1. Brahma Sutra, The Philosophy of Spiritual Life Radhakrishnan S

RADHAKRISHNAN

THE

BRAHMA

SUTRA

The Philosophy of Spiritual Life

GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD

RADHAKRISHNAN

THE BRAHMA SUTRA

The Philosophy of Spiritual Life

GEORGE ALLEN AND UNWIN

THE

BRAHMA SUTRA

RAIIAKRISHNAN

GEORGE AILEN AND UNWIN

The illustrious scholar-statesman Dr. Rad- hakrishnan to whom we already owe many standard works on religion and philosophy, here gives us another classic. The spiritual tradition of India is based on the three-fold canon prasthana- traya, the Upanisads, the Bhagavadgita and the Brahma Sutra. These texts are not only bound up with a historic past; they are a living force in the present and have a contemporary accent. Though the conditions of modern life have become different and are in some ways better, we cannot say that we are superior to the ancients in spiritual depth or moral strength. The problems which the Brahma Sutra raises and attempts to solve are not dissimilar to those which engage us even today, the nature of the Supreme Reality, the status of the world, the future and destiny of the individual, the path- way to perfection. This study of the Brahma Sutra is a notable contribution to the development of solidarity in thought to which our world is committed. It is no exaggeration to say that this book in its theme and in its serene prose will prove in- valuable to all those who are interested in the problems of man's spiritual quest and fulfilment. A book of the highest erudition and authority.

The Brahma Sutra Radhakrishnan George Allen and Unwin

42s. net

२३ फरवरी'६०, मांगलवार

UNIVERSAL BOOK DEPOT Mzratganj, Luctmor

THE BRAHMA SŪTRA

by Radhakrishnan

RECOVERY OF FAITH EAST AND WEST-SOME REFLECTIONS THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ INDIAN PHILOSOPHY THE HINDU VIEW OF LIFE AN IDEALIST VIEW OF LIFE EAST AND WEST IN RELIGION RELIGION AND SOCIETY THE PRINCIPAL UPANISADS (George Allen & Unwin)

EASTERN RELIGIONS AND WESTERN THOUGHT (Clarendon Press, Oxford)

THE DHAMMADADA (Oxford University Press)

INDIA AND CHINA IS THIS PEACE? GREAT INDIANS (Hind Kitabs, Bombay)

Edited by Radhakrishnan MAHATMA GANDHI HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, EASTERN AND WESTERN Edited by Radhakrishnan and J. H. Muirhead CONTEMPORARY INDIAN PHILOSOPHY by A. N. Marlow RADHAKRISHNAN: AN ANTHOLOGY (George Allen & Unwin)

Edited by Radhakrishnan and C. A. Moore A SOURCE BOOK IN INDIA'N PHILOSOPHY (Princeton University Press)

The Brahma Sūtra

THE PHILOSOPHY OF

SPIRITUAL LIFE

TRANSLATED WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

S. RADHAKRISHNAN

Ruskin House

GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD

MUSEUM STREET LONDON

FIRST PUBLISHED IN 1960

This book is copyright under the Berne Convention. Apart from any fair dealing for the purpose of private study, research, criticism or review, as permitted under the Copyright Act, 1956, no portion may be reproduced by any process without written permission. Inquiry should be made to the Publishers George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1960

PRINTED IN GREAT BRITAIN in 11 on 12 point Old Style type BY UNWIN BROTHERS LIMITED WOKING AND LONDON

PREFACE

THIS book is not a product of purely scholarly interests. It has grown out of vital urges and under the pressure of a concrete historical situation. We are in the midst of one of the great crises in human history, groping for a way out of fear, anxiety and darkness, wandering in search of a new pattern in which we can begin life over again. André Malraux makes a prophecy: 'The principal problem of the end of the century will be the religious problem-in a form as unlike any that we now know as Christianity was from the religions of antiquity-but it will not be the problem of Being.' He refers to 'the discovery of what true Hindu thought is'.1 Hindu thought whether or not we agree with its transcendental claims has survived the storms of the world for over three thousand years. It has seen empires come and go, has watched economic and political systems flourish and fade. It has seen these happen more than once. Recent events have ruffled but not diverted the march of India's history. The culture of India has changed a great deal and yet has remained the same for over three millennia. Fresh springs bubble up, fresh streams cut their own channels through the landscape, but sooner or later each rivulet, each stream merges into one of the great rivers which has been nourishing the Indian soil for centuries. When we speak of Indian philosophy or Eastern philosophy, we mean the philosophy that has developed in a certain region of the earth. We do not mean that the truth which science or philosophy aims at is of a provincial character. The search for truth may be conditioned, even restricted by the mental attitudes and traditions of different countries, but the aim of philosophy is to reach truth which is universal.2 One of the chief

1 Partisan Review (Spring 1955), p. 170. 2 'By Universal History I understand that which is distinct from the combined history of all countries, which is not a rope of sand, but a continuous development, and is not a burden on the memory, but an illumination of the soul. It moves in a succession to which the nations are subsidiary. Their story will be told, not for their own sake, but in reference and subordination to a higher series, according to the time and degree in which they contribute to the common fortunes of Mankind.' Lord Acton-A letter to the contributors to the Cambridge Modern History, dated March 12, 1898.

8 The Brahma Sūtra features of philosophical thought today is the growing univer- sality of outlook. Even Western thinkers are slowly giving up their provincial outlook and are admitting that thinkers outside their cultural traditions have grappled with the central problems of philosophy and a study of their writings may be helpful to students of philosophy. In Bunyan's story there is the house of the interpreter which is always kept open. No one understands the mission of the life of the mind in our time who does not wish to have some part in keeping open a house of the interpreter between East and West. Since our ideals and destinies are largely the same, it is essential that mutual acquaintance should grow. To the creative interpreters are confided the hopes of a better world. The truth which claims to be universal requires to be continually re-created. It cannot be something already possessed that only needs to be re-transmitted. In every generation, it has to be renewed.1 Otherwise it tends to become dogma which soothes us and induces complacency but does not encourage the supreme personal adventure. Tradition should be a principle not of conservatism but of growth and regeneration. We cannot keep the rays of the sun while we put out the sun itself. Petrified tradition is a disease from which societies seldom recover. By the free use of reason and experience we appropriate truth and keep tradition in a continuous process of evolution. If it is to have a hold on people's minds, it must reckon with the vast reorientation of thought that has taken place. By reintrepreting the past afresh, each generation stamps it with something of its own problems and preoccupations. Every age emphasises that particular point of view which is most consonant with its own prejudices. Fifty years ago the main issues which dominated schools of philosophy were those con- nected with religion, faith and doubt, the relation of philosophy and theology. Today new intellectual interests have arisen.2 Philosophy is no more 'a science of things transcendental' but

1 Cf. M. Loisy: 'I am of the religion that is in the making and I am quite willing not to belong to the one that is dying.' 2 See Professor Gilbert Ryle's Introduction to The Revolution in Philosophy (1956), p. 4.

Preface 9 has become scientific and secular in its outlook. It has become an arid professionalism made only for the philosophers. 'We know too much and are convinced of too little.' Many people have no kind of contact with any form of religion or its modes of thought. Even in countries where church attendance has increased, there has not been any growth of religious feeling. The majority of people do not see any reason why religion should play any part in their lives. Many of them are not actually atheist; fewer still have qualified by sober reflection to be called agnostic. They have grown up outside any kind of religious organisation and are simply ignorant of the terms and meaning of religion, though they profess a creed which they have adopted from habit or because of the social advantages it brings them or merely for the sake of good form and con- venience. For them the creative fire has departed from religion. We cannot say that they adopt a materialist creed and believe that somehow through science and technology mankind can be perfected. Perhaps a few leaders may adopt this creed but the vast majority live from day to day with a hope that does not extend far beyond the immediate future. We live in an age of hectic hurry, of deafening noise where we have no time or inclination for anything beyond the passing hour. True life grows from inside. It is in the inner solitude that a seeker finds his solace; yet our modern life is unwilling to grant us this privilege. Not all of us, however, are defrauded of this right and if there is to be a creative movement some of us at least have to reflect on the hopes and disillusionments of the people. The unrest of the people is due to the thwarted desire for religion.1 Man is a religious animal. He is prepared to worship anything and many systems compete for his spiritual suffrage, fragmentary faiths, unaesthetic arts, and attractive panaceas. If he cuts himself away from his spiritual dimension, it is an act of perfidy, of alienation from his own nature. We do not realise that religion, if real, implies a complete revolution, a total over- coming of our unregenerate nature, the death of the old man

1 Dr. C. G. Jung in his Modern Man in Search of a Soul (1933) writes of his middle-aged patients: 'Every one of them fell ill because he had lost that which the living religions of every age have given to their followers, and none of them has been really healed who did not regain his religious outlook.' A*

IO The Brahma Sūtra

and the birth of the new.1 Man's nature is transformed or reformed to a pattern of excellence, because his being is pervaded by the power of truth. Unfortunately, philosophy today is detached and specialised and is not aware of the peril to the human spirit. It does not seem to realise its responsibility for the time in which it is set. Even those who have a religious allegiance do not seem to feel a religious responsibility. Plato once remarked that when the modes of music change, the walls of the city are shaken. A change in our philosophy of life is the first symptom of instability that will presently manifest itself in material, political and economic ways leading to the shaking of walls. Though India has impressive achieve- ments to her credit in art and architecture, literature and morals, science and medicine, all these derive their inspiration from philosophy as love of wisdom or the life of spirit. Its aim is to produce not wise Hindus or Christians but wise men. If the spiritual orientation of the country is undermined or disturbed, the nature of the civilisation will change. The contemporary situation is a challenge to the philosopher of religion. Distances have so shrunk in the modern world that not only people but ideas travel fast. The great religions of the world are interconnected. They face the same dangers and difficulties. That which threatens one will sooner or later endanger another. We have to develop a scheme of life which is at once rational, ethical and spiritual. It will not be wise to look upon ancestral wisdom as infallible. It may be liable to error even as contemporary fashions are. We have to find out what is vital in it. Many centuries ago Cicero said that there is nothing so foolish and so vain which has not been said by some philosopher. In India the threefold canon of religion, prasthāna-traya, consists of the Upanisads, the Bhagavadgīta and the Brahma Sutra. These texts are not only bound up with an historic past but are also a living force in the present. The problems which they raise and attempt to solve are not dissimilar to those which 1 The answer to Nicodemus's question whether a spiritual rebirth is possible is in John iii. 7-8: 'Marvel not that I have said unto thee, ye must be born again. The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth; so is everyone that is born of the Spirit.'

Preface II

engage thinkers in other parts of the world. I have written on the Upanisads and the Bhagavadgita and this study of the Brahma Sūtra may be a small contribution to the development of solidarity in thought to which the modern world is committed. While taking note of the traditional interpretations, I have also in mind the problems of our age. It is my endeavour to present a reasoned faith which deals justly with the old Indian tradition and the demands of modern thought. A commentator has ample scope to explain the Brahma Sūtra in relation to the religious milieu he represents. His purpose should be not simply to interpret the Brahma Sütra but re-establish it in the minds and hearts of the people and restore the unity of religion and philosophy. The classics should be not only guardians of the past but heralds of the future. They are dead if they are mechanically and unthinkingly accepted. They are alive if each generation consciously decides to receive them. Any system of thought should satisfy two basic requirements; it should state the truth and interpret it for each new generation. It must move back and forth between these two poles, the eternal and the temporal. Truth is expressed in a human language formed by human thinking. The consciousness of this leads to a continual clarifying and fuller understanding of the truths. The author of the Brahma Sutra deals with the problems raised by his contemporaries with their views on cosmology but these dated answers are not the essentials of its teaching. We may not accept the scientific thought of those days, but the suggestions about the ultimate questions of philosophy and religion which they set forth with philosophic depth and emancipation from the transient preoccupations of the current hour are of value to us even today. While the Brahma Sutra represents intellectual effort spread over generations, it has also become the starting point of intense reflection. Commentaries and independent treatises have been produced from early times and there does not seem to be any slackening of effort even today. In this book I have followed principally Samkara's com- mentary which is accepted generally by others except in those places where doctrinal differences are indicated. In stating the

I2 The Brahma Sūtra

views of the commentators I have omitted the minor details which have no direct bearing on the general interpretation. I have avoided scholastic discussions found in the commentaries since they are not of much contemporary interest. Since the Upanisads, the Bhagavadgīta, and the Brahma Sutra are said to have unity of purpose and meaning aikārthya, I have indicated what, to my mind, is this general purport. My views are based on experience, authority and reflection. The commentator himself is a product of his times. He looks at the past from his own point of view. Just as each individual strives to organise his memory, we have to organise our past. Our picture of the march of centuries determines our attitude and outlook. Though the conditions of modern life have become different and are in some ways better, we cannot say that we are superior to the ancients in spiritual depth or moral strength to grapple with difficulties. It is possible that some may think that my method of treatment is inadequate and imperfect. But whatever the shortcomings may be, it is not, I hope, lacking in great respect for the traditional interpretations. The Bibliography is by no means exhaustive but I hope it will provide a sufficient guide to the student. I am indebted to Professor Siddheśvar Bhatțācārya of Viśva-bhārati for his kindness in reading the proofs and making many valuable suggestions. Mr. V. Y. Kulkarni of the Sähitya Akademi, New Delhi, very kindly prepared the Index.

New Delhi, 1959. S. R.

CONTENTS

PREFACE 7

SCHEME OF TRANSLITERATION I5

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS I6

PART ONE: INTRODUCTION

I. The Brahma Sūtra I9

2. The Commentators 25

A. Śamkara 28 B. Bhāskara C. Yādava-prakāśa 39 45 D. Rāmānuja 46 E. Madhva 60 F. Śrīkantha 66 G. Nimbārka 78 H. Śrīpati 82 I. Vallabha 88 J. Śuka K. Vijñāna-bhikșu 93 94 L. Baladeva 97

3. Reason and Revelation I03

4. The Nature of Reality II8

5. The Status of the World I35

6. The Individual Self I44

7. The Way to Perfection I5I A. The Way of Karma or Life I5I B. The Way of Bhakti or Devotion 167 C. The Way of Dhyana or Meditation 175 D. Rebirth and Pre-existence 183 E. Some Objections to the Hypothesis of Rebirth I98 F. Life Eternal 207

PART TWO: TEXT, TRANSLATION AND NOTES 227

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY 565

GLOSSARY OF SANSKRIT TERMS 566

INDEX 572

SCHEME OF TRANSLITERATION

Vowels a ā iiuūrīļe ai oau

anusvāra m

visarga

Consonants gutturals k kh g gh n palatals c ch j jh ñ cerebrals th d dh ņ dentals t th d dh n labials p ph b bh m semi-vowels y r 1 v

sibilants ś palatal sibilant pronounced like the soft s of Russian s cerebral sibilant as in shun s as in sun

aspirate h

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Bhagavadgītā B.G. Brahma Sūtra B.S. Brhad-āranyaka Upanişad B.U. Chāndogya Upanişad C.U. Indian Philosophy by Radhakrishnan I.P. Kauşītaki Upanişad K.U. Mahābhārata M.B. Māndūkya Upanișad Mā. U. Mundaka Upanişad M.U. The Principal Upanişads by Radhakrishnan P.U. Rāmānuja R. Rāmanuja's commentary on the Brahma Sūtra R.B. Ramanuja's commentary on the Bhagavadgītā R.B.G. Śamkara Ś. Samkara's commentary on the Brahma Sūtra Ś.B. Śamkara's commentary on the Bhagavadgītā Ś.B.G. Śvetāśvatara Upanisad Ś.U. Taittirīya Upanişad T.U. Upanişad U. Vişņu Purāņa V.P.

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I

The Brahma Sūtra

The Vedas THE Vedas have remained for centuries the highest religious authority for all sections of the Hindus. There are four Vedas, Rg, Yajus, Sama and Atharvan. Each of them has four sections -samhitā,1 or collection of hymns addressed to the different deities; Brāhmanas, which describe sacrificial ceremonies and discuss their value; Aranyakas, forest treatises which dispense with elaborate sacrifices but prescribe meditations on symbols; and the Upanisads, which deal with the path of knowledge, jñana, rather than with the path of work, karma. In early times they were not written down but were handed down from preceptor to pupil. They were literally heard by the pupils and are called śruti.2

Śruti and Smrti The authoritativeness of the Vedas in regard to the matters stated in them is independent and direct, just as the light of the sun is the direct means of our knowledge of form and colour; the authoritativeness of personal views, on the other hand, is of an altogether different kind since it depends on the validity of the śruti and is mediated by a chain of teachers and tradition.3 The Vedas are the authoritative utterances of inspired seers claiming contact with transcendental truth. They are the statements of their metaphysical experience. Smrti will have to reckon with the śruti and should be consistent with it. Sruti has no authority in the realm of the perceptible. It is the source of knowledge in matters transcending sense- experience.4 1 sam : together; hita : put. 2 Pāņini III. 3. 94. 3 vedasya hi nirapekşam svarthe pramanyam raver iva rūpa-vişaye; puruşa-vacasām tu mūlāntarāpekşam vakty-smrti-vyavahitam ceti viprakarșah. Ś.B. II. I. I. 4 śrutiś ca no atīndriya-vişaye vijñanotpattau nimittam: Ś. on T.U .; cp. also Ś.B.G. XVIII. 66. pratyaksādi-pramāņānupalabdhe hi vişaye śruteh prāmanyam na pratyakşādi-vişaye.

20 The Brahma Sūtra Darśana A system of thought is called a darsana1 from the root drś, to see.2 It is a vision of truth. The Upanisads which relate these visions or experiences use the language of meditation, samādhi- bhāșā. It is difficult to express the truths of experience through logical propositions, for the most appropriate response to the spiritual experience is silence or poetry. Every utterance is a weak attempt to deal justly with the mystery, the meaning which has been attained. A great deal of passion and ingenuity has been spent on the task of resolving contradictions and reconciling seemingly conflicting statements. The conclusions of the past are brought into agreement with the findings of the present. The scholastic developments are also called darśanas. Āstika and Nāstika Systems of thought are distinguished into āstika and nāstika. The former or the orthodox schools are six in number, Sāmkhya, Yoga, Vedānta, Mīmāmsā, Nyāya and Vaiśeşika. They all accept the authority of the Vedas. The nästika or the un- orthodox systems do not regard the Vedas as infallible. It is said that the nastikas are the deniers of a world beyond the present. Commenting on Pānini,3 Patañjali makes out that āstika is one who thinks that it exists and nastika one who thinks that it does not exist. Jayāditya makes out that an āstika is one who believes in the existence of the other world, a nāstika is one who does not believe in its existence and a distika is one who believes only in what can be logically demonstrated.4 Manu holds that he who repudiates Vedic doctrines is a nāstika.5 1 Vaiśeşika Sūtra IX. 2. 13. y 2 Speculari, from which the word speculation is derived, means looking at something. It is not creation or construction but vision or insight. The Buddhists refer to views as ditthi, or Sanskrit dysti derived from the same root drs. Haribhadra in his Şad-darsana-samuccaya (fifth century A.D.) and Mādhava (fourteenth century) in his Sarva-darsana-samgraha use darsana for a system of thought. 3 IV. 4. 60. asti-nasti-distam matih. This suggests that the astika is one who believes in the other world, the nastika is one who does not believe in the other world, while the distika is a fatalist. 4 para-lokah astīti yasya matir asti sa astikah; tad-viparīto nastikaḥ; pramāņānupātinī yasya matih sa distikah. Kasika on Panini IV. 4. 60. Cp. Śāndilya U .: 'āstikyam nāma vedokta-dharmādharmesu visvasah.' 5 Veda-nindaka II. II.

Introduction 2I

Mokşa-śāstra Every system of philosophy is a moksa-sastra and teaches the way to release from samsāra or bondage to time. The nature of release has been variously conceived, insensibility, dissolution, isolation, life in God. Negatively all these views are agreed that release is from time; positively the accounts differ. They are all united that ignorance, avidyā, is the cause of bondage; knowledge, enlightenment, vidyā, jñāna, lead to release. Avidya is not intellectual ignorance but spiritual blindness.

Mīmāmsā We are told that the Scriptures are endless, the knowledge to be derived from them is immense but the time is little and the obstacles are many. So we have to choose the essential Scriptures and study them even as the swan takes in only the milk which is mixed with water.1 The task of reconciling the different Vedic texts, indicating their mutual relations, is assigned to a śāstra called the Mīmāmsā which means investigation or inquiry. In the orthodox Hindu tradition, Mīmāmsā is divided into two systems, the Pūrva- mimamsa by Jaimini which is concerned with the correct interpretation of the Vedic ritual and Uttara-mīmāmsā by Bādarāyaņa which is called Brahma-mīmāmsā or Śārīraka- mimamsa which deals chiefly with the nature of Brahman, the status of the world and the individual self. Since it attempts to determine the exact nature of these entities it is also called nirņāyaka-śāstra. The Brahma Sutra is the exposition of the philosophy of the Upanișads. It is an attempt to systematise the various strands of the Upanisads which form the background of the orthodox systems of thought. It is also called Uttara-mīmāmsā or the mīmamsā or the investigation of the later part of the Vedas, as distinguished from the mīmāmsa of the earlier part of the Vedas and the Brahmanas which deal with ritual or karma-kānda. All the commentators on the Brahma Sutra agree that the Brahma Sutra was intended to be a summary of the teaching of the

1 ananta-śāstram bahu veditavyam alpas ca kālo bahavas ca vighnāh yat sāra-bhūtam tad upāsitavyam hamso yathā kşīram ivambu-misram.

22 The Brahma Sūtra

Upanişads. The Brahma Sūtra is also called the Vedānta Sūtra1 or Sarīraka Sūtra.2 It takes into account the systems of thought known at that time.

Date and Author The author of the Brahma Sutra is Badarayana.3 It may be assumed that the Purva-mīmamsa, dealing as it does with ritual, arose at a very early period. Even in the Brāhmaņa literature, we find mention of the word mīmamsa in connection with the discussions of contested points of ritual. As the Uttara- mīmāmsa deals not with practice but with knowledge, and is concerned with the later parts of Vedic literature, it may have been formulated a little later than the Pūrva-mīmamsa. There are cross-references to Jaimini and Bādarāyaņa in the Pūrva- mīmamsa Sutra and the Brahma Sūtra.4 Since B.S. refers to almost all other Indian systems, its date cannot be very early. It was composed about the second century B.c.5 There have been several attempts to represent the teaching of the Upanisads in a consistent way and Bādarāyaņa in his Sutra gives us the results of these attempts. The references to the views of earlier teachers6 show how the author took into account other efforts at interpretation extending over many generations and summarised them. The ancient teachers quoted

1 The Vedanta philosophy takes its stand on the Upanisads, the B.G. and the B.S. The Upanisads are śruti, a part of the Veda, the B.G. is smrti. It is a part of the M.B. As smrti it supports sruti, and clarifies its meaning. 2 The body is sarira, what resides in it is the sartraka, the self. Ratna- prabhā, a commentary on S.B., holds that the B.S. is called Śāriraka as it deals with the Brahman-hood of the individual soul: sārirako jīvas tasya brahmatva- vicāro mīmāmsā. Baladeva adopts a different view. Brahman is embodied sarira since the whole universe is the body of the Lord. 3 He is sometimes said to be Vyasa, literally the arranger. He is said to have arranged the Vedas in their present form. Cp. B.G. X. 37. 'of the sages I am Vyāsa'. 4 According to Sabara, Bādarāyaņa was respected by Jaimini who quotes him in support of his view of the self-evident character of knowledge. It is generally believed that Badarayana was the teacher and Jaimini the pupil. 5 Jacobi thinks that the B.S. was composed sometime between A.D. 200 and 450. See Journal of the American Oriental Society XXXI, p. 29. 6 Ätreya III. 4. 44. Kāśakrtsna I. 4. 22. Āśmarathya I. 2. 29; I. 4. 20. Jaimini I. 2. 28, 31; I. 3. 31. Audulomi I. 4. 21; III. 4. 45; IV. 4. 6. Bādari I. 2. 30. Kārșņājini III. I. 9. Bādarāyaņa I. 3. 26; I, 3. 33.

Introduction 23

by Bādarāyana seem to have entertained different views on important points of doctrine. B.S. states the teaching of the Veda according to Bādarāyana and defends the interpretation adopted.

Sūtra The sutra style which aims at clarity and conciseness is adopted in all the philosophical systems as also in works on other subjects like domestic ceremonies, grammar and metres. It tries to avoid unnecessary repetitions. A sūtra is so called because it suggests wide meaning.1 It should be concise, indicative of its purport, (composed) of few letters and words, in every way meaningful. Such are what the wise ones called sutras or aphorisms.ª In the anxiety for economy of words which is carried to an excess the sūtras are not intelligible without a commentary. They are packed with meaning which is inex- haustible. They are like shorthand notes of the teaching of the preceptor to the pupils. The B.S. strings together the Vedānta texts like flowers.3 In determining the purport of a sūtra, the commentators adopt the principles formulated in the well- known verse: that the beginning, the end, the repetition, the novelty, the objective, the glorifications and the argument-which are the canons for determining the purport.4

Contents of the Brahma Sūtra The B.S. has four chapters or adhyāyas and each of them is divided into four pādas or parts. Each of these pādas is subdivided into adhikaranas or sections made up of sūtras or 1 Madhva on I. I. I. Sūtra is a thread, a string. Cp. Latin sutūra, English suture. bahvartha-sūcanāt. Bhāmatī I. I. I. 2 laghūni sūcitārthāni svalpākșara-padāni ca sarvataḥ sāra-bhūtāni sūtrāny āhur manīșiņah. Cp. also alpāksaram asandigdham sāravat viśvatomukham astobham anavadyam ca sūtram sūtra-vido viduh. 3 vedānta-vākya-kusuma-grathanārthatvāt sūtrāņām. Ś.B. I. I. 2. 4 upakramopasamharav abhyaso 'pūrvata phalam artha-vadopapattī ca lingam tatparya-nirnaye. Madhva quotes it in his commentary on I. I. 4. as from Brhat-samhita. See also Śrīkaņțha on I. I. 4.

24 The Brahma Sütra aphoristic statements. The number of sūtras in each adhikarana varies with the nature of the topic dealt therein. Each section according to the commentators deals with a specific point, criticises the views of others and commends its own. The commentary is a reasoned statement of objections, pūrva-pakșa, and answers, uttara-paksa or siddhānta. According to the Pūrva- mīmāmsā, every section or adhikarana has five factors: (I) vişaya, subject-matter, (2) viśaya, doubt or uncertainty, (3) purva-paksa or the prima facie view, statement of an objection, (4) siddhanta or established conclusion or the final truth of an argument, (5) samgati or connection between the different sections. If an adhikarana has more than one sūtra, the first is the chief, mukhya, and the others are subordinate, guna, to it. The commentators, in spite of their different philosophical allegiances, do not vary much with regard to the arrangement of the topics or the meaning of the sutras or the reference to the sources or texts intended, the vişaya-vākyas. The first chapter deals with samanvaya. It attempts to offer a coherent interpretation of the different texts of the Upanişads. We cannot be content with disconnected scraps of knowledge. Our science, our philosophy and our religion must become integral parts of a general pattern of thought. The method of reconciliation requires today to be extended to the living faiths of the world. The second chapter deals with avirodha and shows that the interpretation offered in the first chapter is not inconsistent with the writings of other sages and views of other systems. Even when the sutras were formulated, they reckoned with other views and objections from rival schools. Truth would not be sought so industriously if it had no rivals to contend against. The third chapter deals with sādhanā and is devoted to an exposition of the means for the realisation of Brahman. The fourth deals with phala or the fruit of knowledge. There are slight variations in the readings of the sūtras in B.S. Sometimes one sūtra is read as two or two as one. Sometimes the last word of a sutra is added to the beginning of the next one. These variations lead to divergent interpretations. Commenting on IV. 3. 7-14, S. says, 'Some declare these sūtras, which I look upon as setting forth the siddhānta, the final view, to state

Introduction 25 merely the purva-paksa or the opponent's view'. Since the sūtras admit of varied interpretations one can honestly admit their validity and still pursue one's own independent line of reflection. The acceptance of the sutras may have a tendency to cripple the discovery of new and fruitful methods of approach but as a matter of fact it has not been so. We have adopted S.'s reading as the standard and noted the divergences from it. His numbering of the sūtras is adopted.

CHAPTER 2

The Commentaries

BADARĀYANA in the B.S. mentions different interpretations of the teaching of the Upanisads. Aśmarathya1 adopts the bhedäbheda relation. The soul is neither different nor non- different from Brahman even as the sparks are neither different nor non-different from fire. The relation between the two is not one of absolute identity but of cause and effect. The bhedābheda theory has received manifold expression among the com- mentators of the B.S. Bhartr-prapañca, Bhāskara, Yādava- prakāśa, R., Nimbārka, Vijñāna-bhikșu believe in the reality of the universe as well as its divine origin, in the distinctiveness of individual souls which are treated as centres of divine manifestation, moral freedom and responsibility and faith in a personal God, in the value of knowledge and love, devotion and service as means to the fulfilment of human nature. Audulomi2 holds that the individual soul is altogether different from Brahman up to the time of release. The soul is merged in Brahman when it obtains release. This view seems to be based on C.U. VIII. 12. 3; M.U. III. 2. 8. Bhāmatī quotes the following from the Pañcarātra agama: 'Up to the moment of reaching emancipation the individual soul and the Highest Self are different. But the released soul is no longer different from the Highest Self since there is no further cause of difference.' 1 I. 2. 29; I. 4. 20. 2 I. 4. 21; III. 4. 45; IV. 4. 6.

26 The Brahma Sutra The difference or non-difference of the two depends on the difference of condition, bondage or release. Audulomi's doctrine is known as satya-bheda-vāda. Kāśakrtsna1 holds that the individual soul is absolutely non- different from Brahman. The individual soul and the Highest Self are one. It is clear that even before Bādarāyana composed the B.S. there were different views about the teaching of the Upanişads. There have been many commentaries on the B.S. though only a few have come down to us.2 Nārāyana Pandit in his Madhva- vijaya-bhāva-prakāśikā mentions twenty-one commentators who preceded Madhva, though only three of them are known to us, Ś., Bhāskara and R. Many other commentaries were written after Madhva's time, notable among them being those by Śrīkaņțha, Śrīpati, Nimbārka, Vallabha, Vijñāna-bhikșu and Baladeva. The chief systematic interpretations of the Vedānta are the Advaita, Viśiştādvaita, Dvaita, Bhedābheda and Suddhādvaita associated with the names of S., R., Madhva, Nimbārka and Vallabha. They all follow one or the other of the ancient traditions. S. is said to have followed Varāha-sahodara- vrtti, R. Bodhāyana-vrtti, Madhva Haya-grīva-brahma-vidya and Śrīpati Agastya-vrtti. Many of these commentaries are not in the strict sense commentaries but are systematic expositions of varying doctrines. Even the most original of thinkers do not claim to expound a new system of thought but write commentaries on the three great works, the Upanisads, the B.G. and the B.S. They use all their ingenuity to discover their views in these works or modify the views expressed in them or even reinterpret the obvious views which they find difficult to maintain. The aim of the commentators is to give a coherent interpretation of the B.S., taking into account the standards and criticisms of their time. They establish the relevancy of the B.S. to their age. Indian thinkers, even when they advance new views, do so in the name of an old tradition. They have a sense of humility and would endorse Hemacandra's statement

1 I. 4. 22. 2 Yamunacarya mentions in his Siddhi-traya the names of Tanka, Bhartr- prapañca, Bhartr-mitra, Bhartr-hari, Brahma-datta, Ś. and Bhāskara.

Introduction 27

pramāņa-siddhānta-viruddham atra yat kincid uktam mati-māndya-doşāt mātsaryam utsāryya tad ārya-cittāh prasādam ādhāya višodhayantu. May the noble-minded scholars, instead of cherishing ill-will, kindly correct any errors here committed through dullness of intellect in the way of wrong statements and interpretations. The B.S. is held in such high esteem that anyone setting forth a new system of religious and philosophic thought is at pains to show that his views are consistent with the meaning of the B.S. The views of the different commentators have been accepted by some sections of the people who look upon their teachers as infallible and their teachings above doubt and dispute. When the different systems claim to represent accurately the meaning of the texts, we have to examine them before we accept or reject them. Bodhäyana was perhaps the first commentator but his work is not now available. The following commentaries on the B.S. will have to be taken note of :-

(I) Ś. A.D. 788-820 Nirviśeşādvaita (2) Bhāskara A.D. I000 Bhedābheda (3) Yādava Prakāśa A.D. I000 Bhedābheda (4) R. A.D. II40 Viśiştādvaita (5) Madhva A.D. I238 Dvaita (6) Nimbārka latter half of thirteenth cen- tury A.D. Dvaitādvaita (7) Śrīkaņțha A.D. I270 Śaiva-viśistādvaita (8) Śrīpati A.D. I400 Bhedābhedātmaka- viśiştādvaita (9) Vallabha A.D. 1479-1544 Śuddhādvaita (10) Śuka A.D. I550 Bheda-vāda (II) Vijñāna-bhikșu A.D. 1600 Ātma-brahmaikya- bheda-vāda (12) Baladeva A.D. I725 Acintya-bhedābheda On each of these commentaries there are sub-commentaries, glosses, etc.

28 The Brahma Sūtra

A. ŚAMKARA Śamkara About A.D. 780 Gaudapada wrote a commentary on the Māndūkya U. called the Māndūkya-Kārikā. His disciple Govinda was the teacher of S. (A.D. 788-820). S. is said to be the incarnation of Siva on earth.1 S. was a naişthika-brahma-cārin and his life was spent in exposition, discussion and organisation. Four of the mutts he established are well known, Dvaraka in the West, Puri in the East, Badri in the North and Śrngeri in the South. His commentary is well known for its profundity of spirit and subtlety of speculation.2 S. refers to the views of another commentator on the B.S. and his followers are of the view that this other is the Vrtti-kara. Advaita Vedānta Literature Ś.'s bhasya on the B.S. was followed by a series of studies. Mandana Miśra (A.D. 800), when he became converted to Advaita Vedānta, assumed the name of Sureśvara and wrote his famous work Naişkarmya-siddhi. It is an independent work on Ś.B. Anandagiri, a disciple of Ś., wrote a commentary on Ś.B. called Nyāya-nirņaya and Govindānanda wrote another commentary called Ratna-prabhā. Vācaspati Miśra (A.D. 841) wrote a commentary on S.B. called Bhāmatī. Amalānanda (thirteenth century) wrote his Kalpa-taru on it and Appaya Dīkşita (sixteenth century) wrote the Kalpa-taru-parimala on the Kalpa-taru. Another disciple of Ś., Padmapāda, wrote a commentary on Ś.B. known as Pañcapādikā. It deals only with the first four sūtras. Prakāśātman (A.D. 1200) wrote a commentary on Pañca-pādikā known as Pañcapādikā-vivaraņa. Vidyāraņya wrote Vivarana-prameya-samgraha elaborating the ideas of Pañca-pādikā-vivarana. His Jīvan-mukti-viveka deals with the Advaita doctrine of release or moksa and his Pañca-daśī is a popular treatise on Advaita Vedānta. Sarvajñātma-muni's (A.D. 900) Samkșepa-śārīraka states the main teachings of S.B. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's Advaita-siddhi 1 śambhor mūrtis carati bhuvane samkarācārya-rūpā. 2 Vācaspati praises S.'s bhāsya as lucid and profound, prasanna-gambhīra.

Introduction 29 is an important work on Advaita Vedanta. His other works include Vedānta-kalpa-latikā and Siddhānta-bindu. There are many other learned treatises developing the logical side of Advaita Vedānta.

Gaudapāda Gaudapāda's Māndukya Kārikā may be said to be the first formulation of Advaita Vedanta. Ś. in his commentary on Gaudapāda Kārikā gives Gaudāpada the credit for developing the true meaning of the Ma.U. Gaudapada holds that all appearances (dharma) are like the vacuous sky (gaganopama).1 There is no such thing as coming into being.ª He holds the doctrine of ajäti.3 Duality is a distinction imposed on the non- dual (advaita) reality by māyā. The real does not suffer any change. Whatever has a beginning and an end is unreal.4 The one is the unborn, the unmoved, not a thing (avastutva) and tranquil (śāntah). Causality is a false idea. So long as we think of it we suffer birth and rebirth. When that notion ceases there is no samsāra. All things are produced from a relative point of view (samvrti). They are produced only apparently, not in reality. Dependent existence is not real existence. Gaudapāda v says of Advaita Vedānta that it is pleasing to all, has no dispute with anyone, and is not hostile to anyone.5 Reason and Experience Ś. attempts to build a spiritual view of life on rational foundations. He holds that anyone who adopts any view without full inquiry will miss his aim of beatitude and incur grievous loss.6 Ś. tries to show that the Upanisad passages could be co- herently interpreted only on the basis of non-dualism and that any other interpretation of the ideas of the Upanisads is open to 1 IV. 98. 99. ª IV. 2. 4. 3 IV. 19. 4 Cp. 'How can that which is never in the same state be anything', Cratylus 439 E. Brahman is kūtastha, immobile, unchanging. Amara-kośa says: eka-rūpa- tayā tu yah kāla-vyāpī sa kūțasthah. 5 asparsa-yogo vai nāma sarva-sattva-sukho hitah avivādo aviruddhaś ca desitas tam namāmy aham. 6 tatra avicārya yat kiñcit pratipadyamāno nihsreyasāt pratihanyeta, anartham ceyāt. S.B. I. I. I.

30 The Brahma Sūtra objections. It is obvious from S.'s commentaries on the B.S. and the Upanisads that he is controverting dualistic interpretations of the teaching of the Upanisads.1 S. says that he is attempting the commentary to demonstrate the unity of the Self, ātmaikatva. A mere intellectual understanding of reality is not enough. The end of all knowledge is spiritual realisation, anubha- vāvasānam eva vidyā-phalam.2 Knowledge and renunciation lead to the experience of self, svānubhava or ātmānubhava. This is the aim of religion. These experiences are recorded in the Upanişads. Reason is employed for the discovery of the real purport of the Upanișads. Truth cannot contradict reason and experience. Brahman Brahman, according to S., is the cause of the origination, subsistence and dissolution of the world which is extended in names and forms, which consists of many agents and enjoyers:3 (I) This world must have been produced as the modification of something which is itself unproduced. Brahman is the source and if it is produced from something else, we will have anavasthā or regressus ad infinitum. (2) The world is so orderly that it could not have come forth from a non-intelligent source. Brahman is the intelligent source. (3) This Brahman is the immediate consciousness (säksin) which shines as the self and also through the objects of cognition which the self knows. Even when we deny it, we affirm it. When we look at the created world, Brahman is viewed as Īśvara. Brahman, associated with the principle of māyā or creative power, is Iśvara who is engaged in creating and main- taining the world. Brahman is at once the material cause (upādāna-kāraņa) as well as the efficient cause (nimitta-kāraņa) of the world. There is no difference between cause and effect. Clay is the cause and jugs and jars are the effects. These trans- Causation formations are appearances of name and shape, nāma-rūpa. The 1 Ś. in commenting on C.U. III. 10. 4 refers to an explanation offered by an ācārya, atroktah parihārah ācaryaih and Ānanda-giri mentions that the ācārya referred to is Dravidācārya. 2 pratyakşāvagamam cedam phalam, tat-tvam-asīty pratipattau satyām samsāryātmatva vyāvītteķ. Š.B. I. 4. 14. asamsāryātmatva- 3 Ś.B. I. I. 2.

Introduction 3I world of experience is not the ultimate reality; it is not | pāramārthika, but only empirically true, vyavahārika. In spiritual experience we feel the identity of subject and object. In the Sata-śloki it is said that we first have the experience of the identity of the Self with Brahman and then the Cp. K.S experience of the world as Brahman.1 The Supreme Brahman which is one with the inmost Self is pure being, awareness and bliss. For S. ultimate reality is pure intelligence, cin-mātra, devoid of all forms. Brahman is devoid of qualities. Whatever qualities are conceivable can only be denied of it: eko brahma dvitīyo nāsti. The differences of knower, known and knowledge are imposed on it. When the reality is known, these differences which hide the true nature of reality disappear. Scriptures describe Brahman as reality, consciousness and infinity, satyam, jñānam, anantam brahma. These are not qualities which belong to Brahman but are one with Brahman. They constitute the very nature of Brahman. Ś. opens his commentary with the statement of the existence of the pure Self free from any impurity as the ultimate truth. This is affirmed on the authority of the Upanisads. Our experience is based on an identification of the Self with the body, the senses, etc. This is the beginningless māyā. In our waking life we identify the Self with many unreal things but in dreamless sleep, when we are free from phenomenal notions, the nature of our true state as blessedness is partially realised.2 S. argues that the Self is of the nature of pure consciousness and it is perma- nent and not momentary. Sureśvara in Naişkarmya Siddhi says that ignorance of the nature of Self is the cause of all unhappiness.3 The root cause of all bondage is present in susupti which leads to dream and waking states. When the knowledge of Self arises it is destroyed. The Buddhist view that there is no permanent Self cannot account for the feeling of self-identity. The Self cannot be reduced to a series of passing ideas. On such a view it would be impossible to account for the recognition of mental states and

V 1 adau brahmaham asmīty anubhava udite khalv idam brahma pascat. R . S 2 suşuptākhyam tamo'jnanam bījam svapna-prabodhayoh svatma-bodha pradagdham syād bījam dagdham yathābhavam. 3 atas sarvānartha-hetur ātmānavabodha eva. I. 8. Cp. also IV. 43.

32 The Brahma Sūtra

their differences. We cannot say with the Naiyayika that the self is the inferred object to which cognitions, feelings and volitions belong. The Self is directly and immediately intuited. Otherwise we cannot distinguish between experiences which are our own and those of others. We do not infer the self as the possessor of any experiences but intuit it. The self-revealing character belongs to the Self which is one with knowledge. The Self is pure consciousness, impersonal, unlimited and infinite. In different ways the Advaitin establishes the supreme reality of a transcendental principle of pure consciousness, which, though always untouched and unattached in its own nature, is yet the underlying principle which can explain all the facts of our experience. Vidyāranya in his Pañca-daśī states that there is no moment when there is no consciousness whether in our awakened states or dreams or in our dreamless condition. Even in dreamless sleep there is consciousness for later we remember the experience of the dreamless state. The light of consciousness is ultimately real. It is self-luminous. It neither rises nor sets.1 The Self is pure bliss.

The Status of the World Brahman is self-luminous, sva-prakāśa; it is not the object of any other consciousness. All other things are drśya or objects of consciousness, while Brahman is the drasta, the pure con- sciousness which comprehends all objects.2 The world of not- self, anātma-vastu, derives its meaning from the Self of which it becomes an object. Apart from Self or consciousness the world of objects is non-existent. Only the Self exists for itself, svārtha. The world of objects exists for another, parartha. The world does \ not exist of itself. It is derived from and dependent on Brahman 1 nodeti nāstamety ekā samvid eșā svayam-prabhā. I. 7. 2 Cp. Drg-drśya-viveka I. rupam dysyam locanam dyk tad dysyam dyk tu manasam dysyā dhī-vrttayas sāksī drg eva na tu drsyate. The form is perceived and the eye is its perceiver. It (the eye) is perceived and the mind is its perceiver. The mind with its modifications is perceived and the witness is verily the perceiver. But the witness is not perceived (by any other). Whatever is cognised is not-self. The body is not the self for it is knowable, like a jar. deho nātmā drsyatvāt ghatąvat. Whatever is not-self is an appearance like shell-silver. brahma-bhinnam sarvam mithya brahma-bhinnatvāt. śukti-rojatavat. Vedānta-paribhāșā II.

Introduction 33 and so is less real than Brahman. The relation of consciousness and its objects is difficult to explain. It cannot be samyoga or contact or samavāya or inherence. Yet consciousness is related to objects. We have to accept the facts as given and describe them and not try to establish them by logic.1 S. suggests that the world is an appearance due to ignorance and so this appearance does not affect the cause in any way, even as a magician is not affected by the illusion he creates for others. That Brahman appears to be connected with the three conditions of the world जगग स्पितिव is as illusory as the appearance of a snake in a rope.ª This is merely to indicate the one-sided dependence of the world on Brahman. We cannot say that an illusion is non-existent. Something is perceived though it is interpreted wrongly. The rope which is perceived as snake is contradicted when the perception of snake disappears. But the world does not dis- appear. When the appearance of the world is said to be anirva- canīya, all that is meant is that it is unique. We cannot describe it as existent or non-existent. The world is said to be sad-asad- vilakșana and not non-existent. The world is sat because it exists for a time; it is asat for it does not exist for all time. A thing is said to be true only so long as it is not contradicted. Since the world-appearance is found to be non-existing at the rise of right knowledge, it is not true. Māyā is neither sat, being, nor asat, non-being. It is the undefinable cause owing to which this world of distinct individual existences arises. The world is not of the nature of an illusion, prātibhāsika, which is contradicted by later experiences. The world is not contra- dicted on the empirical stage. It is vyavahārika. Our normal behaviour is based on the world. We cannot be sure that it will not be contradicted at some later stage. What really persists in all experience is being, sat and not its forms. This being forms the substratum of all objective forms.3 Being is the basis, adhiśthāna, of all experience. Reality is one and the world of many is not real. Ś. regards vi durghaļatvam avidyāyā bhūșanam. Ista-siddhi I. 140. e yathā svayam prasāritayā māyayā māyāvī trişvapi kālesu na samspryate avastutvāt . . . māyāmātram hy etat yat paramātmano' 'vasthā-trayātmanā- vabhāsanam rajjvā iva sarpādi-bhāveneti. Š.B. II. I. 9. 3 ekenaiva sarvānugatena sarvatra sat-pratītih. B

34 The Brahma Sūtra

the world as maya which is wrongly translated as illusion. The world is unreal when viewed apart from its basis in the ultimate reality or Brahman. When viewed in its relation to Brahman, we find that all this is Brahman: sarvam khalv idam brahma. Ś. sometimes says that the world does not exist in reality and its manifestation disappears when the reality is known. The world appearance is māyā. The question how maya becomes associated with Brahman cannot be raised for the association does not begin in time either with reference to the cosmos or with reference to the individual persons. In fact there is no real association for the unchangeable truth is not affected. Māya is not a real entity. It is only wrong knowledge, avidyā, that makes the appearance. It lasts so long as avidyā lasts. It is dissolved when the truth is known. Māya cannot be said to be either existent or non- existent, tattvānyatvābhyām anirvacanīyā. Sometimes it is said that the world is like a dream or an illusory cognition. It exists as it is perceived. It has no other independent existence except the fact of its perception. It has Brahman for its basis. The concrete appearances are impositions on this unchanging reality. They are not the effects of Brahman, for Brahman is not the upādāna or the material cause of the world of objects. There are different views on this matter among the followers of Ś. The author of Padārtha-nirnaya thinks that Brahman and māyā are jointly the cause of the world, Brahman being the unchanging cause and māya the changing cause. Sarvajñāt- ma-muni, in his Samkşepa-śārīraka, thinks that Brahman is the material cause through the instrumentality of māyā. Vācaspati Miśra is of the view that the māyā resting in jīva as associated with Brahman produces the world. Sarvajñātma-muni and his followers think that pure Brahman should be regarded as the causal substance, upādāna, of the world. Prakāśātman and Madhava hold that Brahman in association with māyā, i.e. Iśvara, is the cause of the world. Vācaspati attempts to interpret the relation in a non- dualistic way. Brahman is the ultimate truth underlying the world-appearance. The element of change and diversity is due to māyā. Brahman with avidyā is the upādāna or the

Introduction 35 material cause of the world in which the world is grounded and absorbed.1 Vācaspati looks upon Brahman as the real vivarta cause and māyā as only saha-kāri, an accessory cause. The author of Siddhānta-muktāvali is of the opinion that the māyā-sakti is the real material cause and not Brahman who is beyond cause and effect.2 Brahman is the vivarta cause and māyā is the pariņāma cause. If māya is regarded as the power or śakti of Brahman, the sakti and its transformation cannot be regarded as unreal or false, so long as the possessor of śakti is regarded as real and absolute. The pure Self appears as many individuals and as God through the veil of maya. This self which is consciousness and bliss according to Vidyāraņya is obscured to us by māyā which is described as the power by which is produced the manifold world-appearance. This power, śakti, cannot be regarded either as absolutely real or as unreal. It is associated only with a part of Brahman and not with the whole of it. Through this association it transforms itself into various elements and their modifi- cations. All objects of the world are the products of Brahman and māyā. Māyā regulates all relations and order of the universe. In association with the intelligence of Brahman māyā acts as an cp.ks intelligent power which is responsible for the orderliness of all Ni yah Sakh qualities of things and their interrelations.3 Vidyaranya compares the world-appearance to a painting, where the white canvas stands for the pure Brahman, the white poster for the inner controller, antaryāmin, the dark colour for the dispenser of the crude elements (sūtrātman) and the coloration for the dispenser of the concrete elemental world; virat and the figures that are manifested thereon are the living beings and other objects of the world. Brahman reflected through māyā assumes various forms and characters. Ignorance, avidyā or māyā, produces the world of appearance. It cannot be said to be existent or non-existent, sad-asad- anirvacanīyā and it ceases when Brahman is known. It is true that in our ordinary experience we perceive multiplicity and

1 avidyā-sahita-brahmopādānam jagat brahmany evāsti tatraiva ca līyate. Bhāmatī I. I. 2. 2 Siddhanta-lesa, pp. 12-13. 3 saktir asti aisvarī kācit sarva-vastu niyāmikā. Pañcadasī III. 38.

36 The Brahma Sūtra

the Vedic injunctions imply the existence of plurality. The scriptural texts which speak of Brahman as the one and only reality have greater validity than those which imply the existence of plurality. Even according to S., the world is not non-existent; it is not absolutely real. Brahman with māya or śakti as its power is the cause of the world. The world has a relative, empirical existence. The Individual Self The jiva is the phenomenal self which feels, suffers and is affected by the experiences of the world. The individual self is a phenomenon while the truth is Brahman. The world is the play of Brahman, his vilāsa, his māya. It is the expression of the urge in Brahman to become many. But the many are not always Cp KS aware of the Supreme immanent in them. They believe in their own finiteness and not in the Infinite dwelling in them. Instead of recognising themselves to be one with Ultimate Reality, they identify themselves with the body, the sense-organs, etc. They become agents and enjoyers, accumulate merit and demerit, undergo a series of embodied existences. The Lord as the dispenser of our destiny allots to each soul the form of embodi- ment earned by its previous actions. At the end of each of the world periods called kalpas, the Lord retracts the whole world; the material world is merged in the non-distinct prakrti while the individual souls free for the time from actual connection with their upādhis or adjuncts lie in deep sleep, as it were. But as the consequences of their former deeds are not yet exhausted they re-enter embodied existence when the Lord sends forth a new world.

Perfection and the Way to it To recognise the highest truth as Brahman is to attain release. Meditation, worship, ritual are intended for a lower class of aspirants and jñana or wisdom is the path pursued by the higher class of aspirants who have no desire for earthly prosperity or heavenly joy. The qualifications necessary for a man intending to study the Vedānta are :- (I) discriminative knowledge of what is eternal and non-eternal, nityānitya- vastu-viveka, (2) disinclination to the enjoyment of the pleasures

Introduction 37 of this world or the next, ihāmutra-phala-bhoga-virāga, (3) attain- ment of tranquillity, self-restraint, renunciation, patience, deep concentration and faith, śama-damādi-sādhana-sampat,1 and (4) desire for release, mumukşutva. Origen speaks of 'that unspeakable longing with which the mind burns to learn the design of those things which we perceive to have been made by God'. As the eye naturally demands light and colour, as the body desires food and drink, so the soul cherishes a natural desire to know God's truth and free itself from falsehood. This is the passion for liberation. When a person with these qualifi- cations studies the Upanisads, he will know the identity of self and Brahman and be liberated. Ś. holds that the path of work, karma, and the path of wisdom, jñāna, are intended for different classes of seekers. The two cannot be pursued together.ª Ceremonial piety can only lead to new forms of embodied existence. Prosperity is the result of religious duty while knowledge of Brahman has release for its result and does not depend on any other observance.3 The knowledge of the ever-existent Brahman does not depend on human activity.4 There are two kinds of release, sadyomukti or instantaneous release and krama-mukti or gradual liberation. The former is the result of jñāna or wisdom, the latter of upāsanā or worship and prayer. While S. is an absolute non-dualist in his metaphysics, he had great faith in bhakti or devotion to a personal God. He prays to Viśva-nātha in Kāśī: yātrā mayā sarva-gatā hatā te, dhyānena cetah-paratā hatā te stutyānayā vāk-paratā hatā te, kşantavyam etat trayam eva śambho. Forgive me, O Siva, my three great sins. I came on a pilgrimage to Kāśi forgetting that you are omnipresent; in 1 Ś. asks us to give up any complacency and fight against the fall in moral standards: yato vinaştir mahatī dharmasyātra prajāyate māndyam samtyajya evātra dāksyam eva samāśrayet. 2 jñāna-karma-samuccayābhāvah. 3 abhyudaya-phalam dharma-jnānam taccānusthānāpeksam; nihśreyasa- phalam tu brahma-jñānam, na cānusthāņāntarāpekșā. S.B. I. I. I. 4 iha tu bhūtam brahma-jijnasyam nitya-vrttatvan na purusa-vyapāra-tantram. Ibid.

38 The Brahma Sūtra thinking about you, I forget that you are beyond thought; in praying to you I forget that you are beyond words.1 He prays to Vişņu: satyapi bhedāpagame nātha tavāham na māmakīnas tvam sāmudro hi tarangah kvacana samudro na tārangah O Lord, even after realising that there is no real difference between the individual soul and Brahman I beg to state that I am yours and not that you are mine. The wave belongs to the ocean and not the ocean to the wave. Ś. prays to Śāradā-devī: kațākșe dayārdrām kare jnāna-mudrām kalābhir vinidrām kalāpaiḥ subhadrām purastrīm vinidrām purastungabhadrām bhaje śāradāmbām ajasram mad-ambām. I constantly worship my mother, the śāradāmbā, the goddess of learning who is soft with compassion in her looks, who has the jnana-mudra in her hand, who is bright with all the arts, who is blessed with long flowing hair, who is ever watchful, in front of whom flows the Tunga-bhadrā. Ś. is said to have composed a prayer to the Buddha: dharā-baddha padmāsanasthāmghriyastih niyamyānilam nyasta nāsāgra-drstih ya āste kale yoginām cakravartī sa buddhah prabuddho'śtu mac cittavartī. While the Absolute is beyond words human nature brings it within the limits of its comprehension by making it into a personal God. S. adopts a catholic view with regard to these personal conceptions. Prayer and worship of the Supreme as Iśvara do not lead to final release. The devotee gets into brahma-loka where he dwells as a distinct individual enjoying great power and knowledge. 1 Cp. Francis Thomson's words: O world invisible, I view thee; O world intangible, I touch thee; O world unknowable, I know thee; Inapprehensible, I clutch thee.

Introduction 39 When he gains knowledge of Brahman he obtains final release. Until the final redemption of all takes place, release can take the form of the attainment of the nature of Iśvara and not identity with Brahman. S. makes out that the identity with the Higher Self is not destruction of the soul; there is no more specific cognition or objective knowledge.1

B. BHĀSKARA Bhäskara2 wrote his commentary on the B.S. which is a criticism of Ś.'s māyā-vāda. At the very beginning of his com- mentary he says that he is writing his work to refute those who express their own opinions, suppressing the real purport of the B.S.3 He holds that those who adopt the māya-vāda are really Buddhist in their outlook.4 He is of the view that both difference and non-difference, bheda and abheda, are real unlike Ś. who argues that only non-difference is real and not difference. The bhedābheda-vāda was popular even before Ś. who criticises it. There are references to it in the B.S.5

Pramāņas Scripture is our guide with regard to the knowledge of supersensible objects. Reason must follow scriptural evidence.6

Ultimate Reality For Bhäskara, Brahman is the supreme reality. He is the cause of the universe, material and efficient.7 Brahman has two 1 viseşa-vijñāna-vināsābhiprāyam etad vināsābhidhānam nātmocchedābhi- prāyam. See P.U., p. 200. 2 Udayana in his Nyāya-kusumāñjali refers to Bhāskara's commentary on the B.S. Bhaskara does not seem to know of R.'s work on the subject. He may be assigned to the ninth century A.D. Some hold that he lived from A.D. 996-1061. 3 sūtrābhiprāya-samvytyā svābhiprāya-prakāsanāt

4 vigītam vyākhyātam yair idam sāstram vyākhyeyam tan-nivyttaye. vicchinna-mūlam māhayanika-bauddha-gathitam māyā-vādam vyāvarņayanto lokān vyāmohayanti. I. 4. 25. 5 I. 4. 20-I. 6 I.I. 4. 7 This is the view of the Pancaratras who look upon Vasudeva as both the material and the efficient cause of the world and so he does not find anything to criticise in their doctrine. Vāsudeva eva upādāna-kāraņam jagato nimitta-kāraņam ceti te manyante ... tad etat sarvam śruti-prasiddham eva tasmān nātra nirākaraņīyam paśyāmah. II. 2.41.

40 The Brahma Sūtra / forms, the causal, kārana-rūpa, and the effect, kārya-rūpa.1 It is one as cause and multiple as effect even as gold is one as gold and many as bracelets.2 The causal form is the original, natural form while the effect form is due to limiting adjuncts, upādhis, and so is adventitious, agantuka. But the latter is also real. S. argues that when clay is known all objects made of clay are known because they are all modifications, vikāra, mere ex- pressions of speech, vācārambhaņam, mere names, nāmadheyam, without any real basis.3 Bhaskara does not agree with this interpretation. Cause and effect cannot be identical. The effect world is the basis of our experience and conduct. The effects are the modifications of the cause itself. Only they come and go, they are transitory whereas the cause is permanent as the ground of all the modifications. The effect is a statement of the cause and so is both identical with the cause and different from it.4 The difference between what is svabhavika or natural and what is aupādhika or adventitious is not a difference between what is real and what is unreal. It is a difference between what is real for ever, nitya, and what is real for a time, anitya. While S. identifies the real with the permanent, Bhäskara holds that a real object need not be permanent. If it is said that the knowledge of duality is false because the person who hears the dualist texts of the Scriptures is under the influence of avidya, his knowledge of non-duality is also false, since in reading the non-dualist texts of the Scriptures he is under the influence of avidyā. The account of avidyā as indes- cribable cannot be accepted for it is the very basis of our world of practical behaviour.5 The fact of difference is, for Bhäskara, a matter of direct experience6 and cannot be dismissed as unreal. That difference and non-difference coexist is a fact of experience. A cow is different from a horse but it is not different from it in so far as it 1 tat kāranātmanā kāryatmana dvi-rūpeņa avasthitam. I. I. 4. 2 ato bhinnabhinna-svarupam brahmeti sthitam. I. I. 4. 3 C.U. VI. I. I. Bhāmatī says that clay alone is real and the objects made of clay do not exist at all. vācā kevalam ārabhyate vikāra-jatam na, tu tattvato'sti yato nāmadheya-mātram etat ... vastu-sūnyo vikalpa iti. II. 2. 14. 4 II. I. I4. 5 yasyāh kāryam idam kytsnam vyavahārāya kalpate nirvaktum sa na sakyeti vacanam vacanārthakam. 6 bheda-jñānam api jňānam eva. II. I. 14.

Introduction 4I is an existent animal. Unity and multiplicity are both real and coexist. If avidyā is beginningless and endless there can be no liberation. To say that it is both existent and non-existent involves us in contradiction. A non-existent entity cannot bring bondage. If it is existent, Brahman has a second to it. Sundara-bhatța, one of the followers of Nimbārka, refers to Bhaskara as the upholder of the aupādhika-bhedābheda-vāda while Nimbārka supports svābhāvika-bhedābheda-vāda. When Brahman manifests himself in the effects, he does not himself become the universe. He remains unchanged in his nature even as a spider remains unchanged though weaving its web out of itself. Creation means the manifestation of Brahman's powers by which he produces the world of the enjoyed (bhogya) and the enjoyers (bhoktr). It is the powers of Brahman that are modified but he remains unchanged in his own purity, even as the sun sends out his rays and collects them back, without forfeiting his nature.1 According to Bhaskara, Brahman has a twofold power known as jīva-pariņāma, transformation as the individual soul, and acetana-parināma or transformation as matter. The first is the bhoktr-sakti, the power as the enjoyer, and the second bhogya-akti or the power as the enjoyed. The Absolute puts on a multiplicity of names and forms in srsti or creation as subjects and objects of experience and withdraws it in the state of pralaya or dissolution. Brahma springs from Brahman's creative power and is the totality of selves. He is the first-born who manifests himself as a variety of conscious and non- conscious beings according to the moral needs of the individual souls. The universe is grounded in the nature of the Absolute. Brahman's immanence in the created effects is not his actual transformation into the effects. It is only his abiding within the universe and in the hearts of men as their inner controller. He is not affected by the defects of the world. The world is the expression of Brahman. While Brahman is manifested in the world there is also the formless Brahman which is transcendent to the world, nis-prapañca. In the causal state, Brahman and the universe are one; in the effect state, Brahman and the universe are different. In the 1 See II. I. 27; I. 4. 25. B*

42 The Brahma Sūtra

state of samsara, on account of the limiting adjuncts of the body, the sense-organs, etc., the soul is different from Brahman. Like the infinite space that is enclosed in jars, the unconditioned Brahman on account of the adjuncts exists as the individual soul. In the condition of release when the adjuncts fall away, the soul becomes identical with Brahman. In the causal state, Brahman is free from all distinctions. He has no internal differences for his powers remain merged in him even as salt in the sea. His qualities like knowledge and the rest are non- different from him even as heat, which is the quality of fire, is non-different from fire.1 Brahman is pure being, sal-lakşana, and pure knowledge, bodha-lakşana; yet he is a knower possessing knowledge as his quality. He is omniscient, sarvajña, and omnipotent, sarva- śaktiman. He has also other qualities, such as freedom from fear, freedom from sin. Though Brahman is characterised as sat, being, cit, consciousness, and ananda, bliss, these do not refer to different entities. They are qualities of Brahman which is the substance possessing the qualities. No substance can remain without its qualities and no qualities can remain without their substance.2 A substance does not become different by reason of its qualities.3 The universe has Brahman for its essence but Brahman has not the universe for his essence. The universe has no existence apart from Brahman but Brahman is not exhausted by the universe. He has many other aspects beyond the universe. Bhaskara rejects the theory of the four vyhas.

The Individual Soul The individual soul is knowledge by nature, a knower, an enjoyer and an active agent. It is atomic in size. We have an infinite number of souls. The qualities of the soul are not natural and are due to limiting adjuncts, upādhis. They last only so long as the limiting adjuncts last. The qualities of the soul are not natural for then the soul would always continue in samsāra on account of action and enjoyment. The soul is an agent when it

1 III. 2. 23. / 2 na hi guna-rahitam dravyam asti, na dravya-rahito gunah. III. 2. 23. 3 na dharma-dharmi-bhedena svarūpa-bheda iti. III. 2. 23.

Introduction 43 has body, sense-organs, etc .; when these disappear the soul is no longer an agent. The atomicity of the soul is also aupādhika or adventitious for Brahman is all-pervading by nature and the soul is non-different from Brahman.1 The soul's knowledge and its quality as knower are not aupādhika for Brahman himself is knowledge and knower. The individual soul is different and non-different from Brahman during the state of samsāra; it is non-different from Brahman in the state of release. The non- difference of the soul from Brahman is natural, svābhāvika, real and lasting; the difference from Brahman is aupādhika, real but not lasting. Bhāskara criticises Audulomi's view that the soul is absolutely different, atyanta-bhinna, from Brahman during the state of bondage.2 The upadhi or the limiting adjunct cannot make the individual soul absolutely different from Brahman even as the spark is not absolutely different from the fire or the ether in the jar is not absolutely different from the universal ether, or as the waves are not absolutely different from the ocean. The soul is only different and non-different, bhinn- äbhinna. During the state of mundane existence the individual soul as a part and an effect of Brahman is non-different from Brahman; at the same time it is different from Brahman because of the upadhi or the limiting adjunct which separates it from Brahman. Upādhis are not false or illusory.3 The upādhis are beginningless; they are buddhi, the internal organ, and their qualities, attachment based on self-sense. So long as the individual soul is under the influence of avidyā and regards itself as absolutely different from Brahman, it acts in a selfish spirit, identifying itself with the upādhis, body, senses, internal organ, buddhi.4 So long as this relation to upādhis exists, the agency of the soul is real. Brahman is not something to be produced, utpādya, but something to be obtained, apya. When the upādhis are removed, the soul becomes one with Brahman, omniscient, omnipotent and all-pervading. Liberation is not a state of pure consciousness 1 jīva-parayos ca svābhāvikah abhedah aupādhikas tu bhedah ; sa tan-nivrttau nivartate. IV. 4. 4. 2 I. 4. 20. 3 na caupādhikam kartytvam apāramārthikam. II. 3. 40. s yāvad ayam ātmā kevalena dvaita-darsanena samsarati tāvat-kālabhāv i buddhyādy-upādhi-yogaļ. II. 3. 20. Cp. also: dehādişu viparīta-pratipattih brahma-svarūpāpratipattis ca avidyā. IV. I. I.

44 The Brahma Sūtra

but of bliss also, for a state of pure consciousness is not much different from a state of pure unconsciousness.1 Liberation is not the result of the removal of avidya; it is the attainment of something new. The individual soul becomes absolutely identical with Brahman. It is omniscient, omnipotent and one with all souls as God himself.2

Nature of Release Bhaskara does not admit the conception of jivan-mukti. Salvation can be attained only after the destruction of the earthly body. Bhäskara adopts the distinction between sadyo- mukti or immediate release and krama-mukti or gradual release. If we meditate on the Supreme Brahman we become one with it and become free at once. This is immediate release. If we meditate on the Kārya Brahman or Hiranya-garbha, we get to his world and having attained supreme knowledge in that world, we attain to Supreme Brahman, along with Hiranya-garbha, on the dissolution of this world. This is gradual release. When we are in the world of Hiranya-garbha, we remain distinct from Brahman and do not have the power of creating, maintaining and destroying the world. The liberated soul may or may not assume a body as it chooses.3 By mere knowledge of texts we cannot attain liberation.4 When knowledge is combined with work, realisation arises. To attain liberation we must act in the world with knowledge. Mere actions are useless but they become fruitful when they are combined with knowledge.5 The B.S. is to be studied after the performance of the duties enjoined in the Pūrva-mīmāmsā- sūtra. In this view Bhāskara follows Upavarşācārya whom he calls the founder of the school, sāstra-sampradāya-pravartaka.6 Bhāskara adopts jñāna-karma-samuccaya-vāda, the co-ordina- tion of knowledge and action .? The proper performance of daily 1 mukto pāşāna-kalpo 'vatișthate. IV. 4. 7. 2 muktah kāraņātmanam praptah tadvad eva sarvajnah sarva-saktih. IV. 4. 7. 3 IV. 4. 12. 4 vākyārtha-jnāna-mātrān na samsārika-nivrtti-bhavo' vagamyate. 5 atra hi jnana-karma-samuccayāt moksa-praptih. 6 I. I. I; Il. 2. 27. Cp. also ātma-jñānādhikrtasya karmabhir vinā apavargānu- papatter jñānen-'karma samuccīyate. I. I. 4. 7 See C.U. II. 23. I; B.U. IV. 4. 22; Iśa U. II. Abhinava-gupta and Ananda-vardhana adopt this view.

Introduction 45 and occasional duties removes the traces of past karmas, while knowledge of identity with Brahman removes all traces of avidyā, passion, attachment, etc. When we desire union with the Highest Brahman we reach release; when we desire the objects of this world we are subject to bondage.1 Knowledge leads to meditation. We have different forms of meditation on Nir-guna Brahman, the formless Brahman, on Sa-guna Brahman or the manifested Brahman and on pratikas or symbols. All these have limited results while meditation on the Highest Brahman leads to release. C. YĀDAVA PRAKĀŚA Yādava Prakāśa who succeeded Bhāskara made his theory more realistic. Sudarśanabhatța in his Śrutaprakāśikā says that Yādava Prakāśa adopts the views attributed to Āśmarathya in B.S. I. 4. 20 which is said to be one of bhedābheda. He accepts brahma-parinama-vāda or the theory of the transformation of Brahman into the world. The Absolute by its own potential energy śakti becomes God and the world of conscious and non-conscious objects, cit and acit. Yādava Prakāśa postulates· both difference and non-difference as the essential relation between Brahman and the world. He does not recognise any fundamental distinction between cit and acit; acit is only cit in ep.K.t an unmanifested state.2 While Bhaskara believes that the individual soul is one with Brahman and the world of matter, acit, is both different and non-different from Brahman. Yadava Prakaśa assigns the same status to both individual souls and |ghete tutul matter. For him Brahman the Absolute is of the nature of pure universal being, sarvātmakam sad-rūpam brahma, endowed with three distinct powers as consciousness, matter and God. Brahman exists as God or Isvara, and individual souls or cit and the world or matter, acit. The Absolute is God and the finite centres and not God alone. The Absolute is trinitarian. The finite world is not unreal but an integral expression of the Absolute. Through these powers Brahman passes through 1 rāgo hi paramātma-vişayo yah sa mukti-hetuh vişaya-vişayo yah sa bandha- hetuh. 2 yādava-prakasamate sarvam api cetanam eva; tatra ghaļādes caitanyā-

dīpikā. nabhivyaktimātram eveti na cid-acid-vibhāgaļ. Sudarśanācārya's Tātparya-

46 The Brahma Sūtra

various phenomenal changes even as one ocean appears in diverse forms as foam and waves. According to Yādava Prakāśa, the individual is an amśa or fragment of the Absolute. It is both one with and different from the Absolute. In the state of release the finite self retains its individuality though it is deprived of its finiteness. The Absolute is identical with itself and is not affected by the contingency of the pluralistic world. R. points out that if Brahman in its own essence is transformed into the world, such a Brahman becomes subject to all the impurities and defects of the world. If it is argued that in one part it is transcendent and has innumerable good qualities and in another suffers impurities, such a being which is impure in one part cannot be called Iśvara. Liberation for Yādava Prakāśa is the realisation of the consciousness of bhedäbheda or difference-non-difference. It is not the extinction of the finite, but its highest fulfilment. While Bhaskara maintains that the individual soul can attain unity with Brahman, Yadava Prakasa holds that difference and non- difference express two fundamental aspects of the Absolute.

D. RĀMĀNUJA Viśiştādvaita R. is the chief exponent of the doctrine of Visistādvaita. The viśesanas or adjectives are different from the substance which is not a mere assemblage of attributes. The substance is some- thing over and above the attributes and both the substance and the attributes are real, being parts of a whole. The relation between the Supreme Being and the particular beings is that of viśeşya-viśeșana. Qualified non-dualism is not a correct rendering of viśiştādvaita. It is visiștasyādvaitam, the non-dualism of the S,v differenced. It is the unity of the conscious and the non- conscious with and in God whose body they constitute. Perhaps the first commentators on the B.S. were advocates of Viśistādvaita or non-dualism with a distinction. The B.G., for example, mentions the B.S. as supporting its own view.1 Bādarāyaņa seems to be a theist more than an absolutist. - 1 brahma-sūtra-padais caiva hetumadbhir viniścitaih.

Introduction 47

Rāmānuja Rāmānuja (A.D. 1017-1127) became an ascetic after he had lived a married life for some years. The heads of religious centres founded by him are not, however, ascetics. R.'s interpre- tation of the B.S. is influenced by the Bhāgavata doctrines and the bhakti cult of the Alvars. The Pañcaratra and the Pāsupata systems are mentioned in the M.B.1 They are referred to in the B.S.2 They are theistic systems which affirm one Supreme Personal God Vişnu, Siva or Sakti. While the Brahman of the Upanişads is universal and non-sectarian,3 the āgamas appeal to special classes of worshippers. R. does not draw much on the Pañcarātra Āgamas but urges that Bādarāyaņa does not condemn them.4 It is clear that the Bhāgavatas reached a considerable degree of importance at the time the B.S. was composed. We find in R.'s system a synthesis of the early prabandha literature of the Alvars and the theistic current of the Upanişads. R. was greatly influenced by Yāmunācārya though he sometimes differed from his views.

Literature R.'s chief works are Gadya-traya, Śrī-bhāsya, a commentary on the B.S. based on Bodhāyana-vrtti,5 Vedārtha-samgraha, Vedānta-sāra, Vedānta-dīpa, a brief commentary on the B.G., and Bhagavad-ārādhana-krama. It is obvious that R.'s doctrine develops an old and established tradition. He mentions several ancient teachers, Tanka, Dramida, Guha-deva, Kapardin, Bharuci and quotations from them are to be found in Śrī-bhāsya and Vedartha-samgraha. Some of these may have preceded S. R.B. was commented on among others by Sudarśana Sūri in his Śruta-prakāśikā, by Venkața-nātha (or Vedānta Deśika, 1 Śanti-parva : chapter 350, 63-7. ª II. 2. 3 Some Upanişads like Švetāsvatara, Atharva-sikhā, Kaivalya, Subāla and others are sectarian. 4 See R.B. II. 2. 40-3. 5 bhagavad-bodhāyana-kytām vistīrņām brahma-sūtra-vrttim pūrvācāryāh samcikşipuh. tan-matānusāreņa sūtrākşarāņi vyākhyāyante. The Vrtti-kāra of R. is sometimes identified with Upavarsa whom Ś. mentions in S.B. I. 3. 28; III. 3. 53. Vedānta Deśika in his Tattva-ļīkā says that Upavarșa is the name of Bodhāyana. Vytti-kārasya bodhayanasyaiva hi upavarsa iti syān nāma. See Proceedings of the Third Oriental Conference, Madras 1924.

48 The Brahma Sūtra thirteenth century), in his Tattva-tīka, who also wrote Tattva- muktā-kalāpa, Nyāya-pariśuddhi, Para-mata-bhanga, Sata- dūşaņī, Samkalpa-sūryodaya and many other works. Two schools of Vaisnavism developed, the Vada-kalai under Venkața-nātha and the Ten galai under Pillai Lokācārya. The latter wrote many works of which the chief are Tattva-traya, Tattva-śekhara and Śrī-vacana-bhūşaņa. R. also quotes Bhāskara and Yādava Prakāśa (II. I. 15). According to the tradition the latter was R.'s teacher. In his Vedartha-samgraha R. mentions not only Bodhāyana but also Tanka, Dramida, Guha-deva, Kapardin and Bhāruci. Yamunācārya says in his Siddhi-traya that Dramidācārya commented on the B.S. R. refers to Dramida-bhāşya. He mentions also Vākya-kāra (I. I. I; I. 3. 14). In one place he also refers to Bhāsya-kāra. It is difficult to establish their identity. Pañcarātra Āgamas The Pañcaratra doctrines can be traced to the Puruşa-sūkta of the Rg Veda, where, according to the Satapatha Brāhmana1 % S.V. Nārāyaņa, the great being, performed the pañca-rātra sacrifice and attained his purpose. Nārāyana is the highest divinity and all other gods, Brahmā, Vișnu, Siva are subordinate to him. Yāmunācārya in his Āgama-prāmānya argues that the Pañcarātra āgamas are as valid as the Vedas, since both are derived from the Supreme Person Nārāyana.2 Image worship is an essential feature of the Pañcaratra doctrine though it does not find support in the Vedas. It was, however, current even in the sixth century B.C. though the orthodox sects were not reconciled to some of their practices. The Sātvata-samhitā mentions the four vyuha manifestations (vibhava-devata). Ahirbudhnya-samhita which shows considerable influence holds that Ultimate Reality is the Beginningless, Tantric

Endless, Eternal One, devoid of names and forms, beyond all 1 XIII. 6. I. Cp. the Nārāyaņa Sūkta sahasra-sīrşam devam visvāksam visva-sambhavam visvam nārāyanam devam akşaram paramam padam nārāyanam mahājneyam visvātmānam parāyanam. 2 Vedānta Deśika, quoting Vyāsa, says: idam mahopanişadam catur-veda-samanvitam sāmkhya-yoga kṛtāntena pañcarātrānusabditam. Seśvara Mīmāmsā, p. 19.

Introduction 49 speech and mind. He is devoid of all that is evil and the abode of all that is good. He is known by many names, Param-ātman, Bhagavān, Vāsudeva, Avyakta, Prakrti, Pradhāna. He is pure consciousness and yet is regarded as possessing knowledge as a quality. That by which he creates the world is his power, śakti.1 When Brahman resolves to split himself into many he is called Sudarsana. God's śakti exists undifferentiated from him as the moonbeam from the moon. The universe is a mani- festation of God's power. With this power of God, Visnu-sakti lep ISre is S.V or Laksmī, God is always engaged in creative activity.2 The Supreme has not only the powers of creation, main- tenance and destruction but also favour (anugraha) and "r.k.s. disfavour (nigraha). Though he has no unrealised desires and is utterly independent, he acts like a king just as he wishes in his playful activity.3 The jivas enter into God at the dissolution and remain in a potential form in him. They separate out at the time of the new creation. The jīva appears as atomic, ignorant and ineffective. He performs actions leading to beneficial and harmful results. He is thus subject to rebirths according to his conduct. Through the grace of God he aims at emancipation. He adopts the adoration of God and service of man as the way to the achieve- ment of perfection. Prapatti or śaranā-gati is complete self- offering to God leaving nothing to oneself.4 Absolute dependence on God and a sense of utter helplessness of oneself are the marks of prapatti. It has for its accompaniment universal charity, friendliness even to one's enemies. The liberated souls enter into God, though they do not become one with him. They have an independent existence in the abode of Vişnu, Vaikuntha.

Ālvārs In the Bhāgavata Purāna,5 it is said that the devotees of Visnu will appear in the South on the banks of Tāmraparnī 1 jagat-prakyti-bhāvo yaļ sā saktih parikīrtitā. III. 2. 57. 2 satatam kurvato jagat. II. 59. 3 sarvair ananuyojyam tat svātantryam divyam-isituh avāpta-viśva-kāmopi krīdate rājavad vaśī. Ahirbudhnya-samhitā. XIV. 13. Cp. khelati brahmānde bhagavān. 4 See Ahirbudhnya-samhita. XXXVII. 27-8.' 5 XI. 5. 38-40.

50 The Brahma Sūtra Kṛtamālā (Vaigai), Payasvinī (Pālār), Kāverī and Mahānadī (Periyar). The reference is to the Alvars, the ancient Vaisnava saints of the South. Manavāla ma-muni says that the earliest of the Alvars flourished at the time of the Pallavas who came to Kāñcī about the fourth century A.D. Their influence was great about the seventh and the eighth centuries A.D. Their writings in Tamil, about 4,000 hymns, were collected perhaps in R.'s time and are called Nāl-āyira-divya-prabandham which is treated by the Vaisnavas as of great authority. It gives ecstatic accounts of the emotion of love for God as Vişnu. The Alvars hold that the grace of God is spontaneous and does not depend on the effort or merit of the devotee. Others hold that God's grace depends on the virtuous actions of the devotees. Possibly while God is free to extend his mercy to all, he does so in practice only as a reward to the virtuous. God's mercy is both without cause and with cause.1 The human soul and the universe are entirely dependent on God. While the Alvars were inspired devotees, the Alagiyas had in addition to devotion learning and scholarship. Natha-muni (tenth century) was the first of them. It is said that he was in direct contact with Nammaļvar or Sathagopa. Nammāļvar, Nāthamuni, Yāmunācārya otherwise called Āļavandār belonged to the pañcaratra tradition which R. accepted. Yāmunācārya gave philosophical expression to the devotional thoughts of the Alvārs and emphasised the concept of bhakti. In his Siddhi- traya he argues for the existence of the individual soul in- dependent of God. Release from bondage is attained through devotion to God, according to him. Yāmunācārya invested his disciples with the five Vaisnava samskāras. He wrote six works, Stotra-ratna, Catuh-ślokī, Agama-prāmanya which establishes the authority of the Pañcarātra Agamas, Siddhi-traya, Gītārtha-samgraha and Mahā-purușa-nirnaya. He is deeply devoted to the Lord and realises his utter helplessness without his grace.2 He advocates the doctrine of prapatti. R. was the son of Yāmunācārya's sister Kāntimatī born in 1 R. in his Aştādasa-bheda-nirņaya says: krpā svarūpato nirhetukah, rakșaņa- samaye cetana-kyta-sukṛtena sa-hetukā bhūtvā rakșati. Cp K.S 2 na dharma-nitsho'smi, na cātma-vedī, na bhaktimams tvac-caranāravinde. a-kiñcano nānyagatis saranye tvat-pāda-mūlam saraņam prapadye. Stotra-ratna, 22.

Introduction 5I circa A.D. 1017. He received his training from Yādava Prakāśa who advocated a system of monism.

S. and R. R. takes into account Ś.'s views and develops a theistic interpretation with great feeling, vast learning and brilliant logic. Ś. and R. represent two uninterrupted traditions in Indian thought. To my mind these traditions are not exclusive of each other but complementary. For example, commenting on B.S. I. 3. 19, Ś. explains his view that the individual soul as such cannot claim any reality except in so far as it is identical with Brahman but adds, 'there are other thinkers and among them some of us who are of the view that the individual soul as such is real'.1 Difference on such a vital point did not incline Ś. to exclude its upholders from his own community of Vedāntins. If he had lived to see the later developments of the Vedānta, he would not have rejected them.

Pramāņas R. admits three pramānas, Perception, Inference and scriptural testimony.2 R. writes: 'Scripture, although not dependent on anything else and concerned with objects which are non-perceptible, must, all the same, come to terms with tarka (ratiocination), for all the different means of knowledge can in many cases help us to arrive at a decisive conclusion only if they are supported by ratiocination. All means of knowledge equally stand in need of tarka: Scripture, however, the authoritative character of which specially depends on expectancy, proximity and compatibility throughout requires to be assisted by tarka. In accordance with this, Manu says, he who investigates by means of reasoning only knows religious duty and none other.'3

Supreme Reality For R., there exists One All-embracing Being called Brahman, the Highest Self or the Lord. Iśvara in his nature is free from 1 apare tu vādinah pāramārthikam eva jaivam rūpam iti manyante asmadīyās ca kecit. 2 In R.G.B. he adds intuitive or yogic knowledge. jñānam, indriya- lingāgama-yogajo vastu-niścayah. XV. 15. Vedānta Deśika includes yogic knowledge under perception. 3 R.B. II. I. 4.

52 The Brahma Sūtra all impurities and possesses all the auspicious qualities. He is all-knowing, all-merciful, all-pervading, all-powerful. R. repudiates S.'s view that Brahman as Ultimate Reality is absolutely unqualified, nir-viseşa. He argues that we have no means of proving such a reality for all knowledge is of qualified objects. If plurality is false, scriptural texts which point to an absolutely differenceless reality cannot be accepted for Scriptures are based on the assumption of plurality. The texts which refer to Brahman as pure being1 or as transcendent2 or as truth and knowledge3 do not indicate that Brahman is devoid of qualities but as possessing many auspicious qualities of omniscience, omnipotence, all-pervasiveness and the like. Brahman is one in the sense that there is no second cause of the world. Brahman being of the essence of knowledge may also be considered to be the possessor of knowledge even as a lamp which is of the nature of light may also be regarded as possessing rays of light.4 All knowledge refers to an object. Even in what we call illusion there is an element of reality. When we mistake a conchshell for silver, it is because the conchshell resembles silver in a sense. We do not notice the other qualities on account of our defects in the organs. The knowledge of silver in a conchshell is not unreal but real. It refers to the silver element existing in a conchshell.5 Even the dreams which are momentary and appear only to the dreamer are produced by the Lord. R. holds that all cognitions are of the real and dreams and illusions are not an CP.KS exception to the rule. Things we know are all the result of trivrt-karana and everything contains in it elements of every- thing else. 'That one thing is called silver and another "shell" has its reason in the relative preponderance of the one or the other element.' In mistaking one for the other, we still cognise what is, not what is not, nor something which neither is nor is not. In dreams we perceive what is real though transient, this being produced for the enjoyment of souls in accordance with 1 C.U. VI. 2. I. 3 T.U. II. I. I. 4 jñāna-svarūpasyaiva tasya jnānāsrayatvam mani-dyumani-pradīpādivad ity 2 M.U. I. I. 5. uktam eva. I. I. I. 5 Cp. R. yathārtham sarva-vijñānam iti veda-vidām matam sruti-smytibhyah sarvasya sarvātmatva-pratītitah.

Introduction 53 their merit or demerit. There is no knowledge which has no object. Even in sleep or swoon, we have the direct experience of the self and not the formless experience of pure consciousness. Consciousness is always revealed to a knower or the self. We do not directly experience pure consciousness for all experience is of qualified entities. Even freedom from qualification is a quality. Reality, consciousness, etc., which are said to be Brahman indicate characteristics of Brahman. Scriptures do not testify to the existence of a characterless reality. Iśvara is to be admitted on the authority of scriptural texts. The existence of God cannot be established by perception or inference. R. does not make any distinction between Brahman and Īśvara. Brahman is I śvara called Nārāyaņa or Vişņu.1 Vedānta Deśika mentions three modified forms of Vāsudeva, namely Samkarşana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha who control the individual souls, mind and the external world. These are not three separate entities but are one Lord conceived differently according to his functions. The Supreme as Antaryāmin R. takes his stand on the Antaryāmin Brāhmana2 which says that within all elements, all sense-organs, all souls, there dwells an inward ruler, whose body these elements, sense-organs and souls are. Brahman comprises within himself all elements of plurality, matter with its various modifications and souls of different classes and degrees. These are real constituents of Brahman. Cit (soul) and acit (matter) are the body of the Lord.3 They are entirely dependent on and subservient to the Lord who pervades and rules all things, material and immaterial as their inmost self, antaryamin. Their individual existence has been there from all eternity and will never be entirely resolved into Brahman. They exist in two different periodically alternating conditions. In pralaya state, which occurs at the end of each world-period, when Brahman is said to be in a causal condition, kāranāvastha, distinctions of names and forms disappear. Matter 1 vede rāmāyane caiva purāņe bhārate tathā ādāv ante ca madhye ca vişņuh sarvatra gīyate. Hari-vamśa. III. 323. 94. 2 B.U. III. 7; see P.U. (1953), pp. 224-30. B isvaras-cid-acic-ceti padārtha-tritayam harih.

54 The Brahma Sūtra is unmanifested, avyakta, individual souls are not attached to bodies and their intelligence is in a state of contraction, samkoca. Even then Brahman contains within itself matter and souls in a bīja or seed condition. When owing to an act of volition on the part of the Lord pralaya is succeeded by srsti or creation, unmanifested matter becomes gross and evident to the senses and the souls enter into connection with material bodies corresponding to their accumulated merit and demerit and their intelligence undergoes expansion, vikāsa. Brahman then is in effect condition, kāryāvastha. Cause and effect are different names for different conditions or changes, pariņāma. For R., the world and the souls apart from Brahman are not real. The relation between Brahman and souls and matter is analogous to that between soul and body or substance and attribute. It is one of non-separation, aprthaktva. The soul and body, substance and attribute are different from one another; yet they are inseparably connected and form a whole. The same is the case with Brahman and souls and matter. R. says: 'Everything different from the Highest Self, whether of conscious or non-conscious nature, constitutes its body, while that self alone is the non-conditioned embodied self. For this very reason, competent persons designate this doctrine which has the highest Brahman for its subject-matter śārīraka, i.e. the doctrine of the embodied self.'1

Acit According to R. there are three kinds of acit, prakrti or matter, kāla or time and śuddha-tattva or pure matter.2 Acit is prakrti or primal matter and its modifications. Prakrti with its three qualities passes through many stages and manifests itself as the phenomenal world, producing happiness or misery in accordance with man's good or bad deeds. The favour or disfavour of Iśvara works in accordance with the past conduct of man.

1 evam ca sva-vyatirikta-cetanācetana-vastu-jātam sva-sarīram iti sa eva nirupādhikah sārīra ātmā. ata evedam param-brahmādhikytya pravyttam śāstram sārīrakam ity abhiyuktair abhidhīyate. I. I. 13. While R. looks upon individual souls and the world of matter as modes, attributes or Viseşanas of God, Nimbärka looks upon them as living parts of the Lord, his powers or śaktis. 2 Nimbārka calls this aprākrta.

Introduction 55

Cit The individual soul is often called jñana or consciousness, since it is as self-revealing as consciousness. It reveals all objects when it comes into contact with them through the senses. It is a knower, an agent, an enjoyer. The Self is a knower, and also possesses the quality of consciousness and knowledge1 even as light exists both as the light and as the rays emanating from it.ª Consciousness, though unlimited of itself3 can contract as well as expand.4 In an embodied self it is in a contracted state through the influence of its actions. The Self, though pure in itself, becomes associated with ignorance and selfish desires through its contact with matter, acit. Avidya or ignorance is lack of knowledge, misunderstanding of characteristics, false knowledge. When the association with matter, acit, is cut away, the self becomes freed from avidya and is emancipated. The soul realises itself as forming the body of Brahman. The soul is atomic in size but spreads out its knowledge all over the body like the rays of a lamp. It desires things according to its free will and the will of God does not interfere with it. To those who are attached to him he is well disposed and produces in them desires by which they can win him.5 Isvara exists in us all as the inner controller. He grants good and evil fruits according to our good and evil deeds. His control over us does not deprive us of our freedom. R. speaks of the souls as being the body of Isvara but Lokācārya argues that as the external material objects exist for S-v. the sake of the souls, so the souls exist for God. God is the goal (śeșa) for which the soul exists as the object of his control and support (śeşin). Yāmunācārya observes that release from the ills of bondage has no meaning or attraction, if the released soul does not survive in its distinctive individuality. The text 'That thou art' is interpreted by R. as expressing oneness without losing the distinctive characters denoted by the two words That and Thou. Whoever cognises and meditates on the Supreme, assisted by

1 jñāna-guņāśraya.

I. I. I. 2 mani-prabhytīnām prabhāsrayatvam iva jnānāśrayatvam api aviruddham. 3 svayam aparicchinnam eva jñānam. 4 samkoca-vikāsārham. 5 II. 3.40-I.

56 The Brahma Sūtra the grace of the Lord attains at death final emancipation. He passes through the different stages of the path of the gods up to the world of Brahma, there enjoys blissful existence from which there is no return to the world of samsāra.

Release The individual for R. lasts for ever and even in release enjoys its individuality. R. criticises the view of release as a refunding into Brahman as an earthen vessel is refunded into its own causal substance. This would mean nothing else but complete annihilation, not a worthy end for a human being.1 For R., mukti or release is a state when the individual is freed from avidyā and has the intuition of the Supreme. The state of kaivalya or realisation of one's own self as the Highest is a lower form of emancipation. Freedom according to Vedānta Deśika is sāyujya or sameness of nature with Iśvara. The human soul participates in the qualities of Isvara except those of the creation and control of the world and the grant of freedom to other souls. Mukti for Vedanta Desika is servitude to God. The Way to Release The way to freedom is through bhakti, which according to R. is a species of knowledge, jñāna-viśesa. Without bhakti mere knowledge cannot lead us to freedom. Bhakti is supreme self- surrender which one develops when the prescribed duties are performed and true knowledge is obtained from the study of the śāstras. Karma and jñāna help to purify the mind and prepare it for bhakti. According to R., bhakti is the means of salvation. Bhakti is 4 K.S upāsanā or meditation.2 This bhakti is based on knowledge and arises from six essential prerequisites, discrimination (viveka), complete disregard for worldly objects (vimoka), continued practice (abhyāsa), performance of rites (kriyā), virtuous conduct like truthfulness and the rest (kalyāna) and freedom from dejection (anavasāda). Prapatti or complete surrender to 1 ghațādivat kāraņa-prāpter vināsa-rūpatvena mokşasyāpurușārthatvāc ca. Cp. aham artha vināsas cen mokşa ity adhyavasyati apasarpedasau mokşa-kathā-prastāva-mātratah. See R.B. I. 4. 21. 2 evam-rūpā dhruvānusmrtir eva bhakti-sabdenābhidhīyate.

Introduction 57 God is described in the Saranāgati-gadya.1 It elevates all irrespective of caste restrictions.2 He who adopts prapatti does not aim at emancipation. He enjoys servitude to God. Though R. adopted Vedic rituals of initiation and worship, he was catholic in his views and admitted into the Vaisnava fold Jains, Buddhists, Sūdras and even untouchables. R. in his work on Aştā-daśa-rahasyārtha-vivaraņa makes out that he who is devoted entirely to God need not follow the ordinary code of duties. The scriptural duties are not binding on him.3 R. seems to have modified this view in his bhāsya. For R., Vedic ritual alone does not lead to emancipation. Devotion to Vişņu in the company of Lakşmī is the central feature of his scheme of salvation. Through the concept of Laksmi who intercedes on behalf of the sinners and persuades Visnu to bestow his grace for the good of the devotees, R. develops the concept of karunā. God has vatsalya or filial affection which moves him to remove the sufferings of others.

Later Developments R.'s Viśiștādvaita developed into two schools, Vada-galai and Ten-galai, associated with Vedānta Deśika and Pillai Lokācārya. They emphasise respectively devotion with personal endeavour or bhakti and complete dependence on God or prapatti. The former adopts the markata-nyaya which holds that the devotee collaborates with God even as a young monkey clings to the back of its mother while the latter adopts the mārjāra-nyāya, that God alone is active and carries the surrendering devotee to his goal even as a cat carries a kitten. Pillai Lokācārya points out that God moves us all to our actions and fulfils our desires according to our karmas. He gives knowledge to the ignorant, power to the weak, mercy to the sufferers and goodness of heart to the wicked. His qualities are for the sake of others, not for himself. 1 sarva-dharmāms ca samtyajya sarva-kāmāms ca sākșarān loka-vikrānta-caranau saranam te vrajan vibho. 2 Cp. Bhāradvāja-samhitā. brahma-kşatra-visah sūdrāh striyas cāntara-jātayah sarva eva prapadyeran sarva-dhātāram acyutam. 3 jnāna-nistho virakto vā mad-bhakto hi anapekşaka sa lingān āśramān tyaktvā cared avidhi-gocarah, p. 23. Cp. B.G. XVIII. 66.

58 The Brahma Sūtra

Many religious leaders have been influenced by the Visişād- vaita doctrines. Nām-deva (A.D. 1269-1295) born in Satara was a devotee of Vitthoba of Pandharpur. He was a tailor by pro- fession and wrote a number of hymns in Marathi and Hindi. He had four sons and a daughter. Jñāneśvara (A.D. I275-1296) was a life-long celibate. He was a personal friend of Nam-deva. He lived for only 21 years. His Jñāneśvarī was written in A.D. I290. According to the Mahārāștra tradition his great-grandfather was a disciple of Gorakhnätha. Though a follower of the Advaita of S., he encouraged worship of a Personal God. The Personal God is not the phenomenal appearance of the Absolute but is the Absolute itself which has in it the principle of plurality. The world is not the expression of māya but is the outcome of divine love and joy. For Krsņa and Rādhā, Jñāneśvar substituted Krșna in the form of Vitthala and Rukmiņī. Rāmānanda (A.D. 1360-1450) was born at Melkote and went to the north and started the Vaisnavite movement of which the chief exponents were Kabīr (A.D. 1440-1518), Nānak (A.D. I469-I538), Dādu (A.D. 1544-1603), Tulasi-dās (A.D. I527-1623) and the Mahratta saint Tukārām. Rāmānanda gave a systematic account of the theory of avataras. The two chief are those of Rama and Krsna. He had a preference for the worship of Rāma,1 though he mentions Krsna as a principal object of adoration. In his worship of Krşna he looked upon Rukmiņī as his śakti or energy. Later varieties of Krsna-worship give this place to Rādhā. According to Rāmānanda, anyone can attain release through bhakti or devotion. He did not recognise any caste distinctions. He had a number of disciples of whom the famous were Sen, a barber, Dhanā, a Jat, Rai-dās, a Chāmar, Kabīr, a Muslim, and Mīrā, the princess of Jodhpur. Rāmānanda established an ascetic order which had a large membership. Kabīr, of uncertain parentage, was brought up by a Muslim weaver and became the disciple of Rāmānanda. He condemned the superstitious practices of the people and fostered faith in the unity of God which could be accepted both by the Hindus and the Muslims. He used different names for God, Rām, Allāh and 1 ramante yoginah yasmin sa rāmah.

Introduction 59 others. Though essentially a mystic who, in his state of rapture, rose above the concepts of philosophy and the names of religion, he taught a simple faith in a God of love. He laid stress on the inner purity of life without which fasts, pilgrimages and rites were of no avail. He lived a normal home life, had a son and a daughter. After his death both Hindus and Muslims claimed him. Nothing was found of his body except a heap of flowers, of which each took a share and burned or buried it. Kabir exercised great influence on Nānak. Nänak composed Japji which is a collection of verses arranged for daily use by the Sikhs for prayer and praise. The Adi- granth1 of the Sikhs was composed by the fifth guru Arjun in A.D. 1604 and includes Nānak's utterances as well as those of other religious teachers. Many of Kabir's hymns are included in it. The Supreme, according to Nānak, is nirguņa, devoid of qualities. He is the unrevealed and the unrevealable. The holy men took the place of the avatāras or the incarnations of Hinduism. Devotion to the guru, service of saints and insistence on the greatness of the name are stressed in Sikhism. Nānak ridiculed superstition, denounced caste distinctions, taught a life of brotherhood. Nānak says:

There are ignoble amongst the noblest And pure amongst the despised The former shalt thou avoid And be the dust under the foot of the other.

He affirmed equality of sexes. For Nanak woman is ardh-sarīri and mokh-dvarī. She is the half of a full life and the doorway to liberation. Tulasi-dās composed his great work Rāma-carita-mānasa in A.D. 1574. It is the most popular classic of religion and morals in North India. He took the story from Vālmīki's Rāmāyaņa and Adhyātma Rāmāyana and adapted it to his purposes. He thought that his account was faithful to the originals.2 He lived in Banaras till his death in A.D. 1623. Though he had great faith

1 See Occasional Speeches and Writings. Vol. II (1957), pp. 364-77. 2 The opening verse of the Rama-carita-mānasa begins with these words: nānā-purāņa-nigamāgama-sammatam.

60 The Brahma Sūtra

in devotion, his spiritual leanings were for the non-dualism of S. He popularised the worship of Rāma. In his Vinaya-patrikā the poet shows his catholicity of outlook by inculcating the worship of the five gods, Vişnu, Siva, Durgā, Sūrya and Ganesa. All the three paths to spiritual freedom are commended though bhakti is the simplest and the easiest.1 Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (A.D. 1540-1623) wrote a book called Advaita-siddhi, defending non-dualism against its critics; he yet espoused the worship of Krsna.

E. MADHVA Madhva Madhva (A.D. 1197-1273) while still a bachelor became an ascetic of the Samkara school. He soon developed a theistic interpretation of the B.S. and identified the Supreme with Vișnu or Narayana,2 who was for Madhva the purport of the Sutras, sūtrārthah. Legend has it that Madhva was an incarna- tion of Vayu for the purpose of destroying the Advaita Vedānta, which is not different from materialism or Buddhism.3 He was a disciple of Acyuta-preksa and received the name of Pūrņa- prajña at the time of initiation. He is also known as Ānanda- tīrtha.

Works Madhva is said to have written thirty-seven works of which the chief are the commentaries on some of the principal Upanișads, the B.G., the B.S., Anu-bhāsya, which is a brief 1 The unfortunate suspicion of women lingers even in our noblest souls. Tulasi-dās makes Sītā insinuate wrong motives to Lakșmaņa: marma bacana sītā jaba boli hari prerita lakmana mati doli. 2 nārāyanam gunaih sarvair udīrņam doșa-varjitam. Rāma-carita-mānasa III. 3 Nārāyaņa Paņditācārya, in his Madhva Vijaya, a work of the fourteenth century, called the followers of S. pracchana-bauddhah. asatpadesan sad-asad-viviktam māyākhyayā samvrtim abhyadattā brahmāpy akhandam bala sūnya-sidhyai, pracchanna-bauddhoyam atah prasiddhah. I. 51.

Introduction 6I

summary of the Sūtra-bhāsya, Anu-vyākhyāna, Mahābhārata- tātparya-nirņaya, Bhāgavata-tātparya-nirņaya and Māyā-vāda- khandana. Madhva's system is called dvaita or dualism. It claims ancient authority. The Padma Purana mentions that Madhva is connected with the Brahma-sampradāya even as R. adopts the Śrī-sampradāya. By the thirteenth century, in which Madhva lived, S.'s non- dualism received great support from its principal exponents like Vācaspati, Prakāśātman, Sureśvara and others. Madhva and his followers, Jaya-tirtha, Vyäsa-tīrtha and others did their best to repudiate the doctrine of non-dualism and establish the reality of a Personal God, the plurality of the world and the difference between Brahman and the self. Jaya-tīrtha's Nyāya- sudhā, Anu-vyākhyāna and Vyāsa-tīrtha's Nyāyāmrta are important works which defend Madhva's theistic dualism against S.'s non-dualism. Madhva says that the B.S. was written to repudiate the non- dualistic interpretation. Since the Supreme Being full of auspicious qualities cannot be understood by finite minds, an inquiry starts. The second sūtra declares that the Supreme cannot be identified with the individual self as he is the source and support of the world. That Brahman is the cause of the world can be understood only by Scripture and scriptural texts can be reconciled only by the recognition of difference or bheda.

The Pramānas Madhva says that in writing the Anu-vyākhyāna, he followed scriptural texts, the Vedas and logical reasoning.1 One can know God not by perception and inference but only by Scripture, the Vedas. Scripture, according to Madhva, is nitya, eternal, nir-doșa, devoid of defects, svatah-pramāņa, self-evident, and apaurușeya, impersonal. The Vedas are not produced by any human being. If we do not admit the impersonal origin of the Vedas, ethical and religious duties will not have validity. We cannot say that the commands proceed from an omniscient 1 ātma-vākyatayā tena śruti-mūlatayā tathā yukti-mūlatayā caiva prāmānyam trividham mahat. I. I.

62 The Brahma Sūtra

being, for the existence of an omniscient being cannot be known apart from the Scriptures. The impersonal origin of the Vedas is valid because we do not know of anyone who has composed and uttered them. The Vedas exist in their own nature and have been perceived by God and revealed to the seers, who, at the beginning of each creation, remembered the instructions of their previous birth. Their validity is self-evident. Madhva says in his Vişnu-tattva-vinirņaya, 'Neither sense perception nor infe- ence reveals to us the nature of God. It is only through the Vedas that we can know him. Hence it is that they are called Veda.'1 The Scriptures refer to Nārāyana as the omniscient creator of all things.

Supreme Reality The teaching of the Scriptures gains strength by what is known from other pramānas. Madhva proceeds by way of inference to establish the reality of a Personal God who is omniscient and omnipotent. The world being of the nature of an effect must have an intelligent cause, a maker who is God. He has many qualities. When he is said to be nir guna, all that is meant is that he is not associated with the qualities and attributes of prakrti. He is sa guna in that he admits the presence of auspicious spiritual qualities. The Supreme cannot be avācya or indescribable. In that case he cannot be the subject-matter of Scriptures. Madhva repudiates the view that though words cannot describe, they may suggest or indicate.2 Brahman is pari-pūrna-guna.3 Each one of his qualities is boundless.4 He is the author of the eight acts of creation, preservation, des- truction, governance, knowledge, ignorance, bondage and release.5 He is absolutely free, sarva-svatantrah. Vişnu is the all-perfect one. Brahman is one in whom there is the fullness of qualities.6 The acceptance of difference between Brahman and

1 nendriyāņi, nānumānam vedā hy evainam vedayanti tasmād āhuh vedāh, iti pippalāda-śrutih. 2 sarva-sabdāvācyasya lakșaņāyukteḥ kenāpi sabdenāvācyasya lakșaņāyām api pramāņam nāsti. 3 brahma-śabdopi hi guņa-pūrtim eva vadaty ayam. Aņu-vyākhyāna I I. I. 4 pratyekam niravadhikānanta-guna-pari-pūrņatva. 5 sṛstyādy-astā kartā. c brhanto hi asmin gunāh.

Introduction 63

the souls does not limit the nature of Brahman. Brahman is not devoid of all determination or viśeşa. Even the denial of determination is itself a determination which the non-dualists will have to deny. Madhva looks upon Ś.'s system as crypto- Buddhism. There is no difference between the qualityless Brahman and the sunya of the Madhyamika system.1 The non- dualists treat it as unspeakable and unknowable, though all knowledge refers to it. Madhva believes in a Personal God endowed with qualities and characters. If all selves were identical then there would be no difference between the emancipated and the unemancipated ones. If all difference is due to ignorance, then God who is free from ignorance will perceive himself as one with all individual selves and experience their sufferings. The world, our experience and bondage are all real. A non-existent universe cannot affect anyone favourably or adversely. Scriptures assert difference between the individual souls and Brahman. No one feels that he is omnipotent and omniscient. The text tat tvam asi is used with illustrations which affirm the difference between Brahman and the souls. When the Upanişad says that when one is known all is known, the meaning is that the object of knowledge is one, or that one alone is the cause. It does not mean that the other things are false. Were it so, the knowledge of all false things would be derived from the knowledge of the truth.2 The Scriptures do not declare the falsity of the world.3 We cannot say that Brahman is one but appears as many because of upadhis or limiting conditions. If he is conditioned by upādhis he cannot be released from them for his association with the upādhis will be permanent. If upādhis are the product of ignorance, then ignorance will be of the nature of Brahman. If they were different, then we will have dualism of Brahman and ignorance. If it is argued that ignorance or ajñāna is a quality of jīva, we are in a vicious circle. There is no jīva without ajñāna; there is no ajñāna without jīva. 1 Cp .: The state of samādhi is void of modifications, of mental activities, of understanding, free from defects, devoid of all, without any distortion. prabhā-sūnyam manas-sūnyam buddhi-sūnyam nirāmayam sarva-śūnyamı nirābhāsam samādhis tasya lakșaņam. Uttara-gītā 14. 2 na hi satya-jñānena mithyā-jñānam bhavati. 3 B.G. XVI. 8-9.

64 The Brahma Sūtra

Brahman is the efficient cause of the universe1 and the giver of salvation.2 Even in the Mahā-bhārata-tātparya-nirņaya Madhva declares that all those who proclaim the unity of the self with Brahman either in bondage or in release are wrong. The world is real with its fivefold difference, viz. that between the self and God, between the selves themselves, between matter and God, between matter and matter and between matter and self.3 Though the physical world and the individual souls are real they are not independent of the Supreme. They are para-tantra while God alone is sva-tantra. Prakrti, puruşa, kāla, karma, svabhāva are dependent. Though eternal, these do not exist by their own right but by the will of the Supreme.4 The Supreme is the only independent real that exists in its own right. All others, finite selves, etc., exist as subordinate to the central Reality of God. There are four categories, God, prakrti, jīva, or the individual soul, and matter, jada.5

The Individual Soul From Brahma to the grass tip, all belong to the world of living beings, jīva-rāśi. The jīvas are of three kinds, deva, mānușa and dānava.

Karma and Release The best men attain salvation through knowledge and grace of God; ordinary men pass through cycles of births and rebirths and the worst are damned in hell. The eternally liberated and those cursed in hell are not subject to birth and rebirth. There is no hope for the wicked in hell. Only in Madhva's system do we 1 In this Madhva agrees with the Pasupatas: mahesvarās tu manyante pasupatir īsvaro nimitta-kāraņam iti. Ś.B. II. 2. 37. 2 vāsudevam anārādhya na mokşam samavāpnuyāt. Vișņu Purāņa I. 4. 18. 3 jagat-pravahah satyo'yam pañca-bheda-samanvitah. jīvesayor bhidā caiva jīva-bhedah parasparam jadesayor jadānām ca jada-jīva-bhedā tathā pañca-bhedā ime nityāḥ sarvāvasthāsu nityasah muktānām ca na hīyante tāratamyam ca sarvadā. 4 dravyam karma ca kālaś ca svabhāvo jīva eva ca I. 69-71.

yad-anugrahatah santi na santi yad-upekşayā. 5 īsvarah prakrtir jīvo jadam ceti catuştayam Bhāgavata II. 10. 12.

padārthānām sannidhānāt tatreso vişņur ucyate.

Introduction 65 have the doctrine of eternal damnation.1 Karma is to be performed since the sāstras require it. Sāstra is aparijñeya or of transcendental origin and its injunctions are absolutely valid. Karmas are to be performed without any desire for fruit. The only desires we may have are for greater knowledge and greater devotion. Without bhakti the performance of duties does not help. Even if we commit the worst sin, love of God will save us. God is pleased only with bhakti and he alone can save us. Individual souls are self-luminous in themselves but their intelligence becomes veiled by avidya. When the direct know- ledge of God arises, ignorance is dispelled. Bondage is due to attachment and liberation is produced by the direct realisation of God, aparoksa-jñānam visnoh. This may be produced in different ways, experience of the sorrows of worldly existence, company of good men, renunciation of the desire for the enjoyment of pleasures in this world or in another, self-control and self-discipline, study, association with good teachers, resignation to God, realisation of the five differences. Worship is of two kinds, study and meditation, dhyāna. The latter is continual thinking of God, leaving all other things aside.2 Bhakti consists of a continual flow of love for the Lord which overcomes all obstacles. When God is pleased we attain salvation. The state of liberation is of four kinds sālokya, sāmīpya, sārūpya and sāyujya. Sāyujya is the entrance of the freed souls into the body of God where they share in the enjoyment of God in his own body. Only deities have this kind of liberation. They can at will come out of God and remain separate from him. Sālokya is residence in heaven where the freed souls have the satisfaction of the continual sight of God. Samīpya is continual residence near God as enjoyed by the sages. Sārūpya is enjoyed by God's attendants who have outward forms similar to those

1 Cp. Mahā-bhārata-tātparya-nirņaya. trividhā jīva-samghās tu deva-mānușa-dānavāh tatra devāh mukti-yogyā mānușeșūttamās tathā madhyamā mānușā ete sṛti-yogyās tadaiva hi

2 dhyānam adhamā nirayāyaiva dānavās tu tamo-layāh.

Madhva-siddhānta-sāra, p. 502. ca itara-tiraskāra-pūrvaka-bhagavad-vişayakākhanda-smrtih .

c

66 The Brahma Sūtra

which God possesses. The freed souls are different from one another.1 The doctrine of absolute equality, parama-sāmya, is not exclusive of difference. Jaya-tīrtha commenting on IV. 4. 17 says that, though the released soul is God's own (svakīya), he is a step below him (avara) and so is excluded from world-creation, etc. The freed soul comes close to God but does not become one with him. Difference is real and ultimate and does not dis- appear in the state of release.2 There is also gradation in the state of release. Even the liberated enjoy bliss through devotion. Madhva believes in jīvan-mukti. Madhva's philosophy had a great influence on Bengal Vaişņavism. Rāmadāsa (A.D. 1608-1682) the adviser of Sivāji followed Madhva's teaching.

F. ŚRĪKAŅȚHA

Śrīkantha's date is uncertain. He was perhaps a contemporary of R. Some scholars hold that he lived in the thirteenth century and was a contemporary of Meykanda-deva, the author of the Tamil translation of the Sanskrit work Siva-jñāna-bodha.

Śrīkaņțha.3 Appaya Dīksita suggests that R.'s commentary follows that of

Śrikantha introduces his commentary with a statement that he is attempting to clarify the purpose of the B.S., which has been obscured by other teachers.4 They may be S. and Bhāskara whose views are criticised by Srīkantha.5 Appaya Dīkșita, sixteenth century, wrote a commentary on Srīkantha's bhāsya called Sivārka-maņi-dīpikā. 1 muktānām ca na hīyante tāratamyam ca sarvadā. Mahā-bhārata-tātparya nirņaya, p. 4. 2 Cp. Bhamatī which quotes a verse from the pañcarātrikas : āmukter bheda eva syāj jīvasya ca parasya ca muktasya tu na bhedo'sti bheda-hetor abhavatah. I. 4-21. 3 tad-anukyti-saraņi. 4 vyāsa-sūtram idam netram viduşām brahma-darsane pūrvācāryaiḥ kaluitam śrīkaņțhena prasādyate sarva-vedānta-sārasya saurabhāsvāda-modinām āryāņām siva-nisthānām bhāsyam etan mahā-nidhih. 5 See II. 3. 19; II. 3. 42; II. 3. 49.

Introduction 67 The Vedas and the Agamas Śrikantha tried to reconcile the Saivism based on the Vedas with that of the Agamas. Agama means texts which have come down to us. Evidently there have been two currents of thought, the Vedic and the Agamic, from the beginnings of Indian philosophic speculation. In the Mohenjo-däro excavations we have a statuette in the form of Siva seated on a bull, surrounded by animals. This is perhaps Siva as Pasu-pati. The Pāśupata and the Pañcaratra Agamas in which bhakti is the criterion of faith are criticised by Bādarāyaņa in the B.S.1 But the Āgamas themselves claim the support of the Vedas.2 The Saiva Siddhānta system which claims to be based on the Agamas purports to expound the teaching of the Vedas.3 It relates itself to the theistic tendencies of the Upanisads. It is developed in the thirteenth century by Meykanda-deva and his pupils, Arul- nandi and Umāpati. Whatever may be the origin of the Agamas it is clear that they do not insist on sacrificial religion but support a personal religion in which Visnu or Siva or Sakti is equated with the Highest Reality. It also has support in the Upanisads. The Saiva-siddhānta is based on the Agamas and the earliest Tamil exponent of this system is Tiru-mülar who was followed by later teachers, Māņikka-vācagar, Appar, Jñāna-sambandhar and Sundarar. Tiru-mūlar holds that the Vedas and the Agamas are the creation of the Lord and they are both true. 'The Veda with the Agama is the truth; they are the word of the Lord: these revelations of the Lord are to be studied as the general and the special doctrines; on enquiry, they are taken to be different as giving rise to two different sets of conclusions; but to the great ones they are non-different.'4 Śrīkantha holds that the Vedas and the Agamas are of equal authority; only while the former are studied by men of the three upper castes, the latter may be

1 II. II. 2. 2 veda-sāram idam tantram. Makuțāgama. 3 siddhānto veda-sāratvāt. Suprabhedāgama. vedāntārtham idam jnānam siddhāntam paramam subham. Makutāgama. 4 vedamodāgamam meyyā miraivanūl odum sirappum poduvu menrullana nādanurai ivai nādilirandandam bhedamadenbar periyorkkabhedame.

68 The Brahma Sūtra studied by all.1 The Hindu tendency to reconcile different traditions of thought is evident in Srikantha's commentary. He explains his views as conformable to reason and Vedic authority.

Śaivism From Ś.'s commentary,2 it may be inferred that Bādarāyaņa knew about the Saiva system. At any rate, S. is acquainted with it. The Jain writer Raja-sekhara (fourteenth century) calls the Saiva system a yoga-mata.3 He is of the view that the Naiyāyikas like Jayanta, Udayana and Bhāsarvajña and the Vaiśeşikas were followers of Saivism. Haribhadra in his Sad-darsana- samuccaya makes out that the followers of the Nyaya and the Vaiśeșika systems adopt the same divinity.4 The Saiva gamas were written in Sanskrit, Präkrit and local dialects according to Siva-dharmottara.5 They are available in Sanskrit and Dravidian languages like Telugu, Tamil and Kannada. In Mādhava's sarva-darśana-samgraha we find a treatment of Nākuliśa-pāśupata, the Saiva and the Pratyabhijñā systems. The Agamic Saivism is found in South India, the Pāsupata system in Gujerat, the Pratyabhijñā in Kāșmīr and other parts of North India, and Vira-saivism developed by Basava (twelfth century) in Karņātaka.6 The Pāśupata school which dates from the second century B.C. adopts a dualistic view. According to it the Supreme and the individual souls are distinct entities and prakrti is the constituent cause of the world. In the released condition the individual soul shakes off weak- ness and ignorance and attains boundless knowledge and power of action. In this school release is samīpya or proximity to God and not identity with God. While Śrikantha's system has many 1 II. 2. 38. 2 II. 2. 35-8. 3 atha yoga-matam brūmah, saivam iti aparābhidam, p. 8. 4 devatā-vişayo bhedo nāsti naiyāyikaiķ samam vaiseşikānām tattve tu vidyate asau nidarśyate, p. 266. 5 samskytaih prākrtair vākyair yas ca sişyānurūpaļah desa-bhāşādyupāyais ca bodhayet sa guruh smytah. Quoted in Siva-jñāna-siddhi. 6 Vatulāgama mentions the different varieties of Saivism. saivam catur-vidham proktam samāsāc chrņu şanmukha. sāmānyam misrakam caiva suddham vīram yathākramam.

Introduction 69

points in common with the Visistādvaita of R. and the Saiva Siddhānta, it has distinctive features of its own.

Supreme Reality and the World The Supreme is identified with Siva and there is sufficient support for it in the early Scriptures.1 Brahman is Siva who is to be meditated on by all those who seek release. Ś. treats I. I. 2 as a statement of the nature of Brahman. R. looks upon it as an attempt to reconcile apparently contra- dictory statements of the Upanisads. Śrīkantha argues that God is inferred as the primal source and the supreme Lord of the whole of the material and spiritual universe. Siva is possessed of an infinite number of attributes and inconceivable powers. He is free from all defects and faults. He is gracious towards his devotees. Siva is adored by Śrikantha as being of the nature of self-substance in his invocation.ª He is called Bhava because he exists everywhere and at all times, Sarva because he destroys everything, Pasu-pati, the lord of all creatures, Rudra because he removes the sorrows of the world, Siva because he is free from all taints and is supremely auspicious.3 Siva is the cause of the creation, maintenance and dissolution of the world, of the liberation of souls through the cessation of bondage by his grace, and the concealment of the essential nature of the soul thus causing bondage, janma, sthiti, pralaya, anugraha and tirobhäva. He is also an enjoyer, not of the fruits of karma but of his own infinite bliss. He has a celestial non-material body which is free from subjection to karma. All these qualities belong to the world of manifestation and do not constitute the essential nature of Siva and so do not limit him. They indicate the nature of Brahman but do not disclose his true nature. The manifested world is the tatastha-laksana or temporary quality of Brahman. When mya transforms itself into the world by the grace of God, God himself, being eternally associated with māyā, may in a sense be regarded also as the material cause of the world though he remains outside māya in his transcendence. Brahman exists

1 See R.V. X. 125. 7: Atharva-Śiras U. V. 3. 2 aum namo'ham-padārthāya lokānām siddhi-hetave sac-cid-ānanda-rūpāya sivāya paramātmane. 3 I. I. 2; I. I. 4.

70 The Brahma Sūtra

in a transcendent manner apart from the individual souls and the material world. While God is the instrumental and material cause of the world, he is unaffected by the changes of the latter.1 God is both the transcendent Supreme and the active cause of the world. The various epithets of Brahman, being, conscious- ness and bliss are qualities and not substance of Brahman. If Brahman were of the nature of consciousness he could not have transformed himself into the material world. For this would mean that Brahman was changeable; this would contradict the view of the Upanisads that Brahman was devoid of action, nişkriya. Brahman is not pure consciousness but is endowed with omniscience. He does not depend on any external aid for the execution of his power, anapekşita-bāhya-karana. Though Brahman is absolutely unchangeable in himself, his energy undergoes transformation in the creation and dissolution of the world. He has within him the energy of consciousness and the energy of materiality.2 During the universal dissolution there is nothing, no sun or moon, no day or night, no names and shapes, no sentient and non-sentient objects. Everything is enveloped in darkness and the Lord with all powers withdraws, abides as a cause, absolute, one without a second, self-luminous. When there arises in him the supreme power of knowledge removing the darkness around, he wishes to be many. Then the subtle powers of the sentient and the non-sentient become manifest. The world is said to be both unborn and an effect. It is unborn since it abides as a subtle power of the Lord; it is an effect in the sense that during creation it is manifested in gross forms.3 The relation between Brahman and the universe is analogous to that between the soul and the body, or that between substance and attribute or that between cause and effect. The soul (śaririn) and the body (śarīra) are non-different in the sense that the soul cannot exist without the body and vice versa. It is the same with regard to substance, gunin or viśeşya, and attribute, guņa or viśeșaņa, as well as cause, kāraņa, and effect, kārya. Brahman cannot exist 1 jagad-upādāna-nimitta-bhūtasyāpi paramesvarasya nişkalam nişkriyam ityādi-śrutibhir nirvikāratvam apy upapadyate. See II. 2. 36-8.

3 I.I. 4. 10. 2 cid-acit-prapañca-rūpa-sakti-visiştatvam svābhāvikam eva brahmaņah.

Introduction 7I without the universe which ever exists in him as his power, just as fire cannot exist without heat or a blue lotus without blue- ness. The universe cannot exist without Brahman even as an earthen jar cannot exist without clay. Non-difference means essential and mutual interdependence and not actual identity.1 Difference means difference of nature.ª This peculiar relation enables them to form one whole where one cannot exist with- out the other. Appaya Dīkşita says that God himself is not transformed into the form of the world but his śakti or energy manifests itself as the world. This sakti is of the very being of God. The world is not an illusion. It is not an attribute of God or limb of God where all activities are dependent on the will of God as R. suggests nor is the relation of the world to God of the nature of waves to the sea. Brahman is the controller of all sentient entities and non- sentient world.3 He is both knowledge and knower.4 Cit and acit, the sentient and the non-sentient, are the powers of the Lord.5 Cit-śakti consists of three factors, knowledge, jñāna, volition, icchā, and action, kriya. The acit-sakti consists of the elements, earth, water, fire, air and ether.6 These two together consisting of eight forms constitute the body of the Lord, or the attributes of the Lord qualifying him as the body qualifies the soul or as the colour blue qualifies the blue lotus. The Lord has the universe for his form or body, prapañca-rūpa. For Śrīkaņtha, Siva is both the material and the efficient cause of the universe. He criticises the views of those Saiva sects which look upon the Lord as merely the efficient cause and not the material cause .? When Siva is the material cause through his māyā or icchā- śakti, he is called Nārāyana or Vișņu. He is subordinate to Śiva though non-different from him.8 Subordinate to Nārāyana is Hiranya-garbha or the aggregate of souls of effects.9 The Lord is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe which is the result of the transformation of Brahman. This transformation does not imply any change or defect in 1 prapañca-brahmanor ananyatvam nāma vinā-bhāva-rahitatvam. II. I. 22. 2 II. I. 22. 3 anena-cid-acin-niyāmakam brahmeti vijñāyate. I. I. 2. 4 II. 3. 29. 5 I. 2. 9. 6 II. 3. 14. 7 II. 2. 35-8. 8 yato vişņu-sivayor upādāna-nimittayor avasthā-bhedam antareņa svarūpa- bhedo nāsti. I. I. 6. 9 IV. 3. 14.

72 The Brahma Sūtra Brahman. Brahman's parinama or transformation relates only to his cit-sakti, the energy of consciousness. This is the material cause which takes on the form of the world. Sometimes māya is said to be the primal matter or prakrti. Brahman associated with māya, i.e. subtle consciousness and subtle materiality, is the cause; the same is the effect in its gross manifestation.1 Brahman and the universe are non-different but not identical. Brahman is qualified by the world, sentient and non-sentient, cid-acid-prapañca-visișta. R. and Srikantha adopt the same view of causation. The process is not the changing of one thing into another but the transforming of the same reality from a subtle to a gross condition. The beings sentient and non-sentient are already there in a subtle condition indistinguishable by name and shape. The manifestation of names and shapes marks the transformation of cause into effect. This view is called by Śrīkaņțha viśista-śivādvaita-vāda. Siva is qualified by the sentient and the non-sentient even as the soul is qualified by the body. While for Nimbärka non-difference and difference are on the same level, for Śrikantha non-difference is the principal which is qualified by difference. Difference is subordinate to non-difference, even as the body is subordinate to the soul which it qualifies.

Cit-śakti The sentient and the non-sentient world is the result of the transformation of the cit-sakti or the energy of consciousness of the Supreme Lord who is non-different from it. The first manifestation of cit-sakti is Nārāyana who is the material cause of the world. He is of the form of the universe, viśvākāra. Brahman himself who is Siva is the efficient cause. Brahman and cit-śakti are distinguishable aspects and not separate entities. Between Brahman and cit-sakti there is non-difference. Brahman is unchanging and unaffected by the transformation through cit-akti. Brahman as different from cit-sakti is only the operative cause. Brahman as creator is to be viewed as endowed with cit-sakti. On account of the relationship to the Lord 1 sūkşma-cid-acid-visiştam brahma kāraņam; sthūla-cid-acid-visistam tat- kāryam bhavati. I. I. 2.

Introduction 73 through cit-sakti, the world partakes of the three qualities of being, consciousness and bliss of the Supreme. Particular things are a fraction of the existence of Brahman and their knowledge and bliss are fragments of the knowledge and bliss of Brahman. The identity of Brahman and the finite self is not to be taken literally. The relationship is of the nature binding the body and the embodied, the pervaded and the pervader. When the faggot is lit by fire, we speak of it as fire.

Viśişļa-śivādvaita Śrikantha warns us against three possible views: (i) atyanta- bheda-väda, the view that there is an absolute difference between the Lord and the soul as between a jar and a piece of cloth because this conflicts with scriptural texts which deny difference. (ii) atyantābheda-vāda, the view that there is absolute non- difference between the Lord and the soul, because this conflicts with scriptural texts which admit difference between the two. (iii) abhedā-bheda-vāda, the view that there is both non-difference and difference for this goes against facts of direct experience. Difference and non-difference are mutually contradictory and cannot coexist. Srikantha says: 'We are not among those who maintain absolute difference between Brahman and the world as between a jar and a cloth, that being opposed to the texts which declare their non-distinctness; and we are not of those who maintain their absolute non-difference; nor do we declare the illusoriness of one of them as in the case of silver and mother-of-pearl,1 that being opposed to the texts which declare difference between their natural qualities. Nor are we of those who posit both difference and non-difference, that relationship being opposed to fact. We are, however, of those who maintain the non-dualism of the distinct, as exists between body and the embodied, or between a quality and the qualified.' For R. Brahman is a concrete universal, having matter and consciousness always associated with him and controlled by him as the limbs of a person are controlled by the person 1 brahma-prapañcayor na vayam atyanta-bheda-vādino ghata-patayor iva tad- ananyatva-para-śruti virodhāt. na cātyantābheda-vādinah. na vā sukti-rajatayor ivaikataramithyātva-vādinaļ, tat svābhāvika-guņa-bheda-para-śruti-virodhāt. na ca bhedābheda-vādinah, vastu-virodhāt. kim tu sarīra-sarīriņor iva guņa-guņinor iva ca visiștādvaita-vādinah. C*

74 The Brahma Sūtra himself. In his Sivādvaita-nirņaya Appaya Dīkșița argues against the identification of Srikantha's philosophy with that of R.'s visistadvaita. He argues that Srikantha's system was essentially a non-dualism, Advaita, though he offers the visistādvaita view for the benefit of those who are incapable of comprehending the absolute non-dual Brahman. Srikantha does not criticise the Advaita doctrine as R. does but expounds the theistic position. Appaya Diksita commenting on Srikantha's views argues that Brahman differs from the sentient (cetana) and non-sentient (acetana). These are two forms of energy, cit-śakti or energy of consciousness which is responsible for conscious beings and jada- śakti which transforms itself in the form of the material universe under the instrumentality of Brahman. Both these are mani- festations of the energy of God. They are the qualities of God and have no existence separate from the nature of God. The soul is an eternal and real substance, a knower, an enjoyer and an active agent, atomic in size. These qualities pertain to the very nature of the soul and endure in bondage as in release. The soul though intelligent is not omniscient. It has limited know- ledge and is subject to defects and faults. Though the souls and the Lord are different, they are not absolutely different. The soul is atomic and is not of the nature of pure consciousness. It possesses knowledge as its permanent quality. It is a real part of Brahman and not a false appearance due to limitations of causes and conditions. The individual souls are active agents, doing things by themselves. God only helps the realisation of each one's wishes. He cannot be charged with cruelty or partiality.1 Even though Siva is all-merciful, he cannot remove the sorrows of all. It is only when by their own deeds the veil of ignorance and impurity is removed that the mercy of God manifests itself in the liberation of the soul. The laws of nature are the manifestation of the grace of God. By our good deeds we earn the mercy of God. By the proper and disinterested performance of duties we purify the mind and help the rise of knowledge. Though karma does not directly lead to salvation, it is an indirect means, for it gives rise to knowledge which leads to meditation and meditation leads to salvation. 1 Appaya Dīkşita makes God completely responsible. tathā ca parameśvara- kārita-pūrva-karma-mūla-svecchādhīne yatne, paramesvarādhīnatvam na hīyate.

Introduction 75 Kinds of Meditation There are various kinds of meditation. Meditation of the Lord in his own nature leads to liberation directly and immediately. The Lord is meditated on as identical with the self of the devotee which helps to remove the pasutva or bondage of the soul and leads to the attainment of Sivatva. Sarvajñānottara says: 'He who thinks, I am the self, Siva, the supreme self is, indeed, different or he who because of delusion meditates thus does not attain sivatva. Give up the thought of difference, "Siva is other than myself", contemplate them always as not-dual, but in the form, what is Siva that is myself.'1 There is meditation on Nārāyana which leads to the attainment of Nārāyana and then to that of the Lord Siva.2

Release The grace of the Lord is an essential prerequisite of salvation. While the soul is under the control of the Lord in the state of bondage, it becomes free in the state of release. Liberation is severance of the bondage of worldly existence3 and attaining to a similarity with Siva. The freed soul becomes omniscient4 and independent, possessed of all his auspicious qualities and free from all defects.5 The freed soul becomes similar to the Lord and not identical with him.6 It is the full development of the soul? and not absorption in Siva. It is distinct from the Lord since it is atomic while the Lord is all- pervading. It lacks the power to create, maintain and destroy the universe which only the Lord has. The freed soul shares all the divine pleasures with the Lord.$ It possesses pure, independent, non-material sense-organs and mind by which it

1 aham ātmā sivohy anyaļ paramātmeti yah smrtah evam yopāsayen mohāt na sivatvam avāpnuyāt sivo'nyas tu aham evānyah prthag-bhāvam vivarjayet. yaś sivas so'ham eveti hy advayam bhāvayet sadā. Śiva-ananya-sākşātkāra-pațala. 12, 13. 2 III. 3. 57. 3 pāsa-viccheda and pasutva-nivytti. 4 samsāre kimcijjñatvam muktau sarvajňatvam iti jñātā eva ātmā. 5 IV. 4. 9. 6 I. 3. 8. 7 IV. 4. 21. 8 pari-pūrnāham bhavam prakatam anubhavati. This egoity is not like the prakrta aham-kara which is narrow but embraces the whole world prapaňcāvagāhin. IV. 4. 17, 18, 19.

76 The Brahma Sūtra enjoys pleasures. It perceives the diversity of the universe.1 It is united with the Lord in blissful experience and perceives his form. The liberated soul can remain without a body and enjoy all experiences through mind alone or he can at the same time animate or recreate many spiritual bodies which transcend the laws of prakrti and through them enjoy any happiness he wishes to have. He is not subject to the law of karma; he has no rebirth but he retains his personality possessing perfect resemblance with God, sārūpya. Salvation is a positive state of supreme and unsurpassed bliss and knowledge. It is not a state of mere unconsciousness. It can be attained only after the death of the earthly body.2 For Srikantha there is no jīvan-mukti, liberation in this life. All karmas which are ripe for producing fruits will continue to give fruits and do so until the present body falls away. Past karmas which have begun to take effect have to run their course till the end of this life. In that state we attain knowledge but not liberation. There are two kinds of salvation, immediate and gradual. Those who meditate on the Supreme Lord in his own nature go directly to the Lord and become free at once. Those who meditate on the Lord as sentient and non-sentient or on Nārāyana who is the Lord in the form of the material cause of the universe first go to Nārāyana and then to Siva. Śrīkantha sometimes says that there is no need for the devotees of the non-related, niranvayopāsakas to travel by this path of the gods.3 Some like Appaya Dīksita argue that Śrikantha was at heart a non-dualist. The expression niranvaya is understood by Appaya Dīkșita as niş-prapañca. Śrīkaņțha seems to admit the existence of Brahman without deter- minations, Nir-guna Brahman, though his main purpose is to foster faith in and devotion to Personal God, Sa-guna Brahman. Śrikantha asks us to look upon the Lord as master in relation to servants and adopt the path of service, the dāsa mārga, but he admits that those who seek release should meditate on the Lord as one with the self and not as standing in the relationship of the embodied to the body. 1 vividham vastu-jātam pasyanti, vimysanti cid yasya sah. III. 2. 16. 2 IV. 28. 3 kecin niranvayopāsakānām iha sarīrapāta eva muktir iti arcirādi-gatim aniyatām āhuh. Srikaņțha on IV. 2. 18.

Introduction 77 Śaiva Siddhānta Ś. mentions the name of Siddhānta-śāstra composed by Siva himself.1 He refers to the three categories of pati, the lord, pasu, the creature, and pasa, the bond. The purpose of creation is to enable the souls to purify and perfect themselves. The paśu is in bondage and the pasa can be scotched only by union with pati, the Lord. These views were adopted by the Saiva Siddhānta and the Pasupata schools. The pati is Siva who is called Rudra. Uma-pati who lived in the early half of the fourteenth century says that Siva is the Supreme Being who is neither permanently manifested nor unmanifested, without qualities, without impurities. The Pāśupata system deals with five categories, the cause (kārana), effect (kārya), union with God (yoga), rules of conduct (vidhi) and end of sorrow (duhkhānta). For this system Paśu-pati, God is the instrumental cause of the world. The Naiyāyikas and the Vaiśeșikas adopt a similar view of God's causality.2 Between Srikantha's view and the Saiva Siddhānta there are some differences. The anava mala or the power which obscures of the Saiva Siddhānta is called avidyā by Śrīkaņtha. Śaiva Siddhānta makes a distinction between cit-śakti and māyā. Śrīkantha accepts the tādātmya view that the One Reality appears as gunin and guna, substance and attribute, while the Śaiva Siddhānta means by tādātmya the close connection of two things which might be regarded as one. The soul is atomic, anu, for Śrikanta while for Saiva Siddhānta it is all-pervading, vibhu. Śrikantha does not adopt the view attributed to Śaivā- gamas that God is only the instrumental cause. For him, as we have seen, he is also the material cause. For Saiva Siddhānta, the soul is pure consciousness (cin- matra) covered with impurities. It is all-pervading in space and time and goes through the cycle of birth and rebirth. Its nature is both jñāna and kriyā. It is pure consciousness which appears as distinct on account of the impurities, the pāśas with which it is covered. The malas or impurities do not affect the purity of

1 II. 2. 37. 2 R. mentions Kāpālikas and Kāla-mukhas as being sects of Śaivism which are of an anti-Vedic character (veda-bāhya). Ānandagiri's Śamkara-vijaya mentions the Kāpālikas as being outside the pale of the Vedas.

78 The Brahma Sūtra

the consciousness even as gold is not affected by the dross with which it is associated. The impurities can be removed not by knowledge but by the grace of Siva. The malas bind us differently on account of different kinds of karma. The obscur- ations of mala differentiate the different souls which are all basically one with Siva. Liberation does not mean transfor- mation. It is only the removal of the impurities, the malas on account of which the different individual entities pass through the cycle of samsāra.

G. NIMBĀRKA

Nimbārka was a Telugu Brahman who was born in Nimba or Nimbapura in the Bellary district but lived in Brindavana.1 He was a lifelong celibate, naisthika-brahma-cārin. He seems to be indebted largely to R.'s bhasya and criticises Srikantha's views. His date may be about the latter half of the thirteenth century.

Literature Nimbārka's main works are Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha, which is his commentary on the B.S., Dasa-ślokī or Siddhānta- ratna and Sa-viśeşa-nir-viśeşa śri-Krşna-stava-raja. He has also written a number of stotras. His direct disciple Śrīnivāsa wrote a commentary on Nimbārka's work, called Vedānta-kaustubha. Keśava Kāmīrin wrote a work on Vedānta-Kaustubha called the Vedānta-Kaustubha-prabhā.

Bhedābheda-vāda There are texts which affirm duality between Brahman and the individual souls and others which affirm their non-duality. We can reconcile these conflicting texts by adopting the bhedābheda or the dvaitadvaita-vāda to which we have references in the B.S. According to Nimbärka there are three equally real and coeternal realities (tri-tattva), Brahman, cit and acit. While Brahman is the controller, niyantr, cit is the enjoyer, bhoktr, and acit is the enjoyed, bhogya. Acit or non-sentient reality is of 1 There is also a view that he was born in Brindāvana on the Yamunā river.

Introduction 79 three kinds, (i) präkrta or what is derived from prakrti or primal matter, (ii) apräkrta or what is not derived from prakrti but derived from a non-material substance of which the world of Brahman is made and (iii) kāla or time. There is a difference of nature between them, svarūpa-bheda. Souls and matter, cit and acit, have a dependent reality, para-tantra-tattva. Nimbärka adopts the view of svābhāvika-bhedābheda. Differ- ence and non-difference are both equally real. They coexist but do not contradict each other. The relation between the one and the many is like the sea and its waves1 or the sun and its rays. Cit and acit, the souls and the universe, exist in Brahman from all eternity and do not become separate from him even when manifested. They retain their specific natures. Brahman has a karana-rūpa when he is pure cause without producing any effects, i.e. during the time of universal dis- solution. Even in the causal state, he is not absolutely un- differenced or nir-viśeşa, a pure unity or a bare identity. Brahman is always sa-viśeşa. Cit and acit are never absolutely merged in Brahman. They retain their individuality and separateness even during salvation and dissolution. God is separated from everything and inseparable from everything. Brahman is both transcendent and immanent. Brahman is personal, possessed of a celestial body, full of divine beauty and grace. He is bhakta-vatsala, a god of love and grace. Nimbārka identifies Brahman with Krsna. For R.'s Vişņu and Lakșmī, we have in Nimbārka Krșņa and Rādhā. Brahman assumes earthly forms to help the world. Brahman is the omniscient, the cause of the origin, sustenance and destruction of the universe. He is all-powerful and all- merciful. While R. insists on the incomparable greatness (aiśvarya) of the Lord, Nimbārka lays stress on the sweetness (madhurya). Brahman is gracious to his devotees and helps them to have a direct vision of himself.

Scriptural Authority Brahman, possessed of inconceivable energies, is apprehended through the authority of Scripture. We cannot know the truth 1 avibhāgepi samudra-tarangayor iva sūrya-tat-prabhayor iva vibhāgas syāt. II. I. 13.

80 The Brahma Sūtra of things by our own limited powers of perception and inference. We have to rely on Scripture for our knowledge of Brahman. Scripture is the record of the experiences of great seers who have attained the power to realise God directly.

Brahman and the World Brahman's relation to cit and acit is not one of substance and attribute as is the case with R. but is that of cause and effect. The impure cit and acit cannot be parts of Brahman. Brahman is the material and efficient cause of the universe of souls and matter.1 The material and efficient causes are ordinarily different from one another. In the case of the jar made of clay, clay is the material cause and the potter is the efficient cause. Prakrti is said to be the cause of all material objects. But according to Nimbārka's follower, Puruşottama, prakrti is said to be a power or sakti of Brahman. In his Vedānta-ratna- manjūșā, Purușottama observes that creation is the mani- festation of the subtle powers of cit and acit in the form of gross effects. In pralaya or dissolution they remain in a subtle state and in srsti or creation they become manifest. The universe is a real transformation, parinama, of Brahman. Brahman is greater than the world which is not a complete or exhaustive manifestation of Brahman. Acit is prakrti or primal matter. The presence of cit and acit in Brahman does not affect his nature. Why should the perfect Brahman, who can have no motive, no unfulfilled desire create the world? Nimbarka says that he does so in sport, out of the abundance of his joy. Creation does not indicate any insufficiency in Brahman. The word līla or sport does not indicate any arbitrariness or irrationality.

Souls and their destiny Nimbärka believes in an infinite number of souls. Each of them is a distinctive agent, a knower (jñātr), doer (kartr) and enjoyer (bhoktr). The soul is atomic in size and is said to pass out of the body through such small openings as the eye, etc. Though atomic in size, its attribute of knowledge pervades the whole body and is capable of experiencing the various states of 1 C.U. VI. 2. 3.

Introduction 8I the body even as a small lamp can flood a large room with its light. Nimbärka criticises the doctrine of the all-pervasiveness of the soul. If it were so we would have eternal perception or eternal non-perception. Either it is in connection with all objects when it will have eternal perception or it is not in connection with all objects, when it will have eternal non- perception and there will not be anything outside to bring about any connection. Human individuals undergo experiences in accordance with their past conduct. There are three kinds of destiny for the soul, svarga or heaven, naraka or hell and apavarga or release. The sinners go to hell; the virtuous go to heaven and the knowers go to the world of Brahman and are not bound to return any more to samsara. They are the released souls. Release is not the annihilation of the individual but is the full development of one's nature, ātma-svarūpa-lābha. One attains freedom by the ceaseless reflection on Brahman as the deepest self of the individual soul; not in the sense of absolute identity but in the sense of identity in difference.1 Freedom is the attainment of the nature of Brahman, tad- bhavapatti or brahma-svarūpa-lābha. As the difference between Brahman and the soul is natural and eternal, it persists even in the state of release. In the state of release the individual is not merged in God. When the soul attains its full development, it becomes similar to and not one with the Supreme. The goal is fellowship with the Supreme through the bond of mutual love. The freed soul is both different and non-different from Brahman. It is different because its individuality is not lost; it is non- different because it is dependent on and an organic part of Brahman. It has the attributes of being, consciousness and bliss and is free from the defects of sin, pain and suffering. It is still atomic in size while Brahman is all-pervading. The freed soul has not the power to create, maintain and dissolve the world. Even in the state of release the soul has the power to move about freely and realise its aims. Souls in bondage are attached to material bodies and are subject to rebirth according to their past deeds. The released souls are freed from connection with karma and are not liable to be born in the world of samsāra. 1 mumukşuņā parama-puruşah svasya ātmatvena dhyeyah. IV. I. 3.

82 The Brahma Sütra Release is possible only after death. There is no jivan-mukti according to Nimbärka. So long as the material body persists, release is not possible. The way to salvation is by means of the five sādhanas, work, knowledge, devotion and meditation, surrender to God and obedience to the spiritual preceptor. One can undertake the inquiry into Brahman only after a study of the Vedic duties leading to different kinds of beneficial results. The function of karma is to purify the mind and help the rise of knowledge. Even after the rise of knowledge, the various duties of the different stages of life have to be observed.1 When we realise that these results of karma are different from eternal bliss we attempt to attain Brahman through the grace of God. Brahman is to be meditated on as Krsna along with Rādhā.2 While both R. and Nimbarka hold that the world is real like Brahman and is both different and non-different from it, the emphasis is more on non-difference in R. and on both difference and non-difference in Nimbārka.3

H. ŚRĪPATI

Śrīpati Pandit, an Andhra Brahmin of Vijayavāda, lived about the latter half of the fourteenth century,4 and wrote a com- mentary on the B.S. defending dvaitadvaita, unity in duality. He calls his doctrine viseşādvaita dvaitādvaitābhidhāna, bhedābhe- dātmaka and is opposed to Pāśupata dualism. It is different from 1 tasmāt vidyodayāya svāsrama-karmāgnihotrādi-rūpam grhasthena, tapo- japādīni karmāņi ūrdhva-retobhir anuştheyāni iti siddham. Vedānta-kaustubha- prabha. 2 This view is to be found not in Vedānta-pārijāta-saurabha but in Dasa- ślokī Jayadeva (twelfth century) described in his Gita-govinda the longing of the human soul for union with the Divine through the love of Radha and Krsna. The soul which is divine in its essence longs for union with the Divine from which it is separated by the feeling of individuality and it yearns to return to its original source. Jayadeva had remarkable skill in blending sounds and feelings. Vidyapati (A.D. 1368-1475) was his follower in poetry though not in religion. 3 brahmabhinnopi ksetrajñah sva-svarupato bhinna eva. 4 Śrīpati refers to Srīkaņtha's bhāsya on B.S. II. I. 22; III. 2. 8 and is therefore later than Srikantha.

Introduction 83 pariņāma-vāda and vivarta-vāda. Srīpati's view combines the bheda and the abheda views on the analogy of the serpent and its coils or the sun and its rays. There are advaita texts like tat tvam asi and dvaita texts like two birds dwelling on the same tree. If we are not to violate the two sets of texts, we must adopt dvaitādvaita. His work is the philosophical basis of Vīra- śaivism.1 Śrīpati's bhāşya is called Śrīkara-bhāsya for Śrīpati wrote it not in his own name but in the name of Śrikara or Śivakara, for Siva is said to have inspired him to write this work.2 Śripati is a vīra-śaiva. Vīra-śaivas accept the twenty- eight Saiva Agamas and the Siva-gītā. Śrīpati does not accept the validity of the Tantric agamas and rites, which R. does.3 He is also opposed to the Tantric doctrines of Pāśupatas.4

Unity in Duality This doctrine of unity in duality has had a long history. It goes back to a period prior to the composition of the B.S. Ś. criticises a similar theory attributed to Bhartr-prapañca.5 According to Professor M. Hiriyanna, Reality for Bhartr-pra- pañca is bhedābheda or difference and non-difference. The relation of Brahman to the world is analogous to that of snake and its coils or the sun and its radiance. The cause is immanent in the effect. He adopts parināma or transformation as against vivarta or appearance. Brahman, who is one without a second, becomes Iśvara, God and the worlds of souls and material objects. The jiva or the individual soul is a mode of Brahman and not an illusory appearance. Bhartr-prapañca adopts jñāna- karma-samuccaya or co-ordination of knowledge and work as the means to liberation. This doctrine co-ordinates experience and Scripture. We have pramāna-samuccaya. Bhāskara and 1 Cp. vi-sabdam vā vikalpārthe ra-sabdo rahitārthakah vikalpa-rahitamı saivam vira-saivam pracakșate. 2 Baladeva's commentary is called Govinda-bhasya for he says that it was written at the command of Govinda. bhāşyam etad viracitam baladevena dhīmatā srī-govinda-nidesena govindākhyam agat tatah. 3 paribhāşā-pradhāna-rāmānuja-sāstram veda-mūlatvābhāvāt avaidikam iti ghanțāghoșah. II. 2. 42. 4 pānca-rātrādivat pāsupatyāgamānām nirastatvāt. 5 See S. on B.U. V. I. I.

84 The Brahma Sutra Yādava Prakāśa, who adopt varieties of this doctrine, are criticised by R.1 Śrīpati attacks the materialist (cārvāka) view that life is a product of material forces. Life cannot be a product of non-life. Even as a temple has a builder, the world also must have had a builder. Vedic texts declare the reality of Brahman as Siva. Brahman is different from the world of gross and subtle forms.2 Brahman is identified with Para-siva or Parama-śiva who has two forms undivided (a-dvitīya) and divided (dvitīya). In the latter he has pradhana.3 Siva, though endowed with the three gunas, is different from the three guņas, or triguņātmaka-hetu- bhūta-pradhana-sakti, or the threefold creative power. Siva is nir-guna when, prior to creation, he withdraws all his powers within himself; he is sa-guna when he expands the powers and is about to create the world. Siva is the efficient and material cause of the world. The two are non-different but not one.4 Siva, through his cit-sakti, creates the world.5 The energy that manifests itself is in Brahman. The sat-sthala para-siva Brahman is the primal cause of everything.6 God is indistinguishable from his energies even as the sun cannot be distinguished from his rays. In the original state when there was no world God alone existed, and the world of multiplicity existed in a subtle form wholly indistinguishable from him. When the idea of creation moves him he separates the living beings and makes them different, being associated with different kinds of karma. Everything we see in the world is real and has Siva for his substratum. Criticism of Māyā Śrīpati criticises the view of the differenceless Brahman and the world-appearance. The differenceless Brahman can be established only on the authority of Scripture or inference but these are included within the conceptual world of distinctions and cannot take us beyond it to a differenceless Brahman. If 1 R. on B.S. II. I. 15. 3 śivādhīna-pradhāna-vikāsa-sad-bhāve. 2 sthūla-sūkșma-prapanca-vyavrtta. 4 abhinna-nimittopādāna-kāranatvam na tu eka-kāraņatvam. 5 bhedābhedātmikā saktih brahma-nișthā sanātanī. 6 sarva-kāraņa, vedānta-vedya, pūrva-parāmysta-sat-sthala-para-siva-brah- maiva.

Introduction 85 Brahman has avidya as its quality it would cease to be Brahman. If avidyā belongs to Brahman, there ought to be some other entity by whose action avidya is removed. There are many texts which speak of a Personal God. So a differenceless Brahman is a wrong assumption. How can a formless Brahman be reflected through māya or avidya? If the Personal God, Iśvara, is a reflection in māyā or avidyā, then the destruction of the latter will mean the destruction of God and the individual soul. We must admit that Brahman appears in two forms as pure consciousness and as the world. Scriptural texts support Brahman with form and without form. The Personal God cannot be mere appearance. An apparent object cannot bestow benefits or be the object of devotion. There is nothing that can establish the fact of the world- appearance. It exists and fulfils our needs. It is not something which appears without an underlying reality. The world has a substratum. If the appearance is regarded as different from the substratum, we fall into the error of duality. The world has a definite order and system. It is the basis of our knowledge and behaviour. Even dream experiences are real. They are not created by the individual through his personal effort. They are created by God and are not wholly unrelated to the objects of life. They indicate luck or ill-luck in life. Even deep sleep, susupti, is produced by God when we enter into the network of nerves in the heart. We do not become merged in Brahman. When we wake up we remember our past. B.S.1 repudiates the idea of the non-existence of an external world. The texts that speak of the world as being made up of names and shapes do not lead to the view that Brahman alone is real and the world is an appearance. In whatever form the world may appear, it is in reality nothing but Siva.2 The manifold world which has come out of Brahman is one with him. It cannot be regarded as the body of Brahman for the Scriptures declare that in the beginning only pure being existed. The world and Brahman are distinct from each other and one cannot be said to be a part of the other. The texts teach

1 II. 2. 27-8. 2 vācārambhaņa-śrutīnām sivopādānatvāt prapañcasya tad-tādātmya- bodhakatvam vidhīyate, na ca mithyātvam. I. I. I.

86 The Brahma Sūtra both duality and non-duality. The world is different from and identical with Brahman. There is no question of the false imposition of the one on the other. Sripati repudiates S.'s theory of world-appearance and formless Brahman as unworthy of acceptance.1 Śrīpati takes his stand on the bhedābheda texts used also by Bhaskara and R., which state that the relation between God and the world is similar to that between the ocean and the waves. Commenting on I. 4. 22 Srīpati says that Bādarāyaņa's view is the bhedābheda view of Käakrtsna. The world exists in a subtle form and is developed into gross existence through the power of Siva.2 He is beyond all worlds and is possessed of all powers. There is nothing impossible for him. The pradhāna power is treated as a bhinna-śakti while the cit śakti is said to be abhinna-śakti. Siva remains unaltered in all the three stages of time.3 Though God transforms himself into the material world he does not exhaust himself in creation. The greater part of him is transcendent. The individual soul, jīva, is beginningless, anādi, atomic (aņu), bound down by māyā (māyā-pāśa-baddha), caught in the whirl of samsāra (ghora-apāra-nissāra- samsāra-vyāpāra), subject to the three kinds of passion (tāpa- traya) and so subject to birth and death (nānā-sarīra-praveśa- nirgama). It is possessed of self-conceit (abhimāna-visișta), leading to attachment and anger (kāma-krodha) resulting in happiness and misery (sukha-duhkha). The jiva has power of understanding and can act independently. It has the capacity to realise Brahman.

Release When the jiva is freed from the fetters of the three gunas, it is freed and becomes one with Siva. Then the advaita state prevails. So long as the jiva is fettered, he is separate from Siva and the dvaita condition is true. The freed soul has no body subject 1 smārtān sarva-mata-bhraştān jagan-mithyātva-sādhakān gaņikācāra-sampannān pāsandān pari-varjayet. I. I. 20. 2 parcchinna-sakti-višişte niravayave jīvātmani sva-manaś-saktyā vicitra- nānā-vidha-brahmāņda-kalpanām upapannam. 3 kāla-trayepi eka-rūpatayā sthitah.

Introduction 87 to karma. The body which he assumes to attain kailāsa is non-natural and effulgent like that of Parameśvara1 and is free from causes that make for unhappiness.2 He is of true resolve, satya-samkalpa and has no lord over him, ananyādhipati. He is as independent as Siva himself, sivavat svatantrah. The freed souls assume the form of Siva (śiva-sārūpya), are omniscient and free from self-conceit (abhimana). They have Siva's own form but still worship him even in the state of release. Jiva and Brahman are different from each other in the state of bondage;3 in the state of release, the jīva is not different from Brahman.4 The intuition of Brahman, brahma-sākşātkāra, cannot be had by a study of the Upanisads. The grace of God and the grace of the guru are also needed. By knowledge and devotion we may attain to the supreme state.5 By upāsana, dhyāna, dhārana and jñāna the earthly sheath is cast off and Sivatva is reached. Caste distinctions are not insisted on by the Vira-saivas. Vedic duties are compulsory in all stages of life.6 Those who worship Siva go to Siva; those who worship other forms of Brahman than Siva go to them .? In the interests of devotees God takes all the forms in which we find him.s Devotees who meditate on the mūrta and amūrta forms of Brahman realise both these states. Sripati points out that on the analogy of bhramara-kīta-nyāya, by faith, devotion and meditation, the individual soul attains the nature of Siva.9 The formless Brahman can be obtained by means of the worship of personal forms, sa-gunopāsanā. By meditating on Nīla-kaņtha the supreme three-eyed Lord helped by Umā, the saint will 1 aprākrta-jyotir-mayatvena parameśvara-śarīravat. a na duhkha-hetuh. 3 svābhāvika-bhinnatvam. s tadvad abhinnatvam. 5 jñānam vastu paricchetti dhyānam tat-bhāva-kāranam tasmāt jīvo bhavet sambhuh krimivat kīļa-cintanāt. G III. 4. 2. 7 Śrīpati quotes the following smyti text: śivam bhajanti ye narāh sivam vrajanti te narāh sivetaram bhajanti ye sivetaram vrajanti te. 8 bhaktānugrahārtham ghrta-kāthinyavad divya-mangala-vigraha-dharasya maheśvarasya mūrtāmūrta-prapañca-kalpane apy adosah. I. I. 2. 9 śraddhā-bhakti-dhyāna-yogād avehi' ityādau bhramara-kījavat parameś- varopāsanātmaka-dhyāna-jñāna-vašāt jīvasya siva-tattva-prāptim upadešāt. I. I. 4.

88 The Brahma Sūtra attain Siva, the origin of created things, who is beyond dark- ness.1 The six positions in the progress of the aspirant aiming at the attainment of freedom from bondage are said to be sat-sthala.2 Sat-sthala is the connecting link between the individual soul and the Supreme Reality. It marks the six stages which signify the acquisition of knowledge which leads to sāmarasya or equality with Brahman. They are named bhakti, mahesa, prasāda, prāņa-linga śarana, aikya. Siva is worshipped as linga.3 the symbol which is said to transcend space. While the worship of Hari and Hara, Visnu and Siva was generally adopted, still in some periods rivalries were pronounced. Haradattācārya's work on Hari-hara-tāratamyam is a case in point. The joint worship of Vişnu and Siva in the form of Hari-hara is advised in the well-known Devangere inscription dated A.D. I224.

I. VALLABHA

Vallabha belongs to the latter part of the fifteenth century.4 He wrote a commentary on the B.S. called the Anu-bhasya, the small commentary as distinct from the Brhad-bhäsya, or the large commentary, which has not come down to us. Like Madhva and Jīva Gosvāmin, Vallabha holds the Bhāgavata Purana in high esteem. He wrote a commentary on it called the 1 umā-sahāyam paramesvaram prabhum tri-locanam nīla-kantham prasāntam dhyātvā munir gacchati bhūta-yonim samasta-saksim tamasah parastāt. 2 I. I. 3. Kaivalya U. 7. 3 liyante yatra bhutani nir-gacchanti punah punah. tena lingam param vyoma nişkalah parama sivah. Lingam linam gamayati yat, the unseen background of the universe. Anyone initiated in the Pāsupata-vrata wears not only bhasma but lińga: lingānga-sanginām caiva punar-janma na vidyate yeşā pāsupato yogah pasu-pāsa nivrttaye sarva-vedānta-sāroyam atyāsrama iti śrutih. He who wears the linga on his body will have no more rebirth. This wearing of the linga is the pasupata yoga by which we destroy the animal created by bondage. This is the essence of the Vedanta, the meaning of atyasrama of the śruti. 4 His dates are given as A.D. 1479-1531 or 1481-1533.

Introduction 89 Subodhini. In his Anu-bhaşya, he uses not only the Upanişads, the B.G. and the B.S., but also the Bhāgavata. His commen- tary is available only up to III. 2. 33 and it was completed by his second son Vittala-nätha. He himself was a follower of Vişnu-svāmin (fourteenth century) who is reputed to be the founder of Viśuddhādvaita. Vișņu-svāmin is said to have written a commentary on the B.S. called Sarvajña-sūkta. There is a legend that Visnu-svāmin's successors were Jñāna-deva, Nāma-deva, Tri-locana and Vallabha. Possibly Vișņu-svāmin lived about the end of the thirteenth century. He follows Madhva's views except that he advocates the worship of Rādhā along with that of Krsna. In his commentary on the Bhāgavata Purāņa called Subodhinī,1 Vallabha states the view of Vișņu- svāmin as propounding a distinction between Brahman and the world through the qualities of sattva, rajas and tamas while he holds that Brahman is devoid of qualities.2 Vallabha's suddhād- vaita is distinct from S.'s system which he regards as impure on account of its use of the doctrine of māyā.

Ultimate Reality For Vallabha, the Supreme is Krsna, known as Brahman in the Upanisads, one without a second, being, awareness and bliss, sac-cid-änanda. He is free from all differences, internal or external. There are three forms of Brahman: (i) Para-Brahman, Purușottama or Krşna, (ii) Antar-yāmin, the principle dwelling in the finite souls, (iii) Aksara-Brahman, which is the object of meditation which is regarded as the abode of Krsna. The Akşara appears as prakrti and purușa and is the cause of every- thing. It is higher than purusa and prakrti and includes in- numerable worlds. While Purusottama is the highest, Aksara Brahman is one expression of it. It appears in four forms: (I) akşara, (2) kāla or time, (3) karman or action, (4) svabhāva or nature. Time is regarded as a form of God. It is supra-sensible and is inferred from the nature of effects, kāryānumeya. It is all- pervasive and the cause and support of all things. It is the first cause that disturbs the equilibrium of the gunas. 1 III. 32. 37. 2 te ca sāmpratam vişņu-svāmy-anusāriņah tattva-vādino rāmānujaś ca tamo-rajas-sattvair bhinnā asmat-pratipāditāc ca nairguņya-vādasya.

90 The Brahma Sūtra Karma or action is also universal. It manifests itself as different actions in different men. A third category is svabhava. It is that which produces change.1 These are eternal principles which are one with God. The souls, the material world and the indwelling spirit are three forms of God and not different from him.2 The universe consists of these three elements. Inanimate objects have only sat or being; consciousness and bliss are absent. The animate creation jiva has being and consciousness but not bliss. Krsna, the Supreme Being, has all the three qualities, being, consciousness and bliss. God is both agent and non-agent. He cannot be known through the pramanas; yet is he known when he wills. God is the changeable as well as the unchangeable. He is not sa-guna or possessed of qualities for the simple reason that the qualities do not stand against him depriving him of his independence. He is , the controller of the qualities and so their existence and non- existence depend on him. He is both sa-guna and nir-guna. God has the power to become anything at any time through what is known as his māyā-śakti. He is the creator of everything and is the material and efficient cause of the world.3 God does not create by using prakrti but through his own nature. He is the samavāya and the nimitta-karana of the world. Vallabha holds that Brahman is the inherent cause or samavāyī-kāraņa since Brahman exists everywhere in his tripartite nature as being, consciousness and bliss. Brahman manifests his three characters in different proportions in matter, soul and Brahman. He is present in his fullness in all objects though he manifests his qualities in different degrees. Multiplicity does not involve any change for it is the one identity that is manifested in varying forms. Maya is the power of Brahman and is not different from Brahman.4 The cause, Brahman, and the effect, the world, are the same. Though unmanifest and transcendent by creating the world, he becomes manifest and the object of comprehension. The world being a manifestation of Brahman is never destroyed 1 pariņāma-hetutvam tal-lakşanam. 2 sa-jātīya-vi-jātīya-sva-gata-dvaita-varjitam sa-jātīyā jīvā, vi-jātīyā jadāh, sva-gata antar-yāminah; trișv api bhagavān anusyūtas tri-rūpas ca bhavatīti. tair nirūpitam dvaitam bhedas tad-varjitam. Tattvārtha-dīpa. 3 I. I. 4. 4 māyāyapi bhagavac-chaktitvena Purușottama's Prasthāna-ratnākara, p. 159. śaktimad-abhinnatvāt.

Introduction 9I except when the Lord wishes to take it back into himself. The world comes out of the very nature (svarūpa) of Brahman and not out of māyā as Ś. thinks or the body as R. suggests or power or śakti as Nimbārka holds. To think that Brahman appears as the world through the bondage of avidya is to lower the dignity of God. Vallabha upholds the doctrine of the transformation of the nature of God, svarupa-parināma, though he says that this change does not affect the integrity of Brahman. It is a-vikrta- parināma. Vallabha does not argue the point but accepts it on the authority of the Scripture. The nature of Brahman can be known only through the testimony of Scripture. In this view Vallabha is in agreement with Bhāskara and R.

Creation Though God is self-sufficient, he creates the world as his līlā or sport. He delights in creation and in withdrawing it within himself. He is related to the world as the spider to its web. Though everything in the world is Brahman, different qualities manifest themselves in different objects at the will of the Supreme and are called by different names. On account of ignorance, objects are not seen in their true form but are seen as possessing imaginary attributes. Bondage is the effect of this ignorance, vyāmohikā-māyā. God manifests himself as many through māya. The mani- festation is not an error or illusion. It is a real manifestation of God in diverse forms and in partial aspects. Though he is identical with knowledge and bliss he appears as the possessor of them. Māyā is not the original cause. It serves to make God manifest himself in the world. It also creates the diversity of the grades of existence as higher and lower. When the multi- plicity shuts us away from the reality of God, māya is called avidyā. When subject to it, individuals feel that they have a separate existence and thus become subject to bondage. When they are freed from avidyā, they become pure intelligence though they have no power to control the affairs of the universe.

Individual Souls The individual souls come out of Aksara Brahman like sparks from fire. Brahman is the support of the jīva; all activities

92 The Brahma Sūtra of the jiva are under the control of Brahman. Brahman and jiva are real, one being the support and the other the supported. The self is one though it appears as many when it becomes associated with diverse kinds of ignorance and limits itself by the objects of knowledge. The notion of the self as doer and enjoyer is due to misconception. If the self were not naturally free, it would not be possible to liberate it by any means. The souls are eternal parts of Brahman. Though atomic in size, they pervade the whole body by their intelligence. They are of three classes, pusti, maryāda and pravāha. The first class are the chosen ones who enjoy the grace of God and are ardently devoted to him. The second are devoted to God and worship him through the study of the Scriptures. The last are engrossed in worldly desires and do not think of God. For the jiva to enjoy all blessings along with Brahman, it is necessary that it should possess all attributes as Brahman. The jīva is made in the image of Brahman. It is not ānanda-maya but when it attains brahma-knowledge it enjoys ananda. It does not become ananda-maya for then it would be the creator of worlds like Brahman. The Supreme who is ananda-maya gives bliss to the jivas and cannot itself be the jiva. There is always a distinction between the giver and the receiver, the attained and the attainer. For the individual to know itself as pure intelli- gence, yoga or knowledge by special vision is essential. Release and the Way to it Vallabha holds that the knower of Brahman is absorbed in Akşara Brahman and not in Purusottama. If knowledge is associated with devotion the seeker is absorbed in Puruşottama. There is a still higher stage where the Lord gives to some souls divine bliss. They share the joy of his company, nitya-līlā. Bhakti, of which Vallabha gives a detailed analysis, is the only means to salvation. By it we reach release from birth and rebirth. The state of bhakti when we enjoy God with all our senses and mind is better even than release. Bhakti, for Vallabha, is premā and sevā, love and service. Through intense attachment to the Supreme one perceives him in all things, for they are all manifestations of God. Bhakti produces c ks| sarvātma-bhāva.

Introduction 93 There are two forms of bhakti, maryāda-bhakti which is attainable by one's own efforts and pusti-bhakti which is attainable by the grace of God alone, without one's own effort. Vallabha adopts the latter position. Those who adopt this way gain release through the grace of the Supreme. They are elected by God whether they have acquired the requisite qualifications or not. This way demands complete surrender to the Supreme. Vallabha does not advocate renunciation or samnyāsa. Renunciation follows from bhakti out of necessity and not out of a sense of duty. The path of knowledge brings its results after many births. The way of bhakti is preferable. Sür Das (A.D. 1483-1563) was Vallabha's chief disciple and he popularised Vallabha's teaching. Mīrā Bāi (A.D. 1498-1573) in her songs brought out the full implications of the worship of Rādhā-Krșna. She put herself in the place of Rādhā and addressed her songs to Krsna.

J. ŚUKA From the quotations in other commentaries we find that Śuka (sixteenth century) is an advocate of bheda-vāda. Śuka follows Madhva's teaching on this point. He bases his views on the Bhāgavata Purāna. He admits differences to be real between the individual soul, jīva, and the Lord, Isa, jīva and prakrti. The world is real. The B.S. gives us not an unqualified, nir-viśeșa Brahman but a qualified, sa-viseşa Brahman. While Para- Brahman is nir-guna in so far as he is absolutely free from sattva, rajas and tamas, he is full of auspicious qualities, ānandādi-sad- gunas. He is the source of the creation, maintenance and destruction of the universe.1 Brahman in the form of Śri Hari, Nārāyaņa, Krșņa is to be adored. Šuka believes in avatāras which are said to be equal. The purpose of jijñāsā or inquiry is for the attainment of release, moksa-labha. The Supreme, out of his grace, grants moksa or liberation.2 The released soul is para-tantra,

1 jagat-janmādi-kāraņatvam janmādyasya iti. para-brahmano laksanam bhavatīti prāha

IV. 4. 17. 2 bhagavat-prasāda-labdhasya mokşasya pratyag-ātmana sannihitatvam asti.

94 The Brahma Sūtra

subordinate to Paramatman. He enjoys bliss in association with the Supreme Lord.

K. VIJÑĀNA-BHIKȘU

Vijñāna-bhikșu, a native of Bengal, who lived about the beginning of the seventeenth century, wrote a commentary on the B.S. called Vijñānamrta-bhasya, which develops a theistic Samkhya. He attempts to reconcile the Vedanta and the Samkhya systems. He supports the personal individuality of souls, protests against S.'s view and complains that he reduces Brahman to the sunya of the Buddhists. He dismisses teachers of non-dualism as Ku-kalpakas.1

Brahman Brahman has many qualities, atyanta-sammiśra-rūpeņa. It is akhanda, impartible. Brahman is possessed of śakti. There are two forms of the Supreme, Brahman and Iśvara. Brahman is pure consciousness and unchangeable. Iśvara possesses energies constituting prakrti and purușa while Brahman is pure consciousness. Prakrti and purușa have no existence apart from God. Though therefore the world has no permanent reality, it has a relative vyāvahārika existence. Iśvara is the instrumental and material cause. While in the Samkhya system prakrti is associated with purusas through an inner teleology, according to Vijñāna-bhikșu, their mutual association is due to the operation of God.2 Prakrti is the upādhi of Iśvara. Brahman is not directly the material cause of the world; it is only the substratum or the ground cause, adhişthāna-kārana. The relation between the upādhi and prakrti is one of the controller and the controlled. Through the instrument of prakrti, God is able to think or will. For in himself God is only pure consciousness. Prakrti acts as the upādhi of God with its pure sattva. Kāla and adrsta are also parts of prakrti. For Vijñāna-bhikșu, Bhagavān or Absolute God is different 1 I. I. 2. 2 asmābhis tu prakrti-purușa-samyoga īsvareņa kriyate. I. I. 2.

Introduction 95 from Nārāyaņa or Vișuu who are his manifestations even as sons are of the father.1 Brahman as God is responsible for the creation, maintenance and destruction of the world. Commenting on I. I. 2, Vijñāna- bhiksu states that the world is real and eternal, nitya. While God creates changes, he is not affected by them. Prakrti and purușas are entities which abide outside God and are coexistent with him. They are moved by God for the production of the universe which is experienced and enjoyed by the purusas who are ultimately led to liberation beyond bondage. Purușa and prakrti merge in the end in Iśvara by whose will the creative process begins in prakrti at the end of each pralaya. Brahman as Ī śvara brings into being purusa and prakrti which are already potentially existent in God and connects the prakrti with purusa. God is all-pervasive, the cause of all and the inner controller. The ultimate principle is not Isvara which is the manifestation of pure consciousness in sattva-maya body.2 The Supreme Self does not undergo any change or transformation. He is more real than purusa or prakrti and its evolutes.

The Individual Soul The self is devoid of any connection (asanga). Its association with prakrti is not direct contact. It is the reflection of the pure soul in the conditioning factors which turn it into a jiva or the individual. The self is pure consciousness and knowledge of objects is possible through the changes of antah-karana and buddhi.3 The jivas are not unreal. While the individual souls and Brahman are indistinguishable in character (avibhāga), the reality of the individual souls is not denied. They are said to be derived from God as sparks from fire. Though they resemble God in so far as they are of the nature of pure consciousness, they retain their individuality on account of their association with limiting conditions and so they appear as finite and limited, different from Brahman.4 While the Samkhya system recognises 1 Quoting the Bhāgavata, Krsņas tu bhagavān svayam, he explains that Krşna is a part of God even as the son is part of the father: atra krsno visnuh svayam parameśvaras tasya putravat sākşād amsa ity arthah. 2 IV. I. 3. 3 II. 3. 5 1 bhedābhedau vibhāgāvibhāga-rūpau kāla-bhedena aviruddhau anyonyābhāvas ca jīva-brahmaņor ātyantika eva. I. I. 2.

96 The Brahma Sūtra the individuality and separateness of the souls (purusas) Vijñāna-bhikșu maintains that, in spite of their separateness, they are one in essence with Brahman and have sprung out of it. When their destiny is fulfilled, they will be merged in Brahman. Brahman is the final goal of jiva but jiva is not one with Brahman. The ultimate state of realisation is entry into the ultimate being. It is a state of non-difference with it. At the time of release the individuals are not connected with any content of knowledge and are therefore devoid of any con- sciousness. Even in the state of dissolution, they enter into the great soul even as rivers enter into the ocean. The released soul is an amsa, not an amsin. The goal is sāyujya, attaining Brahma- rupa and not aikya or oneness with Brahman. It is the happiness of living near God, saha-vāsa-bhoga-mātra. The released soul does not possess the powers of creation, etc., which are the prerogatives of Iśvara.1 To get to the presence of Brahman is the highest reward for the devotee. Vijaya-dhvaja, the commentator, writes mad-darsanam eva sarva-śreyasām phalam iti. Vijñāna-bhiksu holds that the seekers may reach brahmatva but they cannot attain para-brahmatva. After the completion of enjoyment with Brahman,2 they secure release from rebirth. Those who attain to kārana-Brahman have no return. Vijñāna- bhiksu holds that one can get to karya-Brahman and not to kārana-Brahman. Bhakti as love is the way to the highest realisation. To know Brahman, the aid of the Samkhya system is essential.3 When the seeker realises his nature as pure con- sciousness and that God is the being from which he has derived his existence, by which he is maintained and to which he will ultimately return, his false attachment to the ego disappears. 1 Cp. Bhāgavata II. 9. 20. varam varaya bhadram te varesam mabhivanchitam sarva śreyah pariśrāmah pumsam mad-darsanavadhih. 2 tad-bhoga-samapty-anantaram. 3 Vijñāna-bhikșu quotes from Vyāsa-smrti: śuddhātma-tattva-vijnānam sāmkhyam ity abhidhīyate.

Introduction 97

L. BALADEVA Baladeva Baladeva is said to have lived about the beginning of the eighteenth century. He is the author of many works of which the chief are his commentary on the B.S. known as Govinda- bhāşya, Siddhānta-ratna, Gītā-bhūșana, which is a commentary on the B.G., and Prameya-ratnavali. His views are based on the doctrines of Madhva and the teachings of Caitanya.

The Supreme Bengal Vaişnavism developed by Caitanya (A.D. 1485-1533) is greatly influenced by the teachings of Madhva. Caitanya's doctrine is not pure dualism but what is called acintya-bhedā- bheda. It emphasises not only the transcendent majesty (aiśvarya) of the Lord, but also his sweetness of motive (madhurya-rūpa). The chanting of the Divine name is exalted.1 Jīva Gosvāmin, Rūpa Gosvāmin and Baladeva are among the followers of Caitanya. Madhva's influence is found in Baladeva's insistence on the concept of visesa and the difference between I śvara, jīva and the world. He also wrote a work called Krsna- caitanyamrta which sets out the essence of Caitanya's teaching. In his commentary on the B.S., Baladeva followed Suka's commentary on the same work. Siddhanta-ratna speaks of five tattvas or realities which are the same as those admitted by Hari-vyāsa-deva.2 Prameya- ratnāvali lays down nine prameyas or propositions: (1) The Lord is the highest reality; (2) He is known from Scripture alone; (3) The universe is real; (4) The difference between the Lord and the individual souls is real; (5) The individual souls are real and are servants of the Lord; (6) The individual souls are different from one another and there are five grades of souls; (7) Release consists in the attainment of the Lord; (8) Worship of the Lord is the cause of release; (9) There are three sources of knowledge, perception, inference and Scripture, the last being the most authoritative and reliable. 1 Cp. Adi-purāņa 465. na nāma-sadysam jñānam na nāma-sadṛsam vratam na nāma-sadysam dhyānam na nāma-sadysam phalam. 2 tathā hi īśvara-jīva-prakyti-kāla-karmāņi panca-tattvāni śrūyante. D

98 The Brahma Sūtra Brahman is Krşna, Vişnu or Hari. He is the Personal God possessed of infinite auspicious qualities. He is nir-guna in the sense that he is free from the three gunas of prakrti, sa-guna in that he has innumerable auspicious qualities. He is pure consciousness and bliss. He is mighty and majestic and yet sweet and lovely. He has great solicitude for his devotees. He gives his own self to them.1 His powers and attributes are inconceivable, acintya, and mysterious. The Lord is all-pervad- ing, yet atomic. He is of the size of a span, dwelling actually in the heart of his devotees. He is just and impartial and yet shows special grace to his devotees. He is the creator of all and yet is himself unmodified, without any parts and yet possessed of parts, immeasurable and yet measured.2 The attributes of the Lord are not different from the Lord; they are nothing except the Lord himself. Even as the coil constitutes the serpent and is not separated from it but is yet the attribute of the serpent, so is it with the attributes of the Lord.3 Or as the sun is essentially light, yet the substratum of light, so the Lord though essentially of the nature of knowledge, is yet the substratum of the knowledge as well.4 The Lord is both knowledge and knower, substance and attribute.5 The Lord has no internal differences.6 He is not a concrete whole of different attributes, as a tree is a concrete whole of fruits, flowers, roots and leaves. He is one essence throughout and every one of his attributes is identical with him and not a part, separate from him and as such every one of them is full, perfect and un- changeable.7 The Lord has three powers, parā-śakti, aparā-śakti and avidyā-śakti. The first is Vişņu-śakti or svarūpa-śakti, the second Kșetrajña and the third karma, māyā or tamas.8 The parā-śakti is threefold, samvit or jñāna-śakti or the power of consciousness, sannidhi or bala-śakti or the power that gives existence and hlādinī or kriyā-sakti, which is the power that gives bliss. Through the first the Lord who is knowledge knows 1 vidyayā paritusto haris svabhaktāya ātmānam dadāti. III. 4. I. 2 II. I. 27. 3 III. 2. 28. 4 III. 2. 29. 5 III. 2. 30. 6 III. 2. 28. 7 III. 3. 13. 8 vişņu-saktiņ parā proktā kşetrajñākhyā tathāparā avidyā-karma-samjňānyā tytīyā saktir işyate. Prameya-ratnāvali I.

Introduction 99 himself and imparts knowledge to the souls. Through the second, the Lord existent by nature gives existence to space, time, matter, souls and karma. Through the third, the Lord who is blissful by nature enjoys himself, and gives bliss to others. The aparā-śakti and avidyā-sakti consist respectively of souls and matter. The Lord is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe. He is the efficient cause through his parā-sakti and is the material cause through his apara and avidya śaktis.1 When the latter powers are manifested in gross forms, the universe of souls and matter arises. As the operative cause the Lord is unchangeable; as the material cause he is subject to modification or parinama. The changes are effected in his powers but he remains unchanged. God's actions are not in any way determined by motives but they flow spontaneously from his own essential nature through his enjoyment of his own nature as bliss. The world is an effect, the development of prakrti which is also called māyā or avidyā. It is originally the equilibrium of the three gunas but it is set in motion by a glance of the Lord. The world is real, for God who is reality cannot produce anything which is unreal. During pralaya or dissolution souls and matter remain merged in the Lord. Time is said to be an eternal, non-intelligent substance, a power of the Lord without beginning and end. Karma is also an important factor. God is not capricious. He creates the world strictly in accordance with the past deeds of the souls. The three substances, matter, time and karma are coeternal with the Lord and subordinate to him. The Lord in the act of creation takes account of them. The Lord is possessed of a celestial non- material form or body,2 which has the attributes of being, consciousness, bliss and all-pervasiveness. Though the Lord is ordinarily imperceptible to the senses, in absorbed devotion he is perceptible to the senses of the devotee. The devotee sees him with his purified mind even as he sees external objects.3 The form or body of the Lord is not different from the Lord but is identical with him. It is only as an aid to meditation that the 1 tasya nimittatvam upādānatvañcābhidhīyate. tatrādyam parākhyā saktimad- rūpeņa, dvitīyam tu tad-anya-sakti-dvayadvāraiva. I. 4. 26. 2 II. I. 31. 3 III. 2. 24-7.

I00 The Brahma Sūtra

devotees conceive of his body as distinct from him. When the Lord is said to be formless, it means that he does not possess the form but is the form itself.1 The Lord has a multitude of forms through which he manifests himself. These are his avatāras or incarnations. Though the Lord is not limited by these forms, he is fully manifest in each one of them. Some of the incarnations are partial and some full. In Krsna we have a full incarnation. Besides this essential form of Krsna, the Lord has also other energy forms, vilāsa-rūpa such as Nārāyaņa, Vāsudeva, Samkarşana and Aniruddha.2 Besides the full and partial incarnations, there are certain exalted souls like Nārada and Sanat-Kumāra who are called āveśāvatāras. They are not to be worshipped since they do not possess all the attributes of the Lord.3 The Supreme appears in many places and this is possible on account of his marvellous powers.4

The Individual Soul The individual soul is by nature eternal, i.e. without beginning and without end and self-luminous. It is both knowledge and knower, an enjoyer and an active agent. These qualities belong to the soul in bondage and release. It is not, however, an independent agent like the Lord. In every act, the soul, the body, the different sense-organs, various kinds of energies and the Lord are involved.5 The soul is not, however, an automaton. Free will on the part of the agent is assured. Even as the acts of the soul in the present life are determined by those in former lives, it can shape its future. God determines the souls in accordance with their nature. Though God is capable of changing the nature of the individuals he does not do so.6 He leaves it to the free will of the individual. The soul is a part, an effect and a power of the Lord and is both different and non- different from him. It is not a part as a chip cut off from the 1 III. 2. 14. 2 III. 3. 15. 3 III. 3. 21, 23. 4 ekam eva svarūpam acintya-saktyā yugapat sarvatrāvabhaty eko'pi san; sthānāni bhagavad-āvirbhāvāspadāni tad-vividha-līlāsraya-bhūtāni vividha- bhāvavanto bhaktāś ca. III. 2. II. 5 Cp. B.G. XVIII. 14. 6 na ca karma-sāpekşatvena īsvarasya asvātantram svabhāvānusāreņa hi karma kārayati svabhāvam anyatha-kartum samartho'pi · anādi-jīva- kasyāpi na karoti. II. I. 35.

Introduction IOI rock is a part of the rock. It is a part in the sense of being subordinate to the Lord, separate from him and yet related to him as the created and the ruled. In one sense the individual soul and the world are different from Brahman; in another sense they are non-different as effects of Brahman. The relationship of difference-non-difference is incomprehensible by intellect and is known only through the Scriptures. The union of Rādha and Krsna symbolises the intimate communion between man and God. The soul is atomic in size and we have a plurality of souls. There are differences among souls owing to their past deeds and aspirations.1 There are three kinds of souls, the bound, the freed and the ever-free souls. Even the freed souls are different from one another on account of the difference in the quality of their devotion. The world is real. Even dream creations are not false. They are produced through the will of God and disappear through his will in the waking stage.2 What is the relation between the Lord and the sentient souls and the non-sentient matter? The latter are the effects of the Lord and so are non-different from him. They are also different because they are ruled and supported by the Lord. The relation of unity of the Lord to the plurality of the world is beyond our grasp. Baladeva recognises difference between the Lord and the soul for it is the basis of all devotion but does not make the difference absolute like Madhva for the effect cannot be absolutely different from the cause. The world and the souls belong to God.3 Bondage results from turning one's face away from the Lord resulting in the obscuration of one's real nature. Release consists in turning one's face towards the Lord.

Release The freed soul is different from the Lord in that it is atomic while the Lord is all-pervading and it lacks the power of creation which belongs only to the Lord. The freed soul has a distinctive individuality and is under the control of the Lord. The freed souls are collaborators of the Lord and can assume many forms. The freed soul is in union with the Lord, resides in the same world as the Lord, attains his nature and attributes 1 II. 3. 42. 2 III. 2. 1-5. 3 sarvatra tadīyatva-jñānārthah.

I02 The Brahma Sūtra and is in proximity to him.1 It, however, retains its separate individuality. Baladeva does not admit jīvan-mukti.

Bhakti

Bhakti is the sole and direct cause of salvation. Bhakti is premā or intense love and not upāsanā or meditation. According to Baladeva, dhyāna or meditation is one form of bhakti. When God is worshipped in a limited form, he reveals himself in that same form to the devotee, though he remains as the all- pervasive being. Bhakti involves negatively a strong dislike for all objects other than the Lord and positively an intense love of God, vairāgya and prema. The former is produced by the know- ledge of the imperfection and transitoriness of all worldly objects and the knowledge that attachment to them produces endless rebirths while the latter is engendered by the knowledge of the Lord and his attributes of omniscience, omnipotence, loveliness, etc. Devotion is based on knowledge of the self and the world and of the Lord. Bhakti is jñāna-viśeșa. Baladeva distinguishes between two kinds of knowledge, vijñāna which is obtained from the study of the Scriptures and prajña or intuitive know- ledge or intimate realisation. The performance of the duties relating to one's own stage of life helps to purify the mind. It is a means to the rise of know- ledge and devotion and is not by itself the cause of salvation. When once knowledge and devotion arise, karma is no longer necessary even as a horse is necessary for accomplishing a journey but is no longer necessary when the journey is accom- plished.2 Baladeva rejects the theory of jñāna-karma-samuccaya. Only jñāna or vidyā is the cause of salvation. Vidyā is devotion preceded by knowledge.3 The grace of the Lord is essential. Man cannot reach salvation by his unaided effort. The grace of the Lord is not arbitrary. It depends on the devotion of the souls themselves. The Lord chooses those who are wholeheartedly devoted to him. The grace of the Lord leads to the direct intuition or vision of the Supreme. 1 IV. 4. 4. 3 vidyā-sabdena jñāna-pūrvakā bhaktir ucyate. III. 3. 48. 2 III. 4. 8, 33, 36.

Introduction I03

CHAPTER 3 Reason and Revelation

Rational Inquiry EVEN those who feel that religion is an illusion have to investigate religion as a natural phenomenon. It is reason that provokes the religious quest. Man's physical life is not a perfect realisation of an idea. Nor is human life a simple biological process. Man wishes to have a programme of salvation. He wishes to be saved from the dangers of existence, from the snares of life, from the treacherous forces of nature. His ignorance of laws governing natural phenomena, his confused interpretations of nature's striking manifestations impel him to propitiate the forces that govern the universe. As his knowledge increases and he becomes familiar with the regularity and inevitability of natural forces, he understands the conditions under which nature can be controlled and turned to his use. Attention shifts from the natural to the ethical realm. We must love our neighbour and serve him. The ethical emphasis is possible when we recognise the transcendent world of spirit. The conflict in us is indicated by the myth of original sin. We escape from blind servitude to passional experience when we achieve freedom that lies in the inner intuitive vision of the transcendent spirit. There is a subtle interwovenness with the realities of the spiritual world, a kinship between Atman and Brahman. The B.S. opens with the words 'now therefore an enquiry into Brahman'. Philosophy as brahma-jijñāsā is a consistent effort of reflection. The process of evolution has been at work from the inorganic to the organic, from the organic to the sentient, from the sentient to the rational. A new phase is ahead of us, a life as far above the purely rational as the rational is above the sentient. Through effort and discipline the rational man has to grow to the spiritual man, to the God-man. Ideas manifest themselves in different stages of development and we can understand these stages only in the light of the full development. It is the perfected product that gives us the key to the under- standing and interpretation of the imperfect. The full stature of

I04 The Brahma Sūtra man, his completion as man, is reached when he becomes a God-man. Nature will not do this work for man. He has to struggle and evolve to this higher stage. Natural Religion The view of God which we obtain from the employment of reason is what is called in modern theology 'natural religion'. When the B.S. argues in I. I. 2 that the Supreme is the basis of the whole world process, its origin, maintenance and dissolution, it is adopting the attitude of natural religion. It is essential in this age of science that religious belief should be shown to be reasonable. Plato inscribed the warning above the door of his Academy: 'Nobody untrained in mathematics may cross this my threshold.' In his commentary on the Māndūkya Kārikā III, Ś. raises the question whether the non-dualist doctrine can be established only by scriptural evidence or whether it can be proved by reasoning as well. How it is possible to prove the validity of advaita by reasoning is shown in the chapter on Advaita.1 Yet reasoning is not all. There is a realm where it has no sway. There are limitations of scientific knowledge. Moral values, wisdom and the life of spirit are beyond it. The tree of the knowledge of good and evil does not grow from the soil of science. Self-awareness is not a proposition to be proved true or false by scientific tests. Yet it is the ultimate pre- supposition which is indubitable, according to S. and Descartes. Heracleitus felt that there was a mystery which the human mind cannot comprehend, an incomprehensible and unfathom- able element which human thought cannot fully penetrate. Knowledge of that mystery is not derived or derivable from any empirical observation or rational analysis of the facts observed. Socrates was a great advocate of reason but yet a profoundly religious man with mystical feeling. The much abused term existential means that philosophy is not a matter of abstract thinking, but is rooted in the inward soul. We must get down to the bedrock, the point at which we know our own infinitude, stretching forward and backward in time and upwards to eternity. The meaning of existence, the 1 advaitam kim āgama-mātreņa pratipattavyam āhosvit tarkenāpi ity ata aha sakyate tarkenāpi jnātum, tat katham iti advaita-prakaraņam prārabhyate.

Introduction I05 nature of the spirit of man lies in a realm of mystery and we can live human lives only by a commitment of faith. From that security we must go our way and fulfil our destiny. Philosophy is a school of wisdom and a school of wonder. If it is lacking in wonder, it will be inadequate. Belief in God is not a scientific conclusion, but it is not inconsistent with the findings of science. In his works Thomas Aquinas tried to demonstrate that the doctrines held to be revealed were also reasonable. If religion is to survive, the schism between the free questioning attitude widely diffused among the educated people all over the world and the insights of religion should be healed. It is sometimes argued that science examines facts with an open mind, without any preconceived ideas. The scientist uses his reason to interpret the raw material of knowledge provided by the senses. His interpretation may be wrong. The philosopher of religion also accepts the facts, lets reason go wherever the facts lead it. He notes the facts and finds that there must be a spiritual background to life. Even the scientist accepts that the world works rationally and uniformly. This is an act of faith though the scientist calls it a working hypothesis. The Hindu thinkers do not share Barth's utter contempt for nature and reason. In some of his later writings Barth made some con- cessions to a more humanistic outlook but they have not been integrated with his earlier outlook. Religion for the Hindu thinkers should commend itself to reason even while trans- cending it. Intuition completes and transforms reason. We cannot make a science of God for God is not an object like other objects of thought.

Modes of Consciousness Three modes of consciousness are recognised by the Upanișads, sense perception, logical understanding and intuitive insight. Plotinus, who regards the human individual as a trinity of body, soul and spirit, adopts the same threefold classification, sense perception, discursive thought and spiritual knowledge. Aquinas distinguishes between intellect and reason; only he means by intellect intuitive knowing, and by reason discursive thinking. 'Intellect and reason', he says, 'are not two powers, D*

I06 The Brahma Sūtra

but distinct as the perfect from the imperfect .... The intellect means an intimate penetration of truth; the reason enquiry and discourse.' Near the end of his life Thomas Aquinas laid aside his writing and refused to complete his Summa saying that he had seen that which made the writing of books a small and insignificant thing. Spinoza distinguishes imagination, ratio or reasoning, scientia intuitiva or rational intuition. F. H. Bradley, who is inclined to follow Kant in his account of logical thought, argues that thought is inadequate to the grasp of reality. The real for him is not the rational and cannot be reduced to an 'unearthly ballet of bloodless categories'. Bradley is clear that we have a different mode of apprehension by which we can acquire a knowledge of the Absolute, a supra- relational experience of which an earnest is found in the immediacy of feeling. The religious experience of God confirms and illuminates man's consciousness of the ultimate as the mystery that permeates everything, embraces everything and completes everything. Henri Bergson wrote to Jacques Chevalier: 'You are perfectly right in saying that all the philosophy I have expounded since my first Essay affirms, against Kant, the possibility of a supra- sensible intuition; taking the word "intelligence" in the very broad meaning given it by Kant, I could call "intellectual" the intuition I speak of. But I should prefer to designate it as "supra-intellectual", because I believed I must restrict the sense of the word "intelligence", and therefore I reserve this name for the set of discursive faculties of the mind, originally destined to think of matter. Intuition bears toward spirit'.1 Intuitive consciousness is called pratibhā or ārșa-jñāna or para-samvit, and has the characteristics of immediacy and clarity. It is independent of perception and inference.2 It is synoptic not analytic, noetic not discursive. It is inarticulate and cannot be readily translated into conceptual terms, though it can become articulate. The two types of knowledge are not incompatible though distinguishable. The seers are those who have seen, heard and handled the word of life. While divine wisdom is eternal and is always possessed by God, intuitive 1 April 28, 1920. Letters published in Bergson by Jacques Chevalier. 2 See Yoga Sūtra III. 84.

Introduction I07 consciousness is brought into existence by a mental process. Viśva-nātha in Bhāșā-pariccheda1 describes yogic intuition as twofold, that of yukta-yogin who mirrors the eternal light in which the totality of things remains perpetually illumined2 and that of yuñjana-yogin who requires the aid of reflection, and contemplation for the understanding of eternal wisdom. When mind by gradual training is freed from the influences of the concepts and memory images of the past (vikalpas) it merges itself in the object (dhyeya) and is absorbed and pervaded by it. The nature of the object is then fully revealed. When we develop yogic intuition we have direct knowledge of objects, past and future.3 I have called it intuition or integral insight. It is different from sense-observation, mathematical and logical reasoning. It comes in a flash as distinct from patient obser- vation or logical analysis. We cannot foresee it or consciously prepare for it. It is creativity. It reveals the central feature of the intuited object. The subject and the object in intuition tend to coalesce. We thus gain an unmediated immediate knowledge and not the mediated, inadequate and always uncertain cognition or idea derived from the sense-perception or logical reasoning. It deals with the reality and not the appearance of the object. It lies at the basis of sense and logical knowledge. The ego disappears. The individual becomes the instrument of the universal lifted above the limitations of the ego. This is the supra-rational divine madness of Plato. It is what Rousseau calls 'sovereign intelligence which sees in a twinkle of an eye the truth of all things in contrast to vain knowledge'. Reason and all other forms of awareness depend on it. Gauss struggling with a mathematical problem reported: 'I succeeded not on account of my painful efforts, but by the grace of God. Like a sudden flash of lightning the riddle happened to be solved. I myself cannot say what was the conducting thread which connected what I previously knew with what made my success possible.'

Spiritual Experience Man is not saved by metaphysics. Spiritual life involves a change of consciousness. It is a vital process which is more an exertion of the will than a play of the intellect. Wisdom, 1 66. 2 yuktasya sarvadā mānam. 3 Cp. Ś. on B.S. I. I. 5.

I08 The Brahma Sūtra gnosis, is different from knowledge. It is not a conceptual elaboration of data that reach us through sense-experience. It is the power to recognise absolute values through the spirit in us without the mediation of sense-perception or logical analysis. Brahma-svarūpa-sākșātkāra or the realisation of the Supreme is the goal of human existence. What we aim at is not thinking but seeing.1 It is a change of being, a rebornness. The sphere of logical thought is exceeded by that of the mind's possible experience of reality, anubhava or interior awareness.2 It is an experience which is a blend of wonder, ecstasy and awe at what is too great to be realised by intellect. It is none of these but something beyond them all and has an element of quite inexpressible strangeness. Transcendent Being is never given as an object. It is experienced directly in the very failure of discursive reason to reach it. It becomes transparent in illumination. In early Christian thought, intellect is rated higher than reason. It is capable of intuiting knowledge that is beyond the reach of reason. 'Final and perfect bliss can only consist in the vision of divine being.'3 Nicholas of Cusa writes: 'It is reason (which is much lower than intellect) that gives names to things in order to distinguish them from one another. This reconciliation of contraries is beyond reason.' Through the power of intellect man can grasp truths which are higher than those accessible to reason. The development of intellect takes place through initiation. 'Self-evidence is the basic fact on which all greatness supports itself. But "proof" is one of the routes by which self-evidence is often obtained.'4 Faith is not belief. It arises out of a conflict between doubt and belief. It is an experiencing of that which cannot be known by reason. It does not strive after logical certainty but adores the mystery, which is revealed to the seeker when he enters the inner sanctuary where the bustle of the mind is stilled and truth

1 The first step in the Buddha's eightfold path is samma-dassana, right seeing. Cp. Psalm xxxiv 8: 'O taste and see that the Lord is good.' Dialogues II. 6. 2 Justin Martyr says that 'the aim of platonism is to see God face to face'. 3 Thomas Aquinas in Sumna Theologica: ultima et perfecta beatitudo non potest esse nisi in visione divinae essentiae. 4 A. N. Whitehead: Modes of Thought (1938), p. 66.

Introduction I09 shines by its own light. But one cannot stay there all the time and when one leaves it one finds that its light is reflected in the restless world of sense and of thought. We have to think out our faith and use words to communicate our thoughts to others. We begin to expound and argue about it and get back to it continually for refreshment and renewal. The primary concern of philosophy in India has not been doctrine as change of nature, a total conversion. This was also the view of some philosophers of the West like Pythagoras, Empedocles, Plato, the Stoics, Epicurus, Plotinus, Augustine, Boehme and Schopenhauer. For all these truth is recognised and not created by intellectual activity, though the latter may prepare the mind for intuition. Plato says: 'Suddenly a light, as if from a leaping fire, will be enkindled in the soul.'1 'Suddenly there shone from heaven a great light."2 Plutarch writes: 'The principle of knowledge that is conceptual, pure and simple, flashes through the soul like lightning and offers itself in a single moment's experience to apprehension and vision.'3 At a critical point in his life, Socrates gave up the study of physical science in order to seek communion with the spiritual power that informs and governs the universe.4 The religious soul is not concerned with arguments for the existence of God. He is alive to God's presence in every mani- festation of life, in every impulse implanted by grace in the depths of his heart. Without the succour of the Divine the whole world will instantly crumble into nothingness.5 Wisdom affirms that there is God and knowledge enquires into his ways, his manifestations, his acts in the great drama of the world which moves through pain and death to the ultimate kingdom of truth and love. Saints do not prove the existence of God for they have apprehended the Divine. They seek to help us to rise in our spiritual stature by forms of worship and service to living creation through whom God works.

Mysticism Sometimes the word mysticism is used to define spiritual apprehension. It is derived from the Greek word 'I close' and 1 Epistle 7. 2 Acts xxii. 6. . 3 De Iside Ch. 77. 4 See Phaedo: 96-7. 5 Cp. B.G. III. 24 where Kysna says: 'If I should cease to work these worlds would fall in ruin.'

IIO The Brahma Sūtra suggests the shutting of the ears, eyes and lips. This shutting of the senses is the prerequisite of spiritual perception. In order to see in the world of spiritual reality, we must close our eyes to the world in which we ordinarily live. To hear the melodies of the spiritual world we must close our ears to the noise of the world. A seer is one who wraps himself in the mantle of seclusion, closes the avenues of communication with the outside world, not to renounce his powers of sight, hearing and speech but to open the inner eye to spiritual realities, capture the sounds that come from the world above the ordinary one and sing in silence the hymn of praise to the Supreme Being. We should recognise that there are two strands in mysticism, though some view these as two different types of mysticism. For the Upanisads they are only two sides. We have the strictly solitary who seeks to liberate his consciousness from the whole burden of materiality, who leads it through zealous purification and inner elevation to beatific reunion with the One Eternal. When once we discover the oneness of our deepest self with the Supreme, we realise our oneness with the whole universe, sarvam khalv idam brahma. All this is God. The seer is as one 'who, having looked upon the sun, henceforward sees the sun in all things'.1 The world becomes the raw material for transfiguration. We do not negate the world but negate what is base and worthless in it. We try to overcome the world and see in it the invisible splendour. Our physical frame, our feeling for the flesh become aids, instruments for the higher life. While these two phases are organically bound up with each other, in the East as well as in the West, they were sometimes treated as exclusive of each other. Porphyry in his Life of Plotinus describes the attitude of the sensitive and receptive spirit who felt ashamed at being clad in a body. It is by a purely personal effort that we can achieve purification and it does not matter if the living reality of the outside world did not exist at all. St Paul and Augustine use the world to rise to the maker of the world. God's divine radiance shines on the world and humanity. 'Hast thou seen thy brother? Then thou hast seen God.' Early Christians had this motto as reported by Clement of 1 Meister Eckhart.

Introduction III

Alexandria and Tertullian. The spiritual should interpenetrate and renew the life of the world.

Contemplation The contemplative life is not easy to realise. It is becoming more and more difficult in our age. There is a constant struggle between the biological impulse to adapt to the environment and the human creative impulse. We are inclined to do what others do, think what others think, and not think, feel and act with insight and conviction. We tend to lose ourselves in the anon- ymity of the human mass, become mere tools of an increasingly efficient social organisation which, the more elaborate and complex it becomes, tends to crush out of existence whatever is human, creative and spiritual in us.1 If it is said that the contribution of Greece is primarily science and the arts, that of Rome law and order, Judea, ethics and religion, of China humanism and social peace, it may be remembered that all these are products of the contemplative spirit and creative action. All great works of art and science, literature and philosophy spring from the contemplative spirit.2 'Wisdom cometh by the opportunity of leisure.'s

Prophetic Religion Those who have attained wisdom are called rsis or seers, the Buddhas or the awakened ones, the enlightened. While they identify the ultimate with the ground of all being, their faith is not irrational. Some of the greatest seers of Asia and Europe have also been some of the greatest philosophers. They were outstanding in their clarity, consistency and comprehension.4 1 Cp. M. Jean Cocteau, who in his Oxford address on Poetry and Invisibility points out that 'the hectic hurry of our age contributes to the crime of inattentiveness, a crime against the spirit, indeed against the soul'. London Magazine, January 1957. ª Pushkin, the great Russian poet, writes: 'Until Apollo calls a poet to his sacred sacrifice he is vulgarly silent; his soul is asleep; and among the insigni- ficant children of the world he is perhaps the most trifling. But as soon as the Divine word touches his sensitive ear, the poet's soul rouses as an awakened eagle. He is bored amidst amusements of the world; he is a stranger to the gossips of the mob; he does not bend his proud head to the feet of the popular idol.' 3 Ecclesiasticus. 4 In Mysticism and Logic Bertrand Russell writes: 'The greatest men who have been philosophers have felt the need both of science and mysticism.'

II2 The Brahma Sūtra Religion is founded on illumination. It is knowledge revealed to us in our highest consciousness. It is possible that we may have different interpretations of what is revealed but all religions are based on the personal experiences of their founders and prophets. Among the Hebrews there are evident indications of a mystical faith such as the experiences of the great prophets, the visions they saw and the voices they heard. The religions of the Buddha, Jesus and Muhammad were reflections of their experiences. There is however a tendency to deify the founders of religions. Zarathustra did not claim for himself to be more than a man but he was transfigured by his followers when they came to believe that a superhuman saviour Saoshyant was to be begotten of Zarathustra's seed at the end of time. The Buddha became the enlightened one and his followers felt that he was a superhuman being and expressed their feeling in a set of birth stories. Jesus was identified by his followers with the Messiah who was expected by the Jews to be begotten at the end of time from the seed of David. Other leaders in Jewry both before and after Jesus were identified with the Messiah as Jesus was: for example, Simon Maccabaeus in the second century B.c. and Bar Kokhba in the second century A.D. Muhammad did not claim to be superhuman. He said that he was the latest of the prophets and the last of them that was ever to be. He claimed that he received revelations from God through the Archangel Gabriel and on the night of power he had ascended unto heaven and in the seventh heaven had been admitted into God's presence. While all these prophets were deified by their followers, orthodox Christians affirm that Jesus is the final self- manifestation of the Divine. Every revealed Scripture is at once both divine self-manifestation and the way in which human beings have received it. There is a reciprocity of inward and outward. Revelation and its reception are inseparably united.1 1 'The basic error of fundamentalism is that it overlooks the contribution of the receptive side in the revelatory situation and consequently identifies one individual and conditioned form of receiving the divine with the divine itself.' Paul Tillich: Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality (1955), P. 4. Cp. also 'Revelation is never revelation in general, however universal its claim may be. It is always revelation for someone and for a group in a definite

Introduction II3 We are the receptacles of the revelation. Our own form of reception cannot be confused with 'an assumedly undiluted and untransformed revelation' in Professor Paul Tillich's words. 'Wherever the divine is manifest in flesh, it is in a concrete, physical and historical reality.'1 Scriptural Testimony The Vedānta adopts six pramānas of which scriptural testimony is one.2 In I. I. 3 the B.S. states that sāstra is the source of divine knowledge. The Scriptures register the ex- periences of seers, they are apta-vacana, the sayings of the inspired men, who have time and again been illuminated by the light of God, aptena pranitam vacanam apta-vacanam.3 While the Hindu thinkers accepted the authoritativeness of the Vedas, the Buddha did not resort to any authority Vedic or non-Vedic; yet his discourses attained the sanctity of Scripture. The records of the experiences of the great seers who have expressed their sense of the inner meaning of the world through their intense insight and deep imagination are the Scriptures. The word of the Buddha, buddha-vacana, became the authority for both the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna systems. Even when the Scriptures are traced to divine authorship, it is said that even God is not completely free but has to reckon with the nature of truth.4 The Vedas are received by men. They speak to men in their concrete situations. The claim to the possession of a special revelation of the Jews, Christians and Muslims is on the same level. It is not necessary for us to close the door to future revelations. At a time when it has become difficult for the educated person to rest his faith on the infallibility of the Scriptures, or a miraculous revelation in the past, the ultimate basis of religious environment, under unique circumstances. Therefore, he who receives revelation witnesses to it in terms of his individuality and in terms of the social and spiritual conditions in which the revelation has been manifested to him,' pp. 3-4. 1 Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality (1955), p. 5. 2 Pratyaksa or sense-perception, anumāna or inference, upamāna or analogy, sabda or Scripture, arthapatti or implication, an-upalabdhi or negation. See Vedānta-paribhāșā. 3 Prameya-kamala-martāņda, p. 112. 4 evam sargāntareșvapīti, tad-anurodhāt, sarvajño'pi sarva-śaktir api, pūrvāpūrva-sargānusāreņa vedān viracayan na svatantrah. Bhāmatī I. I. 3.

II4 The Brahma Sūtra trust must be found in personal experience. John Smith, the Cambridge Platonist, says: 'To seek divinity merely in books and writings is to seek the living among the dead; we do but in vain seek God many times in these, where his truth too often is not so much enshrined as entombed. No, seek for God within thine own soul.' Belief in God must grow out of our own consciousness. We require today a spiritual religion which can be developed only by souls of large, spiritual compass and moral power. They alone can inaugurate an age of spiritual vitality and fervour.

Experience and Interpretation No adequate formulations in logical propositions are possible of experiences which are of an intuitive character. Plato in his Seventh Letter makes out that the knowledge of essential truth cannot be reduced to writing. 'This does not admit of exposition like other branches of knowledge; but, after much discourse about the matter itself and a life lived together, suddenly a light, as it were, is kindled in one soul by a flame that leaps to it from another, and thereafter sustains itself.'1 St Augustine said: 'I entered, and beheld with the eye of the soul the light that never changes; above the eye of the soul, above my intelligence.' St Angelo of Foligno says: 'I beheld the ineffable fullness of God, but I can relate nothing of it, save that I have seen the fullness of Divine wisdom wherein is all goodness.' St Catherine of Siena observes: 'I now know for certain, Eternal Truth, that Thou wilt not despise the desire of the petitions I have made unto Thee.' 'If I could only show you a tithe of that Love in which I dwell.' All these are in the presence of an experience which surpasses ordinary levels of feeling, powers of speech and organs of apprehension. These form a great body of witness to humanity's experience of God. All of them agree with the Upanisad writers that the experience baffles linguistic and logical description. These may vary. Astronomies change but the stars abide. We learn the truth not from books but from a teacher. The true teacher is a live coal from the altar, not an encyclopaedia of what religious books teach. A teacher is a śikşā guru; a preceptor is a dīkșā guru. 1 34IC.

Introduction II5 The spiritual experience cannot be adequately described in words. It is beyond the grasp of empirical thought. It is pure inwardness of which no conceptual description is possible. Through poetry and paradox the seers suggest something of the nature of that which surpasses the bounds of logic. Pure know- ledge cannot be transmitted except through symbols. It is covered as by a veil though it becomes transparent to those who desire and know how to look beyond it. No symbol can be taken as final. Scriptural statements reveal the philosophic vision of those in whom the light is kindled. They recognise a profounder reality than that of human life and seek to establish a true harmony between the two. Scriptures are not infallible in all they say. Truth is eternal in validity and is timeless apart from the texts which may be dated. The truths which are apprehended are timeless though the act of apprehension like all activity is a temporal event. The eternity of the Vedas, 'the timelessness of the dharma' of the Buddhists, the eternity of the Divine word of the Christians refer not to the texts but to the truths enshrined in them. Experience is never immediate. It is mixed up with inter- pretation and tradition. Revelation is not found outside some mind. The superhuman wisdom which transcends time is given to us in time. Even though spiritual experience arises with a self-evident certitude, the interpretations we give to it require rational scrutiny. There is a difference between psychology and philosophy. Our mental states, ideas, impressions and feelings are the subject-matter of psychology but what we think is not a matter of what takes place in our minds. We think of reality, rightly or wrongly. A psychologist may be interested in the private experiences of individuals but a philosopher is investigating what our experiences mean. There is a difference between the vehicle of thought and the meaning of thought. Psychology is a factual enquiry and philosophy is conceptual analysis. F. H. Bradley makes a distinction between images and meanings. Images are facts, neither true nor false, while meanings are capable of being true or false of reality. Philosophy is interested in discussing what images mean and not what they are. Scriptures contain many survivals of crude, imperfect and

II6 The Brahma Sūtra undeveloped images. These are to be refined and improved in the light of our present knowledge.

Faith and Belief There is a difference between faith and belief. The two are not necessarily in conflict. An act of faith involves a surrender to the creative intuition which transcends the limited awareness of the intellectual self. Those who live by faith, who had a personal encounter with the Supreme need not abandon the traditional formulations of belief in which they have been reared; for these beliefs were also originally born in the mind of man. To become organic expressions of faith they must be reborn and continually renewed in personal experience. Even when we admit revelation, there must be an answering witness within the soul. Sometimes these beliefs are more a barrier than an aid to the unfolding of the creative experience. Dogmas and usages tend to stifle the spirit in us. Those who feel the spiritual urge in them sometimes feel the oppressive weight of dogmas. We cannot accept the verbal inspiration of the Scriptures. Indian thought assigns a place to belief in the development of religious experience. Sravana or hearing the Scriptures is the first step to spiritual realisation. It is safe to cling to a system of beliefs, lest in seeking reality for oneself, one may miss one's way. But beliefs become moribund when they lack the inward ex- perience which renews their meaning. Belief should set us on to reflection, manana, and contem- plation, nididhyāsana, which results in ātma-darśana or vision of the Self. If we end with beliefs we preserve safety at the cost of life itself. When we rise to the highest experience we abandon the defences. The orthodox theologians of different religions do not accept experience or immediate knowledge as final.1 We may have a feeling of certainty but not certainty itself. This experience must be open to reason and not at any rate contrary to it. Even if we have a direct knowledge of God we must establish it on other 1 Cp. Hermann: 'When the influence of God upon the soul is found solely in an inward experience of the individual, he who seeks in this wise has stepped beyond the pale of Christian piety. He leaves Christ and Christ's Kingdom altogether.' The Communion of the Christian with God.

Introduction II7 grounds. We cannot be content with stating that the experience is ineffable. The B.S. is an enquiry into the nature of reality revealed by the seers of the Upanisads. It is its function to interpret the experiences of the seers so as to give a coherent view, to relate their account of reality with the nature of reality given by science and common sense. For nature is of God; its study is his service; its truth is his revelation. The theological doctrines of different religions have been adapting themselves to the intellectual temper of the world, accepting truth from whatsoever source it appeared and discarding erroneous forms of expression. The authoritative character of the Vedas which include the Upanişads is not inconsistent with philosophy as a criticism of categories. The seers give utterance to their visions of Ultimate Reality. The author of the B.S. systematises them and has referred to oral traditions of their significance.1 Today unbelief in the form of certain conviction is yielding to unbelief in the form of doubt. Michael Faraday said: 'In knowledge, that man only is to be condemned and despised who is not in a state of transition.' With sincerity and impartiality we should endeavour to seek solutions of religious questions. The view that Scriptures of all religions have a claim to our allegiance in so far as their statements are not dated has the support of Indian religious classics. The spiritual community of the future needs for its foundation no geographically limited writings, no groups organised in accordance with ecclesiastical articles and rules. All those who are aware that future salvation does not depend on mechanical or technological development or regulation of economic and social life but solely on the revival of a world of spiritual values which evade empirical analysis but reveal themselves only to faith and hope should band together and work for the world community. In that city which is still out of sight, in that homeland of the spirit, we will understand one another. Every period of history nurses in its bosom certain unavowed 1 Professor A. E. Taylor writes: 'What we have a right to demand of the theologian is that the matter upon which his thought works shall be something genuinely given, and that in his reflective elaboration of it he shall be true to it. I do not see that we have a right to demand more.' The Faith of a Moralist, Vol. II (2nd edition), p. 390.

II8 The Brahma Sūtra and unanalysed assumptions which constitute the key to the interpretation of that period. Our generation is aiming at human unity and brotherhood and the establishment of the one and only universal Church. An interpretation of the great Scriptures of the world on the lines outlined here may perhaps provide the basis for such a consummation.

CHAPTER 4 The Nature of Reality

Brahman the Absolute IN spiritual experience, Ultimate Reality impinges on the human spirit. Religion is a living creative power because Ultimate Reality manifests itself to the human spirit. Whether we mean by religion adherence to sect or dogma, an attitude of faith or reverence toward what William James calls the more that lies beyond subjectivity, that Platonic pure reason of which Coleridge wrote that it is not 'something which is in us, but something in which we are', it brings us into contact with something out there. The seers have an overpowering conviction of the presence of Spiritual Reality. The experience is a com- pelling vision or intuitive realisation of the reality of the Supreme. If religion arises at the point where Ultimate Reality mani- fests itself to the human spirit, our view of religion will be determined by the view we take of the nature of Ultimate Reality and of the relationship with the human spirit into which it enters. Religion is the self-manifestation of Ultimate Reality in man. The Supreme is completely different from the contingent things of the world. It is the presence behind the phenomena and transcendent to them. The Supreme is non- dual, free from the distinctions of subject and object. The principle of via negativa makes out that Brahman cannot be the object of rational knowledge. It emphasises the incommensur- ability of the infinite and the finite. When logical categories are

Introduction II9 denied of the Supreme Spirit, it only means that it is not an objective existent or a logical category. To use Kantian terminology the reality of spirit is that of freedom rather than that of nature. Spirit exists only in the subject but it is not in the least subjective for the distinction of subject and object as correlatives has meaning only on the logical plane but spirit is reality of another kind, an immeasurably greater and more primal one. Professor R. A. Nicholson in his article on Sufis1 quotes: In solitude where Being signless dwelt, And all the universe still dormant lay In Selfishness, One Being was, Exempt from 'I' or 'Thou'-ness and apart from all duality. Subject and object, I and Thou have no place there. We cannot describe the Supreme in personal terms when the non- dual, advaita aspect is in view. Beware! say not, 'He is all-beautiful, And we His lovers.' Thou art but the glass, And He the face confronting it, which casts Its image on the mirror. He alone Is manifest, and Thou in truth art hid .. . If steadfastly Thou canst regard, thou wilt at length perceive He is the mirror also; He alike The Treasure and the Casket. There is nothing else than the Absolute which is the pre- supposition of all else. The central mystery is that of Being itself. We should not think that emphasis on Being overlooks the fact of becoming. Being as such is free from static or dynamic implications. It is devoid of and is antecedent to any special qualifications. It points to the original fact that there is something and not nothing and to the power of that which resists non-being. We cannot define Being since it is the pre- supposition of all definition. In it is the coincidence of opposites. It is all and nothing, self and not-self, activity and rest, formlessness and form, the unknown knower in which all things 1 Encyclopaedia of Religions and Ethics. XII. pp. 16-17.

I20 The Brahma Stra are known, the void from which all fullness flows, ever pouring forth in creation and for ever undiminished in itself.1 The primacy of Being is argued on a rational basis. There is the ontological otherness, the otherness of the Transcendent Absolute, source of all existent things, the perfect being from which all existent things derive their being and nature. Apart from this Transcendent Reality existent things neither exist nor persist. The sense of the absolute dependence of all existent things is central to piety. It is this sense that is translated into the argument from the radical contingency of the world to an absolute self-subsistent, non-contingent being as its source. The contemplation of finite things leads to a direct discernment of the Supreme as their absolute source. S. says, 'Whenever we deny something unreal, we do so with reference to something real. The unreal snake, for example, is negatived with reference to the real rope. But this is possible only if some entity is left. If everything is denied, then no entity is left, and if no entity is left, the denial of some other entity which we may wish to undertake becomes impossible, i.e. the latter entity becomes real and cannot be negatived.'2 We teach Brahman without speaking about it, avacane ca brahma provāca. Every spoken word narrows down Being. We can say only that Being is itself. Beginningless, absolute Brahman is not known by gods or sages. Only the Lord Nārāyana knows him.3 Silence is the only language of worship. Worship is not servile cringing before absolute power but worship or adoration. 'How can he who holds all be brought into a temple? How can he who is the basis of all be confined 1 Philo observes: 'God is withdrawn from both ends of time, for his life is not Time but Eternity, the archetype of time. And in eternity there is neither past nor future but only present.' Cp. Dante: 'O Light Eternal who only in Thyself abidest, only Thyself dost comprehend, and, of Thyself comprehended and Thyself comprehending, dost love and smile.' 2 kam ciddhi paramārtham ālambya aparamārthah pratişiddhyate. yathā rajjvādişu sarpādayah. tacca parisişyamāne kasmims' cidbhāve'vakalpate. kytsna-pratişedhetu tu ko'nyo bhāvah parisişyeta. aparisisyamāne canyasmin yah itarah parişeddhum ārabhyate. tasyaiva paramārthatvāpatteh pratişedhānu- papattih. S.B. III. 2. 22. 3 anādyam tam param brahma na devā na rşayo viduh ekas tad veda bhagavān dhātā narayanah prabhuh. Vijānāmṛta-bhāşya I. I. 5.

Introduction I2I

to a spot? How can there be the circling round of the Infinite? How can there be prostration to him who is our very self?'1 There is the other-ness of God felt in the act of worship. He cannot be wholly other for then it would be impossible to know anything about him even on the basis of his own self-revelation. There is an element of non-otherness. The other-ness of God does not exclude the possibility of community of being between God and man. In the act of worship we have a sense of the other- ness of God as well as a sense of wonder that he has bestowed on us a nature akin to his own. It is this kinship that makes communion with him possible.2 There is an incomprehensible other-ness of God as the source of all, an other-ness which God himself discloses to the soul of man. God is both transcendent to and immanent in the world. He originates, sustains, sets limits to his community of being with the world and transcends it. When we refer to the Supreme as Brahman, as Transcendent Reality, we employ the negative method. The Supreme Principle is conceived in the Vedas not only as the substance of the world and of all beings but also as that which transcends them 'by three quarters' existing as the 'Immortal in the heavens'.3 The Upanişads hold that the Absolute can be described only as not this, not this, na iti, na iti. The Avadhūta Gītā says: advaitam kecid icchanti dvaitam icchanti cāpare samam tattvam na vindanti dvaitādvaita-vivarjitam Some prefer non-duality; others prefer duality. They do not understand the Truth which is the same, free from duality and non-duality.4 Asanga says: na san na cāsan na tathā na cānyathā na jāyate vyeti na cāvahīyate na vardhate nāpi viśuddhyate punah viśuddhyate tat paramārtha-laksaņam. 1 pūrņasya āvāhanam kutra, sarvādhārasya ca āsanam pradakşiņā ca anantasya hi, advayasya kutah natih? 2 Cp. Augustine: 'What is that which gleams through me and smites my heart without wounding it? I am both a-shudder, and a-glow. A-shudder in so far as I am unlike it; a-glow in so far as I am like it.' The Confessions XI. 9. I. 3 Rg Veda X. 90. 3; C.U. III. 12. 6. 4 I. 36.

I22 The Brahma Sūtra

It is not existent, nor non-existent; it is not thus, it is not otherwise; it is not born, it does not decay or die or grow, nor does it purify. The ever-pure is the mark of the Ultimate Reality. Nāgārjuna declares:

anirodham, anutpādam, anucchedam, aśāśvatam anekārtham, anānārtham, anāgamam, anirgamam na san nāsan na sad-asan na cāpy anubhayātmakam catuşkoti-vinirmuktam tattvam mādhyamikā viduh.1 Nirvāņa is described in similar terms: aprahīņam, asamprāptam, anucchinnam, aśāśvatam aniruddham, anutpādam etan nirvāņam ucyate. Theologia Germanica says: 'Where this Light is, the man's end and aim is not this or that, I or Thou, or the like, but only the One, who is neither I nor Thou, this nor that, but is above all I and Thou, this and that; and in him all Good is loved as one Good.' Henry Vaughan writes: There is in God (some say) A deep but dazzling darkness; as men here Say it is late and dusky, because they See not all clear; O for that night! where I in him Might live invisible and dim.2

The Ātman The Supreme Reality is not out there but is one with our deepest self. Brahman is Atman, the Universal Spirit. Tat tvam 1 Mādhyamika-Kārikā. 2 Cp. namostu sūnyatā-garbha sarva-samkalpa-varjita sarvajňa jñāna-sandoha jāna-mūrte namostu te sambuddhā bodhisattvās ca(tvattah) pāramitāguņāh sambhavanti sadā nātha bodhi-citta namostu te. Hail to thee the birthplace of the void, who art free of all conceits, omniscient one, thou mass of knowledge, knowledge personified, all hail to thee. From you, O Lord, there ever rise into existence Buddhas and Bodhisattvas who possess as their good qualities the great perfections, O the thought of enlightenment, hail to thee. Prajñopāya-viniścaya-siddhi III. 9 and II.

Introduction I23

asi.1 The self is an independent entity underlying the conscious personality and the physical frame. The natural man is alienated from the self in him. All that we know and express about the self belongs to the world of change, of time and space but the self is for ever changeless, beyond the world of space, time and cause. In all the countless months, years and aeons, past and to come, what does not rise or set, that is the one self-luminous con- sciousness.2 The Devi Bhagavata says:'Break of this consciousness is never seen. If it is ever seen, then the seer remains behind embodied as that same consciousness.'3 Samkşepa-śārīraka says: 'This unique undivided selfconsciousness is subject and object at once.'4 This self is unseizable as an object of thought. 'It is never known but it is the knower.' avijnātam vijnātr.5 The self is the point where science and every objective method of approach become inapplicable.6 When the Upanisad thinker says I am Brahman, aham brahmāsmi, when the Buddha declares that he is wisdom or enlightenment, when Jesus says, 'I am the Truth', what is the 'I' which is said to be the real and the true? No Western philo- sopher before Socrates is so interesting as Heracleitus. His 'I sought for myself' expresses the highest consciousness of the problem of philosophy. We cannot seek the 'I' by logical analysis or intellectual observation. A new world is revealed when the soul turns to contemplate itself. Heracleitus says: 'Travel over every road, you cannot discover the frontiers of

1 The author of the Imitation puts into the mouth of Jesus: 'When you think that you are far from me, then, often am I nearest to you.' 2 māsābda-yuga-kalpeşu gatāgamişu anekadhā nodeti nāstameti eşā samvid ekā svayam-prabhā. Pañca-daśi I. 7. 3 samvido vyabhicāras tu naiva drsto'sti karhicit yadi drştah tadā draştā siştah samvid vapuh svayam. III. 32. 4 āśrayatva-vişayatva-bhāginī nir-vibhāga-citir eva kevalā. 5 B.U. III. 4. 2. 6 Cp. Max Planck: 'Science cannot solve the ultimate mystery of nature. And that is because in the last analysis, we ourselves are part of nature and therefore part of the mystery we are trying to solve. The most penetrating eye cannot see itself any more than a working instrument can work upon itself.' Where is Science Going?

I24 The Brahma Sūtra

the soul-it has so deep a logos.'1 For conceptual thinking the soul is boundless. Transcendence is the only means of reaching the soul's deeper stratum. The power to transcend is the property of the subject 'I'. It always goes beyond the 'me'. It is greater than the series of empirical selves. In a prayer to Krsna, Brahma says: 'We imagine things outside ourselves and look upon our Self as a stranger to us and seek for him outside ourselves. Look at the ignorance of the unenlightened.'2 Ś. opens his commentary on the B.S. with a distinction between subject and object, atman and an-atman, with the formulation of the absolute disparity between I and Thou, asmat and yuşmat. The pure subject is distinguished from the ego, the psychological or sociological self which is a part of the objective world. The latter is a fragment of nature. In his own depths, in the very core of his existence, the self continues to be himself. This Self, S. says, 'the unconditioned, markless, free from the characters of existent and non-existent, is real metaphysically'.3 'There are two sights', says S. 'One is eternal and unseen viz. the sight of the seer: the other is non-eternal and seen.'4 'By his ever-present eternal sight which is his own nature known as the self-shining one, the seer sees the other evanescent sight in the waking state and in dreams, consisting of desires and cognitions.'5 The perceptible is limited to space and time; the inferrible is also limited but the pure subject is devoid of all limitations and is known immediately though not objectively.6 If the Self were not immediately manifested the whole world would become blind.7 Consciousness is the very essence of self as heat is of fire according to S.8 While the content of experience changes, the consciousness does not. Even when there are no objects to be known as in deep sleep, consciousness is present. For its positive manifestation, consciousness like light needs objects but it is never absent.9 1 Fragment 45. 2 tvam atmanam param matva paramatmanam eva ca. ātmā punar bahir mrgyah aho'jñajanatājñatā. 3 tasya nirupādhikasya, alingasya, sad-asādi-vişayatva-varjitasya ātmanah tattva-bhāvo bhavati. S. on Kațha U. VI. 13. 4 dve drstī draştur nityā adrsya, anyā'nitya drsyeti. 6 aparoksatvac ca pratyag-atma prasiddeh. S .: Introduction to S.B. 5 Ś. on B.U. I. 4. 10. 7 Vācaspati in his Bhāmatī. jagad-āndhya-prasangāt. 8 Ś.B. I. 4. 10. 9 vişayābhāvād iyam acetayamānatā, na caitanyābhāvāt. Ś.B. II. 20. 3.

Introduction I25 The Sämkhya system distinguishes between puruşa and prakrti. Objectivity is foreignness to subjectivity. Object is avivekin; it cannot distinguish itself from subjectivity. Rather it is subjectivity that posits the object as the other. Object is acetana. It is not self-revealing. It is revealed by something else, the subject.1 We have to rise to pure subjectivity by gradual stages. Through the subjective realisation of the body as perceived by the senses, of the subject as ego, aham-kāra, as reflective intelligence, buddhi, we get to pure subjectivity or puruşa. For Eckhart, the ground of the soul is the inner citadel in the hidden depths of man's being. It is the uncreated, eternal, pure essence at the centre of man's inmost life. The existentialist philosophers hold that truth is not external and impersonal but is immediate and experienced. It is not so much knowing the truth as being it. Kierkegaard says: 'Truth in its very nature is not the duplication of being in terms of thought .... No, in its very being it is the reduplication in me, in you, in him, so that my, your, his life, is striving to attain it ... is the very being of truth, is a life.'2 The Self is experienced as the Absolute Reality in the state of turīya. It is raised above the distinction of subject and object.3 In susupti or deep sleep, the empirical mind with all its modes is inactive. In sa-vikalpa samādhi the mind is concentrated on one object with which it becomes identified. In it we have the consciousness of determinate reality. The consciousness of duality is absent in this state and the self enjoys undifferenced bliss. In both these states the seeds of knowledge and action, vidyā and karma, are present. In nir-vikalpa samādhi we have the intuition of reality transcending all determinations. This is the highest stage, the truth, Brahman. 'Desireless, firm, immortal, self-existent, contented with the essence, he is lacking nothing. One fears not death who has known him, the self, serene, ageless, youthful.'4 Even worship becomes irrelevant when the realisation occurs. 1 paratah-prakāsa-vişaya, sāmānya-prasava-dharmin. 2 Training in Christianity, pp. 201-2. 3 See P.U., pp. 75ff. 4 akamo dhīro amrtah svayambhu rasena trptena na kutascanonah tam eva vidvān na bibhaya mytyor atmanam dhīram ajaram yuvānam. Atharva Veda X. 8. 44.

I26 The Brahma Sūtra To whom shall I offer my salutation? I am one, free from defects.1 Without our participation in the Divine, neither knowledge of God nor love of God is possible. It is the Divine which drives the soul through all levels of reality to Ultimate Reality. To know this Self and make this knowledge effective in human life has been the aim of man, according to the Vedānta system. Iśvara or Personal God The Upanisads are not content with a mystery hidden in a cloud of negative phrases. They do not reduce the Absolute deprived of all determinations to a bare abstraction by the ruthless logic of the negative method. The Absolute is a living reality with a creative urge. When this aspect is stressed, the Absolute becomes a Personal God, Iśvara. In religious experience personal encounter is as real as the encounter of subject and object in cognitive experience. We meet a 'Thou' whom we can influence by prayer and worship. While Brahman is the trans-personal ground and abyss of everything personal, I svara is the Personal God. While Brahman is the object of nir-vikalpa samādhi, Iśvara is the object of sa-vikalpa samādhi. In the concept of Iśvara the Absolute is brought into closer relationship with the world. There is continuity between the values discerned in God and the values discernible and realisable in human life. God in his perfection is the ultimate source of all values whatsoever which derive from him. On the human level, person is individuality with self- relatedness and world-relatedness and therefore with rationality, freedom and responsibility. Brahman and Iśvara are not distinct entities but different aspects of the same Reality. Brahman is Iśvara when viewed as creative power.2 It is wrong to imagine that the absolutistic doctrine is for the philosophically initiated and the theistic doctrine for others. Even in S.'s thought the apprehension of God as personal is a living factor. Theism arises out of the com- 1 kasyāpy aho namas-kuryām aham eko niranjanah. Avadhūta Gīta I. 3. 2 brahmaiva sva-sakti-prakytyābhidheyam āsritya lokān srstvā niyantrtvad īśvaraḥ.

Introduction I27 pulsions of the human spirit. It is not a question of higher and lower knowledge. The view that the representation of Brahman as Iśvara is a concession to the weakness of the human mind as some Advaitins hold is not supported by the B.S.1 As Brahman answers to the content of the turiya or the transcendental consciousness, Iśvara answers to the sușupti or the consciousness of deep sleep. The principle of objectivity is present in the state of deep sleep. It has the seed of both dream and waking states.ª The principle of objectivity is called prakrti, the unmanifested, imperceptible all but nothing which receives existence, form and meaning. It is the limit of the downward movement, the lowest form which is all but non- existent. There is nothing in the actual world which is com- pletely devoid of form. Prakrti is the potentiality of all things. The supra-real one and the infra-real matter answer to pure being and pure non-being. The Supreme self-conscious Lord is the wisdom of Solomon which sweetly ordereth all things. It is said that the Divine Wisdom acts through its opposite avidyā, non-wisdom. Brahman with avidyā is Brahman as subject-object which is the basis of the whole world. According to later Advaita Vedānta, Brahman with avidyā is the material cause of the world. The world is grounded in such a Brahman and is absorbed in it.3 Avidyā is also regarded as māyā and the joint causality of Brahman and māya is conceived in a threefold manner. The two are twisted together as two threads into one or that Brahman with māya as its power or śakti is the cause of the world or Brahman being the support of māya is indirectly the cause of the world. 1 Kalpa-taru states that 'the demonstration of Brahman as with attributes is out of compassion for those dull-witted persons who have not the capacity to intuit the Supreme Brahman without attributes; having thereby directed their minds to the pursuit of the Brahman with attributes, Brahman devoid of all duality directly manifests itself'. nirviseşam param brahma sākşāt kartum anīśvarāh ye mandās te'nukampyante saviseşanirūpaņaih vašīkṛte manasy eşām saguņa-brahma-sīlanāt. tad evāvirbhavet sākşād abhedopādhi-kalpanam. 2 suşuptākhyam tamo-'jñānam bījam svapna-prabodhayoh. Š. on Upadesa- sāhasrī. Sureśvara in Naişkarmya-siddhi says: tasmāt sușupte ajñānam abhyupagantavyam.

Bhāmatī I. I. 2. 3 avidyā-sahita-brahmopādānam jagat brahmaņi evāsti tatraiva ca līyate.

I28 The Brahma Sūtra In all creation there is the union of the male and the female. They are two aspects, co-partners of the Supreme Being. The Supreme transcends all opposites but also includes them. Darkness is not the mere negation of light or light of darkness. Each is a necessary condition of the other. The darkness and passivity of the Divine is as real as the light and activity of the Divine. God is father-mother. The inseparable union of being and non-being is the creative mystery. The Supreme is regarded as the Universal Mother, jagad-amba. In one of the hymns attributed to S., she is said to have her abode in the form of energy in all things.1 The Rg Veda describes the Supreme as an inconceivable wonder, a sublime unity, a totality from which light shoots forth to generate out of darkness and emptiness a living universe. The Absolute appears in a double aspect, eternity and time. Though apparently opposed they are one in reality. They are seemingly antagonistic but really complementary aspects of the Absolute. The cosmic process is the interaction between the two principles. It is the supreme Purusa or God working on prakrti or matter. In the image of Ardha-narīśvara the two opposed but complementary principles are shown as one complete organism. Rādhā and Krsna are said to be one integral whole.2 We do not have a metaphysical dualism for the principle of non-being is dependent on Being. It is that without which no effort would be possible or necessary. It is a necessary moment in reality for the unfolding of the Supreme. If the world is what it is, it is because of the tension. The world of time and change is ever striving to reach perfection. Non-being which is responsible for the imperfection is a necessary element here; it is the material in which the ideas of God are actualised. Because as Proclus says matter is a 'child of God', it is aiming at transformation into spirit.

1 yā devī sarva-bhūteșu šakti-rūpeņa samsthitā. 2 Cp. Sāma-veda-rahasya: anādyo'yam puruşa eka evāsti, tad evam rūpam dvidhā vidhāya sarvān rasān samāharati: hyayam eva nāyīkārūpam vidhāya samārādhana-tat-paro' bhūtasmāt tām rādhām rasikānandām veda-vido vadanti. Krsna says, according to Nārada-pañcarātra, that his grace is available only to those who meditate on Rādhā. satyam satyam punah satyam satyam eva punah punah rādhā-nāmnā vinā loke mat-prasādo na vidyate.

Introduction I29 God is the infinite mind whose mode of being is at once the consciousness of self and constitutive of what is other than self. For Hegel God realises himself in and through the universe. As the universe proceeds from God it belongs essentially to his own being. When the Divine Subject objectifies itself in this way in the universe, the essential unconditioned freedom of the spirit becomes involved in conditions and limitations which contradict this freedom. Nevertheless it is through this contradiction that the spirit is able to realise itself and return to itself, not now simply as the One but as the One that is in all. In this integration the spirit takes up its opposite into itself and achieves a richer consciousness, a fuller harmony. The goal of attainment is spirit in its completeness. Judaism, Christianity and Islam look upon Reality as a person and the approach to the Supreme is through prayer and worship. The mystics of these religions, however, look upon the highest goal as union with Reality in which the distinction between subject and object fades away. For them the vision of Reality is a unitive, undifferentiated state of being. So also many Hindu and Buddhist thinkers approach Reality in its super-personal form and their aim is moksa or nirvāņa which can be attained through the spiritual activity of meditation. But there are large numbers in the Hindu and the Buddhist faiths who look upon the Supreme as a Person and insist on prayer and worship to him. The Saiva, the Vaisnava and the Sākta cults as well as Mahayāna Buddhism represent the theistic tendency .!- Though the emphases may be different, all these religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam as well as Hinduism and Buddhism, admit the vision of Reality as a super-personal state of being and as Personal God. The latter look upon them as two poises of the same Reality. All these religions are aware of personal saviour gods. Iśvara in the form of Vişnu is said to be the source, the transcendent God of the created worlds. The waters of life which feed creation are the elementary material aspects, the first tangible emanation of the Divine, which, though beyond form, yet evolves and comprehends all forms. In sculptural repre- sentations they are symbolised in the coils of the huge serpent whose dwelling is the cosmic abyss and whose name is ananta, E

I30 The Brahma Sūtra endless. God as Vișnu reclines on this immeasurable body from which temporal existences spring. Ananta supports in his expanded hoods both the terrestrial and the celestial spheres. He is the ever-living cosmic ocean from out of which the world and its forms emerge. He rests in the ocean which is perpetually transforming its movement and its colour. He is also called Seșa or the remainder for he is the abysmal water that has not become transformed into creatures but remains at the bottom of the universe as its primal life-force, the original substance feeding all. Ultimately Ananta is identical with Vişnu himself who, in his human form, is seen recumbent on his coils. Vişņu and Ananta are subject and object, Isvara and prakrti. These are the dual manifestations of a single divine presence which, by and in itself, is beyond the forms it assumes when bringing the world-process into action. The supreme Iśvara is often identified with Siva, and there are symbolic representations of Siva as Nata-rāja, the King of dancers. Nata-rāja is the manifestation of the eternal energy in five activities, pañca-kriyā: (i) srsti or pouring forth, creation; (ii) sthiti or maintenance; (iii) samhāra or taking back, destruction; (iv) tirobhāva or concealing, veiling, hiding the transcendental reality behind appearances; (v) anugraha or favouring, bestowing grace through manifestations that accept devotees. Nata-rāja is represented as dancing on the dwarfish body of the demon apasmāra-purușa, forgetfulness, loss of memory, ignorance the destruction of which brings enlighten- ment which effects release from the bondage of mundane existence. In the figure of Nāta-rāja we see the contrast between the movement of his limbs and the tranquillity of his face. It symbolises the paradox of time and eternity, of mortal existence and indestructible being. Sometimes, the Supreme is identified with Sakti. This type of worship is not unknown to the West. When the pagan temples were closed, the cult of Virgin Mary replaced that of Virgin Athene. The act of creation, the relationship between God and man is the revelation of the divine drama of which time and history are the inner content. Iśvara is the guide and controller of the world.

Introduction I3I Even the avataras or incarnations are identified with the Supreme Iśvara. Tulasi Dās, in his Rāmāyaņa, makes Śiva tell Parvatī: 'The Rama on whom gods, sages and seers from Brahma downwards meditate in their devotions is not the Räma of history, the son of King Dasaratha, the ruler of Ayodhya. He is the eternal, the unborn, the one without a second, timeless, formless, stainless.' bhaktānām anukampārtham devo vigrahavān bhavet. Out of compassion for the devotees the Supreme assumes a human form. Jesus of history is represented as the incarnation of the Supreme. He assumed human form for the sake of saving us. St Paul says: 'Our Lord Jesus Christ, though he was rich, yet for your sakes he became poor, that ye through your poverty might be rich.'1 Irenaeus expresses the view more directly: 'Our Lord Jesus Christ did through his transcendent love become what we are, that we might become what he is.' 'He was made man', said Athanasius, 'that we might be made God.'2 Jesus asks his disciples to be united with him. 'Abide in me, and I in you.'3 Even as there is no existence apart from him there is no salvation apart from union with God. Jesus is the forerunner, the first born of many brethren and the first fruits of them that slept.4 The different representations of the Supreme as Vişnu, Siva, Sakti take into account the traditional beliefs of the different people. They are not cold abstractions but symbolise different ways of communion and fellowship. The spread of Hinduism in India has resulted in the assimilation of the divinities wor- shipped by the people. Iśvara is not the ultimate ideal. A Personal God even when theologically sublimated is only a realisation of that which is beyond both being and its opposite non-being. We must leave behind the categories of religious thought and have a direct ascent. In the concept of Iśvara, we objectify what is essentially non-objective. We try to naturalise what is beyond nature. There are many analogies to the conception of Brahman and Isvara, Absolute and God in Western religious thought. To give one example, for Plotinus God is super-being or 1 II Corinthians viii. 9. 2 De Incarnatione LV. 4. 3. 3 John xv. 4. 4 Hebrews vi. 20; Romans viii. 29; I Corinthians xV. 20.

I32 The Brahma Sūtra nothing, if being is something. In the sphere of the nous, the relation of subject and object exists. While the one for Plotinus is the absolute Godhead, the intellectual principle is God. Brahmā Brahma or Hiranya-garbha is the first-born emanation of the supreme Iśvara, who controls the processes of cosmic evolution. Iśvara is infinite, has all possibilities in him without limitation. There are inexhaustible ranges of being and value in him which have not yet received realisation. They belong solely to the distinctive being and perfection of God. Brahma is created and this world is perishable.1 Manu says: 'From the Highest Narayana, there was born the four-faced one.'2 He says: 'This universe existed in the shape of darkness. ... The Supreme desiring to create beings of many kinds from his own body, first with a thought created the waters and placed his seed in them. That seed became a golden egg equal to the sun in brilliancy; in that he himself was born as Brahma, the progenitor of the whole world.'3 Hiranya-garbha is a mani- festation of Isvara. S. says that in the Katha U. the mahān ātman is Hiranya-garbha and his buddhi is the basis of all intellects.5 According to R., there are four classes of creatures (godmen, men, animals and plants), and the difference of these classes depends on the individual selves which are attached to various ,1 yo brahmāņam vidadhāti pūrvam. Š.U. VI. 18. According to the writings of the Egyptians there was a time when neither heaven nor earth existed, and when nothing had being except the boundless primeval water which was, however, shrouded with thick darkness. At length, the spirit of the primeval water felt the desire for creative activity, and having uttered the word, the world sprang straightway into being in the form which had already been depicted, in the mind of the spirit before he spoke the word which resulted in the creation. The next act of creation was the formation of a germ or egg from which sprang Ra, the Sun-God within whose shining form was embodied the almighty power of the divine Spirit. E. A. Wallis Budge: Egyptian Ideas of the Future Life, pp. 22-3. 2 paro nārāyaņo devas tasmāj jātas catur-mukhah. 3 tad andam abhavaddhaimam sahasrāmsu-sama-prabham tasmin jajne svayam brahmā sarva-loka-pitāmahah. 4 I. 3. I0-II. I. I. 5, 8-9. 5 yā prathamajasya hiranya-garbhasya buddhis sā sarvāsām buddhīnam paramā pratisthā. S.B. I. 4. I.

Introduction I33 bodies enabling them to experience the results of their works in the world beginning with Brahma and ending with non-moving objects.1 By the interaction of subject and object the cosmic process gradually realises the values of spirit in its upward ascent from nothingness to the Kingdom of God or brahma-loka under divine inspiration and influence. The changing historical process is not coextensive with reality. It is a limited manifestation of the Supreme. Hiranya- garbha is not only the world-soul but also the highest of all beings in the world. 'For as in the series of beings, though having the common attributes of being animated, from man to a blade of grass, a successive diminution of knowledge, power and so on is observed, so in the [ascending] series [extending] from man to Hiranya-garbha, a gradually increasing manifestation of knowledge, power and so on takes place.'2 We cannot say that the Absolute changes into Iśvara or Iśvara into Hiranya-garbha. The objection to the parināma or change theory is put in several ways. Väcaspati asks: does it change as a whole or in part? If it changes as a whole, how can there be no destruction of old nature; if it changes in part, is the part different from the whole or non-different? If it be different, how can the transformation be of the original reality, for when one thing is changed a different thing is not also changed as that would be an undue extension. Or if it be non-different, how can the transformation be not of the whole?3

Viśva-rūpa The world is a concretisation of the world purpose. It is the virāt-svarūpa. The Vedic gods were representations of prominent aspects of nature. Dyaus, from div, to shine, is the lord of the heavenly light, the source of strength, splendour and knowledge. 1 brahmādi-sthāvarāntam catur-vidham bhūta-jātam tat-tat-karmocita-sarīram tad-ucita-nama-bhakcakarod ity uktam. R.B. I. 3. 26. 2 yathā hi prānitvāviseşe'pi manuşyādi-stamba-paryanteșu jnānaisvaryādi pratibandhah parena parena bhūyān bhavan drsyate, tathā manusyādisv eva hiranya-garbha-paryanteşu jnānaisvaryādy-abhivyaktir api pareņa pareņa bhūyasī bhavati. Ś.B. I. 3. 30. 3 tat sarvātmanā vā pariņamate eka-dese vā? sarvātmanā pariņāme katham na tattva-vyāhatiņ? eka-desa-pariņāme vā sa eka-desas tato bhinno vā abhinno vā? bhinnas cet katham tasya parināmah? na hy anyasmin pariņama-mane'nyah- parināmati ati-prasangāt abhede vā katham na sarvātmanā pariņāmah?

I34 The Brahma Sūtra Varuna is the symbol of celestial and regal power and is connected with the idea of rta, of a cosmic order, of natural and supernatural law. Mitra is the god of truth and fidelity. Sūrya is the flaming sun from whom nothing is hidden, who destroys every infirmity. In the form of Savitr, Surya is the principle of awakening and intellectual animation. Usas is the dawn, the eternally young, who opens the way for the sun, who gives life, who is the symbol of eternal life. Indra is the incarnation of the heroic. He is the god of war, of valour and of victory. Yama is the first of the mortals 'who first found the road to the here- after'.1 By drinking Soma, the symbol of a sacred ecstasy, we become immortal and reach the light.2 Vighneśvara is Ganeśa, the lord of hosts (gana). By his aid we overcome obstacles. He removes all barriers from the path of a devotee. He clears the way by pushing aside whatever lies across the road. He is said to be of the form of an elephant for the elephant forges ahead even through pathless thickets and jungles. It can swim rivers and lakes and with its trunk tears down the branches that block the way and even uproots trees. The print of its feet is the target of all footprints.3 Where an elephant has trod, other animals can follow. Ganesa's vāhana or vehicle is the rat which finds and makes its way subtly. When we come up against the vital elements of nature, when we wash our hands in the waters of a river, when we raise our eyes to the sun, when we prepare ourselves for the joy of eating a slice of bread made of the corn of the earth, we have a sense that nature's elements are the work of God. For the Jews the heavens declare the glory of God. The light is his robe and the clouds his chariot. The gods who retain their anthropomorphic personifications of the natural forces serve to assist the mind in its attempt to comprehend what is regarded as manifested through them. They are useful symbols which serve as bearers of the divine power or mystery. Our interest in nature has become today an impersonal, technical one, how to master and manipulate it. We have lost our life with nature to our great impoverishment. In all this analysis we are tearing apart and in a sense 1 Rg Veda X. 14. 2. 2 Rg Veda VIII. 48. 3. 3 The doctrine of the Buddha is compared to the footprint of the elephant.

Introduction I35

misrepresenting what is presented in a unitary way. Brahman, Iśvara, Hiranya-garbha and Virāt-rūpa are four poises of the one Reality.1

CHAPTER 5 The Status of the World

Samsāra The world in Indian thought as in many other systems is said to be a perpetual procession of events where nothing abides. It is a succession of states. The Hindu and the Buddhist systems accept the fact of samsara, what Plato calls 'the world of coming into being and passing away'. It is an endless process of becoming and not a state. The universe is not a static one. The actual world is a process whose possibilities are infinite. Bhartrhari says: 'We see that life is being wasted every day. Youth is approaching its end, the days that are past do not return. Time devours the world. The goddess of wealth is as unsteady as waves in a river. Life is as fleeting as lightning itself. Therefore, O Lord, save me, seeking refuge in thee, this very instant.'2 Transiency is the character not only of human life but of the very structure of reality. 1 See P.U., pp. 701-5. 2 āyur nasyati pasyatām prati-dinam yāti kşayam yauvanam pratyyānti gatāh punar na divasāh kālo jagad-bhakşakah lakşmīs toya-taranga-bhanga-capalā vidyuc-calam jīvitam tasmān mām šaraņāgatam šaraņada. tvam-rakșa rakşādhunā. In the Phaedrus, Plato says that 'if man had eyes to see Divine Beauty, pure and clean and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mortality and all the colours and varieties of human life, his one aim would be to fly away from earth to heaven'. 'Human life! Its duration is momentary, its substance in perpetual flux, its senses dim, its physical organism perishable, its consciousness a vortex, its destiny dark, its repute uncertain-in fact, the material element is a rolling stream, the spiritual element dreams and vapour, life a war and a sojourning in a far country, fame oblivion. What can see us through? One thing and one only-Philosophy; and that means keeping the spirit within us unspoiled and undishonoured, not giving way to pleasure or pain, never acting unthinkingly or deceitfully or insincerely, and never being dependent on the moral support of others. It also means taking what comes contentedly as all part of the process [Continued on page 136

I36 The Brahma Sūtra When we speak of the world as māya we refer to the feeling of the vanity of life. 'All this most lovely fabric of things exceeding good', wrote Augustine in the fourth century A.D., 'when its measures are accomplished will pass away; they have their morning and their evening.'1 The world subject to change, decay and death is not the Ultimate Reality. If the constant is real, the changing is less than real. Samsāra has a pattern The problem for philosophy is, why is there a world at all and what are we all doing in it? Before we are able to answer these questions, we must know the nature of the world. Even Buddhism which stresses the transiency of life allows the rule of law. Each state is determined by what went before it. The world process has a pattern and a goal. It is marching towards freedom. The path is not smooth or straight. There are blind alleys, relapses. As we shall see, the human individual can shape the future. If we do not have men of sufficient courage, strength and dedication, humanity may lapse into long nights of reaction. Yet, slowly, painfully, but inexorably, it moves on towards an ideal state of happiness, truth, beauty and goodness. This world is not a wasteland. It is not altogether a world of woe. Human life is not an accident in a blind impersonal process. There is a relation between the self-conscious spirit of man and the reality at the heart of things. Enlightened ideas have a transforming power.

Time and Eternity Though everything is subject to the law of time, time itself is, in Plato's words, the moving image of eternity. We cannot account for the order and progress we discern in the world, if it is treated as self-sufficient. It is said that this entire triad of worlds would have become blind darkness if the light known as Continued from page 135] to which we owe our own being; and, above all, it means facing Death calmly- taking it simply as a dissolution of the atoms of which every living organism is composed. Their perpetual transformation does not hurt the atoms, so why should one mind the whole organism being transformed and dissolved? It is a law of Nature, and Natural Law can never be wrong.' Marcus Aurelius Antoninus, Meditations Book II ad fin. 1 Confessions XIII. 3. 5.

Introduction I37 Word had not been shining in it.1 If there were no God there would not be anything else. If we immerse the light in darkness, the world becomes a void, a nothingness, an abyss and a night descends on the depths of the human spirit. The world is not self-sufficient or self- explanatory nor is it meaningless or unintelligible. God is time as well as eternity. Both Nāgārjuna and Ś. admit the factual nature of the pluralistic world. Both of them affirm that it is not ultimate. Its character is indeterminate, anirvacanīya, neither real nor unreal.2

Māyā To look upon the temporal process apart from the eternal background is to mistake the nature of the world. The world is not apart from Brahman. To look upon the world as self- sufficient is to be caught in māya. The B.G. admits that the world is anitya, non-eternal, and asukha, painful, but there is the eternal underlying it. There is bitterness at the bottom of every cup, blight in every flower, shadow in every sunshine. To see into the abyss and yet to believe that God is merciful and by his grace man can right his course even when he has strayed is the teaching of the B.G. The temporal is, however, not to be identified with the Eternal. Eternal Being is non-dual; objectified or known being is dual. Concepts and categories are only a means of apprehending Dasein or being in the world, objective existence. The objective universe consists of three things, 'name, form and action'. 'trayam vā idam nāma rūpam karma.'3 These three support one another and are really one. To be perceived, to be an object, drśya, is to forfeit ultimate reality. Time is a fundamental form of the objectification of human existence. The waking and the dream worlds are both unreal in the strict metaphysical sense in that they involve duality and are objective but this is not to reduce a waking experience to a dream state. There is nothing to 1 idam andham tamah kystnam jāyeta bhuvana-trayam yadi sabdāhvayamı jyotirā sanısāram na dīpyate. 2 'Jesus, son of Mary (on whom be peace) said: The world is a bridge; pass over it, but build no house upon it.' This was inscribed by Akbar on the Bulwand Darwaza, the lofty gateway into the palace of Fatehpur Sikri, completed by him A.D. 1571. 3 B.U. I. 6. I. E*

I38 The Brahma Sūtra support the view that the entire manifold universe is illusory in character. The tangible objects which we see around us are not the objects of our imagination. The world is distinguished from such self-contradictory entities as the son of a barren woman and dreams and illusions. Ś. takes pains to repudiate the view of mentalism advocated by the Vijnāna-vādins. Whatever the outside world depends on, it does not depend on the human mind. Ś. does not favour the modern attempt to dissolve concrete realities like stars and atoms into mathematical equations or mental states. He argues against the subjectivist theory which asserts that everything exists only so far as it is known or is a content of consciousness. The sensation 'blue' is different from the sensation 'red', because the objects given to the sensing consciousness are different. Awareness of something 'blue' and the object 'blue' are not identical.1 The object of consciousness is not the same as the consciousness of the object and the manner of the existence of the one is not like the manner of the existence of the other. The object 'blue' can exist without requiring that the consciousness of 'blue' should exist. It is just the same whether we are aware of it or not. The object seen is independent of perception. Even if the world be an illusion, the maker of the illusion is not the individual subject but the divine Lord. māyām tu prakrtim viddhi māyinam tu maheśvaram.2 The idea of the created world is not our dream but is put into our heads by the Divine Being. If it is imagination that creates the world, it is the cosmic imagination and not any private one. Commenting on II. 4. 20, Ś. clearly makes out that the individual soul is not responsible for the world of objects: 'with regard to the manifold names and forms, such as mountains, rivers, oceans, etc., no soul apart from the Lord possesses the power of evolution; and if any have such power it is dependent on the Highest Lord'.3 If life is an illusion it is one that lasts endlessly, anādi, ananta. It is shared by all human beings, sarva-loka-pratyaksa.4 It is difficult to draw a distinction between such an illusion and reality.

1 artha-jñānayor bhedaķ. Ś.B. II. 2. 20. 2 Ś.U. IV. IO. 3 na ca giri-nadī-samudrādişu nānāvidheșu nāmarūpeșv anīśvarasya jīvasya vyākarana-sāmarthyam asti; yeşv api cāsti sāmarthyam teșv api parameśvarā- yattam eva tat. 4 Ś.B. I. I. I.

Introduction I39 Each entity is a mixture of being and non-being. In his finitude the human individual asks the question of the nature of being. He who is infinite does not ask the question of being for he is being completely. A being who does not realise that he is finite cannot ask because he does not go beyond himself. Man cannot avoid asking the question because he belongs to being from which he is separated. He knows that he belongs to it and is now separate from it. What we come across in this world appears to us as real but we soon realise that its reality is only transitory, historical. It was and is no more. The world is to help human beings realise their destiny. Historical objectification is the path of division which man must tread. He must face his destiny by which he may rediscover his alienation from his self. Our finiteness is the condition of our awareness. Our temporality gives us a chance of knowing the eternal. Our limitation gives us the scope and the opportunity to glimpse the Unlimited. The world is, verily, a passage from existence to reality. The world of becoming is not authentic being, but aspires to be that. 'All things pray except the Supreme', says Proclus. The world is a different kind of existence, a degraded form when compared to the Supreme Being. Whatever is known is a reflection of the Self in limiting adjuncts. The objective universe is not the subject but is yet derived from it. 'As a spider moves along the thread (it produces), and as from a fire tiny sparks fly in all directions, so from this Self emanate all organs, all worlds, all gods, and all beings. Its secret name (upanisad) is "the truth of truth" (satyasya satyam). The vital force is truth and it is the truth of that (prāņā vai satyam, teşām eșa satyam).'1 The world is actual, existent, but its truth is in the Self. In the Self alone all the world takes its rise, persists and perishes. 'Although one, thou hast penetrated diverse things.'2 'The one Lord is hidden in all beings, all-pervading and the Self of all.'3 There is not any radical separation between the Supreme 1 B.U. II. 1. 20. Cf. '[God] giveth to all life and breath, and everything, and he made of one blood every nation of men ... that they should seek God ... and find him, though he is not far from each one of us; for in him we live, move, and have our being; as certain even of your own poets have said, for we are also his offspring.' Acts xvii. 25-8. 2 Taittirīya Aranyaka. III. 14. 3. 3 Ś.U. VI. 2.

I40 The Brahma Sūtra Spirit and the actual world. On the contrary the values of spirit are surprisingly exemplified in the world of existent fact. A realm of subsistent being altogether unrelated to the realm of actual existents is meaningless. Even those who look upon values as belonging to a realm of being which is different from that of actual existents assert that values are realised in actual entities. We speak of beautiful pictures, scenes and persons. Existent objects exemplify subsistent values. Though the world has not absolute reality, it is not to be compared with illusory appearances. The Advaita Vedanta emphasises the unity of being, the oneness of the subject. But the object is discrete but not illusory. It is not a bare multiplicity which would be unthinkable. Embodiedness has positive value for the evolution of the soul and every form of life should be respected.1 The cosmic process is not a meaningless one but aims at the realisation of an ideal. It has selves which are both subjects and objects. Our objective knowledge, though it apprehends an already degraded being, still reveals something of the reality despite its divorce from intimate, inward existence. It is a manifestation or objectification of Spirit, though it may be difficult to account for this fact. Why should real being suffer the accident of objectification? We may as well ask, why should the world be what it is? Though the world is a manifestation of Spirit, there is no spiritual freedom in it. The final triumph of Spirit would mean the annihilation of the non-authentic objective world, the creation of reality over symbol, the realisation of authentic being. We must realise Spirit, existentially rather than objectively. That is the purpose of human life. Man has Spirit but he must become Spirit, an incarnate Spirit. Creation The Sanskrit word systi means literally emanation, letting loose. The world is dependent on Brahman but this dependence does not take away from the integrity and independence of 1 A popular verse says that you have acquired this body as the result of great goodness. Cross this ocean of temporal becoming before the body breaks. mahatā punya-paņyena krīto'yam kāyanaus tathā pāram duhkhodadhair gantum taraī yāvan na bhidyate. Cp. also jantūnām nara-janma durlabham.

Introduction I4I Brahman. The onesided dependence of the world on Brahman is sometimes illustrated by the analogy of the rope which gives rise to the appearance of the snake. Though the latter depends on the rope, the rope does not depend on the appearance of the snake. Since the appearance is not factual, it is sometimes imagined that the world is not factual. But S. himself explains that the illustrations have only a limited application and are not to be extended to all points.1 When one thing is compared with another it does not follow that they are similar in all respects. They are similar only in some intended point. Creation of the world out of nothing describes the absolute independence of God as Creator, the absolute dependence of creation and the distance between them. Even in the instances which S. gives, silver which turns out to be mother-of-pearl or a human being who turns out to be a post, there is an object which is misinterpreted. The world is a manifestation, real and unreal, real as Brahman and unreal when viewed apart from Brahman. I śvara is Brahman with creative power. He is Brahman with the principle of self-manifestation. How is the Eternal Logos related to the contents of the world-process? The classical answer is that the essences or potentialities of the world are eternal in the Divine Mind. Not all of them are manifested in the world. God is absolutely free in respect of creation, with his māyā-śakti or power of determination without any impairment of his being. Iśvara is not a mere symbol adopted for upāsanā or worship. He has two sides, transcendent when he is one with Brahman, immanent when he produces the world. As trans- cendent, Iśvara is conceived as devoid of māyā, as immanent he is the determiner of māyā. He has a double form. As trans- cendent he is free from mäyā, other than the world put forth by him, one with Brahman, trīgunatita. He is also the living creative God. The existence of the world is altogether contingent. It does not flow necessarily from the existence of God. While God can create a world if he wills to do so, he is entirely free with regard to the exercise of his will. There is thus a double contingency with regard to the world. God need not have made a world 1 sarva-sārūpye hi drștānta-dārștāntika-bhāvoccheda eva syāt. Ś.B. III. 2. 20.

I42 The Brahma Sūtra at all. He need not have made this particular world which he has made. Why we have this world and not another is something for which we cannot offer an explanation. F. H. Bradley observes: 'That experience should take place in finite centres and should wear the form of finite this-ness is in the end inexplicable.' We have to accept it as the given datum and cannot derive it from the definition of God. The creative thought: 'let me be many' belongs to Brahman. It is not simply imagined in him. The energy that manifests itself in Brahman is one with and different from Brahman.1 The doctrine of creation out of nothing insists that God is not limited by a pre-existent matter or by any conditions external to himself. God's will is the meaning of the world and it is sovereign over both nature and history. The Upanisads do not countenance any dualism. They hold that the power which rules the cosmic energies is the determiner of human destiny. I śvara, as stated in the previous section, is associated with the principle of objectivity. He is described as the poet, the creator of order out of chaos. The world should become an ordered beauty. Commenting on I. I. 4, S. says that avyakta is not to be confused with pradhana or prakrti. It is just the unmanifested na vyakta. It is just the subtle cause, the primal state of the existence of the universe. It is dependent on God and is not an absolute reality. If we do not accept such a subtle power abiding in God, God cannot be a creator. He cannot move towards creation. This avyakta is avidyā or māyā depending on God. The individuals lie in it without any self-awakening. The potency of this power is destroyed by knowledge in the case of the emancipated beings. They are therefore not born again.2 Bhāmatī says that there are different avidyās associated with different selves. When any individual gains wisdom the avidyā associated with him is destroyed. The other avidyās associated with other individuals remain the same and produce the world. The term avyakta relates to avidyā in a generic sense. While

1 bhedābhedātmikā saktir brahma-nişthā sanātanī. 2 muktānām ca punar an-utpattiņ, kutaḥ vidyayā tasyā bīja-sakter dāhāt. I. 4. 3.

Introduction I43 it rests in the individual, it is yet dependent on God who is its agent and object. The support of avidyā is Brahman. Though the real nature of the selves is Brahman, so long as they are surrounded by avidya, they do not realise their true nature. Hiranya-garbha is seeking complete expression in the world. While the world is dependent on Brahman and not vice versa, while it is the expression of the creative energy of God, it is the manifestation of Hiranya-garbha. The Puruşa-sūkta of the Rg Veda makes out that in the original act of creation, God has torn himself apart. The act of creation is an act of sacrifice. There is a tearing apart, an aberration and the end of the cosmic process is a return to the Spirit. There is nothing but God and by his will the universe is made ceaselessly. Being good and the giver of all, God gives out himself through countless forms that they may all share his life of infinite bliss. Being perfect he needs nothing for himself but desires recipients of his love. The world is not a completed act, it is still in the process of completion. The world-spirit exists in the human spirit and can attain to a consciousness of itself. Spirit and matter are aspects of the Uncreated Light from which all creation flows. In creation it is as if the Primordial Light while remaining pure and undivided in itself enters as light into its own divine darkness, as selfhood enters non-self, All forms of evolving life are born and grow of the marriage of the Prime mover and the primal darkness. Nothingness is the veil of Being according to Heidegger. Being conceals itself behind nothingness. Nothingness is most intimately united with Being. It proceeds out of Being and yet conceals it. The world is an appearance of Brahman, a partial mani- festation of Isvara and an organic manifestation of Hiranya garbha. These are the conceptions to which we are led by an examination of the given experience. If we are unable to reconcile these different views it does not mean that there is an inner contradiction in the nature of the Supreme but that there is a limit to our powers of comprehension. The emancipated souls understand the fourfold status of reality, the Absolute Brahman, God Iśvara, world-soul Hiranya-garbha, and the world virāt-svarūpa.

I44 The Brahma Sūtra

CHAPTER 6

The Individual Self

Duality in human nature The question of the nature of the self is raised only by human beings. Animals cannot ask this question and redeemed spirits know the self and do not pose the question. The naturalistic world view reduces man to an object utterly insignificant in the vast magnitudes of space-time. Man is not exhausted by body and mind. In the complex of personality there is something which uses both and yet is neither. The waxing years and the waning strength are quite powerless to dim the brightness of spirit. Any change which may spell decay for the body or even for mind may yet be irrelevant for the spirit which is essentially man himself. The Empirical Self Buddha and S. adopt a view of the self which reminds us of Hume's account. When we look within, we come across an endless procession of thoughts, imaginings, emotions, desires, but not a permanent self. The Upanisads look upon the individual as a composite of physical and mental traits, nāma-rupa. They both change, the body somewhat more slowly than the mind. We are not aware of the changing for it is continuous and what is constant, relatively speaking, is the name. The permanence of the name produces the illusion of unity. Strictly speaking, man is nothing more than a sequence of physical and mental processes, a chain of events, a series of thoughts, perceptions, emotions and other responses to im- pressions received from outside. The self is a mental construction. Many of our acts, psychologists say, are automatic, mechanical. Men are, for the most part, machines and many men do not realise that it is possible for them to overcome their automatism. Most of the time we struggle through life com- pletely unaware of what we are doing, responding to external stimuli in an automatic way. We are at the mercy of all chance happenings. If this were all, human mind would be like the animal. But we know that there is a fundamental difference

Introduction I45 between the two. For example, animal sounds register immediate impulses; human speech gives us more than im- mediacy. It communicates ideas which transcend immediacy. Consciousness cannot be defined. It is awareness of thinking, imagining, sensing. There are four states of consciousness according to the Māndūkya U., waking, dream and sleep, and the transcendental consciousness called turīya. We generally pass our time awake, dreaming or sleeping but we are not self- aware. We are aware of tables and chairs or in dreams of horses and chariots or we are in sound sleep. In this state, there is con- sciousness without thought, without any dream or perception. We are rarely aware of our selves standing apart from all that surrounds us, physically or mentally. But the vivid moments of life are those in which man is aware of himself. The Samkhya system argues that all except the pure self, purușa, is objective, non-self, prakrti. All the divisions of organic and inorganic, mental and non-mental, the intelligent and the non-intelligent are divisions within the object side. This is not materialism for matter itself is invested with a new quality. The human individual belongs to the object side, an element in the perpetual procession we call the universe. There is always and everywhere creative movement and the universe is no exception to it. The difference between material things and living organisms is one of the degree of individuality. Every individual is a composite, a unity in multiplicity. The more individual we are, the deeper is the unity and the larger the complexity. Animals are unities of complex mental elements.1 The rise of reflective thought at the human level raises new problems.2 There is a greater unity of behaviour. The possibility 1 Cp. Walt Whitman, who describes the life of animals thus: 'they are so placid and self-contained, they do not sweat and whine about their condition, they do not lie awake in the dark and weep for their sins, they do not make me sick discussing their duty to God, not one is dissatisfied, not one is demented with the mania of owning things, not one kneels to another, nor to his kind that lived thousands of years ago, not one is respectable or unhappy over the whole earth' 2 Cp. St Bernard: 'God who, in his simple substance, is all everywhere equally, nevertheless, in efficacy is in rational creatures in another way than in irrational, and in good rational creatures in another way than in the bad. He is in irrational creatures in such a way as not to be comprehended by them; by all rational creatures, however, He can be comprehended by knowledge; but only by the good is He also comprehended by "love".'

I46 The Brahma Sūtra of self-knowledge arises. Human beings are self-conscious and self-directing. They are capable of controlling their conduct by general principles and judgments of value. Their spontaneity becomes transformed into creative freedom. We philosophise because we are finite and we know that we are finite. We are aware that we are a mixture of being and not- being. The body is that which dissolves itself.1 It is that which burns itself out.2 The human self as a centre in the objective series can be analysed into its components, can be regarded as a sum of states or experiences. It knows that it is finite and incomplete, limited by an environment, natural and social. We cannot account for this knowledge of ourselves as finite and imperfect except on the assumption of the infinite and the perfect in us of which we are dimly aware. In his non-being man cannot help but aspire to being. So he cries out for the light from which he has hidden himself. He is not content with the sandy wastes of the human spirit deprived of God. For Sartre, life is absurdity, nothingness and each one has to make of it something meaningful. The sign of hope is that we realise our non-being. It is the eternity in us which makes us aware of time. In our nature the temporal and the eternal meet. We must cease to be mechanical and become conscious. It is then the real 'I' appears. When we wake up we realise our nothingness, our mechanisation, our utter helplessness. Our views and opinions, our tastes and thoughts are not our own. They are borrowed from elsewhere. In some small measure man has governance over himself. Our choices may be conditioned by circumstances over which we have no control. This conditioning may be a limitation on our freedom; yet in some sense we are capable of acting freely.

Jīva and Ātman The human individual has reason, self-consciousness, freedom. Unlike the rest of nature, he can say 'I'. His self stands against the ego which is a part of nature. He anticipates the death of the ego and runs ahead of himself. The 'I' transcends the 'me' which is subject to moods. The unseizability of the self has been a commonplace of 1 śīryate iti śarīram. 2 dahyate iti dehah.

Introduction I47 philosophic thought. Hume in one way and Heidegger in another maintain that the self remains inaccessible to thought. As a centre of action, the self is an activity and an activity cannot be seized. When philosophers speak of self-knowledge they do not refer to psychological introspection. The Self is pure spirit. The task of human individuals who are weak, finite beings though endowed with a spark of divinity is to work and suffer in an effort to reach a state of perfection. Each individual is a spark from a great flame, a ray of the one Light, differentiated within the body of the Cosmic Spirit. The spark is an encloser of divine potentialities which become manifest through life in the empirical world. At the present stage of its unfoldment it uses on the physical plane a form which includes the mental, emotional and physical bodies. These are collectively called the persona or mask, the perishable personality behind which it operates, using it as a tool with which to gather experience for the purposes of the growth of the soul. The text 'That thou art' means that the Divine is all that we are capable of becoming and we must strive on and on till our life becomes an expression of the Divine. The psychological ego implies the individuation of the Universal Spirit by the non-conscious or material principle. The threefold conception of man as body, mind and spirit implies an important truth, that man is not a mere object, that his spiritual nature is not on the same level as his psychic and corporeal, that his soul and body can participate in a new higher order of spiritual existence. Man can pass from the order of nature to that of freedom, from the region of discord and hostility to that of love and union. Personality is not merely body and mind but Spirit, and Spirit, as we have seen, is. It is the primal reality more authentic than anything reflected in the objective world. Atman is the foundation of the ego, the kernel of the personality. It is the Universal Self active in every ego even as it is the universal source of all things. The oneness of the Transcendent or Super-temporal subject is not in conflict with the plurality of empirical selves. The Self in us expresses itself by the power to transcend every objectified form of psychic life. It is, as it were, a divine breath, penetrating existence and

I48 The Brahma Sūtra endorsing it with the highest dignity, with an inner independence and unity. It is the image and likeness of God in Man. By the impact of the Spirit with the psychophysical organism, there is set up the attempt to realise the idea, the divine purpose concerning the individual. The Spirit hidden in the depths of being is made manifest by a slow conquest achieved in course of time. Man's salvation is dearly bought for he has to gather his soul into his hands and let the Universal manifest through it. Creative action and self-conquest are derived from the Self in us. Each individual attempts to become a real whole, not a sum of parts, an end in itself, not a means to an end. Though it has a material content and foundation, the Self has an autonomous validity which prevents its being converted into a means. Selfhood involves the possibility of moral failure. The individual is unique and unpredictable. His function lies in his participation in this continually creative act. Freedom vouch- safed to us is like all gifts, a double-edged sword, but that is no reason for ceasing to use it. Life's course is tragic, a progress in which joy is inseparable from suffering. Yet it is enjoined on us to live it. Suffering is the result of alienation from reality and when we get back to it suffering disappears. As Spirit is opposed to the world of things or of objects or of phenomena, the human individual attempts at becoming a historical reality, one and unique, achieving a unity of originality and value, despite its multiplicity of functions. A unique and indivisible destiny is its essential constituent. The power of free choice is its essential feature. As it is not an objective datum, it fashions and creates itself. Personality is the union of our acts and potentialities, a complex unity of body, mind and spirit. It is the symbol of human integrity, of a constant and unique form created in the midst of incessant flux. It would dissolve itself into nothing as soon as it discarded its limitations and supports, though it would reduce itself to an object if it passively submitted to these limitations. We cannot say that the non-successive is real and the successive is unreal. The whole attempt of creation is to lift up the phenomenon to the level of the subject, to divinise the empirical ego. The self is spirit and body; it includes the super-temporal subject and the temporal experiences. For us in the objective world, the

Introduction I49 super-temporal has no existence apart from the temporal, though the latter cannot be conceived apart from the former. Time is in us as pure subjects and we are in time as empirical egos. Both are true though neither is true by itself. From the naturalist point of view, man is only a minute part of nature; from the sociological viewpoint he is a small unit of society; from the spiritual point of view, he is real and free. In man is an intersection of several worlds, none of which completely contains his true self. It exists on several planes and is permanently in a process of creative change. It has need of time to realise its potentialities to the full. It always endeavours to resolve contradictions. It will not do if the spirit establishes unity and control within the nature of the ego. It must conquer the world and transform it instead of denying and abandoning it to its fate. It aims above all at the Kingdom of God. Salvation comes only through realising or establishing truth in human relationships, through enabling each individual to realise his personality. The empirical individuals are not really subsistent subjects but are parts of the objective world, abstractions made for practical purposes from the concrete reality of history. Their separate existence and self-control are limited. They are all parts of the objectified universe. God is, however, an existent among existents in no way to be identified with the whole creation though closely concerned with it. His knowledge of the world is perfect and his love for it profound and he works through creation to effect its consummation. It is incorrect to imagine that the objective process has in it two opposite natures, spiritual and material, of which one must be discarded and the other accepted. These worlds are not separate and hostile. Reality is one with many planes. The material looks upward to the spiritual and finds in it its true meaning. Similarly the spiritual leans to the physical in order to find itself. Every aspect of existence has in it these two in different measures. Eternal Brahman is a living God in relation to the temporal world. If existence is a degradation, it is one in which the whole from God to matter shares. The physical world seems to be the first statement of the conditions from which there is a progressive evolution of spirit. One principle acts throughout the cosmic process though it assumes special

I50 The Brahma Sūtra

forms in special regions. It is different in living things and in non-living. In non-living things also we have the distinction of form and matter. Matter is pure potentiality and such a pure potentiality without an actual character or behaviour is just non-existence. So pure matter is never found in itself. It is the lower limit of the range of being. As a concrete existent, it is both being and non-being. Until the purpose of the Spirit in this manifestation is perfectly fulfilled, there is no departure from it. The complete self-finding of Spirit in the cosmic life is the terminus. The Kingdom of God is the fulfilled transfigured life of this world. Jainism holds that man's nature is dual. It has both material and spiritual content. So man, as he is, is not perfect but he can attain perfection. The soul's true nature is perfection. When it is unencumbered by error, it consists of infinite perception, knowledge and bliss. By this spiritual nature man can control his material nature and when he succeeds in doing it he becomes a jina or conqueror, a liberated soul. These souls are of two kinds, those who have attained nirvana and those who are still embodied. The latter are called arhats. They are the jivan- muktas. Great religions retain the notion of a state of original innocence in which human beings or at least a couple of them according to the Jews, Christians and Muslims lived in direct communion with God. Supporters of extreme doctrines of transcendence like Karl Barth believe that the distance from the state of innocence is so great that the divine spark in us may be supposed to be completely extinguished and can only be relit by an act of vicarious grace. A world wholly given over to the Devil is the result of pure transcendence. If absolute immanence is accepted, there is no work for man to do. Both these views are unsatisfactory. In human beings as in the world there is both being and non-being. God is both immanent and transcendent. The self comes from God and goes back to him. There are stages in the soul's journey to God. Philo, Theophilus of Antioch, Clement of Alexandria and Origen hold in the spirit of the Upanisads and of Plato that God created man in his own image. Man's real being, his spiritual being partakes of the nature of God. But man is also involved in

Introduction I5I

the life of the senses which is alien to his nature.1 When he tries to mould himself in the pattern of the animal life, he forgets his true nature. A fall is the descent of spirit into matter. It is the condition of earthly existence. The purpose of this existence is to ascend to the light of creative consciousness. To go down into non-entity and to rise again later is the law of growth for every seed of spirit. Spiritual life consists in the process of returning to one's true nature. He must realise what he is, must recover his real nature by destroying the hold of the animal nature. Commenting on Genesis, Origen says: 'The man who was made in God's image is the inner man, the incorporeal, incorruptible, immortal one.'ª Man loses his likeness to God when he sins.

CHAPTER 7

The Way to Perfection

A. THE WAY OF KARMA OR LIFE

The Purpose of Human Life Everything that lives aims at its own specific perfection. The blade of grass, the flowering tree, the flying bird, the running deer, each one strives to reach the perfection of its nature. While the sub-human species work according to a pre- determined pattern, man, on account of the possession of 1 Iamblichus writes: 'The soul has a twofold life, a lower and a higher. In sleep that soul is freed from the constraint of the body and enters, as one emancipated, on its divine life of intelligence. Then, as the noble faculty which beholds objects as they are-the objects in the world of intelligence-stirs within, and awakens in its power, who can be surprised that the mind, which contains in itself the principles of all that happens, should, in this its state of liberation, discern the future in those antecedent principles which will make that future what it is to be. The nobler part of the soul is thus limited by abstraction to higher natures, and becomes a participant in the wisdom and foreknowledge of the gods.' 2 Jean Danielou: Origen (1955), p. 295. Cp. Claudefield: In each human heart is a Christ concealed, To be helped or hindered, to be hurt or healed. If from any human soul you lift the veil, You will find a Christ there without fail.

I52 The Brahma Sūtra creative will, has to achieve his fulfilment by his effort and will. Descartes reduced the human self to the status of an object for purposes of scientific understanding. The self was, for him, a counterpart of the body. Spinoza felt that if bodily states were strictly determined, mental states were also subject to a strict determinism. Mind and body became objects of scientific treatment only on the condition of a universal determinism. Freud and Marx adopt a similar objective view of the human self, that it is determined ultimately by unconscious impulses or relations of economic production. Man is not completely a victim of circumstances. He can say 'no' to life whereas the animal always says 'yes' even when he is in the throes of terror and revulsion. Man can deliberately reject satisfaction at one level for the sake of satisfaction at another, higher level. He can impose discipline on his nature and check the drive of desire. He can create a new nature in which the different elements of his being are harmonised. Each individual is not one but many, an assemblage of different factors.1 He must reach unity through inner develop- ment. External events impinge on us, emotions are suddenly aroused and become dominant and soon they give way to others which in turn try to govern us. There is a strain in human life which impels us to introduce peace and order into the swarm of impulses, emotions and notions, incongruous and often con- tradictory. This is a life-time job, perhaps a job for many lives. There is in man the ache for unity, the anguish for beatitude. Man's quest for perfection consists in organising the things of body, mind and soul into a whole. The activities of the human spirit are interrelated, the artistic and the ethical, the religious 1 Catullus says : I hate and I love. You ask how can that be? I know not but I feel the agony. Plutarch says: 'Each one of us is made up of ten thousand different and successive states, a scrap heap of units, a mob of individuals.' Concerning the Delphi, edited by A. O. Prickard (1918). Oh, wearisome condition of humanity! Born under one law, to another bound; Vainly begot, and yet forbidden vanity; Created sick, commanded to be sound; What meaneth Nature by these diverse laws? Passion and Reason, self-division's cause. Fulke Greville.

Introduction I53 and the rational. Man is a miniature of the universe in which he lives. Man, as he is, is a transitional being, an unfinished experi- ment. When he is awakened, he is at peace with himself, he thinks and acts in a new way. For this awakening, man has to take another step in his evolution. The Kingdom of Heaven is the highest state attainable by man. So long as our nature is not integrated, our actions are confused and contradictory. In an integrated man, thought, speech and action are of one piece.1 The M.B. says that there is no thief so dangerous2 as the hypocrite who says one thing and does another, for his is the sin of the deepest dye. When Jesus attacks the Pharisee, he is attacking the man of pretences who keeps up appearances, who pretends to be good when he is not. The Lord is merciful to the sins of the flesh but wrathful against those of the spirit. We must recognise that evil is in us though such a recognition may wound and shame our pride and presumption. There is only one thing of which we have to be ashamed, i.e. unwillingness to recognise the truth. The lie is the great evil of which the Pharisees are guilty. Different Ways to Fulfilment There is an old saying that there are as many ways to God as there are souls on earth. Each person is unique and his way to fulfilment is also unique. It is also true that there is so much in common among human beings that we can distinguish certain broad ways to man's realisation, the karma-mārga, the way of work, bhakti-märga, the way of devotion, the dhyāna- marga, the way of meditation. All these lead to jñāna, wisdom or enlightenment. All yoga is one and includes the different aspects of work, devotion and knowledge. 1 manasy ekam vacasy ekam karmany ekam mahātmanām manasy anyad vacasy anyad karmany anyad durātmanām. 2 yo anyathā santam ātmānam anyathā pratipadyate kim tena na kytam pāpam caureņātmāpahāriņā. Cp. Plato's description of the just man in his Republic IV. There is a revealing story in Sā-di: 'A righteous man saw in a dream a King in Paradise and a devotee in Hell He enquired: "What is the reason for the exaltation of the former and the degradation of the latter? For I used to think it would be the other way round." A voice came saying: "The King is in Paradise because of his kindness to the poor; and the devotee is in Hell because of his attachment to kings".' Gulistan II. 15.

I54 The Brahma Sūtra Dharma in a wide sense is used to connote all the means for the achievement of the different ends of life. Samantabhadra says that dharma is that which leads people out of the woes of the world and fixes them in the highest bliss.1

The Primacy of Ethics Man is the bridge between nature and spirit. His destiny drives him on to the spirit. Through agonies and ecstasies he has to reach his fulfilment. The programme of duties laid down in dharma śāstras is intended to help man to reach his goal. The spiritual goal and the ethical means are bound up with each other and not externally related. The moral law within us is evidence of our citizenship in the world of spirit. Moral discipline makes for spiritual insight. Their relationship is not adventitious. To reach the goal is to perfect the means to it.2 We cannot bypass the ethical. Almost all the religious classics of India insist on ethical conduct as an indispensable means for spiritual life. Ethics is the basis of spiritual life and its substance. Aśoka's dharma, for example, emphasises sīla or conduct, not creed or doctrine, worship or ceremony. In his Rock Edict 7, Aśoka says that 'all sects wish [to acquire] self-control and purity of mind'.3 He calls those without these qualities mean indeed, nīcāh. Rock Edict II says there is no such gift as dharma-dāna. Dharma is defined as proper behaviour towards slaves and servants, respect for father and mother, gifts to friends and relatives, to Brahmanas and ascetics, non-killing of creatures. Ś. says that one should undertake enquiry into Brahman only 1 samsāra-duhkhatah sattvān yo dharati uttame sukhe. Cf. Nyāya Sūtra I. I. 2. 'Of misery, birth, activity, defect and illusory knowledge, by the destruction of each subsequent one there is the destruction of each earlier one and consequently final release.' i duhkha-janma-pravytti-dosa-mithyā-jnānānām uttarottarāpāye tad-anantarā- pāyād apavargaḥ. In Gheranda Samhita it is said: nāsti māyā samam pāsam nāsti yogāt param balam nāsti jñānāt paro bandhur nāham -kārat paro ripuh. There is no bond equal to that of maya, there is no strength higher than that of yoga, there is no friend higher than knowledge, no enemy greater than self-conceit. 2 Cp. Ś.B.G. II. 55. sarvatraiva hi adhyātma-sāstre . .. yāni yatna-sadhyān sādhanāni lakșanāni ca bhavanti tāni. See also Ś.B.G. XIV. 25. 3 In Sanskrit it reads sarve te samyamam ca bhava-suddhim ca icchanti.

Introduction I55 after he acquires self-control, detachment, etc., what he calls viveka, vairāgya, şat-sampatti and mumukșutva.1 Moral life is an essential condition for the pursuit of wisdom. Ethical conduct is different from ceremonial piety. The latter is of no use to those who are morally impure.2 Speaking the truth is much better than performing many sacrifices.3 There is a popular verse which says that people want the fruits of dharma and not dharma itself.4 There is a general insistence on truth in inward nature and not merely conformity in outward conduct.

Freedom of Will The integration of the individual has to be achieved by a conscious effort. If God had desired to create a world of automata there would have been no evil, no failure, God could have eliminated evil if he had so wished by denying us freedom of choice. Evil is there because we sometimes abuse free will. If the world is a machine, then the human individual has no meaning. Man in so far as he is made in the image of God is a creator. He is not free until he is capable of creative activity. While animals are creatures men are creature-creators. There is no animal delinquency. Evil is not passivity but activity. Without creative freedom man cannot produce either a paradise or a desolation on earth. God permits evil because he does not interfere with human choice. Man is subjected to different sets of laws. He cannot disobey | the law of gravitation. If he is unsupported in mid-air he must fall to the ground like a stone. As a living organism he is subject to various biological laws which he cannot violate. These laws

Ś.B. I. I. 8. 1 tasmāt yathokta-sādhana-sampaty-anantaram brahma-jijnāsā kartavyā. acara-hinam na punanti vedah. Vasistha Dharma-sūtra VI. 3. 3 aśvamedha-sahasrāt tu satyam ekam visişyate. M.B. 4 punyasya phalam icchanti punyam necchanti manavah. Cp. yo lubdhah pisunah krūro dāmbhiko vişayātmikah sarva-tīrthesvapi snātah papo malina eva sah. He who is covetous, hypercritical, cruel, ostentatious and attached to the senses though he bathed in all places of pilgrimage, is still sinful and impure. nighītendriya-grāmo yatraiva ca vasen narah tatra tasya kuru-kşetrarı naimişam puşkarani ca. One who controls his senses wherever he stays, that place is for him, Kurukşetra, Naimişāraņya or Puşkara.

I56 The Brahma Sūtra he shares with the animals but there is a law which he does not share with animals, a law which he can disobey if he so chooses. It is the law of dharma or right and wrong. Religion is essentially a passion for righteousness.

The Complaint of World-negation It is said that for the Hindu all true existence is non-material, unchangeable and eternal and therefore the material, change- able, temporal existence is false. So it is said that the good of man consists not in transforming the world which is a vale of woe but in transcending it. It is not his aim to change the world but turn away from it. If the Hindu adopts an exalted morality, it is not founded on Hindu metaphysics but is inconsistent with it.1 The world is not a deceptive façade of something underlying it. It is real though imperfect. Since the Supreme is the basis of the world the world cannot be unreal.2 Maya has a standing in the world of reality. S. says that after filling our sight with wisdom let us see the world as Brahman. Such a vision is fruitful, not the vision which looks solely at the tip of the nose.3 The world of multiplicity is acknowledged even by those who attempt to explain it away. Heidegger, for example, emphasises the finiteness and contingency of man's condition. Human life is a brief span of existence between original nothingness and death. It is constantly passing away and tends to return to non-being. The threat of nothingness is the source of that fundamental anguish which the existentialists emphasise. Some existentialists like Jaspers and Marcel, following the lead of Kierkegaard, find the counterpoise to the world of nothingness in the reality of God. In Hindu thought, māya is not so much 1 Albert Schweitzer says: 'World- and life-negation if consistently thought out and developed does not produce ethics but reduces ethics to impotence.' The Philosophy of Civilisation, E.T. (1950), p. 288. Cp. John McKenzie: 'The duties of social life cannot be deduced from the ultimate goal of attainment as the orthodox understand it, nor can they be shown to stand in any vital relation to it.' Hindu Ethics (1922), pp. 206-7. 2 Cp. M.B. brahma satyam, jagat satyam, satyam caiva prajā-patih. satyād bhūtāni jātāni satyam bhūta-mayam jagat. 3 drstim jñāna-mayīm kytvā pasyed brahma-mayam jagat. sā drstih paramodārā na nāsāgrāvalokinī.

Introduction I57 a veil as the dress of God. The destiny of the world is to be transformed into the perfect state of the Kingdom of God. The concept of brahma-loka, the Kingdom of God, is known to the Vedic seers, the Hebrew prophets and Zarathustra. If we are to share the new existence, we must achieve perfection. We must renounce self-interest and dedicate ourselves to the doing of good. We must work for better conditions for the material and spiritual development of human beings, for civilisation is material and spiritual progress for both the individual and society. The aim is loka-samgraha, in the words of the B.G. Man is a social animal. He loves those with whom he lives in close association. Latterly the small social groups have been broken up by the forces of industrialism but new opportunities for larger groups are now available. The whole of society requires to be reconstructed on the principle of social solidarity. Society is approaching what seems to be the final stage of economic evolution. We have passed beyond the hunting and the fishing stages, the pastoral, the agricultural and the industrial stages with their different phases. Unfortunately, the contemporary world situation where two rival power systems are facing each other is leading to the emergence of a narrowly secular, materialistic, extraverted mass-state. Sensitive people deplore the disintegration, the superficial materialism, the lack of creative vision and the uncontrolled technocracy which are the alarming symptoms of a disease eating at the heart of our modern way of life. Our best attempts are incapable of remedying the disease of which we are all obscurely aware. The crisis which faces us is a spiritual one and what we need is a recovery of spiritual awareness, a new and transforming contact with the inner sources of spiritual inspiration which once animated the soul of our civilisation and produced and maintained its indefeasible unity of consciousness, in other words a healing of the divorce between the outward resources of power which are assuming frightening proportions and the inward resources of the spirit which are decaying or dead. Materialism is the height of unintelligence. The B.G., when it calls upon us to work for a world community, calls us back to the Indwelling Spirit which is in us as in others. Such a faith will help us to bring love where there is hatred, hope where

I58 The Brahma Sūtra

there is despair, light where there is darkness, joy where there is sorrow. We must give if we wish to receive. We shall be able to serve if we are ourselves saved, integrated. The world is the place where the human individual has to attain his integration, his fulfilment. We are called upon to participate in the life of the world. It is through time that time is conquered. The transitoriness of earthly possessions is used to emphasise the imperative necessity of the practice of dharma. There is a well-known verse which reads: 'Our bodies are not permanent, our prosperity is fleeting; death is always near to us. Therefore one should take to dharma.'1 The goal is a reorientation of human personality, where the self assumes control over cravings and desires. These latter are not to be destroyed but transformed. The kind of life one leads has an importance both for oneself and the world. This world is our home and our lives are dedicated to action. We are not strangers in the world required to develop indifference to it. Each individual appears to be isolated but we soon realise that there is a living substance from which all emerge. We are called upon to act in a disinterested way, free from egotism. We should not become victims of material interests and vulgar appetites. We should not be preoccupied with our own salvation. The soul is bound so long as it has a sense of mineness; with the absence of the sense of mineness it is liberated.2 If God is to live in us pride must die in us. For the cultivation of detach- ment, it is not essential to become a samnyāsin. It is possible to cultivate vairāgya or detachment even as householders.3 1 anityāni sarīrāņi, vibhavo naiva sāsvatah. nityam samnihito mytyuh, kartavyo dharma-samgrahah. Cp. Hitopadesa : grhīta iva keseşu mytyunā dharmam acaret. 2 Paingala U. IV. 20. Two words make for bondage and release: freedom from mineness and mineness. The sense of mineness binds the creature, freedom from mineness produces release. dve pade bandha-mokşābhyām nirmameti mameti ca. mameti badhyate jantuh nirmameti vimucyate. 3 vane'pi doşāh prabhavanti rāgiņām grheșu pancendriya-nigrahas tapah. akutsite karmani yah pravartate, nivytta-ragasya grham tapovanam. Cp., however, what Krsna says to Uddhava in the 11th skandha of the Bhagavata: 'A spiritual aspirant should not only give up the company of

Introduction I59

There is a popular impression that Hindu ethics requires us to treat the body with contempt. It is well known that the body is regarded as the instrument for righteous living, dharma- sādhanam. We are not called upon to fear bodily desires or hate the body. If we adopt fasting and other physical discipline, it does not mean that the fasts and the physical exercises are ends in themselves. The practitioners of Hatha yoga are not the exponents of the best type of sanctity. The body must be disciplined in order that it may serve the ends of righteousness. We must be ready to cast off unnecessary burdens and travel light. Bodily discipline helps us to see the face of God and hear his voice. It helps us to see the needs of people, and undertake fresh acts of service, visit the sick, care for the poor and put an end to injustice wherever we see it.

Ethical Rules The different virtues of fortitude, justice, love, compassion, self-control are not separate qualities but are the different facets of the personality. Inward awareness, satya, and life of compassion, ahimsã, are the two principal sides of a spiritual life. We must be truthful in our words and deeds. To know the truth we are taken out of the world but only temporarily. We are again brought back to it. The Divine is expressed in nature as an impersonal, non-ethical creative power and as ethical conscious- ness in human life. When we realise that the Divine is expressed in us as in others we feel the obligation to help others. Thereby the individual spirit becomes enriched. Ahimsa is reverence for all life, active devotion to and a sense of union with all that exists. There is no infinite being except being in its infinite manifestations. If we believe in God, we will adopt the principle of ahimsa. The Quran says: 'The servants of the merciful are those who meekly walk upon this earth and if the fools speak to them, they say "peace".'1 Again 'If you forgive and practise forbearance and pardon, verily Allah is also forgiving and merciful.'2 The women but even the company of householders and sit in solitude, free from danger and meditate on me.' strīņām tat-sanginām sangam tyaktvā dūrata ātmavān

1 XXV. 64. kşemamı vivikta āsīnas cintayen mām atandritah. 2 LXIV. 14.

I60 The Brahma Sūtra individual is required to treat humanity as his kindred. We must cultivate in our hearts the sentiments of affection and trustfulness. Compassion is the one good that is never exhausted even if the whole world is pursuing it. The M.B. says that 'nothing is wholly good and nothing is wholly bad. The two, good and evil, pervade the world through- out'.1 We must be careful before we judge others. The posses- sions we have are a trust for others. The Bhāgavata gives the proper attitude to wealth: 'Living beings have a right only up to what is necessary for satisfying their hunger; he who thinks of acquiring more is a thief and deserves punishment."2 This is the basic principle of a socialist order of society. The Creative God is the source of all beings. He is infinite and unfathomable yet we can enter into spiritual relations with him by devoting ourselves to all living beings within the range of our help. In the Rāmāyaņa, Rāma asks Laksmana 'How shall we seek to please the Divine, who is not within our reach, when we neglect father, mother and teacher who are with us?'3 When we pierce through the confusions of the world to the strength and certainty of its basis we accept every man as brother and show sympathy, understanding and patience in our dealings with others. When ahimsa is said to be the supreme moral law, it is not merely negative abstention from injury to living beings, but positive love for them all. Sympathy and compassion are its expressions. Charity with kind words, knowledge without pride, 1 nātyantam guņavat kiñcit nātyantam doșavat tathā. ubhābhyām guņa-doşābhyām vyāptam hi sakalam jagat. 2 yāvat bhriyeta jatharam tāvat svatvam hi dehinām adhikam yo'bhimanyeta sa steno dandam arhati. Cp. Bhartrhari: dānam bhogo nāsas tiśro gatayo bhavanti vittasya yan na dadāti na bhunkte tasya tṛtīyā gatir bhavati. Cp. a saying attributed to Muhammad: 'He is not of us who sleeps with his stomach full while his neighbour is hungry.' The prophet Malachi asks: Have we not all one Father? Hath not one God created us? Why do we deal treacherously Every man against his brother? ii. I0. 3 svādhīnam samatikramya mātaram pitaram gurum asvādhīnamı katham daivam prakārair abhirādhyate. II. 30. 33.

Introduction I6I

courage with forbearance and wealth with renunciation, these four are difficult to attain, but they make for man's progress.1

Social Institutions Whereas the utterances of the founders of religions have a claim on our allegience this is not true of the institutions built round them. These must be flexible enough to be altered to suit progress in human thought. It is said that many pernicious customs pass for religious duties under the influence of ignorant persons of bad character.2 They are generally adopted out of greed,3 more often out of inertia. The main obstacle to social progress in India is conformity. We wish to belong and not be isolated or lonely. Unless we belong to a social whole we feel that we are powerless, insigni- ficant. So we adhere to absurd and degrading customs, because they relate us to others. Whereas the principal demands of truth and love, satya and ahimsā, are absolute, their application depends on the concrete situation. Changes of place, time and circumstance cause changes in dharma also. There is one law for men in time of peace and another in time of distress. There is no single law for all time. So dharma is known to depend on circumstances. No law has been found which is of help to all. Therefore it is changed for one that seems better and it is again found harmful demanding change. Therefore we see non-unity among customs at all times.4

1 dānam priya-vāk-sahitam, jnānam agarvam, kşamānvitam sauryam, vittam tyaga-sametam, durlabham etac catur-bhadram. There is a Christian hymn written by Henry Wotton which ends with the lines: This man is freed from servile bonds Of hope to rise, or fear to fall; Lord of himself, though not of lands And having nothing, yet hath all. 2 murkha-duhsīla-purusa-pravartitah. Medhatithi on Manu. 3 lobhān mantra-tantrādișu pravartate. Ibid. 4 deśa-kāla-nimittānām bhedair dharmo vibhidyate anyah dharmah samasthasya vişamasthasya ca aparah na hy eva aikantiko dharmah, dharmo hi avasthikah smytah na hi sarva-hitah kaścid ācārah sampravartate tasmād anyah prabhavati, sah aparam bādhate punah ācārāņām anaikāgryam tasmāt sarvatra lakşaye. M.B. Śāntiparva. F

I62 The Brahma Sütra

The Caste System The vocation of a person is that which manifests his inner nature. It must accord with his temperament.1 In its origin the caste system represented the division of men into classes according to their capacity and function, guna and karma.2 Later it became mixed up with heredity. The M.B. says: 'Austerity, learning, birth, these make the Brahmana; he who lacks austerity and learning is a Brahmana by birth alone.'3 Some of the great leaders of Indian civilisation were of mixed origin. Krsņa Dvaipāyana Vyāsa was the son of a Brāhmana father and a non-Aryan mother. Krsna Vāsudeva Vārșneya was the son of a kşatriya prince, Vasudeva, and a non-Aryan princess, Devakī, the sister of Kamsa. The system of caste whatever its historical significance has no contemporary value. Today it injures the spirit of humanity and violates human dignity. To offer a cup of water is a sign of friendship, not of defilement. "I consider to be a Brahmana that Sudra who is ever endowed with self-restraint, truthfulness and righteousness. A man becomes a Brahmana by his conduct."4 If these characteristics be found in a Sudra and if they be not found in a Brahmana, then such a Sūdra is not a Sūdra and such a Brāhmaņa is not a Brāhmana.'5 There is a story that when S., in spite of his non-dualism, asked an outcaste to clear the way for him, the outcaste who was God 1 varanīyāh svabhāva-guņa-karmānusāreņa varītum yogyāh varņāh-Nirukta. 2 ekavarnam idam pūrvam visvam āsīd yadhișthira karma-kriya-bhedena catur-varnyam pratisthitam. According to the Hebrew Scriptures, Adam, the parent of all mankind, has nothing to do with race, nationality or religion. He is just a human being. 3 tapah śrutam ca yonis cety etad brāhmana-karakam tapah śrutibhyām yo hīno jāti-brāhmaņa eva saḥ. Cp. Manu : One is born as a Sudra, but through the (performance of) rites he becomes a twice-born. By the study of the Vedas he becomes a vipra but by the knowledge of Brahman he becomes a Brāhmana. janmanā jāyate sūdrah samskārāt dvija ucyate vedābhyāsāt bhavet vipro brahma jānāti brāhmaņah. 4 yas tu sudro dame satye dharme ca satatotthitah tam brahmanam aham manye vrttena hi bhaved dvijah. 5 sūdre caitad bhavel laksyam dvije caitan na vidyate M.B. Aranya parva 206. 12. na vai sudro bhavec chūdro brahmano na ca brahmanah. M.B. Śānti parva 182. 8.

Introduction 163 himself asked: 'Do you wish my body to leave your body or my spirit to leave your spirit?'1 If democracy is to be seriously implemented, then caste and untouchability should go.

Women and Family Life We are not called upon to suppress human desires, reject human pleasures, renounce the world and all its ways and thus freeze the human spirit. The state of the householder is an exalted one. From early times, marriage has been treated as a sacrament and its purpose has been the production of offspring, especially a son. In the Aitareya Brahmana, we read: 'Of what good is dirt, the deer-skin, the unshaven hair, austerities, of what [good are they]? O Brāhmana, desire a son. He verily is the blameless source of enjoyment.' Manu says: 'One should direct one's mind to renunciation after discharging the three debts. He who, without discharging [them], practises renunciation goes below.'3 In some periods of our history, women were not treated with fairness and dignity. The dominant ideal, however, has been one of perfect equality. When Janaka gives Sītā to Rāma, he asks him to treat her as his companion in all duties.4 It would be wrong to hold that Madhva denied moksa or final release to women, Śdras and fallen Brāhmaņas and non- Hindus. He denied to them one particular method of attaining

1 anna-mayād anna-mayam athavā caitanyam eva caitanyāt dvija-vara dūrī-kartum vanchasi kim brūhi gaccha gaccheti. 2 kim tu malam, kim ajinam, kimu śmaśrūņi, kim tapah, putram brāhmaņa icchadhvam sa vai loko'vadāvadah. Professor Berniedale Keith gives the following E.T. What is the use of dirt, what of the goat-skin. What of long hair, what of fervour? Seek a son, O Brähmin This is the world's advice. XXXII. 1. 70. Harvard Oriental Series. Vol. 25, p. 300. Thomas Aquinas in a passage in his Summa Contra Gentiles (III. 136) writes: 'Certain men of distorted mind have spoken against the good of sexual moderation .... For the union of man and woman is ordained for the good of the species. But this is more divine than the good of the individual .... To this may be added the Lord's commandment to our first parents: "Be fruitful and multiply and fill the earth".' 3 VI. 5. 4 iyam sītā mama sutā saha-dharma-carī tava pratīccha cainām bhadram te pāņim grhīşva pāņinām.

I64 The Brahma Sūtra release.1 Other ways were prescribed for them which will lead to the same goal of final release. This exclusion, whatever justification it may have had at the time the commentaries were written, has no excuse today. In the Vedas we find reference to women seers who are brahma-vādinīs. They, of course, had a right to brahma- knowledge, brahma-vidyādhikāra. Brahma-carya, or chastity of body and mind, is insisted on. It is said in the Brahma Purana that a woman who is addressed as mother in speech should be truly looked upon as mother. Dharma is a witness to this as also the wise.2 Samnyāsa-sometimes renunciation of the world is exalted.3 What is meant is the spirit of renunciation. Samnyāsa is sometimes prescribed as a preparation for service. There are some who take to samnyäsa when they feel lonely, inadequate and incomplete and in their shock of loneliness and isolation wish to turn back on the world. That, however, is not the proper spirit. We cannot grow as individuals apart from one another. The order of the samnyasins presents itself to the modern world as a scandal. There was a time when it was taken for granted. People's lives were directed beyond the quest of wealth and pleasure, artha and kama, and devoted to an invisible God. The true samnyasins realise human unity and brotherhood in their souls. Even a parivrājaka who abandons the world absolutely has to sustain his life and do the duties that are 1 vaidika-brahma-vidyādhikāra. Cp. kirāta-hūņāndhra-pulinda pukkasā abhīra kankā yavanāh sakādayah ye'nye ca pāpā yad-upāsrayāh sudyanti tasmai prabhavisnave namah. Again: strī-sūdra-brahma-bandhūnām trayī na sruti-gocarā Bhāgavata II. 4. 18. itibhāratam ākhyānam krpayā muninā krtam. Baladeva, commenting on Jiva-Gosvamin's sat-sandarbha refers to Madhva's Ibid. I. 4. 24. doctrine and says that according to it only Brahmanas were eligible for moksa, bhaktānām viprānām eva mokşah, lakşmyā jīva-koțitvam ity evam mata-viseşa !. This does not seem to be correct. Madhva confined the pursuit of Vedic knowledge to the three upper classes. 2 mātar-ity eva sabdena yām ca sambhāșate narah sā mātru-tulyā satyena dharma-sākșī satām api. 3 Brhad-dharma-purāna says: X. 50.

muhūrtam api samnyasya labhate paramām gatim na samnyāsāt paro dharmo vartate mukti-kāranam.

Introduction I65 allotted to him.1 The samnyäsins work in the world so long as their fellow-men are insensitive and irresponsible and so are unfree. In a sense until all men become free no one is absolutely free.

Beyond Ethics When one attains the spiritual level, he rises above the ethical, not that he repudiates it but he transcends it. Ś. says 'this is indeed an ornament to us that, when there is the realisation of Brahman, there is the destruction of all obligations and the accomplishment of everything that is to be accom- plished'.2 When we undergo the ethical discipline, there is a change in the inward man which makes us practise good in an effortless, spontaneous way. Freedom from obligation is only for those who have cast off their self-sense. 'I do nothing of myself. The Father that dwelleth in me, he doeth the works.'3 'If ye be led of the Spirit, ye are not under the law.'4 Whoever is born of God cannot sin. When Jesus tells us that our righteousness should be different from that of the Scribes and the Pharisees, he points out that our conduct should be not one of mere conformity to duty with an effort.6 We must cease to be men of external piety and become men of inner understanding. Then we break the inertia of habit. We become different and act not from expectation of reward or fear of consequences but because the act is good in itself. Jesus says of John the Baptist that he is the highest man born of woman but the least in the Kingdom of Heaven is greater than he.7 John stands for salvation through moral life. He tells us what to do but we 1 Cf. Bhāskara: parivrājakasyāpi saucamāna-snāna-bhikşāļanādi karma Rayikamı vācikam mānasam tacca aparihāryam dhriyamāņa-sarīrasya. III. 4. 20. 2 alankāro hy ayam asmākam, yad brahmātmāvagatau satyām sarva-kartavyatā- hanih kyta-krtyata ceti. S.B. I. I. 4. See S.B.G. XV. 20. 3 John viii. 28; xiv. 10. St Francois De Sales says: 'Tell me, I pray you, Theotimus, if a drop of water, thrown into an ocean of some priceless essence, were alive and could speak and declare its condition, would it not cry out with great joy: "O mortals Ilive indeed but I live not myself, but this ocean lives in me and my life is hidden in this abyss".' 1 Galatians v. 18. 7 Matthew iii. 2; Luke iii. 10-14. 5 I John iii. 9. 6 Matthew v. 20.

I66 The Brahma Sūtra cannot gain release unless we change our nature, become different, are inwardly transformed. John asks us to become better men and Jesus asks us to become new men. There is a stage in which we accept the world, another in which we reject it, a third in which we accept it, gratefully acknowledging its place in the divine scheme. Those who have full mastery over their natures sometimes do things which may appear wrong to the conventional people. John the Baptist was uneasy when he heard that Jesus and his disciples ate and drank and did not fast. They plucked the ears of corn on the Sabbath day. The Bhāgavata says: 'Iśvaras or masters are sometimes seen to transgress rules of conduct with courage. These are not faults among those with tejas or radiance, even as the all-devouring fire is not affected [by the impurities it consumes].1 He who is lacking in such control [anīśvarāh] should not even think of imitating such conduct for it can only bring destruction to him even like swallowing poison in imitation of Siva.' Fire may consume a forest or Siva drink poison without any harmful consequences. But ordinary men cannot transgress rules until they have shaken off all selfishness and established control over their nature. It is easier to fight non-human nature, forests and woods and wild beasts. It is more difficult to fight the passions, the sub- rational elements in human nature. This is a more arduous struggle. We cannot extinguish selfish desire by the mere force of intellect. We have to develop the power of will.2 The different elements in human nature are divided in a disintegrated man but in an integrated life they are held in harmony. An integrated personality is incapable of doing anything wrong. The ethical man, the economic man and the artistic man are all abstractions obtained by our intellect from the concrete unity of our being. These values are complementary. A great artist may be a great moral force. An ideal personality would be all these, a man of wisdom and holiness, sanity and sanctity. 1 tejīyasām na doșāya vahneņ sarva-bhujo yathā. Bhāgavata X. 33. 30. 2 Agastya Samhitā says: tapo dadāti saubhāgyam tapo vidyām prayacchati tapasā durlabham kiñcin nāsti bhāminī dehinām. Tapas gives us welfare, it helps us to attain knowledge. There is nothing, O Parvati, that tapas cannot give men.

Introduction I67

B. THE WAY OF BHAKTI OR DEVOTION1

Need for Religious Devotion It is often said that man is incurably religious. He must have some object or person or cause on which to fix his devotion. The instinct, if we may call it by that name, may become perverted and abused but the need is there. It must be turned to an ideal which is genuine, grounded in truth, an ideal that touches the deepest springs of man's inner life. What a man believes has a determining influence on his character. There are some thinkers both in the East and the West who feel that man's capacity for integration, for the growth of the individual into a person would be unintelligible unless we have a Divine Personality. McTaggart's notion of a community of personalities living in a kind of spiritual void is not tenable, for the direct apprehension of value which transforms the individual into a person implies an ideal personality who embodies the value apprehended. It is possible for atheists and agnostics to lead virtuous lives. They may be unaware or unmindful of the divine source of all. Existentialists of the school of Sartre struggle to seek some meaning for human life in a godless universe. If we grant that the world has meaning, it means that it has a purpose. The reality of God does not, however, depend on our views. Our irreligion does not entail the suspension of divine acting.2

Bhakti Bhakti is conscious recognition of and wholehearted response to the source of all goodness, the Divine. It is said 'in this world, not vows, not pilgrimages, not yoga practices, not study of Scriptures, not sacrificial rites, not philosophical discourses; only devotion can give us freedom'.3 1 See B.G., pp. 58-66. 2 Cp. St. Augustine: 'Thou hast always been with me but I have not always been with myself.' 3 alam kalau vrataih tīrthaih yogaih sāstraih alam makhaih alam jñāna-kathālāpaih bhaktir ekaiva muktidā. Bhāgavata-Māhātmya. [Continued on page 168

I68 The Brahma Sūtra The Bhāgavata Purāna is treated as the standard work on bhakti. 'It is the quintessence of the Vedanta philosophy. He who has tasted its nectar-like juice will not be attracted by anything else.'1 As we have seen, while God is transcendently infinite he is also greatly loving. He takes up human creatures into his range of action if they respond to his call. 'Behold, I stand at the gate and knock. If any man shall hear my voice and open to me the door, I will come in to him, and will sup with him and he with me.' God is the reward of those who wait on him. He helps his devotees to act in this world as partners in his divine work. Our one prayer is that God should increase in us true religion. Sāndilya Sūtra says bhakti is the highest attachment to God, parānurakti. In the Vișņu Purana Prahlada expresses the wish that he may have that attachment to God that is experienced with regard to sense-objects.2 One must find one's supreme pleasure in God. Love of man and woman is used to illustrate love of man for God. 'As maid delights in youth and youth in maid, so may my mind rejoice in Thee.'3 'When the lovers are together, they are afraid of being separated; when they are not together, they have a painful desire for union.'4 Continued from page 167] Cp. Manu: tapah pūrvam krta-yuge tretāyam yajnam eva ca dvāpare dānam ity āhuh kalau bhaktir garīyasī. See Vişņu Purāņa VI. 2. 17. A well-known Sanskrit verse reads: minah snāna-parah phaņī pavana-bhuk meşas tu parnāsanah nīrasī khalu pavakah prati-dinam sete bile mūşikah bhasmoddhūlatatparopi ca kharah dhyānena yukto bakah ity evam nahi yānti mokşa-padavīm śri-krşna-bhaktim vinā. 1 sarva-vedānta-sāram hi srī-bhāgavatam ișyate tad-rasāmyta-trptasya nānyatra syad ratih kvacit. XII. 13. 15. 2 yā prītir avivekānām vişayesv anapāyinī tvam anu-smaratah sā me hydayān māpasarpatu. 3 yuvatīnām yathā yūni yūnām ca yuvatau yathā I. 20. 19: see also B.G. X. 9. manah abhiramate tadvat manah me ramatām tvayi. 4 Cp. Bhakti-mārtaņda by Gopeśvara: adrsļe darșanotkanthā drste visleșa-bhīrutā nādrstena na drstena bhavatā labhyate sukham.

Introduction I69

The clean of heart shall see God. If we sin against the light we will be left in darkness. Devotion implies obedience to the will of the Supreme in all our activities. It brings deliverance from anxiety about the necessities of life. There is a popular verse which says: 'In vain does the devotee worry about food and other necessities of life. Can God who sustains the whole creation ever forget his own devotees?'1 A devotee is not elated by praise or depressed by censure. In the name of God he does service to the world.2

Bhakti and Knowledge Bhakti opens the way to illumination. R. regards bhakti as a kind of knowledge. Narada Bhakti Sūtra says: 'When adored with love God speedily manifests himself and gives his devotees perception.'3

Praise of the Devotee The devotee is praised as the highest of all. 'What speciality is there in being born a member of the highest class? What does it matter even if one possesses learning that includes enquiry into all the systems of thought? In all the three worlds who is there more blessed than the person whose heart is always steeped in devotion to the Supreme Lord?'4 The Bhāgavata Purāna says: 'The devotees are my heart and I am the heart of the devotees. They know no one else than me; I know no one else than them.'5

1 bhojanācchādane cintām: vrdhā kurvanti vaișņavāh yo'sau visvam-bharo devah sa kim dāsānupekșate. Cp. sarvadā sarva-kāleşu nāsti teşām amangalam yeşamı hydistho bhagavān mangalāyatanam harih. 2 dāsyam aiśvarya-vādena jñātīnām tu karomy aham. M.B. 3 sa kīrtyamānah šīghram evāvirbhavati anubhāvayati ca bhaktān 80. 4 kim janmanā sakala-varņajanottamena? kim vidyayā sakala-śāstra-vicāravatyā? yasyāsti cetasi sadā parameša-bhaktiķ ko'nyas tatas tri-bhuvane puruso'sti dhanyah. Brahma-samhitā. 5 sādhavo hydayam mahyam sādhūnām hydayam tvaham mad-anyat te na jānanti nāham tebhyo manāgapi. IX. 4. 8. F*

I70 The Brahma Sūtra

Liberty of Worship From early days Hindu tradition has held that truth is a path- less land and cannot be organised. When organised it cripples the individual mind and prevents it from growing. When our minds get incarcerated within the narrow confines of dogma, the spirit of free adventure is checked. Devotion to the Supreme opens our hearts to the new life. Spiritual life is the end. That is why the Hindu permits each individual to worship the aspect of Godhead which appeals to him most. The radiance of reality is mirrored variously according to the mediums in which it is reflected.1 The different aspects we adore are pointers, not halting places. Whatever name we may give to the Supreme, it is addressed to the Ultimate Reality. 'I do not mind who he is, Visnu or Siva, Brahma or Indra, the Sun or the Moon, the blessed Buddha or any saint. Whoever he be, that one who is free from the disease of being poisoned by craving and hatred, who is endowed with all noble qualities and is ever ready to act com- passionately towards all creatures, to him I bow down always.'2 Ś., the great teacher of non-dualism, manifests a spirit of devotion to the different aspects of the Godhead. There are devotional hymns ascribed to him to Bhavānī,3 to Vişņu,4 to Siva.5 Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, a great teacher of Advaita, says: 'I know not what truth there is beyond Krsna.'6 The Maharastrian saint-poet Eknath identifies Vithoba of Pandharpur with the Buddha. 1 Lessing in his letter to Rimarius says: 'Each one says what he thinks is the truth, but the truth is with God alone.' 2 vişnur-vā, tripurāntako bhavatu vā, brahma, surendro'thavā bhānur-vā, sasa-lakșaņo'tha bhagavān buddho'tha siddho'thavā rāga-dveşa-vişārti-moha-rahitaḥ sattvānukampodyato yah sarvaih saha samıskyto guņa-ganais tasmai namah sarvadā. 3 gatis tvam gatis tvam tvam eka bhavāni. avinayam apanaya vişno damaya manah samaya vişaya-mrga-trşnam. 5 samsāra-duhkha-gahanāj jagadīša rakșa. 6 vamsi-vibhūşita-karāt nava-nīradābhāt pītāmbarād aruna-bimba-phalādharoșthāt pūrnendu-sundara-mukhad aravinda-netrat krşnat param kim api tattvam aham na jane. Cp. also his verse where he realises the Absolute Brahman in the blue effulgence that sports on the banks of the Yamuna: dhyānāvasthita tad-gatena manasā yan nirguņamı nişkriyam jyotiḥ kiñcana yogino yadi param paśyanti pasyantu te asmākan tu tad eva locana-camatkārāya bhūyāc ciram kālindī-pulinodare kim api yan nīlam maho dhāvati.

Introduction I7I

Mystics of other religions and some leading thinkers tend to adopt an attitude of respect for other forms of worship than their own. The Word came and dwelt among us, not for the first and last time at Bethlehem but from the moment man was born into the world in the likeness of the divine image and as such distinct from other creatures. As Eternal Wisdom it was and is before all creation in its pure creativeness. For many Christian mystics, Christ is not limited to the historic personality of Jesus. He is the eternal Logos who comes to birth in men whenever they are inwardly united with God. Justin Martyr in his Apologia and Dialogue with Trypho presents God as the Primordial Cause of the world, eternal, unchangeable and accessible to reason. Before all creation, from the indefinable Father and Lord of the universe a force emanated called Logos which means Word and Reason. This Logos is the Son generated before all creation, the divine wisdom of Proverbs viii. He spoke through the Prophets and manifested his action also outside Israel. To justify universal claims for the Logos, Justin argues that those outside the Biblical tradition who have developed spiritual life like Heracleitus, Socrates and his own contem- porary Musonius all belong to the Christian fold. If they were called atheists and condemned to death, the Christians also suffered the same fate. Justin says: 'Everything good and beautiful taught by thinkers and poets is ours.' For all that is Christian is due to the working of the Logos. Justin presents Christianity as a philosophical religion which uses Greek ideas, especially the Stoic, in a Biblical garb. Both Clement and Origen were Christian thinkers who wished to express Christian truth through Greek philosophical categories. They believe in the Eternal Logos. They speak about the ultimate oneness of God and man. The deepest self of all rational beings is divine. Every individual attains his fulfilment through unification with the Logos. By imitating Christ the Logos, everyone can obtain the same power as the Logos. William Law says that the Christ of God is 'the light and life and holiness of every creature that is holy'.1 He argues: 'Hence it was that so many eminent spirits, partakers of a divine life 1 The Spirit of Love.

I72 The Brahma Sūtra have appeared in so many parts of the heathen world .... These were the apostles of a Christ within.'1 'As many as are led by the Spirit of God, these are the sons of God.' Man in his deepest being is one with God. The goal of life is to enter into the realisation of this hidden unity. Boehme asks 'were we not in the beginning made out of God's substance? Why should we not also abide therein?'2 William Penn said: 'It is better to be of no Church than to be bitter for any.'3 Kabir says that he is 'a child of Allah and Ram'. He did not find it necessary to identify himself with any religious faith but was devoted to spiritual realisation. Religious intolerance does not make for world unity. Religions which aim at the conversion of the whole world to their own doctrines aim at the religion of power which amounts to sacred egoism, to spiritual pride. Reason should teach us to doubt our own infallibility. Unless we do it there is no chance for toleration in the world. If we are convinced of the absolute truth of our revelation and the falsity of others, how can we tolerate those who spread error and lead others astray? It is essential for us to note that while we are convinced of the infallibility of the truth we adopt, others may be equally convinced of the infallibility of their own doctrines. From ancient times, Hinduism adopted a view which would not hurt the religious susceptibilities of others. It enabled the Hindus to welcome the Jews, the Christians, the Parsees and the Muslims.4 1 The Spirit of Prayer. e Of the Super-sensual Life. 3 Even Karl Barth admits that 'our concepts are not adequate to grasp the treasure of our experience'. Karl Jaspers says: 'Theology turns the alternative "God or Nothing" into a very different one: "Christ or Nothing" with Christ promptly made synonymous with the doctrine of some Church, and obedience to God equally obedience to that Church and its dogmas.' Existentialism and Humanism, E.T. (1952), p. 94. A. N. Whitehead observes: 'It would be impossible to imagine anything more unchristian than Christian theology. Christ probably would not have under- stood it,' quoted by H. E. Fosdick in his The Living of These Days (1956), p. 268. M. Loisy thinks that St Paul was chiefly responsible for imposing an alien mythology on the life and teaching of Jesus. There is a gap between Jesus of the Gospels and the redeemer of St Paul. 4 'The result of the honourable place given by the rajas to the Christians, and of their assimilation in social custom to their Hindu neighbours, was that they were accepted as a caste, and often thought of their community in this way. They ranked after the Brahmanas and as equals of the Nayars. Many Christians would claim that there was Brahmana convert blood in the community and that for this reason they were superior to Nayars. 'It was in consequence of this position that the St Thomas Christians, so far

Introduction I73 The Hindu believes that, varied as all these religions are, behind them all is the same fire. The experience of the fire, though it speaks with many tongues, carries the same message. They all speak of the one realm of spiritual being. Of course, there are characteristic differences among the great religions. They do not all teach the same doctrines of God or of man or of the world or provide the same kind of ritual, myth or norm of behaviour. But these differences are not enough to justify discord and strife. There may be mutual education among religions if they peacefully coexist and there is no doubt that all the religions have helped to produce saints of an exalted : character. We should be lacking in charity, even piety, if we denied the high character of sanctity in other religions than our own.1 Many of the living faiths are passing through self- criticism, are getting infected with secularism and humanism and the loss of the vision of God. Many of the leaders regard themselves as the priests of a new religion. We need not a new religion but a creative vitality in the practice of the old, the recognition that the Kingdom of Heaven lies within man, in his depths, in his integrity, in his inmost truth. God is the potentiality of every man.

Image Worship There is such a thing as pratīkopāsana or symbol worship. This is an aid to worship.2 The symbolic is not the imaginary. as our evidence goes, never attempted to bring their non-Christian neighbours to a knowledge of Christ and so into the Christian Church. The Portuguese Archbishop Menezes did his best to create a sense of evangelistic responsi- bility among the Indian Christians by preaching to the Hindus whenever he could, and the eighteenth-century Carmelites had a number of baptisms from the heathen every year, so much so that they had to defend their action before the Raja of Travancore, but the Indian Church itself was not aroused to share this work. 'A further consequence of acceptance as a caste was that untouchability was observed by Christians as by Hindus.' L. W. Brown: The Indian Christians of St Thomas (1956), p. 173. 1 'Those who bow to all the gods, who listen to the doctrine of all the religions, who have faith and who are possessed of tranquil minds, get over all difficulties.' sarvān devān namasyanti sarva-dharmāms ca śrnvate ye śraddhadhānāh santās' ca durgany ati-taranti te. M.B. Śānti Parva CX. 18. 2 Cp. ajñānām bhāvanārthāya pratimāh parikalpitāh.

I74 The Brahma Sūtra Slowly we get beyond the symbol to the object symbolised. Until we reach the Highest, we gain rewards great or small, according to our aims and objects.1 Ś. observes that on account of our imperfections we connect the Omnipresent Lord with limited abodes.2 'Image worship is the first, doing japa and chanting mantras is the middle; meditation or mental worship is superior; reflection on one's own true nature is the highest of all.'3 Image worship is a means to realisation. When we gain our ends, the means fall away. Lamps are useful so long as we live in darkness, but when the sun arises they cease to be of any help. Kabīr sings: 'There is nothing but water at the holy bathing places; and I know that they are useless, for I have bathed in them. The images are all lifeless, they cannot speak; I know for I have cried aloud to them. The Purana and the Quran are mere words; lifting up the curtain, I have seen.'4 The Avatāras The theory of avataras assumes divine concern for human endeavour. God is the light in the soul; our part is to open our being to the Divine Light which is ever shining in us. When the Light in us comes to possess our being we speak of the birth of God in us. The Incarnation is not a special event but a continuous process of self-renewal.5 1 tam yathā yathopāsate tathā tathā phalam bhavati. See also B.G. IV. I1. 2 Ś.B. I. I. 24. 3 prathamā pratimā-pūjā japah stotrāņi madhyamā uttamā mānasī pūjā so'ham pūjā uttamottamā. Even in Advaita Vedanta it is accepted as a preparation for pure contem- plation. uttamo brahma-sadbhāvo dhyāna-bhāvas tu madhyamah stutir japo adhamo bhāvo bahih-pūjā adhamādhamā. Mahā-nirvāņa Tantra XIV. 112. To remain merged in Brahman is the highest, meditation is the middle way; prayer to God and repetition of his name are the lowest and external worship is lower than the lowest. Tantra-sara says: prathamā pratimā-pūjā japa-stotrādi madhyamā uttamā mānasī-pūjā so'ham pūjo'tamo ttamā. First comes image worship; the middle way is repetition of the name and prayer; good is mental worship; realisation that I am he is the best. 4 Rabindranath Tagore's E.T. 5 William Law says that the desire for God 'will lead thee to the birth of Jesus, not in a stable at Bethlehem in Judaea, but to the birth of Jesus in the dark centre of thy own fallen soul'. The Spirit of Prayer.

Introduction I75 The avataras are born not only to put down evil but to teach us mortals. Great souls appear for the well-being and spiritual enlightenment of creatures.1 They tell us how to remould our lives so as to serve the purpose of the Divine.2 Deification is the transfusion of human nature by the Indwelling Spirit of the Divine. Rāma says: 'I look upon myself as a man, Rāma, the son of Daśaratha. May the Lord [Brahmā] tell me who I am, where I belong and whence I come.'3 Krsna by the repeated practice of meditation, by uninterrupted concentration for a long period, attaining through intuition of Brahman lordship similar to his over the world is seen to reveal that to Arjuna in the Gita.4 The devotee is slowly transformed into the likeness of the Divine. He becomes what he is called to be. He realises the meaning of his existence. It is said that devotion to the Supreme, experience of the Highest and detachment from other things, all these three occur at the same time.5

C. THE WAY OF DHYĀNA OR MEDITATION

Yoga System If we study the history of religions we will note that there is a broad stream of spiritual knowledge which requires us to grow to a higher level of being. It refers to an inner quickening and growth in our nature.6 The All-pervading Self abides in every heart. Those who turn from him, seeking outside, are inferior 1 bhūtānām kşemāya ca bhavāya ca. Bhāgavata I. I. 13. 2 Jung in his Psychology and Alchemy says: 'The call for the Imitatio Christi ought to aim at developing and raising one's own inner man, but it is made by superficial believers ... into an external object of worship, which, precisely through the veneration of its object, prevents the soul from being affected in its depths and transformed into a whole.' 3 atmānam mānuşam manye rāmam dasarathātmajam yo'ham yasya yatas cāham bhagavāms tad bravītu me. 4 ata eva bhagavatah kṛsņasyopāsanā-karmany-abhyāsāt cira-nirantaraikāgryāt VI. 120. II-12.

brahma-sākşātkāreņa tadvat jagad-aisvarya-prāptyām arjunāya tat-prakāsanam gītāsu dysyate. Appaya Dīkeșita: Šivādvaita-nirņaya. 5 bhaktih paresānubhavah viraktiļ anyatra ca, eşa trikah, eka-kālah. Bhāgavata. G Why Mullah, must you ascend the minaret? God is not deaf, he hears thee here; For His sake do you call to prayer Look for Him in thy heart, so says Kabīr.

I76 The Brahma Sūtra creatures.1 'God is neither in temple nor in mosque', says Kabir. He would add today: 'neither in Church nor in synagogue'. He is found in the heart of man. God is not doomed to be perpetually overwhelmed by an uncomprehending darkness. Nānak says that we should ascend to the satya-loka, the kingdom of truth, the abode of eternal life. 'Lead us from darkness into light' is the prayer of the Upanişads. We must be awakened out of the sleep of the natural world-view. We must break through the surface in which we live and move. Imprisoned in history we become . restricted to the narrow limits of existence. We must be lifted out of this confinement and become aware of our historicity. We must grasp the real which is before all phenomena, before all time and which is equally after all phenomena and all time. Yet it is neither before nor after. It is that which does not become, that which is, real, unhistorical being itself. We cannot think it, enclose it within categories, images and verbal structures. But we know more than we can think and express in historical forms. By discipline of mind we should strive to apprehend the Real. 'True knowledge which is produced by the means of true knowledge and is comparable to its object can neither be brought about by hundreds of injunctions nor be checked by hundreds of prohibitions. For it does not depend on the will of man, but merely on what really and unalterably exists."2 A rigorous discipline of mind, heart and will is necessary. Our vision becomes obscure if it is dimmed by vice or weakness. The M.B. says the Supreme is visible only to those who have overcome anger and mastered their senses.3 To use Plato's words, we should not be bound to the shadows of the cave but get to see the reality. For this an illuminating revelation, a saving transformation is necessary; an opening of the eyes is essential. We cannot get this experience by detached 1 sarvasyaiva janasyāsya visnuh abhyantare sthitah tam parityajya te yānti bahir vişņum narādhamāh. St Augustine says: 'Why do we go forth and run to the heights of the heavens and the lowest parts of the earth, seeking Him who is within us, if we wish to be with Him?' 2 Ś.B. III. 2. 21. 3 svargam dvaram susūksmam tam tu pasyanti puruşā jitakrodhāļ jitendriyāh. XIV. 27. 84-5.

Introduction observation, logical analysis and inference.1 We must encounter I77

truth as a matter of existential concern, participate in the Ultimate Mystery. It is not an intellectual state but a state of being when we are filled with the Spiritual Presence. As the Upanisads declare the state can be gained by śravana, hearing, manana, reflection, and nididhyāsana or concentration.2 Dhyāna is anavaratānusandhāna, constant meditation. To learn concentration one should learn to be alone with oneself, without reading or listening to the radio or other pre-occupation. It is to be able to be alone with oneself. It is in moments of meditation that we become self-aware. We do not lose the sense of the eternal in the inevitable distractions of life. We acquire a trust in the foundations of things, a trust that sustains us in the most terrible catastrophes, a firm loyalty to truth in the midst of passions and lures. The Yoga system describes the processes by which our consciousness grows into the life divine by the control of the thinking mind. The cultivation of states of mind and body which permits the full realisation of the ultimate truth requires disciplined effort. The Yoga Sutra says 'that [discipline of mental functioning] practised for long, unintermittently and with satkāras [i.e. self-control, austerity, faith, ceremonial piety] is the sure means of realising the truth'.3 Boehme in his imaginary dialogue between a disciple and his master in The Signature of All Things makes the disciple ask the master what prevents him from apprehending the ultimate truth and the master answers that it is his 'thinking of Self and his willing of Self'. Our confusion of the real Self with the outward selves prevents our awareness of the true Self. Boehme said that Omar Khayyam in his Treatise on Metaphysic says that the Sufis are 'those who seek knowledge, not by reflection and speculation (like the theologians and philosophers), but by purifying their soul (the passive and static ego), by orrecting their character (the active and dynamic ego), and by freeing the tellect from the obstacles which arise from bodily nature. When this substance is presented, pur principial] fied, before the Divine Glory, then the [intellectual and models of the [mental and manifested] knowledge will surely be revealed in this other world [of transcendent Reality]'. Frithjof Schuon: Spiritual Perspectives and Human Facts, E.T. (1954), p. 73n. 2 āgamenānumānena dhyanābhyāsa-rasena ca tridhā prakalpayan prajnām labhate yogam uttamam. Vişņu Purāņa. 3 sa tu dīrghakāla-nairantarya-satkara-sevito ddha-bhūmiļ. I. 14.

178 The Brahma Sūtra

we could come into a new reality of our being and perceive everything in a new relation 'if we can stand still from self- thinking and self-willing and stop the wheel of imagination and the senses'.1 The aim of Yoga is to help us to discern the being that is at the back of all becoming. It is difficult to reach it, but one should concentrate on that which exists of itself above and continues to be such as it is in itself.

Stages of the Journey The ascent to union with the Supreme is hard and steep. It is a personal adventure. The categories of metaphysics are verified by states of consciousness. The soul must pass through the period of purgation. We must strip away the merely natural life and wake up to the importance of the spiritual life. The stripping process begins with the withdrawal from the bustle of earthly things. We must become free and unattached. God is the soul's guide on the journey with the purgative, the illuminative and the unitive stages. The soul should realise the nothingness of temporal things and learn to understand that the spiritual world alone is real. With the practice of detachment, spiritual freedom occurs. Speculation is vision, an intuitive mode of apprehension. It is not irresponsible meandering of the mind. Yājñavalkya says that samadhi is equanimity.2 We must steady the mind, concentrate on the truth by which one is intellectually con- vinced until it culminates in direct experience. By contemplation on a particular form we become one with it.3 The Gāyatrī mantra, dhiyo yo nah pracodayāt, inspire our understanding, is 1 Karl Barth says: 'Men suffer, because bearing within them an invisible world, they find this unobservable inner world met by the tangible, foreign, other, outer world, desperately visible, dislocated, its fragments jostling one another, yet mightily powerful and strangely menacing and hostile.' Commentary on Romans, p. 306. 2 samādhiḥ samatāvasthā jīvātma-paramātmanoh brahmany avasthitir ya sa samadhih pratyag-ātmanah. 3 mananāt trāyate yastu mantra ity abhidhīyate tasmāt mantreņa tan-mūrtim bhakti-pūrveņa dhīyatām. Tantra-sāra-āgama. Japa is akşaravrttih (Tantra-sāra, p. 68), repetition of letters. It must be repeated according to rules, vidhānena mantroccāraņam. Sabda-kalpa-druma. Patañjali makes out that the repetition of the name should be accompanied by reflection on the meaning, taj-japas tad-artha-bhāvanam. Y.S. I. 28.

Introduction 179

meditated on so that we may see the truth. When the seeker sees the truth he becomes spiritually free. All experience becomes ordered and unified. We do not prove the truth of an idea by merely demonstrating that its author lived centuries ago and was of a saintly disposition. The truth lies in our experience of it when it enters into us. Without the knowledge of one's self, no release is possible even in many ages.1

Solitary Meditation There is an emphasis on a solitary life of meditation in a monastery or a hermitage but this does not mean a turning away from life. B.G.2 speaks to us of the way in which dhyāna yoga should be practised. We do not seek for rewards but aim at transforming our nature. Let a man lift himself by himself.3 Vīramitrodaya-paribhāşā-prakāśa quotes Angirah Smrti to the effect that excepting efforts for attaining self-knowledge, whatever one does out of his own personal desire is like child's play and unnecessary.4 We must get into the house of our innermost self, shut the door on everything outer and pray from that inner self.5 It is said of Muhammad that in his fortieth year he desired solitude. He withdrew to a cave on Mount Hira near Mecca and practised religious austerities. By undergoing the disciplines of karma, bhakti and dhyāna, the mind gets purified and truth dawns and ineffable peace is experienced. Whatever action we perform is illumined by knowledge and dedicated to the glory of God. Samādhi when it is sa-vikalpa is a state of contact with a Personal Being not evident to the senses, a Person discerned as divine. In nir-vikalpa samādhi, the reality is super-personal, the one that changes not, the deepest self in one which is also the

1 ātmaika-bodhena vinā ca muktir na siddhyati brahma-satāntare'pi. 2 VI. 3 uddhared atmanātmānam. VI. 5. 4 svābhiprāya-kytam karma yat-kincij jñāna-varjitam krīdā-karmeva bālānām tat-sarvam niş-prayojanam. 5 'But thou, when thou prayest, enter into thine inner chamber and having shut thy door, pray to thy Father which is in secret and thy Father which seeth in secret shall recompense thee.' Matthew vi. 6.

I80 The Brahma Sūtra Eternal.1 The state is one of unalterable bliss, freedom from self-sense, serenity and transcendent peace. Those who attain samädhi claim that their experience is far richer and deeper than the most intense satisfaction of this world. When Ś. says that no amount of temporal activity can take us to the heart of the Eternal, he is emphasising that the distinction between time and eternity is a qualitative one. Our thought must be lifted to another order of being. Time is everlasting but Reality is eternal. Though we may spend all our life doing good deeds, we do not cross from time to eternity. A glimpse of eternity is different from an endless series of finite things. To know the Self we must leap into another dimension. We are then released from the rules of conventional religion. 'The sun of consciousness shines always in the sky of the heart. There is neither rising nor setting of it. How shall I perform the sandhyā prescribed in the śāstras?'2 Dionysius the Areopagite says: 'The simple, absolute and immutable mysteries of Divine Truth are hidden in the super- luminous darkness of that silence which revealeth in secret. For this darkness, though of deepest obscurity, is yet radiantly clear; and though beyond touch and sight, it more than fills our unseeing minds with splendours of transcendent beauty.' The original meaning of theory is vision. Every philosophy is the exposition and justification of an experience. By means of the three methods of work, devotion and contemplation (which are not exclusive of each other), we are reborn into the world of spirit. Religion by the use of symbols and metaphors indicates to us the goal of our quest. The festival of Easter, for example, was a pagan one marking the awakening of nature to new life. The Christian Easter refers to the resurrection of Jesus. But even for those who are not disposed to accept the historical evidence, it has a meaning that

1 Cp. Schweitzer: Rational thinking which is free from assumptions ends in mysticism .... All profound world-view is mysticism, the essence of which is just this: 'that out of my unsophisticated and naïve existence in the world there comes, as a result of thought about self and the world, spiritual self- devotion to the mysterious infinite will which is continuously manifested in the universe.' The Philosophy of Civilisation, E.T., p. 79. 2 cidādityo hdākāse sadā bhāti nirantaram udayāstamayo nāsti kathamı sandhyām upāsmahe.

Introduction I8I

we can all be made new. We must become what we are. The Festival of Easter is not a commemoration of a past event but the recognition of a present reality. The cosmic process has for its goal the Kingdom of free spirits where the son of man becomes the son of God. The first fruits of the new species of spiritual personality are already manifest on earth in the saints and the sages of the different religions who have risen from the disruption of being to its articulation, integration. In the spirit of the Vedanta, the Buddha speaks of human fulfilment as the transition from ignorance and craving to enlightenment and compassion. The aim of religion is to release us from the tornness of our life. We must grow from the status of the creature, given to inertia, distractedness, corruption, selfishness to integrality with its unswerving devotion. The Jews tell us that sin is the isolation of the selfish individual; it is lovelessness. When we turn away from it, our self-alienation, self-estrangement is gone. 'Return ye and make you a new heart and a new spirit.'1 'Create me a clean heart, O God, and renew a steadfast spirit within me."2 'A new heart will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you.'3 'Turn me, O Lord, that I may turn.'4 Religion is a question of turning and renewal. For the Jews, 'The spirit of man is the candle of the Lord.'5 When the Lord lights the candle, darkness disappears. All the darkness in the world cannot put out the light of the candle. Speaking of the mystery religions of Greece, Aristotle observes 'The initiated do not learn anything so much as feel certain emotions and are put in a certain frame of mind'. To live one must first die to his old life. Orpheus believed that the soul was 'the son of the starry heaven', that its dwelling in a body was a form of original sin, its earthly life was a source of corrup- tion and its natural aim was to transcend this life. Each human being is a reflection of the celestial light and has his roots below. This view is at the heart of Plato's idealism. Plato tells us in his image of the cave in the Republic that we are all prisoners living in shadows. One philosopher shattered his fetters and saw the sun shining of which the fire in the cave was a small reflection. 1 Ezekiel xviii. 30ff. 4 Lamentations v. 21. 3 Psalm li. Io. 3 Esekiel xxxvi. 26. 5 Proverbs xx. 27.

I82 The Brahma Sūtra

After having seen the great light, Plato's philosopher does not remain content with his own revelation. He returns to the cave and tells the prisoners shackled there that what they take for reality is only a shadow cast by the light they do not see. The prisoners, not having seen the light, take the shadows to be the only reality and think that the philosopher is insane. Philosophy, for Plato, is the love of wisdom, the fine flower of serenity. Plotinus says: 'Withdraw into yourself and look, and if you do not find yourself beautiful yet, act as does the creator of a statue that is to be made beautiful: he cuts away here, he smoothes there, he makes this line lighter, this other purer, until a lovely face has grown upon his work. So do you also: cut away all that is excessive, straighten all that is crooked, bring light to all that is overcast, labour to make all one glow of beauty and never cease chiselling your statue, until there shall shine out on you from it the godlike splendour of virtue, until you shall see the perfect goodness surely established in the stainless shrine.' He argues that each individual should pass beyond the restlessness of this life, its fragmentariness, its precariousness, its discordance. We have to pass through the depth of the struggle to gain the peace of the One, which is unity, pure and simple. The inner meaning of crucifixion and resurrection is the story of man's dying to the purely physical and egoistic existence, when he is resurrected into the spiritual awareness of his oneness with the life, love and power of the Supreme. It is the dramatisation of man's deliverance from the tomb of living death in which fear, greed, hate, pride have imprisoned him and his free ascent into the freedom of his divine nature. When we die to the old nature, we are reborn to the new. St Paul said: 'Jesus Christ is in you.'1 'Christ in you, the hope of glory.'2 Christ is the divine self within, waiting to be released and expressed. When the rebirth takes place we become 'partakers of the divine nature'.3 The author of the Fourth Gospel makes Jesus say, 'I am the Truth'. The religion of truth is based on spiritual inwardness. The descent of the spirit at Jesus' baptism or his temptation in the wilderness must have been the story of his inner experience. In their present form they are externalised. In Christianity we are called upon to follow the 1 II Corinthians xiii. 5. 2 Colossians i. 27. 3 II Peter i. 4.

Introduction 183

example of Jesus. We are to be made like unto him by bringing our natural desires and expectations into subjection to the Universal Purpose. William Law says: 'To have salvation from Christ is nothing else but to be made like unto him; it is to have his humility and meekness, his love of God, his desire of doing God's will.' Jesus asks us to free ourselves from priestly control, and undergo spiritual growth. We must be born again, born of the spirit of Truth. Those who practise the goodness and love illustrated in Jesus' life become sharers in the eternal Kingdom of spirit, a fellowship of redeemed men who live both in time and beyond time. They strive to raise the world to a more stable way and further the time when nation shall not take up sword against nation, neither learn war any more. A Sufi mystic (twelfth century), Ayn al-qudāt at Hamadhāni (d. A.D. 1I31) says: 'He who is born from the womb sees only this world; only he who is born out of himself sees the other world.' Ibn'Arabi (thirteenth century) says: 'I am knowledge, the known and the knower. I am wisdom, the wise man and his wiseness.' (60. 16.) Both the Buddha and Jesus tell us: 'Be of good courage. I have overcome the world.' Renewal, rebirth is the universal aim of all religions. Out of different origins and backgrounds we are reaching out to the one goal.

D. REBIRTH AND PRE-EXISTENCE

Future Life Belief in some kind of survival is very nearly universal. There is no country or creed in which the great hope of survival has not supported men in the prospect of death and mitigated the grief of bereavement. Even the primitive peoples of whose habits of life we have knowledge assume it as their funerary customs indicate. This universality is often urged as proof in itself of the validity of belief in future life.1 On a question of truth however, suffrage is not conclusive.2 But while a strong wish is Many years ago a questionnaire was sent out by the Society for Psychical Research and it elicited very different views about the fact as well as the desirability of survival. Some believed implicitly and were glad; others were sceptical and were quite satisfied. Apparently men do not seem to think about it unless it be in crises. 2 Cp. Gorgias 472, 474.

I84 The Brahma Sūtra not in itself evidence, the consensus of feeling seems to attest a natural instinct. It may not be too much to assume that the instincts of mankind prophesy a fulfilment even as those of the bee and the ant who lay up stores for a winter.1 Besides, the concurrence of many thinkers in one conclusion is probably the most convincing kind of evidence which is possible on questions of morality and religion. At any rate it is a fact sufficiently impressive to make it worth while to investigate the belief in question. Unfortunately the consensus of agreement disappears when we examine the nature of survival. Strange and terrifying forms of beliefs, crude and dreary conceptions are found side by side with abstract and exalted notions. The activities of heaven change with our earthly aspirations. The Egyptians looked upon their celestial home as replete with rich wheatfields and harvests produced without labour. The Red Indians dreamed of happy hunting grounds with plenty of game and unending sport. For Isaiah, in the Kingdom of God impotence and infirmities shall be done away, 'the eyes of the blind shall be opened, and the ears of the deaf shall be unstopped, the lame man leap as an hart and the tongue of the dumb sing'. The ancient Teutonic peoples conceived of a Valhalla with endless scope for military exercises and stores of beer to be drunk from the skulls of former enemies. Dante's picture of hell as a pendant to heaven is well known. Dostoievsky makes one of his characters say, 'Why should not eternity be a little bathhouse covered with spiders?' We have believed that the soul lives like a pale shadow craving blood to feed it, that it migrates into innumerable forms of plants and animals, that it repeats indefinitely its main occupations here, that it is tortured in hells for sins, that it sings for ever hymns in heavens. The intellectual demand common to the vivid pictorial forms is to secure for human personality some significance that transcends the world of the senses, to maintain that life is not a formless: flux but has a pattern which is not exhausted by this brief span. The dead do not wholly cease to be. This question of survival has significance only in reference to 1 Ruysbroek: 'As hunger presupposes bread so does man's longing after God presuppose God.'

Introduction I85 human beings. Some materialist thinkers have believed that atoms are absolutely everlasting but they do not speak of them as having future life or immortality because they are not selves.

Survival and Eternal Life The term 'future life' is ambiguous and means either durational continuance or eternal life, survival after death or immortality. Eternal life differs from life in time, in quality and not quantity. It is a higher state of being which knows nothing of past or future, the divine mode of existence which we may enjoy here and now. Perpetuity which is a form of time is different from eternity which is timelessness. The distinction between rebirth (punar-janma) and release (mokșa) is familiar to all systems of Hindu thought. We find it also in some of the philosophies of the West. In Plato, for example, we have these two conceptions. There is the doctrine of the Symposium, which is not of a future life but of timeless existence, attainable here and now by an escape from the flux of time. There is the other doctrine of the Phaedo involving pre-existence and post- existence which are concepts possessing meaning only with regard to the temporal life of the soul. In the New Testament we have the eschatological teaching with its pictures of the judgment and the Kingdom of God to which the faithful dead shall rise, which are projected into the future in addition to the doctrine of an unseen world which is more real than the present one. According to the latter view, heaven is a subsisting reality, not a remote state. In one passage Jesus substitutes the idea of the present eternal life of individuals for the hope of a general resurrection of the righteous. When Martha says about her brother 'I know that he shall rise again in the resurrection at the last day', Jesus said to her 'I am the resurrection and the life; he that believeth in me, though he die, yet shall he live; and whosoever liveth and believeth in me, shall never die.'1 He apparently substitutes the conception of a present eternal life which is unaltered by death for a resurrection at some future date, 'the last day'. According to Jesus we can have eternal life while still in the flesh. 'Verily, verily, I say unto you, he that heareth my word, and believeth him who sent me, hath eternal 1 John xi. 23-6.

I86 The Brahma Sūtra

life, and cometh not into judgment, but hath passed out of death into life.'1 St Paul affirms that God 'alone hath im- mortality'.2 Similarly in the Fourth Gospel, we have the conception of eternal life though the Messianic expectation is not discarded. 'He that believeth in the Son hath eternal life.'3 For Philo, time is the moving succession of ever-shifting phenomena while eternity is the motionless duration of un- alterable being. In Plotinus we have the distinction of awakening from the body which is not awakening with the body.4 It is the distinction between the ethical and the spiritual points of view. At the ethical level, we have an infinite progress toward an ideal that is never completely realised. Kant, for example, believed in future life as a postulate of the practical reason. If the holy will is unrealisable here, it can only be realised under the form of an endless progress towards perfection. So ethical consciousness justifies the assumption of infinite time to work out infinite perfection. The spiritual point of view is different. By the identification of the finite self with the divine order, the supreme good is achieved.5 Thus in the history of thought, future life has been conceived in two ways, either as a prolongation of this earthly life or as a complete change from time to eternity. When we raise the question of future life, we are concerned with the individual human soul. It is no comfort to know that there is the Divine in man and it is immortal. The Divine, the immutable presence, what the Advaita Vedānta calls sva-prakāśa- caitanya, the self-luminous consciousness in us may be

1 John v. 24. 2 Timothy vi: 16. John iii. 36. Cp. Dr Alexander Nairne: 'This then is the assurance of the Johannine discourse and its concluding prayer: that eternal life is here and now and always and everywhere: that soul or spirit entering the eternal state, gains intercourse, communion, union with the souls it knows: that this is what our affection for one another means and depends upon, and this kind of communion or union cannot be ended by death.' The Life Eternal, Here and Now, p. 127. 4 Enneads III. 6. 6. 5 E. Troeltsch tells us that there is a future life or lives involving a continuous process of moral purification and an ever-increasing identification of the human will with the divine. The end of the ethical process is, however, the identification of the creature with God. 'The actual end would thus be the complete unity of will with the divine will eventually achieved in this further development after death, and a confluence of the finite wills in love, the complete disappearance of the perfected individuals, the yielding up of the personality to the divine life.' Quoted in Braham: Ourselves and Reality (1929), p. 173.

Introduction 187 insusceptible to change but it does not affect the status of the human self, the jivätman, the complex composite organism which suffers a crisis at death. An unchanging self outside of the succession and supposed to bring connection and unity into otherwise unrelated terms is not the human self in whose survival we are interested. The eternal ätman, according to Advaita Vedānta, is common to all individuals.1 Its continuance after the disintegration of the complex of elements which constitute personal existence is not of much interest. In Plato we have the idea of an indiscerptible soul-substance immortal in its own right. He says in the Republic, 'Soul is substance and substance is indestructible'. The soul is what makes us what we are. It is immortal because its very idea and essence is the self-moved and self-moving. Yet we find in Plato the view that the soul is not quite eternal like the divine ideas. It partakes in their nature but it must train itself, by exercising its highest faculties, to think immortal thoughts and identify itself with the eternal world by entering into it. But when Plato speaks of the nature of soul-substance, that it belongs to the invisible world of changeless reality, that it was never born and will never die and that body is part of the unreal world of becoming2 and not the object of true knowledge, he is reaffirming that the Divine in man is immortal. His proofs in the Phaedo from recollection and from the soul's kinship with God prove the eternity of impersonal reason and not of the individual self. For the Neoplatonists the higher soul has life and being in itself and can neither be born nor die and the fate of the lower soul depends on the manner of living. This soul may be lost if it rebels against the higher principle. Modern psychology is inclined to view the individual as a perpetual becoming, a system of psychological and ethical energies, that is changing as long as it is alive. When William James makes out that the passing thought is the only thinker, he is suggesting by the passing thought the present state of the continuously developing self, which represents in itself all 1 Katha U. II. 16. 2 'I cannot persuade Crito, my friends, that I am that Socrates who is now conversing with you, and who methodises each part of the discourse; but he thinks that I am he whom he will shortly behold dead, and asks how he should bury me.'

I88 The Brahma Sūtra

thoughts and states that went before. The passing thought is a résumé or a sum-total of all its predecessors, the inheritor of the past and the growing point of the future. It takes up in itself the previous moment, makes it its own and gives it up to the next moment of experience.1 It is the actual self quite distinct from the unchanging self outside of the succession altogether, supposed by its relating activity to bring unity and connection into a series of otherwise unrelated items. The self is con- stituted by its experience. It is the unity of the conscious experiences of a particular individual centre. It is not a simple atomic unit but a complex living structure, a unity in multi- plicity. Each self enjoys a kind of unity and continuity. The states are not detached and the self is not apart from the succession. It is the organised or consolidated unity of all experience. All states occur as belonging to this unity, as elements in a growing self-integrating whole. The unity of self is not a mechanical one. We can destroy a wall and retain the bricks. We cannot destroy a self and retain thoughts and emotions. The self is a different kind of unity where form and content are closely united. The unity of the individual is of a functional rather than of a substantive character. Soul is the name of the composite nature which one knows as oneself and which functions as one person though it passes from life to life or body to body. It is not an abstraction. The conscious self is shaped by all one's experiences; its individuality is the result of the discipline of time. Immortality has point only if it refers to the human person and his capacity to attain it by consciously realising his unity with the timeless or eternal self. If the world is rational, the final outcome of the age-long organic process must be something better and less ephemeral than man as we know him in ourselves and others-doomed to death. If we are to save the rationality of the universe we must assume that the transition from self- consciousness to God-consciousness is the aim of organic evolution. When the Hindu thinkers, Plato, Aristotle and the 1 'Each pulse of cognitive consciousness, each thought dies away and is replaced by another. The other, among the things it knows, knows its own predecessor, and finding it "warm" in the way we have described, greets it, saying: "Thou art mine, and part of the same self with me".' Principles of Psychology (1890), Vol. I, p. 339.

Introduction I89 Neoplatonists affirm the reality of the Divine in man, they have in mind the possibility of realising the divine quality through the apparatus of mind and body. The presence of the Universal Spirit operates as the ideal to which the organism strives. The simplicity of the human individual, the unity of the human soul are not obvious. They are the ideals we strive for. We have argued that the process of becoming is not unreal. The human individual is not a false appearance. By means of self-variation the Spirit manifests itself as the universe without at the same time suffering any derogation from its original status. The universe is essentially dynamic and the human individual is the growing point of the future, the agent as well as the offspring of the creative process. His personality is continuously enriched and changed by his experiences and there is no break. The thread in the weaver's loom is not cut; it disappears from our vision. There is an ancient saying that death is natural to embodied beings; it is life that is unnatural.1 The conditions which determine the individual unity are organic since every soul known to us is an embodied soul. The Jews, for example, never thought of the soul as distinct from the body or of the body as the prison-house of the soul so far as they escaped Greek influences. Their belief in personal im- mortality was always belief in the resurrection of dead persons as wholes. It was not an immortality of bare souls. St Paul expresses the faith in which he had been bred thus 'having hope towards God which these also [my Jewish adversaries] them- selves look for, that there shall be a Resurrection both of the just and the unjust'.2 A disembodied state of existence is not admitted. St Paul raises the question 'How are the dead raised? With what manner of body do they come?'3 Heaven seems to be an organisation which does not undergo decay. They shall hunger no more; neither thirst any more; neither shall the sun light on them, nor any heat; for the Lamb which is in the midst of the throne shall feed them and lead them into living fountains of water; and God shall wipe away all tears from their eyes.' 'And there shall be no more death, neither

1 maranam prakrtih sarīriņām vikrtīr jīvanam ucyate budhaih. Kavikulacakravartin. Acts xxiv. 15. 3 I Corinthians xv.

I90 The Brahma Sūtra

sorrow nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain.' It seems to be a simple scheme where we will have life with its goods and not its ills. Those who have tasted sorrow and seen the shadow of death are told that these things will not be. This view admits that every manifestation of life must have its own fit embodiment, its appropriate means of expression. Tertullian takes the extreme position that the soul is nothing if it is not body. Justin considers the doctrine that the soul is taken to heaven at the death of the body to be unchristian.

Rebirth In this world body is the basis and starting point for the development of life, mind and spirit. Bodiless beings are not known. The assumption of body is called birth and it is essential for the manifestation of the individual on the physical plane. But it cannot be an isolated accident or sudden excursion into physicality without any past or future. In an ordered world, sudden embodiment of conscious life would be meaningless and inconsequential. It would be a violation of the rhythm of nature, an effect without cause, a fragmentary present without a past. Life is a term in a series, a slow development. It cannot be regarded as something which mysteriously appears at or about birth and disappears equally mysteriously at or about death. The individual is constantly changing in his mind as well as in his body. There is, however, unity in so far as each state is a present transformation representative of all those which are past as it will be the producer of all future transformation potentially involved in it. The development of a coherent mind and character is the aim of self-conscious life and it is the reality which the body in its structure and organisation exists to actualise. Though based on the body, the characteristic unity of the self is spiritual, more complete and permanent than any achieved by any individual being. The self of man is not a mere effect of its body or a form of its activity, though it requires the body for its work in this world. It follows that the self existed before it began to animate the body of this life and will exist after it ceases to animate it. Death has no meaning except as a process of life. Death is a condition, not a denial of life. Disintegration of substance and change of form are constant

Introduction I9I processes of all living beings. One span of life ends to give place to another. A single life, in many cases, is not enough for achieving perfection. If there are other lives they must be continuous with the present one. God's love being unlimited, the opportunities not made use of in one life will be renewed in other lives till the spirit finds its fulfilment. If every soul is created at birth, why should it be created sinful? Notable Christian thinkers like Paul, Augustine and Calvin adopt the view of original sin. The soul must at least be born without sin whatever it may make of itself later. It must be born free though it may forge for itself chains later. Some are born from birth deformed and tortured with disease or into circumstances of extreme squalor and misery while others are born into lives of health, ease and happiness. The souls are made to assume bodies with their qualities, capacities and defects made for them and for the use of which they are made respon- sible, though they are fortuitously connected with them. We are made helpless by what we are and are held accountable for what we shall be, which is largely determined by what we are originally. We start on an unequal level. It offends our logical and ethical sense to assume that a Socrates and a sinner are endowed with different constitutions to strive for eternal life, and if the sinner fails it cannot be a matter for surprise. He made the best of his bad equipment. If the inequalities are to be traced to God, he cannot be freed from the accusations of partiality and favouritism. Again, if every time a baby is born a new soul is created, the universe will be capable of infinite increase. Though the rise of human souls may be a mystery of faith, the best explanation we can think of is that the physical act provides a body for a soul which awaits rebirth. The soul is not something created at birth. Life here is an episode in a larger life, involving a succession of alternate births and deaths. Individual souls follow their course and their present fortunes depend on the past in an organic and indissoluble manner. Growth is the character of the soul. As a living organism, it is modified by the life it chooses and the way it acts. The forms and properties of matter, plants and animals do not come into

I92 The Brahma Sūtra existence all of a sudden. The objects of nature develop from stage to stage and, at every stage, nature takes up its past and transforms it into the stuff of its new development. Human nature is not an exception to this rule. It is logical to assume that the soul has developed continuously from almost nothing at the earlier limit of time like a ripple spreading out from a centre. Each soul would appear to be coeval not only with the universe but with time itself. It is this fact that binds him with the physical and organic conditions of the world. From the first the world is equally real with himself. The two, the individual and the world, coexist and subsist together. The individual is placed in an environment which he has chosen, his own natural environment, that which answers to his character. Man is born into the world which he has made.1 The variety of the world is born of karma.2

Survival of Death and Personal Immortality When we think of a person, we think of his body and character, thoughts and feelings which are connected with and conditioned by the body. The belief that we will recognise our friends in another world assumes that personal characteristics are immortal but if by personality we mean the psychophysical organism which was born at a certain date and grew up for a number of years and died at a certain date, it is difficult to say which part of this organism, which is compacted of qualities, physical and mental, inherited and acquired would be preserved, when it is attached to another body or set down in another time and place. Rebirth means that there is change in the physical and even some mental characteristics. Disappearance of body makes a difference to the subtle body as there are psychic elements which have no function except in relation to the body. The persistence of the results of experience is different from the resuscitation of personality. What is it that survives death, if it is not the body? When Yājñavalkya was asked, 'When the speech of a dead person enters into fire, the breath into air, the eye into the sun, the mind into the moon, the hearing into the quarters, the soul into 1 kytam lokam puruso'bhijāyate. Śatapatha Brāhmaņa. VI. 2. 2. 27. 2 karmajam loka-vaicitryam. Abhidharma-kośa. IV.

Introduction I93 the ether ... what then becomes of this person?', he answered 'verily one becomes good by good actions, bad by bad actions'. The lessons learnt at any stage are carried over into the next. Manu says 'The only friend who follows men even after death is dharma; for everything else is lost at the same time when the body perishes'.1 Whatever our character and knowledge in the flesh may be, we arrive with them in the next state.2 They are the all-commanding things that ultimately matter. Our rank in the scale of being depends on the powers which we exercise and the objects which we contemplate. We become what we love and care about. The knowledge we painfully acquire and the character we develop are carried over to the next life. 'Verily man consists of purpose [kratu-maya] and according to the completeness of his understanding when he departs this world, thus he becomes after having passed away.'3 He will find himself in an environment similar to that to which he is adjusted here. The scribes and the pharisees have their reward for ambition and self-seeking and the craven soul in emptiness of spirit. We must accept our wages, high and noble or petty and shameful, and cast ourselves afresh on the adventure of life. Man grows and flourishes and when at the end of a single life he dies, he leaves behind a seed from which a new plant grows. Man is his own heir, his own ancestor. Life is not a mechanical recurrence but a significant process. We cannot say that the wheel turns ceaselessly, creating souls whose ideal is to cease to exist. Even in the material world, we have not got mere mechanical recurrence. Rebirth is not an eternal recurrence leading nowhere but a movement from man the animal to man the divine, a unique beginning to a unique end, from wild life in the jungle to a future Kingdom of God. The soul is constantly performing the miracle of self-embodi- ment which is a means for self-renewal, a growth into light.4

1 B.U. III. 2. 13. Manu VIII. 7: see also XI. 51-81.

them. 2 Cp. Revelation xiv. 13. 'They rest from their labours and their works follow 3 Śatapatha Brāhmaņa X. 6. 3. 1. See also C.U. III. 14. I. 4 Lessing asks: 'Why should not every individual man have existed more than once upon this world? Is this hypothesis laughable merely because it is the oldest? ... Why should I not come back as often as I am capable of acquiring fresh knowledge, fresh expertness?' G

I94 The Brahma Sūtra

The Law of Karma There is one law for the whole universe for all existence is one existence. There is, however, a persistent variety in existence. The law of karma tells us that as in the physical world, in the mental and moral world also there is law. The world is an ordered cosmos. What we sow we will reap. The law of karma governs the growth of the human individual. Our acts determine our character which in turn determines our acts. An individual is full of desire.1 Desire is said to be the agent of action, the impeller of action.2 The law of karma emphasises the importance of conduct. Man is continually shaping his destiny. The piling up of the past goes on without interruption. Each thought, each action has definitive consequences. 'What a man wills he does; what he does even so he becomes.'3 'As a calf finds its mother among a thousand cows, so does the deed previously done follow after the doer.'4 We can never separate ourselves from our past.5 We may completely recover from a disease, sincerely repent for a wrong deed but we bear for ever the scar of these events. A well-known verse in the Garuda Purāna tells us that the results of our deeds, good or evil, must be experienced; those that are not experienced do not fade away even in hundreds of millions of ages.6 The universe is ethically sound. Even as the world would be a logical contradiction without the reign of law, it would be a moral chaos without the moral law. The law of karma is not a blind necessity or a mechanical rule but simply the organic nature of life where each successive phase grows inevitably from 1 kāma-mayaḥ purușaḥ. B.U. III. 9. II. 2 kāmaḥ kartā kāmaḥ kārayitā. 3 B.U. IV. 4-5. 4 yathā dhenu-sahasreșu vatso vindati mātaram tathā pūrva-kytam karma kartaram anugacchati. M.B. ānti parva 15. 56. 5 Cp. Coleridge: 'It may be more possible for heaven and earth to pass away than that a single act, a single thought should be loosened or lost from that living chain of causes with all the links of which the free will, our only absolute self, is coextensive and copresent. And this, perchance, is that dread book of judgment in the mysterious hieroglyphics of which every idle word is recorded.' Biographia Literaria, Vol. I. 2nd edition, p. 119. Marcus Aurelius says: 'Of whatever colour are the thoughts you think often, to that colour does your mind grow, for the soul is dyed by its thoughts.' Meditations V. 16. 6 avaśyam eva bhoktavyam kytam karma śubhāśubham nābhuktam kşīyate karma kalpa-koti-satair api.

Introduction I95 what has gone before. The law of karma intensifies our sense of the tremendous significance of every decision we make for the right or the wrong. Every choice has an influence on our whole moral being not merely for this life but for ever.

Karma and Freedom If we reduce the spiritual to the animal, free self-determination will be replaced by rigid coercion. The roots of our existence lie in the transcendent sphere. All the time our existence where law or karma prevails points and strives beyond itself. If man were a mere object of study in physiology, if he were a mere mind described by psychology, his conduct would be governed by the law of necessity. But man is not just a natural and historical product. He is aware of himself as a free being. He is not altogether self-made. He exists by virtue of something other than himself, something transcendent to his existence. There is in us the Eternal different from the limited chain of causes and effects in the phenomenal world. An objective account of human consciousness is not the whole truth about man. Man is aware of himself not only as an object in the world but as an individual subject, the active source of what he is and does. From this point of view the Transcendence speaks to us from our innermost depths, through our freedom. We must acknowledge the material needs of our existence, otherwise we are not alive; we must admit our relation to the Supreme, otherwise we are not true. Evil is not disobedience. It is corruption, moral obliquity by which we abuse our creative powers. When the soul of man realises that it is one with the power of Self-existence which manifests the universe, it ceases to be bound by karma. Mind, life and body become its apparatus. In man is the seed of all creation. Man is one with the Supreme in his innermost being and the spirit in him is superior to his karma but when he mistakes himself for the ego his will is not altogether free. The individual will and personality are bound by many things physical and vital: heredity, past creation of our mental nature and environmental forces, but the soul is greater than its present form. Karma refers to the limiting force of our equipment and

I96 The Brahma Sūtra environment; freedom refers to human plasticity, the variety of possible development opening before a man endowed with a definite character. Spirit is the negation of all inertia. From the point of view of Spirit, there are no good habits and bad habits. All habits are bad. With every habit we form, man's original freedom congeals into bondage. All fixation is a victory of routine over initiative, of inertia over freedom. Human freedom has to reckon with the necessary law according to which character as modified up to date tends to express itself. If we do not exercise our creative choice, what has been done will rule completely what shall be done. What we have done is past and unalterable. It has entered into us and become a part of us. Character is destiny.1 If the present state of man is the product of a long past, he can change what he has made. His past which he has built for himself and his present environment may offer obstacles to him but they will all yield in the end to the will in him in proportion to its sincerity and insistence. Life is a constant self-creation.

Karma and Predestination The law of karma has nothing in common with the popular teaching that rewards and punishments are dependent on the arbitrary will of God. If God predestines us for weal or woe regardless of what we do, it is no use bothering about what we do. Karma is not predestination. Augustine's teaching that only a small fraction of humanity, the elect, are destined to bliss while the many are 'reprobate', predetermined to everlasting damnation, is contradicted by the law of karma which affirms that by doing what is in our power we can dispose the mind to the love of the Eternal and attain salvation. Man's instinctive

1 Cp. 'Destiny is nothing but what inevitably happens as the good or bad results of our efforts already put forth.' siddhasya pauruşeneha phalasya phala-sālinā. Yogavāsistha. subhasubhartha-sampattir daiva-sabdena kathyate. Yogavāsistha. II. 9. 4. Destiny is the result of our past efforts, prāktanam paurusam II. 6. 4. Even as one endeavours, so one achieves. The present can overcome the past (II. 5. 12). yathā yathā prayatnaḥ syād bhaved āsu phalam tathā iti paurușam evāsti daivam astu tadeva ca. II. 6. 2. The fools who believe that everything is in the hands of destiny are ruined. daivāttam iti manyante ye hatās te kubuddhayah II. 5. 29. The Rāmāyana asks us to overcome fate by human efforts: daivam puruşakāreņa nivartayitum arhasi.

Introduction I97 sense of justice is bewildered by the bland relegation of a large part of humanity to everlasting torment. If the law of karma is the will of the highest wisdom and God is the sovereign who works the law, then our future may be regarded indifferently as either the fulfilment of the law or a gift of God. If we are rationally-minded we say that the future life is a natural and necessary consequence of the first; if we are theistically-minded, that it is due to the intervention of God who rewards the righteous and punishes the wicked in the manner of an earthly sovereign. If his will is not arbitrary or capricious but wholly reasonable and right, its operations are rational and necessary. God has so ordered the world that if a man lives rightly he will achieve salvation but there is no grace, no free gift of God to enable him to do so. God, of course, is the only source and guarantee. God seeks to draw us, to persuade us but we can resist him. When we resist him, we find ourselves up against punishment. This principle is worked into the moral structure of things. It makes evil in the long run self-defeating. God is the universal background providing for the multiple manifestation, the actualisation of the different possibilities. Ś. argues that even as rain helps the growth of the different seeds into their own respective plants, so does God serve as the universal concomitant or the unvarying condition in the creation of human beings, while each one's karma determines what he grows into.1 For him the rise of the world is due to moral necessity. The accumulated karma of the past requires expiation. The need for moral consummation and continuity brings the world into being.

The Law of Karma and Prayer If karma determines our future, has prayer any use? Can God forgive in answer to prayer? R. says: 'That man who acts with the determination to be wholly on the side of the Supreme Person, the Lord blesses by himself creating in him a taste for such actions only as are a means to attaining him and are extremely good. But he punishes the man who acts with the determination to be wholly against him by creating in him a 1 Ś.B. II. I. 34.

I98 The Brahma Sūtra

taste for such actions as stand in the way of attaining him and lead him downward.'1

Ethical Value of the Law of Karma To those discouraged by life's disabilities, the doctrine of karma teaches patience and persistent endeavour. When we see the long procession of men either deformed in body or warped in mind, with faint hearts and weak wills, we should not judge them harshly. When man is set alone against the vast background of his destiny, when he finds that he cannot defy his fate and unfaltering despair overtakes him, belief in karma steadies his nature. For most of us it may appear that we are playing a part that we have not chosen, in a play which does not interest us. Life to such may seem a dull proceeding and they may pass through it with a certain listlessness. The principle of karma tells us that we earned this particular life, indeed we chose it. Our lives are self-begotten and self-born. If what we are is due to what we did, we will be even as we now do. It is open to us to remake our life even as we will have it. The future is not a finished product like the past.

E. SOME OBJECTIONS TO THE HYPOTHESIS OF REBIRTH

Lack of Memory There is reason for the old belief that between each fresh life, the soul or the ego of the individual drinks of the waters of Lethe. In other words memory of the past is obliterated by the transition from life on another plane to life on earth. The Bhāgavata Purāņa says that death is absolute forgetfulness.2 If we do not know that we enjoy or suffer in this life on account of our deeds in a previous life, we cannot be said to profit by experience. If we do not know why we suffer, our suffering is not a safeguard against the repetition of our evil deeds.3 Since

1 R.B. II. 3. 4. 2 mytyur atyanta-vismrtih. 3 Professor Pringle Pattison, quoting Leibniz, writes: 'What good, Sir, would it do you to become king of China on condition that you forget what you have been? Would it not be the same as if God, at the moment he destroyed you, were to create a king of China.' Idea of Immortality, p. 125.

Introduction I99 there is complete discontinuity of consciousness between one life and the next, the reward or punishment cannot in any intelligible sense be experienced by him who has deserved it. If one who has abused his intellectual gifts is reborn as an idiot, how does it help? Our present lives may be continuous with past lives but it does not make any difference so long as we do not remember the fact. We have no clear ideas about the mechanism of memory, how it inheres and is perpetuated in this life. We do not know how precisely experiences are stored in the organism and by what means they are revived. Psychical dispositions are for James Ward the basis of memory when the cerebral states are shattered. William James makes memory 'a physiological quality given once for all with its organisations which we can never hope to change'. G. F. Stout speaks of psychophysical dispositions. Bergson holds that memories are indestructible psychical entities and as immaterial they have no particular location in space. These memories hang together in associated systems. In Matter and Memory Bergson suggests that the true function of the brain is not to enable us to remember things but to forget them. But for this eliminating power of the brain, crowds of recollections which are irrelevant to the purpose in hand would overtake us, making it difficult for us to deal with immediate issues. The brain acts as a kind of sieve allowing only those memories to pass which have relevance to the present situation. Bergson assumes that our experience as it develops itself leaves behind an integral record, complete to the minutest details. When a new situation confronts us and the need for constructive action arises, memory images from the past attach themselves to the present perception, interpreting it. The memories are the acted past and the present consciousness may be active in selecting but the memories themselves are acted, not active. In Freud's view the constituents of the soul are not past actions but present active wishes repressed and more or less actively controlled but producing conflict in their struggle to rise to consciousness and reach fulfilment. Memories are, for him, not pictures hung up in the halls of the mind but active vibrant centres. The unconscious memories keep the un- conscious part of our mind alive and occasionally by pressing

200 The Brahma Sūtra through the boundary that separates the unconscious from the conscious, bring back varied associations into conscious memory. In any experience we have two elements. Suppose we cut our finger we have (i) the series of events that produce the pain: the misadventure in handling the knife, the cut, the bleeding, (ii) the sense of pain. The first is in the background while the second holds the centre. Gradually even the second recedes into the background leaving behind not a direct memory as an event but an indirect memory or a tendency to be careful in the handling of knives. If the tendencies persist, it does not matter if the memories lapse. The trained musician plays with a mind free from all recollection of the details of the past labour of learning notes. His fingers remember them and his subconscious mind stores the experience. Reflective knowledge results in an instinctive endowment. Wisdom does not consist in vast stores of knowledge but in the ability to profit by experience. Though we may not have conscious memory there is a persistence of dispositions and tendencies. Though at death we may lose the memory of the detailed knowledge and the skill and the habits, still we start our next life in consequence of having possessed these with more efficient dispositions and a greater power to reacquire the detailed knowledge and insight.1 Active memory does not seem to be essential for personal identity. Forgetting may perhaps be essential for making a fresh start. Providence has been more beneficent in bestowing on us the gift of forgetting. We do not deny our existence as an infant or an embryo simply because we do not remember them. Much passes into oblivion even in this life. We cannot identify the infant with the grown-up man if memory of the earlier stage is regarded as essential. Individuality does not depend on memory. Simply because we forget the experiences of our infancy, we do not believe that it is not we who had them. The unconscious processes do not form a part of the conscious ego but belong to the totality of the individual. Simply because the ego is not conscious of them we cannot deny their existence for they reveal themselves in and determine the 1 See McTaggart: Some Dogmas of Religion (1906), pp. 127-37: The Nature of Existence, Vol. II (1927), pp. 385-96.

Introduction 20I

individual's behaviour. If, without a memory of our previous life, we still think that the present life has positive value, absence of memory of previous lives need not be taken as a fatal objection. The hypothesis of rebirth admits that there is a breach of consciousness and yet affirms continuity of self. While memory fades, the modifications remain, the attitude of mind, the habit of judgment, the dispositions of character survive in the new individuality and form its basis. It is also held that the illumined by the development of psychic powers are able to recollect their past births.1 Individual cases of memory of past lives are reported.

Inequalities may be due to Heredity Simply because we are ignorant of the cause of the inequality of human circumstance, we need not postulate previous existences. Inequality is a law of nature which we find in plants and animals also. It is not uncaused, however. The differences in natural endowment can all be traced to heredity. Pre-existence need not be assumed. The nature of any organism is largely determined by that of its biological ancestors. Heredity expresses the large resemblance between parents and children. Heredity means the transmission of physical form and biological characteristics from a previous life. A lion generates a lion, not a horse or a tiger. Things transmitted are not only physical and biological but psychical also, mental powers and tendencies. If we hold that man's whole nature is derived from his physical birth, that the body and mind of the indi- vidual are only a continuation of the body and mind of his ancestors, then the individual has no past being independent of his ancestors, or future independent of his descendants. He prolongs himself in his progeny and there is no rebirth for him. No continued stream of individuality survives the death of the

1 Yoga Sūtra II. 30; Upaskāra on Vaišeșika Sūtra V. 2. 18; VI. 2. 16. Compare also the romantic story of Apollonius of Tyana and the later legendary lives of Pythagoras. See the B.G. IV. 5. The Buddha, according to Aśvaghosa, remembered his past births: 'In recollection all former births passed before his eyes. Born in such a place, of such a name, and downwards to his present birth, so through hundreds, thousands, myriads, all his births and deaths he knew.' Buddha- carita. Samuel Beal's E.T. G*

202 The Brahma Sūtra body. If the parents literally make the child, then we do not require either a prior life or divine agency. If we posit an element in us which cannot be accounted for by the principle of heredity, a psychic power behind the veil of material process, then it presupposes a past and admits a future evolution other than that of the race mind and physical necessity. Human life manifests itself in a body but is not the product of the body. Its characteristics are determined jointly by those which the self had when it began to animate the organism and by the nature of the organism which it animates. The problem is, how does a certain self become associated with a certain organism when the latter is the product of purely biological causation? The theist argues that God creates a suitable mind whenever an organism is conceived and unites the two. In other words, every birth is a miracle. It is more plausible to think that a pre-existent self becomes associated with a certain organism at the moment when the latter is conceived. In nature this kind of adaptive affinity occurs frequently, in chemical affinity, in the selective affinity of spermatozoa for ova of the same species. Minds and organisms attract each other in the same way. The reincarnating ego is attracted to parents from whom it can inherit a particular set of qualities. The psyche appropriates the body necessary for its realisation. The natural body derived from the parents according to the laws of heredity is taken over by the soul. There are differences also among children of same parents brought up under same conditions and these cannot be accounted for exclusively by heredity. While the physical heredity (i.e. bodily characteristics) is derived from the parents, social heredity is derived from the family, race, nation and religion; there is psychological heredity which is not derived from the parents or the society. This controls physical and social heredity. Human and Animal Life It is argued that the hypothesis of rebirth overlooks the fundamental distinction between human and animal life. There are passages in Hindu texts which declare that persistent ill-doing will cause human souls to be born in animal bodies. Such

Introduction 203 a view prevailed in the West among the philosophers of the later Platonic school.1 It is the product of a number of varying tendencies. (i) The view that animals have souls is held by many primitive tribes and when they were accepted in the Hindu fold, their view affected the eschatological speculations of the Hindus. (ii) An obscure sense of the unity of all creation and that the souls of all living things are of like nature helped to foster it. There is something which binds us to all the children of the earth. All forms of life are ultimately identical. (iii) As the hypothesis of rebirth in animal bodies tended to increase the respect for animal life, those who were sympathetically inclined towards it did not discountenance this doctrine. When one considers the wanton destruction and needless suffering we have inflicted on the animal creation, a doctrine which fosters a disinterested love of animals is not to be discouraged. Our general idea is that animals exist to provide food and clothes for men and women. To see and delight in an animal for its own sake involves a high development of charity and selflessness. These different tendencies found expression in this extrava- gance of the rebirth hypothesis. While we must be earnest with the idea of development, we must not pull down the higher or exalt the lower. While we must recognise the identity of principle in the whole universe, we must not abolish the wealth of varieties and stages of progress in which the single principle has found realisation. We must admit our kinship with the lower animalse but the difference is also fundamental. Release from rebirth is dependent on knowledge 1 The religious poem Katharmoi of Empedocles speaks of the fall of the soul and the ways by which it may attain the purity which is necessary, if it is to return to its primitive state of blessedness. In the process, it is said, it may go through all kinds of mortal shapes including those of men, animals and plants. In the course of his Purifications, Empedocles states: 'I have already been a youth and a maid, a bush, a bird and a dumb fish of the sea.' Guthrie: Orpheus and Greek Religion (1935), p. 175 e Cp. Bradley: 'The frank recognition of a common parentage leaves us still the rulers of our poor relations, but breaks down the barrier which encourages our cruelty, our disregard for their miseries and contempt for their love. And when this moral prejudice is gone, our intellectual prejudice will not long survive. We shall not study the lower animals with the view to make out a case or a claim, but for the pleasure of finding our own souls again in a different form; and for the sake, I may add, of understanding better our own develop- ment.' Principles of Logic, Vol. II, p. 514.

204 The Brahma Sūtra and conduct of which only human beings are capable and, if once we enter animal life, they become impossible. How can a soul which has once sunk down to an animal life become ethi- cally deserving? When it is said that the human soul suffers the indignity of animal life, the suggestion is figurative, not literal. It means that it is reborn to an irrational existence comparable to animal life, and not that it is actually attached to the body of an animal.1 Those who so vehemently protest against the rebirth of human souls in animal bodies on the ground that it is incompatible with the organic relation between soul and body must admit that this very organic conception requires us to assume that souls will acquire bodies similar to those which they have abandoned at death.

The Mechanism of Rebirth In regard to the modus operandi of rebirth, different views are held. McTaggart argues that 'souls somehow steer their way back to a suitable rebirth'. 'Each person enters into connection with the body that it is most fitted to be connected with.'2 As there can be no continuity of life without continuity of organism, a subtle body which carries the impress of its past tendencies3 is assumed. The gross body (sthūla śarīra) is supported by the physical life-force which courses through the whole nervous system and which distinguishes our bodily action from that of an inert mechanical being. It is only the outer instrument. When it disappears the soul is not formless. An individual existence is always conditioned by an organic substratum. 1 Dr E. B. Tylor writes: 'So it may seem that the original idea of trans- migration was the straightforward and reasonable one of human souls being reborn in new human bodies .... The beast is the very incarnation of familiar qualities of man; and such names as lion, bear, fox, owl, parrot, viper, worm, when we apply them as epithets to men, condense into a word some leading feature of human life.' Primitive Culture (London, 1891), ii. 17. Dr L. A. Waddell writes: 'The pig symbolises the ignorance of stupidity; the cock animal desire or lust; and the snake anger.' Gazetteer of Sikkim, ed. by H. H. Risley, p. 267 2 Studies on Hegelian Cosmology, pp. 45ff. 3 What departs from the body at death is manas (mind), the five senses of knowledge and the five of action, the five subtle elements, life (prāna) and merit (punya) and demerit (papa). C.U. V. 3. 3; V. 9. I. B.U. IV. 4. 3, 5 and 6; III. I. I-7. VI. 2. 4 and 15; Maitri U. VI. 10; B.G. XV. 7 and 8; Manu XII. 16-17; B.S.

Introduction 205 Human life is always attached to some vehicle and we need not assume that the forms of matter with which we are familiar are the only forms that exist in the universe. When the gross body drops, the soul is accompanied by the subtle body, transparent and invisible though material. It is the basis for consciousness and memory. We cannot localise subtle bodies which survive physical death. The subtle body is the reflex image of our personality in all its phases. The linga-sarīra is the carrier of karma and assumes a body which, though different from the present one, is not altogether discontinuous with it. It is sometimes said that when the self leaves the body, it leaves with vijñāna which Ś. equates with determinate consciousness due to vāsanā and vidyā, karma and pūrva-jñāna. Ś. admits that the individual, when he passes from one body to another, possesses primary prāņa, senses, and manas, also avidyā, karma and previous experience. The jiva carries with it the subtle elements forming the basis of the body.1 In the story of Sāvitrī, it is said that Yama extracted from the gross body of Satyavän the self which is of the size of a thumb.2 The subtle body is said to have form. At the point of death, as the servants of a king gather round him when he starts on a voyage, so all the vital functions and faculties of an individual gather around the living soul, when it is about to withdraw from its bodily form.3 The ātman or the Universal Self which is present as sāksin throughout successive experiences is a mere spectator.

History of the Doctrine Belief in rebirth is widespread in the East and is not unknown in the West. Pythagoras and Plato suggested this theory as an explanation for the inequalities of life. Plato in the famous myth of Er towards the end of his Republic shows the disciplinary value of suffering. Virgil, the Mystery religions, the Neo- platonists supported the theory of rebirth. Plotinus says: 'Such things as happen to the good without justice, as punishments, 1 dehabījair, bhūtasūkşmaih samparişvaktah. B.S. III. I. I. 2 anguştha-mātram puruşam niścakarșa yamo balāt. M.B. Vanaparva 20. 6. 16. 3 B.U. IV. 3. 28. The process of death and rebirth according to Tibetan Buddhism is given in The Tibetan Book of the Dead, ed. by W. Y. Evans- Wentz, third edition (1957).

206 The Brahma Sūtra

or poverty, or disease, may be said to take place through offences committed in a former life.'1 Caesar reports that the Druids had a belief that 'the soul does not perish, but after death passes from one body to another'. The Cathari taught that the wicked would be reborn in the bodies of animals. Recent anthropological investigations reveal that many African peoples hold the belief in rebirth. Josephus tells us that 'pure and obedient souls obtain a most holy place in Heaven from whence in the revolution of the ages they are sent again into pure bodies.'2 The general Jewish belief, however, is a resurrection to bodily life on earth. The case of the man born blind is used to suggest belief in pre-existence. If he is not born blind as the result of his own sin it should be due to his conduct in a previous life. Among Christian thinkers Origen believed in the pre-existence of the soul though he held that after death the soul passed into a resurrection body. Jerome believed in pre-existence. Augustine did not deny it, and there was hesitation about the doctrine till the time of Gregory the Great. The Second Council of Constantinople in A.D. 553 issued a pronunciamiento: 'Whoever shall support the mythical doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul and the consequent wonderful opinion of its return, let him be anathema.' There- after belief in rebirth became a heretical doctrine. In recent times owing to the spread of the knowledge of the teachings of Eastern religions a few Western thinkers have been attracted to this hypothesis. Schopenhauer admits the useful- ness of this doctrine.3 Sir William Jones, in his letter to Earl Spencer dated September 4, 1787, wrote: 'I am no Hindu; but I hold the doctrine of the Hindus concerning a future state to be incomparably more rational, more pious, and more likely to deter men from vice, than the horrid opinions inculcated by Christians on punishments without end.'4 For McTaggart, the 1 T. Taylor: The Select Works of Plotinus (1914), p. 229. 2 Antiquities XVIII. I. 3. 3 Cp. Wordsworth: 'Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting.' Rosetti: 'I have been here before. But where or how I cannot tell.' 4 See Arberry: Asiatic Jones (1946), p. 37. Cp. G. Lowes Dickinson: 'If we are to hold, as we must, I believe, if we are to be optimists, that there is some definite goal to be reached by all individuals in a temporal process, then the notion of a series of successive existences, in the

Introduction 207 universe is not a person but a society of persons, eternal and perfect, each of whom is in love with one or more of the others. Moreover, it is probable that each human mind, as it really is, is identical with one of these persons. Each one of us is, there- fore, eternal in reality and this eternity probably appears sub specie temporis as persistence throughout the whole of past and future time. This existence is split up into a sequence of many successive lives each beginning with a birth and ending with a death. Belief in rebirth seems to be the least unsatisfactory of the views held about the future of the human being after death.

F. LIFE ETERNAL

Union with Brahman Release is life in spiritual consciousness; rebirth is life in becoming. Eternal life is a new life into which we are born by a direct contact with the Divine. It is not a prolongation of the natural life into an indefinitely extended future. Eternity is not endless continuity. As we have seen any attempt to describe spiritual experience in human language involves the clothing of the truth in imagery borrowed from the thought-forms of time. Even as the Supreme Reality is envisaged in the four forms of the Absolute Brahman, Personal Iśvara, the world-soul and the world, the liberated has the feeling of oneness with Brahman, communion with Iśvara and co-operation with the world-soul for the betterment of the world. S. says that the highest goal of life is the realisation of Brahman.1 Since the Absolute is indescribable the state of union with the Absolute is also indescribable.2 The self realises its true nature and its difference from the empirical order. It is course of which all are gradually purified and made fit for the heaven they are ultimately to attain, would seem to be the one least open to objection. It is also, I think, the one which is gradually popularising itself among those, who, without being students of philosophy, feel an intimate interest in its problems, and are not satisfied with the Christian solution.' 1 brahmāvagatir hi puruşārthah. Ś.B. I. I. I. 2 Cp. Sutta Nipata : 'He who (like the sun) has gone to rest is comparable to nothing whatsoever. The notions through which his reality can be expressed are simply not to be found. All ideas are nothing as bearing upon him; hence all modes of speech are, with respect to him, unavailing.' 5, 7, 8.

208 The Brahma Sūtra

an individual realisation of the Supreme by the individual soul. This is not thinking but seeing, a change of being.1 According to Ś., this realisation is a modification of the internal organ generated in the mind aided by the impressions produced by hearing, reflection, etc. This, while destroying the ignorance leading to the apprehension of the world as real, roots itself out as well, not being distinct from the universe.2 Ś. makes out that the attainment of moksa is not the destruction of the world but only the displacement of a false view of the world.3 The world has Brahman for its true nature and not vice versa. The cognition of Brahman is effected by the dissolution of the view of the reality of names and forms. Otherwise the first released person would have destroyed the world once for all so that at present the whole world would be empty, earth and all other substances having been finally annihilated.4 The life of union with Brahman is described in different ways. It is said that nothing remains of the individual whether as to name or likeness (nama-rupa)5 but only the Universal Reality. He becomes the Self that seems to have been determined or 1 na brahma-jñāna-mātram sāmsārika-nivrtti-kāraņam api tu sākşātkāra- paryantam. Bhamatī I. I. 4 .; see also I. I. I. 2 brahma-sākşātkāras cāntahkaraņa-vrtti-bhedah śravaņa-mananādi-janita- samskāra-saciva mano-janmā. sa ca nikhila-prapañca-mahendra-jāla-sākātkāram sa-mūlam unmūlayan ātmānam api prapancatvāviseşād unmūlayati. 3 brahma-svabhavo hi prapañco na prapanca-svabhāvam brahma, tena nāma- rupa-prapanca-pravilapanena brahma-tattvavabodho bhavati. 4 ekena cadimuktena prthivyādi-pravilayah kyta itīdānīm prthivyadisūnyam jagad abhavişyat. Ś.B. III. 2. 21. 5 For a Buddhist version see Anguttara Nikaya IV. I. 8. 'Just as the flowing streams that move towards the sea, on reaching it, are coming home, their name and shape are broken down and one speaks only of the sea, even so of this witness the sixteen parts that move towards the Person, when they reach the Person are coming home, their name and shape are broken down and one speaks only of the Person. As the drop becomes the ocean, so the soul is deified, losing her name and work, but not her essence.' Eckhart Pfeiffer's Edition, p. 314. Cp. Ruysbroek: 'All men who are exalted above their creatureliness into a contemplative life are with this Divine glory-yea, are that glory, and they see and feel and find in themselves by means of this Divine light that they are the same ground as to their uncreated nature. Wherefore contemplative men should rise above reason and distinction and gaze perpetually by the aid of their inborn light, and so they become transformed, and one wills the same light by means of which they see and which they are.' Quoted by Inge: Christian Mysticism, p. 189.

Introduction 209

particularised but is in fact impartible. Any kind of embodiment or individuality is regarded as a descent from the truth of being, a bondage to ignorance and desire, a self-forgetfulness of spirit. Freedom is absolute identification of the finite with the Infinite. B.U. describes the state of liberation thus: 'As a man when in the embrace of his beloved wife, knows nothing without or within, so the person when in the embrace of the Intelligent Self knows nothing without or within. That, verily, is his form in which his desire is fulfilled, in which the Self is his desire, in which he is without desire, free from any sorrow.'1 According to the Praśna U. the freed individuals lose their specific individu- alities when they merge themselves in the Supreme Self, even as rivers that flow into the sea lose their names and forms in it. 'As on the destruction of the jar, etc., the ether enclosed in the jar, etc., merges in the ākāa [the vast expanse of ether], even so the individuals merge in the Universal Spirit.'2

Communion with the Divine Iśvara The released soul retains its distinct individuality and becomes a mover at will, kama-carin, whose will indeed is no 1 IV. 3. 21. 2 Gaudapāda on Kārikā on Mā. U. III. 40. Meister Eckhart says: 'If therefore I am changed into God and He makes me one with Himself, then, by the living God, there is no distinction between us. ... Some people imagine that they are going to see God, that they are going to see God as if He were standing yonder, and they here, but it is not to be so. God and I: we are one. By knowing God I take Him to myself. By loving God, I penetrate Him.' Meister Eckhart, E.T. by R. B. Blakney (1941), pp. 181-2. St Catherine of Genoa cried: 'My one is God, nor do I recognise any other one except my God himself.' St John of the Cross likened the soul in search of God to a log of wood which is consumed by fire in which the fire only is operative. 'The soul that is in a state of transformation of love may be said to be, in its ordinary habit, like to the log of wood that is continually assailed by the fire; and the acts of this soul are the flame that arises from the fire of love: the more intense is the fire of union, the more vehemently does its flame issue forth. In the which flame the acts of the will are united and rise upward, being carried away and absorbed in the flame of the Holy Spirit, even as the angel rose upward to God in the flame of the sacrifice of Manue. In this state, therefore, the soul can perform no acts, but it is the Holy Spirit that moves it to perform them; wherefore all its acts are Divine, since it is impelled and moved to them by God. Hence it seems to the soul that whensoever this flame breaks forth, causing it to love with the Divine temper and sweetness, it is granting it eternal life, since it raises it to the operation of God in God.' The Living Flame of Love, tr. by E. Allison Peers (1953), pp. 18-19.

210 The Brahma Sūtra longer his own. M.U. says that he attains divine likeness.1 For R., the distinction between the individual soul and the Universal Self is real and so the two can never become one. Eternal life is love of God. It is essentially restful because the soul rests in God who is sufficient in himself and good unconditionally. Its only desire is to make its love more and more intense and absorbing. There is not with R. any question of the identity of the individual soul with God for such an absorption is not permissible in his philosophy. Love depends on a relation between two persons. The released soul has all the exalted qualities of the Divine except a few special prerogatives such as those of creatorship, etc. For Madhva life eternal is life in the presence of the Deity. For him difference is fundamental and obtains even in the state of release. For S., liberation is identification with the Self, sa-ātmaka; for R. it is direct contact with the Supreme, sa-yujyatā; for Madhva it is proximity to the Supreme, sa-lokatā. The author of the B.S. denies to the released souls the right to participate in the cosmic functions of the Lord. Bādarāyaņa gives us the views of Jaimini and Audulomi. Jaimini holds that the individual in the state of release becomes invested with the highest attributes of Iśvara or the Personal God.2 Release is regarded as the attainment of an unconditioned state where all traces of the manifested world disappear (prapañcopasama). Audulomi maintains that the released soul attains the state of pure consciousness. The state of absolute release is oneness of the individual self with the Super-personal Absolute which is the substratum of the world of experience. The unreleased souls look upon it as one of identity with Godhead. All these views are characterised by the negative condition of freedom from rebirth. The state of liberation is one of freedom from the limitative conditions of individual human existence. It is freedom from subjection to time, from birth and death which are marks of time. 'Death, thou shalt die.' All views agree that eternal life is an absolute fulfilment of what we are, the final affirmation of our progressive self-finding. 1 III. I. 3. 2 IV. 4. 5.

Introduction 2II

The Self shines forth in its purity.1 The Bhāgavata describes the state of release as the attainment of the individual's natural state by relinquishing its imposed state.2 The knowledge of God which is equivalent to the direct realisation of Ultimate Reality is the highest human good (parama-puruşārtha). The self as part (amśa) attains the whole (amsin). It is brought into personal contact with the Personal God. It is not a question of attaining sameness or identity but attaining similarity. The views affirm the timelessness of our inmost being, an indestructibility without continuance in time, but in the cosmic process, individuation is the method. Until the cosmic process is consummated, the individual centres will continue. Appaya Dīkşita in his Siddhānta-leśa-samgraha writes: 'Liberation being the manifestation of our nature and nothing adventitious, cannot be denied to or withheld from anyone. Universal liberation is more than a possibility; it is a logical necessity. Different souls will require a long or short period of time in proportion to their capacity to get rid of avidyā but its final removal is certain. So long as there is a single unrealised soul, māyā is not completely destroyed and there can be no absolute realisation for any other soul, however advanced it may be in the path of perfection.' Appaya Dīkşita says that as long as the created world lasts, i.e. as long as liberation of all does not happen, the Supreme Brahman has the form of Isvara.3 So from the empirical viewpoint, the fruit of knowledge turns out to be of the form of the attainment of the nature of Parameśvara characterised by the possession of desires which come true and so on. The lordship manifested in those who have intuited Brahman may be said to be of the nature similar to Brahman because of the text 'the stainless one attains absolute equality with the Supreme'.4 1 svena rūpeņa abhinispadyate. C.U. ātma-svarūpa-lābha or attaining one's own form is becoming like the Divine for Nimbarka. See Vedānta-pārijāta- saurabha. IV. 4. 1-2. 2 muktir hitvānyathā-rūpam, svarūpeņa vyavasthitih. 3 tad eva nirviśeşam brahma yāvat sarva-mukti saguņeśvarbhāvam āpadyāva- tişthata iti vyavahāra-drstyā satya-kāmatvādi-guņaka parameśvara-bhāvā- patti-rūpam api bhavati tat phalam. Śivādvaita-nirņaya III. 235. I. 4 U. III. I. 3: brahma-sākşātkāravatām yad aisvaryam āvirbhavati tad brahma- sāmya-rūpam iti vaktavyam. nirañjanah paramam sāmyam upaiti. Śivādvaita- nirņaya.

212 The Brahma Sūtra Life eternal is not a denial of becoming but a victory over it. The saved souls devote their energies to the spiritualisation of the world, to raising it to its highest levels. They are engaged in the development of the human type into the spiritual. To be free is to live in the integral power of spirit, which does not consist in the repose of a featureless existence indifferent to activity but in the simultaneous possession of a transcendent reality and cosmic activity and existence without which the cosmos will cease to exist. We are in bondage so long as the individual is confined to his superficial mind, ignorant of the spirit in him which is always free master of its world, its manifestation. In Yajña-varāha-bhagavadgītā 42, it is said that to the ignorant the world is full of sorrow, to the awakened it is full of bliss even as the world is dark to the blind and is bright to the seeing.1 Release (mukti) consists not in the shaking off of all bodily life or cosmic existence but in a recovery by the individual conscious being of its spiritual freedom. The spirit in us is the Divine enjoying the possible relations of his oneness in the multiplicity of souls. Individual existence in life is not a thing absolutely apart; it is part of the divine self-manifestation in the universe. The enlightened soul is one with the Divine in himself as well as the Divine in all. An exclusive emphasis on one side of the truth is misleading. The soul that has entered into that complete oneness with the Divine Being must, even as that Divine does, continue to be one with all being. The released souls live in the world though they are no more of the world. Their lives are lit by a steady spiritual flame imparting a new coherence, tranquillity and freedom. They are filled with peace though it is not a peace of the desert. They are vibrant with energy and engaged in meeting the demands of the world. Sudarśanācārya in his Śruti-sūkti-mālā gives the following illustration of the contemplation of identity with Brahman: 'Padma-nābha is said to be the Supreme Brahman and the Supreme Real, the Supreme Light and the Supreme Lord, since delighting only in contemplation of Thee, he is non-different

1 ajñasya duhkhaugha-mayam jñasyānandamayam jagat andham bhuvanam andhasya prakāsam tu su-cakșusa.

Introduction 2I3 from Thee, as the magician by the contemplation of Garuda is non-different from Garuda.1

Union with the World-Spirit These mukta-puruşas or enfranchised souls are those in whose lives the temporal and the eternal interpenetrate. God's light streams not darkly as through a glass but undimmed as through an open window.2 All the traces of egoism are dissolved and the limitations which condition individuality are extinct in them. They are untouched by the fear of death and untroubled by anxieties concerning the future of their temporal personalities. The divine principle in its eternal being is identical with one's own formless essence, beneath all the conscious and the unconscious qualifications of the personality. It is the non- particular in us, the pure divine non-form, a nameless, shapeless power which sustains the whole personality. The released are not the solitary men cut off from society and severed from the empirical self retreating from the threatening world. Such men of mere negation are sterile and unfruitful. The free souls are full men representing consistent and comprehensive affirmation of the Divine in life. After their enlightenment they get back to the world, love and serve their fellow-men in the light of their blessing. On the plane of spirit, there is an indivisible solidarity of the human race. The free spirits are persons without frontiers. They do not have any barriers of sex, class, race or nation between themselves and the rest of humanity. They are at home with men and women of all religions and no religion. They are the apostolate of the future. The marks of a liberated man are an earthen pot (for drinking water), the roots of trees (for food), coarse cloth, solitude, equanimity towards all.3 The life of the liberated has two characteristics. It is free from the egoistic self and its tyrannous desires. It is convinced of the unity with all and so has love for others. The freed man works for the good of others. Though he wants nothing for

padma-nābhah. 1 brahmocyate paramasau paramam ca tat-tvam jyotih param ca parameśvara tvad-bhāvanaika-rasikas tvad-ananyabhāvān mantrī yathā garuda-bhāvanayā garutmān. (42.) 2 I Corinthians xiii. 12. 3 kapālam vrksa-mūlāni kucailam asahāyatā samatātaiva sarvasmin etad muktasya lakșaņam.

214 The Brahma Sūtra himself, he cannot see others immersed in ignorance and suffering. So long as we are seekers of the goal we do unselfish work by conscious effort; when we are free we do it effortlessly. So long as the cosmic process continues the liberated souls have work to perform. They co-operate with the divine purpose for this world and strive for the redemption of all.1 According to Vaiśnava philosophy they live in Vaikuntha and are unlike human beings in respect of their conditions. They are said to be devoid of bodies and organs of sense.2 The appearance of the divine souls in the world gives light to those that live in darkness and in the shadow of death.3 This is the view of S. as indicated by Appaya Dīkşita. The liberated souls are active wherever a tear falls, wherever an act of injustice or brutality is committed, wherever a heart is seized with despair.4 In his hymn to the Supreme in the Bhāgavata, Prahlāda criticises those performers of penance in the forests who strive for their own salvation indifferent to the sufferings of the erring mortals and he says that he does not desire his own salvation unless these erring people are taken along:

prāyeņa deva munayah sva-vimukti-kāmāh maunam caranti vipine na parārtha-nisthāh naitān vihāya krpaņān vimumukşa ekah nānyam tvad asya caranam bhramato'nupasye. Life is a continuous drama embracing the beginnings of existence and its end. The light suffers and struggles to over- come the darkness in which evil cloaks itself.

1 'For we are labourers together with God', fellow-workers with him. I Corinthians iii. 9. Talmud (Sabbath, 10) says: 'Any judge who exercises rightful judgment even for one hour, of him Scriptures say that he becomes, as it were, a co-worker with God in the work of Creation.' In the phrase of Dame Julian of Norwich we are 'partakers in his good deed'. Revelations of Divine Love. 2 dehendriyāsu-hīnānām vaikuntha-pura-vāsinam. Bhāgavata VII. I. 34. 3 Luke i. 79. 4 Pascal says that Jesus struggles with death until the end of the world. In this boundless Gethsemane which is the life of the universe, he struggles with death, as the personification of all suffering and sorrow.

Introduction 215

Jīvan-mukti Liberation is not a state of existence to follow on physical death but an all-satisfying present experience. It can be had even in life. It is the condition of Jivan-mukti. The fruit of knowledge being present to intuition does not manifest itself at a later time only as the fruits of actions do.1 Hindu systems of thought describe the state of those who are released while they are in an embodied condition as one of jivan-mukti. They feel that the result of karmas which have begun to operate should be exhausted. There is no help for it.2 But we can escape from those which have not begun to operate, when we gain wisdom.3 Eternity is a state of mind, not a place or an environment. Kabīr asks, 'if your bonds be not broken whilst living, what hope of deliverance in death?' Life eternal is not in the future of time. Every moment we stand on the frontier of time. Release is not a state after death but the supreme status of being in which the spirit knows itself to be superior to birth and death, unconditioned by its manifestations, able to assume forms at its pleasure. It is wrong to think that a jīvan-mukta is not wholly perfect, that he is only a sādhaka and not a siddha. To possess a body does not mean identification with it. Jivan-mukti is not close proximity to final release but it is final release. A released person continues to have individuality until the whole cosmic process is dissolved or redeemed. Continuance till the dissolution of the primal elements is called immortality.4 When ignorance is destroyed by knowledge, it follows that release is obtained forthwith. But the freed soul does not become disembodied. There are passages which declare that only after physical death release is attained. Those who are released in spirit become released in fact after death.5 Embodiment may continue after the attainment of knowledge

Ś.B. III. 4. 15. 1 anubhavārūdham eva ca vidyā-phalam na kriyā-phalavat kālāntarabhāvīti.

2 prārabdha-karmānām bhogād eva kşayam. 3 See B.S. IV. I. 13-15. 4 Cp. ābhūta-samplavam sthānam amrtatvam hi bhāsyate. Quoted in Bhāmatī. I. I. I. 5 Cp. tasya tāvad eva ciram yāvan na vimoksye atha sampatsye. C.U. VI. 14. 2. Again: vimuktaś ca vimucyate. tasyābhidhyānād yojanāt tattva-bhāvāt bhūyaś cānte visva-māyā-nivrttih.

216 The Brahma Sūtra and therefore release. It is the liberated people that teach us the truth. S. says: 'It should not be disputed whether the knower of Brahman is embodied for a time or is not embodied. How can one's own intimate experience of the knowledge of Brahman existing together with embodiment be denied by another?'1 Those who hold that all embodiment is the effect of ignorance contend that full release is possible only after death. They assume that embodiment is a sign of ignorance and karma. If ignorance persists release is not gained. We are adepts and not perfected men. Bondage and release cannot coexist. Release relates to the frame of mind. It does not depend on embodiment or non-embodiment. Even after physical death, the released soul may assume individual form to work for the world. That is why it is sometimes said that the released soul becomes one with Iśvara, the creative dynamic side of Brahman. Even as Iśvara controls his manifestation and is not bound by it, the released soul controls his individuality and is not bound by it as a limitation. Even as Iśvara expresses himself in various forms to help suffering humanity, the released souls may assume forms to help the unregenerate. The individual soul becomes identical with Iśvara and when the world process is redeemed, he along with Brahma or the World-spirit lapses into the Absolute-God, Brahman-Iśvara.2 Salvation is possible for all and till that consummation is attained, the individual souls work in the world with a feeling of identity with God. While possessing wisdom they may act in the world. This action may take many forms. A popular verse reads 'Krsna was an enjoyer, Śuka was a renouncer, Janaka and Rāma were kings, Vasistha was a performer of ceremonies. These five kinds of knowers are to be regarded as equals.'3 To each is the way ordained by his nature. The way of the householder is suited for some, that of the houseless wanderer for others. We have to renounce not the things of the world but the desires of the heart. 'Whether one is interested in renunciation or 1 naivātra vivaditavyam brahma-vidah kincit kālam sarīram dhriyate na dhriyata iti. Katham hy ekasya sva-hydaya-pratyayam brahma-vedanam deha- dhāranam cāpareņa pratikşeptum sakyate. S.B. I. 4. 15. 2 See Appayya Dīkşita: Siddhānta-leśa-samgraha 3. 2351-3. 2355. 3 kysno bhogī śukas tyāgī nrpau janaka-rāghavau vasisthah karma-kartā ca pancaite jnānina samāh.

Introduction 217 enjoyment, in company or in solitude, he whose mind delights in the Supreme, he, verily, rejoices', says a verse attributed to S.1 He looks upon all creation as equal.ª He is detached but not isolated from the world; if isolated, he is isolated only in spirit. Yoga-Vasiștha tells us how a liberated soul should act in the world. 'Steady in the state of fullness which shines when all desires are given up and peaceful in the state of freedom in life, behave in this world, O Raghava. Inwardly free from all desires, dispassionate and detached, but outwardly active in all affairs, behave in this world, O Raghava. Outwardly full of zeal in action but free from any zeal at heart, active in appearance but inwardly peaceful, behave in this world, O Rāghava. Free from egoism, with mind detached as in sleep, pure like the sky, ever untainted, behave in this world, O Raghava. Conducting yourself nobly and with tenderness, conforming to the forms of society but inwardly renouncing all, behave in this world, O Raghava. Unattached at heart but outwardly acting as if with attachment, inwardly cool but outwardly fervent, behave in this world, O Raghava.'3 The jivan-mukta wears his life like a light garment. Hindu thought points out that what binds is not action but the spirit in which it is done. It is the desire for or aversion from the results that bind the individual soul. But so long as the 1 yoga-rato vā bhoga-rato vā sanga-rato vā sanga-vihīnah yasya brahmani ramate cittam, nandati, nandati, nandaty eva. ' samatā sarva-bhūteşu etan muktasya lakșanam. 3 prņo drştim avaştabhya dhyeya-tyāga-vilāsintm jīvan-mukta-tayā svastho loke vihara rāghava antaḥ samtyakta-sarvāso vītarāgo vivāsanah bahih sarva-samācāro loke vihara rāghava bahih krtrima-samrambho hydi samrambha-varjitah kartā bahir akartāntah loke vihara rāghava tyaktāhamkytir āsuptamatir ākāsa-sobhanaķ agṛhīta-kalankānko loke vihara rāghava udāra-pesalācārah sarvācārānuvrttimān antaḥ sarva-parityāgī loke vihara rāghava. antar nairāsyam ādāya bahir āsonmukhe hitaḥ bahis tapto'ntarāsīto loke vihara rāghava. William Law quotes: 'Do but suppose a man to know himself, that he comes into this world on no other errand but to arise out of the vanity of time .... Do but suppose him to govern his inward thought and outward action by this view of himself and then to him every day has lost all its evil; prosperity and adversity have no difference because he receives them and uses them in the same spirit.' The Works of William Law (1749), Vol. VII, p. I, reprinted in 1893.

218 The Brahma Sūtra action is performed in a selfless spirit, without desire for fruit, it is one with the creative activity of God. Without action, the world would cease to exist. We hear of many cases of liberated individuals who are engaged in the work of the world. They live as universal men with no private attachments or personal feelings. When the realised soul returns to the plane of conduct, his action will neither add to nor detract from the value of his realisation. Action itself will be of a different kind. It has no selfish motives behind it but is a manifestation of spiritual peace. The individual who is enlightened by knowledge does not renounce all activity. He acts to sustain his body and social relationships. He is incapable of selfish action as his egoism is burnt out. He is free from selfish desire, a-käma. He who has attained truth which is its own fruition acts selflessly and with full freedom.1 Sarva-mukti Whatever pathway we take, the end is the transformation of the individual and, as a result, the transformation of all human relationships. Individuals cannot be fully transformed in separation from each other. The word sarva-mukti means the liberation of all. In a deeply spiritual sense there can be no other salvation. Brahma-loka or the Kingdom of God implies corporate salvation.2 We are all wayfarers towards the Divine Kingdom and so cannot rest until the goal is reached. In the Yoga system the sage is likened to one standing on the 1 Cp. 'That is right action which does not make for bondage; that is right knowledge which makes for liberation.' tat karma yan na bandhāya sā vidyā yā vimuktaye. Eckhart says: 'It is permissible to take life's blessings with both hands provided thou dost know thyself prepared in the opposite event to leave them just as gladly.' 2 Siddhanta-muktavali quotes a verse: 'Men who duly observe the rites, who perform worship at the junctions of time [morning, noon and evening], then sins removed go to the world of Brahma which is free from harm [literally disease].' sandhyām upāsate ye tu satatam samsitavratāh vidhūta-pāpāh te yānti brahma-lokam anāmayam. Augustine observes: 'How could the city of God have a beginning or , developed or fulfil its destiny if the life of the saints were not a social lifer

Introduction hilltop and looking down on the suffering multitude below.1 This 219

infinite compassion impels him to build for himself a new body and mind and teach the saving wisdom to the world.2 In Mahāyāna Buddhism, Avalokiteśvara, the future Buddha looks downwards on all less elevated beings helping and expecting them to rise. So long as there are unreleased souls, the released souls will have work in the temporal order. The conception of the solidarity of mankind tells us that the saved souls and the sinning are bound to one another. The former work on the latter by persuasion and love until they are transformed and reborn into spiritual souls alive with the life that grows more and more into life eternal. In the saved souls there is a never completely resolved strain of temporality which makes them members of the cosmic order. If the last vestige of succession and contin- gency is removed time will have disappeared with it. The world is a whole where everything is necessary to all the rest. If anyone finds his end in himself he suffers defeat.3 So long as the cosmic plan is not fulfilled work will continue, in a spiritual selfless way by the saints, in a material selfish way by others. When the consummation of the world is reached, it lapses back into the Absolute. Two conditions are essential for final salvation, (i) inward perfection attained by intuition of self, (ii) outer perfection possible only with the liberation of all. The liberated souls which obtain the first condition continue to work for the second. So long as the cosmic process continues, life is not a resting but a going on. It goes on never pausing, always restless, always straining forward for something that has not been but should be. 1 prajñā-prasādam āruhya ašocya śocato janān bhūmisthan iva sailasthaḥ sarvam prājno'nupaśyati. Yoga-bhāşya I. 47. 2 ādividvān nirmāņacittam adhisthāya kāruņyād bhagavān paramarşir āsuraye jigñāsamānāya tantram provāca. Yoga-bhāşya I. 25. Kapila is said to have taught Asuri out of compassion. .Cp. 'Strike me out of the Book of Life or forgive my people their trespass', said Moses to God. Origen believed that God's infinite love would finally prevail over all evil and even Satan and his fallen angels would be ultimately redeemed. Such a view of universal restoration questions the justice of eternal damnation. It is impossible for any believer in God to assume that countless human souls could be for all time beyond the possibility of redemption, beyond the reach of God's love. It means the ultimacy of evil and the defeat of God's purpose.

220 The Brahma Sūtra Till the end is achieved the temporal process has a meaning and a value as the stage of soul-formation and growth. The world is not an adequate expression of reality and cannot therefore share the eternity which is characteristic of reality. It can only be an unending succession of transitory states. True individuality of human self is to be found in the achievement of the unity of the world. In that cosmic harmony which is the destiny of the historical process, each individual has his distinct place, has an eternal value, dharma, form or idea. Distinction does not any more mean opposition since all individuals strive for the same end and are inspired by the same ideal. They all know even as they are known. They all have a sense of communion with the Cosmic Spirit and devote their lives to its purpose. Each particular individual expresses the universal in its own way.1 The world-redemption (sarva-mukti) is not to be confused with cosmic millennia or earthly paradises. It is not a gradual accumu- lation of material comforts through the ages. It deals with values of spirit which may be gained sometimes through convulsions of nature and history. The question of universal salvation is not to be confused with the realisation of finite purposes in time. The chances of time, its fulfilments and frustrations, have little to do with the new mode of living which is independent of time. This view is not bound up with the inevitability of progress as that term is understood by us. Inner desolation and outward wealth may well go together. But the possibility of a spiritual life for the whole race is indicated by the theory of the indwelling of God. We may well cherish the hope that the ascent of the soul to God achieved by several individuals during the course of human history may be an earnest of what humanity will one day attain. The Kingdom of God, a society of saved souls, is the cosmic destiny. It is one expression of the Absolute but not the Absolute itself. It is a manifestation of one of its possibilities. The Absolute, however, 1 'They see themselves in others. For all things are transparent and there 15 nothing dark or resisting but everyone is manifest to everyone internally and all things are manifest, for light is manifest to light. For everyone has all things in himself and again sees in another all things, so that all things ar everywhere and all is all and each is all and the splendour is infinite.' E Enneads V. 8. 4.

Introduction 22I is not limited by its manifestation in such a divine society. The peace, the bliss and the oneness of the Absolute are not con- stituted by or limited to the perfection of this cosmic process. It may be said that it is an utterly futile business for the Creative Spirit to have brought individual souls into existence, spent infinite pains on their education only to get them dis- integrated at the end. Is all this difficult process of soul-making to end in their breaking up again? Personality, love and service should not be allowed to disappear in some infinite sea of undifferentiated being. Let us understand the implications of such a demand. Unless we regard imperfection as an end in itself, a state may arise when there is nothing for human minds to know or human wills to do. When the self-disclosure of personalities is accomplished, when the integral revelation of the world possibility is achieved, a simple continuance of such a state becomes a useless luxury. As Lotze argues, souls will exist as long as their existence has meaning for the universe. When this world order ends, the creative freedom of the Absolute may find expression in forms of which we have no knowledge today; other possibilities may be realised in other frameworks. While R.'s account of the independent existence of the liberated souls represents the cosmic destiny, S.'s view of the final identification of the liberated with the Supreme represents the state of the released, when the cosmic destiny is fulfilled. So long as the cosmic plan is in process of fulfilment, we have a dynamic fellowship of liberated spirits working for it, in co- operative union with God; when it reaches its fulfilment, there is unity of substance. There is support for the doctrine of the kingdom of spirit or brahma-loka in the Upanisads. A passage in the M.U. declares that 'those who have their intellects firmly rooted in the principles of the Vedanta, and purified themselves by methods of renunciation, go to the world of Brahma with whom they attain to final dissolution at the time of the great end'.1 The B.U. says that the knowers of Brahman go to the world of neaven (svargam lokam).2 Even Advaita Vedanta is not incon- . Cp. B.G. II. 12: 'Nor at any time verily was I not, not thou nor these princes of men; nor verily shall we cease to be hereafter.' 2 IV. 4. 8.

222 The Brahma Sūtra sistent with this view. It believes in the multiplicity of empirical selves. According to the doctrine that the whole universe including other finite selves is a creation of one's mind, the release of that one ego will mean the release of all. But this eka-jīva-vāda is not sustainable. The consciousness of the ego arises and gets strengthened by its clash with other egos. When anyone is released, does avidyā continue to exist or not? If the answer is negative, it means that all souls are released; if it is in the affirmative, what is the relation of the released soul to the ajñana which still binds others? His position is one of identity, not with Brahman but with Isvara. If he is not aware of the existence of avidya at all, then he is in a condition where there are no bound souls. Either the release of all is a fact or his awareness is a delusion. Though some later Advaitins adopt the theory of eka-jīva, Ś. is opposed to it. If all the different souls are only one jiva, then when for the first time any soul attains liberation, bondage should have terminated for all which is not the case.1 From the empirical standpoint a plurality of individuals is assumed by S. and many of his followers. On this view, salvation does not involve the destruction of the world. It implies the disappearance of a false view of the world. Ś. admits that the world appearance persists for the Jivan- mukta or the Sthita-prajna of the B.G. The Jivan-mukta, though he realises moksa or brahma-bhava, still lives in the world. The appearance of multiplicity is not superseded. It is with him as with a patient suffering from timira that, though he knows there is only one moon, he sees two. Only it does not deceive the freed soul even as the mirage does not tempt one who has detected its unreal character. Freedom consists in the attainment of a universality of spirit or sarvātma-bhāva. Embodiment continues after the rise of saving knowledge. Though the spirit is released, the body persists. While the individual has attained inner harmony and freedom, the world manifestation still persists and engages his energies. Full freedom demands the transfiguration of the world as well. S.'s view of the Jivan-mukta condition makes out that inner perfection and work in the finite universe can go together. 1 III. 2. 21.

Introduction 223 This view is not to be confused with krama-mukti or gradual release which is the aim of those who are devoted to Kārya- Brahmā or Hiranya-garbha. Ś. is discussing not gradual release but release consequent on brahma-jñāna which is attainable here and now; and for even such released souls, persistence of individuality is held not only as possible by S. but necessary in the interests of what is called world maintenance. In other words, the world will persist as long as there are souls subject to bondage. It terminates only when all are released, i.e. absolute salvation is possible with world-redemption. There are Advaitins who argue that each soul is an individual existence trying to get away from its own self-deceiving. They insist on the necessity for individual salvation and this has little to do with the destiny of the cosmos or other souls. Such a view is more in accordance with the Samkhya theory of a plurality of spirits (purușa) for in it each spirit is a separate eternal entity which falls into subjection to prakrti (nature) and pursues its separate cycle of cosmic existence and works for its separate release. The Samkhya theory affirms a dualism between spirit and nature and we cannot be certain that the free spirit that has once fallen into subjection by the disturbance of the equilibrium will not again fall into subjection by a repetition of the disturbance. According to the Advaita Vedānta, in each soul separately the one spirit has assumed the form of individual being. If it gets rid of the deception it may be saved, but the continuance of the self-deception in myriads of other souls will make for the time process. If the spirit is eternally free in itself and is also bound in the cosmos, it is not enough for a few souls to release themselves from time to time out of this deception.

PART TWO

TEXT, TRANSLATION AND NOTES

H

Section 1 (1) THE DESIRE TO KNOW BRAHMAN

I. 1. 1. The object of the study is indicated in this section. athāto brahma-jijñāsā. अथातो ब्रहधा जिज्ासा Now therefore the desire to know Brahman (the Ultimate Reality). atha: Now. It may also mean 'then' signifying immediate succession. ānantaryārthah. Ś. and R. atah: therefore; brahma: Ultimate Reality. jijñāsā: desire to know, to enquire into, to examine and test. The vişaya-vakya or the text referred to is the passage in B.U. 'Verily, it is the Self that should be seen, heard of, reflected on and meditated upon.'1 Cp. also T.U. 'Seek to know Brahman'. The word atha indicates that the desire to know Brahman arises subsequent to the fulfilment of certain conditions, according to S. The antecedent condition for the rise of the desire to know cannot be the study of the Vedas for that is necessary for the knowledge of both Brahman and dharma. It cannot be the performance of religious duty, for one can have the desire to know Brahman by a study of the literature of the Vedanta. Religious duty has temporal prosperity for its goal while knowledge of Brahman leads to eternal bliss. The latter is not dependent on human activity while the fruit of dharma is dependent on it. The knowledge of Brahman results immediately in realisation. brahma-vit brahmaiva bhavati. The desire to know Brahman has for its antecedent conditions the possession of the qualities of discrimination of things eternal and non-eternal, non- attachment to the enjoyment of fruit here or hereafter, possession in abundance of the qualities of calmness, equanimity and other such means, and desire for release.2 When we know that the Self alone is eternal and all others non-eternal and contemplate the impermanence, impurity and painful character of the world, non- attachment arises.3 Then follow śama, calmness, dama, control, titiksa, indifference to objects, uparati, turning away from them and śraddha, faith in the truth. The word atha indicates that the desire to know Brahman arises subsequent to the fulfilment of these conditions. While the result of the performance of religious duty may lead to

1 II. 4. 5. P.U., p. 197. 2 nityānitya - vastu - vivekah, ihāmutrārtha - bhoga - virāgah, śama - damādi - sādhana-sampat, mumukşutvam atha śabdena yathokta-sādhana - sampaty-ānantaryam upadiśyate. 3 nityah pratyag-ātmā; anityah dehendriya-vişayādayah ... asmin samsāra- mandale anityāsuci-duhkhātmakam prasamkhyānam upāvartate . . . virāgo abhogātmikopekşābuddhih. Bhāmatī.

228 The Brahma Sūtra earthly prosperity, even residence in heaven, knowledge of Brahman leads to liberation from bondage. The two cannot be regarded as complementary to each other. Ś. does not accept jñāna-karma- samuccaya-vāda. / Sureśvara holds that karma is an indirect means to liberation since it purifies the soul and helps the acquisition of knowledge. Ritual is a means of liberation though it is not as effective as knowledge.1 Bhaskara is of the view that the enquiry regarding Brahman must be preceded by a study of the Pūrva Mīmamsa. One has a right to know Brahman and obtain release only after one has discharged his three debts to the ancestors, to the seers, and to the gods. In other words only those who are self-controlled are eligible to undertake an enquiry into Brahman. Bhaskara holds that we enquire into the nature of religious duty and of Brahman since works and knowledge both play an important part in the achievement of salvation. He adopts the doctrine of jñana-karma-samuccaya or a combination of knowledge and works. J R. interprets atha to denote temporal succession to the study of the karma-kanda of the Vedas.2 When we reach the knowledge that the result of mere works is limited and non-permanent we get the desire for final release. A systematic study of religious duty is the necessary antecedent of the enquiry into Brahman. The conditions which S. lays down as essential for the enquiry into Brahman presuppose an understanding of the nature of duty. Madhva and his followers make out that the use of atha is for the sake of auspiciousness.3 He suggests that the study of the Vedānta has to be undertaken after the attainment of certain preliminary qualifications and the acquisition of certain spiritual and moral qualities.4 Those who have devotion are eligible for the enquiry into the nature of Brahman. Madhva takes atha to indicate the beginning of a subject. The word atah means that the knowledge of Brahman leads to release and so the enquiry into Brahman is justified. Madhva interprets it to mean 'through the grace or kindness of the Lord Visnu'. The reason for the enquiry into the nature of Brahman is the grace of the Lord. By a proper knowledge of him, we can obtain favours. According to Madhva there are three stages of fitness for the study of the Vedanta. A studious person devoted to the Lord is the lowest: one endowed with the six moral qualifications is the next higher; the highest is he who is solely attached to the Lord and detached from the world which he knows to be transitory. The desire

1 Sambandha-vārttika 1133-1134. 2 karma-vicārānantaram tata eva brahma-vicarah kartavyah. 3 mangalārthah. Cp. Jaya-tīrtha: kartavyam eva kāryārambhe mangalācaraņam kytam ca bhagavatā sūtra-kāreņa nivesitam ca granthādau. Nyāya-sudhā. 4 adhikārāntaryārthas ca.

Text, Translation and Notes 229 to know starts us on the path of enquiry, mīmāmsa.1 Madhva looks upon jijñāsā not as desire to know but as vicāra or enquiry to determine the nature of Brahman and his qualities. The distinction of the knowledge of the eternal and the non-eternal, nityānitya-vastu- viveka cannot be a prerequisite for it is the ultimate goal. Wherever there is doubt we have to use our reason to resolve the doubt.2 For Śrikantha an enquiry into Brahman can begin only after a study of the nature of dharma.3 When the mind is purified by the performance of Vedic duties one becomes entitled to enquire into the nature of Brahman. While S. speaks of the inner values and qualities as qualifying one for the enquiry into Brahman, Srikantha insists on the discipline of sacrificial duties as essential for such an enquiry. Appaya Dīksita reconciles the two by arguing that the performance of Vedic duties without any desire for fruit leads to the acquisition of the moral qualities insisted on by Ś. and so qualifies those possessing them for brahma-knowledge. Srīkantha adopts the view that a knowledge of religious duties is a necessary antecedent to the enquiry into Brahman for the two stand in the relation of arādhana, worship, and arādhya, the worshipped, sādhana, means, and sādhya, end. Works purify the mind and help the growth of the knowledge of Brahman. Nimbārka says that one who has read the Veda, whose mind is assailed by doubts about the results of actions, who has studied the Pūrva Mīmāmsā in order to remove such doubts and has a proper knowledge of karma and its fruits should try to acquire a knowledge of Brahman. The two mimamsas form one whole.4 The study of the B.S. must be preceded by the study of the Pūrva Mīmamsa. Nimbārka holds that the karma and jñāna-kāndas form a whole. Vallabha holds that both the mīmamsas, purva and uttara, deal with one topic, God, who possesses innumerable divine qualities including kriyā or sacrifice and jñāna or knowledge. The two mīmāmsas deal with the two qualities. He also holds that the word atha is used to signify the auspicious. He makes out that it denotes the commence- ment of a new topic. The performance of duty should precede knowledge of Brahman. Knowledge of Brahman does not result in the cessation of activity. Even jivan-muktas perform all karmas. Śrīpati makes atha mean 'afterwards' or 'then'. When the desire to learn is there, there is adhikāra or fitness. It is attained after the seeker frees himself from the three kinds of wordly sins, mala-traya, arising from mind, speech and body. He also suggests that it is after 1 In his Gītā-tātparya, Madhva says that mīmāmsa is of three kinds, brahma- mīmāmsā, daiva-mīmamsa and karma-mīmamsa and all the three should be studied. 2 sandigdham sa-prayojanam ca vicāram arhati. Jñānottama on Naişkarmya- siddhi I. 29. 3 dharma-vicārānantaram. 4 vakşyati ca karma-brahma-mīmāmsayor aikasāstryam.

230 The Brahma Sūtra obtaining initiation, dīksānantaram, that one can enquire into the nature of Brahman. Sripati gives a long passage about the pre- liminaries for the study of Brahman.1 Vijnāna-bhikșu says that atha indicates authority2 and auspicious- ness.3 The realisation of Brahman is the goal. Baladeva argues that the word atha means immediate sequence but contends that the mere knowledge of karma-mīmamsa or the acquisition of the qualifications laid down by S. does not give us the desire to enquire into the nature of Brahman. We need, in addition to all these, association with saintly people. All except S. seem to agree that a previous study of Pūrva Mīmāmsā is necessary before Uttara Mīmāmsā is taken up and the two form one whole. The knowledge of Brahman is not a matter of faith but the result of enquiry. Science comes by observation, not by authority. If religion is to be scientific it must be found through reasoned processes rather than by revelations from external authorities. If we use authority we do not use reason but memory as Leonardo da Vinci observes. Philosophy wishes to understand; religion is content to experience. Insistence on a logical approach to religious problems has been a persistent feature of the Indian tradition.4 Brahma-jijñāsā is brahmanah jijñāsā, discussion about Brahman. This discussion goes on till the realisation of Brahman is attained. Jijñāsa is the desire to know. The knowledge culminating in realisation is the object of the desire expressed by the suffix san. The realisation of Brahman is the end of man, since it destroys all evils, avidya, etc., all the seeds of rebirth. Therefore, Brahman is what is to be desired to be known.5 Philosophy is not mere logical analysis or epistemological enquiry. It is the love of wisdom. The urge to metaphysical inquiry is a natural one. It arises from the human situation. It is a natural propensity of the human mind to seek the presuppositions of thought and experience. The ultimate question is about the nature of being, what is meant by saying that something is. The objection is raised that an enquiry is unnecessary if Brahman is 1 nigamāgama-ubhaya-vedānta-pratipādita-bhakti-kriyā-jñāna-kāņda-traya- vihita-sthūla-sūkşma-cid-acit-prapañca-prakāsaka- şaļsthala - para-siva-sākșāt- kāra-kāraņa - bahu-janma-kṛta- sivārpita-yajana-yājana-tapodhyānādy- aneka- punya-pūrva-phalaka-sarīra-traya-gata-mala-traya-dhvamșaka-kāruņya-kalyāņa- kaivalya - vibhūti-traya - pra - dāyaka - astāvaraņa-pañcācāra-sadguru-karuņā- kațākşa-labdha-sakti- pātādy-avacchinna-para-para-siveșta-linga-dhāraņātmaka- pāsupata-dīkşānantaryam iti. 2 adhikāra-vācaka. 3 mangala-rūpa. 4 Cp.'I seek to know theself mentioned in the Upanisads'.tam tv aupanişadamı puruşam pcchāmi. 5 jñātum icchā jijňāsā. avagati-paryantam jňānam san-vācyāyā icchayāh karma . . . brahmāvagatir hi puruşārthah. nihseșa-samsāra-bījāvidyāy-ādy anartha-nibarhanāt, tasmāt brahma jijñāsitavyam. Ś.

Text, Translation and Notes 23I known (a-sandigdha) and futile (a-prayojana) if it is not known. If Brahman is pure and absolute intelligence, it is open only to direct intuition and is not a proper object for enquiry and discussion. Desire to know can only be with reference to an object which is not definitely known,1 so that by reasoning and discussion we can reach a definite conclusion. S. says that Brahman is known for Brahman is one's own self, ayam atma brahma. No one thinks that he does not exist. Each one cognises the existence of himself.ª Yet an enquiry into the nature of Brahman is essential since there are conflicting views about its nature. Brahman is often confused with the body, the sense-organs, mind or intelligence. It is said to be the doer or the enjoyer. These definitions are due to a confusion between object and subject, thou and I.3 We superpose the qualities of the object on the subject and the subject on the object through non-discrimination, a-viveka, and so we mix up the true and the untrue. We find in experience such expressions as 'I am this', 'this is mine'.4 The Ultimate Reality which is the pure Self, the inward subjectivity, is made into an object, a substance in empirical usage and this is the result of āropa, avidyā, bhrānti, ajñāna, which are synonymous terms. Väcaspati argues that the Self is known through indubitable, non- erroneous and immediate experience.5 Whatever experiences we pass through, the Self is constant and unchanging. 'That which is constant in whatever is variable, that is different from the latter even as a string [is different] from the flowers [strung on it].'6 The Self is distinct from the body, the sense-organs, the mind, the intellect and all objects. The Self which is of the nature of intelligence is the subject; the non-intelligent intellect, sense-organs, body and the objects are the objects of cognition .? The consciousness of 'I'is the consciousness of the Self limited by the adjuncts of body, sense-organs, intellect, etc. It is the conscious- ness of the jiva, the individual self. The pratyag-atman is in reality non-object since it is self-luminous, svayam-prakāśa. It becomes the object of the idea of the ego in so far as it is conditioned by the adjuncts of internal organ, senses, intellect, subtle and gross bodies. The empirical ego or agent is different from the Self present in all.8 1 jñātum icchā hi sandigdha-vişaye nirņayāya bhavati. Bhāmatī. 2 sarvo hy ātmāstitvam pratyeti na na aham asmi'iti. 3 Ś. opens his commentary with the words: yuşmad-asmat-pratyaya-gocarayo vişaya-vīşayinos tamah-prakāsavad viruddha-svabhāvayor itaretarabhāvānu- papattau siddhāyām. 4 satyānrte mithunīkrtya, 'aham idam' 'mamedam' iti naisargiko'yam loka- vyavahārah. Ś.B. 5 a-sandigdha, a-viparyaya, aparokşānubhava. e yeşu vyāvartamāņeşu yad anuvartate tat tebhyo bhinnam, yathā kusumebhyah sūtram. Bhāmatī. 7 cit-svabhāva ātmā vişayī, jada-svabhāvā buddhīndriya-dehavișayā vișayāh. 8 aham-pratyaya-vişaya-karty-vyatirekena, tat, sāksī sarva-bhūtasthah sama eka kūțastha nityah puruşaņ ... sarvasyātmā. Š.B. I. I. 4.

232 The Brahma Sūtra The Self is a non-object, avisaya, of empirical knowledge but it is the object of the notion of 'I' and of immediate realisation.1 It is of the nature of light which is self-luminous, one, immutable, eternal, without parts.2 The Self is immediately perceived. If it were not manifested, nothing else can be manifested. The whole world would cease to be manifest and become blind.3 Vācaspati makes out that when the inner self is made into an object, it becomes determinate, limited, and this limitation is apparent, not real.4 The Pure Universal Self appears in the concept of the individual soul jiva, as agent and enjoyer. For the Atman which is indifferent there cannot occur the capacity to act or to enjoy.5 The body, the organs, etc., cannot act and enjoy without the aid of intelligence, caitanya. So the Self whose nature is intelligence linked with the body and the organs acquires the capacity to act and enjoy. It is these adjuncts that make for the differences among souls. The discrimination between the Self and the not-self, atmanatma- vastu-viveka, is essential for salvation. Life in samsāra is traceable to the non-experience of the true nature of Self and will end with the recognition of the Self.6 S. observes that the superposition, wise men hold, is avidya, ignorance, and as distinct from that the determination of the nature of reality is vidyā or knowledge .? 'Superposition is the cognition as something of what is not that.'8 The superimposition of the not-self on the inner Self is the cause of ignorance but this ignorance does not affect the Supreme even to the smallest extent, anumātrenapi. The whole empirical universe with its distinctions of valid knowledge and means thereof and the sacred teachings relating to prescription, prohibition and release, śāstrāņi, vidhi- pratisedha-moksaparani, is the result of avidya or ignorance or non- discrimination between the Self and the non-self. Vidyā or knowledge referred to is the removal of avidyā or ignorance. It is the final cognition which is of the same type as what is removed by it, though it is of a higher degree in so far as it requires 1 asmat-pratyaya-vişayatvāt, aparokşatvāc ca pratyag-atma prasiddheh. S. 2 tad ayam prakāsa eva svayam prakāsa ekah, pratyag-ātmā. ... Bhāmatī. kūțastho nityo nir-amsah 4 tathapi anirvacanīyanādy-avidyā-parikalpita-buddhi-manah-sūkșma-sthūla- sarirendriyavacchedaka-bhedena anavacchinno'pi vastuto 'vacchinna iva abhin- 3 See M.U. II. 2. II. no'pi bhinna iva, akartāpi karteva abhoktāpi bhokteva avişayo'pi asmat-pratyaya- vişaya iva jīva-bhāvam āpannah avabhāsate. 5 na ca udāsīnasya tasya kriyā-saktir bhoga-saktir vāsambhavati. 6 samsāras ca ātma-yāthātmyānanubhava-nimitta ātma-yāthātmya-jnānena nivartanīyah. Bhāmatī. 7 tam etam evam-lakşaņam adhyāsam panditā avidyeti manyante, tad-vivekena ca vastu-svarūpāvadhāraņam vidyam ahuh. Avidya is unillumined knowledge, limited to empirical perception and discursive thinking. 8 adhyāso nāma atasmin tad-buddhiķ. Ś.

Text, Translation and Notes 233 nothing else for its own removal. The final cognition removes the obscuration of the Self which is knowledge caused by avidya. That cognition is spoken of as knowledge only figuratively. Self is know- ledge. The final cognition helps to reveal it and is knowledge only secondarily. So long as the self is a knower it is an agent in respect of knowledge. Without knowership there can be no activity of the means of valid knowledge.1 All knowledge belongs to the world of experience. When it is knowledge itself, it ceases to have cognition. The tendency to objectivisation of the pure subject is wrong but it does not follow that the objective universe is an apparition or illusion. For the Scriptures declare that 'all this is Brahman'. Later sūtras repudiate any suggestion of treating the world as non-existent or dreamlike. The world is, according to S., sarvaloka-pratyaksa, sarvānubhava-siddha.2 Even when the texts declare that the real is one and secondless, they do not contradict the empirical reality of the world we perceive. They only say that the reality of the world is not of an ultimate or absolute character.3 It is however beginningless4 and so is its cause, non-discrimination between the Self and the not-self. Even when S. says that Brahman appears as the world even as nacre appears as silver or as a single moon appears as having a second,5 he means that the manifestation is terminable.6 The world is subject to changes. Even as the nacre is more real than the silver, so the Absolute is more real than its manifestation. The manifestation is not devoid of reality for it is the combination of the real and the non-real. satyānrta-mithunam. The world of samsara is beginningless, anādi, and endless, ananta. It has everlastingness, pravahanaditva, and not eternity which is svarūpānāditva. S. mentions that all the Vedantas are set forth for the removal of the cause of evil and the attainment of the knowledge of the oneness of the Self.7 The goal is the attainment of knowledge which is not to be confused with mere repetition of names or performance of rites 8 It is not mere intellectual knowledge but intuitive realisation. Brahman, derived from the root brh, to grow, become great, means 1 na ca pramatytvam antarena pramana-pravyttir asti. Ś. ayam anadir kartytva-bhoktytva-pravartakah, sarvaloka-pratyaksah. 2 evam 3 ananto naisargiko'dhyāso mithyā-pratyaya-rūpah na hi āgama-jnānam sāmvyavahārikam pratyaksasya prāmānyam upahanti yena kāraņābhāvān na bhavet, api tu tāttvikam. Bhāmatī. 4 5 svābhāvikaņ, anādir ayam vyavahāraļ. Bhāmatī. suktikā hi rajatavad avabhāsate, ekas candrah sa-dvitīyavad iti. avasannah avamato vā bhāsah avabhāsah. Bhāmatī. ? asyanartha-hetoh ārabhyante. Ś. 8 prahāņāya ātmaikatva-vidyā-pratipattaye sarve vedāntā H* Pratipattih prāptih, tasyai, na tu japa-mātrāya, nāpi karmasu pravrttaye,

234 The Brahma Sūtra the Being of unlimited greatness, supreme perfection.1 S. derives Brahman from the root brhati, to exceed atisayana. It means eternity, purity, intelligence. Its main features are being, consciousness, infinity and freedom. While these are the primary qualities, svarūpa- laksana, there are the qualities of omnipotence, omnipresence, omniscience. These have a meaning when Brahman is looked at from the cosmic point of view. They are the tatastha-laksana. For R., Brahman is Narayana. He is free from imperfections, comprises within himself all auspicious qualities2 and enjoys originating, preserving, re-absorbing, providing and ruling the universe. The Highest Reality is determinate and the world which is the manifestation of his power is real. Madhva holds that those who suffer from bondage wish to be released from it and so desire the knowledge of Brahman. Bondage is real.3 Even S. holds that bondage, though unreal, is terminable. Brahman for Madhva is Visnu, the one Supreme God who bears all the names of the deities. He quotes R.V. in support of his view.4 God has a multiplicity of attributes. The Upanisad asserts that the knowledge of the Vedānta is essential for release.5 The main emphasis of this sutra is that a candidate for spiritual knowledge and life should be morally pure. His conduct should be upright. The quarrel of many thinking men is not so much with the foundations of faith but with the degradation in practice by its votaries. Though philosophy as brahma-jijñāsā is a consistent effort of reflection it is not possible with indulgence in ways of life which show lack of restraint. A life dedicated to the pursuit of wisdom must be an ethical life. Etienne Gilson says: 'Wisdom is the prize, not only of a quest, but also of a conquest. We all have to win it the hard way." 1 samasta-kalyāņa-guņātmakam. 2 param brahma sa-viseşam tad-vibhūti-bhūtam jagad api pāramarthikam eva. 3 mithyātvam api bandhasya naiva muktir apekşate. Aņu-vyākhyāna. 4 yo devānam namadha eka eva, tam samprasnam bhuvana yanty X. 82. 3. anyã 5 vedāntārtha-vijnānam moksa-hetuh. See M.U. III. 26. P.U., pp. 690-I. Nārayana Pandit's Nyaya-candrika sums up the substance of this section thus: atha-sabdenādhikāram ata ity amuna phalam brahma-sabdena vişayam sūcayāmāsa sūtra-kyt. 6 History of Philosophy and Philosophical Education (1948), p. 46.

Text, Translation and Notes 235

Section 2 (2) GOD THE WORLD-GROUND I. 1. 2. The second section defines Brahman as the source from which the world proceeds, by which it is maintained and ended. janmādy asya yatah. (Ultimate Reality is that) from which origin, etc. (i.e. subsistence and destruction) of this (would proceed). janmādi: origin, etc. Etcetera means subsistence, sthiti, and destruction, bhanga. To these three Madhva adds niyati (control), jñāna (enlightenment), āvrti (ignorance), bandha (bondage) and moksa (release).1 Śrīkaņtha extends ādi, etc., to cover 'janma- sthiti-pralaya tirobhavānugraha-rūpam krtyam'; asya: of this; yatah: from which. The relevant text is the Taittirīya Upanisad passage 'That from which these beings are born, that by which when born they live, that into which when departing they enter. That, seek to know. That is Brahman'.2 Our age has been greatly influenced by the emergence of the scientific world-view. We cannot believe unless our beliefs are consistent with the world we know and live in. Science is one of the languages in which God can be described. There is a general im- pression that the spirit of science is opposed to a spiritual view of the world and supports materialism. Astronomy is said to present us with a mindless universe which is governed by impersonal, automatic forces. Darwinism tells us that man is an animal. Freud and the Behaviourists explain away the soul. Marxism accounts for history on the basis of economic forces. This is sometimes said to be the scientific view of the universe. We may use the scientific instruments and know more about the nature of the world but what sees through them is the human eye and the achievements of science are the outcome of the human mind. Science describes facts and interprets them but these interpretations have varied from time to time. The B.S. gives us an explanation which is still relevant to the scientific facts. The Oxford group of scientists who founded the Royal Society of England were religious-minded. Its first Secretary, who was also its first historia Sprat, rose to be a Bishop. They were keen to make people religious-minded without making them intolerant. The assumption of philosophy is that this universe makes sense. This faith is not unwarranted. The world has a pattern. Philosophers seek to find it. Plato's Idea of the Good or Marx's economic develop- ment of history is a principle of explanation. Bergson finds in the 1 See V.S. III. 2. 5. III. I. P.U. 553. Cp. an Orphic saying quoted by Plato that God holds 'the beginning, middle and end of all existence'.

236 The Brahma Sūtra

world an élan, Samuel Alexander the nisus, General Smuts the holistic tendency and A. N. Whitehead the Creative Advance of Nature. This sutra gives us what is called natural theology.1 We build up a theory of ultimate being from empirically observable facts. The next sūtra takes us to authoritative sources. From the nature of the world, we infer the existence of One Supreme, Personal, Self-subsistent Mind to whose creative and ruling activities the world owes its existence, nature, coherence and consummation. The earlier stages of the cosmic process are adapted to the later ones. The temporal world taken as a whole suggests a cosmic meaning and admits of a consistent interpretation. While science may explain how things happen, it does not tell us why they happen. From a study of the universe with its ordered growth and plan which cannot be conceived by the mind,2 we infer the reality of an omniscient and omnipotent cause.3 Udayana's Kusumāñjali attempts to prove the existence of God by logical reasoning. S. in his commentary brings together the cosmological and the teleological arguments. Every effect has a cause.4 We cannot trace the world with its order and design to 'non-sentient pradhāna, or atoms or non-being, or a being subject to rebirth, to its own nature or to a human creator'.5 It cannot be traced to the world-soul or Hiranya-garbha for he is subject to the changes of the world.6 The universe has its roots in being, san-mūla, has its basis in being, sad-āśraya, and is established in being, sat-pratistha. This being transcends all distinctions of subject and object and yet when we speak of Brahman, we have to use empirical forms. When viewed as the creator and governor of the universe Brahman is said to be the personal God, Iśvara. Brahman and Iśvara are both valid forms of reality. Only Isvara or God is the cause of the world. 1 By his bequest of 1887 Lord Gifford founded his well-known lectureship in the four Scottish Universities for the promotion and diffusion of natural theology 'treated as a strictly natural science like astronomy or chemistry without reference to or reliance upon any supposed special, exceptional or so-called miraculous revelation ... '. St Thomas Aquinas tells us of 'an ascent, by the natural light of reason, through created things to the knowledge of God' and on the other hand of 'a descent, by the mode of revelation, of divine truth which exceeds the human intellect, yet not as demonstrated to our sight but as a communication delivered for our belief'. Summa Contra Gentiles, Vol. IV. Chap. I. There are some like Karl Barth who feel that rational thinking is not relevant to the religious faith. 2 acintya-racana. Ś. 3 sarvajñāt sarvasakteh kāranād bhavati. Ś. 4 yat kāryam tat sa-kartrkam. 5 pradhānād acetanāt, anubhyo vā, abhāvād vā, samsārino vā, utpadyādi sambhāvayitum śakyam na ca svabhāvataḥ. etad evānumānam samsāri- vyatirikteśvarāstitvādi-sādhanam manyante īśvara-kāraņa-vādinaķ. Ś. 6 Cp. kecit tu hiranya-garbham samsāriņam Ānandagiri. .. . jagad-hetum ācakșate.

Text, Translation and Notes 237 When we work from the cosmic end, we get to the Supreme as the Lord who presides over the world, who experiences all.1 Brahman, the pure spirit beyond the subject-object distinction, and Iśvara, the subject confronting the non-subject or object, are the two forms of one Reality.2 Brahman has two kinds of qualities, essential, svarūpa-laksana, and accidental, tatastha-laksana. The definition of Brahman as creator is of the latter type since it is only in association with māya that Brahman can be said to be the cause of production, etc., of the world.3 Among the Advaitins, many acute differences arose with regard to the causality of Brahman. Sureśvara and his follower Sarvajña in his Samkşepa-sarīraka argue that Brahman alone is the cause of the world. Padmapada contends that Brahman and māya together constitute the cause. Prakāśānanda following Maņdana Miśra believes that maya alone is the cause of the world. R. emphasises the creative aspect and makes it the highest reality. B.S. is not intended to give us a knowledge of Brahman without differences (nirvisesa-brahma). He quotes a verse from the Vişnu Purana which reads: 'From Visnu the world has sprung, in him it exists: he is the cause of the subsistence and dissolution of this world and the world is he.'4 In the first sutra we reach the conclusion that we should enter on an enquiry into the nature of Brahman and the second sūtra gives a description of that Brahman and not of some- thing else. R. says that the knowledge of Brahman may be gained on the ground of its characteristic marks such as its being the cause of the origination, etc., of the world, free from all evil, omniscient, all-powerful and so on.5 Madhva believes that the characteristics mentioned belong to the nature of Brahman. Creativity is an essential defining quality of Bralman. If a crow sits on a house, its association with the house is an accidental feature. Brahman has infinite qualities and their possession forms Brahman's defining character.6 The sutra differentiates God from souls and inanimate objects .?

1 sarvānubhūh. B.U. II. 5. 19. 2 dvi-rūpam hi brahmāvagamyate, nāma-rūpa-vikāra-bhedopādhi-visistam, tad-viparītam sarvopādhi-varjitam. S. 3 Pañcapādikā-vivaraņa by Prakāśātman, pp. 222-3. 4 vişņoh sakāsād udbhūtam, jagat tatraiva samsthitam sthiti-samyama-kartāsau jagato'sya, jagac ca sah. I. I. 35. 5 atah sakala-jagaj-janmādi-kāraņam, niravadyam, sarvajñam satya- samkalpamı sarva-sakti brahma lakşanatah pratipattum sakyata iti siddham. 6 ananta-guna-sattvam eva brahmaņo lakşanam. Nyaya-sudha, p. 107. 7 Madhva quotes in his Anu-bhasya a verse from Skanda Purāna utpatti-sthiti-samhāra-niyatir jnanam avytih bandha-mokşam ca puruşād yasmāt sa harir eka-rāt. Jaya-tīrtha refers to another interpretation of the sūtra: janma-ādyasya hiraņya-garbhasya yatas tad brahma.

238 The Brahma Sūtra Is the universe the result of an accident? Is the cosmic process where matter prepares the way for life and life for mind and mind for intelligence a long chain of accidents?1 Look at the many favour- able conditions that had to be provided for the advent of life and the preparations that had to be made in living conditions for the advent of mind. If we have an understanding of the gradual evolution of intelligence, we will be struck by the vast creative plan of the universe, its marvellous structure. The spectacle of life emerging from primal matter at some distant point of time and space and developing into God-men gives us a sense of mystery. If we wish to explain, the higher can account for the lower and not vice versa. To think that the mindless generates mind is as absurd as to think that a monkey given a typewriter and sufficient time would produce the plays of Kālidāsa or Shakespeare. Professor Planck writes: 'I regard matter as derivative from consciousness.' Mind can account for matter but matter cannot account for mind. So the highest reality can account for the whole creation. God is the illuminating, unifying interpretative principle.2 C. D. Broad tells us that there has been only one plausible argu- ment for supporting religious belief by science. It is the existence of laws which govern the events of the world. A priori it is not self- evident or even plausible that there should be su e such laws but science tells us that they exist. The belief that nature is ruled by laws is the content of what Einstein called 'cosmic religion'. These laws give testimony of God's presence in the universe. In this sutra we exclude the appeal to religious experience and take into account facts which are firmly established and universally acknowledged. The world tells its own story and offers its own suggestions. The most significant quality of early Greek religion, as we find in the Homeric view of life, is its acceptance of nature. The miraculous, in the sense of transcending the natural order, does not play an important role. Even if Homeric gods interfere in mortal affairs, they do so, not by changing the natural course of events, but by par- ticipating in it. Mr Otto observes of the Greeks, 'the divine is not 1 Plato commented on his times as follows: 'They say that fire and water and earth and air all exist by nature and chance. moved by chance and some inherent force, according to affinities amongst The elements are severally them, of hot and cold, or of dry with moist, etc. After this fashion and in this manner the whole heaven has been created as well as animals and plants. Not by the action of mind, as they say, or of any god, but as I was saying, by chance alone.' 2 Cp. Plotinus who says, concerning the seer, that his art is 'to read the written characters of Nature which reveal order and law'. Enneads, E.T. III. 1.6. Paracelsus looks upon Nature as a collection of books which are entire and verfect 'because God himself wrote, made and bound them and has hung them from the chains of his library'.

Text, Translation and Notes 239 superimposed as a sovereign power over natural events; it is revealed in the forms of the natural, as their very essence and being. If we look more closely at the occasions when these divine interventions take place, we find that they always come at the critical moment when human powers suddenly converge, as if charged by electric current, on some insight, some resolution, some deed. These decisive turns which, as every attentive observer knows, are regularly experienced in an active life, the Greeks regarded as manifestations of the gods'.1 The Olympian gods, though they were symbols, represented genuine aspects of human experience. The early Greeks apprehended divinity under different names in all forms of heightened experience. Plato and his successors could not believe in the physical reality of the Homeric gods and held that in moments of intellectual insight the human personality was irradiated with influences from another dimension of being. A distinction was drawn between nature and super-nature. Plato looked upon material things as merely shadows of the divine ideas. The Jews and the Christians believed that the world was governed by an omnipotent deity who could be trusted to punish the wicked and help the weak and the oppressed. 'The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament sheweth his handywork.'2 'I the Lord, the first, and with the last; I am he.' 'I am Alpha and Omega, the begin- ning and the end, the first and thelast.'3 Godis definedas that'whichis, which was, and that which is to come'. 'To God belong the East and the West; whithersoever you turn, there is the Face of God.'4 'We indeed created man; and we know what his soul whispers within him, and we are nearer to him than the jugular vein.'5 This view repudiates the familiar pessimistic doctrine that the world of history is as indifferent to us as the physical world, that it has no concern with the moral aspirations of men. Such a view represents the mood of many people who have seen two wars in one generation, disconsolate, despairing, strident, sick of the world, but incapable of love. They look upon the world as a ferment of fear, envy, hatred and horror. When we think of our encounters with disease and death, we are inclined to believe that we are in the hands of chance, that there is no providence which guides, corrects and leads us onward. There is no rational process of the world, no dialectic of reality, no moral duty to follow it. We live in a world of universal caprice. The era of fire from the sky may begin any day for Machiavelli seems to have penetrated deeply into human nature when he said: 'Men get discontented with the good.' Belief in God is possible only if we draw a veil over the agony and suffering of the world. The atheist argues that there is no God. If he is benevolent, evil is unthinkable. We cannot make God responsible only for the good and the creatures 1 Walter F. Otto: The Homeric Gods: The Spiritual Significance of Greek Religion, E.T. (1954). 4 Quran II. 109. 2 Psalm xix. I. 3 Revelation xxii. 13; see also i. 8. 5 Ibid. I. 15.

240 The Brahma Sūtra responsible for evil. Such a God who takes the credit for the good and shirks the responsibility for evil is not what we mean by God. Stendhal says: 'The only excuse for God is that he does not exist.' This sutra asks us to take a more universal and dispassionate view. The world moves: we cannot turn it backward or hold it where it is. Nothing in it stands still. It either grows or degenerates. This applies to every item in the universe from the atom to the stars. The world is not perpetual repetition. It is a perfecting process making towards perfection. It will change and, if we are wise, it will change for the better and the forces of the world will back us. The future is open. When we face disaster, we begin to doubt and despair. Goethe once wrote: 'A man who is unable to despair has no need to be alive.' We are afraid that mankind will destroy itself. There is no inevitability about it. It will yet become a family. For the laws of nature and God co-operate with one another and the darkness we now are in is a herald not of death but of the dawn of a new era. The first sutra refers to Brahman; the second sūtra refers to the same Brahman in another aspect. The first is Absolute Being, awareness and freedom; the second is the creative side of the Absolute. It is also evident that the world is not a transformation of Isvara in the sense that Isvara is obliged to express or manifest himself in this universe. When we limit our attention to the world which is one expression of the Creative Isvara, we get the concept of Hiranya-garbha. This last becomes. Whatever becomes is neither pure being nor pure non-being.

Section 3 (3)

SOURCE OF SCRIPTURE

I. 1. 3. This section affirms that Brahman is the source of the Veda. śāstra-yonitvāt. From its being the source of Scripture or From Scripture being the source (of its knowledge). sastra: the Veda and the other sacred books. yonitvat: from being the source or cause. Ś. gives two interpretations: (i) śastra-yoni, the cause of the Scripture; (ii) that of which Scripture is the cause or source of revelation or pramana. The first interpretation means that Brahman is the cause of the revelation of the Vedas. No one but an omniscient being could be their source. The second interpretation means that only the Vedas can prove to us that Brahman is the cause of the production, etc., of the world.1

1 śāstrād eva pramāņā jagato janmādi-kāranam brahma adhigamyate. Ś.

Text, Translation and Notes 24I I śvara's causality of the worldisconfirmed in this sūtra. The relevant text is: 'As from a lighted fire laid with damp fuel, various [clouds of] smoke issue forth, even so, my dear, the Rg Veda, the Yajur Veda, the Sama Veda, Atharvangirasa, history, ancient lore, sciences, upanisads, verses, aphorisms, explanations and commentaries. From this, indeed, are all these breathed forth.'1 Iśvara is the source of the śāstra, śāstrasya yonih. The Supreme Isvara is the source of the Veda, etc. He breathes forth all knowledge effortlessly, on the analogy of play, like human breathing.2 The Supreme is omniscient; his knowledge extends to all things. The Veda is said to be apauruseya, independent of human origin. The Pūrva Mīmamsa teaches the transmission of the eternal Veda through a succession of teachers and pupils, who are not its authors. Even those who hold that Isvara creates the Vedas admit that the Creator, though omniscient and omnipotent, creates the Vedas in accordance with what they were in earlier creations and has not freedom in regard to it.3 Even as the world is beginningless so are the Vedas. On this both the followers of Pūrva Mīmāmsa and Vedanta agree, though they use it for different purposes.4 The authors of the Vedas are only the seers of truth and not makers of it. The defects, if any, of the authors, do not affect the truth of the Vedas.5 To say that the Vedas are produced by God by his deliberate desire would be to accept the views of the Nyaya and the Vaisesika systems. The view of the eternity of the Vedas is then abandoned. If the Vedas had come out of Brahman like the breath of a man, the production of the Vedas would be involuntary as all breathing is. It will not show the omniscience of God. If he produces the Vedas in the same order in which they existed in the previous kalpa, then Brahman is subject to some necessities and is not independent. The sūtra may also be constructed to mean that the Scripture is the source of the knowledge of Brahman. sāstram yonih kāraņam pramanam. Scripture is the means of right knowledge through which we understand the nature of Brahman. If I. 1. 2 suggests mere inferential knowledge6 of Brahman, this suggests scriptural know- ledge of Brahman. Reason as the regulator of human life must have a source which transcends it though it must conform to it. Even a thousand upanisads cannot negative what is established by experience. The texts cannot be opposed to experience. 'A thousand Scriptures, 1 B.U. II. 4. 10; P.U., p. 199. 2 līlā-nyāyena purușa-niņśvāsavat. Ś. 3 sarvajñopi sarva-saktir api pūrva-pūrva-sargānusāreņa vedān viracayan na svatantraḥ. 4 puruşāsvātantrya-mātram cāpauruşeyatvam rocayante jaiminīyā api, tac cāsmākam api samānam anyatrābhinivesāt. Bhāmātī. 5 See, however, Vaiseşika Sūtra VI. I. I. buddhi-pūrvā vākya-kṛtir vede. 6 B.U. II. 4. 10; P.U., p. 199.

242 The Brahma Sūtra verily, can not convert a pot into a cloth',1 says Vācaspati. Ś. says that the source of knowledge is knowledge itself. 'The origin of a body of Scripture possessing the quality of omniscience cannot be sought elsewhere but in omniscience itself.' Scripture is not a written text. It is eternal truth interpreted with the help of the doctrine of samanvaya. ŚstraforŚ.includes the four Vedas, the epics, the puranas and other branches of learning, vidyāsthāna. Bhāmatī says: 'The Vedas are his breath, his glance the five elements, the movable and immovable [universe] is his smile and his sleep is the final deluge.'2 Objects require proofs to establish their reality but proofs like perception and inference are different modes of knowledge based on consciousness. Consciousness is the revealer, the proof of all things. It does not require any proof to prove it.3 Reason and experience are two different approaches in man's quest for God. Both are responses of the human soul to God's self-disclosure, through nature and history and spiritual experience. They reveal life's transcendental meaning. Reason reveals to us God as a matter of speculation; in experience it ceases to be an object of speculation but becomes a present reality. The method of natural sciences is not the only instrument by which it is possible to discover truth. Spiritual experience offers a valid proof for the existence of God. In spiritual experience which is registered in the Śastras we have a sense of power, of release from bondage. It is not a subjective impression but cognition of an object. Spiritual experience has this in common with perceptual experience that in both thereis the recognition of something given. It is an experimental knowledge of the things of God.4 The knowledge of Brahman culminates in experience and has an existent object for its content.5 The knowledge of the true nature 1 na hi āgamāh sahasram api ghațam paļayitum īsate. I. I. I. 2 nihśvasitam asya vedā, vīkşitam etasya pañca-bhūtāni, smitam etasya carācaram, asya ca suptam mahā-pralayah. 3 ātmānubhavam āsritya pratyaksādi prasiddhyati, anubhūteh svatah-siddheḥ kā'pekşā, ātma-siddhaye? 4 'You will discover a sense that will perceive the Divine.' Proverbs ii. 5. We have a sense of sight for perceiving non-corporeal things, of hearing voices that make no sound with air, tasting the bread that gives life (John vi. 51 ff.) ; the sense of smell that made Paul say that he was 'the good odour of Christ' (II Corinthians ii. 15); a sense of touch which John used when he handled the 'word of life' (I John i. I). See also John i. 14; Hebrews vi. 5; Romans vii. 22. 5 Ś.B. I. I. 2. Cp. Nietzsche who describes the role of intuition or inspiration. In the state of creative inspiration, he writes: 'One becomes nothing but a medium for super-mighty influences. That which happens can only be termed revelation; that is to say, that suddenly, with unutterable certainty and delicacy, something becomes visible and audible and shakes and rends one to the depth of one's being. One hears, one does not seek; one takes, one does not ask who it is that gives; like lightning a thought flashes out of necessity,

Text, Translation and Notes 243 of a thing is not dependent on human intellection. It depends on the thing itself.1 The knowledge of Brahman depends on the thing itself because its content is an existent thing.2 It is not an object of the senses.3 By nature the senses have objects as their content and do not have Brahman as their content.4 Brahman is not perceived by the senses. It is inferred from the world or learnt from the texts or experienced by the individual. The problem of communication is difficult. We cannot make the experience intelligible to others, cannot adequately express it through the limitations of language. Kabir says: 'That which you see is not; and for that which is you have no words.' Again: 'It cannot be told by the words of the mouth; it cannot be written on paper. It is like a dumb person who tastes a sweet thing-how shall it be explained?'5 The old days when the Scriptures were accepted on trust that God was their author are no more. There is a new approach today. We do not accept scriptural documents as books apart from other books, unquestionable in their accuracy and advice. The view that they are the inerrant word of God does not carry conviction. Disturbed by the attacks of modern knowledge and criticism, some people resort to what is called fundamentalism, a forthright assertion of complete verbal inspiration coupled with a total rejection of all that modern knowledge has contributed to a real understanding of the Scriptures. There is another view of the Veda as apta-vacana or sayings of the wise, those who had attained to a realisation of Brahman, brahma- prapti. This view is supported by Ś. who makes out that the Śruti or Scripture is pratyaksa6 or records of the direct experiences of the seers, which are of a self-certifying character. 'How can one', Ś. asks, complete in form. It is a rapture ... a state of being entirely outside oneself. Everything happens in the highest degree involuntarily, as in a storm of feeling, freedom, of power, of divinity.'

Ś.B. 1 na vastu-yāthātmya-jñānam puruşa-buddyapekșam ... vastu-tantram eva tat. 2 brahma-jñānam api vastu-tantram eva, bhūta-vastu-vişayatvāt. Ibid. 3 indriyāvișayatvena. See also Ś.B. I. I. 4. na ca parinişthita-vastu-svarūpatve'pi pratyakşādi-vişayatvam brahmaņah. William Law said: 'Away, then, with the fictions and workings of discursive reason, either for or against Christianity! They are only the wanton spirit of the mind, whilst ignorant of God and insensible of its own nature and condition. ... For neither God, nor heaven, nor hell, nor the devil, nor the flesh, can be any other way knowable in you or by you, but by their own existence and manifestation in you. And any pretended knowledge of any of those things, beyond and without this self-evident sensibility of their birth within you, is only such knowledge of them as the blind man hath of the light that has never entered into him.' 4 svabhāvato vişaya-vişayānīndriyāni, na ca brahma-vișayāņi. Ś.B. See also Katha U. II. I. I; P.U., p. 630. 5 Rabindranath Tagore: Kabir's Poems, pp. 95, 121. 6 I. 3. 28; III. 2. 24.

244 The Brahma Sūtra 'contest the truth of another possessing knowledge of Brahman, vouched for as it is by his heart's conviction?'1 The experience is intimate, ineffable, incommunicable. It is an act of pure apprehension when our whole being is welded into one, an act of impassioned intuition which excludes all conceptual activities. 'Whereas I was blind, I now see.' The self alone is witness to it.2 The experience of Brahman cannot be adequately expressed in words. This is true even of ordinary immediate experiences of given objects. Vācaspati says: 'the distinctive attributes of various things cannot, indeed, be declared, though experienced. The difference in the sweetness of the sugar-cane, milk and jaggery cannot, verily, be given expression to, even by the Goddess of Learning.'3 The experiences which we cannot know from perception or inference are described in the Vedas; hence their authoritativeness.4 Even those who look upon Brahman as the Vedas.5 personal God admit that his nature is inconceivable except through Mere inferential knowledge will not do for the realisation of Brahman. It is to be used as an aid for the interpretation of the Vedānta texts. This is admitted by the Vedic Scripture.6 R. repudiates the idea of inferring the existence of an omniscient and omnipotent God from the nature of the world. He holds that the reality of God cannot be known through any means of proof such as perception and inference. He is known only through scriptural evidence. Madhva also believes that inference by itself cannot prove that Brahman is the cause of the production, etc., of the world. 1 Ś.B. IV. I. 15. 2 ātma-sākșikam anutpannam. Ś. on B.U. IV. 4. 8. Bergson says that religion represents 'the crystallisation of what mysticism has poured, while hot, into the soul of man. Through religion all men get a little of what a few privileged souls possessed in full'. The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, E.T. (1935), p. 227. Francis Rous (seventeenth century) says: 'The soul has two eyes-one human reason, the other far excelling that, a divine and spiritual light. By it the soul doth see spiritual things as truly as the corporal eye doth corporal things.' The Threefold Life III. 31. 3 na hi te te asādhāraņa-dharmā anubhūyamānā api sakyā vaktum ; na khalv I. I. 3. ikşu-kşīra-gudādīnām madhura-rasa-bhedāḥ sakyāh sarasvatyāpy ākhyātum. 4 Sāyaņa in his introduction to the Rg Veda quotes a verse: pratyakseņānumityā vā yas tūpāyo na drsyate 5 Cp. Skanda purāņa: enam vidanti vedena tasmād vedasya vedatā.

nendriyaih nānumānais ca na tarkaiḥ sakyate vibhum jňātum nārāyanam devam veda-vedyam sanātanam. 6 śrutyaiva ca sahāyatvena tarkasyāpy abhyupetatvāt. Ś.B. I. I. 2. See B.U. II. 7. 19. 14. II. 4. 5; C.U. VI. 14. 2.

Text, Translation and Notes 245 Śrīpati holds that the Vedas were created by Śiva and the texts were intended for the glorification of Siva. This is against the Pūrva Mīmāmsā view that the Vedas are eternal and uncreated. The nature of Brahman can be understood not through discussion but through the testimony of the Vedas. Vallabha combines the second and the third sūtras in one. He believes that we can know only on the evidence of the Scriptures that Brahman is the cause of the world. A rationalist takes the high a priori road and attempts to deduce the universe from a few fixed principles. The inadequacy of rational knowledge is accepted by all knowers of God.1 There are religious leaders both in the East and in the West who demand a complete sacrifice of the intellect. If they say that empirical science can give no knowledge of God or that our thoughts of God cannot be adequate to the Divine Reality but fall inevitably into contradictions or that mere thinking is not a substitute for experience, they are not unreasonable. But highest experience is not irrational. Faith seeks understanding.2 The God one infers is an idea and does not give religious apprehension. It is direct experience that is registered in the Scriptures. Faith is not blind acquiescence in external authority. 'The wise man after studying the Scriptures and becoming devoted to wisdom and knowledge throws away the Scriptures even as one throws away the straw after collecting the grain.'3 'When one knows the truth there is no need for the Vedas.'4 There are those who have neither experience nor rational know- ledge of God. They have neither sight nor proof. They have faith in the Scriptures. In faith we believe with our hearts while in science we believe with our minds. But the word faith has another meaning. It is not merely acceptance of authority without proof or experience. It is the response of the whole man, which includes assent of intellect and energy of will. Men of faith are men of power who have assimilated the truth and made it into a creative principle. God becomes the light and life from which they act, the strange power

1 'The wisdom of this world is foolishness with God.' I Corinthians iii. 19; see also ii. 14. 2 Cp. St Anselm: Fides quaerens intellectum. 'O Lord, I do not dare to search into thy depths, for my understanding is in no wise equal thereto. Yet I do yearn to understand something of thy truth which my heart believes. Not indeed that I seek to understand in order that I may believe, but I believe in order that I may understand.' (Credo ut intelligam.) St Thomas Aquinas states the rationality of the beliefs he holds. Vidyāranya says that reasoning in accord with experience is useful, not mere reasoning. svānubhūty anusāreņa tarkyatām mā kutarkyatām. Pañcadasī VI. 30. 3 grantham abhyasya medhāvī jñāna-vijnāna-tat-parah palālam iva dhānyārthī tyajet grantham aseșatah. Uttara Gītā 20. 4 vedair nāsti prayojanam. Ibid. 22.

246 The Brahma Sūtra beside which our own power is weakness. God is the name we give to that interior principle which exceeds us while forming the very centre of our being. The second and third sutras demonstrate the intimate connection and continuity of reason and intuition. The greatest of the mystics are particularly sensitive to the rational aspect of existence. They rise to the mystical elevation not only through intuition but through the strictly logical sequence of rational thought. The seers of the Upanisads and the Buddha, Plato and Plotinus point to the validity of mystical experience on grounds of logical thought. In these days when many regard themselves as the elect of God, as the chosen instruments of the Holy Spirit, and possess a sublime confidence in their own infallibility, it is essential to emphasise the continuity of reason and intuition and the pre- dominantly rational character of religious insight. As the experience has a cognitive quality about it, the judgments based on it should be subjected to logical analysis. Logical scrutiny is the one safeguard against mere caprice. If the tradition is to be preserved we need men who illustrate it in their own experience. When the Princess in the story cried out in despair as to what would happen to the Vedic tradition,1 Kumārila Bhatța reassured her that there was no need for fear as the great teacher was alive.2

Section 4 (4)

HARMONY OF TEXTS

I. 1. 4. This section declares that Brahman is the meaning of all scriptural passages. Their differences are only apparent and are capable of reconciliation. The many passages have one purport. tat tu samanvayāt But that is the result of the harmony (of the different scriptural state- ments). tat: that; tu: but. samanvayāt being the result of the harmony of the different texts. The word tu, but, according to S., excludes the prima facie view.3 The objection is raised that the Scriptures which are said to be the source of our knowledge of Brahman speak of Brahman in different ways. We must get the connected meaning of the different texts of the Upanisads.4

1 kim karomi kva gacchāmi vedān ka uddharişyati. 2 mā vibheși vararohe bhațțācaryo'sti bhūtale. 3 tu sabdah pūrva-paksa-vyāvmtyarthaḥ. Ś. 4 evam eva samanvito hy aupanişadah pada-samudāyah. R.

Text, Translation and Notes 247 Even as there are order and harmony in the universe so in know- ledge. Though the mystery of Brahman is, strictly speaking, incommunicable, it would be hidden and mute without some form of knowledge. When words come up fresh and breathless from the embrace of Reality they carry power and authority.1 Language is, at best, an instrument and all instruments are subject to imperfection. Ś. starts his discussion on this sūtra by stating the objection that the Vedas deal with ritual and the Vedānta passages are not intended for ritual.2 We cannot have an injunction with regard to a thing already existing,3 and so the Vedas dealing as they do with ritual cannot be the source of the knowledge of Brahman. If it is said that the Vedas enjoin us to contemplate, we have to note that contempla- tion, which depends on the establishment of differences of the contemplated, contemplator, contemplation cannot occur in the case of Brahman which is devoid of all differences and is to be known only through the Vedanta.4 Though Vedic statements are generally treated as authoritative in relation to injunctions, the authoritativeness of the means of valid knowledge consists in their generating knowledge which is uncontradicted, not already under- stood and indubitable.5 Though the generation of this kind of knowledge is known by the nature of presumptive implication from the nature of the effect, yet in the generation of this knowledge, it is not dependent on any other means of valid knowledge. The Vedas give us not only injunctions with regard to ritual but also Brahma- knowledge.6 The authority for Brahman is the sacred teaching .? 1 Cp. Max Picard: 'The perfect silence is heard in the perfect word.' Wittgenstein says: 'There is, indeed, the inexpressible. This shows itself: it is the mystical.' Traetatus Logico-Philosophicus (1922). 2 āmnāyasya kriyārthatvād ānarthakyam atadarthānām. Pūrva Mīmāmsā I. 2. I. Cp. also: tad bhūtānām kriyārthena samāmnāyah. 'The [words] denoting those existent things are to be connected with [passages] whose purport is ritual.' Purva Mīmāmsā I. I. 25. drsto hi tasyārthaļ karmāvabodhanam nāma. 'Its purport is indeed seen to be what is called the teaching of ritual.' Sābara on Pūrva Mīmāmsā I. I. I. Again: codaneti kriyāyāh pravartakam vacanam. 'An injunction is a statement which prompts to action.' Sābara on Pūrva Mīmāmsā I. I. 2. Cp. also: pravyttir vā nivrttir vā nityena kytakena vā pumsām yenopadiśyeta tacchāstram abhidhīyate. 'Participation in activity or abstention from it in respect of the obligatory or the occasional, that by which these are taught to men is called sacred teaching.' Quoted in Bhāmatī I. 1. 4. 3 na ca parinişthite vastu-svarūpe vidhih sambhavati, kriyā-vişayatvād vidheh. 4 upāsyopāsakopasānādi-bheda-siddhyadhīnopāsanā na nirasta-samasta- bheda-prapañce vedānta-vedye brahmaņi sambhavati. Bhāmatī. 5 abādhitānadhigatāsandigdha-bodha-janakatvam hi pramāņatvam pramāņ- ānām. Bhāmatī. 6 ādrg-bodha-janakatvam ca kārye vidhīnām. Bhāmatī. 7 tasmāt siddham brahmaņa sāstra-pramāņatvam. Ś.

248 The Brahma Sūtra Another objection is raised. Though the Veda is the means of gaining a right knowledge of Brahman, yet it suggests Brahman only as the object of certain injunctions even as the sacrificial post, the āhavanīya fire, etc., though they are supra-mundane, are intimated by the sacred teaching (only) as subsidiary to an injunction.1 Even if it is said that there is a distinction between the fruit of the knowledge of Brahman and the fruit of the knowledge of religious duty, a mere statement of the truth of Brahman is not enough to give us the knowledge of Brahman. That is why one is asked to seek the Self, desire to know the Self. So the objector holds that Brahman should be acknowledged to have sacred teaching as authority only as the content of an injunction of realisation.2 It is said in reply that there is a difference in nature between ritual and Brahman, in respect of their knowledge and fruit.3 The fruits of actions, meritorious or simple, are happiness and misery. There are gradations of happiness, rising in degrees of excellence from the world of men to that of Brahma. Similarly there are degrees of misery from the world of men down to the hell known as avici. All that is both produced and destructible.4 The fruit of the knowledge of the Self is, however, final, unembodied, unsurpassable and being naturally established is eternal and unproduced. This eternal reality is not the fruit of an injunction whose content is contemplation. The state of final release which is non-embodiment is distinct from the fruit of ritual to be observed. It is eternal.5 In eloquent phrases, S. describes the state of moksa. 'This is absolute, immutably eternal, all-pervasive like the ether, devoid of all modifications, eternally contented, without parts, self-luminous by nature, which merit and demerit together with their fruit do not approach, not the three times [past, present and future]. This is the non-embodiment called final release.'6 If this is the nature of final release, it is not something to be accomplished, or done. As soon as 1 yady api śāstra-prāmāņakam brahma: tathāpi pratipatti-vişayatāyaiva sāstreņa brahma samarpyate, yathā yūpāhavanīyādīny-alaukikāny api vidhi- śeşatayā sāstreņa samarpyante tadvat. Ś. 2 tasmāt pratipatti-vidhi-vişayatāyaiva bhyupagantavyam. Ś. śāstra-pramāņakam brahmā- 3 karma-brahma-vidyā-phalayor vailakşanyāt. Ś. 4 punyāpunya-karmanoh phale sukha-duhkhe, tatra manusya-lokam arabhya ā-brahma-lokāt sukhasya tāratamyam adhikādhikotkarşah evam manusya-lokam ārabhya duhkha-tāratamyamācavīci-lokāt, tasya tasya sarvam kāryam ca vināsi ca. ātyantikam tv asariratvam, anatisayam svabhāvasiddhatayā nityam akāryam ātma-jñānasya phalam. Bhāmatī. 5 Cp. ata evānuştheya-karma-phala-vilakşanam mokşākhyam asarīratvam nityam iti siddham. S. 6 idam tu pāramārthikam kūțastha-nityam, vyomavat sarva-vyāpi, sarva- vikriyā-rahitam, nitya-trptam, nir-avayavam, svayam-jyotih-svabhāvam, yatra dharmādharmau saha kāryeņa kālatrayam ca nopāvartate, tad etad asarīratvam mokşākhyam.

Text, Translation and Notes 249 knowledge arises, ignorance disappears.1 S. affirms that the knowledge of Brahman is not dependent on human activity.ª It is not something to be attained: it is by nature attained by all.3 It is not to be under- stood by anyone either through the ritual part of the Veda or logical reasoning.4 If the aims of the two śāstras, Dharma-mīmāmsā and Brahma- mimamsa were not different, there would have been no justification for two separate śastras. Their very distinction makes out that the knowledge of Brahman is enjoined for the purpose of final release even as sacrifices are enjoined for the purpose of obtaining the heavenly world and the like. There is no opposition between the two śastras. Madhva argues that the Scriptures declare Visnu to be Brahman, the ultimate cause of the world and not Siva. Bertrand Russell admits that great thinkers are sometimes led by mysticism (I. I. 3) and sometimes by science (I. I. 2) to the prob- lems of philosophy. 'But', he observes, 'the greatest men who have been philosophers have felt the need both of science and of mysti- cism; the attempt to harmonise the two was what made their life, and what always must, for all the arduous uncertainty, make philosophy, to some minds, a greater thing than either science or religion.'5 Science and religion require to be reconciled. Today the samanvaya or harmonisation has to be extended to the living faiths of mankind. Religion concerns man as man and not man as Jew or Christian, Hindu or Buddhist, Sikh or Muslim. As the author of the B.S. tried to reconcile the different doctrines prevalent in his time, we have to take into account the present state of our knowledge and evolve a coherent picture.6 Beliefs retain their vigour for a long time after their roots have withered or their sources have silted up. We must express our beliefs in the context and shape of the real questions and search of modern men. The way in which faith has hitherto expressed itself, the categories which it has evolved, the very nature of the world and the hope towards which faith directs its attention have lost their meaning and reality for the

1 vidyodaya evāvidyā-nivrttih. Brahmasiddhi, p. 32. 2 na puruşa-vyāpāra-tantrā brahma vidyā. 3 nityāpta-svarūpatvāt. Ś. 4 vidhi-kāņde tarka-samaye vā kenacid adhigatah. Ś. 5 Mysticism and Logic (1918). G Origen writes to his former pupil Gregory the Wonder-worker: 'I should like to see you use all the resources of your mind on Christianity and make that your ultimate object. I hope that to that end you will take from Greek philosophy everything capable of serving as an introduction to Christianity and from geometry and astronomy all ideas useful in expounding the Holy Scriptures; so that what philosophers say of geometry, music, grammar, rhetoric and astronomy-that they assist philosophy-we too may be able to say of philosophy itself in relation to Christianity.' Epistle Gregory I, quoted in Origen by Jean Danielou (1955), p. 16.

250 The Brahma Sūtra

modern world. Our society is shaken to its foundations. The con- ventional call on the part of religions to believe in God, work for his glory and purpose has become open to question. Philosophy is not a mere intellectual pursuit labelling and classifying the contents of thought but the creation of a new awareness of oneself and the world. Samanvaya or reconciliation is the need of our age. The global, all- comprehensive changes which are taking place represent something new in the structure of human society, though they are not deviations from the normal course of history. The world community which we envisage can be sustained only by a community of ideals. We have to look beyond the political and economic arrangements to ultimate spiritual issues. We have to fashion a new type of man who uses the instruments he has devised with a renewed awareness that he is capable of greater things than mastery of nature. Unfortunately rivalries among religions are retarding the growth of an international community, the fellowship of man. If we accept the view that the Scriptures of the world are the records of the experiences of the great seers who have expressed their sense of the inner meaning of the world through their intense insight and deep imagination, we will not adopt an attitude of dogmatic exclusiveness. Symmachus in his controversy with St Ambrose said: 'It is impossible that so great a mystery should be approached by one road only.' Nicholas of Cusa, echoing the words of the prophet Muhammad, observes: 'God is sought in various ways and called by various names in the various religions ... he has sent various prophets and teachers in various ages to the various peoples.' The view is in agreement with the concept of universal revelation that has the support of Justin, Clement and Origen. The Logos or the Word of God inspired all that is true and good in the religious thinking of men. The seeds of Logos, Logos Spermatikos, were scattered in all mankind. Justin proclaims: 'All who have lived according to the Logos are Christians, even if they are generally accounted as atheists, like Socrates and Heracleitus among the Greeks.'1 Clement of Alexandria looked upon Greek philosophy as 'a preparation for Christ'; 'a schoolmaster to lead us to Christ'.2 He brought about the marriage between Platonism and Christianity. The early Fathers enriched Christian mysteries by using the ideas of Socrates and Plato. They expressed Christianity in terms familiar to the people trained in Greek thought. Augustine's views are well known. 'The salvation brought by the Christian religion has never been unavailable for any who was worthy of it.' 'What is now called the Christian religion always existed in antiquity and was never absent from the beginning of the human race until Christ appeared in the flesh. At this time, the true religion which was already there, began to be called Christian- ity.'3 It is now admitted that in the course of its development

1 Apology I. 46. 2 Stromata IV. 28, 32. 3 Retractions I. 13.

Text, Translation and Notes 25I

Christianity has drawn upon Greek metaphysics and mystery religions. The religion of the New Testament according to St Paul is 'debtor both to Greeks and barbarians'.1 Now that the religious environment has been world-wide and the living faiths are en- countering one another the idea of fellowship among religions is gaining ground and a reconciliation or samanvaya is taking place. The great sages are symbols of the Spirit in which they are one. While we have to communicate our faith through words and symbols, forms and creeds in accordance with the accidents of our race, nation or training, we use them to help us to realise the presence of the Spirit in us. If we strive with a sincere intent and a whole heart, we get not to a new faith but to the heart of all faith. The first four sutras are said to be the essence of the teaching of the B.S

Section 5 (5-11)

INADEQUACY OF NATURALISM I. 1. 5. Section 5 (5-11) suggests by various arguments that the cause of the world is conscious reality and cannot be identified with the non-conscious pradhana or matter as the Samkhya system holds. īkşater nāśabdam. Because of seeing (matter which is) not founded on the Scripture is not

iksateh: on account of seeing; na: not; asabdam: not founded on (the cause).

Scripture. The primary matter, pradhāna, is sometimes said to be the root cause of the world. From the principle that every effect has a cause, to avoid infinite regress, we affirm a primary cause which itself is uncaused. 'That in which the world, divested of name and shape, resides, some call prakrti, others māyā, others atoms.'2 Devī Māhatmya says: 'You are the power of Visnu, endless valour. You are the source of the universe, the primal māya. By you all this is enchanted [confused]. When you are gracious you are the cause of final emancipation.'3 The Samkhya thinkers argue that the non-intelligent matter pradhāna consisting of the three strands of sattva, rajas and tamas is the cause of the world. This view is devoid of scriptural evidence.

1 Romans i. 14. 2 nāmarūpa-vinirmuktam yasmin samtisthate jagat. tam āhuh prakrtim kecin māyām vanye pare tv anūn. Quoted from Byhad-Vasistha in the Pātanjala-bhasya-Varttika. 3 tvam vaişnavī saktir ananta-vīryā viśvasya bījam paramāsi māyā sammohitam devi samastam etat tvam vai prasannā bhuvi mukti-hetuh.

252 The Brahma Sūtra

Pradhana cannot be the cause, for the quality of seeing, thinking is ascribed to the cause in the Scripture. The passage says tad aiksata bahu syam prajayeyeti.1 'It saw, [thought], may I be many, may I grow forth.' Thought is prior to all creation.2 The Samkhya thinkers may say that thought is a quality of the sattva (goodness) quality of the pradhana. It is said that when the three gunas are in equipoise in the state of pradhana knowledge which is a quality of goodness is not possible. There can be no knowledge without a witnessing principle of consciousness.3 If it is said that pradhana possesses the quality of knowledge owing to the witnessing principle, the Lord, then it would be more reasonable to assume that the all-knowing Brahman itself is the cause of the world. This sutra is used to suggest that the Ultimate Reality is not nirguna-Brahman, but saguna, Personal God. R. develops his view that the universe of sentient and non-sentient beings constitutes the body of the Lord. According to Saivites, Sakti and Siva are both Brahman and through their harmony they ensoul the world.4 Accord- ing to Śrīkantha, Siva qualified by Sakti, sakti-visista-śiva, is Brahman. Baladeva gives a different interpretation: 'Since [Brahman is] seen [i.e. mentioned by the Scripture] [he is] not inexpressible.' Vijñāna-bhiksu points out that Brahman must be a person since it is said that he perceives or desires. Perception or desire cannot be attributed to unconscious prakrti. Vijñāna-bhikșu questions Ś.'s assertion that the purport of the sutra is that prakrti is not the cause of the world since the idea of prakrti is un-Vedic. He quotes from the Upanisads many passages where prakrti is spoken of as the cause of the world, as the energy of God, for example, in the S.U. Even though the magician may withhold his magic, the magic power is in him.5 It is clear that the Sutrakara does not hold that the world is due to avidyā. He takes the problem of the creation of the world seriously and urges that the world is the product not of pradhana of the Samkhya system but of Brahman possessed of intelligence. There is no suggestion here of the unreality of the world. Ś. holds that Brahman's power is māyā, that it exists and functions only as residing in Brahman, that, though thus informed, it is transcended by Brahman. The effect is Brahman functioning through maya and is not non-existent. The world is unreal apart from Brahman but is real as founded in Brahman.6 1 C.U. VI. 2. 3; P.U., p. 449; see also Aitareya Aranyaka II. 4. 1. 2. Praśna U. VI. 3. 2 sarveşv api syşti-prakaraneşvīkşā-pūrvikaiva srsti pratīyate. R. 3 nāsākşikā sattva-vrttir jānāti nābhidhīyate, na cācetanasya pradhānasya sākșitvam asti. Ś. 4 śaktih śivaś ca sac-chabda-prakrti-pratyayoditau tau brahma-sāmarasyena samasta-jagad-ātmakau. 6 māyāyā vyāpāra-nivrttir evāvagamyate na nāsah. 6 brahma-vyatirekena kārya-jātasyābhāva iti gamyate. Ś.

Text, Translation and Notes 253 I. 1. 6. gauņaś cen nātma śabdāt On account of the word self (used for the cause), (the meaning of the word 'seeing') is not secondary (figurative). gaunah: secondary, figurative; cen: if; na: not; ātma-śabdāt: on account of the word 'self'. If it is argued that the word 'seeing' is used in a secondary or figura- tive sense in some passages 'That fire thought; that water thought',1 and it may be so treated here, the answer is that the word 'self' is actually employed. It is the self that sees or thinks and there is no need to look upon seeing as figurative. In the passages 'fire thought' or 'water thought' what thinks is the self acting through them.2 Baladeva gives a different interpretation. If it be said that the creator of the world is gauna (i.e. saguna Brahman associated with the qualities of prakrti possessing the sattva guna), the sūtra says it cannot be on account of the term 'self'. This term 'self' can apply only to the nirguna-Brahman, free from the qualities of prakrti.

I. 1. 7. tan-nişthasya moksopadeśāt Because release is taught of him who takes his stand on (is devoted to) that (Brahman). tan-nisthasya: of him who concentrates on that Self (or Brahman). moksopadeśat: because of the instruction of release. If it be said that the term 'self' may be used in regard to pradhāna, figuratively, that the real (sat) meant in the Upanisad3 is the non- intelligent matter, it is said in reply that release is possible only with concentration on Self which is intelligence. The whole teaching in the Upanisad is clear that release is possible for one who is devoted to the Real as self, tat satyam, sa ātmā. Devotion to the non-intelligent principle is the cause of all suffering; it cannot lead to release. Even those who advocate the view of pradhana as the cause of the world do not maintain that he who is devoted to pradhāna attains release.4 Baladeva argues that salvation is promised to him who relies on nirguna-Brahman.

I. 1. 8. heyatvāvacanāc ca And because there is no statement that it has to be discarded. heyatva: the quality of being discarded; avacanāt: because there is no statement; ca: and. The word sat has not been used to indicate pradhāna even as a first step to the knowledge that the real is Brahman. In such a case 1 C.U. VI. 2. 3, 4; P.U., p. 449. tat teja aikşata. tā āpa aikșanta. 2 C.U. VI. 3. 2. 3 C.U. VI. 2ff. 4 pradhāna-kāraņa-vādinopi hi pradhāna-nişthasya mokşam nābhyupagac- chanti. R.

254 The Brahma Sūtra

there would have been instruction to discard the provisional definition of Brahman as pradhana. There are no statements that this view has to be discarded. What is called arundhatī-nyaya is adopted here. If we are to point out the small star Arundhati, we first direct attention to a big star near it and say 'that is Arundhati' though it is really not so. Later on, we withdraw the first direction and point to the real Arundhati. It is possible in the same way that the teacher may direct the pupil through the non-self, pradhana, to the self but in that case there would have been a statement that the self is not of the nature of pradhāna but there is no such statement. Ca for Bhaskara means contradiction of the original proposition. Nimbārka says [pradhāna] cannot be denoted by the terms Existent, Self, etc., for there is no [scriptural] statement of its having to be discarded. Pradhāna cannot serve the purpose of salvation. Scripture does not give any other purpose for Scripture does not teach anything which does not fulfil a purpose. Baladeva says that if saguna-Brahman were the Creator of the world, Scripture would have said that he was inferior and fit to be discarded. In some versions there is, at this point, another sūtra, prati- jñavirodhat. R. and Nimbārka have it as a separate sūtra while S., Bhāskara, Vallabha and Baladeva do not mention it. On account of the contradiction of the initial statement. pratijñā: initial statement, definite thesis. virodhat: on account of the contradiction. The initial statement is that through the knowledge of the one reality, all things are to be known.1 From the knowledge of pradhāna, we cannot know all things for conscious beings cannot be the effects of non-conscious principle. There would thus arise a contradiction of the view that through the knowledge of one, there would be the knowledge of all.

I. 1. 9. svāpyayāt On account (of the individual soul) entering the self. sva: the Self, atman. apyayat: on account of entering. Pradhana cannot be the Self for it is said 'When a person sleeps, as it is called, then he has reached pure being. He has gone to his own, svam apito bhavati. Therefore, we say, he sleeps for he has gone to his own.'2 Here the Real is said to be the Self. It cannot be the pradhāna. If we say that the word 'own' denotes pradhana we will have the absurd position that an intelligent entity is being resolved into a

1 C.U. VI. I. 2 C.U. VI. 8. I; P.U., p. 456.

Text, Translation and Notes 255

non-intelligent one.1 There is also the other passage that in the state of dreamless sleep the Self is absorbed in the Self.2 It cannot be absorbed in the non-conscious pradhāna. R. quotes the Vrttikara to the effect: 'Then he becomes united with the Real-this is proved by [all creatures] entering into it and coming back out of it.' Baladeva reads the sūtra differently, svāpyāt, and interprets it differently. '[The Creator is not the Personal God] because "he [the Creator] merges into himself" and saguna-Brahman merges into something other than himself.'

I. 1. 10. gati-sāmānyāt On account of the uniformity of teaching (Brahman is to be treated as the cause). gati: teaching, primary meaning, pravrtti. R. apprehension. avagati, Nimbārka. sāmānyāt: on account of uniformity. The Vedänta texts are agreed in teaching that the cause of the world is the intelligent Brahman.3 There is no disagreement on this point. R. says that the import of the scriptural texts is uniform, that Brahman alone is the cause and not any other. Madhva holds that there is taratamya among the nine different kinds of devotees.4 Suka is of a different view. For him those who practise bhakti in the nine forms mentioned in the Bhāgavata are on a level.5 Nimbārka points out that as a conscious cause is indicated by all the scriptural texts, a non-conscious cause is not acceptable. Baladeva says that Scriptures uniformly teach nirguna-Brahman and not saguna-Brahman.

I. 1. 11. śrutatvāc ca And because it is stated in the śruti (that the all-knowing Brahman is the cause of the world). śrutatvāt: because it is stated in the śruti, i.e. Vedic Scripture; ca: and. The reference is to the Ś.U.6 where the All-knowing Lord is said to be the cause. S. gives a number of passages where the Supreme is described in 1 pradhānam ātmīyatvāt sva-sabodenocyeta, evam api cetano 'cetanam apyetīti. viruddham āpadyeta. Ś. ª B.U. IV. 3. 21. 3 samānaiva hi sarvesu vedānteşu cetana-kāraņāvagatiķ. Ś.

nirņaya. I. 4 mokşāhkye laye tāratamyam devānām api drsyate. Mahābhārata-tātparya-

5 tasmād anyatamāpi navānām api bhaktīnām moksa-rūpa-phalasya samānatvāt. 6 VI. 9.

256 The Brahma Sūtra

negative terms and others where he is said to be all-knowing, etc. He suggests that this dual description of Brahman is relative to our states of knowledge and ignorance.1 R. affirms that the Brahman which forms the object of enquiry possesses attributes such as thinking and so on in their real literal sense. On the theory that Brahman is nothing but distinctionless intelligence, even the witnessing function of consciousness would be unreal. There are passages which describe Brahman as devoid of deter- minations and others which describe Brahman as endowed with all auspicious qualities. They indicate that from the cosmic end Brahman is viewed as Iśvara and in himself as absolute being devoid of all determinations. The Upanisads do not suggest any status of inferiority to one or the other. The Sūtrakara in I. 1. 10 makes out that the teaching of the texts is uniform. This whole section is viewed by Madhva not as repudiating the Samkhya view of pradhana but as critical of the Advaita view of the indescribability of Brahman as being beyond the scope of Vedic utterances. na cāśabdatvam itara-siddham. The witnessing character of the Supreme is inconsistent with the Absolute without deter- minations. Brahman is described in the Scriptures for they enjoin that Brahman should be perceived. If Brahman cannot be grasped and described by any of the pramanas, there would not be any proof of its existence. Though R. follows S. in his interpretation of this section, he says that this section does not support the non-dualistic theory of Brahman without determination.2 While this section (5-11) is viewed by the other commentators as dealing with the question whether Brahman or pradhana is the creator of the world, Baladeva discusses in this section the question whether nirguna-Brahman or saguna-Brahman is the creator of the world.

Section 6 (12-19)

THE SUPREME AS BLISS

It is now established that the cause of the world is an intelligent principle and cannot be identified with the non-intelligent pradhāna of the Samkhya system. From this section onwards to the end of the chapter, we find a discussion of certain terms used in the Upanisads, 1 evam sahasraśo vidyāvidyā-vişaya-bhedena brahmaņo dvi-rūpatām darsayanti vedānta-vākyāni. 2 ata eva, nirviseşa-cinmātra-brahma-vādino'pi sūtrakārenabhih śrutibhir nirastā veditavyāh. pāramārthika-mukhyeksaņādi-guņa-yogi jijnāsyam brahmeti vyavasthāpanāt ; nirviseşavāde hi sākșitvam apy apāramārthikam. R.

Text, Translation and Notes 257 whether they refer to the Supreme Lord, the individual soul or unintelligent matter. The first topic considered is the meaning of ananda or bliss in relation to the Supreme Reality.1

I. 1. 12. ānandamayo'bhyāsāt (Brahman is) a being full of bliss, because of repetition. ānandamayah: full of bliss; abhyāsāt: because of repetition. The text considered in this sutra is the second chapter of the T.U. (1-5) where we have a progressive definition of the nature of self as consisting of anna, food, prāņa, life, manas, mind, vijñāna, under- standing. Then it is said 'different from and within that which consists of understanding is the self consisting of bliss'.2 If it be said that the Self consisting of bliss is a secondary and not the principal self, that it is the empirical self subject to rebirth,3 as it forms a link in a series of selves, since it is said to have joy and so forth for its limbs and as it is embodied, the reply is given that it is the Highest Self on account of frequent repetition in the Upanisads. Though it is a link in a series of selves, it is the innermost self of all. For the purpose of logical exposition and easy comprehension, we are led on from one stage to another till we reach the Highest. This accounts for the attribution of limbs and body to it. It is not said of ananda that there is another self inside it, as it was said of matter, life, mind and understanding.4 The objector quotes the text, brahma puccham pratistha:5 Brahman, the lower part is the foundation. If Brahman is the foundation, ananda cannot be Brahman. When it is said that Brahman is the puccha, it is meant that it is the foundation of all, sarvādhāra, and not that it is merely a limb (avayava) of ānanda. The self consisting of bliss is the Supreme Self.6 Ś. gives a twofold explanation of the ānanda-mayādhikaraņa. R. says that the self of bliss is other than the individual soul, it is Brahman itself .? He argues that the self consisting of knowledge is the 1 Ś. holds that the enquiry is continued to explain the distinction between nir-viseşa Brahman, or the Absolute without determinations, and sa-visesa Brahman, or the Absolute with determinations. George Thibaut writes'But that such an investigation is actually carried on in the remaining portion of the first Adhyaya, appears neither from the wording of the Sutras nor even from S.'sown treatment of the Vedic texts referred to in the Sūtras'. Introduction to Vol. I of the Vedanta Sutras with the Commentary of S. (1890), pp. xxxii-xxxiii. 2 tasmād vā etasmād vijñāna-mayāt anyo'ntara ātmā ānanda-mayah. II. 5. P.U., p. 546. 3 samsāry evānanda-maya-ātmā. The individual self does not become ānanda- maya for then it would be the creator of the worlds like the Supreme. The Supreme who is ananda-maya gives bliss to the individuals and cannot itself be an individual. There is always a distinction between the giver and the receiver, the attained and the attainer. 4 See Ś.B. I. I. 19. 5 T.U., II. 5: P.U., pp. 546-7. 6 para eva ātmā. Ś. 7 ato vijñāna-mayāj jīvād anya eva paramātmā, R. I

258 The Brahma Sūtra individual self, while the self consisting of bliss is the Highest Self.1 When Brahman is said to be the support, it means that Brahman has no support outside itself. Brahman is rooted in itself. For Srikantha, the self of bliss is the para-akti, otherwise called param-akasa of which Brahman is the support. The Sūtrakāra refers to Brahman itself as the self of bliss since there is no fundamental difference between para-sakti which is the attribute or dharma of Brahman and that which possesses the dharma. The dharmin is referred to on account of its essential non-difference from dharma. For Nimbarka, that which consists of bliss is the Supreme Self alone and not the individual soul.

I. 1. 13. vikāra-śabdānneti cen na prācuryāt If it is said (that anandamaya) does not (denote the highest Self) since it is a word denoting modification, it is not so on account of abundance. vikāra-sabdāt: because of the word denoting modification. na iti cet: if it is held that it does not (refer to the Highest Self). na: not so; prācuryāt: on account of abundance. If the word 'mayat' is taken to mean 'made of', a product or a modification, then it cannot apply to the Highest Self which is not a product or a modification. It is stated in reply that the word mayat need not always mean vikāra or modification, it may also mean pracurya2 or abundance. Brahman abounds in bliss and this bliss is immeasurable.3 Suka says that it is the Supreme Self only that is primarily contemplated and there is not a suggestion of non-difference between the individual soul and the Supreme Self.4

I. 1. 14. taddhetu vyapadeśāc ca And because (Brahman) is declared to be the cause of it (the bliss). tat: of it (bliss); hetu (cause); vyapadeśāt: because (Brahman) is declared; ca: and. The Self which causes bliss5 must itself abound in bliss, even as one who gives wealth to others must himself possess abundant wealth. According to Srikantha, the self of bliss is cit-śakti, the energy of consciousness, while the Brahman spoken of as the tail or the support is the Supreme Brahman.

1 See B.U. III. 7. 22; P.U., p. 229. 2 Pāņini V. 4. 21. 4 tasmāt iha śārīratvasya param-ātmany eva paryavasānāt na jīveśvara-abheda- 3 T.U. II. 8.

prasakti-gandho'pi iti niscīyate. See Jaya-tīrtha's Nyāya-sudhā I. I. 25. 5 eşa hy evānandayati. T.U. II. 7.

Text, Translation and Notes 259

I. 1. 15. māntra-varņikam eva ca gīyate And because the same (Brahman) which is described in the mantra is sung (in the Brahmana). mantra-varnikam: what is described in the mantra; eva: the same; ca: and (hence); gīyate: is sung. Anandamaya is Brahman because the Mantra and the Brahmana portions of the T.U.1 agree in referring to the same Brahman.

I. 1. 16. netaro'nupapatteh (Anandamaya is) not the other, because of inappropriateness. na: not; itara: the other; anupapatteh: because of inappropriateness. The individual soul is not capable of the activities of creation, etc. S. says that it is impossible for the individual soul or any being other than the Highest Self, to brood over himself before sending forth whatever there is. To think about things to be created and to create the things in such a way as to be non-different from himself are possible only for the Highest Self.2 The Sanskrit word for creation is derived from srj, to emit, to discharge. Creation is an outflow from the Divine. It is not creation out of nothing. R. explains that the higher self is not Brahman without deter- minations but the all-knowing, blissful Brahman. The clause 'from which speech returns along with mind' means that mind and speech are not means for the knowledge of Brahman.3 Śrikantha makes out that Hiranya-garbha, world-soul, is not the cause of the world, on account of inappropriateness. He begins a new section here consisting of sūtras 17-20, to deal with the question whether the Supreme Isvara is the cause of the world or someone

paśu-pati. else, viz. Hiranya-garbha. Prajā-pati in the context is equivalent to

I. 1. 17. bheda-vyapadeśāc ca And on account of the declaration of difference (between the two). bheda: difference; vyapadesat: on account of the declaration; ca: and. The individual soul and the Self of bliss are represented as different in the Upanisad.4 'That, verily, is the essence of existence. For truly on getting the essence, one becomes blissful.' He who attains cannot be that which is attained.5

1 II. I and 5. 2 tatra prak-charīradyutpatter abhidhyanam srjyamānānām vikārāņām

Ś. sraştur avyatirekas sarva-vikāra-systis ca na parasmād ātmano'nyatropapadyate.

4 T.U. II. 7; P.U., pp. 548-9. 3 vān-manasayos tatrāpramāņatām vadet. R. 5 na hi labdhaiva labdhavyo bhavati. Ś.

260 The Brahma Sūtra Ś. suggests that this and the previous sūtra relate to the difference between the Highest Self and the individual self, for in his view the two are the same. The difference between the individual soul and the Absolute Self cannot be regarded as fictitious according to this sūtra, though S. holds that there is no difference in reality between the individual soul and Brahman. R. refers to another passage in the T.U. (II. 5) and holds that the difference between the individual soul and the Self of bliss is real. Śrikantha says that the sūtra states the difference between Hiranya-garbha and the Supreme Lord. 1. 1. 18. kāmāc ca nānumānāpeksā And on account of desire, there is no dependence on inference. kāmāt: on account of desire; ca: and; na: not; anumānāpekā: dependence on inference. The desire 'to become many and to create' makes out that the non-intelligent pradhana cannot be the cause of the world or be one. with the Self of bliss for it is incapable of volition. Thought (I. 1.5) and desire in this sutra suggest that the inference made by the Samkhya that pradhana is the root cause of the world is wrong. Will is possible for a conscious being or for the Self of bliss and not for matter, pradhāna. R. and Nimbarka argue that if the individual soul is admitted to be the cause, it must depend on a material cause, pradhāna, as a potter depends on clay, etc. But the Supreme Self has no need to depend on any factor outside himself. Śrikantha points out that though Hiranya-garbha is said to have created the world, it does not stand to reason for it is the Lord himself who is said to have created the world in the form of Hiranya-garbha. I. 1. 19. asminn asya ca tad yogam śāsti Besides, in this the union of this with that (Scripture) teaches. asmin: in this; asya: of this; ca: and; tad-yogam: union with that, śāsti: teaches. Scripture teaches the union or yoga of the individual soul with the Self of bliss. When the individual soul attains knowledge, it is united with the Self of bliss, i.e. in the state of release, the two are united. This is possible only if we understand by the Self of bliss, the Highest Self and not either pradhana or the individual soul.1 Ś. gives another interpretation of these sūtras (12-19). We cannot hold that the affix mayat means product reference to food, life, mind and understanding and means something r modification with different, 'abundance' when we come to ananda. The words belong 1 tac ca param-atma-parigrahe ghatate, na pradhana-parigrahe jīva-parigrahe vā ; tasmād ānanda-mayah param-ātmeti siddham. Ś.

Text, Translation and Notes 26I to one series and it would be wrong to suggest that only the last word of the series refers to Brahman. If ananda-maya denotes Brahman, even anna-maya should denote it.1 If it is argued that for other members, there is an inward self, while no such inner self is mentioned for ānanda-maya, limbs are attributed to it and Brahman is said to be its lower part or support. It is not ānanda-maya that is Brahman but its support is Brahman.2 Puccha is to be taken as support or resting place. B.U. says: 'Only on a particle of this bliss [of Brahman] all other creatures live.'3 If, in spite of this, we still hold that ānanda-maya self is Brahman, S. urges that it refers to the determinate Brahman and not the Brahman without determinations.4 Ananda is the quality of Brahman qut not ānanda-maya. So the affix mayat does not mean abundance but product or modification.5 S., after telling us that the ānanda-maya- atma or the Self of bliss is the Highest Self,6 rejects this view and holds that Brahman as the foundation is the indeterminate Brahman and ānanda-maya-ātmā is only the determinate Brahman. The first explanation that Brahman is ananda-maya, full of bliss, is accepted by Ś., R., Keśava-Kāșmīrin, Vallabha and others. Since this interpretation goes against the unqualified character of Brahman, Ś. Brahman. offers a strained explanation that ananda-maya is a vesture of The Sütrakāra evidently means that Brahman is full of bliss. While the indeterminate Brahman cannot be spoken of by words or concepts, when we attempt to describe it we state it to be characterised by bliss and the whole creation is an expression of this bliss or joy. The controversy raised by S. relates to the relative superiority of Brahman and Isvara, Absolute and God, but the two are co-ordinate though logical and not temporal priority may be given to the indeterminate Brahman for Brahman must be before it can create. salvation. Bhaskara interprets tad-yogam as union with the Lord, i.e. Srikantha says that the Lord himself creates the world in the form Of Hiranya-garbha. The latter is the soul of this world. Baladeva interprets tad-yogam as union with fearlessness 1 anna-mayadīnam api tarhi brahmatva-prasangah. Ś. 2 pratisthā, parāyanam eka-nīdam. Ś. 3 IV. 3. 32. sa-viseşam brahmābhyupagantavyam. Ś. prācuryārthaņ. Ś. tasmād anna-mayādisv ivānanda-maye'pi vikarartha eva mayad vijneyo na · para evātmā ānanda-mayo bhavitum arhati, tasmad ananda-mayah param- ātmā iti sthitam. Ś.B. I. I. 12; I. I. 19.

262 The Brahma Sūtra

Section 7 (20 and 21)

THE GOLDEN PERSON IN THE SUN AND THE EYE

I. 1. 20 antas tad-dharmopadeśāt The person within (appearing within the sun and the eye is the highest God) because his qualities are mentioned. antah: within; tad-dharma-upadeśāt: because his qualities are mentioned. This section purports to show that the Golden Person seen within the sun and the Person seen within the eye1 do not refer to any individual soul of eminence but to the Supreme Brahman. While the Upanisads stress the relativity of all logical knowledge, they yet use this knowledge through symbol and similitude to approximate to the absolute truth, though without ever being able to attain it. The Ultimate can be approached only asymptotically. It can be appre- hended in a sort of penumbral manner by way of what Nicholas of Gusa, a distinguished thinker of the fifteenth century, calls con- jecture. In Nicholas's view, conjecture does not mean a guess at the truth or a hypothesis but actual though necessarily inadequate truth. This view bears some resemblance to the Thomistic doctrine of Analogy. The Upanisads use this method. The sun which not only illumines but warms is the best image of the Divine used by the ancient Indians, the Iranians and others. The passages referred to are C.U. I. 6ff. and I. 7.5. The objector argues that the person described as possessing form and features, a golden beard, etc., cannot be Brahman without determinations. He is not all-pervading and his powers are limited. To this, Ś. answers that only the qualities of God are mentioned in regard to him. The person in the sun is called ut and is said to be free from all sins. Freedom from sins is a feature of God and not any individual soul, however eminent. The Person in the eye is declared to be Rk, Saman, etc., and is the cause of them all. When it is said that those who sing unto him become wealthy (C.U I. 7. 6), the reference can only be to the Supreme. S. says that the Golden Person represents the determinate Brahman who is the object of meditation. God by his power can assume any form for the sake of bestowing grace on his devotees.2 R. agrees with the view that the Supreme by his mere will can take any shape, human, divine or otherwise so as to render it suitable for the apprehension of the devotee and then satisfy him.3 Śrikantha identifies the golden person within the sun with Siva 1 C.U. I. 6. 2 parameśvarasyāpīcchā-vasān māyā-mayam rūpam sādhakanugrahartham. Ś. 3 tad idam svābhāvikam eva rūpam upāsakānugraheņa tat pratipatyā- nuguņākāram, deva-manuşyādi-samsthānam karoti: svecchāyaiva parama- kāruņiko bhagavān.

Text, Translation and Notes 263

and accounts for the mention of two eyes only and not the third by saying that the third eye is ordinarily closed.

I. 1. 21. bheda-vyapadeśāc cānyah On account of the declaration of difference, there is another (different from the individual souls residing in the sun, etc.). bheda: difference; vyapadeśat: on account of declaration; ca: and; anyah: another. The passage considered is B.U. III. 7. 9 which declares that the Self which resides and rules from within is different from the indi- vidual soul and the body of the sun or of any other being. The Supreme is the inward principle of all beings.1

Section 8 (22)

ĀKĀŚA (SPACE) AS BRAHMAN

I. 1. 22. ākāśas tallingāt Akasa (is Brahman) since the characteristic marks (of Brahman) are

ākāsah: space; tat: that; lingat: on account of characteristic marks. mentioned.

The passage considered here is C.U. I. 9. 1, which holds that all beings originate from ākāśa, space. This refers to the highest Brahman. Ākāśa is equated with ānanda in T.U. II. 7; see also C.U. VIII. 14. 1. As all the prominent characteristics of Brahman are mentioned in regard to ākāśa, it cannot refer to the element ākāśa, but only to Brahman. Besides, the synonyms used for ākāśa, vyoman, kha, are used for Brahman. Akaśa is that which shines everywhere.2 The word ākāśa is translated by ether, space, though both these are inadequate equivalents.

Section 9 (23)

LIFE AS BRAHMAN

I. 1. 23. ata eva prānah For the same reason, life (is Brahman). atah: hence, for the same reason; eva: also; prānah: life, vital breath. The question arises whether in the passages (C.U. I. 10. 9; I. 11. 4 and 5) prana or life refers to the vital principle or Brahman. The 1 P.U., pp. 226-7 2 āsamantāt kāsata iti ākāsah. See Śrīnivāsa's Vedānta-kaustubha.

264 The Brahma Sūtra

same argument of the presence of characteristic marks is used here to make out that prana does not mean the life principle (or the fivefold vital breath) but the Supreme Brahman. R. states that life is not present in all things; for example, it is not present in stones, wood, etc .: Brahman is called life because he bestows the breath of life on all beings.1

Section 10 (24-27)

LIGHT AS BRAHMAN

In these sutras, the light mentioned in C.U. III. 13. 7 is established to be not the physical light but the highest Brahman.

I. 1. 24. jyotiś caranābhidhānāt (The word) light (indicates Brahman) on account of the mention of feet. jyotih: light; carana: feet, pāda; abhidhānāt: on account of the mention. The passage considered is C.U. III. 13. 7. To what does 'light' refer? The objector says that it refers to physical light. Ordinarily light and darkness are opposed to each other and so light must mean the physical light. The word 'shines' refers to sun and similar sources of light. It cannot refer to Brahman which is devoid of colour. Since a physical boundary is mentioned for light it cannot mean Brahman which is the self of all and has no boundary. If it is suggested that the light mentioned is the original, invisible first principle of light, it cannot be made an object of devotion or used to dispel darkness. The attributes 'beyond heaven' or 'on this side of heaven' cannot apply to Brahman which has no sides or supports. This light beyond the heaven cannot be identified with Brahman as it is said to be the same as the light within the body,2 which is physical in character. Meditation on this light is said to make one celebrated and beautiful. But meditation on Brahman gives us not these precarious goods but final release. No special characteristic marks of Brahman are given here. The previous section of the Upanisad (C.U. III. 12) deals with gayatrī alone and not with Brahman. To all these objections, the reply is made that the word 'light' refers to Brahman since in the preceding passage (C.U. III. 12. 6)3 Brahman is spoken of as having four feet. One foot of it covers all beings: three feet of it are the immortal in heaven. This immortal in heaven cannot be the ordinary light. The one topic discussed in this section of the Upanisad as also

1 atah prāņayati sarvāņi bhūtānīti krtvā param brahmaiva prāņa-sabdenābhid- hīyate. 3 pādo'sya sarvā bhūtāni, tripād asyāmrtam divi. 2 antah puruşe jyotih.

Text, Translation and Notes 265 the preceding and the succeeding is Brahman. As the general topic considered is Brahman, it is futile to argue that the words 'light', 'to shine', apply to physical light only and exclude reference to Brahman. They refer to Brahman in so far as it is characterised by the physical shining light which is its effect.1 In several passages (B.U. IV. 3. 5 and Taittirīya Samhita I. 6. 3. 6) whatever illuminates something else is spoken of as light and so Brahman which gives light to the entire world may be called light.2 To the objection that the omnipresent Brahman cannot be viewed as being bounded by heaven, S. says that it is not contrary to reason for it serves the purpose of devout meditation.3 So Scripture speaks of different kinds of devout meditation as specially connected with certain localities. For the same reason it is possible to attribute to Brahman a multi- plicity of abodes. Even the fire in the body may be regarded as a symbol or outward appearance of Brahman. For S. meditation on the Highest Brahman as the Universal Self results in final release; worship of other symbolic representations of Brahman result in various rewards. Brahman is the light of lights, jyotişam jyotih.4 I. 1. 25. chando'bhidhānān neti cen na, tathā ceto'rpaņanigadāt tathā hi darśanam If it be said that (Brahman is) not (mentioned) since the metre is mentioned, (the reply is) not so because the fixing of the mind (on Brahman by means of the metre) is declared. This also is seen (elsewhere). chandah: metre; abhidhānāt: being mentioned; na: not; iti: so; cet: if; na: no; tathā: so; cetah: mind; arpana: fixing; nigadāt: on account of being declared; tatha: this; hi: also; darsanam: being seen. R. reads nigamāt for nigadāt. Nigama is a sacred precept or direction or instruction. If it be objected that the passage considered in the previous sūtra refers to the gāyatrī metre and not to Brahman, it is said in reply that the metre is to be used for fixing the mind on Brahman. Light, metre, etc., are used as means for the meditation on Brahman. Ś. quotes the Vrttikāra as holding that the gāyatrī directly denotes Brahman, on account of the fact that the gayatri and Brahman have both four feet or quarters. Even on this view, only Brahman is spoken of in this sūtra. Baladeva means by darśanam consistency. For him tathā hi darśanam means: 'for by such an explanation alone the above passage gives a consistent meaning'. 1 See also Taittirīya Brāhmaņa (III. 12. 9. 7): 'That by which the sun shines [first] and illumines others' "yena sūryas tapati tejaseddha".' 2 brahmanopi caitanya-rūpasya samasta-jagad-avabhāsa-hetutvād upapanno jyotiś-śabdah. Ś.B.U. IV. 4. 16. 3 sarva-gatasyāpi brahmaņa upasanarthah pradesa-visesa-parigraho na virudhyate. 4 B.U. IV. 4. 16.

266 The Brahma Sūtra I. 1. 26. bhūtādi-pāda-vyapadeśopapatteś caivam Thus also (Brahman is the topic) for the indication that the beings, etc., are the feet is reasonable. bhūtādi: beings, etc .; pāda: feet; vyapadeśa: indication; upapatteh: because of reasonableness; ca: and; evam: thus. The passage considered is that 'all the beings are one foot [or quarter] of it'. Rg Veda (X. 90) mentions this verse with reference to Brahman. See also B.G. (X. 42). I. 1. 27. upadeśa-bhedānneti cen nobhayasminn apy avirodhāt If it be said that (Brahman cannot be recognised as the same in the two passages,) on account of the difference in teaching, (we reply that) it is not so because there is nothing contrary (to such recognition) in both cases. upadeśa: teaching; bhedāt: on account of difference; na: not; iti: so; cet: if; na: not; ubhayasmin: in both cases; api: even; avirodhāt: without contradiction. The objection states that the two passages are actually contra- dictory. The passages are: 'Three feet of it are wh e what is immortal in heaven', tripādasyā'mrtam divi: (C.U. III. 12. 6); the other is 'that light shines above this heaven', atha yad atah paro divo jyotir dīpyate' (C.U. III. 13. 7). In one, heaven is designated as the abode, in the other as the boundary. There is thus a difference between the two. In spite of it they both refer to Brahman. Ś. gives an analogy for argument. 'Just as in ordinary language a falcon, although in contact with the top of a tree, is not only said to be on the tree, but also above the tree, even so Brahman though being in heaven is referred to here as being beyond heaven also.'1 Another explanation is also offered. A falcon, though not in contact with the top of a tree, is said to be above the top of the tree and also on the top of the tree."

Section 11 (28-31) LIFE AS BRAHMAN (contd.) I. 1. 28. prāņas tathānugamāt Life (is Brahman) on account of (intelligible) connection. pranah: life; tatha: in that way; anugamat: on account of (intelligible) connection. A connected consideration of the passages referring to life of 1 yathā loke vyksāgrena sambaddho'pi syena ubhayathopadisyamāno drsyate. vyksāgre śyeno vrksāgrātparatah śyena iti ca. Ś. 2 yathā loke vyksāgrenāsambaddho'pi syena ubhayathopadisyamano drsyate, vyksāgre śyeno vrksāgrātparatas śyena iti ca.

Text, Translation and Notes 267 prāna (K.U. 111. 1, 2, 8),1 requires us to look upon prāņa as Brahman. It cannot be treated as breath or modification of air or the individual soul or the self of some divinity. The different passages can be construed as a whole only if they are viewed as referring to Brahman and not to vital air.2 I. 1. 29. na vaktur ātmopadeśād iti ced adhyātma-sambandha- bhūmā hy asmin If it be said that (Brahman is) not (indicated) because the speaker refers to himself, (we reply that it is not so) for here (in this Chapter) references to the inner self are numerous. na: not; vaktuh: of the speaker; atmopadeśāt: because of reference to himself; iti: so; cet: if; adhyātma: inner self; sambandha: references (relationships); bhūmā: numerous; hy: because; asmin; in this. The objection considers Indra's statement 'Know me only'3 and later on 'I am prana, the intelligent self'.4 Of Brahman, it is said, 'It is without speech, without mind'.5 Indra praises himself by listing a number of his qualities. Prana cannot denote Brahman. I. 1. 30. śāstra-drstyā tūpadeso vāmadeva-vat But the teaching (of Indra that he is one with Brahman) (is justifiable) through the insight of Scripture as in the case of Vamadeva. sastra-drstyā: through the insight of Scripture; tu: but; upadeśāh: teaching; vāmadeva-vat: like Vāmadeva. The individual self Indra, perceives through the intuition of transcendental truth that his self is identical with the Supreme Self and so instructs Pratardana about the Highest Self through the words 'Know me only' By a similar intuition, the sage Vamadeva attained the knowledge expressed in the words: 'I was Manu and Sūrya.' Intuitive insight is defined in Govindananda's Ratna-prabhā as the self-evident intuition rendered possible through the knowledge acquired in previous existences.6 Compare the famous statement, brahmavid brahmaiva bhavati. The knower of Brahman becomes Brahman.7 The individual in a supreme effort stretches towards the indefinable and adorable and in that condition he is lost and absorbed. R., in accordance with his doctrine, makes out that the object of meditation is the Highest Self of which his own individual person is the body. The sage Vamadeva perceiving that Brahman is the inner 1 P.U., pp. 774ff. prāne. S. sarvam etat parasmin brahmanyāsrīyamāne anugantum sakyate na mukhye 3 mām eva vijānīhi. s pranośmi prajnātmā. avāg amanā. B.U. III. 8. 8. ārşam. Cp. janmantara-krta-sravanādinā asmin janmani svatas-siddham darsanam 7 Cp. ya evam veda aham brahmāsmi. B.U. I. 4. 10.

268 The Brahma Sūtra

self of all, that all things constitute his body and that the meaning of words denoting a body extends up to the principle embodied, denotes with the word 'I' the Highest Brahman to which he himself stands in the relation of a body and then predicates of this 'I', Manu, Surya and other beings.1

I. 1. 31. jīva-mukhya-prāņa-lingān neti cen nopāsāt traividhyād āśritatvād iha tad-yogāt If it is said that (Brahman) is not (meant) because the characteristic marks of the individual soul and the chief breath (are mentioned), (we say) no, because (on this interpretation) three types of devotion (would result); because (our view) is accepted elsewhere; and because (characteristic marks of Brahman) are connected (with the passage under discussion). jīva: individual soul; mukhya-prana: chief breath; lingat: on account of characteristic marks; na: not; iti: so; cet: if; upāsāt: on account of meditation; traividhyat: on account of threefoldness; āśritatvāt: because of acceptance; iha: here; tad-yogāt: because of its connection with that. The passage refers to a single type of meditation and so cannot be treated as suggesting different objects of meditation. It says 'Know me only' and then 'I am life, the intelligent self, meditate on me as life, as immortality' and concludes 'And that life, indeed, is that intelligent self, blessed, imperishable, immortal'. As the beginning and the conclusion are seen to be similar, the whole passage must be taken as referring to one and the same type of meditation. Again, we have passages where life is treated as equivalent to Brahman. Besides, the characteristic marks of Brahman are assigned to life. The Vrttikara gives a different interpretation, that the section aims at enjoining three kinds of meditation on Brahman as life, as intelligent self and in itself. So Brahman is the topic of this section, whether in its own nature or in the form of its two adjuncts of the individual soul and life. Bhāskara omits 'āśritatvād iha tad-yogāť'. R. argues that the threefold view of Brahman is quite appropriate: (i) meditation on Brahman in his own nature as the cause of the world, (ii) meditation on Brahman with the totality of the enjoying souls as his body, (iii) meditation on Brahman with the objects and means of enjoyment for his body.2 Śrikantha follows R. in holding that the three kinds of meditation on the Lord are (1) svarūpena, in his own nature, (2) bhoktr-śarīreņa,

1 yathā vāmadevah parasya sarvāntarātmatvam taccharīratvam śarīravācinām sabdānām sarīriņi paryavasānam pasyann aham brahmanah sarvasya

iti svātma-sarīrakam param brahma nirdisya tat sāmānādhikaranyena manu- sūryādīny vyapadisati. R. 2 nikhila-kāraņa-bhūtasya brahmanah svarūpeņānusandhānam, bhoktr-varga- śarīrakatvānusandhānam, bhogya-bhogopakarana-sarīrakatvānusandhānam.

Text, Translation and Notes 269 as having the totality of enjoying souls for his body, (3) bhogya- rupena, as having the objects and means of enjoyment for his body. In this first part of the first chapter of the B.S. we get an indication of the governing principle that gives life to the great structure of Hinduism. Regarded from the outside, it may have the appearance of a confused mass of conflicting ideas, a congeries of contradictory elements, a complex of varied forces. There is, however, an identity, not mechanical but organic. To understand it we must live in the Hindu life-stream. Then we can know its full meaning and com- plete reality and feel the forces which pulsate through the whole body. We should not get imprisoned in our ideas as intellectuals do or in our flesh as sensualists do. Enlightenment comes only with self- surrender and we do not surrender ourselves so long as we cling to our ideas. When reason leads us to experience, we know the meaning of life. This experience is variedly interpreted but the interpretations are no substitute for the experience.

Section 1 (1-8)

MIND AS BRAHMAN

Certain other passages which are not clear about their reference to Brahman are taken into consideration in this part. The eight sūtras of this first section show that the being which consists of mind, whose body is breath, etc., mentioned in C.U. III. 14, is not the individual soul but the Highest Brahman.

I. 2. 1. sarvatra prasiddhopadeśāt (That which consists of mind is Brahman) because of the teaching of what is well known everywhere. sarvatra: everywhere; prasiddha: well known; upadeśat: because of the teaching. The passage considered is C.U. III. 14. The doubt arises whether what is pointed out as the object of meditation by means of attributes such as 'consisting of mind', etc., is the individual soul or the Highest Brahman. For it is the individual soul that is connected with . mind, etc., and not Brahman 'who is unborn, without breath and without mind, pure'.1 Since we are asked to meditate with a calm mind, the object of meditation need not be Brahman. The other descriptions, 'He to whom all works, all desires belong', 'He is my self within the heart, smaller than a grain of rice, smaller than a grain of barley', apply to the individual soul. The object of meditation indicated by the qualities of 'consisting of mind', etc., is the individual soul. The objection is answered by the sutra which says that all the Vedanta passages speak of the cause of the world. R. says that the text which declares Brahman to be without mind and breath is meant to deny that the thought of Brahman does not depend on a mind and that its life does not depend on breath.2

I. 2. 2. vivaksita-gunopapatteś ca

Brahman). And because qualities desired to be expressed are appropriate (in vivaksita: desired or intended to be stated;3 guna: qualities; upapatteh: because appropriate; ca: and. The qualities useful in meditation belong to Brahman alone. He is satya-samkalpa, having true purpose. This applies to the Highest Self which has unimpeded power to create, maintain and dissolve the

1 M.U. II. I. 2; P.U., p. 680. 2 mana-āyattam jñānam prānāyattam sthitam ca brahmano nisedhati. 3 vaktum iştam vivakşitam.

Text, Translation and Notes 27I

world.1 Similarly in C.U. (VIII. 7. 1) the Self is said to be 'free from sin'. It is omnipresent like ākāśa, space. See also Ś.U. IV. 3; B.G. XIII. 13.

I. 2. 3. anupapattes tu na śārīrah But, as (the qualities desired to be expressed) do not belong (to the individual soul, the self denoted by mano-maya, etc.), is not the embodied one. an-upapatteh: not belonging to; tu: but; na: not; śārīrah: embodied one. The qualities of 'consisting of mind' and so on are applicable only to Brahman and not the individual soul. It is true that God resides in the body but he is outside as well and is all-pervading. See C.U. III. 14. 3. The individual soul resides in the body alone since he experiences the effects of his action in the form of pleasure and pain through the body. The attributes of 'having true resolves', etc., are appropriate only to the Highest Lord and not the individual soul. Śrikantha begins a new section (3-8) here, which considers whether the passage in the Mahā-Nārāyana U. (XI. 3) refers to

to Nārāyaņa. Nārāyaņa or iva. Śrīkantha concludes that it refers to Śiva and not

I. 2. 4. karma-kartr-vyapadeśāc ca And because activity and agent are (separately) mentioned. karma: activity; kartr: agent; vyapadesat: being mentioned; ca: and. The passage considered here is C.U. III. 14. 4. 'Into him, I shall enter, on departing hence.' Here the object of meditation is declared to be different from the meditator who is the individual soul. One and the same thing cannot be both subject and object. The em- bodied soul cannot possess the qualities mentioned in the Upanisad. Brahman which possesses these qualities cannot be the embodied self. R. puts it clearly. 'The soul which obtains is the person meditating and the Highest Brahman that is to be obtained is the object of meditation. Brahman, therefore, is something different from the attaining soul.'2 Srikantha suggests that the Supreme Self is Siva and not Nārāyana as he is the object to be worshipped and Nārāyana is the worshipper.

I. 2. 5. śabda-viśeşāt On account of the difference of words. śabda: word; viśest: on account of difference. 1 satya-samkalpatvam hi srşti-sthiti-samhrtisv apratibaddha-śaktitvāt param- ātmano'vakalpate. Ś. 2 prāpta jīva upāsakah, prāpyam param brahmopāsyam iti prāptir anyad evedam iti vijñāyate.

272 The Brahma Sūtra

The passage considered is in the Satapatha Brāhmaņa. 'Like a grain of rice or a grain of barley or a millet seed or the kernel of a millet seed thus that golden person is in the self.'1 Here Brahman indicated by the word person in the nominative is distinct from the individual soul indicated by the locative. The two are different as they are denoted by different words. Srikantha argues on scriptural authority that the Supreme Being Śiva is other and higher than Nārāyana, nārāyaņāt param brahma. Nimbārka refers to C.U. III. 14. 3 and 4.

I. 2. 6. smrteś ca And on account of smrti. smrteh: on account of smrti; ca: and. The passage considered is B.G. XVIII. 6. 1. S. points out that the difference is not to be taken as real and that it is due to limiting adjuncts. Space or ākāśa, though in reality unlimited, appears limited owing to certain adjuncts such as jars and other vessels. When we grasp the truth that there is only one Universal Self, there is an end to the whole practical view of the world with its distinctions of bondage, release and the like.2 R. finds it easy to explain these sutras. He says that the Highest Self is free from all evil and is not subject to the effects of works as the individual soul is. The difference is maintained between the individual soul who is the meditating subject and the Highest Self which is the object of meditation.3 For Śrīkantha Nārayana is the worshipper, different from Siva.

I. 2. 7. arbhakaukastvāt tad-vyapadeśāc ca neti cen na, nicāyyatvād evam vyomavac ca If it be said that (Brahman is) not (referred) because of the smallness of the abode and is so designated (we reply that it is) not so because (Brahman) is to be meditated thus; and (this is to be understood) like space. arbhakaukastvat: because of the abode being small; tat: that; vyapadeśāt: being (so) designated; ca: and; na: not; iti: so; cet: if;

ākāśa. na: not; nicāyyatvāt: being meditated; evam: thus; vyomavat: like,

For the purposes of meditation, the omnipresent Brahman may be said to occupy a limited space. Although present everywhere, S. says, the Lord is pleased when meditated upon as limited in, for example, 1 yathā vrīhir vā yavo vā syāmāko vā syāmāka-tandulo vaivam ayam antar- ātman purușo hiraņmayah. X. 6. 3. 2. 2 yathā ghata-karakādy-upādhivasāt aparicchinnam api nabhah paricchinnavad avabhasate, tad-vat grhītetv ātmaikatve bandha-mokşādi-sarva-vyavahāra-pari- samāptir eva syāt. 3 sārirakam upāsakam param-ātmānam copāsyam smytir darsayati.

Text, Translation and Notes 273 connection with the eye of a needle. The Lord of the entire universe may be said to be the Lord of Ayodhya, so the Supreme Self abiding everywhere may very well be denoted as abiding within the heart.1 We worship the Supreme through an image, yathā sālagrāme harih. Ś. For Ś. the limitations are not real. So we cannot say that if Brahman has its abode in the heart and these heart-abodes are different in different bodies, it is affected by the imperfections of the different bodies. For R., the Supreme Lord is designated to occupy a small abode only for purposes of meditation.2 Baladeva remarks that the Lord may dwell in the heart of man because he is possessed of inconceivable powers.

I. 2. 8. sambhoga-prāptir iti cen na, vaiśesyāt If it be said that (because the individual soul and the Universal Self are one) there may arise experience (of pleasure and pain for the Universal Self also) it is not so since there is difference in nature (of the two). sambhoga: experience; praptih: attainment; iti: so; cet: if; na: not; vaiśesyāt: on account of difference. The embodied self acts and enjoys, acquires merit and demerit and is affected by pleasure and pain and so on; the Universal Self is of a different nature; it is free from all evil, etc. On account of the difference between the two the experiences of the individual soul do not affect the Supreme Self. See M.U. III. 1. 1. The individual soul undergoes pleasure and pain because it is subject to karma, whereas the Lord is not subject to it. It is not living in the body but subjection to karma that involves a soul in the experiences of pleasure and pain. Bhäskara holds that simply because the Lord abides in the heart, it does not follow that he shares its experiences. Coexistence and consequent interrelationship do not imply the sharing of the same attributes. The ether, for example, though in connection with a burning place, does not burn itself. R. means by vaiśesyāt, on account of the difference of the cause of enjoyment, hetu-vaiśeşyāt. Nimbārka means by vaisesyāt, on account of the difference of nature between the individual soul and Brahman. 1 sarvagato'pīsvaras tatropāsyamāņah prasīdati. 2 ata upāsanārtham evālpatva-vyapadesah.

274 The Brahma Sūtra

Section 2 (9-10) THE SUPREME SELF AS THE EATER OF THE WORLD I. 2. 9. attā carācara-grahaņāt The eater (is the Highest Self) on account of the taking in of (whatever is) movable and immovable. attā: eater; carācara: movable and immovable; grahanāt: on account of taking in. The passage considered is Katha U. I. 2. 25, where the Brāhmanas and the Ksatriyas are treated as food and death itself as a sauce.1 The doubt arises whether the eater is fire (agni) or the individual soul or the Highest Self. B.U. I. 4. 6 suggests fire and M.U. (III. 1. 1) says that the Supreme Self looks on without eating. Against these objections, the sutra affirms that the Supreme Self is the eater for he consumes or absorbs in himself the movable and the immovable worlds.2 The Brahmanas and the Ksatriyas are mentioned as representatives of the whole world. When the Upanisad says that the Self does not eat but looks on, it means that the Self is not subject to actions. Grahana may mean understanding or taking in or eating. Brahman is the eater because the movable and the immovable worlds are understood here as the food or because the two worlds are taken in.

I. 2. 10. prakaraņāc ca And on account of the topic under discussion. prakaranāt: on account of the context; ca: and. The general topic discussed in the Katha U. I. 2. 18, 22-23 is the Highest Self and so we should take it as the topic in that context.

Section 3 (11-12) THE SUPREME AND THE INDIVIDUAL SELVES IN THE CAVE

I. 2. 11. guhām pravistāvātmānau hi tad-darśanāt The two who have entered into the cave are the selves (the individual soul and the Supreme Self) because that is seen. guhām: into the cave; pravistau: who have entered; atmanau: the (two) selves; hi: because; tat: that; darśanāt: is seen. The passage considered is Katha U. I. 3. 1. Are the two selves 1 P.U., p. 621.

Ś. 2 sarva-vedānteşu srsti-sthiti-samhāra-kāranatvena brahmanah prasiddhatvāt.

Text, Translation and Notes 275 intelligence (buddhi) and the individual soul (jiva) or are they the individual soul and the Highest Self? Both alternatives seem to be possible. The opponent says that the reference is to the individual soul and intelligence: (i) For the cave is a small and special place and the Infinite Self cannot enter it. (ii) The statement that they enter the world of good deeds obviously refers to the individual soul and intelligence for they are subject to the law of karma and not the Highest Self (B.U. IV. 4. 23). (iii) Again, the analogy of shade and light applies to the individual soul and intelligence, for the former is intelligent and the latter buddhi is treated as non-intelligent, jada. The answer is given to these points: (i) As the two beings are said to be of the same nature, atmānau, the reference should be to the individual self and the Supreme Self and not to the individual soul and buddhi. (ii) If a special local position is assigned to the Omni- present Self, it is for the purpose of meditation. See Katha U. I. 2. 12; T.U. II. 1. (iii) The attribute of existing in the sphere of good works, no doubt, belongs to the individual soul only and not to Brahman, though it may apply to Brahman in a figurative way, even as a group of men is described as having an umbrella though only one of them has it. (iv) The individual soul and the Supreme Self are correctly described as being disparate in nature. They are not the same.

I. 2. 12. viśeşaņāc ca And on account of the distinctive qualities (mentioned). viśeșanāt: on account of distinctive qualities; ca: and. Katha U. (I. 3. 3 and 9) speaks of the body as the chariot and the individual soul as the charioteer making his journey from the world of becoming, samsara, to final release. Another passage (I.3.9)1 speaks of the Highest Self as the abode of Visnu. The individual soul is said to be the meditator and the Supreme Self the object of meditation. The two who have entered the cave have distinctive qualities. The passage from the M.U. (III. 1. 1 and 2) which refers to two birds, one eating the fruit, the other abstaining from eating but looking on, refers to the individual soul and the Supreme Self. S. quotes Paingi-rahasya Brahmana which discredits the two interpretations of (i) the individual soul and buddhi, and (ii) the individual soul and the Supreme Self and holds that the being which eats the fruit is the internal organ by means of which a man dreams and the being which merely looks on without eating is the individual soul, who is really not the enjoyer but the Supreme Brahman. The dualism exists only within the sphere of experience. R. refers to Katha U. 1. 20 and says that the question raised by Naciketas relates to the problem of release. When a man qualified for release dies and is released from bondage, a doubt arises as to his existence or non-existence. Philosophers are not agreed about the 1 See P.U., pp. 624-5.

276 The Brahma Sūtra nature of release. Some hold that the Self is constituted by conscious- ness only and release consists in the total destruction of this essential nature of the Self. Others define release as the passing away of ignorance, avidya. It is sometimes said that the Self is itself non- conscious like a stone but possesses in the state of bondage certain distinctive qualities as knowledge and so on. Release consists in a total removal of these qualities, the Self remaining in a state of pure isolation.1 R. declares that release consists in the intuition of the Highest Self which is the natural state of the individual souls and which follows on the destruction of ignorance, avidya, i.e. the influence of the beginningless chain of works.2

Section 4 (13-17) THE PERSON WITHIN THE EYE IS BRAHMAN I. 2. 13. antara upapatteh The Person within (the eye is Brahman) on account of appropriateness. antarah: the Person within; upapatteh: on account of appropriateness. The passage considered is C.U. IV. 15. 1. The point is raised that it may refer to the image of some person standing before the eye, or the individual soul who sees the forms of objects through the eye, or the sun, the deity of the sense of sight which causes the eye to see (B.U. V. 5. 2). It cannot refer to God. The sutra says that the Person in the eye is the Highest God for immortality and fearlessness are mentioned as his characteristics. The eye is described as his abode. The other features mentioned in C.U. IV. 15. 2 apply only to God.

I. 2. 14. sthānādi-vyapadeśāc ca And on account of the statement of place and other things. sthānādi: place and other things; vyāpadeśāt: on account of the statement; ca: and. The objection is raised that the omnipresent Brahman cannot be confined to the eye. The answer is that it is not the only locality that is assigned to the Lord. Earth and so on are mentioned as his residence (B.U. III. 7. 3). Not only place but name and form are attributed to Brahman (C.U. I. 6. 7. 6). Brahman, though devoid of qualities, is spoken of as possessing qualities for purposes of 1 kecid vitti-mātrasy ātmanah svarūpocchitti-lakşanam mokşam ācakșate. anye vitti-mātrasyaiva sato'vidyāstamayam. apare pāşāņakalpasyātmano jñānādy- aseşa-vaiseşika-gunoccheda-lakşanam kaivalya-rūpam. 2 jīvasyānādi - karma - rūpāvidyā - tirohita - svarūpasyāvidyoccheda pūrvaka- svābhāvika-paramātmānubhavam eva mokşam ācakșate.

Text, Translation and Notes 277 meditation. To assign a definite locality is not contrary to reason, since it serves the purpose of meditation. R. mentions that the Highest is directly intuited by those who practise yoga or concentration of mind.1

I. 2. 15. sukha-viśiştābhidhānād eva ca On account also of the mention only of what is characterised by pleasure. sukha: pleasure; viśista: characterised by; abhidhānāt: on account of mention; eva: only; ca: and. Brahman which is spoken of as being characterised by pleasure at the beginning of the section (C.U. IV. 10. 4) is also referred to in the present passage.2 R. here has another sūtra which is not found in Ś., Bhāskara and Baladeva. Nimbārka and Śrīkantha have it. ata eva ca sa brahma: Also for that very reason, that is Brahman. atah: for that reason; eva: alone; ca: and or also; sa: that; brahma: Brahman. ākāśa which is denoted by kha is also Brahman. C.U. IV. 10. 5.

I. 2. 16. śrutopanişatkagatyabhidānāc ca

Upanişads. Also on account of the mention of the path of him who has heard the

śruta upanisatka gati: the path of one who has heard the Upanisads; abhidhanāt: on account of the mention; ca: also. The passage considered is Praśna U. I. 10 which describes the path of the gods, deva-yāna. See also C.U. IV. 15. 5; B.G. VIII. 24. From all these it follows that the person in the eye is no other than Brahman. śrutopanisatka is one by whom the Upanisad has been directly heard from a teacher. Vedānta-Kaustubha.

I. 2. 17. anavasthiter asambhavāc ca netarah (The Person in the eye is) no other (than the Highest Self) because of the non-permanence (of others) and on account of the impossibility. anavasthite: because of non-permanence; asambhavāt: because of impossibility; ca: and; na: not; itarah: other. To the objection raised that the Person in the eye is either the reflection of someone standing before the eye, or the individual soul or the self of some deity, the answer is given that all these are non- permanent. Since immortality, fearlessness are ascribed to the Person in the eye, it can only be Brahman. Śrīkantha takes this as a separate section dealing with the question whether the Person of the size of a thumb (Māhānārāyaņa 1 sākşātkāra-vyapadeso'pi yogibhir drsyamānatvād upapadyate. 2 P.U., p. 413.

278 The Brahma Sūtra

U. X. 6.3) is the Lord or someone else and concludes that he is the Lord and not any other on account of the non-permanence of others and the impossibility of any other view.

Section 5 (18-20)

THE INDWELLING SPIRIT

I. 2. 18. antaryāmy adhidaivādişu tad-dharma-vyapadeśāt The Indwelling Spirit of gods and others (is the Self) for his (characteristic) marks are mentioned. antaryāmi: inner controller, indwelling spirit; adhidaivādisu: in gods and others; tat: his; dharma: defining or characteristic marks; vyapadeśāt: on account of mentioning. R., Nimbārka read this sūtra in a slightly different way, antaryāmy adhi-daivādhi-lokādisu: The indwelling spirit of gods, the worlds and others. The passage in question is B.U. III. 7. 1. Who lives inside and controls all? Is he the self of some deity, or a yogin who has acquired extraordinary powers or the Highest Self or some other being? The answer is given that it is the Highest Self for his qualities are mentioned. The universal rulership implied in the statement that, dwelling within, it rules the entire aggregate of created beings, inclusive of the gods is an appropriate attribute of the Highest Self, since omnipotence depends on the Omnipotent Ruler being the cause of all things. The qualities of selfhood and immortality belong to the Highest Self. He is declared to be different from the deities of the earth, etc. The objection that the Highest Self cannot be a ruler for he has no organs of action is untenable because organs of action may be ascribed to him since those whom he rules possess organs of action. If it is argued that the admission of an internal ruler in addition to the individual self will force us to assume again another and yet another ruler, ad infinitum, the answer is that there is no ruler other than the Highest Self. So the internal ruler is the Highest Self. Vacaspati suggests that the Highest Self is not different from the individual self.1 R. quotes S.U. (III. 19) 'he sees without eye, hears without ear'2 and comments: what terms such as 'seeing' and 'hearing' really denote is not knowledge in so far as it is produced by the eye and the ear, but the intuitive presentation of colour and sound. In the

1 na cānavasthā, hi niyantrantaram tena niyamyate kim tu yo jīvo niyantā ālokasiddhah, sa paramātmaivopādhyavaccheda-kalpita-bhedaḥ. Bhāmatī. 2 P.U. 729-30.

Text, Translation and Notes 279

case of the individual soul whose intellectual nature is obscured by Karman, such intuitive knowledge arises only through the mediation of the sense-organs; in the case of the Highest Self, on the other hand, it springs from its own nature.1

I. 2. 19. na ca smārtamatad-dharmābhilāpāt And (the Indwelling Spirit) is not that which is assumed by the smrti (the Samkhya system) on account of the mention of characteristics not belonging to it (the pradhana). na: not; ca: and; smartam: assumed by the smrti ; atat: not belonging to it; dharma: characteristics; abhilapāt: on account of mention. R. and Srīkantha add to this sūtra at the end śarīraś ca, which is found at the beginning of the next sūtra in S. and Nimbārka.

I. 2. 20. śārīraścobhaye'pi hi bhedenainam adhīyate And the embodied soul (is not the Indwelling Spirit) for in both also it is taught as different. śarīrah: the embodied self; ca: and; ubhaye: in both; api: also; hi: for; bhedena: as different; enam: this; adhiyate: taught. To the suggestion that the Indwelling Spirit is the embodied Self, the sutra says that it cannot be, for both the rescensions, the Kānva and the Madhyandina describe the individual soul as different from the Indwelling Spirit. See B.U. III. 7. 22.ª The Kanvas read 'He who dwells in knowledge'; the Madhyandinas 'He who dwells in the self'. Both refer to the individual soul and declare it to be different from the Indwelling Spirit. S. believes that the declaration of the difference between the embodied soul and the Indwelling Spirit has its reason in the limiting adjunct consisting of the organs of action presented by ignorance, and is not absolutely true. For the Self within is one only; two internal selves are not possible. But owing to its limiting adjunct the one Self is practically treated as if it were two, just as we make a distinction between the space in the jar and the universal space.3 R. uses this to establish the difference between the individual soul and the Indwelling Spirit, the Supreme free from all evil.4 The two 1 na ca darsana-śravaņādi-sabdās cakșurādi-karaņajanmano jñānasya vācakā api tu rūpādi-sāk șātkārasya. sa ca rūpādi-sākşātkārah karma-tirohita-svābhāvika- jñānasya jīvasya cakșurādi-karaņa-janmā, parasya tu svata eva. R. 2 avidyāpraty-upasthāpita-kārya-karaņopādhi-nimitto' yam śārīrāntaryāmiņor bheda-vyapadeśo na pāramārthikah eko hi pratyag-atmā bhavati, na dvau pratyag-ātmānau sambhavatah. ekasyaiva tu bheda-vyavahāra-upādhi-krtah, yathā ghațākāso mahākāśa iti. 3 P.U., p. 229. 4 ato antaryāmī pratyag-ātmano vilaksaņo'pahatapāpmā paramātmā nārāyaņa iti siddham.

280 The Brahma Sūtra

are different because the individual soul is the abode and the Indwelling Spirit is the one who abides therein.

Section 6 (21-23)

THE INVISIBLE AS BRAHMAN

I. 2. 21. adrśyatvādigunako dharmokteh That which possesses the qualities of invisibility and others (is Brahman) on account of the mention of the characteristics (peculiar to it). adrśyatvadi: invisibility and others; gunakah: one who possesses the qualities; dharmokteh: on account of the mention of the characteristics. The passage considered is M.U. I. 1. 5-6. Is bhūta-yoni, the source of all existences, the pradhana, the embodied soul, or Brahman? The opponent contends that the passage in the M.U. (I. 1. 7): 'As a spider sends forth and draws in [its thread], as herbs grow on the earth, as the hair [grows] on the head and the body of a living person, so from the imperishable arises here the universe' suggests that the world is produced by the non-intelligent pradhana even though it may be guided by the intelligent purusa. The qualities mentioned belong to the pradhana and the others like 'knowing all' 'perceiving all' may refer to that which is higher than the pradhana. Again, if the word yoni, source, is taken as the efficient cause, then the embodied soul is the efficient cause. The sūtra refutes this view. The imperishable source is spoken of as omniscient and the source of created things (I. 1. 7 and 9). In II. 1.2, also, the same idea is under discussion. The Upanisad distinguishes between higher knowledge, parā-vidyā, and lower knowledge, aparā- vidya, the first leading to bliss and the second to worldly prosperity. Ceremonial observances lead to worldly prosperity; knowledge of Brahman leads to eternal life. The reference here is to the latter. If Brahman is known, everything else becomes known (I. 1. 3). The knowledge of pradhāna or the embodied soul does not produce knowledge of everything else. So the reference in the passage is to Brahman and not to pradhana or the embodied soul.1

I. 2. 22. viśeşaņa-bheda-vyapadeśābhyām ca netarau The two others (the individual soul and pradhana) are not (the source

difference. of all beings) on account of the mention of distinctive qualities and

viśeșaņa: distinctive qualities; bheda: difference; vyapadeśābhyām: on account of the mention (of the two); ca: and; na: not; itarau: the two others. 1 adrsyatvādi-gunako bhūta-yonih paramevsara eva. Ś.

Text, Translation and Notes 28I

Bhūta-yoni, the source of all, is neither the pradhana nor the individual soul, for the mention of attributes 'all-pervading' (M.U. I. 1. 6, II. 1. 2) and of difference 'higher than the high, imperishable' (II. 1. 2) rules out these. S. makes out that the Im- perishable is the unmanifested entity which represents the seminal potentiality of all names and forms, contains the subtle parts of the material elements, abides in the Lord, forms limiting adjunct and being itself no effect is high when compared to other effects. 'Higher than the high, Imperishable' expresses a difference between the Imperishable and what is higher than that and so the reference is to the Highest Self.1 R. quotes Paraśara to the effect that 'the cause of attaining him is knowledge and work and knowledge is twofold according as it is based on sacred tradition or arises from discrimination'.2 The apara- vidyā or lower knowledge mentioned in the M.U. refers to the know- ledge of the Rg Veda up to the dharma-sastrās. This prepares for the intuition of Brahman.3 The higher kind of knowledge is called upāsanā, has the character of devout meditation and consists in direct intuition of Brahman.4 R. develops his own view of the relation of God to the world in his commentary on this sūtra. The qualities of omniscience, etc., enable the Highest Brahman to create and from the indestructible Highest Brahman, the effect (karya) Brahman arises, distinguished by name and form and comprising all enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment. The Highest Self constitutes the Self of all things and has all things for its body, for its outward form, and emits all things from itself.5 The term aksara, imperishable, may be explained etymologi- cally as either that which pervades (aśnute) or that which does not pass away (a-ksarati). In either sense it applies to the Highest Self. It pervades all effects; it does not pass away or decay.

I. 2. 23. rūpopanyāsāc ca Also, on account of the description of (his) form. rūpa: form; upanyāsāt: on account of the description; ca: also. In M.U. II. 1. 3-4, there is a description of the form which can 1 akşaram, avyākṛtam, nama-rūpa-bīja-sakti-rūpam, bhūta-sūkşmam, isvarāsrayam, tasyaivopādhi-bhūtam sarvasmād vikārāt paro, yo' vikārah, tasmāt paratah para iti bhedena vyapadesan param-ātmānam iha vivakșitam darsayati. 2 tat-prāpti-hetur jñānam ca karma coktam mahāmune āgamottham vivekāc ca dvidhā jñānam tathocyate. 3 brahma-sākşātkāra-hetu-bhūtam paroksa-jnānam. 4 upāsanākhyam brahma-sāk şātkāra-laksanam bhakti-rūpāpannam jnānam. 5 sarvajñāt satya-samkalpāt parasmād brahmaņo'kșarād etad kāryākāram brahma nāma-rūpa-vibhaktam bhokty-bhogya-rūpam ca jāyate . . . svarūpa- guņaih saha sarva-bhūtāntarātmatayā visva-sarīratvena viśva-rūpatvam, tasmād viśva-srstim ca.

282 The Brahma Sūtra belong to God alone and not to the individual soul or pradhāna. Pradhana cannot be the self of all and the individual is of limited power. Ś. mentions an alternative view that the inner self of creation is Hiranya-garbha or Praja-pati and not the Highest Self. R.V. (X. 1. 21. 1) says: 'Hiranya-garbha arose in the beginning; he was the one born lord of things existing. He established the earth and the sky.' He may be called the inner self of all beings. M.U. (II. 1.4-9) describes the creation, the inner self of which is not the Highest Self but Hiranya-garbha, who is the sūtratman of the later Vedanta, the breath of life in everything. If the sūtra refers to M.U. (II. 1. 10), then the Highest Self is described. Baladeva has a sūtra here, prakaranāt. This is not found in other commentaries. It means 'on account of the context'.

Section 7 (24-32) VAIŚVĀNARA IS BRAHMAN I. 2. 24. vaiśvānarah sādhāraņa-śabda-viśeșāt Vaisvanara is (the Highest Self) on account of the distinction (qualifying) common words. vaiśvānarah: Vaiśvānara; sādhāraņa: viśesāt: on account of the distinction. common; sabda: word; The passage considered is C.U. V. 11. 18. The question is raised whether the word Vaisvanara refers to the fire in the body, or the element fire or the deity fire. Does the word self mean the individual soul or the Highest Self? The sutra says that though the words Vaisvanara and Self have various meanings, on account of the distinction mentioned, the terms refer to' the Highest Self." V aisvānara is the self of the worlds and is described as having head, eyes, etc., for the purposes of meditation. As the cause of all, God possesses within him all the stages of all the effects and so the description of the several worlds and beings as the limbs of God is adequate. The statement regarding the result of meditation on Vaiśvānara, viz. 'he eats the food in all worlds meaning only with reference to God. So also the passage in C.U. beings and self' has V. 24. 3. The general topic of discussion is also Brahman. Vaiśvānara refers to Brahman. . So I yady apy etāvubhāvapy vaiśvānara-śabdas tu trayāņām sādhāranah, atma-sabdas ātma-vaiśvānara-sabdau viseşo drsyate. yena parameśvara-paratvam tayor avagamyate. sādhāraņa-sabdaut ca dvayoh tathāpi

Text, Translation and Notes 283 I. 2. 25. smaryamāņam anumānam syād iti Because that which is stated in the smrti is an inference. smaryamanam: that which is stated in the smrti; anumānam: inference; syād: may be; iti: because. The reference is to the passage in the Visnu Purana. 'He whose mouth is fire, whose head the heavenly world, whose navel the ether, whose feet the earth, whose eye the sun, whose ears the regions, reverence to him, the self of the world.'1 From the shape described in the smyti passage we infer a śruti text on which the smrti rests and that is the Chandogya passage mentioned in the previous sūtra. Even its basis. if the smrti passage is taken as a eulogy, it must have a śruti text for I. 2. 26. śabdādibhyo'ntah-pratişthānācca neti cen na, tathā drstyu- padeśād asambhavād purușam api cainam adhīyate If it be said that (Vaisvanara is the fire in the body and) not (the Highest Self) on account of the words, etc., and on account of his abiding within (which is the characteristic of the fire residing in the body), (we say) not so, because of the teaching of the vision (of the Lord) thus, on account of impossibility and because also they speak of him as the Person. sabdādibhyah: on account of word, etc .; antah: within; pratişthānāt: on account of abiding; ca: and; na: not; iti: so; cet: if; na: not; tathā: in that way, thus; drsti: vision; upadesat: because of the teaching: asambhavat: because of the impossibility; purusam: person; api: also; ca: and; enam: him; adhīyate: is taught or studied. or purusam we read in some versions'puruşa-vidham'. puruşa-vidham is puruşakaram. The form of purușa or person cannot be assigned to the fire in the body; so the reference is only to the Supreme Self. several Vaiśvanara, it is objected, is the fire within the body because of passages (Satapatha Brāhmana X. 6. 1. 11; C.U. V. 18. 2). Again, the Scripture speaks of Vaisvanara as abiding within. So he is not the Highest Self. The reply quotes passages where we are advised to look upon Vaisvanara as the symbol of Brahman. The attributes mentioned apply to the Highest Self and not to the fire in ce body. Again, we are taught by the Vajaseneyins to look upon Vaisvānara not as residing within man but as a person. I. 2. 27. ata eva na devatā bhūtam ca ror the same reason (the Vaisvanara) is neither the deity (of fire) nor the element (of fire). atah: therefore: eva: also; na: not; devata: deity; bhutam: element. ca: and. 1 yasyāgnir āsyam dyaur mūrdhā kham nābhis caraņau ksitih sūryas cakşur disah śrotram tasmai lokātmane namah. See also M.B .: Śanti Parva 47: 65. M.U. II. I. 4.

284 The Brahma Sūtra It has been shown that Vaiśvanara does not apply to the fire in the body; here it is said that it cannot be the deity fire or the element fire. We cannot call heaven, etc., as the head of either of these. So Vaiśvānara is the Highest Self. I. 2. 28. sākşād apy avirodham jaiminiḥ (There is) no contradiction, says Jaimini, even if (the Highest Self is taken as the object of worship as Vaiśvanara) directly. sāksāt: directly; api: even; avirodham: no contradiction; jaiminih: Jaimini. Even if we worship Vaiśvānara, not as a symbol but as God himself, there is no contradiction. Ś. explains the term Vaiśvānara in three ways: (i) the Self of all things including the soul; (ii) the cause of all modifications; (iii) the ruler whose subjects are the souls.1 It means the Highest Self. I. 2. 29. abhivyakter ity āśmarathyah On account of manifestation (thinks) Asmarathya. abhivyakteh: on account of manifestation; iti: so; aśmarathyah: Āśmarathya. If the objection is raised that according to the Scripture, the Supreme is measured by a span (C.U. V. 18. 1), this sutra answers that the Supreme though he transcends all measurements manifests himself for the benefit of his devotees in limited forms. R. and Śrīkaņtha take abhivyakti to mean definiteness. For helping the thoughts of the devotees, the Lord assumes definite forms. I. 2. 30. anusmyter bādarih On account of remembrance (thinks) Bādari. anusmrteh: on account of remembrance; badarih: Bādari. The Highest Self is said to be measured by a span since he is remembered by means of the mind located in the heart which is of the measure of a span. Or the Highest Self though not really measured by a span is to be remembered (meditated upon) as being of the measure of a span.2 I. 2. 31. sampatter iti jaiminih tathā hi darśayati According to Jaimini, (God is said to be a span in length) on account of imaginative identification; the same (Scripture) shows. sampatteh: on account of imaginative identification; jaimini!t. Jaemini; tatha hi: the same; darsayati: shows. 1 viśvaš cāyam naras ca visvāvarah; visveşām vāyam narah, visve vā nara asyeti visvānarah param-ātmā sarvātmakatvāt. 2 pradesa-matra-hrdaya-pratisthitena prādeśamātra ity ucyate. tena vāyam manasānusmaryate,

Text, Translation and Notes 285 The account of Vaiśvānara in the Satapatha Brāhmaņa (X. 6. 1. 11) and in the C.U. (V. 11-18) is the same in essentials. Both the passages use the expression 'measured by a span'. So Jaimini says that it is appropriate to call the Highest Self pradesa-matra and the Scripture declares him to be so imagined for the purpose of meditation. Baladeva takes sampatti to mean mysterious power. For him the Supreme is said to be of the measure of a span on account of his mysterious power.

I. 2. 32. āmananti cainam asmin Moreover they (the Jabalas) speak (of the Highest Self) in that (the space between the forchead and the chin). amananti: (they) speak; ca: and, moreover; enam: him; asmin: in that. The text considered is Jabala U. I. The statement which ascribes to the Highest Self the measure of a span is appropriate. The Highest is called abhi-vimana1 for the inward self of all; he is directly measured or known by all sentient beings or the word may be explained as 'he who is near everywhere-as the inward self-and who at the same time is measureless'; or else it may denote the Highest Lord as he, who, as the cause of the world, measures it out, i.e. creates it. By all this it is proved that Vaiśvānara is the Highest Lord.2 1 abhi vimīyate ity abhi-vimānah. abhigatas ca vimānas ca abhi-vimānah: abhi-vimimīte sarvam ity abhi-vimānah. ª See P.U., p. 895.

Section 1 (1-7)

BRAHMAN IS THE SUPPORT OF HEAVEN, EARTH, ETC.

I. 3. 1. dyubhvādyāyatanam sva-śabdāt The support of the heaven, the earth and the rest (is Brahman) because of the word 'own'. dyu: heaven; bh: earth; adi: and the rest; ayatanam: support, abode; sva-śabdāt: because of the word 'own'. The passage considered is M.U. II. 2. 5 which speaks of the being 'in whom the sky, the earth and the inter-space are woven as also the mind along with all the vital breaths'. This is said to be the bridge to immortality. The point is raised that this being is different from Brahman which is said to be without end and without any other bank. B.U. II. 4. 12. It may be pradhāna or air (B.U. III. 7. 2) or the individual soul. The use of the word atman, self, denotes Brahman and not unintelligent matter or the individual soul. Atman is said to be sat or reality in C.U. VI. 8. 4. This is the implication of other passages in M.U. (II. 1. 10; II. 2. 11). Ś. in his comment on this sūtra argues that the world and Brahman should not be regarded as separate from each other. The Self is not to be regarded as many or as qualified by this world of manifold effects.1 It is to be known as one homogeneous substance. The word 'bridge' does not mean that there is another bank. It holds together or lends support, from the root si, to bind. It means only that the knowledge of Self is the means for attaining immortality.

I. 3. 2. muktopasrpya-vyapadeśāt And because it is mentioned as that to be attained by the released. mukta: the released; upasrpya: to be attained; vyapadeśāt: because it is mentioned. R. and Nimbarka add 'ca' at the end of the sūtra. The goal of the released is Brahman. See M.U. II. 2. 8; III. 2. 8; see also B.U. IV. 4. 7; IV. 4. 21. R. holds that those freed from samsara attain to Brahman for the state of samsara consists in the possession of name and form, which is due to the connection with non-conscious matter, such connection springing from good and evil works. The Person therefore who is the abode of heaven, earth, etc., and whom the text declares to be the aim to be achieved by those who, having freed themselves from good and evil, and hence from all contact with matter, attain supreme

1 yat sarvam avidyaropitam tat sarvam paramarthato brahma na tu yad brahma tat sarvam ity arthah. Bhāmatī.

Text, Translation and Notes 287

oneness with the Highest Brahman, can be noneother than the Highest Brahman itself.1

I. 3. 3. nānumānam atacchabdāt Not that which is inferred on account of there being no text to indicate it. na: not; anumanam: what is inferred; atac-chabdat: on account of there being no text to indicate it. R. and Srīkantha take this and the next sūtra as one. Pradhāna is arrived at by inference. We argue that every effect must have a cause and that cause another and so on until we reach an uncaused first cause. As the effects are non-conscious the cause is inferred to be non-conscious since the cause and theeffect areassumed to be of similar nature. This is the reasoning adopted by the Sāmkhya system to establish the reality of pradhāna. We cannot infer that the support of heaven, earth, etc., is pradhāna or air since there is no word to suggest it; on the other hand, words like omniscient, etc. (M.U. I. 1. 9), indicate that the support is an intelligent being.

I. 3. 4. prānabhrc ca (not) the bearer of the vital breaths (the individual soul) too. prana-bhrt: the bearer of the vital breaths; ca: and. Some readers omit 'ca' at the end. Though the individual soul is intelligent, it is not omniscient and all-pervading. The individual soul may be taken as the instrumental cause of the world since its unseen store of merit and demerit requires the world for enjoying the fruits. It cannot, on any account be called the material cause of the world. The individual soul is not the support of heaven, earth and the rest for the reason that there are no texts to indicate it.

I. 3. 5. bhedavyapadeśāc ca And on account of the declaration of difference. bheda: difference; vyapadeśāt: on account of the declaration; ca: and. In the text, 'Know him alone as the Self'2 (M.U. II. 2. 5), a distinction is made between the knower and the known. The individual soul seeking release is the knower and the Highest Self is the object of knowledge. The latter is the abode of heaven, earth, etc. 1 samsāra-bandhād vimuktā eva hi vidhūta-puņya-pāpā nirañjanā nāma rūpābhyām vimuktās ca. punya-pāpa-nibandhano'citsamsarga-prayukta-nāma- rūpabhāktvam eva hi samsārah. ato vidhūta-punya-pāpair niranjanaih prakrti- samsarga-rahitah parena brahmanā param-sāmyam-āpannaiḥ prāpyataya nirdişto dyu-prthivyādy-āyatana-bhūtah purusah param brahmaiva. 2 tam evaikam jānatha ātmānam.

288 The Brahma Sūtra

R. considers here M.U. III. 1. 2 and refers to the distinction between the bewildered and grieving individual soul and the detached Supreme Self, both dwelling on the same tree.

I. 3. 6. prakaranāt On account of the context. The whole chapter in M.U. discusses the nature of the Highest Self. It must also be the topic here.

I. 3. 7. sthity-adanābhyām ca And on account of (the two conditions) abiding and eating. sthity-adanābhyam: on account of abiding and eating; ca: and; sthiti: abiding; adana: eating. Another reading sthityodanābhyam sthiti and odana. See Śrīnivāsa's Vedānta Kaustubha. The passage considered is M.U. I. 1. 3. There are two birds, one who eats and the other who looks on. The former is the individual soul; the latter is the Supreme Self. The bridge to immortality, the soul of all, the support of heaven and the rest is the Supreme Self. Even if the two birds are taken to mean buddhi or understanding and the individual soul devoid of upadhis or adjuncts, as the Paingi U. suggests, the individual soul limited by the adjuncts is not the Highest Self and the latter alone is the support of heaven, etc. S. points out that the distinction between the individual soul and Brahman is no more real than that between the ether within a jar and the universal ether.

Section 2 (8-9)

BHŪMAN IS BRAHMAN

I. 3. 8. bhūmā sam-prasādād adhyupadeśāt The Bhuman is Brahman since the instruction (about it) is additional to the state of serenity (deep sleep). bhūmā: Bhūman; sam-prasādat: to the state of serenity; adhi: additional to; upadeśat: on account of the instruction. The passage considered is C.U. VII. 23 and 24. Sanat-kumāra tells Narada that Bhūman is that where one sees nothing else, hears nothing else and understands nothing else. The doubt arises whether it is the life-principle, prana, or the Highest Self. The objector makes out that Bhūman is prana for after a series of questions about what is greater and greater still, präna is affirmed to be the greatest of all and Bhuman is said to be prana. He who knows the prana is said to be an ati-vādin (VII. 15. 4). Even the statement that he sees nothing else, hears nothing else applies to a condition in which all the senses

Text, Translation and Notes 289 become merged in prāna (see Praśna U. IV. 2) and only the prāna keeps awake. The immortality of Bhūman can apply to prāna (C.U. VII. 24. 1, K.U. III. 2). Prāna is also treated as the self of all (C.U. VII. 15. 1). It is spoken of as the nave of the wheel in which all the spokes of the things in the world are fixed. The answer to this is that Bhuman can represent the Highest Self. Sam-prasāda1 is serenity and refers to the state of deep sleep as it is mentioned along with the states of waking and dream (B.U. IV. 3. 15). It belongs to the prana and Bhuman is described as subsequent to prana and so must refer to an entity different from it. What is said about Bhuman is different from what is said about prana. The statement regarding the ati-vadin is made not only with regard to the man who has the knowledge of prana but also later with regard to one who has the knowledge of truth. Sanat-Kumara leads his pupil Nārada by a series of steps beyond prāna to Bhūman. Prāna is a product since it is said to spring from the Self (C.U. VII. 26.1). Bhuman is said to reside in his own glory (C.U. VII. 24. 1). The same topic is continued to the end of the chapter with the sole change of the word Self (atman) for Brahman. So Bhuman is the Highest Self.

I. 3. 9. dharmopapatteś ca And on account of the appropriateness of the attributes. dharma: attributes; upapatteh: on account of appropriateness; ca: and. The attributes assigned to the Highest Self and Bhūman agree (see C.U. VII. 24. 1; B.U. IV. 5. 15). The serenity of deep sleep applies to Brahman or Bhūman and not to prana for it is said to be great and not little (C.U. VII. 23. 1); see also B.U. IV. 3. 32. The absence of the activities of seeing, etc., in the state of deep sleep (Praśna U. IV. 2) indicates the non-attachedness of the self. The qualities of immortality, truth, omnipresence, self-existence and being the self of all apply to the Highest Self and Bhūman.

Section 3 (10-12)

THE IMPERISHABLE IN WHICH SPACE IS WOVEN IS BRAHMAN

I. 3. 10. akşaram ambarāntadhrteh The Imperishable (is Brahman) on account of its supporting (all things) up to space. aksaram: the imperishable; ambara: sky or space; anta: end; dhrteh: because it supports. 1 sam-prasīdaty asminn iti sam-prasādah. K

290 The Brahma Sūtra

The passage considered is B.U. III. 8, 7 and 8. Does aksara refer to the syllable or the Highest Self? The objector mentions the collection of fourteen sutras which Panini is reported to have received from Śamkara, akşara-samāmnāya. C.U. (II. 23. 4) mentions the syllable Aum as the symbol of Brahman, the Self of all and worthy to be meditated upon If it is suggested that the ambara may be the pradhāna, R. says that the support of that pradhana cannot itself be the pradhana. The conclusion is that while all things find their support in ākāsa, akāsa itself is supported by Aksara. It can only be the Brahman. Aksara is that which is not perishable (na ksaram), which is all- pervading (aśnute) and so can refer to Brahman only. Aum is used as a symbol for Brahman for purposes of meditation. It is also called pranava. prakarșeņa nūyate anena iti pranavah. It is called praņava because it is the best stotra.1 Atharva-Sikha U. (I. 17) says: 'It is called pranava because it is effective in restraining the senses and directing them to the Supreme Self.2 Brahman as the support of ākāśa is Brahman as Iśvara. Śrikantha suggests that there is a difference between the support and what is supported. The former is Brahman and the latter is cit-śakti. Akāśa is referred to as being woven as warp and woof in Akşara in B.U. III. 8. 11.

I. 3. 11. sā ca praśāsanāt And this (supporting) (belongs to the Highest Lord only) on account of command. sā: this; ca: and; praśāsanāt: on account of command. If it is argued that the cause which supports all effects called the Imperishable is pradhāna and not Brahman, the answer is that it is the work of God alone and not non-conscious pradhāna (see B.U. III. 8. 9), for non-conscious causes such as clay and the like are not capable of command3 with reference to their effects such as jars, etc.4 R. says that the supreme command through which all things in the universe are held apart cannot possibly belong to the individual soul in the state of either bondage or release.5 It belongs to the Supreme Person. Srīnivāsa accepts this position.

1 Bhoja's Yoga-sūtra-vrtti. 2 prāņān sarvān paramātmanam praņāmayati iti etasmāt praņavah. 3 prakrstam śāsanam: unrestricted commanding. 4 praśāsanam ca pārameśvaram karma nācetanasya pradhānasya prasāsanam sambhavati. na hy acetanānām ghațādi-kāranānām mrdādīnām ghațādi-vişayam praśāsanam asti. Ś. 5 na cedrśam sva-śāsanādhīna-sarva-vastu-vidharanam baddha-muktobhay- āvasthasyāpi pratyag-ātmanaḥ sambhavati. atah purușottama eva prasāsit! akşaram. R.

Text, Translation and Notes 29I

I. 3. 12. anyabhāvavyāvrtteś ca And on account of the exclusion of a different nature. anya: different; bhava: nature; vyavrtteh: on account of exclusion; ca: and. Other alternatives are excluded. The Imperishable cannot be the pradhana for the Aksara is said to be seeing, hearing and perceiving, which pradhana is not capable of (B.U. III. 8. 11). When it is said that there is no other seer but the Imperishable, no other hearer, etc., individual souls are excluded. Even the limiting adjuncts are excluded for the Imperishable is said to be 'without eyes, without ears, without speech, without mind' (B.U. III. 8. 8). The Imperish- able is Brahman.

Section 4 (13)

THE SYLLABLE AUM

I. 3. 13. īkşati-karma-vyapadeśāt sah On account of the mention as the object of seeing, he (is the Highest Self). īkśati: seeing; karma: action; vyapadeśāt: on account of mention; sah: he. S. thinks that the passage (Praśna U. V. 2) refers to Brahman without determinations and not Brahman with determinations. The objector contends that as the reward promised is a limited one confined to brahma-loka, it is not a worthy reward for one who knows the Highest Self. It is said that he will reach the Highest, para-purusa, but this has reference only to the physical body. Hiranya-garbha is the vital principle in all creatures.1 To all this S. answers that the object of meditation is the object of sight. Though it is possible that an object of meditation may be unreal, the object of sight must be real and existing. The Highest Self is the object of meditation and perfected sight or intuition.2 The object of meditation is not the jiva-ghana (Praśna U. V. 5) but that which transcends it, as the use of the words para and purusa indicate. When jīva-ghana is itself said to be transcendent, it is only in the sense that it transcends the sense-organs and their objects. Or if jīva-ghana is taken as referring to the brahma-loka presided over by Brahmā or Hiranya-garbha the cosmic Person3 including in him all the jīvas, the man who meditates on the Aum with its three elements does not stop there but goes further along in attaining the vision of the Highest Self which exceeds the jiva-ghana and yet dwells in them all. Scripture also holds that the Highest Person is Brahman. From the 1 pindah sthūlo dehah, prāņah sūtrātmā. Ānandagiri. 2 samyag-darśana-vişayī-bhūta. Ś. Panini: IV. 3. 77, murttam ghanah.

292 The Brahma Sūtra

worship of the determinate, we pass to the meditation of the Indeterminate. In other words, one attains to freedom by degrees along with Brahma.1 R. holds that meditation and seeing have the same sense as seeing is the result of devout meditation.2 The doubt considered by R. is whether the Highest Person mentioned in the text is Hiranya- garbha or the Lord of all. The objection is raised that it refers to Brahma or Hiranya-garbha,3 as he who meditates on Aum as having one matra obtains the world of men; he who meditates on it as having two matras, obtains the world of the atmosphere and so those who meditate on it as having three syllables reach the world of Brahmā, who is constituted by the aggregate of the individual souls. This collective soul is higher than the many souls which are associated with the body and the sense-organs. R. answers that the Highest Person is referred to and not Brahma. For the text says that the object of seeing is the Highest Self (C.U. IV. 15. 1). Brahmā is himself jiva-ghana for he is created (S.U. VI. 18) and his world is perishable. While for S. the question relates to Brahman or Iśvara, for R. it relates to Iśvara or Brahmā. Ś. says that the reference is to Brahman without determinations. R. holds that the reference is to the Highest Person Iśvara and not Brahmā, Hiraņya-garbha.

Section 5 (14-21) ĀKĀSA WITHIN THE HEART OF BRAHMAN

I. 3. 14. dahara uttarebhyah The small (space) (is Brahman) on account of what follows. dahara: small; uttarebhyah: on account of what follows. In the Adhikarana-ratna-māla, the sūtras 14-21 are divided into two sections comprising 14-18 and 19-21. Both these discuss the question whether akaśa within the lotus of the heart is the element akāśa or the individual soul or Brahman. The passage considered is C.U. VIII. 1. The doubt arises whether 'small' here refers to the element akāśa or the individual soul or Brahman. It may mean the element (bhūtākāsa). Though it is all- pervading, it is spoken of as small since it is located in the heart. Though there is one ākāsa, it may be conceived as two, one inside

1 tri-mātreņaumkāreņālambanena paramātmānam abhidhyayatah; phalam brahma-loka-prāptih, krameņa ca samyag-darsanotpattir iti. krama-mukty abhiprāyam etad bhavişyati. Ś. 2 atra dhyātīkșati-śabdāv eka-vişayau, dhyāna-phalatvād īkșaņasya. R. 3 jīva-samaşti-rūpo'ndāthipatis catur-mukhah. R.

Text, Translation and Notes 293 and the other outside, for the purpose of meditation and it is possible to compare them (C.U. VIII. 1. 3). Brahma-pura is the city in the form of the body and the Lord of the city is the individual soul. The soul dwells in the heart which is the seat of mind. It is spoken of as small since it is compared to the point of a goad. (S.U. V. 8.) Dahara may also mean the quality of something else residing within the small ākāśa in the heart and in no case can it apply to Brahman who is not connected with body. Ś. answers these points. Dahara does not refer to the element ākāśa, for the teacher asks us to search and understand that which is in the heart and it cannot be the element akaśa. The space within is said to be as large as the space without. It is free from sin, etc. These qualities cannot apply to the element ākāśa. If the reference is to the individual soul, it cannot be said to be all- pervading like ākāśa. Brahma-pura need not mean the city in which the individual soul resides; it means the city of Brahman. (Praśna U. V. 5; see also B.U. II. 5. 18.) This body is not only the abode of Brahman,1 but is useful for its realisation. Even if brahma-pura is the city of the individual soul, we are told that Brahman resides in the body in close proximity with the devotee even as the image of Visnu is said to be accessible in the salagrama stone.2 When we find that the results of the knowledge of the dahara are imperishable as compared with the perishable nature of the results of works, it is clear that dahara refers to the Highest Self and not to the individual soul. (C.U. VIII. 1. 6.) Śrikantha holds that the passage stating that what is within daharākāśa is to be sought (C.U. VIII. 1. 1) suggests that the seat is cit-śakti and what is seated is Brahman.

I. 3. 15. gati-śabdābhyām tathā hi drstam lingam ca (The small is Brahman) on account of the movement and of the word for thus it is seen (elsewhere) and there is reason for inference as well. gati-śabdābhyam: on account of the movement and of the word, tathā hi: for thus; drstam: it is seen; lingam: reason for inference; ca: too. The reference is to C.U. VIII. 3. 2, where it is said that all creatures here go day after day into the Brahma-world. Here the word creatures' is used for the individual souls and Brahma-world for the small one. Again, in C.U. VI. 8. 1, it is said that during sleep the individual soul becomes one with pure being. Brahma-loka is Brahman and not the world of the god Brahma. The term 'world of 1 upalabdher adhişthānam brahmaņa deha işyate tenāsādhāranatvena deho brahma-puram bhavet. Bhamatī. 2 athavā jīva-pura evāsmin brahma sannihitam upadeksyate, yathā sālagrāme visnus sannihitah iti tadvat. Ś.

294 The Brahma Sūtra Brahm' in apposition with the word which refers to the small one is an inferential mark that the small one is Brahman.

I. 3. 16. dhrteś ca mahimno'syāsminn upalabdheh (The small is Brahman) because of support also and because his greatness is observed in him. dhrteh: because of support; ca: and; mahimnah: greatness; asya: his (the Supreme Self's); asmin: in him; upalabdheh: because it is found or observed. C.U. (VIII. 4. 1) declares that the Highest Self is the bridge, support and boundary which keeps the worlds apart. The greatness of the dahara or the small is indicated in B.U. III. 8. 9. See also IV. 4. 22. Dahara is the Highest Self. R., Śrikantha and Baladeva adopt the same view; they interpret the words differently; asya: of the Lord; asmin: in the small space. The sutra reads: Because supporting the worlds is a greatness of him (the Lord) is observed in it (the small space).

I. 3. 17. prasiddheś ca And because it is well known (that dahara is the Highest Self). prasiddheh: because it is well-known; ca: and. When it is said that akāśa alone manifests names and forms (C.U. VIII. 14), that 'all these beings spring forth from ākāsa' (C.U. I. 9. 1), akāśa cannot mean the element but only the Highest Self. Srīkantha refers to passages in the Mahā U. and Kaivalya U., where the Supreme Lord is said to be the object worshipped as abiding in the small lotus (of the heart).

I. 3. 18. itara-parāmarśāt sa iti cen nāsambhavāt If it is said that on account of reference to the other (the individual soul), he is (the dahara), (we say) no for it is impossible. itara: other; paramarsāt: on account of reference; sa: he (is the small); iti: thus; cen: if; na: no; asambhavāt: for it is impossible. In the previous sūtras, reference to the element of ākāśa is rejected. In this and the following sūtras, reference to the individual soul is considered. The objector takes up C.U. VIII. 3. 4 and argues that sam-prasāda applies to the individual soul. S. answers that the individual soul qualified by the adjuncts of buddhi, etc., cannot be compared with the unlimited ākāśa. Again, qualities such as freedom from sin cannot apply to a being who is limited by adjuncts. R. points out that the individual soul cannot be the dahara as the qualities attributed to it such as freedom from sin, etc., can apply only to the Supreme Lord.

Text, Translation and Notes 295

I. 3. 19. uttarāc ced āvirbhūta-svarūpas tu If it be said (that dahara is the individual soul) on account of sub- sequent (statements), (we say) (but the subsequent passage refers to the individual soul only in so far as) its real nature has become manifest. uttarat: on account of what is subsequent; cet: if; āvirbhūta: become manifest; svarūpah: one's real nature; tu: but. The objector takes up the dialogue, which comes after the dahara- vidyā between Indra and Virocana on the one hand and Prajā-pati on the other. (C.U. VIII. 7. 1ff.) Prajä-pati, while declaring that he is teaching the truth of the Self which is free from sin, old age, death, etc., speaks only of the individual soul, the person seen in the eye, the dream and sleep conditions of the individual soul and it is the individual soul which rises in the form of sam-prasāda from the body, meets the Highest Light and appears in its own form. Ś. points out that Prajā-pati is not speaking of the individual soul qualified by the conditions of waking, dream and sleep but the self which has manifested its real nature, after rising beyond the con- sciousness of body into realisation of its oneness with Brahman. According to S. the individual soul whose nature has become manifest is no longer the individual soul. It is this freed individual (M.U. III. 2. 9) that is referred to by Prajā-pati. If it be objected that if the true nature of the individual soul is Brahman, all this discussion about its activities, its rise from the body becomes meaningless, Ś. argues that just as a crystal which is white and transparent is not discerned to be separate from the adjunct of real or blue colour, the individual soul which is pure consciousness or light appears to be of the nature of the upādhis or the adjuncts of body, sense and mind and to be endowed with the activities of hearing, seeing, etc., on account of the lack of discrimination. The moment discrimination arises, when the crystal appears as white and transparent, the individual soul appears in its original form of the Self. The embodied or the disembodied condition of the soul is the result of the absence or presence of discriminative knowledge;1 notwithstanding the possession of body, the soul is without the body if it has the knowledge that it is one with Brahman. If it has no such knowledge it remains an individual soul bound up with the upadhis. Praja-pati gradually leads us on to the true nature of the individual soul as nothing but the Highest Self. According to S. the author of the sutras disproves the erroneous doctrine of the duality of the Highest Self and the individual soul. He distinguishes the Highest Self from the individual soul but does not distinguish the individual soul from the Highest Self.2 The latter as the support

1 vivekāvivekāmātreņaivātmano'sarīratvam sa-śarīratvam ca. Ś. See B.G. XIII. 31; Kațha U. I. 2. 22. 2 paramātmano jīvād anyatvam dradhayati, jīvasya tu na parasmād anyatvam pratipipādayişati.

296 The Brahma Sūtra is different from the things imagined to exist but the imagined things cannot exist apart from the support on account of which they are imagined. The rope exists by itself and is different from the serpent but the serpent which is imaginary cannot exist apart from the rope. Ś. also refers to some who belong to his own school of thought who hold that the individual soul as such is real.1 For Bhaskara the statement of Praja-pati does not refer to the individual soul as such but to the soul which has attained the form of the Supreme Self. R. holds that Praja-pati's teaching and the statement about dahara have different topics. What refers to the dahara does not apply to the individual soul even when it has freed itself from bondage and become free from sin. Nimbärka argues that the Highest Self having his real nature ever manifest is the small one but not the individual soul who has his real nature manifest, not always but only during release. I. 3. 20. anyārthaś ca parāmarśah And the reference to the individual soul has a different meaning. anya: other; arthah: meaning; ca: and; parāmarsah: reference. The reference to the individual soul in regard to sam-prasāda means that when the soul is tired of the activities of waking and dream and becomes desirous of resting, it goes beyond the consciousness of gross and subtle bodies, in deep sleep. It then reaches the highest light or Brahman and so appears in its own real nature. Here the reference to the individual soul is to make us aware of its real nature. Nimbärka holds that the reference to the individual soul is for showing that the Supreme Self is the cause of the manifestation of the real nature of the individual soul.

I. 3. 21. alpa-śruter iti cet tad uktam If it be said that (ākāśa cannot mean the Highest Self) on account of its being mentioned by the sruti as small, we say that) that (point) has already been considered. alpa: small; śruteh: on account of mention by śruti; iti: thus; cet: if; tat: that; uktam: (has been) said. In I. 2. 7, it has already been said that the Supreme, though all- pervading, is capable of being meditated upon, as dwelling in the small heart. It has also been said that the ākasa within the heart is as large as the ākāśa without. 1 apare tu vādinah pāramārthikam eva jaivam rūpam iti manyante. asmadīyās ca kecit. Ś.

Text, Translation and Notes 297

Section 6 (22-23)

UNIVERSAL LIGHT AS BRAHMAN

I. 3. 22. anu-kṛtes tasya ca And on account of acting (shining) after and (of the word) his. anu-krteh: on account of acting after; tasya: his; ca: and. While S. treats the two sūtras 22 and 23 as a new section R. holds that they do not start a new topic but furnish additional arguments for the conclusion reached in the preceding sūtras. The passage considered is Katha U. II. 2. 15. 'Everything shines only after that shining light. His shining illumines all this world.' (See also M.U. II. 2. 11.) The doubt is raised whether this being is a luminous body or the Highest Self. The answer is that it is the Highest Self for C.U. (III. 14. 2) says that his form is light, bhā- rūpah. Luminosity being the common nature of all, there is no need for one to shine first and the others to follow. Imitation does not depend on similarity. Iron is different from fire and dust is different from wind; yet a red-hot iron ball burns things like the fire and the dust on the ground blows after the blowing wind. The word 'his' refers to the source of the light of the sun, moon. B.U. (IV. 4. 16) says of him that he is the light of lights (jyotişām jyotih). Obviously this does not refer to the physical light. S. suggests that we may take it not merely as the cause of the light of the sun, moon, etc., but as the cause of all this, sarvam idam. (See M.U. II. 2. 5; B.U. IV. 2. 4, IV. 3. 6.) R. takes anu-krti to mean imitation and quotes M.U. III. 1. 3. The individual soul in Praja-pati's teaching is the imitator and Brahman which is imitated is the dahara.1 Nimbarka follows this interpretation.

I. 3. 23. api ca smaryate And the same is declared in the smrti. api: also (the same); ca: and; smaryate: is declared in smrti. ca is omitted by R. and Baladeva. The reference here is to B.G. XV. 6, 12. 'That splendour of the sun that illumines this whole world, that which is in the moon, that which is in the fire, that splendour, know as mine.' R. mentions B.G. XIV. 2. 'Having resorted to this wisdom and become of like nature to me, they are not born at the time of creation; nor are they disturbed at the time of dissolution.' Nimbārka accepts this interpretation. Śrinivasa says: Smrti declares the equality of the individual soul, freed from all bondage, in B.G. XIV. 2. So it is estab- lished that the daharākasa is none but the Supreme Self.

1 ato'nukartā prajā-pati-vākye nirdisto'nu-kāryam brahma daharākāsah. R. K*

298 The Brahma Sūtra

Section 7 (24-25) THE PERSON OF THE SIZE OF A THUMB IS BRAHMAN I. 3. 24. śabdād eva pramitaḥ On account of the text itself, what is measured (by a thumb) (is the Highest Self). śabdāt: on account of the text; eva: itself; pramitah: is measured. The passage considered is Katha U. II. 1. 12-13. 'The person of the size of a thumb resides in the middle of the body. After knowing him who is the lord of the past, and the future, one does not shrink (from him). This, verily, is that.' 'The person of the size of a thumb resides in the middle of the body, like a flame without smoke. He is the lord of the past and the future. He is the same today and the same tomorrow. This, verily, is that.'1 The objector contends that the person referred to is the individual soul and not the Highest Self who cannot be measured. The soul limited by adjuncts, samsāri-jīva, may be taken as being measured by a thumb. In the M.B., Yama is said to have dragged out forcibly by his noose the thumb-sized person from out of the body of Satyavān. The person can be the Highest Self alone for none else can control the past and the future. The words 'this is that' are an answer to the question by Naciketas who is asking about Brahman. The person is the Highest God and not the individual soul.

I. 3. 25. hrdyapekayā tu manusyādhikāratvāt In the reference to the heart, however, (the Supreme is said to be of the size of a thumb) because men have a right (to the study of the Veda). hrdi: in the heart; apeksaya: with reference to; tu : however; manusya: man; adhikāratvāt: because of a right. But how can a measure be attributed to the Omnipresent Self? The sutra answers this doubt. To the objection that the size of the heart varies in different classes of beings and so the measure of the size of a thumb cannot apply to all, the sūtra says it applies to men only. The Scripture, though propounded without any distinction, does in reality entitle men only to act according to its precepts for they alone can act (according to the precepts); they alone are desirous (of the results of actions), they are not excluded by pro- hibitions and are subject to the precepts about upanayana ceremony, etc.2 Animals, gods and seers are excluded. Gods cannot perform sacrifices for they involve offerings to the gods. Seers cannot perform sacrifices, as the ancestral seers are involved in the performance of 1 P.U., pp. 634-5. 2 sāstram hy avisesa-pravyttam api manusyānevādhikaroti saktatvād arthitvād aparyudastatvād upanayanādi-sāstrāc ceti. Ś.

Text, Translation and Notes 299

the sacrifices. Again, those who desire release do not care for the perishable fruits of sacrifices. The third and the fourth reasons give the right only to the three higher castes and upanayana is pre- scribed as indispensable for the study of the Veda.1 As the human body has a fixed size the heart also has a fixed size. The Scripture says that 'the person of the size of a thumb is the inner self, etc.': Katha U. II. 3. 17.2 R. argues that men are qualified for devout meditation. In so far as the Highest Self abides in the heart of the devotee-which heart is of the measure of a thumb-it may itself be viewed as having the measure of a thumb.3 Śrīnivāsa gives alternative explanations. The Lord is said to be one who makes three strides (tri-vikrama) in reference to the three worlds. If he can be said to be of three strides why not 'of the size of a thumb'. Again, the Lord manifests himself to be of the size of a thumb to please his devotees. Apeksayā is treated as a reference to the worshipper's wishes. Though S. admits that Scriptures are of universal application, and are to be followed by all, some restrictions were imposed on certain sections of the people.

Section 8 (26-33)

GODS ARE CAPABLE OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF BRAHM AN

In this section the question whether the gods are capable of the knowledge is answered in the affirmative but incidentally other problems are raised such as the relation of the different species of beings to the words denoting them.

I. 3. 26. tad-upary api bādarāyaņah sambhavāt Also beings above them (men) (are qualified for the study of the Vedas), as Bādarayana holds, on account of possibility. tad: them; upari: above; api: also; bādarāyaņah: as Bādarāyaņa holds; sambhavat: on account of possibility. Gods may have the desire for formal release caused by the reflection that all effects, objects and powers are non-permanent. Just as men are led to seek for salvation as the earthly rewards do not yield permanent fruits, so also gods who realise the transitoriness of even heavenly enjoyments are led to worship the Supreme Lord. It may be argued that gods cannot practise meditation since they do not have physical bodies and the God they meditate on should have a form.4 1 See Pūrva Mīmāmsā Sūtra VI. I. 3 paramātmana upāsanārtham upāsaka-hṛdaye 2 P.U., pp. 647-8.

hṛdayasyāngustha-pramāņatvāt vartamānatvād upāsaka tad-apekşayedam angustha-pramitatvam upapadyate. R. 4 na hi nirviśeşa-devatā-dhiyam adhirohati. R.

300 The Brahma Sūtra

Gods are known to possess bodies, from the accounts of them we read in the epics and the puranas, from paintings and images. In their case there is no need for the upanayana ceremony since the Vedas are open to them. We know that they accept discipleship. Indra lived as a disciple of Prajā-pati for 101 years (C.U. VIII. 11. 3). Bhrgu approached his father Varuna to teach him the knowledge of Brahman (T.U. III. 1). Gods and sages may be incapable of action such as a sacrifice (see Pūrva Mīmāmsā Sūtra VI. 1. 5) as there are no other gods whom they have to please or other sages to whose families they would belong. So far as the knowledge of Brahman is concerned no action need be performed. So far as the size of the Person is concerned, it may be measured by the thumb of a god, even as it is measured in the case of men by the thumb of a man. B.U. I. 4. 10 says: 'Brahman, indeed, was this, in the beginning. It knew itself only as "I am Brahman". Therefore it became all. Whoever among the gods becomes awakened to this, he, indeed, becomes that. It is the same in the case of seers, the same in the case of men.' R.says that wish and capacity exist in the case of gods1 as they also are liable to suffering, arising from the assaults hard to be endured, of the different kinds of pain and as they also know that supreme enjoyment is to be found in the Highest Brahman, which is untouched even by the shadow of imperfection and is full of auspicious qualities of the highest perfection.

I. 3. 27. virodhah karmanīti cen nānekapratipatter darśanāt If it be said (that possession of bodies would result in) a contradiction to (sacrificial) works, (we say that) it is not so because it is observed that (gods) assume many forms. virodhah: contradiction; karmani: in action; iti: thus; cet: if; na: not; aneka: many; pratipatteḥ: assumption; darsanāt: because it is observed. The difficulty is mentioned that, if gods have bodies, they may be expected to be present like priests on the occasion of a sacrifice. How can God Indra be present at many sacrifices, if they are performed at the same time? In answer, it is stated that one and the same deity can assume various forms at the same time. B.U. (III. 9. 1-2) indicates that one and the same divine Self may at the same time appear in many forms. It is mentioned in the M.B. (XII. 110-62) that a yogin, who has acquired supernatural powers, can assume many forms, have many experiences and take them all back into himself.2

1 arthitva-sāmarthyayoh sambhavāt. 2 ātmanām vai sahasrāņi bahūni bharatarșabha kuryād yogī balam prāpya tais ca sarvair mahīm caret prāpnuyād vişayān kaiścit kaiścid ugram tapas caret samksipec ca punas tāni sūryo raśmigaņān iva.

Text, Translation and Notes 30I Another explanation is also possible. Just as a Brahmana who cannot be fed by different people at the same time can nevertheless be saluted by them all at the same time, a deity can without leaving his place be the common object of reverence of several persons who may at the same time give their offerings to him. The embodiedness of gods is in no way a hindrance to their sacrificial activity. Nimbārka answers the objection that embodiedness of the deity will result in a contradiction with regard to work by 'the observation of the assumption' simultaneously of many bodies by one and the same deity. Śrīnivāsa takes a different view. 'Because of the observation of many worships.' Just as one and the same teacher is found to be saluted simultaneously by many worshippers, so different performers of sacrifices may give their offerings to one and the same corporal deity who abides in his own place.

I. 3. 28. śabda iti cen nātah prabhavāt pratyaksānumānābhyām If it be said that (a contradiction will result in regard to) word, (we say) that it is not so because perception and inference show the origination of everything from this (the word). śabda: word; iti: so; cet: if; na: not; atah: from this; prabhavāt: on account of origination; pratyaksānumānābhyām: from perception and inference. The problem of the relation in which the different species of beings stand to the words which denote them is taken up for con- sideration here. S. opposes the views of Upavarsa, the Mīmāmsaka according to whom the word is nothing but the aggregate of the letters which constitute it as well as the view of the grammarians who teach that over and above the aggregate of the letters, there exists a supersensuous entity called sphota, which is the direct cause of the apprehension of the meaning of a word. In this sutra, the objection is considered whether the authoritative- ness of the Veda is not contradicted by the attribution of bodies to divinities. The possession of body subjects them to the changes of birth and death, so the eternal connection of the eternal word with a non-eternal thing is inconceivable.1 The sūtra answers it by saying that the world with the gods and other beings originates from the Veda. But this is not consistent with I. 1. 2 which holds that Brahman is the origin of all things and, again, the word or name comes into existence after the object which is given the word or the name. As the objects are transitory even the words or names are transitory and so cannot be self-valid and eternal. In reply it is said that the words are connected with the jäti, or the class which is eternal, and not with the individuals which may be infinite in number and transitory. Words connote some permanent meanings on account of whose presence in individual objects, the names are extended to them. It is in this sense 1 See Pūrva Mīmāmsā Sūtra I. I. 5.

302 The Brahma Sūtra that the individuals are said to originate from words and not in the sense that the word is, like Brahman, the material cause of the universe. The evidence for the view that the universe arises on account of the efficient cause of the word lies in perception and inference. Perception means śruti; for its validity it is not dependent on anything else; inference is smrti.1 S quotes texts from śruti and smrti, Rg Veda IX. 6. 2; B.U. I. 2. 4; M.B. XII. 233. 24 and 25; Manu I. 21. Just as we make jars after conceiving the meaning of the word jar, the Creator first conceives the words and then corre- sponding to them creates the universe.2 The question is raised about the nature of the word which causes the universe. The grammarians contend that it is the sphota which arises in the mind: after the word is uttered and on account of it, the meaning of the word becomes known. The sphota is the eternal entity and not the letters which perish as soon as they are uttered.3 Gods, etc., cannot arise from the perishable words but only from the imperishable sphota. Upavarșa, the Mīmāmsaka, opposes this view and argues that there is no separate perception of the sphota over and above the perception of the letters. The letters are not short- lived because they are recognised to be the same. They are not different on different occasions. The object of cognition is not sphota, an additional something which is suddenly perceived after the accumulation of the successive impressions of the letters. The letters of a word which succeed each other in a certain order give all the meaning they have to our intelligence in one single act of cognition. There is no need for the assumption of a sphota. Whether the word is of the nature of letters or class or sphota, the theory that the gods originate from the eternal words remains unaffected. R. quotes Manu, Visnu Purana and others. Cp. 'In the beginning there was sent forth by the Creator, divine speech beginningless and endless-in the form of the Veda and from it originated all creatures'. Nimbārka quotes Taittirīya Brāhmaņa (II. 6. 2. 3), 'He evolved name and form by means of the Veda'. Śrinivāsa also states the objection and answer. The objection says that the gods who possess bodies which are non-eternal must themselves be non-eternal whereas the Vedic words which denote the gods are eternal. How can 1 pratyakşam hi srutih prāmānyam praty anapeksatvāt; anumānam smrtih prāmānyam prati sāpekşatvāt. Š. śrutim pasyanti munayah smaranti ca tathā smytim. 2 api ca cikīrşitam artham anutişthan tasya vācakam sabdam pūrvam smrtvā paścāt tam artham anutişthatīti sarveşām nah pratyakam etat. tathā prajā-pater api sraştuh sṛsteh pūrvam vaidikās sabdā manasi prādurbabhūvuņ; paścāt tad- anugatān arthān sasarjeti gamyate. tatha ca sruti : sa bhūr iti vyaharat sa bhūmim asrjata. Taittirīya Brāhmaņa II. 2. 4. 2. 3 anādi-nidhanā hy eșā vāg utsrstā svayambhuvā ādau veda-mayī divyā yatah sarvā prasūtayah.

Text, Translation and Notes 303 there be an eternal connection between the non-eternal gods and the eternal Vedic words? The answer states that the individual gods are non-eternal but this does not show that the Vedic words are meaningless for they denote not the individual (vyakti) but the type (äkrti). While the individual is non-eternal, the type is eternal. The non-eternal individuals are created at the beginning of each creation in accordance with the eternal types which are indicated by the eternal Vedic words.

I. 3. 29. ata eva ca nityatvam And for this very reason, the eternity (of the Vedas follows). atah: therefore, for this reason; eva: very or same; ca: and; nityatvam: eternity. The Veda is the eternal source of the universe. Rg Veda (X. 71. 3) tells us that the eternal speech dwelling in the sages was found out by those who performed the sacrifice. See also M.B. which says: 'Formerly the great sages, with the permission of the Self-born, obtained through their penance the Vedas together with the epics, which had been hidden at the close of the cosmic period.'1 The Vedic mantras or hymns are said to be composed by different seers like Viśvamitra and so on. It may be argued that the Vedic mantras are non-eternal as their authors are non-eternal. But the seers are not really the authors or composers of the hymns which are eternal. They only utter or reveal the Vedic mantras and these revealers change from age to age.

I. 3. 30. samāna-nāma-rūpatvāc cāvrttāv apy avirodho darśanāt smrteś ca And on account of the similarity of name and form (there is) no contradiction (to the eternity of the word of the Veda) even with regard to

and the smrti. the recurrence (of the world), (as is clear) from what is perceived (sruti)

samāna-nāma-rūpatvāt: on account of the similarity of name and form; ca: and; avrttau: recurrence (repetition of cycles of births and deaths); api: even; avirodhah: absence of contradiction; darśanāt: from what is perceived; smyteh: from the smrti; ca: and. The eternity of the Vedas is not affected even though there are new creations with new Indras and other gods because the names and forms of each new creation are the same as those of the preceding world. In spite of periodical creations and dissolutions, samsāra is beginningless and endless. Even as a man who has awakened from sleep goes on with his affairs even as he did before he went to sleep, so

K.U. III. 3. also creations and dissolutions do not disturb the continuity. See

1 yugānte'ntarhitān vedān setihāsān maharşayah lebhire tapasā pūrvam anujñātās svayambhuvā.

304 The Brahma Sūtra If the objection is raised that the dissolution or mahāpralaya is like death and not sleep and if continuity is kept up, it is because all men do not sleep at the same time, so that those who are awake remind others of their previous lives, the answer is that gods do not suffer from the defects which afflict men; the gods remember the past even after dissolution. Besides, the world is nothing but the results of the actions of beings done in the previous creation. It provides opportunities for experiencing the pleasures and pains consequent on past conduct. By our present actions we prepare for future creation. So the world moves on perpetually from desires to actions, from actions to their results and from the results to desires. There remains always a potentiality of the world to become actual through the same names and forms, same desires and actions in spite of apparent dissolution. The new creation is not an effect without a cause. See Rg Veda X. 190-3. Vāk is sometimes described as subtle, eternal, imperishable and incomprehensible to the senses.1 Those who meditate on Väk over- come death.2 Taittirīya-Brāhmaņa II. 8. 8 says: Whom the Sages, the Makers of Hymns, the Wise Ones, And the Gods also, sought with austerity and with Effort: Her, the Divine Speech, with this Offering we pray; May She vouchsafe Welfare unto the World.3 In Proverbs viii. and Job xxviii. Wisdom is said to have its origin in God and also its place beside God. Wisdom is represented as a pre- existent divine associate of God in his creative activity. She was before the foundation of the world. 'Whoso findeth me [i.e. wisdom] findeth life and shall obtain favour of the Lord. But he that sinneth against me [i.e. wisdom] wrongeth his own soul: all they that hate me love death.'4 St John's Prologue begins: 'In the beginning was the Word; the Word was with God.' The Word marks the transition from eternity to history.

I. 3. 31. madhvādişv asambhavād anadhikāram jaiminiḥ On account of the impossibility (of the gods having a right to the know- ledge of) the honey and the rest they (the gods) are not qualified, (so) Jaimini (thinks). madhvādisu: in madhu (honey), knowledge and others; asambhavāt: 1 yām sūkşmām nityām atīndriyām vācam rşayah sākşātkrta-dharmāņo mantradrsah paśyanti. Puņyarāja on Vākyapadīya I. 6. 2 te mrtyum ati-vartante ye vai vācam upāsate. 3 yām rşayo mantrakrto manīşinah anvaicchan devās tapasā śrameņa tām devīm vacam havisā yajāmahe 4 Proverbs viii. 35-6. sā no dadhātu sukrtasya loke.

Text, Translation and Notes 305

on account of impossibility; anadhikāram: no fitness or qualification; jaiminih: Jaimini (thinks). In C.U. III, it is said the sun is the honey of gods, the sky is the bee-hive, the Vedic hymns the trees, the sacrifices are the flowers and the offerings of soma, milk, etc., are the honey itself. Led by Agni, Indra and others, the gods live on this honey. It is possible for men to meditate on the sun and not for gods. They cannot at once be the meditators and the objects of meditation. Again, certain divinities like Fire, Wind, Sun, Directions are each declared to be a foot (pāda) of Brahman and as such are recommended to be the objects of meditation for men; it is not possible for gods to meditate on themselves. (C.U. III. 18. 2; III. 19. 1; IV. 3. 1.) Similarly the right and the left ears are to be meditated on as Gautama and Bhāradvāja respectively (B.U. II. 2. 4). It is not possible that these sages should meditate on themselves. So Jaimini holds that deities and sages are incapable of acquiring the knowledge of Brahman.

I. 3. 32. jyotişi bhāvāc ca And because (the words denoting the deities) are used in the sense (or sphere) of light. jyotişi: in the sphere of light; bhavat: because used; ca: and. Agni, Aditya belong to the sphere of light. How can these be endowed with a bodily form or intelligence or choice? Since they are not personal beings, they are not capable of or qualified for the knowledge of Brahman. Other sources of knowledge which give personality to these luminous beings are not acceptable; so the objector contends that devas and similar beings are not qualified for the knowledge of Brahman. R. Nimbarka hold that the objection is that as the gods meditate on the light of lights, Brahman (B.U. IV. 4. 16), they are not entitled to the honey meditation and the rest.

I. 3. 33. bhāvam tu bādarāyano'sti hi But Bādarāyana (maintains) the existence (of qualification for Brahma- knowledge on the part of the deities) for there is certainly (evidence to show this). bhāvam: existence; tu: but; bādarāyaņah: Bādarāyaņa; asti: is; hi: certainly. The objection stated in the two previous sūtras is repudiated here. Though the qualification of the gods for madhu-vidyā, etc., may not be admitted, for the gods themselves are involved in them, the qualification for the pure knowledge of Brahman need not be denied to them.1 Scripture says that the gods are qualified for Brahma-

1 yady api madhv-ādi-vidyāsu devatādi-vyāmiśrāsu asambhavo' dhikārasya, tathāpi asti hi suddhāyām brahma-vidyāyām sambhavah. Ś.

306 The Brahma Sūtra knowledge. B.U. I. 4. 10; C.U. VII. 7. 2. Words like Āditya, though they refer to light, convey the idea of certain divine persons endowed with intelligence and pre-eminent power. By their power they reside within the light and assume any form they like. The Vedic injunctions presuppose certain characteristic shapes of the several divinities. The status of divinity is a stage leading to final emancipation. Bhäskara thinks that there is scriptural evidence that the gods are entitled to the honey meditation and the rest. Nimbarka holds that the gods are entitled not only to the knowledge of Brahman in general but also to the meditations in which they themselves are implicated.

Section 9 (34-38)

THE DISQUALIFICATION OF SŪDRAS FOR BRAHMA-KNOWLEDGE

I. 3. 34. śugasya tad-anādara-śravanāt tad ādravaņāt sūcyate hi The grief which he (Janasruti) felt on hearing the disrespectful words (about himself) made him run (toward Raikva) for that alone is

śuk: grief; asya: his; tad-anādara-śravanāt: on hearing the dis- indicated.

respectful words; tad: that; ādravaņāt: because of running; sūcyate: indicated; hi: alone. The objector urges that the Sudras have a right to Brahma- knowledge for they desire that knowledge and are capable of it. There is no scriptural prohibition as we have in the matter of offering sacrifices. 'Therefore the Sudra is unfit for sacrificing' (Taittirīya Samhita VII. 1. 1. 6). The reason which disqualifies the Sūdras for sacrifices is their being without the sacred fires but that is no dis- qualification for knowledge. In C.U. (IV. 2. 3)1 samvarga-vidyā, which is a part of Brahma-knowledge, is admitted for Jānaśruti. Śūdras like Vidura are spoken of as possessing Brahma-knowledge. The answer is given that the Sudra who is not competent for the upanayana ceremony cannot study the Vedas and is therefore disqualified for Brahma-knowledge. The word 'Sudra' does not refer to caste. It may refer to the grief of Jānaśruti and not to Jānaśruti himself. Whether Janaśruti came to grief or grief fell on him or whether he rushed to Raikva on account of grief, the word 'sūdra', refers to one of these three things and not to caste.2 1 P.U., pp. 401 ff. 2 śucā gurum abhidudrāveti sūdrah. sucam abhidudrāveti sūdrah. sucā abhidudruva iti śūdrah. hamsa-vākyād ātmano'nādaram śrutvā janasruteh śugutpannety etad eva katham gamyate yenāsau sūdra-sabdena sūcyate, tatrāha spyśyate ceti. Anandagiri.

Text, Translation and Notes 307 R. says that Janaśruti, when taunted by a flamingo for his lack of Brahma-knowledge, was overtaken by grief and resorted to Raikva who had Brahma-knowledge. When Raikva addresses Janaśruti as 'sūdra', he refers to Jänaśruti's sorrow and not to his being a member of the fourth caste. The word śūdra etymologically considered means he who grieves or sorrows (śocati). Śrīnivasa, in his Vedānta Kaustubha, in stating the objection mentions that Vidura and others as well as women like Sulabhā, are found to possess Brahma-knowledge. Sulabha carried on a highly learned discussion with Janaka, according to the M.B. (XII. 321). As we will see, Ś. makes out that Suta, Vidura and others, though born Sudras, on account of the merit acquired in their previous lives, have obtained Brahma-knowledge. The author of Parimala argues that, though the Sūdras may not have a right to Vedic study, by listening to the Epics and the Puranas, on account of the strength of their merit previously acquired, they attain to a knowledge of Brahman. Thus knowledge of Brahman is open to all. The ways to it may be different for different people. All human beings by virtue of their humanity are entitled to Brahma-knowledge and salvation.

I. 3. 35. kşatriyatvagateś cottaratra caitrarathena lingāt (Janaśruti was not a śudra because his ksatriyahood is known from the inferential sign (supplied by his having mentioned) later on with Caitraratha (who was a kşatriya). R.and Śrīkaņtha divide this into two sūtras: (i) kşatriyatvā gateś ca; (ii) uttaratra-lingāt. Bhāskara reads kşatriyatvā-gateś ca; others as ksatriyatva-avagateś ca. kşatriyatvagateh: nature of a ksatriya being known; ca: and; uttaratra: later on; caitrarathena: with Caitraratha, lingat: because of the inferential sign. As Janaśruti and Caitraratha are mentioned together we gather that Janaśruti was also a kşatriya. (C.U. IV. 3. 5.)

I. 3. 36. samskāra-parāmaršāt tad-abhāvābhilāpāc ca On account of the mention of the ceremonies (purificatory in the case of the three twice-born castes) and the absence of mention of them (in the case of the fourth caste). samskāras: ceremonies; parāmarāt: on account of mention; tad: its; abhāva: absence; abhilāpāt: on account of mention; ca: and. In Satapatha Brahmana (XI. 5. 3. 13); C.U. (VII. 1. 1); Praśna U. (I. 1), samskāras like upanayana, initiation, are mentioned for the three twice-born castes, which are not for the fourth caste. See Manu X. 4; X. 126.

308 The Brahma Sūtra I. 3. 37. tad abhāva-nirdhārane ca pravrtteh And because of (Gautama's) proceeding (to initiate Jabala) on the ascertainment of the absence of that (viz. his sudrahood). tad-abhava-nirdharane: on the ascertainment of the absence of that; ca: and; pravrtteh: because of proceeding. C.U. (IV. 4.5) tells us that Gautama was satisfied that Jabala, who did not know his gotra or family name, was not a śūdra because he possessed the quality of speaking the truth and initiated him. Gautama said: 'A non-Brahmana cannot speak thus.'1 It is obvious from the Chandogya episode that character and not birth was the test of Brahminhood. Jabala was given initiation because he did not deviate from truth.

I. 3. 38. śravanādhyayanārtha-pratişedhāt smrteś ca And because (the Sudra) is forbidden by smrti from hearing and study (of the Vedas) and (understanding their) meaning. śravana: hearing; adhyayana: study; artha: meaning; pratiședhāt: because (it is) forbidden; smrteh: by the smrti; ca: and. R. and Nimbārka state smrteś ca as a separate sūtra, while Ś., Bhaskara and Baladeva treat the text given as one sūtra. See Gautama Dharma-śāstra (XII. 4, 5, 6; X. 1); Manu (IV. 80). Obviously uneasy about these prohibitions, S. observes that Vidura, and Dharmavyādha had Brahma-knowledge as the result of deeds in their previous births and the fruit of knowledge, that is release, is inevitable.2 Gaining knowledge through Vedic study is forbidden but gaining knowledge through other means is encouraged. R. argues that on the theory of Advaita which holds that the sole Reality is Brahman of pure indeterminate intelligence and that bondage is ended by the mere cognition of the nature of Reality, restrictions imposed on the Sūdras cannot be justified. Even a Sūdra can free himself from the bondage as soon as the knowledge of the true nature of things has arisen in his mind through a statement resting on the traditional lore of men knowing the Veda. The knowers of truth will teach all for they are not bound by injunctions and prohibitions.3 On this view the Sudras have a perfect right to the knowledge of Brahman.4 After attacking the Advaita doctrine, R. concludes that the way to release is by means of devout meditation. Such meditation by which we attain the grace of the Supreme can be

1 naitad a-brāhmano vivaktum arhati. 2 pūrva-kṛta-samskāra-vasād vidura-dharmavyādhaprabhrtīnām jñānotpattis teşām na sakyate phala-prāptih pratibaddhum. jnānasyaikāntika-phalatvāt. S. 3 śūdrasyāpi vedavit-sampradāyāvagata-vākyād jagad-bhrama-nivyttir api bhavişyati. R. vastu-yāthātmya-jñānena

4 śūdrādīnām eva brahma-vidyadhikarah su-sobhanah.

Text, Translation and Notes 309 learned from Scripture only. This is open only to those who are purified by such ceremonies as upanayana.1 The different methods of gaining salvation, meditation, devotion which lead to Brahma-knowledge are open to all. The restrictions with regard to Vedic study cannot be defended. If we take our stand on the potential divinity of all human beings, whatever be their caste or class, race or religion, sex or occupation, the methods for gaining release should be open to all.

Section 10 (39) LIFE PRINCIPLE IN WHICH EVERYTHING TREMBLES IS BRAHMAN

I. 3. 39. kampanāt On account of trembling (of the world, the life-principle is Brahman). kampanat: on account of trembling. The discussion of the right for Brahma-knowledge was a digression. We get back to the meaning of the Vedānta texts. Katha U. (II. 3.2)2 speaks of the whole world as trembling in life. The doubt is raised whether this life-principle cannot be air. In the context, it can only be Brahman. The passage makes out that Brahman constitutes the abode of the whole world. Brahman is the life of life (B.U. IV. 4. 18). Katha U. (II. 2. 5) says that there is another on which the two life-breaths (prāna and apāna) depend.3 Brahman is the cause of the great fear for it is said that the whole world carries on its many functions for fear of Brahman (T.U. II. 8. 1). Again, knowledge of air can give us a relative reward and not life eternal. See Ś.U. VI. 15. R. and Nimbarka do not take it as a new section but only resume discussion of section 7, about the person measured as of the size of a thumb. Baladeva begins a new section and discusses the question whether vajra, the thunderbolt, is Brahman or not.

1 yasya tu mokşa-sādhanatayā vedānta-vākyair vihitam jñānam upāsana- rūpam tac ca para-brahma-bhūta-parama-purusa-prīņanam tac ca sāstraika- samadhigamyam. upāsanā-sāstram copanayanādi-samskāra-samskṛtādhīta- svādhyāyajanitam jñānam viveka-vimokādi-sādhanānugṛhītam eva svopāyatayā svīkaroti. R. 2 P.U., p. 642. 3 P.U., pp. 637-8.

3I0 The Brahma Sūtra Section 11 (40)

THE LIGHT IS BRAHMAN I. 3. 40. jyotir darśanāt The light (is Brahman) because it is seen (in the scriptural passage). jyotiḥ: light; darśanāt: because it is seen. The passage considered is C.U. VIII. 12. 3. 'That serene one when he rises up from this body and reaches the highest light appears in his own form. Such a one is the Supreme Person.'3 Does this light refer to the physical sun which dispels darkness or Brahman? It is Brahman because the topic of discussion from VIII. 7. 1 onwards is the Self which is free from sin and is said to be the object of enquiry. VIII. 12. 1 speaks of freedom from body which is possible only in Brahman. To the objection that the Scripture (C.U. VIII. 6.5) speaks of a man to be released as going to the sun, the release referred to in it is not the ultimate release which has nothing to do with going or departing. The light is spoken of as the 'highest light' and the 'highest Person'. This view is adopted by Ś., Bhāskara and Śrīkaņțha. R. thinks that this section continues the preceding and makes out that the passage about the angustha-mātra-purusa which speaks of a primary light can only be Brahman. Nimbärka adopts this view and says that the measured person is the Supreme Being. Baladeva argues that the Vajra or thunderbolt is the Lord because in a preceding passage he is called light.

Section 12 (41) ĀKĀŚA IS BRAHMAN I. 3. 41. ākāśo'rthāntaratvādi-vyapadeśāt Space (is Brahman) since it is mentioned as something different in meaning and so on. ākāsaḥ: space or ether; arthāntaratv-ādi: being different in meaning and so on; vyapadeśāt: since it is mentioned. The passage considered is C.U. VIII. 14. 1.2 Ākāśa is said to be the cause of the manifestation of names and forms. These are contained in the immortal Brahman, the Self. The doubt is raised whether the ākāśa cannot be the elemental ether. The answer is given that it is Brahman. It contains within it names and forms. It is only Brahman that is different from names and forms. Elemental ether belongs to the world of created things, having names and forms, and is not 1 P.U., p. 509. 2 See P.U., p. 5II.

Text, Translation and Notes 3II

different from them. For the manifestation of names and forms, the creative power of Brahman is ultimately responsible.1 See C.U. VI. 3. 2. The words 'Brahman, immortal, Self' all refer to Reality. This sūtra supports further what was said in I. 1. 22. Nimbarka says that Brahman is something different even from the freed souls. Sriniväsa raises the question whether the reference here is to elemental ether, or the soul freed from the bondage of mundane existence, or the Supreme Self. It applies to the source of all manifestations. The freed soul, it will be pointed out later, cannot cause creation, etc., of the world.

Section 13 (42-43)

HE WHO CONSISTS OF KNOWLEDGE IS BRAHMAN

I. 3. 42. suşupty-utkrāntyor bhedena (On account of the mention of the Highest Self) as different (from the individual soul) in the states of sleep and departure from the body). suşupti-utkrantyoh: in the states of sleep and departure. bhedena: because of difference. While Ś. takes these two sūtras (42 and 43) as beginning a new topic, R. takes the three sūtras 41-3 as one section, dealing with the question whether the ether in the C.U. passage (VIII. 14) refers to Brahman or the individual soul in the state of release. The latter doubt arises from the fact that the released soul is the theme of the passage immediately preceding. 'Shaking off evil as a horse his hairs, shaking off the body as the moon frees itself from the mouth of Rāhu, I, a perfected soul, obtain the uncreated Brahma-world, yea, I obtain it.' Does not this passage show that the released soul and Brahman are identical? The objection is raised that the B.U. passage IV. 3. 7 refers to the embodied soul, that it describes how, in the state of deep sleep, being not conscious of anything, it is held embraced by the all-knowing Highest Self (IV. 3. 21). So also with reference to departure, it is said that 'the self in the body mounted by the self of intelligence moves creaking'. The sutra says that the Highest Self is mentioned as different from the embodied soul in the states of deep sleep and departure from the body. There is nothing to be gained by des- cribing the nature of the embodied self which is already well known. Both the beginning and the end of the chapter deal with one topic, viz. the Highest Self. The reference to the conditions of sleep and

1 na ca brahmano'nyan nāmarūpābhyām arthāntaram sambhavati. sarvasya vikāra-jātasya nāma-rūpābhyām eva vyākṛtatvāt. nāma-rūpayor api nirvahaņam nirankuśam na brahmano'nyatra sambhavati. Ś.

3I2 The Brahma Sūtra

departure is used to note the difference of the Highest Self from such conditions. See B.U. IV. 3. 14-16 and 22.

I. 3. 43. patyādi śabdebhyah On account of the words, lord and others. paty-adi: Lord and others; sabdebhyah: on account of words. B.U. IV. 4. 22 uses words like adhipatih, vaśi, īsānah the great Lord, the Controller, the Protector of all. These cannot refer to the embodied soul. The quality of being neither great by good deeds nor small by evil deeds is not ascribable to any except God. The sūtra refers to the non-transmigrating supreme Lord.1 R. states that we have here declarations of general unity, that all conscious and non-conscious beings are effects of Brahman and have Brahman for their inner self.2

1 asamsārī paramesvarah. 2 aikyopadesas tu sarvasya cid-acid-ātmakasya brahma-kāryatvena tad- ātmakatvam. R.

Section 1 (1-7)

THE UNMANIFESTED DENOTES THE BODY

I. 4. 1. ānumānikam apy ekeşām iti cen na śarīra-rūpaka-vinyasta- grhīter darśayati ca If it be said that what is derived by inference (pradhana) too (is the avyakta, the unmanifested) according to some, (we say that) it is not so, because (the term) of understanding what is referred in the simile of the body and (the text) shows (this). ānumānikam: what is derived by inference; api: too, even; ekeşām: of some; iti cet: if it be said; na: not; śarīra: body; rūpaka: simile; vinyasta: referred, contained; grhīteh: because of understanding; darśayati: shows. This section discusses the Katha U. passage (I. 3. 10 and 11)1 where the terms mahat, the great, avyakta, unmanifested, are used in the Samkhya sense, where avyakta is a synonym for pradhāna. S., after an elaborate review of the topics mentioned in the Katha U., argues that the term avyakta has not the special meaning given to it by the Samkhya system but denotes the subtle body, the sūksma śarra, as also the gross body which is viewed as an effect of the subtle one. We have already seen that Brahman is the cause of the origin, maintenance and dissolution of the world (I. 1. 2), that pradhāna is not the cause (I. 1. 5, 10). But as there are some texts which seem to favour the view that pradhana is the cause, we have to show that Brahman is the cause and not pradhana.2 The passage under discussion comes after another passage where the simile of the chariot is used (I. 3. 3-4). In both the passages, the senses, the mind and the understanding are mentioned. By buddhi we may mean the human understanding and by mahān-ātman the understanding of Brahma or Hiranya-garbha for it is his buddhi that can be truly considered to be the support of all the buddhis of beings. In the passage it is only the body which can be identified with avyakta. The whole section shows that the embodied soul is bound to body, mind, senses, etc., while it is, for Ś., in reality nothing but the Supreme Self. The simile of the chariot shows that our final destiny is the abode of Visnu (Katha U. I. 3. 12). By the practice of Yoga we reach it. In all this, there is no place for the hypothesis of pradhāna.3 R. argues that avyakta does not denote pradhāna independent of Brahman but denotes the body represented as a chariot in the simile 1 See P.U., p. 625. 2 kāsu cicchākhāsu pradhāna-samarpaņābhāsānām sabdānām śrūyamāņatvāt. atah pradhānasya kāranatvam veda-siddham eva mahadbhih. paramarsibhiļ kapila-prabhytibhih parigrhītam iti prasajyate. Ś. 3 nāsty atra para-parikalpitasya pradhānasyāvakāsah.

314 The Brahma Sūtra of the body.1 R. also points out the differences between the sāmkhya view and the Upanisad arrangement.

I. 4. 2. sūkşmam tu tad arhatvāt (The word avyakta means), however, the subtle body for this is the appropriate (meaning) of that (word). sūksmam: (the subtle body); tu: however; tad: that; arhatvāt: because it is appropriate. If it is said that the gross physical body (sthūla śarīra) is vyakta, manifested, and not avyakta, the sutra says that avyakta means the subtle body which consists of the subtle parts of the elements and it applies to its effect of the gross physical body. It is not uncommon to use the name of the effect for the cause. See Rg Veda (X. 46. 4; B.U. I. 4) where the present manifest world is referred to by the former non-manifest condition. R. interprets appropriateness in a different way. The unmanifested matter alone, when it assumes the form of the effect (body) is fit to undertake activities furthering the purposes of man like the chariot.2

I. 4. 3. tad-adhīnatvād arthavat On account of dependence on him, it has a meaning. tad-adhīnatvāt: on account of dependence on him; arthavat: has a meaning. To the question whether the non-manifest condition of the world may not be called pradhana, the answer is given that the previous condition of the world is not an independent cause but is dependent on the Highest God. The potential primordial power of the Highest God is called by S. avidyā, māyā, avyakta, ākāśa and akșara. It is known as ākāśa because of its unlimited extent, akșara because it does not cease to exist until there is knowledge, māya on account of its wonderful power, avyakta because being the power of Brahman, it is neither different nor non-different from Brahman. See B.U. VII. 8. 11; M.U. II. 12; Ś.U. IV. 10. Sometimes it is said that the word avyakta means the subtle body only, since the bondage and release of the soul are possible on account of this. The soul is in samsara when the desires bind the subtle body; when they cease to do so, the subtle body is destroyed and release attained. The answer is given that even as the word chariot refers to both gross and subtle bodies, avyakta also refers to both. Even if it is taken as referring to the subtle body, it is clear that the Katha U. passage has no reference to pradhāna. Bhäskara holds that the subtle body is designated as subtle in

1 nāuyakta-sabdenābrahmātmakam pradhānam ihābhidhīyate ... śarīrākhya- rūpaka-vinyastasyāvyakta-śabdena grhīteḥ. Ś. 2 puruşārtha-sādhana-pravrtty-arhatvāt. R.

Text, Translation and Notes 315 reference to the gross body and it is rightly called unmanifest. Bondage and release have meaning in so far as they are dependent on the subtle body. R. makes out that matter in its subtle states is meaningful and serves human ends only in so far as it is dependent on the Supreme Self. Avyakta and its effects constitute the body of the Lord who constitutes their self. For Srikantha the soul, the body and the rest have a meaning as dependent on the Lord. Śrīnivāsa makes out that the Sāmkhya pradhana cannot give rise to effects and so for producing effects it is dependent on Brahman.

I. 4. 4. jñeyatvāvacanāc ca Also because there is no mention of its being an object to the known. jñeyatva: an object to be cognised; a-vacanāt: there being no mention; ca: and, also. Whereas for the Samkhya system, knowledge of pradhāna as distinct from purua is said to be essential for achieving the liberation of the soul, in the Katha U. passages avyakta is not mentioned as an object of knowledge or meditation. The word 'avyakta' is used incidentally for body after the passage of the chariot, to indicate the nature of the highest abode of Visnu.

I. 4. 5. vadatīti cen na prājño hi prakaraņāt And if it be said that (pradhana as the object of knowledge) is mentioned (in the śruti), (we say that) it is not so for the intelligent self (is meant) on account of the general subject-matter. vadati: says, is mentioned; iti cet: if it be said; na: not; prājñah: intelligent self; hi: for; prakaranat: from the context. Katha U. speaks of that 'which is without sound, without touch and without form, undecaying, without taste, eternal, without smell, without beginning, without end, beyond the great, abiding, by discerning that one is freed from the mouth of death'. This description cannot apply to pradhana. It applies to the Highest Intelligent Self. The Person is said to be the goal for there is nothing beyond him. We can have a vision of him by the practice of self- control, etc. Even on the Samkhya theory, liberation is not possible by a mere knowledge of pradhāna. It is possible only by a knowledge of purusa as distinct from pradhāna. In the Vedānta texts, these qualities are possible only with regard to the Highest Self.

I. 4. 6. trayāņām eva caivam upanyāsah praśnaś ca And thus there are statement and question about three (things) alone. trayāņām: of three; eva: only; ca: and; evam: thus; upanyāsah: statement; praśnah: question; ca: and.

316 The Brahma Sūtra

The three questions in the Katha U. I relate, according to Ś., to the fire sacrifices, the individual soul and the Highest Self. There is no separate question and answer in regard to pradhāna. So it cannot be said to be either the object of knowledge or indicated by the word 'avyakta'. S. here urges his theory of the unity of the individual soul and the Highest Self. The denial of birth and death in the case of the individual soul suggests the non-difference of the soul and Brahman. Katha U. II. 1. 4 suggests that the Self which perceives both dream states and working states is clearly the intelligent Self, Prajña. Again II. 1. 10 censures those who find a difference between what is here and what is there.

I. 4. 7. mahadvac ca And like the word 'great'. mahat-vat: like the word mahat; ca: and. The word mahat does not refer to pradhāna. The Samkhya uses the word mahat in the sense of satta or buddhi since it it the first product of pradhana, and enables one to achieve both prosperity and freedom. The Vedic meaning of avyakta is purusa or atman, knowing whom there is an end to all sorrow,1 and not pradhāna. See Kațha U. I. 2. 22; Ś.U. III. 8.

Section 2 (8-10)

AJA (SHE-GOAT) OF RED, WHITE AND BLACK COLOURS IS NOT PRADHĀNA

I. 4. 8. camasavad aviśeşāt As in the case of the bowl (the aja, the unborn, is not pradhana) because of the absence of special characteristics. camasa-vat: like the bowl; aviśeşāt: because of the absence of special characteristics. The advocates of the pradhana theory quote S.U. IV. 52 and argue that aja, she-goat of red, white and black colours which produces manifold offspring, similar in form (to herself) refers to pradhāna which has the three qualities of sattva (white), rajas (red) and tamas (black). On account of attachment to prakrti, some souls are deluded and pass through samsāra; others on account of discrimination and non-attachment attain release. The Sutrakara answers that there is no special reason why ajā 1 avyakta-śabdo'pi na vaidike prayoge pradhānam abhidhātum arhati. Ś. ātmā mahān ity ātmā. śabda-prayogāt. Ratnaprabhā. 2 See P.U., p. 732.

Text, Translation and Notes 317 should be treated as equivalent to pradhāna. There are no special features which justify us in giving the meaning of pradhāna and not any other. In B.U. II. 2. 3 there is the passage: 'There is a bowl with its mouth below and bottom up.' This by itself does not tell us what bowl it is but the next passage provides the sense that the bowl refers to the head. So also the meaning of the word 'aja' has to be understood from some other passage. R. quotes Culika U. (3-7) which teaches that the Supreme Person is the self of prakrti, Garbha U. (3), Ś.U. I. 8-10; V. 9-10; VI. 16 and B.G. XIII. 19-21; XIV. 5; IX. 7, 8, 10. From all these texts, R. concludes that ajā is not prakrti. The prakrti indicated is brahmātmikā. Nimbārka suggests that the unborn one, ajā, must have Brahman for its soul. It is dependent on Brahman.

I. 4. 9. jyotir-upakramā tu tathā hy adhīyata eke (Aja), however, (means the three elements) beginning with light ; for some read (their text) in that manner. jyotih: light; upakramā: beginning with; tu: however; tatha: in that manner; hi: for; adhīyate: study; eke: some. C.U. VI. 4. 11 refers to the colours red, white and black as those of the three elements of fire, water and earth. Others have arisen from the highest God. We need not give up these primary meanings and adopt secondary meanings of the three gunas of prakrti. S.U. 1. 3 describes the power of the Supreme as the cause of the universe. Other passages 4, 5, 10, 11 indicate the causality of the Supreme Self. So the aja passage cannot suggest a different view in that context. The divine power is said to possess the three colours of the three elements of fire, water and earth. Ś. means by ajā, the unborn, unproduced māyā. R. refers to the passages which refer to Brahman as the light of lights. (B.U. IV. 4. 16; C.U. III. 13. 7.) He quotes the Mahānārāyaņa U. which instructs us about the aggregate of things other than Brahman and yet originating from Brahman. So aja is a creature of Brahman and has its self in Brahman and this is the meaning of the Ś.U. passages also.

I. 4. 10. kalpanopadeśāc ca madhvādivad avirodhah And on account of the mention of the image, as in the case of honey and others, there is no contradiction. kalpanā-upadeśāt: on account of the mention of the image; ca: and; madhu-adi-vat: as in the case of honey and others; a-virodhah: no contradiction. S. asks, if aja is taken to mean the three elements of the C.U.

1 See P.U., p. 451.

318 The Brahma Sūtra

(VI. 4. 1), how can the three elements be conceived as having the form of the she-goat or be thought of as unproduced, since they are the products of māya? This sūtra gives the answer. Even as the sun is imagined as honey or the speech as cow or the heavenly world as fire (C.U. III. 1; B.U. V. 8; VI. 2. 9), even so, prakrti which consists of the water and the earth, is imagined as the she-goat. It is imagining only, kalpana. It is not literally unborn but only figuratively. It represents prakrti, the source of all things, even as the sun which is not really honey is represented as such. It therefore stands to reason that aja means fire, water and earth taken together. This view is followed by Bhāskara. R. takes kalpanā as formation as in the passage, the Creator made sun and moon, 'yatha sūryā-candramasau dhātā yathā-pūrvam akalpayať'. Mahā-nārāyana U. V. 7. The world is unborn (ajā) in the causal condition and in the effect condition it divides itself into names and forms, into fire, water and earth, appearing as red, white and black. Between these two conditions there is no contradiction. Aja is to be taken as denoting the causal state of the three elements. R. criticises the view that prakrti is to be imagined as the she-goat. While aja for Ś. is the power of the Lord from which the world springs, it is for R. the primary causal matter from which the world is fashioned. Nimbärka agrees with R. and holds that no contradiction is involved in taking one and the same substratum of qualities as unborn and having at the same time Brahman for its material cause. The unborn has Brahman for its self.

Section 3 (11-13)

THE FIVE GROUPS OF FIVE ARE NOT THE TWENTY-FIVE PRINCIPLES OF THE SĀMKHYA

I. 4. 11. na samkhyopasamgrahād api nānābhāvād atirekāc ca Not even on account of the mention of the number (can it be said that pradhāna has scriptural authority) on account of diversity (of the categories) and on account of excess (over the number of the categories). na: not; samkhyā: number; upasamgrahāt: on account of the mention; api: even; nānābhāvāt: on account of many differences; atirekāt: due to excess; ca: and. B.U. IV. 4. 17 mentions 'that in which the five groups of five and space are established' is the Self, the Immortal. The five groups of five make twenty-five and this is the number of the principles mentioned in the Sāmkhya Kārikā (3). Prakrti or pradhāna is not an effect. Mahat or buddhi, understanding, aham-kara or the self-sense,

Text, Translation and Notes 319 the five tanmätras or subtle elements are the seven effects of prakrti but are causes too of the sixteen which are effects only, viz. the five gross elements and the eleven organs (indriyas). Purusa or the self is neither effect nor cause. As the same number twenty-five is found in the Upanişad passage and the Sāmkhya Kārika, it is urged that pradhana has the authority of śruti. The sūtra refutes this suggestion for each one of the twenty-five principles of the Samkhya is different from the others. The Samkhya principles cannot be classed into five groups of five principles, there being no common quality among the members of any group. Again the word 'five, five' (pañca, pañca) need not be taken as indicating twenty-five for where it is possible to indicate the number directly as twenty-five it is not correct to say that it has been indicated indirectly as five groups of five. Besides, the second word pañca is not independent but is a part of the compound pañca-jana as in the passage pañcānām tvā pañca-janānām (Taittirīya Samhitā I. 6. 2. 2). So we cannot say that the word pañca is repeated twice. Pañca-jana indicates five distinct persons and not groups. Jana does not mean any principle or category. The phrase pañca pañca-jana cannot refer to the Samkhya principles for the Self and space, ātman and ākāsa, are stated independently while they are included in the Sāmkhya twenty-five principles. We cannot arbitrarily interpret the expression pañca pañca-jana as referring to the principles of the Samkhya. It may refer to any other group of twenty-five things. The Samkhya advocate asks about the interpretation of pañca-jana. Accord- ing to Pānini (II. 1. 50), words indicating direction or number are compounded with other words and then mean only a name of something or person. The word 'pañca-janāh' indicates not number five, but a particular class of beings. It suggests that beings known as pañca-jana are five in number as the beings known as saptarsi are seven in number.

I. 4. 12. prāņādayo vākya-śeșāt The life-principle and others (are the panca-janah) on account of the complementary passage. prāņādaya: life-principle and others; vākya-śeșāt: from the comple- mentary sentence (which follows). The next passage (B.U. IV. 4. 18) reads: 'They who know the life of life, the eye of the eye, the ear of the ear and the mind of the mind, they have realised the ancient primordial Brahman.' The word pañca-jana refers to the life-principle and other beings. It has also been taken to mean: (i) the five beings of gods, fathers, gandharvas, asuras and rāksasas or (ii) the four castes of Brāhmaņas, Kşatriyas, Vaiśyas, Śudras with the Nisadas added to them. Whatever be the interpretation, it has obviously no connection with the Sāmkhya categories.

320 The Brahma Sūtra I. 4. 13. jyotişaikeşām asaty anne When food is not present (i.e. not mentioned) in the case of some (the Kanvas) (number five is completed) by light. jyotişā: by light; ekeşām: of some; asati: when not present; anne: food. In the Kanva rescension of the B.U. there is no mention of the being of food while the Madhyandina mentions it. For the former, the fifth number is light which is mentioned in the preceding passage IV. 4. 16.

Section 4 (14-15)

NO CONFLICT IN PASSAGES REGARDING BRAHMAN'S CAUSALITY

I. 4. 14. kāraņatvena cākāśādisu yathā-vyapadistokteh And on account of (Brahman) as described being declared to be the cause of space and the rest. kāraņatvena: as cause; ca: and; ākāśa-ādişu: of ākāśa and others yathā: as; vyapadistokteh: declared as described. According to S., the objection raised relates to apparently con- flicting passages which deal with creation. The order of creation varies from passage to passage in B.U. I. 4. 7; C.U. VI. 2. 1-3; T.U. II. 1; Praśna U. VI. 4. The sūtra makes out that though there may be contradictions in the order of creation, there is no such contradiction regarding the Creator. He is described in all passages as omniscient, lord of all, the inner soul of everything and as the one and only cause without a second.1 See T.U. II. and 6; C.U. VI. 2. 1-3; Aitareya U. I.1. R. and Nimbärka also make out that the intention of the sūtra is to affirm that the Highest Person alone, endowed with the attributes of omniscience, omnipotence and the rest is the cause of the universe. Śrikantha does not begin a new section here but continues the consideration of the five-five people (B.U. IV. 4. 17). These refer to the life-principle and the rest and not to the Sāmkhya pradhāna.

I. 4. 15. samākarșāt On account of the connection samākarsāt: on account of connecting or linking up. There are passages which tell us that 'all this, verily, was in the beginning non-being' (asat) (T.U. II. 1). This does not mean absolute non-existence. If sat indicates the being of Brahman with all the

1 yathā-bhūto hy ekasmin vedānte sarvajnas sarveśvaras sarvātmaiko'dvitīyah kāraņatvena vyapadistah.

Text, Translation and Notes 32I

manifest names and forms, asat indicates the being of Brahman without names and forms. It indicates the condition of the world prior to its manifestation. The same interpretation should be given to C.U.III. 19.1; B.U. I. 4. 7. The evolution of the world, C.U. (VI.3.2) tells us, takes place under the supervision of the Omniscient Ruler.1 If we read the passage about non-being in its context, we will see that the previous passage speaks of the Self consisting of bliss (T.U. II. 7). Ś. and Bhaskara treat this section as dealing with the general question of the concordance of all texts with regard to Brahman. This is evident from the way S. comments on this section at the very beginning.2 Nimbarka uses this sutra for the refutation of the Samkhya view of pradhāna.3

Section 5 (16-18)

BRAHMAN'S CAUSALITY

I. 4. 16. jagadvācitvāt Because of the denoting of the world. jagat: world; vācitvāt: because (it is) denoted. The text considered is K.U. IV. 19. 'He, verily, who is the maker of these persons, he of whom all this is the work (karma), he alone is to be known.' What is the object of knowledge? Is it the individual soul, or the chief vital breath or the Highest Self? Arguments for the chief vital breath, mukhya-prāna, are set forth. It is the support of all activity or work. In a complementary passage (IV. 20), the word 'prāna' occurs. Prana is said to be the creator of the persons in the sun, moon, etc. See also B.U. III. 9. 9. There are also arguments in support of the view that the object of knowledge is the individual soul. The work of the soul will mean its deeds of merit and demerit. The soul may be considered to be the cause of the persons in the sun, etc., inasmuch as the sun, the moon are said to be the sources of pleasure and pain to be experienced by the soul. Besides, we find in a later passage a characteristic mark of the individual soul. Ajātaśatru failed to awaken a sleeping man by merely shouting at him. He roused him from his sleep when he pushed him with a stick. It shows that the individual soul is different from the life-principle. There is another characteristic mark given in IV. 20. The individual soul and the selves in the sun and the moon are helping each other. The individual soul as the support of prāna is itself called prāna. 1 sādhyaksām eva jagato vyākriyām darsayati. 2 tatra idam aparam āsankate: na janmādi-kāranatvam brahmaņo brahma- vişayam vā gati-sāmānyam vedānta-vākyānām pratipattum sakyam. 3 na pradhāna-sankā-gandho'pīti bhāvah. L

322 The Brahma Sūtra

Both these suggestions are refuted by the sūtra. Bālāki begins his conversation with Ajatasatru with the offer: 'Let me declare Brahman to you.' The maker of all these individual souls cannot be a soul lower than Brahman for then the introductory offer would be meaningless. Only the Highest Lord is capable of being the maker of all those mentioned for he alone is truly independent. The word karma does not indicate movement, or merit or demerit accruing from it. So it cannot refer to prana or the individual soul. It cannot denote persons in the sun for purusa is masculine and is used in genitive plural and karma is neuter and is used in the singular number. Karma cannot refer to the activity of producing the persons on the result of that activity for both these are included in the agent without whom they would not exist. The passage 'he of whom all this is the work' means that the entire world and the person in the sun, etc., are only a part of this world which is nothing but the work of God. The passage sets forth the maker of the world in a twofold way, as the creator of a special part of the world and as the creator of the whole remaining world. R. opposes the view which holds that the person to whom the work belongs is the enjoying soul, the ruler of prakrti. For work, meritorious or the contrary, belongs to the individual soul only. The generally accepted meaning of karma is good and evil actions. The origination of this world is caused by the various actions of the individual souls. The explanation given by Ajātaśatru to Bālāki, who has been unable to say where the soul goes at the time of deep sleep, that all the speech and other organs become one in prana in deep sleep clearly refers to the individual soul which alone passes through the states of dream, deep sleep and waking. This view is controverted by R. who makes out that the work is the world and the Supreme Person is the sole cause of the world. Though the origination of the world has for its condition the deeds of the individual souls, yet those souls do not independently originate the means for their own retributive ex- perience but experience only what the Lord has created to that end in agreement with their works.1

I. 4. 17. jīva-mukhya-prāņa-lingān neti cet tad vyākhyātam If it be said that this is not so on account of the characteristic marks of the individual soul and the chief vital breath, (we reply that) that has been already explained. jīva: individual soul; mukhya: chief; prāna: vital breath; lingat: due to characteristic marks; na: not; iti cet: if it be said; tad: that; vyākhyātam: (is) already explained. Bhaskara reads this sutra and the next as one section. 1 jagad-utpatter jīva-karma-nibandhanatve'pi na jīvah sva-bhogya- bhogopakaraņādeh svayam utpādakaḥ. api tu sva-karmānugunyenesvara-srstam sarvam bhunkte. R.

Text, Translation and Notes 323 If it be said that the characteristic marks of the individual soul and the chief vital breath are given in the passage, S. observes that when a text is ascertained, as referring to Brahman by a compre- hensive consideration of the opening and the concluding clauses, all characteristic marks which point to other topics must be so inter- preted as to fall in with the principal topic. In the text under consideration, at the outset it is said: 'Let me declare Brahman to you.' In the middle, the clause 'of whom this is the work' refers to the Highest Person who is the cause of the whole world. At the end again, we hear of a reward which relates itself only with meditations on Brahman by śraisthyam: eminence, svārājyam: independence, ādhipatyam: supremacy. All other topics must be interpreted so as to conform to this main topic of Brahman. Again, the refutation has already been made in I. 1. 31; only the creation of the world was not there referred to Brahman. The word prana is used with reference to Brahman in C.U. VI. 8. 2. S. adds that whatever characteristic marks we may have about the individual soul, we shall be justified in considering them as indicative of Brahman, since the jiva is identical with Brahman.1

I. 4. 18. anyārtham tu jaiminih praśna-vyākhyānābhyām api caivam eke But Jaimini thinks that (the reference to the individual soul) has another purport, on account of the question and the explanations and so some others too (read the text). anyartham: another purport; tu: but; Jaiminih: Jaimini; praśna- vyākhyānābhyām: on account of the question and the explanation; api: also; ca: and; evam: so; eke: some others. Even assuming that there is a reference to the individual soul, it is only to indicate the knowledge of Brahman. This is clear from the nature of the question and the explanatory answer given in this connection. When Ajätaśatru asked as to where the person was asleep and whence he came back to the waking state, the reply given is that during dreamless sleep a person becomes one with this prāna (Brahman) alone; and that it is from this Self alone that the prānas depart to their abode; and from prana depart the gods and from gods the beings (K.U. IV. 19 and 20). It is the Vedanta view that during sleep the soul becomes one with Brahman and it is from Brahman that the world and the prana proceed. That in which the sleeping soul becomes devoid of cognition of the waking life and enjoys tranquillity is Brahman itself which is the object fit to be known. Again, in B.U. II. 1. 16 and 17 it is said that the soul as distinct from the Highest Self lies in the akasa within the heart. C.U. VIII. 1. 1 says that this small ākasa is nothing but the Highest Self. It is the

1 brahma-vişayatvād abhedābhiprāyeņa yojayitavyam. Ś.

324 The Brahma Sūtra

source of all as the empirical selves are said to spring from it. B.U. II. 1. 20. All these lead to the conclusion that the Self exists beyond both prana, life-principle, and jiva or the individual soul. This view that the section deals with the general agreement of all texts with regard to Brahman is supported by Bhāskara. R., while adopting the same view as S., directs his attack on the Sāmkhya theory of pradhāna. Śrikantha holds that this section deals with the difference between the individual soul and Brahman.1

Section 6 (19-22)

THE SELF TO BE SEEN, HEARD, ETC., IS THE HIGHEST SELF ON ACCOUNT OF THE CONNECTION OF TEXTS

I. 4. 19 vākyānvayāt On account of the connection of sentences (the Self to be seen, heard, etc., is the Highest Self). vākya: sentence; anvayat: on account of the connected meaning. The passage considered is B.U. IV. 5. 6. 'Verily, the Self is to be seen, to be heard, to be reflected on, to be meditated upon; when, verily, the Self is seen, heard, reflected on and known, then all this is known.' The doubt arises whether the Self to be seen, heard, etc., is the individual soul or the Highest Self. The opponent contends that the reference is to the individual self: (i) because the objects of enjoyment, husband, wife, wealth, etc., can only have in view the enjoying soul and so the self which is the object of sight and so on can only be the individual soul; (ii) the sentence 'how should one know the knower?' can denote only the agent, the individual soul and so the declaration that through the cognition of the Self, everything becomes known must be taken to mean that the world of the objects of enjoyment is known through its relation to the individual enjoying soul. The answer is given that the reference is to the Highest Self on account of the meaning and mutual connection of passages. Maitreyi wishes to know that by which she can become immortal and this can be reached only by the knowledge of the Highest Self. In subsequent passages it is said: 'Brähmanahood deserts him who knows Brahmanahood in anything else than the Self' and so on. It means that all these have no independent existence apart from the Self. The next passage that 'everything is the Self' tells us that the entire aggregate of existing things is non-different from the Self. The similes of drum and so on confirm this view. Yājñavalkya urges that 1 punar api jīvāt parameśvarasya anya-bhāvam upapādayati. I. 4. 16.

Text, Translation and Notes 325 the Highest Self is the cause of the world of names and forms and works. He leads us to the same conclusion that the Self is the centre of the whole world with the objects, the senses and the mind, that it has neither inside nor outside, that it is altogether a mass of knowledge. R. thinks that this sutra is an answer to the suggestion that the Samkhya purusa or soul is meant by the text. According to the Sāmkhya system, immortality is obtained through the cognition of the true nature of the soul viewed as free from all erroneous im- putation to itself of the attributes of non-conscious matter. The world originates from the soul in its quality as the ruler of prakrti. R. answers this objection by stating that the Self which Yajñavalkya speaks of as the proper object of knowledge leading to immortality is the Highest Self. See S.U. III. 8. The knowledge of the true nature of the individual soul which obtains immortality, and which is a mere manifestation of the power of the Supreme Person, is useful for the cognition of the Supreme Person who brings about release and is not by itself instrumental for such release. The causal power with regard to the entire world can belong to the Supreme Person only. Again, everything cannot be known through the cognition of one individual soul only. It is possible only through the knowledge of the Highest Self which is the self of all. All search for dear objects as husband, wife, etc., should be given up and only the Self should be sought. It is the Highest Self alone that makes objects dear. R. quotes Visnu Purana to the effect: 'The same object which gave us delight later on becomes a source of grief. What was the cause of wrath later tends to peace. Hence there is nothing that is in itself of the nature either of pleasure or of pain.'1

I. 4. 20. pratijñā-siddher lingam āśmarathyah (The reference to the individual soul as the object to be seen, heard, etc.), indicates the proof of the statement; (so thinks) Asmarathya. pratijñā: statement; siddheh: of proof; lingam: indicatory sign; āśmarathyah: Āśmarathya. If the individual soul were different from the Highest Self, then the knowledge of the latter will not involve the knowledge of the former and thus the statement that through the knowledge of one thing everything will be known would not be fulfilled. If the im- plications of this statement are to be realised, then the individual soul and the Highest Self are non-different. R. argues that if the individual soul were not identical with Brahman as its effect, then the knowledge of the soul-being some- thing distinct from Brahman-would not follow from the knowledge 1 tad eva prītaye bhūtvā punar dukhāya jāyate tad eva kopāya yataḥ prasādāya ca jāyate tasmād duņkhātmakam nāsti na ca kiñcit sukhātmakam. II. 6. 46-7.

326 The Brahma Sūtra

of the Highest Self. He quotes texts declaring the oneness of Brahman previous to creation (Aitareya Aranyaka V. II. 4. 1. 1) as well as those which make out that the souls spring from and merge in Brahman (M.U. II. 1. 1). The souls are one with Brahman in so far as they are its effects. Srīpati quotes B.U. II. 4. 6; C.U. VI. 1. 4 and holds that 'if one is known all is known' is according to the nyāya of dadhi-kșīra, curds resulting from milk. When the cause is known the effects are known. Āśmarathya considers both the doctrines of a-samyukta-bheda-vāda which differentiates between the individual soul and Brahman as between a jar and a cloth and the doctrine of angangivat-samyukta- bheda, which connects the soul with Brahman as closely as a body is connected with its members. Śrinivāsa points out that since the individual soul is reckoned among the effects of Brahman there is a difference between effect and cause. Thus the texts declaring duality are correct. But since the effect is non-different from the cause, being born from it, non-difference between the two is equally a fact. So between the individual soul and Brahman there is a natural relation of difference and non-difference. So it is possible for words denoting effects to denote the causes as well as in the case of the pot and the clay. So through the knowledge of one, the knowledge of all is established. Āśmarathya holds that the soul stands to Brahman in the bhedā- bheda relation. It is neither absolutely different nor non-different from Brahman, as sparks are neither different nor non-different from fire.

I. 4. 21. utkramişyata evam bhāvād ity audulomih (The identification of the individual soul with the Highest Self is possible) because the soul when it will rise (to depart from the body) is such (i.e. one with the Highest Self) ; (so thinks) Audulomi. utkramisyatah: of one who rises up (to depart); evam: so; bhāvāt: because of being; iti: thus; audulomih: Audulomi. C.U. VIII. 12. 6 says: 'That serene one when he rises up from this body and reaches the highest light appears in his own form.' M.U. III. 2. 8 reads: 'Just as the flowing rivers disappear in the ocean casting off name and shape, even so the knower, freed from name and shape, attains to the divine person, higher than the high.' So Audulomi thinks that the reference to the individual soul as non- different from the Highest Self is appropriate. It is in view of the future condition that is acquired by the individual soul that it is described as non-different from the Highest Self. Audulomi teaches that the soul is altogether different from Brahman up to the time of its final release when it is merged in Brahman. Vācaspati quotes a verse from the Pañcaratrikas which states that

Text, Translation and Notes 327 difference is real until release when it becomes extinct.1 While Ś. and Bhaskara mean by bhava identity with the Supreme Self, paramātmaikyopapatti, R. and Srīkantha mean by it the state of the Supreme Self, paramātma-bhāva. Srīpati interprets the sūtra thus: utkramişyatah, svām vidyopādhim tyajatah, jīvasya ghatākāśa mahākāśavat, brahma-bhinnatvāt sarvadā brahma-bhinnatayā jīvo- pakramanam. When the erroneous knowledge of jīva is removed, jīva realises its identity with Brahman. Śrīnivāsa develops Nimbārka's theory of difference-non-difference. Audulomi suggests difference between the individual soul and Brahman in the state of bondage and non-difference in the state of release. This difference-non-difference is admitted by Audulomi, according to Srinivasa, for the benefit of the dull-witted. But strictly even during the state of bondage the individual soul which is atomic in size and possesses very little knowledge, though different from Brahman who is all-pervasive, is yet non-different from him since it has no separate existence and activity, even as a leaf is non- different from the tree, a ray from the lamp, an attribute from its substratum and the sense-organs from the vital principle. Even so, though, in release, it is non-different from him, it having no separate existence and activity, it is also different from him. See C.U. VIII. 3.4. According to Baladeva, the released soul becomes dear to all.

I. 4. 22. avasthiter iti kāśakrtsnah (The identification of the individual soul with the Highest Self is possible) because (the Highest Self) exists (in the condition of the individual soul), (so thinks) Kāśakrtsna. avasthiteh: because of existence; iti: thus; kāśakītsnah: Kaśakrtsna. S. points out that Aśmarathya believes in the non-difference of the individual soul from the Highest Self but he does so to establish the possibility of the knowledge of all things as a result of the knowledge of the Highest Self. His belief in non-difference is relative and not absolute for he views the Highest Self and the individual soul as cause and effect. Audulomi admits the difference between the two in the state of bondage and identity in the state of release. Kāśakrtsna interprets tat tvam asi, that thou art, in a proper way. The individual soul is described as non-different from the Highest Self for it is the Highest Self that lives in the form of the soul.2 Kāśakrtsna holds that the soul is absolutely non-different from 1 āmukter bheda eva syāj jīvasya ca parasya ca muktasya tu na bhedo'sti bheda-hetor abhāvatah.

See also C.U. VIII. 12. 3; B.G. XIV. 2. Bhāmatī I. 4. 21.

2 asyaiva paramātmano'nenāpi vijñānātmabhāvenāvasthānād upapannam idam abhedābhidhānam iti, kāsakṛtsna ācāryo manyate.

328 The Brahma Sūtra

Brahman, which somehow presents itself as the individual soul. The individual soul abides in the Supreme. The term avasthita suggests the abiding of one thing in another rather than identity. But S. believes in absolute identity. The individual soul and the Highest Self differ only in name.1 Ś. agrees with Käsakrtsna that the Highest Self itself appears as the individual soul. The eternally unchanging Self which is one mass of knowledge does not perish. By means of true knowledge there is effected its dissociation from the elements and the sense-organs which are the product of avidya. When the connection is severed, specific cognition which depended on it no longer takes place. We cannot therefore insist on the distinction of the individual and the Highest Self. S. and Bhäskara interpret the word avasthiteh as meaning 'because of Brahman's abiding as the individual soul', vijnānātma-bhāvena. R. objects to the view that the soul, when departing, becomes one with Brahman. If the soul is not Brahman previous to its departure, is it due to its essential nature or limiting adjuncts? If the former, it can never become Brahman for then its essential nature will be violated. If it becomes Brahman, it perishes utterly. If the difference before departure is due to limiting adjuncts, it is Brahman even before departure and there is no point in saying that it becomes Brahman only when it departs. The adjuncts cannot introduce differences into Brahman which is without parts and incapable of difference. The difference resides altogether in the adjuncts and so the soul is Brahman even before departure from the body. If the difference due to the adjuncts is not real, then what is it that becomes Brahman on the departure of the soul? If it is said that Brahman's true nature is obscured by avidya or ignorance, Brahman whose true nature is eternal, free, self-luminous intelligence cannot possibly be hidden by avidya. When light belongs to the essential nature of a thing, there cannot be any obscuration of it. If there is obscuration, it means that the thing is completely destroyed. So Brahman's essential nature being manifest at all times, there is no point in speaking of becoming Brahman at the time of departure. R. interprets Kāśakrtsna's view as meaning that Brahman abides as itself within the individual soul which thus constitutes Brahman's body.2 See C.U. VI. 3. 2. 1; B.U. III. 7. 22. All the texts can be understood if we accept Kāśakrtsna's view. Nimbārka takes this section to be connected with the refutation of the Sāmkhya doctrine. 1 eko hy ayam ātmā nāma-mātra-bhedena bahudhābhidhīyata iti. Ś. 2 sva-śarīra-bhūte jīvātmanyātmatayāvasthite jīva-sabdena brahma prati- pādanam iti kāsakṛtsna ācāryo manyate sma.

Text, Translation and Notes 329

Section 7 (23-27)

BRAHMAN IS THE MATERIAL AND THE EFFICIENT CAUSE OF THE WORLD

I. 4. 23. prakṛtiś ca pratijñā-drstāntānuparodhāt (Brahman is) the material cause also, for this view does not conflict with the (initial) statement and illustration. prakrtih: material cause;1 ca: and; pratijñā: (initial) statement; drstanta: illustration; anuparodhāt: because of non-contradiction. The opponent holds that Brahman is the efficient cause of the world only and not the material cause. See Praśna U. VI. 3 and 4. Brahman first reflects before creating. Like kings of different places, he is the lord of the world and so possesses only efficient power. Besides, the world is non-conscious, impure and consists of parts and so its cause also should be of the same nature. But Brahman 'is without parts, without activity, tranquil, irreproachable, without blemish' (Ś.U. VI. 19). So Brahman is not the material cause. Something different from Brahman, the pradhana of the Samkhyas is the material cause and Brahman is only the efficient cause. The answer to this objection is that it is the material cause also for C.U. VI. 1. 3 says that to know the Self is to know everything else. This is possible only with regard to the material cause for the effect is not different from the material cause. We cannot say that of the efficient cause. The illustrations given apply only to the material cause. 'As by one clod of clay all that is made of clay becomes known ... by one nugget of gold all that is made of gold becomes known.' (C.U. VI. 1. 4-8.) M.U. I. 1. 7 speaks of herbs growing on the earth. B.U. IV. 5. 8ff. gives illustrations of drum, conch, etc. All these prove that Brahman is the material cause of the world. T.U. III. 1 speaks of that from which, yatah, these beings are born. This indicates the material cause of the beings. While in the case of clay or gold, efficient causes like potters and goldsmiths are needed for turning clay or gold into vessels or ornaments, no other efficient cause of the world is possible than Brahman. If there were, the statement and the illustrations would become false. The knowledge of everything else would not follow from the knowledge of one thing. So Brahman alone is both the efficient and the material cause of the world. R. holds that the pūrva-paksa here is śeśvara Sāmkhya or theistic Samkhya which holds that the Lord creates this world only in so far as he guides prakrti, which is the material cause. S.U. IV. 9. 10; B.G. IX. 10. In ordinary experience the material and the efficient causes are different. We also know that the production of effects 1 jani kartuh prakrtiķ. Patañjali I. 4. 30.

330 The Brahma Sūtra requires invariably several instrumental agencies. So it is urged that Brahman is only the operative, not the material cause of the world, while the material cause is the pradhana guided by Brahman. R. answers this objection by using the same texts. With reference to the difficulty caused by texts like those of Cūlika U. which declare prakrti to be eternal and the material cause of the world, R. answers that prakrti in such passages denotes Brahman in its causal phase when names and forms are not yet distinguished for there is not any principle independent of Brahman. The Highest Brahman, having the whole aggregate of non-conscious and conscious beings for its body, is the self of all. Sometimes, however, names and forms are not evolved, not distinguished in Brahman; at other times they are evolved, are distinct. In the latter state, Brahman is called an effect and manifold; in the former it is called one, without a second, the cause.1 As for the passage that the unevolved originates and passes away, it means that Brahman having non-conscious matter for its body, the state which consists of the three gunas and is denoted by the form avyakta, unmanifested, is something effected. In total dissolution non-conscious matter having Brahman for its self, continues to exist in a highly subtle condition. This highly subtle matter stands to Brahman in the relation of a mode (prakāra). As for the contention that, in ordinary experience, one and the same principle cannot be both the operative and the material cause and that effects cannot be brought about by one agency, this applies to ordinary forces and not to the Supreme.2 R.'s view is adopted by Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa.

I. 4. 24. abhidhyopadesāc ca And because of the statement of volition (on the part of the Self). abhidhya: volition; upadeśāt: because of statement; ca: and. There are passages like, 'He wished, may I be many', 'sokāmayata, bahusyām prajāyeyeti', or He reflected 'May I be many', 'tad aikşata, bahusyām prajāyeyeti', which show that the Self is an agent of independent activity, which is preceded by the Self's reflection. So the Self is the efficient cause. It is also the material cause, since the words 'May I be many' indicate that the reflective desire of multi- plying itself has the inward Self for its object. (C.U. VI. 2. 3; T.U. ÎI. 6.)

1 sarva-cid-acid-vastu-śarīratayā sarvadā sarvātma-bhūtam param brahma kadācid vibhakta-nāma-rūpam, kadācic cāvibhakta-nāma-rūpam 'yadā vibhakta- nāma-rūpam tadā tad eva bahutvena kāryatvena cocyate, yadā vibhakta-nāma- rūpam tad-aikam-advitīyam kāranam iti ca. 2 sakaletara vilakşanasya parasya aikasyaiva sarvam upapadyate. R. brahmanah sarvasakteh sarvajñasy

Text, Translation and Notes 33I

I. 4. 25. sākșāc cobhayāmnāyāt And because of the direct mention of both in the sacred text. sāksat: direct; ca: and; ubhaya: both; āmnāyāt: because (of mention in) the sacred text. Brahman is stated in the śruti as the material cause of the world, as that from which the world comes into being and in which it is reabsorbed. See C.U. I. 9. 1. The effects cannot be absorbed by anything else than their material cause. 'Both' refers to the origin and the dissolution of the world. This view is supported by S. and Bhāskara. R. and Nimbārka quote Taittirīya Brāhmaņa II. 8. 9. 7. 'Brahman was the wood, Brahman the tree from which they shaped the heaven and the earth; you wise ones, I tell you, it stood on Brahman, supporting the worlds.'

I. 4. 26. ātmakrteh pariņāmāt (Brahman is the material cause) on account of action referring to itself. (This is possible) owing to transformation. atma-krteh: on account of action concerning itself; parināmāt: because of transformation. T.U. II. 7. 'tad ātmānam svayam akuruta' makes out that 'that Atman (Self) transformed itself into its own self'. Even as clay is changed into its effects, the Self got itself transformed into the things of the world. The word 'itself' excludes the possibility of any other cause. Bhāskara criticises Ś.'s theory of adhyāsa by which everything is destructible. Bhāskara says that Ś. is adopting a mahāyāna view.1 Parināmāt is taken by R. and Śrīkaņțha as a separate sūtra. It means that Brahman became sat and tyat (T.U. II. 6), the visible things of the earth like water and light and the invisible beings of air and akāśa or the defined and the undefined things. Brahman has become the whole world of effects. R. holds that Brahman has for its body the entire universe with all its conscious and non-conscious beings and constitutes the Self of the universe. These beings abide in a subtle condition and become one with the Supreme Self in so far as they cannot be designated as something separate from him. When this Brahman resolves to become many, it invests itself with a body consisting of all conscious and non-conscious beings in their gross manifest state which admits of distinctions of name and form and thereupon transforms itself into the form of the world. When Brahman undergoes change into the form of this world, all changes exclusively belong to non-conscious matter, which is a mode of Brahman, and all imperfections and sufferings to the individual 1 mahāyānika-bauddha-gāthitam māyāvādam vyāvarņayanto lokān vyāmo- hayanti.

332 The Brahma Sūtra souls which also are modes of Brahman. Brahman himself is nirdosa, nirvikāra, free from all imperfection and change.

I. 4. 27. yoniś ca hi gīyate And because (Brahman) is celebrated as the source. yonih: origin; ca: and; hi: because; gīyate: is sung. Brahman is described as the source of all beings, bhuta-yoni (M.U. I. 1. 6); brahma-yoni (III. 1. 3). 'Source' generally means the material cause. See M.U. I. 1. 7 where the spider is said to be the cause of the threads which he sends forth and draws in. Brahman is the material cause of the world even as the rope is the basis of the appearance of snake.1 This does not mean that the world is as illusory as the snake. It is only the dependence of the world on Brahman that is brought out. It is also implied that the integrity of Brahman is not affected by the changes of the world, even as the rope is not affected by the changes in the apparent snake. The illustrations used are unfortunate, in that they suggest that the world is also an illusion even as the appearance of snake is. There are Advaita Vedantins who hold such a view. Nimbārka takes this section as directly connected with the refutation of the Samkhya view.

Section 8 (28)

THE EXPLANATION OF ALL

I. 4. 28. etena sarve vyākhyātāh vyākhyātāh Hereby all (the doctrines opposed to the Vedanta view) are explained, etena: by this; sarve: all; vyākhyātāh: are explained. explained.

The repetition of 'explained' is to mark the end of the chapter. The Sāmkhya doctrine of pradhāna has been refuted. It is taken up for special notice as it stands near to the Vedanta doctrine, admits the non-difference of cause and effect and is also accepted by some of the authors of the dharma-sutras like Devala and others. The atomic and other views are not founded on scriptural authority and are con- tradicted by several Vedic passages. The Sāmkhya system, unlike many others, is anxious to prove that its views are warranted by scriptural authority. So the Sūtrakāra attempted a refutation of the Samkhya theory of pradhana as the only cause of the world. 1 iyam copādāna-pariņāmādi-bhāşā na vikārābhiprāyena api tu yathā sarvasyopādānam rajjuh evam brahma jagad-upādānam drastavyam. Bhāmatī.

Section 1 (1-2) REPUDIATION OF SMRTI OPPOSED TO ŚRUTI

II. 1. 1. smṛty-anavakāśa-dosa-prasanga iti cen nānyasmrty-anavakāśa- doșa-prasangāt If it be said that there will result the defect of not allowing room for certain smrtis (we say) not so, because there will result the defect of not allowing room for some other smrtis. smyti: smyti texts; an: not; avakāśa: room; dosa: defect; prasangah: result, occasion; iti: that; cet: if; na: not; anya: other; smrti: smrti texts; an: not; avakāśa: room; doșa: defect; prasangāt: on account of the result. In the first chapter dealing with the concordance or harmony of texts, it is established that the omniscient Lord of all is the material and efficient cause of the universe. He is the Self of all. The Samkhya view that pradhana is the cause of the universe is shown to be lacking in scriptural authority. In the second chapter known as avirodha, non-contradiction, the first part is devoted to show that there is no contradiction between the conclusions of the first chapter and the statements of certain smrtis; the second part shows that opinions about pradhana and others are based on defective reasoning, the third and fourth parts show that the śruti passages do not contradict one another when they deal with cosmology, individual soul and the sense-organs. The opponent argues Kapila's Samkhya-smyti and the views of his followers, Asuri and Pañcasikha, urge that the cause of the universe is the independent non-conscious pradhana. These are not like Manu smrti concerned with the duties and rules of life, sacraments, etc. They claim to impart the knowledge of liberation. How are we to interpret them so as not to contradict the śruti passages? It is no answer to say that, in the first chapter, with the aid of the śruti passages, we have shown that the omniscient Brahman alone is the cause of the universe. It is true that where smrtis conflict, those which follow the śruti are to be accepted and those which conflict with śruti are to be disregarded. This is in accordance with the Pūrva Mīmāmsā Sūtra (I. 3. 3). Kapila-smrti has not got a śruti supporting it but is in conflict with the existing smytis and so it should be rejected. Kapila's own intuitive experience cannot be said to be the authority for his smrti, for his experience of the transcendental reality is itself the result of religious practices based on the śruti injunctions. Again, the word Kapila in the S.U. need not necessarily mean the author of the smrti. He may be the Kapila who burnt the sons of Sagara. Manu who is mentioned with respect in Taittirīya Samhita (II. 2. 10. 2) criticises the views of

334 The Brahma Sūtra

Kapila and commends the person who has realised the Self in all things (XII. 91). M.B. also gives again the Samkhya-yoga view (I. 2. 360. 1-3). See Iśa U. 7. The doctrine of Kapila is in conflict with the Veda and Manu-smrti which follows the Veda. The opponent continues, while it is possible for men of great ability to interpret the śruti texts by means of their intellect, ordinary people look to the smrtis and the Purānās for a proper interpretation of them. They have great regard for sages like Kapila. S.U. (V. 2) looks upon Kapila as the first among created beings, one who was well instructed. How can his smyti be set aside? If there are certain smrtis which do not support Brahman's causality of the world, there are others which support it. In M.B. (Santi-parva 334, 29) it is said that the pradhana which consists of the three gunas comes into being and is absorbed in the indeterminate Person who alone is the Self and the knower of all that is created.1 See also B.G. VII. 6.

II. 1. 2. itareşām cānupalabdheḥ And on account of the non-perception of others. itareşām: of others; ca: and; anupalabdheh: on account of non- perception. A smrti is accepted when it refers to things in our experience or mentioned in the śruti. Kapila-smrti, on the other hand, refers to things like mahat, the great, aham-kara; the self sense of which we have no experience; nor are they mentioned in the śruti. If it is said that Katha U. (I. 3. 11) mentions mahat the great and avyakta the unmanifested, in I. 4. 1, it has been explained that these refer to the intellect and body of Hiranya-garbha and not the great and pradhāna of the Samkhya. If Kapila-smrti cannot be trusted in the treatment of the effects, it follows that it cannot be trusted in the treatment of the cause also, i.e. pradhāna.2 Nimbarka says that if persons like Manu do not perceive that the Veda is concerned with pradhana, the smrti which is opposed to the Veda is unacceptable. Baladeva holds that on account of the non-perception in Scripture of many other doctrines found in the Samkhya system such as the doctrine that the souls are pure consciousness and all-pervading, the śruti has to be accepted.

1 avyaktam puruşe brahman nişkriye sampralīyate. Apastamba Dharma Sūtra I. 8. 23, 2.

abhiprāyaḥ. Ś. 2 kārya-smrter a-prāmāņyāt kārana-smyter apy a-prāmanyam yuktam ity

Text, Translation and Notes 335

REFUTATION OF THE YOGA DOCTRINE

II. 1. 3. etena yogah pratyuktah Thereby the Yoga (smrti) is refuted. etena: by this; yogah: the Yoga smyti; pratyuktah: is refuted. The Yoga philosophy maintains that pradhana is the independent cause of the universe and the great one and self-sense are its effects. This view is refuted already. The Yoga system with its eightfold discipline is not opposed to the Vedas. It is a way to the realisation of the Self. B.U. II. 4. 5; Katha U. II. 6, 11, 18; Ś.U. II. 8, VI. 13 uphold the Yoga doctrine. So one is likely to think that the Yoga system may be relied upon, as it is in partial agreement with the Veda. Ś.U. III. 8 tells us that Sāmkhya knowledge of Yoga discipline is not enough. What we need is knowledge of the Self. We accept the systems of Samkhya and Yoga in so far as they are in conformity with the śruti and reject them when they contradict śruti. Taittirīya Brahmana says: 'No one who does not know the Veda knows the Highest Self.'1 See also B.U. III. 9. 26. These observations apply also to other smrtis.

Section 3 (4-11) BRAHMAN'S NATURE IS NOT VIOLATED BY HIS CAUSALITY OF THE WORLD

II. 1. 4. na vilakşanatvād asya tathātvam ca śabdāt (Brahman can) not (be the cause of the world) on account of difference of nature of this (the world) and its being such (i.e. different from Brahman) (is known) from Scripture. na: not; vilaksanatvāt: on account of difference of nature; asya: of this; tathātvam: its being like this; ca: and; śabdāt: from Scripture. This sutra states the opponent's viewpoint. Reasoning is also possible as a means of knowledge in the case of Brahman. If there are conflicting passages of śruti, their reconciliation is possible through reasoning. Again, the knowledge of Brahman through reasoning is said to culminate in an intuition of Brahman which dispels all ignorance and causes release.2 It is thus superior to śruti. B.U. (II. 4. 5) says that the Self is to be heard, to be thought, etc. If we apply our reason to the question of Brahman's causality of the world, 1 nāvedavin manute tam byhantam. III. 2. I. 9; III. 2. 9. 7. 2 anubhavāvasānam ca, brahma-vijñānam avidyāyā nivartakam mokșa sādhanam. Š. brahma-sākşātkārasya moksopāyatayā prādhānyāt tatra sabdād api parokşagocarād aparokşārthasādharmya-gocaras tarko' ntarangam iti tasyaiva balavatvam ity arthaḥ. Ānandagiri.

336 The Brahma Sūtra we find that there is a difference of nature between Brahman the cause and the world the effect. Brahman is conscious and pure; the world is unconscious and impure. Cause and effect cannot be different in nature. Gold ornaments are made of gold and not of earth; earthen vessels are made of earth and not of gold. So this world which is non-conscious and comprises pleasure, pain and infatuation (sukha-duhkha-mohanvitam) is impure and its cause cannot be the pure Brahman. The world is not conscious for it is an instrument of the conscious soul. If the universe were itself conscious, it cannot be of use to the conscious soul even as one lamp cannot be of use to another. If it is said that the world too may be conscious and the apparent absence of consciousness is due to a modification of consciousness itself as may appear in the condition of sleep and swoon and it is not necessary for the things of the world to be utterly unconscious to be useful to the soul as instruments of action and the relation between souls and objects may be one of superior to subordinate, this position, however, which minimises the dis- tinction between the conscious Brahman and the non-conscious world will not explain away the difference in nature between the two which the śruti asserts. T.U. (II. 6) speaks of Brahman as manifesting itself in two forms, intelligent and non-intelligent (vijñānam cāvijñānam ca). If it is said that there are passages in the śruti such as the earth spoke, fire thought, the prānas quarrelled (Satapatha Brāhmana VI. 1. 3, 2 and 4; C.U. VI. 2. 3-4; B.U. VI. 1. 7, I. 3. 2), this objection is answered in the next sūtra by the Pūrva-pakşin. R. uses the same arguments but adds another objection that things of different essential characters stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect. From man who is a conscious being, there arise nails, teeth and hair which are non-conscious things. The sentient scorpion springs from the non-sentient dung and the non-sentient threads spring from the sentient spider. R. answers this objection by saying that in these instances the relation of cause and effect rests only on the non-sentient elements.1 Śrīnivāsa, following R., answers the objection of the pūrva-paksin that it is possible to imagine that there is consciousness in stones, wood and the rest, though it is not manifest, by saying that it is unreasonable to take what is known by direct perception to be incorrect on the ground of mere imagination. Baladeva gives an absolutely different interpretation. He makes this sutra a separate section and gives it a new meaning. '[The idea] is not [unauthoritative like the Samkhya and the rest] on account of its difference [from them] its being so is known from the text.' The Veda is non-human in origin unlike the Samkhya and therefore it is authoritative.

1 yatas tatrāpy acetanāmsa eva kārya-kāraņa-bhāva.

Text, Translation and Notes 337 II. 1. 5. abhimāni-vyapadeśas tu viśeşānugatibhyām But the reference is to the presiding deities on account of the distinctive nature and relatedness. abhimāni-vyapadeśah: reference to presiding deities; tu: but; viśeşa-anugatibhyām: on account of distinctive nature and related- ness. When it is said that 'the earth spoke', 'the fire thought', etc., the reference is not to the elements but to the deities which control them. See K.U. II. 14; C.U. VI. 3. 2; Aitareya U. I. 2. 4. So the objection holds that the world being different in nature, Brahman cannot be its material cause. In agreement with smrti confirmed by reasoning, the pūrva-paksin holds that pradhana is the universal material cause. Baladeva thinks that the sutra states not the objection but the correct conclusion. If it be said that we cannot reconcile the sayings of the Veda as the Earth spoke and the Fire willed, the answer is that in these passages the reference is to the presiding deities.

II. 1. 6. drśyate tu But (it) is seen. drśyate: is seen; tu: but. Here the objection stated in sūtras II. 1. 4 and 5 is refuted. That the world cannot proceed from Brahman because the two are different in nature cannot be accepted. For non-intelligent hairs and nails proceed from intelligent beings like men and scorpions and other sentient beings spring from cow-dung. Even if we say that they come out of the bodies and not souls, the difference in nature still remains between the cause and the effect for it is the non-intelligent body which is the abode of the intelligent soul, though neither the cow-dung nor the hair and the nails are the abodes of it. It is due to the presence of the soul that the body undergoes changes of colour, form, etc., before it manifests as the hair and the nails, or the cow-dung changes into the body of the scorpion. If there were complete identity between the two, there would be no distinction of cause and effect. If a partial identity is allowed, say between the element of earth in the body of the scorpion and the cow-dung, a similar identity in nature can be established between the world and Brahman, viz. the fact of existence itself, sattā-laksana. What exactly is the meaning of the difference in nature between Brahman and the world? (i) Does the opponent mean the non- occurrence in the world of the entire characteristics of Brahman or (ii) the non-occurrence of a few characteristics or (iii) the non- occurrence of the characteristic of intelligence. If the first alternative is taken, there can be no causal relation at all. For unless there is some difference between the two, there can be no causal connection. The second alternative is not acceptable for the quality of existence is present in the world. The third is incapable of proof. So this entire

338 The Brahma Sūtra complex of things has Brahman for its material cause. Scripture supports this view. Scripture is the way to prove the reality of Brahman. For being devoid of form and other sensible qualities Brahman is not the object of perception. It cannot be an object of inference or comparison because there is no perceivable sign or similarity in it. So it is to be known through the Vedic teaching. See Katha U. 1. 2. 9; Rg Veda X. 130. 6. If it is said that reasoning is useful for attaining the knowledge of the Scripture, it is reasoning which comes after the hearing of śruti and is favourable to it. It is reasoning which is subservient to anubhava or spiritual experience.1 Reasoning applied to śruti helps us to understand the śruti better. For example, we learn that the Self is not connected with the waking or dream conditions as they are exclusive of each other. Since during sleep the individual soul becomes one with the Universal Self without the consciousness of the world, the individual soul is in reality the Universal Self. Since the world has arisen out of Brahman and the effect is not different from the cause, the world cannot be different from Brahman. T.U. II. 6 can be explained by those who believe in an intelligent cause of the world which is manifold and unmanifested in the two parts of the world cetana and acetana. The Samkhya system which believes that the non-intelligent pradhana is the cause would not be able to make any sense of the śruti passage. The cause of the world is an intelli- gent being, in spite of its being different from its effect. R., Nimbarka and Śrīnivasa hold that the objection that the universe on account of its difference from Brahman cannot have Brahman for its material cause is not valid for 'it is seen' that nails, hair, etc., arise from a person from whom they are different. Baladeva adopts the same interpretation but looks upon this sūtra as a separate section.

II. 1. 7. asad iti cen na pratiședha-mātratvāt If it be said that (in that case the effect is) non-existent, (we reply) that it is not so because it is a mere negation (without an object which is to be negated). asat: non-existent; iti cet: if it is said; na: not; pratişedha-mātratvāt: because it is a mere negation. The Vedäntin maintains the view that the effect exists in the cause already. The objection is raised that this view is violated, because the impure world which is the effect cannot exist in pure Brahman. The effect must be treated as non-existing before its actual origination. The answer is given in the sutra. If you negate the existence of the effect before its actual origination, you are negating something which 1 śruty anugrhīta eva hy atra tarko'nubhavāngatvenāśrīyate. Ś.

Text, Translation and Notes 339 does not exist.1 If the negation has for its object the existence of the effect previous to its origination, then prior to its coming into being the effect does exist in the form of its cause and so it cannot be negated. Even after coming into being the effect does not exist independently, apart from the cause. So either in the past or in the present, the effect by itself is non-existent without the cause. As it is always one or the other form of the cause it cannot be negated. The world with all its qualities does not exist without the cause, Brahman, either now or before the beginning of the effect. So it cannot be said that the effect was non-existent before its actual beginning. See B.U. II. 4. 6. For R., the objection considered is that since Brahman, the cause, differs from the world, the effect, they are two separate things and so the effect does not exist in the cause. This means that the world originates from what has no existence. R. says that, while cause and effect are not of the same nature, the effect is not altogether different and separate from the cause. Brahman the cause modifies itself so as to assume the form of a world differing from it in character. There is difference of characteristics but as in the case of gold and golden bracelets there is oneness of substance.2 II. 1. 8. apītau tadvat prasangād asamanjasam Because at the time of the dissolution, (Brahman will be) of the same

inadequate. nature (as the world) (the doctrine of the causality of Brahman) is apitau: in dissolution; tadvat: of the same nature; prasangāt: because of an occasion; asamanjasam: inadequate or unsatisfactory. Another objection is raised to the causality of Brahman. At the time of the dissolution, when the effect becomes one with the cause, Brahman will be polluted by the qualities of grossness, absence of intelligence, limitation, impurity, etc. Besides, as all distinctions will be resolved into a state of non-distinction, there would be no special causes left at the time of a new beginning of the world and so the new world could not arise with its distinction of enjoying souls, objects of enjoyment and so forth. If, however, we assume the origin of a new world even after the annihilation of all works of the enjoying souls which enter into the state of non-difference from the Highest Brahman, then even the released souls may be subject to rebirth in the world. If, to avoid these difficulties, it is held that the world remains separate from Brahman even during the period of the dissolution, the view that the effect is non-different from the cause is violated. 1 pratişedham hīdam nāsya pratişedhasya pratişedhyam asti. 2 kāraņa-bhūtam brahmaivasvasmād vilakşaņa-jagad-ākāreņa pariņamata iti . . . kymi-mākşikayor api hi sati ca vailakşanye kundala-hiranyayor iva dravyaikyam asty eva. R.

340 The Brahma Sūtra R. takes this sūtra to mean that the relation of embodied being and body cannot subsist between Brahman and the world and if it did subsist, all the imperfections of the world would cling to Brahman also. If we accept the doctrine of the oneness of substance of cause and effect, then the imperfections of the effect will affect the cause. We cannot say that Brahman in its causal as well as in its effected state has all conscious and non-conscious beings for its body and as imperfections inhere in the body only, they do not affect Brahman in its causal or effected state. If there is a causal relation between Brahman and his body, then the imperfections of the latter would affect the former. It is also objected that the conscious and non- conscious beings cannot constitute the body of Brahman. Embodied- ness is the result of karma and the Highest Self is free from it. He is not capable of enjoyment through sense-organs and has no life dependent on breath. So Brahman cannot have a body constituted by conscious souls and unconscious objects. If it is said that the body of a being is constituted by that, the nature, subsistence and activity of which depend on the will of that being and so a body may be ascribed to the Lord in so far as the essential nature, subsistence and activity of all depend on him, it is not correct, for the nature of a body does not depend on the will of the intelligent soul joined to it. An injured body does not obey the will of its possessor. The per- sistence of a dead body does not depend on the soul that tenanted it. Intelligent souls control the movements of puppets and the like but we do not say that the latter constitute the bodies of the former. Again, the nature of an eternal intelligent soul does not depend on the will of the Lord. We cannot say that the body of a being is constituted by that which is exclusively ruled and supported by that being and stands to it in an exclusive subservient relation (śesa) for this definition would include actions also. Several texts declare that the Lord is without a body.

II. 1. 9. na tu drstānta-bhāvāt But not so for there are (parallel) instances. na: not; tu: but; drstānta-bhāvāt: because there are instances. The Vedanta view is not inadequate for there are instances of effects which do not affect by their qualities the causes into which they are reabsorbed. Things made of clay are of different shapes and sizes but these latter do not affect the clay into which they may be reduced. So also with gold ornaments which do not affect the gold into which they are reabsorbed by their qualities. Similarly with regard to earth and the organic beings which spring from it. The opponent cannot quote any instance to the contrary. Reabsorption is impossible if the effect retains its particular qualities. In spite of the non-difference of cause and effect, the effect has its self in the cause but not the cause in the effect. See II. 1. 14. Again, the identity of

Text, Translation and Notes 34I

cause and effect holds good not only in the period of dissolution but at all times. See B.U. II. 4.6; C.U. VII. 25. 2; M.U. II. 2. 11. Ś. argues that the effect and its qualities are mere appearances due to ignorance and so do not affect the cause in any way either during dissolution or subsistence of the world in Brahman,1 even as a magician is not affected by the illusions he creates for others or a person is not affected by the illusions of his dream. The Self who is the eternal witness of the three states of the world is not affected by any one of them, since each is exclusive of the other two.2 The other objection about the rebirth of the liberated souls is set aside on the ground that rebirth after dissolution is possible only to those who are subject to ignorance which persists both in sleep and dissolution. See C.U. VI. 9. 2-3. The liberated souls are not born again because their ignorance is wiped out by the knowledge of the Real. As for the plea that the world remains distinct from Brahman in dissolution, we cannot accept such a dualist position. R. argues that Brahman has all conscious and non-conscious beings for its body and constitutes the self of that body. Brahman is connected with two states, a causal and an effected one, the essential characteristics of which are expansion and contraction. These apply not to Brahman but to conscious and non-conscious beings. The imperfections of the body do not affect Brahman and the good qualities belonging to the self do not extend to the body, even as youth, childhood and old age which are attributes of embodied beings such as gods or men belong to the body only, not to the embodied self; while knowledge, pleasure and so on belong to the conscious self only, not to the body.3 As for the objection that the world comprising matter and souls, either in its subtle or gross condition, cannot stand to Brahman in the relation of a body, it is based on faulty reasoning. There are many texts which declare that the entire world stands to Brahman in the relation of a body. See the Antaryāmin Brāhmana of B.U., Subāla U., etc. Again, the word 'body' is not like the word 'jar' used in one sense. The opponent's definitions are erroneous. The view that body is 'that which is the cause of the enjoyment of the fruits of action' does not apply to earth and the like, nor does it apply to the bodily forms which the Lord or the released souls assume for these embodi-

1 kāryasya tad dharmāņām cāvidyādhyāropitatvān na taih kāraņam samsrjyata iti apītāv api sa samānaķ. Ś. 2 avasthā-traya-sāksy eko'vyabhicāryavasthā-trayeņa vyabhicāriņā na śamsprśyate. Ś. 3 cid-acid-vastu-śarīratayā tad-ātma-bhūtasya parasya brahmanah samkoca- vikāsātmaka-kārya-kāraņa-bhāvāvasthādvayānvayepi na kascid virodhah. yatah samkoca-vikāsau para-brahma-sarīra-bhūta-cid-acid-vastu-gatau. śarīra-gatās tu doşānātmani prasajyante. ātma-gataś ca guņā na šarīre yathā deva-manusyādīnām sa-śarīrāņām ksetra-jñānām sarīra-gatā bālatva-yuvatva-sthaviratvādayo nātmani sambadhyante. ātma-gatās ca jñāna-sukhādayo na śarīre. R.

342 The Brahma Sūtra

ments do not subserve the fruition of the results of actions. These bodily forms of the Lord are not the combinations of earth and the other elements. The other definition that the body is 'that, the life of which depends on the vital breath with its five modifications' is too narrow since it does not apply to plants. Though vitality is present in plants, it does not take five modifications. We cannot say that the body is the abode of sense-organs or the cause of pleasure and pain. It does not apply to the bodies of stone or wood which are bestowed on Ahalya and other persons in accordance with their deeds. The correct definition of body is this. Any substance which a conscious soul is capable of completely controlling and supporting for its own purposes and which stands to the soul in an entirely subordinate relation, is the body of that soul.1 In the case of an injured body the power of control is obstructed; in the case of a dead body the body begins to decay the moment the soul departs from it and we speak of it as a body because it is a part of the aggregate of matter which previously constituted a body. In this sense all conscious and non- conscious beings together constitute the body of the Supreme Person for they are completely controlled and supported by him for his own ends and are entirely subordinate to him.2 When the texts deny a body to him, they deny to him a body due to karman. They actually declare that the universe is his body.

II. 1. 10. sva-paksa doşāc ca And because the defects (alleged to be in the Vedanta view by the Samkhya are found) in his own view also. sva: one's own; paksa: side; dosāt: due to defects; ca: and. The objections against the Vedānta view dealt with already apply to the Samkhya view of pradhana as the cause of the world. The world with form and sound is different in nature from pradhāna which does not possess form and other qualities. The objection that the effect was non-existent before origination is common to both the Vedānta and the Sāmkhya which accept sat-kārya-vāda. Again, in Samkhya also, the effect becomes one with the cause in dissolution and so will pollute the cause. Again, as the reasons which are re- sponsible for the joys and sorrows of different persons are destroyed in dissolution, there is no reason why a new creation should arise. If there can be a new creation without any cause, the rebirth of the released is also possible. If it is said that some distinctions remain unabsorbed even in dissolution, these distinctions are not the effects of pradhana; for otherwise they would not have been non-distinct

1 ato yasya cetanasya yad dravyam sarvātmanā svārthe niyantum dhārayitum ca sakyam tac-cheşataika-svarūpam ca, tat tasya śarīram iti śarīra-lakșaņam āstheyam. 2 atah sarvam parama-puruşena sarvātmanā svārthe niyāmyam dhāryam tac cheşataika-svarūpam iti sarvam cetanācetanam tasya sarīram.

Text, Translation and Notes 343 from pradhāna. So far as the Vedānta is concerned, these objections have been answered. R. makes out that the Samkhya theory cannot account for the origination of the world. It holds that owing to the purusa's approxi- mation to prakrti, the attributes of the latter are fictitiously super- imposed on the purusa which consists of pure intelligence free from all change and on this depends the origination of the empirical world. What is the nature of approximation? Does it imply change in prakrti or change in purusa? Not the latter for purusa is incapable of change; not the former for changes in prakrti are supposed to be the effects of superimposition and cannot therefore be the cause. If approximation means the mere existence of prakrti, then even the released soul would be liable to that superimposition. The Samkhya is unable to give a rational account of the origination of the world.

II. 1. 11. tarkāpratisthānād apy anyathānumeyam iti ced evam apy avimoksaprasangah If it be said that, notwithstanding the ill-foundedness of reasoning, it is to be inferred otherwise, (we say) that, in that way, too, there will be the result of non-release. tarka: reasoning; apratisthānāt: because of ill-foundedness; api: notwithstanding; anyatha: otherwise; anumeyam: be inferred; iti cet: if so; evam: in that way; api: too, even; avimoksa: non-release; prasangah: result, consequence. Ś. states the pūrva-paksa thus: Mere reasoning cannot be depended upon in matters which must be understood in the light of śruti. Reasoning rests on individual opinion. The arguments of some clever men are refuted by others. On account of the diversity of men's opinions, it is impossible to accept mere reasoning as a sure guide. Even men of outstanding intellectual eminence as Kapila, Kaņāda and others are seen to contradict one another. If it be said that all reasoning is not unsound, even this assumption is based on reasoning. If some arguments are devoid of foundation, it does not follow that others are also devoid of foundation. If all reasoning were unfounded, the whole course of practical life would come to an end. Men act on the assumption that in the past, the present and the future nature is uniform. When there is a conflict among different interpretations of śruti it is reasoning that enables us to fix the correct meaning of words and sentences. Manu asks us to determine what is dharma by means of reasoning (XII. 105-6). We require reasoning to detect and avoid fallacies. Because the argument of the pūrva-paksa is fallacious, it does not follow that the siddhanta is also fallacious. To all this the sutra replies. Though reasoning may hold good in certain cases, with regard to ultimate questions on the nature of Reality and release, reason is not of use if it is not backed by śruti. Brahman is not an object of perception or inference. It has neither

344 The Brahma Sūtra form to be seen nor sound to be heard nor any sign from which it can be inferred. Again, release is the result of the right kind of knowledge which is constant and uniform. We do not have different views about it. It is similar to the knowledge of fire that it is hot.1 A mere inference may take different forms and may leave us in doubt about the nature of the object. It need not be universal and constant like the perception of heat in fire. The Samkhya views based on reasoning are not accepted by all. The knowledge of the Veda being self-evident and eternally the same is incapable of being challenged by any logician. Release cannot be attained by any other means than the right kind of knowledge imparted to us by the Upanisads. So by reasoning which is faithful to śruti, it is proved that the intelligent Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause of the universe. R. and Śrīkaņtha break this sūtra into two, tarkāpratișthānād api and anyathā ... prasangah. R. points out that the theories based on human reasoning are liable to be upset or modified by those more skilled in reasoning. With regard to transcendental issues, Scripture alone is authoritative and reasoning is to be applied only in support of Scripture. Nimbārka reads for vimoksa, anirmokșa.

Section 4 (12) REFUTATION OF OTHER THEORIES

II. 1. 12. etena śiştāparigrahā api vyākhyātāh By this those (theories) also which are not accepted by competent authorities are explained (i.e. refuted). etena: by this; śistāh: competent authorities; aparigrahāh: not accepted; api: also; vyākhyātāh: are explained. As the Samkhya which is closest to the Vedanta in view of its acceptance of sat-kārya-vāda, identity of cause and effect, and the independent existence of the Self, its powerful support by reasoning and approval by competent persons, if disproved, the other theories like atomism, etc., which are less reasonable may be taken as being disproved. R. points out that the atomists disagree in many ways about the nature of the atoms, whether they are fundamentally void or non- void, whether they have a merely cognitional or objective existence, whether they are momentary or permanent, definite or indefinite, real or unreal, etc. This disagreement proves that these theories are ill-founded. 1 samyaj-jñānam eka-rūpam vastu-tantratvāt. eka-rūpeņa hy avasthito yo'rthas sa paramārtho loke tad vişayam jnānam samyaj-jnānam ity ucyate yathāgnir ușņa iti.

Text, Translation and Notes 345 R. and Śrīnivasa mean by śistāh: the remaining ones. While Ś., Bhaskara and Śrīkantha explain the compound as śistaih aparigrahāh, R., Nimbārka, Śrīnivāsa and Baladeva explain it as šistās ca aparigrahāś ca.

Section 5 (13) BRAHMAN AND THE ENJOYING SOUL AND THE OBJECTS OF ENJOYMENT II. 1. 13. bhoktrāpatter avibhāgaś cet syāl lokavat If it be said that there will be no distinction (between the individual souls and their objects of enjoyment) on account of the enjoyer being reduced to the condition (of the objects) (we say that the distinction may exist as is seen) in ordinary experience. bhoktr: enjoyer; apatteh: on account of being reduced to the condition (of objects); avibhāgah: no distinction; cet: if; syāt: may be; lokavat: as in ordinary experience. If the world were non-different from Brahman, then the distinction of enjoyers and the objects of enjoyment would be nullified. So the doctrine of Brahman's causality should be given up since it negates the well-established distinction between enjoyers who are intelligent embodied souls and the objects of enjoyment. To this the reply is made that the distinction may exist as ordinary experience furnishes us with analogous examples. Waves, foam, bubbles and other modifications of the sea, though they are not different from sea-water exist sometimes in a state of mutual separation and sometimes in conjunction. Because they are non-different from the sea-water it does not follow that they pass over into each other. So also the enjoyers and the objects of enjoyment do not pass over into each other, though they are not different from the Highest Brahman. According to S., though the enjoyer is not really an effect of Brahman but is the unmodified creator himself, in so far as he enters into the effect (T.U. II. 6) it passes into a state of distinction on account of the effect, acting as a limiting adjunct, even as the universal ākāśa is divided by its contact with jars and other limiting adjuncts.1 R. criticises Ś.'s interpretation of the sūtra given above and puts the objection differently. The theory of an embodied Brahman being the universal cause does not allow of a distinction in nature between the Lord and the individual soul. Besides, Brahman becomes the abode of all the imperfections attaching to the world as a lump of clay or gold shares the imperfections of the things fashioned 1 Cp. saty api bhedāpagame nātha tavāham na māmakī nas tvam sāmudro hi tarangah kvacana samudro'sti tārangah.

346 The Brahma Sūtra out of it. To this objection the answer is, if a soul experiences pleasures and pains, it is not due to its being joined to a body but to its karman in the form of good and evil deeds. The body is originated by karman. (See C.U. VII. 26. 2; VIII. 2. 1; 12. 3.) He who is freed from bondage is not touched by evil, even if he has a body. The Highest Self has a body of conscious and non-conscious beings but is not connected with karman and is therefore free from evil. We also see in ordinary life that a ruler may reward or punish those who observe or transgress the rules but he does not, simply because he has a body, himself experience the pleasures and pains due to the observance or transgressions of any of his commands. Again, Brahman does not undergo changes like clay or gold for he is said to be free from all change and imperfection. In support of his reading of the sūtra and interpretation, R. quotes Dramida-bhāsya.

Section 6 (14-20) NON-DIFFERENCE OF THE EFFECT FROM THE CAUSE

II. 1. 14. tad ananyatvam ārambhaņa-śabdādibhyah The non-difference of them (cause and effect) (results) from words like beginning and others. tad: that; an-anyatvam: non-difference; ārambhana-śabdādibhyah: words like beginning and others. In the previous sutra, the distinction between enjoyers and the objects of enjoyment was acknowledged from the empirical stand- point. Here it is said that the effect, world, is non-different from the cause, Brahman. C.U. VI. 1. 4 says: 'Just as, my dear, by one clod of clay all that is made of clay becomes known, the modification being only a name arising from speech, while the truth is that it is just clay ... ' S. says these modifications or effects are names only, exist through or originate from speech only, while in reality there exists no such thing as a modification.1 In so far as they are names they are untrue; in so far as they are clay they are true. The entire body of effects has no existence apart from Brahman.2 S. does not affirm the absolute oneness of Brahman and the world but only denies their difference.3 The world does not exist apart from Brahman. Therefore to know Brahman is to know everything else. It may be said that Brahman has in it elements of manifoldness. As the tree has many branches, Brahman possesses many powers. 1 vācaiva kevalam asti ... na tu vastu-vrttena vikāraḥ kaścid asti. 2 brahma-vyatirekena kārya-jātasyābķāva iti gamyate. Ś. 3 Cp. na khalu ananyatvam iti abhedam brūmah, kim tu bhedam vyāsedhāmah. Bhāmatī.

Text, Translation and Notes 347 Unity and manifoldness are both true. A tree considered in itself is one; it is many when viewed as having branches. The sea is one and yet manifold as having waves and foam. Unity is used for achieving release and multiplicity for work in the world. S. answers this view by saying that the Highest Reality is one according to the Vedic texts. The independent existence of the world and the individuals is denied in many texts. If both unity and multiplicity are real, then he who is engrossed with the manifold world cannot be regarded as ignorant. A text like 'He goes from death to death, who sees in it, as it were, diversity' (B.U. IV. 4. 19) will be unmeaning. If unity and multi- plicity are both true, bondage cannot be the result of multiplicity nor release the result of the perception of unity. How can the knowledge of unity remove the knowledge of manifoldness if both are true.1 Another objection is raised: If absolute unity is the truth, then the ordinary means of right knowledge, perception, etc., become invalid, since the absence of manifoldness deprives them of their objects. The idea of a man, for example, becomes invalid, when the true idea of the post has presented itself. Again, texts embodying injunctions and prohibitions lose their meaning if the world does not exist. The entire body of doctrine which refers to final release will collapse. The answer to these objections is that so long as the know- ledge of Brahman by the self has not arisen the entire complex of phenomenal existence is taken as true, even as the phantoms of a dream are taken as true until the sleeper wakes. Until awakening the ordinary course of secular and religious activity goes on undisturbed. Another objection is raised: How can passages of the Vedānta which belong to the phenomenal world produce a knowledge of the identity of the soul with Brahman? It is said, in reply, that death occurs sometimes as the result of the mere suspicion that a venomous snake has bitten. Even when the dream is over, knowledge of the dream persists in waking life. Events in the dream, though unreal, are said to be indications of actual future events in life. See C.U. V. 2. 8. Aitareya Āranyaka III. 2. 4. 7. The Vedic statements have a purpose whereas the knowledge of the unity of the Self has nothing else above it. Vedic knowledge removes ignorance and is therefore useful. Another objection is raised that the illustrations of clay, etc., suggest that Brahman too is capable of modifications. The answer is that Brahman is incapable of modifications. Modification is only appearance. The illustrations are used to show that Brahman alone is real. Another objection is that if Brahman alone is real, there is no room for the distinction of a God who rules and the world and the souls

1 ubhaya-satyatāyām hi katham ekatva-jñānena nānātva-jñānam apanudyata iti.

348 The Brahma Sūtra ruled by him. The world is neither one with nor different from Brahman. It is said to be indescribable, māyā, the product of śakti or prakrti of the omniscient God.1 For the liberated soul there is no distinction of ruler and ruled. C.U. VII. 24. 1. The entire phenomenal world does not exist for him who has realised the Self.2 From the viewpoint of the Highest Reality, there is non-difference of cause and effect. With reference to the phenomenal world which is considered to be real from the practical point of view, Brahman is said to be the ocean and the world is the waves. The transformation (parināma) is accepted by the Sutrakara in so far as there is insistence on devotion to Personal God. It is only then that the world is treated as real and God is said to be omniscient, omnipotent and omnipresent.3 Bhaskara criticises S.'s view and insists on the reality of difference. In his commentary on the sutra, R. considers the views of the Vaiśeşika system and Ś. He criticises the doctrine of avidyā or ignorance. If the soul in its essential form and not fictitiously imagined form is the abode of avidya, this means that Brahman is the abode of avidya. If it is said that the soul as different from Brahman and fictitiously imagined in it, is the abode of avidya, this would mean that the non-conscious (jada) is the abode of avidya. If it be maintained that the abode of avidya is the soul in its essential nature, as qualified by the fictitiously imagined aspect, the soul which has an absolutely homogenous nature cannot be qualified apart from avidyā. Again, if by release is understood the destruction of avidyā, when one soul attains release and avidya is destroyed, all souls should be released. But it is not so. If we say that there is a separate avidyā for each soul, this implies distinction of souls. Is this distinc- tion real or a product of avidya? It cannot be the former, because the soul is pure, non-differenced intelligence: if the latter, does avidyā belong to Brahman or the souls? Not to Brahman. If to souls, we are arguing in a circle. Avidyas are established on the basis of the distinction of souls and the distinctions are established on account of avidyās. If it is urged that these defects do not touch avidyā which is itself unreal, in that case it would cling even to the released souls and the Highest Brahman. When the avidya of a soul passes away on the rise of true knowledge, does the soul perish or not perish? If it perishes, release means the destruction of the essential nature of the soul; if it does not, then the soul continues to exist different from Brahman. 1 sarvajñasyeśvarasyātma-bhūte ivāvidyā-kalpite nāma-rūpe tattvānyat- vābhyām anirvacanīye samsāra-prapañca-bīja-bhūte sarvajñasyesvarasya māyā- saktih prakrtir iti ca śruti-smytyor abhilapyete. 2 evam paramārthāvasthāyām sarva-vyavahārābhavam vadanti vedanta. Ś. 3 sūtrakāro'pi paramārthābhiprāyeņa tad ananyatvam ity āha. vyavahārābhi- prāyeņa tu syāl lokavad iti mahā-samudrādisthānīyatām brahmanah kathayati. apratyākhyāyaiva kārya-prapañcam pariņāma-prakriyām cāśrayati saguņo- pāsaneşūpayoksyata iti.

Text, Translation and Notes 349 R. criticises the distinction of māyā and avidyā. Brahman cannot be the abode of maya. R. says that none but a person who is not in his right mind would take pleasure in an unreal play, carried on by means of implements unreal and known by him to be unreal. R. takes the sūtra to be an answer to Kanāda's view that the effect constitutes a substance different from the cause. The subtle and gross conditions of the conscious and non-conscious beings which constitute the body of Brahman are the cause and effect. He interprets the phrase vācārambhana as follows: vācā, on account of speech; arambhana: what is touched or taken; ā-rabh, a-labh, alambhah, sparsa-himsayoh. For the bringing about of activity, 'fetch water in the jar', the clay must enter into contact with the effect, vikāra, i.e. a particular make or configuration and a special name, a nāmadheya. R. and Nimbärka look upon the relation of Brahman and the universe as one of soul-body relationship. Śrīkantha, after R., adopts the Viśistādvaita view: 'What has been set out already as to Siva alone, without a second-the Self qualified by the universe both conscious and non-conscious, becoming both cause and effect, that constitutes the doctrine of the qualified non- dualism of Siva.'1 Śrikantha explains vācārambhana in two ways: That which is the beginning, i.e. the cause, of speech, i.e. of speech and of practical activity. So the text means that an effect vikāra is a name, nāmadheya, which is the cause of speech and practical activity. Another ex- planation is that which has speech for its beginning. So the text means that an effect, vikāra, is just the object of such expressions as 'this is a jar', i.e. a special condition which the clay has assumed for practical purposes. It is not a separate entity from the clay.

II. 1. 15. bhāve copalabdheh And because of the perception (of the effect) on the existence (of the cause). bhave: on existence; ca: and; upalabdheh: because of perception. The effect cannot be independent and different from the material cause. We can have a jar only when the clay exists. If it be said that fire and smoke continue to be two different things, though smoke is seen only where the fire exists, it is not correct for smoke may be observed in a jar in which it is collected even after the fire is extin- guished. The jar makes us aware of the material cause while smoke does not make us conscious of fire. The sūtra may be read as bhāvāc ca upalabdheh. The non-difference of effect from cause is a fact of perception. A cloth is nothing but threads crossing each other, which we perceive. It is these perceived 1 yad uktam pūrvatra cid-acid-prapañca-visiştah siva evādvitīyah kāryam kāraņam ca bhavati iti visişta-sivādvaitam.

350 The Brahma Sūtra facts which enable us to infer that the smallest parts of things are ultimately nothing but the three elements of fire, water and earth, represented by the three colours of red, white and black. C.U. VI. 4. These are connected with air, air with ākāśa and ākāśa with Brahman. All means of proof lead back to Brahman as the cause of the world, and not pradhāna. For R., the effect denotes nothing else than the causal substance which has passed over into a different condition. Gold which is the cause is perceived when the ear-ring is present. The fact that we do not recognise fire in smoke does not disprove this view. Fire is the operative cause of smoke and smoke originates from damp fuel joined with fire.

II. 1. 16. sattvāccāparasya And on account of the existence of what is posterior. sattvāt: on account of existence; ca: and; aparasya: of what is posterior or afterwards. That which is posterior in time, i.e. the effect, is declared in the Scripture to have its being in the cause, prior to its actual beginning. 'Being only was this in the beginning.' C.U. VI. 2. 1; Aitareya Āranyaka II. 4. 1. 1. We cannot produce oil from sand. The effect is non-different from the cause. Some read avarasya for aparasya.

II. 1. 17. asad-vyapadeśān neti cen na dharmāntareņa vākya-śeșāt. If it be said that on account of the mention of what is non-existent, (the effect is) not (existent prior to creation) (we say) not so because with reference to complementary passage (the mention of non-existence means) another quality (only). asat: non-existence; vyapadeśāt: on account of mention; na: not; iti cet: if so; na: not so; dharmāntareņa: due to another quality; vākya-śesāt: on account of the complementary passage. The objection is raised in regard to certain scriptural texts which declare 'In the beginning this was that only which is not'. (C.U. III. 19. 1.) 'Non-existent, indeed, this was in the beginning.' (T.U. II. 7.) So being cannot be ascribed to the effect before its production. The reply is given that non-existence does not mean absolute non- existence but only a different quality or state in which name and shape are not manifested. In reference to this condition the effect is called non-existent though it existed as one with the cause. Later passages make out that absolute non-existence was not meant. R. Nimbārka take this, along with the next sūtra, as one. Ś., Bhäskara and Baladeva adopt the reading given here.

Text, Translation and Notes 35I

II. 1. 18. yukteh śabdāntarāc ca From reasoning and from other Vedic text. yukteh: from reasoning; śabdāntarāt: from another Vedic text; ca: and. That the effect exists before its origination and is non-different from the cause can be ascertained from reasoning and Scriptures. Experience teaches us that if we wish to produce curd, earthen jars or gold ornaments, we employ milk, clay and gold; we do not employ clay for curds or milk for making jars. If the effect were non-existent in the cause, all this should be possible. Besides, all the effects being non-existent in the cause, anything might come out of anything else. If it is argued that there exists in each cause power to produce a special effect, atisaya, milk for curd and clay for jars, then we assume something prior to the effect which later becomes the effect. If the specific power is considered to be non-existent before its appearance, then the objection is valid that anything may come out of anything else. Is this specific power non-existent before its appearance or is it different from both cause and effect? The specific power view does not help us. If it is said that the cause and the effect do not appear different because they are held together by the connection known as samavāya and not because they are identical with each other, then we ask whether samaväya is connected with the terms between which it exists or is independent of them entirely. If the former, then to explain one connection of samavāya we have to postulate a second connection and to explain that another and so on ad infinitum. If the latter, the cause and the effect will fall apart from each other and be totally unconnected. The relation of samavāya is unnecessary as experience tells us that cause and effect are identical. If the relation between the cause and the effect is regarded as that which exists between the parts and the whole and if the two are said to be held together by samavaya, the question arises whether the whole resides in all the parts simultaneously or only in some parts successively. If the former the whole may not be perceptible at all. The other side of a jar may not be in contact with the eyes. If the latter, we may infer the knowledge of the whole from the perception of a part. The knowledge of a part of the sword we hold in the hand makes us aware of the whole, though we have no perceptual knowledge of the whole on account of its being hidden in the sheath. The hidden parts of the sword are different from those of the sheath. Thus we introduce a new series of parts between the original parts and the whole or between the cause and the effect. To pervade the second series of parts, a third will have to be devised and so on ad infinitum. In short, the effect will be further and further removed from the cause. The effect as a whole cannot be said to reside in each of the parts simultaneously, for in that case, it would be more than one whole. One man cannot reside in two places at the same time. It is possible only when there are two men. The whole cannot reside in each one of

352 The Brahma Sūtra

the parts simultaneously in the manner in which one sāmānya or jāti of cow is said to reside in each of the cows simultaneously. For as every cow manifests the sāmānya or general character, every part of the cause might manifest the whole of the effect. This is not invariably experienced. Besides, if the whole were to reside fully in each part, one may as well have the milk of the cow from her horns. Again, if the effect be non-existent before its origination, there would be no notion of origination itself because origination implies a reference to the particular effect and the substratum in which it takes place. Unless the existence of the jar is assumed before it is produced, in the form of its cause, clay, the sentence 'the jar is produced' will have no meaning. If it is argued that origination is the connection of the effect with the existence of the cause, we ask, how can something which has not yet obtained existence enter into connection with something else? Connection is possible of two existing things only, and not one existing and one non-existent thing or of two non- existing things. Only existing things can be spoken of as having limitations. Absolute non-existence or what is altogether featureless cannot be spoken of as 'being prior to' origination. To say that the son of a barren woman was king before Pürnavarman is absurd. For the son of a barren woman is not only non-existent but is an un- reality and so no temporal limitation can be set to him. Even so, at no time will the absolute non-existence of the effect, viz. a jar, be a reality, whatever may be the efforts of the potter. If the non- existent can never become existent, the asat-kārya-vādin may ask, what is the purpose of the operative causes, the potter, etc. If the effect exists in the cause and is non-different from it, where is the need of the potter to bring out a jar into existence. As the potter puts forth effort, one must assume the non-existence of the effect prior to its origination. To this the answer is that the operative agents arrange the cause in the form of the effect. Even the form is not absolutely new. A mere change in form does not transform one thing into an altogether different thing. People may be seen in different moods and yet they are recognised as the same. If it is argued that they are recognised as the same persons because their conditions are not separated by death, the case of the jar is different because the clay is as good as destroyed. Ś. says that the analogy is not correct. Milk continues to exist in a different form when we say that it has become curd. Even when the continued existence of the cause is not perceiv- able, when the seed is not seen to exist in the tree, we have to notice the earlier stages of the tree such as the sprouts, to know that they are the later stages of the seed. It is the seed which becomes visible in the form of the sprout, with the accumulation of particles of matter. It becomes invisible, not non-existent, when the sprouts change into something else. Incidentally S. says we have refuted the Buddhist theory of momentary existence for we have proved the eternal continued existence of cause. On the asat-kārya-vāda the operative

Text, Translation and Notes 353

agents have no purpose to serve. For it non-existence cannot be the object of any activity as the sky cannot be modified in any way by weapons. Nor can the cause clay which is said to be samavāyi and existent be the object of the activity of the operative agent, for if the effect which is non-existent is to arise from a cause which is different in nature, then anything may arise from anything else. If it is said that the effect is nothing but the specific power of the cause, then sat-kārya-vāda is accepted. The text C.U. VI. 2. 1 is quoted: 'In the beginning this was Being alone, one without a second.' This repudiates the suggestion of the non-existent as the source on the ground that the existent cannot come out of the non-existent. The effect exists prior to its origination in the form of the cause and is identical with it and so is it that everything else becomes known when Brahman, the cause, is known. C.U. VI. 1. 3.1 Śrīnivāsa, following Nimbārka, argues that names and forms, knowable by means of the evidence of direct perception and the rest are real, because they are perceived. An agent makes a jar out of a lump of clay that is existent. Here like the lump of clay, the existence of the jar is also known from perception. The activity of the agent is not useless since it helps manifestation. What was unmanifest before is made manifest. The origin of a non-existent effect is not tenable since we do not see a barley sprout from fire.

II. 1. 19. patavac ca And like a piece of cloth. patavat: like a piece of cloth; ca: and. Even as a rolled piece of cloth is not different from what it is when it is spread out, so is the effect not different from the cause. What is not manifest in the cause becomes manifest in the effect. The length and breadth of the rolled piece of cloth which were not manifest when the cloth was rolled up become manifest when it is spread out. Similarly a piece of cloth which was not manifest in the threads becomes manifest owing to the operative agents such as the shuttle, the loom and the weaver. R. says even as threads joined in a special cross-arrangement are called a piece of cloth, thus acquiring a new name, a new form and new functions, so is it with Brahman also. Srīnivāsa holds that the universe remains existent, indeed, prior to creation, though not known to be a universe, having its name and form unmanifest but is clearly known as the universe at the time of creation when its name and form are manifest.

II. 1. 20. yathā ca prāņādi And as in the case of vital breaths. yathā: just as; ca: and; prānādi: vital breath and others. 1 I.P., Vol. II, pp. 528ff. M

354 The Brahma Sūtra The different pranas, ascending, descending, may be held up from functioning by holding our breath. In that case they remain in their causes only keeping the body alive. When they manifest as separate from one another, they not only keep the body alive but perform other functions such as binding and stretching the limbs. Then the movement which was not manifest in the cause becomes so in the effect. The world being an effect of Brahman, is not different from it. So if Brahman is known, everything else becomes known. (C.U. VI. 1.3.) R. says that as the one air, according as it undergoes in the body different modifications, acquires new names, new characteristics, new functions, being then called prāna, apāna, etc., even so the one Brahman becomes the world, with its manifold moving and non- moving beings.

Section 7 (21-23)

GOD AND THE PROBLEM OF EVIL

II. 1. 21. itara-vyapadeśāddhitākaraņādi-doșa-prasaktih On account of the mention of another (the individual soul as non- different from Brahman) there would attach (to Brahman) faults like not doing what is beneficial to others and the like. itara: another; vyapadeśat: on account of mention; hita: what is of benefit; akaranādi: not doing and the like; dosa: fault; prasaktih: would follow. The scriptural passages convey the non-difference of the individual soul and Brahman. From this it follows that the power of creation also belongs to the individual soul. This soul being an independent agent might be expected to produce only what is beneficial to itself and not things of a contrary nature, such as birth, death, old age, disease. No free person will build a prison for himself and take up his abode in it.1 Again, how can the pure self look upon this unclean body as part of itself? It would free itself from the painful results of its former actions and enjoy only the pleasant results. When it remembers that it created this manifold world, it would like to withdraw it. Apparently it cannot withdraw even its own body. So a doubt arises whether the world has been created by an intelligent cause. R. says that if the soul is Brahman, then certain imperfections attach to Brahman. If Brahman is omniscient and omnipotent, why does he create a world full of pain? No rational independent person 1 svatantrah kartā san hitamevātmanah saumanasyakaram kuryāt nahitam janma-maraņa-jarā-rogādyanekānartha-jālam. na hi kaścid bandhanāgāram ātmanah kṛtvā'nupravisati. Ś. aparatantro

Text, Translation and Notes 355 endeavours to produce what is clearly non-beneficial to himself.1 If it is argued that the texts declaring difference are due to limiting adjuncts and those which declare non-difference mean eventual non- difference, the question arises whether Brahman knows or does not know the soul which is non-different from it. If it does not, Brahman's omniscience is compromised; if it does, then Brahman is conscious of the suffering of the soul which is non-different from Brahman and therefore itself suffers. It follows that Brahman does not create what is beneficial to itself and creates what is non-beneficial to itself. If it is said that the difference between Brahman and the soul arises on account of avidya on the part of both, then the old difficulties about the locus of avidya arise. So Brahman's causality of the world seems to be untenable. Baladeva carries this section to sūtra 33. He takes the whole section as concerned with showing that Brahman and not the individual soul is the cause of the world. He takes this sūtra as stating the correct conclusion and not the prima facie view. He reads it as follows: 'There will be the consequences of faults like not doing what is beneficial and the rest from the designation of another (i.e. if the individual soul be designated as the creator of the world).' The individual soul would not have created a world full of miseries. So Brahman and not the individual soul must be the creator.

II. 1. 22. adhikam tu bheda-nirdeśāt (But Brahman) is something more (than the individual soul) on account of the indication of difference. adhikam: something more than or additional to; tu: but; bheda: difference; nirdeśāt: on account of indication. The word 'but' suggests that the objection stated in the previous sūtra is refuted. Brahman, the creative principle, is different from the embodied self. The jiva cannot create himself or destroy himself. The faults such as doing what is not beneficial and the like do not attach to Brahman. There is nothing beneficial to be done by it or non-beneficial to be avoided by it. There is nothing which Brahman cannot know or do. The individual soul, being different in nature, may have the defects mentioned. For a declaration of difference between Brahman and the individual soul, see B.U. II. 4. 5; IV. 3. 35. VI. 8. 1; C.U. VIII. 7. 1. In all these passages actions such as seeing, seeking and meditating point to the individual soul as the subject and the Supreme Self as the object. If it is said that there are passages which declare non-difference between the individual soul and the Supreme Self, S. points out that the difference is real, so long as the knowledge does not arise. In the condition of ignorance, Brahman which is the object of enquiry and search is different from 1 na cedyse svānarthe svādhīno buddhimān pravartate. R.

356 The Brahma Sūtra the individual soul. The individual soul is a creature and not the creator. The defects therefore do not belong to Brahman. R. gives a number of texts in support of the difference between Brahman and the individual soul: B.U. III. 7. 22, IV. 3. 21, IV. 3.35; Ś.U. I. 6, 9, IV. 6, 9, VI. 13, 16.

II. 1. 23. aśmādivac ca tad anupapattih And like stones and the rest, these (defects) cannot be conceived. aśmadivat: like stones and the rest; ca: and; tad: that; anupapattih: cannot be conceived. We find a great variety among stones, some of them valuable like diamonds, others not. The same piece of ground yields different trees like sandal and cucumber which have different leaves, flowers, fruits, fragrance and juice. The same food assumes different forms. In the same Brahman we may have various distinctions. But Brahman, however, is not affected by the defects of the individual soul and the world. S., in view of his own position, says that the distinctions have their origin in speech only and are like phantoms of a dreaming person. R. makes out that even as it is impossible for non-conscious objects like stones and the rest to be identical with Brahman, so the individual soul cannot be one with Brahman. Śrīkantha gives the same interpretation. Srīnivāsa argues that even as a ray of the diamond is non-different from its substratum, the diamond, and yet is different from it, the embodied soul is by nature different from Brahman though it is at the same time non-different from him as having him for its soul. The soul is subject to samsara, while Brahman is not. So faults like not doing what is beneficial and the rest do not apply to Brahman.

Section 8 (24-25)

BRAHMAN'S INDEPENDENCE OF MATERIAL AND INSTRUMENTS OF ACTION

II. 1. 24. upasamhāra-darśanān neti cen na ksīravadd hi If it be said that on account of the observation of the collection (of instruments for the production of something) (Brahman) is not (the creator of the world) (we say) not so for (he acts alone) like milk. upasamhāra: collection; darsanāt: on account of observation; na: not; iti cet: if it be said; na: not so; kşīravat: like milk; hi: for. The objection states that we notice in ordinary life that potters, weavers, etc., before they produce jars or cloth, provide themselves with various implements, clay, wheels, string, etc., and Brahman

Text, Translation and Notes 357 cannot be the cause of the world since there are no instruments for him to work with. The answer is given that causation is possible as the result of the peculiar constitution of the causal substance like milk. Even as milk and water turn into curds and ice respectively without any extraneous help, so is it with Brahman. If it is said that milk in order to turn into curds requires an extraneous agent, heat, the answer is given that milk by itself undergoes a certain amount of definite change and this is only speeded up by heat. Brahman does not require any extraneous help. See S.U. VI. 8. Brahman, though one only, is, owing to its manifold powers, able to transform itself into manifold effects like milk.1 Baladeva gives a different interpretation. The soul's power of action is like the cow's power of producing milk. Although the soul is an agent and can as such bring works to completion, yet it is not an independent agent but has to depend on the Lord for its activities even as a cow cannot by herself produce milk but has to depend on the life energy.

II. 1. 25. devādivad api loke And (the case of Brahman is) like that of gods and other beings in ordinary experience. devādivat: like gods and others; api: also; loke: in ordinary ex- perience. If it be said that non-conscious beings like milk may change of themselves without extraneous means into curds, etc., Brahman being intelligent, like the potter, cannot be conceived to create without other external means. The answer is that gods and sages are reported in the śāstras to have the ability to produce palaces and chariots by the sheer force of their will. So Brahman may create the world without any extraneous means. Brahman is free to create without depending on any means. Baladeva says that the Lord, though invisible, is the creator of the world even as gods, though invisible, are seen to work in the world, i.e. produce rain and so forth.

Section 9 (26-29)

BRAHMAN'S INTEGRITY IS UNAFFECTED BY THE WORLD

II. 1. 26. krtsna-prasaktir niravayavatva-śabda-kopo vā (If Brahman be the material cause of the world) there will result either

upapadyate. Ś. 1 ekasyāpi brahmaņo vicitra-sakti-yogāt kşīrādivad vicitrah pariņāma

358 The Brahma Sūtra (the change of) the entire (Brahman) or the violation of the texts (declaring Brahman) to be without parts. krtsna: entire; prasaktih: will result; niravayavatva: being without parts; śabda: texts; kopah: violation; vā: or. The objection is raised that if the whole of Brahman is trans- formed into the world, then Brahman would cease to exist and there is no point in asking us to see Brahman or in saying that Brahman is unborn. If, on the other hand, we hold that a part of Brahman is transformed, then we assume that Brahman is capable of being divided into parts. This would be a direct violation of the texts which declare that Brahman is partless, etc. See B.U. II. 4. 12, III. 8. 8; III. 9. 26, M.U. II. 1. 2; Ś.U. VI. 19. Ś. uses these objections to support his view that the world is only an appearance (vivarta) of Brahman and not a transformation (pariņāma). In Brhan-naradīya-purana it is said that by means of yoga we perceive the identity of God with his māya and thus attain release from it. Māyā is not unreal, not real, not both. It creates the sense of diversity in the Supreme Being. māyino māyayā bhedam paśyanti paramātmani tasmān māyām tyajed yogān mumuksur vipra-sattamāh. nāsad-rūpā nasad rūpā māyā vai nobhayātmikā anirvācyāhritā jñeyā bheda-buddhi pradāyinī. 3I: 69-70. Visnu-dharma adopts the difference-non-difference (bhedābheda) view: advaitam paramārtho hi dvaitam tad bheda ucyate ubhayam brahmano rūpam dvaitādvaita-vibhedatah. 96. 225. R. states the objection in a different way. If the entire Brahman enters into the effected state, its conscious part dividing itself into the individual souls and the non-conscious part into ether, air and so on, this violates the texts which declare that Brahman in the causal state is devoid of parts. If it is without parts, it cannot become many. It is not possible that there should persist a part not entering into the effected state. Śrīnivāsa argues that if Brahman is without parts, then the entire Brahman will become the effect and there will not remain a trans- cendent Brahman beyond samsara to be approached by the liberated. To attribute divisions to Brahman will be opposed to the Scripture. Baladeva reads vyakopa for kopa and thinks that the sutra is the statement not of pūrva-paksa but of siddhanta. If the individual soul be the creator, since it is without parts, its entire being is present in every act. This is not the case. While lifting a blade of grass, one's

Text, Translation and Notes 359 whole nature is not functioning. Or else we must conclude that the individual soul possesses parts and this again is opposed to scriptural authority. So the individual soul is not the creator.

II. 1. 27. śrutes tu śabda-mūlatvāt But (it is not so) on account of Vedic testimony since (Brahman's causality) has its ground in Scripture. śruteh: on account of śruti or Vedic testimony; tu: but; śabda- mulatvat: because śruti is the ground. The entire Brahman does not undergo transformation as śruti declares that Brahman, the source of the world, exists apart from the world. C.U. III. 12. 6; VI. 3. 2. If Brahman were completely trans- formed it would have been perceptible as the world is, which is not so. If it is held that it is difficult to understand how Brahman is partless and yet does not undergo transformation as a whole, Ś. says that śruti is the only source of our knowledge of Brahman. Even with regard to ordinary things such as gems, herbs, spells which have varying effects on different occasions, we cannot understand them unaided by instruction. Much less can reasoning tell us about the unthinkable. Ś. quotes a text which says: 'Do not apply reasoning to what is unthinkable; the mark of the unthinkable is that it is above all natural causes.'1 Ś. states the objection again. Brahman is either partless or is transformed partially. If it is partless, it is transformed as a whole or not at all. If it is only partially transformed, then it consists of parts. S. overcomes the difficulties by his view that Brahman ever remains the same in reality. It does not undergo any change, though it is the ground of the multiplicity of name and form in the pheno- menal world. These distinctions are the products of ignorance and arise from speech alone.2 The negative descriptions of Brahman are intended to draw our attention to the non-phenomenal character of Brahman. For R., creation is merely the visible and the tangible mani- festation of what existed previously in Brahman in a subtle and imperceptible condition. He also cites the support of Scripture for Brahman cannot be proved or disproved by means of generalisations from experience.3 For R., Scripture tells us that the Supreme possesses various powers. 1 acintyāh khalu ye bhāvā na tāms tarkeņa yojayet prakytibhyah param yac ca tad acintyasya laksanam. Ānandagiri observes: prakrtibhya iti, pratyaksa-drsta-padārtha-svabhāvebhyo yat param vilakşanam ācāryady-upadesa-gamyam tad acintyam ity arthah. 2 avidyā-kalpitena ca nāma-rūpa-lakşaņena rūpa-bhedena vyākṛtāvyā- kṛtātmakena tattvānyatvābhyām anirvacanīyena, brahma-pariņāmādi-sarva- vyavaharaspadatvam pratipadyate. pāramārthikena ca rūpeņa sarva- vyavahārātītam apariņatam avatisthate. 3 na sāmānyato drstam sādhanam dūşanam vārhati brahma.

360 The Brahma Sūtra For Nimbārka, it is Scripture that declares that Brahman creates the world and yet remains untransformed. For Srīnivāsa, trans- formation means nothing but projection of powers and this is also declared by Scripture.

II. 1. 28. ātmani caivam vicitrāś ca hi For thus it is even within the Self and wondrous. atmani: within the self; ca: and; evam: thus; vicitrah: wondrous; ca: and; hi: even. B.U. IV. 3. 10 speaks of chariots, horses and roads which the dreamer creates in the state of dream. Gods and magicians create elephants, etc., without losing their own unity of being. So there may exist a manifold creation in Brahman without impairing his real nature and unity. R. says that in the soul, the attributes of the non-conscious objects are not found for there are manifold powers in different objects. A conscious soul differs from non-conscious objects and does not possess their qualities. The non-conscious objects like fire, water and the rest do not share each other's qualities. So Brahman who is different from both the conscious and the non-conscious objects does not possess their attributes but has numerous others not found in them. This view is followed by Śrīkantha. Baladeva uses this sūtra to indicate that the Lord is possessed of mysterious powers.

II. 1. 29. sva-paksa-doşāc ca And because there is fault in the (opponent's) own view. sva: own; paksa: side, doșāt: because of the faults; ca: and. The Samkhya theory of pradhana is considered. Does it change into the world wholly or partially? If the former there will be no pradhāna; if the latter, the view that it is partless must be given up. If we say that the three gunas are the parts of pradhana, it does not improve the position. For creation is the combination of all the three gunas. It cannot be said that one or two of them evolve and not all. Again, the gunas are partless and so no one part can evolve. Besides, if pradhana possesses various powers, it is saying what the Vedānta says and nothing special. The atomists' case is taken up.1 If the partless atoms combine and occupy the same space, they become one atom; if the atom is conceived as coming into contact with another in some of its parts, then the atomists give up their view that the atom is partless. 1 Comparing ancient and modern atomic theories Sir Charles Sherrington says: 'The atom of today is no untested a priori speculative dogma. It is unrelated, except by misnomer, to its namesake of antiquity.' 'The speculations of Democritus and Leucippus cannot be put beside [the modern] scheme. They were relatively to it essays in fancy.' Man on his Nature (1946), pp. 365, 301.

Text, Translation and Notes 36I

Baladeva points out that the objection whether Brahman creates with his entire nature or part of it only applies equally to the view that the individual soul is the creator. While we can overcome the objection, the opponent cannot.

Section 10 (30-31)

THE MANIFOLD POWERS OF BRAHMAN

II. 1. 30. sarvopetā ca tad-darśanāt And (Brahman) is endowed with all (powers) because that is seen from Scripture. sarva: all; upetā: endowed with; ca: and; tad-darśanāt: because that is seen. This manifold world of effects is possible for Brahman, though one only, is endowed with various powers as we see from the scriptural texts. See C.U. III. 14. 4, VIII. 7. 1; B.U. III. 8. 9; M.U. I. 1. 9. R. cites Ś.U. VI. 8; C.U. III. 14. 2, VIII. 1. 5.

II. 1. 31. vikaranatvān neti cet tad uktam If it be said that (Brahman cannot be the cause) on account of the absence of the organs, (we say that) this has been explained (already). vikaranatvāt: on account of the absence of the organs; na: not; iti cet: if it be said; tad: that; uktam: has been stated or explained. When it is described only in negative terms, how can Brahman be endowed with powers? Besides, how can it produce the world when it is said to be 'without eyes, ears, speech or mind'? B.U. III. 8. 9. The sūtra says that the answer has been given. See I. 2. 18-20; II. 1. 4. We cannot understand the nature of Brahman by mere reasoning. We have to rely on Scripture. Ś.U. III. 19 says: 'Without foot or hand, yet swift and grasping, he sees without eye, he hears without ear.' S. adds that Brahman is conceived as being endowed with powers when we assume in its nature an element of plurality which is the product of avidyā.

II. 1. 27, 28. R. thinks that the refutation of this objection is to be found in

Section 11 (32-33) THE WORLD OF GOD'S LILĀ

II. 1. 32. na prayojanavattvāt (Creation is) not (possible for Brahman) on account of having a motive. na: not; prayojanavattvat: on account of having a motive; another reading is prayojanatvāt. M*

362 The Brahma Sūtra The objection is raised that no one acts in the world without a motive. God cannot have a motive or a need for creating the universe for he is all-sufficient. Without a motive there can be no activity and the Supreme cannot have a motive. So God's creation of the world cannot be accepted. R. says that all activities are undertaken with the motive of doing something beneficial to themselves or to others. All the wishes of Brahman are eternally fulfilled. He does not attain through the creation of the world any object not attained before. If, however, he concerns himself with others, it can only be to help them. No merciful divinity would create a world so full as ours is of evils of all kinds- birth, old age, death, hell and so on. If he created at all, pity would move him to create a world altogether happy.1 So Brahman cannot be the cause of the world. Nimbarka also states the objection that God has no need to create the world as he has his desires eternally fulfilled.

II. 1. 33. lokavat tu līlā kaivalyam But, as in ordinary life, creation is mere sport (to Brahman). lokavat: as in ordinary life; tu: but; līlā: sport; kaivalyam: merely. But indicates the refutation of the objection set forth in the previous sūtra. Men in high position, who have no unfulfilled desires, indulge in sport. S. uses the example of breathing which goes on without reference to any extraneous purpose, merely following the law of its own nature. So also creation proceeds from the nature of the Supreme without reference to any purpose.2 We cannot question why God's nature is what it is.3 We have to accept it. Even though we may detect some subtle motives for sportful action among men, we cannot attribute any to the Supreme. We cannot say that he does not act or acts like a senseless person. He is omniscient. The passages relating to creation do not refer to the Absolute Transcendent Being.4 But so far as the divine Creator is concerned it is his nature. Baladeva makes out that lila or sport is the overflow of the joy within. As in ordinary life, a man full of cheerfulness on awakening from sound sleep dances about without any motive or need but simply from the fullness of spirit, so is the case with the creation of the world by God.

1 na hi parasya brahmanaḥ svabhāvata evāv āpta-samasta-kāmasya jagat- sargeņa kiñcana prayojanam anavāptam avāpyate. nāpi parārthah; āpta- samasta-kāmasya parārthatā hi parānugraheņa bhavati. na cedrsa-garbha-janma- jarā-maraņa-narakādi-nānā-vidhānanta-duhkha-bahulam jagat karuņāvān srjati. pratyuta sukhaikatānam eva srjej jagat karuņayā srjan. See also R.B. II. 2. 3. 2 evam īśvarasyāpy anapeksya kincit prayojanāntaram svabhāvād eva kevalam līlā-rūpāpravrttir bhavişyati. Ś. 3 na ca svabhāvah paryanuyoktum sakyate. Ś. 4 na ceyam paramārtha-vişayā srsti-srutih. Ś.

Text, Translation and Notes 363 In many systems of religious thought, self-sufficiency is regarded as an attribute of deity. If God is constrained by an inner necessity to create, he depends on others. The unmoved perfection is for Aristotle the cause of all motion but it is only its final cause. The bliss which God unchangingly enjoys in his never-ending self- contemplation is the good after which all existences aspire. Aristotle tells us that the Timeless Incorporeal One is not only the logical ground but the dynamic source of the temporal universe. He says in his Metaphysics1: 'it is not necessary that everything that is possible should exist in actuality' and 'it is possible for that which has a potency not to realise it'. Why does something exist rather than nothing? The answer is that the Absolute is also fecundity. Its joy overflows into existence. This spontaneous outflow is symbolised by the theory of līlā.

Section 12 (34-36)

THE PROBLEM OF SUFFERING AND EVIL

II. 1. 34. vaişamya-nairghrnye na sāpeksatvāt tathā hi darśayati Inequality and cruelty cannot (be attributed to Brahman) for (his activity) has regard to (the works of souls) ; besides the same (Scripture) shows. vaişamya-nairghrnye: inequality (of dispensation) and cruelty; na: not; sāpeksatvāt: on account of regard to; tathā: the same; hi: also; darśayati: shows. There are inequalities among the souls; some are happy and others unhappy. Does it mean that the Divine has also the qualities of passion and malice? As there is so much pain in the world, are we to treat him as cruel also? For these reasons Brahman cannot be the cause of the world. The objections are not valid. The inequalities of creation are due to the merit and demerit of the creatures. They are not a fault for which the Lord is to blame. An analogy is given. As Parjanya, the giver of rain, is the common cause of the production of rice, barley and other plants, and the differences are due to the potentialities of the seeds themselves, even so God is the common cause of the creation while the differences are due to the merit and demerit of the individual souls. There are many scriptural texts in support of this view. B.U. III. 2. 13 says: 'One becomes good by good acts, bad by bad actions.' See also K.U. III. 8; B.G. IV. 11. R. quotes Visnu Purana I. 4. 51-2 to the effect that the Lord is the operative cause only in the creation of new beings; the material cause is constituted by the potentialities of the beings to be created. 1 II. 1003a2 and XI. 1071bI3.

364 The Brahma Sūtra II. 1. 35. na karmāvibhāgād iti cen nānāditvāt If it be said that this is not (possible) on account of the non-distinction of works (before the first creation we say that it) is not so for (samsāra) is without beginning. na: not; karma: works; avibhāgāt: on account of non-distinction; iti cet: if it be said; na: not so; anāditvāt: on account of beginning- lessness. Many passages in the Upanisads tell us that 'In the beginning there was Being only, one without a second'. There was no karma which had to be taken into account before creation. The first creation at least should have been free from inequalities. The answer is given in the sutra. The world is without beginning. Work and inequality are like seed and sprout. They are caused as well as causes. Bhaskara reads the first part of this sūtra differently: asmād vibhāgād iti cen nānāditvāt. R.and Nimbarka takethis and the next sutra as one. R. says though the individual souls and their deeds form a perpetual stream, without a beginning, non-distinction is reasonable for, prior to creation, the substance of the souls abides in a very subtle condition, without names and shapes, and thus is incapable of being designated as something apart from Brahman though in reality they constitute Brahman's body only. If we do not admit that the distinctions in creation are due to karma it would follow that the souls are requited for what they have not done and not requited for what they have done. II. 1. 36. upapadyate cāpy upalabhyate ca (The beginninglessness of samsāra) is ascertained (by reason) and is observed (in Scripture). upapadyate: is ascertained; ca: and; api: also; upalabhyate: is found. If the world had a beginning, it would follow that it came into being without a cause, then it would be possible for the released souls to return to samsāra. There would then be no justification for inequalities. That the Lord cannot be the cause of inequality has already been established. Avidya cannot be the cause as it is of a uniform nature; without karma no one can come into existence; without coming into existence karma cannot be formed. So we must accept that the world is without a beginning. Scripture also affirms it. See C.U. VI. 3. 2; Rg Veda X. 190. 3; B.G. XV. 3. R. quotes other texts, Katha U. I. 2. 18; B.U. I. 4. 7; B.G. XIII. 19, and concludes 'As Brahman thus differs in nature from everything else, possesses all powers, has no other motive than sport and arranges the diversity of the creation in accordance with the different karmas of the individual souls, Brahman alone can be the universal cause'.1 1 ataḥ sarva-vilakşanatvāt sarva-saktitvāl līlaika-prayojanatvāt kșetrajña- karmānugunyena vicitra-srsti-yogād brahmaiva jagad-kāraņam. R.

Text, Translation and Notes 365 Baladeva holds that the grace of the Lord is not partial. It is shown by the Lord to his devotees. The grace is not arbitrary but depends on the devotion of the souls themselves. It is also observed in Scripture.

Section 13 (37)

BRAHM AN HAS ALL THE QUALITIES FOR THE CREATION OF THE WORLD

II. 1. 37. sarva-dharmopapatteś ca And because all the qualities (for the creation of the world) are present (in Brahman). sarva: all; dharma: qualities; upapatteh: on account of presence or availability; ca: and. The qualities of Brahman, omniscience and so on, are such as to enable Brahman to create the world. Baladeva suggests that the Lord is possessed of paradoxical and mysterious powers and it is possible for the Lord to have not only the attributes of perfect justice and impartiality but also the quality of showing special favour to his devotees.

Section 1 (1-10)

CONSIDERATION OF THE SAMKHYA THEORY II. 2. 1. racanānupapatteś ca nānumānam Because the orderly management of the world is not possible (on that hypothesis), that which is inferred (by the Samkhya, viz. the pradhāna) cannot be (the cause of the world). racanā: orderly arrangement; anupapatteh: because (it is) im- possible; ca: and; na: not; anumanam: that which is inferred. The second part of the second chapter is devoted to the refutation of the more important philosophical views in regard to the cause of the world which are opposed to the Vedanta position. In the first section of this part the Samkhya view, which has already been briefly considered, is taken up. It is shown that a non-intelligent first cause such as the pradhana cannot account for the creation and orderly arrangement of the world. Here S. says that we refute the Samkhya theory by independent arguments and not by reference to the Vedic texts.1 The different phases of the cosmic process, its evolution from the primal nothingness, a matter still unformed but capable of receiving all forms gave rise to elements. These advanced to higher forms; organisms appeared and man attained to reason. These phases constitute the history of the generation of the universe and suggest the realisation of a plan. Religion has to fight today not heresy but materialism. The Samkhya argues that as vessels made of clay have clay alone as their cause, even so the external and internal world of effects, whether house, body or mind, endowed as it is with the characteristics of pleasure, pain or infatuation must have for its cause a being which possesses these characteristics. These qualities together form the pradhana. Like clay it is non-conscious. It evolves spontaneously into various modifications for the sake of fulfilling the purposes of the soul, viz. the enjoyment of worldly pleasures and release. There are other reasons also which lead us to infer that pradhana is the cause of the world. See Sāmkhya Kārikā 15. The answer to this objection is next given. A non-conscious object like stone cannot serve any purpose, unless it is guided by an intelligent being. Palaces and pleasure gardens do not come into existence of their own accord. How can this world with its wonderful variety and arrangement be created by an unconscious principle? Vessels are made out of clay only if a potter is there; so also pradhāna can evolve only under the guidance of an intelligent being. This is in 1 iha tu vākya-nirapekşas svatantras tad-yukti-pratişedhah kriyata ity eşa viseşah.

Text, Translation and Notes 367

conformity with śruti which declares that there is an intelligent cause of the world. Ca: and, indicates other reasons for not accepting pradhāna as the cause. The external and internal objects of the world are not of the nature of pleasure, pain and infatuation, but they occasion these feelings in the individual according to their mental condition. If the followers of the Samkhya from their limited observation tell us that some distinct and limited things like roots, sprouts, etc., are the results of the conjunction of several things and therefore all objects of the world are effects of conjunctions of several things, we can also say to them that the three constituent qualities of pradhāna, sattva, rajas and tamas arise on account of previous conjunctions of several things, for they also limit one another and are distinct and separate. R. and Śrikantha combine this and the next sūtra into one.

II. 2. 2. pravrtteś ca On account of the tendency to activity. pravrtteh: because of the tendency to activity; ca: and. Even according to the Samkhya, the original disturbance of the three gunas from the condition of equipoise which is essential for creative manifestation cannot be due to the unintelligent pradhāna. Clay does not change into pots without the help of a potter nor does a chariot move without a horse. So pradhāna cannot be the cause of the world unless there is an ultimate intelligent principle. It may be argued that we do not see the principle of intelligence or its activity. Only the existence of the intelligent principle and not its activity can be inferred from the actions which take place in a living body which is dissimilar in nature to inanimate objects like chariots. The intelligent principle is found only when there exists a body and no intelligent principle is found when there is no physical body. So the materialists (lokayatikas) argue that intelligence is a mere attribute of the body. Activity belongs only to what is non-intelligent. Ś. replies that though activity is observed in non-intelligent things, it is due to an intelligent principle. Even the materialists admit that activity is present in a living body and not in a corpse, in a chariot drawn by a horse and not a mere chariot. Intelligence therefore possesses the power to move. If it is said that, according to the Vedānta, pure consciousness is incapable of activity and incapable of making others active, Ś. says that a thing may be devoid of volition and yet capable of moving other things. A magnet may not move itself but moves a piece of iron. The Supreme Being can move the universe, himself remaining unmoved. If it is said that there is one Brahman and nothing else and therefore there can be no motion at all, S. answers by saying that, as the entire world of names and forms is the work of māya or avidya, God too is conceived as connected with it as the substratum on which the appearance rests. So there is scope

368 The Brahma Sūtra for activity if the ultimate cause is conceived to be Brahman, and not when it is taken to be non-intelligent pradhāna. R.says that the Samkhya assumes three gunas and not one ultimate cause. If it is said that creation is accomplished, as the three gunas are unlimited, then R. says, if they are unlimited and therefore omnipresent, then no inequality can result and so no effects can originate. To explain the origination of results, it is necessary to assume limitation of the gunas.

II. 2. 3. payo'mbuvac cet tatrāpi If it be said that (pradhana may be active) like water and milk (we say that) then too (the activity is due to an intelligent principle). payah: milk; ambu: water; vat: like; cet: if it be said; tatra: then; api: even. If it be said that if milk flows naturally for the nourishment of the calf and water flows for the benefit of mankind, even so pradhāna may transform itself into the world for enabling men to achieve the highest end of life, S. replies that, as in the case of chariots, the non- intelligent milk and water must be assumed to be guided by intelli- gence. Besides, it is the intelligent cow loving her calf that makes the milk to flow and the flow is aided by the sucking of the calf. The flow of the water depends on the level of the ground. In a general way it is dependent on the intelligent principle of Brahman which is present everywhere. See B.U. III. 7. 4; III. 8. 9. There is no contradiction between this and II. 1. 24 where it was shown from ordinary experience that the effect may take place in itself, independent of any external, instrumental cause. This does not conflict with the view based on Scripture, that all effects depend on the Lord. R. uses the illustrations in a different way. Milk when turning into curds undergoes, of itself, many changes. It does not depend on anything else. Similarly, water discharged from the clouds spon- taneously proceeds to transform itself into various saps and juices of different plants. So also pradhāna whose essential nature is change, may, without being guided by another agent, abide in equipoise between two creations and then, when the time for creation arises, may modify itself into various effects due to the loss of equilibrium on the part of the gunas. See Sāmkhya Kārikā I. 16. R. says that even in these instances of milk and water, activity is not possible without the presence of an intelligent principle. Srinivāsa adds that the cow gives milk even when the calf is dead because she remembers the calf or because she loves her master and wishes to be of benefit to him.

II. 2. 4. vyatirekānavasthiteś cānapekșatvāt And because there is nothing different, (pradhana is not the cause) on account of non-dependence.

Text, Translation and Notes 369 vyatireka: different, separate, other; anavasthiteh: because of non- existence; ca: and; anapeksatvāt: on account of non-dependence. Since, according to the Samkhya, pradhāna is the three gunas in equilibrium and there is no other principle which can make it active or inactive, it is impossible to know why it should sometimes transform itself into the effects of mahat, etc., and at other times not. Purusa is indifferent and so cannot cause action or cessation from activity. God, on the other hand, as a principle of intelligence, can act or not as he chooses. R. says that pradhana guided by the Lord explains the alternating states of creation and dissolution which are to carry out God's purposes. Pradhana which is not guided by an intelligent principle cannot account for them. Śrīnivāsa gives an alternative explanation. Pradhāna cannot be the cause because there is no object to be instigated and there is no instigator other than pradhana. If the works of souls stimulate pradhana to creation, then works will be the cause of the world and not pradhāna. Besides, how can works stimulate pradhāna? The works bear fruits according to the wishes of the Lord. It cannot be said that pradhana acts through the proximity to purusa for this

II. 2. 7. proximity being eternal, its activity should also be eternal. See

II. 2. 5. anyatrābhāvāc ca na trņādivat Nor (does pradhana modify itself spontaneously) like grass, etc. (which turn into milk) for (milk) does not exist elsewhere (than in the cow). anyatra: elsewhere; abhāvāt: because of absence; ca: and; na: not; trna-adi-vat: like grass and other things. Grass is transformed into milk without any other cause. If there were any other cause, men would employ it to produce as much milk as they liked. It is a natural process. We may expect the same in pradhana. The answer is that some other cause is responsible for changing grass into milk. It is only grass that is eaten by a cow that changes into milk and not grass that is not eaten or eaten by an ox. An event need not be said to be natural simply because men cannot accomplish it. Things not brought about by men are brought about by divine activity. Even men feed the cows with plenty of grass, if they need more milk. So we cannot admit the spontaneous modifi- cation of pradhāna.

II. 2. 6. abhyupagame 'py arthābhāvāt Even if there be the admission (of the spontaneous activity of pradhāna still it cannot be the cause) on account of the absence of a purpose. abhyupagame: admitting; api: even; artha: purpose; abhāvāt: on account of absence. If pradhāna is said to be active spontaneously, it means that it is

370 The Brahma Sūtra not in need of any other principle, that it acts independently of any purpose. But the Samkhya holds that the pradhana becomes active for fulfilling the purpose of man. What is the purpose? It cannot be to provide appropriate pleasures and pains to the purusa, for the purysa is eternally unchanging and cannot undergo modifications of ingrease or decrease in his nature. If pleasure and pain are the only Photives for the activity of pradhana, then there would be no release. a The purpose cannot be to achieve the liberation of purusa for purusa is in the state of liberation even before the activity of pradhana. If the motive is not to provide with the pleasures and pains of life, there would be no empirical life at all. If it is said that both the pleasures and pains and liberation are the purposes, we find that neither is possible. Liberation is not possible for the objects produced by pradhāna are infinite and there would be no occasion at all for final release. Satisfaction of human purposes cannot be attributed to pradhana for it is not intelligent. We cannot attribute desire to purusa which is pure and passionless. If, to avoid all these difficulties, we say that pradhana acts on account of its inherent power to produce and the power of purusa to look on, samsāra will be permanent and there will be no liberation at all. We cannot therefore maintain that pradhāna enters on its activity for the purposes of the soul. In R.'s commentary, this sūtra is No. 8. He quotes Sāmkhya Kārikā I. 2. 1, that the purpose of pradhāna is fruition and final release on the part of the soul. But both these are impossible. As the soul consists of pure intelligence, is inactive, changeless and spotless and is eternally emancipated, it is not capable of either fruition or consciousness of prakrti or release which is separation from prakrti. If nearness to prakrti makes the soul capable of fruition, i.e. of being conscious of pleasure and pain which are special modifications of prakrti, it follows that as prakrti is ever near, the soul will never accomplish emancipation.

II. 2. 7. puruşāśmavad iti cet tathāpi If it be said that (the purusa moves the pradhāna as a lame) man (may lead a blind man) or as the magnet (may attract the iron), thus also (the difficulty remains). purusa: person; aśmavat: like magnet; iti cet: if it be said; tathā: thus; api: also. Even if it be said that like a lame man devoid of the power of motion but possessing the power of sight makes the blind man who is able to move but not to see and move of his own or, like a magnet, not moving itself moves the iron, so the soul moves the pradhāna, we say that this doctrine is not free from difficulties. First of all, the position that pradhana moves of itself is abandoned. Again, how can the indifferent purusa move the pradhāna? A lame man makes a blind

Text, Translation and Notes 37I man move by means of words and the like but the purusa is devoid of action and qualities. We cannot say that pradhāna moves by mere proximity as the magnet moves the iron. As this proximity is permanent, so movements should also be treated as permanent. The proximity of the magnet to iron is not permanent but depends on a certain activity and adjustment of the magnet in a certain position. So the analogies of the lame man and the magnet do not apply. Pradhāna is non-intelligent and purusa is indifferent and there is no third principle and so there can be no connection between the two. If the soul sees and pradhana is capable of being seen, then capacities which are permanent imply the impossibility of final release. For Ś, the Highest Self endowed with māyā is superior to the purusa of the Samkhya. For R., this is the fifth sūtra.

II. 2. 8. angitvānupapatteś ca And because the relation of principal (and subordinate) is impossible (pradhāna cannot be active). angitva: the relation of principal; anupapatteh: on account of im- possibility; ca: and. Pradhāna cannot be active as the three gunas, sattva, rajas and tamas abide in themselves in a state of equipoise without standing to one another in the relation of principal and subordinate. For activity the equipoise should be disturbed. There is no external principle to stir up the gunas. For R. this is sutra 6. He says that in the pralaya state there is no relation of superiority and subordination among the gunas and so the world cannot originate. If it be said that there is a certain inequality even in the state of pralaya, then creation would be eternal.

II. 2. 9. anyathānumitau ca jña-śakti-viyogāt And if there be an inference in another way, (pradhana cannot still be the cause) on account (of pradhana) being devoid of the power of being a knower. anyathā: in another way; anumitau: if inferred; ca: and; jña-śakti: the power of being a knower; viyogāt: being devoid of. We may infer the nature of the gunas from that of their effects and say that gunas are of an unsteady nature and so enter into a relation of mutual inequality even while they are in a state of equipoise. Even then the objection holds that a non-intelligent pradhāna cannot account for the orderly arrangement of the world. If the Samkhya attributes intelligence to pradhāna, then it admits our position that there is one intelligent cause of the multiform world. Pradhāna would then be equivalent to Brahman.1 Even if the gunas are capable 1 cetanam ekam aneka-prapañcasya jagata upādānam iti brahma-vāda- prasangāt. S.

372 The Brahma Sūtra of undergoing inequality in spite of their equipoise, there must be an adequate cause for it; or else if they were an operative cause, being a non-changing circumstance, the world always would be samsāra and there would be no scope for release. In R., this is sūtra 7.

II. 2. 10. vipratişedhāc cāsamañjasam And on account of contradictions, (the Samkhya doctrine) is unsatis- factory. vipratisedhāt: on account of contradictions; ca: and; asamañjasam: is not satisfactory. Ś. points out that the Samkhya mentions seven senses and some- times eleven. In some places it teaches that the subtle elements of material things proceed from the great principle, mahat, at others from the self-sense or aham-kara. Sometimes it speaks of three internal organs, and sometimes of one only. Besides, it contradicts Scripture which declares that the Lord is the cause of the world. The Samkhya brings a countercharge that the Vedanta does not make a distinction between the suffering souls and the objects which cause suffering since it believes that Brahman is the self of everything and the cause of the whole world. If the causes of suffering and the sufferer constitute one self, it follows that final release is impossible. If they are assumed to constitute separate classes, then the possi- bility of release is not excluded. Ś. replies that the distinction of the two classes is in the phenomenal world only. The distinction between the two, the suffering soul and the cause of suffering, is the product of avidyā. R. criticises the Samkhya view. The eternally non-active, unchanging purusa cannot become witness, an enjoying and cognising agent. It cannot be subject to error resting on superposition for these are of the nature of change. Mere proximity to prakrti cannot bring about changes. The Samkhya teaches that prakrti, when seen by any soul in her true nature, retires from that soul (Sāmkhya Kārikā 59, 61). But as the soul is eternally released and above all change, it does not see prakrti; nor does it attribute to itself her qualities. Prakrti cannot see herself as she is non-intelligent; she cannot impute to herself the soul's seeing of itself as her seeing of herself. R. says that these difficulties are to be found in the theory of an eternally unchanging Brahman which, being conscious of avidyā, experiences unreal bondage and release. He feels that the Advaita doctrine is more irrational than the Samkhya which admits a plurality of souls.

Text, Translation and Notes 373

Section 2 (11-17) CONSIDERATION OF THE VAIŚESIKA THEORY

II. 2. 11. mahad-dīrghavad vā hrasva-parimandalābhyām Or (the world may originate from Brahman) as the great and the long (originate) from the short and the spherical. mahat-dirgha-vat: as having dimensions of the great and the long; vā: or; hrasva-parimandalābhyam: from what is short and spherical. The Vaisesika argues that the qualities which inhere in the substance constituting the cause reappear in the substance con- stituting the effect. From white threads white cloth is produced. If the intelligent Brahman is the cause of the world, intelligence must be present in the effect also. But this is not the case. So the intelligent Brahman cannot be the cause of the world. The answer is given in the sūtra. According to the Vaiśesika, from spherical atoms binary compounds are produced which are minute and short and ternary compounds which are big and long but not anything spherical; again from binary compounds which are minute and short, ternary compounds, etc., are produced which are big and long and not minute and short. So a non-intelligent world may spring from intelligent Brahman. If it is argued that the binary and ternary compounds are endowed with qualities opposed in nature to those of the causes, so that qualities of the causes being overpowered do not appear in the effects, it is said that non-intelligence is not a quality opposed in nature to intelligence but its very negation. So there is nothing to prevent Brahman from reproducing its quality of intelligence in the world. The reply is given to this objection. The two cases are parallel. If the qualities of sphericity and so on existing in the cause do not produce corresponding effects, it is the same with intelligence. Endowment with other qualities does not modify the power of originating effects which belongs to sphericity. For it is admitted that the substance produced remains for a moment devoid of qualities and only after that, other qualities begin to exist. The origin of other forms is due to other causes. See Vaisesika Sūtra VII. 1. 9, 10, 17. So if sphericity, etc., do not produce like effects, it is due to their own nature. If it is the nature of sphericity, etc., not to produce like effects, it may be the nature of Brahman to produce an unlike effect, the non-intelligent world. Besides, there is also the observed fact that, from conjunction (samyoga) there originate substances belonging to a class different from that to which con- junction itself belongs. The doctrine that effects should belong to the same class as the causes from which they spring is too wide. See also II. 1. 6. Bhaskara adopts this interpretation. R. and Nimbarka hold that this sūtra refutes the theory of atoms

374 The Brahma Sūtra constituting the universal cause. If the atoms consist of parts, there will result an infinite regress; if they are without parts, they cannot account for the production of other evolutes. The atomic view is untenable.

II. 2. 12. ubhayathāpi na karmātas tad-abhāvaḥ Even in both ways activity is not possible (on the part of the atoms); hence the absence of that (the creation of the world). ubhayathāpi: even in both ways; na: not; karma: activity; atah: hence; tat-abhävah: absence of that. S. states the atomic theory and then criticises it. The conjunction which takes place between the separate atoms at the time of creation is due to some action like the one required to bring about the conjunction of threads into a piece of cloth. The action implies effort on the part of the soul or the impact of one thing like wind against another tree. The effort of the soul is possible only when the mind is joined with the soul and there is impact only after the creation of products like wind, etc. But neither is possible in the state of dissolu- tion for then there is neither the physical body nor any evolved product or thing except in its atomic condition. Creation out of atoms is inexplicable. If it is said that the principle of adrsta, the unseen accumulation of merits and demerits causes the original motion of the atoms, where does it reside, in the soul or in the atoms? As a non- intelligent principle, it cannot be the cause of action. Nor can it be guided by the soul for, according to the Vaisesika, the soul is not intelligent. Even if it is said to reside in the soul, there will be no connection between the principle and the atom. If the unseen principle in the soul is said to be connected with the atoms indirectly, there will be perpetual activity and perpetual creation and therefore no dissolution at all. In the absence of any definite cause of action, there will be no activity in the atoms and so no creation. Even dissolution will be impossible in the absence of any visible cause for the separation of atoms. R. asks whether adrsta resides in atoms or souls and rejects both views.

II. 2. 13. samavāyābhyupagamāc ca sāmyād anavasthiteḥ And because of the admission of the relation of inherence, and on account of infinite regress (arising therefrom) because of sameness (there will be neither creation nor dissolution). samavāya: the relation of inherence; abhyupagamāt: on account of admission; ca: and; sāmyāt: owing to sameness; anavasthiteh: on account of infinite regress. The relation of samavaya cannot account for the creation and dissolution of the world. A binary which inheres in two atoms is

Text, Translation and Notes 375 different from them and the relation of inherence which is equally different from two atoms must be inherent in them on account of a second relation of samavāya and so on ad infinitum. If samavāya is said to be eternally present in the things seen here and before us, samyoga also may be said to be eternally connected with things which are joined together and need not depend on a further connection, samavaya. Both of them are different from the terms they relate.

II. 2. 14. nityam eva ca bhāvāt And there will be permanent (activity or non-activity of atoms) alone on account of existence. nityam: permanent; eva: alone; ca: and; bhavat: on account of existence. The atoms may be essentially active or non-active or both or neither. If active, there will be no dissolution; if non-active there would be no creation. Their being both is impossible because of mutual contradiction. If they were neither, their activity or non- activity would depend on an operative cause. Such causes as adrsta being in permanent proximity to the atoms, permanent activity would result. If they are not operative causes, permanent non-activity will result. So the atomist view is untenable. R. says that if the samavaya relation is eternal, that to which the relation belongs is also eternal and so the world is eternal. Śrīkaņtha and Baladeva accept this position.

II. 2. 15. rūpādimattvāc ca viparyayo darśanāt And on account (of the atoms) having colour and so on, the opposite conclusion (will follow) because it is observed (in daily experience). rūpādimattvāt: on account of possessing colour and so on; ca: and; viparyayah: an opposite conclusion; darśanāt: because it is observed. The Vaiśesika assumes that when substances are broken up into parts, a limit is reached beyond which the process of breaking up cannot be continued. The atoms are the limit. They belong to four different classes, are eternal, possess the qualities of colour, etc. These are the originating principles from out of which this material world of colour, form, etc., is made. If atoms have colour, etc., then they are gross and non-permanent. We find from daily experience that things possessing colour, etc., are, compared to their causes, gross and non-permanent. A piece of cloth is gross when compared to the threads of which it is made and non- permanent; so the threads are gross compared to the filaments of which they are made. So the atoms possessing colour must be gross and non-eternal compared to their causes. So Vaiśeşika Sūtra (IV. 1. 1) that 'that which exists without having a cause is eternal' does

376 The Brahma Sūtra not apply to the atoms. Secondly, the reason which the Vaisesika gives for the permanence of the atoms, that if, as causes, they are not permanent, there is no point in referring to the non-eternity of effects (Vaiseşika Sūtra IV. 1. 4) is not satisfactory. The eternal cause may be Brahman. Again, a word need not always imply the existence of the thing implied by the word. The object must be established as existing by other means of knowledge. If ignorance or non-perception of the cause is assigned as the reason for believing that the atoms are eternal, this is too wide for we may believe even binary compounds to be eternal for they produce perceptible effects and are themselves produced by non-perceived atoms. If it is said that non-perception in IV. 1. 5 means that the atoms cannot be destroyed either by the destruction of the cause or by disintegration and therefore they are to be regarded as eternal, we reply that this reasoning applies only to things that come into being as the result of the combination of several substances. Then the things perish when the substances become separate from each other or are themselves destroyed, but the view of the Vedänta is that the destruction of the effect is possible only by a modification in its condition as solid ghee is destroyed when it is reduced to a liquid condition. So atoms may not be destroyed or disintegrated but may be transformed into a prior non-atomic condition, which is the condition of the being of Brahman.

II. 2. 16. ubhayathā ca doşāt And on account of defect in both ways. ubhayathā: both ways; ca: and; dosāt: owing to defect. Earth has the qualities of smell, taste, colour and touch and is gross. Water has colour, taste and touch and is fine; fire has colour and touch and is finer still; air is finest of all, having the quality of touch only. Do the atoms constituting the four elements possess a larger or smaller number of qualities than their elements? If we say that some atoms possess more numerous qualities, then their size will be increased and they will cease to be atoms. If to save the equality of atoms, we say that there is no difference in the number of their qualities, they must have one quality only, then we will not perceive touch in fire or colour and touch in water or taste, colour and touch in earth, since the qualities of effects have for their antecedents the qualities of their causes. If all atoms are assumed to have all the four qualities we should perceive what we do not actually perceive, smell and taste in air. For all these reasons the atomic doctrine is unacceptable. This is sūtra 15 in R. and Śrīkaņtha. R. says that there is defect in both ways, i.e. either if the atoms be possessed of colour, etc., or if they be not. On the first view, they cannot be eternal; on the second, their effects cannot be possessed of colour and the rest.

Text, Translation and Notes 377

II. 2. 17. aparigrahāc cātyantam anapekșā And because of non-acceptance there must be an absolute disregard (of the atomic theory). aparigrahāt: on account of non-acceptance; ca: and; atyantam: complete or absolute; anapeksā: disregard. Some competent persons accept the Samkhya but not the Vaiśeşika. While the Vaiśesika holds that there are six categories it makes substance the principal one on which the other five are dependent. If these are dependent, then they may be different forms and conditions of one and the same substance. But this is to give up the Vaiśesika point of view. It cannot be said that substance and quality are separate for in a white blanket, a red cow or a blue lotus, the qualities of white, red and blue reside only in some substances. If it is said that substance and qualities stand in the relation of one not being able to exist without the other (ayutasiddhi), then they must be either non-separate in place, non-separate in time or non- separate in character and none of these alternatives agrees with the Vaiśeika principles. Again, the distinction between samyoga or conjunction of things which can exist separately and samavāya or inherence or connection of things which are incapable of separate existence is futile since the cause which exists before the effect cannot be said to be incapable of separate existence. If it is argued that it is the effect which is inherent in the cause, the quality cannot exist independently and apart, say from a piece of cloth. How can the quality which has not come into existence be related to the cause at all? Nor can it be said that the effect comes into existence first and is then related with the cause for this would mean that the effect exists prior to its coming into existence and is capable of separate existence. The relation between the two is conjunction and not inherence. Again, there is no proof to show that samyoga and samavāya are themselves actual entities beyond the things in which they exist as relations. Simply because things have names of their own and produce distinct cognitions in us, it does not follow that they are actual entities. Things have an original nature of their own before they acquire a new nature on account of their being related with other things. Samyoga and samavāya have no nature of their own apart from what accrues to them from the relatedness of the things. Atoms cannot enter into samyoga with each other and samyoga of the soul with the atoms cannot be the cause of the motion of the latter and samyoga of the soul and manas cannot be the cause of cognitions for these have no parts. If we are asked to assume samavāya because otherwise the relation of that which abides and the abode is not possible we will be guilty of mutual dependence. The Vaiseşika doctrine cannot be sustained.

378 The Brahma Sūtra

Section 3 (18-27)

CONSIDERATION OF THE SARVĀSTIVĀDA

II. 2. 18. samudāya ubhaya-hetu-ke'pi tad-aprāptih Even (if we assume) collections due to two causes, it is not established. samudāyah: collection; ubhayahetuke: due to two causes; api: even; tad-apraptih: there is non-establishment of that. S. refers to the different developments of Buddhism and mentions three, the Sauträntika and the Vaibhäsika which believe in the reality of every object, sarvāstivāda; and the Vijñānavāda which opines that thought alone is real. For the nihilists everything is void or unreal; they adopt Sūnyavāda. The Vaibhasikas maintain the reality of external objects which are directly perceivable. The Sautrāntikas hold that external objects are inferable through cognition and are not directly perceived. The Vijñanavādins maintain the reality of cognitions alone without any substratum. All these are of the view that the objects admitted by them are momentary. The view of Sūnyavāda is that everything is void. In this sūtra, realism is taken up for consideration. The realists assume that the external world of elements, sense-organs and qualities and the internal world are both real. The external world arises out of four kinds of atoms, earth, water, fire and air. The inward world consists of five groups or skandhas: rūpa (sensation), vijñāna (knowledge), vedanā (feeling), samjñā (verbal knowledge) and samskāra (dispositions). Neither the atoms nor the skandhas can achieve the groupings as assumed by the realists. They are non- intelligent. If they are assumed to be active of their own nature, they will be always active and there will be no scope for release. The activity of the mind which is said to be the cause of the collections is not possible without the accomplishment of the groupings, i.e. without the presence of the body. The theory does not allow the existence of any other permanent and intelligent being such as the soul which enjoys and the Lord who governs. A series of cognitions of one's own self cannot be the cause. If the series is different in character from the several momentary cognitions of which it is made, then this is to admit a permanent self. If the series is momentary, it cannot be active and bring into being the external and the internal worlds. R. asks how on the doctrine of momentariness, the aggregates the theory postulates can ever come into being. If we are referred to the doctrine of dependent origination, pratītya-samutpāda, it does not solve the difficulty. For, though ignorance may lead to desire and so on as they say and in the end to ignorance once again, this does not explain the origination of the aggregates about which there is ignorance. To take the shell for silver may be an act of ignorance.

Text, Translation and Notes 379 But how about the aggregate which is known as the shell and what is the substratum of ignorance in this case? Ignorance does not account for that. Again, everything being momentary, the subject who experiences the silver in the shell passes away with that experience. If desire and aversion result from ignorance, they occur not to a subject that was ignorance but to a different subject. We are thus left with the anomalous consequence of one man's ignorance causing another's suffering. Srinivasa says that the view is faulty since it rejects Brahman, admits the collections of atoms, unseen and unheard, but a cause for their collection is impossible.

II. 2. 19. itaretara-pratyayatvād iti cen notpattimātra-nimittatvāt If it be said that (groupings of atoms and skandhas are possible) on account of mutual causality (of avidya and the rest), (we say) they are the cause only of origin (and not of groupings). itaretara: mutual; pratyayatvāt: on account of causality; iti cet: if it be said; na: not so; utpatti: origin; mātra: only; nimittatvāt: because of being the cause. R. reads pratyayatvād upapannam. ... If it be said that it is to be explained through mutual causality .... Nimbārka follows this reading. Bhāskara reads ... pratyayamanyatvāt. The objection is raised that, even though there is no permanent ruling principle, the world of samsāra is made possible because of the causal force of the series beginning with avidya and ending with death and return to life. The answer to this is given that that causality accounts for the origination of the different members and not for their groupings, external and internal. The series of avidyā, etc., are themselves dependent on groupings and so cannot account for them. Even if we assume that the two avidya and the rest and the groupings of the atoms and the skandhas arise simultaneously, it may be asked whether the successive groupings are like or unlike each other. In the former case they will be unable to change; in the latter they will change, irrespective of their good or bad actions. Again, if even the souls are momentary, how can they wait till the formation of the objects of enjoyment? Release and enjoyment become impossible.

II. 2. 20. uttarotpāde ca pūrva-nirodhāt Because on the origination of the subsequent (moment) the preceding one

the rest). ceases to be (therefore there can be no causal relation between avidya and

uttara: subsequent; utpāde: as it arises; ca: and; pūrva: preceding; nirodhat: on account of ceasing to be. Between two momentary things, there cannot be any relation for the first has ceased to be, when the second comes to exist. If we say

380 The Brahma Sūtra

that every consequent has in it the essence of the antecedent, we deny the doctrine of universal momentariness. If origin and destruc- tion are the earlier and the later stages of one and the same thing, then the thing is assumed to exist for three moments of time.

II. 2. 21. asati pratijñoparodho yaugapadyam anyathā When (the cause) is absent, (if the effect is present) there results the contradiction of the admitted principle or else simultaneity (of cause and effect). asati: when absent; pratijna: an admitted principle; uparodhah: contradiction; yaugapadyam: simultaneity; anyathā: otherwise. If it be said that there may be an effect, even when there is no cause, the main principle of the school that the mind and its states arise on account of the four causes, material cause (ālambana), impression (samanantara), sense (adhipati) and auxiliary cause (sahakāri) will have to be given up. If no cause is required, anything may come into being at any time. If it is said that the antecedent continues to exist until the consequent is produced, we accept the simultaneous existence of cause and effect and reject the theory of universal momentariness. Baladeva interprets the phrase pratijñoparodhah as the con- tradiction of the initial proposition that the world originates from the skandhas.

II. 2. 22. pratisamkhyā'pratisamkhyā-nirodhāprāptir avicchedāt Since there is no discontinuity in the series, there is the non-establishment of the voluntary and the involuntary destruction. pratisamkhyā: voluntary; apratisamkhyā: non-voluntary; nirodha: destruction; apraptih: non-establishment; avicchedāt: on account of non-discontinuity. The Buddhists maintain that universal destruction goes on constantly. They hold that whatever forms an object of knowledge and is different from the triad is produced and momentary.1 The triad are non-substantial and merely negative in character, abhāva- mātra. Destruction dependent on a voluntary act of the mind is when one by an act of will smashes a jar; destruction not so dependent is that which is due to the material decay of things. The third is akāśa which means the absence of anything occupying space which will be taken up later. Destruction, dependent on voluntary or involuntary acts, is impossible for it must refer to the series of things as a whole or to the things themselves. The series cannot be destroyed for its members are connected together as cause and effect in an unbroken manner. The things cannot be destroyed for in the various states or conditions of a thing, there remains something by which the

1 buddhi-bodhyam trayād anyat samskrtam kşanikam ca.

Text, Translation and Notes 38I thing itself is recognised either by perception or by inference. So there is no kind of destruction possible. Bhäskara reads asambhavah for avicchedāt.

II. 2. 23. ubhayathā ca doşāt And on account of defectiveness both ways. ubhayathā: both ways; ca: and; dosat: on account of defectiveness. If destruction of avidyā, etc., results from perfect knowledge and the adoption of the ethical path, we must give up the view that destruction takes place without any cause. If avidyā, etc., are destroyed of their own accord, what is the use of the ethical path and the knowledge that everything is momentary, painful and void? R. makes out that both origination from nothing and passing away into nothing are impossible. If the effect originates from nothing, it will itself be of the nature of nothing; but the world is not seen to be of the nature of nothingness. Again, if that which exists undergoes destruction, it would follow that after one moment the entire world would pass away into nothingness. On both the views, origination and destruction cannot take place as described by the Buddhists. Śrīkaņtha follows R. Bhāskara does not mention this sūtra.

II. 2. 24. ākāśe cāviśeșāt In the case of akaśa also, there being no difference (it cannot be treated as a nonentity). ākāśe: in the case of ākāśa; ca: also; aviśeșāt: on account of non- difference. Scripture says that ākāśa is an entity, a real thing. T.U. II. 1. It is inferred from the quality of sound as earth and the other elements are inferred from smell, etc. The Buddhists claim that ākāśa is the support of air. So it must be an entity. Again, we cannot say that ākāsa like the two kinds of destruction is a nonentity and at the same time eternal. That which is non-existent can be neither eternal nor non-eternal. R. says that when we say 'here a hawk flies, there a vulture', we are conscious of ākāśa as marking the different places of the flight of the different birds. It cannot be regarded as a nonentity. For R., non-existence, abhāva, is a special state of something actually existing. Even if ākāśa were admitted to be of the nature of abhāva, it would not be a futile nonentity, na nirupākhyatvam.

II. 2. 25. anusmyteś ca And on account of remembrance. anusmrteh: on account of remembrance; ca: and. If we believe in the doctrine of universal momentariness, then the experiencing subject will also be momentary and the act of

382 The Brahma Sūtra remembrance becomes inexplicable. The subject cognising a thing and the subject remembering it should be the same. The moments of cognition and recognition, perception and remembrance should belong to the same person and so he cannot be regarded as momentary. If it be said that belief in one and the same experiencing subject arises from the similarity of two or more cognitions of the self, the recognition of similarity implies a person who is permanent enough to discern the similarity of different cognitions. To argue that the knowledge of similarity is a new cognition independent of prior cognitions occupying the different moments or of a permanent experiencing subject, etc., does not help, for when we say this is similar to that, this and that as well as similarity between them are expressed in one act of judgement. If similarity were a distinct cognition unconnected with things which are similar, then similarity has no reference to this or that. It is an admitted fact. Whatever may be said with regard to objects, there can be no doubt with reference to the conscious subject. He is distinctly aware that he is the same subject who remembers today what he apprehended yesterday. R. means by anusmrti, recognition.1 He points out that not only recognition but inference which presupposes the ascertainment and remembrance of general propositions would become inexplicable. He would not even be able to prove the assertion that things are momentary for the subject perishes the very moment he states the proposition to be proved and another subject will be unable to complete what has been begun by another and about which he himself does not know anything. Śrīnivāsa says that if a permanent soul were not acknowledged, there would be no practical activities at all.

II. 2. 26. nāsato'drstatvāt (Entity does) not (arise) from non-existence since it is not observed. na: not; asatah: from non-existence; adrstatvat: since it is not seen (observed). Those who hold that the effect does not arise without the destruction of the cause, maintain that existent things spring from non-existent ones. This view is refuted by the sūtra. If things spring from non-existence, there is no point in the assumption of special causes. Non-existence is the same in all cases. Sprouts could not come from seeds but from the horns of hares, which we do not observe. If it is said that there are different kinds of non-existence with special features, then they cease to be non-existent and become entities. Non-existence as such cannot possess causal efficiency. Again, if existence came from non-existence all effects would be affected by non-existence whereas they are positive entities distinguished by

arthah. R. 1 anusmaranam pūrvānubhūta-vastu-vişayam jnānam pratyabhijnānam ity

Text, Translation and Notes 383

special characteristics. When a seed becomes a sprout the cause is those permanent particles of the seed which are not destroyed (even when the seed undergoes decomposition). This doctrine of entity springing from non-entity, is inconsistent with their own view that all material aggregates spring from the atoms and mental aggregates from the skandhas. R. considers here the Sautrāntika view that to be an object of cognition means nothing more than to be the cause of the origination of cognition. So even a thing that has perished may have imparted its form to the cognition and on the basis of that form the object is inferred. The manifold character of cognitions is derived from the manifold character of real things. The sūtra makes out that the special forms of cognitions cannot be the forms of things that have perished. For it is not observed that when a substrate of attributes perishes, its attributes pass over into another thing. The manifold- ness of cognitions can result from the manifoldness of things only on the condition of the persistence of the thing at the time of cognition. Śrīkantha begins a new section here. This sūtra and the next deal with the refutation of the Sautrantika view that an object is inferred from the impressions left on our mind by it. But a momentary and therefore non-existent entity cannot produce any impression.

III. 2. 27. udāsīnānām api caivam siddhiḥ And thus there will be accomplishment on the part of the indifferent as well. udāsīnānām: of indifferent (inactive) persons; api: even; ca: and; evam: thus; siddhih: accomplishment. If the doctrine that entity arises from non-entity is accepted, then non-existence can be achieved without any effort. Anyone can attain release. R. says that as all effects are accomplished without a cause, even perfectly inert men will accomplish all the ends to be reached in this and in the next life, including final release. Since there is never any attainment of knowledge or release by one who is inactive, this doctrine is false.

Section 4 (28-32) CONSIDERATION OF VIJNĀNA-VĀDA

II. 2. 28. nābhāva upalabdheh The non-existence (of external objects) cannot be maintained on account of perception. na: not; abhāvah: non-existence; upalabdheh: on account of per- ception.

384 The Brahma Sūtra

In this sūtra, the view that ideas are the only reality is considered. According to Vijñana-vāda the process whose constituting members are the act of knowledge, the object of knowledge and the result of knowledge is altogether an internal one. Even if things exist in the outside world, we can have experience of them through mental processes. External objects cannot be apprehended for they are either atoms or their groupings. Atoms are imperceptible and so are their groupings which cannot be different from the atoms which enter them. The differences of cognitions of pillar, wall or jar are mental in character. The forms of the objects of knowledge are determined by ideas and not the reality of the external world. As our knowledge of objects in the form of ideas and of the objects themselves, is simultaneously presented, they must be one and the same. If they were different, we may be conscious of one and not of another. So Vijñāna-vāda argues that the world of external things is not real. This view is confirmed by the similarity of our perceptions of waking life and experiences of our dreams and illusions. Our perceptions of objects are only simple ideas. The variety of ideas can be accounted for by samskaras or impressions of past ideas. The ideas and im- pressions succeed each other as necessarily as the seed and the sprout. Even the Vedanta admits that in dreams, when there are no external objects, knowledge arises on account of prior mental impressions. To all this the reply is made in this sūtra. Our perceptions point out to us external things like pillars and walls. We are aware in perception, not of perception but of the object of perception. Vijñāna-vāda admits it when it says that the internal object of cognition appears like something external. If we have no experience of the external world, how can we say that it seems like something external? We apprehend things through means of knowledge. If there are no external objects, how can the ideas have the form of objects? If they have the form of objects it does not mean that objects have become reduced to forms. Objects are apprehended as external and distinct from ideas. Between the idea and the object there is not identity but only causal connection. We have knowledge of different attributes black and white as also of different objects. Again, if the ideas occupy different moments of time and vanish immediately after they have been felt in consciousness, we cannot say of them that they are either the knower or the known. If the idea does not last even for two consecutive moments, then there cannot be talk about ideas being different from each other, about anything being momentary and void, between individuals and classes, between existence and non-existence due to avidya and about bondage and release. The Vijñana-vāda argues that while an idea illumines by itself as a lamp, the external objects do not and so we become conscious of the idea and not of the external world. The obvious fact is that ideas make us aware of external things. We cannot say that one idea depends on another and so on for it is the self who cognises the ideas

Text, Translation and Notes 385 and yet the self and the cognitions are of a different nature. They are related to each other as the knower and the known or as subject and object. The witnessing self exists by himself and cannot be doubted. This witnessing self of the Advaita Vedanta is one, permanent, and self-illuminating while the ideas of the Vijñāna-vada are transitory and many and therefore require for their manifestation an intelligent principle beyond them. Incidentally, this sūtra repudiates the interpretation of the māyā doctrine which holds that all objects are illusory or non-existent. It maintains the reality of external objects and says that cognitions arise from the contact of sense-organs with particular objects. The external object is other than the cognition of it. There are texts which look upon the world as self-contradictory and therefore non-existent. See, for example, the following verse from the Teja-bindūpanisad. vandhyā-kumāra bhītiś ced asti kiñcana śaśa-śringena nāgendro mrtaś cej jagad asti tat. If you are afraid of the barren woman's son, if a serpent is killed when hit by the horns of a hare, then the world exists.

II. 2. 29. vaidharmyāc ca na svapnādivat And on account of difference in nature, (ideas of the waking life) are not like those in a dream, etc. vaidharmyāt: on account of difference in nature; ca: and; na: not; svapnādivat: like dream, etc. If it is argued that ideas in the waking life arise as those in a dream, without the stimulus of external objects, the sūtra states that the two kinds of ideas are different in nature. Whereas the dream-states are negated in waking life, waking experiences continue to exist without being negated. What we experience in dream is due to memory, while what we experience in waking life is immediate apprehension. The difference between remembered and perceived experience is marked by the presence and absence of objects. There- fore waking life is different from dream. Even Ś. admits that the things that we apprehend in the waking state are not negated in any state.1 It will not be correct to argue that the Sutrakara is here establishing the phenomenal reality of the world, vyāvahārika-satyatva, for the Buddhists do not deny it.2 The sūtra denies the subjective idealism of the Vijñāna-vāda and affirms the extra-mental reality of the world of waking experience. 1 naivam jāgaritopalabdham vastu stambādikam kasyāñcid apy avasthāyām bādhyate. Ś. 2 dve satye sam-upāśritya buddhānām dharmadesanā loke samurti-satyam ca satyam ca paramarthatah. Nāgārjuna: Mādhyāmaka Kārikā XXIV. 492. N

386 The Brahma Sūtra Bhaskara says that those who follow the Bauddha system are māyā-vādins who are rejected by the Sūtrakāra.1

II. 2. 30. na bhāvo'nupalabdheh The existence of (impressions) is not (possible) on account of non- perception. na: not; bhävah: existence; an-upalabdheh: on account of non- perception. Vijñāna-vāda attempts to account for the variety of ideas by the variety of mental impressions without any reference to external objects. Without the perception of external objects, the existence of mental impressions is impossible. For the variety of mental impressions is caused by the variety of the objects perceived. How can various impressions arise if no external things are perceived? The positive and the negative method of argument2 is in favour of the reality of external objects. Cognitions arise when there are external objects; they do not arise when there are no external objects. Even in the absence of impressions, we believe in the existence of the external world. Again, the impressions require a substratum in which they reside. Such a substratum cannot be cognised by any means of knowledge. R. argues that we do not perceive mere cognitions devoid of corresponding objects. We nowhere perceive cognitions not inherent in a cognising subject and not referring to objects.3 Even dream cognitions are not devoid of objective content.

II. 2. 31. kşanikatvāc ca And on account of (the alaya-vijnana) being momentary, (it cannot be the substratum of mental impressions). ksanikatvat: on account of being momentary; ca: and. If pravrtti-vijñana or the cognitions having the form of external things cannot be the substratum of impressions, even ālaya vijñāna cannot be the substratum for it is also momentary in character. Facts of memory, recognition, etc., imply a being which continues to exist and is therefore connected with the past, the present and the future. As for the Sūnya-vāda, Ś. contends that complete denial of every- thing is not possible except on the recognition of some truth which cannot be denied. R., Bhāskara and Śrīkaņtha do not mention this sūtra. 1 ye tu bauddha-matāvalambino māyā-vādinas tepy anena nyāyena sūtra- kāreņaiva nirastā veditavyāh. 2 anvaya and vyatireka. 3 na hy akartykasyākarmakasya vā jñānasya kvacid upalabdhih.

Text, Translation and Notes 387 II. 2. 32. sarvathānupapatteś ca And on account of being defective in all ways. sarvathā: in all ways; anupapatteh: on account of being defective; ca: and. The different doctrines of the reality of external objects, or of ideas and general nothingness contradict one another. The Buddhist doctrine cannot be accepted. Bhāskara does not have this sūtra. R. takes this sūtra as a separate section dealing with the refutation of the Sunya-vāda that nothing whatever is real. Modern existentialism is reminiscent of some forms of Advaita Vedanta and Buddhism that the quest for reality is prompted by the perception of the misery and vanity of existence. The world we know is various, mutable. Its events lapse into non-entity at the very moment of their birth. The world is samsāra, a perpetual flux of states and relations of things, an evershifting phantasmagoria of thoughts and perceptions devoid of any substance. The objects of empirical knowledge are unstable, contingent, for ever breaking down logically into new relations to other things, which, when scrutinised, prove equally relative and elusive. The glory of this imperfect world is that it puts us on the track of apprehending the Real Being which underlies and informs this unstable world. It also helps us to become emotionally detached from the triumphs and tragedies of life.

Section 5 (33-36)

CONSIDERATION OF JAINISM

II. 2. 33. naikasminn asambhavāt (The Jaina doctrine) cannot (be accepted) on account of the impossi- bility (of contradictory attributes) in one thing.

bility. na: not; ekasmin: in one thing; asambhavat: on account of impossi-

S. summarises the Jaina view according to which there are seven entities, jīva (soul), ajīva (non-soul), āsrava1 (issuing forward), samvara (restraint), nirjara2 (destruction), bandha (bondage) and moksa (release). Soul and non-soul refer to the enjoying souls and the objects of enjoyment. Äsrava is the forward movement of the senses towards their objects; samvara is the restraint of the activity of the senses; nirjara is self-mortification by which sin is destroyed; bandha or bondage consists of works and moksa or release is the ascent of the soul to the highest regions after bondage has ceased. These are

1 āśravati iti āśrava. 2 nirjarayati iti nirjara.

388 The Brahma Sūtra brought under the two categories of the soul and the non-soul. Sometimes five asti-kāyas or existing bodies are mentioned, viz. soul, jīva; body, pudgala; merit, dharma; demerit, adharma; space, ākāśa. The reasoning known as sapta-bhangi-naya is applied to all these. Maybe it is; maybe it is not; maybe it is and is not; maybe it is indescribable; maybe it is and is indescribable; maybe it is not and it is indescribable; maybe it is and is not and is indescribable.1 The stra says that this reasoning is untenable since contradictory attributes cannot belong to one and the same thing. A cognition of indefinite nature cannot be a source of knowledge. If indefiniteness belongs to all things, knowledge and the means of knowledge, knowing subject and the objects of knowledge, the Jain teachers do not teach us anything definite or certain. Again, to call the asti-kāyas indescribable and yet to describe them is to contradict oneself. If heaven is nothing definite in regard to its existence or duration, how can one aim at it? As for the doctrine of atoms or pudgalas, it has already been refuted in considering the Vaisesika theory. The Jaina doctrine of anekanta-vāda describes the complexity of objects. The different qualities possessed by an object are not contradictory to one another.

II. 2. 34. evam cātmākārtsnyam And likewise (there results) the non-pervasiveness of the soul. evam: thus; ca: and; atma: the soul; akartsnyam: non-pervasiveness. For the Jainas, the soul has the same size as the body. Being limited in extent, it is non-eternal, anitya. If it enters a large body like that of an elephant, it cannot occupy the whole of it; in a small body like that of an ant, it will not have sufficient space. The same difficulties are felt if we consider the different stages of one person, his childhood, youth and old age. If it is argued that the soul consists of an infinite number of parts, which are capable of being compressed or expanded, then if the infinite particles occupy different places, they cannot be contained in a small body; if they occupy . same place, the size of the soul will always be very small. Again, where the soul has a limited extent, why should we assume that the particles are infinite in number? II. 2. 35. na ca paryāyād apy avirodho vikārādibhyah Nor also is there non-contradiction (if particles join or fall away fromt the soul) by modification, on account of change and the rest. na: not; ca: and; paryāyāt: by modification; api: also; avirodhalt. non-contradiction; vikārādibhyah: on account of change, etc. If the Jainas say that the particles join or fall away when the soul 1 syād asti, syān nāsti, syād avaktavya, syād asti ca nāsti ca, syād ash cāvyaktavyas ca, syān nāsti cāvaktavyas ca, syād asti ca nāsti cāvaktavyaś ca.

Text, Translation and Notes 389 enters into a large or a small body, the sūtra points out that this view implies that the soul is capable of undergoing change and is therefore non-permanent. This is inconsistent with the Jaina view of release of the soul, the ascent of the soul when its bonds are sundered; which is likened to the rise of the gourd to the surface of the water, when it is freed from the encumbering mud. The particles cannot be of the nature of self, since they have origin and destruction. We cannot say that one of these particles is permanent, for we do not know which it is. Nor do we know where they come from or go, when they join or fall away from the soul. On the Jaina view both the particles and the soul are indefinite. If it is argued that the soul may be considered to be permanent in spite of its changes, even as a stream of water is said to be permanent in spite of the changing water, it is said in reply that if the stream is not real, we get the theory of the void; if the stream is real, then the soul becomes of a changing nature. II. 2. 36. antyāvasthiteś cobhaya-nityatvād avišesah And on account of the permanence of the final (size of the soul) and because of the permanency of the two (earlier sizes) there is non- distinction of the size. antya-avasthiteh: on account of the permanency of the final; ca: and; ubhaya-nityatvat: because of the permanence of the two (earlier sizes); aviseșah: there is non-distinction (of size). Since the Jainas hold that the final state of the soul is permanent, it follows that the two earlier, initial and intervening ones also are permanent, otherwise there would be three different conditions of one and the same soul. This means that the different bodies of the soul have one and the same size and it is not required to enter into larger and smaller bodies. Or we may say that the dimensions of the soul being the same in its three conditions, the soul is either small or large and cannot vary according to the size of the body. So the Jaina view cannot be accepted. R. argues that the final size of the soul, i.e. its size in the state of release is enduring since the soul thereafter does not pass into another body. This size being permanent belongs to it previously also. Therefore there is no difference in size and the soul cannot have the size of its temporary bodies. Srinivasa is of the same view. The soul has a permanent and constant size in a gross body as well as in a subtle body, in the state f bondage as well as in that of release. So the doctrine that the sonl is of the size of the body is untenable. Baladeva gives a different interpretation: 'On account of the non-distinction of the final state [of release from that of bondage) both being permanent.' According to the Jaina view there is no difference between the state of release and that of bondage for the

390 The Brahma Sūtra former, is a constant progress upward or remaining in the alokākāśa. Movement whether in the world or upward is a characteristic of bondage. No one can possibly feel happy in the state of constant motion or standing still in a place without any support. So there is no difference between release and bondage on this view.

Section 6 (37-41) CONSIDERATION OF THE VIEW THAT GOD IS ONLY THE EFFICIENT CAUSE II. 2. 37. patyur asāmañjasyāt (The doctrine) of the Lord (as only the efficient cause of the world) (is untenable) on account of inadequacy. In I. 4. 23-4, it is shown that God is both the material and the efficient cause of the world. The view that God is merely the efficient and not the material cause of the world is here considered. Some forms of Samkhya and Yoga look upon God as the efficient cause different from purusa and pradhana. The Mahesvaras hold that Pasupati, Siva, is the efficient cause. There are other systems which hold that God is only the efficient cause of the world. If the Lord assigns to different people different positions according to his liking, he will be like any one of us, subject to hatred, passion and so on. If we say that these positions high, intermediate and low, are determined by the merit and demerit of living beings, this leads to mutual dependence. To suggest that this mutual dependence is beginningless does not solve the problem. If imperfection leads to activity1 as the Nyāya Sūtra (I. 1. 18) states, then even God who is active is imperfect. The Yoga view is that God is a special kind of soul (purusa-viśesa). In that case he must be devoid of all activity. R. mentions the different schools of Saivism here and argues that the Scripture refers to Narayana as the universal creator. He quotes Mahopanişad. 'Alone, indeed, there was Nārāyana, not Brahmā, not Iśāna, he being alone did not rejoice."2 Both R. and Nimbarka insert a negative particle 'not'. The doctrine is not acceptable, on account of inconsistency Śrikantha refers here only to those Śaivas who look upon the Lord as the efficient cause only, while maya is the material cause anu Sakti is the instrument. S. and Bhaskara consider under this sutra no only the Pasupata doctrine, but the Samkhya-Yoga as well as othe views which maintain that the Lord is the efficient cause only and not the material cause of the world. 1 pravartanā lakșanā doșāh. 2 tathaiko ha vai nārāyaņa āsīn na brahmā nesānah. sa ekākī na ramate.

Text, Translation and Notes 39 II. 2. 38. sambandhānupapatteś ca And on account of the impossibility of the relation. sambandha: relation; an-upapatteh: on account of being impossible; ca: and. A Lord distinct from pradhana and the souls cannot be their ruler unless he is related to them. This relation cannot be samyoga or conjunction for all the three are of infinite extent and devoid of parts. It cannot be samavaya or inherence for it is impossible to say which is the abode and which is the abiding thing. We cannot assume any other connection which can be inferred from the world as effect for we have yet to decide whether the world is an effect. This difficulty does not apply to the Vedanta which assumes the connection to be one of identity, tādatmya. While the Vedānta accepts śruti from its self-evidence, others, i.e. those who derive the authoritativeness of the Vedas from their divine authorship, suffer from the defect that the authoritativeness of the Vedas is derived from the omniscience of the Lord and the omniscience of the Lord is derived from the authority of the Vedas. This sūtra is not found in R., Bhāskara and Śrīkaņțha. II. 2. 39. adhişthānānupapatteś ca And on account of the impossibility of a support (or substratum) (the Lord cannot be the maker). adhisthana: support; anupapatteh: on account of being impossible; ca: and. The Lord cannot produce action in the pradhāna as the potter does in the clay, for pradhana, which is devoid of colour and other qualities. is not an object of perception. It is therefore different in nature from clay, etc., and so it cannot be looked upon as the object of the Lord's action. R. says that those who do not accept the authority of the Vedas establish the Lord's rulership over the material cause from obser- vation. We cannot prove that the Lord is the ruler of pradhāna even as the potter is the ruler of clay. Again, the power of ruling material causes is possible only for embodied beings but the Lord is without a body. If it is said that the Lord has a body, the difficulties mentioned in I. 1. 3 apply. Nimbarka says that Pasupati is not the cause of the world as he cannot have an eternal body, since it is opposed to what is observed. or a non-eternal one, since it arises later. All non-eternal objects arise later as effects and Pasupati, the Lord, is prior to everything. According to Śrikantha, the study of the Agamas is open to all castes, while the study of the Vedas is permitted only to the three upper castes.

392 The Brahma Sūtra II. 2. 40. karanavaccen na bhogādibhyah If it be said that as in the case of sense-organs (we say) no on account of enjoyment and the rest. karanavat: as in the case of sense-organs; cet: if it be said; na: not; bhogadibhyah: on account of enjoyment and the rest. If it be said that the Lord rules the pradhana in the same way as the soul rules the sense-organs which are devoid of colour and are therefore not objects of perception, the stra says that the analogy is misleading. We know that the organs are ruled by the soul from the fact that they experience pleasure, pain, etc., but we do not observe that the Lord experiences pleasure, pain, etc., caused by the pradhāna. The two sutras 39 and 40 may be explained in a different way. Experience shows that kings who rule countries are not without a material abode, a body. So we may attribute to the Lord some kind of abode to serve as the substratum of the organs. In reply, it is said that we cannot ascribe such a body to the Lord, for all bodies are later thancreation. So the Lord is devoid of a support and so cannot act. If, on the other hand, we ascribe a body to him, he becomes like any of us, an ordinary transmigrating soul undergoing pleasure and pain.1 Nimbärka says that it is not possible to suppose that the Lord has sense-organs and the body like the individual soul, for then the Lord will have enjoyment and the rest. II. 2. 41. antavattvam asarvajñatā vā (On this view there will result) finitude or non-omniscience. antavattvam: finitude, liability to end; asarvajñatā: non-omniscience, vā: or. While Ś. and Bhaskara take the particle va in the sense of 'or', R. and Nimbärka take it in the sense of and. If the omniscient God knows the duration, extent and number of himself, pradhana and the souls, then like all measured things they are of finite duration only, like jars and the like. When all the souls get released, samsara ends. That means that pradhana which under the guidance of the Lord had modified and manifested itself, for the good of the souls, also will end and there will be nothing for the Lord to rule. If, on the other hand, we say that God does not know the measure, the extent, etc., then he is lacking in omniscience. doctrine that God is only the efficient cause of the world is untenabre . So the R. says that if the Lord is under the influence of adrsta, he, like th individual soul, is subject to creation, dissolution, etc., and that he not omniscient. Besides, though there are features in the system acceptable to the Veda, it rests on an assumption contrar Pāśupata to the Veda, viz. of the difference of the general instrumental and 1 sa-šarīratve hi sati samsārivad bhogādi-prasangād īsvarasyāpy anīsvaratvan prasajyeta. Ś.

Text, Translation and Notes 393 material causes, and implies an erroneous interchange of higher and lower entities. Nimbarka follows R.'s interpretation. In the M.B. the pasupata and pāñcarātra doctrines are distinguished from the Vedic religion: 'listen, O saintly king, the Sāmkhya, the Yoga, the Pāñcarātra, the Vedas, the Pāśupatas are types of know- ledge propounding different views.'1 The Tantras claim to be of Vedic origin and are based on the Yoga system. They are Hindu and Buddhist, cast in the form of dialogues between Siva and Parvati or the Buddhas and their Saktis. They deal with the nature of the cosmos, its evolution and dissolution, rules regarding human behaviour, different forms of worship and spiritual training, etc.

Section 7 (42-45) CONSIDERATION OF THE BHĀGAVATA VIEW II. 2. 42. utpatty asambhavāt On account of the impossibility of origination utpatti: origination; asambhavat: on account of impossibility. The Bhagavata view admits that God is both the efficient and the material cause. It holds that Väsudeva is the highest reality and is of the nature of pure knowledge. He assumes four forms, Vasudeva. Sankarsana, Pradyumna and Aniruddha.2 These answer to the Highest Self, the individual soul, the mind and the self-sense. Vasudeva is the ultimate causal essence and the three others are the effects. Ś. does not object to the theory that Vasudeva is the Highest Self, higher than the undeveloped, and the self of all, that he appears in manifold forms (C.U. VII. 26. 2) and that by devotion and meditation we reach the Highest Being. Only S. objects to the doctrine of origination of Sankarsana from Vasudeva. If such were the case, the individual soul would be non-permanent and there is no possibility of release. 1 sāmkhyam yogaļ pāncarātram vedāh pāsupatam tathā jñānāny etāni rājarșe viddhi nānāmatāni vai. 2 In the M.B. Asvamedha Parva, Yudhişthira asks Bhīşma: XII. 349. 64.

and Bhīșma replies: katham tvam arcanīyo'si mūrtayah kīdrśāś ca te vaikhānasāh katham brūyah katham vā pāncarātrikāh vişnum ca puruşam satyam acyutam ca yudhişthira aniruddham ca mām prāhuņ vaikhānasa-vido janāh anyetv evam vijānanti mām rājan pāñcarātrikāh vāsudevam ca rājendra samkarșaņam athāpi vā N* pradyumnam caniruddham ca catur-mūrtim pracakșate.

394 The Brahma Sūtra Bhāskara agrees with Ś. that this section deals with the Pāñcarātra doctrine and not with the Sakta view as suggested by Madhva and Nimbārka. He, however, defends the Pancarātra doctrine and argues against S.'s view. He holds that the Pāñcarātra doctrine is not against Scripture. R. holds that the origination of the individual soul is contrary to Scripture. Katha U. II. 18. This is, for R., the prima facie view. Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa refer to the view of the Śaktas that Sakti alone is the producer of the world and refute it. The origin of the world from Sakti without purusa is impossible. There is a different explanation also. The origin of the world is impossible for it is eternal. As the world is not something produced, Śakti cannot be its cause. If the authority of the Scripture is quoted, then we find that, according to Scripture, the cause of the world is Brahman. The causality of Śakti is without any basis. II. 2. 43. na ca kartuh karanam Nor is the instrument (produced) from the agent. na: not; ca: and; kartuh: from the agent or doer; karanam: instrument. We do not observe that the instrument of doing anything springs forth by itself from the doer. Devadatta may use an axe but the axe does not come out of Devadatta. The Bhagavatas hold that from the individual soul termed Sankarsana arises its instrument, viz. the internal organ termed Pradyumna, and from this another instrument called aham-kara or self-sense. R. points out that the view that the internal organ originates from the individual soul is opposed to the text that from him there is produced breath, mind and all sense-organs'. M.U. II. 1. 3. The authoritativeness of the Bhagavata view cannot be admitted. The two sūtras for R. constitute the pūrva-paksa. Nimbarka and Srinivasa refer to the Sakti doctrine. If it is said that the world is something produced and the Creator helps Sakt, the sutra answers that no sense-organ is possible on the part of the Creator, since there is no sense-organ prior to creation. Without a sense-organ, it is not possible for the Creator to be a helper, nor is it established that the world is something produced. II. 2. 44. vijñānādibhāve vā tad apratiședhah Or if (Vasudeva, etc., are taken as) possessing knowledge and other (qualities), there will be no exclusion (of the defect of non-origination). If we take Sankarsana, etc., not as individual soul, mind, but as lords possessing knowledge, power, glory, etc., even objection holds. If the four individual lords have the same attributes, then the there is no need to have more than one. To admit four lords con tradicts their own position that the one supreme essence is Vasudeva.

Text, Translation and Notes 395 If it be said that the four forms possessing the same attributes spring from the one Higher Reality, the objection of non-origination holds. Sankarsana cannot be produced from Vāsudeva, nor Pradyumna from Sankarsana nor Aniruddha from Pradyumna. Since they all possess the same attributes, there is no superiority of one to the other. The relation of cause and effect requires some superiority of the cause over the effect. The Bhagavata view holds that they are all forms of Vasudeva without any special distinctions. The forms of Vasudeva need not be confined to four as the whole world from Being.1 Brahman down to a blade of grass is a manifestation of the Supreme R. says that 'or' in the sutra refutes the view set forth in the two previous sūtras. Apratisedhah is taken to mean that there is no contradiction (to the Bhagavata doctrine). The doctrine teaches not an inadmissible origination but that the Highest Brahman called Vāsudeva from compassion abides in a fourfold form so as to render himself accessible to the devotees.2 Sankarsana, Pradyumna, Aniruddha are thus mere bodily forms which the Highest Brahman voluntarily assumes. Scripture declares 'not born, he is born in many ways'3 and it is this birth consisting in the voluntary assumption of bodily form, due to tenderness towards its devotees, which the Bhāgavata system teaches. Nimbārka and Śrinivāsa argue that the doctrine of Sakti is set aside through the admission of Brahman. What is possessed of all attributes is the Highest Deity. (II. 1. 29.) Srikantha takes this sutra as representing the prime facie view. It is not contended that there is the origin of the individual soul, etc .. but only that Sankarsana, etc., assume the forms of the individuai soul. Baladeva argues that if the Saktas hold that the Lord has a non- material body composed of knowledge and so on, then we have no objection, since this view is identical with our own doctrine. II. 2. 45. vipratişedhāc ca And on account of contradiction. vipratisedhat: on account of contradiction; ca: and. There are several contradictions in the Bhagavata view. Sometimes these four are mentioned as qualities, sometimes as bearers of the qualities. The Vedas are sometimes criticised.4 Sandilya's criticism is only to eulogise, says R., the Bhagavata view. vagamāt. Ś. * brahmādi stamba-paryantasya samastasyaiva jagato bhagavad-vyūhatva- 2 vāsudevākhyam yatvāya svecchayā caturdhāvatișthata iti hi tat prakriyā. R. 3 ajāyamāno bahudhā vijāyate. Taittirīya Aranyaka III. 12. param brahmaivāśrita-vatsalam svāśrita-samāśrayaņī- * caturşu vedeşu evari sreyo'labdhvā sāndilya idam sastram adhītavan

396 The Brahma Sūtra The criticism is on a par with Narada's words (C.U. VII. 2) that one knows only the texts but should know the knowledge of the Self. He quotes a verse which says that 'the wise Lord Hari, impelled by kindness for those devoted to him, extracted the essential meaning of all Vedanta texts and summed it up in an easy form'.1 R. affirms that the sutras do not reject all the doctrines of the Sāmkhya, Yoga, Pāñcarātra and the Pāśupata systems. We reject only their weak points and accept whatever is valid in them though the teachings of the Jainas and the Buddhists are rejected entirely. While S. rejects the Bhagavata view in the same way in which he rejects the other theories, R. points out that the Bhagavata view is consistent with Scripture and is approved by the Sūtrakāra. This sūtra is not found in Bhāskara. Nimbārka refutes the causality of Sakti and accepts the supremacy of Brahman. Śrikantha stresses the opposition of the Pāñcarātra doctrine to Scripture. The Bhagavata doctrine stresses the importance of devotion and praise of God. S. in his commentary on Visnu-sahasra-nāma observes that adoration in the form of praise is superior to other forms of worship, since it involves no injury to any living being, does not depend on men or material and is independent of place, time or procedure.2 1 vedānteşu yathā sāram samgrhya bhagavān harih bhaktānukampayā vidvān samciksepa yathā sukham. 2 asya stuti-lakşanasya arcanasya adhikye kim karanam? ucyate: himsad puruşāntara dravyāntaru desa-kālādi-niyamānapekşatvam ādhikye kāranam.

Text, Translation and Notes 397

Section 1 (1-7) ĀKĀŚA IS AN EFFECT II. 3. 1. na viyad aśruteh Akasa is not created on account of non-mention in the Scripture. na: not; viyat: ākāśa, space or ether; aśruteh: on account of non- mention in the Scripture. The third part of the second chapter considers whether the forms of existence which constitute the world are created or not, whether they are coeternal with Brahman or issue from it to be resolved into it at stated intervals. The prima facie view is that akaśa is not created since there is no scriptural statement to that effect. In C.U. VI. 2. 3, fire, water and earth are mentioned as produced and not ākāśa. II. 3. 2 asti tu But there is. asti: there is; tu: but. The answer to the objection is stated here. There are scriptural passages which mention the origination of ākāśa. T.U. II. 1 says: 'from that Self sprang akasa'. There is apparently a conflict between the two texts, one which mentions fire as the first created product, the other which mentions akasa as the first created product. II. 3. 3. gauny asambhavāt It is used in a secondary sense, on account of impossibility. gauni: in a secondary sense; asambhavat: on account of impossibility. The text dealing with the origination of akasa is not to be taken literally but only secondarily because the creation of ākāsa is im- possible since it has no parts. Äkāśa is all-pervading and so can be inferred to be eternal and without origin. S. here refers to the Vaisesika view that whatever is originated springs from inherent. non-inherent or operative causes. We cannot conceive of such causes for akasa. Those elements like fire which have an origin exist in different conditions at an earlier and later period. No such divisions can be conceived for ākāśa. R. quotes another text which declares that air and akasa are eternal. vayus cantariksam caitad amrtam. B.U. II. 3. 3; Śatapatha Brahmana XIV. 5. 3. 4. The text about the origination of akasa can only be metaphorical. II. 3. 4. śabdāc ca And on account of the text. śabdāt: on account of the word, the text; ca: and.

398 The Brahma Sūtra The opponent may quote a number of scriptural texts. We have already mentioned B.U. II. 3. 3. Omnipresence and eternity are attributed to ākāśa. ākāśavat sarvagataś ca nityah. Again, as the ākāśa is infinite, so the Self is to be known as infinite: sa yathānanto- 'yam ākāsah evam ananta ātmā veditavyah. Again, 'Brahman has ākāśa for its body': ākāśa śarīram brahma, ākāśa atmā. R. and Nimbārka take sūtras 3 and 4 as one. The question relates to the origination of ākāsa. The prima facie view is that it is not, since the origination is mentioned in some texts, not in others. So where the word origination, sambhūtah, occurs, it should be taken in a secondary sense. It is to be taken literally with reference to fire and so on and figuratively with reference to akasa. This is on the analogy of the word Brahman which in M.U. I. 1. 8 and 9 is used literally in one case and figuratively in the other as referring to prakrti. The analogy is not complete because the word sambhutah is used once, while Brahman is used twice. R. treats the difference as immaterial since a figurative sense may be understood in addition to the literal sense even when a word is carried on just as much as when it is repeated.1 II. 3. 5. syācchaikasya brahma-śabdavat The one word may be (taken in its primary as well as secondary senses) like the word Brahman. syät: may be, is possible; ca: and; ekasya: of one word; (sambhūta- śabda); brahma-śabdavat: like the word Brahman. The objection that one and the same word, sprang, cannot be used in its primary sense with regard to fire and in a secondary sense with regard to akasa is answered here. The word 'Brahman' is used (T.U. III. 2-6) in the primary sense with regard to bliss and in the secondary sense with regard to food. It is said tapo brahma, austerity, is the means of knowing Brahman which is the object of knowledge. The word is used for both austerity and the object of knowledge. R. quotes M.U. II. 1 for the twofold use of Brahman (8 and 9). II. 3. 6. pratijñāhānir avyatirekāc chabdebhyah (There is) non-abandonment of the initial statement on account o non-distinction (of the world from Brahman) according to scriptural bratijna: initial statement; ahanih: non-abandonment; avyatirekat. texts on account of non-distinction; ca: and; sabdebhyah: from the

scriptural texts. The statements in C.U. VI. 1. 3; B.U. IV. 5. 6; M.U. I. 1. 3 that by the knowledge of one thing, everything is known are not contradicted because the entire aggregate of things is non-different from Brahmar, So akāsa will also be one of the effects of Brahman ; otherwise it coula 1 anuşangeca śravanāvyttāv iva.

Text, Translation and Notes 399 not be known when Brahman becomes known. There are also texts which declare that all this is Brahman and ākasa is included in the world. So ākāśa is a created product. The C.U. text in which ākāśa is not mentioned is to be interpreted in relation to the Taittirīya passage. Ākāśa and air are first created and then fire. There is no contradiction between the different scriptural passages. R. and Śrīkantha break this sūtra into two, sabdebhyah being the second. II. 3. 7. yāvad vikāram tu vibhāgo lokavat But as far as there is effect, there is division as in ordinary life. yavat: as far as there is; vikaram: effect, modification; tu: but; vibhāgah: division; lokavat: as in the world, in ordinary life. 'But' refutes the view that akasa is not created. The creation of ākāśa is not impossible. Whatever is divided is an effect; whatever is not an effect is not divided as the Self. Akasa is divided from earth and so on and it is therefore an effect. It cannot be said that the Self also is divided from akasa and so on, for the Self is self-established while akāśa and others are to be established by other means of knowledge. An adventitious thing may be refuted but not that which is the essential nature of him who refutes. The Self is therefore not an effect. Ś. points out that Brahman existed before ākāśa was produced. Besides, akāsa is non-eternal because it is the substratum of a non- eternal quality like sound. Statements regarding the eternity of akāa are to be taken in a relative sense. Akāśa is an effect of Brahman. Whatever is an effect has an origin. Akāśa has Brahman for its material cause.

Section 2 (8) AIR SPRINGS FROM ĀKĀŚA II. 3. 8. etena mātariśvā vyākhyātah etena: by this; mātariśvā: air; vyākhyātah: is explained. Objections to the origination of air are considered. In the chapter of the C.U. which treats of the origination of things, air is not mentioned. A different opinion that it sprang from ākāśa is mentioned in the T.U. So the opponent argues that the passage which refers to the origination of the case of akasa the literal sense cannot be adopted. Besides, there is a passage which f air should be taken in a secondary sense for, as in passages which denies that air ever rests. B.U. I. 5. 22. There are a product for it is conformable to the general tendency of Scripture. h declare air to be eternal. The sutra contends that air is Whatever is capable of division is an effect. The denial of its ever setting refers to lower knowledge, aparā vidyā.

400 The Brahma Sūtra

Section 3 (9) BRAHMAN IS NOT A PRODUCT II. 3. 9. asambhavas tu sato'nupapatteh But there is no origin of that which is on account of the impossibility (of such an origin). asambhavah: no origin; tu: but; satah: of that which is, i.e. Brahman; anupapatteh: on account of impossibility. The pūrva-paksa says that Brahman does originate in view of statements like 'non-existent was this in the beginning'. asad vā idam agra äsīt. The sūtra asserts the non-origination of that which is, on account of the impossibility of its being originated. Brahman is the only thing which is unborn. Brahman whose self is being cannot be suspected to have sprung from anything else. Brahman which is mere being cannot spring from mere being as there is a certain superiority on the part of the cause in the relation of cause and effect. Particulars spring from what is general and not vice versa. Nor can Brahman spring from that which is not. See C.U. VI. 2. 2. Ś.U. VI. 9 denies that Brahman has any progenitor. The fundamental cause of all effects, which is not itself an effect, is Brahman. Śrīkantha agrees with this view of Ś. For R., the sutra teaches the origination of everything else except Brahman, the latter alone being non-originated. Śrikantha seems to agree with this interpretation. 'Hence non-origination applies to Brahman alone; origination applies to all else, on account of failure otherwise of the promise that everything will be known.'1 Nimbārka agrees with Ś. Bhāskara criticises Ś.'s interpretations.

Section 4 (10) FIRE SPRINGS FROM AIR II. 3. 10. tejo'tas tathā hy āha Fire springs from this (air) (for) thus (the text) verily says. tejah: fire; atah: from this; tatha: thus; hi: verily; aha: says. The opponent mentions C.U. VI. 2. 3 where fire is said to have fo its source Brahman and the T.U. II. 1, where the source of fire is sald to be air and argues that Brahman is the source of fire for every thing without exception is born from Brahman (M.U. II. 1.3; see als C.U. III. 14. 1; T.U. II. 6). The sutra says that fire springs from 1 tatah brahmana evāsambhavo'nutpattih, tad-anyasya sarvasya sarva-

vijnāna-pratijñānupapatteh sambhava utpattir iti.

Text, Translation and Notes 40I Brahman through intermediate links. Though all things are traced to Brahman they are not the immediate effects of Brahman. S., Bhaskara and Baladeva take this as the correct conclusion. Nimbārka takes this as stating the prima facie view.

Section 5 (11)

II. 3. 11. apah WATER SPRINGS FROM FIRE

Water (springs from fire). The sutra explains the order of creation, srsti-krama. See C.U. VI. 2. 3; T.U. II. 1. While this is the prima facie view for Nimbarka, it is the correct conclusion or siddhanta for Ś., Bhāskara and Baladeva. There is a sutra which is not mentioned by S., Bhaskara and Baladeva. 'The Earth originates from water.' prthivi.

Section 6 (12) FROM WATER EARTH II. 3. 12. prthivyadhikāra-rūpa-sabdāntarebhyah The earth (is meant by the word anna, food) on account of the subject- matter, colour and other scriptural texts. Prthivi: earth; adhikara-rupa-sabdantarebhyah: on account of the subject-matter, colour and other scriptural texts. C.U. VI. 2. 4 says that water sent forth food. Does anna mean objects fit to be used as food like rice, barley and the like or cooked food or earth? The opponent claims that anna should mean food and not earth. The s of the elements fire, air, water and so the reference is to the element e sūtra contends that the word occurs in the treatment earth. In a complementary passage the black colour is said to be the colour of anna. Earth has black colour while eatable things are not necessarily black. Even though earth may have different colours, its predominant colour is black. Many scriptural texts support the view of anna as earth. See T.U. II. 1; B.U. I. 2. 2. Therefore anna denotes earth. R. quotes M.U. I. 1. 9. Nimbarka adopts the same interpretation though he regards it as the prima facie view.

402 The Brahma Sūtra

Section 7 (13) BRAHMAN IS THE CREATIVE PRINCIPLE II. 3. 13. tad-abhidhyānād eva tu tal lingāt saḥ But he (Brahman is the creative principle abiding within the elements) on account of his desire only and indicatory mark. tad-abhidhyānāt: because of his desire; eva: only; tu: but; tat-lingāt: on account of his indicatory mark; sah: he. Brahman is described in some texts as the creator of everything. There are other passages where certain elements are said to produce certain effects. If the opponent points to this conflict, the sūtra maintains that the Supreme residing within these elements produces these effects and so there is no contradiction. See B.U. III. 7. 3; C.U. VI. 2. 3-4. The elements become causes only through the will of the Supreme who resides in them. Nimbärka states that the correct conclusion is indicated in this sütra. Independent creatorship belongs only to the Supreme Self and not to anything else.

Section 8 (14) THE REABSORPTION OF THE ELEMENTS INTO BRAHMAN II. 3. 14. viparyayena tu kramo'ta upapadyate ca The order (in which the elements are resolved into Brahman) is the reverse of that (i.e. the order in which they are created) and this is proved. viparyayena: in the reverse order; tu: indeed; kramah: order; atah: from that (the order of creation); upapadyate: is proved; ca: and. If the opponent says that the retractation of the elements is not in any definite order, the stra says that it is the reverse of the order of creation. This is seen in ordinary life. He who ascends a stair, has to descend it by taking the steps in the reverse order. Each effect passes back into its immediately antecedent cause, until the last cause is resolved into Brahman. R. does not look upon this sutra as concerned with the order of dissolution. He continues the topic of the order of evolution. He mentions texts which designate the vital breath and the rest as rising directly from Brahman, in opposition to the real order of evolution, viz. prakrti, mahat and so on. These texts are explicable only on the view that everything arises directly from Brahman. Śrīkantha begins a new section ion here and reads pāram-paryena in place of viparyayena. He deals with the question of. the origin of sense-organs, mind and the like.

Text, Translation and Notes 403 Baladeva follows R.'s interpretation, though he takes this sūtra as constituting a separate section.

Section 9 (15) THE ORDER OF THE CREATION AND ABSORPTION OF ELEMENTAL SUBSTANCES IS NOT AFFECTED BY THE CREATION AND ABSORPTION OF SENSE-ORGANS, MIND AND THE LIKE II. 3. 15. antarā vijñānamanasī krameņa tal-lingād iti cen nāvišeşāt. If it be said that in between (Brahman and the elements) intellect and mind (are mentioned and so their creation and absorption are to be placed somewhere) in the order on account of the inferential indications (in the texts) to that effect, (we say) not so, on account of the non- difference (of the intellect and the mind from the elements). antarā: in between; vijñāna-manasī: intellect and mind; krameņa: in the order; tat-lingat: owing to inferential indications of that; iti cet: if it be said; na: not so; aviśeāt: on account of non-difference. In Katha U. I. 3. 3-4 and M.U. II. 1. 3, mind, intellect and senses are mentioned as arising from the Self and so there is a variation from the previously stated order of creation and reabsorption. The sūtra denies this on the ground that the organs themselves are non- different from the elements. See C.U. VI. 6. 5. If the organs are sometimes mentioned separately from them, it is only in the same way as the mendicant Brāhmanas (parivrājakas) are mentioned separately from the Brahmanas. Besides the M.U. gives an enunciation of the organs and the elements and not the order of their creation. So the origination of the organs does not constitute a break in the order of the origination of the elements.

Section 10 (16) BIRTH AND DEATH REFER TO THE BODY ONLY AND FIGURATIVELY TO THE SOUL CONNECTED WITH THE BODY II. 3. 16. carācaravyapāśrayas tu syāt tad-vyapadeśo bhāktās tad- bhāva-bhāvitvāt But the mention of that (viz. the birth and death of the individual soul) is with regard to (the bodies) of moving and non-moving beings; it is secondary (figurative) if applied to the soul, on account of (the forms) depending on the existence of that (the body). carācaravyapāśrayah: depending on the bodies of moving and non- moving beings; tu: but; syāt: may be; tat-vyapadeśah: the mention of

404 The Brahma Sūtra that; bhāktah: secondary, figurative; tat-bhāva-bhāvitvāt: on account of those forms depending on the existence of that (the body). In ordinary usage we say that Devadatta is born or Devadatta is dead, and certain ceremonies are also prescribed at the birth and death of people. The sutra refutes such a doubt and says that the soul has neither birth nor death. These belong not to the soul but to the body with which the soul is connected. Birth and death do not belong to the soul but indicate only the connection and disconnection with the body. See C.U. VI. 11. 3; B.U. IV. 3. 8. R. gives two interpretations resulting from two readings bhākta and abhākta. (i) The reference to moving and non-moving beings is figurative, secondary because of their being permeated by Brahman. All the words denoting moving and non-moving beings really denote Brahman since all objects are modes of Brahman. (ii) The forms denoting moving and non-moving beings are primary with regard to Brahman since the denotative power of all forms depends on the being of Brahman. Nimbārka follows Ś. Śrikantha follows R.'s second interpretation. Baladeva, on the whole, follows R.

Section 11 (17) THE ETERNITY OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL II. 3. 17. nātmāśruter nityatvāc ca tābhyah The soul is not (originated) on account of the statement of śruti and also the eternity resulting therefrom. na: not (originated, produced); atmā: the individual soul; asruteh. since it is not mentioned in the Scriptures; nityatvat: on account of being eternal; ca: and; tabhyah: from them. If it is urged that at the beginning there was only one Brahman without a second and some scriptural passages mention that living souls are like sparks produced from a fire and are therefore produced from Brahman (B.U. II. 1. 20; M.U. II. 1. 1), it is said in answer that the individual soul is not a product for there are no scriptural statements to that effect and it is said to be eternal, i.e. not-produced; see C.U. VI. 11. 3, VI. 3. 2, VI. 8. 7; B.U. IV. 4. 25; Katha U; T. 2. 18; T.U. II. 6. We cannot argue that the soul is divided and therefore is a product for it only appears divided on account of limiting adjuncts. The passages which speak of the soul's production, etc., relate to the soul's connection with the limiting adjuncts. According to R., the individual soul is, no doubt, an effect of Brahman but has existed in Brahman from all eternity as ar individual being and a mode, prakara, of Brahman. It is true that the material elements also subsist in Brahman but there is a

Text, Translation and Notes 405 difference. The material elements exist in a subtle condition prior to creation and do not possess the qualities which render them objects of ordinary experience. They are said to originate when they pass into a gross condition at the time of creation. The souls, on the other hand, possess at all times the same essential qualities. They are cognising agents. Only at the time of the new creation they connect themselves with bodies and their intelligence undergoes a certain expansion or development, vikāsa, as distinct from the contracted state (sankoca) in which they were prior to creation. The change is not one of essential nature, svarūpānyathābhāva. R., Śrīkantha and Baladeva read śruteh instead of aśruteh but give the same interpretation. Section 12 (18) THE SOUL AS INTELLIGENCE III. 3. 18. jñyo'ta eva (The soul is) intelligence, for this very reason. jñah: intelligence; ata eva: for this very reason. There are different views about the nature of the soul, whether its intelligence is adventitious or natural to it. The opponent argues that as the soul does not remain intelligent in the states of sleep, swoon, and as we say when we wake up from sleep that we are not conscious of anything, it is clear that intelligence is intermittent and so adventitious only. The answer to this objection is stated by S. Intelligence is not a product. Brahman is of the nature of intelli- gence and appears as the individual soul owing to its contact with the limiting adjuncts. See B.U. III. 9. 28. 7, IV. 3. 11, IV. 3. 14 IV. 5. 13; C.U. VIII. 12. 4; T.U. II. 1. While the soul's essential nature is intelligence the senses serve the purpose of determining the special object of each sense such as smell and so on. See C.U. VIII. 12. 4. Even in sleep persons have intelligence. For if intelligence were non-existent in sleep, the individual could not say that he did not know anything in deep sleep. The absence of objects is mistaken for the absence of intelligence even as the light pervading space is not apparent owing to the absence of things to be illuminated and not to the absence of its own nature. The view of the Vaisesika and others is wrong. that the soul is itself non-intelligent and intelligence is adventitious R. explains jnah by jnatr, the knower, and uses the sutra against the Samkhya and the Advaita Vedanta. He maintains that the soul is not pure intelligence but a knowing agent. Jñah is jñātr and not jñānam. R. is opposed both to the Vaisesika which holds that the soul is of a non-conscious nature and to the Advaita Vedanta which holds that the soul is pure consciousness. Nimbārka follows R.

406 The Brahma Sūtra

Section 13 (19-32)

THE SIZE OF THE SOUL

II. 3. 19. utkrānti-gaty-āgatīnām (The soul is not infinite in size on account of the scriptural declarations of) passing out, going and returning. utkrānti-gati-āgatīnām: passing out, going and returning. The question taken up for consideration is the size of the soul, whether it is atomic or medium-sized or of infinite size. There are passages which declare the soul to be of atomic size. The opponent maintains that its passing out and returning will be possible only if it is of limited size. See B.U. IV. 4. 6; K.U. III. 3, I. and 2. Movement is impossible in the case of an all-pervading being. If it is of limited size, it can only be of the atomic size since the position that it is of the same size as the body has already been refuted.

II. 3. 20. svātmanā cottarayoḥ And on account of the latter (going and returning) being connected with their soul (the soul is of atomic size). svātmanā: (being connected directly) with their soul; ca: and; uttarayoh: the latter two. So far as passing out is concerned, it may be said that the soul passes out when it ceases to be the ruler of the body, when the results of its former actions are exhausted. A ruler of the village may be said to go out when he ceases to be the ruler. But the other two activities are not possible in the case of a being who does not move. Going and returning are activities abiding in the agent. Some texts mention the parts of the body from which the soul starts in passing out. B.U. IV. 3. 11; IV. 4. 2; IV. 4. 1. So the soul is the size of the atom.

II. 3. 21. nānuratacchruter iti cen netarādhikārāt If it be said that (the soul is) not atomic, as the Scriptures state it to be otherwise (i.e. all-pervading) (we say) not so on account of the other one (the Highest Self) being the subject-matter (of those texts). na: not; anuh: atomic; atat-śruteh: since the Scriptures (state it) to be otherwise; iti cet: if it be said; na: not so; itarādhikārāt: owing to another principle being the subject-matter. If it be said that there are scriptural passages which hold that the soul is all-pervading (B.U. IV. 4. 22; T.U. II. 1), the opponent argues that these refer to the Highest Self and not to the individual soul. R. mentions B.U. IV. 4. 13 as referring to pratibuddha ātmā and not to the individual soul.

Text, Translation and Notes 407 II. 3. 22. svaśabdonmānābhyām ca And also on account of direct statements and infinitesimal measure (the soul is atomic). svaśabda-unmānābhyām: on account of direct statements (of the texts) and infinitesimal measure; ca: and. M.U. III. 19 refers to the atomic self, anur atma. From passages (S.U. V. 8 and 9) that 'this living self is to be known as a part of the hundredth part of the point of a hair divided a hundredfold' the self seems to be of the size of the point of a goad. It is clear that the soul is of atomic size. unmāna is uddhrtya mānam, a measure which is distinct from all gross measures. It means an intensely minute measure according to Srīnivāsa.

II. 3. 23. avirodhaś candanavat (There is) no contradiction as in the case of the sandal-paste. avirodhah: no contradiction; candanavat: like the sandal-paste. If the objection is raised that if the soul is assumed to be of the atomic size and so to occupy only one point of the body, how can one feel any sensation over the whole body as one does when he is bathing in a river or feels hot over the whole body in summer, the answer is given by way of an example. Though sandal-paste is applied only to a particular part of the body, it gives an agreeable sensation extending over the whole body. The soul may occupy only one part of the body and yet experience pleasure and pain extending over the whole body. See also B.G. XIII. 33.

II. 3. 24. avasthiti-vaiśesyād iti cen nābhyupagamād dhrdi hi If it be said (that the two cases are not parallel) on account of the special position (of the sandal-paste), (we say that it is) not so on account of the admission (in the Scriptures of a special seat for the soul, viz.) in the heart alone. avasthiti-vaiśesyāt: on account of the special position; iti cet: if it be said; na: not so; abhyupagamāt: on account of the admission; hrdi: in the heart; hi: alone. A possible objection to the atomic size of the soul is mentioned. It is true that the sandal-paste occupies a particular part of the body and yet gladdens the whole body, but we do not know that the soul occupies a particular place. To this the answer is given that the soul, according to some texts, is said to reside within the heart (B.U. IV. 3. 7). So it is atomic in size.

II. 3. 25. guņād vā lokavat Or on account of its quality (intelligence) as in the world. gunāt: on account of quality; vā: or; lokavat: as in the world. In the world we find that a light placed in one corner illumines the

408 The Brahma Sūtra whole room. So also the soul, though atomic and so occupying a particular portion of the body, may, because of the quality of intelligence, pervade the whole body and experience pleasure and pain throughout the body. Sandal-paste consists of parts and by the diffusion of its imper- ceptible particles may refresh the entire body but the soul as atomic does not possess any parts. A quality cannot extend beyond that in which it inheres and abide elsewhere. The whiteness of a cloth does not extend beyond the cloth. We cannot say that the soul is like the light diffused from a lamp for the light itself is admitted to be a substance. The reply to this objection is given in the next sūtra. R. and others read ālokavat.

II. 3. 26. vyatireko gandhavat The extending beyond is as in the case of smell. vyatirekah: extending beyond the object; gandhavat: like smell. Even as the smell extends beyond the substance which gives it off, so the quality of intelligence extends beyond the soul which is atomic. R. points out that just as smell which is a quality of earth is distinct from earth, so is knowledge different from the knowing subject. II. 3. 27. tathā ca darśayati Thus also (the Scripture) declares or shows. tathā: thus; ca: also; darsayati: shows or declares. Scripture declares that the atomic soul pervades the whole body on account of the quality of intelligence. See K.U. IV. 20; B.U. I. 4. 7. R. and Nimbarka treat the sutra as part of the previous one. II. 3. 28. prthag upadeśāt On account of the separate teaching (about soul and intelligence). prthak: separate; upadesat: on account of teaching. There are passages (B.U.II.1.17) which declare soul and intelligence to be separate. See also K.U. III. 6. According to Ś., sūtras 19-28 state the pūrva-paksa or the prima facie view that the soul is atomic while the siddhanta is stated in the next sūtra. It is not usual to state the prima facie view at such length. R. mentions B.U. IV. 3. 30, III. 7. 22; T.U. II. 5. 1. According to R., sūtra 19 states the siddhānta that the soul is of minute size. Sūtras 20-25 confirm this view and repudiate objections raised against it. Sūtras 26-29 consider the question already raised in sūtra 18 about the relation of jñātr, the knower, to jñāna, know- ledge. Baladeva considers the objection that intelligence is not a permanent attribute of the soul and holds that it is, since there is a separate statement in Scripture to that effect.

Text, Translation and Notes 409 II. 3. 29. tad-guņa-sāratvāt tu tad vyapadeśah prājñavat But that declaration (as atomic) is on account of its having for its essence the qualities of that (i.e. the buddhi) even as the Intelligent Self (which is all-pervading is said to be atomic). tad-guna-sāratvāt: on account of its having for its essence the qualities of that; tu: but; tat: that; vyapadeśah: declaration (as to atomic size); prājñavat: like the Intelligent Self. For Ś., this sutra discusses the size of the self. S. argues that atomicity essentially belongs to buddhi or understanding and is wrongly referred to the Self which is the Highest Brahman. As Brahman is all-pervading, the soul also is all-pervading. See B.U. IV. 4. 22. If the soul were of atomic size, it could not experience sensations extending over the whole body. It cannot be said that this is possible owing to the soul's connection with the sense of touch (the skin) for then, when we tread on a thorn we should experience pain over the whole body and not merely in the sole of the foot, which is not so. The quality of an atom cannot diffuse itself beyond the confines of the atom. The light emitted from a lamp is not a quality but a different kind of substance. Again, if the intelligence of the soul pervades the whole body, the soul cannot be atomic. Intelligence constitutes the essential nature of the soul, even as heat and light constitute the nature of fire. It has already been shown that the soul is not of the same size as the body: II. 2. 34. It can only be all-pervading. Its atomic nature is due to its association with mind, etc., in the empirical world. When S.U. V. 9 states that the soul is atomic and again that it is infinite, its infinity is primary or real and its atomicity is metaphorical. See also Ś.U. V. 8 and M.U. III. 1. 9. All statements about the soul's abiding in the heart or passing out depend on the limiting adjuncts. See K.U. III. 6, Praśna U. VI. 3. 4; C.U. III. 14. 2 and 3. According to R., this sūtra belongs to the jñānādhikarana, the section dealing with the self as knower. The self may be referred to as knowledge also, for knowledge is the self's essential characteristic. Brahman is described as jñanam in the text, satyam, jñānam, anantam, brahma. Śrikantha and Baladeva agree with R.'s view. II. 3. 30. yāvad ātma-bhāvitvāc ca na doșas tad darśanāt There is no fault (for the connection of the soul with the intelligence lasts) as long as the soul exists, because this is observed (in the Scripture). yāvat: so long as; ātma-bhāvitvāt: the soul exists; ca: and; na dosah: there is no fault; tat-darsanāt: because it is seen. If the objection is raised that the conjunction of the soul and the intellect which are different entities is bound to end sometime and then the soul will cease to exist altogether or at any rate cease to be an individual, samsārin, the reply is given that the conjunction will

4I0 The Brahma Sūtra last as long as the soul continues to be an individual and its ignorance is not destroyed by the realisation of knowledge. This is evident from the Scriptures. See B.U. IV. 37. R. and Śrikantha hold that because it is seen that all cows are hornless and so on and are called cows since they possess the generic character of cowness, knowledge is an attribute which is met with wherever a self is, there is no objection to the self being designated by that attribute. While S. holds that the soul may be called anu or atomic, since it is connected with the buddhi or intellect in the samsāra condition, R. holds that the soul may be called vijñāna or knowledge because the latter constitutes its essential quality as long as it exists.

II. 3. 31. pumstvādivat tv asya sato'bhivyakti-yogāt As in the case of virility and so on, verily, on account of the mani- festation being possible only on its existing potentially. pumstvadivat: as in the case of virility, etc .; tu: verily; asya: its (ofthe connection with the intellect); satah: existing; abhivyakti-yogāt: on account of the manifestation being possible. If the objection is raised that in susupti, or deep sleep, there is no connection with the intellect (see C.U. VI. 8. 1) and so it is wrong to say that the connection lasts as long as the individualised state exists, the answer is given in this sutra that even in the state of deep sleep the connection exists in a potential form. Were it not so, it could not have become manifest in the awakened state. See B.U. VI. 8. 2 and 3. Virility becomes manifest in youth because it exists in a potential condition in the child. R. holds that consciousness is always there; only in waking state and dream, it relates itself to object. jnatrtvam eva jīvātmanah svarūpam. To be a knower, subject is the essential character of the self. When it is said that the released self has no consciousness, samjñā (B.U. II. 4. 12), it only means that it has no consciousness of birth, death and so on, which, in the state of samsara, is caused by the connection of the self with the elements. Bhaskara agrees with Ś. in holding that the soul's connection with intellect exists potentially in the state of deep sleep, etc., and is manifested in the state of waking. II. 3. 32. nityopalabdhyanupalabdhiprasango'nyatara-niyamovānyathā Otherwise (i.e. if no intellect existed) there would result either constant perception or (constant) non-perception or else the limitation of the power of either of the two (of the soul or the senses). nityopalabdhi: constant perception; anupalabdhi: (constant) non- perception; prasangah: there would result; anyatara-niyamah: limitation of the power of either of the two; va: or else; anyatha: otherwise.

Text, Translation and Notes 4II If the internal organ (antah-karana) of which the intellect is a mode is not accepted, then as the senses are always in contact with their objects, there would result the perception of everything as the requisites of the soul, the senses and objects are present. If this is denied, then there can be no knowledge and nothing would ever be known. The opponent will have to accept the limitation of either the soul or the senses. The self is changeless. The power of the senses which is not impeded either in the previous moment or in the subsequent moment cannot be limited in the middle. We have therefore to accept an internal organ through whose connection and disconnection, perception and non-perception result. We find texts which say: 'I am absent-minded. I did not hear it.' B.U. I. 5. 3. So there is an internal organ of which intellect is a mode and it is the connection of the self with this that causes individuation in samsāra. R. criticises the view that the self is omnipresent and mere know- ledge, for then consciousness and non-consciousness would take place together permanently everywhere or else there would be definite permanent restriction either to permanent consciousness or non- consciousness. This would mean that there would be everywhere and at all times simultaneous consciousness or non-consciousness. If, on the other hand, it were the cause of consciousness only there would never and nowhere be unconsciousness; if it were the cause of non- consciousness there would never and nowhere be consciousness of anything. R. holds that the self abides within bodies only and consciousness takes place there only and nowhere else. R. criticises the Vaisesika view of the self also. Nimbarka states that on the view of an all-pervasive soul the perception and non-perception, the knowledge and the release of the soul must all become eternal. The soul will be either eternally bound or eternally free; thus there must be a restriction with regard to the one or the other. Śrīnivāsa following Nimbārka holds that the individual soul is possessed of the attribute of being a knower, is knowledge by nature and atomic in size. S. views sūtras 19-28 as the statement of the pūrva-paksa that the individual soul is atomic in size and holds sūtra 29 as the statement of the siddhanta that the individual soul is all-pervading but is spoken of as atomic in some scriptural passages because the qualities of the internal organ which is atomic constitute the essence of the individual soul as long as the latter is implicated in samsāra. R. contends that the sūtra 19 states the siddhänta view that the soul is of minute size, sūtras 20-25 confirm this position and refute objections to it. According to him, sūtras 26-29 consider the relation of the soul as knowing agent to knowledge.

4I2 The Brahma Sūtra

Section 14 (33-39)

THE SOUL AS AGENT II. 3. 33. kartā śāstrārthavattvāt (The soul is) an agent, because of Scripture having a meaning. kartā: agent; śāstrārthavattvāt: because the Scripture has a meaning. Scriptural injunctions like 'He is to sacrifice' 'He is to give' will have meaning only if the soul is an agent. If the soul were not an agent, these injunctions would become pointless. R. sets forth the opponent's view that the soul is non-active and only prakrti acts. See Katha U. II. 18; B.G. III. 27, XIV. 19, XIII. 20. R. refutes this view by declaring that the soul is an agent, not the gunas. The very term śāstra is derived from śas, to command, and commanding means impelling to action. śāsanāc ca śāstram, śāsanam ca pravartanam, śāstrasya ca pravartakatvam bodha-janana-dvāreņa. Pūrva Mīmāmsā sutra III. 7. 18 declares that the fruit of the injunction belongs to the agent. The texts quoted in support of the opponent's view mean that the activity of the soul is due not to its own nature but to its connection with the gunas. See B.G. XIII. 21; XVIII. 16. Śrīnivāsa quotes 'Only doing works here, let one desire to live a hundred years'. (Iśa U. 2.) 'One desiring heaven should perform sacrifices.' (Taittirīya Samhita II. 5. 5.) 'One desiring salvation should worship Brahman. Let one worship calmly.' (C.U. III. 14. 1.) Ś. and Bhäskara hold that the soul's state of being an agent is not natural but is due to limiting adjuncts. II. 3. 34. vihāropadeśāt And on account of the teaching of its moving about. vihara: moving about; upadesat: on account of the teaching. The texts 'The immortal one goes wherever he likes' (B.U. IV. 3. 12); 'He moves about, according to his pleasure, within his own body' (B.U. II. 1. 18), are considered here to be teaching the moving about of the soul. All commentators agree on this sutra. Only R. takes this and the next sūtra as one by adding a ca: upādānāt vihāropadeśāc ca. II. 3. 35. upādānāt On account of (its) taking (the organs). upādānāt: on account of taking. B.U. II. 1. 18 says that the soul in the state of dream takes the organs with it. This shows that the soul is an agent. II. 3. 36. vyapadeśāc ca kriyāyām na cen nirdeśa-viparyayah (The soul is an agent) also because it is designated as such with regard to

Text, Translation and Notes 4I3 action; if it were not such, the designation (would have been) of a different character. vyapadeśāt: because of the designation; ca: also; kriyāyām: with reference to action; na cet: if it were not so; nirdeśa-viparyayah: the designation (would have been) of a different character. If the objection is raised that agency belongs to intelligence or buddhi from the texts 'Intelligence performs sacrifices and it also performs all acts' (T.U. II. 5), it is said in reply that intelligence refers to the soul as agent. See B.U. II. 1. 17, where intelligence is said to be the instrument through which the self acts. Buddhi is the instrument of action according to R. As the word used is vijñānam and not vijñānena, it refers to the soul as agent.

II. 3. 37. upalabdhivad aniyamah The absence of restriction is as in the case of perception. upalabdhivat: as in the case of perception; aniyamah: there is no restriction. If it is argued that if the soul is the agent apart from buddhi, it would, being independent, bring about what is pleasant and useful and not the opposite, the sūtra states in reply that there is no such restriction. As the soul perceives what is agreeable and disagreeable, so it can bring about what is pleasant and unpleasant. If it be said that in the act of perception there are causes of perception, that does not invalidate the view that the perceiver is the soul. In action also, the soul is not absolutely free since it depends on differences of place, time and efficient causes but the agent does not cease to be agent because he requires assistance. A cook remains the agent in the action of cooking, though he requires fuel, water and so on. R., Śrīkanțha, Baladeva interpret the sūtra differently. If prakrti were the agent and not the soul, then there would be non-restriction of actions as in the case of perception. Just as it is shown that, if the soul be all-pervading, no definite perception will be possible, so also if prakrti be the agent, no definite activity will be possible; for if prakrti be all-pervading and common to all, all activities would produce results in the case of all souls or produce no results in the case of any soul. For if each soul is held to be omnipresent, they are all of them in equal proximity to all parts of prakrti. We cannot say that the distribution of results will depend on different internal organs for the omnipresent souls cannot be exclusively connected with any particular internal organ.

II. 3. 38. śakti viparyayāt On account of the reversal of power. śakti: power; viparyayāt: on account of reversal. If intellect or buddhi, which is an instrument, becomes the agent and ceases to function as an instrument, then we will have to devise

414 The Brahma Sūtra

something else as an instrument. The dispute concerns only terms for we need an agent different from the instrument. R. points out that, if the internal organ were the agent, it would also be the enjoyer. Then there would no longer be any proof for the existence of the self but the texts teach that the person, the soul exists on account of the fact of enjoyment. puruso'sti bhoktr-bhāvāt. Sāmkhya Kārikā 17.

II. 3. 39. samādhyabhāvāc ca And on account of the impossibility of deep concentration. samādhi: deep concentration; abhāvāt: on account of impossibility; ca: and. We are asked to realise the Self: B.U. II. 4. 5; C.U. VIII. 7. 1; M.U. II. 2. 6. If the soul were not the agent, it would be incapable of activities like 'hearing, reflecting and meditating' which lead to samädhi or self-realisation. Then there would be no liberation for the soul. It is therefore clear that the soul alone is the agent and not the intellect. R. points out that in the final state of meditation called samādhi, the meditator realises his difference from prakrti of which the internal organ is a modification. So the self is different from the intellect.

Section 15 (40) THE SOUL IS AN AGENT WHEN CONNECTED WITH THE ADJUNCTS

II. 3. 40. yathā ca takșobhayathā And like a carpenter, in both ways. yathā: like; ca: and; taksā: carpenter; ubhayathā: in both ways. The soul's agency is established in the previous sūtras. The question is raised whether the agency represents the real nature of the Self or is only a superimposition. The Nyaya school holds that it is its real nature. The Upanisads declare that the Self is non-attached. B.U. IV. 3. 7, 15; Katha U. I. 3. 4. The reconciliation is effected by the example of the carpenter. The soul is an agent when connected with the instruments of action, buddhi, etc., and ceases to be so when dissociated from them even as a carpenter works so long as he wields his instruments and rests when he lays them aside. The Self is active in waking- and dream-states and is blissful when it ceases to be an agent as in deep sleep. The Self's true nature is inactive but it becomes active when it is connected with its upadhis or adjuncts. R. holds that activity is an essential attribute of the soul but from this it does not follow that the soul is always actually active. A

Text, Translation and Notes 415 carpenter, for example, though furnished with the requisite instru- ments, may either work or not work as he chooses. If the internal organ, on the contrary, were essentially active, it would be acting constantly since as a non-sentient being it could not be influenced by particular reasons for action, such as the desire for enjoyment. Nimbärka holds that the soul acts or does not act according to its own wish. Sriniväsa adds that acting or refraining from action is not possible on the part of buddhi which is an instrument like the axe, by reason of its non-sentience. On account of the constancy of its proximity to a sentient being and the absence of any desire on its part, being non-sentient, we will have either perpetual activity or perpetual non-activity. Baladeva points out that the carpenter is an individual agent when he acts through his instruments and a direct agent when he is handling the instruments. So also the soul is an indirect agent through its sense-organs and a direct agent in the act of controlling these sense-organs.

Section 16 (41-42)

THE SOUL'S DEPENDENCE ON THE LORD

II. 3. 41. parāt tu tac-chruteh But that (agency of the soul) is (derived) from the Supreme Lord so Scripture (teaches). parat: from the Supreme Lord; tu: but; tat: that (agency); śruteh: Scripture (teaches). The texts considered are K.U. III. 8. 'This one, truly, indeed causes him whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds to perform good actions. This one, indeed, also causes him whom he wishes to lead downward, to perform bad actions.' Satapatha Brāhmana XIV. 6. 7. 30. 'He who dwelling within the self pulls the self within', ya ātmani tişthann ātmānam antaro yamayatīti. The soul in the state of samsara when it appears as agent and enjoyer is brought about through the permission of the Lord who is the Highest Self, the supervisor of all actions, the witness residing in all beings, the cause of all intelligence. We must assume therefore that

Lord.1 final release is effected through knowledge caused by the grace of the

R. supports the view by quotations from the B.G. XV. 15; XVIII. 61. Nimbārka uses Taittirīya Āraņyaka III. 11. 1. 2 to support the I avidyāvasthāyām kārya-karaņa-samghāto'vivekadarsino jīvasyāvidyātimi- rāndhasya sataḥ parasmād ātmanaḥ karmādhyakşāt sarvabhūtādivāsāt sākșiņas cetayitur īśvarāt tad-anujnayā kartrtva-bhoktrtva-lakşaņasya samsārasya siddhis tad-anugraha-hetukenaiva ca vijñānena moksa-siddhir bhavitum arhati. Ś.

416 The Brahma Sūtra view that the individual soul is not an agent independently. His agency is subject to the control of the Supreme Lord.

II. 3. 42. krta-prayatnāpeksas tu vihita-pratişiddhāvaiyyarthādibhyah But (the Lord's making the soul act) is dependent on the efforts made (by it); only thus will the injunctions and prohibitions, etc., be meaningful. krta-prayatna-apeksah: is dependent on the efforts made; tu: but; vihita-pratişiddha-avaiyyarthadibhyah: on account of the meaning- fulness of injunctions, prohibitions, etc. This sutra refutes the objection that the Lord must be cruel and whimsical since he makes some do good actions and others evil actions. The Lord directs the soul taking into account previous good and bad deeds. The Lord is a mere occasional cause, in allotting to the souls unequal results. The analogy of rain is used. The rain constitutes the common occasional cause for shrubs, bushes, corn, etc., which belong to different species and spring each from its particular seed, for the inequality of sap, flowers, fruits and leaves results neither when the rain is absent nor when the special seeds are absent; so the Lord arranges favourable or unfavourable conditions for the souls taking into account their previous efforts. Since samsāra is beginningless and endless, the objection of infinite regress cannot be raised. R. cites B.G. X. 8, 10, 11; XVI. 8-19. While in II. 1. 33, it is shown that the Lord is not partial as a creator, here it is shown that he is not partial as an instigator. So the Lord cannot be accused of cruelty or partiality. Only thus will injunctions and prohibitions have a meaning. This does not take away from the independence of the Lord, even as a king who rewards or punishes his subjects according to their deeds does not lose his independence.

Section 17 (43-53)

THE RELATION OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL TO BRAHMAN

II. 3. 43. amśo nānā-vyapadeśād anyathā cāpi dāśakitavāditvam adhīyata eke (The soul is) a part (of the Lord) on account of the declaration of difference and otherwise also; for in some (rescensions of the Vedas) (it) is spoken of as being (of the nature of) slaves, fishermen, etc. amśah: part; nānā-vyapadeśāt: on account of the declaration of difference; anyatha: otherwise; ca: and; api: also; dāśa-kitavāditvam: being of the nature of slaves, fishermen, etc. In the previous section, it has been said that the Lord controls the

Text, Translation and Notes 417 soul. Here the question is raised about the relation of the individual soul to Brahman. Is the relation between the two one of master and servant or fire and its sparks? This sūtra suggests that the soul is a part of Brahman as the spark is a part of fire. As Brahman does not consist of parts, the soul can only be an imagined part, 'a part as it were'. We do not view the Lord as identical with the soul because of the declaration of difference. See C.U. VIII. 7; B.U. IV. 4. 22. There are also passages which teach the non-difference of the Lord and the soul. S.U. IV. 3; Taittirīya Āranyaka III. 12. 7. There is a certain passage of the Atharva Veda which asserts that 'Brahman are the fishermen, Brahman the slaves, Brahman these gamblers, etc.' 'brahmadāśā brahmadāsā brahmaiveme kitavāh.' Since there are statements of difference and non-difference, the soul is said to be a part of the Lord. R. holds that the souls are in reality parts of Brahman and not merely in appearance as S. suggests by the phrase 'amsa iva'. He refutes the other views of absolute difference, absolute non- difference and imaginary difference due to limiting adjuncts. Nimbārka and Srīnivāsa argue that the individual soul is neither absolutely different from the Highest Person nor absolutely non- different from him but is a part of the Highest Self. Part does not mean a portion that can be cut off for that would contradict texts like 'without part'. S.U. VI. 19. The individual soul is by nature different from the Supreme Person predicated to be the whole and yet non-different from him as its existence and activity are under the control of the whole. Śrikantha says, if it is declared of the class of intelligent beings that it is an amsa or fragment of Brahman, as a particular mode of what is qualified, being of the same nature as inseparable attributes like light, etc., it may be true of the class of non-intelligent beings as well.

II. 3. 45. api ca smaryate And it is also stated in smyti. api: also; ca: and; smaryate: is stated in the smrti. The text here is B.G. XV. 7. 'A fragment of my own self (mamaivāmsah), having become a living soul, eternal, in the world of life, draws to itself the senses of which the mind is the sixth, that rest in nature.' R. omits the ca.

II. 3. 46. prakāśādivan naivam parah The Highest Lord is not (affected by pleasure and pain) like this (the individual soul), even as light, etc. (are not affected by the shape of the things they touch). prakāśādivat: like light, etc .; na: is not; evam: like this; parah: the Highest. O

418 The Brahma Sūtra

The objection that, if the soul is a part of Brahman, the imper- fections of the soul affect Brahman also is answered in this sūtra. As the all-pervading sun looks straight or bent when it comes into contact with particular objects or as the ether enclosed in a jar seems to move when the jar is moved or as the sun appears to shake when the water in which it is reflected shakes but in reality none of these undergoes these changes, so also the Supreme is not affected by pleasure and pain which are experienced by the individual soul which is a product of ignorance and is limited by adjuncts of buddhi, etc. R. makes out that the individual soul is a visesana of the Highest Self, standing to it in the relation of part to whole. The Highest Self is not of the same nature as the individual soul. As the luminous body is of a nature different from that of its light, so the Highest Self differs from the individual soul which is a part of it. As the attribute and the substratum are not identical, the soul and Brahman are not the same. Śrīkaņtha develops here his distinctive viśistādvaita. Baladeva begins here a new section dealing with the queston of the Lord's incarnations. Supreme (incarnations are) not so, (i.e. parts of the Lord as the individual souls are) as in the case of light. Though incarnations and individual souls are both parts of the Lord, the word amsa has a different meaning when applied to the incarnations. They represent the entire Lord.

II. 3. 47. smaranti ca And the smrtis state. smaranti: the smytis state: ca: and. The texts M.U. III. 1. 1; Katha U. II. 5. 11 state the difference. 'It is not stained by the fruits of actions any more than a lotus leaf by water.' na lipyate phalaiś cāpi padma-patram ivāmbhasā. M.B. XII. 13754. R. and Srikantha quote other texts to show that the soul is an attribute of the Lord. Baladeva uses other texts to show that incarnations are not parts of the Lord in the same sense in which the individual souls are.

II. 3. 48. anujñā-parihārau deha-sambandhāj jyotirādivat Injunctions and prohibitions (are possible) on account of the connection (of the soul) with the body, as in the case of light, etc. anujñā-parihārau: injunctions and prohibitions; deha-sambandhāt: on account of the connection with the body; jyotir-adivat: like light, etc. Permissions and prohibitions are possible, because the Self, though one, is connected with various bodies. The connection, however, originates in the erroneous notion that the Self is the aggregate of the body and so on. When the error is removed and knowledge obtained, there are no obligations. Fundamentally all obligation is an erroneous imagination existing in the case of him only who does not see that

Text, Translation and Notes 419 his Self is no more connected with a body than the ether is with jars and the like. The illustration of light is given to show that, though light is one only, we shun the light which shines on unholy places and not that which falls on pure ground. Some things con- sisting of earth are desired like diamonds and beryls; others like dead bodies are shunned. While Ś. develops his doctrine of adhyāsa, Bhāskara speaks of his doctrine of upādhi. R. holds that though all souls are essentially of the same nature as parts of Brahman, permissions and exclusions are possible for the reason that each individual soul is joined to some particular body, pure or impure. Baladeva continues his view of the distinction between incar- nations and ordinary individuals. While the individual soul, though a part of the Lord, is connected with ignorance and a body and is as such under the control of the Lord for its activity and inactivity, incarnation, though a part of the Lord, is not under his control. The eye or the power of vision though a part of the sun depends on the permission and presence of the sun for its activity or otherwise, while a ray of the sun, though a part of the sun, is identical with it and does not depend on the permission of the sun.

II. 3. 49. asantateś cāvyatikarah And on account of the non-extension (of the individual soul beyond its own body) there is no confusion (of the results of actions). asantateh: non-extension (beyond its own body); ca: and; avyatikarah: no confusion (of results of actions). If it is argued that on account of the unity of the Self, there would result a confusion of the results of actions, since everyone would get the results of actions of everyone else, it is said in reply that the individual soul is connected only with a particular body, mind, etc. Since the individual souls are thus different from each other there is no possibility of confusion. R. understands avyatikarah to mean absence of confusion. There is no mixing up of the accumulated merit and demerit of various souls since they are distinct, are of atomic size and reside in separate bodies. R. suggests that the other views of the soul being Brahman deluded or Brahman affected by a limiting adjunct are incapable of explaining how the experiences of the different selves are not mixed up.1 Nimbarka says that the individual souls are parts of the all- pervasive being and are themselves all-pervasive by reason of the attribute of knowledge, yet they, being atomic in size, are not all-pervasive and so there is no confusion among their actions. 1 bhrānta-brahma-jīva-vāde copahita-brahma-jīva-vāde ca jīvaparayor jīvānām ca bhogavyatikarādayah sarve doşāh santi.

420 The Brahma Sūtra Baladeva argues that the soul is atomic and not full and perfect like an incarnation and so is different from him. Śrīkantha reads avyatirekah for avyatikarah. Though the souls are distinct, their experiences are similar. The experiences, though similar, are not mixed up.

II. 3. 50. ābhāsa eva ca And (the individual soul is) only a reflection (of the Supreme Lord). ābhāsaḥ: a reflection; eva: only; ca: and. The individual soul is a mere reflection of the Highest Self analogous to the reflection of the sun in the water. It is neither directly the Highest Self nor a different thing. Even when one reflected image of the sun trembles, another reflected image does not on that account tremble also, so when one soul is connected with actions and results of actions, another soul is not on that account connected likewise. There is therefore no confusion of actions and results. Ś. here criticises the Samkhya and the Vaiśesika theories of the self. This sutra is taken by the Advaita Vedantins as a statement of pratibimba-vada, that the individual soul is but the reflection of the Self in buddhi as distinct from the avaccheda-vada or the view that the soul is the Highest Self in so far as it is limited by its adjuncts. Bhaskara reads va in place of ca and criticises S.'s view. R. interprets ābhāsa as hetvābhāsa, a fallacious argument, and makes out that the view that the soul is Brahman in so far as it is limited by non-real adjuncts is an erroneous argument. R. points out that the obscuration of the light of that which is nothing but light means destruction of that light. prakāśaika-svarūpasya prakāśa-tirodhānam prakāśa-nāśa eva. If difference is due to upādhis, which are the products of avidya, then the spheres of experience are bound to be mixed up as the thing with which all the limiting adjuncts connect themselves is one only: avidya-parikalpitopādhi-bhede hi sarvopādhibhir-upahita-svarūpasyaikatvābhyupagamād bhoga- vyatikaras tad-avastha eva. Śrikantha follows R. in criticising the reflection theory. Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa read ābhāsāh and make out that the arguments of Sāmkhya and Vaisesika are fallacious. Baladeva makes out that the equation of the individual soul with the incarnation is fallacious since it involves the fallacy of undistri- buted middle. Simply because soul and incarnation are both parts of the Lord we cannot equate the two. II. 3. 51. adrstāniyamāt On account of the unseen principle being non-restrictive. adrsta: the unseen principle; aniyamat: on account of being non- restrictive.

Text, Translation and Notes 42I Adrsta is the unseen principle of the nature ot religious merit or demerit. According to the Samkhya system it inheres not in the self but in pradhāna. As the latter is the same for all souls, it cannot determine the enjoyment of pleasure and pain for each individual self. According to the Vaisesika, the unseen principle is created by the conjunction of the soul with the mind and there is no reason why any particular adrsta should belong to any particular soul. So confusion of results is inescapable. R. holds that the attempt to explain different spheres of experience as traceable to beginningless adrstas which are the cause of the limiting adjuncts is futile as the adrstas have for their substrate Brahman itself and there is no reason for their definite allotment to particular souls and so there can be no definite separation of spheres of experience. The limiting adjuncts as well as the adrstas cannot by

in reality. their connection with Brahman split up Brahman itself which is one Baladeva begins a new section here stating the mutual differences among the individual souls.

II. 3. 52. abhisandhyādişv api caivam And it is so even with regard to resolves, etc. abhisandhyādişu: in regard to resolves, etc .; api: even; ca: and; evam: it is so. The same objection applies to resolves, etc., for these are formed by the conjunction of the soul and the mind. Baladeva says that the individual souls are different even with regard to their resolves and the rest.

II. 3. 53. pradeśād iti cen nāntar-bhāvāt If it be said that (the distinction of experiences results) from (the difference of) place, (we say) not so, on account (of the self) being within all (bodies). pradeśāt: from (difference of) place; iti cet: if it be said; na: not so; antar-bhavat: on account of the Self being in all bodies. If it be said, as the Nyāya does, that though each soul is all- pervading, yet if we take its connection with the mind to take place in that part of it which is limited by its body, then a confusion will not result, this is not tenable for since every soul is all-pervading and therefore permeates all bodies, there is nothing to determine that a particular body belongs to a particular soul. Again, there cannot be more than one all-pervading entity. If there were, they would limit each other and so cease to be all-pervading or infinite. There is only one Self and not many. The plurality of selves is a product of ignorance. It is not a reality. R. takes up the prima facie view, that though Brahman is one only and cannot be split up by the several limiting adjuncts with

422 The Brahma Sūtra which it is connected, still the separation of the spheres of every enjoyment is not impossible since the places of Brahman which are connected with the upadhis are distinct. R. answers this objection by saying that as the upadhis move here and there and so all places enter into connection with all upadhis, the mixing up of spheres of enjoyment cannot be avoided. Even if upadhis were connected with different places, the pain connected with some particular place would affect the whole of Brahman which is one only. Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa commenting on this sūtra hold that the individual soul is a part of Brahman, atomic in size, knowledge by nature, and is possessed of the attributes of being an agent, a knower and so on and is different in every body. For Baladeva, adrsta or the unseen principle is the cause of the differences among the souls.

Section 1 (1-4) THE ORIGIN OF THE SENSE-ORGANS

II. 4. 1. tathā prāņāh Likewise the vital breaths. tathā: likewise; prānāh: the vital breaths. While many scriptural passages (C.U. VI. 2. 3; T.U. II. 1) speak of the origin of things, it is mentioned in some texts that the vital breaths are not produced. Śatapatha Brāhmana VI. 1. 1. 1 states that the vital breaths existed before the origin of things. There are other passages where we read of the origin of vital breaths: B.U. II. 1. 20; M.U. II. 1. 3 and 8; Praśna U. VI. 4. There is thus uncertainty. The sūtra holds that the vital breaths spring from Brahman. In support of it are many texts: B.U. II. 1. 20; M.U. II. 1. 3. So the vital breaths are created. The word 'likewise' refers not to the immediately preceding topic of the last part, i.e. the plurality of souls, but to the creation of ākāśa, etc., spoken of earlier. In Pūrva Mīmāmsā III. 4. 32 the word 'tadvat', 'in the same manner', refers not to the immediately preceding sections but to an earlier one, III. 4. 28. Śrikantha takes this sūtra as setting down the prima facie view that (as the individual soul is eternal) so are the vital breaths.

II. 4. 2. gaunyasambhavāt On account of the impossibility (of explaining the origination) in a secondary sense. gaunī: secondary sense; asambhavāt: on account of impossibility. To take the texts in a secondary sense would lead to the abandon- ment of the general assertion, 'By the knowledge of one, everything else is known': M.U. I. 1. 3. The reference to the existence of the vital breaths before creation in Satapatha Brāhmaņa is in regard to Hiranya-garbha who is not resolved in the partial dissolution of the world, though all other effects are resolved. In complete dissolution, even Hiranya-garbha is resolved. R. takes this and the next sūtra as one and makes out that the plural number in the text is secondary because of impossibility, i.e. prior to creation Brahman alone exists. Śrikantha follows R., takes this and the next sūtra as forming one and holds that it answers the prima facie view.

II. 4. 3. tat prāk śruteś ca And on account of that (word which indicates origin) being mentioned first (in connection with the vital breaths). tat: that; prak: first; sruteh: being mentioned; ca: and. M.U. 1. 3 says: 'from him are born vital breaths, mind and all the

424 The Brahma Sūtra organs, ether, air, water, fire and earth'. The word 'born' occurs at the very beginning; if it is interpreted in the primary sense with respect to ether, etc., it should be so interpreted with regard to vital breath, mind and organs mentioned earlier.

II. 4. 4. tat-pūrvakatvād vācah Because the organ of speech is preceded by that (i.e. fire and the other tat-pūrvakatvāt: because of being preceded by that; vacah: of the elements).

organ of speech. C.U. VI. 5. 4 shows that the organs are the products of the elements, which, in their turn, arise from Brahman. So they also are the products of Brahman. R. holds that prana stands not for the sense-organs but for Brahman. For him the sutra is 'Because of speech [names of objects] being preceded by that [the existence of the objects]'. Names of objects presuppose the existence of objects. But prior to creation there were no objects and so no speech or organs of speech. Śrīkantha and Baladeva follow R.'s interpretation.

Section 2 (5-6) THE NUMBER OF THE ORGANS II. 4. 5. saptagater viśeşitatvāc ca (The organs are) seven (in number) because it is so known (from the Scriptures). sapta: seven; gateh: because it is so known. viśeșitatvāt: on account of the specification; ca : and. Thereare texts which declare that thereareseven organs: 'The seven life-breaths spring from it' (M.U. II. 1. 8) and the specification in the text 'Seven indeed are life-breaths in the head'. (Taittirīya Samhitā V.1.7. 1.) There are other texts which mention eight (B.U. III. 2.1), ten (Taittirīya Samhitā V. 3. 2. 3), eleven (B.U. III. 9. 4), twelve (B.U. II. 4. 11), thirteen (Praśna U. IV. 8). The opponent argues that the number is seven and the statements of other numbers refer to difference of modifications. R. states the pūrva-paksa as mentioning seven organs only, the others being organs only in a metaphorical sense since they assist the soul. II. 4. 6. hastādayas tu sthite'to naivam But the hands, etc. (are also mentioned as sense-organs in scriptural texts). This being so, it is not like this (i.e. they are not merely seven in number).

Text, Translation and Notes 425

hastādayah: hands, etc .; tu: but; sthite: being so; atah: therefore; na: not; evam: like this. 'But' refutes the view of the previous sūtra. The number is said to be eleven consisting of the five organs of knowledge, the five organs of action and the inner organ. Manas or mind, buddhi or understanding, aham-kāra or self-sense and citta or consciousness are all modifications of the internal organ. etat sarvam mana eva. All this is mind only. They are not separate organs and do not raise the number beyond eleven. R. says that the organs are not seven only but eleven since the hands and the rest also contribute towards the experience and fruition of that which abides in the body (i.e. the soul) and have their separate functions, such as seizing and so on. While these are to be added to the seven organs, buddhi, etc., need not be added since they are only different names of mind when it is functioning in different ways. The number eleven is confirmed by scriptural texts. B.U. II. 4. 11; B.G. XIII. 5. Sthite in R. means 'because of abiding [in the body and assisting the soul]'.

Section 3 (7)

THE ORGANS ARE MINUTE IN SIZE

II. 4. 7. anavaś ca And (they are) minute. anavah: minute; ca: and. The organs are minute, subtle and so are not seen. If they were all-pervading, then the texts which speak of going out of the body, etc., would become self-contradictory. Again, since we do not perceive through the senses what is happening throughout the universe, which would be the case if they were all-pervading, they are said to be subtle and limited in size. R. mentions B.U. I. 5. 13, 'These are all alike, all infinite', and argues that infinity refers to the abundance of activities of the life-breath which is to be meditated on.

Section 4 (8)

THE CHIEF VITAL BREATH IS PRODUCED FROM BRAHMAN

II. 4. 8. śresthaś ca And the chief (vital breath). śresthah: the chief (vital breath); ca: and. The text considered is C.U. V. 1. 1. 'The vital breath is, indeed, the oldest and the best.' It is the chief because we will not be able to live o*

426 The Brahma Sūtra without it. (B.U. VI. 1. 13.) Rg Veda X. 129. 2 says: 'By its own law it was moving without air.' This suggests the doubt that before creation there was the vital breath. That doubt is removed by this sūtra. As the words 'was moving' are qualified by 'without air', they do not indicate that the vital breath existed before creation. M.U. II. 1. 3 says 'From this [the Self] is produced the vital breath' R. points out that the words 'the one was moving without air' do not refer to the vital breath of living creatures but intimate the existence of the Highest Brahman, alone by itself.

Section 5 (9-12)

THE CHIEF VITAL BREATH IS DIFFERENT FROM AIR AND THE SENSE FUNCTIONS

II. 4. 9. na vāyukriye prthag-upadeśāt (The chief vital breath) is neither air nor function (of the organs) on account of its being mentioned separately. na: not; vāyu-kriye: air or function; prthak: separately; upadeśāt: on account of being mentioned. The objection is raised that there is no separate principle called prana or vital breath. It is just air which exists in the mouth as well as outside. There are texts which make out that prāna is vāyu. S. refers to the other view that 'the five breaths, prana, are the common function of the other instruments'. The reference is to the Samkhya Sūtra II. 31; sāmānya-karana-vrttih. While Ś. understands by karana the eleven organs, the Samkhya commentator gives another interpretation. sādhāraņī karaņasya antah-karaņa-trayasya vrttih parināma-bheda iti. The sutra points out that prana is neither air nor function as many scriptural texts distinguish prana from air and function. See M.U. II. 1. 3; if it is said that as eleven birds shut up in one cage may, although each makes a separate effort, move the cage by the combination of their efforts, even so the functions which abide in one body may, although each has its own special function, by the combination of these functions produce one common function called prana, this argument is untenable for we see that the birds by their combined efforts move the cage but we do not see that the different functions in the body produce the function of vital breath. The functions of the organs are not of the same character; they are of a distinct nature from that of the vital breath. So it is different from all functions and air.

Text, Translation and Notes 427 II. 4. 10. cakşurādivat tu tat-saha-śistyādibhyah But (the life-breath is subordinate to the soul) like the eye, etc., on account of its being taught with them and other reasons. cakşurādivat: like eyes, etc .; tu: but; tat-saha-śistyādibhyah: on account of its being taught with them and other reasons. In the Upanisads C.U. I. 2. 7; B.U. I. 5. 21, the vital breath is mentioned along with the sense-organs. They are grouped together since they are all subordinate to the soul. The other reasons mentioned in the sūtra are that they are made up of parts, are non- conscious, etc. The vital breath is under the control of the individual soul and is serviceable to it like the eyes.

II. 4. 11. akaraņatvāc ca na doșas tathā hi darśayati And on account of its not being an instrument, the objection is not (valid) ; for thus (Scripture) shows. akaranatvāt: on account of not being an instrument; ca: and; na: not; doşah: fault or objection; tathā hi: because thus; darśayati: (śruti) shows. If the vital breath is an instrument of the soul like the eye and other organs, then there must be some special form of activity by which it assists the soul but no such activity is perceived. To this objection, the present sūtra gives an answer. It is not an instrument or organ like the eye, for which a separate sense-object is necessary; yet it has a function in the body, viz. the maintenance of the body, śarīra-raksā. See B.U. IV. 3. 12, I. 3. 18, 19; Praśna U. II. 3. R. quotes C.U. V. 1. 7ff. where, on the successive departure of speech and so on, the body and the other organs maintain their strength, while on the departure of the vital breath the body and all the organs become weak and powerless. So the vital breath serves the purpose of the individual soul.

II. 4. 12. pañcavrttir manovad vyapadiśyate It is taught as having a fivefold function like the mind. pañcavrttih: (having) fivefold function; manovat: like the mind; vyapadiśyate: is taught. It has five functions, prāņa, apāna, vyāna, udāna, samāna: breathing in, breathing out, holding in so as to aid works requiring strength, the ascending when the soul passes out of the body, and

body. the function which carries the nutriment through all the limbs of the

R. mentions B.U. I. 5. 3, for the five functions of the air.

428 The Brahma Sūtra

Section 6 (13) THE MINUTENESS OF THE VITAL BREATH

II. 4. 13. anuś ca And (it is) minute (or atomic). anuh: minute; ca: and. It is minute, limited and subtle like the senses. If the objection is raised that in B.U. I. 3. 22, it is said to be all-pervading, the answer is given that the reference there is to Hiranya-garbha, the cosmic soul. So far as the individual soul is concerned, it is limited. Śrīnivāsa mentions Praśna U. II. 6.

Section 7 (14-16) II. 4. 14. jyotirādy adhisthānam tu tad-āmananāt But the guidance by fire, etc., on account of the declaration of that. jyotir-ādi-adhisthānam: guidance (or control) by fire and the rest; tu: but; tat-amananat: on account of the declaration of that. The question is raised about the dependence or independence of the vital breath and the other organs. They are said to be controlled by gods like fire, etc. See Aitareya Āranyaka II. 4. 2. 4. Fire, having become speech, entered the mouth, agnir vāg bhūtvā mukham pravisat. They cannot move of themselves and are dependent on presiding deities. See also C.U. IV. 18. 3; B.U. I. 3. 12. R. and Srikantha read this and the next sūtra as one and argue that the fire god and the rest as well as the individual soul rule over the sense-organs but their rule depends on the mind and will of the Lord. R. quotes B.U. II. 1. 18, III. 7. 8. 9; T.U. II. 8 and argues that the sense-organs together with their guiding divinities and the individual soul depend in all their doings on the thought of the Highest Person. indriyānām sābhimāni-devatānām jīvātmanaś ca sva-kāryeșu parama- puruşa-mananāyattatva-śāstrāt. Baladeva makes out that the Lord is the primary initiator of the sense-organs while the fire god and the rest as well as the individual soul are secondary initiators.

II. 4. 15. prāņavatā śabdāt (It is not so since the breaths are connected) with the possessor of the vital breath (viz. the individual soul as we know) from the Scripture. prānavatā: one possessing the breaths (the organs); sabdat: from the Scripture. The gods are not the enjoyers. The soul is the enjoyer in the body.

Text, Translation and Notes 429 The Scriptures declare that the relation between the soul and the organs is that of master and servant. See C.U. VIII. 12. 4. Though there are many gods in the body each presiding over a particular organ, there is only one enjoyer. Otherwise we will not be able to account for the memory of the past. Ratnaprabha says, kiñca yo'ham rūpam adrāksam sa evāham śrņomīti pratisandhānād ekaś śārīra eva bhoktā na bahavo devāh.

II. 4. 16. tasya ca nityatvāt And on account of the permanence of that (i.e. the embodied soul). tasya: of that; ca: and; nityatvat: on account of permanence. The soul abides permanently in the body as the experiencer of pleasure and pain and the results of good and evil actions. It is not reasonable to suggest that in the body which is the result of the soul's actions, others like gods enjoy. See B.U. 1. 5. 20 where it is said that

IV. 4. 2. evil does not approach the gods. The soul is the enjoyer. See B.U. R. says that as the quality inhering in all things, of being ruled by the Highest Self, is eternal, it follows that the rule of the soul and the divinities over the organs depends on the will of the Highest Self. See T.U. II. 6. 'Having created it, into it, indeed, he entered.' The

B.G. X. 42. Highest Person has entered into all things to be their ruler. See also

Baladeva makes out that the relationship between the Highest Lord and the divinities is eternal, so the divinities rule the sense- organs through the mere will of the Lord.

Section 8 (17-19) THE ORGANS ARE INDEPENDENT PRINCIPLES AND NOT MODIFICATIONS OF THE CHIEF BREATH

II. 4. 17. ta indriyāņi tad-vyapadeśād anyatra śresthāt They (the breaths) are senses on account of their being so designated except the chief. te: they; indriyāni: organs; tad-vyapadeśāt: on account of being so designated; anyatra: except; śresthāt: the chief. The opponent quotes B.U. I. 5. 21 and argues that the different organs are modes of the vital breath. The sutra says that they are independent since they are separately mentioned. M.U. II. 1. 3. The life-breath is not generally treated as a sense-organ. This difference of designation is appropriate only if there is a difference of being. If there were unity of being, it would be contradictory that the life

430 The Brahma Sūtra principle should sometimes be designated as sense-organ and some- times not. So the other life-breaths are different in being from the chief vital breath. R. quotes B.G. XIII. 5 and argues that the chief vital breath is not designated as an organ. Srīnivāsa points out that B. U.I. 5. 21, 'Let us all assume his form', means that the activities of the sense-organs are under the control of the vital breath and so are said to be vital breaths; even as C.U. III. 14. 1, 'All this is, verily, Brahman', means that all this is under the control of the Supreme.

II. 4. 18. bheda śruteh On account of scriptural texts regarding difference. bheda: difference; śruteh: on account of scriptural texts. In B.U. I. 3. 2 and I. 5. 3 the organs are treated in one section and the vital breath in another. This shows that they do not belong to the same class. The organs are independent principles and not modes of the vital breath. R. and Nimbārka treat this and the next sūtra as one. R. says that M.U. II. 1. 3 mentions the vital breath separately from the organs and so it is not one of the organs. We also observe that it is different from the organs of sight, etc. In the state of deep sleep, the activity of breath is noticed while that of sight, etc., is not. While the organs serve as instruments of cognition and action, the work of breath serves to maintain the body and the organs. Since the subsistence of the organs depends on breath, the organs themselves are said to be forms of breath. See B.U. I. 5. 21. When it is said that they become its form it means that they become its body, and that their activity depends on it. II. 4. 19. vailakşaņyāc ca And on account of characteristic differences. vailaksanyāt: on account of characteristic differences; ca: and. Ś. points out certain differences. The organs do not function in deep sleep while the vital breath does. The organs get tired but not the vital breath. The loss of organs does not affect life but the passing out of the vital breath ends in the death of the body. The passage that the organs assumed the form of the vital breath means that the organs depend on the vital breath even as the servants on the master. The vital breath is the leader of the organs.

Text, Translation and Notes 43I

Section 9 (20-22) THE EVOLUTION OF NAMES AND FORMS IS THE WORK OF THE SUPREME LORD, AND NOT OF THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL

II. 4. 20. samjñā-mūrti-kļptis tu trivrt-kurvata upadeśāt But the fashioning of name and shape (is the function) of him who renders tripartite, on account of the teaching. samjña-murti-klptih: the fashioning of name and shape; tu: but; trivrt-kurvatah: of him who renders tripartite; upadeat: on account of the teaching. The question is raised whether the individual soul or the Supreme Lord fashions names and shapes after the three elements have been made by the Lord. C.U. VI. 2 refers to the making of the elements. C.U. VI. 3. 2 says: 'That Divinity thought: well, let me enter into these three divinities by means of this living self and let me then develop names and forms.' So the doubt arises whether the shaping of the gross world after the elements have been made belongs to the individual soul or the Supreme Lord. This sūtra makes out that the individual soul has not the power to make the gross world. The next passage, VI. 3.3, declares that the Supreme Lord alone fashions names and shapes and produces the gross elements and this world. Even when a potter produces pots the Lord is the inner director. He resides in everything and directs the whole creation. R. makes out that the rendering tripartite cannot belong to Brahmā (Hiranya-garbha) who abides within the Brahma-egg for the egg itself is produced from fire, water and earth after these elements have been made tripartite. Manu says tasminn ande bhavad brahma sarva-loka-pitāmahaĥ (119). In that egg originated Brahmā, the grandfather of all the worlds. The living self in the passage denotes the Highest Brahman as having the soul for its body. jīva-sarīrakam param brahmaiva jīva-śabdenābhidhīyate. So the work of differen- tiating names and shapes belongs to the Highest Brahman which has for its body, Hiranya-garbha, who represents the soul in its aggregate form. For Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa, the Supreme Brahman alone who renders tripartite is designated as the creator of names and shapes and the individual soul is incapable of creating them.

II. 4. 21. māmsādi bhaumam yathā-śabdam itarayoś ca Flesh and the rest are of an earthly nature in accordance with the scriptural text, and of the other too. māmsādi: flesh and the rest; bhaumam: (are) of an earthly nature; yathā-śabdam: according to the Scripture; itarayoh: of the other (two); ca: too, also.

432 The Brahma Sūtra Earth when assimilated by man becomes flesh. See C.U. VI. 5. 1. We have to understand the effects of the other two elements also according to the Scriptures. Water produces blood, vital breath, etc., and fire, bone, marrow and the organ of speech. R. makes out that the earth when eaten is disposed of in three ways, faeces, flesh and mind; water when drunk becomes urine, blood and breath; fire becomes bones, marrow and speech.

II. 4. 22. vaiśeşyāt tu tad-vādaś tad-vādah

designation. But on account of distinctiveness there is that designation, that

vaiśesyāt: on account of distinctiveness; tu: but; tad-vādah: that designation; tad-vādaḥ: that designation. If all the gross elements contain the three fine elements, why do we have special names for earth, water and fire? The answer is given that as the fine elements are not found in equal proportion in each of the gross elements, they are named after that fine element which is found in a preponderant degree in their composition. The repetition at the end is to indicate the conclusion of a chapter.

Section 1 (1-7) THE SOUL WHEN PASSING OUT OF THE BODY AT THE TIME OF DEATH IS ENVELOPED BY SUBTLE MATERIAL ELEMENTS III. 1. 1. tad-antara-pratipattau ramhati samparisvaktah, praśna- nirūpaņābhyām (The soul) goes (out of the body) enveloped (by subtle material elements) with a view to obtaining a different (body); (so is it known) from the question and explanation (in the Scripture). tad-antara-pratipattau: with a view to obtaining a different body; ramhati: goes; samparisvaktah: enveloped (by subtle material elements); praśna-nirūpanābhyām: from the question and the explanatory answer. The first part of this chapter explains the significance of the different texts, removes doubts and attempts to produce a sense of dispassion for the world by disclosing its imperfections. The second part tries to produce a yearning for Brahman by a discussion of his attributes. The third part describes the different types of meditation, their points of agreement and difference. The fourth part considers the question whether the highest end of man is derived from know- ledge or action or both. The soul, on departing from the body, carries with it subtle

Text, Translation and Notes 433 material elements. In C.U. V. 3. 3ff., water is called person, as the soul departs enveloped by water. Though the material elements are available everywhere, the seeds for a future body are not easily available. Again, the adjuncts of the individual soul such as the organs, etc. (B.U. IV. 4. 2), cannot accompany the soul unless there is a material basis which carries the impressions left by previous lives, pūrva-prajña janmāntarīya-samskārah. Ānandagiri. If the scriptural text (B.U. IV. 4. 3) is cited as declaring that like a caterpillar the soul does not abandon the old body before it makes an approach to another body, it is said in reply that the example of the caterpillar is used to suggest not the non-abandonment of the old body but the lengthening out of the creative effort whose object is to obtain a new body which new body is presented by the karman of the soul. S. repudiates the views of the Samkhya, the Bauddha, the Vaiśeşika and the Jaina thinkers.

III. 1. 2. tryātmakatvāt tu bhūyastvāt But on account of (water) consisting of three (elements) (the soul goes enveloped by all these elements and not merely water though water alone is mentioned) on account of its preponderance. tryātmakatvāt: on account of (water) consisting of three elements; tu: but; bhuyastvat: on account of preponderance. The answer is here given to the objection that the soul goes enveloped by water only and not the subtle parts of all elements. In water are found the other two elements, fire and earth. Water is specifically mentioned on account of its preponderance and not because it is the only element. 'Water' implies the subtle parts of all the elements which constitute the seed of the body. R. quotes C.U. VI. 3. 4 to indicate the tripartite character of all the elements. See also B.S. II. 4. 19-21. Bhāskara reads ātmakāt tu but the interpretation is the same.

III. 1. 3. prāņa-gateś ca And on account of the going of the vital breaths. prana-gateh: on account of the going of the life-breaths; ca: and. B.U. IV. 4. 2 mentions that when the vital breath departs all organs depart. When they leave they must have a material base. So it is inferred that water and the other elements follow the soul and these form a basis for the organs. For the life-breaths cannot either move or abide anywhere without such a base. na hi nirāśrayāh prāņāh kvacid gacchanti tisthanti vā. Ś. R. quotes B.G. XV. 7-8.

III. 1. 4. agnyādi-gatiśruter iti cen na bhāktatvāt If it be said (that the life-breaths and organs do not accompany the soul) on account of the scriptural statements as to entering into fire, etc. (we say

434 The Brahma Sūtra that it is) not so on account of the metaphorical nature (of those state- ments). agnyādi-gatih: entering into fire, etc .; śruteh: from the Scriptures; iti cet: if it be said; na: not so; bhāktatvāt: on account of metaphorical nature. B.U. III. 2. 13 says that at the time of death the organs are resolved into their presiding deities. How then can they accompany the soul? The answer is given in the sutra that there are many texts which declare that they accompany the soul. B.U. IV. 4. 2. The texts cited should be interpreted in a secondary sense even as the passage (B.U. III. 12. 13.) 'His body hairs to the medicinal herbs, his hairs on the head to the trees' is to be interpreted in a secondary sense for it is not found that the body hairs and the rest of a dead man dissolve into the medicinal herbs, etc.

III. 1. 5. prathame 'śravanād iti cen na ta eva hy upapatteh If it be said on account of non-mention (of water) in the first (fire), (we reply) it alone, on account of fitness. prathame: in the first (of the offerings); aśravanat: on account of non-mention; iti cet: if it be said; na: not so; tāh: that; eva: only; hi: because; upapatteh: on account of fitness. If it be objected that in C.U. V. 4. 2, śraddhā is mentioned and not water, it is said in answer that śraddhā means water. Otherwise the answer to the question will not be relevant. Cp. Ānandagiri: upasamhārālocanāyām api śraddhā-śabda-tvam apām evety āha tv iti. To take śraddhā as water is the only coherent interpretation. Cp. Taittirīya Samhitā I. 6. 8. 1. Śraddhā, indeed, is water, as it produces in the person a will for holy works. āpo hāsmai śraddhām san-namante punyāya karmane. Again, water, when forming the seed of the body, becomes thin and subtle and thus resembles faith. A man who is as strong as a lion is sometimes called a lion. Śraddhā may be applied to water since water is intimately connected with religious works which depend on faith even as the word 'platform' is applied to men on the platform.

III. 1. 6. aśrutatvād iti cen nestādikāriņām pratīteh If it be said on account of the non-mention (of water) in the Scripture (the souls also do not depart enveloped by water), (we say) not so because it is understood (from the Scriptures) that the souls who perform sacrifices, etc., (alone go to heaven). aśrutatvāt: on account of non-mention in the śruti; iti cet: if it be said; na: not so; istādikāriņām: the performers of sacrifices, etc .; pratīteh: being understood. In C.U. V. 3. 3, there is mention of water only but no reference to the soul. How can we infer that the soul departs enveloped by water and is born again as man? C.U. V. 10. 3-4 state that those who

Text, Translation and Notes 435 perform sacrifices, etc., go to heaven enveloped by water which is supplied by the materials like curds and the rest which are offered as oblations in sacrifices. These assume a subtle form called apūrva and attach themselves to the sacrificer. S. says tāh śraddhā-pūrvaka- karma-samavāyinyah āhutimayya āpopūrva-rūpās satyas tān iștādı- kāriņo jīvān parivestyāmum lokam phaladānāya nayanti. R. refers to those who, while devoid of the knowledge of Brahman, practise useful works, reach the heavenly world and become there of the nature of the moon, soma-rajanah. When the results of their good works are exhausted, they return again and enter on a new state, punya-karmāvasāne ca punar āgatya garbham prāpnuvanti. R. See C.U. V. 10. It is the soul which moves enveloped by water and the other subtle elements.

III. 1. 7. bhāktam vā'nātmavittvāt tathā hi darśayati Or (the soul's being the food of the gods is) metaphorical on account of their not knowing the Self; for thus Scripture shows. bhāktam: in a metaphorical or secondary sense; vā: or; anātmavittvāt: on account of not knowing the Self; tathā: thus; hi: for; darśayati: (śruti or Scripture) shows. C.U. V. 10. 4 says: 'That is the food of the gods. That the gods eat.' See also B.U. VI. 2. 16. How then can the souls enjoy thefruit of their deeds? The sūtra says that these statements are not to be taken in a literal sense. The gods, it is said, do not eat or drink. C.U. III. 6. 1. To say that the gods 'eat' means that they rejoice with the performers of sacrifices. Since they do not know the Self they perform the sacrifices which the gods enjoy. See B.U. I. 4. 10. The conclusion is that the soul goes into other spheres enveloped by the subtle elements for experiencing the results of its past deeds. R. quotes B.G. VII. 23 and says that while those who know the Self attain to Brahman, those who do not know are means for enjoyment by the gods. Bhāskara reads ca for vā.

Section 2 (8-11) WHEN THE SOULS DESCEND TO THE EARTH FOR A NEW EMBODIMENT A RESIDUAL KARMA CLINGS TO THEM AND DETERMINES THE NATURE OF THE NEW BIRTH

III. 1. 8. krtātyaye' nuśayavān drsta-smrtibhyām yathetam anevam ca On the exhaustion of the works (the soul descends) with a remainder according to śruti and smrti along the path (it) went by (from here) and differently too. krtātyaye: on the exhaustion of works; anusayavān: with a remainder

436 The Brahma Sūtra or residual karma; drsta-smrtibhyām: (as is known) from the śruti and the smrti; yathah itam: as it went (from here); anevam: differently; ca: and. The objector quotes C.U. V. 10. 5 and suggests that all the karma is exhausted and there is no residual karma left. Besides, it is reasonable to think that karma earned in one life as man is exhausted in the next as god. The sūtra refutes this suggestion and points out that only that karma which gave the soul birth in heaven as god is worked out and the remaining karma brings it back to earth. Otherwise, it is difficult to explain the happiness or misery of a newborn child. Nor is it possible to work out in one life the entire karma of the previous life. The soul is born with residual karma. It descends by the same path by which it ascended and with a difference too. See C.U. V. 10. 5; V. 10. 3; V. 10. 6. R. quotes Gautama Dharma Sūtra (XI. 29) which refers to a remnant with which souls are born again, after enjoying after death the results of their works. varnāsramāś ca sva-karma-nisthāh pretya- karma-phalamanubhūya tatah śeşeņa viśişta-deśa-jāti-kula-rūpāyuh śruta-vitta-vrtta-sukha-medhaso janma pratipadyante. R. also refers to Apastamba Dharma Sūtra II. i. 2, 3. Bhaskara leaves out 'ca'. Baladeva breaks the sūtra into two, beginning with krtātyaye and yathetam, respectively.

III. 1. 9. caraņād iti cen nopalaksaņārtheti kārșnājinih If it be said that on account of conduct (the assumption of a residual karma is not necessary), (we say that) it is not so (for the word conduct is used) to denote indirectly (the residual karma). So (thinks) Kārşnājini. caranat: on account of conduct; iti cet: if it be said; na: not so; upa-lakşanārtha: to denote indirectly; iti: thus; kārşnājinih: (the sage) Kārşņājini (thinks). If it be said that conduct and not residual karma determines the new birth (and the two are different: see B.U. IV. 4. 5), the sūtra denies this view. The word conduct is used in the sense of residual karma. R. reads tad before upalaksanārthe. He says that mere conduct does not lead to the experiences of pleasure and pain; pleasure and pain are the results of works in the limited sense. kevalācārāt sukha- karma-phale. duhkha-prāpty asambhavāt; sukha-duhkhe hi punya-pāpa-rūpa-

III. 1. 10. ānarthakyam iti cen na tad-apekșatvāt If it be said that purposelessness (of conduct would result therefrom), (we say) it is not so on account of the dependence (of work) on that (conduct). änarthakyam: purposelessness; iti cet: if it be said; na: not so; tad-apeksatvāt: on account of dependence on that.

Text, Translation and Notes 437 Good conduct determines karma and is therefore not purposeless. The Vedas do not purify one who is devoid of good conduct. acarahnam na punanti vedah. Vasistha Smrti VI. 3. As work is the cause of new births, we need not assume that conduct is the cause. If a man is able to run away by means of his feet, he will surely not creep on his knees, na hi padbhyām palāyitum pārayamāņo jānubhyām ramhitum arhati. Ś.

III. 1. 11. sukrta-duşkrte eveti tu bādariḥ But (conduct means) only good and evil works, thus Badari thinks. sukrta-duşkrte: good and evil works; eva: only; iti: thus; tu: but; bādarih: Bādari (thinks). This sūtra makes out that there is no real difference between conduct or carana and karma. So residual karma is the determining cause of a new birth on earth. Bhāskara omits iti in the sūtra.

Section 3 (12-21) THE FUTURE OF THOSE SOULS WHOSE WORKS DO NOT ENTITLE THEM TO GO TO THE LUNAR WORLD

III. 1. 12. aniştādikāriņām api ca śrutam Even of those also who do not perform sacrifices (the ascent to the moon) is stated by Scripture. anitādikārinām: of those who do not perform sacrifices; api: even; ca: also; śrutam: is stated by Scripture. The opponent holds that even those who do not perform sacrifices go to heaven though they may not enjoy there like the performers of sacrifices, because they too require the fifth oblation for a new birth and the Scripture declares that 'those who depart from this world they all, in truth, go to the moon'. K.U. I. 2. This, for R., implies that all whether they do good works or evil works go to the moon. Śrīnivāsa means by anista, forbidden deeds; and the word adi means the giving up of what is enjoined. III. 1. 13. samyamane tv anubhūyetareșām ārohāvarohau tad-gati- darśanāt But of others (i.e. those who have not performed sacrifices) after having experienced the fruits of their actions in the abode of Yama, ascent and descent take place, as such a course is declared (by the Scripture). samyamane: in the abode of Yama; tu: but; anubhūya: having experienced; itaresām: of others; ārohāvarohau: ascent and descent

Scripture). (take place); tad-gati-darśanāt: since such a course is declared (in the

438 The Brahma Sūtra samyamanam yamālayam. Ś. The abode of Yama is said to be the gathering place of men, sangamanam janānām. Rg Veda X. 14. 1. This sūtra negatives the suggestion made in the previous sūtra. Evildoers do not go to heaven; they go to the world of Yama where they experience the results of their actions and then descend again to earth. Katha U. I. 2. 6. The ascent to the moon is only for the enjoyment of the results of good works and not for any other purpose. So evil-doers do not go there. Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa take this sūtra as the continuation of the prima facie view, the purva-paksa. Even those who do not perform sacrifices after having experienced the results of their actions in the abode of Yama ascend to the world of moon and re-descend. While Nimbārka takes this and the next three sūtras as stating the prima facie view, others hold that they state the correct conclusion. Śrīkanțha adopts Ś.'s interpretation.

III. 1. 14. smaranti ca The smrtis also declare (this). smaranti: smrtis declare; ca: also. Vyāsa, etc. That evil works are requited in Yama's world is declared by Manu, R. quotes Vişnu Purāņa: sarve caite vaśam yānti yamasya bhagavan kila. III. 7. 5. 'And all these pass under the control of Yama.

III. 1. 15. api ca sapta Moreover there are seven (hells). api ca: moreover; sapta: seven. There are seven hells mentioned in the Puranas to which the evil- doers go to experience the results of their evil deeds. R. and Nimbārka omit ca in the sūtra.

III. 1. 16. tatrāpi ca tad-vyāpārād avirodhah And on account of this activity there also, (there is) no contradiction. tatra: there; api: also; ca: and; tat-vyāpārāt: on account of his activity; avirodhah: (there is) no contradiction. To the objection that in the different hells, different persons like Citragupta are in control, the answer is given that the different hells and their controllers are directed by Yama. III. 1. 17. vidyā-karmaņor iti tu prakrtatvāt But (the reference is to the two roads) of knowledge and work, thus (we understand) on account of their being the subject under discussion. vidyā-karmanoh: of knowledge and work; iti: thus; tu: but; prakrtatvat: on account of their being the subject under discussion. C.U. V. 10. 8 says that those who do not go along the ways of

Text, Translation and Notes 439 knowledge which take us to the path of the gods and of works which take us to the path of the fathers go to a third place, where they are born and die and so that place is not full. The evildoers who form a separate group go to this third place. The Kausītaki text that all go to the sphere of the moon refers only to those who have performed good deeds and not to evil-doers. Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa take this sūtra as stating the correct conclusion.

III. 1. 18. na trtīye tathopalabdheh Not in the case of the third place, (for) so it is seen. na: not; trtiye: in the case of the third place; tatha: so; upalabdheh: it being seen. If it be said that all must go to the moon for the purpose of obtaining a new body, to complete the five oblations that cause the new birth, the sūtra says that this specification does not apply in the case of evil-doers, who are born irrespective of the oblations.

III. 1. 19. smaryate'pi ca loke And (it is), moreover, declared by smrti in ordinary life. smaryate: (it is) declared by smrti; api: moreover; ca: and; loke: in the world, in ordinary life. Cases of birth without the completion of the five oblations are recorded. The bodies of some specially meritorious persons like Draupadī, Drsțadyumna, Sītā, are formed independently of the fifth oblation (i.e. sexual union). Such are cases of immaculate conception.

III. 1. 20. darśanāc ca Also on account of observation. darśanāt: on account of observation; ca: and. The rule about five oblations is not universal; for of the four forms of life viviparous, oviparous, life springing from moisture and plant life, the last two are born without any mating and there is not the fifth oblation in their case.

III. 1. 21. trtīya-śabdāvarodhah samśokajasya The third term (plant life) includes that which springs from moisture. trtīya-śabda-avarodhah: inclusion in the third term; samśokajasya: of that which springs from moisture. C.U. VI. 3. 1 speaks only of three modes of origin, andajam, jivajam, udbhijjam. How then can it be maintained that there are four forms of life? The answer is that that which springs from moisture is included in plant life, since they both germinate, one from the earth and the other from water, etc. It is clear that the evil-doers do not go to the moon.

440 The Brahma Sūtra

Section 4 (22) THE SOUL DESCENDING FROM THE MOON THROUGH THE ETHER, ETC., DOES NOT BECOME IDENTICAL WITH THEM BUT ATTAINS SIMILARITY OF NATURE III. 1. 22. sābhāvyāpattir upapatteh (The soul when descending from the moon) attains similarity of nature with them (i.e. ether, air and the rest) (that alone) being reasonable. sābhāvya-apattih: attainment of a similarity of nature with them; upapatteh: being reasonable. C.U. V. 10. 5 says that the souls return through the ether, air and the rest. The question is raised whether they attain identity of nature or likeness or similarity of nature. Not the former; a thing cannot become another of a different nature. All that the passage means is that the souls attain similarity of nature. If the souls become identified with ether, they could no longer descend through air, etc. R. and Nimbārka read svābhāvya for sābhāvya.

Section 5 (23) THE ENTIRE DESCENT OCCUPIES A SHORT TIME III. 1. 23. nāticireņa viśesāt (The soul passes through the stages of descent) in a not very long time; on account of the special statement. na: not; aticirena: in a very long time; visesāt: on account of the special statement.

C.U. V. 10. 6. The descent through different stages takes place quickly. See Srinivasa says that there is no point in the soul's remaining in a state of likeness to ether, etc., for a long time.

Section 6 (24-27) WHEN THE SOULS ENTER INTO PLANTS AND THE REST THEY ARE ONLY IN CONTACT WITH THEM BUT DO NOT PARTICIPATE IN THEIR LIFE III. 1. 24. anyādhisthiteșu pūrvavad abhilāpāt (The descending souls enter) into (plants, etc.), occupied by other (souls) as in the previous cases, on account of (scriptural) declaration.

Text, Translation and Notes 44I anya-adhisthitesu: in what is occupied by another; pūrvavat: as in the previous cases; abhilapāt: on account of (scriptural) declaration. If it be said that C.U. V. 10. 6 states 'they are born here as rice and barley, etc.' and so the word 'born' should be taken literally, the sūtra says that the word 'born' implies mere connection with rice and barley which are animated by other souls. They enter these plants, etc., independently of their karma and while there they do not experience the results of their actions. The next passage, V.10. 7,says that 'those whose conduct here has been good will quickly attain a good birth, but those whose conduct here has been evil, will quickly attain an evil birth' which makes it clear that the souls dwell, as it were, in plants, etc., till they get the opportunity for a new birth. If we take the passage to mean that the souls are born in plants, then when they are cooked and eaten, the souls will have to leave them. The state of plant existence may be a place for experience but not for those souls which descend from the moon with an unrequited re- mainder of works.

III. 1. 25. aśuddham iti cen na śabdāt If it be said that (sacrificial work is) impure, (we say it is) not so, on account of scriptural authority. aśuddham: impure; iti cet: if it be said; na: not so; śabdāt: on account of scriptural authority. If it be said that scriptural works are impure because they involve injury to animals and so souls who have committed such evil deeds may be born as herbs, etc., the sūtra refutes this view on the ground that Scripture is our authority for determining what is right and what is wrong. If it be said that the Scripture also states that we should not hurt any creature, it is said in answer that it is a general rule and other scriptural injunctions give the exceptions. So the souls descending from the moon are not born in plants but are only enclosed in them. śāstra-hetutvād dharmādharma-vijñānasya. Ś. The same line of conduct may be right in one set of circumstances and wrong in another. yasmin deśe kāle nimitte ca yodharmo'nusthīyate sa eva deśa-kāla-nimittāntaresv adharmo bhavati. So Ś. asks us to accept the śāstras as our sole guide. tena na śāstrādrte dharmādharma-visayam vijñānam kasyacid asti. R. makes out that an action which is the means of supreme exaltation is not of the nature of violence, even if it involves some little pain; it rather is of beneficial nature. atiśayitābhyudaya- sādhana-bhūto vyāpāro'lpa-duhkho'pi na himsā pratyuta raksanam eva. R. Whether the infliction of pain is right or wrong depends on the motive. An act which is healing though it may cause transitory pain, men of insight declare to be preservative and beneficial. cikitsakam

442 The Brahma Sūtra

ca tādātvikālpa-duhkha-kāriņam api rakşakam eva vadanti pūjayanti ca tajjñāh. R. See also Taittirīya Brāhmaņa III. 7. 7. 14. Thus the commentators allow exceptional circumstances in which we may inflict pain; only the motive should be the welfare of the being who suffers pain. The spirit should be one of love or negatively vaira-tyāga, renunciation of hatred.

III. 1. 26. retah-sig-yogo'tha After that the connection with him who performs the act of generation. retah-sik-yogo: connection with him who performs the act of generation; atha: then, after that. C.U. V. 10. 6 says that the soul becomes one with him. It means the soul gets connected with him. This also shows that the soul's becoming plants, etc., is mere connection with them and not actual birth.

III. 1. 27. yoneh śarīram From the womb the (new) body. yoneh: from the womb; sariram: body. Till now it was only conjunction with successive stages but now through its connection with a person, the soul enters the woman, there acquires a new body fit for experiencing the results of the past residual karma. The commentators are at pains to show that connection with

beings. plants and animals is metaphorical and real rebirth is as human

Section 1 (1-6)

THE SOUL IN THE DREAM STATE

III. 2. 1. sandhye srstir āha hi In the intermediate state (between waking and deep sleep) (there is a real) creation because (the Scripture) says so. sandhye: in the intermediate state (between waking and deep sleep, i.e. the dream state); srstih: creation; āha: (Scripture) says so; hi: because. The opponent's view is stated that the dream state is just as real as the waking state. B.U. IV. 3. 9 says there is a third intermediate state, the state of dreams, sandhyam trtīyam svapna-sthānam. Here the two states of waking and deep sleep join. B.U. IV. 3. 10 says: 'He creates tanks, lotus-pools and rivers. He, indeed, is the agent [maker or creator].' Besides, we do not feel any difference between the experience of the waking state and that of the dream state. A meal taken in dream has the effect of giving satisfaction as one taken in

Text, Translation and Notes 443 the waking state. Therefore the creation in the dream state is real and the creator is the Lord himself. S. R. raises the doubt whether the creation is accomplished by the individual soul or by the Lord. The opponent states that the creator is the dreaming soul. For R., Nimbarka and Śrīnivasa the problem is whether the dream creation is due to the individual soul or the Lord, while for Ś. and Bhaskara it is whether the dream creation is real or unreal. Baladeva holds that this sūtra does not express a prima facie view but the correct conclusion that the creation in the dream state is due to the Lord and not to the individual soul.

III. 2. 2. nirmātāram caike putrādayaś ca And some (schools state the self to be) the shaper; sons and so on (being the objects of desire which he shapes). nirmātāram: shaper, creator; ca: and; eke: some; putrādayah: sons and so on; ca: and. The creation even in dreams is by the Lord himself as Katha U. II. 2. 8 says: 'That person who is awake in those that sleep, shaping desire after desire, that, indeed, is the pure. That is Brahman.' So as in the case of the waking state, even in dreams the Lord is the creator. So the world of dreams is real like the empirical world. tathya- rūpaiva sandhye srstih. Ś. For R., this sūtra states the pūrva-paksa that the individual soul is the shaper of dream objects. For Baladeva this sutra states the correct conclusion that the Lord is the maker of dream objects.

III. 2. 3. māyāmātram tu kārtsnyenānabhivyakta-svarūpatvāt But (the dream world) is mere appearance on account of its nature not being manifest with the totality (of attributes of the waking state). māyāmātram: mere appearance; tu: but; kārtsnyena: with the totality; anabhivyakta-svarūpatvāt: on account of its nature not being manifest. For kārtsnyena, some read sākalyena. S. argues that the dream world does not agree with the waking world in respect of time, place, cause and non-contradiction and so it is not real like the waking world. na hi paramārtha-vastu-visayāņi deśa-kāla-nimittāny abādhaś ca svapne sambhāvyante. Dream states are not bound by the rules of space time, cause and non-contradiction. We cannot find space for chariots and the like in the limited confines of the body. The dreamer sees things at long distances. He cannot go out and return in a moment. B.U. (II. 1.18) says that 'the dreamer moves about in his own body as he pleases'. So ideas of going out of the body, etc., are a mere deception. Conditions of time are not observed. Lying asleep at night he dreams

444 The Brahma Sūtra

that it is day. Besides, how can he without materials make chariots and the like? Within the dream itself there is self-contradiction. A chariot becomes a man and man a tree. Objects appear to exist in dreams as silver does in a mother-of-pearl. What we see in dreams is only an appearance. māyā-mātram svapna-darśanam. S. says that the individual soul creates in dreams and not the Lord. It is obvious from S.'s insistence on the difference between dream states and the waking world that the latter is not an appearance. Bhaskara criticises the interpretation usually ascribed to S. by pointing out that those who hold that objects in the waking state too are maya like the dream states, misinterpret the author of the sūtra and delude people. ye punar jāgaritāvasthā'pi māyāmātram ity āghoşayanti te sūtra-kārābhiprāyam nāśayantah śrotriyajanam mohayanti. Bhāskara obviously rebukes those who cannot see the distinction between waking and dream states and reduce the former to the latter. Bhaskara holds that dream objects are māya as they are created by the mysterious will of the Lord and their nature is not fully manifest, since they are not objects of perception as gross material objects are. All this proves that the dream objects are created by the Lord alone and not by the individual soul. For R., the things appearing in dreams are absolute māya in the sense that they are wonderful. māyā-śabdo hy āścaryavācī. He quotes Vālmiki's Rāmāyaņa I. 27, janakasya kule jātā devamāyeva nirmitā. She was born in the family of Janaka appearing like the wonderful power of the divine Being in bodily shape. When it is said 'there are no chariots', etc., it means that they are not perceived by any other person except the dreaming one. They belong to the private world of the individual and not to the public world. The Supreme Person creates these objects to be perceived by the individual though they endure for a short time only. atha rathan ratha-yogan pathah srjate svapnadrg-anubhāvyatayā tat-kāla-mātrāvasānān srjata ity āścarya- rūpatvam evāha. The creation of these dream objects is possible only for the Supreme Person who can immediately realise all his wishes but not for the individual soul.

III. 2. 4. sūcakaś ca hi śruter ācaksate ca tad-vidaḥ For (though the dream is an illusion) yet it is indicative (of the future) according to sruti; those who are versed in that (the reading of dreams) also declare it. sūcakah: indication of the future; ca: yet; hi: for; śruteh: (we find) in the śruti; ācaksate: declare; ca: also; tad-vidah: those who are versed in that (in the reading of dreams). Though the dreams themselves are illusory, their indications about the future may be real, even as the appearance of silver in mother- of-pearl is false and yet produces joy in us. See C.U. V. 2. 8. Ś.

Text, Translation and Notes 445 elaborates his view in regard to the metaphysical, the empirical and the apparent reality, if such a term be permitted. The world is not real in the same sense as the world consisting of ether and so on is real. The empirical world which is not to be confused with the dream world is not absolutely real. For in one sense the entire expanse of things is mere appearance. The world consisting of ether, etc., remains fixed and distinct up to the moment that the soul cognises that Brahman is the self of all. The world of dreams, on the other hand, is daily sublated by the waking state. That the latter is mere appear- ance has to be understood with a distinction. pratipāditam hi, tad-ananyatvam ārambhaņa-śabdādibhyah (II. 1. 14), ity atra samastasya prapañcasya māyā-mātratvam. prāk tu brahmātma- darśanāt viyadādi-prapañco vyavasthita-rūpo bhavati, sandhyāśrayas tu prapañcah prati-dinam bādhyata ity ato vaiseşikam idam sandhya- sya māyā-mātratvam uditam. Ś. Bhäskara says that it is unreasonable to suppose that what is created by the Intelligent Being can be subject to pleasure and pain. So the dream objects cannot be due to the Lord, though he is the cause here, too, as he is the controller of all. na hi prajñājasya sukha- duhkha-yogyatā'vakalpate parasyāpi nirmātāram iti caviruddham jīva-parayor abhedāt. hetu-kartrtvam niyantrtvāt.

For R., this sūtra is the sixth. Since dreams are indicative of future good or ill, they cannot be due to the individual soul for he would create for himself only such dreams as would indicate good fortune. So the creation which takes place in dreams is the work of the Lord only Though S. does not deny altogether that the Supreme Self, as the controller of the soul at all times and in all states, is also active in the dream states, yet he affirms that the dream objects are created by the individual soul itself and not the Supreme Soul. His view thus differs from that of R. and Nimbarka. Baladeva begins a new section here ending with the next sūtra and declares that the dream objects are real.

III. 2. 5. parābhidhyānāt tu tirohitam tato hy asya bandha-viparyayau But by meditation on the Highest, that which is hidden (viz. the similarity of the Lord and the soul becomes manifest), for from him (the Lord) are its (the soul's) bondage and freedom. parābhidhyānāt: from meditation on the Highest Self; tu: but; tirohitam: that which is hidden (by ignorance); tatah: from him (the Lord); hi: for; asya: of the soul; bandha-viparyayau: bondage and its opposite, i.e. freedom. If it be said that the individual soul is a part of the Supreme Self and so shares its power of knowledge and rulership, even as a spark and fire have alike the power of burning and should therefore be able to create at will like the Lord, this sūtra says that this rulership is

446 The Brahma Sūtra

covered by ignorance and becomes manifest only when, through meditation on the Supreme, ignorance is destroyed. See Ś.U. I. 11. So long as the soul is subject to ignorance it cannot create anything real. Besides, bondage and freedom of the individual arise from the Lord. Ś. R. says that the nature of the individual soul is hidden owing to the wish of the Highest. parābhidhyānāt parama-purusa-samkalpād asya jīvasya svābhāvikam rūpam tirohitam. T.U. II. 7. 1; II. 8. 1. Nimbarka holds that the qualities of the soul remain hidden through the wish of the Supreme Lord in accordance with the deeds of the soul. See Ś.U. VI. 16. Baladeva's explanation is different. If it be said that the dreams must be unreal, since the dream objects are sublated in the waking state, the answer is that the dream objects are withdrawn by the wish of the Lord alone. There is nothing unnatural in the Lord's creating and withdrawing the dream objects even as he can cause the bondage and release of the soul. The dream objects are not unreal simply because they are sublated.

III. 2. 6. deha-yogād vā so'pi Or that (the concealment of the soul's powers) also (results) from its connection with the body. deha-yogāt: from its connection with the body; va: or; sah: that; api: also. Though the soul is not different from the Lord, its powers remain hidden, because of the limiting adjuncts such as connection with the body. Ś. R. says that the obscuration of the soul's true nature results from the soul's connection with the body or its connection with the power of matter in a subtle state. In the state of creation the soul is connected with a body; in the state of dissolution, pralaya, it is connected with subtle matter which does not admit of differentiation by means of name and shape. So as its true nature is not manifest the soul is unable to create dream objects like chariots, etc. The dream objects are specially created by the Supreme Person and are meant by him to be the reward or punishment for deeds of minor importance. They, therefore, last for the time of the dream only and are perceived by that one soul only. Srīnivāsa says that the Lord takes into consideration the deeds of the soul and connects the soul with prakrti in its effected and causal states. The dream states are created by the Lord and not by the individual soul. Baladeva takes this as a separate section concerned with showing that the waking consciousness, too, is due to the Lord.

Text, Translation and Notes 447

Section 2 (7-8)

THE SOUL IN DREAMLESS SLEEP

III. 2. 7. tad-abhāvo nādīșu tac-chruter ātmani ca The absence of that (i.e. of dreams, i.e. dreamless sleep) takes place in the nadis and in the self; according to Scripture. tat-abhāvah: the absence of that; nādīsu: in the nerves; ātmani: in the self; ca: and; tat-śruteh: as it is known from the śruti or Scripture. The self in sleep is said variously to reside in the arteries (nādis) pericardium (puritat) and in Brahman. The question is whether these are mutually exclusive or not. The former view is urged on the ground that the statements have all one purpose, viz. the description of the self in deep sleep. When this purpose is served by one statement, the others should be excluded. Where rice and barley are prescribed for one purpose, only one of them is to be used and not both. In the setting out of this position, with reference to a single purpose, in the disjunctive reading, in the illustration of rice and barley, there is considerable similarity between Ś. and Śrīkantha. The sutra holds that the places enumerated are not alternatives but stand in mutual relation and refer to one place only. If we allow option between arteries (C.U. VIII. 6. 3; B.U. II. 1. 19) and the self (B.U. II. 1. 17) the Vedic authority is compromised for the acceptance of one authority will mean the denial of the other. If there are two statements to the effect 'he sleeps in the palace', 'he sleeps on a couch', we have to combine the two and say 'he sleeps on a couch in the palace'. Similarly here we should mean that the soul goes through the nerves to the region of the heart and there rests in Brahman. If it is asked as to why in deep sleep the soul does not experience the relation of supporter and that which is supported, ādhārādheya-bheda, it is possible that the individual soul concerned with ignorance is lost in Brahman. 'When a person sleeps ... he has reached pure being. He has gone to his own' (C.U. VI. 8. 1). K.U. (IV. 20) suggests that he becomes one with the Self. So Self is the soul's place of rest in deep sleep, ātmaiva suşupti-sthānam. R. says that the arteries and the pericardium answer to a palace and a couch within the palace while Brahman is the bed, as it were. So Brahman alone is the immediate resting place of the sleeping soul. For a man sleeping on a bed is at the same time sleeping on a couch and in the house.

448 The Brahma Sūtra

Section 3 (9) THE SAME SOUL RETURNS FROM DEEP SLEEP

III. 2. 9. sa eva tu karmānusmrti-śabda-vidhibhyah But the same soul (returns from Brahman of the deep sleep) on account of work, remembrance, scriptural authority and injunction. sa eva: the same soul; tu: but; karma-anusmrti-śabda-vidhibhyah: on account of work, remembrance, scriptural authority and injunction. A doubt is raised that we cannot be sure that the same soul returns from Brahman of the deep sleep, even as we cannot be sure that the same drop of water comes back after it is once merged in water. The sutra answers this doubt. The same soul comes back for (i) it takes up the work on return from sleep which was left unfinished before falling into sleep; (ii) there is continuity of experience before and after sleep and there is remembrance of past events, ātmānu- smarana that he is the same as he was before; (iii) there is scriptural authority also. See C.U. VI. 9. 3 (4). If the person who rises after sleep is different from the person who goes to sleep, then injunctions with regard to work or knowledge would be meaningless. If a person attains oneness with Brahman by falling into sleep, then sleep will be one with liberation and scriptural instruction to attain liberation would be pointless. The analogy of a drop of water and the ocean is not correct, since the drop merges in the ocean without any adjuncts whereas the soul merges in Brahman with adjuncts. The same soul rises again from Brahman, with its work and ignorance as these are not lost in Brahman completely. The individuality of each soul continues through the states of sleep and waking; in the former it is like the seed; in the latter like the fully developed plant. R. quotes C.U. VIII. 2. 1; VIII. 12. 3; VII. 25. 2; VII. 26. 2 which imply the distinctiveness of the released soul. The soul in samsāra puts off his instruments of knowledge and action in deep sleep, repairs to the place of complete rest and having refreshed himself there rises to a new enjoyment of action. Nimbārka takes karmānusmrti as one, remembrance of work, while Śrīnivāsa takes it as two, as work and remembrance, and thus follows S. and others.

Section 4 (10) THE NATURE OF SWOON

III. 2. 10. mugdhe'rdha-sampattih pariśeşāt In the swooning person, there is half-attainment, this being the re- maining. mugdhe: in a swooning person; ardha-sampattih: half-attainment; parisesāt: this being the remaining (hypothesis).

Text, Translation and Notes 449 The doubt is raised whether the state of swoon is not to be affiliated to one of the four states, waking, dream, sleep and death, as a fifth state is not known from Scripture. The person in swoon is not conscious of objects as a waking person. We cannot say that on account of concentration on one object he is unaware of other objects. For the swooning person is not conscious of anything. He who is concentrating on an object keeps his body straight while he who is in swoon falls prostrate on the ground. He is not dreaming for he is altogether unconscious. He is not dead for he continues to breathe and feel warm. He rises again to conscious life. He is not in deep sleep when one is peaceful, breathing at regular intervals. The man in a swoon breathes irregularly; his body trembles; his face has a frightful expression. His eyes are staring wide open. A sleeping person may be roused to waking consciousness by a gentle stroke with the hand, the person in a swoon not even by a blow with a club. The state of swoon has some qualities in common with sleep and some with death. It belongs to death in so far as it is the door to death. It is not considered to be a separate fifth state as it is compounded of several states. For R., swoon is a half-way approach to death. maranāyārdha- sampattir mūrchā. For Nimbarka, swoon is half-attainment of death.

Section 5 (11-21)

THE NATURE OF THE SUPREME BRAHMAN

III. 2. 11. na sthānato'pi parasyobhaya-lingam sarvatra hi Not on account of (difference of) place also, twofold characteristics can belong to the Highest for everywhere (Scripture teaches it to be without any difference). na: not; sthānatah: from (difference of) place; api: also; parasya: of the Supreme (Brahman); ubhaya-lingam: twofold characteristics; sarvatra: everywhere; hi: for. For Ś., this sutra declares that the twofold characteristic of the presence of qualities, sa-viśesatva, and absence of qualities, nir- viśesatva, cannot belong to the Highest Brahman for all passages which aim at setting forth the nature of Brahman declare it to be devoid of all distinctive qualities. In the texts we find passages referring to the qualified Brahman (C.U. III. 14. 2) and unqualified Brahman (B.U. III. 8. 8). The sūtra says that both these cannot be predicated of one and the same reality which cannot have two contradictory natures at the same time as it is opposed to experience. The mere connection of a thing with another P

450 The Brahma Sūtra

cannot change its nature even as the redness of a flower reflected in a crystal does not change the nature of the crystal which is colourless. The imputation of redness is due to ignorance and is not real. A thing cannot change its real nature which means its destruction. So of the two aspects of Brahman we have to accept that which is non- determinate as its true nature (Katha U. I. 3. 15). It is described as a-śabdam, a-sparśam, a-rūpam, a-vyayam. The other description of Brahman is only for the sake of upasana or worship and it is not its real nature. Bhaskara argues that though Brahman has two forms, nirākāra and sākāra, without form and with form, he is to be meditated on in his formless aspect, for he retains this nature even when he happens to have a connection with the world and the rest. R. makes this section consist of sūtras 11 to 25. In the previous sutras, the different states of the soul are described and the objection is raised, since Brahman is the antaryamin of jiva, Brahman also will be contaminated by the faults attaching to the jiva in its different states. This section shows that Brahman is free from faults. R. holds that the sutra makes out that Brahman is everywhere described as having a twofold character 'Not on account of place even [is there any imperfection] in the Highest; for everywhere [it is described] as having twofold characteristics'. The prima facie view for R. is, though Brahman is the cause of the world and a treasure- house of all auspicious qualities yet it is affected by imperfection since it is connected with matter, bodies and their parts. The answer is stated in this sutra that Brahman has a twofold nature, freedom from imperfections and possession of all auspicious qualities. C.U. VIII. 1. 5; Vişnu Purāņa VI. 5. 84-5, I. 22. 51. Nimbārka accepts R.'s interpretation. Kesava Kāșmīrin follows the same view. While S. contends that Brahman cannot be qualified by the limiting adjuncts which do not change its real nature but only conceal it for the finite being, R. and Nimbärka hold that the two- fold nature, viz. negative freedom from all imperfections and the positive possession of all auspicious qualities, applies to Brahman. Vallabha thinks that sutras 11-13 constitute one section, 14-18 another and 19-22 a third. Baladeva urges that though the Lord manifests himself in various places, he himself undergoes no change, by reason of his mysterious power.

III. 2. 12. na bhedād iti cen na pratyekam atad-vacanāt If it be said (that it is) not so on account of difference (taught in the Scripture), (we reply) not so, because with respect to each (such form) the Scripture declares the opposite of that. na: not so; bhedat: on account of difference (being taught in the

Text, Translation and Notes 45I Scripture); iti cet: if it be said; na: not so; pratyekam: with respect to each; a-tad-vacanät: because of the declaration of the opposite of that. If the Scripture declares Brahman to have different forms (see B.U. III. 18. 1; Praśna U. 2. VI. 1; C.U. V. 3; B.U. I. 3. 22; C.U. V. 11. 2), every such form is denied of Brahman in other texts. See B.U. II. 5. 1. There is only one non-differenced Brahman. With regard to various forms the śruti explains that the forms are not true and there is only one formless principle. See B.U. II. 5. 1. R. omits na at the beginning and reads: 'If it be said "on account of difference" [we say it is] not so, because with reference to each the text says what is not that.' If it be said that the individual soul has the same twofold attribute, freedom from evil, etc. (C.U. VIII. 7), and yet is affected with imperfections owing to the fact that it is connected with bodies, etc., so the inner ruler may be inferred to be affected by imperfections since it undergoes a variety of conditions on account of its connection with different bodies, the sūtra sets aside this objection on the ground that the texts declare the inner ruler to be immortal and denies of him any imperfections due to his connection with the bodies which he voluntarily enters in order to rule them. The perfect nature of the individual soul is obscured as long as it is connected with a body. See III. 2. 5. If it is objected that even the Highest Self, when it enters voluntarily into bodies, cannot escape connection with the imperfections which depend on the essential nature of those bodies, it is said in reply that even non- sentient things are not essentially or intrinsically bad. They cause pain or pleasure to men according to the nature of their past deeds. If the effects of things depended only on their own nature, they would be productive for all beings either of pleasure or of pain. This is not observed to be the case. So to the individual soul subject to karman, connection with different things is the source of imperfection and suffering in agreement with the nature of its deeds; with reference to the Highest Brahman which is subject to itself only, the same connection is the source of playful activity, in so far as it guides and rules these things in various ways. parasya tu brahmanah svādhīnasya sa eva sambandhas tat-tad-vicitra-niyamana-rūpa-līlā-rasāyaiva syāt. R. Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa adopt R.'s interpretation. Šrīnivāsa says that the imperfections pertain to the individual soul, which, though endowed with the attributes of freedom from evil and the rest, has yet its real nature obscured through the will of the Highest, in accordance with its past karma; but the imperfections do not pertain to the Highest who has his real nature ever manifest. There are texts establishing the imperfections of the individual soul in waking state (C.U. V. 10. 7), but none referring to the imperfections of the Highest. In the dream state, in sleep, death, etc., the soul is said to be imperfect. Aitareya Āranyaka III. 2. 4; C.U. VIII. 3. 2.

452 The Brahma Sūtra Bhäskara continues the topic of the worship of the formless Brahman. Baladeva reads the sutra with a na at the beginning and argues that Scripture points out that the Supreme is one, with regard to each of his manifestations.

III. 2. 13. api caivam eke Some also (teach) thus. api ca: also; evam: thus; eke: some. Ś. means by this sūtra that some śākhās or rescensions of the Vedas teach that the manifoldness is not true for they condemn those who see difference. Katha U. I. 4. 11; B.U. IV. 4. 19. Wherever bheda or difference is mentioned and Brahman is said to be possessed of different forms, the difference is mentioned for the sake of worship and ultimately difference is denied. na bhinnākāra-yogo brahmanah śāstrīya iti śakyate vaktum, bhedasyopāsanārthatvād abhede tātparyam. Bhäskara holds that Scripture teaches the essential non-difference of Brahman. R. takes this sūtra to state the objection. The connection with one and the same body is for the individual soul a source of disadvantage while for the Highest Brahman it is an accession of glory in so far as it manifests him as a Lord and ruler. M.U. III. 1. 1. C.U. VI. 3. 2 says: 'Having entered by means of that jiva self, I will differentiate names and forms.' This means that the differentiation of names and forms depends on the entering into the elements of the jiva whose self is Brahman. As the individual self has definite shapes, Brahman also falls within the sphere of beings to whom injunctions and pro- hibitions are addressed. Baladeva quotes from M.U. 7 to show that the Lord is one though appearing as many.

III. 2. 14. arūpavad eva hi tat-pradhānatvāt For (Brahman) is merely devoid of form, on account of this being the main purport of Scripture. arūpavat: formless; eva: only; hi: for; tat-pradhānatvāt: on account of this being the main purport. Since some texts represent Brahman as having a form and others as without form, how can we assert that Brahman is without form? The sutra gives the answer. Brahman is formless. For if it had form the texts which teach it as being without form would become purport- less. Those which deal with Brahman as having form are meant for meditation; upāsanā-vidhi-pradhānāni. Bhaskara has an additional sutra here which reads: asthūlam ananv ahrasvam, adīrgham, aśabdam, asparśam, arūpam, avyayam, (Brahman is) non-gross, non-fine, non-short, non-long, without sound,

Text, Translation and Notes 453 without touch, without form, immutable. Brahman without form is to be worshipped, according to Bhāskara. R. points out that though Brahman enters into bodies, human and divine, it is itself without form and is therefore not subject to Karman, which, in the case of the individual soul, is due to its embodiedness. C.U. VIII. 14. 1 teaches that though Brahman enters into all beings, it is not affected by name and form, though it brings about name and form. If it is asked how Brahman who is the inner ruler of beings in so far as he has them for his body, can be said to be without form, the answer is that while the individual soul partici- pates in the pleasures and pains to which the body gives rise, Brahman does not share the pleasures and pains. Scriptural injunctions apply only to those who are under the power of Karman. Nimbārka makes out that Brahman is formless, i.e. he is not an enjoyer since he is only the principal agent with regard to the creation of names and forms but he is not the enjoyer of names and forms to be created by himself and is therefore without form and untouched by imperfection. Baladeva begins a new section here, with four sūtras about the form of Brahman. He holds that Brahman is formless in the sense that he has no form but is form itself, since the body of Brahman is identical with Brahman himself.

III. 2. 15. prakāśavac cāvaiyarthāt And as light (assumes forms by its contact with objects having forms, so does Brahman) because (the texts ascribing form to Brahman) are not without meaning. prakāśavat: like light; ca: and; avaiyarthāt: because of not being meaningless. Bhāskara substitutes vā for ca. Passages which attribute form to Brahman are not without a purpose. The worship of Brahman with form helps us to attain brahma-loka. All parts of the Veda are equally authoritative and should be assumed to have a meaning. na hi veda-vākyānām kasyacid arthavattvam kasyacid anarthavatvam iti yuktam. The forms, however, are not absolutely real. R. explains that light (intelligence) constitutes the essential nature of Brahman. Brahman possesses twofold characteristics for other- wise the texts declaring Brahman to be free from imperfection, all-knowing, the cause of the world and so on would become meaningless. R. and Nimbārka interpret this sūtra as Brahman consists of light. They cite Vājasaneyi Samhitā XXXI; Taittirīya Āraņyaka III. 13. 1; Ś.U. III. 8; B.G. VIII. 9. Baladeva points out that as the Sun who is pure light is conceived as having a definite form for the purpose of meditation, so the Lord,

454 The Brahma Sūtra

though pure light of knowledge and bliss, is conceived to have a form for the purpose of meditation.

III. 2. 16. āha ca tanmātram And (the Scripture) declares (Brahman to consist of) that (intelligence) only. aha: declares; ca: and; tat-matram: that only. Ś. quotes B.U. IV. 5. 13 and holds that Brahman is mere intelli- gence, caitanyam eva tu nirantaram asya svarūpam. S. R. interprets this sutra to mean that the text says 'so much only' that Brahman has light for its essential nature. This does not negative the other attributes of Brahman, as omniscience, being the cause of the world, etc. Śrīkantha follows R.'s view. Nimbärka says that when a text states that only, its meaning only, then it is not meaningless. Baladeva reaffirms his view that the form which the Lord possesses is not different from him but is his very essence.

III. 2. 17. darśayati cātho api smaryate (This Scripture) also shows and thus (it is) also stated in the smytis. S. argues that the non-differenced Brahman is mentioned in scriptural texts: B.U. II. 3. 6; Kena U. I. 4; T.U. II. 9. Ś. relates how Bāhva, questioned about Brahman by Vāskalin, explained it to him by silence. 'He said to him, learn Brahman, O friend' and became silent. Then on a second and a third question he replied, 'I am teaching you, indeed, but you do not understand. Silent is the self.' brūmah khalu tvam tu na vijānāsi, upaśānto'yam ātmā. See B.G. XIII. 12, also III. 25. Ś. quotes a smrti text where Nārāyaņa instructs Nārada: 'The cause, O Närada, of your seeing me endowed with the qualities of all beings is the māyā created by me, do not cognise me as being such [in reality].' māyā hy eșā mayā srstā yan mām paśyasi nārada sarva-bhūta-guņair-yuktam naivam mām jñātum arhasi. Bhaskara uses S.U. VI. 13 and B.G. VIII. 9 to show that Brahman is self-manifest by nature. R. supports his view that Brahman is the abode of all auspicious qualities and free from imperfections by a number of texts: Ś.U. VI. 7-9, 19; M.U. I. 1. 9; T.U. II. 8 and 9; B.G. X. 3, 42, IX. 10, XV. 17; Vişnu Purāņa V. 1. 46-8. Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa use C.U. VIII. 7. 1, 3; Ś.U. IV. 19; B.G. XV. 18 in addition to others mentioned by S. and R. Baladeva quotes from Gopāla-pūrva-tāpanī U. and Brahma- samhita to show that the body of the Lord is identical with the Lord himself.

Text, Translation and Notes 455

III. 2. 18. ata eva copamā sūryakādivat For this very reason also (there are applied to Brahman) comparisons such as the images of the sun and the like. ata eva: for this very reason; ca: also; upamā: comparisons; sūrya- kadivat: like the images of the sun and the like. Ś. points out that the different forms of Brahman who is free from all differentiation are comparable to the images of the sun reflected in the water and the like. He gives two passages in support of this view. As the one luminous sun when entering into relation to many different waters is himself rendered multiform by his limiting adjuncts, so also the one divine unborn self: yathā hy ayam jyotir ātmā vivasvān apo bhinnāh bahudhaiko'nugacchan, upādhinā kriyate bheda-rūpo devah kşetreşv evam ajo ayam ātmā. Again: 'The one Self of all beings separately abides in all the individual beings; hence it appears as one and many at the same time, just as the one moon is multiplied by its reflections in the water.' eka eva tu bhūtātmā bhūte bhūte vyavasthitah ekadhā bahudhā caiva drśyate jala-candravat. Yājñavalkya Smrti III. 143. 4. R. uses these comparisons to point out that Brahman does not share the imperfections due to the places with which he is connected even as the sun reflected in water, mirrors, etc., is not affected by the inpurities of the latter. He quotes Yajnavalkya Smyti: As the one ether is rendered manifold by jars and the like or as the one sun becomes manifold in several sheets of water, thus the one Self is rendered manifold by being in many places. ākāśam ekam hi yathā ghațādisu prthag bhavet tathātmaiko hy anekastho jalādhārev ivāmśumān. III. 144. Baladeva begins a new section here to show that the worshipper, the individual soul, is different from the object worshipped, the Lord. As the sun (bimba) is different from the image (prati-bimba) so the Lord is different from the soul.

III. 2. 9. ambuvad agrahanāt tu na tathātvam But there is no similarity (of the things compared), since (in the case of Brahman) there is not apprehension of any (separate substance like

ambuvat: like water; agrahanāt: on account of non-apprehension; water).

tu: but; na: no; tāthātmyam: similarity. In the case of the sun and the other luminous bodies, there is a separate material substance occupying a different place, viz. water. So the light of the sun is reflected. The Self, on the other hand, is not a material being. It is present everywhere and there is nothing different from it. So there is no similarity between the two. R. says that the imperfections caused by water and mirrors do not

456 The Brahma Sūtra

attach themselves to the sun or a face because the sun and the face do not really abide in the water and the mirror. Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa argue that the example cited is not to the point. The sentient and the non-sentient beings are not apprehended, as in the case of water, to be remote from Brahman. There is no parallelism between the Supreme Person and the reflected sun. Śrīnivāsa quotes B.U. III. 7. 3, 4; Śatapatha Brāhmaņa XIV. 6. 7. 30; Katha U. V. 8, VI. 1 and also B.G. XVIII. 61, VII. 7.

III. 2. 20. vrddhi-hrāsa-bhāktvam antar-bhāvād ubhaya-sāmañjasyād evam Since the Highest Brahman is inside (of the limiting manifestations) it participates in their increase and decrease; owing to the appropriateness of the two cases, it is thus (the comparison is not defective) vyddhi-hrāsa-bhāktvam: participation in the increase and decrease; antarbhāvāt: on account of its being inside; ubhaya-sāmañjasyāt: on account of the similarity in the two cases; evam: thus. Whenever two things are compared, they are so only with reference to some particular point they have in common. Entire equality of the two can never be demonstrated; indeed if it could be demonstrated, there would be an end of that particular relation which gives rise to the comparison. The feature on which the comparison rests is partici- pation in increase and decrease. The image of the sun dilates when the surface of the water expands and contracts when the water shrinks. It trembles when the water is agitated; it divides itself when the water is divided. It thus participates in all the attributes and conditions of water while the real sun remains all the time the same. So also Ś. says that the unchanging Brahman participates, as it were, in the attributes and states of the body and the other limiting adjuncts within which it abides. So there is some similarity in the comparison. R. and Śrīkantha take this and the next sūtra as one. R. takes together the two comparisons of the ether which becomes manifold through jars and so on and the sun which becomes multiplied through the sheets of water in which it is reflected. Like them the Highest Self while abiding within variously shaped things remains unaffected by their imperfections. Nimbārka and Srīnivāsa hold that the Supreme dwells in objects as their inner controller and does not participate in their increase and decrease.

III. 2. 21. darśanāc ca And on account of the declaration (of Scripture). darśanāt: on account of scriptural declaration; ca: and. The texts considered here are B.U. II. 5. 18; C.U. VI. 3. 2 which declare that Brahman enters within the body. Nimbārka points out that when a comparison is made and we say

Text, Translation and Notes 457 he is a lionlike boy, we do not mean that he has all the qualities of a lion; we mean only that he is as brave as a lion.

Section 6 (22, 24-30)

THE CLAUSE 'NOT THIS, NOT THIS' NEGATIVES THE TWO FORMS OF BRAHMAN AND NOT BRAHMAN ITSELF

III. 2. 22. praktaitāvattvam hi pratiședhati tato bravīti ca bhūyah What has been mentioned up to this (the clause not this, not this), (denies) and (the śruti) says something more than that. prakrta-etavattvam: what has been mentioned up to this; pratiședhati: denies; tatah: than that; bhūyah: something more; bravīti: says; ca: and. The two forms of Brahman, limited and unlimited, sat: defined and tyat: undefined (B.U. II. 3. 1) are denied by the words 'not this, not this'. The words 'satyasya satyam', the Truth of truth, indicate that Brahman alone is the reality that exists and is the substratum of the world. We experience the world and its reality to perception is not denied; only its transcendental reality is not accepted. The cosmic plurality is not absolutely real. Bhaskara does not begin a new section here but continues the topic of meditation on Brahman in his aspect of non-difference, as pure being and consciousness. He holds that the first 'not this' denies the corporeal and the non-corporeal forms; the second 'not this' denies his vasana-maya form as the individual soul. The text designates the pure non-differenced form of Brahman but does not indicate the non-existence of the world. R. does not take this sūtra as the beginning of a new section. He holds that it continues the discussion started in sūtra 11. He asks whether the clause 'not this, not this' denies of Brahman all the previously mentioned prakāras, so that it can only be called san- matra. The sutra makes out that Brahman's nature cannot be confined to the attributes stated. Srīnivasa says that Brahman is not limited by the corporeal and incorporeal forms. Brahman is higher than these. He quotes Katha U. V. 13, Ś.U. 'the eternal among the eternal, the conscious among the conscious'. Vallabha says that, according to śruti, the qualities of ordinary things are not to be found in Brahman. But Brahman has qualities like bliss, etc.

III. 2. 24. api ca samrādhane pratyakşānumānābhyām And (Brahman is apprehended) in perfect meditation also, according to perception (śruti) and inference (smrti). p*

458 The Brahma Sūtra api: also; ca: and; samrādhane: in perfect meditation; pratyaksa- anumānābhyām: from perception and inference. Brahman, though not apprehended by the senses, is realised in the state of meditation. Katha U. II. 4. 1; M.U. III. 1. 8. By samrādhana is meant the presentation before the mind (of Brahman) which is effected through meditation and devotion, bhakti-dhyāna-praņidhānāt anusthānam. Ś. He also quotes from smrti. yam vinidrā jitaśvāsās santusțās samyatendriyāh jyotiḥ paśyanti yunjānās tasmai yogātmane namah. He who is seen as light by the yogins meditating on him, sleep- lessly with controlled breaths, with contented minds, with subdued senses, reverence to him. M.B. XII. 1642. Again, yoginas tam prapaśyanti bhagavantam sanātanam. The yogins see him the August, the Eternal One. R. quotes Katha U. 2. 23; M.U. III. 1. 9; B.G. XI. 53-4. Vallabha says that the objector is a fool to argue that Brahman is not perceived for in contemplation Brahman is perceived. Brahman is possessed of form and full of infinite qualities and is not non- manifest. Baladeva takes this sūtra as an independent section. Only in Ś. is ca found after api. The Absolute, though it is not perceived by the senses or known by inference, is apprehended in devotion according to śruti and smṛti. The ultimate datum is consciousness which is above reason. Western thought stresses reason as the capacity by which ultimate reality can be known and expressed in a clear, intelligible form. Conceptual thought which posits the object over against the subject becomes the dominant feature. While the stress is on dualism in

philosophy. Western thought non-dualism is the prominent feature in Eastern

III. 2. 25. prakāśādivac cāvaiśesyam prakāśaś ca karmaņy abhyāsāt And as in the case of light and the like, there is the non-distinction (of the two Selves), the light (being divided) by its activity; on account of repeated declarations (in the Scripture). prakāśādivat: as in the case of light and the like; ca: and; avaisesyam: non-distinction; prakāsah: the light (of Brahman); ca: and; karmaņi: in activity; abhyāsāt: on account of repeated declarations (in the Scripture). If it is said that Brahman as the object of meditation and the individual as the meditator are different, the reply is that Brahman is manifested as different on account of the adjuncts of activity. In reality the two are one as the texts declare, 'that art thou, I am Brahman'. Ś. is at pains to make out that the difference is due to association

Text, Translation and Notes 459 with unreal adjuncts. Ānandagiri says: ātma-prakāśa-śabdito'jāna- tat-kārye karmaņi upādhau sa-viseșah. Bhaskara holds that there is non-distinction between Brahman and the individual soul which is effected from the repetition (of meditation) with regard to the object to be worshipped or from repetition with regard to the act of meditation. R. makes out that light is intuited as constituting Brahman's essential nature by repetition of the practice of meditation. For R., Brahman has all material and immaterial objects for its distin- guishing modes. Śrikantha says that there is no difference between their attaining knowledge, bliss and the rest like the Supreme and attaining lordship and so on like him. Nimbārka makes out that the direct intuition of Brahman results from the incessant practice of the sadhanas consisting in perfect meditation. Śrīnivāsa tells us that though Brahman is accessible to all he manifests himself to those alone who are desirous of salvation and meditate on him incessantly. Baladeva breaks this sūtra into two, prakāśādivac ca vaiśesyāt and prakāśaś ca karmany-abhyāsāt. In the former sutra, he adds a na and says that the Lord has not two states, subtle and gross like fire. His manifestation depends on the love of the devotee. The manifestation is brought about through repeated meditation. Mere love is not enough; repeated acts of meditation are also necessary.

III. 2. 26. ato'nantena tathā hi lingam Therefore (the individual soul enters into unity) with the infinite (i.e. the Highest Self) ; for thus (is the scriptural) indication. atah: therefore; anantena: with the infinite; tathā: thus; hi: for; lingam: (the Scripture is) indication. The individual soul is able to attain unity with the Highest Self because the ignorance which is destroyed by knowledge is unreal. See M.U. III. 2. 9; B.U. IV. 4. 6. If the individuality of the soul were real, then it cannot be destroyed and unity with the Highest Self is not possible. R. makes out that Brahman is distinguished by an infinite number of auspicious qualities. So, for him, Brahman possesses twofold characteristics. R completes a section here. Śrikantha follows R.'s interpretation. Nimbarka holds that the individual soul attains similarity with the Infinite, when it intuits the Highest. See M.U. III. 1. 3. Baladeva points out that the direct vision of the Lord is possible through the grace of the Infinite. The Supreme, though invisible, makes himself visible to his devotees, through his power or grace.

460 The Brahma Sūtra III. 2. 27. ubhaya-vyapadeśāt tu ahi-kundalavat But on account of the twofold teaching, (the relation of the Highest Self to the individual soul is to be viewed) as that between a serpent and its coils. ubhaya-vyapadeśat: on account of twofold teaching; tu: but; ahi-kundalavat: as that between a serpent and its coils. There are texts which suggest a difference between the individual soul and the Highest Brahman: M.U. III. 1. 1, see also III. 2. 8; B.U. III. 7. 15. There are passages like C.U. VI. 8.7: 'That art thou'; B.U. I. 4. 10: 'I am Brahman'; III. 4. 1: 'This is thy Self who is within all'; III. 7. 15: 'He is thy self, the ruler within, the immortal.' This means that, prior to liberation, the difference between the two is real, though it is one of identity after liberation. The relation is one of difference and non-difference as that between a serpent and its coils. As a serpent it is one; but if we look at the coils, hood, etc., there is difference. Similarly there is both difference and non- difference between the individual soul and the Highest Self. This is the prima facie view for Ś. Bhaskara: The snake is one as a whole, yet is different as having different postures, coil, erect hood and so on. Similarly, Brahman is one but is different as soul, matter and so on. R. argues that it has been shown that the entire non-sentient universe is the outward form of Brahman. The question is raised about the way in which the world constitutes the outward form of Brahman. Is the relation like that of the serpent and its coils? Or is it like that of light and the luminous body? Or does the soul form a distinguishing attribute and so a part, amsa, of Brahman? The first alternative is stated here that the non-sentient things are special forms or arrangements of Brahman as the coils are of a coiled up snake, samsthāna-viśesa, as the coil is of the serpent. Śrīkaņțha follows R.'s view. For Nimbärka, the universe consisting of the corporeal and the incorporeal abides in its own cause, i.e. Brahman, in a relation of difference-non-difference on account of the twofold teaching like the case of the serpent and the coils. Śrīnivāsa holds that Brahman is the one non-different material and efficient cause of the world. The coil is the effect dependent on the serpent which is the cause. The universe is the effect of Brahman. See Rg Veda I. 164. 20; M.U. III. 1. 1; Ś.U. IV. 6, I. 6; C.U. III. 14.1, VI. 8. 6,VII. 26.1. Vallabha says that the sruti speaks of Param-atman as both without and with qualities. Even as a serpent assumes a crooked or straight form, so Brahman assumes all contradictory forms. Baladeva begins a new section here devoted to the discussion of the identity of the Lord and his attributes. The Lord is essentially intelligence and bliss and yet possesses them as his attributes, even as the serpent is nothing but the coil, yet possesses it as its attribute.

Text, Translation and Notes 46I III. 2. 28. prakāśāśrayavad vā tejastvāt Or else like that of light to its substratum, both being luminous. prakāśa-āśrayavat: like light and its substratum; vā: or; tejastvāt: on account of being luminous. Both being luminous, Ś. says that they are non-different; on account of their varying extensity they are spoken of as different. Even so is the relation between the individual soul and Brahman ; the former is limited while the latter is all-pervading. This is also the prima facie view. For R., the two are different but at the same time they are identical since they both are luminous. In the same way, the non-sentient world constitutes the form of Brahman. This is also the prima facie view which criticises the preceding prima facie view by pointing out that if the non-sentient would be a state of Brahman, as the coil is of the snake, then it will become identical with him seeing that the coil is only the snake. The correct view is that the soul is related to Brahman as the ray is to the sun, i.e. is his form and is different from him. Śrīkantha follows R. For Nimbärka, there is no absolute non-difference between the two. Baladeva argues that even as the sun is essentially light and is the substratum of light, so Brahman is essentially knowledge and also the substratum of knowledge.

II. 2. 29. pūrvavad vā Or (the relation of the two is to be conceived) in the manner stated previously. pūrvavat: as stated previously; vā; or. This sūtra for Ś. refutes the view of difference-non-difference and establishes what is given in sūtra 25, that the non-difference is the reality and difference is unreal. For if the difference were real, it could

liberation. never cease to be. If separateness were real there could be no

R. points out that non-sentient matter stands to Brahman in the same relation as the individual soul does. It is an attribute incapable of being realised apart from Brahman and hence is a part, amsa, of the latter. Those texts which refer to the two as different should be taken in their primary sense, that the distinguishing attribute and that to which the attribute belongs are essentially different.

III. 2. 30. pratişedhāc ca And on account of the denial. pratisedhat: on account of the denial; ca: and. Passages like 'there is no other witness but he' (B.U. III. 7. 23),

462 The Brahma Sūtra 'not this, not this' (B.U. II. 3. 6), show that there is no other reality than Brahman. S. For R., the relation of the two can only be that of distinguishing attribute and the thing distinguished. Brahman distinguished by sentient and non-sentient beings in their subtle state is the cause; distinguished by the same beings in their gross state is the effect. The effect is non-different from the cause and by the knowledge of the causal Brahman the effect is known. Brahman is free from defects and is the abode of all auspicious qualities. Nimbarka says that Brahman does not possess any imperfection. See Katha U. Srīnivāsa quotes Kațha U. V. 10. 11.

Section 7 (31-37)

BRAHMAN IS ONE WITHOUT A SECOND III. 2. 31. param atah setūn-māna-sambandha-bheda-vyapadesebhyah Beyond this (Brahman there is something further) on account of the designations of bridge, measure, connection and separation. param: beyond; atah: this; setu-unmāna-sambandha-bheda- vyapadeśat: on account of the designations of bridge, measure, connection and separation. Ś. points out that the objection is raised that on account of texts mentioning bridge which separates things other than itself, 'Now the Self is the bridge, the [separating] boundary for keeping these worlds apart' (C.U. VIII. 4. 1), the self has size and is limited. C.U. III. 18. 2 says Brahman has four feet; whatever is limited is limited by some other object. Again, B.U. IV. 3. 21 says that 'the person in the embrace of the intelligent self knows nothing without or within'. This shows that there is something other than Brahman. All these suggest that Brahman is not one without a second. It has something different, anya-tattvam. For R., the sutra states the pūrva-paksa that there is a being higher even than the Highest Brahman, the supreme cause material as well as operative of the entire world. Baladeva makes out that the bliss of the Lord is the highest. It is higher than the worldly bliss on account of the designation of bridge, measure, connection and difference. The bliss of Brahman is the support of the entire world. C.U. VIII. 4. 1; T.U. II. 4. Human bliss compares to the bliss of the Lord as one to infinity. B.U. IV. 3. 22. III. 2. 32. sāmānyāt tu But (Brahman is called a bridge) on account of similarity. sāmānyāt: on account of similarity; tu: but.

Text, Translation and Notes 463 For S., there is nothing different from Brahman. It is called a bridge not because there is something beyond it but because like a bridge which keeps back water and marks the boundary of adjacent fields, Brahman maintains the world and its boundaries. When C.U. VIII. 4. 2 says 'having passed the bridge', it means 'having attained Brahman fully even as we say he has passed in grammar, when we mean that he has mastered it fully'. yathā vyākaranam tīrņa iti prāpta ucyate nātikrāntas tad-vat. For R., Brahman is said to be a bridge in so far as it binds to itself (setu being derived from si: to bind) the whole aggregate of sentient and non-sentient things without any confusion. Again, passing beyond means reaching, as we say he has passed beyond the Vedānta meaning that he has mastered it: taratiś ca prāpti-vacano yathā vedāntam taratīti. For Nimbārka, Brahman is similar to a bridge in a certain respect for he keeps the worlds apart. C.U. VIII. 4. 1. For Baladeva, the word 'bliss' is applied to human bliss on account of similarity even as the term 'jar' is applied to all jars irrespective of their individual differences.

III. 2. 33. buddhyarthah pādavat (The statement that Brahman has size is) for the sake of (easy) compre- hension: just like (four) feet. buddhyarthah: for the sake of comprehension; padavat: like feet. Since it is difficult to comprehend Brahman, infinite and all- pervading, for the sake of easy comprehension and meditation Brahman is imagined to have size, etc. C.U. III. 18. This is Ś.'s view. R. quotes C.U. III. 12. 6 and holds that for the purpose of thought, meditation, the Supreme is said to have measure, etc.

III. 2. 34. sthāna-viśeșāt prakāśādivat (The statements in regard to connection and difference) are due to difference of place; as in the case of light, etc. sthāna-vișesāt: on account of difference of place; prakāśādivat: as in the case of light, etc. Ś.says that differences are made with reference to limiting adjuncts. They do not indicate any difference in the nature of Brahman. Light inside the room is distinguished from the light outside, though all light is one. The sense of difference is produced by the connection of the Self with different adjuncts; when these adjuncts are removed, union is effected. Bhāskara does not mention this sūtra. Śrīnivāsa says that if the objection is raised that the Unlimited can never become limited even for purposes of meditation, the sūtra says that though Brahman is unlimited, he becomes limited on account of the speciality of place.

464 The Brahma Sūtra

Baladeva starts a new section here, showing that the Lord has a variety of manifestations. The Lord, though one, manifests himself in different forms to his devotees in accordance with their different devotions. Those who worship him as the Master see him as the Majestic; those who worship him as the Beloved, see him as the Sweet.

III. 2. 35. upapatteś ca And from reasoning. upapatteh: from reasoning; ca: and. The difference between the soul and Brahman is for Ś. not real but is due to ignorance. See C.U. VI. 8. 1 where the connection of the soul with Brahman is said to be of essential nature. See also C.U. III. 12. 7ff. R. quotes the text M.U. II. 2. 5, amrtasyaisa setuh, he is the bridge of the Immortal, and says that it does not mean a distinction between that which causes to reach and the object reached. The Highest Self is the means as well as the end. See Katha U. I. 2. 23. Baladeva quotes the text: 'as you meditate, so you become', and holds that the devotees realised the Lord differently in accordance with the different modes of worshipping him.

III. 2. 36. tathānya-pratiședhāt Similarly, on account of the denial of other (existences). tathā: similarly; anya-pratisedhāt: on account of the denial of other (existences). S. says that many texts deny the existence of anything other than Brahman. C.U. VII. 25. 1 and 2; M.U. II. 2. 11; B.U. II. 4. 6, IV. 4. 19, II. 5. 19; Ś.U. III. 9. R. holds that there is nothing higher than the Highest and interprets the text tato yad uttara-taram in accordance with the previous verses that that which is the Highest is without form, etc. Again, in M.U. III. 2. 8, the text, 'the knower freed from name and shape, attains to the divine Person higher than the high', the high here means the aggregate soul, samasti-purusa, and the higher refers to the Supreme Person with all his transcendent qualities, who is superior to the aggregate soul. Śrīkantha begins a new section here dealing with the question whether there is anything equal to the Lord, as the doubt whether there is anything superior to the Lord has been disposed of in the

Lord. previous section. This section says that there is none equal to the

Baladeva makes this an independent section proving that the Lord is the Highest for if he were not, there could be no love and devotion for him.

Text, Translation and Notes 465 III. 2. 37. anena sarva-gatatvam āyāma-śabdādibhyah By this, the all-pervadingness (of Brahman is established) in accordance with the statements about (Brahman's) extent. anena: by this; sarva-gatatvam: all-pervadingness; śabdādibhyah: in accordance with (scriptural) statements about āyāma-

(Brahman's) extent. For Ś., texts describing Brahman as bank, etc., are not to be taken literally, for then Brahman would be limited. Texts denying plurality should be accepted as valid. There are texts which declare the all-pervadingness of Brahman: C.U. VIII. 1. 3; Satapatha Brāhmaņa X. 6. 3. 2; B.G. II. 24. R. quotes Ś.U. III. 9; M.U. I. 1. 6; and Mahānārāyaņa U. XI. 6. 'Whatever is seen or heard in this world, is pervaded inside and outside by Nārāyana.' yacca kiñcij jagaty asmin drśyate śrūyate'pi vā antar bahiś ca tat sarvam vyāpya nārāyanah sthitah. Śrikantha points out that the Lord Siva pervades the entire universe through Nārayana, the material cause who is but a part of himself. So it is known that the Lord himself is all-pervasive. Nimbārka argues that the all-pervadingness is established on account of the scriptural texts about expansion and so on. While Nimbarka points out that there is nothing higher than Brahman, S. and Bhäskara take the sutra as establishing that there is nothing besides Brahman. Baladeva makes this an independent section. If it be objected that the Lord is not all-pervasive, but of an intermediate size, i.e. of the size of the body or form in which he appears before his devotees, it is said that even the intermediate form of the Lord is all-pervasive for Scripture declares so.

Section 8 (38-41) THE REWARD OF WORKS IS ALLOTTED BY THE LORD

III. 2. 38. phalam ata upapatteh From him the fruit, for that is reasonable. phalam: fruit (of action); atah: from him; upapatteh: for that is reasonable. The question is whether the fruits of actions spring from the actions themselves or from the Lord. Actions which pass away as soon as they are performed have no power of bringing about results at some future time since nothing can spring from nothing. Nor can it be argued that an action passes away only after having produced some result according to its nature and the agent will at some future time enjoy the fruit of that action. The fruit of an action is the fruit

466 The Brahma Sūtra only at the time of its enjoyment by the doer. We cannot say that the fruit will spring from some supersensuous principle, apūrva, which itself is said to be a direct result of the deed. For apūrva is of a non- intelligent nature and cannot act unless moved by some intelligent being. Nor is there any proof for the existence of apurva. The fact that the deeds are actually requited is accounted for by the action of the Lord. R. makes out that the meditating devotee receives the reward of meditation, i.e. release, which consists in attaining to the Highest Person, only from that Highest Person, for action which is non- intelligent and transitory is incapable of bringing about a result connected with a future time. For Nimbärka, the Highest Person is the giver of fruits.

III. 2. 39. śrutatvāc ca And because the Scripture so teaches. śrutatvāt: because the Scripture so teaches; ca: and. Ś. quotes B.U. IV. 4. 20. R. quotes in addition T.U. II. 7.

III. 2. 40. dharmam jaiminir ata eva Jaimini (thinks) that for the same reasons, religious merit (is what brings about the fruits of actions). dharmam: religious merit; jaiminih: (the sage) Jaimini; ata eva: for the same reasons. Jaimini holds a different view. Scripture says, 'He who is desirous of the heavenly world is to sacrifice', svarga-kāmo yajeta. If such injunctions are to be meaningful, the sacrifice itself must bring about the result but a deed cannot effect a result at some future time, unless before passing away, it gives birth to some unseen result. This apūrva may be an imperceptible after-state of the deed or an imperceptible antecedent state of the result. We need not think that the Lord effects the results of all actions, for one uniform cause cannot account for a variety of effects. Again, the Lord will be charged with partiality and cruelty; besides, if the deed itself did not bring about its own fruit, it would be useless to perform it at all. For all these reasons the result springs from the deed only, whether meritorious or non-meritorious. According to the Pūrva Mīmamsa, the results of sacrifices, etc., are due neither to a Supreme Deity, which it does not admit, nor to the particular deities to whom the offerings are made, but to the unseen potency generated by the very performance of the sacrifices, etc. Pūrva Mīmāmsā Sūtra: II. 1. 5. This pūrva-paksa is refuted in the next sutra.

Text, Translation and Notes 467 III. 2. 41. pūrvam tu bādarāyaņo hetu-vyapadeśāt Bādarayana, however, thinks the former (i.e. the Lord) (to be the cause of the fruits of action) since he is designated as the cause (of the actions themselves). pūrvam: the former; tu: but; bādarāyaņah: (the sage) Bādarāyaņa; hetu-vyapadeśat: on account of his being declared to be the cause (of the actions even). tu: but, refutes Jaimini's view. According to Bādarāyana, Brahman is the dispenser of rewards. The scriptural text declares that Brahman is the cause, and not karma either by itself or through some other mysterious factor called apūrva. According to Ś., the reference is directly to Brahman as the dispenser. He quotes a passage from the K.U. III. 8: 'This one, indeed, causes him whom he wishes to lead up from these worlds to perform good actions. This one, indeed, also causes him whom he wishes to lead downward, to perform bad actions.' See also B.G. VII. 21-22. Since the Lord has regard to the merit and demerit of the souls, the objection that a uniform cause is incapable of producing various effects does not stand. R. considers texts which ascribe potency to the various deities and proves the identity of these deities with Brahman by means of the antaryāmi Brāhmaņa. Srikantha assumes from the start the identity of the deities with the Supreme Lord. parameśvarātmakatayā vāyvādīnām. According to Śuka, Nārāyana grants fruits to the individual souls in keeping with their past actions. nārāyanāt tat-tat-jīvānām tat-tat- pūrvānuguņyena phalam bhavatīti niścetavyam.

Section 1 (1-4) THE DIFFERENT MEDITATIONS ARE ONE

III. 3. 1. sarva-vedānta-pratyayam codanādy aviśeşāt (The forms of meditation) described in all the Vedanta texts (are not different) on account of the non-difference of injunction and so on. sarva-vedānta-pratyayam: described in all the Vedanta texts; codanādy-aviśeșāt: on account of non-difference as regards injunction and so on. This part describes how the individual can by meditation on Brahman obtain final release. In different branches of Vedic learning the same meditations are described with slight or major modifi- cations. But there is unity on the nature of Brahman and the relation to it of the human soul. In the present part attempts are made to remove the contradictions in the sacred texts and achieve reconciliation of the different Vedanta texts on this matter. The meditation on prana is described in one way in B.U. VI. 1. 1 and in a different way in C.U. V. 1. 1. They are non-different because of the similarity as regards injunction, connection, name and form. There is non-difference even as regards the fruit or the result of meditation. This is true not only of prāna-vidyā but dahara-vidyā, Vaiśvānara-upāsanā, Sāndilya-vidyā, etc. Ś. believes that all these vidyas are concerned with Saguna Brahman and not Nirguna Brahman. Some of them lead to the attainment of results on earth while others lead on gradually to salvation, by way of producing knowledge. Baladeva interprets the sutra as stating the settled conclusion anta-pratyayam of all the Vedas. All the Vedas seek to teach Brahman, since all of them enjoin meditation on Brahman.

III. 3. 2. bhedān neti cen naikasyām api If it be said (that the meditations are) not (one) on account of difference (in minor points) (we reply) not so, since even in one and the same (vidya there might be minor differences). bhedät: on account of difference; na: not; iti cet: if it be said; na: not so; ekasyām api: even in the same (vidyā). In spite of secondary differences, it is reasonable to assume that the meditations of the same class are one and not different. S. and Bhäskara hold that differences in details are permissible even in the case of one and the same vidya. If the two vidyās agree in essential points, differences in details do not make them separate vidyās. Baladeva says that if the objection is raised that Brahman is designated differently in different Upanisads-in one he is said to be knowledge and bliss, B.U. III. 9. 28; in another omniscient and

Text, Translation and Notes 469 all-knowing, M.U.I.1.9-the replyis that even in the same Upanisad, Brahman is designated as knowledge, bliss as well as omniscient. So all branches speak of the same Brahman.

III. 3. 3. svādhyāyasya tathātvena hi samācāre'dhikārāc ca savavac ca tan-niyamah (The rite of carrying fire on the head is connected) with the study of the Veda because (it is described) as such in the samācāra; (this also follows) from its being a qualification (for the students of the Atharva Veda) as is the case with the (seven) oblations. svādhyāyasya: of the study of the Vedas; tathātvena: as being such; hi : because; samācāre: in samācāra (a book of that name); adhikārāt: on account of the qualification (for the students of the Atharva Veda); ca: and; savavat: like that of the (seven) oblations; ca: and; tan- niyamah: that rule. If the objection is raised that in the M.U. which deals with the knowledge of Brahman, the carrying of the fire on the head is mentioned, so this vidya of the Atharvanikas is different from all others, the sūtra according to Ś. refutes the objection by holding that the rite of carrying fire on the head is not an attribute of the vidya but of the study of the Vedas of the Atharvanikas. Samācāra is a book which deals with Vedic observances. Bhāskara reads salila-vac ca in place of sava-vac ca. Interpretation is the same. R. contends that the ceremony is not a part of the vidyā; it is a peculiarity of the study of the Veda. Baladeva breaks the sūtra into two independent parts. svādhyāyasya ... adhikārāc ca (3). sava-vac ca tan-niyama (4). (3) means: For the injunction of the study of the Veda being such, (i.e. of a general import) and because of the eligibility (of all) to the sacred duties (mentioned in the Veda), (the entire Veda must be studied). The followers of one branch are eligible for the duties enjoined by all the branches. Brahman may be realised by all the religious practices taught in all the Vedas. (4) means that while the libations are open to the followers of the Atharva Veda only and cannot be offered by the followers of the other Vedas, the worship of Brahman is universal and may be performed by all.

III. 3. 4. darśayati ca (Scripture) also declares thus. darśayati: declares; ca: also. Katha U. I. 2. 15 refers to 'that which all the Vedas declare'. S. says that it is the Nirguna Brahman which is the purport of all Vedānta texts: All vidyās relating to it are one. So also the meditation on Saguna Brahman as Vaiśvānara who is represented as extending

470 The Brahma Sūtra from heaven to earth (see also C.U. V. 18. 1) is one, and not many. The unity of all meditations is indicated here.

Section 2 (5)

PARTICULARS OF IDENTICAL VIDYĀS MENTIONED IN DIFFERENT ŚĀKHĀS OR BRANCHES SHOULD BE COMBINED IN ONE MEDITATION

III. 3. 5. upasamhāro'rthābhedād vidhiśeșavat samāne ca In the case of (a meditation) common (to several śakhas or branches) a combination (of particulars mentioned in each is to be made) since there is no difference of essential matter, even as in the case of what is subsidiary to the main sacrifice. upasamhārah: combination; arthābhedāt: since there is no difference in the object of meditation; vidhi-sesavat: as in the case of the subsidiary rites to the main sacrifice; samane: common; ca: and. The object of meditation is one only comprehending all the attributes mentioned in the different texts. The meditations are identical and their meaning is the same and so their special features are to be combined even as the subsidiary rites are combined in the performance of sacrifices like agni-hotra and the like. Baladeva begins a new section here and asks whether Brahman described as Krsna, Rāma and Nrsimha to denote sweetness, heroism, terrific character is one or different and answers that all the attributes are to be combined.

Section 3 (6-8)

SOME VIDYĀS ARE REALLY SEPARATE, THOUGH APPARENTLY IDENTICAL

III. 3. 6. anyathātvam śabdād iti cen nāviśeșāt If it be said that (the udgitha vidya of the B.U. I. 3. 7 and that of the C.U. I. 2. 7) are separate on account of (the difference of) texts, (we say), not so, on account of the non-difference (as regards essentials). anyathātvam: separateness; śabdāt: on account of (difference of) texts; iti cet: if it be said; na: not so; aviśeșāt: on account of non- difference (as regards essentials). The opponent states that the vidyās are one because in spite of differences of texts, there is unity in essentials. Both texts state that the devas and the asuras are fighting; both at first glorify speech and

Text, Translation and Notes 47I the other vital airs in their relation to the udgitha and then find fault with them and pass on to the chief vital air; both relate that through the strength of the latter, the asuras are scattered as a ball of earth is scattered when hitting a solid stone. So it is argued that the two texts constitute one vidya only. Baladeva does not begin a new section here but continues the topic of the coalescence of the different attributes of the Lord.

III. 3. 7. na vā prakaraņa-bhedāt parovarīyastvādivat Or rather there is no (unity of the vidyas) owing to the difference of subject matter, even as (the meditation on the udgitha) the highest and greatest (is different). na va: rather not; prakarana-bhedāt: owing to the difference of subject matter; parovarīyastvādivat: even as (the meditation on the udgītha as) the highest and greatest (is different from the meditation on the udgītha as abiding in the eye, etc.). The two vidyas are different on account of differences in subject matter. In C.U. I. 1. 1 only a part of the udgitha, the syllable aum, is meditated upon as the prana; in B.U. I. 3. 2, the whole udgitha hymn is meditated on as prana. So the two vidyas cannot be one. The case is similar to the meditation on udgītha enjoined in the passage, 'This is, indeed, the highest and greatest udgītha' (C.U. I. 9. 2), which is different from the one enjoined in C.U. I. 6, where the udgītha is meditated on as abiding in the eye and the sun. R. agrees that the meditations are separate since they have different objects of meditation. Nimbārka follows R.'s interpretation. Baladeva begins a new section here, with two sūtras. While in the previous section all the attributes are said to be combined while meditating on the Lord, here it is pointed out that this is the case only with the svanistha devotees, but in the case of ekantin devotees there is no such combination. He interprets prakarana to mean prakrsta karanam, excellent act (of devotion). For Baladeva, the sūtra reads: or (there is) no combination of attributes (in the case of the ekantins) on account of the difference of devotion (i.e. because the devotion of the ekantins) is one-pointed, while that of the svanistha is universal as in the case of being higher than the high, (i.e. just as the ekāntin worshipper of the golden Person in the sun does not combine the qualities of being higher than the high and so on).

III. 3. 8. samjñātaś cet tad uktam asti tu tad api If it be said (that they are one) on account of name (being the same) it has already been said (answered) but even that (identity of name in different vidyās) exists. samjñātah: on account of name (being same); cet: if it be said; tat: it;

472 The Brahma Sūtra uktam: has already been said; asti: exists; tu: but; tat: that; api: even.

of the vidyās. We have already said that identity of name does not mean unity

Terms like agnihotra, udgītha are given to many different acts, says R. Baladeva holds that even while the same name is given, the attributes of the one need not be combined in the other.

Section 4 (9)

AUM IS COMMON TO ALL THE VEDAS III. 3. 9. vyāpteś ca samañjasam And because (aum) extends (to all the Vedas), to specialise it (by the term udgītha) is appropriate. vyapteh: owing to extension (to all the Vedas); ca: and; samañjasam: is appropriate. In C.U. I. 1. 1 the aumkara and the udgitha stand in the relation of one specifying the other. They stand in the relation of sāmānādhi- karanya, abiding in a common substratum. According to R., the object of meditation is constituted by the pranava; this is termed the udgitha, viewed under the form of prāna in the C.U. In the B.U. the term udgitha denotes the whole udgītha and the object of meditation is he who produces the udgītha, i.e. the udgātri, viewed under the form of prana. So the two vidyās are separate. Srikantha holds that the udgitha qualifies aumkara and so the aumkara is the object to be meditated on. Baladeva asks whether the qualities of infancy, etc., are to be included in the meditation on the Supreme and answers that they are to be included as they are not inconsistent with the all-pervading- ness of the Supreme.

Section 5 (10)

THE UNITY OF THE PRĀŅA-VIDYĀS III. 3. 10. sarvābhedād anyatreme Since (the vidyas) are non-different everywhere, those (qualities which are found in some are to be inserted) in the other places (also). sarvābhedat: on account of non-difference everywhere; anyatra: in the other places; ime: these qualities (are to be inserted). Prāna is mentioned in C.U. VI; B.U. VI. 1 not only as the eldest and the best but also as the richest and so on. In the text of the K.U.

Text, Translation and Notes 473 only the former are mentioned. The question is whether the other attributes are to be imported into it also. The prima facie view is against such importation for each meditation is enjoined in a par- ticular form and for each a special result is prescribed. So a mixing up of the meditations should be avoided. The answer is that, as the meditations relate to one entity, prāna, the qualities mentioned in one context are likely to occur to our minds even in another and so are included in the significance of the particular form of meditation presented. Śrikantha agrees with this view. Baladeva has a different interpretation and takes the sūtra as dealing with the acts of the Lord which are eternal on account of the non-difference of all, viz. the Lord and his companions and they manifest themselves elsewhere. The acts of the Lord which he performs through cit-śakti are eternal, while those which he performs through matter are non-eternal.

Section 6 (11-13) IN ALL MEDITATIONS ON BRAHMAN, ESSENTIAL AND UNALTERABLE QUALITIES LIKE BLISS AND KNOW- LEDGE ARE TO BE INCLUDED EVERYWHERE BUT NOT OTHERS

III. 3. 11. ānandādayah pradhānasya Bliss and other qualities as belonging to the subject of the qualities (have to be attributed to Brahman everywhere). ānandādayah: bliss and other qualities; pradhānasya: of the subject, (i.e. Brahman). The question is raised whether in each place where Brahman is mentioned, we have to understand only the qualities mentioned there or all the qualities, the answer is, since Brahman to which the qualities belong is one and non-different, the qualities should also be the same. Nimbārka says that as the substratum of the qualities, Brahman is

the Highest. the same, the attributes are to be inserted in all the meditations of

III. 3. 12. priyaśirastvādyaprāpti upacayāpacayau hi bhede (Such qualities as) joy being its head and so on have no force (for other passages); for increase and decrease (are possible only) if there is difference (and not in Brahman in which there is non-difference). priyaśirastvādi: (qualities like) joy being its head, etc .; aprāptih: are not to be taken everywhere; upacaryāpacayau: increase and decrease; hi: because; bhede: (are possible) in difference.

474 The Brahma Sūtra Attributes like joy, satisfaction, great satisfaction, bliss are qualities with lower and higher degrees. These degrees are possible only where there is plurality and Brahman is devoid of plurality. They are attributed to the Highest Brahman merely as a means of fixing one's mind on it and not because they are themselves objects of contemplation. These qualities belong to the Saguna Brahman only and not to the Highest Brahman above all qualifications. This is the view of S. R. holds that these qualities are not those of Brahman but are elements in a figurative representation of Brahman under the form of an animal body.

III. 3. 13. itare tu artha-sāmānyāt But other (attributes are valid for all passages relative to Brahman) on account of identity of purport. itare: other (attributes); tu: but; artha-sāmānyat: on account of identity of purport. Attributes like bliss, knowledge, all-pervadingness which describe the nature of Brahman are to be combined since their purport is one and indivisible Brahman. R. and Śrīkaņțha interpret artha-sāmānyāt differently. 'On account of their equality with the object itself.' The qualities of bliss and the rest determine the very nature of the thing (Brahman) and are therefore similar to the thing itself and so are included in all meditations just like the thing itself. Baladeva argues that the meditation on Brahman as possessed of the attributes of all-pervadingness and the rest mentioned in T.U. leads to the attainment of Brahman, even as the meditation on him as possessed of other attributes mentioned in other texts.

Section 7 (14-15)

THE HIGHEST SELF IS HIGHER THAN EVERYTHING ELSE

III. 3. 14. ādhyānāya prayojanābhāvāt (The passage Katha U. I. 3. 10 gives information) for the purpose of meditation since there is no use (of the knowledge of the objects being higher than the senses and so on). ādhyānāya: for the purpose of meditation; prayojanābhāvāt: since there is no use. Katha U. says that beyond the senses are the objects, beyond the objects is the mind; beyond the mind is the understanding; and beyond the understanding is the great self; beyond the great self is

Text, Translation and Notes 475 the unmanifest; beyond the unmanifest is the spirit; beyond the spirit there is nothing. The question is raised whether the aim of the passage is to say that each of the things successively enumerated is higher than the preceding one or only that spirit is higher than all of them. While the opponent splits up the sentence into many and holds that the aim of the passage is to indicate the superiority of one thing over its preceding, the sutra holds that the purport of the passage is that the spirit is higher than everything for it has a purpose, viz. to accomplish final release. See Katha U.I. 3. 15: 'one is freed from the mouth of death'. R. refers to the text T.U. II. 5 which represents Brahman as having joy for its head and so on and holds that it is intended for the purpose of meditation. This interpretation is followed by Nimbārka. Śrikantha begins a new section here of four sūtras which deals with the question whether the self consisting of food and the rest (T.U. II. 2ff.) is to be meditated on constantly as the self consisting of bliss is. The answer is '[they are not to be meditated on constantly] on account of the absence of purpose [for such meditation]'. Meditation on the self consisting of food and the rest has a purpose only so long as the self consisting of bliss is not reached. When it is reached the others become meaningless. So such meditations are not to be practised perpetually. Srīkantha establishes the non-difference of cit-sakti from Brahman.

III. 3. 15. ātma-śabdāc ca And on account of the word Self. ātma-śabdāt: on account of the word Self; ca: and. The subject of discussion is called the Self. Katha U. I. 3. 12. The enumeration is not useless since it helps to turn the mind, which is outgoing gradually towards the Self. R. says that since the Self cannot really possess a head, wings and tail, its having joy for its head, etc., can only be meant figuratively, for the sake of easy comprehension. Nimbārka follows R. Śrīkantha continues the topic whether the selves consisting of food, vital breath, etc., are to be meditated on perpetually or not and gives another reason why they are not to be so meditated. The form self' applied to each of the selves of food, etc., denotes the presiding deities. Brahman alone is to be meditated on and no other deity.

476 The Brahma Sūtra

Section 8 (16-17) THE SELF SPOKEN OF IN AITAREYA ĀRANYAKA II. 4. 1. 1 IS THE HIGHEST SELF III. 3. 16. atma-grhītir itaravad uttarāt The Highest Self is meant (in the Aitareya Aranyaka II. 4. 1. 1) as in other texts (dealing with creation) on account of the subsequent qualifi- cation. atma-grhiti: the Supreme Self is meant; itaravat: as in other texts (dealing with creation); uttarat: on account of the subsequent qualification. The text considered is: 'The Self, verily, was all this; one only in the beginning. Nothing else whatsoever winked. He thought, "let me now create the worlds".' The question is whether the Self refers to the Supreme Self or Hiranya-garbha. It refers to the Supreme Self as Supreme. in other texts T.U. II. 1. 'He thought.' The thinking Self is the R. thinks that the reference is to the Self of bliss because of the passage: 'He desired, may I be many.' Śrikantha continues the topic whether the selves consisting of food and so on are to be meditated on or not and says that only the Supreme Brahman is to be meditated on and not other selves.

III. 3. 17. anvayād iti cet syād avadhāraņāt If it be said that on account of the context (the Highest Self is not meant) (we say that) it is so on account of the statement (that the Self alone existed at the beginning). anvayat: on account of the context; iti cet: if it be said; syat : it might be so; avadhāranāt: on account of the statement. The Highest Self is meant and not Hiranya-garbha. S. explains this position with reference to other texts. B.U. IV. 3. 7. R. takes sūtras 11-17 as one section. R. holds that the Self is connected with things which are not self, because the Highest Self is, as it were, viewed in them. Srikantha concludes the discussion of the question whether the selves consisting of food and the rest are to be meditated on or not with the view that there must be meditation on the Self consisting of bliss alone, on account of definite statement.

Section 9 (18) WATER AS THE DRESS OF PRĀNA III. 3. 18. kāryākhyānād apūrvam Since (the rinsing of the mouth with water) is a restatement of an act

Text, Translation and Notes 477 (already enjoined by smrti) what has not been so enjoined elsewhere (is here intended). kāryākhyānāt: on account of being a restatement of an act; apūrvam: what has not been so enjoined elsewhere. In C.U. V. 2. 2 and B.U. VI. 1. 14 we find a reference to the rinsing of the mouth with water before and after a meal. The question is whether the śruti enjoins both or only the latter. The answer is stated in the sūtra. Since the act of rinsing is enjoined on everyone by the smyti, the latter act of meditation on the water as the dress of prana is alone enjoined by the śruti. R. and Nimbārka agree with this view. Baladeva takes this sūtra as an independent section dealing with the designation of the Lord as Father. He means by apūrva, similar to what precedes (prva). The attributes of fatherhood and the like are similar to the preceding ones, bliss and so on.

Section 10 (19) VIDYĀS IN THE SAME ŚĀKHA WHICH ARE IDENTICAL OR SIMILAR HAVE TO BE COMBINED FOR THEY ARE ONE

III. 3. 19. samāna evam cābhedāt In the same (sakha) also it is thus, (there is unity of vidya) on account of non-difference (of the object of meditation). samane: in the same also; evam: it is thus; ca: also; abhedāt: on account of non-difference (of the object of meditation). Passages in different texts of the same śākhā form one vidyā as the object of meditation is the same in them. Sāndilya-vidyā is the same in Agni-rahasya, Śatapatha Brāhmana X. 6. 3. 1. Baladeva takes this sūtra as dealing with the problem whether the Lord is to be meditated on as a pure soul or as possessed of a body. The answer is 'Even [in the meditation on the form of the Lord] the sentiment is the same [samana], on account of the non- difference [of the Lord's different limbs such as eyes and so on with his very Self]'. Even as a golden image is gold throughout and by looking at different parts of the image, viz. the eyes and so on, one does not get different ideas but only one idea, viz. that of gold, so the different parts of the Lord are identical with the Lord himself and so they do not give rise to different ideas but to one idea of the Lord. Therefore the meditation on the Lord as having a form does, indeed, lead to release. evam api cakşurādīnām vailaksanyena bhāne'pi samānaika-rasaḥ sa eva hiranya-pratimādivat bhagavān vodhyah.

478 The Brahma Sūtra

Section 11 (20-22)

THE NAMES GIVEN IN B.U. V. 5. 1-2 CANNOT BE COMBINED AS THEY ARE TWO SEPARATE VIDYĀS

III. 3. 20. sambandhād evam anyatrāpi In other cases also, on account of the connection (i.e. the object of meditation is the same Brahman, we have to combine particulars) like this (i.e. as in the Sāndilya-vidya). sambandhat: on account of the connection; evam: like this; anyatra: in other cases; api: also. In B.U. V. 5. 1-2 it is said: 'The person who is there in that orb and the person who is here in the right eye, these two rest on each other.' On the analogy of the Sandilya-vidya, these two require to be combined. R. says that the text mentions two secret names of Brahman, aham and ahar (B.U. V. 5. 3 and 4), and so the opponent argues that both these names are to be comprehended in each of the two meditations. Baladeva begins a new section here dealing with the worship of the āveśāvatāras or God-possessed souls like Nārada and so on. The question is whether they are to be meditated on as possessed of the attributes of the Lord himself. The prima facie view holds that they are to be meditated on as possessed of the attributes of the Lord.

III. 3. 21. na vā viśeşāt Rather not, on account of difference (of abode). na vā: rather not; viseșāt: on account of difference (of abode). Though the vidya is one, still owing to difference in abodes the object of meditation becomes different, according to S. R. says that as Brahman is to be meditated on in two different abodes the meditations are separate. On the other hand in both forms of Sāndilya-vidya, Brahman is to be meditated on as abiding within the heart. Baladeva reads aviśeşāt for visesāt. God-possessed souls are not to be worshipped as possessed of all God-like attributes, on account of their non-difference from other souls. God-possessed souls are like other individuals and they are to be highly venerated but not worshipped like the Lord himself.

III. 3. 22. darśayati ca (The Scripture) also declares (that). darśayati: declares; ca: also. The Scripture distinctly states that the attributes are to be kept separate and not combined. It compares the two persons which are distinct. Ś mentions C.U. I. 8. 5.

Text, Translation and Notes 479 Śrīkantha takes this as a new section dealing with mandala-vidyā (C.U. I. 6. 6 and the Maha-nārayana U.) and concludes that the two vidyās are identical since Scripture shows their identity. Baladeva gives an additional reason why the God-possessed souls are not to be meditated on as possessed of the attributes of the Lord himself. Scripture (C.U. VII. 1. 1) shows this. Närada, a god-possessed soul, approaches Sanat-kumara with a view to learning about the Supreme Self from him. This shows that god-possessed souls are not perfect like the Lord. They cannot be worshipped as possessed of his attributes.

Section 12 (23)

ATTRIBUTES OF BRAHMAN MENTIONED IN RĀŅĀYANĪYA KHILA FORM AN INDEPENDENT VIDYĀ

III. 3. 23. sambhṛti dyu-vyāptyapi cātah For the same reason, the supporting (of the universe) and the pervading of the sky (attributed to Brahman) also (are not to be included in other meditations of Brahman). sambhrti: supporting (the universe); dyu-vyäptih: the pervading of the sky; api: also; ca: and; atah: for the same reason (as in the previous sūtra). The text considered is 'brahma jyesthā vīryā sambhrtāni brahmāgre jyestham divam atatāni'. 'Brahman is the best among the powers which are held together. The pre-existent Brahman in the beginning pervaded the whole sky.' These two qualities are not to be included in other places treating of brahma-vidya on account of difference of abode. These qualities and those mentioned in other vidyās like the Sāndilya-vidya are of such a nature as to exclude each other. The mere fact that certain vidyas relate to Brahman does not constitute their unity. Brahman, though one, is meditated on in manifold ways, on account of its different aspects. ekam api brahma vibhūti-bhedair anekair anekadhopāsyata iti sthitih. Ś. So the meditation referred to in this sūtra is an independent vidya standing by itself. Baladeva says that the attributes of holding together and pervading the sky are not to be combined in the meditation on God- possessed souls because they are not equal to the Lord.

Section 13 (24)

THE TWO VIDYĀS ARE TO BE HELD APART

III. 3. 24. puruşa-vidyāyām iva cetareșām anāmnānāt And (since the qualities) as (mentioned in the purusa-vidya of C.U.) are not mentioned in that of the others, (the two are not one.)

480 The Brahma Sūtra puruşa-vidyāyām iva: as in the purușa-vidyā (of the C.U.); ca: and; itareșām: of the others; anamnanat: on account of non-mention. The question relates to the two vidyās (C.U. III. 16. 1; Taittirīya Åranyaka X 64) which compare the sacrifice with life, purusa- yajña. The details and the purpose in the two are different and the similarities are unimportant. So the purusa-vidyā of the C.U. cannot be combined with that in the Taittirīya text. R. reads: 'puruşa-vidyāyām api' while Ś. reads: 'puruşa-vidyāyām iva', though both reach the same conclusion. Baladeva concludes his discussion of the worship of God-possessed souls. Since they are not equal to the Lord, they are not to be wor- shipped as possessed of his attributes.

Section 14 (25) CERTAIN PASSAGES RELATING TO SACRIFICES AT THE BEGINNING OF SOME UPANISADS DO NOT FORM PART OF BRAHMA-VIDYĀ III. 3. 25. vedhādy artha-bhedāt (Certain mantras relating to) piercing, etc., (are not part of the brahma- vidya) since they have a different meaning. vedhādi: piercing and so on; artha-bhedat: because of difference of meaning. Certain passages met with in the beginning of some Upanisads do not belong to the main teaching of the Upaniads, viz. brahma-vidyā, since they are obviously connected with sacrificial acts; their textual collation does not make them parts of brahma-vidyā. Baladeva takes this as a separate section dealing with the question whether one should meditate on the Lord not only as possessing the sweet and the majestic attributes like bliss and omnipotence but also of destructive and fearful attributes such as piercing and so on. He answers that we should not: 'One who is desirous of release should not meditate on the Lord as possessed of the attributes of piercing and so on, on account of the difference of result [of such a meditation] which does not lead to release as the meditation on the Lord as sweet and majestic does.'

Text, Translation and Notes 48I

Section 15 (26)

THE STATEMENT THAT THE GOOD AND EVIL DEEDS OF A PERSON WHO HAS ATTAINED KNOWLEDGE GO TO HIS FRIENDS AND ENEMIES RESPECTIVELY, IS VALID FOR ALL TEXTS WHICH SPEAK OF THE DISCARDING OF GOOD AND EVIL DEEDS BY SUCH A PERSON

III. 3. 26. hānau tūpāyana-šabda-śeşatvāt kušāc chandah stuty- upagānavat tad uktam Where the discarding (of good and evil) is mentioned (the obtaining of this good and evil by others has to be included) on account of this word 'receiving' being supplementary (to the statement about discarding) as in the case of Kusas, the metres, the praise and the recitation. This has been stated (in the Pūrva Mimāmsā). hanau: where (only) the discarding (of good and evil is mentioned); tu: but; upāyana-sabda-sesatvat: on account of the word 'receiving' being supplementary (to the word discarding); kuśa-chandah-stuti- upaganavat: as in the case of Kusas (which are used for keeping count of hymns, metres, praise and recitation); tat: that; uktam. has been stated (in the Pūrva Mīmāmsā). Jaimini says that while some texts mention only Kuśas and others state that they should be made of udumbara, tree, the first will have to be completed in the light of the other. (Pūrva Mīmāmsā X. 8-15.) So also if one text mentions the discarding of good and evil by a person attaining knowledge (C.U. VIII. 13; see also M.U. III. 1. 3), and another says that good and evil are obtained by his friends and enemies respectively (K.U. I. 4), the two have to be taken together. S. discusses another possible interpretation from the word dhu to tremble, shake and not discard. This would mean that good and evil still cling to a person who attains knowledge though their effects are retarded owing to the knowledge. Ś. argues against this view as the subsequent discussion in K.U. shows that others receive this good and evil which is not possible unless the person who attains know- ledge has discarded them. Baladeva raises a different question here whether the meditation on the Lord is obligatory or optional for freed souls. He reads achanda for chanda meaning option. For him the sūtra means: 'But on the destruction [of bondage, the released souls are under no obligation to practise meditation because they have obtained] nearness [upāyana to the Lord] and because scriptural texts are supplementary [to this, i.e. are meant for leading the soul to this stage, viz. release], just as the singing of hymns with Kuśa [in hand] is optional [achanda for a student who has finished his daily duties], it is declared [by Scripture].' The aim of all texts is to teach men

482 The Brahma Sūtra meditation so that they may attain salvation. When the end is reached, when men are freed and approach the Lord, it is no longer necessary for them to go on with meditation.

Section 16 (27-28) ONE SHAKES OFF GOOD AND EVIL DEEDS, NOT ON THE ROAD TO BRAHMA-LOKA BUT AT THE MOMENT OF THE SOUL'S DEPARTURE FROM THE BODY

III. 3. 27. sāmparāye tartavyābhāvāt tatha hy anye At the (time of) departure, (he frees himself from the effects of his works), there being nothing to be reached (by him on the way to brahma-loka through these works) ; for thus others (declare). sāmparāye: at the time of departure; tartavya-abhāvāt: there being nothing to be reached; tatha: thus; hi: for; anye: others. K.U. (I. 4) says: 'He comes to the river vijara (the Ageless) there he shakes off his good deeds and evil deeds.' The discarding .. takes place, according to the opponent, on the way to brahma-loka and not at the time of death. The sutra says that the man of reali- sation gets rid of the results of his deeds at the time of death. The man possessing knowledge is about to reach Brahman and there is nothing to be reached by him on the way through his good and evil works. This is affirmed by other passages also. C.U. VIII. 13. 1; VI. 14. 2. R. says that there are no further pleasures and pains to be enjoyed as the result of good and evil deeds, different from the obtaining of Brahman, which is the fruit of knowledge. Śrīkantha takes 27, 28, 29 as the statement of the prima facie view. Baladeva interprets the word samparaya as 'love of the Lord'. Samparaya means one in whom all the truths meet, samparayati tattvāni yasmin. Love of samparāya is sāmparāya. So Baladeva interprets the sutra: When the love of the Lord (has arisen) (it is no longer obligatory for one to practise meditation) on account of there being nothing to be crossed (there is no bondage any more) for thus others declare.

III. 3. 28. chandata ubhayāvirodhāt According to his liking (he gets rid of good and evil while living) since there is no contradiction between the two. chandatah: according to his liking; ubhaya-avirodhāt: on account of non-contradiction between the two. When the body is left behind, man can no longer accomplish according to his liking, that effort which consists in self-restraint and

Text, Translation and Notes 483 pursuit of knowledge and which is the cause of the obliteration of all his good and evil deeds. So obliteration cannot take place, and we must assume that the requisite effort is made and the result earned at an earlier moment. A disembodied soul cannot undergo the discipline for attaining knowledge, which only an embodied being can do according to its liking. So if the works of a knower persist after the fall of the body, it will not be possible for him to get rid of them seeing that there is no possibility for acquiring further knowledge. If knowledge be the cause of the destruction of works, the moment one acquires knowledge, the works must decay. This view agrees with all the texts. The attainment of brahma-loka is not possible so long as there is a body but there is no such difficulty about shaking off of good and evil results. This view avoids a contradiction. It makes knowledge the

Scripture. direct cause of the destruction of works and does not contradict

R. explains K.U. I. 4 which seems to go against the view that the soul leaves all its works at the time of leaving the body. '[The different parts of the text are to be arranged] at will, on account of the non-contradiction of both [reason and Scripture].' We must put 'he then discards good and evil deeds' before the other, 'having attained the path of the gods, he comes to the world of fire'. Śrikantha is of the view that the sūtra states the opponent's view. Baladeva begins a new section dealing with two ways of meditating on the Lord. We may meditate on him as the sweet or the majestic as both lead to salvation through the will of the Lord since there is no conflict between the two. The word 'no' is taken from III. 3. 22.

Section 17 (29-30)

HE WHOSE KNOWLEDGE IS LIMITED TO THE MANIFESTED ABSOLUTE GOES ON THE PATH OF THE GODS WHILE THE SOUL OF HIM WHO KNOWS THE UNMANIFESTED BRAHMAN BECOMES ONE WITH IT WITHOUT GOING TO ANY OTHER PLACE

III. 3. 29. gater arthavattvam ubhayathā'nyathā hi virodhah A meaning has to be given to the going (on the path of the gods) in a twofold manner; for otherwise (there would result) a contradiction. gateh: of the journey (of the soul along the path of the gods) arthavattvam: meaningfulness; ubhayatha: in a twofold manner; anyathā: otherwise; hi: for; virodhah: a contradiction. S.says that the journey along the path of the gods is true only of the worshippers of Saguna Brahman; it has no meaning for the devotees

484 The Brahma Sūtra

of Nirguna Brahman whose ignorance is destroyed by knowledge. If the journey applies to him also, texts like M.U. III. 1. 3 where the knower 'shaking off good and evil and free from stain' is said to 'obtain supreme equality with the Highest' become meaningless. How can one who has become Brahman go to another place? For R., this sutra states the prima facie view. Only on the view that a part of the good and evil works is left behind at the time of the soul's departure from the body and another part later on, a meaning can be found for the scriptural declaration of the soul proceeding on the path of the gods. For otherwise there would be a contradiction. For if all the works perished at the time of the soul's departure from the body, the subtle body would also perish and there can be no going on the part of the self. So it cannot be that at the time of the soul's departure from the body, all works should perish without any remainder. Nimbarka follows R.'s interpretation. Śrikantha reverses the order of the sūtras 29 and 30, makes 30 the prima facie view and 29 the correct conclusion. There is meaning for the journey on two ways only if the soul discards a part of its karma at the time of its departure from the body and the rest after crossing the river vijara, for otherwise there is contradiction. If all the karmas of the soul are destroyed completely at the time of its departure from the body it will become freed immediately and it would not be necessary for it to travel along the path of the gods, attain Brahman and then be freed. Thus there will be contradiction between passages which speak of travelling along the path of the gods to attain Brahman and release. Again, if the soul becomes freed as soon as it leaves the body, the texts which designate that the soul attains its real form on approaching Brahman will also be contra- dicted. To avoid these twofold contradictions, we must say that all the karmas of the soul do not decay completely as soon as it leaves the body. Though the vidya of the soul leads it to travel along the path of the gods, yet as actual release is not attained until one directly approaches Brahman, some part of karma still clings to the soul until it crosses the sphere of matter and actually attains the Lord. Baladeva observes that both the paths, meditation on God as the sweet and meditation on God as the majestic, lead to the Lord.

III. 3. 30. upapannas tal-laksanārthopalabdher lokavat (The twofold view adopted above) is reasonable for we observe a purpose characterised thereby (i.e. a purpose for going); as in the world. upapannah: is reasonable; tat-laksanārtha-upalabdheh: for a purpose characterised thereby is observed; lokavat: as in the world. The texts mention certain results which can be obtained by the worshipper, only by going to different places, such as mounting the

Text, Translation and Notes 485 couch and holding conversation with Brahmā. But a journey is meaningless for one whose ignorance is destroyed. This is seen in the world. To reach a village we have to go by the path which leads to it; to get rid of one's illness no such journey is required. yathā loke grāma-prāptau deśāntara-prāpaņah panthā apeksyate nārogya-prāptau. Ś. R. holds that there is the complete decay of all works at the time of the soul's separation from the body, on account of finding things which are marks of that (the soul's connection with the body) as in the world. A pond dug for the purpose of irrigation continues to exist and may be used for other purposes such as supplying drinking water, even when its original purpose has been served, so the subtle body continues to exist for serving a purpose, viz. attainment of Brahman, though its original purpose, viz. the undergoing of karma, is absent. Bhäskara says that in the K.U. (I. 5-6) we find that the soul enters into conversation with Kārya-Brahma and this is not possible unless it travels through the path of light and so on. This shows that it is accompanied by the subtle body since in ordinary experience we find that only those who are endowed with sense-organs can enter into conversation. The subtle body disappears only when the soul attains the Supreme Brahman through the Kārya-Brahmā. Baladeva asks which of the two paths of meditation, God the Sweet or God the Majestic, is the higher. The devotee who meditates on the Lord as the sweet wins his favour. What is the stage when the accumulated merit and demerit of an enlightened person leave him? Is it at death or later? The prima facie view is that there is no object in its continuance after death, as there is no further use for karma. When the death of the body occurs, karma ceases for the enlightened person. S., Bhāskara, R., Nimbārka and Vijñāna-bhikșu accept this position. R., Śrīkaņtha and Nimbārka believe that even the enlightened one has to proceed along the path of light, arciradi-mārga, before attaining Brahman. The gross body being destroyed at death and there being no karma left to form a subtle body, how can there be departure along a path? Srikantha argues that the cessation of karma should be understood to take place in two instalments, at death and at a later stage on the crossing of the river virajā. As long as departure along a path is admitted the continuance of bondage is also admitted. Only with the final attainment of Brahman the intellect expands and the self manifests its full stature. Prior to that the intellect is in a state of contraction (samkucita) which is the characteristic of souls in samsāra. Samsāra does not exist in the absence of karma. Till the river Viraja is crossed, we must admit residual karma. Beyond the river is the abode of final release. R. and Nimbarka do not accept this position. They think that, though karma ceases, a subtle body may yet continue by the potency of the meditation on Brahman. Though the subtle body may

486 The Brahma Sūtra require karma for its creation, it may be kept on independently of it, even as a tank dug for irrigation purposes may continue to exist (when that purpose has been otherwise fulfilled) and serve as a source of drinking water. While Ś. and Vijñāna-bhiksu deny departure in the case of the enlightened one, Bhaskara upholds the doctrine of departure. He believes that the destruction of good and evil deeds is essential to departure on the path of light. If bad deeds are not destroyed, there will be no upward departure at all; if good deeds are not destroyed the departure will be followed by return to the world of samsāra and this is inconsistent with enlightenment.

Section 18 (31-32) III. 3. 31. aniyamah sarvāsām avirodhah śabdānumānābhyām There is no restriction (as to the going on the path of the gods as it applies) to all (vidyas of the Saguna Brahman). There is no contra- diction as is seen from the śruti and the smrti. aniyamah: (there is) no restriction; sarvāsām: (the path applies) to all; avirodhah: (there is) no contradiction; śabda-anumānābhyām: (as is evident) from the śruti and the smyti. Ś. argues that going on the path of the gods is connected equally with all those vidyas which have prosperity for their aim. Scripture declares that not only those who know the pañcāgni-vidyā (C.U. V. 10. 1) but also those who understand other vidyas and those who in the forest follow faith and austerities proceed on the path of the gods. See also B.G. VIII. 26. R. holds that all those who meditate on Brahman, irrespective of the distinction between saguna and nirguna, proceed after death on the path of the gods. R. reads sarvesam, all worshippers, and not sarvāsām, all saguņa-vidyās. This is sūtra 32 in R. Baladeva reads avirodhāt for avirodhah. 'There is no rule [that meditation, prayers, singing the name of the Lord and the rest are to be performed conjointly always as a means to salvation, since any one of them may singly lead to salvation] because there is no contradiction of all [texts] on account of verbal testimony and inference.'

III. 3. 32. yāvad-adhikāram avasthitir ādhikārikāņām Of those who have an office to fulfil, there is subsistence (of the body) as long as the office lasts. yāvat-adhikāram: so long as the office lasts; avasthitih: subsistence (corporeal existence); ādhikārikānām: of those who have an office to fulfil.

Text, Translation and Notes 487 Ś. says that the bliss of Brahman is enjoyed here and now by virtue of the knowledge of Brahman and there is no question of taking it on trust like the attainment of paradise, svarga, after death. This sūtra says that ordinarily a person after attaining knowledge is not reborn. But the case is different with those who have a mission to fulfil. Those perfected sages take one or more births until their mission is fulfilled; after which they are not born again. Though they are reborn, they are not subject to ignorance. Their cases are analogous to those of jivan-muktas, who, even after attaining knowledge, continue their corporeal existence so long as their prārabdha karma lasts. The divine mission of these people is com- parable to the prārabdha karma. Ś. admits that some persons although knowing Brahman attained new bodies, brahmavidām api keşāmcid itihāsa-purāņayor dehāntarot- patti-darśanāt. Apāntaratamas, Vasiștha, Bhrgu, Sanat-kumāra, Dakşa, Nārada assumed new bodies, after attaining knowledge of Brahman. Those to whom the Highest Lord has entrusted certain offices, though they possess complete knowledge which is the cause of release, last as long as their office lasts, their works not yet being exhausted. They obtain release only when their office comes to an end. teşām apāntaratamahprabhrtinām veda-pravartanādişu loka- sthiti-hetuşv adhikāresu niyuktānām adhikara-tantratvāt. sthiteh yathā'sau bhagavān savitā sahasra-yuga-paryantam jagato'dhikāram caritvā tad-avasāne udayāstamaya-varjitah kaivalyam anubhavati (see C.U. III. 11. 1). evam apāntaratamah-prabhrtayo'pīśvarāh parameś- vareņa teşu teşvadhikāresu niyuktās santah satyapi samyagdarśane kaivalya-hetāv akşīņa-karmāņo yāvad-adhikāram avatisthante tad- avasāne cāpavrjyanta ity aviruddham. As long as there is adhikāra, they are subject to prārabdha karma. They however pass, according to their free will, from one body to another, preserving all the time the memory of their identity. R. points out that in the case of the persons who hold office, the effects of the works which gave rise to the offices continue to exist as long as the office itself does and so they do not after death enter on the path beginning with light.

Section 20 (33) NEGATIVE DESCRIPTIONS ARE TO BE COMBINED

III. 3. 33. aksaradhiyam tv avarodhah sāmānya-tadbhāvābhyām upasadvat tad uktam But the (negative) conceptions concerning the Immutable are to be comprehended (in all meditations on the Immutable) on account of the

488 The Brahma Sūtra similarity and of the object being the same as in the case of the upasad (the offerings). This has been said (in the Pūrva Mīmamsa III. 3. 9). akşaradhiyam: of the (negative) conceptions of the Immutable; tu: but; avarodhah: comprehension; sāmānya-tadbhāvābhyām: on account of the similarity (of negative descriptions) and the object (the immutable Brahman) being the same; upasadvat: as in the case of the upasad (offering); tad: this; uktam: has been said. In B.U. III. 8. 8-9 and M.U. I. 1. 5-6, we have negative descriptions of the Immutable. Are they to be treated as two separate vidyās or one vidya? The opponent says that these des- criptions do not directly specify the nature of Brahman as the positive characterisations as bliss, truth, etc., do; so the denial is valid only for the text in which it occurs and not for others. The sūtra refutes this objection according to S. and argues that such denials are to be comprehended since the method of teaching Brahman through denial is the same and the object of the instruction is also the same, viz. the Immutable Brahman. The case is analogous to the upasad offerings. Though the mantras are found only in the Sama Veda the priests of the Yajur Veda also use them. For R., he who thinks of Brahman must think of it as having for its essential nature bliss, knowledge, etc., in so far as distinguished by the absence of grossness and the like. These qualities are no less essential than bliss and must therefore be included in all meditations on Brahman.

Section 21 (34) M.U. III. 1. 1; KAȚHA U. 3. 1 FORM ONE VIDYĀ III. 3. 34. iyad-āmananāt On account of the same being described. iyat: this much, the same; amananāt: on account of being described. In the two texts, M.U. III. 1. 1; Katha U. I. 3. 1, according to S., the opponent says that in the former one eats the fruit while the other does not, in the latter both of them enjoy the results of their good actions and therefore the object of meditation is not identical. The sutra contends that they form one vidya, for both describe the same Lord as existing in the form of the individual. The object is to teach about the Supreme Brahman and show the identity of the Supreme and the individual. Since the object of meditation is one, the vidyās are also one. According to R., the sūtra contains a reply to an objection raised against the conclusion reached in the previous sūtra. Bhäskara reads īsat. In both the texts the Lord and the individual soul are designated as the objects to be known. So they both constitute the same vidyā. Baladeva means by āmananāt: on account of scriptural declaration.

Text, Translation and Notes 489

Section 22 (35-36)

B.U. III. 4. 1 AND III. 5. 1 CONSTITUTE ONE VIDYĀ

III. 3. 35. antarā bhūta-grāmavat svātmanah (There is the same teaching) as the Self is within all, as in the case of the aggregate of the elements. antara: as being within all; bhūta-gramavat: as in the case of the aggregate of elements; svätmanah: (teaching) of the same self. To the objection that the two passages B.U. III. 4. 1; III. 5.1 refer to two separate teachings, and two separate objects, the answer is given that the Supreme Self is the object in both cases since two different selves cannot be simultaneously the innermost of all in the same body, even as none of the elements constituting the body can be the innermost of all in the true sense of the term though, relatively speaking, one element may be said to be inside another. The same Self is taught in both the texts. Ś. gives Ś.U. VI. 11 as a possible scriptural text intended by the author: 'The one God hidden in all beings ... the witness, the knower; the only one devoid of qualities.' The object of knowledge is one and therefore the teaching is one. Baladeva begins a new section here with three sūtras dealing with the topic of the identity of the Lord and his city. In the City of the Lord, everything being a manifestation of the Lord is but the Lord himself though they look like material objects to the devotees. He interprets the next sūtra as declaring that the Lord is both the dweller and the residence. He is identical with the city and yet dwells within the city. Everything is possible in the case of the Supreme. Bhäskara holds that, as there are different teachings, the objects taught are also different. R. argues that the repetition of question and answer serves the purpose of showing that the same Brahman is the cause of breathing, etc. (B.U. III. 4. 1), and is beyond all hunger, thirst and so on (B.U. III. 5. 1). Nimbarka agrees with this view and holds that in C.U. VI. we have the same kind of repetition to demonstrate the attributes of Brahman.

III. 3. 36. anyathā bhedānupapattir iti cen nopadeśāntaravat If it be said that otherwise the separation (of the teachings) cannot be accounted for; (we say) not so; (it is) like (the repetition in) another teaching. anyatha: otherwise; bhedanupapattih: the separation cannot be accounted for; iti cet: if it be said; na: not so; upadeśāntaravat: like another teaching. The reference is to C.U. VI. where there is repetition intended to make the student understand the subject convincingly. Q*

490 The Brahma Sūtra

Section 23 (37)

AITAREYA ĀRANYAKA II. 2. 4. 6 CONSTITUTES TWO MEDITATIONS *

III. 3. 37. vyatihāro visimșanti hītaravat (There is) reciprocity (of meditations for the Scriptures) prescribe (this) as in other cases. vyatihārah: reciprocity (of meditations); viśimșanti: (the Scriptures) prescribe (or distinguish); hi: for; itaravat: as in other cases. The Aitareya Aranyaka text II. 2. 4. 6 reads: 'What I am that he is; what he is that am I' tad yo'ham so'sau, yo'sau so'ham. The question is raised whether the meditation is to be of a reciprocal nature, i.e. identifying the worshipper with the being in the sun and inversely identifying the being in the sun with the worshipper or only in the first suggested way. The answer is given that he is to be meditated in both ways for Brahman who has no form can be worshipped even as possessing a form.

Section 24 (38)

B.U. V. 4. 1 and V. 5. 2 TREAT OF ONE TEACHING

III. 3. 38. saiva hi satyādayaḥ The same (satya-vidya is taught in both places) for (attributes like) satya and others (are found in both places). sā eva: the same (satya-vidyā); hi: for; satyādayaḥ: (attributes like) satya, etc. The two texts speak of one meditation and the results are the same. Some commentators think that the reference in the sūtra is not to passages in B.U. V. 4 and V. 5 but to the C.U. (I. 6. 1, 8; I. 7.7). S. thinks that this is not so for there is nothing in the B.U. text to connect the meditation with sacrificial acts. The subject-matter is different, the teachings are separate and the details of the two should be held apart. According to R., sutras 35-38 constitute one section only and the subject-matter is the same as that of section 22 above. Baladeva reads sā, the Parā-śakti of the Lord alone is truth and the rest. In other words the attributes of the Lord like truth, omniscience, etc., are modifications of the Para-sakti of the Lord. They are real and constitute the essential nature, svarupa, of the Lord. They are not illusory.

Text, Translation and Notes 49I

Section 25 (39)

C.U. VIII. 1 AND B.U. IV. 4. 22 ARE ONE TEACHING

III. 3. 39. kāmādītaratra tatra cāyatanādibhyah (Qualities like true) desire, etc. (mentioned in C.U. VIII. 1. 1 are to be inserted) in the other and here on account of the abode and so on. kāmādi: desire, etc .; itaratra: in the other; tatra: (those mentioned) in the other; ca: and; āyatanādibhyah: on account of the abode and so on. The sutra says that the two passages form one teaching, and the qualities mentioned in each passage are to be combined in the other for many points are common to both. There is the same abode, the same Lord who is the object of meditation and so on. There is, however, one difference. The C.U. passage treats of Brahman with qualities and the B.U. passage of Brahman without qualities. But then the determinate Brahman is one with the indeterminate. This sūtra prescribes a combination of qualities for glorifying Brahman and not for the purpose of worship, gunavatas tu brahmana ekatvād vibhūti pradarśanāyāyam guņopasamhāras sūtrito nopāsanāyeti drastavyam. Ś. Śrīkaņtha mentions Mahā-nārāyaņa U. X. 7 in addition to the C. U. and B.U. texts. Baladeva takes the words sa eva from the preceding sūtra and makes out that the Parā-sakti of the Lord creates all objects of desire elsewhere and here for he is all-pervading, āyatana.

Section 26 (40-41)

THE QUESTION ABOUT PRĀŅĀGNIHOTRA

III. 3. 40. ādarād alopah On account of respect shown there is non-omission. adarāt: on account of respect shown; alopah: no omission. The sutra gives the opponent's view that pranagnihotra, which enjoins the offering of food to the priests, should be observed even in the days of fasting. There should be no omission of it. See C.U. V. 19. 1; V. 24. 2, 4. R. takes sūtras 39-41 as one section. This one and the next sūtra discuss meditations on Brahman. To the objection that the qualities of control and truthful wishes cannot be regarded as real, pāram- ärthika, as other passages describe Brahman as free from all qualities, this sutra gives the answer which, according to R., is that these qualities are not to be omitted as they are stated with emphasis.

492 The Brahma Sūtra Śrīkantha takes it as a separate section. He argues that the attributes of physical form, etc., of Siva are true and eternal and not fictitious and impermanent. For Baladeva, this sutra raises the question that if Śrī is identical with the Para-sakti of the Lord, she must be identical with the Lord himself and so cannot be devoted to the Lord, who is her own self and gives the answer: 'On account of her great regard for the Lord there is non-cessation of her devotion to him.' Though one with the Lord Śrī cannot but love and be devoted to him who is her very existence even as a branch cannot but love the tree or the ray the moon.

III. 3. 41. upasthite'tas tad-vacanāt When food is served, from that (the offering is to be made) for so the text declares. upasthite: when food is served; atah: from that; tat-vacanat: for so the text declares. Only on the days when the food is taken, the first portion is to be offered to the pranas and not on fasting days. R. holds that even those who are desirous of release may meditate on the Supreme as possessed of qualities. The possession of the qualities forms part of the experience of the released soul itself. For Srikantha, attainment of equality with Siva is Supreme release.

Section 27 (42)

MEDITATIONS CONNECTED WITH CERTAIN SACRIFICIAL ACTS ARE NOT PARTS OF THE LATTER

III. 3. 42. tan-nirdhāraņāniyamas tad-drsteh prthag hy apratibandhah phalam (There is) non-restriction of the assertions concerning them (sacrificial acts) because this is seen (in Scripture); a separate result, viz. non- obstruction (of the success of the sacrifice), (belongs to them). tat-nirdhārana-aniyamah: (there is) non-restriction of the assertions concerning them; tat-drsteh: that is seen; prthak: separate; hi: for; apratibandhah: non-obstruction; phalam: result. Certain meditations are mentioned in connection with some sacrifices. The sūtra says that these meditations are not a part of the sacrifices. C.U. I. 1. 10; I. 10. 9, make out that there is no insepara- bility between the two. Besides, meditations and sacrifices have separate results. The meditation does not interfere with the result of the sacrifice. The result of the sacrifice may be delayed owing to the interference of the karma of the sacrificer but the meditation

Text, Translation and Notes 493 destroys the effects of that and the results are attained earlier. But the sacrifice does not depend on the meditation for its results. Meditation is not a part of the sacrifice and it is therefore optional. Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa use this sūtra to show the superiority of meditation to work. Baladeva takes this as a separate section and raises an altogether different question, whether the Lord is to be meditated on as Krsna alone and holds there is no such restriction. While the meditation on Krsna is the direct (unobstructed) means to salvation, the worship of other deities is the indirect means.

Section 28 (43) MEDITATION ON AIR AND LIFE ARE TO BE HELD APART

III. 3. 43. pradānavad eva tad uktam Even as in the case of the offerings (Vayu and Prana must be held apart). This has been stated (in the Pūrva Mīmamsa Sūtra). pradanavat: as in the case of the offerings; eva: even; tat: that; uktam: has been stated. In B.U. I. 5. 21, Prāna is said to be the best among the organs of the body and Vayu the best among the devas. In C.U. IV. 3. 1 and 3, Vāyu is said to be the absorber of the devas and Prāna is said to be the general absorber of the organs of the body. Are they to be treated as separate or not? The sūtra says they should be treated as separate. The texts represent Vāyu and Prāna as different. Even as the offerings are given separately to Indra the ruler, the monarch and the sovereign according to his different functions though he is one God, so also the meditations on Vāyu and Prāna are to be kept separate. R. takes up C.U. VIII. 1ff. and points out that there is first a meditation on the Highest Self and then separately a meditation on the qualities. The opponent maintains that as the two can be comprised in one meditation, it is not necessary to repeat the meditations. The sūtra holds that the meditation has to be repeated for there is a difference between the Supreme in its essential nature and as possessing the qualities. Here the analogy of offerings is cited. Baladeva treats this sūtra as a separate section dealing with the grace of the spiritual preceptor. This is necessary for salvation in addition to the knowledge of the Vedas.

494 The Brahma Sūtra

Section 29 (44-52)

THE FIRES MENTIONED IN SATAPATHA BRĀHMANA ARE NOT PARTS OF THE SACRIFICIAL ACTS BUT SUBJECTS OF MEDITATION III. 3. 44. lingabhūyastvāt taddhi balīyas tad api On account of the abundance of indicatory marks, (the fires of the mind, speech, etc., mentioned in the Agni-Rahasya section of the B.U. are not parts of the sacrificial action) for [this the indicatory mark] is stronger (than the general subject-matter). That also (has been stated in the Pūrve Mīmāmsā Sūtra). linga-bhūyastvāt: on account of the abundance of the indicatory marks; tat: it (indicatory mark); hi: for; balīyah: is stronger; tat: that; api: also. In the Agni-rahasya of the Satapatha Brāhmana (X. 5. 3. 3, 12) certain fires named after mind, speech, etc., are mentioned. The question is raised whether they are parts of the sacrifice or are independent meditations. The sutra adopts the latter view for the indicatory marks that they are subjects of meditation and are stronger than the context or general subject-matter. See Pūrva Mīmāmsā Sūtra III. 3. 14, which states: 'If there be combination of direct association, indicatory mark, syntactical connection, general subject matter [context], place and name, then each succeeding one is weaker [than each preceding one] on account of its remoteness from the meaning.' R. takes this sutra as an independent section dealing with the question whether the dahara-vidya of Mahā-nārāyana U. (XI) is the same as that which is mentioned in the previous section of the U. (X), and answers that the same object is meditated on in all brahma- vidyas on account of the many specific indications that Nārāyana is the object to be meditated on in all brahma-vidyās. Srikantha deals with the matter in the same way as R .; only for Nārāyana he substitutes Rudra accompanied by Umā (see Mahā-nārāyana U. XIII). Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa follow Ś. Baladeva takes this as a separate section dealing with the grace of the spiritual teacher.

III. 3. 45. pūrva-vikalpah prakaraņāt syāt kriyāmānasavat (The fire spoken of) is a particular form of the preceding one on account of the subject-matter; it is a part of the sacrifice as in the case of the mānasa cup. pūrva-vikalpah: a particular form of the preceding one; prakaranāt:

Text, Translation and Notes 495

on account of the subject-matter; syāt: should be; kriyā: part of the sacrifice; mānasavat: as in the case of the mānasa cup. The opponent points out that in the offering to Praja-pati where the earth is regarded as the cup and the sea as the soma (Tāndya Brāhmaņa IV. 9; Taittirīya Samhitā VII. 3. 1) though it is a mental act only, it is treated as a part of the sacrifice, so also these fires, though mental, are parts of the sacrifice and not independent meditations on account of the subject-matter. They are alternative forms of the first-mentioned fire, vikalpa-visesa or, as Anandagiri puts it, prakāra-bheda. R. and Nimbārka adopt the same interpretation. Baladeva begins a new section here with two sūtras dealing with the meditation on the Self as identical with the Supreme.

III. 3. 46. atideśāc ca And on account of the extension (of the attributes of the first to these fires). atideśāt: on account of the extension; ca: and. The opponent gives another reason in support of this view. As the text attributes the qualities of the actual fire to the others, they are a part of the sacrifice. See Śatapatha Brāhmaņa X. 3. 3. 11. Baladeva interprets the sutra: 'Also on account of analogies.' In the Gopāla-uttara-tāpanī U. the Lord is compared to a loving father and the devotee to his son. This shows that the individual soul is not identical with the Lord. So meditations like 'I am he' are only modes of devotion and do not indicate any identity between the two.

III. 3. 47. vidyaiva tu nirdhāraņāt But (the fires) are indeed a meditation, on account of the assertion. vidyā: meditation; eva: indeed; tu: but; nirdhāranāt: on account of the assertion (of the text). 'But' refutes the opponent's position. The fires constitute a meditation, for the text says: 'they are made of knowledge only.' 'By knowledge and meditation they are made for him who thus knows.' Śatapatha Brāhmana X. 5. 3. 12. R. and Nimbarka take this and the next sūtra as one. Baladeva begins a new section here with three sütras showing that devotion based on knowledge alone is the means to salvation.

III. 3. 48. darśanāc ca And because (indicatory marks of that) are seen (in the text). darśanāt: because (indicatory marks are) seen; ca: and. The indicatory marks are those mentioned in sūtra 44. R. makes out that there is seen in the text a performance con- sisting of thought only to which the fires stand in a subsidiary

496 The Brahma Sūtra relation. From this it follows that the entire performance is an act of meditation. (See Śatapatha Brāhmaņa X. 5. 3. 3.) While S., Bhaskara and Baladeva take this as a separate sūtra, R. and Nimbarka take this sutra along with the previous one. Baladeva makes out that the direct vision of the Lord is attainable through vidya alone.

III. 3. 49. śrutyādi-balīyastvāc ca na bādhah (And the view that the fires constitute an independent meditation) cannot be refuted, owing to the greater force of the sruti. śrutyādi-balīyastvāt: because of the greater force of śruti, etc .; ca: and; na bādhah: cannot be refuted. The Purva Mīmamsa tells us that scriptural statement (śruti), indicatory mark (linga) and syntactical connection (vākya) are of greater force than subject-matter (prakarana) and these three means of proof confirm the view that the fires are independent meditations. The text is 'they are piled up by the mind alone' (Satapatha Brahmana X. 5. 3. 12); the indicatory mark is found in the passage: 'All beings at all times pile up [those fires] for him who knows thus, even while he sleeps.' (Ibid.) The syntactical connection also is found in the text: 'For through knowledge alone these are piled up for one who knows thus.' (Ibid.) Baladeva considers the objection that karma or karma and vidyā are the means to salvation and holds that vidya alone is the cause of salvation as the scriptural texts quoted in support of this view are of greater authority than the smrti texts quoted in support of the objection.

III. 3. 50. anubandhādibhyah prajñāntara-prthaktva-vad drstaś ca tad uktam From the connection and so on, (the fires constitute a separate meditation), even as other cognitions are separate. And (it is) seen (that in spite of the subject-matter a sacrifice is treated as independent). This has been stated (in the Pūrva Mīmamsa Sūtra). anubandhadibhyah: from the connection and so on; prajñāntara prthaktva-vat: even as other cognitions are separate; drstah: (it is) seen; ca: and; tat: this; uktam: has been stated. The fires form a separate meditation even as Sāndilya-vidyā, Dahara-vidyā, etc., form separate meditations, though mentioned along with sacrificial acts. It is also seen in the sacrificial portion of the Vedas; the sacrifice Avesti, though mentioned along with the Rājasūya sacrifice, is treated as an independent sacrifice by Jaimini in the Pūrva Mīmāmsā Sūtra III. 5. 21; see also X. 4. 22. Baladeva breaks this sutra into two parts: anubandhādibhyah and prajñantara, etc. The first is taken by him as a separate section dealing with the worship of holy men: 'On account of injunction and

Text, Translation and Notes 497 so on.' Scripture expressly enjoins the worship of great and good men. This worship serves as an auxiliary and indirect means to salvation. With the next part of the sūtra, Baladeva begins a new section concerned with showing that the devotees realise and intuit the Lord differently. He reads drstiś ca for drstaś ca. 'And like the difference between prajña and other types of knowledge, the perception [of the Lord too differs in the case of different devotees], that has been said.' In B.U. IV. 4. 21, two types of knowledge, vijñāna and prajñā, are mentioned. The first is intellectual knowledge, the second is intuitional knowledge or direct realisation. There are different types of intuitional knowledge also. Different devotees following different paths have different intuitions or visions of the Lord. See C.U. III. 14. 1.

III. 3. 51. na sāmānyād apy upalabdher mrtyuvan na hi lokāpattih Not in spite of similarity (can the fires constitute parts of an action), for it is seen (on the ground of scriptural texts that they are independent) ; as in the case of death; for the world does not become (fire because it resembles a fire in some points). na: not; sāmānyāt: on account of similarity; api: in spite of; upalabdheh: for it is seen; mrtyuvat: as in the case of death; na hi lokapattih: for the world does not become (fire because of certain resemblances). One thing may resemble another in certain respects; yet the two things are different. Death applies to fire and the being in the sun. Śatapatha Brāhmana X. 5. 2. 3; B.U. III. 2. 10. Fire and the being in the sun are not one. Again, C.U. V. 4. 1 says: 'That world is a fire; the sun itself is its fuel.' From this it does not follow that the fuel and the world actually become fire. R. and Śrikantha hold that the transference of the property of one thing to another does not indicate an identity between them. Baladeva interprets the sūtra differently. The objection is raised that if the vision of the Lord be the cause of salvation, then everyone who sees an incarnation of the Lord like Rāma must become freed immediately. Baladeva answers: 'Even on account of the common perception [of the Lord as an incarnation, there is no universal release] like death [which is] not [the cause of] salvation but the attainment of [other worlds].' Death does not lead to release but often to other worlds like heaven and the rest. Similarly, all visions of the Lord are not the cause of release. The vision of the Lord on earth as an incarnation leads only to heavenly regions.

III. 3. 52. pareņa ca śabdasya tādvidhyam bhūyastvāttvanubandhah And from the subsequent (Brahmana) the fact of the text being such (enjoining a separate meditation) (is known). The connection, however, (of the imaginary fires with the real one is) due to the abundance (of the

498 The Brahma Sūtra attributes of the latter which are imaginatively connected with the meditation). parena: from the subsequent (Brahmana); ca: and; sabdasya: of the text; tadvidhyam: the fact of being such; bhūyastvāt: on account of the abundance; tu: but; anubandhah: connection. In a subsequent Brahmana, it is said: 'By knowledge they ascend there where all wishes are attained. Those skilled in works do not go there.' Satapatha Brāhmana X. 5. 2. 23. Here knowledge is praised as superior to work. From this we find that the fires form a meditation. The connection of the fires with the actual fire is not because they form part of the sacrifice but because many of the attributes of the real fire are imaginatively connected with the fire of meditation. Baladeva takes this sūtra as a separate section dealing with the grace of the Lord. The objection is raised that the view that the direct vision of the Lord alone attainable through devotion is the cause of salvation, is inconsistent with M.U. III. 2. 3 where the vision of the Lord is said to depend on the grace of the Lord. The answer is given: 'On account of what follows, the being of that kind of the word is established, [there is] the mention [of grace in the passage], on the other hand, on account of preponderance, [i.e. because the grace of the Lord is the most important factor in the attainment of salvation].' The Mundaka text implies that devotion is the cause of the direct vision of the Lord and the latter the cause of emancipation for the grace of the Lord is not arbitrary but is determined by the devotion of men.

Section 30 (53-54)

THE SELF AS SEPARATE FROM THE BODY

III. 3. 53. eka ātmanah śarīre bhāvāt Some (maintain the non-existence) of a (separate) self on account of the existence (of the self) (only) where there is a body. eke: some (maintain the non-existence); ätmanah: of self (apart from the body); śarire: when there is a body; bhavāt: on account of existence. Ś. thinks that this sūtra gives the Cārvāka or materialist view. The human being is only the body, having consciousness for its quality. Consciousness is produced even as the intoxicating power is produced, when certain materials are put together even though none of them is by itself intoxicating. Consciousness (caitanya), though not observed in earth and the other external elements, either separately or in combination yet appears in them when transformed into the shape of a body. Consciousness is seen to exist only when there is a body. It is nowhere experienced apart from the body. For wherever something

Text, Translation and Notes 499 exists if some other thing exists, and does not exist if that other thing does not exist, we determine the former to be a mere quality of the latter. Light and heat, for example, are qualities of fire. yaddhi yasmin sati bhavaty asati ca na bhavati tat tad-dharmatve nādhyavasī- yate; yathāgnidharmāv ausnya-prakāśau. So the qualities of the self are qualities of the body only. Bhāskara adopts Š.'s interpretation. R. does not deal with the question of the materialist view of self but raises the question of the self of the meditating devotee. His pūrva- paksa is stated thus: 'Some [maintain that the soul of the devotee has in meditation only those attributes which belong to it in the embodied state such as jñatrtva and the like] because the self is in the body [at the time of meditation].' R. quotes here C.U. X. 8. 1. Nimbārka states the objection that the individual soul is to be meditated on in its state of bondage for only such a soul exists in the body. Baladeva makes this sūtra into a separate section dealing with the worship of the Lord in the different parts of the body, the stomach, the heart, the top of the head and so on. For he exists in these places also and grants salvation to the devotee.

III. 3. 54. vyatirekas tad-bhāvābhāvitvān na tūpalabdhivat There is separation (of the self from the body) because its existence does not depend on the existence of that (viz. the body); but there is not (non-separation); as in the case of cognitive consciousness. vyatirekah: separation; tadbhāva-abhāvitvāt: for (consciousness) does not exist even where there is (the body); na: not so; tu: but; upalabdhivat: as in the case of cognitive consciousness. The answer is given to the objection raised in the previous sūtra by pointing out that consciousness does not exist in a body after a person dies. So it is a quality of something different from the body though residing in it. The Cārvakas admit that the cogniser is different from the thing cognised. We cognise the body and the cogniser is different from the body. The cogniser is the self and consciousness is a quality of this self. If consciousness were a quality of the elements, it could not cognise the body. It is contradictory that anything should act on itself. Fire is hot but it does not burn itself. That consciousness is permanent follows from the uniformity of its character. Though connected with different states, it recognises itself as a conscious agent. This recognition is expressed in judgments such as 'I saw this'. It is also inferred from the fact of remembrance. Again, cognitive consciousness arises when there are certain auxilia- ries such as the lamp and the like and does not arise when they are absent. From this it does not follow that cognitive consciousness is an attribute of the lamp and the like. So also the fact that con- sciousness takes place when there is a body and does not take place where there is none, does not imply that it is a quality of the body.

500 The Brahma Sūtra Like lamps and so on the body may be used by the self as a mere auxiliary. Besides, body is not a necessary auxiliary of consciousness. In dreams, we have perceptions while the body is inactive. It is obvious that the self is something separate from the body. Bhaskara adopts a similar interpretation. Consciousness does not always exist when the body does and so it is not a quality of the body. R. argues that as the realisation of Brahman means the realisation of Brahman in his real form, so self-realisation means the realisation of the self in its true realised state. His reading of the sūtra is: 'But this is not so but different; since it is of the being of that; as in the case of intuition.' When we meditate on the self, we meditate on the self as released. Nimbarka follows this interpretation. Baladeva starts a new topic here, viz. different kinds of realisations in accordance with different kinds of devotions. The devotees who meditate on the Lord as the sweet realise him as the sweet in the condition of release. He who meditates on him as the majestic realises him as such.

Section 31 (55-56) MEDITATION CONNECTED WITH SACRIFICIAL ACTS SUCH AS THE UDGĪTHA ARE VALID FOR ALL ŚĀKHĀS

III. 3. 55. angāvabaddhās tu na śākhāsu hi prativedam But the (meditations) connected with members (of sacrificial acts are) not (restricted) to (particular) śākhās only of each Veda because (the same meditation is described in all). angāvabaddhāh: (meditations) connected with members (of sacrificial acts); tu: but; na: not; śākhāsu: to (particular) śākhās; hi: because; prativedam: in each Veda. The doubt arises because the udgītha, etc., are chanted differently in different śākhās; they may be considered different. The sūtra says that the meditations are one in all the branches. Baladeva uses this sutra to point out that the Lord is realised differently by different devotees in accordance with the kind of devotion with which they worship him.

III. 3. 56. mantrādivad vā'virodhah Or else, as in the case of mantras and the like, there is no contradiction. mantradivat: as in the case of mantras and the like; va: or else; avirodhah: there is no contradiction. Even in the case of mantras, acts and qualities of acts which are enjoined in one śākhā are taken over by other śākhās also. Baladeva concludes the section about different modes of worship by giving another illustration. 'Or as in the case of sacred formulae

Text, Translation and Notes 50I and the rest, there is no contradiction', i.e. just as some formulae are employed in many ceremonies, some in two, some in one only, so men worship the Lord in several ways or some only in one. While bhakti or devotion to the Lord is indicated as an essential means for the attainment of freedom, for the common man surrender or prapatti is easy. Appaya Dīkita in his Naya-mayūkha-mālikā which summarises the ideas of R.B. says: bhakti-rūpāņām daharādi- vidyānām nyāsa-vidyāyāś ca śabdāntareņāpi bhedo'śtīti darśayitum ayam pūrva-pakso daršitah. This purva-paksa is indicated in order to show that there is difference among the vidyas, dahara, etc., resulting from bhakti on the one hand and nyāsa-vidyā or surrender on the other.

Section 32 (57) THE VAIŚVĀNARA MEDITATION IS ONE WHOLE III. 3. 57. bhūmnah kratuvaj jyāyastvam tathā hi darśayati Importance (is given to the meditation) on the entire form (of Vaiśvānara) as in the case of sacrifice; for so (Scripture) shows. bhumnah: on the entire form; kratuvat: as in the case of sacrifice; jyāyastvam: importance; tathā: so; hi: for; darśayati: (the śruti) shows. In C.U. V. 12-17, we have references to the meditation on the different parts of the Cosmic Self and also on the whole. V. 18. The question is whether the meditation is on the whole or on parts. The answer is given that it refers to the whole. It discourages meditation on parts as in the passage 'Your head would have fallen off, if you had not come to me'. C.U. V. 12. 2. The object of meditation is the entire Self. Baladeva takes this as a separate section dealing with the mani- foldness of the Lord.

Section 33 (58) MEDITATIONS WHICH REFER TO ONE SUBJECT BUT ARE DISTINGUISHED BY DIFFERENT QUALITIES ARE TO BE KEPT SEPARATE

III. 3. 58. nānā śabdādi-bhedāt (The meditations are) different on account of the difference of words and the like. nāna: different; sabdadi-bhedāt: on account of difference of words and the like.

502 The Brahma Sūtra The different meditations, Dahara-vidyā, Sāndilya-vidyā, etc., are to be kept separate. For they use different words. This is difference of acts according to Purva Mīmamsa Sutra II. 2. 1ff. Though the Lord is the only object of meditation, each passage teaches different qualities of the Lord. And the like, for R., means repetition: abhyāsa; number: samkhyā; quality: guņa; subject-matter: prakriyā; and name: nāmadheya. Baladeva makes out that the meditations are different on account of difference of words and so on. Meditation on Krsna is different from meditation on Nrsimha. Their forms are different and the texts are also different.

Section 34 (59) AMONG MEDITATIONS RELATING TO BRAHMAN ANY ONE COULD BE SELECTED ACCORDING TO ONE'S CHOICE III. 3. 59. vikalpo'viśişta-phalatvāt There is option (with respect to the several meditations), because the fruit (of all meditations) is the same. vikalpah: option; aviśista-phalatvāt: on account of having the same fruit. All forms of meditation have the same result. One has to select one form of meditation and remain intent on it, until, through the intuition of the object meditated on, the fruit of the meditation is obtained. To practise more than one meditation at a time will cause distraction of mind and retard one's progress. R. makes out that the object of meditation in all the vidyas is the determinate Brahman and the vision of him is the fruit of all meditations. R. on I. 1. 1. Baladeva shows that meditation on different forms of the Lord such as Krsna, Rāma, etc., are optional since any one of them leads to release. So the devotee should take one form and adhere to it. The fruits of all meditations are the same.

Section 35 (60)

MEDITATIONS FOR SPECIAL DESIRES MAY OR MAY NOT BE COMBINED ACCORDING TO ONE'S CHOICE

III. 3. 60. kāmyās tu yathā-kāmam samuccīyeran na vā pūrva-hetv- abhāvāt But (meditations) connected with desires, may, according to one's choice, be combined or not, on account of the absence of the former reason.

Text, Translation and Notes 503 kāmyāh: (meditations) for desires; tu: but; yathā-kāmam: according to one's desire (choice); samuccīyeran: one may combine; na vā: or not; pūrva-hetu-abhāvāt: on account of the absence of the former reason. As for the meditations which are practised not for the realisation of Brahman but for obtaining particular desires, one can take one or more of these meditations according to one's pleasure.

Section 36 (61-66)

MEDITATIONS CONNECTED WITH MEMBERS OF SACRIFICIAL ACTS MAY OR MAY NOT BE COMBINED ACCORDING TO ONE'S CHOICE

III. 3. 61. angeșu yathāśraya-bhāvah With regard to meditations connected with members (of sacrificial acts), it is as with their abodes. angesu: with regard to meditations connected with members (of sacrificial acts); yathā-āśraya-bhāvah: it is as with their abodes. Four sūtras 61-64 state the objection. The same rule applies to the members and to the meditations connected with them, viz. that they may be combined. A meditation is subject to what it refers. Baladeva begins a section here, which continues to the end of the chapter dealing with the topic of the meditation on the various limbs of the Lord, the benevolent eyes, the smiling face, etc.

III. 3. 62. śisteś ca And on account of the teaching. sisteh: from the teaching (of the śruti); ca: and. The Vedas do not make any distinction between the members of the sacrificial acts and the meditations relating to them. C.U. I. 1.1. Baladeva reads śistaiś ca: Such a meditation is performed by those who are taught.

III. 3. 63. samāhārāt On account of combination. C.U. I. 1. 5 says from the seat of the hotr he rectifies all defective singing of the udgatr. The meditation on the pranava, aum, belonging to the Rg Veda is connected with the meditation on the udgitha of the Sama Veda. All meditations on members of the sacrificial acts, in whatever Veda they may be mentioned, have to be combined. Baladeva considers the objection that C.U. I. 6. 7 mentions only the lotus-like eyes of the Lord but not his limbs. This sūtra

504 The Brahma Sūtra points out that there is no discrepancy on account of comprehen- siveness. The word 'na' is to be put in at the beginning. III. 3. 64. guņa-sādhāranya-śruteś ca And from the sruti declaring the quality (of the meditation) to be common (to all the Vedas). guņa-sādhāranya-śruteh: from the śruti declaring the quality (aum) as being common (to all the Vedas); ca: and. C.U. I. 1. 9 is considered here. The syllable aum is common to all the Vedas and the meditations in them. As the abode of all meditations is common, so are the meditations which abide in it. Baladeva reads that every limb of the Lord must be meditated on as possessed of the powers or attributes of the rest, on account of a scriptural text of the commonness of attributes. B.G. XIII. 14 shows that every limb of the Lord can discharge the function of every other limb. So every member must be so meditated on. This is the pūrva- pakșa.

III. 3. 65. na vā tat-sahabhāvāśruteh (The meditations on members of the sacrificial acts are) rather not (to be combined) since the sruti does not say that they go together. na vā: rather not; tat-sahabhāva-asruteh: their going together not being stated in the śruti. The correct conclusion is set forth in this and the next sūtra. The meditations are not inseparable from the sacrifice. They may or may not be practised. See III. 3. 42. The meditations may be performed according to one's liking. Baladeva refutes the prima facie view. 'Or not [i.e. every limb of the Lord is to be meditated on as possessed of its peculiar attributes only] because there is no scriptural text [to the effect that it is to be meditated on] as accompanied by [the attributes of the other limbs].'

III. 3. 66. darśanāc ca And because (Scripture) shows it. darśanāt: and because (the śruti) shows it; ca: and. C.U. IV. 17. 10 distinguishes Brahman priests from the rest. It means that all the priests do not know all of them. The meditations therefore may or may not be combined according to one's taste. Baladeva makes out that every member of the body of the Lord is to be meditated on as endowed with its own attributes, the eyes with sight and the ears with hearing and so on.

Section 1 (1-17)

KNOWLEDGE OF BRAHMAN IS INDEPENDENT AND NOT SUBORDINATE TO ACTION

III. 4. 1. puruşārtho'tah śabdād iti bādarāyanah From this (the knowledge of Brahman results) the purpose of man on account of scriptural statement, thus (says) Bādarāyaņa. purusarthah: the purpose of man; atah: from this; sabdāt: from the Scriptures; iti: thus; bādarāyaņah: Bādarāyaņa. Bādarāyana, basing himself on the texts C.U. VII. 1. 3; M.U. III. 2. 9; T.U. II. 1, argues that the knowledge of Brahman leads to liberation and is not a part of sacrificial acts. R. asks whether the advantage to the meditating devotee accrues from the meditation directly or from works of which the meditations are members and says that Badarayana holds the former view. Baladeva means by purusārtha not only salvation but all the four ends of men, righteousness, wealth, enjoyment and salvation. The prima facie view is that meditation brings about salvation only. The answer is that all the four ends and not merely salvation arise from meditation.

III. 4. 2. śeşatvāt puruşārthavādo yathā'nyesv iti jaiminih On account of (the self) being in a supplementary relation (to action) (the statements as to the fruits of the knowledge of the Self) are mere praise of the agent even as in other cases, thus says Jaimini. śesatvāt: on account of being in a supplementary relation (to action); puruşa-arthavādah: are praise of the agent; yathā: even as; anyesu: in other cases; iti: thus; jaiminih: Jaimini (says). The knowledge of the self has no independent fruit of its own for it stands in a subordinate relation to sacrificial action. The self as the agent in all action stands in a subordinate relation to action. By knowing that the self will outlive the body, the agent becomes qualified for action, the fruit of which will appear only after death. As the knowledge of the self has no independent position, it cannot have an independent fruit. The passages which state such fruits are to be taken as arthavādas or praise. If it is said that the Upanisads refer to the Self which stands outside the empirical existence and such a Self cannot be subordinate to activity, the opponent points out that the transmigrating self is clearly referred to in passages of B.U. II. 4. 5. For R., the sūtra means that meditations are constituents of sacrificial actions and are of no advantage by themselves.

506 The Brahma Sūtra III. 4. 3. ācāra darśanāt Because we find (from the Scriptures) (certain lines of) conduct. ācara: conduct; darsanat: because of finding. See B.U. III. 1. 1; C.U. V. 11. 5. Both Janaka and Aśvapati were knowers of the Self. If by knowledge of the Self they had attained liberation there was no need for them to perform sacrifices but the texts quoted show that they did perform sacrifices. This proves that liberation is obtained through sacrificial acts alone and not through the knowledge of the Self. If mere knowledge could effect the purpose of man, why should one perform works troublesome in many ways. 'If a man would find honey in the arka tree, why should he go to the hill?' arke cen madhu vindeta kim artham parvatam vrajet? Those who know Brahman, says R., apply themselves to works chiefly. This shows that knowledge or meditation has no independent value but serves to set forth the true nature of the active self and is subordinate to work.

III. 4. 4. tac chruteh That, the Scriptures (declare). tat: that; śruteh: the Scriptures (declare). C.U. I. 1. 10 says: What a man does with knowledge, faith and the U panisad is more powerful. This text directly states that knowledge is subordinate to work. yad eva vidyayā karoti. Vidyā or knowledge is directly represented as a means of work. Nimbārka interprets tasya śruteh and not tat śruteh.

III. 4. 5. samanvānambhaņāt On account of the taking hold together. samanvanambhanāt: on account of taking hold together. B.U. IV. 4. 2 says: 'Then both his knowledge and his work take hold of him.' The two together manifest their fruits. Knowledge therefore is not independent.

III. 4. 6. tadvato vidhānāt And because (the Scriptures) enjoin (work) for such. tadvatah: for such (as know the purport of the Veda); vidhānāt: because (the Scriptures) enjoin (work). The Scriptures enjoin work for those who have a knowledge of the Vedas, which includes the knowledge of the Self. So knowledge does not produce any result independently. See C.U. VIII. 15. R. says that according to this sutra, the knowledge of Brahman is enjoined with a view to works only; it has no independent result of its own.

Text, Translation and Notes 507 III. 4. 7. niyamāc ca And on account of prescribed rules. niyamāt: on account of prescribed rules; ca: and. Iśa U. I. 2 and Śatapatha Brāhmana XII. 4. 1. 1 indicate that knowledge stands in a subordinate relation to work. Sūtras 2-7 state the prima facie view.

III. 4. 8. adhikopadeśāt tu bādarāyaņasyaivam tad-darśanāt But on account of (the scriptural) teaching (that the Supreme Self is) additional (to the agent), Badarayana's (view is) correct for that is seen (in the Scriptures). adhika-upadeśāt: on account of the teaching that (the Supreme Self is) additional to; tu: but; bādarāyaņasya: Bādarāyaņa's view; evam: such (correct); tat-darśanāt: for that is seen. The Vedänta texts teach as the object of knowledge something different from the embodied self. They teach the Supreme free from all empirical attributes. Knowledge of the Supreme does not only not promote action but cuts all action short. See M.U. I. 1. 9; T.U. II. 8; Katha U. II. 6. 2; B.U. III. 8. 9; C.U. VI. 2. 3. There are passages which refer to the empirical self. There is, however, no contradiction, as the Self of the Higher Lord is the real nature of the embodied self. parameśvaram eva hi śarīrasya pāramārthikam svarūpam upādhi- krtam tu śarīratvam. Ś. R. says that Bādarāyana holds that knowledge has an independent fruit of its own. Its object is the Highest Brahman with all its perfections and exalted qualities, which cannot possibly be attributed to the individual self whether in the state of release or bondage. The fruit of the knowledge is eternal life which consists in attaining to him, parama-puruşa-prāpti-rūpam amrtatvam. Baladeva interprets the sutra thus: But on account of the teaching (of vidyā or knowledge as) more than (karma or action).

III. 4. 9. tulyam tu darśanam But the declarations of Scripture support both views. tulyam: equal; tu: but; darśanam: declaration of śruti. There are passages which support that knowledge is incompatible with work: B.U. III. 5. 1; IV. 5.15.

III. 4. 10. asārvatrikī (The declaration of the Scripture referred to in sūtra 4) is non- comprehensive. asārvatrikī: non-comprehensive. The text that knowledge enhances the fruit of the sacrifice does not refer to all knowledge but is connected only with the udgītha which is discussed in the section.

508 The Brahma Sūtra III. 4. 11. vibhāgah śatavat (There is) division (of knowledge and work) as in the case of the hundred (divided between two persons). vibhägah: division (of knowledge and work); śatavat: as in the case of a hundred. Knowledge and work (B.U. IV. 4. 2) are to be taken in a distrib- utive sense. Knowledge follows one and work another. There is no combination of the two. Besides, the text refers not to an emanci- pated soul but to one in samsāra. See B.U. IV. 4. 6.

III. 4. 12. adhyayana-mātravatah (The Scriptures enjoin work) on him who has merely read (the Veda). adhyayana-mātravatah: only on him who has merely read (the Veda). Those who have read the Vedas and known about works are entitled to perform work. For those who have knowledge of the Self from the Upanisads, no work is prescribed. R. says that reading here means nothing more than the appre- hensions of the aggregate of syllables called Veda without any insight into their meaning. Nimbārka quotes C.U. V. III. 15. 1. Śrīnivāsa makes a difference between reading the Vedas and understanding the Vedānta.

III. 4. 13. nāviśeșāt There being no special mention, (the rule does) not (apply to him who knows). na: not; aviśeșāt: on account of the absence of any specification or special mention. Sūtra 7 quotes Iśa U. 2. This, however, is a general statement and does not specially mention the knower or jñani. So it is not binding on him. R. says that there is no special reason to hold that the text refers to works as independent means of a desirable result. It may be under- stood as referring to works subordinate to knowledge. As the knower of the Self has to practise meditation so long as he lives, he may also have to practise works that are helpful to meditation for the same period.

III. 4. 14. stutaye'numatir vā Or the permission is for the purpose of glorification (of knowledge). stutaye: for the glorification (of knowledge); anumatih: permission; vā: or. The injunction to do work Iśa U. 2. may be for the glorification of knowledge. A knower of the Self may work all his life but on account of his knowledge he will not be bound by his works. yāvaj jīvam

Text, Translation and Notes 509 karma kurvatyapi puruşe viduși na karmalepāya bhavati vidyā- sāmarthyāt. R. says, owing to the power of knowledge, a man although constantly performing works is not stained by them. vidyā-māhātmyāt sarvadā karma kurvann api na lipyate karmabhih. Śrīnivasa quotes B.G. XVIII. 56; IV. 14.

III. 4. 15. kāma-kāreņa caike And some according to their choice (have refrained from all work). kama-kārena: according to their choice; ca: and; eke: some. There is no obligation for the knowers of the Self in regard to work. Some may choose to work in order to set an example to others while others may abstain from work. Baladeva begins a new section here and substitutes va in place of ca. Such is the glory of knowledge that one who has attained know- ledge may act just as he likes or abstain from action and yet be free from consequences, good or bad. Knowledge of Brahman and work in the world are not inconsistent with each other.

III. 4. 16. upamardam ca

knowledge). And (Scripture teaches) the destruction (of the qualification for works by

upamardam: destruction; ca: and. Knowledge destroys all ignorance with its distinctions of agent, act and result. See B.U. IV. 5. 15. Knowledge of the Self is antagonistic to all work and so cannot be subsidiary to work. R. mentions that there is a text which declares that the knowledge of Brahman destroys work which is the root of all existence. M.U. II. 2. 8. This also contradicts the view that knowledge is subordinate to works. Srīnivāsa quotes B.G. IV. 19 and IV. 3. 7. Baladeva holds that even prārabdha-karmas may be destroyed by knowledge.

III. 4. 17. ūrdhva-retah su ca śabde hi And (knowledge belongs) to those who observe chastity, (i.e. to samnyāsins) because (this fourth stage of life is mentioned) in the

urdhva-retah su: to those who observe chastity; ca: and; sabde: in the Scripture.

Scripture; hi: because. To these in the stage of samnyāsa there is no work prescribed except discrimination. See C.U. II. 23. 1-2; B.U. IV. 4. 22. See also M.U. I. 2. 11 and C.U. V. 10. 1. Anyone can take to this life without being a householder, etc., which shows the independence of know- ledge.

5I0 The Brahma Sūtra

Section 2 (18-20)

IN THE STATE OF SAMSARA, ONLY KNOWLEDGE IS PRESCRIBED

III. 4. 18. parāmarśam jaiminir acodanā cāpavadati hi Jaimini (thinks that the passages mentioned in the previous sūtra contain) a reference (only to samnyasa) and not injunction, for (other texts) condemn (samnyāsa). parāmarsam: (mere) reference; jaiminih: Jaimini; acodanā: (there is) no injunction; ca: and; apavadati: condemn; hi: because. In C.U. II. 23. 1, we do not find words expressive of injunction. In B.U. IV. 4. 22, there is mere statement of fact and no injunction. The text promises steadfastness in Brahman. There are other texts which forbid samnyāsa: T.U. I. 11; Taittīriya Brāhmaņa VII. 13. 12. Baladeva means by this sūtra: '[There is a favourable] reference [to works in Scripture], according to Jaimini: there is no injunction [with regard to the giving up of works] because [Scripture] condemns [such a giving up of works].

III. 4. 19. anustheyam bādarāyaņah sāmya-śruteh Bādarāyaņa (thinks that samnyāsa or monastic life) is to be accom- plished for the text (cited) applies equally (to all the four stages of life). anustheyam: is to be accomplished; bādarāyaņah: Bādarāyaņa; samya-sruteh: on account of the common scriptural text. The text cited speaks of sacrifices, etc., in the grhastha state, i.e. the householder's life, penance in vānaprastha, celibacy in brahma- carya, and steadfastness in Brahman for the samnyasa stage. As the three former are enjoined elsewhere, the last should also be taken as enjoined. Baladeva holds that a knower of Brahman may perform the obligatory duties partially just as he likes, but is not required to perform them exhaustively like ordinary men. Scripture states that such a partial performance by the knower is equal to a full perfor- mance by ordinary men.

III. 4. 20. vidhir vā dhāranavat Or rather (there is) an injunction as in the case of the carrying (of the sacrificial fuel). vidhih: injunction; vā: or rather; dhāranavat: as in the case of the carrying (of the sacrificial fuel). In the passage 'Let him approach carrying the firewood below [the ladle holding the offering, for above he carries it for the gods]' (Apastamba Śrauta Sūtra IX. 11. 8-9), the last clause is interpreted as an injunction by Jaimini, though it is not in the form of an

Text, Translation and Notes 5II

injunction. On account of its newness (a-pūrvatā) it is an injunction. In accordance with this view, C.U. II. 23. 1 is an injunction and not a mere reference. There are other texts which directly enjoin samnyāsa. Jābāla U. 4. Again, the condition of being grounded in Brahman is exalted and is said to be enjoined. This state belongs only to the wandering mendicant. Those belonging to the three former stages of life obtain the world of the blessed, while the fourth, the wandering mendicant, enjoys immortality. Immortality does not accrue merely by belonging to a stage of life. It is the result of being grounded in Brahman, brahmasamstha, to the exclusion of all other activity. This state is impossible for those belonging to the three former stages for they suffer loss on account of the non-performance of works enjoined on them. The mendicant, on the other hand, who has discarded all works can suffer no loss on account of non-performance. The duties incumbent on him such as the restraint of the senses, etc., are not opposed to the state of being grounded in Brahman but are helpful to it. Many passages declare that for him who is grounded in Brahman, there are no works, M.U. III. 2. 6; B.G. V. 17.

Section 3 (21-22) CERTAIN SCRIPTURAL STATEMENTS AS IN C.U. I. 1. 3 ARE NOT GLORIFICATORY BUT ENJOIN MEDITATION

III. 4. 21. stuti-mātram upādānāt iti cen nāpūrvatvāt If it be said that (the texts such as the one about the udgitha are) mere glorification, on account of their reference (to parts of sacrifices) (we say that it is) not so on account of the newness (of what they teach). stuti-mātram: mere glorification; upādānāt: because of their reference (to parts of sacrificial acts); iti cet: if it be said; na: not so; apūrvatvāt: on account of newness. The opponent says that C.U. I. 1. 3; I. 6. 1 simply glorify the ladle and so on. The sūtra refutes the view and argues that glorification to have a purpose must be in complementary relation to an injunction. The Chandogya passage where udgitha is mentioned as the essence of essences is in the Upanisad and cannot be taken along with the injunctions about the udgītha in the ritual part. On account of newness it is an injunction and not mere glorincation. Baladeva uses this sūtra to indicate that the view that the knower is at liberty to act at will is not enjoined before but is enjoined in the above texts.

5I2 The Brahma Sūtra III. 4. 22. bhāva-śabdāc ca And on account of texts expressive of injunction. bhāva-śabdāt: on account of texts expressive of injunction; ca: and. In C.U. I. 1. 1 'Let one meditate on aum of the udgitha'. See also C.U. II. 2. 1; Aitareya Aranyaka II. 1. 6. All these passages enjoin devout meditations.

Section 4 (23-24) THE STORIES IN THE UPANISADS ARE NOT MEMBERS OF SACRIFICIAL ACTS BUT GLORIFY THE INJUNCTIONS WITH WHICH THEY ARE CONNECTED III. 4. 23. pāriplavārtha iti cen na viseșitatvāt If it be said (that the stories in the Upanisads are) for the purpose of pariplavas, (we say it is) not so, because (only certain stories) are specified (for the purpose). pariplavārthah: for the purpose of pāriplavas; iti cet: if it be said; na: not so; viśeșatvāt: on account of (certain stories) being specified. In the horse-sacrifice which lasts for a year, the sacrificer and the members of his family are expected to hear at intervals the recital of certain stories which are called pariplavas. They form part of the ritualistic acts. The question is raised whether the stories of the Upanisads also serve the purpose of the ritualistic acts. The sūtra denies that they serve his purpose for the stories meant for this purpose are specified. Upanisad stories are not mentioned in this category. Bhaskara takes this and the next sūtra as one. III. 4. 24. tathā caikavākyatopabandhāt This follows also from the connection (of the stories with the meditations) in one whole. tathā: this (follows); ca: and; eka-vākyatā-upabandhāt: being connected in one whole. The story form is used to attract attention. The stories not serving the purpose of pāriplavas are intended to introduce the meditations.

Section 5 (25) THE SAMNYĀSINS NEED NOT OBSERVE RITUAL ACTS SINCE KNOWLEDGE SERVES THEIR PURPOSE III. 4. 25. ata eva cāgnīndhanādy-anapekșā And for this very reason there is no need of the lighting of the fire and so on.

Text, Translation and Notes 5I3 ata eva: for this very reason; ca: and; agni-indhanādi: lighting of the fire and so on; anapeksā: (there is) no need. Since the purpose is effected through knowledge, the lighting of the sacrificial fire, etc., are not necessary. While Nimbarka holds that knowledge is independent of works only in the case of those who practise brahmacarya, S. holds that it is so in all cases. Baladeva also thinks that knowledge is sufficient for salvation.

Section 6 (26-27)

WORKS PRESCRIBED BY SCRIPTURE ARE USEFUL SINCE THEY HELP THE RISE OF KNOWLEDGE

III. 4. 26. sarvāpekșā ca yajñādi-śruter aśvavat And there is need of all (works) on account of the scriptural statement of sacrifices and the like; as in the case of the horse. sarvāpeksā: need of all; ca: and; yajñādi-śruteh: on account of the scriptural statement of sacrifices, etc. (as means to knowledge); aśvavat: as in the case of the horse. This sutra says that works are useful as a means to knowledge and even the Scriptures prescribe them. But they have no part in producing the result of knowledge which is liberation. Liberation comes only from knowledge and not from work. Work purifies the mind and the knowledge of the Self is manifested in a pure mind. So works are useful as an indirect means to knowledge. S. quotes: 'Works are the cleansing away of uncleanliness but knowledge is the highest way. When the impurity has been removed by works, then know- ledge begins to act. kaşāyapaktih karmāņi jñānam tu paramā gatih kaşāye karmabhih pakve tato jñānam pravartate. The illustration of the horse is given. The horse on account of its special character is not used for ploughing but is harnessed to chariots. So works are not required by knowledge for bringing about its results but only with a view to its own origination. Bhäskara points out that karma is not the cause of the origin of knowledge but has an essential part in bringing about salvation. He stresses the doctrine of the combination of knowledge and work. 'Just as a horse is fit for carrying a man, but not for drawing a plough, so knowledge combined with work is fit for leading to salvation and not mere knowledge.' R. makes out that, in the case of householders, knowledge has for its prerequisite all sacrifices and other works of permanent and occasional obligation. He quotes B.U. IV. 4. 22: 'Him the Brāhmanas R

5I4 The Brahma Sūtra seek to know by the study of the Veda, by sacrifices, by gifts, by penance, by fasting.' By knowledge we understand in this connection a mental act different in character from the mere cognition of the sense of the texts and more specifically denoted by such terms as dhyāna or upāsanā, meditation or worship, which is of the nature of remembrance (i.e. representative thought), but intuitive clearness is not inferior to the clearest presentative thought, pratyaksa; which, by constant daily practice, becomes ever more perfect and being duly continued up to death secures final release. jñānam ca vākyārtha-jñānād arthāntara-bhūtam dhyānopāsanādi- śabda-vācyam visada-tama-pratyaksatāpanna-smrti-rūpam niratiśaya- priyam ahar-ahar abhyāsādheyātisayam ā prayāņād anuvartamānam moksa-sādhanam iti. R. and Śrikantha interpret 'as in the case of a horse' differently. Just as a horse, though the real means of going, depends on some other assisting factors, such as the saddle, attendants, grooming and the like, so knowledge, though the real means to salvation, depends on the co-operation of works. III. 4. 27. śama-damādy-upetah syāt tathāpi tu tad-vidhes tad- angatayā teşām avaśyānuștheyatvāt But even if it be so (that there is no injunction to do work to attain knowledge in B.U. IV. 4. 22), one must possess calmness, self-control and the like since they are enjoined as helps to knowledge and (on that account) have necessarily to be accomplished. śama-damādi-upetah syāt: one must possess calmness, self-control and the like; tatha api: even if it be so; tu: but; tad-vidheh: since they are enjoined; tad-angatayā: as helps to it (knowledge); teşām avaśya anustheyatvāt: and therefore they have necessarily to be accom- plished. Even if B.U. IV. 4. 2. 2 does not enjoin work specificially, B.U. IV. 4. 23: 'He who knows it as such, having become calm, self- controlled, withdrawn, patient and collected sees the Self in his own self' is injunctive in character. These qualities are enjoined and have to be accomplished. Self-control, etc., directly help the attainment of knowledge, while work helps it indirectly.

Section 7 (28-31) RELAXATIONS OF RULES REGARDING FOOD ARE PERMITTED IN CASES OF EXTREME NEED III. 4. 28. sarvānnānumatiś ca prāņātyaye tad-darśanāt (Only) in case of danger of life (there is) permission to take all types of food; because the Scripture shows that.

Text, Translation and Notes 5I5 sarva-anna-anumatih : permission to take all types of food; prāņātyaye: in case of danger of life; tat-darsanāt: because the Scripture shows that.

The opponent argues from C.U. V. 2. 1, 'For one who knows this, there is nothing whatever that is not food', that it is an injunction since it is not found anywhere else. This sūtra refutes the view and holds that it is only a statement of fact. Forbidden food can be taken only when life is in danger as was done by the sage Cākrāyana when his life was in danger. See C.U. I. 10. 1-5.

III. 4. 29. abādhāc ca And because of non-contradiction. abādhāt: on account of non-contradiction; ca: and. C.U. VII. 26. 2: 'When the food is pure, the mind is pure.' Baladeva gives a different interpretation: 'On account of non- obstruction.' Although in ordinary cases the taking of improper food obstructs the full manifestation of knowledge, yet when a knower of Brahman does so by necessity, it does not obstruct his knowledge.

III. 4. 30. api ca smaryate Moreover the smrtis say so. api ca: moreover; smaryate: the smrtis say so. The smrtis say that both those who have knowledge and those who have not can take any food when life is in danger. They hold that it is normally sinful to take certain types of food. See Manu X. 10. 4; B.G. V. 10.

III. 4. 31. śabdaś cāto'kāmakāre And hence also a scriptural passage as to non-acting according to one's wish. śabdah: a scriptural passage; ca: and; atah: hence; a-kāmakāre: not acting according to one's wish. There are scriptural passages prohibiting one from acting as one pleases. Freedom from all restraint cannot help us to attain know- ledge. Kāthaka Samhitā (XII. 12) says: 'Therefore a Brāhmaņa should not take liquor.' tasmād brāhmaņas surām na pibet.

5I6 The Brahma Sūtra

Section 8 (32-35) THE DUTIES OF THE AŚRAM AS ARE TO BE PERFORMED EVEN BY THOSE WHO DO NOT AIM AT KNOWLEDGE III. 4. 32. vihitatvāc cāśrama-karmāpi And the duties of the asramas are (incumbent on him) also (who does not desire release); because they are enjoined (on him by the Scriptures). vihitatvāt: because they are enjoined; ca: and; āśrama-karma: duties of the stages of life; api: also. If works are a means to knowledge, the question is raised whether works should be performed by one who does not desire knowledge. The sutra answers that these duties of the stages of life are obligatory for all. Baladeva begins a new section here with two sūtras. He says that even when the devotee has come to acquire knowledge, he should continue to perform his duties in order to increase his knowledge. III. 4. 33. sahakāritvena ca Also because of being helpful (as a means to knowledge). sahakāritvena: as a means (to knowledge); ca: and. Duties are helpful in producing knowledge, though not its fruit liberation, which is not attainable except through knowledge. R. says that works give rise to the desire for knowledge. Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa quote B.U. IV. 4. 22: 'Him the Brāhmaņas seek to know by sacrifices.' If it be said that the same works cannot serve the purpose of a stage of life and the goal of knowledge, the answer is given on the basis of the Pūrva Mīmāmsa Sūtra (IV. 3. 5). 'But with regard to one and the same thing being both, there is conjunction and separation.' III. 4. 34. sarvathāpi ta evobhayalingāt In all cases the same duties (have to be performed) on account of the twofold indicatory mark. sarvathā api: in all cases; te eva: the same duties (have to be performed); ubhaya-lingat: on account of the twofold indicatory mark. The question is raised whether the works done as enjoined in the stages of life or those performed as aids to knowledge are of two different kinds. In either case the same duties are performed as is seen from the śruti and the smrti texts. See B.U. IV. 4. 22; B.G. VI. 1. The twofold indicatory mark is śruti and smrti. Baladeva begins a new section here with two sūtras. The parinistha devotee should first perform his duties of worship and then his ordinary duties.

Text, Translation and Notes 517 III. 4. 35. anabhibhavam ca darśayati And Scripture declares that (those performing works) are not over- powered (by passion and the like). anabhibhavam: not being overpowered; ca: and; darsayati: the Scripture declares. Scripture shows that he who is furnished with self-control, etc., is not overpowered by such afflictions as passion and the like. See C.U. VIII. 5. 3. Sacrifices, etc., are works incumbent on the aśramas or stages of life and are helpful for knowledge. Nimbārka quotes Mahā-nārāyaņa U. XXII. 1: 'By means of religious observance one removes one's sin.' Baladeva says that the parinistha devotee is not overpowered by the fault of the non-performance of the duties incumbent on his own stage of life.

Section 9 (36-39)

THOSE WHO STAND BETWEEN TWO STAGES OF LIFE ARE ALSO ENTITLED TO KNOWLEDGE

III. 4. 36. antarācāpi tu tad-drsteh But also (persons standing) between (are qualified for knowledge) for that is seen (in Scripture). antarā: (persons standing) in between (two aśramas); ca: and; api tu: also; tad-drsteh: because that is seen. The question considered here is whether those who belong to no recognised stage of life (aśrama) are fit for brahma-knowledge. The answer is in the affirmative though it is better to belong to one āśrama rather than none. A widower, for example, cannot do the duties of an asrama. The sūtra says that such people are qualified for knowledge. Scriptures give examples of people like Raikva and Gargi, who had the knowledge of Brahman. C.U. IV. 1; B.U. III. 6 and 8. III. 4. 37. api ca smaryate Also this is stated in smrti. api ca: also; smaryate: stated in smrti. Samvarta and others paid no regard to the duties incumbent on the stages of life and yet attained the highest knowledge. R. says that men who do not belong to an asrama or a stage of life grow in knowledge through prayer and the like. He quotes Manu II. 87: 'Through prayer also a Brāhmana may become perfect. Whether he performs other works or not, one who befriends all creatures is called a Brāhmana.' japyenāpi ca samsidhyed brāhmaņo nātra samśayah kuryād anyan na vā kuryān maitro brāhmana ucyate.

518 The Brahma Sūtra III. 4. 38. viśeşānugrahaś ca And special works favour (knowledge). viśesa-anugrahah: favour due to special work; ca: and. Those who are not householders or are unable due to poverty, etc., to perform the duties of the stages of life can attain knowledge through special works like prayer, fasting, meditation, etc., which are not opposed to the condition of those who do not belong to any stage of life. R. quotes Praśna U. I. 10. He holds that acts which do not ex- clusively pertain to any āśrama conduce to knowledge, anāśrama- niyatair dharma-viseşaih vidyānugrahah. Śrīkantha interprets the sūtra to mean that āśrama-dharma, the duties prescribed for each stage of life, has a special efficacy in promoting knowledge.

III. 4. 39. atastvitaraj jyāyo lingāc ca But better than this is the other (stage of belonging to an aśrama) on account of the indicatory marks. atah: than this; tu: but; itarat: the other; jyayah: better; lingāt: because of the indicatory marks; ca: and. Though it is possible for one who stands between two āśramas to attain knowledge, both the śruti and the smrti say that it is better to belong to some aśrama. See B.U. IV. 4. 22; IV. 4. 9. Baladeva concludes that one who does not belong to any stage of life is higher than one who belongs to a stage of life.

Section 10 (40) THERE IS NO REVERSION TO FORMER STAGES OF ONE WHO HAS TAKEN TO SAMNYĀSA III. 4. 40. tad-bhūtasya tu nātad-bhāvo jaiminer api niyamātad- rūpābhāvebhyah But of him who has become that (entered on a higher asrama) there is no becoming not that (i.e. reverting to a lower one), according to Jaimini also, on account of restrictions, on account of the absence of the forms of that. tad-bhūtasya: of him who has become that; tu: but; na: no; atad- bhävah: becoming not that; jaimineh: of Jaimini (in this view); api: also; niyama: on account of restriction; atad-rūpa-abhāvebhyah: on account of the absence of the forms of that. The question is whether one who has taken to samnyāsa can go back to the previous stages of life. The sutra says that he cannot for

Text, Translation and Notes 5I9 the texts do not speak of reversion. They speak only of ascent to the higher stages of life. There exist no cases of such reversion. Baladeva says that a nirapeksa devotee does not deviate from his vow and enter worldly life.

Section 11 (41-42)

EXPIATION FOR ONE WHO VIOLATES THE VIEW OF SAMNYĀSA

III. 4. 41. na cādhikārikam api patanānumānāt, tad ayogāt And not also (can the expiation take place) mentioned in the chapter treating of qualification, because a lapse is inferred (in his case from the smrti) and because of its inefficacy (in his case). na: not; ca: and; ādhikārikam: (expiation) mentioned in the chapter dealing with qualification; api: even; patanānumānāt: because a lapse is inferred; tad-ayogat: because of its inefficacy. If a brahma-carin for life breaks from inattention the vow of celibacy, is he to perform the expiatory sacrifice mentioned in the text Apastamba Dharma Stra I. 9. 26. 8? The opponent says he is not. Pūrva Mīmāmsā Sūtra VI. 8. 22 speaks of brahma-cārins in general and not of perpetual ones. Smrti declares that such sins cannot be expiated by him any more than a head cut off from the body can again be tacked on to the body. The upakurvāna or a brahma-carin for a certain time only (and not for life) may purify himself by the ceremony mentioned. Nimbarka quotes the smrti passage: 'But the twice-born who, having reached the state of a perpetual religious student bound by chastity deviates therefrom-I do not see any expiation whereby he, the slayer of himself, may be purified.' (Agni Purāna 165. 23a-24b.)

III. 4. 42. upapūrvam api tv eke bhāvam, aśanavat, tad uktam But some (consider the lapse) a minor one (and claim) the existence (of expiation for naisthika brahma-carins also) as in the case of eating (forbidden food by ordinary brahma-carins). This has been stated (in the Pūrva Mīmāmsā). upa-purvam: a minor lapse; api tu: but; eke: some; bhavam: the existence; asanavat: as in the case of eating; tat: this; uktam: is stated (in Pūrva Mīmāmsā). Transgression of the vow of chastity is a minor sin. It is not listed among the deadly sins such as violating a teacher's bed and so on. So the expiatory ceremony is claimed to be valid for both sets of brahma-cārins, the naisthika and the upakurvana. The case is analo- gous to that of eating forbidden food. The brahma-carins who eat

520 The Brahma Sūtra forbidden food may purify themselves by performing a ceremony. The principle guiding the decision is explained in Pūrva Mīmāmsā Sūtra I. 3. 8.

Section 12 (43) SUCH TRANSGRESSIONS ARE TO BE KEPT OUTSIDE SOCIETY III. 4. 43. bahistūbhayathāpi smṛter ācārāc ca But in both cases (they are to be kept) outside society, on account of smyti and custom. bahih: outside; tu: but; ubhayatha-api: in both cases; smrteh: from the smyti; acarat: from custom; ca: and. Whether the lapses are to be regarded as major or minor, good people should avoid such transgressors, since smrti and approved custom both condemn them. Bhäskara and Baladeva omit the word 'api'.

Section 13 (44-46) MEDITATIONS CONNECTED WITH MEMBERS OF SACRIFICIAL ACTS ARE TO BE PERFORMED BY THE PRIEST AND NOT THE SACRIFICER III. 4. 44. svāminah phala-śruteh ity ātreyah To the lord (of the sacrifice only the agentship in meditation belongs) because Scripture declares a fruit (for it) ; thus Atreya thinks. svaminah: to the lord (of the sacrifice); phala-sruteh: from the declaration of fruits in the śruti; iti: thus; atreyah: Ātreya. The question is raised as to the agentship of the meditations con- nected with members of sacrificial acts. Is the sacrificer or the priest the agent? Atreya holds that the agentship belongs to the sacrificer since the śruti declares a special fruit for these meditations. Nimbārka quotes C.U. I. 1. 10.

III. 4. 45. ārtvijyam ity audulomis tasmai hi parikriyate (They are) the work of the priest; this is the view of Audulomi since for that he is paid. artvijyam: the work of the priest (rtvik); iti: this; audulomih: (is the view of) Audulomi; tasmai: for that; hi: because; parikriyate: (he) is paid (engaged).

Text, Translation and Notes 52I The meditations have to be observed by the priest, since he is paid for his acts. The fruits of his acts are purchased by the sacrificer. This is the view of the sage Audulomi. Śrīnivāsa quotes two authorities. Pūrva Mīmāmsā Sūtra (III. 7. 18) says that the fruit mentioned in the Scripture (accrues) to the instigator. Satapatha Brāhmaņa (I. 3. 1. 26) reads: 'Whatever blessings, for sooth, the priests pray for, all those accrue to the sacrificer.' Baladeva gives a different interpretation. Just as an officiating priest sells himself, as it were, to the sacrificer, so the Lord sells himself to the nirapeksa devotees.

III. 4. 46. śruteś ca And because the śruti so declares. śruteh: from the śruti; ca: and. Ś. quotes Satapatha Brāhmana I. 3. 1. 26; C.U. I. 7. 8, and holds that Audulomi is correct. R. and Nimbārka omit this sūtra.

Section 14 (47-49)

B.U. III. 5. 1 ENJOINS SILENT MEDITATION BESIDES SCHOLARSHIP AND THE CHILDLIKE STATE

III. 4. 47. sahakāryantara-vidhih pakseņa trtīyam tadvato vidhyādivat (Silent meditation is) the injunction of another auxiliary (to knowledge) which is a third one (besides the two expressly enjoined) as an alternative (where perfect knowledge has not arisen) to him who is such (i.e. the

like. samnyāsin possessing knowledge): as in the case of injunctions and the

sahakāryantara-vidhih: injunction of another auxiliary (to knowledge); pakseņa: as an alternative; trtīyam: a third one; tadvatah: for one who possesses it (knowledge); vidhyādivat: as in the case of injunctions and the like. The question is raised in regard to B.U. III. 5. 1, whether silent meditation is enjoined or not. The opponent holds that it is not, since there is no word indicating an injunction. The text says that he becomes a muni, a silent meditator, whereas with regard to learning and the state of a child, it expressly enjoins one should remain endowed with them. Besides, learning includes silent meditation. The sūtra refutes this view and states that silent meditation is enjoined as a third requisite besides learning and the state of a child. Silent meditation is not merely learning but continuous devotion to know- ledge, jñānātiaya-rūpam. It has therefore the value of an injunction. R*

522 The Brahma Sūtra Baladeva begins a new section here and continues the topic of nirapeksa devotees. These already possess sacrifice, calmness and control and so in their case meditation is enjoined.

III. 4. 48. ktsna-bhāvāt tu grhiņopasamhārah On account (of the householder's life) being all, however, there is the conclusion (with the enumeration of the duties) of the householder. krtsna-bhavat: on account (of the householder's life) including all; tu: however; grhinah: with the householder; upasamharah: the conclusion. In C.U. VIII. 15. 1 after enumerating the duties of the brahma- carin those of the householder are mentioned but there is no mention of samnyasa. This, the sūtra says, is only to lay stress on the householder's life and its importance. The householder's life includes more or less the duties of all aśramas. R. says that B.U. III. 5. 1 mentions duties of all aśramas.

III. 4. 49. maunavad itareşām apy upadeśāt On account of there being injunction of the others also, in the same way as of the state of a silent meditator. maunavat: even as the state of a muni (samnyāsin); itareșām: of the others; api: even; upadeśāt: on account of instruction (injunction). Even as the Scriptures enjoin the states of samnyasa and the householder's life, they enjoin all the four stages of life either in sequence or alternatively. Śrīkantha begins a new section of two sutras here dealing with the topic whether those who practise the vow of Pāsupata and do not belong to any particular stage of life are entitled to salvation and answers that they are entitled to salvation. For the Pasupata vow includes calmness, self-control and the rest.

Section 15 (50) THE CHILDLIKE STATE IS INNOCENCE, FREE FROM ANGER, PASSION, ETC. III. 4. 50. anāvişkurvann anvayāt (The childlike state means) not manifesting himself on account of the context. anāviskurvan: not manifesting himself; anvayāt: on account of the context. What is the childlike state? Is it a state of ignorance of right and wrong or of doing what one likes or is it one of freedom from guile and the sense of egoism. It is the latter for the former is detrimental

Text, Translation and Notes 523 to knowledge. Only such a meaning is appropriate in the context. The state of a child is not wilful behaviour but freedom from pride and arrogance.

Section 16 (51) KNOWLEDGE CAN ARISE IN THIS LIFE III. 4. 51. aihikam apy aprastuta-pratibandhe tad-darśanāt In this life also (the fruition of knowledge may take place) if no obstruction is present; on account of this being seen in the Scripture. aihikam: in this life; api: also; aprastuta-pratibandhe: if there is no obstruction present; tat-darsanāt of this being seen in Scripture Knowledge arises in this life when its rise is not obstructed by some other works whose results are reaching maturity. When there is such an obstruction, then knowledge arises in the next life. See Katha U. I. 2. 7; B.G. VI. 43; VI. 45. Bhāskara reads aihikam aprasutam pratibandhena darśanāt: (There is the rise of knowledge) in this life (if the works which obstruct it have) not sprung up, through (the presence of such an) obstruction (however there is the rise of knowledge in the next world) because (that) is seen. R. says that vidya whose result is mere exaltation, abhyudaya, takes place in the present life, if there is not present an obstruction in the form of a serious karma, prabala-karmāntara, in which case knowledge arises later. Aihikam refers to worldly prosperity only as distinct from that which aims at final release. Śrikantha speaks of the time of the rise of salvation and not of knowledge. He reads: '[The result of meditation, viz. salvation, arises] in this life [i.e. as soon as the present body ceases] if obstruction be not present, on account of that being seen.' If there be no contrary works, then a knower attains release as soon as he dies. If there be such works he has to be reborn and exhaust them before he can attain release. So even knowers like Vāmadeva are seen to have rebirths. Baladeva follows R.'s interpretation.

Section 17 (52) LIBERATION IS OF ONE KIND IN ALL CASES

hävadhrteh III. 4. 52. evam mukti-phalāniyamas tad-avasthāvadhrteh tad-avast-

(There is) no rule like this, with respect to liberation, the fruit (of knowledge) on account of the assertions as to that condition, on account of the assertions as to that condition.

524 The Brahma Sūtra evam: like this; mukti-phala-aniyamah: no rule with respect to liberation, the fruit; tat-avastha-avadhrteh: on account of the assertions about that condition. In the previous sutra, it is said that knowledge may result in this life or the next according to the absence or presence of obstructions and the intensity of the means adopted. The question is raised whether there is any rule with regard to liberation which is the fruit of knowledge, whether it can be delayed after knowledge arises. The sutra states that no such rule exists. The nature of final release is the same and there can be no variations of it. See B.U. II. 4. 6, III. 8.8, III. 9. 26, IV. 4. 25, IV. 5. 15; C.U. VII. 24. 1; M.U. II. 2. 11. Differences are possible with regard to the worship of Saguna Brahman but not with regard to the knowledge of Nirguna-Brahman. There cannot be any delay with regard to the attainment of liberation after knowledge has arisen for the knowledge of Brahman is liberation. The repetition is to indicate that the chapter ends here. Bhaskara means by this sutra that though there is no fixed rule as to whether salvation is to arise in this life or in after-life yet there is no non-fixity in the nature of salvation for salvation is nothing but the nature of the Highest Lord. Śrikantha holds that salvation means attaining similarity with the Lord. As the Lord is the same, salvation is the same though there may be gradations in the meditations.

Section 1 (1-2)

MEDITATION ON THE SELF IS TO BE REPEATED TILL KNOWLEDGE IS ATTAINED

IV. 1. 1. āvrttir asakrd upadeśāt Repetition (of hearing, reflection and meditation on the Self is necessary) on account of the instruction (which is given) more than once. avrttih: repetition (is required); asakṛt: more than once; upadeśāt: on account of instruction (by the Scriptures). B.U. II. 4. 5, IV. 4. 21; C.U. VIII. 7. 1 require us to realise the Self through hearing, reflection and meditation. The question is whether this is to be done only once or repeatedly. The answer is given that it is to be repeated till the knowledge of Brahman arises. Where the text requires repeated instruction, repeated performance of the mental acts is directly intimated.

IV. 1. 2. lingāc ca And on account of the indicatory mark. lingat: on account of the indicatory mark; ca: and. Repetition is necessary for if it were not so, Scriptures would not teach the doctrine 'That thou art' repeatedly. With advanced souls a single hearing of the statement may produce knowledge but such souls are very rare. For ordinary people who are attached to the world, repeated meditation is necessary before the last traces of ignorance are removed. R. means by 'inferential mark' smrti. Smyti also declares that the knowledge which effects release is of the nature of continued repetition. Meditation therefore has to be repeated. Nimbarka follows R. and quotes B.G. XII. 9.

Section 2 (3) THE MEDITATOR SHOULD VIEW BRAHMAN AS CONSTITUTING HIS OWN SELF

IV. 1. 3. ātmeti tūpagacchanti grāhayanti ca But as the Self (scriptural texts) acknowledge and also make us comprehend (the Supreme). atmeti: as the Self; tu: but; upagacchanti: acknowledge; grāhayanti: make us comprehend; ca: also. The Lord is to be contemplated as the Self in the form 'I am Brahman', not as another being. See B.U. I. 4. 10; Mā.U. 2. The

526 The Brahma Sūtra Jabalas hold 'Thou indeed I am, O holy divinity, and I indeed thou art, O holy divinity'. tvam va aham asmi bhagavo devate, aham vai tvam asi bhagavo devate. R. declares that God is to be contemplated as the Self that controls the individual, which is as the body of God. Srinivasa says that since the Highest Self is the whole of which the individual soul is a part and since the former is the very soul of the latter, which can have no existence or activity independently of him even as the thousand-rayed sun, having independence, existence and activity in contrast to its own rays is their soul and the rays are non-different from it, so the Lord should be known to be non- different from the individual soul. Śrīkantha who generally adopts the śarīra-śarīri-bhāva, the relation of God to the soul on the analogy of the soul to the body, here gives it up and supports the view that the Lord is to be meditated on as identical with the Self. This is one of the grounds on which Appaya Dīkșita maintains that Śrīkantha was at heart a non-dualist.

Section 3 (4) WHERE SYMBOLS ARE USED FOR CONTEMPLATION, THE MEDITATOR IS NOT TO CONSIDER THE SYMBOLS AS IDENTICAL WITH HIS SELF IV. 1. 4. na pratīke na hi sah

(that). (The meditator is) not (to see the Self) in the symbol, because he is not na: not; pratike: in the symbol; na: is not; hi: because; sah: he. In a passage like C.U. III. 18. 1, 'Let one meditate on mind as Brahman', the mind is not to be identified with the Self. If the mind is cognised as identical with Brahman, then it ceases to be a symbol, even as a gold ornament loses its individual character when it is identified with gold. Again, if the meditator is conscious of his identity with Brahman, then he ceases to be the individual soul, the meditator. The act of meditation is possible only where distinctions exist and unity has not been reached.

Section 4 (5) THE SYMBOL IS TO BE VIEWED AS ONE WITH BRAHM AN AND NOT BRAHMAN AS ONE WITH THE SYMBOL IV. 1. 5. brahma-drstir utkarşāt (The symbol is) to be viewed as Brahman (and not in the opposite way) on account of exaltation (bestowed on symbols).

Text, Translation and Notes 527 brahma-drstih: viewing as Brahman; utkarsāt: on account of the exaltation. The symbols are to be regarded as Brahman and not vice versa. We can make progress only by looking upon an inferior object as symbolic of the superior and not vice versa. Since our objective is to get rid of the idea of diversity and see Brahman in everything, we have to meditate on the symbols as Brahman. R. does not take this as a separate section. It only states, for him, a reason for the conclusion reached in the previous sūtra. Baladeva takes this sūtra as a separate section dealing with a different topic. Even as the Lord is to be meditated on as the self of the devotee, he is to be meditated on as Brahman also, i.e. as possessed of great attributes and powers. Such a meditation is the highest of all.

Section 5 (6) IN MEDITATIONS ON MEMBERS OF SACRIFICIAL ACTS THE IDEA OF THE DIVINITY IS TO BE IMPOSED ON THE MEMBERS AND NOT VICE VERSA

IV. 1. 6. ādityādimatayaś cānga upapatteh And the ideas of the sun and so on (are to be imposed) on the subordinate members (of sacrificial acts) because (only in that way would the statement of the Scriptures) be consistent. ādityādi-matayah: the ideas of the sun and so on; ca: and; ange: in a subordinate member (of the sacrificial act); upapatteh: because of consistency. Ś. reads: angesu' instead of ange. In C.U. I. 3. 1 where 'one should meditate on that which shines yonder as the udgitha' and II. 2. 1 where 'one should meditate on the saman as fivefold' the members of the sacrificial acts are to be viewed as the sun and so on. By so doing the fruit of the act is enhanced. This is to be done if the statements of the Scriptures that the meditations enhance the fruits of the sacrifice are to be fulfilled. R. says that only through the propitiation of gods are sacrifices capable of bringing about their results. The udgitha and so on are to be viewed under the aspect of the sun and so on. Baladeva takes this sutra as a separate section dealing with a different topic. 'The ideas of the sun and the rest [as generating from the eyes of the Lord and so on should be imposed] on the limb [of the Lord], on account of appropriateness.'

528 The Brahma Sūtra

Section 6 (7-10) ONE IS TO MEDITATE SEATED IV. 1. 7. āsīnah sambhavāt Seated (a man is to meditate) on account of the possibility. asīnah: seated; sambhavāt: on account of possibility. One is to meditate seated. It is not possible to meditate standing or lying down. In upāsanā one has to concentrate one's mind on a single object. This is not possible when one is standing or lying down. R. says that the needful concentration of mind can be reached in a sitting posture. Standing and walking demand effort. Lying down may induce sleep. The proper posture is sitting on some support so that no effort may be required for holding the body erect. IV. 1. 8. dhyānāc ca And on account of meditation. dhyānāt: on account of meditation; ca: and. Ś. says that upāsanā and dhyāna mean the same thing, con- centrating on a single object, with a fixed look and without any movement of the limbs. This is possible only in a sitting posture. R. says that meditation means thought directed on one object and not disturbed by ideas of other things, dhyānam hi vijātīya- pratyayāntarāvyavahitam eka-cintanam ity uktam. Śrikantha defines release as the attainment of supreme self-hood which is free from the state of the bound creature, characterised by love of bodily conditions such as that of Brahmana, etc., which is full of essential unsurpassable bliss, and is of the form of Siva, the self-luminous witness. nivytta-brāhmanādi-dehābhimānamaya-paśubhāvasya niratiśaya- svarūpānandamaya - sāksi-svaprakāśa - siva-rūpa - parāhambhāvāpattir muktir iti sarva-śruti-tātparyāt. IV. 1. 9. acalatvam cāpeksya And with reference to immobility. acalatvam: immobility; ca: and; apeksya: referring to. Meditation is ascribed to earth in some passages (C.U. VII. 6.1) on account of its immobility or steadiness. Steadiness is a concomitant of meditation and this is possible only while sitting and not while standing or walking. IV. 1. 10. smaranti ca The smrti texts also say (the same). smaranti: the smrti texts say; ca: also. The reference is to the B.G. VI. 11-12 where the sitting posture is prescribed for meditation and also to the Yoga Sūtra on the āsanas.

Text, Translation and Notes 529

Section 7 (11) MEDITATION MAY BE CARRIED ON AT ANY TIME, AT ANY PLACE FAVOURABLE TO CONCENTRATION OF MIND IV. 1. 11. yatraikāgratā tatrāvišeșāt Where concentration of mind (is possible) there (meditation may be carried on) on account of there being no difference. yatra: where; ekāgratā: concentration of mind; tatra: there; aviśeşāt: on account of there being no difference. One can meditate at any time, in any place and in any direction where he can with ease concentrate his mind. It is true that certain directions are given as in S.U. II. 10. These are only suggestions and are not fixed rules.

Section 8 (12) MEDITATIONS ARE TO BE CONTINUED UNTIL DEATH IV. 1. 12. āprāyaņāt tatrāpi hi drstam Till death (meditations have to be continued) because (their continuance) even at that moment is seen (in Scripture). āprāyaņāt: till death; tatra: then; api: even; hi: because; drstam: is seen (from the Scriptures). The meditations are to be continued till death for the śruti and the smrti say so. Satapatha Brāhmana (X. 6. 3. 1) says: 'With whatever thought he passes away from this world, sa yāvat kratuh ayam asmāl lokāt praiti.' See also B.G. VIII. 6. 'Whatever idea you have in mind when you quit the body at death, that idea you will realise.'1 S. maintains that the meditations which lead to intuition of Brahman are not subject to this rule. R. quotes C.U. VIII. 15. 1: sa khalv evam vartayan yāvad āyușam brahma-lokam abhi-sampadyate. He who behaves thus throughout his life reaches the Brahma-world. Śrikantha explains the word 'rudra' as one who drives away the sorrows of bondage, samsāra-rugdrāvakah. Baladeva interprets tatrāpi to mean 'even after death'. The devotee not only practises meditation so long as he lives but even after death, i.e. even when he is freed. He worships the Lord even though he is not required to do so.

Nārada U. 1 yay yam vāpi smaran bhāvam tyajaty ante kalevaram tam tam eva samāpnoti.

530 The Brahma Sūtra

Section 9 (13) WHEN THE KNOWLEDGE OF BRAHMAN IS ATTAINED, THE KNOWER IS NO LONGER AFFECTED BY THE CONSEQUENCES OF HIS PAST OR FUTURE SINFUL DEEDS IV. 1. 13. tad-adhigama uttara-pūrvāghayor aśleșa-vināśau tad- vyapadeśāt On the attainment of this (Brahman) (there occur) the non-clinging and the destruction of the later and the earlier sinful deeds, because it is (so) declared (in the Scriptures). tat-adhigame: on the attainment of this; uttara-purva-aghayoh: of the later and the earlier sinful deeds; aślesa-vināśau: non-clinging and destruction; tad-vyapadeśat: because it is (so) declared (in the Scriptures). The question here relates to the state of jivan-mukti or liberation in life. If it is said that one must experience the results of one's deeds committed before the attainment of liberation, the sūtra observes that when a person attains knowledge, all his earlier sins are destroyed and later ones do not cling to him. When he attains knowledge, the sense of agency is lost and the effects of deeds do not affect him. See C.U. IV. 14. 3; V. 24. 3, M.U. II. 2. 8. The law of karma does not apply to the knowers of Brahman. When we attain liberation, the chain of work is broken. We become superior to time.

Section 10 (14) GOOD DEEDS LIKEWISE DO NOT AFFECT THE KNOWER OF BRAHMAN IV. 1. 14. itarasyāpy evam asamśleșah pāte tu Of the other (i.e. good works) also there is in the same way non-clinging but on the fall (of the body, i.e. death). itarasya: of the other; api: also; evam: in the same way; asamślesah: non-clinging; pate: on the fall (at death); tu: but. The knower of Brahman, since he is devoid of the sense of agency, goes beyond good and evil: B.U. IV. 4. 22. Since he is not affected by good or evil after illumination and his past sins are destroyed by knowledge, his liberation takes place at death. R. says that good works which produce results favourable to knowledge and meditation perish only on the death of the body and not during the lifetime of the meditator. Śrīkantha follows R.'s interpretation.

Text, Translation and Notes 53I

Section 11 (15) THIS CHARACTERISTIC APPLIES ONLY TO WORKS WHICH HAVE NOT BEGUN TO PRODUCE THEIR EFFECTS

IV. 1. 15. anārabdhakārye eva tu pūrve tad-avadheh But only those former (works) whose effects have not yet begun (are destroyed by knowledge) ; because (Scripture states that) death is the limit. anārabdha-kārye: works which have not begun to yield results; eva: only; tu: but; pūrve: former works; tad-avadheh: that (death) being the limit. When we say that the past works of a knower of Brahman are destroyed, we have to make a distinction between two kinds of past works, sañcita or accumulated works which have not yet begun to bear fruit and prärabdha or those works which have begun to yield results and have produced the body through which a person has attained knowledge. The sutra says that prarabdha works have to be worked out. prārabdha-karmāņi bhogād eva ksayah. So long as the momentum of the works lasts, the knower of Brahman has to be in the body. When they are exhausted, the body falls off and the knower attains perfection. His knowledge cannot check these works even as a potter's wheel comes to rest only when its momentum is exhausted. See C.U. VI. 14. 2. If it were not so, then there would be no teachers of knowledge. The knowledge of Self being essentially non-active destroys all works by means of refuting wrong knowledge but wrong knowledge comparable to the appearance of a double moon lasts for some time even after it has been refuted, owing to the impression it has made. Moreover, it is not a matter for dispute at all whether the body of him who knows Brahman continues to exist for some time or not. For how can one man contest the fact of another possessing the knowledge of Brahman, vouched for by his heart's conviction-and at the same time continuing to enjoy bodily existence. katham hy ekasya svahdaya-pratyayam brahma- vedanam deha-dhāraņam cāpareņa pratikseptum śakyate. S. Knowledge of reality is self-attested. Besides, along with the possession of the knowledge of the Absolute Brahman, embodiment, deha-dhāranam, is possible. It is clear that even according to S., knowledge of Brahman can coexist with embodied life and partici- pation in the work of the world.1 R. says that there is no proof for the existence of an impetus accounting for the continuance of the body's life, other than the Lord's pleasure or displeasure caused by good or evil deeds: na ca punyāpunya-karma-janya-bhagavad-prīty-aprīti-vyatirekeņa sthiti-hetu-bhūta-samskāra-sadbhāve pramānam asti. R. śarīra-

1 asya jīvan-muktasya deha-dhāranam lokasyopakārārtham. Ś. The embodiedness of the liberated soul is for the service of the world.

532 The Brahma Sūtra

Section 12 (16-17) OBLIGATORY WORKS ARE EXCEPTED SINCE THEY PROMOTE THE ORIGINATION OF KNOWLEDGE IV. 1. 16. agnihotrādi tu tat-kāryāyaiva tad-darśanāt But (the results of daily) agnihotra, etc., (are not destroyed by knowledge as they) contribute to the same result (as knowledge) because that is seen (from the Scriptures). agnihotrādi (daily) agnihotra, etc .; tu: but; tat-kāryāya: contribute to the same result (as knowledge, i.e. liberation); eva: only; tat- darśanāt: because that is seen (from the Scriptures). Works are of two kinds, those which yield specific results and those which help to produce knowledge. Obligatory regular works performed before the rise of knowledge are of the latter kind. Since knowledge leads to liberation, the regular works may be said to contribute indirectly to that. So their results persist till death. While for Ś. works are indirect means to liberation, i.e. produce knowledge which leads to liberation, Bhäskara holds that they are a direct means.

IV. 1. 17. ato'nyāpi hy ekeşām ubhayoh According to some, (there is) also (a class of good works) other than this. (There is agreement) of both (teachers) (as to the result of these works). atah: from this; anya: different (or other); api: also; hi: indeed; ekeşam: of some; ubhayoh: of both. Besides the obligatory works like the daily agnihotra and the like, there are other good works which are performed with a view to certain results. Of these latter works, it is said that 'his friends enter on his good works', suhrdas sādhu-krtyām upayanti. Others profit by one's good deeds. Both Jaimini and Bādarayana are agreed that works undertaken for the fulfilment of some special wish do not contribute to the origination of true knowledge. R. means by both works of both kinds, either prior or subsequent to the rise of knowledge. Baladeva begins a new section here of 3 sutras dealing with the case of some nirapeksa devotees. They become free at once without having to wait for the exhaustion of their prarabdha-karmas.

Text, Translation and Notes 533

Section 13 (18)

SACRIFICIAL WORKS NOT COMBINED WITH KNOWLEDGE OR MEDITATION ALSO HELP IN THE PRODUCTION OF KNOWLEDGE

IV. 1. 18. yad eva vidyayeti hi For (the statement) whatever he does with knowledge (indicates this). yat eva: whatever; vidyaya: with knowledge; iti: thus; hi: for. The reference is to C.U. I. 1. 10. What one performs with know- ledge, that indeed becomes more powerful, viryavattaram. Works done without knowledge are not useless though works done with knowledge are more powerful. Ś. holds that all obligatory works performed before the rise of true knowledge, whether with or without knowledge, either in the present state of existence or a former one, by a person desirous of release with a view to release, all such works act according to their several capacities, as means of the extinction of evil desert which obstructs the attainment of Brahman and thus become causes of such attain- ment, subserving the more immediate causes such as the hearing of and reflecting on the sacred texts, faith, meditation, devotion, etc. Bhāskara omits this sūtra. Śrīnivāsa argues that works of greater strength first begin to produce their own fruits. When this happens, other good or bad deeds of lesser strength performed with a view to attaining certain ends remain without producing their results even as a weak cow is kept off from water, grass and so on by a stronger one. When the knower becomes free immediately after the decay of those works the effects of which have already begun, those works go to his friends and foes respectively. Baladeva says that even the prārabdha-karmas may be destroyed at once through the grace of vidyā.

Section 14 (19) ON THE EXHAUSTION OF WORKS WHICH HAVE BEGUN TO TAKE EFFECT, THE KNOWER OF BRAHMAN ATTAINS ONENESS WITH BRAHMAN

IV. 1. 19. bhogena tv itare-ksapayitvā sampadyate But having exhausted by enjoyment the two other (sets of work), he becomes one with Brahman. bhogena: by enjoyment; tu: but; itare: of the other two works;

534 The Brahma Sūtra kşapayitvā: having exhausted; sampadyate: becomes one (with Brahman). When the works good and bad which have begun to bear fruit are exhausted through enjoyment one attains oneness with Brahman. See C.U. VI. 14. 2; B.U. IV. 4. 6. Till then, however, the knower of Brahman has to be in the relative world as a jivan-mukta, one liberated in life. When the works whose effects have begun are destroyed, he who knows necessarily enters into the state of perfect isolation, kaivalyam. Śrinivsa says that there is salvation, when on the decay of the works-the effects of which have already begun by enjoyment-there is the fall of the body at the completion of enjoyment. While for S. the fruition is restricted to the present existence, since the complete knowledge attained by him destroys the ignorance, avidya, which otherwise would lead to further embodiments, for R a number of embodied existences may have to be gone through before the effects of the works which have begun to bear fruit are exhausted.

Section 1 (1-2)

AT THE TIME OF DEATH THE FUNCTIONS OF THE ORGANS MERGE IN MIND

IV. 2. 1. vān manasi-daršanāc chabdāc ca Speech (is merged) in mind on account of observation and the scriptural

vāk: speech; manasi: in mind; darśanāt: on account of observation; statement.

sabdat: on account of scriptural statement; ca: and. In the previous section it is shown that by destruction of actions which have not as yet begun to yield results a knower of Brahman attains liberation in life, jivan-mukti, and on the exhaustion of prärabdha-karma, works which have begun to yield results, he attains videha-mukti at death, when he becomes one with Brahman. For S. the knower of the Saguna Brahman travels after death by the path of the gods. The steps by which the soul passes out of the body at death are set forth in many texts. C.U. VI. 8. 6 says that speech gets merged in mind and mind in prāna or life and so on. The question is raised whether it is the organ or the function that is merged and the answer is that it is the function. As mind is not the material cause of the organ, the organs cannot get merged in mind. The function and the organ to which it belongs are treated as one. We notice that a dying man first loses his function of speech though his mind is still functioning. When a person departs from this life, speech is said to get merged in mind and so on. This merger is not of forms but only of function. Hence that in which the merger takes place need not be the material cause of what is merged. This is the doctrine of laya or mergence. This is S.'s view, which is followed by Śrīkantha. R. understands laya to mean not mergence but a 'going forth', a combination or connection. Speech goes with mind and so on. While Ś. distinguishes between the knower who has the highest knowledge and the knower of the qualified Brahman, for R. the knower is of one type only. For R. the combination sampatti of the sense-organs with manas is a samyoga or connection and not laya or merging. Nimbärka holds that the organ of speech is connected with mind. With R., Nimbärka holds that the description of the path belongs to all knowers. Baladeva is of the view that both the organ of speech and its function are connected with the mind.

536 The Brahma Sūtra IV. 2. 2. ata eva ca sarvāņy anu And for the same reason all (sense-organs follow) after. atah eva: for the same reason; ca: and; sarvāni: all (organs); anu: after. All other sense-organs follow, i.e. get merged in mind. See Praśna U. III. 9. The functions of all the organs get merged in mind. Nimbarka and Śrīnivasa hold that all sense-organs are united with and not merged in mind.

Section 2 (3) MIND GETS MERGED IN PRĀŅA OR LIFE IV. 2. 3. tan manah prāņa uttarāt That mind (is merged) in life owing to the subsequent clause. tat: that; manah: mind; prane: in life; uttarat: from the subsequent clause (of the text previously cited). Here also it is the function that gets merged for we find that mind ceases to function in a dying man, even while his vital force or prāna is functioning. The organ itself is not merged in life for life does not constitute its causal substance. R. and Nimbarka hold that mind is united with the vital breath. Śrikantha follows Ś. and holds that the function of the mind merges in life.

Section 3 (4-6) THE FUNCTION OF LIFE GETS MERGED IN THE INDIVIDUAL SOUL IV. 2. 4. so'dhyakse tad-upagamādibhyaḥ That in the ruler on account of (statements indicating) approach and so on. sah: that; adhyakse: in the ruler (jiva, the individual soul); tat- upagamādibhyah: on account of (statements indicating) approach to that and so on.

VI. 3. The texts here considered are B.U. IV. 3. 38, IV. 4. 2; Praśna U. · Life into which the different organs are merged has its abode in the individual soul. R. and Nimbarka hold that the life-principle is connected with the individual soul. Śrīkaņțha reads adhyakseņa for adhyakse.

Text, Translation and Notes 537 IV. 2. 5. bhūteșu tac-chruteh In the elements (the soul with the life-principle is merged) as is seen in the Scriptures. bhutesu: in the elements; tat-śruteh: from the śruti texts to that effect. The soul with the life-principle takes its abode in the fine essence of the gross elements, fire, etc., which constitute the seed of the future body. The life-principle is said to be united with fire in C.U. VI. 8. 6 but it means the elements together with fire, on account of scriptural declarations to that effect. See B.U. IV. 4. 5.

IV. 2. 6. naikasmin darśayato hi Not in one (element only) (the soul goes) for both (sruti and smyti) na: not; ekasmin: in one; darsayatah: (both) declare so; hi: for. declare this. At the time of death, when the soul leaves our body and goes in for another, it, together with the subtle body, resides in the subtle essence of all the gross elements and not in that of fire only for all the elements are required for a future body. See C.U. V. 3. 3; B.U. IV. 4. 5; Manu 1. 27. R. says that fire denotes fire mixed with the other elements. Life- principle and the soul are therefore united with the aggregate of the elements. Nimbārka quotes Vişņu Purāņa (I. 2. 48): 'These [elements] possessed of various powers but separate were unable to produce beings without aggregation, i.e. without coming together entirely.'

Section 4 (7) THE MODE OF DEPARTURE FROM THE BODY UP TO THE ENTRANCE OF THE SOUL INTO THE NADIS IS COMMON TO BOTH THE KNOWER OF SAGUNA BRAHMAN AND THE ORDINARY MAN IV. 2. 7. samānā cāsrty upakramād amrtatvam cānuposya And common (is the mode of departure for both the knower of Saguna Brahman and the ignorant) up to the beginning of the way and the immortality (of him who knows) (is relative only), not having burnt samānā: common; ca: and; ā srti upakramāt: up to the beginning of (ignorance). the way; amrtatvam: immortality; ca: and; anuposya: not having burnt (ignorance). According to S., for the knower of the Nirguna Brahman, there is

538 The Brahma Sūtra no departure at all. The question arises whether the path to brahma- loka to which the knower of Saguna Brahman goes and the world in which the ignorant is reborn are identical or different. The sūtra says that both go by the same way till the knower enters the susumna nādī and the ignorant some other nerve. After that one goes to the path of the gods and the other to have rebirth. Till they enter on their respective ways the mode of departure is the same. R. quotes B.U. IV. 4. 7 and explains that the immortality which is ascribed to the knower as soon as he shakes off all desires can only mean the destruction of the effects of good and evil works and the reaching of Brahman means the intuition of Brahman vouchsafed to the meditating devotee. C.U. VIII. 6. 5 speaks of a hundred veins. As the soul of the knower is said to pass out by way of a particular vein, up to the soul's entering the vein, there is no difference between the knower and the non-knower.

Section 5 (8-11) THE MERGING OF FIRE, ETC., IN THE SUPREME IS NOT ABSOLUTE MERGING IV. 2. 8. tad āpīteh samsāra-vyapadeśāt That (subtle body continues) up to the attainment (of Brahman) on account of the declarations of the empirical state (made by Scripture). tat: that; a apiteh: up to the attainment (of Brahman); samsāra- vyapadeśat: on account of the declarations of the empirical state. The mergence cannot be absolute for then all would attain liberation. It is the kind of mergence that we experience in deep sleep. Only the functions of the elements are merged and not the elements themselves. The final dissolution does not take place until knowledge is attained. Till then the Scriptures declare that the individual soul is subject to empirical existence, samsāra: Katha U. II. 5. 7. If the merging of death were absolute, then there could be no rebirth. So the elements continue to exist in a seminal condition. Bhaskara follows S.'s interpretation. R. does not take this as the beginning of a new section. He refers to the immortality spoken of in the previous sutra and holds that it does not imply the separation of the soul from the body for Scripture declares samsara as embodiedness up to the reaching of Brahman. tasya tāvad eva ciram yāvan na vimoksye atha sampatsye. IV. 2. 9. sūksmam pramānataś ca tathopalabdheḥ And that is subtle in size because it is so experienced. sūkșmam: subtle; pramānatah: as regards size; ca: and; tathā: so; upalabdheh: because it is experienced.

Text, Translation and Notes 539 The body in which the soul abides at the time of death is subtle in nature and size. This is understood from the scriptural statements which declare that it goes out along the nādis. It is therefore subtle in size. Its transparency explains why it is not obstructed by gross bodies or is not seen when it passes out at death. R. says that the bondage of the knower is not dissolved for the reason that the subtle body continues to persist. We know this from Scripture, K.U. I. 3ff.

IV. 2. 10. nopamardenātah Therefore (this subtle body) is not (destroyed) by the destruction (of the gross body). na: not; upamardena: by the destruction; atah: therefore. The subtle body is not destroyed by what destroys the gross body, burning, etc. R. says that immortality is not effected by means of the total destruction of the body.

IV. 2. 11. asyaiva copapatter eşa ūşmā And to this (subtle body) alone does this (bodily) warmth belong, because this (only) is possible. asya: to this; eva: alone; ca: and; upapatteh: because of possibility; esah: this; ūşmā: (bodily) warmth. The bodily warmth observed in living animals belongs to this subtle body and not to the gross body for the warmth is felt so long as there is life and not after that.

Section 6 (12-14) THE LIFE-PRINCIPLES OF A KNOWER OF NIRGUNA BRAHM AN DO NOT DEPART FROM THE BODY AT DEATH

IV. 2. 12. pratişedhāt iti cen na śarīrāt If it be said that on account of the denial (made by the Scripture) (the life-principles of a knower of Brahman do not depart) (we say that it is) not so, (because Scripture says that the life-principles do not depart) from the embodied soul. pratisedhāt: on account of denial; iti cet: if it be said; na: not so; sarīrat: from the embodied soul. B.U. IV. 4. 6 says: 'His pranas do not depart. Being Brahman, he goes to Brahman.' From this express denial it follows that the prānas do not pass out of the body of him who knows Brahman. The opponent denies this and argues that the passage does not deny the passage of the pranas from the body but only from the embodied

540 The Brahma Sūtra soul. For if they do not depart from the body there will be no death at all. This is clear from the Madhyandina rescension, where the ablative, 'from him', tasmat, is used.

IV. 2. 13. spato hy ekeşām For (the denial of the departure) is clear (in the texts) of some (schools). spastah: clear; hi: for; ekeşām: of some (schools). This sutra refutes the view of the previous sutra by connecting the denial to the body and not the soul. That the pranas do not depart from the body is clear from B.U. III. 2. 11. The Mādhyandina reading 'from him' refers to the body. It is not true that if the prānas do not depart there will be no death for they do not remain in the body but get merged, which makes life impossible and we say that the person is dead. Again, if the pranas departed with the soul from the body, then the rebirth of the soul would be inevitable and there would be no liberation. So the pranas do not depart from the body in the case of the knower of Brahman. R. takes this and the previous sūtra as one. The question relates to the departure of the knower, vidvān tasya, in B.U. IV. 4. 5, from the body, śārīrāt, so that the passage means from the jiva or the individual soul the pranas do not depart. Again, with reference to the instruction given to Ārtabhāga by Yājñavalkya (B.U. III. 2. 10-11) there is nothing to show that ayam purusa is the sage who knows Brahman.

IV. 2. 14. smaryate ca And the smrti (also) says (so). smaryate: the smrti says (so); ca: and. M.B. XII. 270. 22 says that he who has become the self of all beings and has a complete intuition of all, at his way the gods themselves are perplexed, seeking for the path of him who has no path. sarvabhūtātma-bhūtasya samyag-bhūtāni paśyataḥ devāpi mārge muhyanti hy apadasya padaișinah. It follows that he who knows Brahman neither moves nor departs. R. says that there are smyti passages which declare that the sage also when dying departs from the body. The soul of him who knows departs by means of an artery from the head. R. quotes Yajñavalkya Smrti (III. 167): 'Of those, one is situated above which pierces the disc of the sun and passes beyond the world of Brahma; by way of that the soul reaches the highest goal.' ūrdhvam ekah sthitas teşām yo bhitvā sūrya-mandalam brahma-lokam atikramya tena yāti parām gatim. According to Nimbārka both knowers and non-knowers go out; only they travel by different paths.

Text, Translation and Notes 54I

Section 7 (15) THE ORGANS OF THE KNOWER OF NIRGUNA BRAHMAN ARE MERGED IN IT AT DEATH

IV. 2. 15. tāni pare tathā hy āha Those (elements, etc.) (are merged) in the Highest Brahman for thus (the Scripture) says. tani: those; pare: in the Supreme Brahman; tathā: so; hi: for; āha: (the Scripture) says. The question is in regard to the knower of Brahman who dies. What happens to the sense-organs and the subtle body in which they abide? These get merged in the Supreme Brahman. See Praśna U. VI. 5. 1. M.U. III. 2. 7, however, gives the account of the end from a relative standpoint according to which the body disintegrates and goes back to its cause, the elements. The former text speaks from a transcendental standpoint according to which the whole aggregate is merged in Brahman. kytsnam kalājātam para-brahma-vid brahmaiva sampadyate. Ś. R. says that the elements unite themselves with the Highest Self: C.U. VI. 8. 6. The functionings of those elements are to be viewed in such a way as to agree with Scripture. As in the states of deep sleep and pralaya, there is, owing to union with the Highest Self, a cessation of all experience of pain and pleasure, so is it in the case under question.

Section 8 (16) ON THE DEATH OF THE KNOWER OF THE HIGHEST BRAHMAN THE ORGANS AND THE ELEMENTS ARE MERGED IN BRAHMAN SO AS TO BE NO LONGER DISTINCT FROM IT IN ANY WAY

IV. 2. 16. avibhāgo vacanāt (There is) non-distinction (from Brahman, of the parts merged in it) according to (scriptural) statement. avibhāgah: non-distinction; vacanāt: on account of the (scriptural) statement. The text here referred to is Praśna U. VI. 5. The merging of elements in the case of the knower of Brahman is absolute, whereas in the case of an ordinary person it is not so. The elements exist in a subtle condition, causing future rebirth. In the case of the knower of Brahman, knowledge destroys ignorance and its effects get merged in Brahman absolutely, without any chance of cropping up again.

542 The Brahma Sūtra

R.says that the union is non-division, i.e. connection of such a kind that those subtle elements are altogether incapable of being thought and spoken of as separate from Brahman.

Section 9 (17)

THE SOUL OF THE KNOWER OF SAGUNA BRAHMAN PASSES INTO THE HEART AND THENCE DEPARTS OUT OF THE BODY THROUGH THE SUSUMNĀ NĀŅI IV. 2. 17. tadoko'grajvalanam tat-prakāśita-dvāro vidyā-sāmarthyāt tac-cheşagaty-anusmrti-yogāc ca hārdānugrhītah śatādhikayā (When the soul of the knower of the Saguna Brahman is about to depart from the body, there takes place) a lighting up of the top of its (the soul's) abode (the heart). With the passage (for the departure of the soul) being illuminated thereby, (the soul departs), being favoured by him (Brahman) who resides in the heart, along that nadi which is beyond the hundred, (i.e. the susumnā), owing to the power of knowledge and the appro-

knowledge. priateness of his constant meditation on the way which is part of that

tat-okah-agrajvalanam: the lighting of the top of its abode; tat- prakāsita-dvārah: with the passage illuminated by this light; vidyā- sāmarthyāt: owing to the power of knowledge; tat-śesa-gati-anu- smrti-yogāt: owing to the appropriateness of constant meditation as the way which is a part of that (knowledge); ca: and; hārdānugrhītah: being favoured by him who resides in the heart; śatādhikayā: by the one that is beyond the hundred. The texts considered here are B.U. IV. 4. 1-2. These texts indicate that, at the time of death, the soul together with the organs come to the heart. For both the knower and the ignorant the point of the heart becomes shining and the door of exit is also thereby lighted up, yet the knower departs through the skull only while the others depart from other places. See C.U. VIII. 6. 6. R. continues in his comment on this sutra, the departure of the knower. The knower wins the favour of the Supreme Person who abides within the heart and is assisted by him.

Section 10 (18-19)

THE DEPARTING SOUL PASSES UP TO THE SUN BY FOLLOWING THE RAYS

IV. 2. 18. raśmyanusārī (The soul after departing from the body) follows the rays. raśmi-anusarī: following the rays.

Text, Translation and Notes 543 From C.U. VIII. 6. 2. 5, we learn that the soul of the knower of Saguna Brahman, after departing from the body along the suşumnā, follows the rays of the sun. Whether it departs in day or night, it follows the rays which exist both in day and night.

darśayati ca IV. 2. 19. niśi neti cen na sambandhasya yāvad-deha-bhāvitvād

If it be said (that the soul does) not (follow the rays) in the night, (we reply that it is) not so because the connection of (the nadis and the rays) continues as long as the body lasts; and (Scripture) also declares (this). niśi: in the night; na: not; iti cet: if it be said; na: not so; sambandhasya yāvat-deha-bhāvitvāt: because the connection continues as long as the body lasts; darśayati: (Scripture) declares; ca: also. The connection lasts as long as the body lasts. So it is immaterial whether the soul passes out in day or in night. The sun's rays continue even in night though we do not feel their presence owing to the fact that their number is limited in night. The result of knowledge cannot be made to depend on the accident of death by day or by night. Cp. C.U. VIII. 6. 5.

Section 11 (20-21) THE KNOWER WHO DIES DURING DAKSIŅĀYANA REACHES BRAHMAN

IV. 2. 20. ataś cāyane'pi dakșiņe And for the same reason (the departing soul follows the rays) during the southern progress of the soul also. atah: for the same reason; ca: and; ayane: during the sun's course; api: also; daksiņe: southern. The objection is raised that the soul of the knower of Brahman who passes away during the southern course of the sun does not follow the rays to Brahma-loka as both śruti and smyti say that only one who dies during the northern course of the sun goes there. Besides, it is said that Bhīsma waited for the northern course of the sun, to leave the body. The sūtra says that the result of knowledge does not depend on the accident of passing in the northern or the southern course of the sun. C.U. V. 10. 1 refers to deities and not to the points in the northern course. Bhsma wanted only to show that he could die at will and to uphold approved custom. ācāra-paripālanārtham, pitr-prasāda-labdha-svacchanda-mrtyutākhyāpanārtham ca. See also B.G. VIII. 23ff.

544 The Brahma Sūtra IV. 2. 21. yoginah prati ca smaryate smārte caite (These details) are stated in the smrti with reference to the yogins; and both (Samkhya and Yoga) are smrti only. yoginah prati: with reference to the yogins; ca: and; smaryate: the smrti declares; smarte: belonging to the class of smrti; ca: and; ete: these two. The details as to the time mentioned in B.G. VIII. 23. 24 apply only to yogins who adopt the sadhana of the Yoga and the Samkhya systems. They are smrtis and not śrutis. These limitations do not apply to those who pursue the path of knowledge described in the śruti texts. Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa hold that there are no fixed rules about the time of departure.

Section 1 (1)

THE PATH CONNECTED WITH DEITIES BEGINNING WITH LIGHT IS THE ONLY WAY TO BRAHMA-LOKA

IV. 3. 1. arcirādinā tat-prathiteh (On the road) beginning with light (the departed soul proceeds) on account of that being widely known. arcih-ādinā: (on the road) beginning with light; tat-prathiteh: on account of that being well known. There are different declarations about the path of the gods, deva-yāna to brahma-loka. C.U. V. 10. 1; B.U. VI. 2. 15, see also V. 10. 1; K.U. I. 3; M.U. I. 2. 11. The question is whether these texts refer to different paths or different descriptions of the same path. The sūtra says that they give different descriptions of the same path. This is well known from the śruti C.U. V. 10. 1. Again, the goal attained is the same in all cases. While S. treats this sutra as referring to the knowers of Saguna Brahman, R., Nimbarka and others treat it as referring to all knowers.

Section 2 (2)

THE DEPARTING SOUL REACHES THE DEITY OF THE YEAR AND THEN OF THE AIR

IV. 3. 2. vāyum abdād avišeșa-viśeșābhyām From the year to air, on account of the absence and presence of speci-

vāyum: (the deity of) the air; abdat: from (the deity of) the year; fication.

aviśeşa-viśeşābhyām: on account of absence and presence of speci- fication. The passage that the soul goes to air from the year has reference to the C.U. text V. 10. 1. The B.U. text VI. 2. 3 has reference to month. In the one the world of gods is absent, in the other the year is absent. As both texts are authoritative both stages have to be inserted in each and the distinction has to be made that, owing to its connection with the months, the year has the first place (after the months and before the world of the gods) and the world of the gods the second place. Ś. and Bhäskara do not identify the world of gods with air. For them the order is light, day, bright fortnight, six months of the northern course of the sun, year, world of gods, air, sun and so on. R. and Śrīkaņțha take aviśea-vieşābhyām as stating the reason why the air is to be placed after the year and before the sun. For S

546 The Brahma Sūtra

them 'the world of gods' denotes air which is the dwelling-place of gods. Scripture specifically says that the soul comes to the air.

Section 3 (3)

AFTER REACHING THE DEITY OF LIGHTNING, THE SOUL REACHES THE WORLD OF VARUNA

IV. 3. 3. tadito'dhi varunah sambandhāt After reaching the deity of lightning (the soul reaches) Varuna on account of the connection. tadito'dhi: after (the deity of) lightning; varunah: (comes) Varuņa; sambandhat: on account of the connection. Varuna is the god of rain and lightning precedes rain (C.U. VII. 11. 1). After Varuna come Indra and Prajā-pati. In these three sutras the different accounts are reconciled.

Section 4 (4-6)

LIGHT, ETC., MEAN THE DEITIES IDENTIFIED WITH THEM LEADING THE SOUL TO BRAHMA-LOKA

IV. 3. 4. ātivāhikās tal-lingāt (These are) deities conducting the soul (on the path of the gods) on account of the indicatory marks of that. ātivāhikāh: deities conducting the soul; tat-lingat: on account of indicatory marks of that. The deities are meant and not places of enjoyment. See C.U. IV. 15. 5; V. 10. 1. These are non-human persons, a-mānava.

IV. 3. 5. ubhaya-vyāmohāt tat-siddheh This is established on the ground that both (the traveller and the path) are bewildered (unconscious). ubhaya-vyāmohāt: from the bewildered (unconscious) state of both; tat-siddheh: that is established. As the organs of the souls are withdrawn into the mind they cannot guide themselves; light, etc., being without intelligence, cannot guide the souls. So intelligent deities guide the soul along the path to brahma-loka. Besides, as the organs of the departed souls are with- drawn into the mind they cannot enjoy. Light and the rest cannot be places of enjoyment. Ś. says that knowers of Brahman enjoy bliss, etc. tathaiva ca viduşām tuty-anubhavādi-darśanāt.

Text, Translation and Notes 547 This sutra is found only in Ś. and Baladeva and not in others. Baladeva explains it thus: 'On account of the untenableness of the two alternatives, light and the rest can neither be landmarks nor persons standing on the path. The only correct alternative is that they are conducting deities.'

IV. 3. 6. vaidyutenaiva tatas tac chruteh From thence (the souls are guided) by him only who belongs to the lightning, that being known from the śruti. vaidyutena: by the superhuman guide who belongs to lightning; eva: alone; tatah: from thence; tat-ruteh: that being known from the śruti. After they reach the deity identified with lightning they are led by the very superhuman person who takes charge of them from the deity of lightning to brahma-loka through the worlds of Varuna, Indra and Prajā-pati. See C.U. IV. 15. 5, V. 10. 1 and B.U. VI. 2. 15. These do not actually guide but favour the souls either by not obstructing or helping them in some way. From all these it is obvious that by light, etc., deities are meant.

Section 5 (7-14)

BY THE PATH OF THE GODS WE REACH SAGUŅA BRAHMAN

IV. 3. 7. kāryam bādarir asya gaty-upapatteh To the effected Brahman (the souls are led) (so thinks) Badari on account of the possibility of its being the goal. kāryam: the effected Brahman (relative Brahman); bādarih: Bādari (thinks); asya: its; gati-upapatteh: on account of the possibility of being the goal. C.U. V. 10. 1 says that we are led to Brahman. Is this Saguna Brahman or Nirguna Brahman? Badari is of the view that Saguna Brahman is meant for it occupies a place to which souls may go while Nirguna Brahman is all-pervading. With the Highest Brahman we cannot connect the ideas of one who goes or the object of going or act of going; for that Brahman is present everywhere and is the inner-self of all. na tu parasmin brahmani gantrtvam gantavyatvam gatir vā'va kalpate, sarvagatatvāt pratyagātmatvāc ca gantīņām. S. R. makes sūtras 7-16 into a single section in which the views of Bādari and of Jaimini are represented as two pūrva-paksas which are set aside and Bādarāyaņa's opinion is accepted as the siddhānta. The question is whether the guardians of the path lead to Brahman only

548 The Brahma Sūtra

those who worship the effected Brahman, i.e. Hiranya-garbha, or those who worship the Highest Brahman or those who worship the individual soul as free from prakrti and having Brahman for its self. ye pratyag-ātmānam prakrti-viyuktam brahmātmakam upāsate. Badari maintains that the guardians lead to Brahman those who worship the effected Brahman because going is possible towards the latter only. No movement can take place towards the Highest Brahman which is absolutely complete, all-knowing, present everywhere, the Self of all. We do not move to some other place in order to reach Brahman. Brahman is something already reached. na hi pari-pūrņam, sarvajnam, sarva-gatam, sarvātma-bhūtam, param brahmopāsīnasya tat-prāptaye deśāntara-gatir upapadyate, prāptatvād eva. For him the effect of true knowledge is only to put an end to that ignorance which has for its object Brahman, which, in reality, is eternally reached. nitya-prāpta-para-brahma-vişayāvidyā-nivrtti- mātram eva hi para-vidyā-kāryam. R.

IV. 3. 8. viśeşitatvāc ca And on account (of Brahman to which the souls are led) being qualified (in another passage). viśesitatvāt: on account of being qualified; ca: and. B.U. VI. 2. 15 speaks of the worlds of Brahman, brahma-lokān gamayata. Plurality of worlds is not possible with regard to the Supreme Brahman. Saguna Brahman may abide in different conditions. Even the term 'world' can denote only some place of enjoyment falling within the sphere of effects and possessing the quality of being entered into.

IV. 3. 9. sāmīpyāt tu tad-vyapadesah But on account of the proximity (to the higher Brahman) there is designation (of the lower Brahman) as that. sāmīpyāt: on account of proximity; tu: but; tat-vyapadeśah: (its) designation as that. When the higher Brahman is described as possessing certain effected qualities for the purposes of pious meditation, then it is what we call lower Brahman. R. says that Hiranya-garbha as the first created being stands near to Brahman and may therefore be designated by the same term, Brahman. See Ś.U. VI. 18. Baladeva interprets thus: 'But the designation of that [viz. salvation] is on account of nearness.' That is, the souls are said to go to the world of Brahma and never return (B.U. VI. 2. 15) not because they obtain salvation directly, but because they are very near getting it.

Text, Translation and Notes 549 IV. 3. 10. kāryātyaye tad-adhyakșeņa sahātah param abhidhānāt On the passing away of the effected world (brahma-loka) (the souls attain) together with the ruler of that world, what is higher than that, (i.e. the Supreme Brahman) on account of scriptural declaration. kārya-atyaye: on the passing away of the effected world; tat-adhyak- sena saha: together with the ruler of that world; atah param: higher than that (i.e. the Supreme Brahman); abhidhānāt: on account of the scriptural declaration. If the souls travelling by the path of the gods reach only the world of Hiranya-garbha, how can it be said that they will not return to the world (C.U. IV. 15. 6, VIII. 6. 5; B.U. VI. 2. 15) since there is no permanence apart from the Supreme Brahman? The sūtra explains that, at the passing away of the brahma-loka, the souls, which by that time have attained knowledge along with Hiranya-garbha, attain the Highest Brahman. S. holds that what is higher than that is the pure highest place of Vişnu, parisuddham vişnoh param padam. Ś. thinks that this passage gives krama-mukti or release by gradual steps. R. quotes M.U. III. 2. 6.

IV. 3. 11. smrteś ca And on account of smrti. smrteh: on account of smyti; ca: and. The smrti passage referred to here states: When the dissolution has come and the end of the highest (Hiranya-garbha) then they all, together with Brahma, with purified minds enter the highest place. brahmanā saha te sarve samprāpte prati-samcare parasyānte krtātmānah pravisanti param padam. K.P. XII.

IV. 3. 12. param jaiminir mukhyatvāt To the Highest (Brahman) (the souls are led) Jaimini (thinks) owing to this being the principal sense of the word (Brahman). param: the Highest t (Brahman); Jaiminih: Jaimini (thinks); mukhyatvat: owing to this being the principal sense of the word (Brahman). The reference is to C.U. IV. 15. 5. When two meanings are possible, the higher should be preferred. Brahman can mean the higher and the lower. The higher should be adopted, according to Jaimini. R. makes out that brahma-loka means the world which is Brahman even as nişāda-sthapati means a sthapati who is a nișāda and not a sthapati of the nişādas. Srikantha says that (the souls are led to Siva) higher than (Hiranya-garbha).

550 The Brahma Sūtra IV. 3. 13. darśanāc ca And on account of the declarations of śruti. darsanat: on account of the declarations of śruti; ca: and. The texts are C.U. VIII. 6. 6, VIII. 12. 3, VIII. 2. 23; Katha U. II. 6. 16. These declare that the soul which passes out of the body through the susumnā nadī reaches immortality, which can only be the attainment of Supreme Brahman. R. and Nimbärka hold that a knower who travels along the path of the gods reaches Brahman.

IV. 3. 14. na ca kārye pratipatty-abhisandhih And the desire to enter (Brahman) cannot be (with respect) to the effected (Brahman). na: not; ca: and; karye: in the effected (Brahman); pratipatti- abhisandhih: the desire to enter (Brahman). In C.U. VIII. 14. 1 the desire to attain the assembly hall and abode, sabham veśma, cannot be with respect to the effected Brahman. It is appropriate only with respect to the Supreme Brahman. According to S., sutras 12-14 give the opponent's view. The Brahman attained by those who travel by the path of the gods cannot be the Supreme Brahman but only the karya Brahman or effected Brahman. The Supreme Brahman is all-pervading and the inmost self of all. Journey or attainment is possible only where there is a difference, where the attainer is different from the thing attained. To realise the Supreme Brahman, all that is necessary is to remove ignorance. In such a realisation there is neither going nor attaining. The reference to a journey to Brahman belongs to the sphere of relative knowledge and if it occurs in a chapter dealing with supreme knowledge, it is only for the glorification of the latter. So the view expressed in sūtras 7-11 by Bādari is the correct one. R. points out that what the soul aims at is the condition of the Universal Self which has for its prerequisite the removal of ignorance. See C.U. VIII. 14. 1. The Brahma-world which is the thing to be realised is something non-created, akrta, and reaching that would mean freedom from all bondage whatsoever. sarva-bandha-vinirmoksa.

Section 6 (15-16)

ONLY THOSE WHO WORSHIP BRAHMAN WITHOUT A SYMBOL ATTAIN BRAHMA-LOKA

IV. 3. 15. apratīkālambanān nayatīti bādarāyaņa ubhayathā'doșāt, tat-kratuś ca Those who do not take their stand on symbols (the superhuman being)

Text, Translation and Notes 55I leads, thus Badarayana thinks; there being no defects in the twofold relation (resulting from this view); and the meditation on that (i.e. Brahman) (is the reason of this twofold relation). apratīka-alambanāt: those who do not take their stand on symbols (in their meditations); nayati: (the superhuman being) leads; iti: thus; bādarāyaņaņ: Bādarāyaņa; ubhayathā: the twofold relation; adosāt: there being no defect; tat-kratuh: (as is) the meditation on that (so does one become); ca: and. The question is raised whether all worshippers of Saguna Brahman go to brahma-loka. The sūtra says that only those who do not use any symbol in their meditations go there. This does not contradict III. 3. 31, if we understand by all only those worshippers who do not use any symbol. This view is justified by the scriptural declaration: 'In whatever form they meditate on him, that they become.' In the worship of symbols, the meditations are not fixed on Brahman. They are fixed on symbols. So the worshipper does not attain brahma-loka. The case of the worshipper of the five fires is different because Scripture declares that he goes to brahma-loka. Where there is no such specific declaration we have to hold that only those whose object of meditation is Brahman go to brahma-loka, and not others. Bhaskara holds that those who meditate on the effected Brahman are led to the effected Brahman while those who meditate on the Highest Brahman are led to the Highest Brahman. There is no contradiction here since even those who meditate on the effected Brahman do not return for they attain a gradual release, while those who meditate on the Highest Brahman attain immediate release. According to R., sūtras 7-16 form one section, in which the views of Bādari and Jaimini represent two pūrva-paksas, while Bādarāyaņa's opinion is adopted as the correct conclusion or siddhānta. R. interprets the sūtra differently. 'Those not depending on symbols he leads, thus Bādarāyana [thinks] there being a defect in both cases; and he whose thought is that.' R. reads dosat for S.'s adoşāt: Bādarāyana thinks that all those who do not take their stand on symbols, i.e. who worship the Highest Brahman, and those who meditate on the individual self as dissociated from prakrti and having Brahman for its self are led to Brahman. Śrikantha and Baladeva adopt R.'s reading. According to Śrīkaņtha those who meditate on the Highest Brahman alone are led to him but not those who meditate on Hiranya-garbha or on Nārāyaņa.

IV. 3. 16. viśeşam ca darśayati And Scripture declares a difference (with respect to meditations on symbols). viśesam: difference; ca: and; darśayati: the Scripture declares. C.U. VII. 1. 5; VII. 1. 2 point out that different results accrue from different symbols. There can be no such difference for those who

552 The Brahma Sūtra meditate on the Highest Brahman which is non-different. Those who use symbols cannot go to brahma-loka like those who worship the effected Brahman. Śrikantha says that the Scripture shows the difference between Hiranya-garbha, Nārāyana and Siva. Baladeva points out that the conducting divinities lead the devotees to the Lord. Only in the case of the nirapeksa devotees, the Lord himself comes down to fetch them.

Section 1 (1-3)

THE RELEASED SOUL DOES NOT ACQUIRE ANY NEW CHARACTERISTICS BUT ONLY MANIFESTS ITS TRUE NATURE

IV. 4. 1. sampadyāvirbhāvah svena śabdāt (On the soul's) having attained (the Highest light) there is manifestation (of its real nature) (as we know) from the word 'own'. sampadya: having attained; āvirbhāvah: manifestation (of its real nature); svena śabdāt: from the word 'own'. See C.U. VIII. 12. 3. Release is not something new. It is pre- existent. The soul manifests its true nature which is covered with ignorance. This is the attainment of release. It is not anything newly acquired. R.says that if the soul assumes a new body, the specification 'in its own nature' would be without meaning. While S. refers in this sutra to the knower of parā-vidya or higher knowledge, R. refers to the knower or vidvan who goes to Brahman.

IV. 4. 2. muktah pratijñānāt (The self which manifests its true nature) is released; (as is evident) from the promise (made in the Scripture). muktah: is released; pratijnanāt: from the promise. The self is freed from the three states of waking, dream and sleep and abides in its own nature. See C.U. VIII. 9-11. That the self is free is declared in C.U. VIII. 11. 3; VIII. 7.1.

IV. 4. 3. ātmā prakaraņāt (The light into which the soul enters is) the Self; on account of the context. atmā: the Supreme Self; prakaranat: on account of the context (or subject-matter). See C.U. VIII. 3. 4, VIII. 7. 1; B.U. IV. 4. 16. These texts deal with the Supreme Self. R. says that intelligence, bliss and the other essential qualities of the soul which were obscured and contracted by karman expand and manifest themselves when the bondage due to karman passes away and the soul approaches the highest light.

s*

554 The Brahma Sūtra

Section 2 (4)

THE RELEASED SOUL STANDS TO BRAHMAN IN THE RELATION OF NON-SEPARATION

IV. 4. 4. avibhāgena drstatvāt (The released soul exists) as inseparable (from Brahman) because that is seen (from Scripture). avibhāgena: as inseparable; drstatvāt: for it is seen from Scripture. The question is raised whether the released soul exists as different from or as identical with Brahman. The sūtra says that it exists as inseparable from Brahman. See C.U. VI. 8. 7; B.U. I. 4. 10, IV. 4. 6. The released soul should be regarded as identical with Brahman. Passages which speak of difference between the two should be treated in a secondary sense as expressing unity. See C.U. VI. 8. 7; B.U. I. 4. 10, IV. 3. 23; C.U. VII. 24. 1. Avibhāga or non-separation means for S. identity. Ś. says that the released soul abides in non-division from the Highest Self for that is seen from the Scripture. mukta-svarūpa-nirūpana-parāņi vākyāny avibhāgam eva darsayanti nadī-samudrādi-nidarśanānica. R. points out that the question is whether the released soul views itself as separate, prthag-bhūta from Brahman or as non-separate, being a mode of Brahman. There are passages favouring both views. The released soul, it is said, stands to the Highest Self in the relation of fellowship, equality, equality of attributes. All this implies consciousness of separation. See T.U. II. 1. 1; B.G. X. IV. 2. The sutra says that the released soul is conscious of itself as non- divided from the Highest Brahman. This is seen. The souls have for their inner self the Highest Self. They are modes (prakāras) of it.

Section 3 (5-7)

THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE RELEASED SOUL

IV. 4. 5. brāhmeņa jaiminir upanyāsādibhyah (The released soul exists) as possessed of the nature of Brahman (so thinks) Jaimini, on account of the reference, etc. brahmena: as possessed of the nature of Brahman; Jaiminih: Jaimini; upanyasadibhyah: on account of reference, etc. Jaimini thinks that the released soul's nature is like that of Brah- man. It possesses the qualities mentioned in C.U. VIII. 7. 1. 'The self which is free from evil, free from old age, free from death, free from grief, free from hunger and thirst, whose desire is the real, whose thought is the real. For such there is freedom in all worlds.'

Text, Translation and Notes 555 teşām sarvesu lokesu kama-caro bhavati. VIII. 1. 6 The released soul is said to be all-knowing and all-powerful. He is of the nature of Brahman as Iśvara. Nimbarka thinks that the individual soul becomes manifest as endowed with the attributes, 'relating to Brahman', such as freedom from evil, etc.

IV. 4. 6. citi tanmātreņa tad-ātmakatvād ity audulomih Solely as pure intelligence (the soul manifests itself) as that is its Self; thus Audulomi (thinks). citi-tanmātrena: solely as pure intelligence; tat-ātmakatvāt: that being its self (or the nature); iti: thus; audulomih: Audulomi (thinks). Bhāskara and Srīkantha read citi-mātreņa for citi-tanmātreņa. Since the soul is of the nature of pure intelligence it exists as such in the released condition. Cp. B.U. IV. 5. 13. Freedom from sin, etc., cannot constitute the nature of the Self. This is the view of Audulomi. IV. 4. 7. evam apy upanyāsāt pūrva-bhāvād avirodham bādarāyanah Even if it be so, on account of the existence of former qualities (admitted) owing to reference and so on, there is absence of contradiction; (so thinks) Bādarāyaņa. evam: thus; api: even; upanyāsāt: on account of reference; pūrva- bhavat: on account of the existence of former qualities; avirodham: absence of contradiction; bādarāyaņah: (so thinks) Bādarāyaņa. Though it is admitted that the nature of the Self is constituted by pure intelligence, the possession of qualities like freedom from evil is not rejected from the standpoint of the world of manifestation. According to Audulomi, the only characteristic of the released soul is thought, caitanya. Jaimini maintains that it possesses a number of exalted qualities. Bādarāyaņa favours a combination of these two views. Ś. feels that Jaimini speaks with reference to the world of mani- festation, Audulomi with reference to the transcendental standpoint and Bādarāyaņa reconciles the two. Śrinivāsa thinks that having attained the form of the highest light, the individual soul becomes manifest in its own natural form as endowed with the attributes of freedom from evil and so on, in conformity with both sets of scriptural texts.

Section 4 (8-9)

THE SOUL EFFECTS ITS DESIRES BY MERE WILL

IV. 4. 8. samkalpād eva tu tac-chruteh But through mere will (the released effect their purposes) for the Scriptures say so.

556 The Brahma Sūtra

samkalpat: through will; eva: only; tu: but; tat-sruteh: for the Scriptures say so. 'tu' is omitted in some versions. C.U. (VIII. 2. 1) says: 'If he becomes desirous of the world of the fathers by his mere will [thought] fathers arise.' The doubt arises whether will is enough or it requires an operative cause. The sūtra says that the will is enough. If any other causes were required the scriptural statement 'by the will only' will be contradicted. The will of the released differs from that of ordinary men. It has the power of producing results without any operative cause. R. uses C.U. VIII. 12. 3 and holds that mere will is enough and no further effort is necessary.

IV. 4. 9. ata eva cānanyādhipatih. And for this very reason (the released soul is) without a lord. ata eva: for this very reason; ca: and; ananyadhipatih: he is without a lord. C.U. VIII. 1. 6 says that there is freedom for them in all worlds. A released soul is master of himself. R. says that the released soul realises all its wishes and is therefore not subject to another ruler. To be under a ruler is to be subject to injunction and prohibition and this is opposed to freedom in the realisation of one's wishes. While Ś. treats this as relating to apara-vidya, R. treats this section as a continuation of the topic of the state of the released. Nimbārka quotes C.U. VII. 25. 2 .: sa svarād bhavati, He becomes a self-ruler.

Section 5 (10-14)

THE RELEASED SOULS ARE EMBODIED OR DISEMBODIED ACCORDING TO THEIR WILL

IV. 4. 10. abhāvam bādarir āha hy evam There is absence (of body and sense-organs for the released), Bādari (thinks) ; for thus Scripture says. abhavam: absence (of body and sense-organs); bādarih: Bādari; āha: (the Scripture) says; hi: because; evam: thus. The possession of the will means that the released soul has a mind. Has it also a body and sense-organs? Badari thinks that it does not have a body and sense-organs for the Scripture says: 'Now he who knows, let me think this, he is the self, the mind is his divine eye. He, verily, seeing these pleasures through his divine eye (daivena cakșusā), the mind rejoices.' C.U. VIII. 12. 5. This shows that he possesses only the mind, and not the body or organs.

Text, Translation and Notes 557 R. quotes C.U. VIII. 12. 1 and 3 and says that the released soul is without a body. Baladeva reads abhāve for abhāvam.

IV. 4. 11. bhāvam jaiminir vikalpāmananāt There is presence (of body and sense-organs) Jaimini (thinks) because the Scripture declares (the capacity for a released person to assume) diverse forms. bhavam: presence (of body and sense-organs); jaiminih: Jaimini; vikalpa-āmananāt: because the Scripture declares (the capacity to assume) diverse forms. C.U. VII. 26. 2 says that a released soul can assume many forms. This implies that it possesses, besides the mind, body and sense- organs. This is the view of Jaimini. R says that the various forms of manifoldness of which the text speaks must be due to the body. The text which speaks of the absence of the body refers to the absence of that body only which is due to karman. It is the latter body which is the cause of pleasure and pain.

IV. 4. 12. dvādaśāhavad ubhaya-vidham bādarāyaņo'tah For this reason Badarayana (thinks that the released soul is) of both kinds; as in the case of the twelve days' sacrifice. dvādaśāhavat: as in the case of the twelve days' sacrifice; ubhaya- vidham: of both kinds; bādarāyaņaḥ: Bādarāyaņa; atah: for this reason. According to Badarayana a released soul which has attained brahma-loka can exist both ways, with or without a body according to its desire. The same sacrifice extending over twelve days may be viewed either as a sattra or as an adina sacrifice. Both alternatives are indicated in Scripture. See Pūrva Mīmāmsā Sūtra II. 3.

IV. 4. 13. tanvabhāve sandhyavad upapatteh In the absence of a body (the fulfilment of desires is possible) as in the dream state, since this is reasonable. tanu-abhäve: in the absence of a body; sandhyavat: as in the dream state; upapatteh: since this is reasonable. In the dream state which is midway between waking and sleep, objects wished have an existence even while body and senses do not really exist. R. says that the released soul may undergo experiences of pleasure by means of instruments created by the highest person though the released soul may not himself be creative. As in the state of dream the individual soul has experiences depending on chariots and other implements created by the Lord (B.U. IV. 3. 10); so the released soul

558 The Brahma Sūtra may have experience of different worlds created by the Lord engaged in playful sport.

IV. 4. 14. bhāve jāgradvat In the presence (of a body the fulfilment of desires is) as in the waking state. bhäve: in the presence (of a body or when the body exists); jagrat-vat: as in the waking state. When the released soul has a body the objects of his wishes may have real existence, as in the waking state. R. says that the released soul possessing a body created by its own will enjoys its various delights in the same way as a waking man does. In the same way as the Highest Person creates out of himself, for his own delight, the world of the Fathers and so on, so he sometimes creates such worlds for the enjoyment of the released souls. Some- times the souls by their own will-power create their own worlds, which are, however, included within the sphere of the sport of the Highest Person. For Ś. and Bhäskara, when there is a body, the objects desired by the freed soul have real existence. Śrikantha considers the objection that, when there is enjoyment in the nature of the perception of the things of this world by released souls, then by their experience of what does not serve the goal of man, the absence of bondage and suffering cannot be secured, and answers that there is no perception of the world by the liberated ones in the form in which it does not serve the goal of man, for it is perceived as of the form of Brahman.

Section 6 (15-16)

THE RELEASED SOUL CAN ANIMATE SEVERAL BODIES AT THE SAME TIME

IV. 4. 15. pradīpavad āveśas tathā hi darśayati The entering (of one soul into several bodies) is like (the multiplication of) the flame of a lamp, for so the Scripture declares. pradīpavat: like the flame of a lamp; aveah: entering (or animating different bodies); tathā: so; hi: because; darsayati: the Scripture declares. In sūtra 11, it is stated that a liberated soul can assume many bodies at the same time for enjoyment. The objection is raised that enjoyment is possible only in the body in which the soul and mind exist while other bodies will be lifeless puppets. Soul and mind cannot be divided and so cannot exist in more than one body. The sutra says that the released soul can animate, on account of its

Text, Translation and Notes 559 power, all the bodies even as the flame of a lamp can pass over into several flames (lighted at the original flame). C.U. VII. 26. 2 says that the one self can render itself manifold. The released soul can create other bodies with internal organs comparable to the original sense- organ. For R., the question is, if the soul is of atomic size, how can it connect itself with many bodies? The answer is given in the sūtra. Even as a lamp abiding in one place only enters through light proceeding from it into connection with many places, so the soul also, though limited to one place, may through its light-like consciousness enter into several bodies. R. adds that even in this life the soul, though abiding in one part of the body only, viz. the heart, pervades the whole body by means of its consciousness and thus makes it its own. There is, however, this difference. The non-released soul has its intellectual power contracted by the influence of karman and is therefore incapable of that expansive pervasion without which it cannot identify itself with other bodies. The released soul whose intellectual power is not contracted, is capable of extending as far as it likes and making many bodies its own. See S.U. V. 9. The non- released soul is ruled by karman, the released soul by its will.

IV. 4. 16. svāpyaya sampattyor anyatarāpekşam āvişkrtam hi (What Scripture says of the absence of all specific cognition) refers either to deep sleep or absolute union (with Brahman) for this is made clear (by the scriptural texts). svāpyaya-sampatyoh: of deep sleep and absolute union with Brahman; anyatara-apeksam: having in view either of these two; avişkrtam: this is made clear (by the scriptural texts); hi: for. B.U. II. 4. 14; IV. 3. 21, 30, 32 deny specific cognition to a released soul. The objection is raised as to how such a released soul can assume several bodies and enjoy. These texts, it is said in reply, refer to the state of deep sleep or that of liberation, in which the soul attains union with the Absolute Brahman. We are not discussing these states but only entrance into brahma-loka where there is diversity and cognition is possible. Brahma-loka is not heaven for return to the mortal world after the exhaustion of the virtue which raised one to the status of a god is possible, while from brahma-loka no return to earth is possible. R. quotes C.U. VI. 15. 1 and B.U. IV. 5. 13 and refers to the states of deep sleep and death in which the soul is unconscious.

560 The Brahma Sūtra

Section 7 (17-21) THE RELEASED SOUL HAS ALL THE LORDLY POWERS EXCEPT THE POWER OF CREATION IV. 4. 17. jagad-vyāpāra-varjam prakaraņād asannihitatvāc ca (The released soul possesses all lordly powers) except the power of activities relating to the world (such as creation, etc.), on account of (the lord being) the subject-matter (of all texts where creation, etc., are described) and (the released souls) not being near (to such activities). jagad-vyapāra-varjam: except the power of activities relating to the world; prakaranat: on account of the subject-matter; asannihitatvāt: not being near; ca: and. According to S., the question relates to the worshippers of Saguna Brahman who attain brahma-loka and worldly powers. Are their powers limited or unlimited? The opponent quotes C.U. VII. 25. 2 and T.U. I. 5 and holds that the powers are unlimited. The sūtra says that the released souls have all powers except those of creation, preservation and destruction of the world. If the released souls have these powers which are the prerogatives of Iśvara, we will have many Iśvaras and there may be conflict. The released souls work under the control of the Supreme, though they do not participate in the work of creation, ruling and dissolution of the world. Bhaskara refers this and the following sutras to those who attain brahma-loka. R. quotes M.U. III. 1. 3 and states the objection that the released souls have the power of realising all their wishes. The world-control is the privilege of Iśvara. See C.U. VI. 2; B.U. I. 4. 11; Aitareya Āranyaka II. 4. 1. 1; B.U. III. 7. 3. The Vrtti which R. follows says: 'With the exception of the business of the world, the released soul is equal [to the Highest Self] through light.'1 The author of the Dramida-bhasya says: 'Owing to its intimate union with the Divine, the disembodied soul effects all things like the divinity.'2 According to Srikantha the contemplation of oneself as Siva continues, even in him who, in the world of Parama-Siva, has attained union with him, after the complete extinction of merit and demerit. He says: 'Wandering about freely in the worlds of the [celestial] rulers from Sadāśiva up to Brahmā, eating what he chooses, taking on what forms he desires, rid of the desire for human and other bodies, functioning with the three energies [icchā, jñāna and kriyā] uncontracted, he enjoys the splendour of perfect self-consciousness, 1 vyttir api jagad-vyāpāra-varjam samāno jyotișeti. R.B. I. I. I. 2 drāmida-bhāsya-kāraś ca devatā-sāyujyād asarīrasyāpi devatāvat sarvārtha- siddhih syād ity āha. R.B. I. I. I.

Text, Translation and Notes 56I immersed in the world which is of one texture with the nature of Brahman, the harmony of Siva with Sakti, which abounds in supreme bliss, light and power.'1 T.U. III. 10 speaks of the released Self being both the food and the food-eater, the subject and the object.

IV. 4. 18. pratyakşopadeśād iti cen nādhikārika-mandalasthokteh If it be said (that the released soul attains unlimited power) on account of direct teaching (we say) no, for the Scriptures declare (that the released soul attains him) who, entrusts (the sun and others with their offices) and resides in those spheres. pratyaksa-upadeśāt: on account of direct teaching; iti cet: if it be said; na: not; ādhikārika-mandalastha-ukteh: for the Scripture declares (that the soul attains him) who entrusts with their offices (the sun, etc.) and resides in those spheres. The sutra says that the powers of the released souls depend on the Lord who abides in the spheres like the sun, etc., and entrusts the sun, etc., with their offices. The powers of the released souls are not unlimited for they get their powers from the Lord and depend on him. R. holds that the soul whose knowledge is no longer obstructed by karman freely enjoys all the different worlds in which the power of Brahman manifests itself.

IV. 4. 19. vikārāvarti ca tathā hi sthitim āha And (there is a form of the Highest Lord) which abides beyond all effected things; for thus far Scripture declares his abiding. vikāra-āvarti: which abides beyond all effected things; ca: and; tathā: so; hi: because; sthitim: existence; äha: the Scripture declares. C.U. III. 12. 6 says: 'All beings are one-fourth of him; the three- fourths, immortal, are in the sky.' The Supreme Lord abides in two forms, the transcendental and the empirical. He who worships the Lord in his empirical aspect does not attain his transcendental form. Since the worshipper is able to comprehend him only partially, he attains only limited powers and not unlimited powers like the Lord himself. Bhäskara takes the non-qualified Brahman to be real and eternal and the qualified Brahman to be real and non-eternal while S. takes the former alone to be real. R. says that the released soul while conscious of Brahman with its manifestations experiences also the enjoyments lying within the 1 sadāsivādīnām adhikāriņām brahmāntānām maņdaleșu svecchayā sañcara- māņaḥ kāmānnī kāmarūpī vigalita-manusyādi-dehābhimāno 'sankucita-sakti- traya-vyāpāraḥ paramānanda-prakāsa-vibhūti-maya-siva-sakti-sāmarasya-para- brahma-svarūpaikarasah aham-bhāvam prakatam anubhavati. prapancavagahinam pari-pūrņam

562 The Brahma Sūtra sphere of change, which abide in the world of Hiranya-garbha and similar beings. He.does not possess the power of creating and controlling the world which are the distinctive attributes of the Highest Lord.

IV. 4. 20. darśayataś caivam pratyaksānumāne And thus perception and inference show. darśayatah: (the two) show; ca: and; evam: thus; pratyaksa-anumāne: perception and inference. The non-abiding of the highest light within effected changes is a well-known circumstance. See M.U. II. 2. 10; B.G. XV. 6. R. says that the energies connected with the rule of the world are exclusive qualities of the Highest Person. Sruti and smrti also declare it. See T.U. II. 8. 1; B.U. III. 9, IV. 4. 22; B.G. IX. 10, X. 42. Śruti and smrti declare that the Highest Person is the cause of the bliss that is enjoyed by the released soul. T.U. II. 7; B.G. XIV. 26-7. The exalted qualities of freedom from evil, sin, etc., belong to the soul's essential nature but that the soul is of such a nature depends on the Supreme Person. The equality to the Lord which the released soul may claim does not extend to world creation and control. Nimbārka and Śrīnivāsa believe that the freed soul, though similar to the Highest Brahman, cannot possibly be the lord of all the sentient and the non-sentient beings, their controller, supporter, etc. The lordship is exclusive of the activities relating to the universe.

IV. 4. 21. bhoga-mātra-sāmya-lingāc ca And on account of the indications of equality (of the released soul with the Lord) only with respect to enjoyment. bhoga-matra-samya-lingat: on account of indications of equality with respect to enjoyment only; ca: and. B.U. I. 5. 20, 23; K.U. I. 7 describe equality only with respect to enjoyment and do not mention anything about creation, etc. R. asks us to treat the powers of the released soul in accordance with what the texts say. They speak of the Highest Lord only as possessing the power of ruling and controlling the entire world and so this power cannot be attributed to the released soul.

IV. 4. 22. anāvrtti-śabdād anāvrtti-śabdāt There is non-return (for these released souls), according to Scripture; non-return according to Scripture. anāvrttih: non-return; śabdāt: according to Scripture. The doubt arises that, if the powers of the released souls are limited, they may return to the mortal world. The sūtra dispels the doubt by a reference to scriptural authority. Those who go to

Text, Translation and Notes 563 brahma-loka by the path of the gods do not return from there. C.U. VIII. 5. 3, IV. 15. 6, VIII. 6. 6; B.U. VI. 2. 15. Those who through perfect knowledge have dispelled all mental darkness and are devoted to the eternally perfect nirvāna do not return. samyag-darśana-vidhvasta-tamasām tu parāyaņānām siddhaivānāvrttih. nitya-siddha-nirvāņa-

Those also who rely on the knowledge of the qualified Brahman in the end have recourse to that nirvana and so it follows that they also do not return. The repetition of the words is to indicate the completion of the work. R. says that we know from Scripture that there is a Supreme Person whose nature is absolute bliss and goodness; who is funda- mentally antagonistic to all evil; who is the cause of the origination, maintenance and dissolution of the world; who differs in nature from all other beings, who is all-knowing, who, by his mere thought and will, accomplishes all his purposes; who is an ocean of kindness, as it were, for all those who depend on him, who is all-merciful; who is immeasurably raised above all possibility of anyone being equal or superior to him; whose name is the Highest Brahman. yathā nikhila-heya-pratyanīka-kalyāņaikatāno jagad-janmādi kāra- nam, samasta-vastu-vilaksanah, sarvajñah vātsalyaika jaladhih, parama-kāruņiko satya-samkalpa-āśrita- nirasta - samā bhyadhika- sambhāvanah, para-brahmābhidhānah parama-puruşo'stīti śabdād avagamyate. And with equal certainty we know from Scripture, that this Supreme Lord when pleased by the faithful worship of his devotees frees them from the influence of avidya which consists of karman accumulated in the infinite progress of time and hence hard to overcome; allows them to attain to the supreme bliss which consists in the direct intuition of his own true nature and after that does not turn them back into the suffering of samsāra. R. quotes B.G. VIII. 15-16; VII. 17-19 in confirmation of his view. Śrikantha says that the bodies assumed by released souls are the products of pure mahā-māyā. Those versed in metaphysics and religion have been treated with greater respect in India than those proficient in other branches of learning. Anandagiri commenting on S.B.G. IX. 2 writes: dipyate hīti, drśyate hi vidvad antarebhyo loke pūjātireko brahmavidām iti bhavah. This great work B.S. is capable of answering the main problems of the philosophy of religion, though many of its detailed references may be outdated. It deals with the problems of religious experience and scriptural authority, moksa as union with the Godhead and worship as the confrontation of the human individual and the Divine Reality, the destiny of the individual, ethics and spiritual life. We have inherited a priceless trust which must be

564 The Brahma Sūtra fostered until, as the Arabs say, the stars grow old, the sun grows cold and the leaves of the judgement book unfold. The Rg Veda has a prayer which is at least four thousand years old: trātāro devā adhivocatā no mā no nidrā īśata mota jalpiņ.

Protectors, Gods, bless us! Let not sleep overtake us nor idle gossip. VII. 48. 14; see also X. 82. 7.

śivam astu sarvajagatah para-hita-niratāh bhavantu bhūta-ganāh doşāh prayāntu nāšam sarvatra sukhī bhavatu lokah. Brhat-śanti-stotra.

Let there be peace in the whole world. Let everyone exert for the well-being of the other. Let evil disappear. Let everybody be happy everywhere.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

George Thibaut: The Vedanta Sutras with the Commentary by Samkarācārya. Part I. 1890. Part II. 1896. George Thibaut: The Vedanta Sutras with the Commentary of Rāmānuja. 1904. Max Muller: Six Systems of Indian Philosophy. 1899. Paul Deussen: The System of the Vedanta. E.T. 1912. Mādhavācarya: Sarva-darśana-samgraha. E.T. by E. R. Cowell and A. E. Gough. Popular Edition 1914. Surendranath Dasupta: A History of Indian Philosophy. 5 Vols. Radhakrishnan: Indian Philosophy. 2 Vols. 1923 and 1927. 1922-55. Appaya Dīkşita: Sivādvaita-nirņaya. Ed. with E.T. by S. S. Sūryanā- rāyaņa Sāstrī. 1929. S. S. Sūryanārāyaņa Sāstrī: The Śivādvaita of Śrīkantha. 1930. Swami Nikhilānanda: Drg-drśya-viveka. E.T. 1931. S. S. Sūryanārāyaņa Sāstrī and C. Kunhan Raja: The Bhāmatī of Vācaspati on Samkara's Brahma-Sūtra-bhāsya Catus-sūtrī. 1933. B. N. Krishnamurti Sarma: The catus-sūtrī bhāsya of Sri Madhvā- cārya. 1934. C. Hayavadana Rao: Śrīkara Bhāsya. 1936. Kokileswar Sastri: An Introduction to Advaita Philosophy: A Realistic Interpretation of Samkara Vedānta. S. Subba Rao: Pūrna-prajña-darśana. E.T. 1936. S. S. Sūryanārāyaņa Sāstrī and Saileswar Sen: Vivaraņa-prameya- samgraha of Bhāratī-tīrtha. E.T. 1941. Roma Bose: The Vedanta-parijata-Saurabha of Nimbārka and Vedānta Kaustubha. Vol. I. 1940; Vol. II. 1941; Vol. III. 1943. Swamī Vireśvarānanda: Brahma Sūtras. 2nd Edition. 1948. S. S. Sūrayanārāyaņa Sāstrī: Siddhanta-leśa-samgraha. E.T. 1937. Radhakrishnan and others: History of Philosophy: Eastern and Western. Vol. I. 1952. pp. 272-428. Tulsi Das: Rama-carit-manas. E.T. by Rev. A. G. Atkins. 3 Vols. 1955. T. R. V. Murti: The Central Conception of Buddhism. 1955. The Cultural Heritage of India. Vol. IV. The Religions. 1956. Radhakrishnan and Moore: A Source Book of Indian Philosophy. 1957. Satyavrata Singh: Vedānta Deśika. 1958.

GLOSSARY OF SANSKRIT TERMS

aksaya: exempt from decay, undecaying. akșara: imperishable. akhanda: entire, whole, the opposite of fragmented. agocara: inaccessible (to the senses), what is not seen. angustha-mātra: of the size of a thumb. aja: unborn, uncreated. ajara: not subject to old age, undecaying, ever young. ajā: a she-goat. ajāti-vāda: the theory of non-origination. ajñāna: ignorance, spiritual ignorance. anu: fine, minute, atomic. atathya: untrue, unreal. atiśaya: eminence, pre-eminence, superiority in quality or quantity. adrsta: unseen, invisible. advaita: non-dual, sole, unique. adharma: unrighteousness, demerit. adhikāra: possession of a right or a claim, competence. adhikarin: he who has adhikara or competence; he who has a right to, is qualified or fit for. adhisthāna: basis, substratum. ananta: endless, boundless, eternal, infinite. anādi: having no beginning. anitya: not everlasting, transitory anupalabdhi: non-perception, non-recognition. anubhava: perception, experience, direct apprehension, knowledge derived from personal experience. anumäna: the act of inferring, inference, one of the means of obtaining true knowledge. antaryamin: the indwelling principle. antah-karana: the internal organ. apara-vidyā: lower knowledge, knowledge of the manifested world. aparoksa: not invisible, perceptible. apavarga: completion, freedom of the soul from samsāra, release, liberation. apurva: not having existed before, the remote or unforeseen con- sequence of an act, an invisible quality of the soul produced by an act, which bears fruit in other worlds. apāna: downward breathing. abhaya: absence of fear, peace, safety, security. abhāva: non-being, negation, absence. abheda: non-difference. abhyāsa: practice, repetition. amūrta: formless, shapeless, unembodied. artha: wealth, material possessions.

Glossary of Sanskrit Terms 567 arhat: the worthy, the elect. amrta: immortal, imperishable, eternal. avatāra: descent, appearance or manifestation of a deity on earth. avidyā: ignorance, spiritual ignorance, the state of existence in which the soul unawakened to reality lives. asti-kāyas: Jain term for existing bodies. aham-kara: self-sense, conception of individuality, egotism. ahimsā: non-injury, non-killing, non-violence, non-hatred, gentle-

ākāśa: the subtlest of the five elements, the other four being agni ness.

(fire), ap (water), vāyu (air), prthivī (earth), ether, space, sky. agama: sacred work handed down and fixed by tradition. ācārya: a spiritual guide or teacher. atman: the universal Self, the inner principle that exists apart from any definable ego; life, breath. ānanda: bliss. āyatana: resting place, support, abode. aśrama: a stage of life, retreat. indriya: a sense-organ, power of the senses, virile power. ista-devatā: a chosen deity, a favourite God. īśa: master, lord, the supreme spirit. Iśvara: personal God. udāna: breathing upwards. upanisad: sitting down near a teacher to listen to his words, secret knowledge, mystery, esoteric doctrine, the philosophical writings which expound the meaning of the Vedas: the source of the Vedānta philosophy. upanayana: the act of leading or drawing to one's self, the ceremony in which a teacher initiates the pupil into spiritual life. rta: order, rule, law, truth, righteousness. rşi: an inspired sage. ekāgryam: one-pointedness, a state of concentration, close attention. aiśvarya: sovereignty, supremacy, power, lordship. aum: object of meditation, a mystic name for the triad of Brahma, Visnu and Siva, representing the oneness of the three gods. karuņā: compassion. karman: action, work, deed, rite, result of acts done in the past. karma-mārga: the path of action. karmendriya: organs of action. kavi: thinker, seer, prophet, poet. kevala-jñāna: absolute knowledge. kaivalya: isolation, aloneness, absolute. kriyā: performance, act, action. kleśa: affliction, distress. khyāti: knowledge. gāyatrī: a hymn composed in the gāyatrī metre of twenty-four syllables.

568 The Brahma Sūtra

guna: quality, virtue, merit, excellence. guru: spiritual preceptor, teacher. Cārvāka: a materialist philosopher. citta: the thinking mind. cin-mātra: pure intelligence. cetana: conscious being, intelligence. indriya: sense-organ. jarā: old age. jāti: birth, caste. jiva: the individual soul, the principle of life. jīvan-mukta: a person who is liberated, and yet lives in the world. jina: an enlightened, redeemed person. jñāna: knowledge, wisdom. jñāna-mārga: the path of knowledge. jnanendriya: the sense of apprehension. tapas: religious austerity, penance, bodily mortification, asceticism. tamas: darkness, gloom, the quality of inertia, one of the three qualities of prakrti. tarka: reasoning, speculative enquiry. trsnā: desire, craving. tyāga: renunciation, forsaking worldly desires, liberality. dama: self-restraint. dayā: sympathy, compassion, pity. dana: the act of giving, charity. darśana: insight, realising of the Ultimate; a viewpoint, a system of philosophy. duhkha: sorrow, pain, suffering. deva: a bright, shining force, deity. dravya: substance. dvandva: pairs of opposites. dvesa: hatred, repugnance, dislike. dharma: moral and religious duties; virtue, morality, religion, custom, rule, law. dhāranā: a stage of Yoga in which the mind is fixed on one particular object of meditation. dhyāna: contemplation. nāstika: atheist, unbeliever. nama-rūpa: name and shape, individual being. nimitta: efficient cause. niyama: restraint, rules, self-imposed observances. nitya: perpetual, continual, eternal. nirguna: devoid of qualities. nir-grantha: without knots, unfettered. nirvāņa: release, emancipation, salvation, bliss, serenity. niş-kriya: devoid of activities, inactive. paramartha: metaphysical reality, literally parama: highest; artha: object.

Glossary of Sanskrit Terms 569 paramartha-tattva: absolute truth. param-atman: the supreme spirit. Parameśvara: the Supreme Lord. parā-vidyā: higher knowledge. pitr-loka: the world of the ancestors. purusa: spirit, individual human being, highest personal principle, Supreme Spirit. punar-mrtyu: dying again. punar-janma: rebirth. praja-pati: the Lord of Creatures, Creator. prakrti: objective nature, the primordial substance from which all objects spring, the principle of objectivity. pradhana: primal matter of the Samkhya system. prasada: grace, kindness, favour, calmness of mind, clearness of speech. prajñā: wisdom, discernment. pramana: that by which anything is measured, standard of truth, the means of true knowledge; pramā-karanam; like perception, inference or a valid cognition as distinct from invalid or illusory

pratyag-atman: the Supreme Self embodied in the individual. cognitions.

pratyaksa: sense perception. pratyāhāra: withdrawal of attention from sense impressions. pralaya: dissolution, re-absorption, death. prana: life-breath, a form of life-breath, forward breathing. pūjā: worship. prāņāyāma: breath-control. prarabdha-karma: the past or stored works which have begun to yield results. purva-paksa: the prima facie view or argument in any question. bandha: bondage. bāhyendriya: senses working outward. buddhi: understanding, intelligence. bodhi: enlightenment, spiritual wisdom. brahman: Ultimate Reality, an all-embracing, unborn, first principle, the self-existent Universal Spirit. brahma: one of the three principal gods, the Creator God. bhakti: devotion, love. bhakti-marga: the path of devotion. bhagavat: the divine spirit, the adorable one. bheda: difference. manana: logical reflection. manas: mind, internal organ. marana: death. mārga: path. mayā: the phenomenal character of the world; the principle used by the Divine in the creation of the world, creative power, phantom, illusion, world appearance.

570 The Brahma Sūtra

mīmāmsā: investigation, examination. mukta: set free, liberated. mukti: freedom, release. muni: sage, seer, one who has taken the vow of silence. mumuksutva: moksa-icchā or desire for release. mūla-prakrti: primeval or root matter, also called pradhāna in Sāmkhya philosophy. mrtyu: death. moksa: release, emancipation, union with the Ultimate. yoga: yoking, union, mental concentration, discipline by which the individual attains union with the Absolute. The way to enlighten- ment. rajas: the quality of activity, one of the three qualities of prakrti. raga: attachment, affection. rupa: appearance, form, shape. linga: mark, token, sign, phallic symbol. līlā: play, sport, pastime. loka: all things visible to the eye, the world. varna: colour, complexion, lustre, beauty. vāyu: air. vāhana: vehicle. vedanā: feeling. vidyā: knowledge, opposed to avidyā. viśesa: particularity. Visnu: the second person of the Hindu trinity who takes birth on earth from time to time to save mankind, the symbol of the immanence of Godhead. vedanta: the philosophy based on the Vedas and the Upanisads. There are varieties of the Vedanta philosophy, non-dualism, monism, dualism, etc. śakti: the energy or active power of the deity. sañcita-karma: accumulated works. śabda: sound, verbal testimony. śama: tranquillity, calmness, quietude. śānti: tranquillity, peace, quiet. śāstra: order, command, teaching, instruction, sacred book. śikşā: learning, study, knowledge, art, skill. Śiva: the auspicious one, one of the Hindu triad. śraddhā: faith, belief, trust with reverence. śramana: a mendicant, an ascetic. śravana: the act of hearing. śruti: that which has been heard or communicated from the begin- ning, sacred knowledge, the Veda heard by the sages. sad-āyatana: the abode of the six senses. saguna: possessed of qualities. samavāya: inherence, getting together. samāna: equalising breath.

Glossary of Sanskrit Terms 57I samädhi: the final stage of meditation, the attainment of union with God. sādhanā: discipline. sușupti: deep, dreamless sleep. sūkșma śarīra: subtle body. Surya: the sun God samkalpa: resolve of the mind, will, purpose. samnyāsa: renunciation, the state of recluse. samyoga: conjunction. samvara: restraint. samvrti-satya: relative truth. samsära: the wheel of time, the round of birth, death and rebirth, the cycle of existence. samskāra: impression, disposition; putting together, accomplishment, making sacred, sanctifying ceremonies leading to regeneration. sattva: the quality of goodness, one of the three qualities of prakrti, true essence, nature. satya: reality, truth. syād-vāda: the Jaina doctrine that all judgements are conditional and no judgements are absolute. sva-dharma: one's duty. sva-bhāva: one's nature. svayam-bhū: self-existent. svarga: heaven, paradise. samkhya: one of the six orthodox systems of Indian philosophy sāmīpya: nearness to the deity. sāyujya: continual association with God. siddhanta: established conclusion, any canonical textbook on any sūtra: a thread, a short or aphoristic sentence. subject. sthūla śarīra: gross body. smyti: memory, knowledge, tradition. Hiranya-garbha: womb of God, Brahmā.

INDEX

• Indicates Separate Section

Abbreviations, list of 16 Absolute values 108 Aberration 143 Absolute, the, with and without Abhāsa 420 determination 257 Abhāva 381 Absolutistic doctrine 126 Abhava-matra 380 Absorber 493 Abheda-bheda-vāda 73 Absorption 75, 210 Abhidharma-kośa 192 Abstractions 126, 131, 166, 188 Abhimāna 87 Abstract thinking 104 Abhinna-sakti 86 Abundance 260-I Abhi-vimāna 285 Abysmal water 130 Abhivyakti 284 Acarya 30 fn. Abhyāsa 56, 502 Accession of glory 451 Abhyudaya 523 Accordance of all texts 324 Abode 266, 276, 478, 491, 536, 537, Accumulated works 531

Abode and abiding thing 391 550 Acetana 125 Acetana-parinama 4I Abode, difference of 478, 479 Acintya 98 Abode of all meditations 504 Acintya-bhedabheda 27, 97 Abode of auspicious qualities 454 Acit 45, 53, 54*, 71, 78 Abode of avidya 348 Action 158, 217-18, 413, 441, 465-6, Abode of final release 485 467, 507, 535 Abode of Krsna 89 Action, instruments of 430 Abode of Māyā 349 Action (works) and knowledge Abode of soul 542 Abode of Vişnu 275 Actions and results 304, 419-20, 440 507-9

Abodes, multiplicity of 265 Active cause of the world 70 Absolute, the 41, 45-6, 58, 106, 119, Active memory 200 121, 126, 128, 131, 133, 207, 219- Active self 506 20, 233, 256, 458 Activities 289, 295, 355, 430, 560 Absolute Being 240, 362 Activities of waking and dream states Absolute bliss 563 206 Absolute Brahman 170 fn., 207, Activity 321, 367, 511, 505, 526 531, 559 Activity and Agent 271 Absolute difference 73 Activity and non-activity 414-15, Absolute equality 21I Activity essential attribute of soul 419 Absolute forgetfulness 198 Absolute goodness 563 Act, object, result of knowledge 384 414 Absolute identity 25, 81, 209, 328 Absolute immanence 150 Act of creation 99 Absolute, manifested v. unmanifested Act of meditation 526 483 Acton, Lord, 7 fn. Absolute non-difference of Jiva and Acts 109, 139 fn., 189, 518 Brahman 417 Acts and character 194 Absolute non-existence 350, 352 Acts and their qualities 500 Absolute realisation 21I Acts of the Lord, eternal and non- Absolute reality 125 eternal 473 Absolute release 210 Acyuta-prekşa 60 Absolute salvation and world- Adam 162 fn. redemption 223 Adaptive affinity 202 Absolute truth 262 Adharadheya-bheda 447 Absolute union 559 Adhikāra 229, 487 Absolute unity 347 Adhikarana-ratna-mālā 292

574 The Brahma Sūtra

Adhikaranas of the B.S. 23, 24 Aggregates, mental 383 Adhipati cause 380 Aggregates, origination of 378 Ādhipatyam 323 Aggregation 537 Adhisthāna 33 Agni 274, 305 Adhişthāna-kāraņa 94 Agni-hotra 470, 532 Adhyāsa 232, 331, 419 Agni Purāna 519 Adhyātma Rāmāyaņa 59 Agni-rahasya 477 Adhyayas of the B.S. 23 Agnostics 9, 167 Adi-granth 59 Ahalya's body of stone 342 Adina sacrifice 557 Aham and ahar 478 Aditya 305-6 Aham brahmasmi 123 Adjuncts 231, 268, 288, 294-5, 298, Aham-kara 75 fn., 125, 318, 334-5, 328, 418, 433, 448, 459 Adjuncts, non-real 420 372, 394, 425 Ahavaniya fire 248 Adjuncts of activity 458 Ahimsa 159, 160 Adoration 120, 396 Ahirbudhnya-samhita Adrsta 94, 374-5, 392, 421 48, 49 fn. Aihikam 523 Advaita 26, 28, 29, 58, 74, 86, 119, Aikarthya 12 170, 308, 372 Aikya 88, 96 Advaita-siddhi by Madhusūdana Aim of religion 181 Sarasvati 28, 60 Air is eternal 397 Advaita texts 83 Air, qualities of Advaita, validity of 104 Advaita Vedānta 28, 29, 60, 127, Air sprung from Akasa 399 376

Aisvarya of the Lord 79, 97 140, 174 fn., 186-7, 221, 223, Aitareya Aranyaka II. I. 6, 512; 387, 405 II. 2. 4. 6, 490; II. 4. I. I, 326, Advaita Vedanta literature 28* African peoples 206 350, 476, 560; II. 4. I. 2, 252 fn .; II. 4. 2. 4, 428; III. 2. 4, 451; After-life 524 III. 2. 4. 7, 737 Āgama-prāmāņya 48, 50 Aitareya Brahmana 163 Agamas 47, 67-8, 391 Aitareya Upanişad Aja 316 ff. 320, 337 Agamic Sáivism 68 Agantuka 40, 399 Ajātaśatru 321, 322, 323 Agastya Samhitā 166 fn. Ajāti, doctrine of 29 Agastya-vytti 26 Ajñāna 63, 222, 231 Agency belongs to intelligence 413 A-kama 218 Agency of the soul 416 Akāśa 209, 263, 271, 272, 277, 290, Agency of the soul real or super- 310, 314, 319, 323, 331, 345, 350, imposed 414 380-1, 397, 398, 423 Agency, sense of 530 Akāsa and air 397, 399 Agent 213, 406, 413, 442, 505 Akāsa, inside-and outside-29-23, Agent, act, result-distinction o 296 509 Akāsa is an effect 397 ff. Agent and enjoyer 30, 36, 42, 55, Akāsa's omnipresence and eternity 74, 80, 92, 100, 232, 415, 465, 466 398 Agent and instrument 413-14 Akbar 137 fn. Agent and non-agent 90 Akhanda 94 Agent and object 143 Akyta 550 Agent, direct and indirect 415 Akyti 303 Aggregate of elements 489, 537, 54I Akşara 89, 281, 289 ff., 314 Aggregate of existing things 324, Akşara-Brahman 89, 91 Akşaravrttih 178 fn. Aggregate of matter 342, 383 463 Akşara-samāmnāya 290 Aggregate of non-conscious and con- Alagiyas, the 50 scious beings 330 Alambana cause 380 Aggregate soul 464 Alavandār (Yāmunācārya) 50 Aggregate syllables of Veda 508 Alaya-vijñāna 386 Aggregates 378 Alexander, Samuel 236

Index 575

Alienation from reality 148 Analogies-continued Allah 58, 159, 172 Rain, seeds and plants 197,352, All-pervading 81, 99, 101-2, 175, 274, 281, 290, 293, 296, 327, 354, 383-4, 416, 448 Rivers and ocean 96, 209, 326 419, 461, 465, 472, 574 Salt and sea 42 All this is Brahman 233 Scorpions from dung 336-7 Alvars, the 49* Serpent and its coils 83, 98, 460 Amalananda 28 Śiva swallowing poison 166 A-manava 546 Snake and rope 120, 141, 296, Ambara 290 Son of a barren woman 138, 352 332 Amrtatvam 537 Amsa 46, 418, 460, 461 Sons and fathers 95, 495 Amsa and amsin 96, 211 Spider and its web 41, 91, 139, Amsa of Brahman 417 280, 332, 336 Amurta forms of Brahman 87 Sprouts from horns of hare 382 Anādi, Ananta 86, 138, 233 Sun and his rays 41, 83, 84, 98, Analogies 461, 526 Ākāśa and jars 42, 43, 245, 272, Sun looks straight or bent 418, 279, 288, 418-19, 455-6 Attribute and substratum 327 Thread, loom, cloth 189, 349, 353, 420

Cat and kitten 57 374-5, 408 Chariot 313, 315, 367-8 Tree and its branches, etc. 98, 327, Clay and pots 40, 290, 326, 331, 346-7 340, 345-6, 349, 351, 366-7 Two birds on the same tree 83 Conchshell and silver 52, 73, 141, Young monkey and its mother 57 233, 379, 444 Analogy, Thomistic doctrine of 262 Devadatta and axe 394 Ananda 91, 257, 260, 261 Dreams and illusions 138, 347 Ānandagiri 28, 30 fn., 77, 236, Drums 324; 329 291, 306 fn., 335, 359, 433-4, 459, Eye and light 37, 419 563 Fire and heat 71, 124, 344 Anandamaya 92, 257, 261 Fire and sparks 43, 72, 91, 95, Ananda-maya-ātmā 261 139, 326, 404, 417, 445 Ananda-mayadhikarana 256 ff. Flame and smoke 241, 298, 349, Anandatirtha (Madhva) 60

Gold and its ornaments 40, 329, 350 Ānanda-vardhana 44 fn. Ananta 129, 130 336, 339, 340, 350-1, 526 Ananyadhipati 87 King meting out rewards and Anātma-vastu 32 punishments 416 Anava mala 77 Kings of different places 329, 392 Anavasāda 56 Lame man and blind man 370-I Anavastha 30 Lamp and darkness 174, 405, 418, Andajam Anekānta-vāda 388 439

Lamp and light 52, 81, 327, 500 460 Angangivat-samyukta-bheda 326 Lamp and several flames 559 Angirah Smrti 179 Love of man and woman 168 Anguish for beatitude I52 Magician 213, 252, 34I Angustha-mātrapurusa 310 Magnet and iron 367, 370 Anguttara Nikaya 208 fn. Master and servant 76, 417, 429 Animal life 150, 204, 539 Milk and curds 326, 351, 357, 368 Animal nature 151 Moon and second moon 233 Aniruddha 53, 100, 393, 395 Ocean and foam 46 Anirvacanīya 33, 137 Ocean and waves 38, 43, 79, 86, Anista 437 345,348 Anitya 40, 137 Oil from sand 350 Anna 257, 401 Potter and clay 260, 329, 352-3, Anna-maya 261 356, 366-7, 391, 431 Annihilation 81 Potter's wheel 53I Antah-karana 95, 4II

576 The Brahma Sūtra

Anta-pratyayam 468 Arhats 150 Antaryāmin 35, 63, 89, 278, 450 Aristotle 181, 188, 363 Antecedent and consequent 380 Anthropomorphic personifications Arjuna 175 Arjun, Guru 59 I34 Antiquities 206 Aropa 231 Arsa-jnana 106 Anu 86, 77 Art III Anu-bhāşya (Madhva) 60, 237 fn. Art, India's IO Anu-bhāşya (Vallabha) Anubhava 108 88 Artabhaga 540

Anugraha 49, 69, 130 Arteries and pericardium 447 Anu-kyti 297 Artery from the head 540 Anumāna 113 fn. Artha, kama 164

An-upalabdhi 113 fn. Arthapatti 113 fn. Arthavadas 505 Anusmrti 382 Anu-vyākaraņa (Madhva) Arundhali-nyaya 254 Aņu-vyākhyāna (Madhva) 234 A-rūpam, etc. 450 61 Anya-tattvam 462 A-samyukta-bheda-vada 326 Ăsanas Apana 309, 427 528

Apantaratamas 487 Asanga 95, 121 Aparā-śakti 98, 99 Asat 33, 320, 321 Aparā-vidyā 280-1, 399, 556 Asat-kārya-vādin 352 Aparijneya 65 Ascending Prānas 354 Aparoksa-jñāna 65 Ascent and descent 438, 44I Apasmāra-purușa 130 Ascent to higher stages of life Apastamba Dharma Sūtra 518-19 Ascent to union 178 519 334, 436, Apastamba Śrauta Sutra Āsmarathya 22 fn., 25, 45, 284, Apauruşeya 61, 241 510 325 ff. Apavarga 81 Aśoka 154 Aphorisms 23, 24 Aspirants, higher and lower classes of

Apollonius of Tyana 201 fn. Apologia (Justin Martyr) 171, 250 Āśramas 516, 517, 518, 522 36

Aştādaśa-bheda-nirņaya (Rāmānuja) Apostolate of the future 213 50 fn. Appar 67 Aştā-daşa-rahasyārtha-vivaraņa 57 Apparent reality 444 Astika and nāstika 20* Appaya Dīkşita 28, 66, 71, 74, 76, Asti-kayas 388 175 fn., 211, 214, 216 fn., 228, Asuras 319, 470 501, 526 Āsuri 219, 333 Apprehension of Brahman 79 Aśvaghoşa 201 fn. Apprehension of God I26 Aśvapati 506 Aprākyta 79 Athanasius 131 Aprthaktva 54 Atharvangirasa 241 Apta-vacana 113, 243 Atharvanikas 469 Apūrva 435, 466, 467, 477 Atharva Śikhā Upanişad 47 fn., 290 Apya 43 Atharva-Siras Upanisad 69 fn. Aquinas (See Thomas) Atharva Veda 19, 125 fn., 417, 469 Arabs 564 Atheists 9, 167, 171, 239 Arādhana and ārādhya 229 Atiśaya, Atiśayana 234, 351 Aranyakas, the 19 Ati-vādin 289 Arberry, Professor 206 Atma-brahmaikya-bheda-vāda 27 Archangel Gabriel II2 Atma-darsana 116 Arcirādi-mārga 485 Atmaikatva 30 Ardha-nārīśvara I28 Atman, the 122, 146, 205, 232, 286, Ardh-sarīri 59 289, 319, 33I Argument from existence of laws 238 Atman and an-atman I24 Argument, positive and negative Atman and Brahman I03 method of 386 Atmānātma-vastu-viveka 232

Index 577

Atmānusmaraņa 328, 348-9, 355, 361, 364, 367, Atma-svarūpa-lābha 81, 211 fn. 448 372, 379, 381, 420, 534, 563 Atom 409 Avidya, abode of 348 Atomic self 406 Avidya-śakti 98-9 Atomic size of soul 43, 81, 86, 92, Avikrta-parinama 9I I01, 327, 406 ff., 559 Avirodha 24, 333 Atomic view not founded on Scrip- Avişaya 232 ture 332 A-viveka 231 Atomic view of creation 373-5 Avivekin 125 Atomicity belongs to buddhi 409 Avyakta 49, 54, 142, 313, 314, 315, Atomism 344, 360, 375 ff., 388 316, 330, 334 Atoms 185, 236, 251, 360, 372, A-vyayam 450 373-5, 377, 379 383, 384 Ayam atma brahma Atreya 22 fn., 520 Ayatana 491 23I

Attachment 45, 65, 102 Ayn al-quadat, a Sufi mystic Ayodhyā 131, 273 183 Attachment and anger 86 Attainment of Brahman 538, 553 Ayutasiddhi 377 Attributes, destructive and fearful, 480 Attributes of deities 363 Bādarāyaņa 21 ff., 46-7, 67-8, 86, Attributes of Fatherhood 477 210, 305, 467, 505, 507, 532, Attributes of non-conscious matter 547,551, 555, 557

Attributes of physical form of the 325 Bādari 22 fn., 28, 284, 437, 547-8, 550-1, 556 Lord 492 Bähva 454 Attributes of Prāna 472-3 Baladeva passim Attribution of limbs and body to Bālāki 322 Brahman 257 Bala-śakti 98 Atyanta-bheda-vāda 73 Bar Kokhba II2 Atyasrama 88 fn. Barth, Karl 105, 150, 172 fn., Audulomi 22 fn., 25, 26, 43, 210, 178 fn., 236 326, 327, 521, 555 Basava 68 Aumkāra 291, 292, 471 ff., 504, 512 Bauddha system 386 Aum, meditation on 503 Bauddha thinkers Aum symbol of Brahman Beal, Samuel (Tr.) 433 290 201 fn.

Aupādhika 40, 43 Becoming 187, 189, 212 Aupādhika-bhedābheda-vāda 41 Behaviourists 235 Austerities 163, 177, 398, 486 Being 7, 33, 70, 119-20, 132, 143 Authoritativeness of Veda 301 Being and Becoming 119, 177 Authority 230 Being, consciousness and bliss 81 Authors of Vedas 241 89, 90, 99 Antonomous validity 148 Being and Non-being 128, 131, 139, Avacane ca brahma provāca 120 146, 150 Avaccheda-vāda 420 Bengal Vaisnavism 66, 97 Avācya 62 Bergson, Henri 106, 199, 235, 244 Avadhūta Gītā 121, 126 fn. Bethlehem 171, 174 fn. Avalokiteśvara 219 Beyond Ethics 165* Avasthita 328 Beyond good and evil 530 Avastutva 29 Bhagavad-ārādhana-krama (Rāmā- Avatāras 58, 59, 93, 100, 131, 174, nuja) 47 I75 Bhagavadgītā 317, 327 fn., 329, 334, Avayava 257 363-4, 407, 412, 415 ff., 429 ff. Avesāvatāras 100, 478 Bhagavadgītā II. 24, 465; III., 25, Avesti sacrifice 496 454; IV. 2, 554; IV. 3 and 7, Avīci 248 509; IV. 14, 509; IV. 19, 509; Avidyā 21, 34-5, 40 ff., 55-6, 65, V. 10, 575; V. 17, 5II; VI. I, 77, 85, 91, 99, 127, 142, 205, 516; VI. 1I-12, 528; VI. 45, 2II, 222, 230 ff., 252, 276, 314, 523; VII. 7, 456; VII. 17-19,

T

578 The Brahma Sūtra

563; VII. 21-22, 467; VII. 23, Bhedabheda 25 ff., 45 ff., 83, 86, 326, 435; VIII. 6, 529; VIII. 9, 451, 358 454; VIII. 15-16, 563; VIII. 23 Bhedabhedatmaka-visișțādvaita 27 -24, 544; VIII. 24, 277; VIII. Bhedābheda-vāda 39, 78 26, 486; IX. 10, 454; 562; X. 3 Bheda-vada 93 and 42, 454; X. 42, 266; 562; Bhinna-sakti 86 XI. 53-4, 458; XII. 9, 525; XIII. Bhișma 393 fn., 543 5, 425; XIII. 12, 454; XIII. Bhogya 71 13, 271; XIII. 14, 504; XIII. 31, 295; XIV. 2, 297; XIV. Bhogya-sakti Bhoja 290 4I

26-7, 562; XV. 6, 562; XV. 6 Bhoktr 78, 80 and 12, 297; XV. 7-8, 433; XV. Bhoktr-sakti 41 17, 454; XV. 18, 454: XVIII. Bhramara-kīļa-nyāya 87 56, 509; XVIII. 1, 6. 272; XVIII. Bhrānti 231 61, 456 Bhrgu 300, 487 Bhagavan 49,94 Bhuman is Brahman 288-9 Bhagavata doctrines 47 Bhūtākāsa 292 Bhāgavata-Māhātmya 167 fn. Bhūta-yoni 280, 281, 332 Bhāgavata Purāņa 49, 88, 89, 93 Biblical Religion and the Search for 95, 96, 158 fn., 160, 164 fn., Ultimate Reality (Paul Tillich) 166, 168, 169, 175 fn., 198, 210, 112 fn., 113 fn. 214, 255 Biblical tradition 171 Bhagavatas, the 47, 64 fn. Bhāgavata-tātparya (Madhva) 6 I Bija condition 54 Bimba 455 Bhagavata view 393 fn. Binary compound 373, 376 Bhakta-vatsala 79 Bhakti 37, 50, 56 ff., 60, 65, 88, Biographia Literaria (Coleridge) 194 fn. 92, 96, 102, 167-8, 255, 501 Bhakti and knowledge 169* Biological causation 202 Biological impulse III Bhakti cult 47 Biological laws 155 Bhakti-dhyana-pranidhāna Bhakti is prema, sevā 92, 102 458 Birth and death 86, 191, 210, 215, 301, 316, 354, 362, 403-4 Bhakti-mārga 153 Birth and Rebirth 29, 92 Bhakti-mārtāņda (Gopeśvara) Blakney, R. B. (Tr.) 209 fn. 168 fn. Bliss 32, 35, 66, 69, 70, 76, 91-2, Bhakti only means to salvation 92 94, 98-9, 125, 180, 196, 212, Bhakti, Vallabha's two forms of 93 221, 227, 257-8, 280, 321, 363, Bhāmati (Vācaspati Miśra) 23 fn., 454, 457 ff., 462-3, 468-9, 473 ff., 25, 28, 35, 40 fn., 66 fn., 127 fn., 480, 487-8, 528, 561-2 142, 208, 215 fn., 227, 231 fn., Bodhāyana 27,48 232, 241-2, 247 fn., 248 fn., Bodhāyana-vrtti 47 278, 286, 293 fn., 327 fn., 332 fn., Bodily resurrection 189, 206, 558 346 fn. Body 159, 231, 296, 442, 450-I, Bhāradvāja 305 474, 477, 482, 485-6, 498, 528, Bhāradvāja-samhitā 57 fn. 530-1, 535, 537 ff., 542, 553, 558 Bhartr-hari 26 fn., 135, 160 fn. Body and mind 144 Bhartr-mitra 26 fn. Body and sense organs 556-7 Bhartr-prapañca 26 fn., 83 Body, definition of 341-2 Bhāruci 47 Body, injured-and death 340 Bhā-rūpah 297 Body, mind, spirit 147, 195, 313 Bhāșā-pariccheda 107 Body of the Lord 454 Bhāskara passim Body, soul's departure from Bhasma and Linga 88 fn. 482 ff. Bhattācārya, Prof. Siddheśvar 12 Boehme 109, 172, 177 Bhāva 69, 327 Bondage 21, also fn., 26, 31, 41, 43, Bhavāni 170 45, 50, 55, 62 ff., 74 ff., 81 ff., Bheda 61, 452 91, 95, 100-I, 130, 196, 212, Bheda and abheda 39 222-3, 234, 242, 272, 275, 290,

Index 579

296, 308, 311, 314, 327, 347, Brahman, manifold powers of Brahman, Maya's association with 361 446, 481-2, 485, 499, 539, 550, 553, 558 30, 34-5 Bondage and Release 216, 315, 384 Brahman, nature of 234, 449 ff. Bradley, F. H. 106, 115, 142, 203 Brahman priests 504 Brahmā 41, 48, 64, 124, 131*, 133, Brahman's 'body' 268 170, 175, 216, 221, 248, 291-2, Brahman's causality 30, 61, 321 ff., 294, 313, 390, 431, 485, 549, 560 334 ff., 345-6, 350, 355, 453 Brahma-bhāva 222 Brahman's independence 356 Brahma-cārin 519 Brahman's nature not violated by Brahma-carin's duties 522 causality 335 Brahma-carya 164, 510, 523 Brahman source and support of the Brahma-datta 26 fn. universe 30, 258, 286 Brahma-egg 431 Brahman the Absolute 118* Brahma-jijnāsā 103, 227, 230, 234 Brahman three forms of (Vallabha) Brahma-jñāna 223 89 Brahma-knower, death of, 481 ff., 541 Brahman, two meanings of 549 Brahma-knowledge 92, 164, 306, Brahman, upādāna-kāraņa 30 517, 524 f., 530 ff. Brahman with form and without Brahma-loka 38, 56, 133, 157, 218, 450, 452-3 221, 291, 293, 453, 482-3, 529, Brahman without determination 538, 540, 543, 545, 547 ff., 557. 156, 259 559-60, 563 Brahman without symbol 550 Brahma-mīmāmsā 21 Brahma-parinama-vada Brahma-prapti 243 45 Brahman 21, 24, 25, 30*, 92, 94*, 120, 122, 125-6, 137, 140-1, 143, Brahma-pura 293 156, 165, 174 fn., 208 Brahma Purāņa 164 Brahmaņa 162, 301, 515, 517, 528 Brahmarūpa 96 Brahman abiding within heart 478 Brahma-sakşātkāra 87 Brahmana converts 172 fn. Brahma-samhita 169, 454 Brahmanahood 324 Brahma-sampradāya 61 Brahman and the World 80* Brahmasamstha 511 Brahmanas, the 19, 22, 154, 163, Brahmasiddhi 164 fn., 513, 516 Brahma Sūtra 10, 12, 19 ff., 22 ff., 149

Brāhmaņas and Kșatriyas 274 23*, 60, 89, 103-4, 113, 117, 124, Brahman creative principle 41, 355 205, 210, 215, 229, 235, 237, 251, 402 269, 433, 563 Brahman (derivation) 233-4 Brahma Sūtra-Date and Author Brahman described in negative terms 22*

361 Brahma-svarūpa-lābha 81 Brahman dispenser of rewards 467 Brahma-svarūpa sākşātkāra 108 Brahman, enjoying soul, objects of Brahmatva 96 enjoyment 345-6 Brahma-vadinis 164 Brahman free from imperfections Brahma-vid brahmaiva bhavati 227, 450-1, 454 267 Brahman fruit of all mediations 502 Brahma-vidyā 479-80, 494 Brahman ground of multiplicity 359 Breath 267, 340, 458 Brahman has no progenitor 400 Breath, mind, all sense-organs Brahman-hood 22 fn. Breath of life 264, 282 394

Brahman immediate consciousness Brhadāranyaka Upanişad passim (sākşin) 30 Brhad-bhāşya (Vallabha) 88 Brahman in causal state 358 Brhad-dharma-purāņa 164 Brahman is draştā 32 Brhad-Vasistha 251 fn. Brahman is one without a second Brhan-naradīya-purāņa 462 ff. Brhat-samhita 23 fn. 358

Brahman is partless 358 Brhat-santi-stotra 564 Brahman is the totality of selves 4I Bridge to immortality 288 Brahman, Isvara 30, 126, 127, 261 Brindavan 78 fn.

580 The Brahma Sūtra

Broad, C. D., Professor 238 80, 101, 195, 287, 314, 318, 327. Buddha, the 38, 108 fn., 111-13, 123, 331, 336-7, 339-40, 349, 351-2, 134, 144, 170-1, 181, 183, 201 f.n. 354, 373, 376-7, 380, 382, 395, I34, 144, 170-1, 181, 183, 400, 446, 462, 556 201 fn., 246, 393 Cause, eternal continued existence of Buddha-carita (Aśvaghoşa) 201 fn. 312 Buddha-vacana 113 Cause of evil 233 Buddhi 43, 95, 125, 132, 275, 288, Cause of salvation 498 313, 316, 318, 409, 413, 415, 418, Cause of the Universe 39, 64, 84, 420, 425 99, 127, 256, 317, 333, 450, 454 Buddhism 129, 136, 378, 387 Cause, parinama 35 Buddhists 20 fn., 57, 94, 115, 380 f., Cause, saha-kāri 35 396 Cause supporting all effects 290 Buddhist system 135 Cause, uncaused first 287 Buddhist Tantras 393 Cause, vivarta 35 Buddhist theory of momentary Ceremonial observances 280 existence 352 Ceremonial piety 37, 155, 177 Buddhist view of impermanency of Cessation of activity 229 self 31 Cessation of experience 541 Budge, E. A. Wallis 132 Cessation of karma 485 Bunyan 8 Cetana and acetana 74, 338 Chain of works 276, 530 Caesar 206 Chandogya Upanişad passim Caitanya 97, 232, 498, 555 Change 90, 368 Caitraratha 307 Change and diversity 34 Cākrāyaņa, Sage 515 Changeless reality 187 Calmness 227, 514, 522 Character and knowledge Calvin 191 Character is Destiny 196 193

Cambridge Modern History 7 fn. Characteristics of released soul Candidate for spiritual knowledge 553 ff. 234 Charity 160, 173, 203 Canons of interpretation 23 Chastity 164, 519 Canons of interpretation in Pūrva Chevalier, Jacques 106 Mīmāmsā 494, 496 Chief vital breath 321, 323, 425 ff, Carmelites 173 fn. Cārvākas 84, 498-9 Childlike state 521-2 471

Castes 57-9, 67, 87, 162, 173 fn., China 1II, 198 299, 306-7, 309, 391 Christ 151 fn., 171, 242 fn., 250 Caste system 162* Christian Easter 180-1 Categories 137, 176, 178 Christian mysteries 250 Categories of faith 249 Christian Mysticism (Inge) 208 fn. Categories of religious thought 131 Christian mystics 171 Categories, Vaiśeşika 377 Christians 10, 110, 112-13, 115, 150, Cathari, the 206 171-2, 206, 250 Catuh-ślokī 50 Christian thought 108 Catullus 152 fn. Christianity 7, 129, 171, 182, 243, Causal connection 337, 384 249 fn. Causal efficiency 382 Cicero 10 Causal power 325 Cid-acid-prapañca-visista Causal state of Brahman Cin-mātra 31, 77 72 41, 42, 330, 358 Cit 53 Causal substance (upadana) Causality 29, 241, 379 34,350 Cit and acit 45, 71, 78 ff Citragupta Causality of Brahman 237, 335 Cit-śakti 71, 72*, 74, 77, 86, 258, 438

Causality of Sakti 394, 396 290, 293, 473, 475 Causality of Supreme Self 317 Citta 425 Causation 72, 202, 357 Cittaśuddhi 82 Cause and effect 30, 35, 40, 54, City of the Lord 489

Index 58I

Claudefield 151 fn. 'Conjecture' Clement of Alexandria 110, 150, (Nicholas of Cusa's) 262 171, 250 Conjunction 367, 373-4, 377, 391, Cocteau, M. Jean 11I fn. Cogniser and the cognised 498 442, 446, 516 Conjunction of soul and mind 409, Cognition 231, 233, 242, 302, 308, 323, 325, 378, 514, 559 Conjunction v. inherence 377 42I

Cognition, instruments of 430 Conscious beings v. non-conscious Cognitions 32, 52, 124, 377, 384 ff. principle objects 33, 46, 254, Cognitions, manifoldness of 383 Cognitions and recognitions 382 Conscious ego 200, 222, 231, 251 457

Cognitive consciousness 499 Conscious life 190 Cognitive experience 126 Conscious memory 200 Coincidence of opposites 119 Consciousness 32, 35, 45, 55, 70, Coleridge 118, 194 fn. 96, 107, 124, 145, 177, 199, 205, Collaborators of the Lord 101 242, 276, 411, 425, 457-8, 498-9, Colossians 182 500, 554, 559 Combination of knowledge and work Consciousness not a quality of the 508 body 499 Combination of meditations 470, Consciousness, uniformity of 499 471, 501 ff. Conscious reality 251 Combination of sense organs and Conscious subject 188, 382 mind 535 Consequent and antecedent 380 Commentaries, commentators II ff. Consistency 265, 527 23 ff., 39 ff., 442, 490 Consummation of the world 219 Commentary on Romans (Barth) Contemplation 107, III*, 178, 247, 178 fn. 248, 458, 474, 526, 560 Commonness of attributes 504 Continued existence of cause in the Communication (of Brahman know- effect 352 ledge) 243 Continuity of experience Communion of the Christian with God Contradictions 149, 555 448

116 fn. Contradictions in Bhāgavata view Communion with God 121, 209 Contradictions in sacred texts 395 Community of ideals 250 Contradictory attributes 388 468 Complaint of world-negation 156* Complete intuition, knowledge 534, Contradictory forms 460

Compounds, binary and ternary 540 Contradictory natures 449 Contrary works 523 373,376 Control 491, 522 Concentration 37, 175, 177, 253, Controller and the controlled 94 277, 449, 528-9 Conventional religion 180 Concept of viśesa 97 Conversion 172 Concepts 261 Co-ordination of experience and Concepts and categories 137 Scripture 83 Conceptual thought 84, 124, 458 Co-ordination of knowledge and Concerning the Delphi (Ed. Prickard) works 44 152 fn. Corinthians 131, 182, 189, 213 fn., Concordance of texts 320, 333 214 fn., 242 fn., 245 fn. Concrete universal Corporal deity 301 Conduct 194, 436, 441 73 Corporate salvation 218 Conducting divinities 552 Corporeal and non-corporeal forms Coexistence 273 Confessions (Augustine) 457, 460 I20 Corporeal existence 487 Conflicting smytis 333 Cosmic abyss 129 Conformity 161, 165 Cosmic activity 210, 212 Confrontation of man and God Confusion of results of action 419, 563 Cosmic destiny 220, 221 Cosmic end 237, 256 421 Cosmic energies 142

582 The Brahma Sūtra

Cosmic existence 2II Dadhi-kşira nyaya 326 Cosmic harmony 220 Dahara 293 ff., 501 Cosmic imagination I38 Dahara-vidyā 295, 468, 494, 496, Cosmic life 150 502 Cosmic millenia 220 Dame Julian of Norwich 214 fn. Cosmic period 303 Danielou, Jean 151 fn. Cosmic plan, order, 134, 219, 221 Dante 120 fn., 184 Cosmic plurality 457 Darsana 20*, 265 Cosmic process 128, 132-3, 140, Darwinism 235 143, 157, 181, 2I1, 214, 215, Dāsa mārga 76 219, 221, 236, 238, 366 Cosmic religion 238 Daśa-śloki (Nimbārka) 78 Cosmic Spirit 147, 220, 428, 501 David 112 Death Cosmological argument 236 190, 200, 205, 274, 295, 304, Cosmology 11 347, 352, 432, 434, 436-7, 451, Cosmos, the 34, 194, 212, 223, 393 475, 482, 485 ff., 497, 499, 505, Cratylus 29 fn. 514, 529 ff., 539 ff., 543, 559 Death, survival of-and personal Craven soul, the 193 immortality 192* Craving and hatred 158, 170 Creation 41, 54, 62, 70, 84, 91*, Deeds 194, 275, 286, 312, 415-16, 429, 435, 437, 441, 445, 450, 99, IOI, III, 126, 130, 132, 138, 466-7, 482, 486, 530 ff., 538 140*, 141, 148, 211, 259, 303, Deeds, forbidden 437 320, 359, 373-4, 403, 431, 446 Deeds, fruit of 218, 429, 435, 438, (Also see Srisți) Creation, inner self of 282 440, 465-6 Deeds, good and evil, of a mukta Creation, maintenance and dissolu- 481-2 tion 62, 70, 75, 81, 93, 95, 271, Deeds, obliteration of 482-3 303, 311, 369, 374, 375, 392, Deepest self 81, 171, 179 560, 562 Deep sleep 31-2, 36, 85, 124-5, Creation as modification of pradhana 127, 145, 255, 289, 295-6, 3I1, 369 Creation of Akasa 322-3, 341, 405, 410, 414, 430, Creation out of atoms 399. 423 447-8, 451, 538, 541-2, 559 374 De Incarnatione (Athanasius) 131 Creative activity, man's 155 De Iside (Plutarch) 109 Creative activity of God 143, 160, Deities 65, 210, 277, 278, 282 ff., 217 428 (See Divinities) Creative freedom, man's 146, 155. Democracy 163 196 Democritus 360 fn. Creative freedom of the Absolute Departed souls 433, 542-3, 545 221 Departure from the body 311-12, Creative intuition 116, 157 328, 427, 482 ff., 535, 542 ff. Creative will 11I, 126, 152 Descartes 104, 152 Creativity 237 Desire for knowledge 227 ff., 516 Creator, the 90, 98, 141, 241, 254, Desires 124, 152, 194, 211, 213, 216 255, 318, 320, 322, 362, 442 260, 304, 314, 370, 378-9, 415, Creator and Governor 236 443, 491, 502-3, 538, 554, 560 Creature-creators I55 Detachment 155, 158, 175, 178 Creatures 293 Determinate Brahman I25, 261-2, Creed, materialist 9 491, 502 Criticism of Māyā 8.4* Determinations 63, 76, 125-6, 152, Crito 187 fn. 256, 291 Crucifixion 182 Devala 332 Cruelty 416, 466 Devangere Inscription 88 Cruelty (attributed to God) 74 Deva-yāna 277, 545 Crypto-Buddhism, Samkara's, 63 Devī Bhāgavata 123 Cūlikā Upanișad 3-7, 317; 330 Devī Māhātmya 251 Cycle of birth and rebirth 64, 77 Devotion 25, 57, 65-6, 82, 92, 99, Cycle of Samsāra 78 10I-2, 169-70, 175, 255, 264,

Index 583

309, 348, 365, 393, 396, 458-9, Doctrine of laya 535 471, 495, 498, 501, 533 (See Bhakti) Doctrine of momentariness 378 Dogmas 116, 118, 170 Devotion to the guru 59 Dogmatic exclusiveness Devout meditation 281, 292, 299, Dostoievsky 184 250

308, 512 Dramida-bhāsya 48, 346, 560 Dharma 115, 146, 154-5, 158, 161, Dramidācārya 47-8 164, 193, 220, 227-8, 343 Dravidācārya 30 fn. Dharmavyadha 308 Dream, dreamer, dream states passim Dhyana 87, 102, 177, 514, 528 Drg-drśya-viveka 32 fn. Dhyana-marga 153, 175 Drstadyumna 439 Dhyana Yoga 179 Dialogue with Trypho (Justin Martyr) Dualism 30, 61, 68, 97, 128, 142, 223, 341, 458 Duality 29, 40, 78, 85, 119, 121, Dickinson, G. Lowes 206 fn. 171 125, 137, 295, 326 Difference and non-difference 45-6, Duality in Human Nature 144* 72-3, 79, 82-3, 100-1, 314, Durgā 60 326-7, 358, 460-1, 463 Duties 333, 511, 516 ff. Difference between Brahman and Duties of the Asramas world 336 ff. Duties of Brahma-cārin 516 522 Differenceless Brahman 84 Dvaita 26-7, 61, 86 Different forms of Brahman 455 Dvaitādvaita 27, 82, 83 Differentiation 446, 455 Dvaitādvaita-vāda 78 Different Ways to Fulfilment 153* Dying man 535-6 Dionysus the Areopagite 180 Direct intuition 211, 230, 281, 336, Earth 376, 432, 439, 528 459, 563 Direct knowledge of God 65, 116, Earthly prosperity 36, 158, 228 East and West 8, 110, 167, 205, 245 459, 496, 498 Eastern philosophy 7, 458 Discipline 103, 152, 159, 176, 228, Eastern religions 206 183 Ecclesiasticus III Discrimination 227, 281, 295, 509 Eckhart 110, 125, 208 fn., 218 fn. Discursive reason 108, 232 Economic man 166 Disembodied soul 483, 560 Effect (See Cause and effect) Dispassion 158, 217, 432 Disqualification of Sudras 306 Ego 96, 107, 124-5, 146, 148-9, 195, 198, 213, 222 Dissolution 44, 49, 78, 96, 99, 221, Egoism 75 fn., 158, 213, 522 303, 330, 339, 341-2, 374-5, 393, Egyptian Ideas of the Future Life 402, 446, 549 (See Pralaya) (Wallis Budge) 132 Ditthi 20 fn. Egyptians 132 fn., 184 Diversity 76, 364, 527, 559, 560 Einstein 238 Divine ideas (Plato) 197, 239 Ekāgratā 529 Divine in man 186-7, 189 Eka-jiva-vāda 222 Divine Iśvara, communion with Ekantin devotees 471 200* Eknath 170 Divine light 150, 174 Eko brahma dvitīyo nāsti 31 Divine mission 487 Elements 35, 53, 238 fn., 282 ff., Divine personality, presence 130, 314, 342, 378, 381, 397, 410, 167, 306, 314 431 ff., 452, 474, 489, 499, Divine power 134, 317 537-8,541 Divine purpose 214 Elements, subtle (See Subtle ele- Divine speech 115, 301 ff. ments) Divine wisdom 106, 114, 127 Emanicipated souls 63, 142, 143, Divinities 131, 301, 304-5, 323, 337, 213, 508 428-9, 434-5, 466-7, 475, 493, Eminence (Sraişthyam) 323 Empedocles 109, 203 fn. Doctrine 543, 546-7, 552, 559 of eternal damnation Empirical life 370, 505, 538 (Madhva) 65 Empirical reality 233, 444

584 The Brahma Sūtra

Empirical science 245 Evolution 103, 138, 188, 238 Empirical self 124, 144*, 213, 231, Evolution of cosmos 321, 393 257, 324, 507 Evolution, spontaneous 366 Empirical world 232, 343, 443 Exaltation 441, 523, 526 Encyclopaedia of Religions and Exhaustion of works, virtue 533-4, Ethics 119 559 Ends and means 174, 464, 524 Existence Energies 71, 74, 79, 84, 100, 128, 104, 149, 337, 526, 557-8 Existence-forms, grades of 91, 397 142, 258, 562 Existent and non-existent 120, 124, Enjoyer and the enjoyed 41, 78, 353 231, 322, 324, 339, 345-6, 361, Existential 104, 177 387, 414, 421-2, 453, 533-4, 545, Existentialism 125, 156, 167, 387 548, 558, 562 Existentialism and Humanism (Jas- Enlightened, the 11I, 212, 485 Enlightenment 21, 153, 181, 213, pers) 172 fn. Experience 8, 30 ff., 41, 63, 73, 76, 269, 486 81, 114-15, 124, 147, 175, 179- Enneads (Plotinus) 186, 220, 238 fn. 80, 188, 192, 198, 200, 230-1, Enquiry regarding Brahman 227 ff. Entities, seven-of Jainism 241, 245, 269, 329-30, 351, 375, Entity 139, 382-3, 393 387 392, 440, 449, 492, 541, 558 Experience and Interpretation 114* Environment 192-3, 195-6 Epics, the 300, 303, 307 Experience, different spheres of Epicurus 109 419 ff., 385 Experience, remembered Epistemological enquiry 230 Expiation 197, 519 385 Epistles 109 External authority 230, 245 Equality of sexes 59 External World 53, 85, 99, 378, Equanimity 178, 213, 227 Equilibrium of Gunas 89, 99, 223, 384 ff. Ezekiel 181 252, 367, 371-3 Er, myth of 205 Face of God 239 Eschatological speculations 185, Faith 11, 37, 67, 76, 87, 105, 108, 203 120, 157, 177, 230, 234, 245, 249, Eternal and non-eternal 36, 229, 251, 434, 486, 533 391, 473 Faith and Belief 116* Eternal Being 137, 248, 458 Faith of a Moralist (Taylor) 117 fn. Eternal bliss 82, 227 Faraday, Michael 117 Eternal damnation 65, 219 fn. Fasting 59, 158, 491-2, 514, 518 Eternal existence of cause 352 Fearlessness 261, 276-7 Eternal life 128, 134, 146, 185*, 191, Feelings 32, 378 207, 210, 280, 507 Final release 216, 248, 251, 265, 275, Eternal Logos 141, 171 306, 326, 347, 371-2, 383, 415, Eternal types 303 467-8, 468, 485, 514, 523-4, 538 Eternity 79, 104, 186, 120 fn., 207, (See Release) 215, 220 Final state of soul (Jaina) 389 Eternity of the Vedas 115, 241, 303 Fire 282 ff., 297, 318, 376, 398, Ether 209, 273, 292 ff., 310, 440, 400, 483, 494, 495, 497, 538 Fire, water, earth 317-18, 350, 360, Ethical v. spiritual view-point 186 444 397, 431, 433, 537 Ethics, ethical 61, 103-4, 152 ff., First commentators on the Brahma 159, 165-6, 186, 191, 195, 198, Sūtra 46 228, 234, 381, 563 First created being-Hiranya-garbha Evans-Wentz, W. Y. 205 548 Everlasting torment 197 Five asti-kāyas of Jainas 388 Evil 153, 155, 175, 195, 214, 230, Five kinds of knowers 216 239, 272-3, 311, 346, 354 ff., 362, Five organs 425 429, 562 ff. Food 260, 274, 398, 475, 491, 514, Evil deeds, doers 312, 438-9, 441 519,561 Evil is self-defeating 197 Forbearance 161

Index 585

Founders of religions 112, 161 Goal, the 129, 172, 230, 233, 286, Four ends of man (Puruşartha) 315-16, 527, 558 Four-fold status of reality 143 505 God passim Four forms of Akşara-Brahman 89, God and man IOI, 121, 130, 148, 207 I55. 171 Four stages of life 510, 522 God and Problem of Evil 354 ff. Four states of consciousness 145 God as sweet and majestic 484-5 Fourth Gospel 182, 185 God created man in his own image Free choice, will 100, 148, 155 150 Freed souls 65-6, 75, 81, 87, 101, God is principle of intelligence 369 209, 213, 215, 222, 295, 311, God, life in 21 346, 481, 483, 485, 562 God not partial 416 Freedom 119, 126, 146, 148, 167, God, surrender to 82 196, 209, 222, 316, 446, 501, 550, Goddess of Learning 38, 244 554 (See Mokşa) Godless universe 167 Freedom from obligation 165 God-man 65, 103 Freedom from rebirth 210 God-possessed souls 478 ff. Freud 152, 199, 235 Gods and sages 300, 357 Fruit of knowledge 24, 211, 215, Gods are capable of Brahma-know- 248, 482, 507, 523-4 ledge 299 ff. Fruit of meditation 465, 467-8, 502, God's causality 77, 390, 393 520-1 God's love 59, 143 Fruits, non-desire for 228 Gods, path of the 483-4, 545, 547 Fruits of ritual 248, 412, 527 Gods (See Divinities) Fulfilment, Different Ways to, 153* God's self-contemplation 363 Full man 213 God's will 140-I Fundamentalism 112 fn., 243 Goethe 240 Future Life 183* Golden Person 261, 271, 47I Future life (Kant) 186 Good and evil 160, 286, 481, 530 Gopāla-purva-tāpanī Upanişad 454 Gadya-traya (Rāmānuja) 47 Gopala-uttara-tāpanī Upanișad 495 Galatians 165 Gopeśvara 168 fn. Ganeśa 60, 134 Gorakhnātha 58 Garbha Upanişad 317 Gorgias 183 fn. Gārgī 517 Govinda 28 Garuda Purāņa 194 Govinda-bhāşya (Baladeva) 83 fn., Gaudapāda 28, 29*, 209 06 Gautama 305, 308 Govindananda 28, 267 Gautama-Dharma-śastra 308 Grace of God 50, 64, 69, 74, 78-9, Gautama Dharma Sūtra Gauss 107 436 82, 87, 93, 98, 102, 107, 137, 262, 308, 365, 415, 459, 498 Gāyatrī Mantra 178, 264-5 Grace of God not arbitrary 498 Gazetteer of Sikkim (Risley, Ed.) Grace of spiritual teacher 87, 493-4 General Resurrection 285 204 Gradations in meditation 524 Generalisations from experience Genesis 151 359 Gradual release 37, 223, 292, 549, 551.661 Gethsemane 214 fn. Grammarians 301-2 Gheranda Samhita 154 fn. Greece, Greeks III, 238-9, 250 Gifford, Lord 236 fn. Greek ideas, influence 171, 189 Gilson, Etienne 234 Gitā-bhūșaņa (Baladeva) 97 Greek philosophy 171, 249 ff. Greek religion 237 Gita-govinda (Jayadeva) 82 Gregory the Great 206 Gitārtha-samgraha (Yāmunācārya) Gregory the Wonder-worker 249 fn. 50 Greville, Fulke 152 fn. Gitā-tatparya (Madhva) 229 fn. Gross and subtle bodies, forms 69, Glory of knowledge 509 84, 99, 296, 389 Glosses 27 Gross body 204-5, 231, 313 ff., 485, Gnosis 108 539 T*

586 The Brahma Sūtra

Gross existence 86, 462 Hiranya-garbha 44, 71, 132-3, 143, Groupings 384, 379 Guardians of the paths 223, 236, 240, 259 ff., 282, 291-2, Guha-deva 47, 48 547-8 313, 334, 423. 428, 431, 476, 548 ff., 562 Gulistan 153 fn. Guņas 70, 77, 84, 86, 89, 90, 93, Hiriyanna, Prof. M. 83 Historical process 133, 220 98, 162, 251-2, 316-17, 330, 334, History of Philosophy and Philosophi- 360, 367-8, 371, 412, 502 Guru 82, 114, 493-4 cal Education (Gibson) 234 History of religion 175 Guthrie 203 fn. History of the Doctrine of Rebirth 205* Haradattācārya 88 Haribhadra 20 fn., 68 History, universal 7 fn. Hari-vamsa 53 fn. Hitopadesa 158 fn. Holy Spirit 209 fn., 246 Hari-vyasa-deva 97 Homeric Gods: The Spiritual Signi- Harmonisation (See Samanvaya) ficance of Greek Religion (Otto) Hatha Yoga 159 Honey meditation 305 239 Hatred, renunciation of 442 Haya-grīva-brahma-vidyā 26 Householders 157, 163, 509-10, 513, Heaven 65, 189, 206, 249, 286, 318, 518, 522 435, 437, 466, 497, 559 Hebrews 112, 131, 242 fn. Houseless wanderer (See Samnyasin) Hebrew scriptures 162 fn. Human and animal life 202 Hegel 129 Human beings 81, 145 ff., 150, 155, Heidegger 143, 147, 156 158, 189, 194, 214, 307, 442, Hemacandra 26 498, 563 Heraclitus 104, 123, 171, 250 Human bliss 462-3 Human fulfilment 181, 315 Heredity 162, 195, 201, 202 Human history 220 Hermann 116 fn. Human language 145, 207 Higher and lower knowledge 127, Human life 103, 126, 135, 136, 156, 280, 281, 553 202, 205, 210, 24I Higher, Highest Brahman, Reality Human Life, purpose of 151 passim Human mind 138, 195, 207, 235, 344 Higher stages of life, ascent to 519 Human nature 163, 166, 192 Higher than the high 281, 326, 471 Human self 56, 146, 152, 158, 184, Higher v. lower self (Neoplatonists) 187, 239, 468 187 Human society 250 Highest Brahman v. qualified Highest experience 96, 116, 245 449 Human spirit 10, 118, 137, 163 Human thought 104, 156, 161, 242 Highest goal 207, 540 Human unity 118, 148, 164, 213, Highest human good 211 219 Highest Intelligent Self 315 Humanism 173 Highest Light 295, 310, 553, 555, Humanity, mankind 11I, 136, 160, 562 240 Highest Person-Reality-Self Hume 144, 147 passim Humility 26 Hnayana system 113 Husband 324, 325 Hindu ethics (McKenzie) 156 fn. Hypothesis 262 Hinduism 59, 129, 131, 135, 172, Hypothesis of Rebirth 198 203, 269 Hindu life-stream 269 Iamblichus 151 Hindu metaphysics 156, 215 I am Brahman 458, 460, 525 Hindu tendency to reconcile 68 I and Thou 119, 122, 124 Hindu thinkers, thought 7, 105, Ibn Arabi 183 I13, 129, 185, 188, 217 Idealism 181 Hindu tradition 21, 170 Ideal personality 166-7 Hindus, the 10, 19, 58, 156, 172-3, Idea of Immortality (Pringle Pattison) 203, 206 198

Index 587

Ideas 10, 31, 103, 145, 384, 386, 443 Individual, the 34, 107, 142, 205, Ideas at death 529, 547 208 Identity 25, 37, 73, 79, 211, 327-8, Individuation 211, 4II 391, 440, 460-1, 488, 495, 497, Indra 134, 170, 267, 295, 300, 303, 526, 554 Identity in difference 81 305, 493, 546 Indriyas (See Organs) Identity of cause and effect 341. Indwelling God 220

Identity of God with Maya 358 344 Indwelling spirit 90, 157, 175, 278 ff. Identity of self with Brahman, God Ineffable peace 179 31, 38, 45, 68, 210, 216, 222, 347, Inequalities 191, 201, 363-4, 372 Inequalities may be due to heredity Ignorance 21, 62, 63, 74, 91, 208, 417 201* 212, 215, 232, 276, 279, 328, 355. Infatuation (See Pleasure, Pain) 359, 378-9, 418-19, 447-8, 450, Inference 50, 62, 84, 97, 177, 242, 459, 464, 484 ff., 522, 525, 534. 283, 287, 302, 382, 458, 486 537, 541, 548, 550, 553 Inferential knowledge 241, 244 Ihāmutra-phala-bhoga-virāga 37 Infinite and finite, the 36, 118, 121 Illumination 108, 112, 169, 530 Infinite compassion 219 Illusion 33, 52, 91, 138, 233, 384 Infinite perfection 186 Images 115, 273, 300, 477 (See Infinity 104, 186, 425, 462 Symbols) Inge, Dean 208 fn. Image Worship 48, 173 Inherence 33, 375, 377, 391 Imitation of Christ 123 fn. Initiation 108, 229 Immediacy and clarity 106 Injunctions 36, 247-8, 306 ff., 437, Immediate knowledge 116, 385 Immediate release 44, 551 441, 448, 453, 466, 468, 477, 496, 510 ff., 521-2 Immortal 318, 464, 488 Injunctions and prohibitions 308, Immortality 185, 188, 215, 268, 416, 452, 556 276-7, 286, 288-9, 324-5, 511, Injunction to work 508 537 ff., 550 Injury to animals 441 Impassioned intuition 244 Injustice 159 Imperfection 221, 340, 390, 418, Inmost self 31, 179, 195, 232, 257, 450-1, 462 547, 550, 554 Impersonal reason 187 Inmost truth of man 173 Impressions 383-4, 386, 531 Inner ruler 53, 278, 451, 453, 456, Impurity 74, 513 Inner sanctuary 108, 125 460 Inattention 519 Incarnation 100, 174, 418, 420, 497 Inner solitude (See Avatāras) Insights of religion 105 Indeterminate Brahman 261-2, 292 Inspired seers 19 India 10, 131, 161, 563 Instrumental and material cause 70, Indian canon of religion 10 94, 287, 368 Indian Christians 173 fn. Instruments 204, 357, 557 Indian Christians of St. Thomas Instruments of action 412-13, 430, (Brown) 173 fn. 448 Indian Church 173 fn. Instruments of cognition 430, 448 Indian culture 7, 10, 157, 162 Integral revelation 22I Indian philosophy 7, 67, 116, 135, Integrated man 153, 166

Indian Philosophy (Radhakrishnan) 223 Integration 129, 158, 167, 181 Intellect 101, 106, 231, 410, 485 353 fn. Intellect and reason 105, 108 Individual and the world 192 Intellectual insight, knowledge 233, Individuality 126, 200, 215 239, 497 Individuals and types 302 Intelligence 92, 125, 232, 252, 275, Individual Self 36*, 95*, 144 Individual soul 26, 42*, 64*, 100*, 305, 337, 367, 405, 408, 413, 453, 454, 460, 546 159, 191, 208, 291, 459 Intelligence v. intellect 231

588 The Brahma Sūtra

Intelligent cause 338, 354, 367 Jean Danielou 249 fn. Intelligent power, Māya as Intelligent Self 35 Jerome 206 209, 267, 268, 316, Jesus 112, 123, 131, 137, 153, 165-6, 340, 462 Internal organ 208, 231, 275, 372 171, 172 fn., 174 fn., 182-3, 185 Jews 112-13, 134, 150, 171-2, 181, 394, 411 ff., 425, 559 Interpretation 11, 12, 21-2, 24-5 189, 206

27 ff., 115, 118, 235, 269, 334 Jijñāsā 93, 229, 230 Interpretation, canons of 23, 495, Jiva passim Jiva and Atman 146* 496 Introspection 147 Jiva and Brahman 87-8, 355, 416 ff. Intuitive realisation 51, 87, 102-3, Jiva (Baladeva) 100* Jiva creative, not creator 356, 358 105, 114, 116, 118, 125, 175, Jiva-ghana 291-2 215, 219, 233, 242, 246, 267, 276, 281, 459, 497, 500, 502, 538, 540 Jīva-Gosvamin 88, 97, 164 fn. Inward awareness 108, 159 Jivan-muktas 150, 215, 217, 222, Inward self 261, 285 229, 487, 530, 533 Iranians Jīvan-mukti 44, 66, 76, 82, 215*, 262 Irenaeus 131 Jivan-mukti-viveka (Vidyaraņya) ' 28 530 Irrationality 80 Irreligion 167 Jīvas 49, 53-4, 64-5, 70, 91, 95, Isaiah 184 363, 467 Īśāna 390 Jñāna 19, 36, 55-6, 77, 87, 102, Isa Upanişad 334, 412, 507, 508 153, 235, 560 Islam 129 Jnana-deva 89 Iśvara 30, 34, 38-9, 45-6, 51, 53 ff., Jnanadhikarana 409 83, 85, 94-5, 129-30, 133, 141 ff., Jñana-karma-samuccaya 44, 83, 166, 210-I1, 216, 236-7, 240-I, I02, 228 Jñana, path of 19, 37 256, 259, 290, 292, 555 Isvara or Personal God 126* Jñana-sambandhar 67 Isvara's prerogatives 96, 560 Jñānesvari 58 Jnanottama 229 fn. Jnatr-jnana relation 408, 499 Jābāla, Jābālas 308, 526 Job 304 Jābāla Upanişad 285, 511 Johannine discourse 186 fn. Jacobi 22 fn. John 10 fn., 131, 165, 185, 186, Jada 275, 348 242 fn. Jada-śakti 74 John the Baptist 165-6 Jagad-ambā 128 Jones, Sir William 206 Jaimini 21-2, 210, 284-5, 304, 323, Josephus 206 466-7, 481, 496, 510, 518, 532, Journal of the American Oriental 547,549, 551, 554-5, 557 Society 22 fn. Jaina soul 389 Judaism 129 Jaina thinkers 433 Judea III, 174 fn. Jainas 57, 396 Judgement Book 564 Jainism 150, 387 ff. Judgement (Christian) I86 James, William 118, 187, 199 Jung, Prof. C. G. 9 fn., 175 fn. Janaka 163, 216, 307, 444, 506 Justice 159, 197 Janaśruti 306-7 Justin Martyr 108 fn., 171, 190, Japa 174, 178 fn., 233 250 Japji (Nanak) 59 Jyotişām jyotih 265, 297 Jaspers, Karl 156, 172 fn. Jatakas, the 112 Kabīr 58, 59, 172, 174, 175 fn., 176, Jati 301, 352 215 Jayadeva 82 fn. Kabir's Poems (Tagore, Tr.) 243 Jayāditya 20 Kaivalyam 56, 534 Jayanta 68 Kaivalya Upanişad 47 fn., 88 fn., Jaya-tīrtha 61, 66, 228 fn., 237, 294 258 fn. Kāla 54, 64, 79, 89, 94

Index 589

Kālidāsa 238 Knower, known, knowledge 31, 71, Kalpa-taru (Amalananda) 28, 81, 98, 100, 233, 287, 308, 384-5,

Kalpa-taru-parimala (Appaya Dīk- 127 fn. 408, 483 ff., 508, 511, 530 ff., 535 Knower of Nirguna Brahman

Knower of Saguna Brahman 541 539, şita) 28 Kāma 86, 164 537, Kāma-cārin 209 Kaņāda 343, 349 Knowers of Self and works 44, 228, 542

Kant 106, 119, 186 281, 498, 505 ff., 513-14, 531 Kanva and Madhyandina Kapardin 47 279,320 Knowledge passim Knowledge and devotion 87 Kapila 219, 333-4, 343 Knowledge and meditation 495 Kapila-smrti 333-4 Knowledge, Bhakti and 169 Karaņa and Kārya 70, 77 Knowledge, disqualification for 306 Karana-Brahman 96 Knowledge, Helps to 514 Kāraņa-rūpa 40, 79 Knowledge in this life 523 Kāraņāvasthā 53 Knowledge, intellectual 233, 497 Karma 19, 36, 45, 56, 64-5, 69, 76, Knowledge not part of sacrificial acts 78, 81-2, 84, 87, 89, 90, 99, 102, 505 125, 192, 195, 197, 205, 216, 227, Knowledge, soul's essential quality 229, 273, 279, 321-2, 340, 342, Krama-mukti 37, 223, 292, 549, 4I0 346, 364, 433, 467, 484-5, 492, 507,513 55I Karma and Freedom 195* Kriyā 56, 77, 98, 229, 560 Karma and Predestination 196* Karma and Release (Madhva) 64* Krsna 58, 60, 79, 89, 90, 93, 100,

Karma, bhakti, dhyāna 179 109 fn., 124, 128 fn., 158 fn., 162, 170, 175, 216, 470, 493, 502 Karma is direct means to Mokşa Karma, jñāna kāņdas 21, 228-9 74 Krsna and Rādhā 58, 79, 82, 89 Krşņa-caitanyāmyta (Baladeva) 97 Karma-mārga 37, 151, 153 Krşņastu bhagavān svayam 95 Karma-mimāmsā 230 Kșetrajña 98 Karman 433, 436, 440, 451, 453, Kumārila Bhațța 246 523, 553, 557, 559, 561, 563 Kusumāñjali (Udayana) 236 Kārșņājini 22 fn., 436 Karuņā 57 Lack of Memory 198 Kārya Brahman 44, 96, 223, 485, Lakşmi 57 550 Language 243, 247 Kāryāvasthā 54 Law of Karma 76, 194*, 275, 530 Kāśakrtsna 22 fn., 26, 86, 327, 328 Law of Karma and Prayer 197* Kāśikā 20 fn. Law, William 171, 174 fn., 183, 217, Kathaka Samhita 515 203 fn. Laya, doctrine of 535 243 Katharmoi (Empedocles) Katha Upanişad passim Leibnitz 198 Kavikulacakra-vartin 189 fn. Leonardo da Vinci 230 Keith, Prof. Berriedale 163 fn. Lessing 170 fn., 193 fn. Kena Upanişad 545 Leucippus 360 fn. Keśava-Kāșmīrin 78, 261, 450 Liberated soul 76, 150, 207, 213-14, Kha 263, 277 217-18, 348, 358 Kierkegaard 125, 156 Liberated souls, rebirth of 341 Kinds of Meditation 75* Liberation 59, 74, 81, 209 ff., 215, Kingdom of God 133, 149-50, 157, 221, 228, 315, 333, 414, 460, 184-5, 193, 218, 220 505-6, 513, 516, 523, 532, 538, Kingdom of Heaven 153, 165, 173 548, 556, 559 Kingdom of spirit 183, 221 Liberty of Worship 170* Knower-agent 233-4 Life 260, 536, 539, 540 Knower of Brahman 216, 534-5, Life as Brahman 266 ff 540, 545 Life-breath 309, 425, 429 Knower of Brahman, death of, 541-2 Life divine 177

590 The Brahma Sūtra

Life, duties and rules of 333 Madhava 20 fn., 34, 68 Life Eternal 207, 212, 215, 507 Madhurya-rūpa 79, 97 Life Eternal, Here and Now (Nairne) Madhusūdana Sarasvatī 60, 28, 170 186 fn. Madhu-vidya 305-6 Life, four stages of 511, 516-17, 522 Madhva 23 fn., 26-7, 60, 88-9, 93, Life in becoming 207 97, 101, 163, 164 fn., 210, 234 ff., Life in samsāra 232 Life of a householder 522 244, 249, 255-6, 394 Life of Plotinus (Porphyry) Madhva-siddhānta-sāra 65 Madhva-Vijaya (Nārāyaņa Pandit) Life of spirit 10, 104 IIO 60 fn. Life-principle 264, 288, 309, 320-1, Madhva-vijaya-bhāva-prakāšikā 324, 429-30, 536-7, 539 Light 264, 305, 459, 561 (Nārāyaņa Pandit) 26 Light and its substratum 461 Mādhyamika-Kārikā (Nāgārjuna) Light of Lights 265, 297, 305, 317 122, 385 fn. Lila 80, 91, 361-3, 451, 558 Madhyandina 320, 540 Limbs of God 282, 527 Mahabhārata, the 22 fn., 47, 153, 155 fn., 156 fn., 160, 162, 169 fn., Limitations 74, 124, 129, 213, 352 Limiting adjuncts 42, 139, 272, 279, 173 fn., 176, 194, 205 fn., 283 fn., 298, 300, 302-3, 307, 334, 393. 281, 291, 328, 345, 355, 404, 409, 418, 540 412, 414, 417, 419, 421, 446, 450, Mahābhārata-tātparya-nirņaya 456, 463 (Madhva) 61, 64 ff., 355 Limiting conditions Maha-maya 563 Linga 88, 496, 525 63, 95, 210 Mahānārāyaņa Upanişad 271, Linga-sarīra 205 Literature I0, III 277 fn., 317-18, 465, 491, 494, Living faiths 9 fn., 173, 249 Living Flame of Love (St. John of the Mahan-atman is Hiranya-garbha 517

132, 313 Cross) 209 fn. Mahā-nirvāņa Tantra 174 fn. Living God 149 Mahā-puruşa-nirņaya (Yāmunā- Living near God 96, 481 cārya) 50 Living of These Days (Fosdick) Mahat 313, 316, 318, 334-5, 369, 172 fn. Living souls 404, 406, 431 Mahayana Buddhism 372 113, 129, 219 Living universe 128 Mahesvaras, the 390 Logical analysis 107-8, 177, 230, Mahopanişad 294, 390 246, 257 Maitreyi 324 Logical approach, plane II9, 230 Maitri Upanisad 204 fn. Logical categories II8 Malachi, Prophet 160 Logical knowledge 105, 108, 262 Malas (impurities) 77-8, 229 Logical propositions 20, II4 Malraux, Andre 7 Logical reasoning 61, 106 ff., 236, Man a miniature of the universe I53 246, 249 Manana (See Śravana) Logos 171, 250 Manas 25, 204 fn., 205, 377, 425 Logos Spermatikos 250 Maņavāļa mā-muni 50 Loisy, M. 8 fn., 172 fn. Mandala-vidyā 479 Loka-samgraha 157 Mandana Miśra 28, 237 (See Sureś- Lokāyatikas 367 vara) London Magazine III fn. Māndūkya-Kārikā (Gaudapāda) Lord, the, passim 28-9, 104, 209 Lord's will 428, 531 Māņdūkya Upanisad 28-9, 145, Lotze 221 Love of God 65, 126, 210, 459, Manifestation 233, 311, 464, 553 525

Manifold creation 85, 138, 360 Love of the Eternal 196 464 Manifoldness 346-7, 383, 452, 501, Luke 165, 214 Māņikka-vācagar 67 557

Machiavelli 239 Mano-maya 270-I

Index 59I

Man on his Nature (Sherrington) Meditation obligatory or optional 360 fn. 481, 502 Mantras 174, 488, 500 Meditation, posture for 528 Manu 20, 51, 132, 161 fn., 162 fn., Meditation, purpose of 472, 474 163, 168 fn., 193, 204 fn., 267, Meditation, result of 419, 468, 473, 302, 307-8, 333-4, 343, 431, 438, 515, 517, 537 Meditations (Marcus Aurelius) 523

Many Isvaras 560 135-6 fn., 194 fn. Marcel 156 Meditations passim Marcus Aurelius 135-6 fn., 194 fn. Meister Eckhart (See Eckhart) Mārjāra and Markața-nyāyas 57 Meister Eckhart (Blackney, Tr.) 209 Marriage 163 Memory 198 ff., 205, 230, 385-6, Martha 185 429, 448 Marx 152, 235 Menezes, Portuguese Archbishop Maryādā-bhakti 93 173 fn. Maryada souls 92 Mental acts 177, 384, 525 Mass-State 157 Mentalism 138 Master, God as 464 Mental worship 174 Mastery of nature 250 Mergence 535, 540-I Material cause 35, 69, 95, 302, 318, Merit and demerit 36, 54, 204 fn., 273, 287, 307, 321-2, 363, 374, Material and efficient cause 332 71-2, 390, 419, 421, 467, 474, 485, 80, 90, 94, 127, 287, 329, 331, 560 333, 390, 460, 462 Messiah, the 112 Material elements 281, 404-5, 433 Messianic expectation 186 Materialism 9, 84, 138, 145, 157, Metaphysical experience 19, 20 235, 367, 498-9 Metaphysics 107, 178, 563 Material world 69, 70, 74, 86, 193, Metaphysics (Aristotle) 363

Mathematics 104, 107, 138 375 Meykanda-deva 66-7 Mīmāmsā 20, 21*, 229 Matras, two-of Aum 292 Mind 53, 75, 208, 231, 260, 293, 378, Matter 41, 45, 53-4, 101, 150, 315, 394, 424-5, 458, 475, 494, 496, 450, 460, 484 526, 529, 535, 546, 556, 558 Matter, aggregate of 342, 383 Mind and body 152, 189, 195, 229 Matter and Memory (Bergson) 199 Mind and matter 238 Matter in subtle state 54, 446 Minds and organisms 202 Matthew 165, 179 fn. Mind and speech 229, 259 Māyā 29 ff., 58, 69, 71-2, 85-6, Mind, distraction of 502 89 ff., 99, 127, 136-7*, 141-2, Mind, purification of 74, 102, 228 156, 211, 237, 251-2, 314, 317-8, Mirā Bāi 58, 93 348-9, 358, 367, 390, 444, 454 Mission, Persons with a 487 Māyā-mātram svapna-daršanam 444 Mode 330, 404, 417, 459, 554 Māyā-śakti 34-5, 90, 141 Modern knowledge 243 Māyā-vāda, criticism of 39, 84 , 385 Modern life 9, 12 Māyā-vāda-khandana (Madhva) 6 Modern psychology 187 McTaggart 167, 204, 200 fn., 206 Modern theology 104 Means to purify, fix the mind 74 Modern thought II 102, 228, 474 Modes of Consciousness 105 Mechanical development 117 Modes of Thought (Whitehead) I08 Mechanism of Rebirth 204 Modification 346-7, 376, 490 Medhatithi 161 fn. Modus operandi of rebirth 204 Meditation and meditator 271-2, Mohenjo-dāro 67 275, 305, 414, 458, 499, 505, Mokh-dvari, woman is 59 525-6, 538 Mokşa 25, 28, 36 ff., 41, 43 ff., 49, Meditation and sacrifices 492, 504-5 55 ff., 62, 64 ff., 74 ff., 82-3, Meditation and the gods Meditation, any-leads 304-6 86-7, 93, 100 ff., 129-30, 163-4, to release 166, 179, 208, 222, 227, 563 502 Mokşa-śāstra 21*

592 The Brahma Sūtra

Momentary existence, Buddhist Nathamuni 50 theory of 352 Natural Religion 104 Monism 51 Natural theology 236 Morality and religion 184 Naturalism ZZZZ Moral law 154, 160, 194 151 fn. Morals, Morality (See Ethics etc.) Nature 192, 223, 340 Nature of Existence (McTaggart) 200 Moses 219 fn. Nature of reality 117 ff., 308, 343-4 Muhammad 112, 160 fn., 179, 250 Nature of the self 144, 257, 414, Mukhya-prāņa 321 Mukti 56, 76, 112 553,555 Makuțāgama 67 fn. Nayars 172 fn. Multiplicity 41, 35, 90, 91, 140, 265 Necessity, law of, vs law of Karma Multiplicity of empirical selves 212, 194-5 Need for Religious Devotion 167 Mumukşutva 37, 155 222 Negative descriptions of Brahman Mundaka Upanişad passim 121, 126, 359, 361 Mundane existence 43, 130, 311 Neoplatonists 187, 189, 205 Muni 521-2 New Testament 185, 251 Muslims 58, 113, 150, 172 Nicholson, Prof. A. R. 119 Nicholas of Cusa 108, 250, 262 Mystery religions 181, 205, 251 Nicodemus II Mystical faith II2 Nietzsche 242 fn. Mysticism 109, 180 fn., 249 Mysticism and Logic (Russell) Nigama 265 Nihilism (See Sūnyavāda) III fn., 249 Mystics 129, 171, 246 Nimbārka passim Nimitta-kāraņa 30, 90 Nirguņa Brahman 45, 76, 252 ff., Naciketas 275, 298 468-9, 484, 486, 524, 537, 54I Nādis 447, 537, 539, 542-3 Nirguņa vs saguna Brahman 256, Nāgārjuna 122, 137, 385 fn. 468, 547 Nairne, Dr Alexander 186 Nirvāņa 122, 129, 150, 563 Naişkarmya-siddhi (Sureśvara) 28, Nir-vikalpa samādhi 125, 126, 179 31, 127, 229 Nir-viseşa Brahman 52, 79, 93, 237, Naişthika-brahmacārin 28, 78, 519 257 Naiyāyikas, the 32, 68, 77 Nirviśeşādvaita 27 Nakulisa-pasupata system 68 Nityānitya-vastu-viveka 36, 229 Nāl-āyira-divya-prabandham 50 Non-attachment 227-8, 289, 530 Nāma-rūpa 30, 137-8, 144, 208 Non-being 119, 128, 236, 320-I Nam-deva 58, 89 Non-difference 26, 39, 71, 73, 316, Name and form 30, 41, 48, 70, 72, 325-6, 355, 398, 446, 451-2, 457, 85, 150, 208-9, 251, 262, 276, 461-2, 473, 526, 552 281, 286, 294, 364, 301 ff., 310- Non-difference of cause and effect II, 318, 321, 325-6, 330-1, 350, 332, 340, 346 ff. 353, 359, 364, 367, 431-2, 452-3, Non-difference of Jiva and Brahman 464, 468 (See Nama-rūpa) 345, 417 Nammāļvār 50 Non-distinction 73, 339, 459, 542, Nānak 59, 176 Non-dualism 29, 54, 60-1, 63, 94, 554 Nārada 100, 288-9, 396, 454, 478-9, 487 104, 121, 162, 170, 256, 458, 554 Nārada Bhakti Sūtra 169 Non-dualism of the differenced 73 46, Nārada-pañcarātra 128 fn. Nārada Upanişad 529 fn. Non-duality, non-dual 29, 40, 78, Nārāyaņa 48, 53, 60, 62, 71-2, I18 ff., 137, 377 75-6, 93, 95, 100, 120, 132, 234, Non-eternity of effects 278, 376 271-2, 390, 454, 465, 467, 494, Non-existence 150, 381 ff. 551-2 Non-intelligent matter IOI, 251, Nārāyaņa Pandit 26, 60, 234 286, 330-1, 561 Nārāyaņa Sūkta 48 fn, Non-return 562-3 Nața-rāja 130 Nous, the 132

Index 593

Nyaya system 20, 241, 326, 414, 421 Orderly arrangement of the world Nyāya-candrikā (Nārāyaņa Paņdit) 35, 247, 37I

Nyāya-kusumānjali (Udayana) 234 Order of creation and reabsorption

39 fn. Organs 214, 319, 322, 403, 423, 429- 402-3

Nyāyāmrta (Vyāsa-tīrtha) 61 Nyāya-nirņaya (Ānandagiri) 28 30, 433-4, 493, 535, 541, 546 Organs of action 278-9 Nyāya-parišuddhi (Venkața-nātha) Origen 37, 150-I, 171, 206, 219, 249 fn., 250 Nyāya-sudhā (Jaya-tīrtha) 61, 47-8 Origen (Danielou) 151 228 fn., 237, 258 Original Sin 102, 19I Nyāya Sūtra 154 fn., 390 Origination from nothing 381 Origination of akāśa 397, 398 Objectification 140, 233 Origination of effect 351, 352, 368 Objections to the Hypothesis of Origination of knowledge 513, 532 Rebirth 198* ff. Origin, maintenance, dissolution of Objective universe 124, 137, 139-40, the world 30, 79, 104, 237, 313, 147 ff., 233, 384 322, 331, 343, 380, 563 Objectivity, principle of 127, 142 Orpheus 181 Object of enquiry and research 231, Orpheus and Greek Religion (Guthrie) 355 203 fn. Object of knowledge 231, 315, 321, Orthodox schools (of Indian philo- 325, 380, 398, 464, 507 sophy) 20, 215 Object of meditation 270 ff., 291, Otto, Walter M. 238-9 315, 477, 488, 551 Outer perfection 219 Object of (the present) study 227 Oxford Group 235 Objects 81, 91, 124, 138, 192, 231, 387, 474 Pādas of the Brahma Sūtra 23 Obligation to work 509 Padārtha-nirņaya 34 Obligatory duties 57, 165, 280, 418, Padma-nābha 212 510, 513, 516, 532-3 Padmapāda 28, 237 Observation 177, 230, 535 Padma Purāņa 61 Occasional Speeches and Writings Paingala Upanişad 158 (Radhakrishnan) 59 fn. Paingi-rahasya Brāhmaņa 275 Offerings 301, 466, 488, 493, 495, Pain, infliction of 441-2 510, 561 Pañca-daśi 28, 32, 35, 123 fn., Offices entrusted by the Lord 487 245 fn. Of the Super-sensual Life (Boehme) Pañca-kriyās of Nața-Rāja 130 172 Pañcapādikā (Padmapāda) 28 Omar Khayyam 177 fn. Pañcapādikā-vivaraņa (Prakāśātman) Omnipotence, omnipresence, Omni- 28, 237 science 70, 102, 234, 242, 278, Pañcaratra Agamas 25, 47, 48*, 50, 281, 287, 289, 320-1, 354, 365, 391-2, 454, 468-9, 480, 490 Pañcartra System 39, 47-8, 50, 67

Omnipotent, omnipresent, omniscient 326, 393, 396 174, 239, 333, 348 Pañcasikha 333 Omnipresent Self 275, 298, 413, 455 Pāņini 19, 20, 258, 290 One and the many 79, 452 Para-Brahman 89, 93, 96 Oneness of Brahman I29, 182, 221, Paracelsus 238 fn. 326, 442 Paradox of time and eternity 130 Oneness with Brahman I10, 207, Parama-purușārtha 2II, 219 448, 534 Pāramārthika 31, 491 One-pointed devotion 471 Paramātman 49, 94, 460 One Without a Second 89, 131, 330 Para-mata-bhanga (Venkata-nātha) Operative agents 352-3 Operative cause 72, 99, 330, 350, Paramatma-bhāva 327 48

352, 363, 372, 375, 397, 462, 556 Paramātmaikyopapatti 327 Oral traditions II7 Parānu-rakti 168

594 The Brahma Sūtra

Parā-śakti 98, 99, 258, 490-I Personal God 25, 38, 58, 61, 62, 63, Parāśara 281 85, 98, 126, 129, 131, 207, 210- Parā-vidyā 280, 553 II, 236, 244, 252, 255, 348 Parimala 307 Personal identity 200 Pariņāma 35, 54, 71-2, 80, 99, 348, Personal immortality, Survival of 358 Death and 189, 192 Parināma-vāda 83, 133 Pariņiștha devotee 516-17 Personality 76, 147-8, 159, 192, 205, 213, 221 Pāriplava stories 512 Pari-pūrņa-guņa Brahman Person within the eye 262, 276-7, 62 295, 478 Parsees 172 Person within the sun 322, 490, 497 Part and whole 211, 351 Person of size of thumb 277, 298, Partiality attributed to God 416, 466 74, Persons with entrusted offices 487 309 Particles 388-9 Partisan Review 7 fn. Peter 182 Phaedo (Plato) 109, 185, 187 Pascal 214 fn. Phaedrus (Plato) 135 fn. Passion 45, 166, 363, 517, 522 Past Karmas 45, 81, 99, 101, 384, Phenomenal world 54, 118, 195, 347-8, 359 451, 467 Philo 120 fn., 150, 186 Past works of a knower 531 Philosopher, philosophy of religion Pāsupata Agamas-system 47, 64, 8, 10, 105, 123, 136, 249, 563 67-8, 77, 83, 390, 392-3, 396 Philosophers 11I, 115, 147, 235, 275 Pāśupata-vrata 88 fn., 522 Paśu-pati 67, 69, 77, 259, 390-I (See above) Pātañjala-bhāşya-Vārttika 251 fn. Philosophers of the West 109, 185 Patañjali 20, 178 fn., 329 fn. Philosophic thought 27, 147 Path of fathers 439 Philosophic vision 115 Path of the Gods 76, 277, 483-4, Philosophical discourses Philosophy 7, 8, 11, 21, 104, 105-6, 167

486, 535, 538-9, 545, 547, 550, III, 115, 117, 180, 182, 230, 563 234-5, 235, 250 Path of light 485 ff. Philosophy and Theology, relation of Patience 37, 514 8 Peace 212, 221, 564 Philosophy of moksa-śāstra 21 Peers, E. Allison (Tr.) 209 fn. Philosophy as Brahma-jijñāsā 103 Penance 214, 303, 510, 514 Philosophy-Eastern, Indian 7 Penn, William 172 109, 458 Perceptible, the 19, 124 Philosophy made a professionalism Philosophy of Civilization (Schweit- 9 Perception 51, 97, 138, 199, 242, 347, 349, 353, 382, 384, 391-2, zer) 156 fn., 180 fn. 413, 444, 457, 500, 558 Philosophy, unity of religion and Perception and inference 80, 106, II 244, 302, 338, 343, 381, 384 Physical body 123, 291, 367 Perception and non-perception 81, Physical death 215-16 4II Physical heredity 202 Perceptual experience 242 Physicality 190 Perfection 150, 185, 191, 240, 531 Physiology I95 Perfection and the Way to it 36, Picard, Max 247 fn. I51 Piety 120, 155, 173 Permanence 549 Piety, ceremonial 37, 165, 177 Permanent activity 374-5 Pilgrimages 59, 167 Permanent fruits 299 Pillai Lokācārya 48, 55, 57 Permanent self 144, 378, 382 Planck, Max 123 fn., 238 Permissions and prohibitions 418- Plant Life 342, 439-40 19 Plato 104, 107, 109, 114, 135-6, 150, Perpetual becoming 187 153 fn., 176, 187-8, 205, 235, Perpetual religious student 519 238 fn., 239, 246 Perpetuity v. Eternity 185 Platonic pure reason I18

Index 595

Platonic school 203 Praņa 204 fn., 205, 257, 263-4, 267, Platonism 108 fn. 288-9, 309, 321 ff., 354, 424, Platonism and Christianity 250 426-7, 468, 471 ff, 476, 492-3, Plato's image of the cave 181-2 535-6, 539-40 Play (vitasa) of Brahman 36 Pranava (aum) 290, 472, 503 Pleasant v. unpleasant 354, 413 Prāņa-vidyā 468, 472 Pleasure and pain 271, 273, 277, Prapatti 49, 50, 56-7, 501 321, 325, 341-2, 346, 370, 392, Prārabdha karma 487, 509, 531 ff. 407-8, 418, 421, 429, 436, 444, Prasāda 88 451, 453, 482, 541, 557 Praśna Upanişad passim Pleasure, pain, infatuation 336, Prasthāna-ratnākara (Purușottama) 366-7 90 Plotinus 105, 109, 131-2, 182, 186, Pratardana 267 205, 238 fn., 246 Prātibhāșika 33 Plotinus Life of (Porphyry) 110 Prati-bimba-vāda 420, 455 Pluralistic world 46, 61, 101, 137, 548 Pratītya-samutpāda 378 Plurality 36, 52-3, 58, 361, 465, 474 Pratyabhijña system 68 Plurality of souls 80, 101, 147, 421, Pratyag-ätman 231 Pratyakşa 113 fn., 243, 514 Plutarch 109, 152 fn. 423 Prayer 37-8, 59, 126, 129, 174 fn., Poetry 20, 115 486, 517-18 Poetry and Invisibility (Cocteau) Predestination 196 III fn. Pre-existence 201-2, 206 Porphyry 110 Preliminary qualifications 227 ff. Positive and negative method of Prerogatives of Isvara 560 argument 386 Presiding deities (See Divinities) Positive characteristics 488 Prickard, A. O. (Ed.) 152 fn. Potential divinity 309 Priests 300, 504, 520-I Potentiality, seminal 28 Primacy of Ethics 154 Poverty 206, 518 Primitive Culture (Tyler) 204 fn. Power 38, 86, 91, 306, 527, 561 Primordial Cause (Justin's) 171 Power of creation 101, 354, 560 Principal Upanişads, The (Radha- Power of knowledge 245, 509 krishnan) 39, 53, 135, 227, 234, Power of will 166 235, 241, 243, 252, 253, 257, Prabala-Karmantara 523 258, 259, 263, 298, 299, 306, 309, Prabandha literature of the Alvars 47 310, 313, 316, 317 Practical Reason (Kant's) 186 Principles of Logic (Bradley) 203 Pradhana passim Principles of Psychology (James) Pradyumna 53, 393, 395 187-8 Prahlāda 168, 214 Pringle Pattison, Prof. 198 Praise of the Devotee 169 Problems for and of philosophy 8, Prajā-pati 259, 295 ff., 300, 495, 123, 136, 249, 563 545 Proceedings of the Third Oriental Prajñā 102, 316, 497 Conference 47 fn. Prajňopāya-viniścaya-siddhi Process of becoming 189 I22 fn. Process of soul-making 220-1, 404 Prakāras (modes) 330, 404, 457, Proclus 128, 139 495, 554 Progress 502 Prakāsānanda 237 Prohibitions 298, 308, 515 Prakāśātman 28, 34, 61, 237 fn. Proof, means of 350, 496 Prakrti passim Prophetic Religion III Pralaya 41, 53-4, 70, 80, 95, 99, Prophets 112, 157, 17I 242, 304, 371, 446, 541 Prosperity 37, 160, 227, 316, 486, Pramāņas 39, 51, 61, 90, 113, 497,523 240, 256 Proverbs 171, 181, 242 fn., 304 Prameya-kamala-mārtanda 113 fn. Proximity 102, 210, 370-1, 375, 481, Prameya-ratnāvali (Baladeva) 97, Psalms 108 fn., 181, 239 548 98 fn.

596 The Brahma Sūtra

Psyche, psychic 147, 192, 199, 202 Qualities 73-4, 77, 276, 378, 449, Psychological heredity 202 454, 458, 460, 462, 464, 473-4, Psychological introspection 147 Psychological organism 148, 192 489, 491 ff., 502, 548, 553, 555, 562 Psychological self 124, 147 Quest, Our 180 Psychology, psychologists II5, 144, Quran, the 159, 239 187, 195 Psychology and Alchemy (Jung) Race, race-mind 202, 309 175 fn. Race and nation 213 Punar-janma v. mokşa (See Rādhā-Krșņa 89, 93, 101, 128 Rebirth) 185 ( Ra, Egyptian Sun-god 132 fn. Puņya 204 Rāi-dās 58 Puņyarāja 304 fn. Raikva 306-7, 517 Purana and Quran Puranas, the 242, 300, 307, 334, 174 Raja-sekhara 68 Rāma 58, 60, 131, 160, 163, 175, 216-17, 470, 497 Pure being 85, 293, 447, 457 438 Rama-carita-manasa Pure being and pure non-being Rāmadāsa 66 59, 60 fn., 131 127. 240 Rāmānanda 58 Pure consciousness 31,43-4, 49, 53, Rāmānuja passim 74, 77, 85, 94 ff., 210, 295, 367, Rāmānuja's Vrtti-kāra Rāmāyaņa (Vālmīki) 47,255 513, 515 59, 160, 196, Pure contemplation 174 Pure dualism 97 Rāņāyaniya Khila 479 444 Pure Intelligence 31, 91-2, 308, 348, Rational Enquiry 555 Rational intuition 106 103

Pure knowledge I15, 305, 393 Rationality 126, 188, 245 Pure potentiality 150, 171 Rational knowledge 118 Pure reason 118 Rational thinking 180 fn., 246 Pure self 31, 35, 45, 124-5, 145, Ratnaprabha 22 fn., 28, 267, 316 fn., 231-2, 237 Realisation 65, 86, 96, 125, 153, 165, 429 Pure unity 79 Purification of consciousness, mind 174, 207, 227, 230, 244, 293, 74, 82, 102, IIO 295, 335, 410, 497, 500, 525, 550 Purifications 203 fn. Realisation, man of 481-2 Pūrņa-prajña (Madhva) 60 Realism, realist 378 Purpose of Human Life 151 Reality 33, 53, 83, 106, 126, 129, Purusa 64, 94, 145, 223, 280, 283, 149, 180, 247, 311, 449, 531 315, 319, 322, 369, 370, 372 Reality of difference 348 Puruşa and prakrti 89, 95, 125, 343, Reality of external objects 25, 252, 390 384 ff. Puruşa-sūkta 48, 143 Reality of God 167, 244 Purușa-vidyā-Yajña 479-80 Reality of spirit (Kantian) 119 Purușottama 80, 89, 92 Realm of mystery 104-5 Pūrva-jñāna 205 Real, the 29, 176, 254-5 Pūrva Mīmāmsā 21-2, 24, 228, 241, Reason 8, 30, 39, 68, 104, 107-8, 245, 247, 299 fn., 300, 333, 412, 116, 146, 171-2, 229, 241, 269, 423, 466, 481, 494, 496, 502, 519 343, 458 Pūrva-mīmamsa Sūtra 22, 44, 516, Reason and Experience 29, 242 519 ff., 557 Reason and intuition 246 Pūrva-pakșa (prima facie view) 24, Reason and Scripture 483 246, passim Reasoned faith II Pushkin 11I fn. Reasoning 230, 245 fn., 335, 338, Pythagoras 109, 201 fn., 205 343, 351, 359, 361 Reasoning and discussion 227-8, Qualifications for enquiry into Brah- 23I man 227, 228-9, 519 Reasoning as means of knowledge Qualified non-dualism 46, 349 335

Index 597

Reasoning subservient to anubhava Religious quest, the 103 338 Religious rivalries 250 Rebirth 49, 76, 81, 102, 190-I, Religious soul, the 109 193, 204, 206-7, 230, 257, 339, Religious student 519 434, 437, 439-40, 442, 519, 523, Religious susceptibilities 172 538, 540-I Religious thought 27, 131, 363 Rebirth and Pre-existence 183 Remembrance 382, 499, 514 Rebirth, objections to hypothesis of Rendering tripartite 431 198 Renunciation 30, 37, 65, 93, 161, Rebirth of liberated souls Rebirth v. Release 185 341-2 163-4, 216, 221 Renunciation of hatred 442 Rebornness 108 Republic (Plato) 153 fn., 181, 187, Reconciliation 246, 250 205 Reconciliation of religions Requittal 364, 440, 466 Reconciliation of scriptural 24, 250 texts Residual Karma 436-7 61, 246, 335, 468, 555 Resignation to God 65 Redemption, final-of all 39, 211, Restraint 234, 290, 515 214, 218, 497 Restrictions 308-9 Red Indians 184 Resurrection, the 180, 182, 192 Reflection theory of soul 420, 455 Retractions 250 Regressus ad infinitum 30, 251, 374 Reunion with the one Eternal 110 Reign of Law 194 Revelations 67, 112-13, 115, 172, Reincarnating ego 202 176, 193 fn., 230, 236, 239-40 Relative knowledge 550 Revelations of Divine Love (Dame Release passim Julian) 214 fn. Release, gradual (See Krama-mukti) Reversion from samnyāsa 518-19 Released person, powers of 68, 557, Revolution in Philosophy (Ryle) 559 ff. 8 fn. Released soul 25, 93, 209 ff., 215, Reward of works 291, 465 327, 339, 341, 348, 364, 410, 448, Rewards and punishments 196, 446 481, 553 ff., 561 ff. Released soul and body, bodies Rg-Veda 19, 48, 69, 121, 128, 134, 143, 241, 266, 281-2, 303-4, 314, 556-8 338, 364, 426, 438, 460, 503, 504 Released souls, rebirth of 342 Right and wrong 440, 522 Release is pre-existent 553 Righteousness 156, 159, 165, 505 Release, way to 56, 92 Right to Vedic study 307 Religion 8, 9, 11, 30, 103, 105, 112, Ritual 22, 36, 59, 167, 173, 228, 233, 118, 160, 180-1, 202, 230, 244 fn., 247, 470, 512 249, 309, 563 Rock Edicts 154 Religion, threefold Indian canon of Romans 131, 242 fn., 251 IO Rosetti 206 fn. Religion of power 172 Rous, Francis 244 fn. Religions, unity of II Rousseau 107 Religions of the world 9, 10, 150, Rta 134 173, 183, 213, 250 Rudra 69, 77, 499, 529 Religious allegiance 10 Rule 514, 523, 529, 544 Religious apprehension 104, 245-6 Rūpa Gosvamin 97 Religious austerities 179 Russell, Bertrand 11I fn., 249 Religious classics of India 117, 154 Ruysbroeck 184 fn., 208 fn. Religious devotion, need for 167 Ryle, Prof. Gilbert 8 fn. Religious duties 37, 61, 65, 227-8, 347,434,517 Śabara 22 fn., 247 fn. Religious experience 116, 126, 238, Śabda-kalpa-druma 178 fn.

Religious intolerance 563 Sacraments 333 172 Sacred ecstasy 134 Religious leaders Sacrificer 435, 512, 520-I Religious organisation 245 9 Sacrifices 19, 143, 155, 249, 298 ff., Religious problem, the 7 303, 305, 435, 437-8, 466, 470,

598 The Brahma Sūtra

480, 492, 494-5, 498, 500, 510 ff., Šamkara's Vrtti-kāra 28, 265, 268, 520, 522 Śamkara-vijaya (Ānandagiri) 560 Sacrificial acts 167, 490, 520, 527, Samkarşana 53, 100, 393 ff. 77 fn. Sacrificial religion 67 533

Şad-darśana-samuccaya (Haribhadra) Sāmkhya and Vaiseşika 377 Sāmkhya and Vedanta 344 20 fn., 68 Samkhya and Yoga 390 Sādhaka 215 Samkhya commentator 426 Sādhana 24, 459, 544 Sāmkhya Kārikā 319, 366, 368, 370, Sadhana and Sadhya 229 Sadyomukti 37 372

Sadyomukti and krama-mukti 44 Samkhya-smyti (Kapila) 333 Sages 65, 218, 251, 303, 305, 540 Samkhya Sūtra 426 Samkhya system 20, 36, 95-6, 125, Sages with mission 487 Sa-guna Brahman 45, 145, 223, 251-2, 256, 260, 287, 76, 313, 315-16, 319, 328-9, 332-3. 254-5, 449, 468-9, 474, 483, 486, 252, 338, 342-3, 360, 367-8, 371, 393. 524, 535, 538, 543, 545, 547-8 Sa-guņa, nir-guna Brahman 396, 405, 420-1, 502, 544 256, Samkhya thinkers 251-2, 433 468, 547 Saguņa-vidyās Samkşepa-śārīraka (Sarvajñātma- Sa-guņopasana 486 muni) 28, 34, 123, 237 Samma-dassana 108 fn. Saha-kāri cause 35, 380 87 Samnyāsa 93, 158, 164-5, 403, Saints 87, 109, 173, 181, 219 Śaiva Agamas 28, 68, 77, 83 509 ff., 518, 522 Śaiva Siddhānta School 67, 69, 77 Sam-prasāda 289, 294 ff. Śaivism 67, 68, 77, 129, 390 Samsāra 21, 29, 42-3, 56, 78, 81, 86, Śaivites 252 135, 232-3, 275, 286, 298, 303, Śākhās 452, 470, 477, 500 314, 316, 356, 358, 364, 370, 372, Śāktas, the 129, 394-5 379, 387, 392, 409 ff., 415-16, 448, 485-6, 510, 538, 563 Śakti 35-6, 45, 47, 49, 58, 67, 71, Samskaras 307, 378, 384 80, 91, 94, 127, 130-1, 348, 390, Samvarga-vidya 306 393-4 Samyoga 33, 373, 375, 377, 391, 535 Salvation 78, 103, 131, 148-9, 158, Sanat-kumāra 100, 288-9, 479, 487 183, 197-8, 214, 216, 222, 228, Sanctity 159, 173 232, 253-4; 261, 299, 307, 309, Sandilya 395 459, 468, 482, 486, 493, 495 ff., Śāndilya Sūtra 168 505, 513, 522 ff., 548 Sandilya Unpanişad 20 fn. Salvation, two conditions for 219 Śandilya-vidyā 468, 477 ff., 496, 502 Salvation through moral life 165 Saoshyant 112 Śama 227 Sapta-bhangi-naya 388 Śama-damadi-sadhana-sampat 37 Śāradā-devī 38 Samadhi 63 fn., 178 ff., 414 Śaraņāgati-gadya (Rāmānuja) 57 Samādhi-bhāșā 20 Śārīraka-mīmāmsā 21 Sāmānādhikaraņya 472 Śārīraka Sūtra 22 Samantabhadra 154 Śarīra-sarīri-bhāva 526 Samanvaya 24, 129, 242, 249-50 Sartre 146, 167 Samavaya 33, 90, 251, 351 ff., Sārūpya 65, 76 374-5, 377, 39I Sarva-darśana-samgraha (Mādhava) Sāma-Veda 19, 241, 262, 488, 503, 20, 68 527 Sarvajña 237 Sama-veda-rahasya I28 fn. Sarvajñānottara 75 Sambandha-varttika 228 Sarvaja-sūkta (Vișņu-svāmin) 89 Samkalpa-sūryodaya (Venkata-nāțha) Sarvajñatma-muni 28, 34

Śamkara passim 48 Sarva-loka-pratyaksa (the world is-) 138, 233 Samkara and Rāmānuja 51 Sarvam khalv idam brahma 34, 110 Śamkara's Commentary on the Sarva-mukti 39, 211, 214, 218*, 220, Brahma Sūtra passim 497

Index 599

Sarvāstivāda 378 Scriptural Testimony 39, 104, 113, Sarvātma-bhāva 92, 222 Śāstra 56, 65, 113, 149, 180, 232, 244 Scripture, scriptural texts passim 242, 357, 412 Scripture only source of knowledge of Śāstra-yoni 240-I Brahman 80, 359 Sat 33, 90, 253, 286 Scriptures enjoin work 506 Śata-dūşaņi (Venkața-nātha) 48 Śatapatha Brāhmana 48, 192-3, 272, Scriptures of the world 118, 250 Scriptures, study of 167, 227, 283, 285, 307, 336, 397, 415, 307 ff., 391 423, 456, 465, 477, 494 ff., 507, Second Council of Constantinople 521, 529 206 Śata-śloki 31 Secularism 173 Sat-cid-ananda 31, 43, 44, 73, 89 Śathagopa (Nammāļvār) 50 Seekers 37, 92, 96, 108, 179 Seers 19, 62, 106, 110 ff., 113, 115, Satkāras (of Yoga) 177 118, 123-4, 238, 241, 243, 250, Sat-kārya-vāda 342, 344, 353 291, 298 Sat-sampatti 155 Seers of the Upanisads 117, 246 Sat-sandarbha (Jīva-Gosvāmin) Seers, Women 164 164 fn. Select Writings of Plotinus (Taylor, Sattva 93, 94, 252-3 Ed.) 206 Satvata-samhita 48 Self passim Satya and Ahimsa 154, 161 Self and body 54, 193, 349, 354, 357, Satya-bheda-vada 26 412-3, 499, 539 Satyam, jñānam, anantam brahma Self and intelligence 253, 410 31, 409 Self and not-self 119, 129, 143, 232, Satyasamkalpa 87, 270-1 387 Satyasya Satyam 139, 457 Self as agent 330, 414-16, 428-9 Satyavān 205, 298 Self as knower, knowledge 233, 405, Sautrantika Buddhism 378, 383 409-10 Sa-vikalpa samādhi 125-6, 179 Self-awareness 104, 177, 190 Saviour gods 129 Self-conceit 86, 87 Sa-viseşa Brahman 79, 93, 449 Self-contradiction 443, 444 Sa-viseşa-nir-viśeşa-Krşņa-stava-rāja Self-control 37, 65, 148, 155, 159, (Nimbārka) 78 177, 482, 514-15, 517 Savitr 134, 205 Self-criticism among living faiths Sayaņa 244 fn. 173 Sāyujya 56, 65, 96, 210 Self-determination 195 Scholastic developments 20 Selfish desire 157, 166 Schopenhauer 206 Selflessness 203, 218 Schuon, Frithjof 177 fn. Self-luminous 65, 70, 100, 186, 231, Schweitzer, Albert 156 fn. 528 Science 105, III, 117, 123 fn., 230, Self-manifestation 112, 141, 454 235-6, 245 Self-mortification 387 Science and mysticism 249 Self of all 289, 330, 333, 540, 548 Science and technology Science of God 105 9 Self of bliss 257 ff., 476 Self of the universe 282, 331 Scientific knowledge 104 Self-renewal 174, 193 Scientific religion 230 Self-sense 43, 165, 180, 318, 334, Scientific world-view 235 372, 394, 425 Scientist, the 105 Self, sociological 124 Scribes and Pharisees 153, 165, Self-surrender 56, 269

Scriptural Authority 79, 332, 359, 193 Sen, the barber saint 58 Sensations 138, 378, 407 448, 563 Sense-experience 19, 62, 107-8, Scriptural declarations 51, 115, 488, 168 507, 535 ff., 549, 551, 556 Sense-organs 36, 42, 43, 53, 75, 100, Scriptural injunctions, prohibitions 231, 279, 291, 292, 327, 328, 333, 306, 412-13 340, 342, 378, 385, 392, 394,

600 The Brahma Sūtra

402-3, 412, 415, 424, 427, 428, Size of the soul 406 ff. Senses 429, 430, 485, 536, 541, 559 Skanda-Purana 237, 244 fn. 125, 178, 205, 243, 288, 290, Skandhas 378-9 372, 387, 405, 411, 458, 474 Sensualists 269 Sleep 53, 293, 321, 323, 336, 405. Sentient, non-sentient 71, 72, 74, 449,528 76, 101, 252, 285, 456, 462, 562 Smiling face of the Lord, meditation Serenity, Serene 180, 289, 310, 326 on 503 Service 25, 92, 109, 159, 164, 221 Smith, John 114 Śeșa 55, 130, 340 Smrtis 19, 22 fn., 87, 283, 297, 302, Seśvara Mimāmsā 48 308, 333 ff., 337, 458, 477, 496, Seśvara Sāmkhya 329 515 ff., 525. 528-9, 537, 540, 544, Sex 213, 309 549 Sexual union (fifth oblation) Smuts, General 236 Shakespeare 238 439 Social heredity 202 Shape (See Name and form) Social Institutions 161 She-goat 316, 318 Social solidarity 157, 161, 213, Sherrington, Sir Charles 360 fn. 219 Siddhānta-bindu (Madhusūdana Socialist order of society 1, 160

Sarasvati) Society for Psychical Research Siddhānta-leśa 35 fn. 29 183 fn. Siddhanta-lesa-samgraha Sociological self 124 Dīkşita) 211, 216 fn. (Appaya Socrates 104, 109, 123, 171, 187 fn., Siddhānta-muktāvali 35, 218 fn. 191, 250 Siddhanta-ratna (Baladeva) Solitary Meditation 178 Siddhānta-ratna (Nimbāraka) 97 Solitude 179, 213 Siddhi-traya (Yāmunācārya) 78 Solomon 127 26, 48, Soma 134, 305, 495 Signature of All Things (Boehme) 50 Some Dogmas of Religion (McTaggart) 200 fn. Sorrow 65, 209, 316, 529 Sikhism, Sikhs 59, 249 177

Sikşā guru and Dīkșā guru 114 Soul, atomic (anu) size of 74, 77, Sila 154 80-1, 406 ff., 410, 420, 422, Silence 120, 180, 454 462 Soul (Plato) 187 Silent meditation 521-2 Soul, Souls passim Simon Maccabaeus 112 Souls and their destiny 8 Sin, sins 81, 153, 181, 206, 293, 295, Space 88, 263, 289, 293, 319, 380 310, 517, 519, 530, 555, 562 Space and time 77, 99, 123-4, 144 Sītā 60 fn., 163, 439 Specific cognition 328, 559 Śiva 28, 37, 47-8, 60, 67, 69, 71-2, Speech 318, 349, 356, 359, 470, 494, 74-5, 77, 84 ff., 89, 130-1, 170, 535 245, 249, 262, 271-2, 349, 355, Sphota 301-2 390, 465, 492, 528, 549, 552, 560 Spinoza 106, 152 Siva - ananya - sākşātkāra - pațala Spirit 106, 119, 140, 143, 147-8, 75 fn. 150, 165, 189, 196, 251, 475 Siva and Parvati 393 Spirit of Love (William Law) 171 Siva and Sakti 252, 561 Spirit of Prayer (William Law) 172, Śiva-dharmottara 68 Spiritual and material nature of man 174 fn. Śivādvaita-nirņaya (Appaya Dīkșita) 74, 211 fn., 175 fn. 103, 147, 150 Siva-gītā, the 83 Spiritual awareness 109, 157, 165, Sivāji 66 182 Śiva-jñana-bodha (Meykanda-deva, Spiritual blindness, void 21, 167 Tr.) Spiritual crisis 157 Siva-jnana-siddhi 68 fn. Spiritual Experience 20, 31, 107, Śivārka-mani-dīpikā (Appaya Dīk- 115, 118, 147, 207, 338 şita) 66 Spiritual goal 149, 154 Size imagined for Brahman 300, 463 Spiritual growth 157, 182-3, 183

Index 60I

Spiritual insight, freedom 30, I10, Status of the World 32, 135 116, 140, 154, 172, 175, 178, 212, Steadfastness in Brahman 218 Stendhal 240 510

Spiritual life 10, 107, 151, 154, 159, Sthūla sarira 204, 314 170-1, 178, 563 Stoic ideas 171 Spiritual peace 218 Stoics, the 109 Spiritual Perspectives and Human Stories in the Upanisads Facts (Frithjof Schuon) 177 fn. Stotra, best 290 512

Spiritual pride 172 Stotra-ratna (Yāmunācārya) 50 Spiritual religion 114 Stotras (Nimbārka) 78 Spiritual training 393 Stout, G. F. 199 Spiritual values 69, 103, 117, 178 Stromata (Clement of Alexandria) Spiritual view 149, 186, 235 Studies in Hegelian Cosmology 250 Spiritual view of life 29 Spontaneous evolution 366 (McTaggart) 204 Sprat 235 Study of Scriptures 167, 227, 307ff. Śraddhā 227, 434 Study of Vedas open to three higher Śravaņa, manana, nididhyāsana castes 306, 391 116, 177, 208, 414, 525 Subāla Upanişad 47 fn., 34I Śri-bhāşya (Rāmānuja) passim Sub-commentaries 27 Śrikantha 66*, passim Sub-human species 151 Śrikara-bhāsya (Srīpati) Subject and object 31, 41, 107, Śrīnivasa passim 83 118-19, 123 ff., 132-3, 140, 231, Śrīpati (Pandit) 26, 27, 82*, 229-30, 236-7, 271, 281, 385-6, 458, 561 245, 326-7 Subjection 223 Śrī-sampradāya 61 Śrī-vacana-bhūşaņa (Pillai Lokā- Subjective idealism 138, 385 Subjectivity 118-19, 125 cārya) 48 Subodhini (Vallabha) 89 Srşti 41, 54, 80, 130, 140, 401 Sub specie temporis 207 Śruta-prakāśikā (Sudarśana Sūri) Śruti passim 47 Substance 46, 70, 79, 373, 376-7 Substance and attribute 54, 77, 80, Śruti and Smrti 1, 537, 543, 562 98, 318 Śruti only source of knowledge of Substrate 383, 421 Brahman 359 Substratum 33, 84, 94, 210, 352, Śruti-sūkti-mālā (Sudarśanācārya) 367, 378, 383, 386, 399, 418, 421, 212 Śruti teaches difference as well as 457, 461, 471 Subtle and gross conditions 331, non-difference 417 Subtle body 204-5, 231, 313 ff., 349 Śrutopanişatka 277 St. Ambrose 250 485, 537 ff. St. Angelo of Foligno 114 Subtle elements 205, 319, 372, 433, St. Anselm 245 fn. 435,537,542 St. Augustine 109-10, 114, 121 fn., Subtle matter 330, 446 136, 167 fn., 176 fn., 191, 196, Subtle state 459, 462 206, 218 fn., 250 Sudarśana 49 St. Bernard 145 fn. Sudarśanabhatța 45 St. Catherine of Genoa 209 fn. Sudarśanācārya 45 fn., 212 St. Catherine of Siena 114 Sudarsana Sūri 47 St. François De Sales 165 fn. Śuddhādvaita 26-7, 89 St. John of the Cross 209 fn., 304 Śuddha-tattva 54 St. Paul 110, 131, 172 fn., 182, 186, Śūdras 57, 162-3, 306 ff. 189, 191, 251 Suffering 205, 214, 253, 372, 451, 558 St. Thomas Aquinas 105, 106, 108, Suffering and evil, problem of 363-5 163 fn., 236 fn., 245 fn. Suffering humanity 216 St. Thomas Christians 172 Sufis 119, 177 fn. Stages of Life 510-11, 516 ff. Śuka 27, 93*, 255, 258, 467 Stages of the Yoga Journey 178 Śuka's commentary on Brahma State of a child 521-2 Sūtra 97

602 The Brahma Sūtra

Sūkşma śarīra 313 Sweet and majestic Lord, attributes Sulabha 307 480, 483-4, 500 Summa Contra Gentiles (Aquinas) Symbols, symbol worship 19, 45 106, 163 fn., 236 fn. 115, 141, 173-4, 284, 526-7, Summa Theologia (Aquinas) 108 fn. 550 ff. Sun 60, 134, 170, 262 ff., 276, 297, Symbols and metaphors 180, 262 310, 321, 453, 471, 526, 527, Symmachus 250 540, 542-3, 561, 564 Sun as honey 304, 318 Symposium (Plato) 185 Systems of Philosophy 9, 11, 21 Sun best image of the Divine 262 Sundara-bhatta 41 Tādātmya 77, 391 Sundarar 67 Tadbhāvāpatti 81 Sun, northern and southern courses Tagore, Rabindranath (Tr.) 174 fn., of 343 243 Sun, Person in the 497 Śūnya-vāda 63, 94, 378, 386-7 Taittiriya Aranyaka 139, 395 fn., Superimposition 232, 343 415, 417, 453, 480 Taittiriya Brahmana 265 fn., 302, Support and the supported 92, 290, 304, 331, 335, 510 447,479 Suprabhedāgama 67 fn. Taittiriya Samhitā 265, 306, 319, 333, 412, 424, 434, 495 Supreme as Antaryamin Taittiriya Upanişad passim Supreme Being, - Brahman, 53 Talmud 214 fn. Lord, - Person, - Self passim Tandya Brāhmaņa 495 Supreme bliss 256, 300, 563 Tanka 26 fn., 47 Supreme exaltation 87, 441 Tantra-sara 174 fn., 178 fn. Supreme good 186 Tantra-sāra-āgama 178 fn. Supreme Iśvara 131, 241 Tantras, the 393 Supreme Light 212 Tāntric āgamas 83 Supreme moral law 160 Tapa-traya 86 Supreme perfection 234 Tațastha-lakșaņa 69, 234, 237 Supreme Reality 51, 62, 88, 122, Tātparya-dīpikā (Sudarśanācārya) 207, 257 45 fn. Supreme Reality and the World 69 Tat satyam, sa ātma 253 Supreme self in cave 274 Tat tvam asi 30, 55, 63, 83, 122 Supreme, the 97 Tattva-muktā-kalāpa (Venkața-nātha) Sur Das 93 48 Sureśvara 28, 31, 61, 127 fn., 228, Tattvartha-dipa 90 fn. 237 Tattva-śekhara (Pillai Lokācārya) Tattvā-țikā (Vedānta Desika) 48 Surrender 82, 501 47-8 Survival and Eternal Life 185 Tattva-traya (Pillai Lokācārya) 48 Survival of Death and Personal Taylor, Prof. A. E. 117 fn. Immortality 192 Taylor, T. (Ed.) 206 fn. Suşumnā nādi 538, 542-3, 550 Teachers 19, 114, 293, 301, 531-2 Sușupti 31 fn., 85, 125, 410 Technical development 117 Sūtra Sūtra-bhāşya (Madhva) 61 23 Technocracy 157 Tejabindūpanişad 385 Sūtrakāra 210, 249, 252, 256, 258, Teleological argument 236 261, 295, 316, 332, 348, 385-6, Temporal and eternal 146, 213 396, 489 Temporal experience 148 Sūtrātman 35, 282 Temporality 219 Sutta Nipāta 207 fn. Temporal world 30, 40, 149, 178, Svābhāvika-bhedābheda 41,79 236, 363 Svaniștha devotee 471 Ten-galai 48, 57 Svanubhava 30 Tertullian 11I, 190 Sva-prākāśa caitanya 186 Teutonic peoples 184 Svarga 81, 487 Texts referred to (Vişaya-vākya) Svarupa-laksana 234, 237 227 passim Śvetāśvatara Upanisad passim Texts, uniform teaching of 256

Index 603

Textual collation 'That thou art' 147, 458, 460, 525 480 Training in Christianity (Kierke-

Theism, theist 126, 129, 197, 202 gaard) 125 Tranquillity 37, 173 fn., 323 Theistic current of the Upanişads 47 Transcendence 86, 90, 97, 124, 150, Theistic dualism of Madhva 60-1 195, 464 Theistic Samkhya 94, 329 Transcendence and immanence 79, Theistic systems 47 141, 180 Theologia Germanica 122 Transcendent Reality 108, 120-I, Theologians 116 129-30, 212, 333, 358, 457, 561 Theological doctrines 117 Transcendent subject 103, 147 Theology 172 fn. Transcendental consciousness I27, Theophilus of Antioch 150 Theory of Avataras 174 145, 541, 555 Transcendental issues 344 Theory of rebirth 183 ff. Transcendental Truth 19, 267 Thibaut, George 257 fn. Transfiguration 110, 222 This world a cosmos 194 Transformation 95, 133, 176, 218, Thomas Aquinas (See St.) 240, 348, 358 ff. Thomistic doctrine of Analogy 262 Transgressors 520 Thomson, Francis 38 Transiency 135-6 Thought 260, 463, 555-6 Transmigration 204 fn., 505 (See Thought alone is real (Vijñāna-vāda) Rebirth) 378 Treatise on Metaphysics (Omar Thought, reorientation of 8 Khayyam) 177 fn. Thought, speech and action 153 Triad, the 380 'Thou' of religious experience 126 Tribes, primitive 203 Three debts of man 228 Triguņātmaka-hetu-bhūta-pradhāna Three factors of cit-sakti 71 śakti 84 Threefold Life (Rous) 244 fn. Trivrt-karaņa 52 Three methods of realisation 180 Troeltsch, E. 186 fn. Three-stage journey of Yoga 178 Truth 7, 8, 19-20, 30, 34, 108, 115, Three stages of fitness 229 I21, 123, 125, 139, 179, 482, 488, Three syllables of Aum 292 490 Thumb, measure of a 205, 298-9 Tulasi-dās 59, 60 fn., 131 Tibetan Book of the Dead (Evans- Turīya 125, 127, 145 Wentz) 205 fn. Twenty-five principles of Sāmkhya Tibetan Buddhism 205 fn. 318-19 Tillich, Prof. Paul 112 fn., 113 Two birds 83, 275, 288 Time 21, 85, 89, 98, 120 fn., 136-7, Two currents of Indian thought 67 149, 158, 176, 180, 183, 186, 192, Twofold knowledge (Rāmānuja) 207, 210, 219, 530, 563 281 Time and change 128 Twofold yogic intuition 107 Time and Eternity 130, 136, 180 Two kinds of soul in Jainism 150 Time and space 123, 238 Two Sources of Morality and Religion Timeless Incorporeal One (Aristotle) (Bergson) 244 fn. 363 Tyler, Dr. E. B. 204 Time-process 223 Types are eternal 303 Timothy 186 Tirobhāva 69, 130 Udayana 39 fn., 68, 236 Tiru-mūlar 67 Uddhava 158 fn. Titikşā 227 Udgātr 472, 503 Toleration 172 Udgītha 471-2, 500, 503, 507, 511- Total conversion 109 12, 527 Totality 128, 200 Ultimate mystery 123 fn., 177 Tradition 8, 11, 19, 26, 47, 68, 115, Ultimate Oneness of God and man 131, 246 Ultimate Reality 31, 36, 39, 48, 17I Traditions, oral-, 117 Traetatus Logico-Philosophicus (Max 52, 89, 117-18, 126, 136, 170, Picard) 247 fn. 2II, 227, 231, 235, 252, 458

604 The Brahma Sūtra

Ultimate spiritual issues 250 Vairāgya 102, 155, 157 Umā 87, 494 Vaiseşika Sūtra 20 fn., 201 fn., Uncaused first cause 287 241 fn., 373, 375-6 Uncleanliness 513 Vaiśeşika system 20, 68, 77, 241, Unconscious memories Uncreated Light 143 199 348, 375-6, 397, 405, 411, 421, Undifferenced bliss 125 Vaiśeşika theory 373-4, 388, 420 433

Unhappiness 31 Vaişnavas 48, 50, 57, 66, 97, 129 Union with Brahman 45-6, 129, Vaiśvānara 282, 284-5. 468-9, 501 131, 207*, 260, 459, 463, 541, Vājasaneyi Samhitā 453 559-60, 563 Vākyapadīya 304 Union with World Spirit 213 Vallabha 88, passim Unity and multiplicity 41, 145, 347 Vālmīki 59, 444 Unity in Duality 82, 83 Values 126, 132-3, 140, 166-7, 220, Unity of all meditations 470 228 Unity of Prāna-vidyās 472-3 Vāmadeva 267, 523 Unity of religion and philosophy II Vanaprastha 510 Unity v. merging 536 Varaha-sahodara vrtti 26 Universal Church 118 Varuna 134, 300, 546-7 Universal dissolution 79, 380 Vasanā 205, 457 Universal men 218 Vasiștha 216, 487 Universal momentariness 379-80 Vasistha Dharma-sūtra Vasistha Smrti 437 155 fn. Universal Mother 128 Universal Self 122, 147, 189, 205, Vāşkalin 454 209-10, 265, 272-3, 294, 338, Vāsudeva 39 fn., 49, 53, 100, 162, 393 ff. Universal, the 148 550 Vātulāgama 68 fn. Universality of spirit 8, 222 Vaughan, Henry 122 Universe, the 41, 50, 71-2, 75, 93, Veda 22-3, 121, 302, 308, 334, 337, 97, 129, 135, 143, 145, 189, 192, 344, 392, 453, 500, 506, 508, 514 194, 205, 207, 221, 236, 238, 240, Veda-bahya 77 fn. 331, 340 ff., 353, 460, 479, 562 Vedānta 20, 36, 51, 88 fn., 94, 113, Universe, reality of the 25 126, 181, 221, 228, 234, 241, 323, Unmanifested, the 281, 313, 315, 332, 342-3, 360, 366-7 330, 334, 475 Vedänta, chief systems of 26, 27 Unregenerate 9, 216 Vedānta Deśika 47, 48 fn., 51, 53, Untouchability 57, 163, 173 fn. 56-7 Upadana cause 30, 34 Vedānta-dīpa (Rāmānuja) 47 Upadeśa-sāhasrī (Samkara) 127 fn. Vedānta-kalpa-latikā (Madhusūdana Upādhis 36, 40, 42-3, 63, 94, 288, Sarasvatī) 29 295, 414, 420, 422 Vedānta-kaustubha (Srīnivāsa) 78, Upanayana ceremony 298 ff., 306, 263 fn., 277, 288, 307 309 Vedānta-kaustubha-prabhā (Keśava Upanişads passim Kāșmīrin) 78, 82 fn. Uparati 227 Vedānta, later 282 Upāsanā 37, 56, 87, 102, 141, 281, Vedanta literature 28*, 227 450, 452, 514, 528 Vedānta paribhāșa 32 fn., 113 fn. Upaskāra 201 fn. Vedānta pārijāta-saurabha (Nim- Upavarșa 47, 301-2 bārka) 78, 82, 211 fn. Upavarșācarya 44 Vedanta philosophy 22 fn., 168 Uttara-gītā 63 fn., 241 fn. Vedānta, qualifications for study of Uttara-mīmāmsā 21-2, 229 Uttara-pakșa 24 Vedānta-ratna-manjūșā (Purușot- 36

tama) 80 Vacaspati Miśra 28, 34-5, 61, 133, Vedānta-sāra (Rāmānuja) 47 231-2, 242, 244, 278, 326 Vedānta Sūtra 22 Vada-galai 48, 57 Vedanta Sūtras with the Commentary Vaibhāșika Buddhism 378 of Samkara (Thibaut) 257 fn.

Index 605

Vedartha-samgraha (Ramanuja) 47, Viśva-nātha 37,107 48 Viśva-rūpa 133 Vedas, the 19*, 48, 61, 67, 77 fn., Vital air 267, 471 113, 117, 162, 164, 240, 245, Vital breath 321, 342, 423 ff., 475, 299, 300, 306, 335, 393, 395, 536 437, 493, 496, 503-4, 508 Vital principle 263, 291, 327 Vedas and Agamas 67* Vittala-natha 89 Vedas, authoritativeness of the Vitțhoba of Pandharpur 58, 170 301, 391 Vedas, impersonal origin of the 62, Vivaraņa-prameya-samgraha (Vidyā- raņya) 28 344,391 Vivarta cause, -vada 35, 83, 358 Vedic literature 22 Viveka 56, 155 Venkața-nātha (Vendānta Deśika) Void, the 120, 137, 378, 389 47-8, 378 Volitions 260, 320, 367 Vicarious grace 150 Vow of celibacy 519 Vidura 102, 125, 205, 232, 306 ff., Vyāmohikā māyā 91 469, 471, 477-8, 484, 489, 496, Vyasa 22 fn., 48, 162, 438 506-7, 523, 533 Vyasa-smrti 96 fn. Vidyapati 82 fn. Vyāsa-tīrtha 61 Vidyāraņya 28, 32, 35, 245 fn. Vidyās 468, 470 ff., 479, 486, 488, Vyavaharika 31, 33, 94, 385

501 Waddell, Dr. I. A. 204 fn. Vijaya-dhvaja 96 Waking, dream, sleep 295, 338, 384, Vijñāna 102, 205, 257, 378 Vijñana and Prajňā 497 414, 442, 449, 553, 557 Waking state 31, 101, 124, 127, 145, Vijñāna-bhikșu 25 ff., 26, 27, 94, 289, 316, 323, 385, 410, 443, 230, 252, 485, 486 Vijnānāmyta-bhāsya (Vijňāna- 446, 449, 451

bhikşu) 94, 120 fn. Ward, James 199 Waters of Lethe 198 Vijñānavāda 378, 383 ff. Way of Bhakti 153, 167 Vijñāna-vādins 138 Way of Dhyana or Meditation I75 Vinaya-patrikā (Tulasi-das) 60 Ways of Release 56 Vīramitrodaya-paribhāşa-prakāsa, Way to Perfection 151 179 Wealth 160-1, 164 Vīra-śaivasism 68, 83, 87 Western philosophers 123, 206 Virāt-svarupa 35, 133, 143 Western religious thought 131, 458 Virgil 205 West, the 130, 203 Virgin Athene-Mary, cults of 130 Where is Science going? (Max Planck) Virocana 295 I23 fn. Viśistādvaita 26, 27, 46, 57-8, 69, Whitehead, A. N. 108, 172 fn., 236 74,349,418 Whitman, Walt 145 fn. Visiștādvaita literature 47 Will 107, 166, 260, 555-6, 558 Viśişta-śivādvaita-vāda 72-3 Will, freedom of 155 Vişņu 38, 47-8, 53, 57, 60, 62, 67, Will of the Supreme 91, 10I, 340, 71, 79, 88, 95, 129 ff., 170, 229, 429, 483, 555 249, 251, 313 Wisdom 10, 36, 104, 107, 109, III, Vişnu-dharma 358 115, 153, 155-6, 215-16, 234, Vişņu Purāņa 64 fn., 168, 177, 237, Wishes 300, 498, 556, 558 304 283, 302, 325, 363, 438, 450, 454,537 Witnessing self 252, 256, 385, 461, Vişņu-sahasra-nāma, Samkara's Witness to experience of God 114 489 commentary on 396 Vişņu-śakti 49, 98 Women 163, 307, 442 Vişņu-svāmin 89 Women and family life 163 Vişņu-tattva-vinirņaya (Mādhava) Women seers 164 62 Word 137, 171, 301-2, 498, 502 Viśuddhadvaita 89 Word of God 250 Viśvāmitra 303 Wordsworth 206 fn.

606 The Brahma Sūtra

Work 214, 219, 222, 321-2, 347. 173, 301, 393, 450-1, 464, 469, 363, 448, 514, 530 Work, devotion, contemplation 179- 493, 499 ff., 514. 516, 524, 529, 548, 550 ff., 561, 563 80 Work of God 321-2, 431 Worship of Brahman is open to all

Work of the world 218, 531 Worship of holy men 496, 497 469

Work purifies mind 513 Worshipper 47, 272, 455, 483 ff., Works 229, 272, 286, 293, 325, 339, 368, 387, 435, 439, 465, 483 ff., 490, 551, 560 Wotton, Herry 161 fn. 497, 505-6, 508, 513, 516-17, 523, 530 ff. Works, accumulated 531 Yādava-prakāśa 25, 27, 45*, 48, 51, Works and knowledge 44, 228, 84 507-9,513 Yajnavalkya 178, 192, 324-5, 540 Works, destruction of 483, 533-4 Works of Madhva 60* Yajñavalkya smyti 455, 540 Yajna-varāha-bhagavadgītā Yajur-Veda 19, 241, 488 212 Works of William Law 267 fn. Works, past-of a knower 531 Yama 134, 205, 298, 437-8 Works, reward of 291, 465 Yāmunācārya 26 fn., 47-8, 50, 55 World-appearance 33 ff., 63, 71, 84, Yathā sālagrame harih 273 222, 233, 385 Yoga 51, 77, 92, 107, 153, 167, 178, World Community 117, 157, 250 260, 277, 313, 358, 393, 544 World-creation 66, 302, 560 ff. Yoga-bhasya 219 Worldly prosperity 280, 523 Yoga-sūtra 106 fn., 177, 178 fn., World-negation, complaint of 156 201, 528 World-order 85, 221, 336, 371 Yoga-sūtra-vrtti 290 World of becoming 31, 69, 138, 210, Yoga System 20, 68, 175*, 177, 218, 275, 286, 310, 555 335, 390, 396 World-process 136, 141, 216 Yogavāsistha 196 fn., 217 World-soul 133, 143, 207, 216, 236, Yogins 278, 300, 458, 544 Yunjana-yogin World, status of the 32, 135 259 Yukta-yogin and 107 World unity 172 Worship 36, 38, 65, 87, 97, 109, I20-I, 125-6, 129-30, 141, 154, Zarathustra 112, 157

GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD London: 40 Museum Street, W.C.I

Auckland: 24 Wyndham Street Bombay: 15 Graham Road, Ballard Estate, Bombay I Calcutta: 17 Chittaranjan Avenue, Calcutta 13 Cape Town: 109 Long Street Karachi: Metherson's Estate, Wood Street, Karachi 2 New Delhi: 13-14 Ajmeri Gate Extension, New Delhi r São Paulo: Avenida 9 de Julho 1138-Ap. 51 Singapore, South East Asia and Far East: 36c, Prinsep Street Sydney, N.S.W .: Bradbury House, 55 York Street Toronto: 91 Wellington Street West

RADHAKRISHNAN

THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ In the re-spiritualization of the world, the Bhagavadgita will have a considerable influence. Professor Radhakrishnan, the greatest living interpreter of Indian thought, and who is equally at home in the European and Asiatic traditions of thought, provides an autho- ritative and inspiring guide to the meaning and message of the Bhagavadgīta. This volume gives us the Sanscrit text, an English translation and an original commentary which may well become a classic on the subject. 'Brilliant introduction, full exegesis. The translation, free from awkwardness and affectation, is correct and sufficiently literal.' PROFESSOR F. W. THOMAS in The Hibbert Journal Fifth Impression. La. Crown 8v0. Cloth 16s. net Indian Edition 12s. 6d. net

THE PRINCIPAL UPANISĀDS The Upanisads are the earliest documents which speak to us of the splendours of the world of spirit, which transcends the differences of tongues. They illustrate the maxim that truth is one though it shines in many forms. Each generation sees in them something a little different from the preceding and our generation which is in search of a purer and deeper religion, will find the Upanisads the broad outlines of a religion of spirit which will bind peoples together. 'A truly great piece of work .. .profoundly illuminating'. Blackfriars Demy 8v0. Cloth 50s. net. Paper 25s. net

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY, EASTERN AND WESTERN

EDITED BY RADHAKRISHNAN, PROF. A. WADIA, DR. D. M. DATTA and HUMAYUN KABIR 'It is a great and somewhat daunting achievement which tempts us to speculate whether a comparable body of Western philosophers could have performed the task so well. For the grasp of these Indian scholars upon the thought of the West is as firm as their native insight into the ancient wisdom of their own continent and the many branches along which it grew.' Times Literary Supplement Second Impression. Sm. Royal 8vo. 65s. per set. Paper 42s. per set

GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LTD

Printed in Great Britain

BY RADHAKRISHNAN

INDIAN PHILOSOPHY 2 volumes Eighth Impression Second Edition Demy 8vo. 70s. per set

THE HINDU VIEW OF LIFE Tenth Impression Crown 8vo. Cloth 8s. 6d. net. Paper 6s. net

AN IDEALIST VIEW OF LIFE Fifth Impression Second Edition Demy 8vo. 21s. net

EAST AND WEST IN RELIGION Fourth Impression Crown 8vo. 10s. 6d. net

RELIGION AND SOCIETY Third Impression Second Edition Demy 8vo. Cloth 18s. net. Paper 12s. 6d. net. THE BHAGAVADGĪTĀ Fifth Impression La Crown 8vo. Cloth 16s. net. Indian Edition 12s. 6d. net

THE PRINCIPAL UPANISADS Demy 8vo. Cloth 50s. net. Paper 25s. net

RECOVERY OF FAITH Crown 8vo. Cloth 12s. 6d. net. Paper 8s. 6d. net

EAST AND WEST: SOME REFLECTIONS Demy 8vo. Cloth 10s. 6d. net. Paper 6s. net

HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY EASTERN AND WESTERN EDITED BY RADHAKRISHNAN, PROF. A. WADIA, DR. D. M, DATTA and HUMAYUN KABIR Second Impression Sm Royal 8vo. 65s. per set. Paper 42s. per set

CONTEMPORARY INDIAN PHILOSOPHY EDITED BY RADHAKRISHNAN and J. M. MUIRHEAD Third Impression Demy 8vo. 35s. net

U.B.