1. Classical Samkhya (Sankhya) Gerald James Larson MLBD ( See Other Books)

CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA

CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA

An Interpretation of its History and Meaning

GERALD JAMES LARSON

ROSS/ ERIKSON SANTA BARBARA

C 1979 Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, India

Larson, Gerald James. Classical Sāmkhya.

The Sāmkhyakārikā of Īśvarakrsņa, romanized Sanskrit text with translation: pp. xvii-+-316 Includes Bibliography, Index. 1. Sānkhya. I. Īśvarakrsņa. Sānkhyakārikā. English & Sanskrit. 1979. II. Title. B132. S3L28 1979 181'.41 79-26238 ISBN 0-915520-27-3

Second Revised Edition : 1979

Printed in India By Shantilal Jain, at Shri Jainendra Press, A-45, Phase I, Industrial Area, Naraina, New Delhi-110 028 Published by Narendra Prakash Jain, for Motilal Banarsidass, Bungalow Road, Jawahar Nagar, Delhi-110 007.

TO ALL MY LADIES

Claire, Karen, Chandra

and Jenny-ji

CONTENTS

PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION ... ix PREFACE xiii ABBREVIATIONS xvi

CHAPTER INTRODUCTION 1

I. A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SAMKHYA 7

Brief Expositior of the Principles of Classical Samkhya 7

Critical Review of Interpretations 15 Richard Garbe 15 Joseph Dahlmann 22 Paul Oltramare 23 Hermann Oldenberg 26 A. B. Keith 29 Franklin Edgerton 33 Surendranath Dasgupta 36 E. H. Johnston 41 Erich Frauwallner 48 J. A. B. van Buitenen 52 J. W. Hauer 57 ... Mircea Eliade ... 60 Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya 63 ... K. C. Bhattacharya ... 66 Other Contributions ... 70 Conclusions ... 70

II. AN INTERPRETATION OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA 75

Ancient Speculations 76 Proto-Sāmkhya Speculations 95 Classical Sāmkhya ... 134 Renaissance or Later Sāmkhya 152 ...

viii CONTENTS

III. AN INTERPRETATION OF THE MEANING OF CLASSICAL SĀŅKHYA 154

The Means of Knowledge 157 prakṛti, guņas and satkāryavāda 160 purușa ... ... 167 Association and Interaction of prakrti and puruşa 171 Emergence and Functioning of the tatt 176 Discrimination and Release 201 Conclusions and Final Evaluation 206

EPILOGUE: Sankara's Criticism of Sāmkhya and the Sāmkhya Response ... 209 A CHART of the Twenty-five Principles of Classical Sāņkhya ... 236 GLOSSARY 237 APPENDIX A. Chronological Chart 251 APPENDIX B. The Sāmkhyakārikā of Iśvarakrșņa 255 APPENDIX C. A Modern Tradition of Sāmkhyayoga 278 APPENDIX D. Additional Materials for the Study of the History and Meaning of Classical Samkhya since the First edition 279

BIBLIOGRAPHY 293 ... INDEX ... 311 ... CORRECTIONS ... ... 316

PREFACE To THE SECOND EDITION

Nearly ten years have elapsed since I wrote the first draft of Classical Sämkhya. The book was well-received and has gene- rally been considered a useful addition to the secondary literature on classical Sāmkhya. Indeed, as an historical and philoso- phical treatment of the subject, it continues to be one of the few recent books available, and it is primarily for this reason that I have decided to issue a second revised edition. In the intellectual history of India (in the areas of technical philosophy, religious speculation and general cultural development), classical Sāmkhya is of crucial significance, and yet there are few recent books which deal adequately with the subject. All sorts of books are readily available on Yoga, Buddhist meditation and Vedānta, but very little on Sāmkhya, which latter tradition nevertheless represents an important historical and philosophical basis for much of the former. Sāmkhya deserves to be under- stood more fully by those generally interested in South Asian religion and thought, and hopefully this second edition will be a contribution to this general need. Moreover, for the second edition, joint publication in India and the United States has been arranged, so that the work will be more easily available for European and American students. During the past ten years additional materials for the study of Sāmkhya have become available, and, of course, my own research with respect to the history and philosophical significance of classical Sāmkhya has progressed considerably. I have decided, however, not to change the format of the book appre- ciably in the second edition, but simply to add some additional materials and to correct obvious errors. Specifically, the changes and additions are as follows. First, I have worked through the text of the first edition, correcting errors and revising the style here and there, especially in Chapters II and III. Second, I have gone through my translation of the Sāmkhyakārikā, correcting mistakes that I have discovered or that have been pointed out to me by reviewers and colleagues. Third, I have added two additional interpretations of the meaning of the Sāmkhya, namely that of the Marxist interpreter, Debiprasad

X PREFACE

Chattopadhyaya, and that of one of modern India's most crea- tive philosophers, K. C. Bhattacharya. These additional interpretations can be found toward the end of Chapter I. Fourth, I have eliminated the comparison between Sartre and Sāmkhya in the Epilogue of the book and in its place I have put a critical analysis of Sankara's critique of Sāmkhya as the locus classicus for the criticism of Samkhya within its indigenous Indian. environment. The original comparison with Sartre, I now feel, requires much fuller treatment, and I am working on a manuscript which takes up the methodological and interpretive problems of such cross-cultural comparisons. For the present book, however, a comparative discussion of Samkhya with an indigenous Indian system (namely Śankara's Vedānta) appears to be much more appropriate. Finally, I have made some changes in the appendices to the book. I have eliminated Appendix B of the first edition so that in this second revised edition Appendix B includes the text and translation of the , Sāmkhyakārikā. Appendix C in the second revised edition becomes "A Modern Tradition of Samkhyayoga." Appendix D (entitled "Additional Materials for the Study of the History and Meaning of Classical Samkhya since the First Edition") is new, and includes (1) a brief critical survey of historical and textual materials for the study of classical Sāmkhya that have become available since the publica -. tion of the first edition; and (2) a brief critical survey of Sāmkhya in the Purānas together with a discussion of the relationship between classical philosophical Sāmkhya and Purānic Samkhya. Each of these discussions, in my judg- ment, fills an important gap remaining from the first edition, and therefore hopefully the new material will not only bring the book up to date but also provide a more balanced treatment of the subject as a whole. Especially the discussion of Sankara's critique of Samkhya represents an important extension beyond the first edition of the book. In the first edition I attended solely to the Samkhya system itself, giving very little attention to the critical appraisal of Samkhya within the Indian philo- sophical tradition. Several reviewers rightly noted that this was an important omission, and I hope that my inclusion of Sankara's critique in the new Epilogue to the second revised edition will provide the reader with a more balanced view of

PREFA CE xi

the place of Samkhya in India's philosophical heritage. I am also including in the second edition a Chart of the Twenty-five Principles of Sāmkhya and a Glossary of Sāmkhya Terminology both of which additions should prove useful to the beginning student. Finally, some personal comments and acknowledgements. I have a strong sense of déjà vu as I prepare this new Preface. In 1968 I worked on the first edition while in residence as a post-doctoral research scholar at Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, in what was at that time called the College of Indo- logy. Now in 1977 I find myself working on the revised edition of the book while again in residence at Banaras Hindu Univer- sity, only this time as an honorary visiting professor in the Depart- ment of Philosophy. Moreover, my family and I are residing in a house within a few steps of the quarter in which we lived when we were here in 1968-69. As was true at that time, so as much or more on this occasion, I have benefitted greatly from conversations and discussions about my subject with Indian scholars and pandits in Varanasi. Professor N. S. S. Raman, Head of the Department of Philosophy, has been a continuing friend and support for my family and me during our stay in India, and I would like to thank him for his good efforts on our behalf. During my current stay I have also been giving a series of lectures on Samkhya in the Department of Philosophy at BHU, attended by research scholars and faculty, and I would especially like to thank Professors N. S. S. Raman, R. K. Tri- pathi, N. K. Devaraja, R. S. Misra and A. K. Chatterjee for their patience, interest and suggestions regarding my frequently unconventional interpretations of Sāmkhya. Also my thanks to the various research scholars (and, in particular, to Mr. Jayanda Soni) who have listened to my views on Sāmkhya in the medium of my American English and who have courte- ously refrained from laughing at my less-than-perfect Hindi. My thanks also to Pandit Ram Shankar Bhattacharya of Varanasi whose intimate acquaintance with the original Sanskrit texts of Sämkhya and Yoga always amazes me and whose willingness to share his learning continually puts me in his debt. Apart from my lectures in the Department of Philosophy at BHU, I have also been pursuing work (in collaboration with Pandit Ram Shankar Bhattacharya) on the Samkhya and Yoga

xii PREFACE

volumes of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, under the general editorship of Karl H. Potter. For the encyclopedia volumes Dr. Bhattacharya and I (along with scholars in India, Europe and the United States) are preparing summaries in English of some one-hundred-and-twenty original Sanskrit texts of Sāmkhya and Yoga from the beginning of the tradition down to the present day. The volumes will also include detailed, analytic introductions to Samkhya and Yoga philosophy. Support for this research and for our travel to India has come from three sources, and I would like to acknowledge my gratitude and appreciation for the following grants : (a) a senior fellowship from the Indo-U.S. Subcommission on Education and Culture; (b) a senior fellowship from the American Institute of Indian Studies; and (c) a Humanities Institute Grant from the Uni- versity of California, Santa Barbara, where I am currently on the faculty in the Department of Religious Studies.

Varanasi (India) GJL February, 1979

PREFACE

This book represents a somewhat revised version of my doctoral dissertation, submitted to the Faculty of Philosophy, Columbia University, New York City, Spring 1967. The con- tent of the present work is much the same as the original dis- sertation, although I have made a number of changes in style, bibliography, etc. Also, I have added to the present book the Sanskrit text of the Sāmkhyakārikā. There was some question in my mind whether to leave Chapter I in its entirety in the published edition of the work. The Chapter deals with a critical review of the history of Western scholarship on Sāmkhya. Had the book been published pri- marily for a Western audience, I would have edited out some sections of this rather long Chapter. Since the book is being published in India, however, and will be read primarily by Indian and Asian students generally, I felt that all of the material of Chapter I might prove especially useful. Since the completion of my original research for the dis- sertation, several new studies on classical Sāmkhya have appear- ed. None required any major changes in my own research or conclusions, but I have tried to incorporate some of these studies in my notes and bibliography. Two such items, however, require specific mention. (1) R. C. Pandeya's new critical edition of the ruktidipika (New Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1967). It is a great improvement over the older edition and requires careful study. The ruktidipika, however, is a difficult Sanskrit text, and I still hesitate to use it extensively until I have had more time to work with it. (2) S. A. Srinivasan's Vācaspatimiśra's Tattvakaumudī : Ein Beitrag zur Textkritik bei kontaminierter Uberlieferung (Hamburg: Cram, De Gruyter and Co., 1967). This also is a great improvement over all other editions of Tattvakaumudi, and is an important contribu- tion to Sāmkhya studies. I wish to acknowledge my gratitude to the following per- sons at Columbia University, New York City, who helped me a great deal in my research while I was still a doctoral candidate :

xiv PREFACE

Professor Yoshito Hakeda, the chairman of my dissertation committee, whose thoughtful suggestions enabled me to find new insights and fresh perspectives on my subject; Professor Horace . L. Friess, who aided me not only in my research but also through- out my doctoral studies at Columbia; Professor Royal Weiler, now of the University of Pennsylvania, who helped me think through my methods and goals in this work; Professor Ainslie Embree, who offered helpful suggestions concerning style and presentation; and, finally, Professor Robert Olson and Professor Alex Wayman, with both of whom I had a number of stimulat- ing discussions concerning the history of Sāmkhya. I am also grateful to the members of the Columbia University Faculty Seminar on Oriental Thought whose helpful criticisms and suggestions enabled me to clarify some difficult points in this work. I wish also to acknowledge my gratitude to the institutions and foundations who have helped me since the completion of my doctoral studies. First, I am most grateful to the Society for Religion in Higher Education for having awarded me a grant for travel and study in Asia in the academic year 1968-69, during a portion of which time I have revised and expanded this work. Second, my thanks to those academic and adminis- trative officers of the University of Tennessee, Knoxville, who not only graciously provided me with a leave of absence after only one year of teaching but who also supplemented my grant in a most generous manner. Third, my thanks to the staff of the College of Indology and related departments of Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, India, for having allowed me to work as a post-doctoral research scholar and for having provided my family and me with pleasant living quarters during our stay in India. Let me also express my thanks to the following individuals who have been a great help in my recent work : Professor Ralph V. Norman, Jr., not only my departmental chairman at Tennessee but also an engaging colleague and a good friend; Professor A. K. Narain, Head of the College of Indology, BHU, who has been a great help in our adjustment to Indian life and with whom I have had some stimulating discussions on Indian history; and Pandit Rām Shankar Bhattāchārya of Banaras Sanskrit University with whom I have worked almost every

PREFACE XV

day reading the Sanskrit texts and commentaries of the litera- ture of Sāmkhya. With Dr. Bhattacharya's help I have learned some of the subtleties of Sanskrit impossible to learn other than from a traditional teacher. There are, of course, numerous other friends and scholars to whom I owe much, especially here in India, who have enabled me to understand some of the issues of Indian philosophy and religion with greater depth. I should also like to express my gratitude to Mrs. Royal Weiler, who typed the original manuscript of this work.

Varanasi, (India) Author. April, 1969.

ABBREVIATIONS

A. TEXTS

RV. Rig Veda AV. Atharva Veda Śata. Brah. Śatapatha Brāhmaņa BĀUp. Bṛhadāraņyaka Upanişad Chān. Up. Chāndogya Upanişad Kațha Kațha Upanişad Śvet. Up. Śvetāśvatara Upanişad Mbh. Mahābhārata Moksadh. Mokşadharma Gītā Bhagavad Gitā Kārikā or Kārikās Sāmkhyakārikā of Iśvarakrsņa Bhāșya Bhāsya of Gaudapāda STK Sāmkhyatattvakaumudi of Vācaspati- miśra YD Yuktidīpikā Jaya. Jayamangalā Paramārtha's Paramārtha's Chinese translation of Chinese version the Kārikā and a commentary

B. PERIODICALS AND BOOKS IN SERIES

AJP American Fournal of Philology BEFEO Bulletin de l'École francaise d' Extrême-Orient (Hanoi) BSOS Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies (University of London) HOS Harvard Oriental Series IHQ Indian Historical Quarterly JAOS Journal of the American Oriental Society JRAS Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society (London) NGWG Nachrichten von der königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen

ABBREVIATIONS xvii

SBE Sacred Books of the East SBH Sacred Books of the Hindus WZKM Wiener . Zeitschrift für die Kunde des Morgenländes WZKSO Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd- und Ostasiens ZDMG Zeitschrift der deutschen morgen- ländischen Gesellschaft (Leipzig)

INTRODUCTION

PRELIMINARY CONCERNS

The Samkhya system represents one of the more interesting and fascinating phases of Indian religion and thought. Even though the system is no longer a living force in contemporary Indian culture, nevertheless it has exerted an important influ- ence in the development of Indian religious thought, and many of its terms and notions have been and continue to be employed in other systems. Over the years many interpreters have attempted to trace the development of the Sāmkhya and to assess its meaning. Opinions have varied widely, and there has been little attempt in recent years to bring together these varying lines of research.

PURPOSE OF THE STUDY It is-the purpose of this study to offer an interpretation of the history and meaning of classical Samkhya. This work represents an attempt to take a fresh look at the texts relating to the Sämkhya and to assess anew both the historical develop- ment of the system and its significance in the history of reli- gious thought. An attempt is made to evaluate the importance of Samkhya in the context of Indian religious thought and to evaluate its importance with respect to some of the issues of religion and thought in any age. Hopefully our analysis will show that the Sämkhya stands as an important and inte- resting contribution in both areas. The remainder of this brief Introduction is concerned with preliminary considerations such as the meaning of the word, "sāmkhya," the scope of this particular study of the Sāmkhya and a general outline of the contents of the entire work.

MEANING OF THE WORD "SAMKHYA" The term, "Sāmkhya," appears to be derived from the root, khya, together with the prefix, sam, meaning "reckoning," "summing up," "numeration," "calculation," etc. Garbe sees the term primarily as a designation for the notion of "number,"

2 CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA

from which the later ideas of "enumeration," "investigation," and "analysis" were derived.1 According to Garbe, the Sāmkhya is that school or system which emphasizes the enu- meration of principles, evolutes or emergents. Oldenberg prefers the idea of "examination," "calculation" or the "des- cription by enumeration of constituents."2 Jacobi has offered two interpretations of the term.3 On the one hand, says Jacobi, "Sāmkhya" refers to those who define a concept by setting forth or enumerating its content. On the other hand, "Sāmkhya" refers to those who investigate or analyze the various categories of existence. Eliade goes beyond these basic meanings and suggests that the term "sāmkhya" refers to those who seek the ultimate "discrimination" or "discernment" of the difference between prakrti and purusa.4 In other words, Eliade understands the word in terms of the ultimate goal of salvation of the system. Edgerton, emphasizing the uses of the term in the older texts, suggests that "samkhya" refers to the notion of "reasoning, ratiocination."5 In the older texts, says Edgerton, the term "sāmkhya" is not a technical designa- tion for a particular system of thought. It is, rather, a term which refers to those who seek salvation by knowledge. Occasionally, says Edgerton, one finds the term used with reference to various mathematical meanings, but this is not the central significance of the word. Says Edgerton,

Accordingly, the derivative Sāmkhya must be understood as the method 'based on reason, ratiocination'; it is the rationalizing, reflective, speculative, philosophical method. In my translation of the Gita I have rendered

1. Richard Garbe, Die Samkhya Philosophie (Leipzig : H. Haesse, 1917), pp. 189-191; cf. also Mircea Eliade, Yoga: Immortality and Freedom, trans. W. R. Trask (New York): Pantheon Books, 1958), pp. 367-368. 2. Hermann Oldenberg, Die Lehre der Upanishaden (Göttingen : Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1915), p. 351, note 129; and Eliade, loc. cit. 3. Hermann Jacobi, Review of Second Edition of Garbe's Die Sämkhya Philosophie, in Göttingsche gelehrte Anzeigen, 181 Jahrgang (Berlin, 1919), p. 28. 4. Eliade, Yoga : Immortality and Freedom, op. cit., p. 367. 5. Franklin Edgerton, Beginnings of Indian Philosophy (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1965), pp. 35-37.

INTRODUCTION 3

it 'reason-method.' It seems a natural term to describe the method of gaining salvation by 'knowledge."6

In Chapter II, however, the present writer shows that the Sāmkhya represents more than a method of salvation by know- ledge regardless of the content of the knowledge. In other words, it appears that the term "samkhya" has a more technical meaning than Edgerton would allow. It is possible to gain further illumination concerning the term from some of its uses in the texts. In Mbh. XII. 290, 5, for example, one finds the phrase, "computing by knowledge the sense objects. ... " (jñānena parisamkhyāya ... etc.).7 This would tend to support the idea that the term refers primarily to the notion of enumeration. Again, in Mbh. XII, 294, 42 we are told that the followers of Sāmkhya enumerate (pari- samkhyāya) the twenty-four principles. Moreover, in Sām- khyakārikā LXIX one finds the phrase, "expounded or enu- merated by the great sage" ( ... paramarsiņā samākhyātam).8 The reference is to all of the doctrines which have been set forth in the preceding verses, and thus samākhyātam clearly means "expounded" or "enumerated." In Mbh. XII. 308, 79- 80, however, the term "sāmkhya" appears as one of the five parts of speech, and seems clearly to mean "reasoning" or "ratiocination."9 The only reasonable conclusion in all of this is to suggest that the term "sāmkhya" refers primarily to the idea of "num- ber" or "enumeration" but that it also signifies those who reason or analyze by means of the enumeration of categories. At the same time, however, it should be mentioned that the term was probably used and understood in a variety of ways by diffe- rent writers and traditions, thus making it impossible to limit the term to any one technical meaning.

6. Ibid., p. 36. 7. All references to the Mahabharata are from the Critical Edition. For complete reference, see infra, Chapter II. Unless otherwise noted, the present writer uses Edgerton's English translation found in Beginnings of Indian Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 255-358. 8. For complete translation of the verse, see infra, Appendix B. 9. Edgerton, Beginnings of Indian Philosophy, op. cit., p. 36.

4 CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA

MEANING OF "CLASSICAL SAMKHYA" The main focus in this study is on the "classical Sāmkhya." By this is meant that formulation of Samkhya found in Iśvara- krşna's Sāmkhyakārikā.10 The precise date of the text is im- possible to determine, although a terminus ad quem can be esta- blished. The Samkhyakārikā along with a commentary was translated into Chinese by Paramartha some time between A.D. 557-569.11 Assuming, then, that the text was well- known in the sixth century, one gets at least a general idea of its chronological place in the history of Indian literature. Unlike many of the other classical schools of Indian thought, the Samkhya has no ancient philosophical Sūtras. The extant Sāmkhyapravacanasūtra is a late work, perhaps as late as the fourteenth or fifteenth century A.D.12 There were undoubt- edly other texts dealing specifically with the Samkhya in the classical period-i.e. A.D. 300-600- but no such texts are now available. For centuries the Sāmkhyakārikā was the definitive text of the Sämkhya tradition, and was considered authori- tative with respect to the content of classical Samkhya thought.13 The Sāmkhyakārika itself, therefore, functions in this study as the normative definition for "classical Sāmkhya."

10. Henry Thomas Colebrooke (ed. and trans.) The Sānkhya Kārikā .... by Iswara Krishna (Oxford: A.J. Valpy, 1837); and Horace Hayman Wilson (ed. and trans.), The Bhashya or Commentary of Gaurapāda (sic) (Oxford: A. J. Valpy, 1837). Hereafter referred to as Colebrooke-Wilson. Also, Bechana- rama Tripāțhi (ed.), The Sānkhyakārika with an Exposition Called Chandrikā by Nārāyaņa Tīrtha, and Gaudapādāchārya's Commentary (Benares: Braj B. Das and Co., 1883; Benares Sanskrit Series, No. 9). For best available newer editions, see S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri (ed. and tans.), The Sāmkhyakārikā of Isvara Krşna (Madras: University of Madras, 1948) and Anne- Marie Esnoul (trans.), Les Strophes de Samkhya (Paris, 1964). For complete English translation of the Kārikas by the present writer, see infra, Appendix B. 11. Moriz Winternitz, Geschichte der indischen Litteratur Leipzig : C.F. Amelangs, 1920), III, 452. 12. Hermann Jacobi, "The Dates of the Philosophical Sutras of the Brahmans," JAOS, XXXI (1911), p. 9; and cf. Winternitz, op. cit., III, 454. 13. Erich Fauwallner, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie Salzburg: Otto Muller, 1953), I, 286-287; and A.B. Keith, The Sāmkhya System (Calcutta: YMCA Publishing House, 1949; second edition), pp. 83ff.

INTRODUCTION 5

GENERAL OUTLINE OF THE STUDY Any analysis of the classical Sāmkhya must include a care- ful examination of the history of the tradition along with a careful treatment of the key classical doctrines. Moreover, since a variety of interpreters have analyzed the classical Sām- khya from varying perspectives, attention must also be given to the history of research on the subject together with a critical evaluation of the findings and interpretations. It seemed most appropriate, therefore, to organize this study as follows. The first part of Chapter I contains a brief summary of the key doc- trines of the Sāmkhyakārikā for the purpose of giving the reader a preliminary view of the normative content of classical Sām- khya. The remainder of Chapter I is devoted to a critical review of the history of the interpretations of the Sāmkhya, emphasizing both the significant findings of other researchers and those areas and problems requiring further research and exploration. Chapter II contains an interpretation of the historical development of classical Sāmkhya. Beginning with ancient Indian speculations, the present writer offers an ana- lysis of the key texts relating to the development of the tradition. The history of the Samkhya is broken down into four basic pcriods, and an attempt is made to show how the classical Samkhya developed out of the older traditions. Some atten- tion is also given to the development of later or Renaissance Samkhya. Chapter III contaihs the writer's own view of the meaning of the classical Samkhya based upon an analysis of the Sāmkhyakārikā and its important commentaries. Emphasis is placed on the classical Samkhya as an analysis of human existence and as a soteriological system. In a concluding Epi- logue the writer offers a critical analysis of Sankara's criticism of the Sämkhya together with the Sāmkhya response. Since it is generally conceded that Sankara's critique of Sāmkhya is the locus classicus for most critiques of Sāmkhya in the indigenous Indian philosophical context, it seems appropriate to conclude this study by dealing with that criticism directly and by attempting to piece together what the Samkhya response could have been. In addition to these Chapters, the present writer has also included several Appendices. Appendix A includes a Chrono- logical Chart dealing with the history of Indian literature and

6 CLASSICAL SÃMKHYA

culture as it relates to the development of the Sāmkhya. Appendix B includes the present writer's English translation of the Sämkhyakārikā, together with the Sanskrit text. Appendix C contains a brief note on a modern tradition of Sāmkhyayoga. Appendix D (entitled "Additional Materials for the Study of the History and Meaning of Classical Samkhya since the First Edition" contains supplementary historical, textual and biblio- graphical materials that have been added for the second edition. At the conclusion of the book (and before the Appendices) I have also included a Chart of the Twenty-five Principles of Classical Sāmkhya and a Glossary of Sāmkhya Terminology.

CHAPTER I

A CRITICAL REVIEW OF THE HISTORY OF INTER- PRETATIONS OF THE SĀMKHYA

Classical Sāmkhva cannot be interpreted adequately with- out giving some consideration to problems of historical deve- lopment. Such development includes not only the emergence of Sämkhya in the Vedic tradition but also the history of the interpretations of this development. Before proceeding to these historical issues, however, it seems appropriate to offer a brief presentation of the content of classical Samkhya as found in the Sāmkhyakārikā.1 In this way the contours of the classical system will be available before undertaking the historical analysis.

PART I

BRIEF REVIEW OF THE MAIN PRINCIPLES OF CLASSICAL SAMKHYA

I. "Because of the torment of the three-fold suffering, (arises) the desire to know the means of counter- acting it. If (it is said that) this (desire -- i.e., inquiry). is useless because perceptible (means of removal are available), (we say) no, since (per- ceptible means ) are not final or abiding. II. "The revealed (or Scriptural means of removing the torment) are like the perceptible (i.e., ultimate- ly ineffective), for they are connected with impu- rity, destruction and excess; a superior method different from both is the discriminative know- ledge of vyakta (manifest world), avyakta (unmani- fest-i.e., prakṛti) and jña (knower-i.e., puruşa). III. "Primordial nature is uncreated. The seven- mahat, etc. -are both created and creative. The

1. For editions of Kärika itself including Sanskrit text with English translation see Introduction, footnote 10 and bibliography.

8 CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA

sixteen are created. Purusa is neither created nor creative.2 In these opening verses of the Kārikā, the purpose and essence of the entire work is set forth. The first verse informs the reader that the purpose of the Sämkhya is the elimination of the "torment of the threefold suffering". Human existence in the world is characterized by suffering.3 This suffering cannot be decisively and finally removed either by "perceptible" means, i.e., drugs, medicine, etc., or by "revealed" or "Scriptural" means. Only "discriminative knowledge" (vi-jñāna) is effective as a means, and specifically the knowledge of avyakta (the "un- manifest"), vyakta (the "manifest") and jña (the "knower"); i.e., of prakrti, of the manifest world, and of purusa, respectively. In an introductory way the third verse then characterizes avyakta, vyakta and jña as follows:

A. avyakta- i.e., mūlaprakti ("primal nature") -is uncreated. B. vyakta-i.e., the manifest world arising out of prakrti. 1. the seven-i.e., buddhi or mahat ("intelligence" or the "great one") ahamkāra ("self-awareness," "ego") five tanmātras ("subtle elements") - these are created and creative. 2. the sixteen -i.e., manas ("mind") five buddhin- driyas ("organs of sense") five karmendriyas ("organs of action"), five mahābhūtas ("gross elements") - these are simply created. C. jña-i.e., purusa - is neither created nor creative. In this third verse a preliminary summary of the basic Sāmkhya dualism is given along with an enumcration of the basic princi- ples of the system. The dualism is that between avyakta-vyakta, on the one hand, and jña, on the other. The avyakta-vyakta is

2. duḥkhatrayābhighātāj jijñāsā tadabhighātake hetau, drste sāpārthā cen naikāntātyantato 'bhāvāt. I drstavauānuśravikaḥ sa hy aviśuddhikșayātiśayayuktah, tadviparītaḥ śreyān vyaktāvyaktajñavijñānāt. II mūlaprakrtir avikṛtir mahadādyāh prakṛtivikrtayah sapta, şodasakas tu vikāro na prakṛtir na vikrtih puruşah. III 3. The three kinds of suffering are dealt with in the opening section of Chapter III.

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SĀMKHYA 9

equivalent to prakrti and its modifications. ña is equivalent to purusa. The vyakta or "manifest world" is made up of the "seven" and the "sixteen."4 The "seven" are both created (or "evolved") and creative (or "evolvent"). The "sixteen" are simply created (or "evolved"). The avyakta is uncreated-i.e., prakrti or nature in its primordial condition. The "manifest world" (vyakta) of created and/or creative products emerges, emanates (or "evolves") from the uncreated avyakta or prakrti. The "seven," the "sixteen," plus the uncreated avyakta equal twenty-four principles. Apart from these twenty-four stands yet another principle which is neither created nor creative. This is the jña or "knower" which is the purusa and which is unconnected in any way with the other twenty-four principles. All together, then, twenty-five principles are set forth. In these opening three verses, therefore, the basic postu- lates of the classical Sāmkhya are presented : (1) human exist- ence means intense suffering; (2) the Sāmkhya system offers a way of salvation from suffering; (3) the way of salvation is by means of a kind of discriminative knowing; (4) the content of saving knowledge is the discrimination of the difference bet- ween avyakta-vyakta (prakrti) and jña (puruşa). Following these introductory verses, Iśvarakrsna then takes up the problem of the means of knowledge.5 Three kinds of knowledge are acceptable to the Sāmkhya: (1) perception; (2) inference; and (3) reliable authority.6 Perception (drsta) is immediate knowledge arising from the contact of sense organ with an object.7 Inference (anumāna) is mediate knowledge; is of three kinds; and is distinguished in terms of a "mark" and "that which bears the mark."8 The Kārikā itself does not state what the three kinds of inference are, and the commen- taries differ in their interpretation.9 Reliable authority (āptavacana) includes not only Scripture but also the trust-

4. For this standard enumeration, see any of the commentaries of the Kārikā : Gaudapāda, Vācaspatimiśra, Paramārtha's translation, etc. 5. Kārikās IV-VIII. 6. Kārikā IV. 7. Kārikā V. 8. Ibid. 9. See below, Chapter III.

10 CLASSICAL SĀŅKHYA

worthy instruction of sages -e.g., Kapila.10 Each means of knowledge covers a particular area of knowledge.11 Since most of the Sāmkhya principles are imperceptible-e.g., purusa, prakṛti, buddhi, tanmātras, etc. - it is evident that the Sāmkhya. relies primarily on inference and secondarily on reliable authority, especially the tradition of its own teachers.12 Two fundamental notions of classical Sāmkhya are next taken up in Kārikās IX-XVI : (1) the notion of satkāryavāda or the theory of causation which asserts that the effect is pre- existent in the cause;13 (2) the notion of the three gunas or "strands" - sattva, rajas, tamas - or the basic constituents of prakrti or primordial nature.14 According to the theory of causation, there is no material change in the make-up of any- thing. There is only change of appearance or modification. Thus, what appears in the effect is merely a modification of what was there in the beginning in the cause. There can be no effect which did not originally exist, since "nothing" cannot produce something. This original "something" or "ground" or "stuff" from which all products come is, of course, prakrti. As was said above, this prukrti has two dimensions; avyakta, unmanifest; and vyakta, manifest. The manifest world is caused (hetumat), finite (anityam), active (sakriyam), diverse (anekam), etc.15 The unmanifest is the opposite of this.16 Both the avyakta and vyakta are made up or composed of the three guņas: sattva, rajas, tamas.17 Sattva is associated with such notions as goodness, light, pleasure, thought, etc. Rajas is. related to such notions as passion, pain, stimulation, motion, etc. Tamas is associated with darkness, heaviness, indifference, restraint, matter etc.18 These gunas or "strands" are the con- tent of the idea of prakrti. They are continually in tension with one another, and by their mutual interaction the world as we

10. Kārikā V. 11. Suryanarayana, op. cit., Kārikā, p. 11. 12. Kārikās VI-VIII. 13. Kārika IX. 14. Kārikris XI-XIV. 15. Kārikā X. 16. Ibid. 17. Kārikā XI. 18. Kārikās XII-XIII.

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SĀMKHYA 11

know it emerges.19 When these gunas are in a condition of balance or equilibrium, no creation or modification occurs. When this equilibrium is disturbed, however, the manifest world (vyakta) then emerges.20 The process of emergence or "evolution" is determined by the respective dominance of each of the three gunas. The first emergent, for example, is buddhi which is characterized by a predominance of sattva.21 The emergence of the tanmatras or "subtle elements," which provide the essence of the gross physical world, are characterized by a predominance of tamas.22 This process of emergence which depends upon the modifications and changes in the mutual interaction of the guņas is technically known as guņapariņāma.23 The doctrines of (1) causation; (2) the relationship of vyakta and avyakta; and (3) the modification of the gunas are all sum- marized in Kārikās XV and XVI. Apart from this whole system of emergent creation, of unmanifest and manifest, of equilibrium and modification, exists the purusa or "self". Purușa itself is described in Kārikas XVII-XIX, and its association with prakrti in Kārikās XX-XXI. Purusa is the opposite of prakrti or the whole sys- tem of avyakta and vyakta.24 It is inactive (akartrbhāva), isolated (kaivalya), etc.25 It is pure consciousness (cetana), the pre- sence of which disrupts the equilibrium of the gunas in their unmanifest condition.26 This disruption of equilibrium because of the proximity of purusa is the cause of the process of emerg- ence of the manifest world.27 The realm or dimension of pure being (i.e., prakrti), which is inherently non-intelligent or non-conscious, is illuminated by the mere presence of purusa, which is inherently intelligent or conscious.28 This illumination

19. Kārikā XIII. 20. Kārikā XII. The present writer has generally used the words "process of emergence" rather than "evolution." The creative manifest- ation of prakrti bears little resemblance to Western notions of evolution. 21. Kārikā XXIII. 22. Ibid. 23. Kārikā XXVII. 24. Kārikā XVII. 25. Kārikā XIX. 26. Kārikā XX. 27. Kārikā XXI. 28. Ibid.

12 CLASSICAL SĀŅKHYA

of the realm of prakrti by purusa brings about the disruption of the unmanifest condition, and creation of the world results. In other words, it is by the association or proximity of these two diverse principles - purusa and prakrti - that the world as we know it appears. Without this association or proximity of prakrti and purusa, there would be no worldly existence or human experience.29 Prakrti is the primordial "stuff" of the entire unmanifest and manifest world, whereas purusa is the presupposition of individual consciousness.30 Thus, there is only one prakrti but a plurality of purusas.31 Also important to note is that puruşa is not "self" in the sense of intelligence, ego, or mind. These categories or principles are rather emergents or "evo- lutes" of prakrti.32 Purușa is simply pure consciousness which exists apart from prakrti.33 In other words, the dualism of the Sāmkhya is of a peculiar nature. In Sāmkhya the dualism is that of unconscious being (prakrti) - perhaps best expressed at this point as an undifferentiated plenitude of being which implicitly contains the possibilities of all thought and sub- stance -- on the one hand, and pure consciousness which is differ- ent from unconscious being and yet by its mere presence renders unconscious being intelligible, on the other. The proximity of unconscious being and pure consciousness issues in the process of emergence and leads to the emergence of self- awareness (ahamkāra). The purpose of the coming together of prakrti and purusa, and thus of creation as we know it, is twofold.34 First of all, the process of emergence is for the sake of the enjoyment or contemplation of purusa. Second, the conjunction or proxi- mity of prakrti and purusa is for the sake of the liberation of purusa.35 On the one hand, purușa provides the consciousness which renders the process of emergence (i.e., creation).

29. Kārikā XX. 30. Kārika XVIII. 31. Ibid. 32. Kārikas XXII-XXIV. 33. Kārikā XX. 34. Kārikā XXI. 35. Ibid.

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SAMKHYA 13

possible, while, on the other hand, prakrti by means of its first evolute, buddhi, provides the requisite knowledge which enables the realization to arise that purusa is absolutely different from prakrti.36 This realization of the distinction between prakrti and purusa brings the adherent to the condition of isolation (kaivalya) or release (moksa).37 Thus, though quite separate and unconnected, purusa and prakrti mutually interact to bring about the process of creation, self-awareness and, finally, enlightenment. According to a well-known simile of the Sāmkhya, purușa and prakrti interact for each other's sake as do a blind man and a lame man.38 In the absence of discriminating knowledge (viveka) human life is suffering (duhkha) and/or ignorance (avidyā or aviveka). In the condition of non-discrimination, purusa appears as buddhi and ahamkāra-i.e., as a part of the process of emergence which means endless transmigration and suffer- ing.39 This state of illusion or ignorance is the common con- dition of most men. When the realization arises, however, that purusa is different from prakrti, then the self is no longer subject to transmigration and suffering. In other words, when one realizes by means of discriminating knowledge that one's deepest nature.or selfhood is not determined by the process of emergence, i.e., prakrti and its modification - but rather is that which determines the process of emergence, then the possibility of freedom appears. Man's deepest selfhood, according to classical Sāmkhya, is not his empirical ego structure or even his intelligence.40 Man's deepest selfhood is rather the very fact of consciousness. This knowledge of the absolute "otherness" of consciousness frees man from the illusion of bondage and brings man's deepest selfhood into absolute freedom (kaivalya). A number of verses of the Karika are devoted to a detailed discussion of the process of emergence or creation and the func- tioning of the various emergents. These include the emergence of buddhi (intelligence), ahamkāra (ego), manas and the five

36. Kārikā XXXVII. 37. Kārikās LV-LXIX. 38. Kārikā XXI. 39. Kārikā XX. 40. Kārikās LXII-LXIV.

14 CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA

buddhīndriyas (mind and the senses), five karmendriyas (organs of action), five tanmātras (subtle elements), the five mahābhūtas (gross elements) and the process of knowledge.41 Attention is also given in these verses to the notions of "subtle body," "gross body" and the doctrine of transmigration.42 Another group of verses is devoted to a discussion of impulses, desires or dis- positions (bhāvas) which make up human experience and help determine it.43 In other words, in Sāmkhya theory there is a twofold creation or emergence, one "internal" or function- ing within buddhi, and the other "elemental" or function- ing externally.44. All of these details which are relevant to the purpose of this study are discussed with greater precision in Chapter III. The Sāmkhyakārikā concludcs with a brief reference to the transmission of the Samkhya tradition.45 Reference is made to some key Sāmkhya teachers - Kapila, Āsuri, Pañcaśikha - along with reference to an ancient Samkhya textbook - the Șastitantra. For the sake of a more concise view of the contents of the Sāmkhyakārikā, the present writer here includes a brief outline. I. Preliminary Exposition - Kārikās I-III. A. Threefold suffering - Kārikā I. B. Final release by knowing - Kārikā II. C. Twenty-five Principles-Kārikā III. II. Means of knowledge - Kārikās IV-VIII. III. Theory of causation and doctrine of gunas - Kārikās IX-XIV. IV. On the nature of prakrti - Kārikās XV-XVI. V. On the nature of puruşa - Kārikās XVII-XIX. VI. On the connection of prakrti and puruşa- Kārikās XX-XXI. VII. Emergence and functioning of basic principles- Kārikās XXII-XXXVIII.

41. Kārikās XXII-XLII. 42. Kārikās XXXIX-XLII. 43. Kārikās XLIII-LI. 44. Kārikās LII-LIV. 45. Kārikas LXX-LXXII.

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SAMKHYA 15

VIII. Threefold Nature of Reality; linga, bhāva, bhautika - Kārikās XXXIX-LIX. IX. On discrimination and release - Karikas LX-LXIX. X. Transmission of tradition - Kārikās LXX-LXXII.

PART II

A CRITICAL REVIEW OF INTERPRETATIONS OF SĀMKHYA

Much has been written in regard to the history and inter- pretation of the Samkhya. Scholarly opinions vary widely, and, as a result, the Sāmkhya has been interpreted in a number of quite differing and sometimes contradictory ways. This por- tion of the present study is therefore devoted to tracing the most significant of these varying interpretations. The primary focus in this section is on two basic considerations: (1) the scholar's view of the origin and development of the Sāmkhya; and (2) the scholar's view of the meaning and significance of the Sämkhya. In most cases, of course, these two consider- ations are inseparable both from the point of view of method as well as content. It should also be said that attention is given in this section only to the most significant interpretations of scholars of the twentieth century.46

Richard Garbe

From the end of the nineteenth century and continuing into the first decades of the twentieth, the most distinctive work in regard to the history and interpretation of the Sām- khya was that of Richard Garbe. His work included a number of definitive editions and translations of key Sāmkhya texts,47 as well as some major studies regarding the interpretation of

46. For a discussion of some older interpretations of Sāmkhya, see Richard Garbe, Die Sāmkhya Philosophie, op. cit., pp. 3-105, including the excellent bibliography of older works on Samkhya, ibid., pp. 105-112. See also Garbe's "Introduction" in the following : Richard Garbe (ed.), Sāmkhya Sutra Vrtti (Calcutta: J.W. Thomas, 1888), pp. i-xxv. 47. Richard Garbe (ed. and trans.) Sāmkhya Sūtra Vrtti, op. cit .; also (ed.), Sāmkhya-pravacana-bhāsya (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1943); also (trans.) Sāmkhya-pravacana-bhāsya (Leipzig: F.A. Brockhaus, 1889); also (trans.), Der Mondschein der Sāmkhya Wahrheit (München : Franz, 1891); etc., etc.

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the Samkhya system.48 Even in current studies, Garbe's work continues to be recognized as an important contribution.49 There can be no doubt, says Garbe, that Sāmkhya is one of the oldest philosophies of the Indian tradition. To support this claim, Garbe cites the well-known reference in Kautilya's Arthasastra to the three systems of "philosophy" or "science" (ānvīkşikī) current at that time : Sāmkhya, Yoga, and Lokāyata (materialism).50 Garbe accepts the dating of the Arthasāstra to be around 300 B.c.51 Moreover, he sees this reference as evidence not only for the antiquity of the Sämkhya, but also as evidence that the other systems-i.e., Nyāya, Vaiśeșika, Mīmāmsa and Vedanta-were not at that time in any kind of systematic formulation.52 Closely related to the question of the antiquity of the Sāmkhya, according to Garbe, is the question of its relation to Buddhism.53 There are several striking similarities between the Sämkhya and Buddhism which seem to argue for the influ- ence of one upon the other. Moreover, these similarities argue, according to Garbe, for the priority of Sāmkhya to Buddhism.54 Briefly, these similarities are as follows :

(a) organizing notions in "pedantic enumerations" showing a "peculiar scholastic method;" (b) "life is a life of pain;" (c) reaction against the Vedic sacrifices; (d) common rejection of self-torture;

48. Richard Garbe, Die Sāmkhya Philosophie, op. cit., also Sāmkhya und Yoga (Herausgegeben von G. Bühler, III Band. 4 Heft. 1896); also "Samkhya," Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics (New York: Scribner's, 1921), XI, pp. 189-192; also "Yoga," Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics, XII, pp. 831-833; etc., etc. 49. Erich Frauwallner, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, I, op. cit., p. 471. 50. Garbe, Die Sāmkhya Philosophie, op. cit., p. 4. The question of the dating of the Arthaśstra as well as the meaning of the reference to ānvīkșikī has been much disputed. For a recent discussion of these issues, see Paul Hacker, "ānvīkșikī," WZKSO, Band II, 1958, pp. 54-83. 51. Ibid. 52. Ibid., p. 5. 53. Garbe (ed.), Sāmkhya Sūtra Vrtti, op. cit., p. i. 54. Ibid., pp. v-xiv.

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SAMKHYA 17

(e) emphasis on "becoming and change;" (f) similarity of kaivalya and nirvāņa; (g) similarity regarding stages of acquiescence.55 In each one of these similarities, says Garbe, the Buddhist doctrine is more radical and probably represents a further elaboration of the original Samkhya notion. Garbe next discusses the problem of the historical deve- lopment of the Samkhya. On this issue he asserts that the Samkhya underwent very little change in the course of its deve- lopment with respect to its main features.

The Sāmkhya system has not undergone any remarkable alteration from the time of the definitive redaction of the Mahabhärata to that of the composition of our metho- dical text-books, and no important change could have taken place earlier; the whole character of this system which is self-consistent and evidently the work of one man, speaks against this assumption.56

Garbe also accepts the tradition that the sage Kapila was the historical founder of the system. Garbe admits that most references to Kapila are purely legendary, but he maintains the notion that the Sāmkhya system in its principal features is the work of one man.57 Then, too, the name of Gotama's birth place, Kapilavastu, is important, according to Garbe, as an indication of the possible region in which the sage Kapila did his work.58 Moreover, Garbe continues, the Samkhya system is not brahmanical. ... the doctrine of Kapila, although later numbered as a part of the great wisdom or knowledge of Brahmanism, was yet originally unbrahmanical - i.e., a Kşatriya philosophy.59

55. Ibid. 56. Ibid., p. iv. 57. Garbe, Die Sāmkhya Philosophie, op. cit., pp. 46-50. 58. Ibid., p.12. 59. Ibid., p.13. " .... die Lehre Kapilas, obwohl dieser in spāterer Zeit zu den grossen Weisen des Brahmanentums gezahlt wird, doch urs- prunglich unbrahmanisch, d.h. eine Ksatriya-Philosophie, gewesen sei."

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Here it is helpful to refer to Garbe's understanding of the essen- tial contents of the original Samkhya system of Kapila which goes back unchanged to ancient times. Garbe enumerates the main features as follows : ... the absolute differentiation of the spiritual and non- spiritual principles; the independence and eternity of matter (prakrti); the particulars of the doctrine of the constituents sattva, rajas and tamas; the emergence or development of the world out of primordial material; the conception that, first of all, the psychic organ deve- lops and then external things; the threefold nature of the psychic organ; the 25 principles; the doctrine of the subtle elements (tanmātras), of the subtle body (linga sarīra), of the dispositions (samskāras); the interpretation of the psychic process as first of all purely mechanical and only through the spiritual power of the soul raised into the process of consciousness; the denial of God; the thesis that salvation is attainable only through the discrimina- tion (viveka) of spirit and matter.60 None of these ideas, according to Garbe, can be found in the Brāhmaņas and Āranyakas.61 These notions thus originate in non-brahmanical circles. Some of the evidence for the rise of Sāmkhya in Ksatriya circles is as follows : (a) in the Bhāgavata Purāņa (III, XXI, 26) Kapila is said to descend from a Rājarși ;*

60. Garbe, Die Sāmkhya Philosophie, op. cit., p. 26. " ... die absolute Verschiedenheit des geistigen und des ungeistigen Prinzips; die Unabhängig- keit und Ewigkeit der Materie; die Einzelheiten der Lehre von den Konsti- tuenten Sattva, Rajas, und Tamas; die Entfaltung der Welt aus der Urmaterie: die Vorstellung, dass dabei zunächst die psychischen Organe und dann die Aussendinge entstehen; die Dreiheit der psychischen Organe; die fünfundz- wanzig Prinzipien; die Lehre von den feinen Elementen (tanmātra), von dem inneren Körper (linga-sarīra), von den Dispositionen (samskāras); die Auffassung der psychischen Vorgänge als zunächst rein mechanischer und nur durch die geistige Kraft der Seele ins Bewusstsein erhobener Prozese; die Gottesleugnung; der Satz, dass die Erlösung allein durch die Unterscheidung (viveka) von Geist und Materie erreichbar ist." 61. Ibid., p. 27. *This passage, it should be noted, gives such descent only through the maternal line.

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SAMKHYA 19

(b) the Buddha refers to the doctrine of Sanatkumāra, who is connected in the tradition to the Ksatriyas, on the one hand, and Samkhya-Yoga, on the other; (c) a passage in the Moksadharma sets forth five tradi- tions : Vedic, Sāmkhya, Yoga, Pāñcarātra and Pāśupata.62 With respect to the approximate time of the rise of the Sāmkhya, Garbe offers two assertions. First of all, the refer- ence in the Brahmajāla Sutta II, 1 ff., to the doctrine of sassata- vāda (Skt. śāśvata-vāda) is very close to the Sāmkhya notion of satkāryavāda and probably indicates the existence at that time of a Samkhya tradition.63 On the other hand, Garbe asserts that no distinctive Sāmķhya doctrines can be found in any pre-buddhistic, brahmanical literature.64 This obviously leads to the conclusion that the Samkhya was formulated in the period between the oldest. pre-buddhistic Upanisads (Brha- dāranyaka, Chāndogya, etc.) and the rise of the Buddhist tradi- tion. We know, says Garbe, from Jain as well as Buddhist sources that there were many schools which flourished in this ancient period.65 All of the above assertions indicate rather clearly how Garbe would view the so-called Sāmkhya passages in the "middle" Upanişads (Katha, Śvetāśvatara), the Mokșadharma, the Bhagavad Gita, Manu Smrti, etc. All references in these texts to Sāmkhya notions are

... durchaus keine ältere Form, keine Vorstufe des "klassi- schen," d. h., des wirklichen, reinen Sāmkhya ist, sondern eine unklare, zum Teil sinnlose Mischphilosophie.66

In his interpretation of the meaning of the Sāmkhya, Garbe stresses several noteworthy points. First of all, he emphasizes that Samkhya is atheistic. A god or gods play no part in the system of Kapila.67 Second, the Samkhya is remarkable,

62. Ibid., pp. 13-14. 63. Ibid., p. 15. 64. Ibid., p. 26. 65. Ibid., p. 15. 66. Ibid., p. 36 and pp. 52-65. 67. Ibid., pp. 253 ff.

20 CLASSICAL SĀŅKHYA

says Garbe, because it seeks to solve the problems of the universe and man simply by means of reason.68 Garbe even suggests at one point that the Samkhya should be of interest to those modern men whose primary interest is natural science.69 Third, Garbe rejects the notion of some scholars that Sāmkhya is a kind of idealism. He stresses, rather, that Samkhya is much closer to a naturalism, or a modified materialism.70 Garbe discusses the process of emergence including such notions as prakrti, buddhi, ahamkāra, etc., under the headings of "Cosm- ology" and "Physiology."71 Especially important in his inter- pretation is the closing section of Die Sāmkhya Philosophie, entitled "Soul in Itself," in which Garbe stresses the notion of "non- discrimination" as the cause of the bondage of purusa and prakrti.72 It should be noted, finally, that Garbe documents his interpret- ation mainly from the Sāmkhyapravacanasūtra with special reference to the commentaries of Aniruddha and Vijñānabhiksu. 73 Relatively little attention is given to the Sāmkhyakārikā and its commentaries. The main problem in Garbe's interpretation of the origin of Sāmkhya is, of course, lack of evidence. There are no sources other than popular tradition regarding the question of Kapila as the founder of Samkhya. Garbe himself admits that the references point to a legendary Kapila, and yet he adheres to the view that Kapila is the founder of the system. Moreover, there is no evidence that the Samkhya system was a finished system in ancient times. Not a single systematic Sāmkhya text survives from the ancient period. Garbe's view of the antiquity of the system and his view that Kapila was the founder are based primarily on his conjecture that such a unique system must have been the product of a single mind in ancient times. Such a priori reasoning does not shed much light on the actual Sanskrit texts themselves. Thus, Garbe's rejection of all

68. Ibid., p. 184. 69. Ibid., p. 185. 70. Ibid., p. 259. 71. Ibid., pp. 263-304; pp. 3-5-345. 72. Ibid., pp. 355 ff. 73. See e.g., Garbe's listing of parables and similes used in Sāmkhya texts, in Die Samkhya Philosophie, pp. 223-228. Note also his discussion of Sāmkhya terminology, ibid., pp. 229-231.

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SAMKHYA 21

attempts to find an "early Sāmkhya" or a "pre-classical" Sāmkhya is quite arbitrary and unwarranted. The same can be said of his view that the Samkhya is non-brahmanical. His assertion that no Sämkhya notions appear in pre-buddhistic brahma- nical texts is dependent upon his prior assumption that a Sāmkhya notion must. be accompanied by a rational Sāmkhya system. Of course, no such system appears in the ancient literature. On the other hand, if one looks for particular ideas or motifs and seeks to isolate a growing body of notions which eventually are codified into a finished Sāmkhya system, then one can find a number of helpful passages in the ancient brah- manical literature, as will be shown later. There is much more evidence in the Sanskrit texts themselves for this latter approach to the subject. The main problem with Garbe's view of the meaning of the Samkhya is closely related to his view of the origins of the system. He clearly perceives the importance of "discrimina- tion" (viveka or vijñāna) in comprehending the Sāmkhya view of salvation. Generally, however, Garbe understands the prob- lem of discrimination and non-discrimination purely in tradi- tional philosophical categories. As a result, in Garbe's view Samkhya becomes another rationalism in the history of thought. In fact, Garbe devotes a whole chapter in Die Sāmkhya Philo- sophie to comparing Samkhya with various forms of classical Western philosophy (e:g., Pythagoreanism, Platonism, Neo- platonism, etc.).74 Of course, Garbe is neither the first nor the last scholar to attempt such comparisons, and in some sense such an attempt is valuable and important. There are elements in the Samkhya which become clearer by means of a comparison with certain Western notions. Moreover, any Western inter- preter must come to any Indian religion or philosophy with his own philosophical and cultural heritage. The danger here, however, is that one runs the risk of superimposing one's own tradition on the Indian material. Garbe overlooks the reli- gious dimension of the Samkhya and emphasizes only its ration- alism. His emphasis on Sāmkhya as an atheism, a rationalism and a naturalism, which should appeal to every natural

74. Ibid., pp. 113-137.

22 CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA

scientist, clearly overlooks other and more important dimensions of the Sāmkhya.

Joseph Dahlmann Yet another view regarding the origin of the Sāmkhya comes from the work of the Jesuit scholar, Joseph Dahlmann. His Die Sāmkhya Philosophie als Naturlehre und Erlösungslehre, published in 1902, sets forth the argument that the original form of the Samkhya is available in the philosophical portions of the Mahābhārata.75 The epic Sāmkhya, says Dahlmann, both in its form and expression is identical with the classical Sāmkhya (of the Kārika) with one or two exceptions.76 The original epic Samkhya is theistic and is a natural outgrowth of the kinds of speculation found in the Brāhmanas and early Upa- nişads.77 In ancient speculation, according to Dahlmann, the focus was on the atman or Self and that which was not the Self. From this early dualism grew, on the one side, the Sām- khya, emphasizing the notions of purusa and prakrti, and also the Vedanta, emphasizing the atman as a unifying conception. Also from this ancient speculation, it is easy to understand the appearance of materialism, skepticism and, ultimately, Bud- dhism.78 The Samkhya according to Dahlmann, was the first systematic formulation of some of these ancient speculations. This early Sāmkhya included two dimensions : (1) a natural- istic cosmological-psychological system of creation and dis- solution,79 (2) a doctrine of salvation based on discrimination and a belief in an Absolute Spirit along with practical exercises for self-control and proper-conduct.80 In other words, accord- ing to Dahlmann, the original Samkhya was the theistic or absolutistic Sāmkhyayoga as found in some passages of the Mahā- bhärata. Only later did an atheistic Samkhya appear which asserted the notion of a plurality of souls. It was also at a

75. Joseph Dahlmann, Die Samkhya Philosophie als Naturlehre und Erlösungslehre (Berlin : Felix L. Dames, 1902), pp. 1-19. 76. Ibid., pp. 6-7. 77. Ibid., pp. 12-13. 78. Ibid., pp. 180 ff and pp. 251 ff. 79. Ibid., pp. 45 ff and pp. 79 ff. 80. Ibid., pp. 9-10.

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SAMKHYA 23

later time that a separation occurred between Sāmkhya and Yoga. Originally the two were one system.81 Dahlmann's attempt to find the seeds of Sāmkhya in the ancient brahmanical literature is sound, and, as will become evident below, is the direction of the most fruitful research regarding the origins of Sāmkhya. One wonders, however, how Dahlmann can claim that the philosophic passages of the Mahābhārata present not only a uniform formulation but also the most original formulation of the Sāmkhya. As will be shown in the next Chapter, the epic passages which contain Sāmkhya conceptions and terms are quite diverse. To claim a uniform system in such a confusing variety of views is to do an injustice to the Sanskrit texts.

Paul Oltramare

A few years after the publication of Dahlmann's Die Sāmkhya Philosophie, Paul Oltramare came out with the first volume of his L'Histoire des Idées Théosophiques dans L'Inde. The subtitle of the first volume is "La Theosophie Brahmanique" and a sizeable portion of the work is devoted to an exposition of the history and significance of the Sāmkhya.82 Methodologically, Oltramare follows Garbe in that he describes the Sämkhya system as a unified entity which under- went little change from the earliest times to the late Sāmkhya- pravacana-sūtra with the commentaries of Aniruddha and Vijñānabhiksu. As a result, Oltramare, like Garbe, ranges over all the texts of the Samkhya indiscriminately in construct- ing his interpretation. Thus, the criticisms which the present writer directed to Garbe on this point are equally applicable here. Oltramare departs from Garbe, however, in regard to the nature of the Sāmkhya dualism. Garbe, says Oltramare, sees the dualism in terms of the differentiation of matter and spirit.83 Such a dualism is quite radical, says Oltramare, and may be

81. Ibid., pp. 5-10. 82. Paul Oltramare, L'Histoire des Idées Théosophiques dans L'Inde, Tome Premier, "La Theosophie Brahmanique" (Paris : Ernest Leroux, 1906), pp. 219-290. 83. Ibid., pp. 221-222.

24 OLASSICAL SĀMKHYA

the reason why Garbe could find no trace of such a radical conception in the older Upanisads or other brahmanical literature. In other words, this may have led Garbe to look for an independent origin for the Sāmkhya. If, however, one sees the basic dualism of the Sāmkhya, Oltramare continues, in terms of Being (l'Etre) and Becoming (le Devenir), then it is possible to view the Sämkhya as being a further step in the brahmanical tradition.

I will try to show that at the base of the Samkhya, there is less an opposition between matter and spirit, than an opposition between Being (and that which is), on the one hand, and Becoming (and that which becomes), on the other. If such was, in fact, the fundamental posi- tion of the Samkhya, one would not see why this doctrine would not be able to take its birth in the context prepared by the ancient Upanisads, in reaction against some of the tendencies which had their more complete expres- sion in the Vedånta, but which are rather more ancient than the system of that name.84

Moreover, says Oltramare, there are a number of motifs in the Samkhya which are obviously derivative-i.e., the three gunas are not numbered in the twenty-five principles; also, the doc- trine of the prãnas or breaths has no meaningful place, etc.,- and make it difficult to argue forcefully for the independent origin of the system.35 Of course, says Oltramare, the Sāmkhya is nevertheless a unique system. Even though it grew up in the brahmanical tradition, it represents a strong reaction against and a radical reworking of the themes in that tradition.86 It might be added at this point that Oltramare views the Samkhya

84. Ibid., p. 222. "J'essaierai de montrer qu'à la base du Sankhya, il y a moins une opposition entre la matiere et l'esprit, qui une opposition entre l'Être (et ce qui est), d'une part, et le Devenir (et ce qui devient), d'autre part. Si telle fut en realité la position fondamentale du Sankhya, on ne voit pas pourquoi cette doctrine n'aurait pu prendre, naissance dans le terrain preparé par les anciennes Upanisad, en reaction contre des tendances qui ont leur expression la plus complete dans le Vedanta, mais qui sont bien plus anciennes que le systeme de ce nom." 85. Ibid., p. 223 and p. 244. 86. Ibid.

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SAMKHYA 25

and Yoga as originally separate schools, the Yoga being older. Later, Yoga thinkers "annexed" the Sāmkhya theoretical prin- ciples in order to systematize their practical techniques and ascetic exercises.87 In interpreting the significance of the Sāmkhya, Oltramare focuses his discussion around his view of the nature of the Sām- khya dualism. He suggests that there are two basic hypotheses in the Sämkhya conception.88 First of all, there is the onto- logical notion of becoming. Cosmologically, physiologically and psychologically, everything is in a state of change or becom- ing.89 This is the basic meaning of prakrti, the gunas, the process of emergence, transmigration, etc. This continuing process is not an illusion or a product of the imagination; it is quite real. On the other hand, however, the Sāmkhya affirms another principle which is basically teleological, and which is simple, eternal and stable. This second principle is simply the fact of pure being in the deepest selfhood of a creature, the fact for which all becoming takes place, and the fact by which all becoming is intelligible.90 In other words, the Sāmkhya dual- ism, according to Oltramare, centres around Becoming (le Devenir) and Being (l'Etre), around change and permanence, or around an ontological and a teleological principle. Finally, Oltramare interprets the atheism of the Sāmkhya as referring to a high god or omniscient deity. There is no place for an all-encompassing god in the dualism of Being and Becoming. Oltramare then adds, however, that the Sāmkhya does not deny individual gods. Frequent references are made in the texts, says Oltramare, to various well-known Indian gods but they are all included in the notion of Becoming.91 The major difficulty in Oltramare's work, as mentioned briefly above, is that it is historically uncritical. One gets the impression that the Samkhya emerged suddenly full-grown in ancient Indian thought. Moreover, Oltramare would have us believe that this unique system changed very little over a

87. Ibid., p. 304. 88. Ibid., p. 226. 89. Ibid. 90. Ibid., p. 230. 91. Ibid., pp. 268-271.

26 CLASSICAL SĀŅKHYA

millennium of Indian history. Such assumptions have little support in the Sanskrit texts, as will be shown later. Worth noting is the fact that Oltramare documents his interpretation of the Sämkhya almost exclusively from the late commen- taries of Aniruddha and Vījñānabhikșu. With respect to the problem of the meaning of the Sām- khya, however, Oltramare offers at least two provocative and valuable insights. His attempts to rethink the nature of the Sāmkhya dualism is an extremely productive step. He rejects previous attempts to interpret the Sāmkhya dualism in terms of dualisms in Western thought. As a result, he tries to interpret the Samkhya dualism on its own terms. He rightly sees that the two principles of the dualism are not of the same order. Rather, one is ontological, and the other teleological. Unfor- tunately, Oltramare does not fully work through all of the implications of this, but his discussion at least provides a fresh perspective. A second helpful insight in Oltramare's discussion is that the atheism of the Samkhya does not apply to individual gods. The Samkhya did not deny the existence of the gods in the traditional Indian pantheon. What the Samkhya did was to reinterpret the place and function of these gods in such a way that they were rendered irrelevant with respect to the basic problem of man's salvation. In Chapter III the present writer will pursue some of the issues raised here in greater depth.

Hermann Oldenberg A more careful and less biased view of the origin and significance of the Samkhya is presented by the great Indologist, Hermann Oldenberg. Although most noted for his work in the Vedas and in Buddhism, his contribution to the problems of the Samkhya is also significant. Among his many publi- cations, two are of special interest with respect to the present discussion. One is his Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfänge des Buddhismus, and the other is his extended article, "Zur Geschichte der Samkhya-Philosophie," in the NGWG, 1918.92

92. Hermann Oldenberg, Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfänge des Buddhismus (Gottingen : Vandenhoech and Ruprecht, 1915), pp.206- 258; and "Zur Geschichte der Samkhya-Philosophie", Nachrichten von der königlichen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften zu Göttingen, Philologisch-historische Klasse aus dem Jahre, 1917 (Berlin : Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1918), pp. 218-253.

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SAMKHYA 27

The latter was written in direct response to the publication of the revised edition of Garbe's Die Sāmkhya Philosophie in 1917. Oldenberg contends in opposition to Garbe that there was a "pre-classical Sāmkhya" (vorklassische Sāmkhya) which can be seen in the middle and younger Upanisads - i.e., Katha, Śvetāśvatara, Maitrāyaņīya, etc. - and in the philosophical portions of the Mahābhārata-i.e., the Bhagavad Gitā, Moksadharma, etc.93 All of the systems of Indian thought developed over a long period of time, and the Sāmkhya is no exception.94 There are no texts, says Oldenberg, which testify to the existence of the fully developed classical Samkhya in the ancient period. On the other hand, there are a number of texts which clearly indi- cate the beginning of Samkhya-like speculation and form what might be called a "pre-classical" Sāmkhya. In the oldest Upanisads, according to Oldenberg, a kind of dualism is already recognizable. This is the dualism of unity and multiplicity, subject and object, self and non-self.95 The emphasis of course in these oldest Upanisads - e.g., Brhadāranyaka and Chāndogya - centres around the notion of unity and the atman. In time, however, the ancient thinkers grew concerned about what was not the self- i.e., the world or nature. This growing concern, says Olden- berg, was quite undramatic. It was, rather, a plodding, search- ing quest.96 The results of these speculations begin to appear in the Katha Upanisad, and one finds there some of the first technical terms of the Sāmkhya. One finds the avyakta (the unmanifest), the purusa (or self), and many of the principles of the Samkhya -e.g., in III. 9-11, indriya, manas, buddhi, etc.97 One also finds in the Katha some striking differences from the later classical Sāmkhya. For example, ahamkāra is missing; buddhi and mahān ātmā are distinguished; and, most of all, purusa is understood in terms of Brahman.98 In other

93. Oldenberg, "Zur Geschichte .. ."op. cit. p. 218. 94. Ibid., p. 220. 95. Ibid., p. 224. 96. Oldenberg, Die Lehre der Upan. ... ,op. cit., p. 207. 97. Oldenberg, "Zur Geschichte, ... ," op. cit. p. 222. 98. Ibid., p. 223.

28 CLASSICAL SAMKHYA

words, this "pre-classical" Sāmkhya retains a conception of the Absolute, and, in places, almost a kind of gracious deity. A more theistic interpretation of the same "pre-classical" Sām- khya, says Oldenberg, can be seen in the Svetāśvatara Upanişad and in the Bhagavad Gitā.99 In the Moksadharma one finds a further development of the "pre-classical" Sāmkhya, but not yet the full classical form. Most often, says Oldenberg, twenty-five principles are enume- rated in the Moksadharma. The twenty-fifth principle includes the double notion of the individual purusas and the cosmic purusa.100 When occasionally reference is made to a twenty- sixth principle, this is meant simply as an indication of the released purusa in contrast to the bound purusa.101 The doc- trine of the plurality of purusas is a classical doctrine, and comes much later. With respect to the rise of Buddhism, Oldenberg suggests that the "pre-classical" Samkhya exercised a slight influence on that heterodoxy. Oldenberg stresses, however, that the Sām- khya and Buddhism are more dissimilar than similar, again vigorously disagreeing with Garbe.102

Concludes Oldenberg, The foregoing discussions on the history of the Sāmkhya result in the view that this doctrine has developed in a direct line out of the Brahman-atman speculation of the old Upanisads.103

The main problem in Oldenberg's analysis is that he has somewhat oversimplified the problem of the development of the Sāmkhya. To be sure, as a result of Oldenberg's work, there are strong arguments for a "pre-classical" Sāmkhya. Yet a "pre- classical" Samkhya still has overtones of a unified, monolithic

99 Ibid., pp. 226 ff., pp. 233 ff. 100. Ibid., pp. 235-240. 101. Ibid. 102. Ibid., pp. 240-245. 103. Ibid., p. 248. "Die hier vorgelegten Erörterungen zur Geschichte des Samkhya schliessen die Auffassung in sich, dass diese Lehre sich in gerader Linie aus der Brahman-Ätman-Spekulation der alten Upanishden entwichelt hat."

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SĀMKHYA 29

system. In other words, Oldenberg gives the impression that there was indeed one "pre-classical" Sāmkhya system which may be found with minor variants in the Katha, Śvetāśvatara, Bhagavad Gītā, Mokșadharma, etc. This view seems forced, especially when Oldenberg deals with the Moksadharma. The texts would seem to suggest, rather, as will be shown later, that there were a number of pre-classical Sāmkhya speculations.

Arthur Berriedale Keith A careful discussion of the origin and development of the Sāmkhya is to be found in the work of A. Berriedale Keith.104 In the history of scholarship concerning the Sāmkhya, Keith's contribution continues to have influence, even in recent studies. 105 With respect to the origin of the Samkhya, says Keith, it is quite unnecessary to look outside of the orthodox Vedic frame- work. The Samkhya system is most naturally derived out of the speculations in the Vedas, Brāhmanas and Upanisads.106 To be sure, one cannot find the full classical system in any one of the Upanisads, but that is because the system was not in its final form in these earlier centuries. One cannot find clear evidence for the system as a whole much before some later portions of the Moksadharma, and even there some of the minor classical doctrines had not yet developed.107 No clear state- ment of the full classical system is available before the Sāmkhya- kārikā of Iśvarakrsna, which Keith dates in the early centuries A.D.108 Keith likewise favours a late date for the systemati- zation of the Yoga by Patañjali, and even sees the composition of rogasūtra as a direct response to the systematization of the classical Sāmkhya by Īśvarakrșņa.109 In addition, Keith sees

104. Among Keith's many works, only two are especially helpful for the present discussion : Arthur Berriedale Keith. The Samkhya System (Calcutta : Y.M.C.A. Publishing House, second edition, 1949); and The Religion and Philosophy of the Veda and Upanishads (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1925; Harvard Oriental Series, Vols. 31 and 32), Vol 2, pp. 489-551. 105. Frauwallner, op. cit., I, p. 471. 106. Keith, The Sāmkhya System, op. cit., p. 8. 107. Ibid., p. 65. 108. Ibid., pp. 83-86. 109. Ibid., p. 70.

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the Tattvasamāsa and the Sāmkhyapravacanasūtra as very late works -i.e., post 10th century A.D.110 The two key notions of the Samkhya, according to Keith, are the following : (1) the dropping away or denial of the Absolute with the consequent emphasis on the individual soul (puruşa); (2) the theory of the principles or "evolutes" emerg- ing out of prakrti. (1) The first notion, according to Keith, can probably be traced back to the Yājñavalkya doctrine in the Brhadāranyaka in which the Self becomes a pure, abstract Subject. Such an empty conception of the Absolute Self could easily have led to an attempt to find the self closer to hand - i.e., in purusa. Moreover, Keith suggests some interesting parallels between the notion of the Self in Yājñavalkya and in the Sāmkhya : (a) both are inactive and without qualities; (b) both are bare abstractions; (c) both are wholly separated from empirical existence.111 (2) The second key notion-i.e., principles or "evolutes" -can most easily be derived from the old creation theory in which the Absolute creates the world and then enters into it as the first-born. Keith points to the ancient Hiranyagarbha motif in RV. X. 121 as well as references to similar theories in the Brahmanas, together with the creation theory as found in Chandogya VI. 2 as possible contexts from which the Samkhya notion of nature and "evolutes" could have taken rise.112 In addition, Keith traces the origins of the guna- theory back to Chāndogya VI. 4 and to the later Śvetāśvatara IV.113 Moreover, the Samkhya notions of ignorance and salvation by knowledge clearly reflect an Upanisadic heritage. In all of this, Keith does not suggest that any Upanisad has attained a Samkhya point of view. No clear basis for the Sāmkhya is available from these texts. It is, however, possible, says Keith,

... to indicate the mode in which the conception of the absolute tended to fade away and to leave the individual spirits confronted with nature.114

110. Ibid., pp. 109-112. 111. Keith, Religion and Philosophy ... , op. cit, p. 536. 112. Ibid., pp, 524-525; and The Sāmkhya System, pp. 6-9. 113. Ibid., p. 540. 114. Ibid., p. 535.

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SAMKHYA 31

Keith then examines terms or notions in the so-called "middle" Upanisads : Kațha, Śvetāśvatara, Muņdaka, Īśa, etc. These texts exhibit the influence of some kind of "pre-classical" Sämkhya formulation, or at least the beginnings of such formula- tions. Here notions about the emergence or "evolution" of the principles are present as well as references to the gunas.115 The "middle" Upanisads, however, says Keith, tend to be theistic or even absolutistic and thus do not yet really represent a classical Sāmkhya.116 In his discussion of the Moksadharma and other philoso- phical portions of the epic, Keith stresses that there are many different kinds of speculation in the epic, and that there is a dominant theistic tinge throughout, along with many Vedantic ideas.117 Nevertheless says Keith, one can find references to a Sāmkhya system made up of twenty-five principles along with the rather clear denial of god or an absolute (M. Bh. XII. 289, 1 ff .; and XII. 294. 27 ff.).118 According to these epic passages, says Keith, Yoga is differentiated from Sāmkhya. The Yoga accepts a twenty-sixth principle - i.e., the Lord, Isvara - which makes it clearly theistic.119 Summing up his discussion of Samkhya in the epic, Keith concludes,

... it is, apart from efforts made by the epic to torture it into more orthodox pantheism, a system which denies an absolute, and asserts instead a multiplicity of individual souls, but in the epic, as far as we can judge, it is still without some of the more characteristic of its minor doc- trines and has not yet achieved the completeness which mark its classical form.120

Exactly how and when the Samkhya system was formulated is impossible to determine, concludes Keith, but that it

115. Keith, The Sāmkhya System, op. cit., pp. 10-23. 116. Ibid. 117. Ibid., pp. 36-37. 118. Keith, Religion and Philosophy, op. cit., p. 543. 119. Keith, The Sāmkhya System, op. cit., p. 39. 120. Ibid., p. 65.

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owes its origin to the Vedic-Upanisadic-epic heritage is quite evident.121 Regarding the meaning or significance of the Sāmkhya, Keith sees the system as a bundle of contradictions. By drop- ping away the conception of the absolute, the Sāmkhya is left with nature, on the one side, and a plurality of purusas, on the other. Since, however, the purusa is described in categories which have meaning only in connection with an absolute Self, the notion of a plurality of purusas is absurd and shows the derivative nature of the system.122 Then, too, the thorough- going dualism of the Samkhya renders the whole system im- possible. If the connection between prakrti and purușa causes suffering, then there is no suffering, for there really is no con- nection. Even lack of discrimination or a doctrine of illusion cannot free the Samkhya from its ultimate absurdity.

The spirit not being really connected with nature, there is no ground on which there can be produced the lack of discrimination of spirit and nature which causes bondage.123 Or, again, But the ignorance which must be dispelled in the Sāmkhya is the belief in a connection which does not exist, and the Samkhya philosophy never suggests that the misery of the universe is due to the belief : it is only possible because of the connection: ignorance does not produce the connection: therefore logically there is no misery.124

Thus Keith views the Samkhya as an illogical, absurd outgrowth of earlier speculations in the Vedas and Upanişads. Keith's analysis of the origins of the Sāmkhya is helpful to the extent that he traces a number of key concepts back to the Vedic tradition. Keith is right in pointing out that there was no finished Sāmkhya system in ancient times as Garbe had sug- gested. There simply is no evidence for such a completed

121. Keith discusses at length the relationship of Samkhya and Buddhism in The Sāmkhya System, pp. 24-34. He points to a number of "striking" similarities, but he chooses not to take a position regarding mutual influence because of insufficient data. 122. Ibid., p. 107. 123. Ibid., p. 108. 124. Religion and Philosophy, Keith, op. cit., p. 540.

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SAMKHYA 33

system. Rather, one sees in the ancient texts a number of diverse notions and terms which were later brought together to form the Sāmkhya system. The major problem in Keith's analysis is that his view of the meaning of the Sāmkhya is oversimplified. He simply dis- misses the whole system as a derivative bundle of contradictions without seriously trying to comprehend and evaluate the nature of the Sāmkhya dualism and the Sāmkhya doctrine of release. Keith is not very sensitive to the religious issues in the system. His discussion of the content of the Kārikā is little more than a listing of the principal topics mentioned by Iśvarakrsna. As a result, his exposition and interpretation of the meaning of the system is inadequate.

Franklin Edgerton A truly unique and refreshing interpretation of the origin of the Samkhya is to be found in the work of Franklin Edgerton.125 All of Indian thought, begins Edgerton, is "practical in its motive."

If it seeks truth, it is not for the sake of the truth as an abstract end in itself; it is for the sake of the salvation which that truth is believed to bring with it.126

In ancient Indian thought, Edgerton continues, several different ways or methods of salvation were developed. He points to Bhagavad Gita 6. 46-47 in which some of these methods or ways are summarized. Here are mentioned salvation by (1) "disciplined activity;" (2) "knowledge;" (3) "asceticism;" (4) "ritual;" (5) "devotion." 127 Of these various methods of salvation, Sāmkhya is nothing more or less than "salvation by knowing." In the ancient texts, says Edgerton, there simply is no Samkhya system. Nowhere is there a suggestion that it (Sāmkhya) - or

125. Franklin Edgerton, "The Meaning of Samkhya and Yoga," AJP, XLV, L, No 177, 1924, pp. 1-46; and The Beginnings of Indian Philosophy (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1965). 126. Edgerton, "The Meaning of Samkhya ... ," op. cit., p. 1. 127. Ibid., p. 5.

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Yoga either - means any particular system of meta- physical truth.128

Or, again,

In the Gītā Sāmkhya and Yoga are not metaphysical, speculative systems, not what we should call philosophies at all, but ways of gaining salvation; that and nothing else. Moreover, that and nothing else is what they are in all Indian literature until a late time,- until far down into the Christian era.129

When Edgerton refers to the Samkhya as a method of salvation by knowing, he means "knowing" in the sense that it developed in the brahmanical tradition. By "knowing" the ritual of the sacrifice, for example, one could compel the gods.130 By "knowing" that one's own self (atman) is identical with the supreme first principle (brahman), one could control or comprehend the entire cosmos. This kind of "knowing" is, of course, magical, but in time the notion becomes much more sophisticated.131 Speculations become varied and diverse, as can be seen in the Upanisads and in the philosophical texts of the Mahābhārata. "Knowing," thus, becomes a dominant and powerful method of salvation, and it takes many forms. Sāmkhya, however, is simply the term used for the method, regardless of the content of the knowing.

Any formula of metaphysical truth, provided that know- ledge thereof was conceived to tend towards salvation, might be called Sāmkhya.132 It appears, then, that Samkhya means in the Upanisads and the Epic simply the way of salvation by knowledge, and does not imply any system of metaphysical truth whatever.133

128. Ibid. 129. Ibid., p. 6. 130. Edgerton, The Beginnings of Indian Philosophy, op. cit., p. 24 ff. 131. Ibid. 132. Edgerton, "The Meaning of Samkhya ... ," op. cit., p. 16. 133. Ibid., p. 32.

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SAMKHYA 35

Not only does Edgerton reject the idea that the Sāmkhya was a metaphysical system in ancient times, he also rejects the idea that the Samkhya was atheistic or non-absolutistic. He interprets aniśvara in Mbh. 12.289.3 - the text which is usually cited as evidence for an atheistic Sāmkhya -simply as "soul" or "highest self" rather than as "he who has no lord."134 Edgerton also points out that the Sämkhya passages in the ancient texts frequently accept the Upanisadic doctrine of the Self or Absolute.135 Thus, the only characteristic of Samkhya which can be found in the ancient texts is that it was the method of salvation by knowing. Similarly, the Yoga in the ancient texts is simply the method of salvation by "doing" or "discipline."136 Moreover, Samkhya does not mean more than a method of salvation by knowing until the time of the Sāmkhyakārikā of Iśvarakrsņa.

It was only after the formulation of the system of the Kārikas, and precisely as a result thereof, that the name Sāmkhya came to be associated exclusively with the doctrines of plurality of souls and no world-soul.137

Only then did the Samkhya become associated with a particular system of thought. Edgerton's analysis is helpful in clearing away many of the cobwebs left from earlier scholarship regarding the origins and interpretation of the Sāmkhya. His analysis is rooted in the Sanskrit texts, and serves as a needed corrective to the earlier theorizing without evidence. He is right in emphasiz- ing that the ancient Samkhya was a method of salvation by knowing and that this methodology grew out of the early speculations in the Vedas and Upanisads. He is right also in emphasizing the practical nature of this ancient Indian thought. This was not "knowing" in the sense of the disinterested quest for philosophic truth. This, rather, was "knowing" that was useful and powerful for a man's salvation or destiny.

134. Ibid., pp. 11-12. 135. Ibid., p. 22. 136. Ibid., pp. 37 ff. 137. Ibid., p.' 34.

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The problem in Edgerton's analysis is that he carries his point too far. It is one thing to hold out for a view of ancient Samkhya which focuses on its religious significance as a method of salvation. It is quite another thing to suggest that this ancient method remained unconnected with any systematic formulation up to the time of Isvarakrsna. That is pushing a point beyond reasonable limits. There are passages in the Moksadharma, for example, as will be shown later, in which it is quite clear that the Sämkhya is connected with a specific sys- tem of thought. This is also true in some passages of the Gitā. In other words, the Sāmkhya does take on a systematic shape before Iśvarakrsna. To deny this would be to do an injustice to the texts. Edgerton's zeal to overcome the blunders of ear- lier excesses in speculations about the origin of the Sāmkhya led him to go too far in the other direction.

Surendranath Dasgupta One of the most penetrating analyses of the origins and significance of the Samkhya is that of the well-known Indian historian of thought, Surendranath Dasgupta.138 His view of the relationship of Samkhya and Yoga is quite clearly manifest in his title to Chapter VII: "The Kāpila and the Pātañjala Sāmkhya." Moreover, his view of the relationship of Sāmkhya- Yoga to Buddhism and Jainism is quite clearly manifest in the following: ... the Sämkhya-Yoga philosophy as we now get it is a system in which are found all the results of Buddhism and Jainism in such a manner that it unites the doctrine of permanence of the Upanisads with the doctrine of momentariness of the Buddhists and the doctrine of relativism of the Jains.139 With respect to the origins of the Samkhya one can summarize Dasgupta's view under several basic points: (1) The major ideas and terms of the Sāmkhya clearly come from the Vedic-Upanisadic heritage.140

138. Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press, 1922), I, pp. 208-273 Philosophy

139. Ibid., p. 212. 140. Ibid., p. 211.

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SAMKHYA 37

(2) There were probably many schools of Sāmkhya in the period between the end of the oldest Upanisads and the composition of the "middle" Upanisads. Dasgupta points to a reference in Gunaratna's com- mentary to Saddarsanasamuccaya which mentions at least two ancient Samkhya schools: (a) the Maulikya (original) and (b) the Uttara (later).141 (3) An older school of Såmkhya can be seen in the Caraka Samhitā and in the doctrines of Pañcasikha in Mahābhārata 12.219. This school accepted only twenty-four principles. It included purusa within the avyakta or prakrti. It had no theory of the gunas, and the ultimate salvation state was a kind of unconscious annihilation.142 (4) The Samkhya was probably theistic originally. Dasgupta cites here the content of Sastitantra, which is purported to be an old Sāmkhya textbook (but now lost), as described in the Ahirbudhnya Samhita. In the description, says Dasgupta, it is obvious that the Samkhya is theistic. Dasgupta concludes, then, that the Samkhya went through three stages : (a) theistic stage as seen in the Sastitantra; (b) an atheistic stage as seen in the Samkhya school of Caraka and Pañcaśikha; (c) final atheistic stage as seen in Iśvarakrșņa's Sāņkhyakārikā.143 (5) In the Moksadharma portion of the epic (Chap. 304) three schools of Sāmkhya are described. (a) a school holding to twenty-four principles which is probably the school of Caraka and Pañcaśikha; (b) a school holding to twenty-five principles which is the classical Sāmkhya; (c) a school holding to twenty-six principles which is the Yoga.144

141. Ibid., p. 217. 142. Ibid., pp. 213-217. 143. Ibtd., 219-221. 144. Ibid., p. 217.

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(6) Patañjali, the author of the roga Sūtras is the same as the grammarian of the same name, and, thus, lived about the middle of the second century B.C. The fourth book of the roga Sutra, however, is a later addition and cannot be attributed to Patañjali. Vyasa, the famous commentator to the rogasūtra, worked around 400 A.D. The Patañjali rogasūtras, therefore, says Dasgupta, is one of the oldest and most important sources for a knowledge of Sāmkhya.145 (7) Iśvarakrsna can be safely dated around 200 A.D. or a little later. His Sāmkhyakārikā is the classical state- ment of the Samkhya view.146 (8) The Sāmkhyapravacanasūtra and the Tattvasamāsa are both late works, i.e., 14th or 15th cent. A.D.147 (9) Vijñănabhiksu, the commentator to the late Sāmkhya- pravacanasūtra, offers the most satisfactory explana- tions of key Sāmkhya doctrines. Many difficult points of interpretation can only be cleared up by resorting to Vijñānabhikșu's discussion.148 Gene- rally, Dasgupta follows this commentator in his own exposition of the Sāmkhya.

Dasgupta's exposition of the content of the Samkhya system is provocative and ingenious. He views the gunas as "reals," and translates them as "intelligence-stuff," "energy-stuff," and "mass-stuff."149 When in a state of equilibrium, these "reals" are known as prakrti. When this equilibrium is disturbed by the proximity of purusa, the process of creation takes place. Purusa, says Dasgupta, by its presence "intelligizes" these "reals" or "subtle stuffs" and renders creation possible.150 Purusa is the pure consciousness which illuminates or "intelligizes" the unconscious prakrti. The first evolute of prakrti is buddhi, which is made up primarily of sattva or "intelli- gence-stuff." This sattva closely resembles the pure conscious-

145. Ibid., pp. 229-232. 146. Ibid., p. 212. 147. Ibid. 148. Ibid., pp. 223-225. 149. Ibid., p. 244. 150. Ibid., p. 240.

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SĀMKHYA 39

ness of purusa, and thus is a fit medium for the reflection of purușa. This cosmic buddhi contains in itself potentially all individual buddhis and is the presupposition of every individual "thisness," both mental and physical.151 The next evolute is ahamkāra or ego which makes possible the notion of "I" or "mine". In its sāttvika dimension it becomes the ten sense functions and mind. In its tāmasika dimension it becomes the subtle essence of the gross physical world. Its rājasika dimension provides the requisite energy for the process of evolution.152 Knowledge is made up of mental images or pictures which are like photographs of external things. These images are material in nature- "compositions or complexes of subtle mind-substance." This whole process of evolution and cognition is for the sake of purusa. In other words, prakrti is teleological and functions for the enjoyment and liberation of the purusa.153 Suffering arises, says Dasgupta, because of ignorance (avidyā). This ignorance occurs when the equilibrium of the three gunas is first disturbed by the presence of purusa. When the buddhi appears, it is immediately bound up with purusa, whose nature as pure consciousness made its appearance possible. Says Dasgupta: Buddhi resembles purusa in transparency, and the purusa fails to differentiate itself from the modifications of the buddhi, and as a result of this nondistinction the purusa becomes bound down to the buddhi. .. 154 This non-distinction of purusa from buddhi which is itself a mode of buddhi is what is meant by avidyā in Sāmkhya, and is the root of all experience and all misery.155 To eliminate the suffering, says Dasgupta, it is necessary to remove this non-distinction or ignorance which lies at the base of human existence. This ignorance can be removed by know- ing the principles of the Samkhya system -i.e., knowing that purușa is apart from everything that is prakrti. This knowledge arises in the buddhi.

151. Ibid., pp. 248-249. 152. Ibid., pp. 249-250. 153. Ibid., p. 247. 154. Ibid., p. 260. 155. Ibid.

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... when this true conception of purusa arises in the buddhi, it feels itself to be different, and distinct, from and quite unrelated to purușa, and thus ignorance is destroyed.156 As a result of that, buddhi turns its back on purusa and can no longer bind it to its experiences, which are all irrevoc- ably connected with sorrow, and thus purusa remains in its true form.157 This knowledge or realization which arises in the buddhi, says Dasgupta, is sufficient to bring about salvation or release in the Sāmkhya. Finally, with respect to Yoga, Dasgupta points out that this knowledge or realization is not sufficient for salvation. In Yoga one must also eliminate the samskāras, and the ex- perience of salvation follows only upon rigorous self-discipline and asceticism.158 In other words, the method of salvation is quite different. Dasgupta is quite right in emphasizing that there were probably a number of schools or, at least, traditions of Sām- khya in ancient times. As will be shown later, the texts tend to support a view which accepts a number of differing lines of Samkhya thought. That the Samkhya of Caraka-Pañca- śikha, however, is an older atheistic line which represents a transition between an original Sāmkhya theism and a later classical atheism, is pushing the evidence much too far. Such a neat scheme has no solid basis at all in the texts. Like- wise, Dasgupta's attempt to identify the Patañjali of the Yoga- sutras with the older grammarian of the same name fails to convince. Dasgupta's arguments only suggest that there is no definite reason for not identifying them. The only positive reason for identifying them, however, is that they have the same name. Such is slim evidence indeed ! Dasgupta's analysis of the content of Sāmkhya suffers from lack of historical perspective. He offers, of course, a truly penetrating and stimulating exposition of a Samkhya theory. He is usually dependent, however, on the late Sāmkhyaprava- canasūtra and the commentary of Vijnanabhiksu. He does

156. Ibid., p. 265. 157. Ibid. 158. Ibid., p. 266.

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SAMKHYA 41

not take seriously the fact that these later accounts differ signi- ficantly from the classical account in the Kārikā. He thus im- poses a later systematic treatment of the Sāmkhya on the ear- lier classical text, and by so doing distorts the original meaning. More than this, Dasgupta frequently imposes or inserts his own speculations in order to fill in that which is missing in the Sāmkhya texts themselves. For example, he attempts to set forth what the doctrine of the gunas must have been in order to be consistent, even though the texts fail to spell out many of the details of the doctrine. In the final analysis, one is dealing not with original Sāmkhya, classical Sāmkhya or later Sāmkhya. One, rather, is dealing with the Sāmkhya of Das- gupta. Such an analysis which tends to overlook important historical distinctions, even though philosophically interesting, is not very helpful in regard to'the understanding of the classical Sāņkhya.

E. H. Johnston Of prime importance for the study of the Sāmkhya is E. H. Johnston's Early Samkhya, published in 1937.159 Although this work is not concerned with the classical Samkhya-i.e., it is limited to an analysis of pre-classical Sāmkhya terms and texts - nevertheless, it is basic for comprehending the history of Samkhya speculations. Johnston's conclusions reveal the complexity of the problems surrounding the history of the Sāmkhya, and his careful examination of key terms offers fresh insights on a number of issues of interpretation. With respect to the origins of Sāmkhya, Johnston points to the speculations of the Brāhmanas and earliest Upanisads in which one observes a concern for discovering the essential nature of the individual along with a concern for the nature of life after death.160 Already in Satapatha Brāhmaņa X, 1, 3, 4, says Johnston, one finds speculation concerning the five "immortal" and the five "mortal" parts of the individual, which is probably one of the first hints of the later doctrine of the material and mental components or principles of the

Society, 1937). 159. E. H. Johnston, Early Sāmkhya (London : The Royal Asiatic

160. Ibid., p. 18.

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individual. Johnston then traces these ancient speculations and their varieties. He finally refers to the Yājñavalkya- Maitreyi dialogue in the Brhadāranyaka in which one finds men- tion of the five organs of sense, the five organs of action, and manas (mind).161 In addition, says Johnston, one finds also in this Upanisad references to vijñāna, which later becomes buddhi in the Sämkhya scheme, as well as references to the five objects of the senses. Thus, concludes Johnston, seventeen of' the final twenty-three principles of prakrti are already present in the Brhadāranyaka. Concern now, however, is no longer with "mortal" and "immortal " parts. It is, rather, a quest for an analysis of the corporeal individual.162 Of course, says Johnston, none of these speculations in the oldest texts can be called Sāmkhya, but they do at least give a clear indication of the context from which the Sāmkhya emerged. This analysis of the evidence shows that Samkhya is rooted in the speculations of the Brahmanas and the oldest Upanisads about the constitution of the individual, and that as is generally agreed, its formulation took place at the earliest in the interval that separates the oldest group of Upanisads from the middle group, subject to the possibility that certain passages in the former may be subsequent to that event.163 Johnston also asserts that Buddhism arose before the forma- tion of early Samkhya. As evidence he discusses the Buddhist doctrine of namarupa and the ancient list in Buddhist literature made up of drsta, śruta, mata, vijñāta. Johnston demonstrates that these are quite primitive formulations which show a similarity to the speculations in the Brāhmanas and oldest Upani- sads. It is not likely, says Johnston, that ancient Buddhism would include such primitive conceptions had it known any kind of systematic Samkhya. Thus it appears that Buddhism arose before Sāmkhya, and furthermore, says Johnston, the Sāmkhya was probably formulated during the first period of Buddhist dogmatism.164

161. Ibid., p. 19. 162. Ibid., p. 20. 163. Ibtd., p. 21. 164. Ibid., pp. 23-24.

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SAMKHYA 43

Johnston organizes his analysis of the history of Sāmkhya around four groups of texts: (1) Upanisads, including, Katha - relevant portions from about 4th cent B.C. Śvetāśvatara - later than Katha, pehaps 3rd or 2nd cent. B.C. Muņdaka, Praśna, Maitri - all later;165 (2) epic texts, including Mokşadharma - earlier portions similar to thought in Aśvaghoșa's Buddhacarita, thus ca. Ist cent. A.D. Anugita - later text Bhagavad Gitā -- earlier portions similar to kind of speculation in early portion of Moksadharma whereas speculation in Chapters XIII ff. seems later;16 (3) other literary works, including Buddhacarita of Aśvaghosa-with some certainty placed around second half of lst cent. A.D. Carakasamhitā - in use of language slightly later than Aśvaghoşa but view of Sāmkhya quite similar;167 (4) classical texts, including Patañjali's rogasūtra - some sections seem earlier than the Kārikā. Iśvarakrsņa's Sāmkhyakārikā, terminus ad quem, 6th cent. A.D.168

Johnston begins his study with the assertion that there was not a single school of early Samkhya. He makes reference to the Chinese tradition which reports that there were eighteen Sāmkhya schools in ancient times.169 A classical commentary on rogasūtra II, 23, moreover, reports eight different doctrines

165. Ibid., pp. 3-12 166. Ibid. 167. Ibid. 168. Ibid. 169. Ibid., p. 2.

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with respect to the reason for the coming together of prakrti and purusa. Such differing views must have come from various traditions or schools of Samkhya. More specifically, Johnston continues, it is possible to assert that two of these schools were those of Vārsaganya and Pañcasikha. An out- line of the content of these latter two systems can be found in Aśvaghosa's Buddhacarita, canto XII. The Vārșaganya school is a pure Sāmkhya school, whereas the Pañcasikha school repre- sents a Samkhya-Yoga tradition. Since Asvaghosa lived some time in the first century A.D., this results in the obvious con- clusion that at least two systematic forms of early Sāmkhya- Yoga flourished some time before Aśvaghosa. Having discussed these general problems relating to the texts and the question of origins of the earliest Sāmklya, John- ston then changes his method. Instead of considering the many formulations of Sāmkhya as they appear in separate texts, he chooses the method of studying key terms as they ap- pear individually in the texts. Thus, he discusses the uses and modifications of such terms as avyakta, guņa, jiva, bhātātman, puruşa, kşetrajña, svabhāva, and akșara.173 At the end of hıs study he summarizes his conclusions and points essentially to five phases through which the Samkhya speculation developed. These five are as follows:

(1) An mcomplete form of Samkhya first in the Katha Upanişad. Only twenty principles enumerated and no doctrine of great elements. Avyakta functions only as a kind of moral force or what Johnston calls, "the law of the act." No theory of prakrti or gunas is found in the classical sense. No ahamkāra prin- ciple appears, but in its place is mahān ātmā. Buddhi functions in Katha like vijñana. The essence of the person is purusa, and the goal of the system is a kind of self-realization to be attained by means of yogic practices. In this early form, Sāmkhya does not include such later doctrines as satkāryavāda, guņa-

170. Ibid. 171. Ibia., p. 2 and pp. 8-10. 172. Ibtd. 173. Ibid., p. 25 and pp. 25-80.

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pariņāma and tattvavikāra. Philosophical concerns are not separated from religious concerns in this early system. The main preoccupation is with the religious destiny of man. Also, strong concern for stages of consciousness-i.e., yoga.174 (2) A more systematic form of Sāmkhya in the interval between the Katha and the Śvetaśvatara - probably the school of Vārsaganya. Twenty-four principles divided into eight prakrtis and sixteen vikāras. The first of the prakrtis is avyakta in a triple form of sat- tva, rajas, tamas. These gunas are sometimes called bhavas ("forces of becoming," "sentiments"), and in this phase of development, they are not under- stood cosmically. avyakta and gunas or bhāvas are connected still with the "law of the act" -i.e., moral forces which detemine rebirth. These eight prakrtis act independently, but are soon brought together into a whole and characterized as svabhāva. ahamkāra now being used, but meaning is unclear. Various specu- lations concerning jiva, purusa, ātman. A tendency evident to turn away from purusa and to focus more on traditional ätman. Salvation in this system invol- ves getting rid of rajas and tamas and remaining in sattva-i.e., sattvastha. Union of soul with physical principles is caused by fivefold ignorance.175 (3) The above atheistic theories are reworked in a third theistic phase of Samkhya as may be seen in texts. like Śvetāśvatara Upanişad and the Bhagavad Gitā. The divine principle is isvara, the creator and des- troyer of all. The theory of the isvara required some basic changes in the Sāmkhya scheme. Ignorance is no longer the cause of coming together of soul and physical principles. Now the cause is the Lord. avyakta which is the first of the eight prakrtis now is identified with power of iśvara. Avyakta now is a powerful creative force, and ultimately all physi- cal principles are derived from it by means of

174. Ibid., pp. 81-82. 175. Ibid., pp. 82-84.

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emanation. Thus, in this phase, the classical doc- trine of tattvavikāra develops. Salvation now is interpreted in terms of getting away from all phy- sical principles. In other words, one seeks the iśvara who transcends rajas, tamas and sattva. It is in this theistic phase of Sāmkhya development, says Johnston, that gunas become much more than moral forces. Impossible to say, however, what the precise steps were.176 (4) A later phase, when probably the atheistic schools worked out or reconciled the changes coming from the previous theistic stage. This is the final step before the appearance of classical Sāmkhya as set forth by Iśvarakrsna. In this phase, most of the later doctrines begin to appear: (a) svabhāva and avyakta notions all given the name prakrti. (b) doctrine of mutual interaction of guņas is deve- loped, guņapariņāma. (c) notion of purusa is accepted and older notions of ātman, jīva, bhūtātman are all rejected. The doctrine of the subtle body takes the place of jīva. (d) belief in a plurality of puruşas appears. (e) relationship of purusa and buddhi is worked out probably in the Pāñcasikha school. Moral forces or "the law of the act" which originally were associated with the avyakta and the gunas are now transferred to the buddhi and its bhāvas. (f) the great elements and the objects of the senses are replaced in these later speculations by the tanmātras and the gross elements - probably because of influence from Vaisesikas. (g) the full theory of satkāryavāda is developed.177 (5) The classical form of Sāmkhya as found in Iśvara- krşņa's Sāmkhyakārikā. From evidence in rogasūtra

176. Ibid., pp. 84-86. 177. Ibid., pp. 86-88.

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Johnston asserts that Iśvarakrsna possibly did con- tribute the new notion of purusārtha, with respect to the problem of the coming together of prakrti and puruşa- i.e., prakrti undergoes change for the sake of the purusa.178

The present writer included a fairly extensive account of Johnston's research because it represents probably the most important contribution to the study of Samkhya yet made. Johnston's precise and careful analysis of texts and technical terms has succeeded in clarifying a number of difficult points with respect to the history of the Sāmkhya. Moreover, his research has clearly shown the complexity of that history. No longer is it possible to maintain that Sāmkhya was a uniform system of thought in the centuries before Iśvarakrsna. There were, rather, numerous schools or numerous traditions of spe- culation which eventually crystallized into the classical form. One problem with Johnston's analysis, however, is that his conclusions do not always follow from his earlier arguments. Methodologically he examines a series of technical terms as they appear individually in a number of different texts. He specifically points out that this is necessary because it is im- possible to show a chronological development. In his con- clusions, however, Johnston proceeds to offer a chronological development. He suggests that there were at least three sepa- rate phases of development: an early atheistic, an intermediate theistic, and a later atheistic. In Johnston's analysis, however, such a uniform development is not substantiated by his earlier arguments. Another problem with Johnston's analysis is that he assumes too much with respect to the Sāmkhyakārikā. He assumes throughout his study that when one gets to the Kārikā one has arrived at a complete and balanced presentation of classical Sāmkhya. In one sense, of course, this is true. Isvarakrsņa's exposition is the first classical Sāmkhya text. What is also true, however, is that the Kārikā leaves many questions and issues unanswered. It is not clear exactly what Iśvarakrsna meant by prakrti, the gunas, buddhi, etc. It is not clear whether or not

178. Ibid., p. 88.

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Iśvarakrsna understands buddhi cosmologically or psychologically or both. In other words, it is perhaps a mistake to stop short of a full analysis of the Kārikā when considering the question of the history and meaning of "early Sāmkhya." Erich Frauwallner A more recent discussion of problems relating to the ori- gins of the Samkhya is that of Erich Frauwallner.179 He bases his interpretation of earliest Samkhya on a series of passages from the Moksadharma : 12.194=247-249 = 287 (Critical Edition 12.187=239-240).180 That these three passages are closely related and make up three versions of one text has been recognized since Hopkins' research in the epic.181 Frauwallner refers to this text as the "epischen Grundtext des Sāmkhya," and sees it as the first stage of the development of Samkhya. References to Sāmkhya in the Upanisads, says Frauwallner, are limited in valuc because they stand at some distance from actual Sāmkhya speculation. They are, rather, only influenced by Sāmkhya ideas. Likewise, descriptions of Sāmkhya in such texts as Buddhacarita or Carakasamhitā are limited in value because they represent opinions of outsiders or opponents of the system. The only solid materials upon which to base one's view of the rise of Samkhya, therefore, are the passages in the epic.182 Of these epic passages, the above-mentioned serics is especially important, says Frauwallner, becausc it obviously represents an extremely old tradition which originated before the writing of the Moksadharma. The fact that one finds three corrupt versions of an original system or doctrinc argues for its carly date. Morcover, this series of passages is a vivid example of the com- plexity of the epic traditions. It is impossible, says Frauwallner, to sort out earlier from later in many instances. One must, rather, consider each passage individually.183 Frauwallner then proceeds to offer his view regarding

179. Erich Frauwallner, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie (Salzburg : Otto Muller, 1953) I, 275-408; also, "Untersuchungen zum Mokșa- dharma," WZKM, XXXII (1925), 179-206; also, "Zur Erkenntnislehre des klassichen Samkhya-Systems," WZKSO, Band II, 1958, pp. 84-137. 180. Frauwallner, Geschichte ... , op. cit., p. 474. 181. Ibid., p. 479 182. Ibid., pp. 473-474. 183. Ibid., pp. 288-289.

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the stages of the development of Samkhya. They are briefly as follows : (1) The original "Grundtext" from the Moksadharma (12.194 etc.). In this system analysis begins with the five gross elements (mahābhūtāni). Related to these are the five sense organs, manas, buddhi, and kșetrajña. All principles except kșetrajña are on the side of material reality which is called sattva. Frauwallner traces this dualistic conception back to speculations on the Self in Brhadāranyaka and parti- cularly the Yajñavalkya doctrine in which Self is seen as apart from all phenomenal reality. Thus, he sees this early epic speculation as a further working- out of the Upanisadic doctrine of the Self. The crucial difference here is that analysis of the pheno- menal world begins with the gross elements, thus necessitating a dualistic doctrine. Also in this early speculation, guņas are called bhāvas and are little more than psychical qualities : sattva (goodness), rajas (passion), tamas (darkness or dullness). Note here also the two uses of sattva : as psychical quality and as a term for prakrti. guņas or bhāvas in this system are closcly allied with buddhi. Bondage in this system is caused by ignorance (avidyā). ksetrajña thinks that it is bound to the bhavas or gunas of the buddhi. In reality, of course, no such connection exists. En- lightenment comes through knowing the distinction bctwecn ksetra and ksetrajña. This kind of specu- lation, says Frauwallner, is similar to the early Buddhist analysis of skandhas, although Buddhist thought moves in a totally new direction. In view of the similarity of this epic speculation both with Upanisadic specu- lation and with early Buddhist thought, Frauwallner concludes that this system is clearly the first articu- lation of Sämkhya theory, and that it arose in the period after the oldest Upanisads and is roughly con- temporary with the rise of Buddhism. It probably also comcs from the samc region in India as Buddhism.184

184. Ibid., pp. 288-298.

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(2) The second stage of Sāmkhya includes the introduc- tion of the theory of evolution. Related to this is the development of the classical notion of prakrti and the three gunas. The doctrine of evolution can be traced to the speculations concerning the ages and periods of the world as they emerge out of Brahmā. Frauwallner points to the epic passage involving the questions of Suka, as an example of such speculation. This second stage of Samkhya development can be conveniently attributed to Pancasikha, says Frauwallner. Pañcasikha also adds the notion of ahamkāra and establishes the normative number of twenty-five principles. The introduction of aham- kāra is for the purpose of sharpening even more the distinction between prakrti and purusa. Now the whole conception of "I" or "mine" is understood in terms of prakrti. The doctrine of ahamkāra, there- fore, was an innovation achieved by Pañcasikha. Frauwallner also credits Pañcasikha with some of the well-known similes or metaphors of the Sāmkhya texts - e.g., the lame and the blind man, the dancer and the observer, the husband and wife, etc. With this second stage, most of the later classical Sāmkhya was already articulated.185 (3) The third stage includes the addition of further doc- trines, and probably occurred over a long period of time. Of major importance for Samkhya psychology, says Frauwallner, was the introduction of the sixty topics (sastitantra) which include the ten basic princi- ples dealing with the nature of purusa and prakrti and the fifty bhāvas (viparyayas, aśaktis, tuștis, and siddhis). Frauwallner attributes this innovation to Vārsa- ganya. He rejects the other version of Sastitantra as found in the Ahirbudhnya Samhita because it is a later theistic elaboration. Other doctrines added to the system in this later stage are the following: the five breaths or winds, the fivefold sources of karma (pañca karmayonayah), the eight bhāvas of

185. Ibid., pp. 300-318.

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SAMKHYA 51

buddhi and the doctrine of the subtle elements (tanmātras).186 (4) The final stage is the classical formulation as out- lined in Iśvarakrsņa's Sāmkhyakārikā.187

In addition to his view concerning stages of development, Frauwallner also refers to some issues regarding the later history of the system. In the first centuries A.D. Sāmkhya is a leading and dominant system of thought. Its major exponents include such names as Vārsagaņya, Vindhyavāsa and Mādhava. By the end of the fifth century Sāmkhya receives a definitive exposition in İśvarakrsņa's Sāmkhyakārikā. The system flourishes on into the sixth century, after' which time, however, it declines. The Buddhist writer Dignāga, (ca. A.D. 480-540) vigorously opposes the Samkhya position, and gives the impression that it is still a lively force. Dharmakīrti (ca. A.D. 610-670), however, refers to Samkhya in a rather feeble manner, and one has the impression, says Frauwallner, that the Samkhya system has radically declined in influence.188 Lively interest in the Sām- khya does not again appear until after A.D. 1000. In these later centuries which represent a kind of Sāmkhya-Renaissance, one finds such works as the Sāmkhyapravacanasūtra and the commentaries of Aniruddha, Mahādeva and Vijñānabhikșu. All of these later works, however, are separated from the classi- cal texts by many centuries. As a result, they contain different emphases, and must be used very cautiously with respect to the classical doctrines. Generally, these late Sāmkhya texts are greatly influenced by the doctrines of the Vedanta, and they show a marked tendency towards syncretism.189 With respect to the interpretation of the meaning of the Sāmkhya, Frauwallner offers nothing new. He does describe some of the cosmological theories of Sāmkhya, but he bases his exposition on references from the Purānas. He admits that the Sāmkhya texts themselves offer very little material regarding this problem.

186. Ibid., pp. 319-334. 187. Ibid., pp. 334-348. 188. Ibid., pp. 474-475. 189. Ibid., p. 476.

52 CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA

Frauwallner's discussion offers at least two helpful insights. First of all, his work with the text-group Mbh. 12.194= 247- 249=287 is quite significant regarding the early history of Sāmkhya. To claim that the system there outlined is the earliest form of Sämkhya, however, is perhaps to assert too much. Certainly there is no clear evidence for such a definite claim. Nevertheless, the system there presented does offer an important tradition of early Sāmkhya speculation. Secondly, Frauwallner is right in warning against the use of later Sāmkhya texts for interpreting the classical doctrine. A gap of many centuries exists between the classical and what one might call the "renais- sance-Sāmkhya" of the sūtras and especially the work of Vijñānabhiksu. Many interpreters of Sāmkhya (e.g., Garbe, Oltramare, Dasgupta, etc.) tend to overlook this fact. A major defect in Frauwallner's analysis of the history of Sāmkhya is his evaluation of the contribution of the so-called Pañcasikha. He credits him with the theory of evolution (tattvavikāra), the classical theory of prakrti and the three gunas, the introduction of ahamkāra, the firm establishment of a nor- mative number of twenty-five principles, etc. The texts do not support the notion that any one man - other than the legendary Kapila in popular tradition-was responsible for introducing all of the above doctrines. Such a contribution would indeed be a surprising event in the history of Indian thought. Frau- wallner's view on this point reminds one of Garbe's assertion that most of the doctrines of Samkhya must have been the crea- tion of one mind. Such a theory appears to have no basis in the texts, and more than that, appears a priori unreasonable.

3. A. B. van Buitenen A careful and detailed study of the Samkhya which chal- lenges the conclusions of both Johnston and Frauwallner is that of J.A.B. van Buitenen.190 He focuses his study around three basic themes : (1) "An Old Text Reconstituted." in which he recon- structs a passage describing an early "horizontal"

4. J.A.B. van Buitenen, "Studies in Sāmkhya (I-III); JAOS, Vol. 76, 1957, pp. 153 ff; Vol. 77, 1957, pp. 15 ff., and Vol. 77, 1957, pp. 88 ff.

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SAMKHYA 53

evolutionary theory. He finds two uses of the term bhāvas in Mbh. 12, 187 and 239-240, one of which he isolates using a similar series from the Pañcasikha- vākya, Mbh. 12, 212. In this first usage bhāva means "moral" or "psychical" quality as had been noticed by Johnston and Frauwallner. The remaining verses are then rearranged and edited into a coherent passage. This second group of verses uses bhāva in the sense of guna and implies a "horizontal" theory of evolution in which buddhi is successively evolved into manas, senses and elements. The motive force for this evolution is rajas, which leads van Buitenen to define guņas as "the triad in which rajas figures." This passage is obviously quite old, says van Buitenen, and it shows that there was a theory of evolution even in ancient Samkhya, which shows Frauwallner to have been wrong. Moreover, this passage demons- trates conclusively that guna did not originally mean "moral or psychical qualities of the buddhi" as Johnston had suggested.191

(2) "Ahamkāra," in which van Buitenen traces the origin of the Sāmkhyan ahamkāra back to the old Upanișadic speculations concerning the "self-formulation of an original, unformulated and unformed being." A clear example of these creation-myths is found in BAUp. I, 4, 1; 4, 5; 4, 7. See also, says van Buitenen, BAUp, 1,2, 1 and Sat. Br. 10, 6, 5, 1. Usually this act of creation involves the self-formulation of a female partner as a first act of creation. Later the partner is dropped as in Chāndogya Upanisad- VI, 2.

Says van Buitenen,

We started on the interpretation ahamkāra 'the ejaculation' : Aham : self-formulation; but the difference between formulation and creation,

191. van Buitenen, "Studies in Sāmkhya (I)," op. cit., pp. 153-157.

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obvious to us, does not really exist in this train of thought : formulation is formation; name and form are inseparable. As rar as we can see, no distinction is made between macrocosmos and microcosmos: the self-formulated being is the cosmos. Nor is there yet evidence of a deprecation of his self-creation. In this context of speculations we are no longer surprised to meet the term ahamkāra itself, for the first time in Ch. Up .: 7, 25.192

Moving on to the younger Upanisads and the Moksa- dharma, van Buitenen then demonstrates that aham- kāra is seldom associated with the gunas. It appears, rather, in a "vertical" evolutionary theory made up of buddhi, ahamkāra, manas, ākāśa, wind, firę, water, earth-i.e., as one of the eight prakrtis. In time, says van Buitenen, this "vertical" theory replaces the "horizontal," but there is also evidence that an attempt was made to synthesize the two patterns (see Mbh. 12, 206, and, of course, the Sāmkhyakārikā).193

(3) "Sattva," in which van Buitenen traces the origin of the guna-theory and how it was related and assimi- lated into other Samkhya speculations. Using the "myth of hunger and food" in BAUp. 1, 2, together with the researches of Senart, Oltramare and Olden- berg, van Buitenen connects the later guna-theory with early speculations.

... which described creation as a succession of seasons with sun/summer, atmosphere/clouds- rains, earth/harvest and also under the influence of creation-by-formulation of the names and things bhãh bhuvah svah.194

He further connects the later guna-theory with such passages as AV. X. 8, 43, Chāndogya VI and Śvetā- śvatara IV, 5. Originally, says van Buitenen, the

192. van Buitenen, "Studies in Sāmkhya (II)," p. 19. 193. Ibid., pp. 15-25. 194. van Buitenen, "Studies in Sāmkhya (III)," op. cit., p. 101.

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terms sattva and tamas were not connected with the notion of a tripartite creation. Sattva has a wide variety of meanings - five of which are discussed by van Buitenen-ranging from sat-tva as the "condition of an entity which exists concretely"-e.g., the sat as reified asat in RV. X. 129-all the way to sattva as the state or condition of release, - sattvastha. tamas, says van Buitenen, can be traced to an early anti- thesis between tapas-tamas. Furthermore, it appears as the basis of the five kinds of ignorance (viparyaya); tamas, moha, mahāmoha, tāmisra and andhatāmisra.195

In view of the above researches, van Buitenen is able to construct an "hypothesis" regarding the history of the Sām- khya.196 Utilizing older speculations which emphasized a tripartite creation and "creation-by-formulation," the early adherents of Samkhya and Yoga, who were primarily concerned with the question of release or salvation, carried these specu- lations further in the following way. The speculation concern- ing the cosmic person who creates the universe as his body in some kind of triadic pattern was interpreted microcosmically. Evolution was understood "horizontally," i.e., buddhi succes- sively becoming manas, senses and elements. At the same time, another "vertical" theory of evolution developed involving seven or eight principles, of which ahamkāra was one. This "vertical" pattern made no use of a guna-theory. In time the threefold bhävas of the original theory were transformed into affections or "psychical qualities" of the buddhi. In circles which developed the "vertical" pattern, however, the psychical quali- ties" or affections of the buddhi were described differently - i.e., in terms of the contrast tapas-tamas or in terms of tapas, tusti, aśakti and viparyaya. In the process of synthesizing these two lines of development, rajas was reinterpreted to mean "defile- ment" or "passion," thereby losing its original cosmic function. Rajas was then given some of the qualities of the tamas-sequence, and thereby the rajas-tamas distinction developed. Sattva even- tually was given the role of the purest psychical quality, probably

195. Ibid., pp. 88-107. 196. Ibid., pp. 100-102.

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taking the place of a term like tapas or jyotis. In those speculative contexts in which a synthesis was not attempted -e.g., Sāmkhya as described in Buddhacarita - the "vertical" theory stands by itself with a single tamas complex. The Sāmkhyakārikā, of course, represents a synthesis of the above lines of speculation. Says van Buitenen,

There must have existed scores and scores of more or less isolated little centres where parallel doctrines were being evolved out of a common source. Occasional meetings at pilgrimages and festivals, reports from other and remote āśramas brought by wandering ascetics, polemic encounters with other preachers must have resulted in a laborious process of partial renovation and conservation, more precise definitions of doctrines and eclecticism, re-adjustments of terminology, etc. At this stage to credit these little centres with the name "schools" is to do them too much, or too little honor ... Most of the process must elude us necessarily, but we stand a better chance of recovering the little that is left by allowing for the greatest diversity, rather than the greatest uniformity of doctrine.197

van Buitenen's main contribution has been to prove con- vincingly that the development of the Samkhya was incredibly complex. He has clearly demonstrated that there are at least two evolutionary theories : a "horizontal" and a "vertical." He has also shown that the "horizontal" theory is quite ancient. Moreover, he has demonstrated clearly that ahamkara and the "vertical" theory are originally quite separate from the carlier speculations on evolution, involving gunas or bhavas. His discussion of the tapas-tamas antithesis and the five viparyayas along with the various uses of the term sattva, revcals the origina fluidity of the Samkhya notions sattva and tamas. All of his rescarch is based on the Sanskrit texts, and, thus, there is a minimum of theoriz- ing or speculation in his work. Even his "hypothesis" con- cerning the development of the Samkhya docs not extend much beyond his analysis of the texts. van Buitenen's work is

197. Ibid., pp. 101-102.

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SAMKHYA 57

unquestionably the most important contribution to Sāmkhya research since Johnston. One problem in van Buitenen's analysis, however, is that he overemphasizes the cosmic side of early Samkhya speculation. He recognizes, of course, that Samkhya represents a shift from older macrocosmic speculations to a more "microcosmic" inter- pretation, but this shift receives little treatment in his study. What seems clear, for example, in Mbh. 12, 187, 239-240 is that'bhāvas or gunas are primarily understood as moral or psy- chical qualities-i.e., the passage is concerned with an analysis of the human condition, its component principles, and its potential for release. Even though an old cosmic theory of evolution can be reconstructed from the verses, that does not eliminate the prime emphasis of the passage. It shows only that there was an evolutionary theory in ancient times. One might argue that the old cosmic theory of evolution is pre- Sāmkhya and is reinterpreted by Sāmkhya thinkers in terms of their own emphases - i.e., microcosmically, in terms of the bhavas of awareness and their function with respect to the problem of salvation or release. A similar criticism can be made about van Buitenen's treatment of ahamkāra. Again, he recog- nizes that there is a "microcosmic" dimension of the term which involves such notions as "self-delusion" or "self-projection". van Buitenen calls these microcosmic emphases "more advanced philosophical aspects," and then concentrates on the cosmic ahamkāra in the oldest Upanişads, As a result he spends little time discussing how the notion of "self-delusion" or "self- projection" developed out of these older cosmic speculations. In other words, his study perhaps focuses too much on the genesis of Sämkhya terms without giving as careful treatment to the peculiar "inflection" the terms received in later Sāmkhya. Of course, this criticism is only a criticism regarding emphasis.

.3. W. Hauer Hauer's Der Yoga, although not directly concerned with Sāmkhya, is nevertheless worthy of brief treatment.198 Hauer traces the origin of Yoga back to an ancient group of wandering

198. J.W. Hauer, Der Yoga (Stuttgart : W. Kohlhammer Verlag. 1958).

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or itinerant ascetics, known as Vrātyas. These people were not part of the brahmanical priesthood, but they were Aryans. They appear to haye been part of a first-wave of Aryans who dwelled in some of the outlying districts, in which Buddhism and. Jainism later arose. They flourished, says Hauer, from about 1000-600 B.C. They moved among the warriors, herds- men and farmers in ancient times.199 The Vrātyas stem from a community or tribe which worshipped an Urgott called variously Vāyu-Rudra-Śiva. Hauer also suggests that the Vrātyas probably go back even further, to Indo-Iranian or Indo-Germanic times. Some of their practices, says Hauer, resemble some of the military cultic communities of the Germans and Greeks.200 The sacred traditions of these Vrātyas, says Hauer, are preserved in the Atharva Veda, the kernel of which is Book XV, entitled "Vratya."201 This book is made up of "rhythmic litanies," which are quite different from other Vedic verse forms. Other books of the Atharva Veda which contain informa- tion about the Vrātyas are especially Books VIII-XII and XIII-XVIII. The "wisdom-songs," "magic-rites," and "curse-songs" of the Atharva Veda reveal various kinds of primi- tive breath-exercises, which, according to Hauer, developed finally into the prāņāyāma of classical Yoga. These songs and litanies also emphasize a kind of sacred mumbling or murmuring which eventually, says Hauer, led to the practice of inner medi- tation (dhyāna-yoga). Moreover, the Vrātyas engaged in various kinds of asceticism and abstinence which generated experiences of rapture and ecstasy. Important to notice also, says Hauer, is their use of the term purusa to represent a kind of cosmic man with whom one becomes united in ecstasy.202 In time, Hauer continues, the god-complex Visnu-Nārā- yaņa became linked with this tradition. Visnu-Nārāyaņa and Rudra-Siva are finally all combined in the notion of Isvara or "Lord," the typical name for the deity in Sāmkhyayoga.203 Eventually, says Hauer, Brahmanism absorbed most of this ancient tradition, and many of the Vrātya groups took their

199. Ibid., pp. 91-94. 200. Ibid., p. 91. 201. Ibid., p. 93. 202. lbid., pp. 48-90. 203. Ibid., p. 92.

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place in the orthodox tradition. Some of the groups so con- verted are the following : Jaiminīyas, Kathas, Maitrāyaņīyas, Kauşītakins. Then, too, there is a close relationship between. the Vratyas and the Chandogyas, for both, says Hauer, are famed Sama-singers.204 Thus, at a fairly early date, Brahmanism took this proto-yoga into its midst, and thereafter the two traditions mutually influenced one another. Sämkhya, according to Hauer, is a later development grow- ing out of yoga. Originally, jñāna-yoga or Sāmkhya emerged from within the tradition as a type of yoga which emphasized "intuitive-philosophical" examination of the yogic states of consciousness (see Bhagavad Gitā III, 3 and Śvetāśvatara Upa- nişad VI, 13).205 Whereas most types of yoga emphasized immediate experience-i.e., meditation, trance, devotion to the Isvara etc., for the purpose of gaining release; Sāmkhyayoga emphasized speculation and philosophical-psychological des- cription of the states of consciousness. Both had the same goal of kaivalya, but the methods and emphases differed. Eventually, however, says Hauer, some other more basic differences emerged. Sāmkhya became atheistic (Mbh. 12.289) and rigorously dualistic. It developed its own textbooks (Iśvarakrsna, etc.) and thus became a separate system.206 The more traditional forms of yoga, (kriyā-yoga, dhyāna-yoga, bhakti-yoga, etc.), says Hauer, were then brought together and synthesised by Patañjali in his rogasūtra.207 Hauer's hypothesis regarding the origins of Yoga in the ancient Vrātya groups is interesting but open to question. Certainly there are some motifs in the Vratya hymns which later played a significant role in the development of Yoga-e.g., breath- exercises, asceticism, speculations about a cosmic man (purusa), etc. The problem, however, is that many of these same motifs appear in the brahmanical sources as well. The hymns of the Rig Veda contain references to tapas, purușa, ecstatic experiences, etc. Edgerton asserts in contrast to Hauer that many of the speculative notions in the Atharva Veda are borrowed from the

204. Ibid. 205. Ibid., pp. 208-209. 206. Ibid. For a more detailed comparison and contrast of the "meta- physic" of Sāmkhya and Yoga, see pp. 274-300. 207. Ibid., pp. 221-239 and pp. 239 ff.

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Rig Veda and other brahmanical sources but used in a magical or popular manner in the Atharva Veda.208 In such matters the most reasonable procedure is to keep in mind one of van Buitenen's methodological principles-e.g., allowing for the greatest diversity. Obviously, there are numerous lines of speculation and various religious practices in the ancient Vedas. Undoubtedly, some of these speculations and practices came from outside the brahmanical framework. If one had access to adequate data about this/ancient period, one would probably be amazed at the complexity and intricacy of the various tradi- tions and their mutual influence on one another. Unfortunately, however, adequate data is not available. One can safely assert that there was an ancient Vratya group and that this group con- tributed certain notions and practices to brahmanical religion and thought. At the same time, however, brahmanical traditions greatly influenced and, in fact, absorbed the Vrātya tradition along with many others. The origins of Yoga along with the origins of most forms of Indian religion and thought most likely developed some time after this period of absorption.

Mircea Eliade Eliade's roga : Immortality and Freedom is another study which, though not directly concerned with Sāmkhya, has impor- tant implications for understanding the meaning of Sāmkhya.209 Regarding the relationship of Samkhya and Yoga, Eliade begins,

The Yoga and Samkhya systems are so much alike that most of the affirmations made by the one are valid for the other. The essential differences between them are few : (1) whereas Sāmkhya is atheistic, Yoga is theistic ...; (2) whereas, according to Sāmkhya, the only path to salvation is that of metaphysical knowledge, Yoga accords marked importance to techniques of meditation.210

208. Franklin Edgerton, "The Philosophic Materials of the Atharva Veda," Studies in Honor of Maurice Bloomfield (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1920), pp. 117-135. 209. Mircea Eliade, roga : Immortality and Freedom, trans., Willard R. Trask (Bollingen Series LVI : New York : Pantheon Books, 1958). 210. Ibid., p. 7.

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Eliade's treatment of Yoga is primarily phenomenological, and, thus, he seldom engages himself in problems connected with the history or development of Samkhya and Yoga. Occa- sionally, of course, he offers a few historical judgments. For example, he accepts the general view that the systematic treat- ments of both Sāmkhya and Yoga are first available in Patañjali's Yogasūtras and Īśvarakrsņa's Sāmkhyakārikās. Sāmkhya and Yoga as found in the Moksadharma and earlier works are non- systematic and represent earlier stages of thought.211 "Sām- khya" in these early texts refers to any kind of "metaphysical knowledge," whereas Yoga refers to any kind of "practical discipline." Eliade emphasizes the "real morphological diver- sity" of Yoga. "If 'yoga' means many things," says Eliade, "that is because Yoga is many things."212 The origins of Yoga, Eliade continues, can be traced back to Vedic and to pre-Vedic times. Yoga as a phenomenon in Indian religion and thought is a synthesis of Indo-European ritualism, speculation and pre- Āryan aboriginal practices and ascetic techniques.213 Yoga is a "modality of archaic spirituality that has survived nowhere else."-i.e., a kind of "living fossil."214 In his description of the content of Samkhya and Yoga, Eliade emphasizes the soteriological notions of "absolute free- dom" and "rebirth" into a timeless condition of "transconscious- ness."215 Both Sāmkhya and Yoga, says Eliade, seek a release from the "suffering" which characterizes human existence. This suffering is caused by a "metaphysical ignorance" which fails to distinguish "psychomental life" (buddhi, ahamkāra, etc.) from "Spirit" (puruşa).216 In Sāmkhya this suffering is over- come by "metaphysical discrimination" (viveka), a "higher cognitive process." This is not a "discrimination" in the usual sense of the term, says Eliade. It is, rather, an "awakening," a "contemplation." The reflection and cognition of the buddhi brings man to the "threshold" of this absolute knowledge, but the absolute knowledge itself is beyond any process or realization

211. Ibid., pp. 148-149. 212. Ibid., p. 150. 213. Ibid., pp. 293-358 and p. 360. 214. Ibid., p. 361. 215. Ibid., p. 99. 216. Ibid., p. 14.

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of prakrti.217 This "knowledge" or "awakening" is a "reve- lation," says Eliade, in that it "reveals reality immediately." When one comes to this revelation, one then has achieved moksa and kaivalya.218 In Yoga, Eliade continues, this gnosis is in- sufficient. Yoga emphasizes also "ascesis" and a "technique of meditation" which are indispensable for salvation. Yoga, says Eliade, aims at "annihilating the psychomental flux" by means of rigorous discipline and asceticism.219 Yoga also fre- quently involves devotion to the iśvara as well as magical and supernatural powers, both of which emphases are usually absent in Sāņkhya. Both Sāmkhya and Yoga, Eliade stresses, drive man away from humanity. They deal with suffering by "ignoring it as suffering." They emphasize a condition of "freedom" and "transconsciousness" which sacrifices personality and the human condition.220 They reject life in order to create an "anticipa- tory death," but, says Eliade, this "death" leads to a "rebirth" in another "mode of being," an "eternal present," which is totally beyond the "profane".221 For those who might view this ultimate condition as a "mere regression to primordial nondistinction," Eliade says,

There is a "return to the beginning," but with the diffe- rence that the man "liberated in this life" recovers the original situation enriched by the dimensions of freedom and transconsciousness.222

The major contribution of Eliade is his attempt to develop a vocabulary which adequately describes the experience of the followers of Yoga. In this he has succeeded, and every inter- preter of these ancient systems must be at least aware of Eliade's sensitivity and frequently profound insights. The major difficulty in Eliade's treatment is that he too often reduces Sāmkhya to Yoga. He does, of course, distinguish

217. Ibid., pp. 29-30 and p. 44 218. Ibid. 219. Ibid., p. 15 and p. 38. 220. Ibid., pp. 34-35. 221. Ibid., p. 363. 222. Ibid., p. 99.

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between the two-i.e., Sāmkhya as gnosis, Yoga as ascesis, etc. - but he never deals adequately with the gnosis-emphasis of Sāmkhya. There is only one short paragraph (p. 29) in which he attempts to describe the peculiar Sāmkhya idea of saving knowledge. As a result, Eliade misses the truly unique contribution of Sāmkhya, and makes it, rather, into a mere imitation of Yoga.

Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya

Among Marxist interpreters of Indian thought (including Th. Stcherbatsky, D.D. Kosambi, W. Ruben, N.P. Anikeev and others), the most interesting and sustained treatment of the history and meaning of Samkhya philosophy is to be found in the work of Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya. His basic position regarding the interpretation of Samkhya was first set forth in his important book, Lokāyata: A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism (first edition, 1959), and he has more or less re- iterated his basic views in his subsequent books, including Indian Philosophy (first edition, 1964), Indian Atheism: A Marxist Analysis (first edition, 1969), and most recently, What Is Living and What Is Dead in Indian Philosophy (first edition, 1976.)223 Two basic lines of argument are apparent in Chattopadh- yaya's treatment of Sāmkhya and can be used for purposes of providing a brief summary of his perspective. First, Chattopadh- yaya argues that the form of Samkhya found in Iśvarakrsņa's Sāmkhyakārikā is neither the oldest form of the doctrine nor a very consistent form of the Sāmkhya position. Iśvarakrsņa's Sāmkhya system is a syncretistic product of an older materialist philosophy derived from pre-Vedic or non-Vedic sources together with Vedanta notions about the purusa or consciousness taken over from the idealistic Upanisads. The result of this syncretism is a hopeless bundle of contradictions which Sankara,

223. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, Lokāyata ... (New Delhi : People's Publishing House, 1973; third edition), pp. 359-458. Also, Indian Philo- sophy: A Popular Introduction (New Delhi : People's Publishing House, 1975; third edition), pp. 106-117. Also, Indian Atheism : A Marxist Analysis (Calcutta : Manisha Granthalaya, 1969), pp. 69-94. Also, What Is Living and What Is Dead in Indian Philosophy (New Delhi : People's Publishing House, 1976), pp. 251 ff., 413 ff., 497 ff., and 588 ff.

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as a consistent idealist, rightly criticizes and rejects in his Vedānta- sūtra-bhāsya. Chattopadhyaya accepts at face value Śankara's clainı that the Sāmkhya system as set forth in the Sāmkhyakārikā is anti-Vedic and has no legitimate claim whatever to be an acceptable interpretation of the orthodox tradition. The necessary interpretive task, therefore, according to Chatto- padhyaya, is to reconstruct what the original Sāmkhya position was; and, in view of the fact that the purusa is an anomalous notion within the classical system, the way to proceed in recon- structing original Samkhya is to work out a consistent interpreta- tion of the Samkhya position without the classical notion of the purusa.224 There is some textual support for such an approach, says Chattopadhyaya, since the older Sāmkhya texts like Caraka- samhitā and certain passages from the Mahābhārata appear to suggest an interpretation which assigns a minor role to the purușa or consciousness.225 Second, Chattopadhyaya argues that the most important notion in the Sāmkhya is prakrti. The notion of prakrti is femi- nine, and a tradition like the Sāmkhya, which affords such a primary role to the notion of prakrti, probably reflects an ancient agricultural-matriarchal social reality different from the Indo- Aryan pastoral-patriarchal context. Similarly Chattopadhyaya continues, such an agricultural-matriarchal tradition of mother- right is undoubtedly the context from which arise many of India's archaic fertility rites, traditions of ancient magic, forms of proto-materialism and the Indian Tantra in all of its varieties. Tantric traditions, according to Chattopadhyaya, are very ancient and in many instances pre-Vedic, and these archaic traditions of mother-right later come into conflict with the brahmanical pastoral-patriarchal tradition of the alien Indo- Aryans. Samkhya philosophy, therefore, is to be construed primarily as an ideological event in the history of Lokāyata or ancient Indian materialism and to be traced to the archaic agricultural-matriarchal traditions of mother-right. Sāmkhya, however, rather than being the point of origin for Tantric reflection, represents instead the later and " ... more explicit re-statement of the theoretical position implicit in Tantrism."226

224. D. Chattopadhyaya, Lokāyata, op. cit., pp. 383-423. 225. Ibid., pp. 398-400. 226. Ibid., p. 360.

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SĀMKHYA 65

As evidence in support of his argument, Chattopadhyaya cites Śankara's Vedānta-sūtra-bhāsya in which Sāmkhya is referred to as a "Tantra". Chattopadhyaya also mentions the Sasti-tantra and the Atreya-tantra, both of which are sometimes cited as ancient Samkhya texts, as further support for his claim that original Samkhya is an ideological elaboration of the Tantra. Samkhya probably arose in self-conscious resistance to the brahmanical idealism of certain Upanisads, and it was only later that thinkers like Iśvarakrsna attempted to synthesize this older Samkhya materialism with speculations about a detached Self or consciousness. The synthesis worked out in classical times, Chattopadhyaya concludes, was a complete failure, but the older Samkhya materialism with its theory of satkārya, guņapariņāma and tattva-vikāra is one of ancient India's most remarkable contributions to the history of science and the philosophy of materialism.227 Little work has been done on materialist thought in Indian intellectual history, and therefore, Chattopadhyaya's work is an illuminating and valuable contribution. Moreover, whereas much of Indological work has focused on the so-called "Great Tradition" (that is to say, Vedic and brahmanical institutions and literature), Chattopadhyaya has focused his work on folk traditions, popular institutions and cultural productions of those who were not members of the priestly elite. Chattopadhyaya is undoubtedly right in tracing Tantric motifs and practices to these popular folk traditions rather than to the brahmanical "Great Tradition," and recent anthropological research lends support to Chattopadhyaya's perspective. To argue, however, for an archaic agricultural-matriarchal tradition of mother-right and a pastoral-patriarchal tradition of male dominance and then to trace in a direct one-on-one correlation a Samkhya materialism to the former and a Vedanta idealism to the latter is clearly an oversimplification that reflects Chattopadhyaya's political ideology more than it does India's ancient cultural heritage. What begins as a refreshing anthro- pological methodology for studying ancient Indian thought and culture is reduced to an ideological perspective designed to show that " ... private property and the state machinery are not eternal

227. Ibid., pp. 445-458.

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adjuncts to human existence ... " and that " ... the spiritualistic outlook is not innate in man."228 The treatment of Sāmkhya by Chattopadhyaya is the clearest example in his work of his method- ological reductionism. The crucial problem in Sāmkhya as a classical philosophical position is its dualism of purusa and prakrti, but Chattopadhyaya deals with the problem by denying it. Sāmkhya is really not a dualism,. It is a monistic materialism, a precise antithesis to Śankara's monistic idealism. The apparent dualism in Samkhya is simply a wrong-headed syncretism constructed by Iśvarakrsna and others. Original Sāmkhya had no notion of the purusa; it was simply the philo- sophy of pradhāna-kāraņa-vāda. Having thus eliminated dualism from the original Samkhya, Chattopadhyaya then proceeds to re-introduce it on an all-India cultural level. The dualism now is one of male-dominant pastoral-patriarchal Vedānta idealism with its notion of the detached purusa, on one side, and of female-dominant agricultural-matriarchal Sāmkhya materialism with its notion of the active prakrti, on the other side. Quite apart from the nearly total lack of evidence for such a construct, either within the Samkhya materials or within the larger context of Indian culture, Chattopadhyaya's analysis is an oversimplification even on the level of Marxist ideology. A truly Marxist analysis interprets social reality with its economic infrastructure as a largely determinative influence on the ideological, artistic and cultural superstructure. Chattopadhyaya reverses this perspective and interprets the history of Indian culture as an on-going conflict on the ideological level between agricultural-matriarchal Lokāyata (and Samkhya) materialism and pastoral-patriarchal Vedānta idealism. In other words, he offers what a Marxist would call an "idealistic" interpretation of Indian culture. His extensive use of Sankara, therefore, is no accident, for he is without doubt a fellow-traveller with Vedanta !

K.C. Bhattacharya

Although K.C. Bhattacharya's work contributes little to the problem of the historical interpretation of classical Sāmkhya,

228. Ibid., p. xxiv.

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SĀMKHYA 67

his treatment of the meaning of Samkhya as a philosophical position is one of the most creative and profound in modern scholarship. His essays entitled "Studies in Samkhya Philo- sophy" remained unpublished during his life-time (1875-1949) and were finally issued posthumously in 1956 as part of volume I of a two-volume work entitled Studies in Philosophy, edited by Gopinath Bhattacharya.229 In the Preface to these essays on Sāmkhya, K.C. Bhattacharya indicates his methodology as follows :

Much of Sāmkhya literature appears to have been lost, and there seems to be no continuity of tradition from ancient times up to the age of the commentators .... The interpretation of all ancient systems requires a con- structive effort; but while in the case of some systems where we have a large volume of literature and a con- tinuity of tradition, the construction is mainly of the nature of translation of ideas into modern concepts, here in Sāmkhya the construction at many places involves supplying of missing links from one's imagination. It is risky work, but unless one does it one cannot be said to understand Samkhya as a philosophy. It is a task that one is obliged to undertake. It is a fascinating task because Sāmkhya is a bold constructive philosophy. Sāmkhya is not the avowed formulation of religious ex- perience which Vedānta is primarily, nor analytical and critical like Nyāya but is based on speculative insight and demands imaginative-introspective effort at every stage on the part of the interpreter.230

For Bhattacharya, then, the interpretation of Sāmkhya is not really an historical task but, rather, a constructive philosophical problem. To engage in Sāmkhya studies is to engage in creat- ive philosophy itself as an "imaginative-introspective effort." According to Bhattacharya, Sāmkhya philosophy derives from "spiritual reflection" on the "contradictory character of

229. Krishnachandra Bhattacharya, Studies in Philosophy, volumes I and II, edited by Gopinath Bhattacharya (Calcutta : Progressive Publishers, 1956), "Studies in Sāmkhya Philosophy", volume I, pp. 125-211. 230. Ibid .. p. 127.

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the feeling of pain."231

Reflection starts as reflection on the feeling of pain. To wish to be free from pain is the primary reflection on the bodily self, the self that appears to feel in the body, pain unlike pleasure being always explicitly felt in the body. ... Were it not, however, for the reflective consciousness of struggle in pain, the conquest in pleasure could not be reflectively apprehended as such. ... Reflection, accordingly, is primarily reflection on pain.232

Sāmkhya differs from Vedanta not only in its dualism but also in its completely natural interpretation of freedom and release.

... While Vedanta holds that the reflective process towards mukti starts miraculously and is no part of natural life, Sāmkhya takes it to spring from life and to be continuous with the life-process.233

Sāmkhya may thus be said to present a religion of reflective spontaneity or spiritual naturalness. Its metaphysics springs from this religion, reflection which is the spiritual freeing process being the organ of metaphysical knowledge.234

Sāmkhya proceeds methodologically, says Bhattacharya, by means of inference, faith and yoga, " ... but they are all under- stood as implied in different ways in the one natural-spiritual process of reflection."235 Inference in Sāmkhya is " ... a reflec- tively synthetic cognition. ... Kant's transcendental reflection is the same process : only what is founded on it is epistemology, not metaphysics."236 Transcendental reflection as in Sāmkhya involves inference

231. Ibid., p. 137. 232. Ibid., p. 143. 233. Ibid., p. 146. 234. Ibid., p. 147. 235. Ibid., p. 148. 236. Ibid., p. 149.

INTERPREȚATIONS OF THE SĀMKHYA 69

that implies a faith in its continuous passage into intui- tion. The inferred content is meant, in the reflection, to be intuited in the given content and believed to be intuitable. ... ... self-concretion of reflective perception is yoga, and the faith in such yogic intuition as involved in reflection which is assertorial certitude about the metaphysical entities (namely, the Sāmkhya tattva-s) is what is really meant by faith in the scriptures. Thus, inference, faith and yoga are all implied in the transcendental reflection that is the organ of Sāmkhya metaphysics.237

It is not possible in this context to present a complete summary of Bhattacharya's interpretation, but even these few selected passages show clearly the direction of his thinking. His "constructive effort" is an intriguing blend of Advaita meta- physics and Kantian critical philosophy, and he construes Sāmkhya as a reflective enterprise that transforms Advaita in the direction of "spiritual naturalness" and that transforms Kantian transcendental reflection in the direction of a kind of metaphysical intuition. Far from being a hopeless bundle of contradictions (as it is to Śankara) or a wrong-headed syn- cretism which conceals an ancient materialism (as it is to Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya), the Samkhya philosophy, according to K.C. Bhattacharya, is instead a profound meditation on the nature of the human condition and a "bold, constructive philosophy." The unusual juxtaposition of Advaita metaphysics, Kantian terminology and "imaginative-introspective effort" in Bhatta- charya's approach, can, of course, be criticized as hopelessly confusing the issues and finally transforming the Sāmkhya into something other than what it was and is. Overall, however, K.C. Bhattacharya appears to be a remarkably faithful inter- preter who takes seriously the full force of the Samkhya position in his on-going "constructive effort." When he departs from purely Sāmkhya reflection, it is only for the sake of relating Samkhya insights to larger issues in comparative or cross- cultural philosophy. Such an extension of Samkhya should

237. Ibid., p. 149.

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hardly be regretted but rather welcomed as one of the more productive approaches for any future philosophical interpreta- tion of the tradition.

Other Contributions The above critical summary of various views in the history of the interpretations of Sāmkhya is, of course, not exhaustive. Yet the above discussion does represent at least the most impor- tant findings and insights which have appeared in the history of scholarship on the subject. There are many other discus- sions of Sämkhya, most of which, however, represent one or more of the above treated lines of interpretation. Most Indian historians of thought (Radhakrishnan, Chandradhar Sharma, etc.) offer only very general summaries of the doctrines of Samkhya followed by a criticism of the system from the point of view of Advaita Vedanta.238 In addition there are some Western studies which emphasize only a parti- cular aspect of Sāmkhya such as Riepe's The Naturalistic Tradi- tion in Indian Thought (emphasizing the relationship of Sāmkhya to philosophic naturalism) and Potter's Presuppositions of India's Philosophies (logic and epistemology in Sāmkhya and other systems).239 Over against these quite general treatments there are, of course, numerous articles and studies concerning special problems in the Samkhya texts and tradition. These will be dealt with when necessary in the remainder of this study.

CONCLUSIONS

Before proceeding to analyze specific texts relating to the development of the Sāmkhya, it is appropriate here to sum-

238. S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy (New York : Macmillan Company, 1951), II, 248-373; A. K. Majumdar, The Samkhya Conception of Personality (Calcutta : University Press, 1930); Chandradhar Sharma, Indian Philosophy : A Critical Survey (New York : Barnes and Noble, 1962), pp. 137-156; Anima Sen-Gupta, The Evolution of the Samkhya School of Thought (Lucknow : Pioneer Press, 1959); also for a different yet Vedantic treatment see M.G. Sastri, An Examination of Samkara's Refutation of the Sam- khya Theory (Poona : Gujarat Printing Press, 1925). 239. Dale Riepe, The Naturalisitc Tradition in Indian Thought (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1961); Karl H. Potter, Presuppositions of India's Philosophies (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey : Prentice-Hall, 1963).

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SAMKHYA 71

marize the findings and results of the above critical review of interpretations. These conclusions should serve not only to reveal a basis for further research but also to call attention to key problems in the interpretation of Sāmkhya. The present writer has organized the conclusions under three basic divisions: (1) methodological; (2) historical; (3) philosophical or interpretative. (1) Methodological. The most significant studies -e.g., Edgerton, van Buitenen, Johnston, etc .- have clearly demon- strated that the development of the Sāmkhya tradition is ex- tremely complicated and diverse. van Buitenen's principle of "allowing for the greatest diversity" must be the starting-point methodologically for any treatment of the history or interpreta- tion of the Samkhya. Attempts to find an ancient, systematic Sāmkhya -- e.g., Garbe, or more recently, Frauwallner and his hypothetical Pañcasikha- are little more than scholarly specu- lations with little evidence for support. Similarly, attempts to trace the origins of Samkhya or Yoga back to any one group or tradition-e.g., Hauer's Vrātyas, etc. -are questionable and generally unconvincing. One sees, rather, numerous lines or traditions of speculation in the ancient Indian texts, many of which, of course, may have been pre-Aryan originally. At a very early period, however, most of these traditions were synthesized or absorbed into Brahmanism, and thereafter one finds a mixture of myths, practices, speculations, etc. To trace Sāmkhya or Yoga back to any one of these ancient strands is to oversimplify the problem of intellectual history in ancient India. (2) Historical. In spite of the complexity and diversity of these ancient traditions, some fairly reliable facts have been established by researchers. (a) The speculative hymns of the Rig Veda and Atharva Veda provide important data for problems relating to the Samkhya view of creation, evolution, etc. In addition, a number of passages in the Brāhmanas and earliest Upanişads are important for problems relating to the Sāmkhya conceptions of self, knowledge, and salvation. No one of these older texts, of course, actually provides a Sāmkhya system or even a clear Sāmkhya terminology. What is important, however, is to note doctrines and trends of thought which may have later been assimilated into Sāņkhya.

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(b) The first references to Sāmkhyayoga terminology appear in the Katha Upanisad- roughly 4th century B.C. accord- ing to Johnston. This "middle" Upanisad influences both the Śvetāsvatara Upanişad and the Bhagavad Gitā. A tradition of Sāmkhyayoga is clearly reflected in these texts. (c) An early form of Sāmkhya is present in the Moksa- dharma, Mbh. 12, 187-239-240. This has been noticed and discussed by Johnston, van Buitenen and Frauwallner. (d) Based upon this old text and other sources, van Buitenen has demonstrated that there were originally two theories of "evolution:" a "horizontal," involving guņas or bhāvas, and a "vertical," involving ahamkāra and eight prakrtis but no guņas. The gunas, according to Johnston, were originally understood as 'moral psychical qualities," but van Buitenen has also shown that gunas (bhavas) were used in an ancient scheme of cosmic evolution. The doctrine of gunas and the process of evolution in the Sāmkhyakārikā represent some sort of synthesis of these earlier theories. (e) Another early form of Sāmkhya appears to be pre- sent in Aśvaghosa's Buddhacarita- convincingly dated by Johnston in the lst century A.D. This form of Sāmkhya is related in turn to the summary of Sāmkhya found in the Carakasamhitā and in the "Pañcasikhavākya" of the Mokşadharma. (f) In these early forms, Samkhya is closely allied with Yoga, and both represent "ways" or "methods" of salvation. Edgerton has shown the "practical" (i.e., saving or soteriolo- gical) emphasis in all forms of ancient Indian speculation. Edgerton and others have also shown that almost all forms of early Sämkhya, including even the latest philosophical passages of the Moksadharma, represent a pre-systematic or non-systematic form of the doctrine. In other words, there are differing Sām- khya constructions in these early texts, none of which is yet normative. (g) The classical doctrines of prakrti, satkāryavāda, tattvavikāra and the tanmātras are not present in these early forms of Sāmkhya. (h) There are two different accounts available con- cerning the content of the Sastitantra-see Dasgupta and Frau- wallner-a summary of which the Sāmkhyakārikā purports to be. (i) With the works of Iśvarakrsna and Patañjali we

INTERPRETATIONS OF THE SĀMKHYA 73

have the first systematic accounts of Samkhya and Yoga as independent systems of thought. (j) By the 7th or 8th century A.D., according to Frau- wallner, Sāmkhya has seriously declined. After a gap of many centuries, Sāmkhya has a kind of renaissance as evidenced in the late Sāmkhyapravacanasūtra and the work of Vijñānabhiksu, Mahādeva and Aniruddha. (3) Philosophical or Interpretative. Unfortunately, the great strides achieved in sorting out some of the complicated problems in the history of Samkhya have not been matched on the side of the interpretation of the meaning of classical Sāmkhya. Most recent studies-e.g., Johnston, Edgerton, van Buitenen-stop short of the Sāmkhyakārikā or classical Sāmkhya in their work. There are, of course, some older interpretations such as those of Garbe, Oltramare, and Dasgupta. Most of these studies, however, interpret the doctrines of Sāmkhya using the Kārikā, its commentaries, the Sāmkhyapravacanasūtra, the Tattva- samāsa, and the later commentaries of Vijñānabhiksu, Aniruddha, etc. Few of these studies recognize, however, the gap which exists between the Karika and its commentaries, on the one hand, and the later Samkhya texts, on the other. As a result, the interpretation of the Samkhya in such studies is historically uncritical. Little light is shed on the content of classical Sām- khya as it is found in the Kārika itself. Part of the problem, of course, is that the Karika is a difficult text which presents the system in a rather dogmatic, condensed fashion. Thus, it is natural to use any other available texts in order to get at some of the underlying suppositions and arguments not explicitly set forth in the Karika itself. Yet the fact remains that the Kārikā is the oldest systematic text available, and it represents the content of classical Samkhya. Important to remember is that what the Kārikā fails to include is as interesting as what it does include. It is the contention of the present writer that the Kārikā can and should be given a unified, consistent interpret- ation in and of itself without recourse to the later texts. It is also the contention of the present writer that the system in the Kārikā is decidedly different from later statements about the system, and furthermore, is quite different from the most com- monly accepted summaries and outlines of the system presently available in the secondary literature. Chapters II and III

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of the present study are given over to developing the present writer's interpretation of the history and meaning of classical Samkhya. It is only necessary at this point to summarize some of the problems regarding interpretation which have arisen in the course of the above critical review. These conclusions are stated in the form of problems because of the present writer's view that these are still open and require further thought. (a) Problem of the nature of the Sāmkhya dualism in the Kārikā. (b) Problem of the connection or relationship of prakrti and purușa. (c) Problem of the cosmological and/or psychological understanding of the "evolutes." (d) Problem of the introduction of tanmātras. (e) Problem of the 50 bhāvas and the 8 bhāvas. (f) Problem of Sämkhya atheism or non-theism. (g) Problem of the meaning of the basic soteriological terms : viveka, vijňāna and kaivalya.

CHAPTER II

AN INTERPRETATION OF THE HISTORICAL DEVELOP- MENT OF CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA

The texts relating to the development of the Sāmkhya may be arranged conveniently into four basic periods. These periods may be designated as follows : (1) ancient speculations, including the speculative Vedic hymns and the oldest prose Upanisads. This period extends from the eighth or ninth century B.C. through the period of Jainism and the rise of early Buddhism; (2) proto-Sāmkhya speculations, including the "middle" Upanisads, such texts as the Carakasamhitā and the Buddhacarita, the Bhagavadgitā, and the speculative passages from the Moksadharma portion of the Mahabharata. This period extends from about the fourth century B.C. through the first century A.D., (3) classical Sāmkhya speculation, including the Sāmkhyakārikā, the rogasūtra and related commentaries. This period ranges from about the first century A.D. to the tenth or eleventh century A.D .; (4) renaissance or later Sāmkhya speculation, including the Sāmkhyapravacanasūtra and the com- mentaries of Aniruddha, Mahādeva and Vijñānabhiķsu together with the Tattvasamasasūtra. This period reaches from about the fifteenth century A.D. to the seventeenth century. In dating the various texts relating to the development of the Samkhya, the present writer has followed the conclusions of previous researchers. Only the periodization is new.1

1. Briefly, the present writer has followed Deussen and Keith (for the dating of the "oldest", "middle" and "later" Upanishads), Johnston (for the dating of the Buddhacarita); Dasgupta (for the dating of the Caraka- samhita); Jacobi and Winternitz (for the dating of the philosophical sutras of the six systems); Edgerton and Winternitz (for the dating of the Bhagavadgiiā and the Moksadharma); and Winternitz (for the general chronology of Indian literature). There is some justification for establishing a broad periodization of the development of the literature of Samkhya, although the specific date for any text is frequently open to question. In Appendix A the present writer has given a chronological chart which summarizes the history of the literature as it relates to the Sāmkhya.

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(1) ANCIENT SPECULATIONS.

In this first period of development, Sāmkhya as such- either in its classical or proto-classical forms-is nowhere to be found. It is in this ancient period, however, that many motifs, ideas and structures of thought begin to appear which are later assimilated into Sāmkhya contexts. The task, therefore, is to show the trends in this ancient period which foreshadow later developments. The Vedas and the oldest Upanisads. It seems clear that brahmanical speculation arises out of the Vedic sacrificial system and is a product of the priestly class.2 Originally the saving power of the sacrifice resided in the sacrifice itself together with the gods for whom the sacrifices were performed. In time, however, the focus shifted to the priests performing the sacri- fice. The precise knowledge and recitation of the formulas and rubrics took on saving power. By knowing the details of the sacrificial process and by executing them properly, the priest could compel the gods and bring about the desired results. This "knowing" and "doing" of the priests was important for later speculation.3 The priest's knowledge not only "control- led" the sacrifice, but also "controlled" that which the sacrifice symbolized-i.e., the gods, the sun, the forces of nature; etc. It is easy to see how speculations might grow from this context. On the one hand, attempts would be made to explain every detail of the ritual in order to insure the priest's knowledge of the process. This line of speculation can be traced in the Brahmanas.4 On the other hand, attempts would be made to explain the basis or foundation of the priest's own capacity for knowledge-i.e., speculations concerning the speech of the

2. F. Edgerton, The Beginnings of Indian Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 17-28; Edgerton. The Bhagavad Gita, Translated and Interpreted (Cambridge : Harvard Press, 1944; Harvard Oriental Series, Vols, 38-39;), Part II, pp. 9-17; Jan Gonda, Die Religionen Indiens (Stuttgart : W. Kohlhammer, 1960), I, pp. 15-26 and pp. 174-197; A.B. Keith, The Religion and Philo- sophy of the Vedas and Upanisads, op. cit., second half, pp. 433 ff .; Paul Oltramare, L'Histoire des Idées Théosophiques dans L' Inde, op. cit., pp. 2-59; E. Frauwallner, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, op. cit., I. pp. 39 ff., S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, op. cit., I, pp. 10-26, etc., etc. 3. Edgerton, Beginnings, op. cit., p. 17; Indiens, op. cit., I., pp. 174-180. J. Gonda, Die Religionen

3. A.B. Keith, Religion and Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 440-448; Gonda, Die Religionen Indiens, op. cit., pp. 187-197.

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priest, its foundation in his inner nature or body, etc. This line of speculation can be traced not only in the Brāhmanas but also in some of the speculative hymns concerning speech, the speaker, breath, etc.5 The very word "brahman" seems. to be clearly related to the root-notion of "prayer" or "utter- ance."6 Yet another line of speculation, of course, would concern the world itself. If the priest by his "knowledge" and precise "doing" is able to control the sacrifice and that which the sacrifice symbolizes, then one naturally becomes concerned with what kind of world is being controlled. This line of speculation can be traced in hymns concerning the struc- ture, support and origin of the world. Some hymns reveal a tendency to interpret the world in terms of an order established in mythic times by Indra's victory over the demon Vrtra (RV. I. 32).7 Other hymns attempt to describe the ultimate principle or basis of the world-e.g., Prajapati or Brahmanaspati (RV. X. 121 and RV. II. 25 respectively). Still others emphasize an abstract first principle such as Skambha (AV. X. 7) or Viśvakarman (RV. X. 81). One even finds attempts to esta- blish the world on the basis of a primeval sacrifice with a kind of primal, cosmic "man" (puruşa) as the victim (RV. X. 90). Probably from the very beginning of these speculations attempts were made to relate one line to another. This is especially evident if one keeps in mind the centrality of the sacrificial process.8 If one could make an identification between the power of the priest, the power of the sacrifice and the power of the world, then the centrality of the sacrifice would be assured. That such a "logic" of identification developed is quite clear

5. Ibid. 6. Edgerton, Bhagavad Gītā, op. cit., p. 14. 7. The present writer has used the following texts and translations of the Rig Veda and Atharva Veda : Edgerton (trans.), Beginnings, op. cit., pp. 51-132; Wm. T. de Bary (ed.) Sources of Indian Tradition (New York; Columbia University Press, 1960), pp. 9-20; C.R. Lanman and W.D. Whitney (trans.), Atharva-Veda Samhita (Cambridge : Harvard Press, 1905; HOS, 8-9; R.T.H. Griffith (trans.), The Hymns of the Rig-veda (Benares : E. J. Lazarus, 1920), 2 Vols. Sanskrit texts used are : Thcodor Aufrecht (ed.) Die Hymen des Rigveda (Bonn : A. Marcus, 1877), 2 Vols .; and R. Roth and W.D. Whitney (eds.), Atharva Veda Samhita (Berlin; Dummlers, 1924). 8. Edgerton, Beginnings, op. cit., pp. 21-27.

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from such hymns as RV. X. 90, X. 71, X. 125, etc. Similar "identifications" together with crude magical charms can be found throughout the hymns of the Atharva Veda. Thus, it is not surprising that at a later time the identification is made bet- ween the basic principle in man-i.e., his deepest selfhood- and the basic principle of the world. The identification, Brahman-ätman, therefore, is little more than the logical out- come of a way of thinking first initiated in the context of the ancient sacrificial rites. Of course, the precise history of these stages of speculation is quite complex, and the tracing of it is beyond the scope of this essay.9 It is necessary, however, to understand this general speculative background in order to see the stage upon which is acted out the drama of Indian religious thought as found in such texts as the Upanisads, the Gitã, etc. Indian religious thought, then, stems primarily from the priestly class, and its first subject-matter is the sacrifice itself. This speculation in its initial phases is practical and its goal is the appropriation of saving power over both the gods and the world. It involves a "knowing" and a "doing" which continue to be central themes down through the centuries. For a long while these speculations are quite diverse, and undoubtedly reflect a wide variety of traditions from a variety of places. Moreover, they reflect-e.g., some of the hymns of the Atharva Veda-a number of popular or nonpriestly elements, possibly coming from pre-Aryan or indigenous sources which were assimilated from an early period into the brahmanical framework.10 As was mentioned above, the Sāmkhya in any of its forms is not present in these early speculations. Yet it is possible to point to certain trends of thought which might have later been assimilated into Sāmkhya. To point to such trends is not to make the claim that these trends can be precisely traced into later Sāmkhya. The claim is only that certain trends

9. See Keith, Religion and Philosophy, pp. 440 ff., Gonda, Die Religionen Indiens, op. cit., pp. 174-213. 10. F. Edgerton, "The Philosophic Materials of the Atharva Veda," Studies in Honor, of Maurice Bloomfiela (New Haven : Yale University Press, 1920), pp. 117-135; and M. Bloomfield, The Atharvaveda . (Strassburg; Trübner, 1899), passim. For an excellent discussion of problems relating to pre-Aryan religion see Eliade, roga : Immortality and Freedom, ap. cit., pp. 293-358, 385-388, 425-428.

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provide a context from which later Samkhya may have arisen. Important to remember is the fact that Samkhya probably owes its origin to a variety of traditions and cannot convincingly be attributed to any one. One of the more obvious sources for later Sāmkhya is to be found in the ancient cosmological speculations of the Vedas, Brahmanas and oldest Upanisads. Most interpreters of the ancient traditions point to the monistic tendency in early Indian thought, and it is quite true, of course, that most of the ancient speculations seem to move in this direction. It is also true, however, that other emphases are present. In the ancient Indra- Vrtra myth, for example, there is an interesting dualism between chaos and order. Vrtra holds within himself all of the creative forces, and only when he is slain by Indra does creation take place. In RV. I. 32. 11 we are told.

... the waters remained imprisoned like cows held by the Pani. Having killed Vrtra, (Indra) threw open the cleft of waters which had been closed.11

In verse 4 of the same hymn the creative power issuing from Indra's victory is set forth.

When you, O Indra, killed the first-born among the dragons and further overpowered the wily tricks (māyā) of the tricksters, bringing forth at that very moment, the sun, the heaven and the dawn ... etc.

Later in verse 8 we are told, Over him (i.e., Vrtra), who lay in that manner like a shattered reed flowed the waters for the sake of man.

There appears to be a twofold dualism here. On the one hand, there is the dualism of order and chaos. On the other hand, there is the dualism of Indra's power over against both the chaos and the order. In the latter sense one is able to relate the myth to the kinds of speculation found in RV. X. 72 and RV. X. 129. In the former the sat (perhaps "order" or "being" in the sense of the manifest world) and the asat (perhaps

11. Wm. T. de Bary, Sources, op. cit., pp. 13-15.

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"chaos" or "non-being") are derived together with the gods from Brahmanaspati ("the Lord of the Holy Word").12 Verse 2 presents the essence of the hymn.

Brahmanaspati (the Lord of the Holy Word) smelted . them together, as a smith. In the primal age of the gods the Existent (sat) was born from the Non-existent (asat).

Both the sat and the asat exist over against the creative force - in this case, Brahmanaspati.

In RV. X. 129 the same theme is carried still further. Here the previously cosmic and mythological speculation is given a subjective or internal cast. In verse 1 the hymn begins,

Non-existent (asat) there was not, existent (sat) there was not then ... 13

That which "existed" before the sat and asat is simply called That One (tad ekam) in verse 3.

... That One breathed without breath by inner power ...

The environment in which That One was born is then given in verses 4-5.

Darkness there was ... ... an undistinguished ocean was This All. ... by the might of (its own) fervour (tapas) That One was born.

Desire arose then in the beginning which was the first seed of thought. The (causal) connection (bandhu) of the existent the sages found in the non-existent, searching with devotion in their hearts.

Later in verses 6-7 the assertion is made that the gods also are created and thus probably do not know from whence the creation comes.

12. Edgerton, Beginnings, op. cit., p. 60. 13. Ibid., p. 73.

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In the above texts one is reminded of the Samkhya dualism, albeit in a vague way. One side of the dualism includes the primal principle which provides the reason for the appearance of the world. The other side of the dualism includes both the manifest and the unmanifest world. One thinks of the vyakta- avyakta polarity of prakrti with respect to the latter side of the dualism, and one thinks of purusa with respect to the former. Moreover, the sat and the asat may represent the origin of the guna-theory of later Samkhya. The sat would be the ancient counterpart of the sattva, and the asat the counterpart of the tamas guņa.14 Another line of speculation which may have had some influence in the formulation of the Samkhya is the well-known Purușa-hymn, RV. X. 90. The hymn concerns an original cosmic sacrifice involving purusa-a kind of primal, cosmic man - both as sacrifice and sacrificer. Of interest are verses 2-3.

The Purusa alone is all this universe, what has been, and what is to be. He rules likewise over (the world of) immortality (viz. the gods), which he grows beyond, by (sacrificial?) food.

Such is the extent of his greatness; and the Purusa is still greater than this. A quarter of him is all beings, three quarters are (the world of) the immortal in heaven.15

One quarter of purusa becomes the basis or "substance" of all mortal things while three quarters of him are immortal. In the remaining verses of the hymn the origins of the individual, the caste-groups, the gods and the cosmic forces-i.e., sun, moon, wind, etc. - are derived from the first quarter of purusa. The other three quarters remain unmanifest or immortal in heaven.

14. Excellent discussions of sat and asat as they relate to ancient cosmology and doctrines of creation are found in W.N. Brown, "The Rig-Vedic Equivalent for Hell," JAOS, Vol. 61 (1941), pp. 76-80; and, W. N. Brown, "The Creation Myth of the Rig Veda," JAOS, Vol. 62 (1942), pp. 85-98. Also, for sattva and its relation to sat and asat in the Vedas, Upanisads and other texts, see J.A.B. van Buitenen, "Studies in Samkhya (III)," JAOS, Vol. 77 (1957), pp. 88-107. 15. Edgerton, Beginnings, op. cit., pp. 67-68.

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This split reminds one again of the vyakta-avyakta polarity of prakrti in Sāmkhya.16

The notion of the purusa as sacrifice and sacrificer reminds one of yet another series of speculations which may have had some influence in the formation of Samkhya. In RV. X. 121 the "golden germ" (hiranyagarbha) is represented both as the creator and as a product of creation. Keith has pointed out the significance of the creator or principle who becomes the first-born of his own creation, and he has related this notion to the Samkhya notion of the buddhi or mahat (the "great one") which is the first product of prakrti.17 Keith supports his argu- ment by referring to appearances of the term hiranyagarbha in Śvetāśvatara Up. III. 4 and IV. 12, an Upanisad clearly under the influence of Samkhya ideas. He relates the first mention of Kapila, the traditional founder of the Sāmkhya, in Śvetāsvatara Up., V. 2 to the same ancient mythological idea.18 As was mentioned in Chapter I, van Buitenen has simi- larly traced the notion of ahamkāra in Sāmkhya back to some of the ancient cosmological speculations in this ancient period. He especially relates the notion of ahamkāra to the creation myths found in BAUp. I. 4. 1 ff. and BAUp. I. 2. 1 ff.19 In his view ahamkāra was first a cosmic entity and only later became a psychological notion. BAUp. I. 4. 1 is especially suggestive in this regard.

In the beginning this (world) was only the self, in the shape of a person. Looking around he saw nothing else than the self. He first said, 'I am' (aham asmi). There- fore arose the name of I ... 20

16. For discussion of this hymn, see especially W.N. Brown, "The Sources and Nature of purusa in the Puruşasūkta," JAOS, Vol. 51 (1931), pp. 108-118. 17. Keith, The Sāmkhya System, op. cit., pp. 9-10. 18. Ibid., p. 47.

pp. 17-18. 19. van Buitenen, "Studies in Sāmkhya (II)," JAOS, Vol. 77 (1957) 20. Unless otherwise noted all passages quoted from the Upanișads are taken from S. Radhakrishnan (ed. and trans.), The Principal Upanisads (London : George Allen and Unwin, 1953). The author includes the Sanskrit text along with the translations.

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Such a cosmological origin for the notion, according to van Buitenen, then renders more intelligible the first appearance of ahamkāra in Chāndogya VII, 25, an obviously cosmological usage.21

That (infinite) indeed is below. It is above. It is behind. It is in front. It is to the south, it is to the north. It is indeed all this (world). Now, next, the instruction in regard to the self-sense (ahamkāra). I, indeed, am below. I am above. I am behind. I am in front. I am to the south. I am to the north; I indeed am all this (world).

Yet another series of cosmological speculations which may have had some influence on the formation of Sāmkhya is the well-known passage in Chāndogya Upanisad VI, 1 ff. This pro- bably represents a somewhat later stage of speculation, since the text is reacting against the old idea that the sat can be derived from the asat. In VI, 2, 1-2, we are told,

In the beginning, my dear, this was Being alone, one only without a second. Some people say in the beginning this was non-being alone, one only; without a second. From that non-being, being was produced.

But how, indeed, my dear, could it be thus ? said he, how could being be produced from non-being? On the contrary, my dear, in the beginning this was being alone, one only, without a second.

This passage reminds one of the Samkhya notion of prakrti, and is perhaps one source of the theory of causation known as satkāryavāda which was to become a central doctrine in classical Sāmkhya.22 This passage in the Chandogya then goes on to describe the emergence of the world from this Being. In Chandogya Up. VI, 2, 3-4 we read,

It thought, May I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth fire. That fire thought, May I be many, may I. grow forth. It sent forth water ...

21. van Buitenen, "Studies in Sāmkhya (1I)," op. cit., p. 19. 22. Keith, Thè Sāmkhya System, op. cit., pp. 13-14.

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That water thought, May I be many, may I grow forth. It sent forth food ....

This tripartite creation is then related in a puzzling manner to three colours in Chāndogya VI, 4. 1.

Whatever red form fire has it is the form of heat, what- ever (is) white (is the form) of water. Whatever (is) dark (it is the form of) earth.

Here again, of course, one thinks of the process of emergence of prakrti and also of the doctrine of the three gunas.23 That speculations like this were later employed in a Sāmkhya context receives some documentation from the later Śvetāsvatara Up., which, as has been said, is under obvious Sāmkhya influence.24 In Śvetāśvatara Up., IV, 5 ff., the above tripartite scheme together with the colors is related as follows :

The One unborn, red, white and black, who produces manifold offspring similar in form (to herself), there lies the one unborn (male) delighting. There two unborn entities (male and female) are then related to the motif of the two birds, which goes back ultimately to RV. I. 164, 20. In Śvetāśvatara Up. IV. 6-7 we read

23. Emile Senart, "Rajas et la théorie indienne des trois gunas," "Four- nal asiatique, Ser. XI, Vol. XI (Paris, 1915), pp. 151-164; Senart, "La Théorie des guņas et la Chāndogya Upanișad," Etudes asiatiques, Tome Second, Pub- lications De L'Ecole Francaise D'Extrême-Orient, Vol. XX (1925), pp. 285-292; J. Przyluski, "La Théorie des guna," BSOS, Vol. VI (1930-32), pp. 25-35. The latter goes far beyond Senart relating the gunas to Iranian and even Semitic sources. For critique of these views together with an attempt to relate gunas to the seasonal pattern of summer, rains, harvest, see van Buitenen, "Studies in Sāmkhya (III)," JAOS, op. cit., pp. 88-93. On gunas as "psychic qualities" see Johnston, Early Sāmkhya, op. cit., pp. 25-40. Various attempts have been made to relate gunas to the Buddhist theory of Dependent Origination, on this see Jacobi, "Uber das Verhältnis der buddhistischen Philosophie die Sankhya-Yoga und die Bedeutung der Nidānas," ZDMG, xlii (Leipzig, 1898), pp. 1-15; Th. Stcherbatsky, "The 'Dharmas' of the Buddhists and the 'Gunas' of the Samkhyas," IHQ (Calcutta, 1934), pp. 737-760; Alex Wayman, "Buddhist Dependent Origination and the Sāmkhya gunas," Ethnos (1962), pp. 14-22. 24. E.H. Johnston, "Some Samkhya and Yoga Conceptions of the Śvetāśvatara Upanisad," JRAS (London, 1930), pp. 855-878.

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Two birds, companions (who are) always united, cling to the self-same tree. Of these two the one eats the sweet fruit and the other looks on without eating. On the self-same tree, a person immersed (in the sorrows of the world) is deluded and grieves on account of his helplessness. When he sees the Other ... he becomes freed from sorrow.

This appears to be a clear reference to the dualism of purusa and prakrti in Sāmkhya. What is interesting to observe is how various traditions of ancient speculation are brought together and interwoven with one another in order to form new concep- tions. In most cases, of course, it is impossible to trace the precise stages through which thought passed on its way to later conceptions. What is clear, however, is that this occurred very slowly over a long period of time. In addition to cosmological speculations one can also find possible sources for the Samkhya in notions of self and con- sciousness in the older texts. Here again it should be empha- sized that the classical or even proto-classical notion of purusa is nowhere to be found in the ancient texts. Yet one can point to certain key notions which probably exercised some influence on Sāmkhya formulations. Of special interest in this regard, first of all, are the many references in the ancient texts to purusa. Most often purusa appears simply as a term for mortal man : RV. VII. 104, 15; X. 97, 4-5; X. 165, 3; AV. III. 21, 1; V. 21, 4; VIII. 2, 25; VIII. 7, 2; XI. 3, 51; XII. 4, 25; XIII. 4, 42, etc. Similar references are numerous in the Brahmanas. Of note are the references in Śatapatha Brāhmaņa XIII. 5. 1, 6; VI. 2. 1, 23; in which purusa is said to have twenty-one parts and twenty-five parts respectively. Of note also is Satapatha Brāhmana X. 1. 3, 4 in which man is described in terms of five mortal and five immortal parts.25 In this latter passage, of course, a more speculative concern is evident. Johnston has suggested that speculations involving man or purusa probably developed because of two closely related

25. Julius Eggeling (ed. and trans.), Satapatha-Brahmana (Oxford:

cit., p. 18. Clarendon Press, 1882; Sacred Books of the East); Johnston, Early Samkhya, op.

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concerns: (1) an urge to find the ultimate essence of life in man; (2) an urge to work out a notion of life after death for man.26 This undoubtedly explains hymns like AV. X. 2 which are concerned with an analysis of the component parts of man.27 In AV. X. 2. 1, we read

Who brought here the two heels of Man (purusa) ? Who assembled his flesh, his two ankles ?

Then in X. 2, 31, purusa is characterized as follows :

The impregnable citadel of the gods has eight circles, nine doors. In it is a golden treasure-chest, heavenly, enveloped in light.

And in X. 2. 31,

In this golden treasure-chest, which has three spokes and is triply based - the prodigy in it which consists of Self (atman), that verily brahman-knowers know.

The latter verse calls to mind AV. X. 8. 43,

The lotus with nine gates, covered over with three strands - the prodigy in it which consists of Self (ātman). that verily brahman-knowers know.

In both AV. X. 2. 31 and AV. X. 8. 43 the three "spokes" or "strands" (triguna) may be an ancient source for the later guna-theory, although it is difficult to determine what is meant by the term in this context.28 The three "spokes" also reminds one of a somewhat similar verse in AV. X. 8. 4.

Twelve fellies, a single wheel, three naves; who under- stands that ? Therein are fixed three hundred and sixty pins (=spokes) pegs which are immovable.

This in turn calls to mind a similar image of the wheel in RV. I. 164. 48 which is repeated in a modified form in the opening

26. Johnston, Early Sāmkhya, op. cit., p. 18. 27. The foilowing quoted passages from AV are from Edgerton's. recently published translations, Beginnings, op. cit., pp. 79-132. 28. See Edgerton's note on the problem, Beginnings, op. cit., p. 91.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 87

verses of the Śvetāsvatara Up. (I. 4 ff.). The latter reference, according to Johnston, is clearly a summary presentation of the principles of Sāmkhya.29 In AV. XI. 8 the purusa is discussed with respect to its relations to the world. Verse 2 of the hymn seems to recall the kind of speculation found in RV. X. 129.

Fervour (tapas) and action were within the great flood (the cosmic waters); they were the groomsmen, they the wooers; brahman was the chief wooer.30

In verse 4 one finds some early speculations dealing with breath, the senses, speech and thought.

Upper and nether breath, sight, hearing, both imperish- ability and perishability, transverse breath and rising breath, speech, thought- these verily brought Wish (as bride of Passion).31

The gods who assemble the parts of the universe are related to purușa ina verse 13.

Pourers-together are called those 'gods' who assembled the assemblings; having poured together the entire mortal, the 'gods' entered into Man (purua).

Finally, in verse 32 of AV. XI. 8 the purusa is described as the ultimate essence and is equated with the Brahman and with the gods.

Therefore one who knows Man (purusa) thinks, 'This is Brahman,' for all deities (devatā) are seated in him, as cattle in a cow-stall.

This notion of purusa as the ultimate essence or reason for all things brings us back to RV. X. 90 which was discussed earlier when we were discussing cosmological theories. In RV. X.

29. Johnston, "Some Sāmkhya and Yoga Conceptions of the Śvetāśva- tara Upanișad," loc. cit. 30. Cf. RV. X. 129. 3-4. 31. Cf. AV. XV. 15-17 in Lanman-Whitney (trans.), Atharva-Veda. Samhitā, op. cit., pp. 790-791; and cf. AV. XI. 4, a hymn to breath

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90 - repeated, although with a different order of verses in AV. XIX. 6 - purusa is also the essence of the world both in its mortal and immortal manifestations. Hauer in his Der Yoga emphasizes the point that specula- tions concerning the purusa, especially those found in the Atharva Veda, are always closely attached to speculations regarding breaths and tapas or "fervour." It is in this context, Hauer suggests, that one finds the earliest forms of what is later to become classical Yoga.32 Hauer furthermore relates these speculations to the ancient Vrātyas- an ascetic group of early Aryans - who worshipped an Urgott resembling Vayu, Rudra, and Siva and the later iśvara of classical Yoga.33 It is interest- ing to note in this regard that the Śvetāsvatara Up., which con- tains a number of obvious Sāmkhyayoga elements, is also related to Rudra-Śiva. Although one hesitates to accept Hauer's con- clusions regarding the Vrātyas (see Chapter I), nevertheless there is no doubt that one finds in these ancient speculations a number of motifs which were probably picked up or used in the formation of Sāmkhya and Yoga. In addition to the speculations regarding purusa, there are, of course, the many passages dealing with atman. Frequently, purușa and ātman are simply used interchangeably as synonyms for man.34 In other passages, however, atman is understood in a more philosophical way. The famous Yājñavalkya doctrine of the Self in BAUp. III-IV and the well-known dialogue between Śvetaketu and his father, Uddālaka Āruņi, in Chān. Up. VI. 8-16 can be characterized as passages in the Upanisads which offer the most advanced stages of thought regarding the Self and the Absolute in the ancient Vedic literature. Since these passages have been dealt with by most historians and interpreters of ancient Indian thought, there is no need to enter into a long discussion concerning them here.35 Suffice it to say that in these ancient texts the attempt is made to find the ultimate or

32. Hauer, Der roga, op. cit., pp. 64-90. 33. Ibid., pp. 32-47. 34. Edgerton, Beginnings, p. 354. 35. Paul Deussen, The Philosophy of the Upanisads, trans. A.S. Geden (Edinburgh : T. and T. Clark, 1906), passim; A.B. Keith, Religion and Phi- losophy, op. cit., pp. 516-567; Jan Gonda, Die Religionen Indi ens, op. cit., I, pp. 197-213; etc., etc.

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inner most essence of man. This essence is discovered in the deepest selfhood of man which is also equated with the ultimate essence of the universe (Brahman). As was pointed out at the beginning of this chapter, this search for the ultimate essence probably originated in a sacrificial context and was also related to the quest for immortality. This ultimate essence is described as being pure subjectivity - i.e., the knower who is himself unknowable, the seer who cannot be seen, etc. - as being one - i.e., over against all multiplicity - as being pure consciousness - i.e., consciousness apart from the subject-object duality of ordi- nary experience.36 Moreover, this ultimate consciousness is discovered by means of speculations concerning the various breaths which make up a living organism, and by means of speculations concerning the various stages of consciousness - waking, dreaming, deep sleep and beyond.37 The focus in all of this is the interior Self which is the foundation of man's life. The problems of the reality or unreality of the world in relation to this Self are only vaguely dealt with in these early stages of thought, usually in terms of naive identifications. There is no dominant or prevailing assertion that the world is an illusion or simply an emanation from the Self. It is quite possible that some later thinkers would take up the problem of the reality of the world and attempt to relate it to the older speculations concerning the Self and the Absolute. In other words, it seems quite likely that both the monistic trends in Indian thought and the dualistic Samkhya could have developed out of these ancient speculations.38 Thus far we have discussed possible sources for the deve- lopment of Samkhya in ancient cosmological speculations and in notions relating to consciousness, the Self, etc. Related to both of these yet deserving of at least brief mention separately is the tendency toward enumeration in the ancient texts. In the Introduction the present writer suggested that the word "sāmkhya" is related to the idea of enumeration. The whole Samkhya system from one point of view can be seen as an

36. Ibid. 37. BAUp. IV. 3. 7-33; Chān. Up. V. 18-24. 38. Cf. Oldenberg, "Zur Geschichte der Samkhya-Philosophie," op. cit., pp. 224-225.

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enumeration of tattvas or principles. Thus it seems appropriate to look in the ancient texts for possible enumerations of principles which may have later been assimilated into Sāmkhya. Enumerations of various kinds abound throughout the ancient texts. To mention only a few, one finds the enumera- tion of the parts of man which is correlated with the com- ponent parts of the world in RV. X. 90 (and AV. XIX. 6) ; one finds varieties of enumerations relating to the sacrifice throughout the Brahmanas; one finds enumerations in the form of riddles in such texts as RV. I. 164; one finds enumerations of the parts of man correlated with the parts of the universe in such Upanisadic passages as Taittirīya I. 7.

Earth, atmosphere, heaven, the quarters, and the inter- mediate quarters. Fire, air, sun, moon, stars. Water plants, trees, etc ... Now with regard to the self, prāna, vyāna, apāna, udāna, and samāna; sight, hearing, mind, speech, touch; skin, flesh, muscle, bone, marrow ... the sage said : Fivefold verily is this all. With fivefold does one win the fivefold.39 This reminds one of the passage in BAUp. I. 4, 17. ... The sacrifice is fivefold. The sacrificial animal is. fivefold. A person (purusa) is fivefold. This whole world, whatever there is, is fivefold. He obtains this whole world who knows this.40

With respect to specific enumerations which may have had some influence on the development of Samkhya, one can find several suggestive passages. Already in the Taittirīya Up. (II. 1) and Aitareya (III. 3) one finds references to the five mahābhūtas: ether, air, fire, water and earth. Also, in Taitti- riya (II. 1) one finds mention of the five senses. Of special interest, however, is the passage in BAUp. IV. 5. 12, a portion of the Yajñavalkya-Maitreyi dialogue. Here seventeen of the later twenty-five tattvas of Sāmkhya are mentioned.41

39. Cf. Edgerton, Beginnings, op. cit., p. 21. 40. "Five" is a favorite number throughout the Brāhmanas; see Eggeling's Introduction in Satapatha Brāhmanas, loc. cit. 41. Cf. Johnston, Early Sāmkhya, op. cit., p. 20.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 9I

As the ocean is the one goal of all waters, as the skin is the one goal of all kinds of touch, as the nose is the one goal of all smells, as the tongue is the one goal of all tastes, as the eye is the one goal of all forms, as the ear is the one goal of all sounds, as the mind (manas) is the one goal of all intentions, as the heart is the one goal of all knowledge, as the hands are the one goal of all kinds of work, as the generative organ is the one goal of all forms of delight, as the anus is the one goal of all evacuations, as the feet are the one goal of all movements, as the speech is the one goal of all the Vedas. 42

In this ancient period one also finds the beginning of the doctrines of transmigration and karman, which are of great impor- tance in Samkhya as well as most other forms of Indian thought and religion. These doctrines are late developments in the period, however, since one does not find references to the doc- trines in the hymn-collections. One first finds references to the notion of re-death (punar-mrtyu) in the Brahmanas.43 The notions of karman and samsāra begin to appear in passages like BAUp. IV. 4, 4-5; IV. 4, 6; III. 2, 14. The doctrines are there taught as esoteric or secret teachings, and it is obvious that they did not represent a widely held view.44 In the period between the oldest Upanisads and the rise of Buddhism (6th B.C.), however, the doctrines evidently took on great importance, for Buddhist texts simply assume the centrality and universality of the doctrines.45 The notion of suffering (duhkha) as a major factor in the religious consciousness likewise develops rather late in the period. In the hymn-collections the notion of suffering plays very little if any role. The goal of religion is simply long life, much cattle,

42. This similarity in enumerations cannot be pushed too far. All systems of Indian thought engage in numbering principles and create various kinds of lists. Important to notice only is the fact that Sāmkhya's. tendency towards enumeration probably has this ancient setting as its background. 43. Edgerton, Bhagavad Gīiā, op. cit., part 2, pp. 20-21; Keith, Religion. and Philosophy, op, cit., pp. 570-581. 44. Ibid. 45. Ibid.

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and life after death in heaven with the gods and the fathers.46 In some of the later passages of the oldest Upanisads, however. -e.g., BAUp. IV. 4. 13 ff. and Chan. Up. VII. 22 ff. - one begins to find references to the idea of suffering and to the idea that suffering is due to ignorance which leads to the bondage of the Self in the world. In addition to these ancient Vedic speculations, one must also mention possible influences on Samkhya from the ancient heterodox traditions-i.e., Buddhism and Jainism. These tradi- tions grew up in Northeastern India some time after the period of the speculations found in the oldest Upanisads. By the beginning of the fifth century B.C. these two traditions had achieved some prominence. We learn from the Digha Nikāya I. 47 ff., and other Buddhist texts that there were a number of teachers and traditions of speculation which were prevalent in this area in India before and during the fifth century.47 It is difficult to determine the origins of these traditions, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to determine what connections these traditions had with the Vedic tradition. In view of the fact that early Buddhism opposes any metaphysical doctrine of the atman, however, it can be assumed that there was some con- tact. Buddhism is clearly a reaction against the excess of meta- physical speculation like that found in the oldest Upanisads. It is also opposed to the Vedic sacrificial system.48 Keith, Garbe and Frauwallner have noted a number of striking similarities between Sāmkhya and Buddhism (see Chapter I), and the suggestion has been maintained that there was some kind of influence of one upon the other. Most of the similarities noted, however, are not very convincing, and in most instances are little more than the kinds of similarities one finds generally in ancient Indian culture.49 The tendency towards enumeration, in both the Samkhya and Buddhism, for example, could also be said about any system of ancient Indian thought. The one similarity which is rather striking, however, is the

47. Wm. T. de Bary (ed.), Sources of Indian Tradition, op. cit., pp. 42-44. 46. Ibid.

48. Franklin Edgerton, "Did the Buddha have a System of Meta- physics ?", JAOS, Vol. 79 (1959), pp. 81 ff. 49. See, for example, the list of similarities in Garbe, Sāmkhya-Sūtra- Vṛtti, op. cit., pp. v-xxii; cf. Keith, Sāmkhya Syslem, op. cit., pp. 26-34.

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great emphasis on suffering (duhkha) in both Sāmkhya and Buddhism. The notion that life is suffering is, of course, pre- sent in many phases of Indian thought, but in Sāmkhya and Buddhism it is the foundation upon which the respective soterio- logies are built. As will be seen later, however, the emphasis on suffering in Sāmkhya does not appear as a central motif until classical times, and so it is more likely that Buddhism has influenced Samkhya in this regard. This conclusion would agree with the research of Johnston who has suggested that Buddhism is older than the earliest forms of Samkhya.50 It is also quite possible, of course, that Sāmkhya and Buddhism exerted mutual influence on one another in later times.51 There is one other source of ancient non-Vedic speculation which probably exerted some influence on the formation of Sāmkhya : the Jain doctrine of the individual jiva and the Jain doctrine of the state of salvation characterized as kaivalya.52 The former doctrine in later times probably was one influence in the emergence of the Samkhya notion of the plurality of purusas. Again it is to be noted, however, that the plurality of puruşas in Sāmkhya is a late doctrine and is not clearly arti- culated until classical times. Thus, there is no reason to sup- pose that the Sāmkhya notion of purusa is dependent solely on the jiva-notion in ancient Jainism, as Jacobi, and others have suggested. It is much more likely that the Samkhya doctrine is a modification of a number of ancient soul-theories including Jain as well as Vedic conceptions.53 The same thing can be said with respect to the notion of kaivalya.54 Again, the doctrine of kaivalya in Sāmkhya is not clearly expressed much before the time of the classical Sāmkhya of Iśvarakrsna. The state of

50. Johnston, Early Sāmkhya, op. cit., pp. 21-24. 51. For comprehensive discussion on literature relating to similarities of Samkhya and Buddhism, see Eliade's notes in roga, op., cit., pp. 377-381. 52. Walther Schubring, The Doctrine of the Jainas, trans Wolfgang Beurlen (Delhi : Motilal Banarsitdass, 1962); pp. 152 ff .; Johnston, Early Sāmkhya, op. cit., p. 140. 53. See Johnston's excellent discussion of soul-theories. Early Sāmkhya op. cit., pp. 41-65. 54. W. Schubring, op. cit., pp. 324-329. The released soul is called kevalin.

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salvation in Sāmkhya also has some similarities with the Buddhist notion of nirvana as well as with older Vedic conceptions as noted earlier. Here again the Samkhya conception is best under- stood as a modification in later times of a number of earlier conceptions.55 Conclusions. (1) Although no system of Sāmkhya is found in the ancient texts, nevertheless, one can point to a number of traditions of speculation which may have been important in the eventual formation of the Sāmkhya. These include, (a) those mythological and cosmological passages emphasizing order and chaos, sat and asat, etc .; (b) those cosmological speculations emphasizing a tripartite creation in which the creative force or principle enters into the creation as the first-born; (c) those speculations concerning purusa as the primal sacrifice and emphasizing purusa as the essence or reason for the emergence of the world and of man; (d) those speculations concerning the Self (atman) as the radical foundation of subjectivity and con- sciousness; (e) those passages which set forth various kinds of enumeration, some of which contain many of the tattvas which later appear in the Sāmkhya; and (f) those non-Vedic doctrines of Jainism and Buddhism - e.g., kaivalya, and duhkha - which later play an important role in Sāmkhya doctrine. (2) Most of these ancient traditions of speculation are quite diverse and unsophisticated. No one point of view predominates through- out. Thought in this ancient period is in its infancy, and in many cases has not yet clearly dissociated itself from its original * sacrificial context. (3) Most of the speculations concerning purușa and ātman are related at many points with speculations about the breaths or winds and the various stages of consciousness (waking, dreaming, deep sleep, etc.). (4) It has become clear that it would be a mistake to trace the development of Sāmkhya

55. As was mentioned earlier, when dealing with ancient speculations, whether orthodox or heterodox, it is best to allow for the greatest diversity. That some notions of Buddhism or Jainism have carried over into Sāmkhya does not imply, therefore, that Samkhya arose in some ancient, non-Vedic tradition any more than the presence of Yoga practices in Jainism and Buddhism argues for the Vedic background of these systems. All of these systems developed in mutual interaction with one another. Especially in later classical times much borrowing back and forth occurred, and it is in this later time that Sāmkhya becomes a separate and unique system.

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to any one of these traditions. What is much more likely is that Sāmkhya is a derivative and composite system, a product of a wide variety of speculations from a wide variety of contexts, both orthodox and heterodox.

(2). PROTO-SĀŅKHYA SPECULATIONS In this second period one is able to discern the appearance of a definite sāmkhya-yoga tradition. Many of the earlier diverse speculations are brought together and placed into a recogniz- able framework. A technical terminology begins to appear, although there continues to be various lines or traditions of interpretation. It seems likely that there were a large number of centres or "schools" of Sāmkhya-yoga speculation, none of which could yet claim to possess an authoritative interpreta- tion.56 Towards the end of this period, however, it is possible to detect a movement in the direction of dogmatic or normative systems. Sāmkhya almost reaches its classical form, and some late texts reveal attempts to differentiate clearly between Sām- khya and Yoga. It should be noted that this movement towards definitive or normative systematization is also apparent in other traditions of speculation - i.e., in Vedānta, Nyāya-Vaiśeika and Pūrva- mīmāmsā. Jacobi and Winternitz have suggested that many of the later systems of Indian thought were taking shape in the latter part of what the present writer is designating as the second period.57 Similar tendencies towards more dogmatic and systematic presentation also are evident in Buddhism in this period - i.e., the development of the Abhidhamma along with early speculations regarding the Perfection of Wisdom in early Mahāyāna.58 Thus, this second period marks a time of amazing intellec- tual growth. In the first period we noticed little more than a variety of religious speculations none of which really approxi- mated any kind of significant philosophical interpretation. In

56. van Buitenen, "Studies in Sāmkhya (III)," op. cit., pp. 100-102. 57. J. Jacobi, "The Dates of the Philosophical Sutras of the Brah- mans," JAOS, Vol. 31 (1911), pp. 1-29; M. Winternitz, op. cit., III, pp., 421 ff. 58. Edward.Conze, Buddhism, Its Essence and Development (New York : Harper Torchbooks 1959), pp. 28 ff., and pp. 123 ff.

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this second period, however, thought becomes much more self- conscious. Attempts are made to find first principles; the means of knowledge become a problem; the need for intelligible systems is felt, etc., etc. Of course, the basic problem of man in this second period - indeed, in any period of Indian thought -is still religious or soteriological. The difference is that in this second period the religious quest is given a more rational and systematic foundation.

(a) Katha Upanişad In this Upanisad one finds the first clear references to Sāmkhya ideas and terminology. This is probably the oldest of the so-called "middle" Upanisads and was composed possibly as early as the fourth century B.c.59 The basic story of the Upanişad first appears in Taittirīya Brāhmaņa III. 1. 8 and may even be traced back to the episode in RV. X. 135.60 The doctrines of this Upanisad resemble many of the doct- rines of the oldest Upanisads with the exception that many of the passages seem to have a theistic tinge. In II. 22-23, for example, the Upanisadic Self-doctrine (atman) is set forth together with reference to the purusa, but the whole passage has hints of a kind of doctrine of grace.

Bodiless among bodies, made fixed among the unfixed, - thinking (thus) on the great, pervasive Self (ātman), the wise man is not grieved.

This Self cannot be gained by instruction, not by intel- lect, not by much holy learning. Only whom he chooses, by him he is to be gained; this Self chooses that man's person as his own (to dwell in).61

Here purușa is conceived as the individual soul or self in which the atman dwells by choice or election. Elsewhere in IV. 12 the purusa is described as the "size of a thumb."

59. Johnston, Early Sāmkhya, op. cit., p. 3, 20, 81-82; Keith, Religion and Philosophy, op. cit., II, pp. 499-500. 60. Radhakrishnan, The Principle Upanișads, op. cit., p. 593.

ton's excellent, 61. All passages quoted here from the Katha are taken from Edger- partial translation in Beginnings, op. cit., pp. 178-193.

pp. 595-648. Complete translation together with Sanskrit text in Radhakrishnan, op. cit.,

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The spirit (purusa) of the size of the thumb abides in the midst of the self, the lord (Isana) of what has been and is to be. From that he does not shrink away (who knows this). Even this is that.62

In Katha II, 18-19 one finds purusa or the self described in a way which resembles later Sāmkhya notions.

He is not born, nor does he die, the wise; he is not (derived) from any, nor does he become anymore. Unborn, eternal, everlasting, this ancient one is not slain when the body is slain.

If the slayer thinks to slay ... etc.63

Thus, one finds in the Katha both the old Upanisadic notion of the Self together with the beginning of the Sāmkhya notion of purușa. In addition to these rather puzzling notions of purusa and ätman in the Katha, one finds also a number of other passages which give a much clearer picture of the beginnings of Sāmkhya- like descriptions. In Katha III. 3-4, for example, one finds the metaphor of the chariot.

Know that the Self (atman) is the traveller in the chariot, while the body is the chariot itself; intelligence (buddhi) on the other hand, know as the charioteer, while the thought-organ (manas) is the reins rather.

The senses (indriya) are the horses; the objects of sense (vişaya) are their ranges. That which is joined with the Self, the senses, and the thought-organ the wise call the Enjoyer (bhoktr).

Again, in III. 10-11 one finds clear reference to Sāmkhya terminology.

For the objects of senses are higher than the senses (because they enthrall them), and the thought-organ (manas) is higher than the objects, while the intelligence is higher

62. Cf. Svet. Up. III. 13, V. 8 and Maitri Up. VI. 38 . 63. Cf. Gītā II. 19-20, in Edgerton, The Bhagavad Gītā, op. cit., part 1.

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than the thought-organ; higher than the intelligence is the Great Self (mahān ātmā).

Higher than the Great Self is the unmanifest (avyakta) (cosmic material nature); higher than the unmanifest is the purusa. Higher than the purusa there is nothing; that is the goal; that is the supreme course.

A slightly different version of the same sequence is found in Katha VI. 7-9.

Higher than the senses is the thought-organ; higher than the thought-organ is the Essential (material) Reality (sattva) (replaces buddhi here); higher than the Essential Reality is the Great Self (mahān atma); higher than the Great Self is the Unmanifest (material nature).

But higher than the Unmanifest is the Spirit, pervading and quite without distinguishing mark; knowing which a creature is released and goes to immortality.64

Many of the tattvas of Samkhya are present here although they are not yet clearly worked out. Also, ahamkāra has no place in these passages, although the function of ahamkāra is probably included within the notion of the mahān ātmā.65

Of crucial importance in the Katha, however, is that all of these Sämkhya-like speculations are included within the overall yogic environment. In II. 12, for example, we are told,

By resort to the discipline of the super-soul (adhyātma- yoga) thinking on the god that is hard to perceive, entered into a hidden place, set down in secret, abiding in an obscure location, ancient - the wise one abandons both joy and grief.

Again in III. 6, shortly after the metaphor of the chariot, one finds the following verse.

64. See Edgerton's note in Beginnings, op. cit., p. 186. 65. Cf. Johnston, Early Sāmkhya, op. cit., p. 82.

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But he who has intelligence, with always fastened (disciplined) thought-organ, his senses are controlled, like a charioteer's good horses.

Again in V. 1,

Having controlled the eleven-gated citadel of the unborn (soul) of unwavering intelligence, one is not grieved; being released, he attains release. Even this is that.

Finally, in VI. 10-11 the term yoga is specifically used.

When the five organs of perceptional knowledge together with the thought-organ are brought to stability, and the intellect does not stir, that they call the highest goal.

This steady control of the senses they regard as practical discipline (yoga). Then he becomes calm; for practical discipline (yoga) is (not only) origination but also is absorption (its goal).

Although for the sake of discussion we have separated out the Sāmkhya and Yoga portions of the Upanisad, in actuality they are undifferentiated in the text itself. In fact, it is quite clear that the Samkhya principles here mentioned are closely related to the experience of yoga. The metaphor of the chariot, for example, which employs a number of Sāmkhya terms is a des- cription of the disciplined yogin. Likewise the passage which begins, "Higher than the senses ... etc.," is immediately followed by the passage quoted just above which describes the experience as "practical discipline"-e.g., yoga.66 Therefore, in the Katha Up. one finds neither Samkhya nor Yoga but, rather, a kind of undifferentiated sāmkhyayoga. We saw also that this samkhyayoga still employs the notions of atman and purușa which we found in the period of ancient speculations. Thus, this text has not moved very far from the speculations which we discussed in the first period, although some differen- tiation and focus is beginning to appear.

66. Ibid.

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(b) Śvetāśvatara Upanişad This text is also part of the so-called "middle" Upanisads, and represents a later stage of thought than that found in the Katha. It is difficult to date even approximately, although Johnston and others have placed it around the third century B.C.67 The Śvetasvatara along with the Katha Upanisad belongs to the Taittiriya school of the rajur Veda.68 Unlike the Katha which has only some theistic tendencies the Śvet. Up. is clearly and predominantly theistic. The god or lord of the Svet. Up. is Rudra-Siva as is mentioned in III. 2.69

Truly Rudra is one, there is no place for a second, who rules all these worlds with his ruling powers. He stands opposite creatures. He, the protector, after creating all worlds, withdraws them at the end of time. The centrality of the Lord is set forth also in I. 8. The Lord supports all this which is a combination of the mutable and the immutable, the manifest and the un- manifest. And the soul, not being the Lord, is bound because of his being an enjoyer. By knowing God (deva) (the soul) is freed from all fetters.

Again, in I. 10, What is perishable is the pradhāna (primary matter). What is immortal and imperishable is Hara (the Lord - Śiva). Over both the perishable and the soul the one God rules. By meditating on Him, by uniting with Him, by reflecting on His being more and more, there is complete cessation from the illusion of the world (māyā-nivrttih).

In the opening verses of the Upanisads an interesting series of enumerations are given which interpreters have viewed as Sāmkhya tattvas.70 In I. 4, we read,

67. Johnston, Early Samkhya, op. cit., p. 82; Johnston, "Some Sāmkhya and Yoga Conceptions of the Śvetasvatara Upanişad," loc. cit .; Keith. Religion and Philosophy, loc. cit. 68. Radhakrishnan, op. cit., p. 707. 69. All passages quoted here from Svet. Up. are from Radhakrishnan, op. cit., pp. 709-750. 70. Analysis of enumeration in Johnston, "Some Samkhya and Yoga Conceptions of the Śvetāsvatara Upanişad," loc. cit.

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(We understand) Him (as a wheel) with one felly, with three tires, sixteen ends, fifty spokes, twenty counter- spokes and six sets of eights, whose one rope is manifold, which has three different paths whose one delusion (moha) arises from two causes.71

As mentioned before this verse calls to mind both RV. I. 164, 48 and AV. X. 8, 4. Moreover, in this Upanisad VI. 13 the term sāmkhya is mentioned for the first time.

He (i.e., eko devas of vs. 12) is the eternal among the eternals, the intelligent (cetana) among the intelligences, the one among many, who grants desires. That cause which is to be apprehended by discrimination and discipline (sāmkhyayogādhigamyam) - by knowing God, one is freed from all fetters.

One also finds in the Upanisad the image of the two unborn birds and the three colors which we discussed above in relation to Chan. Up. VI.72 In addition, in this Upanisad one finds references to many of the other principles of the Sāmkhya. avyakta, pradhāna and prakrti are mentioned in I. 8; I. 10; and I. 9 respectively. The doctrine of the gunas is referred to in V. 7, although it is not clear just how the term is used. ahamkāra is mentioned in V. 8, etc., etc. At every point, however, these notions are interpreted from a theistic point of view. As in the Katha, however, all of the above notions are related to yoga and in Śvet. Up. II. 8-10 one gets a much clearer picture of the practice of yoga.

8. Holding the body steady with the three (upper parts) erect, causing the senses and the mind to enter into the heart, the wise man should cross by the boat of Brahman all the streams which cause fear. 9. Repressing his breathings here (in the body), let him who has controlled all movements, breathe through his nostrils, with diminished breath; let the wise man restrain his mind vigilantly as (he would) a chariot yoked with vicious horses.

9. Ibid. 72. Supra. pp. 76-78.

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10. In a level clean place, free from pebbles, fire and gravel, favourable to thought by the sound of water and other features, not offensive to the eye, in a hidden retreat protected from the wind, let him per- form his exercises (let him practice Yoga). Finally, in VI, 21 we find that this Upanisad represents a kind of secret or mysterious doctrine which is taught only to the most advanced sages.73 By the power of austerity and the grace of God, the wise Śvetāśvatara in proper manner spoke about Brahman, the Supreme, the pure, to the advanced ascetics, what is pleasing to the company of seers. This undoubtedly explains the rather puzzling style and pre- sentation of the Upanisad. It is written for a kind of elite group of initiates. For the purposes of our discussion it is necessary to note only that Samkhya and Yoga are still closely allied in this text, and have not yet become differentiated.74 Speculation has progressed considerably, however, for many more doctrines of the later classical systems are mentioned either explicitly or implicitly.

(c) Maitri and Other Later Upanişads The later Upanisads are primarily important for tracing the development of Yoga practice.75 Already in the Maitri (VI. 18) one finds mention of five of the eight angas of later classical Yoga : prāņāyāma, pratyāhāra, dhyāna, dhāraņā and samādhi.76 Also, some of the physiological theories of later Yoga begin to appear in the Maitri (VI) along with medita- tions on the mystical syllable OM.77 These practices receive greater emphasis and importance in the still later Samnyāsa Upanişads and Yoga Upanisads. All of these texts have an ambiguous quality about them which makes it impossible to

73. Cf. Eliade, roga : Immortality and Freedom, op. cit., pp. 120-122. 74. Cf. Hauer, Der roga, op. cit., p. 119. 75. For discussions of these later Upanisads see Hauer, Der Yoga, op. cit., pp. 95-117; Eliade, Yoga, op. cit., pp. 124-135. 76. Eliade, roga, op. cit., p. 125. 77. Ibid.

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sort out different traditions. They are all theistic and devo- tional and represent a syncretism of various traditions of yoga practice.78 Samkhya terminology appears throughout these later texts, but Samkhya as a theoretical system in the context of Yoga receives very little emphasis. Interest has obviously shifted to various kinds of mystical meditations, bodily postures, breath-exercises, etc. The emphasis in these texts is upon immediate mystic perception with little or no attempt to under- stand these experimental states rationally. Many of these later texts extend beyond what the present writer has designated as the second period, yet it seemed appro. priate to mention these texts in the context of our discussion of the Upanisads. In addition to the suggestive doctrines of the Upanisads in this second period, some interesting sāmkhyayoga passages are also found in Carakasamhitā, the "Pañcasikhavākya" of the Mbh. (Cr. Ed., XII. 211-212), and the Buddhacarita of Aśva- ghosa.79 Regarding dates, Johnston in his Introduction to the Buddhacarita has convincingly placed Aśvaghosa in the first century A.D.80 Winternitz has shown that the Carakasamhitā is a composite text, the earliest portions of which may go back to the second century A.D.81 The "Pañcasikhavākya" is diffi- cult to date, although it probably belongs to the earlier strata of the speculative portions of the epic.82

(d) Caraka and Pañcasikha There is little point in pursuing a detailed analysis of the

78. Hauer, Der roga, op. cit., pp. !16-117. 79. The relevant passages were first noticed by Dasgupta and Johnston. Dasgupta claims that the Samkhya of Caraka and Pañcasikha represents the earliest form of the doctrine. Johnston claims (on the basis of some references mainly from the Yogasūtrabhasya) that the Samkhya of Asvaghoșa's Buddhacarita (XII. 15-44) is that of Varsaganya and the Yoga (XII. 45-67) is that of Pañcasikha. These claims, however, are based on meagre evidence. That the samkhyayoga in these texts represents an early form of the doctrine appears justified. That they are the earliest form or that they can be ascribed to a particular teacher is open to question. 80. Johnston (ed. and trans.), Buddhacarita (Calcutta : Baptist Mission Press, 1936), I, pp. xiii-xcviii. 81. Winternitz, op. cit., III, pp. 545-547. 82. Johnston, Early Samkhya, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

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relevant passages of these versions of Sāmkhyayoga, since it has already been presented adequately by Dasgupta in his History of Indian Philosophy, I, pp. 213-217. Suffice it to say that Caraka and Pañcasikha both accept twenty-four rather than twenty-five principles - i.e., they combine purusa and avyakta into one tattva; both argue for the doctrine of the self because of the need for a basis of moral responsibility; both assert that experience arises because of the conglomeration of the physical body, mind and cetana; both assert that suffering occurs because of the mistaken identity of the conglomerations and the self; both characterize gunas as good and evil psychic qualities; both use the terms kşetra and ksetrajña for the Sāmkhya notions of prakrti and purusa; and both refer to the final state of salvation as alinga - almost a kind of annihilation, which is beyond consciousness.83

(e) Aśvaghosa's Buddhacarita In the work of Garbe, Keith, Dasgupta and other older studies of Samkhya, Buddhacarita XII was generally ignored, since it was thought that Aśvaghosa's treatment of Samkhya and Yoga was unreliable. Johnston in his research has shown, however, that Aśvaghosa's descriptions and judgments are frequently quite accurate.84 As a result, any attempt to comprehend the development of Sāmkhya must take Aśvaghoșa's treatment seriously. In Buddhacarita XII. 15-44 one finds a quite systematic account of Samkhya followed in verses 45-67 by an account of Yoga. Aśvaghosa ascribes these teachings to the sage, Arāda, and although the terms sāmkhya and yoga do not appear in the text, it is obvious that Samkhyayoga is being described. In XII. 17-18 one finds a preliminary description of the tattvas.85

83. Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy, op. cit., I. pp. 213-217. It should be said, however, that Dasgupta perhaps overemphasizes the simi- larity of the two. There are also some striking differences which suggest two related but distinct traditions. 84. Johnston, Early Sāmkhya, op. cit., p. 8. 85. All quotations from the Buddhacarita are taken from Johnston's English translation in Buddhacarita, Part II, op. cit., pp. 167-178. Sanskrit text taken from Part I.

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Do you, whose being is steadfast, grasp this : primary matter (prakrti), secondary matter (vikāra), birth, death and old age, these, and no more, are called the "being" (sattva).

But in that group know, O Knower of the nature of things, that primary matter consists of the five elements (pañca- bhūtāni), the ego-principle (ahamkāra), intellect (buddhi) and the unseen power (avyakta).

In XII. 19 the sixteen vikāras are described : the five senses, the five objects of the senses, the five organs of action and the manas. Over against all of this, according to XII. 20, is the "knower of the field" or the Self.

And that which is conscious is called the knower of the field, because it knows this field. And those who meditate on the atman say that the atman is the knower of the field.

In XII. 23 ajñāna, karman and trsā are called the causes of the "cycle of existence," and in XII. 24 eight reasons are given as to why the Self gets involved in existence and suffering.86

By reason of misunderstanding (vipratyaya), of wrong attribution of personality (ahamkāra), of confusion of thought (samdeha), of wrong conjunction (abhisamplava), of lack of discrimination (avisesa), of wrong means (anupāya), of attachment (samga) and of falling away (abhyavapāta).

Interesting to note is that the explanation of avidyā in XII. 33 includes the sequence tamas, moha, mahāmoha, tāmisra and andhatāmisra, which eventually become the five viparyayas in Sāmkhyakārikā XLVIII. Salvation from suffering and the cycle of existence accord- ing to the account in Buddhacarita XII. 40 is by means of right knowledge.87

86. Cf. Carakasamhitā, Šarīrasthāna, in edition of Jibananda Vidya- sagar, pp. 330, 350, cited in Johnston, Baddhacarita, op. cit., II, p. 170. Cf. also on XII. 24, Carakasamhitā, Śarīrasthāna, p. 360. Johnston finds similar references also in Mokşadharma. 87. See Johnston's notes in Buddhacarita, op. cit., II. pp. 169, 173.

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In that matter, O prince desiring salvation, the man of right knowledge should know the group of four, the intelligent (pratibuddha) that which lacks intelligence (aprabuddha), the seen (vyakta) and the unseen (avyakta).

And in XII. 41,

For when the knower of the field properly discriminates these four, it abandons the rushing torrent of birth and death, and obtains the everlasting sphere.

The state of salvation, according to Buddhacarita XII. 42, is the condition of the "Supreme Absolute" (paramabrahma). Arada then goes on in verses 45-57 to discuss "the same dharma" only by a different "method" (anyena kalpena). Thence follows a description of the practices and techniques of yoga. Although Arāda in Aśvaghoșa's treatment discusses Sāmkhya and Yoga separately, nevertheless, it is quite clear that they both belong to the same tradition. No attempt is made to differentiate them. They are simply set side by side as two separate methods within the same school : one being theoretical and emphasizing right knowledge, the other practical, empha- sizing right practice. The theoretical account in the Buddhacarita has some interesting variants from the classical Sāmkhya. Prakrti is a plural notion including within it avyakta, buddhi, ahamkāra, and the five gross elements. The classical notion of prakrti, on the other hand, is here called sattva. Similar occurrences of sattva appear also in the Moksadharma. Another interesting variant is that the Buddhacarita includes no account of the doc- trine of the gunas in the classical sense. Then, too, although basically dualistic, the Buddhacarita has a cosmic Self or prin- ciple called ätman or brahman quite similar in appearance to the old Upanisadic notions. There is no doctrine of the plurality of purusas. Thus, although it is obviously more dualistic than the doctrines of Caraka and Pañcasikha, it is yet not the full- blown dualism of classical Samkhya. In this respect the account in Buddhacarita is closer to the doctrines of the Mokşadharma and the Gitā. That there are interesting similarities between the

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 107

doctrines of Caraka-Pañcasikha, on the one hand, and Aśvaghoșa, on the other, is fairly obvious as has been pointed out by Johnston.88 Aśvaghosa's treatment probably represents a somewhat later version of the kinds of speculation found in Caraka-Pañcasikha. It appears that all three versions are influenced by a common Sāmkhyayoga tradition. There are, of course, some differences. As noted above, the Caraka-Pañca- śikha complex is more monistic (with twenty-four principles) whereas the Buddhacarita is more clearly dualistic (with twenty- five principles). Another obvious difference is that the Caraka- Pañcaśikha complex recognizes a doctrine of guņas (as psychic qualities) whereas Aśvaghosa does not refer to the gupas. That Aśvaghoșa does not mention gunas, of course, does not neces- sarily mean that he was unaware of such a doctrine. It could simply mean that he describes a view of Sāmkhya which has no need of a guna-theory. van Buitenen has convincingly suggested that the Samkhyayoga of Aśvaghosa represents a tradition which eventually becomes a "vertical" theory of evolution - the eight- fold prakrti including ahamkāra-which was a tradition distinct from a "horizontal" theory of evolution - i.e., buddhi evolving in three successive bhava or guna conditions.89 It should also be mentioned that the gunas in the Caraka-Pañcasikha complex are not the same gunas which play a part in the theory of evolu- tion in classical Sāmkhya. Guņas in Caraka-Pañcaśikha are little more than psychic states, much closer in appearance to the later notion of bhavas in classical Sāmkhya. These diverse traditions, according to van Buitenen, were later combined in the classical doctrine of Iśvarakrsna, who synthesizes the eight- fold prakrti theory of "vertical" evolution with the guna-theory of "horizontal" evolution, and relegates the gunas as psychic qualities into the bhava doctrine.90 More light will be shed on these problems in the next section, when passages from the Mokşadharma and the Gitā are discussed. At this point it is necessary only to stress the fact that we find in Caraka-Pañca- śikha-Aśvaghosa an old tradition of Sāmkhyayoga which is yet

88. Johnston, Early Sāmkhya, op. cit., p. 10 et passim. 89. van Buitenen, "Studies in Sāmkhya (II," JAOS, Vol. 76 (1957), pp. 22-23. 90. Ibid.

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in a fluid or changing condition. Enough similarities exist to enable one to posit some sort of common tradition, but the differences reveal that this tradition was not yet a finished or normative system.

(f) Mokşadharma and Bhagavadgitā Perhaps the most valuable passages concerning the develop- ment of proto-Samkhya speculation in this second period are those found in the epic, Mahābharata. Within this great mass of material the most relevant portions for purposes of this dis- cussion are those found in the Moksadharma (or Chapters 168- 353 in the Critical Edition of Book XII) and the Bhagavad- gitā (or Chapters 23-40 of Book VI). It is most difficult to establish even an approximate date for this material, although most scholars place the texts somewhere in the period between the fourth and fifth century B.C. and the first century A.D.91 Johnston has suggested on the basis of language and terminology that there is a parallel between the earliest portions of the Moksadharma and the earliest portions of the Gita.92 A similar parallel can be maintained, says Johnston, between the later portions of the texts. With respect to the entire epic, the speculative portions tend to be later than the narrative portions. Another speculative text, the Anugita (Book XIV of the epic) also contains some interesting passages, but generally these repeat the material of the Moksadharma and the Gita.93 More- over, this text is quite late, and, therefore, not clearly relevant for this second period. Regarding the nature of the epic material Johnston has asserted the following :

The teaching in the epic is of a semipopular character and is not given with the precision of statement which would be expected of a formal treatise on philosophy. Further it covers a considerable period of time and ema- nates from many different writers and from several schools;

91. Johnston, Early Sāmkhya, op. cit., pp. 5-7; Wm. T. de Bary (ed.), Sources, op. cit., p. 203; Hopkins. The Great Epic of India, op. cit., pp. 386-402. etc., etc. 92. Johnston, Early Sāmkhya, op. cit., pp. 6-7. 93. Ibid.

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naturally, therefore there is discordance between different passages. But frequent ambiguity and lack of consist- ency do not prove that these epic descriptions are not to be taken seriously.94

Edgerton, in comparing the Gitā and the Moksadharma, makes the following important observation :

This (i.e., the Moksadharma) and the Bhagavad Gita together contain the most important speculative materials in the epic. The Moksadharma cannot, however, compare with the Gita, in either philosophical depth or poetic quality. If even the Gita shows inconsistencies and illogical elements, this is much more true of the Mokşadharma.95

Keeping in mind, then, these basic limitations, let us proceed to the texts themselves. An early form of Samkhya in the epic is found in XII. 187 (Cr. Ed.)=XII. 239-240. In the older Bombay edition three passages were involved; XII. 194=XII. 247-248=XII. 285. In the Critical Edition of the epic, however, XII. 285 is in- cluded in the Critical Apparatus to XII. 187. It has been noted (by Frauwallner, van Buitenen, etc.) that these passages are all versions of one text,96 Both Frauwallner and Johnston have emphasized these texts with respect. to determining the earlier phases of the development of Samkhya. Frauwallner,

94. Ibid., p. 4. 95. Edgerton, Beginnings, op. cit., p. 255. 96. Frauwallner, "Untersuchung zum Moksadharma," op. cit., pp. 179 ff .; van Buitenen, "Studies in Sāmkhya (I)," JAOS, Vol. 75 (1955),

Critical Edition : S.K. Belvalkar and others (eds.). The Mahābhārata, pp. 153 ff. All references to the Moksadharma are from the

Santiparvan, fascicules 22-24 (Poona : Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1951-53). For excellent English translations of portions of Moksadharma, see Edgerton (trans.), Beginnings, op. cit., pp. 255-334. Complete but poor English translation in Pratapa Chandra Ray, The Mahābhārata, Sānti Parva, Vol. II, (Calcutta : Bharata Press, 1891). Excellent complete German translation of Mokşadharma in Paul Deussen, Vier Philosophiche Texts des Mahābhāratam (Leipzig : Brockhaus, 1922), pp. 111-882. Unless otherwise noted quota- tions from Mokşadharma are from Edgerton's translation. The present writer has also used the Sanskrit text and English translation from Edgerton's Bhagavad Gītā, loc. cit.

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in fact, makes the bold claim that this text-group contains the original formulation of Samkhya which knows nothing of an evolutionary doctrine and has no guna-theory.97 Johnston; referring to the same text-group, sees in it evidence for his notion that the original guna-theory or bhava-theory was little more than a doctrine of "psychical qualities."98 van Buitenen, however, claims that Frauwallner and Johnston are both wrong. He demonstrates that there are two quite distinct traditions present in XII. 187=XII. 239-240.99 He is able to restore the traditions by interpolating out two uses of the term bhāva : one usage being bhava as "sensations, qualities and condition" (as Johnston has stressed); the second usage being bhāvas as successive evolutes of buddhi. This latter usage employs rajas as an evolutionary principle and probably, according to van Buitenen, points to an ancient, cosmic, guna-theory of evolution. van Buitenen links the former usage to that of the "Pañcasikha- vākya" (XII. 211-212).100 For the sake of convenience we shall refer to van Buitenen's "reconstituted text" as Text A, and we shall refer to the remain- ing passage as Text B. The Sanskrit text together with an English translation of Text A is available in van Buitenen's "Studies in Sāmkhya (I)," pp. 155-156. In verse 1 of Text A the general evolutionary scheme is set forth.

The buddhi controlled by the purusa exists in three (bhāvas) evolved forms of being; characterized as it is by these three forms it goes beyond them.

Buddhi first becomes manas (verse 2). In verse 3, we read the following :

Then, however, rajas gets active and succeeds that form of being : for it is then that the buddhi brings about all five senses.

97. Frauwallner, "Untersuchung zum Moksadharma," op. cit., pp. 179-180. 98. Johnston, Early Sāmkhva, op. cit., pp. 29-32, and p. 36. 99. van Buitenen, "Studies in Sāmkhya (I)," op, cit., p. 153. 100. Ibid., pp. 153, 156.

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Then, from the senses buddhi brings forth the gross elements (verse 6). The passage concludes, then, in verse 7,

All forms of being (things) that exist are comprised under these three forms of being ...

Here then is a text which sets forth a cosmic, evolutionary theory understood "horizontally"-i.e., buddhi successively becomes manas, senses and gross elements. This reminds one of the old cosmological notion of the creative principle entering into creation as the first-born and also calls to mind the tripartite creation in BAUp. I and Chan. Up. VI. In what we have called Text B, however, one finds a quite different account. In it we are told that all is derived from the gross elements. In XII. 187. 4-5, we read,

Earth, wind, ether, water and fire as the fifth, are the gross elements; they are the origin and end of all beings.

Beings are created from them, and into them they return again and again; the gross elements in beings are like the waves of the sea.101

In verse 11 of Text B one finds an eightfold sequence, although it differs from the eightfold prakrti of many other passages in the Moksadharma and the Gitā.102

The senses and the thought-organ are man's means of perception. They say the intellect is the seventh, while the Field-knower is eighth.

In verse 12 the functioning of the sequence is set forth.

101. Edgerton, Beginnings, op. cit., pp. 255-260, and see supra. 102. The eightfold prakrti - as e.g., in XII. 294, 27 ff. and XII 298, 10 ff. - includes avyakta, buddhi, ahamkāra and the five gross elements. Here the senses take the place of the gross elements, "field-knower" takes the place of avyakta and manas appears rather than ahamkāra. A somewhat similar scheme appears in Mbh. XII. 267, 16 This may represent a transi- tion stage between the scheme as found in Katha Up. III. 10-11 and VI. 7-9, on the one hand, and the eightfold prakrti of the later passages in the Mokşadharma, on the other. Another eightfold sequence appears in Gita VII. 4 : five gross elements, manas, buddhi, ahamkāra.

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The eye is for seeing, the thought-organ causes doubtful consideration, the intellect is for determination; the Field-knower is present as Onlooker.

In these verses one is reminded of the sequence in the Katha Up. VI. 7-9 in which the sequence also begins with the senses and works its way up through the manas to the buddhi. One is reminded too that the sequence in the Katha is directly related to the practice of yoga. Thus, it may be legitimate to suggest that the "vertical" theory of evolution had its rise in this context. To be sure, the sequence in Mbh. XII. 187. 11-12 and in the Katha are not at all evolutionary in the later sense of the eightfold prakrti, but it may have been in such a context that this latter theory of evolution had its origin. If this is the case, then the so-called "vertical" and "horizontal" theories of evolution which are synthesized in classical Sāmkhya may have originated, on the one hand, from the old cosmological theories of the ancient speculations -i.e., the "horizontal" theory -and, on the other hand, from the practice of yoga as articulated in such texts as the Katha -i.e., the "vertical" theory. Interesting to note in Text B also is that the gunas or bhavas are understood as psychic qualities. In XII. 187. 28-29, for example, we read,

Three sorts of sensation are seen in all beings, those due to goodness, passion and darkness (dullness).

The strand goodness has contact with pleasure, the strand passion has contact with pain; by the strand darkness both (pleasure and pain) become joined and (so) inactive (they are cancelled out).

In other words, in Texts A and B one finds two quite different accounts of gunas or bhāvas : one, in Text A, uses guna or bhäva in the sense of varying levels of evolution; the other, in Text B, uses guna or bhäva in the sense of moral or psychic con- dition or state. This fits conveniently with our suggestion that the former usage originates in ancient cosmological speculations whereas the latter originates in the context of yogic experience and practice. Finally in classical Sāmkhya, as was

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 113

mentioned above, the two theories are synthesized. In the Sāmkhyakārikā the gunas, though still characterized in moral or psychic terms, are employed as qualities or aspects of prakrti in order to account for the multiplicity of phenomena. On the other hand, many of the former uses of gunas as psychic or moral qualities which help determine the destiny of the individual, are now included in the doctrine of bhavas of the buddhi. Thus, in the present writer's view, Frauwallner, Johnston and van Buitenen are all correct to some degree. Each has noticed an important dimension in the text-group XII. 187=239-240. Each one, however, has only empha- sized one aspect of the doctrines there set forth. Throughout this text-group, ahamkāra does not appear. Since this principle does appear generally in the Moksadharma in enumerations of Sāmkhya tattvas, and since this principle appears already in Asvaghosa's treatment, this tends to argue for an early date of this text-group. Moreover, as Frauwallner has argued, the very fact that this text-group is so corrupt tends to support an early date.103 In addition to the above-mentioned proto-Sāmkhya tradi- tions in the epic, one also finds other complexes many of which are quite unintelligible and probably represent aberrant specu- lations. For example, in XII. 290. 14-22 there is a bewildering list of tattvas intermixed with some sort of guna-theory. The whole passage is impossible to decipher.104 Then, too, in XII. 244. 2 ff. one finds a list of the five gross elements together with "coming into being", "passing away," and "Time". This peculiar eightfold sequence reminds one, of course, of the other sequences noted above, but the last three members of the sequence show little similarity with any other traditions of speculation. Again, in XII. 267. 4 ff. "Time" is said to be the creator of the five elements. In addition to these bewildering lines of speculation, one also finds in the Moksadharma various listings of the Sāmkhya tattvas. In XII. 239, 15; XII. 267. 28; and XII. 231. 15 there are references to seventeen tattvas or principles. In XII. 267. 30 twenty tattvas are mentioned. In XII. 296 and elsewhere

103. Frauwallner, "Untersuchung zum Moksadharma," op. eit., p. 179. 104. Edgerton, Beginnings, op. cit., p. 296.

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twenty-four tattvas are discussed. In XII. 296, 7; XII. 306. 53-54, twenty-six tattvas are set forth.105 The standard list of twenty-five tattvas also appears, of course - e.g., XII. 298. 10 ff. Moreover, in the Moksadharma the term guna is used in a variety of ways as Edgerton, Johnston and others have noticed. It frequently appears, of course, in the standard use as "quality" of the avyakta or prakrti - e.g., XII. 294, 32; 293, 33-34. The term appears also, however, in the sense of "quality" or "aspect" of the gross elements - e.g., XII 244, 4; 267, 13-15. Then, too, the term is used in the sense of vikāra or "secondary part"- e.g., XII. 295, 13-17; 267, 28-29.106 Similar diversity appears with respect to the notion of the ultimate material reality. In classical Sāmkhya, of course, the term for this ultimate material principle is prakrti. In the Mokşadharma, however, it is frequently called sattva which Edgerton translates as "essential material reality" - e.g., XII. 187, 37; 228, 31; etc.107 Sometimes it is referred to as pradhāna (the "chief" one) -e.g., XII. 298, 16. Elsewhere it appears as avyakta (the "unmanifest") -e.g., XII. 238, 4. The term prakti itself in the Mokadharma is usually used in the sense of the eightfold prakrti-e.g., XII. 298, 10- and is set alongside the sixteen vikāras or "secondary modifications," thus making the standard list of twenty-four tattvas of material reality. Johnston suggests that this latter usage is associated with the notion of svabhava ("inherent nature") and is thus the notion employed to account for the derivation of all of reality by the "inherent nature" of the principles themselves.108 van Buitenen, as was mentioned earlier, relates this eightfold prakrti to the "vertical" theory of evolution, which is a rival theory to the "horizontal." Classical Sāmkhya represents a synthesis of these two theories.109 Nowhere in the Moksadharma, however, is this synthesis worked out, although XII. 298, 10 ff., and XII.

105. See Edgerton's Index under "tattva", Beginnings, p. 359. 106. Ibid., p. 347; cf. Johnston, Early Sāmkhya, op. cit., pp. 29-35. 107. Edgerton, Beginnings, op. cit., passim; sattva also used in sense of condition of salvation : sattvastha, Gita XIV. 18 : see van Buitenen's discusssion of different uses of sattva, "Studies in Sāmkhya (III)," op. cit., pp. 95 ff. 108. Johnston, Early Sāmkhya, op. cit., pp. 67-68. 109. van Buitenen, "Studies in Sāmkhya (II)," op. cit., pp. 22-23.

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294, 27 ff., seem to be moving in that direction. It appears, therefore, that the classical doctrine of prakrti and the three gunas together with the theory of satkāryavāda is a later modi- fication by Iśvarakrsna or his school. Even more complicated than the notion of material reality in the Moksadharma are the many views regarding the self or Self. The various terms used for the self are the following : jīva, bhūtātman, purușa, ātman, kşetrajña and adhyātman. The first two terms are used in the sense of the individual self as a living being, including physical manifestation-e.g., XII, 187, 6; XII. 291, 34; XII, 231, 21.110 According to Johnston. in the earliest speculations these terms were associated also with that which transmigrates.111 Later, in classical Sāmkhya the functions of these terms are taken over by the doctrine of prānas and the doctrine of the linga (the subtle transmigrating body or entity).112 The next two terms-i.e., purusa and atman- seem to be used interchangeably throughout the epic, and they function both as cosmic and individual conceptions.113 We noted a similar tendency to use these terms interchangeably in the older texts. In classical Sāmkhya, of course, the atman disappears from use, and one finds only a doctrine of the plurality of purusas. The latter doctrine cannot be found anywhere in the Moksadharma, although a movement in that direction might be inferred from XII. 238.114 The fifth term, ksetrajña, appears extensively throughout the Moksadharma, and we noted its use earlier also in the Carakasamhita and the Buddhacarita. It appears also in the Gita and in the later classical Sāmkhyakārikā. In XII. 187, 1-3 it is the "Onlooker" and in XII. 187, 37 we are told that it does not create the strands, but, rather, (in XII. 187, 42) surveys or knows them. This term obviously emphasizes the dualistic tendency of the developing Samkhya. As Johnston · has shown, ksetrajña is used in the sense of the individual self, and is viewed usually as the individual or psychological

110. Cf. Edgerton, Beginnings, op. cit., p. 256, note 1. 111. Johnston, Early Sāmkhya, op. cit., pp. 44-50. 112. Ibid. 113. See. Edgerton's notes on ätman and purusa in his Index to Begin- nings, op. cit., pp. 341, 354 respectively. 114. For a different view see Edgerton, Beginnings, p. 45.

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aspect of the cosmic atman.115 Later in classical Sāmkhya it is used simply as a synonym for purusa. The final term -i.e., adhyātman - is translated by Edgerton as "super-self" or "over- self."116 It occurs in such passages as XII. 187, 1; 232, 3; 267, 18, and is seldom differentiated from the more common ātman. Thus, it becomes clear that the classical doctrine of the purusa has not yet developed in the speculations represented in the Moksa- dharma, although all of the component parts for the later doctrine are present. As we noticed in the earlier texts of this second period, so, too, in the Moksadharma, what is later to be known as Sāmkhya, is in close association with Yoga. The difference, however, is that in the Moksadharma we are given a much clearer picture of the two allied systems. Most often one reads in the text that Sāmkhya and Yoga are one. Only the method for attaining salvation differs. In XII. 295, 42-43 we read, for example,

I have stated Sāmkhya and Yoga according to the teach- ing of the two textbooks. The same teaching that is stated in Samkhya, that is just the view of Yoga.

... And in this teaching (of the Samkhya-followers) there is now the curds, now the cream, of the followers of Yoga.

Again in XII. 293, 29-30,

Therefore, hear you how this is beheld in very truth, among exalted followers of (both) Samkhya and Yoga.

The same which Yoga-followers see, that is observed by Samkhya-followers. Who sees that Sāmkhya and Yoga are one, he is enlightened.

Yet again in XII. 304, 2b-4.

... But both of these (i.e., Samkhya and Yoga) have the same practical result and both are declared (to lead to) freedom from death.

115. Edgerton, Beginnings, op. cit., pp. 54-55. 116. Edgerton, Beginnings, op. cit., p. 339.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 117

... (those of) weak intelligence regard them as separate; but we regard them as certainly only one.

The same thing which Yoga-followers perceive, is per- ceived also by Samkhya-followers. Who looks upon Sāmkhya and Yoga as one, knows the truth.

Along with these passages which emphasize the oneness of Sāmkhya and Yoga, there are also numerous passages which characterize the two separately, and it is in these passages that one begins to get a clearer picture of the two systems. Descriptions of Yoga are numerous throughout the Moksa- dharma, and in all of them there is a strong emphasis on discipline and meditation.117 A typical passage is in XII, 232, 2 ff., which follows upon a previous description of Sāmkhya (in XII. 231). In XII. 232, 2, the goal or purpose of Yoga is set forth.

But (now) I shall exhibit for you the whole of Yoga- activity; listen to it! It is unification of the thought- organ and consciousness, and of the senses altogether; this is the supreme knowledge of the self, that is engaged in meditation.

Then, in XII. 232, 10 ff., the Yoga-activity is set forth.

10. Meditation, study, generosity, truth, modesty, honesty, patience, purity, cleanness of food, and restraint of the senses. 11. By these his energy increases, and he dispenses with evil; all his aims succeed and his understanding progresses.

Then, in verse 13, we read, Collected and effecting concentration of the thought- organ and senses, in the early. and late parts of the night he shall make the thought-organ firm by his self.

117. The term "yoga," as Edgerton has emphasized, is used both in the sense of "method, means" and in the sense of "disciplined course of action;" see Edgerton, Beginnings, op. cit., p. 37. It should be noted, how- ever, that yoga is never just action or "doing". It has associated with it a number of doctrines which clearly distinguish it and give it an identity which goes beyond sheer "doing."

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In verses 15-16 discipline and control is emphasized.

But the knower of Yoga should first grasp his thought- organ, as a fisherman grasps his unruly fish, and so also then his ear, eye, tongue, and nose.

Then the ascetic should hold these (senses) fast and make them rest in the thought-organ, and similarly should remove all purposes from the thought-organ and hold it steadily in the self.

The result of this practice is set forth in verse 17.

Uniting the five (senses) knowingly, the ascetic shall make them rest in the thought-organ; and when they, and the thought-organ as sixth, abide in the self, and stand- ing firm become calmed, then Brahman shines forth.

This latter verse calls to mind the description in the Katha Upanişad. Other typical Yoga passages in the Mokşadharma include the following : XII. 188; XII. 228; XII. 232; XII. 294; XII. 304, and so forth. In all of them the emphasis is on discipline, meditation and control of the senses and the thought-organ. These practices frequently lead to supernatural or magical powers - as e.g., in XII. 232, 21-22 - but these are to be avoided by the true yogin. The ultimate goal of the disci- pline is the attainment of the state of Brahman - as e.g., XII. 232, 17- or the "highest place," or "immortality," or "union with the One," or union with the deity.118 Descriptions of Sāmkhya also abound in the Mokşadharma, and in all of them there is an emphasis on knowledge or "know- ing".119 Among the many descriptions of Samkhya - some of which have already been referred to - those which come closest to the classical system are found in XII. 298, 10-15;

118. Edgerton, Beginnings, op. cit., pp. 45-46, 119. See discussion of the term "samkhya" in the Introduction. See also Edgerton's discussion in Beginnings, pp. 36-37. Here again it should be noted that Sāmkhya is never simply "knowing". It is always associated with a given system of tattvas, etc. although there are variations of the system. In other words, Samkhya is not simply a method of salvation by knowing, regardless of the content of the knowledge, as Edgerton suggests. More than a methodological distinction is involved.

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and XII. 294, 27 ff. In XII. 294, 27 ff., one finds the eight- fold prakrti together with an evolutionary scheme.

27. Those who discuss material nature call the primal material nature the Unmanifest. From it the Great arose as the second (principle). 28 But the I-faculty arose from the Great as third, so we have heard. Those who understand Sāmkhya say that the five (gross) elements arose from the I-faculty. 29. These are the eight material principles. And there are also sixteen (non-productive) modifications ...

In verse 31 one also finds a doctrine of creation and dissolution much like the classical system.

31. Whatever is produced from anything, that dissolves in that same thing again. They dissolve in the reverse order from that in which they are created ...

This in turn is related in verse 32 to the idea of the gunas

The strands always are created in regular order, and dissolve in reverse order, like the waves of the sea.

In verses 34 ff., the self is described as the "superintender," "field-knower," and "purusa," and in verses 37-38 one finds articulation of a clear dualism.

37. He knows (i.e., the purusa or ksetrajña) the Unmani- fest Field, so he is called the Field-knower; he lies (sete) in the citadel (pura) that belongs to the Unmanifest and so he is called spirit (purusa). 38. The field and the field-knower are two quite different things; the field is said to be the unmanifest, the knower is the twenty-fifth.

Salvation, according to this passage, is by means of knowledge (jñana) - i.e., knowledge of the Field (or the first twenty-four principles) and the Knower of the Field (or the twenty-fifth). Presumably the emphasis is on knowing the distinction between the field and the field-knower as in the classical doctrine. In

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other words, it is not simply knowledge in the ordinary sense of discursive thought. Furthermore, when this knowledge arises (verses 45-46) one is then free from the strands, free from rebirth and situated in an immortal condition. The system set forth here is obviously quite close to the classical Sāmkhya, although a number of the later doctrines are missing or only barely hinted at. In XII. 298, 10-15 one finds almost an identical descrip- tion of the Sämkhya as in the above passage. Also interest- ing to mention is a kind of hymn to knowledge in XII. 290, 95 ff., which praises the Samkhya emphasis on knowledge as the most excellent means of salvation. Then, too, in XII. 295, 23 ff., one finds a soliloquy of the enlightened purusa which emphasizes knowledge and the ultimate separation which occurs between the field and field-knower in the state of salvation. Finally, it is interesting to notice the description of the style of life of the Samkhya-follower as mentioned in XII. 295, 33-36.

Unselfish, without egotism, free from the pairs, having cut off doubts, he is not angry and does not hate, nor does he speak false words.

When reviled and beaten, because of his kindness he has no bad thought; he turns away from reprisal in word, action and thought, all three.

Alike to all beings, he draws near to (the god) Brahma. He neither desires, nor is he without desire; he limits himself to merely sustaining life.

Not covetous, unshaken, self-controlled; not active, yet not neglecting religious duty; his sense-organs are not drawn to many objects, his desires are not widely scattered; he is not harmful to any creature; such a Samkhya-follower is released.

In all of these Sāmkhya passages one notices that the basic system of thought is not different from the system of thought in the Yoga passages. The emphasis, however, is quite different. Sämkhya emphasizes knowing the principles and knowing the self. This act of knowing is itself sufficient for salvation, and

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one finds little emphasis in the Sāmkhya passages on meditation or trance or rigorous bodily discipline, all of which are quite characteristic of the yoga passages. Edgerton has maintained the notion that the distinction between Smkhya and Yoga in these texts is simply method- ological.120 Samkhya means the method of salvation by "know- ing" and Yoga means the method of salvation by "doing". Such a distinction, however, does not really get to the essence of the problem. More than a general methodological distinction is involved. It appears in the texts, rather, that one is dealing with two or more kinds of yoga. If one takes the term "yoga" in the sense of "a disciplined course of action" -as Edgerton himself does121 - then both Samkhya and Yoga are kinds of yoga. Samkhyayoga is that tradition of yoga emphasizing the discipline of knowledge, whereas that which is characterized simply as yoga is usually karmayoga or dhyānayoga-i.e., the dis- cipline of action or the discipline of meditation. Distinctions along these lines are set forth quite clearly in the Bhagavadgitā. In Gita XIII. 24, for example, we are told.

dhyānenātmani paśyanti kecid ātmānam ātmanā, anye sāmkhyena yogena karmayogena cāpare.

By meditation, in the self see some the self by the self; Others by discipline of reason, and others by discipline of action. (Edgerton's edition, see supra)

The verse is suggesting three kinds of yoga : dhyānayoga, sāmkhya- yoga and karmayoga. In Gitā III. 3 two kinds of yoga are set forth : sāmkhyayoga and karmayoga.

loke 'smin dvividhā nisthā purā proktā mayānagha, jñānayogena sāmkhyānām karmayogena yoginām.

In this world a two-fold basis (of religion) has been de- clared by Me of old, blameless one; By the discipline of knowledge of the followers of reason- method, and by the discipline of action of the followers of discipline-method.

120. Edgerton, Beginnings, op. cit., pp. 35 ff. 121. Ibid., p. 37.

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Thus, sāmkhyayoga, karmayoga, dhyānayoga, and so forth, seem to be divergent trends within the context of a general, undifferentiated Yoga tradition. This general tradition is discernible as far back as Katha Up., and is also reflected in the Carakasamhitā, "Pañcasikhavākya," and the Buddhacarita. It owes its origin probably to the ancient cosmological speculations together with those ancient speculations concerned with the cosmic and individual purusa and ātman, and those concerned with medita- tions on the breaths and various states of consciousness - as e.g., in the Atharva Veda and the oldest Upanisads. Given this undifferentiated yoga tradition, the frequent refrain in the later texts of this second period-i.e., in the Mokşadharma and the Gitā- that Samkhya and Yoga are one must be viewed in a somewhat new way. Rather than inter- preting such passages as attempts to synthesize an older Sām- khya and Yoga, the passages probably reflect precisely the opposite. They represent attempts to deny a process of diffe- rentiation which is beginning to occur in later times. In other words, there was probably a "school" or tradition of Sāmkhya- yoga which was claiming an independent position apart from the older undifferentiated traditions. This "school" empha- sized only a kind of metaphysical knowledge as sufficient for salvation. Interest in this "school" centred in the enumera- tion of tattvas and in the realization of the distinction between the field and the field-knower. Less emphasis was placed in this "school" on practice and meditation. Some evidence for this interpretation is available in Mbh. XII. 289, 1 ff. Here some clear indication is given regarding the differentiation of samkhyayoga from other kinds of yoga. In verse 2 we are told that there are "schools" or traditions which claim superiority for their interpretations.

Brāhmanas who follow Sāmkhya praise Sāmkhya, and those who follow Yoga praise Yoga; they declare (each their own) superiority by the means (which they adopt) to magnify their own (respective) parties.

sāmkhyāh sāmkhyam prasamsanti yogā yogam dvijātayah; vadanti kāraņaih sraisthyam svapakşodbhāvanāya vai.

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In verse 3 the followers of yoga reject the Sāmkhya because the latter does not believe in a saving Lord.

How may he who has no Lord be saved ? Thus, by the means (they adopt to this end), the wise followers of Yoga declare in clear form their superiority.

anisvarah katham mucyed ity evam satrukarsaņa, vadanti kāranaih sraişthyam yogāh samyanmanīşiņah.

The Samkhya response to the question of the followers of Yoga is given in verses 4-5.

But the Sāmkhya brahmans declare in clearform this (following) means (for saving the soul). Whosoever, know- ing all courses in this world, turns away from the objects of sense,

He, after leaving the body, will assuredly be saved, and not otherwise. This the great sages say is the Samkhya view of salvation.

vadanti kāraņam cedam sāmkhyāh samyagdvijātayah, vijñāyeha gatīḥ sarvā virakto vişayeşu yah.

ūrdhvam sa dehāt suvyaktam vimucyediti nānyathā, etad āhur mahāprājñāh sāmkhyam vai mokşadarsanam.

Then, in verse 7 another distinction between Sāmkhya and Yoga is given.

The followers of Yoga rely on immediate (mystic) per- ception; the followers of Sämkhya rest on accepted teach- ing. And both these opinions I consider true :..

pratyakşahetavo yogāḥ sāmkhyāḥ śāstraviniścayāh, ubhe caite mate tattve mama tāta yudhisthira.

Again, in verse 9, we read,

Common to both of them alike are disciplined purity, and compassion to all creatures. The maintenance of vows is alike in both of them; the views are not the same in them.

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tulyam śaucam tayor yuktam dayā bhūteșu cānagha, vratānām dhāraņam tulyam darsanam na samam tayoh.

Later, in verses 18 and 28 respectively the typical yoga emphasis is set forth.

18. So Yoga-followers bound by the bonds of action, perish if weak, and get free if strong. 28. For on the part of the Yoga-follower that is established in strength and that can overcome the bonds, mastery of salvation is attained without a doubt.

The distinction in this whole passage between the Sāmkhya emphasis on knowledge and the Yoga emphasis on power or strength also reminds one of XII. 304, 2.

There is no knowledge (jñānam) like Sāmkhya, there is no power (balam) like Yoga ...

From XII. 289 we, thus, learn that Sāmkhya is non-theis- tic, emphasizes knowledge as the only means of salvation, relies primarily on accepted teaching as a means of knowledge. Yoga, on the other hand, is theistic, emphasizes the power and strength of bodily discipline, and relies primarily on immediate perception as a means of knowledge. We are also told that the "views" (darsana) are not the same in the two schemes, although the text does not explain exactly what is meant by that. There has been much controversy as to the meaning of the first pāda in XII. 289, 3: "anisvarah katham mucyet ... " Hopkins in his work, The Great Epic of India, was one of the first to suggest that the passage is a clear indication of an atheistic Sāmkhya.122 Anisvarah is translated as a bahuvrihi compound in the sense of "he who has no lord." Keith, Hauer and others agree with this translation. Edgerton has suggested, however, that the term here and elsewhere means simply, "having none-higher" or "Supreme Self."123 There is no basis

122. E.W. Hopkins, The Great Epic of India, op. cit., pp. 104-106. 123. Edgerton, Beginnings, p. 291 and his article "The Meaning of Sāmkhya and Yoga," AJP, XLV (1924), passim. But cf. Keith, Religion and Philosophy, op. cit. p. 543 and Hauer's Der roga, op. cit., pp. 200-305.

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in this verse, says Edgerton, for an atheistic doctrine. Sāmkhya says Edgerton, is theistic throughout the epic passages and differs from Yoga only in the sense that it emphasizes salvation by means of knowing rather than doing. van Buitenen tends to agree with Edgerton that Samkhya is originally theistic.124 Johnston, as was noted in Chapter I, thinks that there were three phases of early Sāmkhya development : an early atheistic phase, a middle theistic phase and a later atheistic phase.125 Edgerton is right in asserting that anisvarah in this context means purusa or the "none-higher," but the force of the adjective also appears to connote the rejection of Isvara. It is true, of course, that some Sāmkhya passages -e.g., Mbh. XII. 290, 23 and throughout the Gita- are clearly theistic. It is also true that many other Samkhya passages are set in a framework which espouses the old Upanisadic notions of atman or brahman - e.g., the Katha Up., the Buddhacarita, and such passages in the Moksa- dharma as XII. 233, 13; XII. 242, 17; and so forth. Even many passages in the Moksadharma which assert a twenty-sixth prin- ciple do not imply the later classical Yoga notion of a lord as a kind of super-soul, but rather mean the purusa or ksetrajña in its enlightened state-e.g., XII. 296, 11; XII. 306, 53-54. Most important to note, however, are the several passages in which a non-theistic doctrine seems clearly implied. In XII. 241, 1, for example, the ksetrajña is equated with the isvara.

Essential (material) reality creates the strands (of matter); but the Field-knower governs them, disinterestedly, as Lord (isvara), all the strands as they are modulated.

In XII. 238, 7 the term anisvara is used.

Making the thought-organ come to rest by meditation, and perfecting it by knowledge, he who has no lord (aniśvara) calmed in nature, then goes to the immortal place.

Here aniśvara clearly means purusa, but it also clearly means

124. van Buitenen, "Studies in Sāmkhya. (II)," op. cit., p. 19. 125. Johnston, Early Sāmkhya, op .. cit., pp. 80-88.

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that it has no lord, or that the purusa itself is the lord. The most important reference in this regard, however, is XII. 294, 40.

Unmanifest the Field is said to be, likewise essential reality, likewise the ruler; rulerless (aniśvara) and without (material) principles is that twenty-fifth principle.

The Sanskrit text of XII. 294, 40 is worth quoting at this point.

avyaktam kşetram ity uktam tathā sattvam tatheśvaram, aniśvaram atattvam ca tattvam tat pañcavimśakam.

In the first half of the verse the isvara is included as an aspect of avyakta, kşetra, or sattva-i.e., as comprehended on the side of prakrti. In the second half of the verse purușa is characterized as being aniśvara and atattva - it is neither involved with the lord nor with any of the other tattvas. Salvation is the realization that the purusa or ksetrajña is distinct or apart from prakrti or essential material reality. Isvara, if it exists at all, is considered to be a part of the material nature and thus is irrelevant from the point of view of salvation. In other words, the problem of salvation is viewed in non-theistic terms. Whether or not isvara exists makes little difference. Only the knowledge or realization that the purusa or ksetrajña is apart from all else includ- ing the isvara can lead to salvation. Thus, it seems best to translate aniśvarah katham mucyet ... , in XII. 289, 3 as "how can he who has no lord be saved ?" in the sense of "how can purusa be saved for whom an isvara is irrelevant ?" It is in this latter sense that the problem of theism or non-theism is handled in the Sāmkhyakārikā. In Kārikās LIII and LIV the existence of the old Vedic gods is affirmed, but they are included on the side of prakrti. No attempt is made to deny their existence. It is obvious, however, that the gods are irrelevant from the point of view of salvation. Implicit is the idea that they, too, are in need of salvation. Not until the late Sāmkhyapravacanasūtra is an attempt made to set forth a clearly atheistic doctrine (in sūtras 92-94 of Book I). When one puts together passages like XII. 289, 1 ff., which assert some distinctive aspects of Samkhya as opposed to other

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Yogic traditions, and passages like XII. 298, 10-15; and XII. 294, 27 ff., which set forth a systematic presentation of the tattvas in almost a classical form, one gets at least some idea of the nature of this independent tradition which is establishing itself in the midst of the older speculations. Sāmkhyayoga is becoming Sāmkhya, and this process of differentiation will reach its culmination in the classical text of Iśvarakrsna together with the commentaries. Precisely when this process of diffe- rentiation begins to occur is impossible to determine, although it is safe to say that the process was well under way in the period of the Moksadharma and Bhagavadgītā. By the time of Iśvara- krsna, of course, the process of differentiation is complete, and Sāmkhya then stands as an independent system with a technical terminology and a normative network of doctrines. Unfor- tunately, almost all of the texts which could offer further evidence for the precise details of the process are missing. One finds only occasional and rather unilluminating references to various texts and teachers of Samkhya in the interval between the epic texts and the texts of the classical period. Before concluding this section, it is necessary to suggest a few more comments concerning the Gita. As is well known, the main thrust of the Gita is to establish bhakti as a superior way of salvation.126 It deals with different kinds of discipline (yoga), but it especially recommends devotion to Krsna as the highest religious goal. In VI. 47, for example, we read, (Edgerton's translation here and following). Of all men of discipline, moreover, with inner soul gone to Me, Whoso' reveres Me with faith, Him I hold the most disciplined. Elsewhere the Gita combines many of the older Upanisadic notions of atman and brahman together with the old sacrificial system into atheistic framework. In IX. 17, for example, one finds the following assertion : I am the father of the world, the Mother, the establisher, the grandsire,

126. Edgerton, Beginnings, p. 46. Also, the present writer has used Edgerton's version of Gita, supra.

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The object of knowledge, the purifier, the sacred syllable Om, the verse of praise, the chant, and the sacrificial formula.

In addition to this main purpose, however, the Gitā also offers some interesting passages with respect to the Sāmkhya. We have already noticed, for example, those passages which empha- size sāmkhyayoga as a kind of yoga which stands apart from karma- yoga, dhyānayoga, etc. In Chapter II one finds this sāmkhyayoga (or "discipline of reason") described mainly in terms of the dualism between the self or soul and what is not self. This soul (verse 20) is unborn, eternal, and everlasting. It is distinct from material reality which is made up of the three strands (verse 45). The ultimate goal as represented in Chapter II is to stand apart from these strands. In II. 45 bcd, for example we read,

Be thou free from the three strands, Arjuna, Free from the pairs (of opposites), eternally fixed in goodness (nityasattvastha), Free from acquisition and possession, self-possessed.

Throughout the Chapter samkhyayoga is described in terms not unlike the Katha Upanisad, and, as was noted earlier, the Chapter even repeats (verses 19-20) two verses from the Katha. The actual state of salvation in the Chapter is described in the last verse as brahmanirvāņa, again not unlike the Katha. In Chapter VII of the Gita a clearly theistic account of Samkhyayoga is set forth. There in verse 4 the eightfold prakrti is described as the "lower nature" of Krsna. Also included in this "lower nature" are the three "strands" or "conditions" (guņamāyair bhāvair) (verse 13). Then, too, this "lower nature" is described as the "trick-of-illusion" (māyā) of Krsna which must be transcended in order to achieve salvation (verse 14). Krsna's "higher nature" (verse 5) supports or sustains the lower nature, and everything ultimately derives from and dis- solves in the higher and lower natures of Krsna. In Chapter VIII this supreme deity in the form of Krsna is called both "imperishable" (akşara) and "perishable" (kşara) and is equated successively with brahman (verse 3), the "Supreme Spirit"

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(purusah parah) (verse 22), and the mystical syllable OM (verse 13). In Chapter XIII of the Gita yet another account of sām- khyayoga appears. Johnston has suggested that this account seems considerably later than the earlier accounts.127 In the early verses (2-5) twenty-five tattvas are mentioned: the eight- fold prakrti (the five gross elements, ahamkāra, buddhi, avyakta), the eleven senses (five sense functions, five organs of action and manas), and the five objects of the senses. These twenty-four make up the Field apart from which the Field-knower exists (verse 3). This listing of the tattvas is identical with that in Mbh. XII. 298, 10-15 and 294, 27 ff., and is the closest appro- ximation in this period to the classical scheme. In XIII. 19 both purusa and prakrti are characterized as beginningless, and the prakrti is described as the source of the strands (gunas). The gunas in this Chapter (verses 6-9 and 21) together with their description in Chapter XIV (verses 5-20) are characterized mainly as psychic qualities or conditions which determine rebirth. At points, however, (as in XIII. 21-23 and XIV. 5-10 and 19-20) the gunas seem to constitute the very nature of prakrti, and it may be possible to see in this account the begin- ning of the synthesis of the psychic gunas with the old evo- lutionary gunas. In Chapter XIII one also finds a clear statement concerning the means and goal of salvation. In verse 34, we read,

Thus between Field and Field-knower The difference, with the eye of knowledge, And release from the material nature of beings, Those who know (these), they go to the highest.

kşetrakşetrajñayor evam antaram jñānacaksuşā, bhūtaprakrtimoksam ca ye vidur yānti te param.

This dualistic emphasis, however, is overlaid in XIII. 12-17 with the typical monistic doctrine of the Gita. It seems clear, nevertheless, that the writer of the passage was familiar with a

127. Johnston, Early Sāmkhya, op. cit., p. 7.

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form of sämkhyayoga much like that which we pointed to in the later passages of the Mokşadharma, and it is this form of sāmkhya- yoga which seems to be differentiating itself from the older yoga traditions and claiming an independent position for itself. Conclusions. Throughout this second period we have noticed a variety of diverse traditions many of which stand side by side in the texts. Monistic trends frequently parallel or subsume dualistic-tendencies, and many passages are given a theistic emphasis. Self-doctrines vary from jīva to bhūtātman to the Upanisadic ätman and the beginnings of the purusa doc- trine of the Samkhya. Often these varieties of speculation are hopelessly intermixed, and it is quite impossible to describe the stages of development with precision. Attempts to postulate various stages of development of the Sāmkhya in this period - e.g., Johnston's scheme of an original atheistic Samkhya followed by a theistic stage and culminating in a final atheistic stage128 are seldom convincing. The best procedure is simply to point to the various strands or traditions of speculation and to show how they come together in the later texts of the period without attempting a chronological scheme. In this second period we noted the appearance of ahamkāra and its close association with the eightfold prakrti. We saw this eightfold prakrti first as a simple list of eight principles- e.g., in the Buddhacarita, etc. - apart from an explicit theory of evolution. Later we noticed the eightfold prakrti interpreted as a "vertical" theory of evolution. In addition, we called attention to a passage -Mbh. XII. 187 - which derived the principles from the five gross elements. We related this scheme both to the eightfold prakrti and to the succession of states in the Katha Up. (VI. 7-9) the latter of which clearly derives from yogic practice and meditation. Also, following van Buitenen in Mbh. XII. 187 we called attention to an ancient scheme of "horizontal" evolution involving the emergence of buddhi successively in three "forms of being" (bhavas). We related this scheme to the old Vedic idea of the creator or first principle becoming the first-born of creation and to various theories of tripartite creation in the BAUp. and Chan. Up. We also sug- gested a possible connection between this theory of emergence

128. Ibid., pp, 80-88.

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and the old sat and asat which may go back as far as the ancient Indra-Vrtra myth. Then, too, we saw a tendency to combine the eightfold "vertical" theory of evolution with the threefold "horizontal" -e.g., in Mbh. XII. 294; XII. 298 and Gitā XIII. This synthesis regards not only the theory of evolution but also necessarily the doctrine of the gunas. The notion of gunas or bhāvas as psychic qualities or conditions is combined with the notion of bhävas as forms of being involved in the pro- cess of emergence. Eventually in later passages of the Gitā (XIII) we noted a tendency to combine gunas with the notion of prakrti. The gunas begin to appear in these later passages as aspects or qualities of prakrti. They seem to function in such passages both as psychic or emotional qualities which condition rebirth as well as almost'kinds of substances. The exact con- ception is not clear in the texts, and, one might add, it is not much clearer even in the Sāmkhyakārikā. It should be added that the notion of prakrti as a technical term for "material nature" is late in appearing. We did note its use in the Śvetāśvatara Up., but it is not used regularly until much later. In the older texts the terms used which seem somewhat equivalent to prakrti are sattva, avyakta, pradhāna, and the eightfold prakrti. Johnston has pointed out that sattva and avyakta are terms which seem associated with what he calls the "power of the act" -i.e., with the moral state of the individual which controls or determines his next birth.129 He has shown that pradhana is used in yogic passages. The eightfold prakrti refers to those principles which are determinative for the emer- gence of the world-i.e., are creative factors in creation. Here again the classical Samkhya represents a kind of synthesis, for in Kärikā III we learn that only the first of the eightfold prakrti- i.e., avyakta - is called prakrti (or mūlaprakrti) while the other seven are evolutes of mūlaprakrti. Elsewhere in the Kārikā, as we shall see, the mūlaprakrti is referred to as pradhāna and avyakta. It can no longer be called sattva, for in the Kārikā, sattva is used in a different sense -i.e., as one of the three qualities (guņas) of prakrti. The most important observation in this second period, however, is that the texts fail to distinguish clearly between

129. Ibid., pp. 39-41.

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Sāmkhya and Yoga. The first appearance of Sāmkhya-like terminology in the Katha Up. is obviously in a yogic context, and we may conclude from this and other passages that the enumeration of principles arose primarily in yogic meditation in which attempts were made to describe and isolate various states of consciousness. The Yoga in these texts is not the full- blown classical Yoga of Patañjali. It is, rather, a broad group of traditions all of which emphasize self-discipline, meditation and concentration for the purpose of achieving salvation. Generally, these traditions emphasize a dualism of self and world, although the precise conception of each side of the dua- lism varies widely, as we have seen. The ultimate state of sal- vation in most of these traditions is much like that of the older Upanișads or else plainly theistic. In the later texts of this period we note the growing emphasis on "knowing" within the context of the older yoga. The method of knowing seems quite close to the emphasis on knowing in the older Upanisads, although now one is to know the distinction between the Field and the Field-knower (Gitā XIII. 34). This "knowing" is a specific kind of yoga-i.e., jñānayoga or sāmkhyayoga as in Gitā XVI. 1 and III. 3 and XIII. 24. In turn this emphasis on the discipline of "knowing" leads to a greater emphasis on teaching and learning, and, accord- ingly, we find greater emphasis on the reliable authority as a means of knowledge, as in Mbh. XII. 289, 3. In a number of passages we begin to see the claim that knowing alone is sufficient for salvation. If one knows all of the states ot con- sciousness and knows that one's own deepest self is apart from the world, then one achieves the state of salvation. This deepest self is the very source or root of consciousness, and it is separate from prakrti and its three gunas. With the growing emphasis on knowing in the yogic context along with the quest for the deepest selfhood, one also finds a tendency to move away from a theistic or absolutistic context. The important act becomes the act of knowing - i.e., my knowing -and all else is secondary. The gods or the absolute are not denied. They are seen to be; . rather, within the realm of prakrti and, therefore, irrelevant from the point of view of salvation as an act of knowing. Purusa or ksetrajña is anīśvara and atattva (Mbh. XII. 289, 3 and XII. 294, 40) -i.e. not under the domination of isvara or the other

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT 133

tattvas or anything else belonging to prakrti. It should be noted, of course, that some passages in the epic suggest a twenty-sixth principle apart from the twenty-fifth. In most cases, as already mentioned, this is simply another designation for the enlightened purușa as opposed to the purușa in the world. In the Gitā, how- ever, the tendency is to relate the highest principle which is beyond the twenty-five to Krsna as an incarnation of Visnu. Of course, this then transcends the dualistic tendency, and leads one back to the old Vedic pantheism or monism. Within the context of the twenty-five principles, however, it is clear that there is little place for a god or an absolute except on the side of prakrti. Later classical Yoga accepts an Iśvara as a kind of super-purua, but it is obvious that such a notion is quite secondary in the rogasūtra. In all of this it is, thus, possible to see the emergence of a specific doctrine of twenty-five principles, comprehended from an evolutionary perspective, basically dualistic, non- theistic and emphasizing salvation by knowing. This tradition puts great emphasis on reliable authority as a means of know- ing and is not as concerned with yogic techniques and exercises as the other yogic traditions. Our conclusion, then, is that this line of speculation is the basis of the later classical Sāmkhya. It had its rise within the context of general yogic traditions and was known first as jñāna-yoga or sāmkhya-yoga. It included speculations from a variety of sources - e.g., old Vedic specu- lations,. Upanisadic notions of Self, and so forth -but placed great emphasis on the discipline of intellectual comprehension of the enumerated principles. In the latter part of this second period this tradition begins to differentiate itself from other kinds of yoga, and this process of differentiation is reflected in those texts which are reacting against such differentiation, and claiming, rather, that Samkhya and Yoga are one. This tradition deve- loped slowly over a long period and finally received its classical and normative articulation in the Sāmkhyakārikā of Iśvara- krsna. In other words, our conclusion is that Sāmkhya as a differentiated system did not really begin to emerge until well into what we have called the second period. Moreover, we note that many of the later classical notions are still missing even in the early phases of this differentiation. We have no tanmātras as yet. We still do not have the doctrine of evolution

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(tattvavikāra) as found in the Kārikā. We find no clear doctrine of the plurality of purusas. We have yet no doctrine of bhāvas or conditions which impel the buddhi as in classical Sāmkhya. We find no doctrine of a transmigrating lingasarira. The doc- trines of guņapariņāma and satkāryavāda are yet not clearly spelled out, and there is no doctrine of purusārtha. In other words, all of the texts in this second period, even those which offer a description of an emerging Sāmkhya system, can only be charac- terized as proto-Sāmkhya speculations.

(3) CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA

This third period extends from the first century A.D. through about the tenth century. At the beginning of the period one finds Samkhya differentiating itself from other yogic traditions, although one still finds a great variety of doctrines within the developing tradition. This diversity leads even- tuallv to the normative system of Isvarakrsna which then remains the authoritative interpretation for many centuries. In later times both Alberuni (eleventh century A.D.) and Mādhava (fourteenth century A.D.) base their summaries of classical Samkhya on the text of Iśvarakrsna. Precisely how and why the interpretation of Iśvarakrsna and his school became normative is extremely difficult if not impossible to determine. We learn from occasional references in other texts that there were a number of Sāmkhya teachers and texts in the early centuries of this period. All of the texts, however, are no longer avail- able, and the references regarding teachers and schools of inter- pretation are generally unilluminating. It has already been noted - see Chapter I - that Sāmkhya was in decline by the end of this third period. Again it is difficult to determine the reasons for this decline, although it is possible to offer a few suggestions. One possible reason is that the formation of a dogmatic or normative view of the doc- trine by Iśvarakrsna and his school may have tended to curtail further creative thought. The commentaries to the Kārikā, for example, do little more than explain the details of the text. Almost no attempt is made to raise new issues or interpretations. No creative re-working of the doctrines occurs much before Vijñānabhiksu in the sixteenth century which is well after this

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third period. A second possible reason for the decline may have been the rise of the Advaita Vedānta of Śankara, which pressed a vigorous critique of the Samkhya dualism from the perspective of the older Upanisadic, monistic tendencies. Moreover, one can point to the political instability which existed in northern India in the later centuries of this third period which undoubtedly had an adverse effect on most of the older systems and schools. Then, too, unlike Buddhism and the more common forms of Hinduism, Sāmkhya seemingly developed no institutional forms. It moved away also from the emphasis on meditation and supernatural powers of the more popular forms of yoga, and it even tended to reject the theistic emphases which had found their way into most other forms of Indian religion and thought. Finally, the emphasis in Sāmkhya on a kind of intuitive discri- mination together with the description of the state of salvation as kaivalya ("isolation") is a stark, austere mode of religious thought, which obviously would exercise little popular appeal. Putting together all of these reasons, it is not impossible to have some understanding of the decline of the system. Even though the classical Sāmkhya declined, nevertheless it exerted considerable influence in Indian culture. Some of its doctrines and terminology - e.g., the guņas, prakrti, etc. - were taken up into other contexts. Sāmkhya influence can be seen in the Puranas, the law books of Manu, and in many of the other texts of popular religious cults- e.g., the Bhāgavatas, Pāśu- patas, and so forth.130 Moreover, many of its insights have remained in the yoga traditions even into modern times. Since a discussion regarding the meaning and significance of the doctrines of classical Samkhya is the subject of the final Chapter of this work, it is only necessary here to deal with issues relating to the history of Sāmkhya in its classical period.

(a) Sastitantra In Sāmkhyakārika LXXII we are told that the seventy verses represent a summary of the sastitantra.

130. Richard Garbe, Die Sāmkhya Philosophie, op. cit., pp. 52-65. On Sāmkhya and Purāņas see J. Gonda, Die Religionen Indiens, op. cit., II, pp. 54-57 and 68 ff.

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The subjects of the entire sastitantra are indeed in the seventy (vss. of Iśvarakrșņa), although the illustrative stories together with the objections of opponents are not included.131

saptatyām kila ye'rthās te'rthāḥ krtsnasya sasțitantrasya, ākhyāyikāvirahitāḥ paravādavivarjitāś cāpi.

Whether sastitantra refers to a work or simply to a systematic presentation of the doctrine in "sixty topics" is not clear. It is clear, at any rate, that Iśvarakrsna's text represents a sum- mary of sastitantra. Vācaspatimiśra in his commentary Tattva- kaumudi on LXXII enumerates "sixty topics," and claims that these sixty topics can be found in the text, Rājavarttika.132 This latter text, however, is no longer extant. The enumeration of the topics, according to Vācaspati, is as follows : 1. The existence of prakrti. 2. Its singleness. 3. Objectiveness. 4. Distinctiveness. 5. Subserviency (of Matter to Spirit) 6. Plurality (of Spirits). 7. Disjunction (of Spirit from Matter). 8. Conjunction (of Spirit and Matter in the beginning). 9. Relation of subserviency. 10. Inactivity (of the Spirit). These are the ten radical categories (maulikārthāh smṛtā daśa). (In addition to these) are the five kinds of error (viparyaya) nine of contentment (tusti) twenty-eight of disability of the organs (aśakti) and the eight sorts of power (siddhi); (These) make up the sixty topics.133

131. See Appendix B for the present writer's English translation of Kārika. All quotations from the Kārika are taken from this translation. For another rendering see Suryanarayana Sastri, The Sāmkhyakārikā of Isvara- krsna, op. cit., including the Sanskrit text. 132. Ganganatha Jha, An English Translation, with the Sanskrit Text of the Tattvakaumudi of Vacaspatimisra (Bombay : Tattva-vivechaka Press, 1896), pp. 113-114. 133. Ibid.

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The same enumeration is found in the commentary trans- lated by Paramārtha into Chinese and in the Sāmkhyakrama- dipikā, a commentary on the Tattvasamāsa.134 This enumera- tion, however, is little more than a summary of the first twenty verses of the Kārikā together with XLVI-LI. Moreover, as Keith has noted, it combines two lists of enumerations dealing with separate problems.135 Then, too, a different list of the ten maulikārthas is given in Nārāyaņatīrtha's Candrikā.136 This enumeration of sixty topics, thus, appears arbitrary and un- convincing. A different account of the content of sastitantra is available in a Pañcaratra text called the Ahirbudhnyasamhita.137 In the twelfth section of the work five systems are described : Veda, Yoga, Pāśupata, Sātvata, and Sāmkhya. The description of the latter is broken up into two groups : prākrtam mandalam and vaikrtam mandalam. The former consists of thirty-two divisions and the latter twenty-eight.138 Altogether there are sixty topics. As Schrader, Keith and others have noted, however, the system there described is a composite Sāmkhyayoga tradition. In addition to the confusion regarding the content of sastitantra there is also confusion regarding its authorship. The Ahirbudhnyasamhitā and the Yuktidīpikā, another commentary on the Kārikā, claim that Kapila is its author.139 The com-

134. M. J. Takakusu (trans.), "La Sāmkhyakārikā étudiée a la lumiere de sa version chinoise (II)," Bulletin de l'Ecole Francaise d'Extreme- Orient, (BEFEO), Tome IV, Hanoi, 1904, pp. 1060-1061. Hereafter refer- red to as the Chinese version of Paramārtha. 135. Keith, The Sāmkhya System, op. cit., pp. 72-73. 136. Ibid., p. 73. 137. F. Otto Schrader, "Das Sastitantra," ZDMG (Zeitschrift der deutschen morganländischen Gesellschaft), 68 Bd. (Leipzig, 1914), pp. 101-110. For listing of sixty topics as found in Ahirbudhnya, see Schrader, pp. 103-104. See also Keith, The Sāmkhya System, p. 74. 138. Ibid. 139. Schrader, "Das Sastitantra," loc. cit .; and Pulinbehari Chakra- varti, (ed.), Yuktidīpikā, Calcutta Sanskrit Series, XXIII (Calcutta : Metro- politan Printing and Publishing House, 1938); Pulinbehari Chakravarti, Origin and Development of the Samkhya Svstem of Thought (Calcutta : Metro- politan Printing and Publishing House, 1951), pp. 116-127. The latter is a detailed study of Samkhya based on the author's work with Yuktidīpikā.

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mentary on the Kārika called Jayamangalā together with the Chinese version of Paramärtha attributes its authorship to Pañcaśikha.140 Finally, Vācaspatimiśra and the commentator Bālarāma attribute the work to Vārsaganya.141 These varying claims have led Dasgupta and Schrader to suggest the possibility that there were two sastitantras.142 Keith, who follows the tradition which ascribes authorship to Vārsagaņya, claims that Vindhyavāsa (whom he equates with Iśvarakrșna) rewrote the şaştitantra of Vārșagaņya.143 The original sastitantra was a sāmkhyayoga work, says Keith, which was rewritten by Iśvara- krsna as a response to the doctrines of the Buddhists. Such a view depends on the identification of Vindhyavāsa and Iśvara- krsna.144 This identification was put forth first by Takakusu and later accepted by Keith, but, as we shall see, it is unlikely that such an identification can be maintained.145 Our conclusion is that it is impossible to determine either the content or authorship of sastitantra. What little evidence is available tends to support the notion that the sastitantra repre- sents an old sāmkhyayoga tradition, the Sāmkhya portions of which were summarised by Iśvarakrsna in his text. This is sheer speculation, however, and further discussion of the prob- lem in this context would be pointless.146

140. P. Chakravarti, op. cit., pp. 116-127. 141. Keith, The Sāmkhya System, op. cit., p. 76. 142. Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy, op. cit., I, pp. 220-222; and Schrader, "Das Sastitantra," op. cit., p. 110. 143. Keith, The Samkhya System, op. cit., pp. 76-77. Cf. Takakusu's, "La Sāmkhyakārikā ètudiée a la iumiere de sa version chinoise (1)," BEFEO, Tome IV, Hanoi, pp. 40-47. 144. Vindhyavasa, according to the Chinese tradition, revised and reworked the topics of Varsaganya. See Takakusu, "Paramartha's Life of Vasubandhu," JRAS, 1905, pp. 47 ff. 145. See Takakusu's "Paramartha's Life of Vasubandhu," op. cit., p. 48, and Keith, Sāmkhya System, op. cit., p. 77. 146. For detailed discussions see, in addition to Schrader and Keith, Hiriyanna, "Şaştitantra and Vārșaganya," Journal of Oriental Kesearch, Madras, III, ii, pp. 107-112. See also Garbe, Die Samkhya Philosophie, op, cit., pp. 75 ff .; Chakravarti, Origin and Development of Samkhya, op. cit., pp. 116-127; Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy I, op. cit., pp. 219 ff .; and Frauwallner, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, op. cit., pp. 286 ff.

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(b) Sāmkhya Teachers From the Indian texts we learn that there were at least twenty-six Samkhya teachers, the most important of which are the following : Kapila, Āsuri, Pañcaśikha, Vindhyavāsa, Vārșa- gaņya, Jaigīsavya and, of course, Isvarakrsna. 147 The rest are only names mentioned here and there, although Asitadevala and Nārada in Mbh. XII. 267 engage in a dialogue the subject of which is a peculiar listing of Sāmkhya tattvas interpreted theistically.148 Kapila is considered by all texts to be the founder of Samkhya, but there is no doubt that he is a mythical figure.149 The same is true for the second teacher in the tradi- tion, Āsuri. Jaigīșavya is mentioned in Vyāsabhāsya on roga- sūtra II. 55 as a teacher of Yoga and also in Buddhacarita XII. 67 along with Parasara, the latter of whom is to be identified with a certain Pañcaśikha.150 The teachers concerning whom some information is available are the following : Pañcasikha, Vārşagaņya, Vindhyavāsa, and Iśvarakrsņa. The references available, however, are puzzling and often contradictory, and it is extremely difficult to establish any solid conclusions. We shall look only briefly at some of these references. Pañcaśikha. According to Vācaspatimiśra, Pañcaśikha is quoted in the following passages in Vyāsa's rogasūtrabhāsya : I. 4; I. 25; I. 36; II. 5; II. 6; II. 13; III. 13; and III. 41.151 Pañcasikha is also referred to in Sāmkhyapravacanasūtra V. 32 and VI. 68. Moreover, Johnston has suggested that the des- cription of Samkhyayoga in Buddhacarita XII can be ascribed to Pañcasikha among others.152 All of these references clearly indicate a certain Pañcasikha who was a teacher emphasizing

147. Har Dutt Sharma, "The Samkhya-teachers," Festschrift Moriz Winternitz (Leipzig : Otto Harrassowitz, 1933), pp. 225-231. A listing of Sämkhya teachers may be found in Mbh. XII. 306, 58-62. See also an in- teresting list of seven teachers in Gaudabādubhāsya on Kārikā 1. 148. H.D. Sharma, "The Samkhya-teachers," op. cit., p. 230. 149. Keith, The Samkhya System, op. cit., p. 47; and H. D. Sharma, "The Samkhya-teachers," op. cit., p. 225., et al. But cf. Garbe, Die Sāmkhya Philosophie, op. cit., pp. 46-51. 150. H.D. Sharma, "The Samkhya-teachers," op. cit., pp. 229-230; Keith, The Sāmkhya System, op. cit., pp. 53-54. 151. H.D. Sharma, "The Samkhya-teachers," op. cit., p. 227. 152. Johnston, Early Sāmkhya, op. cit., pp. 8-9.

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the yogic dimension of sämkhyayoga. According to the Chinese tradition Pañcasikha also is credited with the authorship of the sastitantra.153 Vācaspatimiśra, however, as mentioned earlier, ascribes authorship of sastitantra to Vārșagaņya. Moreover, Chakravarti has shown that the commentary ruktidīpikā attri- butes some of the quotations from the rogasūtrabhāsya to Vārșa- ganya rather than Pañcasikha.154 Even more confusing is the fact, however, that quite different accounts of Pañcasikha's doctrines are found in the Moksadharma. Earlier we discussed the "Pancasikhavākya" in Mbh. XII. 211-212, and related it to the views of Caraka. Then, too, in Mbh. XII. 308 a system of thirty tattvas understood theistically is ascribed to Pañcasikha.155 The reasonable conclusion in all of this is that there were probably several Pañcasikhas, one or more of whom were sämkhyayoga teachers. In the course of time the views or systems of these teachers became confused with one another and with the views of other teachers.156 Vārşaganya. In rogasūtrabhāsya III, 53 Vyāsa quotes a passage from a work by Vārsaganya the substance of which is a criticism of the atomic theory of the Vaisesikas.157 Again, in rogasūtrabhāsya IV. 13 Vyāsa quotes a verse concerning the nature of gunas which is attributed to Vārsaganya by Vācas- patimiśra in his Bhāmati on Vedāntasūtra II. 1.2.3.158 Then, too, in the commentary Tattvakaumudī on Kārikā XLVII by Vācas- patimiśra, Vārșaganya is mentioned as a teacher of the doctrine of fivefold ignorance (pañcaparvā avidyā).159 The latter doctrine

153. Takakusu, "La Sāņkhyakārikā (II)," op. cit., p. 1059. 154. P. Chakravarti, Origin and Development of the Sāmkhya, op. cit., p. 115. 155. Hopkins, Great Epic of India, op. cit., pp. 152-157; and Keith, The Sāmkhya System, op. cit., pp. 47-49. 156. For further discussion of Pañcasikha, see Garbe, "Pañcasikha Fragmente," Festgruss an Rudolph von Roth, ed. E.W.A. Kuhn (Stuttgart, 1893), pp. 77-80; Garbe; Die Sāmkhya Philosophie, op. cit., pp. 66-71; Keith, The Samkhya System, op. cit., pp. 47-53; Frauwallner, Geschichte des indischen Philosophie, op. cit., pp. 312 ff. Chakravarti, Origin and Development of the Sām- khya, op. cit., pp. 113-127. 157. J.H. Woods, The Yoga-Svstem of Patañjali (Cambridge : Harvard University Press, 1914), p. 291. 158. Ibid., p. 317. 159. G. Jha (trans.), Tattvakaumudī, op. cit., p. 89.

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is found also in Buddhacarita XII. 33, and led Johnston to suggest that the Samkhya in Buddhacarita is that taught by Vārsa- ganya.160 It should also be noted here that Vacaspatimiśra not only ascribes the quote in rogasūtrabhāsya IV. 13 to Vārșa- ganya but says also that the quote is from a work called Sastitantra.161 This reference together with the similar claim by the commentator Balarama led both Keith and Frauwallner to assign authorship of the Sastitantra to Vārsaganya.162 As mentioned earlier, however, Vacaspatimiśra's view of the content of sastitantra appears confused and arbitrary and is quite different from the outline of the content of sastitantra in the Ahirbudhnyasamhitā. Chakravarti, attempting to reconcile these problems, has suggested that Vārsaganya revised an original Sastitantra.163 There is no solid evidence for this, how- ever, and thus the attempt at reconciliation is sheer speculation. Vārşaganya, Followers of Vārşaganya, and Vindhyavāsa. In addition to the above citations, further references to Vārsa- ganya are available in the Chinese tradition and in. a newly edited commentary to the Kārikā, ruktidīpikā (see supra). In Paramartha's "Life of Vasubandhu" a teacher called Vārsa- ganya is said to have lived at the base of the mountain, Vindhya.164 He was a sage of the Samkhya school and was known mythologically as the "king of the Nagas." His pupil, Vindhya- vāsa, learned the Sāmkhya system from him, but then revised or re-worked the content of the system. He also composed some couplets summarizing the revised doctrines. This Vin- dhyavāsa, according to Paramārtha, debated with the Buddhist teacher Buddhamitra, who was the teacher of the famed Vasu- bandhu. Vindhyavasa won the debate and was rewarded with a large sum of money by the then king, Vikramāditya. The debate took place, according to the Chinese tradition, in the city of Ayodhya.165 At the time of the debate, Vasubandhu

160. Johnston, Early Sāmkhya, op. cit., p. 8. 161. Har Dutt Sharma, "The Samkhya-teachers," op. cit., p. 229. 162. Keith, The Samkhya System, op. cit., p. 77; Frauwallner, Geschichte des indischen Philosophie, op. cit., pp. 319-334. 163. Chakravarti, Origin and Deveiopment of Sāmkhya op. cit., p. 126. 164. Taka' usu, "Paramartha's Life of Vasubandhu, " op. cit., pp. 47-50; Takakusu, "La Sāmkhyakārikā (I)," op. cit., pp. 40-47. 165. Ibid.

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was dwelling in the city of Purusapura (Peshawar). Hearing of the defeat of his teacher, Vasubandhu returned to Ayodhyā in order to challenge the Sämkhya teacher to another debate. In the interval, however, the Sāmkhya teacher had died. Vasubandhu then composed the "Paramarthasaptati" as a rejoinder to the Sāmkhya doctrines. Vikramāditya then rewarded Vasubandhu, and the Crown prince, Bālāditya, later became a patron of Buddhism.166 Another Chinese tradition gives a somewhat different account. Hsüan-tsang says that Manoratha was the teacher of Vasubandhu rather than Buddhamitra, and Kuei-chi, the pupil of Hsüan-tsang, in his commentary on his teacher's trea- tises, says that there were eighteen Sāmkhya schools or groups.167 According to Takakusu, the text of Kuei-chi contains the following :

The Samkhya school was formerly split up into eighteen groups, the head of which was 'Ba-li-sha', meaning 'Rain' (Varsa). His associates were all called the 'Rain-host' (Vārșagaņya). The 'Gold-seventy' (Hiranyasaptati) is the work of them.168

Elsewhere, Kuei-chi refers to a debate which took place between a Sämkhya teacher and a Buddhist.169 For purposes of the debate the Sämkhya teacher composed a treatise in seventy verses called the "Gold-seventy". The Samkhya teacher won the debate, and later Vasubandhu composed his "Paramārtha- saptati" as a rejoinder. The "Gold-seventy", according to the Chinese tradition, is the "Samkhya-sastra" or the Chinese version of the Sāmkhyakārikā, first translated by Paramārtha between 557-569 A.D.170 Kuei-chi mentions no names other than "Varsa", but if one combines the accounts of Paramartha and Kuei-chi, then it becomes possible to identify Vindhyavāsa with Iśvarakrsna. Takakusu made such an identification, and his conclusion has been accepted by both Garbe and

166. Ibid. 167. Takakusu, "Paramartha's Life of Vasubandhu," op. cit., p. 49, 168. Ibid. 169. Takakusu, "La Sāņkhyakārikā (I)," op. cit. pp. 38-40. 170. Takakusu, "Paramartha's Life of Vasubandhu," op. cit., p. 47.

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Keith.171 According to this view, Vārsaganya and Vindhyavāsa both become older contemporaries of Vasubandhu. If one accepts Takakusu's dating of Vasubandhu-i.e., ca A.D. 420- 500 - this puts Vindhyavāsa (or Iśvarakrsņa) ca. A.D. 450.172 If one accepts other dates for Vasubandhu-e.g., N. Peri's sug- gestion that Vasubandhu lived a century earlier - then Vin- dhyavāsa's date is likewise earlier.173 If one accepts the Takakusu dating, this places the events described in the reign of Skandagupta, who ruled ca. 452-480, and who was known as Vikramāditya.174 If one accepts the earlier dating, this would suggest the reign of Chandragupta II (ca. 380-415), also known as Vikramāditya.175 Takakusu's attempt to identify Vindhyavāsa and Iśvara- krsna, however, is open to question. In Kumārila's Śloka- vārttika Vindhyavāsa is said to have rejected the notion of the subtle body.176 In the ruktidipikā Vindhyavāsa is said to have asserted that both the ahamkāra and the five tanmātras proceed from the buddhi.177 Also in the ruktidīpikā Vindhyavasa is credited with the notion that all is experienced in the manas.178 In each case the respective doctrines of Iśvarakrsna in the Sāmkhyakārikā are different. Moreover, in the ruktidipikā it is explicitly stated that Iśvarakrsna did not discuss syllogistic reasoning since it had already been exhaustively treated by Vindhyavasa.179 Whether or not the writer of the ruktidipika has accurately represented the views of Vindhyavāsa is, of course, difficult to determine, but what is important to note is

171. Takakusu, "Paramartha's Life of Vasubandhu," op. cit., pp. 47-51; Keith, The Sāmkhya System, op. cit., pp. 76-77; Garbe, Die Sāmkhya Philosophie, op. cit., pp. 77-83. 172. Takakusu, "Paramartha's Life of Vasubandhu," op. cit., p. 53. 173. Keith, The Sāmkhya System, op. cit., p. 84. 174. Takakusu, "Paramartha's Life of Vasubandhu," op. cit., p. 44. 175, Chakravarti, Origin and Development of Samkhya, op. cit., p. 153; and H. G Rawlinson, India (New York : F.A. Praeger, 1965), p. 107. 176. Har Dutt Sharma, "The Samkhya-teachers," op. cit., p. 228. 177. Yuktidīpikā, op. cit., p. 108; mahațaḥ şadaviseşāh srjyante, pañca- tanmātrāny ahamkāras ceti vindhyavāsimatam, cited in Chakravarti, Origin and Development of Samkhya, p. 141. 178. Yuktidīpikā, op. cit., p. 108 : ... sarvārthopalabdhih, manasi vindhyavāsinah, cited in Chakravarti, Origin, op. cit., p. 141. 179. Yuktidīpikā op. cit., p. 4, cited in Chakravarti, Origin, op. cit., p. 149.

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that in the mind of the commentator Iśvarakrsna and Vindhya- vāsa are two separate teachers. Other scattered references to a certain Vindhyavāsa also tend to support the idea that Iśvarakrsņa and Vindhyavāsa are not identical.180 In addition to all of this, there is one further point which no one seems to have noticed. It is quite difficult to believe that the Sāmkhyakārikā was written for purposes of a debate. It is not a polemical text. Indeed, in Kārikā LXXII it is ex- pressly set forth that the text is a simple summary of doctrine without illustrative stories or arguments against opponents. Thus, it is highly unlikely that the Sāmkhyakārikā represents the "couplets" composed by Vindhyavāsa for purposes of a debate with a Buddhist teacher. Likewise, if one follows the testimony of Kuei-chi, it is highly unlikely that the Sāmkhya- kārikā is the same as the "Gold-seventy" (Hiranyasaptati) which was used in debate. The most plausible explanation of the confusion is that the Chinese tradition has tended to identify two separate texts or events. On the one hand, there was probably a tradition which involved a debate between a Samkhya teacher and a Buddhist, and there, is no reason to doubt that the Samkhya school involved was that of the follow- ers of Vārșaganya, one of whom was a certain Vindhyavāsa. At a later time this tradition became associated with the com- position of the "Samkhyasaptati" or the Chinese version of the Sāmkhyakārikā. The latter text was probably composed by Iśvarakrsna some time after the reported debate, perhaps as a final summary of the Samkhya position. This conclusion would support the Chinese tradition concerning a debate, at least in its main outline, and would eliminate the necessity of identifying Vindhyavāsa and Iśvarakrsna. Moreover, it would eliminate the necessity of equating the Kārika with the text or couplets used in the context, of the debate. Other teachers. The Yuktidipika mentions the views of the followers of Varsaganya at a number of points, but it does not say who these followers are with the exception of Vindhya- vāsa.181 In addition, however, the ruktidipikā also mentions

180. Har Dutt Sharma, "The Samkhya-teachers," op. cit., pp. 228-229. 181. Chakravarti, Origin and Development of the Samkhya, op. cit., p. 136. See ruktidīpika; pp. cit., 39, 67, 95, 102, 132-133, 145, 170.

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some other teachers. Paurika, for example, is represented as holding the view that there is a separate prakrti for each purusa which immediately calls to mind the reference in Gunaratna's commentary on the Saddarsanasamuccaya to the school of "Maulikya Sāmkhya."182 Moreover, the author of ruktidipikā claims that a certain Pañcadhikarana represented the view that the internal organ is made up of ten members rather than thirteen members as set forth in the Kārika.183 Then, too, a certain Patañjali is credited in the Yuktidipikā with the notion that there is no separate existence of ahamkāra.181 It is simply a function of buddhi. Again, it is difficult to determine the accuracy of these references in the ruktidipikā, but it is import- ant to note that there were evidently a number of schools or traditions of interpretation of Sāmkhya. Even though many of the references to the teachers of Sāmkhya are bewildering and contradictory, nevertheless, it is quite obvious that the Samkhya in these early centuries A.D. was a vigorous and important tradition. Key doctrines were evidently being worked out within the tradition and in response to opposing points of view. The reported debates with the Buddhists probably represent an important chapter in the history of the tradition, and it is quite probable that the nor- mative, classical Samkhya eventually took shape in response to such encounters. It is also probable that many of the simi- larities between Samkhya and Buddhism should be traced to this period just before the work of Iśvarakrsna.

(c) Sāmkhyakārikā and its Commentaries Paramārtha translated the Kārikā together with a commen- tary into Chinese some time between 557 and 569 A.D., the last period of his literary activity.185 Very little is known about Iśvarakrsna, the author of the Karika, although the Chinese version claims that he was a member of a brahmanical family named Kausika.186 It seems probable that he was a

182. Chakravarti, Origin and Development of the Samkhya, op. cit., p. 132, note 3. 183. Ibid., p. 133, note 1. 184. Ibid., p. 134, note 1. 185. Takakusu, "La Sāņkhyakārikā (I)." op. cit., p. 3. 186. Takakusu, "Paramartha's Life of Vasubandhu," op. cit., p. 48.

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contemporary of Vasubandhu, Vindhyavāsa and the followers of Vārșaganya. It is quite difficult to determine the precise date for any of these people, although the above discussion concern- ing Sämkhya teachers would tend to support the general claim that Isvarakrsna and the others carried on their activities under the Gupta dynasty (ca. A.D. 320-540).187 This was a period of great literary and cultural activity in India, and it seems quite natural that classical Sāmkhya would achieve its normative articulation in this era.188 The Kārikā, according to Gaudapāda and Vācaspatimiśra, contains seventy-two verses. Of these Gaudapāda comments only on the first sixty-nine verses. The Chinese version, how- ever, which is undoubtedly the oldest text available, does comment on the final verses, but leaves out Kārika LXIII. The Yuktidipika, on the other hand, does not read Karikas LX, LXI, LXII, LXIII, LXV and LXVI. The Mātharavrtti, finally, reads an extra verse beyond the seventy-two of Gauda- pāda and Vācaspatimiśra, thus making a total of seventy-three verses. In Kārikā LXXII, however, we are told that the origi- nal text included only seventy verses. Various attempts have been made to establish the original seventy, but there is little evidence for any real success.189 At any rate, the extra verses do not deal with the content of the system but rather with questions of authorship and transmission. With respect to content, therefore, there is no great problem. There are a few variant readings of some verses in the various commentaries, but none of them change the basic meaning.190

187. Keith, The Sāmkhya System, op.cit. p. 84. 188. A.L. Basham, The Wonder That Was India (New York: Grove Press, 1954), pp. 63 ff .; H.C. Rawlinson, India, A Short Cultural History New York : F.A. Praeger, 1965), pp. 105-141. 189. B.G. Tilak attempted to reconstruct the missing verse from the sixty-nine commented on by Gaudapada. He reconstructs the verse from the Gaudapāda's Bhāsya on Kārikā LXI, as follows, kāraņam īśvaram eke bruvate kālam pare svabhāvam vā, prajāh katham nirguņato vyaktah kālaḥ svabhāvaś ca. Tilak claims that this verse was dropped because it denies an Iśvara. B.G. Tilak, Sanskrit Research, Vol. I, pp. 107-117, cited in Chakravarti, Origin and Development of Samkhya, op. cit., pp. 156-157. 190. For listing of variant readings of the Kārikā, see Chakravarti

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The verses of the Kārika are written in the arya metre, which is described by A.L. Basham as follows :

This (i.e., the ārya stanza) is divided into feet, each con- taining four instants, counting a prosodically short syllable as one and a long syllable as two instants. The first quarter of the ryã stanza contains three such feet; the second, four and a half: the third, three, and the fourth, three and a half, with an extra short syllable after the second foot.191

Hence, there are thirty "instants" (mātr) in the first half- stanza and twenty-seven "instants" in the second. The basic commentaries on the Kārikā are the following : Paramārtha's Chinese version, the Gaudapādabhāsya, the Māțhara- vrtti, the Sāmkhyatattvakaumudī, the Jayamangalā, and the rukti- dipikā.192 Most of them are extremely difficult to date, although it is possible to offer a few comments regarding the approxi- mate time of composition. Paramartha's Chinese version. This commentary accom- panies the Chinese version of the Kārika, translated during the

(ed.) Yuktidīpikā, op. cit., pp. i-xi; for collation of variant readings from manuscripts in possession of Colebrooke, Wilson and Lassen see section entitled "Variations and Corrections" at the end of Sanskrit text edited by H.H. Wilson in the Colebrooke-Wilson, Sāmkhya Kārikā, op. cit., not paginated. See also variant readings in new edition of Yuktidīpikā, edited by R.C. Pandeya (Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1967) pp. 147. 191. A.L. Basham, The Wonder That Was India, op. cit., pp. 511-512. 192. The present writer has used the following editions of the commen- taries. (1) Paramartha's Chinese version : M.J. Takakusu, (ed. and trans.), "La Sāņkhyakārikā (II)," BEFEO, Tome IV, Hanoi (1904), pp. 978-1061. (2) Bhāysa of Gaudapāda : Colebrooke-Wilson. op. cit .; and B. Tripathi (ed.), The Sāmkhyakārikā with an expositon' called Chandrikā and Gaudapadāchārya's Commentary (Benares : Braj B. Das 1883), (3) Māțhara- vṛtti : V.P. Sarma (ed.), Māțharavrtti (Benares, 1922; Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, CCXVI. (4) Sāmkhyatattvakaumudī : G. Jhā (ed. and trans.), Tattvakaumudī of Vāchaspati Miśra (Bombay, 1896); and Ramesh Chandra Tarkatirtha (ed.), Vācaspatimiśra's Sāmkhyatattvakaumudī (Calcutta, 1935; Calcutta Sanskrit Series, No. XV); and Richard Garbe (trans.) Der Mondschein der Sämkhya-Wahrheit (München : G. Franz 1891). (5) Jaya- mangalā : H. Sarma (ed.), Jayamangalā (Delhi : Betab Printing Works, 1926; Calcutta Sanskrit Series, No. 19). (6) Yuktidīpikā : P. Chakravarti (ed.) Yuktidīpikā, loc. cit.

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last period of the literary activity of Paramartha, ca. A.D. 557- 569. One Chinese tradition attributes the authorship of the commentary to Vasubandhu, but that is obviously a mistake.193 Most likely the tradition confused the commentary on the Kārika with the "Paramarthasaptati" of Vasubandhu which was written to refute the Sāmkhya system.194 Gaudapādabhāsya. A terminus ad quem for this commen- tary is the eleventh century A.D., for Alberuni in his account of Sāmkhya clearly uses the Kārikā and refers to an "anchorite" by the name of "Gauda" who is an authority on the Sāmkhya.195 Some have tried to link the Gaudapada of the Bhasya with the Gaudapāda of the Māņdūkyakārikā, but, as Keith and others have pointed out, the philosophies are quite different.198 The only basis for a connection is the similarity of name which is obviously insufficient evidence. This commentary is perhaps the most useful, however, since it discusses the verses of the Kārikā in a simple, direct manner. Mațharavrtti. This is a recently edited commentary, and it has been the center of much controversy. Belvalkar claimed that it is the original Sanskrit version of the Chinese translation of Paramärtha.197 He asserted this identity on the basis of certain common subject-matter in the two texts. According to this view, the Bhāsya of Gaudapāda is simply a kind of plagia- rized version of Mātharavrtti. Keith, S.S. Suryanarayanan, Umesha Mishra and others have shown convincingly, however, that there are a number of differences between Mātharavrtti and

193. Takakusu, "La Sāņkhyakārikā (I)," op. cit., pp. 37 ff. 194. Ibid. 195. M. Winternitz, Geschichte der indischen Litteratur, III, op. cit., p. 453; and Edward Sachau, Alberuni's India, I (London : Kegan Paul, 1910), pp. 266-267. 196. Keith, The Samkhya System, op. cit., p. 85; Eliade, roga : Immortality and Freedom, op. cit., p. 370; and cf. Umesha Mishra, "Gaudapādabhāsya and Matharavrtti," Allahabad University Series, VII (1931), pp. 371-386; and Amar Nath Ray, "The Māndūkya Upanişad and the Karikas of Gaudapāda," Indian Historical Quarterly, XIV (1938), pp. 564-569; and B.N.S. Krishnamurti, "New Light on the Gaudapada-Karikas," Review of Philosophy and Religion, Poona, II (1931) pp. 35-56. 197. S.K. Belvalkar, "Matharavrtti and the Date of Iśvarakrșņa," Bhandarkar Commemorative Essays (Poona, 1917), pp. 171-184.

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Paramārtha's Chinese version and the Bhāsya of Gaudapāda.198 The only reasonable conclusion is that all three com- mentaries go back to a common original which is now lost. Moreover, Keith and S.S. Suryanarayanan have suggested that the Matharavrtti shows a number of signs which would indicate a very late date. 199 Sāmkhyatattvakaumudī. This well-known and important commentary is dated by the author himself in the ninth century A.D.200 Nārayanatīrtha composed a gloss on Tattvakaumudi called Sāmkhyacandrikā.201 Jayama igala. The date of this work is unknown, although it appears to be earlier than Tattvakaumudi.202 Its authorship is attributed to a certain Sankara, although it is obviously not the well-known Sankara of the Vedanta school. As Eliade and others have pointed out, the work is not of great value or of much philosophical depth.203 Yuktidīpikā. Again it is difficult if not impossible to date this commentary, although Chakravarti, the editor of the text, claims an early date for it. He even suggests that it was written as a response to Vasubandhu's "Paramārthasaptati.204 As noted above, this work is valuable historically in that it offers some information regarding other teachers and schools of Sāmkhya. Generally, however, the text is quite confusing and problematic. It does contain a number of polemics against various kinds of Buddhism, and may prove valuable as a source for further knowledge concerning various schools or traditions of Buddhism. As a source for understanding the difficult points of Sāmkhya doctrine, however, it takes one little further than

198. A.B. Keith, "The Matharavrtti," BSOS (Bulletin of the School of Oriental Studies), III, 3 (1924), pp. 551-554; S.S. Suryanarayanan, "Mathara and Paramartha," JRAS (1931) pp. 623-639; Umesha Mishra, "Gaudapādabhāsya and Māțharavṛtti," loc. cit. 199. Ibid. 200. G. Jhā, Tattvakaumudi, op. cit., p. iii. 201. B. Tripathi (ed.), The Sāmkhyakārikā with an exposition called Candrikā, etc., loc. cit. 202. H. Sharma (ed.), Jayamangalā, loc. cil. 203. Eliade, roga, op. cit., p. 369. 204. Chakravarti, Origin and Development of Sāmkhya, op. cit., pp. 160-162.

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the other commentaries. The present writer hesitates to offer a judgment regarding the date of the work until more critical research is done on the text as a whole.

(d) rogasūtra Since a detailed discussion of the composition of the roga- sūtra and related texts is beyond the scope of this study, the present writer simply calls attention to the excellent discussion of Hauer in Der Yoga.205 He sees the Yogasutra as a composite text, the final redactor of which worked probably in the fourth century A.D. The latest portion of the text, according to Hauer, is the nirodha-section (I. 1-22). The oldest portion is the yoganga-section (II.28-III.55) which may go back to the second century B.C. The kriyayoga-section (II.1-27) and the iśvarapraņidhāna-section (I.23-51) are the next oldest. The nirmanacitta-section (IV.2-34) was added just before the final redaction and represents a reaction against both the Yogacara school of Buddhism and the Sāmkhya.206 It appears, therefore, that the final redaction is roughly contemporary with the composition of the Kārikā, and, as Keith has suggested, its final compilation may have been occasioned by the appearance of Iśvarakrsna's work.207

(e) Alberuni and Mādhava This third period in the development of the Samkhya comes to an end with the work of Alberuni and Madhava. We know that Alberuni lived and worked in India in the eleventh century.208 He was interested in Indian philosophy, and his book contains a summary of the doctrines of the Samkhya based primarily on the Karika.209 His summary indicates that the Sāmkhyakārikā had been recognized for some time as the definitive or normative account of the system.

205. Hauer, Der Yoga, op. cit., pp. 238-239 and pp. 221-239. See also his excellent translation of Yogasūtra, ibid., pp. 239-258. 206. Ibid., p. 239. 207. Keith, The Sāmkhya System, op. cit., p. 70. 208. Winternitz, Geschichte der indischen Litteratur III. 209. Sachau, Alberuni's India, op. cit., pp. 226-227, and pp. 30, 40-49, 62, 132.

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Madhava's Sarvadarśanasamgraha also includes a summary of the doctrines of the Sāmkhya based solely on the Sāmkhya- kārika. This writer lived in the fourteenth century A.D., and his work is a summary of sixteen systems of Indian thought including the Vedanta.210 He consistently bases his discussions on the normative texts of the various schools, and his sole use of the Kārikā on Sāmkhya indicates clearly that the Kārikā was at that time the standard text.211 Conclusions. This, then, brings to a close our discussion of the third period of the development of the Samkhya. In this period Sämkhya differentiated itself from the older tradi- tions and developed into a unique system with a technical terminology. In the early centuries of the period it was a vigorous tradition, and, as we have seen, the various teachers in. the tradition engaged in debates with the Buddhists- and followers of other schools of thought. The Samkhya reached the height of its creative activity under the Gupta dynasty, and it was probably during that time that Iśvarakrsna completed his definitive work, the Sāmkhyakārikā. In time this latter text became normative in the school, and the doctrines of other teachers became less important. As Frauwallner has suggested, classical Sāmkhya retained its vigor and importance through the time of Dignāga (A.D. 480-540) who polemicizes vigo- rously against the Samkhya, thus suggesting that it was still a potent force with which to reckon.212 Even Śankara-tradi- tional date, ca. 788-820 A.D. - vigorously argues against the Sāmkhya.213 For the next several centuries, however, the Sāmkhya loses its force and goes through a period of decline. By the time of Alberuni and Madhava one finds only occa- sional summaries of the doctrine as just one more system of Indian thought.

210. Winternitz III, op. cit., pp. 419-420. 211. Mādhava, Sarvadarsanasamgraha, trans. E.B. Cowell and A.E. Gough (London : Trubner, 1894), pp. 221-230. 212. Frauwallner, Geschichte des indischen Philosophie, I, op. cit., p. 475. 213. G. Thibaut, The Vedānta-Sūtras of Bādarāyana, with the Commen- tary by Sankara (New York : Dover Publications, 1962; Sacred Books of the East, Vols. 34, 38), passim. And cf. M.G. Sastri, An Examination of Samkara's Refutation of the Samkhya Theory (Poona: Gujarat Printing Press, 1925), pp. 1-114. See also C. Sharma, Indian Philosophy : A Critical Survey (New York : Barnes and Noble, 1962), pp. 244-245.

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(4) RENAISSANCE OR LATER SĀMKHYA The Samkhya underwent a kind of revival in the sixteenth century A.D., for in that century both Aniruddha (ca. 1500 A.D.) and Vijñānabhiksu (later half of sixteenth century) wrote commentaries on the Sāmkhyapravacanasūtra.214 It is difficult to determine the date of the sutras, but in view of the, fact that Mādhava in his Sarvadarsanasamgraha makes no refer- ence to them, it appears likely that they were compiled after his time - i.e., after the fourteenth century.215 The same is true for the Tattvasamāsasūtra.216 The late date of the texts is supported by the fact that the commentaries to the texts are also late. It is possible, of course, that many passages or ideas in the collections of sūtras may go back to classical times, but it is difficult to sort out the earlier from the later. Generally, these late texts are markedly influenced by the Vedānta. Vijñānabhikșu, for example, devotes much energy to showing that Samkhya can be reconciled with the orthodox point of view.217 There is also a greater emphasis in these late texts on the cosmic side of the doctrine, and the Sāmkhya- pravacanasūtra articulates in detail the doctrine of the periodic creation and destruction of the world.218 Some of these emphases in the late texts are absent or only vaguely implied in the

214. Winternitz, op. cit., pp. 454-457. The present writer has used the following edition of the sūtras : Richard Garbe (ed. and trans.), Sāmkhya- Sutra-Vrtti or Aniruddha's Commentary and the original parts of Vedāntin Mahadeva's Commentary (Calcutta : J. W. Thomas, 1888): Garbe (trans.), Sāmkhya-pravacana-bhāsya, Vijñānabhikşu's Commentar zu den Sāmkhyasūtras (Leipzig : Brockhaus, 1889); Garbe (ed.) The Samkhyapravacana-bhāsya (Cambridge Harvard Press, 1943; HOS, Vol. 2). J.R. Ballantyne (trans.), The Samkhya Aphorisms of Kapila (London): Trubner, 1885); and Nandalal Sinha (trans.), The Sāmkhya Philosophy, Containing : (1) Sāmkhya Pravachana Sutram, with the Vritti of Aniruddha and the Bhāsya of Vijñāna Bhiksu and Extracts from the Vrttisāra of Mahādeva Vedāntin; (2) Tattva Samāsa; (3) Samkhya Karika; Panchasikha Sutram (Allahabad : Krishna Bose, 1912; Sacred Books of the Hindus XI). 215. Keith, The Sāmkhya System, op. cit., p. 112. cf. also Winternitz. 216. Ibid. cf. also Winternitz. 217. Especially good discussions of Renaissance or later Samkhya may be found in Keith, The Samkhya System, op. cit., pp. 112-128; Das- gupta, History of Indian Philosophy, I, op. cit., pp. 222-226; Garbe, Die Samkhya Philosophie op. cit., pp. 100-105 and pp. 263 ff. . 218. Garbe (ed. and trans). Sāmkhya-Sūtra-Vrtti, ob. cit., I, 154, V. 15-16, III. 4-5 together with commentaries.

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Kārikā, as will be shown in the final Chapter. In view of this Vedānta influence and in view of the new emphasis in the sūtras, it becomes clear that these late texts must be used cau- tiously, if at all, in explicating and interpreting the doctrines of classical Sāmkhya. The tendency among interpreters has been to use the late texts freely in interpreting the meaning of the Kārikā.219 Our approach, however, is to explicate the Kārikā on its own terms, wherever possible avoiding recourse to the late materials. Occasionally, of course, it is necessary to refer to the Sāmkhyapravacanasūtra and its commentaries for purposes of comparison and contrast. . Having thus discussed the development of the Sāmkhya from the period of ancient speculations down through Renais- sance or Later Sāmkhya, we are now able to focus on the task of explicating and interpreting the meaning of classical Sāmkhya.

219. Garbe, Dasgupta, Oltramare, et al.

CHAPTER III

AN INTERPRETATION OF THE MEANING OF CLASSICAL SĀŅKHYA

In the preceding chapters, the complex and intricate problems relating to the history of Sāmkhya have been examin- ed. The beginnings of Samkhya-like speculations were traced in the ancient texts followed by an analysis of the development of terminology and systematization in the proto-Sāmkhya, classical and later periods.1 Emphasis was placed on the deri- vative, composite nature of Samkhya. Influences were traced from the old Upanisadic notions of atman and brahman; from ancient creation myths; from analysis of the breaths and specu- lations concerning the states of waking, dreaming and dream- less sleep; from ancient and later yogic theories and techniques; and even from some doctrines of Jainism and Buddhism. That Sāmkhya is not a monolithic system stemming from ancient times has become obvious. One finds, rather, a kind of slowly growing organism which has assimilated a variety of traditions. over a period of centuries. This organism reached maturity in what we have called the third or classical period with the work of Iśvarakrsna. Sāmkhya then stands as a unified system apart from Yoga and other systems of thought. It has deve- loped a technical terminology and offers a unique theory and method of salvation. This classical system represents a synthesis of many ancient traditions in which previously diverse and frequently contradictory doctrines are given a systematic and coherent form. From this synthesis an extremely subtle and sophisticated system of thought emerged. Usually the Sāmkhya has been interpreted as a philo- sophic naturalism - e.g., Garbe and Deussen - or as a deca- dent form of Vedänta - e.g., Deussen, Radhakrishnan, and C. Sharma.2 The purpose of this final Chapter is to offer a.

1. See supra, Chapter II. 2. See supra, Chapter I and Appendix B.

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somewhat new interpretation of the classical Samkhya which may establish a fresh perspective concerning the nature and meaning of this ancient system. Hopefully our interpretation will reveal that Sämkhya is dealing in a significant manner with some of the most difficult problems of religion and thought. As was mentioned in the brief summary of the doctrines of classical Samkhya in the first part of Chapter I, classical Sāmkhya takes its point of departure (Kārikā I) from the fact of suffering in human existence.3 This suffering is threefold : personal (ādhyātmika), external (ādhibhąutika) and cosmic and/ or supernatural (ādhidaivika). That is to say, suffering is brought about by factors relating to the bodily or mental make- up of man himself, by factors coming from man's natural environment, and by factors coming from the forces of nature or the gods.4 In other words, suffering pervades man's entire existence, even his relationship with the gods. The purpose of the Samkhya is to provide a means of release from this im- mense suffering or torment. Classical Sāmkhya, therefore, is above all a religious system. It is an attempt to find a way or mode of existence which transcends the ordinary structures of human experience. It seeks a condition of salvation which is apart from the universal human condition of suffering. More- over, according to Kārikā I, this release from or removal of suffering must be final or abiding (atyanta), which thereby renders all provisional or temporary alleviation of suffering irrelevant- as e.g., the temporary relief from such means as the sacrificial system, etc.5 Such temporary expedients only beg the question. They fail to deal with the fundamental

3. The term "classical Samkhya" is used in this work as that sum- mary of the doctrine found in the Kārika, together with the commentaries. It should be remembered, of course, that most or all of the commentaries come later than the Krikā, and thus must be used cautiously, especially when there is much disagreement as to a given doctrine. Throughout this Chapter, the following abbreviations are used, (1) Kārikā for Sāmkhyakārikā; (2.) Bhāsya for the commentary of Gaudapāda; (3) STK for Sāmkhyatattva- kaumudī of Vācaspatimiśra; (4) Paramārtha's Chinese version for the Chinese translation of the Karika and the accompanying commentary; (5) YD for Yuktidīpikā; (6) Jaya., for Jayamangalā. 4. Bhāşya on Kārikā I; STK on Kārikā I; Paramārtha's Chinese version on I, etc. 5. Ibid.

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problem - i.e., the problem of the very structure of human experience. There is only one means of achieving this ultimate goal of the elimination of suffering : vyaktāvyaktajñavijñāna (Kārikā II)-i.e., the "intuitive. discrimination" of the "knowing one" or "knower" (jña), the "manifest" world (vyakta), and the unmanifest" (avyakta).6 These terms will be discussed in detail below. What is important to note at this point is simply that all of the doctrines of the Sāmkhya serve one end : salva- tion. Classical Sāmkhya is neither an attempt to satisfy man's need to know nor an attempt to render the world intelligible for its own sake. It is, rather, a quest for salvation from suffering. Moreover, it is also important to observe that classical Sāmkhya begins its analysis from within the context of con- crete human experience. The two prime facts noticed in the opening Kārikās are (1) the fact of awareness as suffering; and (2) the fact of the world itself which is the context of the suffering. The two are inextricably related with one another at the outset. Later, of course, the Kārikā deals at length with the problem of the relationship of man and the world. Its starting-point, however, is the simple fact of man in the world, and it is this simple fact which is the basic problem of the classical Sāmkhya system. It consistently refuses to reduce consciousness to the world or the world to consciousness. It rejects the Buddhist notion of No-self and the Vedanta notion of Self .? It maintains, rather, a fundamental dualism -between individual consciousness, on the one hand, and a real world, on the other. The two sides of this dualism are perpetually interacting with one another, and it is this dialectic or inter- action which brings about both the manifest world and the ultimate salvation of purușa. These basic presuppositions or assumptions of the classical Sāmkhya are important to keep in mind, for they determine

6. All commentaries equate jña with puruşa and vyaktāvyakta with prakrti. The term uyakta is the pp. of the root, añj, meaning "manifest," "distinct," "clear". The term a-vyakta is simply the negative form : "un- mnanifest," etc. 7. The notion of self or consciousness will be discussed infra, section C. purușa.

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. the orientation of the entire system. Without these presuppo- sitions the Samkhya analysis of the human situation becomes rather pointless -little more than an historical curiosity. If one keeps in mind the basic presuppositions, however, then the system becomes important both as a significant stage in the development of Indian thought and as a significant contri- bution to some of the basic problems of religion and thought in general. Having thus briefly established the context and purpose of the system, let us now turn to a more detailed analysis of the content of classical Sāmkhya. A. THE MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE Before discussing or presenting the main doctrines of the system, the author of the Kārikā first sets forth the means of correct knowledge (pramāņa).8 Classical Sāmkhya recognizes only three such means; perception (pratyaksa), inference (anu- māna), and reliable authority (aptavacana). Perception is the "ascertainment" or "determination" of various objects by means of the senses (prativişayādhyavasāyo drsțam ... V). "Determination" or "ascertainment" (adhyavasāya), according to Kārika XXIII, is a function of buddhi. The five senses to- gether with mind (manas), according to Kārikās XXVI and XXVII, are products of ahamkāra, which in turn (Karikā XXII) derives from buddhi. Hence, perception is a process which involves buddhi, ahamkāra, manas and one or more of the senses in contact with the objects of the senses. This is the first means of knowledge, and we will defer further discussion of it until we have discussed the significance of the above terms in greater detail. Inference, according to Karika V, is the knowledge which derives from the prior knowledge of the "characteristic mark"

8. The number of pramanas or means of knowledge varies from school to school. Some-e.g., the Purvamimāmsa-accept six means : perception, inference, analogy, reliable authority, non-perception or negative proof (anupa- labdhi or abhāvapratyaksa), and inference from circumstances or implication (arthapatti). Other schools-e.g., Nyaya-accept only the first four of the above. Sāmkhya and Yoga accept only three. Still others, however, add three more to the six, making nine. These last three are usually sambhava, aitīhya and cestā. See Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy, op. cit. I, pp. 330-360 and pp. 375-399; or any standard history of Indian thought.

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(linga) and that in which the mark inheres (lingi).9 In the common illustration -i.e., "where there is smoke, there is fire" - smoke is the linga and fire is the lingi. According to the same Kārikā (V), there are three kinds of inference, although the reader is not given an enumeration of the three. The commentators list the three kinds as pūrvavat, śeșavat and sāmān- yato drsta, but they differ widely in their interpretations of the significance of each kind. Gaudapāda interprets pūrvavat in terms of prior perception-e.g., the inference that it will rain because of the presence of rain-clouds; and interprets śeșavat in terms of inference from a part to a whole-e.g., from one salty drop of water the saltiness of all the water is inferred and interprets sāmānyato drsța as inference by analogy - e.g., since motion is inferred because of the change in position of the moon and the stars; so if Caitra changes position, etc.10 Paramārtha's Chinese version interprets pūrvavat, sesavat and sāmānyato drsta as (1) inference from the cause or a priori - e.g., from rain-clouds, the rain; (2) inference from the effect or a posteriori - e.g., it must have rained because the river is over-flowing; and (3) inference by analogy, etc.11 Väcaspati- miśra in his commentary discusses the three in terms of a two- fold distinction : (1) vīta, including pūrvavat and sāmānyato drsta, as affirmative; and (2) avīta, including seșavat, as nega- tive.12 Of these differing interpretations, the version of Para- martha is the same as that found in the well-known explanation of the threefold inference of Vatsyayana in his commentary on the Nyāyasūtra.13 Reliable authority, according to Kārikā V, is reliable reve- lation or unimpeachable verbal testimony (aptaśruti). Accord- ing to all commentators, this includes the teaching of the Vedas together with the doctrines of revered teachers in the tradition - e.g., Kapila, etc.

9. See E.A. Welden, "The Samkhya Term, Linga," AJP. XXXI (Baltimore, 1910), pp. 445-459. He shows the relationship between linga used in the sense of "characteristic mark" and linga as used in linga-śarīra or "subtle body," etc. 10. Bhāsya on Kārikā V. 11. Paramārtha's Chinese version on Kārikā V. 12. STK on Kārikā V; cf. also YD, pp. 43-51. 13. Suryanarayana Sastri, Sāmkhyakārikā, op. cit., pp. 14-15.

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Classical Sāmkhya rejects any other means than these, mainly because other so-called means can be reduced to one of these three.14 It is important to realise that each one of these accepted means of knowledge functions separately and on different levels of experience. Perception obviously relates to experiences arising out of immediate contact with the objects of the senses. Inference (Kārikā VI) gives mediate knowledge which goes beyond mere perception, and inference by analogy gives knowledge of matters which are imperceptible. Reliable authority (Kārikā VI) gives knowledge concerning obscure matters which transcend even inference by analogy. Even though something is imperceptible, it does not necessarily follow that it is non-existent. In Kārika VII eight reasons are given why something may not be perceived.15 In Kārika VIII one of these reasons - i.e., sauksmya or "extreme subtlety" - is given as the factor which renders prakrti imperceptible. The existence of prakrti is realized, however, from its effects -i.e., buddhi, etc. (Kārikā VIII). Unfortunately, the Kārikā and its commentaries do not carry the discussion of the means of knowledge any further. Precisely what is meant by the threefold inference, for example, is not clear, nor is the role and function of reliable authority clear. To what degree the latter depends on the former is also unstated. Moreover, the reliance of classical Sāmkhya on the Vedas is unclear, although the lack of reference to the sacred scriptures in the Kārikā would tend to argue for a mini- mum of dependence. Reliable authority, therefore, is prob- ably used primarily with respect to the tradition of Samkhya teachers. In all of this, if one keeps in mind that classical Sāmkhya is primarily concerned with the problem of salvation from suffering, perhaps the lack of detailed treatments of the means of knowledge becomes more understandable. There were

14. See Bhāsya on Kārikā IV and STK on Kārikā V, etc. 15. The eight reasons are as follows : (1) because something is too far away; (2) because something is too close; (3) because of an injured sense-organ; (4) because of inattention; (5) because of extreme subtlety; (6) because of intervention (of an object between organ and object to be perceived); (7) because of suppression; (8) because of intermixture with what is similar.

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probably more detailed discussions of these kinds of problems, but such discussions did not receive great emphasis in the summaries of the doctrine.16

B. PRAKRTI, GUŅAS AND SATKĀRYAVĀDA In Kārikā III a brief summary of the Sāmkhya tattvas is set forth in which prakrti is used in two quite different senses.

Primordial nature (mūlaprakrti) is uncreated. The seven - mahat, etc. - are both created (vikrti) and creative (prakrti). The sixteen are created. purușa is neither created nor (creative.

We see in this verse, first of all, that the old eightfold prakrti is no longer considered as a unit. Mūlaprakrti refers to the avyakta which formerly functioned as the first of the eight prakrtis.17 Here, however, it is clearly distinguished from the other seven, and is referred to as "uncreated" or "unmade" (avikrti). The other seven prakrtis are now both created and creative (vikrti and prakrti). In other words, in addition to being creative, they are now conceived also as being products of the original mūlaprakti or avyakta. Rather than deriving the manifest world from eight creative principles as was the

16. For further discussions of the means of knowledge in classical Samkhya, see the following : Garbe, Die Samkhya Philosophie, op. cit., pp. 208-228; Keith, The Sāmkhya System, op. cit., pp. 87-89; Chakravarti, Origin and Development of the Samkhya, op. cit., pp. 171-196; Suryanarayana Sastri, Sāmkhyakārikā, op. cit., pp. 9-22. For a good discussion of the three- fold inference and its meaning in Indian thought, see A.B. Dhruva, "Tri- vidham Anumanam," Oriental Conference, 1919 Proceedings and Transactions (Poona : Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1922), pp. 251-280. For a good discussion of Samkhya means and theory of knowledge as it relates to Buddhism, see E. Frauwallner, "Die Erkenntnislehre des Klassichen Sāmkhya-Systems," WZKSO, Band II (Leiden, 1958), pp. 84-137; cf. also Frauwallner, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, op. cit., pp. 348 ff. Finally, for helpful discussions of problems of logic, epistemology, syllogism, etc. in all schools of Indian thought, see Karl Potter, Presuppositions of India's Philosophies (Englewood Cliffs, N. J. : Prentice-Hall, 1963), passim cf. also Garbe (trans., Sāmkhyapravacanabhāsya, I. 87 ff., op. cit., pp. 104 ff. 17, The eightfold prakrti included usually avyakta, buddhi, ahamkāra, and the five gross elements - e.g. Mbh. XII. 298, 10 ff. It should be noted here that classical Sāmkhya substitutes the five tanmātras for the five gross elements. This will be discussed further below.

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common doctrine in the proto-Sāmkhya period, classical Sām- khya derives the manifest world from an original or primordial nature. This mūlaprakrti, in addition to being called avyakta, is also called (in Kārikās XI, LVII, LXVIII, etc.) pradhāna (the "chief" one), a term originally used in the context of Yoga.18 Thus, we find prakrti being used in the sense of a kind of ultimate first principle, and its synonyms are avyakta and pradhāna. The second usage of prakrti appears to be simply as "creative" - i.e., buddhi, ahamkāra and the five tanmātras are prakrti because they are involved in the creation of the func- tioning senses, the mind, the motor functions and the gross elements. In some of the later Kārikās (LIX, LXIII etc.) prakrti appears also to be used synonymously with buddhi, but more on that problem later. This doctrine of mūlaprakrti probably represents the final outcome of carrying the doctrine of the eightfold prakrti under- stood in evolutionary terms to its logical conclusion. Origi- nally, we suggested that the eightfold prakrti probably goes back to the enumeration of levels of yogic awareness in such passages as Katha III. 10-11. We related this also to the pas- sages which derive the manifest world from the five gross ele- ments - e.g., Mbh. XII. 187. Later, these enumerations were related to a "vertical" theory of evolution, in which the tattvas were eventually traced to an original tattva.19 This "vertical" theory of emergence or evolution existed side by side with another theory of "horizontal" evolution -i.e., the successive bhavas of the buddhi as in Mbh. XII. 187. The Sāmkhyakārikā reflects a synthesis of these two theories.20 On the one hand, the "vertical" theory is the main doctrine which derives all tattvas from mūlaprakrti (Kārikās III, XXII. etc.). The “hori- zontal" theory, on the other hand, is incorporated in the doctrine of ahamkāra, which evolves or emerges successively as mind and the senses in its sāttvika form and as tanmātras and gross elements in its tāmasika form (Kārikā XXV).21 Up to this point we have-referred to mūlaprakrti or avyakta as "primordial nature." It is necessary now to examine the

18. Johnston, Early Sāmkhya, op. cit., p. 26. van Buitenen, "Studies in Sāmkhya (II)," op. cit., pp. 22-23. 20. van Buitenen, 19. "Studies in Sāmkhya (I)," 21. van Buitenen, "Studies in Sāmkhya (II)." op. cit., pp. 153-157.

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term more specifically. In Kārikā XI vyaktāvyakta is described as follows: it is characterized by the three gunas (triguna); undiscriminated (aviveki); objective (vişaya); general (sāmā- nya); non-conscious (acetana); and productive (prasavadharmi). In Kārikā X the vyakta -i.e., that which includes the twenty- tbree evolutes of avyakta - is described as follows : it is caused (hetumat); finite (anitya); non-pervasive (avyāpi); active (sakriya); plural (aneka); supported (āśrita); mergent (linga);22 composite (sāvayava); and dependent (paratantra). In this verse the avyakta or mūlaprakrti is said to be the opposite of these characteristics. Of these characteristics of mūlaprakrti by far the most important are the three gunas, for they pervade the entire manifest world from buddhi down to the gross elements. More- over, they make up the nature of mūlaprakrti. In Kārikās XII- XIV they are described as follows :

sattva - characterized by pleasure (priti) and illumina- tion (prakāśa); it is buoyant (laghu) and shining (prakāśaka). rajas - characterized by pain (apriti) and actuation (pravrtti) ; it is stimulating (upastambhaka) and moving (cala). tamas - characterized by indifference (vişāda) and res- traint (niyama); it is heavy (guru) and enveloping (varaņaka).

These gunas somehow subsist in mūlaprakrti, although the Kārikā never says specifically whether they are qualities of prakrti or actually constitute the nature of prakrti. The characterization of the gunas is primarily in terms of psychic states or affective conditions, but at times they are much more than this. In Kārika XXIII, for example, the sāttvika form of buddhi is said to make up the dharma, jňāna, virāga and aiśvarya bhavas- i.e., the conditions of "virtue," "knowledge" or "wisdom," "non-attachment," and "power" which impel the buddhi. The tamasa form of buddhi is said to make up the other four bhāvas. In Kārikā XXV the sāttvika form of ahamkāra

22. E.A. Welden, "The Samkhya Term, Linga."

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develops into mind and the senses, and the tāmasa form develops into the subtle elements and the gross elements. In each of these processes the rajasa form seems to function as an activator or that which brings about the various manifestations. Then in Kārika LIV sattva is said to predominate in the world of the gods, tamas in the sub-human order, and rajas in the human order. Clearly in all of these verses the gunas are much more than psychic states or conditions. Here again it is obvious that the Sāmkhyakārika has brought about a synthesis of older doctrines. The doctrine of gunas as psychic states or conditions is combined with the gunas which play a role in the process of emergence or evolution. We noticed the former doctrine in such passages as the Carakasamhitā and the "Pañcasikhavākya," and the latter doctrine in the text reconstituted by van Buitenen from Mbh. XII. 187, etc.23 Dasgupta to some degree captures the significance of this synthesis in the Kārika with his trans- lation of gunas as "feeling-substances."24 His tendency to see the gunas as types of "reals," however, goes beyond the signi- ficance of the term in the Kārikā, and Dasgupta himself admits this in his exposition.25 Garbe and Keith likewise tend to interpret the gunas as material constituents or "reals," although both admit the ambiguity of the Kārika and the commentaries on this point.26 The problem with all of these expositions is the inclination to give the Sāmkhya a naturalistic interpret- ation. Here again it is necessary to keep in mind the basic presupposition of the system. Classical Sāmkhya is primarily concerned with the salvation or freedom of purusa, and it is in the context of this fundamental concern that all of its doc- trines must be interpreted. Therefore, it will be possible to offer an interpretation of the gunas only when we have examined the function and role of purusa in the system. Suffice it to say at this point that according to the Kārika the gunas include two levels of meaning : (1) as psychic or moral conditions - i.e., sattva as pleasure, goodness, etc .; rajas as pain, passion, etc., and tamas as indifference, dullness; and (2) as factors

23. See supra, Chapter II. 24. Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy, op. cit., I, p. 243. 25. Ibid., pp. 223-224. 26. Garbe, Die Samkhya Philosophie, op. cit., pp. 272 ff., and Keith, The Sāmkhya System, op. cit., p. 91.

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involved in the unmanifest and manifest world - i.e., sattva as illumination, thought, etc .; rajas as activation, energy, etc .; and tamas as heaviness, etc. These gunas interact with one another, and the various conditions of the manifest world depend upon the dominance of one or another of these factors (Kārikā XII). Intimately related with the mūlaprakrti, they function for the sake of the purusa "like a lamp" (pradipavat) (Kārikā XIII). The Bhāsya, STK, YD, Jaya., and Para- martha's Chinese version all interpret this simile in terms of the joint functioning of the wick, oil and flame of a lamp in producing light.27 Even though each has a different make-up, they co-operate in the production of light. Closely related to the doctrine of the gunas is the notion of causation in classical Samkhya. In our discussion of the means of knowledge we mentioned that, according to Kārikā VIII, mūlaprakrti or pradhāna is imperceptible but that its exist- ence may be inferred from its effects -i.e., buddhi, etc. Then, referring to Kārikā X, we noticed that mūlaprakrti is charac- terized as being the opposite of vyakta - i.e., mūlaprakrti is un- caused, eternal, one, and so forth. In Kārikā XI, however, both mūlaprakrti and vyakta are said to be made up of the three gunas, to be undiscriminated, objective, general, unconscious and* productive. These verses all relate to the classical Sāmkhya theory of causation known as satkāryavāda. The term satkārya literally means "existent effect," but in classical Sāmkhya it implies much more than this literal meaning. The term sat- kārya appears in Kārika IX, and five reasons are given to explain the phenomenon.

(1) because of the non-productivity of non-being; (2) because of the need for an (appropriate) material cause;

27. See Bhāsya, STK, YD, Jaya. Paramārtha's Chinese version, and Mātharavrtti, on Kārikā XIII. Commentators vary in interpretation of arthatas some taking it as purusārtha, some as simply "joint purpose;" cf., Suryanarayana Sastri, Sāmkhyakārikā, op. cit., pp. 32-33. For discussion of guņas in later Sāmkhya see Garbe (trans.) 'Sāmkhyapravacanabhāsya, I, 128 ff., op. cit., pp. 144 ff .; and Garbe (ed. and trans. ), Sāmkhya-Sūtra-Vrtti, op. cit., p. 72 ff.

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(3) because of the impossibility of all things coming from all things; (4) because something can only produce what it is capable of producing; (5) because of the nature of the cause (or, because the effect is non-different from the cause).28

As Keith has suggested, these reasons can be reduced to three.29 First of all, non-being obviously can produce or do nothing. Second, the effect is made up of the same material as the cause, there being a difference only with respect to the appearance or modification of the material. Third, a specific cause is able to produce only a specific effect. With these reasons the author of the Karika is suggesting. not only that everything in the manifest world must have an existing cause but also that the effect pre-exists in the cause. That is, the effect is nothing new, it is simply a modification of that which is already present in the cause. There is little precedent in the older texts for this doctrine of satkāryavāda in the sense of the pre- existence of the effect in the cause, although we did suggest that Chän. Up. VI may represent one of the earlier passages which sets forth the notion that being can only come from being.30 Further evidence with respect to the problem of causation in classical Sāmkhya is available in Kārikās XV and XVI. In these verses avyakta is called the cause of the manifest world because of the "finiteness of specific things" in the world (bhedānām parimānāt) which require a cause; because of the "homogeneity" or "sameness" of the finite world (samanvayāt); because of the "power" or "potency" (of the cause) which the process of emergence or evolution implies (saktitah pravrtter); because of the "separation" or "distinction" between the cause

28. Sanskrit text of Kārikā IX : asadakaraņād upādānagrahaņāt sarvasambhavābhāvāt, śaktasya śakya-karaņāt kāraņabhāvāc ca satkāryam. 29. Keith, The Sāmkhya System, op. cit., pp. 89-90. 30. See supra, Chapter II, (1) Ancient Speculations. For further dis- cussion of satkāryavāda see Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy, op. cit, I, pp. 254-258; Garbe, Die Sāmkhya Philosopie, op. cit., pp. 293 ff., Keith, The Sāmkhya System. op. cit., pp. 89 ff. For discussion in later Sāmkhya, see Garbe (trans.), Sāmkhyapravacanabhāsya, I. 115 ff., op. cit., pp. 132 ff.

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and its effect (with respect to modification or appearance) (kāraņakāryavibhāgāt); and because of the "undividedness" or "uniformity" of the entire world (avibhāgād vaiśvarūpyasya).31 The remainder of Kārika XVI explains how the avyakta functions.

... pravartate trigunataḥ samudayāc ca, pariņāmataḥ salilavat pratipratiguņāśrayaviseşāt. ... (avyakta) functions because of or by the interaction of the three gunas, modified like water, due to the specific nature abiding in the respective gunas.32

The avyakta, which is the cause of the manifest world, exercises its creative functioning by means of the interaction of the gunas, which exist throughout the manifest world. The diversity in the phenomenal world is due to the various manifestations of each of these gunas, which are continually undergoing change and transformation (pariņāma). Ultimately these gunas are to be traced back to the avyakta, and like the avyakta they are uncaused, eternal, etc. The simile of the water, according to all commentators, is to be interpreted in terms of the multi- plicity of manifestation - i.e., water as rain, juice, etc. - which manifestations nevertheless are ultimately one reality.33 For purposes of exposition we have referred to mūla- prakṛti, the guņas, and satkāryavāda separately, but it has become obvious that such a separation is hardly justified. The doctrines are inextricably involved with one another, and one must take them together in order to get the full force of the Sāmkhya point of view. When taken together they represent the entire manifest and unmanifest world from mūlaprakrti down to the gross elements. They include everything except the purusa (Kārikā XI), but this one exception makes all the difference. As we will see in the next section, without the presence of puruşa, the terms mūlaprakṛti, guņa, satkāryavāda, etc., would be

31. Sanskrit text of Kārika XV : bhedānām parimāņāt samanvayāt saktitah pravrtteś ca, kāraņakāryavibhāgād avibhāgād vaiśvar ūpyasya.

XV-XVI. 32. Cf. Bhāsya, STK, Paramārtha's Chinese version, etc., on Kārikās

33. Ibid. Bhāsya, STK. etc., relate reference to gunas as the state of equilibrium in mūlaprakrti before evolution begins, but this is not stated in the verse.

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quite meaningless. The mūlaprakrti can only be known by means of its effects (Karika VIII) -i.e., buddhi, etc. - but the effects could never be cognized without the presence of purusa. The gunas bring about the diversity of the manifest world and are the creative factors of the avyakta, but their activity and transformation cannot begin to occur without the presece of puruşa. Similarly, causation understood in terms of satkārya- vāda can only take place when purusa is present. Apart from puruşa mūlaprakrti is simply a plenitude of undifferentiated being. It cannot be characterized as "stuff", for such a notion, whether understood as subtle or gross "stuff," can only arise when purusa is present. Thus, it is extremely difficult to find a word which adequately translates the term mūlaprakrti.34 The usual translations such as "nature" or "matter" are useful as general designations, so long as they are not confused with our Western notions of nature and matter, which freguently imply more than the Samkhya notion would allow. Although awk- ward, perhaps a better translation is something like "an undiffe- rentiated plenitude of being" for the term mūlaprakrti- i.e., the simple fact or presence of being apart from consciousness. Later in this chapter we will return to this problem and offer a more detailed discussion.

C. PURUȘA In Chapter II we indicated that the term purusa is an ancient one, going back even to the Rig and Atharva Vedas. It is frequently used in the ancient texts as a term for mortal man - e.g., RV. X. 97, 4-5. It is also used in speculative con- texts, one of the more interesting of which is purusa as a kind of cosmic man in RV. X. 90. There are also some other interesting speculative uses of the term in the Atharva Veda, especially in such hymns as AV. X. 2 and X. 7. In the Upa- nisads the term is often used synonymously with atman. In most of the texts of the proto-Sāmkhya period purusa is used as a term for the self or Self along with a number of other terms including ātman, jīva, bhūtātman, ksetrajña, etc. In that period

34. The term prakrti is from root, kr together with prefix pra, mean- ing "making or placing before or at first." The term mūla simply means "root," "base," "bottom," etc.

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no one term had yet emerged as a technical designation for the self or Self in the sämkhyayoga traditions, although the Upani- șadic atman is by far the most frequent conception.35 Towards the end of this second period, however, we noted the emergence of a distinctive samkhyayoga tradition which placed great em- phasis on knowing and usually referred to the self as ksetrajña ("knower of the field"), but even in these passages the notion of a cosmic Self continues to appear. There is a more pro- nounced dualism in these later passages, however, and we suggested that the later classical Sāmkhya notion of purusa probably developed from this distinctive sāmkhyayoga tradition. In the classical Samkhya a much more sophisticated and refined notion of self appears. All of the older terms have dropped away, and purusa has become the technical term. There is one possible reference to the older ksetrajña in Kārikā II in the phrase, vyaktāvyaktajñavijūānāt. Here, vyaktāvyakta refers to prakrti or the older idea of ksetra ("fileld"), and the jña which stands for purusa is probably the older ksetrajña.36 Before attempting to interpret the significance of purusa in classical Sāmkhya, it is first necessary to pull together the key passages in the Kārikā which refer to the term. First of all, in Kārikā III purușa is said to be neither prakrti (creative") nor vikrti ("created") : na prakrtir na vikrtih purusah. That is, purusa is not to be thought of as being organically connected with the other twenty-four principles. This idea is given further elucidation in Kārikā XI at which point purusa is said to be opposite from both vyakta and avyakta - i.e., purușa is not charac- terized as being made up of the three gunas ; it is, discriminating, subjective, specific, conscious and non-productive. In other words, it exists distinct from the manifest and unmanifest world. It is a reality of a completely different order. Moreover, according to Kārikā XIX, because the purușa is apart from that which is made up of the three gunas - i.e.,

35. See supra, Chapter II, (1) Ancient Speculations; and (2) Proto- Sämkhya Speculations. 36. Cf. Bhāsya, STK, Paramārtha's Chinese version, etc., on Kārikā II. For other discussions of the nature of purusa in'classical Sāmkhya and later Sāmkhya, see Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 355.390; Keith, The Sāmkhya System, op. cit., pp. 92 ff .; cf. also Garbe (trans.), Sāmkhyapravacanabhāsya, I. 139 ff., op. cit., pp. 151 ff.

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it is apart from the entire manifest and unmanifest world - it is characterized as being, (1) a witness (sākșitvam). (2) possessed of isolation or freedom (kaivalyam) . (3) indifferent (mādhyasthyam). (4) a spectator or one who sees (drastrtvam). (5) and inactive (akartrbhāva).37

The purusa, according to this view, does or adds nothing to the mūlaprakrti and its manifestations. It is simply present in the world and sees or witnesses the modifications of the world. Moreover, it is not determined by the world. It is isolated or completely free (kaivalya). The reasons for postulating the existence of purusa are given in Kārikā XVII. They are as follows : (1) because aggregations or combinations exist for another (sanghātāparārthatvāt). (2) because (this other) must be apart or opposite from the three guņas, etc. (trigunādiviparyayāt). (3) because (this other) (must be) a superintending power or control (adhişthānāt). (4) because of the existence or need of an enjoyer' (bhoktr- bhāvāt). (5) because there is functioning or activity for the sake of freedom or isolation (kaivalyārtham pravrtteś ca).38

These reasons can be reduced to two assertions. On the one hand, purusa must exist because of the fact of consciousness in the world. Every distinction in the phenomenal world is for something, and that something is purusa. Without purusa there would only be an undifferentiated mass or plentitude of being. On the other hand, this purusa exists apart from the world, for it is observed that this purusa can be and is free. If it were not apart from the world, then it would be determined by the world. Freedom and release would be impossible.

37. Sanskrit text of Kārika XIX : tasmāc ca viparyāsāt siddham sākşitvam asya puruşasya, kaivalyam madhyasthyam dastrtvam akartrbhāvaś ca. 38. Sanskrit text of Kārika XVII : sanghā nparārthatvāt triguņādiviparyayād adhişthānāt, purușc' sti bhoktrbhāvāt kaivalyārtham pravrtteś ca.

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In addition to these characterizations of the purusa in classical Sāmkhya, there is yet another crucial factor in the conception, and that is the doctrine of the plurality of purusas. In the older samkhyayoga traditions we found the notion of Self understood usually in cosmic terms. Generally throughout the Mokșadharma and Gitā, for example, the dominant .conception of the Self is very much like the old Upanisadic notion of ātman.39 In classical Sāmkhya, however, the purusa is said to be plural. In Kārikā XVIII this doctrine of the plurality of purusas is clearly set forth. jananamaraņakaraņānām pratiniyamādayugapatpravrttes ca, purusabahutvam siddham traigunyaviparyayāc caiva. The plurality of purusas is established. (1) because of the diversity of births, deaths and faculties; (2) because of actions or functions (that take place) at different times; (3) and because of differences in the proportions of the three gunas (in different entities). With this doctrine of the plurality of purusas the classical Sāmkhya has taken a major step away from the older doctrines of a cosmic Self.40 On the one hand, the doctrine tends to underscore the dualism of the system. No longer is it possible to derive man and the world from a cosmic consciousness or spirit. In classical Samkhya the world exists as a real world over against the individual purusa. All manifestations of the phenomenal world, althougn dependent on the presence of purusa, neverthe- less have their source or origin within mūlaprakrti - i.e., apart from the purusa. On the other hand, the doctrine of the plura- lity of purusas tends to underscore the concreteness of the pro- blem of salvation. The basic problem in classical Sāmkhya is suffering; not the abstract suffering of a cosmic entity, but the concreteness of individual suffering. The purușa is individual but not personal. The personal ego or self-awareness in classical Sāmkhya is included in the notions of buddhi, ahamkāra and manas, which are the first

39. See supra, Chapter II, section (2) Proto-Sāmkhya Speculations. 40. Cf. Bhāsya, STK, Paramārtha's Chinese version, etc., on Kārikā XVIII. But cf. also Vijñānabhiksu's attempt to reconcile individual and cosmic puruşa in Garbe (trans.), Sāmkhyapravacanabhāsya, I. 92 ff., and I. 149 ff., op. cit., pp. 113 ff. and pp. 160 ff.

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evolutes of mulaprakrti when the latter has come into the pre- sence of purusa. Thus, what commonly is considered to be self-awareness or ego is understood in classical Sāmkhya to be other than the purusa, although purusa's presence is re- quired in order for these dimensions of human experience to appear. The purusa in itself, then, is apart from all know- ledge, emotion or self-awareness. It is likewise apart from all action and willing. As was mentioned above, it is simply a witness, a spectator.It is in a condition of isolation or free- dom (kawvalya) from all of the manifestations of the world, both mental and physical. One possible way of characterizing the purusa in itself is to suggest that it is simply the fact of con- sciousness. Impersonal yet individual, it is the fact of man's experience which renders him able to become a man. It is the fact of man's experience which is apart from all of his feel- ings, inclinations, impulses, etc. It is the fact of man's experi- ence which provides the basis for his freedom precisely because it is not a part of or determined by the world. By referring to puruşa as the simple fact of consciousness apart from all thought, feelings, etc., this also brings to mind such terms as. "transparent" or "translucent." It is only by the "light" of purusa that one sees the world, and it is only the fact of the world which renders purusa aware of itself. The fact of consciousness and the fact of the world are two irreducible realities in constant interplay with one another, and it is this interplay which must now occupy our attention.

D. ASSOCIATION AND INTERACTION OF PRAKRTI AND PURUȘA At the beginning of this chapter we suggested that the classical Sāmkhya begins its analysis from within the realm of concrete human experience - i.e., the fact of consciousness as suffering in the context of the world. We then proceeded to examine the understanding of the means of knowledge in classical Sāmkhya followed by an analysis of mūlaprakrti in itself (and the corollary doctrines of the guņas and satkāryavāda) and purușa in itself. We now return to our starting-point and take up the question of the association and interaction of prakrti and purusa.41

41. In this respect the present writer is following the method of the Kārika which first discusses prakrti and purusa separately, and then proceeds to discuss their association and interaction : Karikas X-XXI.

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Little attention is given in the Kārikā as to how the two basic principies - i.e., prakrti and purusa - come together, although the text does tell us they are together and what happens when they come together. With respect to the problem of how they come together, one can only suggest that the author of the Kārika evidently never asked that question. He simply assumes from the beginning that they are together, and his analysis includes only a description of the mutual interaction of the principles together with a description of the means to attain isolation or freedom. Here again, of course, it is neces- sary to keep in mind the purpose of the text. The task is not to explain how prakrti and purusa first came together. The task, rather, is to describe the nature of human existence and suffering in view of the fact that prakrti and purusa are together, and then to offer a solution. In other Samkhya texts, of course, there may have been attempts to explain how prakrti and purusa first came into contact with one another, but the Kārika itself offers no illumination on this point. In the late Sāmkhyaprava- canasūtra the point is made that the association of prakrti and purusa has no beginning, but can have an end.42 This assertion does not appear in the Kārikā, however, and one can only con- clude that such issues were not the main concern of the author. We learn from Kārikā LXII that classical Sāmkhya views the relationship of prakrti and purusa only in terms of proximity or association.

tasmān na badhyate'ddhā na mucyate nāpi samsarati kaścit, samsarati badhyate mucyate ca nānāśrayā prakrtih.

No one therefore, is bound, no one released, likewise no one transmigrates. (Only) prakrti in its various forms transmigrates, is bound and is released.

That is, there is an absolute separation between prakrti and purusa. The purusa is never in fact bound to the world. It

42. Garbe (ed. and trans,), Sāmkhya-Sūtra-Vrtti, I. 158-159 and VI. 67-70, op. cit., pp. 85 ff. and pp. 307 ff .; cf. also Garbc (trans.), Sāmkhyapravacanabhāsya, op. cit., pp. 174 ff. and pp. 367 ff.

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only appears to be bound due to the lack of discrimination. Thus, prakrti and purusa are always only in proximity to one another, never in actual contact. This is a puzzling notion if one thinks of prakrti and purusa as two things. As we have tried to show, however, prakrti and purușa are two realities of a completely different order. The one-i.e., mūlaprakrti -includes in itself the potentiality of all things in the manifest world, both mental and physical. The purusa, however, as we suggest- ed above, is something like the simple fact of consciousness. Hence, it is not a thing of the manifest world, but rather a presence in the midst of the world. The purusa is in the world but not of the world. When viewed from this perspective the statement that purusa is neither bound nor released is more intelligible, for by its very nature it could not be bound. Because of the proximity, a kind of interplay or dialectic occurs between prakrti and puruşa. The mūlaprakṛti begins to undergo transformation or modification which issues in the manifest world, and the purusa begins to witness this trans- formation. Each of the two principles appears to take on the characteristics of the other. In Kārika XX this interplay or dialectic is described.

tasmāt tatsamyogād acetanam cetanāvad iva lingam, guņakartṛtve'pi tathā karteva bhavaty udāsīnaḥ.

Because of the proximity (or association) (of the two - i.e., prakrti and purușa), the unconscious one appears as if characterized by consciousness. Similarly, the indifferent one appears as if characterized by activity because of the activities of the three gunas.

This interaction brings about the creation of the manifest world. It should be noted, however, that purusa is not a direct cause of the appearance of the manifest world.43 The purusa is simply present, and this presence functions as a kind of catalyst in releasing the casual process of transformation in the mūla- prakrti. Because of the presence of puruşa the mūlaprakrti and its transformations appear as if they were conscious. Because

43. See supra, Section B, prakṛti, guņas and satkāryavāda.

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of the presence of mūlaprakrti and its transformations the purusa appears as if it were active, etc. In other words, the mūla- prakrti and its transformations appear as what they are not, and the purusa appears as what it is not. A kind of double negation occurs. Yet it is interesting to observe that both principles can only be what they are by appearing as what they are not. That is, prakrti gets active and manifests what it is . capable of manifesting by means of the presence of what it appears not to be. Similarly, the purusa is able to become a witness and to see what it is only by means of the presence of what it appears not to be. The purpose of this interaction or dialectic, according to Kārikā XXI, is to bring about the salvation or release of purușa.

puruşasya darśanārtham kaivalyārtham tathā pradhānasya, pangvandhavad ubhayor api samyogas tatktah sargah.

The proximity (or association) of the two, which is like that of a blind man and a lame man, is for the purpose of seeing the pradhāna (or prakti) and for the purpose of the isolation of the purusa. From this (association) creation proceeds.

In this verse purusa and prakrti co-operate like the blind man and the lame man, each one benefiting from the capacities of the other. The prakrti becomes active by being seen by the purușa, and the purusa is finally released by the knowledge of itself which arises in its opposite. Actually, of course, only the purusa is really benefited in this interaction, for only purusa is free.44 The prakrti becomes active, but its activity ultimately is only for the purpose of generating the discriminative realiza- tion that it is not purusa. It can only do this, however, because of the presence of purusa. When this discrimination is achieved, prakrti is no longer a relevant notion, for it no longer appears as consciousness. This idea is given clearer expression in Kārikā LVI.

44. See Kärikā LX in which it is stated that the prakrti is not ultimately benefited by the interaction or dialectic.

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ity eşa prakrtikṛto mahadādiviseşabhūtaparyantah, pratipuruşavimokşārtham svārtha iva parārtha ārambhah.

This creation, brought about by prakrti - from mahat (or buddhi) down to the specific gross objects - is for the purpose of the release of every purusa; (this is done) for the sake of another, as if it were for her own (benefit).

Here it is clear that all of the manifest and unmanifest world functions for the sake of the purusa. This implies almost a kind of teleology in prakrti, but here again the dialectic or interplay must be kept in mind. The only reason that prakrti functions at all is because of the presence of purusa. In one sense, then, purusa is responsible for the conditions which will provide its own release. Similarly the presence of purusa is also responsible for the fact of suffering, for it is only when purusa is in proximity to prakrti that the conditions arise which lead to suffering. The purusa can only be a witness when there is something to witness, but, when it witnesses the mani- festations of prakrti, suffering arises. This happens because purua is little more than what it is not. Because of its trans- parency or translucent nature it functions only in terms of what it is not. In other words, consciousness is always con- sciousness of something. To be conscious of something is to be aware of that something. Consciousness then appears as the something of which it is conscious, in this case the world. Therefore, the fact of suffering arises because the purusa appears as what it is not. Yet, as was mentioned above, this very pro- cess is an important stage in the development of the realization of an isolated or free consciousness, for purusa can only become what it is by means of what it appears not to be. This idea is given some clarification in Kārikā LV.

tatra jarāmaraņakrtam duḥkham prāpnoti cetanah puruşah, lingasyāvinivrttes tasmād duḥkham svabhāvena.

parusa, which is consciousness, attains there the suffering made by decay and death; until deliverance of the subtle body; therefore, suffering is of the nature of things.

That is, suffering arises because the purusa appears as what

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it is not - i.e., as part of the manifest world of suffering and death. Yet it is the nature or function of purusa to so appear, and, as a result, suffering is of the nature of things (svabhāva).45 Thus, the emergence or evolution of the manifest world out of mūlaprakrti is for the sake of the purusa (purusārtha). The term puruşārtha ("for the sake of the purusa") appears in Kārikās XXXI, XLII, LXIII and LXIX, and is the doctrine in classi- cal Samkhya which explains why creation occurs. In the Yogasūtra the reason given for the emergence or evolution of the manifest world is avidya ("ignorance").46 In this respect there is a fundamental difference between Sāmkhya and Yoga, for the appearance of the manifest world in classical Samkhya is much more than the result of ignorance. It is the result, rather, of the very nature of purua which must become what it is not in order ultimately to become what it is.47 The manifest world appears puruşārtha.

E. EMERGENCE AND FUNCTIONING OF TATTVAS Having discussed the basic principles of prakrti and purusa and their interaction or relationship with one another, it is neces- sary now to examine the process of emergence or evolution of the manifest world. Throughout our discussion it is impor- tant to keep in mind the fact of the presence or proximity of purusa, for without that presence the manifest world would never appear. The purusa, which is consciousness, witnesses every level of the manifest world, and the manifest world does what it does because of or for the sake of purusa. At the same time, however, it must be stressed that the manifest world is' not derived from purusa.48 It is derived, rather, from the mūlaprakrti, which is characterized by the three gunas and which

45. For good discussion of term svabhāva in older proto-Sāmkhya speculations, see Johnston, Early Samkhya, op. cit., pp. 67-72, 75, 77, 83-86. 46. Yogasutra II. 23-27 in J.H. Woods (trans.), The Yoga-System of Patanjali, op. cit., pp. 160-172. See also Johnston, Early Sāmkhya, op. cit., p. 34. 47. For further discussions of the interaction of prakrti and purusa, see Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy, op. cit., I. pp. 245 ff .; Garbe, Die Samkhya Philosophie, op. cit., pp. 284 ff .; Keith, The Samkhya System, op. cit., pp. 93 ff. For views in later Sāmkhya see Garbe (ed. and trans.), Samkhya-Sūtra-Vrtti, II, 11 ff., op. cit., pp. 95 ff. 48. See preceding discussion.

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emerges or evolves itself in terms of satkāryavāda - i.e., trans- formation, or modification of itself, but always in terms of itself. In other words, the fundamental dualism of Sāmkhya carries over or applies to every phase or dimension of the manifest world. Thus, the world is understood primarily in terms of its relationship to purusa. Although the classical Sāmkhya refuses to reduce the world to consciousness, nevertheless, the world is understood in terms of consciousness-i.e., purușārthatā. In this respect the classical Samkhya views the world in instru- mental terms. There is little or no concern for the world in and of itself. There is no attempt in the Sāmkhya to map out the intelligibility of the world for its own sake. The world, rather, even though it is quite real, is a kind of tool or instrument to be used by the purusa for achieving salvation. As we pointed out above, however, purusa does nothing. Accord- ing to classical Sāmkhya it is only a witness, and thus the world is only "used" by the purusa in the sense that it (the world) becomes that which is witnessed. The inquiry into the principles which make up the world, therefore, has the purpose of isolating that in the world which is not part of the world - i.e., purusa. By knowing what the manifest (and unmanifest) world is or includes, one can learn what it is not or what it does not include. In other words, the purusa is everything which is not prakrti, and prakrti is everything which is not purusa. This discriminative'realization is the ultimate goal of Samkhya for when this "knowledge" arises, suffering ceases. At that point one has achieved the realization that purusa is radically distinct from prakrti and, thus, is isolated or free.49 To achieve this ultimate goal of the isolation of purusa, the classical Samkhya sets forth a rather subtle analysis of that which makes up the manifest and unmanifest world.50 It attempts to set forth the basic structures and forces which make the world what it is. Access to the world, however, is only by means of the presence of purusa, and since the purusa is indivi- dual (yet impersonal) the world is understood primarily in terms of the individual. In other words, the world is compre- hended in terms of how the purusa witnesses it. This explains

49. See infra under F. Discrimination and Release. 50. Ibid.

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why the principles (tattvas) in the Kārikā are expressed usually in terms of psychological rather than cosmological categories. This is not to suggest, however, that the classical Sāmkhya has no cosmology. In Kārikās LIII-LIV, for example, some kind of cosmology seems to be implied, although it is impossible from the context to say what the theory was. Moreover, in such texts as the Puranas, which are influenced by Samkhya terminology, cosmology is one of the main concerns.51 This led Frauwallner in his interpretation of the classical Sāmkhya to use the Purānas as sources for reconstructing the Sāmkhya theories on cosmology.52 In the Kārika, however, the basic tattvas or principles are analyzed mainly from the point of view of the individual. Little attention is given to cosmological implications, and one can only conclude that such concerns were secondary in the mind of the author.53 The prime em- phasis in the Kārikā is on the structures or forces operating or functioning in the individual, the "knowledge" of which will lead to isolation (kaivalya). When we say, however, that the Kārikā analyzes the principles or tattvas in terms of psychological cate- gories, we do not mean experimental investigation or scientific research of the psyche We mean, rather, that the world is understood primarily from the point of view of the individual, witnessing purusa. The analysis of the world in classical Sām- khya is in terms of how the world appears to the individual consciousness. In one sense, then, the classical Sāmkhya ana- lysis is a description of what consciousness sees. Yet again, however, one gets caught up in the dialectic, for the description of what consciousness sees does not occur or is not performed by consciousness. The description, rather, takes place in that which reflects consciousness or in that which consciousness is conscious of - i.e., the buddhi, etc., according to classical Sāmkhya.

51. For good discussions of Samkhya terminology in Purānas, Manu, etc., see Garbe, Die Sāmkhya Philosophie, op. cit., pp. 52-54 and 60-65; and Gonda, Die Religionen Indiens, op. cit., pp. 54-57 and 68 ff. 52. Frauwallner, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, pp. 358-361 and see Appendix D. op. cit.,

52. Cf. Keith, The Sāmkhya System, op. cit., pp. 97 ff.

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With these general considerations in mind, let us now take up the specific categories of Sāmkhya. In Kārika XXII the basic principles or tattvas of the Sämkhya are set forth together with their relationship to one another.

From prakrti (emerges) the great one (mahat or buddhi); from that (comes) ahamkāra; from that (comes) the group of sixteen. Moreover, from five of the sixteen (come) the five gross elements.

This verse serves as an introduction to a long series of verses which deal with the emergence and functioning of the princi- ples (XXIII-XXXVIII). It is obvious from the verse that two kinds of emergence take place. The prakrti or mūlaprakrti, when in proximity to purusa, undergoes transformation, and from this transformation buddhi appears. As the transform- ation or modification continues, the ahamkāra emerges or comes forth from the buddhi. Up to this point the emergence or evo- lution is "vertical", each emergent appearing successively from its prior principle. From ahamkara, however, the "group of sixteen" emerges, and this group includes manas, the five senses, the five organs of action, and the five tanmātras or subtle elements (Kārikās XXV-XXVII). The emergence or evolu- tion of the sixteen, however, is not "vertical." It is, rather, "horizontal" - i.e., ahamkāra becomes or is transformed into mind, senses, subtle elements, etc. In other words, sixteen of the Samkhya evolutes emerge or come forth out of various transformations of ahamkara. Finally, from five of these sixteen - i.e., from the five tanmātras (Kārikā XXXVIII) - the five gross elements come forth or appear. As we have men- tioned at several points, the "vertical" side of the theory of emergence or evolution appears to go back to the old eightfold prakrti and back to the stages of yogic awareness in such pass- ages as Katha Up., III. 10-11. The "horizontal" side of the theory appears to go back to such passages as Chān. Up. VI and BAUp. 1. 2, etc., which describe the emergence of a tripartite creation from an original principle. With respect to the latter we recall also the "horizontal" theory of the emergence of bhävas in Text A of Mbh. XII. 187, etc. Furthermore, the

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term ahamkāra has probably been derived from some of the creation theories in the oldest Upanisads, as we suggested in Chapter II following van Buitenen.54 Its use in Chān. Up. VII. 25 would certainly support this idea.55 Even the buddhi in classical Sāmkhya seems to recall some old cosmological notions, for in Kārikā XXII and elsewhere it is referred to as mahat ("the great one"). Keith pointed out long ago that the notion of buddhi or mahat probably goes back to the old cosmo- logical idea of the creative principle entering his creation and becoming the first-born of creation.56 Thus, the classical Samkhya theory of emergence is a derivative and composite scheme made up of older cosmological notions, together with theories or notions arising from the descriptions of the stages of yogic awareness. Following this general characterization of the process of emergence or evolution in Kārika XXII, the author then takes up each phase or level of the process. From the discussion in Kārikās XXIII-XXXVIII it is clear that the analysis is directed or oriented with respect to the individual. The possible cosmic function or relevance of the evolutes or emergents is scarcely hinted at, although as we said above, many of the terms of the Sāmkhya analysis are taken from old cosmological theories. It appears from these verses that the classical Sāmkhya is inter- preting formerly macrocosmic notions in microcosmic terms. Just as the classical Samkhya reduced or transposed the old cosmic Self into the individual purusa, so it appears that classical Samkhya has similarly transformed the old cosmological theo- ries.57 Undoubtedly this latter transformation is directly related to the former. Since the prime concern is now with the individual purua, it follows that the comprehension of the mani- fest world should be understood primarily in terms of the individual's orientation in the world. Here again it must be stressed that the description of the manifest world is inextricably tied up with the presence of the individual purusa as witness. When puruşa is present, the prakṛti or mūlaprakrti immediately

54. van Buitenen, "Studies in Sāmkhya (II)," op. cit., pp. 22 ff. 55. There, ahamkara is used in an obviously cosmological context; see supra, Chapter II, (1) Ancient Speculations. 56. Keith, The Sāmkhya System, op, cit., pp. 9 ff. 57. Cf. van Buitenen, "Studies in Sāmkhya (II)." loc. cit.

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undergoes transformation and becomes manifest. What is witnessed by the purusa is the manifest world. The unmanifest world (avyakta or mūlaprakṛti) is not witnessed, and thus in classical Samkhya it is only an inference from that which is witnessed - i.e., the manifest world, which appears to purusa. Because purusa is not the source of what appears to it, classical Sāmkhya infers that the source is avyakta or mūlaprakrti, which potentially must contain or include everything in the manifest world with the exception of consciousness. As soon as the unmanifest becomes manifest, however, it is primarily indivi- dual, for from Kārika XX we know that the manifest world appears immediately as if it were consciousness - i.e., as if it were purusa. Similarly purusa appears as if it were active - i.e., as if it were the manifest world. Thus, from the point of view of experience, the world is understood in terms of the individual purușa - i.e., purușārthatā. In other words, the tendency in the Kārikā to interpret the principles or tattvas from an individual point of view is no accident. Given the conception of the indi- vidual purușa in classical Sāmkhya, the explanation or descrip- tion of the tattvas from the point of view of individual conscious- ness is the most natural or logical procedure. buddhi. The first evolute or emergent of mūlaprakrti and, thus, the first principle which is vyakta, "manifest," is the buddhi. Because it is vyakta or "manifest," it is caused, finite, non-pervasive, active, plural, etc., all of which characteristics are common to everything that is vyakta or "manifest," accord ing to Kārikā X. A more precise characterization of buddhi is given in Kārikā XXIII. buddhi is (characterized by) ascertainment or determination (adhyavasāya). Virtue (dharma), knowledge (jñāna), non- attachment (virāga), and possession of power (aiśvarya), are its sāttvika form. Its tāmasa form is the opposite (of these four.) In the Bhäsya the following synonyms are given for buddhi : mahat ("the great one"), āsuri ("demonic"), mati ("under- standing" or "thought" or "inclination"), khyāti ("fame" or "perception"), jñāna ("knowledge") and prajñā ("insight" or "wisdom").58 Some of these characteristics - i.e., mahat and

58. For good discussion of these synonyms see Colebrooke-Wilson version of the Bhāsya on Kārikā XXIII. op. cit., pp. 85-91.

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āsuri - suggest the original cosmic significance of the term, but the other characteristics point in the direction of the individual.59 In the Kārikā itself, buddhi is characterized as being adhyava- sāya. The term is from the root sa or si meaning "to bind," together with the prefixes adhi and ava. It can mean "attempt," "effort," "exertion," "perseverance," etc. A slightly different form of the word appears also with reference to buddhi in Gita II. 41.60 There the term is uyavasāya and is used in the sense of one whose buddhi is controlled or properly directed. According to the Gitã passage, the opposite is one whose buddhi is avyava- sāya or "not controlled" or "not resolute." In addition, accord- ing to this Kārikā (XXIII), the buddhi includes the eight bhāvas, the "dispositions" or "conditions" which determine the style of life of the human being (Kārika XLIII). Four of the bhāvas (dharma, jñāna, virāga, aiśvarya) are related to the sāttvika form of buddhi, and their opposites are related to the tāmasa form.61 One of these bhavas is the "condition" of "knowledge' (jñāna) which eventually, according to the classical Sāmkhya, leads to salvation or isolation.62 The other seven bhāvas or "conditions" lead to continued existence, and, thus, are instru- mental in causing suffering (Kārikā LXIII). Moreover, according to Kārika XXX, the buddhi is involved

59. Ibid. 60. Sanskrit text of Gita II.41. vyavasāyātmikā buddhir ekeha kurunandana, bahuśākhā hy anantāś ca buddhayo 'uyavasāyinām. Edgerton translates. "The mental attitude whose nature is resolution Is but one in this world, son of Kuru; For many-branched and endless Are the mental attitudes of the irresolute."

op. cit., I, 23. Text and translation in Edgerton (ed. and trans.), Bhagavad Gītā,

61. For discussion of bhāvas in older Sāmkhya traditions, see supra, Chapter II, (2) Proto-Sāmkhya Speculations; and see infra, under bhāvas; cf. also Johnston, Early Samkhya, op. cit., pp. 31-32; and van Buitenen, "Studies in Sāmkhya (I)." op. cit., pp. 153-157. 62. According to Karika XXXVII, the buddhi "produces" or "brings about" (sådhayati) the "enjoyment" (upabhogam) of the purusa and also "dis- tinguishes the subtle difference between the pradhāna (or prakrti) and the puruşa (visinasți ... pradhānapuruşāntaram sūkșmam). See infra under discussion of linga.

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in the process of perception along with the other members of the "internal organ." The buddhi "ascertains" and "decides" in the process of perception on the basis of the sensations, etc., which are given to it by the other organs (Kārikās XXXV and XXXVII). Besides these uses of the term in the Kārikā, Edgerton in his Index to Beginnings of Indian Philosophy has brought together a number of other uses of the term buddhi, the most important of which for understanding the term in the context of classical Sāmkhya are, "awareness," "general mental attitude," "intelli- gence," "enlightenment," and "will."$3 An important point in deciding how to take the term buddhi, however, is that it is generally used as an evolute or emergent which precedes ahamkāra. This is true in the Gitā, the Moksadharma and throughout the Kārikā. Although it is that from which ahamkāra emerges, nevertheless, it precedes it. In other words, like purusa, the buddhi is individual but not personal. It is outside of self-awareness. With respect to per- ception this is no problem, for the Kārikā tells us that buddhi functions together with ahamkāra, manas and the senses (Kārika XXX). The problem arises when one tries to comprehend the nature of buddhi in itself. As such, the buddhi is made up of the three gunas, is the locus of the bhavas (and hence the locus of both salvation and suffering), and is characterized by "ascer- tainment" or "determination." It is the first "manifest" evolute and thus is the first principle which the purusa sees or witnesses. In a sense, it is also that evolute which purusa be- comes, for with the emergence of buddhi, the purusa appears as what it is not - i.e., purușa appears as if it were buddhi, etc. In view of all of this the present writer would suggest that the best way to take buddhi is as "will," but not "will" in the sense of conscious choice and decision. Rather buddhi is "will" in the sense of being that dimension of man which is the source of his fundamental strivings or urges. The buddhi includes the basic predispositions and conditions which define or provide the framework for man's fundamental strivings. These strivings determine both what man perceives as well as what man does when he becomes aware ofhimself -i.e., when he becomes ahamkārā etc.

63. Edgerton, Beginnings of Indian Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 313-344.

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Since the ahamkāra and its sixteen modifications emerge from buddhi, it is true that buddhi is also the source of "intelli- gence," etc. It seems best to avoid such terms, however, for "intelligence", "awareness," etc., all imply self-awareness which is not present in buddhi, except potentially. The Western psycho- analytic notion of the unconscious might be somewhat helpful in describing buddhi, in so far as it is our Western equi- valent to a dimension of man which is not selfconscious but yet determines basic human strivings. The Western notion of the unconscious, however, carries with it much content which is foreign to Sämkhya, and thus it is wise not to push such a parallel too far. A better parallel might be the kind of aware- ness which is characteristic of a newborn child. The child has certain fundamental strivings or needs but has very little self- awareness. Again, one might suggest the parallel of the experi- ence of deep sleep. In such a condition one is not self-con- scious - i.e., one's self-awareness is temporarily suspended. In the final analysis, however, no parallel from our own experience can do justice to this Samkhya notion. We suggested earlier that the Sāmkhya analysis arose to some degree as an attempt to describe the various levels or stages of yogic aware- ness. The buddhi is certainly one such level, and it transcends all of our familiar experiences. According to the classical Samkhya, it is the structure or dimension of man which makes up his innermost core of being and which provides the foun- dation of his entire self-conscious life.64 ahamkāra. The second evolute or emergent which appears because of the presence of purusa is ahamkāra. This principle emerges directly from buddhi and is described in Kārikā XXIV.

Self-awareness (ahamkāra) is self-conceit (abhimāna). From it a twofold creation emerges, the group of eleven and the five subtle elements (tanmātras).

The term ahamkāra is difficult to translate. It is made up of

64. For other discussions of buddhi, see especially Garbe, Die Sāmkhya Philosophie, op. cit., pp. 307-311; Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy, op. cit., I, pp. 248-251; Keith. The Sāmkhya System, op. cit., pp. 97 ff .; Frauwallner, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, op. cit., pp. 353 ff. See also Vijñānabhiksu on the functioning of buddhi in Garbe (trans.), .Sāmkhyapravacana-bhāśya, II. 15, op. cit., pp. 186-187.

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the personal pronoun, "I" (aham), and the particle kāra, which may mean "making," "doing," "working," etc. The particle is also used, however, in designating a letter or sound or an indeclinable word -e.g., omkāra.65 The ahamkāra has usually been translated as "ego", "individuation," "conception of one's individuality," etc. van Buitenen, emphasizing the cosmic significance of the term, understands it as the creative cry "I.'66 In the Kārikā the term is equated with abhimāna, which implies such notions as "conceit," "pride," or "erroneous conception," etc. 67 We also learn from the Kārikā that a "twofold creation" emerges from the ahamkāra. One of these creations is the "group of eleven," which, according to Kārikās XXV-XXVII, includes mind (manas), the five senses (buddhindriyas), and the five organs of action (karmendriyas). This "group of eleven" is the sāttvika ahamkāra or the form of ahamkāra characterised primarily by the guņa, sattva. It is also called in Kārikā XXV vaikrta ahamkāra.68 The other creation is the group of "five subtle elements" (tanmātras), from which, according to Kārikā XXXVIII, emerge the five gross elements (pañcabhūtāni). This second creation is the tāmasa ahamkāra or the form of aham- kāra characterized primarily by the guņa, tamas. It is also called in Kārikā XXV, bhūtādi - i.e., that form of ahamkāra leading to the gross or external world.69 Sharing in both creations, pre- sumably by providing the motive force or energy, is taijasa ("bright" or "fiery"), according to Kārika XXV. Although not directly stated, this latter form of ahamkāra undoubtedly relates to the guna, rajas.70 Here again, as was true with buddhi, however, it is

65. van Buitenen, "Studies in Sāmkhya (II)," op. cit., pp. 17 ff. 66. Ibid. van Buitenen was the first scholar to point out the use of -kara not in the sense of "doing" or "making." His argument is convincing. 67. abhimāna is from the root, man plus the prefix abhi, and may mean "imagine," "suppose," "desire;" and as masc. noun may mean "self- conceit," "pride," or "erroreous conception." 68. For excellent discussion of the origin of the terms: vaikrta, bhūtādi, and taijasa, see van Buitenen, "Studies in Sāmkhya (II)." op. cit., pp. 23-25. 69. Ibid. 70. Ibid. Cf. V. V. Sovani, A Critical Study of the Sāmkhya System (Poona ; Oriental Book Agency, 1935), pp. 32-33.

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important to separate what the principle becomes from what it is in itself. From the point of view of what it becomes, ahamkāra pervades all of experience including the functions of mind, senses, etc. In itself, however, it precedes all of these mani- festations or functions, although it contains in itself the poten- tiality of such functions. In itself, the ahamkāra is simply the sense of "I" or "mine." It is simply the fact of self-awareness, apart from all functioning in the realm of mind, senses, etc. It is, thus, a kind of general self-awareness dissociated from ordi- nary experience. One might compare the level of ahamkāra in itself to the experience of dreaming sleep in which state one is aware of one's own identity or presence apart from ordinary experience. One might also compare the level of ahamkāra to various kinds of fantasies or daydreams in which one's self- awareness is present apart from the realm of waking experience. Again, one might compare the experience of ahamkāra in itself to the experience of the young child who is just becoming aware of himself as an individual, as an "I". The ahamkāra, then, is a kind of pure self-awareness.71 sāttvika ahamkāra .. The "group of eleven," also called sāttvika ahamkāra or vaikrta ahamkāra, is made up of mind (manas), the five senses (buddhindriyas) and the five organs of action (karmendriyas) (Kārikā XXV). It is on this level of emergence or evolution that man is first in contact with the external or gross world.72 The manas ("mind"), according to Kārikā XXVII, is samkalpaka - i.e., it is "constructive," "re- flective," "analytic," "explicative."73 The Bhasya explains manas in terms of determining or arranging the impulses or sensations coming from the senses and the organs of action.74

71. For discussions of ahamkāra, see especially Garbe, Die Sāmkhya: Philosophie, op. cit., pp. 311-314; Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy, op. cit., I, pp. 248-251; Keith, The Sāmkhya System, op. cit., p. 98; Frauwallner, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, loc. cit .; cf. Vijñānabhiksu's treatment in. Garbe (trans.) Sāmkhyapravacanabhāsya, II. 16 and VI 54, op. cit., pp. 187 and 359. 72. For sāttvika ahamkāra, see Bhāsya, STK, Paramārtha's Chinese version, YD, etc., on Karikā XXV. 73. V.V. Sovani, A Critical Study of the Samkhya System, op. cit., pp .. 33-34. 74. Colebrooke-Wilson, op. cit., pp. 97-100.

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STK takes manas in the sense of making clear that which is. only vaguely perceived by the senses, etc.75 The manas, thus, serves as a kind of bridge between buddhi and ahamkāra, on the one hand, and the senses and organs of action, on the other. It is, thus, also a bridge between the internal and external world. According to Kārikā XXXIII, the manas together with. buddhi and ahamkāra makes up the "internal organ" (antah- karaņa), and in Kārikā XXVII the manas is also characterized as an indriya - i.e., it is also a sense organ and an organ of action. The manas in itself, then, is that dimension or level of man's experience which is involved primarily in waking experience. It is also involved in the internal functioning of man apart from waking experience in so far as it provides the distinct im- pressions, constructions, etc., which are used by the ahamkāra and buddhi.76 The ten senses or indriyas ("sense organs" or perhaps "powers or capacities of the senses") are in two groups : (1) the five sense organs (buddhindriyas) including the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin; (2) the five organs of action (karmendriyas) including the voice, hands, feet, and the organs of excretion and generation (Kārika XXVI).77 These senses are not to be confused with the gross organs, which, of course, are made up of the gross elements. The senses, rather, refer to the func- tioning of the various organs. tāmasa ahamkāra. Emerging from ahamkāra at the same time as the sāttvika ahamkāra or "group of eleven" is the group known as the five "subtle elements" (tanmātras) characterized by a predominance of tamas (Kārikā XXV). These tanmātras like buddhi and ahamkara are both "creative" (prakrti) and "created" (vikrti) (Kārikā III). That is, they are products of a preceding evolute, but they are also creative with respect to other evolutes, in this case the gross elements. The term tan- matra means "only so much or little," "rudimentary", or "trifle."78 The five tanmatras are as follows : sound (sabda),

75. Cf. Suryanarayana Sastri, Śāmkhyakārikā, op. cit., pp. 52-53. 76. Ibid. 77. Ibid. 78. For good discussion of the term see Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy, op. cit., I, p. 251; Keith. The Samkhya System, op. cit., pp. 100-101; Frauwallner, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, op. cit., pp. 345-348.

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touch (sparśa), form (rūpa), taste (rasa), and smell (gandha). Exactly what is meant by "subtle element" is difficult to deter- mine. They are said to be "non-specific" (avisesa), according to Kārikā XXXVIII, whereas their products, the gross elements, are said to be specific (visesa).79 They are extremely fine or subtle "potentials," according to Dasgupta, which together bring about the five gross elements.80 Precisely how the tan- mātras generate the gross elements has been interpreted variously. The Kārika itself offers no illumination on this. It is simply stated in Kārikā XXXVIII that the gross elements emerge from the "subtle" elements. The Bhasya simply correlates the five tanmātras with the five gross elements as follows : the subtle element smell leads to the gross element earth; taste to water; form to fire; touch to wind; and sound to space.81 It should be noted that the five subtle elements are not present in the older listings of the twenty-five evolutes as found, for example, in the Gitā, the Moksadharma, etc. In the older accounts of the tattvas the five gross elements functioned in place of the tanmätras, and the remaining five tattvas were the objects of the senses, which are left out of the classical Sāmkhya listing.82 This change is probably another indication of the classical Samkhya interest in the analysis of the individual as opposed to the older cosmological concerns. The tanmātras in the classical scheme are emergents or evolutes of the ahamkāra, and are placed parallel with the emergence of manas, the five senses, and the five organs of action. The subtle elements function somewhat like manas in that they represent a kind of bridge between the internal and external or between the individual and the world. They are products of self-aware- ness, and yet they in turn come in contact with or generate the external world.

79. See note on viseşa and aviśeşa in Suryanarayana Sastri, Sāmkhya- kārikā, op. cit., p. 70. 80. Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophy, op. cit., I, p. 251. 81. Bhāsya on Kārika XXXVIII. For a good summary of other ver- sions of the production of gross elements from subtle elements as set forth by STK, Māțharavrtti, Jayamangalā, Candrikā, see V.V. Sovani, A Critical Study of the Samkhya System, op. cit., p. 31. For a chart showing one version of the production of gross elements, see Zimmer, Philosophies of India (New York : World Publishing Co., 1961), p. 328. 82. Edgerton, Beginnings of Indian Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 42-44.

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linga.83 Thirteen of the evolutes or emergents make up what is called the "instrument" (karana) or the linga : buddhi, ahamkāra, manas, the five senses, and the five organs of action (Kārikās XXXII, XXXIII, XLI). Of these thirteen the buddhi, ahamkāra and manas make up the "internal organ" (antahkarana) which functions in the past, present and future (Kārikā XXXIII). The remaining ten indriyas or "senses" make up the "external" (bahya) dimension of the "instrument" (karaņa) and function only in present time (Kārikā XXXIII). In Kārikā XXXV the "external" is compared to a door, while the "internal organ" is called the doorkeeper. This thirteen- fold instrument functions as a whole by "seizing" (āharaņa), "holding" (dhāraņa), and "manifesting" (prakāśakara) (Kārikā XXXII).84 The function of the five senses (buddhindriyas) is "bare awareness" (ālocanamātra), and the function of the organs of action (karmendriyas) is speech, grasping, motion, excretion, and orgasm (Kārikā XXVIII). As noted above the functions of buddhi, ahamkāra and manas are "determination," "self-awareness," and "explication" or "differentiation," res- pectively. With respect to perception, the "internal organ" together with any one or more of the senses function either simultaneously or successively (yugapat or kramaśas) (Kārikā XXX). The five vital breaths (prānas) circulate throughout

83. The present writer has taken linga as equivaient to karana or the "thirteenfold instrument." This agrees with E.A. Welden's analysis of the problem as found in his excellent article, "The Samkhya Term, Linga," op. cit., pp. 445-459. Welden bases his analysis on the Kārikā together with the Bhāsya of Gaudapāda. According to Welden, linga means "characteristic mark" or "mergent." In the former sense it signifies that which characterizes man. In the latter sense it is that which disappears or vanishes when enlightenment or isolation is achieved. When taken together with the five tanmätras the linga is then characterized as the linga-sarīra or "subtle body." The linga-sarīra is the transmigrating entity and includes both the thirteenfold instrument and the five tanmātras: see infra under linga-sarīra. This interpretation of linga-śarīra and linga is also that of Paramartha's Chinese version (on Kārikās XL, XLI, XLII). For discussion of the problem in STK, Candrikā, and Vijňānabhiksu, see Cole- broke-Wilson, op. cit., 129-131; cf. also V. V. Sovani, A Critical Study of the Sāmkhya System, op. cit., pp. 40-41; and Suryanarayana Sastri, Sāmkhya- kārikā, op. cit., pp. 72-74. 84. For a good summary of the various views of the commentators on the problem of the functioning of the "thirteenfold instrument," see V.V .. Sovani, A Critical Study of the Samkhya System, op. cit., pp. 36-37.

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the thirteenfold instrument (Kārika XXIX), and, according to the commentators, maintain the living functions or life-forces of the instrument.85 All perceptions, impressions, actions, etc., of the instrument are presented finally to the buddhi (Kārikā XXXVI). This is necessary, according to Kārikā XXXVII,

Because the buddhi produces (or brings about) every enjoyment of the purusa, and, moreover, (the buddhi) distinguishes the subtle difference between the pradhāna and the purusa.86

sarvam pratyupabhogam yasmāt purusasya sādhayati buddhih, saiva ca viśinaşti punah pradhānapuruşāntaram sūkmam.

In other words, the functioning of the "instrument" (karana) or the linga is for the sake of the purusa. This is explicitly stated again in the second half of Kārika XXXI.

... The only cause is for the sake of the purusa. By no- thing else is the instrument (karana) caused. ... puruşārtha eva hetur na kenacit kāryate karaņam.

Finally, this linga or thirteenfold instrument transmigrates until the purusa attains salvation (Kārikās XL and XLIV). This linga transmigrates or attains salvation because of the force or power of the bhavas which reside in the buddhi (Kārikās XL, XLIV, and XLV). In all of this, it has become obvious that the thirteenfold instrument is the essential structure or nature of man which enables him to grasp and know the world and himself. It includes within it the entire mental and emotional make-up of man, and it is by means of one aspect of this instrument - i.e., the buddhi - that man is also able to discover or discrimi- nate the purusa, which is both the reason why the world is

85. The Bhāsya and Jaya, suggest that the prānas circulate through- out the thirteenfold instrument; whereas STK and the later Sāmkhya of Vijňānabhiksu claim that prānas circulate only in the "internal organ" (i.e., in the buddhi, ahamkāra, and manas). 86. viśinaști is from the root, śiș plus prefix vi., meaning "distinguish" "particularize," or "distinguish from others."

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manifest and the reason why man is ultimately free or isolated. Hence, this thirteenfold structure is appropriately called the "instrument" (karaņa) and the "characteristic mark" (linga). linga śarīra or sūksma sarira. This thirteenfold instru- ment or linga cannot exist without some kind of support (Kārikā XLI). This support is made up of the five "subtle elements" (tanmātras) (Kārikā XLI), which, according to the comment- ators, make up a kind of sheath or body which accompanies the linga in its transmigration from life to life.87 Thus, the linga with respect to its nature as a transmigrating entity is made up of eighteen parts: the thirteenfold instrument together with the five tanmātras. The Bhāsya, STK, Paramārtha's Chinese version, YD, etc., all refer to this total transmigrating entity as the linga-śarīra or sūkșma-śarīra. The Kārikā itself refers to the linga and the linga-śarira simply as the linga (XL, XLI, XLII). By implication, however, in Kārikā XLI, it distin- guishes between the linga as the thirteenfold instrument and its support or substrata - i.e., the five tanmātras. bhavas. We have already noticed that the fundamental material cause of the entire manifest world is the mūlaprakrti, which is intimately related to the three gunas.88 The purusa simply by its presence or proximity acts as a kind of catalyst which brings about the transformation or modification of the avyakta ("unmanifest") into the "manifest" world (vyakta). This process of transformation or modification is called guna- pariņāma (Kārikā XXVII), and the whole process is under- stood in terms of satkārya - i.e., the effect pre-exists in the cause (Kārikā IX). Thus, the effects (or the evolutes of the manifest world) are only transformations or modifications of the original mūlaprakrti or avyakta. The effects represent nothing new. They are simply re-arrangements or modifications of the single material cause. In other words, the purusa adds nothing to the vyakta or the avyakta. It simply witnesses or sees the process of emergencc. With respect to the transmigrating entity -i.e., the linga or linga-śarira-another kind of causation occurs, which, according to the classical Samkhya, explains why the linga

87. See supra, note 83, p. 182. 88. See supra, under section B. prakrti, guņas and satkāryavāda.

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transmigrates from life to life. This is the causation brought about by the force or power of the bhavas, which, as we noted above, reside in the buddhi (Kārikās XXIII and LXIII).89 As we suggested above, the bhavas are "conditions" or "dispositions" or fundamental strivings in the innermost core of man's nature. They are eight in number : (1) dharma; (2) adharma; (3) jňāna; (4) ajňāna; (5) virāga; (6) rāga; (7) aiśvarya; and (8) anaiśvarya. They may be translated as follows : "virtue," "vice," "knowledge," "ignorance," "non-attachment," "attach- ment," "power," and "impotence" respectively. All of these bhāvas with the exception of jñana impel or carry man along in the various phases and dimensions of the manifest world -i.e, they lead to continuing life, transmigration, suffering, etc. (Kārikā LXIII). Only the bhāva, jñāna, leads to salvation. It is obvious, of course, that this "knowledge" (jñana) is not the discriminative knowledge of ordinary experience, for that kind of knowledge takes place in the functioning of the thirteen- fold instrument in its contacts with the external world.90 The bhāva which is jñana, rather, is salvation-knowledge, or the "knowledge" which distinguishes the absolute otherness of purusa with respect to prakrti. By the same token, the bhāva which is ajñana is not simple ignorance. It is, rather the funda- mental lack of salvation-knowledge which in turn leads to ordinary knowledge of the manifest world. The present writer will return to these problems later in the Chapter. What is important to note at this point, however, is that the continu- ation of life, suffering and ordinary existence is attributed in classical Sāmkhya to these fundamental strivings of man in his innermost nature. They are the foundation or basis for all of his actions, and, with respect to the future, what a man becomes in the scale of life is determined by what he has done

89. See Bhāsya, STK, Paramārtha's Chinese version, Jaya., YD on Kārika XXIII. For a good summary of views of commentators see Colebrooke- Wilson, op. cit., pp. 85-91; and V.V. Sovani, A Critical Study of the Sāmkhya System, op. cit., pp. 31-32. For good interpretive discussions see Keith. The Sāmkhya System, op. cit., pp. 103-104; Garbe, Die Sāmkhya Philosophie, op. cit., pp. 339-340; Johnston, Early Sāmkhya, op. cit., pp. 31-32, 70, 79, 83, 87. 90. See supra, under linga.

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(Kārikās XLIV-XLV). Thus, the eight bhāvas are an essen- tial part of man's nature. In fact, according to Kārikā LII, the bhavas add an essential dimension to the functioning of the linga and vice versa.

bhāvas ("dispositions") cannot function without the linga. The linga cannot function without bhavas. Therefore, a twofold creation operates (or functions), called linga and bhāvas.

na vinā bhāvair lingam na vinā lingena bhāvanirvrttih, lingākhyo bhāvākhyas tasmād dvividhah pravartate sargah.

That is, there are two functioning systems or structures, one of which is the linga-structure, the other of which is the bhāva- structure. The bhava-structure, of course, is within or a part of the linga-structure, since. it resides in the buddhi. Never- theless, it performs an absolutely essential function in impelling or determining the future of the linga. It is the basis or foun- dation of the fundamental strivings of man which lead to further existence or to the experience of salvation. Another account of the bhava-structure is given in Karikas XLVI-LI. In these verses the bhavas are said to be fifty in number : five varieties of "ignorance" (viparyaya); twenty- eight varieties of "incapacity" (aśakti); nine varieties of "com- placency" (tusti); and eight varieties of "perfection" (siddhi). This account of the bhavas is sandwiched in between the account of the eight bhavas. The doctrine of eight bhāvas is dis- cussed in Kārikās XLII-XLV and again in LII. The six intervening verses discuss the fifty bhävas, but the doctrine in these intervening verses is decidedly different from the doctrine of eight bhavas. This peculiar contradiction in the text led Keith to suggest that Kātikās XLVI-LI represent a later inter- polation.91 Frauwallner suggests, rather, that the doctrine of fifty bhävas represents an older form of the doctrine. The author of the Kārikas, says Frauwallner, included this older doctrine because it may have been a sacred tradition.92 This

91. Keith, The Sāmkhya System, op. cit., p. 105. 92. Frauwallner, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, op. cit., pp. 339 ff.

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latter suggestion appears unlikely, however, since the Kārikā as a short outline of the classical system generally presents only essential and important aspects of the doctrine. Keith may be correct that these verses represent a later interpola- tion, but there is also another possibility. It could be the case that the eight bhavas and the fifty bhavas or components represent two dimensions or two aspects of the same pheno- menon. Whereas the eight bhavas are the deeper, causal predispositions that determine the future of the linga, the fifty bhāvas or components may be the phenomenal, manifest effects of the deeper causal predispositions in one's present life. In other words, the bhava-structure or what the Sāmkhyakārikā calls the "intellectual creation" (pratyayasarga) may be construed to have two dimensions : a causal dimension (of the eight bhavas) and a phenomenal or effect-dimension (of the fifty bhāvas or components). bhautika sarga. In addition to the twofold creation men- tioned in Kārikā LII - i.e., the linga-sarga and the bhāva-sarga - the author of the text refers to yet a third creation : the bhautika sarga (the "elemental" or "gross" creation) (Kārikās LIII-LIV). It is at this point in the text that the author takes up the question of the external world or the make-up of the universe. Up to this point the text has dealt primarily with the make-up of the individual. Here in verses LIII and LIV we read about the total universe or cosmos for the first time. In Kārikā LIII we are told,

The divine or celestial (order) is eightfold; the sub-human (order) is fivefold; the human (order) is one variety; such, briefly, is the elemental or gross creation (bhautika sarga).

aşțavikalpo daivas tairyagyonaś ca pañcadhā bhavati, mānuşakaś caikavidhaḥ samāsato bhautikaḥ sargah.

According to the various commentaries the eightfold celestial order includes Brāhma, Prājāpatya, Aindra, Paitra, Gāndharva, Yākşa, Rākșasa and Paiśāca, etc.93 The sub-human order

93. See Bhāsya, STK, Paramārtha's Chinese version, etc., for various enumerations.

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includes cattle, wild beasts, birds, reptiles, and immovable things like vegetables and minerals. The human order is only one variety. Then in Kārika LIV, the celestial or divine order is said to be predominantly made up of the guna, sattva; the sub-human order of the guna, tamas; and the human order of the guna, rajas. Such, then, is the characterization of the gross or external world, according to the Kārika. It should be noted that man's gross or physical body shares in this third or bhautika sarga. Unlike the linga or linga-śarīra it comes into being and then dissolves in the course of one life. It is the body born of father and mother (Kārikā XXXIX).94 Summary. Before moving on to discuss salvation-know- ledge and the ultimate state or condition of kaivalya ("isola- tion"), it is necessary at this point to summarise the main insights of the classical Samkhya which we have explicated thus far. It must be said first, however, that there are several doctrines in the classicl Samkhya analysis which are not clear. For example, the precise significance of the tanmatras is difficult to determine. On the one hand, they serve as the support or basis of the individual, and yet they are also said to generate the external world. Does this mean that the external, mani- fest world is simply a manifestation of individual evolution or emergence? Or does it mean rather that there must be some kind of cosmic buddhi or ahamkara which exists somehow apart from the individual buddhis, etc .? If one accepts the latter interpretation, as Garbe, Dasgupta and other interpreters have done, then it becomes difficult to appreciate the classical Sām- khya doctrine of the plurality of purusas. The puruas must then be seen as one totality, the presence of which brings about

94. For further discussions of the whole problem of the emergence and functioning of the tattvas, see especially Garbe, Die Samkhya Philosophie, op. cit., pp. 284-351; Dasgupta, History of Indian Philosophiy op. cit., I, pp. 247-265; Keith, The Sāmkhya System, op. cit., pp. 94-108; Frauwallner, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, op. cit., pp. 348-381; Suryanarayana Sastri, Sāmkhyakārikā, op. cit , pp. 46-89; V.V. Sovani, A Ctitical Study of the Såm- khya System, op. cit., pp. 31-48; Chakravarti, Origin and Development of the Sāmkhya, op. cit., pp. 208-314. For texts; relating to emergence or function- ing in later Sāmkhya, see Garbe (ed. and trans.), Sāmkhya-Sūtra Vrtti, Books, I, II, IÌI, op. cit., pp. 2-158; Garbe (trans.), Sāmkhyapravacanabhāsya, Books I, II, III, op. cit., pp. 12-250; and for discussion in the Tattvasamāsa, see Muller. The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, op. cit., pp. 242 ff.

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the emergence of a cosmic buddhi, a cosmic ahamkāra, etc., which somehow then generate or bring forth individual buddhis and ahamkāras which transmigrate. Such an interpretation simply adds more categories and more difficulties to the original prob- lem. The only reasonable solution seems to be that the classical Sāmkhya understands the basic evolutes or emergents primarily in individual terms and considers questions regarding cosmic development and the external world as secondary. In other words, the classical Sāmkhya is not primarily a cosmology, a theory of physics or any kind of natural science, except perhaps on a very primitive level. The classical Sāmkhya is, rather, a soteriological system which seeks to find an answer to the problem of suffering in human life. Another related difficulty in the Sämkhya analysis regards the relationship between the theory of evolution or emergence and the doctrine of trans- migration. On the one hand, we are told that buddhi, ahamkāra, manas, the senses, etc., evolve or emerge one after another. At the same time we are told that the linga transmigrates from life to life. The linga, however, is already made up of buddhi,. ahamkāra, etc., which implies that the evolution or emergence took place at the beginning of time or creation. As a result, the theory of evolution has very little to do with the problem of salvation, since in any given life, evolution is already accomp- lished before that particular life. begins. But why then does the Karika discuss the problem of the functioning of the indivi- dual in the context of evolution or emergence ? One possible answer is that each successive life somehow recapitulates the original process of emergence, but such a doctrine of recapi- tulation is nowhere set forth in the Kārikā. We are told only that in each life a subtle body (made up of the thirteenfold instrument and the five tanmātras) comes to reside in a gross body born of father and mother. Clearly the exposition of the Sāmkhyakārikā on this point leaves much to be desired. As Keith has pointed out, most of these kinds of problems in the classical Sāmkhya are due to the derivative, composite nature of the system.95 Older cosmological terms and notions are combined with descriptions and analysis of the states or levels of yogic awareness. Moreover, the Sāmkhya inherits a number

95. Keith, The Sāmkhya System, op. cit., pp. 97 ff.

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of basic Indian beliefs such as the doctrine of transmigration. Most important of all, the old notion of a cosmic or absolute Self is transposed into a doctrine of the plurality of purusas. To be sure, these various traditions and doctrines lead to serious problems in rendering the whole classical Sāmkhya system intelligible. One must simply admit that certain aspects of the whole system are unclear. If, however, one focuses on that dimension of the system which deals with the analysis of man and his salvation or freedom, then one finds some impor- tant and penetrating insights in the classical Sāmkhya. These insights may be summarized as follows: (a) In classical Samkhya the world is not derived from the purusa, but it is understood or comprehended in terms of purușa. This purușa is not personal, but it is individual. The presence of this individual purusa results in the emergence or appearance of the manifest world. Without that presence the world remains simply "unmanifest" (avyakta). Thus, the manifest world serves the purpose of the individual purusa : purusartha. The world is that which is witnessed. It is an instrument used by the purusa, and all of the evolutes from buddhi down through the gross elements are instrumental in serving purusa's purpose. This individual purușa, moreover, is simply the fact of consciousness. It is transparent, trans- lucent; it is a witness. It functions by witnessing or seeing the world, and by so doing it appears as what it is not. It appears as if it were the world, and the world appears as if it were possessed of consciousness. In other words, a kind of double negation takes place. The purusa appears as what it is not, and the world appears as what it is not. This negation occurs, however, because of the very nature of purusa - i.e., its function as witness is to reflect or to appear as what it is not. Only by appearing as what it is not can it be what it is. (b) As a result of the centrality of the doctrine of the individual purua and the doctrine of puruşārtha ("for the sake of the purusa") in classical Sāmkhya, no conscious Spirit or deity functions in the system to bring about the manifest world. The world in and of itself is simply "unmanifest" (avyakta) apart from the presence of the purusa. The ultimate mūla- prakrti or avyakta is made up of the three gunas, but these gunas do not become active or creative until the purusa is present.

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The world in and of itself, although containing potentially everything in the manifest world, is simply an undifferentiated, unmanifest plenitude of being. It is completely unconscious. When the purusa comes into proximity with this unmanifest plenitude, however, the manifest world then begins to unfold or emerge. The buddhi, ahamkara, manas, the five senses, the five organs of action, the five subtle elements and the five gross elements then appear to the purusa. These evolutes are made up of various admixtures or collocations of the three gunas, or qualities which materially make up the avyakta or mūlaprakrti. The guna, sattva, is extremely subtle and light, and functions both as the quality of thought and goodness. The guna, rajas, is active and aggressive, and functions both as the quality of energy and passion. The guna, tamas, is passive and dull, and functions both as the quality of matter and delusion. These gunas extend throughout the manifest and unmanifest world, and they undergo continual modification and transformation- in the presence of purusa. With respect to man, they constitute the psychophysical make-up of his nature. They similarly constitute the nature of everything that is not man. They represent the fundamental structure of the manifest and unmanifest world. In themselves, however, they are quite unconscious. Like the mūlaprakrti or avyakta they are absolutely separate from the purusa. Thus, the classical Sāmkhya recog- nizes no conscious Absolute or Creator God. To be sure, the gods may exist, but they too are simply products of the inter- action of unconscious mūlaprakrti and the conscious purusa. (c) In classical Sāmkhya, therefore, the fundamental dualism is that between individual consciousness, on the one hand, and the unconscious world, on the other. The Samkhya dualism is not a dualism of mind and body, or a dualism of thought and extension. All such dualisms are included or com- prehended on the side of the unconscious world. The mind, the self-awareness of man are all evolutes emerging out of the mūlaprakrti. Similarly all of man's emotions and strivings and urges are also comprehended in classical Samkhya on the side of the mūlaprakrti. Thus, in classical Sāmkhya man is viewed as a psycho-physical unity. Thought and extension, mind and body, etc., are viewed simply as different dimensions or attributes of the manifest world. This unity is maintained

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by the doctrine of the gunas, which, function both on the psy- chomental level as well as on the gross or physical level. The dualism of classical Samkhya centres or focuses around the distinction of the conscious and the unconscious. The purusa which is consciousness, is not part of the manifest world, which is unconsciousness. Yet the purusa, which is consciousness, is not a cosmic consciousness. It is, rather, simply the fact of individual, impersonal consciousness, the consciousness which renders man's life and the manifest world possible. This indi- vidual, impersonal consciousness is not to be confused with the buddhi, the ahamkāra, the manas, or with any other evolute or emergent of the manifest world. Thus, it is neither thought, self awareness, life-force, etc., nor is it the source of any of these dimensions of man's experience or life. Likewise, the purusa which is consciousness, is neither the strivings, the urges, the impulses, or any other emotional forces which make up man's nature. The purusa is simply the fact of consciousness. Put- ting this another way, one might say that since the mūlaprakrti together with its gunas or qualities makes up everything that is in the manifest world including both the psychomental and the physical dimensions of the world and man, the purusa is nothing, or the presence of nothingness in the world. It is a kind of emptiness at the very heart of the world and man, but it is the nothingness or emptiness which reveals being or the world. We suggested above in our discussion of the nature of purusa that by its very nature it appears as not what it is. That is, as pure consciousness it simply witnesses or sees. It appears as what it is not, but this appearance is what it is. It is pure, translucent emptiness which only has content in so far as it reflects something. The content of purusa can only be what the purusa is not. Consciousness is always consciousness of some- thing, and this insight is the heart of the Samkhya dualism. (d) In classical Sāmkhya what a man becomes is deter- mined by his fundamental strivings which reside or exist in. the buddhi. In other words, a man's place in the world depends upon his basic inclinations. The buddhi is not only the evolute or emergent which "determines" or "decides", but it is also the locus of the bhavas, those "conditions," or "urges" which establish the fundamental life-style of man. These bhāvas impel or motivate man to become a particular kind of man

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in the manifest world, and the dominance or ascendancy of some of these bhavas over others is related to what a man has done previously. From the point of view of ordinary existence in the world, the basic bhāva, of course, is ajñāna, or "un-know- ledge," or "lack of knowledge." This "lack of knowledge" however means lack of salvation-knowledge. It does not mean the lack of ordinary everyday knowledge or discrimination. The other bhavas- e.g., "virtue," "vice," "non-attachment," "passion," etc .- come into play in the course of man's life according to how he lives his life. What a man does, there- fore, in classical Sämkhya is directly related to what he becomes. The Samkhya understands and interprets this doctrine of action in terms of the traditional Indian doctrine of transinigration, which is accepted almost universally in Indian thought. Thus, this doctrine of the importance of action and the fundamental strivings of man is not unique to the Sāmkhya, yet it neverthe- less is an important aspect of the system. (e) In classical Samkhya an important role or function is played by what one might call affective or emotive states. The manifest world is comprehended not only in terms of indi- vidual, impersonal consciousness-i.e., the presence of purusa. It is also comprehended or viewed from the perspective of the emotional conditions and longings of man. In other words, the world is not understood in itself apart from the fact of human existence. The world, rather, at every point is inextricably bound up with the presence of human existence. In a sense, then, the world is uniquely human. The gunas, for example, are interpreted in classical Samkhya not simply as the qualities of thought, energy and matter; they are also interpreted in their very nature as the sources or foundations of pleasure, pain, and dullness. Even the gross elements are not inter- preted simply as physical entities or things; they are also charac- terized as being "tranquil" (sānta), "turbulent" or "violent" (ghora), and "delusive" or "stupid" (mūdha) -i.e., they are apprehended or comprehended primarily from the perspective of concrete human existence (Kārikā XXXVIII). The Sām- khya emphasis that human existence in the world is suffering (duhkha) is another example of the importance of affective states. Suffering pervades all of life and the world, and the manifest world is never understood in Sāmkhya apart from this

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fact. The world in itself does have a rational structure, but this rationality is never separated or abstracted in classical Samkhya from the longings, strivings, emotions, etc., which make up concrete human existence. (f) Finally, in classical Sāmkhya it is important to empha- size that ajñana or "lack of knowledge" or "ignorance" is really equivalent to ordinary, everyday knowledge, for it is because of the "lack of knowledge" that ordinary knowledge arises. Man's knowledge of the world and his place in the world is because of the "lack of knowledge." This "lack of know- ledge," however, as we suggested briefly above, means the lack of salvation-knowledge - i.e., the lack of the knowledge that purusa is apart or separate from the manifest and unmani- fest world. Thus, ajñana or "ignorance" or "lack of knowledge" is not a kind of mistake or blunder which originally set the process of creation in operation. It is, rather, the natural or normal result of the coming together of the purusa and the mūla- prakrti. Here again the dialectic or interplay of the two basic principles must be fully appreciated. The purusa is pure, trans- lucent consciousness, a kind of transparent emptiness, which by its nature is only a witness. It is only consciousness of some- thing. The mūlaprakrti, on the other hand, is simply undiffe- rentiated, unconscious thing-ness, or that which is witnessed. Each one of these two principles appears as what it is not. Thus, the "lack of knowledge" or "ignorance" is the result of the presence of these two principles to one another, and is the reason for the appearance of the manifest world. Salvation, then, involves the further discrimination of the dialectic. Salvation- knowledge is a special kind of "knowledge" which brings one to the realization of the purusa itself apart from its appearing as what it is not. This salvation-knowledge, which arises in the bhāva, jñāna, of the buddhi, represents a final discrimination that moves beyond ordinary knowledge, and it is necessary now to examine this salvation knowledge more closely.

F. DISCRIMINATION AND RELEASE Throughout our interpretation of the meaning of classical Samkhya, we have placed great emphasis on the fact that the system is primarily soteriological-i.e., it is fundamentally con- cerned to find a way of ending the suffering which is human

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existence in the world.96 The Kārika, as we noticed, sets forth this basic purpose at the very outset, and it is interesting to notice that Karikas LV-LXIX are concerned solely with the question of salvation. All of the preceding verses dealing with the emergence and functioning of the manifest world serve as a kind of prelude or preparation for the doctrine of salvation articulated in these last fourteen verses. This last portion of the Karika begins first of all with a kind of summary of the preceding discussion together with some similes which illustrate the relationship of the purusa and the prakrti. In Kārika LV we are reminded of the basic fact of suffering in human life due to the presence of purusa which appears as what it is not. According to this verse, suffer- ing is of the nature of things until the purusa becomes separated or isolated from the linga. Then in Kārika LVI we are remind- ed that everything in creation functions for the sake of each purusa.97

This creation, brought about by prakrti- from mahat (or buddhi) down to the specific gross objects- is for the purpose of the release of every purusa; (this is done) for the sake of another, as if it were for her own benefit).

ity eşa prakṛtikrto mahadādivišeşabhūtaparyantah, pratipuruşavimoksārtham svārtha iva parārtha ārambhaḥ.

That is, the manifest world appears because of the presence of purusa, and functions for the sake of the purusa. The verse also stresses the dialectical interaction which we have men- tioned at several points. The prakrti as manifest appears as if it were consciousness, and this very appearance is what serves the purpose of the purusa. Put another way, the manifest world serves its own purpose by serving the purpose of the other. It becomes what it is not in order to bring about what it is-i.e., not purusa. The next three Kārikas (LVII-LIX) present simple

96. See supra, the opening pages of Chapter III. 97. See supra, pp. 278-279.

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comparisons which illustrate this notion of purusartha.98 The prakrti is like the non-conscious milk which functions as nourish- ment for the calf (Kārika LVII). Again, the prakrti is like someone who undertakes a certain action in order to satisfy a basic need or desire, the desire in this case being the release of puruşa. Yet again, the prakrti is like a dancer who performs for a spectator, and having completed her purpose, simply walks off the stage or ends her act (Kārika LIX). In each of these similes it is important to note that the prakrti is not served except in so far as it fulfils its own function as servant. Ulti- mately the prakrti is unconscious, and since the classical Sāmkhya is concerned only with the isolation of pure consciousness or purusa, the world itself is irrelevant apart from its function as a means to salvation. In other words, the classical Sāmkhya is not concerned at all with the world in itself except in so far as it is instrumental in the discrimination of the isolated or pure purusa. This is expressed in an interesting and sensitive manner in Kārikā LXI.

It is my thought that there is nothing more delicate than prakrti, who (says to herself) 'I have been seen,' and never again comes into the sight of purusa.

prakṛteḥ sukumārataram na kiñcid astīti me matir bhavati, yā drstāsmīti punar na darśanam upaiți puruşasya.

As noted earlier, even though prakrti and purusa are in proximity with one another, they nevertheless are completely separate. They are two different realities or dimensions of existence. The one is a pure witness and the other is that which is witnessed. Neither can be reduced to the other, according to classical Sāmkhya. Because of this absolute separation or radical differentiation, the author of the Kārikā makes the following puzzling assertion in verse LXII.99

98. Book IV of the Sāmkhyapravacanasūtra is a summary of parables and similes used in the later Sāmkhya school; see, Garbe (ed. and trans.), Sāmkhya-Sūtra-Vṛtti, op. cit., pp. 159-177; and Garbe (trans.), Sāmkhya- pravacanabhāșva, op. cit., pp. 251-255. See also Garbe's discussion of similes and metaphors in his Die Samkhya Philosophie, op. cit., pp. 223-228. 99. See supra.

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No one, therefore, is bound, no one released, likewise, no one transmigrates. (Only) prakrti in its various forms transmigrates, is bound and is released.

Because the purusa in itself is pure, translucent consciousness, it cannot be bound or liberated. It only appears as if bound, liberated, etc., from the perspective of man in the manifest world. In fact, the purusa is simply a presence in the world. This realization of the absolute separation of prakrti and purușa is called jñāna or "knowledge". This knowledge resides in the buddhi as one of the eight bhavas.100 As noted above, this knowledge is not ordinary, everyday knowledge. It is, rather, the fulfilment of ordinary knowledge. It is a "knowledge" which results from going beyond the ordinary processs of know- ing in the manifest world. It is a "knowledge" which arises when man seeks the ultimate basis or foundation of his existence. This ultimate foundation or basis is not to be found in the will or strivings of man, in his self-awareness, in his mind, etc. It is to be found in the pure consciousness which stands behind or apart from all of these dimensions of man and the world, the presence of which renders man aware of himself and the world. It is a "knowledge" which transcends all knowledge and is the final, absolute awareness or pure consciousness. According to the classical Sāmkhya, this salvation-knowledge comes as a result of the study and analysis of the tattvas or principles which make up the manifest world. We read in Karika LXIV,

Thus, from the study (or analysis) of the tattvas ("prin- ciples"), the "knowledge" (jñāna) arises, "I am not (conscious); (consciousness) does not belong to me; the "I" is not (conscious)" (and this "knowledge") is complete because free from error, pure and solitary (kevala).

evam tattvābhyāsān nāsmi na me nāham ity apariseşam, aviparyayād visuddham kevalam utpadyate jñānam. Even though this 'knowledge" arises from the study or analysis of the tattvas, this does not mean that one can achieve this realization simply by learning the number and function of the

100. See supra, under bhāvas.

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various evolutes or emergents of the system. Much more is in- volved. Jñāna or "knowledge" is one of the bhāvas and thus a basic striving or possible orientation in man's nature. It resides in the buddhi, which, as we have suggested, is a principle or evolute existing in the innermost core of man's nature. Thus the "study of the principles" implies much more than ordinary study. It implies, rather, a fundamental change in the basic orientation of a man. It implies a kind of intuitive realization or discrimination which separates out pure consciousness from everything that is not consciousness. This ultimate process of intuitive discrimination occurs in the buddhi (Kārikā XXXVII), and its effect is to expel everything from consciousness except consciousness itself.101 All notions of "I", all strivings, all thought, all the processes of ordinary existence are radically eliminated, and one is left only with the pure fact of conscious- ness. It is because of the radical nature of this ultimate dis- crimination that this "knowledge" is called "complete" (apari- Seşam), "pure" (visuddham), and "solitary" (kevalam) (Kārikā LXIV). It is consciousness emptied of all content and distinc- tion. Elsewhere this jñana or "knowledge" is called "secret" or a "mystery" (guhyam) (Kārikā LXIX), and one who has realized this "knowledge" is described as having achieved "isolation" or "abstraction" (kaivalya) (Kārikā LXVIII). That is, one who possesses this "knowledge" or has realized this ultimate intuitive discrimination exists or dwells apart from involvement in the manifest world. He dwells in abstract, pure isolation, a kind of translucent emptiness. "Emptiness" or "nothing- ness" appear to be appropriate terms, for the condition of sal- vation in classical Sâmkhya is the condition of the purusa in itself. It is the reversal of the dialectical relationship of prakrti and purușa. It is a condition in which consciousness is no longer consciousness of something. As a result, it is consciousness emptied of all content or a kind of translucent emptiness or no- thingness. Such a condition, of course, is the absence of life as ordinarily understood. It is a condition of absolute freedom, and it is a condition which is apart from all suffering.102

101. As noted above the buddhi "distinguishes" (visinasti) the purușa from the pradhāna or prakrti. It also "brings about" (sadhayati) the "enjoy- ment" (upabhogam) of the purusa. 102. For other discussions of the ultimate experience of salvation, see

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When this salvation-knowledge is achieved in the course of human existence, the man who possesses this "knowledge" nevertheless continues to exist in the context of the manifest world, for latent impulses (samskāras) from previous experience maintain his existence in the world until death (Kārikā LXVII).103 At death, however; the man who possesses salva- tion-knowledge attains "certain" and "final" "isolation" ( ... aikāntikam ātyantikam ubhayam kaivalyam āpnoti (Kārikā LXVIII)

CONCLUSION AND FINAL EVALUATION

In our interpretation of classical Samkhya we have focused attention on the fundamental dualism between individual consciousness (purusa), on the one hand, and the mass of un- differentiated being (prakrti), on the other. We have stressed the importance of the fact of consciousness in the emergence of the manifest world (vyakta), and we have emphasized the dialectic or interplay which takes place when purusa comes into proximity to prakrti. Our interpretation has attempted to show that classical Samkhya is a system of religious thought which seeks to understand the world and man's place in the world from the perspective of this fact of consciousness. This fact is the reason why there is a manifest world, although in itself purusa adds nothing to the world. The purusa only wit- nesses the world, but since its nature is to witness, it thus uses the world as an instrument for its own purposes and ends. In classical Samkhya the world is not derived from con- sciousness, nor is consciousness derived from the world. There is a fundamental dualism or split at the very heart of reality, and this dualism or split is the fundamental fact of existence. The classical Samkhya refuses to understand the world simply as a product of consciousness. It refuses to see the world as an illusory projection of consciousness, and thus it rejects any

Garbe, Die Sāmkhya Philosophie, op. cit., pp. 354-390; Dasgupta, History oj Indian Philosophy, p. cit., I pp. 264-268; Keith, The Samkhya System, op. cit., pp. 105-108; Frauwallner, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, op. cit., pp. 377-381; Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, op. cit., II, pp. 311 ff. For release as understood in later Samkhya see sutras VI 1-20, 58-70 in Garbe (ed. and trans.), Sāmkhya-Sūtra-Vrtti, op. cit., pp. 268-277, 299-309; and Garbe (trans.), Sāmkhyapravacanabhāsya, op. cit., pp. 333-342, 361-370. 103. Suryanarayana Sastri, Sāmkhyakārikā, op. cit., pp. 102-103.

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idealistic monism. Similarly, it refuses to see consciousness simply as a product of the world, and thus it rejects any kind of materialism or naturalism. Thus, it steers an intermediate course or path between the Indian notion of a conscious, cosmic Self or its equivalent, which is the ground of all being, on the one hand, and the notion of a conscious self which is only an empirical, relative construction, on the other. It maintains, rather, a fundamental dualism, the opposite poles of which function in a kind of dialectical interaction. The ultimate ground or foundation of man in classical Samkhya is this fact of consciousness, but this consciousness is not man's will or mind or self-awareness, or emotions, etc. It is, rather, the pure, translucent witness, which is at once the source of man's freedom and his suffering. This fact of consciousness makes man what he is. It is the radical founda- tion of his existence. The purpose of the classical Sāmkhya analysis is to grasp or comprehend this ultimate, translucent consciousness in order to overcome suffering and to find that condition of freedom and isolation which is consciousness in itself. Because the purusa or the ultimate ground of man's existence is only a witness, however, it can only be grasped or comprehended in terms of what it witnesses. Thus, the classical Samkhya attempts to analyze and comprehend what conscious- ness sees or witnesses in order ultimately to comprehend and discover that which witnseses. In other words, it describes everything that appears to consciousness for the purpose of eventually penetrating to consciousness itself. Ultimately, everything that appears to consciousness is eliminated or ex- pelled. The purusa in itself is apart from all strivings, all self- awareness, all discursive thought, etc. In itself the purusa is a kind of translucent emptiness, a pure witness. Thus, the classical Samkhya might be described as a kind of "logos" of that which appears to consciousness. The purpose of the analysis or study of that which appears is to reach or pene- trate to that for which and by means of which everything appears. The purpose of the analysis is puruşārtha - i.e., "for the sake of the purusa." By coming to know what purusa is not, one then has access to what purusa is. When one has access to what purusa is, one then has access to the intuitive discri- mination that purusa is radically distinct from everything that

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appears. When one has access to this intuitive discrimination, one then has access to the ultimate ground of human existence, which, according to classical Sāmkhya, is purua itself .· One then has reversed the normal tendency of human existence in the world, and one has attained the condition of "isolation" or "aloneness" or "solitariness" (kaivalya). One dwells in pure, translucent consciousness, but this consciousness is radi- cally emptied of all content. It is, thus, a kind of pure, trans- lucent emptiness which transcends everything in the manifest and unmanifest world.

EPILOGUE

ŚAŃKARA'S CRITIQUE OF CLASSICAL SĀŅKHYA If the amount of rigorous criticism directed at a philoso- phical position is any measure of a position's value and impor- tance, then the classical Sāmkhya enjoyed a privileged status in the intellectual history of India in the classical period. Classi- cal Sāmkhya had so many opponents that one can hardly deal with them without doing a history of Indian philosophy from the fourth through the tenth-century A.D. (including, for example, the critiques of Vātsyāyana, Dignāga, Dharma- kīrti, Kumārila, Prabhākara, Sankara, and possibly even Kamalaśīla, Vācaspatimiśra and Udayana). Nyāya, Vaiśe- şika and Mīmāmsā thinkers attacked the Sāmkhya notion of relation (samyoga or sambandha), of causation (satkāryavāda), and of the purusa as non-agent (akartr-bhāva). Buddhists (of all varieties) attacked the Sāmkhya notion of substance (prakrti and gunapariņāma) as well as its theory of a permanent self (purusa), the Sarvāstivāda Buddhists in particular being insultingly criticized by other Buddhists because their position appeared to be indistinguishable from the Samkhya theory of manifestation. Even the exponents of classical Yoga, though dependent throughout on the Samkhya epistemology and onto- logy, refused to accept the Sāmkhya denial of a "Lord" (iśvara). All would perhaps agree, however, that the most thorough- going and influential critique of classical Sāmkhya was that of the eighth-century Vedantin, Sankara - thoroughgoing in the sense that Śankara in his Vedānta-sūtra-bhāsya gives more detailed and precise attention to the criticism of Sāmkhya than he does to any other system, and influential in the sense that Sankara's critique not only encompasses most of the important critical issues in classical Sāmkhya in its own time but is considered to be a locus classicus for the criticism of Samkhya by orthodox thinkers down to the present day. Moreover, among modern critical scholars of the intellectual history of India (including Deussen, Keith, Stcherbatsky, Dasgupta, Radhakrishnan, and others), the critique of Sāmkhya by Śankara is widely used, and even Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, the Marxist historian

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of Indian thought, beats Samkhya over the head with the "idealist" club of Śańkara. 104 Although it has been rightly argued recently that Sankara's philosophical work is sometimes overrated, it cannot be seriously denied that the reputation of his critique of Sāmkhya is well- deserved, for in many ways it best typifies the kinds of issues generally pressed by the opponents of Samkhya within the Indian tradition itself.105 Sankara, of course, represents a specific intel- lectual position within the tradition, and naturally, therefore, his critique of Samkhya does not encompass all of the possible critical perspectives. The range of his criticism, however, at least exemplifies the issues that were being discussed polemically in the classical period, and there is considerable evidence in the Vedānta-sūtra-bhāsya that Śankara is self-consciously aware of the most important philosophical alternatives in the tradition as he presses his criticism of Sāmkhya. In one passage (I.4.28 and repeated again in II.1.12), for example, he argues that his critique of Sämkhya is also a critique of other traditions of Indian philosophizing.

... we have taken special trouble to refute the pradhāna doctrine, without paying much attention to the atomic and other theories. These latter theories, however, must likewise be refuted, as they also are opposed to the doc- trine of Brahman being the general cause. ... Hence the Sūtrakāra formally extends, in the above Sūtra, the refuta- tion already accomplished of the pradhāna doctrine to all similar doctrines which need not be demolished in detail after their protagonist, the pradhāna doctrine, has been so completely disposed of. (Thibaut, p. 289)

In other words, Sankara is framing his critique of Sāmkhya in a manner designed to address many of the fundamental issues

104. Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, Lokāyata : A Study in Ancient Indian Materialism, op. cit., pp. 369 ff. 105. I have used the following editions of Śankara's work throughout this section. George Thibaut (trans.) The Vedānta Sūtras of Bādarāyaņa with the Commentary by Sankara, Dover reprint of volume XXXIV and XXXVII of the Sacred Books of the East, 1890 and 1896 (New York : Dover, 1962); and for the Sanskrit, Brahamasūtra with Sankarabhāsya, Works of Sankara- carya in original Sanskrit, volume III (Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass 1964).

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being discussed generally within the tradition. Moreover, he is writing at a time - that is to say, roughly A.D. 750 - in whịch most of the classical philosophical positions had received their technical formulation. There appears to be a good deal of justification, therefore, for considering Sankara's critique as a locus classicus for the criticism of classical Samkhya within the Indian tradition itself. As mentioned earlier, however, a crucial problem for the interpreter of Samkhya is that there are no extant classical Sāmkhya texts which contain the Sāmkhya response to Śankara's critique (or any other critique for that matter). In the classical period there are only a series of commentaries on the Sāmkhya- kārikā, and the latter is not a polemical text in the manner of classical philosophical śāstra. Thus whereas there is a locus classicus within the tradition for the critique of classical Sāmkhya, there is no comparable locus classicus for the Sāmkhya response. The Sāmkhyasūtra, to be sure, is polemical, but as mentioned earlier it is a late text, and more importantly, is commented on (by Aniruddha, Vijňānabhiksu, and others) from a post-classical and syncretistic perspective. The interpreter of Sämkhya, therefore, is dependent on the statement of the pūrva-paksa - that is to say, on the preliminary exposition of the view to be criticized by the critic himself (in this instance, Śankara) - together with whatever can be reconstructed about what the Samkhya response could have been based on the texts that are available. This is admittedly an unsatisfactory situa- tion, but in the absence of additional Sāmkhya texts it is the only method that can be employed. In the following, there- fore, I shall present the structure and content of Sankara's critique and then proceed to reconstruct what the classical Samkhya response could have been. Sankara begins his critique of Sāmkhya in his commen- tary on Vedānta-sūtra I.1.5-11 and 18; continues with it in I.4.1-28; proceeds further with it in II.1.1-11; and concludes his refutation in II.2.1-10. Sankara claims that his treatment of the Sāmkhya in four different sections of his Bhāsya is deter- mined by his role as bhāsya-kāra (commentator) ) on Bādarā- yana's sutras. Whether or not one accepts Sankara's claim that he is simply following Bādarāyana - the evidence, according to Thibaut and others, appears to be that he is not - the structure

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and content of Sankara's critique moves through four distinct phases, the basic argument in each section of which may be summarized as follows : 106

(A) Section I.1.5-11 and 18. The authoritative passages of Scripture (śruti, vedānta-vākya) uniformly teach that Brahman is the omniscient and omnipotent cause of the world (brahma ... sarvajñam sarvaśakti jagadutpattisthitilayakāraņam iti uktam, Sanskrit edition, p. 18). The followers of classical Sāmkhya, how- ever, assert on the basis of inference that the cause of the world is unconscious "nature" (pradhana), and they assert further that the notion of pradhāna is consistent with the teachings of Scripture (vedānta- vākya) (samkhyāh pradhānam triguņam acetanam svatantram jagataḥ kāraņam iti manyamānā āhuḥ, Sanskrit edition, p. 19). (B) Section I.4.1-28. The followers of Samkhya claim that their views are actually expressed in authori- tative passages of Scripture, and, hence, it is neces- sary to show. that all such passages mean other than what the followers of Samkhya suggest (tad yāvat teşām śabdānām anyaparatvam na pratipādyate tāvat sarvajñam brahma jagataḥ kāraņam iti pratipāditam api ākulībhavet. atas teşām anyaparatvam darśayi- tum parah samdarbhah pravartate, Sanskrit edition, p. 113). (C) Section II.1.1-11. The followers of Sāmkhya argue that their views are also independently based on authoritative tradition (smrti) and reasoning (tarka) and, hence, it is necessary to show (a) that Scripture (vedānta-vākya) takes precedence over smrti when there is a contradiction among smrtis (vipratipattau ca smrtinām avaśyakartavye 'nyataraparigrahe 'nyatara- parityāge ca śrutyanusārinyah smrtayaḥ pramāņam, Sanskrit, p. 141); and (b) that reasoning (tarka)

106. See volume I of the Thibaut translation, pp. 46-64, 70-71, 237-289, 290-318 and 363-381. In the Sanskrit edition, see pp. 18-26, 61-62, 113-131, 140-152 and 174-182.

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must always be used as a "subordinate auxiliary" within the context of Scripture (śrutyanugrhita eva hi atra tarko ... āśrīyate, Sanskrit, p. 148). (D) Section II.2.1-10. Because others (of inferior intelli- gence) might be attracted to the rationalism of Sāmkhya, it is also necessary to refute the Sāmkhya on purely rational grounds, quite apart from śruti and smrti (iha tu vākyanirapeksaḥ svatantras tad yukti- pratişedhaḥ kriyata iti eşa viśesaḥ, Sanskrit, p. 175).

The intellectual and emotional intensity of Sankara's critique clearly suggests that classical Sāmkhya was at that time a potent philosophical position subscribed to by a variety of thoughtful persons. More than that, however, classical Sāmkhya philo- sophers claimed Vedic authority for their views, and this fact more than anything else helps to explain the intensity of Sankara's refutation. In the Introduction to II.2.1-10, Śankara comments as follows regarding his motivation.

As the Sankhyas and other philosophers also quote, in order to establish their own positions, the Vedānta-pass- ages (vedānta-vākya) and interpret them in such a manner as to make them agree with their own systems, we have hitherto endeavoured to show that their interpretations are altogether fallacious. (Thibaut, p. 364)

... there is some danger of men of inferior intelligence (manda-mati) looking upon the Sānkhya and similar systems as requisite for perfect knowledge (samyag darśana), because those systems have a weighty appearance, have been adopted by authoritative persons (mahājana), and profess to lead to perfect knowledge (samyag darśana). Such people might therefore think that those systems with their abstruse arguments (yukti-gādhatva) were propounded by omniscient (sarvajña) sages and might on that account have faith in them. For this reason we must endeavour to demonstrate their intrinsic worthlessness. (Thibaut, p. 364)

Turning now to the specific content of Sankara's critique,

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it should be noticed, first of all, that in sections (A), (B) and (C) (namely, I.1.5-11 and 18; I.4.1-28; and II.1.1-11), the issues under discussion relate to the role and function of śruti (scripture), smrti (authoritative tradition), and tarka (reason- ing) in the knowing situation. It is only in section (D) (namely, II.2.1-10) that Śankara criticizes Sāmkhya from a rational point of view apart from śruti and smrti. A modern philosophical interpreter might be tempted, therefore, to pass over sections (A), (B) and (C) and move directly to (D). Such would be a gross caricature of Sankara's critique, however, for it is clearly the case that Sankara himself considers his critique in (A), (B) and (C) as being primary whereas his comments in (D) are set forth almost as an afterthought. Basic to Śan- kara's philosophical position is the primacy of śruti as a pramāņa or means of knowledge, which always takes precedence over perception, inference or any other means of knowledge with respect to attaining "perfect knowledge" (samyag darśana). Reasoning by itself lacks a firm foundation.

We see how arguments, which some clever men had ex- cogitated with great pains, are shown by people still more ingenious, to be fallacious, and how the arguments of the latter again are refuted in their turn by other men; so that, on account of the diversity of men's opinions, it is impossible to accept mere reasoning as having a sure foundation. (Thibaut, p. 315)

Furthermore, Śankara asserts, "perfect knowledge" (samyag darśana) " ... on account of its excessive abstruseness, (cannot) even be thought of without the help of the holy texts" (Thibaut, p. 316). Śankara then asserts,

Our final position, therefore, is that on the ground of Scripture and of reasoning subordinate to Scripture, the intelligent Brahman is to be considered the cause and substance of the world. (Thibaut, p. 317)

He draws this conclusion in section (C), thus making clear the basis for his lengthy interpretations of śruti and smrti in (A) and (B), and also making clear that his position as set forth

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in (A), (B) and (C) is fundamental for section (D). If Śankara had not argued in this manner, then his own rational critique of Sāmkhya in (D) would be useless, for Śankara him- self would be caught up in the very infinite regress of which he accuses his opponents who rely on reasoning (namely, "We see how arguments, which some clever men had excogitated with great pains, are shown by people still more ingenious to be fallacious ... etc.,"see above). Again, Śankara makes the same point in a positive way when criticizing Sāmkhya and Yoga at another place in section (C).

We willingly allow room for those portions of the two systems (namely Sānkhya and Yoga) which do not contradict the Veda. (Thibaut, p. 298)

That for which room is allowed includes the notion of Self as free from qualities (nirguna), the rules of discipline (yoga) for mendicants, and so forth. That for which room is not allowed includes

(a) pradhāna as "unconscious" (acetana) and independent (svatantra); (b) the plurality of selves (puruşa-bahutva); (c) buddhi, or mahat, etc., as derived from pradhāna;

because these principles are not founded in śruti (Thibaut, pp. 295-296). In śruti Brahman is revealed to be the operative cause (nimitta-kāraņa), the material cause (upādāna-kāraņa), the omniscient (and, hence, conscious) (sarvajña, cetana), omni- potent (sarvaśakti) source (yoni) of the world (jagat), function- ing through māyā, iśvara and avidyā; or, as cited earlier, " ... the intelligent Brahman is to be considered the cause and substance of the world" (Thibaut, p. 317). To allow for an independent and "unconscious" (acetana) material cause (pradhāna) is to allow independent existence to something other than Brahman ontologically, and even more than that, is to allow for a means of knowing (namely, pramāņa as anumāna or "inference") inde- pendent of śruti on the level of the highest truth (samyag darsana) epistemologically. In other words, according to Sankara, reasoning is incompetent to fathom the highest truth (parama

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gambhirasya jagatkāraņasya tarkānavagāhyatvam, Sanskrit, p. 153, and Thibaut, p. 318). By way of reeonstructing the Smkhya response to the basic thrust of Sankara's argument thus far in sections (A), (B) and (C), I shall use Śankara's own exposition of Sāmkhya together with the general outline of the Samkhya position as set forth in the Sāmkhyakārikā. The Sāmkhya rejoinder might be developed as follows. Śankara is quite right in affording śruti a legitimate and important place as a means of knowing (pramāna), but Śankara's position is such that it introduces an extreme dichotomy into the knowing situation that is totally unwarranted. There is an "ordinary" knowing and an "extraordinary" know- ing in the Vedānta position, but the Vedāntin so separates the two that he makes.the very notion of "knowing" unintelligible. The highest truth (samyag darsana) cannot be fathomed by ordinary reasoning; indeed, it cannot" ... even be thought of without the help of the holy texts." If that is the case, the Sāmkhya thinker might ask, in what sense is it legitimate to use the term "knowing" in the two contexts ? If "knowing" in the ordinary sense is accepted as an interpretation of cognition, then the "highest truth" must be different in kind from cognition in that sense, and vice versa, if "knowing " in the extraordinary sense is accepted as an interpretation of cognition, then the ordinary sense of knowing must be set aside. If one accepts the latter of these two interpretations, as does Sankara, then one must give up any hope of rendering ordinary experience intelligible (because intelligibility resides solely on the level of "highest truth" or samyag darśana). Because of this extreme dichotomy in the knowing situation, one is forced to interpret the everyday world of ordinary experience in terms of avidyā (epistemologically) and māyā (ontologically). Epistemologi- cally, our everyday experience of the world must become anirva- caniya or "uncharacterizable." Śankara thinks that this extreme dichotomy in knowing is essential in order to preserve the validity of śruti as pramāna, but by introducing such an ex- treme dichotomy he defeats his own purpose. He has stretched the notions of pramāna and "knowing" to such an extent that they no longer have any ordinary significance. One is left with blind obedience to śruti, and the only significant intellectual enterprise is the one ofreducing all ordinary knowing to extraordinary knowing.

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Such an extreme dichotomy in knowing, however, is un- necessary. To be sure, the Samkhya thinker might say, there is a distinction between ordinary discrimination and the ultimate discrimination between purusa and prakrti, but this distinction is not one in kind. It is only a distinction in degree or in inten- sity. There is unity in the knowing situation, although there is also methodological diversity. That is to say, there is a unified realm for knowing (namely the twenty-five tattvas), but there are various means for knowing it and various kinds of discri- mination to be accomplished. "Reliable authority" (āptavacana or śruti) is one means, but perception (drsta, pratyaksa) and inference (anumāna) are also legitimate means. The various means of knowing do not contradict one another, but rather supplement one another in the sense that each means of knowing provides access to truth in a unique manner. Perception pro- vides access to the pleasure, pain and indifference (priti, apriti, and vişāda) of ordinary experience (both external and internal) by means of the sense-capacities (including manas or mind), and this ordinary experience always functions in the presence of the ego (ahamkāra) and the intellect (buddhi) in immediacy. Inference provides access to a more general or mediate level of truth (encompassing the levels of ordinary experience and samyag darśana as well) by means of reasoning from ordinary experience to the more general principles invariably associated with ordinary experience and required in order to have ordinary experience. Reliable authority (aptavacana) provides access to the intuitive discrimination experienced by the Vedic seers and other highly accomplished rsis by means of their trustworthy verbal testi- mony as found in the Veda and authoritative smrtis. If śruti should on occasion appear to contradict perception and infer- ence, then a mistake has been made in the interpretation of śruti, for śruti ought not to contradict ordinary knowing. It can only confirm, extend and enrich ordinary knowing. Thus, there is a cotinuum in the knowing situation which extends from the level of purusa and prakrti to the level of perceiving a jar on the ground. The intellectual enterprise, therefore, is one of discriminating the various levels in the knowing situation. The extreme dichotomy, which Sankara introduces on the level of knowing, classical Samkhya introduces instead on the level of being, or putting the matter another way, there is

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one kind of knowing but two kinds of being. Moreover, the Sāmkhya thinker might continue, a distinction must be main- tained between being and knowing. Knowing occurs in being (namely in prakrti as buddhi when in the presence of purusa), but knowing qua knowing does not change being. Knowing as a function of buddhi discriminates the various levels of being and is ultimately capable of discriminating purusa from prakrti (or, in other words, samyag darśana). Wrong knowledge in the Sāmkhya is neither a metaphysical entity nor an ontological problem as it is for Sankara and the Vedanta. Wrong knowing is simply the failure to make relevant distinctions whether on the level of purusa and prakrti or on the level of the rope-snake. Ordinary experience, according to Sāmkhya, makes us aware of a world of jars, dishes, bodies, ideas, pleasures, pains and so forth; and inference enables us to reason that all such effects in our manifest experience presuppose a general, ultimate cause in which all such effects reside, namely prakrti or pradhāna. Similarly, ordinary experience makes us aware that conscious- ness always shows itself as other than jars, dishes, etc., together with the awareness of a desire for freedom or release; and inference enables us to reason that consciousness (purusa) is radi- cally distinct from the world of entities. It appears to be the case that consciousness (purusa) is inextricably bound up with entities, but knowing or discrimination shows us finally that such is not the case. Returning now to Sankara's critique of the Sāmkhya in sections (A), (B) and (C), the following can be said vis-à-vis the issue of sruti. If Sankara's exposition of the Sāmkhya pūrva- paksa is reasonably correct, it appears that the followers of Sām- khya utilized the following texts of śruti to support their position : Chāndogya Up., VI (the Śvetaketu passages); Bṛhadāranyaka Up. IV.4.17 (the passage about five pentads); Bhadāranyaka IV.5.6 (the Yajñavalkya-Maitreyi dialogue); Katha Up .; Śvetāśvatara Up .; Kauşītaki Up .; and many others. Also, according to Śankara, the followers of Sāmkhya found support for their views in the Bhagavad Gita, Manu-smrti, and other smrti-texts; and most interestingly, the Kapila-tantra itself (that is to say, the Sām- khya tradition) claimed smrti-status for itself in classical times. Perhaps most important, however, according to Sankara, the followers of Samkhya argued that there are many discrepancies

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in the śruti regarding the origin of the world and that, therefore, śruti cannot be interpreted simply in terms of itself. The śruti must always be construed along with smrti and reasoning. It is neither possible nor necessary in this context to enter into the detailed debates between Sankara and the followers of Sämkhya regarding the interpretation of specific passages. Suffice it to say, however, that the Samkhya, far from being antagonistic to the Vedic tradition, clearly utilized śruti in its on-going intellectual enterprise. Also, on the testimony of Śankara himself, it enjoyed a wide following within orthodox circles. Sāmkhya differed fundamentally from Śankara, how- ever, in the importance it ascribed to reasoning as an indepen- dent and fully legitimate pramāna for the ascertainment of "per- fect knowledge" (samyag darśana). For Śankara "perfect knowledge" is established on the ground of Scripture " ... and of reasoning subordinate to Scripture." For Sāmkhya perfect knowledge is established on the ground of reasoning and of Scripture subordinate to reasoning. For Śankara philosophy is the handmaiden of "theology." For Sāmkhya "theology" is the handmaiden of philosophy. In the fourth section of his critique of Sāmkhya (namely section D above, or II.2.1-10), Śankara finally addresses himself to the purely rational dimension of the Sāmkhya position. Śankara's polemic may be summarized as follows :

(a) Sāmkhya argues that just as jars, dishes, and so forth, possess a common quality of clay in general as their unconscious (acetana) material cause (kāraņa), so all inner and outer effects of experience character- ized by pleasure, pain and indifference possess a general pleasure, pain and indifference as their ultimate material cause; and that ultimate material cause is the unconscious pradhana which is constituted by pleasure, pain and indifference (sattva, rajas, and tamas) in general. This argument, however, is counter-intuitive. That is to say, our ordinary experience does not show this, or, in Indian terms, the drstanta or the example which illustrates the general proposition is inadequate. We notice in the world houses, palaces, couches, and so forth,

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and we notice also that they are made by workmen endowed with consciousness. Moreover, we notice the entire animate and inanimate world of which the most clever artisan cannot even conceive. How is it possible to suggest that all of this is caused by an unconscious (acetana) pradhāna ? Just as a potter is required for turning clay into a pot, so the pradhāna must be ruled by an intelligent principle, and that intelligent (cetana) principle must be both the operat- ive as well as the material cause of the world. Stones and pieces of earth do not possess such powers. (see II.2.1) (b) Likewise, the ground of inference (namely, the three gunas as the hetu or so-called "middle term" of the Sāmkhya argument) is absent from the so-called major term of the proposition (namely, the universe), since the experiences of pleasure, pain, and so forth, are internal whereas objects are external. It would be more correct to argue that external objects generate pleasure in some, pain in others, and so forth, (see II.2.1) (c) Again, positing a general sattva, rajas and tamas as the ultimate material cause requires still another ultimate material cause because the gunas limit one another and, hence, cannot be ultimate. (see II.2.1) (d) In addition, Sāmkhya asserts that the three gunas in their ultimate causal state are in a balanced state or equilibrium. In order for them to produce effects, they must move out of the state of equilibrium, but an unconscious pradhāna in balanced equilibrium cannot so move. An intelligent (cetana) operative cause or principle is necessary to initiate movement or activity, but the Sāmkhya purusa is totally inactive (akartrbhāva) and, hence, there is nothing that can initiate the production of effects. In view of this, how can the pradhana ever modify itself ? And even if it did modify itself, how could it ever stop modify- ing ?. (see II.2.2, II.2.4, II.2.8 and II.2.9) (e) Yet again, Sāmkhya asserts that pradhāna serves the "purposes" of puruşa (puruşārtha namely upabhoga, and

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apavarga or "enjoyment" and" release"), but how can that which is unconscious (acetana) serve a "purpose" ? If the example of unconscious milk serving the purpose of a calf is cited, it must be remembered that the unconscious milk resides in an animate creature (namely the cow). Also, if pradhāna provides "enjoy- ment" for the purusa, how is this possible in view of the fact that purusa is incapable of experiencing pleasure, pain, and so forth ? If pradhāna provides "release", then it must be said that such a purpose is pointless, since, according to Sāmkhya, purușa is already released even prior to the activity of the guņas. Also, if it is argued that purusa and prakrti function svabhava (by their "own or inherent nature"), then the manifest world would never come to an end. That is to say, both principles would function according to their "own nature" endlessly in the absence of some third principle to hinder the func- tioning. (see II.2.3, II.2.5 and II.2.6) (f) Furthermore, if purusa is simply a witness, totally inactive (akartrbhāva), indifferent (audāsīnya), and constituted as consciousness (cetana); and if pradhāna is active (gunapariņāma) and unconscious (acetana); and if ontologically both are radically distinct; then how can one possibly influence the other? If there are two real things (namely, pradhāna and purușa), then there must be some sort of relation between them, yet Samkhya denies that the two are related. More- over, if purușa is radically distinct from pradhāna, then in what sense can one speak of bondage and release. The purusa is always released, and if that is the case, how can it become bound ? If the purusa is always radically separate from pradhana, why and how does the pradhana become active ? The example cited in the Sāmkhyakārikā, of the lame man and the blind man cooperating with one another is of no use, because it presupposes what Sāmkhya denies. That is to say, the lame man and the blind man are both conscious and act together for their mutual benefit. Sāmkhya, however, denies that

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both purușa and pradhāna are conscious, and more than that, denies any capacity for action on the part of the purusa. Likewise, the example of a magnet does not work. If purusa is like a magnet, then it will continually bring about transformation in the pra- dhāna and release will become impossible. If one argues that a magnet can be removed from that which it influences, then this presupposes some third principle, apart from purusa and pradhāna, that accom- plishes the removal, but the Sāmkhya denies that there is any third principle that could mediate this extreme dualism. (see II.2.7, II.2.8, II.2.10)

From a rational point of view, therefore, classical Sāmkhya is a bundle of contradictions that cannot be logically explained. pradhānakāraņavādo nirākrtaḥ. "The pradhāna-doctrine (namely, the Sāmkhya) has now been completely refuted." In reconstructing what the classical Sāmkhya response could have been, I shall assume throughout that the reader has carefully reviewed Chapter III in this book ("An Interpretation of the Meaning of Classical Samkhya"). In other words, I shall not repeat here the more detailed treatment of the Sām- khya position and terminology as set forth there. I shall simply assume that the reader is familiar with the overall Samkhya position. The Samkhya response to Sankara's critique, then, could have been point by point as follows :

(a) In criticizing the Sāmkhya notion of pradhāna, Śankara has overlooked or perhaps misconstrued a funda- mental distinction in the Sāmkhya position. Śankara asserts that the Sāmkhya inference is counter-intui- tive because we notice in our ordinary experience that things like houses, etc., are made by workmen endowed with consciousness. Also, Sankara argues that the entire animate and inanimate world in its intricate and marvelous design must have had a conscious operative cause. Stones and clods of earth do not have such powers. Śankara conveniently

THE SĀMKHYA RESPONSE 223

ignores, however, that Sāmkhya does not argue that the pradhāna is like a stone or a clod of earth. Sāmkhya refers to jars, dishes, and so forth, as an illustration that the empirical world of distinctions (effects) requires an ultimate material, cause. The ultimate material cause, however, is not a stone or a dish. The ultimate material cause is made up of sattva, rajas and tamas, or thought, activity and stuff or inertia. The material cause encompasses intellect (buddhi), ego (ahamkāra) and mind (manas) as well as subtle and gross matter. According to Sāmkhya, cognition, self-awareness, intellectual elaboration and all conative decisions and acts are to be construed as manifestations of subtle matter. Sāmkhya is not a dualism of mind and body or even a dualism of subject and object. Intellect, will, self-awareness and gross objects are all products (or effects) of pradhāna. Thus, when Sankara asserts that houses and so forth are made by workmen, the Samkhya fully concurs. Also, Samkhya fully concurs that the entire world with its intricate and marvelous design requires an all-powerful operative cause. The workmen and the all-powerful operative cause, however, are as much aspects of pradhāna as are jars, dishes and houses. The notion of pradhāna in Sāmkhya signifies a closed, causal system of reductive materialism.107 Subtle and gross matter interact and run parallel with one another on every level. Awareness, cogni- tion, etc., are all manifestations of pradhāna as are jars and stones, and the manifest world is an intelligible whole, encompassing all distinctions (whether mental or physical) and functioning by its own inherent capacity (svabhāva). Sāmkhya also wants to argue, however, that this closed causal system of pradhāna, which includes the mental and

107. By "reductive materialism" I mean a philosophical view which construes or "reduces" mind, thought, ideas, feelings, etc., in terms of some sort of material stuff or energy or force. The expression "reductive material- ism" has been used in recent philosophical writing - for example, in the work of Kai Nielsen, J. J. C. Smart and others.

224 CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA.

physical, has nothing whatever to do with purusa or consciousness. Putting it another way that addresses the critique of Sankara, Sāmkhya wants to argue that "consciousness" (cetana) has to be distinguished from "awareness" (antahkaraņa-vrtti or citta-vrtti). Sāmkhya, therefore, would restate Sankara's point that houses and so forth are made by workmen "endowed with consciousness" to read, rather, by workmen "endowed with awareness" - that is to say, endowed with intellect, determination, ego or self- awareness and mind. Likewise this entire manifest world is endowed with awareness. Whereas "aware- ness" (antahkaraņa-vrtti) is the intellectual, emotional and conative reflection of pradhāna, consciousness (puruşa, cetana) is a passive witness (sākșin), a trans- lucent medium in which and for which pradhāna functions. Whereas "awareness" is the reflective content of all manifestation, "consciousness" is the contentless medium in which and for which manifestation shows itself. "Consciousness" as a translucent witness without content cannot function, therefore, as a material cause or as an operative cause. Whereas "awareness" is both "creative" and "creat- ed" (prakṛti and vikrti), "consciousness" is neither (na parkrtir na vikrtih puruşah, Kārikā III). Sāmkhya there- fore, can easily meet this first objection of Śankara. This is not to suggest that the Samkhya distinction between "consciousness" and "awareness" is not problematic. Clearly it is. Yet Sankara's criticism does not really raise this problem, and as such his critique misses the mark. (b) and (c) That the pradhana is a closed causal system of reductive materialism also provides a response to the next two objections of Sankara. For Sāmkhya such distinctions as "external" and "internal," "substance" and "quality" "material cause" and "operative cause," "subject" and "object" are only manifestations or transformations (parināma) of the causal system of pradhāna. The term guņa in Sām- khya is not construed to mean "quality" or "attribute"

THE SAMKHYA RESPONSE 225

as it is in Nyāya, Vaiśesika and other systems which distinguish a substance from its "attributes" or "quali- ties." For Sāmkhya the term guna signifies a second- ary manifestation of pradhana and as such actually constitutes the pradhāna. The causal system is a cognition-system of sensing, thinking, feeling and willing; an energy-system of continual change and creative manifestation; and a reification-system of constituted objects (both internal and external, subtle and gross); all functioning together in dialec- tical transformations wherein any given manifestation presupposes the entire functioning system. Logically or analytically, any manifestation is simply a "part" of the totally functioning "whole." Empirically or synthetically, any manifestation is an effect which pre-exists in its ultimate cause. Combination and change occur throughout the system and come to be conceptualized or reflected on a mental level as space and time that can be measured, but measurable space and time are not categories separate from pradhāna. Space and time are, rather, derived correlates of the functioning system, and, hence, always relative to the system.108 Thus, when Sankara argues that the experiences of pleasure, pain and indifference, which are "internal" are different from sounds, etc., which are "external," or when Sankara argues that the gunas themselves presuppose yet another cause because they are limited, he shows in his polemic that he has misunderstood the Samkhya position. Śankara evidently wants to force Sāmkhya into the position of naive realism, but the Sāmkhya inter- pretation of pradhāna as guņapariņāma, satkārya, tattva- vikāra, and antaḥkaraņa-vrtti precludes such a critique. (d) Regarding the problem of the gunas in a balanced

108. Regarding space and time in classical Sāmkhya, the classical texts say nothing, but the later Sāmkhyasūtra (in II. 12) appears to document the view that I am arguing. See also K. C. Bhattacharya's interpretation of space, time and causality in Samkhya in his Studies in Philosophy, volume I, op. cit., pp. 165-172. In my judgment, the classical Sāmkhya position appears to require some such interpretation of space and time.

226 CLASSICAL SĀŅKHYA

state or equilibrium and how the process of mani- festation gets started, the important issue has to do with the interpretation of time in classical Sāmkhya and whether Samkhya views the process of emergence as a temporal process within measurable time. We have already noticed above (see footnote 108), how- ever, that the Sāmkhya position appears to require that measurable space and time are derived corre- lates of a beginningless process of combination and change. Moreover, we know from the Sāmkhya- kārikā that purusa is both beginningless and all-per- vasive. There could never be a "time", therefore, when purua was not in proximity to pradhāna, and, hence, it appears to be the case that Sāmkhya is not describing a "temporal" process of emergence in the sense of measurable time. One has to argue, then, that the notion of mūlaprakrti (with its gunas in a balanced state or equilibrium) in classical Sāmkhya functions as a kind of logical construct or regulative idea in the context of the process of beginningless change and combination, but may become a genuine possibility for realization on the part of a buddhi in the context of manifestation in which measurable time shows itself. Putting the matter another way, apart from derived, measurable time, the process of combination and change has neither a beginning nor an end. The notions of "beginning" and "end" are relative constructs within the com- bination and change of manifestation occasioned by aviveka or non-discrimination. When the buddhi discriminates "consciousness" (purusa) from itself, it merely realizes what has always been true and what will always be true, namely, that there is a process of beginningless and endless change and combination to which contentless consciousness is present but by which it is not determined. In other words, buddhi realizes the "isolation" or "freedom" (kaivalya) of consciousness together with what can subsequently only show itself as a balanced state or equilibrium of continuous gunapariņāma, a gunapariņāma no longer

THE SĀMKHYA RESPONSE 227

conceived as tattva-vikāra because the condition necessary for tattva-vikāra (namely aviveka) no longer is the case. If this is a possible interpretation of the Samkhya position, then the question which Sankara asks about how the process gets started cannot arise as an ontological question but can only arise as an epistemological issue and can be answered as indicated above. (e) Śankara next calls into question the notion of "pur- pose" (artha), and here again it is necessary to clarify what the important issue is. When the followers of Sāmkhya describe pradhāna as a dancer, or a ser- vant, or unconscious milk, they are using metaphors and poetic language to describe what occurs as a result of the presence of consciousness (purusa) to the causal process of manifestation (prakṛti or pradhāna). The term "purpose" is not to be taken literally, for by definition purusa as contentless consciousness pre- cludes any ordinary "purpose." Contentless con- sciousness (purusa) appears as what it is not, but its contentlessness can only show itself vis-à-vis what it is not (namely, the manifestations of emergent prakrti). Similarly, pradhāna appears as what it is not. Its manifest effects and activities appear as if they are conscious (Kārikā XX). Ordinary "awareness" (antahkarana-vrtti) appears to be "consciousness" (purușa), and the failure to discriminate (aviveka) the difference between "awareness" and "consciousness" brings about the experience of suffering and bondage. Suffering, therefore, occurs because of a fundamental non-discrimination on the highest level of causal manifestation, namely the level of buddhi, but given the nature of purusa as contentless consciousness, it is hard to imagine that consciousness could show itself in any other manner. In other words, suffering can be said to occur spontaneously or as it is put in Kārika LV " ... therefore, suffering is of the nature of things" ( ... tasmād duhkham svabhävena). Yet the other side of this double negation, which occasions aviveka or non-discrimination, must also be taken into account.

228 CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA

If contentless consciousness (purusa) appears as what it is not, so also buddhi appears as what it is not. The natural function of buddhi, however, is discrimination or ascertainment (adhyavasāya). Just as contentless consciousness appears spontaneously as what it is not, thereby showing itself in buddhi as suffering, so buddhi within the context of manifest experience functions spontaneously to separate and distinguish what it is' not. To be sure, according to Sāmkhya, the buddhi has.other functions as well, including the various transactions that occur because of the other "pre- dispositions" (bhāvas) which reside in the buddhi, but the buddhi's most important function from the perspective of "perfect knowledge" (samyag darśana or viveka-khyāti) is its basic predisposition (bhāva) towards discrimination (jñana). Thus in classical Samkhya the tendency to suffer as well as the tendency to seek discrimination occur spontaneously. Crucial to recognize in these transactions, however, is that purușa as contentless consciousness does not have to do anything or to act in any manner. It need only be what it is. The buddhi, on the other hand, though a product of pradhāna occasioned by the presence of consciousness appearing as what it is not, must act by way of discriminating itself from what it is not thus bringing about knowledge on all levels including, finally, the realization of "freedom" or "isolation" (kaivalya). Because purușa as contentless conscious- ness, by simply being what it is, provides the occasion for the manifestation of buddhi, and because purusa, by simply being what it is, shows itself finally as the princi- ple of freedom by the discriminating buddhi, it can be said that the closed causal system of prakrti or pradhāna functions "for the sake of purusa" or "for the purpose of purusa." The manifest pradhāna (namely buddhi), therefore, provides upabhoga ("experience," "enjoy- ment") and apavurga (the realization of "release") vis-à-vis purușa. The purușa does not, indeed cannot, "do" anything, but that it is makes all the difference. (f) Śankara's final criticism raises what must be conceded

THE SĀMKHYA RESPONSE 229

to be the most problematic issue in the Sāmkhya position, and for that matter in almost any position in classical Indian philosophizing, namely, the issue of relation. On the one hand, within the context of unmanifest and manifest prakrti, the followers of Sāmkhya deal with the problem of relation largely in terms of "part" and "whole" and "cause" and "effect," and on this level the Sāmkhya position implies what Karl H. Potter has called a "strong dependence relation." The closed causal system of prakṛti appears to be a consistent reductive material- ism encompassing the subtle discriminations of intellect as well as the jar on the ground. Within the parameters of the closed causal system, dependence relations are so strong as to preclude any meaningful freedom within "awareness" (antahkarana-vrtti) other than a posture of acquiescence to the beginningless process of combination and change, and even a posture of acquiescence can arise only as a cognitive reflection derivative of the beginningless process. Although intellect or buddhi is the primary factor within the causal system, thus separating Sāmkhya on this level from a form of crude materialism, never- theless the system clearly assigns only an epipheno- menal status to the buddhi making it as much a product or effect of prakrti as is a jar or a clod of earth. On the other hand, however, the followers of Sāmkhya also want to argue that such a description is incomplete; or, perhaps better, such a description is insufficiently discriminating (that is to say, aviveka). Reflection or meditation on experience shows, according to the followers of Samkhya, that the closed causal system cannot account for the spontaneous tendency within experience to seek freedom or release nor for that matter can it account for the beginningless process of change and combination of which reflection itself is a product. Something always escapes formulation in the reflect- ive, discriminating process. This "something" is neither subjectivity (as buddhi, ahamkāra or manas)

230 CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA

nor objectivity, yet this "something" allows both to appear. This "something" cannot itself think or feel or imagine or do anything, yet it appears to be a presence whenever cognitions, feelings, images or transformations occur. This "something" shows itself as not anything, yet it allows everything to appear. In attempting to describe this "something" Sāmkhya uses terms like "witnessing," "isolated," "uninvolved," "seeing," and "non-acting," but undoubtedly the followers of Samkhya recognize that such terms are only symbolic and derived from our manifest experience. In the Kārikā these adjectival or attributive characteristics are turned into abstract nouns : sākșitva ("the condition of being a witness"), kaivalya ("the condition of being isolated or sepa- rate"), mādhyasthya ("the condition of being unin- volved"), drastrtva ("the condition of seeing"), and akartrbhāva ("the condition of being inactive") (Karika XIX). In other words, whatever this "some- thing" is, it is not adjectival to prakrti but, rather, a contentless medium or transparency apart from prakrti through which and for which prakrti shows itself. Whereas it is reasonably clear how classical Sāmkhya deals with the problem of relation from within the context of prakrti - that is to say, the relation of "part" 'and "whole" and the relation of cause and effect - it is not as clear how Samkhya deals with the issue of the relation between purusa and prakrti. The relation cannot be one of identity, for then purusa and prakrti would simply collapse into one another. Furthermore, the relation cannot be one of "inhe- rence" (samavāya), for Sāmkhya refuses to accept a real distinction between categories like substance, quality, motion, universals, and so forth, even within the context of prakrti. Likewise, "contact" (samyoga) is a problematic notion, although the term is used in the Sāmkhyakārikā, because within Indian philo- sophy "contact" tends to be viewed as a quality, and Sāmkhya does not recognize such a category. Simi-

THE SĀMKHYA RESPONSE 231

larly, the relation of operative cause and effect is not helpful, since purusa neither "acts" nor "thinks" nor "sees" in any ordinary sense, and a contentless "something" can in no intelligible sense be said to be acted upon. It is perhaps tempting to suggest that purusa or consciousness is the presupposition or foundation for all relations and as such cannot be construed in terms of a particular relation, but this would obviously come dangerously close to positing an identity between. prakṛti and purușa or to reducing purușa to a purely relational notion in general. In the one case, consci- ousness would be reduced to prakrti or prakrti to cons- ciousness, which would inevitably lead either to thoroughgoing materialism or some kind of idealism. In the other case, consciousness would be reduced to the notion of relation as such, which would inevitably lead to some kind of Buddhistic perspective. The followers of Sāmkhya reject all of these possibili- ties and assert, rather, the admittedly paradoxical claim that, finally, there is no relation between purusa and prakrti other than that of sheer presence (sākșitva). Consciousness or purusa is the transparent witness in which and through which prakrti functions. Cons- ciousness, therefore, cannot be acted upon nor can it act. It cannot be bound or released. When not discriminated it appears as what it is not, but even that appearing is only a manifestation of what it is in its contentlessness and as revealed on the level of the buddhi. Therefore, whatever "influence" purusa exerts is only the purely passive "influence" of its sheer presence. Similarly, when it is discriminated as con- tentless consciousness, the discrimination is accomp- lished by the buddhi. The illustrations of the lame man and the blind man or of the magnet, then, are only used to suggest the general principle that two separate entities or things, when construed with one another, may lead to a common result. The illustra- tions are not meant to provide information about the content or nature of the two things or entities, as

232 CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA

Śankara's criticism implies. Moreover, to argue that the relation of purusa as sheer presence to prakrti will lead to endless transformation and, therefore, will preclude any possibility of release, or conver- sely, will lead to bondage again and again, is to miss the point of the Samkhya position. The criticism would be justified if bondage and release were on- tological problems because it is indeed the case that the Sāmkhya position implies that the purușa (as an all-pervasive contentless witness) is continually in the presence of prakrti. The presence of purusa, however, causes neither bondage nor release. The purusa is always free and can never become bound ontologi- cally. Bondage and freedom are problems, rather, on the level of "awareness" (antahkarana-vrtti or buddhi) and occur because of non-discrimination (aviveka) or discrimination (viveka) by the buddhi. In concluding what the Samkhya response could have been to Śankara, I want to introduce an analytic scheme taken from the Nyäya school which may illust- rate in a helpful manner the internal consistency of the Sāmkhya position. The school of Nyāya developed a typology of negative "entities" or "absences" in an attempt to describe with greater precision some of its philosophical problems. It should be noted, of course, that the followers of Samkhya never accepted the reality of negative entities - Sāmkhya argued, rather, that negative entities or "absences" are known through the perception of absence in a given locus - but the typology of "absences" is neverthe- less a useful analytic scheme for clarifying certain aspects of the Samkhya position. According to the Nyāya analysis, there are four kinds of "non-exis- tence" or "absence" (a-bhāva): (a) "antecedent non-existence" (prāgabhāva) or the kind of non-existence which has no beginning but may have an end - for example, the particular jar that I am now making had no prior existence as jar and, hence, is characterized by "antecedent non-existence";

THE NYAYA VIEW 233

(b) "consequent non-existence" (pradhvamsābhāva) or the kind of non-existence which may arise at some point in the future - for example, the jar which now- exists may subsequently be broken and, hence, may be characterized by "consequent non-existence";

(c) "reciprocal non-existence" (anyonyābhāva) or the simple negation of identity -for example, this jar is not space and space is not this jar- hence, the jar is characterized by "reciprocal non-existence" or the absence of identity with things that are not jars;

(d) "absolute non-existence" (atyantābhāva) or the non- existence of a connection between two things at any time in the past or future - for example, a jar in the clouds, wherein although the jar exists and the clouds exist, there is an absence of connection between the jar and the clouds, and, hence, the jar may be charac- terized as being in a relation of"absolute non-exist- ence" with the clouds. Among these four types of non-existence or absence, types (c) and (d) describe what cannot be changed. "Reciprocal non-existence" (as the logical absence of identity) and "absolute non-existence" (as the mate- rial absence of connection or relation) simply des- cribe what is the case in the kind of world in which we live. Only types (a) and (b) are amenable to human effort. What is absent by reason of "ante- cedent non-existence" may be brought into being, and what exists as characterized by "consequent non-exis- tence" may be eliminated. From the perspective of classical Samkhya, the following would thus appear to be the case : (a) viveka or "discrimination" of the difference between puruşa and prakrti (by the buddhi) is an example of "antecedent non-existence" - or perhaps better in Sāmkhya terminology, "antecedent non-manifestation" -it does not exist or is not manifest in ordinary awareness but it may be brought into awareness;

234 CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA

(b) aviveka or "non-discrimination" of the difference between puruşa and prakrti is an example of "conse- quent non-existence" - it exists now in ordinary awareness but it may be eliminated;

(c) the fundamental ontological difference between purușa and prakrti is an example of "reciprocal non- existence" - there is a logical absence of identity betweeen puruşa and prakrti under all circumstances;

(d) the lack of relation between purusa and prakrti is an example of "absolute non-existence" - there is a material absence of connection or relation between purușa and prakrti under all circumstances.

Many questions and problems remain, and as one probes the many issues that separate the followers of Samkhya from Śankara, one begins to appreciate the simplicity and elegance of Śankara's reliance on śruti which provides not only a good deal of intellectual security but also the rather attractive promise that ultimately the innermost essence of the human condition will show itself to be the consciousness and bliss of Being itself, the material and productive fountainhead of everything that is. Classical Samkhya philosophy, on the other hand, offers quite a different vision, a vision in which there is a bifurcation in the very nature of things and a vision in which the human condition, far from being the innermost essence of Being itself, is rather symptomatic of a beginningless confusion, a confusion which occasions the process of reflection and a confusion which can only be dissipated by reflection. For Sāmkhya the human con- dition generates itself and is finally the only agency for generat- ing its own awareness of itself either as bound or free. Freedom for Sämkhya is not a positive realization of what the human condition is. Freedom instead is precisely the realization of what the human condition is not - namely that it is not content- less consciousness. Hence, there is no realization of a cosmic or metaphysical Self at the conclusion of the process of reflection or discrimination. There is, rather, the realization na asmi,

EPILOGUE 235

na me, na aham iti: "I am not (conscious); (consciousness) does not belong to me; the "I" is not (conscious)" Kārikā LXIV) 109

109. This possibly helps to explain the insistence in Sāmkhya philo- sophy on the "plurality of purusas" (purusa-bahutva), since discrimination even on the highest level is a discovery of what is not the case, thus implying that there are as many realizations of contentless. consciousness as there are buddhis engaging in discrimination, or put another way, insofar as purusa appears as what it is not and insofar as buddhi distinguishes itself as what it is not, the final discrimination is to be interpreted individually or pluralistically so long as one assumes a plurality of buddhis. Interestingly, Sankara refrains from criticizing the Samkhya notion of a plurality of purusas" in section II.2.1-10 of his Vedānta-sūtra-bhāsya. He rejects purusa- bahutva in I.4.22 and again in II.1.1. and by implication in II.1.3, but in all of these latter passages he rejects a "plurality of purusas" on the grounds that such a notion has no basis in sruti. That he does not address the issue in II.2.1-10 may indicate his reluctance to discuss the issue from a purely rational point of view, possibly since his own Vedānta position is fraught with problems regarding this issue.

A CHART OF THE TWENTY-FIVE PRINCIPLES (tattvas) OF CLASSICAL SAMKHYA 236

(1) (2) CLASSICAL SĀŅKHYA

puruşa prakrti

(consciousness) (primal nature or materiality consisting of sattva, rajas, tamas)

avyakta (unmanifest) vyakta (manifest) (3) buddhi (intellect or will with bhavas)

(4) ahamkāra (ego) (taijasa or rajas-mode) ahamkāra as vaikṛta ahamkāra as bhūtādi

(sattva-mode) (tamas-mode)

-> ->

(6-10) (11-15) (16-20) (21-25)

Five buddhīndriyas Five karmendriyas Five tanmātras Five mahābhūta

(sense-capacities) (action-capacities) (subtle elements) (gross elements)

hearing speaking sound space

feeling grasping touch wind

(5) seeing walking form fire

manas tasting excreting taste water

(mind) smelling generating - smell earth

GLOSSARY OF SĀMKHYA TERMINOLOGY*

abhimāna, self-conceit or the egoistic awareness accompanying all ordinary experience, considered to be the basic function of the ego or ahamkāra (XXIV and see ahamkāra). abhyāsa, practical study of the principles of Sāmkhya, implying meditation and discrimination, and recommended as the method to be employed for attaining knowledge of the difference between puruşa and prakrti (LXIV and see tattva, jñāna). acetana, unconscious or devoid of consciousness, referring to all of the principles of Samkhya except the purusa (XI, XX and see cetana, purușa). adharma, unmeritorious behavior or vice, one of the eight basic predispositions (bhävas) which reside in the buddhi and assist in determining the process of rebirth as well as the quality of one's present life (XXIII, XLIV and see bhāva). adhisthāna, the role of superintending or overseeing which is. . one of the passive functions of the purusa (XVII and see puruşa). adhyavasāya, ascertainment or determination, the discriminating capacity that establishes correct knowledge enabling one to act accordingly, and taken to be the basic function of the intellect or buddhi (V, XXIII and see buddhi). ahamkāra, the ego or one's ordinary personal identity, a basic principle or tattva of the Samkhya system, derived from the buddhi and in turn producing the five sense-capacities, the five action-capacities, mind or manas and the five subtle elements (XXII, XXIV, XXV, and see abhimāna, vaikta, taijasa, bhūtādi, buddhīndriya, karmendriya, manas and tanmātra). ajñana, ignorance or non-discrimination of the difference between purușa and prakrti, one of the eight basic predispositions

*Verse references in parenthesis are to the Sāmkhyakārikā, the text and translation of which may be found in Appendix B.

238 CLASSICAL SĀŅKHYA

or bhävas which reside in the buddhi and assist in deter- mining the process of rebrith as well as the quality of one's present life (XXIII, XLIV and see bhāva). aiśvarya, power or control, one of the eight basic predispositions or bhävas which reside in the buddhi and assist in deter- mining the process of rebirth as well as the quality of one's present life (XXIII, XLV and see bhāva). ālocana-mātra, bare awareness, the result of the functioning of the sense-capacities of seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and feeling, prior to or without the mental elaboration provided by manas, ahamkāra and buddhi (XXVIII and see buddhindriya, indriya). anaiśvarya, impotence or lack of power, one of the eight basic predispositions or bhävas which reside in the buddhi and assist in determining the process of rebirth as well as the quality of one's present life (XXIII, XLV and see bhāva). antahkaraņa, the internal organ, consisting of intellect, ego and mind, which carries on all of the functions of mental awareness based upon the data provided by the sense- capacities and action-capacities (XXXIII and see buddhi, ahamkāra, manas). anumāna, inference, one of the three reliable means of knowing accepted by Samkhya, whereby one reasons from ordinary experience to the more general principles invariably asso- ciated with ordinary experience (IV, V, VI and see pramāņa). -apavarga, that which results from the final discrimination accom- plished by the buddhi that it is different from the purusa, hence providing awareness of what has always been the case, namely, that purua is isolated or free - in other words, the experience of release or freedom (XLIV and see kaivalya). apriti, pain, a synonym for suffering or duhkha, considered to be the inherent nature of the constituent or guna of prakrti known as rajas, which guna is characterized by activity, energy and passionate attachment (XII and see rajas, guņa). āptavacana, the trustworthy verbal testimony of sacred scripture and accomplished holy men, one of the three reliable means of knowing accepted by Samkhya (IV, V and see pramāņa).

GLOSSARY OF SAMKHYA TERMINOLOGY 239

aviśeșa, the subtle, non-specific or imperceptible dimension of prakrti, most often used in reference to the five subtle elements or tanmātras (XXXVIII and see tanmātra). onyakta, the unmanifest or primordial condition of prakrti prior to or apart from its manifest condition (X, XIV, LVIII and see mūlaprakrti, vyakta). aśakti, incapacity, considered to be of twenty-eight varieties (including the failure to function of mind, the five sense- capacities, the five action-capacities, the nine compla- cencies, or the eight perfections), thus accounting for twenty-eight of the fifty components of the "intellectual creation" or pratyaya-sarga. Presumably in classical Sām- khya the "intellectual creation" with its fifty components represents the manifestation in ordinary, everyday expe- rience of the eight basic predispositions or bhāvas which reside in the buddhi (XLVI, XLVII, XLIX and see pratyaya-sarga, viparyaya, tuļi, siddhi, dvividha-sarga, bhāva, linga). bhva, predisposition or fundamental striving, eight in number (including dharma, adharma, jñāna, ajñāna, virāga, rāga, aiśvarya and anaiśvarya), which reside in the buddhi and assist in determining the process of rebirth as well as the quality of one's present life. These eight predispositions in turn relate to the fifty components called the pratyaya- sarga or "intellectual creation". Presumably in classical Sāmkhya, whereas the eight predispositions represent a deeper, causal level, the fifty components represent the same predispositions as effects that show themselves in ordinary, everyday experience (XLIII, XLIV, XLV, XLVI-LI, LII and see pratyaya-sarga and dvividha-sarga). bhūta, mahābhūta, gross element, five in number (including space, wind, fire, water and earth), derived from the subtle elements (XXII, XXXVIII and see tanmātra). bhūtādi, an ancient name for that form of ahamkāra, when domi- nated by the guna, tamas, from which the subtle elements are derived (XXV and see ahamkāra, tanmātra, tamas). bhoktrbhäva, the state or condition of being an enjoyer, which is one of the passive functions of the purusa (XVII and see puruşa). buddhi, will or intellect, synonymous with mahat or the "great one"

240 CLASSICAL SĀŅKHYA

derived from mūlaprakrti and in turn producing ahamkāra, thus preceding ordinary self-awareness but nevertheless responsible for ascertainment or determi- nation and considered to be the causal abode of the basic predispositions or bhāvas (XXIII, XXXVI, XXXVII, XLIX and see adhyavasāya, bhāva). buddhindriya, sense-capacity, five in number (including seeing, hearing, smelling, tasting and feeling), derived from ahamkāra when dominated by the guna, sattva (XXV, XXVI and see ahamkāra, sattva, vaikrta). cetana, conscious or consciousness, referring to the nature of purușa (LV and see purușa). cetanāvat, the appearance of consciousness, referring to what buddhi, and so forth, appear to be as a result of the pro- ximity of purușa (XX and see purușa). dharma, meritorious behaviour or virtue, one of the eight basic predispositions or bhävas which reside in the buddhi and assist in determining the process of rebirth as well as the quality of one's present life (XXIII, XLIV and see bhāva). drastrtva, the condition of being a seer, which is one of the passive functions of the purusa (XIX and see purusa). drsta, perception, one of the three reliable means of knowing accepted by Sāmkhya (I, II, IV, V, VI, XXX and see pramāņa). duhkha, suffering or pain, the experience of which is the occasion for the philosophical inquiry into Samkhya (I and see jijñāsā, duḥkhatraya, apriti). duhkhatraya, the three kinds of suffering, namely internal or personal, external, and cosmic and or supernatural (I and see duhkha). dvividha-sarga, the twofold creation, referring to (a) the deeper, causal principles of buddhi, and so forth, sometimes called the linga-level; and (b) the apparent, predispositional result of the deeper, causal principles, sometimes called the bhāva-level or the pratyaya-sarga (LII, XLIV, XLV, XLVI and see pratyaya-sarga, linga, bhāva). guna, a constituent, strand or dimension of prakrti, three in number (namely, sattva, rajas, and tamas), experienced initially on a psychological level (as pleasure, pain and delusion) but implying finally a deeper constitutive

GLOSSARY OF SAMKHYA TERMINOLOGY 241

tendency within primal nature itself (as intelligibility, acti- vity and restraint) (XII, XIII, XIV,XX, XXVII, XXXVI, XLVI, LX and see sattva, rajas, tamas, guņapariņāma). guņaparināma, the transformation of the gunas referring to the mutual interaction that occurs as each of the gunas, becomes successively dominant thereby bringing into manifestation the various tattvas or principles, buddhi, and so forth (XII, XXVII and see guna). indriya, a capacity of sensing, of acting or of thinking, referring not to the gross, physical organ (for example, the eye) but rather to the function or capacity of the organ-for example, seeing, hearing, speaking, walking, and so forth (XXVI, XXVII, XXXIV and see buddhindriya, karmen- driya, manas). jijñāsā, the desire to know, an inclination within a person which arises as a result of the experience of suffering, and which is the beginning of all serious philosophizing that may eventually lead to the realization of freedom (I and see duhkha, duḥkhatraya). jñāna, knowledge, one of the eight basic predispositions or bhävas which reside in the buddhi and assist in deter- mining the process of rebirth as well as the quality of one's present life (XXIII, XLIV and see apavarga). kaivalya, isolation or freedom, synonymous with apavarga, the discriminative realization of the difference between purusa and prakrti accomplished and realized by the buddhi (XVII, XIX, XXI, LXVIII and see apavarga). karana, the act of making or producing, the instrument or means of action, referring in Sāmkhya to the buddhi, ahamkāra, manas, the five sense-capacities, and the five action-capa- cities taken together as the thirteenfold "instrument" that characterizes a person and transmigrates from life to life (XXXI, XXXII, XXXV and see linga). kāraņa, the material cause or mūlaprakrti (consisting of sattva, rajas and tamas) from which all the manifest tattvas' or principles (buddhi and so forth) arise (IX, XIV, XV, XVI and see kārya). karmendriya, action-capacity, five in number, including speaking, grasping, walking, excreting and generating (XXVI and see indriya).

242 CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA

kārya, effect or product of the ultimate material cause, including all of the manifest tattvas or principles of Samkhya except puruşa and prakti (XV, XLIII and see kāraņa, satkārya). linga, characteristic mark or feature, used in two distinct ways in Sāmkhya, either as (a) the characteristic mark in the process of reasoning or inference whereby one establishes an invariable association between an aspect of ordinary experience and a more general basic principle (V and see anumāna); or (b) the characteristic mark of the trans- migrating entity made up of buddhi, ahamkāra, manas, the five sense-capacities, and the five action-capacities, synonymous with the karana or "instrument" (X, XX, XL, XLI, XLII, LII, LV and see karaņa.) mahat, see buddhi. manas, mind, derived from ahamkāra and considered to be a capacity or indriya whose function is explication or mental elaboration (ordinary thinking, memory, and so forth) (XXVII and see antahkaraņa). mūlaprakṛti, primal nature or materiality (consisting of sattva, rajas and tamas) in its unmanifest condition (III and see kāraņa, prakṛti). niyama, restraint on inertia, ·characteristic of the guna, tamas (XII and see guna, tamas). pariņāma, see guņapariņāma. pradhāna, the principal one, a synonym in classical Sāmkhya for prakrti and mūlaprakṛti (XI, XXI, XXXVII, LVII, LXVIII and see prakrti, mūlaprakṛti). prakāša (prakāśaka), illumination or intelligibility, characteristic of the guna, sattva (XII, XIII and see guņa, sattva). prakrti, nature or materiality in its unmanifest and manifest condition; the ultimate material cause (kāraņa) of intellect, ego, mind, the five sense-capacities, the five action-capa- cities, the five subtle elements and the five gross elements; undergoing continuous change or modification as deter- mined by its constituents of sattva, rajas and tamas in mutual interaction (guņa-pariņāma) (III, VIII, XXII, XLII, XLV, LVI, LIX, LXI, LXII, LXIII, LXV and see pradhāna, mūlaprakṛti, guņa-pariņāma, satkārya). pralaya, dissolution or termination, referring to that condition

GLOSSARY OF SAMKHYA TERMINOLOGY 243

in which the tattvas or principles no longer manifest or show themselves (LXIX). pramāna, a reliable means of knowing of which there are three according to classical Samkhya : perception, inference, and reliable authority (IV and see drsta, anumāna, āptavacana). pratyaya-sarga, the "intellectual creation" or the ordinary, everyday level of awareness, conditioned by the basic predispositions or bhvas and made up of fifty components including the five varieties of ignorance (viparyaya), twenty- eight varieties of incapacity (aśakti), the nine varieties of complacency (tusti) and the eight varieties of perfection (siddhi) (XLVI and see viparyaya, aśakti, tuşți, siddhi, bhāva, dvividha-sarga). pratyupabhoga, upabhoga, enjoyment or experience, referring to that which prakrti provides for purusa (XXXVII and see apavarga, purusārtha). pravrtti, activity or energy, characteristic of the guna, rajas (XII and see guna, rajas). priti, pleasure, a synonym for happiness or sukha, considered to be the inherent nature of the constituent or guna of prakrti known as sattva, which guna is characterized by goodness, thought and detachment (XII and see sattva, guņa). pums, the self or soul, a synonym for purusa (XI, LX and see purușa). purusa, the self or soul but more precisely the principle, of con- sciousness, since Samkhya interprets most of the usual functions of the self or soul in terms of the antakarana (or "internal organ" made up of intellect, ego and mind) which is a manifestation of prakrti. The purușa is simply a contentless witness (sāksitva), its only function being that of passive presence. When described as "overseeing" (adhisthāna), "the condition of being an enjoyer" (bhoktṛ- bhāva), or as the "condition of being a seer" (drastrtva), these are all to be construed as passive functions, for the purușa is totally inactive (akartrbhāva), totally detached (mādhyasthya, udāsina), and isolated (kevala, kaivalya) from prakrti (III, XVII, XVIII, XIX, XX, XXI, XXXI, XXXVI, XXXVII, XLII, LV, LVII, LVIII,

244 CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA

LIX, LX, LXI, LXII, LXIII, LXIX, and see purusārtha, purușabahutva). puruşartha, "for the sake of the purusa," or the purpose of the purușa, referring to what prakrti does for the purușa or referring to the basic Sāmkhya notion that prakrti only functions for the sake of the purusa. The prakrti functions "for the sake of the purusa" by providing "enjoyment" or "experience" (upabhoga) and "freedom" (apavarga) XXXI, XLII, LXIII and see puruşa, apavarga, pratyupa- bhoga). purușabahutva, the plurality of purusas referring to the basic Samkhya notion that there is no one single cosmic Self or atman but only a plurality of selves (XVIII and see puruşa, puruşārtha). rāga, passion or attachment, one of the eight basic predisposi- tions or bhävas which reside in the buddhi and assist in determining the process of rebirth as well as the quality of one's present life (XXIII, XLV and see bhāva). rajas, the constituent or strand (guna) of prakrti that accounts for motion, energy and activity, experienced psycholo- gically as suffering, craving and attachment (XII, XIII and see guņa). sākșitva, the state of being a witness, referring to purușa's func- tion as passive presence to all of the transformations of prakti (XIX and see purușa). samkalpaka, the explicating or elaborating capacity of ordinary mental awareness, considered to be the primary function of mind or manas (XXVII and see manas, antahkaraņa). samskāra, the subtle traces of past deeds which reside in the buddhi and exert influence in one's present life-experience (LXVII and see bhāva, buddhi). samyoga, proximity or contact, referring to the presence of purusa to prakrti without implying any activity or dependence on the part of purusa (XX, XXI, LXVI and see purusa). sarira, the body, either the subtle body which transmigrates (made up of intellect, ego, mind, the five sense-capacities, the five action-capacities and the five subtle elements) or the gross, physical body (made up of the gross elements) that perishes at death (LXVII, LXVIII and see linga, karaņa).

GLOSSARY OF SAMKHYA TERMINOLOGY 245

satkārya, the theory in Sāmkhya that the effect pre-exists in its cause in an unmanifest condition prior to its manifest production. The process of causation, therefore, does not generate anything new; it simply brings into mani- festation what is already present in the cause (IX and see kāraņa, kārya). sattva, the constituent or strand (guna) of prakrti that accounts for thought and intelligibility, experienced psychologi- cally as pleasure, thinking, clarity, understanding and thoughtful detachment (XII, XIII and see guna). siddhi, perfection, considered to be of eight varieties (including proper reasoning. oral instruction, study, removal of the three kinds of suffering, friendly discussion and genero- sity), thus accounting for eight of the fifty components of the "intellectual creation" or pratyaya-sarga (XLVI-LI and see pratyaya-sarga). taijasa, an ancient name for that form of ahamkāra, presumably when dominated by the guna, rajas, from which both the intellectual capacities (of mind, sense-capacities and action-capacities). and the subtle elements (tanmātras) are derived (XXV and see ahamkāra, bhūtādi, vaikrta). tamas, the constituent or strand (guna) of prakrti that accounts for restraint and inertia, experienced psychologically as delusion, depression and dullness (XII, XIII and see guna). The term tamas is also used as a name for one of the sub-varieties of viparyaya or "error" (see viparyaya). tanmātra, subtle element, five in number (including sound, touch, form, taste and smell), considered to be the non- specific or imperceptible elements of prakrti from which the specific or perceptible gross elements are derived (XXIV, XXV, XXXVIII and see avisesa). tattva, principle, a general term referring to the twenty-five basic components of the Samkhya system (LXIV and see abhyāsa). tattva-vikāra, the transformation or manifestation of the prin- ciples of Sāmkhya (and see tattva, guņapariņāma, vikāra). tusti, complacency or contentment, considered to be of nine varieties (including the four internal tendencies of being content with only a knowledge of nature, content with a knowledge of limited means, content that in time

246 CLASSICAL SĀKHYA

knowledge will arise, and content with the belief in destiny; and the five external tendencies of turning away from each one of the five objects of sense), thus accounting for nine of the fifty components of the "intellectual creation" or pratyaya-sarga (XLVI, L and see pratyaya-sarga). udāsīna, the indifferent one, a synonym for purusa (XX and see purușa). vaikṛta, vaikrtika, an ancient name for that form of ahamkāra from which the mind, the five sense-capacities and the five action-capacities are derived (XXV and see aham- kāra, bhūtādi, taijasa). vairāgya, virāga, detachment or dispassion, one of the eight basic predispositions or bhävas which reside in the buddhi and assist in determining the process of rebirth as well as the quality of one's present life (XXIII, XLV and see bhāva). vijñāna, the discrimination of the difference between purusa and prakrti and synonymous with the term viveka (II and see apavarga, kaivalya). vikāra, a product, referring to those principles or tattvas which are produced in the process of manifestation but do not in turn produce other products. The vikāras are sixteen in number, including mind, the five sense-capacities, the five action-capacities and the five gross elements. The remaining manifest tattvas (namely, buddhi, ahamkāra and the five tanmatras) are both products and productive of other products. Unmanifest prakrti is itself not a pro- duct, but it produces products. The purusa is neither a product nor does it produce a product (III and see puruşa, prakrti, guņapariņāma). vimokșa, release, the discriminative realization of the difference between purusa and prakrti, accomplished and realized by the buddhi (LVI, LVII, LVIII and see apavarga, kaivalya and vijñāna). viparyaya, error or wrong notion, considered to be of five varieties (including obscurity, delusion, extreme delusion, gloom and utter darkness and sometimes correlated with the five "afflictions" of Yoga, namely, ignorance, egoity, passion, hatred and the fear of death), thus accounting for five of the fifty components of the "intellectual creation"

GLOSSARY OF SAMKHYA TERMINOLOGY 247

or pratyaya-sarga. Each of the five viparyayas. also has sub-varieties. Obscurity (tamas) is of eight varieties and includes mistaking the self for the buddhi, ahamkāra, manas or one of the five tanmātras. Delusion (moha) is of eight varieties and includes belief in the permanence of any one of the eight supernatural powers (for example, levitation, and so forth). Extreme delusion (mahāmoha) is of ten varieties and includes the attachment to the various objects of sense, both human and divine. Gloom (tāmisra) is of eighteen varieties and includes attachment to the ten objects of sense together with the eight super- natural powers. Finally, utter darkness (andhatāmisra) is of eighteen varieties and includes the fear of being de- prived of the objects of sense and the eight supernatural powers (XLVI, XLVIII and see pratyaya-sarga). vişāda, depression or indifference in the sense of insensibility or bewilderment, a synonym for delusion or moha, consider- ed to be the inherent nature of the constituent or guna of prakrti known as tamas, characterized by restraint and inertia (XII and see tamas, guņa). viśeșa, the gross, specific and perceptible dimension of prakrti, most often used in reference to the five gross elements or bhūtas (XXXVIII and see bhūta). vyakta, the manifest condition of prakrti that shows itself when purusa is present, including intellect, ego, mind, the five sense-capacities, the five action-capacities, the five subtle elements and the five gross elements (II, X, XI and see avyakta).

APPENDICES

APPENDIX A

CHRONOLOGICAL CHARTI

B.C. c. 2700 Indus Valley c. 1700 Harappā c. 1500-1200 (1) Ancient Speculations Aryan invasions B.C. c. 1200-900 Compo- sition of Rig Veda

c. 900 Great war depict- c. 900-500 Later Vedas ed in Mahābhārata (Sāma, Yajur, Atharva) Brāhmaņas, and early prose Upanișads (Bṛhadāranyaka, Chāndogya Taittirīya Aitareya)

c. 542-490 Bimbisāra c. 566-486 Buddha king of Magadha c. 468 (or 487 or 477) c. 490-458 Ajātaśatru Death of Mahāvira king of Magadha

1. The present writer has already discussed the difficulty of dating Indian texts, even approximately (supra, Chapter II). The purpose of this chart, therefore, is to offer only a relative chronology of texts and events for the purpose of giving the reader a general picture of the development of the Samkhya. The dates used in this chart are those found in A. L. Basham, The Wonder That Was India, op. cit., pp. xxi-xxii; and Wm. T. de Bary (ed.), Sources of Indian Tradition, op. cit., pp. 1, 37-38, 203-204, 367-368, 551-552., For problems relating to the dates of the Upanisads, Moksadharma, Gitā, etc. see supra, Chapter II, (1) Ancient Speculations, and (2) Proto-sāmkhyan Speculations. Generally, all of these dates are in keeping with Moriz Winter- nitz, Geschichte der indischen Litteratur, op. cit., passim.

252 CLASSICAL SĀŅKHYA APP. A

(2) Proto-Sāmkhyan Speculations

B.C. 327-325 Invasion B.C. c. 500-500 A.D. of Alexander of Hindu lawbooks, epics, Macedon development of six orthodox systems

B.€. c. 400-200 (?) B.C. c. 322-298 Candra- "Middle" or verse gupta Maurya Upanișads (Katha c. 269-232 Aśoka Īsa Śvetāśvatara Muņdaka Mahānārāyaņa)

B.C c. 100-100 A.D. A.D. c. 190 Greek kingdoms Bhagavad Gitā in NW India c. 1st cent. A.D. Caraka (?)

c. 1st cent. A.D. c. 1st cent. A.D. Kușānas invade Buddhacarita of NW India Aśvaghoșa

c. 78-101 Kanişka c. 1st-4th centuries A.D. c. 1st-4th centuries Speculative portions A.D. Rise of Mahā- of the Moksa- yāna Nāgārjuna dharma (?) Vasubandhu

(3) Classical Sāmkhya A.D. c. 320-335 Candra Gupta I A.D. c. 300-500 Sāmkhya- kārikā A.D. c. 335-376 A.D. c. 300-400 Final red- Samudra Gupta action of rogasūtra

APP. A CHRONOLOGICAL CHART 253

c. 376-415 Candra Gupta II c. 415-454 Kumāra Gupta I c. 454 First Hūņa invasion c. 455-467 Skanda Gupta c. 495 Second Hūņa invasion

c. 540 A.D. c. 557-569 End of Gupta Paramārtha's Dynasty Chinese version of Kārikā together with a commentary

A.D. c. 606-647 Harsa A.D. c. 600-800 (?) king of Kānyakubja Gaudapāda's Bhāsya

c. 712 Arabs occupy c. yth cent. A.D. Sind Vacaspatimiśra's Sāmkhyatattva- kaumudi

(?) Jayamangalā (?) Māțharavrtti (?) Yuktidīpikā

1192 Ghori's defeat 1030 Alberuni of Prthivī Rāj

A.D. 14th cent. Mådhava's Sarvadarśanasamgraha

(4) Later or Renaissance Sāmkhya

254 CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA APP. A

(?) Sāmkhyapravacanasūtra (?) Tattvasamāsa both texts, at least in their present form, appear to be post- Madhava

15th cent. A.D. Sāmkhya-Sūtra Vrlti of Aniruddha

1556 Accession of 16th cent. A.D. Akbar Sāmkhyapravacana- bhāsya of Vijñānabhiksu 1569-1586 Mughal con- quest of Gujarat, Bengal, and Kashmir. 1651 Foundation of East India Co. factory at Hugli 1757 Battle of Plassey (Clive's victory at Plassey gives English control of Bengal).

APPENDIX B

THE SĀMKHYAKĀRIKĀ OF IŚVARAKRȘŅA1

Sanskrit Text* with Translation

I. duḥkhatrayābhighātāj jijñāsā tadabhighātake hetau, drsțe sā'pārthā cen naikāntātyantato'bhāvāt.

Because of the torment of the threefold suffering, (there arises) the desire to know the means of coun- teracting it. If (it is said that) this (desire-i.e., inquiry) is useless because perceptible (means of removal are available), (we say) no, since (percept- ible means are not final or abiding.2

1. The present writer has primarily used the text as found in the Colebrooke-Wilson edition of the kārikā and the Bhāsya of Gaudapāda; and as found in S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri, The Sāmkhyakārika of Isvara Krma. Suryanarayana Sastri lists some variant readings although, as mentioned supra in Chapter II, they are quite insignificant. Variant readings in the various commentaries are also cited in P. Chakravarti (ed.) ruktidīpikā, op. cit., pp. i-xi. It should also be noted here that the present writer has consulted the following English translations : Colebrooke-Wilson, op. cit., pp. 1-194; G. Jha, Tattvakaumudi, op. cit., pp. 1-114; John Davies, The Sankhya Karika of Isvara Krishna, op. cit., pp. 6-72; and the partial English translation found in Wm. T. de Bary (ed.) Sources of Indian Tradition, op. cit., pp. 308-315. Of these the partial translation in the Sources is by far the best. The rendering of Suryanarayana Sastri is also generally quite good. See also Anne-Marie Esnoul (trans. ) Les Strophes de Samkhya (Paris, 1964) for an excellent French translation 2. Generally, the present writer has followed the commentaries of Gaudapāda, Vācaspatimiśra, and Paramārtha's Chinese version with respect to problems of interpretation. Such problems are discussed in the text and notes of Chapter Il1, and they are not repeated here. *This is not a critical rendering of the Sanskrit text. It is simply a version of the text presented for the convenience of the reader. The text here set forth is based on the following commentaries : (1) Bhāsya of Gaudapāda; (2) Tattvakaumudī of Vācaspati; (3) Yuktidīpikā. For editions used, see bibliography.

256 CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA APP. B

II. drstavad ānuśravikaḥ sa hy aviśuddhiksayātiśayayuktaḥ, tadviparītaḥ śreyān vyaktāvyaktajňavijňānāt.

The revealed (or scriptural, means of removing the torment) are like the perceptible (-i.e., ultimately ineffective), for they are connected with impurity, destruction and excess; a superior method, differ- ent from both, is the (discriminative) knowledge of the manifest (vyakta), the unmanifest (avyakta) and the knowing one (or knower -i.e., purusa).

III. mūlaprakrtir avikṛtir mahadādyāḥ prakrtivikrtayaḥ sapta, sodaśakas tu vikāro na prakrtir na vikrtiḥ purușaḥ.

Primordial nature (mūlaprakrti) is uncreated. The seven - the great one (mahat), etc. - are both creat- ed and creative. The sixteen are created. purusa is neither created nor creative.3

IV. drstam anumānam āptavacanam ca sarvapramāņasiddhatvāt, trividham pramāņam iștam prameyasiddhiḥ pramāņād dhi.

The attainment of reliable knowledge is based on determining the means of correct knowledge. The accepted means of correct knowledge are three because (these three) comprehend all means of correct knowledge. These three means (are as follows :)

3. Although the present writer has rendered mūlaprakrti as "primordial nature," generally the term mūlaprakrti or prakrti is left untranslated in this translation. The terms "nature" or "matter" come closest to the notion of prakrti, but no English term effectively captures the significance of the Sanskrit. Similarly, the present writer has not translated the following : puruşa, guņa, and the synonyms for sāttvika, rājasa and tāmasa ahamkāra - i.e., Daikrta, bhūtadi, and taijasa. All of these terms are discussed in Chapter III.

APP. B SĀŅKHYAKĀRIKĀ OF ĪŚVARAKRSŅA 257

(a) perception, (b) inference, (c) reliable authority.4

V. prativişayādhyavasāyo drstam trividham anumānam ākhyātam, tallingalingipūrvakam āptaśrutir āptavacanam tu.

Perception is the selective ascertainment of particular sense-objects. Inference, which is of three kinds, depends upon a characteristic mark (linga) and that which bears the mark (lingi). Reliable authority is trustworthy verbal testimony.

VI. sāmānyatas tu drsțād atīndriyāņām prasiddhir anumānāt, tasmād api cā'siddham parokşam āptāgamāt siddham.

The understanding of things beyond the senses is by means of (or from) inference by analogy. That which is beyond even inference, is established by means of reliable authority.

VII. atidūrāt sāmīpyād indriyaghātān mano'navasthānāt, sauksmyād vyavadhānād abhibhavāt samānābhihārāc ca.

(Perception may be impossible due to the following:) (a) because something is too far away; (b) because something is too close; (c) because of an injured sense-organ; (d) because of inattention; (e) because of being exceedingly subtle; (f) because of intervention (of an object between an organ and the object to be perceived); (g) because of suppression (i.e., seeing the sun but no planets);

4. See supra, Chapter III, A. The Means of Knowledge.

258 CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA APP. B

(h) because of intermixture with what is similar.5

VIII. saukşmyāt tadanupalabdhir nā'bhāvāt kāryatas tadupalabdhiḥ, mahadādi tac ca kāryam prakrtivirūpam sarūpam ca.

The non-percéption (of prakrti) is because of its subtlety - not because of its non-existence. Its apprehension is because of (or by means of) its effect. Its effect - the great one (mahat), etc. -is different from yet similar to prakrti.

IX. asadakaraņād upādānagrahaņāt sarvasambhavābhāvāt, śaktasya śakyakaraņāt kāraņabhāvāc ca satkāryam.

The effect exists (before the operation of cause) (satkārya). (a) because of the non-productivity of non-being; (b) because of the need for an (appropriate) mate- rial cause; (c) because of the impossibility of all things coming from all things; (d) because something can only produce what it is capable of producing; (e) because of the nature of the cause (or, because the effect is non-different from the cause).6

X. hetumat anityam avyāpi sakriyam anekam āśritam lingam, sāvayavam paratantram vyaktam viparītam avyaktam.

The manifest (vyakta) is (a) caused;

5. Here and in a number of the following verses, the present writer has enumerated the content of the verse. This seems to reflect the style of the Sanskrit. The designations (a), (b), (c), etc., are, of course, not in the text itself. 6. See supra, Chapter III, B. prakrti, guņas and satkāryavāda.

APP. B SĀŅKHYAKĀRIKĀ OF ĪŚVARAKRSŅA 259

(b) finite; (c) non-pervasive; (d) active; (e) plural; (f) supported; (g) mergent; (h) composite; (i) dependent; the unmanifest (avyakta) is the opposite .?

XI. triguņam aviveki vișayaḥ sāmānyam acetanam prasavadharmi, vyaktam tathā pradhānam tadvipárītas tathā ca pumān. (Both) the manifest and unmanifest are, (a) (characterized by the) three gunas ("consti- tuents" or "strands"); (b) undiscriminated; (c) objective; (d) general; (e) non-conscious; (f) productive; the purusa is the opposite of them, although similar (to the avyakta as characterized in vs. X.)

XII. prītyaprītivișādātmakāḥ prakāśapravrttiniyamārthāḥ, anyonyabhibhavāśrayajananamithunavrttayaś ca guņāh.

The gunas, whose natures are pleasure, pain and in- difference, (serve to) manifest, activate and limit. They successively dominate, support, activate, and interact with one another.

XIII. sattvam laghu prakāśakam istam upastambhakam calam ca rajaḥ, guru varaņakam eva tamaḥ pradīpavac ca'rthato vrttiḥ.

7. Ibid.

260 CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA APP. B

sattva is buoyant and shining; rajas is stimulating and moving; tamas is heavy and enveloping. They function for the sake of the purusa like a lamp.8

XIV. avivekyādiḥ siddhaḥ traiguņyāt tadviparyayābhāvāt, kāraņaguņātmakatvāt kāryasyā'vyaktam api siddham.

Lack of discrimination, etc., is established because of (the manifest) having the three gunas and because of the absence (of the gunas) in the opposite of that (i.e., in the purusa). The unmanifest is likewise established because of the guna-nature in the cause of the effect (or because the effect has the same qualities as the cause).

XV. and XVI. bhedānām parimāņāt samanvayāt śaktitaḥ pravrtteś ca, kāraņakāryavibhāgād avibhāgād vaiśvarūpyasya. kāraņam asty avyaktam pravartate triguņataḥ samudayāc ca, pariņāmataḥ salilavat pratipratiguņāśrayaviśeșāt.

(a) Because of the finiteness of specific things in the world which require a cause; (b) because of homogeneity or sameness of the finite world. (c) because of the power or potency (of the cause) which the process of emergence or evolution

(d) because of separation or distinction between implies;

cause and its effect (with respect to modifica- tion or appearance); (e) because of the undividedness or uniformity of the entire world;

8. Ibid.

APP. B SĀŅKHYAKĀRIKĀ OF ĪSVARAKRSŅA 261

the unmanifest (avyakta) is the cause; it functions because of or by the interaction of the three gunas, modified like water, due to the specific nature abiding in the respective gunas.9

XVII. saņghātaparārthatvāt triguņādiviparyayād adhișthānāt, purușo'sti bhoktrbhāvāt kaivalyārtham pravrtteś ca.

The purusa exists, (a) because aggregations or combinations exist for another; (b) because (this other) must be apart or opposite from the three gunas; (c) because (this other) (must be) a superintend- ing power or control; (d) because of the existence or need of an enjoyer; (e) because there is functioning or activity for the sake of isolation or freedom.10

XVIII. jananamaraņakaraņānāņ pratiniyamād ayugapatpravrtteś ca, purușabahutvam siddhaņ traiguņyaviparyayāc cai'va.

The plurality of purusas is established, (a) because of the diversity of births, deaths, and faculties; (b) because of actions or functions (that take place) at different times; (c) and because of differences in the proportions of the three gunas (in different entities).

XIX. tasmāc ca viparyāsāt siddham sākşitvam asya purușasya, kaivalyam mādhyasthyam drastrtvam akartrbhāvaś ca.

9. Ibid. 10. See supra, Chapter III, C. purușa.

262 CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA APP. B

And, therefore, because (the purusa) (is) the oppo- site (of the unmanifest), it is established that puruşa is a (a) witness; (b) possessed of isolation or freedom; (c) indifferent; (d) a spectator; (e) and inactive.11

XX. tasmāt tatsamyogād acetanam cetanavad iva lingam, guņakartṛtve ca tathā karte'va bhavaty udāsīnaḥ.

Because of the proximity (or association) of the two -i.e., prakrti and purușa - the unconscious one appears as if characterized by consciousness. Similarly, the indifferent one appears as if charac- terized by activity, because of the activities of the three gunas.12

XXI. purușasya daranārtham kaivalyārtham tathā pradhānasya, pangvandhavad ubhayor api samyogas tatkrtaḥ sargaḥ.

The proximity (or association) of the two, which is like that of a blind man and a lame man, is for the purpose of seeing the pradhana and for the purpose of the isolation of the purusa. From this (associa- tion) creation proceeds.

XXII. prakrter mahāms tato 'hankāraḥ tasmād gaņaś ca sodaśakaḥ, tasmād api șodaśakāt pañcabhyaḥ pañcabhūtāni.

From prakrti (emerges) the great one (mahat);

and puruşa. 12. See supra, Chapter III, D. Association and Interaction of prakrti 11. Ibid.

APP. B SĀŅKHYAKĀRIKĀ OF ĪŚVARAKRSŅA 263

from that (comes) self-awareness (ahamkāra); from that (comes) the group of sixteen. Moreover, from five of the sixteen (come) the five gross ele- ments.13

XXIII. adhyavasāyo buddhir dharmo jňānam virāga aiśvaryam, sāttvikam etadrūpaņ tāmasam asmād viparyastam.

The buddhi ("will" or "intellect") is (characterized by) ascertainment or determination. Virtue, know- ledge, non-attachment, and possession of power are its sāttvika form. Its tāmasa form is the opposite (of these four).14

XXIV. abhimano 'hankāras tasmād dvividhaḥ pravartate sargaḥ, ekādaśakaś ca gaņas tanmātraḥ pañcakaś cai'va.

Self-awareness (ahamkāra) is self-conceit (abhimāna). From it a twofold creation emerges: the group of eleven and the five subtle elements.15

XXV. sāttvika ekādaśakaḥ pravartate vaikrtād ahankārāt, bhūtādes tanmātraḥ sa tāmasaḥ taijasād ubhayam.

From self-awareness (known as) vaikrta ("modi- fied") proceeds the group of eleven, characterized by sattva ("goodness" or "purity"); from self- awareness (known as) bhūtadi ("the origin of gross elements") proceed the five subtle elements (tan- mātras), characterized by tamas ("darkness" or

13. See supra, Chapter III, E. Emergence and Functioning of the tattvas. 14. Ibid., under buddhi. 15. Ibid., under ahamkāra.

264 CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA APP. B

"delusion"); from self-awareness (known as) taijasa ("shining" or "passionate") both proceed.16

XXVI. buddhīndriyāņi cakșuḥ śrotraghrāņarasanatvagākhyāni, vākpāņipādapāyū 'pasthān karmendriyāņi āhuḥ.

The sense organs (buddhīndriyas) ("organs of the buddhi" or "organs of ascertainment") are called eye, ear, nose, tongue, and skin. The organs of action (karmendriyas) are called voice, hands, feet, and organs of excretion and generation.

XXVII. ubhayātmakam atra manaḥ samkalpakam indriyam ca sādharmyāt, guņapariņāmaviśeșān nānātvam bāhyabhedāś ca.

The mind (manas) is of the nature of both; it is characterized by reflection (or synthesis or con. struction) and it is a sense because it is similar (to the senses). The variety of external things and the variety (of the organs) is because of the specific modifications (or transformations) of the gunas.17

XXVIII. śabdādișu pañcānām ālocanamātram isyate vrttiḥ, vacanādānaviharaņotsargānandāś ca pañcānām.

The function of the five (sense organs) - (hearing) sound, etc. - (is) mere awareness (ālocanamātra). The function of the five (organs of action) (is) speech, grasping, walking, excretion and orgasm.18

XXIX. svālaksaņyam vrttis trayasya sai'sā bhavaty asāmānyā,

16. Ibid., under sāttvika ahamkāra and tāmasa ahamkāra. 17. Ibid. 18. Ibid., under linga.

APP. B SĀMKHYAKĀRIKĀ OF ĪŚVARAKRSŅA 265

sāmānyakaraņavṛttiḥ prāņādyā vāyavaḥ pañca.

With respect to the specific characteristics of the three (i.e., of the buddhi, ahamkāra and senses) each functions differently; the five vital breaths (or winds) (make up) their common function.19

XXX. yugapac catustayasya tu vrttiḥ kramaśaś ca tasya nirdistā, drste tathā'py adrste trayasya tatpūrvikā vrttiḥ.

With respect to that which is presently in perception, the function of the four (i.e., buddhi, ahamkāra, manas and any one of the senses) (is) simultaneous and successive. With respect to that which is not pre- sent in perception, the function of the three (i.e., buddhi, ahamkāra and manas or the "internal organ") is based upon a prior perception.

XXXI. svām svām pratipadyante parasparākūtahetukām vrttim, purușārtha eva hetur na kenacit kāryate karaņam.

(The external and internal organs) accomplish their own particular function in coordination with one another. The only motive is for the sake of the puruşa. By nothing else is the instrument (i.e., the thirteenfold instrument) motivated.20

XXXII. karaņam trayodaśavidham tadāharaņadhāraņaprakāśakaram, kāryaņ ca tasya daśadhā'hāryam dhāryaņ prakāśyam ca.

The instrument (karana) is thirteenfold (i.e., made up of buddhi, ahamkāra, manas and the ten senses);

19. Ibid. 20. Ibid.

266 CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA APP. B

(it is) characterized, by seizing, holding and mani- festing. (The instrument's) effect is tenfold (i.e., relating to the five senses and the five actions) : the seized (or to be seized) the held (or to be held, ) and the manifested (or to be manifested).21

XXXIII. antakaraņam trividham daśadhā bāhyam trayasya vișayākhyam, sāmpratakālam bāhyam trikālam ābhyantaram karaņam.

The internal organ (antahkarana) is threefold (i.e., buddhi, ahamkāra, and manas); the external is tenfold and is known as the context (or range or sphere) of the threefold. The external (functions) in present time. The internal (functions) in the three times (i.e., in past, present, and future).

XXXIV. buddhīndriyāņi teșām pañca viśeșāviśeșavișayāņi, vāg bhavati śabdavișayā śeșāņi tu pañcavișayāņi.

Of these, the five senses (buddhindriyas) (function with) specific and non-specific (i.e., gross and subtle) objects. Speech only has sound as its object, but the remaining (organs of action) have all five as objects.

XXXV. sāntaḥkaraņā buddhiḥ sarvam vişayam avagāhate yasmāt, tasmāt trividham karaņam dvāri dvārāņi śeșāņi.

Since the buddhi together with the other internal organs (i.e., ahamkāra and manas) comprehends every object; therefore, the threefold instrument is door-keeper and the remaining (ten) are the doors.

21. Ibid.

APP. B SĀŅKHYAKĀRIKĀ OF ĪŚVARAKRSŅA 267

XXXVI. ete pradīpakalpāḥ parasparavilaksaņā guņavieșāḥ, krtsnam purușasyā'rtham prakāśya buddhau prayacchanti.

These (organs - i.e., ahamkāra, manas, and the ten senses), which are different from one another and which are distinct specifications of the gunas, present the whole (of being) to the buddhi, illuminating it for the sake of the purusa like a lamp.22

XXXVII. sarvam pratyupabhogam yasmāt puruşasya sādhayati buddhiḥ, sai 'va ca viśinasți punah pradhānapurușāntaram sūkșmam.

(This is done) because the buddhi produces (or brings about) every enjoyment of the purusa; and, moreover, (because the buddhi) distinguishes (visi- nasti) the subtle difference between the pradhāna and the purusa.23

XXXVIII. tanmātrāņy aviseșāḥ tebhyo bhūtāni pañca pañcabhyaḥ, ete smrtā viśesāḥ śāntā ghorāś ca mūdhāś ca.

The subtle elements (tanmātras) are non-specific. From these five (emerge) the five gross elements. These (gross elements) are considered (to be) specific, and are tranquil, turbulent and delusive.24

XXXIX. sūkșmā mātāpitrja saha prabhūtais tridhā visesāh syuḥ, sūkșmās teșām niyatā mātāpitrjā nivartante.

22. Ibid. 23. Ibid., under linga and buddhi. 24. Ibid., under tāmasa ahamkāra.

268 CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA APP. B

'Subtle (bodies), (bodies) born of father and mother together with gross elements are the threefold kinds (of bodies). Of these the subtle (bodies) are con- stant; (bodies) born of father and mother are perishable.

XL. pūrvotpannam asaktaņ niyatam mahadādisūkșmaparyantam, samsarati nirupabhogam bhāvair adhivāsitam lingam.

The subtle body (linga), previously arisen, uncon- fined, constant, inclusive of the great one (mahat), etc., through the subtle elements (i.e., inclusive of buddhi, ahamkāra, manas, the ten senses and the five subtle elements), not having enjoyment, trans- migrates, (because of) being endowed with bhāvas ("conditions" or "dispositions").25

XLI. citram yathā'śrayam rte sthāņvādibhyo vinā yathā chāyā, tadvad vinā viśeșair na tișthati nirāśrayam lingam.

As a picture (does) not (exist) without a support or as a shadow (does) not (exist) without a post, etc .; so, too, the instrument (linga or karana) does not exist supportless without that which is specific (i.e., a subtle body).

XLII. puruşārthahetukam idaņ nimittanaimittikaprasańgena, prakrter vibhutvayogān națavad vyavatisthate lingam.

This subtle entity, motivated for the sake of the purusa, appears like a player (who assumes many roles) by means of its association with efficient causes and effects (i.e., by means of its association

25. Ibid., under linga and bhāvas.

APP. B SĀŅKHYAKĀRIKĀ OF ĪŚVARAKRSŅA 269

with the bhavas) and because of its association with the power of prakrti.26

XLIII. sāmsiddhikāś ca bhāvāḥ prākrtikā vaikrtāś ca dharmādyāḥ, drstāḥ karaņāśrayiņaḥ kāryāśrayiņaś ca kalalādyāḥ.

The innate bhavas, both natural and acquired - i.e., virtue (dharma), etc. - are seen to be dependent on the instrument (karana) (i.e., thirteenfold instru- ment); whereas the embryo, etc., is dependent on the effected (i.e., the gross body).27

XLIV. dharmena gamanam ūrdhvam gamanam adhastād bhavaty adharmeņa, jñānena cā'pavargo viparyayād isyate bandhaḥ.

By means of virtue (i.e., the bhāva, dharma) (there is) movement upwards (in the scale of beings); by means of vice (adharma) (there is) movement downward; by means of salvation-knowledge (jñāna) (there is) final release or salvation (apa- varga); from the opposite (of jñāna) bondage results.

XLV. vairāgyāt prakrtilayaḥ samsāro bhavati rājasād rāgāt, aiśvaryād avighāto viparyayāt tadviparyāsa.

From non-attachment (comes) dissolution in prakrti; from attachment which is passionate (rājasa) (comes) transmigration; from power (comes) non- obstruction; and the reverse of that from its opposite (i.e., from anaiśvarya).28

26. Ibid., under linga and bhāvas. 27. Ibid., under bhāvas. 28. Ibid.

27.0 CLASSICAL SĀŅKHYA APP. B

XLVI. eșa pratyayasargo viparyayāśaktitusțisiddhyākhyaḥ, guņavaisamyavimardāt tasya ca bhedās tu pañcāśat.

This is the intellectual creation, and it is distingui- shed as ignorance, incapacity, complacency and perfection. These are of fifty varieties because of the suppression of differing qualities.29

XLVII. pañca viparyayabhedā bhavanty aśaktiś ca karaņavaikalyāt, așțāviņśatibhedā tușțir navadhā'șțadhā siddhiḥ.

There are five varieties of ignorance; twenty-eight varieties of incapacity, due to defects of the instru- ment; nine complacencies and eight perfections.

XLVIII. bhedas tamaso'stavidho mohasya ca daśavidho mahamohah, tāmisro 'șțādaśadhā tathā bhavaty andhatāmisraḥ.

There are eight varieties of obscurity and delusion; ten kinds of extreme delusion; both gloom and utter darkness are eighteenfold.

XLIX ekādaśendriyavadhāḥ saha buddhivadhair aśaktir uddistā, saptadaśa vadhā buddher viparyayāt tusțisiddhīnām.

Injuries to the eleven organs together with injuries to the buddhi are said to make up incapacity; the injuries to the buddhi are seventeen due to the failure of the (ninefold) complacency and the (eightfold) perfection.

29. See supra, Chapter III, E. Emergence and Functioning of the tattvas, under bhāvas.

APP. B SĀŅKHYAKĀRIKĀ OF ĪŚVARAKRSŅA 271

L. ādhyātmikāś catasraḥ prakrtyupādānakālabhāgyākhyāḥ, bāhyā vișayoparamāt pañca nava tustayo'bhimatāḥ.

The nine complacencies are thought of (in two groups); four are internal, including nature, means, time, and destiny; and five are external due to the cessation or turning away from the objects of sense.

LI. ūhaḥ śabdo'dhyayanam duḥkhavighātas trayaḥ suhrtprāptiḥ, dānam ca siddhayo'șțau siddheḥ pūrvo'n kuśas trividhaḥ.

The eight perfections are proper reasoning, oral instruction, study, removal of the three kinds of suffering, friendly discussion and generosity. The previous threefold division (i.e., ignorance, incapa- city, and complacency) hinders the perfections.

LII. na vinā bhāvair lingam na vinā lingena bhāvanirvrttiḥ, lińgākhyo bhāvākhyas tasmād dvividhaḥ pravartate sargaḥ.

The linga (or karana or thirteenfold insturment together with the five subtle elements) cannot func- tion without the bhavas ("conditions," "dispositions," or "strivings"). The bhavas cannot function with- out the linga. Therefore, a twofold creation operates (or functions) called linga and bhāva.

LIII. aștavikalpo daivas tairyagyonaś ca pañcadhã bhavati, mānusyaś cai'kavidhaḥ samāsato bhautikaḥ sargaḥ.

The divine or celestial (order) is eightfold; the sub- human (order) is fivefold; the human (order) is one

272 CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA APP. B

variety; such, briefly, is the elemental or gross creation (bhautika sarga).30

LIV. ūrdhvaņ sattvaviśālas tamoviśālaśca mūlatah sarga, madhye rajoviśālo brahmādistambaparyantaḥ.

(In the) upper (world) (there is) a predominance of sattva. (In the) lower creation (there is) a pre- dominance of tamas. In the middle, (there is) a predominance of rajas. (This is so) from Brahmā down to a blade of grass.

LV. tatra jarāmaraņakrtam duḥkham prāpnoti cetanaḥ purușaḥ, lingasyā'vinivṛtteḥ tasmād duḥkham svabhāvena.

The purusa, which is consciousness, attains there the suffering made by decay and death, until deliverance of the subtle body; therefore, suffering is of the nature of things.31

LVI. ity eșa prakrtikrto mahadādiviśeșabhūtaparyantaḥ, pratipurușavimokșārthaņ svārtha iva parārtha ārambhaḥ.

This creation, brought about by prakrti - from the great one (mahat) down to the specific gross ele- ments - (functions) for the sake of the release of each purusa; (this is done) for the sake of another, as if it were for her own (benefit).

LVII. vatsavivrddhinimittam kșīrasya yathā pravrttir ajñasya,

30. See supra, Chapter III. E. Emergence and Functioning of the tattvas, under bhautika sarga. 31. See supra, Chapter III, C. purusa; and Chapter III .F. Discrimi- nation and Release.

APP. B SĀŅKHYAKĀRIKĀ OF ĪŚVARAKRSŅA 273

purușavimokșanimittaņ tathā pravrttiḥ pradhānasya.

As the unknowing (or unconscious) milk functions for the sake of the nourishment of the calf; so the prakrti functions for the sake of the release of the purușa.

LVIII. autsukyanivrttyartham yathā kriyasu pravartate lokaḥ, purușasya vimoksārtham pravartate tadvad avyaktam.

As (in) the world (a man) engages in actions for the sake of the cessation of a desire; so also does the prakrti function for the sake of the release of the purușa.

LIX raṅgasya darśayitvā nivartate nartakī yathā nrtyāt, purușasya tathā'tmānam prakāśya vinivartate prakrtiḥ.

As a dancer ceases from the dance after having been seen by the audience; so also prakrti ceases after having manifested herself to the purusa.

LX nānavidhair upāyair upakāriņy anupakāriņaḥ pumsaḥ, guņavaty aguņasya satas tasyārtham apārthakam carati.

(She) (prakrti), possessed of the gunas and helpful in various ways, behaves selflessly for the sake of him (purusa), who is without the gunas and who plays no helpful part.

LXI. prakrteḥ sukumārataram na kiñcid astīti me matir bhavati, yā drstāsmī'ti punar na darśanam upaiti purușasya.

274 CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA APP. B

It is my thought that there is nothing more delicate than prakrti, who (says to herself) 'I have been seen,' and never again comes into the sight of purusa.32

LXII. tasmān na badhyate 'ddhā na mucyate nā'pi samsarati kaścit, samsarati badhyate mucyate ca nānāśrayā prakrtiḥ.

No one therefore, is bound; no one released, likewise no one transmigrates. (Only) prakrti in its various forms transmigrates, is bound and is released.32a

LXIII. rūpaiḥ saptabhir eva tu badhnāty ātmānam ātmanā prakrtiḥ, sai'va ca purușārtham prati vimocayaty ekarūpeņa.

prakrti binds herself by herself by means of seven forms (rūpa or bhava); she releases herself by means of one form (rūpa or bhāva) for the sake of each purușa.33

LXIV. evam tattvābhyāsān nā'smi na me nā'ham ity apariśeșam aviparyayad viśuddham kevalam utpadyate jñānam.

Thus, from the study (or analysis) of the principles (tattvas), the "knowledge" (or salvation-knowledge) arises, "I am not (conscious); (consciousness) does not belong to me; the "I" is not (conscious) (and this "knowledge") is complete because free from error, pure and solitary (kevala).

32. Many of the references to prakrti in these last verses seem to refer to prakrti in its manifestation as buddhi, since the buddhi provides both enjoy- ment of the purusa as well as the final salvation-knowledge (Kārika XXXVII). 32a. "No one", of course, refers to purusa, see p. 222. 33. Ibid.

APP. B SĀŅKHYAKĀRIKĀ OF ĪŚVARAKRSŅA 275

LXV. tena nivrttaprasavām arthavaśāt saptarūpavinivrttām, prakrtiņ paśyati purușaḥ preksakavad avasthitaḥ svasthaḥ.

Then, the purusa, comfortably situated like a specta- tor, sees prakrti whose activity has ceased due to the completion of her purpose, and who has turned back from the seven forms (rūpa or bhava).

LXVI. drstā maye'ty upeksaka ekaḥ drta'ham ity uparamaty anyā, sati samyoge'pi tayoḥ prayojanam nā'sti sargasya.

(Says the) indifferent one (or spectator), 'I have seen (her);' the other ceases (saying), 'I have been seen.' Though the two are still in proximity, no (further) creation (takes place).

LXVII. samyagjñānādhigamād dharmādīnām akāraņaprāptau, tișțhati samskāravaśāc cakrabhramivad dhrtaśariraḥ.

Having arrived at the point at which virtue, etc., has no (further) cause, because of the attainment of direct knowledge (samyagjñanadhigamad), the endowed body (i.e., the body in association with purușa) yet continues because of the force of past impressions (samskāras), like a potter's wheel.

LXVIII. prāpte śarīrabhede caritārthatvāt pradhānavinivrttau, aikāntikam ātyantikam ubhayam kaivalyam āpnoti.

With the cessation of prakrti due to its purpose having been accomplished, (the purusa) on attaining separation from the body, attains isolation (kaivalya) which is both certain and final.

276 CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA APP. B

LXIX. purușārthajñānam idam guhyam paramarșiņā samākhyātam, sthityutpattipralayāś cintyante yatra bhūtānām.

This secret (or mysterious) "knowledge" for the sake of the purusa - wherein is analyzed the existence, origin, and termination of all beings - has been expounded or enumerated by the highest (or greatest) sage.

LXX. etat pavitram agryam munir āsuraye'nukampayā pradadau, āsurir api pañcaśikhāya tena ca bahudhā krtam tantram.

This excellent and pure (knowledge) the sage gave with compassion to Asuri; Āsuri likewise to Pañcasikha; and by him the doctrine (tantra) was expanded or modified.

LXXI. sisyaparamparayā' gatam iśvarakrsnena cai' tad aryabhiḥ, saņkșiptam āryamatinā samyag vijñāya siddhāntam.

Handed down by disciples in succession, it has been compendiously written in ārya metre by the noble- minded Iśvarakrsna having fully learned the demonstrated truth.34

LXXII. saptatyām kıla ye'rthās te'rthāh krtsnasya șașțitantrasya, ākhyāyikāvirahitāḥ paravādavivarjitāś cā'pi.

The subjects of the complete sastitantra are indeed in the seventy (verses of Iśvarakrsna), although the

34. For significance of the comments on the tradition of Samkhya teachers, see supra, Chapter II.

APP. B SĀŅKHYAKĀRIKĀ OF ĪŚVARAKRSŅA 277

illustrative tales together with the objections of opponents are not included.

One final verse is added in the version of Mātharavrtti.35

LXXIII. tasmāt samāsadrstam śāstram idaņ nā'rthataś ca parihīnam, tantrasya ca brhanmūrter darpaņasankrāntam iva bimbam.

Thus, this briefly expounded sastra is not defective with respect to content, and is like a reflection in a mirror of the vast material of the tantra.

35. S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri, Sāmkhyakārikā, op. cit., p. 110.

APPENDIX C

A MODERN TRADITION OF SAMKHYAYOGA

During my stay in India, I came to know of a monastery in Madhupur (Bihar) by the name of Kapila Matha, the members of which community claim to be followers of Sāmkhyayoga. Since I had been under the impression that Samkhya was no longer a living tradition in India, I was naturally quite inte- rested in this contemporary community. The founder of this modern Sāmkhyayoga tradition was Swami Hariharananda Āranya, a Bengali, born December 4, 1869, died April 19, 1947. He claimed to have been initiated into the tradition by Swami Triloki Aranya. Information about the latter teacher is totally lacking. Swami Hariharananda wrote a number of books on Sāmkhyayoga in Bengali and Sanskrit. A few are available in English. They are as follows: The Sāmkhya Sūtras of Pañcasikha and Other Ancient Sages, translated by Jajneswar Ghosh; Sām- khyatattvāloka, a Sanskrit treatise also translated by Jajneswar Ghosh; The Samkhya Catechism, a compilation of the teachings of Hariharananda Āranya edited and translated by Śrimad Vivekaprakāśa Brahmacārī; and The roga Philosophy of Patañjali, a partial translation of Hariharananda's major work in Bengali, Kāpilāśramīyapātañjalayogadarśana, prepared by P. N. Mukerji. Unfortunately, all of these works are out of print with the exception of the latter which is available from the University of Calcutta Press. Of interest also is a book by Jajneswar Ghosh, A Study of Yoga, which sets forth Hariharananda's views on classical Yoga. According to tradition, Hariharananda entered an arti- ficial cave at Kapila Matha on May.14, 1926 and remained there in study and meditation for the remainder of his life. His successor as leader of the community is Swami Dharmamegha Āranya, who currently resides in the cave at Kāpila Matha. The above information was given to me by Pandit Ram Shankar Bhattacharya, a member of the General Council of Kāpila Mațha. Dr. Bhatțāchārya is currently in the Research Institute of Banaras Sanskrit University, Varanasi.

APPENDIX D

ADDITIONAL MATERIALS FOR THE STUDY OF THE HISTORY AND MEANING OF CLASSICAL SAMKHYA SINCE THE FIRST EDITION

It has occurred to me that a revised edition of my origi- nal Classical Sāmkhya should incorporate additional material in at least two areas, primarily for the sake of up-dating the original work but also for the purpose of providing a more balanced treatment of the overall subject. First, throughout my exposition of the history and meaning of classical Sāmkhya in Chapters II and III of the first edition, I continually draw attention to the lacunae that exist in our sources for the study of Samkhya. Numerous questions remain unanswered historically and philosophically. In subsequent years - that is to say, since 1968 when the manuscript for the first edition was completed - some progress has been made in filling some of the gaps, although, unfortunately, in my judgment, not enough to warrant any strikingly new or firm conclusions concerning the history or philosophical significance of the Sām- khya. Sufficient progress has been made, however, to focus some of the older questions in a somewhat more specific manner, and I want to characterize the direction of this refocussing that has emerged as a result of subsequent research. Second, in the intervening years since the first edition, I have had an opportunity to examine many passages in the Purānas that utilize Samkhya notions and terminology, and I have come to the conclusion that the relation between Purānic Sāmkhya and classical philosophical Sāmkhya is an issue that should be addressed in any historical treatment of the subject.

(1) Recent textual and bibliographical studies (a) Probably the most important text for understanding the history of Sämkhya in the classical period is the commentary on the Sāmkhyakārikā entitled ruktidīpikā, but the text continues

280 CLASSICAL SĀŅKHYA APP. D

to be something of an enigma in Sāmkhya studies. The text was first edited by P. Chakravarti (Calcutta Sanskrit Series, no. 23, and see Bibliography to the first edition) and then extensively utilized by Chakravarti in his book, Origin and Development of the Samkhya System of Thought (see Bibliography). In 1967 R. C. Pandeya, consulting an additional manuscript, re-edited the text (see Bibliography), and he is currently preparing yet another re-edited version (to be published by Motilal Banarasidass in 1977). Erich Frauwallner relied heavily on the Yuktidipika in his exposition of the content of classical Sāmkhya in volume I of his Geschichte der indischen Philosophie (see Bibliography), especially in his treatment of the "five breaths" (pañca-vāyu), the five "sources of action" (karmayoni), the fifty "basic predispositions" or "feeling-states" (bhāva), the "sixty topics" (sasti-tantra), and his treatment of the views of other classical teachers like Paurika, Pañcadhi- karaņa, Patañjali, Pañcaśikha, Vindhyavāsin, Vrșagaņa and the followers of Vrsagana (Varsaganya). Currently A. Wezler of Hamburg, Germany, is preparing a critical edition of the Yuktidipika (as announced in his "Some Observations on the Yuktidīpikā", see Bibliography). In addition, a complete summary in English of the content of Yuktidipikā will be available in the forthcoming volume on Sāmkhya and Yoga of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies (already referred to in the Preface to the Second Edition of this book). The ruktidipikā was written some time during or prior to the eighth century A.D. and appears to be responding largely to Buddhist criticisms of classical Sāmkhya. It has been sug- gested by Chakravarti and R. C. Pandeya that the ruktidipikā may be the same as the so-called Rāja-vārttika, but it may be argued, perhaps more plausibly, that the ruktidīpikā, rather than itself being a vārttika, instead appears to presuppose a vārttika- that is to say, there appears to be a secondary text within the text of the Yuktidipika. If such is the case, that would explain the incredibly varied and terse contents of the text wherein it is frequently difficult to sort out the views of the commentator from a variety of other views. Also, there are important gaps in the Yuktidīpikā as it is now available. For example, there is little of value in the commentary on the epistemological issues

APP. D ADDITIONAL MATERIALS 281

of kārikās 4-6 and no commentary available at all on kārikās 11-12 and 60-63. Moreover, no other extant texts on Sāmkhya from any period refer to the ruktidīpikā or its views (unless one accepts the identity of ruktidipikā with Rāja-vārttika, which, as indicated above, has not been adequately established). Finally, one has the impression that the author of the ruktidipika was a grammarian rather than a philsopher since many passages of the text deal with the analysis of Sanskrit compounds together with references to Patañjali's Mahābhāsya. Possibly, then, even with a critical edition together with a full summary of content, the text may not prove to be of profound philosophical significance. Historically, however, it is perhaps the most valuable source for developments within the Sāmkhya traditions in the classical period, and mainly for that reason a critical edition of the text will be a most welcome addition to Sāmkhya studies. (b) Of perhaps greater interest from the point of view of completed research are the three recent books of Esther A. Solomon: Samkhya-Saptati-Vrtti (V1); Sāmkhya-Vrtti (V2); and The Commentaries of the Sāmkhya Kārikā- A Study (and see Bibliography for full entries). The first two are printed editions of two unknown commentaries on the Sāmkhyakārikā from palm-leaf manuscripts found in the Jaina Grantha Bhandara of Jesalmere, in Devanāgarī characters with extensive notes comparing the commentaries with one another. The third book is a detailed discussion of all of the extant com- mentaries on the Samkhyakārika in which Professor Solomon seeks to work out the chronological order of the various commentaries. It has been known for many years that there are strong similarities between Gaudapāda's Bhāsya, Māțharavrtti and Paramartha's Chinese commentary. Some have argued (for example, Belvalkar) that Matharavrtti is the oldest commentary and that Gaudapada more or less plagiarized much of his Bhāsya from the Vrtti. Others have argued (for example, A. B. Keith) that all three commentaries are dependent on an original commentary that is no longer extant. The two new comment- aries edited by Solomon (V1 and V2), rather than solving the problem, tend to exacerbate it, since both new commentaries have much in common with Gaudapāda, Mthara and Para-

282 CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA APP. D

märtha. Professor Solomon, after a painstaking comparative analysis of the five commentaries (together with occasional references to ruktidīpikā, Jayamangalā and Tattvakaumudī), argues that V2 is the oldest commentary (ca. fourth-century or fifth century A.D.) available on the Kārikā, and that V1, Gauda- pāda, Paramārtha and ruktidīpikā are dependent on it. Moreover, she argues that Matharavrtti is simply an enlarged and revised edition of V1; and because of Māthara's references to the later Purāņas, Māțhara must be assigned a late date, perhaps ca. 1000 A.D. Taken together, then, the commentaries on the Kārikā can be arranged, according to Solomon, in the following order:

V2 -fourth-century A.D. or early fifth V1 -late fifth-century Paramārtha's Chinese com- mentary -fifth-century or early sixth Yuktidīpikā -fifth-century (?) Gaudapāda's Bhāşya -late seventh or early eighth-century Jayamangalā -ninth-century Tattvakaumudī -ninth-century Māțharavrtti -tenth or eleventh-century

Solomon also speculates that Isvarakrsna may have been the author of V2 (hence making V2 a svopajna-vrtti), although she hastens to add that there is insufficient evidence to support the claim. The most convincing aspect of Solomon's work is the relationship she establishes between V1 and Mātharavrtti. The parallels are striking, and her assigning of Mātharavrtti to a late date, largely on the basis of Purānic references, seems fully justified. That V2 is the original commentary on the Kārikā, however, and is the basis for V1, Gaudapada and Paramartha is perhaps less convincing, since on the basis of the evidence available, it is quite possible to argue that V2 is as derivative of an earlier or contemporary commentary as are the others. Or, again, one might argue that Paramartha is the original commentary. In such matters of Indian chronology, one is

APP. D ADDITIONAL MATERIALS 283

often tempted to paraphrase the last section of RV. X. 129: only God knows about these matters, and perhaps even He does not know ! Be that as it may, Solomon's detailed com- parative analyses are a welcome addition to Sāmkhya studies and deserve careful attention by all serious students of the subject. Also, it should be noted that complete summaries in English of the contents of both V1 and V2 will be available in' the forthcoming Samkhya and Yoga volume of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies. (c) Three other recent works deserve mention as important contributions to Samkhya studies in recent years. While they do not concern newly discovered texts, they do provide valuable improvements of older texts and interpretations. First, Srinivasan Ayya Srinivasan has edited an elaborate critical edition of Vācaspatimiśra's Sāmkhyatattvakaumudī (see Bibliography for full entry). I became aware of this work just as the first edition of Classical Sāmkhya was being printed, and I could only refer to it in passing in the Preface and Bibliography. Since then I have had numerous occasions to check readings of the Tattvakaumudi and have found Srinivasan's work to be a great help. Also, quite apart from Sāmkhya studies, it should be noted that Srinivasan's work is a model of methodological clarity with respect to deter- mining critical readings of a text when there are a great variety of manuscripts available. If Srinivasan's work has any fault, it is perhaps that too many variants are cited and that the numbering system is a bit awkward for purposes of quick refer- ence. Second, a reliable and up-to-date French translation of the Sāmkhyakārikā together with the Bhāsya of Gaudapāda is now available, prepared by Anne-Marie Esnoul (Les Strophes de Sāmkhya avec le commentaire de Gaudapāda, and see Bibliography for full entry). This book also only came to my attention when the first edition was being published, and it is referred to only in passing in the Biblio- graphy. The book provides a French translation accom- panied by the Sanskrit text (on facing pages), an elaborate set of notes on the translation, and a word-index of the Sāmkhyakā ikā. The book can be said to be the best recent translation of Gaudapāda's Bhāsya available in a European language. Third, in the area of exposition and interpretation,

284 CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA APP. D

Anima Sen Gupta's Classiccl Sāmkhya: A Critical Study (Patna University, 1969), should be mentioned. The book is especially valuable as a careful exposition of Văcaspatimiśra's interpreta- tion of classical Samkhya. Also, it contains an interesting chapter (IV) on the problem of Samkhya "theology", or perhaps better, "anti-theology" (niriśvaravāda). The book is soon to be issued in a second edition by Motilal Banarsidass. (d) Finally, in the area of bibliography, Sāmkhya studies have been greatly facilitated in recent years by the appearance of volume I of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, entitled "Bibliography of Indian Philosophies," compiled by Karl H. Potter. The secondary literature on Sāmkhya-Yoga (pp. 523-535) is nearly exhaustive through the year 1965, and a "Supplement" providing entries through the late sixties can be found in the Journal of Indian Philosophy 2,2 (August, 1973), pp. 186- 189. The "Bibliography" volume also contains chronological listings of Sanskrit authors and texts from the first-century A.D. up to the twentieth century. Elaborate indices of names, titles and topics are also provided, making the volume especially useful for rapid reference.

(2) Purāņic Sāmkhya and Classical Philosophical Sāmkhya

In Chapter II of the original edition of this book, the history of Samkhya is set forth within a framework of four basic periods : (a) ancient speculations (1000-400 B.c.); (b) proto- Sāmkhya speculations (400 B.C .- A.D. 100); (c) classical Sām- khya speculation (A.D. 100-900); and (d) renaissance or later Sāmkhya speculation (1400-1600) (supra, pp. 75 ff.). Charac- teristic of the proto-Sāmkhya period (in such texts as Katha, Śvetāśvatara, Caraka-samhitā, and the philosophical portions of the Moksadharma and Bhagavad Gitā) is a rather undifferentiated Sāmkhya-yoga complex of traditions in which one finds the beginning of a technical Samkhya terminology (including the use of the term "sāmkhya"), a variety of speculations concern- ing the nature of the self (jīva, purușa, ātman and so forth), a pronounced theistic bias, and a generally eclectic or syncretistic conflation of older Vedic-Upanisadic, theistic and ascetic (or perhaps better, meditative) motifs. This was a fluid and parti-

APP. D ADDITIONAL MATERIALS 285

cularly creative phase in the intellectual history of India, and although one cannot yet identify the classical philosophical "schools" in this period, it is clear enough that this was the environment from which the classical and technical systems of Indian philosophy emerged. It is also clear enough that this was the intellectual context from which many of the later popu- lar and sectarian traditions of Hindu thought and orthopraxis developed. Indeed, this is the period in which the word "Hindu" has its legitimate usage in the sense that the word "Hindu" (as opposed to such terms as "Vedic," "brahmanical," and so forth) usually implies a syncretistic conflation of religious. options and practices that allows for the greatest diversity within a general framework of expected behavior (varņāśrama- dharma). The old debate among German scholars as to whether the philosophy of this period was Mischphilosophie (syncretism) or Übergangsphilosophie (transition) is in retrospect misdirected, for the evidence suggests that it was undoubtedly both. The priestly "imperialism" of brahmanical speculation, which from the beginning was probably little more than a fiction in the minds of certain priestly groups, had long since given way to a "mixed" or more "democratic" interpretation of human life in the cosmic scheme of things, occasioned partly by the success of Buddhist institutions and ideas from the third through the first-century B.C. (and their subsequent decline in the first centuries A.D.), partly by the emergence of vigorous devotional traditions, and partly by a new social reality in which mono- lithic notions of religious authority were no longer accepted. At the same time, this broadened syncretistic environment pro- vided a remarkable reservoir of powerful ideas that could be tapped by the later technical "schools" of Indian thought. In other words, the philosophy of the proto-Samkhya period was Mischphilosophie as well as Ubergangsphilosophie. If the classical and technical "schools" of Indian philo- sophy (darśana) are symptomatic of an urge to formulate the cognitive content of this syncretistic and transitional cultural environment in a more precise and analytic fashion for those specializing in intellectual pursuits (sūtrakāras, copyists, bhāsya- kāras, and so forth) within the tradition, then it might be said that the Puranas are symptomatic of an urge to formulate the

286 CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA APP. D

"narrative," affective and devotional content of the same cul- tural environment in an imaginative and dramatic fashion for "all sorts and conditions" of people in need of symbolic arti- culations of the meaning of human existence within the context of everyday life. The term "narrative" in such an environment cannot be restricted to historical narrative (although the Purānas display some sensitivity to that dimension of cultural life) but, rather, connotes a sensitivity to the more expansive contexts of "time" in which everyday life is lived and about which "stories" are told that render the "times" meaningful - for example, the time of ritual re-enactment, the time of birth and death, the time of illness, the time of disaster and fear, the time of heroic action, the time of sacrifice, the time of the gods, the time of kings, and the time of the creation and dissolution of all things. A passage from the Mārkandeya-purāna summarizes well the kinds of questions which the Purānas in general are seeking to answer.

How did this universe, both moveable and immoveable, come into existence ? And how will it fall into dissolution at the proper time, most excellent priests ? And how came the families that sprang from the gods, the rishis, the pitris, created things, etc. ? And how did the Manvan- taras occur? And what was the history of the families of old? and whatever creations and whatever dissolu- tions of the universe have occurred; and how the ages have been divided; and what the duration of the Man- vantaras has been; and how the earth remains stable; and what is the size of the world; and what are the oceans, mountains and rivers and forests according to their situa- tion; what is the number of the worlds, the bhūr-loka, svar-loka, etc., including the lower regions; and what is the course of the sun, moon and other planets, of the stars and heavenly bodies also. I wish to hear of all this which is destined to subversion; and what will be the end when this universe is dissolved.1

Tradition claims that a purana (meaning "ancient" or an old

1. F. E. Pargiter (trans.), The Mārkandeya Purāņa (Calcutta : The Asiatic Society, 1904; Bibliotheca Indica), Canto 45.9-14, p. 218.

APP. D ADDITIONAL MATERIALS 287

narrative) has five characteristic themes (pañcalaksana), namely creation (sarga), dissolution and recreation (pratisarga), genea- logies of kings, sages and gods (vamsa), world-periods or Manu- periods (manvantara), and narrative accounts of kings, sages and gods (vamśānucarita). Tradition also recognizes some eighteen Purāņas as basic or impontant (mahāpurāņa), Brahma, Padma, Vişņu, Vāyu (or, in some lists, Siva), Bhāgavata, Nāradīya, Mārkandeya, Agni, Bhavişya, Brahmavaivarta, Linga, Varāha, Skanda, Vāmana, Kūrma, Matsya, Garuda and Brahmānda; and Vaișņava traditions classify these eighteen according to the three gunas. Those Purāņas (for example, Visņu, Bhāgavata, etc.) whose primary focus is Visnu, the preserving deity, are classified as dominated by the guna, sattva; those (for example, Linga, Skanda, etc.) whose primary focus is Siva, the destroying deity, are classed as dominated by the guna, tamas; and the remainder (Brahmāņda, Bhavisya, etc.) whose focus is on creative activity (and, hence, possibly related to Brahmā) are classified as domi- nated by the guna, rajas. From an historical-critical point of view, of course, such listings and classifications are later elaborations, reflecting sect- arian bias. Critical research (in the work of F. E. Pargiter, W. Kirfel, R. C. Hazra, P. Hacker, and most recently, R. Morton Smith, and see Bibliography for entries) indicates that although Puranas were probably being compiled even in the period of ancient speculations, the extant texts that we now have come from a later period. The nucleus of some Purāņas (for example Mārkaņdeya, Vāyu, Brahmāņda, Padma, Vişņu, Linga and Kūrma,) especially in the cosmogonic portions, can be assigned dates ranging from A.D. 300 (for some passages of Mārkandeya) through A.D. 700-800 (for some passages of Linga, Kūrma, etc.). All of the Purānas, however, contain later additions and were redacted and re-edited by various sectarian hands down through the medieval period and even into modern times. Moreover, some Purāņas (for example, Bhāgavata, Agni, Garuda, Śiva, etc.) are quite late (tenth-century or later) and are not so much Purānas as they are encyclopedic compilations of rituals, myths, behavioral codes, medical theories, legends, and sectarian usages of particular complexes of tradition (for example, South Indian Vaisnava, Pāśupata Śaiva and Šākta traditions).

288 CLASSICAL SĀŅKHYA APP. D

The oldest passages in the Purānas (specifically, the cosmo- gonic passages in Mārkaņdeya, Vāyu, Brahmāņda, Padma, Vişņu, Linga and Kūrma) appear to reflect the intellectual milieu of such texts as the Moksadharma, Manusmrti, and Bhagavad Gītā- that is to say, the intellectual milieu of what I have called in this book the "proto-Samkhya" period. Hacker has shown, for example, that Moksadharma 224 (in the Critical Edition of the Mbh ; Manusmrti, chapter I; Mārkandeya 45; Padma II; Vāyu 11-16; Brahmānda I; Vişņu I and Kūrma I; all utilize what he calls a pre-classical Sāmkhya emanation-text (a "short in- structional tract") for their accounts of the beginning of creation, and that the various editors and redactors of the texts shape this "short instructional tract" to bring it into conformity with the classical philosophical Sāmkhya of Īśvarakrsna.2 He argues, further, that this "short instructional tract" was current in the third-century A.D. and that by A.D. 300 the Sāmkhyakārikā had become authoritative and thereafter became a norm for editing older cosmogonic accounts.3 That the Sāmkhyakārikā itself was authoritative by A.D. 300 may be a hasty conclusion on Hacker's part, for it is just as likely that the classical text or tradition that had become authoritative was the sastitantra (the tradition of "sixty topics") of which the Sāmkhyakārikā purports to be a later summary (see Kārikā 72). In any case, Hacker's work has clearly shown that the cosmogonic sections in the oldest passages of the Purānas reflect a period of transition from "proto-Sāmkhya" speculation to classical philo- sophical Samkhya, very much on analogy, albeit slightly later, with the speculative environment of the Moksadharma and the Bhagvad Gita. Apart from the cosmogonic portions of the Purāņas, other references to Sāmkhya terminology in the Purānas (as, for example, Mārkandeya 46-48; Brahmāņda III. 3-4; Kūrma II. 11 and II.37; Visņu VI. 5-%, Bhāgavata II.2, III.5-6; III.25-27, XI.14, and XI.19-28; Garuda IV, XIV, .XLIX, CCXXXII and CCXLII; Matsya LII; and Siva 6, 10 and 16, etc .; and see Bibliography for editions used) appear to reflect an undifferentiated Sāmkhya-yoga tradition,

2. Paul Hacker, "The Sankhyization of the Emanation Doctrine Shown in a Critical Analysis of Texts," WZKSO, volume 5 (1961), 75-112. 3. Ibid.

APP. D ADDITIONAL MATERIALS 289

also very much on analogy with the Moksadharma and Bhagavad Gitā, although reflecting more sectarian interpretations of devo- tion to a particular god (Vișņu, Śiva, Krsna and so forth) or more specialized traditions of meditation (Pupata-yoga, etc.). It should also be noted that even in the cosmogonic portions of the oldest passages in the Purānas (wherein one finds the appro- priation of more purely philosophical notions), the theistic and sectarian biases of the Puranic editors are everywhere present. For example, purusa and prakrti are derived from iśvara, Šiva, Śiva's phallus, or Vișņu; or again, the avyakta or "unmanifest" appears as the world-egg (anda) in which continents, oceans, heavens, hells and various realms of deities manifest themselves.4 Thus, although the extant Purānas range historically over a thousand years (beginning about A.D. 300) and, hence, encompass what I have called the "proto-Sāmkhya," the "classi- cal Samkhya," and the later "renaissance Samkhya," it appears to be the case that philosophically the Purānas reflect the Mischphilosophie and Übergangsphilosophie of the "proto-Sāmkhya" period, occasionally up-dated by the classical philosophical formulations of the şastitantra and the Sāmkhyakārika. That over so long a period there should have been such minimal philo- sophical development is hardly surprising given the fundamental intentions of the Puranic traditions which are imaginative and devotional rather than philosophical. This is not to suggest that the editors and redactors were unaware of developments in the classical philosophical tradition nor that occasionally Purānic editors and redactors did not utilize philosophical materials. Indeed, Hacker's work has documented at least one clear example of the use of a philosophical "short instructional tract" for purposes of interpreting cosmogony in the Purānas. The point is rather that the Puranic editors were asking questions of a distinctive kind and formulating their answers in a literary genre radically distinct from the technical philosophical schools. Moreover, the audience to whom the Purānas were directed is fundamentally different from that of the philosophical schools.

4. Perhaps the best summary-account of the overall mythologized cosmogony of the Puranas may be found in Erich Frauwallner's Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, op. cit., I, 358-361.

290 CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA APP. D

Frauwallner disagrees with this assessment and argues instead the following (in footnote 196 in volume I of his Geschichte der indischen Philosophie) :

The cosmological views of the Samkhya are not presented in the philosophical texts in a connected manner but sporadic, occasional suggestions are provided to us in that connection. As these suggestions, however, agree with those in the presentations of the sectarian literature of the Puranas, there stands no hesitation to join or put them together and to supplement them, corresponding to these presentations (of the Puranas), because those views form nevertheless a necessary supplement of the system and are many times presupposed as such.5

This, is, indeed, a strange argument. Frauwallner begins by admitting that "the cosmological views of the Samkhya are not presented in the philosophical texts," except for "sporadic, occasional suggestions." He then argues that these "sugges- tions" "agree with those ... of the sectarian literature," but one is left wondering how this could be the case if the "cosmological views of the Samkhya are not presented in the philosophical texts." Then, on the basis of this supposed conformity, which cannot be documented by his own admission, he concludes that "there stands no hesitation to join or put them together and to supplement them ... " since, after all, the Puranic cosmology is a "necessary supplement" and "presupposed as such" in classical Sāmkhya. He is, thus, able to interpret Sāmkhya cosmology vis-à-vis Puranic cosmogony in a direct, symmetrical fashion. Unfortunately, there is no evidence whatever that Puranic cosmogony is a "necessary supplement" or "presupposed as such" in classical philosophical Sāmkhya. Cosmology or cosmogony is simply not spoken of in the classical Sāmkhya texts, and whatever "sporadic occasional suggestions" there are appear to point neither to the Purānas nor to uniquely Sāmkhya themes, but appear to be, rather a sort of general

5. Erich Frauwallner, Geschichte der indischen Philosophie, I, note 196 as translated by V. M. Bedekar History of Indian Philosophy by Erich Frauwallner (Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1973), volume I, p. 389.

APP. D ADDITIONAL MATERIALS 291

world-view shared by all traditions. Moreover, in the Purānic texts one finds only the bare essentials of a Samkhya philoso- phical system, and that largely of a proto-Sāmkhya variety, which has been filtered through the devotional and mythological interests of the editors and redactors. It is only with Vijñāna- bhiksu in the late sixteenth-century in his Sāmkhyapravacana- bhāsya that one finds Puranic cosmogony a "necessary supple- ment" or "presupposed as such" in the interpretation of philo- sophical Sāmkhya, but in Vijñānabhiksu we also find the claim that philosophical Samkhya should be supplemented and "presupposes as such" all of the orthodox traditions of Indian philosophy ! My own conclusion regarding the relationship between Purāņic Sāmkhya and classical philosophical Sāmkhya, there- fore, can be summarized briefly as follows. The "Sāmkhya" of the Purānas is really the "proto-Samkhya" Mischphilosophie and Übergangsphilosophie of the late epic in such texts as the Mokșadharma and the Bhagavad Gitā. Unlike the epic context, however, in which classical philosophical Sāmkhya is slowly emerging in its normative and technical formulation, in the Purāņic texts this proto-Sāmkhya speculation functions more as a heuristic cluster of symbols, utilized for purposes of cosmogony, mythology and religious devotion. It represents an interesting illustration of the manner in which philosophical notions came to be assimilated and popularized in a broader cultural environment-perhaps not unlike the assimilation of elementary notions of Scholastic philosophy in a poem like the Divine Comedy or the appropriation of elementary notions of Platonic and Neo-Platonic philosophy in popular Christian belief. Purānic Sāmkhya, in other words, is an intriguing chapter in the history of religions but must be used with great caution in interpreting classical philosophical Sāmkhya.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A. REFERENCE WORKS

Emeneau, M. B. (comp.). A Union List of Printed Indic Texts and Translations in American Libraries. New Haven : American Oriental Society, 1935. Grassmann, Hermann. Wörterbuch zum Rig-Veda. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 1955. Hastings, James (ed.). Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics. 13 vols. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1908. Jacob, G. A. (comp.). A Concordance to the Principal Upanishads and Bhagavadgita. Bombay: Government Central Book Depot, 1891. Macdonell, Arthur A. A Practical Sanskrit Dictionary. London: Oxford University Press, 1958. Vedic Mythology. Strassburg: Karl J. Trubner, 1897. Monier-Williams, Monier. A Sanskrit-English Dictionary. New edition. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960. Whitney, William D. The Roots, Verb-Forms, and Primary Deriva- tives of the Sanskrit Language. Leipzig: Breitkopf and Härtel, 1885. Sanskrit Grammar. Second edition. London: Oxford University Press, 1960.

B. TEXTS AND TRANSLATIONS

1. Key to Primary Texts Alberuni. See Sachau, E. C. Atharva Veda. See Edgerton, F .; Roth, R. and W. D. Whitney; and Whitney, W. D. Bhagavadgitā. See Deussen, P .; Edgerton, F .; Telang, K. T. Bhāşya of Gaudapāda. See Colebrooke, H. T .; Esnoul, Anne- Marie; Tripathi, B .; Mainkar, T. J. Buddhacarita of Aśvaghosa. See Johnston, E. H. Jayamangalā. See Śarmā, H. Mahābhārata. See Belvalkar, S. K .; Rāy, R. C.

294 CLASSICAL SÂMKHYA

Manu Smrti. See Jha, G. Māțharavrtti. See Sarma, V. P. Mokşadharma. See Belvalkar, S. K .; Deussen, P .; Edgerton, F .; Rāy, R. C. Paramartha's Chinese version. See Takakusu, M. J. Purāņas. See Gupta, A. S .; Kirfel, W .; Pargiter, F. E .; Sanyal, J. M .; Sastri, M. N. D .; Shastri, J. L .; Wilson, H. H. Rig Veda. See Aufrecht, T .; Geldner, K. F .; Griffith, R. T. H .; Macdonell, A. A .; Max Müller, F. Sāmkhyakārikā of Īśvarakrsņa. See Colebrooke, H. T .; Davies, J .; Esnoul, Anne-Marie; Sastri, S. S. Suryanarayana; Takakusu, M. J .; Tripāțhi, B. Sāmkhyapravacanabhāsya of Vijñānabhikșu. See Ballantyne, J. R .; Garbe, R .; Sinha, N. Sāmkhyapravacanasūtra. See Ballantyne, J. R .; Garbe, R .; Sinha, N .; Bhatțāchārya, R. S. Sāmkhya-Saptati-Vrtti. See Solomon, E. A. Sāmkhya-Sūtra-Vrtti of Aniruddha. See Garbe, R .; Sinha, N. Sāmkhyatattvakaumudī of Vācaspatimiśra. See Garbe, R .; Jhā, G .; Ramesh Chandra; Bhattāchārya, R. S .; Srinivasan, S. A. Sāmkhya-Vrtti. See Solomon, E. A. Sarvadarśanasamgraha of Mādhava. See Cowell, E. B. and A. E. Gough. Śatapatha Brāhmana. See Eggeling, J. Suvarņasaptati. See Sastri, N. A. Tattvasamāsa. See Sinha, N. Upanișads. See Ayyangar, T. R. S .; Deussen, P .; Hume, R. E .; Max Müller, F .; Nikhilananda, S .; Radhakrishnan, S. Vedānta Sūtras of Bādarāyaņa with Commentary of Śańkara. See Thibaut, G., and Sankarācārya. Yogasutra of Patanjali. See Hauer, J. W .; Nikhilananda, S .: Woods, H. J. Yuktidīpikā. See Chakravarti, P .; Pandeya, R. C.

2. Listing of Editions and Translations

Aufrecht, Theodor (ed.). Die Hymnen des Rigveda. Bonn: Adolph Marcus, 1877.

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Ayyangar, T. R. Śrīnivāsa (trans.). The Yoga Upanişads. Edited by G. S. Murti. Adyar: Vasanta Press, 1952. Ballantyne, James R. (Trans.). The Sānkhya Aphorisms of Kapila. London: Trubner and Co., 1885. Belvalkar, S. K., et al. (eds.), The Mahābhārata. Sāntiparvan, fascicules 22, 23, 24. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1951-53. Bhatțāchārya, Rām Shankar, ed. Sāmkhyadarsana. Varanasi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakasana, 1966. , ed. Sāmkhyakārikā. Varanasi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1967. Chakravarti, Pulinbehari (ed.). ruktidīpikā. Calcutta Sans- krit Series No. 23. Calcutta: Metropolitan Printing and Publishing House, Ltd., 1938. Colebrooke, Henry Thomas (trans.). The Sāmkhya Kārikā ... by Isvara Krishna. Oxford: A. J. Valpy, 1837; and Wilson, Horace Hayman (ed. and trans.). The Sānkhya Kārikā ... with the Bhāshya or Commentary of Gaurapāda (sic). Oxford: A. J. Valpy, 1837. Cowell, E. B. and A. E. Gough (trans.). Sarva-darsana-samgraha by Madhava Acharya. Second Edition. London: Trübner and Co., 1894. Davies, John (trans.). The Sankhya Karika of Iswara Krishna. Second edition. Calcutta: Susil Gupta Ltd., 1957. de Bary, Wm. Theodore, et al. (eds.). Sources of Indian Tradi- tion. Introduction to Oriental Civilizations No. LVI. New York: Columbia University Press, 1958. Deussen, Paul (trans.). Vier Philosophische Texte des Mahā- bharatam. Leipzig: F. A. Brockhaus, 1922. A Brockhaus, 1905. Edgerton, Franklin (trans.). The Beginnings of Indian Philo- sophy. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965. (trans. ). The Bhagavad Gita. Part I: Text and Translation. HOS vol. 38. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1944. Eggeling, Julius (trans.). Satapatha-Brāhmaņa. SBE, 5 parts. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1882. Esnoul,. Anne-Marie (trans.). Les Strophes de Sāmkhya, avec le Commentaire de Gaudapāda. Sanskrit text and translation. Collection Emile Senart. Paris: Societé d'Edition, Les Belles Lettres, 1964.

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Garbe, Richard (trans.). Der Mondschein der Sāmkhya Wahrheit, Vācaspatimiśra's Sāmkhya-tattva-kaumudi. München: Verlag der k. Akademie in Commission bei G. Franz, 1891. - (trans.). Sāmkhya-pravacana-bhāşya, Vijñānabhikșu's Commentar zu den Sāmkhyasūtras. Leipzig: F. A. Brock- haus, 1889. (ed.). The Sāmkhya-pravacana-bhāsya or Commentary on the Exposition of the Sānkhya Philosophy by Vijnānabhiksu, HOS vol. 2. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1943. (ed. and trans.). Sāmkhya-Sūtra-Vrtti or Aniruddha's Commentary and the Original Parts of Vedāntin Mahādeva's Commentary to Sāmkhya Sūtras. Calcutta: J. W. Thomas Baptist Mission Press, 1888. Geldner, Karl F. (trans.). Der Rigveda. HOS vols. 33-36. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951-57. Griffith, R. T. H. (trans.). The Hymns of the Rigveda. Benares: E. J. Lazarus and Co., 1920. Gupta, A. S. (ed.). The Kūrma Purāņa. Varanasi: All India Kashiraj Trust, Fort Ramnagar, 1972. (ed.). The Vamana Purāņa. Varanasi: All India Kashiraj Trust, Fort Ramnagar, 1968. Hauer, J. Wilhelm (trans.). "Die Texte des pātañjalayoga- sutram," in Der Yoga, pp. 239-258. Stuttgart: W. Kohlhammer, 1958. Hume, Robert Ernest (trans.). The Thirteen Principal Upani- shads. London: Oxford University Press, 1931. Jacobi, Hermann (trans.). Jaina Sūtras. SBE vols. 22 and 45. Oxford: Clarendon.Press, 1884, 1895. Jhā Gangānatha (trans.). Manu Smrti. 9 vols. Calcutta: University of Calcutta, 1920-26. (trans.). Tattva-kaumudi of Vāchaspati Miśra. Sanskrit text and translation. Bombay: Tattva-Vivechaka Press, 1896. Johnston, E. H. (ed.). The Buddhacarita: or, Acts of the Buddha. Part I, Sanskrit text. Punjab University Oriental Publications No. 31. Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1935. (trans.). The Buddhacarita. Part II, Translation, Cantos I-XIV. Punjab University Oriental Publi- cations No. 32. Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1936.

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Kirfel, W. Das Purāņa Pañcalakşana. Bonn: 1927. Macdonell, Arthur Anthony (trans.). A Vedic Reader. Sanskrit text and translations of selected hymns. London: Oxford University Press, 1917. Mainkar, T. G., (ed. and trans.). Sāmkhya-kārikā of Isvara- krsna. Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1964. Max Muller, F. (ed.). The Hymns of the Rig-Veda. Second edition. 2 vols. London: Trubner and Co., 1877. (trans.). The Upanishads. SBE vols. 1 and 15. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1884. Nikhilananda, Swami (trans.). The Upanishads. 4 vols. New York: Harper, 1949-59. (ed.). Vivekananda: The rogas and Other Works. Re- vised edition. New York: Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Center, 1953. Pandeya, Ram Chandra (ed.). Yukti-Dipikā. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1967. Pargiter, F. E. (trans.). The Mārkaņdeya Purāņa. Bibliotheca Indica. Calcutta: Baptist Mission Press, 1904. Phukan, Radhanath (ed. and trans.). The Sāmkhya Kārikā of Isvarakrsna. Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1960. Radhakrishnan, S. and C. A. Moore (eds.). A Source Book in Indian Philosophy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957. Radhakrishnan, S. (trans.). The Principal Upanişads. Sanskrit text and translation. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1953. Ramesh Chandra (ed.). Sāmkhyatattvakaumudi and the Sāmkhya- kārikā of Isvarakrsna and the Introduction to the Sāmkhya- tattvavilāsa of Raghunātha, etc. Calcutta Sanskrit Series No. 25. Calcutta: Metropolitan Printing and Pub- lishing House Ltd., 1935. Ray, Pratāpa Chandra (trans.). The Mahābhārata, Vol. 10. Calcutta: Bharata Press, 1891. Roth, R. and W. D. Whitney and M. Lindenau (eds.). Atharva Veda Sanhita. Berlin: Ferd. Dummlers, 1924. Sachau, Edward C. (trans.). Alberuni's India. London : Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner and Co., 1910. 2 vols.

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Śankarācārya. Brahmasūtra with Śankarabhāsya, Works of Śankarācārya in original Sanskrit, vol. III. Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1964. Sanyal, J. M. (trans.). The Śrimad Bhāgavatam, 2 vols. New Delhi : Munshiram Manoharlal, 1973. Śarmā, H. (ed.). Jayamangalā. Calcutta Oriental Series No. 19. Delhi : N. P: Betab at the Betab Printing Works, 1926. Sarma, Vishnu Prasad (ed.). Māțharavrtti. Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series No. CCXCVI. Benares : Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series Office, 1922. Sastri, M. N. D. (trans.). Agni Purānam. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies, vol. LIV. Varanasi : Chowkhamba Sanskrit series Office, 1967. (trans). Garuda Purāņam. Chowkhamba Sanskrit Studies, vol. LXVII. Varanasi : Chowkhamba Sans- krit Series Office, 1968. Sastri, N. Aiyaswami (ed.). Suvarņasaptati Šāstra. Venkates- vara Oriental Series No. 7. Tirupati: Tirumalai- Tirupati Devasthanam Press, 1944. Sastri, S. S. Suryanarayana (ed. and trans.). The Sāmkhya- kārikā of Īśvara Krsna. Third revised edition. Madras : University of Madras, 1948. Shastri, J. L. (ed.). Brahmāņda Purāņa. Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1973. (ed.). Linga Purāņa. 2 vols. Trans., a Board of Scholars. Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1973. Shastri, J. L. and Kunst, A. (eds.). Siva-purāņa, 4 vols. Trans., a Board of Scholars. Delhi : Motilal Banarsidass, 1969. Sinha, Nandalal (trans.). Sāmkhya Pravachana Sūtram, with the Vrtti of Aniruddha and the Bhāsya of Vijñānabhikșu and extracts from the Vrtti-sāra of Mahādeva Vedāntin and the Tattvasamasa or Kapila Sutram with Narendra's Commentary. SBH vol. 11, Allahabad: Apurva Krishna Bose at the Indian Press, 1912. Solomon, Esther A. (ed.). Sāmkhya-Saptati-Vrtti (V1). Ahmedabad : Gujarat University, 1973. (ed.). Sāmkhya-Vrtti (V2). Ahmedabad : Gujarat University, 1973.

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Oberhammer, Gerhard. "The Authorship of the Sastitantram," WZKSO, Band IV (1960), 71 ff. Oldenberg, Hermann. "Zur Geschichte der Samkhya-Philo- sophie," NGWG, Philologisch-historische Klasse (Berlin, 1917), 218-253. Péri, N. "A propos de la date de Vasubandhu," BEFEO, XI (1911), 356 ff. Potter, Karl H. (ed.). "Supplement to Bibliography of Ency- clopedia of Indian Philosophy, Journal of Indian Philosophy, vol. 2 (Aug., 1973), 186-189. Prasad, Jvala. "The Date of the rogasutras," JRAS (1930), 365-375. Przyluski, Jean. "La Théorie des Guna," BSOS, VI (1930-32), 25-35. Ray, Amar Nath. "The Māndūkya Upanişad and the Kārikās of Gaudapada," IHQ, XIV, 3 (1938), 561-569. Sarma, Haradatta. "Jayamangalā and Other Commentaries on Sāmkhya-Saptati," IHQ, V, 3 (1929), 417-431. Sastree, Y. C. "The Principles of Samkhya Philosophy," Journal of the Moslem Institute, n. d. and n. p. Reprint pamphlet. Sastri, S. S. Suryanarayana. "The Manimekalai Account of the Samkhya," Fournal of Indian History (Madras), VIII (1929), 322-327. "Mathara and Paramartha," JRAS 1931), 623-639. Schrader, F. Otto. "Das Sastitantra," ZDMG, Band 68 (1914), 101-110. Sharma, Har Dutt. "The Samkhya-teachers," Festschrift Moriz Winternitz. Leipzig : Otto Harrassowitz, 1933. Pp. 225-231. Sharma, H. "The Fayamangala and Other Commentaries on the Samkhya-Saptati of Isvarakrsna," Fifth Indian Oriental Conference : Proceedings and Transactions, 1928. 2 vols. London : Arthur Probsthain, 1930. Pp. 1024-1040. Shāstri, Haraprasād. "Chronology of Sāmkhya Literature," Journal of Bihar and Orissa Research Society, IX (1923), 151-162. Shastri, Udaya Vira. "Antiquity of the Sankhya Sutras," Fifth Indian Oriental Conference: Proceedings and Trans- actions, 1928. 2 vols. London : Arthur Probsthain, 1930. Pp. 855-882.

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viii CONTENTS

III. AN INTERPRETATION OF THE MEANING OF CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA 154

The Means of Knowledge 157 prakṛti, guņas and satkāryavāda 160 purușa ... 167 Association and Interaction of prakrti and purușa 171 Emergence and Functioning of the tattvas 176 Discrimination and Release 201 Conclusions and Final Evaluation 206

EPILOGUE: Sankara's Criticism of Sāmkhya and the Sāmkhya Response ... 209 A CHART of the Twenty-five Principles of Classical Sāņkhya 236 GLOSSARY 237 APPENDIX A. Chronological Chart 251 APPENDIX B. The Sāmkhyakārikā of Iśvarakrșņa 255 APPENDIX C. A Modern Tradition of Samkhyayoga 278 APPENDIX D. Additional Materials for the Study of the History and Meaning of Classical Samkhya since the First edition 279

BIBLIOGRAPHY 293 ... ... INDEX ... 311 ... CORRECTIONS ... 316 ... ...

INDEX

Abhimana 185 Abhyasa, as leading to discrimination Aśvaghosa, author of Buddhacarita,

204-205, 274 43, 44, 70, 74, 104-108 Atharva Veda, speculative portions Adharma, one of the eight bhavas 192-193, 262, 269 relevant for the study of Samkhya,

Ädhyatmika, Adhibhautika, Ãdhi- 58-60, 71, 77, 78, 85, 86, 87

daivika, the three kinds of suffering Atheism of Classical Sāmkhya, or

in classical Sāmkhya 155, 255 non-theism, 25, 35, 124-126, 146n.,

Adhyavasaya 181-182 198

Ahamkara, Ego, sense of I-ness 8, 12, Ātman, 27, 88-89, 105, 115-116. See

13, 53-54, 82, 83, 184, 185, 186, also Purușa.

187, 188, 189, 262-263 Avidya, Ignorance, as the cause of

Ahirbudhnyasamhita 37, 137, 141 bondage in Yoga, and how Sām- khya differs, 13, 176. See also Aiśvarya, one of the eight bhāvas 192-193, 262, 269 Ajñāna and Puruşārtha for Sām- khya view. Ajñana, one of the eight bhavas 192- 193, 200-201, 262, 269 Avyakta, Unmanifest 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 44, 45, 46, 79, 80, 81, 97, 98, 100, Alberuni 134, 150, 151 Alocanamatra, bare awareness, 101, 103, 106, 118, 119, 126, 131, as 160, 161, 162, 165, 166, 256, 258, the function of the five senses 189, 259, 260, 261. See also Prakrti 264 and Mulaprakrti. Anaiśvarya, one of the eight bhāvas Awareness, bare awareness, see Alo- 192-193, 262, 269 Ancient Speculations, canamātra. trends of thought in the Vedic texts leading Basham, A. L. 147, 251n. towards Samkhya 76-95 Bhagavadgita 43, 108-109, 121, 122, Aniruddha, the sixteenth-century 127-130 commentator on the Sāmkhya Sūtras 152 Bhattacharya, K. C. 66-70

Aniśvara, interpretation of as basis Bhautika-sarga, gross

for atheistic Samkhya 25, 35, 124- creation 194-195, 271-272 or external

126, 132, 146n., 198 Bhāvas 14, 45, 46, 49, 53, 55, 57, 74, 191-194, 268-271. See also Eight Anugita 108-109 Bhavas and Fifty Bhavas. Anumana, Inference, as one of the Bhava-sarga 194, 271 three means of knowledge in Sām- Bhoga, enjoyment 12, 190, 267 khya 9-10, 157-159, 256-257 Bhūtādi or tāmasa ahamkāra 187-188, Antahkaraņa, Internal Organ, made 263 up of Buddhi, Ahamkāra, and Bondage 12, 13, 14, 172-176. See. Manas 187, 189, 266 Aptavacana, Reliable Authority, as also Ajñāna and Purușārtha. Buddhacarita, see Aśvaghoșa. one of the three means of know- ledge in Sāmkhya 9-10, 157-159, Buddhi, Intellect, Will, Decision, etc.,

217, 256-257 8, 10, 11, 13, 14, 27, 28, 38-40, 42,

Arya metre, verse form of the Sam- 44, 46, 48, 50, 53-55, 97, 98, 104, 106, 110, 111, 118, 129, 181-184, khya-kārikā 147 Aśakti, Incapacity, a subdivision of 189, 190, 262, 266, 267

the fifty bhavas, making up twenty- Buddhindriyas, the sense functions

eight of the fifty, 193-194, 270 14, 186-187, 190, 263 Buddhism, relation of Samkhya to Asat and Sat, as terms in the Vedas 79-81 16, 21, 28, 37, 43, 92, 93, 141-145,

Asmitā, see Ahamkāra and Abhimāna. 150. See also Aśvaghosa, Dharma-

Asuri, one of the ancient Samkhya kirti, Dighanikāya, Dignāga, Vasu-

teachers, 14, 134, 276 bandhu Brahman 88-89. Sce also Atman.

312 CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA

Brahmasūtra 151, 210n .; see also Explication, reflection or construction, Śankara, Vedāntasūtra. as function of Manas 186, 187, 189, Brhadāraņyaka Upanișad 19, 27, 42, 49, 53, 82, 83, 90, 91, 92, 218 264. See also Samkalpaka.

Brown, W. Norman 81n. Fifty Bhavas 193-194, 270-271. See Carakasamhitā 37, 40, 43, 103-104, also Viparyaya, Aśakti, Tuşți, 106-108 Siddhi.

Causation in Classical Samkhya 10, Five Breaths 90, 189-190, 265. See 11, 44, 46, 83, 84, 134, 164-167 also Prāņas. See also Satkāryavāda. Five "organs" of action, see Kar- Cetana, cetanā, consciousness, con- mendriyas. scious, 12, 167-171, 173, 174, 176, Five Senses, see Buddhindriyas. 262, 272. See also Purușa. Five fold Sub-human Order 194, 271 Chāndogya Upanisad 19, 30, 53-54, Frauwallner, Erich 48-52 83, 84, 92 Freedom 12, 167-171, 171-176, 201- Chandragupta II (Vikramāditya) 208. See also Jñāna, and Kaivalya. 143 Chattopadhyaya, D. 63-66, 210 Garbe, Richard 15-22 Chinese Sources, relating to the Sāmkhya 4, 141-145, 147 Gaudapāda, author of Kārikā Bhāsya, 147-148; different from author of Classical Sāmkhya, see Sāmkhya Māņdūkyākārikā 148 Consciousness, see Cetana and Purusa. Creative-Created, prakrti-vikrti, Gnosis, 62-63

9, 160, 161, 162. See also Prakrti 8 Gold-Seventy, see Hiranya-saptati.

and Mūlaprakrti. Gunas, Qualities, strands or consti- tuents, sattva, rajas, tamas : brief

Dahlmann, Joseph 22-23 description of-10, 11, 14; in the history of interpretations of the Dasgupta, S. N. 36-41 Sāmkhya-18, 25, 38, 39, 44, 45, Decision or Will, see Buddhi and 46, 48, 49, 50, 52, 54, 56, 72; in Adhyavasāya. ancient speculations-84, 86; in Determinism and Freedom in Classical Sāmkhya 160-176 proto-Sāmkhya-101, 103, 110, 112, 113, 114, 119, 128, 129, 131, 132; Deussen, Paul 154 in Classical Samkhya-162-166, Dharma, one of the eight bhāvas 192-193, 262, 269 173, 181, 186-188, 197-199, 258- 260. Dharmakirti, the Buddhist writer 51 Dighanikāya 92 Guņapariņāma 11, 65, 160-166, 177-

Dignaga, the Buddhist writer 51, 151 201, 260, 264

Discipline, see Yoga. Gunaratna, commentator 145

Discrimination or Release 201-206. Gupta era, period of formation of

See also Jñāna. Classical Sāmkhya 146

Double Negation, as relating to the interaction of prakrti and purușa Hauer, J. W. 57-60 171-176 Hiranyagarbha 82 Dualism of Classical Samkhya 13, 14, Hiranyasaptati, Gold-Seventy, 171-176, 197, 198, 199 Suvarņasaptati 142, 144 Duhkha, Suffering 7, 8, 9, 13, 61, 62, 93, 155-157, 201-206 Ignorance, see Avidyā and Ajñāna.

Edgerton, Franklin 33-36 Impressions, Latencies, Samskāras

Efficient Causes and Effects 206 in Classical Samkhya, function Indriyas, see Buddhindriyas and of Karmendriyas. bhāvas 192, 193, 269, 274 Ego, see Ahamkāra. I-ness, Ego, see Ahamkāra.

Eight Bhavas 192, 193, 262, 268, 269 Intellect, t, Will, see Buddhi

Eight fold Prakrti 45, 53, 54, 104, Interaction of purusa-prakrti 171-176

106, 107, 118, 128-130, 160, 161 Isolation, see Kaivalya.

Eightfold World of the gods, 194, 271 Iśvara, see Aniśvara.

Eliade, M. 60-63 Iśvarakrsna and Classical Sāmķhya 145-147

INDEX 313

Jainism, relation of Samkhya to 37, 92, 93, 94. See also Schubring, Natura lism 20, 38-39, 207

w. Nature, see Prakrti.

Jayamangalā 150, 282 Negation in Classical Sāmkhya 171- 176 Jña, kșetrajña, Purușa 8, 9, 108ff., Neo-Platonism 21 168 Jñāna, Knowledge, "Salvation Know- Nescience, see Avidyā, Ajñāna.

ledge" 13, 192, 200, 201, 204-208, No-Self, Buddhist doctrine of, 156,

263, 269, 274 207

Johnston, E. H. 41-48 Nyāyasūtra 158

Oldenberg, Hermann 26-29 Kaivalya, Isolation or the Condition Oltramare, Paul 23-26 of Salvation 12, 13, 17, 93-94, 201- OM 102 206, 208, 274-275 Outline of Sāmkhyakārikā 14-15 Kapila 17, 139 Karana, thirteenfold instrument, Linga Pañcādhikaraņa 145 189, 190, 191, 265, 266 Pañcasikha 50, 139-140 Kāraņa, Cause 10, 11, 14, 160, 161, Pañcasikhavākya 52, 103 260 Pañca-vāyavas, Five-Breaths, Prāņas Karma 91, 200 189-190, 265, 280 Karmendriyas, "organs" of action 8, Paramartha's, Chinese Version 4, 9, 186, 187, 189, 190, 264 147 Kārya, Effect 10, 11, 164-166, 258, Pariņāma, see Guņapariņāma. 260, 265. See Satkāryavāda. Past, Present, and Future in Classical Katha Upan., 96-99 Sāmkhya, 189, 266 Keith, A. B. 29-33 Patañjali, the Yoga teacher 38, 150 Knowledge, see Jñana. Patañjali, the Samkhya teacher 145 Kșetrajña, see Jña. Patañjali's Yogasūtra 150 Paurika 145 Linga, 189-191, 268-272. Perception, see Pramăņas. Karaņa. See also Platonism 21 Linga-sarga 194, 272. See also Bhāva- Potter, Karl 70 sarga and Bhautika-sarga. Pradhāna, synonym for prakrti in Linga-śarira 268-270. Classical Samkhya, see Prakrti. Sūkşma-śarira. See also Prakrti, Nature, brief description of -- 7-14; in the history of interpreta-

Mādhava's Sarvadarsanasamgraha tions 18, 20, 22, 25, 30, 32, 37-39, 44, 46, 47, 50, 54, 62, 64, 66; in 151 Mahabharata 108-130; See also ancient speculation 81,83,84, 85; in Proto-Samkhya-101, 104-106, 111, Bhagavadgita and Moksadharma. Mahābhūtas 187-188, 262-263, 267 114, 115, 119, 129-133; in Classical Sāmkhya 135, 136, 160, 166, 171ff., Mahadeva, commentator on Ani- ruddha 152n Pramāņas 9, 10, 157-160, 256-257 201ff.

Mahat, see Buddhi. Prāņas, the vital principles, breaths Maitri Upan., 102-103 Manas, Mind 186-187, 264, 266. See 90, 189, 190, 265 Prāņāyāma 101, 102, 150 also Antaḥkarana. Māņdūkyakārikā 148 Pratyakşa, see Pramāņas.

Manusmrti 135 Pratyayasarga 194, 270

Mațharavrtti 148-149, 281-282 Primordial Nature, see Mūlaprakrti.

Means of Knowledge, see Pramāņas. Proto-Sāmkhya 95-134

Mind, see Manas. Przyluski, J., 84n.

Mokșa, see Discrimination, Freedom, Purāņas 135, 178, 284-291

Jñāna, Kaivalya. Purușa, brief description of-7, 8,

Mokşadharma 49, 108-130 11, 12, 14; in the history of inter-

Monism, 156, 207 pretations-22, 27, 28, 30, 32, 37-

Mūlaprakrti, primordial or root 40, 44, 46, 47, 50, 59, 61, 63, 66;

nature 8, 160-164, 166, 167, 173, in ancient speculation-81, 82, 85-

174, 176, 181, 198, 199, 201, 256 88, 93; in Proto-Sāmkhya-96, 97, 98, 104, 110, 115, 116, 119, 122,

314 CLASSICAL SĀMKHYA

125, 126, 130, 133; in Classical Sāmkhya-136, 167-171, 171-176, Sattva 54-55; see also Guņas.

201-208 Sattvastha 55

Purușārtha, Purușarthata 12, 13, 47, Schubring, W. 93n.

167-171, 171-176. See also Purușa. Self, see Atman, Purusa. Senart, E. 84n. Pūrvavat, Seșavat, Sāmānyatodrsța, Sen-Gupta, A. 70n. see Pramāņas. Pythagoreanism 21 Siddhi, a subdivision of the fifty bhavas, making up eight of the

Qualities, strands, constituents, see fifty 193, 262 Sixty Topics, see Sastitantra. Guņas. Skandagupta (Vikramāditya) 143

Radhakrishnan, S. 70 Solomon, E. 281-283

Raga, one of the eight bhavas 192-193, Study, Repetition, Practice, see

262, 270 Abhyāsa. Suffering, see Duhkha. Rajas, see Guņas. Sūkşmaśarira 267, 268, 269 Reason, Ratiocination, see Edgerton. Reliable Authority, see Aptavacana. Suvarnasaptati, see Hiraņyasaptati.

Renaissance Samkhya 152-153 Svabhava 114, 176

Riepe, D. 70 Śvetāśvatara Upan., 100-102

Rig Veda, speculative portions rele- vant for the study of Sāmkhya 76- Taijasa or rājasa ahamkāra 185 85,90 Takakusu, J., 137n., 138n., 140n., 142-144 Samkalpaka 186-187, 190, 264. See Tamas, see Gunas. also Manas. Tanmātras 8, 9, 187, 188, 191, 196, Samkhya, meaning of the term-2, 267 3; meaning of the term "Classical Tattvasamāsasūtra 152 Sāmkhya"-4; interpretations of Tattvavikāra 177-201 -15-74; history of -: in ancient Time in Sāmkhya 189, 266 speculation, 76-95; Proto-Sāmkhya, Transmigration 91, 200 95-134; Classical Sāmkhya, 134- Trividham anumānam, see Pramāņas. 151; Renaissance Sāmkhya, Tusți, a subdivision of the fifty bhāvas, 153; -and Buddhism, see Bud- 152- making up nine of the fifty, 193, dhism; -and Jainism, see Jainism; decline of, 134-135; -and Vedānta, Twenty-five, Twenty-four, Twenty-six 270-271

154, 156, 207; philosophical signi- Principles 113-114, 236 ficance of-154-208; a modern Two-fold Creation, see Linga-sarga tradition of Samkhyayoga, 278 and Bhava-sarga. Sāmkhyakārikā of Īśvarakrșņa 7-15; outline of, 14-15; historical 4, Üha, one of the eight siddhis 193, 271 place of, 145-147; commentaries Upanişads, see Brhadāraņyaka, Chān- on, 147-150; Sanskrit text and dogya, Katha, Maitri, Śvetāśvatara. translation of, 255-277 Sāmkhyapravacanabhāsya 152, 153,

Sāmkhyapravacanasūtra 152, 153 291 Vacaspatimiśra 148-149 Vaikrta-ahamkāra 186-187

Sāmkhyasaptativrtti 281, 282 Vairāgya, virāga, one of the eight bhavas 192, 193, 262, 269 Sāmkhyasūtravrtti 152, 153 van Buitenen, J. A. B., 52-57 Sāmkhyatattvakaumudi 149, 282 Sāmkhyavrtti 281, 282 Varșagaņya 140-143 Vasubandhu, the Buddhist teacher Samskāras 206 141-144 Śańkarā 70, 135, 151, 156, 157, 209- Vedāntasūtra, 151n., 209ff. 235 Vedic Speculations, see Atharva Sarvadarsanasamgraha, see Mådhava. Veda, Rig Veda. Șastitantra 50, 135-138, 280 Vijñāna 8, 9, 13, 14, 201-208. See Sat and Asat, see Asat. Śatapatha Brāhmaņa 41, 85 also Jñāna.

Satkāryavāda 10, 11, 12, 164, 165, Vijňānabhiksu 152-153 Vindhyavāsa, the Sāmkhya teacher 166 141-144

INDEX 315

Viparyaya, a subdivision of the fifty Winternitz, M. 75n., 251n. bhavas, making up five of the fifty 193, 270-271 Viveka, Discrimination 13, 201-208. Yoga 33-36, 57-60, 60-63, 87-88, 96- See also Jñāna. 100, 102, 103, 106, 116-118, 120- Vrātyas 58-60, 88 Vyakta 7-11, 160-167, 176-201, 258- 123, 130-134, 150

'259. See also Avyakta. Yogasutras of Patanjali 150 Yuktidipika, commentary on the

Will or Intellect, see Buddhi. Sāmkhyakārika 137, 143-145, 147, 149-150, 280, 281, 282