1. Carvaka Lokayata An Anthology of Source Materials and Some Recent Studies Debiprasda Chattopadyaya Mrinal Gangopadhyaya

Carvaka/ Lokāyata AN ANTHOLOGY OF SOURCE MATERIALS AND SOME RECENT STUDIES

Edited by Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya in collaboration with Mrinal Kanti Gangopadhyaya

INDIAN COUNCIL OF PHIL OSOPHICAL RESEARCH NEW DELHI

Carvaka/ Lokāyata AN ANTHOLOGY OF SOURCE MATERIALS AND SOME RECENT STUDIES

Edited by Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya in collaboration with Mrinal Kanti Gangopadhyaya

INDIAN COUNCIL OF PHIL OSOPHICAL RESEARCH NEW DELHI

Contents

First published 1990 Preface ix

Second Edition 1994 Editor's Note xii Third Edition 2006 PARI I @Indian Council of Philosophical Research 1990 The Source Materials Chāndogya Upanișad (viii. 7-9) All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be The Asura View 1 reproduced in any form, or by any means, without written permission of the publisher. Maitrī Upanișad (vii. 8-9) On the Ancient Heretics 6

Published by Pāyāsi Suttanta

Member Secretary for Denial of the Doctrine of Karma 8

INDIAN COUNCIL OF PHIL OSOPHICAL RESEARCH Sāmañna-phala-sutta Darshan Bhawan, The Non-conformists in Buddhist India 32 36, Tughlakabad Institutional Area, Mehrauli Badarpur Road, New Delhi-110062 Ancient Grammatical Literature 73

Arthaśāstra (ii. 1) Distributed by Earliest Enumeration of Philosophies 73 Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd Epics and Purānas 54 Rani Jhansi Road, New Delhi-110055 See Muir's Article in Part II (No. 20), where all relevant sources are quoted 75 ISBN: 81-85636-11-7 Nyāyasūtra with Vātsyāyana's Commentary 75 (a) On Inference 76 (b) Bhuta-caitanya-vāda 85

Praśastapāda-Bhāsya with Nyāya-kandalī

Printed in India Self as Distinct from Body etc .. 93

Durga Print-O-Graph Jayanta Bhatta's Nyāya-manjarī 109

Delhi-110091 (a) Dehātmavāda 110

vi CONIENIS CONTENIS vii

(b) On Inferençe 132

(c) Stray References 154 PARI II Modern Scholars

Udayana's Nyāyakusumānjali Dehātmavāda 158 J. MUIR: Verses Illustrating the Cārvāka Tenets 351

Śāntaraksita and Kamalaśīla 159 RHYS DAVIDS: On Lokāyata 369

(a) On Lokāyata 160 H. P. SASIRI: Lokāyata 377

(b) On Svabhāvāda 222 G. IUCCI: A Sketch of Indian Materialism 384

Sankara's Śārīraka-bhāsya 234

On Dehatmavada 234 D R. SASTRI: A Short History of Indian Materialism 394

Vācaspati's Bhāmati 240 IH. SICHERBAISKY: History of Materialism in India 432

On Dehātmavāda 240 GOPINAIH KAVIRAJ: Lokāyata and Svabhāvavāda 441

Mādhavācārya's Sarvadarsana-samgraha ANANTA KUMAR BHATTACHARYYA: Cārvāka-darśana 452

The Cārvāka Philosophy 246 ERIC FRAUWALLNER: The Materialism 474

Haribhadra with Commentaries by Manibhadra and Gunaratna 257 PARI III

(a) Saddarśanasamuccaya on Lokäyata with On the Tattvopaplavasimha of

Manibhadra's Commentary 258 Jayarāśi Bhatta

(b) Gunaratna on above 266 (c) Gunaratna on Bhütacaitanya-vāda 278 SUKHLALJI SANGHAVI and R. C .. PARIKH 492

(d) Guņaratna on Kālavāda etc .. 293 WALIER RUBEN 505

Prabhācandra's Prameya-kamala-mārtanda and K. K. DIXII 520

Nyāya-kumuda-candra 298

(a) Bhūta-caitanya-vāda 298 Index 531

(b) Refutation of anumāna 312

(c) Akhyātivāda 316

Täranätha's History of Buddhism in India 343 A Quaint Legend of Refuting Lokāyata 343

Krsnamiśra's Prabodhacandrodaya 344

Caricature of Cārvāka 344

Preface

In 1959 my book Lokayata: A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism was first published, the seventh edition of which is now in press Besides being published in a number of Indian vernaculars, it is also brought out abroad as translated into Russian, Chinese and Japanese languages. There is thus reason to presume that my own understanding of the Lokayata-later called Cārvāka -- is likely to be known to a fairly wide circle of readers. Hence it is not in need of being mentioned here over again While looking back at one's own work of about three decades ago, one naturally feels the need of certain revisions. So do I, while turning over the pages of the book. But I also feel that these are mainly concerning the elegance of presentation without affecting its main argument or methodology. So I have preferred to leave the book as it is. Whatever new points that have occurred to me during the last thirty years concerning the materialist tradition in Indian thought, I have preferred to work out in the form of separate monographs, of which I should like to mention here only a few: What is Living and What is Dead in Indian Philosophy, Indian Atheism, Science and Society in Ancient India and the recently published populariser In Defence of Material- ism in Indian Philosophy. Nevertheless, since my Lokayata required a good deal of argumentation with ramifications and digressions in various forms, I was often told by my friendly critics to prepare a separate volume documenting in full all the major references to Lokayata in the source-books of Indian philosophy as well as allowing full scope of speaking for themselves to the more eminent modern scholars with'whom I felt obliged to differ in defence of my own understanding of the view The identification or understanding of the view itself is not easily done, for the fact remains that what comes down to

X PREFACE

us as the Lokayata in our traditional texts-philosophical or otherwise-does not always concur. In spite of the bold attempt Acknowledgements of Mädhava in his Sarvadarsanasmgraha to present it as a syste- matic philosophy, what is said in various other works hardly agrees with it. Even the great Jayanta Bhatta, as will be found in the present volume in his stray references to Cārvaka/Lokāyata For permission to incorporate in the present work copyright in the same Nyāyamanjari, is not fully consistent. materials (either in the form of newly done translations or more In my own book on the Lokayata, I did my best to work out or less revived form of existing translations) we are profoundly a coherent understanding of it, following a methodology that grateful to the following: appeared to me scientifically satisfactory. But the claim that it is the only acceptable understanding of the subject would be 1 Maharaja Sayajirao University of Baroda

dogmatic, if not also arrogant. The sense of objectivity demands 2. Shri Udayan Bhattacharyya

that I must concede to other possibilities of reconstructing the 3. Shri Biswanath Bhattacharyya

view from its fragmentary survivals mainly in the writings of 4. Messrs Motilal Banarsidass.

those that had no taste for it. What is imperative, however, is that the modern scholars undertaking such a task must be provided with data about it as comprehensive as is feasible. This, if presented in the form of a handy collection, should have its obvious advantage When, therefore, the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, resolved to get such a handy volume prepared and when, moreover, I was myself asked to prepare it, I felt happy and even grateful to the Council for giving me an opportunity long looked forward to. Hence is this volume. The general plan followed for its preparatjon is explained in the Editor's Note and is thus not in need of reiteration.

3 Sambhunath Pandit Street DEBIPRASAD CHAITOPADHYAYA Calcutta 700020

Editor's Note

The present work is the outcome of a project assigned to me by the Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi. My original idea, which I mentioned while submitting to the Council my plan of work, was to prepare an anthology of articles written on the materialistic trend in traditional Indian philosophy usually mentioned as Cārvāka or Lokāyata, although often also as Bärhaspatya. This would include articles written not only in the English language but also in Indian vernaculars, as well as in European languages other than English. Eventually, however, such an idea had to be substantially modified, mainly because it was found that most of such articles are-at least substantially-reiterations of the main contents of the first chapter of Mādhavācārya's Sarvadarśanasamgraha. Hence, I have tried to concentrate specially on those studies that have something very different to say than what has already been said by Madhava. The special points sought to be emphasised in such articles, often differ startlingly from each other-not to speak of their differing from the textbook version of Carvāka/Lokāyata, which is, of course, derived mainly from Mädhava. However each view expressed seeks to draw its sanction from some traditional Indian source with an authenticity of its own. It was thus considered necessary, first of all, to be clear about the source materials concerning the Cārvāka/Lokāyata, which may enable the reader to form his own view of the view itself. Surprisingly enough, these source materials are not confined to philosophical texts alone in their strictest sense: we come across these in the puranas and epics, in grammatical literature, in the treatise primarily on statecraft called the Arthasastra and even in dramas intended for popular consumption like the

xiv EDIIOR'S NOIE EDITOR'S NOIE XV

Prabodhacandrodaya. Besides, some of the philosophical texts, already been published The final manuscript embodies so much although profoundly original, are generally neglected by of his labour that only by violating my personal conscience modern scholars. Such, for example, are Prameya-kamala- am I entitled to call it my own On my earnest request he has mārtanda and Nyayakumudacandra by Prabhacandra, a great formally agreed to lend his name as a collaborator, which I feel logician of the ninth century AD professing Jainism as his gratified to use in the title page of the present anthology personal creed I take this opportunity to express my sincere thanks to the Besides, as is rather well known, a furore has been recently Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi, without created in our academic world by the publication of Jayarāsi whose moral and material support it would have been most Bhatta's Tattvopaplavasimha, particularly because a traditional difficult-if at all possible-to prepare the present work scholar of the stature of Sukhlalji Sanghavi endorsed the claim We are grateful to the publishers and copyright holders for that here, at last, was found an original work belonging to a permission granted to include materials in the present anthology. hitherto unknown school of the Carvakas. It is true that the furore is now fading out, making room for the view that the DEBIPRASAD CHATIOPADHYAYA

text-rather than expounding any shade of the Cārvāka/ Lokāyata position-is actually a work in defence of scepticism, or at best, agnosticism. Nevertheless, in an anthology of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata it would be unrealistic to ignore this text altogether. In view of the considerations mentioned above, the original plan of the project submitted to the Indian Council of Philo- sophical Research had to be amended by way of splitting the work into three main parts-the first containing the source materials, the second containing modern studies in the Cārvāka/ Lokāyata that seem to go against the textbookish stream and the third, a survey of Jayarasi's Tattvopaplavasimha. As for the source materials, some are available in English translation and some remain hitherto untranslated into English On re-examining what is already available in English, however, it was felt that these are not necessarily satisfactory: a few of these may be used with some minor or major modifications, while a few others require fresh translations. I therefore requested my young friend Mrinal Kanti Gango- padhyaya, with whom I have worked on various assignments for the last two decades, to translate not only those texts which have not been translated before, but also to prepare fresh trans- lations of works of which some sort of English rendering have

PARI I The Source Materials

Chāndogya Upanisad (viii. 7-9) As one of the principal Upanisads, the text is usually viewed as pre-Buddha, and hence, might have belonged to c. seventh century BC Since in the extract quoted here we have the earliest refer- ence to a view identifying the body with the self, which is reminiscent of one of the typical tenets of the Lokayatas/ Cārvākas, S N. Dasgupta is inclined to read in it an expression of the same, though the text does not mention the word Lokāyata or Cārvāka and attributes the view to the Asuras

IEXI Chāndogya Upanisad (viii. 7-9) viii. 7 1. Thus declared Prajäpati: 'The self (atman) is free from evils, without age, without death, without sorrow, without hunger, without thirst; its desire inevitably comes true, its contemplation (samkalpa) inevitably comes true. Such a self is to be searched for, and one should desire to ascertain its nature. One who realises (the nature of) that self, after searching for it (in the prescribed way), attains all the worlds and obtains all the desires. 2. Both the gods and the Asuras listened to it (i e., the words of Prajäpati). They said: 'Well, we shall search for that self- the self searching out which one attains all the worlds and obtains all the desires.' Then, from among the gods, Indra went away and from among the Asuras, Virocana. The two, without get- ting acquainted with each other, carrying fuel in hand (i.e., the traditional mode of approaching the preceptor) came into the presence to Prajāpati. 3. The two spent thirty-two years observing celibacy (brahmacarya). Then Prajäpati said to them: 'Desiring what are you living here?' They replied: 'The self is free from evils, with-

4 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA out age, without death, without sorrow, without hunger, IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 5 without thirst; its desire inevitably comes true, its contemplation two are going away without realising, without ascertaining, inevitably comes true Such a self is to be searched for and one the self. Whosoever they may be, gods or Asuras, if they have should desire to know its nature. One who realises that self, such doctrines (upanisad) (i.e., such notions about the self), after searching for it, attains all the worlds and obtains all the they will surely be defeated ' desires. Sir, this is known to be declared by your very self. We But, then, Virocana, quite peaceful in mind, went to the are living here only desiring that self.' Asuras and preached this doctrine to them: 'Here oneself alone 4. Prajāpati said to the two: 'The very person (purusa) that is to be adored, oneself alone is to be looked after. It is by ador- is seen in the eye is the self about whom I have spoken. It is ing and looking after oneself alone that one can attain both the immortal, it is fearless and it is the brahman ' (Then the two worlds, this one as well as the other.' asked for clarification:) 'Sir, of the one that is reflected in the 5. From then on, even till today, the followers of Asura water and the one that is (reflected) in the mirror, which one is (asura) are said to be the ones who never give away anything, actually that (self)?' (Prajapati replied:) 'In fact, the same one is have no faith and never perform any sacrifice. And strange reflected within all these.' enough is the doctrine of the Asuras. They adorn the body of a

viii. 8 person who has died, with clothes and ornaments which (they collect) by begging They think that by this they will win the 1. (Prajāpati said:) 'Look at yourself in an earthen plate yonder world (śarāba) full of water. Tell me then whatever you do not under- stand concerning the self.' Accordingly, they looked in an viii. 9 earthen plate full of water. Prajäpati said to the two: 'What do 1 Then Indra, even before he had reached the gods, found you see?' The two replied: 'Sir, we see everything of it. We see that there was cause for concern. (He thought:) 'Just as it the self as the exactly corresponding one, even to the hair, even becomes well-adorned when this body is well-adorned, it has to the fingernails.' good clothes (when this body) has good clothes, and it becomes 2. Prajapati said to the two: 'Adorn yourselves well, put on clean (when this body) is made clean, so also, it becomes blind good clothes, make yourselves clean and then, look in an earthen (when this body) becomes blind, it becomes sick (when this plate full of water.' The two adorned themselves well, put on good body) becomes sick, it becomes disfigured (when this body) is clothes, made themselves clean and looked in an earthen plate disfigured, and it perishes immediately upon the destruction full of water. Then, Prajapati said to the two: 'What do you see?' of the body. I do not find anything worth enjoying in it ' 3. The two said: 'Exactly as we two are, well-adorned, dres- 2. Fuel in hand, he went back. Prajäpati said to him: 'O the sed in good clothes and made clean; we find ourselves to be munificent one (maghavat)! With a peaceful mind, you went the same, well-adorned, dressed in good clothes and made away, along with Virocana Desiring what have you come clean.' Prajäpati said: 'That is indeed the self. It is immortal, it back?' He replied: 'Sir, just as it becomes well-adorned when is fearless, it is the brahman.' At this, the two went away with a this body is well-adorned, it has good clothes (when this body) peaceful mind. has good clothes, and it becomes clean (when this body) is made 4. Seeing them (leaving in this way) Prajāpati said: 'These clean, so also, it becomes blind (when this body) becomes blind, it becomes sick (when this body) becomes sick, it becomes dis-

6 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 7

figured (when this body) is disfigured, and it perishes imme- One should never live with those others who are: diately upon the destruction of the body. I do not find anything Perpetually hilarious (nitya pramudita), perpetually roving worth enjoying in it.' about (nitya pravasita), perpetually begging (nitya yācaka), per- 3. He (Prajapati) said to Indra: 'O the munificent one! It is petually living on crafts (nitya śilpa-upajīvin); indeed so. Well, I shall explain it to you once again. Stay with Further, those who are seeking alms in the cities; performing me for a further period of thirty-two years.' Then he (Indra) sacrifices for those unfit for sacrifices; disciples of a Sūdra and lived (with Prajapati) for a further period of thirty-two years in spite of being a Sudra are well-versed in the scriptural lore; Further, those who are 'knaves, have matted hairs, dancers, mercenaries, roving mendicants, stage-actors and deserters of royal service', etc., (cāta-jata-nața-bhața-pravrajita-rangāvatārinah

Maitrī Upanișad (vii. 8-9) rāja-karmaņi patitādayah); Further, those who with a view to earn money claim:

Though usually considered to be a comparatively later 'We shall remove the spell of evil spirits, goblins, ghosts, Upanisad, mainly because Śankara did not comment on it, demons, snakes and planets, etc.'; there is no definite reason to view it as post-Buddha. The Further, who in vain wear red robes and ear-rings, the Kāpā- special importance of the passage chosen is that it shows that even in those ancient days the country was teeming with all lins;

sorts of heretics, the description of some of which cannot Further, who try to deride the Vedic rites by cheating and

but be reminiscent of what still persists in the country as creating illusions with futile arguments and perverted instances representing the folk-cults, inclusive of the Kāpālikas (who of observation. are mentioned by name in the text), identified by H. P. Sastri All such persons are but palpable thieves and unfit for heaven. with the Lokāyatas. Significantly, in this Upanisad also, the Thus it is declared: heretics are said to represent the view of the Asuras. Besides we have in this passage the first reference to Brhaspati deli- People confused by the deception of the soul-denying doc- berately propagating this false knowledge among the Asuras trine, in order to bring about their downfall-a legend accounting And by false observations and arguments, for the Lokäyata view being alternatively known as Bārhas- Fail to understand the distinctive peculiarity of Vedic lore. patya IEXI vii. 9

Maitrī Upanisad (vii 8-9) Really speaking, Brhaspati, taking the disguise of Sukra, created this ignorance for the security of Indra and the destruc- vii. 8 tion of the Asuras. It is because of this (ignorance) that they Now, O king (are discussed) the obstacles to knowledge (Asuras) consider good as evil and evil as good. They claim: Well, the mixing of those fit for heaven with those who are Let people consider as dharma that which is destructive of scrip- unfit for heaven is that from which originates 'all delusions' tures like the Veda, etc. (mohajäla). It is like one who, in spite of the pleasure-garden Therefore, we (the pious ones) must not discuss all this: it is right in front, embraces the tuft of grass below. improper, fruitless and conducive to mere worldly pleasure.

THE SOURCE MATERIALS 9

Pāyāsi Suttanta generosity (dana) by laymen. We have discussed in the Introduction to the Maha-govinda Suttanta the reasons which The Payasi Suttanta as translated by T. W. Rhys Davids with induced ancient authors to bring down a divinity from heaven his own introduction is given here (Sacred Books of the Bud- to support any particular opinion Why was it done here? It dhists, vol iii, Dialogues of the Buddha, vol ii, London, 1910, seems scarcely necessary. pp. 346-74) True, the doctrine does not occupy a very high position in Its main point of interest is the denial of rebirth and karma, the earliest documents. It does not appear at all in the thirty- a view attributed to King Payäsi, (who in the Jaina text with sever points (afterwards called the Bodhi-pakkhiyadhamma) a similar theme, Rayapasenaijja, is mentioned as King Paesi). in which the Buddha, just before his death, summed up his The denial of rebirth and karma-the main planks of practi- teaching. cally all the systems of Indian philosophy-is undoubtedly It does not appear in the Dhammapada, an anthology of reminiscent of the materialists' viewpoint verses current in the community on twenty-six subjects Frauwallner, however, goes to the extent of arguing that which the makers of the anthology held of most importance such materialism suited the political purpose of the early There is a miscellaneous section into which verses on charity despots, because it removed the moral scruples that were might well have been introduced, had it been considered a hindrances to their own actions. See his essay on materialism point of equal value with the rest; but it is not there. It is the in our present collection. first and lowest in the list of the ten Paramitas, the virtues necessary to the attainment of Buddhahood But this list is a Pāyāsi Suttanta late one, and is not found in the Four Nikayas, or even in the Vinaya. (INIRODUCIION BY RHYS DAVIDS) On the other hand, there are several incidental references to giving in charity, and always by way of approval, in the This Dialogue is one of the few which refer to events that Dialogues and the Samyutta. And in the Anguttara (which

took place in the community after the Buddha's death. We contains a good deal more of the milk for babes than the other hear from Dhammapala (in his commentary on the Vimāna three of the great Nikayas) there is a special Dana Vagga with Vatthu, p. 297) that the Dialogue was believed, when he seven short Suttas on the subject, and six or seven more are

wrote (that is, at Käñcipura in South India in the fifth century), scattered through the work.

to have taken place after the erection of the cairns (thūpas) It is clear, therefore, though this particular virtue is

over the ashes of the Teacher He does not say how long ranked after the thirty Wings of Wisdom, that it is accorded,

after; and the length of the interval is not very important, for in the earliest Buddhism, a very respectable place. Neverthe- all the Dialogues were put together at least over fifty years less, at this particular juncture, when the death of their Master after the Buddha's death. The difference is only this, that had weakened the prestige of the Order, it is quite possible whereas the Dialogues in which the principal part is ascribed that the brethren, finding their numbers in excess of the sour- to the Buddha himself may well, and very often undoubtedly ces of income and support, should have found it advisable to

do, contain material much older than the date of the redaction invoke the help of a deus ex machina to set the discrepancy of the Digha, this Suttanta (and that is also true of the few right others that fall into the same category) may not. The differ- The rest of the Suttanta throws some light on the reputation

ence is not great. in which Kassapa, the Boy-Wanderer, was held by his fel-

In this particular case we find nothing fresh in the Suttanta. lows. As becomes a flowery speaker (citra-kathi), he is lavish The climax, led up to at the end, shows us a messenger from in illustration and tells a number of stories, some of them

the gods coming down from heaven to teach the doctrine of quite good and all of them bearing a great or a lesser relation (usually lesser) to the particular point in dispute. They are

10 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIALS 11

sufficient, however, to throw dust into the eyes of Pāyāsi, 3. Now at that time, Payasi, the chieftain, had gone apart whose arguments, futile as they are, do not depend so exclu- sively on analogy, that most misleading of guides. to the upper terrace of his house for his siesta. And seeing the people thus go by, he said to his doorkeeper: 'Why are the people of Setavya going forth like this towards the Simsapā-tree IEXI Pāyāsi Suttanta Grove?' Then the doorkeeper told him the news. And he said: 'Then, good doorkeeper, go to the brahmins and householders (Rebirth and Karma) of Setavya and say to them: 'Payasi, sirs, bids you wait; he will come himself-to see the Wanderer Master Kassapa.' That Boy Thus have I heard. Kassapa will be winning over at the outset those foolish and 1. The venerable Kumara Kassapa1 was once walking on inexpert brahmins and householders of Setavya to think: tour in Kosala together with a great company of bhikkhus, to 'There is both another world and there are beings who are the number of about five hundred, and coming to the Kosalese born not of parents. And there is fruit and result of deeds well- city named Setavya, he there abode. And there the venerable done and ill-done ' But, my good doorkeeper, these three Kumāra Kassapa dwelt to the north of Setavyā, in the Simsapa- things do not exist.' tree Grove. Now, at that time the chieftain Payäsi was residing 'Even so, sir,' said the doorkeeper, and carried out his master's at Setavya, a spot teeming with life, with much grass-land and bidding. wood-land, with water and corn, on a royal domain granted 4. So Payasi, the chieftain, surrounded by the brahmins and him by King Pasenadi of Kosala as a royal gift with power over it householders of Setavya, came to the Simsapa-tree Grove and as if he were the king 2 finding the venerable Kassapa, exchanged with him the greet- 2. Now at that time there came over Payasi an evil view of ings and compliments of politeness and courtesy and took his things, to this effect: 'Neither is there any other world, nor are seat on one side. And as to the brahmins and householders of there beings reborn otherwise than from parents, nor is there Setavyā, some of them bowed before the venerable Kassapa fruit or result of deeds, well done or ill done.' Now the brahmins and householders of Setavya heard the and took their seats on one side; some of them exchanged with him greetings and compliments of politeness and courtesy and news: 'They say that the wanderer Master Kassapa, disciple of then took their seats on one side; some of them saluted him with the wanderer Gotama, walking on tour with a great company joined hands and took their seats on one side; some of them cal- of bhikkhus, to the number of about five hundred, has arrived at led out their name and family and did likewise; some of them Setavyā and is staying there to the north of the town, in the took their seats on one side in silence. Simsapa-tree Grove. Now regarding that Master Kassapa, 5. And when he was seated, Päyäsi spoke thus to the vener- such is the excellent reputation that has been raised abroad: able Master Kassapa: 'I, Master Kassapa, am of this opinion, of 'Wise and expert is he, abounding in knowledge and learning, these views: neither is there another world, nor are there beings eloquent and excellent in discourse, venerable too and an Arahant. And good is it to interview Arahants like him.' Then reborn not of parents, nor is there fruit or result of deeds well done or ill done' the brahmins and householders of Setavya, coming out from the town in companies and bands from each district so that they 'I, Prince, have neither seen nor heard of any one holding such a view, such an opinion. How then can you declare as you could be counted,3 went by the north gate to the Simsapa-tree do, that "there neither is another world, nor rebirth as inheritor Grove. of the highest heavens, nor fruit or result of deeds well-done or

THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 13 12 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA ill-done"? Wherefore, Prince, I will cross-question you herein another world, nor rebirth not by htiman parents, nor fruit or and do you reply in what way you may approve. What think result of deeds well done and ill.' 7. 'Well then, Prince, I will yet ask you this and do you you: yonder moon and sun, are they in this world or in another world? Are they divine or human?' answer even as you think fit. What think you? Take the case 'This moon and sun, Master Kassapa, are in another world, of men who have taken a felon redhanded and brought him not in this; they are gods, not human.' up, saying: "My lord, this felon was caught in the act; inflict 'Then, Prince, let this be taken as evidence that there is both what penalty you wish. " He replies: "Well then, sirs, bind this

another world and rebirth as inheritor of the highest heavens man securely, his arms behind him, with a strong cord; shave and fruit and result of deeds done well or ill.' his head; lead him around, to the sound of sharp drum, from 6 'Even though Master Kassapa says thus, it still appears to street to street, from cross-road to cross-road and out at

me that not one of these things exists. ' the southern gate; there, south of the town in the place of 'Have you, Prince, any proof to establish that they do not execution, cut off his head " They, assenting with "Very good", proceed to carry out these orders and, in the place of exist?' 'Ihave, Master Kassapa'. execution, make him sit down. Now would the felon gain 'As how?' permission of this sort from his executioners: "Let my 'Here it is, Master Kassapa, I have had friends, companions, masters, the executioners, wait till I have visited my friends relatives, men of the same blood as myself, who have taken and advisers, my kinsmen by blood, in this or that village or life, committed thefts, or fornication, have uttered lying, slan- town and come back"? Or would the executioners cut off the derous, abusive, gossiping speech, have been covetous, of head of this vain talker?'

malign thoughts, of evil opinions. They have fallen ill of mortal 'They would not grant the permission, Master Kassapa; they suffering and disease .. When I had understood that they would would cut off his head.' 'But this felon, Prince, is human and cannot get leave from not recover from that illness, I have gone to them and said: "According to the view and opinion held, sirs, by certain human executioners. How much less, then, would your friends and relatives, after death in the Pit, gain permission from the wanderers and brahmins, they who break the precepts of morality, when the body breaks up after death, are reborn into keepers of the Pit, saying: "Let my masters, the Pit-keepers, the Waste, the Woeful Way, the Fallen Place, the Pit Now wait till we have gone and told the chieftain Pāyäsi that there is both another world and rebirth other than of parents and fruit you, sirs, have broken those precepts. If what those reverent wanderers and brahmins say is true, this, sirs, will be your fate. If and result of deeds well-done and ill"? Be this exposition a proof these things should befall you, sirs, come to me and tell me, to you, Prince, that these things exist.'

saying: 'There is another world, there is rebirth not of parents, 8. 'Even though Master Kassapa speaks thus, it still appears there is fruit and result of deeds well-done and ill-done.' You, to me that not one of these things exists.'

sirs, are for me trustworthy and reliable and what you say you 'Have you, Prince, any further proof to establish that they have seen will be even so, just as if I myself had seen it " They do not exist?'

have consented to do this, saying, "Very good. " But they have 'I have, Master Kassapa.' 'As how?' neither come themselves, nor dispatched a messenger. Now this, Master Kassapa, is evidence for me that there is neither 'Here it is, Master Kassapa. I have had friends and compa-

14 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 15

nions, kinsmen, men of the same blood as myself, who have ters, now dress his hair." And they were to do so And you abstained from taking life, from committing thefts, or forni- were to say to them: "Now, masters, deck him with a costly cation, from lying, slandering, rude or frivolous speech, who garland and costly unguent and costly garments." And they have not coveted or had malign thoughts or evil opinions. They were to do so. And you were to say to them: "Well, masters, have fallen ill of mortal suffering and disease. When I had take him up on to the palace and amuse him with the pleasures understood that they would not recover from that illness, I of the five senses." And they were to do so. Now what think have gone to them and said: "According, sirs, to the views and you, O chieftain? Would this man, well bathed, well anointed, opinions held by some wanderers and brahmins, they who shaved and combed, dressed, wreathed and adorned, clad in keep the precepts of morality, when the body breaks up, are clean raiment, taken to the upper palace and indulging in, sur- after death, reborn into the bright and happy world. Now you, rounded by, treated to, the five pleasures of sense, be desirous sirs, have kept those precepts. If what those reverend samanas of being plunged, once more, into that pit of mire?' and brahmins say is true, this, sirs, will be your fate. If these 'No indeed, Master Kassapa. things should befall you, sirs, when you have been there reborn, 'And why?' come to me and let me know that there is both another world, 'Foul, Master Kassapa, is a pit of mire, foul and counted as rebirth other than of parents and fruit and result of deeds well- such, stinking, disgusting, repulsive and counted as such.' done and ill-done You, sirs, are for me trustworthy and reliable 'Even so, Prince, are human beings in the eyes of the gods, and what you say you have seen, will be even so, just as if I foul and counted as such, stinking, disgusting, repulsive and myself had seen it." They have consented to do this, saying counted as such. The smell of man offends the gods a hundred "Very good"; but they have not come and let me know, nor leagues away. What then? Shall your friends and companions, have they dispatched a messenger. Now this again, Master your kinsmen and connexions who, having kept the precepts, Kassapa, is evidence to me that there is neither another world, are reborn into the bright and happy place, come and bring nor rebirth other than of parentage, nor fruit and result of deeds you word that there is another world, that there is rebirth other well-done and ill-done.' than by parentage, that there is fruit and result of deeds well- 9. 'Well then, Prince, I will make you a simile, for by a simile done and ill-done? Let this exposition, chieftain, be evidence some intelligent persons will recognize the meaning of what is to you that these things exist.' said. Just as if a man were plunged head-under in a pit of mire. 10. 'Even though Master Kassapa says so, it still appears to And you were to order men, saying: "Well now, masters, pull me that not one of these things exists.' the man out of that pit. " They, saying "Very good," were to 'Have you any further evidence, Prince?' comply and pull him out. You were then to say to them: "Well 'I have, Master Kassapa.' now, masters, brush the mire smearing him from off his body 'As how?' with split bamboo." And they were to obey you. And you were Here it is, Master Kassapa I have had friends, companions, to say to them: "Well now, masters, shampoo this man's body a kinsmen, men of the same blood as myself, who kept the pre- treble massage with yellow shampoo powder " And they were cepts, abstaining from taking life; from taking what was not to do so. And you were to say to them: "Now, masters, rub him given, from inchastity, lying speech and strong intoxicating with oil and bathe him three times, using fine chunam. " And liquors. They have fallen mortally ill; and I, having told them they were to do so. And you were to say to them: "Well, mas- how some samanas and brahmins say that, after such a life, one

16 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIALS 17 would be reborn in the communion of the Threc-and-Thirty that would not be speaking rightly.' Gods, have asked them, if they were so reborn, to come and let 'But even so methinks, do you, Prince, talk like the blind me know that there was another world, birth other than of man in my parable when you say: "But who lets Master Kassapa parents and fruit and result of deeds well-done and ill-done. know that there are Three-and-Thirty Gods, or that the Three- They have promised to do so, but they have neither come and and-Thirty Gods live so many years? We do not believe him told me, nor sent a messenger. This, Master Kassapa, is evidence when he says these things." For, Prince, the other world is to me that not one of those things exists ' not, as you imagine, to be regarded with this fleshly eye. 11 'Well then, Prince, I will reply by asking you something 'Those wanderers and brahmins who haunt the lonely and and do you answer as you think fit. That which humanly speak- remote recesses of the forest, where noise and sound there ing is a century, this, to the Three-and-Thirty Gods, is one night hardly is, they, there abiding, strenuous, ardent, aloof, purify and day. Of such a night, thirty nights are the month-of such a the eye divine; they, by that purified eye divine, passing the month, twelve months are the year-of such a year, the celestial vision of men, see both this world and that other world and thousand years are the life-span of the Three-and-Thirty Gods beings reborn not of parents. In this way, Prince, is the other Those of whom you now speak will have attained rebirth into world to be seen and not, even as you imagine, by this fleshly the communion of these Gods. If it should occur to them thus: eye. Let this be a proof to you that there is another world, that "Let us, for two or three days, indulge ourselves, surrounded there are beings reborn not of parents, that there is fruit and by and steeped in the five pleasures of sense and thereafter let result of deeds well-done and ill-done ' us go and tell the chieftain Payasi that there is another world, 12. 'Even though Master Kassapa says so, yet it still appears rebirth other than of parents and fruit and result of deeds well- to me that not one of these things exists. done and ill-done"-would they, then, have come to you and 'Have you any further evidence, Prince?' told you so?' 'I have, Master Kassapa.' 'Certainly not, Master Kassapa; for we should have been 'As how?' dead long before. But who lets Master Kassapa know all these 'Here it is, Master Kassapa. I see wanderers and brahmins things: that there are Three-and-Thirty Gods, or that the Three- moral and of virtuous dispositions, fond of life, averse from and-Thirty Gods live so many years? We do not believe him dying, fond of happiness, shrinking from sorrow. Then I think, when he says these things.' Master Kassapa: "If these good wanderers and brahmins were 'That, Prince, is just as if there were a man born blind who to know this-'When once we are dead we shall be better off'- could not see objects as dark or bright, as blue, yellow, red or then these good men would take poison, or stab themselves, brown; who could not see things as smooth or rough, nor the or put an end to themselves by hanging, or throw themselves stars, nor moon, nor sun. And he were to say: "There are none from precipices And it is because they do not know that, once of these things, nor any one capable of seeing them. I don't know dead, they will be better off, that they are fond of life, averse them, I don't see them; therefore they don't exist. " Would one, from dying, fond of happiness, disinclined for sorrow. This, so speaking, speak rightly, Prince?' Master Kassapa, is for me evidence that there is no other world, 'Not so, Master Kassapa. The wisual objects of which you no beings reborn otherwise than of parents, no fruit and no speak do exist and so does the faculty of seeing them. To say "I result of deeds well and ill-done.' don't know them, I don't see them; therefore they don't exist": 13. 'Well then, Prince, I will make you a simile, for by way of

18 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIALS 19 a simile some wise men discern the meaning of what is spoken Once upon a time, Prince, there was a brahmin who had two wish." And I should say: "Well then, my masters, throw this wives. By one he had a son, ten or twelve years of age; the other man alive into a jar; close the mouth of it and cover it over with was pregnant and near her time. Then the brahmin died. Now wet leather, put over that a thick cement of moist clay, put it the boy said to his mother's co-wife: "Whatever treasure there on to a furnace and kindle a fire." They saying "Very good" is, lady, or grain, or silver, or gold, all that is mine. There is would obey me and . .. kindle a fire. When we knew that the nothing here for you whatever; make over to me lady, the man was dead, we should take down the jar, unbind and open heritage of my father!" Then the brahminee made answer to the mouth and quickly observe it, with the idea: "Perhaps we him: "Wait, my lad, till my child is born Ifit will be a boy, one may see the soul of him coming out!" We don't see the soul of portion shall be his; if a girl, she shall wait on you " But the boy him coming out! This, Master Kassapa, is for me evidence that reiterated his claim again and yet again. Then the brahminee, there neither is another world, nor rebirth other than by parent- taking a sword, entered an inner room and ripped up her belly, age, nor fruit or result of deeds well or ill-done.' saying: "If I can only find out whether it is a boy or a girl!" Thus 15. 'Well then, Prince, I will in reply ask you something did she destroy both her own life and her unborn infant and and do you answer as you may please. Do you not admit, Prince, her wealth also, through the foolish and thoughtless way in that when you are taking a siesta, you see dreams of enjoyment which, seeking a hertiage, she met with ruin and disaster. Even in garden, grove, country or lake side?' so you, Prince, foolish and thoughtless that you are, will meet 'I do admit it, Master Kassapa.' with ruin and disaster by seeking, without wisdom, another 'Are you at that time watched over by attendant women- world Moral and virtuous wanderers and brahmins do not hunchbacks and dwarfs and maidens and girls?' force maturity on that which is unripe; they, being wise, wait for 'That is so, Master Kassapa.' that maturity. The virtuous have need of their life. In proportion 'Do they see your soul entering or leaving you?' to the length of time such men abide here, is the abundant merit 'Not so, Master Kassapa.' that they produce and accomplish for the welfare of many, for 'So they who are living do not see the soul of you who are the happiness of many, out of compassion for the world, for living entering or leaving you (when you dream). How then the advantage, the welfare, the happiness of gods and men. Let will you see the soul of a dead person entering or leaving him? this then be a proof to you, Prince, that there is another world, Let this be a proof to you, Prince, that those things do exist.' that there is rebirth other than of parentage, that there is fruit 16. 'Even though Master Kassapa says so, it still appears to and result of deeds well and ill-done.' me that not one of those things exists.' 14 'Even though Master Kassapa says so, it still appears to 'Have you any further evidence, Prince?' 'I have, Master Kassapa.' me that not one of these things exists.' 'Have you further evidence, Prince?' 'As how?'

'I have, Master Kassapa.' 'Take the case, Master Kassapa, of men taking a felon red- 'As how, Prince?' handed and bringing him up saying: "My lord, we caught this 'Here it is, Master Kassapa. Take the case of men who having felon in the act. Inflict what penalty you wish. " And I say: "Well taken a felon red-handed bring him up, saying "This felon, my then, my masters, take this man and weigh him alive; then lord, was caught in the act. Inflict on him what penalty you strangle him with a bowstring and weigh him again." And they do so. While he lives, he is more buoyant, supple, wieldy.

20 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 21 When he is dead, he is weightier, stiffer, unwieldier. This, they do so, but we see the passing of no soul. Then I say: "Well Master Kassapa, is evidence for me that there is neither another then, lay him bent over ... on his side ... on the other side ... world, nor rebirth other than by human parentage, nor fruit stand him up ... stand him on his head ... smite him with your nor result of deeds well-done or ill-done.' hand ... with clods .. . on this side 17. 'Well now, Prince, I will give you a simile for by way of . .. . on that side. .. all over; perhaps we may see the soul of him pass out." And they do so, a simile some wise men discern the meaning of what is said. It but we see the passing of no soul He has sight and there are is just as if, Prince, a man were to weigh in a balance a ball of forms, but the organ does not perceive them; he has hearing iron that had been heated all day and was burning and glowing and there are sounds, but the organ does not perceive them; he with heat; and were to weigh it later on in a balance when it has smell and there are odours, but the organ does not perceive was cool and quenched. When would that ball of iron be lighter, them; he has a tongue and there are tastes, but the organ does softer and more plastic? When it was burning and glowing with not perceive them; he has a body and there are tangibles, but heat, or when it was cool and quenched?' the organ does not perceive them. This, Master Kassapa, is for 'When, Master Kassapa, that ball of iron, with its lambent me evidence that there is neither another world, nor rebirth and gaseous concomitants, is burning and glowing with heat, other than of parents, nor fruit or result of deeds well or ill- then it is lighter, softer, more plastic, but when, without those done.' lambent and gaseous concomitants, it is cool and quenched, it 19. 'Well then, Prince, I will give you a simile, for by way is then heavier, more rigid, less plastic.' of a simile some wise men discern the meaning of what is said Even so, Prince, when this body has its concomitants of Once upon a time, Prince, a certain trumpeter, taking his trum- life, heat and intelligence, then it is lighter, softer and more pet of chank-shell, travelled to the folk on the border. When he plastic. But when it lacks those three concomitants, then it is came to a certain village, he stood in its midst and blew thrice heavier, more rigid, less plastic on his trumpet, then laying it on the ground sat down beside it. 'Let this, Prince, be a proof to you that there is both another Now, Prince, those border folk thought: "Whose is this sound so world, rebirth other than of parents and fruit and result of deeds charming, so lovely, so sweet, so constraining, so enervating?" well and ill-done. Coming together they asked the trumpeter. "This, my masters, 18. 'Even though Master Kassapa says this, it still appears is what men call a trumpet, the sound whereof is so charming, to me that-not one of those things exists.' so lovely, so sweet, so constraining, so enervating " They laid 'Have you any further evidence, Prince?' the trumpet on its back and said: "Speak, master trumpet! Speak, 'I have, Master Kassapa.' master trumpet!" No sound did the trumpet make. They laid 'What might that be like?' the trumpet curving down-ward, on this side, on that side, 'Take the case, Master Kassapa, of the men taking a felon they stood it upright, they stood it topsy turvy, they struck it red-handed and bringing him up, saying: "My lord, this felon with their hands, with a clod, with a stick, with a sword, on was caught in the act. Inflict on him what penalty you wish. " one side, on the other, on every side, saying: "Speak, master And I say: "Well, my masters, kill this man by stripping off trumpet! Speak, master trumpet!" Then, Prince, the trumpeter cuticle and skin and flesh and sinews and bones and marrow." thought: "How silly are these border born men! Why will they They do so And when he is half dead, I say: "Lay him on his seek so senselessly for the trumpet's sound?" And while they back and perhaps we may see the soul of him pass out. " And looked on, he took his trumpet, blew thrice upon it and, taking it

22 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 23 with him, went away. Then, Prince, those border born men after spending one night near the Jatila's hermitage, went away thought thus: "When forsooth there was with that trumpet a Then the Jatila thought: "If I were to go to that leader's camp, I man and an effort and air, that same trumpet made sounds. might perhaps get something useful " And rising up bedtimes, But when there was with it neither man, nor effort, nor air, he came to the leader's camp and there he saw, abandoned and that same trumpet made no sounds." Even so, Prince,-when lying on its back, a little baby. And when he saw it, he thought: this body has its concomitants of life, heat and intelligence, "It is not fit that I should let a human being die while I look on. then it goes about and comes back, it stands and sits and lies What if I were to carry this baby to my hermitage and foster, down, it sees forms with the eye, hears sounds with the ear, tend and rear it?" So he carried the baby to his hermitage and smells odours with the smell, tastes tastes with the tongue, fostered, tended and reared it. When the boy had attained the touches the tangible with the body, cognizes things with the age of ten or twelve years, it happened that the Jatila had some- mind. But when it lacks those three concomitants, it can do thing or other to do in the countryside. So he said to the boy: "I none of these things Let this, Prince, be to you a proof that want to go to the countryside, my lad; keep up the fire; do not there both is another world, rebirth other than of parents, and let it go out. If it should go out, here is a hatchet, here are sticks, fruit and result of deeds well and ill-done. ' here is the fire drill, so that if you do let the fire out, you can 20. 'Even though Master Kassapa says this, it still appears rekindle it again." And having thus instructed the boy, the to me that there is neither another world, nor rebirth other than Jatila went off to the countryside. Intent upon his play, the boy of parents, nor fruit or result of deeds well or ill-done.' let the fire out. Then he thought: "Father told me, 'Tend the 'Have you any further evidence, Prince?' fire, my lad; let it not go out. If it should go out, here is a hatchet, 'I have, Master Kassapa here are sticks, here is the fire drill, so that if you do let the fire 'What may that be like?' out, you can rekindle it again. ' What if I were now to do so?" 'Take the case, Master Kassapa, of men who have taken a Then the boy chopped the fire drill with the hatchet, thinking: felon red-handed and bring him up, saying: "My lord, we "Perhaps that's how I shall get fire." No fire got he. He split caught this felon in the act; inflict on him what penalty you the fire drill in twain, in three, four, five, ten, a hundred pieces, wish." And I say "Well; my masters, flay this man alive, per- he made it into piecemeal, he then pounded it in a mortar and chance we may see the soul of him passing out." They do so, winnowed it in the wind, thinking that so he might perhaps but no passing of his soul do we see. And in cutting out his get fire No fire got he. Then the Jatila, having accomplished integument and his flesh and his nerves and breaking his bones his business, came back to his own hermitage and said to the and extracting the marrow thereof, still no soul of him do we boy: "Why, child, you have let the fire out!" "Father, the fire see. This, Master Kassapa, is for me evidence that there is neither went out because I was busy at my game. Then I thought of another world, nor rebirth other than of parents, nor fruit or what you had told me and I set about rekindling it. And I chop- result of deeds well or ill-done.' ped the fire drill, with the hatchet to get fire, but no fire came. 21. Well now, Prince, I will give you a simile, for it is by And I went on till I had smashed the fire drill into atoms, way of a simile that some intelligent men discern the meaning pounded it in a mortar and winnowed it in the wind, but I of what is spoken. Once upon a time, Prince, a fire-worshipping never got any fire!" Then the Jatila thought: "How silly, how Jatila was dwelling in a leaf-hut in a woodland spot. Now the unintelligent is the lad! Why will he be seeking fire in this sense- people of a certain countryside migrated. And their leader, less manner? And while the boy looked on, he took a fire drill,

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and making fire said to him: "This is how to make fire, my lad. '"Has there, Sir, been any great fall of rain recently in the One doesn't try to get it as you, so silly and unintelligent, were jungle?" trying." Even so, Prince, have you, silly and unintelligent, '"Yes indeed, Sir, there has been a great rain in the jungle sought after another world. Renounce, Prince, this evil set of just in front, the roads are well watered, there is much grass opinions. Let them not involve you for long in bale and sorrow!' and wood and water. Throw away the grass and wood and 22. 'Even though Master Kassapa, says this, I still cannot water, Sir, you have already got; with light-laden carts you bring myself to renounce this evil set of opinions. King Pasenadi will go quite quickly; do not tire your teams " the Kosalan knows me, and so do foreign kings, as holding to 'Then the leader told his carters what the man had said, and the creed and the opinion that there is neither another world bade them throw away their provender and wood, that the nor rebirth other than of parents, nor fruit or result of deeds caravan might travel more quickly well and ill-done IfI, Master Kassapa, renounce these opinions, '"So be it, sir," the carters replied, and did so. But at their people will say of me: "How silly is Prince Pāyasi, how uninte- first camp they saw no grass or wood or water, nor at the second, lligent, how badly he grasps anything!" In wrath thereat will I third, fourth, fifth, sixth or seventh camp. So they all met with keep to it. In guile will I keep to it In self-respect will I keep to ruin and disaster. And then that fiend, the yakkha, devoured all

it!' the men and the cattle in that caravan, leaving only the bones 23. 'Well then, Prince, I will give you a simile; for it is by behind way of a simile that some intelligent men discern the meaning 'When the second caravan leader knew that the other caravan of what has been said. Once upon a time, Prince, a great caravan had got well on its way, he took in large supplies of grass and of a thousand carts was going from the East country into the wood and water and set out. And he too met a swarthy red-eyed West country. Wherever it went, it consumed swiftly straw, man, and exchanged with him the same remarks and was also wood, water and verdure. Now in that caravan were two bidden to throw away his provender. caravan leaders, each commanding one half of the carts. And 'Then that leader said to his carters: "This man, sirs, says this occurred to them: "This is a great caravan, one of a thousand that there has recently been much rain in the jungle, that the carts. Wherever we go, we consume everything. What if we roads are watered and there is plenty of grass and wood and were to divide this caravan into two, five hundred carts in each." water. And he advises us to throw away our provender, so 'So they divided that caravan into two equal portions. Then that with lightened carts, we may travel quicker and not weary one of the leaders collected large quantities of straw, wood and. our teams. But this man, sirs, is not a friend of ours, nor a kins- water and started (his carts). On the second or third march the man, nor of our blood. Why should we act as if we trusted him? leader saw a swarthy red-eyed man coming from the opposite Our stock of provender is not to be thrown away; let the caravan direction, armed with a quiver, wearing a lotus wreath, his proceed with the goods we brought; let us not part with what garments and hair wet and driving a chariot drawn by asses; we have." its wheel splashed with mud. When he saw this man he said: '"So be it, sir," agreed the carters, and went on with the stock "Whence come you, Sir?" they had loaded. And at seven successive camping places they '"From such and such a district." saw no grass or wood or water; but they saw the other caravan '"Whither go you?" that had come to grief. And they saw the skeletons of the men '"To such and such a district." and cattle devoured by that yakkha fiend.

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'Then the caravan leader said to the carters: "That caravan, you must be mad, you must be out of your senses! How can my masters, met with ruin and disaster, through having that silly caravan leader for its guide. Well then, let us leave here you tote along that oozing, dripping load of dung, splashed with muck to your nail-tips?" "It's you that are mad, you that such of our wares as are of little value and take from that caravan are out of your senses; by this my pigs will get food." Even so, such wares as are of great value. "So be it, master," replied the methinks, Prince, do you talk, like this dung-carrying simile. carters and made the transfer and passed safely through the Renounce, Prince, this evil set of opinions, renounce them, I jungle, through having this wise caravan leader for their guide 'Even so you, Prince, silly and unintelligent, will meet with say! Let them not be long a cause of bale and sorrow to you.' 26. 'Even though Master Kassapa says this, I cannot bring ruin and disaster in that you seek so senselessly after, another world, even like that former caravan leader. They who fancy myself to renounce this evil set of opinions. King Pasenadi the Kosalan knows me and so do foreign kings, as holding to the that they can believe whatever they hear, will meet with ruin and disaster, even like those carters. Renounce, Prince, this creed and the opinion that there is neither another world, nor rebirth other than of parents by human parentage, nor fruit or evil set of opinions; renounce them, I say! Let them not involve result of deeds well or ill-done If I, Master Kassapa, renounce you long in bale and sorrow!' these opinions, people will say of me: "How silly is Prince 24. 'Even though Master Kassapa says this, I still cannot Päyāsi, how unintelligent, how bad is his grasp of things!" In bring myself to renounce this evil set of opinions. King Pasenadi the Kosalan knows me and so do foreign kings, as holding to anger thereat will I keep to it. In guile will I keep to it. In self- respect will I keep to it!' the creed and the opinion that there is neither another world, 27. 'Well then, Prince, I will give you a simile, for it is by nor rebirth other than of parents by human parentage, nor fruit way of a simile that some intelligent men discern the meaning or result of deeds well and ill-done. If I, Master Kassapa, re- of what is said. Once upon a time, Prince, two gamesters were nounce these opinions, people will say of me: "How silly is prince Pāyāsi, how unintelligent, how badly he grasps any- playing with dice. One gamester swallowed, as it came, each

thing!" In wrath thereat will I keep to it. In guile will I keep to adverse dice. The other gamester saw him do this and said: "Look here, friend, you've won outright; give me the dice; it. In self-respect will I keep to it!' 25. 'Well then, Prince, I will give you a simile, for it is by I will make a votive offering of them" "Good, friend," said the other and handed over the dice. Then the second gamester way of a simile that some intelligent men discern the meaning smeared over the dice with poison and proposed to the former: of what has been said. Once upon a time, Prince, a certain "Come along, friend, let's play. " "Good, friend," replied the swineherd was going from his own village to another village. There he saw a heap of dry dung thrown away .. Seeing it he other. Again, therefore, they played and again, that gamester swallowed each adverse dice. The second gamester saw him thought: "That's a lot of dry dung thrown away which will doing so and said: feed my pig. What ifI were to carry it away?" So he spread out his cloak and collecting the dry dung, tied it into a bundle and The man knows not the swallowed dice With sharpest burning is smeared o'er. lifting it on to his head went on. In the after-part of his journey Swallow, you false cheat, swallow now! there fell a heavy shower of rain out of season. He, splashed Bitter the hour at hand for you!

with muck to his nail-tips, bearing his oozing, dripping dung- 'Even like the simile of the gamester, Prince, methinks, burden, went on his way. And men seeing him said: "Mercy, is what you say. Renounce, Prince, this evil set of opinions,

28 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 29 renounce them, I say! Let them not be long a source of bale and we'll each take a load of hempen cloth." "I've brought this load sorrow to you! of hemp a long way, friend, and it's well tied up-that's enough 28 'Even though Master Kassapa says this, I still cannot for me; you choose for yourself" So the former changed his bring myself to renounce this evil set of opinions King Pasenadi load for one of hempen cloth. the Kosalan knows me and so do foreign kings, as holding to 'Then they came to another village street. There they saw a the creed and the opinion that there is neither another world, heap of flax; and to another where they saw linen thread; and nor rebirth other than of parents, nor fruit or result of deeds to another where they saw linen cloth. And at each place the well or ill-done. If I, Master Kassapa, renounce these opinions, one crony made a change for the better, the other retained his people will say: "How silly is Prince Päyäsi, how unintelligent, hemp. Further they saw cotton-down, cotton thread and calico; how bad is his grasp of things!" In wrath thereat will I keep to and the same thing happened. Further they saw iron, copper, it. In guile will I keep to it. In self-respect will I keep to it.' tin, lead, silver, gold. So that in the end the one crony had a 29. 'Well then, Prince, I will give you a simile, for it is by load of gold, the other of hemp. way of a simile that some intelligent men discern the meaning 'So they came to their own village. There the crony who of what is said. Once upon a time, Prince, a certain country-side brought a load of hemp pleased neither his parents, nor his migrated And one man said to his crony: "Let's go, friend, to own family, nor his friends and won neither pleasure nor happi- that country-side; perhaps we may come upon some treasure. " ness. But the other with his load of gold both gave and won "Good, friend," assented the other. And they came to where, pleasure. in that country-side, there was a certain village street. There, 'Even like the simile of the load of hemp, methinks Prince, they saw a heap of hemp thrown away. Then, one said to the is what you say. Renounce, Prince, this evil set of opinions, other: "Here's a heap of hemp: you make some into a bundle, renounce them, I say! Let them not be long a source of bale and I'll do the same and we'll carry it away." The other consented sorrow to you.' and they did so 30 'With Master Kassapa's first simile I was pleased, I was 'Bearing this burden, they went on to another village street. charmed; moreover I wanted to hear his ready wit in questions, There, they saw a heap of hempen thread thrown away and for I regarded Master Kassapa as one who was to be opposed one said to the other: "This heap of hempen thread thrown It is wonderful, Master Kassapa, it is marvellous! Just as if one away is just the thing we want hemp for. Well then, friend, were to set up what has been upset, or were to reveal that which you throw away your load of hemp, I'll throw away mine and has been hidden away, or were to point out the road to the we'll take away each a load of hempen thread. " "I've brought bewildered, or were to bring a lamp into the darkness, so that this load of hemp a long way, friend and it's well tied up-that's they that have eyes may see -- even so has the truth been declared enough for me; you choose for yourself" So the former changed in many a figure by Master Kassapa. And I, even I, betake myself his load for one of hempen thread. for refuge to Gotama the Exalted One, to the Doctrine and to 'Then they came to another village street. There they saw a the Brotherhood. May Master Kassapa accept me as a disciple, heap of hempen cloths. And the one said to the other: "This as one who from this day forth as long as life endures, has taken heap of hempen cloths is just the thing we want hemp for, or him as his guide .. And I should like, Master Kassapa, to offer a hempen thread for. Well then, friend, you throw away your great sacrifice. Let Master Kassapa instruct me herein that it load of hemp. I'll throw away my load of hempen thread and may bring me long welfare and happiness.'

30 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIAIS 31

31. 'At the sort of sacrifice, Prince, where oxen are slain, or that gift such food was given as gruel and scraps of food and goats, or fowls and pigs, or diverse creatures are put an end to; coarse robes with ball-fringes. And at that gift a young brahmin and those that take part in the sacrifice have wrong views, wrong named Uttara was passed over. When the largesse had been intention, wrong speech, wrong action, wrong livelihood, distributed he mocked, saying: 'By this largesse I have met wrong endeavour, wrong mindfulness, wrong rapture, such a Prince Payasi in this world, but how about the next?' Pāyasi sacrifice, Prince, is neither of great fruitfulness nor of great heard of this and sent word to Uttara asking him if it were true profit, nor of great renown, nor of widespread effect. It is just that he were saying this. as if a farmer, Prince, were to enter a wood taking with him 'Yes, sir,' replied Uttara. plough and seed, and were there, in an untilled tract, in un- 'But why have you been saying this, my dear Uttara? Do favourable soil, among unuprooted stumps, to plant seeds that not we who are seeking merit look for results from giving?' were broken, rotten, spoilt by wind and heat, out of season, 'In your gift, sir, such food as gruel and broken meats are not in good condition, and the gods were not to give good rain given which you sir, would not touch with your foot, much in due season. Would those seeds attain growth, increase and less eat; also coarse ball-fringed robes which you, sir, would expansion, or would the farmer get abundant returns?' 'No not deign to use as carpets, much less to wear. You, sir, are indeed, Master Kassapa.' pleasant and dear to us; how are we to associate what is pleasant 'So is it, Prince, with that sort of sacrifice. But where, Prince, and dear with what is unpleasant?' neither oxen are slain, nor goats, nor fowls and pigs, nor are 'Well then, my dear Uttara, arrange that such food shall be diverse creatures put an end to, and those that partake of the given as I eat and such garments be given as I wear.' sacrifice have right views, right intention, right speech, right 'Very good, sir,' replied Uttara, and did so action, right livelihood, right endeavour, right mindfulness, Now Prince Payasi, inasmuch as he had bestowed his gift right rapture, such a sacrifice is of great fruitfulness, of great without thoroughness, not with his own hands, without due profit, of great renown, of widespread effect. It is just as if a thought, as something discarded, was, after his death, reborn farmer, Prince, were to enter a wood, taking with him plough into the communion of the Four Great Kings, in the empty and seed, and were there, in a well-tilled tract, in favourable mansion of the Acacia. But the youth Uttara, who had objected soil well-cleared of stumps, to plant seed that was unbroken, to that gift and had bestowed his gift thoroughly, with his own free from mildew, unspoilt by wind or heat, in season and in hands, with due thought, not as something discarded, was, good condition and the gods were to give good rain in the due after his death, reborn in a bright and happy world, into the season. Would those seeds grow, increase, expand and would communion of the Three-and-Thirty Gods the farmer get abundant returns?' 33 Now at that time the venerable Gavampati used fre- 'He would indeed, Master Kassapa.' quently to go for his siesta to the empty mansion of the Acacia. 'So is it, Prince, with that sort of sacrifice, where : no And Payasi, now one of the gods, came up to him and saluting creatures are put to death, and those that take part therein are him, stood on one side. To him so standing, the venerable of high character. Such a sacrifice is of great fruitfulness, profit, Gavampati said: 'Who art thou, friend?' 'I sir, am Prince Pāyāsi.' renown and widespread effect.' 'Wert thou not once of the opinion that there was no other 32. Then Prince Payasi instituted a gift to wanderers and world, no rebirth other than of parents, no fruit or result of brahmins, the poor, wayfarers, beggars and petitioners. In deeds well or ill-done?'

THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 32 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA 33 of extreme materialism and hence a follower of the Carvaka/ 'I was indeed, Sir, but through his reverence Kumāra Kassapa Lokāyata view. detached myself from that evil set of opinions.' 'But the youth Uttara, who objected to thy gift, friend, whereunto has he been reborn? 'He, Sir, having objected to my gift and having himself Sāmañña-phala-sutta bestowed a gift thoroughly, with his own hands, with due thought, not as something discarded, has, since he died, been (INIRODUCIION BY RHYS DAVIDS) reborn in the bright and happy world into the communion of the Three-and-Thirty Gods. I, sir, inasmuch as I bestowed my The first Dialogue deals with the most fundamental conceptions gift without thoroughness, not with my own hand, without that lay at the root of the Buddha's doctrine, his Dharma, his due thought, as something discarded, was after my death reborn ethical and philosophical view of life. The second puts forth into the communion of the Four Great Kings, in the empty his justification for the foundation of the Order, for the en- mansion of the Acacia. Wherefore, Gavampati, Sir, go thou unciation of the Vinaya: the practical rules of canon law by into the world of men and tell them: "Give ye your gifts with which life in the Order is regulated. The Rules themselves are thoroughness, with your own hands, with due thought and not discussed. It is only certain ethical precepts that are referred give not as if ye were discarding somewhat. For so did not Prince to in so many words. The question is a larger and wider one Pāyāsi; and he, after his death, was reborn into the communion than the desirability of any particular injunction. It is as to the of the Four Great Kings, in the empty mansion of the Acacia. advantage, as to the use, of having any Order at all. But the youth Uttara, who bestowed his gifts in the right way, King Ajätasattu of Magadha, after pointing out the advan- was after his death reborn in the bright and happy world, into tages derived from their occupations by a long list of ordinary the communion of the Three-and-Thirty Gods. "' people in the world, asks whether the members of the Order, 34. So the venerable Gavampati came back to the world of who have given up the world, derive any corresponding men and there, told these things. advantage, visible in this life, from theirs The answer is a list (The Pāyāsi Dialgoue is ended.) of such advantages, arranged in ascending scale of importance, each one mentioned being said to be better and sweeter than the one just before described The list of ordinary occupations given in the question is interesting evidence-especially as compared with the later Sāmañna-phala-sutta lists of a similar kind referred to in the notes-of social conditions The Samanna-phala-sutta as translated by T W. Rhys Davids in the Ganges valley at the time when this Dialogue was com- with his own introduction is given here (Sacred Books of the posed And the introductory story, in which the king explains Buddhists, vol. ii, reprinted, London 1925, pp. 56-95) how he had put a similar question to the founders of six other The special interest of this dialogue is that it practically orders, and gives the six replies he received, is interesting forms the main source for modern scholars for the under- evidence of the views held by the authors of the Dialogue as to standing of a number of the most prominent 'heretics' or beliefs current at the time non-conformists of Buddha's time, inclusive of a certain Ajita Keśakambalī who is generally taken as a representative The replies are no less interesting from the fact, pointed out

34 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 35 by the king, that they are not to the point. Each of the six says would apply as much to his strongest opponents as to the teachers goes off into a general statement of his theory instead members of his own Order. of answering the question put. But as the works, if any, of all The following, in a constantly ascending order of merit, are these teachers-save one Nigantha Nata-putta-have been the advantages, visible in this life, which he claims for such a irretrievably lost, the summary here given of their doctrines is recluse: of great importance as evidence of the sort of speculation they favoured. The six paragraphs are short and obscure, and this is 1. The honour and respect shown to a member of a religious just what we should expect. As is the case with the accounts order given by early Catholic writers of opinions they held to be 2. The training in all those lower kinds of mere morality set heretical, the versions of these six sets of belief are neither out in the very ancient document called 'The Silas'. The adequate nor clear. But a number of other references to these importance of this document has been discussed in the six theories are found, as pointed out in the notes, both in the Introduction to the Brahma jala. The details of it may be Buddhist and in the Jain records. And it would be premature summarised here as follows: to discuss our six paragraphs until the whole of the available Mercy and kindness to all living things (§ 43). 1 evidence is made accessible to scholars. It is noteworthy that in b. Honesty .. at least two of these answers some of the expressions used C .. Chastity. seem to be in a Prakrit differing in dialect from the Pali of the d. Truthfulness, peacefulness, courtesy, and good sense Pitakas. And these are not the only instances of the preservation in speech (§ 44). in the Pitakas of ancient dialectical varieties. e. Abstinence from luxury of twelve different kinds, and The answer which the Buddha is represented to have given, freedom from trickery and violence (§ 45). in his turn, to the question raised by the king, takes (as is so Not injuring plants (§ 46). often the case) the form of a counter-question. 'The very man g. Not laying up treasure, of seven kinds (§ 47). whom, under ordinary circumstances, you would treat as slave h Not frequenting shows, of twenty-six specified kinds or servant-what treatment would you mete out to him after (§ 48). he had joined an Order?' The king confesses that he would 1. Not playing games, eighteen being mentioned by treat him as a person worthy of honour and respect. And neither name (§ 49) in question nor answer is there any reference specially to the Not using luxurious rugs, etc., of twenty different Buddhist Order. It is taken for granted, alike by the Buddha and kinds (§ 50) the king, that anyone who had devoted himself to the religious k Not using toilet luxuries, of which twenty-two are life, whatever the views or opinions he held, or the association specified (§ 51) he had joined, would, in accordance with the remarkable tole- 1. Not saying vain things, of which twenty-seven in- rance of that age and country, be treated with equal respect and stances are given (§ 52). courtesy. And the same note runs all through the Dialogue. m. Not using sophistical and rude phrases when talking The Buddha shows the advantages of the 'life of a recluse', of higher things (§ 53). not necessarily of a follower of his own. And most of what he n. Not acting as go-between (§ 54).

36 CĀRVĀKA / ĻOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIALS 37 o. Not practising trickery and mystery under the guise which is exclusively Buddhist. But the things omitted, the of religion (§ 55) union of the whole of those included into one system, the order p. Not gaining a living by low arts, such as auguries in which the ideas are arranged, the way in which they are (§ 56); advising as to the best sorts of various things treated as so many steps of a ladder whose chief value depends (§ 57); prophesying as to war and its results-(§-58); on the fact that it leads up to the culminating point of Nirvāna astrology (§ 59); foretelling famine or plague or the in Arahatship-all this is also distinctively Buddhist. And reverse (§ 60); arranging marriages, using spells, or further, the whole statement, the details of it, the order of it, worshipping gods (§ 61); various sorts of medical must have soaked very thoroughly into the minds of the early trickery (§ 62) Buddhist. For we find the whole, nearly the whole, of it repeated (with direct reference by name to our Sutta as the oldest and 3. The confidence of heart and absence of fear resulting from most complete enumeration of it) not only in all the subsequent the consciousness of right doing (§ 63) Dialogues translated in this volume, but also in many others. 4. The habit of keeping guarded the door of his senses (§ 64). In these repetitions the order is always the same, and the 5. The constant self-possession he thus gains (§ 65). details (so far as they occur) are the same. But one or other of 6. The power of being content with little, with simplicity of the thirteen groups is often omitted, and the application of life (§ 66) those of them that remain is always different-that is to say, 7. The emancipation of heart from the Five Hindrances to they are enumerated in support, or in illustration, of a different self-mastery-covetousness, ill-temper, laziness, worry proposition. and flurry, and perplexity (§S 68-74) A comparison of some of these other applications of the list 8. The joy and peace that, as a result of the sense of this emanci- is full of suggestion as to its real meaning here pation, fills his whole being (§ 75) In the Ambattha, the point is as to caste The Ksatriya caste 9. The practice of the Four jhanas (SS 75-82). 2 is the most honourable, but wisdom and conduct are higher 10 The Insight arising from knowledge (nāna-dassana) (SS 83, stilf. What then is the right conduct, what the right wisdom? 84) The conduct (sarana) is all the above paragraphs from 2-9 11. The power of projecting mental images (SS 85, 86). inclusive; the wisdom (vijja) is the rest, 10-13.3 12 The five modes of mystic Insight (abhiñna); S§ 87-96- In the Sonadanda, the question is: 'What is the true Brahman?' a The practice of Iddhi After, by his usual Socratic method, leading Sonadanda to b The Heavenly Ear-hearing heavenly sounds acknowledge that the only two essential requisites are good- c Knowledge of others' thoughts. ness and intelligence, these last are explained as above (2-9 and d. Memory of his own previous births. 10-13). e Knowledge of other peoples' previous birth (the In the Kutadanta, the question is as to the right sort of sacrifice .. Heavenly Eye): After rejecting animal sacrifice we have generosity (of various 13. The realisation of the Four Truths, the destruction of the kinds, each better than the last), faith, training in the precepts, Asavas and attainment of Arahatship (SS 97, 98) and 2-13, set forth as each of them a better sacrifice than the .... Now it is perfectly true that of these thirteen consecutive last. propositions or groups of propositions, it is only the last, No. 13, In the Galiya, the question is whether the soul is the same as,

THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 39 38 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA our groups 5,7,8,9, and the last two only out of group 12, and or is other than, the body. The answer is a counter-question. then (as a climax) our group 13-all enumerated to show what Repeating our sections 2-13 (omitting 11 and 12) the Buddha is the true Brahman, the true Samana. asks, at the end of each subdivision, whether men who do that Then again in the Sakuludāyi, No. 79 of the Majjhima, it is would be likely to trouble themselves as to speculations about declared to be not for the sake of realising happiness that recluses the soul? And the answer being, of course, 'No', rejoins that take up the celibate life in the Order under the Buddha, but for neither does he the sake of those matters set forth in our groups 2-9,6 inclusive In the Potthapada the question is as to the way in which vari- of the two last of the Abhiñnas, and above all for the sake of the ous recluses attain to mystic trance. The Buddha's answer is attainment of Arahatship Besides the differences pointed out that it is by training; and the training should be first in morals above between the Suttas preserved in the Dīgha, and in the (our groups 2 and 3) then in the things mentioned in our groups Majjhima, respectively-differences due, I think, solely to the 4-9, and then in the Four Arūpa Vimokkhas. The Dialogue difference in the subjects under discussion-there are also a then takes up other questions, omitting our groups 10-13 few verbal differences, amounting to scarcely more than 'various In the Kevaddha the talk is on miracles, mystic powers. And readings', due, perhaps, to the divergent traditions of the Digha- the Buddha, disparaging all others, calls attention to our groups bhāņakā and the Majjhima-bhānaka (the students and repeaters 2-13. of the two collections in which the Dialogues are handed down In the Lohicca the question is as to who is the right sort of to us) teacher; and the answer is that it is the one whose pupil carries However this may be, it is clear that the sum and the sequence out our groups 2-13 of the paragraphs in our Sutta is regarded as of great importance, In the Tevijja the question is as to the way by which one can not as a statement of Buddhist ethics, or of Buddhist philosophy, attain to union with God (Brahma-sahavyata) The answer gives or of the Buddhist religion, but as a statement of the advantages our groups 1-8, and then adds the Four Brahma-vihāras. that may be looked for as the result of life in an Order. And In the shorter of the two Hatthipadopama Suttas (No. 27 in further, that the statement has to be slightly modified and the Majjhima), the question discussed between a Brahman and shortened when the question is the narrower one of life in the an ascetic is as to the ascendancy of the Buddha over the other particular community which we call the Buddhist Order. teachers of the time The Buddha himself giving afterwards The difference is interesting-in the scheme for the Buddhist the full reason, repeats our group 2 (omitting however clauses Order, the näna-dassana, the power of projecting a mental f to p inclusive),4 then repeats our groups 6,3,4,5,7,8,9, then image (apparently of oneself, which seems like the earliest germ omitting groups 10 and 11, quotes two only, the last two (omit- of the modern Yoga ideas about the astral body), the powers ting the first three)5 of the five Abhiñnas in group 12, and con- of Iddhi, the power of hearing heavenly sounds (something cludes with group 13 in full. like hearing the music of the spheres), and the power of knowing In the Mahā Tanha-sankhaya Sutta (No. 38 in the Majjhima), the thoughts of others, are all omitted: we have the same sequence-our group 2 (omitting fto p), In the abstract given above, I have called these last three, then 6,3,4,5,7,8 and 9. The rest is omitted. together with the power of calling to mind one's own and other In the next Sutta, the longer of the Assapuras, after a summary peoples' previous births, the Five Abhiññas or Intuitions. And in different words of most of the contents of our group 2, we this is in accord with the passages on which Childers's article have our group 4, then two paragraphs not in our Sutta, then

40 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 41 sub voce is based. But these powers are not so called either in been simply incorporated from the rules found expedient by our text, or in any other Dialogue yet published. The use of previous recluses, both Brahman and non-Brahman, though the word abhiñna in this technical sense would seem, therefore there are numerous differences, both of the positive regulations (to judge from the published texts), to be a sign of the later date included, and also of things deliberately omitted. Even the of the book in which it.occurs.7 In the oldest portions of the third, as we have seen, cannot be considered, except in a very Pitakas the word is always used in the general sense of insight, limited sense, as exclusively Buddhist. It is in the fourth that and if any special limitation is hinted at, it is simply the insight the essential doctrines of Buddhism are to be found. All four · of Arahatship that is emphasised (as in Dhammapada 423, which have, no doubt, become welded together into a more or less is a quotation from Iti-Vuttaka, No. 99, and is quoted also at consistent whole. But to understand the whole, the relation of Anguttara I .. 165).8 its various parts has to be kept constantly in view The Eightfold Path is not mentioned in our Sutta This is This will explain an apparent contradiction. The last Sutta not merely because it is not possible always to mention every- quoted, the Sakuludayi, states that the aim of the religious or thing. The Path does not come within the special advantages celibate life as led in the Buddha's Order, is the attainment, in of life in the Order. To enter upon the Path to Arahatship, to order, of the various things set out in our Sutta (groups 2-9, 12 walk along it, is not peculiar to members of the order. A bhiksu and 13). might reach the goal either along that path, open also to laymen,9 Now in other passages, other things are stated to be the aim or by the process set out in our Sutta They are two quite distinct Thus in the Samyutta (IV, 51), the Buddha himself is repre- methods of training, of which our Sutta deals only with one sented as explaining that the celibate life (the brahmacariya)12 is It is essential, in order to understand Buddhist ethics, to bear led by his followers for the sake of the complete understanding in mind that there are (and must be in such a system) several of pain (dukkha-pariñna). Further on in the same book (VI, different lines along which both speculation and edifying teach- 253 = V. 6, 27), this is thrice repeated, with the suggestive ing run. These are: addition that there is one way to this-the Noble Eightfold 1. The course of conduct laid down for the ordinary Buddhist Path

layman, contained in the Gahapati-vaggas found in the various Again, in the Anguttara (IV, 7) the higher life is said to be nikāyas. 10 for the sake of getting rid of, of cutting through, seven Bonds 2. The rules as to the outward conduct of the members of the which prevent one from attaining Arahatship. The argument Order, laid down in the Pätimokkha and in the Khandhakas. 11 on pp.88, 99 (though the word brahmacariya does not occur) 3. The system of self-training in higher things prescribed comes to much the same thing And further on in the same for members of the order. Of this, our present Sutta is a striking book (IV, 272), the object is stated to be for the sake of getting

example. rid of five particular sorts of envy. 4. The method of self-training laid down for those who have Nägasena is, therefore, quite right when he says that the entered upon the Path to Arahatship. (The Four Truths, the object of renouncing the world to life in the Order is for the Eightfold Path, and the Āsavas.) sake of righteousness and peace13 and in another place, that it is to the end that sorrow may pass away. 14 All these explanations In the first of these, Buddhism goes very little beyond the belong to the Path, not to the rules of the Order. They are not current ethics of the day. In the second, a very great deal has really inconsistent with the other aim that our Sutta sets out

42 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 43 And they are only additional proof, if such were needed, that it How beautiful, friends, is the moonlight night! is no more possible to sum up in a single phrase (as some writers How lovely, friends, is the moonlight night! have tried to do) the aim of Buddhism, or the object of life in How soothing, friends, is the moonlight night! the Order, than it would be to sum up in a similar way the aim How grand a sign, friends, is the moonlight night! of Christianity, or the object for which men enter a Christian 'Who is the recluse or Brahman whom we may call upon to- Order. The aims are necessarily as various as the character and night, who, when we call upon him, shall be able to satisfy our circumstances of the various individuals who take them up. hearts?'19 And Nägasena does not hesitate to add-and to add in speak- 2. When he had thus spoken, a certain minister said to the ing to a king-that some had joined the Order in terror at the king: 'There is, Sire, Pürana Kassapa, the head of an order, of tyranny of kings, some in fear of robbers, some because they a following, the teacher of a school, well known and of repute were harassed by debt, and some perhaps merely to gain a live- as a sophist, revered by the people, a man of experience, who lihood. has long been a recluse, old and well stricken in years. Let your This also would apply to other Orders both in India and Majesty pay a visit to him. It may well be20 that, on calling elsewhere, and is quite consistent with our Sutta, which only upon him, your heart, Sire, shall find peace. ' But when he had purports to set forth the advantages the early Buddhists held to thus spoken, Ajatasattu the king kept silence. be the likely results of joining, from whatever motive, such an 3-7. The other five ministers spoke in the same terms of order as their own. Makkhali of the cow-pen, of Ajita of the garment of hair, of Pakudha Kaccāyana, of Sanjaya of the Belattha clan, and of the Nigantha of the Nata clan And still, to each, Ajātasattu the Sāmañña-phala-sutta king kept silence. (THE FRUIIS OF THE LIFE OF A RECLUSE15) 8. Now at that time Jivaka the physician was seated, in silence, not far from Ajätasattu the king. And the king said to IEXI him: 'But you, friend Jivaka, why do you say nothing?' 'The Blessed One, Sire, the Arahat, the all-awakened-one, 1. Thus have I heard The Blessed One was once dwelling at is now lodging in our Mango Grove, with a great company of Rājagaha in the Mango Grove of Jivaka, the children's physi- the brethren, with twelve hundred and fifty brethren. And this cian, 16 with a great company of the brethren, with twelve is the good report that has been said abroad as to Gotama the hundred and fifty of the brethren. Now at that time the king of Blessed One: "An Arahat, fully awakened, is the exalted One, Magadha, Ajātasattu, the son of the Videha princess, 17 on the abounding in wisdom and goodness, happy, with knowledge Uposatha day, held on the fifteenth, on Komudi (white water- of the worlds, unsurpassed as a guide to mortals willing to be lily), the full moon day of the fourth month, 18 at night, when led, the teacher of gods and men, a blessed Buddha." Let your the moon was full, was seated on the upper terrace roof of his Majesty pay a visit to him. It may well be that, on calling upon palace surrounded by his ministers. And the king, on that sacred him, your heart, Sire, shall find peace.' day, gave utterance to a hymn of joy, saying: 'Then, friend Jīvaka, have the riding-elephants made ready.' 'How pleasant, friends, is the moonlight night! 9. 'Very good, Sire!' said Jivaka the physician in assent to

44 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MAIERIAIS 45 the words of the king. And he had five hundred she-elephants Blessed One on a certain matter, if he give me opportunity to made ready, and the state elephant the king was wont to ride, set forth the question.' and had word brought to the king: 'The elephants, Sire, are 'Ask, O king, whatsoever you desire' caparisoned. Do now what seemeth to you meet.' Then the 14. 'There are, Sir, a number of ordinary crafts: mahouts, king had five hundred of his women mounted on the she- horsemen, charioteers, archers, standard-bearers, camp mar- elephants, one on each; and himself mounted the state elephant; shalls, camp followers, high military officers of royal birth, and he went forth, the attendants bearing torches, in royal military scouts,21 men brave as elephants, champions, heroes, pomp, from Rajagaha to Jivaka the physician's Mango Grove. warriors in buckskin, home-born slaves, cooks, barbers, bath 10. And the king, when close upon the Mango Grove, was attendants, confectioners, garland-makers, washermen, weav- seized with a sudden fear and consternation, and the hairs on ers, basket-makers, potters, arithmeticians, accountants, and his body stood erect. And anxious and excited, he said to whatsoever others of like kind there may be. All these enjoy, Jīvaka: 'You are playing me no tricks, Jīvaka? You are not in this very world, the visible fruits of their craft. They maintain deceiving me? You are not betraying me to my foes? How can themselves, and their parents and children and friends, in happi- it be that there should be no sound at all, not a sneeze nor a ness and comfort. They keep up gifts, the object of which is cough, in so large an assembly of the brethren, among twelve gain on high, to recluses and Brahmans-gifts that lead to re- hundred and fifty of the brethren?' birth in heaven, that rebound to happiness, and have bliss as 'Fear not, O king. I play no trick; neither deceive you; nor their result. Can you, Sir, declare to me any such immediate would I betray you to the foe. Go on, O king, go straight on! fruit, visible in this very world, of the life of a recluse?'22 There, in the pavilion hall, the lamps are burning. 15. 'Do you admit to us, O king, that you have put the 11. Then the king went on, on his elephant as far as the path same question to other recluses or to Brahmans?' was passable for elephants, and then on foot, to the door of the 'Ido, Lord' pavilion; and then said to Jīvaka: 'But where, Jīvaka, is the 'Then tell us how they answered it, if you do not mind.' Blessed One?' 'I have no objection where the Blessed One, or others like 'That is he, O king, sitting against the middle pillar, and facing him, are' the East, with the brethren around him.' 'Then speak, O king.' 12. Then the king went up, and stood respectfully on one 16. 'Once I went to Pürana Kassapa 23 And after exchanging side .. And as he stood there and looked on the assembly, seated with him the greetings and compliments of friendship and in perfect silence, calm as a clear lake, he broke out: 'Would courtesy, I seated myself beside him, and put to him the same that my son, Udayi Bhadda, might have such calm as this question as I have now put, Lord, to you.' assembly of the brethren now has!' 17. 'Then Purana Kassapa said to me: "To him who acts, O 'Do your thoughts then go where love guides them?' king, or causes another to act, to him who mutilates or causes 'I love the boy, and wish that he, Udäyi Bhadda, might enjoy another to mutilate, to him who punishes or causes another to such calm as this assembly has,' punish, to him who causes grief or torment, to him who trem- 13. Then the king bowed to the Blessed One, and stretching bles or causes others to tremble, to him who kills a living crea- forth his joined palms in salutation tò the Order, took his seat ture, who takes what is not given, who breaks into houses, aside, and said to the Blessed One: 'I would fain question the who commits dacoity, or robbery, or highway robbery, or

46 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 47 adultery, or who speaks lies, to him thus acting there is no given condition, of any character, does not depend either on guilt. If with a discus with an edge sharp as a razor he should one's own acts, or on the acts of another, or on human effort. make all the living creatures on the earth one heap, one mass, There is no such thing as power or energy, or human strength of flesh, there would be no guilt thence resulting, no increase or human vigour. All animals, all creatures (with one, two, or of guilt would ensue. Were he to go along the south bank of more senses) all beings (produced from eggs or in a womb), all the Ganges, striking and slaying, mutilating and having men souls (in plants)27 are without force and power and energy of mutilated, oppressing and having men oppressed, there would their own. They are bent this way and that by their fate, by the be no guilt thence resulting; no increase of guilt would ensue. necessary conditions of the class to which they belong, by their Were he to go along the north bank of the Ganges giving alms, individual nature: and it is according to their position in one or and ordering gifts to be given, offering sacrifices or causing other of the six classes that they experience ease or pain. them to be offered, there would be no merit thence resulting, "There are fourteen hundred thousands of the principal sorts no increase of merit. In generosity, in self-mastery, in control of birth and again six thousand others, and again six hundred. of the senses, in speaking truth, there is neither merit, nor There are five hundred sorts of Karma, and again five (according increase of merit." Thus, Lord, did Pürana Kassapa, when to the five senses) and again three (according to act, word, and asked what was the immediate advantage in the life of a recluse, thought); and there is a whole Karma and a half Karma (the expound his theory of non-action.24 Just, Lord, as if a man, whole being a Karma of act or word, the half a Karma of when asked what a mango was, should explain what a bread- thought) fruit is, so did Purana Kassapa, when asked what was the fruit, "There are sixty-two paths (or modes of conduct), sixty- in this present state of being, of the life of a recluse, expound two periods, six classes (or distinctions among men),28 eight his theory of non-action. Then, Lord, it occurred to me: "How stages of a prophet's existence,29 forty-nine hundred sorts of should such a one as I think of giving dissatisfaction to any occupation,30 forty-nine hundred sorts of wandering mendi- recluse or Brahman in my realm?" So I neither applauded nor cants, forty-nine hundred regions dwelt in by Nägas, two blamed what he said, and though dissatisfied, I gave utterance thousand faculties, three thousand purgatories, thirty-six to no expression of dissatisfaction, and neither accepting nor places where dust accumulates, seven sorts of animate and seven rejecting that answer of his, I arose from my seat, and departed of inanimate production, and seven of production by grafting, thence.' seven sorts of gods, and of men, and of devils, and of great 19. [In the same manner I went to five other teachers, and lakes, and seven principal and again seven hundred minor sorts receiving to this same question an answer not to the point, I of Pacutas31 of precipices, and of dreams behaved in each case as just set forth And the answers of the "There are eighty-four hundred thousand periods during five were thus:]25 which both fools and wise alike, wandering in transmigration, 20. 'When one day I had thus asked Makkhali of the cow- shall at last make an end of pain. Though the wise should hope: pen,26 he said: "There is, O king, no cause, either ultimate or 'By this virtue or this performance of duty, or this penance, or remote, for the depravity of beings; they become depraved this righteousness will I make the Karma (I have inherited), without reason and without cause. There is no cause, either that is not yet mature, mature'-though the fool should hope, proximate or remote, for the rectitude of being; they become by the same means, to get gradually rid of Karma that has pure without reason and without cause. The attainment of any matured-neither of them can do it. The ease and pain, mea-

48 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYATA THE SOURCE MATERIAIS 49

sured out, as it were, with a measure, cannot be altered in the them), steadfast as a mountain peak, as a pillar firmly fixed.

course of transmigration; there can be neither increase nor They move not, neither do they vary, they trench not one upon

decrease thereof, neither excess nor deficiency. Just as when a another, nor avail aught as to ease or pain or both. And what are ball of string is cast forth it will spread out just as far, and no the seven? The four elements-earth, water, fire, and air- farther, than it can unwind, just so both fools and wise alike, and ease, and pain, and the soul as a seventh. So there is neither wandering in transmigration exactly for the allotted term, shall slayer nor causer of slaying, hearer or speaker, knower or then, and only then, make an end of pain " explainer. When one with a sharp sword cleaves a head in twain, 'Thus, Lord, did Makkhali of the cow-pen, when asked no one thereby deprives any one of life, a sword has only penet- what was the immediate advantage in the life of a recluse, ex- rated into the interval between seven elementary substances." pound his theory of purification through transmigration.' 'Thus, Lord, did Pakudha Kaccäyana, when asked what was

23 'When, one day, I had thus asked Ajita of the garment the immediate advantage in the life of a recluse, expound the of hair, he said:32 "There is no such thing, O king, as alms or matter by expounding something else. sacrifice or offering. There is neither fruit nor result of good or 28 'When, one day, I had thus asked the Nigantha of the evil deeds There is no such thing as this world or the next. There Nāta clan, he said: "A Nigantha, O king (a man free from is neither father nor mother, nor beings springing into life bonds), is restrained with a fourfold self-restraint He lives without them. There are in the world no recluses or Brahmans restrained as regards all water; restrained as regards all evil; all who have reached the highest point, 33 who walk perfectly, and evil has he washed away; and he lives suffused with the sense of who having understood and realised, by themselves alone, both evil held at bay Such is his fourfold self-restraint And since he this world and the next, make their wisdom known to others is thus tied with this fourfold bond, therefore is he, the '"A human being is built up of the four elements. When he Nigantho (free from bonds), called Gatatto (whose heart has dies, the earthy in him returns and relapses to the earth, the gone; that is, to the summit, to the attainment, of his aim), fluid to the water, the heat to the fire, the wind to the air; and Yatatto (whose heart is kept down; that is, is under command), his faculties34 pass into.space The four bearers, on the bier as and Thitatto (whose heart is fixed)"36 a fifth, take his dead body away; till they reach the burning- 'Thus, Lord, did the Nigantha of the Näta clan, when asked ground mèn utter forth eulogies; but there his bones are bleached, what was the immediate advantage in the life of a recluse, ex- and his offerings35 end in ashes. It is a doctrine of fools, this talk pound his theory of the fourfold bond of gifts. It is an empty lie, mere idle talk, when men say there is 31 'When, one day, I had thus asked Sanjaya of the Belattha profit therein. Fools and wise alike, on the dissolution of the clan, he said: "If you ask me whether there is another world- body, are cut off, annihilated, and after death they are not." well, if I thought there were, I would say so. But I don't say so 'Thus, Lord, did Ajita of the garment of hair, when asked And I don't think it is thus or thus. And I don't think it is other- what was the immediate advantage in the life of a recluse, ex- wise. And I don't deny it. And I don't say there neither is, nor is

pound his theory of annihilation. not, another world. And if you ask me about beings produced 26. 'When, one day, I had thus asked Pakudha Kaccāyana, by chance; whether there is any fruit, any result, of good or bad he said: "The following seven things, O king, are neither made actions; or whether a man who has won the truth conti- nor commanded to be made, neither created nor caused to be nues, or not, after death-to each or any of these questions do I created; they are barren (so that nothing is produced out of give the same reply "37

50 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 51 33. 'Thus, Lord, did Sanjaya of the Belattha clan, when asked what was the immediate advantage in the life of a recluse, admitted into an Order, and dwells restrained, content with

show his manner of prevarication. And to him, as to all the mere food and shelter, delighting in solitude?"

others, I expressed neither approval nor dissatisfaction, but 'Would you, then, say: "Let the man come back; let him

neither accepting nor rejecting what was said, I arose from my become a slave again, and work for me"?'

seat, and departed thence. 38 36. 'Nay, Lord; rather we should greet him with reverence, 34. 'And now, Lord, I put the same question to the Blessed rise up from our seat out of deference towards him, and press One. Can you show me any immediate fruit, in this world, of him to be seated .. And we should have robes and a bowl, and a the life of a recluse, such as those who follow each of the occu- lodging-place, and medicine for the sick-all the requisites of a pations I have mentioned are, each of them, able to show?' recluse-made ready, and beg him to accept them. And we 'I can, O king. And to that end I would put a question to you. should order watch and ward and guard to be kept for him Answer it as you think most fit. according to the law.'

35. 'Now what do you think, O king Suppose, among the 'But what do you think, O king. That being so, is there, or is people of your household, there were a slave who does work there not, some fruit, visible in this world, of the life of a

for you, rises up in the morning before you do and retires earlier to recluse?'

rest, who is keen to carry out your pleasure, anxious to make him- 'Certainly, Lord, that is so.'

self agreeable in what he does and says, a man who watches your 'This then, O king, is the first kind of the fruit, visible in this every look Suppose he should think, "Strange is it and won- world, which I maintained to arise from the life of a recluse.' derful, this issue of meritorious deeds, this result of merit! Here 37. 'Can you, Lord, show me any other fruit, visible in this is this king of Magadha, Ajätasattu, the son of the Videha prin- world, of the life of a recluse?'

cess-he is a man, and so am I But the king lives in the full 'I can, O king. And to that end I would fain put a question enjoyment and possession of the five pleasures of sense-a very etc., (as before, to the end of § 36, the case now put being that of god, methinks-and here am I, a slave, working for him, rising a free man who cultivates his land, a householder, who pays before him and retiring earlier to rest, keen to carry out his ple- taxes and thus increases the King's wealth, but gives up his little asure, anxious to make myself agreeable in deed and word, property and his position in his clan, and enters an Order).' watching his very looks. Would that I were like him, that I too 39. 'Can you, Lord, show me any other fruit, visible in this might earn merit. Why should I not have my hair and beard world, of the life of a recluse, a fruit higher and sweeter than shaved off, don yellow robes, and going forth from the house- these?'

hold state, renounce the world?" 'I can, O king. Give ear therefore, O king, and give good 'And suppose, after a time, he should do so. And having been heed, and I will speak '

admitted into an Order, should dwell restrained in act and 40. 'Suppose, O king, there appears in the world one who word and thought, content with mere food and shelter, has won the truth, an Arahat, a fully awakened one, abounding in delighting in solitude. And suppose your people should tell wisdom and goodness, happy, who knows all worlds, un- you of this, saying: "If it please your majesty, do you know that surpassed as a guide to mortals willing to be led, a teacher for such a one, formerly your slave, who worked for you, and so gods and men, a Blessed One, a Buddha. He, by himself, on (all as before), has now donned yellow robes, has been thoroughly knows and sees, as it were, face to face this uni- verse,-including the worlds above of the gods, the Brahmas,

52 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIALS 53 and the Maras, and the world below with its recluses and Brah- mans, its princes and peoples,-and having known it, he makes of mercy, he dwells compassionate and kind to all creatures his knowledge known to others. The truth, lovely in its origin, that have life .. ' lovely in its progress, lovely in its consummation, doth he 'This is part of the goodness that he has.' proclaim; both in the spirit and in the letter, the higher life doth he [Here follow the whole of the Silas (the paragraphs on make known, in all its fullness and in all its purity. 39 minor morality), in the words already translated above in the 41. 'A householder40 or one of his children, or a man of Brahmajala Sutta, SS 8 to 27. Only, for 'Gotama the recluse' inferior birth in any class, listens to that truth; and on hearing it, one should read 'the Bhiksu'; and alter, in each case, the words he has faith in the Tathagata (the one who has found the truth); of the refrain accordingly ] and when he is possessed of that faith, he considers, thus, 63. 'And then that Bhiksu, O king, being thus master of the within himself: minor moralities, sees no danger from any side; that is, so far '"Full of hindrances is household life, a path for the dust of as concerns his self-restraint in conduct. Just, O king, as a passion. Free as the air is life of him who has renounced all sovereign, duly crowned, whose enemies have been beaten worldly things. How difficult it is for the man who dwells at down, sees no danger from any side; that is, so far as enemies home to live the higher life in all its fullness, in all its purity, in are concerned; so is the Bhiksu confident And endowed with all its bright perfection! Let me then cut off my hair and beard, this body of morals, so worthy of honour, he experiences, let me clothe myself in orange-coloured robes, and let me go within himself, a sense of ease without alloy. Thus is it, O king, forth from the household life into the homeless state " that the Bhiksu becomes righteous. 'Then, before long, forsaking his portion of wealth, be it 64. 'And how, O king, is the Bhiksu guarded as to the great or small, forsaking his circle of relatives, be they many or doors of his senses?'42 be they few, he cuts off his hair and beard, he clothes himself in 'When, O king, he sees an object with his eye, he is not en- orange-coloured robes, and he goes forth from household life tranced in the general appearance or the details of it. 43 He sets into the homeless state.' himself to restrain that which might give occasion for evil 42 'When he has thus become a recluse, he lives self-restrained states, covetousness and dejection, to flow in over him so long by that restraint that should be binding on a recluse. 4t Upright- as he dwells unrestrained as to his sense of sight. He keeps a ness is his delight, and he sees danger in the least of those things watch upon his faculty of sight, and he attains mastery over it. he should avoid. He adopts, and trains himself in, the precepts. And so, in like manner, when he hears a sound with his ear, or He encompasses himself with good deeds in act and word, smells an odour with his nose, or tastes a flavour with his ton- Pure are his means of livelihood, good is his conduct, guarded gue, or feels a touch with his body, or when he cognizes a the door of his senses Mindful and self-possessed, he is alto- phenomenon with his mind, he is not entranced in the general gether happy.' appearance or the details of it. He sets himself to restrain that 43. 'And how, O king, is his conduct good?' which might give occasion for evil states, covetousness and 'In this, O king, that the Bhiksu, putting away the killing of dejection, to flow in over him so long as he dwells unre- living things, holds aloof from the destruction of life. The cudgel strained as to his mental (representative) faculty. He keeps and the sword he has laid aside, and ashamed of roughness, full watch upon his representative faculty, and he attains mastery over it And endowed with this self-restraint, so worthy of

54 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIALS 55 honour, as regards the senses, he experiences, within himself, a sense of ease, into which no evil state can enter. 44 Thus is it, remains with a heart that hankers not, and purifies his mind of

O king, that the Bhiksu becomes guarded as to the doors of his lusts. Putting away the corruption of the wish to injure, he remains with a heart free from ill-temper, and purifies his senses 65. 'And how, O king, is the Bhiksu mindful and self- mind of malevolence. Putting away torpor of heart and mind, 48 keeping his ideas alight, 49 mindful and self-possessed, possessed? 'In this matter, O king, the Bhiksu, in going forth or in he purifies his mind of weakness and of sloth Putting away

coming back, keeps clearly, before his mind's eye (all that is flurry and worry, he remains free from fretfulness, and with

wrapt up therein-the immediate object of the act itself, its his heart serene within, he purifies himself of irritability and

ethical significance, whether or not it is conducive to the high vexation of spirit. Putting away wavering, he remains as one

aim set before him, and the real facts underlying the mere passed beyond perplexity; and no longer in suspense as to

phenomenon of the outward act). And so also, in looking for- what is good, he purifies his mind of doubt. 69. 'Then just, O king, as when a man, after contracting a ward, or in looking round; in stretching forth his arm, or in loan,50 should set a business on foot, and his business should drawing it in again; in eating or drinking, in masticating or swallowing, in obeying the calls of nature, in going or stand- succeed, and he should not only be able to pay off the old debt he had incurred, but there should be a surplus over to maintain ing or sitting, in sleeping or waking, in speaking or in being still, he keeps himself aware of all it really means. 45 Thus is it, a wife; then would he realise: "I used to have to carry on my

O king, that the Bhiksu becomes mindful and self-possessed. business by getting into debt, but it has gone so well with me

66. 'And how, O king, is the Bhiksu content?' 'In this mat- that I have paid off what I owed, and have a surplus over to

ter, O king, that the Bhiksu is satisfied with sufficient robes to maintain a wife" And he would be of good cheer at that, he

cherish his body, with sufficient food to keep his stomach would be glad of heart at that:

going. Wheresoever he may go forth, these he takes with him 70. 'Then just, O king, as if a man were a prey to disease, in pain, and very ill, and his food would not digest, and there were as he goes-just as a bird with his wings, O king, wheresoever he may fly, carries his wings with him as he flies. Thus is it, O no strength left in him; and after a time, he were to recover from

king, that the Bhiksu becomes content. 46 that disease, and his food should digest, and his strength come back to him; then, when he realised his former and his present 67. 'Then, master of this so excellent body of moral pre- state, he would be of good cheer at that, he would be glad of cepts, gifted with this excellent self-restraint as to the senses, endowed with this excellent mindfulness and self-possession, heart at that:

filled with this excellent content, he chooses some lonely spot 71. 'Then just, O king, as if a man were bound in a prison

to rest at on his way-in the woods, at the foot of a tree, on a house, and after a time he should be set free from his bonds,

hillside, in a mountain glen, in a rocky cave, in a charnel place, safe and sound, and without any confiscation of his goods; when he realised his former and his present state, he would be or on a heap of straw in the open field. And returning thither after his round for alms, he seats himself, when his meal is of good cheer at that, he would be glad of heart at that: 72. 'Then just, O king, as if a man were a slave, not his own done, cross-legged, keeping his body erect, and his intelli- master, subject to another, unable to go whither he would; gence alert, intent. 68. 'Putting away all hankering after the world,47 he and after a time he should be emancipated from that slavery, become his own master, not subject to others, a free man, free

56 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA THE SOURCE MATERIALS 57 to go whither he would; then, on realising his former and his reasoning and investigation, enters into and abides in the Second present state, he would be of good cheer at that, he would be Jhana, a state of joy and ease, born of the serenity of concentra- glad of heart at that: tion, when no reasoning or investigation goes on-a state of 73. 'Then just, O king, as if a man, rich and prosperous, elevation 53 of mind, a tranquillisation of the heart within. were to find himself on a long road, in a desert, where no food 'And his very body does he so pervade, drench, permeate, was, but much danger; and after a time, were to find himself and suffuse with the joy and ease born of concentration, that out of the desert, arrived safe, on the borders of his village, in there is no spot in his whole frame not suffused therewith. security and peace; then, on realising his former and his present 78. 'Just, O king, as if there were a deep pool, with water state, he would be of good cheer at that, he would be glad of welling up into it from a spring beneath, and with no inlet from heart at that: the east or west, from the north or south, and the god should 74. 'Just so, O king, the Bhiksu, so long as these five Hind- not from time to time send down showers of rain upon it rances are not put away within him, looks upon himself as in 'Still, the current of cool waters rising up from that spring debt, diseased, in prison, in slavery, lost on a desert road. But would pervade, fill, permeate, and suffuse the pool with cool when these five Hindrances have been put away within him, waters, and there would be no part or portion of the pool unsuf- he looks upon himself as freed from debt, rid of disease, out of fused therewith .. jail, a free man, and secure; 'This, O king, is an immediate fruit of the life of a recluse, 75 'And gladness springs up within him on his realising visible in this world, and higher and sweeter than the last. that, and joy arises to him, thus gladdened, and so rejoicing, 79. 'Then further, O king, the Bhiksu, holding aloof from all his frame becomes at ease, and being thus at ease, he is filled joy, becomes equable;54 and mindful and self-possessed, he with a sense of peace, and in that peace, his heart is stayed.51 experiences in his body that ease which the Arahats talk of when 75A. 'Then, estranged from lusts, aloof from evil disposi- they say: "The man serene and self-possessed is well at ease," tions, he enters into and remains in the First Rapture-a state and so he enters into and abides in the Third Jhana. of joy and ease born of detachment, 52 reasoning and investiga- 'And his very body does he so pervade, drench, permeate, tion going on the while and suffuse with that ease that has no joy with it, that there is 'His very body does he so pervade, drench, permeate, and no spot in his whole frame not suffused therewith suffuse with the joy and ease born of detachment, that there is 80. 'Just, O king, as when in a louts tank the several lotus no spot in his whole frame not suffused therewith. flowers, red or white or blue, born in the water, grown up in 76. 'Just, O king, as a skilful bathman or his apprentice the water, not rising up above the surface of the water, drawing will scatter perfumed soap powder in a metal basin, and then * up nourishment from the depths of the water, are so pervaded, besprinkling it with water, drop by drop, will so knead it drenched, permeated, and suffused from their very tips down together that the ball of lather, taking up the unctuous moisture, to their roots with the cool moisture thereof, that there is no is drenched with it, pervaded by it, permeated by it within and spot in the whole plant, whether of the red lotus, or of the white, without, and there is no leakage possible. or of the blue, not suffused therewith 'This, O king, is an immediate fruit of the life of a recluse, 'This, O king, is an immediate fruit of the life of a recluse, visible in this world, higher and sweeter than the last. visible in this world, and higher and sweeter than the last. 77. 'Then further, O king, the Bhiksu, suppressing all 81. 'Then further, O king, the Bhiksu, by the putting away

58 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA alike of ease and of pain, by the passing away alike of any elation, IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 59

any dejection, he had previously felt, enters into and abides in turbable, he applies and bends down his mind to the calling up the Fourth Jhäna, a state of pure self-possession and equanimity, of a mental image. He calls up from this body another body, without pain and without ease having form, made of mind, having all (his own body's) limbs And he sits there so suffusing even his body with that sense and parts, not deprived of any organ. 58 of purification, of translucence, of heart, that there is no spot 86. 'Just, O king, as if a man were to pull out a reed from its in his whole frame not suffused therewith sheath. He would know: "This is the reed, this the sheath. The 82. 'Just, O king, as if a man were sitting so wrapped from reed is one thing, the sheath another. It is from the sheath that head to foot in a clean white robe, that there were no spot in his the reed has been drawn forth. "59 And similarly, were he to take whole frame not in contact with the clean white robe-just so, a snake out of its slough, or draw a sword from its scabbard 60 O king, does the Bhiksu sit there, so suffusing even his body 'This, Q king, is an immediate fruit of the life of a recluse, with that sense of purification, of translucence, of heart, that visible in this life, and higher and sweeter than the last. there is no spot in his whole frame not suffused therewith. 87. 'With his heart thus serene, made pure, translucent, 'This, O king, is an immediate fruit of the life of a recluse, cultured, devoid of evil, supple, ready to act, firm and imper- and higher and sweeter than the last turbable, he applies and bends down his mind to the modes of 83. 'With his heart thus serene, made pure, translucent, the Wondrous Gift.61 He enjoys the Wondrous Gift in its various cultured, devoid of evil, supple, ready to act, firm, and imper- modes-being one, he becomes many, or having become many, turbable, he applies and bends down his mind to that insight becomes one again; he becomes visible or invisible; he goes, that comes from knowledge. He grasps the fact: "This body of feeling no obstruction, to the further side of a wall or rampart mine has form, it is built up of the four elements, it springs from or hill, as if through air; he penetrates up and down through father and mother, it is continually renewed by so much boiled solid ground, as if through water; he walks on water without rice and juicy foods, its very nature is impermanence, it is subject breaking through, as if on solid ground; he travels cross-legged to erosion, abrasion, dissolution, and disintegration;55 and in the sky, like the birds on wing; even the Moon and the Sun, therein is this consciousness56 of mine, too, bound up, on that so potent, so mighty though they be, does he touch and feel it does depend." with his hand; he reaches in the body even up to the heaven of 84. 'Just, O king, as if there were a Veluriya gem, bright, Brahmā of the purest water, with eight facets, excellently cut, clear, 88. 'Just, O king, as a clever potter or his apprentice could translucent, without a flaw, excellent in every way. And make, could succeed in getting out of properly prepared clay, through it a string, blue, or orange-coloured, or red, or white, any shape of vessel he wanted to have-or an ivory-carver out or yellow should be threaded. If a man, who had eyes to see, of ivory, or a goldsmith out of gold were to take it into his hand, he would clearly perceive how 'This, O king, is an immediate fruit of the life of a recluse, the one is bound up with the other. 57 and higher and sweeter than the last. 'This, O king, is an immediate fruit of the life of a recluse, 89. 'With his heart thus serene, made pure, translucent, visible in this world, and higher and sweeter than the last. cultured, devoid of evil, supple, ready to act, firm and imper- 85. 'With his heart thus serene, made pure, translucent, turbable, he applies and bends down his mind to the Heavenly cultured, devoid of evil, supple, ready to act, firm, and imper- Ear. With that clear Heavenly Ear, surpassing the ear of men, he hears sounds both human and celestial, whether far or near.'

IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 61 60 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA an aeon of both dissolution and evolution 64 "In such a place; 90. 'Just, O king, as if a man were on the high road and were such was my name, such my family, such my caste, 65 such my to hear the sound of a kettledrum or a tabor, or the sound of food, such my experience of discomfort or of ease, and such chank horns and small drums, he would know: "This is the the limits of my life. When I passed away from that state, I took sound of kettledrum, this is the sound of a tabor, this of chank form again in such a place. There I had such and such a name horns, and of drums. "62 and family and caste and food and experience of discomfort or 'This, O king, is an immediate fruit of the life of recluse, of ease, such was the limit of my life. When I passed away from visible in this life, and higher and sweeter than the last. the state, I took form again here"-thus does he call to mind 91 'With his heart thus serene (etc., as before), he directs his temporary states in days gone by, in all their details, and in and bends down his mind to the knowledge which penetrates all their modes the heart. Penetrating with his own heart the hearts of other 94. 'Just, O king, as if a man were to go from his own to beings, of other men, he knows them. He discerns: another village, and from that one to another, and from that The passionate mind to be passionate, and the calm mind one, should teturn home. Then he would know: "From my calm; own village I came to that other one. There I stood in such and The angry mind to be angry, and the peaceful mind peaceful; The dull mind to be dull, and the alert mind alert; such a way, sat thus, spake thus, and held my peace thus. Thence I came to that other village; and there I stood in such and such a The attentive mind to be attentive, and the wandering mind way, sat thus, spake thus, and held my peace thus. And now, wandering; from that other village, I have returned back again home "66 The broad mind to be broad, and the narrow mind narrow; The mean mind to be mean, and the lofty mind lofty;63 'This, O king, is an immediate fruit of the life of a recluse. Visible in this world, and higher and sweeter than the last ' The steadfast mind to be steadfast, and the wavering mind 95. 'With his heart thus serene (etc, as before), he directs to be wavering; and bends down his mind to the knowledge of the fall and rise The free mind to be free, and the enslaved mind enslaved of beings. With the pure Heavenly Eye,67 surpassing that of 92. 'Just, Q king, as a woman or a man or a lad, young and men, he sees beings as they pass away from one form of exis- smart, on considering attentively the image of his own face in tence and take shape in another; he recognises the mean and the a bright and brilliant mirror or in a vessel of clear water would, noble, the well-favoured and the ill-favoured, the happy and if it had a mole on it, know that it had, and if not, would know the wretched, passing away according to their deeds: "Such it had not and such beings, my brethren, in act and word and thought, 'This, O king, is an immediate fruit of the life of a recluse, revilers of the noble ones, holding to wrong views, acquiring visible in this world, and higher and sweeter than the last for themselves that Karma which results from wrong views, 93. 'With his heart thus serene (etc., as before), he directs they, on the dissolution of the body, after death, are reborn in and bends down his mind to the knowledge of the memory of some unhappy state of suffering or woe But such and such his previous temporary states. He recalls to mind his various beings, my brethren, well-doers in act and word and thought, temporary states in days gone by-one birth, or two or three or not revilers of the noble ones, holding to right views, acquiring four or five births, or ten or twenty or thirty or forty or fifty or a for themselves that Karma that results from right views, they, hundred or a thousand or a hundred thousand births, through on the dissolution of the body, after death, are reborn in some many an aeon of dissolution, many an aeon of evolution, many

62 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 63 happy state in heaven." Thus with the pure Heavenly Eye, on the bank, and with eyes to see, should perceive the oysters surpassing that of men, he sees beings as they pass away from and the shells, the gravel and the pebbles and the shoals of fish, one state of existence, and take form in another; he recognises as they move about or lie within it: he would know: "This the mean and the noble, the well-favoured and the ill-favoured, pool is clear, transparent, and serene, and there, within it, are the happy and the wretched, passing away according to their the oysters and the shells, and the sand and gravel, and the sho- deeds. 68 als of fish moving about or lying still. "74 96. 'Just, O king, as if there were a house with an upper 'This, O king, is an immediate fruit of the life of a recluse, terrace on it in the midst of a place where four roads meet, and visible in this world, and higher and sweeter than the last. And a man standing thereon, and with eyes to see, should watch there is no fruit of the life of a recluse, visible in this world, that men entering a house, and coming forth out of it, and walking is higher and sweeter than this. '75 hither and thither along the street,69 and seated in the square in 99. And when he had thus spoken, Ajatasattu the king said the midst. Then he would know: "Those men are entering a to the Blessed One: 'Most excellent, Lord, most excellent! Just house, and those are leaving it, and those are walking to and as if a man were to set up that which has been thrown down, or fro in the street, and those are seated in the square in the midst. " were to reveal that which is hidden away, or were to point out 'This, O king, is an immediate fruit of the life of a recluse. the right road to him who has gone astray, or were to bring a Visible in this world, and higher and sweeter than the last. lamp into the darkness so that those who have eyes could see 97. 'With his heart thus serene, (etc., as before), he directs external forms-just even so, Lord, has the truth been made and bends down his mind to the knowledge of the destruction of known to me, in many a figure, by the Blessed One And now the Deadly Floods. 70 He knows as it really is: "This is pain." I betake myself, Lord, to the Blessed One as my refuge, to the He knows as it really is: "This is the origin of pain. " He knows Truth, and to the Order May the Blessed One accept me as a as it really is: "This is the cessation of pain. " He knows as it disciple, as one who, from this day forth, as long as life really is: "This is the Path that leads to the cessation of pain." endures, has taken his refuge in them. Sin has overcome me, He knows as they really are: "These are the Deadly Floods." Lord, weak and foolish and wrong that I am, in that, for the He knows as it really is: "This is the origin of the Deadly sake of sovereignty, I put to death my father, that righteous Floods." He knows as it really is: "This is the cessation of the man, that righteous king! May the Blessed One accept it of Deadly Floods. " He knows as it really is: "This is the Path that me, Lord, that I do so acknowledge it as a sin, to the end that in leads to the cessation of the Deadly Floods" To him, thus future I may restrain myself ' knowing, thus seeing, the heart is set free from the Deadly 100. 'Verily, O king, it was sin that overcame you in acting Taint of Lusts, 71 is set free from the Deadly Taint of Becomings, 72 thus. But inasmuch as you look upon it as sin, and confess it is set free from the Deadly Taint of Ignorance 73 In him, thus according to what is right, we accept your confession as to set free, there arises the knowledge of his emancipation, and he that. For that, O king, is custom in the discipline of the noble knows: "Rebirth has been destroyed. The higher life has been ones,76 that whosoever looks upon his fault as a fault, and fulfilled What had to be done has been accomplished After rightfully confesses it, shall attain to self-restraint in future.' this present life there will be no beyond!" 101 When he had thus spoken, Ajätasattu the king said to 98 'Just, O king, as if in a mountain fastness there were a the Blessed One: 'Now, Lord, we would fain go. We are busy, pool of water, clear, translucent, and serene; and a man, standing and there is much to do'

THE SOURCE MATERIALS 65 64 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA 4 .. From which we may infer that, as respects those matters, he saw no 'Do, O king, whatever seemeth to thee fit ' differences between himself and the other teachers Then Ajätasattu the king, pleased and delighted with the 5. So that the power of Iddhi, of hearing heavenly sounds, and of knowing words of the Blessed One, arose from his seat, and bowed to other people's thoughts, are apparently supposed to be common ground the Blessed One, and keeping him on the right hand as he passed between the Buddhists and the other sects They are included in our him, departed thence." ... Sutta because they are supposed to be part of the advantage of life in an Order-in any Order, that is, not only the Buddhist 102. Now the Blessed One, not long after Ajatasattu the 6. Majjhima II, 37, 38. Perhaps the pe is meant to be supplied from the king had gone, addressed the brethren, and said: twenty-seventh Sutta just quoted-the difference, however, as we have 'This king, brethren, was deeply affected, he was touched in seen, is not of great importance 7. The oldest case of the technical use of the word, so far as I know, is in the heart. If, brethren, the king had not put his father to death, that introductory story of the Maha Vibhanga on the fourth Pārajika (Vin. righteous man and righteous king, then would the clear and III, 87). This is later than the Old Commentary on the Patimokkha, spotless eye for the truth have arisen in him even as he sat from which it incorporates many passages, and this again is later, of there. 77 course, than the Patimokkha itself. Neither the Five nor the six Abhiñnas are given as groups among the Thus spake the Blessed One. The brethren were pleased and groups of Fives and Sixes in the Anguttara. The word Abhinña is used delighted at his words. in the divisions containing the Fivesand Sixes exclusively in its ordinarv sense (III, 277, 451; comp IV, 348) And this is the more instructive as NOTES what were afterwards called the Six Abhinñas are actually given in full (IV, § 17-19, § 6-11) in the same words as in the Akankheyya Sutta [BY RHYS DAVIDS] (No. 6 of the Majjhima, translated in my 'Buddhist Suttas'), and very nearly as in our Sutta, here under discussion But they are not called 1. Details a-d (though the fact is not referred to here) are the opposites of Abhiññās the three bad acts of the body, and the four bad acts of speech kāya- and 8 Compare also A. I, 100; II, 249; III, 3, 9, 277. vaci-duccaritani, so often referred to in the Suttas, and in the Abhidhamma 9. For a list of twenty-one laymen Arahats see A. III, 451; and there are The three others (of the mind), making up the ten given in my manual, other instances recorded p. 142, are omitted here bécause they belong to the higher morality 10. A good summary of this is in the Sigalovada Sutta, an 'abstract of which 2. Buddhaghosa (p. 219) says that though the Four Arupa Vimokkhas are is given in my Manual, pp. 143 foll not explicitly mentioned, they are to be understood (thus making up the 1 Translated in 'Vinaya Texts' (S.B E.). Eight Samäpattis). This may be so: but it gives the impression of a later 12. That is, of course, 'the best course of life' with the connotation of celibacy writer reading his own opinion into the older text They are put into the The German 'Wandel' is a good rendering of Cariya. We have no text at Potthapada, pp. 183, 184, and it is difficult to see why they should expression so good See Samyutta V, 16, 17. not have also been inserted here, if they were really implied. 13 Milinda I, 31 (of my translation). 3 Nos 11 and 12 are possibly meant, both here and in all the other Suttas, 14 Ibid., I, 51; compare I, 101 to be omitted. The wording is ambiguous Buddhaghosa, who talks 15. Gogerly s translation of the first part of this Sutta, and Burnouf's trans- here (see p 268) of nos 10-13 as the Eightfold pañña, apparently means lation of the whole of it, have been reprinted in Grimblot's 'Sept Suttas to include them (he could not otherwise get eight) But the argument of Palis' These versions, of remarkable merit for the time when they were the Mahali seems to exclude them The texts always jump from the last made, are full of mistakes which the since-published editions of the words of 10 to the last words of 13 Now as, in the Mahali, no. 12 is Commentary, and of numerous allied texts, enable us now to avoid I excluded, it is clear that there, at least, only nos. 10 and 13 are meant have not thought it necessary to point out the numerous passages, And.there is no difference between the phraseology in the Mahali and occurring indeed in nearly every sentence, in which the present translation that used in the other Suttas.

66 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 67 differs from theirs. It should be mentioned here, however, that Burnouf 23. According to Buddhaghosa (p. 142) he was one of the teachers who has missed the whole point of the dialogue by misunderstanding the went about naked constantly repeated phrase sanditthikam samanna-phalam from which this 24: Akiriyam vyākāsi Gogerly interprets this: 'he replied by affirming that title is taken. He renders it throughout as meaning 'foreseen and general there are no future rewards and punishments.' Burnouf has simply: fruit', which is grammatically impossible as regards sanditthikam, and 'm' a donné une réponse vaine ' But the corresponding word in the rests on a false derivation as regards samañña. This last word means, of subsequent sections summarises the theory of the teacher questioned course, 'samanaship, being a samana, living as a samana, a recluse, a On this theory, compare A. I, 62; V I. 235 religieux.' 25 In the text the framework of the interview is repeated each time in the 16. Jivakassa komārabhaccassa. Buddhaghosa (Sum. I, 133) naturally follows same words as above .. Only the answers differ. The answers all recur in the compilers of the Khandakas (V. I, 269) in interpreting the adjective the Majjhima I, 513 foll as 'brought up by the Prince. ' But see the note at 'Vinaya Texts,' II, 174; 26. There is a good deal in both the Buddhist and the Jaina texts about this which shows that the more likely meaning is 'the bringer-up of children' Makkhali Gosāla, whose followers were called Ajīvakas, and who was (child-doctor) Several cures, however, wrought by him are recorded; regarded, from the Buddhist point of view, as the worst of the sophists. and the patients are always adults. There is no other reference at all to his Some of the Jaina passages, and also Buddhaghosa here, are referred to by being a child-doctor, and the Khandaka which gives the interpretation Hoernle, 'Uvāsaka dasāo,' pp. 108 ff : and in the Appendixes. The princi- is a very ancient document pal Pițaka passages are M. I, 31, 198, 238, 250, 483, 516, 524. S I, 66, 68, 17. See the note in my 'Buddhist Suttas,' p. 1. Buddhaghosa (p. 139) says III, 69, 211; IV, 398. A. I, 33, 286; III, 276, 384 V. I, 8, 291; II, 111, 130, she was the daughter of the king of Kosala 165, 284; IV, 74. See also Jät. I, 493 and G. V, 68 As the sect is thrice 18 This is interesting, as it shows that the year, for the compilers of our mentioned in the Asoka Edicts as receiving royal gifts, it is certain that it Sutta, began in Sāvana (middle of July to middle of August), that is, retained an important position for several centuries at least See Senart, with the rainy season There were three Uposatha days in each month, 'Inscriptions de Piyadasi,' II. 82, 209. on the 7th, 14th, and 15th day of the month. The full moon night of From the beginning of the answer down to the end of p. 53 recurs at Kattika (middle of October to middle of November) is called Komudi S III, 211, and the rest of it at ibid, p. 212, and the first part of the answer is (from Kumud2, a white water-lily), because that flower is supposed to ascribed at ibid., p. 69 to Pūraņa Kassapa bloom then. Burnouf is wrong in translating Komudi as the name of the 27. Sabbe sattā, sabbe pāņā, sabbe bhūtā, sabbe jīvā. Buddhaghosa gives details month of these four classes of living beings, showing how they are meant to 19 The same lines recur, but in a different order, at Jāt I, 105. Dosina, the include all that has life, on this earth, from men down to plants The etymology of which puzzled Childers and also Buddhaghosa (p. 141), is explanation is very confused, and makes the terms by no means mutually jyotsnā exclusive They are frequently used in the same order in the Jaina-Sūtras, 0 Appeva nama. Both Gogerly and Burnouf take this to mean 'to a certainty,' but compare D. I, 179, 205; V. II, 85, 262 and Professor Jacobi renders them accordingly: 'Every sentient being, 21. Pakkhandino, 'rushers forth ' The exact meaning of some of these military every insect, every living thing, whether animal or vegetable. 'Jaina- Sūtras,' II, xxv. This is much better; but we have, in our version, to give terms is still uncertain, and was apparently uncertain to Buddhaghosa They all recur, with some differences of reading, in the Milinda (p 331, the sense in which the Buddhists supposed Gosāla to have taken the words. in a later and much longer list), and also in the Anguttara (IV, 107), as the names of the constituent elements of a standing army 28 Compare the corresponding theory of the Jains as given in the Uttara- 22. Burnouf has made a sad mess of this important and constantly repeated dhyayana Sutra in Jacobi's Jaina-Sutras, Vol. ii, p. 213: and that of Purana Kassapa quoted in Anguttara III, 383 clause. He has: 'Is it then possible, Sir, that one should declare to them (that is, to the craftsmen just mentioned) in this world, such a result (of 29 Buddhaghosa gives the details 'babyhood, playtime, trial time, erect their actions) as foreseen and as the general fruit of their conduct?' But time, learning time, ascetic time, prophet time, and prostrate time' with the king asks the Buddha to tell him (the king himself) whether the (very necessary) comments on each. One may compare Shakespeare's members of the Order derive, from their life, any benefit corresponding 'Seven Ages of Man'

to that which the craftsmen derive from theirs. 30. Ājīva. The Siamese edition reads ājīvaka. 31. I think this is the right reading, but don't know what it means ..

68 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 69 32. This answer recurs S. III, 307, M I, 515 (compare Dh. S. 1215, 1362, 1364), as the view of a typical sophist. life. But it seems more in accord with the next paragraph to refer them

33. Sammag-gato. Buddhaghosa gives here no explanation of this word, but to the life

the Jataka Commentary on Jat III, 305 says it means the man who has 40. Gahapati, which Buddhaghosa takes here in the sense of peasant, ryot attained the highest fruit; that is, Arahatship. Gato is used here in the 41. Pātimokkha-samvara-samvuto. Buddhaghosa, I think, takes this to mean

same sense as it has in Tathagato, in gatatto (in the Nigantha paragraph 'restrained according to the rules of the Patimokkha.'

below), and in vijjā-gato (S.N. 730, 733, 743), that is, who has not only 42 On the following important and constantly repeated paragraph compare attempted to go to, but has actually reached, the aim (common alike to M. I, 180, 268; K. V. 424-6, 463-4; Mil 367; Asl. 400, etc.

the orthodox Vedantist Brahmans and to each of the various schools of 43. Na nimittaggāhī hoti nānuvyanjanaggāhī The phrase nimittam ganhāti

independent, dissenting, thinkers and recluses) of the conquest over means either to seize upon anything as the object of one's thought to the

ignorance, of the grasp of truth exclusion of everything else (see for instance, Vin. I, 183, and Buddha-

34 Indriyani, the five senses, and the mind as a sixth. ghosa's note on it given in the 'Vinaya Texts,' II, 9), or to seize upon the 35. Ahutiyo. See Buddhavamsa XXVII, 10; Katha Vatthu 550. The phrase is outward sign of anything so keenly as to recognise what it is the mark of

omitted in the parallel passage in the Jaina 'Sutrakritanga pointed out by (Vin. III, 17). And when the object is a person of the other sex this

Jacobi, 'Jaina-Sutras,' II, xxiv. phrase is the idiom used for our 'falling in love with'. Buddhaghosa

36. The series of riddles in this difficult passage is probably intended to be an gives, as an instance of the nimitta, the general conclusion that the object

ironical imitation of the Nigantha's way of talking. Gogerly has caught seen, heard, etc., is a man or woman; of the anuvyañjana, the perception the general sense fairly enough, but his version is very free and wrong as of the detail that he or she is smiling, talking, etc.

to two of the words, and it gives no idea of the oracular form in which 44. Avyāseka, literally 'with no besprihkling' (of evil, says Buddhaghosa).

the original is couched. Burnouf's rendering is quite wide of the mark. 45 A small volume might be written on the various expansions of this text

The first of the 'Four Restraints' is the well-known rule of the Jains in the Pitakas Several whole Dialogues are devoted to it, and various

not to drink cold water, on the ground that there are 'souls' in it. See the Suttas in others of the oldest texts. Buddhaghosa has many pages upon

discussion in the Milinda (II, 85-91 of my translation) it here, and deals with it also at length in the Visuddhi Magga and else- Professor Jacobi ('Jaina-Sūtras,' II, xxiii) thinks the 'Four Restraints' where What is above added in brackets explains the principal points of

are intended to represent the four vows kept by the followers of Parśva. what is implied, according to the Pitakas, in this famous passage, the

But this surely cannot be so, for these vows were quite different. Buddhist analogue to St. Paul's: 'Whether therefore ye eat or drink, or

7 The text repeats the whole paragraph put above (p 27 of the text) into whatsoever ye do, do all to the glory of God' (I Cor. x 31).

the mouth of the Eel-wriggler. By the real fact underlying any action is meant that, in the Buddhist 38. Of these six teachers, Purana denies the evil Karma in a bad act and vice theory, behind the action (going, seeing, etc ) there is no ego, no actor versa; Ajita, in preaching annihilation at death, shuts out the possibility (goer, seer, etc.), that cari be called a 'soul' (Abbhantare attā nāma āloketā

of any effect to be worked by Karma; and Makkhali rejects both Karma vā viloketā vā n' atthi), but that there is a psychological explanation suffi-

and its effect. The theory of Pakudha seems to exclude responsibility; cient, of itself, without the soul-theory ..

the Nigantha simply begs the question, by asserting that a Nigantha has 46. 'Consider the fowls of the air,' etc. (Matt. vi .. 26).

attained the end; and Sanjaya gives no answer at all No man can call me servant, and I wander-

The only one of these six theories of life on which independent evidence So said the Exalted One-

is at present accessible is that of the Nigantha (the Jain theory). But no At will, o'er all the earth, on what I find

attempt has yet been made to summarise it, or set it out in a manner I feel no need of wages, or of gain, intelligible to Western readers It is very much to be hoped that this So let the rain pour now, if it likes, to-night

want may soon be supplied by one or other of the excellent scholars (Dhaniya Sutta 8)

familiar with the texts. And see the context in my 'American Lectures', p. 168.

39. Büddhaghosa applies these last two adjectives to the truth, not to the 47. Abhijjham loke pahaya Gogerly renders 'banishes desire from him,' leaving out loke altogether, and rendering abhijjha in defiance both of the

70 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 71 nothing else to fasten on) were apt to fasten on to the Buddhist Viñnana derivation and of the traditional explanation of the word. Even Burnouf as a possible point of reconciliation with their own theory: Even an (who frequently uses 'desire' for words in the Pali meaning 'lusts' or admirer of the Buddha (one Säti, a member of the Order) went so far as 'excitement') has here 'cupidité' to tell the Buddha himself that he must, as he admitted transmigration, 48 So Buddhaghosa here (p. 211). But the Dhamma Sangani 1156, 1157 have meant that the Viñnana did not really depend upon, was not really explains it as torpor of mind and body bound up with, the body, but that it formed the link in transmigration .. 49. Aloka-sañni, literally 'whose ideas are light ' Neumann ('Reden des In perhaps the most earnest and emphatic of all the Dialogues (M .. I, 256 Gotamo,' I, 434, etc) translates 'loving the light,' which may be the ff.), the Buddha meets and refutes at length this erroneous representation right connotation. Burnouf has 'being aware of his visual sensation' (de ofhis view. But it still survives. I know two living writers on Buddhism son regard), which is certainly wrong who (in blissful ignorance of the Dialogue in question) still fasten upon 50 Inam ādāya Neumann has 'oppressed by debt,' but Buddhaghosa (p. 212) Buddha the opinion he so expressly refused to accept. says 'taking goods on interest'; this is confirmed by Gat. IV, 256, V, 436. 58. Buddhaghosa explains that, if the Bhiksu have his ears unpierced, so 51. From the beginning of § 68 the text, though here split up into paragraphs will the image, and so on for the convenience of the reader, is really one long sentence or paragraph 59 This old simile occurs already in the Satapatha-Brāhmana IV 3, 3, 16. of much eloquence and force in the Pali; and the peroration, leading on 60. The point is the similarity. Buddhaghosa explains that the Karanda is to the Jhanas, is a favourite passage recurring M. I, 71; Vin I, 294; Mil. not a basket (as Burnouf renders it), but the skin which the snake sloughs 84. The five similes are to be taken, in order, as referring to the Five off; and that the scabbard is like the sword, whatever the sword's shape. Hindrances (Nivaranā) given in § 68: The Dhamma Sangani 1152 gives He adds that of course a man could not take a snake out of its slough six hindrances, and M. I, 360-3 gives eight. with his hand. He is supposed in the simile to do so in imagination. 52 Viveka, 'separation'-physically of the body, 'seclusion'; intellectually, 61 Iddhi, literally well-being, prosperity The four Iddhis of a king are of the objects of thought, 'discrimination'; ethically, of the heart, 'being personal beauty, length of life, strong health, and popularity (M Sud. separate from the world' We have no word in English suggesting these Sutta in my 'Buddhist Suttas,' pp. 259-61) The Iddhis of Gotama when three, all of which are implied. The stress is upon separation from at home, as a boy, were the possession of a beautiful garden, soft the world, taking 'world' in the sense of all the hindrances to spiritual clothing, comfortable lodging, pleasant music, and good food (A. 1, 145) .. progress, and especially of the five chief Hindrances (Nīvaranā) just Worldly Iddhi is distinguished from spiritual at A. I, 93. Buddhaghosa above set out. Buddhaghosa has nothing here, but compare Asl. 166 53. Ekodibhāva Compare Asl. 169, Senart in Mahāvastu I, 554, and the gives nine sorts of Iddhi, mostly intellectual, at Asl. 91, and compare 237. There are no examples in the Pitakas of concrete instances of any of notes in J P. I S., 1884, p 32 ff. these except the last; but see S .. IV, 289, 290; A. III, 340, 341, M P.S. 43 54 Upekhako, literally 'looking on,' that is, looking on rival mental states 62 The point of the comparison, says Buddhaghosa (223), is that if he is in with equal mind. Imperturbable, impartial, tolerant, unsusceptible, trouble and has lost his way he might be in doubt. But if calm and secure stoical, composed, are all possible renderings, and all unsatisfactory. he can.tell the difference The ten kinds of Upekkha, 'equanimity,' translated into English from 63 Sa-uttara and anuttara Unless the interpretation given in the Dhamma Sinhalese by Spence Hardy (Manual, p. 505), can now be corrected Sangani 1292, 1293, 1596, 1597 ('occupied with rebirth in heaven, and from the Pali at Asl. 172. 55 This is a favourite description of the body (See M. I, 500; II, 17; S. IV, occupied with Arahatship') reveals a change in the use of terms, the evil 83; Gät I, 146, tc .. ) The words for erasion, abrasion, are cunningly cho- disposition, in this case only, is put first. 64 This is based on the Indian theory of the periodic destruction and reno- sen (ucchadana, parimaddana). They are also familiar technical terms of the Indian shampooer, and are so used above (p. 7, § 16 of the text). The vation of the universe, each of which takes countless years to accomplish double meaning must have been clearly present to the Indian hearer, and 65 Vanna, 'colour' the words are, therefore, really untranslatable. 66. The three villages correspond to the three stages of being, the three 56. Vinnäna 'The five senses, sensations arising from objects, and all emo- Bhumis,-the world of lust, the world of form, and the formless tions and intellectual processes,' says Buddhaghosa (p. 221) worlds (the Kāma, Rūpa, and Arūpa Lokas). 57. In spite of this and similar passages the adherents of the soul theory (having

72 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 73

67. Dibba-cakkhu: Sce the note below on § 102 at the end of this Sutta. Ancient Grammatical Literature 68 This paragraph forms the subject of the discussion in the Katha Vatthu III, 9 (p. 250) The mere knowledge of the general fact of the action of Karma is there distinguished from the Dibba-cakkhu, the Heavenly The passage is quoted from S. N. Dasgupta's A History of Eye; and the instance of Sariputta is quoted, who had that knowledge Indian Philosophy, vol. iii, Cambridge 1922, pp. 515-6. but not the Heavenly Eye. As he was an Arahat it follows that the posse- The special significance of the passage, as Dasgupta ssion of the Heavenly Eye was not a necessary consequence of Arahatship rightly insists, is that our ancient grammatical literature Buddhaghosa adds (p. 224) that the sphere of vision of the Heavenly preserves some conclusive evidence of the actual writings of the Lokäyatas having once been in circulation in spite of the Eye did not extend to the Formless Worlds On the Dhamma-cakkhu, 'the Eye for the Truth,' see below, p 110, § 21 of the text. fact that no such writing has survived for us.

68. Vitisañcarante is Buddhaghosa's reading. The Siamese has Vithim Compare M I, 279. Ancient Grammatical Literature 70 Åsavas, Deadly Floods, another untranslatable term. Neumann has Illusion (Wahn); Burnouf has defilement (souillures) They are some- 'Fortunately we have still further conclusive evidence that the times the three here mentioned (M. 1, 23, 155; A. I, 167; S. IV, 256, etc ); Lokāyata-śāstra with its commentary existed as early as the but speculation, theorising (Ditthi) is added as a fourth in the M P.S. time of Kātyāyana, i.e. about 300 BC. There is a Vārtika rule and elsewhere Unfortunately, the world has not been yet found in its associated with VII. 3. 45 "varņakā-tāntave upasamkhyānam," concrete, primary, sense; unless indeed Buddhaghosa's statement (at that the word varņaka becomes varnaka in the feminine to Asl 48) that well-seasoned spirituous liquors were called āsavā be taken literally. It is therefore impossible to be sure what is the simile that mean a blanket or a wrapper (prāvarana), and Patañjali (about underlies the use of the word in its secondary, ethical sense Perhaps 150 BC), in interpreting this värtika-sūtra, says that the object after all it is the idea of overwhelming intoxication, and not of flood or of restricting the formation of the word varnaka only to the sense taint or ooze, that we ought to consider. of a cotton or woollen wrapper is that in other senses the feminine Subhuti in quoting the above passage from Buddhaghosa (in the form would be varņikā or vartika (e.g. meaning a commentary) Abhidhāna Padīpikā Sūci, p. 43) reads părivas throughout for pārivās 71. Kamāsavā, with special reference to the taint of hankering after a future as in the case of the Bhaguri commentary of the Lokayata-

life in the sensuous plane (Kama Loka); that is, in the world varņikā bhāgurī lokāyatasya, vartikā bhāgurī lokāyatasya. Thus 72. Bhavāsava, with special reference to the taint of hankering after a future it seems to be quite certain that there was a book called the life in the plane of form and the formless plane (the Rūpa and Arūpa Lokayata on which there was at least one commentary earlier Lokas) that is, in heaven .. than 150 BC or even earlier than 300 BC, the probable date of 73. Avijjāsavā, with special reference to ignorance of the Four Great Truths, Katyayana, the author of the vārtika-sūtra." just above summarised 74. The simile recurs M. I, 279; A. I, 9. Compare for the words sippisambuka Gāt V, 197; A. III, 395; Trenckner, 'Pali Miscellany,' p 60. 75 Because, as Buddhaghosa points out, this is really Arahatship, Nirvana; and it was to this, to Arahatship, that all the rest led up. Arthaśāstra 76. Ariyanam. That is, either of previous Buddhas, or perhaps of the Arahats 77. The Dhamma-cakkhu (Eye for the Truth) is a technical term for conver- The following extract is from the Introductory Part of sion, for entering on the Path that ends in Arahatship. It is higher than the Kauțilya's Arthaśāstra (1 2 1-12) Heavenly Eye (dibba-cakkhu, above, p. 82 of the text, § 95) which sees The special importance of the passage consists in being other people's previous births, and below the Eye of Wisdom (paññā- the earliest available classification of the philosophical views cakkhu) which is the wisdom of the Arahat (Itivuttaka, p. 52, § 61) of ancient India .. What is more significant for us is to note

74 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MATERIALS 75 that in this classification Lokāyata is definitely mentioned as arguments (hetu)-dharma and adharma which belong to Vedic one of the three logic-based philosophies (anvīksikī: translated by Kangle simply as 'philosophy', though Vātsyāyana in lore, gain and loss which belong to varta, and good policy and

the introduction to his commentary on the Nyaya-sūtra bad policy which belong to dandaniti; and moreover, the relative

clearly interprets the word in the sense of logic). As for the strength and weakness of all these-benefits the people, keeps word Yoga, mentioned by Kautilya as another such philoso- the thinking steady both in calamities and prosperities, and phy, Sanskritists as eminent as M. M. Kuppuswami Sastri also brings about expertness in knowledge, speech and actions. and M. M. Phanibhusana Tarkavagisa convincingly argue that this was but an ancient term referring to the Nyāya- 12. Logic is ever accepted to be the lamp of all the branches

Vaiśeșika of learning, the means for all kinds of activities and the basis of all virtues (dharma) Arthaśāstra

[IEXI] Epics and Purānas The First Chapter (adhikarana) Section 1: The enumeration of the branches of learning (vidyā) Philosophical literature apart, there are a number of references and the establishment of (the utility of) logic (ānvīksiki). to the Lokāyata/Cārvāka views in the epics and Purāņa, 1. The branches of learning are: Logic, the three Vedas presumably indicating its wide prevalence in ancient and

(trayi), agriculture, cattle-raising and trade (collectively called early medieval periods. However, as J. Muir, in his article

vārta) and the technique of ruling (dandanīti) read in 1861 and published in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, vol.xix, pp 299 ff, has extensively quoted these 2. According to the followers of Manu (they are only three): references, the readers are referred to his article included in the three Vedas, vārtā and dandanīti. part ii of the present collection. (See No 20). 3. For, logic is only a special branch of Vedic lore 4. According to the followers of Brhaspati (they are only two): vārtā and dandanīti 5. For, Vedic lore is only a kind of cloak (samvarana) for Nyāyasutra with

those who are wise in the ways of worldly life Vātsyāyana's Commentary

6. According to the followers of Usanas, there is only one branch of learning, namely, dandanīti. The Nyāyasūtra of Gautama (also called Gotama or Akșapāda)

7. For, (the success of) various efforts put according to all is the basic and earliest text of the Nyaya system. The work

the branches of learning is rooted in it. is divided into five adhyäya-s, each of which is further divided into two ähnika-s. The total number of the Sūtras is 528. It is 8. However, Kautilya says that the branches of learning are very difficult to be conclusive about its date. Various dates four and only four. have been proposed by various scholars: AD 200-500 (Jacobi); 9. The (common) essential characteristic of all the branches not older than fourth century Bc (Bodas); middle of fourth of learning (vidyätva) consists in the fact that, with them as the century and second century Bc. (Kuppuswami)

means, one can learn the (nature of) dharma and artha. A vast literature has grown upon this early sutra-work of

10. Logic-based philosophy (ānvīksiki) (is represented by Gautama and the Nyaya system may be said to have developed almost exclusively through the commentaries and sub- the following three): Samkhya, Yoga and Lokāyata. commentaries on it written in later times. Thus, to mention 11. (Logic), by critically examining with the means of proper a few important ones, Vātsyāyana (about AD 300) wrote the

76 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 77

Bhasya on the Sūtras, Uddyotakara (about AD 635) wrote [Again] the peacock's cry may as well be imitated by a human the Vartika on the Bhasya, Vacaspati (AD 840) wrote the being; even in such a case, because of the similarity of the sound, Tātparyatikā on the Vartika; and Udayana (AD. 984) wrote there may be a wrong inference. the Parisuddhi on the Tatparyatikā. We have given here in literal translation the Sutras of Elucidation Gautama and Vatsyayana's Bhasya bearing on mainly two It is objected that the inference of the past, present and future topics, most commonly attributed to the Lokāyata/Cārvāka: (i) the denial of inference as a source of knowledge and (ii) the may be wrong, because of the irregularity of the probans. The denial of a self distinct from the body. To the texts are also typical example of the inference of something belonging to the added the Elucidation (in summary) by Mm. Phanibhușana past is the inference of past rain from the fullness of the river. Tarkavāgīśa. But the fullness of the river is an irregular probans for the

Nyāyasūtra with inference of rain, inasmuch as this fullness may as well be due to the obstruction caused by an embankment. The typical Vātsyāyana's Commentary example of the inference of something belonging to the future is Adhyāya II, Āhnika 1 the inference of future rain from the movement of the ants with their eggs. But such a movement is an irregular probans, in- A. CRITICAI EXAMINATION OF INFERENCE asmuch as it may be due to the damage done to their habitation .. The typical examples of the inference of something belonging Bhāsya to the present is the inference of the peacock from the peacock's The critical examination of perception is over. Now inference cry. But such a sound is an irregular probans, inasmuch as it is being critically examined. may be due to the similarity of the human voice imitating the peacock's cry. Sūtra 37 The evidence of irregularity in these three examples causes [Objection] Inference is 'not valid' (a-pramāna), because [in doubt as to the possibility of valid probans in general. There- the typical examples of inference] there is irregularity (vyabhicāra) fore, inference is not valid; it cannot prove anything belonging due to embankment (rodha), damage (upaghata) and similarity to the past, future or present. In other words, this shows that (sādrśya) // ii. 1.37 // inference as such is unreal, because the probans of any inference can similarly be shown to be irregular. Bhāsya It may be objected that if inference itself is viewed as unreal, [Objection explained] The expression 'not valid' [in the sūtra] how can one claim that it has no validity? Is there any sense in implies the incapacity of determining the object in any of the saying that the flower blossoming in the sky has no fragrance? three times [i e. past, present and future]. [Thus, in the typical The answer is that what is denied here is the alleged validity of examples of inference], the fullness of the river may as well be what is called inference by others. What is actually unreal may tnderstood as due to embankment; even in such a case there wrongly appéar to be real. In the same way, though inference may be the wrong inference that the deity above has showered. is actually unreal, it wrongly appears to be real to others. [Similarly] the movement of the ants with their eggs may as well be due to damage done to their habitation; even in such a Sūtra 38

case there may be the wrong inference that it is going to shower .. [Answer] No [i.e. inference is not invalid], because [the

78 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 79. probans for the inference ot past rain, future rain and present Phanibhūșana discusses many important issues relating to the peacock, viz., the fullness of the river, the movement of the ants nature and validity of inference. with their eggs and the sound of the peacock's cry respectively] Uddyotakara, already in his explanation of the previous are different from [the fullness of the river due to] the embank- sutra, points to the futility of the objections raised against the ment in a part of the river, [the movement of the ants with their validity of inference The objector himself has to take recourse eggs due to] fear (träsa) [caused by the damage done to their to an-inference to prove the invalidity of inference, his,own habitation] and [the sound having] similarity [with the peacock's probans being the irregularity of the probantia of three types cry when the human voice imitates it]. //ii. 1.38// of inference. But this is flatly self-contradictory. The objector cannot deny inference and, at the same time, takè recourse to Bhāsya an inference to prove this. Further, does the objector intend to [Answer] This is not irregularity of inference, but the illusion prove the invalidity of inference in general, or only of certain (abhimana) of inference in what is not an inference. How? specific cases of it? The former alternative is impossible, in- Something not being specifically determined cannot be a real asmuch as the objector has at least to assume his own inference probans .. A person observing [in the river] the rain-water as to be valid The latter alternative entails the 'fallacy of proving different from the water previously existing-the swiftness of what is already proved' (siddhasādhanadosa), for it is already the current and the floating of profuse foam, fruits, leaves and accepted by everybody that the specific cases of inference wood, etc-infers, from the fullness of the river, that the deity committing the fallacy of the irregular probans are invalid above has showered, and not from the mere swelling of the The Cārvākas do not admit any pramāna except perception river. There is the legitimate inference 'It will rain', only when According to them, that which is not perceived cannot be admit- there is movement everywhere of the ants with their eggs, and ted as existent: its non-apprehension proves its non-existence. not from stray cases of it. From the absence of the knowledge There is no pramāna like inference, etc. Human activity (loka- of the specific difference in the form 'This is not the cry of a vyavahāra) is based on probability. From the perception of a peacock, but a sound merely imitating it'-there is the wrong specific smoke, people are led to believe in the (probable) inference [of the present peacock]. However, for one who can existence of fire there and, when this fire is actually obtained discriminate the real peacock's cry, from the sound merely there, people are wrongly led to believe in a pramāna. Udayana, imitating it, the specific sound of the peacock's cry, when in his Nyāya-kusumāñjali (iii. 6), refutes this position. He argues apprehended, becomes the probans, [of a right inference], as it that probability is a form of doubt and, from the Carvaka happens in the case of the serpents, etc .. , [i.e. the serpent can point of view, there is no explanation for such a doubt: when correctly differentiate the actual sound of a peacock from other the fire is actually perceived, its existence is positively proved, sounds resembling it, and can thus rightly infer the presence of and so long as the fire is not perceived, it is proved to be non- the peacock therefrom]. existent in the Carväka view, according to which the un- Therefore, the error is that of one who [wrongly] infers, and perceived does not exist. Thus, the perception of a specific not of the inferential process itself. In other words, [the error is smoke cannot result in any doubt of the nature of probability of one who] wants to infer from an unspecified observation a concerning fire; the absence of the perception of fire proves specific object which can be proved only by a specific ground. it to be non-existent Further, the Carvaka assertion that whatever is not perceived is proved to be non-existent leads to Elucidation sheer absurdities. One leaving one's home does not perceive After explaining the main points of Vātsyāyana above, his relations, and therefore should believe in the non-existence

80 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS. 81

of these relations and even of his home itself. There will be no condition, no inference is possible. But it is impossible for the point for such a man to return home. Naiyāyikas to prove that a probans is absolutely free from all The Carvakas, however, propose to disprove the validity of possible adventitious condition. The mere non-perception inference also on various other grounds. Their main argument of any adventitious condition cannot be, for a Naiyāyika, a is that inference is impossible, because it is impossible to establish positive proof of the non-existence of any such condition. any vyapti or invariable relation between the probans and the Only from the Cärväka point of view that which is not per- probandum. Vyāpti is said to be ascertained (positively) by the ceived is non-existent-a view which the Naiyāyikas want, 'knowledge of co-existence' (sahacāra-grahana) and (negatively) above all, to refute. Nor can it be claimed that the absence by the 'absence of the knowledge of any contrary instance of of all adventitious conditions is proved by inference, because this co-existence' (vyabhicāra-agrahana) But it is impossible to absence is a precondition for inference itself. ascertain the absence of any contrary instance of co-existence, Thus, in short, it is impossible to prove that in an inference, because there is always the scope for doubt of the probans as the probans is absolutely free from all possible adventitious existing without the probandum. How can one be absolutely conditions./ The probans of an inference may be vitiated by the sure that smoke exists in no case of the absence of fire? presence of an adventitious condition in some possible place or In a more sophisticated form, the Cārvāka position is as time beyond the range of actual perception Therefore, because follows: The Naiyayikas claim that vyāpti is an 'uncondi- of the possibility of being vitiated by an adventitious condition, tional relation' (anaupadhika-sambandha) or a 'natural relation' no inference is beyond doubt. (svābhāvika-sambandha), i e a relation free from any 'adventitious Udayana answers this argument by showing that the doubt condition' (upadhi). Thus, e.g., fire is inferred from smoke, concerning inference, based on the possible existence of an because the relation between fire and smoke is a natural one and adventitious condition in some place or time beyond the range not a relation due to any adventitious condition. Phanibhūsana of actual perception, is inadmissible for the Cārvāka himself, examines at length various definitions of upādhi or adventitious according to whom nothing that is not actually perceived can condition. Of these, the usually accepted definition is that an be possible. Thus, since, this alleged doubt concerning inference adventitious condition is one which invariably co-exists with is itself inadmissible, inference must be admitted as valid. the probandum but not with the probans. Thus in the wrong Says Udayana: śamkā cet anumā asti eva, na cet śamkā tatastarām. inference, 'This contains smoke because it contains fire'-the This means, 'If you admit that there is doubt, then inference probans is fire, the probandum is smoke and the adventitious has got to be admitted; if there is no doubt, then all the better condition is 'the presence of wet fuel'. The 'presence of wet (for inference)'. fuel' invariably co-exists with the probandum 'smoke' but not But the Carvakas may argue that even admitting the refuta- with the probans 'fire'. For example, in the red-hot iron-ball, tion of their above argument, how can the Naiyayikas com- fire exists without wet fuel. pletely eliminate the possibility of the irregularity or deviation With this idea of adventitious condition, we may proceed to (vyabhicara) of the probans-probandum relation? How can understand the Cärvaka position more fully. Since, according they positively prove the co-existence of the probans and the to the defenders of inference themselves, a real probans must probandum in all cases? Observed cases of this co-existence, be free from any adventitious condition, without a positive however numerous these may be, can never be equated to all proof that the probans is absolutely free from any adventitious cases, and it is well known that even the evidence of thousands

82 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 83 of cases is disproved by the evidence of a solitary contrary instance Therefore, there always remains a doubt concerning formulating a counter-śloka showing slight verbal variations

the invariability of the probans-probandum relation. with Udayana's śloka, but intended to rebut it. Before quoting To this Udayana answers: tarkah śamka-avadhih matah. This this counter-śloka, we may sum up Sriharsa's main arguments

means, 'Reductio is to be regarded as the dispeller of doubt'. In against Udayana.

other words, this doubt concerning the invariability of the Udayana claims that contradiction (vyāghāta) with practical probans-probandum relation is finally eliminated by a 'reductio' .. activity (pravrtti) dispels doubt concerning the invariable relation

Thus, in the inference of fire from smoke, the possible doubt between the probans and the probandum. But this is impossible.

is: Is smoke really invariably related to fire? This doubt is dis- A contradiction implies the contradicted, i.e. there must be

pelled by the following reductio: 'If smoke were not invariably two alternatives, one of which contradicts the other. In the related to fire, then smoke would have never been due to fire.' present context, the two alternatives are: (1) the doubt con-

But the fact is that smoke is due to fire. cerning the invariable relation, and (2) the practical activity

The Carvakas may argue that the reductio itself presupposes Therefore, to admit the contradiction means to admit (both

an invariable relation and as such, another tarka is necessary to these alternatives, i e. also the) presence of the doubt. In other

dispel the doubt concerning the invariable relation presupposed words, doubt is one of the supports (aśraya) of this contradiction.

by this tarka itself-and so on, ad infinitum. Thus, the doubt Wherever there is contradiction, there is doubt. Thus, far from concerning the invariable relation between the probans and dispelling the doubt, contradiction implies its presence. Śrīharsa

the probandum cannot really be dispelled by a tarka. expresses this by saying: vyāghātah yadi, śamkā asti This means, As against this, Udayan says: vyāghāta-avadhiḥ āśamkā. This 'If there is contradiction, there must be doubt'. If, in order to

means, 'Doubt is permissible only so long as there is no con- avoid this difficulty, Udayana goes to the extent of denying tradiction.' In other words, one can continue to doubt only so the contradiction, then, argues Sriharsa, it is all the better for

long as this doubt does not contradict one's own practical doubt, because there remains nothing to contradict it. So, he

activity. Thus a person cannot have any doubt concerning the adds: na cet śamkā tatastarām. This means, 'If not (i.e. if there is

invariable relation between smoke and fire inasmuch as, in his no contradiction), it is all the better for doubt:'

practical life, he unhesitatingly seeks fire for obtaining smoke. It cannot thus be said that contradiction is the dispefler of If he really has any doubt concerning the invariable relation doubt, and as such, the doubt concerning the invariable relation

between smoke and fire, why should he at all seek fire in order between the probans and the probandum remains ever un-

to obtain smoke? His own activity, therefore, is itself an indica- dispelled. If the invariable relation is never free from doubt, tion of the absence of the doubt. then tarka itself becomes doubtful; for tarka depends on an Thus, the full statement of Udayana, in the Nyāya-kusumāñ- invariable relation. It is thus futile to imagine that tarka dispels

jali iii. 7, is- doubt concerning the invariable relation. Argues Śrīharsa:

šamkā cet anumā asti eva, na cet śamkā tatastarām / vyāghāta- vyāghāta-avadhiḥ āśamkā tarkah samkā-avadhih kutah. This means,

avadhih āśamkā, tarkah śamkā-avadhiḥ mataḥ // 'How can contradiction dispel doubt, or how can reductio Sriharsa, the great exponent of Advaita Vedānta, in his dispel doubt?'

Khandana-khanda-khādya, proposes to refute elaborately the Therefore, as Śrīharsa claims, only a little variation in the above arguments of Udayana. He sums up his refutation by wordings makes Udayana's verse go in favour of Srīharsa's own view:

84 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 85 vyāghātah yadi śamkā asti, na cet śamkā tatastarām/ and others are not tenable. Even one, wanting to prove that vyāghāta-avadhih āsámkā tarkah šamka-avadhih kutah // As against this, Gangesa argues that Srīharsa is here distorting inference is invalid, has to depend upon inference itself. It is futile to claim that inference as such is invalid merely by pointing the real purport of Udayana's claim. The real point of Udayana is that a clash with practical activity removes the very possibility to certain cases of inference committing the fallacy of irregu- larity (vyabhicāra). A case of genuine inference is free from any of doubt. Udayana does not claim that 'contradiction', in the sense in which Srīharsa takes it, is the cause of the removal of irregularity. Thus, in short, the objection that inference is invalid cannot be sustained. doubt Gangesa further argues that even admitting Śrīharsa's interpretation of'contradiction', his conclusion does not follow. B. REFUIATION OF It is a fact that doubt is dispelled by the perception of specific BHŪTACAITANYA-VĀDA

characteristic. Thus, e g. when we have the doubt: 'Is this a Adhyāya III, Āhnika 2 pillar or a person?'-the perception of the specific characteristics Bhāșya of a person in the object like arms, legs, etc., dispels the doubt and results in the definite knowledge: 'This is a person ' But In this context, the Bhūtacaitanyavādin (i.e. one who admits how can this perception of specific characteristics remove the the consciousness of material elements) says: doubt? Only by contradicting the latter. Thus it is seen that the Sūtra 35 perception of specific characteristics, by contradicting the doubt, (Objection) The probantia for the inference of desire and removes it. Assuming Sriharsa's contention that contradiction implies the presence of two factors, one of which is doubt-he aversion are (exertion and its absence) As such, (consciousness)

cannot explain the fact of the removal of doubt by the perception cannot be denied to the bodies made of earth, etc , //iii. 2. 35//.

of specific characteristics. Bhāsya Srīharsa's other contention is that doubt concerning irregu- larity cannot be silenced by tarka. This tarka is dependent on a (Objection) Desire and aversion have, for their probantia, causal relation. However, though in the cases observed, the respectively, exertion and its absence. Thus it follows that

relation between the cause and the effect holds good, this is not knowledge, as well as desire and aversion, all belong to what is

bound to be so even in the unobserved cases. In other words, characterised by exertion and its absence Exertion and its

the causal relation cannot be a universal or invariable one. Thus, absence are observed to exist in the bodies-made of earth,

e.g. though in the cases observed, smoke is caused by fire, made of water, made of fire and made of air. As such, they there is no ground to assume that in all cases smoke is related to must be characterised by desire, aversion and knowledge, and

fire in the same way. must also be the loci of consciousness.

To this, Raghunatha replies that when the relation between Elucidation fire and smoke is observed in numerous cases, there actually results the ascertainment of a causal connection between fire as The cause and its effect must be located in the same sub-

such and smoke as such stratum. Thus, the effect-exertion or its absence-is located

After elaborately discussing all these, Phanibhūsana concludes in the body and hence the cause-desire or aversion-must that the objections raised against inference by the Carvākas also be located in the body. In the same way, knowledge being the cause of desire or aversion must also be located in the body

86 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 87 itself. It is concluded, therefore, that consciousness belongs to form of activity, as in the case of a piece of stone, etc., in which material elements .. the above probans (viz. the peculiar conjunction of the atoms)

Sūtra 36 is absent. Thus, exertion and its absence (as described above) are the probantia for the inference of desire and aversion. Such (Answer) (Consciousness does not belong to the body), exertion and its absence being observed in the atoms of earth, because exertion or its absence is observed even in the case of etc., the connection (i.e presence) of desire and aversion, too, an axe, etc. //iii. 2. 36// is proved in them and (from the presence of desire and aversion) Bhāsya is proved the presence of knowledge in them. It is, therefore, established that consciousness belongs to material elements. (Answer) Consciousness does not belong to the body. If it (Answer) The above (does not indicate) a valid ground, for be argued that the body is characterised by desire, aversion and (desire or aversion) is not apprehended in the jar, etc. To explain, knowledge -- because exertion and its absence are observed in from the peculiar conjunction of the carth-particles constituting it, it would as well be provcd that consciousncss belongs to the jar, ctc , excrtion in the form of a specific activity is inferred instruments like the axe. ctc., for exertion and its absence arc in them also. and (from the absence of a peculiar conjunction observed also in them leading to the formation of a compact body), the absence of Again, if it be said that on the basis of exertion or its absence exertion-i.e. the absence of a specific activity-is inferred in the relation (i.e. presence) of desire, etc., is proved in the body the sand-particles. Still, it is never admitted that 'carth or sand only; and exertion or its absence does not invariably point to is characterised by desire, aversion, internal effort and know- (the presence of desire, etc) in the case of instruments like the ledge, because exertion and its absence are observed to exist in axe, etc., the statement 'the bodies-made of earth, made of them.' Therefore, the ground mentioned by the expression tal- water, made of fire and made of air-are characterised by desirc, lingatvād icchā-dveșayoh (i e sūtra 35 above) is not a valid one aversion and knowledge, because exertion and its absence arc observed to exist in them' does not represent a valid ground. Elucidation (In short, the presence or absence of merc physical action is not According to the alternative interpretation of the previous a valid ground for the inference of consciousness.) sitra, attributed to the Bhūtacaitanyavadin, exertion means a (Objection) Let then (the implication of the previous sūtra, specific form of activity in the atoms of earth, etc, which viz .. ) 'the probantia for the inference of desire and aversion are leads, through a peculiar conjunction of the atoms, to the (exertion and its absence); and as such, consciousness cannot formation of the body. The presence of exertion in the atoms be denied to the bodies made of earth, etc.,' be interpreted in a establishes the presence of its cause-viz. desire-in them, different way (as follows). Exertion (ärambha) in the case of and finally, the presence of desire establishes the existence of material elements like earth, etc. (i. e. the atoms of earth, etc., consciousness in them, for desire is never possible without which constitute the body) means a specific form of activity consciousness Thus, the atoms being characterised by con- (pravrtti) which is inferred through the probans-viz. the sciousness, the material elements composed of them will also peculiar conjunction of the component parts (i.e. the atoms)- be so. in the bodies of beings moving (trasa) as well as stationary In answer, Vätsyayana contends that the alleged probantia (sthāvara). Absence of exertion is the absence of the specific for the inference of exertion and its absence-viz. the peculiar

88 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 89

conjunction of parts and its absence-are present in the case of form of downward movement) due to some other quality the atoms of a jar and sand also, for a jar is formed only when (viz. heaviness) and they are characterised by the absence of the atoms of carth are conjoined in a specific way and the atoms exertion (i.e. the absence of the said movement) when the quality of sand do not form a compact substance due to their inability (viz: heaviness) is made ineffective. In the same way, exertion to combine in a specific way. Thus, exertion and its absence and its absence, which are due to knowledge, desire and are proved in the atoms of a jar and sand, which, however, are aversion, should also reside in their own substratum, viz not characterised by desire and aversion. In other words, it material elements in general. This is, however, not actually so. follows that exertion and its absence are not invariable marks It is, therefore, proved that knowledge, desire, aversion and for desire and aversion, and hence they do not establish the internal effort are located in the employer (i e. the knower or presence of desire and aversion in the body. the self); while exertion and its absence are located in what is

Sūtra 37 employed (as the means) There is no ground for multiplicity of knowers in the same The special characteristics (of desire and aversion) are 'presence body. In the view of the Bhutacaitanyavadin, would not there of a rulc' (niyama) and 'absence of a rule' (aniyama) //iii. 2. 37// be many knowers in the same body, for the numerous material

Bhāșya elements (i.e. the atoms in the body) are all characterised by the qualities of knowledge, desire, aversion and internal The special-i.c. distinguishing-characteristics of desire effort? There is no ground in favour of one who answers in the and aversion are presence of a rule and absence of a rule. Exertion affirmative. The existence of different knowers in different and its absence, which are due to the knower's desire and bodies is (admitted) because of a specific rule regarding the aversion, do not reside in their own (i.e. of desire and aversion) location of the qualities of knowledge, etc., (i e. the rule that substratum. What, then, is (the substratum of exertion and its each knower experiences only his own pleasure, pain, etc.). (If absence)? Their substratum is what is employed (prayojya) (as a single body is sought to be proved as a locus of many knowers the means). (As for instance, in the act of cutting, the desire or selves), such a specific rule regarding the location of the inheres in the self of the person and the exertion in the form of qualities of knowledge, etc .- which indicates the multiplicity upward and downward movement inheres in the axe.) Thus, of knowers-is to be admitted in the case of a single body also. exertion and its absence exist only in the material elements (i.e. (That is, it is to be admitted that each part of the same body objects) which are employed, and not everywhere. Hence the has its own pleasure, pain, etc. This is, however, not possible, absence of rule (regarding the occurrence of exertion or its and hence it cannot be claimed that the same body has many absence and desire or aversion) is justified. knowers.) Presence of rule is possible in the view of one (viz. the Bhutacaitanyavādin) according to which, the material elements Elucidation being themselves conscious, exertion and its absence which In the Nyaya view, exertion and its absence have for their are due to desire and aversion reside in their own (i e. of desire substratum the body, while desire and aversion are located in and aversion) substratum (viz. the body) .. the self. This difference of substratum is expressed in the sūtra It is observed, in the casc of material elements in general, by the word aniyama that the material elements are characterised by exertion (in the In the view of the Bhutacaitanyavadin, however, exertion,

90 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 91 absence of exertion, desire and aversion are all located in the Vācaspati Miśra says that if the presence of numerous same substratum, namely, the body; for the Bhutacaitanyavadin knowers in the same body is admitted, the body would be admits the consciousness of the body itself. This identity of unable to perform any function, for each knower would have substratum is expressed in the sūtra by the word niyama. his own desire which would not be in agreement with those of After explaining the nature of aniyama, Vatsyayana argues the others. An agreement may sometimes accidentally take that niyama of the Bhūtacaitanyavadin cannot be logically place, still it cannot be accepted to be the general rule. defended. The implication of Vātsyāyana is that the qualities Refuting the view of the Bhūtacaitanyavādin, Udayana says of the material elements are observed to be present in all the that if the body itself is admitted to be conscious or the knower, a cases of the element to which the quality belongs. Heaviness, a person would not be able to recollect, in his youth or old age, quality of earth, for instance, is present in all the cases of earth. an object perceived in his childhood, for, through continuous If the qualities of knowledge, desire etc. are admitted to be the production and destruction of the different constituents, the qualities of material elements, they should be present in all body is constantly changing, and an object perceived by one cases of the same This is, however, contradicted by facts, for cannot be recollected by someone else. a jar made of earth is characterised by none of the qualities To this, it may be replied that in spite of the change of the As against the above, the Bhūtacaitanyavadin may point out body the group of impressions persists and is transmitted from that there can be no rule that each and every substance made of one body to another, and thus recollection is possible. Udayana material elements like earth, etc., is to be characterised by the rejects the argument by pointing out that a transmission of quality of knowledge. It is observed, for instance, that molasses, impressions is not possible, for, in that case, the impressions rice and other such objects develop the power of intoxication of the mother may be said to be transmitted to the child in the only when they are transformed through fermentation into a womb so that the child even may recollect the objects perceived new substance, and not if they are arbitrarily mixed up. by its mother. In the same way, a material body develops the quality of Still, the Bhūtacaitanyavadin may persist in saying that the knowledge, only when the atoms of earth, etc., combine them- impressions located in the material cause only are transmitted selves, through a specific form of conjunction, into the body and the mother not being the material cause of her child, the of a human being above difficulty does not arise. However, such a position, too; Foreseeing this objection, Vätsyayana says that the above involves difficulties. The material cause of the body is the argument presupposes the presence of knowledge in the con- different component parts or the limbs. When any one of the stituent atoms also, for the quality of an effect is derived from limbs is damaged, the impressions located in it also are destroyed the qualities of its material cause. In that case, there would be a Thus, according to the Bhütacaitanyavādin, there can be no multiplicity of knowers in the same body, which is, however, recollection of an object perceived through one limb of the not proved by any ground. Different knowers in the bodies of body when that limb is destroyed. This is, again, contradicted different persons are admitted to explain the fact that the pleasure by facts, for an object known by one's eyes is recollected even or pain of one person is not experienced by someone else. This when they are damaged and one has turned blind. is quite possible on the admission that one body is related to Finally, the Bhūtacaitanyavadin may maintain that conscious- one knower or self only. ness as well as the impressions produced by cognitions belong

92 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYATA THE SOURCE MATERIALS 93

to the atoms that constitute the body. The atoms being eternal, knowledge (i.e. recollection) is produced even when they are recollection is possible even in later times. To this, Vardhamana destroyed' is also directed against the same (doctrine) .. answers that the qualities of atoms are never perceived, for an When (the Bhūtacaitanyavadin) claims, (as in sūtra 35 above), atom not being characterised by 'intermediate magnitude' that the probantia for the inference of desire and aversion are (mahattva) is imperceptible, and if knowledge be a quality of (exertion and its absence), and as such, consciousness cannot the atoms, it can never be internally perceived in such forms as 'be denied to the bodies made of earth, etc., (he wrongly) con- 'I know', 'I have a cognition' and so on: siders exertion and its absence to be mere physical movement and its cessation. But, as has been stated, these, exertion and Bhäsya absence of exertion, are actually of a different kind (viz .. a It is observed that the particular exertions of the material specific form of purposive action leading to the attainment or

elements are due to the quality of something else, and this is the avoidance of an object) Such exertion and its absence,

a ground for inference in other cases also. To explain: it is however, are not observed in earth, etc. and, therefore, it is

observed that in the case of material objects like the axe, etc., illogical to claim that the probantia for the inference of desire

which are used as instruments and the clay, etc. which are used and aversion are (exertion and its absence), and as such, con-

as material causes, the particular exertions are due to the quality sciousness cannot be denied to the bodies made of earth, etc. of something else. This (observed fact) is the ground for the inference of (exertions being due to the quality of something else) even in other cases of bodies, moving and stationary. (It is thus established that) the particular exertions of the material objects-inferred from the peculiar conjunctions of their com- Praśastapāda with Nyāyakandalī ponent parts-are due to the quality of something else. (That is, from the instance of the axe, etc., it is inferred that the physical Prasastapāda's (c fifth century AD.) Padārtha-dharmasangraha, exertions of the body, too, are due to the urge of something also known as Prasastapāda-bhäsya, is about the most impor- else, which is nothing but the conscious self.) tant and early exposition of the Vaisesika view. Sridhara's This quality (of something else which is the cause of physical Nyāya-kandalī (c. tenth century AD) is one of the best known commentaries on it. exertions in the body) is the impression, known as dharma and We have given here the section of the text and commentary adharma, which coexists with 'internal effort' (prayatna) (i. e discussing the self as distinct from the body, sense-organ exists in the self), is a cause for all actions and, just like internal and mind, much of which is, evidently, intended to be the effort, is required for the attainment of all human ends. statement and its refutation of the standard understanding It is to be noted that (the doctrine of) the consciousness of of the Lokayata/Carvaka position. the material elements is refuted also by the proofs for the exis- An English translation of the two was done by Mm. Ganga- natha Jha and as reprinted from the Pandit, it was published tence of the self as well as the proofs for the eternality of the from Allahabad in 1916. Though depending much on this self .. Besides, the sūtra (i.e. Nyāya-sūtra iii.2.18), viz. 'know- translation, we have found it necessary to make substantial ledge is not a quality of the sense or the sense-object, because changes in it

THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 94 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA 95 Praśastapāda-Bhāsya with Nyāya-kandalī contained in the body, (we infer the existence of a guiding agent), like a conductor of a bellow. 2) From the regular action [ON PROOFS FOR THE EXISTENCE OF SOUL] of opening and shutting the eyes we infer the existence of an agent, like the string-puller of a wooden puppet. 3) From the TEXI fact of the wounds of the body being healed up, we infer the Ätman, Self, is that to which belongs the universal self-ness existence of the agent like the master of a house (repairing it). (ātmatva). (Vaiśeșika-sūtra viii. 1.2; iii 1.2). 4) From the action of the mind that effects a contact of the Being too rarefied to be sensed, it is imperceptible. It is sense-organs with desirable objects, we infer the existence of the agent, like a boy in a corner of the house throwing a ball. 5) ascertained by means of the auditory sense, etc., which, in When with the eye we look at an object, and then remember its theit turn, are inferred from the perception of sound, etc .- for such instruments as the axe and their like are always found to taste, a certain modification is found to occur in the organ of taste From this, we infer the existence of a single guiding be operated by an agent. In the case of the cognitions of sound, etc. too, we infer a agent for the two operations, like a person looking through 'cogniser'. It cannot belong to the body, or to the mind; because different windows. 6) Also, from the qualities of pleasure, all these are unconscious. Consciousness cannot belong to the pain, desire, aversion and effort, is inferred the existence of body because it is a product of matter, like the jar. Further, no one to whom these qualities belong. These qualities cannot belong either to the body, or to the sense-organs. Why? consciousness is found in dead bodies. Because: a) these are coextensive with the notion of the ego; b) Nor can consciousness belong to the sense-organs, because these qualities exist only in certain parts of the object to which these are mere instruments, and also because even after the they belong; c) they are not coexistent with their substratum; sense-organ is destroyed, when the object is no longer in contact and d) they are not perceptible by the external senses. 7) The with it, recollection may occur .. Nor can consciousness belong to the mind; because if the existence of the self (as a distinct substance) is also proved by mind may be regarded as functioning independently of the the fact of its being spoken of by the word 'I', which is distinct from the words 'earth', etc (Vaisesika-sūtra iii. 2. 4-13) other organs, we could have perception and recollection The qualities of the self are: knowledge, pleasure, pain, desire, simultaneously .. Also because the mind itself is a mere instru- aversion, effort, virtue, vice, impression, number, magnitude, ment We are thus left with the only alternative that conscious- ness belongs to the self, which, in its turn, is known by this separateness, conjunction and disjunction. The sūtra, dealing with the distinguishing marks of the self, clearly establishes consciousness the qualities, beginning with knowledge and ending in effort As from the motion of the chariot we infer the existence of The presence of virtue and vice is indicated by the mention of an intelligent guiding agent as the charioteer, so also we infer the fact that the qualities of one self are not the cause of the an intelligent guiding agent for the body, from the activity and the restraint found in the body which have the capacity of appearance of a quality in another. The existence of impression is acquiring the desirable and avoiding the undesirable respec- indicated by the mention of it as being the cause for the pro- duction of remembrance The presence of number is indicated tively. (Vaiśeșika-sūtra iii. 1 .- 19) The intelligent agent is also inferred from the breathing, etc. by the mention of 'specific reference' (vyavastha) and, on the How? 1) When we perceive an unusual movement of the air same ground, 'separateness'. The greatest magnitude of the

96 CĀRVĀKA/ LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIALS 97 self is mentioned in the stra, 'so is the self also'. The fact of worked by an intelligent agent. That is to say, whatever instru- pleasure, etc. being due to contact proves the existence of ment there is in the world, it is found to be worked by an conjunction with the self; and disjunction as the destroyer of intelligent agent, as we find in the case of the axe, which is that conjunction. (Vaisesika-sūtra iii. 2.4; 20; 21; vi. 1.5; ix 2.6& worked by the carpenter; and the organs of audition, etc .. , are all vii. 1. 22) instruments; as such, they must be worked by something else. Commentary (Nyāya-kandali) That by which these are worked is the self Though the auditory sense, which is of the nature of ākaśa, has no direct relation The author now proceeds to describe that for whom the with the self, as ākāśa is all-pervading, yet it has the capability knowledge of truth brings the highest good, and false know- of being worked by the self, through the substratum of the ledge leads to birth and rebirth, and for whose purpose there internal sense (mind); just as the hand is in contact with the are all the things (in the world). red-hot ball of iron through the pincer Ätmatvābhisambandhät, etc .: Ātmatva is the name of a uni- The fact of the auditory sense, etc., being but instruments, versal. The relation with this universal makes the substance is proved by the fact of their illumining, or manifesting, or known as atman. It is the fact of being characterised by this rendering perceptible, the definite objects, as does the lamp universal that differentiates the self from all other things. Though it is by the mind that we cognise the self as 'I' and Objection: As a matter of fact, we find that the existence of a 'mine', mixed up with the notions of the doer and the master, perceptible object is always accompanied by a cognition of its brought about by the limiting conditions of the body and the form. In the case of the self, there is no cognition of the form of senses acquired by it by reason of its previous deeds, yet it is the self. Hence, not finding its invariable concomitant, we spoken of as 'imperceptible by the senses', on account of its cannot but reject the existence of the self. Under the circum- being imperceptible by the external sense-organs. stances, why should any attempt be made for ascertaining its Śabdādişu prasiddhyā, etc: Inasmuch as there is a cognition of distinguishing marks? sound and other things, we infer from that the existence of the Answer: There is no reason for setting aside the notion of cogniser. For instance: 'Cognition must inhere in something, the existence of self, because the absence of its perceptibility by because it is an action, like the action of the axe; and that the sense is implied by its very nature. On the other hand, for wherein it inheres is the self.' its existence we have an inferential proof. The author proceeds Objection: The cognition cognises the object by itself, and to show this: tasya, etc. Rarefiedness consists in the incapability not as inhering in something else. of being perceived by the senses; and this rarefied self is known Answer: Is such cognition eternal, or does it change every by inference from the auditory and the other senses, whose moment? If it is eternal, then there is a mere difference of name existence, again, as belonging to the imperceptible self, is (as what we call 'self' is nothing more than an eternal cogniser). If proved by another inference: 'The perception of sound, etc .. , is it be momentary, then there could be no remembrance of brought about by means of an instrument, because it is an something perceived a long time before, for the cognition that action, like the action of cutting (which is not possible without remembers is something wholly different from that which had an instrument in the shape of the axe)'. How these senses perceived on the previous occasion. prove the existence of the self is next shown: in the case of such Objection: Inasmuch as there is a causal relationship between instruments as the axe and the like, we find that they are always the previous cognition and the subsequent remembrance, the

98 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIALS 99

former cognition would be remembered by the latter. The Answer: It does not belong to the body, the sense-organ or reason for the son not remembering that which was perceived the mind. What does not belong to these is 'consciousness', by his father lies in the fact of there being no causal relationship caitanya, mentioned in the next sentence. That is to say, con- between the cognition of the father and that of the son. Though sciousness does not belong to the body, or to the sense-organ, there is such a relationship between the bodies of the two persons or to the mind, because these are 'unconscious', i.e. they are (father and son), yet inasmuch as the bodies are unconscious not the material cause of cognition. things, their relationship can have no bearing upon their Objection: This argument involves a begging of the question, cognitions the premise being the same as the conclusion Answer: This is not correct, because if there be no self, there Answer: With a view to this objection, the author adds na would be no idea at all of any causal relationship, for at the time śarīrasya, etc That is to say, consciousness does not belong to when the cause would be cognised, there would be no cognition the body, because like the jar, the body is a product of matter. of the effect, which has not yet come into existence at that As a matter of fact, we find that whatever is a product of matter time; while at the time when the effect would be perceived, the is not conscious, as the jar; and the body is a product of matter .. cause would disappear in the past, and hence there can be no Therefore, it cannot be conscious. cognition of it. According to one who denies the self, there He adds another argument: Because it is not found in the would be no one perceiver of both, and, as such, there would dead body. The putting forward of the fact of there being no be none to ascertain the causal relationship between these two consciousness in the dead body, is with a view to show that the things appearing one after the other property of consciousness is not coeval with its substratum. Objection: The previous cognition cognising itself also The argument thus comes to this: Consciousness is not a brings about the idea of its causal character, which is nothing specific quality of the body, because it is not coeval with (does apart from itself The subsequent cognition cognising itself, not exist as long as) its substratum like conjunction. From this, also cognises its character as an effect, which is not distinct it follows that consciousness does not belong to the material from its own nature. The character of the cause and that of the constituents of the body. If these constituents were conscious, effect, apprehended by each of these cognitions, come to be their product would also have been so, and there would be cognised by a simple idea brought about by the single impression numerous cognisers (conscious beings) in one and the same produced by the two cognitions conjointly body. Answer: These are simply absurd assumptions. How could The conscious entity not being one, there could be no the two cognitions, which would be confined to their respective adjustment of the activities of the body, because in accordance objects, have any such idea as that 'I am the effect or the cause with the motive or purpose of each of those numerous conscious of that cognition', for certainly, they would be wholly ignorant beings (in the body, there can be no unanimity). of the conditions of each other .. And that which they would Consciousness does not belong to the sense-organs, because not cognise could not be apprehended by them, as apprehension these are of the nature of instruments. That is to say, the sense- always follows in the wake of cognition .. organs are unconscious, because they are instruments, like a Objection: We grant that cognition inheres in something stick (in the making of the jar) else; and as the substratum of cognition we would have either He adds another argument: When they are destroyed, etc., the body, or the sense-organ, or the mind. that is to say, as a matter of fact we find that even when a sense-

100 CĀRVĀKA/IOKĀYATA THE SOURCE MATERIALS 101 organ has been destroyed, we have distinct remembrances of things previously perceived by its means; and certainly no name (you applying the name 'mind' to what we call 'self') as

remembrance would be possible if the cogniser (in the shape of what this other organ would be is the mind, and the mind

the sense-organ) had been destroyed. Hence, consciousness which you hold to be the substratum of consciousness would

cannot be a quality of these sense-organs be what we call 'self'. If the mind does not need the help of any

Then again, we find that we have the remembrance of an other organ save the eye, etc., in the case of an object with a

object even when the object is not before us (and hence, not in colour, taste, etc., being before us, all these would be perceived

contact with the sense-organs, which would not be possible simultaneously, as there would be a simultaneity of the causes

if consciousness belonged to these organs). Nor could the of their perception. It is only when there is a need of some other

remembrance be attributed to these organs, for these operate organs that this organ of the mind, being atomic in its nature,

on objects only by going over to them (which would not be cannot be in touch with all the ordinary sense-organs at one

possible in the case of the absence of the object). Hence, and the same time Hence, there would be no possibility of any

remembrance cannot belong to the sense-organs. The absence simultaneous cognitions of colour, taste, etc If there were no

of remembrance would also prove the absence of cognition in such organ (in the shape of an eternal organ, mind), there would

these, for remembrance cannot belong to any other thing, be simultaneous remembrances, as there would be no want of

viz., that to which the previous cognition belongs. any necessary element. Whereas, if there be a need of such an

It is for this same reason that consciousness cannot belong to organ, as there could be no simultaneous contact with this

the objects. If it were so, there could be no remembrance of the organ, the remembrances could only be gradual

object after it had been destroyed It has been held by some people that the mind, being a single,

For the following reason also, consciousness cannot belong eternal entity, cannot bring about any remembrance, either

to the object: we do not find the object to have any idea either of simultaneous or successive (as in the latter case the remembr-

its position or of the pleasure, etc .. , brought about by it, and we ances would go on ad infinitum, and as such, it could not be

do not find it ever moving at all with any degree of intelligence. regarded as having any instrumentality in the bringing about Then, again, if consciousness belonged to the sense-organ of remembrances). But this is not right, because as regards the

or to the object, then we could have no such notion as 'I saw simultaneous bringing about of remembrances, this is not

the colour, perceived the taste, and am feeling the touch,' possible Then, as regards thé successive bringing about of which unifies in itself the several cognitions of colour, etc. them, when one has been brought about, there can be nothing Colour, etc., and eye, etc., are distinct from one another left to be brought about after that. But this does not mean that

(i. e. colour is distinct from taste, and the eye from tongue, and at this latter time, the mind does not exist, as we do admit of an

so on) existence other than that which consists in effective activity

Objection: Consciousness may be a quality of the mind, as it For the following reason also, consciousness cannot belong

applies to all objects, and is eternal. As such, the unification of to the mind: the mind being itself of the nature of an instrument.

cognitions just spoken of would be quite possible in this case. That is to say, 'Mind is not conscious, because it is an instrument Answer: It cannot belong to the mind. If the mind be believed of consciousness.'

to cognise with the help of some organ of perception other Objection: The fact of the mind being an instrument has not than the eye, etc., then your theory differs from mine only in been accepted (by both parties), as it is held to be the doer or agent.

102 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MATERIALS 103

Answer: If the mind were the doer, then for the perception activity capable of acquiring the desirable and avoiding the of pleasure, etc., we should find some other instrument, like undesirable, through acceptance and rejection of the means the eye for the perception of colour, for no action can ever be leading to those experiences, must be regarded as due to a produced without an instrument. If you agree to accept the preceding effort, because it is a particular kind of activity, existence of some such organ, there would be a difference in like the activity of the chariot and 2) the body is controlled name only, as you would also admit the existence of a doer by an intelligent agent, because it has a peculiar action, like (calling it 'mind' while we call it 'self') and a distinct instrument the chariot.

(calling it something else while we call it 'mind'). Prānadibhiśca: The significance is that also from the Another reason why the mind cannot be regarded as conscious actions of breathing, etc .. , we infer the existence of the intelligent lies in the fact of its being a material substance, like a piece of controller. This refers to all such actions as inhaling, exhaling,

stone. closing and opening of eyes, living, mental activity, and the Question: If consciousness does not belong to the body, or modifications undergone by the sense-organs; as also pleasure, to the sense-organ, or to the mind, how does that prove its pain, desire, aversion and effort,-all of these being indicative relation with the self? of the existence of the self Answer: Pariseşat, etc. That is to say, consciousness being an With a view to show in what way these are indicative of the effect, must be the effect of some cause in which it would self, the author proceeds to show first how breathing up and inhere. It has been proved that it cannot inhere in the body, down is indicative of it: sarīraparigrhītah. Air has the character sense-organs or the mind. It will be shown later on that nothing of blowing horizontally; but in the case of the air, enclosed in else has the power to be the cause of consciousness. Hence the the body, we find it moving up and down vertically, in a manner only thing that remains, to which consciousness could be attri- contrary to its ordinary nature. From this we infer the existence buted, is the self. Inasmuch as it is a product of the self, it is by of a controller of the body, who makes the air move in that means of consciousness that the self is cognised. manner, as otherwise we could not account for such an action The author brings forward other arguments to prove the of the air, contrary to its natural mode of motion. The instance existence of the self: sarīra-samavāyinībhyām, etc. That is to say, cited is that of the blower of the bellow. from the activity and restraint found in the body, we infer the The argument may be simply stated thus: The body is con- existence of an intelligent guide of the body, who makes the trolled by an intelligent agent, because it is the receptacle of necessary effort. In order to preclude the activity of the creeper, such air as has its action modified by the desire of someone, etc., the author has added 'inhering in the body'. For the purpose just like the bellow. The qualification sarīraparigrhītah indicates of precluding the movement and its absence in the dead body the fact of being preceded by intelligent desire. Hence the in a current of water, he has added: 'capable of acquiring and argument is not invalidated by such instances as those of the avoiding the desirable and the undesirable respectively'. The dvivāyuka and the like. (Dvivayuka is the name given to the 'desirable' is pleasure and the 'undesirable' is pain. The acquiring phenomenon of the rising up of the whirlwind caused by the of pleasure and the avoiding of pain indicate such activity as is collision of two contrary winds.) prompted by intelligence. The closing and opening of the eyes indicate a controlling The author cites an instance: 'Just as we infer the charioteer agency, of the same kind as the string-puller of the puppet. as guide from the motion of the chariot.' That is to say, 1) the That is to say, the action bringing about the conjunction of the

104 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 105

upper lid with the lower is called nimesa; and that which brings because it is the substratum of an action bringing. about the about their separation is called unmesa; and from this action we infer a controlling intelligent agent for the body who would connection with a desired object, like the ball in the boy's

act like the string-puller of the puppet. hand. That which would be moved by non-intelligent agencies

Inasmuch as the propelling up and down of the puppet-could- of the wind and the like would bring about connection with undesirable things also. be brought about by the action of the wind also (as in the case of the wind-mill), in order to preclude this, the author has added Nayanavisaya, etc: As a matter of fact, we often find that after the perception of colour in the object of vision, there may niyatena, in a fixed manner, which implies dependence upon someone else's desire. The argument may be thus stated: The be certain modifications in the organ of taste, following upon

body is controlled by an intelligent agent, because it has, as its the remembrance of the taste of the object seen. From this, we infer that there is a single agent who cognises both colour and constituents, such parts as are moved up and down by desire, like the puppet. taste, by means of the two organs, resembling a person looking

The author next puts forward an argument that proves the through two openings in the window. That is to say, when we

existence of life: dehasya, etc .: Vrddhi is growth; this and the see the colour of a nice fruit we like, we have a remembrance of

healing up of wounds being due to some intelligent controller, its taste perceived on some previous occasion; this remembrance

we infer the existence of such an intelligent controller or mender produces in us a desire to eat the fruit; this is followed by an

for the body, who would be similar to the master repairing his effort towards obtaining it; and this effort, through the contact

house. That is to say, the growth of the body and the healing of the self and the mind, produces a modification in the organ

up of its wounds must be regarded as being brought about by of taste, in the form of making saliva flow from the roots of the

an intelligent agent, because they have the character of growth teeth; this flow of saliva could not be due to any intelligence in

and healing up of wounds, like the extending and repairing of the sense-organ itself; as each of the two organs concerned

the house. Nor would the growing of trees, etc., invalidate perceives only the colour and the taste respectively. Hence, the

this argument, as the growth of these also is brought about by seeing of colour could not bring any remembrance of the taste.

God. As a matter of fact, however, we do find this modification

Such things as the tree and their like have no souls, as in the appearing in the organ of taste. Hence, there must be someone

case of these we do not find any connection with soul charac- apart from the organs who cognises both, and who, on seeing

terised by the various functionings of the intellect, etc .. the colour, remembers the taste. Nor could the body itself be

The author now puts forward the inferential argument based taken as the cogniser of both, because the young body being

upon mental activity: abhimata, etc. That is to say, the exis- universally recognised to be different from the old body, on

tence of the self in the body is indicated by the action of the account of the difference in size, anything perceived in boyhood

mind that brings about its connection with the eyes and the could not be remembered in old age. Not for the above reasons alone, but also because of the other organs of perception, which apprehend objects desired to be perceived. The mover of the mind is inferred to be like the properties of pleasure, pain, desire, aversion and effort, which

boy throwing one ball against another fixed in a corner of the lead to the inference of something to which these properties belong, all these qualities are cognised as co-extensive with the room. That is to say, the mind is moved by an intelligent agent, notion of 'I', being always cognised as 'I am pleased', 'I am pained' and the like, where we find that it is the object 'I' which

106 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 107 is characterised by pleasure, etc. The notion of 'I' could not refer to the body, because it is not found to apply to the body simplified in the form of a negative inference: pleasure, etc ,

of another person. Nor could it be said to apply to one's own are not the specific properties of the body or the sense-organs,

body alone. Because one body, as a body, does not differ from because they exist only in parts of their substrates, while the

another body: If the notion of I' is referred to the body, then- specific properties of the body and the sense-organs have always

just as another man's body being as perceptible as our own, the been found to pervade the whole of their substrates, e g., colour

notion of fatness appearing equally with references to both- and the rest. Pleasure, etc., however, do not thus pervade the

the other man's body would also be capable of being spoken of whole of their substrates, and hence they cannot be the properties

as 'I', specially as, in both, the shape is the same. If it be held of the body or the sense-organs Nor could the case of sound

that there is a difference between the two on account of the be an exception invalidating the above premise, although sound

characters of things related to them, then the notion of 'I' is a property of ākāśa (the whole of which it does not pervade), would come to apply to these things, and not to the body. Then yet it appears as the property of that portion of akāśa which is

again, if the notion of 'I' referred to the body, it could not enclosed within the cavity of the ear, the whole of which it

appear in our consciousness as something internal. certainly pervades.

For the same reasons, the notion of 'I' could not refer to the For the following reason also, pleasure, etc., cannot be the

sense-organs, as these organs are themselves beyond sense- properties of the body or the sense-organs: they do not last

perception; while the notion of 'I' is of the nature of sense- as long as their substrates The case of colour may be cited as

cognition, being independent of inferential marks as well as of an instance to the contrary. In fact, this argument cannot

verbal expression. apply to the case of the sense-organs, because the premise

For the same reason, pleasure, etc .. , as well could not belong would be invalidated by the casc of the organ of hearing,

either to the body or to the sense-organs. Then again, it is a whose property, viz sound, does not exist as long as the

fact known by all that to him alone who is the experiencer or organ itself

cogniser, belong remembrance, desire, acquiring of the means Another reason why pleasure, etc., cannot be properties

of pleasure, the feeling of pleasure, avoidance of pain, and so of the body or of the sense-organs, is that they are not per-

forth. It has already been proved that cognition and rememb- ceptible by any of the external senses. The qualities of the

rance do not belong either to the body or to the sense-organs. body and sense-organs are of two kinds: 1) some, like gravity

Hence it follows that pleasure, etc, also cannot belong to and the like, are imperceptible; and 2) some, like colour, etc.,

them .. are perceptible by the external sense-organs.

The author brings forward another reason: pradesavrttitvāt. In the case of pleasure, etc., however, we find that they do

That is to say, we actually see that the qualities of pleasure, not come within any of the two categories (being perceptible,

etc , exist only over a part of their substratum: for instance, we but not by any of the external sense-organs). Hence these can-

have such ideas as 'I feel pleasure in my feet', 'I have a pain in not be the properties of the body or the sense-organs

my head'. From this, it follows that they cannot be the properties It being thus proved that pleasure, etc., cannot belong to the

of the body or the sense-organs, as they differ essentially from body and the sense-organs, the self is the only substance left to

the specific properties of these, which are found to pervade which they could belong

over the whole of their substrates. The argument may be thus Objection: Pleasure and pain are modifications, and as such, cannot belong to the self, which is eternal (hence, unmodifiable).

108 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 109

Even if they could belong to it, that self (being modifiable) earth'), aham udakam ('I am water'), etc. Hence, the word 'I' would become non-eternal, like the skin. cannot be taken as applying to the earth, etc.

Answer: Not so; because the production and destruction Objection: The word 'I' is found to be applied to the body in (appearance and disappearance) of these cannot cause any distur- such expressions as sthūlo'ham, 'I am fat '

bance to the nature of the self. In the case of all eternal things, Answer: Not so; because we find it used in such expressions we do not admit of any destruction or change of its form as aham jānāmi ('I know'), aham smarāmi ('I remember'). It has As for the disappearance of one quality (pleasure) and the been shown that knowledge and remembrance do not belong appearance of another (pain) in connection with it, there to the body. Hence its use with regard to the body must be would be no incongruity. understood as secondary or figurative, based upon the fact of Question: How do pleasure and pain relate to the eternal the body being a useful instrument for the self, as the master self? says of his useful servant: 'he is my very self' Answer: They afford to it an experience with regard to themselves Question: What good could this experience do to one that is free from all addition or substraction (i.e. want and its supply)? Jayanta Bhatta's

Answer: The good done consists in this, that it is on the Nyāyamañjarī strength of such experience that it becomes an enjoyer or experiencer of pleasure and pain. The Nyayamanjarī of Jayanta Bhatta is one of the most out- Tathahamsabdenapi: That is to say, just as the self is inferred standing contributions in the field of Nyāya-Vaiseşika in

from pleasure, etc., so also is it inferred from the notion of'I' .. particular and Indian philosophy in general. A Gauda- Brahmana of the Bharadvaja gotra, Jayanta was the son of We find the word 'I' used in the Veda, as well as in ordinary Candra Pandita. Probably his family's original home was parlance by learned persons. This word cannot be without Bengal, but his forefathers had gone to Kashmir and settled something that it would denote Its own form cannot form its there. He is said to have written this immortal work while denotation, as that would involve the incongruity of its opera- he was imprisoned for his refusal to part with, on the king's tion bearing upon itself. As has been well declared: 'No word demand, the wealth of the temple of which he was the chief He appears to have quoted Vacaspati Misra and hence, must ever denotes itself.' Hence, that something which is denoted be posterior to him, and might have flourished betwecn by the word 'I' would be the self. AD 850 and 910. As is evident from every line of his writing, Objection: The word 'I' may be regarded as denoting the Jayanta was a profound scholar in most of the systems of earth, etc .. Indian philosophy. The Nyyamanjari is supposed to be a Answer: prthivyādiśabdavyatirekāt That is to say, that which commentary on Gautama's Nyāya-sūtra, although it is rather denotes one thing is always found to be co-extensive with of the nature of an independent work, and in any case, a

other words denoting the same thing, as we find in the case of unique exposition. Jayanta has discussed in great detail all the important próblems of logic and philosophy, representing the words 'substance' (dravya), 'earth' (prthivi) and the like: the opponent's positions most elaborately and criticising In the case of the word 'I', however, we find that it is not co- them from the Nyaya standpoint with great logical acumen. extensive with the other words denoting the earth, etc., as we His style of writing, too, is unique-witty, forceful and never come across such expressions as aham prthivi ('I am sometimes sarcastic.

110 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 111 We have given here mainly his exposition with refutation NOIE The most important consideration for the admission of the Cärvaka/Lokayata views on the validity of inference of a distinct self is that the body is non-sentient whereas the self and the materialistic understanding of the self, besides adding a few stray references to the Carvakas in different must be something, which is sentient. As will be presently shown, according to the Laukayatikas, the body itself can have contexts. consciousness and hence, there is no need for the admission of

Nyāyamañjarī a distinct self. The concepts of rebirth, 'merit and demerit' (dharmādharma), etc., are not logically justifiable; the destruction A. DEHĀIMAVĀDA of the body, or death, means the end of one's worldly existence for good. There is, thus, no need to assume that there is some A.I. THE VIEW OF IHE CĀRVĀKAS WHO ADMII IHAT THE BODY IS THE SELF eternal being, a distinct self, which may survive even after death and pass from births to births. (śarīrātma-vādi-cārvāka-mata) IEXI The (so-called distinct) self cannot be perceived, for it cannot be apprehended by the external sense-organs, like the IEXI All this 'discussion about one becoming non-attached' jar, etc .. , or by the internal sense-organ, like pleasure etc. Accord- (virakta-samkatha) 'cannot produce the intended result' (asañjāta- ing to the Cārvākas, inference is not a pramana at all; moreover, phalocita). Why not, first of all, decide whether there is any there is also no inferential mark which can prove the existence (distinct) self or not? of the self. NOTE After discussing the pramana-s very thoroughly and NOIE The two most generally accepted pramāna-s are per- elaborately in the first six āhnika-s of the Nyāyamanjarī, Jayanta ception (pratyaksa) and inference (anumāna). The Cārvākas goes on to discuss the prameya-s, which comprise the next three now claim that there is neither perception nor inference to ähnika-s. The twelve prameya-s are taken up in the same order prove a self as distinct from the body in which they are mentioned in the list given by Gautama Perception may be either external (e.g. the perception of a (Nyāya-sūtra i.1.9), where, again, the self comes first. jar) or internal (e.g. the perception of pleasure). The most In a general introduction to his discussion of the prameya-s, important precondition for the external perception of a substance Jayanta argues (following Nyāya-sütra i. 1.2) that the right is the 'possession of colour' (rūpavattva): only a substance knowledge of the twelve special prameya-s leads, through a which has colour can be externally perceived. The self is, distinct causal sequence, to the ultimate good, namely, libera- admittedly, a substance without colour; hence it cannot be tion, which is nothing but an absolute cessation of suffering. perceived externally. An internal perception of the self may, Thus, right knowledge of the prameya-s leads to the removal sometimes, be possible; still, such a perception does not prove of false knowledge about the prameya-s; false knowledge being any self as distinct from the body, rather, it substantiates the the cause of evil (dosa), its removal leads to the removal of its view that the self is identical with the body effect, etc, ... i.e., the self has to be admitted. Inference-even if it is admitted to be valid-is not possible TEXI Thus, for example, the Laukäyatikas, who deny that in the case of the self Inference is vitally dependent upon a there is any 'other world' (paraloka), think that there is no self probans (linga, hetu) having invariable concomitance with the other than the body itself as 'endowed with consciousness probandum (lingin, sādhyâ). Thus, fire can be rightly inferred (caitanya-khacita) from smoke, because smoke is invariably related to fire-

112 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 113 wherever there is smoke there is fire, and wherever there is no ingly, consciousness in the effect, namely, the body, must fire there is no smoke. Further, the presence of invariable con- come from consciousness in the cause, namely, the forms of comitance is not enough; it has got to be verified perceptually matter. But actually the forms of matter are all devoid of in some instance. But, so far as the so-called distinct self is consciousness. How, then, can consciousness appear in the concerned, no such invariable probansconcomitance.of body? which with the self may be established beyond doubt-is The Carväka answer to these two objections is given here. available Hence, the self remains unproved inferentially too First, the mixture of the forms of matter that gives rise to con- TEXT (The properties of) 'knowledge and others' (jnānādi) sciousness is not an arbitrary one; it is a specific form of mixture would be produced in the forms of matter (bhūta) themselves, leading to a 'specific kind of transformation' (parināma-visesa) when these elements attain a high degree of potency (śakti) as a When the forms of matter form the body, the transformation result of undergoing a 'special kind of transformation' (parināma- takes place and consciousness appears in the body. But in things viśeșa). As, for example, things like guda, pista and others become like the jar and others, the transformation does not take place, characterised by 'intoxicating power' (mada-śakti), even hence, consciousness does not appear in them. Secondly, it is though it had not been present in them earlier, when they not true that the quality in the effect necessarily comes from undergo (a special kind of) transformation in the form of the quality in the cause. The various ingredients of a spiritous 'spirituous liquor' (sura). In the same way, the forms of matter, drink do not possess individually any intoxicating power; but even though without consciousness in the state of simple earth, when they are mixed in a particular proportion and undergo etc., would become characterised by consciousness, when transformation, they become characterised by such power they have a (special kind of) transformation in the form of a The case of the body being conscious, in spite ofits production body. After the end of the specified period (i.e after the life- out of unconscious material elements, may be similarly ex- span has come to an end), due to disease or some other cause, plained. So long as one lives, transformation is there and the the same forms of matter lose the special (kind of transformation) body remains conscious. When death comes, the transformation and become things without any consciousness. is not there, and the body becomes unconscious NOTE There being no pramāna to establish the existence of IEXI Because of the non-absence (anapāya) of consciousness a distinct self, the body itself is to be admitted as the seat of in them (i. e. since the presence of consciousness in the material consciousness-as the substratum for the qualities of know- elements can be logically justified), the material elements ledge (jñāna), desire (iccha) and others. However, as against themselves (in the form of the body) would be quite capable, this, two objections may be raised. First, the body is only during the specific period (i.e. a life-time), to perform the various an assemblage of certain forms of matter If the body can be functions like recollecting (smrti), recognising (anusandhāna = characterised by consciousness, then other assemblages of pratyabhijña) and others. Thus, by what inference would a forms of matter as well, such as the jar and others, should be distinct self be proved? characterised by the same. But the jar and others are never NOIE A distinct self is inferred as the conscious agent who observed to be characterised by consciousness. Secondly, it is recollects and recognises. But since the body itself can be con- generally observed that the qualities in the effect come from scious, it can very well perform the acts of recollection and re- the qualities in the cause. Thus, for example, the colour of a cognition too. Hence, there is no logical basis for the inference piece of cloth agrees with the colour of the yarns used. Accord- of a distinct self.

114 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIALS 115 TEXI The 'scriptural statements' (agama) have only such The self may be inferred on the basis of the quality of desire, validity as is imposed upon them by one's mere wish (i e they for instance, in the following manner. One perceives an object have no real validity; they are considered to be valid, illogically, and derives pleasure by attaining it. In some later time, again, by some persons only). How can they rightly convey that one perceives an object of the same kind, recollects that it has there-is a-distinct self? (Such-statements, even though they earlier been a cause of pleasure and strives to attain it for the may speak of a distinct self. cannot be trusted, for they have no sake of similar pleasure This indicates that 'one' who previously validity.) perceived the object must be the same as 'one' who later strives (Even those who admit the validity of gama cannot deny to attain it, for an object perceived by one cannot be recollected the fact that consciousness may appear even in the material by another Moreover, here one has also the re-cognition in elements), for there is, in the scripture, also such a statement the form-'I, who previously enjoyed pleasure by perceiving as: 'Pure consciousness (vijñana-ghana) appears out of all these and attaining this kind of object, am the same who, coming material elements and then, disappears in the same; there is no across a similar object, is now desiring to attain it.' Briefly, consciousness after death.' there must be a permanent substance which would be the subject Therefore, there being no eternal self which can travel to the (kartr) or substratum of the previous perception, the later per- 'other world', one should desist from all these discussions ception, the recollection and the desire for the object-all these about the 'other world' which involve only meaningless taking place at various times. Besides, all qualities reside in exertion. substances. Desire, etc., too, are qualities and therefore, must reside in some substance. This substance can be nothing other

A.II. ILLOGICALITY OF VIEWING THE BODY than the self.

AS THE IOCUS OF DESIRE AND OTHERS Jayanta first discusses and defends the above Nyaya position and then, takes up the task of criticising the opponents, for the (śarīrasya icchādyāśrayatvānupapattih) Indian philosophers believe that one's own view is not estab- lished simply by giving the arguments for it; the rival theories IEXI (Objection) Why not admit that (the qualities of) desire too have to be logically refuted. Accordingly, after rejecting and others may have for their substratum (aśraya) the body the Buddhist view which admits a distinct self, but considers it itself? Brhaspati has in fact asserted that consciousness is a to be impermanent, merely a 'stream of momentary conscious- property of nothing but the material elements It has also been ness' (ksanika-vijnāna-santāna), Jayanta takes up the Cārvāka view claimed that consciousness (vijnana) is produced just like the according to which the body itself may be considered the sub- 'intoxicating power' (mada-śakti) stratum for desire, etc .. It has already been shown (see supra) that NOTE According to Nyāya (see Nyāya-sūtra i. 1.10 and Vāt- the body itself may be the seat of c onsciousness and hence, the syayana's commentary thereon), the self as a distinct substance other similar qualities also-the so-called specific qualities of the is inferred on the basis of the qualities (guna) of desire (iccha), self-may reside in the body. There is no need for admitting a' aversion (dvesa), motivation (prayatna), pleasure (sukha), suffer- distinct self. ing (duhkha) and knowledge (jnana) These are called the 'specific IEXI (Answer) To this, the reply is as follows. The body qualities' (visesa-guna) of the self; they are not present in any cannot be the substratum of the qualities of desire and others, other substance. because it becomes different in the different 'states of life'

116 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIAIS 117 (avastha) such as childhood, youth, old age and others. Indeed, observed. The negation of momentariness in the case of the an object perceived by one, cannot be recollected by another, pillar (stambha) and its like would also be made (by the and when an object is recollected by one, a desire in respect of Naiyayika) with the help of nothing but re-cognition, and in it cannot be produced in somebody else. Therefore, for the the present case as well, (i.e. in the case of the body,) it may be single series of effects, starting with the first cognition of an so. object and ending with the production of the desire, some single NOIE As against the claim that the body cannot be the substratum has got to be admitted. The body, however, becomes different in the different states, such as childhood and knower, because, in different states there are different bodies, it is contended here that actually, only the states are different, others, and therefore, it cannot logically be the substratum (of the cognition, etc.), just like a different stream of conscious- but the body remains the same

ness (which is held to be the self by the Buddhists). Just as an How is it to be concluded that the body remains the same?

object perceived by Devadatta is never recollected by Yaj- On the strength of a valid re-cognition. For example, one sees Devadatta at Mathura; once again, afterwards, one comes ñadatta, so also, an object perceived by the childhood-body (bāla-śarīra) would not be recollected by the youth-body (yuva- across Devadatta at Vārānasī One has, then, a special kind of perception, in the form: 'this is that Devadatta (so'yam Deva- śarīra). NOTE It is an undeniable fact that the first perception, the dattah) Such a form of knowledge is called re-cognition or

subsequent recollection and the ultimate desire must all have a pratyabhijna. It proves the identity of an object-perceived in

single subject (kartr) or substratum. In that case, however, the different times, in different places. In the case of the body, too,

body cannot be considered the knower or conscious subject of one can have a re-cognition identifying the body to be the same

all these, because (as it will be presently shown) in the different at childhood and at old age There is thus no need to admit a

states of life there are present different bodies and not the same distinct self.

one. The body of childhood and the body of youth are, in fact, In fact, even the Naiyayikas have to accept the validity and

two different entities. On the assumption that the body is the importance of re-cognition, for they have to take the help of

knower, things experienced in childhood would not be recol- re-cognition to refute the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness

lected in youth, for what had perceived earlier is not present, (that every object is constantly changing every moment) when they argue that all objects cannot be momentary, for a pillar is now and what recollects now had not perceived earlier. This anomaly can be explained only by assuming that the knower definitely proved to be durable and identical on the strength of

is the self, something distinct from the body, which remains a re-cognition, namely, this is that pillar.

unchanged It may be pointed out that a re-cognition does not necessarily

IEXI (Objection) In reality, only the states (avastha) are diffe- establish the identity of an object; there are cases of re-cognition

rent, but the body itself, which continues to exist, is the same. where only sameness of kind is established because the object,

And this is rightly ascertained by a valid cognition in the form actually, differs. For example, a person shaves off his hair on

of recognition (pratyabhijña). The re-cognition, in this case, his head and afterwards, hair grows there once again One

cannot be explained to be otherwise, like the re-cognition in may, then, have a re-cognition in the form: 'this is that hair'

the case of the nail and others which have been cut off and Here, the hair is different, although similar in kind. However,

grown once again, for the destruction (of the body) is not the re-cognition in the case of the body is not of such a form. In the case of the hair, there is definite evidence against the establish-

118 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MATERIALS 119

ment of identity, for, in the intervening period, the head may TEXI That there is a different body is ascertained, also, from be observed to be without any hair and hence, it has to be the fact of the digestion (parinama) of food taken. Otherwise, accepted that the old hair is gone and new hair has grown later. the food would not have been digested in the manner in which During one's whole life-span, however, one is not observed 'qualities produced due to contact with fire' (pākaja) appear. to be without the body; hence there is no evidence for the- There would have been no nourishment from the consumption production of a new or different body of curd, milk and such other things. However, the body is In short, re-cognition establishes that the body remains the observed to be rich in blood when gold, etc., are consumed. same at different states and hence there is no need to assume a (In the various states) sometimes, some of the 'component self as distinct from the body. parts' (avayava) perish, and sometimes, newer components are IEXI (Answer) All this is illogical. The re-cognition in the immediately produced; how can the body (lit the 'whole', case of the pillar and its like is really erroneous, the error being due to the non-awareness of the cause for difference. (In the avayavin) (being composed of such different component parts) be considered to be the same? case of the body also), the re-cognition is erroneous and the (As in the case of an unbaked jar put into fire), so in the case error is due to resemblance (sādrśya), for (the re-cognition is of the body also, food and drink, etc., (taken by one) are cooked produced) in spite of the observation of difference in complexion by the 'fire in the stomach' (udarya) and become transformed in (rūpa), size (parimāna) and condition (pariveśa), etc. Indeed, in the form of 'vital fluid' (rasa), excrement (mala) and 'essential the body of the child, in the body of the youth and in the body ingredient' (dhatu), and it is thus quite possible that almost of the old man, the size, etc., are never observed to be the every moment, production and destruction are going on. same. Therefore, there being no permanence, (i e. there being constant NOTE A pillar, although re-cognised to be the same at diffe- changes), how can the body perform the acts of re-cognition, rent times, cannot actually be so, for subtle changes due to the etc. (which presuppose the presence of a permanent entity)? action of various natural forces such as the sun, wind, rain, Therefore, the body cannot be one and the same all along, etc., are constantly taking place there as well But it is not because differences of size, etc., are clearly observed in it. As possible to easily determine all these changes and their causes such, the re-cognition in the case of the body is similar to the Hence, the pillar is re-cognised to be the same-only erroneously. recognition in the case of the flame (of a lamp) In the case of the body, however, the changes are palpable NOTE To substantiate further the view that the body cannot Still, there may be a recognition, though erroneous, revealing be the same all along, Jayanta argues with a well-known Vaisesika the body to be the same. The cause for the error is similarity -- theory, called pīlu-pāka-vāda which explains how the four the previous body and the later body, although actually different qualities of earth-substances-colour, taste, smell and touch- ones, happen to be closely similar to each other. In short, there change when they come in contact with fire; as, for example, a must be different bodies in different states and hence, the body black, unbaked jar becomes red after it has been put into fire cannot be the knower. When an unbaked jar is put into fire, movements (karman) Some of the most obvious conditions indicating the dis- are produced, because of conjunctions with fire, in the atoms appearance of the old body and the appearance of a new body constituting the jar. The movements then give rise to disjunc- are stated here. Some further grounds in justification of the tions (vibhaga) among the atoms. The disjunctions, in their difference of the body are given in the text below. turn, destroy the conjunctions among the atoms. Since the

120 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 121 group of conjunctions among the atoms is one of the vital How, then, is the body recognised to be the same at different causes of the jar, the destruction of the conjunctions leads to times? the destruction of the jar as well-the effect The jar is, thus, The fact is that although re-cognition generally refers to the ultimately reduced to a group of isolated atoms Then, the same object, there are some exceptional cases in which re- conjunctions of fire, aided by heat, destroy the black colour-of cognition is admitted to refer not to the same object, but to each of the atoms and produce the red colour in each of them .objects which are different but similar For example, the flame of Next, once again, movements are produced in those atoms a lamp, as long as it burns, is recognised to be one and the which now have a new colour; due to movements conjunctions same But in reality, different flames come into being at different are produced among the atoms, and gradually, a new jar with moments It is an undeniable fact that if the causes are different, a new colour is produced. The destruction of the colour or its the effects, too, must be different Thus, each flame produced production cannot take place in the jar as a whole, for, in that in consecutive moments has different causes-a new drop of case, since the jar remains compact, fire would not be able to oil, a new particle of the wick, and so on. Besides, some of the penetrate and come in contact with all the constituent atoms flames are shorter, some are longer, some are more brilliant, inside and out. As a result, only the outer atoms would turn some are less brilliant, and so on and so forth Hence, re- red and the inner ones would not, and then, the whole jar can- cognition, in such a case, cannot refer to the same object; it not become red, for the colour in the effect must come from refers to a similar object In the case of the body, too, re- the colour in the causes. Thus, since the whole jar is baked and cognition is to be explained similarly (Also see supra, text turns red it is to be admitted that all its constituent atoms have and notc) come in contact with fire. But this can happen only if the jar IEXI Moreover, the statement that actually the states are disintegrates and the atoms are all isolated. Therefore, the different, but the thing that continues to exist-namely, the destruction of the jar and consequently, its production too, are body-is one and the same, is illogical, because it can be to be admitted. justified in neither of the possible alternatives 'that the states It is to be noted, however, that all this happens with extreme are different' and 'that the states are not different'. rapidity, and hence it is not perceptible to the eye As for the If it is claimed that the states of the body are really nothing baked jar being recognised to be the same as the unbaked one, different from the body itself, then the states themselves cannot it is only due to their extreme similarity. be mutually different (for the body is alleged to be the same In short, it follows that when qualitative changes due to and the states are all identical with the same body). If, on the contact with fire take place in an earth-substance, the substance other hand, it is claimed that the states are really different from cannot remain the same; there can only be a different but similar the body, then it has to be shown (at least in some case) that substance. they are apprehended as different entities; büt, in fact, there is The fact of food-digestion (ahara-parinama) caused by the never any such apprehension. fire in the stomach proves that changes due to the action of fire Therefore, the body being a different entity (in each state) take place in the body as well, which is an earth-substance; and it would not be possible for it to perform the acts of recollection, these go on almost continuously. Hence, the body cannot re-cognition and suchlike, and hence, the body cannot be the remain the same all along substratum of the effects like desire, etc.

122 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIAIS 123

(There are also) the following grounds (in favour of the view because the production and the cessation of itching, it is that consciousness cannot belong to the body): The body cannot observed, are due to some specific cause; whereas in the present be characterised by knowledge, etc, because it is 'subject tò case there is no such cause. Or, there would be no irregularity transformation' (pariņāmin), just like milk, etc ; because it is if a 'qualifying expression' (visesana) is added, namely, 'being a characterised by colour, etc, just like the same,-(i e milk, etc.); specific quality' If consciousness is regarded to be a specific because it is 'of the nature of a collectivity of the many' (aneka- quality of the body, then there arises an undesirable consequence: samūha-svabhāva), just like the tripod (tridanda), etc .; because it just like colour, etc., consciousness too would be lasting, and has a peculiar 'arrangement of parts' (sanniveśa), just like the would not be destroyed (as long as the body would be in external material objects. existence). NOTE It has already been shown that the substance which NOIE The unaltered shape, etc., indicate that the body would be the substratum of knowledge, etc., must be some- remains when a man dies. But a dead body is never observed thing permanent, and not something subject to constant change. to have consciousness or knowledge. Hence, the body cannot But the body goes on changing. Hence, it cannot be charac- be the substratum of consciousness. The occasional appearance terised by knowledge, etc. of consciousness in the body does not necessarily indicate that According to Nyāya-Vaiśeşika, three substances-earth, it is a quality of the body. Water, for example, may sometimes water and fire-are characterised by the qualities of colour, appear to be characterised by hotness (usna-sparśa); but this is etc. But they are all observed to be without the qualities of explained to be due to its connection with fire, which is hot by knowledge, etc .. The body, too, is an earth-substance Hence, nature. Similarly, the appearance of consciousness in the living it cannot be characterised by knowledge, etc. body is to be explained as due to its connection with something else The living body may be said to be a collectivity of the many, which is really conscious for, besides its basic element of earth, the presence of water, Later writers note and answer a possible objection to the fire, air and akasa may be inferred from the presence of the above. Knowledge is said to be a quality of the self But the various fluids, the act of digestion (with the aid of stomach- self, too, is not always characterised by knowledge; for, accord- fire), the act of breathing and the presence of openings (cf. ing to Nyāya-Vaiseșika, the liberated self is devoid of all specific Nyāya-sūtra iii 1.27-30). Thus, since it is of the nature of a qualities such as knowledge, etc. Then, instead of admitting a collectivity of different elements, it cannot be characterised by new substance, why not admit that the body is the seat of knowledge, etc .. consciousness? As to the absence of consciousness in the dead The external material substances, such as the jar, etc., are all body, this may be explained to be due to the absence of 'vital observed to be without knowledge, etc .. The body, too, is an breath' (prāna) there external material substance. Hence, it also must be so In answer, it is pointed out that the admission of consciousness IEXI The body is devoid of consciousness, because it is a in the body fails to explain the facts of recollection, etc. (as it body, just like a dead body has already been shown by Jayanta himself,) and hence, there Consciousness is not a property of the body, because it is is no alternative to the admission of a new substance The 'not a quality which exists as long as its substratum exists presence of knowledge in the liberated self is not admitted '(a-yāvad-dravya-bhāvin). It cannot be argued that there is only because it cannot bè logically established. irregularity (vyabhicara) in the instances of itching (kandu), etc., The accepted qualities of the body, colour, etc., remain

124 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 125 present in the body so long as the body exists. They are quality of the body is present-in the body all along'. Knowledge destroyed only when their substratum, the body, is destroyed. is not of such a nature and hence, it cannot be a quality of the The body, therefore, is never observed to be without the body. qualities of colour, etc. On the basis of this, a rule may be IEXI As to the contention that (consciousness is produced) stated: whatever is a quality of the body remains present in the body just like the intoxicating power, (our reply is) that the production as long as the body exists The quality ofknowledge, however, is of intoxicating power there is admitted because it is actually not of such nature; it may be destroyed even if its substratum observed to be there; but knowledge is not observed to be there may continue to exist. Therefore, it cannot belong to the body (and hence, there is no question of explaining the production As against the above. it may obviously be pointed out that of knowledge in a similar manner) the said rule is not invariable and decisive, because there are, NOTE The presence of intoxicating power in a spiritous indeed, properties of the body which, admittedly, do not drink can be explained by admitting that such a power has remain present in the body even though the body may continue actually been produced in it. In this case, there is also no violation to be there, e g. itching. What is the harm, then, in admitting of the rule that the qualities of the effect come from the qualities knowledge to be a quality of the body? of the (material) causes, for the ingredients of a spiritous drink In answer, it is pointed out that, for the itching of the body, (e.g. molasses, rice, etc.) possess in themselves the said power the body is not the sole cause; there are other specific causes, However, it has already been shown that knowledge cannot too. When these causes are there, along with the body, the belong to the body. Nor can the quality of knowledge be itching is there; when they are not there, it is not there, in spite admitted to be present in the components of the body (see supra, of the presence of the body. But, according to the Cārvakas, under Nyāya-sūtra iii. 2.37). Hence, the appearance of knowledge for the production of knowledge or consciousness, the body in the body cannot be explained to be due to the production of itself would be the sole cause (see supra, under Nyāya-sūtra knowledge in the body; it has to be explained otherwise. iii 2.37). Hence, itching, etc., cannot be similar to knowledge, and the body should be characterised by knowledge as long as A.III. REFUIATION OF THE VIEW THAT CONSCIOUSNESS BELONGS TO THE it exists .. FORMS OF MATTER The same objection may be answered in a different way. According to one principle of classification, qualities may be (bhūta-caitanya-vāda-nirāsah) of two kinds: 'general qualities' (samanya-guna) which belong to many substances (e.g. conjunction, magnitude, etc.) and IEXI (The position of the Bhūtacaitanyavādin) But then, it 'specific qualities' (visesa-guna), each of which belongs to one is generally (prayena) observed that knowledge, too, concomi- substance alone (e. g. smell inhering in earth alone, hot touch tantly follows the presence (anvaya) and the absence (vyatireka) of inhering in fire alone, etc.). Knowledge, if it be a quality of the these (i e. the forms of matter). body, would have to be considered a specific quality, for it When the forms of matter are nourished by the consumption would not, then, belong to any other substance. (upayoga) of food, drink, etc:, there is produced a 'higher degree However, it is observed that the specific qualities of the of consciousness' (patvi cetana); and in the absence of it (viz such body -- colour, etc .- are invariably present in the body as it is nourishment), there follows the absence of that (viz a higher there, and we can have a general rule: 'whatever is a specific degree of consciousness). (For instance,) a higher degree of

CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 127 126 intelligence is produced in the body of a boy that has been action' (cesta), senses (indriya) and 'pleasure and suffering' (artha). enriched (samskrta) by the consumption of Brāhmi butter, etc. Now, because of the nourishment (anugraha) of the body, the (Moreover), it is observed that, in the rainy season, over a senses also become nourished; as a result, their capability is very long time, the minute components of curd themselves enhanced and consequently, they become more skilful in receiv- (which are unconscious) are transformed, due to moisture ing their respective objects There is, indeed, nothing called (sveda), etc., into moving worms, such as the pūtanā, etc. consciousness other than the reception of objects. This explains (which are conscious) .. also the case of the consumption of Brahmi butter. Hence, the attributions (vyavahāra) of excellent consciousness Moreover, the self (as distinct from the body) is ubiquitous and inferior consciousness can also be explained to be due to and as such, it is present everywhere. At a certain time, at a the presence and the absence, respectively, of the excellence of certain place, it may take up some components of material forms of matter. elements as the locus for its experience of pleasure and pain; Thus, it appears that the doctrine that consciousness belongs thus, just as it may take up semen and blood, etc. (and have the to the forms of matter is really quite logical. human body, etc .. , as the locus of experience) so also, it may NOTE Some further arguments showing that knowledge or take up the changed (vikrta) components of curd (and have the consciousness can belong to the material body are noted here body of the worm as the locus of experience). Indeed, in this First, there are 'agreement in presence' (anvaya) and 'agree- way, the process of the creation of living beings in their varied ment in absence' (vyatireka) between the body and knowledge. forms-there being so many forms of living beings, such as If there is a body, knowledge is produced, and if there is no the ones produced from moisture and many others-goes on, body, knowledge is not produced Hence, just as hot touch depending on the fruition (paripaka) of the various forms of having agreements in presence and absence with fire is admitted merits and demerits (of the living beings) All this is rather to be a quality of fire, so also, knowledge can be admitted to be simple (and needs little further elaboration) a quality of the body. Hence, it is established that in no way can consciousness Secondly, consider, for example, the case of the pot and the belong to the forms of matter potsherds .. If the potsherds (kapāla-kapālika) are smaller, the NOIE, The argument based on agreement between the body pot (ghata) would also be smaller; and if the potsherds are bigger, and knowledge is negated by the instance of the dead body, the pot would also be bigger. But the potsherds are the cause, and this has already been discussed (see supra) and the jar the effect. Similarly, it is observed that excellence of The argument based on the fact that excellence of body is body is followed by excellence of knowledge; a body nourished followed by excellence of consciousness also does not stand, by food, drink, etc., has a better consciousness, whereas a for though the two are related, it is not established thereby that body not so nourished has an inferior consciousness. Hence, consciousness must be a quality of the body. What, actually, is the body must be the cause and substratum of knowledge consciousness? Consciousnes is nothing but the 'reception of Thirdly, due to the effect of heat, moisture, etc., forms of objects' (visaya-grahana) by their appropriate senses Excellence matter themsleves may be transformed into living beings, e. g. of consciousness means nothing but a better reception of the the components of curd are transformed into worms objects by the senses, and this may well happen when the body IEXI (Jayanta's answer) However, all this is not proper. is nourished by food and drink. The body is the very seat of the The body will be presently defined as the substratum of'physical senses (Nyäya-sutra i 1 11), and the nourishment of the body

128 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 129 means the nourishment of the senses as well Thus, the senses dharma), etc., is to be shown, perforce, by a 'secondary mode become more powerful and fit to receive their objects. This is of expression' (gauni vrtti) why a nourished body appears to have a better consciousness To explain, if the (inferable) character (dharma) alone (e.g., than what appears to be present in an unnourished body. fire) is considered the probandum, the probans (e g., smoke) Moreover, although the self is an entity distinct from the cannot be a property of the subject (e.g., the mountain), because body, it has to be specifically connected with a particular body smoke is a property of fire. to experience the results of its actions-the sensations of pleasure Again, if the 'thing characterised' (dharmin) alone is considered and pain. When, for this purpose, the self gets specifically the probandum, the probans cannot have concomitance, for connected with the mixture of semen and blood, its locus for there is, indeed, no such agreement in presence as, 'wherever experience would be the human body, and then the human there is smoke there is a mountain'. body may appear to be conscious Similarly, it may also get If both of them (i.e. the character and the thing characterised) specifically connected with some transformed particle of curd. are considered the probandum, neither of the two (vital charac- In that case, its locus for experience would be the worm (really teristics of a valid probans, viz. location in the subject and con- a transformed particle of curd), which may, then, appear to be comitance) would be possible. It is not possible that smoke conscious. However, the nature of the particular body with would be a property of both fire and a mountain. Nor is there which a self is to be connected for expericnce is determined by any such agreement in presence as 'wherever there is smoke the adrsta of that particular self (cf. Nyaya-sutra ili. 2.60-72) there are a mountain and fire. ' This is also why there are to be found so many kinds of living Even if it be said that the probandum is the thing possessing beings with so many forms of bodies (cf. Prasastapādabhāsya, the character, none of the two (said vital characteristics) would prthivī-nirūpana). be logically possible For, it is not possible to know smoke, at first, as a property of a mountain or as possessing fire; and B. ON INFERENCE moreover, there is neither any such agreement in presence as, B.I. AGAINSI THE VALIDITY OF INFERENCE 'wherever there is smoke there is a mountain as possessing fire' TEXI Therefore, to justify the 'verbal expressions' (vyavahāra) Now, if it be a fact that inference rcally has validity, in that conveying that (the probans) is a property of the subject, and case, a discussion as regards its definition may be worthwhile; that (the probans) has agreement in presence, the term paksa the fact, on the contrary, is that its validity cannot be logically (subject), which ordinarily has as its established meaning the justified 'thing as possessing the character' (dharma-visista-dharmin)-is For instance, some have argued in the following manner to be taken (to mean), through the secondary mode, a part of (against the validity of inference) Since pramana must be non- that (established meaning); namely, the thing only (for justifying secondary (agauna) (and inference is secondary), it is very the probans as a property of the subject) Again, at the time of difficult to have an ascertainment regarding an object through showing the agreement in presence, the same term is to be inference. 1 explained, in the same manner (i.e. secondarily), in the sense (How is inference secondary?) That the probans has the of a part of that (established meaning, namely, the character characteristics of 'being a property of the subject' (paksa- only)

130 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 131 Thus it follows that (in the case of inference) the definition has to be understood in too secondary a sense. It cannot be may also be due to something that is not fire?7

taken in the primary sense, as is possible, for instance, in the For persons like you (who claim that) they can know the

case of (the definition of perception, namely,) 'knowledge whole world by perception, what purpose would be served by

which is produced from sense-object contact', etc.2 inference, since they have divine eyes (capable of seeing every-

Therefore, inference cannot be a source of valid knowledge. 3 thing)?

Further, (there are other arguments that also go against the Nor can it be claimed that the ascertainment of universal

validity of inference) agreement would be possible through generalities (sāmānya);

No concomitance (anugama) being possible in the case of the for, in reality, nothing called a generality exists. 8

particular (visesa) and there being the charge of 'proving the It can neither be accepted that concomitance is ascertained

proved' (siddhasādhana) in the case of the general (sāmānya), the by repeated observation; because, even though the association

subject cannot be justified as a locus of the probandum. How has been observed in thousands of cases, deviation may be

can, therefore, one talk about inference (as a source of valid determined (by coming across, later, a single instance in which

knowledge)?4 the two do not coexist).9 The nature of a thing may be deter-

There is a relation (between the probans and the probandum) mined, time and again, (in a particular way)-'it is of that

in the form of their (mutual) association (sāhacarya), and trust nature;' but, again, it may be found to be otherwise due to the

may be put on that (That is, the one is inferred from the other change of space, time, and so on. 10

on the basis of this relation or association) But such an idea By repeated observation, this much only may be ascertained,

would be mere foolishness, because deviation (vyabhicāra) is that smoke is associated with fire; but it can never be established

possible even if their association has been observed in hundreds by repeated observation that smoke is never present in a place

of cases 5 where there is no fire.

Various things each have their own peculiar nature due to It is not that by observing (a probans) simply as accompanied

the difference of space, time and circumstance (dasa). There- by (the probandum), one may be certain that it is capable of

fore, it is not possible that there would be present universal yielding true inferential cognition. For, there must be invari-

agreement (between two things which may vary according to ability (niyatatva) also, which depends upon an agreement

the difference of space, etc.). It has, thus, been said that since between the absence of one (viz. the probandum) and the

the various things differ in their powers (sakti) due to the change absence of other (viz. the probans). (That is, anvaya is not

of circumstances, time, space and the like, it is hardly possible enough; there must be vyatireka also). 11

to determine the things (in their true nature) by inference. 6 This invariability can be considered an indispensable factor

Even if it is assumed that universal agreement is possible, it for the production of inference only if it is ascertained (grhila), 12

would not be possible to ascertain this agreement without and its ascertainment is not possible without an ascertainment

acquiring knowledge about all the innumerable things that of the absence of smoke somewhere else (i.e. where there is no

pervade the three worlds. (And this is truly impossible ) So fire).

long as each and every individual smoke and individual fire If it be claimed that invariability is ascertained through

(present in the world) have not been perceived, one may very observation and non-observation?

well have a doubt: is it not possible that this thing (viz. smoke) Well, it would be unjustified; for, in that case, it would have to be perceived that smoke is never present where there is

1.32 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIAIS 133 no fire But how innumerous would be the spots which are characterised by the absence of fire, for they would consist of determine, bcyond doubt, the presence of one object from the

the whole world except the few spots in which fire may be presence of another object which has an invariable relation

present! And in all these spots, the absence of smoke cannot be with the former. If the validity of inference is denied, (percep-

ascertained by any one unless one is a yogin. tion would be the only source of valid knowledge). But the

Thus, since there is a no invariability; or since, even though everyday life of people in general cannot be carried on with the

such invariability may be there, it is impossible to ascertain it; help of perception alone, and hence, the world would have

one should best give up the impossible hope of establishing been as motionless as a figure drawn in a picture. Even in the

inference as a source of valid knowledge. case of objects which are being perceived, common people

Moreover, it is easily possible to find, in all cases, that one's apply the probans-'it is of the same nature' (as previously

inference is contradicted13 either by a probans 'which nullifies produced pleasure or pain) in respect of them, and thus deter-

one's own thesis' (ista-vighātakrt), 14 or by a probans 'which is mine them (by inference) to be either a cause of pleasure or a

an invariable opposite' (viruddhāvyabhicarin) 15 cause of pain, and accordingly, take them up or avoid them. 20

That is why. the learned, finding that inferences have no If it be said that all the above (i.e. practical activity based

validity, have urged the following, with a view to destroy the upon inference) shows, simply, the foolishness of one who

undue faith in inference: (for instance,) when a blind person acts without proper judgement?21 Indeed, we only endeavour

hurries on in an uneven path, mainly depending upon infer- to argue against the definition of inference, because it is not

ences by the touch of the hand, etc., he stumbles down, not possible to state specifically a correct definition of inference.

infrequently, on the ground. 16 However, such a contention is also illogical. For, the estab-

Further, 17 an object may be determined (to be of a particular lished rule is that a particular object indicates the presence of

nature) with an inference, carefully formulated, by persons only another particular object, and not that one seeing simply

who are quite adept in the act of inference; still, the same may an object ascertains the presence of, simply, another object.

be described to be of a quite different nature by others who are Just like a gradual stretching of the feet,22 (one gradually

more learned. 18 comes to understand that) it is the very nature of that particular thing (to be always accompanied by the other particular thing) B.II. IN DEFENCE OF THE VALIDITY OF INFERENCE That is why it is observed that the presence of one object is IEXT known from the presence of another object which has invariable

As against the above, we would like to state the following. concomitance with the former.

By the above, do you argue against the fact (svarūpa) of Thcrefore, we conclude that when due to the perception of

inference itself; or, do you argue against the various definitions one object, there results an awareness regarding the presence (laksana) of inference which have been offered by the various of another object, there must exist some kind of relation between logicians?19 the two. However, those who really know about this relation (The first alternative is untenable. ) It is by no means possible do not.favour the idea that it consists in identity (tādātmya) and

to disprove the fact of inference itself, because it is well-estab- causation (tadutpatti).23 This relation-so far as we are able to lished (by the practice of) people in general. Even ordinary comprehend-is nothing but co-existence (sāhacarya), and people like a woman, a child, a cowherd, or a ploughman then, it comes to: One is necessarily present when the other is present, and when the other is absent, one also is absent. This

134 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MATERIALS 135

is what is variously called inseparability (avinābhāva), invaria- It has also been argued that (even if concomitance may be bility (niyama) and co-existence (sahacarita): there), it is not possible to ascertain the same. (In this regard, Now, one may, indeed, ask: to what exactly is this invaria- however, various answers have been given ) bility (of occurrence) due? There are some who maintain that concomitance is ascer- Our answer to this would be as follows: this question remains tained by 'mental perception' (mānasa-pratyaksa) First one unanswered, even if one adheres to some other view such as ascertains, by perception and non-apprehension respectively that (the said relation) consists in identity, etc. What is there to that smoke is accompanied by fire, and that smoke is absent explain the fact that smoke is produced only from fire and not from where fire is absent; on the basis of this, one determines from water?24 If it be answered that it is just so (i e. their very mentally that smoke is invariably concomitant with fire 29 Is nature), let the same answer be given in the case of co-existence there anybody who does not admit that the mind is capable of as well. 25 A reductio can prove only that much of a fact as lies comprehending all things, even things which are not near at within its scope; it does not have the power to prove a thing as hand? There is no need for knowing directly each and every different from what it really is 26 The proper point to be case of individual smoke and individual fire, confined within decided by argument (i e. reductio), as it has already been various holes all over the three worlds, for concomitance is pointed out, is that, unless there is invariability (niyama), the ascertained (generally) through the universals of fireness and perception of one thing cannot lead to the awareness of another the like. 30 thing; and hence it has to be assumed. After this (i e. the There are others who maintain that concomitance is ascer- establishment of invariability), the question-"to what is due tained by a special kind of perception, called) the argumentative this invariability" would not arise (It has already been shown (yauktika), which is very similar to Yogic perception .. It may that) identity and causation (alleged to be responsible for be alright that the agreement in presence between the pervaded establishing invariability) do not stand logically. Therefore, it and the pervader is ascertained through universals like smoke- is concluded that (by agreements in presence and absence) ness and fireness. But the absence of smoke from where there invariability is justified. is no fire (i.e. the agreement in absence), is also to be ascer- It would not be proper to say that inferential cognition is tained.31 The spots where there is no fire, again, are very much only a form of 'intuitional knowledge' (pratibha), for it has scattered; and there is, indeed, no universal in them which already been pointed out that (in inference) an awareness may be called non-fieriness (anagnitva) 32 Therefore, concomi- regarding a thing is produced from the perception of some tance would not be ascertained without a perception revealing other thing which is invariably concomitant.27 (smoke's invariable) presence in, and absence from, spots with If it be assumed that concomitance becomes a condition for fire and without fire respectively -- such spots, however, being the production of (inferential) cognition, even though it remains scattered all over the three worlds. The concomitance, again, unascertained, it would have to be admitted that even the cannot lead to valid knowledge, unless it is ascertained. But inhabitants of the coconut-tree island (narikela-dvipa) would the fact is that there is produced valid (inferential) knowledge have been able to infer fire from the presence of smoke But (due to the ascertainment of concomitance). Hence, it is only the fact is not so. Hence (it is not enough that concomitance logical (to admit that) there must be some.perception which may be there); it is also necessary that the concomitance should determines, perforce, in a single moment, the concomitance, be ascertained 28 and which-though not ascertained to be so (at that moment),

136 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIAIS 137

is assumed to be so (later on)-has, for its object, the innumer- only that the one is present wherever the other is present, but able individuals (of smoke and fire). And this kind of perception also that wherever the other is not present, the one is also not is called the argumentative (yauktika). present. But repeated observation (said to be the cause of the There are others who, therefore, fearing that such a special ascertainment of concomitance) can determine only the agree- kind of perception would have to be admitted, maintain that ment in presence; namely, wherever there is the one, there is let such a probans be accepted as 'yielding valid inferential the other. Thus, the invariability would only be determined cognition' (gamaka), in respect of which agreement in presence by half, for, the other half, namely, wherever the other is has been determined, with the aid of repeated observation, absent the one, too, is absent, would remain unascertained. through universals, but in respect of which agreement in Others, again, (admit) that there is, indeed, no universal in absence does not stand in need of being determined the form of non-fieriness (anagnitva), and also, without assuming For example, it has been said:33 'In my view, probantia the necessity of Yogic perception, maintain that agreements which co-exist (with the probandum) are capable of yielding valid inferential knowledge, when they are not ever observed in presence and absence may well be ascertained by mental perception 37 At the moment smoke, as characterised by smoke- (as unaccompanied by the probandum)'. The implication is as ness, and fire, as characterised by fireness, are perceived to be follows: Because of repeated observation (of the co-existence), co-existing, the absences of the two are also likewise ascertained there is produced an awareness in the form, 'this thing is invari- to be co-existing, because smoke, as characterised by the ably concomitant with that thing,' which is evidenced by (the universal of smokeness, is never perceived to be present practice of) all living beings 34 And by this much only, a probans' with non-fire, such as water, etc .. Although in the case of capability of yielding valid inferential knowledge is proved (agreement in) absence, there is no universal in the form of generally (autsargika). The Mīmamsakas argue as follows. An non-fieriness, etc., even then, uniformity as regards presence awareness contradicting it (i e. a probans' capability being being established through the universal of fireness, located established by agreement in presence only), would be the per- in the counterpositive (pratisedhya), uniformity as regards ception of the probans in a spot without the probandum. But their absence, too, is established. 38 For the ascertainment of (it may be pointed out) that there is, in fact, no such awareness, concomitance, the knowledge of all the individuals (of probans for, up to this day, smoke has never been found to be present without fire. It is not proper to be apprehensive of a contradic- and probandum) is not a necessary condition. 39 The concomitance of two absences is ascertained in the same tory awareness, even though it is not produced actually. So it has been said by them: If no awareness regarding an error way as the concomitance between two positive things in general is ascertained. The concomitance of two positive things is called (doșa) is produced, a doubt (regarding the validity of a cognition) anvaya, while the same of two absences is known as vyatireka. 40 would be unfounded 35 When one absence is offered as the probans and another But the above view does not seem acceptable. For, it has absence is offered as the probandum, the anvaya would be already been pointed out36 that without an ascertainment of between themselves (i.e. the two absences), while the vyatireka the agreement in absence, concomitance cannot be logically would be between two positive things (i.e. the two absences of determined. The invariability (niyama)-since it is responsible for indicating the presence of the probandum-stands in need the absences). In this way, just like the anvaya of two absences,

of being itself ascertained; and by invariability is meant nöt the vyatireka of two positive things may also very well be ascertained by perception. The only difference comes to this: if

138 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIALS 139 the relation of being the pervaded and the pervader exists between two positive things, one has just to reverse the order with the definition of inference. If, however, the opponent

in order to understand the same between their absences 41 contends that all these definitions formulated by the various

When the 'relation of the indicator and the indicated' (gamya- logicians do not convey any sense, then let him cite one himself

gamaka-bhava) exists between two absences, the concomitance which may be free from all defects. It is not proper to deny the

may be understood between two positive things (i.e. the two thing defined (which is an established fact) simply out of grudge absences of the absences) only by reversing the order. Thus, the against its (definition offered by others)

awareness of uniform presence between two absences in general It has been said (by the opponent) that inference cannot lead

being justified as following from the uniform presence of the to the valid knowledge of an object, because a (true) pramāna is

counter-positives, Yogic perception would not be relevant for non-secondary (whereas inference is secondary). This argument, the ascertainment of either anvaya or vyatireka Actually, one first however, is not intelligible to us. Even in the case of inference,

ascertains the co-existence of two positive things and also the we do not find any secondariness so far as the pramana is con-

co-existence of their absences; and afterwards, the awareness cerned. Even if it be a fact that certain terms, such as paksa-

of invariability is produced through the instrumentality of the dharma and others, are used in a secondary sense by persons

mind who seek to explain (the nature of inference), how is it possible

Therefore, the opponent should desist from undue insistence that thereby the pramana is made secondary? If the definition of

upon (the view that invariability or concomitance cannot be inference be stated using different terms, there would, in fact,

established) It is thus established that just as there is invariability, be no such fault of secondariness or the like. 43

so, also, there is a means for its ascertainment As to the contention 'there being no concomitance in the

Even after invariability has been ascertained, the awareness case of the particular, and there being the charge of proving

of the probandum (as present in the subject) is not produced so the proved in the case of the general', etc., we say that it is

long as the probans, e g smoke, is not perceived in the parti- unjustified; for its has been shown that the probandum stands

cular spot (i.e the subject), and hence, there is the necessity of for what is expressed by the suffix matup. 44

a further perception of the probans, called the second perception Again, as to the contention 'there being difference due to the

in relation to (the prior perception of the probans) at the time difference of circumstances, space, time and others', etc , we

of ascertaining the concomitance. And this is what is conveyed say that it is also not much to be afraid of; for, if concomitance

by the term paksa-dharmatā. be correctly ascertained, there would be no scope for contradic-

Even when a probans' residence in the subject and agreements tion (viplava) In such a case, the fault lies only with the person

in presence and absence have been ascertained, a probans does who infers (since he infers wrongly), and not with inference

not lead to inferential knowledge in case it is contradicted by itself. 45

perception and verbal testimony, or in case it is challenged by The opponent has also urged the following: '(Inference is

a counter-probans. For this reason, two other characteristics not valid), because everywhere it is possible to find an opposite

of a valid probans have been stated, namely, non-contradiction inference and contradiction-sometimes an invariable opposite,

and non-opposition 42 and sometimes one nullifying one's own thesis, being easily

Thus, just as the fact of inference itself has to be admitted available,' etc. But all this is simply nonsense, because if a

because of general experience establishing it, so also is the case probans truly capable of indicating the probandum is offered, there remains no scope for counteracting factors like these. 46

140 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA IHE SOURCE MATERIALS 141

We shall later show that an inference which has a further is different. The concomitance may be ascertained [as the case inference (contradicting its thesis) is not truly capable of indicat- may be] by verbal testimony, by inference, by advancing a ing the probandum; bcing only the cause for a doubt, it becomes reductio or by perception; but that does not make any difference 50 a pseudo-probans. 47 (in the actual nature of the inference) (In a true inference), there is scope for neither a probans Therefore, you should admit inference as an instrument of which is an invariable opposite nor a probans nullifying one's valid knowledge, the efficacy of which is not at all disproved own thesis; if the probans is a well-established one, these kinds by the said charges advanced by you. However, if you do not of difficulties would never arise. When one knows an object admit this, as has already been pointed out, all living beings through such a faultless inference, one never does resemble a would cease to have any kind of activity and hence would blind person who proceeds after inferring the nature of the become just like stones (upala) 51 path by touching it with hands (and stumbles). An object which is carefully inferred (to be of a particular nature) by persons NOTES adept in the act of inference cannot be shown to be of a different nature, even by hundreds of contrary arguments. 48 ABBREVIATIONS (USED IN THE NOTES) Now, those who (think themselves to be) more learned, say ATV Ātma-tattva-viveka of Udayana that (in fact) there are two kinds of inference; 'some in case of KKK Khandana-khanda-khādya of Śrīharsa which the inferential cognition can be acquired by oneself MM Mānameyodaya of Nārāyaņa (utpanna-pratiti), and 'some in case of which the inferential NB Nyāya-bindu of Dharmakīrti NBHU cognition is to be acquired (on somebody else's advice)' (utpādya- Nyāyabhūsaņa of Bhāsarvajn̄a NM pratīti). [The former kind is valid, but the latter kind is not.] Nyāya-mañjarī of Jayantabhatta NS Nyāya-sūtra of Gautama The inferences of God and the like are ones in case of which the NVIT Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-țīkā of Vācaspati inferential cognition is to be acquired [on others' advice]. NVIIP Nyāya-vārtika-tātparya-țīkā-pariśuddhi OF UDAYANA Indeed, who will deny the validity of inference when one NK Nyäya-kandalī of Śrīdhara PPBH infers fire from smoke, and so on; for even ordinary people Prasasta-pāda-bhāsya of Praśastapāda PV Pramāņa-vārtika of Dharmakīrti ascertain the probandum by such inferences, though they may SDS Sarva-darśana-samgraha of Mādhavācārya not be pestered by the logicians. However, inferences that SV Śloka-vārtika of Kumārila seek to prove a self, God, an omniscient being, the after-world, SVR Syādvāda-ratnākara of Vādideva Sūri TCM and so on, are not considered valid by those who know the real Tattva-cintā-mani of Gańgeśa TP I attva-pradīpikā of Citsukhamuni nature of things. Simple-minded people cannot derive the TS Tattva-samgraha of Sāntarakșita knowledge of the probandum by such inferences, so long as VP Vākyapadīya of Bhartrhari their mind is not vitiated by cunning logicians, 49 VS Vaiśeşika-sūtra of Kaņāda However, those who contend in the above manner succeed YS Yoga-sūtra of Patañjali only in making a show of their extreme aversion against 1 From the treatment of invalidity of inference from the Carvāka view- orthodoxy, or utter foolishness, but not in establishing the point. as found in NBHU (p. 210) and SVR (p. 265), it appears that the invalidity of inference. Indeed, invalidity is not proved merely present objection was formulated in a sūtra-like form (viz pramā- because the means for the ascertainment of the concomitance nasyāgaunatvād anumānād arthaniścayo durlabhah) by Purandara, a Cārvāka,

142 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIALS 143

celebrated for holding the view that inferences concerning ordinary ment in absence. In the case of an inference involves secondariness and objects have validity, but inferences concerning the so-called extra- cannot be a pramăna ordinary imperceptible objects have no validity. See infra, fn 3, fn 49. The second explanation comes, most probably, from Purandara There is no mention of such an objection in later scholastic works like (SVR, p. 266). One of the means for the ascertainment of concomitance the KKK or IP is an observation of agreement in presence and an observation of agree- 2. Two illustrations for the point have been given by NBHU (p. 240). ment in absence.In the case of an inferenc. involving ordinary objects, First, consider the inference: Thls Brahmin boy is capable of burning both are possible, and it would be a case of valid inference. But in the (dāhasamartha), because he is of a fiery nature. Here, the probans 'fieriness' case of an inference involving imperceptible objects-the existence of is present in the subject, a Brahmin boy, not in a literal sense but only in which is advocated only by some particular school-the latter is possible, a figurative sense Secondly, consider the inference: Sound is non- but the former is never possible. That is, the latter kind of inference has eternal, because it is audible; as, for instance, is pleasure (sukha). Here, only a partial similarity with a genuine inference-it is an inference in a pleasure has been cited as a corroborative instance for the concomitance, secondary sense; hence it has no validity. See infra, fn. 49 'whatever is audible is non-eternal'. But such a concomitance can be 4. The idea is as follows. It is alleged, for instance, that one infers, in the corroborated by pleasure only in a figurative sense, for pleasure can be mountain, fire from smoke But what is really sought to be established said to be audible, not literally, but figuratively, when, for example, by it? Does it prove that smoke in general is accompanied by fire in

one experiences pleasure because of hearing sweet words general? In that case, there is no need for an inference, for the fact is

Both these inferences are invalid proved already, by perception, in the instances of the kitchen (mahānasa) and the like Or, does it prove that some particular smoke is accompanied 3. The validity of inference is being rejected on the charge of secondariness by some particular fire? In that case, an inference would not be possible; (gaunatva). The explanation of secondariness, given here by Jayanta, because concomitance between mountain-smoke and mountain-fire, agrees with that of NBHU (p. 210) or SVR (p. 261). Yet, two other for instance, has not been established. For a somewhat different inter- different explanations of secondariness may be gathered from these two pretation, see SVR, p 262.

works 5. The most common example is the relation between earth-substance- First (NBHU, p. 211), in an inference, there are mainly three terms, hood (parthivatva) and iron-scratchability (loha-lekhyatva): It may be paksa (subject), sādhya (probandum) and hetu (probans) A sādhya is a observed, in hundreds of cases, that an earth-substance is scratched by

thing the presence of which is sought to be established; a paksa is the iron; but there is no invariability, because dimaond, though an earth-

locus in which the presence of the sadhya is sought to be established; and substance, cannot be scratched by iron. 6 This is VP i. 32, also quoted in TS (verse 1459) and SVR, p. 262 Thus, a hetu is the mark on the basis of which the presence of the sādhya is for instance, Devadatta is observed to have a strong physique, capable sought to be established. In short, all these terms have reference to the of lifting heavy loads But from this it would not be correct to infer, on 'act of establishing' (sadhi-kriya) But then, a question may be asked: some later occasion, that he would be able to carry a certain heavy load. when one goes on to infer, is or is not the act of establishing already For in the meantime, because of some internal disease, he may lose his accomplished? If it is, the inferential process would be useless, and the strength, even if his outward appearance may remain unchanged. This so-called sādhya would only be siddha (established). is an illustration of avastha-bheda. Secondly, the water of the Himalayan If it is not, how would one apply these inferential terms to some region is very cold to the touch, but the water of a hot spring in some particular things? In fact, what happens is that one takes, obviously in a other place (e. g. in Rajagrha) is warm to the touch.

secondary sense, the future act (i.e. that which is yet to occur) as the past Thus in the case of the water in a certain place, it would be wrong to

act (i.e that which has already occurred), and applies the inferential infer either that the water is cold, or that the water is warm. This is an illustration of desa-bheda. Thirdly, the water of the same well feels terms accordingly. In other words, inference involves secondariness different in different seasons. In summer and in the autumn, for instance, and cannot be a pramāna the touch and the taste of the water both differ. Thus, the nature of the The second explanation comes, most probably, from Purandara water in the well cannot be correctly determined by an inference. This is (SVR, p. 266). One of the means for the ascertainment of concomitance an illustration of käla-bheda. (See Vrsabhadeva's Paddhati on VP, i 32) is an observation of agreement in presence and an observation of agree- 7. As Vrsabhadeva (on VP, i. 32) illustrates, a frog (śaluka) may be born of

144 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 145 a frog, and also from cowdung (gomaya). Similarly, smoke may be sādh yadharma), because it only represents a part of what is denoted by produced by fire or, by something else. 8. It may be pointed out further that even if it is accepted that there is, in the term probandum (sadhya), just like the inferable property itself.' The reality, something called a generality, there will be absurdities. Thus if probandum of an inference is a 'thing (i.e the subject, or dharmin) as the concomitance be established through generalities, it would mean characterised by a property' (dharma-visista-dharmin) Thus, taking the that the presence of one generality leads to the presence of another genera- probandum as a whole. we may say that what is denoted by the term lity. But such a knowledge has little practical value, and would not probandum has two constituent parts; namely, the dharmin (i.e the explain a person's peculiar activity after having an inferential knowledge subject only) and the dharma (i.e. the inferable property only). Now, it is (such as the collection of fire, etc.); for fireness has never been observed a fact that the latter, the dharma itself, cannot be a locus of the inferable to have any usefulness for burning a thing or cooking. property-that is, of its own self; because the substratum-superstratum Moreover, if one is led to activity on the basis of the knowledge of a relation (ādhārādheya-bhāva-sambandha) is possible only between two generality, one would not proceed in one particular direction alone A separate entities Hence the conclusion that follows is that a part of what generality does not have any fixed spot or direction, because it inheres in is denoted by the term probandum cannot be a locus of the inferable so many individuals who are scattered in all directions. To this, it may be property. The subject is such a part; hence it cannot also be a locus of objected that a generality is not possible as detached from an individual the same

Thus, when one ascertains the presence of a generality, one also ascertains Another instance of the same kind would be: This subject cannot be a locus of the intended inferable property, because it is one of the two things a particular individual as its locus, and since one's activity relates to that particular locus or individual, one proceeds to a particular direction representing the paksa and the vipaksa (paksa-vipaksayor anyataratvāt), only. But such an objection would be of no avail .. It cannot be claimed just like the vipaksa, which is defined to be an indisputable locus of the that the generality is not possible without that particular locus or indi- absence of the inferable property. But the vipaksa represents one of the vidual alone, for it resides as well in so many other individuals For two things. The paksa, too, represents one of the two things; and hence a locus of the generality any individual would suffice, and as such, it also cannot be a locus of the inferable property one's proceeding towards a particular direction alone would remain Such counter-inferences are possible in each and every case of inference. As an instance of the latter. where one particular inference is invalidated unexplained 9. Cf. TCM., section on vyapti-grahopāya. Text and English translation by some inconsistency, the following may be noted. A Naiyāyika with explanatory notes by Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyay. Journal of offers, for instance, an inference for his own view, 'Sound is non-eternal, Indian Philosophy, 3, pp 167-208 because it is something produced, just like a jar ' As against this, it may 10. See supra fn 6. be pointed out that the probans 'being something produced' (krtakatva) 11. Agreement in presence alone does not prove invariability; there must would also prove that sound cannot be a quality of akasa (for barring one also be agreement in absence. Otherwise the relation even between or two qualities, all its qualities are eternal and not produced); hence, a smoke and an ass, for instance, would be concomitance; for it may so Naiyäyika would have to deny one of his accepted conclusions. In diffe- happen that in certain cases of smoke there may also be present, by rent cases of inferences, such inconsistencies may be pointed out in chance, an ass. different ways. For further details, see Pañjika on TS, (verses 1456f) 12. Sometimes, a thing may be a cause simply by its presence (svarūpa-sat and NBHU., pp 211f kārana) For example, fire is the cause of burning; whoever puts his hand 14 Inference is not valid. because it often proves a wrong conclusion and into the fire, knowingly or unknowingly, gets burnt But sometimes. goes against one's own view The illustration can be given from the presence of a thing is not enough; to be a cause, it must be known to Dharmakīrti's Nyāyabindu (iii. 101) To prove the existence of the self be so (jñāta-sat kārana) For example, smoke yields the knowledge of fire (purusa), the Samkhyas offer the following inference (SK, verse 17): in the mountain only after being known to be present there Concomi- 'The visual organ and the like are for the use of someone else, because tance as a cause of inference belongs to the second category they are composite substances. just like the various implements (anga), 13. Inference is not valid, because every inference, it can be shown, suffers such as a bed, a chair, and so on.' The thesis intended to be proved is from contradiction (virodha), generally (sāmanyatah) or specifically 'usefulness for a non-composite being' (i e purusa) (asamhatapārārthya). (visesatah) But the inference actually proves 'usefulness for a composite being' As an instance of the former, which is capable of invalidating any (samhata-pārārthya), because the instances like the bed, etc., establish inference, the following inference may be cited: 'The subject (dharmin) usefulness for only ordinary persons who are composite beings cannot be a locus (adhara) of the intended inferable property (abhimata- Ista-vighatakrt has been mentioned by Dinnaga as a variety of the pseudo-probans called the contradictory (viruddha). But Dharmakīrti

146 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 147 refuses to recognize it as a separate variety (op cit.). usefulness, and infers: 'this water is useful for me, because it is of the 15 Inference is not valid, because it can be shown that for every inference, sarne particular nature as previously quenched my thirst.' Next, he there is an equally strong counter-inference proving just the opposite. proceeds to collect the water. Hundreds of similar instances may be cited For instance, one may argue that sound is non-eternal, because it is 21 According to the Carvakas, practical activity in the so-called cases of something produced, just like a jar. But it can be counteracted by the inference is based upon mere probability. argument that sound is eternal, because it is audible, just like sound-ness 22 Pāda-prasārikā Considered to be a popular maxim (laukika-nyāya) See (śabdatva) [According to Nyãya, a universal is eternal and is perceived Jacob, A Second Handful of Popular Maxims, addenda (p. 61) by the same sense which perceives its locus. Thus, sound-ness would be 23. Cf. PV, iii. 31. What is the means for the ascertainment of concomitance? eternal and also audible. ] "The Buddhist answers that the concomitance is known to be universal Viruddhavyabhicarin has been accepted as a fallacy of inference by and invariable if the relation between the probans and the probandum Dinnäga, though Dharmakīrti rejects it (NB, iii. 126). Cf. the Nyāya can be shown to be either one of causality or essential identity, and not fallacy of prakaranasama (NS, i 2 7) and PPBH, pp. 192ff. from mere observation of co-accompaniment of two factors If the 16 VP, i. 42 concomitance be based upon causality or essential identity, the relation 17. VP, i 34. The reasoning of one may be upset by another. "The argument cannot be conceived to be invariable, as an effect cannot be conceived to of the Naiyayika to prove that substance is different from quality is be independent of a cause, and hence the effect is the proof of the cause; taken as an example .. His argument, briefly, is: Substance is different and as regards two things, whose nature is fundamentally identical, from quality, because the latter can qualify the former Against this, there can be no separation between the two, as that would be tantamount others point out that the argument is weak, because both what is different to forfeiture of their own essential character, which is inconceivable. " and what is not different from another can qualify it in some cases, and Satkari Mookerji, The Buddhist Philosophy of Universal Flux, p. 372 For cannot qualify it in other cases. A king and a kingdom are different from further details of the Buddhist view, see ch XXIV of the same. each other, and we can say: the king's kingdom (rajno rastram) Here, An inference in which the concomitance is based upon causality is the 'king' qualifies 'kingdom' But on this analogy, we cannot say: the inference of fire from smoke, smoke being an effect of fire (cf SDS, p 16). hermit's kingdom; even though the hermit and the kingdom are also An inference in which the concomitance is based upon identity (svabhāva different from each other Similarly, we can say 'the smell of sandal', or tādātmya) is the inference of 'being a tree' (vrksatva) from 'being a but we cannot say 'the smell of something which has colour', even śimśapā' (śimśapātva), for a śimśapā is a kind of tree and hence is not though in both cases, there is a difference between the two things. To fundamentally different. come to cases where there is no difference, we can say: amrānam vanam=a Jayanta Bhatta has already refuted, in some detail, this Buddhist grove of mango-trees. Here, mango-trees qualify grove, although the doctrine (NM, pp. 104f). As to concomitance based on causality, he grove is not different from the trees". K. A. S. Iyer, note on op cit. says that the Naiyayikas too admit cases of inference where the probans 8. Some further objections against the validity of inference have been and the probandum may have, between them, a causal relation. In fact, noted (and answered) in SVR, pp. 266-67: (a) The knowledge given by Gautama (NS, i. 1. 5, pūrvavat and śeșavat inferences) and Kaņāda (VS, inference is dim and not vivid (aspasta-svarüpatvāt); (b) inference has to ix. 2. 1. see also Upaskāra thereon) both speak of such inferences. B it depend on other things for the determination of its object (s vartha-niścaye the point is determined because of the constant association (sähacarya) of parāpekșatvāt); (c) inference is always preceded by perception (pratyaksa- the probans and the probandum, and not because of the causal relation. pürvakatvat): (d) inference is not directly produced by the object (arthad In fact, numerous instances of inference may be cited in which the probans anupajāyamānatvät); and (e) inference does not have something real as its and the probandum have neither a causal relation, nor identity 'Thus, object (avastu-visayatvat). See also S. N. Dasgupta, A History of Indian for instance, the forthcoming appearance of stars is inferred from sunset; Philosophy, III. p. 537 the rise of tidal waves from the rise of the moon; impending rainfall is 19 See also SVR, pp 268f inferred from the movement of ants carrying off their larvae; the existence 20. Without inference, everyday life would be impossible. Consider, for of shade on the other side of light on the surface, and such like. But the example, the activity of a person searching water to quench his thirst concomitance, in these cases, cannot be traced to causality' In many previous cases, when he had been thirsty, he had obtained a Besides, as Väcaspati Miśra points out (NVTT, p. 161), if one infers particular kind of water and found it useful. From this, he acquires the the probandum from the probans, ascertaining concomitance through knowledge that a particular kind of water is always useful for quenching causality, the fact that one proceeds unhesitatingly to collect the thing thirst .. In the present occasion, on perceiving water at some spot, he inferred (i e the probandum) cannot be explained. For, causality recalls this invariable relation between a particular kind of water and its implies that the effect is posterior and the cause is prior; the two are

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invariably non-simultaneous. Thus, a person inferring fire (=cause) presence of an ass; but still, it is not an invariable antecedent of fire from smoke (=effect) would ascertain that fire had bcen there, but he For, even in the presence of an ass, smoke is not produced when fire is cannot be certain that fire is there. Therefore, how can he proceed to not present, and even in the absence of an ass, smoke is produced collect fire then? when fire accompanied by wet fuel is present The Buddhist position is untenable, also because there may be, on the But all this, Vacaspati contends. would be of no avail. Although it one hand, an ascertainment of cause-effect relation between fire and ash, may be observed, in some cases, that the presence and the absence of although there may not be an ascertainment of concomitance; and on smoke are related to the presence and the absence of fire, the question the other, an ascertainment of concomitance between smoke and fire, still remains-in the spots other than the observed ones, due to what can although there may not be an ascertainment of cause-effect relation. be explained the presence of smoke? It is possible that one may observe, (cf. NVTTP, p 333) in a number of instances, that there is an ass and there is smoke; and Identity, also, cannot be the means for the establishment of concomit- again, that there is no ass, and there is no smoke Still, everybody ance. In fact, if such a claim is put forward. inference, in those cases, admits that it would be wrong to conclude that smoke is an effect would have little relevance It is admitted by all that there can be no produced by an ass; for the same kind of smoke is observed to be inference unless the probans is first cognized. Now, to the Buddhist produced when there is no ass but there is fire. In the same way, even who believes in the identity of the probans and probandum. a question after it has been observed in a number of instances that where there is may be put: Is, or is not, the probandum, too, cognized, when the probans fire there is smoke, and where there is no fire there is no smoke, it is is initially cognized? If the probandum is not cognized, it must be some- possible to assume that smoke may be produced, in some other spots, thing totally different from the probans; just like a cow and a horse, for even in the absence of fire, but in the presence of something else, say, a instance. If, however, the probandum is also cognized it would have to demon (piśaca) [which may be the real cause of fire] In the instances in be admitted that .. just like the probans. the presence of the probandum as which smoke is found to be followed by fire, the presence of fire may be well is already determined In that case, why should one go on to infer? explained to be due to some extraneous circumstances and not because it Moreover, one who happens to ascertain the general property of is the cause of smoke; just like the accidental presence of an ass in some vrksatva, but not the specific property of śimsapātva, may be justifiably instances of smoke prompted to take the help of inference. But why should one go on to Invariability presupposes the removal of such a doubt, and again, the infer vrksatva from śimsapātva, for ascertaining the latter amounts, in removal of such a doubt presupposes the establishment of invariability. fact, to ascertaining the former as well? It is really an extraordinary claim In short, there arises the fallacy of mutual dependence that a person perceives simsapātva, but vrksatva remains imperceptible to 25 Thus, for Vācaspati (NVTT, p 165), Udayana (ATV, p. 403) and the him. Thus, there remains no scope for an inference author of MM (p 26), concomitance is only a natural relation (svābhāvika- Moreover, if there really be an identity between śimsapätva and vrksatva. sambandha) then, just like the inference of vrksatva from śimsapātva, it would have 26 The idea seems to be that there is a limit to the power and application of been possible to infer, also. simsapātva from vrksatva But that is not a a reductio; it cannot disprove an established fact. It cannot be argued, fact, for, in a khadira. there is vrksatva. but not śimśapātva, and the probans for instance, by a reductio, that if fire (tejas) be a substance (dravya), it would be irregular. cannot have hot touch (usna-sparsa), just like the other substances, 24. Vacaspati Misra has argued (NVTI, pp. 159ff) in great detail that namely, earth, water etc concomitance or invariability cannot be based upon causation, for in the 27. Intuitional knowledge is independent of the perception of a mark, Buddhist view, it can never be concluded with certainty, for instance, whereas inference is essentially dependent upon the perception of an that smoke is always produced from fire and never from anything else. invariable mark. Intuitional knowledge is thus defined to be a form of It is claimed that there is concomitance between smoke and fire, because valid knowledge produced by the mind alone, independent of any other smoke has 'production from fire' (tad-utpatti; tat=fire). But what exactly factor (YS, iii. 33. Bhojavrtti); for instance, when a girl speaks about her is meant by this 'production from fire'? Does it mean simply that the brother who is away in a distant country, 'My brother will come back presence of smoke is followed by the presence of fire? But it may be true tomorrow.' [And he actually arrives]. See also PPBH on ārsa-jñāna, of an ass also, and one would be led to the absurd position that smoke pp. 627-28 and NM, pt. i, p. 21 has concomitance with an ass as well. 28 See note 12, above As against this, it may be pointed out that the implication here is that 29. Vacaspati Miśra appears to object to such a contention. He argues that the presence of smoke is invariably followed by the presence of fire. The the mind alone (which is the internal sense or antah-karana), independent presence of smoke may sometimes be accidentally followed by the of any external sense-organ, cannot produce a direct awareness about an

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external object. If such a position is accepted, there would be no person the probandum, and (ii) absence of any knowledge that the probans is who may be called blind or deaf, because it may be claimed that even a present without the probandum. Thus, a person who knows that smoke is person without the visual or the auditory sense-organ may have a direct an effect of fire can ascertain that smoke is invariably accompanied by awareness of colour or sound through the instrumentality of the mind. fire, even on the first case of observation. But another person, unaware alone. It is not that a perception becomes a mental one simply because it of such a cause-effect relation, has to observe many instances of co- is produced by the operation of the mind. In that case, knowledge existence to determine concomitance. See TCM, ibid, pp .. 168f and 203f would only be mental and never otherwise, for the mind has a role to and also NVTTP, p. 337 play in the production of all kinds of knowledge. It may be pointed out 35. SV (i. 2. 60), codana-sūtra, verse 60 that though the various kinds of knowledge have the mind as a common 36 supra, fn 11. cause, still they are different from one another, because of the fact that, 37. supra, fn 29. in each case, there is some special cause to assist the mind. Thus, in the 38 supra, fn. 32. ascertainment of concomitance, the mind may be the cause, as assisted 39. NBHU (pp. 218, 219) thus argues that for the perception of a property by 'repeated observation' (bhuyodarsana). But this would lead to another which is resident in many individuals, it is not necessary to perceive all absurdity, namely, the admission of a new kind of pramāna. For, the those individuals; the perception of a few individuals being sufficient. ascertainment of concomitance would, then, be a special kind of know- As, for instance, the fact is proved by the perception of cowness (gotva- ledge distinct from all other kinds, having a special cause of its own; and jati). Similarly concomitance, being a property of many smokes, can be hence it must have a special instrument (karana=pramāna) of its own. ascertained by the perception of only some smokes. Secondly, the Väcaspati's own view is that the cause of the ascertainment of con- concomitance may be determined as relating to the unperceived, past comitance is the sense-organ having, as its accessory, the group of and future individuals also, by an inference on the basis of the observed impressions (samskāra) produced by the various individual perceptions cases of individuals: the other individuals of smoke also are pervaded by of the co-existence of the probans and the probandum. Sucarita Miśra fire, because they have the property of smokeness, just like the individual (SV, verse 12) also seems to hold a similar view For its refutation by the smokes already observed. Thus, concomitance would be proved in Prabhakara, see TCM, section on vyapti-grahopaya. Text and English respect of all smokes. translation with explanatory notes by Mrinalkanti Gangopadhyay, 40 Cf. NS.,i. 1. 34-35 Journal of Indian Philosophy, 3, pp. 169ff 41. For example, in the inference of fire from smoke, the anvaya will be: NBHU first argues against the view that concomitance is ascertained 'wherever there is smoke, there is fire'; here, smoke is the pervaded, and by the mind, but later on replies to the objections noted earlier and fire is the pervader The vyatireka will be: 'wherever there is absence of accepts the view fire, there is absence of smoke'; here, absence of fire is the pervaded, and 30. See, for instance, TCM, section on vyāpti-grahopāya. M. K. Gango- absence of smoke is the pervader padhyay, ibid. 177 42 According to the Naiyayikas, the essential characteristics of a valid 31 See note 11, above. probans are five: (i) presence in the subject (paksa-sattva), (ii) presence in 32. However, here also, the difficulty may be solved with the help of an indisputable locus of the probandum (sapaksa-sattva), (iii) absence in sāmānya-lakșanā-pratyāsatti. The term sāmānya in the case of such an indisputable locus of the absence of probandum (vipaksāsattva), apprehensional connection is not necessarily to be taken in the technical (iv) not having an equally strong counter-probans proving the opposite sense of a universal (jati); it may be taken in the ordinary sense of a (asat-pratipaksatva), and (v) not having the absence of the probandum common property as well, which, in the present case, would be 'absence of already established in the subject by some stronger pramāna (abādhitatva) fire' (agnyabhāva). See Muktāvali, on verse 64 The lack of any one of these five characteristics makes a probans 33. SVi. 1. 5, anumāna, 134-37 fallacious Thus, the lack of the first leads to the fallacy of the unproved 34 Gadādhara (TCM, beginning of section on vyāpti-grahopāya) characterizes (asiddha), of the second to the fallacy of the contradicted (viruddha), of such a view as jaran-naiyayika-siddhanta. According to Uddyotakara, the third to the fallacy of the irregular (anaikantika), of the fourth to the concomitance is ascertained by perception, but he is silent about the fallacy of the counter-acted (sat-pratipaksa), and of the fifth to the fallacy number of cases to be observed Of the Mīmāmsakas, Kumārila (SV, of the sublated (bādhita) chapter on inference, verse 12) holds a similar view. Gangeśa maintains The examples are respectively: (i) Sound is a quality, because it is visible that no hard and fast rule about the number of cases to be observed can (But 'visibility' does not belong to sound.); (ii) Sound is eternal, because be laid down. For an ascertainment of concomitance, two factors are it is a product. ('Being a product' is not true of any eternal thing ); responsible: (i) a knowledge about the co-existence of the probans with (iii) The mountain has smoke, because it has fire. (Fire is present even

152 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIALS 153 where smoke is absent, as in the red-hot iron ball); (iv) Sound is non- The suffix matup generally expresses a relation (sambandha) of the eternal, because it is a product, just like a jar. (There is also a counter- thing expressed by the word to which matup has been added .. The subject as probans: sound is eternal, because it is audible, just like the universal of such, and the inferable property as'such, may already be proved elsewhere sound-ness.); (v) Fire is not hot because it is a substance, just like water. But the relation between the subject and the inferable property is not a (Fire is already proved to be hot by tactual perception). proved fact, and the function of inference is to establish this relation. The Buddhists accept only the first three, and strongly argue against Thus, in the instance cited, the inference proves the relation of conjunction the admission of the last two. For a summary of the Buddhist objections, (samyoga) between the mountain and fire. See also NBHU, p. 216 see M. K. Gangopadhyay, Vinītadeva's Nyāyabindu-țīkā, Supplementary 45 supra, fn. 6. For example, one may wrongly identify rising steam as note 3 .. Jayanta's arguments for the Nyaya position are given earlier smoke, infer the presence of fire, and may not get fire at the particular (NM, pt. i, pp. 101f.). The views of Kaņāda and Praśastapāda seem to spot. But it proves only the ignorance of the person concerned, and not agree with that of the Buddhist. However, Śridhara (NK, pp. 482-85), the invalidity of inference Concomitance is properly established only after refuting an alternative view that the fallacies of the counter-acted after the possibility of deviation due to the change of time, place and the and the sublated are to be included in the fallacy of the irregular, explains like has been duly taken into consideration. See Kamalaśīla on TS, that the probantia lacking in the last two characteristics are to be covered verses 1474-76 by defective formulations known as paksābhāsa. See also Uddyotakara 46. See NB, (pp. 104, 111), IS, verses 1472-73 and NBHU, p. 213 and Vacaspati on NS, i. 2.4 and Upaskara on VS, iii, 1.17 47. See Jayanta's discussion on the fallacies prakarana-sama and kālātīta (NM, 43. Cf. SVR (p. 265) quoting the view of Udbhata in the attva-vrtti. pt. ii, pp. 158 and 167) Also Vinītadeva's Nyāyabindu-țīkā, pp 220f NBHU (pp 213-15) replies in some detail to the charge of 'secondariness' 48. Cf TS, verse 1476 against inference .. The opponent's argument, in prief, is that terms like 49. supra, fn. 3. The idea is: there are certain inferences which are so obvious paksa-dharma and others are used in the context of inference in a secondary and well-known that their validity cannot be challenged But there are sense and hence, inference has no validity But a use in a secondary sense also inferences-put forward dogmatically by the followers of particular is not possible unless there is also a use in a primary sense; a word cannot systems-which are unintelligible, and not verifiable The validity of have a use in a secondary sense alone. For instance, a Brahmin boy, such inferences is not beyond question. Cf. Purandara's view noted by because of his courage and brilliance, may be called 'fire' (agnir mānavakah), Kamalaśila on TS, verse 1481 the word 'fire' being used in a secondary sense But the word is also used 50. The basic principles are the same in all cases of inference; the nature of in the primary sense of something that burns in so many instances. the object inferred does not matter. Hence, the admission of validity in Thus, it would have to be presupposed that the terms like paksa-dharma one case amounts to the admission of validity in other cases as well. Cf and others have, also, a use in a primary sense; and in such a case, the TS, verses 1481ff. validity of inference would have to be admitted even by the opponent. 51. SVR, (p. 268, attributing to Dharmakīrti) and SDS, (p 19 attributing to Moreover, even if the said terms are used in a secondary sense, there the Buddhists) quote a verse noting some further arguments for the is no harm so far as inference's capability of yielding valid knowledge is admission of the validity of inference (pramānāntara-sāmanya-sthiter concerned For example, a person desiring to weave a piece of cloth goes to anadhiyo gateh/pramānāntara-sadbhāvah pratiședhāc ca kasyacit/) the market and buys a bundle of yarns When somebody asks him 'What First, if inference is not admitted, it would not be possible to distinguish are you carrying?', he replies, 'These are yarns for a cloth' However, between a valid cognition and an invalid cognition. When one sees, for the piece of cloth will be produced much later and hence, the expression instance, water at a distance, one determines the validity or the invalidity 'yarns for a cloth' is to be taken in a secondary sense, as distinguished of the cognition by an inference. Earlier, in some other spot, one had from its use in a primary sense when it is used in respect of yarns fitted in seen water, had gone there, and had actually found water there. Finally, a weaving machine actually producing a piece of cloth Though the one had decided that the cognition must have been valid cause of the piece of cloth is 'secondary' in one case, and 'primary' in the Or, conversely, in the same instance, one had gone there, but had not other, there is no difference in the nature of the piece of cloth produced actually found water there; finally, one had decided that the cognition from either. Similarly, let inference be secondary; still, its effect, the must have been false. In the case of the newly acquired cognition of knowledge, would not be secondary or invalid. water, one thus infers either that this cognition is valid, because it is of 44 supra, fn. 4. Jayanta's implication is as follows Generally, in an inferential the same kind [as the one acquired earlier]: or, 'this cognition is invalid, formulation, the term indicative of the probandum is a word formed by because it is of the same kind [as the one acquired earlier]' the addition of the suffix matup. For instance, the inference of fire from Secondly, a person utters sentences to convey his implications to smoke is expressed as parvato vahnimān dhūmāt others But how does he determine that his words have been correctly

154 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 155

understood or not by the hearer? It cannot be determined by percetion, (According to the commentator Cakradhara, suśiksita- and if the fact remains undetermined, he should become silent at once cārvaka refers to Udbhata and others., Udbhata was said to be a But the fact is that he continues his dialogue. In other words, from the Sabhapati of King Jayapīda of Kashmir) reactions and replies of the hearer, the speaker infers whether he has been understood or not, and continues accordingly. Hence, the validity (d) The Cärväka, the cunning one (dhurta) begins with the of inferences cannot be denied. promise: 'now, therefore, we will explain tattva (reality, true Thirdly, inference is necessary also for the cognition of absence nature of things),' but afterwards, explains tattva to be nothing (abhava) As, for instance, one infers the absence of a jar on the ground: but the impossibility of making a specific rule regarding the there is an absence of a jar on the ground, because though perceptible, it is not cognised there. (See NB pp. 47ff). number and definition of pramāna and prameya. To establish that it is impossible to make a specific rule regarding the number of pramana, they have cited the following forms of valid knowledge which cannot (be said to) be produced by (the NYĀYAMAÑJARĪ accepted) pramana-s like perception, etc .: One standing in C. STRAY REFERENCES darkness, or with the eyes closed, has an awareness in the form 'the fingers of the hand are closed', or 'the fingers of the hand (a) (In the lists enumerating the vidyasthāna-s, two words are open.' But such an awareness cannot be produced by the denoting logic have been mentioned, namelý, tarka and nyāya- tactual sense, for the tactual sense, as located in the hand, cannot vistara. Jayanta contends that both of them refer to the Nyaya produce a valid cognition in that hand itself Moreover, at system of Gautama and not to any other. Thus, as against a night, the flame of a lamp, seen from a distance, produces an possible claim of the Cārvakas he remarks:) 'The wretched awareness of the glow as reaching up to the end of the quarters. (varāka) Cārvākas are only to be thrown away (i.e. refuted) Again, (for one standing) in a spot lying in the direct path of and therefore, where is the scope for enumerating their very the blowing wind, a cluster of lotuses shaken by the wind insignificant (ksudra) logic (tarka) in this list (of vidyāsthāna-s)?' produces an awareness of fragrance even at a distance. (b) (The Nyāya system recognizes four kinds of pramāna-s, But then the ascetic, though he is adept in inventing such namely, perception, inference, comparison and verbal testi- (peculiar) instances of awareness, does not really know the mony But there are systems which do not accept such a classi- nature of either perception or inference. The awareness that fication. So Jayanta remarks:) 'Thus, for example, the Cārvākas the fingers in the hand are open is due to perception; the sense say that there is only one kind of pramana, which is perception. (tactual), being pervasive, is not incapable in respect of such (pratyaksa) ... . Later on, when we will establish the validity of (an awareness). Persons who drink cold water up to the navel inference, we will refute (the arguments of) the followers of feel its touch to be colder well inside. Just as the awareness of Brhaspati (bārhaspatya) (claiming that inference is not a pramāna). conjunction is produced by it (the tactual sense), so also the (c) (Different systems accept different kinds of pramāna-s. awareness of its absence, too, is produced by it. The sense is The Naiyayikas say they are four, the Prabhakaras five, the capable of receiving specific forms of action and, for that reason, Bhättas six and yet others eight. In such a context, Jayanta the closedness of the fingers can be known by it. The knowledge remarks:) 'The Cārvākas, the well-learned ones (suśiksita), of the fragrance of the lotus (at a distance) and the knowledge say that it is really impossible to specifically state the number of the glow of a lamp at a distance are produced by inferential

of pramāņa-s'. marks (linga), and they proceed from the ascertainment of

156 CĂRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MATERIALS 157 invariable concomitance. Thus, where is there any form of the different systems in this regard are to be critically discussed. knowledge which would be dependent upon some other novel For example, the Vaisesika and others argue that sound is non- form of pramana? Therefore, the Nastikas, not having enough eternal and is produced. Jayanta remarks:) intelligence to determine the power of the pramāna-s, have But, in such kinds of assemblies (discussing philosophical been clamouring in vain that in the case of pramana-s, there is questions), who would indeed care to remember the (name of no specific rule as to the number .. the) wretched Cārvākas? According to us, however, in the case of pramāna-s, there is (h) (If all precepts based upon the Veda are considered definitely a specific rule as to the number, and we shall discuss valid), well, then, even the precepts (āgama) of the Lokāyata later on the prameya-s which have their specific nature etc. By and others would have to be considered valid, for it is found declaring before the assembly of the learned that tattva is nothing that (their precepts too) are based on Vedic statements, e g., but the impossibility of determining (the true nature of pramāna 'the one of pure knowledge (vijnanaghana), appearing out of and prameya), they have only revealed their dullheadedness. these forms of matter, gets dissolved again only into them; (e) (According to Nyaya, the existence of God is proved by an there is no awareness (samjña) after death' (Brhadāranyaka 4.5 13) inference: The earth, etc .. , must have a conscious agent, because And thus, if the Lokayata doctrine is also held to be valid, then they are effects, like the jar, etc. The probans of the inference is let us hope for the best for the precepts of all the other systems. effecthood, or käryatva, of the earth, etc.) The reply to this is as follows. In the Lokāyata view, no precept is indeed (positively) prescribed. It is only the assertions .. In this connection, Jayanta observes: Well, it has already been said that effecthood (of the earth, of a Vaitandika (representing, merely, the destructive criticism etc.), is unproved. (So how can it be the ground for proving of others). It is not really a body of precepts. the existence of God?) Who would argue in such a manner-a But then, there it has been (positively) prescribed: 'live in Cārvaka, a Šākya (Buddhist), or a Mīmāmsaka? A Cārvāka pleasure as long as you live.' No. The fact being naturally is, in fact, one who admits the effecthood of even the Vedic established, a prescription in this regard becomes useless. (It is compositions in spite of the fact that they are distinct in nature not a prescription at all.) from other compositions; as such, how can he deny the effect- As to the instructions 'dharma is not to be practised', 'faith is hood of formations like the earth, etc. ? not to be put upon instructions regarding it', etc., (it is to be (f) (As against the Nyaya view of God it may be argued, noted that) they are not really proper instructions, for the why not explain the production of the earth, etc., by only per- Lokāyata doctrine is based only upon such statements as rep- ceptible causes? What is the use of admitting an imperceptible resent the viewpoint of the opponent (pūrvapaksa-vacana) cause, an agent in the form of God? In answer, it is pointed out Thus, there are subsequent Brähmana statements replying (to that there is no harm in this, for those who admit paraloka also the previous ones): 'Well, I am not preaching ignorance. This admit an imperceptible cause in the form of adrsta or merit- self is indeed, indestructible. It only has a connection with the demerit. Then, Jayanta remarks:) senses, etc.). (The self is not born; it can only have connection The reply to (the objections against the admission of God with newer senses, etc. )' (cf. Brhadāranyaka 4.5. 14). raised by) the Bärhaspatyas would simply be the establishment Thus, due to its being based upon statements representing of paraloka (When paraloka is established, their objections are only the viewpoint of the opponent, the doctrine of the Lokāyata automatically rejected.) is also not an independent one; and because it is contradicted (g) (Is sound, śabda, produced or manifested? The views of by later statements, it is not to be taken into account.

THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 159 Udayana's Nyāyakusumāňjali of there being no recollection of things apprehended on each previous day Udayana (c tenth century AD ) is a highly respected name in Nor can consciousness inhere in each individual (limb of the the history of Indian philosophy As a representative of the body), for in that case, it would not be possible to recollect Nyaya-Vaiseșika he has commented on the major works of what had been apprehended by them in the event of the limbs- the systems, besides writing a few independent works of hand, foot etc .- being severed (from the body). which the Nyāyakusumanjali is one, which has as its main theme various proofs for the existence of God. Given here is Neither can it be argued that, like the lingering fragrance of an extract from it containing a brief exposition and refutation musk (transferred to) a piece of cloth due to constant contact, of the Cārvāka/Lokāyata view identifying the self with the impressions of one also may be transmitted to another; for the body then there would arise the absurdity of recollection by the embryonic child (garbhastha-bhrūna) of what has been experienc- ed by the mother. The objection cannot be avoided even by Nyāyakusumāñjali (1.15) maintaining that (for such transfer the precondition would be) (ON DEHĀIMAVĀDA) a relation of being the material and the effect (upādānopādeya- bhava); for, if the view of the permanence of things is accepted, (The following may be advanced by the opponent): Well, all it (i.e. such a relation) would not be possible in the case of atoms .. this would have been so, if there would actually have existed (It is not possible) also because, in relation to a broken whole an enjoyer (bhoktr) who is eternal and omnipresent. But where (khandāvayavin), the parts severed from them cannot be the is there such a being, the forms of matter themselves being material causes; and also because the whole, produced pre- conscious? (The conscious one) is nothing but the forms of viously, has been destroyed .. matter transformed into the shape of a body, for it is observed to be so through agreement in presence and agreement in absence. Everywhere, the (unseen karma-vāsanā = adrsta) and the reminiscent impression (jnāna-vāsana) would follow as Śāntaraksita and Kamalaśīla restricted to each particular combination of matter, so that a specific rule as regards enjoyment and recollection can be Because of the circumstance that, of the great Buddhist justified. ācārya-s of India, Santaraksita spent the maturest part of his In answer, it is said (verse 15): What is apprehended by one life in Tibet where he was most highly esteemed, and is not recollected by another. The same combination of matter moreover because practically nothing about his life and activity survives for us in Indian sources, we have basically is not there, because there is constant change (apakrama). Nor to depend upon the Tibetan historians of Buddhism for our can there be a transfer (samkrama) of impressions, and neither is knowledge of him. According to the foremost Tibetan there any other alternative, accepting the permanence of things. historians, he acted, before leaving for Tibet, as the upādhyāya It cannot be said that consciousness inheres in the collectivity of Nälanda during the eighth century AD when Gopāla and (samudäya) of the forms of matter as a whole (i.e., in the body Dharmapāla ruled over eastern India He persuaded the as a whole), because it becomes a different one day after day Tibetan king Khri-sron-Ide-dtsan to construct in AD 787 the bSam-yas monastery in the model of Odantapuri, the first (being subject to change), and there would arise the absurdity genuine centre of Buddhist studies. It was here that the

160 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 161 earliest Tibetan scholars of Indian Buddhism were trained Text (1857): and initiated in the activity of translating Indian texts into Tibetan. He died in Tibet, 'having been kicked by a horse', If there is no entity that has continuity of existence, then in the first decade of the ninth century AD. The foremost there can be no other world, because there is nothing that disciple and commentator of Sāntaraksita was Kamalaśīla, could belong to the other world who also followed the master to Tibet where, according to Tibetan historians, he was killed by some Chinese rivals Commentary expounding Buddhist doctrine in their own way and, in 'No entity'-like the soul, etc. The 'soul' has already been a grand debate organised by the king, got defeated by rejected; hence it cannot be 'continuous', simply because it Kamalaśīla Although in the large Tibetan collection called the Tanjur does not exist at all As for cognition and other entities, they (bsTan-'gyur), a large number of works is attributed to are all momentary, and it has been proved in the (previous) him, the most important philosophical work of Sāntaraksita chapter on 'The Three Points of Time' that there can be no is undoubtedly the Tattvasangraha, which fortunately for us continuity of these survives also in its original Sanskrit. It is commented upon in detail by Kamalasīla, the commentary being known as the 'The body, etc , might appertain to the other world.' The Pañjika The work is intended to defend the later Yogācra answer to that is as follows: view for the purpose of which it goes into detailed refutation of practically all the other Indian philosophical views, and is Texts (1858-9) thus a veritable encyclopaedia for us of Indian philosophy The body, cognition, the sense-organs and the rest being current in his time. We have given here, mainly in Ganganatha Jha's English destroyed every moment, they cannot pertain to the other rendering (with revisions where felt necessary), the section world There is nothing else that is admitted (by you, Bud- explaining and refuting the Lokāyata view as well as the dhists). Hence, consciousness must be regarded as produced section on Svabhäva-vada, which we are inclined to under- from, or manifested by, certain material substances, just like stand as a prominent feature of ancient Indian materialism acids, liquors and such things. Jha's translation originally appeared in GOS, Baroda, 1937. Commentary

Śantaraksita's Tattva-samgraha with the The term 'and the rest' includes feeling (vedana), naming Commentary (Pañjikā) of Kamalśīla (samjñā) and mental impressions (samskāra) 'There is nothing else that is admitted'-as the 'Soul'. A. LOKĀYAIA Thus, this turns out to be the assertion of the view of the Lokāyata (Materialist). His aphoriśms read as follows: 'There being nothing that can belong to the other world, there can be Commentary no other world; there are four material substances-earth, (In the introductory text, verse 4): Truth has been spoken of water, fire and air; and from these proceeds consciousness'. as 'without beginning, without end' The author proceeds to Some commentators on these aphorisms offer the explanation set forth arguments in support of this view, starting with the that consciousness is produced out of material substances; criticism that has been urged against it others explain that it is manifested by them. Hence the author

162 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MATERIALS 163 has mentioned both these views-'produced or manifested' Commentary Śukta is acid Surā is intoxicating liquor. 'And such things' are Further, if the mind that existed in the past body were the meant to include things having the effect of making people cause of the mind (consciousness) in the body now born-and unconscious, and so forth An objection is raised-'As a matter of fact, consciousness the mind in the dying body were the cause of the mind in the future body,-then, inasmuch as there would be no cessation (or cognition) is always produced on the basis of such causes as the eye and other sense-organs and objects, in the shape of colour in the continuity of the mind, the existence of the "other (forms); this fact is well known. How, then, is it said that world" might be postulated. As a matter of fact, however, there can be no relation of cause and effect between the said cognition proceeds from those material substances?' The (Materialist's) answer is as follows: two minds in dispute, because they reside in different bodies- just like the cognition of the cow and the cognition of the Text (1860) horse. The names 'body', 'sense-organ', and so on are applied to 'Or, the produced cognitions may be made the 'Subject'- particular combinations of earth and other material substances; in regard to which there is denial of the idea of their being there is no reality other than these .. produced by the last cognition in the past (dead) body-the

Commentary 'Probans' being the same as before, 'because they are cogni- tions'-the 'cognitions appearing in other series' supply the Says the Lokayata-sūtra-'It is to the combination of these corroborative instance. that the names "object" and "sense-organ" are applied; the 'The argument may be formulated as follows: the (present) sense-organ, etc .. , have no existence apart from the great material cognition cannot be produced by the last cognition in the past substances (mahabhuta); the notions of these appear only in body, because it is cognition,-like the cognition appearing in regard to the combinations of these; and "combination" has no another series; the cognitions appearing in the body in question existence apart from the combining elements; these four material are all cognitions; hence, there is apprehension of what is con- substances are well-known by direct perception. Apart from comitant with the contrary; inasmuch as 'being cognition' these, there is no other reality equally well-known by direct is concomitant with the contrary of 'being produced by the perception; and apart from perception, there is no other means cognition in the last body in question.' of cognition which could prove the existence of the "other The idea of the 'previous birth' has thus been denied by the world" and such things' .. Materialist; he proceeds to deny the 'future birth':

Texts (1861-62) Text (1863) There can be no relation of cause and effect between the two minds (consciousnesses) under dispute, because they subsist The dying consciousness of the man beset with affections in different bodies, just like the consciousness of the cow and cannot bring about the contiguity of another mind (or con- the consciousness of the horse. Cognitions (consciousness) sciousness), because it is dying consciousness-just like the cannot be the effects of the cognition (consciousness) in question, dying consciousness of the person free from the 'afflictions' because they are consciousness, like consciousness connected (passions and impurities).

with another 'series'.

164 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIAIS 165 Commentary sciousness, the body is the only substratum possible for it. 'The dying consciousness cannot bring about another con- So that, at the end, when the body has ceased to exist, wherein sciousness, because it is dying consciousness, like the dying could the consciousness subsist? consciousness of the Arhat, (the person free from the afflictions of passions, etc .. ) .. ' Commentary Question: How, then, does consciousness (mind) come 'The sense-organ and the object are the cause of the birth of about? consciousness; because consciousness consists only in the Answer: apprehension of things; at the foetus-state of the body, neither the sense-organs nor the objects are there; how then could Text (1864) there appear the effect of these in the form of consciousness? From this, it follows that the right view is that consciousness Thus it is proved that on account of the absence of the cause, proceeds from the body itself which is equipped with the five there can be no consciousness, even in a swoon. Such is the life-breaths-Prana, Apana and the rest-as has been declared outcome of the whole. by Kambalāśvatara .. 'It cannot be correct to assert that at that stage, conscious- ness is there in the state of latent potency. Because at that stage, Commentary there is no substratum for such a potency, either in the shape of The Sütra is-'It is from the body itself, etc.'-which has the "soul" postulated by the Naiyayika, or in that of the "chain been pronounced by Kamabalaśvatara. of cognitions" (postulated by the Buddhist); and potency can- An objection is raised-even before the body has been com- not be there without a substratum. pletely formed, and while it still exists only in the form of the Hence it follows that on the ground of sheer capacity, the foetus, etc., consciousness is already there, though in latent body alone can be the substratum of consciousness, for the condition; and this consciousness is known as being produced simple reason that there is nothing else that could be the required by the consciousness in the past body; then how can it be substratum-either in the shape of the "chain of cognitions", asserted that it proceeds from the body itself alone? The answer or the "soul". Consequently at the end, when the body dies, to this is as follows: the substratum in the shape of the body having ceased to exist, how could consciousness exist without a substratum? Texts (1865-8) 'Thus it is proved that there can be no future birth. ' To assert that consciousness resides in the foetus, etc., is Texts (1869-71) sheer audacity; nothing can be cognized at that stage, as the sense-organs are not there; and consciousness can have no When the other body has not been seen, how can it be under- form other than the cognition of things; it is for this same stood that the required substratum is the body that is sub- reason that there is no consciousness in the state of swoon. sequently born? How, too, could the consciousness, residing Nor can consciousness exist there in the form of a latent in different bodies, be related to the same 'chain of cognitions'- potency, because no potencies can exist without a substratum; being like the consciousness of the elephant, the horse, and other and as there is no soul that could be that substratum of con- animals? For these reasons, as the substratum of consciousness, you have either to seek a beginningless and endless transmigrat-

166 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 167

ing personality, or accept pure Materialism (nāstikatā) 'Or, accept pure Materialism'-this indicates the Lokāyata- sūtra-'There is no ohe related to the other world; hence there Commentary can be no other world'. 'It might be argued that consciousness would be subsisting The following texts answer the above arguments (of the in that intermediate body which would be produced imme- Materialist): diately after death'. But that cannot be correct, because no such Texts (1872-7) intermediate body has ever been seen to appear immediately after death; and there can be no certainty regarding the existence As regards the 'other world', there is no such 'other world', of what has never been seen, as such a thing is always regarded apart from the 'chain of causes and effects, in the form of

as non-existent. cognition and the rest'. What is spoken of as 'the other world' Nor can it be correct for the consciousness of one "chain" to or 'this world', is only, by way of a certain limit, placed upon subsist in another body; as in that case, the character of being the said 'chain', which is beginningless and endless. We regard related to the same "chain" would be lost; just as in the case of it to be thus, in the same way as people addicted to the pleasures the consciousness of different animals, elephant, horse and of the perceptible only assume the 'other world' to consist in

so forth some other part of the country. If what you are denying is the The argument may be formulated thus: consciousness 'other world' different from those just mentioned, then the appearing in different bodies cannot belong to the same attempt to prove that denial is futile, as there is no dispute "chain"-like the cognition of the elephant and that of the horse, (between us) regarding the non-existence of such an 'other the consciousness subsisting in the dead body and that subsisting world'. in the succeeding intermediate body subsist in different bodies; Objection-'The chain being a non-entity, it cannot have hence there would be the possibility of the apprehension of different states; how, then, can the "other world" consisting what is contrary to the wider conception; but as a matter of of these be anything real?' fact there is no such apprehension; hence, the contrary must be Answer-There is nothing in this; what are denoted by the true. That is, what are related to the same "chain" cannot subsist term 'chain' are the members of the chain, spoken of collec- in different bodies, e.g. the consciousness of the elephant does tively by that term for the sake of brevity; just like such not subsist in the body of the horse; the consciousness of every terms as 'forest' and the like. person is related to the same chain; hence there is apprehension Commentary of what is concomitant with the contrary; because "being related to the same chain" is invariably concomitant with What is the 'other world' which you are denying? Is it "subsisting in the same body", which is contrary to "subsisting something different from the chain of causes and effects,

in different bodies".' consisting of cognition and the other four constituents (skandha)? The words-'for these reasons, etc.'-recapitulate the Or is it this same chain?

Materialist's view. The former cannot be right, as no such 'other world' has Ādi-is birth, beginning; nidhana is destruction, end; that been admitted. In fact, there is nothing apart from the chain of which has neither beginning nor end is 'beginningless and causes and effects, in the shape of cognition and the rest, which

endless' .. could be accepted. What is actually regarded as the 'other

168 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIAIS 169 world', or 'this world', or the 'previous world'-is only by without beginning and without end? If (it had a beginning way of a certain limit, in the form of a hundred years or so, and) the first member of the 'chain' consisted of the first cogni- placed upon the said chain of cognition, etc., which is without tion, this could be held to be either: (1) 'without cause', or beginning and without end. This is exactly as you (Materialists), (2) as produced by an eternal cause, or (3) as eternal by itself, or who are addicted to merely perceptible pleasures, apply-the (4) as produced from any substance, or (5) as produced by any name 'other world' to some other part of this same visible world; other cognition as is declared in such assertions as: 'Man is only so much as is perceptible to the senses'; and again: 'The other world consists 1 The first cognition would appear at the very inception of in another place, another time or another state'. the foetus, and it could not come about without cause, If, on the other hand, the 'other world' that is denied is because otherwise, its existence, which is only occasional, something different from the said chain of causes and effects in would be quite the reverse (everlasting) the shape of cognition, etc., then as such, a conclusion is 2. Nor could it be brought about by such eternal causes as already admitted (by both parties); any proving of it would be Mind, Time, Space, God, Soul and so forth, because on futile, as no such 'other world' is postulated by us. that very account, it should be eternal

An objection is raised-'The chain being a non-entity, any 3. On account of the absence of the said 'eternal existence', it state that.is attributed to it must also be a non-entity; under the would be sheer audacity to assert that the cognition is one circumstances, the "other world", based upon such limitations, and eternal, as difference is clearly perceived among the could not be real .. ' cognitions of colour, sound and other things Answer-This does not affect our position. What the term (4-5) Nor could it be produced from, or manifested by, the 'chain' denotes are the members of the chain, which are material substances-earth, fire, water and air; as in that entities; these being spoken of for the sake of brevity, and case, all cognitions would be simultaneous; as the other expressed collectively and simultaneously, by the one name party regard these substances as of permanent form; and 'chain'; in the same way as the Dhava and other trees (which the idea of a permanent thing requiring the help of are real) are spoken of collectively as 'forest' (though the forest auxiliaries has been already rejected as such, apart from the trees, is not a real entity). Question: 'Ifit is so, then how was it that the chain was spoken Commentary of as a non-entity (under text 1807), where the chain or series That 'chain' which has been postulated as one has been has been declared to be "illusory" (unreal)?' found to be incapable of being indicated as the same as, or diffe- Answer; rent from, the members of the chain, and on that ground, it Texts (1878-85) has been regarded as a 'non-entity', just like the 'series of sky- lotuses'; and we do not base our notion of the 'other world' Because it is conceived as 'one' (composite), and is feature- upon the states of any such one 'chain'. Ifit is this 'chain of cog- less and incapable of being indicated either as the same, or as nitions, etc' called the 'other world', which you are denying, different (from the component members of the chain), the chain then it cannot be right to deny this 'other world' on the basis of has been regarded as a 'non-entity', just like the 'line of sky- the denial of the very form or existence of the said 'chain', lotuses'. As it is, why cannot the chain be accepted as being because what is actually percevied cannot be denied. All the

170 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA THE SOURCE MATERIALS 171 denial that could be made of it would be with regard to its qualities of beginninglessness and endlessness. But why cannot "the production of the cognition from an eternal cause would

these-endlessness and beginninglessness-be accepted? be possible as it would be dependent upon auxiliary causes,"

If beginninglessness is denied, and the first cognition at birth is because it has been thoroughly established that an eternal cause

held to be the first cognition (the beginning), then this initial cannot depend upon an auxiliary, as it can render no help to it

cognition would be either: (1) without cause, (2) produced by (The refutation of the fifth alternative follows under text

an eternal cause, like an eternal cognition, or God, and so 1893.)

forth, (3) it would itself be eternal, (4) it would be produced Text (1886) from any substance, (5) produced by a cognition appearing in another 'chain'. These are the five possible alternatives If the other party asserts that "these elemental substances are

If each cognition in the 'chain' were the effect of another momentary (not eternal)", then, in that case, why cannot their previous cognition in the same chain, then alone could the own doctrine be regarded as rejected by this? chain be beginningless, not otherwise That is why the author Commentary has set forth these alternatives that are possible (under the idea of the chain not being beginningless, and then to show the If the four major elemental substances (bhüta-catustaya) are

untenability of every one of these alternatives): described by the other party as momentary-with a view to

(1) The first alternative cannot be accepted, as under that escape from the objections urged above-then also, there are view the cognition would have permanent existence. Things objections against him This is what is meant.

are occasional only when they are dependent upon other (These objections against the view that cognition proceeds

things, and what is without cause is not dependent upon any- from the elemental substances, earth, etc., are now set forth

thing-why, then, should it cease to exist? in detail.)

(2) Nor is the second alternative tenable, as for that same For instance, there is nothing to prove that between cogni-

reason, it would be eternal. Effects become non-existent only tion and the body (made of the material substances), there

by reason of the absence of their cause; when the cause is present subsists the relation of cause and effect, on the basis of which

in its perfect form, you have to explain why the effect should the usage of the other party could be justified. This argument

not come about. may be thus formulated: When there is no evidence in support (3) Nor can the third alternative be accepted. "Why?" of a certain thing having a particular character, no sane man

'Because of the absence'-of permanent existence. The same should treat that thing as having that character: for instance, absence is further emphasized by the words-'It would be one should not treat fire as cold. There is no evidence in support sheer audacity, etc.'. This points out the fact of the opponent's of the presence of a causal relation between the body and

proposition being contrary to perceived facts cognition, hence there is no awareness of the wider term (4) The sentence 'Nor could, etc.,' rejects the fourth alter- (vyāpaka-anupalabhi). Nor can the reason (het) be held to native Ksonī is earth. This alternative is open to the same objec- be 'inadmissible'. As the causal relation is always based on per- tions as the second one-that it proceeds from the eternal God, ception and non-apprehension, it can be ascertained through etc .; because the four major elemental substances are held by specific positive or negative concomitance, not by mere percep- the other party to be eternal. It will not be right to urge that -- tion or non-perception. When the fact of a certain thing being the effect of a particular cause is going to be ascertained through

THE SOURCE MATERIALS 173 172 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA absurdity. Thus it is only through positive and negative positive concomitance, what is to be found out is if the thing in concomitances that the relation of cause and effect can be ascer- question is one which is perceptible and which, not being seen tained, and not in any other way. before, is seen when the other thing (the cause) is seen; other- There is no such positive or negative concomitance between wise, if it were not discovered that the thing is perceptible and the body and cognition .. For instance, there can be no certainty was not seen before, then it might be thought that the thing regarding the positive concomitance between one's own body (effect) might have been there even before the cause appeared, and cognition, because in the foetus, before the appearance of or it might have gone to some other place. So that there would cognition, the body alone is not perceived; nor is it perceived be nothing in the idea of the tree and such other things, which apart from the cognition. As regards the body of another person were existing before the cause in question, being the cause of as well, the cognition is not one that could be perceptible; the effect concerned. This possibility becomes averted by noting hence there is no perception of any order of sequence. Hence that the effect is one that could be perceived and yet is not there can be no certain idea of positive concomitance perceived; as this condition is not fulfilled in the case of false Nor can there be any certainty regarding negative concomi- causality tance. It is possible to know that when one's own body is In this way, the fact of a certain thing being the effect of a absent, one's own cognition is also absent-because the man certain cause becomes ascertained through positive concomi- himself is absent; but it can by no means be ascertained that in tance .. In the ascertainment of the fact of a certain thing being the absence of another man's body, his cognition is also absent. the effect of a certain cause through negatiye concomitance, it Because that man's cognition not being perceptible, even in has to be found out what that thing is during the absence of the absence of his body, there may be doubts regarding the which the effect in question does not appear, even though absence of his cognition It is for this reason that, even in the other efficient causes are there; otherwise, if all that were case of trees, though the body is not there, it is not certain that ascertained were that it does not appear when the other is the cognition is not there; as in this case also there will be the absent, it would be doubtful if that particular cause were really suspicion that its presence is not amenable to perception. It efficient enough to bring about that effect; as other causes effi- cannot be correct to be certain of absence on the basis of the cient for that purpose are also absent, so that it might be absence of vibration, etc., as it is not necessary that causes must conceivable that-"these latter causes are the real causes of the always produce their effects. It would be always a matter of effect; and it is the absence of these to which the absence is due; doubt whether the absence of cognition in the tree is due to the and as for its absence during the absence of this other thing as absence of the body, or to the absence of its cause in the shape well (which is intended to be the cause)-that may be a mere of the absence of desire, which would be the cause of its having accident; just as in the case of the absence of the date-palm, a particular body which grows in a place where the Mātrvivāha (plant) generally Thus, the reason adduced by us is not 'inadmissible'. grows, during the absence of this latter. Hence the qualification, Nor is it 'contradictory', as it is present in all cases where the 'other efficient causes being present', has to be added. It is in probandum is known to be present. this way that it is fully ascertained that the thing in question Nor, again, can it be 'inconclusive', as that would lead to only can be the cause of the effect concerned, its absence being incongruities; and it would also mark the objector as being duly followed (by the absence of the effect). There is no such devoid of intelligence .. foHowing of the absence of anything which renders no help in Question: 'What is there to prove that the contrary of the the bringing about of the effect. If it did, it would lead to an

174 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 175 proposition "The body cannot be the cause of cognition" is when even one of those conditions is absent; if it did, it would not true? not be dependent upon them. It might be held that 'all the atoms Answer: This has no force, as the proof is there; for are the cause of cognition, according as they happen to be in instance, that 'the body cannot be the cause of purely mental proximity'. But in that case, there should be some difference cognition' is going to be proved under text 1930: 'Mental con- between the effect as produced by a perfect cause and that pro- sciousness is independent, self-súfficient, etc. ' Specially as it is duced by a defective cause, as the two causes would be different; this mental consciousness itself which serves as the dominant otherwise the distinction in the cause would be pointless. As a cause in bringing about the contact of other bodies, which matter of fact, when a cause that has been perfect in all its parts shows that it is not dependent upon the present body; and thus happens, subsequently, to be defective in certain parts, there is it is that the existence of the 'other world' becomes established not found any difference in the mental cognition at all. This is Then again, the body may be the cause of mental conscious- due to the fact that the impressions of past auditory and other ness. But would it be so in the form of the single composite cognitions continue to be intact. It is only in the case of animals, whole, or in diverse forms-in the form of an aggregate of like the elephant, that there are changes in mental consciousness, atoms? Would it be the cause along with the sense-organs? Or not in the case of, human beings .. Animals, in the infantile stage without the sense-organs? Would it be the material (constituent) of the body, are dull, while those that have acquired a full- cause? Or the contributory cause? These are the alternatives grown body are cleverer; the improvement and deterioration possible. of the cause, in this case, are found to bring about improvement Now the body, as a single composite whole, cannot be the and deterioration in the effect. Hence when, between two cause of cognition, as the very idea of the 'composite whole' things, changes in one do not lead to changes in the other, one has already been rejected. And also because such an idea would cannot be the effect of the other; otherwise there would be militate against the notion that the cause consists of the four absurdity; and the changes in the effect would be without major elemental substances, as a single thing could not have cause .. four forms; for, if it did, there would be an end of all notions of Nor can the other alternative view be accepted, viz. that the 'plurality'. body along with the sense-organs is the cause of mental con- Nor can the body in the form of the aggregate of atoms be sciousness. For here also, would the mental consciousness accepted (as the cause of cognition). Will the cause consist of proceed from each of the sense-organs severally? Or from all the atoms severally, or collectively? It cannot be severally, as in of them collectively? It could not proceed from each severally, that case, the cognition would arise from each one of the atoms, because it is found that even after the disappearance of the just as the sprout arises from every one of the seeds. Nor could sense-organs one by one, the mental consciousness remains it be collectively, as in that case, the defect in any one of the intact. For instance, even when the motor-organs have become limbs-like the nose-would lead to the contingency of no disabled by paralysis and other diseases, the mental conscious- cognition being produced at all; just as the defect in even one of ness remains intact and in a perfect state of existence. And the various ingredients of the cause of the sprout-in the shape when between two things, the changes in one do not bring of the soil, for instance-makes it impossible for the sprout about changes in the other, one cannot be the effect of the other; to appear. In fact, whenever an effect is dependent upon a otherwise there would be incongruities. Further, according to concatenation of cause-conditions, it does not come about the view under consideration, mental consciousness would

176 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIALS 177 have to be regarded as: (a) apprehending only particular way, no one can impede the appearance of the subsequent things, (b) as being free from conceptual content (indetermi- effect going to be produced. For instance, in the case of the jar, nate), and (c) as being dependent upon the presence of the no modification can be made in the effect to be produced without object-just like the visual and other sense-cognitions; because it having brought about a 'moment' in the clay incapable of would have the same cause as these latter; and also because further efficiency. In fact in the bringing about of all modifica- there would be the possibility of several conceptions appearing at tions, the process is the same-that of producing a 'moment' the same time. (entity) incapable of producing another 'moment'. If it were Nor can the other alternative view be accepted, that 'mental not so, nothing could be directly contrary to anything. If such consciousness proceed from all the sense-organs collectively'; direct modification were possible, then as the cause, so could as in that case, there could be no mental consciousness when the effect also be modified directly by itself-not through the even one of the sense-organs would be absent (disabled); just bringing about of a like modification in its material cause. It is like the absence of the sprout on the absence of even one of its true that in the case of the lamp, there is a modification brought contributiory causes about in its outspreading light by putting up an intervening Nor can the other alternative view be accepted that 'mental screen without modifying the light at all; but in this case, the consciousness proceeds from the body without the sense- lamp is not the direct material cause of the light; each light- organs.' As under that view, it would be possible for the said moment is the cause of the light-moment that follows it, so consciousness to proceed from the hand and other such parts that what happens is that the screen brings about a modification of the body, even when severed from the body. If it were held in the shape of a 'moment' devoid of further causal efficiency, that a qualified body is the cause, then it would come to this, and thereby practically destroys the light at that point. In a case that the cause consists of the bouy along with the sense-organs, where a thing is modified without modifying an entity, it is as no qualified body can be shown other than the body with not a case of material cause: when, for instance, the cow is the sense-organs. modified without modifying the Gavaya. In the case in question, Nor, again, can the view be accepted that 'the body is the however, it is found that without modifying the body, the material (constituent) cause of mental consciousness.' mental consciousness is subjected, by wrong-doing, to modi- Because that particular cause is accepted as the 'material fications, such as evil intentions and the like. So that here, cause' of a certain effect which is found to fulfil the two condi- there would be apprehension of something contrary to the tions, viz. (1) that it helps, by its presence, the entire nature of wider premise (that there can be no modification in the effect the effect embracing all its peculiar features, and (2) that the without modifications in the cause-if the body were regarded effect undergoes no change, except upon changes in the said as the matérial cause of mental consciousness). cause, as is found in the case where the clay is held to be the Objection: 'When there is modification in the body, in the 'material cause' of the jar, as it passes successively through all shape of it being well-nourished and strong-which is brought the modifications proceeding from the clod of clay to the about by good food-there is actually perceived a modification finished product called 'jar'. It is for this reason that when one in the mental consciousness, in the shape of love, etc.' desires to modify a certain thing, he modifies it by modifying Answer: What does it matter if such modification is seen? its material cause-not in any other way. When a material This alone does not make our reason inadmissible. For example, cause precedes without having its potency impeded in any all that is meant by us is that, when between two things, the

178 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 179 modification of one is possible without modification of the other; then the one cannot be the material cause of the other. It beset with the notion of impermanence attaching to pleasures is quite possible that under certain circumstances, without any and their means-sometimes feels that what obstructs his modification in the body, there is modification in the mental pleasure does him good as well as harm; and thence follows the consciousness by wrong-doing. Consequently, why should idea of the two alternatives of loving (the benefactor) and hating our reason be 'inadmissible'? But on the basis of occasional (the obstructor); thence follow (respectively) good-will and stray instances of modification (of the mental consciousness ill-will; from all this proceed the notions of pleasure and other due to modification in the body), it cannot be right to regard things. All this is well-known through positive and negative the one as the material cause of the other. As, in this way, the concomitances. In fact, it is only when the mind is happy and object also might become the material cause (of cognition). For at peace that love is found to appear; and it is often found not to instance, when one sees such alarming things as the blood of a appear when the body is over-fed. From all this it follows that tiger, etc., there appears a modification in the mind of a cowardly over-feeding, etc., of the body cannot be the cause of mental consciousness. person in the shape of swooning and so forth; yet this does not make the said mental consciousness a material effect of that From all this it also follows that, on account of its affording blood. Again, when the mind is beset with vacillations due to no direct help, the body cannot be the contributory cause of love or grief and such causes, there come about certain modi- mental consciousness; because in the case of the sprout, it has fications in the body; and on the basis of this, the body might been found that the contributory causes are only those that come to be regarded as having the mind for its material cause. have a direct bearing upon it-e g. the soil, moisture, etc. If it The fact is that when the modification of one thing always were not so, there would be incongruities. Love and other fóllows the modification of another, then alone can the one be feelings, therefore, must be regarded as proceeding from the rightly regarded as the material cause of the other. Modifications awakening of an antecedent homogeneous root-cause .. As for of the mind such as love, hate, etc., do not always follow from over-feeding of the body, youth and so forth, these are found the strength and vigour of the body, as it is not found to follow to give rise to love, etc., by enlivening the impressions of the in the case of the vigorous man who has attained wisdom. past, in men who have had no practice of meditation and are Conversely, even a man or an animal with a weak body and hence without the requisite wisdom poor development, who happens to have no opportunities for Even granting that sometimes the body has a direct bearing sexual and other indulgences, has his mind beset with much upon mental consciousness, when this latter proceeds from its love and hate, etc .. And when one thing comes about in the own material cause-even so, it does not follow that it ceases absence of another thing, one cannot be rightly regarded as the upon the cessation of the body. For instance, even on the cause of the other. If it were so regarded, there would be cessation of fire, the jar does not cease to exist, because it has incongruities. Love and hate, etc., do not proceed directly proceeded from its own material causes; so this does not affect from the body; the absence of opportunities for sexual and our view adversely. Nor is the reason 'inconclusive'; for if it other indulgences being the necessary intervening conditions. were, then there would be incongruities. Nor, again, is the For instance, when the body is quite vigorous, there is a pleasure reason 'contradictory', as it is present in all cases where the felt in the contemplation of pleasurable sensations; in such probandum is known to be present. cases, the man who has a body and a soul and has his mind Thus it is proved that the body cannot be the material cause of mental consciousness; nor can it be the contributory cause;

THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 181 180 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA cognition (mental consciousness) were produced at the outset from all of which it follows that mental consciousness proceeds out of the body and then, subsequently, came to be produced from preceding cognitions, occurring one after the other in the out of each preceding homogeneous cognition, then forever same 'chain' afterwards, it would be produced out of preceding homo- The following argument might be urged: 'When any two geneous cognitions, and never out of heterogeneous cognitions things are found to be invariably concomitant with one produced through the eye and other organs. Once the smoke another, they must be regarded as material cause and effect, as has been produced by fire, it is never, later on, produced from in the case of the lamp and the light. There is such invariable anything not homogeneous to itself. As a matter of fact, mental concomitance between the body and the mental consciousness; cognition is not always found to be produced by mental cogni- hence this is a reason based upon the nature of things.' tions only; it is found to be produced by any cognition that The reason adduced here is 'inadmissible' for one or the happens to go immediately before it. When one thing has been other party. Because in certain cases, where the mind-essence found to appear immediately after another thing, the former is devoid of material form, mental consciousness is present cannot be held to proceed from anything other than the latter; even though there is no body. Nor does the argument put as in that case, it would have to be regarded as being without forward actually prove what is intended to be proved, as on cause. As regards mental cognition, it is found to appear the same grounds, mental consciousness might be regarded as immediately after the visual and other cognitions. Hence it the material cause of the body. becomes established that it can follow from any cognition The reason adduced is also 'inconclusive' as the said con- without restriction. comitance is possible even when the cause is different-as Further, if it is only at the earlier stage that the body is the between fire and fluidity of (melted) copper. For instance, it is material cause of the mental cognition-and not at the later only with fire as the contributory cause, that copper produces stages-then why should it not proceed entirely independently fluidity, not otherwise. Similarly, in the case in question, the of the body? It is not right that it should depend upon the foetus, which is the material cause of the body, produces the body, which does not help it in any way. It might be urged, 'In next body, which is the contributory cause of mental conscious- your case also, where one cognition is preceded and brought ness; so that the concomitance between the body and the mental about by another cognition, why should not the cognition be consciousness is not due to the one being the material cause of the other. To this extent, the reason adduced is 'inconclusive', brought about by itself alone?'-There can be no force in this, as it does so proceed, as in the case where the mind-element is 'doubtful'. without material embodiment. When a cognition wants another The following might be urged: 'Even though the mental cognition, it is dependent upon that; this is only natural, and consciousness appearing subsequently proceeds from each should not be objected to. If it is held that 'at the later stages preceding consciousness (cognition), yet that which appears for the first time must have proceeded from the body; hence it also, the body does help the mental cognition'-then there would be the incongruity of several chains of cognition pro- cannot be regarded as beginningless.' This is not correct. There is no proof in support of such an ceeding at once, as the body, which is the material cause of the assumption, as has been explained already. It cannot be said other cognition, would be present there in its efficient form that 'there is no proof to the contrary either', because there and would be productive of the same. Because, whichever certainly is proof to the contrary. For instance, if the mental cognition is produced from the body sets going its own 'chain

182 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIALS 183 of cognitions', different from the other chains. In this way, therefore, for a single person there would be issuing forth, at already been rejected in detail; and also because in that case, the every moment, innumerable 'chains of cognition'. But such is first initial cognition too would have to be regarded as preceded never found to be the case. and produced by another cognition. It might be argued: "when the body helps cognition at the It is for these reasons that, even under the view that material later stages, it does not help as its material cause; it is only as a substances are impermanent, the following objection urged contributory cause that it helps the mental cognition that has by the teacher remains applicable: 'If cognition, once pro- been produced out of itself as the material cause, in bringing duced from the body, becomes restricted to its own kind, about each of its succeeding effects; so that the body helps as a through something else, then why should there be cessation of contributory cause, and the cognition does not function entirely the efficient body?' independently of the body at any state." From all this it follows that mental cognition (mental con- This, also, cannot be true. When one thing is known to be sciousness) is without beginning. Or it may be understood that productive of another thing in a certain way, it cannot produce all cognition, without exception, is without beginning it in any other way; as there is no difference in the conditions. Because if the cognition had a beginning-then, when the For instance, light, having served as productive of visual cognition would appear first of all, would it be sensuous cognition cognition as its basis, does not produce it in another way. As or mental cognition? It could not be sensuous cognition; has been thus declared-'Apart from apprehensibility, there is because, in the case of men asleep or in a swoon or with mind no other characteristic of the apprehensible thing; colour, and elsewhere, even though the sense-organs are there, the sensuous other things, cannot otherwise be helpful to cognition'. If this cognition does not appear, on account of the absence of the were not so, there,could be no certainty regarding the difference mental functions Hence it is understood that the sense-organs and non-difference of the effect from the character brought alone cannot be the cause of sensuous cognition. They can be about by its cause, as it would not be following in the wake of so only through the help of a particular functioning of the the help rendered by it; this would mean that the effect is without mind; and it should be so understood because the causal relation

a cause. between things is always determined by positive and negative Then again, at the first stage-apart from the body being concomitance .- Similarly, when one thing has been ascertained directly productive of the cognition-you have not noticed in to be produced, at first, from a certain other thing, as such it any other character of the material cause. What you have appearance would be without a cause, as for example, if smoke apprehended is merely the fact of its being a directly contributory were held to proceed from non-fire. When the sensuous cogni- cause. And as this is present at the later stages as well, why tion has come about first of all, it does so only through a should it not be the material cause at those stages too? Other- favourable mental operation. Hence it becomes established wise, as at the later stages, so at the first stage, too, it may not that the sense-organ alone can never be its cause; otherwise it be the material cause at all, as the conditions are the same. .... would be without a cause. This is an argument that annuls the It will not be right to argue: 'At the later stages as well, it is said view. the body itself, which, along with the preceding cognition, Nor can the first cognition be a mental cognition. As a matter would be the material cause of each succeeding cognition'. of fact, it never appears independently by itself in reference to Because the possibility of its being such a material cause has anything not apprehended by the senses; if it did, there would be no deaf or blind persons. Even if it did appear so, it should

184 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 185

be explained if it were conceptual 'determinate', or non- From all this it follows that the word in the form of 'specific conceptual 'indeterminate'. It could not be conceptual individuality' cannot be expressive; nor can it be the property Whenever conceptual thought operates, it operates as associated of the cognition itself. with verbal expression, expressive of the concept; because it is As regards the word in the form of the 'universal'-though always found to appear in the form of an internal (unexpressed) that is expressive, yet it cannot be a property of the cognition verbal presentation. This expressive verbal form of conceptual itself; because it is tacked on, not to the cognition itself, but thought could proceed either (a) from the comprehension of to that which is comprehended on the hearing of the specific convention, (b) from the fact of word in the expressive form individuality of the word appertaining to the external thing. being a property of cognition itself, like the form of conscious- The 'universal' of one thing cannot be tacked on to another ness, or (c) from the comprehension of the meaning of the thing; if it were, then there would be incongruities in the word. These are the only alternatives possible. cognition, as in that case, the universal 'cow' could be tacked (a) It cannot be true that it proceeds from the comprehension on to the 'horse'. And until the thing, in the shape of the of convention; because the convention has not yet been com- specific individuality, has been apprehended, it is not possible prehended to tack on to it that property which is expressive; for the simple (b) Nor can the second alternative be accepted; because the reason that properties are always dependent upon the objects essence-form-of the word is twofold: 'specific individuality' to which they belong, and as such, cannot be apprehended by and 'universal'. Of these, the 'specific individuality' of the themselves .. And the thing in the form of 'specific individuality' word is always apprehended in an inexpressive form; hence, on cannot be apprehended by conceptual thought; as this latter that basis, the cognition could (not) be conceptual (determinate). always envisages the 'universal'. Hence it becomes established Nor is it a property of the cognition itself, as it always appears that all conceptual thoughts have their source in the awakening as something external, like the colour blue and other objects. of the tendencies created by the beginningless apprehension of If, then, it were the property of cognition itself, then the colour. 'specific individualities'. blue and other things might also be the property of cognition (c) Nor, lastly, could the fact of the conceptual thought itself; as there would be nothing to distinguish between the having the form of the expressive word be due to the com- two cases. In that case the entire universe would be mere prehension of what is expressed by the word Because words cognition, and not a modification of material substances. do not subsist in the object; nor are they of the nature of Objection: "According to the view that cognition has forms, objects; for if they were so, they could be understood by the the colour blue and other things are of the very essence of the unlearned, too; and it would, in that case, be impossible to cognition, and it is these that appear as external; what, then, is apply words to things according to one's own choice. meant by thé assertion that 'because they appear in the external Further, though all objects are similar insofar as they are form, they cannot be properties of cognition'?" impermanent, yet conceptual thought cannot envisage them Answer: True; but the very fact of cognition appearing in a all at one and the same time, as each conceptual thought form tainted by the external object leads us to conclude that it appears only in respect of certain well-defined objects with forms the essence-not of the cognition, but of the external special forms, as differentiated from other forms. Hence, the object; as therein lies its own essence. In the cognition, it cause that is pointed out should be through a conceptual thought appears only on account of certain circumstances and is purely that appertains to a single form. Such a cause cannot be indicated adventitious to be any other except repeated practice; as is found in the case

186 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 187 of the conceptual thoughts appertaining to dead bodies (?) Thus then, as the conceptual thought proceeds through previous new-born young of the monkey feels instinctively afraid of

repeated practice, it becomes proved that conceptual cognition is death and suffering caused by falling from a height and, on without beginning. account of that fear, clings more strongly to its mother's arms Nor can it be correct to accept the alternative that 'the first and also avoids the place where there is a precipice. Until mental cognition (or mental consciousness) is non-conceptual'. people have had some actual experience of things bringing Because under that view, there would never be any conceptual pleasure or pain, they never invariably seek to obtain one and cognition at all. It might be argued: 'In the manner explained avoid the other. If they did, there would be an absurdity. The before, it could appear later on the basis of conception'. But example of iron being drawn to the magnet cannot be properly that cannot be; so long as man rests upon non-conceptual cited in this connection; because that attraction is not without

cognition, he cannot set up any convention. Because no con- cause; if it were without cause, then it would always be there.

vention can be set up until the universal word or the universal If, then, it has a cause, it is the magnet that is pointed out to be thing figures in the cognition. What does figure in the cognition, the cause, on the basis of positive and negative concomitance; however, is the specific individuality, and no convention can and some similar cause will have to be found for the action of be made either in relation to it or upon its basis; because it is the child in securing and avoiding certain things. No such meant for the purposes of usage; while the specific individuality cause can be indicated, apart from repeated experience. Hence that is seen at the time of the convention can never be present at it becomes established that the action of children in seeking to the time of usage. Consequently, it has to be admitted that obtain and avoid certain things is due to repeated past experi- there is conceptual thought before the convention is made ence; and that on this account, the cognition must be without

relating to the specific individuality. And this is not possible beginning without repeated experience; so that there also, it becomes It is for these reasons that the author is going to indicate

established that the cognition in question is without beginning. other objections applicable in common (to all the views of the

Then again, if it is not admitted that 'the first cognition at Materialists) under texts 1930 and 1940 below. Hence we birth is due to the continuity of the impressions left by the desist from further details ...

repeated expériences of previqus lives'-then how would you Further, if the Carvakas admit the momentary character of

account for the idea in the new-born babe-even among things, then their own doctrine-that material substances are

animals-of a certain thing being a source of pleasure, and everlasting-becomes invalid

another a source of pain? It is by virtue of such ideas that it Texts (1887-88) seeks the mother's breasts which it regards as a source of pleasure, and it cries out when it does not find them, or having (The Materialist might say): 'Let the doctrine be upset; we found them, suddenly stops crying and proceeds to feed itself. accept the view that all things are decidedly momentary, because Certainly during its present life, the baby has never experienced it is a reasonable view supported by all kinds of reason.'-If the fact of the breasts being the means of allaying its pangs of your love for reason is so great that you have no regard for hunger. Nor has it had any experience of the fact that falling your own doctrine, then you should accept, also, the more from a precipice is a source of hurt and pain; and yet even the reasonable view that 'primary elemental substances do not exist at all.

188 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MAIERIAIS 189 Commentary the basis of what appears in cognition, just like dreams and If you accept the momentary character of things because it is illusions. And they have no real existence in accordance with reason, then you should also accept the doctrine that 'ideas alone exist', which is still more reasonable, Commentary

because reasonableness, which is your criterion for acceptance, is Question: 'If the elemental substances do not exist, then present in this case as well .. what is the basis of the cognition (of these)?' Question: 'How so?' Answer: Answer: Text (1889) Text (1892)

The primary elemental substances cannot exist in the form It is not possible that something different from the cognition

of composite wholes, nor in the form of atoms; because there can should figure in it; it is only a previous cognition envisaging

be no conjunction of atoms, as is going to be explained. the substances that could produce another such cognition.

Commentary Commentary

Tesam-of the primary elemental substances. Tadanyasya -- something different from the cognition, in the To be explained in the next chapter, on the examination of shape of the four elemental substances. the 'external world' It has thus been proved that the first cognition after birth Question: 'If the said elements do not exist, then how is it cannot proceed from any material substance. The author now that they figure in cognitions?' proceeds to demolish the view that it is produced only by Answer: another cognition (occurring in a different chain; the fifth

Text (1890) alternative put forward under text 1880).

Not having any real external form, they figure in cognitions Texts (1893-6) only through the fruition of dispositions; just as during dreams; they do not appear anywhere else. If the cognition in some other 'chain' is held to be the cause (of the first cognition)-then (the question is): is that the Commentary 'material cause' of it, or the 'contributory cause'? If it is meant

'Anywhere else'-i e apart from cognition. to be the material cause, then the learning and culture of the

Question: 'How, then, is it that people and the scriptures parents should continue in the child's 'chain of cognitions.'

speak of the earth and other elemental substances?' That such is the nature of the material cause and its effect has

Answer: been ascertained, through positive and negative concomitance, in connection with one's own 'chain'. If, on the other hand, Text (1891) the cognition of the other 'chain' is assumed to be the 'contri-

All these four primary elemental substances are assumed on butory cause' of the first cognition on the basis of its own material cause-then there would be nothing wrong in it.

190 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 191 Commentary Then again, the reductio ad absurdum that has been urged is in Would this 'cognition' occurring in 'another chain'-i.c. the regard to the view that one cognition is the material cause of 'chain of cognitions' of the parents-be the material cause or the other; but one lamp is not the material cause of the other the contributory cause (of the first cognition under considera- lamp, because it belongs to an entirely different 'chain'. Hence tion)? It cannot be the material cause; as, in that case, it would "what has been urged is nothing at all be possible for the peculiar learning and culture of the parents Further, in the case of beings who have no mother-e.g to continue in the son, just as the parents' cognition continues sweat-born insects-how could the first cognition be due to a in their own subsequent cognitions. It has been found, in the cognition in another series? We desist from further argumenta- case of all material causes and their products, that the embellish- tion on this subject. ments of the preceding 'moment' continue in the succeeding If, on the other hand, it is held that the cognition of the other 'moments'; this having been ascertained by positive and negative chain is a contributory cause of the first cognition, then the concomitance to be the case in one's own 'chain' .. argument proves what is already admitted (by all parties) and The following opinion might be suggested: 'When one hence is superfluous. lamp is lighted from another lamp, the second lamp is not The following text formulates the argument in support of equipped with the size and other embellishments of the first the beginninglessness (of cognition): one. It is produced merely as a lamp, without any embellish- ments. It acquires its own embellishments from other sources, Text (1897) in the shape of its own wick and oil, etc The same may be the Thus then the first cognition must be regarded as arising out case with the cognition in question as well.' That cannot be so; because the embellishment of the lamp of its own material cause, because it is cognition and so forth, like the cognition of the present moment. sets up a 'chain' in its own substratum too, as it is itself evanes- cent. That is the reason why, on the exhaustion of the 'fuel' (in the shape of the oil and wick), the lamp ceases to exist. The Commentary embellishment of learning and culture, however, is not evanes- The argument may be formulated as follows: that entity cent, as it continues for a long time. Hence it is not possible for which partakes of the nature of the four constituents (skandha- mere cognition without embellishments to be produced, in s)-cognition, feeling, name-conception, and mental faculty -- the manner of the lamp. must be regarded as proceeding from its own material cause; Further, in the case of the lamp and other things, the presence because it is cognition, feeling, etc , just like the same four or absence of peculiarities is determined on the basis of their constituents during youth and old age, the first cognition is of being aggregates of larger and lesser numbers of atoms. Of the the nature of cognition: hence this is a reason based upon the single thing, as a mere entity, there cannot be either presence nature of the thing or absence of peculiarities. In the case in question, however, In the term 'first cognition', the mention of cognition is the single entity-the cognition in the mother-would have only by way of illustration; what is asserted should be under- the peculiarities of cultural and other embellishments, whereas stood to be true of feeling and the other constituents also. while appearing in the son, would be without these peculiarities. The following text puts forward an argument against the Who can impart such a teaching? contrary of the above conclusion:

192 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 193

Text (1898) This reason cannot be said to be 'inadmissible'; because as a

As other causes have been rejected, if the cognition were matter of fact, the consciousness that is dissociated from the

entirely without cause-then, it could not have any particular idea of 'void', which is opposed to all experience, is always beset with affections; because it is dissociated from its opposite, character at all just like the consciousness during intercourse. Commentary Nor is the reason 'inconclusive' (doubtful), because the

All other causes, in the form of eternal things-mind, time, appearance of another cognition is always due to this much only. Hence, the reason against the contrary of the conclu- space, God and so forth-have been rejected before; and the view that the cognition arises out of itself is not accepted. The sion would consist in the impossibility of there being a fully

only alternative left is that it should be without cause; but in efficient cause.

that case, it could not have any such particular (distinguishing) The same point is further elucidated:

character as being, cognition and the like. Because a character Text (1900) or property that is purely accidental cannot serve as a deter- In the form in which the cognition produced a definite minant, and hence there could be no determination on the cognition in the past-why can it not, in the same unalloyed basis of that form, be productive of it in the future as well? Thus the causelessness of cognition would be open to rejection by the incongruity of there being no possibility of the appearance Commentary of such distinguishing characters as that of being, cognition and the like. There would be the further objection that if it 'In the same form'-i e. bearing the same form or character .. In the following text, the opponent urges the objection were causeless, it would not be possible for the cognition to appear only occasionally. against both the above arguments, that 'the corroborative

Having thus established the fact of there being 'previous instances cited are devoid of the probandum':

birth, the author proceeds to establish 'future' birth as well: Text (1901)

Text (1899) According to the other view, the idea is that consciousness

The cognition at the moment of death is capable of bringing proceeds from the body itself; how, then, can the two corrobora-

about its product, because it is beset with affections, not having tive instances be admitted to be equipped with the probandum?

shaken off all attachment-like the previuos cognition. Commentary

Commentary The probandum that is desired to be proved, is that the cog- nition proceeds from its own material cause and produces its own pro- The cognition or consciousness that is beset with affections duct. According to the other party, however, cognition is is capable of producing its effect in the shape of another cogni- always produced from the body itself; so that for him, there tion, because it is beset with affections, like the consciousness can be no instance which fulfils the conditions of the pro- during the previous state; and the consciousness at the moment bandum. Why, then, has the Buddhist put forward the two of death is beset with affections; hence this is a reason based instances of 'the present cognition' and 'the previous cognition'? upon the nature of things (The answer to this is as follows):

194 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA Texts (1902-5) IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 195

The view that the budy is the cause (of cognition) has already the passion of love. Similarly when someone causes one an

been discarded on grounds of its involving the possibility of injury, one goes on thinking of it: 'He has caused me this

all cognitions appearing simultaneously, on account of there injury-he has done it in the past -- he is going to do it again,'

being no other (contributory) causes. As a matter of fact, it is and so forth. Thereupon, there appears hatred How can all

found that cognition in the form of remembrance, affection this be denied, especially by one who takes his stand upon

and so forth (which are cognitions) actually proceeds from sense-perception (as the only right means of cognition)?

pleasurable experiences and pleasant reminiscences of the Similarly, when there is deterioration and improvement in

same (which are also cognitions); and this cannot be denied. the previous practice of learning and arts, it is found that there

Then again, it is also seen that deterioration and improvement is corresponding deterioration and improvement in the sub-

in one's later cognitions are brought about by deterioration sequent cognitions. And it is found that, when the mind is

and improvement in the practice of the learning and arts .. It is attracted elsewhere and the functioning of the mind is defective,

also seen that when the functioning of the mind is defective, there is no perception of other things.

there is no apprehension of other things. On account of all From all this it is clear that the idea that cognition is the cause

these facts, the idea of cognition proceeding from cognition of cognition is in accordance with reason, and should not be

cannot be objected to. objected to; also because it has actually been proved that cognition is the cause of cognitions.

Commentary There is no force in the above objection. It has already been Text (1906)

shown that the body cannot be the cause of cognition, on the The reason-'because they subsist in different bodies'-

ground that that would involve the simultaneity of cognitions; cannot be admissible. Because how can there be any subsis- because there is no other contributory cause which would be tence of the cognition, which is incorporeal and hence not needed; and if the body is eternal, it cannot require anything liable to fall down, in the bodies? else. If, on the other hand, it is not eternal, then, the previous and the present, both objections, would be applicable. As a Commentary

matter of fact, what is proved by proper means of cognition Under text 1861, it has been argued (by the Materialist) cannot be set aside by mere assertion, as otherwise there that-'there cannot be any relation of cause and effect between would be incongruities, so that nothing could be the cause of the two cognitions under dispute, because they subsist in dif- anything at all. This is what has been described in the words ferent bodies.' This reason put forward is not admissible. If the 'mere disagreeableness cannot render things objectionable'. 'subsistence' meant is that of the nature of 'container and Further, it is found that after a pleasurable experience, when contained', then such subsistence in the bodies is entirely there is remembrance of it in a definite form, there proceeds, impossible for cognition, which is not liable to fall, because from this pleasurable cognition, a feeling of love and attachment: even though the causal relation may be there, the cognition, 'How beautiful she is! So youthful and slim-waisted, with a which is incorporeal, could never be liable to fall; and for what lovely face!' and so forth. When one goes on contemplating it is not liable to fall, no container is needed, as it could serve no there appears, in the mind of the man inclined to be passionate, useful purpose Question: 'What, then, would the container (or receptacle)

196 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 197 do in the case of water and such things?' Texts (1909-10) Answer: If the cognition is ofthe same nature as the body-then why Text (1907) is the consciousness (cognition) of love, hatred, etc., not perceived by others as clearly as the body is? In fact, cognition In the case of water and other things, the receptacle (container) is cognised by the cogniser himself alone; while the body is would be there to prevent their falling down. In the case of cognised by himself as well as others. Things that are so cognised cognitions, however, which are devoid of movement (and are always distinct, e g. colic pain and the dramatic actor. hence of falling), what would be the use of receptacles (or containers)? Commentary

Commentary When the body of a man is perceived by another man, it should be possible for the latter to perceive the emotions of In the case of earth, etc, which is corporeal, things are love, hatred, etc., as well of the former; as the two are not produced on the spot where the material cause exists, and different. Nor can the premise be falsified on the basis of occult never in a place where that cause does not exist. Hence, that powers (whereby the feelings of others are perceived), because which serves as a preventive of its moving away from that at the time concerned, no such powers are noticeable. Nor can place is regarded as the receptacle (substratum, container). No consciousness be regarded as incognisable; as in that case, it such thing is possible in the case of what is incorporeal. could not be cognised by the cogniser himself. Text (1908) Further, whenever between two things, one is cognised by one while the other is cognised by both-they are different If then, the 'subsistence' (of the cognitions in the bodies) is from one another; for instance, colic pain and the dramatic assumed to be of the nature of 'identification' (sameness)-that, actor. Of the two cognitions in the two bodies in question, too, cannot be right. Because for you, cognition cannot be of while one is cognised by one, the other is cognised by both; the nature of the body. hence this is a reason based upon the nature of things. Commentary Svenaiva-by the cogniser himself. Says the opponent: 'If this is so, then nothing can prevent If what is meant by 'subsistence' is, 'being of the same the doctrine of pure idealism (that there is cognition or con- nature'-that cannot be admitted either For you, who insist sciousness alone) also being rejected on these same grounds' upon external things only, it cannot be correct to assert that The answer to that is as follows: 'cognition is of the nature of the body'; though it is all right for me, who posits the cognition only and for whom the body Texts (1911-12) also is of the nature of the alayavijnana (a series or chain of This reason is not admissible against the doctrine that 'cogni- cognitions). tion (consciousness) alone exists', as (under that view) what is Question: "Why can it not be right (to assert that cognition cognised (by the cognition) is the appearance of itself-as in is of the nature of the body)? the case of the man with defective vision. Further, cognition is Answer: always found to be destroyed immediately after appearance.

198 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIALS 199 If, then, the body with the cognition is of the same nature as inseparability from the body-the reason put forward is the cognition -- why is it not regarded as momentary? wrong (inconclusive, doubtful) The body undergoing Commentary destruction every moment, the previous consciousness brings about an unbroken continuity of consciousness in such suc- This reason is not admissible'-i:e. the reason, if so applied, ceeding bodies. If, by reason of their occurring in the same becomes subject to the objection of being 'inadmissible'. For chain, the two bodies are held to be not different from one instance; the fact of 'being cognised by both' cannot be another, then in the other case also there could be no difference, admitted by the Idealist. For him, what is cognised by the on the same ground of occurrence in the same chain. cognition is always its own appearance, as in the case of the man with defective vision seeing two moons. Commentary Then again, when a particular object is cognised, the cognition As a matter of fact, there is no incompatibility between the is clearly found to disappear immediately after its appearance. contiguity of other consciousnesses and the presence of the Hence, if the body were held to be of the same nature as the consciousness in the body. For instance, the consciousness at cognition, it should have to be regarded as momentary (like the moment preceding death brings about contiguity with the the cognition). consciousness in the living body coming into existence at the Thus, then, it has been proved that the 'subsistence' of cogni- next moment, even though this latter consciousness appears in tions in the body cannot be admitted to be of the nature of a body other than that of the former; because the body has only 'identity' (or 'sameness'). If the 'subsistence' of the cognition a momentary existence. Hence, the reason put forward by the in the body be held to consist in its being produced from it, other party is 'inconclusive'. then the question is: Is it 'produced from it' in the sense that the If, on grounds of their occurring in the same chain, the two mental cognition has the body for its receptacle (or substratum) bodies are regarded as one and the same, and on that ground, in the way that visual perception is produced by the eye, which the fact of the consciousness appearing in the 'same' body is serves as its receptacle? Or, is it 'produced from it' in the sense assumed-then the same might be said in the other case as that it is inseparable from it' as smoke is inseparable from fire? well-of the bodies appearing during the stage intervening Both these forms of'subsistence' are inadmissible. Because between the two physical bodies. Because the body appearing mental cognition does not rest in the body, like sense-cognition, in the other regions (at which the intervening bodies appear) is as it does not always follow the changes in the body. Nor is it only one other state of the chain of the same body consisting of invariably concomitant with-inseparable from-it; because, the five 'receptacles' (ayatana-s)-just like the states of child- in the case of 'formless negations', it is held that there are hood and old age cognitions without the body. In the second argument (of the opponent) as well, the probans Yet, even admitting the above, for the sake of argument, the or reason adduced is, 'because it is cognition (or consciousness)'; author proceeds to show that it is 'inconclusive' (doubtful). and no evidence has been adduced to prove that the said reason

Texts (1913-15) is not present where the contrary of the probandum is known to be present; so that the reason is clearly 'inconclusive', If the said 'subsistence' is held to be due either to the cognition doubtful. This fact was quite clear; hence the author did not being produced in the body as its substratum, or to its mention it

200 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIALS 201

The third argument adduced by the other party is that-"the up a reason which does not lead to the desired conclusion, and dying consciousness of the man beset with affections can bring which only indicates sheer stupidity? Certainly, that other about another consciousness, because it is dying consciousness; proof cannot be unfit for proving the other conclusion (of the like the consciousness of the man free from affections". This is Materialist), for which reason it has not been adduced. now taken up: Even though the statement may be made on the basis of the

Text (1916) Buddhist doctrine, there are some Buddhists who cannot admit the corroborative instance (of the Arhats) to be endowed with Why has it been held that the consciousness of the person the probandum (not bringing about further consciousness). free from the impurities of the affections is non-contiguous? If This is what is shown in the following. this view is held in accordance with the doctrine of others- that cannot be right; because the authority (and validity) of Texts (1917-18)

these doctrines is not accepted (by the Materialist). As regards this matter, there are some wise persons who

Commentary describe the Jinas (Buddhas) as 'beings' whose Nirvāna is not 'absolute and final', and the two paths as aiming at that same 'Non-contiguous': i e that which has no contiguity with Path. For these people, the instance cited cannot be admitted another consciousness. to be endowed with the probandum; even though it has been What is meant to be shown by this is that the corroborative cited (by the Materialist) on the basis of the doctrine of the instance cited is 'not admitted' by either one or the other of the other disputant. two parties concerned. For instance, how does the Materialist know that in the case of the Arhats, the dying consciousness Commentary

does not bring about the contiguity of another consciousness? 'This matter': the doctrine of the Buddhists. It may be that in the Buddhist's philosophy, the following 'Some wise persons': the Mahayanist-Madhyamikas. assertion is found: 'My life is at an end; I have led the life of the These people have declared that the Nirvana of the Buddhas student; I have done my duty; I know of no more birth.' It is in consists of the absence of absolute finality, on the ground that accordance with this faith of the Buddhist that the Materialist both 'birth-cycle' and 'cessation of conscious existence' are has based his assertion that 'there is no contiguity of the dying neither final nor absolute for them, as is clear from such state- consciousness' ments as-'There is only one Path, that of the Mahayana' This, however, cannot be correct. As a matter of fact, the Having pointed out the defect in the corroborative instance, Materialist does not admit the authority or validity of the the author proceeds to show that the probans is also open to doctrines of other people. How, then, could he come to have a the charge of being 'inconclusive'. conviction on the basis of what he does not accept as valid? Specially, in this same way, he may come to the decision that Text (1919)

the 'other world' exists. Inasmuch as no argument has been adduced as negativing If it is from any other valid source of knowledge that the the contrary, there is an uncertainty regarding the negative Materialist derives the said conviction-then why has that concomitance (of the probans with the probandum); so that, same source not been cited as proof? What is the use of putting there being a suspicion regarding the presence (of the probans)

202 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 203 in the contrary of the probandum, the probans remains 'incon- clusive' .. the case of a swoon. From this, it is clear that consciousness can exist in the foetus. Commentary 'Inasmuch as, etc.': this is the reason for the uncertainty Commentary

regarding the negative concomitance (i e there is no certainty If all cognition were apprehended only through the sense-

as to the probans being absent whenever the probandum is organs and objects-then our assertion would have been an

absent). audacious one. As a matter of fact, however, in dreams and

'There being a suspicion, etc.': This is the reason for 'incon- other states, there appears mental consciousness envisaging

clusiveness'. the colour blue and objects, which is apprehended even when

Vijātīyasadbhāva is presence in the contrary. "Whose pre- there is no sense-organ nor any object that has colour, etc Nor

sence?"-of the probans. can it be said that at that time, the substratum of the conscious-

The compound Sankyamāna, etc.': is to be expounded as ness consists of the sense-organ in the body, because what

'whose presence in the contrary is suspected'. figures in the consciousness is the colour blue (which is not pre-

Nor could the contingency of the idea (of death-cognition sent in the body); and every bodily cognition apprehends only tangible

producing another cognition) being taken to imply the absence objects. Hence, it is not correct to say that 'all cognition is in the

of death, be taken as serving the purpose of the argument form of the apprehension of things'. There is, therefore, nothing

negativing the contrary. Because in reality, there is no 'death' incongruous in asserting the presence of cognition in the state

of anything in the shape of the 'soul' and other things; what of swoon and similar conditions.

really happens is that a dissimilar chain is set up, which brings The following might be urged: 'There is nothing incongruous

about the cessation of the condition which gave the name to in the idea of consciousness existing there in the form of a

the particular body; and it is this that is spoken of as 'death' in latent potency; but the idea that it is actually there in its potent

common parlance and also in scientific treatises. form is certainly incongruous.'

It has been argued above (under text 1865) that-'it is sheer The answer to this is as follows:

audacity to assert that there is consciousness in the foetus, etc.' Texts (1923-27) The answer to this is as follows: Consciousness is not present in the foetus merely in the Texts (1920-22) form of a potency; the view held is that consciousnesses are

There is no audacity in asserting that 'there is consciousness present there in their actual form. From where do you derive

in the foetus': even though the sense-organs have not appeared the idea that there is no consciousness during sleep, swoon and

in it, why can cognition not be there? In fact, the assertion that other such conditions? If it is argued that "the idea is obtained

does involve audacity is that 'all cognition proceeds from from the absence of consciousness", then the question is: now

sense-organs and objects'; because the contrary is found to be has this absence been cognised? In case your idea proceeds

the case during dreams. In reality, ognition is also apprehended thus-"we do not cognise any consciousness at the time".

in a form which is distinct from that of the object, as is found in then that itself proves the presence of consciousness at the time. It might be argued that: 'If consciousness is present during

204 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 205 the said states, then why is there no remembrance of it on This is the objection urged by the opponent in the following: awakening, etc? This fact (of non-remembrance) is not effective (in refuting our view); the absence of remembrance is due to Text (1928) the absence of vividness and other conditions (in the conscious- 'If it is so, then how do you postulate the presence of this ness)-as in the case of the consciousness of the newborn infant. (consciousness) in these (states)?'

Commentary Commentary There would certainly be an incongruity if there were some 'Of this': of the consciousness. means of knowing with certainty that there is no consciousness 'In these': in the states of sleep, etc. at all during the states of sleep, swoon and the like. Our reason is as follows, as has already been explained 'There is this means of knowledge available in the fact that there is no consciousness or cognition of the consciousness itself.' Texts (1928-30) That cannot be right; how has this absence of the conscious- We conclude the following from reasons already explained ness itself been cognised? As ex hypothesi, there can be no definite before. If the presence of consciousness is not admitted during cognition of the absence of cognition. the states of sleep, swoon and the like, then there should be If also your definite cognition proceeds in the form that 'in death. While, if another consciousness is produced, then there sleep, swoon and other states, I am not cognisant of any con- would be no death at all. Thus, mental (subjective) consciousness sciousness'-then this definite cognition itself proves the must be regarded as independent, as it is not dependent upon existence of cognition (or consciousness). the eye, etc., and is present on the strength of its own cause, It might be argued that: 'if there were consciousness during just as during dreams, etc. sleep and other conditions, then why should there not be remembrance of it on awakening, etc. ? The 'etcetera' is meant Commentary to include the state when the swoon and the intoxication have The reason, as already explained before, is as follows: On passed off.' awakening, the first consciousness that the man has must be But this non-remembrance is not effective in proving that regarded as arising from its own cause, because it is conscious- what has been cognised did not exist there. It would be so, if ness-like the reminiscent cognition following after experience .. the mere cognition of a thing meant that there must be remem- The probans adduced here is not 'inconclusive', because on the brance of it. As a matter of fact, however, in many cases, even previous occasion it has been shown, bý the rejection of the when there is cognition, there is no remembrance, on account possibility of other causes, that the necessary invariable con- of the absence of vividness, repetition and interest in the cogni- comitance is there. tion; just as is found in the case of the new-born infant, where Then again, if there were no consciousness during sleep, even though there is cognition, there is no remembrance of etc., then there would be death. such If on the other hand, it is held that 'after the body has become Question: 'What proof or authority have you to assert that entirely deprived of all consciousness, another consciousness consciousness is present, where there is doubt regarding the is produced (on awakening)'-then, such an appearance of appearance of remembrance?' consciousness would mean that there can be no death at all;

206 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIALS 207 because, as in the case of the man awakening from sleep, so in in regard to a part of the 'subject'?' the casc of the dead man also, there would be a reappearance The answer to this is as follows: of consciousness. Specially as it is only mental (subjective) consciousness that has the capacity to link up with the next Texts (1932-33) birth, as has been thus declared-'linking up, dispassion and Even in the presence of the sense-organ and the object, the the rest are admissible only when the subjective consciousness conceptual cognition that appears in relation to the past, etc., is there.' should be regarded as on the same footing as the conception From all this it follows that mental consciousness rests entirely that envisages a non-entity. It has already been explained in on the previous consciousness; this is the idca expressed in the detail that the form of an entity cannot figure in conceptual words: 'mental consciousness must be regarded as independent.' cognitions, because they involve verbal expressions. The reason for this 'independence' consists in the fact of its not requiring anything else. In all cases, this mental consciousness procceds entircly from its own cause, because it does not stand Commentary

in need of any causes other than its own, in the shape of the tayoh-of the sense-organ and the object. eye, ear, etc .. ' as is found to be the case during sleep asadarthoparagena-is 'that which envisages what does not The following text disposes of the charge of 'inadmissibility' exist'-i e. the conception of things like the sky-lotus. On the against the reason just stated. same footing as this would be conception relating to the past (if cognitions were dependent upon the actual presence of the Text (1931) object cognised). For instance, conceptual cognitions are not dependent upon 'How so?' sense-organs and objects, because they come about even in the All conceptual cognitions appear as associated with verbal absence of the functioning of the latter, as in the case of the expressions, and hence they envisage verbal expressions as 'sky-lotus' and such things. well; and that which envisages the verbal expression cannot envisage an entity, because verbal expressions do not bear upon Commentary the form of things, as words are not fixed by convention in Tadavyāpāra, etc .- Even when there is no functioning of relation to the actual form of things. All this has been explained the sense-organ and the object. When one thing comes about in detail under the chapter on 'Word and its Denotation' without the functioning of the other, this latter cannot be the (Chapter XVI). cause of the former. If it were, it would lead to absurdity. 'The reason is present in everything where the probandum is The following might be urged: 'The conceptual cognition known to be present; hence it cannot be regarded as 'contradic- of the sky-lotus and such things may be independent of the tory'. Nor is it 'inconclusive', because if the cognition were sense-organ and the object, because it comes about even in the not produced from its own cause, it would have to be regarded absence of these latter. How could the conceptual cognition, as without cause. however, which appears when the eye is fixed upon the blue It might be argued that-'as the cognition would subsist in colour before one, be independent of the sense-organ and the body, it could not be regarded as without cause.' object, which could save the probans from being 'inadmissible' The answer to that is as follows:

208 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 209 Text (1934) mental consciousness shall not cease. There is no incongruity In the states of paralysis, etc., even though there is change in this. When one thing does not subsist in another, it does not in the body, there is no change in the mental consciousness. necessarily cease upon the cessation of the latter: e.g., the Hence this latter cannot be regarded as subsisting in the body. cessation of the cow does not lead to the cessation of the Gavaya. The body is not the substratum of subjective consciousness; Commentary hence there is non-apprehension of the wider character .. When the body is struck with diseases like paralysis, there is It has been argued above (under text 1869) that-'when the modification in it; but that does not create any change in the other body has not been seen, how can it be understood that mental consciousness. Hence, this subjective consciousness the required substratum is the body that is born subsequently?' cannot be regarded as subsisting in the body. When one thing The answer to that is as follows: does not become directly modified upon the modification of Texts (1937-8) another thing, it cannot be regarded as subsisting in the latter: e.g., the horse, which is not modified by the modification of When there is no incongruity in mental consciousness by the cow (does not subsist in the cow). On the modification of itself, we are not eager to prove the existence of another body. the body, mental consciousness does not always and directly But, even though unseen, such a body cannot be denied, become modified, as in the state of paralysis, etc .; hence there because the non-perception may only be due to uncertainty in is non-apprehension of the wider character (which implies the the man with defective eyesight-as in the case of scanty absence of the less wide) .. smoke that does not vividly enough indicate the presence of The following text proceeds to show that the character of a fire. subsisting in something is invariably concomitant with the character of becoming directly modified on the modification Commentary

of the latter thing: What is meant is as follows: what is intended to be proved is the existence of the 'other world'. And how can it be proved? Texts (1935-6) It can be proved if it is shown that consciousness is without In cases of affections of the eye, whenever there is the beginning and without end, as it is only an aspect of conscious- slightest defect in the eye, the cognition based upon the eye ness that figures in the idea of the 'other world'. This idea appears in a defective form. Thus even when the body has cannot subsist in the body, which is a material object with a perished, the mental consciousness, which does not subsist in shape; as the 'other world' is held to be there even when the it, continues to exist through the force of its own cause .. There body is not there If the 'chain of cognitions' is proved to be can be no incongruity in this. without beginning and without end, then the existence of our 'other world' is also proved. Hence we do not put forth any Commentary effort towards establishing the existence of the other body, as As the wider character is absent, it is proved that the mental this would be useless consciousness does not subsist in the body Simply because the other body is not seen, it cannot be 'Thus'-therefore-even on the cessation of the body, the denied; as this not-seeing may be due to the absence of necessary

210 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYATA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 211 attention, as happens in the case of the man with defective of the present life appear with the same peculiarities as the eyesight-even though the body may well be there; as it happens cognitions of the previous life This has been thus declared: when there is a scanty line of smoke; so that mere non-perception 'Through repeated practice, good and evil deeds appear in the does not prove non-existence. In fact, a subsequent body is nature of men; and the same appear in future lives, without described as actually perceived by persons of pure birth and any instruction-like a dream.' The Materialist has argued as follows: 'The body in this super-normal vision. For these same reasons, there can be no denial of the 'mig- world and the body in the 'other world' being entirely different, ratory body' (lingaśarīra) postulated by the Sānkhya. the chain of cognitions in those two bodies cannot be one and In the case of the previously-born body too, it is possible the same, so that the first cognition that appears in the foetus that there may be non-perception due to the remoteness of cannot belong to the same chain as the cognition under dispute- place-due either to its being produced at a remote place, or to because they belong to different bodies-like the cognitions of the difference in its character, as in the case of ghosts and goblins the buffalo, the boar and other animals.' Even when bodies are not remote, people with normal vision This is also refuted by what has been said above. can never cognise with certainty that such and such a being has Then again, for the following reason as well, the existence been born as a bird; just as there is no recognition in cases of the 'other world' should be admitted: every conceptual where the body is changed by means of the use of medicines cognition is preceded by the repeated cognition of words, with unthinkable potency because it is conceptual-like the conceptual thoughts occurring Question: 'How is it, then, that cognitions appearing in in youth and old age. The conceptual cognition involved in the different substrata are spoken of as belonging to the same desire for sucking the breast and so forth appearing in newborn chain?' infants is conceptual. Hence this is a reason based upon the Answer: nature of things. The reason cannot be said to be one which has an unadmitted Texts (1939-41) substratum; because the existence of the probandum in the Even though the two cognitions subsist in two different shape of the desire for sucking the breast, etc .. , is proved by bodies, yet by reason of the later cognition appearing in the same such effects in new-born infants as crying and actual breast- particular character as the preceding one, the later cognition sucking. Such crying and breast-sucking cannot be possible in is connected with the same 'chain' with which the previous one who has no conception of liking and disliking cognition was connected. Further, even in the case of new- Nor is the reason 'inadmissible by itself'. This is shown by born infants, there is activity towards sucking the breast, as the words, 'all this is of the nature of conceptual, etc.' 'All this'- also displeasure at being balked; all of which is inferred from i.e. the desire for breast-sucking, etc-is of the nature of such acts as crying, sucking the breast and so forth. All this is conceptual thought, because it is apprehended as something of the nature of conceptual cognition, and conceptual cognition sought-after .. is associated with names (verbal expression) That the reason is not 'inconclusive' is shown by the words: 'is associated with names'. Sah stands for conceptual cognition. Commentary Inasmuch as conceptual cognition is associated with verbal By reason of the later cognition, etc .- That is, the cognitions expression, it is said to be 'associated with names'. This

212 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 213 'association with names' of the conceptual cognition is not Commentary possible without repeated convention; as has been explained by us already in detail tat-stands for tasmat, 'for these reasons' The following might be urged: 'There may be association The following text describes the upshot, of the above argu- with names due to repeated practice; but that does-not prove ments: what is wanted; in fact, it only proves the contrary, i e. the fact Text (1944) of being preceded (and produced) by repeated practice during the present life.' Because the conceptual cognition of the said persons is born The answer to this is as follows: of the fruition of the impressions left by the repeated cognition of the name during that same birth-therefore 'another birth' Text (1942) becomes established. In the case in question there can be no 'name-form' to which Commentary one has been habituated, during the present birth. As in the case Name-verbal expression 'Cognition'-apprehension, of these persons, if there has been no previous birth, there should knowledge; abhyāsa, repeated appearance. be an entire absence of the said desire, etc The compound yannāma, etc., is to be expounded as 'that Commentary birth during which there has been repeated cognition of the name', this compound being in accordance with a particular What is meant is as follows: The practice, or habitual use rule (of Panini's)-Saptamī etc. The impressions are left by this during the present life in this world, is negatived by all evidence repeated cognition-these impressions have this 'fruition', in the case of new-born infants. The reason adduced in support development, or attainment of their full character, by producing of a conclusion that is so annulled cannot be said to be 'contra- their effects; and it is from this 'fruition' that the said conceptual dictory', because the probans has been said to be 'contradictory' cognition is born. Of the said persons-i.e. of new-born infants only when the probandum is one that is not already annulled. The following text sets forth the opponent's reductio ad Name-form, i.e. the form of the name, or its expressiveness; absurdum argument against the above view: even though this really functions in the mind, it is imposed Text (1945) upon (attributed to) the verbal forms. These persons -- i.e. new-born infants. 'If the said conceptual cognition of new-born infants proceeds Absence of, etc -i.e absence of the said desire for breast- from the repeated cognition of names, how is it that they do sucking and so forth. not have the memory or the clear speech of eloquent speakers?' The following text sums up the purport of the above argu- Commentary ments: Text (1943) 'If the conceptual cognition proceeds from the repeated cognition of the convention during previous lives, then the For these reasons, the said desire, etc .. , must be regarded as newborn child should have remembrance of the past conven- proceeding from the impressions left by the habitual use of the tion, because the continuity of a habit could not be possible name; and as these are of the nature of conceptual cognition, without remembrance. Also, the child should have clear speech the said desire should also be admitted to be conceptual. like eloquent speakers, and in that case, there would be no

214 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 215

need for the setting up of any conventions during the present there are some who are dull-witted and who lose their memory. life. Yet, none of these things happen. Hence it follows that, as Tasam-stands for words, speech. there is no remembrance and there is no clear speech, the idea The following text shows that the reason adduced'in the that the conceptual cognition is preceded and produced by reductio ad absurdum is 'inadmissible' regarding its substratum. repeated cognition is incompatible with facts.' By means of this reductio ad absurdum which rejects the very Text (1947)

nature of the subject (paksa), the opponent shows that the final In the case of those high-souled men, where there is not the conclusion (of the Buddhist) is defective. slightest impediment, clear speech is actually heard and they In the following text, the author points out that the reason do have clear remembrance of them as well. put forward in this reductio ad absurdum is 'inconclusive' (doubtful). Commentary

Text (1946) High-souled men-men of exceptionally pure life. The following texts set forth another argument in proof of That speech does not exist is due to the fact that the develop- the idea of the 'other world': ment (of the impressions) becomes hampered by powerful impediments, just as in the state of a highly-complicated fever. Texts (1948-53)

Commentary As a matter of fact, all these feelings of love, hatred and the rest become strong through habit and repetition, as has been As a matter of fact, repeated cognition is not invariably ascertained by positive and negative concomitance. These concomitant with remembrance, etc., by virtue of which con- feelings, appearing for the first time (in the child), are entirely comitance it should always produce the said remembrance, or devoid of any habit and repetition during the present life. What, should cease on the cessation of the same. Because it is quite then, is the cause of their appearance, if there is no other life? possible that there may be continuance of the previous habit, Their appearance cannot be due to the presence of their (external) and yet there may be no remembrance. excitants; because even when these excitants are present, the The mention of the 'high complicated fever' is only by way feelings in question do not appear, if there is disgust; and when of illustration this disgust ceases, they are found to be strong even in connec- Powerful impediments-due to existence in the mother's tion with past and future things, when the counter-feelings womb appear in intensified form. The feelings of love, hatred and the The development becomes hampered-that is, the full develop- rest are found to proceed in regard to women and other things, ment of the impressions becomes hampered; i.e. it does not when the man attributes to them goodness, devotedness, proceed in exact accordance with the peculiarities of the parti- constancy and so forth; even though these qualities may not cular place, time and character of things as previously cognised. actually be there. For these reasons, these feelings appearing in This answers the following argument of the Materialist: this life must be regarded as appearing without the excitants 'Remembrance of previous birth cannot be admitted; because being actually present, through the force of the habitual there is remembrance of all men coming from the same village.' appearance of similar feelings in the past-because they are The fact of the matter is that even those coming from the same feelings of love, etc .- like these same feelings appearing village do not have the same remembrance; as among them, subsequently.

216 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIALS 217

Commentary cannot be due to the presence of the excitants

The argument may be thus formulated: the strength of the Then again, even with regard to past and future things, the

feelings of love, hatred, jealousy, haughtiness and pride, etc .- feelings are found to be strong in the man in whom the feeling as also, wisdom, compassion, sympathy and so forth-is due of disgust has ceased and feelings due to the absence of pleasure

to habitual practice; just as during the present life, it is found in have become intensified through strong desire .. And, when

men possessed of varying degrees of these feelings, during the there is no change in the presence or absence of a certain thing on

present life, there is in the body, etc, of a man, a degree of the presence or absence of another thing, the one cannot be the

strength of the feelings, which is not due to any such practice cause of the other. Otherwise, there would be incongruities.

during the present life; so this is a reason based upon the relation For the following reason as well, feelings of love, etc., cannot

of cause and effect. As all such relations of cause and effect are be due to the presence of the excitants: because if the feelings

determined by positive and negative concomitance, the reason appeared exactly in accordance with the excitants, they would

cannot be said to be 'inadmissible'. This is what is meant by proceed from the excitants in exactly the same manner as the

the words-Ascertained by positive, etc .. cognition of blue and other things (which always proceeds in

It cannot be urged that: 'The reason is 'contradictory', as accordance with these things); the feelings, however, do not

cited in proof of the fact of the feelings due to habitual repetition proceed in this way. On the contrary, the said feelings appear during other lives' What is meant is that these feelings, as with regard to the woman and other things, in men who attri-

appearing for the first time during the present life, have not bute, to the woman, the form of their own lasting pleasure,

been habitually repeated during this life. This may not be a etc .. , which has not been experienced at all; and yet, the objects

reason directly proving the fact of these feelings being due to (woman, etc.) may not actually be possessed of the said form habitual practice during previous lives; but what is stated as of goodness, etc .- and when a thing is devoid of a certain the reason being admitted to be a fact, it could not be without form, it cannot be the excitant or basis of the cognition of that

some cause: if it were without cause, it would be there at all form; otherwise it would lead to absurdity times. Hence if another life were not there, what could be the. tat-i e. for these reasons, the feelings of love, etc., as per-

cause of the strength of the said feelings of love, hatred, etc ? taining to imposed things, must be regarded as devoid of an Hence the conclusion is that habitual repetition during past objective basis (or excitant). From this, it follows that the said

lives is the cause of the said strength of the feelings Thus, the feelings of love, etc , when they appear for the first time during 'other world' becomes established one's present life, proceed from the repeated experience of The external objective excitant cannot be the cause of the similar feelings in the past feelings in question, because in many cases, even when these Question: "If objects are not the excitants of the feelings,

excitants are there, the feelings of love, etc., do not appear at then how is it that feelings of love, etc., appear only when the all-if there happens to be present a feeling of disgust against objects are present?" the evil character of the things. Answer: The term pratisankhyāna, 'disgust', stands for that counter- feeling against love, etc., which is based upon the idea of evil Texts (1954-6) Sometimes even when the excitant is not there, the said feelings of love, etc., actually appear. Hence the presence of the feelings When the objects are present, there appear pleasure, etc .; from this pleasure, etc, proceed the 'afflictions' of love, hate

218 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 219 and the rest, being the outcome of the fruition of impressions left by similar past feelings in men who are devoid of wisdom other persons; because such is not always found to be the case.

and are subject to evil propensities-in accordance with the Commentary potency of things. Directly, the objects are not the cause of the feelings; if they were, a single affliction would be the cause of vrtti stands for doings.

them all with regard to the object, like the cognition of things The following text shows how this is not always found to be the case: Commentary Text (1958) The process is as follows: when the object is present, there appears pleasure born'of the sense-organ concerned; from this Boars, bucks and other animals-who have never seen or

pleasure proceed the 'afflictions' oflove, etc., in men devoid of heard of such acts-become perturbed at the touch of females

wisdom (and dispassion) and subject to evil propensities and of their own kind.

tendencies, out of the fruition of impressions left by previously experienced feelings of love, etc ; so that the objects are not the Commentary

direct cause of the feelings. Acts-intercourse and the like.

The following might be urged: 'You are only expounding Sabhagagati, etc .- females of the same kind, i. e the sow and

your own doctrine; you state no reasons.' the doe.

The answer to this is: a single affliction, etc. Single-i.e. of a When there is contact-proximity-of these, there is 'per-

single kind. Tatra-in regard to the object. Tasya-of the turbation'-disturbance-i e. desire for intercourse

object. Like the cognition of things; i.e. like the cognition Text (1959) apprehending the form of blue and other things. As a matter of fact, however, a single 'affliction' is not what actually appears; Such qualities as wisdom, gentleness, compassion and the

for instance, with regard to the single object in the shape of the like-which are not habitually practised in the world-do not

body of the woman, while in one man the feeling aroused is proceed by themselves, like pride, etc

that of love, in another it is hate, while in yet another, mere jealousy; so that there are several kinds of 'afflictions' (feelings) Commentary that appear. The following might be urged: 'The feelings of love, etc., It must be admitted that feelings of love, etc., appear by

that appear during the present life cannot be the effect of themselves, as the effects of habitual experience in the past;

repeated experience in the past; they arise either from tlie because such qualities as wisdom, gentleness and others,

seeing of the actual act done by others, or from the advice of which are not habitually practised in the world, are not found

other persons.' to appear by themselves like pride, etc. This is an instance of

This is answered by the following: dissimilarity. Otherwise, like pride, etc., wisdom and the rest would also appear by themselves. Text (1957) Some people have held the following view: 'Love proceeds

The appearance of the feelings cannot be due either to the from phlegm (in the physical constitution of the body), hatred

perception of the doings of others, or to hearing of things from from bile, and delusion from wind. The answer to that is as follows:

220 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS .221

Texts (1960-61) contrary to what is desired (by the Buddhist). (b) If what is

The origination of the feelings cannot be due to phelgm and meant to be proved is the fact of their being produced by the

the rest. Because as in the previous case, the entire falsity of repeated experience of other lives, then the corroborative

this idea is perceived in experience. For these reasons, it is instance is devoid of the probandum. (c) If what is meant to be

established that time-repeated practice which is the cause of proved is the mere unqualified fact of the feelings being produced

feelings appcaring for the first time, must be from the 'other by 'repeated experience'-the reason put forward is 'contra-

birth'; and the doctrine of the nastika is killed dictory', because it proves contrary to the fact of the feelings being due to the repeated experience of another life' Commentary Commentary Balāsa is phlegm The sense of the objection is as follows: As in the previous case-in the case of objects, as shown under 'With reference to the feelings of love, etc., appearing for text 1950 above. Then again, as a matter of fact, there is no increase and the first time, what is it that is desired to be proved? (1) Is it that

decrease in the feelings of love, etc., upon increase and they proceed from repeated experience during the present life?

decrease of phlegm. And when change in one thing does not Or, (2) that they proceed from repeated experience during

bring about a change in the other, the former cannot be the other lives? Or, (3) that they proceed only from mere 'repeated

cause of the latter. Similarly, fierce hatred, and not fierce love, experience', without any qualifications? As if this is proved,

has been seen to appcar in one with a. preponderance of then by implication it is also proved that they are due to

phlegm; while one with a preponderance of bile is found to experiences of the 'other world' These are the only alternative

have fierce love, not fierce hatred. This sort of comingling is views possible

often met with; and when one thing appears without the other, '(1) If it is the first-then there is bādhana of it-incompati-

this latter cannot be the cause of the former Further, the man bility with facts of perception; because, in fact, the feelings of

with love is often found to be in the same condition as the man love, etc., in question are never found to appear from experience

with hatred. From these non-concomitances it follows that the during the present life; and there is badhana-denial-also of

feelings of love, etc., are not the effects of phlegm, etc. what is desired by the upholder of the 'other world'." '(2) Under the second view, the corroborative instance tasmat-Thus; this sums up the chapter. cited becomes devoid of the probandum; because for the yadabhyāsa, etc .- The compound is to be expounded as: 'Repeated experience during which occurs the cause of the Materialist, there can be no instance where the feelings proceed

feelings in question'. from experiences of past lives.

The following texts set forth the objections of the other '(3) Under the third view, the reason becomes "contradic- tory"; as, like the corroborative instance, it proves only the party: negation of the desired idea of the feelings being due to experi- ences during other lives.' Texts (1962-3) The above objection is answered by the following: '(a) If what is meant to be proved is the fact that feelings are produced by repeated experience during the present life-then Text (1964)

such an idea is annulled by well-perceived facts, and is also What is meant to be proved is the general fact. Nor would

222 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 223 the reason be 'contradictory'; there is no incompatibility between these and the reason, because of which it could the doctrine that the things are produced by themselves (as detailed in texts 106 et seq ). Those who assert that things are negative it .. born out of themselves have been silenced by the works (in Commentary text 107)-'The operation of thing upon itself is a contradiction

It is the third of the above alternative views that is meant by in terms.' Now, the upholders of the doctrine of svabhāva are

us. Nor is the reason 'contradictory'. 'Why?' going to be silenced These philosophers assert as follows: 'The origination of Because there is no incompatibility between 'being produced things does not proceed either from themselves or from any from past experience' and 'love and other feelings' by virtue of which incompatibility, the idea of 'being due to past expe- other thing; in fact, it is independent of all causes, i e it does

rience' could be set aside. not depend on the action of any cause at all.'

Further, such notions as 'this world' and 'the other world' Question: 'What is the difference between these people and

are based on differences in the state or condition of things- those who ascribe the origination of things to themselves?'

and the differences of childhood, youth and so forth. Answer: They do not, etc. 'They', i.e. the upholders of sva-

In this way, the beginninglessness (of things) becomes bhäva; the thing itself, i.e. its own nature (prior to origination);

established. Hence this should not be emphasized-as it 'even'-this implies that they do not accept the form of any

amounts to the viewpoint of other disputants (Naiyāyika, other thing to be the 'cause'; the difference thus is that while

Mīmāmsaka, etc.). the previous people hold the nature of the thing itself to be its 'cause', these other people do not accept even that as the

B. THE DOCIRINE OF THE ORIGIN OF 'cause'. THE WORLD BY SVABHĀVA These people put forward the following reason in support

Commentary of their view: 'When a thing which fulfils the conditions of perceptibility has an existence that is not perceived, it should The opening verses of the text have spoken of 'other be regarded, by intelligent persons, as non-existent, as are the entities', which include the doctrine of those philosophers "hare's horns". Any cause of things is something whose who hold that the origination of the world is due to its 'own existence is not perceived; hence it follows that there can be no nature' (svabhāva). This is the doctrine that is now taken up cognition of the "nature of the thing" (the cause).' for refutation, even out of its proper sequence, because there is In the following text, it is shown that the reason put forward little to be said regarding it. is not 'unproven' (hence, inadmissible):

Text (110) Text (111) The propounders of the doctrine of svabhava describe the Who makes the diversity in the lotus and its filaments, etc. ? origination of things as being independent of all causes. They do not declare even the thing itself to be its own cause. By whom, too, have the variegated wings of the peacock and such things been created? Commentary Commentary Although the doctrine of svabhava has nowhere been directly promulgated in so many words, yet it is implied by Rājīva is lotus; the 'filaments, etc.' of the lotus. Such is the analysis of the compound. Et cetera is meant to include the stalk,

224 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 225 the petals, the pericarp and other parts; also the sharpness of Texts (113-14) thorns and the like. Diversity-such diversities as those of shape, colour, hardness and the like. Who makes ?- The sense is As regards the lotus and its filaments, etc., it is definitely that no one makes it, since we do not find any such 'cause' as ascertained through perception and non-apprehension that God and the like they have their 'cause'-in the seed, clay, water, and the rest, The following might be urged: 'Even if it be regarded as under certain peculiar conditions-with which they are posi- proven that external things are without "cause", because no tively and negatively concomitant. Such being the case, what such cause is perceived-how can it be taken as proven with other 'cause' can there be of those of which you are asking? regard to internal things?' Commentary The answer to this is provided by the following text: By this text, the author shows that the reason adduced by Text (112) the other party is 'unproven' and 'inadmissible', and the Just as sharpness and other properties of the thorn and other conclusion put forward is contrary to perceived facts. things must be regarded as without cause, on the ground of It has been asserted (under text 111) that 'of such things as their appearing at certain times only, so also must pain and the lotus, its filaments and the like, no cause is perceived'. This other (internal) things be regarded as without cause. is 'not admitted'; as through perception and non-apprehension, such 'cause' is definitely cognised to consist in the seed, clay, Commentary water and such things, with which the said things are positively

Even though the fact of pain and other internal things being and negatively concomitant. To explain: when it is found that a certain thing is produced only when another thing is present, without cause is not proved by perception, yet it is clearly proved and it becomes modified by the modifications of this latter -- by inference. For instance, what appears only at certain times then this latter thing is said to be the 'cause' of the former is definitely known to be without cause, e.g the sharpness of the thing Such a 'cause of the lotus and its filaments, etc .. ,' is thorn and such things. Pain and such internal things appear found in the shape of the seed, etc., which, under certain peculiar only at certain times; hence this is a reason based upon the conditions, such as their becoming swollen due to moisture and nature of things. Nor is it right to hold that, when a certain so forth, serves as their 'cause', with which they are positively thing is present or absent at the time when another thing is and negatively concomitant. The lotus, etc .. , come into existence present or absent, the latter should be regarded as the cause of only when the seed, etc., are present, and they do not come the former, as this is not found always to be true. For instance, into existence when these latter are absent; that these are the visual perception is present when there is touch (in the object 'cause' of the lotus, etc., is definitely ascertained through perceived), and is absent when there is no touch; and yet, touch is not the 'cause' of visual perception. Hence, the said perception and non-apprehension. Thus, the reason put forward

definition of the causal relation cannot be true. From all this by the other party is 'inadmissible', untrue.

it follows that 'the origination of all things is independent of Then again, it has been urged that 'the definition of "causal relation" is not true (fallible)'. This reason, also, is 'unproven', all causes' .. not admissible; as in the instance cited, as touch is also a cause The author answers the above arguments of the upholder of of colour, it is admitted to be the cause of visual cognition as svabhāva with the following texts: well To explain-the term 'touch' (in this connection) stands

226 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA for the material substance; and it is only by associating with THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 227

these substances that colour subsists; hence, with regard to vis- specifically at a certain place, at a certain time, and in certain ual cognition, touch does serve as a 'cause'; the only difference receptacles; being dependent upon these and independent of all being that while one (colour) is a direct cause, the other (touch) others.

is only an indirect one. Further, mere negation (absence) is not regarded by us as Commentary

determining the causal relation. 'What then?' It is a particular If the lotus, etc., did not have them-i.e. the particular points kind of absence that is so regarded; for instance, when it is of place and time-for their 'cause'-then such phenomena as found that even though other efficient agents are present, yet their production only in a particular place, such as water and in the absence of some one agent, the thing in question is not similar things, and not in other places, such as stone-and only produced-then this latter agent is regarded as the 'cause' of at particular points of time like the summer, and not at other that thing; and not when there is simple negation in the form points of time like the winter-would not be possible. In fact, that 'it is not produced while the other is absent'. Otherwise (if the lotus and other things would, then, come into existence at such mere negation were to determine the causal relation) all places and at all times, as they would be independent of the date-growing in the country proper for Matrvivaha would not peculiarities of place and time. It is clearly recognised, therefore, be produced if the Matrvivaha had not been there (as ex hypothesi, that they are dependent upon these latter, from the fact that by mere negation, the Matrvivaha would be the 'cause' of the they avoid certain places and times and appear only at special growth of the date). places and times. The negative premise in the qualified form that we have Question: 'The things in question (by their insentience) cannot shown is not 'fallible' (untrue) with regard to touch. For, if it have any wish; how, then, can they have any need for (depend- could be shown that even in the presence of colour and other ence upon) the causal conditions?' conditions (of visibility), there is no visual cognition on The answer is given in the following text: account of the absence of touch alone, then there might be 'fallibility' in our premise. Nothing like this, however, can be Text (117)

shown. Hence, there can be no 'fallibility' in the definition of What is meant by their being 'dependent' is that they come the 'causal relation' (as stated by us) into existence in that manner, so that it is the character of 'effect' It is not only such things as the seed and the rest that are that is spoken of as 'dependence'. That things come into exis- definitely known as the 'cause' of things; even particular tence in that manner is a perceptible fact; hence, the said causes points of place and time are definitely known as such 'causes': become duly established. This is what the author indicates in the following text: Commentary Texts (115-16) What is meant by the things being so 'dependent' is that they Particular points of place and time are also related (as causes) come into existence at particular places and times, and not at to things. 'How so?' If the said points were not the cause of others; it does not mean that they have any 'wish' or 'desire'. things, these would be produced everywhere and at all times. Objection: 'If such is their dependence on the particular points As a matter of fact, however, things are found to be produced of time and place-even so, how does it follow that they are effects of these?'

228 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 229

Answer: It is the character of 'effect' that is spoken of as Text (119) 'dependence'. The character of the effect is not anything else It may be that there are no proofs of the existence of the except the dependence involved in the fact that they come into 'cause' of things; but the mere absence of proof cannot prove the existence in that particular manner. non-existence of anything. Question: 'How is it known that they come into existence in that particular manner?' Commentary Answer: It is a perceptible fact. If mere 'non-apprehension' is put forward as the reason for

Text (118) the non-existence of the cause, then it is 'inconclusive'; because

Thus the doctrine of svabhāva is discarded by perception, mere absence of proof, i.e. mere absence of a valid means of knowing, cannot serve as a reason for establishing the non- specially as the exact nature of the 'cause' of things is duly existence of the thing concerned. ascertained through perception and non-apprehension. Question: "Why can it not be a proof?"

Commentary The answer is provided in the following text:

Tat-Therefore, thus; or the whole expression tatsvābhāvika- Text (120) vādah may be taken as a compound, meaning 'the doctrine of Inasmuch as 'proof is not pervasive of the 'existence of the svabhäva with regard to the lotus and other things'; is discarded thing'; nor is it its 'cause'; (a) because there is difference; by perception. Perception alone is mentioned here, as the 'non- (b) because there is non-concomitance; and (c) because it pro- apprehension' of a certain thing also consists only in the ceeds from that (mere absence of proof cannot prove the non- 'apprehension' of something else, and as such, is of the nature existence of a thing) of 'perception' It has been sought (under text 112, above) to prove: 'Pleasure Commentary

and such internal things can have no cause, because they appear When one character is pervasive of (more extensive than) only occasionally' .. This reasoning, however, is 'contradictory', another, then alone does the absence of the former imply the inasmuch as it proves only the contrary of what is desired to be absence of the latter; similarly, the absence of the cause implies proved; because what has no cause and is not dependent upon the absence of the effect; and the reason for this lies in the fact anything else cannot be 'occasional', appearing only at certain that the less extensive is invariably concomitant with the more times and places What is meant is that the corroborative instance extensive one, because of the two being of the same essence; cited is devoid of the character desired to be proved. and the effect is invariably concomitant with the cause, being Thus it has been shown that the conclusion (of the other party) produced by this latter. is contrary to facts of perception and that their reason is 'un- In the case of 'proof and 'non-existence of a thing' there can proven, inadmissible'; now, the author takes for granted (for be no co-essentiality, as the two actually appear to be distinct; the sake of argument) the 'admissibility' of the reason, and nor can proof be the 'cause' of the thing, as there is no concomit- then proceeds to show its 'inconclusiveness', in the following ance between them, the thing existing even when the proof is text: not there. For instance, there is nothing incongruous in admitt-

230 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 231 ing the existence of things which are far removed in space and of any one person himself? It cannot be the former; because time and character, hence not within reach of any proof-and, ordinary men with limited powers of perception can never be when a thing can exist even during the absence of another sure of anything not perceived by all men; hence this must thing, the latter cannot be regarded as the cause of the former; always be doubtful. People of limited vision have no means of for, if it were, it would lead to an absurdity. In fact, if the other knowing that no man has the perception of an unseen cause for party were to regard this as a 'cause', he would renounce his such things as the marks on the wings of the peacock. As for own position. any single man's own non-perception, that can never be con- Also, because it proceeds from that: Proof cannot be the 'cause' clusive. Why? Because even though such things as the grass, of the existence of things: That is, the proof arises out of the the coral, the pebbles and such like growing in mountain- thing itself, which forms its objective; and the cognisable thing caves are not perceived, they do exist; that is, there is nothing does not arise out of the proof. incongruous in regarding them as existent. Thus the reasons It might be argued: 'Even though not invariably concomitant, adduced being doubtful, non-existence cannot be regarded as the proof (being absent) may yet preclude the existence of the proved beyond doubt thing. ' The answer to this is provided by the following text: Texts (123-4) Text (121) If no reason is adduced to prove the fact of things having no When a thing is neither one nor the other, its absence does cause, then, inasmuch as nothing can be proved without reason, not conclusively preclude the other thing; because there is no your theory is not proved. If, on the other hand, you do connection. adduce a reason proving it, then also, your theory is not

Commentary proved; as the proving itself would be produced by the proof adduced (which would, therefore, be the cause of the proving). Neither the one nor the other; i e. neither the cause, nor perva- sive-the absence of what is not invariably concomitant cannot Commentary rightly be taken as, necessarily, precluding the other thing; for Further, you have to be asked the following question: in if it did. it would lead to an absurdity: the absence of the horse support of your conclusion that 'things have no cause'-do might, in that case, imply the absence of the cow as well. you adopt any reason, or not? If you do not adopt it, then your Text (122) view is not proved, as there can be no proving anything without adequate proof If, on the other hand, you do adopt a reason -- 'Non-perception' by all persons is doubtful. 'Non-perception' even then, your view cannot be proved (such is the construc- by any one person himself is inconclusive, as it is found that tion of the words of the text). 'Why so?'-Because the 'proving' grass and other things growing in the caves of the Vindhya itself would be produced by the proof adduced. This is what has thus mountains do exist, even though they are not perceived. been declared by the revered ācārya Sūri: 'One who declares

Commentary that there is no cause would demolish his own conclusion ifhe adduces any reasons in support of his assertion; on the other Further, when 'non-apprehension' is put forward as the hand, if he were slow to adduce reasons, what could be gained reason (for non-existence), is it put forward in the form of the by mere assertion?' absence of perception by all men? Or of the absence of perception The following might be urged: 'The reason that I adduce is

232 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 233

indicative, not productive; why, then, should my conclusion not while that which actually produces what is desired to be be proved?' The answer to this is provided by the following text: accomplished-such as the sprout and the like-is called 'pro- ductive'. Hente there is nothing wrong in the distinction that

Text (125) has been made This answers all the objections that may be urged against the As regards the indicative, be it in the form of the probans, or declaration of acarya Süri. For instance, the following is an in the form of words expressive of that (probans), it is said to be 'indicative' of the probandum (desired conclusion) only when objection that may be raised: 'Even when asserting with reason that there is no cause, why should one demolish his own conclu- it becomes the 'cause' of the proving (of the said conclusion). sion? As what he asserts is an indicative reason, while what he

Commentary denies is the productive cause.' The answer to this is as follows: the indicative reason is also a productive cause, because it The indicative probans-i.e. the probans fulfilling the three produces the cognition of the thing. This urges against the conditions, as conceived by the reasoner for his own benefit; or other party the fact of his assertions being self-contradictory .. in the form of words-when the same probans is asserted for the In fact, there can be no reason that could prove the absence of benefit of someone else. Expressive of that-i.e. of the probans. all cause, because such a proposition would clearly be one that Cause of the proving-i.e. of the bringing about of the definite is contrary to, and set aside by, sense-perception and the rest. cognition of the object to be cognised. If it were otherwise, With the following text, the author sums up his position and and the probans or reason did not serve as the 'cause' of the said thereby also shows that the conclusion of the other party is proving, then how could it be regarded as an 'indicative'? In contrary to, and set aside by, inference: fact, in this way, everything would be 'indicative' of every- thing else. Text (127) Question: 'If this is so, then how do the teachers make the From all this, it follows that other things also have their distinction between the indicative and the productive?' 'causes', as their production is restricted-just as your cognition The answer given in the following text is that the 'indicative' is of the probandum appears when the probans is there. so called because it makes the thing known, and what is called 'productive' is that which actually brings into existence the thing Commentary concerned Things like the lotus and its filaments-which are 'other'

Text (126) than the things spoken of by the other party in his reasoning.

Thus, it is really the 'productive' cause which is spoken of as As their production is restricted-i.e. they are produced only when certain particular things are there. The argument may be for- 'indicative'; because it does not actually produce (bring into mulated as follows: those things whose production is restricted existence) what is desired to be accomplished, it is not called to occasions when certain other things are there must be 'productive'. regarded as with cause-as, for instance, your own cognition of

Commentary the probandum (desired to be proved) which appears only

It is called 'indicative'-and not 'productive'-because it when the probans (reason) is there the same is the case with the lotus and other things (hence, these must be regarded as 'with does not actually produce what is desired to be accomplished; cause')-this being a reason based on the nature of things.

Śankara's Śārīraka-bhāsya THE SOURCE MATERIALS 235 Thus there are many various opinions, basing part of them COMMENIARY ON IHE on sound arguments and scriptural texts, part of them on Brahma-sūtra fallacious arguments and scriptural texts misunderstood.

Sankara (c AD 788-820) is the most renowned exponent of ii. 2.2 the Advaita school of Vedanta philosophy, his magnum opus being the commentary on the Brahma-sūtra of Badarāyana, The existence of an intelligent Self joined to a body and so

which he calls the Sarīraka-bhasya In this commentary he on which are the abode of activity can be established (by infer- refers thrice to the Lokayata view. One of these references ence) only; the inference being based on the difference observed (on ii. 2.2) seems to have the peculiar intention of showing between living bodies and mere non-intelligent things, such as how the Sankhya philosophy, in defence of itself, was likely chariots and the like. For this very reason, viz. that intelligence to quote the authority of the Lokāyatikas. We have given here these three references in the standard English translation is observed only where a body is observed while it is never

of G. Thibaut (SBE, vols. xxiv and xxxviii). seen without a body, the Materialists consider intelligence to be a mere attribute of the body. Hence, activity belongs only Sankara's commentary on the Brahmasütra: to what is non-intelligent. To all this, we-the Vedantins-make the following reply. ON DEHĀIMAVĀDA We do not mean to say that activity does not belong to those i. 1:1 non-intelligent things in which it is observed; it does indeed

But if Brahman is generally known as the Self, there is no belong to them; but it results from an intelligent principle,

room for an enquiry into it! Not so, we reply; for there is a because it exists when the latter is present and does not exist

conflict of opinions as to its special nature. Unlearned people, when the latter is absent. Just as the effects of burning and shin-

and the Lokāyatikas, are of the opinion that the mere body, ing, which have their abode in wood and similar materials, are,

endowed with the quality of intelligence, is the Self; others, indeed, not observed when there is mere fire (i.e are not due

that the organs endowed with intelligence are the Self; others to mere fire; as mere fire, i.e. fire without wood, etc., does not

maintain that the internal organ is the Self; others, again, that exist), but at the same time, result from fire only as they are

the Self is a mere momentary idea; others, again, that it is the seen when fire is present, and are not seen when fire is absent;

Void. Others, again (to proceed to the opinion of such as so, as the Materialists also admit, only intelligent bodies are

acknowledge the authority of the Veda), maintain that there is observed to be the movers of chariots and other non-intelli-

a transmigrating being different from the body, and so on, gent things. The motive power of intelligence is, therefore,

which is both agent and enjoyer (of the fruits of action); others incontrovertible But-an objection will be raised-your Self,

teach that that being is enjoying only, not acting; others believe even if joined to a body, is incapable of exercising moving

that in addition to the individual souls, there is an all-knowing, power, for motion cannot be effected by that, the nature of

all-powerful Lord. Others, finally (i.e. the Vedāntins), maintain which is pure intelligence. A thing, we reply, which is itself

that the Lord is the Self of the enjoyer (i e. of the individual devoid of motion, may, nevertheless, move other things. The

soul whose individual existence is apparent only, the product magnet is itself devoid of motion, and yet it moves iron; and

of Nescience). colours and other objects of sense, although themselves devoid of motion, produce movements in the eyes and the

236 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIALS 237 other organs of sense. So the Lord also, who is all-present, the Self of all, all-knowing and all-powerful, may, although himself and allows the matter to rest there. Here, where we are engaged

unmoving, move the universe. If it finally be objected that (on in an inquiry into the pious meditations which are a matter of

the Vedanta doctrine) there is no room for a moving power, as injunction, a discussion of the existence of the Self is introduced

in consequence of the oneness (aduality) of Brahman, no motion in order to show that the whole Sastra depends thereon.

can take place; we reply that such objections have repeatedly Moreover, in the preceding adhikarana, we have shown that

been refuted by our pointing to the fact of the Lord being passages may be exempted from the influence of the leading

fictitiously connected with Maya, which consists of name and subject-matter, and that for that reason, the fire-altars built of

form presented by Nestience. Hence, motion can be reconciled mind and so on subserve the purpose of man (not of the sacri-

with the doctrine of an all-knowing first cause; but not with fice). In consequence thereof, there naturally arises the question:

the doctrine of a non-intelligent first cause. who is that man whose purposes the different fire-altars sub- serve; and in reply to it, the existence of a Self which is separate iii. 3.53-54 from the body is affirmed. The first Sūtra embodies an objection

Sūtra 53. Some (maintain the non-existence) of a (separate) against that doctrine; according to the principle that a final

Self, on account of the existence (of the Self) where a body refutation of objections stated in the beginning effects a stronger

is (only). conviction of the truth of the doctrine whose establishment is

Bhäsya. At present, we will prove the existence of a Self aimed at.

different from the body in order to establish, thereby, the Here now, some materialists (Lokayatika), who see the Self

qualification (of the Self) for bondage and release. For, if there in the body only, are of the opinion that a Self separate from

were no Self different from the body, there would be no room the body does not exist; assume that consciousness (caitanya),

for injunctions that have the other world for their result; nor although not observed in earth and the other external elements-

could it be taught of anybody that Brahman is his Self. But, an either single or combined-may yet appear in them when

objection is raised, already in the first pada which stands at the transformed into the shape of a body, so that consciousness

head of this Sastra (i.e. the first pāda of the Pūrva Mīmāmsā-sūtras), springs from them; and thus maintain that knowledge is

there has been declared the existence of a Self which is different analogous to intoxicating quality (which arises when certain

from the body and hence capable of enjoying the fruits taught materials are mixed in cortain proportions), and that man is

by the Sastra True, this has been declared there by the author only a body qualified by consciousness. There is thus, according

of the bhasya, but there is in that place no Sütra about the exist- to them, no Self separate from the body and capable of going

ence of the Self Here, on the other hand, the Sūtrakāra himself to the heavenly world or obtaining release, through which

establishes the existence of the Self after having disposed of a consciousness is in the body; but the body alone is what is

preliminary objection. And from hence, the teacher Sabara conscious, is the Self. For this assertion, they allege the reason

Svamin has taken the matter for his discussion of the point in stated in the Sūtra, 'On account of its existence where a body

the chapter treating of the means of right knowledge. For the is.' For wherever something exists, if some other thing exists,

same reason, the reverend Upavarsa remarks in the first and does not exist if that other thing does not exist, we determine

tantra-where an opportunity offers itself for the discussion of the former thing to be a mere quality of the latter; light and

the existence of the Self-'We will discuss this in the Sārīraka,' heat, e g., we determine to be qualities of fire. And as life, movement, consciousness, remembrance and so on-which,

238 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 239 by the upholders of an independent Self, are considered qualities Should he say that consciousness is the perception of the of that Self-are observed only within bodies, and not outside elements and what springs from the elements, we remark that bodies, and as an abode of those qualities, different from the in that case, the elements and their products are objects of body, cannot be proved, it follows that they must be qualities consciousness, and that hence, the latter cannot be a quality of of the body only The Self, therefore, is not different from the them as it is contradictory that anything should act on itself. body. To this conclusion the next Sūtra replies. Fire is hot indeed, but does not burn itself, and the acrobat, Sütra 54. There is separation (of the Self from the body) well-trained as he may be, cannot mount his own shoulders. because its existence does not depend on the existence of that As little could consciousness, if it were a mere quality of the (viz. the body), but there is not (non-separation); as in the case elements and their products, render them objects of itself. For of perceptive consciousness. form and other (undoubted) qualities do not make their own Bhäsya. The assertion that the Self is not separate from the colour or the colour of something else their objects; the elements body cannot be maintained. The Self, rather, must be some- and their products, on the other hand, whether external or thing separate from the body, 'because the existence (of the belonging to the Self (the organism), are rendered objects by Self) does not depend on the existence of that (i.e. the body).' consciousness. Hence, in the same way as we admit the existence For if, from the circumstance that they are where the body is, of that perceptive consciousness which has the material elements you conclude that the qualities of the Self are qualities of the and their products for its objects, we also must admit the body, you must also conclude, from the fact that they are not separateness of that consciousness from the elements. And, as where the body is, that they are not qualities of the body, because consciousness constitutes the character of our Self, the Self thereby they show themselves to be different in character from must be distinct from the body. That consciousness is perma- the qualities of the body. Now the (real) qualities of the body, nent, follows from the uniformity of its character (and we such as form and so on, may be viewed as existing as long as therefore may conclude that the conscious Self is permanent the body exists; life, movement, etc., on the other hand, do also; as also follows) from the fact that the Self, although not exist even when the body exists, viz. in the state of death connected with a different state, recognises itself as the conscious The qualities of the body, again, such as form and so on, are agent-a recognition expressed in judgments such as 'I saw perceived by others; not so the qualities of the Self, such as this'-and from the fact of remembrance and so on being consciousness, remembrance, and so on. Moreover, we can possible. indeed ascertain the presence of those latter qualities as long as The argumentation that consciousness is an attribute of the the body exists in the state of life, but we cannot ascertain their body because it is where a body is, is already refuted by the non-existence when the body does not exist; for it is possible reasons stated above. Moreover, perceptive consciousness that even after this body has died, the qualities of the Self takes place where there are certain auxiliaries such as lamps should continue to exist by passing over into another body. and the like, and does not take place where those are absent, The opposite opinion is thus precluded, also for the reason of without its following therefrom that perception is an attribute its being a mere hypothesis. We further must question our of the lamp or the like. Analogously, the fact that perception opponent as to the nature of that consciousness which he takes place where there is a body, and does not take place assumes to spring from the elements; for the materialists do where there is none, does not imply that it is an attribute of the not admit the existence of anything but the four elements. body; for, like lamps and so on, the body may be used (by the

240 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 241

Self) as a mere auxiliary. Nor is it even true that the body is the body as being of the nature of a fair-complexioned thing; absolutely required as an auxiliary of perception; for, in the and not.as something distinct from it; as it is in the case of the state of dream, we have manifold perceptions while the body awareness, 'there is curd in the bowl.' For this reason is well- lies motionless. The view of the Self being something separate justified the co-application (sāmānādhikaranya) of the terms from the body is therefore free from all objections. aham and sthula, etc (to the same object), as in the expression 'I, a fat one, am going'. Indeed, terms that can be co-applied to curd (dadhi), namely, sweet (madhura) etc., are never observed to be referring equally to the bowl as well (so that one may say), the bowl is something white and sweet (though-one may Vācaspati Miśra's Bhāmatī easily say that curd is something white and sweet) The existence of an entity in the form of the self which is not Väcaspati Miśra (c. ninth century AD) is the author of very perceptible cannot be ascertained even on the basis of inference, important expositions of the various systems of Indian etc. Indeed, there is no pramana other than perception. As it has philosophy like Sānkhya, Yoga, Advaita Vedānta, Pūrva been said: 'Since the various things differ in their powers (śakti) Mīmāmsā and Nyāya-Vaisesika. He is thus, for us, the most versatile exponent of what is often called the 'orthodox due to the change of circumstances like space, time, etc , it is systems', though leaving the stamp of his individuality on hardly possible to determine the things (in their true nature) by each of the expositions-a circumstance due to which he is inference.' When such is the plight of a mark the invariability popularly known as sarvatantra-svatantra. We have given (nāntarīyakabhāva) of which is possible to be established on the here an extract from his commentary on Sankara's Śārīraka- strength of observation (upalabdhi), then what, indeed, can be bhäsya, called Bhamatī, in which he deals with the Lokāyata said in respect of verbal testimony, in the case of which deviation view of dehātmavāda (vyabhicāra) is actually observed; of postulation, which has for

Vācaspati Miśra's its object things totally beyond perception; and of comparison, against which may be posed the alternatives of 'total similarity' Bhāmatī and 'partial similarity'. In the event of total similarity there would be identity, and in the event of partial similarity there (3.3.53) would be undesirable consequences, since in that case every- The objection (aksepa) is described: 'Here there are some thing would be compared to everything else. who consider the body alone as the self'. Effort (cestā) is activity (vyāpāra) with a view to obtaining Although consciousness is not observed in earth, water, fire the beneficial and avoiding the harmful. It is observed to take and air, either taken collectively (samasta) or separately (vyasta), it place as dependent upon the body and hence, must be a property may still be present in them when they are transformed into of the body. In the same way, breath (prana) also, which consists the shape of a body. It is not that kinva, etc., since they are not of inhaling and exhaling, is a property of the body. Desire, found to be intoxicating taken either collectively or separately, volitional effort (prayatna) etc., though they are internal (antara) would not produce intoxication when they are transformed properties, are to be admitted as located in the inner parts of into a spiritous drink the body itself, because no substratum for them other than the In the awareness, namely, 'T' (aham), what is revealed is only body is ever observed, and they are produced only when the

242 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA body is there. Otherwise there would arise the absurdities of THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 243

denying what is observed and of admitting what is not observed. Moreover, even beasts, with a view to obtaining the beneficial There being no proof of the existence of a self over and above and avoiding the harmful, move towards a field green with the body, and their (i.e. of desire, etc.) occurrence being possible soft, fresh grass and leave one full of dried grass and thorns. in the body itself, the body itself can be considered the self, as The Nastika, not knowing what would lead to his own good characterised by desire, etc .: or what would lead him into harm, is more beastly than a beast. After such a contention has been made, the reply is to be In this matter (of determining a thing as desirable and undesir- given as follows. One making the claim that there is no pramana able), which is the basis of an effort for obtainment (pravrtti) or other than perception, becomes liable to question. Wherefrom an effort for avoidance (nivrtti), and can only be known by had you ascertained the invalidity of inference, etc. ? Perception inference, perception is not capable of doing anything. can grasp the mark, etc. only as such, and would not be capable Nor should the Nastika utter words to convey anything to of determining their invalidity (also). It would not be proper others; for the objects referred to by words are not perceived. that, just like the knowledge of smoke, the knowledge of their Thus, let there be no other birth for the Nastika; but in this invalidity, too, should be produced from the sense-object very birth would he be thrown into the great hell, in the form contact; rather, it is to be produced from a possible doubt of muteness and absence of all efforts either for obtainment or concerning deviation (vyabhicara) due to the difference of for avoidance. Learned ones have discussed all of these in great space, time, condition and nature. But (the consideration of) detail. (So we are not going into them any further.) so much cannot be the function of perception. As it has been Although postulation has, for its object, what is totally said: 'Perception, indeed, is not capable of discharging so beyond perception, it arises from facts (artha) which cannot be many functions, for it is produced on the strength of an object explained otherwise In the context of the definition of pramana, which is in contact, and also because it cannot critically judge.' comparison has been explained to be based on the presence of Therefore in this regard, one would have to admit, even though similarity in many respects (bhūyah-sāmānya-yoga). unwillingly, an additional form of pramana. Well, let there be other forms of pramana in this regard. Still, Moreover, people who have the power of critical judgement it can be ascertained through agreement in presence and agree- explain things only to such persons who are not convinced and ment in absence that even a perceptual cognition, an awareness as are under doubt; they leave alone such persons who are already involving the 'I', has, for its underlying object, something convinced. But such conditions of the persons concerned cannot distinct from the body. It has already been pointed out that, as be perceptually known to you. These conditions, indeed, cannot in the case of one assuming the form of a tiger through powers be perceptually known, just like a fair complexion etc. Rather, of yoga (yoga-vyäghra), in the state of dream as well, although they are only to be inferred from such marks as their words, there is the notion that a different body has been assumed, the activities etc. (But in your view) the mark is not a pramāna basis of the awareness involving the 'I' is re-cognised to be from which these conditions can be established. It is indeed no the same. mark of critial judgement for one who, without becoming The syntactical connection of (the words) in the sūtra would aware of the actual conditions of the persons concerned, be as follows: the self is not non-distinct, but quite distinct becomes desirous of explaining things to any person at random, from the body. Why? Because it (the self) is not invariably and consequently, whose words do not command respect. present in the presence of that (the body). If consciousness etc. are to be the qualities of the body, they must be specific qualities

244 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIAIS 245 (viśeșaguņa), and not general qualities (sāmānya-guņa) like body. Thus, in a single body there would be present a number number (samkhyā), magnitude (parimana), conjunction of conscious agents. However, it is not possible to unify the (samyoga) etc. Thus, it is observed that those which are the different intentions of each of so many conscious agents, and specific qualities of the forms of matter remain present (in their that is why a number of birds caught in a single net, each eager substratum) as long as the forms of matter are present. It is not to move in an opposite direction, are not able, although they possible that there is a form of matter, but it is without colour have the capacity, to cross a distance even as much as the Therefore, because of being dissimilar to colour etc. which are length of a hand. In the same way, the body would also not the specific qualities of the forms of matter, consciousness have the inclination to do anything cannot be a quality of the body. By this, also is refuted the Moreover, it is not possible to ascertain, only on the basis of contention that desire etc. are the specific qualities of the body. agreement in presence, a relation of property and property- Similarly, breath, effort etc., as well, though they are the possessor (between two things) (dharma-dharmi-bhāva). It is properties of the body alone, are not born of the body alone, not that all properties should belong to akasa, simply because it for then their presence would have been possible in the state.of has agreement in presence with all of them; (but such a relation death (i.e. in a corpse) as well. Therefore, that (the body), is determined) on the basis of both agreement in presence and being governed by which these can be produced as properties agreement in absence. However in the present case, the agree- of the body, is the self, as distinct from the body .. ment in absence is doubtful. Thus, the agreement in presence Besides, if adrsta is admitted to be a cause, its location in the alone cannot establish (what is sought to be established by the body cannot be logically justified, and hence the self has to opponent). The author points to all this by saying: 'Besides, be admitted. when (the body) is there' etc. Another point of dissimilarity is indicated: 'the properties of Desiring to point out a further fallacy, the author asks: 'Of the body again', etc. The properties of the body, such as colour, what nature, again' etc. etc .. , are observed to be perceptible to one's own self as well as The Nastika says: 'The very awareness' etc. The implication to others. But desire, etc., are perceptible only to one's own is that just as colour, etc., are only different kinds of transfor- self (and not to others), and thus they become dissimilar to the mations of matter, and not anything distinct from the four properties of the body. On this ground too, they should be the forms of matter, so also, consciousness is a particular transfor- properties of something distinct from the body mation of matter, and not anything distinct from the forms of Moreover, even if consciousness is also admitted to be a matter; so that there might have been any contradiction with specific quality of matter, it should continue to be present as the thesis (pratijña) that there are only four forms of realities, long as matter is present. It cannot be said that there would be namely, earth, water, fire and air. Thus, the following conclu- deviation (vyabhicara) in the instance of power of intoxication, sion is arrived at: the whole world is the transformation of the for capability (samarthya) is a kind of general property. four forms of matter only; there is no other form of reality, the Again, in each of the component particles of a spiritous transformation of which would be colour, etc., or any other drink, the power of intoxication is present in a very small form of transformation. degree. In the same way (if it is assumed that there is conscious- (The contention that consciousness is a) property of the body ness) in the body, consciousness should be present, though in has been refuted by grounds already discussed. Still, because a very small degree, in each of the component parts of the of a desire for pointing out a further ground, the author says:

246 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 247 'But, then' etc. The properties of matter, the colour, etc., being inanimate (jada), are observed to be of the nature of object impression of a systematic treatment of the view as a whole This exposition of the Carvaka view undoubtedly enjoys (vişaya) only, and never of the nature of knowledge (visayin = the highest popularity among modern scholars. lit., that which possesses object) itself. It cannot be said that Mädhava's work, as translated into English by E B. there are some objects of knowledge which may-also-be-of-the Cowell and A. E. Gough, was originally published at intervals

nature of knowledge itself, for one's own action in respect of in the Pandit between 1874 and 1878 and appeared in book-

one's own self would be contradicted. It cannot be argued that form in 1904 .. We have used here the chapter of Cārvaka as

the same contingency would arise in the case of knowledge translated by E. B. Cowell, with his notes.

itself as well, for, though inanimate, it is admitted to be self- Mādhavācārya's

manifested (svayam-prakāśa) by nature Sarva-darśana-sangraha The author explains the part of the sūtra, namely, 'just like IEXI knowledge': 'just as its', etc. From the very proof establishing THE PROLOGUE knowledge itself is also ascertained its difference with the body; for its difference with the properties of matter which are inani- 1. I worship Siva, the abode of eternal knowledge, the

mate is ascertained by the distinctive feature that it is only of storehouse of supreme felicity; by whom the earth and the rest

the nature of self-manifested awareness were produced, in him only has this all a maker ..

Well, then, because of essential difference, let knowledge be 2. Daily I follow my Guru Sarvajña-Visnu, who knows all

something distinct from the forms of matter. Still, there is an the Agamas, the son of Sarngapäni, who has gone to the

absence of proof with regard to the self Hence (i.e apprehend- further shore of the seas of all the systems, and has contented

ing such an objection), the author says: the self, according to the hearts of all mankind by the proper meaning of the term

us, is actually of the nature of knowledge itself soul .. 3. The synopsis of all the systems is made by the venerable Mädhava, mighty in power, the Kaustubha-jewel of the milk- ocean of the fortunate Sāyana. 4 Having thoroughly searched the Sastras of former Madhavācārya's teachers, very hard to be crossed, the fortunate Sāyana-

Sarvadarśana-sangraha Mädhava1 the lord has expounded them for the delight of the good. Let the virtuous listen with a mind from which all envy has been far banished; who finds not delight in a garland strung An Advaita Vedantist of the fourteenth century AD, Mādhavācārya is best known for his compendium of Indian of various flowers? philosophy called the Sarvadarsana-sangraha. Although a THE CĀRVĀKA SYSTEM minister of the Vijayanagara empire, he eventually became the chief abbot of the Srngeri Matha, one of the four most [We have said in our preliminary invocation, 'salutation to famous centres of Advaita Vedanta generally viewed to Siva, the abode of eternal knowledge, the storehouse of supreme have been established by Sankara himself. felicity,]' but how can we attribute to the Divine Being the The compendium discusses sixteen philosophical views, of which the Cärvaka forms the first chapter, and gives the giving of supreme felicity, when such a notion has been utterly abolished by Carväka, the crest-gem of the atheistical school,

248 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIAIS 249

the follower of the doctrine of Brhaspati? The efforts of Carvaka a fear of pain, to reject the pleasure which our nature instinctively are indeed hard to be eradicated, for the majority of living recognises as congenial. Men do not refrain from sowing rice, beings hold by the current refrain- because forsooth there are wild animals to devour it; nor do

While life is yours, live joyously; they refuse to set the cooking-pots on the fire, because forsooth

None can escape Death's searching eye: there are beggars to pester us for a share of the contents. If anyone

When once this frame of ours they burn, were so timid as to forsake a visible pleasure, he would indeed

How shall it ever again return? be foolish like a beast, as has been said by the poet-

The mass of men, in accordance with the Sastras of policy The pleasure which arises to men from contact with

and enjoyment, considering wealth and desire the only ends of sensible objects,

man, and denying the existence of any object belonging to a Is to be relinquished as accompanied by pain-such is

future world, are found to follow only the doctrine of Carvaka. the reasoning of fools;

Hence another name for that school is Lokayata-a name well The berries of paddy, rich with the finest white grains,

accordant with the thing signified.2 What man, seeking his true interest, would fling away

In this school the four elements, earth, etc., are the original because these are covered with husk and dust?5

principles; from these alone, when transformed into the body, If you object that, if there be no such thing as happiness in a intelligence is produced, just as the inebriating power is deve- future world, then how should men of experienced wisdom loped from the mixing of certain ingredients;3 and when these engage in the agnihotra and other sacrifices, which can only be are destroyed, intelligence at once perishes also They quote performed with great expenditure of money and bodily fatigue; the Sruti for this (Brhad Arany Up. ii. 4,12), 'Springing forth your objection cannot be accepted as any proof to the contrary, from these elements, itself solid knowledge, it is destroyed since the agnihotra, etc, are only useful as means of livelihood, when they are destroyed-after death no intelligence remains. '4 for the Veda is tainted by the three faults of untruth, self-con- Therefore the soul is only the body distinguished by the attribute tradiction, and tautology;6 then again, the impostors who call of intelligence, since there is no evidence for any soul distinct themselves Vaidic pundits are mutually destructive, as the from the body, as such cannot be proved, since this school authority of the jnana-kanda is overthrown by those who holds that perception is the only source of knowledge and does maintain that of the karma-kanda, while those who maintain not allow inference, etc the authority of the jñāna-kānda reject that of the karma-kānda; The only end of man is enjoyment produced by sensual and lastly, the three Vedas themselves are only the incoherent pleasures. Nor may you say that such cannot be called the end rhapsodies of knaves, and to this effect runs the popular saying- of man as they are always mixed with some kind of pain, because it is our wisdom to enjoy pure pleasure as far as we can, and to The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three

avoid the pain which inevitably accompanies it; just as the man staves, and smearing oneself with ashes-

who desires fish takes the fish with their scales and bones, and Brhaspati says, these are but means of livelihood for

having taken as many as he wants, desists; or just as the man those who have no manliness nor sense.

who desires rice, takes the rice, straw and all, and having taken Hence it follows that there is no other Hell than mundane as much as he wants, desists It is not therefore for us, through pain produced by purely mundane causes, as thorns, etc; the

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only Supreme is the earthly monarch, whose existence is proved by all the world's eyesight; and the only Liberation is the dis- by the external senses, or by the inner sense, mind) The former is not the required means; for, although it is possible that the solution of the body. By holding the doctrine that the soul is actual contact of the senses and the object will produce the identical with the body, such phrases as 'I am thin,' 'I am knowledge of the particular object thus brought in contact, yet black', etc., are at once intelligible, as the attributes of thinness, as there never can be such contact in the case of the past or the etc .. , and self-consciousness will reside in the same subject (the future, the universal proposition, 11 which was to embrace the body); like the use of the phrase 'my body' is metaphorical, invariable connection of the middle and major terms in every 'the head of Rahu' (Rahu being really all head) case, becomes impossible to be known. Nor may you maintain All this has been thus summed up- that this knowledge of the universal proposition has the general In this school there are four elements, earth, water, fire class as its object, because if so, there might arise a doubt as to and air; and from these four elements alone is intelli- the existence of the invariable connection in this particular gence produced-just like the intoxicating power from case12 (as, for instance, in this particular smoke as implying kinva, etc., mixed together; since in 'I am fat', 'I. am fire) lean', these attributes7 abide in the same subject, Nor is internal perception the means, since you cannot èstablish And since fatness, etc .. , reside only in the body,8 it alone that the mind has any power to act independently towards an is the soul, and no other, external object, since all allow that it is dependent on the external And such phrases as 'my body' are only significant senses, as has been said by one of the logicians, 'The eye, etc., metaphorically. have their objects as described; but mind externally is dependent 'Be it so', says the opponent; 'your wish would be gained if on the others.' inference, etc., had no force of proof; but then they have this Nor can inference be the means of the knowledge of the force, else, if they had not, then how, on perceiving smoke, universal proposition, since in the case of this inference we should the thoughts of the intelligent immediately proceed to should also require another inference to establish it, and so on, fire; or why, on hearing another say, "there are fruits on the and hence would arise the fallacy of an ad infinitum retrogression. bank of the river", do those who desire fruit proceed, at once, Nor can testimony be the means thereof, since we may either to the shore?' allege in reply, in accordance with the Vaisesika doctrine of All this, however, is only the inflation of the world of fancy Kanada, that this is included in the topic of inference; or else Those who maintain the authority of inference accept the we may hold that this fresh proof of testimony is unable to leap sign or middle term as the cause of knowledge, which middle over the old barrier that stopped the progress of inference, term must be found in the minor and be itself invariably con- since it depends, itself, on the recognition of a sign in the form nected with the major. 9 Now, this invariable connection must of the language used in the child's presence by the old man; 13 be a relation destitute of any condition accepted or disputed;10 and, moreover, there is no more reason for our believing and this connection does not possess its power of causing another's word that smoke and fire are invariably connected, inference by virtue of its existence, as the eye, etc., are the cause than for our receiving the ipse dixit of Manu, etc. (which, of of perception, but by virtue of its being known. What, then, is course, we Cārvākas reject). the means of this connection's being known? And again, if testimony were to be accepted as the only We will first show that it is not perception. Now perception is means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, then in held to be of two kinds, external and internal (i.e. as produced the case of a man to whom the fact of the invariable connection

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between the middle and major terms had not been pointed out major term as is distinguished by the absence of any such con- by another person, there could be no inference of one thing (as dition; and on the other hand, the knowledge of the condition

fire) on seeing another thing (as smoke); hence, on your own depends upon the knowledge of the invariable connection showing, the whole topic of inference for oneself14 would Thus we fasten on our opponents, as with adamantine glue,

have to end in mere idle words. the thunderbolt-like fallacy of reasoning in a circle Hence, by Then again, comparison,15 etc .. , must be utterly rejected as the the impossibility of knowing the universality of a proposition, means of the knowledge of the universal proposition, since it is it becomes impossible to establish inference, etc. 20 impossible that they can produce the knowledge of the uncon- The step which the mind takes from the knowledge of smoke, ditioned connection (i.e. the universal proposition), because etc., to the knowledge of fire, etc., can be accounted for by its their end is to produce the knowledge of quite another connec- being based on a former perception, or by its being an error;

tion, viz., the relation of a name to something so named. and that in some cases, this step is justified by the result, is acci- Again, this same absence of a condition, 16 which has been dental, just like the coincidence of effects observed in the given as the definition of an invariable connection (i.e. a universal employment of gems, charms, drugs, etc. proposition), can itself never be known; since it is impossible From this, it follows that fate, etc.,21 do not exist, since to establish that all conditions must be objects of perception; these can only be proved by inference .. But an opponent will and therefore, although the absence of perceptible things may say, if you do not thus allow adrsta, the various phenomena of be itself perceptible, the absence of non-perceptible things the world become destitute of any cause. But we cannot accept

must be itself non-perceptible; and thus, since we must here, this objection as valid, since these phenomena can all be pro- too, have recourse to inference, etc., we cannot leap over the duced spontaneously from the inherent nature of things. Thus obstacle which has already been planted to bar them. Again, it has been said- we must accept as the definition of the condition, 'it is that The fire is hot, the water cold, refreshing and cool the which is reciprocal or equipollent in extension17 with the breeze of morn; major term, though not constantly accompanying the middle.' By whom came this variety? From their own nature These three distinguishing clauses, 'not constantly accompany- was it born .. ing the middle term,' 'constantly accompanying the major term,' and 'being constantly accompanied by it' (i.e. reciprocal), And all this has been also said by Brhaspati --

are needed in the full definition to stop, respectively, three There is no heaven, no final liberation, nor any soul in such fallacious conditions, in the argument to prove the non- another world eternity of sound, as 'being produced,' 'the nature of a jar', and Nor do the actions of the four castes, orders, etc , 'not causing audition';18 wherefore the definition holds-and produce any real effect. again, it is established by the śloka of the great Doctor beginning The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, thè ascetic's three samāsama 19 staves, and smearing one's self with ashes, But since the knowledge of the condition must here precede Were made by Nature as the livelihood of those destitute

the knowledge of the condition's absence, it is only when there of knowledge and manliness. is the knowledge of the condition, that the knowledge of the If a beast slain in the Jyotistoma rite will itself go to universality of the proposition is possible; i.e. a knowledge in heaven, the form of such a connection between the middle term and Why then does not the sacrificer, forthwith, offer his

254 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 255

own father?22 NOTES If the Śräddha produces gratification to beings who are dead, 1. Dr. A. C. Burnell, in his preface to his edition of the Vamsa-Brāhmana,

Then here, too, in the case of travellers when they start, has solved the riddle of the relation of Madhava and Sayana. Sayana is a

it is needless to give provisions for the journey. pure Dravidian name given to a child who is born after all the elder chil- dren have died Madhava elsewhere calls Sayana his 'younger brother', If beings in heaven are gratified by our offering the as an allegorical description of his body, himself being the eternal soul. Śrāddha here, His use of the term Sāyana-Mädhavah here (not the dual) seems to Then why not give the food down below to those who prove that the two names represent the same person. The body seems

are standing on the housetop? meant by the Sayana of the third śloka Mayana was the father of

While life remains, let a man live happily, let him feed Mādhava, and the true reading may be śrīman-māyana. 2. 'Sankara, Bhāskara, and other commentators name the Lokāyatikas, on ghee even though he runs in debt; and these appear to be a branch of the Sect of Carvāka' (Colebrooke), When once the body becomes ashes, how can it ever Lokayata may be etymologically analysed as 'prevalent in the world' return again? (loka and āyata) Laukāyatika occurs in Pānini's ukthagana If he who departs from the body goes to another world, 3. Kinva is explained as 'drug or seed used to produce fermentation in the How is it that he comes not back again, restless for love of manufacture of spirits from sugar, bassia, etc.'Colebrooke quotes from

his kindred? Sankara: 'The faculty of thought results from a modification of the

Hence it is only as a means of livelihood that Brahmans aggregate elements, in like manner as sugar with a ferment and other ingredients becomes an inebriating liquor; and as betel, areca, lime, and have established here extract of catechu chewed together have an exhilarating property not All these ceremonies for the dead-there is no other found in those substances severally.'

fruit anywhere. 4. Of course Sankara, in his commentary, gives a very different interpreta- The three authors of the Vedas were buffoons, knaves, tion, applying it to the cessation of individual existence once the

and demons knowledge of the Supreme is attained Cf. Sabara's Comm. Jaimini Sūt ,i i 5 All the well-known formulae of the pandits, jarphari, 5 I take kana as, here, equal to the Bengali kunr. Cf. Atharva-V., xi 3.5. turpharī etc 23 Aśvāh kanā gāvas tandulā māșakās tușāh And all the obscene rites for the queen commanded in 6. See Nyāya Sūtras, ii 57

the Aśvamedha; 7 I e personality and fatness, etc. These were invented by buffoons, and so all the various 8. I read dehe for dehah

kinds of presents to the priests, 24 9. Literally, 'must be an attribute of the subject and have invariable

While the eating of flesh was similarly commanded by concomitance (vyāpti) 10. For the sandigdha and niścita upādhi, see Siddhānta Muktāvalī, p 125 The night-prowling demons former is accepted by only one party

Hence, in kindness to the mass of living beings must we fly 11 Literally, the knowledge of the invariable concomitance (as of smoke by fire) for refuge to the doctrine of Cärvaka. Such is the pleasant 12. The attributes of the class are not always found in every member-thus

consummation idiots are men, though man is a rational animal; and again, this particu-

E.B.C. lar smoke might be a sign of a fire in some other place. 13. See Sāhitya Darpana (Ballantyne's trans. p 16), and Siddhānta-M, P. 80.

256 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 257 14. The properly logical, as distinguished from the rhetorical, argument. 15 'Upamana, or the knowledge of a similarity, is the instrument in the panied by the special kind of fire, that produced from wet fuel. But this production of an inference from similarity. This particular inference will not be the case where the non-reciprocating term is thus invariably consists in the knowledge of the relation of a name to something so accompanied by the other reciprocal, as, 'the mountain has fire because named. Ballantyne's Tarka Sangraha. it has smoke'; here, though fire and smoke do not reciprocate, yet 16. The upadhi is the condition which must be supplied to restrict a too- smoke will be a true middle, because it is invariably accompanied by general middle term; as in the inference, 'the mountain has smoke because heat, which is the reciprocal of fire I wish to add here, once and for all,

it has fire,' if we add wet fuel as the condition of the fire, the middle term that I own my explanation of this, as well as many another difficulty in will no longer be too general. In the case of a true vyāpti, there is, of the Sarva-darsana-sangraha, to my old friend and teacher, Pandit Mahesa course, no upādhi. Chandra Nyayaratna of the Calcutta Sanskrit College 17. (Pr Anal.,ii 25). We have here our A with distributed predicate. 20 Cf.Sextus Empiricus, P Hyp ii. In the chapter on the Buddhist system 18. If we omitted the first clause, and only made the upadhi 'that which infra, we have an attempt to establish the authority of the universal constantly accompanies the major term and is constantly accompanied proposition from the relation of cause and effect or genus and species. by it,' then in the Naiyayika argument 'sound is non-eternal because it 21. Adrsta, i.e., the merit and demerit in our actions which produce their has the nature of sound,' 'being produced would serve as a Mīmāmsaka effects in future births.

upadhi to establish the vyabhicara fallacy, as it is reciprocal with 'non- 22. This is an old Buddhist retort. See Burnouf, Introd., p. 209 eternal'; but the omitted clause excludes it, as an upadhi must be consistent 23. Rgveda, x 106. For the Avamedha rites, see Wilson's Rgveda Preface, with either party's opinions, and, of course, the Naiyāyika maintains Vol. ii. p. xiii.

that 'being produced' always accompanies the class of sound Similarly, 24. Or this may mean, 'and all the various other things to be handled in the if we defined the wpadhi as not constantly accompanying the middle rites.'

term and constantly accompanied by the major,' we might have, as an upädhi 'the nature of a jar,' as this is never found with the middle term (the class or nature of sound only residing in sound, and that of a jar only in a jar), while at the same time, wherever the class of jar is found, there is also found non-eternity. Lastly, if we defined the upadhi as 'not Haribhadra's Şad-darśana-samuccaya constantly accompanying the middle term. and constantly accompanying and commentaries on it: the major,' we might have, as a Mimamsaka upadhi, 'the not causing audition,' i e the not being apprehended by the organs of hearing; but Manibhadra's Laghuvrtti and this is excluded. as non-eternity is not always found where this is, ether Gunaratna's Tarka-rahasya-dīpikā being inaudible and yet eternal 19. This refers to an obscure śloka of Udayanācārya, 'where a reciprocal and a non-reciprocal universal connection (i.e. universal propositions A prolific writer subscribing to the Jaina creed, Haribhadra which severally do and do not distribute their predicates) relate to the (c eighth century AD) wrote a popular compendium on the same argument (e. g. to prove the existence of smoke), there, that non- six systems of Indian philosophy called the Sad-darsana- reciprocating term of the second will be a fallacious middle, which is not samuccaya. Although the six systems discussed by him do invariably accompanied by the other reciprocal of the first.' Thus 'the not include the Lokāyata, he adds a special section on it, in mountain has smoke because it has fire' (here, fire and smoke are non- consideration of the fact that the Nyaya and the Vaisesika- reciprocating, as fire is not found invariably accompanied by smoke, discussed by him originally as separate views-constitute, though smoke is by fire), or 'because it has fire from wet fuel' (smoke according to some, a single system. From their point of and fire from wet fuel being reciprocal and always accompanying view, the sixth is the Lokayata. Two of his renowned com- each other); the non-reciprocating term of the former (fire) will give a mentators are Gunaratna (c. 15th century AD) and Mani- fallacious inference, because it is also, of course, not invariably accom- bhadra, who was much earlier. Given here is Haribhadra's version of the Lokayata, along with the commentaries of

258 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 259 both, adding to this Gunaratna's elaborate and separate Commentary discussion of the dehātmavāda of the Cārvākas. This world is this much only, consists of this much only, as Haribhadra's Sad-darśana-samuccaya with much as is within only the scope of the senses. The senses are Manibhadra's Commentary of five kinds-tactual, gustatory, olfactory, visual and auditory 'Those which are within their scope' means 'those which can A. & B. DOCIRINE OF IHE IOKĀYAIAS be their objects'. Only those things which are manifested by the five senses really exist, and nothing else. Since the word (Verse 80): The Lokäyatas give their views as follows. There 'world' (loka) has been used here, we should understand, by it, is neither god (deva) nor liberation. Merit (dharma) and the various groups of things found in this world demerit (adharma) also do not exist. Nor is there any fruit of However, others have spoken of heaven, hell, etc., which virtue and vice. can be achieved by virtue and vice. They are also unproved on the same ground that they can never be perceived. If even Commentary unperceived objects really exist, then let horns growing on a The Lokāyatas, the Nāstikas, speak of, set forth, their hare's head, a son born of a barren woman, etc., really exist. views, thus, in the following manner. How? So it is said that Thus, through the tactual sense are known things which there is no omniscient being, etc., and also, there is no liberation are soft, hard, cold, warm, oily and dry, etc, Through the or final release. There are some more things which do not gustatory sense are known the tastes of pungent, astringent, exist. What are they? Merit and demerit (dharmadharmau). We sour and sweet, and things to be licked, to be sucked, to be have a dvandva compound here, dharmaś ca adharmaś ca. That is, drunk and the like. Through the olfactory sense one gets virtue and vice also do not exist The fruits of virtue and vice, acquainted with the ever-flowing sweet scent of such fragrant of merit and demerit, such as heaven, hell, etc., are not there, substances as musk, sandalwood, camphor, aloe wood, etc. do not exist That also follows by implication: if virtue and Through the visual sense are apprehended so many groups of vice themselves are non-existent, wherefrom would come things, immovable and movable, such as the earth, mountain, about their fruits? city, rampart, jar, cloth, pillar, lotus, etc., as well as man, To show how they state (their views) in their own work animal, ferocious beast, etc. Through the auditory sense one (sastra), ridiculing the opponent, the author says: 'Here is their listens to sweet music, proceeding (from the lips of) a widely- view.' The words 'here is' are in the sense of introduction. known wandering singer, playful and swaying, marked by 'Their view' means 'the view of the Nastikas', since such a proper time-beat, measure, and melodious modulation of voice. view has been proposed for discussion. Thus, only things which can be known by these five kinds How is that? The answer is given: of perception would be things really established by pramāna. (Verse 81): This world (loka) consists of only as much as is The other pramana-s, there being no evidence for their existence, are to be rejected like flowers blooming in the sky. within the scope of the senses. What the vastly learned ones speak of (as true) is but similar to (the statement) 'Oh! Dear! There are, indeed, people who accept the reality of even that Look at the footprints of the wolf!' which is not touched, not tasted, not smelt, not seen and not heard; they have their hearts drawn by the lust for pleasures

260 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYATA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 261

like heaven, liberation, etc., and fritter away their own lives in and produce blind faith in pious acts great suffering by performing the severest forms of penances, etc .. All these are really acts of great courage on their part. (Verse 82): Oh! The one who has become all the more

Moreover, if even unperceived things are accepted as existing, beautiful! Drink and eat. Oh! The one with a charming body!

then the world would remain unexplained. A poor man, simply That which is past does not belong to you. Oh! The timid one!

contemplating 'I have heaps of gold', would, with the greatest The past never comes back. This body is only a collectivity ..

ease, overcome all his miseries. A servant too, elevating himself Commentary to the position of the master in his own heart, should be able to get rid of his state of servitude. Nobody should ever get any 'Oh! The one who has become all the more beautiful!' The

pain undesirable to himself. As a result, there would be no expression is evocative for a lady in whom beauty-the presence

persons related as the served and the servant, nor anybody of (charming) face, eyes, etc .- has occurred. Drink-any fixed

who can be said to be rich or poor. Thus there would follow rule regarding what is to be drunk and what is not to be drunk

the undesirable consequence that the normal order of things in being done away with, take liquor, etc. (according to your free

the world would be destroyed. Therefore, it is well-established will). (You should) not only drink, but also eat, without paying

that only objects perceived by the senses are real. any heed as to what is eatable and what is not, take meat, etc.

For those chatter-boxes who accept the validity of inference, (according to your choice). Or, 'drink' means 'drink' the lips etc

verbal testimony etc., and seek to establish pleasure and pain (of the beloved)' (i e. engage in the act of kissing), and 'eat'

in the forms of heaven and hell, etc., to be achieved through means enjoy the objects of pleasure. And all this is the advice

the agencies of virtue and vice, and never cease in their efforts, coming from an impassioned man. That is, crown your youth

an illustration is cited: 'Oh! Blessed one! Look at the footprints with success.

of the wolf!' Thus, for example, a certain person, after draw- But then, due to the acquisition of virtue, it would be easy

ing, with the movement of his own fingers, the shape of a to acquire beauty (of the limbs) even in a different birth

wolf's footprints on the layer of dust made even by a very Apprehending such a rejoinder from the opponent, it is said,

gently blowing breeze, said to his wife, who had become eager 'Oh! The one with a charming body!' 'Oh! The one with

to see the footprints of a wolf, 'Oh! Blessed one! Look at the remarkable limbs!' That which is past, youth, etc., which have

footprints of the wolf!' gone away, would not come to you once again, but you will

What is the implication? Just as her shrewd husband fulfilled only be worn out with old age, and this is the implication.

her desire for seeing the footprint of a wolf-she, being an artless Although the vocative expressions, 'Oh! The one who has

lady, was unaware of the real fact-by deceiving her only with become all the more beautiful!' and 'Oh! The one with a

the marks made by his fingers, so also these people-knaves in charming body!' have the same meanings, there is no fault of

the garb of the pious, and bent upon only cheating others- repetition because of the excessiveness of care and affection

land ordinary people, by somehow convincing them of the But, then, if one indulges in continuous eating and drinking

infallibility of certain inferences and verbal testimonies, into according to one's free will, one would be subject to an into-

the dilemma of what is to be eaten and what is not, who is fit lerable series of pains in the other world. If, however, one

for copulation and who is unfit, what is desirable and what is accumulates merit, it would be quite easy for one to obtain

to be avoided, etc., by enticing them away with the hope of youth, etc, even in a different birth Refuting such a contention

enjoying pleasures to be attained after reaching heaven, etc. of the opponent, it has been said, 'Oh! The timid one! The past

262 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 263

never comes back.' Oh! The timid one! Oh! The one who just them, i e. the Carväkas, these are the basis of consciousness, upon the words of the opponent, has become fearful of the i.e. the causes for the production of consciousness. The implica- suffering to be experienced in hell, etc .! The past, pleasures, tion is that all these four forms of matter collectively produce youth, etc., which you have already enjoyed in this birth, consciousness along with the body (pinda). would not come back, would not appear again, in the other Again, valid knowledge, knowledge which is non-erroneous, world. Thus, disregarding the pleasures of this world, per- is ascertained to be only the one produced by the senses. That forming painful acts such as the practice of penance, etc , with is, perception is the only source of valid knowledge. the desire for enjoying pleasures in the other world, is simply But then, how can the production of consciousness be ascer- useless tained in the body, which is produced by the combination of the But then, what if it be said that because of the presence of a four forms of matter (which are all unconscious)? Apprehending cause-effect relation, pleasure and pain, etc., which have such an objection, it is said- specific causes, are necessarily to be experienced even in the (Verse 84): When there is a collectivity (samhati) of the forms other world, through this body? So it is said: 'This body is of matter, the earth, etc., there is production of the body and only a collectivity.' This body, this physical frame, is only a others. Just as the power of intoxication (is produced) from the collectivity. Collectivity means assembling together a con- ingredients of a spiritous drink, so also is determined (in the junction of the four forms of matter which will presently be body) the presence of the self's essential mark (ātmatā, i.e. stated. (The body is) that much only. The word 'only' (eva) is consciousness). in the sense of specification (avadharana). The body is only the related state of the four forms of matter, and not anything Commentary

dependent upon pleasure and pain, etc., to be experienced Earth, etc., all the forms of matter that are there, namely, through the fruition of pious and non-pious actions performed earth, water, fire and air; when collected together, mutually in the previous birth, etc. The conjunctions are liable to combined, conjoined with one another; there is the production destruction within a short time, like those of a flock of birds of the body and others. By 'others' is (to be understood) various seated upon the rows of tree-tops. In short, the implication of things like the mountain, etc., which are also to be known as the verse is that paying no heed to the other world, drink and produced from the conjunction of the four. eat according to your free will An illustration is given. Just as, i.e. in the same manner, Regarding consciousness, it is said -- from the ingredients of a spiritous drink, i.e. from molasses, (Verse 83): Moreover, earth, water, fire and air are the four dhātakī fruit, etc, which are the components of liquor, is forms of matter. According to them, these four are the basis produced the power of intoxication, i. e the capacity for making (bhümi) of consciousness, and the only valid form of knowledge one drunk; so also, i.e. in a similar way, due to the combination is the one produced by the senses. of the four forms of matter, in the body itself is determined the

Commentary presence of the self's essential mark, i.e. consciousness is produced (in the body itself) 'Moreover' is in the sense of introduction. Prthvi or earth, Such being really the case, the following concluding jala or water, tejas or fire and vāyu or air-these are the four remarks are made by way of giving (proper) advice- forms of matter (and there is no other form). According to (Verse 85): Therefore, the Carväkas have contended that, on

264 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 265 the part of the ordinary people, the activity for the obtainment of the unseen, leaving aside the seen, is only extreme foolishness. is produced, brought about, by these two, in (the heart of) a person, some individual, is admitted, considered, by them, Commentary the Carvakas, as useless, not serving any purpose, simply

The word 'therefore' is added for the purpose of drawing empty. The implication is that in no way can there exist pleasure

attention to what has already been said. Thus, 'therefore' and pain, etc , to be acquired by virtue and vice accumulated in

means 'for the reasons previously discussed.' 'By leaving aside various births. Such pleasure is nothing better than the empty

the seen': the seen means pleasures which can be directly sky. Just as the sky is only emptiness, so also, this form of

enjoyed, depending upon what are fit or unfit for drinking, pleasure is nothing but non-existence itself.

what are fit or unfit to be eaten, and who are fit or unfit to have Concluding the discussion, it is said-

copulation with. (Verse 87): Thus, the doctrine of the Lokayata is also presen- By leaving aside such pleasures (foolish persons engage ted here in brief. The implication of the conclusions (abhidheya) themselves) in respect of the unseen, i.e pleasures to be enjoyed is to be critically discussed by the intelligent. in the other world, which are to be obtained by painful acts like the practice of penance, etc .; activities, exertions, made Commentary

for their obtainment ... as are observed on the part of the Thus, in the above manner, the doctrine of the Lokāyata is ordinary people, are extreme foolishness, a kind of delusion. also presented here in brief. The word 'also' (api) is in the sense This is what the Cārvākas, the Laukāyatikas, have propagated, of addition (samuccaya). That is, not only have the doctrines of i.e. they believe in (the truth of) such (a position). The foolish others been presented here in brief, but also that of the Lokāyatas people, their judgement vitiated by statements made by (has been added). deceitful persons, leave aside the pleasures of the ordinary Well, a treatise (sangraha) on the doctrines held by all the world and uselessly (hanker after) heaven, and pay no heed to systems is found to be a record of so many conflicting views the pleasures of this world, even though they are within easy proposed by each of the systems, and people (studying it) reach, by practising penance, muttering spells, performing would simply become confused as regards what is actually to meditations and offering oblations, because of a thirst for be done. Hence, advice regarding what is to be done is given liberation. by 'the implication' etc. The implication of the conclusions is

(Verse 86): According to their view, the pleasure that is to be critically discussed by those possessed of intelligence, i. e.

produced in (the heart of) a person due to the obtainment of by the learned. The conclusions are what are sought to be

the desired and the avoidance (of the undesired) is useless;'it is conveyed, what are sought to be established as the essential

nothing better than the (empty) sky. expedients for liberation, the accepted viewpoints of the particular system; their implications, their real significances, Commentary are to be examined by the intelligent, i e. persons who possess

The obtainment, the acquisition, of some object which is a clear, impartial, critical faculty, and not by those who are

sought to be obtained, which is desired; and the avoidance the possessed by perverse motives. As it has been said: 'A person

absence, of some object which is not desired; the pleasure that with too much inclination (towards a particular view) would like to find arguments (whatsoever) for whichever view his

266 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA mind is fixed upon. But truly, one's conviction should rest THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 267

only upon that for which there is (valid) argument, from one terized by consciousness. They take spiritous drinks and meat

who is free from impartiality.' and also copulate with those unfit to be sexually approached

Although the different systems have unanimity as regards (agamya) like the mother, etc. Every year, on a particular day, their ultimate aim, they have different kinds of instructions they assemble and copulate randomly with women. They do

to be imparted and hence, there being scope for confusion, not consider dharma to be anything different from kama. Their

people would become perplexed; and since they would touch names are Cārvāka, Lokāyata, etc. (The word cārvaka is

upon all, it would be difficult for them to be the expedients for derived from the root carv listed as) the roots gal and carv mean

heaven and liberation. Therefore the real implications are to be 'to eat'; they are called Carvakas, because they chew up

critically determined. As it has been critically considered by (carvanti), eat up (bhaksayanti), i. e. do not consider as realities a

the older ones (cirantana): 'The doctrine (dharma) of Sugata is to host of entities such as virtue, vice, etc., which are imperceptible. be listened to; but that of the Arhat is to be followed, that of The word is irregularly formed (nipātana) by a rule of the Unādi

the Veda to be practised, and the highest Siva to be meditated section of Siddhahaima (grammar) beginning with mayāka-

upon.' Thus, the implication of the final verse is that, critically śyämāka, etc. The word loka means ordinary people who act

judging all this, the essential truth which is the most beneficial without discretion, and since the Carvakas act like them, they

is to be arrived at by the wise. are also called Lokayatas and Laukayatikas. As they subscribe to the views propounded by Brhaspati, they are also known as Bārhaspatyas Their doctrine itself is stated as follows: Gunaratna's Commentary (Verse 80): The Lokayatas say: There is neither self nor final on Haribhadra bliss (nirvrti) Merit (dharma) and demerit (adharma) also do not exist. Nor is there any fruit of virtue (punya) and vice B. IHE LOKĀYAIA DOCIRINE (pāpa). The explanation is as follows, according to the Lokayatas and First, the characteristics (svarūpa) of the Nästikas are being the Nāstikas stated. The Nästikas are a kind of people, including Brahmins How? It is said, a self which is (supposed to be) conscious and ending with the low-born, who carry human skulls, and capable of travelling to the other world does not exist, smear their bodies with ashes and practise yoga because in this very world, when a living being dies, conscious- They do not admit the self, virtue (punya), vice (papa) and ness too-which is produced from the five forms of 'great the like. They speak of the world as consisting of only four matter' (mahābhūta)-is destroyed, and there is no possibility forms of matter. Some sections of the Carvakas, considering of a travel to the other world. If one reads devah in place of akasa as the fifth form of matter, declare that the world consists jivah, the meaning would be: there is no god who is omniscient, of five forms of matter. etc .. So, also, there is no final bliss, i.e. liberation (moksa). In their view, consciousness is produced from these forms Moreover, the so-called two, merit and demerit, do not exist, of matter, like the power of intoxication. Living beings are and virtue and vice too are absolutely non-existent. Futher, like water-bubbles. The self is nothing but the body as charac- there is absolutely no fruit of virtue and vice, such as heaven, hell, etc. The implication is that if merit and dc.nerit are them-

268 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 269

selves non-existent, wherefrom, indeed, can their fruits be things like merit and demerit which are the causes of living produced? beings' pleasure and pain, heaven and hell which are abodes In order to show how they have tauntingly stated (their for the enjoyment of fruits of the most intense forms of merit view) in their own Sastra, the author says: and demerit, and liberation which results from the destruction Here is their view. of virtue and vice. To whom would all these not be simply (Verse 81) This world (loka) consists only of as much as is ludicrous? within the scope of the sense (indriya-gocara). Oh! Dear! only There are, indeed, people who firmly believe in the existence those who lack sufficient experience (a-bahu-śruta) make such a of the self, etc., although such things can never be touched, (foolish) statement as, 'Look at the footprints of the wolf.' tasted, smelt, seen or heard; their judgement is baffled by their The expression 'here is' is by way of introduction 'Their yearning for pleasures like heaven, liberation, etc .; they fritter view' means the view of the Nästikas, for the discussion has away their human life with sufferings like enduring the extreme started with them. The implication of the expression indriya- heat of the sun, etc .. , while engaged in the practice of penances gocara is as follows The senses are five-tactual, gustatory, of the most difficult kind after shaving off the head and the olfactory, visual and auditory; that which is within their scope face. It is only futile activity on their part due to their being (gocara), i e. can be known by them (is indriya-gocara). Only under the influence of a great delusion. Thus it has been said: such things exist in reality as can be known by the five senses, 'Penances are only various forms of torments, and abstinence and nothing else. By the word 'world' are to be understood the is only depriving oneself of the pleasures of life. The rituals of various things which are found in this world. Agnihotra, etc., appear only to be child's play. Live happily as Thus the self, virtue and vice, their fruits in the form of long as you live-enjoying worldly pleasures. How can the heaven and hell, etc, which are admitted by the opponents do body, burnt to ashes, return once again?' not really exist, for they are imperceptible. If it is admitted that Therefore, it is well established that only that which is within even imperceptible things may exist, then even a horn growing the scope of the senses is really existent. on a hare and a son born of a barren woman should exist. In However, there are some who think that inference has validity fact, nothing can ever be known by these five kinds of percep- in respect of things which are imperceptible, and with its help tion except things which are soft or hard, substances which are they seek to establish the realities of self, virtue, vice, etc., and bitter, pungent or astringent, things which have fragrance or never cease in their efforts in this regard. To convince them (of bad smell, a great number of movable and immovable things the Carvaka view), an illustration is being given: Oh! Dear! like the earth, mountains, regions, trees, columns, lotuses, Look at the footprints of the wolf! etc., and also human beings, animals, wild beasts, etc., and Here is a traditional story. Once there was a man, his mind further, the various kinds of sounds coming from the flute, deeply inculcated with ideas advocated by the Cārvāka doctrine. vīnā, etc. But his own wife had her mind deeply rooted in Āstika doctrine. In spite of the fact that no entity capable of travelling to the Very diligently, every day, he tried to convince her with argu- other world, distinct from consciousness produced by matter, ments set forth in his own system. But as she was not convinced, and conceived to be the real cause of consciousness, is ever (he hit upon a plan) and thought to himself, 'she will be con- apprehended by perception, (the opponents foolishly) claim- vinced by this process.' So thinking, in the later part of the as if drawing a charming picture on the sky -- that there are night, he went out of the city along with her, and said to her:

270 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 271

'Oh! Dear! In this city there live some people who maintain etc. by producing conviction with the help of some sort of that inference has validity in respect of imperceptible things, inference, verbal testimony etc. They may indeed produce and they are held as men of great wisdom by ordinary people. confusion in the minds of many persons foolish enough to be But just mark their dexterity in the matter of critical judgement.' pious by throwing them into dilemmas regarding the eatable Then, starting from the city-gate up to the junction of the four and non-eatable, persons fit or unfit to copulate with, things to roads, on the main thoroughfare where the mass of dust has be desired and things to be avoided, etc., alluring them with been made even by the breeze blowing gently, he made foot- hosts of pleasures to be obtained by the attainment of heaven, prints of the wolf on the mass of dust, on both sides of his own etc. But all their words are despised by the noble. Thus the body, by pressing upon the three fingers joined together of lady finally accepted the validity of all the words of her husband. both his hands. Then in the morning, finding those footprints, To show what her husband advised her to do after that, the a large crowd gathered on the main thoroughfare .. The men of author says: great wisdom who also arrived there said to the people: 'As the (Verse 82): Oh! the one with beautiful eyes! Drink and eat (as footprints of the wolf cannot be explained otherwise (it is to be you like). Oh! the one with a charming body! That which is concluded that) at night, some wolf must have come here past does not belong to you. Oh! the timid one! The past never from the forest.' comes back. This body is nothing but a collectivity. So the man, finding them speaking in such terms, said to The explanation is as follows. Oh! the one with beautiful his wife: 'Oh! Dear! My beloved one! Look at, consider, the eyes! Oh! the one with charming eyes! Drink, there being no case of these footprints of the wolf.' But what is there to be restriction as to what is to be drunk and what is not to be considered? The answer is given: 'That these people who lack drunk; drink spirits, etc. (according to your liking) You should sufficient experience speak of and discuss the footprints of the not only drink, but also eat, without considering what is to be wolf'. According to popular belief they may be men of great eaten and what is not to be eaten; take meat, etc. (according to wisdom, but since they are speaking without ascertaining the your liking). The acts of drinking and eating are mentioned by actual position, they are actually men without sufficient way of illustration. Hence, the following advice also is to be experience. If the reading accepted is 'those who are men of understood therefrom: disregarding restriction as to persons great experience speak like', etc. then the implication is to be fit or unfit to copulate with, enjoy the pleasures (as much as explained as, 'they are men of great wisdom only according to you like) and thereby bring fulfilment to your own youth. Oh! popular belief (and not in reality)' the one with the most excellent limbs! the age of youth, once it Now, these persons who do not know well the actual fact is past, once it has gone away, 'will never be yours again', the regarding the footprints of the wolf, speaking, though many expression is to be supplied elliptically in number, like a single person, may create confusion in the But then, if one drinks, eats and enjoys pleasures according minds of ignorant persons; but still, their words would never to one's own choice, one would surely be afflicted by a host of be acceptable to those who are well-aware of the truth. So also, sufferings in the other world. On the other hand (if one does there are many preachers (vadin) who are really cunning fellows not do so), it would be easy to accumulate virtue; and as a disguised as pious ones and who have the sole aim only of result, in the other world, one would enjoy pleasures, have cheating others. happiness, and be blessed with youth. To refute such an objec- They speak in a similar way about the existence of the self, tion that may be raised by the opponent, it has been said: No,

272 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYATA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 273

etc. Oh! the timid one-one perturbed by the apprehension of If the reading of the text is accepted to be caitanya-bhūmir sufferings to be experienced in hell, etc The past, i.e. moments eteșām, the implication would be as follows. (To the question) of pleasure, youth, etc; which have been spent in this world, 'characterized by what does this group of four become the seat are never offered once again in the other world. of consciousness, the substratum for the origin of conscious- That is, it is useless to abandon the pleasures of this world by- ness?' (it is answered that) the four forms of matter collected performing painful acts like the practice of penance, etc., with together produce the single (property of) consciousness And a desire for obtaining pleasures in the other world. such a view is upheld by the Cārvakas. Well, a living being is under constraint of its actions, good If, again, the reading of the text is accepted to be different, and bad. As a result, it lives at present, inhabiting the present namely, pramāna-bhūmir etesām, the implication would be as body (and experiences pleasure and pain through it, according follows. The four forms of matter are the only things accessible to the nature of its action). Similarly, in the other world as well to pramāna, i e. capable of being established by pramāna; i. e., (after assuming another body), it should experience pleasure, they are the only realities, according to Carvakas. pain, etc., the results of its own actions (through that body) The only form of valid knowledge is sense-perception and Apprehending such an objection, it has been said (that the nothing else; knowledge derived through inference, etc., has body is) only a collectivity. 'Collectivity' means the conjunction no validity. The word 'indeed' (hi) has been used here to indicate of the four forms of matter (and the body is) that much alone a speciality. The speciality, again, is that the Cārvākas admit The word 'alone' (mätra) is in the sense of exclusion (avadhārana) the validity of inferences which tend to facilitate the daily On the basis of ellipsis, it is to be understood that just this activities of ordinary people, such as the inference (of fire) perceptible body, the physical frame, exists; and in the body, from smoke, etc., but they never admit the validity of extra- there exists no self which is distinct from the mere conjunction ordinary inferences which seek to establish heaven, merit and of the four forms of matter, capable of travelling to the other demerit, etc world and the experiencer of fruits of actions good and bad But then, how can the production of consciousness in the This conjunction of the four forms of matter is observed, like body, which is a product of the four forms of matter, be the flash of lightning, to be destroyed in a very short time explained? Apprehending such an objection, it is said: Therefore, without paying any heed to the idea of the other (Verse 84): Due to the combination (samhati) of the forms of world, drink and eat according to your wish. matter such as the earth, etc., as also due to transformation in Next are stated the objects of valid knowledge (prameya; the the shape of a body, consciousness is produced in the body, forms of realities) and the instruments of valid knowledge just as the power of intoxication is produced from the ingredients (pramāņa) Moreover- of a spiritous drink (Verse 83): Matter is of four forms-earth, water, fire and The explanation is as follows. The existing forms of matter, air. Earth is the substratum of all these That (knowledge) namely, earth, water, fire and air; their combination, i.e their alone is valid (hi) which is produced by the senses. assemblage (samavāya), i e. finally, their mutual conjunction The explanation is as follows. 'Moreover' is used in the (samyoga); and with such combination as the cause (they produce sense of addition. Earth, water, fire and air are the four forms consciousness). In the same way, on account of the transforma- of matter. Earth, again, is the substratum of all these forms tion, they change into the shape of a body (consciousness is of matter .. produced in the body), and this is how the sentence is to be

274 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA construed. Just as from the ingredients of a spiritous drink, THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 275

molasses, dhātakī, etc., is produced the power of intoxication, ordinary nature and is produced from an object of enjoyment. the capability of making a man drunk; so also is produced cit, .After leaving aside all this, activity-i.e. effort for obtainment- consciousness, in the atman, the body. Here by the word atman, on the part of ordinary people in respect of the unseen, namely, which has a variety of meanings, is to be understood only the pleasure, etc., to be enjoyed in the other world and to be body and not the self The idea is as follows: There is transfor- achieved by painful acts like the practice of penance, etc., is mation in the shape of a body from the combination of the four nothing but extreme foolishness or crass ignorance. This is the forms of matter, and therefrom exists consciousness in the body. view the Cärvakas have propounded-they are convinced of Alternately, there is a different reading of the verse (according it. The main point of their contention is: people have their critical to which the meaning is): 'When there is a combination of the judgement baffled by the verbosity of knaves. Leaving aside forms of matter such as the earth, etc .. , there comes about the worldly pleasures which are within their easy reach, they strive origin of the body, etc. Just as the power of intoxication is (with a desire for obtaining pleasures like heaven and liberation) produced from the ingredients of a spiritous drink, so also is by practising penance, muttering spells, sitting in meditation, the case with consciousness, (atmata, lit. the specific property offering oblations, etc: The only cause for such acts 'is their of the self).' That is, if there is a combination of the forms of ignorance matter, then the origin of the body, etc, would be possible. Next, to state what the Carvakas say addressing those who, By 'etc ' is meant that the earth, mountains and other similar with their hearts overflowing with the sentiment of quietitude things are also produced from a combination of the forms of (santa-rasa), speak about the incomparable bliss of quietitude matter. Just as from the ingredients of a spiritous drink is (śama-sukha), the author says: produced the power of intoxication, so also, due to the combina- (Verse 86): According to them, the pleasure produced in (the tion of the forms of matter, there is, i.e there is determined to heart of) a person by activity for obtaining the desirable (sādhya) be present in the body, the specific property of the self; namely, and for avoiding (the undesirable) is useless. Indeed (hi), dharma consciousness. As Väcaspati has said: The realities (tattva) are is not superior to kāma. earth, water, fire and air. The names 'body', 'object' and The explanation is as follows. The word sādhya means 'sense' are given to their combinations. Consciousness is meditation (dhyäna), which is of two kinds, desirable and produced from them (i. e. the forms of matter). undesirable. The two desirable ones are the virtuous (dharmya) To describe what they further put forward after thus giving and the pure (sukla). The two undesirable ones are the painful their view (on the forms of realities), it is said: (arta) and the cruel (raudra). (Verse 85): Therefore the Carvakas have contended that all Or, the word sadhya means the two kinds of action performed. activity on the part of ordinary people for the attainment of the Desirable actions are those leading to virtue; namely, practice unseen (adrsta), leaving aside the seen (drsta), is only extreme of penance, abstinence, etc. Undesirable actions are those foolishness leading to vice; namely, striving for objects of enjoyment, The explanation is as follows 'Therefore' means, for the pleasure, etc. Thus, according to Cārvakas' view, the pleasure, very reason that consciousness is produced from the forms of the mental happiness, which arises and is produced in a person, matter. 'Leaving aside the seen': 'seen' means pleasure which in an ordinary man, on account of activity for obtaining and can be perceptually known, that belongs to this world, is of an for avoiding-i.e. engaging oneself in, and disengaging oneself from-respectively the two (the desirable and the undesirable), is

276 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIALS useless and serves no purpose, i.e. is quite fruitless and unreal. 277

Indeed, this is because dharma is not superior to kāma, the Apprehending such an objection, it has been said: 'the tenets', constant enjoyment of pleasures derived from objects of the etc .. The tenets, or the views sought to be conveyed by all the senses. The idea is that kama is the highest form of dharma and systems of philosophy, and their implications, the ultimate

the highest form of bliss is produced by it. truths in their manifold signification-one should oneself

Or, to show what the Carvakas say to those who maintain discuss all these and critically examine them from different

that, in this world as well, due to the influence of dharma, one viewpoints, considering their pros and cons.

succeeds in performing desirable actions and in avoiding Or, since in the list of roots there is a root locrd, in the sense

undesirable ones, it has been said: 'Activity for obtaining the 'to see' (from which the word paryalocya of the text may be desirable and for avoiding (the undesirable) etc.' (It is claimed derived), the idea is that (for truths propounded in the other'

that) there is success, fruitful completion, of the intended, the systems) intelligent people, people with a keen intellect, should action sought to be performed, by means of the practice of look into the particular authoritative works of particular schools;

penance, muttering spells, offering oblations, etc .. Also, by the for the present work in the style of the Sutra is meant for the

same means of practising penance, muttering spells, etc., it is convenience of people who have a liking for brief discussion

possible to remove, to nullify, to make as good as non-existent, Or, on hearing about the mutual conflicts in the tenets

all obstacles to the attainment of the intended. On account of accepted by all the systems of philosophy, people become these two, success in respect of the intended and removal of confused about what is to be done. To advise them as to what

the obstacles (to its achievement) pleasure is produced in the is to be done, it is said: 'the tenets', etc. The tenets are the

heart of a person. But (the Carvakas point out) such pleasure is conclusions sought to be established by all the systems of

useless. Since the word artha is also applicable in the sense of philosophy. Their implications, the ultimate purports, estab- 'cause', the meaning may be that (such pleasure) is really with- lished by discerning the true and the untrue, are to be critically out any cause, without any proper ground; indeed, because in discussed, to be reviewed carefully; not to be accepted simply their view, dharma is not superior to kama, and the implication as they are stated, without any critical consideration. By whom?

here is as before. By the intelligent-by people who have a fine, discriminating

Concluding the discussion, it is said: intellect, free from partiality, following the right path; by them

(Verse 87): Thus, the doctrine of the Lokāyata is also hereby alone and not by those guided by perverse motives.

presented in brief. The tenets, and their implications, are to be Thus it has been said: 'A person who is too enthusiastic (about

critically examined by the intelligent some particular view) would like to find arguments in favour

The explanation is as follows. 'Thus', i e. in the above of that view alone upon which his mind is fixed. But truly,

manner. Since the word 'also' is in the sense of addition, (the one's conviction should rest only in that in favour of which

meaning is that), here, not only have the doctrines of other there is argument from one free of partiality.'

schools been stated in brief, but also the doctrine of the The idea here is as follows. On hearing about the mutual

Lokāyata, as just discussed. conflicts in the views of ail systems of philosophy, confused

Well, if here the doctrines of all-the Buddhists and others- people become interested either in all the systems of philosophy,

are only stated in brief, how would one ascertain, in detail, the or completely partial to their own system of philosophy alone.

ultimate truths in them? Thus it becomes difficult for them to progress to heaven and liberation. Therefore, by assuming the role of an impartial

278 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIALS judge (madhyastha), one should discern the actual position by 279

discriminating between what is true and what is untrue. After manifold assumptions (kalpana-gaurava) and also an absence of such critical deliberation the beneficial path is to be adopted, the fixed order of things and efforts are to be made in that direction by those who have It also cannot be said that an awareness involving the 'T' cannot

a keen intellect. logically pertain to the body, which is non-sentient, like the jar, etc., because it becomes sentient when consciousness is C. GUŅARAINA ON BHŪIA-CAIIANYA-VĀDA produced in it. Nor can it be said that the cause of such consciousness is the The Carvakas discuss (the nature of the self) in the following self, for, as such a thing is never perceived, it would be illogical

manner to claim that it is the cause of consciousness, there arising such The forms of matter which become the causes for conscious- a possibility even in the case of a flower blooming in the sky, ness are only found when they are transformed in the shape of etc. Therefore, it being well-established, the body itself would a body. But there is nothing called the self which is distinct logically be the cause of consciousness. from them, transmigrates to another birth, and possesses the (The body is the cause of consciousness) also because con- characteristics said to belong to it (by you), because there is no sciousness has agreements in presence and in absence with the

proof of its existence. body. The inferential formulation here would be: when one Thus (it may be asked), what kind of proof is truly possible thing has agreements in presence and in absence with another for the existence of a self distinct from the forms of matter -- thing, the former becomes the effect of the latter, e.g. the jar

perception, or inference? (is the effect of) a lump of clay. Consciousness also has agree- It cannot be perception, because perception can have for its ments in presence and in absence with the body; hence, the body object only colour, etc., as connected to their own specific is the cause of consciousness. Everywhere, the cause-effect senses, and as such, it cannot pertain to the self which is quite relation is determined by agreements in presence and in absence.

different in nature from them The two are possible in the present case, too-when the body However, it cannot be said that a self distinct from the forms is there, consciousness is found to be there; and when the body of matter is revealed as the agent (kartr) of the act of knowing is not there, consciousness is not found to be there. (when one acquires) an awareness involving the 'I', namely, 'I Further, it cannot be said that the fact of such agreements in know a jar', for it can easily be justified as having the body presence and in absence is not proved, as consciousness is not itself for its object, as in the cases of awareness like 'I am fat', 'I found to be there in a corpse, for in the state of death, there is am thin', etc. Such forms of awareness can, in no way, have the absence of the body itself due to the absence of air and fire; the self as the underlying object, because properties like fatness, and by 'body' is meant nothing but a specific kind of conjunction etc .. , cannot belong to the self. So also, in the awareness 'I of the forms of matter. Indeed, it is not logical that consciousness know a jar', no self other than the body-as assumed by you would be produced even when the mere shape of the body (the opponent)-is ever revealed as the underlying object, (and not a real body) is present, for in that case there arises the even in a dream. If one assumes the existence even of what is possibility of consciousness being produced even in a horse never revealed by knowledge, there would be unnecessarily painted in a picture It is thus established that consciousness is an effect of the

280 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 281

body. As the production of an awareness involving the 'I' is However. in a similar manner, no concomitance of the self, logically possible in respect of the body itself as characterised the probandum, can be established by perception, with any by consciousness, it cannot be said that the self is a thing known probans; so that a person recollecting the concomitance between by perception (viz. the said form of awareness). As such, it the two, as well as perceiving the probans once again, may must be non-existent. The inferential formulation here would have an inferential knowledge of the self If, again, the con- be: the self is non-existent, because it is absolutely unperceived; comitance between the self and the probans is established by that which is absolutely unperceived is non-existent, e.g. a perception, then a perception of the self too would have to be flower blooming in the sky; that which is existent is perceived admitted, and as such an inference would be useless, as the exist- (at least somewhere), e.g. a jar. Atoms are, no doubt, imper- ence of the self would be established by that very perception ceptible, but they acquire perceptibility when they are trans- It also cannot be said that the self is established by an inference formed into effects, such as the jar, etc. But likewise, the self based on general observation (sāmānyato-drsta), like the move- never acquires perceptibility. That is why the qualifying term ment of the sun-the sun has movement because it is found to 'absolutely' has been added there and as such, there is no occupy different places, like Devadatta. For indeed, in the case irregularity (vyabhicāra) by the instance of atoms. of Devadatta, the one cited as the corroborative instance, the Similarly, neither is inference capable of proving the existence fact that the occupation of different places is, in general, the of the self as distinct from the forms of matter, because it is not result of movement is ascertained by perception itself; and a source of valid knowledge. Or even if it be a source of valid hence, it is quite logical that a person infers movement in the knowledge, the probans would suffer from the fallacy of the same manner in respect of the sun as well. But in the case of the mistimed (kālātyayāpadista), being advanced after putting for- self, no instance is found in which may be perceived a probans ward an inferential subject (paksa) which is contradicted by having invariable concomitance with the presence of the self. perception. An inferential subject in the form of the self as Hence, the self cannot be established even by an inference based distinct from the body is indeed contradicted by perception. on general observation. Moreover, inference is to be preceded by a recollection of Nor can the self be ascertained by verbal testimony (āgama). the concomitance between the probans and the probandum. The validity of verbal testimony is due to its being conveyed Thus, a person earlier ascertains, by perception, the invariable by a trustworthy person (apta) whose words are never falsified concomitance, based on agreements in presence and in absence (avisamvādi). However, nowhere can we find any such trust- between the probans and the probandum; such as, smoke and worthy person, whose words are never falsified-a person fire in the kitchen, etc., and afterwards, seeing a column of who has even known the self by perception. If we do not actually smoke reaching up to the sky somewhere else, in a forest or in find (any such person), why should we deceive ourselves? the valley of a mountain, etc., recollects the concomitance Moreover, all verbal testimonies are found to be contradicted ascertained earlier. Then (he goes on to infer fire), 'I have by one another. Therefore, the validity of verbal testimony is found that wherever there is smoke there is fire, as in the licked by the flames of the forest-fire of doubt; namely, 'which instances of the kitchen, etc. Smoke is seen here. Therefore, one is valid and which one is invalid?' Thus the self cannot be fire must also be present here'. In this way, on the basis of established by the source of valid knowledge known as verbal the perception of the probans and the recollection of the testimony concomitance, a person ascertains the presence of fire in a place. Similarly, the self cannot be proved by the source of valid

282 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 283 knowledge known as comparison (upamana). In the case of comparison, similarity produces a cognition in respect of an Nor can it have the body as the underlying object, because it

object not connected with the sense, as in, 'the gavaya is like is produced exclusively by the function of the internal senses,

the cow', etc. But not even in the three worlds is there any independent of the external senses. The body cannot be the

object similar to the self by comparison with which we can object revealed by such an awareness involving the 'I', because

ascertain the existence of the self. If it be objected that there it is an object for the external sense Hence, some entity distinct

are, in fact, things similar to the self, such as kāla, ākāśa, diś, from the body, which is the underlying object of such an

etc., it would be futile, for their existence is also equally under awareness and a substratum of knowledge, has to be admitted,

dispute and they, also, are tied up at the roots (i.e. belong to for logically, such an entity alone can be considered a knower.

the same category of the non-existent). And since such an entity is nothing but the self, it is etablished

So also, the self cannot be proved by presumption (arthapatti) that the self is known by perception in the form of self-cognition.

either. There is not a single thing, seen or heard, the existence Further, as to the statement that an awareness involving the

of which is not explicable without the assumption of the self, 'I' can logically pertain to the body itself, as it can become

so that on its strength we may establish the self. sentient when consciousness is produced in it, etc. (we say)

Therefore, as it is found that (the self is) beyond the scope of this is just useless talk For even after the production of con-

any source of valid knowledge which can prove a thing to be sciousness, an awareness involving the 'I' can logically pertain

actually existent, it is only logical to conclude that the self is an only to what is itself sentient, and not to what is itself non-

object of the source of valid knowledge called non-apprehension sentient. Thus, for example, it is observed that even with the

(abhäva), which alone can establish the non-existence of a assistance of light from more than a thousand lamps, a jar is

thing never capable of revealing things, but only a lamp is. Similarly,

The above is now being refuted. even with the production of consciousness, the body, which is

As to the statement 'there are only found forms of matter itself non-sentient, cannot be the knower; and logically, the

transformed into the shape of a body, and not any self distinct self alone can be considered the knower, and hence an awareness

from them, because there is no proof for its existence', etc., involving the 'I' can be produced in respect of the self and

(we say) it is a statement made without critical consideration; nothing else

for there is proof for its existence, which is perception itself. As to the forms of awareness 'I am fat', 'I am thin', etc.,

Thus in the case of every living being, there is observed to be which are actually observed to be produced, the fact is that

produced an awareness in the form 'I experience pleasure', they are produced in respect of the body simply because it is

which is self-cognized and refers to the thing known, the the most useful implement for the self; and such forms of aware-

knower and the knowledge itself, clearly distinguishing each ness are only secondary, like one's awareness in respect of

from the others. Such awareness is not false, for there is no one's most useful servant: 'this is none but myself' ..

contradiction. Nor is it a form of doubt, as it does not involve Further, as to the statement you have made, posing like a

two alternatives. Nor is it logical that such an awareness should great debater that the body itself is the cause of consciousness

be without an underlying object, for then there would arise the (we say), this is only the raving of a lunatic. For consciousness

absurdity of the awareness of colour, etc., also being without does not have agreements in presence and in absence with the

any underlying object. body. In the case of a person drunk, one who has fainted, and one who is under deep sleep, in spite of the presence of an

284 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 285

intact body, no such consciousness is found to exist. It is also (Answer by the Jainas:) The above is not acceptable, for the

observed that even some men with an emaciated body may probans would be irregular so far as the rule that only when it

have superior consciousness, whereas some men with a plump (i e. transformation = the body) is there, does consciousness

body may have inferior consciousness. Thus it follows that exist is concerned; because in the state of death, although it

consciousness has no agreements in presence and in absence (= the body) is there, there is no consciousness.

with the body and hence, it is not an effect of the body. (Carvāka objection:) Well, the fact is that consciousness is

Moreover, we do not find any proof for the alleged fact that produced by the collectivity (samudāya) of the four-earth,

consciousness is the effect of matter. To explain, it cannot be water, fire and air. In a dead body there is no air, and due to its

perception, because it cannot act in respect of imperceptible absence, consciousness is not present there. There is thus no

things. That consciousness, produced or not produced, is an irregularity in our argument by the instance of a dead body

effect of the forms of matter can never come under the scope of (Jaina answer:) We answer as follows If the body is something

perception; for perception, by nature, receives only such things porous (susira), there is every possibility that air is present

as are fit to be received by it and are connected (with the sense). there. Moreover, if it were a fact that there is no consciousness

(But all this is not possible in the case of consciousness), because due to the absence of air, then consciousness would have been

not being corporeal (mürta), it is not fit to be received by it. found there after air has been supplied through the pelvis, etc.

It would also not be possible to know by perception-'Iam But consciousness is not found to be there even when air has

an effect of the forms of matter'-that the characteristic of been supplied there in the said manner

being an effect of matter pertains to the self; because the cause- If it be said that in a dead body, there is no consciousness

effect relation is known only through agreements in presence because of the absence of air in the specific forms of prāna (air

and in absence. You (the Cärväkas) do not admit to the existence inhaled) and apna (air exhaled), it would not be justified,

of any entity distinct from both matter and consciousness because air in the specific forms of prāna and apāna is not a

which would be the knower of agreements in presence and in cause of consciousness since it does not have agreements in

absence between the two; for then one would be forced to presence and in absence. Thus in the states of death, etc., it is

admit the self possible that there are long inhalations and exhalations in

Nor can it be proved by inference that consciousness is the profusion, and yet there is an extreme loss of consciousness.

effect of matter, for its (validity) is not admitted (by the Again, in the case of a Yogin who has his eyes closed in medita-

Cārvakas). As you have said: perception alone is a source of tion, has controlled all activities through mind, speech and

valid knowledge, and nothing else Besides, even if (the validity body, resembles a great ocean unruffled by waves, and has

of inference) is admitted, it would not be possible to establish also stopped the flow of prāna and apāna, there is observed an

the intended conclusion by it. excess of consciousness reaching the highest point of excellence.

(Objection by the Carvakas): Consciousness is produced If it be claimed that in the state of death, there is no conscious-

from the forms of matter as transformed into the shape of a ness due to the absence of fire; then (we ask), how is it that

body, because only when the body is there, does consciousness consciousness is not found even when fire is added to it?

exist. From inferences such as" 'like the power of intoxication Moreover, if in the state of death, the absence of conscious-

from the ingredients of a spiritous drink', etc., it is quite ably ness is admitted to be due to the absence of air and fire, then

proved that consciousness is an effect of matter. how is to be explained the presence of consciousness in worms,

286 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA 287 etc., born in a dead body after some interval? Therefore, all THE SOURCE MATERIALS

these are only empty words. The second alternative-namely, it is due to some different

Further, consciousness cannot have as the cause only the entity-would also be improper, because if such a position is

forms of matter. In that case, consciousness being of the nature accepted, it would be possible to establish the self ..

of an effect produced only by the forms of matter, and they If it is without any cause, however, there would result an

also being of the nature of causes productive of consciousness, absurdity-it would always be present, for it has been said: 'a

there would be production of clear consciousness always and thing without any cause must either be eternally existent or

everywhere, even in a jar, etc., as it is in the case of the human eternally non-existent, since it does not depend on anything

being. Thus, there would remain no distinction between a jar else.

and a human being. (Everything would be alive.) Therefore in your view, the transformation into the shape

Well, there is no scope for the absurdities pointed out above; of a body cannot be justified. In the absence of such a transfor-

because what we mean to say is that consciousness is found to mation, the chance of the forms of matter taking up inhalation

be produced from forms of matter only when they have been and exhalation becomes extremely remote. Consciousness

transformed into the shape of a body and have taken up inhala- cannot be an effect of matter, and therefore it has to be admitted

tion and exhalation. that consciousness is the quality of nothing but the self.

No, such a claim would not be proper, for according to your Moreover, since the quality is perceptible, the quality-

view, the very transformation into the shape of a body cannot possessor (gunin) as well, namely the self, must be perceptible.

logically be justified. In this regard, there can be three alterna- The inferential formulation is: the self is perceptible, because

tives: (i) the transformation into the shape of a body is only due its qualities-specific forms of cognition like recollection, desire

to the forms of matter like the earth, etc. (ii) it is due to some to know, desire for action, desire for movement, doubt, etc .-

different entity and (iii) it is without any cause are perceived by self-cognition. It is observed that a thing, the

Of these, the first alternative cannot be admitted, because qualities of which are perceptible, is also itself perceptible, e.g.

the presence of the earth, etc, being possible everywhere, a jar. The self is a thing the qualities of which are perceptible,

there arises the possibility that transformation into the shape and hence it is perceptible.

of a body may also be present everywhere. If it be said that the As against the above, the opponent may say that the probans

possibility of consciousness being everywhere does not arise (in the above inference) is irregular, for the quality of akāśa,

because of the non-availability of the cooperating cause (in sound (sabda), is perceived, but ākāśa is never so. However,

some cases), namely, the presence of a requisite proportion we say that this is illogical, because sound is not a quality of

(sāmya) etc., such a claim would not be proper, because the ākāśa. Sound is, in fact, a quality of matter as it is perceived by

requisite proportion, etc., also cannot be due to some different an external sense, like colour, etc.

entity, as in that case there arises the absurdity of admitting an In this context, the following has also been urged: Well, let

additional reality; it must be due only to the presence of the the quality-possessor also be perceptible, because of its identity

earth, etc., and their presence being equally possible every- with the quality, when the qualities are perceptible. But qualities

where, how can the cooperating cause not be available (in like knowledge, etc , are found only in the body. Therefore it

some cases)? is only proper that the body should be the quality-possessor for them, as in the case of colour, etc., the jar is so. The inferential

288 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MAIERIAIS formulation is as follows: knowledge, etc., are qualities of the 289

body only, because they are found only in the body, like fair and a fixed shape of its own, like a jar. That which is without a complexion, leanness, fatness, etc. maker does not have an origin and a fixed shape of its own, Our reply is as follows. It is a mis-statement of thesis (paksā- e g. the ever-changing cloud. That which is the maker of its bhäsa), the one contradicted by a counter-inference. The own body is the self The Meru mountains, etc., also have

counter-inference here is: knowledge, etc., cannot be the fixed shapes of their own, but they do not have any maker. qualities of the body either because it is corporeal (mürta), or Thus the ground would have become irregular by their instances because it is visible, like a jar. Therefore it is established that and hence, to eliminate their cases, it is to be noted, the qualify- the quality-possessor, the self, is also perceptible, because of ing expression 'having an origin' has been added.

the perceptibility of the qualities So also the senses must have a (conscious) agent governing Moreover, for one who seeks to deny the perceptible self, them, because they are instrumental causes, as, for example, known through an awareness involving the 'I', it would be a the stick, wheel, etc , have the potter ..

mis-statement of thesis, the one contradicted by perception, Again, the body must have an enjoyer (bhoktr), because it is

as in the case of 'sound is inaudible', etc. an object of enjoyment (bhogya), like a meal. That which is the

It would also be a mis-statement of thesis, the one contra- enjoyer is the self

dicted by inference, as in the case of 'sound is eternal', etc., But, then, all these grounds (cited for the existence of the

for, as it will be shown, there exist inferences proving the self) are contradictory (viruddha) ones, for they establish the opposite of what is intended to be proved. Thus it is observed existence of the self Also, for one negating the self which is well-known to people that the makers of the jar, etc .- the potter and others-all have definite shapes, and are subject to death (lit. non-eternal) by in general, starting from the boy, cowherd, woman, etc., there would also be a contradiction with accepted general nature. Therefore (by the grounds mentioned), a self of such

practice (loka-virodha) as in the case of (one saying) 'there is no nature alone may be established. But the self is intended to be

sun, the illuminator of things', etc proved as having quite an opposite nature. Thus all these

Moreover, for one claiming 'I am not "I" (i.e I negate the grounds, since they establish the opposite of what is intended

self),' there also is self-contradiction in terms. to be proved, are only contradictory.

Therefore finally, it follows that the ground (advanced by No, such an objection would not be proper. For the self, the Carvakas) 'because of being absolutely imperceptible' is while in worldly existence (samsära), being encircled by eight unproved, as by the arguments explained above, the self is kinds of karma-matter (karma-pudgala) (fine particles of matter that bind the self to worldly existence), has a (material) body proved to be perceived by self-cognition The self is also ascertained by inferences, which are as follows: and as such, it is somewhat characterized by a definite shape. The living body is governed by one possessing (conscious) Therefore, there is no objection.

effort, because it is a locus of wilful action, like a chariot. So also, the knowledge of colour, etc., must reside some-

The auditory sense, etc, which are the instruments for where, because it is a quality, like colour, etc. So also, know-

acquiring cognitions, must be led to action by a (conscious) ledge, pleasure, etc., must have some material cause, because

agent, because they are instruments, like the axe, etc. they are effects, like the jar, etc It cannot be said that it would The body must have a maker (vidhatr), because it has an origin be a case of proving the proved, as the body itselfis intended to be their substratum and the material cause, for the claim that

290 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MATERIALS 29 the body is their substratum and the material cause has already is a form of negation. For example, the statement 'there is no been refuted. jar here' necessarily indicates the presence of the jar elsewhere. So also, the term a-jiva (not-self) must have an opposite, The inferential formulation would be: when a thing is negated because it is the negation of a chaste (śuddha) word having a somewhere, it must exist elsewhere, e.g. the jar, etc. The self, grammatical derivation (vyutpatti). When there is observed too, is negated by you as you say 'there is no self. Therefore, the negation of a chaste word having grammatical derivation, it must exist. That which is absolutely non-existent is never there exists an opposite, e g. the term a-ghata (not-jar) has, for found to be negated, e.g. a sixth form of matter over and its opposite, ghata (jar). In the term a-ghata, there is a negation above the five ones. of a chaste word having grammatical derivation, and there- But then, even the negation of such things that are absolutely fore, an opposite in the form of ghata must be there. Where non-existent-horns growing on the head of an ass, etc .- is there is no opposite, there is no negation of a chaste word having observed and as such, the above ground becomes irregular. grammatical derivation, as in the case of the terms a-kharavisāņa No, it would not be so. Whenever a thing is negated some- and a-dittha In the term a-kharavisāna, there is the negation of where, what is actually negated in the intended place is either an unchaste compounded term, namely, khara-vișāna (horn of the four-conjunction (samyoga), inherence (samavāya), growing on an ass). There is no opposite here, because although commonness (sāmānya) and a specific characteristic (viseșa) --- there is grammatical derivation, there is no chaste word. In the in respect of the thing existing in some other place only. It is term a-dittha, there is no grammatical derivation although not that its absolute non-existence is indicated. For example, in there is a chaste word, and hence there is really no entity in the the statements 'Devadatta is not in the house', etc., only the form of dittha as the opposite, as (in the case of a-jīva) there is conjunction between the house and Devadatta, etc., which all jīva. exist, is negated; their existence is not absolutely denied. After establishing in one's own body the presence of the self Again, in the statements 'there is no horn growing on the head as perceived by self-cognition, (the presence of the self) in of an ass', etc., only the inherence between the ass and horns, another person's body can also be established by inference etc., which all are existing things, is denied. Similarly, in the based on general observation. Thus (the inferential formulation statements 'there is no moon', etc., only the commonness of would be), the self is present in another person's body as well, the existing moon with any other moon is denied, as the reality because action for acquiring (pravrtti) and action for avoiding of any other moon is not proved, and it is not that the absolute (nivrtti) in respect of things desirable and undesirable res- non-existence of the moon is indicated. Also, in the statements pectively are observed. In another person's body are also 'there are no pearls of the size of a jar', etc., only a specific observed actions for acquiring the desirable and for avoiding property, namely, the size of a jar, is denied in respect of the the undesirable. Therefore it must have a self, for in the absence pearls, and their non-existence is not indicated. In the same of the self, there is also the absence of these two forms of action, way, when it is said that there is no self, what can be denied is as in a jar. It is to be noted that this also refutes the statement, only the conjunction of the self somewhere with something- 'the self cannot be established even by inference based on general of a self which is existent; for example, 'there is no self in this observation', etc. body', etc But it is not possible to absolutely deny the self's Moreover, the clamour for negating the self-'there is no existence. self-necessarily indicates the existence of the self; because it In the present context, someone says: If it is a fact that what-

292 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 293 ever is negated is existent, then let me also have mastery over the three worlds; since it is being negated by people like your- five, also, is not present in respect of the modes of negation,

selves So also, there should be a fifth category of negation but it is there in the case of the most excellent heavenly body

over and above the four categories of negation (mentioned by (anuttara-vimāna) etc. Only with the intention of conveying

you-above), the conjunction, etc, because it is negated by such implications do we say that what is negated is existent in general. It is not that we claim that what is negated in relation none but yourselves This is illogical, for only a specific property, mastery over to a particular thing is present in relation to that very thing, so

the three worlds, is negated with respect to you, like the pearl that there may be irregularity .. Thus, in the case of the self as

having the size of a jar; and not your mastery in all respects, as well, there may be a negation of the existent self only some- where, but not everywhere .. you also have mastery over your own disciple, etc. Similarly, So also, there must be a self distinct from the body; because in the case of negation as well, its being characterized by the number five, which is not possible, is denied, and negation is even after the sense has ceased to function, there may be the

not absolutely denied, for negation as characterized by the recollection of an object apprehended by it, as in the case of Devadatta who recollects an object apprehended through five number four is possible .. But then, all this is merely incoherent talk. My mastery over windows. Thus it is established that the self can be known by inference .. the three worlds which is being negated is really non-existent. In the case of negation too, its being characterized by the If it is established that the self can be known by inference, then it is also established that the self can be known by verbal number five, which is being denied, is really non-existent. So testimony (agama), comparison (upamāna) and presumption also, the denials of conjunction, inherence, commonness and a (arthapatti), since these are included in inference specific property in respect of the house and Devadatta, the ass Moreover, the statement you have made earlier that (there is and horn, etc., are really the negations of the non-existent. Therefore, why should your generalization that whatever is no self) because of the impossibility of the five sources of valid knowledge in respect to it, is only similar to the ravings of one negated must be existent not fall through? Our reply is as follows. The conjunction of Devadatta and intoxicated by spiritous drinks. For although the five sources

the house, etc., which is denied, may be non-existent; but it of valid knowledge are not possible in respect to the magnitude

exists in relation to other things. It is only with the house that of the Himalaya, the lotus, etc., and (also in respect of the

Devadatta has no conjunction, but he has conjunction with existence of) the demon, etc., they do exist Therefore, the

other things like the garden, etc. Similarly, the house, also, has rule that if the five sources of valid knowledge be impossible in

no conjunction with Devadatta; but it has conjunction with respect to a thing then that thing is non-existent, becomes

the cot, etc. Similarly, the horn has no inherence with the ass, irregular.

but it has inherence with the cow, etc. Also, commonness is Thus it is established that the self is known by sources of

not present in the moon, since there is no second moon; but it valid knowledge, like perception, etc.

is there in the jar, etc. Again, the size of a jar is not present in D. GUŅARAINA ON KĀLAVĀDA EIC. the pearls, but it is present elsewhere. Mastery over the three worlds is not present only in relation to you, but also in relation One of the alternatives is: the self exists by itself (svatah), is to the Tirthakaras, etc. Being characterized by the number eternal, and is dependent upon time (kālataḥ).

294 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MATERIAIS 295

The implication of this alternative is as follows. According beings; when the world sleeps, time remains awake; time is, to the contention of the Kalavädins, there indeed exists the self indeed, insurmountable. by its own nature; it is also eternal and dependent upon time. Here (in the view quoted above), 'from the presence only of By Kālavādins are to be understood those who think that the those causes which are admitted by the opponent' means 'just whole of this world is produced by time. They argue in the fol- from the presence of causes like the union of a man and a lowing manner. Without (the action of) time, flowers would woman, etc., which are accepted by the opponent' (as causes never come forth and fruits also would never appear on the of conception). trees Campaka, Aśoka and Sahakāra, etc .; (there can neither So also, time cooks the forms of matter, the earth, etc., i. e .. be) the onset of the winter permeated by particles of frost or it brings them to maturity, brings about transformation in the movement of stars, conception (by women) and the onset them of the rainy season, etc .. , brought forth by the different seasons So also, time destroys living beings, i e. dissociates living (and divisions of time). Also, it would not have been possible beings, the inhabitants of the world, from their previous to experience the particular stages of life, such as childhood, modes of existence; and time associates them with different boyhood, youth, old age when wrinkles and grey hair appear, modes of existence. and so on. For all these are observed to be invariably dependent So also, when the world sleeps, time remains awake. The upon a fixed division of time; otherwise, everything would idea is that only time protects the sleeping world from dangers. have happened without any fixed order .. But this is not actually Therefore clearly, it is impossible to surmount time, to over- observed; nor is it desirable. Moreover, in ordinary life as come its influence. well, even the cooking of mudga is not found to be possible In the said manner, the second alternative, too, is to be without (the action of) time, but only in course of time. Other- stated, which would be as follows: the self exists, is by itself, is wise it would have been accomplished even at the very first eternal and is due to God (īśvara). The Iśvaravādins think that moment when the necessary conditions-the cooking pot, the whole world is created by God. God is the one in possession fuel, etc .- have all been assembled together. But it is not actually of the group of four, omniscience, freedom from all desires so. Therefore, whatever is produced is produced by time. (vairāgya), virtue (dharma) and the highest accomplishments As it has been said: 'Without (the action of) time, there can (aiśvarya), all innate to him; he is the one who moves living be no conception by women, no boyhood and no youth. For beings to heaven and liberation. As it has been said: 'The lord whatever is produced in this world, time is surely the cause. of the world has the four, all innate to him, unobstructed Moreover, without (the action of) time even the cooking of (apratigha) knowledge, freedom from all desires, the highest mudga (a kind of beans) is not found to be possible. Even when accomplishments and virtue. A living being is ignorant, the cooking pot, etc .. , have been brought in, it is accomplished incapable of mastery over its own pleasure and pain. It goes only in course of time. Without (the action of) time, all concep- either to heaven or to hell, as governed by God.' tion, etc., would have happened without any fixed order, for it The third alternative is the one advanced by the Ātmavādins. would have come about from the presence only of those causes The Atmavädins are those who conclude that all this is self which are admitted by the opponent.' (purusaj, etc .. '(Also), time cooks the forms of matter; time destroys living The fourth alternative is the one held by the Niyativādins.

296 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIAIS 297 They contend in the following manner. There is a distinct thing effort?' 'Of the many thorns of a jujube tree, one is sharp, called the fixed order of things (niyati), due to the influence of which all things get produced exactly with a specific nature, another is straight, yet another is crooked. But its fruit is round. Say, who has made all this.' and not otherwise. Thus, when one thing is produced from Moreover, let alone the talk of other forms of effects, even another thing, it is observed that the latter is produced exactly. the cooking of mudga would not be possible without svabhāva. and with a specific nature, only from the former. Otherwise For example, even when all the necessary things, the cooking there would be no fixed cause-effect relation, and also no fixed pot, fuel, time, etc., have been assembled, the cooking of rule as to the specific nature of each thing; for there would be Kankatuka mudga is not observed to take place. Therefore (on no regulating factor (niyāmaka). Thus, is there any person the principle that) when the one is present in the presence of adept in the application of pramana-s, capable of negating such the other, the one follows the agreements in presence and in a fixed order of things which is clearly evident from the specific absence of the other, and the one is produced by the other, nature of each effect? (Denying it) let no one land in the absurdity even the cooking of mudga is to be accepted to be'due to of coming into conflict with the application of pramāna in svabhäva. Therefore it is to be concluded that all these things other cases as well. (That is, if one does not accept such a well- are due to svabhāva. proved position, one would have to deny other well-proved According to the view of the Yadrcchavadins, the word conclusions too). yadrccha means the obtainment of objects without any prior Thus it has been said: 'All effects are produced exactly, with deliberation (abhisandhi) (i.e. accidentally). But, then, who a specific nature of their own, and from this (it is to be con- are these Yadrcchavadins? The answer is as follows. The cluded that) they are so produced by the fixed order of things, Yadrcchävadins are those who, in this world, do not admit to for permeated through them is its essence. When one thing is any fixed cause-effect relation in respect to objects, but (maintain produced from another thing, then the latter is (observed to such a relation to be due to) yadrccha (accident) be) produced invariably from the former, because of a fixed They contend in the following manner .. There is no fixed order (nyaya); and who is capable of preventing it?' cause-effect relation among things, because it is not ascer- The fifth alternative is the one held by the Svabhāvavādins. tained to be there by any pramana. Thus for example, a frog may The Svabhāvavādins argue as follows. Here, it is the 'essential be born of a frog, and again, it may also be born of cowdung. nature' (svabhāva) of a thing that it undergoes transformation by itself (svatah). All entities are born due to the influence of Fire may be produced from fire and again, it may be produced from kindling wood (arani). Smoke may be produced from svabhava. Thus for example, from clay, a jar is produced and smoke and again, it may also be produced from putting fuel not cloth, and from yarn, a cloth is produced and not the jar, into the fire. The plantain tree may grow from the bulb and etc But this production according to a fixed rule cannot be also from the seed. The banyan tree, etc., may be produced explained to take place without it being characterized by such from the seed and also from the part of a branch. Wheat-plants specific svabhava. Therefore, it is to be concluded that all this is due to svabhava. Thus it has been said: 'Who produces sharp- may be produced from seeds of wheat and also from seeds of cane (vamsa). Therefore there is nowhere any fixed cause-effect ness in thorns? (Who creates) different dispositions in animals relation. It is to be concluded that wherever any thing is pro- and birds? All this has proceeded from svabhāva. There is no duced, it is only due to yadrccha. People with critical judge- scope for action according to one's will. What is the use of ment do not tire themselves in vain by imaginging otherwise,

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when they actually find the order of things to be different. As consciousness were a transformation of matter it would have it has been said: 'All these varied multitudes of pleasure and been possible to perceive it by external senses, like a mirror. suffering experienced by people come about only accidentally, There is no such absurdity, because consciousness is the just as the striking of the tāla fruit by the crow is not an action transformation of a special kind of subtle (sūksma) matter. preceded by intention (i.e., is accidental). Pride is, therefore, This is also unjustified. How would this special kind of subtle futile.' Indeed, all these, birth, old age and death, are only matter be the cause of the production of consciousness-being similar to the case of the crow and the tala fruit. in nature identical (sajātīya) to, or different (vijātīya) from, consciousness? In the first alternative, there would be the fallacy of proving the proved (siddha-sadhyata) (in the Jaina view). For the Prabhacandra's opponents (i e. the Jainas) quite admit that there is a special

Prameya-kamala-mārtanda kind of subtle being, also known by the name ātman (self),

and Nyāya-kumuda-candra which is the material cause for the production of consciousness; it is by nature differentiated from (vyavrtta) unconscious sub- stances; it is without the qualities of colour and such like; it is Among the galaxy of the later logicians subscribing to the Jaina creed, Prabhacandra (c. ninth-tenth century AD) was never an object of the external senses; it is known by perception

an outstanding representative of the Digambara sect. Iwo in the form of self-cognition; and it is also inferred as being

of his major philosophical works are the Prameya-kamala- related to the other world (paraloka).

mārtanda (a commentary on Mānikyanandin's Parīksā-mukha- On the other hand (i.e in the second alternative), if the subtle sütra) and the Nyāya-kumuda-candra (a commentary on Akala- matter be different in nature from consciousness, it would not nka's Laghīyastraya, a work consisting of three small treatises). be a material cause for the production of consciousness On In both these works, Prabhäcandra, defending his own Jaina the admission that even a totally dissimilar thing may be the position, criticizes his rival views, inclusive of the Cārvāka/ Lokäyata. We have given here extracts from the two texts material cause of another thing, it would be possible even for

discussing the two prominent features generally attributed fire to become a material cause of water, and as a result (the to the Lokāyatas, namely, dehātma-vāda and pratyaksaika- doctrine of) the four realities (tattva) would be contradicted. pramāna-vāda. The same fallacy would occur even if it is admitted that it

Prabhacandra's would become the material cause of consciousness, being

Prameya-kamala-mārtanda similar in nature by (the possession of properties like) existence (sattva), etc. A. BHŪTA-CAITANYA-VĀDA In fact; the self being proved on valid grounds (pramāna), it alone can logically be held to be the material cause of con- (The Cārvākas say to the Jainas:) Well, let consciousness sciousness .. (vijñāna) be without form (nirākāra). But it cannot be self- Besides, if one entity possesses some distinctive characteristic cognized (sva-samvidita), for it is a transformation (parināma) which is different from the one present in another entity, then of matter (bhūta), like a mirror. the former must be completely different (tattvantara) from the But this is not proper, because the ground is unproved. If latter; for example, air and other substances are different from

300 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 301 fire. And consciousness possesses some distinctive charac- object (alambana), for such awareness is produced by the teristics which are not shared by the earth and other forms of function (vyäpara) of the internal sense (antahkarana), indepen- matter. dently of the external senses (bahihkarana): The body is not It cannot be said that the ground (namely, the possession of revealed by such (exclusively internal) awareness, because it is some distinctive characteristic) is unproved, for consciousness an object of the external senses, and also because it is not an has the distinctive characteristic of being of the nature of know- object of awareness involving the 'I'in a non-secondary sense. ledge (jñāna), belief (darśana) and active awareness (upayoga). An awareness in the form 'I am fat' (sthulah aham) or 'I am On the other hand, earth, water, fire and air do not share such lean' (krsah aham) or the like, identifying the 'T' with the body, a characteristic, their specific natural characteristics being the is not in a non-secondary sense; for in that case there would capacity to hold (dhärana), fluidity (drava), hotness (usnatva) arise the absurdity of accepting non-secondariness even in the and constant movement (īrana) case of the awareness 'this is none but myself (aham eva ayam) Indeed, the forms of matter do not have the characteristic of when one refers to one's servant (identifying the 'I' with the being of the nature of knowledge, belief and active awareness, servant) who is extremely useful to oneself. because they are perceived by many knowers such as ourselves. (It may be objected that in identifying the 'I' and the servant) :But that which has such a characteristic is not perceived by there is an impediment (badhaka), namely, a difference in the many knowers such as ourselves; for example, consciousness. mental reflection (pratibhasa). But then, the same is also possible The forms of matter are, however, so (i.e. perceived by many) in the other case (i e. in identifying the 'I' and the body). In the and hence, they must be so (i.e. without such a characteristic) mental reflection of the awareness involving the 'T' on the part But then, no distinct entity, other than the one which has of a person who has his physical form (vigraha) covered by the the special characteristic of being of the nature of knowledge, veil of a dense mass of darkness, not even the body, as charac- etc. (i.e consciousness) which may be said to possess it, is ever terized by the properties of fatness and the like, appears. established on valid grounds. Hence (the ground put forward A secondary use is not possible without a ground (nimitta) by you, namely,) the possession of a distinctive characteristic Hence, as in the case of the servant, here also (i e in the case of becomes incapable of proving (a distinct self). Thus, such an the identification of 'I' and body) the ground is assumed to be entity cannot be apprehended by perception, because it is not usefulness (upakārakatva) to the self. determined to be of the nature of a thing possessing colour, Like the distinct awareness 'this is my servant' (madīyo etc. Nor can it be apprehended by inference, for its validity is bhrtyah), the distinct awareness 'this is my body' (iadīyam not established. Besides, there also is no inference capable of śarīram) is to be taken in the primary sense (mukhya). proving its existence As to the objection (that the self cannot be perceived or All this is improper .. For the self is apprehended by perception admitted, we reply that) it is unjustified, because its nature is itself, as all living beings have direct awareness revealing the revealed by awareness in the form 'I' (aham). There is nothing self, and awareness involving the 'I' (aham-pratyaya) in a non- objectionable in the fact that some entity is not perceived secondary sense (anupacarita) in the forms: I am happy (sukhi through the property of another property. Otherwise there aham), I am unhappy (duhkhī aham), I have desire (icchāvān arises the absurdity of the non-perception of all entities. aham) and so on. Such awareness is not false, because it is not But then, what if it be argued that the self cannot be perceived contradicted later. Nor does it have the body as its underlying because it is the agent (kartr), and it is not possible for it to be

302 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA THE SOURCE MATERIALS 303 the object (karman) at the same time? No, that would not be is there. Hence, it is not a specific quality of the body. proper, because (such duality of character) is justified by the Similarly, the senses do not possess the quality of conscious- presence of different specific marks (laksana). Thus the specific ness, because they are instruments; or because they are trans- mark of an agent is independence (svätantrya) (and it is present formations of matter, like the axe, etc. in the self), and at the same time it is also perceived to be Moreover, if consciousness were a quality of the sense there pervaded (vyapya) by the act of knowing (which is the specific would have been no knowledge in the event of the sense being mark of an object} and hence, there is no contradiction in its destroyed, because a quality cannot be known when the very being considered an object as well. In fact, the specific deter- substratum of the quality has been destroyed. But it is not so mination of (the nature of) a thing depends upon the specific (in the case of consciousness). Hence, it cannot be a quality of mark (present in it). the sense. It can thus be put in the form of an inferential argument Similarly, the self is also known by inference. Instruments (prayoga): consciousness in the form of recollection (smarana) (karana) like the auditory and other senses must be moved to etc., is not a quality of the sense, because it may be produced action (prayojya) by some agent, because they are instruments, even when the sense has been destroyed. If one thing is produced like an axe. It cannot be said that the very fact that the auditory in spite of the destruction of another thing, then, the former and other senses are instruments is unproved. For it is established cannot be a quality of the latter; for example, the colour of the by the following inference: the knowledge of colour, taste, jar cannot be a quality of the cloth as it can be produced in spite smell, touch and sound must be due to instruments, because it of the destruction of the cloth. is a form of action (kriya), like the act of cutting. Moreover, Moreover, if consciousness is a quality of the senses, some the self is also known by the following inference: the knowledge further instruments for them would have to be assumed, for of sound, etc., must reside somewhere, because it is a quality no action can take place without an instrument. If each of them (guņa), like colour, etc .. possesses the quality of consciousness, then there arises the We shall give arguments for the validity of inference later. absurdity of (admitting) many selves in one and the same body (The opponent may say:) Knowledge is actually a quality of In that case, just as an object perceived by Devadatta is not re- the body, the sense, the mind (manas), or the object of know- cognized (pratisandhāna) by Yajñadatta, so also, an object ledge (vișaya), and it does not reside in any substratum other perceived by one sense would not be re-cognized by another than any one of these so that it would be possible to establish sense .. But re-cognition is actually observed to occur. Hence, the self as a distinct entity. consciousness would not be a quality of the sense. If, however, But this would be mere wishful thinking (on his part), for it is said that such an objection cannot be raised, for it is admitted knowledge cannot be proved to be a quality of any of them. that only one sense would be the controller (adhisthāyaka) of Thus (it may be inferred that) the body is not the substratum all the instruments, then it would only be a difference in (aśraya) of the quality of consciousness, because it is a transfor- terminology (samjña), for nothing but the self would be so mation of matter, like the jar, etc. Or, consciousness is not a expressed, though by a different term. specific quality of the body, because it can disappear even when The mind, too, cannot be characterized by the quality of the body exists But those that are the specific qualities of the consciousness, for it is an instrument, like the axe, etc. Besides, if body do not disappear as long as the body is there, for example, the mind is admitted to be the agent (kartr) and consequently, colour, etc. But consciousness disappears even when the body the conscious one, it would have to be dependent upon some

304 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MATERIAIS 305

other instrument for (acts like) the apprehension of colour, existent (asat), or both existent and non-existent (sad-asat)? etc. But then the self itself would be admitted, although only The assumption of the first alternative would lead to the in a different manner. establishment of its beginninglessness (anāditva) and endlessness Nor can consciousness be a quality of the object (visaya), (anantatva), for the manifestation of a thing always existent is because even in its absence (asannidhya) or in its destruction, not logically justified without such establishment, as in the recollection and the like are observed to be produced. It is not case of universals like earth-ness (prthivitva) etc Thus, the justifiable that there should be the knowledge of qualities even statement-there being no one 'capable of travelling to the when their substratum is absent or has been destroyed, because it other world' (paralokin), there is the absence of the 'other would lead to a contradiction that they are its qualities (yet world' (paraloka) itself-would be one made without proper they can be apprehended without it). critical judgement Thus, all the alternatives being exhausted (parisesat), it follows On the other hand, if it is admitted that there is manifestation that consciousness must reside in a substratum other than the of consciousness previously non-existent, there would be body, etc. Hence, the self (as a distinct entity) is proved. contradiction with its awareness, because the manifestation of By this is also refuted the following view: there is manifesta- what is totally non-existent is never observed. Besides, for one tion (abhivyakti) of consciousness out of (the combination of) who maintains such a position there would be no difference matter such as earth, etc., which are known by the names 'body', between 'what manifests' (vyanjaka) and 'what produces' 'sense' and 'object', just like the power of intoxication (madasakti) (kāraka), for, as it is well-known, they are differentiated as 'a from (the combination) of flour (pista), water (udaka), molasses vyanjaka is that which refines the nature of what already exists' (guda) and dhātakī Therefore, in spite of the possession of and 'a karaka is that which brings into being the non-existent'. some distinctive characteristic, consciousness is not a totally However, on the admission that there is manifestation (of distinct entity (tattvāntara). The realities (tattva) are earth consciousness) which is somewhat (kathancit) existent as well (prthivi), water (ap), fire (tejas) and air (vāyu); the names 'body', as somewhat non-existent, there would follow the forced 'sense' and 'object' are given only to their (i. e. of the forms of acceptance of the position of the opponent (i.e. the Jaina). For realities or matter) combinations (samudaya). The full implica- it is quite clearly admitted by the opponents (i.e. the Jainas) tion (viz. there is manifestation of consciousness, etc .. ) is obtained that, as in the case of the four forms of matter like the earth, by syntactically supplying (adhyāhāra) the verbal form 'goes etc .. (in the case under consideration also) there is manifestation into manifestation' to the statement 'consciousness, out of through matter (pudgala) in the forms of earth, etc., which them'. Hence, the absence (vyavrtti) of the reason (viz. the have been transformed (parinata) into the shape of a body possession of some distinctive characteristic) from a negative (kayakara), of consciousness which is somewhat existent as instance (vipaksa) is doubtful. substance (dravyatah) as well as somewhat non-existent as Besides, this admission of the doctrine of the manifestation special mode (paryāyatah) of consciousness is also in contradiction with (the Cārvāka's) But then, if it be so, there can also be no manifestation of the refutation of the doctrine of the manifestation of sound in power of intoxication out of flour, water, etc., for the said general. alternatives (leading to the refutation of the view that conscious- Moreover, it is said that there is the manifestation of con- ness is manifested out of matter) are equally possible in the sciousness. But is this consciousness existent (sat), or non- present case as well However, such an objection would be

306 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 307 improper, for in this case also, pre-existence as substance is deviation to the rule that the effects (vikara, lit. transforma- admitted, all entities (bhava) being beginningless (anādi) and tions) of matter are characterized by colour and others. endless (ananta) in such a form. To argue that in the same way, matter and consciousness Others maintain that the objections raised against the view can also be the material cause and the effect in relation to each of the manifestation (of consciousness) have no scope, for, by other, for here also, it is possible to have such presence by taking supplying syntactically the verbal form 'is produced' (utpadyate) into consideration the properties of existence (sattva), etc., and in the statement 'consciousness, out of them', what is admitted is performance of specific actions (kriyākāritva), etc., would not the production (utpatti) of consciousness out of (the combina- be proper. In that case, there would follow the absurdity that tions of) matter known by the names of 'body', 'sense' and water, fire and others are also the material causes and the 'object'. effects of one another, as in this case also, such presence would But then, let them clearly state what they will say in reply be equally possible if those properties (i.e. existence, perfor- when the following is put to them: Are the forms of matter mance of specific actions, etc.) are taken into consideration material causes (upādāna-kāraņa), or co-operating causes Moreover, from such inferences as the following-the first (sahakāri-kārana) for consciousness? consciousness (adya-caitanya) of living beings must have con- The forms of matter cannot be the material causes (of con- sciousness for its material cause, because it is a modified form sciousness), because there would follow the absurdity of the of consciousness (cid-vivarta), like the modified form of con- presence (anvaya) of the properties of matter in consciousness, sciousness in the middle (madhya-cid-vivarta); and also, the like the presence of the properties of gold in the crown and final modified form of consciousness (antya-caitanya-parināma) other such things which have gold as their material cause; or, must be the effect of consciousness on the same ground and the like the presence of the properties of earth and others in the same instance-it is proved that (any form of consciousness) body, which has earth and others for its material cause. But it has, for its material cause, only another form of consciousness is not so in the present case. It is not established by any pramāna and as such, the assumption that the forms of matter are the that a combination (samudaya) of the forms of matter- material causes of consciousness does not logically stand. abandoning first their unconsciousness, and acquiring later the If, on the other hand, (the forms of matter) are assumed to property of consciousness-becomes endowed with the proper- be the co-operating causes, then something quite different ties of matter, namely, capacity to hold (earth), constant (from the forms of matter) has to be admitted as the material movement (air), fluidity (water) and hotness (fire); or the cause, for an effect which does not have a material cause is possession of colour and others. For one becomes aware of never found. To say that it (i.e. the opponent's view) is free consciousness by internal perception as to what is without such from objection because effects like sound, lightning and others properties as the capacity to hold and such like. which do not have any material cause are also found, would be It cannot be argued that there is deviation (vyabhicara) in the a statement made without proper judgement; for in the cases instances of collyrium, etc .. , which, though possessing flame, of such effects also, the fact of their having material causes is etc .. , as material causes, are not characterized by the properties proved by the inference that sound and others have material of the flame, etc., for there also, the presence (of the properties causes, because they are effects, like the cloth and others. of the material cause in the effect) is observed at least because It would be illogical to say that the (Jaina) argument suffers of the possession of colour and others. Indeed, there is no from irregularity (anekānta) since it is observed, for example;

308 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MAJERIALS 309

that a conscious scorpion is born of unconscious cowdung, Indeed, the facts of re-cognition (pratyabhijñāna), desire because the same (i e the scorpion's consciousness) is also (abhilāsa) and others, just after birth, in respect of objects included in the subject of the inference (paksa). What is actually desirable and undesirable, cannot be explained without admit- born of cowdung is only the unconscious body of the scorpion ting one single knower which is beginningless; for these are all and not the scorpion's modified form of consciousness, for its preceded by (i.e. dependent upon) repeated experience (abhyāsa). production is admitted to be possible only from a previous It would not be proper to claim that one may have repeated modified form of consciousness. experience when one is confined to the mother's womb, even Now, (the opponent may argue that) just as the first fire of without perceiving external objects; for then there will be the traveller which is born of the rubbing of fire-kindling absurdities wood (arani) is not preceded by fire (i.e. does not have fire as Nor would it be justifiable to claim that although re-cognition the material cause), but the other fire (i.e. the later one, e g the and the like are established to be preceded by repeated experience cooking fire) is preceded by fire (i.e. has fire as the material in the later stages, they are not preceded by it just after birth, cause), so also, the first consciousness would be born of the for otherwise (it may also be claimed that) although smoke is forms of matter transformed into the shape of a body, but the observed to be preceded by fire (in many cases), it may also not other (later) consciousness would be preceded by consciousness be preceded by fire (in some cases) .. (i.e .. would have consciousness as the material cause), and It would also be impossible to contend that there would be there would be no contradiction in such a position no objection because these (re-cognition, etc., of the just-born But this is also mere wishful thinking (on the opponent's infant) are preceded by the repeated experience of the parents; part). For, if one admits that the first fire of the traveller may for absurdities will follow if re-cognition on the part of one have something other than fire as the material cause, one would person (santāna, lit. stream) is admitted to be due to repeated be led to the absurdity that water, etc .. , too may have, as material experience on the part of another person If so, each of the infants causes, things other than water, etc , and thus there would be (born of the same parents) would have re-cognition in respect contradiction with (the opponent's own) view that the four of the objects apprehended by its parents, in the form 'all this forms of matter-earth and others-are distinct entities has been perceived by me'. Also, there would arise the absurd (tattväntara) Things which stand as the material cause and the possibility of mutual re-cognition among themselves, as in the effect in relation to one another are not really distinct entities; case of cognitions through the visual and the tactual senses for example, the products of earth (are not ultimately different produced in respect of a single person from earth). But (according to the opponent,) the earth and Moreover, the denial of the self is not justified, because it others stand as the material cause and the effect in relation to is established by an awareness involving the 'I', namely, 'I one another and therefore, there would remain only one form apprehend the jar and others through knowledge'. Here, just of matter in reality, which would be the modified form of as the jar and others are revealed as the object (karman), so also the earth and others. If, however, they are admitted to be co- is the self revealed as the agent (kartr) .. The body, the senses, or operative causes, then let it be so in the case of consciousness also. any other similar thing cannot be considered the agent, because Just as the first manifested fire is preceded by a latent (tirohita) like the jar and others, they are also revealed to be the object fire, so also the first manifested (avirbhūta) consciousness of (e g in the awareness 'I apprehend the body, senses and others the one in the womb is preceded by a latent consciousness .. through knowledge'). There can also be an awareness involving

310 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA the 'I' even when the body is not revealed; in the awareness of THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 311

a person whose physical form is covered by a veil of a dense mean that the self is not known to be uncharacterized by the mass of darkness and whose sense has ceased to function, such nature of the body? Or, does it mean that the self is not known properties as a fair complexion, plumpness and the like are not to belong to any space (deśa) other than the space occupied by revealed. Thus, awareness involving the 'I', experienced by all the body?

and self-revealing, is established as having for its underlying As to the first alternative, (we contend that) there is indeed

object (alambana) something distinct from the body, the senses knowledge of the self as dissociated from the body, because, as

and others. So it is established on valid grounds (pramāna) that has already been pointed out, the self, since it is by nature non- the self is a distinct substance, without origin and without corporeal (amurta) and consciousness itself, is perceived as

destruction. distinct from the body, which is by nature a thing possessing

The inferential formulation is: the self is without beginning colour, etc., and unconscious.

and without end, because it is a substance, like earth and As to the second alternative, (we ask) is the non-existence

others. The reason here is not one with an unproved substratum of the self proved because it is not apprehended in some space

(äśrayāsiddha), because the self is proved by an awareness other than the one occupied by the body, or because it is

involving the 'I'. Nor is it a reason unproved in the substratum apprehended only in the space as is occupied by the body? (svarīpāsiddha), because (the self) possesses the essential pro- In the former case, it would be proving what is already proved

perties of a substance. That is, the self is a substance, because it (siddha-sādhana), because the absence of the self there (i.e. possesses qualities (guna) and modes (paryāya) like earth and somewhere outside the body) is quite accepted (by the Jainas)

others. This reason, too, is not an unproved (asiddha) one, Unlike the Naiyayikas, the Jainas do not think that the self can because qualities like knowledge, belief, etc., and modes like be present somewhere outside the body. pleasure, pain, delight, sadness, etc., are observed to be present In the second case, not only the non-existence of the self, but

there (in the self). also the non-existence of the jar, etc., would be established,

It also cannot be said that the reason (viz. because it is a for they too are not apprehended in some space other than

substance) suffers from the fallacy of irregularity (anekānta) their own.

considering the instances of the jar, etc., because they are really Moreover, on what ground is the self's absence of distinction

the modes of earth and others. from its body sought to be proved-because the self is of the

But then, (it may be objected that) if there were ever any same nature as the body, or because the self is a quality of the

awareness of the self as dissociated from the body (sarīra-rahita), body, or because the self is an effect of the body? (The opponent it would have been a distinct entity, without beginning and can, at best, offer these three grounds), for no other alternative

without end, like fire (which is known) as dissociated from is possible. However, the answers to all the three alternatives water. But actually it is not so, because so long as there is have already been given.

worldly existence (samsara), the self is known only as Thus the existence of the self which is of the nature of con-

associated with the body. (Hence, the self is not distinct from sciousness itself is proved on valid grounds, and hence it is

the body.) only proper that knowledge should be a property of it. Know-

(The reply to this is as follows:) What is meant by the expres- ledge must be self-revealing in nature (sva-vyavasāyātmaka), sion 'dissociated from the body' in your statement? Does it because it is a modification of the conscious self; that which is not self-revealing in nature is not so (ie. is not a modification

312 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 313

of the self), for example, a jar. But knowledge is so. Therefore the probans and the probandum may co-exist) due to the fact it is to be admitted that knowledge is self-revealing in nature. that perception can apprehend only objects which are proximate (sannihita). Nor is ascertainment of concomitance possible through Prabhacandra's inference, because it must itself be preceded by an ascertainment Prameya-kamala-mārtanda of concomitance. If there, also, the ascertainment of concomi- tance is admitted to be due to inference, there would result the B. PRATYAKȘAIKA-PRAMĀŅA-VĀDA fallacy of either infinite regress (anavastha) or mutual depen- dence (itaretarāśraya). And there is no other form of source of For those who contend that there is only one form of source valid knowledge which may be said to lead to its ascertainment. of valid knowledge (pramāna) and it is perception (pratyaksa) Therefore, how can inference have validity (or, be a source of : alone, it would not be possible to include in perception the valid knowledge)? other sources of valid knowledge like inference (anumāna), However, all this is being said without proper critical con- etc., because they are distinct in nature and are also produced sideration. For the validity of inference, etc., is also well-estab- from different collocations of causes (samagri). lished because of their uncontradictedness (avisamvādakatva) But then, (it may be objected) there is no need to debate which follows from the fact that, through them also, there can about the possibility of inference's inclusion (in perception), be invariable specific determination (vyavastha) of their because inference is not a source of valid knowledge at all. In respective objects (sva-visaya), as in the case of perception. It is fact, perception alone is a source of valid knowledge, because a a well-known fact that in the case of perception, validity is due pramāna must be non-secondary (agauna). (But inference is to nothing but uncontradictedness; and it is the same also in secondary, or gauna.) the case of others, for there is no contradiction (visamvāda) in Moreover, a pramana is what produces an ascertainment respect of an object even when it is ascertained by inference, etc. (niścaya) in respect of an object. But it is not possible to have, As to the contention that (inference, being secondary, cannot through inference, an ascertainment in respect of an object, be a pramāna) because a pramana must be non-secondary, (we because in the case of the general (sāmānya), there is the charge ask) why should inference be secondary-because it has a of proving the proved (siddha-sadhana), whereas in the case of secondary object, or because it is preceded by perception? the particular (visesa), there is no universal agreement (anugama) The first alternative is not possible, because it is admitted Thus it has been said: 'In the case of the particular there is an (by us) that just like perception, inference, too, has for its object absence of universal agreement and in the case of the general, what is real (västava) and is of the nature of having general as the proved is being sought to be proved. well as specific characteristics. Unlike the Buddhists, the Jainas Further, there can be inference only when concomitance do not admit that inference has for its object only imaginary (vyäpti) is ascertained and also the (probans') residence in the generalised forms (kalpita-sāmānyārtha) subject (paksa-dharmata) is known for certain. But there can be If, on the other hand, the secondariness of inference be due no ascertainment of concomitance through perception, because it has no capability of leading to the ascertainment of concomi- to its being preceded by perception, then some cases of percep- tion also-because of their being preceded by inference-would tance as embracing all the objects (i.e all relevant cases where have to be considered as secondary (and consequently, would

314 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIALS 315

not be valid), for it is observed that perception originates therefrom, that) in other cases also, similar (i.e non-secondary) (subsequent to inference) when one exerts oneself after ascer- perception alone would be valid, it is possible to have an ascer- taining the thing sought through inference. tainment of concomitance, as embracing all the cases, between Moreover, it is not a fact that inference is preceded by per- non-secondariness and validity? No, such a claim would not ception, because it is actually preceded by the source of valid be proper, for there can be no ascertainment embracing all the knowledge known as deliberation (ūha) cases when (some) lie beyond the scope. As to the contention that there can be no ascertainment of Moreover, the admission of an ascertainment as embracing concomitance through perception, etc. (we say that) all that is all the cases would be as good as admitting deliberation, only only empty talk, for concomitance is very well ascertained by in a different name. the source of knowledge called deliberation proceeding on the Also, in the same manner, why should there not be an ascer- strength of observation (pratyaksa) and non-observation tainment of concomitance between smoke and fire, and others? (anupalambha). The innumerability of the individuals or How, then, would your statement that inference is not a deviation (vyabhicāra) in relation to space (and time) cannot be an impediment to its ascertainment, because concomitance is source of valid knowledge, because it is impossible to ascertain

determined through the generalities (samanya), the reality of concomitance as embracing all the cases, be justified? Further, what do you intend to establish-the invalidity of which is established on the ground that it is the object of un- inference as such, or (the invalidity of) those inferences only contradicted (abadhita) identical (anugata) cognitions which relate to imperceptible things? Moreover, without admitting a source of valid knowledge In the first alternative, there would be a cessation of all in the form of deliberation, it cannot at all be claimed that 'per- practical activities which are well-established by general ception is the only source of valid knowledge because of its acceptance. In fact, it is actually observed that even ordinary non-secondariness,' etc. That is, the probans, non-secondariness people ascertain, without fail, the presence of one thing from or uncontradictedness, cannot lead to the inference of validity the presence of another thing when the latter has an invariable in perception unless its concomitance is rightly ascertained, for relation with the former; but not anything from everything. otherwise there would be absurdities. It is also to be admitted In the second alternative, how would there be the specific that the concomitance must be ascertained in its entirety, for determination of validity and invalidity respectively by non- otherwise validity would be established, on the ground of secondariness and secondariness in respect of perception and non-secondariness, only in that particular instance of perception the other pramana-s, which are all imperceptible? How would in respect of which alone the concomitance between non- there be knowledge about the minds of others which are imper- secondariness and validity has been ascertained; and not in the ceptible on the basis of specific effects like some particular other instances, because concomitance has not been ascertained in respect of them. But concomitance in its entirety cannot be activity, speech, etc .? How would there be the negation of heaven (svarga), merit-demerit (apūrva) and the gods, etc, ascertained through perception, for it can have as its object which are all imperceptible, on the basis of non-apprehension only what is proximate. Now, what if it be said that after ascertaining, through (anupalabdhi)? And how would the Carvaka-claiming that the ascertain- perception, in respect of one individual, the concomitance of ment of an object through inference is impossible because of the two (viz. non-secondariness and validity) (and concluding the non-secondariness of pramana-establish the validity and

316 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 317 invalidity of perception and others, on the basis of nothing but inference? If he has really to do so, why should he not accept, cognition). On what specific ground can a cognition which as valid, inferences having imperceptible and perceptible objects? does not reveal any object be specifically referred to by words,

As it has been said: 'The existence of a distinct kind of pramāna as in the form, 'water-cognition' or 'silver-cognition'?

(i.e. inference) is established from the determination of validity Moreover, in such a view, there would be another absurdity-

and invalidity in general, from the knowledge acquired about there would be no distinction between illusion and the state of

the minds of others; and also from the negation of certain deep sleep (susupti). Here (i.e. in the case of illusion), there is things.' no other point of distinction except that there is some object Therefore, the invalidity of inference is not established. being revealed (pratibhasamāna), and that which becomes revealed (by a cognition) is said to be the underlying object of that cognition ..

Prabhācandra's Therefore, it cannot be said that an illusion is an objectless

Prameya-kamala-mārtanda cognition (akhyāti)

C. AKHYĀTIVĀDA

What if it be said that in the case of an illusory cognition Prabhäcandra's

(viparyaya), no object is actually cognized? Thus, for example Nyāya-kumuda-candra (when water is wrongly perceived in a mirage), the cognition revealing water cannot have actual water as its underlying object A. BHŪIA-CAIIANYA-VĀDA

(alambana), for in that case, it would have been non-erroneous (abhränta). Nor can the absence of water be said to be revealed But then in the Carvaka view, the four forms of realities

by it, because one is led to activity (with the conviction that) (tattva), namely, earth, water, fire and air, which are charac-

water is present there. terized by mutually exclusive (anyonya-asambhavi) characters,

On the same ground, neither can the group of rays be taken which are capable of producing specific combinations serving

as the underlying object If that is so, there also arises the specific uses, namely, body, sense and object, and the nature

absurdity of the cognition being non-erroneous. of which can be ascertained by the source of valid knowledge

It would also be illogical to say that it is a cognition of the called perception, are well justified; for it has been said (by

ray as water, because the former is totally different from the them): 'Earth, water, fire and air are the only realities; the

latter. It is never observed, for example, that a cloth, which is names "body", "sense" and "object" are given to their (specific)

totally different from a jar, is perceived as a jar .. combinations (samudāya).'

Therefore it is to be concluded that the illusory cognitions of There is nothing over and above these, for there is no valid

water, etc., are without any underlying object (nirālambana). ground to prove its existence. Indeed, perception would not However, all this would appear pleasant only to one who succeed in establishing the existence of akāsa, etc., for it can act

speaks without proper judgement. For in such a view, there only in respect of colour, etc., and things that possess them.

can be no specific verbal reference (vyapadeśa) (for any illusory But it would not be possible in the case of akāśa, for it is admitted to be a substance without colour. Also, since inference is not a

318 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIALS 319

source of valid knowledge, neither can its existence be estab- bubbles of various forms and nature appear without having lished by it any regulating factor in the form of adrsta, simply out of the But then, in the absence of a knower (grahaka) which is the capacity of the things themselves; so also (in this world) are self, how can the existence of even the four forms of realities be born different beings subject to various kinds of pain, pleasure, established, for the reality of a thing (prameya) invariably etc. But there are no selves eternal by nature, distinct from (the presupposes its cognition by some knower (pramātr)? Appre- collection of) matter as transformed into the shape of a body; hending such an objection, it has been said: 'Consciousness is for there is no proof of their existence .. from them'. Here, some think that the verbal form 'manifested' What proof, indeed, is possible, in such a case-perception (abhivyajyate) is to be added, and others think that the verbal or inference? form 'produced' (pradurbhavati) is to be added. Therefore, the Perception would not be capable of proving a self as distinct contention that the knower is the self as conceived by others, from the body, because perception can act only in respect of or a beginningless stream of consciousness, is refuted, because colour and things possessing colour, when they are related to there is no valid ground to establish its existence. The reality of the sense. As a result, it would not be able to act in respect of a thing (is possible) when its invariable relation to just some (such a) self which is (conceived to be) distinct from them. knower is established, and as such, consciousness itself (pro- It also cannot be said that such a self is revealed as what duced out of earth, etc.) may well be the knower. performs the act of knowing (jñana-kartr) in the awareness But then, how is it that there is no contradiction (in main- involving the 'I', namely, 'I know a jar'. For it can easily be taining that) consciousness, which is identical, gets manifested justified as referring to the body (by the word 'I'), as is the case or is produced out of different things like the earth, etc .? To with (such awarenesses as) 'I am fat' or 'I am lean'. In such an this, it is said: 'consciousness is like the power of intoxication awareness, the self cannot be the object referred to, as properties (madaśakti)'. Just as in the ingredients of a spiritous drink like fatness, etc., cannot belong to the self. Similar is the case (madya) such as kinva, etc , there is produced, in some particular with an awareness like 'I know a jar', etc. In such an awareness space, time and condition, a special character, namely, the too, no self distinct from the body as conceived by others is power of intoxication; so also there is produced, in the earth, ever revealed as the underlying object, even in a dream. Even etc., in some particular (space, time and condition), a special if the reality of a thing which is never apprehended is admitted, character; namely consciousness, which reveals the jar etc., as there would be an undue multiplicity of assumptions (kalpanā- restricted to its specific object. It cannot be argued that the production of the various forms gaurava) and also an absence of the fixed order of things. It is neither logical to consider a thing as one performing an act (kartr) of effects, such as the specific kinds of pleasure, pain, etc., cannot when its existence is never apprehended, for then it may even be justified without a regulating factor (niyāmaka), and the be so in the case of a flower blooming in the sky (khapuspa) regulating factor is established to be the adrsta (merit and Therefore, it is only logical to justify that in respect of (the act demerit) acquired by actions in the previous birth, and as a of) knowing, the body alone is the one performing the act, result, the presence of the self, one who has performed the since its nature is established (to be so) on 'unrefutable actions (kartr), is established even in the previous birth (as such, a distinct, permanent self has to be admitted); for 'beings grounds. Moreover, (consciousness is proved to be an effect of the are like water-bubbles (jala-budbuda)'. Just as in the ocean, etc., body) because of its having agreements in presence and absence

320 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 321

with the body. When a thing has agreements in presence and of water and dhātakī, etc. Such transformation is not present in

absence with another, it must be an effect of that; for example, the case of the jar, etc., and so there is no manifestation of con-

a jar is the effect of a lump of clay. Consciousness, also, has sciousness there, just like the absence of the power of intoxica-

agreements in presence and absence with the body. The cause- tion in the dust, etc., due to the absence of a (specific) transfor-

effect relation is always ascertained through agreements-in- mation of pista, etc.

presence and absence and in the present case also, such agree- It cannot, however, be said that in that case, there arises the

ments are available-when the body is there consciousness is possibility of finding consciousness even in a corpse, as the said

found to be there, and in its absence it is not found to be there. transformation is equally present there; for the non-availability

Therefore, the self cannot be established by perception. of consciousness there is justified by the absence of the cause.

Nor (can the self be established) by inference, because it is The cause for the presence of consciousness is a specific trans-

not a source of valid knowledge. Even if it be a source of valid formation of skin, bone, flesh and blood, etc. When it is

knowledge, the reason (hetu) would be mistimed (kālātyayā- disturbed due to striking by weapons and diseases, etc., con- padista) because of it being advanced after stating a subject of sciousness cannot continue to be present and hence, it is not

inference (paksa) which is contradicted by perception. A subject found there, just like the particular shape of the body (pre- of inference in the form of the self as distinct from the body is viously present)

contradicted by perception. In this regard, there is no valid Thus, it being established that, like the particular shape of

reason; nor is its invariable concomitance with the inferable the body, consciousness, too, is a property of the body, it is

(sadhya) established anywhere The awareness of pleasure, further established that 'due to the absence of the paralokin (one

etc., being the effect of matter, it is possible for it to have capable of travelling to the other world), there is the absence of

invariable concomitance with them (ie forms of matter) the paraloka (the other world) itself' .. A paralokin is one who is

only. Thus, no proof for the existence of the self being possible, capable of comprehending the implications of the Sastra, per-

its eternality, etc., would be like the fragrance of a flower forming actions (accordingly), and enjoying the results thereof.

blooming in the sky; and what intelligent man would put faith But in the said manner it is proved to be non-existent. Thus,

upon it? Therefore, it is to be concluded that, (during the time) the non-existence of the other world becomes established

beginning with conception (garbha) and ending with death, without he least effort.

consciousness is produced out of matter only, or is manifested Now, the above is being refuted.

out of matter only. As to the statement 'earth, water, fire and air (are the only

'But then, if consciousness is manifested out of the earth, realities)', etc .. (we say that) this is illogical. Because the

etc., then, as in the body, it should have manifestation even in specific conclusion that the realities are only four would be the jar, etc.'-apprehending such an objection, it is said: 'In the established only when the absence of any other reality has been

jar, etc., there is no manifestation of consciousness, because of established. But the absence of any other reality is unproved,

the absence of the other cause; just as there is no manifestation because the existence of a distinct reality, the self (jīva), is proved of the power of intoxication in the dust, etc.' The cause of the by perception in the form of self-awareness (sva-samvedana),

manifestation of consciousness is the transformation of the and also that of (other realities like) ākāśa, etc., by scriptural

earth, etc., into the shape of a body, as in the case of the power statement (agama) as well as inference. The validity of these

of intoxication it is a (specific) transformation of pista, properties two has been determined while refuting the view that perception

322 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MATERIALS 323 is the one and only source of valid knowledge. there is no change (vikāra) in consciousness in the case of persons But then, it is unproved that the self is a distinct reality, for whose minds are deeply absorbed elsewhere and to whom the since it is of the nature of consciousness, it would be an effect stab of a knife is like the smearing of sandal-paste, even though of matter and like the jar, etc., would be included in it. However, their bodies may suffer changes on being struck by weapons, etc. this is a statement made without proper critical consideration, (The forms of matter cannot be the material cause) also for a cause-effect relation between matter and consciousness because even though there may not be changes in them, there cannot be logically justified. Thus, consciousness cannot be an may be a change in consciousness, as in the case previously effect of matter, because of its absence in spite of their (i.e. of mentioned (i.e. in the case of a horse and a cow). And this, too, the forms of matter) presence, just like the one which is always is not unproved. For even though there is no change in the absent (in their presence). Just as even when the forms of matter existing conditión of the body, changes in one's consciousness like the earth, etc .. , are present, there being the absence of the in the form of joy, etc., are observed when one is in the company one which is always absent, one is not (admitted to be) their of a charming lady effect; so also is the case with consciousness, there being no Therefore it cannot be logically shown that the forms of distinction. matter are the material cause (of consciousness). Indeed, even though the forms of matter in their varied If, on the other hand, they are supposed to be co-operating states, like clay, body, jar, etc., are always present, conscious- causes, (the question arises), does it or does it not have something ness is not always to be found. distinct from them as the material cause? If it does not, then Moreover, in the present case, there can also be no cause- how can it, without having any material cause, be produced effect relation because of the absence of anteriority-posteriority at all? That which has no material cause is never produced, e g. (pūrvāparībhāva) which is there in the case of yarn and cloth, a horn growing on a hare's head; and you conceive of conscious- etc. (having a cause-effect relation). It is not that the transfor- ness as something without a material cause. mation of matter, the body, is first apprehended as without If, however, it does (i e it has a material cause), then (the consciousness, and then afterwards is found consciousness. question arises), is this (material cause) dissimilar or similar to Thus, since it is found that they are simultaneously produced consciousness? Here, the first alternative is illogical, for if the (sahasiddha), there can be no cause-effect relation between production of something dissimilar out of something dissimilar them, as between water and fire: be possible, there would arise the possibility of the production Or, let it (i e. a cause-effect relation) be there Still, then, in of fire, etc .. , even from water, etc., and as a result, there would relation to consciousness, would the forms of matter be the follow the absence of the fourfold realities material cause (upādana) or the co-operating cause (sahakārin)? However, if (the material cause is admitted to be) similar, it The forms of matter cannot be the material cause, for even would be quite logical, for in every case, only a similar thing is though they may undergo changes, consciousness does not. observed to be the material cause. Thus, whatever is the material Of two things, when one does not undergo changes although cause of an effect is similar in nature to the effect; e g. a jar the other may, one cannot be the material cause of the other, e.g. possessing colour, etc., has (as its material cause) a lump of clay, a horse for a cow. Even though the forms of matter transformed which is of a similar nature. And you will have to admit that into the shape of a body may undergo changes, consciousness there is some distinct entity which would be the material cause does not. And this is not unproved. For it is well-known that of consciousness, which is of the nature of self-awareness

324 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIALS Therefore it is only logical that the material cause should be 325

something distinct from the earth, etc., having a nature similar of the beneficial and the harmful; and then, there is the produc-

to that (i.e. being of the nature of self-awareness), and hence, a tion of the body.

reality in the form of the self is established. (In the second alternative), if adrsta be the one produced in.

Moreover, what kind of matter would be the cause of con- some other birth, the existence of one capable of being related

sciousness-unqualified (nirvisista) or qualified (viśișta)? to the other world would be established and as such, the state-

If unqualified (matter be the cause of consciousness), then ment that due to the absence of one capable of being related to

there arises the possibility of its production everywhere and the other world there is the absence of the other world, would

always. itself be unjustified

Again, if qualified (matter be the cause), (we ask) how do Or, let them somehow undergo transformation in the shape

the forms of matter become qualified-because of collectivity of a body. Even then, if such a transformation is (admitted to

(samudāya), because of transformation into the shape of the be) the cause of consciousness, there would arise the possibility

body, because of a specific state (avasthā-viśeșa), or because of of consciousness being produced even in a corpse, there being

a different co-operating cause? no difference.

If (they be qualified) because of collectivity, then from the As against this, no doubt, the following may be put forward:

acts of putting the pot on the fire (adhiśrayana), etc., there a specific state (avastha-visesa) too, is the cause of conscious-

should have been produced consciousness, just like the cooking ness; due to its absence, there is no possibility of consciousness

of rice, because their collectivity is equally present there. in a corpse; the forms of matter transformed into the shape of a If (they be qualified) because of transformation into the body, when characterized by a specific state, become the cause

shape of a body, then, we ask, how do they get this transfor- for the production of consciousness

mation itself -- not due to any cause, simply arising out of their But then, we ask the following: What exactly is being

own nature, or, due to adrsta? characterized by a specific state on the part of these so trans-

If it is not due to any cause, it would be either present or formed-being accompanied by consciousness, being related

absent always. to a specific adrsta, preponderance of a particular body-

If it simply arises out of their own nature, there arises the constituent (dhatu), or being of some particular age?

possibility of that transformation occurring everywhere and The first alternative, being accompanied by consciousness,

always, for in their own nature they are equally present is not acceptable; for in that case, there arises the absurdity of

everywhere and always. their not being the cause for the production of the first conscious-

If it is due to adrsta, we ask, what adrsta would be the cause- ness (adya-caitanya), as at that stage they are not yet accom- the one produced in the present birth, or the one produced in panied by consciousness

some other birth? However, if it is intended that even then, they are accom-

In the first alternative, there is the absurdity of arguing in a panied by consciousness, then we ask, are they so by that very circle (cakraka): after the production of the body there is the consciousness, or by a previous one? If they are so by that very

production of consciousness; after the production of conscious- one, then there is mutual dependence-when the first con-

ness there is the production of adrsta from the performance of sciousness is proved, their accompaniment by it is proved,

acts productive of adrsta, on the basis of critical consideration and again, when such accompaniment is proved, the first consciousness is proved If, on the other hand, they be so by a

326 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 327

previous one; how can the existence of one capable of being Moreover, every effect is found to have a substratum related to the other world be denied, as it will have to be (aśraya). Therefore if consciousness is to be an effect, some admitted, then, that the stream of consciousness (caitanya- substratum for it has to be cited. What would be such a sub- prabandha) continues even prior to consciousness, belonging stratum-the body, the forms of matter, the senses, the mind, to the one in the womb (garbha-caitanya) ?. or the object? If, again, it is said that being characterized by a specific state The body cannot be such, because it is made of matter, means being related to a specific adrsta, (we ask) why is it that perceived by an external sense, and has a tangible form (mūrta); as it does not exist in a corpse-due to the absence of consciousness, in the case of the jar, etc .. due to the absence of the performance (of acts) productive of That the forms of matter constitute the substratum of con- it, or because it is earned to last only for that span of time? sciousness is also refuted by this, because their presence is In the first alternative, being related to a specific adrsta can- possible everywhere and always, and as such, there is no not be the cause for the production of consciousness, there difference so far as the presence of these everywhere and arising the contrary possibility that consciousness itself is the always in their perfect state (avikala), constituting the sub- cause for its production. The second and the third alternatives, stratum of consciousness, is concerned. too, are negated by the same; for the performance (of acts) Well, let the senses then constitute the substratum of con- productive of it and also it being earned to last only for that sciousness, for through agreement in presence (anvaya) and span of time are both dependent upon a specific form of con- agreement in absence (vyatireka) it is found to be produced sciousness. by them. This too is not established, for contradiction by Nor would it be logical to say that being characterized by a inferences (having as ground) 'because of being made of matter', specific state means preponderance of a particular body- etc., is equally possible here constituent; because in the state of deep sleep, although there is Moreover, how would the senses constitute the substratum such preponderance, the production of consciousness in the of consciousness-separately (vyasta), or collectively body is never observed. (samasta)? That being characterized by a specific state signifies possession If (they do so) separately, then there arises the possibility of of a particular age is also refuted by this, for although the body having many streams of consciousness ( = selves) in the same of one under deep sleep and that of a corpse are of a particular body, and as such, as in the case of a single stream constituted age such as childhood, etc., they are never productive of con- of many individuals, there would follow the impossibility of sciousness. recollection (anusandhana). Also, how would the blind, etc., Nor would the forms of matter be qualified because of a recollect colour, etc., when the sense is destroyed? How would different co-operating cause, for it is not admitted (in the there be the cognition of colour, taste, etc., in the states of Cārvāka view) that there is any other co-operating cause dream, etc? How would there be the cognition of pleasure, distinct from the realities in four forms. If, however, it is pain, etc., when the senses are destroyed by diseases like admitted, then the specific determination that the realities sleeping-sickness (prasuptikā), etc? Of two things, when one are only four would be contradicted; and moreover, the self does not undergo changes even though the other may do so, would be proved, for such (a co-operating cause) is, indeed, one cannot be the effect of the other, for otherwise there the self. would be absurdities.

328 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 329

The alternative that (they do so) collectively is also refuted by this, for collectivity cannot be there in the absence of even a independently of any other cause and as a result, there would be infinite regress .. single sense and thus, in the case of the blind, etc., there should not be produced even the minutest amount (leśa) of knowledge. It (i.e. the alleged additional cause) cannot be something else

Indeed, collectivity or the production of a seedling is never (i.e. other than mind), because in the case of one whose senses

observed when any one among the earth, etc., is absent. have ceased to function, there is no functioning of any other

And if it be said, then let the mind be the substratum of sense (except the mind). Nor can the object be the substratum of consciousness, consciousness, for even when the (external) senses have ceased because the illogicalities pointed out against the alternatives to function, knowledge in the form of internal awareness (antah-sankalpa) is found to be there? 'body is the substratum' and 'senses are the substratum' can be

We then ask: is the mind eternal or non-eternal? It cannot be cqually applied to it. Therefore a substratum of consciousness distinct from the eternal, because in that case, the accepted view on the number of realities would be contradicted and there would also arise body, namely the self, has to be admitted and thus it is estab-

the absurdity of surrendering to the view of the opponent. lished as a distinct reality

If, however, the mind is supposed to be non-eternal, we How, otherwise, would be produced the desire, etc., leading

further ask, is it produced from matter or from something to activities like movement towards the breast, etc., on the

else? It cannot be produced from something else, because it is part of an infant born on that very day? That an activity is due

not admitted. If it be produced from matter it cannot logically to desire is not unproved. For instance (it can be inferred), an

be accepted as the substratum of consciousness because of activity like movement towards the breast, etc., on the part of

(opposition by) the inference having as their ground 'because an infant born on that very day is due to desire, because it is a form of activity, just like an activity in the middle stage (of of being made of matter', etc., which have been mentioned life). (The) desire (of the infant), again, is due to recollection earlier .. Moreover, does the mind as the conscious one produce the (smarana), and its recollection too is due to actual experience

knowledge of objects independently of any other cause, or as (anubhava), because they are so (i.e. a form of desire and a form of recollection), just like them (i.e. desire and recollection in dependent upon (some other cause)? If it would do so indepen- dently, it would be possible for one to acquire the knowledge the middle stage of life). The experiences, etc., cannot take

of things, one and all, at the same time, and everybody would place in the embryo, etc., and hence it is established that the experience takes place in a previous birth The infant, suffering become omniscient .. If, however, it would do so as dependent upon some other from hunger, recollects that the sucking of the breast, which is capable of removing its hunger, is a means for obtainment of cause, (we ask) what is that other cause-the mind, or some- thing else? If it be the mind, (we ask again) would it be conscious pleasure, and because of a desire to suck, proceeds towards the breast. If he fails to reach it he starts to cry, and when he or unconscious? It cannot be unconscious, because as a sub- stratum of consciousness it has already been accepted as the reaches it, he stops crying and engages himself in sucking the breast. Even the babies of a monkey become afraid as they conscious one; otherwise one would be forced to admit the unconsciousness of the first one as well. If, however, it be recollect their pain due to falling down from a height, and

conscious, then it also would produce cognition of objects hence they cling very closely to their mothers' laps and avoid places from which they may fall down. It is not possible that

330 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 331

those who have not earlier enjoyed the fruits produced by things form of adrsta) being established, it is proved that the variety leading to benefit or harm would, in a regular manner, desire of pleasure, etc., is due to the variety of adrsta. Thus it is not to obtain or to avoid such things, for otherwise there would be possible to deny the existence of one capable of travelling to absurditics. That in respect of which experiences in a previous the other world by admitting a cause-effect relation (between birth are established is the self, which is a distinct form of reality. matter and consciousness). Its relation with a new (collectivity of) body, senses, etc., is its Nor can (consciousness and matter) be related to each other birth, but it is not an appcarance of the previously non-existent. as the thing that is manifested (vyangya) and the thing that Again, the perishment of these (the body, etc.) is its death, but makes it manifested (vyañjaka), because such a relation would

it is not a total annihilation .. actually contribute to the establishment of the other world As to the contention that consciousness is like the power of Thus (it may be asked), is there a manifestation of consciousness intoxication, (we say) this is illogical. The power of intoxication which is existent (sat), or which is non-existent (asat), or is found even in things which are not transformations of the which is existent as well as non-existent (sad-asad-rūpa)? ingredients of a spiritous drink, e g the dhatturaka (white In the first alternative the other world would be established thorn-apple), kodrava (species of grain), etc., and hence it is without any dispute, for the presence of consciousness would ascertained to be (produced) in a specific transformation of have to be admitted even prior to the transformation of the matter. As a result, there is no contradiction in (accepting) its forms of matter into the shape of a body appearance (out of them). But consciousness is not found in (The second alternative is also unacceptable ) The manifes- any specific transformation of matter, such as the jar, etc, tation of something that is previously non-existent is con- even in a dream, for there is a contradiction. tradicted by experience. As is well-known, manifestation As to the other contention that beings are like water-bubbles, means revealing clearly things like the jar, etc., which are (we say) this too is unjustified, for it is not possible to find any already existent, by the lamp, etc ; and not things which are similarity between the two things compared to each other. non-existent. Water-bubbles are not absolutely different from water itself; (The third alternative is also unacceptable ) If (consciousness hence it is justified that they are produced only by it As a manifested is existent as well as non-existent), (we ask), is it so result, their variety is justifiably explained to be due to it alone. totally or partially? It cannot be so totally, because of con- But matter and consciousness are absolutely different from tradictions. If it be so partially, the Jaina view will be established, cach other; hence there can be no cause-effect relation between for it is admitted by the Jainas that through the forms of matter them at all. As a result, without adrsta, the variety of pleasure, (pudgala) like the earth, etc., transformed into the shape of a pain, etc., or the variety of body, etc., cannot be logically body, there is manifestation of consciousness, which is existent explained Otherwise how is it that out of so many people as substance (dravyatah) as well as non-existent as mode engaged in service (seva), agriculture (krsi), etc., who put in the (paryayatah). Thus it is established that this self is without a same amount of effort, or who are devoted in the same degree, beginning and without an end. only some achieve results while others fail to do so? Therefore, As to the contention 'because there is no proof of its existence', there being deviation (vyabhicara) in the case of ordinary etc. (we say) these are only empty words, for there is clear causes (drsta-kārana) and thereby an extraordinary cause (in the proof of the existence of the self, which is perception. Thus in

332 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 333

the case of every living being, there is observed to be produced etc., must have some material cause, because they are effects, a cognition in the form 'I experience pleasure', which is self- like the jar, etc.' cognized and clearly refers to the thing known (jñeya), the It cannot be said that it would be a case of proving the proved, knower (jñātr) and the knowledge (jñana), which are all mutually as it is accepted that the body is their substratum or that the distinct. body is their material cause; because by the discussion previously Such a cognition is not false, for there is no contradiction. made, the view that the body is the substratum and that the Nor is it a form of doubt, because it does not involve two alter- body is the material cause have been adequately refuted. natives (koți). Nor would it be logical to say that such a cognition There are also (other inferences proving the self): is without an underlying object, for then there would arise the 'The living body is governed by one capable of applying absurdity of the cognitions of colour, etc., also being without effort (prayatnavat) because it becomes a locus of wilful action, any underlying object like a chariot. Nor can such a cognition have the body as the underlying 'The auditory organ, etc .- the instruments for acquiring object, because it is produced exclusively by the function knowledge-must be employed by an agent; because they are of the internal sense, independently of the external senses. instruments (karana), like the axe, etc.' The body cannot be the object revealed by such an awareness Therefore it being established that there is a substance in the involving the 'I', because it is a thing perceivable by the external form of the self, which is a form of reality distinct from the

senses earth, etc., how can it be specifically determined that only four Hence, some entity distinct from the body, which would be realities exist? the underlying object of such an awareness and a substratum of knowledge, has to be admitted; for such an entity alone can Prabhācandra's Nyāyakumudacandra

logically be considered a knower. But the body (cannot be so), B. REJECIION OF CONCOMIIANCE (VYĀPTI) because it is made of matter, like the jar, etc Indeed, the jar, etc., which are made of matter are never observed to be so. It Well, it being impossible to state specifically the nature of cannot even be claimed that although there is no difference so concomitance, how can tarka be considered the pramāna in far as constitution by matter is concerned, still, the body can be respect of it? To explain, concomitance is a relation among the object revealed by an awareness involving the 'I'; because things; but is it a relation of one thing with another thing in there will be deviation (vyabhicara) in the case of the corpse. respect of space or in respect of time? It cannot be in respect of Such cognitions as 'I am fat', though produced in respect of the space, for smoke is in the sky and fire is on the ground; the rain body, are to be taken in a secondary sense due to its (the body) falls on the upper region and the swelling of the river occurs in being the most useful implement (upakāraka) for the self; just the lower region. Nor can it be in respect of time, for the like the awareness of one in respect of one's most useful servant: swelling of the river does not occur at the time when the rain 'this is none but myself is falling; and the Rohini does not rise at the moment the Moreover, the self is known by inference as well: 'the Krttikā is rising knowledge of colour, etc , must inhere somewhere, because Moreover, between which two would there be this relation of they are qualities, like colour, etc. ' and 'knowledge, pleasure, one not being without the other (avinābhāva = concomitance)-

334 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIALS 335 would it be a relation of one generality with another generality probandum, and it is thus only a word signifying absence and (sāmānya), or of a generality with the particulars (visesa), or of not one signifying a relation particulars with particulars? In the first alternative, it would be Also, (from the statement of) the inconsistency (anupapatti) proving the proved, for it is well-known that fireness and of smoke, namely, 'smoke accompanied by the absence of fire smokeness are related in respect of all space and time, because cannot be explained', (it follows that) absence of fire is a qualifier of eternality and ubiquity. In the second alternative as well, (viśesana) But is this absence of fire real (pāramārthika) or (it may be asked) has a generality concomitance with a mere unreal? If it is real, then due to the absence of smoke as well, it particular not delimited by any space or time, or (with a would not be possible to ascertain concomitance as pertaining particular) as delimited by them? If it be with a particular not to the smoke. Indeed, when the substratum (smoke in the so delimited, it would be nothing but a case of proving the present case) is not known, the thing related to it also (con- proved If it be with a particular as delimited by space and comitance, in the present case) cannot be known; for in that time, there would be absence of agreement (anugama). It is not case there would be absurdities. If, again, the qualification is that smoke in general which is present in the kitchen has agree- unreal, the inconsistency of smoke also, being qualified by it ment with a particular fire as located in the mountain, nor (i.e. an unreal qualification), would itself be unreal. As a result, (smoke in general) which is present in the mountain with the there would follow the impossibility of inference as well particular fire as located in the kitchen. Well, it may be said that (what is meant is that) if there is Nor can there be concomitance of particulars with particulars, absence of fire, then the presence of smoke cannot be justified, for (it may be asked), is it of observed ones with observed for absence of fire is pervaded by absence of smoke However, ones, or of non-observed ones with non-observed ones, or of this also would be illogical. Only such concomitance is relevant observed ones with non-observed ones? If it be of observed for inference as is actually present and ascertained, not that ones with observed ones, it would be a case of proving the which is only surmised to be there; for such concomitance, proved. In case a new (apūrva, i e. as yet unknown) individual even though it may possibly be present, is not thus ascertained. is perceived, inference would not be logically justified. If, again, Such knowledge (viz if there is absence of fire, the presence of it be of non-observed ones with non-observed ones, then due smoke cannot be explained) is only of the nature of a surmise to the absence of the ascertainment of the relation as well as (sambhāvanā); it cannot determine the true nature of a thing agreement, how would inference be possible? Nor can it be of like (the knowledge), 'if the earth was not there, the mountains observed ones with non-observed ones, for the said objections would have fallen down.'

would follow. Morcover, is it the case that smoke is not justified in the Moreover, concomitance is a kind of relation (sambandha) absence of any one particular fire, or in the absence of all fires? Its ascertainment must be preceded by the knowledge of the It cannot be so in the absence of any one particular fire, because relata (sambandhin). But the relata are always two particulars. even in the absence of that fire, but in the presence of some So how can concomitance be ascertained as embracing all the other fire, smoke may be justified. Nor can it be so in the cases (i.e. in general)? absence of all fires, for it is impossible to know the thing qualified Again, the word avinābhava (used to mean concomitance) without knowing the qualifier In the inconsistency of smoke, speaks only of the absence of the probans in the absence of the the qualifier is the absence of all fires; but it cannot be known

336 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIAIS 337 unless all the fires have been known, for the precondition for possible either in respect of space or in respect of time, is also the knowledge of absence is the knowledge of the negatum rejected by this, for the concomitance of one (e.g smoke) as (pratiyogin) and the substratum (aśraya). characterized by its own properties, with another (e.g. fire) as Besides, (smoke being present) sometimes even in the absence characterized by its own properties, is revealed by an uncon- of the absence of fire, it is to be concluded that there is opposi- tradicted awareness. Concomitance is (established) only tion between absence of smoke and presence of smoke. Thus, with that which is non-deviating. Space and time are not non- the precondition for opposing smoke would be not the absence deviating, for smoke, etc, are observed to be present even of fire, but only the absence of smoke" in the absence of the (points of) space and time sought to be Thus on critical examination, concomitance itself becomes conveyed. unjustified; and then, how can tarka, alleged to be the cause for As to the statement 'concomitance --- of what, with whom?', its ascertainment, or inference, which is said to be produced (we reply), concomitance is of one with another, when one has from such ascertainment, be held to be valid? non-deviation with another. Smoke characterized by general Or, let concomitance be admitted. Even then, (it is observed as well as special properties has non-deviation with fire, that) in spite of there being concomitance, the redness of fire characterized by general as well as special properties; thus is not inferred from smoke; for fire alone is inferred by smoke. smoke has concomitance with fire and nothing else. Therefore Similarly, smoke only leads to the inference (of fire), but not to there is no scope for the said objection. The pervader (vyāpaka) is that of the blackness, etc., belonging to it, although they also are what is made known (gamya) and the pervaded (vyāpya) is equally concomitant. (In short, one is not inferred from another, what makes it known (gamaka). It is not that mere generality in spite of concomitance; so inference is impossible). or merely the particular is observed to be of the nature of what The above is now being refuted. is made known and what makes it known, for in spite of some- As to the statement 'it being impossible to state specifically the how being of the nature of both, the two are revealed to be nature of concomitance', (we reply), this is not proper. Since by things belonging to a quite distinct class concomitance we accept non-deviation (avyabhicāra) due to a As to the contention that concomitance is a kind of relation thing's own nature, how can it be said that it is impossible (to and its ascertainment is to be preceded by the knowledge of the state specifically) its nature? (In the inference of fire from smoke), relata, etc. (we reply that) it, too, is refuted by the above, for the specific nature of the probandum and the probans respec- since concomitance can occur between two particulars as tively is fireness and smokeness, as accompanied by a host of its characterized by generalities, it is possible to determine it as own peculiar characteristics. This very nature (of smoke and embracing all cases. In that case, neither is there any scope fire). by dissociating them from others, such as space, time, for objections based on innumerability, etc form, etc., makes the relation pertain to nothing but themselves (In reply to) the contention that the word avinābhāva (i e. smoke and fire) 'Make sure, make sure, that concomitance speaks merely of absence and does not convey a relation, is dependent upon ourselves (smokeness and fireness)'-estab- (we say that) this also is a group of empty words. For the lishing concomitance, in this way, as pertaining to nothing but word avinabhava cannot be construed to mean absence themselves, they make the knower aware of the concomitance alone, as in that case, there would arise the undue possibility which is due to their own selves. of it being applied even to the case of the absence of the jar, Another statement made earlier, that concomitance is not etc .; but actually (it is to be construed to mean) an invariable

338 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MAIERIALS 339 rule (niyama). Such a rule is established on the basis of such been no ascertainment of concomitance even in eternity; for observation (e g. smoke is everywhere accompanied by fire) the particular individuals are countless. Further, there would and unjustifiability otherwise (anyatha-anupapatti; e.g. be an absurdity: inference would become useless, for all the presence of smoke cannot be justified without the presence of spots where fire and smoke are present would already be known fire). Therefore, the word avinabhava is also used to mean the at the time of ascertaining the concomitance. (No unknown two invariable rules; namely, 'wherever there is smoke there is spot where fire may be inferred from smoke would remain.) fire', and 'wherever there is no fire, there is no smoke'. It also cannot be said that, if all fires are not ascertained, it Well, how is it known that where there is no fire there is also would not be possible to know the absence of fire, which is a no smoke? The answer is: in the absence of fire, smoke being qualifier to the unjustifiability of smoke; for an absence of one invariably unperceived, smoke must be invariably concomitant is of the nature of such a spot as is other than a spot charac- with the presence of fire; otherwise, just as, even in the absence terized by one, due to the fact that an absence is really of the of smoke, fire is sometimes found, so also, in the absence of nature of a different positive category (bhāvāntara) ... (In the fire, smoke, too, would have been found, at least in some case .. present case), it consists only of such spots as are not charac- When the presence of one cannot be justified without the pre- terized by fire, and they can be known by perception The sence of the other, then one would invariably be concomitant knowledge of the negatum (pratiyogin) is a precondition only with the other. For example, the presence of fire can be justified for the use of words to express (an absence), and not for ascer- even in the absence of smoke, and hence fire is not invariably taining the absence itself. Otherwise, how can there be know- concomitant with smoke But the presence of smoke cannot ledge even of a jar? For by nature, a jar is different from all be justified without that of fire, and hence, smoke is invariably other objects in the three worlds; and unless the nature of all concomitant with fire other objects in the three worlds is known, there arises the It has also been objected that if the absence of fire be real, absurdity of a jar, also, remaining unknown. then because of the absence of smoke as well, it would not be As to the contention 'sometimes there being the absence of possible to ascertain concomitance as pertaining to it But this, smoke even in the absence of the absence of fire, opposition to also, is unjustified, for only in that particular space or time the presence of smoke is observed (only in the absence of where there is actual absence of fire, is there also thę absence smoke)', etc (we reply that) these are only empty words of smoke; and not everywhere. Therefore how would it be Since in the absence of fire, the presence of smoke is invariably impossible to ascertain concomitance as pertaining to it denied, (it follows that) in the matter of opposing smoke, just (smoke)? like its own absence (i. e the absence of smoke), the absence of As to the contention, 'Is the presence of smoke unjustified in fire, too, is justified to be a precondition When in the presence the absence of only an individual fire, or all fires?', etc .. (we of one, the other is invariably denied, one becomes the precon- reply that) this also is illogical; for concomitance is ascertained dition for opposing the other; for example, cool touch in the with reference to all-'whatever smoke exists, is all unjustified presence of warm touch. And it is observed that in the absence in the absence of fire', and (it is not ascertained) with reference of fire, the presence of smoke is invariably denied. Hence, it to any particular individual, such as, 'smoke, as located in the must be a precondition for opposing smoke. mountain, a house, or a forest, is unjustified in the absence of (Objection:) But then, it is not proved that in the absence of fire'. Had it been ascertained in that way, there would have fire smoke is invariably denied; for in the case of magical

340 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA IHE SOURCE MAIERIALS 341

smoke (gopāla-ghațikā); the presence of smoke is observed which are brought together all the individuals of fire and even in the absence of fire. (Answer) this, also, is illogical; for smoke as existing within the limit of the three worlds and even here, the presence of smoke would only be possible in the their properties; would establish invariable concomitance presence of fire. Presence of smoke implies production of (between themselves), and such properties can be nothing smoke, and that can take place only when there is fire. There- except fireness and smokeness. The properties of redness, etc. fore, in the case of magical smoke as well, how can there be are common to so many objects, but fireness and smoke- any doubt as to the presence of smoke in the absence of fire? ness are not. When words denoting the two (fire and smoke) Well, then, as in the case of the mountain, in the case of a magical are uttered, the hearer only becomes aware of two things, fire show as well, smoke should lead to the ascertainment of fire. and smoke; which are distinct from all other things in the three Such a claim is illogical, for magical smoke is quite distinct worlds and are characterized by their own group of specific from smoke located in the mountain, etc. Smoke located in the properties. Thus it follows that for this reason, concomitance mountain, which is contemporaneous with the presence of is established between the probans and the probandum only fire, is observed to simulate a cluster of banners (fluttering in through fireness and smokeness. the air). But magical smoke is not of this nature Hence, it But then, if there really is concomitance between smoke and

cannot lead to the inference of fire. fire, why is it that it is not referred to at the time of the first

As to the contention that in spite of there being concomi- observation? Because of the absence of the means for cognizing

tance, redness is not inferred from smoke, (we reply that) (grahaka) it When the means for cognizing one is not present, this, too, is unjustified, for inference is admitted to occur one is not perceived; e.g. taste (is not perceived) at the time accordingly as concomitance (is established). The concomi- colour is being perceived. At the time of the first observation tance is ascertained through fireness and smokeness and not of smoke and fire, the knowledge which is the means for through the properties of redness, etc. as they are of innumer- cognising concomitance is not present there. The absence of able kinds and have deviation. (Hence, only fire is inferred the means for cognizing at that time, is established by the from smoke ) The deviation of properties belonging to fire absence of its cause. The cause for the ascertainment of con- is (as follows): yellowness is found to deviate in such cases comitance is observation (wherever there is smoke there is

as the pigeon, gold; brightness in the case of the sun, stars, fire), as well as non-observation (if there is no fire, there is no lightning; substancehood in the case of all the nine substances; smoke) These two are not there at the time of the first obser- and upward movement in the case of the storm; etc. Similarly, vation. It is not to be said, however, that at that time, there (there is deviation of properties) belonging to smoke as well; should also be the absence of concomitance itself due to the for example, blackness deviates in such cases as the blue lotus, absence of the means for cognising; because the absence of the collyrium; acridity in the case of spices (trikatuka: black and means for cognising is incapable (anyatha-siddha) (of proving long pepper and dry ginger); irritation to the eyes in the case of the absence of concomitance). Otherwise, at the time colour is white mustard (katutaila); choking the throat in the case of the being perceived at a distance, (one would have to admit) the unripe rose-apple (jambūphala); and upward movement in the absence of taste (which cannot be perceived, due to distance); case of vapour; etc. These (properties of smoke) are observed as there is no difference (from the case of concomitance, as to be common (to other things as well). Therefore, those parti- alleged by the opponent) .. If, at the time of the first observation, cular properties alone; i.e only those specific properties by concomitance is not really there, how would it appear in an

342 CĀRVĀKA /IOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIALS 343

awareness subsequently, like a flower blooming in the sky? seems to illustrate Madhavacarya's remark that the refutation

What if it be said that it would appear in an awareness sub- of the Carvaka view is not an easy proposition (durucchedam

sequently on the strength of agreement in presence and agree- hi cārvākasya cesțitam)!

ment in absence? (We then ask:) Is concomitance produced The English translation used here is from Taranātha's History of Buddhism in India, Simla, 1970. (janyate) or conveyed (jnapyate) by agreement in presence and agreement in absence? Concomitance cannot be produced (by them), because these two are the means for cognition Tāranātha's

It is never found that the means for cognition produces the HISTORY OF BUDDHISM IN INDIA object of cognition (concomitance, in the present case). If, on the other hand, it is said that concomitance is conveyed (by In the east, [Fol 75 A] in Varendra*, there lived a pandita* them), then, (we ask), is it conveyed as being present only at who attained the vision of arya Avalokiteśvara He entered that time (i.e. the time of the agreements, and not earlier), or as into a debate with a tīrthika Lokāyata teacher. He defeated his being so beforehand as well? It cannot be conveyed as being (firthika's) views no doubt; yet [the īrthika claimed] that argu- present only at that time, because there is no ground to prove ments depended on the intellect and hence one with keener that concomitance exists only at the time of agreement in intellect gained victory. [So he said] presence and agreement in absence (and not at other times as 'There is no direct evidence for anterior and posterior exis- well). If, however, it is conveyed as being present beforehand tence. So I do not admit this.' as well, then it is easily established that concomitance exists Being thus told, he kept the king and others as witnesses and even at the time of the first observation. As such, how can con- said, 'I am going to be reborn. Put a mark on my forehead.' comitance itself and also the means for its ascertainment, namely He placed on his forehead a mark of vermilion cut deep into tarka, be denied (by the opponent)? In case even what is actually the flesh. Putting a pearl into his mouth, he (the pandita) died experienced is negated; there should be the (absurd) negation on the spot even of colour, etc., or the awareness revealing them. His corpse was kept in a covered copper vessel and it was Therefore it is established that tarka can be the pramana (in sealed by the king. respect of concomitance) According to his promise to be reborn as the son of a ksatriya pandita* called Viśesaka*, a son with auspicious marks was born to the latter. His forehead was found to have the mark of vermilion and within his mouth was found the pearl On being Tāranātha examined by the king and others, the dead body of the pandita was found to have no mark of vermilion on the forehead and Born in AD 1575, the great Tibetan scholar popularly the place where the pearl was kept was found empty. It is said known as Lama Taranatha wrote his History of Buddhism in India in AD 1608. The importance of this work as a source- that the same tirthika then came to believe in past and future

book for Indian history is generally recognized. We give existence.

here his brief account of the refutation of the Lokayata by [*mark in the translation indicates Taranatha's use of Indian the famous acarya Candragomin Although a quaint one, it words in Tibetan transcriptions. ]

THE SOURCE MATERIALS 345 Krsnamiśra's to somebody else. Only those who are devoid of manliness Prabodhacandrodaya consider whether an act should be done or not, whether it entails harm, whether to approach women at one's pleasure The Prabodhacandrodaya of Krsnamiśra (c. eleventh and to seize the wealth of others. (18). century AD) is an allegorical drama intended to popularize (After thinking, proudly.) By all means materialism alone is the Advaita view The author naturally feels the need to refute by ridicule the Carvaka view, which he does in a the science, in which view, the only means of knowledge is

section of the second act of the play. This portion is given perception. The elements are earth, water, fire, and air. Wealth

here in translation (largely depending on that of Dr. Sita and pleasure are the sole aims of man. The elements move Krishna Nambiar, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1971). through original impulse. There is no other world. Emancipa- tion is death. This science was composed by Väcaspati who followed our view and has given it to the Materialist. This Krsnamiśra's Prabodhacandrodaya science is popularized in the world by him through his disciples and their disciples

[EXIRACI FROM ACT II] (Then enter the Materialist (Cārvāka) and his disciples.) Crvāka: My child, know that knowledge consists only of

(Then enters Grand Delusion (mahāmoha) pompously with statecraft. The science of agriculture and trade is included in

his attendants) this. The three Vedas are the incoherent talk of cheats. It

Mahamoha: (Smiling) The fools are without any check on makes no difference just because they postulate heaven. Thus:

them 'The view that there is a soul separate from the body, If sacrifices obtain (for one) heaven, by the destruction of the

which on reaching the other world enjoys rewards, is (like) a sacrificial matter through the action of the officiating priest,

hope to get tasty fruits from a big flower of a tree in the sky' (16). then trees burnt by the forest fire would as well bear ample

This world is deceived by the ignorant, who accept the exis- fruit! (19). Moreover-

tence of the mere creations of their own imagination. For- If it is assumed that an animal slain (in sacrifices) goes to

There are talkative believers (ästika-s) who jabber in vain that a heaven, why does the sacrificer not immolate his own father?

thing which does not exist, exists; condemning the truth- (20). And-

speaking non-believers (nāstika-s). Oh, consider from the If Śräddha (offering of rice balls to a dead person) produces

viewpoint of reality: when the body is destroyed, has anyone gratification to beings who are dead, then oil as well may

seen a soul separate from it which acquired consciousness as a inflate the flame of an extinguished light (21).

result of transformation (of material elements due to certain Disciple: Venerable teacher, if the sole aim of man is to eat

combinations)? (17) and drink, then why do these ascetics renounce worldly

They deceive not only the world, but also themselves. pleasures and afflict themselves with severe tortures caused by parāka (a sacrificial sword), sāntapana (a kind of rigid penance), For- If bodies are alike in their different parts, the mouth, etc., and take food once in three days (as an expiatory act)?

how can there be a hierarchy of castes? We do not accept any Cārvāka: These fools who are deceived by the Vedas

difference between a woman and wealth belonging (to us or) composed by cheats are content with the sweetmeats of their hopes. Thus:

346 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA THE SOURCE MATERIALS 347 How blissful is the embrace of long-eyed maidens, the embrace pressing their shoulders with one's arms which is so thy glory, my Lord-neither mine nor Kali's-for this

pleasing because of their prominent breasts compressed; how achievement. (25)

painful is begging, fasting, penance, and exposure to the burning The people of the north and west have forsaken the three

heat of the sun, which only emaciates the bodies of these Vedas, not to speak of tranquillity and self-restraint. In other

fools. (22) places too, the three Vedas exist only as a means of livelihood.

Disciple: Revered sir, these ascetics say that worldly pleasure The Acarya (Brhaspati) has said:

should be given up because it is mingled with miseries. 'Oblations in the fire, the three Vedas, the carrying of three

Cārvāka: (Laughing) This is only the expression of the staves tied together, and smearing of oneself with ashes-all

foolishness of these human animals these are the means of livelihood of those who are devoid of

It is the reasoning of fools that the pleasure which arises in intelligence and manliness. (26)

men from contact with sensible objects should be relinquished 'Those in Kuruksetra and other places, my Lord, need not

as it is accompanied by pain. What man, seeking his true fear the birth of knowledge or Spiritual Awakening, even in

interest, would fling away the berries of paddy, rich with a dream.'

finest white grains, because they are covered with husks and Mahamoha: Well done. That great holy place is rendered

dust? (23) useless

Mahamoha: Well, it is after a long time that my ears are Carvaka: My Lord! There is something more to be reported.

gratified by words which are authoritative! (With joy:) Oh! Mahamoha: What is it?

it is my dear friend, the Carvaka! Carvaka: There is a Yogini of great power called 'Devotion

Carvaka: So, this is King Delusion! (going near him) May to Visnu.' Though her popularity is lessened by Kali, we cannot

the king be victorious! I, (Carvaka), salute you. even look at those who are blessed by her. Therefore, my

Mahāmoha: Welcome, Cārvāka, be seated here Lord; you have to be on your guard against her.

Carvaka: (sits) Kali (age) prostrates before you Mahāmoha: (Somewhat afraid, addresses himself) Oh! it is

Mahamoha: Ah! Kali (age), unimpaired blessings be difficult to destroy one whose great power is well-known and

upon you! who is my natural enemy. Well. (To himself) Sometimes,

Cārvaka: By your grace all is good. He has accomplished drastic action has to be taken. (Loudly) Then, my dear, do not

everything (ordered by you) and wishes to (worship at) your have any doubt. Where can she appear when Lust and Anger

feet. For- are her enemies?

After receiving the great command (from you) and having Cārvāka: Even so, one who desires victory should not remain

accomplished it by destroying his enemies, he is now happy unguarded, even where the enemy is weak. For-

and delighted, and with his great joy feels blessed and prostrates 'Even a weak enemy may prove to be a fierce one in the end

himself at the lotus feet of the Lord! (24) and inflict a mortal wound, like a small thorn that afflicts the

Mahamoha: And what has that Kali (age) achieved? foot.' (27)

Cārvāka: Lord, he caused the virtuous to forsake the path Mahämoha: (Looking behind the curtain) Who is there?

shown by the Vedas and act according to their own wish. It is (Enters the gatekeeper) Gatekeeper: Victory to my Lord. Let my Lord command.

348 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA Mahamoha: Oh! 'Companion of the wicked'! Go and direct Lust, Anger, Greed, Arrogance, Spite and others that they should be on their guard and kill the Yogin known as 'Devotion PART II

to Visnu'. Modern Scholars

Gatekeeper: As your Lord commands

(Exit)

J. Muir

First presented in 1861 and published in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland in volume xix, pp. 299-314, this article bears for us the special impor- tance of being the earliest compilation of the major references to the Carvaka/Lokayata view as found in the epics and the Purāņas.

J. Muirs

Verses from the Sarva-darsana-sangraha, the Visnu Purāna, and the Rāmayana, illustrating the tenets of the Cārvākas or Indian Materialists, with some remarks on Freedom of Speculation in Ancient India In his essay on the heretical schools of the Hindus, Mr. Cole- brooke has given an account of the tenets of the Cārvkas or Materialists (Misc. Essays, i., 402 ff). Professor Wilson, too, in his "Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus" (As. Res .. , Vol. XVI., pp. 5, 6), alludes to the attacks made by the founder of the atheistical or materialistic school, Vrhaspati, on the Vedas and the Brahmanas, and quotes some verses attributed to that author in which he asserts that 'the whole Hindu system is a contrivance of the priesthood to secure a means of livelihood for themselves:' I am not aware whether either the aphorisms of Vrhaspati (Värhaspatya Sütras), to which Mr. Colebrooke refers (Misc. Ess., i., 404) as having been quoted by one of the commentators on the Vedanta, or the Work which contains the verses adduced by Professor Wilson, are still extant or not. As, however, the Sarva Darsana Sangraha1 of Mādhava Ācāryya (a work containing a concise account of the different philosophi- cal schools of India, both orthodox and heretical), from which Professor Wilson derived the verses which he cites, contains a good many more of a similar tendency which are both satirical and clever I shall translate the whole and compare them with

352 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 353

passages of the same tenor which occur in the Visnu Purana and are of the same tendency, and in part identical with those just in the Rāmāyana. quoted. The passage is considered by Professor Wilson to rep- (1). The passage from the Sarva Darsana Sangraha is as resent the sentiments of Vrhaspati's school, and has already follows: been translated by him in his Visnu Purāna (p. 340, f.); but I 'All this has been uttered by Vrhaspati as well: shall give a version of my own, prefixing to it the original '1. There is no heaven, no final liberation, no soul (which Sanskrit, which has never been printed continues to exist) in another world; nor any ceremonies of Vişnu Purāna iii. 18. 14: Anyān apyanya-pāşanda-prakārair castes or orders which are productive of future reward 2. The bahubhir dvija/Daiteyān mohayāmāsa Māyāmoha vimoha- Agnihotra sacrifice, the three Vedas, the mendicant's triple krt/15. Svalpenaiva hi kālena māyāmohena te 'surāḥ/Mohitās staff (tridanda),2 and the practice of smearing oneself with tatyajuh sarvām trayī-mārgāśritām kathām/ 16. Kecid hi nin- ashes, are only a means of livelihood ordained by the Creator dām vedānām devānām apare dvija/ Yajña-karma-kalāpasya for men who have neither understanding nor energy. 3. If (it tathā 'nye ca dvijanmanām/17. Naitad yuktim-saham vākyam be true that) an animal slaughtered at the Jyotistoma Sacrifice himsā dharmāya neșyate / havīmsy anala-dagdhāni phalāyety is (in consequence) exalted to heaven,3 why does the worship- arbhakoditam/18. Yajñair anekair devatvam avāpy endrena per not immolate his own father? 4. If a śräddha (offering of bhujyate/śamyādi yadi cet kāstham tadvaram pattra-bhuk food to the manes)4 satiates even defunct creatures, it is quite paśuḥ/19. Nihatasya paśor yajñe svarga-prāptir yadīyate/ superfluous to furnish people who are setting out upon a journey Sva-pitā yajamānena kinnu tasmād na hanyate/20. Triptaye with any provisions (as their friends who remain behind can jāyate pumso bhuktam anyena cet xataḥ (tataḥ ?)/dadyāc chrād- offer food to them). 5. Since (as you say,) persons in heaven dham śraddhayā 'nnam na vaheyuh pravāsinaḥ/21. Janaśrad- are filled with oblations presented upon earth, why is food not dheyam ity etad avagamya tato vacaḥ/Upexya śreyase vākyam similarly offered (by those below) to people on the roof of the iocatām / yuktimad vacanam grāhyam mayā nyaiśca bhava- house? 6. While a man lives, let him live merrily;5 let him borrow 'mahāsurāh/yuktimad vacanam grāhyam mayā nyaiśca bhava- money, and swallow clarified butter; how can a body return to dvidhaih/23. Māyāmohena te daityāh prakārair bahubhis earth after it has been reduced to ashes? 7. If a man goes to tathā / vyutthāpitā yathā naișām trayīm kaścid arocayat/ another world when he quits his body, why does affection for 24. Ittham unmārgayātesu (teșu?) daityesu te 'marāh/udyogam his kindred not impel him to come back? 8. Hence ceremonies paramam krtvā yuddhāya samupasthitāḥ/25. Tato devāsuram for the dead are a mere means of livelihood devised by the Brahmins, and nothing else. 9. The three composers of the yuddham punar evābhavad dvija/ hatāśca te 'surā devaih

Vedas were buffoons, rogues, and goblins; everyone has heard sanmārga-paripanthinah/26 Sa dharma-kavacas teşām abhūd

of jarbhari, turpharī, and other such (nonsensical) exclamations yah prathamam dvijx/tena raxā'bhavat pūrvam neśur naște ca tatra te/ of the Pandits.6 10. It is well-known that in an aśvamtedha After describing how Mayamoha, the great impersonated (horse-sacrifice), the embraces of the horse must be received Delusion, had seduced the Daityas (who here stand for the by the Queen;7 and it is, in like manner, also well-known what heretical Indians in general) into embracing Jaina and Buddhist other sorts of things are to be grasped by those buffoons.8 In doctrines, the writer proceeds: 'The great Deceiver, practising the same way, the eating of flesh is prescribed by those goblins." (2) The ideas in the following verses from the Visnu Purāna illusion, next beguiled other Daityas by means of many other sorts of heresy In a very short time these Asuras (= Daityas),

354 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA MODERN SCHOLARS deluded by the Deceiver, abandoned the entire system founded 355

on the ordinances of the triple Veda. Some reviled the Vedas, passage may be found translated in Carey and Marshman's

others the gods, others the ceremonial of sacrifice, and others edition of the Ramayana, but I have rendered it anew, both

the Brahmins. This (they exclaimed,) is a doctrine which will according to the text of Schlegel's and of Gorresio's editions,

not bear discussion; the slaughter (of animals in sacrifice) is not and have placed my own two versions in parallel columns for

conducive to religious merit. (To say that) oblations of butter facility of comparison. I have placed in italics the passages

consumed in the fire produce any future reward, is the assertion which coincide most closely with those from the Sarva-darsana-

of a child. If Indra, after having attained godhead by numerous sangraha and Vişnu Purāna:

sacrifices, feeds upon sami and other woods, then an animal Rāmāyana, Ayodhyākanda, Section 108, Ed Schlegel

which eats leaves is superior to him. If it be a fact that a beast 1. Jāvāli, most excellent of Brahmins, thus addressed Rāma,

slain in sacrifice is exalted to heaven, why does the worshipper who was comforting Bharata, and who was thoroughly versed

not slaughter his own father? If a man is truly satiated by food in duty, with the following words which were contrary to that another person eats, then śraddhas should be offered to duty.10 2. You, descendant of Raghu, who are intelligent and

people who are travelling abroad, and they, trusting this, of superior understanding, ought not to entertain such unprofit-

should have no need to carry any food along with them. 9 After able notions, as if you were an ordinary person. 3. How can

it has been settled that this doctrine is entitled to credence, let any one person be of kin to any other? What has any one to

the opinions which I express be pondered and received as con- gain from any other, seeing that every creature is born alone

ducive to happiness. Infallible utterances do not, great Asuras, and dies alone?11 4. Anyone, therefore, who feels attachment

fall from the skies; only assertions founded on reasoning to any persons, such as his father and mother, is to be regarded

are accepted by me and by other (intelligent) persons like as insane; since no one is anything to any other. 5. Just as in the

yourselves. Thus by numerous methods the Daityas were case of a man who goes into a strange village, sojourns there,

unsettled by the great Deceiver, so that none of them regarded and then quits his abode and proceeds on his journey the follow-

the triple Veda with favour any longer. When the Daityas had ing day; 6. so are men's fathers, and mothers, and houses, and

entered this path of error, the deities mustered all their energies property but temporary possessions (lit. abodes), on which

and approached to battle. Then followed a combat between the good will not allow their affections to fasten. 7. You, most

the gods and Asuras, and the latter, who had abandoned the excellent of men, ought not, by abandoning your paternal

right road, were smitten by the former. In previous times they kingdom, to enter upon a wrong road, painful, uneven, and

had been defended by the armour of righteousness which they beset with troubles. 8. Permit yourself to be enthroned in

bore, but when that had been destroyed, they too perished.' opulent Ayodhya; that city eagerly expects you, with her hair

(3) The following is the passage of the Ramayana to which I fastened in a single braid (in token of mourning). 9. Enjoying, have alluded. It contains the speech of the Brahmin Javali, in prince, the exquisite gratifications of royalty, disport yourself

which he endeavours, ineffectually, to shake the resolution of there as Indra does in paradise. 10. Dasaratha (his father) is

Räma, who was unwilling to deviate from the arrangements now nothing to you, nor you to him; that king (was) one person

made by his late father Dasaratha and return from the forests and you (are) another; do, therefore, as I advise. 11. A father is

of the south to Ayodhya to take possession of the throne now nothing more than the seed of a creature; his seminal principle

offered to him by his dutiful younger brother, Bharata. This and blood combined with the seminal substance of the mother- such is a man's terrestrial generation. 12. That monarch has

356 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 357 gone to the place to which he had to go; such is the course of level path, free from dust and alarm, and to enter upon a wrong human beings; but you are being needlessly injured 13. There- road beset with troubles. 17. Permit yourself to be enthroned fore, I lament12 (the fate of) such men as adhere to justice, and in opulent Ayodhya; that city eagerly expects you, with her of no others; for the just suffe" affliction here, and when they hair fastened in a single braid (in token of mourning). 18. Enjoy- die, they incur annihilation. 14. Men are intent upon oblations ing, prince, the exquisite gratifications of royalty, disport to their progenitors and to the gods: but see what a destruction yourself there as Indra does in paradise. 19. Dasaratha (his of food! For what can a dead man eat? 15. If an oblation eaten father) is now nothing to you, nor you to him; that king (was) here by one (really) passes into the body of another, then let a śrāddha one person, and you (are) another; do, therefore, what I advise. be offered to a man who is travelling abroad; he need not eat upon his 20. A father is nothing more than the seed of a creature; his journey 16. These books composed by wise men (containing seminal principle, with blood and air, combined with the such precepts as) worship, bestow, offer sacrifice, practise seminal substance of the mother-such is a man's generation austerities, abandon (the world); are mere charms to draw of a son. 21. That monarch has gone to the place to which he forth gifts. 17. Understand, intelligent (prince,) that no one had to go; such is the course of human beings; but you are exists hereafter, regard only that which is an object of perception, being needlessly injured. 22. Wherefore I inquire of such as and cast behind your back whatever is beyond the reach of adhere to justice, and of no others; for the just suffer affliction your senses. 13 18. Acting upon this principle, which should be here, and when they die they incur annihilation. 23. Oblations the guide of all mankind, allow yourself to be persuaded by are offered to progenitors and to the gods; men are intent upon Bharata, and accept the kingdom the ceremony, but see what a destruction of food! What is left Rāmāyaņa, Ayodhyākānda, Section 116, Ed. Gorresio. for the dead? 24. If an oblation eaten here by one (really) passes into 1.2. Then Javali, most excellent of Brahmins, the king's the body of another, then let a śräddha be offered to a man who is logician (naiyayika) versed in all learning, and acquainted with travelling abroad, and let him carry no provisions for his journey .. duty, being desired by them all, and seeking to comfort Bharata, 25. These books composed by wise men (containing such addressed Räma, who was unwilling to go to the city, with precepts as) worship, bestow, offer sacrifice, practise austerities, these words in consonance with duty. 3 You, descendant of abandon (the world); are merely meant to multiply gifts: Raghu, ought not, like an ordinary person, to entertain such 26 Understand, intelligent (prince), that no one exists hereafter; unprofitable notions, the contemptible ideas of an ascetic. .... 14 regard not that which is beyond the reach of your senses, but 12. How can any one person be of kin to any other? What has only that which is an object of perception. 27. Acting upon any one to do with any other? Seeing that every creature is this principle, which should be the guide of all mankind, allow born alone, and dies alone 13. Hence a mother and a father yourself to be persuaded by Bharata, and accept the kingdom. both resemble a lodging; the man who feels any attachment to 28-33. Follow, therefore, wise counsels, and abide in your them is to be regarded as insane ... 14. Just as in the case of a man proper path Xupa, the illustrious mental son of Brahma ... these who goes into any strange village, and sojourns there, and then (whose names are enumerated in verses 29. ff) and many other quits his abode, and proceeds on his journey the following day; excellent monarchs, abandoning their dear sons and wives, 15. So are men's fathers, and mothers, and houses, and prop- 34. have yielded to the power of time. We know not whither erty, but temporary possessions (lit. abodes); away with all they nor the Gandharvas, Yaxas, and Raxasas, 35. may have idea of loving them. 16. You ought not, hero, to abandon a departed; such a scene of illusion is this world. For it is the

358 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA MODERN SCHOLARS 359

names of these kings only which are now heard. 36. Anyone self-restraint-this wretch, wishing evil to the magnanimous imagines them to exist in whatever region he pleases. Thus Pandavas, without saluting those Brahmins, thus addressed there is no firm foundation on which this world may abide. the King: "All these Brahmins, falsely imputing the malediction 37. It is this which is the other (or highest) world; enjoy, therefore, to me, themselves exclaim, woe to you, wicked king, the happiness; for just men are not qualified for this enjoyment. slayer of your kindred. What can be the issue of this, son of 38 Just men, descendants of Kākutstha, are very miserable, Kuntī? Since you have slaughtered your kinsmen and elders, while the unjust are seen to be happy. 39. This world, again, is death is desirable for you, and not life." Hearing this speech of in every way confused and perturbed; do not, therefore, most the wicked Raksasa the Brahmins were pained and indignant, eminent of men, condemn the fortune which seeks you being maligned by his words. But they, as well as King Yudhi- 40. Accept this great kingdom which is free from rivals and sthira, all remained silent, being ashamed and cut to the heart. enemies. When Rama had heard this discourse, although Then Yudhisthira said: "Let all your reverences be reconciled slow to wrath, he was greatly incensed at being exhorted to to me, who bows down and supplicates you: you ought not to atheism. 15 curse me who has recently (?) undergone such great misfor- As the doctrines, which in these verses are put into the mouth tunes." All the Brahmins then exclaimed: "We never uttered of the Brahmin Javali, agree essentially in their tenor with the words imputed to us; may your Majesty enjoy prosperity" those ascribed to the Carvakas in the verses I have quoted from Then these noble-minded Brahmins, versed in the Vedas and the Sarva-darsana-sangraha, it would appear (if the section be purified by austerities, recognised (the pretended mendicant) genuine) that those Materialists must be as old as the composi- by the eye of knowledge, and exclaimed: "This is the Raxasa tion of the Rāmayana, to whatever era that may be referred. called Carvaka, friend of Duryodhana; in the garb of a vagrant And that a sect bearing that appellation must have existed at he seeks to accomplish the purposes of your enemy; we speak the time when the Mahabharata received its present form not so, righteous King; let all such fears be dissipated; may appears highly probable from the contents of the following prosperity attend you and your brothers." Then all these pure passage from the Santiparva, or 12th Book, verses 1,414 ff., in Brahmins, infuriated with anger, uttering menaces, slew, with which a story is told about a Räxasa or demon of that name, muttered curses, the wicked Räxasa; who fell down consumed who was a contemner of the Brahmins, and who, there can be by the might of utterers of Vedic incantations, burnt up by the little doubt, is meant to stand for a hostile sectary. bolt of Indra, like a tree covered with leaves.' After Yudhisthira had entered the city and had bestowed Krsna then, in the following verses (1,430-1,442), explains largesses on the Brahmins, etc., the following scene is to Yudhisthira that formerly in the Krta age this Rāxasa, described to have taken place: Carvaka, had for many years practised austerities at Badari; 'When the Brahmins were now once again standing silent, and that having in consequence received from Brahmā his Cärväka the Raxasa, in the disguise of a Brahmin, addressed choice of a boon, he had selected that of being perfectly secure the King. This friend of Duryodhana, concealed under the against the hostility of all creatures. This boon was granted garb of a mendicant with a rosary, a lock of hair on his crown, under the sole condition that he should abstain from showing and a triple staff, impudent and fearless, surrounded by all the any disrespect to Brahmins (dvijāvamānad anyatra). Having Brahmins exceeding a thousand in number, who were anxious obtained this prerogative of immunity from attack, he began to utter their benedictions-men who practised austerity and to oppress the gods. The latter appealed to Brahma, who told

360 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 361 them that he had decreed that the Raxasa'a death should shortly be an upapätaka, or sin of lesșer heinousness. Allusion is said to be brought about through his friendship with Duryodhana, be made in v. 89, 90 and viii. 363 to female anchorets of an which would lead him to treat the Brahmins contemptuously, heretical religion. when they would consume him, as the King had seen; and that The anti-brahminical opinions referred to here áre, however, Yudhisthira was not to feel any remorse for the slaughter of his kindred, since this carnage had taken place in the exercise of his most probably those of the Buddhists, although some other sects may possibly be included. functions as a Xatriya, and its victims had gone to heaven. It is evident from some of the hymns of the Veda (see Muller's Carvaka is again briefly mentioned in the 'Lament of Duryo- Hist. of Anc. Sansk. Lit., p. 556 ff. ) that theological speculation dhana', 9th, or Salya Parva, 3,619: when that prince had has been practised in India from a very early period. In fact all received his death-wound, his thighs having been fractured by the blow of Bhimasena's club: 'If Carvaka, the wandering of these hymns, even those of them which are most artless, poetical, and anthropomorphic in their character, may in a ascetic, skilful in discourse, learns (that I have been mortally limited sense be regarded as speculative; since the religious wounded), he will certainly perform an expiation16 for me in the holy (lake) Samanta-pancaka, renowned in the three worlds' ideas which they express, being founded on no external revela- tion, must have owed their existence not ony to the religious I am not aware how far back the sect of the Carvakas can be emotions and imagination of their authors, but also to a certain traced in Indian literature. Nāstikas (nihilists), Pāșandis (herc- exercise of reflection, which assigned particular attributes and tics), and revilers of the Vedas are mentioned in many parts of functions to the different deities and proceeded along a certain Manu's Institutes, ii. 11: iii. 150, 161; iv. 30, 61, 163: V. 89; viii. 22, 309; ix. 225; xi 65. 66; xii. 33; 95 96. I quote two of these theory of the relations of the Godhead to the universe. There- fore, as the religions or mythological systems of India developed, passages as specimens; ii. 11: 'Whatever Brahmin, addicting it was to be expected that they should exhibit numerous varia- himself to rationalistic writings17 (hetu-śästra), shall despise tions springing out of the particular genius of different writers; these two sources (of knowledge, the sruti and the smrti), is to be cast out by good men as a nihilist and reviler of the Veda.' and more especially that, whenever the speculative element xii. 95, 96: 'All religious systems (smrtis) which stand apart predominated in any author, he should give utterance to ideas from the Vedas, and all heretical opinions whatever, are un- on the origin of the world and the nature and action of the deity or deities which were more or less opposed to those profitable in the next world, for they are founded on darkness. Whatever books, separate from the Vedas, spring up and dis- commonly received. In the stage here supposed, a fixed and authoritative system of belief or institutions had not yet been appear, are worthless and false, due to their recentness of date.' constructed, but was only in the process of construction, and Such heretics appear to have been numerous at the period when therefore considerable liberty of individual thought, expression, these Institutes were compiled, as the faithful are warned (iv. 61) and action would be allowed; as is, indeed, also shown by the against living in a village 'overrun with heretics'; a kingdom 'in which Sudras predominate, overrun with nihilists, and existence of different schools of Brahmins, not merely attached to one or other of the particular Vedas, but even restricting destitute of Brahmins', is said (viii. 22) to be doomed to their allegiance to some particular recension of one of the destruction; a king who is a nihilist is threatened with perdition Vedas. Even after the Brahminical system had been more (viii 309); and it is enjoined (ix. 225) that heretics shall be banished. Nihilism is, however, only pronounced (xi. 66) to firmly established and its details more minutely prescribed, it is clear that the same strictness was not extended to speculation,

362 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 363 but that if a Brahmin were only an observer of the established atheistical principles furnished to him by the former of these ceremonial, and an assertor of the privileges of his own order, philosophers (Bouddhisme Indien, pp. 211; 520). This may be he might entertain and even profess almost any philosophical true and may be susceptible of proof from a comparison of the opinion which he pleased (Colebrooke, Misc. Ess., i., 379; principles of these two systems and an examination of their Muller, Anc. Sansk. Lit., 79) In this way the tradition of free mutual relations. In the meantime, however, it is worthy of thought was preserved and speculative principles of every remark that the Sankhya Sutras, i 27-47, adduce and refute character continued to be maintained and taught without certain tenets which are those of the Buddhist schools. The hindrance or scandal. Meanwhile the authority of the Vedas opinions in question are, (1) the momentary duration of external had come to be generally regarded as paramount and divine, objects, which succeed each other in a perpetual flux (Sütras, but so long as this authority was nominally acknowledged, 34, 35); (2) that things exist only in perception, and have no independent thinkers were permitted to propound a variety of objective reality (Sütra, 42),18 (3) that there is nothing but a speculative principles at variance with their general tenor, void (sunya). All these doctrines are those of the Buddhist although perhaps not inconsistent with some isolated portions schools (as described in Mr Colebrooke's Essay on the Heretical of their contents. It was only when the authority of the sacred Sects). The first doctrine is mentioned in p. 397 of that Essay as books was not merely tacitly set aside or undermined but openly Buddhist; while the second is that of the Yogacaras and the discarded and denied, and the institutions founded on them third that of the Madhyamikas, who are both Bauddha sects, were abandoned and assailed by the Buddhists, that the ortho- ibid. p. 391. (See also p. 380, where Mr. Colebrooke alludes to dox party took the alarm. the Buddhists being noticed in the Sankhya.) If, therefore, the Accordingly, traces of a sceptical spirit are not wanting in Sankhya Sūtras are to be regarded as the original form in which different parts of Indian literature. that system was propounded by its author, and if they have In the Rig Veda viii. 89, 3, 4, reference is made to some free remained free from interpolation, the Sankhya must be later thinkers who had doubted the existence of Indra. (See Original than Buddhism. It appears, however, to be prima facie very Sanskrit Texts, iii. 151.) improbable that the Sūtras of the different philosophical In the Nirukta, Yäska refers to an older author named schools (whatever may be the age to which the earliest nucleus Kautsa, who had spoken of the hymns of the Veda as often of each may be referred) should have remained unaltered from being unmeaningful or contradictory (Original Sansk Texts, the date of their first composition; and the mutual references ii. 180 ff.) which are to be found in the Brahma and the Sankhya Sūtras to Sākya Muni, the founder of Buddhism, who is generally each other's doctrines, totally preclude such a supposition. considered to have flourished in the sixth century BC and, as is The Sutras must therefore either have received interpolations well known, rejected the authority of the Vedas and promul- at some period subsequent to their first compilation, or must gated a system of doctrine and practice at variance with their be regarded as nothing more than later summaries of doctrines contents; most probably derived many ofhis tenets from other which had been handed down, either orally or in writing, speculators who had preceded him. Burnouf (who is followed from an carlier period by Lassen, Muller, and others) is of the opinion that Sakya Mr. Colebrooke, with his usual caution, does not determine merely carried on a work which had previously been com- whether or not the Buddhist doctrines are derived from those menced by Kapila and Patanjali, and proceeded upon the of Kapila, but merely notices the 'strong resemblance' which

364 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 365 the latter 'manifestly bear to the opinions of the sects of Jaina procure in the present life, or on account of the gains and the and Buddha' (Misc. Ess. i., 228) In another place (i. 378), he respectability connected with their performance In this case, says no more than that the last-named sects 'exhibit some it is a singular fact that the votaries of the Vedic rites should analogy to the Sankhyas.' have adopted the speculative opinions of those very materialists But it is not the-systems-of-Buddha-and of Kapila alone by whom these ceremonies and their performers have been so which are atheistic in their principles. Three of the other keenly ridiculed and denounced Darsanas, reputed as being more or less orthodox, or subdivi- P.S. Since the preceding paper was delivered to the Royal sions of them, are known or suspected-not without some Asiatic Society, I have learned, from a letter from Dr. Fitz appearance of reason-to have once professed the same Edward Hall, that he had made a long but fruitless search in opinions, or to profess them still India for the aphorisms on Vrhaspati. In his Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy which have lately appeared, Professor K. M. Banerjea states his opinion (pp. 141, NOTES ff) that the Nyaya and Vaisesika systems were originally atheistic although their modern adherents have adopted a 1 Published in the Bibliotheca Indica, nos 63 and 142 2. See Professor Wilson's Sketch of the Religious Sects of the Hindus, above theistic creed 19 referred to; and for the words tridanda,and tridandin, consult Boehtlingk The wide prevalence of atheistic sentiments in the middle and Roth's Lexicon, with the passages there cited from Manu, ix. 296, ages of Indian history (i.e in the centuries subsequent to the and xii. 10, 11, and other writers commencement of the Christian era) is, however, yet more 3. This refers to the notion expressed by Manu, V.42: 'The twice-born distinctly shown by the remarkable fact that tenets of this man who, knowing the meaning and principles of the Veda, slays cattle on the occasions mentioned, conveys both himself and those cattle to description had, as the orthodox Kumärila himself confessed the summit of beatitude. (Sir W Jones) In the second act of the drama in one of the introductory verses of his Varttika,20 become, in called Prabodhacandrodaya (which has been translated into English by his day, quite general among the adherents of the Pūrva Dr. Taylor and into German by Professor Goldstucker), Māyāmoha (or Mīmamsā School, who thus strangely combined the two Delusion) and a Carväka are introduced among the dramatis personae and characteristics regarded by Manu and the Visnu Purāna as give utterance to the tenets of the Indian materialists. The second and incompatible; namely, recognition of the authority of the the third of the verses quoted in the text from the Sarva-darsana-sangraha are adduced there also. Verse 4 of the text is varied as follows: 'If a Veda and strict observance of Vedic ceremonies which these śräddha satiates even defunct creatures, then oil must nourish the flame of an works so strongly enjoin, with the nihilism, atheism, or extinguished lamp.' The following stanzas are of a similar purport with materialism (nastikya) which they so strenuously denounce If verse 1 of the text: 'The idea that the soul exists with an essence distinct we are to understand from the term Lokāyata, applied by from that of the body, and that it enjoys rewards after it has gone to Kumarila to the hostile section of the Mimamsakas, that they another world, is (as vain as) the expectation of luscious fruit from trees had abandoned the belief in a future life as well as in a God (as growing in the sky.' 'If heaven is obtained by worshippers after the per- former, the ceremonial, and the materials of the sacrifice have all passed we, no doubt, should understand, and as I have been assured away, then abundant fruit will be produced from trees which have been by Pandit Nehemiah Goreh, an intelligent and well-informed consumed in the conflagration of a forest ' In another verse, the gratifi- convert from Brahminism to Christianity); then they have cations of the voluptuary are contrasted with the mortifications of the only practised their Vedic ceremonies either for the sake of the ascetic in a sense favourable to the former. prosperity and happiness which they conceived they would 4. See Manu, chap iii , verses 122 to the end.

MODERN SCHOLARS 366 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA 367 says the Mayamoha, in the Prabodha-candrodaya, Act. ii 5. Dum vivimus, vivamus, 'Let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die', Cor. 14 Verses 4-11 in Gorresio's edition, urging that Rama had sufficiently fulfilled his duty to his father and exhorting him to take posscssion of Compare Original Sanskrit Texts, ii 183. and iii. 45. The words jarbhari, XV. 32 the kingdom, have nothing parallel to them in Schlegel's recension. turphari, occur in Rg Veda, x 106. 6, Sce Bochtlingk and Roth's Lexicon, 15 The section of the Ramayana, and those which follow it, as given in the under these words, and Nirukta, xiii 5 three different editions of the Ramayana, well illustrate the peculiaritics 7. I give the literal meaning of this line in Latin: 'Fama notum est equi membrum of their different texts. In Schlegel s edition, section 108 concludes with genitale a regina capiendum esse . Sec Wilson's translation of the Rg Veda. the 18th verse. which is immediately succeeded by the reply of Rama vol ii., Introd., p. xiii; Rāmāyana, i. 13, 36 (Schlegel's cdit.); i , 13 34 to Jäväli's suggestions, in the 29 anustubh verses, which stand at the (Gorresio's edit. ); Mahābh , xiv , 2645; Vājasaneyi Samhitā, xxiii, 20 ff. and commencement of section 109 To these are added nine more verses in a commentary; Śatapatha Brāhmana, pp 990 ff; Kātyāyana's Sūtras, p 973 longer metre, the Upajati, which Schlegel regards as spurious. As 8 I do not perceive the exact allusion here. unless it be to the Brahmins' regards some of the verses his opinion is no doubt just; for Rāma is grasping character. Possibly there may be a reference in the next line to represented in the first of these additional stanzas as a second time the practice of the Saktas. Goblins are represented by the Hindus as commencing his answer to Jävali, and the tone in which he then repudiates being fond of flesh the sentiments of the latter is much harsher than in the carlier (anustubh) 9. The satirical purport of this half-verse has not been correctly under- verses of the section. In the 36th and following verses of the addition, stood by Professor Wilson, who renders it thus: 'It must be unnecessary Javali is introduced as apologizing for, and half recanting, the opinions for one who resides at a distance to bring food for presentation in he had expressed: 'The Brahmin then addressed to Rama these truc, person. wholesome, and believing (astika) words: "I do not utter the doctrines 10. Schlegel reads here dharmapetam, and Gorresio dharmopetam. The former of the nihilists (nastika): I am not a nihilist; nor does nought exist is the best reading Having regard to opportuneness of time, I have again become a believer 11. The same reflection, with a different moral annexed, occurs in the very (astika) and on an opportunc occasion. I may again become a nihilist". striking verses of Manu, viii , 17 and iv., 239 ff; which I have attempted In one of these Upajati verses, the Buddhists are expressly mentioned to put into verse as follows: Gorresio's edition, however. contains much more extensive interpola- 1 Our virtue is the only friend that follows us in death tions than Schlegel's As we have seen, stanzas 4-11 and 28-39 of section While other ties and friendships end with our departing breath 116 of the former, are all in excess of the verses contained in the corres- 2. Nor father, mother, wife, nor son, beside us then can stay, ponding section of the latter But section 116 of Gorresio's edition docs Nor kinsfolk-virtue is the one companion of our way. not stop even there It contains, in verses 40 ff., a short repudiation by 3 Alone each creature sees the light, alone the world he Icaves, Rama of Javali's doctrines Another discourse of Bharata's follows in Alone of actions wrong or right, the recompense receives. scction 117, and it is not until section 118 that Rama is represented as 4. Like log or clod, bencath the sod, their lifeless kinsman laid, beginning (a second time) the answer to javali, which corresponds to His friends depart, with aching heart, but virtue guards the dead that in section 109 of Schlegel's edition 5 Be then a hoard of virtue stored, to help in day of doom, Carey and Marshman's text generally coincides (as regards the By virtue led, we cross the dread, immeasurable gloom. sections under consideration) with Gorresio's, although in some readings This passage is imitated and expanded in the 13th or Anusāsana Parva it agrees with Schlegel's when that and Gorresio's differ. of the Mahabharata. verses 5 805-5.815. The words in Manu, iv , 244, I will not enter here on the question, of which I have not studied both tamas tarati dustaram, he crosses the gloom difficult to cross,' are probably sides, as to the comparative antiquity of Schlegel's and Gorresio's texts; derived from the Atharva Veda, ix., 5, 1 Tirtvā tamāmsi bahudhā mahānti but I will adduce from the speech of Vasistha in the 110th section of ajo nākam ākramatām trtīyam: 'Having crossed the dark abysses in many Schlegel's edition as compared with the corresponding section of directions immense, let the unborn (or, the moving) one ascend the Gorresio's, what I conceive to be one decided argument in favour of the third heaven. greater antiquity of the former text. We there read (in Schlegel's edition). 12. Compare Mahābhārata, Udyoga Parva versc 4205 'There was then nothing but water, in which the earth was formed 13. These are the principles of the Carvakas Perception is the only proof'

368 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA

From thence was produced Brahma the self-existent, together with the deities He then, becoming a boar, raised up the earth and created the whole world with his sons, who were perfected in spirit Brahma was produced Rhys Davids from the ether,' etc. It is therefore Brahma, who here becomes a boar. and in that form raises up the earth-an incarnation and an act which are In the introduction to his English translation of the clsewhere. as in the Visnu Purana (pp. 27-32 of Wilson's translation), Kutadanta sutta, Rhys Davids finds it necessary to comment and in the Bhāgavata Purāna i , 3,7 and iii , 13, 18 ff ascribed to Vișnu on the Lokayata-a word frequently occurring in the Pali To harmonize the account in the Ramayana with that in the Purānas Tripitaka without it being anywhere explained, in the vast (which is. to all appearance, of later origin), the author of the recension array of Buddhist canonical literature, what this view actually edited by Gorresio changes the words Brahmā svayambhūr daivatais saha, stands for. Although the Indian philosophical tradition is 'Brahma, the self-existent, with the gods', into Brahma svayambhūr almost unanimous in equating the Lokayata to the extreme Vişnur avyayah, "Brahmā the self-existent imperishable Visnu'; and in a materialism of the Carvakas, Rhys Davids argues that such subsequent line substitutes the words Sacarācaram avyayam for saha a philosophy hardly existed in reality: it is more in the nature putraih krtātmabhih, i e. 'he created the whole imperishable world, movable of a figment of imagination of the other philosophers, and immovable,' instead of'he created the whole world with his sons', etc especially of Sankara. The portion reproduced here is This last alteration was rendered necessary by the fact that sons are from the first part of Dialogues of the Buddha, (pp. 166-72, ascribed by mythological tradition to Brahma, but none to Visnu London, 1889) When. therefore the name of Visnu was introduced, it became necessary to strike out all reference to sons. These alterations are not found in On Lokāyata Carey and Marshman's edition, which here agrees with Schlegel's 16 The word which I have translated as expiation is apacita (apaciti?) The I. W. RHYS DAVIDS word apaciti occurs in the 7th or Drona Parva, 7, 811 17. Although reasoning is looked upon by Manu (ii 11) and other orthodox There is a curious expression in the stock phrase describing writings (e g., Mahabhārata, iii 13,463, śuska tarka) with great jealousy the learned Brähmin, so often found in the Pitakas, which I as likely to be employed against the Vedas, its aid is also invoked as have left untranslated in this Sutta, being uncertain as to the necessary for their defence and exposition (Manu, xii. 105); and profes- sors of different systems of logic or speculation (haituka and tarkin) are meaning in which it was used at the time when our Sutta was referred to (xii. 111) as essential component members of a Brahminical composed. It will be instructive in more ways than one to collect conclave of ten (daśāvarā parișad) and consider the other passages in which the word occurs. 18. See Professor Banerjea s Dialogues on Hindu Philosophy, where Sankara's Lokayata is explained by Wilson as 'the system of atheistical refutation of this doctrine, the Vijñana-vāda, is quoted from his com- philosophy taught by Carvaka',1 and by the Petersburg Dictionary mentary on the Brahma Sutras, ii , 2, 28 19. Sce also "Original Sanskrit Texts'. Part iii., p. 216. as 'Materialism'. Now the description of the good Brähmin as 20 He there says, 'For the Mimamsa has generally been turned into a school put, in the Buddhist Suttas, into the mouth of Brähmins them- of materialism (or atheism. lokāyatīkrta), but I have made this attempt to selves,2 mentions Lokäyata as one branch of his learning. The bring it into the paths of theism (cf. the recognition of a future existence, whole paragraph is complimentary. And though the exact ästikapathe)' See Orig Sansk Texts, iii p 209 Comp Professor connotation of one or two of the other terms is doubtful, they Banerjea's Dialogues, pp. 78 ff., 477 ff are all descriptive of just those things which a Brähmin would have been rightly proud to be judged a master of It is evident, therefore, that the Dictionary interpretations of the word are quite out of place in this connection.

370 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA MODERN SCHOLARS 371 Yet they are each of them, at least for a later period, well authenticated. Kumārila Bhatta, in his Vārttika (verse 10), good idea, to a European reader, of the sort of feeling conveyed to Sankara's Indian readers, yet it is not quite exact. European charges the Mimamsa system with having been, for the most 'materialists' (and one or two may be discovered by careful part, converted into a Lokāyata system, and claims for his own search) do not hold the view which Sankara describes to his book the merit of bringing it back to theistic lines.3 Now of Lokāyatikas. course the Mimamsists would indignantly deny this. Kumārila Buddhaghosa in our passage has: Lokayatam, vuccati vitanda- who seems to have been a good deal of a bigot, is here merely vāda-sattham: 'the Lokāyata is a text-book of the Vitandas hurling at adversaries, who claimed to be as orthodox as himself, (Sophists)'.6This does not help us much but previously he a term of abuse. But it is clear that he uses that term in the sense explains Lokākkhāyika as follows: 'Foolish talk according to of'atheistic'. The exact phrase would be nāstika, as opposed to the Lokāyata, that is the Vitanda, such as: "By whom was this his own ästika-patha: that is, the system or the man who says world created? By such a one. A crow is white from the white- 'there is not', an infidel. This is somewhat wider than atheist; it ness of its bones; cranes are red from the redness of their blood."' comes, however, in Kumärila's mouth, to much the same thing. Other Pali comments on the word are the Abhidhāna Padīpika Śankarācārya uses the word Lokāyata several times,4 and (verse 112), which says simply, probably following Buddha- always in the same specific sense as the view of those who look ghosa: Vitanda-sattham vinneyyam yam tam lokāyatam. The date upon the soul as identical with the body, as existing only so of this work is the middle of the twelfth century AD. Much long as the body exists, not continuing, after death, in a new clearer is Aggavamsa in the Sadda-niti, which is a generation condition and separate from the body. A very similar, if not older. He says:7 indeed the very same view is also controverted in the Brahma- Lokotibāla-loko; ettha āyatanti ussāhanti vāyamanti vadassādenāti jāla Sutta; and is constantly referred to throughout the Pițakas lokāyatam. Ayatati vā tena loko, na yatati na īhati vā lokāyatam under the stock phrase tam jivam tam sarīram.5 But it is never Tam hi gandham nissāya sattā puñña-kiriyāya cittam na uppādenti. called Lokayata in the Pitakas. It seems to be the view that there Lokāyatam nāma: sabbam ucchittham sabbam anucchittham seto is a soul; but that it is diffused through the body and dies with kāko kālo bako iminā va iminā va kāraņenāti evam-ādi-niratthaka- it; and is not a separate unity, within the body but not of it, karana-patisamyuttam titthiya-sattham, yam loke Vitandasattham which flies away from the body after death. It is not necessary vukkati yam sandhāya Bodhisatto asamadhuro Vidhūra-pandito: to suppose that either Sankara or the Buddhists had in their Na seve Lokāyatikam, Na, etam punnāya vaddhanam ti āha minds any book setting forth a philosophy based on this single Loko means the common world. Lokayata means: "on that proposition, or any actual school using such a book as a manul. It they äyatanti"; that is, they exert themselves about it, strive may have been so. But the expressions used point rather to an about it, through the pleasure they take in discussion. Or perhaps opinion held by certain thinkers in union with other opinions, it means: "the world does not yatati by it"; that is, does not and not expounded in any special treatise. Nor do either the Buddhists or Sankara pretend to set out that opinion in full. depend on it, move on by it. For living beings do not stir up They are dealing with it only so far as is necessary to enforce their hearts to right-doing by reason of that book.8 Now the Lokāyata is the book of the unbelievers (of the Titthiyas) full of their own contrary positions. And though 'materialist', as a rough and ready translation of Sankara's Lokāyatika, gives a such useless disputations as the following: "All is impure; all is not impure; the crow is white, the crane is black; and for this

372 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 373 reason or for that"-the book known in the world as the Vitanda- sattha, of which the Bodisat, the incomparable leader, Vidhūra Lokāyatikas who know by heart the Lokāyata mantras (mystic

the pandit, said: verses) 12 The date of this may be a century or two after Christ. "Follow not the Lokäyata, that works not for progress in And in the Jain book, entitled the Bhagavati, which Weber puts at about the same time, the Lokāyatikas occur in a similar list merit: The verse quoted-certainly a very old one-is in the Vidhūra of blameworthy persons 13

Jataka,9 and the commentator there says: "This means: In the Milinda, which is probably somewhat earlier, the

Follow no Lokāyata disputation, Vitanda chatter, concerned word is mentioned twice. One passage ascribes a knowledge

with useless matters which neither give paradise nor lead men of the Lokayata (in a sentence expanded from the very clause in our Sutta) to the hero of the story, Nägasena 14 Here the Milinda on into the Path "' Śankara says: 'There is thus, according to them, no soul is quite at the old standpoint. The other passage is in a paren-

separate from the body and capable of going to the heavenly thesis15 in which the sub-hero, the king, is described as 'fond

world or obtaining release '10 The unknown author of the of wordy disputations, and in the habit of wrangling against Jātaka commentary, who certainly wrote, however, in the fifth the quibbles of Lokayatas and Vitandas. ' This may possibly be century, gives the allied proposition as his own conclusion a gloss which has crept into the text But in any case it is evidence

from the uselessness of their discussions, not as the opinion of that, at the time when it was written, the later view of the

the Lokayatikas themselves. It would be an easy transition meaning of the word had become prevalent. from the one expression to the other And the difference is In the long list of various sorts of hermits given in the Harsa

suggestive, especially in the light of other passages in both Carita the Lokayatikas come among others who would be

Sanskrit and Päli books classed by Vedantists as heretics. 16 We cannot, unfortunately,

For while the Mahabharata has precisely the same use of the draw any certain conclusion as to whether or not there were

word as the Pitakas, later works use it in a manner approximat- actually any Lokayatikas living in Bana's time In expanding ing more and more nearly to that of Sankara. The passage in previous descriptions of the concourse of hermits in the forest,

the Mahabhārata is at I, 2889 (= Hari Vamśa 14068), where, at he may be merely including in his list all the sorts of such people the end of a list of the accomplishments of learned Brähmins, he had ever heard or read of.

they are said to be masters of the Lokayata Being mentioned, Lastly, the Lokayata system is, in various works of the four- as in our passage, at the end of the list, it is plain that this branch teenth century, and later, appropriately fathered on Cārvāka, a of learning is meant to be taken as of minor importance. But it mythical character in the Mahabharata, an ogre, who appears is not yet considered unfavourably, much less opprobiously in the garb of a Brähmin. 17 It is not certain whether this is due And the Petersburg Dictionary, from which I take most of these to the ingenuity of a friend or a foe In either case, like the

references, points out that the word may possibly, in this fathering of the later Sankhya on the ancient sage Kapila; or the

passage, have some other meaning than 'Materialism'. fathering of the collection of fables, made by Planudes in the

The Rāmayana goes further There the word is also in a list, fourteenth century AD, upon Acsop the story-teller of the fifth but the Laukāyatikā are blamed as 'clever in useless things' 11 century BC, it has been eminently successful, has deceived

So in the Saddharma Pundarīka the good Mahāyānist does not many, and is still widely accepted serve or court or wait upon (among other low people) 'the Pending the discovery of other texts, and especially of such as are not only the testimony of opponents, the best working

374 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 375 hypothesis to explain the above facts seems to be that about 500 Bc the word Lokayata was used in a complimentary way as the one hand, but to such science as there was on the other.

the name of a branch of Brahmin learning, and probably meant In the first half of the eighth century Kumarila uses the word

Nature-lore -- wise sayings, riddles, rhymes, and theories handed as a mere term of abuse, and in the sense of infidel, of his equally

down by tradition as to cosmogony, the elements, the-stars, orthodox opponents, the Mimamsists. And shortly afterwards

the weather, scraps of astronomy, of elementary physics, even Sankara, in setting forth his theory of the soul, controverts a

of anatomy, and knowledge of the nature of precious stones, curious opinion which he ascribes to Lokāyatikas-possibly

and of birds and beasts and plants. To be a master of such lore wrongly, as the very same opinion was controverted ages

was then considered by no means unbecoming to a learned before in the Pitakas, and not there called Lokāyata, though

Brähmin, though it ranked, of course, below his other studies. the word was in use in Pitaka times.

At that time there was no school so called, and no special hand- Finally in the fourteenth century the great theologian Sayana-

book of such knowledge. But portions of it trenched so closely Mädhava has a longish chapter in which he ascribes to the

upon, were so often useful as metaphor in discussing the Lokāyatikas the most extreme forms of the let-us-eat-and-

higher and more especially priestly wisdom, that we find sayings drink-for-tomorrow-we-die view of life; of Pyrrhonism in

that may well have belonged to it preserved in the pre-Bud- philosophy, and of atheism in theology. The Lokāyata had, no dhistic literature. Such passages, for instance, as Br. Ar. Up. III doubt, at that time, long ceased to exist. His very able descrip-

8.3, Chand. Up. IV, 17, I and VI, 2-7, on the worlds and on tion has all the appearance of being drawn from his own

cosmogony; Chand. III on the colour of the rays of the sun; Br imagination; and is chiefly based on certain infidel doggerel Ār. Up. II. I. 5-7, and III, 7, 3-7, on the elements; Ait. Ār. III, verses which cannot possibly have formed a part of the Lokāyata

2.1.4 and others on the parts of the body; and many others of a studied by the Brähmins of old 18 It is the ideal of what will

similar kind on these and other subjects might be cited as happen to the man of some intellect, but morally so depraved

examples. that he will not accept the theosophist position.

The amount then existing of such lore was too small to make a Throughout the whole story we have no evidence of anyone

fair proficiency in it incompatible with other knowledge. As who called himself a Lokayatika, or his own knowledge

the amount of it grew larger, and several branches of natural Lokāyata. After the early use of the word in some such sense as

science were regularly studied, a too exclusive acquaintance Nature-lore, folk-lore, there is a tone of unreality over all the

with Lokäyata came to be looked upon with disfavour. Even statements we have. And of the real existence of a school of

before the Christian era, masters of the dark sayings, the thought, or of a system of philosophy that called itself by the

mysteries, of such mundane lore, were marked with sophists name, there is no trace. In the middle period the riddles and

and casuists. This feeling is increasingly vouched for in the quibbles of the Nature-lorists are despised. In the last period

early centuries of our era. In the fifth century we hear of a the words Lokāyata, Lokāyatika, become mere hobby-horses,

book, presumably on the riddles and mysteries of the craft, as pegs on which certain writers can hang the views that they

it is called 'a book of quibbles'. Various branches of mundane impute to their adversaries, and give them, in doing so, an

science had been by that time fairly well worked out Lokāyata odious name.

was still the name for the old Nature-lore, on the same level as folk-lore, and in contradistinction, not only to theosophy on

376 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYATA

NOTES

1. He gives as his authority the Amara Kosa; but the Kosa merely mentions the word, in a list, without any explanation. H. P. Sastri 2 Anguttara I. 163, and other passages 3. The passage is quoted in Muir's Sanskrit Texts, III,95 In this article, originally published as a booklet, Dacca 4 For instance in his commentary on the Brahma-Sūtra, I 1.2; II. 2.2; III, University Bulletin No. 1, 1925, the distinctive feature of 3.53 H. P. Sastri's argument is that the Lokäyata view might 5 For instance in the Mahāli and Jaliya Suttas 6 Sum 1, 247. The Vitandas are quoted and refuted in the Attha Sālinī, originally have been the same as the theoretical position of

pp. 3, 90, 92, 241 (where the word is wrongly spelt). the Käpälikas, and hence it continues to survive in the country

7 Quoted sub voce in Subhūti's Abhidhānappadīpikā Sūci, p. 310. According to in the form of some obscure popular cults, like that of the

the Sasana Vamsa Dīpika (Dr Mabel Bode's edition, p 74), he lived at Sahajiyās

Arimaddana in Burma in 1127 AD. See also Sāsana Vamsa Dīpo, verse 1238; Gandha Vamsa, pp. 63, 67; Forchammer, Jardine Prize Essay, p 34; Lokāyata

J. P T.S., 1882, p 103. H. P. SASIRI 8. With this attempt at derivation may be compared Nilakantha on the passage quoted below from the Mahābhārata (as given in B R.) Loka evāyatante te lokayātikā Also Prof. Cowell's suggestion (Sarvad S , p 2) The Sarvadarsanasamgraha was published in the Bibliotheca

that Lokayata may be analysed etymologically as 'prevalent in the Indica Series in 1858 under the editorship of Pandit Iśvar world. The exact meaning of ayata is really very doubtful Chandra Vidyasāgara. The first chapter of this work contained 9 Fausböil's edition, VI, 286 No less than four bas reliefs, illustrating this an account of the Carvaka Darśana-a system of philosophy Jataka, have been found at the Bharhut Tope. See my Buddhist Birth which believed neither in God nor in a future existence. But Stories, p. cii. On the greater age of the verses, as compared with the prose, of the Jatakas, see ibid Lxxviii the most attractive feature of this account was the bold specu-

10. Loc cit. See Deussen, Vedānta-system, 310; and Thibaut. Vedānta-Sūtras. lations of the system and the sarcastic tone it assumed against

II. 269 the cherished doctrines of Hindu Orthodoxy. Those were 11. Gorresio's edition, II, 109. 20 Both these passages from the epics are days of translations from Sanskrit into Bengali and the transla- from later portions of them tion of the Sarvadarsanasamgraha was undertaken by the most 12. Chapter XIII, at the beginning. Burnouf (p. 168) reads tantras (instead of learned man of the time, Pandit Jayanārāyana Tarkapañcānana, mantras), no doubt wrongly, and has a curious blunder in his note on the passage (p. 409). He says Lokayata means in Pāli 'fabulous history. Professor of Hindu Philosophy in the Sanskrit College, Calcutta.

romance': and quotes as his authority, the passage given above from the But that conscientious scholar soon found that the task was Abhidhāna Padīpikā, in which Lokāyatam is simply explained as vitanda- beyond him. He translated the Carvaka Darsana all right. sattham This last expression cannot possibly mean anything of that sort But the next Darsana, the Buddhist and the Arhata, proved a 13. Weber, Ueber ein fragment der Bhagavati II, 248. stumbling block to him and he gave the work up in despair. 14 My Milinda, I, 7 But there was a bolder spirit among his pupils. This was Pandit 15 Ibid 1, 17 16 Cowell's Translation, p. 236 Maheś Candra Nyāyaratna, then about thirty years of age. He 17. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, Prabodhacandrodaya, Sarva-darşana-samgraha boldly translated the whole work and issued it in his own name, 18 Sarva-darsana-samgraha, Chapter I, translated by Prof Cowell in the his Guru writing a foreword on the translation, which gave version published in 1882 Maheś Candra a name and I should say, a fortune.

378 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA MODERN SCHOLARS 379 This book early attracted my attention and I read not only the Bengali but also the Sanskrit. The versified portion of seventh or the beginning of the sixth century BC, according to

the account of the Carvakas I soon made my own. Curiosity the date of Buddha's nirvāna in 543 or 483 BC.

impelled me to look at other references to the Cārvākas and I Kauțilya, in the fourth century BC, speaks of the Lokāyatikas

got one in the Seventeenth Canto of the Naisadhacarita-a only once in his work, but the connection in which he speaks

work which was very popular in those days. The tone of sarcasm of them seems to indicate that they had a system like that of the

was more bitter, but there was no new information. References Sāmkhya and Yoga.

were found in the Rāmāyana, the Mahābharata and in the Kāvyas In the second century Bc Patañjali speaks of the Lokāyatas

and Natakas, but information about the doctrines was very and of Bhāgurī as their Vārttika or supporter. In the second century AD, Vātsyāyana in his Kāmasāstra quotes meagre. The Sarvadarsánasamgraha was written by Mādhavācāryya in a number of Lokāyata sūtras and refutes them. These sūtras

the second half of the fourteenth century, and the Naisadha, relate to the desirability or otherwise of the study of Dharma-

according to the Bombay editor, in the end of the twelfth śāstras. The Lokāyata, who believes neither in Dharma nor in

century. But the late lamented Pandit Vindhyesvarī Prasad Adharma, says:

Dube, in his Chronology of Nyaya works, says that Hira 1. Religious rites should not be practised.

Pandit, the father of the author of Naisadha, was a contemporary 2 Because their fruition depends upon the future.

and a rival of Udayana early in the eleventh century. The 3. And is doubtful

Carvaka Darsána, when it is mentioned in the Rāmāyana and 4. Who, unless he is a fool, gives away what belongs to him

the Mahabharata, must be older than them, and I began my to others?

search anew. The result of the research is given below. 5 A pigeon today is better than a peacock tomorrow.

One of the six heretical teachers who were either older than 6 A sure kaudi is better than a doubtful gold coin. So says

or contemporary to the Buddha was Ajitakeśakambalī. He the Lokāyata.

held a doctrine which was rank Materialism. He said that there These six seem to be genuine aphorisms from the Lokãyata

were four elements-earth, water, air, and fire-a combination Sūtras.

of these in certain proportions and under certain circumstances In the eighth century, Haribhadra Suri, a voluminous writer

produced vitality, and at death, earth went to earth, water to of the Jainas, writes six verses in his Saddaraśanasamuccaya

water, fire to fire, air to air and that vitality was gone. Just as noting the fact that the Lokayatas regard earthly enjoyment as

certain ingredients coming together produce the power of the highest aim of human life. But his commentator Gunaratna

intoxication, so the elements came together and produced gives us a quotation from Väcaspati, which may be synonymous

what is life. Life beyond this is a myth. This body is ätman with Brhaspati: Prthivyaptejovayuriti tattvāni tatsamudāye

Ätman is nothing beyond this body. Ajitakeśakambalī is śarīravisayendriyasamjnās tebhyaś caitanyam.

regarded in some quarters as Carvaka. But I suspend my The ordinary derivation of the word Cārvāka is cāru and

judgement for the present until I have exhausted my references väk: charming, alluring, entertaining speech. But the com-

in Buddhist and Jaina literature-store-houses of information mentator gives another and more attractive derivation. He

about the most productive period of Indian thought. says that the word is derived from carva: chewing, grinding

Ajitakeśakambali must have lived either at the end of the with the teeth, eating, swallowing virtue and vice. Those who take no notice of virtue and vice are Cārvākas. He also says

380 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 381

that Brhaspati is the author of their doctrine and so they are with a view to rise up to heaven seem to be no better than sheep called Barhaspatyāh. who, in order to advance for a fight in front, always retrace From the statements of the commentator Gunaratna, it their steps appears that there were Lokayatikas even in his time, the end (2) If the animal immolated in a sacrifice goes to heaven, of the fifteenth century AD, that they were given to eating and why does the sacrificer not kill his father and send him to drinking; that they indulged in all sorts of sensual excesses; heaven-a consummation so devoutly to be wished? that they were Kapalikas besmeared with dust; and they were (3) A Lokayata had a very orthodox wife, who always dinned Yogins belonging to all castes. into his ears that what learned men say after long deliberation In a work entitled Sarvasiddhanta-samgraha attributed to cannot but be true He said, very good, come. They went at Sāmkarācāryya in the early part of the ninth century, it is midnight to the city gate The broad road leading from the stated that Barhaspatya, Arhata and Bauddha are non-Vedic gate was full of dust. They made marks with three figners on systems of philosophy. The well-known verse agnihotram both sides imitating the footprints of wolves, and returned trayo vedah etc. Samkara attributes to Brhaspati, and he says home. Next morning the footprints frightened even the best that the Lokayatas do not believe in the blessings of the future of citizens who were afraid that wolves were frequenting the existence, but only in such blessings as agriculture, commerce, city. The man now succeeded in bringing his wife completely dairy farming, and dandanīti, which produce tangible results around to his own opinion. in this world. This is what Kautilya also says about the followers The orthodox Brahmins hated them with a genuine hatred of Brhaspati, the author of an ancient Arthasastra before him, Himadrī in the 13th century says that they should be expelled who, he says, believed only in vārtā (Economics) and dandanīti from the Śraddhasabha like dogs. (Coercion) Dr. F. W. Thomas has recently published a work entitled There is another work on the History of Indian Philosophy Brhaspati Sutra which has been eagerly studied by all scholars entitled Sarvadarśanasamuccaya written under the patronage of interested in Indian history, thought and society. The school a Rajput Prince at Delhi by Maladhāri Rājaśekhara Sūri in 1340 of Brhaspati is older than Kautilya who quotes their opinion. AD. He includes the slokas on the Lokayatikas as found in Brhaspati is said to have been propounder of the doctrine of Haribhadra's work and attempts to refute their contents. the Lokäyatikas He is also the writer of a Smrti work. Some This is all the information we can pick up from known litera- people think that there were three Brhaspatis: the economist, ture in Sanskrit. From this, it is possible to recount a history of the philosopher and the law-giver. Of the law-giver we have a the system from the seventh century BC to the present day. number of verses printed in the collection of Smrti works. Of The Lokayatas do not believe in Iśvara or in a future cxistence. the philosopher, we have two quotations. The Sūtras now Virtue and vice they have none. They believe in the present, published by Dr. Thomas, written in the form of aphoristic and not in the past nor the future. They are Positivists They lectures by Brhaspati to his pupil Indra, the ruler of heaven- have few doctrines to defend but many to assail, and in the in which form the Smrti work is also written-related to matter of assailing they are bold, direct and exccedingly Economics. Dr. Thomas is, however, not disposed to consider sarcastic. Some of their sarcastic arguments are very enjoy- these sūtras as genuine. He thinks there are sūtras which relate able. I cannot resist the temptation of quoting one or two. to things very modern: Rejecting those sūtras, and their (1) Those who take a dip under the water of the Ganges number is large, there are enough in the book which should be

382 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA MODERN SCHOLARS 383 as ancient as Brhaspati the economist. These ancient sūtras speak of the Lokayatas with approval, extolling them to the bent upon the seduction of Mälti and upon her destruction.

skies After enumerating the branches of economics then But the Brhaspati Sutras tell us that the Kapalikas are an ancient

known, namely agriculture, cattle-breeding and commerce, sect, at least as ancient as the Lokayatas; and that as the Lokayatas,

Brhaspati says that in the matter of acquisition of wealth, with their Materialistic philosophy, marked the beginning of

Lokāyata is the Sāstra. Again, Lokāyatikas say that the fruit of the science of Economics, so the Kapalikas, with what system

Värtā, if not for the support of an army, soon perishes Even in of philosophy we do not know, marked the beginning of the

those Sutras which Dr. Thomas considers spurious, we get science of Erotics. Brhaspati considers them to be distinct sects,

more information about the Lokayatikas than anywhere else but Guņaratna identifies the Kāpālikas with the Lokāyatikas

One sutra says, if one not believing in Orthodoxy attempts The influence of the Lokāyatikas and of the Kāpālikas is still

to attain a human object in the right direction, he is a Lokayata strong in India. There is a sect, and a large one too, the followers

Another says that the Lokayatikas hold Dharma to be futile. of which believe that deha or the material human body is all

It conduces to wealth (for the priests). It is like stealing iron that should be cared for; their religious practices are concerned

from a lump. Agnihotra, morning and evening rites, reciting with the union of men and women and their success (siddhi)

mantras-everything is done for wealth. One reads the Vedas, varies according to the duration of the union. These call them-

which are full of earthly desires, to hide one's own transgres- selves Vaişnavas, but they do not believe in Visnu or Krsna or

sions. Similarly, Agnihotra is performed with the object of his incarnations. They believe in deha. They have another

drinking wine and enjoying women name, Sahajia, which is the name of a sect of Buddhists which

But the most important piece of information the Brhaspati arose from Mahayana in the last four centuries of their exis-

Sutras give us is the close connection of the Lokayatas with the tence in India. But Brhaspati Sūtra gives the idea that there are

Kāpālikas. It says, for the production of wealth Lokāyata is the more Kāpālikas bent on Kāmasādhanā than Buddhists.

Sāstra; in the same breath it says, for Käma or earthly enjoy- ments, Kāpālika is the Sastra. If Brhaspati says so he is sure to be denounced by orthodox people as Nästika. But that is not our present purpose-our present purpose is the Kāpālika. These are always looked down upon by all classes of people. They are fond of cruel rites. None can forget the fierce Kapalika bent upon woman-sacrifice in Bankim Chandra's most power- ful novel, Kapalakundala The scenes in that work are set in the Bengal coast in the early seventeenth century. In the year 1092 Krsna Miśra, in his wonderful allegorical drama the Prabodha- candrodaya, introduces a Kāpālika and a Kāpālikī to test the character for continence of a Buddhist monk and of a Digambara Jaina priest. The pair is bent upon Kāmasādhana. Bhavabhūti speaks of a Kāpālika Aghoraghanta and a Kāpālikī Kapālakundalã

MODERN SCHOLARS 385 they consider, as their text-book, the Vijñaptimātrasiddhisāstra of Vasubandhu. In fact, this book is one of the greatest monu- G. Tucci ments of Indian thought; and I hope that in the near future the collaboration of Chinese scholars and Indian pundits will In this article, originally published in the Proceedings of the restore the Sanskrit text, which seems hopelessly lost. First Indian Philosophical Congress, 1925, the main drive But if it is difficult to find a European philosopher who of Tucci's argument is in favour of the possibility of the rightly appreciates the value of Indian philosophy, nobody materialist view having been a forerunner of Niti and Artha would deny that the fundamental characteristic of Indian śastra, or ancient Indian political science. thought is an idealistic one. A Sketch of Indian Materialism In fact, India is traditionally believed to have been the country of thinkers and yogins, Brahmins and ascetics; a country G. IUCCI which, plunged in dreams of mysticism and abstruction, denied life and any form of activity .. Even now, this is the most pre- It will seem strange enough that among the multiplicity of valent opinion on India we have in Europe Indian philosophical schools and systems I have chosen as the But they ignore that even according to the more orthodox subject of my paper the Carvaka-or Lokāyatamata-which Indian conception, life is considered the result of kāma, artha as a particular school has disappcared long ago from India, and dharma. As in individuals there is a time when kāma and and which was so greatly looked down upon that according to artha predominate, so in the history of Indian civilization, side Brahminical orthodoxy, no sin could be compared with nāstikya by side with the Upanisads and Buddhism we find Lokayatas Nevertheless it is necessary to pay attention to it, because and Cārvākas, hedonists and politicians who were so outspoken the study of it sheds new light on this many-sided activity in defence of that Wille zum Leben which mysticism seemed of the Indian mind which had, and has, so many aspects and to check, that perhaps we ourselves in the West cannot vie tendencies that there is perhaps no Western thought that was with them not anticipated in India. We are proud of our absolute idealism But India was not just a country of saints and hermits: she which seems to us to be one of the greatest conquests of the not only prayed and meditated, but also had her struggles and European mind, because it veils the materialism and the practical her history. Without men working in this life and for this life it mechanicism which constitute the real essence of our civilization. is not possible that this eternal drama, of which God only Evidently it is ignored that Nagarjuna, Asanga and Vasu- knows the end and the goal and which we call history, can take bandhu were the greatest and unsurpassed forerunners of the place. Those who know only an ascetic India do not under- same principles which Hegel started and our contemporary stand India, that India who is revealed by her poems, her Italian school, with Benedetto Croce and Giovanni Gentile at dramas, her nītis. On the contrary, you find that this home of its head, has emphasized. On the contrary, our colleagucs of idcalism hås produced the crudest form of hedonism and politi- China and Japan are quite right when they assert that the East cal science that we know, a political science compared with has its own idcalistic philosophy which is far better than any which the principles of Machiavelli or Hobbes would appear other Western system, as it is born in its own country and quite soft. harmonizes, therefore, with its spiritual exigencies; and when In my new book, History of Indian Materialism,1 I think that I

386 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA MODERN SCHOLARS 387 have succeeded in giving a general idea of what Indian material- have been taken from an ancient but now lost compilation of a ism was But as this book is written in Italian, that is, in a peculiar Lokayata character. Certainly, we cannot accept the language which is not yet largely known in India, I shall try to tradition when we are told that the author of this book was expose some results about the principal materialistic schools Brhaspati himself who, according to the Maitri Up. (Ed. An. that I could gather from the philosophical literature I have As. S.s. p. 466), Visnupurāna (III, 17,41), Matsyapurāna (47, 184) perused conceived this devilish doctrine in order to spread untruth and It is well known that no Lokayata text has come down to us; disbelief among the Asuras; but what must chiefly interest us therefore the principal tenets of the school can be restored only is only that Brahminical authority too, that should have had on the basis of the more or less detailed exposition of the some interest in freeing their heavenly representative from Lokayatamata that is to be found in the pūrvapaksa of many such a responsibility, did not object the authorship of the Brahminical or Buddhist philosophical works, and in some doctrine and the book to Brhaspati How, morcover, can we quotations we can meet with in books on Nyāya. But from explain the similarity in many a quotation from the Lokāyata- this to assume, as some scholars did, that Lokayata texts never mata which can be found in the most different texts? This existed, is to go too far. I cannot give all the arguments which similarity, besides, is not only to be met with in recent philoso- I have collected to refute this opinion, without taxing your phical literature, but also in ancient texts; as, for instance, patience; I shall only briefly expose some of the facts which, it between the tenets attributed to Ajita Kesakambalin in the seems to me, clearly point out that Lokāyata texts were known Dīghanikāya and the principal school of the Akiriyāvada in the in ancient times. A Lokāyata Sāstra is quoted in Candrakīrti's Jaina Sūyagadanga, in which the commentator Silānka recog- commentary to Mūlamadhyamakārikā, or rather to the Prajñā- nizes the Lokāyatika or Bārhaspatya. sāstra, as its original title seems to me to have been; in Āryadeva's But from which school did the first Lokayata text issuc? Śataśastra, recently translated by me from the Chinese,2 there This is a question difficult to answer; because materialism is a is a quotation from the Brhaspati Sūtra; according to the general name under which we can collect many tendencies and unknown author of the marginal notes to the apabhramsa systems, as the multiplicity itself of names for materialist seems work, Tisatthimahāpurisa-guņālankāra of Pupphadanta, the to point out: nāstika, Cārvāka, Lokāyata, Bārhaspatya, Svā- Purandara named in the text was a Cārvākamate granthakartā,3 bhāvika, Bhūtavadin, Icchantika. Without discussing here the according to Krsna Miśra, Cārvāka was an ancient master of etymology and the different meanings of all these names, I the school to whom Brhaspati transmitted his doctrine. And shall point out that even if in later times they became almost in an ancient well-known authority, namely the Värtika of synonymous, we are not authorized to assume that this actually Patañjali, we find a nāstika master named Bhāguri expressly did happen in ancient times. But of course it is evident that mentioned. Moreover, the tradition attributes to Brhaspati there must have been a common store of general and funda- himself the first treatise of the system called after him Bärhas- mental principles that characterized these heretical schools and patya, and I domot know why we should not accept it; of distinctly diversified them from the Brahminical ones; so that, course, we cannot assume that the Brhaspati Sutra edited by owing to such a connection even among their own peculiarities, Prof. Thomas is the original book of the school, inasmuch as it they went under the general name of nastika. But what did bears a clear Brahminical character: but in spite of that you will they deny? What was their nastikya? To answer this question it find some quotations in it on the Lokäyata, which are likely to is necessary to remember two things. First, that materialism

388 CĀRVĀKA / 1OKĀYATA MODERN SCHOLARS means cither a conception of the reality which explains every- 389

thing on the basis of mechanical laws and denies the existence Therefore the peculiar characteristic of the Lokāyata must of every transcendent being, or, in the usual vulgar sense, an be found elsewhere. They denied the turning-point around epicurean manner of life which ignores every religious fecling which Indian philosophy, theology, theosophy, religion ever and whose only goal is to enjoy life. The thcory of Viharabhadra moved; consequently, they opened a chasm between them- in the Dasakumāracarita (p. 193, Nirnaya Sagara edition, Bombay selves and other orthodox schools, giving birth to this nāstikya- 1898) can be considered a peculiar type of this hedonistic con- karmanam already quoted in Manu (III, 65) which is so charac- ception Secondly, that Indian religious conception differs in terized in some Buddhist texts: n'atthi sukata-dukkatānam some points from ours. Certainly, aecording to Brahminical kammānam phalam vipāko. sources, it was sufficient not to admit of the authority of the This is the central idea of Indian materialism and the principle Vedas in order to be called a nāstika: these are the vedavādāpaviddha of many important consequences .. If there is no karman, there is of Mahābhārata (XII,2, 15), the vedanindaka of Manu (II, 11), no ätman, there is no paraloka King Prasenajit who is a supporter the aśraddadhāna of Gita (IV,40).4 of the natthikaditthi, in the Dīghanikāya, tries to defend his And according to orthodox theism or pantheism a nāstika thesis that there is no atman, and that our atman is only our body. can also be one who does not believe in any God. But even if to The analogies which the Payasisuttanta shows to have with some strict Brahmins, disbelief in Iśvara scemed to be nāstikya, the Jaina Rayapaseniya and some passages of Samaraicchakaha7 atheism is so often to be met with in India that it cannot be cannot be explained as mutual borrowings, but rather as various considered the principal characteristic of the Lokāyatamata derivations from real doctrines followed in ancient times.8 Buddhism was atheistic-I do not speak of course of later But as a consequence of this rejection of every transcendency Mahayana Buddhism, and Buddhist literature is full of treatises and of the coming back to the enjoyment of life, a tendency aiming at refuting the Isvaravada. I quote the Isvarakartrtva- began in India which we can call a realistic onc nirākrti-visnorekakartrtva-nirākarana attributed to Nāgārjuna, The conception of samsara had contributed a colour of pes- the Isvarabhangakārikā of Kalyāna Rakșita, the Bodhicaryāvatāra simism to the Indian vision of life which conveyed that our Santideva (IX, 119-126). The Jainas followed their example aim is not to be attained in this life, but in a higher world: not and the refutation of God made by Malliscna Sūri in his Syādva- loka, but nirvāna is to be sought. damañjarī can well be considered a standard work of Indian The Lokäyatikas represent a reaction to this thought as they atheism. It is quite useless for me to remind you that Sankhya- teach that only that which can be perceived (pratyaksena) exists, although included among orthodox systems-was athcistic, direct experience is the only pramana for men; what we cannot at least in its ancient form. And that the same thing is to be said see is mere fancy: so that one may be induced to consider them for Vaiśeşika was already pointed out by Faddegon, and is the forerunners of scientific research, as Mr. Rhys Davids9 and demonstrated by a very important treatise of Aryadeva on the Prof. Franke10 did They believed that the Lokāyatamata, to be nirvana of heretics recently translated by me from the yet met with in Buddhist texts, was a doctrine specially aimed at extant Chinese text. Mimamsakas also did not believe in a studying nature and the laws of nature. But I cannot accept personal God, and owed their epithet of5 (prāyenaiva hi loke their opinion Loka never had, in Sanskrit, the meaning of mīmāmsā lokāyatīkṛtā) Lokāyatika to the refutation of the nature for which it is used: pradhāna, or prakrti or svabhāva; so personal God as we can see in the Prakaranapañcikā of Sali- that Buddhist texts when discussing cosmological questions, kanātha6 or in the Ślokavārtika of Kumārila. in order to avoid misunderstanding, are obliged to prefix to loka the word bhajana when they conceive the cosmos as a

390 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 391

material thing: while loka in itself has, rather, the meaning of that in this world of men, God and priests should not interfere: human world or class of beings, lokayātrā, lokokti, lokavāda, Trayi samvaranamātram. As it happens in such a case, the reaction devaloka. Therefore the interpretation we have to give to the of the artha against the dharma went further: artha not only name Lokāyata is quite different. It is but a science which has broke up any relation with dharma, but rose against it From for its only object the loka, that is, this world; and this interpre- this time onwards we have, therefore, two artha schools: the tation is quite in accordance with the Chinese translation of the orthodox one which remained under the authority of dharma word by Shun she or Shun su: 'those who follow the world or and was generally included in the dharmasastra; and the other the customs of the world'. Therefore this Lokayata, which has following its heretical principles until at the end asserting artha for its aim the lokayātra, is the forerunner of niti and arthasāstra, and kama to be the only goal of humanity (arthakāmau that is of a science which was attributed by Brahminical sources puruārthau) dandanīti and vārttā the only science, denying God also to Brhaspati from whom Lokāyata is called Bārhaspatya and karman, and assuming an increasingly materialistic, hedo- as well as Barhaspatyamata and had the meaning of nīti; in his nistic character, splitting, by and by, into a number of schools translation of Lalitavistara, Deväkara, in order to render the and sects name of the Barhaspatyamata included in the list of sciences But India was a country where everything had to be demons- known by the young Bodhisattva, uses the Chinese expression: trated: it was not sufficient to assert a principle, it was necessary wang lung, that is, the doctrine of the king; Khattavijja (Ksatra- to defend it with logical arguments against the attacks-of vidyā) according to which attano attho kametabbo11 as Lokāyata opponents. I wo aspects in particular were to be demonstrated: teaches that arthakāmau are purușārthau. 1 That no karman exists. Aryasura12 and the Milindapanha13 include this science among 2. That pratyaksa is the only means of knowledge. the philosophical systems as previously, the Kautilyārthaśāstra As to the first point, this assumption offended the well- had quoted the Lokayata along with Sankhya and Yoga. 14 known principle karmana sarvam idam tatam generally admitted At its very beginnings this doctrine represented the science and to which orthodox schools found good support in the of the purohita who on earth assisted his King, as in heaven vaicitrya which can be seen in the world. The Lokāyata sought Brahaspati assisted Indra: artha and dharma for a certain period to escape this difficulty raised by their opponents appealing to followed the same way So that we find the Lokayata included the Svabhava theory, which, having evolved from the same in the list of the sciences studied by Brahmins in the sterco- principles that brought about the formulation of Sankhya, is typed formulas of the Pali or Sanskrit Buddhist texts; and sufficiently attested in the epics, and which can be traced back according to the Vinayapitaka there were also some Buddhist to the Aupanishadic times: Makkhali Gosāla and Purāna Kassapa monks who endeavoured to study it, were it not that the Buddha were strictly related to it. This svabhavavada, although having prevented them 15 But political intrigues and religious purity with the Lokäyatamata only one, but the most important point cannot go together, and in fact, signs of a real contrast between in common, that is, the negation of the Karma theory, had artha and dharma can be traced back to the times of Yājñavalkya16 striking analogies to the fatalistic schools of Kālavāda or and of Nārada. 17 Vijñāneśvara, quoting Brhaspati, distinguishes Parinamavāda inasmuch as it maintained that everything the Lokajna from the Dharmajna. 18 In course of time, among which happens on earth is only the effect of the various combi- the masters of this political science there were some who nations of material elements: human effort is useless: not enjoy- refused to acknowledge any authority of dharma and proclaimed ment, therefore, of life, but the accomplishment by destiny

392 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA MODERN SCHOLARS 393

of its own ends. The Lokayata accepted this theory; it is not 3. Bhavisyattakahā, ed by C. D. Dalal (Gackwad's Or series. XX). p. 42. necessary to assume karman in order to explain the vaicitrya: 4 Accoding to Sankara the aśraddadhāna are those who believe that for everything happens svabhāvena, according to the various moksa sacrificial karman only is sufficient combinations of the four elements which constitute the body 5 Ślokavártika i IO

of every being. As to the second point, that is, only that which 6. Pp. 137-140 (Chow. S S.)

is demonstrated pratyaksena exists, they had to have recourse 7. Pp 113-117 (ibid) 8 Pp. 170 ff. to all variety of logical subtleties in order to support it. 9. A later refutation of atman is contained in the commentary of Gunaratna Logical works from general expositions of Indian philoso- to the Saddarsanasamuccaya of Haribhadra (Bibl. Ind , pp. 139 ff ) phical schools like the Sarvadarsanasangraha, or the Saddarsanasa- 10 Dialogues af Buddha, I, p 168

muccaya of Haribhadra with the commentary of Gunaratna, to 11 Dighanikaya in Auswahl ubersetzt, Gottingen, 1913, p. 19, n. 3.

all special treatises on Nyaya, are pregnant with arguments 12 Jātaka, V 228 13. Mahabodhijātaka 20,21 aiming at refuting their assumption which are of the greatest 14 P:3(S B E I p. 6) interest to the history of Indian logic, concerning, particularly, 15 One might object that in this book Lokāyata is not the Bārhaspatya, the syllogism and the theory of vyapti because Brhaspati along with Usanas is quoted before one of the masters of So by and by, ancient Lokāyata lost its original character; it the artha-school which seems, therefore, to be quite distinct from the

was no more a niti, as we presume it was at its very beginnings, Lokāyata But it must be observed that here, we have to do more with

but became a hetuvidyā, a tarkavidya full of logical subtleties methods than with systems. In fact, interference between philosophy

The dhūrta-cārvāka became a suśiksita-cārvāka. Those who did and other sciences is ascertained in the same chapter when Kautilya says that anvīksiki is the best guide in every discipline, in varttā as well as in not recognize any value to pramānas other than pratyaksa were dandanīti, and ānvīkșikī, according to Vātsyāyana, had two aspects It is obliged, as justly the Bhāmati (III, 3, 54), the Nyāyatātparyadīpikā not only an ātmavidya, but also a hetuvidyā (p. 88), the Nyayakandali (p. 259) and other Nyaya works 16 Cullavagga V, 33.2

remark, to have recourse everywhere to inference 17. II 21.

Later on, the Lokäyata appears to have disappeared; but its 18. E 39

doctrines still remained occasionally accepted by disbelievers or materialists, who always exist in every country-even in a country which can be called the fatherland of idealism. If later Sāśtrakāras on Nyāya begin their treatises with the refutation of the Carvakamata, even though as a school this actually was dead, this fact is owed only to a traditional custom.

NOTES

References: 1 .. Linee di una stovia del materialismo indiano, in memorie della R Accademia dei Lincei, Ser. V. Vol. XVII, fasc. VII, 1924 (Part I) 2 Studie materiali di storia delle religioni, 1925 fase I-II, p. 76

MODERN SCHOLARS 395 of India. Kusumānjali, Nyāyamañjarī, Advaita-brahmasiddhi, Vivarana-prameya-sangraha, and numerous other works by D. R. Sastri orthodox writers, Hindu and Jain, Sanskrit and Prakrit works, and Buddhist Pali works, all contain a good deal of useful Of the traditional Indian scholars, D. R. Sastri wrote on information on these schools But these are only fragments of Indian materialism practically throughout his career, the original works of these schools now irrevocably lost to us. although shifting his basic position from time to time. We The pūrvapaksas or views of opponents, in which form they have reproduced here an abridged form of his brief work on appear in subsequent literature, have been studied in the light Indian materialism (originally published in 1930) which is frequently referred to but has been out of print for a long of, and consistently interpreted in the spirit of, the fragmentary

time. We are indebted to Sri Biswanath Bhattacaryya for texts as yet preserved of the earliest exponents of the systems.

permission to reprint it It is pointed out in this connection that the Oriental Institute of Baroda published in the year 1940 'Tattvopaplavasimha' of A Short History of Indian Materialsim, Jayarasi Bhatta, which is an interesting work of the Lokāyata Sensationalism and Hedonism school of philosophy. Attempts have been made in the present edition to utilize Jayarasi's work D. R. SHASTRI The first edition of this short history published in 1930 was completely exhausted long ago. Since then, the book was PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDIION almost lost to interested readers who insisted on its re-publica- tion from time to time. In spite of the fact that I also felt some It is well known to students of Indian philosophy that the sort of responsibility to bring out its second edition, I failed to original sūtra works of the materialists, sceptics and agnostics do so earlier due to indisposition of health and other unavoidable of India are now lost to us. Compelled to rely exclusively for a shortcomings certain doctrine or way of thought on its presentation by its At length, the publication saw the light of day being embodied avowed opponents, one can seldom be free from prejudices with the results of my further study on the subject, the credit and personal predilections. Pūrvapaksas or the opponent's for which goes directly to my affectionate Sriman Banikantha views are almost invariably presented in an inadequate and Chakravarty, B.Sc., C A. and to the authorities of Bookland unsympathetic manner, so that no sound judgement as regards Private Ltd. But for their enthusiasm, the matter would have their proper philosophical worth can easily be formed. If one been delayed for an unlimited period. notes how the doctrines of the Sarvastivadin Buddhists, the Pasupatas, and the Pancaratras have suffered at the hands of D. R. S.

Sankarācārya, it would be clear that the study of a certain system Calcutta,

from its presentation by its opponents has to be undertaken 31 March 1957

with a proper appreciation of these difficulties. An attempt has been made here to collect, from different sources, fragments of actual statements made by the founders and propounders of different schools of the materialists, sceptics and agnostics

MODERN SCHOLARS .397

A Short History of Indian Materialsim, apart from the body and tried, gradually, to identify the sense- Sensationalism and Hedonism organs, breath, and the organ of thought with the self. Before that the materialists had affirmed that inference was not a D. R. SHASTRI means of knowledge But at this stage they accepted at first probability and then even inference, though in a restricted INTRODUCIION form, as a source of true knowledge. Philosophers like Puran- dara were the advocates of this form of Indian materialism In Indian materialism has passed through four logical stages of development. In its first stage it was a mere tendency of its fourth stage, it came to be at one with the Buddhists and the Jains in opposing the Vedicists, and acquired the common opposition. It called in question all kinds of knowledge, immediate as well as mediate and all evidence, perception designation Nästika. A Nāstika is one who condemns the Vedas-nāstiko veda-nindakah. The texts, added in the appendix as well as inference. It denied the authority of even the Vedas. In that period, its name was Barhaspatya In its second stage, with evidences of their genuineness, record some of the views

Svabhavavāda, recognition of perception as a source of know- of these different stages in a blended form. As the literature of

ledge, and the theory of the identification of body with the self, this school is now entirely lost, except what has reached us in fragments, we are quite unable to produce here verbatim all the were incorporated into it. In that stage, it took the form of a system of philosophy. However low its position may be in the original sūtras of this school which represent its various aspects

rank of philosophical systems, it can by no means be denied that, and phases. But there are passages both in sūtra and śloka form which embody in substance these different stages of the Lokāyata at that remote period of Indian history, it was the only system of school. We can gain a complete systematic work on the philosophy worthy of its name. In that period flourished famous materialists of India if we gather these together in a sympathetic materialists like Ajita Keśakambalin, Kambalāśvatara and Purāna Kāśyapa. In this stage it came to be known as Lokāyata manner. Tradition ascribes to Brhaspati the first treatise of this school In its third stage, an extreme form of hedonism, which was and there is no reason for rejecting this view. It is evident from due perhaps to the corruption of freedom of thought-social, the sutras extant and quoted under Brhaspati's name that he religious and political-formed the most important feature of this school. Gross sensual pleasure superseded bliss or con- was not a mythical figure, but a historical personage. But it is very difficult to ascertain who Brhaspati was. It is probable templative joy and licentiousness replaced liberty. Devils that the conception of this school first dawned on Brhaspati, occupied the seats of angels. As a consequence of this impact of the preceptor of the gods, who is regarded by scholars like corruption and misunderstanding, Cārvākism originated. In Professor Belvalkar as the first founder of this Barhaspatya that stage this school preached-'Eat, drink and be merry, for system. If we are authorized to give the credit for founding tomorrow we may die.' The reaction to this extreme form of licentiousness was destructive to the very vitality of this this system to more men than one, then we should like to mention the names of Ajita Keśakambalin, Cārvāka and school. From that period this extremely materialistic school Purandara as the second, third and fourth founders respec- leaned towards spiritualism So long, it had maintained that the body was the self. In that period, under severe attack from tively of the Lokāyata, Cārvāka and Nāstika systems. We know from the Mahābhāsya of Patanjali that Bhāguri was one the spiritualists, it gave up the theory that there was no self of the expounders of the Lokāyata dogmas. Not a single sūtra

398 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA MODERN SCHOLARS 399 attributed to Bhäguri of the Lokayata school having been recovered, we cannot give him any position in these stages of a fact that the word darsana in its primary sense means percep-

development of Indian Materialism and Sensationalism. We tion In its secondary sense it means the Sastra, which is as

shall deal now more elaborately in the following pages with good an authority as perception This emphasis on perception

these four distinct steps of evolution of Indian Materialism. reminds us of the materialists and there are scholars who maintain that the word was first originated by the followers of

EVOLUTION OF MATERIALISM AND Brhaspati. It was from them that the word was borrowed by SENSATIONALISM IN INDIA other schools. This fact induces them to establish the priority

In ancient India, the necessities of life being abundantly of this Darsana to all other Darsanas Scholars are also bold

provided by nature, the struggle for existence was not very enough to declare that the materialistic school is the only original school of philosophy. All other schools were originated simply great. People's tastes were not sophisticated. In order to escape from the heat of the tropical sun, they took to shady groves or for the sake of refuting and destroying this school, whose teachings, according to them, were detrimental to the best the caves of mountain valleys. Their peace of mind was not disturbed by political strife. In the absence of the art of writing, interests of mankind. Others, again, do not go so far. It may be, say they, as old as other schools of philosophy, but not older. people were strangers to literary ambition. Nor were their energies called forth by art or science. There was no literature Materialism is preached nowhere as a doctrine of philosophy,

except what could be retained in memory. Metaphysical and except as a reaction against some perverted ideas or practices.

religious problems formed almost the only subjects of specula- The materialists of India, namely Brhaspati and his followers,

tion. They meditated on how and why the world was in which do not pretend to lay down a constructive system of philosophy

they lived. What were they? From where did they come? Where of their own. They try to refute the foolish orthodoxy of other

would they go? What had they to do? They made an endeavour schools. This, in their opinion, proves that the system of Brhaspati cannot be the first system. It is rather, the last. It to answer these questions in their own way, and thus laid the foundation of philosophical enquiries in India. raises objections against the views of all other systems and pre-

These queries are recorded in the Vedas, the oldest literature supposes the existence of all other schools thereby.

of mankind still extant. These early attempts cannot properly But all systems of philosophy are the growth of years-of

be called philosophical systems, rigidly consistent and calmly centuries. The systems which we possess of the different schools

reasoned. They are mere tendencies, scattered and unsystematic of philosophy, each distinct from the other, are rather the last

like landmarks in an ocean. After a long course of development summing-up of what had been growing among many genera-

from their first hesitating and imperfect stage as tendencies, tions of isolated thinkers, and cannot claim to represent the

they became perfect. Amongst these re-arranged, systematic, very first attempts at a systematic treatment. A large mass of

consistent, calmly reasoned, perfect systems of Indian philoso- philosophical thought must have existed in India long before

phy, materialism can be counted as very old. Some go so far as there was any attempt at dividing it into well-defined depart-

to count it as the oldest and adduce, among others, the following ments of systematic philosophy or reducing it to writing. But such a growth must have required a great length of time: reasons in support of their opinion. It is a fact that all other schools, in their respective systems, try to refute the truths So it is probable that during that long period, the views of one

established by this school, thus admitting its priority. It is also system were discussed in another. During that period anything could be added and anything left out. Subsequently, each system

400 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 401 reached the form in which we possess it. It is not improbable texts without knowing the meaning, do not see the real form that the Lokayata school of philosophy, being developed as of the Veda, and that such people are deluded inasmuch as the the first system of philosophy, raised objections against the way to attain the summum bonum is not revealed to them. In views of other schools which were even then mere tendencies various Brahmanas mere knowledge of a performance has been and which took shape as systems later on. Thus, although as mentioned as having the same effect as the performance itself. mere tendencies, almost all philosophical thoughts are con- In the Chandogya Upanisad it is stated that a performance temporaneous, as systems they belong to different ages. The accompanied by knowledge, produces a better result than a school of Brhaspati is regarded as the weakest school of performance without knowledge. Jaimini, in his Pūrvamīmāmsā philosqphy in comparison with other schools. The law of system, recording this opposition, devotes an entire chapter to evolution or gradual development proves that the earliest school drawing the conclusion that study consists not only in learning is the weakest and the latest the strongest. If the Materialistic by heart the letter of the Veda but also in clearly understanding school be the weakest, it is probable that it is the earliest as well its spirit. Traces of an opposition to the religion of the Vedas appear in the Vedas and in later works. In Aitareya Āranyaka IHE FIRST SIAGE we find-'Why should we repeat the Veda or offer this kind of sacrifice!' Later on, the very authoritativeness of the Vedas Originally, the school of Brhaspati meant Vitanda or casuistry was questioned by Kautsya Opposition was the only duty of and nothing else. In it Vitanda was essential. With its impatience the followers of Brhaspati and they did it from the very begin- of all authority, it tried to refute the views of other schools. It ning of their career. They opposed the Vedas and the practice was, in its original stage, without any constructive element of repeating them without understanding their meaning. But and without any positive theory to propound. It was negative all these represent only the opposing, destructive or negative and destructive. The record of this period is kept by Jayarāśi aspects of the Barhaspatya system. And it is well-known that a Bhatta, author of Tattvopaplava-simha. This negative aspect of system ceases to have any great interest and even value without a the doctrine finds expression in the Vedas themselves. From constructive element, without a positive theory to propound. the earliest Vedic times, there were people who denied the So the doctrine of the followers of Brhaspati appeared to be existence of even the Vedic deities. The Vedic hymns pointedly incomplete without any positive element in it. It felt the necessity refer to scoffers and unbelievers. Those hymns, which are of a positive element. Everybody knows that necessity is the traditionally ascribed to Brhaspati, son of Loka, contain the mother of invention Barhaspatya in its very early stage found first germs of protest against a mere verbal study of the Veda out the means of being complete. So long, under the designation and emphatically declare that a man who tries to understand Barhaspatya, it admitted no authority other than its own. the Veda is far superior to a mere sacerdotal priest. The Mandūka Now, in its second stage, in explanation of the why of an event hymn is a panegyric of frogs who are described as raising their or product, it accepted the doctrine of Svabhāva This doctrine voices together at the commencement of the rains like Brahmin of Svabhava maintains that 'the effects are self-existent and are pupils repeating the lessons of their teachers, and this celebrated produced neither by different things as causes nor by them- hymn on frogs is a satire, says Professor Max Müller, upon the selves, inasmuch as no cause can be found for the filament of Vedic priesthood, or better, upon the system of hymn-chanting. the lotus or the eye-like marks on the peacock's tail. Ifit cannot Yäska clearly tells us that those who merely memorize the be found, it certainly does not exist. Such is the case with this

402 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA MODERN SCHOLARS 403 diversified universe. Similarly, feelings like pleasure, pain, i e. Brhaspati and his followers The Taittirīya Brāhmana etc. have no causes, because they appear only at times.' This relates an interesting anecdote which runs as follows. 'Once doctrine of Svabhäva had been in vogue in independent forms. upon a time Brhaspati struck the goddess Gayatri on the head. In course of centuries, this doctrine, like many other doctrines, The head smashed into pieces and the brain split. But Gayatrī lost its independence altogether and came to be affiliated to the is immortal. She did not die. Every bit of her brain was alive.' Barhaspatya system. The consequence of this gradual assimi- Some scholars have found a very valuable truth behind this lation has been a blending of thoughts. The followers of Brhas- anecdote. They find an allegorical meaning here. Gayatri is the pati became one with, and the earliest representatives of, the symbol of Hinduism. Brhaspati tried to destroy it by introduc- extreme form of Svabhavavada. From this time, the rejection ing opposition. But Hinduism is eternal. It was not destroyed. of causal principle, the rejection of good and evil consequences In Maitrāyana Upanisad we find another anecdote-Brhaspati, of actions, formed its most important feature. The product having assumed the shape of Sukra, brings forth false knowledge comes into existence without any cause. This materialistic for the safety of Indra and for the destruction of the Asuras. By view was emphasiszd by Brhaspati in Vedic times 'In the first it, the Asuras show that good is evil and evil is good; and they age of the gods, the existent was born of the non-existent- say that this new law, which upsets the Vedas, should be studied. asataḥ sad ajāyata. Here, Brhaspati is painted as a deceiver, a hypocrite. The The Śvetāśvatara Upanisad contains a nominal enunciation Mahābhärata records a story of this period relating how Brhas- of some of the most popular theories current in its times in pati, the sceptic, had a long discussion with Manu, one of the explanation of the origin of the universe, and Naturalism founders of the sacrificial cult, and was in the end converted to forms one of this number-kālah svabhāvo niyatiryadrchhā etc. the latter's viewpoint. Another anecdote records-'The reason Uptil then it was an independent doctrine, and the Brhas- why I was born a jackal,' says a character, 'is that I was a blamer patyas were merely the oppositionists. Brhaspati, with lofty of the Vedas, a reviler and opposer of priests, an unbeliever enthusiasm, flung away the fetters of religion that he might be and a doubter of all things.' In another place it records-'The righteous and noble. Some of the verses of the Vedic hymns ignorant and unbelieving man who has a soul of doubt is ascribed to Brhaspati are very noble in thought. Whatever destroyed; neither this world nor the next exists, nor happiness, may be said of his followers, his own teachings were of an for him who has a soul of doubt.' elevated character. Brhaspati had many followers and all of In another place of the Mahabharata which records past them were independent thinkers raising objections against events, an unbeliever is threatened with a sudden enlighten- current superstitions. It is perhaps for his freedom of thought ment hereafter-'the devil in hell will soon change your ideas that he was regarded the priest -- the adviser, the counsellor of on that subject.' The worst that is said of Brhaspati's teaching India, the king of the gods is that it is drawn from a study of the female intellect, which is But this state of things changed very soon. A reaction against full of subtlety and deceit The Visnupurāna records that a the school of Brhaspati appeared. Perhaps the negative or number of Daityas one day, in ancient times, began to practise destructive element of the doctrine was responsible for this severe penances following the injunctions of the Vedas. This reaction. Vedic literature posterior to the Mantras is disfigured caused great apprehension to Indra. At his prayer, Māyāmoha by filthy anecdotes in which pious sages poured out vials of was created who preached to the demons the pernicious doc- their wrath on the devoted heads of those early oppositionists, trines of Brhaspati not for their benefit, but for their destruction.

404 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHQLARS 405 Having gradually been overpowered by that folly, they causal principle was rejected, because sensuous perception is became enemies to Brahmins, gave up their duties and were not an evidence in support of its existence. For mere perception averse to the study of the Vedas Then, as they had strayed of two events, which stand isolated and self-contained, is not from religious observances, Indra killed them. Almost similar sufficient to establish between them a causal relation 'To is the account recorded in the Padmapurāna. All human institu- ascertain whether a given antecedent condition has the character tions prosper through opposition. As a reaction against the of a true cause, it is really necessary to find out with certainty opposition of Brhaspati and his followers, the Vedic schools the elements of invariability and of relevancy involved in such became more extensively engaged in popularizing the Vedic a notion. But this certitude can never be arrived at.' Universal creed of life by means of the most elaborate and thorough- propositions cannot be established by our limited perceptions. going presentations and expositions of their Vedic doctrines. Perception presupposes actual contact of the object with the The result was the production of the six Vedangas, the Smrtis, perceiving organ, and is thus necessarily confined to the present. the Epics and other such useful works. Never has religion It is a case of the here and now. It does not extend to the past or flourished with such luxuriance and in such wide variety, from the future, and is thus unable to establish universal connections the purest to the most abominable shapes, as in this period of of things. In other words, sense-perception can give us only Indian cultural history. A dark shadow fell upon the opposi- particular truths. But knowledge of particular facts cannot tionists-the independent thinkers. All independent lines of give us knowledge which is universally true. Therefore, per- thinking became, for hundreds of years to come, an impossi- ception cannot give us universal relation. Nor can universal bility, through the powerful influence of various schools of relation be established by inference alone For the inference, the Vedicists. which yields a universal relation as its conclusion, cannot work unless it presupposes another universal connection as a THE SECOND STAGE necessary pre-condition of its possibility, and that again another, and so on In other words, the process of reaching a The state of things turned, however, through the influence universal conclusion is always like arguing in a circle. Vyāpti is of Naturalism. Opposed by the strong advocates of the ortho- derived from anumāna, and anumāna again from vyāpti. Thus dox community, the Lokäyatikas returned with the affiliation even inference in itself is not sufficient to produce a universal of naturalism or Svabhavavada. Neither of these two doctrines, proposition. Nor is the universal relation supplied by testimony. Lokāyata and Svabhāvavāda, accepted the good or evil con- For, testimony involves inference. Comparison is equally sequences of actions. The Lokāyata school, for so long a mere unable to establish a universal relation. Comparison only tendency, with the incorporation of naturalism, formed a establishes the relation of a name to something that bears that philosophical system. Thus originated the first Darsana, or the name. Now, such relation of the name and of the named is a Lokāyata Darśana Perception was emphasized in the very particular relation, while we are in search of an unconditional name of this newly built-up system, i.e. Darsana. So long, the universal relation. Thus the universal relation, which is indis- Barhaspatyas did not admit any authority whatsoever Now pensable to all inference, is not given by any of the so-called in its new shape, the school accepted the authority of perception. sources of knowledge. Therefore universal relation cannot, by Perception became the only criterion of existence. Whatever any means, be established As inference is not possible without was not perceived was held to have no existence at all. The universal connection and universal connection is unattainable,

406 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA MODERN SCHOLARS 407 the Lokayata as a system discarded, in its earlier stages, inference perceptions can árise only insofar as they are conditioned by a as a source of knowledge. bodily mechanism. But it would not be so, were not the body It rejected ether as an element because ether cannot be the receptacle of consciousness. The properties of particular known by perception, and it maintained that the four elements preparations of food and drink, conducive to the development of earth, air, fire and water are the original principles of-all of intellectual powers, afford another proof in favour of the things. The four elements, in their atomic condition, when fact that consciousness is a function of the body. Points and mixed together in a certain proportion and according to a certain evidences of correspondence between mind and body-corres- order, become transformed into an organism. pondence between the psychical and nervous processes-and Consciousness is a function of the body. For the manifestation correspondence between mind and brain, the seat of mind, are of consciousness, the body is an indispensable factor. Con- not rare. The most definite aspects of this correspondence are sciousness does not inhere in particles of matter. When these correspondence in quantity, correspondence in change, cor- particles come to be arranged into a specific form in a manner respondence in growth and development, correspondence in not yet scientifically explicable, they are found to show signs inheritance and correspondence in quality. When communica- of life. Life and consciousness are identical. Our thinking power tion is cut off between the brain and any other part of the body is destroyed with the dissolution of the elements from whose owing to the nerves of that part being diffused, there is no longer combination it is evolved. Consciousness is produced from any feeling or sensation connected with that part. Psychological the body, which is endowed with life and vital air. Without experiments prove a measurable interval of time between the sensation, no consciousness is possible. When the body perishes, application of stimulus and the corresponding sensation no consciousness can remain: it must also perish. So there is Prolonged thought and intense emotion produce the sensations nothing to transmigrate. The body, consciousness and sense- of fatigue and exhaustion in the brain, which, if carried organs are momentary. Mind is merely the product of a com- further, produce pain and disorder. Increase of mental work is bination of elements, just as some acid eructations or wines are accompanied by an increase of brainwork. Intense mental the results of chemical combinations. The four elements, when activity is followed by a casting-off of a kind of brain substance combined, produce or manifest the mind. There is no other known as phosphorus. Comparison of the brains of different reality than the four Bhutas The instinctive movements and creatures, different races of men and different individuals expressions of new-born babies are due to 'external stimuli, as shows that there is a connection between intelligence and the much as the opening and closing of the lotus and other flowers size, weight and complexity of the brain. Generally speaking, at different hours of the day or night, or the movement of iron the larger the brain in relation to the rest of the body, the greater under the influence of lode stone In the same way, the spon- the intelligence. So the Lokayatas say that mind is only a taneous generation of living organisms is frequently observed, form or product of the body. The ultimate reality is matter e g. in the case of animalcules which develop in moisture or Consciousness is a function of the body. As contraction is the infusions, especially under the influence of gentle warmth, or function of muscles, as the kidneys secrete urine, in the same of maggots or other worms which in the rainy season by reason way does the brain generate thoughts, movements and feelings. of the atmospheric moisture, are developed in the constituent Mind, therefore, has no substantial reality of its own, but particles of curds and the like, which begin to live and move in springs out of the vibrations of molecules of the brain. When so short a time'. It is an indisputable fact that sensations and the molecular activity of the brain sinks below a certain level,

408 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 409

generally known as the threshold of consciousness, conscious- school to every 'why' is the doctrine of Svabhāva. Every- ness disappears and mind ceases to exist, as in sleep. When, thing happens through the influence of Svabhava, which is again, it rises above a certain degree, consciousness re-appears. all-powerful. It is Svabhava, or law of nature, that conscious- Conscious life is not a life of continuity. It is a coming-out-of ness is a function of the body and the body is the self. The and an again-going-into-nothing. The hypothesis of a conti- Lokayatikas refuted the theory of paraloka-or previous and nuous stream of consciousness is a myth of the Divines and the future births-as there was no reality existing before birth or Theologians. This theory is sometimes known as the theory of after death. The four 'bhutas' or atoms of primary elements are automatism-mind is merely Epiphenomenon, or by-product the only realities. Mind is the production of these elements. So But there is a difficulty in establishing this theory. The spiritual- it cannot be maintained that the mind at death passes on to ists raised an objection against the newly built-up materialistic another body. Mind in different bodies must be different. The system. The objection is this. As the body is declared to be the consciousness of a body which has already perished cannot be agent of all actions, it should be held responsible for their related to a body which comes into being .. One mind cannot natural consequences. But this is impossible. The particles produce another mind after total annihilation. The theory that which form the body are always in a state of flux and the body the foetus is endowed with consciousness cannot be asserted. which performs an action at one moment does not persist at Without sensation, no consciousness is possible. All know- the next to feel its reaction. It is, on the other hand, undeniable ledge is derived from sense-experience alone. All knowledge that the body suffers change. Otherwise bodies could not have is posterior to and derived from experience. The sense-organs different sizes. To this, the reply of the Lokāyatikas is as follows. cannot revive sensations when they are not in existence. There- The Lokäyata system does not admit the existence of karmaphala fore, the foetus cannot be endowed with consciousness. No or the consequence of good or evil actions. The experiences of power is possible without a recipient. When the body perishes, pleasure and pain come by chance Nature is all-powerful consciousness cannot remain as there is no recipient of con- Moreover, recognition proves the identity of the body through sciousness. With the destruction of the body, consciousness all its changing states. There is another difficulty. The spiritual- must also perish. If you hold that previous, present and future ists advance another objection against the materialists. The births are nothing but particular conditions of the stream of objection is put in the following manner The theory of matter consciousness which, according to you, is eternal, the Lok- is unable to account for the facts of memory and recognition. ayatikas would say that the chain of consciousness is not an Necessity of thought demands that memory, and original entity, and a condition that can be predicated only in respect of experience which gives rise to it, should be referred to one and an entity cannot therefore be proved. A future existence of an the same conscious subject. entity which is non-existent cannot be predicated. With this But this identity of reference would be possible only when line of argumentation the Lokāyatikas of that period rejected the subject is fundamentally an unchangeable unity. This diffi- the existence of future or previous births. The Lokāyatikas of culty is removed by the Lokayatikas in the following manner. that stage also maintained that there was no soul apart from the Traces left by previous experiences are capable of being trans- body. If there is any soul, it is only the living principle of all mitted from the material cause down to its direct product, an organisms. It exists only so long as our body exists and ceases analogous instance being the transference of the odour of musk to exist when the body ceases to exist. It is the body that feels, to the cloth in contact with it. But the general answer of this sees, hears, remembers and thinks .. In sayings like 'I am fat," 'I

410 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 411 am lean,' 'I am dark', by 'I', we evidently mean the body. Fatness, leanness or darkness reside only in the body. Such in the horse-sacrifice have been invented by knaves. So also,

phrases as 'my body' are metaphorically used. Just as a knave the custom of giving presents to priests and of eating flesh have

might induce an innocent person to accept glass and such other been commended by night-prowling demons. Ifit were possible for the sacrifices to make one reach heaven after their perfor- -worthless materials in exchange for precious stones, so has the Śruti misled the innocent devotee by making him believe that mances ceased, the performers themselves perished and the

the soul is distinct from the body, displacing his inborn and requisites were used up, then the trees of a forest burnt down by fire might produce abundant fruit. The exercises of religion therefore correct belief that the body and the soul are identical. As nothing like the soul exists after death to go to the next and the practices of asceticism are merely a means of livelihood for men devoid of intellect and manliness. Therefore the so- world, there is no necessity of admitting the existence of such a place. With the denial of karmaphala, this school denied the called sacred books, the three Vedas, have been composed by

existence of the universal mysterious agency called Fate or rogues and can command no authority. A Putresti sacrifice

Adrsta or Daiva. It denied the existence of merits or demerits performed for the birth of a child may yield either of two

acquired in our previous existence. In answer to the objections results-positive and negative, which is doubtful. When a

that fate must be admitted as the cause of the differences and child is born, the knaves say that it is due to the power of their

determinations of the phenomenal world, Brhaspati's followers incantations uttered in performing the rites. When a child is

bring forward the doctrine of Svabhava or spontaneous gener- not born, they explain the event as being due to the rites being

ation of things according to their respective natures. So there is incomplete in some way or another. The priests say that a beast slain in a sacrifice will itself go to heaven. How is it that they no use practising virtue and avoiding sin. Religion is as harmful as opium intoxication. Prayer is the hope of men who are weak, do not kill their own old fathers in a sacrifice in order to send

without will-power to do anything; worship is an insincere them directly to heaven? If the offerings in a funeral ceremony

egoism to save oneself from the tortures of hell; prophets are may produce gratification to beings who are dead, then in the

the greatest liars among men. The Vedas are no authority. case of travellers, when they start it is needless to give provisions for the journey. All these ceremonies were ordered by the There are mantras in the Vedas which do not convey any meaning whatsoever; some mantras are ambiguous; some are absurd; Brahmins as a means of their livelihood. They are worth no better than that. Hence, our religious ceremonies, our endeavour some are contradictory; some repeat what is already known. As regards the other portions of the Vedas we always find to propitiate the gods, to satisfy them by prayers and offerings,

discrepancies and contradictions among them. Cases are not are vain and illusive. Religion is the invention of individuals

rare where a line of action prescribed by one text is condemned desirous of deceiving their fellow men in order to further their

by another. Again, they speak of results that are never realized. own selfish and ambitious motives So let us eat, drink and be

Some portions are rejected by the Vedicists themselves as merry, for tomorrow we die.

interpolations. There are proper names and epithets as well as As the consequence of this kind of thinking, Käma, or fulfil-

foolish statements like the ravings of a madman. Hence, the ment of desire, became the summum bonum of human life. They

Vedas are not only human compositions, but even worse. The were in search of the supreme bliss or contemplative joy, which

buffoon, the knave, and the demon-these are the three authors was available in freedom only. They maintained that there is

of the Vedas. All the obscene rites commended for the queen no particular place named heaven. Even the Vedas themselves doubt the existence of a world beyond. If a man may go to

412 CĀRVÄKA / LOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 413

another world after death, why may he not come back again äyata, the doctrines of Buddha and Cārvaka almost amalga- perturbed by the love of his friends and relatives? When once mated and the name Cārvaka sometimes applied to Buddha. the body is reduced to ashes, how can it ever go to another India had been seething with free thinking and the Buddha was world? When we die, everything ends there. We do not enter the product of this freedom. No man ever lived so godless yet into a region of pain or of darkness unrelieved by a single ray of- so god-like a life. But the people were not satisfied merely light. That God is the judge does not stand to reason, because in with social and religious freedom. Their aspiration was for that case, partiality and cruelty on the part of God will be political freedom as well. This aspiration was realized in the indispensable. If God visits us with the evil consequences of rise of Candragupta and his grandson Asoka, who brought the our sins, He becomes our enemy for no reason. Therefore it is jarring states of India under one rule and set up the Maurya better not to have a God than to have a cruel and partial God. Empire. Politics became incorporated with the Lokayata School, So there is not even such a thing as God, the supreme author which ignored Anvīksikī and Trayi, the sciences dealing with and governor of the world, an omniscient spirit. The senses the supersensuous, and appreciated Dandanīti and Vārtā- cannot reach Him. Adrsta, principle of causality, and inference Coercion and Economics-as the only branches of knowledge itself have been denied. The Vedas reveal no signs of infallibility. deserving special cultivation. The earthly king became the only How can we ascertain that an all-knowing, all-pervading and god. So long, Käma or pleasure was considered to be the only all-powerful spirit exists? Nature, and not God, is the watch- good of human life. Now, Artha, or material advantage, was word of our school added to it. As the Lokayatikas captured the hearts of the With this enlightened credo the Lokāyatikas laid aside the cultured as well as the common people, they became earnest in traditional life of religion and settled down to strain every fibre working out their immediate earthly welfare. of their being, so long frittered away for heaven's sake, to work The result of this movement was the generation and pro- out their immediate earthly welfare. The result of this move- pagation of different arts and sciences. Vātsyāyana keeps ment was an aspiration for freedom. By freedom, they meant records of some sixty-four names of Indian fine arts which all-round freedom-freedom for the individual as well as for probably flourished in this period of Indian materialism. society; freedom for man as well as for woman; freedom for Kambalāśvatara, Ajitakeśakambalin and many other materialists the rich as well as for the poor; freedom for all individuals and flourished and wrote their works on Indian materialism in this for all classes. They exhorted all people to cast off all the shackles period. The Samañña-phalasutta keeps the following records of which had bound them for ages and to march shoulder to Ajita's view. There is no such duty as the giving of alms or shoulder towards freedom. The wonderful consequence of sacrifice or offering. There is neither fruit nor result of good this struggle for freedom was the rise of Buddhistic culture. and evil deeds. There is no such thing as this world or the next Buddha's views against the Vedic sacrifices, the memorizing There is neither father nor mother nor beings springing into life of Vedic mantras and fruitless repetition to retain them in without them. There are, in the world, no recluses or Brāhmins memory, the caste system, the authority of the Vedas and the who, having understood and realized by themselves alone both worship of deities, magic practices and the mortifications and this world and the next, make their wisdom known to others .. other ascetic practices-have their counterpart in the views of A human being is built up of four elements. When he dies, the Lokāyata It is perhaps because Buddhism was greatly influenced earthy in him returns and relapses to the earth, the fluid to the by the Lokayata School that we find, in later accounts of Lok- water, the heat to the fire and the wind to the air. The four

414 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA MODERN SCHOLARS 415

bearers take his dead body away; till they reach the burning ground men utter forth eulogies; but there his bones are bleached pleasure is mixed with pain, should we therefore reject our life?

and his offerings end in ashes. It is a doctrine of fools, the talk Should we fling,away sheaves of paddy rich with the finest

of gifts. It is an empty lie, mere idle talk, when men say there is white grains because they are covered with husk and dust?

a prophet therein. Fools and the wise alike, on the dissolution Should we refrain from plucking lotuses as there are thorns in

of the body, are cut off, annihilated and after death, cease to them? Shall we not take fish because there are bones and scales?

exist. Ajita tlourished during the lifetime of the Buddha. Up to Should we exclude rice from our meal, only for the trouble it

that time, politics was not incorporated with the Lokāyatika will give in husking? Who will not soothe his mind and body

So there is no trace of politics noticeable in the teachings of in ambrosial moonlight though there are spots in the moon?

Ajita. In later accounts, specially in the record preserved by Shall we not enjoy the pleasant breeze of summer, because there

Krsna Misŕa, it is mentioned very distinctly. Krsna Miśra gives is also a slight dust in it? Shall we abstain from sowing a ploughed

almost a perfect account of the doctrines of the Lokāyata land watered by rain, lest the water on its surface should

School formed in that period. His account contains almost all become muddy? Should we not prepare food, for fear of

the elements belonging to the teachings of this school. 'Lokāyata beggars?

is always the only śastra. In it, only perceptual evidence is Unmixed happiness is not available in this world; yet we

authority. The elements are earth, water, fire and air. Wealth cannot overlook the least bit of it. In wordly life, we smile on

and enjoyment are the objects of human existence. Matter can the joy of our dear ones and weep on their woes. If the laughing

think. There is no other world. Death is the end of all. face of a son, or the lustre of a delightful daughter, can impart to us celestial happiness, why will their death or their attack with some fatal disease not find us overwhelmed with grief? If THE THIRD SIAGE the presence of a beloved wife makes a heaven of this earth, her

This prosperity and success of the Lokāyata system ended in departure will surely leave us in eternal darkness. Thus, what

corruption and misunderstanding .. An extreme form of freedom gives you pleasure now will cause you pain another time. We

gave birth to licentiousness. Supreme bliss was transformed cannot totally get rid of troubles even when we have no tie of

into sensual pleasure. Enjoyment of pleasure-gross sensual affection in this wide world. The heart of a man who has none

pleasure-became the only end of human life. Licentiousness to call his own in this populous world is depressed, full of misery

became predominant in the country. India lost its previous and dry as a desert. He must not be a common man, who, even

supremacy-freedom of society, freedom of religion and free- in such conditions, can maintain peace of mind. But even a man

dom.of polity. People became slaves of their senses. The elevated who is quite aloof from all social ties cannot escape occasional

teachings of Brhaspati became absorbed into the eroticism of mishaps, such as disease and accidents. The sudden attack of

his wicked followers. Gratification of the senses became the an ailment can make a total change in our happy state of affairs ..

only good of this school. Let us enjoy pleasure and pleasure And when health goes, it takes away pleasure with it. The

alone. Pleasure is the only thing which is true and good. The loveliness of a moonlit night, the cool breeze at daybreak, the

only reasonable end of man is enjoyment. We know that plea- beauty and scent of flowers, the melodious songs of sweet

sure is never pure, never free from pain. How, then, can pleasure birds-none of these can please a man when he is not in good

be the highest end oflife? But because there is pain, and because health .. You may remain jolly even without a friend. But bodily pain is sure to render you feeble and restless. Besides, we are

416 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 417 placed in terrible distress by the occasional appearance of a for the first time on the eastern horizon of the bright sky, dis- cyclone and thunderstorm, the sudden attack of a ferocious persing the lingering darkness and unfolding all the lotuses of animal, or the undesirable occurrence of famine, drought or the earth, will you not look more happy than ever? The same deluge Still we must say that this world of ours is not full of thing happens when two lovers meet after a long separation .. troubles. True, there is sorrow everywhere; in kings' palaces They have long been tormented by heart-rending affliction, and beggars' huts, in the high souls of the learned and the they have shed constant tears and breathed many a long sigh. superstitious minds of the illiterate, in the beautiful mansions Now, their re-union will produce a heavenly bliss which an of the luxurious and the dark caves of the sages. Sleep in your ever-happy couple cannot have any idea of. Perpetual happiness house or walk outside, enter the temple or hide in the forest, may be desirable, but it is practically unbearable. What pleases run to the burial place or wherever you like-nowhere can you you now, will be disgusting after constant use. Even a palatable escape misery and pain. Still we must say that the amount of dish cannot but bring satiety if we are to take it daily. Variety pleasure in this world is greater than that of pain. If such be not of taste is needed: pungent, astringent, and bitter flavours should the case, why do people so earnestly desire to live, and become be interchanged with sweets. So it is foolishness, no doubt, to frightened at the name of death? Tell them to renounce this overlook pleasure only on the ground that it is not constant, world, and they will at once exhibit utter reluctance. For, how owing to the intervention of pain. Therefore a man should do is it possible to bid adieu to this pleasant world which is the that which yields pleasure in the end. Even sages like Vyāsa tell abode of joys and luxuries? How delicate are the green leaves you that one should fulfil the desire of a woman who is over- of the spring, and how lovely is the rose! Is not the sunshine a come with passion. The moon-god, the lord of the twice-born, glorious thing? enjoyed very eagerly the wife of his preceptor Brhaspati, the If sorrows were more frequent than delight, men would founder of our school. Everybody knows the story of Indra, have escaped misery by suicide. Most men are unwilling to die; the god of gods, and Ahalya, the wife of Gotama. Hence there hence it is evident that in human affairs, pleasure has a larger is no need to restrain sexual appetite. Enjoy all sorts of pleasure, sphere of influence than pain. according to your own desire. Where is unanimity among the It is also to be remembered that happiness is at its best only great men in accepting the interpretations of the Śruti and the when experienced by contrast with misery; and hence it may Smrtis? An intelligent interpretation should not be rejected if it be said that the existence of troubles in the world has a certain favours the enjoyment of pleasure. The sage Panini, who says necessity. Blessings of rest can be fully enjoyed only after hard labour. The ever-healthy man cannot comprehend the ease and in ' Irtiya apavarge' that the third sex will be engaged in finding out a means of salvation, is necessarily of the opinion that the comfort of having a sound body and a sound mind. If you are other two sexes should enjoy sensual pleasures. Carry out the to receive full satisfaction in your diet, suffer from hunger first. commands of Käma, which even gods like Brahma could not The more you sustain the agony of thirst, the greater will be transgress .. The Vedas, too, are nothing but the commands of your delight in drinking cool water. You fear a dreadful night the gods. Then why do you show more respect to the latter? with heavy rainfall and a terrific thunderstorm when dark and Forbear from all disparaging and contemptuous remarks about dense clouds have covered the whole sky, and all the trees and women, in order that you may hope to have the company of houses have been blown away by the furious wind. But after the most excellent of the deer-eyed beauties in heaven. Exert such tedious hours, when the sun with celestial beauty appears yourself to please your beloved, and indulge your own incli-

418 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA MODERN SCHOLARS nations: These are the only roots of the tree of happiness. 419

'Pleasure is the good'-is the cry of nature. The animals know system of philosophy in India. In this stage of Indian Material- no other principle of action than pleasure. Children are sensitive ism, the Buddhists and the Jainas came to the field of philosophy to pleasure alone. The grown-up man, the apparently grave to preach spiritualism. In their first appearance they pretended and sober, all seek and pursue pleasure; the virtuous man enjoys to be the successors of the old heretics, i.e the followers of pleasure in the cultivation of virtue; even those who refute the Brhaspati, by directing their attacks mainly against the doc- statement that pleasure is the object of desire, find pleasure in trines of sacrifice as actually preached and practised in the Vedic

such refutation. School. They became, like the Lokāyatikas, very popular for the time being, as the minds of the people were then still captured 'Whatever the motive, pleasure is the mark: by Materialistic doctrines. For her the black assassin draws his sword; But as time went on, the state of things began to change. For her dark statesmen trim their midnight lamps; The Carvakas came to know what these newcomers really For her the saint abstains, the miser starves; were .. They led their opposition against the orthodox Buddhists The stoic proud for pleasure, pleasure scorns; and Jainas as they previously did against the Vedicists The For her, affliction's daughter grief indulge; result of this opposition was that the Lokayatikas met with And find, or, hope, a luxury in tears; opposition from the side of the Vedicists as well as from the For her, guilt, shame, toil, danger we defy.' side of the Buddhists and the Jainas By this simultaneous attack Therefore, pleasure is the highest good of human life. The from various sides they were, for the first time, pushed to a only good of life is human life. The only good of life is the corner. The philosophers of the Vedic Schools now became

individual's own pleasure. We should fully enjoy the present. very strong, being aided by the spiritualistic doctrines of the To sacrifice the present to the future is unwarranted and perilous new heretics-the Buddhists and the Jainas-and took the field The present is ours. The past is dead and gone. The future is as successors of the sages of old and repelled the attacks on the doubtful. The present is all we have. Let us make the most of permanent principles of spirituality. As time passed, these

it. With this credo, the Lokayatikas of that remote period of Vedicists appeared on the field one after another in order to

Indian history preached and practised the theory of an extreme oppose the heretics in general-both old and new-the Lok- form of hedonism, according to which sensual pleasure is the äyatikas, the Buddhists and the Jainas. They opposed the only end of human life Here, in this stage of Indian Materialism, materialistic views of the old heretics and the anti-Vedic doc-

the school of the Lokayatikas, in addition to its old names trines of the new heretics. The pioneer of these advocates of Bārhaspatya and Lokāyata, gained the designation Cārvāka. the orthodox Vedic schools was perhaps the sage Gotama, who The word means entertaining speech. It is derived from carva, adduced very strong arguments against the theory of Dehātma-

chewing, grinding with the teeth, eating, swallowing virtue väda or the theory which preaches that the body is the self, of the old heretics, and established the theory that the body is ... and vice. 'While you live, drink, for once dead, you never shall return.' 'As long as he lives, let a man live happily; after borrow- different from the soul. Then came Kanada, who made an ing money, let him drink ghee.' The propagation of this rampant endeavour to refute the theory of Svabhavavāda or Naturalism eroticism was the first step towards the downfall of the elevated of the old heretics, and propagated the theory that the diversity system of Lokäyata, which was considered so long the only of creation is not possible for svabhava, which is unconscious The diversity, according to Kanāda, is produced from atoms,

420 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 421 which are unconscious, through the will of God in agreement sponsors came to maintain that consciousness is a quality of with the doings of previous births. After him Kapila, who the mind. The other organs are only the means of indeterminate is regarded by some as representing the oldest tendency of sense-knowledge. It is mind alone that introduces the element philosophy, came to the field and formulated his arguments in of determinateness. Morcover, mind controls by its power of favour of Dualism, for which the field had already been prepared volition the outer organs, and may persist and function singly by his predecessors. Then came Patañjali, who propagated the even when the latter happen to be absent. Therefore, the mind theory of Yoga and tried to establish the theory of the existence is the true self All these have been recorded by Sadānanda in of God. When, through the influence of these teachers, the his Advaita Brahma Siddhi 'Sadānanda speaks of four different mass mind was almost inclined towards spiritualism, and belief materialistic schools. The chief point of dispute is about the in the transmigration and spiritual nature of the soul took almost conception of the soul. One school regards the soul as identical complete possession of the mass mind of India, Jaimini appeared with the gross body, another of the senses, a third with breath, and made an attempt to establish, by argumentative discussions, and the fourth with the organ of thought.' On the other hand, that the Vedas are infallible and authoritative; that Karma or the Lokāyatikas had so long maintained that perception is the action is more powerful than even God, if there be any; that for only source of knowledge. Now being severely attacked by its the sake of the purification of mind, the performance of Karma opponents, who maintained the authority of inference, it is indispensable. When through the influence of Jaimini, the showed for the first time its leaning towards admitting inference minds of the people became prepared, by performing duties as a source of knowledge .. In the first step, it said that for practical sanctioned by the Vedas, for conceiving the spiritualistic soul, purposes probability was sufficient. At the sight of smoke rising and the influence of anti-Vedic doctrines and tendencies was from a certain place, there arises in the mind a sense of the for the time being almost removed from the mass mind, Vyasa probability of fire, and not of its certainty. This is enough, for came to the field and preached spiritualistic or idealistic philoso- all practical purposes. For this end there is no need to assume phy. Lokayata, being thus opposed by these strong enemies, the existence of a distinct kind of evidence, called Inference grew impatient and leaned towards spiritualism. This stage When further pushed to the corner, this school said that the may be called the second or the middle stage of its downfall. In followers of this school were prepared to accept inference as a this stage it admits, gradually, the identification of self with means of right knowledge as it was useful in our daily life the sense-organs, the principle of life and with mind, shaking But the mechanical form of inference as proposed by the off its old doctrine of Dehätmaväda or the doctrine of the identi- Buddhists and others can by no means be considered a medium fication of self with the body. The first view or the doctrine of of right knowledge, as it is thoroughly impracticable for daily the identification of self with the sense-organs, is based on the use. In other words, there are two classes of Inference-one facts that consciousness and bodily movements follow from class inferring something restored in future and the other class the initiation of the senses and that the judgements expressed in inferring what has already taken place The inference about 'I am blind', showing the identity of the self with the sense- what is past is accepted and the inference about what has not organs, are universally accepted as valid Still opposed by the been perceived, such as Paraloka, God, or Soul, is rejected. spiritualists, it maintains that the vital principle itself is really Purandara flourished in this period as an advocate of the Cārvaka the source of intelligence, as the senses depend for existence school Sankara, Kamalaśīla, Abhayadeva, Jayanta and the and operation upon it. When this view too was attacked, its unknown author of Sarvamata Sangraha record his views.

422 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS :423 Being pushed further to the corner, this school accepted, in agriculture, the tending of cattle, trade, politics and adminis- this stage, even ether as an element. Gunaratna keeps its record. tration, etc., a wise man should always endeavour to enjoy pleasure, here, in this world. It was with Sankara and his FOURTH STAGE school that the great reaction proceeded against Indian Material-

But every action has its reaction. The opposition of the ism which in Madhavacaryya, who considered the Lokayata

Vedicists against the Materialists was not without its reaction. system as the lowest system of philosophy, secured the most

As they were supported by the Buddhists and the Jainas in their decided victory

attack on the Vedic sacrifices, the old heretic oppositionists became very powerful. They got their general name Nāstika, CONCLUSION

in this period Vedic rites proper were gradually more or less Just as Plato, one of the spiritualistic thinkers of the West, in pushed to the background. New scriptures were then in course his fanatical zeal would have liked to buy up and burn all the of preparation, fully adapted to the needs, tastes and tendencies works of Demokritos, the father of western Materialism, so it is of the changing times, but not entirely divorced from all con- probable that these advocates of Vedic orthodoxy, in their fanati- nection with the Vedas. Voluminous Tantric and Pauranic cal zeal, collected and destroyed the original works of the Brhas- works grew up in this period and satisfied the needs of the pati School of Philosophy, the extreme materialistic system of times. As these schools were originated for satisfying the India. As the Buddhistic and the Jaina schools were spiritualis- needs of people of different mentalities, elements of different tic in essence, they did not meet with total annihilation. Or it nature were expressly visible in them. As representatives may be that for a considerable time, the views of this school of the old heretic school, whose influence was then still pre- became feeble and unpopular, after which they lost their inde- dominant in the country, they included and adopted the popular pendent existence and became absorbed into other schools of doctrines regarding indulgence of the senses; and as successors spiritualistic philosophy. Although the works of Brhaspati of the spiritualistic schools, they gave them an esoteric purpose were destroyed, the continuity of the influence of his school and thus modified them to some extent. Since then, the period was at no period completely broken. of the great Hindu revival after the fall of Buddhism, India has We have already seen that the Lokayatikas got the designation been popularly Vedic, i.e. Pauranic and Täntric in her broad Nästika as they became one with the Buddhists. Some of the outlook. For this reason perhaps, in the centuries after Christ sects of the degenerated Buddhists, in which laxity in sexual we meet with very few names of Lokayata philosophers, morals was one of the features, became gradually affiliated to although the system must have been in existence even as late as the Lokayata school. One of these sects was the Kapalika sect. the time of Haribhadra; Guņaratna; Śāntarakșita; Kamalaśīla; The Kapalikas are a very ancient sect. They drink wine, offer Siddhasena; Abhayadeva; Krsna Miśra; Śrīharșa; Jayanta; human sacrifices and enjoy women. They strive to attain their Sadānanda; Mādhavācāryya, etc., who have recorded and religious goal with the help of human corpses, wine and women. criticized its theories in their works. It was Sankara and his They are dreaded by all for inhuman cruelties. Bhavabhūti, school who did not even consider the Cārvāka school as a system Krsna Miśra and Kavikarnapūra refer to such Kāpālikas in their of philosophy, although in Sarva Siddhanta Sangraha, he main- respective works the Malatīmadhavam, the Probodhacandrodayam tains that by adopting only those means which are seen such as and the Caitanyacandrodayam. Brhaspati; of Arthasāstra fame,

424 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA MODERN SCHOLARS 425

says that the Kapalika is alone to be followed for the purpose of The essential feature of this romance is-love for one with attaining pleasure whom one is not bound in wedlock Formerly, this Käpālika sect flourished in an independent As a reaction against this practice of sexual romance, Vaisnav- form. In course of time it became weak, and lost its indepen- ism made its appearance and the Madanotsava, the doctrinc dence. Probably the inhuman cruelties, or the dreadfulness of relating to sense-indulgence, must have been favourably the sect, brought about its ruin .. As kama or the enjoyment of received by a large number of people. To counteract this evil, sensual pleasure was the goal of this sect, it came gradually the orthodox school of the Vaisnavas included and adopted the to be affiliated to the Nastika form of the Lokayata school, popular doctrines regarding indulgence but gave them an according to which the summum bonum of human life is, as esoteric purpose and thus modified them to some extent. For shown before, the enjoyment of gross sensual pleasure. Thus this reason we find that the Dolotsava has retained the light the Kapalikas, like the Assassins, became the solitary historical pleasures and gay amusements of Madanotsava in many respects, example of a combination of materialistic philosophy with and the Vaisnavas have given these festivals a far more sober cruelty, lust, supernatural power and systematic crime. Or, it character in respect of sexual freedom. may be that the followers of orthodox schools, through bitter But the ever-flowing current of the Lokāyatikas never did contempt, identified the Lokāyatikas with the fierce Kāpālikas, remain suspended for a considerable period of time in Indian as in previous cases the Vedicists used freely terms of abuse like cultural history. It made its way in the teeth of all obstacles. 'bastard', 'incest' and 'monster' with regard to the Lokāyatikas. After the great Brahminic renaissance, the Lokayata sect took At the time of the author of Arthasāstra, these Kāpālikas were a shelter under different forms in different parts of India. In distinct sect. In Gunaratna's time we find them identified with Bengal, an old sect of the Buddhist Mahayana school, chiefly the Lokäyatika school which had already become a hated name concerned with sexual romance, gave up its independent exis- in the country .. tence; and like the Svabhāvavādins and the Kāpālikas, became The Lokayatikas were a creed of joy. Through their influence one with the Nastika Lokāyatikas; and the Lokāyatikas on at that period of Indian history, the temple and the court, poetry their part incorporated themselves with that community The and art, delighted in sensuousness. Eroticism prevailed all old element of sensualism of the festival Madanotsava of the over the country. The Brahmin and the Candala, the king and Nästikas, a sanction for the gratification of grosser pleasures, the beggar, took part with equal enthusiasm in Madanotsava, is still found to linger in this sect. The name of this sect is the in which Madana or Käma was worshipped. References to this Sahajia sect. The very name Sahajia reminds us of the doctrine festival are not rare in works of poets like Kālidāsa, Bisākha of Svabhäva of the old heretics. The three chief physical appetites Datta and Śriharsa. 'Dance and song, flower and the red powder of man are eating and drinking whereby his body is sustained, fag, swinging and playing, all these created an atmosphere of and sexual intercourse whereby human life is propagated. light amusements from which all sterner laws of sexual ethics Considered in themselves, they are natural and harmless. So were dismissed for the time being and men and women mixed the Sahajias say, 'there is no wrong in the eating of meat and indiscriminately, the green trees wearing red apparel, as it drinking of wine, nor in sexual intercourse, for these are natural were, owing to profuse fäg that filled the whole atmosphere inclinations of men.' over which the April sun threw its gaudy purple rays. They In the meetings of the Sahajias, men and women take their assimilated the element of sexual romance from the Kāpālikas. seats indiscriminately, without any scruple, and with full

426 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 427 freedom. The Candala cooks the food and the Brahmins take it not believe in the human soul and in anything beyond the without hesitation. Unless hunger is appeased, the Sahajiās pleasures of the present moment. They believed in Deha and in cannot pray. Large plates full of eatables are brought to the bed nothing else. On one occasion, some Brahmins of the orthodox spread before the members. Men and women sit there and cat community were performing tarpana in the river Ganges. This them freely In their joy women put food into the mouth of was the custom of taking handfuls of water from the river and men, the latter are not slow in returning the attention, and the throwing them down, by which acts they believed the thirst of house rings with merry laughter. They consider the Vedas and their departed ancestors would be allayed. One of the founders other holy scriptures to have been manufactured by worldly of the Sahajia cult saw this, and taking handfuls of water like men for their own selfish ends. They have no regard for the them, threw them on the bank. This act attracted the attention Brahmins. They entertain no respect for cither the priestly of the Brahmins, who asked him the reason for his doing so. class or for their elders. Women care nothing for their husbands The Sahajia replicd-'If your water will go to your departed They revolt openly against the Brahmins, the Vedas and Hindu forefathers who are far away, mine ought to go to my vegetable socicty. Most of the songs of the Sahajias are about boats, garden which is only a mile from here, and certainly not so trades, mortgages, farming and a hundred other topics of rustic remote as the land of the dead.' This sect raised objections interest of Lokayätra. They set forth canons and theories with against the superstitions and conventions of the orthodox a boldness which is really amazing. Caste, rank in society, or schools. Extreme lawlessness characterized this sect. orthodoxy of views are out of the question in their socicty. All these views of the Sahajia Lokayatikas remind us of the They entertain the utmost freedom in thought, religious and old heretics. Most of the views of the Nāstika Cārvāka or social matters. They are absolutely beyond the prejudices and Lokayatika of this form are recorded by Ciranjib Bhattacharyya conventions of ordinary people. The Sahajias allow the indis- of Bengal in his famous work Vidvānmodatarangini. In his criminate mixing of men and women. The motto of a Sahajiā account of the Nastika school, we find a blending of several woman is-'he who will capture our heart, we will belong to independent doctrines like Bārhaspatya, Svabhāva, Bauddha, him. ' If the man of her love wants her body, she must give it. Jaina and Kapālika. The orthodox community amongst the She must give her all without reserve. The Sahajias do not Buddhists, the Jainas and the Hindus were bitterly hostile to believe in the established ideals of womanhood represented by the supporters of these views of the Sahajia Lokāyatikas in every Sīta, Sāvitrī and the satis who burnt themselves with their stage of their development. This is perhaps why its followers dead husband in days gone by, as living examples of absolute tried, by all means, to hide their societies from public view. devotion. These wives of Hindu scriptures and epics were For this reason, perhaps, the Sahajias hold their meetings in actuated by hopes of getting rewards in the next life and secret. All their old books being destroyed by their opponents praises from society in this for their chaste life. To the Sahajias, of the orthodox schools, they now have a particular language love is religion. They believe that the Deha or material human body is all that should be cared for and their religious practices in circulation amongst themselves named the Sandhyābhāsā, a language which is not understood by people outside the pale of are concerned with the union of men and women. The famous Bengali poet Candidasa was a follower of this cult. But Caitanya, their own society. But thus hidden like owls at daylight, the Lokāyatikas of the Sahajia sect of Bengal could not fight long apprehending its corruption and misuse, declared himself in with the orthodox communities. clear language as against all sexual romance. The Sahajiās did After the Brahminic revival, in the age of Caitanya, they

428 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA MODERN SCHOLARS 429

sought shelter, and in Bengal, Birabhadra, son of Nityānanda, (5) According to the Gita, the Nastikas are godless people. gave them a shelter and converted them to the Vaisnava faith XVI. 8 Kumārila, in his Śloka Vārtika, maintains the same This conversion, however, does not mean much. They merely view. (Pratijna Sutra, tenth verse). cried aloud the names of Caitanya and Nityananda, and there (6) In the later works, the word has been used for vilification. ended all their connection with Vaisnavism: They adopted the The Madhvas vilify the Saivas and vice versa by using this term. Vaisnava creed merely for expediency's sake, in order to have some status in the society which had rejected them altogether. Lokāyata Although, with the revival of the Brahminic form of Vaisnav- ism, the Lokayatikas became very weak and identified them- (1) Old as Ramayana. The word means 'dry arguments' or

selves with the Vaisnavas, yet the school of frec-thinking did 'vitanda' or 'casuistry'

not die out in India. It still lives not amongst a few but amongst (2) It is often used in old Päli texts in the same sense.

thousands today. They are not guided by the spirit of the Hindu (3) The word is available in Patanjali's Mahābhāsya: VII

Renaissance. They have now included the Bible, the Koran and 3 45.

even the Granth Sahib of Guru Nanak. A movement of absolute (4) The name Lokāyata occurs in Pāņini's ukthādigana.

freedom is visible in every department of Indian life -- social, Panini IV. 2 60.

political and religious. The advocates of free-thinking of this (5) Lokāyata has been recognized by Kauțilya as Darśana:

age are no doubt the successors of the old heretics-the Barhas- Artha Śāstra I. 1.

patyas. They have now taken complete possession of the mass Cārvāka mind of India. They constitute the bulk of the cultured. Carvaka is met with in the Mahabharata Later on, this is the

Appendix (abridged) only term by which Indian materialism is designated. The word cārvāka is often taken as cāru (bcautiful) and vāka SOME RELEVANT NOIES (specch). And it is interesting to find that caru is also a synonym

Nāstika for Brhaspati. Thus it may be suggested that cārvaka stands for 'the word of Brhaspati'. (1) The word is as old as the Maitrī Upanisad, III 5, Nāstikyam Pasanda is also a term which is used in the same sense. VII 10' Materialists, Sceptics and Agnostics (2) Pānini gives its derivative meaning. Pānini IV 4. 6 Viśvakarman speaks of a class of thinkers who are wrapt in a According to Panini, a Nastika is one who maintains the vicw misty cloud (niharena pravrtāh), and with lips that stammer that there is no other world (jalpya) The subsequent thinkers speak of avidya or ignorance, (3) According to Manu, a Nästika is one who condemns the and vicikitsā or perplexity. Samaya or doubt is another term Veda. II.11. It is mainly the Veda which establishes the 'next which is met with in this connection in subsequent literature world'. If the authority of the Veda is rejected, the 'next The Mundakas and the Vajasancyas use the term avidya in the world' cannot stand. So, one who condemns the Veda also sense of anything which is not transcendental knowledge (para discards the 'next world'. vidyä) or the knowledge of Brahman (Brahma-vidya), and anything (4) The word has been used in the Mahabharata in the samc which is not conducive to ideal self-realization The word sense as suggested by Manu. vicikitsā, according to Äsuri, means a mental state. In the Katha

430 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 431

Upanisad (1. 20) the word has been used in the sense of philoso- this type. The close relation between the agnostics of the Sūtra- phic doubt as to man's existence after death: 'some say he exists; krtanga and the materialists of the Puranas cannot be ignored.

others, he does not.' These latter are, no doubt, the sceptics In the Buddhist records Sañjaya, who maintains a sort of

and agnostics of ancient India. Visvakarman evidently had in indifferent or neutral attitude towards such problems of meta-

mind: (1) those hymnchanters who doubted the existences of physical speculation as those which are concerned with the

Indra; (2) Paramesthin, who saw no possibility of knowing first cause, the final cause, future life, retribution, and so forth,

any cause or reality beyond original matter; and (3) Dirghat- is best known as a sceptic. According to Sañjaya, the same

amas, who was ignorant of the nature of a first causc. In sub- philosopher tends to be an agnostic as well as a sceptic. When

sequent literature we find that the keniyas were of the opinion he freely confesses his inability to know the ultimate beginning

that the know-all does not know at all, while the know-nothing and end of things, which is virtually the same as admitting that

knows everything these are unknown and unknowable, he is an agnostic. When

And as stated above, some sages, according to the Katha- he doubts or hesitates to admit the correctness of all bold asser-

upanisad, doubt the existence of man after death (1. 20). Scepti- tions about matters beyond human cognition, he is a sceptic.

cism and agnosticism are the expressions of a free mind that What we find in the teachings of Dirghatamas, Paramesthin,

refuses to accept traditional wisdom without thorough criticism. the keniyas and the kathas is represented by the agnostics and

In this respect, the materialists of ancient India are very closely sceptics.

related to the present-day sceptics and agnostics. However Jayarāśi and Tattvopaplavasimha minor their position may be in the field of philosophy, they are, no doubt, the fathers of free and independent thinking The work of Jayarasi is an important new chapter in the

in India. history of Indian philosophy. No work of the Carvaka school Brhaspati Laukyaor Brahmanaspati, who may be termed the itself was known before. Jayarasi's treatment is clear from the founder of Indian materialism, first embodied his views about very title of the book, 'tattvopaplava,' which means 'upsetting the origin of the world in the hypothesis that in the beginning, of all principles.

being came out of non-being-asatah sadajāyata; that matter is There were different classes of Carvākas. A particular division the ultimate reality. Paramesthin treated matter as the ultimate of the school engaged themselves in rejecting all sorts of reality as Brhaspati did, but disavowed all possibility of know- pramānas. Jayarāśi belonged to that group. This is in addition ledge of the ultra-material substratum, if there were any. He to what has been discussed in this book regarding the first stage refused to extend his metaphysical inquiry beyond matter. of Indian Materialism

Brhaspati was a materialist Paramesthin was a sceptic But Jayarāśi has accepted Brhaspati as his Guru and with his per- they were inter-related. Subsequently Mahavira speaks of the mission, demolishes the doctrines of other schools. Annäniyas, who pretend to be intelligent but are in fact un- The method adopted by him may well be called critical. To familiar with truth and have conveniently got rid of perplexity him, there are no valid means of knowledge and to establish

or puzzlement. These Annaniyas are ignorant teachers who his thesis, he has very sharply examined different schools of teach ignorant pupils and speak untruth without proper investi- Indian philosophy gation of knowledge (Sūtrakrtānga, 1. 12. 2). These ignorant The probable date of Jayaräsi Bhatta is the first half of the teachers seem to be the agnostics of ancient India. Subsequently, seventh century AD. Brhaspati of the Carvaka School is pictured as an agnostic of

MODERN SCHOLARS 433 thereto, been expressed so clearly as among the Indian materia- lists. This is evidenced, for instance, by the following verses of Th. Stcherbatsky Indian materialism.

This article originally appeared in the Russian language in The Agnihotra, the three Vedas, the ascetic's three staves, Vostochnye zapiski Leningr. instituta zhivykh vostochnykh and smearing oneself with ashes- yazykov, Leningrad, 1927, vol. i, pp .. 1-10. As translated Brhaspati says, these are but a means of livelihood for those into English by H. C Gupta, it first appeared in Indian Studies: who have no manliness nor sense. Past & Present, vol. x (1968-69), pp. 143-50, and was later incorporated in the book Papers of Stcherbatsky, Calcutta, 1969. The three authors of the Vedas were The buffoon, the knave and the thief. History of Materialism in India All the well-known formulae of the pandita-s jarphari, tur- TH. STCHERBAISKY phari, etc. And all the obscene rites for the queen commanded in the Amidst the diverse philosophical systems, ancient as well as Aśvamedha, modern, which we find in India, it is quite natural that there Those were invented by buffoons, and so all the various kinds must exist some materialistic system too. The main approach of presents to the priests, of such a system lies in reducing all psychic processes to purely While the eating of flesh was similarly commended by physical ones, negating the independent existence of the soul, night-prowling demons and affirming that the so-called soul is simply one of the pro- perties of organized matter This is philosophical materialism There is no other hell than the mundane pain produced by Another approach that we find in India is that of raising the such purely mundane causes as thorns, etc; practical question of the aim of human life and of the prevalence The only supreme is the earthly monarch, whose existence of material aims therein Here, materialism is distinguished is proved by all the world's eyesight; from all other trends by the fact that it negates the law of so- And the only liberation is the dissolution of the body. called karma, i. e. retribution for good or bad actions. The greater According to the generally accepted systems in ancient India, abstraction of the Indian mind, as compared with other ancient human life was regulated by three main aims: property, love civilizations, is expressed in the fact that there the moral law is and duty. By the first were meant the various occupations giving not embodied in the person of God, the judge, but in the form means for life-cultivation, cattle-breeding, trade and industry. of impersonal karma, which may be characterized as the law of Government control, with all its ramifications, also came under moral progress, as faith in the fact that the world is ruled by a this category. By the second aim was meant family life, children special mechanism directing its evolution from the low and and also extra-familial satisfaction of the passions. What was the unjust to the good and the perfect meant by the third was mainly religious duty, the control of This law is fully negated by the extreme Indian materialists. passions with a view to secure rewards in the next life or eternal Nowhere perhaps has the spirit of negation and resentment of divinity. The normal life of man, according to the views of the the fetters of traditional morals, and the religion connected orthodox Hindu, must have all these three aims in view. It is

434 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 435 his duty to create a family and to provide for it: this is inter- materialism, which did not accept the moral law or so-called preted as the service of love even to material aims. Later, having karma established his family, the Hindu may forsake it, become a san- Later, at a time when the Mauryas built a large and blossom- nyāsin, i.e. a poor homeless wanderer, directing all his thoughts ing empire in Northern India, the materialists worked out a to eternal bliss. specific philosophical school. Canakya, Minister to the King In individual cases, however, this equilibrium among the Candragupta, has left a treatise on politics in which he enu- three aims of life was destroyed in favour of one of them. The merates the existing philosophical systems. There, he refers to materialists, naturally, did not give any importance to the aim materialism as one of the main systems which the future ruler of religious duty and openly proclaimed property and love as must study the only aims of man. In this epoch, all the three main aims of man in life-property, On the other hand, there were many people in India who fully love and duty-are treated scientifically. During this period, renounced all property and avowed celibacy, rather, a com- we have the practical sciences (arthasastra), the science of love plete annihilation of all desires. They formed communities of (kāmaśāstra) and the science of religious duty (dharmaśāstra) poor wandering monks These communities sometimes became Among the practical sciences, that of governing the country so numerous that they posed a calamity for the working popu- occupies first place. With his teaching, Canakya marked the lation, which had to support them somehow or the other. beginning of a special school of politicians. Quite indepen- Like all other Indian teachings, Indian Materialism was the dently of Canakya and probably at the same time there also speciality of a specific school, which preserved its traditions, existed the theoretician Uśanas, whose political teaching dif- developed its teachings and put them into practice. Its origin fered considerably from that of Canakya. The latter was the goes back to hoary antiquity. As early as c 1000 Bc in the Upani- representative, so to say, of the official political doctrine accord- sads, there is a reference to a teaching which does not acknow- ing to which it was necessary to support religion with all force, ledge anything except matter. Five hundred years before Christ, and which was convinced that temporal power was illuminated at about the time of Buddha, there were certain schools which with a religious basis. Usanas, on the other hand, did not did not acknowledge anything except matter or, as put at that consider it necessary to found temporal power on a religious time, the four great elements: earth, fire, water and air. There base. According to him, there is only one science and that is were also some who added a fifth element, ether, thinner than the science of punishment, or literally, the science of the rod air, and filling the whole of space. (dandanīti). Brhaspati, to whom the main schools of Indian Buddhism was on the one hand very close to Materialism, materialists are attributed, was also first a founder of a school since it also negated the existence of God and the eternal soul. of politicians. But his political school diverged from religion But the two differed sharply in that Buddhism accepted the still further and remained known in history as an ardent hater law of karma, i.e. retribution for good and bad actions. In all of religion and advocate of theoretical materialism. It was called the proceedings of the initial sermon of Buddha, his hostile either the Brhaspati school after the name of its founder, or and sharp attitude towards all theories which accepted the exis- Cärväka's school, i.e. of the materialists proper who cared for tence of the soul is clearly manifest. But at the same time, it daily bread alone .. Another name for it is Lokāyata, that is, of was with equal resoluteness that Buddha opposed Indian the people who care only about the earth and not about heaven.

436 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 437 No complete text or work of this school has reached us; how- this by sight, because it is dark. We did not know it by sense of ever, several extracts and passages preserved in the works of touch either, for the skin is the organ of the sense of touch and other schools enable us to form a notion of its main aspects and it cannot touch itself. We also cannot know it from inference. the methods by which they are proved. A list (as complete as Hence it is proved by this method that all the accepted teachings possible) of the works, in which there are references to the about the sources of valid knowledge do not withstand criticism. teachings of the Carvakas and excerpts from their works, will Once it is seen that the cognition cannot be determined, it be given below .. follows therefrom that it does not exist and that the processes, Now I shall dwell on two such works, in which have been however conscious, are in reality only mechanical phenomena found extracts from the works of Carvakas unknown till now. (jada). The first of them is the Nyayamanjari by the well-known Jayanta distinguishes the highly educated materialists from philosopher Jayantabhatta. Here the materialists have been these materialist-sophists. They claimed as follows: 'There is mentioned twice. Speaking of the number of sources of valid undoubtedly a sole conscious element, localized in the whole knowledge, he refers to the first main aphorism or sūtra of their living body We also allow that this consciousness is subject to main work. Some sutra-s had already been restored from various synthesis and other mental processes. One would hardly argue sources by Prof. Hillebrandt. It is now possible for us to restore against this; but that this continues to exist after death cannot the first one as well. It reads: be proved. The consciousness, leaving one body, naturally athā'tas tattvam vyākhyāsyāma iti cannot settle in another. Had this been possible, we would have remembered those things which occurred in our previous Here, the word tattva is set against the word dharma, which births exactly in the same manner as in this birth we remember is prominent in orthodox schools. This sūtra means: In our things done in our childhood. We cannot show any reason work, we shall talk of reality and not of duty. From the why the same eternal soul, living now in one and sometimes in interpretation of this sütra it is clear that the materialists were another body, has different memories: it remembers what it then divided into two camps: those who held the extreme view, undergoes in one body, and does not recall what it does in other fully negated consciousness and considered the human body a bodies. Having been convinced, therefore, that there is no soul simple' mechanism (jada) without any consciousness, and after the death of the body, it is necessary to do away with any those who were moderate in their views and acknowledged its talk of future life which is traced back to the theory of the eternal existence, but only in the form of a special function of the soul, and to try to live happily according to the principle: body. Jayanta calls the former sophists (dhurta). It is the latter So long as we live, we shall be happy! whom he calls the real scholars .. And in fact, the discussions of There is none here who will not die; the former appear to be of a sophistic nature. When he dies and is turned to ashes, The fact (tattva) mentioned in the first sutra cannot be either calculated or classified. Also, even the methods of its cognition From where is he to appear again?' cannot be found out, and all attempts made in this connection Another extract to which we would like to draw attention prove futile. Thus, for instance, sitting in a dark room, we occurs in the work of Vacaspati Miśra, in his interpretation of nevertheless know that there are fingers on our hands and that Nyāyasūtra 3 2.39. The school of Indian realists supposes that there is a distance between them. We could not have known matter consists of particles moving in and combining in the

438 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 439 body. Like Aristotle, they assume that the natural motion of members, thought will continue to work. If it be assumed that all particles is rotatory (parispanda). The conscious motion thinking is inherent in parts of a body, then a whole series of (kriyā), i.e. the following-up and achievement of aims, is under thinkers would have to be there in one body. the influence of impulse from the side of psychic elements. 'Let it be so', replies the materialist; 'this does not contradict This impulse was represented in semi-anthropomorphic my principle.' features The main argument of the materialists was that a con- 'No', the Naiyäyika replies. We see that different people, if scious act could be fully explained by the motion of particles of they are self-dependent, have different aims, and all of them matter. The difference between the two motions is only cannot do one job together, for there is no such law that many superfluous. Just as the different material elements connected people could accidentally have one aim and would do one job with each other may form such a substance such as alcohol which Besides, in the case of a single person, in a single body, separate does not resemble the substances of which it is made, in the thoughts exist in agreement among themselves; but this is not same manner, the different material elements, connected in the case with different bodies. This can be explained only by the living body, develop a new quality, a conscious act, which the fact that in one body, there is only one organ of thought. is not similar to them. After the sensual sensation and its object change, there remains, But to this, the Naiyayikas raise the following objection: in nevertheless, their cognition in memory, and we have a right a drink, each particle has alcohol; whereas in the case of material to conclude that the cognition is not a property of either the elements of the body, each one individually does not have con- organ of feelings or its object. In exactly the same manner, sciousness. Any property of matter, as for instance weight, must although the body changes, as evidenced by changing age- be wherever matter is. If the consciousness and the will were infancy, youth and old age-nevertheless the same memory also qualities of matter, they would then have existed every- remains where where there was matter However we do not see this; Therefore one cannot affirm that consciousness is a property for instance, in a pot and similar objects. One cannot therefore of the body. Besides, speaking of conscious motion, we have contend that consciousness and will appertain.to matter .. in view not merely a motion which is possessed by all particles The materialist objects thus: consciousness and will are not of matter, but a conscious attainment of aim, an achievement at all such properties as belong to matter in general, as for of what is desired and an avoidance of what is not desired. The instance, weight. They belong to it only in known combina- tions. Just as the seed kinva, mashed and fermented, gives us materialist, not paying any attention to this difference, founds his thesis on motion in general, and not on the fact of motion alcohol, exactly in the same manner the elements of matter, towards aim having formed a body, may be converted into consciously moving objects. Literature of Indian Materialism To this, the Naiyayikas reply that every particle of alcohol taken individually has an intoxicating effect. This power is not A. In Sanskrit

inherent in the known organized whole consisting of parts. 1. Mādhavācārya, Sarvadarsanasamgraha, ed Bibl. Ind. 1858, Similarly, even the parts of the body would have to be able to pp. 1-7. think, if each were taken separately. One cannot affirm arbit- 2. Haribhadra, Şaddarśanasamuccaya, ed. L. Suali, Bibl. Ind rarily that matter thinks as a whole but does not think as parts 1905, p. 300ff of the body .. It is possible that if one separates three or four 3. Gunarantna, Tarkarahasyadīpikā, ib.

440 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA 4. Jayanta, Nyāya-mañjarī, Benares 1895, pp. 64, 466ff 5. Vātsyāyana, Nyāya-bhāsya on Nyāya-sūtra ii. 2 .. 39. 6 Uddyotakara, Nyāyavārtika: Vācaspati Misra, Nyāyavārtika-tātparya-țīkā Gopinath Kaviraj 8. Samkarācarya, Sarvasiddhāntasamgraha, ed. & trby.M. Rangacarya, Madras, 1909 Originally published in Sarasvati Bhavana Studies, vol ii, 9. Samkhya-sūtra-vrtti, iii. 17-22 pp. 93-111, the main interest of this article seems to be that 10. Sāmkhya-tattva-kaumudī, on Kārikā 5. in it, the author attempts to show that the earliest represen- tatives of the extreme form of Svabhavavada were those 11. Śamkaradigvijaya. philosophers who eventually came to be known as the

B. European Studies Lokāyatas, and still later, as the Cārvākas.

1. H. Jacobi, Zur Frühgeschichte der indischen Philosophie Lokāyata and the (Sitzb. K. Preuss, Ak. d. w., 1911). Doctrine of Svabhāva 2. L. Suali, Materiaux pour servir a I' Histoire du Materialisme Indien, Le Museon, N. S. 9, Louvain, 1908. GOPINAIH KAVIRAJ 3. Pizzagalli, Nāstika Cārvāka e Lokāyatika, Pisa, 1907. 4. A. Hillebrandt, Zur Kenntniss der indischen Materialisten As a brief introduction to the study of theistic philosophy in 5. Ego-khe, Ueber Materialisten and Skeptiker, Alt-Indian, ancient India, it is desirable to make a short survey of the old Breslau, 1890. p. 168ff. controversy over the Causal (efficient) Problem and the kindred 6 Statii R Garbe & L. de la Vallee Poussin in Hasting's questions centred around it. It is an interesting question- Encyclopaedia. viii. 138 & 93 one which inevitably presents itself in the study of all ancient 7. John Muir, in Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, 1861 philosophy-and we cannot well afford to leave out a short 8. Hopkins, Great Epic, 1901, p. 86. discussion of it here 9. Dahlmann, Sāmkhya, p. 208 It may be said, broadly speaking, that the doctrine of Iśvara 10 Max Müller, Six Systems, p. 94. is as old in its systematized formulation as the age of the Maha- bharata and of the Upanisads. The Śvetāśvatara Upanisad contains a nominal enunciation of some of the most popular theories current in its time in explanation of the origin of the Universe, and Iśvaravāda forms one of this number. Thus, we read: kālah svabhāvo niyatir yadrcchā bhūtāni yonih purușa iti cintyam/ samyoga esām na tvātmabhāvād ātmāpyanīah sukhaduhkhahetoh // In the second half of this famous passage, although suffering from a slight ambiguity of expression, the doctrine of Iśvara is, I believe, undoubtedly indicated.1 A more pronounced statement, however, appears in Suśruta, where six diverse

442 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA views are mentioned. Punyaraja in his commentary on the MODERN SCHOLARS 443

Vākyapadīya, Sarvajnātma Muni in the Samksepa Śārīraka the why of an event or product, the doctrine of Svabhava. This (i. 528), Gunaratna in the Saddarsanasamuccayavrtti, Māthara is Svabhāvavāda par excellence and Gaudapāda on Sānkhya Kārikā no. 61, Bhatța Utpala on Brhat Samhita (ii 7), Acārya Nemicandra in Gommațasāra, B. The Moderate View:

verses 877-83, and Gotama in Nyāya Sūtras, IV.1.14-43, It allows causal analysis as possible and even as legitimate

speak of various rival theories about the origin of the world within certain limits, but holds that this discursive process of (Cf Śivapurāna, Vāyavīya Samhitā, Uttara Bhāga, VIII. 14). seeking for a sufficient reason cannot be carried very far. At the Many of these had been in vogue in independent forms, and last stage, however, where no adequate explanation is forth- inter-related, long before the rise of Buddhism. And there coming, an appeal must be made to 'the nature of the thing'; seems to be good reason to believe that in course of centuries, and this is Svabhava. This is practically a confession of the with the systematization of the schools, some of these doctrines impotence of human reason with regard to all first principles, lost their independence altogether and came to be affiliated to on which some assumptions have necessarily to be made.

the systems newly built up. The inevitable consequence of this From the above it would appear that the former kind of

gradual assimilation would appear to have been a blending of svabhāvavā is inimical to scientific progress, in that it puts a thoughts which sometimes seriously hinders historical discrimi- stop to the initiative of all researches by denying the existence

nation. I am, however, trying to append below a short note on and knowledge of the principle of efficient causation, while each of these doctrines, taking special care to keep their integrity the latter view is quite sane and sound

as closely as feasible;2 and it will be evident from a glance at The earliest representatives of the extreme form of svabhāva-

this description that theistic studies were very intimately con- vāda seeni to have been a set of free thinkers in ancient India nected in early times with the study of the fundamental Causal who were originally called lokāyatikas,4 but subsequently Problem, with which all these theories had endeavoured to came to be more widely known under the name of Cārvākas. 5 deal, and that they are traceable to a great antiquity in the past. Rank materialism, an absence of belief in the unseen and of regard for authority, and an uncompromising rationalism- Svabhāvavāda more correctly casuistry (vitanda)6-were their general charac- Under the name of Svabhavavada we may comprise almost3 teristics

all those modes of thinking which may deny the principle of There are evidences in Pali Literature as to the existence,

causality, more particularly efficient causality, and assert during the age of Buddhism or even earlier, of a class of persons,

the supremacy of the inherent or immanent nature of a thing. Brahmins by caste, who spent all their mental energies in the

Theoretically, it may be thought of under a twofold aspect- subtleties of futile controversies. What the nature of these

extreme and moderate: controversies was in which they found so much pleasure and showed such skill, we do not exactly know. But one thing stands A. The Extremist View: out as certain. They did not believe in the Vedas, nor even in It repudiates the possibility of discovering the cause of a thing the Dharma Sastras-the canonical works -- of the Buddhists at the very outset of the inquiry, and sets up in explanation of and the Jains. Hence their arguments did not appeal to any of those religious communities in which, in spite of mutual

444 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 445

differences, there was unanimity in an unquestioning and un- a given antecedent condition has the character of a true cause, questionable obedience to authority (in the form of Veda or it is really necessary to find out with certainty the elements of Buddha Vachana or Jinaśāsana). Thus we find that the Brahmins, the Buddhists and the Jains invariability (niyama) and of relevancy (ananyathasiddhi) involved in such a notion. But this certitude can never be arrived at. As were all equally ill-disposed towards the Lokayatikas, whom for inference being, possibly, a means of the ascertainment of they looked upon with contempt as their common enemies: causality, the Lokayatika contests its evidentiary value The (a) In the Rāmāyana (II 100.38-39) Rāmacandra is said to have problem of Induction is, to him, insoluble. The conviction of spoken to Bharata- Universal Concomitance, or of the absence of a condition

kaccinna lokāyatikān brāhmaņām stāta sevase / limiting the Universality of the relation on which all inference

anarthakuśala hyete balāh panditamāninah// is based, is inaccessible to human resources. The result is that

dharmaśāstresu mukhyesu vidyamānesu durbudhāḥ / to the Lokäyatika, there is no order revealed in the world, either

buddhim ānvīksikīm prāpya nirartham pravadanti te // of sense or of intellect. Everything stands isolated and self- contained. Here the commentator Rāma explains the word Lokāyatikas In this state of intellectual confusion, the fact of contingency as cārvākamatānusārinah or as śuşkatarkavāvadūkah. There is little observable in phenomenal creation appears to be very hard to doubt that Manu, II. 11 refers to these Lokāyatika Brahmins explain; but an explanation may be suggested. Contingency given to casuistry by the expression nästika. (b) Pali works means that a product comes into existence at one particular abound in references to this sect. The Buddha did not allow his moment rather than another. But how is this particular time to Bhiksus to learn or teach the Lokāyata system (Vinaya Pițaka, be determined? The usual reply of the causalists consists in Culla Vagga, V. 33 2). The notorious Chabbaggiya monks, referring this time-determination to the co-operation of the whose names occur so often as mischief-makers in the Vinaya antecedent conditions. But the Svabhāvavādi staves off this Pitaka, were adept in this branch of learning. It is condemned difficulty by an appeal to svabhāva, remarking that no further among other low arts in the Mahaśila 5 The Nepalese Buddhists question on this point is relevant. Let us try to understand the refer to it as one of those things with which a Bodhisattva situation. It is well-known that even the doctrine of causality should not occupy himself, or in which good disciples should fails to explain the ultimate principle; it is then simpler, so it is not take any pleasure (Saddharma Pundarīka, Ch. XIII) (c) The affirmed, to assume at the very start that causes, known or attitude of the Jains may best be evidenced by their describing unknown (adrsta), are all superfluous. Varieties and inequalities it as a form of micchāditthi, or heresy (Weber, Bhagavati, II 248). remain after all unexplained facts, and no amount of analysis The extreme form of Svabhavavada may be thus illustrated. will ever furnish us with the right solution. The only reasonable It has already been noted that in this view, the rejection of a conclusion, therefore, in such cases, is to say that it is the nature causal principle forms the most important feature 7 It is averred of the thing to happen at such and such a time, and that is all. that neither sensuous perception nor inference is an evidence in The only law here is the law of svabhäva. Just as a piece of cloth support of its existence. For, mere perception of two events is occupies the same space as its material cause-the threads (tantu), not sufficient to establish between them a causal nexus, the and not the shuttle, etc., although the threads and the shuttles reason being that even when a thing is observed by the senses, are both equally causes; in the same way a product, though doubt may still arise as to its being a cause. To ascertain whether destitute of a cause, may appear at one time, and not at another.

446 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 447

As in the former case space association (desaniyama) 1s due to svabhava and not to a cause, so in the latter, time-relation svabhāvatah sarvam idam pravrttam. (line 3)

(kālaniyama) is to be similarly explained. This being so, the na kāmakāro's ti kutah prayatnah. (line 4)

contingency of the visible-phenomena need not be in opposition This view is probably referred to as nirnimittavāda in Ny Sūt. to the fact of their being self-sufficient (nirapeksa) and uncaused 4. 1 22-24. Udayana, in his Kusumānjali (1.5.), appears to make (ahetuka) .* The position of the Lokāyatika on this point is thus svabhāvavāda one of the five forms of ākasmikatvavāda, the summed up by Madhusūdana Sarasvatī: remaining 4 forms being (1) ahetuvāda, (2) abhūtivāda, (3) svataut-

adrstāngīkāre'pi kvacid gatvā svabhāve paryavasānāt svābhāvikam pādavāda and (4) anupākhyotpādavāda. A brief note on these tenets

eva jagadvaicitryam astu drsțe sambhabatyadrstakalpanānavakāśāt is, I believe, necessary to make the discussion complete.

ataḥ kāma eva prāņinām kāranam nānyad adrsteśvarādītyāhuriti (1) The first view is apparently a formal denial of causality,

lokāyatikadrstir iyam. (com. on Gītā xvi. 8). but not of production. This much is common with svabhāvavāda,

From what we have seen of svabhāvavāda, we can well under- but it does not accept the elaborate explanation of svabhāva as

stand that it is a doctrine of unmitigated automatism, in the offered by the latter This ahetuvada seems to me identical with the famous adhiccasamuppannavada so often met with in Pali sense that all movements, within the organism and outside it, literature (cf Brahmajālasutta, 1. 30.34 = Dīgha nikāya Vol. I, are held to proceed from the inherent necessity of the body rather pp. 28-30, Mili. Pañ. 1.443. adhicca = fortuitous, opposed to than from an extrinsic principle of efficiency, such as Personal Will or Adrsta.9 The power and freedom of Will being thus abhinha = habitual, Mil. Pañ. 1.442, or paticca = having a cause). As for the meaning of the term adhicca, cf. Udāna VI 5, totally disavowed, the theory commits itself to the awkward where the word from its context seems to mean neither svata position of a queer sort of Determinism. The literature of the Svabhavavadins is now entirely lost, utpanna nor parata utpanna. Buddhaghoșa (Sumangala 1.118)

except what has reached us in fragments. Here is a verse which explains it as ahetuta utpanna. This is really the so-called ahetuvāda. Buddhaghosa explains its form as ahutvā sattattāya appears to have originally belonged to a standard work of this literature, describing in outline the three main theses of this parinata (i e abhūtvā bhavanam). There is reference to the Ahetu-

doctrine, viz. (1) varieties due to svabhāva, (2) movement vāda in the Mahābodhi jātaka (Fausboll, The Jātaka, VI, pp. 228,

(pravrtti and nivrtti) due to svabhäva, and (3) denial of free will: 237), but the doctrine appears to have a slightly different shade of meaning there

kalt kaņtakānām prakaroti taiksnyam vicitrabhāvam mrgapakșiņām ca/ (2) The second view is a downright rejection of production

mādhuryam iksoh katutām ca nimbe svabhāvatah sarvam idam (bhavana) itself. I cannot say anything about the historical

pravrttam// setting of this vada. Could it be an extreme form of Sāsvatavāda, which in later times entered into Vedānta and Sānkhya-Yoga? I quote this from Bhatta Utpala's Com. on Brhat Samhita (3) The third view is a strange doctrine in which the duality (under 1.7), but it also occurs in the Saddarsana Samuccaya Vrtti (p. 13), in Dallana's Com. on Suśruta (Sārīra, Ch I), and among usually set up between an effect and its cause is denied. This view is referred to in (1) above, and in Nāgarjuna's Madhyamaka other ślokas of a similar nature, in Aśvaghoșa's Buddhacarita (IX Kārikā. 47-52) 10 In the last there is a slight variation in the reading of the (4) The last doctrine is evidently some form of Sūnyavāda verse in the second half: thus, in which a product is said to appear from a pre-existing Void

MODERN SCHOLARS 449 448 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA observed order and regularity in our experience is due to mere or Nothing. In this view of causality, the reality of both upādana chance, they would say. Amalananda, in his Vedānta Kalpataru and nimitta is denied. on 2.1.33, brings out this distinction very clearly in the following Ujjvaladatta divides Svabhāva as twofold, viz, (1) nisarga remarkable sentence: niyatanimittam anapeksya yadā kadācit and (2) svabhava proper. The former is explained as habit and pravrttyudayo yadrcchā, svabhāvastu sa eva yāvadvastubhāvi yathā the latter as nature. Habit has its origin in conscious and repeated śvāsādau effort in the past, but nature is spontaneous and has no extrinsic source of origin at all. He says: vahirhetvanapeksī tu svabhāvo'tha prakīrtitah / NOTES nisargaśca svabhāvaśca ityesa bhavati dvidhā// nisargah sudrdhābhyāsajanyaḥ samskāra ucyate / 1. Cf. The well-known verse, ātmā jantur anīso'yam, etc., which forms the ajanyastu svatah siddhah svarūpo bhāva ucyate // nucleus, as it were, of all subsequent literature on Isvaravāda. The locus (Quoted in Nyāya-kośa, 2nd ed , p. 971.) classicus of this śloka is Mahabhārata, Vanaparvan, 30, 28 Yadrcchāvāda 2. Dr Schrader, in his excellent tract 'Uber den Stand der Indischen Philosophie zur Ziet Mahāviras und Buddhas' (Strassburg, 1902), has Yadṛcchā is defined by Šankarācārya (on Śvetāśvatara Up.) attempted to sum up the views of some of these theories. as ākasmikaprāptih or coincidence (Cf. Gunaratna, p. 15) The 3. I say almost, as some of the other Vādas also (e g. Yadrcchã, etc.) reject upholders of this doctrine were also deniers of the uniformities the principle of causality altogether. 4 cf Bhatta Utpala (on Brhat Samhitā 1.7): apare anye laukāyatikāh sva- of nature (kāryakāranabhāva), and asserted that the knowledge bhāvam jagatah kāranam āhuh svabhāvād eva jagad vicitram utpadyate of the causal relation was unattainable by any of the accredited svabhāvato vilayam yāti. See also Schrader, pp. 30-32; Kern, Manual of means of proof. It is observed that the same product arises from Buddhism, p. 134. each of a variety of antecedents, 11 and this would not be possible 5 As to the reason why and the circumstances under which the name if there were a definite and invariable relation between the lokāyata went out of popular use and was superseded by the term cārvāka, cause and the effect The connection between an antecedent nothing is definitely known But it is interesting to note that the meaning of the two terms is virtually the same Cf. Nilakantha's Com. on M.Bh, and the consequent following upon it is always casual, rather I 91.48 Kumbh, Kon. Ed, p. 164 (Madhava's Sarvadarsana Sangraha, than causal. Poona Ed , P I). It is very difficult to distinguish between Svabhāva and 6. The word Lokāyata is explained as Casuistry (vitandavādasatya, vitandā- Yadrccha, as both are identical so far as the rejection of the satya) by Buddhaghosa and in the Abhidhāna Padīpikā Cf Nyāyama- causal principle is concerned. But the distinction, however, ñjari. Viz, Ed., P 270: na hi lokāyate kincit kartavyam upadiśyate / vaitandikakathaivāsau na may be taken to lie in this, that whereas in svabhavavāda a niyama punaḥ kaścid agamaḥ // is formally admitted which is technically known as svabhāvani- In the Vidhurapandita Jātaka (Fausboll, The Jātaka, VI, p 286), yama, in yadrcchāvāda there is no scope for any such restriction 12 Vidhura declaims against it (na seve lokāyatikam), where the commentator With reference to the question-why a jar should be produced expounds the word as vitandasallapam lokāyatikvadam. But cf. Angut- from clay and not from threads-the answer of the Svabhāvava- taranikāya, III. 58 1, III 59 1, Kūțadanta sutta 14, Assalāyana Sutta din is a plain statement of the nature of the thing which is un- (beginning), Milinda pañho (p. 10, Trenckner's Ed.), where the word Lokāyata stands for a branch of learning distinctive of well-educated changeable; but the answer of the Yadrcchāvadin would be a Brahmins It is clear, therefore, from a glance at the testimonies of these flat denial of the reality of any such natural principle. The

450 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA literary usages, that the word originally meant Vitanda or Casuistry and MODERN SCHOLARS nothing else, and that its adherents brooked no authority other than their own. That Vitanda too has a recognized place in a well-organized (b) Of the four Buddhist systems in Nepal, of which Hodgson gave a 451

brief sketch in his famous essay on the subject (Asiatic Researches, Vol system of debate seems evident from Nyāya Sutra 4 2.50. What makes it XVI, pp. 435-40), I feel disposed to identify the Svābhāvikas, the Yātnikas repugnant to the orthodox community, therefore, is its impatience of all authority.In Nyāya the function of Vitanda is destructive, negative and the Karmikas with sects which held svabhāva, prayatna (Will) and karma (Adrsta)respectively as the sole principle of efficiency The (parapaksapratisedha) and is necessarily subordinate, whereas in Lokāyata it- Aisvarikas, of course, are the well-known Isvaravadins." is essential; and we know that without a constructive element, without 10 Cf. Gommațasāra, verse 883, where the reading is-ko karai kamtayānam a positive theory to propound (svapaksasthapana), a Sāstra ceases to have tikkhattam migavihamgamādinam/ vivihattam tu sahao idi savvam pi ya any great interest or value It is this negative element generally charac- teristic of the Lokäyata school that has earned for it the opprobrius sahāotti // The verse-Agnir usno jalam šītam samasparśas tathānilah/ kenedam

nickname of Nāstika citritam tasmāt svabhāvāt tadvyavasthitih//-quoted in Sarva Darśana

(For some interesting notes regarding this sect as bearing on the Sangraha (Poona ed., p. 4) and in Varadarāja and Vardhamana on

M.Bh., see Hopkins, The Great Epic, pp 86-90) Kusumanjali-may also be compared 11. Cf. Gunaratna, p. 15 7. In the commentary on Samksepa Sārīraka (I 528), where the svabhāvavāda is 12. Nilakantha attributes, evidently, this chance-theory to the Arhatas: alluded to, Ramatirtha attributes the view to the nāstikas and Madhusūdana explains it, saying that it consists in holding that the product comes into yadrcchetyaniyatavādinām ārhatānām (on M. Bh., Sānti, Ch 231.53)

existence without any cause: kāranam vinaiva kāryam bhavatīti svabhāva- vādinah Agnicit Purușottama adds: svabhāva eva hetur iti cārvākāh 8. See Nyāya Kusumānjali, I 5 Guņaratna, in the Introduction to his com- mentary on the Saddarsanasamuccaya, p. 13, also gives a report on the views of these Svabhāvavādins on causation. 9. (a) While denying the effectuating power of a nimittakārana and con- ceiving matter as moved into action of its own nature parināmasvabhāva, the Sankhya too approaches the position of a Svabhāvavādin. (cf. the identification proposed by Nilakantha in his Com on M.Bh, Santi- parva 231.53, p. 1635 But this is historically untenable) But it has this difference from the above, that the necessity of a nimitta is here not entirely dispensed with: (1) The Purusa, though exercising no volition, is still a nimitta by mere virtue of its Presence. This Presence is indispensable to set into motion all varieties of existence which lie eternally embosomed in the Primordial Unmanifest Matter .. (2) And the efficiency of adrsta is also accepted, insofar as it determines the precise nature of the product, by removing the obstructions which stand between the cause and its manifestation as (i e. trans- formation into) the product (3) In addition to this, the efficiency of purusārtha viz. bhoga and apavarga is admitted, though as a Final Cause-uddesyatvena The aim and purpose of all natural evolution is either one or the other, according as the Self is on the path of Enjoyment or of Renunciation. All movement is governed by purpose

MODERN SCHOLARS 453 systems; and six systems of philosophy-the Sāmkhya, the Ananta Kumar Bhattacharyya Yoga or Pātañjala, the Vaiseșika, the Nyāya, the Pūrvamīmāmsā and the Uttaramimamsa or Vedanta-are known as the Āstika systems .. Our author surely ranks among the foremost of the recent In India, the Carvaka sect is very ancient. They had preached great traditional Indian scholars of Bengal. The special interest of this article is that it shows how a Carvaka in modern their doctrine in this country long ago. It is well-known that, times could defend his position in terms of traditional Indian among the Nāstikas, those who are known as Cārvāka or philosophy. The article, originally written in Bengali, Laukāyatika are generally the followers of the Bārhaspatya appeared in the Bengali journal Darsana, 6th year, Nos. doctrine and discuss the nature of things (tattva) in accordance iii-iv, 1365 (Bengali year). We are indebted to Sri Udayana Bhattacharyya for permission to translate and print this article. with it. In the Carvaka system, only four basic categories (maulika-padārtha) have been admitted, namely, earth, water, Cārvāka Darśana fire and air. That is, of the seven categories admitted in the Vaiśeșika view-substance, quality, action, universality, ANANTA KUMAR BHATIACHARYYA particularity, inherence and non-existence-only the category (TRANSLATED FROM BENGALI) of substance is partially admitted in the Carvāka view. Accord- ing to this view, quality and action are not separate categories Let that lord of the Ganas, who has a body of pure coriscious- distinct from the substance itself which is their substratum, ness, on the very utterance of whose name all obstacles are and universality, particularity, inherence and non-existence immediately removed, be ever victorious. are completely imaginary or unreal. With the greatest devotion I praise the young Tripurasundarī, Again, of the nine substances admitted by the Vaisesika, without whose embrace the Lord would not have been able to five substances, namely, ākāsá, time, space, self and mind are

attain His sovereignty not admitted as realities in the Carvaka view. In this view, hard Oh! One with the greatest powers! I pray to you to endow things have been called earth, liquid ones water, hot ones fire, me with extraordinary power by dint of which this work and (constantly) moving ones air. intended by me may be made free of faults Self in the Carvaka View This new effort on my part is not for fame; nor is it for any material gain; it is meant only for the purification of learning, Due to a specific form of mixture of semen and female blood, or for the comprehension of the unintelligent. the four forms of matter-earth, water, fire and air-combine The systems of Indian philosophy are mainly divided into in a peculiar way. This very group of the four kinds of matter, two groups, namely, the Nastika systems and the Āstika combined in this peculiar way, is called by the term 'body' systems. Those systems of philosophy which do not accept Life-breath (prana) and consciousness are present only in such the validity of Veda are called the Nästikas, and those which a body. There is no life-breath or consciousness in the minute accept the validity of Veda are called the Āstikas. Four systems particles (kana) of matter which are the basic constituents of of philosophy-the Lokāyata or Cārvāka, the Vaitandika, the the body, when they are in a disjoined state. At that time, they Bauddha, and the Arhata or Jaina-are known as the Nāstika remain in a lifeless and insentient state. However, due to that very peculiar mutual combination or mixture, there first appears

454 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA MODERN SCHOLARS 455

life-breath and then consciousness. Argument for the View that In this view, such a body only which is a combined form or Knowledge is Located in the Body a totality of material elements has been called the self. Anything distinct from the body and ever-permanent, i.e. eternal, has Almost all philosophers admit a general rule to the effect not been called the self in this view. It is well-known that in the that (of two things), when one's presence agrees with the other's scriptures as well as in common usage, by self is meant that presence, i.e. when the one is present the other too is present which is revealed in an awareness involving the 'I' as the doer and when the one is absent the other too is absent, then the one (kartr), experiencer (bhoktr) or seer (drastr). In an awareness becomes the substratum of the other. The colour of the flower, involving the 'I', generally the body itself is revealed as the etc., is present only when the flower is present, and not other- doer, experiencer and seer. Therefore the body itself, which wise; and none of us can ever deny the fact that the colour is constitutes the object of an awareness involving the 'I', should located in that very flower. Such 'presence in presence' and be considered the self. In the awareness involving the 'I', namely, 'absence in absence', i.e. the presence of one in the presence of 'sitting in the room, I am reading and writing', the 'I'is revealed the other and the absence of one in the absence of the other as the doer of the act of reading and writing. This awareness respectively, are what the authorities call 'conforming to also reveals the fact that the 'I' is something located inside the agreements in presence and absence' (anvaya-vyatireka-anuvi- house. But the thing located inside the house is only a body. dhana) Between the two, namely, body and knowledge as well, Therefore the body only is the self; in the said awareness in- we find conformity to agreements in presence and absence. volving the 'I' it is being revealed as the doer. Another instance None of us can deny that when the body, i.e. the sense-organ, of an awareness involving the 'I' is: 'I can see the moon while is present, knowledge too is present, and when the sense-organ is sitting in my room. ' Here, the 'I' has been revealed as the seer absent, knowledge too is absent. The visual sense remaining of the moon. By this awareness it is further revealed that the intact, yet an inability to see, and blindness, yet an ability to one who is the seer of the moon is located inside the house. But see -- not a single such case has been discovered up to this day. here, in fact, only a particular body is located inside the house. Thus, by this conformity to agreements in presence and absence Therefore the body alone is the self; in the said awareness in- between the sense-organ and knowledge, it becomes proved volving the'l', it only and nothing else has been revealed as the that all the instances of knowledge acquired by us are located seer. A further instance of an awareness involving the 'l' is: only in the sensc-organs 'Falling into this pit, I have suffered much pain.' Here, the 'I' Well, it may be objected that the Barhaspatyas or the Cārvākas has been revealed as the experiencer of pain. By the same it has cannot advocate, in the said manner, the view that knowledge also been revealed that the one who is the experiencer of pain is located in the sense-organ; because it has been done taking has fallen into the pit. Here, what has fallen into the pit is only recourse to an argument (yukti), which is conforming to a particular body and nothing else. Therefore, only the body agreements in presence and absence, and the Cārvakas do not is the self; in the said awareness involving the 'l', it has been at all admit the validity of an argument. It is a well-known fact revealed as the experiencer. Thus, analysing the (different cases that they admit the validity only of perception and contend of) awareness involving the 'I', the Carväkas consider only the that inference, etc., are not sources of valid knowledge. body as the self. In that case, in reply, the following may be urged. Keeping

456 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 457 in mind only those who admit the validity of inference, the view that knowledge is located in the body has been sought to form in which a thing is recollected, would be the cause of

be established with the help of an argument, for those who recollection, and we get these impressions from previous

admit the validity of an argument would not be able to deny a experiences of the same form; i.e. from experiences of the

view established in such a manner. To their own followers, it same form, these impressions are produced as belonging to the person who experiences. Only if such a position is main- would be established on the basis of nothing but perception. For example, we always express in words our own cognitions tained can it be explained why the possibility of recollecting

in such forms as, 'while walking I have seen it', 'failing into the an unknown thing does not arise A thing would be unknown if

pit I have suffered much pain', etc. In the first instance, one there is no previous experience in respect of it; therefore, since

who is moving has been called the seer. But the act of moving there can be no impression in respect of an unknown thing,

is a characteristic of the body. Therefore if the thing which is neither can there be a recollection of an unknown thing due to

moving would be the knower or the seer, then the knowledge, the absence of the cause (viz. impression). Following such a

the visual cognition, would ultimately become the property of line of argument, if an impression of the same form is proved

the body. In the second instance, the thing falling into a pit has to be the cause of recollection, then the Bhütacaitanyavādins

been called the experiencer of pain. But falling into a pit is a would not be able to explain the fact of recollection of a thing

characteristic of the body. Therefore if the thing falling into a in old age previously perceived in boyhood. This is because

pit would be the experiencer, then the experience of pain would the impression which was produced from the experience in

ultimately become a property of the body. In this way, the boyhood must have been located only in the sense-organs

view that knowledge is located in the body can be supported (of boyhood), which were the experiencers in the state of boy-

on the basis of perception as well hood. But due to the dissolution (viślesana) of the atoms of

The doctrine of 'consciousness of matter' (bhūta-caitanya- matter, the sense-organs of boyhood no longer exist in old age.

vāda) is only another name for this doctrine of 'consciousness Therefore, the impressions which were located in the sense-

of sense-organs' (indriya-caitanya-vāda), for in the Cārvāka organs of boyhood must also have been destroyed. When the

view the sense-organs, the visual, etc., are admitted to be made thing itself to which the properties belong does not exist, the

of forms of matter, the earth, etc properties too cannot remain in existence, having nothing to

However, an objection may be raised against this doctrine hold on to. Therefore, the causes, the impressions, not being

of consciousness of matter in the following manner. We can present up to old age, the Bhūtacaitanyavādins cannot give any

recollect, even in old age, things experienced in boyhood. explanation for the recollection, in old age, of a thing experi-

This well-established fact cannot be explained if the doctrine enced in boyhood.

of consciousness of matter is accepted. Therefore the said Even then, following the Carvaka view, it may be said in

doctrine is not acceptable. There is no difference of opinion answer that no such objection really arises in their view. For in

among philosophers regarding the fact that there can be no the Carvaka view, an impression of the same form as produced

-recollection of an unknown thing. To establish the fact that from a previous experience has not been admitted to be the cause

there can be no recollection of an unknown thing it is also to be of recollection The existence of a thing which is not established

necessarily admitted that an impression of the same form, i. e. by perception is not admitted in the Carvaka view Therefore,

an impression of a thing having a form exactly similar to the according to the Cärvaka view, an impression which (according to others) can only be inferred by its effects, namely, recollec-

458 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 459 tion, etc., is not the cause of recollection. In fact, because of its (vișayāmśa) is concerned. The implication is as follows. Finding own peculiar nature, recollection is produced depending upon, smoke in the mountain, etc., people think that there is fire i.e. having for its object, a thing previously experienced. Because there. This awareness concerning the presence of fire, which is of such a nature, no unknown thing is presented as the object unperceived, has been called inferential knowledge by the in a recollection. Only because of the peculiarity of nature are authorities. This can never be certain knowledge. So long as different things with different forms produced in different people do not actually see it, they cannot have a firm belief in times, in different places. For this there is no need to admit the presence of the fire. Relying upon the words of people in any cause. The cause-effect relation is not admitted at all in general, the person who infers takes for granted the smoke's the Carvaka view, for in that view perception alone has been invariable relation with fire, i. e. smoke is not present in a spot admited as the source of valid knowledge. No cause-effect where there is no fire. In all the spots where the person con- relation in general can be established by perception. cerned has himself observed smoke, he has also, without fail, Knowledge in the Cārvāka View observed fire. Due to his having had such an experience in some particular cases, he is forced to put reliance upon the popular According to this view knowledge is generally divided into belief that smoke, in general, is invariably related to fire. In two classes, namely, apprehension (anubhava) and recollection this way, he forms the assumption that smoke, whenever (smarana). Apprehension is also divided into two classes, namely, perceived, must be accompanied by fire; later on, he perceives perception and assumption (kalpana). Perception is knowledge smoke in the mountain, etc., and comes to the conclusion that acquired by the five sense-organs-visual, gustatory, olfactory, fire is also present in the same mountain, etc. The knowledge cutaneous and auditory-respectively of colour, taste, smell, of an unperceived thing resulting from the ascertainment of touch and sound. The Carvaka view on mental perception will invariable relation in this manner, is called inference. The be discussed later on. The said sense-organs produce certain Carvakas think that since there is no firm conviction as regards knowledge in respect of their own objects. According to this the knowledge of invariable relation from which proceeds view, the certain knowledge of objects, namely, colour, etc., inferential knowledge, people cannot have a firm belief in (the which is not contradicted by a subsequent knowledge, is to be validity of) inference. Therefore since it is only based upon called valid knowledge (pramāna). Therefore in the Cārvāka popular belief, they have included inference under assumption view, the sense-organs, the eye, etc., being the causes for Verbal knowledge too is a form of assumption, because even such valid knowledge, are to be called the instruments of valid though it may be known in that way, one does not have total knowledge (pramāna). Thus according to the Cārvka view, all reliance upon such a form of knowledge as long as it is not other forms of knowledge which are neither valid knowledge known perceptually. After listening to the statement 'one nor recollection would be assumption, e.g. inferential know- desirous of heaven should perform the Asvamedha sacrifice', ledge or verbal knowledge. (Knowledge derived through) etc., the listener thinks that the Aśvamedha sacrifice is a means postulation and non-apprehension are included, according to to attain heaven. In spite of this, since it is not perceptually this view, in inferential knowledge. Therefore they also would known that any man has ever attained heaven by performing be of the r.ature of assumption. the Asvamedha sacrifice (there is neither any way to ascertain The Cärväkas think that in the case of inference, etc., the it, for heaven is not attained while one is living), one cannot forms of knowledge are not certain as far as the object-part put sufficient faith upon such knowledge. These statements,

MODERN SCHOLARS 461 460 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA heaven. The sacrifice which is of the nature of an act (kriyā) so far as they convey their meanings, are to be taken as traditional may be short-lived; even then, the merit produced by it lasting hearsay (aitihya) and not as sources of valid knowledge. The as long as the attainment of heaven, there would be no difficulty validity of a statement depends upon the perception of the for the sacrificer in the matter of attaining heaven. This ascertain- objects referred to by it; only if the objects referred to by a ment of virtue, vice, etc, arrived at according to this procedure statement can be grasped by perception, can the statement be is valid knowledge derived through postulation. Finally, the taken as valid in respect of the objects referred to by it. Therefore implication is that since the basis of postulation is only tradi- there is no statement which may be said to be valid itself (svatah- tional hearsay in the form of Vedic statements, the Cārvākas pramäna). The validity of the Veda which speaks of extra- cannot characterize it as anything other than assumption. ordinary things is not at all possible, for the things spoken of Non-existence (abhäva) is known by (the pramana called) by it, heaven, etc .. , are totally unfit to be perceived. That know- ledge derived through postulation, is of the nature of assump- non-apprehension (anupalabdhi). In the Carvāka view, non- existences are absolutely unreal. Therefore, in this view, the tion, is easily understood. For on being aware that a certain knowledge of non-existence would be nothing but assumption. accepted meaning is unjustifiable in any other way, when one Thus in this view, inference, comparison, verbal testimony, makes a presumption about another unconveyed meaning (to postulation and non-apprehension have not been accepted as justify the meaning), then the (latter) presumptive knowledge sources of valid knowledge. People put reliance or faith only is called postulation. In such cases, even the knower himself is upon perception. Therefore, perception alone is a source of aware that his knowledge is a kind of assumption, for he (sub- valid knowledge. Perceptual knowledge, as is uncontradicted, sequently) apprehends his own knowledge in the form, 'I is valid. Thus, the definition of valid knowledge would be: a presume such a meaning' perception which has for its object (visaya) an uncontradicted We have been hearing all along that due to the performance of thing. The validity of recollection would be negated by the sacrifices like the Aśvamedha, etc , a kind of adrsta or merit is word 'perception' (in the definition). The knowledge of move- produced in the person who performs the sacrifice. According ment in the passing tree, etc., on the part of a person seated in to the Mīmamsaka view, this adrsta or merit is proved by postula- a fast-moving vehicle is also (a kind of) perception Apprehend- tion. They have explained the matter in the following manner. It has been stated by scriptural statements such as 'one desirous ing that the definition of valid knowledge may unduly apply to it, and to negate such a possibility, the qualifying expression of attaining heaven should perform the Asvamedha sacrifice', 'uncontradicted' has been added to the definition. The object etc , that the Aśvamedha sacrifice is the cause of heaven. But of that cognition, namely, movement, is (ultimately) con- this cannot be logically justified unless some adrsta lasting uptil tradicted, and hence, the definition would no longer be too the time of attaining heaven is postulated; for the act of sacrifice wide. performed at the present time, being short-lived, cannot con- In this view, all perceptual knowledge is indeterminate tinue to be present up to the moment immediately preceding (nirvikalpaka). It reveals only the mere nature of a thing. The the attainment of heaven. This is because the person who has actual nature of a thing has no real connection with a name or performed the sacrifice would attain heaven only after his a universal. Although the names are of the nature of sound and death. Therefore it must be admitted that from the acts of sacri- their nature is determined by auditory perception, and they are fice, etc., a kind of adrsta, namely, merit, is produced in the not unreal or non-entities, still, the names which are of the nature person concerned, which would ultimately make him attain

462 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 463 of sound have no real connection with the things as the names of which they are used. As the udana air strikes at specific parts However it is not that, according to this view, in all cases of

of the body, such as the throat, palate, etc., words (sounds) are illusion what is revealed is a non-entity. Rather in certain cases,

produced and air is their substratum, i.e. the place of residence. an illusory knowlege may have, for its object, something real

Such sounds (words) cannot have any relation with things like as well For example, a man travelling in a fast-moving vehicle

a jar, cloth, etc., which are situated in different places. There- finds the post, tree, etc., standing on the sides, moving at the

fore, when people understand a thing by associating it with a same speed as the vehicle. This perception of a moving post or

name in the form 'it is a jar', or 'it is a cloth', then what can that a moving tree is illusory knowledge, for the post or the tree

awareness be except a kind of assumption? The universals, jar- are actually not moving. The movement or running revealed

ness, cloth-ness, etc., are imaginary by nature. Finding merely in these instances of illusion is not something produced by

some common points in a number of material bodies which, as imagination, as in the case of shell-silver illusion. The move-

individuals, are totally different from one another, people ment of the vehicle which is perceptible to the man travelling

assume them to be of the same kind, and this renders them some in it is revealed as related, due to some defect, to the post, tree,

help in carrying on their ordinary activities. This is how the etc. In these instances of illusion, the relation is only imtaginary.

universal has been postulated; hence by their very nature, they Actually, that movement is related to the vehicle; it is not

are products of imagination. Therefore when people under- related at all to the post or the tree. Yet a man assumes that the

stand a thing by associating it with a universal, such an awareness movement is related to, or connected with, the tree, etc Other

can be nothing other than assumption. Therefore determinate cases of illusions, the illusions of a 'yellow conch-shell', etc.,

knowledge, by which the individual is revealed as related to are also to be explained in the same manner. One should make

name, universal, etc., is only a form of assumption, and not such further explanations by oneself.

perception. Mind as a Sense-organ and

Illusion in the Carvaka View Mental Perception

In explaining the nature of illusory knowledge, the Cārvākas In this view, mental perception is to be explained in the

subscribe to the theory of asat-khyati (lit., awareness of the following manner. In the views of Nyāya, Vaiseşika and others,

non-existent) .. They say that in the case of illusory knowledge, a separate sense-organ called the mind has been admitted. With

for example, of silver in a shell, an imaginary, i. e. unreal, silver is its help people experience pleasure, pain, etc. But in the Cārvaka revealed as identical with 'this' which is real, i e. the shell, view, no separate internal sense-organ in the form of the mind referred to as 'this' Because of some defect (dosa) in the form has been admitted in such a manner. Therefore, in this view, of darkness or distance, one fails to comprehend the shell as the there really is nothing called mental perception. The sense-organ shell, and finds in it similarities with silver; namely, brightness, called 'skin' (tvac) is uniformly present everywhere, outside whiteness, etc. Later on, with the help of the two, namely; and inside the body According to this view, that part of the the ignorance, i.e. absence of the knowledge of shell-ness (in sense-organ called 'skin' which is situated inside the body would the shell) and the knowledge of similarity (with silver), he be the mind, or the internal sense-organ. The Carvakas think imagines the shell, referred to as 'this', to be silver. Therefore that with the help of the mind, which is of such a nature, people can that silver-produced by imagination-be anything other have experiences of pleasure, pain, etc. In many cases, pleasure

than a non-entity, or unreal? or pain is produced due to the experience of (a particular kind of) touch, and its substratum is the inside part of the sense-

464 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA MODERN SCHOLARS 465 organ called 'skin'. In this view, pleasure or pain would, by their very nature, be a kind of knowledge. In other words, recollection Those modifications are also not produced follow- pleasure would only be a kind of tactual experience. Pain, ing any fixed rule. In fact, in the Carvaka view, such discussions too, would be a kind of tactual experience. In this view, desire about the cause-effect relation have very little value, for the and aversion would also be of the nature of knowledge (and Cărvākas do not admit any cause-effect relation based on a not distinct qualities). From an ascertainment in the form 'it is fixed rule.

a means for my desired end' (ista-sādhana) is produced desire, Sense-organs Act after Reaching the Object and from an ascertainment in the form 'it is a thing which would lead me to harm' (dvista-sādhana) is produced aversion. The In the Cärväka view the three sense-organs, the gustatory, the olfactory and the cutaneous, are prāpyakārin; i e they reveal substratum of these, also, is nothing but the sense-organ. In a their objects only after coming in contact with them For particular case, desire or aversion would be produced in that particular sense-organ, only with the help of which has been instance, the gustatory sense reveals taste. But the sweet taste of molasses, etc., kept in a different place and not connected produced a knowledge in the form 'it is a means for my desired with the sense-organ, cannot perceptually be known as long as end', or a knowledge in the form 'it is a thing which would lead they are not connected with the tongue, i.e. the gustatory sense. me to harm'. All this is by way of illustration. (In other cases) Therefore it is to be admitted that it is prāpyakarin, i. e. the one should oneself make the explanation in a similar manner. In this view, knowledge of the nature of recollection is also gustatory sense perceptually reveals only such a thing as is connected to itself. Like the gustatory, the olfactory sense is produced with the help of the sense-organ. Unlike the views of the Nyaya, etc, an impression produced by a previous also prapyakarin. Although it is true that generally, people think that even the fragrance of a flower at a distance is received by experience is not admitted to be the cause of recollection in this view. We have already pointed this out. Because of its peculiar the olfactory sense, yet the olfactory sense is not aprāpyakārin. In the said instance, people perceive the smell of only those nature, such knowledge (i e recollection) never has for its fragrant pollens of the flower which, being carried away by object an unknown thing Due to different kinds of physical the wind, get connected with the olfactory sense. As these stimulation (uttejana) i.e. stimulation as occurring in the sense- pollens are not visible to the eye, ordinary people think that organ, people recollect things previously experienced. Those modifications (vikāra) of the sense-organ cannot be taken as they are perceiving the fragrance of the flower at a distance. Like the olfactory and the gustatory, the cutaneous sense is also contributing factors for the production of recollection by fram- prāpyakārin. It, too, cannot perceptually reveal a thing or its ing a general rule, for it is not really the case that from the same kind of modification of the sense-organ is invariably produced touch, etc .. , if (the thing is) unconnected with itself. the same form of recollection. One particular modification of In this view, the eyeball itself is the visual sense-organ. In the sense-organ may produce the recollection of a jar; but then, it the Nyäya view, the visual sense-organ has been admitted as is not that in the event of such a modification in all cases would a special kind of substance of the nature of fire, imperceptible one recollect a jar, since as a result of such a modification, one and located in the eyeball. In the Carvaka view on the contrary, can sometimes even recollect a cloth. Therefore uniformly, no such separate substance located in the eyeball, has been i.e. by framing as general rule, no cause-effect relation can be accepted as the visual sense-organ. Therefore according to this established between the modification of the sense-organ and view, the visual organ of each living being who possesses two eyeballs would be two in number. On the same ground, in this

466 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 467 view, the tongue itself would be the gustatory sense, the nose the minutest of the perceptible things. Therefore the Cārvakas, itself the olfactory sense, the skin itself the cutaneous sense, upholding as they do the view that perception is the only and the ear-drum itself (not the hole) the auditory sense. pramana, cannot speak of further parts of an atom as conceived In the Carvaka view, material substances such as jar, cloth, by them. In short, in the Carvaka view also, atoms are to be etc., are of the nature of collections (samghata) According to conceived as partless, or without any component part. the views of the Nyaya and others, a jar is not actually a mere In spite of their being of such a nature, the atoms in the collection of earth atoms: it is made by the atoms gradually Cārvāka view are not without production and destruction; i e. following'the sequence of the dyad, etc., and is a separate thing they are not eternal and partless. Since the eternality and part- in the form of the 'whole' (avayavin). But as contrasted with lessness of a thing cannot be proved by perception, according such a view, according to the Cārvākas, it is not a separate to the view that perception is the only pramana, nothing can be 'whole'; a jar is nothing but a group of atoms which are united admitted to be eternal and partless. Although it is ordinarily with one another in a specific manner. It is not of the nature of observed that a substance is destroyed due to disjunction of a 'whole' distinct from (the collectivity of) its component parts, parts and is produced due to conjunction of parts, still, it cannot the atoms. The nature of other material things is also to be be said that these are the only modes or means of production understood in the same manner. and destruction. In some cases, a thing may be produced from In this view, atoms would be the minutest particles of earth, absolute destruction (niranvaya-vināśa) or non-existence In etc., which are perceptible. In the Nyaya view, an atom is said the Carväka view, production and destruction of the atom are to be a part without any further component part and it is to be explained according to this process imperceptible. But unlike it, no such atom has been admitted According to this view, qualities, e.g. colour, taste, etc .. , and in the Cärväka view. Although it is the minutest part, it is not actions, e.g. rising, falling, etc., are to be understood as only itself proved to be partless or without any further component some particular states of the four forms of matter already part. An atom is proved by perception and has a distinct shape. referred to. That is, in the Nyāya or Vaiśesika view, quality That is, what is called a triad in the Nyaya view would be the and action are admitted to be quite separate entities distinct atom in the Cārvāka view .. from the substances of earth, etc, which are their substratum; Are the atoms, as admitted by the Cārvākas, eternal, just but unlike such a view, according to the Carvakas, these have like the ones accepted in the Vaisesika and other views? In the not been admitted as entities distinct from the substances in present context, such a question may naturally arise in the,mind which they are located. In this view, the universals, e g jar-ness, of the reader. Therefore following the Cārvāka view, let us try cloth-ness, etc., have only an imaginary existence. In the to answer it. If, in the Carväka view, the atoms be nothing but Cārvaka view, it cannot be admitted that there may exist a the minutest perceptible parts, then the atoms, as admitted by single universal, called jar-ness or cloth-ness, residing in each them, would have to be considered partless. If they be composed of the innumerable individuals of jar or cloth in all the three of further parts, they can no longer be called the minutest parts divisions of time-past, future and present; for such an entity or atoms. Again, if the perceptible minutest part (= atom) or a common property is not proved by perception. even be conceived as composed of further parts, these further In the Nyaya-Vaisesika view, inherence, particularity and parts would have to be imperceptible, because the 'whole' (= non-existence have been accepted as distinct realities; but they atom) for those further parts has already been admitted to be have not been likewise admitted as distinct realities in the

468 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 469 Cārvāka view. Although they are not really existent, people then in the eyes of the Carvakas, they would be quite contemp- continue to carry on various activities on their basis; these are tible. What if it be said that such actions (murder, causing injury, all effects of the imagination. All this is only by way of illustra- etc.) though they are beneficial for a single person, are not bene- tion. Explanations as regards other things are to be made up in ficial for the majority of people, and hence truly are offences? the Carvaka view following this procedure Even then, the Carvaka would say that it is opposed to the Denial of Rebirth Cārvāka viewpoint. Because so far as one's own self is con- cerned, the majority of people besides one's own self has no In the Carvaka view, the self's connection with the 'other relevance That which is beneficial for me may be harmful for world' has not been admitted. Nor do the Cārvākas subscribe all besides myself; but it does not matter in the least for me, so to the view that, in a state without birth even after death, it long as it does not do me any harm. There are many who, with- waits for God's judgement. Therefore in this view, only worldly out paying due attention to their own doctrine or comprehend- pleasures should be sought after uniformly by all living beings. ing it rightly, taking up the catchy slogans offered by the Man may have a keener intellect, but so far as the search for doctrine of somebody else, sing in praise of the state system. mere worldly pleasures is concerned, no difference or distinction They may do so; but they will never make true Cārvākas. of man from the other animals is admitted in the Cārvāka Actually, a true Carvāka should never make any rule or regu- view .. lation for the general people. This is because when a person has Right and Wrong in the Carvaka View to suffer some personal loss on account of a law, there is no reason why he-suffering loss-should abide by the same law. If, by murdering a man, somebody actually makes some Indeed for the Carvakas, the nation, too, is merely a fiction ... worldly gain, then that murder or act of violence would not To the Carväkas, the question of its well-being or woe is nothing really be wrong on the part of the man committing the murder but a nightmare. It has already been stated that to a person or the act of violence, because an action which contributes to a suffering loss, numerical majority does not matter at all. The man's own benefit cannot really be turned into an offence or Carvakas would have no objection if any person or a party, something unjust on his part even by hurling hundreds of purely for his or the party's own benefit, takes recourse to insults at him ('the man is a murderer', 'the man is an offender'). various kinds of deceptions-'it would be beneficial to all', 'it When by performing an action, a man himself comes to no will contribute to the welfare of the nation', and so on, and harm, but on the other hand derives some benefit, that action gathering support from the deceived, derive some benefit for can never be unjust on the part of that man. Some people may themselves on the basis of such slogans as 'this is a law made by decide that such a man is guilty since (his action) is harmful for yourselves', etc. This is because everybody has the right to do others; but the Cārvākas would not look upon such people as everything to derive his own benefit. But if some intelligent true judges. Persons who, even denying virtue and vice, person succeeds in seeing through the deceptions practised by consider some action to be harmful for the nation and decide that party and works against that party for his own benefit, he that the performer of that action is guilty, would be deserving will also get the support of the Cārvākas. In the Cārvāka view, of praise, according to the Carvakas, in case they would do so except such kinds of arbitrary rules, no other kind of (fixed) only for their personal gain. On the other hand, if they think written rule is possible for the state or society. There are people that they have done so for the benefit of others, i.e the nation, who devote themselves to the welfare of the nation, subscribing

470 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 471

to the view that when an individual dies, everything connected then, even without actually seeing the smoke, he can conclude, with him too disappears for ever; we do not know if the for certain, that fire is present in that hill. This ascertainment of Carvakas would forgive such a band of cheats or not, but we the presence of unseen fire in the hill is the inferential cognition of only pray earnestly that God give them the power to compre- fire in the hill, and the instrument thereof, namely, the ascer- hend (things rightly) .. That which produces pleasure for a person tainment of smoke's concomitance with fire, is the pramana cal- while he is living, is just for him, and that which produces led inference. Therefore knowledge which is of the nature of suffering for a person (while he is living) is unjust for him. In inferential cognition, since it is certain knowledge, would the Carvaka view, there can be nothing uniformly just or unjust surely be valid knowledge, and its instrument, too, a pramāna. Even then, the Carvaka would say in reply that the above

Establishment of the Invalidity of explanation is not correct, for the so-called certain knowledge

Inference in the Carvaka View of invariable concomitance is only an assumption due to ignorance. It can never be known for certain that one kind of While trying to negate the validity of inferential cognition or thing is invariably concomitant with another kind of thing that inference is a source of valid knowledge, the Carvakas con- The ultimate instrument for acquiring certain knowledge is tend that whenever one acquires knowledge about an unseen the sense-organ; it can reveal the relation of one thing with object, it is always based on general belief (aitihya). Thus, none another only individually; the relation of one as a class with of the knowledge produced is certain so far as the object-part is another as a class cannot be revealed by it. The individuals concerned But knowledge which is not certain with reference separated by time and space are also counted as belonging to to the object-part cannot be valid. Since the effect in the form the class, but those separated individuals cannot be known of inferential cognition is not a kind of valid knowledge, the perceptually. Therefore through the sense-organ, there is no instrument (karana) by which it is produced cannot be a source possibility of acquiring the knowledge that smoke as a class is of valid knowledge. invariably concomitant with fire as a class, i e. (every instance While describing the cause of inferential cognition, the of smoke) is related to some instance of fire When people Naiyāyikas say that when a man knows for certain one kind of (allegedly) acquire knowledge of invariable concomitance as thing as invariably concomitant with (i.e. pervaded by) another relating to class, it would be nothing but a notion based on kind of thing, then, finding in a particular spot the kind of general belief Accepting, somewhat, (as true) such popular thing invariably concomitant, he ascertains, in the same spot, notions as 'smoke has invariable concomitance with fire', etc .. , the presence of that kind of thing with which invariable con- people think that perhaps smoke is invariably concomitant comitance has been already ascertained The latter knowledge, with fire. But it is not a form of certain knowledge. Therefore which is certain in nature, is an inferential cognition, and the the knowledge of the presence of unseen fire also, acquired by instrument thereof, namely, the prior ascertainment of invari- people on the basis of such knowledge, cannot be certain in able concomitance, is the pramana called inference. For example, nature Thus, since inferential cognition is not a form of valid a man ascertains that a thing of the nature of smoke is invariably knowledge, its instrument, the notion of pervasion or invariable concomitant with a thing of the nature of fire; when, some other concomitance, also would not be a pramāna time, the same man sees a column of smoke in the hill, etc., i.e. The Cārväkas have also refuted the validity of verbal testi- finds that smoke is rising up from the hill in a continuous flow; mony. By such refutation, they do not mean to say that even

472 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 473 an experienced person does not comprehend any meaning after Not instances of falsehood alone but instances of contradiction listening to such statements as 'to live, it is necessary for a man as well are also quite numerous in the Veda Can a contradicted to exert himself, 'the crystal-clear water of the Mandakini is a statement be accepted as valid? While prescribing the time for great asset to India', etc .. What they mean to say, rather, is that knowledge derived through such statements is not valid, because the Agnihotra oblation, the Veda says that one should offer an oblation either after sunrise or before sunrise, or when neither no such knowledge can be certain as regards the object-part, so the sun nor the star is seen in the sky. But in spite of specifying long as it is not corroborated by perception. Therefore, since such knowledge is dependent (for validity) on something else, the time in this way, later, the offering of oblations at these times has been censured. Thus, the earlier prescription about namely, perception,. the Cārvakas do not admit to the inde- time is contradicted by the subsequent censure. While censuring, pendent validity of any such knowledge. Since the forms of it has been said that if one offers an oblation after sunrise, the knowledge which are the effects are not valid, the instruments thereof, the groups of words or the sentences, would also not things offered by one are eaten up by the dog called Śyāva or Śyāma; if one offers an oblation before sunrise, the things be pramāna. This is the basic implication of the Carvakas when they try to refute the validity of verbal testimony. It spread offered by one are eaten up by the dog called Savala; and if one offers an oblation when neither the sun nor the star is seen one's among the Carvakas in various ways, and due to impatience they also hurled abuses in many forms at the Astikas. Ulti- offering of oblation is spoiled jointly by the two dogs called Śyāva and Śavala Therefore the Veda which contains statements mately, all their animosity centred as if against the Veda contradicted in this manner can never be accepted as valid Impatient with the urge for villifying the Veda which is the Besides, the fault of repetition is also to be found in the repository of all wisdom, they have said that by no means can Veda: it cannot be valid as it is vitiated by the fault of repetition. the Veda be considered valid (i.e. as if validity cannot approach In the Veda, a group of eleven special mantra-s is given the within a radius of ten to twenty miles in all the four corners of the spot where the Veda is present), because there are false name Sämidheni. Because they are applied in the act of kindling the fire, they have been given the particular name Sāmidhenī. statements in it. That which is vitiated by falsehood can never Io turn those eleven into fifteen, it has been prescribed that the be a source of valid knowledge. The Veda says that if the rite called Putresti is performed, the performer obtains a son. first and the last ones are each to be uttered three times. This

There are indeed many who, allured by such statements, have utterance of the same again and again leads to the fault of repeti-

performed the rite called Putresti. But they have been rewarded tion The Veda thus becomes vitiated by the fault of repetition;

with nothing but pecuniary loss and physical strain. No doubt therefore, it can have no validity.

in some particular case, the birth of a son to the performer after the performance of the rite may have been observed; but it is actually not the effect of the performance of the rite; it has happened only due to some ordinary causes. Similarly, other Vedic statements such as 'by performing the Agnihotra sacrifice the sacrificer attains heaven', etc., are totally false. It implies that the sacrificer will attain heaven after his death. But after a man's death, what indeed remains so that he may (be said to) attain heaven?

MODERN SCHOLARS 475 Materialism. As a matter of fact, there are also found given Eric Frauwallner materialistic directions which recognize a soul in this sense, and which have established a connection, therethrough, with the nature-philosophical schools. But while these nature- This article is taken from the author's History-of Indian philosophical schools were governed by a striving towards the Philosophy (translated from the German into English by V. M Bedekar), vol. ii, pp: 215-26; first published in India understanding of the phenomenal world and their attempts at by Ms. Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1973. The main drive of explanation gradually formed into a full-fledged philosophical the argument here is that materialism in India originally system, the materialists satisfied themselves all the while with developed as an ideological justification of the rising despotic their positing of a purely negative aim. Therefore, the Indian powers, though in the subsequent portion of this discussion, characterization of them as 'deniers or negativists' is appropriate he takes into account the ancient non-conformists, inclusive of some generally accepted to be Materialist But in my presentation, I will follow the usual practice for the sake of simplicity and speak of Materialism by which a man Materialism should not lose sight of the right understanding of what has been said. ERIC FRAUWALLNER Materialistic directions of the above-mentioned kind are found in India since early times .. The old maxim, that material- It is advantageous to join the nature-philosophical schools ism is as old as philosophy, holds good here also. And just as with the description of Materialism, as the latter stands nearer we find, in the oldest recorded Vedic monuments, believers in to them than all other schools. By the way, the Indians them- god and also god-deniers, there is also information about selves, as a rule, speak not of Materialism, but characterize its materialistic directions standing side by side with the oldest adherents usually as deniers or negativists (nāstikah) And this recorded monuments of philosophical doctrine. In India, there has its good ground For Indian Materialism, the essential thing early emerges a characteristic feature which also holds good is not the denial of the soul and the exclusive restriction to matter for the later period-a close connection of materialism with as the cause for the explanation of the world. The decisive political theory. thing, on the contrary, is its purely negative interest. Its aim is The Indians had early developed a systematic doctrine of to dispute and deny the continuance of life after death, the statecraft which made light of all moral scruples in the positing retribution of good and bad work, and the moral claims derived of its aim and its choice of means, which, therefore, corresponds out of them. It is interested in philosophical questions only so to what for us is associated with the name of Machiavelli. The far as they serve this aim. Concerning the rest, it is indifferent embodiment of this statecraft is the legendary Minister of the to them. That distinguishes it from all others and also from the King Candragupta of the Maurya family, who founded, for nature-philosophical schools. Naturally, Materialism could the first time, an indigenous empire on Indian soil at the end of reach its aim most quickly if it denied the existence of the soul. the fourth century BC. The Indian tradition ascribes the merit But so far as the assumption of a soul served only the explanation for the success of Candragupta to this Brhāmana named Cānakya of the phenomenal world, as was the case in the old nature- or Kautilya, and has always seen in him an unsurpassed master philosophy before it was connected up with belief in God and of the art of statecraft. The most famous Indian literary work with the doctrine of Deliverance, it was also acceptable to about the science of statecraft is handed down under his name

476 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 477 This Canakya, as is shown by tradition, is the prototype of the following. I had a godless, wicked grandfather who did not unscrupulous Real-politiker who avoids no means, if only it administer his Kingdom well and who, after his death, must leads him to his goal. And his ideal as well as his theory have have reached hell on account of his bad actions. If now he been much esteemed in the circles of practical Politikers or would come to me who am ever his beloved grandson-his politicians joy and care-and warn me against living as godlessly as he It is now easy to understand that such a Politiker, from the did, in order that I should not go to hell, then I would believe points of world-view, supported himself on a doctrine which that the soul is different from the body. But as he has not come put out of the way or removed all moral scruples that were to warn me, I am convinced that the soul and the body are the hindrances to his action. One such doctrine was Materialism. same.' Its positing of the aim, as we have described above, corresponds Thereupon Kesi replied: 'If you notice, oh King, that your entirely with its purpose. It was created for this circle, whether wife has given herself up to another man, what punishment it may acknowledge it openly or secretly. It is, therefore, would you inflict on this man?' 'I would get him executed in certainly no accident that the first materialist, whom tradition any way. has handed down to us in living vivid colours, is a King. 'If the man were to request you that he should be given some King Paesi: We find in the canon of the Jainas as also of the time before his execution in order to warn his relatives and Buddhists, the account of a conversation which one of their acquaintances against a similar offence, would you grant him teachers had with a King who adhered to a gross form of also at least only one moment?' materialism. The conversation ends, as is to be expected 'No, why should I?' according to the origin of the report, with the conversion of 'Entirely in the same way, thy godless grandfather, who, the King. But the narration is carried out in such a lively way according to our doctrine, is in hell, has not come; he has, no and gives such a graphic picture of the materialistic views in doubt, the wish to come to thee, his beloved grandson-his the period of the Jaina and the Buddha that I cite a few pieces joy and care-in order to warn thee. But he cannot Because out of them.1 there are the most diverse grounds that a being tarrying in hell, In the City of Seyaviya, there rules a bad King Paesi (the however much he would like to come to men, cannot come Buddhists call him Pāyāsi) who believes in no God and no Therefore believe, Paesi, that the soul is different from the beyond. One day, the holy man Kesi arrives in this city. Now body.' the King has a charioteer named Citta who was won over earlier And again the King says: 'What you say is merely a com- by Kesi as an adherent, and who longingly wishes that the parison and does not apply to the following. I had a very pious King also should be converted. He knows how to arrange it grandmother, who, according to your doctrine, must have skilfully so that the King, during his morning drive, alights got, after her death, into a world of the gods, for her pious acts. down in the park in which Kesi is staying, and it comes to a If she would come to me who was her most beloved grandson- conversation between the King and the holy man. The King her joy and care-and admonish me to live piously like her, in has heard that Kesi believes in a soul which is different from order that I should attain the world of the gods, then I would the body, and he reproaches him as follows: believe that the soul is different from the body. But she has not 'If you have the conviction that the soul is different from the come to admonish me and I am convinced that the soul and the body and not the same, I have, on the other hand, to cite the body are the same.'

478 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 479

Upon this, Kesi knew how to reply. But Paesi has also made such as represent the materialistic doctrines 2 an experiment. He reports for example: 'I was once in my The oldest Materialistic doctrines: We hear of a certain Pūrana reception-hall surrounded by the distinguished elite of my kingdom. There the city watchman brought a thief whom they Kaśyapa who taught the following: 'Anybody may do or allow

had caught: I got him thrown alive into a brazen pot, with a to do anything, mutilate or allow somebody to be mutilated, roast or allow somebody to be roasted, persecute, plague, harass brass lid strongly soldered laid over it, with the coppersmith or get somebody persecuted, plagued or harassed, may rob watching over him. life, steal, break into a house, drag away the loot, plunder a After some time, I got the lid opened and found the man dead, though there was no opening in the pot through which sequestered house, carry on highwaymanship or brigandage,

the soul could have escaped. Had there been an opening in the commit adultery or lie; but he, with all this, does nothing bad ..

jar through which the soul could have escaped I would believe If anyone, with razorsharp quoit, reduces a living creature on

that the soul is different from the body. But it was not the case. the earth to a heap of flesh, transforms him into a single lump of flesh, he would thereby prove himself as nothing bad; it So I am convinced that the soul and the body are the same.' And another experiment: Paesi had first executed one offender would not appear as anything bad. If anybody would go to the southern bank of the Ganga,3 murdering and allowing some- and then got him locked up in a jar and when it was opened after some time, the corpse was full of worms. The jar, however, body to murder, mutilating and allowing somebody to mutilate,

had no opening through which the souls of these worms could roasting and allowing somebody to roast, he would prove himself as nothing bad; it would not appear bad. And if he would have reached the inside. Another offender was weighed by Paesi. Then he was killed, except that only his skin was injured go to the northern bank of the Ganga, 4 giving gifts and causing them to be given, sacrificing and causing sacrifices to be offered, and he was once again weighed. But the weight was the same. Therefore, no soul could have escaped Another offender he it would thereupon prove in no way meritorious; it would not

got hacked to pieces in order to search the soul, but it was not appear as merit. Through presents, self-discipline, self-mastery and veracity, there arises or appears no merit.' to be found. Such other similar experiments were made by A second teacher, Ajita Keśakambala, represented the Pacsi. Kesi knew appropriate answers to all these arguments following view: 'There is no gift in charity, there is no sacri- and finally Paesi gives himself over as beaten and converted fice, there are no offerings. There is no fruit and ripening of This account gives a lively picture of an old Indian Materialist good and bad actions. There is not this world or that. There is on the King's throne. And Paesi was certainly not the only one no mother nor father. There are no suddenly-born beings. In of his kind. But however interesting and characteristic such the world, there are no ascetics and Brähmanas who have gone accounts are, they can rarely claim a place of the same kind in a along the right path of conduct and follow the right conduct, history of Indian philosophy. Materialism gained for itself who have seen this world and that world out of independent importance only from the moment when it emerged in the form knowledge and proclaimed it. A man consists of four Elements. of a regular doctrine and took up arms against the remaining When he dies, earth goes into the mass of earth (prthivīkāyah), philosophical schools. That also occurred very early. The old water into the mass of water, fire into the mass of tire, breath writings of the Buddhistic canons report that, in the time of the Buddha, a large number of teachers stalked the land and into the mass of air, and the sense-organs enter into space (ākāśah). Four men, with the bier as the fifth, carry forth the gathered students around themselves. Among them are found dead person, and they carry on their talk until they come into

480 CARVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 481

the place of cremation. Then there remain only white bones in the form of a regular theory But the development thereby and all the sacrifices end in ashes. The gift of charity is, therefore, does not remain stationary. It led to the creation of a fully the doctrine of a buffoon; it is empty and false talk when any- formed materialistic system which was handed down like all body asserts that there is something beyond Fools and wise other systems, in the form of a School-that of the Lokāyata. men are destroyed and disappear when the body falls to pieces. The Lokāyata System: The Lokayata, i.e. the doctrine which They are no more after death .. ' concerns this world, arose in the pre-Christian period. As its Finally a third teacher, Kakuda Kātyāyana, teaches the fol- founder is regarded one Cärväka, about whom nothing further is lowing: known. 5 It is characteristic for this system that it is clothed in 'There are seven masses (kayāh) which are neither created the same form as the remaining systems. Like these, its doctrines nor brought forth. They are unfruitful, unchangeable, and are are written down in aphorisms which were orally handed firm like a pillar. They move not, nor do they change, they do down 6 Further one took care to refer his doctrines to a holy not disturb each other, nor are they able to procure joy, grief seer of antiquity in Brahminical circles. In a similar way, the or joy and grief Which are these seven masses? The earth-mass, Lokayata derived its doctrine from a higher authority. As we the water-mass, the fire-mass, the air-mass, pleasure, pain and have already heard, Materialism was connected most closely the souls (jivah) as the seventh. These seven masses are neither with the circles which taught the art of Statecraft. As the highest created nor produced, they are unfruitful, unchangeable, and teacher of the art of Statecraft and as its legendary proclaimer firm like a pillar. They do not move nor do they change, they was considered Brhaspati, the teacher of the gods and besides do not disturb one another and they are not able to procure him, there was Usanas, the teachers of the Asuras, the demons. pleasure, pain or pleasure and pain. There is no murderer, nor Accordingly, the Lokäyata traced back their aphorisms to one who allows to murder, nor anyone who hears or allows to Brhaspati. Besides, we also hear of a school which refers itself hear, no knower or one who allows to know. When anybody to Uśanas.

with a sharp sword strikes off a head, nobody robs nobody of Like the aphorisms of the Vaisesika and other systems,7 the life. The sword passes, on the contrary, through the empty aphorisms of the Lokayata also begin with the words: 'Now space, between the seven masses.' we shall explain the truth.' Now the chief maxims of the system Of these three doctrines, the first exhausts itself in mere follow sharply and trenchantly 8 'Earth, water, fire, air: these denial of all moral obligations. The second seeks to prove it are the entities.' 'One designates their connection or combi- with a gross materialism The third finally represents an ancient nation as body, sense-organs and objects.' 'Out of them nature-philosophy which explains all occurrences through the develops the mind or spirit itself.' 'Knowledge arises like a interplay of a number of permanent factors. The soul also occurs force of fermenting intoxicant out of yeast, etc.' 'The expres- among these factors. But this doctrine also denies everything sions of life (jīvah) resemble bubbles in water.' 'And because transcendent. And all the three are unanimous in the fact that there is nothing that continues in the world beyond, there is, they deny continuance after death and the moral consequences therefore, no world beyond. ' With this has been said what is arising therefrom, and are, in this sense, genuine materialistic essential of the Lokāyata. Man consists only of four elements; doctrines .. there is no soul. Therefore there is no beyond, and no retribution The old writings of the Jainas also describe similar materia- of good and bad actions. listic doctrines. We therefore see that Materialism arose early These short maxims or aphorisms were explained and further

482 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 483 set forth first in oral and later on in written elucidations. For also denied by the opponent-but of the proof that the series of example, the question was raised by the opponents' side, why, knowledge-moments does not endure uninterrupted and does when as a matter of fact, everything consists of the elements, not continue from one existence to another. Because that was sentiency emerges only in the human body and not in inanimate the proof of these schools in asserting in support of a continuance things like a pot or a vessel Thereupon the reply was: 'The after death and of a retribution of good and bad actions. Accor- sentiency does not emerge into appearance in vessels, etc., dingly, the representatives of the Lokāyata emphasized that because the remaining causes are missing, just as in sand, the the coming into existence of knowledge was bound up with a force of intoxication or intoxicant does not appear forth'.9 body and with entirely definite prerequisites. Therefore no 'Again, the force of intoxication, when it is to appear forth, knowledge comes into existence in the embryo, because the presupposes not only the presence of necessary things-flour, sense-organs are still not developed and there is no object (for water and molasses and the remaining ingredients-but also them). So also, knowledge is suspended in a state like that of the fact that these must be in a particular condition of mixture. swoon. The knowledge in an alleged rebirth depends, however, So also the elements may produce the sentiency only when on entirely another body and is entirely different-like the they appear in a particular state, i e. in the form of the body as body-from an earlier knowledge. There is therefore as little skin, bones, flesh and blood. In the corpse already, this condition connection as that in the knowledge of two different beings is not preserved unchanged and therefore sentiency has vanished who live simultaneously near each other. It is also not right to from it. ' In order to derive all the psychical processes out of the trace back, as one does, the expression of passions and instinctive elements, one took hold of the doctrine of the three juices in behaviour of small children to experiences in earlier births. For the body-phlegm, bile and wind 10 It was taught that through then, a man must be able to remember earlier (former) births phlegm there arises desire, through bile, hatred and through not only in isolated cases asserted by the opponent, but in wind, delusion. The manifoldness of life-forces that one general, just as all people who were together in one village experiences in incalculable alternation-now joy, now grief- would remember it in a similar way. was traced by the opponents of the Lokayata to the power of There is therefore no soul, no survival after death, and no good and bad actions which, according to the rigorous law of retribution of good and bad deeds. When one speaks of such retribution, lead to joy and grief. This law was denied by the things it is only a misuse of words which originally implied representatives of the Lokäyata and they appealed to the incal- something quite different.12 The 'other world' (paralokah), culable accidental rise of bubbles in water for explaining the which word in India denotes a peculiar meaning, is nothing accidentality of joy and grief. They also asserted that natural but another place, another time and another condition. 13 Hell feelings or experiences ascribe all these life-forces to no soul. is nothing other than grief, full of agony. Deliverance is the Because, for example, when a man says: 'I know', or when a destruction of the body. The highest god is an almighty King. man also says, 'I am lean; I am fat', he speaks of no soul, but The adherents of the Lokäyata developed and proved their only of a body. Because there is no soul. doctrines in this manner. But there were not only systematic The Buddhist teachings demanded a special comment, as they explanations or proofs with which they met their opponents. assumed no soul but only a stream of consciousness, i.e. a con- They also knew to use, especially effectually, the weapon of nected series of knowledge-moments. 11 What was concerned derision, and knew how to make the opponent a laughing- here was not the contesting of the belief in a soul-which was stock. Their derision, in the first place, was directed against

484 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 485 the sacrificial cult of the Brahmanas. They said, for example, 14 lasts. There is nothing which does not expire after death. Once 'If a man after leaving the body enters into a world beyond, the body becomes ashes, there is no recurrence. why does he not again come back, driven by the impulse of Thus represents itself, in broad features, the doctrine of the love or affection to his relatives?' But the belief in the other Lokāyata of the older period. Its thought-processes are simple world is meaningless. Because if 'a sacrificer would reap the and have rarely interfered in philosophical development. But reward of heaven after the sacrificer himself, the sacrificial act they have continually found adherents and their school has and the implements of sacrifice are long gone (into the limbo maintained its ground through entire centuries. Its situation of the past), the trees which were consumed by a forest con- becomes more difficult at the end of the classical period of flagration would as well bear fruit.' Equally meaningless is it Indian philosophy, when logical and epistemological questions to offer an ancestral sacrifice to the dead. 'If the ancestral offering moved to the forefront of interest and when every system was of worship would be the source of gratification to the dead, compelled to take them into consideration, on which their then one could as well feed the flame of a lamp which is extin- systems were founded. The adherents of the Lokayata also could guished.' 'Fine, indeed, would be any such effect on things not escape this demand. Originally, they made light of the fact which are distant. Then a man need not provide provisions (of In the sutras of Brhaspati16 it is said: 'Inference is not the means food, etc.) to the people who go on a journey. Because then, of right knowledge.' One therefore appealed only to sense- nothing would prevent one from satisfying him (his hunger experience, and simply dismissed the further assertions of the and thirst) by an ancestral offering of worship performed at opponent One could do it so long as inferences which were home! But it is all a swindle! The ceremonies for the dead which arrived at by antagonistic schools were simple inferences by the Brähmanas performed have been performed to provide analogy. It was enough to show the faultiness of every con- themselves with a means of maintenance. There is nothing else clusion, in order to decline every inference as unreliable. Things, in that.' Generally, 'the fire-sacrifice, the three Vedas, the bundle however, were different, as the opponent developed firmly of three sticks which the Brähmanas carry, and the besmearing grounded scientific doctrines forming conclusions. One had of the self with ashes, serves only as a means of livelihood for to discuss these; nay, one was compelled to establish his own men who lack intelligence and energy for any other occupation.' doctrine differently as from what he had done hitherto, and to 'The mortifications, the different self-torments, the self- defend it. Partly one tried to hold fast to the old line, as, for discipline, the deceits for sense-satisfaction and the sacrificial instance, when one explained17: 'The aphorisms of Brhaspati acts like the fire-sacrifice are regarded as childish play' by reason- have only this aim, viz. to refute the opponent.' But in the able men. If that really would have been true, 'if' really, as the majority of cases, one decided to discuss the doctrine of inference Brähmanas assert, 'the animal slaughtered in the sacrifice would and to take it over, at least in parts. This desertion of the original go to heaven,' why does not, then, the sacrificer kill his father, attitude led, in no way, to the consequence of the decline of the in order to despatch him to heaven? But 'the authors of the Vedas system. The taking up of foreign thoughts and occupation with are none else than the three categories of crackers of jests, them led, on the contrary, to regular activity and to a blossoming rogues, and night-sneakers, when they utter their unintelligible of a literature richer than that which existed hitherto. We have, gossip, their "jarbhari" and "turbhari",'15 passing it for the however, reached with it a turning point in the development, words of wise men. That is why one should not believe in at which we must provisionally halt. anything of this kind but should live happily, so long as life Also, among the other systems with which we have dealt, we

486 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA MODERN SCHOLARS 487

have seen that at the end of the classical period of Indian philoso- 6 The aphorisms of Brhaspati are not preserved to us but are only known phy, about the middle of the first post-Christian millennium, from quotations. And as the remaining literature of the system is lost system-building in essentials had come to a close and was at a and besides, the works and the authors about whom we hear belong to a stand-still. In its place there stepped to the forefront the theory later time, I have not further gone in this place into the literature of the

of knowledge, and a lively and fruitful activity developed Lokāyata.

in this sphere for several centuries. The presentation of this 7 The beginning of the Vaisesika-Sūtras runs originally: Yad iha bhāvarūpam tat sarvam abhidhāsyāmi (compare Vyomaśiva, Vyomavatī p. 47, 13 f and development, which appears to a certain extent as a second 492, 25). blossoming of the classical period, has hitherto been placed in 8. The quoted Sutras are often quoted in an isolated manner. In the cited the background in order to handle it separately as an independent order, they appear in Prabhācandra, Nyāyakumudacandra, Mānikacandra section of Indian philosophy. Now we see that the Lokāyata Digambara Jaina Granthamālā. vols. 38-39, Bombay 1938-41, p. 341, 17

also came round to the same path at about the same time. But ff I follow it here

before we can proceed to a presentation of these sections of 9 Prabhācandra, Nyāyakumudacandra p 343, 9f 10 Compare p. (27) f development, there remains for us a group of systems to handle 11. For the following, compare Santiraksita, T'attvasamgrahah, Gaekwad's which later sprang forth and to which we have only briefly Oriental Series No 30-31, Baroda 1926, v. 1857 ff referred uptil now, which developed themselves to such 12. Compare Sayanamadhava, Sarvadarsanasamgrahah, Ānandāśrama great importance and scrambled for the lead through several .Sanskrit Series No 51, Poona 1928, p. 2 23 f. and 3. 1-4

centuries-namely, the systems of the Buddhists. 13. Santiraksita, Tattvasamgrahah v 1874 14. The verses employed for the following are found in their largest number in Sâyanamādhava's Sarvadarśanasamgrahah, p. 5, 1 ff. 15 jarbhari and turpharī are antiquated obsolete Vedic words which become NOTES unintelligible in later times and appear to the sceptics as a senseless Abrakadabra 1. This deals with the second Uvangam of the Jaina, the Rayapasenaijjam, 16 Pratyaksam eva pranāmam anumānam apramānam Compare Abhayadeva- to which from the Buddhistic side Dighanikāya XXIII (Pāyāsisuttantam) süri, Tattvabodhavidhāyinī on Siddhasenadivākara's Sammatitarkapra- = Dīrghagamah 7 corresponds. Of both the versions, the Jainistic one karanam, Purātattvamandira Granthavalī Nos. 10, 16, 18, 19 and 21, is, according to all appearances, the original one Compare E. Leumann, Ahmedabad, 1923-30. p. 70, 18 fand 73, 14 ff. Beziehungen der Jaina-Literatur zu andern Literaturkreisen Indiens. Actes du 17 Sarvatra paryanuyogaparāni eva sūtrāni Brhaspateh Compare Abhayadeva- sixieme Congres International, des Orientalistes tenu en 1883 a Leide, sūri in his above referred-to work, p. 69, 39 Troisieme Partie, Section 2, Leiden 1885, pp. 467-564 .. I closely follow, in the following, the translation by E Leumann, although in doing so I have made it more smooth and short 2 Compare Dīghanikāya II (Sāmañnaphalasuttam) = Dīrghāgamaḥ 27. 3 The northern bank of the Ganga was considered at that time an old Brahminical holy land, in contrast to the southern bank 4. The beings in hell and the world of the gods are not produced, but origi- nate suddenly and directly. The belief in such suddenly-originated beings is, therefore, of importance for the doctrine of rebirth and of the retribution of good and bad actions in the world beyond 5. The word Cärväka holds good partly as the name of the founder of the system but is also explained in a different way.

PART III On The Tattvopaplavasimha of Jayarāśi Bhatta

Tattvopaplava-simha

Much furore was created among scholars of Indian philosophy with the publication of Jayarāsi Bhatta's Tattvo- papląva-simha (GOS, Baroda, 1940) as edited by Sanghvi and Parikh with an English introduction (reproduced below) in which it was claimed that at last, an actual text of some hitherto-unknown school of Carvakas had reached us On various circumstantial evidences, the editors claimed that the work belonged roughly to the eighth century AD and mainly depending on a statement of Śrīharsa as well as one of his commentators, Sankara Miśra, it was sought to be shown that although not representing the Carvaka view as generally understood, it could have been written by some follower of the view that did not accept even perception as a pramana. The text itself claims to demolish all philosophical views by showing that no pramana whatsoever was possible. Interestingly, the text nowhere mentions or refutes Sankara's māyāvāda and as the editors admit, it closely resembles the method followed by Srīharsa in his Khandana-khanda-khādya to establish the Advaita view by rejecting all the pramānas. Though still claimed by'many scholars that it is a work of some Cārvka school, this claim is now receding to the back- ground inasmuch as many other serious scholars are inclined to view the text as representing extreme scepticism, pure and simple. In any case, it defends neither materialism nor perception as the only source of valid knowledge

ON IHE IAIIVOPAPIAVASIMHA 493

the colophons of a great number of mss that it had developed into

Tattvopaplavasimha a centre of learning as well.

of The Present Edition Jayarāśi Bhatta The single palm-leaf ms on which the present text is based pre- SUKHLALJI SANGHAVI AND R. C. PARIKH sents, on the whole, an accurate version of the work. At some places, however, the writing is blurred and those places are indi- INTRODUCIION IO THE PUBLISHED TEXI cated in the footnotes as ghrstam or ghro; at other places, the trend of the meaning required amendations in readings, and these have

As far as our knowledge goes, the Tattvopaplavasimha is a been indicated in the footnotes as parimarjitam or pario. When in

unique work of its kind. The school of Carvaka otherwise the body of the text we have supplied some readings, we have

known as the Lokāyata Darśana was long known to students put the same in rectangular brackets.

of Indian philosophy as a Pūrvapaksa in almost all the systems, The paragraphs in the text are, of course, made by us. We

and also from such works as the Saddarsanasamuccaya of have also supplied the headings of different sections in rectan-

Haribhadra Sūri (about AD 700-70) and the Sarvadarsana Sangraha gular brackets

of Madhavacarya (about fourteenth century AD) No work This, we hope, will greatly facilitate the stady of the work.

belonging to the Lokayata school itself was, however, known The passages that seemed to be quotations have been indicated

The TPS fills, at least partially, that gap in our knowledge. As by "", and wherever possible we have given the names of

we shall see later on, the TPS goes a step further and carries to original works in [ ]. The proper names have been underlined

its logical end the sceptical tendency of the Cārvāka school as it At the end of the text we have provided three appendices

is known to us from this work itself and other sources, and The first gives the index of important philosophical terms, the

ends in 'tattvopaplava' or 'upsetting of all principles ' sccond that of the proper names and the third that of quotations All this, it is hoped, will enable the scholars to utilize this Description of the Ms. important work for further researches in the subject.

This palm-leaf ms, which as noted in the Preface, belongs to Comparative Unfamiliarity of the TPS the Sanghavina pādano Bhandar, is noticed in A Descriptive Catalógue of MSS in the Jaina Bhandars at Pattan Vol I p. 165, Before we attempt to discover the date of the TPS, we prop-

G.O.S. No. LXXVI, published in 1937. It consists of 176 leaves. pose to consider its comparative unfamiliarity and the type of

Its length is 14" and breadth 11/2". A few lines in the beginning and thought it represents Verses attributed to Cärvaka and the

a few in the body of the work are illegible. name of Brhaspati as the founder of the Lokāyata school, more

It becomes clear from the colophon that the ms was copied in familiarly known as the Cārvāka Darśana, are known to us

Samvat 1349 Marg. Vadi 11 Sanau (December sixth, AD 1292) at from such works as the Śastravārtā Samuccaya and the Saddarsana

Dholkā by Maham Narapāla. At the time, Sārangadeva (AD Samuccya of Haribhadra Sūri (AD 700-70), the Sarvadarśana

1274-95) of the House of the Vaghelas was reigning. Dholka had Sangraha of Mädhaväcärya (fourteenth cent. AD) and such other

been a second capital of Gujarat for more than half a century works as the Sarvamata Sangraha. As every student of Samskrta

from the time of Viradhavala (AD 1233-38) and it appears from

494 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA ON IHE IAIIVOPAPIAVASIMHA 495

systems of philosophy knows, Cārvāka or Lokāyata is referred Cārvākas who recognized Pratyaksa, and others who did not. to in many of the major works on the subject This school of thought supposed to be foundcd by Brhaspati, who is also If this assumption is correct, as there is reason to believe. we

supposed to be the founder of the Science of Polity (Arthaśatra), may say that tattvopaplava-vāda was familiar to Śrī Harșa; and looking to the smiliarity of the argument of both the works, seems-to have developed at least-in two branches, as becomes clear from the reference to Navya Nāstikas in the Syādvādalatikā may we suggest that Jayarasi (or somcone else of his school of

of Yaśovijaya (AD 1608-84), a commentary on the SVS of thought) might have inspired that grand dialectical work, viz

Haribhadra and the commentary of Sankara on Khandanakla- Khandana-khanda-khadya, though recognizing at the same time

ndakhādya (about AD 1450) that their aims are altogether different? Sri Harsa tries to show

We are here concerned only with the references of Śankara the anirvacanīyata of Brahma, while Jayaraśi shows the invalidity

Śrī Harşa in the KKK refers to Cārvākas, Mādhyamikas and of Pramanas and the consequent invalidity of everything. The

Śankarācārya as those who do not accept any Pramānas He says: difference may be explained by the fact that Jayarasi does not go beyond the plane of Pramanas -- Reason-while Sri Harsa, tad-anabhyupagacchato' · pi cārvāka-mādhyamikāder vāg-vistarānām the Advaita Vedantin that he is, accepts the possibility of

pratīyamānatvāt so'yam apūrvah pramānādi-sattānabhyupa- knowing Brahma-the ultimate reality-through means other

gamātmā vāk-stambha-mantro bhavatābhyūhito nūnam yasya pra- than Tarka. However that may be, we can safely say that the bhāvād bhagavatā suragurunā lokāyatikāni sūtrāni na pranītāni tath- type of thought represented by the TPS was not so unfamiliar āgatena vā madhyamāgamā nopadistāh bhagavatpādena vā bādarāya- to the old savants as it at first sight may appear; and as will be

nīyesu sūtresu bhāsyam nābhāși. seen from what follows, Jain dialecticians, both Digambara

Now all the different commentators who seem to be familiar and Śvetāmbara, were quite familiar with the TPS

only with that branch of Carvakas which recognizes the validity The Age of the Work and its Author of Pratyaksa and the existence of four elements, arc at great pains to explain this passage by saying that because Cārvākas Coming to the question of the age of the work, we take the

do not recognize the validity of Anumāna, and as Prāmāņya date of the palm-leaf ms as our starting point. That date is sixth

can only be proved through Anumana, only they are said to December, 1292 AD. Now let us make an attempt to find how

recognize no Pramana But surely, this explanation is far- far we can go into times eartier than this.

fetched Only Sankara, after giving the above explanation, Mallisena Sūri in his commentary on Anyayogavyavaccheda Dvātrimšikā of Hemacandra Sūri (AD 1089-1173) named Syādvā- gives the other explanation Cārvākaikadesī vā cārvākah According to him, this particular division of Carvakas do not damañjarī, while commenting on verse 17 after putting forth the view of Sunyavadins, says: 'For a detailed refutation of recognize any Pramanas This, as far as we know, can apply either only to TPS or a similar work, which does away with Pramānas, Tattvopaplavasimha should be consulted.' In this

each and every Pramana known to Indian schools of philosophy. reference we are to note that the work is mentioned with its

It is also very likely that Śrī Harsa also has TPS or a similar full title and for the purpose of pramāna-khandana. The title

work in mind when he refers to Cārvāka as not recognizing agrees completely with one of the works under consideration

any Pramana; for it is not possible that such an accurate and and pramana-khandana which starts on page one of our text forms

learned Pandit as Śri Harsa would not distinguish between its main theme. This leaves no doubt that Mallisena Sūri has our work in mind, and no other. SM was finished on the

496 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA ON THE IATIVOPAPLAVASIMHA 497 eleventh of October, AD 1292-less than two months before Anantavīrya, in his Siddhiviniścayavrtti on folio 228a, says the date of our palm-lcaf ms. This also suggests that M had a atra tattvopaplavakrd aha, etc., and further on in the same folio, copy of this work other than the one available to us tattvopaplavakaraņād jayarāših, etc These two passages leave Candraprabha Sūri, in his Prabhāvaka-carita, chapter 16, no doubt that Jayarasi wrote the TP and that he and his work mentions that the poet Dharma of the Kaula sect and a native IP are referred to by Anantavirya. of Broach had a dialectical duel with the great Jain dialectician Similarly Vidyänandin, in his work named Astasahasrī which Sānti Sūri of Anahillapura Pattan, and that he used the arguments has been published by the N.S.P., says on p. 37, eke hi tattvo- taken from the TP for this purpose. Ch finished his Pra in paplavavādinah, etc., and after devoting about five pages to the V.S. 1334, AD 1277, March twelfth. So the TP was known refutation of tattvopaplavavāda, says: vicārottarakālam api pramā- fifteen years before our ms was copied. We may, however, go natattvam prameyatattvam copaplutam samvidanta evātmānam furher. As there is nothing which goes against the historicity nirasyantīti vyāhatih. The passage may be compared with the of the incident mentioned by Candraprabha Suri, we may say last few lines of our text, wherein Jayarāsi says: tad evam up- that the TP was a well-known work even in the eleventh cent. apluteșveva tattvesu avicāritaramaņīyāh sarve vyavahārā ghațante. AD and that it was used as a powerful dialectical weapon Vidyānandin refers to tattvopaplavavāda in his other work, viz Abhayadeva Suri-the teacher of Sānti Sūri in Pramāna- Tattvārthaślokavārtika, also. He devotes about a page to the dis- śāstra-in his commentary on Sanmatitarka called Tattvabodha- cussion of tattvopaplavavāda. Again, on page 195 of the same vidhāyinī, popularly known as Vādamahārņava, has passages work, he mentions Tattvopaplavavādins with Sūnyavādins which seem to be adapted from the TPS as shown by Pandit and Brahmavādins. Sukhlalji and Pt. Bechardas in their excellent edition of Sanmati- These passages confirm us in our view that Vidyānandin also tarka, Vol. IV, pp 547-51, footnotes. Now Abhayadeva Süri refers to our TP and no other work. In addition to this, we may being a teacher of Santi Sūri who died in V.S. 1096, AD 1040 point out that Vidyänandin first refutes the views of the other falls in the first half of the eleventh century AD Thus the section of Carvākas (pp. 35-37 AS.) and then grapples with evidence considered above enables us to say that the TP was tattvopaplava vada, which means that in V's view, these two are well-known in Gujarat during the period of eleventh to thir- different sections requiring separate treatment. teenth centuries of the Christian Era. The Digambara Jain Thus we find that Anantavirya mentions Jayarasi by name, works of Southern India lead us still further. and Vidyānandin devotes considerable space to refute tattvo- Students of South Indian Jainism know very well that the paplavavāda separately and in addition to the refutation of great Digambara pontiff Akalankadeva (AD 620-80) wrote a other Cārvakas who accept one Pramana and the existence of number of authentic philosophical works and gave great impetus four elements to the development of Jain Nyaya. In that tradition. Vidyānan- Now we find that Anantavīrya is referred to by Mādhavā- din who wrote such works as Tattvārtha-ślokavārtika and Așta- cārya (fourteenth cent. AD) in his Sarvadarsanasangraha. He is sahasri, is a great name. Anantavirya is another important name. also mentioned by the great Digambarācārya Prabhacandra in He wrote a commentary on the Siddhiviniścaya of Akalankadeva his Nyāyakumudacandra, a commentary on the Laghīyastraya of This commentary, not yet published in printed form, exists in Akalankadeva Pandit Mahendrakumar, the learned editor the MS library of Kodai in Kutch. We possess a copy made of it of the NKC, puts Prabhäcandra between AD 950-1020 and These two authors, viz. Anantavīrya and Vidyānandin, refer to Anantavīrya in the ninth century AD. TP in their works. As to Vidyänandin, we find that he mentions Dharmottara,

498 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA Prajnākara and Mandanamiśra and quotes Kārikās from the ON IHE IAIIVOPAPIAVASIMHA 499

Värtika on Brhadāranyaka of Sureśvara. The first two are put in two. One is to Brhaspati, the founder of the Lokayata school, the eighth century of the Christian Era; Mandanamisra is later and the other to Laksanasara, probably a work of Jayarāsi than Kumārila, and Sureśvara, being a disciple of Sankarācārya, himself or someone belonging to his school. The other referen- later than S. Mr. P. V. Kane puts Sureśvara in between AD ces, as said above, are general. So the only course left open to 800-840. Pandit Mahendrakumar, following this order, puts us is to make an attempt to identify the quotations given in the Vidyänandin also in the ninth century Dr. Satishchandra puts TPS with the original passages, and to try with the help of these him about AD 800. Pandit Vamsidhara, the editor of Astasahasrī, identifications to settle the earlier limit of the age of the work puts Vidyänandin in the middle of, the ninth century of the Of the numerous quotations, we have been able to trace only a Vikrama Era-that is to say, about AD 796 few. These come from the Mīmāmsāsūtras of Jaimini, the From the consideration of the dates of Anantavirya and Vaiśesika Sūtras of Kanāda, the Nyāyasūtras of Gautama, the Vidyänandin, we are inclined to believe that TPS and its author Bhāsya of Sabara, the Ślokavārtika of Kumärila, and the Pram- Jayarāśi are earlier than the ninth century of the Christian era. ānavārtika and the Nyāyabindu of Dharmakīrti. Of the two In order to find out the earlier limit of the age of TPS, we have verses noted in the footnote, we are able to trace the latter to to rely upon the references to other works and their authors, as ŚV 2 v. 184 and the context requires that the former also must well as to other Darsanas in it. The main theme of TPS is the be either from the ŚV or a similar work of Pūrvamīmāmsā; but examination of the Instruments of Valid Knowledge, and so it is not found in the published editions of the ŚV and strangely with that aim it surveys the entire field of the then known enough, is found in the Tattvasangraha of Sāntaraksita (kārikā schools of Indian philosophy. It mentions Sankhyas (p. 79), 2895,G.O S.). The context in the TS, however, shows that it Mīmāmsakas (pp. 23, 58, 82), Kāņādas, i e. Vaiśeșikas (p. 117), must belong to some Pūrvamīmāmsā work-presumably the Naiyayikas (pp. 6, 12, 14, etc.), Bauddhas under various names ŚV of Kumarila-as the Panjika on the verse in question gives (pp. 27, 35, 41, 42, 45, 56, 79, 81, 83, etc.) and the Digambaras of in support of a quotation from Sābarabhāsya the Jain Sect. It also refers to the anandarūpam ātmanah kaivalyam Now if the quotations we have identified cannot be traced to (p. 81), which seems to be a Vedanta view older than that of some earlier works, we may, from what we have discussed Sankarācärya, and also refers to the Sambhava and Aitihya above, come to the conclusion that the TPS and its author Pramänas, subsuming the former under Anumāna and the latter Jayarāśi cannot be placed before Kumärilabhatta and Dharma- under Āgama (p. 113). The last section of the work is devoted kīrti. Now Kumārila is assigned by different scholars to some- to sadhupadad artha-pratipattih doctrine of the Vaiyākaranas, where between AD 600 and 700. He is, according to Keith, expecially that of Bhartrhari. earlier than AD 838 and 'wrote' perhaps, about 700. Similarly, Thus it becomes clear that TPS is familiar with the philosophi- Dharmakīrti is also placed between AD 600 and 700. According cal views of almost all important schools-Vedic, Jain and to Keith, he belongs to the seventh century AD, while Satish- Buddhist-as we find them developed in their respective works chandra would place him about AD 635-50. So also Stcherbatsky. by the ninth century of the Christian Era. We also find that the Rāhula Sāmkrtyāyana is of the opinion that AD 625 should be Māyāvāda and the Kevala Advaitavāda as developed by Sankarā- the latest date for DK. and Mahendrakumar would assign him cārya are conspicuous by their absence. All this in itself, the period AD 600-60-90. however, carries us nowhere; and it is curious to note that the These considerations drive us to the conclusion that the TPS individual references to authors and works in the TPS are only and Jayarasi cannot be earlier than the seventh century of the Christian Era, and as we saw above, they cannot be assigned to

500 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA ON THE TATTVOPAPĻAVASIMHA 50 an age later than that of Vidyanandin and Anantavirya: that is, both of them Digambara Jain Acharyas of Southern India, and later than about AD 800. So we are inclined to put TPS and its from the fact that the TPS refers only to the Digambara Jain author Jayaraśi in the eighth century AD. Sects (p 79), we are inclined to guess that probably J. came The absence of a reference by itself may prove nothing, but from the land which produced Bhatta Kumārila, Dharmakīrti,/ in a particular context where a certain reference would reason- Akalanka, Vidyanandin, Anantavīrya and Sankarācārya ably be expected, its absence may be regarded as significant As to the caste of Bhatta Jayarasi as he calls himself, there TPS, while refuting the theory of Pramanas and incidentally cannot be much doubt. He must have been a Brahmin like some Prameyas, takes cognizance, as we saw, of all the principal Bhatta Kumārila, though the title Bhatta is sometimes found schools vi'. Mīmamsā, Nyāya, Vaiseşika, Sāņkhya, Buddhist, with the names of some Digambara Jain pontiffs, e g. Bhatta Jain, etc., but there is no reference to the Māyāvāda of ankarā- Akalankadeva. But Jayarāsi could not have been a Jain or a cārya as there is reference to the Samvrti of Madhyamakas Buddhist, as he mercilessly attacks their views; while his (pp. 98-100). The only reference to the Vedänta doctrine that being a Brahmin would not prevent him from attacking other one finds, as we also saw, is to the anandarupam kaivalyam which Brahminical systems with which he could not agree. In our comes after the refutation of Sankhya Kaivalya (p. 81). This view, the Lokäyata Darśana is one of the Brahminical Darśanas, conspicuous absence of reference inclines us to the view that though not one of the Astika Darsanas, because Brhaspati is Śankarācārya was not known to Jayarāśi, probably because he not outside the Brahminical fold. Śri Harsa, as we saw above, was either prior to him or was his contemporary; because, refers to him as bhagavatā sura-guruņā. considering the influential character of Sankarācārya's works, if it existed in J's time, his not taking cognizance of it in such Works of Jayarāśi a polemical work as TPS would be a puzzle. Now Ś., who Whether J. wrote any other work besides TPS we do not according to Keith 'may have been born in 788, and may have definitely know, but it is likely, as the following reference died or become a Sannyäsin in 820, at any rate worked in c. AD shows, that he may have written another work named Laksa- 800'. If both J. and S. were contemporaries, or J. prior to Ś., it nasāra. But as we have said above, the possibility of Laksanasāra would agree with the conclusion that we have arrived at about being the work of some other author of the same school is not the age of J. and may lead us to assign Jayarasi to the first half of altogether excluded the seventh century AD. Similarly Haribhadrasuri, who is placed by Jinavijayaji in TPS-a Work of the Lokayata School the period AD 700-70-a view accepted by Keith-does not We have said in the beginning that the TPS is a work of the mention the TPS or tattvopaplava-vada either in his Şaddar- Lokāyata or Cārvāka school, or to be more precise, of a parti- śanasamuccaya or Sāstravātāsamuccaya, though he describes the cular division of that school. Our reason for this statement is Lokāyata-darsana in the SDS and discusses it in the SVS. This also agrees well with the age which we assign to Jayarasi. that J., in support of his opinion, quotes Brhaspati only, and that too with great regard (pp. 45 and 88) Native Place of Jayarāśi He also refers to him as Sūtrakāra and quotes a verse of his to

We have no means of ascertaining the birthplace of Jayarāsi. abuse the Digambara Jains (p. 79). The very first quotation

But from the fact that the earliest references to the TPS and prthīvyāpah to samjña (p. 1) in our text is given in the commen-

Jayaraśi are in the works of Vidyānandin and Anantavīrya, tary on the SDS of Haribhadra called Tarkarahasya Dīpika. Thus, yaduvāca brhaspatih prthīvyāpah. This also signifies that

502 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA ON THE TATIVOPAPLAVASIMHA 503 Jayarasi quotes from Brhaspati. The word paramarthavidbhih turn of the Sankhya view of pratyaksa (61-64). Then again, (p. 1) no doubt, also refers to Brhaspati as the quotation laukiko the Naiyayikas have to withstand his attack on their theory of märgo'nusartavyah, etc., suggests. At the end of his work, anumāna (pp. 64-74). While discussing anumāna, Jayarāśi finds Jayarāśi tells us that arguments which could not even occur to it convenient to examine the various theories about ātman or the Preceptor of Gods, that is Brhaspati, obtain in his work TPS. soul. In this connection, he deals with the Naiyāyika, Jaina, That J. is developing the doctrine of the orthodox (!) Mīmāmsaka, Sankhya and Vedanta theories of soul (pp. 74-83) Lokāyata also becomes clear from the first paragraph of the Having finished this part of his argument, he again turns to the text. He has to explain as to why he talks of tattvopaplava when theory of anumana, this time of the Bauddhas, including their Brhaspati says: athātastattvam vyākhyāsyāmah, prthivyāpastejo svabhāvānumāna (pp. 82-109). Then the six types of arthāpatti vāyuriti tattvāni, etc. Jayarāśi in effect says that B. is merely of Mīmāmsakas are considered (109-10). Upamāna of the reflecting (pratibimbanärtham) in his statement the belief of the Naiyāyikas and Abhāva of the Mīmāmsakas are briefly dealt people; but what B. really means is that when one thinks, with (pp. 110-19), and a reference to Aitihya and Sambhava one finds that even Tattvas like prthvi, etc., do not stand- also made, by saying that they come under sabda and anumāna what is-one to say about others? Jayarasi thus disposes of the respectively. orthodoxy and starts, so to say, with the permission of his The last section is directed at the examination of śabda- Guru, by removing him out of the way, on his campaign of prāmānya (113-25), and in that connection the theory of the demolishing the doctrines of other schools. grammarians, especially that of Bhartrhari, is also examined

The Critical Method of Jayarasi (120-23). After this detailed criticism, Jayarāśi comes to the conclusion: tadevam upaplutesveva tattvesu avicāritaramaņīyāh The method which Jayarasi adopts is what may be called a sarve vyavahārā ghațante. critical method, using the word in the Kantian sense. He, in This summary account of the main contents of the work effect, says that the system of knowables depends upon the clearly shows the viewpoint of Jayarasibhatta as critical. In fact system of means of knowledge; while means of knowledge, in he has criticized all the varieties and theories of pramāna known order to be valid, have to conform to reality. So one has to to Indian philosophy of his time. Here, a question arises as to examine whether there are any valid means of knowledge whether this method is merely vitanda, or an honest effort to before one can say anything about reality. J. is of the opinion show that, as there are no valid means of knowledge, nothing that there are no valid means of knowledge and in order to which can be said to conform to reality can be asserted. Vitanda prove his thesis, he examines the different theories of the has been defined by Gautama as sa pratipaksa-sthāpanā-hīno Pramanas or valid instruments of knowledge of the different vitanda. The Jalpa (the sort of discussion which uses all sorts of schools of Indian philosophy. That is why we call J.'s method arguments with a view to defeat the opponent), which has no critical. opposite view to establish, is Vitanda. Can we say that J. has Jayarāśi starts with the examination of the pratyaksa-laksana written this work merely for the fun of confounding different of Naiyayikas and tries of prove that it cannot stand (pp. 2-22). dialecticians and that he has nothing to say as a result of all this Then he discusses Mīmāmsaka and Buddhist views of Pramāna cogitation? We do not think so. A careful reading of the text as such (22 to 32), and follows it up with the criticism of their leaves the impression that J. is as serious a thinker as any other, respective pratyaksa-laksana-s (32-58, 58-61). Then comes the and that he wants to reveal the incapacity of human instruments

504 CĀRVĀKA / ĮOKĀYAIA of knowledge to really know anything. This tendency in Indian thought is not altogether new, and can be traced from the Vedas down to Jayaräsibhatța. But for the present, suffice it to say Walter Ruben

that the TPS of Bhatta Jayarasi adds a new chapter to the history of Indian philosophy! Ruben's analysis of the Tattvopaplavasimha originally appeared in Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sud-Und Ostasiens Und Archive fur Indische Philosophie, Sonderabdruck Aus Band II, 1958. As translated into English by Professor Haridas Sinharay, it was published in Indian Studies: Past & Present, Calcutta, Vol. vii, nos. 2-3. In this article Ruben characterizes Jayarāśi as an 'agnostic critique of knowledge' and not as a Cārvāka/Lokāyata materialist, notwithstanding Jayarāśi's admiration for Brhaspati.

On the Tattvopaplavasimha of Jayarāśi Bhatța WALTER RUBEN

AN AGNOSTIC CRITIQUE OF KNOWIEDGE

Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghvi, the learned editor of the text, is justified in claiming that Jayarasi Bhatta belongs to the school of Brhaspati, because he quotes him and him alone with rever- ence 1 One may add that he does not recognize at all the other well-known trends of philosophy in preference to Brhaspati's materialistic teachings, although he does not seek to defend it positively He opens his text with an announcement of the title: tattvopaplava, i.e. annihilation of all tattva-s or all realities or categories. He makes a pretext that it has indeed been taught (by Brhaspati2): 'Now, therefore, we shall explain reality (tattva). Earth, water, fire and wind are the realities 3 Their combinations are termed body, sense-organs and object, etc: ?4 This clear materialism of Brhaspati, however, does not pro- fessedly contradict Jayarasi's teachings of 'the annihilation of all realities', particularly because of the 'objective of reflection' which is intended. The elements, earth, etc., would be reflected in these teachings of Brhaspati so far as these are known in the

506 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA ON THE IATIVOPAPLAVASIMHA 507

world (loke), i.e. in the world of laymen.5 'But even these-the elements-cannot be taken as real if these are examined criti- fore of matter. That is to say, he turns away from any sort of

cally, not to speak of the other realities.' (He obviously means philosophizing from the definitions of all the schools (except

the atoms of the Vaisesika; the primeval matter of the that of the materialist in the above-mentioned sense), without

Sāmkhya; the soul; god; etc .. ) himself representing the materialistic or idealistic teachings,

Now, if an opponent asks as to how far these universally- but at the same time without denying the existence of matter

recognized realities will be annihilated, i.e. shall not exist, or the possibility of practical life.

Jayarāsi answers: 'The evidence of the existence of the instru- He quotes at the beginning of his work,8 'the knower of the

ments of valid knowledge depends on their right definitions; summum bonum' (paramārthavid, and thereby he presumably

the evidence of the existence of the objects of knowlegde (e.g. refers to Brhaspati9 again) that one should follow the worldly

the elements earth, etc.) depends on the instruments of valid path, because with reference to the ways of the world (of the

knowledge. In default of the instruments of valid knowledge, daily life) laymen (bala) and the wise (pandita) are the same.

how can the objects of knowledge be taken as objects of correct Therefore men may lead the usual life, think, etc., but all

expression (or practice)?' philosophizing is false. He refers back to this at the end of his

As it continues, after a lacuna in the manuscript, 'the soul work 10 and exclaims that he has now nullified all realities and

could as well be attributed with colour, or a jar with intelligence.' categories, but at the same time all the modes of expression or

With this intention he composes his work, which shatters to behaviour (whose definitions he has shattered) could be admitted

pieces the then prevalent idealistic definitions of all instruments if one takes them without analysis Thus is rejected, with a

of valid knowledge. sham proof, by our agnostic the nature of the materialistic

In this introduction, the materialism of Brhaspati is rep- criterion of practice, which had theoretically been treated by

resented in a somewhat obscure way-as an obviously Vātsyāyana in his Nyāya-bhāsya (circa AD 400), and afterwards

unphilosophical reflection of matter-and thereby a unique by the Buddhist logicians of Dignaga's school.

conception of reflection as a kind of knowledge is introduced Vātsyāyana introduces his commentary on the Nyāya-sūtra

as justified in a certain sense. with the following: 'Successful activity results when the object

Accordingly, Jayarasi is, presumably, a Bārhaspatya. But is cognized by the instrument of valid knowledge. Hence the

his work is, nevertheless, not a materialistic one; it is, rather, instrument of valid knowledge is invariably connected with

anti-philosophic, and in a definite sense, agnostic. It denies, the object. There is no cognition of object without the instru-

without representing any positive materialism, all the idealistic ment of valid knowledge; without cognition of object, there is

definitions of the various instruments of valid knowledge with no successful activity. On being aware of the object with the

which the author is familiar, such as perception, inference, etc., help of the instruments of valid knowledge, the knower wants

with 'pure'-i e. apparently logical-argumentations; while either to get it or to avoid it. His specific effort, prompted by

the other materialists6 of ancient India known to us admit the the desire of either getting or avoiding (the object), is called

validity of perception. With this our author denies, at the same activity; whose success, again, lies in its invariable connection

time, as he expressedly says,7 all the prevailing philosophical with the result (phala). One who thus exerts, being desirous of

knowledge of the objects, such as of the elements, and there- getting or avoiding the object, either gets it or avoids it. By object is meant pleasure and (objectively) its cause, as well as

508 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYATA ON THE TATIVOPAPAVASIMHA 509

suffering and its cause .. Those objects of the instruments of valid knowledge should have been eventually proved to be correct.

knowledge are innumerable, because the species of living Now, if one argues that false knowledge, as contrasted with beings are innumerable.' right knowledge, does not lead to the attainment of the water

Uddyotakara, commenting11 on this, rejects all sorts of in the same time and space, then (the answer is) the knowledge

sophisticated pretexts. But Jayarasi Bhatta does not enter into issuing forth from the words of a dying person, or the know- all these. On the other hand, he starts the rejection of this ledge of the moon, the sun, the stars, the constellations, etc .. ,

criterion with the denial of the definition of Vātsyayana: 'The also becomes false (since the dying person attains nothing, nor

success of the activity is its invariable connection12 with the is able to lead another to attain anything, and none can ever

result: results are garland, sandal, women, water, etc: because attain the heavenly bodies) .. Besides, one cannot attain the water these are real and causes of results; that is why these are called in the same time and place, 17 as the place, like the water, may

results (i.e enjoyment). The success of the activity is, therefore; be destroyed (i.e. may change before one can attain it) based on the fact that it is connected with the body (the enjoyer). (iii) The third alternative is illogical, as finished objects18

Activity is thus the motion which pre-exists (inheres)13 in the (basically in accordance with the definition) can be no cause:

body. Its success determines the rightness (of the instruments water as something finally produced cannot produce another

of knowledge). But is this criterion of success known or un- water, just as a pot cannot produce another pot Besides there known? If it is unknown, how can one know of its existence? is no multiplicity of water, as has been shown elsewhere 19 If, on the other hand, it is known (the question arises), how can Water differs from not-water inasmuch as it has the form of

the knowledge of its invariability be known?' Thus the question water. How can it differ from that which has the form of water?

arises14: Is it known through sense-perception or through Is it through the form of water, or through another form (i.e.

inference? It cannot be the first, because it is supra-sensuous. through the form of not-water)? In the first case, the form of

Nor is it the latter, because then one should have to perceive a not-water gives way to other waters In the second case, it

special characteristic by means of which one could infer. would itself have the form of not-water; thus one cannot distin-

Further, the validity of the previous knowledge of water is guish between the known water and the water obtained later.

confirmed by obtaining water 15 Now, is it concerned with Further: is the validity of the previous knowledge said to be

the obtaining of: proved through the success of the (latter) activity, known through a characteristic which necessitates an inference; or is it (i) water that was thus known, or (ii) water of the same nature, or directly perceptible and as such, proved? In the first case, one cannot know the connection (between (iii) water later orginiated from that known water? the characteristic, i.e the success, and the knowledge) But if

(i) The first is illogical, because the previously-known water one could know it, the success of the activity becomes unneces-

has no permanence but flows away (before it can be obtained sary (since then, one would have directly known the connection through activity)16 according to the law of motion of particles, between the knowledge and the water, and thus would not

which results from the movements of fishes and buffaloes. have to wait for the activity). In the second case, the reply is (ii) To the second alternative, the answer is that people that a contact (as, according to the Nyaya view, for every per-

sometimes obtain water even when they have not attained a ception a contact is necessary between the sense and the correct knowledge of water; for in that case, this incorrect object), with the knowledge previously born and immediately

510 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA ON IHE TAITVOPAPLAVASIMHA 511

destroyed, is not at all possible .. A sense-percepton of past you do, that the one generates a manifold product knowledge is as illusory as the vision of a tuft of hair, 20 because From the standpoint of science today too, Buddhistic illusion- it can as little be the object of perception. One cannot perceive ism is to be rejected; but not with such dilemmatic terminology the absence of knowledge as an object of perception, nor the as the agnostic here uses. These tests of his methods of argu- existence of past knowledge, because it exists no more. One mentation might have once been necessary. If we make a short should, then, recognize something non-existent as the object résume, he avoids both the fundamental aspects of a philosophy of perception. But how? Insofar as it imparts the form,21 or as of materialism and thereby establishes the idealistic philosophy endowed with attributes like dimension (mahattva) etc 22 or and rejects materialism. In any case, he overlooks that there is through its sheer existence, or through simultaneous origination the philosophy of the scientist between the knowledge of the with knowledge23? Whichever of these contentions of the layman and that of the philosophers. Thus he becomes a cynical functioning of perception may one accept? How can one accept agnostic with reference to the knowledge of reality, so far as it the past knowledge of perception? In case one accepts it, none- prevails over the knowledge of day-to-day life. He does not theless one must seek a cause for it, as in the case of the false understand that materialism by its nature is a philosophy. knowledge of the tuft of hairs. If one champions the sheer exis- Thus this work is based on an anti-philosophic-and there- tence of the (knowing) soul as such, it follows that every know- fore, also on an anti-materialistic-standpoint; because ledge is false. And our doctrine of the nullification of all materialism is, indeed, a philosophy. A similar standpoint is realities or categories holds good. represented by the Barhaspatyas and Ausanasas already in With such meaningless hair-splittings, Jayarāsi Bhatta Kautilya's polity26 roundabout 300 BC. They have equated exposes, in fact, the uselessness of all his polemics. A better philosophy with religion, which is understandable according criterion than that of practice has not been found till today by to the Upanisadic idealism prevalent in those days. They, how science and epistemology. He who rejects it opens wide the ever, do not in any case recognize that philosophy has two door to illusionism fundamental directions, the idealistic and the materialistic. Contrariwise, the illusionism of the Buddhistic Vijnāna- Some Vaitandikas who are referred to in the Epic27 perhaps vāda24 is, however, rejected: in your view, the object, e.g blue, thought likewise, and possibly also Sanjaya Belatthiputta of is unique. It produces, on the one hand, the knowledge 'blue', the Buddhistic canons. Vitandā is, at least in the Nyāyasūtra, while on the other, the perceptual object 'blue' (i e the unique defined as a form of discussion in which one advances all sorts real splits itself in previous perceptual knowledge into a subjec- of sham arguments in order to demolish the opponent at any tive and an objective phenomenon). 25 But how can the product. cost, though it dispenses with the presentation of its own be a dual one? By means of a unique form, or a variety of forms? thesis.28 This mode of argumentation is recognized expres- In the first case, it gives rise to the faulty inference that all sedly in the Nyāya-sutra as sometimes justified, e.g when a products have one and the same form, i.e. the one becomes a good purpose can be reached thereby 29 Corresponding to it unity as well as a plurality (and that becomes an aspersion on is Mahābhārata ii. 36. 4f, where vitanda is regarded as not to the teaching due to contradiction, which our agnostic seems to be criticized as it is highly efficacious, by which, with learned recognize here temporarily to suit his purpose). In the second discussion, a lean thing is proved to be fat and a fat thing lean. · case, the unity is destroyed due to the variety of forms. If the This is done during the horse-sacrifice of the Pändavas in the original unity is destroyed, one does not need to contend, as palace of Aśvatthāmā (Mahābhārata vii 61.13)30 Sañjaya

512 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA ON THE IATIVOPAPLAVASIMHA 513 Belatthiputta, however, teaches an 'indifferentism', which his own thesis. 35 About the turn of the fifth-sixth century, the appears to be very similar to that of the Jainas and cannot fit in with any positive formulation in philosophy 31 Thus it is also Brahmanic logician Uddyotakara, on the other hand, sometimes

expressedly different from the agnosticism of Jayarasi advances comparable sophistry against the definitions in the logic of Dignāga. 36 Nagarjuna, later in the second century AD, uses a clearly He shatters, for example, the concept of kalpana,37 which is thought-out agnostic-or, as some way, nihilistic-method to defend, systematically, his extreme Buddhistic idealism32 the fundamental concept for Dignaga's definition of perception. (H Jacobi seeks to compare it with the spontaneity of under- and its problems. He can, in a certain way, base himself on the Buddha who withheld from his students some apparently very standing according to Kant.) Dignaga advances the view that the pure sense-knowledge should be devoid of kalpana. And deep wisdom. Nagarjuna postulates various grounds-e.g. Uddyotakara asks, what is it? Dignāga defines it as connection that all phenomena have a cause and hence are not absolutely of sense-impression with name, form, etc. 38 Uddyotakara asks, real, or that all human concepts are relative and thus are not absolutely valid-to show that everything except the Buddha but what sort of a thing can then be cited as standing for the

(equated to Nirvana) is empty Nirväna is the only reality which, name 'sense-perception'? Is it sense-perception? But then, it

however, lies beyond all concepts and possibilities of know- should indeed be cited with the name. Is it something other

ledge. Nagarjuna next asks himself as to with what justice he, than sense-perception? But then, the word sense-perception loses all import. The opponent could reply that by the word being an extreme sceptic of this type, is at all entitled to discuss. 33 He denies the reality of an opponent and of his teachings, and sense-perception the form of perception, but not the indi-

thus virtually disavows the teachings of the Buddha. He does vidual perceptions themselves, are cited But is the form diffe- rent from the individual products, or not? If it is different, the not believe in proofs and thus does not, in fact, even seek to word sense-perception does not refer to the individual sense- prove his nihilism itself. In particular, he turns himself against the validity of the instruments of knowledge with the statement perceptions; if it is not different, then the form is the same as the individual product of sense-perception And then this would that these do not hold good in 'the three times', neither before be connected with the word; which should not be, according nor after nor as simultaneous with its object; and that one has the necessity of finding a proof for every proof and another to Dignaga's definition. Dignaga naturally means it to be

proof for it again, and thus come to an infinite regress. Further, otherwise, namely that the perception of a colour which in

the knowledge of a piece of cloth is inexact; more exact is the reality is something unique is not to be connected with the

knowledge of the threads, etc., and this ad infinitum. general name 'blue', etc , without its concept overlapping the

Against him, the Nyāya-sūtra advances very solid arguments. 34 pure sense-perception. Uddyotakara, perhaps, knows this

Nāgarjuna's line of argument is later advanced further by But he advances here a sophistry which is later similarly used

Buddhapälita (Prasangika-Madhyamika) in the fifth century AD. by Jayarāśi, though not, of course, with regard to a similar

In the middle of the sixth century AD, Bhāvaviveka (Svātantrika- problem.

Mādhyamika) opposes him inside the school of Nāgārjuna. Dharmakīrti opposes Uddyotakara in the seventh century.

But Candrakīrti, in the seventh century, seeks to follow Bud- Against Dharmakīrti and philosophers of other tendencies,

dhapälita's method of agnosticism, the method to drive all however, fights our Jayaräsi Bhatta in the same manner as that of Uddyotakara, Buddhapālita, etc. opponents to absurdity, without advancing any proof to justify Jayarāśi39 asks Dharmakīrti, e.g., what he means by kalpanā. Is

514 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA it: (i) the knowledge which is produced through the specialities as ON THE TATIVOPAPIAVASIMHA 515

attributes, motions, generalities, etc? (ii) Or, a knowledge continuous moments following onc another. Dharmottara which produces memory? (iii) Or, has kalpana the form of believes, indeed, in the momentariness of all appearances memory? (iv) Or, is it to be produced through memory? (v) Or, Thereby, the age of our author is known to be as somewhere is it the manifestation40) of the connection of the pure sense- near the cighth century AD. A Buddhalogist can, perhaps, arrive impression with a sign? Somewhat fully, he repeats the fifth41 at more definite conclusions with the help of Tibetan and after he shatters the first four alternatives. Is kalpanā a knowledge Chinese texts. Thus he belongs to the same century as the which has the appearance42 of connection of sense-impression Buddhist Sāntaraksita (a commentator of Dharmakīrti)46 with a sign? This connection can be either real or unreal. In the whose argumentation against the contentions of Nyāya- first case, it will not be kalpana, i e. no fiction. On the other Vaiścşika, Mīmāmsā, Sāmkhya, the Jainas and the Upanișads hand, this real connection would be as valid as the knowledge on the topic of the eternal soul47 are similar to those of our of a colour, etc. In the second case, the question is: how, then, author, and are directed against the same schools, though can the knowledge appear in this form? Jayaraśi continues Jayarasi turns against the proofs of a soul while Sāntarakșita, with similar hair-splittings through six further alternative against the idea of the soul itself. In any case, it is comparable explanations of the concept kalpana. The fifth, which has just that Jayarasi, in his refutation of the idea of soul of the been dealt with, corresponds, however, to a certain extent, with Nyāya-Vaisésika, does not recognize the inherence of know- the definition which Dharmakīrti himself offers: kalpanā is a ledge, feeling, etc., as attributes of the soul, and asks whether definite knowledge as a 'mental reflex', 43 which is able to become the connection of the soul with these so-called attributes could connected44 with a sign. In a sensible debate, Jayarasi would have not be understood as the causa materialis and its product. 48 San- cited this definition of his opponent word for word, and then taraksita discusses the same possibility.49 In the refutation of refuted it. It is not clear whether he himself thinks out the ten the Upanisadic teachings of atman which is the eternal bliss, other alternative explanations of kalpana in order to refute them, Jayarāśi, emphasizes the possibility of the atman to be free and or whether he quotes them from other Buddhistic writings. mature also in samsara, so that the strivings for liberation are Some of Jayarasi's viewpoints find place in Dharmottara's unnecessary.50) Sāntarakșita51 argues, in fact, on similar lines. commentary on Dharmakīrti. If Jayarasi mentions in the dis- However, the dependence of one author on the other cannot cussion of the criterion of practice that the water attained thereby be proved. and the definite chronological relation through activity cannot be the water of the moment of past between the two is yet obscure. knowledge, but that the right knowledge makes us attain water Samkara, who cares little for theories of knowledge but in the same time and place, then Dharmottara certainly makes sometimes attacks the Vaisesika concepts in somewhat the a pretext of the same sort. If the opponent gives in that one same way as Santaraksita,52 belongs to about AD 800 The attains the object of a definite place and form45 but not of definite agnostic and often the elaborately meaningless method of time, Dharmottara allows it to a certain extent. The times of Jayarāśi and his predecessors-specially Nāgārjuna-is basically the knowledge and the attainment are different. But nonetheless, established by Śrīlarsa, a follower of Samkara, in his volumi- one attains the same object which one has known for a definite nous work Khandanakhandakhādya,53 about AD 1150 Like time, because one sees, indeed, the want of difference, and Jayarāsi, he too attacks all the important definitions of his time knows therefrom that it is one and the same in the chain of the and turns himself specially against Nyaya 54 He argues, e.g., thus: that everyone meets, sometimes, something camouflaged

516 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA ON THE TAIIVOPAPIAVASIMHA 517

which he cannot see, and yct rightly recognizes it, or blunders 4. cf Vaiseşika-sūtra iv. 2.1: tat punah prthivyādikāryadravyam trividham into a right conclusion; that one cannot thus define knowledge as śarīren driyavișayasamjnakam .. the product of valid perception or inference 55 Jayarasi uses a 5 This passage is explained by Sukhlalji, p xii, in a different way The similar argument, among others, in his denial of the criterion matter is not reflected in the materialistic philosophy, but Brhaspati 'is

of practice.56 Not only the Barhaspatya Jayarāsi, but also the merely reflecting in his statement the belief of the people. ' I take it that Brhaspati's teachings reflect the matter without analysing it philosophi- famous Buddhist and Brahmanic Vedantic idealists, have inci- cally. This materialism of Brhaspati thus represents natural science, dentally thus practised agnosticism of this type which is wanting in India and which reflects the matter, while the In this way, a definite sophistic-agnostic-antiphilosophic materialistic philosophy of its teaching is an abstract of the natural tradition comes down through more than a thousand years sciences

and our author is to be placed as belonging to this trend to certain 6. But Sukhlalji has commented on this in p. iii that Srīharsa called the fol-

extent; but the difference of his argumentation, in several lowers of Brhaspati Carvakas who did not recognize any instrument of knowledge, and thus they agree with Madhyamikas and Samkara. On instances, is also to be noted. Jayarāśi Bhatta specially invents for this similarity we shall return later. himself a bagful of points of opposition and hair-splittings, 7 Jayaraśi as in note 1 but he lets alone the basically established idea of the general 8. Ib. p. 1 relativity of all concepts of Nagarjuna and his school and the 9 cf Sukhlalji p. xii -- Jayarāśi p. 125, line 15, emphasizes that he has general argumentation against the concept of instruments of composed his book for the attainment of a great purpose. Is this 'purpose"

knowledge. 57 He declares with pride at the end of his work that which is twice mentioned, the artha of the Arthasāstra? 10 Ib p 125, line 11f his arguments have not come under the purview of Brhaspati. 58 11 Nyāyavārttikam, ed. Chowkhamba Sans. Series, p. 3, line 13ff. As Jayarāśi's agnosticism does not hold good philosophically, so 12. Jayarāśi, p. 3, line 9ff is his claim of originality unfounded and the sign of pettiness. 13 But Jayaraśi in p 7, line 12 ff rejects the concept of samavāya. Accordingly, Jayarasi Bhatta does not play a famous role in the 14 Jayarāśi refers back here to p. 2, line 5ff.

history of Indian philosophy and it is also a fact that only a 15. cf Nyaya-bhasya i 1 4: the water of a mirage leads us astray 16 See Dharmottara, 4 8 ff; 12 16ff. single manuscript of his writing is preserved. The references 17 Similarly, in Sriharsa, see note 56 Cf. S N Dasgupta, History of Indian to it are also rare. Had his writing been materialistic, it would Philosophy, Vol ii, Cambridge, 1932, p. 133 certainly not have been preserved Thus we have, indeed, no 18 antyadravya; cf the definition in Nyāyakośa epistemological materialistic writing of the ancient Indians at 19 See Jayarāśi, p. 5, lines 11-16.

all. . 20 The tuft of hair is an old topic since Nyāyasütram iv. 2 13 cf. E. Fraüwall- ner. Die Philosophie des Buddhismus, Berlin, 1956, p. 360ff, on the per-

NOTES ception of the 'whole' in the teaching of Vasubandhu 21. Jayarāsí, p. 52, line 15ff 22 cf Vaisesikasūtram, iv. 1 6 on the dimension etc of objects. 1 Tattvopaplavasimha of Jayarāśi Bhatta, ed. Pandit Sukhlalji Sanghvi and 23 cf. Jayarāsí, p 56, line 20ff. Prof Rasiklal C Parikh, B A. (Hon). Baroda 1940. (Gaekwad Oriental 24. The illusionism of the Vedanta was in those days certainly not yet for- Series, Ixxxvii), p. xi. f. mulated very clearly 2. Ib. p. xii 25 cf. Fraüwallner, op cit p 329f, 371f .. 396ff: 3 cf. the similarly formulated first sūtra of the Vaiseșikas: athāto dharmam 26. W Ruben, The Beginning of the Epic Samkhya, 'Annals of the Bhandarkar vyākhyāsyāmah. Oriental Research Institute, vol. xxxvii, 1957, p 174ff

518 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYATA ON THE TATIVOPAPIAVASIMHA 519 27 cf J. Dahlmann, Das Mahabharata als Epos und Rechtsbuch, Berlin, 1895, p. 216ff. 55 Dasgupta, op cit., ii 133: one guesses, e.g rightly, what another conceals

28. Nyāyasūtram, i.2 3.cf. Caraka, Vimăna, 8.28; Dasgupta, op cit. I. 302. in his hand, or rightly infers from fog (instead of smoke) the fire, which

29. Nyāyasūtram, iv. 2.48. is behind a hill (which is only incidentally there).

30. Mbh ed Sukthankar, 1955. 56. See note 17.

31. W. Ruben, Geschichte der Indischen Philosophie, Berlin, 1954, p. 107. 57. A few are used when Jayarasi in p. 2ff deals with the concept of avyabhicari

32. Ibid p. 228ff. in the Nyāyasūtram.

33 Ibid. p. 230. 58. Jayarāśi, p. 125, line 13.

34 Ibid p 230ff. 35 cf. Th. Stcherbatsky, The Conception of Buddhist Nirvāna, Leningrad, 1927, p. 87ff; Dasgupta, op cit .: II. p. 164; Fraüwallner, op cit. p. 221ff. 36 On Uddyotakara, cf. Ruben, op.cit. p 252ff-according to Fraüwallner, Dignäga lived between AD 480-540: op. cit. p. 390 37. Nyāyavārttika 41ff 38 Pramānasamuccaya, ed. H R Rangaswamy Iyengar, Mysore 1930, p. 15 39. Jayarāsi p .32, line 5ff; see Uddyotakara in note 37. 40 nirbhāsa. 41 Jayarāsi p 33, line 20 2 pratibhāsa, cf. pratibhāta in Jayarāśi p. 3, line 17 etc. 43. pratibhāsa 44. Nyāyabindu, ed. Stcherbatsky, Leningrad, 1918, i 5; the above translation follows freely that of Stcherbatsky (Buddhist Logic ii, p. 19). Jayarasi has expunged 'yogya' and has not equated pratibhāsa and pratīti, if Sukhlalji expresses rightly; he has not noticed the similarity with Nyāyabindu. 45 Nyāyabinduțīkā 4 8ff; Stcherbatsky (op. cit. ii.9) has, however, translated prāpaya as 'distinctly cognized' and thereby follows the Nyāyabindutīkā 12 16ff He does not know Jayarāsi, who interprets prāpaya in our sense, inasmuch as Dharmottara does from 3 5, where he deals with arthakriyā in the sense of loka. 46. Fraüwallner, op cit., p. 255 47. cf Dasgupta, op cit., ii, 178ff on this polemic In it one argument against the Jainas is lacking. 48. Jayarāśi p. 74, line 21. 9 Tattvasamgraha, ed. E. Krishnamacharya, Baroda, 1926, verse 191 50 Jayarāi p. 81, line 15ff. 51. Tattvasamgraha, verse 330ff. 52 Dasgupta, op.cir., ii 189ff. 53. Ib, ii. 133; see note 6. 54 Ib. ii. 127, 133, etc .; Vedānta and Nyāya were the chief antagonists in Indian feudalism.

ON THE TATIVOPAPLAVASIMHA 52 into uncertainty about everything whatsoever, and that would

K. K. Dixit mean tattvopaplava. So according to Jayarāśi, the doctrine of tattvopaplava should at least mean the doctrine that everything On the special request of the editors of Indian Studies is unreal and that we have no certain knowledge about anything Past & Present, Calcutta, K. K. Dixit makes here (Vol. iv,

Jayarāśi pp 98-104) a critical analysis of the ideological affiliation of whatsoever. Now, nobody has ever attributed this doctrine to the Carvakas, who are invariably treated as philosophers maintaining that everything is made up of four physical ele-

The Ideological Affiliation of ments, viz. earth, water, fire and air, and that perception is the

Jayarāśi-The Author of sole (at least basic) means of valid knowledge. In a nutshell we

'Tattvopapalavasimba' can say that the doctrine of tattvopaplava is equivalent to absolute skepticism, while the doctrine upheld by the Cārvākas is

K. K. DIXII equivalent to materialism. And certainly, nobody can be a materialist and an absolute skeptic at one and the same time.

Jayarāśi, the author of Tattvopaplavasimha, is usually charac- As a matter of fact, even in the case of Jayarasi-the self-pro-

terized as a follower of Brhaspati, that is to say, an adherent of claimed advocate of tattvopaplava-it has never been argued

the Carvaka school. But the characterization is not quite apt, that he was a materialist; what is instead suggested is that he

even if there is no gainsaying that in relation to the Cārvāka was an adherent of the Carvaka school. Now the possibility

school, Jayaraśi stands in a unique position. As is suggested by (like any other which is not logically absurd) is not absolutely

the title of his available text, Jayarasi meant to uphold the ruled out that there were persons who claimed to be adherents

doctrine of tattvopaplava and the crucial questions are whether of the Cärväka school and yet advocated the doctrine of tattvo-

this doctrine can be treated as a variety of Cārvāka philosophy paplava, but we are not, for the present, concerned with the

and whether Jayarasi so treated it. To us it appears that both general possibility. The question is whether Jayarāsi is such

these questions ought to be answered in the negative, and here a person

are our reasons. The fact that Jayarasi, who is so harsh on the Naiyāyikas,

Tattvopaplava is not a standard phrase of Indian philosophy the Mimamsakas, the Buddhists, the Jainas and others, is so

and so we should first try to determine its meaning. Fortu- friendly in his references to Brhaspati, tends to prove that the

nately, here Jayaräsi himself comes to our help; for in the body illustrious iconoclast was a Brhaspatiite. In fact, however,.

of his text he has used the phrase twice. The first occurrence is Jayarāśi nowhere quotes Brhaspati in support of the doctrine

where Jayarasi is saying to an adversary that if the latter adopts of tattvopaplava, but always in support of certain materialist

a particular position, there arises the contingency of everything positions. The opening section of Jayarasi's text might appear

being unreal, and from it follows tattvopaplava. The second to be the only exception in this connection, for here the author

occurrence is where he is, in effect, saying to the same adversary seems to be putting a nihilistic interpretation upon a famous

(though in another connection) that if our knowledge of exis- (and fundamental) aphorism of Brhaspati. Unfortunately, the

tence is no guarantee of actual existence and our knowledge of full text of this opening section has not come down to us, and

absence no guarantee of actual absence, we would be plunged so we cannot be absolutely certain as to the context in which the interpretation in question is being offered. But the testimony

522 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA ON THE IAITVOPAPLAVASIMHA 523 of the entire text will very strongly suggest that Jayarasi is here offering not an interpretation of Brhaspati but an explanation nor Jaina orthodoxy could own this anarchist. Certainly, only

of his own friendly attitude towards this arch-heretic. That is one outside the pale of these various orthodoxies could be bold

to say, when Jayarasi seems to be saying that the real meaning enough to say: 'This difficulty should not be urged against our

of Brhaspati's aphorism under consideration is something objections, because we do not posit moksa' On the positive

nihilistic, he is actually saying that he (i e. Jayarāśi-not Brhas- side Jayarāśi seems to have been some kind of worshipper of

pati) takes this aphorism to mean something nihilistic; (let us, commonsense, an attitude which might explain-at least to

however, admit that the former is the more natural meaning of some extent-his antipathy towards the ivory-tower philoso-

Jayarāsi's words left intact). A more straightforward course phies of the scholarly world, as also his sympathy for Brhaspati's

for Jayaräśi would have been to say that all philosophical posi- 'philosophy of the people'. Thus, while the professional

tions are more or less nonsensical, but that Brhaspati's position is schools of Indian philosophy unite in condemning the materialist

least so (as a matter of fact, this is Jayarasi's actual stand) Why for his alleged lack of sophistication, Jayarāsi condemns these

Jayarāśi-who is otherwise so outspoken -- here adopts a round- schools for their very sophistication and praises the materialist

about course, is intriguing. But one thing is certain. Jayarāsi is for his alleged comparative immunity therefrom

too independent a personality to be a mere follower of any The non-materialist schools of Indian philosophy divide

school-not even of Brhaspati's school, towards which his their investigations into two sets, one dealing with the problems

attitude is that of most sincere friendliness. of epistemology and logic, and the other with that of ontology

The question why the pro-Brhaspati Jayarasi should feel In the former set the usual problems are those pertaining to the

inclined to criticize all philosophical positions whatsoever is as definition and classification of valid knowledge (and of its

difficult to answer as the question why the orthodox Vacas- means), in the latter, those pertaining to the definition and

patimiśra should feel inclined to defend the mutually conflicting classification of reality Jayarāsi's declared aim is to critically

schools of Nyaya, Sānkhya, Yoga, Mīmāmsā and Vedānta. In examine the epistemological and logical findings of the non-

both cases, we will have to depend largely on conjectures, and materialist philosophers, but he so develops his argument that

to us it appears that both are results of a certain independence a good number of their ontological doctrines too come in for

of mind of the authors in question. Such independence of mind animadversion at his hands Thus he proposes to examine the

was rare in medieval India, and the type represented by Jayarāśi Mīmāmsa and Buddhist accounts of prama or valid knowledge

rarer still. Not that there had been no philosophers who would in general; the Nyāya, Buddhist, Mīmāmsā and Sānkhya

criticize everybody with a view to drawing nihilistic conclu- accounts of pratyaksa; the Nyaya and Buddhist accounts of

sions, for this is actually what all Sūnyavādins and Advaita anumāna; the Nyāya and Mīmāmsā accounts of upamāna; the

Vedāntins did. But Sūnyavādins were a recognized sect of Nyāya, Mīmāmsā, Buddhist-cum-Vaiśeşika and Vaiyākarana

Buddhism, while Advaita Vedantins a recognized sect of accounts of sábda; the Mimamsa account of arthāpatti and abhāva;

Brahmanism, and so their nihilistic philosophy was subservient and the account of sambhava and aitihya offered by those who

to whatever positive theology they chose to preach. This treat them as additional means of valid knowledge. But in the

was not the case with Jayarāsi, whose polemics against the course of his examination of the non-materialist philosophers'

Brahmanical, Buddhist as well as Jaina philosophers should treatment of these epistemological and logical topics, Jayarāśi

leave one in no doubt that neither Brahmanical nor Buddhist also finds occasion to examine the Nyāya and Mīmāmsā argu- ments in support of the existence of 'universals'; the Nyāya,

524 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA ON THE TATTVOPAPLAVASIMHA 525

Mīmāmsā, Jaina, Sankhya and Vedānta(?) theories of soul; and rasi's stand vis-a-vis the rather moderate form of spiritualism- the Buddhist arguments against the existence of a composite a form rejected by him in favour of Brhaspati's uncompromising body over and above its constituent-parts, against the existence of a thing for more than one moment, against the existence of materialism. But Jayarasi also takes note of that extravagant form of spiritualism-better called 'idealism' and better still, the external world. 'illusionism'-according to which the physical world is an Now"certain interesting and important conclusions emerge illusory show, whose underlying reality is consciousness By even from a cursory perusal of these issues as raised by the time of Jayarasi, illusionism had been vigorously preached Jayarāśi. The most noteworthy point is that Jayarāsi nowhere criticizes a view that was upheld by the materialists alone: An by certain sections of Buddhists and an array of pro-illusionist

examination of Brhaspati's account of perception-an account arguments had appeared in the writings of Buddhist logicians

which must have been significantly different from those of his whose inclination towards this trend was more or less pro- nounced While refuting illusionism, Jayarāśi directs his rivals-is conspicuous by its absence In all probability Jayarāśi does not mean to suggest that Brhaspati too, like himself, denies attacks against these Buddhists-particularly the logicians

the possibility of perception as a means of valid knowledge (an among them-but his arguments are equally valid against illusionism as preached by certain sections of Vedāntins, to be exceptional case will be considered below); but he deems it impolitic to enter into controversy with a philosopher whom more precise, against Advaita Vedäntic illusionism, the wide-

he almost venerates .. This presumption is amply strengthened spread propagation of which seems to have been a post-Jayaräśi phenomenon. when we have a look at the analogous attitude adopted by Interestingly, however, Jayarasi has refuted a view accord- Jayaraśi towards Brhaspati's fundamental ontological thesis Thus, even after having expressed, at the very beginning ofhis ing to which the soul is essentially and really of the nature of bliss, and is also cognizant of itself, but that its blissful nature is enquiry, his misgiving concerning the materialist thesis that obscured owing to a beginningless dirt accumulated thereupon; everything is made up of four physical elements, Jayarāsi this view, though unidentifiable as it stands, has obvious criticizes it nowhere in the whole course of this considerably potentialities of developing into full-fledged Advaita Vedānta- comprehensive enquiry .. On the other hand, he never misses whose most conspicuous, if not sole significant, difference an opportunity to pass critical comments on the one most from Buddhist illusionism lies in its characterizing the ultimate fundamental doctrine that unites the non-materialist philoso- reality not only as consciousness pure and simple, but also phers against materialism -- that is, on the doctrine that con- as soul. sciousness is not a product of physical elements. This doctrine Then, Jayaräsi has refuted the Buddhist criticism of the is most glaringly upheld by those who posit a soul independent of the body; but it is no less emphatically endorsed by the Nyāya-Vaiśeșika doctrine that a composite body is something over and above its constituent parts, and he also refutes the Buddhists who deny the existence of soul. Jayarāsi polemizes famous Buddhist doctrine of momentarism. In the eyes of a against the non-Buddhist as well as Buddhist versions of the good number of Buddhist logicians, these positions of theirs doctrine and is proud to proclaim that in the controversy in criticized by Jayarāśi were subservient to illusionism which ................ .. question, Brhaspati stands on his side (this is in striking contrast was their fundamental world-outlook, and it is as such that to the usual attitude of Jayarasi who never quotes an authority they are criticized by Jayarasi. But it is obvious that these posi- .......................... .................. by way of strengthening his position). This much about Jaya- tions-which are dialectics (as understood by Hegel and Marx)

526 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYAIA ON THE IAIIVOPAPLAVASIMHA :527

in embryo-can be defended even without subscribing to introducing it, Jayarasi says that it has been made under the illusionism, and a section of Buddhist logicians did actually conviction that perception is an impossibility. Now the fact defend them without subscribing to illusionism. However, that Jayarasi quotes with approval none but Brhaspati, and Jayaraśi's attitude towards the positions in question renders the fact that the argument in question against the possibility of one presumption fairly valid: in Brhaspati's school they were- inference is attributed to Brhaspati-ites also by certain other either ignored or criticized. And this, in turn, would bring to philosophical texts, will lend support to the presumption that light an important truth about our philosophical heritage: those Jayaräsi is here speaking of Brhaspati's attitude towards per- among our ancient philosophers who advocated materialism ception and inference. But no evidence-supplied either by failed to appreciate the elements of dialectics discovered in Jayarāśi or by the tradition-is forthcoming to prove that other quarters, just as the discoverers of these elements of Indian materialists denied the possibility of perception On the dialectics were blind to the truth inherent in materialism. contrary, the tradition frequently tells us that with the materia- Lastly, we notice Jayarāśi's positively deplorable stand on the lists, perception is the sole means of valid knowledge .. Jayarāsi's question of 'universals', for at one place he criticizes the oft-repeated argument against the possibility of inference is Nyāya-Vaiśeșika doctrine of universals and at another place, that if the probandum is some such thing whose concomitance the Buddhist refutation of this doctrine. So far as his treatment with the probans was earlier perceived the inference is need- of ontological topics is concerned, this is perhaps the only place less; while if it is some such thing whose concomitance with where Jayarāsi comes out as a tattvopaplavavādin in true colours; the probans was not earlier perceived the inference is impossible. this is, perhaps, also the only place where it would be difficult As a matter of fact, in an inference the probans and probandum for him to avoid coming in conflict with Brhaspati's are two characters that have been observed earlier and known materialism. For whatever else the universals (as conceived by to go together, but are now occurring in new set-up-so that the Nyāya-Vaisesika and Mīmāmsā philosophers) might or the probandum is neither something entirely old, nor something might not be, they were certainly non-physical entities, which entirely new. As hinted just before, this argument against the means that their existence was bound to be repudiated by a possibility of inference has been attributed to the materialists also materialist. In fairness, let it be noted that while arguing by certain other philosophical texts; but in all probability this is a against the Buddhist, Jayarāsi makes a feeble attempt to steer result of caricaturing the authentic materialist position that the clear of both the Buddhist and Nyāya-Vaisesika positions. only existing entities are perceivable entities. For it is easy to Jayarāi's stand on epistemological and logical problems is a twist this position into the form that the only existing entities matter for much more serious concern. In one word we can are entities that are being perceived-from which might, possi- say that it is unfair to both his materialist friends and his non- bly, be drawn the conclusion that perception is the only means materialist adversaries. Jayarási makes no explicit mention of of valid knowledge and that inference is no means of valid Brhaspati's view on these matters, but at least one passage knowledge; (this is how Udayanācarya has actually made his would suggest that he treats the latter as a denier not only of Cārvāka philosopher argue). However, even the tradition inference, but of perception as well. For here we find quoted grants that the position adopted by a section of Cārvākas was with approval somebody's statement to the effect that 'it is that not all inference whatsoever, but all inference concerning impossible to grasp the relation of invariable concomitance the alleged non-perceivable entities is invalid; that this was the (which is why inference is an impossibility),' and by way of position adopted by all Carvakas is a fair presumption.

528 CĀRVĀKA / LOKĀYATA ON THE IATIVOPAPLAVASIMHA 529 For as Udayanācārya's performance teaches us, a defence of reality; that practice is the criterion for testing the validity of a the validity of perception coupled with an all-out attack on the piece of knowledge; that perceptual knowledge is knowledge validity of inference can be undertaken only by a solipsist, and born of sense-object contact; that invariable concomitance bet- certainly the Carvakas were no solipsists-just as they were no ween probans and probandum ensures the validity of a piece of absolute skeptics. In any case, Jayarasi's presentation of his inferential knowledge; that all (worthwhile) cases of mnvariable own absolutely skeptic stand should not mislead us into thinking concomitance derive their validity from some causal relation- that this was the Carvaka stand, just as the anti-materialist ship or other; that an uttered sentence enables us to infer the philosophers' occasional misrepresentation of the Cārvāka intention of the speaker concerned, while it is a source of valid stand should not mislead us into thinking that this was a solipsist knowledge in case the speaker is an authority on what he is stand. As a matter of fact, any epistemological doctrine (for speaking about; etc. that matter, any doctrine whatsoever) whose acceptance is It is true that the various logicians' endorsements of the incompatible with faith in materialism, should not be attributed theses in question were more or less enthusiastic and valid, but to the Carvakas. To the extent that Jayarasi insinuates that his that is another matter and nothing justifies the way Jayarasi absolute skepticism on the questions of epistemology is shared makes short shrift of these most positive fruits of the logical by Brhaspati, he is being unjust to this redoubtable materialist. endeavours of his predecessors. That Jayarāśi is a competent In relation to his non-materialist adversaries, Jayarāsi's student of the systems of logic he chooses to scrutinize is beyond unfairness is of a different kind Jayarāśi chiefly polemizes doubt; but a peculiar kind of colour-blindness either prevents against the Nyaya, Buddhist and Mīmamsa logicians, in most him from seeing the bright spots of these systems, or turns cases for their having taught doctrines that are their most pre- these bright spots into dark ones. cious contributions to the treasure-house of Indian philosophy. Why an author who has so much genuine regard for the One can appreciate-and even admire-Jayarasi's impatience materialist world-outlook should thus turn a worshipper of with these logicians, insofar as they invariably resort to illogic is worth being investigated into, and the investigator pseudo-logical devices in order to buttress spiritualism in one will have to take into account the whole range of Jayarasi's form or another, but his impatience with Logic itself is down- activities, intellectual and otherwise. Lack of historical data at right perverse. Jayarasi's constant harangue that all attempt at our disposal renders impossible such an investigation being defining valid knowledge in general, or a particular means of undertaken just now, but in any case it will be unwarranted to valid knowledge, is foredoomed to failure, can find echo no- argue that Jayarasi is a worshipper of illogic because he is a where else but in the worst nihilist quarters; and it is well-nigh materialist. For faith in materialism implies not worship of probable that Srīharsa-that arch-nihilist of Indian illogic, but rather fidelity to logic; in other words, the argument philosophy-physically drew upon the material supplied by in question is vitiated by the fallacy designated 'viruddha' in Jayarasi. We need not deny that there are cases when Jayarasi's Indian logic. To say that a Carvaka philosopher, though not a criticism (for that matter, even Srīharsa's criticism) against the materialist philosopher, might well be a worshipper of illogic, logician is valid and fair; but it is equally undeniable that such lacks the sanction ofhistory. As noted earlier, the non-materialist cases are few and far between. I hus Jayaräsi has thought fit to philosophers have often spoken of two schools of Cārvākas, take exception to the absolutely valid theses-endorsed by all one accepting the validity of inference and the other denying logicians-that valid knowledge is knowledge that is true of it. But the latter of these schools is, in all probability, these

530 CĀRVĀKA / IOKĀYAIA philosophers' own creation, the reason for which seems to be Index their failure -- or refusal-to appreciate the Carvaka thesis on the supremacy of perception as a means of valid knowledge abhāva 7; non-existence 79, 81, 324-6, 330-1, 410, 412, 445-6, However, none has misunderstood the Carvakas to the extent 170, 210, 229, 282, 291-2, 305, 450-1, 460 see also heaven, hell of attributing to them a non-materialist world-outlook-or to 331, 461-2, 467, 503, 520; paraloka (includes after)/another/ the extent of attributing to them a denial even of perception as destruction 108, 166, 171; absence other/this world, loka) 11-12, a means of valid knowledge, and consequently a denial of our 154, 170, 173, 226, 230, 234, 236, 14-15, 17-18, 20, 22, 49, 96, 110, 291, 293; negation 291-3 see also 114, 140, 156, 161-2, 167-9, 174, ever acquiring a true view of reality .. Jayarasi claims that he has dissolution 200, 209, 211, 214, 216, 221-2, been able to expose even such philosophical errors as were not Abhayadevasūri 421-2, 487, 496 248-9, 254, 258-60, 262, 264, taken into account by Brhaspati. This claim is tenable in the Abhidhamma 64 267-8, 271-2, 274-6, 279, 319, sense that Brhaspati was a very early philosopher, while Abhidhāna-padīpikā 371 321, 325-6, 331, 336, 339, 344-5, abhidheya 256-66 357-8, 365, 368, 389-90, 411-15, Jayarāśi's treatment of the topic is most up-to-date; but a more abhūtivāda 447 421, 428, 442, 476, 479, 481, honest (though presumptuous) claim on Jayarasi's part would absence see abhāva Ācārya Sūri 231, 483-4, 506, 524 have been that he has been able to expose such philosophical 233 adharma see action (adharma) errors as could make even Brhaspati their victim! accident see yadrccha action 64, 68- adhiccasamuppannavāda 447 9, 92, 94-5, 234, 262, 272, 275-6, adrsta see action (adrsta) advaita 82, 290, 389, 391-2, 408, 420, 432, 234, 246, 491, 498, 522, 525 434, 467, 479, 481-3; dharma 7, Advaita-brahma-siddhi 421 92, 95, 157; rebirth (including agama see Veda; verbal testimony birth, dead body, death, another/ agent 94-5, 97, 101-4, 113, 226, other/previous life) 8, 10-22, 31- 234, 245, 278, 301-303, 309, 408; 2, 49, 60-2, 94, 96, 99, 102, 111, see also self 113-14, 122-3, 127, 157, 163, agnosticism 394, 431, 510, 512, 516 165-6, 186, 189, 192, 199, 212-14, ahetuvāda 447 216-17, 220-1, 248, 261-2, 265, aitilrya 503, 523 278-9, 285-6, 289, 309, 318, 320, Ajātasattu 33, 66 324-5, 330, 343, 370, 378, 410, Ajita-késakambalin 32, 378, 387, 412-14, 420, 437, 468, 474, 477, 396-7, 413-14, 479 480, 483-4; karma 8, 10, 47, 68; ākasmikattavāda 447 fruition 10-12, 14-22, 213; akhyāti 317 adharma (includes demerit) 74-5, Akșapada see Kanāda 92, 111, 127, 258, 267, 269, 273; ālayavijñāna 196 see also cognition; desire and aversion 87-90, 93; consciousness vice (includes păpa) 95, 259, 266- 9, 275, 350, 468; virtue (includes Amalānanda 449 Ambattha 37 puņya) 95, 259, 266-9, 271, 275, anekānta 307, 310 366, 380, 468; dharma (includes Aiguttara-nikāya 9, 40 -- 1, 65-7 merit) 111, 127, 258, 260, 267, aniyama 89-90 269, 273, 276, 354, 382, 460-1, anumāna see inference 479; adrșta (includes unseen) 156, 158, 244, 253, 257, 274-5, 318-19, anupākhyotpādavāda 447 anvaya see inference

532 INDEX INDEX 533

(concommitance) Bhamati 392; selected translation false knowledge to the daityas 6-7, Cānakya see Kauțilya

apta see verbal testimony 240-6 481; his doctrine 248-9, 253-4, Candidāsa 426

Arhat 36-7, 39-41, 51, 57, 65, 68, Bhartrhari 503 267-78, 347, 351-3, 433, 504; Prof: Candragomin 342

72, 164, 200-1, 380, 451-2 see Bhāsarvajna 141 Wilson's interpretation of the Candrakīrti 386, 512

also Buddhism; Jainism Bhattacharyya, Ananta Kumar. Vișņu Purāna 353; quoted by Candraprabha Sūri 496

arthapatti 282, 293, 503 Cārvāka daršana: translation 452- Gunaratna 379; Older than caravan, similie of see similie (of

Arthaśāstra 154, 380, 384, 390, 424, 73 Kauțilya 381-2; father of Indian caravan)

475, 494, 517; translation of its 1st Bhattacharyya, Chiranjib 427 materialism (i.e. Cārvāka/ Cārvāka 3, 33, 75, 79-82, 111, 113,

chapter 73-5 Bhavabhūti 423 Lokāyata) 386-7, 390, 393, 396-7, 115, 124, 147, 154-5, 156-7, 187,

arūpa-vimokkhas 64 Bhāvaviveka 512 418-19, 427-8, 430, 435, 453, 481, 246-8, 251, 254, 258, 263-7, 269,

Aryadeva 386 bhiksu 52-4, 56-8, 71; mendicant 494, 499, 517; the word 'darśana, 273-6, 278, 284-5, 298, 304, 315,

Āryasūra 390 34, 37, 39, 41; recluse 41, 52-3, introduced by his school 399; 326, 343, 345-7, 355, 358-60,

āsavas 72 57-60, 62-3, 66, 71 philosophical significance of his 365-6, 369, 373, 377-9, 384-7,

asiddha see fallacy (asiddha) bhūmis 71 doctrines 400-4, 410, 414, 455, 392, 396-7, 413, 415-19, 421-2,

asuras see daityas bhūta see matter 506-7, 511, 517, 524, 527-8; his 429-31, 435-6, 443-4, 449, 452-9,

athcism 364, 375, 388 see also bhūtacaitanyavāda 85, 87-91, 93, wife and Indra 417; as Synonymn 461-3, 465-72, 481, 486, 491-5,

nāstika 125, 456, 457 of Cāru 429; followed by Jayarāśi 497, 501, 517, 520-1, 527-9, 530

ätman see Self (ätman) birth see action (rebirth) Bhatta 431, 502, 516, 520-3, 525- see also Lokāyata

Ātmatattvaviveka 141, 149 Bodas 75 8,530 Cārvāka darśana: translation 452-73

ātmavādins 295 Bodhicaryāvatāra 388 Brhaspati-sūtra 355, 365, 380-4, causation 133-4, 148, 262; causal

atoms 86-90, 92, 101, 119-20, 152, body 3, 12, 14, 20, 22, 56, 58-9, 61, 386-7 relation 84, 225-6, 458, 465-6;

174-5, 188, 280, 406, 409, 419, 64, 70, 93-5, 97-9, 102-7, 109, Buddhaghosa 64, 67-72, 371 effect 85, 98, 102, 113, 126, 151,

466-7, 506; pākaja 119; pilu-pāka 111-28, 158-9, 162, 164, 166, Buddhapālita 512-13 162, 168, 172-3, 176-7, 180, 182,

119 171, 173-6, 178-80, 182-3, 193- Buddhism 8-9, 32-4, 37-9, 41-2, 195, 227-8, 257, 307, 447-8, 450;

aversion and decision see action 9, 202-3, 205, 207, 209-11, 216, 65-7, 71-2, 115-17, 148, 153, 159- cause 85, 91, 98-9, 102, 113,

avidyā 429; see also illusion; Māyā 234-46, 250, 254, 261-3, 266, 60, 165, 193, 200-1, 214, 257, 276, 126, 162, 168-75, 176-9, 187,

awareness 300-1, 319-21, 323-4, 271-4, 286-90, 293, 300-6, 308- 313, 361-3, 367, 369-70, 378-80, 189-90, 192, 194-6, 224-33, 244,

328, 332, 342, 347, 467 11, 317, 319-27, 330-3, 344, 365, 382-3, 385, 389-90, 394, 412-14, 253, 257, 276, 286-7, 289-90, 294,

370, 374, 378, 383, 392, 396-7, 419, 421-3, 425, 427, 431, 434, 306-8, 312, 322-4, 326, 330, 333,

bādhita see fallacy (bādhita) 406-10, 412, 419, 421, 426-7, 433, 444, 449, 452, 476, 478, 482, 502- 402, 405, 431, 442-50, 458, 474

Ballantyne 256 436-9, 446, 453-6, 463, 476-8, 3, 510-12, 514-16, 524-6, 528; Chain 165-7, 169-70, 180-2, 189-

Băna 373 481-5, 505, 508 Yogācāra 160, 363; Vijnānavāda 91, 199, 209-11

Banerjea, K M, Prof., 364, 368 Bouddhisme Indien 363 368, 510; Sūnyavāda 447, 522; Chāndogya Upanișad see Upanișads

Bārhaspatya-sütra see Brhaspati- Brahmajāla-Sutta 53 Mādhyamika 363, 517; see also Chändogya

sūtra brahman see Self (brahman) Arhat Childers 66

( The) Beginning of the Epic Sämkhya Brahmanas 355; Satapatha Taittirīyas Buddhist.Logic 518 Codana sūtra 151

517 403; Vamsa 255 (The) Buddhist Philosophy of cogniser see self (Cogniser)

Belvalkar, Prof. 397 Branmasūtra 363 Universal of Flux 147 cognition 91, 94, 96-8, 100, 106,

Beziehungen der Jaina-Literatur 24 Brahmanee, Similie of see Similie (of Burnell, A.C., Dr. 255, 363, 376 116, 134, 136, 140, 153-5, 162-5,

486 Brahmanee) Burnoruf 65, 67-8, 70-1 167-71, 173-6, 178, 180-4, 186,

Bhāgavata-purāna see Purānas Brhadaranya see Upanișads 188-99, 202, 204, 206-8, 210-14,

Bhāgavata Brhadāranyaka Caitanya 426 218, 223, 225, 232-3, 243, 287-8,

Bhagavati 373, 376 Brhaspati 154-6, 248, 247, 423 Caitanyacandrodaya 423 314, 316-17, 328, 332, 342, 437,

Bhaguri 73, 379, 386, 397-8 498; as teacher of gods propagates Cakradhara 155 439, 470-1, 507

534 INDEX INDEX 535 see also ālayavijñāna; conscious- dharma see action (dharma) ness; knowledge; viññāna Dharmakīrti 141, 145-6, 153, 513- 373, 400, 429, 443, 449-50, 452, 500; his Sad-darśana-samuccaya: Colebrooke 255, 355, 362-3 14 503, 511; jalpa 503 comparison see upamana Dharmottara 514-15, 518 feelings 215-22 translation of selected texts and

(The) Concept of Buddhist Nirvāna Dialogue on Hindu Philosophy 368 floods, deadly 62, 72 commentary 257-98 Harşacarita 373 518 Dialogues of the Buddha 8, 369-76 see also evolution

concomitance, invariable see Die Philosophie des Buddhismus 517 form 184-5, 193, 212 Hattipadopama-sutta 38

see also name heaven 8-9, 11, 59, 62, 72, 253, 259- inference Dīghanikāya 387-9 contradiction see fallacy (bādhita) Dignāga 146, 507, 513 Franke, Prof. 389 60, 266, 268-9, 271, 273, 275, 277, 295, 352, 365-6. 381, 411, 435, consciousness 86-7, 90, 92-4, 99 disgust see pratisankhyana Fraüwallner, E. 8, 517-18; his dissolution 48, 58, 60-1 see also Materialism 474-87 461, 472, 484 see also action 102, 106, 110-14, 116, 122-3, 125-8,.158-9, 161-2, 164-6, 174- abhāva; elements; evolution freedom 412-14 hedonism 388, 391, 396, 418

fruition see action (fruition) hell 272, 477, 483, 486 see also action 6, 180, 184, 186, 192-3, 197, 199- heretic 6, 353, 360-1, 373, 378, 387, 206, 208-9, 237-40, 244-5, 262-3, Dixit, K K. (The) Indeological 419, 422, 427-8, 444 266-8, 273-4, 278-80, 283-7, Affiliation of Jayarāsi 520-30 doer see agent Gadādhara 150 hetu see inference (probans) 298-300, 302-8, 311, 320-31, 344, doubt 82-4 Gahapati-vaggas 46 hetūśāstra see logic 406-9, 421, 436-9, 453-4, 482, dream see sleep Gańgeśa 84, 150 History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature 525 see also ālayavijnāna; cognition; dualism 420 Gangopadhyay, Mrinal Kanti 144, intoxication, power of; 152 361-2

knowledge; modification Gautama 10, 43, 71, 110, 141, 147, History of Buddhism 342-3

Contradiction see fallacy (viruddha) effect see cousation (effect) elements 48-9, 86-90, 92, 113-14, 154, 419, 503; his Nyāyasūtra: History of Indian Materialism 385 History of Indian Philosophy (of Cowell, E B. 247 127, 162, 171, 174, 187-9, 237-9, translation of selected text and Dasgupta) 146, 517 248, 250, 344-5, 378, 391-2, 406, translation 75-93 History of Indian Philosophy (of Dahlmann, J. 518 generality see universal gift 30-2 Fraüwallner) 474 daityas 3, 5-7, 353-4, 358-60, 387, 409, 413-14, 434, 453-4, 479, 481-2, 494, 497, 506, 521, 524, Gītā 429 History of Materialism in India 432-40 403,481 see also dissolution; evolution god 5, 8-9, 12, 15, 38, 51, 104, 140, Dānavagga 9 equanimity 58, 70 156, 158, 169-70, 192, 224, 258, idealism 198, 384-5, 392, 506, 511- daņdanīti 380, 391, 393, 413, 435 Essay on the Heretical Sects 363 267, 295, 315, 353-4, 357, 359, 13, 525 Das Mahabharata als Epos und eternality 97, 100-101, 107, 114, 361, 364, 368, 377, 380, 385, 388, (The) Ideological Affiliation of Rechtsbuch 518 152, 158, 170-1, 192, 194, 319, 391, 397, 402, 412-13, 420-1, 432, Daśakumāracarita 388 466-7 434, 441, 449, 468, 470, 474-7, Jayarāśi 520-30 illusion 169, 189, 316-17, 462-3, Dasgupta, S.N. 3, 73, 146, 517-19 evolution 60-1, 71 see also 481, 483, 486, 502, 506 Gogerly 65-9 510-11, 525-6 see also avidya; maya death see action (rebirth) dehātmavāda 110, 234 40, 258, dissolution; elements; flood, Gotama see Gautama Indra 3-7

419-20 deadly Gough, A.E 247 infants, new born see recollection inference 76-82, 85-7, 93, 96, 106-7, Dehātmavāda of Śankara 234-40 existence 79, 161, 170, 199, 201, 229-31, 291, 299, 331, 343, 520 grammatical literature and Lokāyata 111, 113, 128, 130-3, 139-41, deliberation see uha 73 143-6, 148, 150, 152-6, 235, delusion see mayamoha fallacy 79, 146, 149, 151, 256; guņa see quality

Siddhasādhanadoșa 79; vyāghāta Guņaratna 257, 266, 379-80, 383, 242-3, 248, 250-3, 260, 270-1, demerit see action (demerit) demons see daityas 393, 422, 424, 448, 450; translatior 273, 278, 280-1, 290, 302, 308, 312-17, 319-21, 328, 332, 335-6, desire and aversion seè action (desire 82-4; tarka 82, 84, 154, 256, 333, 336, 342, 392, 495; vipakșa 145; of his Tarka-rahasya-dīpika and badhita 82-3, 151; viruddha 82-4, Commentary on Saddarsane- 340, 392, 396-7, 405-6, 412, 421, and aversion) 444-5, 455-6, 458-9, 461, 470, destruction see abhāva (destruction) Dhamma-sangamani 70 151, 212, 216, 221-2, 228; asiddha Samuccaya 266-98 485, 494, 503, 506,510, 516, 523,

Dhammapada 8-9 151; sapakșa 151; sat-pratipakșa Hardy, Spence 70 526-9 151; pakşābhāsa 152; vitaņdā 371, Haribhadra Sūri 379-80, 492-4, Inscriptions de Payasi 67 intelligence 100, 102, 105, 126,

536 INDEX INDEX 537

234-5 Kalyāņa Rasika 388 intoxication, power of 240, 244, Kumārila 150-1, 364, 370, 375, Maha-tantra-sankhaya-sutta 38

263, 266, 273-4, 284, 305, 318, Kamaśīla 153, 160, 421 -- 2 Mahā-Vibhanga 65

Kāmaśāstra 379 388, 429 Kuppuswami Sastri, MM 74-5 Mahābhārata 358, 366, 368, 372-3,

320-1, 330, 378, 438, 481-2 Kambalāśvatra 396, 413 376, 378, 388, 403, 429, 449-51,

see also consciousness Kaņāda 75, 152, 251, 419 Kūțadanta-sutta 37, 369 511, 518

iśvara see god Kangle 74 Iśvarabhangakārikā 388 Mahābhāsya 397, 429 Kapalikas 6-7, 380, 382-3 lakşaņa 132 Mahāvastu 70

Iti-vuttaka 40 Kapila 362-4, 373, 420, 423-5, 427 Lakşanasāra 499, 501

karma see action Lalitavistara 390 Maitrăyaņa Upanisad see

Iyer, K.A.S. 146 Upanișads Maitrāyaņa

kartr see agent Lassen 362 Maitri Upanişad see Upanișads

Jacob 147 Kassapa 9-22, 24-30, 32, 43, 45-6 Laukāyatikas see Lokāyata Leumann, E. 486 Maitri

Jacobi 67-8, 75 67, 396,479 liberation 110, 250, 253, 258, 264- Majjhima-nikāya 38-39, 65, 67

Jaimini 420 Jainism 34, 67-8, 257, 285, 298-99, Kātyāyana 73 Katyayana, Kakuda see Kakuda 9, 275, 277, 295, 433, 489, 500, Makkhali 46, 48, 67-8

305, 307, 311, 313, 331, 364, 373, Katyayana 523; salvation 417 Mālatimādhava 423

379, 382, 388-9, 419, 422, 427, maltīșena Sūri 388, 495

Kamla sect 496 life, previous/another/after death Mānameyodaya 141

444, 452, 476, 480, 503 see also Kauțilya 379-81, 390, 393, 429, see rebirth Manibhadra. Commentary on

Arhat 435, 475, 511; translation of the logic 74-5, 392, 528-9; hetuśāstra 360, 392-3 see also nītiśāstra Saddarśana-Samuccaya 258-66;

jalpa see fallacy (jalpa) 1st chapter of his Arthaśāstra 73-5 Lohicca 38 Laghuvrtti: translation 257-66

Jātaka 68 Manu 360_364-6, 368, 388-9,

jatila, similie of see similie (of jatila) Kavikarņapūra 423 lokavyavahāra 79

the Doctrine of Svabhava 441-51 Lokāyata 3, 6, 33, 73-6, 110-11, 157, 403, 428, 444

Jāvāli 354-5, 358, 367 Kaviraj, Gopinath Likayata and materialism 161, 163, 166-8, 174,

Jayanta Bhatta 109-10, 115, 119, 161, 248, 255, 257-8, 264-5, 267,

123, 126, 141, 147, 152-3, 156-7, Kesi, 476-8 Khandakas 40 276, 342, 353, 364, 369-77, 379- 187, 195, 200-1, 214, 221, 235, 237, 345, 358, 364-5, 368-72, 378,

421-2, 436-7; selected translation Khandana-khaņda-khādya 82, 141-2, 93, 395-8, 400, 404, 406-9, 412-

494-5,515 14, 418-25, 427-9, 435, 443-6, 383-4, 386-7, 389, 391, 394, 396-

of his Nyāyamañjari 109-57 9, 402,408, 413, 418-19, 421-4,

Jayarāśi Bhatta 395, 400, 431, 502; Knower see self (knower) 449-50, 452-3, 481-4, 486-7, 429-39, 443, 474-6, 478-81, 491,

follows Brhaspati 431, 502, 516, Knowledge 65, 85-7, 89-90, 92-3, 492-4, 499-501

96, 109-10, 112, 114, 117, 122-6, Lokāyata (of H. P. Sastri) 377-83 505-7, 511, 516-17, 523-9;

520-3, 525-8, 530; Sanghavi and materialistic literature 439-40

Parikh's introduction to his Tattopaplavasimha 491-504; W 130, 132-5, 139-41, 144, 146, Lokāyata and the Doctrine of Svabhāva 441-51 Materialism (of Fraüwallner) 474

149-52, 155-7, 200, 204, 213, 229, Ruben's critique of his Tattvopla- Matsya-purāna see Purānas Matsye

236, 242, 246-8, 250-3, 256, 262- Lokāyata-sūtra 73, 167 matter 112-13, 125-6, 157-8, 163,

vasimha 505-19; Dixit critique of lotus, filament of 223, 225, 233, 244-6, 262-3, 266-8, 272-4, 279-

his Tattvopaplavasimha 520-30 3, 272-3, 278, 280-4, 287-9, 293, 295, 300, 302, 309-18, 320, 322, 401 80, 282, 284, 286-7, 289, 291, 295,

Jha, Ganganatha 93, 160 328, 332-37, 345, 347, 391, 396-7, love 426, 433-5 298-300, 302-8, 320, 322-3, 326-

Jīvaka 42-4 401, 405-6, 409, 430-1, 436-7, 8, 330-1, 408, 414, 430, 432, 437-

jnāna see knowledge 455-6, 458-64, 470-2, 481-6, 491, Mādhavācārya 343, 355, 378, 438, 450, 453, 460, 467, 474, 506-

Journal of Indian Philosophy 144 Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society 75 498, 502-4, 506-10; 512, 514-17, 422-3, 492-3; selected transla- tion of his sarva-darsana-sangraha 7, 517 see also pudgala

520-1, 523-4, 527-30 māyā 236; māyāvāda 491, 498, 500;

Kakuda Katyayana 480 Krsņa Mīśra 382, 386, 414, 422-3; 246-57 see also avidya; illusion

selected translation of his Prabodha- Madhusūdana Sarasvati 446, 450 Mādhvas 255, 429 Māyāmoha 6, 344, 346-8, 365, 367,

kāla see time Madhyamika see Buddhism 403

kālavāda 294, 391 candrodaya 344-8

kalpanā 513-14 kșaņa see tirne (moment) (Mādhyamika) memory see recollection

Kșatravidyā 390 see also nītiśāstra Maha-govinda-suttanta 9 mendicant see bhiksu

538 INDEX INDEX 539 merit see action (dharma) Milindapañha 373, 390 Arthasāstra; daņdanīti; kșatravidyā; logic; statecraft; vārtā Patimokkha 40, 65, 69 Pāyāsi, King 8-11, 13, 16, 24, 26-8, 389, 392, 431, 461, 467, 470-2. Mīmāmsā 364, 368, 370, 375, 526, 491, 494-5, 497-8, 500, 502-3 528; Mīmāmsakas 136, 150, 226, niyati 295-6 -30-1 non-existence see abhāva Pramānasamuccaya 518 388, 460, 502-3 Pāyāsi-Suttanta 8-32 Nyāya 74-5, 80-1, 89, 109, 114-15, Pramāņavārttika 141 mind 93-5, 97,98, 100-2, 104-5, penance 260, 262, 264, 269, 272, prameya 110, 155-6, 272, 318, 500 135, 138, 149-50, 162, 163-4, 169, 117, 146, 151-2, 154, 156-8, 165, 275-6,346 Prameyakamalamārtanda 298-317 176-7, 182-3, 192, 194, 202, 205- 257, 364, 386, 392, 438-9, 450, perception 79, 94, 96, 100, 102, 105-6, 111, 116-17, 134-6, 138, Praśastapāda 93, 152; his Bhāsya 6, 209, 212, 251, 327-9, 406-9, 463-7, 470, 509, 515, 518, 528; 420-1, 463, 481 Naiyāyikas 80-1, 256, 311, 502-3; 141, 143, 146, 149-51, 154-5, 157, called Padärthadharmasangraha

Misc. Essays (of Colebrooke) 355, Nyaya-Vaişeśika 122-3, 525-6 162, 171, 173, 195, 198, 209, 224, 93-109, 128, 141

228, 230-1, 233, 241-3, 248, 251- pratyabhijñā see recognition 362,364 Nyāyabhāsya 154, 507, 517 partisankhyãna 216 modifications 176-8, 208, 464-5 Nyāyabhūsana 141-2, 145, 151-3 2, 259, 268, 273, 278, 280-4, 288, Nyāyabindu 141, 145, 518 300, 312-14, 316-17, 319-21, 331, pratyaksa see perception mokșa see liberation Nyāyabindu-țīkā 152, 518 339, 345, 357, 363, 367, 389, 391- pratyakşa-lakșaņa 502 moment see time 2, 396, 399, 405-6, 421, 444, 455- presumption see arthäpatti motion 235-8, 438-9, 446, 450, 508 Nyāyakandali 93, 141, 152 Muir, J 75, 355-68 Nyāyakosa 517 6, 458, 460-3, 467, 472, 491, 494- Proceedings of the First Indian Philoso-

Muktāvalī 150 Nyāyakumudacandra 298, 317-42, Mūlamādhyamika-kārikā 386 487 5, 503, 506, 509-10, 513, 516, 521, phical Congress (1926) 384

Nyāyakusumānjali 79, 82, 158-9, 523-4, 526-8, 530 proof 229-32, 242 pudgala 305 see also matter Muller 361-2 447 pessimision 389 Pupphadanta 386 mysticism 356, 385 Nyāyamañjarī 109-57, 436 person see Self Puranas 75, 355, 431; Visnu 351-3,

Nāgārjuna 512, 515-16 Nyayaratna, Mahesa Candra 377 phlegm 219-20 355, 364, 387, 403; Bhāgavata 368; Nyāyasūtra 74-93, 110, 114, 124-5, pilu-pāka Matsya 387; Padma 404 Nāgasena 41-2 Naișadhacarita 378 127-8, 141, 146-7, 151-2, 437, pinda see body Pițhakas 34, 40 Purandara 142-3, 386, 396, 421

Naiyāyikas see Nyāya 447, 450, 507, 511-12, 517-19 pleasure 248-9, 259-62, 264-5, 271- purușa see Self (purușa)

name 211-13, 236 see also form 2, 275-6, 298, 319-20, 330-2, 345, Pūrvamīmamsā-Sūtra 236

Nārāyaņa 141 Padarthadharmasangraha Padma- 383, 396, 411, 413-15, 417-18, qualities 107, 112, 114-15, 119-20, nāstika 156, 220, 243, 245, 258, 266- purāna see Purāņas Padma see 423-5, 480 122-7, 302-4, 310, 467 7, 344, 360, 367, 370, 382, 384, Praśastapāda Paesi, King see Pāyasi, King positivist 380 386-9, 397, 422-3, 425, 427-9, Pāņini 255, 428-9 Potthapāda 38, 64 rākșasa see daityas

444, 450, 452-3, 474-5, 494, 521- Prabhacandra 487; his Nyāyaku- Rājaśekhara Sūri 380 Rāmāyaņa 351-2, 354-5, 358, 367, 2, 528 see also atheist Pāñjikā 160 Paññā see knowledge mudacandra 298, 317-42; his 372, 378-9, 429, 444 nature see svabhāva Papers of Stcherbatsky* 432 Prameyakamalamārtanda 298-317 raxasas see daityas negation see abhāva paraloka see liberation Prabhākara 150, 154 Rāyapasenaijja 8, 389 negativist seenāstika Prabhāvaka-carita 496 Prabodhacandrodaya 344-8, 365, realism 389 Neumann 70, 72 Parameșthin 430 reality 155-6, 299, 304, 317-18, 321, Niganțha 49, 68 Păramitās 9 367, 382, 423 Parikh, R C. 492, 516 Prajāpati 3-4, 6 323, 330, 333, 344, 388, 436, 453, nihilist see nastika Nīlakaņtha 451 Prajňāšāstra 386 502, 505-7, 510-12, 523, 528-9 pariņāmavāda 391 Prakaraņapañcikā 388 rebirth see action (rebirth) nirvāņa 37, 201, 389, 512 see also parīśuddhi 76

liberation Pārśva 68 pramāņa 79, 110-12, 128, 141-3, recluse see bhiksu particulars 184-5, 334 Patańjali 73, 362, 379, 420, 429 150-1, 154-6, 259, 272-3, 296-7, recognition 113, 115-19, 121, 309, nītiśāstra 384-5, 390, 392 see also 306, 312-13, 315-16, 333, 342, 408 recollection 93-4, 113, 115-16, 121,

540 INDEX INDEX 541

123, 158-9, 194, 303, 327, 329; 380, 394, 421-3, 448, 491, 494, 498, 515, 517; selected translation sense 70, 93-103, 105-7, 111, 127-8, śrāddha 342, 352, 354, 356-7 456-8, 464; memory 60, 215, 439, 514; impression 91, 158, 161, 179, 130, 149-50, 155, 157, 161-2, Śrīdhara 93, 152

213-14, 218; remembrance 97-8, of his Sarīraka-bhāsya 234-40 164-5, 168, 174-6, 183, 202, 206- Śrīharșa 82-4, 141, 422, 494-5, 515, 517 100-1, 105-6, 109, 194, 204, 214 Sānkhya 74, 81-4, 145, 364, 373, 7, 218, 135-6, 242, 251, 258, 260, 388, 450, 503, 506 268, 262-3, 272, 274-5, 283-4, Stcherbatsky, Th. 432, 518; his 15, 237, new born infant 211-13 Sānkhya-kārikā 145 287, 293, 299, 301-5, 309-10, 317, History of Materialism in India Reden des Gotamo 70 Sankhya-sūtra 363 327-30, 332, 357, 397, 406, 409, 432-40 remembrance see recollection Śāntarakșita 159-60, 515; translation, 412, 414, 420-2, 425, 444-5, 455- Śukra 7 (remembrance) with commentary, ofhis Tattvasan- 6, 458, 463-5, 471, 479, 481, 484- Sūnyavada see Buddhism (Sūnya- reminiscence see recollection graha 159-233 5, 505, 508, 513, 529 vāda) Rhys Davids, T. W 8, 32-3, 389; his sapakșa see fallacy Sept Suttas 65 Sütrakrtānga 431 Dialogue of the Buddha 369-76 Śārīraka-bhāsya: selected translation Shastri, D.R. A Short History of svābhāva 222-4, 228, 233, 253, 296- Ruben, W 517-18; his On the 234-40 Indian Materialism, Sensationalism 7, 319, 374-5, 389, 391-2, 396, Tattvopaplavasimha of Jayarāśi Sarvadarśana-samuccaya 380 Bhatta 505-19 and Hedonism 394-439 401-2, 404, 409-10, 419, 425, 427, Sarvadarśana-sangraha 153, 257, 351- 2, 355, 358, 365, 376 8, 392, 487, (A) Short History of Indian Materialism, 441-51, 458, 474-5, 480

Śabara Svāmin 236, 255 Sensationalism and Hedonism 394 svabhāvānumāna 503 492-3; selected translation 246-57 svabhāvavādins 296 Sacred Books of the Buddhists 8, 32 439 svābhāvika-sambandha 80 sacrifice 5,30, 37, 237, 249, 253, 345, Sarvamata-sangraha 421, 493 siddhasadhanadosa see fallacy (siddham) svatautpādavāda 447 352-4, 356-7, 365, 381-2, 411, Sarvasiddhānta-sangraha 380, 422 Śāstravārtā-samuccaya 493, 500 Syādvādalatikā 494 413, 422-3, 433, 459-61, 473, Sastri, H P. 6; his Lokāyata 377-83 Sigālovada-sutta 65 similie of brahmanee 18; of ball of Syādvādamanjarī 388, 495 479-80, 484 śāśvatavāda 447 Saddarśanasamuccaya 275-98, 379, iron 20; of trumpeter 21-2; of Jatila Syādvādaratnākara 143, 146, 152-5

392-3, 450, 492-3, 500 satpratipaksa see fallacy 21-3; of caravan 24-6; of gamester Śatapatha-brāhmana see Brahmanas 27; of load of hemp 28-9 Taittirīya-brāhmana see Brahmanas Sadānanda 421-2 Śatapatha Sinharay, Haridas, Prof 505 Taittirīya Sadda-nīti 371 Śataśastra 386 (A) Sketch of Indian Materialism Tanjur 160 Saddharma-pundarīka 372 Sāyana 255, 375 384-93 Taranatha History of Buddhism 342-3 Sahajia 383, 425-7 Śaivas 429 scepticism 394, 403, 430-1, 521, 528 Sketch of the Religious Sects of the tarka see fallacy (tarka) Hindus 365 Tarkapañcānana, J. 377 Śāktas 366 science 374-5, 435 (A) Second Handful of Popular sleep 205-6, 326-8, 408; dream 19, Tarkasangraha 256 Sakuludāyi 39, 41 Marxims 147 189, 205, 240 Tarkavāgīśa, P. 74, 76, 79 salvation see liberation self 3-5, 90-8, 102-3, 105, 107-17 Ślokavārtika 150-1, 388, 429 Tatparyațīkā 76 Sāmānna-phala-sutta 32-72, 413 123, 127-8, 145, 157-8, 234-5, smrti see recollection tatsvābhāvikavāda 228 sāmānya see universal 235-44, 246, 263, 266-70, 278-84 Sonadanda 37 tattva see reality sāmānya-lakșaņa-pratyasatti 150 287-91, 293-5, 299-300, 309-12, soul 7, 19-2, 37-8, 49, 69-70, 104, Tattvabodhavidhāyinī 487 sambhava 503, 523 318-22, 324, 326, 329-31, 333, 161, 164-5, 169, 178, 202, 248; Tattvacintāmaņi 144, 150 Sāmkhya see Sānkhya 396-7, 409, 419-21, 450, 454, 468; 250, 253, 344, 352, 365, 370, 409, Tattvasangraha 143, 145, 153, 159- samskära see recollection ātman 3-5, 94, 96, 274, 378, 389, 421, 427, 432, 434, 437, 474-8, 33,518 Samksepa-sārīraka 450 393, 498, 515; brahman 4, 37, 234; 480-1, 483, 503, 506, 515, 524-5 Tattvavrtti 152 Samyutta-nikāya 9, 41 see also self Sanghavi, Sukhlalji 492, 505, 516-18 purușa 4, 145; knower 90-1, 116- tattvopaplava 431, 495, 497, 500, 17, 318, 332; cogniser 99-100, 106 502, 520-1, 526 Sañjaya Belatthiputta 431, 511-12 space 226-7, 230, 241-2, 315, 318, see also soul 334 Tattvopaplavasimha 395, 404; introd śańkā see doubt Śankarācārya 6, 255, 368-72, 375, self-possession/restraint 49, 55, 57-8 specific individuality see particular by Sanghavi & Parikh 491-504; Sénart 70 spiritualism 420, 528 study by Ruben 505-19; study by

542 INDEX INDEX 543 Dixit 520-30 Tevijja 38 Vākyapadīya 143 vyāpti see inference yadrcchā 297, 448-50 Thibaut, G. 234 Vamśa-brāhmana see Brahmanas yadrcchāvādins 297 Thomas, F.W., Dr .. 381-2, 386 Vamśa Vārhaspatya-sūtra see Weber 373, 376 yaśovijaya 494 Brhaspati-sūtra Wilson, Prof. 351, 353, 365-6, 369 yoga 39, 74, 420 time 169, 226 7, 230, 241-2, 293 5, 297, 314, 318, 326, 333-4, 391; vārtā 380, 382-3, 391, 393, 413, 433 wolf, footprint of 260, 268-70, 381 yogācāra see Buddhism (Yogācāra) see also nitiśāstra world, after/other/this see action yogasūtra 149 moment 115, 121, 171, 190, 199, Vasubandhu 517 (paraloka) yogin 285 363, 408, 482-3; momentary 189, 198 Vātsyāyana 74-6, 78, 87, 90, 114, Tişatthimahāpurusa-guņā lankāra 386 375, 379, 413, 507-8 Veda 7, 74, 108, 157, 234, 249, 345, trasarenu see atoms Trencker 72 347, 351-4, 361-2, 364-5, 388, trumpeter, similie of see similie (of 396-8, 400-1, 411-12, 417, 419- trumpeter) 20, 426, 428, 433, 443-4, 452, 460, Tucci, G. A Sketch of Indian 472-3 see also verbal testimony Materialissm 384-93 Vedanta 234-6, 355, 373, 503, 516- 19, 529 Udayana 79, 81-84, 91, 141, 149, Vedānta-kalpataru 449 158, 256. 447, 527-8; selected verbal expression 106, 129, 210-11, translation of his Nyāyakusumāñjali 213 158-9 verbal testimony 114, 141, 154, 260, udbhata 152, 155 271, 281, 293, 321, 459, 461, 471, Udyotakara 76, 79, 150, 513, 518 503, 523; see also Veda uha 314-15 vice see action (vice) universal 130-1, 184-6, 344, 523, Vidvanmodatarangiņī 427 526 Vihārabhadra 388 unseen see action (adrsta) Vijnānavada see Buddhism upādhi 80 (Vijñānavāda) upamāna 154, 243, 256, 282; 293, Vijnāneśvāra 390 405, 461, 503, 523 Vimāna-vatthu 8 Upanișads 434; Chāndogya 3-6; Vinaya texts 9, 33 65-6, 69 Maitri 6-7, 387, 428; Brhadāranya Vinītadeva 152 157; Maitrāyaņa 403 Viññāna 70-1 see also cognition Upaskāra 147, 152 vipakșa see fallacy (vipaksa) Uśanas 435, 511 Virocana 3 Uttarādhyayana sūtra 32, 67 virtue see action (virtue) viruddha see Fallacy (viruddha) Vācaspati Miśra 76, 91, 141, 147-50, viśeșa see particulars 152, 345, 437; selected translation Visnu-purāna see Puraņas Visnu of his Bhāmati 240-6 Visuddhi-magga 69 Vaiśeşika 93, 157, 251, 257, 364, vitandā see fallacy 453, 463, 466-7, 481, 506, 515 Vitandā-sattha 372 Vaiśeșika-sūtra 94-6, 147, 152, 517 void 193, 234, 363, 447, 512 Vaisnavism 383, 425, 428 Vrhaspati see Brhaspati vyāghāta see fallacy (vyaghāta)