभिजातो योगी दुःखलेशेनापयुद्दिजते यथाचिपाचमूर्णातन्ुस्पर्शमाचेणेव महती पीडामनुभवति नेतरदड़गं तथा विवेकी खल्पदुःखानुषङ्गनापि विरव्यते। कथमित्या परिणामतापसंसकारदुःखः।

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BOOK II. 19

is it that the various forms [of Nature presented to us in the shape of objects] are sorrow .*

d. While the means of enjoyment are being enjoyed, since there must ever exist an aversion towards what is hostile to that [enjoyment,-so that thus ever " surgit amari aliquid medio de fonte leporum"-], even at the time of experiencing pleasure, the pain of distress is hard to be got rid of,-such is what constitutes the pain [called] anxiety.t

e. As for the fact that 'impressions self-continuant' are griefs, -the sense of enjoyment, and the sense of suffering, that arises on the contact of objects which one desires or does not desire, originates in one's [mental] field a corresponding self-continuant impression. Again we [thence] experience sensations of the same sort, so that, since, through the emergence of innumerable self-continuant impressions, the mundane state is never cut short, every-thing whatever is a grief.t

• विषयाणामुपभुज्यमानानां यथाययं गर्द्धाभिट्टद्वेखद- प्रापिक्वतस्य दुःखान्तरसाधनत्वाच्चास्येव दुःखरूपतेति परि- घामदुःखतम्। उपभुज्यमानेषु सुखसाधनेषु तत्प्रतिपन्थिनं प्रति देषस्य सर्वदवावस्थितत्वात् सुखानुभवकालेदपि तापदु:खं दुर्ष्पारहारमिति तापदुःखता।

संरकारदुःखतवं। खाभिमतानभिमतविषयसब्निधाने सुखसंविद्द:खसविच्चोपजायमाना तथाविधमेव खचेचे सं- कारमारभते। पुनसथा विधसंविद नुभव दूत्यपरिमितसंस्का- रोत्पनिद्वारेण संसारानुच्केदातर्वस्येव दुःखत्म्। Digitized by Google

20 YOGA APHORISMS.

f. 'And since the modifications due to the Qualities are ad- verse.' Of the Qualities, viz., Purity, Passion, and Darknem, the modifications [or psychical influences] which arise in the shape of Pleasure, Pain, and Indifference, are opposed to one another, since they reciprocally are overpowered or do overpow- er. These are but griefs, since they are, in absolutely every in- stance, the cause of grief* [-grief continning while the mun- dane state due to the Qualities continues].

g. What is asserted is this, that to the discriminating one, who desires entire and complete cessation of suffering, the whole quaternion [enumerated in the aphorism] are causes of the alleged descriptiont [i. e., causes of grief ]. Hence, since all objects exhibit themselves in the shape of vexations, therefore the harvest of all works is in the shape of vexation alone.t

h. This, that, since the aforesaid fund of ' afflictions', the har- vest of [each one's] stock of works, takes its rise in Ignorance, and since Ignorance, as being in the shape of false knowledge, is to be expelled by correct knowledge, and since correct know- ledge consists in the ascertainment of what is to be rejected and what to be accepted, with the means [of rejection, &c.,]-in order [-I repeat-] to declare this, he says.t- गुणर्त्तिविरोधार्चेति। गुणानां सतत्वरजसमसां वा हमय: सुखदु:खमोइरूपा: परस्परमभिभाव्याभिभावकलेन विरुद्धा जायन्े। तासां सर्वचव दुःखानुवन्वाट् दुःखलं। + एतदुक्कसभवति। ऐकान्तिकीमात्यन्तिकीच्च दुःखनिर- निमिच्क्तो विवेकिन उत्नरूपकारणं चतुष्टयं। यावत्मर्वे विषया दुःखसरूपतया प्रतिभान्ति तम्मात्मर्वकर्मविपाको दुःसरूप एवेति। + एमदेवमुक्तस्य केशकर्माशयविपाकराशेरविद्याप्रभव-

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BOOK II. 21

हेयं दुःखमनागतम् । १६।

What is to Aph. 16 .- What is to be shunned is pain not yet be shunned. come.

a. Since what has been is past, and what is being experienced is incapable of being shunned [whilst being experienced], it is only mundane pain not yet arrived that is to be shunned: such is what is here asserted .*

b. He states the cause of that which is to be shunned.t

दूष्टदृश्ययो: संयोगो हेयहेतुः॥१७॥

The origin Aph. 17 .- The cause of what is to be shunned is of evil. the conjunction of the seer with the visual.

a. The 'seer'-in the shape of Thought. The 'visual' means the principle of understanding [which does not itself see, but is Thought's organ]. The conjunction of these two, occasioned by the absence of discriminative knowledge,-their contact as the experienced [-tor all that seems external is developed out of the principle of the understanding-] and the experiencer, -this is the cause or reason 'of what is to be shunned,'-of

त्ादविद्यायाक्च मिथ्याज्ञानरूपतया सम्यगधानोच्क्रेद्यला- सम्घग् जानस्य ससाधन इयोपादेयावधारणरुपत्वात् तदभि- धानायाड़।

• भूतस् व्यतिक्रान्तत्वादनुभूयमानस्यच त्यत्तुमशक्खा- दनागतमेव संमारदु:खं दातव्यमितुक्तमिति।

• ऐेयहेतुमाइ।

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22 YOGA APHORISMS.

pain,-of the world in the shape of a modification of the Quali- ties ;- because when this surceases, the mundane state surcea- ses,-such is the meaning .* ,

a. We have spoken of 'the conjunction of the seer with the visual.' Among these things, of the ' visual' he states the na- ture, the products, and the motive.t

प्रकाश क्रियास्थ्रि तिशोलभ्भूतेन्द्रियात्मकं भोगापवर्गाथे

दश्यम्॥१८।

The nature and purpose of the visible. Aph. 18 .- The visual [-including the visible-] whose habit is illumination, ac- tion, and rest, and which consists of the Elements and the Or- gans, is for the sake of experience and emancipation.

a. 'Illumination' is the property of ' Purity'. 'Action,' in the shape of exertion, is that of ' Passion.' 'Rest,' in the shape of fixation, is that of ' Darkness.' Of which these,-illumination, action, and rest,-are the habit, or the essential nature,-that is what is so described [-i. e. described in the aphorism by the compound epithet here analysed]. Thus has its nature been set forth.t

• ट्रष्टा चिद्रूपः। दृशयं बुद्धित्त्वं । तयोरविवेकस्थाति- पूर्वको यो 5सा संयोगो भोग्यभोक्तृलेन सव्निधानं स देयसय दुःखस्य गुणपरिणामरूपस्य संसारस्य हेतु: कारणं। तञ्नि- उत्त्या संसारनिवत्तिर्भवतीत्र्थ:। + दष्टदृश्ययो: संयोग पत्युत्तं। तब दशयस्य सरूपं काये प्रयोजनञ्व्ाइ। + प्रकाश: सत्त्वस्य धर्मः । क्रिया प्रन्तिरूपा रजसः।

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BOOK II. 23

b. 'Consisting of the Elements and the Organs.' The ' Ele- ments,' according to their division into the Gross and the Sub- tile, are Earth, &c., and the rudiments of Odour; &c. The ' Or- gans,' according to their division into the organs of knowing, the organs. of action, and the internal organ, are of three sorts. Of which this two-fold character of percept and perception is ' what it consists of,'-a modification not other than itself,- that is what is so described [-i. e. described as ' consisting of the Elements and the Organs']. Thus have its products [- which are not other than Nature herself-] been stated .*

c. 'Experience' means what has been already defined [at §13. a]. 'Emancipation' is the surcease, occasioned by discrimi- native knowledge, of the mundane state. Of which these two, ex- perience and emancipation, are the motive or purpose, that is what is so described [-i. e. described by the compound epithet now analysed-], that is to say ' the visual [including the visi- ble.]'t

स्ितिर्नियमरूपा तमसः। ताः प्रकाशक्रियास्थितय: शीख खाभाविकं रूपं यस्य तत्तथाविधमिति खरूपमस्य निर्दि- एम। * भूतेन्द्रियात्मकमिति। भूतानि स्थूलस् स्मभेदेन प्रथि- व्यादीनि गन्वतन्माचाणिच। इन्द्रियाणि बुद्धीन्द्रियकर्मे- न्द्रियान्त:करणभेदेन चिविधानि। उभयमेतद्गाह्यग्रइणरूप- मात्मा सरूपाभिन्नः परिणामो यस्य तत्तथाविधमितनेन कार्यमस्थोक्तम्। + भोग: कथितलक्षणः। अपवगा विवेकस्यातिपूर्षिका संसारनिटृटत्तिः। तो भोगापवर्गावर्थः प्रयोजनं यस् तन याविधं दृश्यमित्वर्थः।

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24 YOGA APHORISMS.

d. And since this, the 'visible,' which consists of modifications in the shape of various conditions, requires to be known as what is to be shunned in order to declare its conditions, he says .*

विशेषाविशेषलि ङ्गमाजालिङ्गानि गुषपर्वाणि।१९।

The aspects of the Quali- Aph. 19 .- The divisions [of condi- ties. tion] of the Qualities are (1) the di- verse, (2) the non-diverse, (3) the merely [once] resolvable, and (4) the irresolvable.

a. The divisions, i. e. the neveral conditions, of the Qualities are to be understood to be four,-such is what we are here in- formed of. Among these, the ' diverse' are the gross elements and the organs; the 'non-diverse' are the subtile elements and the internal organ; the 'merely [once] resolvable' is intellect [-which is resolvable into the Undiscrete, but not further-]; the 'irresolvable' is the Undiscrete [or Nature] :- thus has it been declared.t

b. The four conditions [of developement] of the Qualities are set forth as necessarily requiring to be known at the time of Concentration, because we recognise the Undiscrete, which con- sists of the three Qualities, as being present everywhere that

• तस्यच दश्यस्य नानावस्थारूपपरिणामात्मकस् देव- लवेम वातव्यत्ादवस्था: कथयतुमाइ।

• गुणानां पर्वाएयवस्थाविशेषाश्चत्वारो ज्ातव्या इत्युप- दिष्टन्भवति। तब विशेषा महाभूतेन्द्रियाषि। अ्रविशेषा- सन्मानान्त:करणे। लिङ्गमानं बुद्धि:। अलिङ्गमव्यत्ता मितुक्तम्।

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BOOK II. 25

these are,* [-so that if we did not know these, then the Undis- crete, the cause of bondage, might be present undetected]. c. Since the visible requires first to be known as that which is to be shunned, having thus explained it, with its conditions, in order now to explain what is to be accepted [and not to be got rid of-viz.] the ' seer,'-he says.t

ट्रूष्टा डशिमाच: शुद्धा ऽपि प्रत्यामुपश्य:।२०।

Soul defined. Aph. 20 .- The 'seer' [Soul] is vision simply, though pure, looking directly on ideas. a. The ' seer,' i. e., Soul, is 'vision simply,' i. e., mere Thought. This 'though pure,' i. e. though abiding as itself, without be- coming modified, or the like. 'Looking directly on ideas :'- 'ideas' are thought coloured by objects :- it looks ' directly on' these,immediately,-without the intervention of successive stages, or the like. What is asserted is this, that, whilst it is only the intellect that becomes coloured by the object, Soul is spectator merely through proximity.t

वश्यं वातव्यतेन योगकारे चत्वारि पर्वाणि निर्दिष्टानि। + एवं देयलेन दश्यस् प्रथमं वातव्यतात्तदवस्ासचितं व्यास्यायोपादेयं द्रषटारं व्याकनुमाइ। + टूष्टा पुरुषो दशिमानश्चेतममान: ।स शुद्धो ऽपि। परि- वामित्वाद्यभावेन खप्रतिष्ठा Sपि। प्रत्ययानुपश्यः। प्रत्या विषयोपरक्ानि शनानि। तानि अनु व्व्यवधानेन प्रति- सडुमाद्यभावेन पश्यति। एतदुत्तम्भवति। जातविषयों- परागायामेव मुद्ो सव्िधानमानेषेव पुरुषस्य द्रषटत्वमिति। Digitized by Google

26 YOGA APHORISMS. 1 b. It alone is the experiencer ;- so he says .*-

तदर्थ एव दश्यात्मा। २१।

Soul is the experiencer. Aph. 21 .- For the sake of it alone is the entity of the visible.

a. The ' entity,' the self, of the 'visible' which has been al- ready defined [§17. a.],-this is ' for the sake of it ,'-the bringing about that ' it,' the Soul, shall be an experiencer, is its aim, to the exclusion in short of any selfish end. For Nature, energizing, energizes not with a view to any purpose of her own, but with the design " Let me bring about Soul's experience."t

b. If thus the motive be only the effecting of Soul's experi- ence, then, when this has been effected, it should cease striving for that in the absence of a motive :- and, when it is free from alteration, since it is pure [-exhibiting neither the Qualities of Passion nor of Darkness when all three are in calm equipoise-], all souls should be freed from bondage, and the mundane state should be cut short. Having pondered this doubt, he sayst- * स एव भोक्रेतवत ब्राइ।

• दृश्यस् प्रागुक्तलक्णस ब्रात्ा वम्खरूपं स तदर्य- सख पुरुषस्य भोतृत्वसम्पादनं नाम खार्थपरिद्ारेष प्रयो- जनं। नइि प्रधानं प्रवर्नमानमात्मनः किश्वितयोजनय- पेक्य प्रवर्त्तते किन्तु पुरुषस्य भोगं सम्पादयामीति। + यद्येवं पुरुषस भोगसम्पादनमेव प्रयोजनं तदा सम्पा- दिते तम्मिंसस्तिभ्निष्प्रयोजनं विरतव्यापारं खात्। तस्तिंख परिणामशूभ्ये शुद्धत्वात् सर्वे ट्रूषारो बन्वरचिता: खुख्मर् संसारोच्छेद दत्याशंक्याइ।

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BOOK II. 27

हतार्थम्परति नष्टमप्यनष्टं तदन्यसाधारणत्ात्।२२।

The emancipation of one entails Aph. 22 .- Though it have ceas- not that of others. ed to be, in respect of him who has effected what is required, it has not ceased [in regard to all], because it is common to others besides him.

a. Although, since it causes experience just till there is dis- criminative knowledge, it ceases to be, i. e., desists from acting, in respect of some soul which has effected the end [of discern- ing discriminatively], still, since it is common to all souls, it con- tinues, as regards others, with its operations undestroyed. Therefore, since Nature is common to all experiencers, it never ceases; nor does the emancipation of one involve the emancipa- tion of all :- such is what is asserted .*

b. Having explained the 'visible' and the ' seer,' in order to explain their conjunction, he says-t

सुखामिशत््यो: सरूपोपलव्धिदेतु: संयोग:।२३।

The conjunction of soul Aph. 23 .- The conjunction is the and nature what. cause of the apprehension of the actual condition of the natures of the possessed and the possessor.

तायेँ पुरुषं प्रति तब्षं विरतव्यापारं तथापि सर्वपुरुषसा- धारणव्वादन्यान् प्रत्यनष्टव्यापारमवतिष्ठते। वातः प्रधानस्य सकसभोक्तृसाधारणतवान्न कदाचनापि विनाश एकस् मुंक्री वा न सर्वेषां मुक्तिप्रसङ पतुत्तन्भवति। + डदयद्रूष्टारा व्यास्याय संयोगं व्याख्यातुमाइ।

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28 YOGA APHORISMS.

a. He characterises this through its effect* [-telling us not what the conjunction is, but what it is the cause of].

b. 'The nature of the possessed' is the nature of the visible. 'The nature of the possessor' is the nature of the 'seer.' More- over, the apprehension of the nature of these two, correlated as the known and the knower,-that which is the cause of this is the conjunction [here spoken of] ;- and this is none other than the nature of their cognate habit as the experienced and the ex- periencer. Because, of these two, which are from everlasting and all-pervading, there is no conjunction other than their essential character. That the experienced's character as something expe- rienced, and the experiencer's character as an experiencer, has existed from everlasting,-this alone is the conjunctiont [or re- lation between the two].

c. Moreover he states the cause thereof.t

तस्य हेतुरेयमविद्या।२४।

The cause of the conjunction. Aph. 24 .- The cause thereof is what is to be quitted-viz., Igno- rance.

*कार्यद्ारेणास लच्षणं करोति। + खशत्रिर्दश्यस्य खभावः। खामिर्शात्तिर्दषुः सरूपं। तथोईयोपि संवेद्यसंवेद्कतवेन व्यवस्ितयोया सरूपोप- लव्धिसस्या: कारणं यसंयोग:। सच सहजभोग्यभोत्ृ- भावखरूपाध्चान्यः। नडि तथोनितयोर्व्यापकयोस सरूपा- दतिरिक्क: कश्चितंयोगः। यदेव भोग्यस्य भोग्वलं भोतुच भोतृतवमनादिसिद्धं स एव संयोग:। + तस्यापि कारयमाइ।

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BOOK II. 29

a. That which has been already described [54.] as Ignorance, in the shape of delusion, consisting in. the confounding the un- real with the real, is declared to be of that conjunction in the shape of the absence of discriminative knowledge, the canse,- what is to quitted,-the [grammatical] object of the act of 'quitting.'*

: b. What, again, is the ' quitting' thereof? To this he replies.t

तदभावातंयोगाभावो डामं तडशे: केवळ्यम्।२५।

The quitting of conjunction Aph. 25 .- The 'quitting' consists wkat. in the surcease of the conjunction, on that [Ignorance] ;- this is the isolation of the soul.

a. 'Of that,' i. e., of Ignorance, eradicated by its essential opposite, viz., right knowledge, 'the surcease,'-when this takes place, the surcease also of its effect, viz., of the conjunction, is what is called the ' quitting' of it.t

b. What is meant is as follows ;- abandonment does not apply in the case of this as in that of a circumscribed body [from which yon may disjoin yourself by moving away into a portion of space unoccupied by it]; but, when discriminative knowledge या पूर्व विपर्यासात्मिका मेोइरूपा Sविद्या व्याख्ाता सा तस्या Sविषेकस्थातिरुपस् संयोगस् कारणं हेयं हान- क्रियाकमोचते।

• किम्पुनसद्वानमित्ाइ। + तस्या अविद्याया: खरूपविरुद्ेन सम्यग पानेनोव्ूलि- ताया यो Sयमभावसस्मिन् सति तत्कार्यस्य संयोगस्याप्यभाव- वद्ानमितुचते। Digitized by Google

30 YOGA APHORISMS.

has been produced, the conjunction, which was due to the ab- sence of discriminative knowledge, ceases quite of its own ac- cord ;- such is the 'quitting' of it. And, moreover, that quit- ting which there is of conjunction [with Nature], being for all eternity, is what is called the isolation (kaivalya) of the soul [thereafter existing entirely] alone (kewala) .*

c. Thus have the nature, the cause, and the effect, of the con- junction [of soul with Nature] been declared.t d. Now, by means of declaring the means of ' quitting' [what ought to be quitted], he states [by implication] the cause of [the attainment of] what [condition] ought to be acceptedt [as the most desirable possible].

विवेकस्यातिरविश्वा इानोपाय: ॥ २६। The means of quitting the conjunction. Aph. 26 .- The means of quitting [the state of bondage] is discrimina- tive knowledge not discontinuous.

a. The ' knowledge,'-the perfect cognizance, of the distinc- tion, in this shape, viz., that the Qualities are one thing and Soul is another thing, is 'the means,' the cause, 'of quitting,' i. e., of abandoning, the visible [or phenomenal]. What sort of [knowledge]? 'Not discontinuous.' That [knowledge] is ' not discontinuous,' in respect of which there is no skipping,-no * सयमथो नैतस मूर्नद्रव्यवत् परित्ागो यु्वते किन्तु जातायां विवेकस्थातावविवेकस्थातिनिमित्तसंयोग: खथमेव निवन्नत दति तस्य हानं। यदेबच संयोगस दानं तदेव नित्वं केवलस्थापि पुरुषस्य कैवल्यं व्यपदिश्यते। तदेवं संयोगस् सरूपं कारणं कार्यच्चार्भिहतम्।

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BOOK II. 31

breaks between and between, in the shape of non-abstraction* [or re-conjunction of soul with the things of sense].

b. The import here is this, that, when Ignorance is dissolved by force of meditating on what is opposed to it, that advent which there is of a reflection, in the soul, of the introspective intellect, where the conceit of being knower or agent has been laid aside, and when it is unoppressed by the filth of Passion and Darkness, is what is called discriminative knowledge, [-or the knowledge of the non-identity of soul and Nature]. And when this prevails permanently, there simply becomes, through the cessation of the rule of the visible, isolation.t

c. While telling of what description is the discernment of that soul in which discriminative knowledge has taken place, he de- clares [by implication] the nature of discriminative knowledge itself.t * ग्रन्ये गुणा अन्यः पुरुष द्रत्येवंविधस्य विवेकस्य स्याति। प्रस्था सा हानसय दश्यपरितागस्थोपाय: कारणं। कीढशी। विप्रव। न विद्यते विश्नवो विच्छेदोएन्तरान्तरा व्युत्थान- रूपो यस्या: सा 5विप्नवा। + उदमच तात्पर्यम्। प्रतिपकभावनाबलादविद्याप्रवि-

भिभूताया बुद्धेर न्तमुखाया या चिच्क्वाया संक्रान्तिः सा विवे- कस्यातिरित्युचते। तस्याञ्त् सततवेन प्रदटत्तायां दश्यस्या- धिकारनिटटन्तेर्भ वत्येव कैवल्यम्।

• उत्पन्नविवेकस्त्रातेः पुरुषस् यादशी प्रज्ञा भवत तां कथयन् विवेकस्त्रातेरेव लरूपमाइ।

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32 YOGA APHORISMS.

तस्य सप्रधा प्रान्तभूमा प्रज्ञा।२७।

Discriminative knowledge of what nature. Aph. 27 .- Of that [enlightened soul] the perfect knowledge, up to the ground of the limit, is of seven kinds.

a. 'Of that' [sonl] in which discriminative knowledge has sprung up; 'the perfect knowledge'-in the shape of the discrimi- nation which it behooves us to understand; 'up to the ground of the limit', i. e., as far as is the extent of all the meditation that has a support [-sce B. 1. §17, j,-] ; is of seven sorts .*

b. Among these [seven], that which consists in liberation from the products [of mind] is of four sorts,-(1) "That which is to be known is known by me;" (2) "There is nothing that ought to be known;" (3) "My ' afflictions' are destroyed,-there is no- thing of mine requiring to be destroyed ;" (4) " Knowledge has been attained by me, discriminative knowledge has been attained by me;"-and so, by the abandonment of all other impressions, in that state of things, just such perfect knowledge takes place [as is spoken of in the aphorism]. Such perfect knowledge, being pure knowledge the object of which is some product [of mind], is what is called 'liberation from the products.'t

*तस्योत्पव्नविवेकज्ञानस्य वातव्यविवेकरूपा प्रञ्ा। प्रान्तभूमा सकलसालम्बनसमाधिभ मिपर्यन्तं। सप्रप्रकारा भवति।

• तब कार्यविमुकिरुपा चतुःप्रकारा। घा्तं मया भेयं। म धतव्यं किन्विदन्ति। वीषा मे केशा: न मे किम्चित् चेतव्यर्मास्त। अधिगतं मया ज्ञानं प्राप्ता मया विवेकरा तिरिति प्रत्ययान्तरपरिदारेष तसयामवस्ायामोडशयेव प्रज्ता

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BOOK II. 33

c. 'Liberation from the mind' is of three sorts,-(1) "My mind has done its office [in enabling me to discern the distinc- tion of soul and nature];" (2) "and the Qualities have lost their influence [over me],-like stones that have fallen from a moun- tain-peak they will not again resume their place; for why should these, when tending towards resolution into their cause, spring up again in the absence of the fundamental reason [for their springing up] which is called ' delusion,' and in the absence of a motive?"-(3) " And my meditation is such as has become one with soul ;- such being the case, I exist in my real nature." Such is the threefold ' liberation from mind' .*

d. So then, when there has sprung up such a sevenfold per- fect knowledge, reckoning as far as to the limit [where medita- tion ceases to rest upon an object], we say that soul is alonet [kevala, or in the desiderated state of kaivalya].

e. It has been stated [§26] that discriminative knowledge is

जायते। ईदशी प्रचा कार्यविषयं निर्मलं शामं कार्यवि- मुक्तिरिलुचते। * चित्तविमुक्तिस्त्रिविधा। चरितार्या मे बुद्धि:। गुणास्च इताधिकारा गिर्रिशिखरनिपतिता दरव ग्रावाणः पुनः स्ितिं न यास्यन्ति खकारणे प्रलयाभिमुखानां मोहाभिधा-

सात्मोभूतश्न मे समाधि: तस्मिन् सति खरूपप्रतिष्ठो Sइ- मिति। ईदृशी चिप्रकारा चित्तविमुक्ति:। + तदेवमोदश्यां सप्रविधप्रान्तभूमिप्रज्ायामुपजातायां पुरुष: केवल पत्युचते। E Digitized by Google

34 YOGA APHORISMS.

the cause of the removal of the Conjunction [between soul and nature] ; but what is the cause of that? To this he replies .*

योगाङ्गानष्ठानादशुद्धिकषय ज्ानदीप्रिराविषेक- खयातेः॥२८।

Ascetic practices clear the way Aph. 28 .- Till there is discrimi- to discriminative knowledge. native knowledge, there is, from the practice of the things subservient to the Yoga, an illumination [more or less brilliant] of knowledge [which is operative] in the removal of impurity.

a. The 'things subservient to the Yoga' are what will be mentioned [in §29]. 'From the practice' of these, i. e. from the practice of them preceded by a knowledge of them,-' till there is discriminative knowledge,'-that 'illumination of knowledge' which, more or less, as a modification of the pure [or enlighten- ing] principle, is [operative] 'in the removal of impurity'-in the removal of impurity in the shape of the ' afflictions' whose characteristic is their hiding the light of the pure principle of the mind,-until discriminative knowledge [takes place], that is the cause of this knowledge [of the distinction between soul and nature] ;- such is the meaning.+

*विवेकस्ातिस योगाभावे हेतुरितुत्ं। तस्यासूत्पन्ता कि्चिमित्तमित्यत ब्राइ। + योगाङ्गानि वच्यमाणानि। तेषामनुष्ठानाद् धान- पूर्वकादभ्यासादाविवेकस्थातेरशुद्धिचषये चित्तसत्त्वस्य प्रका- शावरण लक्षपकेशरूपा शुद्धिचये या ज्ानदीप्रिसारतम्घेन सात्त्विकः परिणामा विवेकस्यातिपर्यन्तक्ष तस्या: स्त्राते- इंतुरितर्थः।

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BOOK II. 35

b. ' From the practice of the things subservient to the Yoga, -in the removal of impurity,'-has been said :- what, then, are those 'things subservient to the Yoga'? So he enunciates them .*

यमनियमासन प्राणायाम प्रत्याह्ार धारणाधान- समाधयो Sषावङ्रानि। २६।

The eight subservients of Aph. 29 .- The eight things subservi. Concentration. ent [to Concentration] are (1) forbear- ance, (2) religious observance, (3) postures, (4) suppression of the breath, (5) restraint, (6) attention, (7) contemplation, and (8) meditation.

b. Some of these, as 'attention,' &c., are immediately sub- servient, since they are directly conducive to meditation. Some, as 'forbearance,' 'religious observance,' &c., conduce to medi- tation by means of their eradicating [all] hesitation about things opposed to it, such as killing, &c. Of 'postures,' and the rest [in the list,] the conduciveness is successive, it being, e. g., when one has succeeded in regard to ' posture,' that there is steadiness in 'suppression of breath;'-and so it is to be inferred also in respect of the others [in succession].t * योगा ङ्गामुष्ठानादशुद्धिचय रत्क्तं। कानि पुनस्ानि योगाङ्गानीति तेषामुद्देशमाइ। + यरह कानिचित् समाधेम्ाचाटुपकारकलवेनानराएय- ड्रानि यथा धारणादोनि। कानिचित् प्रतिपचभूतहिंसा- दिवितर्काम्मूलन दारेण समाधेरुपकुर्षन्ति यथा यमनियमा- दयः। तवासनादोनामुत्तरो त्तरमुपकारकत्वं यथा सत्या- सनजये प्राणायामखेये। एवमुत्तरवापि न्याग्यम्।

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36 YOGA APHORISMS. b. He describes these in their order .*

Forbearance what. Aph. 30 .- ' Forbearance' (yama) consists of not killing, veracity, not stealing, contin- ence, and not coveting.

a. Among these [-to speak first of the first-], 'killing' is acting for the purpose of removing life; and this is a canse of all evils. The absence of this is what is meant by 'not killing.' Since 'killing' must be abstained from at all times, its opposite, ' not killing' is set down firstt [in the list].

b. 'Veracity' means conformity, in speech and mind, to fact. Its opposite is falsehood. 'Theft' is the taking away another's property. Its absence is 'not stealing.' Continence' is the sub- jection of one's members. 'Not coveting' means not desiring for one's self means of enjoyment.t

c. These five, 'not killing,' &c., which are meant by the word

• क्रमेणेषां सरूपमाइ्।

• तब प्रापवियोगप्रयोजनव्यापारो हिंसा। साच सर्वा- नर्थहेतु:। तदभावो Sिंसा। हिंसायासवकालमेव परि- हार्यत्ात्प्रथमं तदभावाया कहिंसाया निहेशः।

• सत्वं वाड्मनस्योरयथार्थलं। तदभावो Sसत्ं। सेवं परखापहरणं। तदभावो Sसेय। ब्रह्मचय उपवसंयम्ः। अपरिग्रदा भोगसाधनानामखीकरणं।

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BOOK II. 37

' forbearance,' are laid down as things conducive to Concentra- tion .*

d. He states a peculiarity of these.t

एते जातिदेशकालसमयानवच्किया: सार्वभाम-

मडावतम्। ३१।

Honesty independent Aph. 31 .- These, without respect to of circumstances. rank, place, time, or compact, are the uni- versal great duty.

a. 'Rank' means Brahman-hood, &c. 'Place' means a place of pilgrimage, &c., 'Time' means the fourteenth of the month, or other [date which may affect the meritoriousness or otherwise of this or that otherwise perhaps indifferent act]. 'Compact' means that a Brahman, for example, is the motive [of our doing or leaving undone]. The aforesaid 'forbearances,' viz. ' not killing,' &c., without respeot to these four [considerations], abiding in all places-i. e. [as the moral law written on the heart, in all] understandings-are what are called 'the great . duty.'t

त एते Sहिंसादय: पञ्च यमशन्दवाचा योगाङ्गलेन निईिष्टा।

• एषां विशेषमाइ।

• जातिर्त्रान्मपत्वादिः। देशवीर्थादिः। कालमतुर्द- श्यादि:। समयो ब्राह्मपप्रयोजनादिः। एतेश्वतुर्भिरन- वच्छिया: पूर्वाक्ता वहिंसादयो यमा: सर्वास चितादिषु चित्तभूमिषु भवा महावनमितुचते। Digitized by Google

38 YOGA APHORISMS. b. To explain :- 'I will not kill a Brahman,'-' I will not kill any one at a place of pilgrimage,'-'I will not kill any one on the fourteenth of the month,'-'I will not kill, except for the benefit of a god, a Brahman, or the like,'-[well, the 'forbear- ances' must be] without this fourfold qualification,-unqualified, -thus ' I will not kill any one, anywhere, at any time, or for any purpose whatever.' And the same holds in respect of ' truth' and the rest, mutatis mutandis. It is these thus unqualified, and acted upon in their full generality, that are called 'the great duty.'*

c. He states what are ' religious observances' (niyama).t

Religious observances. Aph. 32 .- Religious observances (niya- ma) are (1) purification, (2) contentment (8) ansterity, (4) inaudible mutterings, and (5) persevering devotion to the Lord.

. a. 'Purification' (saucha) is of two sorts, external, and inter- nal. The external is the cleansing of the body by earth, water, * तद्यथा। ब्राह्मं न इनिष्यामि तोथ कञ्चन न इनि- व्यामि चतुर्दश्यां न इनिव्यामि देवब्राह्मणाद्यर्थव्यतिरक्रेष न इनिष्यामीत्ेवं चतुर्विधाव च्केद व्यतरेकेण कश्वित् कचित् कदाचित कम्मिंश्विदप्यर्थे न इनिष्यामीतनवच्कियाः। एवं सत्यादिषु यथायोगं योज्यं। रत्यमनियतीभूता: सामान्ये- नेव प्रदृत्ता: महावतमिलुचते। + नियमानाड़।

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BOOK II. 39

&c. The internal is the washing away the impurity of the mind by means of benevolence, &c .*

b. 'Contentment' (santosha) means contentedness. The rest have been already described. These, viz. 'purification,' and the rest, are what are meant by the term ' religious observances.'t

c. How are these subservient to Concentration? To this he replies.t

वितकंबाधने प्रतिपच्भावनम्। ३३ ।

How these things are of use. Aph. 33 .- In excluding things questionable, the calling up some- thing opposite [is serviceable].

a. 'Killng,' &c., as opponents of Concentration, are 'things questionable,' because they are doubted about [-it being ques- tionable what real good they can do. If these are excluded when things opposed to them are called up, then concentration is facilitated. Hence ' forbearance' and 'religious observances' really are subservient to Concentration.§

• गाचं द्विविधं वाहमाभ्यन्तरच्च। वाह्यं मञ्जलादिभि: कायप्रचालनम्। व्रान्तरं मैव्यादिभिश्चित्तमलप्रचालनम्। + सन्तोषसुष्टिः। शेषा: प्रागेव भूतव्याख्याना:। एते शांचादयो नियमशब्दवाच्या:। + कथमेषां योगाङ्गत्वमत्यत ब्राइ। 8 वितक्न्त ति वितका योगपरिपन्थिनो हिंसादय:। तेषां प्रतिपच्चभावने सति यदि बाधा भवति तदा योगरु करो भवतीति भवत्वेव यमनियमानां योगाङ्गख्वम्।

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40 YOGA APHORISMS.

b. Now he states, in order, the nature, the divisions, the kind, the cause, and the fruit, of the 'things questionable' (vitarka) .* वितका हिंसादय: कतकारितानुमोदिता लोभकोष मोइपूर्वका मदुमध्याधिमाना दुःखाज्ञानानन्तफला दूति प्रतिपचभावनम्।हे४। Account of objectionable things. Aph. 34 .- The 'things questionable,' killing, &c .; whether done, caused to be done, or approved of; whether resulting from covetousness, anger, or delusion; whether slight, of intermediate character, or beyond measure; have no end of fruits [in the shape of ] pain and ignorance ;- hence the calling up of something opposite [is every way advisable].

a. These the 'killing,' &c., aforesaid are first divided tripartitely through the difference of 'done,' ' caused to be done,' and ' ap- proved of.' Among these, those are ' done,' which are carried into effect by one's self. Those are ' caused to be done,' which are brought about by the employment of the incentive expression 'Do it, do it.' Those are 'approved,' which, when being done by another, are consented to by the expression ' Well done, well done.' And this threefold character is mentioned in order to debar hallucination in regard to these respectively; otherwise some dull-witted one might reflect thus, "The killing was not done by me myself, therefore the blame is not mine."t

• रदानी वितर्काणं सरूपं भेद प्रकारं कारमं फलन्न कमेणाइ। + एते पूर्वाक्ता हिंसादय: प्रथमं बिधा भिद्यन्ने कतका- रितानमोदितभेदेन। तब खयं निष्पादिता: हताः। कुर- कर्वितिप्रयोजकव्यापारेख समुत्पादिता: कारिता:। सन्धेन

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BOOK II. 41

b. In order to declare the causes of these [questionable things'], he says, 'resulting from covetousness, anger, or delu- sion.'*

c. Although ' covetousness' is the one first specified, yet, since the source of all the 'afflictions' is delusion, whose mark is the conceit that what is not soul is soul, this we must be sure is the root, because, when it takes place, ' covetousness' 'anger' and the rest arise in consequence of there having gone before the di- vision of self and other one [-but for the existence of which de- lusive division there would have been no room for either cove- tousness or anger]. We mean, then, that every class of evils results from delusion.t d. ' Covetousness' is a thirst. 'Anger' is an inflamed condi- tion of the mind, which uproots all discrimination between what ought to be done and what ought not to be done.t क्रियमाणा: साधु साधितङ्गीक्वता अनुमोदिताः। एतच्च नैविधं परस्परव्यामोइ्दनिवारणायोचते। ब्रन्यया मन्द- मतिरेवं मन्येत न मया खयं हिंसा क्तेति नााि मे दोष दूति। *एतेषां कारणप्रतिपादनायाइ लोभक्रांधमोइपूर्वका दूति। + यद्यपि लोभ: प्रथमं निर्दिष्टत्षथापि सर्व क्केशानां मोड- स्ानात्मन्यात्ाभिमानलचपस् निदानत्वात् तस्मिन् सति खपरविभागपूर्वकतवेन लोभक्राषादीनामु द्ववाभ्भूलत्वमवसे- यं। मोइपूविका सर्वा दोषजातिरितर्यः। + लोभसृष्ण। करोध: कताऊृत्यविवेकोभ्मूलक: प्रज्वल- नात्कच्चित्तधर्मः। F Digitized by Google

42 YOGA APHORISMS.

e. 'Killing,' &c., moreover, which are severally threefold through the distinction between ' done,' &e., [§34. a.], are divid- ed tripartitely through their having as their cause 'delusion,' &c., [§34. b]. He mentions, of these again, a threefold character, through their difference of state, as ' slight, of intermediate cha- racter, and beyond measure.' The 'slight,' or slow, are those that are neither fierce nor middling. Those 'of intermediate character,' are what are neither slow nor fierce. Those that are 'beyond measure' are what are vehement, neither middling nor slight. Thus the nine divisions, since there is thus a farther threefold character, become twenty.seven .*

f. The 'slight,' &c., moreover severally may be of three sorts through the distinction of slight, intermediate, and excessive. These are to be combined accordingly as they can combine. For example, the 'slightly slight,' the 'slightly intermediate,' the 'slightly excessive,' and so on.t

g. Ile mentions their fruit, saying, 'having no end of fruits [in the shape of ] pain and ignorance.' 'Pain' is a state of mind, dependent on the Quality of passion, exhibiting itself as some-

• प्रत्येकं कुतादिभेदेन त्रिप्रकारा अपि इिंसादयो मोहादिकारणतेन विधा भिख्न्ते। तेषामेव पुनरवस्ा- भेदेन वैविष्यमाइ मृदुमध्याधिमाना:। मृदवो मन्दा न मीजा नापि मध्यमा:। मध्या न मन्दा नापि तीवा:। वषि माना: तीव्रा व मच्या नापि मन्दा पू्ति बव भेदा इत्यं भेविध्ये सनि सपविंशञति:। + मृद्दादीनामषि प्रत्येकं मृदुमध्याधिमानभेदात जेविथ रभवति। तमाययोगं योजं। तद्यथा। सदुसदुकद्मथयो मृदुतीव्र इत्ादि।

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BOOK II. 43

thing repugnant. 'Ignorance' is false knowledge, in the shape of doubt or error. Those ['questionable things'] of which tho endless, or unlimited, fruits are these two, viz. pain and igno- rance, are what are so spoken of* [-i. e. spoken of by the com- pound epithet here aualysed].

h. Thus it is enjoined, that the Yogi, by meditating on ' some- thing opposite' is to get rid of these [' questionable things'] which he has understood by means of the division of natures, causes, &c.,t [that has been now set forth].

i. With a view to declare, in order, how perfections arise, con- sequent on these ['forbearances,' &c.], when, by practice, they have reached their highest degree, he says.t-

सत्च्चिधा वैरताग:।३५।

Influence of the Yogi that is Aph. 35 .- When harmlessness is harmless. complete, near him, there is aban- donment of enmity.

a. When the harmlessness of him that practises harmlessness is complete, even natural enemies, as the snake and the mungoose, abandon [when near him] their enmity, and abide in amity ;- * एवां फलमाह दुःखाच्ञामान्तफला इति। दुःखंप्रति- कूलतयावभासमानो राजसश्चिन्तवर्मः । ब्रज्ञानं मिथ्याच्ानं संघर्यावपर्ययरूपं। ते दुःखाज्ञाने वनन्तमपरिच्किनं फर्ष येषां ते तयोत्रा:। ह इत्यं तेषां खरूपकार पादिभेदेन दानानां प्रतिपद भावमया योगिना परिहार: कर्चव्य प्रत्युपदिष्टसभवति। 1 एषामभ्यासात् प्रकर्षागच्क्तामनु निष्पाहिन्यः सिदयो यथा भवन्ति तथा कमेज प्रतियादवितुनाए्ट।

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44 YOGA APHORISMS.

that is to say, those that delight in destroying, leave off their destructiveness .*

b. What happens in respect of him that practises veracity? To this he replies.t सत्यप्रतिष्ठायां क्रियाफलात्रयलम्। ३३ ।

Influence of veracity. Aph. 36 .- When veracity is complete, he is the receptacle of the fruit of works.

a. For works, such as sacrifices, being performed, give fruits, such as Paradise. But of that Yogi who practises veracity, the veracity rises to such a degree that the Yogi receives the fruit even without the work's being performed. At his bidding, the fruit of works accrues to any one soever, even though not per- forming the work :- such is the meaning.t

b. He states the fruit accruing to him that practises absti- nence from theft.§

• तस्याहिंगां भावयता Sइंसाप्रतिष्ठायां मइजविरोधि मामप्यािनकु लादीनां वैरतागो निर्मतरतयावस्ानं भव- ति। हिंसारता: हिंस्रववं परितजनीतर्यः। + सत्याभ्यासवतः किं भवतीताइ।

• क्रियामाणा हि क्रिया यागादिका: फलं खर्गादिक प्रयच्कन्ति। तस्य तु सत्याभ्यासवता योगिनसथा सत्व प्रक्ृष्यते यथा बह्मतायामपि क्रियायां योगी फलमाप्नोति। तद्चनादस्य कस्यचित् क्रियामकर्वतो 5पि क्रियाफलं भव- तोत्र्थः। 5 चजेयाभ्यासवत: फलमाइ।

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BOOK II. 45

अश्तेय प्रतिष्ठायां सर्वरत्रापस्थानम्। ३७ ।

The reward of not thieving. Aph. 37 .- When abstinence from theft is complete, all jewels come near him.

a. When he practises abstinence from theft, then, on its reach- ing its highest degree, the jewels that exist in every quarter come to him even though he covet them not .*

b. He states the fruit of the practice of continence.t

ब्रह्मचर्यप्रतिष्ठायां वीर्यलाभ: ॥३८।

The reward of continence. Aph. 38 .- When continence is com- plete, there is gain of strength.

a. He, indeed, that practises continence, when it is complete, there is revealed in him excessive strength, or power. For con- tinence is the preserving of one's manly vigour; and from this [continence] being of a high degree, vigour in body, organs, and mind, attains a high degree.t

b. He states the fruit of the practice of non-covetousness.§

• वस्ेयं यदाभ्यस्यनि तदा तस्य प्रकर्षाबचिरभिलास- स्ापि सर्वतो दिकृख्ानि रत्ान्युपतिष्ठन्ते। + ब्रह्मचर्याभ्यासस्य फलमाइ।

• यः किल ब्रह्मचर्यमम्यस्यति तस तत्पकर्षाव्चिरतिशय बीय सामर्थ्यमाविर्भवति। वोर्यनिरोधो कि ब्रह्मचये तस्य प्रकर्षाच्करीरेन्ट्रियमनःस वीयें प्रकर्षमागच्कति। ६ चपरिग्रहाम्यासस्य फलमाइ।

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46 YOGA APHORISMS.

अपरिग्रइख्ये जव्मकथन्तासम्बोघ:। ३ । The reward of non- Aph. 39 .- When non covetousness is es- covetousness. tablished, there is knowledge of all about [former] states of existence. a. 'All about it' means the condition how [-kathanta being the abstract of the indeclinable katham]. ' All about states of existence,' such is the meaning of janma-kathanta. The ' know- ledge' thereof, the perfect understanding. That is to say, he knows perfectly every thing in regard to the question 'Who was I in a former state of existence? What sort of person? The doer of what actions?'*

b. It is not merely the coveting of the means of enjoyment that is [here meant by] covetousness. Covetousness is [meant] even as far as the soul's coveting a body. Since a body is an instrument of enjoyment whilst it exists, from its association with desires, our energy being directed to the external, no real knowledge reveals itself. When, again, without regard to covet- ing a body, &c., one betakes one's self to indifference, then, sinee one abandons desire, &c., the acquaintance with past and future states of existence becomes indeed a cause of right knowledge to the indifferentt [person, who thus discerns how little there is deserving of a wise man's regard in any mundane condition whatever]. * कथमित्यस् भाव: कथना। जवन: कथन्ता जन- कथन्ता। तस्या: सम्बोध: सम्यक् घान। जव्मान्र को Sदमासं कीडश: किक्ार्यकारोति जिव्नासायां सर्वमेव सम्घक् जानातीत्र्थः। + न केवर्ल भोगसाधनपरिग्रह एव परियक:। वावहा- तन: शरोरपरिग्रशो 5पि परिब्रकः। भोगवाधनताचरी-

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BOOK II. 47

c. The fruits of the 'forbearances' have been stated. Now he mentions [those of ] the ' religious observances.'*

Mental result of purifca- Aph. 40 .- From ' purification,' loath- tions. ing for one's own members, and uon- intercourse with others.

a. He who practises 'purification,' to him there springs up a loathing, an aversion, even for his own members, through his thoroughly discerning the cause and nature [of a body] ;- "This body is impure; any fondness for it is not to be entertained ;"- and so for the same reason, there is ' non-intercourse,' the absence of intercourse, the avoidance of intercourse, 'with others,' with other possessors also of bodies ;- such is the meaning. For whoso loathes his own body, through his discernment of this or that fault, how must he judge of intercourse with the similar bodies of others ?t

रखय तस्मिन सति रागानुबन्धादष्टिमखायामेव प्रहठत्ता न

पेच्येष माध्यस्थ्यमवलम्बते तदा मध्यसस्य रागादिलागा- सम्य न्ज्ञानहेतुर्भवत्येव पूर्वापरजव्सम्बोध:। * उक्ता यमानां सिद्यः। अ्रथ नियमानाड़।

• यः शैषं भावयति तथ् खाङ्गेव्वपि कारणखरूपपर्या- सोचनद्वारेण नुगुशा षृण समुपजायते अशुचितयं कायो नानाग्रह: कचला दरत्यमुनैव हेतुना परैरन्येश्च कायवद्धिर- संसर्ग: संसर्गाभाव: संदर्गपरिवर्व्जनमित्यथः। वः किस समेब

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48 YOGA APHORISMS.

b. He states another fruit of this same 'purification.'* सत्वशुद्धिसाम नस्थेका ग्रतेन्द्रियजयात्मदर्शनयोग्य त्वानिच। ४१ ।

Other results of purifications. Aph. 41 .- And purity in the Quality of Goodness, complacency, intentness, subjugation of the senses, and fitness for the behold- ing of soul, [are fruits of ' purification'].

a. 'Are' is required to complete the sentence.t

b. The ' Quality of goodness' is what consists of light, joy, &c., [-see Sánkhya Aphorisms B. I. §62]; its 'purity' is its not being oppressed by Passion and Darkness. 'Complacency' is mental joy, from there not being the oppression of distress. 'Intentness' is steadiness of the mind on an object to which the senses are confined. 'Subjugation of the senses' is the abiding in themselves of the senses averted from objects. The ' fitness' of the mind means its power of beholding soul,-[this 'behold- ing' being] in the shape of the knowledge of the distinctnesst [of soul from Nature]. का्यं जुगुभते तत्तदवद्यदर्शनात्कयं परकीये क्षथाभूतः काये संसर्गमनभवति। * शाचस्थैव फलान्तरमाइ। + भवन्नीति वाक्यशेष:। सत्त्वं प्रकाशसुखाद्यात्मकं। तस्य शुद्धि: रजसमोभ्या- मनभिभवः । सोमनस्यं खेदाननुभवेन मानसी प्रीतिः। एकाग्रता नियतेन्द्रियविषये पेतसः खेय। दन्टिरियजयो विषयपराङ्मु खानामिन्द्रियाणां खात्मन्यवस्थानं। बात- दर्शने विवेकस्वातिरूपे चित्तस्य योग्यखवं समर्थत्ं।

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BOOK II. 49

e. These, 'purity in the Quality of Goodness,' and the rest, manifest themselves in succession, in the case of him that prac- tises purifications. That is to say, from 'purification' comes 'purity in the Quality of Goodness;' from ' purity in the Quali- ty of Goodness,' 'complacency; from 'complacency,' intent- ness; from 'intentness,' subjugation of the senses;' and from 'subjugation of the senses,' 'fitness for the beholding of soul.'*

d. He states the fruit of the practice of contentment.t

The fruit of contentment. Aph. 42 .- From contentment there is acquired superlative felicity.

a. From contentment's reaching its highest degree, there is re- vealed to the Yogi such an inward joy that the external enjoyment of objects is not equal to a hundreth part of it.t

b. He states the fruit of 'austerity' (tapas).§

· शोचाभ्यासवत एते सत्तवशुद्यादय: क्रमेष प्रादुर्भवन्ति। शौचात् सत्वशुद्धि:। सखशुद्धे सोमनसं। सामनस्यादै-

• सन्तोषाभ्यासस्य फलमाइ। + सन्नोषप्रकर्षेष योगिनसथाविधमान्तरं सुखमाविर्भ- वति वस वाह्यं विषयसुखं शर्ताघेनापि न समम्।

5 तपस: फलमाइ। G Digitized by Google

50 YOGA APHORISMS.

Aph. 43 .- The perfection of the bodily The fruit of austerity. senses, by the removal of impurity, [is the fruit] of austerity.

a. 'Austerity,' when thoroughly practised, brings 'perfec- tion,' i. e. a heightening, of the bodily senses, through the re- moval of the impurity, consisting in the 'afflictions,' &c., of the mind .*

b. What is meant is this ;- by the chándráyana [species of fast], and the like, there is the removal of the 'afflictions' [§ 3] of the mind. By the removal of these there is developed, in the senses, the power of, for example, discerning the subtile, the hidden, and the infinite; and, in the body, [the power of assum- ing] at will either an atomic or an enormous bulk, &c.t

c. He states the fruit of 'inaudible muttering' swadhyaya.t

खाधायादिष्टदेवतासम्प्रयोग:।४४।

The fruit of inaudible Aph. 44 .- Through inaudible muttering muttering. there is a meeting with one's favourite deity.

a. When 'inaudible muttering,' in the shape of charms and spells directed [to some deity or other], is at its height, there

• तपः समभ्यस्यमानं चेतसः केशादिलच्षणाशुचिचय- द्वारेण कायेन्द्रियाणां सिद्धिमुत्कर्षमादधाति। + अयमर्थः। चान्ट्रायणादिना चित्तकेशचयः । तत्य

विर्भवति कायस यथेच्क्रमणुमइत्वादीनि। + साधायस्य फलमाड।

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BOOK II. 51

takes place, in the case of the Yogi, a meeting with the 'favou- rite' deity, i. e. with the one to whom this [inaudible mutter- ing] was directed. That is to say, the deity becomes visible* [-and most probably says " Ask a boon"].

b. He states the fruit of 'persevering devotion to the Lord' (iswara-pranidhana).t

The fruit of persevering Aph. 45 .- Perfection in meditation devotion to the Lord. comes from persevering devotion to the Lord.

a. As for this species of faith in the Lord, there is developed therefrom Meditation, which has been already described,-be- cause that Divine Lord, being pleased, having removed the ob- structive ' affictions,' elicits meditation.t

b. Having spoken of the 'forbearances' and the 'religious ob- servances' [§29], he speaks of the 'postures' (ásana).§

• अभिप्रेतमन्त्रजपादिलक्षणे खाध्ाये प्रह्ृव्यमाणे यो- गिन द्रष्टया अभिप्रेतया देवतया सम्प्रयोगो भवति। सा देवता प्रत्यचीभवतीत्वर्थः॥

• ईश्वर प्रणिधानस् फलमाइ।

• ईश्वरे यो एयं भक्तिविशेषः तम्माक्षमाधेवत्ालचष- स्याविर्भावो भवति यस्मात् भगवानीवर: प्रसन्नः सबन्तराय- रूपान् सोशामपहत्य समाधिमुद्दोधयति। 5 यमनियमानुक्तृासनमाइ् । Digitized by Google

52 YOGA APHORISMS.

सिरसुखमासनम्॥४६।

.Postures what. Aph. 46 .- A 'posture' is what is steady and pleasant.

a. A 'posture' means what one sets one's self in,-such as the padma, the danda, the swastika, &c., [with the precise cha- racter of which we are not at present concerned]. When this is 'steady,'-not wavering,-and 'pleasant,'-not uncomfortable,- then this serves as a subservient to Concentration .*

b. He mentions a plan for producing steadiness and pleasant- ness in this same.t

'Postures' how managed. Aph. 47 .- Through slightness of ef- fort and throngh attaining to the infi- nite [do 'postures,' become steady and pleasant].

a. The construction [with the preceding aphorisms] is this, that that,-viz., 'posture,' becomes steady and pleasant through slightness of effort and through attaining to the infinite.t

*सायते बनेनेत्ासनं। पगासनटण्डासनखचिकाय- नादि। तबदा खिरं निष्कम्पं सुसं अनुद्ेजनीयं भवति तदा तद्योगाड़गता भजते।

• तदासनं प्रमलशेयिष्येमानन्तसमापत्याच खिर सुखं भवनीति सम्बम्: ।

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BOOK II. 53

b. When, when he forms the wish-" Let me establish [myself in such and such] a posture,"-that 'posture' is effected with slight effort, with little trouble; and when the mind attains to the boundlessness that belongs to space,-i. e. when in thought one has identified one's self with it,-then, from there being neither body nor self-consciousness, the 'posture' is no cause of pain ;- when this command over the 'postures' has been attained, the tremblings, &c. [B. I. §31], which are obstacles to meditation, no longer prevail .*

c. He mentions a fruit of this same when accomplished.t

तमो इन्दानभिघातः।४८।

Fruit of the ' postures.' Aph. 48 .- Thence there is no assault by the pairs.

a. When this command of the ' postures' has been attained, the Yogi is not assailed by ' the pairs,' cold and heat, hunger and thirst, &c .;- such is the meaning.t

• यदा यदासनं बधामीति एच्छां करोति प्रयत्नशै- थिल्धे प्यक्ञेशेनेव तदासनं निष्पद्यते। यदा बकाशगते आानकये चेतसः समापानः क्रियते ववधामेन तादात्यमा- पद्यने तदा देहाइड्ाराभावान्नासनं दुःखजनकं भवति। सस्मिक्नासनजये सति समाध्न्तरायभूता न प्रभवन्वङ्रमे- अयलादय:।

तम्मिव्ासननये सति इन्देः शीतोष्च्ुनृष्णदिभि- मेगरगी नाभिइन्यत प्रत्यर्थ: । Digitized by Google

54 YOGA APHORISMS.

b. Next after the mastering of the 'postures,' he speaks of the ' regulation of the breath' (pranayama) .*

तस्िन् सति शवासप्रन्वासयोर्गतिविच्छेद: प्राणा- याम: ॥४६॥

Regulation of the breath. Aph. 49 .- When this has taken place, there is regulation of the breath, a cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration.

a. When steadiness in a 'posture' has taken place, that species of auxiliary of Concentration, viz., 'regulation of the breath,' to which this [steadiness of posture] is conducive, is to be prac- tised. Of what sort is this? In the shape of ' a cutting short of the motion of inspiration and expiration'.t

b. ' Inspiration and expiration' are what have been described [B. I. §31, e]. What is called ' regulation of the breath,' is the ' cutting short,' or restraining, ' of the motion,' or flow, in the places external or internal [-see §51-], of these two by means of the threefold process of [regulated] expiration, retention, and inspiration,t[-see B. I. §34, a].

• शासनजयादनन्तर, प्राणायाममाइ। + बासनसेर्य सति तश्िमित्तक: प्राणायामलचणे वो- गाङ्गविशेषो ऽनुष्ठेयो भवति। कीढशः। व्वासप्रन्नासयोरगति- विच्केदल चपः । + नायप्रन्वासा ऊतवचणे। तयोख्धा रेचनक्ञममन- पूरषद्वारेय वाह्याम्यन्नरेषु खानेषु गते: प्रवाइस विच्छेदो धारणं प्राणायाम उच्चते।

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BOOK II. 55

c. In order that this same may be easily understood, he states the nature of it, with its divisions .*

परिदृष्टो दीर्घसह्म: ॥५०॥

This explained. Aph. 50 .- But this, which is (1) outer, (2) inner, and (3) steady, peculiarised by place, time, and number, is long or short.

a. 'That which is outer' is the expiration, or expelling ; 'that which is inner' is the inspiration, or filling ; 'that which abides steady,' within, is called kumbhaka. It is called kumbhaka be- cause, when it takes place, the vital spirits rest motionless like water in a jar (kumbha).t

b. This threefold regulation of the breath, further peculiarised by place, time, and number, is termed 'long or short'. 'Peculi- arised by place,' e. g., [see the direction] " As regards beginning and end, twelve from the nose;"-that is to say, as far as twelve inches, beginning from the nose. 'Peculiarised by time,' as, "For the duration of thirty six mátras," &c. Peculiarised by number,'-e. g. the first udvata is made by so many inspirations and expirations, so many times; and the employment of number is had recourse to in order that this may be known [by substi- tuting the definite number for the indefinite 'so many']. By udodta is meant the impinging of the air sent [upwards, in speak-

• तस्येव सुखावगमाय विभज्य सरूपं कथयति।

• वाहरत्ति: वासो रेचकः। अन्तरद्त्ति: प्रसनास: पूरकः। गनसमरत्ति: कम्भकः। तस्िन् जखमिव क्रम्भे निश्चल- तया प्राणा अवस्थाप्यन्ते इति क्मक:। Digitized by Google

56 YOGA APHORISMS.

ing,] from the pit of the stomach, on the head,* [from which it is supposed to be reflected down again, so passing out of the mouth]. b. Having mentioned three regulations of the breath, in order to declare a fourth one, he says.t

वाह्याम्यन्तरविषयाचेपी चतुर्थः।५१।

A special veriety. Aph. 51 .- The fourth recognises both the outer and the inner spheres.

a. The ' outer sphere' of the breath is that [space] from begin- ning to end [-reckoning from the nose-] of twelve [inches ;- see §50, b]. The 'inner sphere' is the heart, the navel, the plexus, &c. The fourth regulation of the breath is that which, in the shape of motionlessness, is a cutting off of the motion [of the breath], recognising, i. e. having an eye upon, both those two spheres.t

• निविधो 5यं म्राखायामो देशेन कालेन संख्याचापख- चितो दीर्घसत्ष्मसंतको भवति। देशेनोपलचचितो यथा नासाद्वादशास्वादा नासामारम्य द्वादशाङुलपर्यन्तमि- त्यर्थ:। कालेनोपचचितो यथा षट्निंथम्मानादिप्रमाय:। संख्योपलचितो यथा रयतो वाराम् ऊत एतार्वाक्क श्रास- प्रच्ासे: प्रथम उद्वातो भर्वात एतज्ज्ञानाय संस्ाग्रइणमु- पानं। उद्वातो माभिमू लातोरितसय वायो: गिरखभिइन- नम्। + बीन् प्राणायामानभिधाय चतुर्थमभिधातुमाइ। प्रापस वाद्यो विषयो दादयानादिः। बन्तरो

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BOOK II. 57

b. The distinction between this and the third one, viz., the kumbhaka [§50, a,] is this. That one [-the kumbhaka-], without paying any regard to the two spheres, the onter and the inner, suddenly, like a lotus dropped upon a heated stone, at once arrives at the condition of rigidity ;- but this one is a res- trainment that has respect to the two spheres .*

c. This also, like the former [$50, b], is to be regarded as be- ing peculiarised by time, space, and number.t

d. Of this [regulation of the breath] which is of four descrip- tions, he mentions the fruit.

ततः वीयते प्रकाशावरयम्।५२।

The fruit of the regulation of the breath. Aph. 52 .- Thereby is removed the obscuration of the light.

a. 'Thereby,' i. e. by that regulation of the breath, there is 'removed,' or destroyed, that ' obscuration' which, in the shape

विषयो हृदयनाभिचक्रादि: तो द्वो विषयावाच्िप्य पर्या- सोच यो विष्टम्रूपो गतिविच्छेद: स चतुर्थ: प्राणायामः।

• वतीयम्ात्कुम्भकादयमस्य विशेष: । स वाह्याम्यन्रर

घुगपत् समटत्त्या निष्पद्यते। म्रस्य तु विषयद्दयाचेपको निरोध:।

• चतुर्विधसास फलमाच। H Digitized by Google

58 YOGA APHORISMS.

of the 'afflictions' [$3], there is ' of the light,' that belongi to the Pure Quality of the mind ;- such is the meaning .*

b. He mentions another result.t

धारणासुच योग्यता मनसः।५३।

A further result. Aph. 53 .- And the mind becomes fit for acts of attention.

a. ' Acts of attention' are what will be spoken of [in the se- quel]. The mind, freed from its defects by the several kinds of regulation of the breath, wherever it is directed to, there it remains fixed, and does not suffer distraction.t

b. He defines 'restraint' (pratyáhára).§ खखविषयसम्प्रयोगाभावे चित्तस्य सरूपानुकार दूवेन्द्रियाणं प्रत्याहार:।५४।

' Restraint' what. 'Apk. 54 .- Restraint' is as it were the ac- commodation of the senses to the nature of 'the mind in the. absence of concernment with each one's owp object. * ततः तम्मात्प्राणायामात् प्रकाशस्य चित्तसखगतसर यदावरवं केशरूपं तत् चीयते विनश्यतीतर्यः। t फलान्तरमाइ। + धारणा वच्यमाणा:। तासु प्राणायामीः वोषदोषं मनो यब यब धार्यते तब तब खिरं भवति न विज्षेपं भनते। 5 प्रत्याहारस लचषपमाइ।

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BOOK II. 59

a. It is called ' restraint,' because, when it exists, the senses are restrained, are withheld, from their respective objects. And how is this effected? He replies ;- ' of the senses,' Sight, &c., there is 'each one's own object,' as Colour, &c :- 'concernment' there- with is any energizing with respect thereto :- the 'absence' of this is the abiding in their mere nature after having abandoned all regard to such things. When this takes place, the senses simply accommodate themselves to the nature of the mind; for, all the senses are observed to follow obsequiously the mind, as the bees their leader. Hence, when the mind is restrained [from the exercise of its functions], these [senses] are restrained ; and their accommodation to the nature thereof [under such circum- stances] is what is called 'restraint' .* b. He states the fruit.t

ततः परमा वश्यतेन्द्रियाणाम्। पू५्॥ The fruit of restraint. Aph. 55 .- Therefrom is there complete subjection of the senses. * रन्द्रियाणि खखविषयभ्यः प्रत्याड्ट्रीयन्ते प्रतिकूलतया डीयन्ते Sस्मित्चिति प्रत्याहारः। सच कथं निष्पद्यत द्रताइ। चन्ुरादीनामिष्ट्रियाणां खः खो विषयो रूपादिः। तेन सम्प्रयोगसदाभिभुख्ेन प्रवर्त्तनं। तदभावसदाभिमुखं परित्यज्य रूपमाचे 5वस्थानं। तस्मिन् सति चित्तखरूप-

मधुकरराजमिव मधुकरमचिका: सवाणीन्द्रियाणि प्रतीयन्ते। व्रतश्चित्तनिरोधे तानि प्रत्याहतानि भवन्ति। तेषां तत्ख- रूपानुकार: प्रत्याहार उत्त:। + फजमाइ।

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cO YOGA APHORISMS.

c. For, when 'restraint' is practised, the senses become so subjected, so subdued, that, even when attracted towards exter- nal objects, they will not go ;- such is the meaning .*

Recapitulation. b. Thus, then, [-to recapitulate briefly-] of Concentration, which was defined in the Firat Book, having declared that appendage, viz., the 'Practical [part of ] Concentration' [§1], the fruit of which is the alleviating of of the ' afflictions' [§2]; having mentioned the names of the 'afflictions' [$3], their cause and source [§4], their nature and fruit [§5-11]; having stated also the division, canse, nature, and fruit, of works [§12] ; the nature and cause of fructification are set forth [§13-14]. Then, since the 'afflictions,' &c., are to be got rid of, and since it is impossible to get rid of them without knowing what they are, and since knowledge is dependant on instruction, and since the instruction assumes four aspects, as it respects (1) what is to be got rid of, (2) what is not [desired] to be got rid of, (3) what is constituted by the cause, and (4) what is the cause constitutive, and since, without [an explanation of what is meant by the expression] ' getting rid of,' the nature of ' what is to be got rid of' cannot be explained, [therefore] having set forth the fourfold arrangement, with [an explanation of what is meant by] 'getting rid of', and with [an account of ] the cause of each thing severally [§15-27]; having explained, along with the fruits, the nature of those appliances, 'forbearance,' &c., which stand in the relation of causes, immediate or mediate, in respect of the constitutive cause [of emancipation], viz., ' discrimi- native knowledge' [§28-46]; having exhibited the 'postures,' &c., as far as ' attention,' arranged according to their mutual re- lation as conduced to and conducers [§47-52]; their fruits,

• सभ्यस्यमाने दि प्रत्ाहारे तथा वश्यान्यायत्तानोद्दि- याषि सम्पद्यन्ते यथा वाह्यविषयाभिमुखतां नीवमानान्पि न यान्तीत्र्य:।

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BOOK II. 61 along with the respective characters thereof, have been set forth [853-55] .* c. Thus this 'Concentration,' having, through 'forbearance,' 'religious observances,' &c., attained to the condition of a seed, and having sprouted by means of the ' postures' and 'regulation of the breath,' and having blossomed by means of ' self-restraint,' will fructify by means of ' attention,' 'contemplation,' and ' medi- tation' [§29]. Thus has the Book on the Means been explained.t * तदेवं प्रथमपादोतालचपस् योगस्याङ्गभूतं केशतनू करणफलं क्रियायोगमभिधाय केशानामुद्देशं कारणं क्षेतरं सरूपं फलं चोल्का कर्माणामपि भेदं कारणं सरूपं फसं चाभिधाय विपाकस् सरूपं कारणं चाभिद्ितम् ततस्या- ज्यत्वात्क्रेशादोनां जनव्यतिरेकेण त्यागस्याशक्यतात् ज्ञान- स् प शास्त्रायत्ततवात् शास्त्रस्य व देयाडेयकारणोपादेयो- पादानकारपतवेन चतुर्व्यूडताद्रेयस् इानव्यतिरेकेण सरू- पानिष्पन्तेशनसहितं चतु्व्यूहं सखकारणसद्ितमभिधाय उपादानकारणभूताया विवेकस्थाते: कारणभूतानामन्तरङ्- रवाहिरङ्गभावेन खितानां योगानां यमादीनां सरूपं फल- सचितं व्याहत्य धारणापर्यन्तामां चासनादोनां परसर-

वचणपूर्वकं फलमभिड्ितम्। + तदयं योगो यमनियमादिभि: प्राप्नबीजभावः खासन- पाखायामेरकुरितः प्रत्याहारेण ऊसुमितो धारणाधान- समाधिभि: फविष्यतीति व्याख्यातः साधनपादः।

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YOGA APHORISMS.

d. Thus has been completed the Second Book-that on the Means-of the commentary called the Raja Martanda, componed by the illustrious great king and governor, king Bhojarkja, on the Aphorisme of Patanjali's System of the Yoga .*

• इति श्री राजाधिराजभोजदेवविरचितायां राजमा- तण्डाभिधायां पातम्त्रलयोगशालसबटती द्वितीय: साधन- पाद: समात्:।

END OF BOOK 1I.

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THE APHORISMS

OF THE

VEDA'NTA PHILOSOPHY;

BY

BA'DARA'YANA.

WITH

ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMENTARY.

IN SANSKRIT AND ENGLISH,

Drintro for the use of the Brnares Gollege bp orerr of Gout. N. cen. D.

MIRZAPORE:

ORPHAN SCOCOL PRESS : R. C MATHER, SUFERINTENDFNT.

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.

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PREFACE.

The great body of Hindu Philosophy is based upon six sets of very concise Aphorisms. Without a commentary the Aphorisms are scarcely intelligible, they being designed not so much to communicate the doc- trine of the particular school, as to aid, by the briefest possible sugges- tions, the memory of him to whom the doctrine shall have been already communicated. To this end they are admirably adapted ; and, this being their end, the obscurity, which must needs attach to them in the eyes of the uninstructed, is not chargeable upon them as a fault. For various reasons it is desirable that there should be an accurate translation of the Aphorisms, with so much of gloss as may be required to render them intelligible. A class of pandits, in the Benares Sanskrit College, having been induced to learn English, it is contemplated that a version of the Aphorisms, brought out in successive portions, shall be sub- mitted to the criticism of these men, and, through them, of other learn- ed Brahmans, so that any errors in the version may have the best chance of being discovered and rectified. The employment of such a version as a class-book is designed to subserve further the attempt to determine accurately the aspect of the philosophical terminology of the East as regards that of the West. J. R. B. Benares College, 5th January, 1851.

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THE APHORISMS KNOWN AS THE BRAHMA-SU-

TRAS, THE S'ARIRAKA SUTRAS, OR THE

VEDANTA-SU'TRAS.

BOOK I. CHAPTER I.

Salutation to the venerable Ganes'a ! I reverence the pair of feet of the venerable Ráma, the instru- ment [in the attainment] of undivided joy,-from the touch of the dust whereof even a stone [-in the shape of the petrified Ahalya, the wife of Gautama, whose story may be found in the Rámáyana-Book I. sect. 38-] attained felicity .*

SECTION I.

OF THE FIRST CAUSE OF THE UNIVERSE.

The reader to whom a. Finding one, in this world, who had the work is addressed. perused the Vedas in conformity with the injunction of their constant perusal, and

• श्री गयेभाय नमः । म्रीरामचरणइन्द्रमदन्दानन्दसाधनं । नमामि यदुजोयोगात्याषायो डपि सखक्गतः।

A

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2 THE VEDANTA APHORISMS.

[hence] possessing a rough knowledge [of the sense of what he had thus perseveringly perused], desiring to attain the chief end of [the soul of] man [-the " summum bonum"-], not hanker- ing after the fruits of this world or of any one beyond it[-finding such a one-], the pre-eminently benevolent BADARÁYANA apho- rised *- as follows.

चथातो ब्रह्मजिन्नाषा ॥ १॥ APH. 1. Next, therefore, [O student that

The subject proposed. hast attained thus far] a desire to know God [is to be entertained by thee].

a. Here the word ' next' means immediately on the [enqui- rer's] attainment of the quaternion of requisitest-[which, as explained in the Vedánta-sára, § 9, are] a perception of the dis- tinction of the eternal reality from the transient, a disregard of the enjoyment of the fruits of both here and hereafter, the pos- session of tranquillity and self-restraint, and the desire of libe- ration.$] b. The word ' therefore' refers to the reason [why a desire to know the nature of God ought to be experienced by the student

• दूछ खल नित्याध्ययनविधिना उधीतखाध्यायमापातञ्ञानवन्त परमपरुषार्थकाममैद्िकामुभ्िकफलेष विरकमुपलभमानः परम- कारुणिको बाद्रायणस्सूतयामास ।भा०।

++ मादिसम्पत्तिमुमुस्ुत्वानि॥ वे० सार० ।

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BOOK I. CH. I. SECT. I. 3

properly qualified to enter upon the enquiry ;- and this reason is] because the Veda itself shows us that the fruits of keeping up the sacred fire and of the like expedients [for the attainment ]of blessedness, are not eternal .* For example [the Veda declares]- " As, here, the world obtained by works perishes, just so, yonder, the world obtained by virtue perishes."t So too it shows us that the chief end of [the soul of] man is [to be attained] through the knowledge of God-[for the Veda tells us] " He who knows God obtains the highest" &c.t Therefore what is awanting [to supply the ellipsis in the aphorism] is this, that " after the attain- ment of the requisites, as declared, a desire to know God is to be formed." c. The expression brahma-jijnasa means ' desire to know God' -[being made up of the two words brahma and jijnásá.] The word jijnásá [according to its etymology as a desiderative deriva- tive from the root jna ' to know'] means ' the desire to know;'- and the word brahma ' God' means what is next to be told.Il

• अतशशब्दो हेत्वर्थः। यस्माद्वेद एवाग्निद।चादीनां त्रेयसा धनानामनित्यफलतां दर्भयति॥ + तद्यथेष कम्मचिता लोकः चीयत एवमेवामुच पुष्यचिता लोकः चीयत इत्यादि॥ तथा म्रह्मज्वानादपि परमपुरुषार्थ दर्भयति। ब्रह्मविदानो- ति परमित्यादि।। तस्माद्यथो कसाधनसम्पचयनन्तरं व् हमजिच्ासा कत्तव्येति शेष:। ॥ व्रह्मणो जिन्नासा ब्रह्मजिन्नासा। आातुमिच्छा जिन्नासा। व्र ह्ाच वच्यमाणलक्षणम।।

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THE VEDANTA APHORISMS.

d. In the preceding aphorism it was stated that God ought to be desired to be known. How then, [it will of course be asked,] is this ' God' defined [-or, in other words, what is the character- istic mark-lakshana-by which we may be able to recognise the object of our search-] ? Therefore the venerable maker of the aphorisms declares as follows .*

जन्मादयस यतः ॥ २ ॥

What is meant by the APH. 2. [God is that one] Whence the xame ' God.' birth &c. of this [universe results.] a. The compound [janmadi-rendered ' birth &c.' and mean- ing literally] 'that of which the first is birth or production,' is a Bahuvríhi compound of the kind [mentioned in the Laghu Kaumudí, under No. 541, as] " denoting that of which the mat- ters implied in the name are perceived along with the thing it- self." [For] the meaning of the compound is ' birth, continu- ance, and dissolution:t' [-so that ' birth,' which is a part of the compound word, is also a part of the thing meant by the com- pound]. b. And [as some one may ask why, in the compound word denoting 'birth continuance and dissolution', we speak of 'birth,' rather than of either of the others, as the first,-we may mention that] the treatment of 'birth' as the first has a regard both to the teachings of the Veda and to the nature of things. The teaching

• पूर्व्वसूचे ब्रह्म जिन्नासित व्यमित्युनं। बिंलकय एनसदत्रभ्मे त्यत बाच भगवान सूचकार:।। + जन्मोत्पत्तिरादिर्यस्येति तङ्गष कंविध्वानो बजबोदिः। जन्म- सथि तिभक्क समाषार्थः ।।

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BOOK L. CH. I. SECT. 1. 5

of the Veda, on the one hand, [authorises the form of expression in question] by exhibiting the consecutive order, of birth continu- ance and dissolution, in the sentence beginning with " or whence these elements are produced" &c. The nature of things also [au- thorises the form of expression in question] because the continu- ance or the dissolution is possible of that concrete thing alone which, through production, has obtained an existence .* c. 'Of this'-i. e. of whatever concrete The created universe thing is presented to those [our instruments as far as we are con- of cognition] among which the senses stand cerned. first.t By the 'this,' then, is denoted the things concreted with those properties whereof the being produced is the first in order. By the 'whence' is denoted the [Grand First] Cause.t d. The meaning, then, of the aphorism

The conception is this, that, That One is God, from Whom, God according to the of Omniscient, Almighty, First Cause, there Aphorism when explica- ted. is the production the continuance and the dissolution of this world, adjusted as it is

• जम्मनसादित्वं त्रुतिमिर्देश्यपेच वसुटत्ताबन्। श्रतिनि- द्रिश्सावत । यतो वा दूमानि भूतानि जायन्त इत्यसिन वाक्ये जन्मस्थितिप्रलयानां क्रमप्रदर्भनात,। वस््टत्तमपि जन्मना लबधा- त्मकस्य धर्मिषः स्थितिप्रलयसस्भवात.।। + भ्रस्येति। प्रत्यचादिसत्निधापितस्य धम्मिष: ।। . इदमा निर्हथः। जन्मादिधम्मसम्बख्बा चर्थाः । यत दूति कारयनि्हेम: ॥

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6. THE VEDANTA APHORISMS.

with its names and natures -[for language, as well as the things about which language is conversant, is regarded as the work of God-], furnished with its various agents & experiencers, the locality where are [experienced] those [fruits] of action which [fruits] are determined by established places and times- [for the character of a bare act, such as the extending of one's arm, is determined by the fact whether there and then that action was appropriate]-, and the nature of the construction of which [world] even the mind cannot conceive .* And thus, then, the characteristic of God-or that by which we are to re- cognise what is meant when the word ' God' is employed-is this, that He is the cause of the production &c. of the world.t e. Here [-i. e. in speaking of the modes of mundane things-] we take in [or specify] production continuance and dissolution [and no others], because the other modifications of state are included under those three.t f. By saying that God is the Cause of the world, the maker of the aphorisms has, by the sense of the sentence, laid down the proposition that He is Omniscient ; because creation, by one in- telligent, presupposes knowledge. And thus God knows all be- cause He made all. It is an admitted principle that he who

• भस्य जगता नामरूपाभ्यां व्याऊ्कतस्य। पनेककर्टमोतृंयुक्त- स्य । प्रतिनियत देशकालनिमित्तकक्रियाफलात्रवस्य। मनसाष्यचि- न्यरचनारूपस्य । जन्मस्थितिभङ्ग' यतसर्वत्रात्सर्वभ्नकेः कारया- ङ्रवति तदेव ब्रह्मेति सूचार्थः ।। + तथाच जगव्जन्मादिकारणत्वं ब्रह्मणे लक्षणम ।। + अन्येषां भावविकाराणं निष्वेवान्तर्भाव इति जन्मस्थिति- लयानामिष ग्रषणम ।।

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BOOK I. CB. I. SEOT. I. 7

makes anything knows it,-as a potter* [knows a water-jar-so far forth as it is a water-jar-else how could he make one ? and God made everything so far forth as it is anything].

g. By being represented as the Cause of the world, God was implied to be omniscient and almighty. It is merely to impress this that he sayst [as follows].

APH. 3. [That God is omniscient fol- How we are certain lows] from the fact of [His] being the source that God is omniscient. of the Scriptures, [-or-on an alternative rendering-from the fact that the Scriptures, which declare this omniscience, are the source-scilicet of our knowledge-of Him.]

a. God is the source, i. e. the [only possible ] cause, of a great Scripture such as the Rig-veda, augmented by its various repertories of learning [-meaning those appendages of the Veda, grammar &c.]- illuminating, as a lamp, everything, and [itself] the next thing to something omniscient. For-of such & Scripture as the Rig-veda and the like, which [by containing

चेतनसृष्टे ज्ानपूर्वकत्वात.। तथाच ब्रुह्म सर्वकं सर्वकारणत्वात.। यो यत्कर्तता स तञ्जो यथा कुलाल इति सिङूम।। जगत्कारपत्वप्रद्शनेन सवनं सर्वभत्तिमह्मत्वपचित्रं। तदेव

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8 THE VEDANTA APHORINS.

information in regard to everything] is associated with the qualities of one omniscient, the origin could not have been from one otherwise than omniscient .* b. [In illustration of this, it may be Illustration of the induction by means of observed that] it is an admitted fact that which this certainty is whatever treatise, embracing a wide range arrived at. of topics, emanates from any particular man-as the grammar, for example, from Panini-, although its topics be but a part of what is capable of being known [-or of the omne scibile-],-that man, even in consideration of that is inferred to be exceedingly knowingt [-and the author of a work that explains everything must, by parity of reasoning, be inferred to be omniscient.] c. [And the omniscience of God may be learned] from such texts of the Veda as this, viz., " The Rig-veda, and the Yajur-veda is [-notwithstanding its excellence-not the product of labor- ious effort, but] the mere out-breathing of this Great Being." The drift of this text is this, viz.,-what need is there to declare

पव त्सर्वारथद्यो.तनस्सर्वननकत्स्य योनिः कारणं ब्रह्ा। नवीटमस् मास्तरस्य अग्वेदादिलनमस्य सर्वत्रगुणान्वितस्य सर्वम्रादन्यतस-

• यद्यद्विसरारथ माछं वस्मात्युवषविभेषात्मसवति बवा ब्या. करषादि पाचिन्वादेरम्नें यैकदेशार्थमपि स ततो Sय्यधिकतर विज्ञान दूति प्रसिङ्ूम ।।

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BOOK I. CH. I. SROT. I. 9

the omniscience and the omnipotence of that Great Being, the Absolute, when he is [proved to be omniscient &c. by his being recognised as] the source of such works as the Rig-veda &c .*!

d. [But there is another interpretation of The alternative ren- dering of the third the aphorism, for, according to the commen-

Aphorism. tator,] otherwise-the Scripture, i. e. the Rig-veda and the rest, as above deseribed,- is the source or cause or proof of Him,-of God-as far as re- gards our comprehention of His nature :- that is to say-it is from the Scriptures, as our evidence for the fact, that we come to comprehend that He is the cause of the production &e. of the world.t Such a text [-from which the faet may be learned that God is the cause of the production &c. of the world-] is that one already cited under the preceding aphorism-viz., " Or

• पस्थ मवता भूतस्य निव्वसितमेवैतद्यडम्वेदो यजुवेद - त्यादित्रुते: ॥ वम्य महता भूतस्यापरिचिन्नस्य ताहयम् दादियोनित्वं तस्य सर्वमृत्वं सर्वशतित्वन्त किं वत्रव्यमि-

त्याभय: ।।

1 वर्षकान्तरं। चथना। बशोतवम्वेदादिय्याखं योनि: कारवं

प्रमावमस्य प्रम्मणो यथावत्सरूपाधिगमे मास्तादेव प्रमाणव्जगतो

वन्मादिकारयमधिगम्यत दत्यभिप्रायः ।।

B

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10 THE VEDANTA APHORISMS.

whence these elements are produced" &c .* [see § 2. c.]

Objections, of the e. [In the foregoing Aphorism, according

Mimánsd, to the allega- to its second interpretation, it is asserted

tion that the Veda aims that the Institutes are what make us to know

directly at revealing God ;- but the followers of the Mimánsa God. object to this, declaring that the direct de- sign of the Scriptures is to reveal what we ought to do-and not to reveal God apart from any consideration of a line of conduct to be followed in respect of Him. In or- der to obviate these objections, the ortbodox tenet is laid down in the aphorism here following.]

तन्त समन्वयात ।। ४ ।।

APH. 4. But That One [-viz. God- That it aims directly is what the Scriptures declare, not with a at revealing God-the only consistent theory view to anything ulterior, but simply in or- of the Veda. der that what is so declared may be known; and we make this assertion] because there is consistency [in this view, whilst the opposite view would land us in inconsistencies.]

a. The word "but" is intended to rebut the first view of the caset [stated in §. 3. e.]

• भास्त्रमुदाह्टत पूर्वसूचे यतो वा दूमानि भनानि जायन्त ू

त्यादि।।

• तुभब्द: पूर्व्वपक्व्या सर्थः ।।

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BOOK I. CH. I. SECT. I. 11.

b. "That One," i. e. God, is declared in the Vedantas [-i. e. in those theological sections of the Vedas usually termed upani- shads-] as the direct object of declaration [-and not merely, see §. 3. e.,-as a mediate step to the injunction of works :]- why ?- "because there is consistency." Consistency means the suiting of expressions well together among themselves-and that is our reason*[-in as much as we find this consistency among the expressions of Scripture when we hold the pronoun "That" to re- fer to God, but not otherwise].

c. [We make the assertions made in § 4b. Consistency the test because it is a maxim that] consistency is of correct interpreta- that in virtue of which any one [out of se- tion. veral offered interpretations] is [to be re- cognised as] that which conveys the real import.t

d. Now, in order to demolish the opinion of those who wish [it to be believed] that God is set forth, in the theological part of the Vedas, [incidentally] through the injunction of devotions, and who do not wish [it to be believed] that the direct design [of the scriptures] is to declare God as He is,-another comment [on § 4] is undertaken.t

• तदब्रह्म वेदान्नेष तात्पय्येष प्रतिपाद्यते। कुतः । समन्व- यात। सम्यगन्वयस्समन्वयः । तस्मात. ॥

• चन्वयस्य सम्यक्क तात्पर्य्यवच्वम ।।

सम्पति सिद्धे व्यत्पत्तिमनिच्छता उपास्तिविधिद्वारा वेदान्ते-

भ्यो म्रह्मसिङ्धिमिच्तां मतनिरासाय वर्णकान्तरमारभ्यते ।।

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12 THE VEDANTA APHORIONS.

e. In the opinion of these [followers of the Mimdasa 4 d., the theological parta of the Vedas announce God] not as what is to be declared for itself, bnt with a view to something ulterior E -- viz., as the object of the devotions which are enjoined]. They are not concerned [say these objectors} about God aim- ply as he is -- hecanse [if you assert that they are so, then] there is an absenee of the characteristie [by which an Institute om S'astra is recognized-viz. injunctiona respecting} conduct. Sinco an Institute has in view [as its direct object] the doing and forbearing [which it enjoins in respect of acts to be done or forborne], it is not possible that the name of Institute [Sastra -derived as it is from the root s'as ' to enact'] should belong [-as both parties agree it does belong-] to it [ i. e. to the Upa- nishad if the obj ect in view were merely God as he is* [and not as He is to be acted towards].

f. Further [the objector goes on to say], it would present no end to be gained fif the Upanishad were intended merely to declare God as he is-rwhich declaration according to the Ve

Remark, of the Mi- dánta, be it remembered, involves, the de- claration, addressed to every one that, mánsa, that if man, on knowing God, is God, "Thou art That One"-], for we do not

ke does not seem to be see that any end is gained even on the much the better for it. knowledge taking place that " I am Brah- ma." If the end were gained through such

*तब्। देदान्ता विधेयोपायनाविषयत्वेन ब्ष्ज समपगन्ति ।

सेब बासलेन पिद्य सपरले मासतलव्र न सभभवति।।

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BOOK t. CH. J. SEOT. I. 13

knowledge [which knowledge, you assert, it is the direct pur- pose of the Scriptures to communicate], then there would not be [as, however, there is,] the enjoining of such things as Meditation* [on the great fact-which to know at all is to know as completely as it can he known after any amount of medita- tion-for you either know it or you do not, the case not being one that admits of degrees.]

g. Therefore [the objector concludes], since, on meeting with such injunctions as "Only towards Soul should he direct his devotions"-" He who knows Brahma, becomes Brahma" -"He who is desirous of becoming Brahma should effect an understanding of Brahma-or of Soul,"-[since, on meeting with these] the question arises who is this ' Soul' ?- all the Upanishads are serviceable [-for we do not dispute their uti- lity-] in as much as they declare Him [-and, by answering the question, and so rendering the injunctions intelligible, sub- serve the direct aim of the Veda-viz. the conveying of injunc- tions ;]-and Emancipation is to be accomplished [not by a mere knowledge of God, but] by devotions. Well-this objec- tion having presented itself, it is stated [by the author of the Aphorisms in reply] " But That One, because there is consist- ency"t[-§ 4.]. The meaning is this, that, " That One,"i. e.

• मापि प्रयोजनवत्वां। वद्च बह्मासमोति घाने सत्वपि प्रयोज- नस्यादर्श नाद्यधेवमा नध्ानात्वोजन सिद्धिसर्डि मननादिविधानं न

स्यान । + व सादातेले वोपाचीत। ब्रह्म वेद अीप भवनि। अ्ह्हाभवन-

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14 THE VEDANTA APHORISMS.

God, is declared, in the theological parts of the Vedas, simpliciter; -why ?- because this leads to no inconsistency* - and the Mimansa supposition does].

Emancipation cannot h. And it is not true, for the matter of

be the fruit of works. that, that Emancipation is to be accom- plished by [such works as] devotional exer- cises [§ 4. b.], for, since devotional exercise admits of degrees, there would be in the Emancipation thereby accomplished also differences of degree, and thus it would not be absolutet [-which is what we do not allow to be Emancipation at all].

The emancipated ne- i. [And devotional exercises, subserved

cessarily disembodied. by a knowledge of God-see § 4. g .- cannot lead directly to absolute emancipation-see § 4. h .- ] because, since a body is indispensable during the con- dition of enjoying the fruit of enjoined acts, there would be a body even in Emancipation [from the body and all that belongs to it-which is absurd]. Moreover [if the emancipated had a body] Absolute emancipa- there would not be [-as, however, there tion implies the absence of things pleasing as is-] the denial that the emancipated is

well as of things dis- touched by what is pleasing or displeasing

pleasing. -[which denial we find in the following text] viz., " Him that abideth bodiless nei-

वां तत्समपकत्वेन सर्वे वेदान्ता उपयुव्यन्त। उपासनायाध्यय. मोक्ष इति प्रात्ते। उच्चते। तत्तु समन्वयात. । * तङ्म्ह्म वाचादेदान्तप्रतिपादं। कुतः । समन्वयादित्यर्थः ॥ + न तावदुपासनासाध्यो मोचः। उपासनायास्ारतम्यैन तत्वा- व्यमोक्षस्यापि तारतम्यमनित्वत्वन्ध स्यात. ।

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BOOK I. CH. I. SECT. 11. 15

"ther what is pleasing nor what is displeasing doth touch ;"- for, if Emancipation were the fruit of meritorious acts then it would be something pleasing* [-all the fruits of meritorious acts, according to Scripture, being something pleasant.] j. Therefore the theological parts of the Vedas are conversant about God directly, and not [indirectly] through injunctions [which give occasion for the mention of him-see § 4.g .-; ] and thus it is established that God is revealed by the Institutes independentlyt [-i.e. simply to the end that He may be known].

Summary, recapitu- k. Thus has it been stated, in four

lative, of the first four Aphorisms, that God is the Omniscient,

Aphorisms. the omnipotent, the cause of the world, the object of revelation in the theological parts of the Vedas.t SECTION II.

CONFUTATION OF THE ATHEISTICAL DOCTRINE OF THE SANKHYAS. l. [ The following question has been mooted ]-Is "That

• विधेयकम्फलभोगदशायां भरीरस्यावश्यकत्वेन मोक्े डपि ग. रीरं स्यात । किच्वानरीर वावसन्त न प्रियाप्रिये रष्टभत दूति मुत्तस्य प्रियाप्रियस्पर्शनिषेधो न स्यात्। मोक्षस्यधर्ष फलत्वेन त- स्येव प्रियस्य विद्यमानत्वात।। + तस्मादेदान्तास्ाव्ादेव ब्रह्मषि समनुगता न विधिद्वारेति सिड्धूं ब्रह्म सतन्त्रमेव ग्रास्त्रप्रमाणकमिति। + एवं चतुर्भिस्सचेससवंत्र सवशत्ति जगत्कारण वेदान्तप्रतिपांद्य

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16 THE VEDANTA, APHORIOMS.

The question whether One" [spokeu of in § 4] something

the Cause of the world thinking or something unthinking ? The is intelligent or unintelli- Sankhyas, in regard to this, [ -admit- gent. ting the authority, but taking libertios in regard to the interpretation, "of the Vedas,] say-" The cause of the world cannot be a God "who is fixed [in one perpetual and universal monotony of state], "because there is neither the possibility of knowledge nor of "action [in such a being]; but Nature [-see the Tattwa Samása "§ 7 .- ] is the cause of the world, because there is [in nature] "that [viz. the possibility of knowledge and of action]. Taking "into account its [constituent] quality of purity [Tattwa Samása " § 96-] its capability of knowing follows of course, and, by "means of all its three qualities, it is capable of acting. [On the "other hand] Brahma, from being but one thing [along with "nothing else] cannot act :- therefore the Upanishads, by the "expression 'That One,' speak of omniscient and omnipotent " Nature."* In the design to demolish the opinion of those "who hold this opinion], the following Aphorism originates."

ईंघतेनामव्डम्। ५।

APH. 5. [ "Nature"-as declared by the Sankhyas to be the

• वस्तुतस्तचेतनमचेतनं वा । तच सांखया: कूटस्थप्रप्मणे म्ान- क्रियाशल्लाभावास जगत्कारपत्वं। प्रधानस्यतु ततवत््वाळ्जगसकारव त्वं । सत्वगुषमादाय ज्ानभकिमत्वं । चिगुणत्वाक्रियाभ्यकिमत्वं। ब्रदण एकत्वाम्रक्रियाशकिः। तम्मात्सवत्ं सर्वरजाक प्रधानमेव तद- नुवादका वेदान्ता इति वदन्ति।।

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BOOK I. OH. I. SBOT. II. 17

cause of the world-is] not so :- it is un- Brute Nature not the Cause of the world, for scriptural, because of the " reflecting" [or

the Cause is an intelli- " seeing", which Scripture speaks of as be-

gent one. longing to That which is the cause of the world.] a. The "Nature" imagined [or postulated] by the Sankhyas, is not the cause of the world. The reason [assigned in the Apho- rism, for saying so,] is this, that "it is un-scriptural." This [expression-viz. " un-scriptural"-] is an epithet pregnant with a reason. He means to say, [Nature is not the cause of the world], because it is not this [viz. Nature] that the Scripture- that is to say the Veda-furnishes the evidence of. The reason [for asserting] that Scripture does not furnish the evidence of what the Sankhyas call "Nature," is [the word cited in the Apborism-viz.] "reflecting" [-or, literally, "seeing"-] which term [as it stands in the Aphorism] denoting the verbal root itself [-the employment of the word being that which the schoolmen term the suppositio materialis, and which the Sanskrit gram- marians term anukarana-] is intended to indicate [though it does not here denote] the sense of the verb "to see:" t [-conf. tho Sáhitya Darpana § 13. a.].

• तन्मतनिरासार्थमिद सुचमारभ्यते। + वां्थपरिकष्ितं प्रधानं जगतकारयं न भवति। तब हेतुर-

त्वादित्यः । वेदाप्रमाणकत्वे हेतुः । ईकतेरिति धातुवाचकेक- तिशन्दो लक्षपया धात्वघकणपरः । t. Mr. Colebrooke [-Essays Vol. 1. p. 338 .- ], when rendering the 5th Aphorism, makes BADARAYANA say "It is not so ;- for 'wish' (consequently volition) is attributed to that cause." The verb, however, is not isk ' to wish, bnt fksk 'to see.' C

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18 THE VEDANTA APHORISMS.

b. But then [the Sankhyas rejoin]-it is certain that the cause of the world is not [proved to be] God by the mere [men- tion of] "reflecting" [or "seeing"]-for we hear of senseless things seeing-e. g. Water and Light-in such texts as "The Light saw," " The Waters saw;"-and so likewise in regard to Nature the "seeing" is used in a secondary or transferred meaning* [-i. e. tropically]. This [argument of the Sankhyas] having presented it- self, it is declaredt [by the author of the Aphorisms as follows.] • गणखन्नात्मभव्दात् ।६। The scriptural ex- APH. 6. If [you say that the expres- pressions, implying that sion "seeing" is] employed tropically [the the cause of the world reference being to Nature, which does not is intelligent, not to be " see"-then I say] No,-because of the explained away figura- word ' Soul' [which is not applicable to Na- tively. in question]. ture, and which is applied to That which is

• Mr. Colebrooke (-Essays Vol. 1. p. 338-) views differently the scholas- tic term gauna which we have rendered by the expression " used in a serond- ary or transferred meaning." Whately (-in his Logic, B. III. 6 10.)- says with reference to this employment of words, " Thus we speak of Homer. for ' the works of Homer '; and this is a secondary or transferred meaning." So. in the Sahitya Darpana-(see the translation thereof, § 13 a)-the expression " a herd-station on the Ganges' is cited as an instance where a word, the primory (mukhya) sense of which is ' the stream of water named the Ganges', is emploved in the secondary (gaunah or lakshanika) sense of ' the bank' there- of. Mr. Colebrooke, applying these technical terms mukhya and gauna not to the employment of language, in a sense original or transferred, but to the dignity of character of the world's cause, writes as follows. " In the sequel " of the tirst chapter questions are raised npon divers passages of the Vedas, al- " lured to in the text, and quoted in the scholia, where minor attributes [gauna?] "are seemingly assigned to the world's cause ; or in which subordinate desig- "nations occur, such as might be sunnosed to mdicate an inferior being, but are "shown to intend the supreme one."-See § 8. a. * नलीक्षणमावेग न ब्रह्म जगत्कारणमिति निश्चयः । तन्तेज

वे 5.पि ईवतिर्गोपेति पाप्ते । उथ्ते ।

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BOOK I. CH. I. SECT. II. 19

a. If you say that the word " seeing" is used in a secondary sense [i. e. tropically] with reference to Nature, just as it is with reference to Water and Light [§ 5. b.], it is not as you say. Why? -"because of the word Soul" :- that is to say because we hear the word Soul* [applied to the Cause of the world, while it is not in any kind of way applicable to Nature]. b. But then [the Sankhyas may yet rejoin-dont say that,] but let the term ' Soul' also [as well as the term referred to in § 5,] be used tropically with reference to Nature ;- or even say that it denotes it literally, for the term [as may be learned from the dictionary] has a variety of meanings. Because of this [sugges- tion of the Sankhyas] he sayst [as follows].

। तत्निष्ठस्य मोचोपदेशात. ।७।

Man-called upon to APH. 7. [That " That One" is not

identify himself with the "Nature," may be inferred] from the decla- cause of the world-can. ration that the Emancipation takes place of not be called upon to him who is intent upon "That"-[which identify himself with " That," if unintelligent,-as Nature is-it what is unintelligent. is absurd that a thinking being should in- tently strive to identify himself with]. a. 'Nature' is not denoted by the word 'Soul,'-because, in such texts as the one beginning "The man that has a preceptor

• पप्नेजसोरिव प्रधाने ऽपि र ईचतिर्गोपेति वेव्र। कुतः ।

• नन्वात्मशन्दो उपि प्रधाने गौपो इसु। नानार्थकतया मुखो वेत्यत चाइ ।

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20 THE VEDANTA APHORISMS.

knows," and so on,-the Emancipation is declared [of whom ?- ] of S'WETAKETU mentioned in this text "That art thou, O S'weta- ketu !"-[but of S'wetaketu how circumstanced ?- why-of S'we- taketu] who is going to be emancipated after haring been instruc- ted to fix his mind intently upon 'That One.' Now if unthinking ' Nature' were here denoted by the word 'That,' then the precept "That art thou" would cause the intelligent S'wetaketu, desirous of Emancipation, to understand as follows-"O thinking S'weta- ketu !- thou art something unthinking." Then he, on the au- thority of that precept, pondering [as we are directed to ponder the precept, but pondering it under the erroneous impression that it means him to understand] "I am something unthinking," would miss his Emancipation and go to ruin :- and thus the pre- cept would be [no better than] the babble of an idiot :- and this is not what we should like :- and therefore it is a settled point that the word "That" [§ 4] refers to an intelligent Being .* b. But then [the Sankhyas may still contend]-let it be sup- posed [-for the sake of argument-] that "Soul" is declared,

• न प्रधानमातमभ्दवाचं । तत्वमसि सेतकेतो इति ख्वेत- केतोखेतनस्य माचबितव्यस्य तस्िष्ठतामुपदिश् चाचार्यवान्युरषो वेदेत्यदिना मोचषोपदेशात। यदि व्वचेतनं प्रधानं तच्कब्दवा- थ मुमुचुं श्ेतकेतु चेतनं ततत्वमसीति शास्त्र आइयेत्। दे अतकेतो चेतनाचेतनो Sसोति। तदा गारप्रामाष्यादयेतनो इसोति व्यायमानो मोचाद व्याइन्येत। चनर्दच्चेयात,। तथाप मास मुनान्तप्रलापो भवेत। तचानिष्ट । तम्ाचातशब्दखेत- नपर द्ूति सिङूम. ।

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BOOK I. OH. I. SEOT. IL .. 2

[-but at all events admit that, in the first instance, it is declared not directly by the word "That," in Aphorism § 4, but indirectly] through the declaration of " Nature" [which we still contend is denoted directly by the "That"], in the same way as in [the di- rections for finding the small star Arundhati, beginning with] "The large Arundhati" &c .- With reference to this [wilily offered compromise of the Sankhyas] he sayst-

· देयत्वावचनाच ।८।

What the Veda means APH. 8 .- And [you must not say that the directly by the Cause "That"-§ 4-denotes "Nature," and that of the world is no rude the conception of "Nature" is afterwards to type of God but God be quitted for that of " Soul,"] because Himself. there is no direction that it [-whatever the primary denotation of the "That" may be-] is to be quitted [for any other]. a. If Nature,-meaning thereby something that is not Soul,- were denoted [in §4] by the word "That," then, on that occasion [when the declaration was made which runs thus-"That art thou"-] the declaration [-for we cannot suppose the declaration designed to mislead-]would have been "That-meaning That Soul-art thou:"- or, [if the ellipsis in the passage itself were still left unsupplied,-then assuredly] some precept, designed to declare the Supreme Soul, would tell us that that' [first rude con- ception of God under the form of Nature] is to be quitted,-s0 that [we should understand, from that warning percept, that] he

• ननु, स्थूखारन्ट्रतीति न्यायेन प्रधानोपदेशद्वारा भातमोपदढे- मो 5यमस्त्वत चाइ ।

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22 THE VEDANTA APHORISMS.

[meaning S'wetaketu-see § 7. a .- ] is not, is consequence of the [elliptically expressed] declaration of "That" [-which, on the hypothesis under consideration, denotes "Nature" and nothing else-] to become-through ignorance of the fact that Soul is meant-intent [in his meditations] upon that [which is not really meant through mentioned-viz. Nature. And this direction, to abandon the first rude conception after it had served its purpose of suggesting a better one, would resemble a familiar method of pointing out an object not itself readily discernible ;- for the process would be] like as when a person wishing to point out [the small star, in the consellation of the Pleiades, called] Arun- dhati, [first directs attention to the large star near it, and then] tells that the [large] star standing near it is [not the one wanted, but is] to be quitted, [and the small star, which that large one stands near, is the one to be observed] :- such is the meaning :* -[and this wily suggestion, of the Sankhyas, we Vedantins repel,-because if we were to admit that the primary (mukhya) sense of the word 'That,' in Aph. 4., is ' Nature,' and that it means ' God' (-if at all-) only in a secondary (gauna) sense; then you Sankhyas would go on to argue that your 'Nature'- for which you had secured the right of preoccupancy-suffices to account for the phenomena, and that the additional postulate of a Deity is an unphilosophical superfluity].t

• यद्यनातमव प्रधानं सच्छष्दवाचं स चात्मा तत्वमसीति इ- छोपदिष्ट स्यात। स तदुपदेशनादनात्मन्नतया तम्निष्टो मा भूदिति मुख्यमात्मानमुपदिदर्भविषु शारतं तस्य देयत्वं ब्रूयात. । यथा चरन्वती दिदर्शयिषुस्तकमीपस्थताराया: देयत्वं भूते तद्दित्यथः । + Here compare the note on § 5. 6.

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BOOK I. CH. I. SEOT. 11. 23

b. The word " And" [-in the Aph. 8. The knowledge of God involoes all knowledge. -- is intended not to connect the reason there assigned with any reason expressly assigned before, but] is intended to attach it in addition to [the unexpressed renson] that this [theory of the Sankhyas] is oppos- ed to the arriving at all knowledge by means of a single case of knowing *; [and what we here assert-viz-] that all knowledge is arrived at [not by the successive steps of the Sánkhyas, but,] by one single knowing, is declared in Scripturet. c. That it is not Nature that is denoted by the term 'The Existent' in [the passage of Scripture beginning with] 'The Exis- tent alone, O Saumya!'-is inferrible also from the reason which he states t [in the following Aphorism].

खाध्ययात् ।८।

APB. 9. Because into Himself is the return [of all souls].

It cannot be admitted a. The meaning of the aphorism is this,

that the thinking Soul is [that it cannot be Nature that is spoken of

to be resolved into un- -see §. 8. c .- as the ' Existent'-i. e., the thinking Nature. ' Self-existent']-because of Absorption- i. e., because we hear [in Scripture] of the melting away [of pre- viously embodied souls] into Himself, who is in question,-the Soul that is denoted by the term ' the Existent.' If Nature were what is there denoted by the term 'the Existent,' then there

• सदेव सम्येति सच्छष्दवाच्यं प्रधानमितो Sपि न भवती

त्याइ ॥

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24 THE VEDANTA APHORISMS.

would be this [absurd] contradiction that the intelligent melts away into the unintelligent: Therefore the Canse of the World is that intelligent One, denoted by the term 'the Existent,' into whom is the return of all intelligences .*

b. Moreovert, [the assertion that not Nature but God is meant by ' the Existent,' or the Canse of the world, is proved by the reason stated in the Aphorism here following].

· गतिसामान्यात. ।१०

APH. 10. From the sameness of the understanding [of the term 'the Existent' through out the scriptures]. a. The meaning is-[that God is meant by the term, and not Nature-to which it might be plausibly referred only in some passages-] because of the sameness of the understanding-i. e. of the recognising an intelligent Cause [ as spoken of ] throughout the whole of the theological parts of the Vedas; for we no-

That the Cause of the where find the contradictory assertion in one world is an intelligent sentence of an intelligent Cause and in ano- God-the only consis- tent interpretation of ther one of an unintelligent one-but every- Scripture. where an intelligent Cause alone is under- stood. The texts [for example] about the order of creation, in the Taitiriya Upanishad, exhibit Soul alone as the Cause. There-

• खस्मिन्प्रते सच्छन्दवाच्ात्मनि सय्ववाक्वत्रववादिति बार्थ:। तथ यदि प्रधानमेव सच्ष्द्वार्च तदा चेतने ड्येत- नमय्य तोति विबद्ं स्यात। चतो यस्मिव्थ्वसवरवा चेतमाना तख्ेतमं सष्छष्द्वाचयं जगत्वारबममिति ।

• विव्व ।

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DOOR L. OH. 1. I0. n.

fore the net result [of the Aphorisms 5-10] is this that, which- ever way you view the matter, Nature is not what is meant by the term 'The Existent,' nor is it the Cause of the World *. b. Moreovert [that the Cause of the World is not the unin- telligent but the intelligent, may be proved by the reason next to be stated-viz .- ]

। भ्रुतत्वाच। ११ ।

Apa. 11. And because it is so revealed [in Scripture].

.. The meaning is as follows :- That, by the term " Himself" [-see §9-], is meant an Omniscient Ruler, the Cause of the World, [is proved] by the fact of its being so declared [in tho scripture,-to take an instance-] in the S'wetas watara section of the Mantra Upanishad, where we are told " And of Him no one is the parent nor is any one the overruler" &c. Therefore it is a settled point that the Cause of the World is the Omniscient God, not unintelligent Nature or anything else; and here the topic is eoneluded. t

• गतेसवंच वेदान्तंवु चेतनकारणवगतेस्समत्वादित्यर्थः । न- षि वचिदपि विरुद्ध मुपलभ्यते कुचचिद्दाक्य चेतनं कारण कुचचि- दचेतनमिति किन्मु सर्वच चेतनमेव कारपासुपलभ्यते। तैति रोये मृष्टिक्रमे असय चारमान एव कारणत्वन्दर्भबन्ति। चतस्- वथा प्रधान सचछन्दवाथ्यं जगत्कारपच्त न भवतीति परमार्थ: ।

1 विश्व ।

1 सभन्देनैव सर्वत्रेसवरो जमत्कारषमिति। नयास्य कसिष्जनिता D

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26 THR VEDANTA .APHORISMS.

CHAPTER II. SROTION I. OF THE VARIOUS NAMES UNDER WHICH GOD IS SPOKEN OF.

A deity without qua- b. But then, if thus [-see 11 a-] it

lities can be made the be proved, by the Aphorisms § 1-11, that

subject of reflection only all the theological portions of the Vedas by being first spoken of refer to God the Omniscient and Omnipo- as if possessing quali- tent,-then what further remains, for the ties. sake of which another Aphorism need be added ? If you ask "this-it is replied :- since a deity without qualities cannot have his nature described [-for the description of anything is just the enumeration of the qualities of the thing-]. you must consent to his being described as qualified by some characteristic* [ which does not in reality belong to him ;- just as, in seeking to determine the specific gravity, as compared with water, of a substance that is lighter than water, you must at- tach to it some other substance heavy enough to sink it, aud then eliminate the superfluity from the joint result].

A canon of interpre- c. Some passages therein [i. e. in Scrip-

tation in respect of ture] are [intended to enjoin] derotions passages where the dei- with a view to gradual emancipation; and ty is spoken of as having some are intended to convey a knowledge of qualities. . the truth ;- and so wherever, in a passage

नचाधिप दूत्यादि शेतान्वतरारणं मन्त्रोपनिर्षद स्रृतत्वादित्यय: । तस्मात्सवकंब्रह्म जगत्कारग नाचेतनं प्रधानमन्यद्वेतिसिड्म्। * नन्वेवमयात दूत्यारम्य त्रतत्वाच्चतदन्तै: सरनेः सर्वेषां वेदा- न्तानां सर्वज्ञसवंभकिव्रह्मपरत्वं समथितं किमपरमवशिष्ट यर्दर्थमु- त्तरमूचमन्दर्म दूति चेदुवयते। निर्विशेषत्रह्मणः सरूपेणोपदे प्ायोगात किश्चिदुपाध्युपच्वतत्वेनापदेश द्रतति वक्रव्यम्।

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: BOOK L CH. I. SEC. I. 27

where qualities are spoken of, it is really intended to speak of the qualities, there the case in one of some religious observance [which it is intended to enjoin]; but wherever the quality- though mentioned-is not intended to be spoken of, [but is em- ployed as a mere vehicle of the real meaning], there the passage is concerned about God as He is to be known [-not as He is to be acted towards]. It is with the view of determining this [i. e. of determining what are the passages. in which the deity is spo- ken of as He is, or as He is to be acted towards, respectively,] that [-notwithstanding the suggestion, in § 11, b., that no more need be said-] the following aphorism is presented .*

। मानन्दमयो डभ्यासात. ।१२।

What is spoken of as APH. 12. He [-the deity without qna-

consisting of joy, is lities-] is "the One that consists of joy"- God. because it is the practice [of the Veda to speak of Him by that name]. a. But then [some one may object], the term " the one that consists of joy" cannot refer to a deity who is without qualities- for such a one is not made up of portions cf delight, [-which the term would seem to imply-],-but it refers to the embodied soul, for that is spoken of in scripture as being made up of joy :- Well, if any one says this, I reply, it is not thus. The Supreme Soul may properly [ be said to ] consist of joy-why ?- because [as sta-

• तभ कानिचित क्रममुत्यरथा न्यपासनानि कानिचिदभ्यदया- थानि। एवच् यच सगुणवाकय गुपविवता तबोपासना भवति यचतु त्रुयमाणो Sपि गुणो न विवचितस्य तद्ाक्यं भेयब्रह्मपर ..

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28 THE VEDINTA APHORENS.

ted in the aphorism] " it is the practice;" -that is to say, be- cause it is the practice [ of the Veda ] very often to apply to God the term " consisting of joy."*

When the deity is as- b. [ The next aphorism has reference serted to consist of so particularly to the objection that the term end so, it is not asser- ted thot He was formed discussed in the preceding paragraph must, out of so and so. in accordance with its grammatical form, mean some modification of something else, in which case, of eourse, it could not signify the Supreme Soul ]. ॥ विकारशब्दान्नेति चेम्न प्राचुयत. ॥१३।। APH. 13. If you say that it is not so [-i. e. that the term ánandamaya- § 12-does not refer to God- ] because it is a word expressing what has undergone a change ;- it is not as you say, -for it expresses the quantity [that constitutes, without auy reference to there having been any change ]. a. But then [-we remark in explanation-some one may still object], that which is " made up of joy" cannot be God [ who is not made up of anything antecedently existent]-why? -because [-the objector supposes-] the affix mayat [with which the word ananda-maya " consisting of joy" is formed] im- plies a change [from one state or form to another-such as is undergone when card is made out of milk, or a jar is made ont of clay]. and it is absurd to suppese that God is in such a way made up of joy :- well, if any one says this, I reply, it is not

*नम्यानन्दमयशब्दा न निर्गुषत्रछ्मपरः नस्ट प्रियाद्यनवयव- त.त. कितुपरीरसवात्मन आ्ानन्दमयत्यवणजीवपर दूति घन्न। म्रानन्दमयः परमात्मा भवितुमनति। कुतः । चन्बा-

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BOOK I. CH. H. SEO. L. 29

thns. Why ?- " because it is quantity" [that is spoken of, and not change from one state to another],-that is to say, because here the affix mayat is employed with an eye to the quantity of joy* [-according to Panini V. 4. 21 .- that is God; and not, as you suppose-according to Pánini IV. 3. 143 .- that joy out of which something was at any time first made up. b. He next states another reason why the affix mayat [$. 13. a.] is employed in the sense of quantity and not of change.t

God must have joy in APH. 14. And [God must consist of joy Himself if He be the -§ 12-] because He is called [in crip- Cuuse of joy. ture] the cause thereof. a. That is to say-because, in scripture, God is named as the cause in respect thereof-i. e. of joy. $ b. God is spoken of as the cause of joy in such texts as this -riz. "For He alone it is that causeth to rejoice." As those that enrich others must themselves be rich, so it is clear that there must be abuudant joy with Him who causeth others to rejoice.§

• ननु नानन्दमय ब्रह्म । कुतः । विकारार्थमयट्प्रत्ययाद.। महााखानन्दविकारत्वानुपपत्तिरिति वेव्र। कुतः । म्राचु- थीत। मयटः प्रक्से ब्ानन्दप्राचुर्यवाचकत्वादित्वर्यः । + मयटः प्राचुयीर्थकत्वे हेत्वन्तरमाच्च । * श्ुतौ तमानन्द प्रति ब्रह्मणो रेतुत्वव्यपदेशादित्यर्यः । 5 एष द्ेवानन्दयातो.ते ब्रह्मण वानन्दरेतुत्व व्यपदिभ्यते । ये जन्यान, धमोकुर्वन्ति त एव धनिन दनिवद्यो S न्यानानन्दयति स प्रचुरानन्द इति प्रसिङ्धम. ।

.

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30 THE VEDANTA APHORISMS.

c. And he mentions that, for the following reason also, it must be the Supreme Soul that " consists of joy" * [-as asserted in § 12-] viz :- । मान्तवर्णिकमेवच गीयते।१५।

The lyrical and the APH. 15. And to the same effect [-that doctrinal parts of the the Supreme Soul,§ 12, consists of joy-] Veda agree in represen- is sung the comment on the hymn. joy. ting God as made up of a. " Is sung"-that is to say, [by being sung] declares. [The drift of this argument is this]-because both the hymns (mantra) and the doctrinal portions of the scrip- ture (brahmana) are unanimoust [in representing the Supreme Soul as consisting of joy]. b. And he states that it must be tbe Supreme Soul and not any embodied soul that is meant by the term " consisting of joy" [$. 12], for the following reason.t ॥ नेतरो ऽनुपपत्तेः ।१६ ।

Absurdity of suppo- APH. 16. It is none other [than God, sing that any other than that is spoken of-see §. 12 .- as " consisting God is here meant. of joy,"] because there is an absurdity [in any other supposition]. a. That is to say-it is not any embodied soul-from the Lord downwards [ see Vedanta Lecture No. 25]-that is meant by the term "consisting of joy :"-Why ? " Because there is an absurdity."

• इूतख्ानन्दमयः परमात्मेत्याइ। गोयते प्रदर्भयतोत्यर्थः । मन्त्रत्राह्मणयेरेकार्थत्वात । 1 इतखानन्दमय: परमाश्मा न जीव दूत्याइ।

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BOOK I. CH. Ii. SEC. 1. 31

The meaning of the aphorism is this, that, antecedently to the creation [ of the body ] of "the Lord," we are told that He { of whom the term " consisting of joy" is correctly predicable] was one that reflected [ see § 5], One that was Himself His creation, and One that was the cause of the creation [see § 2. and Vedanta Lecture, No. 40]; and all this would be absurd [ if predicated of any other than the Supreme Soul ] :- that is to say-since knowledge belonging to any inferior soul is dependent on there being a body-there could have been no reflection* [ by any such soul antecedently to the creation ]. b. Moreovert [any inferior soul is not what is meant by " that .which consists of joy"-§ 12-for the following reason ]. 11 भेदव्यपदेशाच ॥।१७॥

It is no inferior soul ApH. 17. And [ the inferior soul is not that is spoken of as con- what consists of joy ] because they are spo- sisting of joy. ken of [ in Scripture ] as distinct. a. The inferior soul is not what consists of joy ;- why? because the inferior soul and that which consists of joy are spoken of as being distinct ;- such is the meaning. What is here referred to is this, that, in the passage [for example] of the Taitiríya [section of the Veda] beginning "Truly that joy &c." the One " that consists of joy " and the inferior soul are spoken of under the respectively different characters of " what is to be obtained" and "the obtainer;"-for the obtainer is not the same as that

• ईञ्वरादितरो जीवो नानन्दमयः । कुतः । चनुपपत्तः । ईश्वरम्य सृष्टे: पूर्ष मोचिवत्वं सध्यात्मकत्व सष्टिदेतुत्वच्च अ्यते तत्स वंस्यानुपपत्तेरिति सूचार्थः। जीवच्वानस्य शरीरसाष्यत्वादोच्ष खानुपपत्तिरिति तात्पर्यम । t किश्व।

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32 THE VEDANTA APHORISMS.

which he is to obtain * [-and the inferior soul is here directed to aspire after "the One that consists of joy"]. 6. But then [the followers of the Sankhya will probably hert suggest]-let it be Nature that is denoted by the term " con- sisting of joy" [§ 12]. With reference to this he says as followst. । कामाच नानुमानापेक्षा।१८।

Neither is it unintelli- Apn. 18. And by reason of desire [which gent Nature that is spo- is attributed to that "which consists of ken of as consisting of joy"] no regard [is to be sbown] to the joy. argument [of the Sankhyas, who attempt to prove that it is their unintelligent Nature that is spoken of in scripture as "consisting of joy"]. a. That is to say-we do not regard-i. e. we do not admit that Nature is " what consists of joy", or that it is the causo [of joy-see § 14 -- ]. Why ?- " by reason of desire ;"-i. .. because we find in Scripture, where the topic is " what consists of joy", that this denotes one that desires; and it is impossible that desire should belong to that which is unintelligent t [ as Nature is held by the Sankhyas themselves to be].

• नानन्दमयो जीवः । कुतः । जीवानन्दमययोभेदेन व्यप.दे- श्यमानत्वादित्यथः । तैनिरोयके रसो वै स दत्यारम्य व्ानन्दमयम्व सब्धव्यत्वेन जीवस्यच लन्धृत्वेन भेदव्यपदेशः। नष्ि लग्धैव लब्धव्यो भवतीत्याभयः । + नन्वानन्द्मयभव्देन प्रधानसुख्ता। तवाप। चानन्दनयरवेन कारणत्वेन वा प्रधानस्य नापेचा न खोकार:। फुतः । कामात,। धानन्दमयाधिकारे वामयिट त्वन्रवत्रादि- व्यथंः । नव्यचेतने कामसभ्भवति ।

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BOOK I. CH. II. SEO. I. 33

: b. [He supports the orthodox view by another argument as follows]. · बस्मिमस्यच तद्योगं भास ।१६।

APH. 19. And [the one "consisting of For, neither of these is what we are directed joy" cannot be an inferior soul, or Nature, to aspire after, as we because] the scripture teaches that in this are directed to aspire [-which can therefore mean nothing else after what consists of than the Supreme-] there is the beatifica- joy. union therewith]. tion of that [inferior soul which obtains

a. That is to say,-for tbe following reason also the term " consisting of joy" cannot mean either any inferior soul or [unintelligent] Nature, because the scripture teaches that in this-"the one consisting of joy" that we are concerned about- the [Supreme] Soul-there is to take place, in the case of him- i. e. of the eulightened inferior soul, union therewith-i. e. union with that [Supreme] Soul-[for such is the meaning of] "union therewith"-the attaining to the state of Him-[in short]eman- cipation .* b. Thus has it been settled definitively that [what is spoken of in scripture as] " what consists of joy" is the Supreme Soul t [and nothing else].

• दूतख्च न जीवे प्रधाने वा शानन्दमयशन्दो यस्मादसिमिन्ना- नन्दमये प्रछ्ते। चात्मनि। ब्रस्य । प्रबुङ्धस्य जीवस्य। तद्योगं तदातमना बोगस दयोगसङ्वावापति मतिरित्य थः । ते गास्ति शाखं। तस्मादित्यर्थः: । तस्रादानन्दमयः परमात्मनि सिङ्डम- ।

E

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34 THN VEDINTA APHORISMS.

c. [The next point to be establishod is this, that it is the Supreme Soul that is spoken of in scripture as " the man in the sun" and " the man in the eye"].

It is God that is spo- APE. 20. [God alone is meant when

ken of as the man with- mention is made, in scripture, of that which in the sun and within is] within [the sun and the eye], because the eye. there is mention of His characteristics [which can belong to none other.] a. That is to say-He who is mentioned in scriptnre as "He that is within the sun" and " He that is within the eye," is the Supreme alone and no one worldly. Why ?- "because there is mention of His characteristics"-i. e. because, in these passages, there is mention of characteristics [such as absolute sinlessness] that belong only to Him who is the Supreme .* b. [At this, as at other points, the commentators enter into de- tails which the fear of prolixity constrains us to pretermit].

c. Moreover t [He that is spoken of as " the man in the sun" is some one else than the sun's soul-as is proved by the argument here following]. · भेदव्यपदेशाचान्यः ।२१।

APH. 21. And [ it is not the personal soul of the sun-the

• व एषो इन्तरादिते व एणे उन्तरविवीतिय शुवमाच: परनेश्वर एव नं संसारी। कुतः। तङनीषदेशत.। तख पर- भेखरस्य ये धर्मासेषामस्मिन्वाको उपदेभादित्यर्थः । +

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BOOR I. OH. I. SES. 85

tolar congener of the anima mundi-that is spoken of as "the man in the sun"-] because mention is made of a distinction [bet- ween these two]. a. That is to say-The "man" that is spoken of in scripture as being within the sun and within the eye, is some one other than any inferior soul which has the fancy [-erroneous in the case of any soul that fancies it has a body at all-] that its body is the sun. Why ?- "because mention is made of a distinction." [One of the passages cited in regard to this, is the one beginning] "He who, standing in the sun, yet other than the sun" &c.f [conf. § 20. b]. b. [The next point to be established is this that it is the Sup- reme Soul that is spoken of as the Ether in such a passage of scripture, as the one beginning] " Of this world what is the re- fuge ?' To this he replied-'The Ether' &c".

APH. 22. The Ether, [in certain passa- It is God that ie in cer- tain passages spoken of ges, must be understood to mean God,] by

as the Ether. reason of His characteristics [which are, in such pasages, attributed to that which is there spoken of as the Ether].

· भादित्यानणरन्तः स्ुममाण: पुरुष चादित्यभ्रीराभिमानिनो बोबादन्यः । कुतः 1 भेदव्यपदेशात.। + व चादित्ये तिष्ठव्नादित्वान्तरो डयमित्यादि। + भस्य लोकस्य का गतिरित्याकाम कनि सेवाय ।

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36 THE VEDANTA APHORISMS.

a. That is to say- It is proper to understand, by the word Ether, God, Why ?- " by reason of his characteristic" :- that is to say, because, in this passage [ § 21 b.], we find mentioned such a fact as that of being the creator of the great elements, which character belongs [only] to Him-i. e. to God .* b. [The " breath of life," in like manner, is held to stand for God, in such a passage as] " 'Who is that deity' ?- To this he replied-' The breath of life.' "t

। वत एव प्राण दति ।२३।

It is God that is in APH. 23. For just the same reason,

certain passages spoken " the breath of life" [is to be understood of as the Breath of life. to mean God.] a. " For just the same reason:"-that is to say, for the reason stated in the preceding aphorism [ § 22] viz,. " by reason uf His characteristics," [which could not be predicated of the mere " breath of life,"] it is God alone that is meant by the breath of life," [in the passage cited under § 22. b.] b. But then [-some objector may go on to say-] let that pass-that in the passage about the breath of life [ § 22 6.]

*चाकाशशव्देन ब्रह्मणो ग्रहणयुत्त। कुतः। तक्िङ्गात,। .तस्य ब्रह्मणो यश्िङ्र मचाभूतसषृत्वादिकं तस्यास्म्िनवाक हष्टत्वादित्यर्यः । + कतमा सा देवतेति प्राथ दति होवाच। अत एवं। पूर्षचाततस्निङ्गादिति देतोरेव। प्रायः । प्रा. पभब्दवाचं त्रस्मैवेतय्यः ।

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BOOK I. CH. 11. SEC. I. 37

the [disputed] term does mean God, since the characteristics of God [-we are willing to admit-] are present [in that instance] ; -but [the same argument will not avail you in the following passage, where we object to your assuming that the term " the light" means God] :- " Now the light that shines from beyond that the abode of the celestials &c." The word "light," here can mean only the sun or some other created splendour, for this the word notorionsly is employed to denote; but it cannot mean God, who is without limits, because it is here spoken of as having a limit, when it is styled " the light beyond the abode of the celestials" &c. [well-rejoins the commentator-] this [objection] having presented itself, it is declared* [as follows.]

It is God that is in APH. 24. The "light" [in certain pas- certain passages spoken ofus the the Light. sages means God], because there is men-

said to possess.] tion of feet [which no ordinary light can be

a. That is to say-here [i. e. in the passage cited under § 23. b.] it is God alone that is meant by the word " light." Wny ?- " because of the mention of feet" :- that is to say, be- cause the Elements are spoken of as the feet [of this light,- and light, in the ordinary sense of the word, does not mean anything that has feet,- and these feet are spoken of] in such

• नतु प्रापवा को ब्रह्मजिङ्गसत्वाङ्गवतु तद्गह्मपरं । चथ यदतः परो दिवो ज्योतिर्दोप्यते द्रत्यन्न ष्योतिः पद सूयादिभातिकतेजः परमेव प्रसिडत्वान. । परो दिया न्यातिरित्यादिना मर्यादाश्रव- शाच्च न निर्मर्याद्वह्मपरमिति प्रात्ते उच्चते ।

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THE VEDANTA APHORISMS.

phrases as "The feet thereof are the pervading elements" [-which phrase is employed] in respect of God when regarded as residing in that text [-the most revered of all the texts of Scrip- ture] called the Gayatri, which is declared to have four feet by the text beginning with " the Gayatri, indeed, is all this" &c .*

b. Moreover [-the commentator remarks-] although-by the expression " from beyond that" &c. [ § 23. b.] the mention is [apparently at least] of what has limits &c., yet this is not opposed to its being God ; for, [in accordance with the canon of interpretation laid down in § 11 c.] the passage in question is intended to enjoin certain religious observances [in regard to the " light"]. Besides-the word " light" is notoriously employed in the theological portions of the Veda to denote God; therefore it is a settled point that here [§ 23. b.] the word " light" means God.t

c. [The next aphorism opposes the suggestion that the feet spoken of § 24. a., are the feet of the verse called the Gáyatri,

• अम व्योतिशब्दवार्च ब्रग्जेय। कुतः । परथाभिधानान.। गावची वा डूद सर्वमित्यादिना प्रतिपादितचतुष्पाद्वाय व्याख्थछन्दो पाधिकत्रसय: पादो ऽम्य विश्राभूतानि इत्यादिना भृतपादाभि- धानादित्यथः । +बदतंः पर दत्वादिना मृतं मर्बादादिवंमषि न ब्रह्मण विर- डूं तस्योपासनार्थत्वात.। ध्योतिक ब्दो बहययपि वेदान्तेवु ऋि- हससाळयोतिशब्दो 5ष ब्रहपर एवेति सिङ्डम. । t The discordance in gender bere is a Vaidik licence.

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.SOOM I. OEL H. RBO. I. . 30

-sueh verso having four hemiatichs, the name for which is the same as that for a foot.] । इन्दो डभिधानान्नेति चेव्न तथा पेतेा प्पपनिगदात्तथा- चि दर्शनम् । २५ ।

Why it cannot be the Gsyatri that is referred APH. 25. If you say that it is the verse [-see § 24.c .- of which it is intended to to in such a passage. speak, and not the Deity-see § 24,-] it is not so ; because there is the direction to fix one's mind [on God] thus [i. e. through the medium of the Gayatri] ; for of such a way [of directing the mind to the contemplation of the deity] there is a view [of more than one example in scripture.]

a. "Thus :"-that is to say, because there is the direction or mention, of fixing one's mind or concentrating one's thoughts, by means of the verse [the Gayatri], on the Deity [regarded as] resident therein* [-§ 24. a.]

b. " For of such a way there is a view:"-that is to say,-in other passages also, by means of some modification [of God- such as the sun, the ether, &c.,] the worshipping of God [re- garded as] resident therein, is seen [to be enjoined]. N. B., " there is a view of" means " there is seen." t

• तथा। छन्दोद्वारेप वङ्गते अ्रह्मणि चेतोऽपणस्य । चित्त- समाधानस्य। निगदादभिधानादित्यर्थः । + तथादि दर्शनम । चन्यचापि विकारद्वारेप तद्गतत्रसोषा- सनं । दृम्सत दति दर्शनं। दुडनिव्र्यः ।

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40 THE VEDANTA APHORIMS.

c. Therefore it is a settled point that in the preceding passage [-see § 23. b.] it is God alone that is referred to, and not the verse * [called the Gáyatri-see § 25.] d. [He subjoins a further reason.]

A further reason why APH. 26. And [the fact is] thus [i. e.

it cannot be the Gdya- that the deity and not the verse called the

tri that is referred to. Gáyatrí is referred to in the passage under discussion] because we meet with the men- tion of the elements &c., as the feet [-see § 21-of that which is referred to in the passage in question.] a. [That is to say] :- for the following reason also, it is to be understood that, in the passage respecting the Gayatri [§ 2t. a.], it is God alone that is referred to :- such is the meaning of the word " thus" [in the aphorism g 26]. Why ?:- " because the mention of the clements &c., as the feet can apply, [only to God]" :- that is to say, because the designation "The Gayatri " with its four feet, [which] are the elements, the earth, the " body, and the heart," can apply to God alone ; for the men- tion of feet in the shape of the elements &c., can have no reference to the [verse called the] Gayatri-a thing consisting of a con- glomeration of alphabetical cbaracters.t b. [The objector next proceeds to argue that what is spoken * तस्मात्पूर्यवाक्ये म्रह्मैत्र निर्दिष्ट न कन्द इति सिद्धम् । +

ब्दार्थः । कुतः । भूतादिपादव्यपदेशोपपत्नेः। भृतपुयिबीभरीर- हदयखततुष्प द्गायनीति व्यपदेशस्य ब्रह्मण्येवोपपरेरित्यथः। नम्तव- रसम्रिवेश कपगायच्या भूतादिपाद्व्यमदेभसमभवति।

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DODK I. CH. II. SEC. 1. 41

of in one passage as being " in the sky," cannot be that which is, in another passage, spoken of as the Light shining " from beyond the sky." To this the author, who holds that it is God who is referred to in both passages, replies as follows.]

God may be referred APH. 27. If [ you say that it is] not to under different as- [God that is spoken of in a certain passage pects as regards loca- lity. whilst He is spoken of in another] because there is a difference of declaration [in res- pect of what is spoken of in the one passage and in the other], it is not [as you say], because there is no incompatibility [in His being referred to] even in both. a. ' If you say that it is not so, because there is a difference of declaration' :- [to 'explain this ;- suppose an objector says] but then, as regards the preceding passage [see § 23], the sky, in the passage " In the sky the immortal triad of feet thereof," is mentioned in the 7th [or locative] case as the locus in uo there- of [i. e., as the place in which is that which is spoken of-be that what it may :- and, on the other hand,] in the passage " Now the Light that shines thence from beyond the sky" [§ 23], the sky is mentioned in the 5th [or ablative] case as the limit [from beyond which shines whatever Light that may be that is spoken of] :- and so, since this difference of cases involves a difference of declaration [in respect of what is thus declared to be in, and what is declared to be beyond the sky], it is impossible to recog- nise, in the passage that speaks of the Light, [that which is spo- ken of in the other passage ;- so that, granting that the one passage speaks of God, it is clear the other does not] :- well, if any one says all this, it is replied No :- why ?- " because there

F

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4 THE DEDANTA APHORIEMO.

is no incompatibility fin His being referred to] even in both ;"- that is to say, because there is nothing to prevent His being recognised even in two descriptions involving different declen- sional terminations* {-for what is to prevent our regarding God as existing at once within this " visible diurnal sphere" and beyond it] ? b. Therefore it is a settled point that it is the Supreme Soul alone that is spoken as the Light fin the passage cited under § 23] and not any other created light.t

c. But then [some objector will say,] in the Upanishad called the Kaushitaki Brahmana, in the narrative of Indra and [king] Pra- tardana, we hear [in reply to Pratardana's question respecting the 'summum bonum'], "He [Indra] said-'I am the life, in the -- "shape of perfect knowledge ;- do thou [that seekest to obtain " the summum bouum] worship me, that life immortal.'" In this passage [the objector will say] the word " life" means Indra's vital

• नमु पूर्षस्मिम वाकपे चिपादस्यामतन्दिवीति सप्तम्या द्वाराबार- त्वेन निर्दिश्यते। चथ यदतः परो दिवा ज्योतिरित्यत पञ्चम्याव -- धित्वेम द्यीर्मिरदिखते। तथाच विभतिभेदेनेापदेशभेदात, व्यो- तिर्वाके प्रत्यभिच्वा न स्वतीति चेत. ।न । कुतः । इभय- स्मिव्नयविरोधात। विभक्तिभेदेनेपदेशड्ये पि प्रत्यभिन्नाया भविरोधादित्ययः ।

तस्मात्परं अशव ज्योतिशव्दवाय्य मान्यज्ञातियं तेय इति सिड्डम. ॥

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SOOK L CH. II. ABC. L. .43

spirit, for such is notoriously the sonse of the term,-and it does not mean the Supreme Soul This {objection] having presented itself, it is declared as follows .*-

। प्रापस्तथानुगमात. ।२८।

That the term Life, APH. 28. The Life [-$ 27. c .- means in a certain passage, God alone] because of the conclusion that it means God, shown from the contezt. does so, [which conolusion is forced upon us by an examination of the context]. a. That is to say,-there [i. e. in the passage cited under § 27. c.]the word ' life' means God alone:why ?- " because of the conclusion that it does so"-i. e. because we must conclude, or admit, that it does so-i. e. that it does mean God.t b. To explain,-Pratardana, verily, [when he received the re- ply of Indra, § 27. c.,] was enquiring what was the thing most desirable for man. To him, thus desirous of the summum bonum, the injunction to worship the Life is given in the passage begin- ning " I am the Life" &c. And [-since God alone is the sum- mum bonum and the sole proper object of worship-J how can that which is thus indicated as the chief end of man be the vital spirit [of Indra]? Therefore, by looking forwards and backwards [and

• ननु काषीतकीआरा हमणोपनिषदि द्न्द्र प्रतरदनास्थायिकायां श्रू- बसे। सहोवाच प्रायो उस्मि प्रभाम्मा नं भानावुरमृतमुपाक्षिति। त प्रापशन्द इन्द्रंप्रापवायुपर: प्रषिद्धतवात म बरमात्मपर रति प्राप्त उंचते । + तब प्राण ऋ्शेष। कुमः। मयानुगनात_। तजा । म्रं झपरत्वेन । चनुगमात. । चवगमादित्वर्थः ।

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44 TER VEDANTA APHORISNS.

thus bringing the light of the context to bear upon the question] it is settled for certain that the term ' Life' [in § 27. c.] means God alone .* [c .- The objector being understood still to contend that Indra cannot mean God by the term ' Life,' when he is speaking of him- self as the ' Life,' the following aphorism is enunciated].

। न वकुरात्मापदेभादिति वेदव्यात्मसम्बन्घ भूमाह्स्मिन्. ।२९।

A change of topic is APH. 29 .- If [you say that it is] not

not to be supposed in the [God that it meant by the term ' Life' in the absence of evidence that passage under § 27 c.,] because the speaker any change is intended. is mentioning himself-[it is replied that it is God]-for in this [section of the Veda where the passage occurs] there is abundance of reference to the Super- intending Spirit [-and a change of reference is not to be supposed without some evidence that a change is intended].

a .- [That is to say-we may suppose the objector to con- tinue:] but then what you say-viz., that the term ' Life' [ § 27 c.] means God-is not right ;- such is the meaning of the ' not' [the first word in Aph. 29]. Why [is it not right]? ' Because the

• तथाि। प्रतर्दनः खल चिततमं पुरुषार्थ पृष्टवान। तस्य परमपुरषार्थकामस्य प्राप्त उपास्यत्वेनापदिश्यते प्राणे Sस्मीत्ा- दिना । एवच्त्र परमपुरुषार्थत्वेनेपदिभ्यमानः कथं प्राब्यवायुः स्यात. । तस्मात पूर्वापरपर्यालेचनया ब्रस्मपरमेव प्राययपद्मि- ति सिड्डम. ।

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BOOK I. OH. II. SEC. I. 45

speaker is mentioning himself'-i.e. because it is of himself that the speaker, viz., Indra, is making mention .*

b .- To explain ;- [the objector says that God is not meant ] because the speaker, viz. Indra, a certain embodied kind of deity, indicates himself to Pratardana in that egotistic speech beginning with " Come-do thou know me"-and then going on " I am the Life, in the shape of perfect knowledge" &c. Therefore this is a mention of the deity [Indra] himself, [and not of the Supreme Soul]. This [objection] having presented itself, it is declared [§ 29-that it is not so-] "for in this there is abundance of reference to the Superintending Spirit ;"-that is to say-for, or because, in this, viz., section [of the Kaushitaki Brahmana-§ 27. c.], there is found abundance, or a great deal, of reference to the Superintending Spirit, or of relation to the Supreme Soul. There- fore-i. e. from the abundance of reference to the Supreme Soul [in the section in question, which is almost entirely concerned therewith,]-it is a settled point that it is God, under the aspect of the Life, and not any [embodied] deity, that is here spoken of.t

• ननु यदुतं प्राण्ण ्रक्मेति तद्युक्मिति नअर्थः । कुतः । व- सरालोपदेशात.। वकुरिन्द्र स्यात्मत्वेनेापदेशदित्यर्थः ।

• तथाहि वका हीन्ट्रा नाम कन्विद्विग्रयवान, देवताविशेष: खात्मानं प्रतर्दनायोपदिभति मामेषि विजानादीत्युपक्रम्य प्राण डसिमि प्रज्ञात्मेतेवं चहकारवादेन। तस्मादयं देवतात्मपदेश इति प्राप्त उच्चते अध्यात्मसम्वन्धभमा अस्मिम्चिति । दि यस्मात. । बस्मिन । चध्याये। पध्यातासम्बन्धस्य । परमात्मसम्बन्घस्य ।

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46 TRE VEDINTA APHORONS.

c .- Why then does the apeaker talk of himself [ if it be God that is meant in the passage in which Indra-see 27. c .- says " I am the life" &c.]? This having become a matter of dubi- tation, he declares as follows .*

APH. 30. But the mention, [by Indra, The identification of of himself as the Supreme Spirit], was with onte's self with another accordant with scripture. an eye to the Scripture, [which authorises such a form of expression], as VÁMADEVA [identifies himself, in another place, with Manu and with Surys]. a .- That is to say-the mention of the speaker, Indra, in the passage " Do thou know me" &c." [§ 29. b.] is to be understood with an eye to the scripture :- that is to say, he [Indra] was speaking whilst looking upon the matter under that scriptural view which is conveyed in the text " I myself [-whoever may " be the speaker-] am the Supreme Soul."t

b. Of this [way of regarding one's self as identified with an- other] there is an example [cited in the aphorism-in the words] 'as VĂMADEVA' ;- that is to say-as VAMADEVA, in accordance with the scriptural view, said " I was Manu, and I was Surya."

भमा। बाजत्यमुपजम्यत इव्यर्थः । तसादध्यात्मसम्न्धवाऊ- स्याताखात्मकत झोपदेश एवायं न देवतात्मोपदेश दतिसिड््म,। * कथन्ताई व तुरात्मोपदेश ह्रत्यायंक्राड्। + हन्द्रस्य बंकुमामेव विबानीदीखुपद्रेशः मास्त्रवष्णा भात- व्यः । घह्मेव पदं व्रस्मोति मासतहव्या अव्यभेवमुत्तवानित्वर्यः ।

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BOOK I. CH. II. BEC. I. 47 Therefore it is a settled point that this passage [see § 27. c.] re- fers to God under the aspect of ' the Life.'* c. [In the next aphorism a compromise in regard to the pas- sage cited under § 27. c. is rejected.]

घोगात।३१। APH. 31. If [you say that it is] not [God alone that is meant by the term ' Life' in the passage under § 27 c.] because there is here the mark by which the [embodied] soul and that by which the breath of life is recognised ;- [then we reply] Nay,-be- cause [if the case were as you pretend, then] there would be three sorts of worshippings [enjoined], and because those [cha- racteristics] are here annexed by reason of which the term must [ be seen to ] refer [to God alone.] a. But then [the objector-aiming at a compromise-may say], what you remark [in. APH. 29 ], that the 'Life' does not mean the [embodied] deity fIndra], because there is such abun. dant reference [in the section where the term occurs] to the Su- preme Soul ;- this is quite true. Still the passage does not re. fer solely to God, but it refers also to the [embodied] soul, and to the chief spirit [the breath of life]. Why ?- ' because there is here the mark by which the [embodied] soul and that by which the breath of life is recognised ;'-that is to say, there is the

• तभ दष्टान्तः । वाभदेववदिति। यथा वामदेवः शस्त्र- दृश्या वहं मनुरभवं सर्यख्तेत्यान तडदित्यर्थ: । तस्माव्ावात्मकम्रक्मा - परमेतड़ाक्यमिति सिङ्धम्. ।

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48 THE VEDANTA APHORISMS.

mark by which the [embodied] soul is recognised, and the mark by which the breath of life is recognised .* b. [To pass over the arguments by which the objector at- tempts to show that three things, and not merely one, are refer- red to in the passage under discussion,-the commentator, ex- plaining the rejection of any compromise, says]-if you say that it is not God [alone that is meant,-then we say] No ;- that is to say-it is not proper [to say as you do]. Why ?- ' be- ' cause there would be a threefold case of devotion, ;- that is to say,-because, if the case were such [as you attempt to make it out to be], we should have [enjoined upon us ] a worshipping of three descriptions, viz. (1) a worshipping of the [embodied] soul, (2) a worshipping of the breath of life, and (3) a wor- shipping of God;t [for Indra, in the disputed passage, enjoins the worshipping of ' the Life', whilst, of course, none but God can be the proper object of worship.] c. Since, on the supposition that God is meant, the whole, from first to last, is one consistent discourse ; it is improper to suppose that there are different discourses. Therefore, since the word ' Life' is employed elsewhere-viz. in [the passage referred

• नन यदुश्मध्यात्मसम्बन्धबाजत्यान्न देवतात्मा प्राप्त रति तत्सत्दं। तथापि न ब्रह्मपरमेवेदं वाक किन्तु जीवमु रवप्राष्पवा- युपर्मपि। कुतः । जीवमुस्यप्रापलिङ्ात। जीवलिभ्जात.।

• न ब्रस्मेति चेत। न। न युकमित्यर्थः । बुतः । उपासानवि- ध्यात्। एवं सति निविधमुपासनं प्रसज्येत जीवोपासन मुख्यप्रा. गोपासनं ब्रओ्मोपासनव्ेति।

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BOOK I. CH. II. SEC. I. 49

to in APH. 23-viz.] the text "For the same reason the Life [means God,"-since-we repeat-the word ' life' is there employed] as referring to God, in virtue of the characteristic of God [there recognised-see § 22]; so it is a settled point that here also the mention is solely of God, because of there being annexed [see -§ 28. b .- ] the mention of characteristics that belong to God alone-such as that of being the summum bonum .* d. So much for the first quarter of the first lecture, entitled ' The Distinct Definition of the Supreme Soul.'t

e. [Let us here take a restrospective Retrospective glance. glance at the ground gone over. In the first place it is to be remarked that the aim of this division of the Aphorisms is to determine distinctly what is meant by the term God, and by what other terms in Scripture God is meant. The former of these questions is de- termined in the first four aphorisms, the latter in the remaining twenty-seven.

f. As the enquiry is conducted with the view of ascertaining the sense of Scripture, it will be observed that all the reasonings proceed on the hypothesis (-see the Nyaya Aphorisms, Book I No. 30,-) that the authority of Scripture is not disputed.

• उपक्रमोपसंचाराम्यां ब्रअ्मपरत्वेन एकवाक्यत्वे सभ्भवति वाकभेदो न युकः । चत एव प्राप्त इत्यचान्यच व्रझ्ालिक्गवभ्रा- आवभन्दस्य त्र हषि प्रटत्नेराम्मितत्वात, दशपि चिततमोपन्या- यादि अअ्यषिप्गयोगाद्वप्राय एवायसुपदेश दति सिङ्म. । + इति प्रथमाध्यावस्य प्रथम: स्ष्टत्रझ्मलिक्पादः।

G

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50 THE VEDANTA APHORISMS.

g. Of the twenty-seven aphorisms in which it is sought to determine what are the terms by which, in Scripture, it is God that is really meant, Mr. Colebrooke, in his essays Vol. 1. p. -- 338, gives the following summary :-

" The omnipotent, omniscient, sentient cause of the universe, is " (anandamaya) essentially happy. He is the brilliant golden per- " son, seen within (antar) the solar orb and the human eye. He "is the etherial element (akas'a), from which all things proceed "and to which all return. He is the breath (prana) in which all " beings merge, into which they all rise. He is the light (jyotish) . " which shines in heaven, and in all places high and low, everywhere " throughont the world, and within the human person. He is the " breath (prana) and intelligent self, immortal, undecaying "and happy, with which Indra, (in a dialogue with Pratardana, ) " identifies himself."

The rcader of this summary must not understand it as contain- ing the Vedantin's description of God. The risk of its being so understood might perhaps have been best avoided by converting each of the propositions, and making the predicate take the place of the snbject. No donbt the Vedantin holds that God is everything, and therefore all these things; but BADARAYANA, in his twenty-seven aphorisms, is not concerned abont establishing this, or anything like it. He is bent on declaring, not that God is this that or the other thing, bnt on determining that this that and the other term, which might seem, in certain passages of scripture, to mean something else than God simply, really is employed in the sense of nothing else than God simply.

h. Since a reader not conversant with the topics handled by BADARÁYANA may be apt to think that needless difficulties are

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BOOK I. OB. II. SEO. I. 51

occasionally started, and needless trouble taken to remove them, we would here refer the reader to our remarks at the conclusion of the first Book of the Nyaya Aphorisms. BADARAYANA did not make the difficulties, but he found them. The objections were extant ; and those that had any show of plausibility-whilst the objector conceded the authority of the Vedas-BADARAYANA, bent on demonstrating the consistency of the Vedas, did not con- sider himself at liberty to ignore].

00-

। मिरज़ापुर ॥

। यतोमों के शपासाने में छापी गई।

॥ सन १८५१ ईस्वीं ॥

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5,

THE APHORISMS

OF THE

VAIS'ESHIKA PHILOSOPHY,

or

KAŅADA

WITH

ILLUSTRATIVE EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMENTARY

BY

S'ANKARA MIS'RA.

Brinted for the use of the Benares ollege bp order of @obt. N. Ja. B.

MIRZAPORE:

ORPHAN SCHOOL PRESS : R. C. MATHER, SUPERINTENDENT.

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.

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PREFACE.

The great body of Hindu Philosophy is based upon six sets of very concise Aphorisms. Withont a commentary the Aphorisms are scarcely intelligible, they being designed not so much to communicate the doc- trine of the particular school, as to aid, by the briefest possible sugges- tions, the memory of him to whom the doctrine shall have been already communicated. To this end they are admirably adapted ; and, this being their end, the obscurity, which must needs attach to them in the eyes of the uninstructed, is not chargeable upon them as a fault. For various reasons it is desirable that there should be an accurate translation of the Aphorisms, with so much of gloss as may be required to render them intelligible. A class of pandits, in the Benares Sanskrit College, having been induced to learn English, it is contemplated that a version of the Aphorisms, brought out in successive portions, shall be sub- mitted to the criticism of these men, and, through them, of other learn- ed Brahmans, so that any errors in the version may have the best chance of being discovered and rectified. The employment of such a version as a class-book is designed to subserve further the attempt to determine accurately the aspect of the philoeophical terminology of the East as regards that of the West.

Benares College, J. R. B.

5th January, 1851. S

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THE

VAIS ESHIKA DOCTRINE.

-0-

INTRODUCTION.

A .- [ THE commentary, by S'ANKARA MIS'RA, the " Adorn- ment of the Aphorisms of KANADA," (Sútropaskara), commen- ces as follows]. B .- Salutation to the venerable Ganes'a! Victorious is the man-lion [Vishnu] dear to [the goddess] Lakshmi! Om ! I salute Hara [or Siva] in the lap of whose high.wreathed matted locks the river of the gods disports, and whose forehead is resplendent with [the moon] the lover of the night ! C .- My reverence is ever [due] to KANÁDA and to BHAVANK- THA-the two through whom I have become thoroughly proficient in the Vais'eshika doctrine. D .- Like [that funambulist] the spider [which runs on a thread -sútra-] my boldness also in this case will attain success, whilst I proceed, where I have no [other]. support, in reliance upon [those threads-sútra-] the Aphorisms alone [and not on any com- mentary*].

• -श्री गणेभाय नमः । श्री लक्षीनसिंश जयति।

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2 THE VAIS'ESHIKA APHORISMS.

E .- Certain discriminating persons afflicted by the triad of evils [see-Sánkhya Lecture-No. 80-], investigating the means of the cessation of the triad of evils, discovered, in various Scriptures, law treatises, histories, and sacred poems, that the means there- of is merely the perception of the real nature of Soul. Moreover, wishing to know the path which might be the means of attaining to that, they approached the preeminently benevolent sage KAŅÁDA. F .- Now KANADA, moreover, the great saint, possessing a knowledge of the truth, freedom from passion, and superhuman power [-see Sankhya Lecture-No. 13-], having reflected in his mind-as follows-viz .: "The preeminent way to the "attainment of the perception of the real nature of Soul is the "knowledge of truth [derived] from [the knowledge of] the "[mutual] agreements and disagreements of the Six Catego- "ries [into which the "omne scibile" is distributed] ;- and this "[knowledge of the mutual relations of the Categories] may be " completed, without toil on the part of these [enquirers] " by means of duty [of the kind-to be described elsewhere as] "characterised by forbearance [from works either positively evil "or undertaken with a view to the gaining of their transitory "fruits] ;- therefore I [KANÁDA] shall, in the first place, declare "what is duty-both as regards its characteristic mark and its

चोम । ऊर्ध्वबद्जटाजूटक्रोडाक्रीडत्सरापगम्। नमामि यामि- नोकान्तकान्तभालस्थलं हरम।१॥ याभ्यां वैशेषिके तन्त्रे स- म्यग्व्युत्पादितो इस्म्यनम। कणाद्भवनाधाम्यां ताभ्यां मम नमः सदा ॥२। सूतमाचावलम्बेन निरालम्बे ऽपि गच्छतः । द्योखेलवन्नमाप्यय साइसं सिद्धिमेष्यति । ३।

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LECTURE I. SEOTION 1. 3

"generic nature; and, immediately thereafter, I shall declare "the Six Categories by [the regular process- referred to by "Mr. Colebrooke at p. 264 of his Essays vol. 1. viz.,] enunci- "ation, definition, and examination:"-having settled this in his mind,-in order to [bespeak] the attention of these [en- quirers aforesaid]-he makes an offer* [in the shape of the Aphorism, No. 1, here following].

THE APHORISMS OF THE IST DIURNAL SECTION OF THE IST LECTURE.

The subject pro-7 ब्थाता धम्मं व्याख्यास्याम: ॥ १॥ posed. No. 1. Now, therefore, we shall describe duty. a .- [ The commentator, on this, remarks as follows]-By saying "Now"-he implies [that the enunciation of this Apho-

•- तापचयपराहता विबेकिनस्तापचयनिष्टत्तिनिदानमनुस- न्दधाना नाना त्रति स्मृतीतिहास पुराषेष्यत्मत स्वसाच्षात्कारमेव त- दुपायमाकलया म्वभ् वुस्तत्प्राप्तिदेतुभूतमषि पन्थानं जिन्नासमाना: परमकारुणिकं कणादमुनिमुपसेदुरथ कणादोऽपि महर्षिस्तत्वज्ञान- वैराग्यन्धर्यसम्पन्न: षलां पदार्थानां साधर्म्यवैधर्म्याभ्यां तस्व- ज्ञानमेवात्मतत्वसाचात्कारप्राप्तये परमपन्था इति मनसि लत्वा तच्च निर्ष्टातिलक्षणङमादेतेषामनायासेन सिद्धतीति लक्षणतः सरूपतस् धम्ममेव प्रथममुपदिशाम्यनन्तरं षपि पदार्थानुहेशल- क्षणपरीक्षाभिरुपदेश्यामीति हदि निधाय तेषामवधानाय प्रति- जानीते ।

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4 TBE VAIS'ESHIRA APHORISMS.

rism comes] immediately after [the intimation of] the desire of the disciples [to be informed as to how they may escape from the triad of evils]. By saying "Therefore"-be means-since disciples, apt to hear &c, and free from malice, have come to me .* b .- [ The commentary then goes on to offer an alternative explanation of these words-the remarks having much the same drift as those at the opening of the Muktavali (the commentary on the Bhásha-parichchheda) on the import of a " benediction" (mangala)-which the word atha " now" is held to stand for.t After disposing of this matter, the commentator proceeds to say-as follows]-Now he [KANÁDA] declares [or defines] the thing which he tabledt [in his first Aphorism-viz., duty].

The means of यतेोऽम्युदयनिःश्रेयससिङ्धि: स धर्म्मः। २। emancipation.

No. 2 .- Duty ( dharmma) is that from which there results ' emancipation' (nihs'reyasa) through ' exaltation' (abhyudaya). a .- [ In explanation of these terms the commentator tells us that) "exaltation" means [the being exalted by] the " knowledge of reality," and " emancipation" means the "absolutely final cessation of pain;" and "duty" is that from which come both [of these].f b .- But then [-exclaim the consulters of KANKDA-] the evidence [of your assertion] that the duty [that consists] of

-प्रथेति शिष्याकांचानन्तर्य्यमाह्न। अत इति यतः श्रवणदि पटवो Sनसूयकास्ान्तेवासिन उपसेदुरित्यर्थः । -यद्दा। चथभब्दो मङ्गषार्थः। ()-चथ प्रतिज्ञातमर्थमाइ।

टुभयं यतः सधर्म्मः ॥

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LEOTURE I. SECTION 1. 5

forbearance [from works either positively evil or undertaken with a view to the gaining of their transitory fruits] is the means of [attaining to] emancipation through the knowledge of truth -[the evidence of this-we say-] is the Veda. [Now] we [the present enquirers] deny the authority of the mere Veda-for it has the faults of being false, self-destructive, and tautological. That it is false [is proved] by a son's not being born even after there has been performed the [ceremony of] putreshti [or ' sacrifice for the sake of a son'-which ceremony, the Veda promised, was to lead to the birth of a son] .* c .- [ After citing examples-wbich we here pretermit-of what they take to be self-contradiction and tautology in the Veda, the objectors go on to say that] neither is there anything that shows that the Veda is an instrument of right knowledget, [and that, in short] the whole matter is a mass of uncertaintyt. d .- [ By way of reply to all these objections] therefore, [say s the commentator] he [KANADA] declares§ [as follows].

Why the Veda is held to be7 an authority in the matter.

No. 3 .- As it is the declaration thereof, there is an authority [or a right to be received as evidence] in the Veda.

• श्रुतिः प्रमाणम। त्रुतेरेव प्रमाण्यं वयं विप्रतिपद्यामे। चनृत- व्याघातपुनर कदोषेभ्यः । पुष्ेष्टौ अतायामपि पुचातुत्पादादनृत- त्वम. I + +- सर्वमेतदाकुलम।

5 ऋत भाइ।

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6 THE VAIS'ESBIKA APHORISMS.

a .- The word " thereof" refers to God-although the name [indicated by the pronominal bas not been mentioned before-or] is not standing near -for He is understood to be meant, from the notoriety* [of the use of a pronominal-like the English "He" or " Him" with a capital-when speaking of Him though not mentioned, on the occasion, previously]. b .- [And if you think that KANADA had no right to employ a pronominal where the name of what was thereby implied had not gone close before -then you must extend your censure-which you are not likely to do-to GAUTAMA ;- for the word 'God' is here indicated by a pronominall-just as in the aphorism of GAUTAMA [-the 57th in the 2nd Chapter-viz.,] " The unauthoritativeness " thereof [may be inferred] from its faults of untruth, self-contra- " diction, and tautology"-[as, I repeat,-in this aphorism of GAUTAMA-]the Veda too, which had not been mentioned near the place, is indicated by the expression " thereof."t c .- And thus [the meaning of the 3d aphorism appears to be this that] the authoritativeness [-i. e., as remarked in the Vedán- ta paribhásha, the being the instrument of correct Knowledget-] of the Veda (ámnáya) is [derived] from its being " the declaration thereof"-i. e., a revelation by Him who is the Lord.§

*- तदित्यनुपक्रान्तमपि प्रसिद्धिसिद्धतयेश्वरं पराष्भति । +-यथा तदप्रामाण्यमनृतव्याघातपुनरुतदोषिभ्य इति गौत- मोयसूच तच्छव्देनानुपक्रान्ती 5पि वेद: परामृभ्यते। +-प्रमाया: करणं प्रमाणम । 5-तथाच तद्चनान्तेनेव्वरेण प्रणयमादाखायस् वेदस्व प्रा

माएयम ।

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LECTURE I. SROTION 1. 7

d .- Or [if you do not choose to allow that the pronominal refers to God, you may say that] the " thereof" refers to duty- which [ term] does stand near* [-being mentioned in the prece- ding aphorism, No. 2]. e .- [Passing over the commentatorial details relative to this alternative view of the import of the pronominal, we go on to where, as the commentator tells us,] having, in pursuance of the wish of the disciples, explained what duty is, as regards its nature and its characteristic [ i. e. as regards its genus and differentia,] there is [next presented] an aphorism with a view to explaining the object-matter [of the treatise] and the relationt [between the treatise and that object-matter].

Enunciation of the Cate- gories, the Knowledge of धम्मविशे षप्रसूतादृव्यगुणकमसामान्य- which is to lead to Eman- विशेषसमवायाना साधम्यवैधर्म्याभ्या cipation. तञ्व ज्ञानाव्नि: त्रयसम् ।।४।।

No. 4 .- Emancipation [is to be attained] through the Know- ledge of truth, produced by a particular Kind cf duty [-that ex- plained under No. 4. g-] which [knowledge of truth] specially relates to the agreements and disagreements of [the Six Catego- ries, referred to at f., which Categories are] Substance, Quality, Action, Community, Distinction, and Concretion. a .- Such a knowledge of truth is dependent on the Vais'eshi- ka doctrine; therefore [do we assert that] it also [-viz., that

*- यद्ा तदिति सन्निच्चितं धर्षममेव परामुभति ॥ +-शिष्या कांध्ानुरोधेन सरूपता लक्षणतस्त्र धर्मम व्याखाया- भिधेयसम्वन्धप्रतिपादनाय सूचम, ।। t- एताहर्यं तन्वज्ञानं वैभेषिकश्ास्वाधीनमिति तस्यापि निःश्रेयसदेतुत्वं दण्डापूपितम ।।

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8 THE VAIS'ESBIKA APHORISMS.

this doctrine-] is a means of emancipation -just as a staff with cakest [-tied in a bundle to the end of it, to be carried on a journey-may be spoken of as a means of sustenance, for when the staff is brought then the cakes are brought]. b .- [In accordance with the established opinion, among Hindú commentators, that it is proper to point out not merely what is the object-matter of the book and what is the motive for attending to the matter, but also what is the relation of the book to its object-matter, and who is the person concerned in the enquiry-the commentator informs us that] here it is to be understood that the relation between this doctrine and emancipa- tion is that of cause and effect; between this doctrine and the know- ledge of truth, that of an instrument and its operation ; between emancipation and the knowledge of truth, that of effect and cause; and between the Categories 'Substance &c.' and the doctrine, that of matter for exposition and expositor *.

A dispute concerning the nature of Eman- c .- [The commentator then enters into

cipation. a long discussion of the opinions current respecting the nature of 'emancipation'. He denies that this consists in absorption into Brahma -for, he argues,] if you say that ' emancipation' is the absorption of the human soul into the divine soul, then this is absurd-if by ' ab- sorption' you mean the becoming one-for two never become one [of the same kind]. And the opinion of the Ekadandins [-those who, unlike the bearers of the triple staff, carry a

द्रव्यादिपदार्थशनासत्रयो: प्रतिपाद्यप्रतिपादकभावः सम्बन्धा 5वग- म्यते।

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LECTURE I. SECTION 1. 9

single staff as an emblem of their belief in but one reality-viz. Brahma or the Absolute-] is to be rejected-[the opinion viz .- ] that " 'Absorption' is the departure of the 'subtile body' "and the 'subtile body' is [the aggregate of] the eleven organs "[-see Lecture on the Sankhya No. 29] and " the departure "[we say] of these and of the [gross] body is absorption,"-[this opinion of the Ekadandins is to be rejected] because of the non-existence of any proof that Soul does consist of Knowledge and of Joy [as the followers of the Vedanta assert that it does]. And this scripture is no proof of it-viz .- " Brahma is the eternal, knowledge, and joy"-for this [when correctly interpreted] de- clares His possession of knowledge and his possession of joy [-not his being made up thereof] ;- for [-as every one knows-] there is such a feeling as "I know" or "I am happy," but not such a one as "I am knowledge" or "I am joy." *

d .- Moreover it turns out [-if we admit the tenet of the Vedanta that nothing really exists except Brahma-] that there is no difference between one emancipated and one mundane [or

*- ब्रह्मात्मनि जोवात्मलयो मुक्तिरिति चेत। लयो यद्येकीभा- वस्तदा बाधात। नष्ि दयमेकं भवति। लिङ्गशरोरापगमे लयो लिङ्च्स कादशेन्द्रियाणि तेषां शरीरस्यच बिगमो लय दरति त्वेकद- ष्डिमतमपासम.। चात्मनो जानत्वे सुखत्वच प्रभाणाभावात। नच नित्द विज्ञानमानन्दं ब्रह्मति श्रतिर्मानम। तस्या द्ानवत्वा- नन्दवत्वप्रतिपाद्कत्वात। भवति दि वहं जाने बहं सुखीति प्रती निर्नत्व जानमहं सुखमिति। B

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10 THE VAIS'ESHIKA APHORISMS.

still in the flesh] because each, [on that view of the case] even now, is Brahma. *

e .- [After some other remarks which we omit, the commen- tator says] the cessation of pain, [that cessation being] of the kind that has been described, [viz absolute] is the 'summum bonum.'t

f .- [With reference to the construction of the words in the aphorism-No. 4-he tells us that] in the expression " know- ledge of truth" the sixth [or genitive] case has the force of the ob- jective ; and in the expression "agreements and disagreements" the third [or instrumental] case has the force of specification t [-the knowledge being of that kind which the expression in the third case denotes].

g .- [In the aphorism-No. 4-] the expression "produced by a particular kind of duty" qualifies [or particularises] the expression "knowledge of truth." Here the particular kind of duty is that of forbearance § [-see No. 2. b .- ] h .- But if [-contrary to the analysis adopted under No. 4.

*- किस्व व्ह्मम ददानोमपि सन्मात मुरसंसारियोरविज्वे बापति: ।।

+-तन्वस्य वानमिति कमषि वष्ो। साधम्य वैधर्व्याभ्या- मिति प्रकारे ढतीया।

5-धर्मविभेषप्रसतादिति तच्वभ्वानादित्वस्य विभेषयम। तभ धमविभेषो निषत्तिलचको धर्मः

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LEOTURE I. SEOTION 1. 11

f .- ] it is the doctrine that is meant by the expression [which has been rendered] "knowledge of truth"-because "truth is known thereby" [i. e. by means of the doctrine,] then the " particular kind of duty" [of which we have given our own view under No. 4. g.] must be interpreted to consist in the ascertain- ment of and the grace of God-for it is a matter of tradition that "The great saint, KANADA, having attained to the ascertain- ment and to the grace of God, revealed his doctrine."* i .- And here, by "knowledge of truth" we mean to say the beholding of Soul-since thereby alone is it possible for imagi- nary and false knowledge to be rooted out.t j .- Now, enunciating the species included in the category of 'Substance,'-the one enounced first [in No. 4.] in consideration of its being what [alone] attains to emancipation [-since there- upon the other categories vanish-] and of its being the substra- tum of all the other categories, he [KANÁDA] goes on to say :t-

The Category of Sub- 7 प्टथिव्यापरूजो वायुराकाशं काला दिगा- stance divided. त्मा मन दूति द्रव्याणि ॥ ५ ॥ No. 5 .- Earth, water, light, air, ether, time, place, soul, mind -such are the Substances.

*- यदि तु तत्वं घायते बनेनेति तत्वज्ञानं मास्त्रमुचते तदा धर्मविशेष ईश्वरनियोगप्रसादरूपो वत्व्यः । त्रयते हीख्वरनियो- गप्रसादावधिगम्य कणादो महर्षिः शारतं प्रणोतवानिति।। +-तत्वज्ञानव्वात्मसाक्ास्कार इछ विवनितस्तस्यैव सवास-

• • इूदानीमपवर्गभागितया सर्वपदार्थात्तरयतयाच प्रथमोहिष्ट- स्य दरव्यपदार्थस्य विशेषोद्देशं कुर्व्वन्ना।

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12 THE VAIS'ESHIKA APHORISMS.

a .- The expression " such" (iti) is intended to make the asser. tion definite :- therefore the meaning is, that there are just nine Substances and not nine and more .*

b .- But [some one may object that] " Gold is not earth because "it is without odour [which-see the Tarka-sangraha p. 5 .- is "held to be the characteristic of earth]-nor is it water because it "is devoid of viscidity and of natural fluidity; nor is it fire " because of its weight-and, for the same reason neither is it air " or ether [both of which are held to be devoid of weight] ;- "therefore it is different from all the nine [enumerated in No. '5.]"-if [you say this-then I, the commentator, say] No :- your first two reasons are valid [against gold's being earth or being water], but your third is a case of [the fallacy termed] ' unreality of the alleged naturet'-[for the followers of this doc- trine hold that gold is not really heavy in itself, but appears to be heavy through its admixture with earthy particles-and] the gold itself is composed of fire or light.t c .- Qualities-in the shape of some quality or another-[-nct all qualities in all cases-] reside in all Substances, they are the

*- इतिकारो उवधारणार्थः। तेन नवैव द्रव्याणि नाधिकानि नवेत्यर्थः । +-ननु सुवर्ण न तावत एथथिवी निर्गन्धत्वात्। न जल से इसांसिड्रिकद्रवत्वभून्यत्वात.। न तेजो गुरुत्वात.। पत एव न वायुर्नवाकाशादि। ततो नवन्य भिद्यत दति चेत,।न। ब्राद्य- येरनामासत्वं वतीयस्य सरूपासिद्ूत्वम.।। +- सवर्णस्थ तैजस्त्वम।।

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LEOTURE I. SROTION 1. 13

characteristics of the Substances, and it is they which render Sub- stances cognizable ;- therefore, immediately after the Substances, he enunciates and divides the Qualities* [as follows] :-

The Category of कपरसगन्धसर्णा: संख्ा: परिमाणानि ए्टथकं

Quality संयोगविभागौ परत्वापरत्वे बुद्धयः सुखदुःखे ded. इष्छादेषौ प्रयलास गुणा: ।६। No. 6 .- Colour, Savour, Odour, Tangibility, Numbers, Mag- nitudes, Severalty, Conjunction and Disjunction, Distance and Proximity, Thoughts, Pleasure and Pain, Desire and Aversion, Efforts and [others] are the Qualities. a .- By the "and" he adds [to this list] Weight, Fluidity Viscidity, Momentum, Merit and Demerit, and Sound ; for these are notoriously known to be Qualities, and therefore he did not mention them by word of mouth.t b .- And [-next-] Actions are things perceptible, because they owe their existence to Substances and to Qualities, and they inhere in coloured [and therefore perceptible Substances ;- therefore, im- mediately after the naming of the Substances and the Qualities, he enunciates and divides the Category of] Actiont [as follows]-

*- गुपल्वेन रुपेष गुणानां सर्वद्व्यान्रितत्वं हव्यषिन्नतवं दरव्यानिष्यन्नकल्व पेति द्रव्याननरं मुबानासुदशं विभागचान।। + त्रिनोति। से तिअविडदुषपयावा फवेति कस्ठतो मोताः।

याच प्रत्यक्तेति द्रव्यगुय्ामिधानानन्तं कर्मोपविक्ायाज्ाा।।

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14 THE VAJS'ESHIKA APHORISMS.

The Category of Action divided. ति कर्मापि । ७।

No. 7 .- Elevation, Depression, Contraction, Dilatation, Mo- tion-such are the Actions. a .- The " such" [-conf. No. 5. a .- ] is intended to make the assertion definite ;- for whirling &c., too are not distinct from Motion, [and are not therefore omitted in the enumeration.] And here the kinds [of Action called] Elevation, Depression, Contraction, Dilatation, & Motion, are clearly five species inclu- ded under Action .* b .- [ This division of ' Action' is objected to by others, on the ground that ' Action' and ' Motion' are convertible terms,-80 that the citation of ' Motion' as one member in the division of ' Action' is nothing else than the citation of ' Motion' as one mem- ber in a five-fold division of ' Motion' itself. In the commentary before us this objection is treated voluminously. A more concise solution of the difficulty is offered in the Dinákari, a commentary on the Siddhánta-muktavali which is a commentary on the popu- lar text-book the Bhásha-parichchheda. The author of the Diná- kari, stating the opinion of the objector, says-]-now, since we can obtain ' Elevation', and the rest, from ' Motion' simply, the division [ of ' Action'] into ' Elevation &c.' is improper. Nor [can you say that] the fact of their being ' Motion' is not discer- nible in ' Elevation' and the others,-for, in the case of a clod,

*- इतिरवधारयाथः। अमवादेरपि गमनाडव्यतिरेकात।

सात्ाद्व्याप्याः पच्च जातयः ।

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.LEOTURE I. SEOTION I. 15

or the like, elevated upwards or depressed downwards, the convic- tion [-if there be any-] is-that is goes upwards, or it goes downwards [ -- so that there is a going-or ' Motion'-in either. case-] ;- bnt if you say this [-resumes the author of the Dinákri - ] it is not as you say-for one must not [ presnme to direct a great sanctified sage [like KANADA] whose will is independent* [and who may divide ' Action' according to his own good pleasure.] c .- Next after the topic of the enunciation of ' Substance' &c., [-see § 5 &c .- ] the topic of the communities of character be- longing to the three [-viz. to substance, quality, and action,-] begins. Here, since the disciple is on the look out for the ' com- munities of character' beloning to the three, because these [-see -§ f. in the Introduction-] conduce to the ' knowledge of truth [which-see§ e-leads eventually to emancipation],-even be fore enouncing the [remaining] three categories, beginning wit- ' Sameness' he mentions the communities of character belong- ing to the [first] three t-as follows.

stance Quality and AG In what respect Sub- सदनित्यं द्रव्यवत्काय्यं कारयं सामा-

tion do not differ from न्यविशेषवदिति द्रव्यगुपकर्मण्ामवि- one another. गषः।८।

*- सथैयमुत्खेप वादीनामपि गमनादेव खाभे उत्लेपषत्वादि- भिर्षिभागो Sनुचितः। नवा उत्येपणादौ गमनत्वं नानुभाविक। चर्ड्धमधन प्रचिप्रलोष्ठादौ छडू गच्ति पधो गच्छतीति प्रत्ववा- दिति पेद्र सतन्ो ्स्य मत् मेंनियन्तुमन्यत्वादिति। +-द्रव्यादीनामु ह्ेअपकरणानन्तर नयाया साधम्य प्रकरबमा- रम्थते। तब द्रव्यादोनां चयाथा साधम्वस्य तत्वम्ञानानुककष्ततबा

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1% TEE VAWLDINKA ATHURNNS.

No. 8-The indifferenee Sabstances, Qualities, and Actiom, is this that they are entities, not eterbal, inhering in Substance; effetts, causes, and having [-or being the only loci of-] genus udtimate difference. a .- The word 'indifferenee' means merely a ' community of character' {which mny exist, &, in the case of the three catego- ries in question, does exist] even where ' difference' also exists .* b-'Entities'-i. e. these three alone are the objeets in regerd to which the belief is entertained that they do exist-[and this belief is entertained] because these are associated with existence.t c .- 'Not eternal'-i. e. the counter-opposite [-and possible victim -- ] of an emergent non-existence [-in other words some- thing liable to destruction.] Although this character is not common te Atoms or the Ether &c.,-yet what we mean to speak of is the possession of the distinctive character as a category [- this distinctive character being here either that of Substance Quality or Action-] which resides in those things that are the 'counter-opposites of an emergent non-existence'-[-and which may reside, and does, in some that are not such].

प्रथमं भिष्याकांचितत्वात. सामान्यादिपदार्थचयस्येदेशव्ागेव भायाणां साधम्यमाच्र । *- विशेषे सत्यययमविभेषष्दः साधर्म्यमाचपरः । -सदिति मदाकारप्रत्ययव्यमदेभ्यविषयत्वं चयालामेव। सत्ता- येरगित्वात। -अनित्यमिति ध्वसप्रतियोगि । तद्यधपि न परमाषवावद्िादि- सधार तंथाषि ध्वंचप्रतियेगिट निपदार्थविभाजकोपाधिमत्वं वि- वचितम_I

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LECTURE I. SECTION 1. 17

d .- 'Inhering in Substance'-i. e., 'Substance' is the substratum thereof *[-in the absence of which neither a Quality nor an Ac- tion could exist- nor an ordinary Substance itself,-seeing that any such given substance as a jar exists only in virtue of the existence of the constituent Substances, e. g. its halves, which furnish its substratum].

e .- [The name of an 'effect' does not apply to such things as the Atoms which KANADA holds to be eternal; and the redun- dancy in the definition is explained away like the one in § 8. c.] f .- Now he states the ' communities of character' belonging to Substance and Quality only t [-excluding Action].

How far Substance and Quality agree, while differing from ड्रव्यनपयो: सजातीयारभवत्वं साधर्म्बम

Action.

No. 9 .- It is the common character of Substance and Quality that each originates its congener. a .- By the next aphorism he renders clear just the present one. $

दरव्याषि ट्रव्यान्तरमारभन्ते गुणाख गुणान्तरम. ।१०। No. 10 .- Substances originate another Substance, and Quali- ties another [like] Quality.

*- हव्यवदिति टकं समवायिकारणतवा Sस्वास्तीति दव्यक्त। +-इदानीं द्रव्यमुणयोरेव साधर्म्यमाइ। 1-एतदेव सृचान्तरेष सष्ट्यति। C

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18 THE VAIS'RSHIKA APHORISMS.

a .- [Thus the two halves of a jar originate, or prodnce, the jar; and the black or red colour of the halves originates the black or red colour of the jar.]

b .- But why then do Actions not originate other Actions ?- In reply to this he says* [as follows].

Action not the product of completed कर्म कर्मचाध्यं न विद्यते ।। ११।। Action. . No. 11 .- An Action is not what is established by an Action.

a .- The verb ' to be' [-in the expression ' An Action is' &c .- ] is here intended for knowledge [-that is to say, it is intended -like the ' logical copula' of European logicians -- to make one aware that the subject and predicate stand in such and such a relation to one another ] ;- but it does not connote existence t.

b .- The meaning [of the aphorism] is, that there is no evidence of an Action's being completed [or definitively resulting] in an Action, as there is of a Subtance's or a Quality's in its originated congener t-[$9]. [Action, or motion, commencing in the destruc- tion of a former conjunction-i. e. in the disjunction of the body from the place which it previously occupied, is regarded as being

*- जनु कर्माणि कुता न कर्मान्तरमारभन्त इत्यवार।

+-विदिरयं मानार्थों नतु सन्ताभिधायी। :- सजातीयारक्ट्रव्यगुपमोरिव कर्मसाध्ये कमषि प्रमाय ना- सोत्यर्थः।

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LEOTURE I. SEOTION 1. 19

completed in the subsequent conjunction of the body with another locality -see § 14. a.]. c .- He [now] states the the difference of character in Substance from Quality and Action *- thus.

Wherein Substance differs both from न दरूवं कार्य कारणच् बर्धति ॥१२। Quality and Ac- tion.

No. 12 .- Neither effect nor cause slays Substance.

a .- The meaning is-that its own product does not destroy a Substance, nor does its own cause destroy a Substance, because two substances which stand to each other in the relation of source and product [-e. g. yarn and the web formed thereof-] do not stand to each other in the relation of contradictoriest[-op- posed and opposing.] b .- 'Slays'-is an ' aphoristic' expressiont [-and the illustri- ous propounders of aphorisms have the privilege of employing words in ways more strange than would be tolerated in ordinary cases].

c .- He next states that a Quality [unlike a Substance] is destroy- ed [both] by its cause and its effect. §

*- गुणकर्मन्थां द्रव्यस्य वैधर्व्यमाष। +-द्रव्यं न सकाय दन्ति नवा सकारण इन्ति। कार्यकारणमा-

1-बधनीति सौचो निहेशः। 5-गुवस्य कार्यकारणमध्यत्वमाइ।

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20 THE VAIS'ESRIKA APHORISMS.

उभयधा गुक ।१३ ।

No. 13 .- In both ways Quality.

a .- That is to say-it is destroyed by its product and destroy- ed by its cause. In the case of the first, [second, third,] and following Sounds [generated in succession by the ethereal undulations originated by the sonorous body], and in the case of Notions [succeeding each other in the train of thought], and the like cases, there is an instance of [a Quality's] being destroyed by its own product [each successive thought, for instance, being the product and the superseder of the one preceding]. Bnt in the case of the last [wave, or the like, which is suc- ceeded by no other], we have an instance of its being des- troyed by its cause-for [-as our author chooses to view the matter-]the destruction of the last [Sound] is due [-since it can be due to nothing else-] to the penultimate one* [from which it also took its origin].

b .- [Sound-it must not be forgotten-is here regarded as a guality of the Ether, and Knowledge as a quality of the Soul].

c .- Having stated that Qualities are opposed by [or cannot co- exist with] their effects and causes both, he next states that an Action is opposed only by its effect.t

*_ कार्यबव्यः कारयबध्यसे त्यथ:। बायादिभव्द बुद्दीनां कार्यवड त्वं । चरमस्य तु कारबवहूत्वं। उपान्लेग नव्देनागवस्य मानान। +-गुणानां कार्यकारणोभवविराधित्नमुक्का कर्मचः बाबभाच- विरोषित्वमाच्।

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LECTURE I. SECTION 1. 21

कार्यविरोधि कर्म ॥१४।

No. 14 .- Action is opposed by its effect. a. -[The expression karyyavirodhi, in the aphorism, is] a Bahu- vrihi compound signifying ' whereof the effect is the opponent.' [Action is said to be opposed by its effect] because a motion is destroyed by the latter conjunction produced by itself* [-see 11. b.] b .- Having, in accordance with the wishes of the disciples, stated the communities of character belonging to the three [-see § 7], now, commencing the topic of Definition, t [-see Introduc- tion, f .- ], he says-

The definition of Substance.

No. 15 .- It has Action and Qualities, it is the [sole] intimately united cause [or substratum]-such is the characteristic of Sub- stance. a .- [The expression, in the aphorism,] kriya-gunavat means that ' in it both Action and Qualities reside.'$ b .- Here the word 'characteristic' means a mark-a species of exclusive token which distinguishes things of the same from things

*- कार्य विरोधि वस्थेति बजब्रीहिः । खजन्योत्तरसंयोगना- सत्वात. कर्मणः । +-भिष्याकांचानुरोधेन साधम्यं चमायामभिधायेदानी लक्ष- छप्रकरपमारभमाव भार। -क्रिया गुबख विदयते इसििम्िति क्रियागुणवत्.।

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22 THE VAIS'ESHIKA APHORISMS.

of another genus .- By its etymology it signifies ' that whereby something is recognised' .* c .- Likewise, the fact of being an 'intimately united canse' [or substratum] also is a difference of the category of Substance [alone-see § 18. a .- ] out of the six categoriest [-§ 4.]. d .- Since the enunciation of the Qualities came next after [that of] Substance, he now states the definition thereof t [next after the definition of Substance].

The definition L of Quality. नपेच इति गुणलक्षणम. ।१६। No. 16 .- Inhering in Substance, not having Qualities, not a cause of Conjunction or Disjunction if independent-such is the definition of Quality. a .- 'Inhering in Substance'-i. e. its wont is to reside in a Sub- stance. But this [charactet] belongs to Substance also, [as well as to Quality, for a jar is as dependent on its two halves for its existence as the colour of the jar is dependant on the Sub- stance of the jar]-therefore he says 'not having qualities'.§ b .- But still it [-viz. the definition, even thus narrowed-]

*मच सकषंग भन्दखिकव चनः समानासमानजातीयव्यवच्छेदक-

t-एवं समवायिकार णत्वमपि षट्पदार्थभेदकमेव द्रव्यपदार्थस्य लक्षणम् ।

5-दव्यमाययित शोलमस्येति दृव्यात्रयी। एतच द्रव्ये ऽपि गतमत चाड । सगुषवान् ।

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LECTURE I. SECTION 1. 23

extends [-where the definition of Quality ought not-] to Action [-which resides in Substance-see § 15. a .- and which is not a substratum of qualities-see § 8. c .- ] ; therefore, he says ' not a cause of conjunction or disjunction*[-which Action, or motion, is-see § 17]. c .- And [yet again, conjunction, which is a quality, may be the cause of conjunction-as the conjunction of the man's hat with his head may be the cause of the hat's, mediate, conjunction with the ground on which the man stands]-therefore he says [where it is so, it is not] 'independent [or direct].' Here, after the word ' independent' the word 'quality' is to be supplied [-which accounts for the masculine ending of the word]. The sense then is-'that which, being independent [or unaided by something intermediate], is not a cause of Conjunctions and Dis- junctions.'t d-He next states the definition of 'Action,' which -[see § 4-] was enunciated next after 'Quality.'t

The definition एकट्रव्यमगुणं संयोगविभागेष कारणमनपे- of Action. चमिति कर्मलचण म् ।१७।

No. 17. Belonging to a single substance, without qualities, a canse of Conjunctions and Disjunctions [and a cause there- of prospectively] independent,-such is the definition of Action.

*- तथापि कम एयतिव्याप्तिरित्यत ब्ाड संयोगविभागेव्वकारणम्।

+-भत उतं अनपेक्ष इति। बचानपेघ दत्यनन्तरगुण इति पूरणीयं। संयोगविभागेध्वनपेक्षः सन् कारणं यो न भवतोत्यरथः । +-गुणानन्तरमुदिष्टिस्य कर्मणो लक्षपनाइ।

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24 THE VAIS'ESHIKA APHORISMS.

a .- 'Belonging to a single substance'-i. e. that of which [unlike such Qualities as Conjunction and Disjunction] a single substance is the substratum .*

b-'Without qualities'-i. e. there is not in this any qualityt [of those in the list given under § 6].

c .- 'A cause of Conjunctions and Disjunctions independent' :- here the independentness consists in the [Action's] being inde- pendent [-not of Substance, for example, apart from which it cannot exist,-but] of any thing arising subsequently to its own production.t [Thus, whilst a Quality, such as Conjunc- tion, can be a cause-say of another Conjunction-see § 16. c .- only through the intervention of another Conjunction,-or whilst a Quality, such as the Weight, Odour, and the like, in the separate halves that are to form a jar, can be a cause-e. g. of the Weight, the Odour, and the like, of the jar itself-only through the intervention of another Quality-the Conjunction, namely, of the separate halves ;- Action, on the other hand, is the direct or immediate cause of the Disjunction of the moving body from the place which it quits, and of its subsequent Con- junction with the place which it reaches]. d. He now reverts to the topic of the communities of charac-

*- एकमेव दरव्यमात्रयो वस्य तदेकह्टरव्यम्।

• -- न विद्यते गुखो उस्मिम्नित्यगुणम

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LECTURE I. SECTION 1. 25

ter [belonging to the first three categories], since communities of character serve to establish a distinction [between what possesses and what does not possess these], just as does any definition* [the topic wherewith we are now concerned.] द्रव्यगुणकर्मषां द्रव्यं कारणं सामान्यम् stantial or intimate cause of the first three.

No. 18 .- Of Substances Quality and Action, Substance is the cause ; [-such is] a common character [of the three]. a .- That is to say-it is, singly, quite equally common [to the three]-as [when one says] "She [speaking of some woman-] is the common mother of the two".t The meaning is-that in one single substance, as a substratum (or substantial cause) there (may) reside, as products, Substance, Quality and Actiont -[for example-in the substance of a jar, as a substratum, there may subsist at once the jar itself, the colour of the jar, and the motion of the jar when floating down the Ganges]. b .- He states, as a common character of the thrce, that their non-intimate cause may be a quality.§

Quality the non-inti- mate cause of the first उभयथा गुण; ।१८। three.

*- सक्ण स्ेतर भेद् साधकत्वव त्वाधम्म स्यापोति साधम्यप्रकरणमु- पक्रमते +-समानभेव सामान्यमेकमित्वर्थः । चनयो: समाना मातेतिवत्। -एकस्मिश्नेव ट्रवये समवायिकारणे ट्रव्यगुणकर्माि कार्यापि वर्ततन्त इूत्यर्थः ॥ 5-गुणासमवायिकारवकत्वं भयाणां साधर्म्यमाच।

D

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26 THE VAM'MABEKA APRORIAXS.

No. 19 .- In two ways a Quality [may be a cause of all the three]. a.[He means to say that] a common character of the thres is this, that they possess that generic character which resides in whatever has a Quality as its non-intimate [or in-substantial] cause .* b .- Of Substances the non-intimate cause ia Conjunctiont [-as the conjunction of the threads is the non-intimate cause of the web. Then again-see Tarka-sangraha p. 22 .- the colour of the threads is the non-intimate cause of the colour of the web.t And thus a quality may be a cause ' in two ways'-inasmuch as the quality may be one already existing in the cause-e. g. tho colour,-or it may be one existent only in the product-e. g. tho conjunction]. c .- That a single action may sometimes produce more effects than one, he thus statesg.

A cause may pro- duce divers ef- संयोगविभागवेग्यानां कम ।२०। fects. No. 20 .- Of Conjunction, Disjunction and Momentum [or the manifestation of inertia in what is in motion], Action [-is the common cause]. a .- ' Is the common eause'-snch is the connection,l| [of this *- गुणासमवायिकारण उत्तिआतिमत्वं चितयवाधभ्यम। +-दृव्याणां संयोगो Sसमवायिकारणम्। 1-असमवायिकारण। यथा तन्तुसंबोग: पटस्य। तन्तुरुपं पटरुपस्य। त० स० ॥ 5-एकस्य कम्मणः कचिदनेककारित्वमाघ। ॥-समान कार णमित्यनुषङ्गः।

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LEOTVAS I. SROTION 1. 27

aphorism, with § 18. in which the words, here omitted ellipticnl- ly, occur]. । न ट्रव्याणाम, १२१। No. 21 .- Not of Substances. a .- That is to say-Action is not the canse of Substances. Why so ?- therefore [-since the question may be put-] he tells us .*

| व्यतिरेकात.। २२ । No. 22 .- Because of its abolition.

a .- ' Because of its abolition,'-i. e. because of the cessation [of Action when completed]. When the Action has been put an end to by the ultimate Conjunction [to which it tended-see § 14, a.], the [new] substance is produced [-as the jar is pro- duced when the two halves, being moved towards each other, have met, and the motion has ceased-]; hence Action is not & cause of a Substancet [-that is to say not a permanent and con- subsisting cause-for it is the cause of the Conjunction which is one of the permanent and con-subsisting causes of the jar]. b .- Now he mentions the fact that, in the case of a single pro- duct, many may have been the originators.t । दययाणं द्रव्यकार्य सभान्यम. ।२३ ।

*-- कम न द्रव्याणां कारणनित्यर्थः । कुत एनमत जाइ । +.अतिरेकादिति निषसेरित्वर्षः। उत्तरसंयोगेन कर्मषि निष्टत्ते द्रव्यमुत्पद्यत इति न कर्मणो टरव्यकारयत्वम। 1-इदानोमेकसिमिन काय बडनामारमकत्वंमार ।

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28 THE VAIS ESHIKA APHORISMS.

No. 28 .- A substance which ie a product is the common pro- perty [i.e. the common result] of substances [more than one].

a .- By ' substances' [in the plural] we mean either two or more. From two threads, a web of two threads originates ; and from many threads, a web [as usually met with] ;- but no web is seen composed of one [straight] thread. *

b .- But then [-the question may occur-] as a substance is the product of substances, and in like manner a quality that of qualities, is an action too the product of actions ?- therefore [to prevent such a notion from being adopted] he says :- t

· गुणबैधम्यान्न कर्मबाम. ।२४।

No. 24 .- Not of Actions [-more or fewer-see § 23 a .- any more than of a single Action-see 11.], through the difference of their character [in this particular] from that of Qualities-[is Action the product]. a .- ' Is Action the product'-such is the remaindert [of the sentence given elliptically in the aphorism]. b .- It has been mentioned [at § 9], as a characteristic com- mon to Substance and Quality, that they originate their conge-

*- ट्रूय्येच ट्रव्याषिथ द्रव्याषि। तच हाम्यां तन्तु्या द्विस- न्तुक: पटो वञ्भिरपि तन्तुभिरेक पट सार्यते नत्वेकतन्तुको डपि पटो हशते। -ननु यथा द्रव्याणां द्रव्मं कार्य गुणानान्त मुपसबा किं कर्मणामपि कर्म कार्यमित्यत भार। 1-कर्म कार्यमिति भेषः ।

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LEOTURE I. SECTION 1. 29

ners. But, with reference to the same point, it was denied-by the aphorism [ § 11 ] viz., " An Action is not what is established by an Action"-that actions originate their like. That fact is re-asserted in the present aphorism :- such is the state of the case .*

c .- Now, pointing out that Qualities which reside in the com- plex [-or in a complex substratum-] have their origin in more substances than one [at a time], he sayst- Of qualities re- quiring a complea द्वित्वप्रभ्ृतयः संख्था: ्ठथकं संयोगविभागाः substratum. 11 29 11

No. 25 .- Numbers from two upwards, Severalty, Conjunction, and Disjunction [arise from-or require for their production- more substances than one].

a .- ' Arise from more substances than one'-such is the remaindert [of the sentence given elliptically in the aphor- ism ;- & retrospective regard being had to § 23]. b. But then, as substances that are made up of parts [-see § 23-], and as the qualities before mentioned [at § 25], reside in

*- द्रव्यगुणयो: सजातीयारमाकत्वं साधर््यभुक्तम। तब कर्म कम्माध्यं न विद्यत इति सभेष कर्म्मया कर्ममजनकत्व प्रतिषिद्ध- भेव। तदिघान दयत दति भाव: । -इदानी व्यासव्यटत्तीनां गुणानामनेकद्रव्यारभ्यत्वं दर्भब-

1-पनेकद्रवारण्या इति भेष: ।

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80 THE VALS SIHIKA APBOBISMS.

what is complex,-why should it not be so with Actions also ?- [as this may be asked]-therefore be says *-

भसमवायात्मामान्यकार्य कर्म न विद्यते ।। २६॥ No. 26 .- Action is not the product of a collection, because it does not inhere [-see § 17-in two or more substances]. a .- 'Because it does not inhere'-to this is to be added the words ' in two substances or in more.' So then-one Action [numerically one], does not inhere in two substances ; nor does one Action inhere in a plnrality of substances ; therefore an Action is not the product of [or does not depend for its exis- tence upon] a collection-an aggregate.t b .- In this aphorism too [-as in § 11-see § 11. a] the verb 'to be' is employed for the purpose of predication-and does not coa- note eristence.t e .- Again [-as at § 23-] he mentions one product as that of several $ [causes]. · संयोगानां द्रव्यम् । २७ । No. 27 .- Of Conjunctions-a Substance. a .- That is to say-of many conjunctions [of separate parts or

*- नम्ववर्यावद्रव्याया गुणामाचचोतानां यथा व्यायज्यउस्तित्वं तथा कमणामपि किस्न सादत चाइ। +-असमवायादित्यन द्रयययेोर्द्रव्येष्विति बोव्यं। तथाच न दव्ययोरेकं कर्म समवैति। नवा द्र्व्येघ्वेकं कर्म समवैति। तेन सामान्यस्य समुदायस्य कार्य कर्म न विद्यते। -पचापि विदिर्धानार्थो न सत्तावचनः । 5- पुनर्वइ्ञनानेकं कार्यमाच्।

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LRCTURE I. SEOTION 1. 81

particles] a [given] substance is the result .* b .- This is to be understood with the exclusion of those Con- junctions which belong to intangible substances [-such as Time in its conjunction for instance with the jar or the web of today or yesterday-], and to ultimate formations [sach as a jar, which is a substance formed of its two halves, but which does not go to make a part of any other single substance], and to hetero- geneous substancest [-such as the half of a jar and some threads]. c .- Now he mentions a single resalt as that of many qualitice. t

। रुपाणां रूपम ।२८।

No. 28 .- Of colours [one] colour [is the resnlt]. a .- 'One colour is the result'-such is the connection [wbich the aphorism requires that we should bear in mind]. b .- The word ' colour' in both instances [of its occurrence in the aphorism] is indicatory-and the indicative power here is that of ' a word which does not [-while indicating something else be- sides-] abandon its own meaning,' Il [-so that whilst the word ' colour' here indicates the other qualities in KAVADA's list of qualities, it continues not the less to denote colour also ;- unlike

*- बहनां संयोगानां ट्रव्यमेकं कार्यमित्यर्थः । +-निखर्शमां द्रव्याषामन्यावयबिनां बिज्ातीबद्रव्याणाच्च ये संयोगासान विहायेति द्रष्टव्यम। -इदानों बडनां गुणानाबेंकं कार्बनाड। 5- रपमेकं कार्य मित्यन्वयः । ।-रूपपद् कुभयममि यायगिवनजपस्तायानेवं चबना।

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32 THE VAIS ESHIKA APHORISMS.

the word ' lion' employed to indicate a hero, in which case the word ' lion' ceases to denote a quadruped. See Sáhitya Dar- pana § 14. a.]. c .- For these [qualities], being present in the cause, originate, in the products, one single quality of the same kind *- [as the weight of the one half of the jar and the weight of the other half produce together the weight of the jar formed of these halves].

d .- He now states that a single Action may be the result of a plurality [of causes].t

No. 29 .- Of gravity, effort, and conjunction, Elevating [may be the result]. a .- That is to say-Elevating may be the single result of theset [three-and it is to be observed that you cannot raise what has no weight].

b .- Here too [-as in § 28. b.] the word ' Elevating' is indica- tory of [its kindred terms] ' Depressing' &c.§ [ see § 7 ]. c .- Reminding us merely of [what may have escaped the reader's memory-] the declaration in the aphorism [ § 20 ]

*- एते ि कारणे वर्नमानाः कार्येषु समानजातीयमेकमेव मुख मारभन्ते । +-एकस्य कर्मओो 5नेककार्यत्माइ। 1-उत्वेपष मे ककार्यममी प्ामित्वर्थः । 5-सथाययुत्केपयपद् मपछेप मादावपि लाक्षाबिकम।

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THE VAIS'ESHIKA APHORISMS. 33

that " of Conjunction, Disjunction and Momentum, Action [is the common cause],"-he says -*

What are the results of Actions. । संयोगविभागाख कमशाम् ।३०॥

30 .- Of Actions, Conjunctions and Disjunctions [are the re- sults]. a .- ' Are the results'-such is the remainder + [required to supply the ellipsis.] b .- But then [-some one may object] it was declared before [-at § 21 and § 24] that substances and actions are not the pro- ducts of Actions ;- but it is just Conjunctions and Disjunctions [-see 16. c .- ] that have for their results the Conjunctions and Disjunctions [which you now allege are the results of Action] ; -and so now your styling Action a cause is contradictory [to your previous declarations]. In reply to this, therefore, he says :- । कारणसामान्ये दरव्यकम्मणां कम्ाकारपमुतमिति ।३१। 31 .- In [our discussion of] cause in general, it is of Substances and of Actions that Action has been styled no cause.

*- संयोगविभागवेगानां कमेति दचोत्रमेव सारयन्याइ। +-जम्या इति शेष: । 1-ननु द्रव्यकमणी न कर्मकार्य्ये इति पूर्षमुकरं। संयोगविभा- मैा तु संयोगविभागकार्य्यावेव। तथाचेदानी कर्मनः कारपत्वा- भिधामं विदङू मित्वत श्राइ।

E

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34 I.ECTURE I. SECTION 1.

a .- By the expression ' causes in general' he refers to the topie [that he has been engaged upon]. So-when we were on the topic of the mention of causes in general, it was in respect of Snb- stances and Actions that Action was stated not to be a cause ;- but it was not intended to be said that Action was not a cause in respect of anything whatever,-because this would des- troy [by making nonsense of] the aphorism [ § 30] viz .- " Of Actions, Conjunctions and Disjunctions [are the results"]. b .- So much for the first diurnal portion of the first Lecture in [the commentary entitled] " The Adornment of the Aphor- isms of the illustrious and venerable KANADA."+

*- कारबसामान्यपदेन प्रकरसमुपखव्यते। तेन कारवसामा- न्याभिधानप्रकरणे द्रव्यकर्मशी प्रति कर्मय सकारपत्वमुतं। नदु नर्वथाप्यकारबमेव कर्मोत विवशितं बेम संयोगविभागाख कर्म- बामिति सूयं व्याजन्येतेति भाव:। +-इति श्रोमङ्गवत्वपाटयूनोपस्वारे प्रथमाव्यायस्व प्रयम- माकिकम।

। मिरज़ापुर ॥

। बतीमों के बपाब़ाने में शापी गईं।

· सन १८५१ ईसी ।

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6 .

THE APHORISMS

OF THE

MÍMÁNSÁ PHILOSOPHY

BY

JAIMINI.

WITH

EXTRACTS FROM THE COMMENTARIES.

IN SANSKRIT AND ENGLISH.

Printed for the use of the Benares College, by order of Govt., N. W. P. .

-000-

ALLAHABAD: PRINTED AT THE PRESBYTERIAN MISSION PRESS. Rev. Jos. WARREN, Supt. 1851.

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:

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PREFACE.

-00000-

The great body of Hindu Philosophy is based upon six sets of very concise Aphorisms. Without a commentary the Aphorisms are scarcely intelligible, they being designed not so much to communicate the doctrine of the particular school, as to aid, by the briefest possible suggestions, the memory of him to whom the doctrine shall have been already communicated. To this end they are admirably adapted; and, this being their end, the ob- scurity, which must needs attach to them in the eyes of the un- instructed, is not chargeable upon them as a fault.

For various reasons it is desirable that there should be an ac- curate translation of the Aphorisms, with so much of gloss as may be required to render them intelligible. A class of pandits, in the Benares Sanskrit College, having been induced to learn English, it is contemplated that a version of the Aphorisms, brought out in successive portions, shall be submitted to the criticism of these men, and, through them, of other learned Brahmans, so that any errors in the version may have the best chance of being discovered and rectified. The employment of such a version as a class-book is designed to subserve further the attempt to determine accurately the aspect of the philosophical terminology of the East as regards that of the West. J. R. B.

Benares College,

31st July, 1851.

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THE MÍMÁNSÁ APHORISMS.

INTRODUCTION.

a. SALUTATION to the feet of the venerable preceptor !*

b. Veneration unceasingly be to Jaimini, who removes the de- fect of vision of the simple by the collyrium-needle of his Insti- tutes which put an end to doubt as to the sense of scripture.t

c. Now a doubt being started as to whether or not Jaimini ought to have undertaken this work, which consists of twelve lectures,-and the primd facie solution of the doubt being as fol- lows-viz .- such a work of disquisition ought not to be under- taken, because a work of disquisition is of no use when Heaven (swarga) is obtained by the mere taking of the letters [of the Veda without regard to its sense], Heaven alone being [in this case] to be supposed the fruit, as it is in the case of the sacrifice called viswajit [-mentioned in the 4th canto of the Raghuvan- sa-], it being to be expected that there is some fruit attached *श्ररी गुरुचरपोभ्यो नमः॥

चकेजे नमो जैमिनये Sनिशम्।

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2 THE MIMANSA APHORISMS.

to the perusal enjoined in the direction 'The Veda is to be per- used' [-and Heaven being most probably the fruit when no other fruit is specified ;- well, this prima facie solution of the doubt having presented itself,] he declares the established tenct* [in regard to the point, as follows].

BOOK I. CHAPTER I.

SECTION I.

OF DUTY.

अथातो धर्मजिज्ञासा॥ १॥

Aph. 1 .- Next, thercfore, [O student that hast The subject pro- posed. attained thus far] a desire to know Duty (dharm- ma) [is to be entertained by thee]. a. 'Next' :- i. e. after perusing the scriptures whilst residing with the family of a preceptor.t

b. 'Thcrefore' :- i. c. because the fruit of the perusal of the scripture is the knowledge of the sense [of its several passages,

*अथ द्वादशाध्यायात्मकं शास्त्रमारम्भणीयं नवेति संशये। साध्यायो Sथयेतव्य दति विद्िताध्ययनस्य फलाकाङ्डायां विश्व- जिनन्यायेन खर्ग एव फलं कल्प्यं। तथाचाचरग्रइणमाचेष खर्गसि द्वा विचार शास्त्रस्याकिन्दित्क रत्वात् विचारशास्तरं नार- माणीय्र्मत पूर्वपच्ते सिद्धान्तमाइ। + अथेति। अथ गुरुकलवासपूर्वकवेदाध्ययमानन्तरम्।

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BOOK I. SECTION 1. 3

without comprehensive apprchension of the import of its teach- ings-sce Lecture on the Vedanta §6]; therefore, in respect of Duty, the definition of which will be stated [in Aph. 2.], " a de- sire to know"-i. e. an investigation originating in a desire of knowledge-is to be made ;- such is the remainder* [required to supply the ellipsis in the aphorism].

c. The state of the case is this, that assuredly the work of dis- quisition ought to be undertaken, because such a work of disqui- sition is just subserved by [or has a foundation laid for it in] that knowledge of the sense [of the several passages of scripture, that may be attained by a perusal thereof ], and because it is fit that what is effected by a perusal thcreof should be a correct un- derstanding of the sense thereof [-instead of Heaven's being at- tained thercby, as supposed by the speculater in Intro. c.] seeing that it is improper to imagine an unseen reward [of this or that action] when a visible reward is possible;t [-and the under- standing of the sense of scripture is a manifest reward of its per- usal, whilst the attainment of Heaven by the perusal of scripture is what no one can declare that he has ever found manifested by the senses].

d. As the question will occur-" What is the Duty spoken of, in the expression 'a desire to know Duty', in the preceding

• अतः। यतो Sथययनस्य फलमर्थज्ञानं। अ्रतो धर्मस् वच्यमाणलक्षणस्य जिन्ासा। ज्ञानेष्कासाध्यो विचार:। कर्त्तव्येति शेष:।

• अयम्भावः। सम्भवति दष्टफले अरदष्ट फलकल्पनमनुचि- समित्यध्ययनेन तदर्थनिक्वयसम्पादनस्येाचित्वाद र्थज्ञानस्य वि. चारशास्त्रधीनत्वादिदं विचारशास्त्रम वश्यमारम्णीयमिति।

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4 THE MIMANSA APHORISMS.

aphorism?"-in order to acquaint us with the nature of Duty, he mentions its characteristic mark as follows .*

चोदनालचणो 5यी धर्मः॥२ ॥

How Duty is to Aph. 2 .- A matter that is a Duty is recog- be recognised. nised by the instigatory character [of the pas- sage of scripture in which it is mentioned].

a. ' Instigatory character' [of the passage] :- this means [that the criterion of Duty is] an expression that moves [or instigates] onet [to do so and so].

b. ' Is recognised'-i. e. is known thereby ;- as fire is recognised by smoke, so that the smoke is the mark whereby fire [though un- seen] is known [to be present where the smoke takes its rise] ; in like manner an instigatory form of expression is the mark by which we recognise Duty. So Duty is that, the criterion, or the instrument [in the determination], of which, is an instigatory form of expression.$

What essentially c. And what constitutes any thing such a constitutes Duty. matter [i. e. a matter that is fit to be urged in

• पूर्वस्रचे धर्मजिन्ञासेत्म को धर्म इति जिन्ञासायां धर्मखरूपज्ञानाय लक्षपमाढ्। + चोदनेति प्रवर्त्तकशब्दनाम। + लच्यते सायते अनेनेति लक्षणं। यथा धूमेनवक्कि लंच्यते पति वक्रिशाने लक्षपखूमः। तद्दत् धर्मजञाने लक्षषं चोदना। इत्थन्न चोदनैव लच्णं करवां यस्य।।

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BOOK I. SECTION 1. 5

scripture as a Duty]is the fact of its not producing more pain than pleasure* [-i. e. its being calculated to produce more pleasure than paint].

d. And by this [mention, Aph. 2., of the mark whereby Duty is to be recognised], it is moreover suggested that a Duty is not to be apprehended by the senses or by any thing else besides the instigatory charactert [of a passage in scripture].

e. But now [some one may ask], " Since, according to [the lexi- con called] the Medini Kośa, 'The word dharmma should be mas. culine when it means merit, but when it means sacrifices, &c., it is held to be neuter,' how is the word dharmma masculine in the aphorism where it means the Agnihotra sacrifice and others [which are recognised as matters of Duty by the instigating pro- mises attached to their performance] ?"-if you ask this,-then take [and be content with] as the reason thereof the fact that he [JAIMINI] is a great sanctified sageg [-and therefore entitled to give the word what gender he pleases. Conf. the Vaiseshika Aphorisms No. 7. b].

f. In the foregoing aphorism [§2.] it was intimated that the cause of [our correctly recognising] a Duty was simply an insti-

• अर्थत्वञ्च सुखाधिकदु:खाजनकत्वम्। + This definition of dharmma may be compared with the Benthamite defini- tion of the Useful. + एतेन चोदनातिरिक्रेन्द्रियादिगम्यत्वं धर्मस्य नेत्यपि सचितम्। 5 ननु। अदृष्टे पुंसि धर्म: स्यात् क्लीबे यागादिके मत द्रति मेदिनीकोशात्। अगिद्ोआ्रादिवाचकधर्मशब्दस्य सचे पुंसत्वं कथमिति चेदार्षत्वमेव बीजमिति गृड़ाप।

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6 TIIE MIMANSA APHORISMS.

gation [in the shape of a passage of scripture holding out a reward for its performance], but not any other evidence such as that of the senses, &c. Since it is impossibe that the doubt, as to whe- ther other evidences do enter into the case or not, should be re- moved without examination, he proposes the examination thereof* [as follows].

तस्य निमित्तपरीषटिः। ३।

The definition of Aph. 3 .- An examination of the cause of [our Duty discussed. recognising] it [-viz. Duty,- is to be made.]

a. 'Of it',-i. c. of a knowledge of the truth-the object [in respect of which that knowledge is wanted] being Duty. 'The cause',-i. e. the means. 'An examination' thereof,-i. e. a dis- quisition, a discussion, through decisive confutations [of the op- posite opinion-see the Nyaya Aphorisms No. 39-] preceded by arguments [in support of the position laid down :- such an examination] is to be made :- such is the remaindert [required to supply the ellipsis in the aphorism]. b. [In the following aphorism] he explains the assertion that he made* [in Aph. 2].

• धर्मे चोदनेव निमिन्तं नतु प्रत्यचादीतर प्रमाणानीति पूर्वस्तचेण जापितं। दतरप्रमाणानि तन्र प्रसरन्ति नवेति संशयस्स परीक्षामन्तरा निषृत्त्यसन्भवात् तत्परीच्षां प्रति- जानीते। + तस्येति। तस्य धर्मविषयकतत्वज्ञानस्य। निमिन्ं। करणं। तस्य परीष्टिः। परीच्षा। युक्तिपूर्वकसाधकतकें- रविचारः। कर्त्तव्येति शेष:।

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BOOK I. SECTION 1.

सत म्प्रयोगे पुरुषस्येन्द्रियाणां बुद्धिजन्म तत्प्रत्यक्षमनि मिन्तं विद्यमानोपलम्भात्॥ ४॥

Duty not an object Aph. 4. When a man's organs of sense are of sense-perception. rightly applied to something extant, that birth of knowledge [which then takes place] is Per- ception,-[and this Perception is] not the cause [of our recogni- sing Duty-see § 8-] because [the organs of sense are adapted only to] the apprehension of what is [then and there] existent [-which an act of Duty is not.]

a. 'When rightly applied to something extant' &c. [That is to say]-when a man's organs of sense are 'rightly applied to', or brought into contact with, ' something extant', i. e. some ob- ject [then and there] existing, what 'birth of knowledge', or of intellection, takes place, is [what we call] Perception :- and such Perception is 'not the cause', i. e. not the producer, of a know- ledge of Duty :- that is to say-the organs of sense, which are the means of arriving at the truths of perception, do not [of themselves] enable us to arrive at the truth in respect of Duty.t

b. Of this [-viz. that the senses arc not the means of our discerning Duty-] he mentions the reason [-when he says-in § 4] 'becsuse the apprehension of what is existent'; that is to

• प्रतिज्ञातमेवार्यं विशद्यति॥ + सत्म्प्रयोग दति। पुरुषेन्द्रियाणां। सति। विद्य- माने विषये। सम्प्रयोगे। संयोगे सति। यत् बुध्याः। ज्ञानस्य। जन्म तत्प्रत्यक्षं। ईदशं प्रत्यचं धर्मज्ञान अनि- मिन्तं। नोत्पादकं। प्रत्यक्षप्रमासाधनीभूतानीन्द्रिर्याणि धर्म- प्रमां न साधयन्तीति भाव:।।

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8 THE MIMANSA APHIORISMS.

say-becausc, by means of the organs of sense there is the appre- hension of ' what is existent', i. e. of some thing [then and there] present ;- and since Duty [-in the shape, suppose, of the per- formance of sacrifice-] is not present at the time of our knowing it [to be a Duty to perform the sacrifice,-] it is not adapted to the organs of sense .*

Not being an object of c. From its being disproved that the sense-perception, Duty is not to be recognised by in- senses are the cause thereof [i. e. of our ference from such percep- discerning Duty-] it is to be understood tion. as also disproved that Inference, or Ana- logy, or Conjecture [see Wilson's Sánkhya Káriká p. 21 .- ] which owe their birth thereto-having their root in Perception-can be the cause thereof. Therefore it is a settled point that the characteristic of Duty [-or that whereby we are to recognise it- as declared in Aph. 2 .- ] is the instigationt [of the passage in scripture where some act is mentioned as being calculated to lead to such and such consequences].

The doubt whether the d. But then, an objector may urge,] cvidence in favour of a Du- ty may not be fallacious as -"after words and meanings have pre- is that of the senses. sented themselves, since the connection betwcen the two is one devised by man-consisting, as it does, of the conventions which man has devised,-therefore, as sense knowledge wanders away from truth in respect of mother o' * तन्न हेतुमाइ। विद्यमानोपलम्भात्। विद्यमानस्य। वर्त्तमानस्येव बसुनः। दृन्द्रियैरुपलम्भात्। धर्मस्यच ज्ञान- काले म्रसत्वेन इन्द्रियायोग्यादिति भाव:॥

व्याप्निज्ञानसाह स्यार्थापन्तीनां तश्निमित्तत्वं निर्षमवगन्तव्यं। अतश्चोदनामान्नगम्यत्वं धर्मलच्षणमिति सिद्म्।

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BOOK I. SECTION 1. 9

pearl or the like [when it mistakes them for silver or the like], so since language, as it is dependent on man inasmuch as it has reference to the knowledge of a connection which was devised by man, is liable to part company with veracity in matters of de- claration, the instigatory nature [of a passage which, being in words, is liable to be misunderstood,] cannot be the instrument of correct knowledge in respect of Duty" :- well, this primd facie view of the matter having presented itself, he declares the esta- blished doctrine as follows .*

सात्पत्तिकलु शन्दसाथेन सम्बन्वसस्य ज्ानमुपदेशो ्व्यतिरेकश्नार्थेऽनुपलब्धे तत्प्रमाणं बादरायणस्यानपे- चत्वात् । ५ ।

Reply-that this Aph. 5 .- But the natural connection of a word doubt does not af- with its sense is [the instrument of] the know- fect the evidence of Scripture. ledge thereof, [i. e. of Duty], and the intimation [of Scripture which is] unerring though given in respect of something imperceptible. This [according to our opi- nion as well as that] of BADARAYANA [the author of the Vedanta Aphorisms] is the evidence [by means of which we recognise Du- ty], for it has no respect [to any other evidence-such as that of sense]. a. 'Of a word,'-i. e. of an expression that is a constituent

• शन्दार्थयोरुत्पत्यनन्तरं पुरुषेष कल्पितसक्वेतात्मक

व्दस्य यथा प्रत्यचज्ञानं शुक्तिकादी सत्यत्वं व्यभिचरति तथा पुरुषाधीनत्वेन शान्देऽपि सत्यत्वव्यभिचारसन्भवान्र धमें चोदना प्रमानमिति पूर्वपचे सिद्धान्तमाइ। B

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10 THE MIMANSA APHORISMS.

part of the everlasting Veda ;- such as-"He that desireth Pa- radise should solemnise the Agnihotra sacrifice," &c .*

b. 'With its sense'-i. e. with the meaning whish is to be conveyed by this or thatt [word].

c. 'Connection'-in the shape of powert [or of God's will that this or that word should convey this or that meaning].

d. 'Natural'-i. e. inherent,-in short, eternal.§

e. Thence [i. e. from the eternal connection of a word with its sense] is the knowledge ' thereof'-i. e. of Duty. Here [i. e. in the word jnana] the affix lyut conveys the force of the 'instrument', -so that the word signifies the instrument of knowledge or of right understanding.#

An objection, found- f. But then [some one may ask]-"since it ed on the impossibility is notorious in the world that, after hearing of verification in the case overruled. the expression 'It [-e. g. a mountain-] is fiery',-having seen, with the organ of sense, the fire [asscrted to be, e. g., in the mountain], one then admits [-what one was not prepared to admit before subjecting the matter, on some occasion or other, to the test of the senses]- that matter of testimony is [or may be] matter of right knowledge * शब्दस्य। नित्यवेदघटकपदस्य। अग्रिषेत्रं जुडयात्खर्ग- काम इत्यादे:॥ + सर्थेन। तत्तत्प्रतिपाद्यार्थेन। + सम्बन्वः। शत्रिरूप: ॥ प्रत्पत्तिकः । खभाविकः। नित्व दति यावत् । । अतसस्य। धर्मस्य। ज्ानं। अन्र करणे खुट्। चत्रेयंथार्थज्ञानस्य करगम्।

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BOOK I. SECTION 1. 11

[-or, in other words, that Testimony may be relied on, seeing that we have found it corroborated by the evidence of the sen- ses-]; since [we say] what is conveyed by Words [or Testimo- ny] has need of other evidence, such as the senses, how can it be this to which we owe our right knowledge of Duty ?"-It is with an eye to this [anticipated objection] that he says, [in the Apho- rism, that the testimony is here the evidence] 'in respect of something imperceptible', meaning thereby [that Duty is] some- thing not to be apprehended by means of the senses or any other evidence* [apart from that specified in §2].

g. 'Intimation'-i. e. declaration of a fact.t h. 'Unerring'-i. e. which is not seen to diverge therefromt [i. e. from the fact].

i. 'For it has no respect'-i. e. because it has no reference to sense-perception, &c.§

j. 'This'-i. e. a sentence consisting of an injunction-is the evidence [on which rests our knowledge] of Duty ;- such is the eonsentaneous opinion of BADARAYANA.|| The drift [of what we

• ननु वक्किमानिति शब्दश्रवणानन्तरं प्रत्यव्ेण वक्िं दष्ट्रा शन्दे प्रमात्वं ग्रृह्ातीति लोके प्रसिद्धेः प्रत्यचादीतरप्रमाण- सापेक्षत्वाच्छव्दस्य स कथं धर्मे प्रमाणमत क्राह अनुपलब्ध दति। अनुपलब्धे। प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमागेरज्ञाते यें।। + उपदेशः। अर्थप्रतिपादनम्॥ + अरव्यतिरेक:। अव्यभिचारी दृश्यते अातः। 5 अनपेक्षतात्। प्रत्यच्ादनपेक्षत्ात्। W The mention of the name of BADARAYANA (or VYASA) in the Aphorism goes to prove that JAIMINI's work, the purvva-mimansd, was not antecedent in time to VYASA the author of the uttara-mimansa. Mr. Colebrooke's ren- dering of the terms purvva and uttara by 'prior' and 'later' (-see Essays. vol. .1. pp. 227 and 295 -- ) would seem to have led Dr. Ritter to suppose that

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12 THE MIMANSA APHORISMS.

have been arguing] is this. The sentence "The mountain is fiery", when employed by a man who is defective [in some of his organs of sense], wanders away from the fact [-for the moun- tain may seem to such a one to be fiery when it really is not-]; therefore we require to make use of our senses to ascertain whe- ther credence is due [to the testimony of fallible man] :- but the injunction " He that desireth Paradise should solemnise the Ag- nihotra sacrifice" never at any time past present or future is lia- ble thus to wander from the truth; therefore is it, independently of any thing else, the clear evidence of a duty .*

SECTION II.

ON THE ETERNITY OF SOUND.

The validity of k. It was stated in the foregoing Aphorism Scripture implies the [No. 5] that the connection between a word eternity of Sound. and its sense is eternal [-see §5 d.]; and since this is dependent on the eternity of Sound [-seeing that if Sound were not eternal, then words formed of sound could not JAIMINI's system was the earlier in point of time. He says, (at p. 376, vol. IV. of his History of Philosophy,-Morrison's version -- ) that "according to Colebrooke, the adherents of this school may be divided into the earlier and the later",-and then he goes on to speak of " the older and genuine Vedan- ta" :- but in fact the terms 'prior' and 'later' refer to the divisions of the Veda which JAIMINI and VYASA respectively expound, the latter confining himself to the Upanishads, or theological sections, which stand last in order. * तत्। विधिघटितवाक्यं। धर्मे प्रमाणं बादरायणा चार्यस्य सम्मतं। अयमाशयः। पर्वता व्चिमानिति दोष वत्पुरुषप्रयुत्तां वाक्यं अार्त व्यभिचरति। अ्रतः प्रामाएय- निश्वये प्रत्यच्ादिकमपेक्षते। तथा Sग्रिकेनं जुदोतीति वाक्यं कालचये Sप्यर्थ' न व्यभिचरति। अत इतरनिरपेच धर्मे प्रमापमिति।

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BOOK I. SECTION 2. 13

be eternal, nor consequently the relation of such to their significa- tions-], he, seeking to demonstrate this, sets forth, in the first place, the prima facie view of the question in the shape of the opinion of those who assert that Sound is not eternal .*

कमके तन्र दर्शनात् ॥ ६।

First objection to the Aph. 6 .- Some say that it [viz.Sound]

is a product. eternity of Sound, that it is a product, for in the case of it we see [what constitutes it such].

a. 'Some say that it is a product, &c' :- 'Some'-i. e. the fol- lowers of the Nyaya-say that Sound is a ' product',-i. e. some- thing not eternal; 'for we see'-i. e. we see an effort made ; 'in the case of it'-i. e. in the case of Sound; and it is a rule without exception that that is not eternal which effort is concerned in [the existence of ].t b. Moreover [the Naiyayikas contend that Sound is not eternal for the following reason]t.

म्रस्थानात्।७।

Second objection, that it is transitory. Aph. 7 .- Because of its transitoriness.

• पूर्वसच्े शब्दार्थयोसम्बन्धो नित्य रत्युतां। तच्च शब्द नित्यत्वाधीनमिति तत्विसाधयिषुरादी शब्दानित्यत्ववादिमतं पूर्वपच्मुपादयति। + कर्मेति। एके। नैय्यायिका:। कर्म कानित्वं शब्दं वदन्ति। तन्न। शब्दविषये। दर्शनात्। प्रयत्नदर्शनात्। यद्विषयः प्रयत्नः सोSनित्य रति व्याप्रेः। + किञ्न॥

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14 THE MIMANSA APHORISMS.

a. 'Because of its transitoriness'-i. e. because it is not per- manent ;- or in other words, because, beyond a moment, it is no longer perceived .*

b. Moreovert [the Naiyáyikas contend that Sound is not eter- nal for the following reason]. करातिशब्दात् ।८।

Third objection, that Sound Aph. 8 .- Because [we employ, when is stamped as factitious by the usage of language. speaking of Sound,] the expression ' mu- king.'

a. That is to say-because we treat it as something not eter- nal, inasmuch as we talk of making a sound, just as we talk of making a jar.t

b. And for the following reason also, he mentions, they hold it to be not eternal.§

Fourth objection, that the सत्वान्तरे योगपद्यात्। । alleged eternity of Sound is incompatible with its unde- niable multeity. Aph. 9 .- From its simultaneousness in another person. a. [To complete the sentence] it is necessary to supply 'in another place', when we speak of 'another person' :- so then, we observe ' simultaneousness', i. e. the fact of belonging to one and the same time,-'in another being'-i. e. in the perception of [Sound by] another living creature occupying a different place.|l

• किञ्न॥ + यथा घटं करातीति तथा शब्दं करोतीतनित्यत्वव्यव- हारात्। 5 दतो डप्यनित्य रत्याइ। । स्त्वान्तर दति। देशान्तर रत्यपि पूरणीयं। यथा।

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BOOK I. SECTION 2. 15

b. The scope [of the objection] is this, viz., the unity of Sound will follow from the very same argument by which, for shortness, its eternity will be established [by the followers of the Mímansa, -supposing the argument to be admitted]; and thus one [nu- merically single] thing would be simultaneously perceived by [and hence simultaneously in immediate contact -see Nyáya Aphorisms, No. 4-with the sense-organs of] those both near and far ;- and this could not be if it were [numerically] one and eternal ;- therefore [the Naiyáyikas conclude] Sound is not eter- nal and it is plural .*

c. And for the following reason too [according to the Naiyáyi- kas] it is so [-that Sound is not eternal-], so the author men- tions itt :-

Fifth objection, that sounds Aph. 10 .- And [the Naiyáyikas infer are liable to grammatical that Sound is not eternal, from the ob- inflection. servation] of the original and altered forms [of sounds].

a. What is meant is this,-because it holds universally that that is not eternal the previous condition of which undergoes a change; and in the example dadhyatra [i. c. 'milk-here']

देशान्तरे। अन्यदेशस्थसस्वान्तरे। प्राएयन्तरप्रत्चे। याग- पद्यमेककालिकत्वं दष्टम्। अ्यमाशयः। यथा लाघवाद्नित्यत्वं तथा तेनैव हेतुना शब्द एकत्वमपि सेस्स्यति। दत्यन्ज्ैकस्य वस्तुनस्य निक्ृष्टविप्र- रुष्टप्रत्यक्षं यगपङ्गवेत्। ददमेकत्वे नित्वत्वे ऽनुपपन्नं। अत्ो Sनित्यः शब्दो नानाचेति॥ + दूतो डपि तथेत्याइ।।

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16 THE MIMANSA APHORISMS.

where the original form was dadhi atra, there is a change in the shape of the letter y in the room of the original letter i .*

्दद्विस् कर्नृभूम्नास्य । ११। Sirth objection, that Sound proves the greater when more are engaged in making it. Aph. 11 .- And, by a multitude of makers, there is an augmentation of it.

a. For this reason too, it [viz. Sound] is not eternal, that ' an angmentation', i. e. an increase, 'of it', i. e. of Sound, is observed [to be caused], 'by a multitude of makers', i. e. by the nume- rousness of those who make it. On the other hand, if you as- sume that human effort is [not the maker but only] the manifester of Sound, [-as a lamp is not the maker of a jar but the mani- fester of it-making cognizable the jar which previously existed unperceived-then we reply, that,] what is manifested is not seen to be made greater even by a thousand manifesters, as a jar is not made larger by a thousand lamps, [and Sound is made greater by a multitude], therefore [say the Naiyáyikas] the al- ternative supposition of 'manifestation' [instead of production] will not answer :- such is the import.t

• दध्यवेत्यत्र दधि अत्रेति प्रक्रतिस्िता प्रक्ृतिभूतेकार- खाने यकाररूपो विकारो भवति। यस्या: प्रक्ृतेर्विकारखो Sनित्य दति व्यात्रेरिति भाव:॥ + कर्वभूम्ना। कर्टबाहल्येन। अ्रस्य। शब्दख। दद्धि:। महसवं दृश्यते वरतो Sप्यनित्यः। पुरुषप्रयत्नस्य शब्दव्यण्टा- कत्वपच्षे व्यञ्त्रकसइस्रेषापि व्यंग्यस्य दद्विर्न दश्यते। यण दीपसइस्रेणापि घटस्य। अरतो व्यन्नकतवपचो डयुत्त कति भाव:।

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BOOK I. SECTION 2. 1;

b. The several objections thus alleged The refutation of these objec- tions in undertaken. against the 'manifestation' view [of Sound's coming to be perceived], he proceeds to refute in their order .*

समन्तु तत्र दर्शनम् ।१२ । Aph. 12 .- But alike [according to both opini- How far both par- ties agree. ons-that of these objectors and of ourselves] is the perception thereof-[both agreeing that this is only for a moment, whatever difference of opinion there may be as to Sound itself's being so.] a. 'But alike &c.' There requires to be supplied [to complete the aphorism] 'for a moment' and 'according to both opinions.' According to both opinions,-i. e. according to the opinion that it is produced and the opinion that it is manifested,-' alike,' i. e. without dispute, 'the perception,' i. e. sensation of Sound, is for a moment, i. e. only for a moment.t

b. Though [so far as this point is concerned] they are alike, yet which of the views is the best? To this question the reply is that the ' manifestation' view is the proper one; so he proceeds to say as follows.t * एवं व्यम्न्रकत्वपचे बवनि दूषणान्युक्त्तानि क्रमेण परि- इर्ुमुपक्रमते। + सममिति। चणमिति मतद्दय तिच पूरणीयं। मत- इये। उत्पद्यते व्यज्यत दति मतह्ूये। नषपं। चपमानं। दर्शनं। शब्दप्रत्यचं। समं। अ्रविवादम्। समत्वे 5पि कतमः पचो वरिष्ठ वति प्रश्ने व्यञ्यतवपचो युक्त दत्याइ। C

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18 THE MIMANSA APHORISMS.

सतः परमदर्शनं विषयानागमात् । १३।

Aph. 13 .- Of this [Sound] while it really How Sound erists even when not manifested. exists, the non-perception at another time [than that when the sound is perceived] arises from the non-arrival of the manifester at the object.

a. 'Of this while it really exists' &c. ' While it really exists,' -i. e. which is at all times extant [whether perceived or not] ;- 'at another time,' i. e. at a time before or after ; 'the non-per- ception,' i. e. the absence of perception, [arises] from non-arrival of the efficient manifester at ' the object,' i. e. at the Sound .*

b. The import is as follows. Sound is eternal, [as we are con- strained to admit] by force of the recognition that ' This is that same letter K' [-viz. the same Sound that I heard yesterday or fifty years ago-, and I recognise it as I might recognise a peak of the perennial Himálaya which I do not suppose to cease to exist when I turn away my eyes from it-], and in virtue of the law of parsimonyt [one of the fundamental laws of philosophizing acknowledged by philosophers both of the East and of the West, and implying that we must never assume more causes of a given effect than are sufficient to account for itt].

• सत दूति। सतः। सर्वदा विद्यमानस्य। परं। पू्वा- त्तरकाले। अदर्शनं। प्रत्यच्ाभावः। संस्कर्नु य्यश्न्नकस्य विषयं शब्दं प्रत्यनागमात्। + अयं भावः। स एवायं ककार द्ति प्रत्यभिज्ञाबलात्। लाघवाच्च। शब्दो नित्यः।

t In opposition to the Mimansakas, the Naiyayikas contend that the form of expression 'This is that same letter K.' is grounded merely on the fact that the things referred to are of the same kind,-just as is the case with the ex-

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BOOK I. SECTION 2. - 19

c. The conjunctions and disjunctions What prevents its being always perceived. [-or undulations-] of the air issuing from the mouth [of him who speaks or shouts] remove the still air* which was the obstacle to the per- ception of Sound, and thence it becomes perceptible :- such is the reply to the objection [recorded in Aph. 7] of its ' transitori- ness.t'

d. He next replies to the objection [recorded in Aph. 8] that we use the expression 'making' [in regard to Sound].t

प्रयोगस्य परम् । १४ ॥

When we say we ' make' a Aph. 14 .- This [expression ' making'] sound, we ought to mean that means [merely] employing. we ' employ' a sound. a. In regard to Sound, when we spcak of ' making,' the word 'making' means, or imports, ' em- ploying,' i. e. uttering.§

pression ' He has taken the same medicine that I did.' See the Siddhanta Muktavali p. 103. Compare also the remarks of Whately on the ambiguity of the word 'Same,' quoted at p. 39 of our 'Introduction to the Inductive Philosophy.'

• Europeans hold that Sound is due to vibration. Jaimini admits that it is not perceived when there is no vibration; but he argues that the absence of vibration, or the stillness of the air, is what prevents us from perceiving the sound which never ceases to exist, whether perceived or not.

• मुखोद्गतवायुसंयोगविभागा: शब्दप्रत्यक्षप्रतिबन्वकीभ तस्ििमितवायुन्दूरीकर्ष्वन्ति। ततः प्रत्यक्मिति ब्रस्थानादि- व्वस्योत्तरम्।

8 प्रतिशब्दं करोतीतच करोतिपदं प्रयोगस्। उच्चा- रपस्य। परं। तात्पर्यकम्॥

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20 THE MIMANSA APHORISMS.

b. He next replies to the objection [recorded in Aph. 9] that Sound is heard simultaneously by different individuals .*

As one sun is seen by ma- Aph. 15 .- The simultaneousness is as ny men, so is one sound heard. in the case of the sun.

a. 'As in the case of the sun:'-that is to say,-as the Sun, which is but one, is seen simultaneously by those stationed in different places, so, like the sun, Sound is a great object, not a minute onet [such as cannot come at once under the inspection of persons at any distance from one another.]

b. He next replies to the objection [recorded in Aph. 10] re- specting the original and altered forms of sounds.t वर्णान्तरमविकार: ॥९६।

Letters are enchanged, not Aph. 16 .- This [viz. the letter y-re- transmuted. ferred to in Aph. 10 .- when it comes in the room of the letter i] is another letter, not a modification [of that whose place it takes].

a. 'Another letter' &c,. That is to say,-in the room of the letter i is another letter-another sound-a different sound in short. It is not a modification of the letter i as a mat is a modi- fication of the straws [out of which it is formed]. If it were so, then, as the maker of a mat is under the necessity of providing himself with straw, the man that employs the letter y would be under the necessity of taking the letter ig [to make the y out * सख्वान्तरे यागपद्यादित्यसोत्तरमाइ। + ब्रादित्यवदिति। यथा एक: सय्या नानादेशखैयुंग- पदीच्यते तथा श्रादित्यवनद्दान् शब्दो न सक्ष्म इति भाव:।

5 वर्णान्तरमिति द्रकारख्ाने यकार: वर्णान्तरं। शब्दान्तरं

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BOOK I. SECTION 2. 21

of ;- which is not the case, for one can use the letter y without any reference to the letter i ].

b. He next replies to the objection [recorded in Aph. 11] that there is an augmentation* [of the sound when the makers of it are numerous].

नादवृद्वि: परा ।१७।

Increase of noise not in- Aph. 17 .- It is the increase of noise [not crease of Sound. of sound ] that is [in that case] augmented. a. ' It is of noise,' &c. It is an error to say [as in Aph. 11] that it is an increase of sound that is ' augmented'-i. e. rendered greater.t b. 'Increase of noise.' From many beaters of drums, or pro- nouncers of articulate sounds, it is recognised [by the hearers] that 'There is a great sound.' In such a case it is impossible, according to the opinion of our opponents [the Naiyáyikas] to say that portions of Sound, being produced by each of the men [concerned in the making of the noise], produce a great bulk of Sound, like a bulk of cotton [formed out of portions of cotton aggregated], because Sound, according to these opponents, inas- much as it is a quality, has no partst [or portions].

अन्यशशन्द दति यावत्। न दकारस्य विकारसृणानां कट यूव। तथा सति कटकर्चा नियमेन तपसम्पादनवत् यकारं प्रयुन्नन्नियमेनेकारमादद्यादिति भाव:। * दद्दिश्वेत्यसयोत्तरमाइ। नादेति। परा। अतिशयिता। शब्दद्टद्विरिति भ्रम- विषया। + नाददद्रिः। बङभिभेरीध्रद्गिः वर्णात्मकशन्दमुचचार-

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22 THE MIMANSA APHORISMS.

c. Therefore,-as there is no arriving [at an explanation other- wise],-when the conjunctions and disjunctions [occasioned by the vibration of the air] take place continually without inter- mission, arriving from all quarters at the entrance to the hollow of the ear, it [the Sound] seems to be great, and to be made up of parts. What is meant [in Aph. 17] by ' noise' is these con- junctions and disjunctions, and it is just of these that an aug- mentation takes place* [when a multitude of persons is engaged in rendering Sound manifest].

d. Having thus removed the objections offered by others, he proceeds to state what will establish his own theory.t

नित्यसु स्यादर्शनस्य परार्थतात् ॥१८॥

Sound eternal, else it Aph. 18 .- But it must be eternal, because would not avail for its exhibition is [available-which it else communication. would not be-]for the sake of another.

यद्विवा मद्दान् शब्द दृत्युपलन्यते। तत्र परमते प्रतिपुरुषं शब्दावयवा उत्पन्नासतान्तः तूले मदत्त्ववच्छब्दे महत्त्वं सम्पाद- यन्नीति वक्तुमशक्ं। परमते शब्दस्य गुणतेन निरवयव- तवात्। * कातो Sगत्या कर्णशष्कुलीमणडलस्य सर्वतस्रणिं व्यापु- वद्मिः संयोगविभागे ने रन्तर्येणासक्कङ्गइणान्मद्दानिवावयवा- निवच प्रतीयते। संयोगविभागा नादपदेन वाच्यालेषामेव दद्धिरिति भाव:।। एवं परप्रतिपादितदूषणान्यड्वृत्य खमते साधकं वतुं प्रक्रमते।

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BOOK I. SECTION 2. 23

a. 'Eternal'-i. e. sound must be eternal. Its 'exhibition'- i. e. its utterance-[here denoted by the term] darsana [from dris 'to see'] because Sound is perceived or becomes manifest thereby [i. e. by means of utterance]. 'Because for the sake of another'-i. e. because it is [available] to the end that another may understand one's meaning. If it were not cternal, then, as it would not continue till the hearer had understood our mean- ing [-the perceived sound ceasing on the instant that it reaches the ear-], the understanding [of what was uttered] would not take place because of the absence of the cause :- such is the im- port .* [The understanding of what is uttered must follow-at however short an interval-the perception of the sound uttered; and if the sound uttered perish on the hearing, then, being no longer in existence, it cannot be the cause of any thing. If, on the other hand, it continue to exist, for any period however short, after ceasing to be perceived,-it is impossible to assign any other instant at which there is any evidence of the discon- tinuance of its existence,-whence its eternity is inferred.]

b. Moreovert [as Sound is prospectively eternal, so was it an- teccdently-for] :- सर्वत्र यागपद्यात्॥१९॥ Aph. 19 .- [Sound is proved to be Sound is eternal, because hund- reds simultaneously recognise a eternal] by there being everywhere sound, which cannot therefore be a new production. simultaneousness [in the recognition of it by ever so many hearers].

• नित्य दति शब्दो नित्यस्स्यात्। दृश्यते व्यज्यते शब्दो Sनेनेति दर्शनमुच्चारणं। तस्य परार्थत्वात्। अ्रन्यस्यार्थप्रति- पत्त्यर्थत्वात्। अनित्यत्वे श्रोतुरर्थप्रतिपत्तिपर्यन्तन्न तिष्ठतीति प्रतिपत्तिन स्यात कारणाभावादिति भाव:। + किञ्न।

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24 THE MIMANSA APHORISMS.

a. 'Every where:'-say in the word go, simply, [-a single example of a word here sufficing as the representative of any or every word-]. 'By there being simultaneousness'-i. e. be- cause there arises simultaneously [in the minds of a hundred or more persons, on hearing the word go-"a cow"]-a correct recognition. That "This [letter G, of the word go,] is that samc letter G [that I have heard on an indefinite number of former occasions,]" is the recognition, simultaneously, of many persons ; and a multitude of persons do not simultaneously fall into an error [-this being as unlikely as it is that a hundred arrows discharged simultaneously by a hundred archers should all by mistake hit the same object-]; such is the import .*

b. When the word go " cow" has been pronounced ten times, one says "The word go has been pronounced ten times" but not "Ten words of the form go have been pronounced;" and he next declares that Sound is proved to be eternal by this fact also.t

संख्ाभावात्॥ २०॥

Sound is eternal, because each Aph. 20 .- [Sound is proved to be sound is not numerically differ- ent from itself repeated. eternal] by the absence of Number.

a. 'Of Number:'-i. e. because Number [which belongs to that which, being transitory, is succeeded by another of the same kind,] does not belong to Sound [-for the word go, heard ten

• सर्वन। गोशन्दमात्रे। यागपद्यात्। अ्बाधितप्रति- झया युगपदुत्पन्तेः। स एवायं गकार इति युगपदनेकेषां प्रत्यभिज्ञा भवति नह्यनेके युगपङ्रान्ता भवन्नीति भाव:। 1 दशक्ृतवो गोशन्दसोच्चारणे दशवारमुच्चरितो गोशन्द द्रतेव वदति नतु दश गोशन्दा उच्चारिता कति। बतो 5पि शब्दो नित्व दत्याइ़।

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BOOK I. SECTION 2. 25

times over, is just the same word go,-as remarked under Aph. 19. b.] This is plain .*

b. And for the following reason too it is eternal, as he states :t-

बनपेच्चलात्। २१ ॥

Sound is eternal because Aph. 21 .- [Sound is proved to be eternal] indiscerptible. by there being no ground for anticipation [of its destruction].

a. That is to say, because we do not know any cause that should destroy Sound. To explain :- as, on the mere inspection of a web, for instance, one feels certain that-"This web was produced by the conjunction of threads, and it will be destroyed by the destruction of the conjunction of the threads,"-so, from our having no such certainty as to any cause that should lead to the destruction of Sound, we conclude that it is eternalt [-on the same principle that the immortality of the Soul has been argued from its indiscerptibility].

b. But then [-some one may say-] " Sound is a modifica- tion of the air, since [-as you admit under Aph. 17 .- ] it

• संस्ेति। शब्दे संख्याभावात्। स्पष्टम्। + दूतो डपि नित्य दत्याइ। + शब्दनाशकारणस्याज्ञातत्वादित्यर्यः। यथा पटादिद-

तीति निश्चिनोति तथा शब्दनाशकारणनिक्वयाभावाब्वित्व इति भाव:।। D

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26 THE MIMANSA APHORISMS.

arises from the conjunctions thereof [with the organ of hear- ing] ;- and so too the Sikshá [-that appendage to the Vedas which treats of pronunciation-] tells us ' Air arrives at the state of being Sound ;'-and thus being a product of Air, it is not eternal." This doubt having presented itself, he declares* as follows :-

प्रस्थाभावाच् योग्यस । २२।

Sound not due to Aph. 22 .- And ]the case is not as the Air, because not tan- doubter under Aph. 21. b. suggests], because gible. [if it were so] there would be no perception [by the organ of Hearing] of any object appropriate to it.

a. 'Appropriate to it;'-i. e. an object of the sensation that arises from the organ of Hearing-viz., Sound :- 'because there would be no perception ;'-i. e. by reason of our finding the absence of any perception ;- because modifications of the Air are not what the organ of Hearing takes cognizance of,- Sound not being something tangible [as the Air is held by the Naiyayikas to be, while Sound they admit has an altoge- ther different substratum,-viz., the Ether-]; such is the im- port.t

• ननु शब्दो वायुविकारः। तदीयसंयोगैरुत्पन्नत्वात्। तथाच शिक्षा वायुरापद्यते शब्दतामिति वायुजन्यत्वाद नित्य दत्याशङ्गायामाइ।। + योग्यस्य। श्रोेन्द्रियजन्यप्रत्यक्षविषयस्य। शब्दस्य। प्रस्याभावात्। प्रत्यक्ाभावप्रसङ्गात्। वायुविकारस त्रोत्े- न्द्रियाग्राह्यत्वात्। शब्दस्याप्यस्पृश्यत्वाच्चेति भाव:॥

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BOOK I. SECTION 3. 27

लिङ्गदर्शनाच्च। २३॥

Sound is eternal, for this Aph. 23 .- And [Sound is proved to be is implied in Scripture. eternal] by our seeing a proof, [of this, in a text of the Scripture which will be cited in the commen- tary here following].

a. That is to say ;- because we see a proof that language is eternal, in the following text-viz., "By language, that alters not, eternal,"* &c.

b. And the truth is, that, although this declaration [-viz. the text just quoted-] was intended for another purpose [than to prove the eternity of Sound], still it does declare, incidentally, the eternity of language, and therefore Sound [without which it is impossible that language should be eternal] is eternal.t

c. Here ends the topic of Sound.t

SECTION III. ON THE NATURE OF SENTENCES, &c. d. Though thus Sound is eternal, as also the connection be- tween Sound and sense, still, that an instigation in the shape

• वाचा विरूपनित्ययेति मन्त्रे नित्यया वाचेति लिङ्गदर्श नादित्यर्थः ॥

• यद्यपीदमन्यपरं वाक्यं तथापि वाचो नित्यत्वमनुवदति तम्मातित्यश्शब्द पति भाव:।। + शब्दाधिकरणं समाप्रम्।

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28 THE MIMANSA APHORISMS.

of a sentence is no proof of any thing's being a duty, he states [on behalf of an opponent, and therefore] ironically as fol- lows :*-

उत्पन्तो वा रचना: स्युरर्थस्यातश्निमित्तत्वात्। २४।

Objection that though Words Aph. 24 .- This [-viz. the knowledge may be eternally connected of the meanings of words-] being by with their meanings, still this does not apply to Sentences. nature, still let these [-viz. the con- nections between sentences and their meanings-] be factitious,-because the cause of [the knowledge of ] the meaning [of the whole sentence] is not this [knowledge of the meanings of separate words].

a. 'This being by nature:'-i. e., the fact that knowledge of the meanings of words is natural [and "in short eternal'-see Aph. 5. d .- ] being granted ;- still the connections between sentences and the meanings of the sentences are 'factitious,'-i. e. are devised by man; because of its being ' not that,- i. e. [because of its being] something different from the knowledge of the meanings of the words, that is the 'cause,' or producer, thereof,-viz. 'of the meaning,' i. e .- of the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence.t

b. For [-to explain-], the sense of a sentence is not barely

• एवं शब्दस्य शब्दार्थसम्बन्वस्यच नित्वत्वेऽपि वाक्यात्मि का चोटना न धर्मे प्रमाणमित्याच्िपति। + उत्पत्ताविति। उत्पन्ना। पदार्थज्ञानोत्पन्ती सत्यां। वाक्यवाक्यार्थयोसम्बन्वाः रचनाः। पुरुषकल्पिताः। स्यु: । अर्थस्य। वाक्यार्थज्ञानस्य। अतत्। पदार्थज्ञानभिव्नं। निमिन्तं। कारणं। यस। तस्वात्।

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BOOK I. SECTION 3. 29

the [aggregate of the separate] senses of its words. There is [-we will admit-] a connection between a word and its sense [-a connection, as remarked under Aph. 5. c., in the shape of power, or of God's will that this or that word should convey this or that meaning-]; but it is not the fact that the connection between a collection of words in the shape of a sentence, and the sense of that sentence, is in like manner that of power [-or of God's having pre-arranged that such and such groupes of words should convey such and such a sense]; but the connection is quite a different one, and it is devised by man, and is artificial: -how then can such be our evidence for [-or the cause of an absolutely correct knowledge of ] Duty? Such is the import of the aphorism conveying the primd facie view .*

c. He now declares the established view.t

तज्ञूतानां क्रियार्थन समान्नायो पर्थस्य तश्निमित्त- त्वात् । २५ ।

Aph. 25 .- [In each injunction of Scripture Analysis of a Sentence. there is seen] the mention, along with a verb, of those [words] that are in it, because it is this [viz., the knowledge of the sense of the words-] that is

• नहि पदार्थ एव वाक्यार्थः। पदस्य पदा्थेन सह सम्बन्वसथा पटसमूहरूपवाक्यस्य वाक्यार्थन सह न शक्रि- सम्बन्वः किन्तन्य एव। सच पुरुषकल्पितः कचिमः कथं धर्म प्रमाणमिति पूर्वपचसचाभिप्रायः।

• सिद्धान्तमाइ।

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30 THE MIMANSA APHORISMS.

the producer of [the knowledge of] the meaning [of the sen- tence].

a. 'Of those that are in it' ;- i. e. of those several words that are extant in these [sentences]; 'along with what signifies action',-i. e., along with a term that expresses power [-in other words, along with a verb-]; 'the mention', i. e. the reading [or the employment] is observed, in [the texts which enjoin] the Agnihotra sacrifice, &c. Hence the knowledge of the sense of a sentence-[knowledge] which we had not be- fore [hearing or reading it]-comes only from a collection of words which involves a verb :- 'because it is this that is the producer',-i. e. because of the fact that 'this'-viz. the know- ledge of the meaning of the words, is the producer', or cause, thereof .*

b. To explain :- In the injunction " He that desireth Paradise should celebrate the Agnihotra sacrifice" [see Aph. 5. j.], the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence-viz., that it is by the sacrifice called the Agnihotra that one may secure Paradise,- does not take place unless there be present the meaning of the words [-viz., the words Agnihotra and Paradise-]; but the knowledge of the meaning of the sentence just consists in the knowledge of the mutual relation, consistently, of the meanings

• तडूतानां। तेषु कुप्नानां प्रत्येकपदानां। क्रियार्थेन। शक्रिवाचिना पदेन सह। समास्न्नायः। पठनं। दृश्यते।

देवापूर्वेा वाक्यार्थग्रहः। अर्थस्य। वाक्यार्थज्ञानस्य। तव्षि मित्तत्वात्। तत्। पदार्थज्ञानं। निमिनं। कारवं य।

तत्वात्।

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BOOK I. SECTION 3. 31

that arise before us from the words :*- [so that if it be agreed that the meaning of the separate words is not dependent on man's contrivance, so neither is that of sentences formed out of such words ;- and such additional difficulties as may seem to grow out of this view will be grappled with in the sequel].

लोके सब्ियमात्प्रयोगसन्निकर्षः स्थात् ॥ २६॥

As in secular matters, so in Scrip- Aph. 26 .- Since, in [the secu- ture, the formation of sentences not lar language of ] the world, there capricious. is a regular order,-[so in the Veda also] let there take place the employment [of language according to a fixed system to be learned through traditional instruction].

a. 'In the world' ;- i. e. in secular speech ;- having discern- ed what is meant by the word,-or, with a previous knowledge of what is meant by the word-, ' since there is a regular order' i. e. since there is an employment [of words according to a fixed system,-men not devising phrases capriciously-so] in the Veda also, let there be-founded on knowledge derived from the tra- ditional instruction of teachers,-the ' occurrence'-i. e. the tak- ing place-of an employment of language [according to a fixed system].t

• अग्निद्दोत्रं जुहयात्खर्गकाम द्रत्यत्र अग्निहोतनामक- होमेन खर्गम्भावयेदिति वाक्यार्थज्ञानं न पदार्थापस्थिति- मन्तरा भर्वात किन्तु पदादुपस्थितानामथानां योग्यतया परस्परसम्बन्वज्ञानमेव वाक्यार्थज्ञानमिति भाव:। + लोके। लकिकशब्दे। पदार्थ दष्ट्रा पदार्थशनपूर्वकं।

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32 THE MIMANSA APHORISMS.

Again he [the author] ironically states that this [the Veda]. is no authority in regard to duty, because [forsooth] it is not eternal, and it has been made by men, and men are liable to err .*

वेदांसेके सत्निकर्ष पुरुषास्ा:॥२७।

Objection to the eternity of the Vedas Aph. 27 .- And the Vedas that they contain the names of men. some declare to be something recent, [because] there are the names of men [in it].

a. 'The Veda,' &c. :- i. e. since there are the names Káthaka, and Kauma, &c., therefore it is 'recent'-a matter of now-that is to say having had a beginning. 'The Veda'-i. e. the scrip- tures. 'Some'-i. e. the followers of the Nyaya. These [fol- lowers of the Nyaya] havc asserted this,-such is the remaindert [which requires to be supplied in order to complete the Apho- rism].

सच्नियमात्। प्रयोगात्। वेदेऽ्पि गुरुपरम्परया ज्ञानपूर्वक:। प्रयोगस्य सब्निकर्षः । उत्पत्तिः । स्यात्। * वेदस्यानित्वलात् पौरुषेयत्वात् धर्मे न प्रमाणं पुरुष- दोषसन्भवादिति पुनराच्िपति। + वेदानिति। यतः पुरुषास्याः। काठकं काममिति नामानि। अतः सब्निकर्ष। आधुनिकं। सादीनित्वर्थः। वेदान्। आ्रम्रायान। एके। नैयायिका:। ब्राङ्गरिति शेष:।

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BOOK I. SECTION 3. 33

b. And for the following reason also [-if we are to listen to such objectors as the Naiyayikas-] it [the Veda] is un-eternal -as the author [ironically] states .*

अनित्वदर्शनाच्। २८॥

Objection to the eternity of the Ve- Aph. 28 .- Because of our see- das that they make mention of persons ing un-eternal persons[mention- who must antecedently have been born. ed in the Vedas].

a. 'Un-eternal,' &c. Because, in such scriptures as " Babara, the son of Prahani, desired,"-" Kusurubinda, the son of Udda- laki, desired,"-we see mention of 'un-eternal persons,' i. e. of persons to whom belonged birth and death; and these sentences did not exist before the birth of these persons; so that the un- eternity and the human origin [of the Veda] is established by the fact that it had a beginning.t

a. The author now mentions the established tenet in regard to this.t

उत्तनु शब्दपूर्वत्वम् ।२६। Aph. 29 .- But there has been declared The eternity of the Veda re-asserted. [already] the priority of Sound [to any point in time]. * दूतोऽप्यनित्य दत्याइ़। + वनित्वेति। अनित्यानां। जननमरणवतां। बबर: प्राइिरकामयत कुसुरुबिन्द श्रीद्दालकिरकामयत इत्यादि- वेदेषु दर्शनात्। तेषाञ्ज्वननात्प्रागिमानि वाक्यानि मास- त्विति सादित्वादनित्वत्वं पौरिषेयत्वन्च सिद्धम्। + सिद्वान्तमाइ। E Google

34 THE MIMANSA APHORISMS

a. 'But there has been declared,' &c. To supply the ellipsis,- the priority [to any point in time], i. e. the eternity, of Sound has been established. The eternity of Sound being established, the eternity of the Veda also is declared in the aphorism :-- such is the meaning .*

व्राख्या प्रवचनात्।३०।

How sections of the Aph. 30 .- The name [-derived from that Vedas come to be nam- of some mortal-was given, to this or that ed after mortals. section of the Veda,] because of his reading it.

a. 'The name,'-i. e. the name of " the Káthaka section," [see Aph. 27. a.], or the like, is suitable ' because of his reading' or studying it,-the ' Káthaka section' being that which was per- used by KATHA.t

परन्तु स्रुतिस्रामान्यम् । ३१ । Aph. 31 .- But the terms in the text [which What seem to be seem to be names of men] are common [to names of men, in the Veda, not really such. other objects, and do not there designate men].

Although there is the name " Babara" or "Pravahini" [in the Veda,-see Aph. 28. a.], yet the text-the word ' Pravahani' or the like-is ' common'-, i. e. is expressive also of some other

• उक्तमिति। शब्दे पूर्वत्वं नित्यतवं साधितं प्रागिति शेष:। शब्दे नित्यत्वे सिद्धे वेदेद्पि नित्तं सचे उत्ताम- त्यर्थः॥ + बाख्था। काठकादिसमाख्या। प्रवचनात्। ब्रध्ययनात्। कठेनाधीतं काठकमित्युपपन्ना।

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BOOK I. SECTION 3. 36

thing [than it may appear at first sight to denote]. For exam- ple-[in the word Pravahani-] the prefix pra implies ' excess,'- the word vah signifies 'motion,'-the final i represents the agent; and thus the word signifies the Wind which moves very fast; and this is without beginning ; and [moreover] the word "Babara" is a word imitative of the sound of the Wind,-so that there is not even a smell of inconsistency .*

Objection that the b. But then how can it be instrumental in Vedas contain passa- producing right knowledge in regard to Du- ges of sheer nonsense. ty, when the Veda contains such incoherent prattle as the following -; viz. "Jaradgava, in cloth slippers, standing at the door, is singing benedictions :- of him, a Bráh- man-woman, desirous of a son, enquires,-'O Sir !- what is the meaning of this [which I hear you declaring] about intercourse on days of fastingt ?"-or the following ;- viz. " The cows also attend this sacrifice" -? To this he replies as followst :-

• वद्यपि बबरः प्रावइणिरित्सि परन्तु त्रुतिः प्रावह- एयादिशब्दः सामान्यं। अन्यार्थस्यापि वाचकं। तथाहि। प्रेत्यस्य उत्काषाश्रयः । वहनशब्दस्य गतिः। दकार: क्त्ता। तथाचोत्कृष्टगत्याश्रयः। वायुपरस्सचानादिः। बबर दति वायु शब्दानुकरणमिति नानुपपत्तिगन्वोदपि। t Or, according to another reading, " What is the meaning of garlic as re- gards the goddess Umá ?"

• ननु जरद्गवः कम्बलपादुकाम्यां द्वारि स्थितो गायति मङ्गलानि तं ब्राह्मणो पृष्क्ति पुत्रकामा राजन्रमायां लभ- नस्य कोडर्थ द्वति गावो वा एतत् त्रमासतेत्यादीनामसम्बद्ध- प्रलापानां वेदे सख्वात् कथं स धर्मे प्रमाणमित्यवाइ। Digitized by Google

36 THE MIMANSA APHORISMS. रते वा विनियोग: स्यात् कर्म्मणसम्बन्वात्। ३२ ।

Passages at first sight un- Aph. 32 .- It [-the expression meaning, may be found, on just charged with being incoherent-]

ing. eamination, to have a mean- may have an application to the action, through its really standing in relation to the action [which it serves suggestively to inculcate as a duty].

a. 'To the action,' &c. :- that is to say :- even such an expres- sion as "The cows also attend this sacrifice" [Aph. 31. b.],- ' through its standing in relation'-i. e. through its really involv- ing a mutual reference to-' the action'-i. e. the passage enjoin- ing some action,-has 'an application'-viz. through the praise* [which it suggests as attending the performance of the action]. b. The import of the argument is this, viz .- Did the very brutes -the cows-engago in the sacrifice, or ought wise men to engage in its performance ?- the hinting of the doubt serves to com- mendt [that duty which even things senseless would engage in if men neglected it ;- as we say, "The very stones wuuld cry out" if mon were to keep silence when under an imperative obli- gation to speak out].

c. So much for the firet section of the first Book of the com- mentary on the Aphorisms of Jaimini.t

• ऊत इति। कर्म्मणः कर्म्मप्रतिपादकवाक्यस्। सम् खात्। परस्पराकाङ्माघटितत्वात्। गावो वा दतादीना- मपि। कते। कर्म्मगि। सुतिद्वारा विनियोग:। + खयमाशयः। गवादयो जडा अपि कम्मानुष्ठानं चकुः किमुत विद्वांसो Sनुतिष्ठेरन्नित्यत्र संशय दति सुता तातरय सुबद्धमिति। + दति जैमिनिसबट्टत्ी प्रथमाध्यायस्य प्रथम: पाद:॥

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