1. Classical Sankhya a Critical Study Anima Sen Gupta MRML

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ANIMA SEN GUPTA Classical Samkhya: A Critical Study Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Pvt. Ltd.

Contents Foreword vii Prelude ix Introduction 1 CHAPTER 1 EPISTEMOLOGY 6 Nature of Knowledge 6; Can Purușa be a Sākși in the Advaita Sense? 13; Comments 19; Sources of Knowledge 19; Validity and Invalidity of Knowledge 47; Meaning of Svatahgrahyatva in Regard to Prāmānya and Aprāmāņya 56; Definition of Svatahgrahyatva of Aprāmaņya from the Samkhya Point of View 57. CHAPTER 2 METAPHYSICS 59 Theory of the Gunas 60; Prakrti and the Disturbance of the Prakrti State 70; Purușa 80; Multiplicity of Selves 85; Bhoktribhava 89; Evolution 95; The Samkhya Theory of Causation 108; Non-Causa- lity of Pursa 118. CHAPTER 3 The Samkhya Conception of Subha and Asubha (Good And Evil) ETHICS 120 120; Viparyayas 122; Organic Injuries (Indriya-Vadha) 125; Nine Tuşțis and their Viparyayas 126; Siddhis 130; Conclusion 131; Liberation 133. CHAPTER 4 THEOLOGY 140 Meaning of Sāmkhya Atheism (Nirīśvaravāda) 140.

Second rev. and enl. edition 1982 C 1981 Sen Gupta, Anima APPENDIX 1 The Problem of the Existence of God 145 Samkara's View 156; Samkhya-Yoga on God 159; Conclusion.

Published by Munshiram Manoharlal Publishers Private Limited, 54 Rani Jhansi Road, New Delhi-110055 and printed by Kiran Bibliography 171

Mudran Kendra, A 38/2 Mayapuri, Phase I, New Delhi-110064. Index 173

Foreword Dr. Anima Sen Gupta of Patna University, now retired; has earned a name for herself as a sound scholar and as an authority on the Sämkhya School of Indian Philosophy. Coming from a highly con- nected Bengali family of intellectuals, she has to her credit a distin- guished academic career, after which she has engaged herself for the last 35 years in her vigorous academic pursuits, which have indeed borne good fruit both in her teaching and writing. Though actively interested in all schools and branches of Indian Philosophy, Dr. Anima Sen Gupta has specialised in the study of the Samkhya thought as would be evident from her several pioneer- ing works on it, which she has already published. Incidentally, she has contributed ten authoritative articles, very weighty indeed, on the various facets and thinkers of the Samkhya Philosophy, designed in our Marathi Encyclopaedia of Philosophy, and our editors have been highly impressed by these thoughtful writings. The present book Classical Sāmkhya: A Critical Study reveals once more her acute scholarship and deep insight into the subjects she has dealt with. Needless to say, this work is stimulating and illuminating. I commend this book to scholars interested in various facets and phases of Samkhya philosophy. I hope Dr. Anima Sen Gupta, will continue to make similar contributions to philosophical scholarship by further works on Indian philosophy. Retired Professor and D.D. Vadekar Professor-in-charge, Department of Philosophy, Fergusson College and University of Poona, Poona

Prelude The Samkhya-Yoga philosophy is perhaps the oldest philosophical thought and discipline that has come down to us as a sacred herit- age. There may be differences of opinion among scholars regarding the source of the Samkhya-Yoga philosophy but its antiquity is never disputed. Philosophical endeavour in India is spiritual in the sense that the quest here, has generally stemmed from an urge to know the inner essence of human personality so as to enable a man to grasp in a deeper and proper manner the mystery of both Life and Mind. A philosopher, here, has never been inspired to give only "a general description of the whole universe mentioning all the most important kinds of things which are known to be in it." Sages and saints of India have realised fully that the outer life of man which emerges from his constant contact with the external world and which also receives its due nourishment from the external world, does not constitute the complete life of man. It is just a temporary and finite display of man's real essence which is embedded in his inner life. The external life, which is spread out in the external world, is unable to cater to the higher needs of a man's life. Man, in ignorance, thinks that wealth and power, name and fame can satisfy his inherent urge for lasting delight and happiness. He therefore, gets stuck in the muddy soil of the comflicting biological and moral interests of the practical world. He never realises that there can not be any prospect of real peace and happiness of life through intense and interested enjoyment of wealth, power and other worldly materials. The tragedy of this outer life lies in the fact that it can never offer a man steady and unalloyed peace and happiness. Since the external world is a moving, changing world, the outer life that bursts forth in it, is also always unsteady, always palpitating and always flowing towards its inevitable end. Naturally, therefore, queries arise in thinking and reflecting minds regarding the real purpose and meaning of human life and also regarding its relation to the external world. What really is the true

x Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Pretude xi

significance of human life? Does it mean nothing more than its being not only of human-life and mind but also of the whole visible manifestation in the physical, biological and psychological planes? world. Should we, therefore, accept that this limited, changing and decaying "Tameva bhāntamanubhāti Sarvam. life, which bursts forth, develops and withers away in the day-today Tasya bhāsā sarvamidam vibhāti". world of experience, constitutes the complete picture of human life? Indeed, the smaller truths of life are nothing but spontaneous Does the goal of human-life lie in getting finished in the wilderness expressions of the supreme Truth of life and the world. Both the of this tragic empirical Vortex? Does man really vanish completely world and the life of man are rooted and supported by one supreme for ever after living a finite life of limited horizon and limited scope? Truth. This truth is a spiritual one which is pure and infinite, eternal Is there no other deeper, more delightful and more lasting horizon and also beyond the psycho-biological life of man. It can never be- for him beyond this frail, limited and sorrow-striken one? Is he fated come an object of knowledge of the empirical world. Man can never to swing constantly between waves of pleasure and pain which form know the highest Reality by the usual scientific method of the practi- the texture of this short empirical life? Is his restless mind his only cal life. The Mind, which is the object of study of western psycho- guiding star? Is there no other higher and steadier luminary to emit logy, is not the highest spiritual reality or the soul, the direct bright and steady light for him so as to enable him to control his experience of which can be obtained through yogic discipline and

unsteady mind? moral purification. The mind, studied in western psychology is not What, in fact, does a man do in his empirical life? He only creates the revealer. It has no light of its own. This mind is also an object his own sorrows and joys by making the external world an object of to be revealed (udbhäsya.) It is because the mind of Western psycho- his sense-enjoyment. Is there no steady pivotal principle beyond his logy falls in the category of the known that mental phenomena can unsteady mental states? If this finite and limited psycho-physical be dissected, analysed and described in a fruitful manner by the existence is the final fate of man, then what is the meaning and Scientific method so as to enable a man to understand the complexity purpose of human-existence? We must, therefore say, that man is of his character in a better manner. Such an understanding, no doubt, created finite and that finitude is the last word for him. In that case, enables him to become more accommodating and more rational in life will cease to be an alluring one. A man may live such a life under his practical behaviour, but it can not open his eye of wisdom. compulsion but it will never bring for him the message of hope and Psycho biological phenomena such as perception, conception,

delight. In actual life, however, man is found to possess an inherent desire memory, will etc. belong to the mind and not to the soul or the principle of pure consciousness. All mental phenomena constituting for ever lasting delight and permanent peace. This desire is an in- herent movement in him,- an impetus to go forward. This is the the subject-matter of western psychology are illuminated by pure con- truth that lies at the root of human-life. Now, the finite and limited sciousness which gives them life and meaning. Kant, in the west, has also held that the transcendental unity of apperception is the life of man cannot become the supporting principle of that peace or delight which knows no bounds and never dies. The support must synthetic unity of consciousness, which is original and unchanging. According to him, however, this pure consciousness can not be directly be eternal and infinite both in Delight and Serenity. The sages of the experienced by us. The sages of ancient India, on the contrary, have upanișads have been able to grasp this truth fully and so they have asserted that this pure consciousness which constitutes the real being declared "Bhumaive sukham. Nālpe sukhamasti." The joy, which is reflected in this limited and finite life every now and then, is really of man, can be directly experienced by rising above all gross and the joy of an infinite and inexhaustible source of Delight and Peace subtle things of the world and also by attaining an intense state of from which everything is emerging in delight, is living in delight and concentration in which knowledge of non-self disappears completely. This supramental spiritual experience is the experience of eternal is also finding its culmination in delight. Hence the sages have declared that this infinite Reality is the limitless source of light and peace and serenity which a man, rising above the psycho-biological life of sorrows and sufferings, is able to taste and enjoy. It is because

xil Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Prelude xiii

the sages of our country have been able to have a direct acquain- tance with Truth and Reality through spiritual discipline that Indian Kriyā-yoga. philosophy is regarded as spiritual in character. Philosophy, here, Generally, in practical-life man remains absorbed in various has started with an enquiry into the nature of this eternal and un- practical problems relating to his everyday life and existence. Many

changing spiritual Truth. people believe sincerely that this visible world and the empirical life The direct realisation of this abiding and unruffled truth is not, of man, are all that can be regarded as real. There is nothing behind however, possible unless the intellect and the mind become steady, and beyond the phenomenal life and phenomenal existence. So, there pure and transparent. The impure thoughts and impure emotions is nothing wrong in running after the small gains and losses of this (like self-centred attachment, anger, hatred, greed, delusion etc)., practical life. A man should, however, make attempts to regulate his disturb the internal organs and spoil their power of catching the practical life in a proper manner by establishing social relations of reflections of Truth. So, one has to practise restraint seriously on all mutual trust and mutual 'give and take.' He should always act from fronts of the empirical life so as to drive away all impurities from his an utilitarian point of view since his duty does not extend beyond mind. The primary necessity to become fit for such a spiritual disci- this. There is no other higher truth beyond this world and the pline or sādhanā is to remove completely all passions and impure worldly-life of human beings. thoughts, emotions and will from the mind so that the mind may not be disturbed by undersirablc mental happenings, if it is to realise the The sages of ancient India, however, have realised convincingly shining light of the soul in all its divine calmness and purity. This through direct experience that there is another horizon of Life which exists as the glittering foundational principle of this phenomenal needs intense psychological analysis and plunging by means of which manifestation. The entire phenomenal creation is getting lighted by all the levels of mind, namely conscious, unconscious and super- conscious, can be discovered and known in a proper manner; this the ever-shining luminosity of this principle and is also enriching the enables the seeker of truth to have a glimpse of that abiding light practical life of man with its multicoloured experiences as a result shining beyond all-the levels of the mind and illaminating them in a of which the world has become fascinating to all who are living in it. wonderful manner. Yoga or the science of spiritual psychology is the The light that is shining beyond the world is the original light of the science that aims at showing the path of the spiritual discipline lives of all living beings. This light is to be seen and experienced by which enables a man to have a direct emperience of his self as pure a man in the deep recess of his inner being. The Samkhya-yoga system consciousness which is calm and serene, above and beyond the has shown man the proper way of discovering and realising this empirical life of limited resources and limited delight. The Sāmkhya supreme light in him by means of self-analysis, self-correction, con- has declared that the real essence of man is the supreme spiritual centration, meditation etc. The path of this thorough self-analysis, principle which is steady, qualityless and beyond the sphere of the deep understanding, concentration and meditation (as laid down in the yoga) is not, however, an easy way of discovering the highest guņas where as the yoga philosophy has laid down the rules of and the best in man. "Durgam pathastat". Even then, if a man spiritual sādhanā by means of which man can realise himself as this follows this path with faith and sincerity of purpose he is sure to Supreme 'Essence and Light'. The Samkhya and the yoga constitute have some experience of peace and tranquility of mind and the one comprehensive system of philosophy and religion and these two memory of this bliss will then act as a source of inspiration and courage are inseparable. According to this system, man has to know first to him in his further up-hill journey of spiritual life. As the mind the constitutive principles of the universe and then to understand and know, through study and reasoning, that the soul is his real becomes more and more steady, as its impurities are more and more being. This knowledge, then inspires him to meditate on the tattvas removed, as the noble emotions of love, friendship, compassion etc., are more and more aroused, the aspirant begins to experience more for their direct experience and also to attain the unruffled and and more of that absolute peace which emanates from the soul. If illuminating state of his real being by the practice of detachment and an aspirant proceeds with firm conviction, his mental peace grows deeper and becomes more and more abiding. Since the aspirant is

xiv Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Prelude XV

knowing his own mind and is also discovering all its levels in a mind is not operative? If the mode in the form of 'I am' is not series of ascending movements, he is plunging more and more into there, what else is there to keep a man enlivened? This apprehension an unfathomable sea of peace and serenity. He also feels keenly that however, is baseless. In fact, what remains in this state is the real his approach to this inner essence is not a negative one. There is no essence. The awareness or the Light Infinite which shines in this denial here; on the contrary, there is the forceful realisation of the supreme state is beyond the sphere of thought and language. This is eternal truth. The empirical personality of man which has a colour- the state of pure and complete awareness and it is this state which in ful existence in the visible world, blossoms for a while only being the Upanishads, is regarded as 'avang manasogocaram:' What is supported by the slender stem of this eternal truth. Indeed there is completely arrested is the knowledge of the not-self; pure conscious- no scope for the pessimistic thought that the supramental state of ness is ever shining. When the mind operates and assumes various complete silence and serenity is a state. of deficiency and imbecility modes, thereby, creating variations in the enjoyable experiences of as the mind in this level has become completely inoperative and the empirical life, man focusses his attention on the mental states still. It is to be remembered that the cessation of mental modifications only and loses light of the Supreme Light which is the real revealer does not mean blowing out completely the light of the soul. Mind of the entire creation. The light of the soul can burst forth in its real itself is illuminated and made an instrument for psychical activities infinite illumination only when the mind becomes totally inoperative. by ^the light of the soul. In the ordinary state, a man remains im- The Spiritual knowledge and discipline, advocated by the Samkhya- prisoned in the cobweb of his own mental activities and can not yoga enables a man to have a deep and profound realisation of this perceive the transcendental 'Torch Light' which is reflecting through Supreme Principle of his life, which is called the Purusa or the it; but when the mind loses its power and becomes dead, one gets a atman. The realisation of the self is indeed the realisation which direct experience of the light of the soul which constitutes its real leads a man to the apex of his being by linking the best of his em-

essence. pirical life with the eternal life of the Spirit. In fact, to stop the mind is to stop the manifestation of the not- The analytical technique of the west too enables a man to attain self; the self-revealing light which makes effective the manifestation freedom from the oppression of repressed desires and complexes but of the not-self, is not blown out. It remains in its pure and ever this freedom is a freedom of our normal worldly life. One who shining form. When the mind becomes completely inoperative, con- acquires this freedom is better able to avoid maladjustment with the sciousness becomes very deep and serene and shines in its purity and environment, he lives in. The analytical technique will never be able lustre. This is the final bursting forth of the Infinite and Eternal to give him effective guidance to discover the level of pure concious- Light. Such a state can never be a state of Vacuity or dullness. ness which is behind our worldly experiences. The highest level of Ordinary human beings are living all the time in the midst of the human personality (which is the level of pure eonsciousness-principle creative movements of their minds: their intellectual activities, moral or purușa) can however, be discovered and experienced directly by activities, religious activities and various practical activities are the the method of Yoga, or spiritual psychology. What therefore the outcome of the multifarious operations of their minds. 'Object- Yoga discipline unfolds is beyond the reach of the analytical theory knowledge' always presupposes mental activities and 'object-know- and technique of western psychology. A thorough analysis of the fedge' is the type of knowledge that guides and controls man in his constitutive principles of human personality as well as of the 'expirical life. Hence, it is difficult for the average man to imagine phenomenal world has become the subject-matter of the classical that being which remains as a principle of pure awareness even Sāmkhya because without a clear grasp of these principles, one can when the mind is stopped. To the average man, therefore, not to be not have a vision of the ever shining beyond" which is in us and which mentally active is equivalent to becoming an unconscious and inert alone is the inexhaustible truth and peace. Every man who will thing. A man remains a living and intelligent being only so long as accept the truth promulgated by the Samkhya philosophy and who his mind acts. What is therefore that state of steadiness in which the will also lead a life of detachment, and moral purification as enjoined

xvi Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study by the Yoga practice, will surely reach the state of final enlighten- ment and lasting peace. "Nāsti Sāmkhya samam Jñānam, Nāsti Yoga samam Balam" With the above background I shall now pass on to the introduc- tory chapter of this book in which I have discussed some of the Introduction

basic problems of this system of philosophy. Upantika, Ratanpalli, Anima Sen Gupta The Classical Sämkhya is a dualistic system because it explicitly re-

Santiniketan, West Bengal cognizes the independent existence of the dual principles of Purușa

13 April 1982 and Prakrti. In fact, the nature of Purușa and Prakrti and their relationship forms the central doctrine of the philosophy of this school. The most important point in the Upanishadic Philosophy is the doctrine that the inmost self is of the nature of pure conscious- ness and that it is the ground of all our experiences. The Atman is identical with Brahman. The diverse powers of Nature have no rea- lity independent of it. But in the Upanisads, an attempt to show how from the one reality, the empirical world has sprung up, is no- where visible. We are simply told that this universe has originated from Brahman and that ultimately it will return to it. The Samkhya doctrine has taken up the task of explaining how this world of multiplicity has gradually come into existence through the process of evolution from Prakrti. In this glorious act of crea- tion, Prakrti is vitalised by the sannidhi of Purusa. Multiplicity, however, proceeds directly from Nature and not from the spiritual principle. The spiritual reality is self or Purusa which is of the nature of pure consciousness. Purușa is ever pure in nature and all impurities of action and passion are only falsely ascribable to it. The relation of the soul with the world is merely external and arti- ficial. It is through ignorance and passion, gathered from the cease- less flow of karma from beginningless time, that we ascribe to the soul all the impurities of our worldly life. The realisation of the pure nature of the self and also of its distinction from Prakrti is the goal of this ceaseless cycle of births and rebirths. The productive agent of the universe is Prakrti or Nature. This agent is constituted of the three gunas-sattva, rajas and tamas. The state of Prakrti is the equilibrium of the three gunas; when the equi- librium is disturbed due to puruşārtha samyoga, the world of multi- plicity comes into being. Nature is supposed to be impregnated with

2 Classical Sāmkhya ; A Critical Study Introduction 3

a sort of unconscious teleological force by virtue of which the gunas different from phenomenal knowledge and is also independently are capable of providing the purusas with experience of various existent. The object of cognition is always revealed in cognition as sorts and also of liberating them from bondage through the dissolu- something given, as idam and such a revelation is due to vișaya's tion of buddhi which is the bond of the apparent union between the own power of intelligibility. (Pratyupasthitamidam svamāhāt myena transcendental purușa and Prakrti. There is no real relation between vastu.) Since, the object of cognition possesses sattvaguna, it posses- buddhi and purușa. But due to the presence of transcendental illusion in buddhi from beginningless time, the distinction between the two ses knowability or intelligibility and it is because of the intelligibility that the object gets related to somebody's experience. Had there is not realised. This illusion is mentioned as the bondage of Purusa. The Classical Samkhya thinks that the illusion is of the nature of been no object to be known, there would not have been any cogni- tion. That which is revealed in cognition as 'idam', is real and the non-discrimination between the Purusa and the Prakrti and that existent. It becomes an object of phenomenal knowledge by means of this avidya is the cause of all misery. When this illusion is removed its own jñeyatva dharma. The very fact that the object is revealed in permanently, the purușa becomes free in its nature as pure conscious- cognition, shows that they are different. (Vedyatvasyābhedavyāpyat- ness and this is the state of moksa or liberation from the sorrows and vābhāvāt kuto bhedapratipakșatvam, (TV, IV. 14).

sufferings of the world. The vijñanavādi says that because the knowledge of an object and The Philosophy of sämkhya is not merely a dualistic system; it is the knowledge of the knowledge of that object occur simultaneously, also a realistic and rationalistic system. A realistic system, as we knowledge and the object known are non-different. Knowledge is know, is a system which believes that the object of cognition is different from and independent of cognition. In the opinion of a always apprehended along with the object of knowledge and never apart from the object of knowledge. Vacaspati has emphatically realistic philosopher, the object of valid cognition (pramājñana) is asserted that the non-difference between the knowledge and the never non-existent or unreal (asat). It is only the object of an erro- object of knowledge cannot be proved by this sahopalambhaniyama. neous cognition which can be regarded as asat in some sense or It is, indeed, true that the presence of knowledge always indicates other. Again, the relation or sambandha may, sometimes, be proved the presence of an object of knowledge; but from the absence of to be false but the relata or sambandhi can never be false. The knowledge, nobody can infer the absence of objects. We can never Sāmkhya, being realistic in attitude, has not made any distinction between mithyā and tuccha as has been done in the advaita vedānta. argue that since we are not knowing the object, the object does not The object, which is negated in the empirical life, can, very well, be exist. So, the non-difference of the object from its cognition cannot be proved. Worldly objects are not mere vijñāna as they are always

described either as mithyā or as tuccha. Realism, however, may be merely epistemological, a form which experienced as objects external to cognition (Na vijñānamātram is not incompatible with Idealism, or it may be both epistemologi- vāhyapratiteḥ). Further, one and the same object can be presented to many bud- cal and metaphysical. One who holds that an object known is inde- dhis or cognitions. So, the object cannot be of the form of any one pendent of the knowing mind, may still hold that the object is spiri- tual in nature. Here, the man is a realist only in the epistemological of these cognitions. It has got its own sattā and it exists indepen- dently of cognition. This is because one and the same object can sphere: In the metaphysical sphere, he is an idealist. A metaphysical arouse different kinds of cognitions in different minds. That which realist admits the independent existence of the non-spiritual object arouses different cognitions, can never be of the form of any one of

outside the sphere of knowledge also. these cognitions. (Vastusāmye cittabhedāt tayah vibhaktah panthāḥ). The Philosophy of Sämkhya is realistic both from the epistemolo- In the metaphysical sphere too, the Sämkhya system is a realistic gical and metaphysical points of view. In the field of epistemology, one. This is because according to this school, the unconscious mut- the Samkhya Philosophers have admitted the independent existence able root cause of this world is a pāramārthika tattva. It is meta- of the object of cognition. The object of phenomenal knowledge is physically real, independent and different from purusa or the

4 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Introduction

principle of consciousness. Although, according to Samkhya, the sannidhi of purusa is neces- êver, the creative process is a real one. Just as in actual life, we find sary for creation, still Prakrti does not depend on purusa for its that if a heap of dried leaves and fire are kept very close to one existence. It is true that Purușa vitalises Nature by means of its another, the leaves assume a blazing form immediately and by sannidhi and thereby makes it fit for creation; but that does not in nature. This is a fact of experience. So, the Sämkhya has also held any way impair the independent nature of Prakrti. The reflection of that the palpitating rajas, along with sattva and tamas is undergoing consciousness in Prakti simply becomes the exciting force behind changes constantly and naturally, thereby forming different combi- creation; it is neither the material cause, nor the efficient cause of nations. The result is the creation of this multifarious universe. creation. Purușa is related only seemingly to the world through In the empirical life, we find that all objects are by their very reflection. There is no real relation between the world and the nature, undergoing constant changes and modifications. Hence, it is principle of consciousness. The world is sat independently of Purușa quite rational to suppose, on the basis of worldly experience, that and the root cause of the world is naturally different from purușa the root cause of the world is also a svarūpa pariņamītattva. The

and is independently active. Nyāya-vaiśeșikas believe in atomistic creation; in the opinion of this Had the Samkhya Philosophers admitted any such power in school of philosophers, the activity in the atoms is generated by God Purusa by means of which Prakrti had become active in creation, -a hypothesis which may not stand the test of reason and experience. the svatah pariņāmi nature of Prakrti would have been absolutely The case is different with the Samkhya school. This school has not meaningless. All objects of the world are the effects of a svatah introduced God as the prime mover; but it has shown that since

pariņāmī Prakrti and are also dependent on it. every worldly object is sakriya (active) and pariņāmī (mutable) the Even though, the adristas of jīvas are regarded as sahakārī (assis- root cause of the world must be of the same nature. This is real ting) kāraņa in creation, still this also does not make creation yukti and not mere imagination of the human mind. dependent on Purusa. Changes are constantly going on in the infi- nite bosom of Nature. Even when there is no creation, there is svarūpa pariņāma in the guņa reals. So, adrișta is not the cause of pariņāma; it is the cause simply of diversities in creation. Adriștas actually cause diversities in enjoyment. It cannot make Prakrti dynamic or active. The Sämkhya is also a rationalistic system. This is because the Sāmkhya system has established the reality of its metaphysical principles by means of yukti or reasoning. Only those things which cannot be proved either by perception or by inference, are to be accepted on the basis of scriptural evidence. The advaita vedānta uses the upanișadic text “neha nānāsti kincana" to prove the falsity of the whole world. The Samkhya, however, does not believe in the falsity of the world. From the Sāmkhya point of view this mahāvākya may mean that before crea- tion, there was no creative diversity in the cetānavistā intelligised Prakrti. It is because the advaita vedānta has believed in the falsity of the whole world that the creative process of the advaita vedānța is just a vyānjanā and not a reality. In the Sāmkhya, how-

Epistemology *It is, therefore, evident that purusa is not the real substratum of vrtti-jñāna. The real ādhāra (locus) of object-knowledge is buddhi. Purușa seems to have object-knowledge because of reflection acting

Chapter 1 Epistemology in co-operation with ignorance. Activity, agency enjoyment and object-knowledge have the same locus, i.e., the intellect which is a product of Prakrti. Object-knowledge always presupposes the prior

NATURE OF KNOWLEDGE emergence of "I-consciousness" and as such this knowledge can Sāmkhya, like advaita-vedānta, has admitted a difference between never arise in pure purusa in which there is no vrttl. Like advaita pure consciousness and phenomenal knowledge or vrtti jñāna. Pure vedānta, Sāmkhya too, believes that pure consciousness is not even consciousness, devoid of all relations to buddhi, is the form of sud- "pure-I" (śuddha aham). In the Tantra as well as in the Philosophy dha-purușa. This pure purușa is mere revealing consciousness and as of Rämānuja-school, the ultimate reality is supposed to be of the such it is indifferent and nevtral. This form of consciousness is form of pure aham which is different from āhamkārika aham. This different from intellectual understanding of purușa and Prakrti as is due to the fact that these schools admit the ultimate reality as two (vrttyātmaka viveka)-an understanding which is a dharma or the creator of the world. According to Ramanuja-school, for characteristic of buddhi. Purusa or mere revealing consciousness, in example, Brahman, the ultimate spiritual principle, is the real crea- its pure form, is a witness, a seer, a non-agent and is also unaffected tor of the world. In the beginning of creation, God desired to be by misery.1 That pure consciousness is neutral is also expressed by many. The "I" became the "This" by stimulating its own sentient the statement 'Na Prakrtih, na vikrtiḥ, puruşah'.2 Purușa is buddheh and non-sentient aspects. The desireful supreme entity cannot be Pratisamvedi." In its pure form, it is eternal, ever-free and all- impersonal pure consciousness.

pervading. According to Samkhya, however, purusa or the spiritual reality is In the asamprajñāta samā dhi in which all buddhivrttis are annihi- a disinterested spectator of the world-show. It is neither the material lated, this pure consciousness shines by its own light. So, the stage cause of the universe, nor is it the efficient cause. Purușa does not of asamprajñāta samādhi is not a stage of unconsciousness. On the desire to be many and it does not actively participate in the work of contrary, it is the stage of full consciousness in its pure and eternally creation. It vitalises Prakrti merely by its sannidhi. Hence, the free form. Just as in Tantra, vimarśa is regarded as the pure mirror Samkhya-school has not felt the need for describing purusa as śud- in which Siva experiences his svarüpa,3 in the same manner, pure dha aham. It is true as an orthodox system, Sāmkhya has got to sāttvika buddhi of the Samkhya-yoga School serves as the nirmalā- explain the upanişadic text "Eko'ham Vahusyām". Advaita vedānta darśa (stainless mirror) which reflects the nature of self in the has explained this creative desire of God as a vrtti of Māyā which asamprajñāta-stage when all buddhivrttis are stopped. Conscious- is His upādhi. Vaișnava Philosophy and Tantra do not have to face ness, therefore, in its pure form, cannot be the revealer of any any difficulty in explaining this upanisadic text as according to both, natural object (Prākrtika vișaya). It, then, reveals only its own true the ultimate reality possesses the form of Suddha aham. There is, however, no clear explanation of this upanișadic text in the Sāmkhya

form. In the impure form, however, purușa-caitanya remains apparently literatures available in the present age; but judging from the position associated with buddhi through reflection and is not discriminated of the Samkhya-school, it can be reasonably said that this creative from the latter. So purușa falsely appears as the vişayī of vișaya- desire is to be admitted as a vrtti of cetanāvișțā Prakrti. Purușa is jñāna (object-knowledge) caused through the operation of the intel- pure and immutable consciousness devoid even of I-ness. There is lect and this falsity (dosa) is never felt in the empirical stage. no logical error in such admission as in the advaita-vedānta too, the creative desire is a vrtti of Māyā.

1Sāmkhyakarika, 19. *Sāmkhyakarika, 3. "Kāmakalavilāsa. Now, object-knowledge is always due to the operation of buddhi.

8 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Épistemology

Buddhi, on the one hand, receives reflection of consciousness from of the nature of relation that exists between the intelligised buddhi purușa and on the other hand undergoes modification in the form of the object which has stimulated it. Vrttijñāna, therefore, being a and the object. modification of buddhi, may be regarded as attributive in nature and since in the opinion of the Samkhya-school, there is tādātmya bet- Relation between the intelligised buddhi and the object ween substance and attribute, this vrtti-jñāna may also be regarded Although there is real relation between the intelligised buddhi and

as substantive in nature. the object, still this relation is not direct in the sense that the object The vrtti-jñana of the Samkhya-school is, thus, not very different is not revealed directly. The object is revealed only indirectly through from the ray-like substantive-attributive knowledge of Rāmanuja- vrtti (i.e., the form of the object assumed by the intellect). Vrtti is school so far as its object-revealing nature is concerned. Regarding the prativimba of the object and the object is the vimba. So, the the locus of this knowledge, there is, however, important difference. relation between the buddhi vrtti and the object is of vimba-prati- According to Samkhya, consciousness cannot be directly related to vimba form. The object gets revealed through its prativimba. It is an object. Relation takes place only indirectly through vrtti which the prativimba which is directly cognized. The vimba or the object is nothing but the modification of the intellect in the form of the is cognized by the intelligised buddhi only indirectly. So, the relation object. So, buddhi is regarded as the locus of vrtti-jñana. According between the intelligised buddhi and the object is indirect (parokșa to Rāmānuja, the soul in its empirical state, is the locus of object- sambandha). Since the intelligised buddhi is related to vișaya knowledge. The soul gets directly related to the objects but since the through vrtti, the relation between the intellect and the object may soul is immutable, it cannot go out to the object to get related. be described as paramparā-sambandha. The samkhya-theory, there- Rãmānuja, therefore, has admitted the existence of ray-like know- fore, is not a form of direct realism in which the object is directly ledge in the soul in the place of the vrtti-jñana of the intelligised revealed in knowledge. In this respect, the samkhya theory resembles buddhi of the Sämkhya-school. This ray-like knowledge of Rama- the theory of the advaita-vedänta but differs from the theory of nuja is capable of expansion and contraction. By expanding this ray- knowledge upheld by the nyaya-school or by the school of Rāmā- like knowledge, the soul gets directly related to the object. nuja. According to the latter school, it is the object and not its vrtti which is directly manifested in knowledge. Thus, according to the Relation between the knower and the object of knowledge sämkhya and the advaita-vedanta, three factors are involved in Although buddhi is the locus of knowledge and there is no real knowledge: the intelligised buddhi or antahkaraņāvacchinna cai- relation between the soul and the object of knowledge, still it tanya as the knower, vrtti of the object which amounts to knowledge appears as if purușa or the soul is having this phenomenal know- when consciousness is reflected through it, and the object. (It is, of ledge on account of reflection acting in co-operation with non-dis- course, true that in the sämkhya-realism, there is no such thing as crimination or (aviveka). In other words, purușa falsely appears as prameyāvacchinna caitanya). According to Nyāya and the Rāma- the knower of the object. Here, we should remember that according nūja-school, on the other hand, there is no intermediate factor in to the dualistic Sāmkhya, purușa does not form an element of the the form of vrtti. The object is revealed directly to the knower and experiencing ego which is formed in the intellect with the reflected this direct revelation of the object is knowledge. For the sāmkhya and consciousness of the self combined with buddhi's own conceptual the advaita-vedānta, knowledge is the direct revelation of the vrtti determinations. In object-knowledge, therefore, the object is really and an indirect revelation only of the object (through vrtti). In the related to intelligised buddhi (through vrtti) and is only seemingly case of perception vrtti arises immediately (aparokşa). related to purușa through reflection. "So'yam buddhi tattvavarttinā From the above it would be apparent that there is resemblance jñāna sukhādinā tatprativimvitastachhyāyā pattyā jñāna sukhādimā- between the sämkhya and the advaita-vedanta in regard to the theory neva, bhavati".1 So the problem to be discussed next is the problem 1Vacaspati, Samkhyatattvakaumudī, Karika 5.

i0 Classical Sāmkhya: A Critical Study Epistemology 11

of knowledge. So it will not be out of place if we discuss in brief out- line, the position of the advaita-vedanta in relation to knowledge, khyāti in the case of illusory perception. In 'idamrajatam,' the specially in relation to perception, inference and sabda-the three perception of 'idam' is the perception of sadavastu and so there is

sources recognized by the Sämkhya philosophy. no difficulty in understanding how 'idamvrtti' arises in the buddhi. According to the advaita-vedānta, in the case of perception, antaḥ- So far as the arousal of the rajatākāra vrtti in the intellect is con- karaņa goes out to the object of perception through the sense-organ cerned, the sāmkhya will say that rajatākārā vrtti arises in the intel- which is in contact with the object, as a result of which, it becomes lect as a result of the combined operation of the awakened rajata- so modified as to assume the form of the said object. Perception is vāsanā and the non-discrimination of rajata and śukti (vivekāgraha). the immediate knowledge in which the antahkaraņa vrtti is non- Now, here, although idamvrtti and rajata-vrtti are two different different from the object and is illuminated by the consciousness of vrttis, still due to reflection of one and the same consciousness

the self. through two vrttis, knowledge arises as one. Although the sense-organs here are not āhamkārika, still they are In the case of inference, on the other hand, both the samkhya and produced from the five tanmātras (apañcikrta bhūta) which, being the advaita-vedanta will hold that the buddhi or the antahkaraņa very subtle and simple, are more or less of the form of energy. For will be modified into the form of the inferred object on account of that reason, there is no difficulty in assuming that the visual and the modification of the intellect or anatahkarana in the form of the auditory organs can reach their respective objects. Antaḥkaraņa, mark (hetu) which is perceived by the sense-organ and which is in however, is taijasa in nature, although it is composed of five ele- universal relation with the major term or the inferred object. Since ments taken in combination. (Pañcabhutairmilitairmanobhuddhya- one and the same consciousness is reflected through two vrttis, (i.e.)

hamkāra cittāni jāyante). Pratyakşa vrtti of the hill and vahnyakāra vrtti), there is the arousal Hence, there is also no logical incongruity in thinking that antah- of one knowledge. In the case of śabda, intellect or antahkaraņa as- karaņa too reaches the object and then, assumes the form of the sumes the form of the object (vrttiyabout which an assertion has object. Here, also, what is directly related to antaḥkaraņa is its vrtti. been made by the pta purusa. As soon as the word is uttered by Through vrtti, antahkaraņa is related to the object of perception. It the speaker and understood by the hearer, the intellect or the antah- is because the antahkaraņa is reaching the object and, therefore, karana assumes the form of the object signified by the word. Hence, getting changed into the form of the object that the question, how we find that according to the samkhya and the advaita-vedānta, the does the vrtti correspond to the object-does not arise at all. Sea- object is never known directly either by the buddhi or by the antah- water, coming out of the sea, reaches a river and assumes the form karaņa. In this respect, the sāmkhya and the advaita vedānta are so of the river. Here, there is no difficulty in admitting that the form very close tó each otber that if we substitute antahkaraņāvacchinna of the river which the water assumes resembles the actual river- caitanya in the place of caitanyaprativimbitabuddhi, then the sam-

form. khya theory will become almost indistinguishable from the advaita- The erroneous perception poses no difficulty either for the advaita- theory so far as the relation between the real experiencing ego vedānta or for the sämkhya. Take the case of the 'conch-shell-silver (Paramātā) and the object is concerned. illusion'. The advaitin will say that it is Suktitva prakāraka avidyā Now, since purușa appears as the knower without really being so, which covers the true form of the sukti and projects the form of it becomes necessary for us to consider also the nature of relation anirvacaniya rajata (This is a case of anirvacaniya srsți or indes- that can be logically supposed to exist between purusa and the cribable creation made by avidyā). It is because there is the creation object of knowledge. of the anirvacaniya rajata that there is no difficulty in understanding how rajatākārā vrtti arises in the antahkaraņa as a result of sense- Relation between purusa and the object of knowledge object contact. According to Sämkhya, however, there is sadasat- So far as purușa is concerned, there is no real relation between it and the object of knowledge. Even the relation between purusa and

i2 Ćlassical Sāmkhya: A Critical Študy Epistemology 13

buddhivrtti is apparent and is caused by reflection and non-discri- Smrityā to rajatā bhāsa mination. According to vacāspati, due to sannidhāna, a reflection of upapanno bhavişyati consciousness is caught in the buddhi by virtue of which all visaya- (Prakaraņo paňcikā 4-26-29) kārā vttis of buddhi get apparently changed into consciousness. Both grahana and smarana fail to cognize the difference that exists This apparent change in the character of vrttis gives rise to a sense between their objects (idam and rajatam) due to mental disability of false identity (ekameva darşanam) between purușa and buddhi. (mānasikadoșa) as a result of which there is no discrimination bet- It is on account of this non-discrimination that purușa seems to ween perception and memory knowledge. (grahaņa-smaraņa ceme have knowledge of the objects through vrttis (which are then falsely vivekānavabhāsini) In the absence of discrimination, grahaņasmara-

owned by puruşa). ņātmaka knowledge too, appears in a manner similar to what is ex- According to vijñana-bhiksu, however, the intellect reflects the perienced in the knowledge of real silver. consciousness of purușa and becomes intelligised; the result is that According to Sämkhya, however, there is no non-discrimination the inherent ahamkara of buddhi is falsely appropriated by the self. between perception and memory: there is the failure to discriminate After that the vișayākārā vrttis of the intellect are reflected back in one object from the other. Here, agrahana is of svarūpa bheda (i.e., the self and it appears as if purusa is knowing objects through vrttis. of the difference that exists in the natures of two objects) and also of Truly speaking, there is no real relation of purusa either with buddhi the difference that exists between two vrttis. Smkhya believes that and its vrttis or with objects imaged through vrttis. The seeming knowledge can also be false. This is because Samkhya holds that relation of purusa and buddhi-vrtti may, therefore, be described as just as knowledge or jñāna is a disposition of the,intellect, in the false tādātmya (caused by sannidhi and vivekāgraha of purușa and same manner ajñāna too, is a disposition of the intellect. Prabha- buddhi) according to Vācaspati and abhivyānga-abhivyānjaka rela- kara, on the other hand, believes that all knowledge is true by

tion according to vijñāna bhiksu. nature. The question of falsity arises only when we proceed to use Due to vivekāgraha, the purusa seems to be the knower who that knowledge in our practical life. knows the object in an indirect manner through vrtti. There seems Although Prabhäkara has introduced aviveka to account for erro- to be a false paramparā relation between purușa and the object neous perception, still we should remember that the aviveka of although in reality purusa is asamga having no connection with the Samkhya is different from the aviveka of the Prabhakara school.

world of Prakrti. The aviveka of Sāmkhya is primarily ontological, anādi and apri- That non-discrimination is potent enough to create false know- ori. It is epistemological only in the sense that it is a failure to dis- ledge has also been admitted by the Prabhakara School of Mīmāmsā; criminate between the self and the not-self. Prabhākara's aviveka is because according to akhyātivāda of this school, erroneous percep- purely epistemological as it works in the field of knowledge only. It tion arises because of non-discrimination between memory and is not a creative force of the ultimate material stuff; nor is it the perception and also between their objects. In the case of the percep- cause of the self's attachment to worldly objects. It is not even

tion of silver in a conchshell, it has been stated: anädi.

20. Nanvatra rajatā bhāsakathameva ghatişyate Uccate śuktisa kalam grihitam bhedavarjitam 21. Šuktikayā višeșāye rajatādbhedahetavaḥ CAN PURUȘA BE A SAKȘI IN THE ADVAITA SENSE? From the above discussion, it is clear that there is no real relation

Tena jñātā abhi bhavaj jñātā sāmānya rūpata 22. Anantaram ca rajatasmitirjātā tathāpica between purușa and vrtti-jñāna. The relation is apparent and false.

Manodoșāh tadityāmsa parāmarša vivarjitam Even then purușa has been described as Sākșī. In the advaita-vedān- ta too, there is the mention of Sāksi-caitanya which is necessary to

23. Rajatam vişayikrityā naiva produce vrtti-jñāna. All objects of knowledge become vișayas of

śuktervivecitam Sākșī either through the operation of the Pramānas (in the case of

14 Classical Sāmkhya : A Critical Study Epistemology 15

jñāta vișaya) or through the operation of ajñāna (in tbe case of ajñāta-vișaya).1 The question, therefore arises: does the sāksī of Sām- admitted as objects to be cognized only by the witness (Sākşya- vastu). Things of the world are known through vrttis (internal khya possess the same epistemological status as is possessed by the sākșī-caitanya of the advāita-vedānta? modes) originating from the activity of the means of knowledge In the Sāmkhyakārikā (no. 19) Purușa has been described as a (pramānas). The internal modes, however, are cognised only by the witness, a seer only without any activity. The said Kārikā runs as witness in the individual self without the functioning of any one of

follows: the approved sources of knowledge. According to the Vedanta- "Tasmāt-ca viparyayāt siddham sākșītvam asya purușasya." paribhāșā, which does not admit that the mind is an indriya (sense- The use of the word 'sāksītvam' in the Kārika has led some scho- organ), pleasures, pains etc., are also objects to be revealed by the lars of India2 to assume that purusa of the Sāmkhya philosophy is witnessing consciousness. similar to the jiva-sākşī of the advaita-vedānta: but in the Sāmkhya philosophy, the objects to be revealed only by the witnessing self Jīva-sākșī of the Advaita-vedānta (jivā-sākșī) are not mentioned after the fashion of the advaita- In the philosophy of the Advaita-vedänta, the knowing and the

vedānta. (Vedāntadaršane paramārtha-tattva). # experiencing self is regarded as false and phenomenal. This false and

kind of objects revealed only by the phenomenal ego is a mixture of this (idam) and not this (anidam).

sāksī-Caitanya or the witnessing self In other words, it is a unified category of antahkarana and cit, both The objects which are generally admitted as the objects of the wit- fused into one. So, this "I', of the advaita-vedānta is both objective nessing consciousness (jīva-sāksī) are those which are not cognized and subjective, changing and also the static perceiver of changes. by the activity of the pramānas (sources of knowledge). Internal "I" is recognized both as unhappy and as the object of love. The organ and internal modes (antahkarana vrttis) are, for example, changing aspect of the experiencing ego is known as the pramātā and it is this pramata that reaches the external object through the antahkarana. But a changeable ego alone is not capable of explaining 1Pramāņa makes an object vişaya of sākșī by producing jñātatvadharma in how different experiences of the ego, happening at different periods the object of knowledge whereas ajñana does the same by producing ajñā- tatvadharma in the object. of time, can be gathered together round a single and identical cons- ªDr. Sita Ram Goswami, Vedāntadarśaneparamārtha-tattva, p. 15 |(original cious centre so as to give rise to such phenomena as a feeling of book written in Bengali) 'Puruşa has been described as sākşī in the Sāmkhya- identity, memory, recognition etc. In addition to pramātr-caitanya kārikā (19) .... Those who believe in sākșī do not recognize that the mind is or changeable consciousness, a static witnessing self (jīva-sākșī) has an organ (indriya). Those who admit that the mind is an organ do not believe in sākși. So, pleasures and pains which are generally admitted as objects of got to be recognized in the philosophy of the Advaita school. Hence, in the non-dualistic philosophy, the jiva or the experiencing ego internal perception, are all objects to be known only by the sākșī according to the view of the Sämkhyas. Although, puruşa has been mentioned as sākși in comprises both jīva-sākșī and pramātā. Consequently, objects to be the Sāmkhyakārikā, yet the objects to be known only by the sākșī have not known exclusively by the jīva-sākșī are definitely mentioned in the been clearly mentioned. It is because Sämkhya has admitted the existence of philosophy of the Advaita-school. sākșī without clearly determining the objects which are to be known only by In the philosophy of the Samkhya, however, no mention of pra- the witness, its definition of perception given in kārika 5 has confused the commentators to a great extent. The commentators have thought that this mātr-caitanya as distinguished from the sākșī-caitanya is found in definition gives us the characteristics of both external perception and internal any context. Here the individual or the jīva refers to that purușa perception. But truly speaking, according to Sāmkhya, external perception which has been caught in the snare of prakrti through reflection. occurs through the functioning of the external sense-organs: internal percep- Due to reflection, the unconscious intellect appears as conscious and tion is not due to the operation of any indriya. This is sākșī pratyakșa. Unless it is the intelligised buddhi that actually gets related to the objects this position is admitted, recognition of purușa as sākșī is senseless like the through its modifications. Modification of the intellect, in the form

utterings of a mad person. of the object, is the pramana and the reflection of purușa in it is

16 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Epistemology 17

prama. Although, in the opinion of this school buddhi or the intellect is the real substratum of knowledge, still it appears as if purua is objects, pleasures, pain etc. through reflection and aviveka. Ekameva having this phenomenal knowledge because of reflection acting in daršanam, khyātireva daršanam, happens to purușa and not to a fic- co-operation with ignorance. Since in the Sāmkhya, purușa appears titious knower formed of sākși-caitanya, and pramātr-caitanya. Phe- as the knower of the object, there is no need to assume the existence nomenal knowledge is gained in the following manner. of another sākşī in the Vedānta sense. When buddhi comes in con- Perception: In the case of perception, say the visual perception of tact with the worldly objects, it assumes the forms of these objects, and a jar, the eye comes in contact with a jar as a result of which there all these forms or modes (vrttis) apparently get changed into know- are certain indriya-vrttis which are presented to the mind. The mind ledge through the reflection of cit in the intellect. Due to aviveka, analyses and synthesises those vrttis and presents them to the intel- this apparent change in the character of vrttis gives rise to a false lect. Then through the functioning of the mind and the external sense of non-discrimination between purusa and buddhi. It seems as organ, the intellect assumes the form of the jar (the buddhi-vrttis or if purușa is non-different from buddhi and there is only one principle the pramana). Finally, the consciousness of the self is reflected in this and not two. Here, although the purusa of sāmkhya seems to per- objectified form of the buddhi and the object is immediately revealed. form the same function as is performed by the jīva-sāksī of the This is the perceptual knowledge of the jar. The question that arises Advaita-vedānta, the two do not possess the same status. Jīva-sākșī here is; who is the knower of this knowledge? According to Advaita of the Advaita-vedänta is the static consciousness within the experien- epistemology, the knower is the category formed of sākși and cing ego, the changeable aspect of which is the pramātā. Both pramātri-caitanya (antahkaraņopahita caitanya and antahkaraņāva- sākșī and pramātā are equal (samakakșa) in the sense that both of cchinna caitanya): this knower is as false as the known. Sākși cai- them are false and limited in space and time. In the philosophy of tanya (witnessing consciousness) constitutes the permanent nature Sāmkhya, on the other hand, the purusa (the sāksī) has been admit- of this metaphysically false but empirically real experiencing ego; ted as real and it is not limited in space and time. It does not form and due to its presence, the personal identity which is absolutely an element of the experiencing ego (which is formed in the buddhi essential for being a knower, can be accounted for from the point with the reflected consciousness of purusa united with buddhi's own of view of the Advaita-vedanta. In the Samkhya, however, both the

conceptual determinations). knower and the known, are metaphysically real. What is false is the Sākšī or witness literally denotes that principle which is capable abheda grahana (non-discrimination) of the intellect and the purușa. of revealing anything independently that occurs before it. Therefore, Purușa-the seer-becomes seemingly associated with buddhi through any tattva, which is self-revealing and is also the revealing principle reflection, and due to avidyā, it seems to us as if only one principle of the world, may be called sāksī or the witness. In order to be des- is operating in the perceptual knowledge. According to dualistic cribed as sāksī, it is not necessary for consciousness to assume the Samkhya, the objective ground is as real as the subjective one, and role that has been taken up by the jīva-sāksī of the Advaita-school. purușa can serve as the subjective ground of knowledge without being Moreover, if purușa is brought down to the level of the phenomenal dragged down to the position of the Sāksī of the Advaita-vedānta. In jīva-sākșī then the followers of the Advaita will not be in a position the Advaita vedänta a false knower has been formed to match with to raise any objection against the Sämkhya theory of multiplicity of the false object of the false and phenomenal knowledge, because un-

selves as jīva-sākșīs are many in number. less the individual knower is false along with the known, non-dualism In fact, non-recognition of saksī-caitanya as distinguished from of the Advaita-school cannot be logically upheld. the pramätr-caitanya in the manner suggested by the Advaita-vedān- Inference: Inferential knowledge is that knowledge in which the ta has not created any difficulty in the epistemological position of modification of the intellect in the form of the inferred object occurs the Sāmkhya Darshana. Cognition, plesures, pains etc. actually sub- in the absence of the contact of sense-organ with the object. Here, sist in buddhi and the spirit simply appears to have knowledge of the middle term is perceived, and the major term is inferentially known through its relation to the middle term.

18 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Epistemology 19

Sabda : In the case of sabda, the intellect assumes the form of the tions. ('What the term prativisaya stands for is the indriya in object about which an assertion has been made by a trustworthy relation with the object. Adhyavasāya is cognition, the function of person. In all these cases (perception, inference, and verbal testi- the intellect: in fact adhyavasāya stands for that excess flow of mony) purusa is the apparent knower through aviveka, and therefore, sattvaguna which results from the suppression in the intellect of there is no need for the recognition of any other static consciousness tamas due to the contact of the indriyas with their respective objects.

in the form of the sāksī-caitanya of the Advaita type. This is vrtti or 'knowledge.' (Tattvakaumudī) Since the mind is Cognition of pleasures, pains etc. : So far as pleasures, pains etc., are concerned, these are the objects of internal perception (according admitted as an indriya, pleasures, pains etc., are to be regarded as the objects of internal perception. to Sāmkhya). Mind is the indriya that operates in the perception of these objects. Dr. Sita Ram Goswami is wrong in holding that mind Cognition of internal modes: The internal modes, however, cannot is not an indriya according to the Samkhya school. In the Sāmkhya- be known through other vrttis. These are revealed directly by the kārikā (27) it has been stated: ubhayātmakam atra manaḥ samkal- reflected consciousness of purusa without the help of any other pakam indriyam ca sādharmyāt. In the Sāmkhya Pravacana Bhāșya, media. So, the internal modes are sākșī-bhāsya in the Sāmkhya

too, we come across the following passage. sense : (that is in the sense of purusa-bhāsya) and not in the sense of Indrasya samghāteśvarasya karaņamindriyam tathā cāham-kārakār- Advaita-vedānta.

yatve sati karaņatvamindriyatvamiti. COMMENTS

Further, in the Tattvakaumudi,1 Vācaspati Miśra has emphatically asserted that the mind is an indriya because it has properties com- Truly speaking, it is the realistic frame-work of the Samkhya that mon to indriya : 'The property meant is that consisting in its having makes the assumption of a sākșī-caitanya superfluous in the Advaita for its constituent cause, the I-principle abounding in the sattva sense. In the Sämkhya, no false knower is knowing falsely a false attribute and not in its being a characteristic of Indra (spirit); for world. Aviveka in Sämkhya implies misappropriation of something by this latter property belongs to the will and the I-principle also .... the purusa which does not really belong to it. Phenomenal know- Thus then, being the characteristic of the spirit should be regarded ledge or vrtti is real and its substratum-buddhi-is also real. So is only as an explanation of the derivation of the term indriya; it cannot the purusa which is by nature asamga and unchangeable. The worst

be said to form its connotation.' mistake (mahādoșa) therefore lies in misappropriation or confused It would therefore appear that it is not proper to assert that the perception. The reflection of purusa-caitanya in the intellect together mind is not an indriya and that pleasures and pains etc. cannot be with beginningless ignorance is causing the confused perception of the objects of internal perception. Cognition of everything, according the purusa due to which intellectual concepts appear as self's own to Sāmkhya, is due to the reflection of purusa in the intellect. possession. So purușa, here, is serving as the static background of Cognition of pleasures and pains, too, occur in the same process. the phenomenal knowledge, but this purusa is not a sākșī in the Even then, pleasures and pains cannot be regarded as sākșī-bhāşya Advaita sense as it does not form the part of a false and fictitious in the Advaita sense because these are known through mind which is ego which is limited in space and time. By describing purușa as an indriya. Mind is a tattva different from buddhi and ahamkāra. It sākșī, the Sāmkhya philosophers have not made any 'insane state- is to be classed with the indriyas. It is because the mind is an organ ment'. Sākşāt paśyatī iti sākșī. Purușa, therefore, is sākșī in this that the definition of perception given in the Sāmkhyakārikā (5) sense in which brahman too is a sāksī (sākșīcetā kevalo nirgunaśca. (prativişayādhyavasāyo drstam) has been interpreted by Vācaspati Sveta Upanișad 6-11.) Miśra in a manner so as to cover both external and internal percep- SOURCES OF KNOWLEDGE

1English translation Ganganath Jha, According to Sämkhya there are three independent sources through which knowledge is acquired: Perception, Inference and Subda.

20 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Epistemology

Perception Perception arises only when there is the presentation of an object between pariņāma (vrtti) and pariņāmi (intelligised buddhi) which is on the one hand and operation of one of the sense-organs on the the real pramāta. Intelligised buddhi is the substratum of vrtti as other. Perception always depends upon some sort of sannikarșa well as of bodhah. When pramätri aspect is to be stressed upon in between its object and a particular sense-organ. This fact has been knowledge, pramā is defined as pauruseya bodhah. When the intelli- stressed upon by Vācaspati Miśra when he has said: "Visayam gised vrtti as the effect of pramāņavyāpāra is to be brought into

vişayam prati prominence, pramā is defined as the buddhivrtti through which con-

vartate iti prativişayam ....... sciousness is reflected. As soon as there is reflection of consciousness

artha sannikrştamindriyamityarthah". through vrtti, there is immediately revelation of vrtti resulting in the External perception is caused by the combined operation of the consequent manifestation of the object to the experiencing ego. This external sense-organs and internal organ whereas internal perception manifestation of the object is what is termed knowledge. is caused only by the operation of the internal organ. In both the In Muktāvali, however, Visvanath has accepted pramā of the Sām- cases, there must be the relation between a sense-organ and its khya-school in the sense of caitanya prativimbita buddhi vrtti. object. Adhyavasāya is definite cognition that arises due to this re- "Tasyā evendriya praņālikaya lation. This cognition is a function of the intellect. When a relation pariņatirjñānarūpa ghatādinā sambandhaḥ". or sannikarsa happens to take place between an external sense-organ In fact, there will be no mistake if we say that buddhi vrtti per- and its specific object, the intellect which is permeated with the cons- meated with consciousness (citsambadhayuktah) is pramā because it ciousness of purusa, gets changed into the form of the object. This is the effect of buddhi-vyapara. change of buddhi into the form of the object is what is known as Vyāpāra (as we have seen) is the process by which buddhi vrtti. This vrtti or modification of the intellect in the form of the (through the help of karanas in the shape of sense-organs) assumes object caused through the operation of the sense-organ (indriya- the form of the object. prāņālīkayā) is Pratyaksa pramāņa and the reflection of purușa in this modification (or buddhi vrtti) is Pratyaksa-pramā. (Ato buddhi (Yo vişayākaravrttirūpo budđhivyāpāro jāyate vrtti prativimbitam caitanyam pramā) Pramā has also been defined se eva vyāpāraḥ pramākaraņatvāt pramāņam) Now, buddhi, being a product of Prakrti is unconscious in nature. as 'pauruşeya bodhaḥ' (i.e., adhyavasāya in the form of an appre- Hence, adhyavasāya, which is a unique disposition of the intellect, hension by an experiencing ego (pramātā) which is asandigdhāvipa- ritānadhigata vișaya). is also unconscious in nature; but all the unconscious modifications In the cognition "ghatamaham jānāmi" there is not only the re- of buddhi are intelligised and revealed by the reflection of cit in the intellect. Hence, though knowledge as a buddhi-dharma, is uncon- velation of the jar due to reflection of consciousness in the ghatā- scious in nature, still objects are revealed in knowledge on account kārā vrtti, there is also the appropriation on the part of the of the light borrowed from purusa. Here, too, we can see that it is. experiencing ego of the jar as an object of his knowing process. more logical to define prama as vrtti through which consciousness There is, however, no inconsistency in defining prama in both ways. This is because according to Sämkhya, the real experiencing agent is is reflected because it is the vrtti which can be regarded as uncon- the intelligised buddhi in which ahamvrtti arises as an effect and not scious. In the case of 'bodha' or apprehension on the other hand, it the purusa (that falsely appears as a knower due to sannidhi or re- is very difficult for us to think that it is unconscious; because the flection and aviveka). There is, therefore, no logical incongruity in word bodhah generally refers to conscious aspect of knowledge. It defining pramā either as buddhivrtti through which consciousness is is only when we lay emphasis on the caitanyamsa of knowledge that reflected or as the apprehension of the visaya (object) by an experi- we can describe it as pauruseya bodhah. Since knowledge is regarded as an unconscious disposition of unconscious buddhi, it is proper to encing agent: because according to Sāmkhya, there is tādātmya emphasise the vrttyamśa of knowledge (which is its real acetanāmśa) and say that vrtti, through which consciousness is reflected (citsam-

22 Classical Sāmkhya : A Critical Study Epistemology 23

bandhah) is the resulting knowledge or pramā. İt seems to us that Iśvarakrişna has included buddhi and aham- Mind and the external sense-organs: According to Vijñānbhikșu, kāra in the list of karaņas in karikā 32 mainly due to the fact that an indriya is the instrument of the soul (the lord of the body). The in the said kārika, he is just trying to give us an exhaustive account sense-organ serves as an instrument in producing knowledge and it of the different functions of all the tattvas which worldly soul re- is also āhamkarika in nature.1 Regarding the number of organs, two quires for the purpose of enjoying this world through knowledge, views seem to be mentioned in the kārikā by its author. In two feeling and action. The jīva or the individual soul cannot have any karikas (24 & 25), the number of organs has been mentioned as experience of the bhogya jagat (the world of enjoyment) unless the eleven (5 organs of sensation plus 5 organs of action plus mind): I-sense emerges in it through the awakening of ahamkāra which is but in kārikā 32, organs have been counted as thirteen. (5 organs of an effect of buddhi. Life of an experiencing self is also maintained by sensation plus 5 organs of action plus 3 internal organs such as mind, the circulation of vital airs performed by the three internal karaņas. ego-sense and the intellect). Naturally, therefore, the position be- (According to Gaudapāda, however, the circulation of vital airs is comes confusing and anomalus. This anomaly has been removed by the function of all thirteen organs).1 Since purusartha is the goal Vijñānbhiksu in his Yogavārttika (II.18) where he has come forward to for which Prakrti is undergoing ceaseless changes from time imme- give us a satisfactory explanation of such apparent contradiction. In morial, it becomes a duty on the part of the śāstrākara to examine his opinion, buddhi and ahamkāra are sukșma indriyas whereas carefully all the tattvas which will be operative in leading the soul mind which is an effect of ahamkara is gross in nature. Since, mind to its desired goal. and the other ten organs are effects of ahamkāra, they are to be External sense-organs and their functions: Eye, ear, nose, tongue counted together as eleven organs. Moreover, buddhi, as we know, and skin are known as external sense-organs because through the is the cause of ahamkra, and ahamkara is the cause of the mind. operation of these organs, the individual soul receives information Since, these three internal categories are related as cause and effect, regarding the external world. counting of the mind (managrahana) as an internal organ means The outer parts visible to us are not the real sense-organs. counting of ahamkāra as well, (ahamkāragrahaņa) and counting of The sense-organs receive indeterminate impressions of colour, ahamkāra as an internal organ means similarly the counting of sound, smell, taste and touch from the external world. (Rūpādi- buddhi. Hence there is no anomaly, if organs are described either as vişayamacetanam ālocanam, tatkaraņam buddhindriyam=Jñanen-

eleven or as thirteen. driyami tyarthah). Since these indeterminate impressions of colour, According to Väcaspati too (who was earlier than Bhiksu) the sound etc., are received by these organs from the external world, they

signs of an indrīya are as follows: are known as external sense-organs. The organ that receives rūpa is

(1) Indriya is a characteristic of Indra or soul. known as the eye, the organ that hears sound is known as the ear,

(2) The upādana of an indriya is ahamkāra. the organ that receives smell is known as the nose, the organ that ' If these be the characteristics of an indrīya, then the number receives taste is known as the Tongue. should be counted as eleven because buddhi and ahamkāra cannot The external sense-organs can make an individual aware simply of possess the characteristic of being the effect of ahamkāra mentioned 'This is an object'. (Vastusāmānyenagrihitam) By means of the above. Of these eleven, five are organs of action, fivè are external external sense-organs alone, one is not able to know any qualified sense-organs and one is internal sense-organ in the form of the mind. object (Vastuviśeşatvena agrihitam, viśeșaņa-viśeşyabhāva rahitam). 1Samkhyapravacanasūtra: 2-19. Indrasya samghateśvarasya karaņamind- The object, at that moment, is revealed only as 'idam kincidvastu' riyam, tathā cāhamkāra kāryatvesati Karaņatvamindriyatvamiti. and there is no differentiation (aviviktamevabhāti) of jāti, guņa, *Vacaspati Miśra, Tattvakaumudi, commentary on, Karika 26. sambandha etc. There is also no integration in the form of one

Sāttvikāhamkāropādānakatvamindrīyatvam Indrasya-atmacinhatvādindrīyamucyate. qualified object. This awareness is known as 'sammugdham' due to 1Gaudapāda's bhāşya on Kārikā, 32.

24 Classical Samkhya: A Critical Study Epistemology 25

its not being the object of right cognition. Sāmkhya-kārikā has as different. The use of the word "yugapat" really suggests that in described this awareness as ālocanamātram jñänam. This is the nir- some situations the internal and the external organs operate in such

vikalpaka stage of knowledge. quick succession that the knower has the feeling that he is having (asti hyālocanam jñanam prathamam nirvikalpakam-Tattva the knowledge of the object immediately after his external organ has

kaumudī, bhāsya on kārikā 27). come into operation. As for example, the recognition of a snake Savikalpaka and Nirvikalpaka Pratyaksa : According to Sāmkhya, revealed by a flash of lightning and the immediate flight as a result therefore, nirvikalpaka and savikalpaka represent two stages of thereof. Here, the gradual arousal of knowledge is not felt as knowledge. This distinction is made there on the basis of the func- gradual due to very quick succession of the operational processes. tional differences of the external and internal sense-organs. There are, however, other situations when the knower feels that his The external sense-organs are first to operate in producing per- knowledge is gradually passing through indeterminate stage to the ceptual cognition. The awareness that results from their operation determinate one. As an evidence, we can cite the example of indis- is of an indeterminate type. The external sense-organs produce a tinct perception in twilight of a tall vertical object. the doubt follow- non-relational apprehension of the object simply as an indefinite ed by a recognition of that as a human being, the reference of that only. The simple awareness begins to change into the form of a deter- to the self and determination to meet and to talk to the man or to minate and qualified object when the mind comes into operation. turn and walk away from him. Truly speaking : the different organs This is because the mind possesses the power of determining the can operate in different moments only in regard to one and the same nature of the object by making such discrimination as 'ayam gunah': object. If all the organs operate at one and the same moment, there 'iyam kriyā', 'iyatmatra jātiḥ', etc. Both discrimination and assimi- will be conflict and confusion and no clear perception of the object lation which are involved in determinate perception, are referred to as a consequence thereof. Successive or Kramasah feelings, generally here by the word samkalpa. This is the special function of the mind. arise in the case of doubtful cognition. Hence, determinate perception begins to emerge as soon as mind The process of perception, when analysed fully, will be as under : comes to operate. Further, the functions of the three internal organs First moment of perception: Indeterminate impression of the and one external organ may be both yugapat and kramaśah in per- object received by the external sense-organ, 'idamkincidasti. ception. Here, it seems to us that the words 'yugapat' and kramaśaḥ Second moment of perception: First moment of determinate do not refer to actual operations of the sense-organs ; they, rather, perception : Discrimination and assimilation by the mind. This is stand for two different kinds of subjective feeling of the perceiving the first moment of determinate perception when there is awareness mind in respect of the awakening of knowledge due to the operation of the form 'Ayam ghatah' on the internal and external organs. Samkhya really believes in the Third moment of perception: Second moment of determinate successive operations of the different sense-organs. It has been perception: Functioning of the ego-sense and emergence of percep- clearly mentioned in the Sāmkhyakārikā that the external sense- tual knowledge in the form 'ghatam grahitum śaknomi'. organ, first, perceives an object indeterminately ; it then brings such Fourth moment of perception: Third moment of determinate per- indeterminate impression to the mind which presents it to the ego- ception : Functioning of buddhi in the form of adhyavasäya 'Mayai- sense and which, in its turn, presents it to the intellect through tat kartavyam'. which consciousness of the self is manifested. All the organs cannot Thus, in the opinion of the Sāmkhya, determinate perception therefore, be supposed to operate actually at one and the same begins from the second moment and assumes the form of adhyava- moment of time in any situation whatsoever. Moreover, had all the säya at the fourth moment. organs of knowledge operated simultaneously, there could not have The Nyāya system, too, recognizes indeterminate stage as the been any discrimination between indeterminate and determinate forms. initial stage of the perceptual process. In the opinion of this school, If two things occur at the same moment, they will not be regarded we cannot have determinate knowledge or viśista jñāna without a

26 Classical Sāmkhya : A Critical Study Ěpistemology 27

prior perception of the simpler elements of jāti, guņa, ākarā, sam- So egohood as a separate tattva, has not been accepted. Since, mind bandha etc., in a state of separation (dvandva). A prior perception alone is capable of transforming non-relational awareness to full of viśeşana is absolutely necessary for determinate knowledge of an relational knowledge, no other internal organ is necessary to trans-

object. form indeterminate impression of an object into determinate know- The Nyaya process of perception when analysed, stands as follows: ledge First moment of perception : Nirvikalpaka pratyakșa or non- Now, Vācaspati Miśra has stated in his bhāşya on kārikā 27, that

relational apprehension of viśeşya, viśeșaņa etc. Second moment of perception and first moment of determinate indeterminate perception occurs through the functioning of the external sense-organs whereas mind has the power of arranging the perception : Determinate perception or relational apprehension. sense-data in a definite order and of making the indeterminate Third moment of perception and second moment of determinate sense-data determinate. perception when aham will operate : This is the stage of anuvya- Here, therefore, following Väcaspati, one may say that according

vasāya. to Sāmkhya determinate perception arises fully due to functioning Fourth moment of perception and third moment of determinate of the mind. There is no need for postulating three stages of deter- perception : At this moment, 'hānopādānopekșā buddhi' arises. This minate perception in accordance with the successive operations of stage represents the full perceptual knowledge of the object, because, here, the sense of the object being desirable or undesirable dawns mind, ego-sense and intellect at three different moments. This view cannot be accepted. According to Samkhya, definite

upon the mind of the perceiver. knowledge of an object or adhyavasāya is a dharma of buddhi and Here we should remember that according to Nyaya, determinate buddhi is different from the mind. It is only when buddhi is stimu- knowledge arises after the second moment and in the third and the lated by the functioning of the mind and the ego-sense that the fourth moments (anuvyavasāya-state and hānopādānopekșā buddhi stage) this determinate knowledge, already aroused, becomes simply tamoguna of the intellect is completely overpowered by the over- buddhivrtti. flowing sattvaguna and the object is definitely revealed through more clear, more rich and full. According to Samkhya, however, determinate knowledge, in true sense of the term, does not arise until It is only at this point that purusa appears to have the perceptual buddhi comes into operation at the fourth moment. Adhyavasāya knowledge of the object because of reflection acting in co-operation which is the proper form of determinate knowledge is a disposition with ignorance. Hence, in the Philosophy of the Sāmkhya, (as has of buddhi and as such without the operation of the intellect, savikal- already been pointed out) the contributions of ahamkāra and buddhi

paka jñāna cannot arise. towards the formation of determinate perception cannot be ignored. Although in respect of the number of moments needed for the When Vācaspati has stated in his commentary on kārikā 27, that arousal of full determinate knowledge, there seems to be no differ- determinate perception is due to the functions of the mind, he has ence between the Samkhya-school and the Nyaya-school, still in done so because of the fact that he is considering (in the said kārikā) respect of the number of internal organs operating in producing the functions of the eleven gross organs only. Buddhi and ahamkara, perceptual knowledge there is difference. There is consequent diffe- being subtle in nature and being of different kinds (tattvāntara) have

rence in Prakryā (process) also. not been mentioned here. Difference in respect of the Number of Internal Organs: Buddhi and ahamkāra, as separate internal organs, have not been recognized in Difference in the Pratyakşa Prakriya of Nyāya school and the Sām- the Nyäya. According to this system, the co-ordinating function of khya school: Both the schools believe that in perception, there is the buddhi has been ascribed to the soul through the instrumenta- relation of the sense-organ with the object. Both also believe that lity of the mind. According to Naiyāyikas, I-consciousness is gene- sense-organs are prāpyakārī. The word prāpyakārī is, however, used rated in the soul when it gets associated with the mind-body system. in different senses by the Samkhya and the Nyaya-school. Accord- ing to Sāmkhya, all external sense-organs are prāpya prakāśakārī,

28 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Epistemology 29

because they first get at their objects through vrttis and then reveal discrimination and assimilation. The mind then presents its own them. The real indriya is the inner faculty which has ahamkāra as cooked up stuff to the ego-sense for further elaboration and the ego- its upādāna kāraņa. It is because sense-organs are āhamkārikā in sense, to buddhi. It is only when buddhi comes to make its own nature that they can go out to the object. The stimulation of the contributions to knowledge and assumes the form of the object of external sense-organs produces further stimulation of the mind, ego, knowledge that determinate knowledge proper arises according to and intellect. The external sense-organs (as we have already seen) Sämkhya. Buddhi is the principle that defines, ascertains and recog- produce indeterminate impressions which are then successively nizes the object as belonging to a particular type and also determines operated upon by the mind, ego-sense and buddhi. The final result the desirability and undesirability of its attainment on the basis of

is the determinate knowledge of the object. which a definite conative attitude is adopted by the pramata who is The Nyaya-school, on the other hand, uses the word prapyakārī no other than the cetanāvista buddhi.1 Spatial and temporal localisa- in a different sense. According to this school, it is only the visual tion of the object is also a function of buddhi.2 Hence, determinate organ which is of the nature of light that goes out and reaches the perception proper arises when the intellect works upon the material object. The other organs do not move out to meet the objects. They supplied to it by the other sense-organs. come in contact with the objects remaining in their own places in From the above discussion, it is clear that in the perceptual pro- the body of a living being. They are called prāpyakārī because they cess of the Nyaya-school, functioning of three internal organs in the are receiving impressions by coming in direct contact with their forms of mind, ego-sense and intellect is not necessary. The soul can

respective objects. have a direct perceptual knowledge of the object through the func- Now, when there is a contact between the sense-organ and the tioning of the mind only. Buddhi and ahamkara are not accorded any object which is called sannikarsa, the sense-organ establishes a parti- place in the perceptual mechanism of the Nyaya-school. Knowledge, cular relation with its appropriate object according to both the according to this school, is a non-eternal quality of the atman. The schools. The nature of sannikarsa, however, is to be differently con- soul is the substratum of object-knowledge; but this characteristic ceived by these two schools as will be shown in the succeeding section. (jñānādhāratva) does not do any harm to the kūtastha nature of the This difference is due to the fact that Samkhya-school believes in soul. This is because the Nyaya admits difference between substance tādātmya between substance and quality, quality and its universal and quality. etc., whereas according to Nyaya, substance, quality, universal etc., Quality being different, changes in quality do not affect the un- are entirely different. The relation that unites substance with its changeable nature of the soul. There are changes in knowledge due quality or the quality with its universal etc., is termed samavāya in to origination and decay. Knowledge has become non-eternal in

the Philosophy of the Nyaya-school. nature. This non-eternality, however, does not affect the eternal and As soon as there is intercourse between the object and the sense- immutable nature of the soul. organ, there is the emergence of the indeterminate perceptual know- According to Nyäya, the soul being immutable, cannot go to the ledge involving the operation of the sense-organs only. Now, accord- 1Vacāspati, Tattvakaumudī, bhāşya on kārikā 23, English translation by ing to Nyāya, determinate perception proper arises as soon as the G. Jha. mind comes into operation. The mind is connected with the soul and "It is well known that when a man has to do anything, what he does as such through mind the soul, too, becomes directly connected with is to review the situation: he ponders over it, regards himself as entitled to do the object. There is no such thing as vrtti in the Nyaya theory of it and then makes up his mind, that he should do it and then, does it. Now, perception. The embodied soul is the pramāta who knows the object 'determination' consists in the notion that this should be done, and it belongs

directly. to and forms the characteristic function of Buddhi." "Sāmkhyacandrika, Nārāyanatirtha, commentary on kārikā 23, Adhya- According to Sämkhya, however, the sense-organ receives indeter- vasāyo buddhi riti. Adhyavasāyo mayedam kartavyamitya kāraniścayo .... minate vrtti from the object and this, they present to the mind, for buddhiparināmo, vasthāvisașaḥ.

30 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Epistemology 31

object although it becomes the pramäta or the knower of the object. Samkhya-texts available uptill now, any mention of different forms Mind is the agent, which, on the one hand gets related to the sense- of sannikarşa is to be found. Even then since the sāmkhya has defined organ in contact with the object (arthasamyukta indriya) and on the perceptual knowledge as definite cognition received through the sense- other hand, gets related to the soul. Hence, the soul becomes con- organ in contact with the object, the nature of this contact must be nected with the object through the functioning of the mind and the examined fully as in this system too, it does not seem to be possible sense-organ. Further, mind is eternal and not a product according to have perception of the substance, quality, jati etc., by one form of to this school. So, there is no need to assume any other tattva as sannikarşa only. There are some interpreters1 who have made an the samavāyi karaņa of the mind. If atma, mind, sense-organ and the attempt to enumerate different forms of sannikarsa which may be object remain present and there is relation among them, then know- justifiably held from the Samkhya point of view. ledge arises immediately without the intervention of any other tattva. Samyoga-sannikarşa : According to Krishnavallavacarya, samyoga The position of Sāmkhya is different. Sämkhya recognizes should be supposed to operate in the perception of the substances tādātmya between substance and quality. So, if the soul is regarded like earth, water etc. as the substratum of the non-eternal vrttijñāna (phenomenal know- Samyukta-tādatmya: When we are to perceive the smell of the earth, ledge, which will then become a quality of the soul) then this change- the form of sannikarsa that produces this perception is samyukta- able and non-eternal phenomenal knowledge will spoil the non- tādātmya. There is samyoga between the nose and the earth. Smell, changeable and eternal nature of the ätman. So, the soul cannot be being the quality of the earth is related to the earth by way of iden- the pramāta or the substratum of vrttijnāna. The Samkhya has, tity. Hence, samyukta tādātmya is the sannikarsa by means of which therefore, admitted caitanya prativimbita buddhi (buddhi through smell of the earth is perceived. which consciousness is reflected) as the substratum and pramātā of Samyukta-tadāma-tādātmya : This sannikara is involved in the knowledge. Buddhi is the first evolute of Prakrti and it is essentially perception of that aspect of the thing which is in tadātmya relation sāttvika in nature. So, consciousness can be reflected through buddhi with that perceived by samyukta tādātmya. The universal of the

in a full and clear form. smell of the earth is to be perceived by means of this sannikarsa. Sattvapradhana buddhi reaches the object through the sense-organs The earth is samyukta with the nose, the smell of the earth is in and assumes the form of the object. There can be no real relation tādātmya relation with the earth and the universal of the smell is between purusa and the object from the point of view of the Sämkhya- school. Purușa is mere illuminating consciousness. It simply reveals again in tādātmya relation with the smell. Tādātmya relation is used in perceiving pleasures, pains etc., whatever is placed before it. It is buddhi which is close to purușa caitanya and not the object. So, buddhi is directly receiving reflection through buddhivrtti. from the self. Hence the object can be revealed only if it can impart Universals of pleasures, pains etc., are to be perceived by tādātma- tādātmya relation. its form to buddhi which becomes related to it through the sense- These are the sannikarsas expounded in Kiranāvalī tīkā on Tattva- organs. Hence there is the need for buddhivrtti in the epistemology of the Sämkhya-school. It is the vrtti which is directly revealed. The kaumudī. Here, we may add that Tādātmya sannikarșa can also be operative in the perception of sound because sound, being a quality object is revealed only indirectly through the vrtti. Vrtti, therefore, of ākāśa (ether) is in tādātmya relation with the latter (ether). The becomes the direct object of knowledge according to Sāmkhya organ of hearing is pervaded by ether and so there is tādātmya whereas according to the Nyäya-school, it is the object which is relation between the sound and the organ of hearing.

directly revealed in knowledge. The universal of sound, on the other hand, can be perceived by Sannikarsa: The Nyāyavaiseșikas, the Mīmāmsakas, the Vedāntists tadātma-tādātmya sannikarșa. have admitted different forms of sannikarsa, to account for the perception of different objects. It is true that in none of the original 1Krishnavallabacarya Swami Narayan, the author of Kiranāvali tika on Sämkhyatattvakaumudī.

32 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Epistemology 33

It is, of course, true that Samkhya does not agree with the Nyāya- eye, for instance is capable of receiving only the rūpa (form) of the vaiśesika in holding that substance, quality, action, jāti etc. are different categories. On the other hand, according to Samkhya-school, object and not anything else. Had samyoga been only sannikarșa for quality, action etc., are related to the substance by way of tādātmya knowing all the aspects of a thing then not only the quality and the universal of quality would have been received directly by the eye relation. So, there is not the acceptance of samavāya in the Nyāya sense in the Sāmkhya. Samavāya has been admitted by the Nyāya- along with the shape of the jar, the eye would also have been able to school as a form of bheda-sambandha (relation of difference) where- know smell, touch etc., of the jar because of its contact with the jar- as tädātmya of the Samkhya-school is a form of abheda (identity) form; It is only the ghatākāra that can be received directly by the sambandha. That samyoga and tādātmya (both singly and in combin- eye due to its contact with the jar; vrtti of the colour of the jar ed form) are capable of serving as sannikarsa for perceiving the (which remains in tādātmya relation with the jar) is of such a nature various aspects of an object seems to be the view of the Samkhya. that it can be received by the eye only in an indirect manner through

Here one may pose the following objection: the mediation of the jar (i.e. by samyukta-tādātmya). Otherwise, Since Sāmkhya has admitted tādātmya or identity between quality the eye is not capable of receiving colour of the jar as it is incapable of receiving smell or touch of the jar. Hence, the law of parsimony and the possessor of quality, between jāti and jātiman, it can, very well be remarked that according to the school, the jar, the quality of has not been violated here by the admission of the different forms of sannikarșa. the jar, and the universal of the quality of the jar can be directly Due to the different forms of sense-object relation, different vrttis perceived through contact (Samyoga) only. If the jar is the same as or prativimbas arise in the sense-organs. These are then presented to its colour and also as the universal of its colour, then one form of sannikarșa will be capable of working in all cases of perception. buddhi through ahamkara as a result of which the intelligised buddhi itself, changes into the forms of the object, thereby producing its What is the use, then of postulating that the colour of the jar is own vrttis. Purusa. then, falsely owns these buddhivrttis in the forms known through the mediation of the jar by samyukta tādātmya and that the universal of the colour of the jar is known through the of knowledge, pleasures and pains because of the operation of non- mediation of the jar by the samyukta-tadātma-tādātmya? When one discrimination and reflection. Buddhivrttis are located in the buddhi and not in purusa. form (i.e., a samyoga) of sannikarsa is enough for serving the purpose in all cases, what is the use of increasing its number? Now, here we may point out another important fact which also needs satisfactory explanation. We have already seen that the eye is To meet this objection, we may point out that tādātmya does not capable of receiving the colour of an object by samyuktatādātmya. mean absolute non-difference (sarvatha-abheda). It means identity in difference. Quantity and number are also qualities of the object which are to be Now, if difference (however little) is admitted between jar and its received by the eye and touch. So far as the eye is concerned, it will know both quantity and number by samyukta tādātmya. colour, then the colour of the jar cannot be directly perceived along with the jar by means of samyoga. Colour of the jar is received by Further, it is a fact that when buddhi comes in contact with the samyukta-tādātmya jar through indriyas, it assumes the form of the jar. Now, jar-form Quantity of the jar (length, breadth etc.) is received by samyukta-tādātmya includes the shape of the jar, smell of the jar etc .; still the eye can Number too is received by perceive only the shape of the jar and not its smell or touch. This is samyukta-tādātmya because a particular sense-organ is capable of receiving one specific impression only. Even if the sense-organ is in contact with other These however, are not perceived simultaneously at one and the aspects of the object (which are not its specific vișayas), still vrttis of same point of time. Perception is gradual. This is so, because three these aspects will not be received by that particular sense-organ. The vrttis are not aroused simultaneously although sannikarșa is equally present in respect of colour, quantity and number. Vrttis are the waves

34 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Epistemology 35

which are caused by the blowing of wind in the form of udbuddha- remain in kaivalyāvasthā or advitīyāvasthā. If there is a plece of vāsanā. The kind of object that the knower is very eager to know cloth on the ground on which jar is absent there is no kaivalyāvasthā is imaged in the vrtti and the object is revealed to the knower. of the ground even though the negation of the jar on the ground will Udbuddha vasanā is the cause that produces successive perception be perceived. How is this to be explained? of colour, quantity and number although sannikarsa is present in To solve this, we can say that the Samkhya-school, too, will have respect of all the three aspects of the object. When the desire to per- to admit that yogyänupalabdhi (non-apprehension of the object which ceive the quantity of the object arises in the mind of the perceiver, is suitable for apprehension) becomes an important aid in giving rise there is the corresponding modification of buddhi resulting in the to the perception of negation. In fact, a suggestion to this effect can immediate awareness of the quantity. Similar is the case with the be found in Kārikā seven where the author of the Sāmkhyakārikā perception of number and the colour. Hence, we find that udbuddha has stated the circumstances under which non-apprehension of the vāsanā plays a very important part in savikalpaka perception. It is object does not mean its negation or non-existence. In other words, perhaps due to this fact that buddhists have admitted nirvikalpaka here, the author is saying that non-apprehension of the object, not

as the only type of valid perception. suitable for apprehension (ayogyānupalabdhi), does not mean non- Sāmkhya does not accept anupalabdhi as a separate source for existence of the object which by implication asserts that yogyānu- knowing negation or abhāva. Abhāva can be known through percep- palabdhi helps us to apprehend abhäva of the object. When there is tion.1 Now, if abhava is to be perceived then it must be perceived a piece of cloth on the ground, the ground is sadvitiya and not through a particular sannikarsa suitable for its apprehension. On the advitīya (kevala); even then ghatābhava will be perceived because basis of Vācaspati's commentary on Sāmkhyakārikā, we can say that of the fact that had the jar been present, it ought to have been per- according to Sāmkhya-school, abhāva can be perceived by Samyukta- ceived. Even the Naiyāyikās who do not admit anupalabdhi as an tādātmya sannikarsa. This is because according to this school nega- independent source of knowledge acknowledge the assistance render- tion of the jar on the ground (bhūtale ghatābhava) is a modification ed by anupalabdhi in the matter of perception of negation.1 of the ground only and not a separate category. (Yato bhūtalasya parināmaviśesādanyaḥ Kaścit ghatābhāva rūpa padārtho nāma Inference

nāstyataḥ pratyakșamiti sambandhaḥ.) Inferential knowledge is that knowledge in which the modification Of course, the word pariņāma generally refers to kārya pariņāma of the buddhi in the form of the inferred object occurs in the absence only. Here, abhāva is a special kind of pariņama which is different of the contact between the external sense organ and the object. Here,

from kārya-pariņāma. the middle term (limga) is perceived and the major term is inferen- Pariņāma, according to Sāmkhya, may be dharma parināma, tially apprehended through its relation to the middle term. lakșaņa pariņāma and avasthā pariņāma. When there is the absence In the Sāmkhyakārikā, inference is defined as limga-limgīpūrvakam of the jar on the ground, there is only ground as such. This is known which amounts to saying that limga-limgipūrvakam jñānamanu- as Kaivalya lakșanovastha pariņāma of the ground because at this mänam. In other words, according to Sämkhya, inference is based point of time, ground exists as ground only (kevalātmataya). Hence, on two things: there will be samyoga between the eye and the ground. There is 1. Knowledge of vyāpti (Vyāpya-Vyapaka jnānapūrvakam) tādātmya between the ground and its Kaivalyāvasthāparinama. So The knowledge of the hetu as invariably & unconditionally this kaivalyāvasthā or abhāvāvastha of the ground will be perceived related to the major term.

by samyukta-tādātmya sannikarșa. 2. Knowledge of the presence of limga as a dharma of the pakșa Here, one may legitimately point out that when abhāva of a parti- cular object is perceived, the adhikaraņa (locus) does not always 1 Bhāşāpariccheda, Muktavali tīkā Karika 62, Atra abhāvapratyakșe yogyā- nupalabdhiḥ kāraņam .... Sā ca pratiyogisattva -- prasanjana-prasan-jita- 1Tattvakaumudī on Kārikā, Evamabhāvo, pi pratyakșameva. pratiyogikatvarūpā.

36 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Epistemology 37

(minor term). (Pakșadharmatā jñānapūrvakam) Although the word limgī has not been repeated in the kārikā, still is caused by the relation between the sense-organ and the object. by the word limgi, we are to understand the minor term as well.1 In śabda pramāņa also, there is buddhi vyāpāra ; but in this case Pakșadharmatājñāna and vyāptijñāna, taken together, lead to the the modification of buddhi in the form of the object is due to inferential knowledge. There is no need for the third limga parā- vākyārtha jñāna. Hence, śabda pramāņa is different from both per- marśa of the Nyäya-school. According to Sāmkhya, it is the vrtti ception and inference. Vijñānabhiksu has remarked : 'Pratiban- which is to be treated as kāraņa or pramāņa because it is through dhadriśaḥ pratibadhajñānamanumānam' (SPB, 1-100). 'Pratiban-

vrtti that object-knowledge arises. dha' refers to vyäpti and knowledge of vyāpaka arising from the Of course, vyāptijñāna is generally regarded as the karaņa: this knowledge of vyåpti is inference. does not, however, interfere with the Sämkhya recognition of vrtti Nature of Vyapti : Regarding the nature of vyäpti, the knowledge as the karana. If caitanya-prativimbita-buddhi-vrtti (buddhi vrtti of which is absolutely necessary for anumiti prama, it has been held through which there is reflection of consciousness) is to be regarded by the followers of the Samkhya-school that this vyapti should be as pramā, then it is logical to admit vrtti as the karaņa of valid always anaupādhika (unconditional) in nature. Conditional vyāpti knowledge. Nevertheless, vyāpti jñāna, too, may be admitted as can never serve as the basis of inference. The middle term or the karaņa, since vrtti is due to vyāpti jñāna. It is because vrtti caused hetu must have a natural universal relation with the major term; by vyapti jñāna (vyāpti jñānajanyavrtti) is regarded as a karaņa, otherwise, the middle term cannot be the indicator of the presence there is no harm in describing vyāpti jñāna as the karaņa of the of the major term in the minor term in all cases. In the words of

inferential knowledge. Vācaspati Miśra, we can say “Śamkita-samāropitopādhi nirākara- In arriving at the inferential knowledge 'Parvato Vahniman', there ņena ca svabhāvapratibaddham vyāpyam yena pratibaddham tad- is, firstly, the paksadharmatā jñāna (i.e., perception of smoke in the vyāpakam."1 hill) and secondly there is remembering of vyäpti in the form "where ("The middle term is that where natural concomitance (with the there is smoke, there is fire". These two, taken together, lead to the major term) has been duly recognized after all suspected and assumed inferential knowledge in the form 'there is fire in the hill'. As soon adventitious accidents have been eliminated: and that with which the as vyāpti is remembered, on perceiving the limga as a dharma of middle term is so concomitant is the major term"-Ganganath Jha), pakșa, buddhi assumes the form of fire. This act of modification of Thus, like the followers of the well-known school of logic (i.e., the buddhi in the form of the object (here the inferred object) is known Nyäya-school) the Samkhya philosophers too, hold that inference is as vyāpāra and pramā arises as a result of this vyāpāra. Here, based on the knowledge of the invariable and unconditional relation knowledge of fire which is nothing but reflection of consciousness between the middle term and the major term. (through the modification of buddhi in the form of fire is anumiti- Kinds of inference : Inference is of two kinds :

pramā (i.e., vahnyākāra buddhi vṛtti). (i) Vītam (viśeșena itam=Jnātam) The vrtti of 'the hill with smoke as its dharma' is perceptual or Vīta form of anumāna is that form in which vyāpti is principally (ii) Avītam. aparokşa whereas vrtti in the form of fire is parokșa. It is because the same consciousness is reflected through both, that there is the (mukhena) arrived at by perceiving the universal co-presence of the

knowledge of fire in the hill. middle term and the major term. "Yatra-dhūmastatra agniḥ (wher- Although there is buddhi vyāpāra in perception, still perception is ever there is smoke, there is fire) is the vyäpti which is arrived at by different from inference as in the case of inference this buddhi perceiving" "yo dhumavān savahnimān yathā mahānasaḥ. When vyāpāra is due to vyāpti jñāna. In perception, this buddhi vyāpāra such a vyäpti serves as the basis of an inference the inference is called a vīta form of anumāna; but, here, we should not think that vīta 1Vācaspati, Tattvakaumudī, Karikā 5, Limgī grahaņam căvartaniyam. Tena Jimgamasyāstiti pakşadharmatā jñānamapi darsitam bhavati. corresponds to kevalānvayi inference only. Vīta also includes that *Tattvakaumudī, commentary on Kārikā 5.

38 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Stuđy Ėpistemology 39

form of inference in which vyäpti is arrived at by both anvaya and differs from Purva-vatanumana in which a specific individual of the vyatireka. The word 'mukhena' simply implies that vyāpti in this inferred object is perceived. case, is based mainly (mukhena) on anvaya sahacāra. This does not, Avītam : Avīta form of anumāna or seșavat anumana is that form however, exclude vypti arrived at by both anvaya and vyatireka.1 which is based on Kevalavyatireki Vyāpti.

Vīta form of inference is again of two kinds : As for example : Pürvavat : In this form of inference, the inferred object is quali- Prithivi itarebhyo jalādibhyo bhidyate gandhvattat fied by such a universal (fire of the hill qualified by fireness) a speci- Yadi tarebhyo na bhidyate na tad gandhavat, Jathā jalam. fic individual of which has been perceived (drsta svalaksaņasāmanya Na ceyam Prithivi gandhābhāvavatī

vişaya). Tasmānna i tarebhedabhāvavatī On perceiving smoke in a hill, we infer the presence of the fire in Here, since the earth is the only thing that possesses smell, we the hill qualified by the universal fireness. The universal 'fireness' is cannot have anvayi-vyāpti like 'yad gandhavat taditara bhinnam' in such that a specific instance of it has been perceived in the kitchen. the absence of examples. Here, vyatirekivyāpti alone is possible. Sāmānya to drstam (adrișța svalakșaņa sāmānyavișayam) Vacaspati Misra has established the non-difference of the cause & In this form of inference, the inferred object is qualified by such a the effect by means of the avita form of inference in which there is universal that no specific instance of it has been perceived. only co-existence of negations (vyatireka sahacāra). When we infer the existence of sense-organ as instrument of per- The cloth is non-different from the threads constituting it ; be- ception, we take the help of samānyatodriștaḥ anumāna. No specific cause it subsists in the threads ; no object differing in its essence instrument in the form of an indriya qualified by the universal from another can subsist in it ; as the cow in the horse; but the 'indriyatva' has been perceived; but, usually generally, it has been cloth subsists in the threads. So- cloth is not different from the that where there is an action, there is an instrument to do that threads. action. For cutting down a tree, an axe is needed. That is to say This is how Vacaspati Miśra has described three forms of infere- that although we have not come across any specific instance of the nce. Gaudapāda, on the other hand, has interpreted pūrvavat, instrument in the form of indriya, still we have perceived specific sāmanyatodrstah and śesavat in a manner which is found in the instances of actions like cutting, writing etc., brought about by Nyāya Philosophy. instruments in the forms of axe, pen etc. Now, perceiving, tasting When both oloud and rain have been seen together before and etc., are actions like the actions of cutting, writing etc. Therefore, the when cloud alone is seen, one infers the coming of rain. This is the actions of perceiving, tasting etc. need instruments and these instru- example of Pūrvavat anumāna. ments are the sense-organs. So, the existence of instrument in the The seşavat anumāna is that form in which from the effect, the form of a sense-organ is established. Here, vyäpti is established bet- cause is inferred. When one finds the river swollen, one infers that ween the middle term "kriya of the form of cutting, writing etc.," there was rain. and the major term 'instrument' like axe, pen etc., necessary to per- Sāmānyatodrstah is the form in which the movement of the sun is form all actions other than psychological actions which generate inferred on seeing changes in the position of the sun. This is because knowledge; but the inferred object is instrument in the form of sense- change in the position of an object is generally noticed when there is organ. This inferred instrument is different in kind from the instru- movement in the object. ment that becomes the sadhya of the vyapti. It is because the inferred Methods of Arriving at Vyapti : From what has been stated before, 'instrument in the form of sense-organs' is such that no specific it follows that according to Sāmkhya also, vyāpti can be obtained by instance of it has been perceived that sāmānyatodriștaḥ anumāna three methods. 1Sarabadhini tīkā on Kārikā 5. Anvayavyapti prādhānyameva kevalam vītatve 1. By perceiving mainly such instances in which there is co-pre- prayojakam; na tu tatra vyatirekavyaptyasattvampyabhi pretamityarthah. sence of the middle term and the major term. (anvayadrstanta)

40 Classical Sāmkhya : A Critical Study Èpistemology 41

2. We have already seen that the expression "anvayamukhena" does not exclude the perception of vyatireki examples. Further, the then there is tadätmya between the two. There is tādātmya relation avīta form of anumāna is a kevalavyatireki inference. So, the between simsapa and tree, because both of them co-exist in the same Sāmkhya Philosophers have minimised in no way the importance of locus "treeness". So, the vyäpti, in the form of "All simsapas are the perception of vyatireki instances. There is, therefore, full justi- trees" will be an invariable and unconditional one. fication for holding that vyāpti can be obtained by anvaya-vyatireka Some orthodox systems take the help of tarka and āgama to method also. Perception of both anvaya drstānta and vyatireka eliminate doubt (samaśya) which may arise even after the examina- tion of anvaya sahacāra and vyatireka sahacāra has been done. If drstānata, thus, constitutes the second method for arriving at vyāpti. through a thorough investigation, upadhi or any contrary instance is

(Anvaya-vyatireki method) not discovered, then the relation between vyāpya and vyāpaka will 3. Kevala vyatireki method is the third method by means of be regarded as niyata, avyabhicarita and anaupādhika. Such a vyāpti which the vyäpti which forms the basis of avita form of inference, is will serve as the basis of inference.

obtained. It should, however, be remembered that tarka is taken recourse to We have seen that in the opinion of Vācaspati Miśra vyāpti is to be established by removing all suspected and accidental upādhis. only when doubt arises even after the observation of sahacāra and Upādhi-nirāsa (removal of upādhis) is the most essential require- non-observation of vyabhicāra between vyāpya and vyāpaka. Where doubt can be removed by some other means, tarka is not needed. ment that is to be specially fulfilled when one proceeds to establish the vyāpya-vyapaka sambandha. Truly speaking, vyāpti sambandha is not established by means of tarka but the vyāpti already arrived at, is strengthened by tarka Since upādhi-nirāsa is essential for establishing vyāpti according when it helps us to eliminate upādhis. to Sämkhya, we can say that the Sämkhya is more in favour of applying methods in the manner of Mill's experimental methods Śabda than in the manner of his method of Induction per simple enumera- Śabda, as a source of knowledge, is to be considered after inferen- tion. This is because upādhi-nirāsa can be done in the most satis- ce. This is because the inexperienced person understands the relation factory manner by perceiving anvaya drstāntas and vyatireka drstān- between the word and its meaning by means of inference. It is only tas in different places and under different circumstances. If we when the inexperienced person attains the knowledge of the śabdār- collect different instances from different places and find that in none tha that he comes to possess what is known as śābdabodha. of them the relation between the two phenomena under consideration Āptavacana refers to vākyārtha-jñāna and āptaśruti refers to right is brought about by any third thing, then we can more conclusively revelation. Revelation stands for the knowledge of a sentence which say that the relation between the said phenomena is anaupādhika. is produced by the sentence. It is to bring about such an effective elimination of upädhis that Valid assertion, according to sāmkhya is an independent source of

the buddhists have mentioned. knowledge. It is valid because it originates from the words of the

(1) Kārya-kārana relation. vedas which, being apauruseya, is free from all defects which are

(2) tādātmya relation. noticeable in the composition made by human beings. Knowledge, (1) If we can prove that there is cause-effect relation between two derived from itihäsa and smrti, which are based on the vedas, should things, then there is bound to be niyata sahacāra relation between also be regarded as valid. them. The cause-effect relation is such that the effect cannot exist Gaudapāda, however, divides this mode of knowing into two sets without the cause, so cause-effect relation can serve as vyāpti because -ācāryas and śruti (āpta-ācārya brahmā-dayaḥ śrutirvedaḥ āptaśca the cause, can serve as the mark for inferring the effect and the śrutiśca āptaśrutih). effect, too, can serve as a mark for inferring the cause. (2) When two things co-exist in the same locus (samānādhi karaņa) If Väcaspati's interpretation is accepted, then one may feel diffi- culty in including in ägama the teachings of Kapila who was a siddha

42 Classical Sāmkhya : A Critical Study Ëpistemology 43

purușa. Vācaspati, himself, has solved this problem. Kapila, accord- ing to Väcaspati, did not teach anything original. He simply Upamâna remembered the revealed texts which he had studied in his previous Upamāna has been defined by the Nyaya in the following manner: births. Hence, what he taught was really apauruseya and not pauru- "Prasiddhasādharmyatsadhyasadhanamupamānam." To be more șeya. This explanation may seem to us mythical and irrational. explicit let us take the oft-quoted assertion, "As the cow, so is the Gaudapāda's interpretation may be considered as logical and apt. If gavaya" (yathā gaustathā gavayaitī). This assertion gives the in- ācāryas can be regarded as äptas, then the teachings of Kapila can experienced person a knowledge of the resemblance between the cow very well be regarded as äpatavacan. A little reflection will make us and the gavaya. It is due to this vākyārtha jñāna that he understands feel that this interpretation cannot be accepted from the point of the animal bearing resemblance with the cow as gavaya, although he view of the Sämkhya-school. If teachings of äcaryas are to be regar- is seeing the animal for the first time. This assertion, namely, "yatha ded as a reliable source of knowledge, then the teachings of Gautama gaustathā gavaya iti" helps the inexperienced person to understand as well as of Mahavira cannot be held as unreliable and faulty. It is, the relation between the name 'gavaya' and the animal denoted by for this reason, that Vacaspati has understood by aptavacana vedic this name. (Samjñā-samjñi sambandha). This knowledge of the teachings only which are not the results of human efforts. Kapila relation between samjña and samjñi is what is called upamitijñāna: only remembered what he had learnt in his past lives. Teachings of the knowledge of the similarity between the cow and the gavaya Kapila are not his original composition. The fact that the vedic brought about by the assertion 'yathā gaustatha gavayaiti is the truths learnt by Kapila in his past lives were remembered by him in karaņa of this upamiti jñana. This is how the Nyaya-school has the age in which he was born, could not be regarded as absurd ; understood the nature of upamāna as the source of our upamiti psychical research society, today, is trying to explain such rare jñāna.

experiences which are not normal. According to Samkhya, however, upamāna is not an independent Buddhistic philosophers do not admit śabda as a source of know- source of knowledge. 'Vakyartha jñana' produced by the assertion ledge. This view is not justifiable because valid testimony as a source 'yathā gaustatha gavaya iti' is purely verbal. As soon as the in- of knowledge is resorted to by all human beings in their day-to-day experienced person hears this sentence, relevant buddhi vrtti is dealings. If we do not believe in the validity of the utterances of our immediately formed. It is this buddhi vrtti which is the pramana and teachers and experienced persons we shall never be able to learn not the assertion, 'as the cow, so is the gavaya.' The knowledge that anything and we shall never be able to reap the benefit of our elder's the term gavaya is denotative of the animal similar to the cow is experiences. It is, of course, true that on many occasions what is purely inferential. The inferential process is like this: learnt from a so-called reliable person turns out false, but this un- Gavaya is a term which is qualified by pravrttinimitta of the form fortunate fact should not minimise the importance of valid testimony of gavayatva. as a source of learning in human-life. Inferences also, are very often, As there is no other vrtti like lakșanā etc., the term gavaya is used proved to be untrue; still inference is regarded as a source of know- by the experienced persons only in the case of an animal qualified by ledge by every school of philosophy excepting the Cārvāka school. gavayatva. Just as to make our inference valid, we try to establish a valid vyāpti If a term devoid of all other vrttis, is used in a particular sense between the vyapya and the vyāpaka by eliminating all upādhias, in only, then that term (here gavaya) becomes the pravrtti nimittaka of the same manner to make our śabdajñana valid, we should try to that sense (here gavayatva). test the äptatva of the äptas in a very strict and convincing manner. Generally, in inferential knowledge, sāmānya sādhya (major term If the äptatva of the āpta purușa is proved to be beyond doubt, then in the form of universal) is established on the basis of samānya the utterances of such a purusa can very convincingly be relied vyāpti. When on perceiving smoke, fire is inferred, it is the 'universal fire'

upon. which is established in a particular place.

44 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Epistemology 45

In such a case, by means of inference, we can only say that the without the supposition of some unperceived fact is known as term gavaya has got some pravrtti-nimitta but the fact that this upapādya: the unperceived fact which is presumed to explain the pravrttinimitta is to be had in gavayatva only, cannot be established given fact is known as upapādaka. We cannot explain the absence of by means of the type of anumana mentioned above. Sabda, on the a living person in his residence without supposing that he is present other hand, helps us to know that 'similarily with the cow' is the elsewhere. The absence of the living man in his residence is what is 'pravrtti-nimitta' in the case of the term gavaya. That 'gavayatva' is called upapādya. The presence of the living person elsewhere is, the pravrtti-nimitta of the term 'gavaya' is not made known to us therefore, the upapadaka without the supposition of which upapādya

by śabda. cannot be explained. Here, upapadya jñana which is the cause of the Perception, by itself, can only reveal to us an animal having presumption of upapādaka is the pramāņa and upapādaka jñāna resemblance with the cow. It is only when perception is aided by which results from this pramāņa is the arthāpatti pramā. śabda that we come to have a perceptual knowledge of the animal Now, according to Sāmkhya, arthapatti can be reduced to a form bearing the name of gavaya and also of gavayatva as the pravrtti- of inference. Inference can be of this form:

nimitta. If a living being is absent from home he is present elsewhere. Since perception, inference (in the sense mentioned above) and Living caitra is not at home. sabda cannot give us the knowledge of the relation between the term .. Living caitra is elsewhere. gavaya and the animal that is denoted by the term and is also quali- If anybody says that the anvaya vyapti of the form "whenever a fied by gavayatva which is its pravrtti-nimitta, upamāna has been person is not present at home, he is present elsewhere (i.e., universal regarded as an independent source of knowledge by the Nyaya-school. relation of concomitance between a living man's absence from home Now, apart from the type of inference already mentioned, there is and presence elsewhere) cannot be established in the absence of posi- also another form of inference by means of which a viśesa sādhya tive instances, to serve as the basis of an anvayi anumāna, then this (sādhya as a particular) can be established even on the basis of can be proved by a vyatireki anumāna which has been recognized by sāmānya vyāpti. Where 'itarabādha' is possible, sādhya established the Samkhya school. Inference, in that case, will be as under : on the basis of vyāpti is a particular one. For example, if in a parti- If a living being is present at home, he is not elsewhere cular place, coal is known to be the only fuel in the absence of other Caitra is absent from home forms of combustibles, then on seeing smoke, one can very well infer So Caitra is elsewhere. that there is that particular fire which is generated from coal only. Here vyäpti is of the form "where there is no absence from home This is the type of inference which has been already mentioned in in the case of living beings, there is no presence elsewhere" for the place where we have explained how the Samkhya attempts to prove which instances can be collected from living persons who are not inferentially the fact that the term 'gavaya' is used by the experienced absent from home and for that reason are not present elsewhere. persons only in the case of an animal qualified by 'gavayatva.' In the opinion of the Samkhya-school, living caitra's non-existence Of course, nowhere in the available commentaries of the Sāmkhya- in the house is not contradictory to his existence elsewhere. Non- kārikā this type of inference has been mentioned. Even then, there existence of living caitra in his house does not wipe out his existence. is no harm in supposing that the Samkhya philosophers were cogni- Existence and non-existence are contradictory terms but non-existen- sant of this form of inference as it is the form of inference which can ce in the house and existence in general are not to be regarded as fulfill the function of upamana in the most satisfactory manner. contradictory to each other. Generally, if any school of Philosophy admits vyatireki anumāna

Arthāpatti as valid, then it can very well reduce arthāpatti to a form of inference. Arthāpatti may be defined as 'upapādya jñāna prabhavam upa- Vedānta and the Bhatta-school of Mīmāmsa do not accept vyati- pādaka jnanamarthapattih.' The given fact which cannot be explained reki anumāna as valid. According to them, negation is to be known

46 Classical Sāmkhya : A Critical Study Epistemology 47

by means of a separate source of knowledge which, they term, as already been explained in connection with the exposition of percep- anupalabdhi. Hence both the schools have included arthapatti in the tion as a source of knowledge.

list of pramānas as an independent source. Probability : Probability also is a case of inference. The heavier The Prabhakara-school of Philosophy, however, has admitted weight of khäri has been found to be invariably associated with the arthäpatti as an independent source of knowledge although this lighter weights of dron etc. It is this invariable relation that helps school has not recognised an independent status of anupalabdhi one to infer the existence of the lighter weights in the heavier weights. pramāņa. Prabhakara's analysis of arthāpatti is different. Suppose a person possesses prior knowledge of the living condition of Deva- Rumour datta by some other means : he then perceives that Devadatta who Rumour, generally, appears in the form of "such and such things generally remains at home is not in his residence. This arouses a sort have been said by such and such persons". Here, when the original of doubt in his mind regarding the living state of Devadatta. The source is not known, this knowledge is not a valid knowledge. When absence of Devadatta, thus, throws the man into a doubtful state of the original source is found out and is known to be trustworthy, it mind in respect of the existence of Devadatta. To remove this doubt becomes a case of śabda jñāna. he has to imagine that Devadatta is elsewhere. Here, the perceived fact (i.e., absence of Devadatta in the house) is not by itself inexpli- VALIDITY AND INVALIDITY OF KNOWLEDGE cable ; this perceived fact gives rise to a doubt regarding his previous Knowledge which is revelation of reality may do its function either knowledge of the living condition of Devadatta. It is for the removal in a true manner or in a manner which is false. When reality is of this doubt that there is the presumption of the unperceived fact. revealed truly, knowledge is called Prama and when this revelation is Arthāpatti, thus, cannot be admitted as a form of anumāna as in faulty it is treated as aprama. In the sphere of epistemology, there- no form of inference, an element of doubt is ever present. The per- fore, two important questions arise when we make an approach to ceived middle term never produces doubt in the mind of the perceiver reality through knowledge. regarding its existence. Hence, arthāpatti has to be made use of as a These are : source of knowledge when such a sort of doubt is to be eliminated. 1. How does validity or invalidity arise in knowledge ? Here, although Prabhakara's contention is that the doubt in 2. How is validity or invalidity of knowledge known to us ? question arises in regard to the living condition of Devadatta only and not in regard to Devadatta's non-existence in the house (which The View of advaita-vedānta will be the middle term in the inference) still we can point out that The advaita-vedānta believes in the intrinsic validity (svataḥ prām- there is an element of doubt in respect of Devadatta's existence as āņya) and extrinsic invalidity (Parataḥ a prāmāņya) of knowledge. well. Unless Devadatta's vahir satta (existence elsewhere) is samsa- Knowledge is intrinsically valid and it is also known to be valid by yātmaka (doubtful), there cannot be any doubt regarding his living its own intrinsic conditions. Cognition is self-revealed. A particular state. Hence arthäpatti can be reduced to form of inference in which knowledge reveals not only its existence but also its truth. The same a sandigdha sādhya will be established. The vyāpti will be of this set of conditions from which knowledge arises, also constitutes its form 'whenever a living person is not present elsewhere, he is not validity. Hence, knowledge and also its validity are revealed simul- absent from home'. For this, instances can be collected even from taneously. In actual life, we do find that as soon as there is know- the life of the person who is making this generalisation. ledge, it is accepted as valid, and we proceed to act immediately on The sämkhya has not accepted anupalabdhi as the source through the basis of that knowledge. It is, therefore, quite reasonable for us which negation can be cognized. This is because abhāva has been to believe that the truth of a knowledge and the knowledge of the accepted by them as an object of perception. We can perceive abhāva truth of that knowledge are revealed to us by the same conditions through samyukta-tādatmya sannikarșa. The whole process has which produce knowledge. Just as jñanatva is natural to knowledge,

48 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Epistemology 49

in the same way prāmāņya, too, is natural to knowledge when know- to explain the Samkhya-position. This is because in the opinion of ledge is vitiated, it is vitiated simply by conditions, external to the Sämkhya, it is the excessive flow of tamoguna of the buddhi that itself. When conch-shell is perceived as silver, it is the śuktitvapra- functions as ajñana or avidyā in producing invalidity in knowledge. kāraka avidyā which is causing the illusion. This śuktitvaprakāraka So, the generating condition of invalidity is inherent in the conditions avidyā is an adventitious positive entity (āgantuka bhāva kāraņa). which are causing knowledge (jñāna karaņa sāmagrī). Here, one may

Nyāya View raise an objection by saying that the excess of tamoguna, being the According to Nyāya, both validity and invalidity are externally cause of invalidity, cannot be inherent in the generating conditions caused. In perception, contact of the sense-organs with a large of knowledge; because the 'excess flow' means that there is some- number of parts is the generating condition of validity. In the infe- thing more than the knowledge producing conditions. Hence, this ex- rential knowledge, "sallinga parāmarśa" is the required condition cess flow of tamoguna is something outside the generating conditions whereas in śabda, the character of the äpta serves as the generating of knowledge. Aprāmānya should, therefore, be regarded as parataḥ. condition of prāmānya. The generating condition of invalidity in per- This objection, too cannot stand. If the excess flow of tamah is to be ceptual knowledge will, therefore, be the contact of the sense-organs regarded as a condition external to the generating conditions of know- with a smaller number of parts, in inferential knowledge, defective ledge, then the excess flow of sattvaguna, needed for producing valid- ity in knowledge, may also be regarded as external to the knowledge limga parāmarśa and in the case of śabda, untrustworthiness of the producing conditions. In that case, both validity and invalidity are to

purușa etc. be regarded as paratah in regard to their origination in knowledge.

Sāmkhya View Analysed In the case of invalid knowledge, like the knowledge of silver in a The position of Sāmkhya is unique among orthodox systems be- conchshell, the vrtti of 'this' (idam vrtti) is pratyaksa vrtti and this is also sadvastuvrtti. The vrtti in the form of silver (rajatākārā vrtti) cause it has asserted not only the self-validity of knowledge but has also held that invalidity is intrinsic in knowledge. Both validity and however, originates due to combined operation of rajatavāsanā and invalidity are inherent in knowledge in regard to origination. Both non-discrimination (vivekāgraha) between 'conchshell' and 'silver'. jñāna and ajñāna are inherent in buddhi. Ajñāna is not negation of Here, two vrttis are generated simultaneously; but as there is the knowledge but it is confused knowledge due to non-discrimination reflection of the same consciousness though two vrttis, there is the between two different things. The confusion in perception, is due to generation of one cognition in the form "This is silver". Here, the defects are 'rajatavāsanā' and non-discrimination between the conch- improper suppression of tamoguna which is an ingredient of know- shell and the silver. These are positive but not adventitious. These ledge. Sattva, rajas and tamas which are necessary for generation of knowledge, are also the factors which generate validity and invalidity are the effects of the excess flow of tamoguna. The Samkhya School has admitted tädätmya between the cause and the effect, dharma and by means of proper and improper suppression of tamoguna by the sattvaguņa. dharmī (quality and the possessor of quality). So, vivekāgraha and the desire for the object (which is not present on that occasion) are When the conchshell is truly revealed in knowledge, there is tadva- non-different from the tamoguna of knowledge which is a disposition titat prakāraka vrtti' in the intellect (i.e., there is sadvastu vrtti) of buddhi. The result is that all the factors necessary for generating which is the pramana and the illumination of this vrtti by conscious- invalidity in knowledge are also inherent in the generating conditions ness of the soul is the pramā. Prāmānya of this prama is not generated of knowledge. Suktitva prakāraka avidyā of the advaita-vedānta and by any adventitious positive entity. In the case of valid knowledge, contact with a small number of parts of the object of perception, there is the arousal of sat indriya and sat buddhi vrtti due to excessive flow of tamoguna. Hence, the knowledge (i.e., revelation of vrtti) is defective, limgaparāmarśa, untrustworthiness etc, are all conditions valid. The supposition of śuktitva prakāraka avidyā is not necessary external to knowledge-producing conditions. Hence, in the opinion of in the same way prāmānya, too, is natural to knowledge. When

50 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Epistemology 51

the advaita-vedanta and the Nyāya, invalidity in knowledge is exter- the suppression of tamas is done in a proper manner, there is excess nally caused. According to Sāmkhya, however, both rajatavāsanā and flow of sattva and the consequent arousal of knowledge and its vali- vivekägraha are inherent in knowledge. Hence, invalidity is svataḥ dity. If the suppression is not done properly, then there is the excess of

in regard to its origin. tamoguna and the consequent origination of invalidity in knowledge. Regarding the second question (i.e., how validity or invalidity is We have already seen that 'excess' cannot be regarded as external known) we can say that the natural tendency of man is to accept any to knowledge producing conditions, because in that case both vali- and every kind of knowledge as valid as soon as it arises. Hence, in dity and invalidity will become paratah. the case of valid knowledge, there is no extra factor (other than the Further, buddhi is changing from moment to moment and so it is factors needed for the generation of knowledge and its validity) to becoming different at every moment. Similar is the case with know- make its validity known to the knower. The intrinsic conditions ledge. This difference, however, is not treated as a condition external which produce a valid cognition, also produce the knowledge of the to the knowledge-producing ones.

validity of that cognition. Now, vivekāgraha is not a negative condition because this has been

These in trinsic conditions are as under : described as khyāti and avidyā in the yoga-sūtra; it is that which

1. Indriya vrtti due to karaņa vyāpāra. causes "ekamevadarsanam" of two different things. This is not

2. Buddhi vrtti. merely vivekābhava (negation of discrimination). On the other hand, 3. No confused perception of sadasat vrtti as one, due to excess this is a positive abhedagrahana of two similar things.

flow of sattvaguņa. Since, vivekāgraha is positive, it has got to be destroyed (the des- When these factors operate, valid vrtti or valid knowledge is pro- truction of vivekāgraha results in the apprehension of invalidity of a duced and is also immediately known as valid. It is because the vali- particular cognition) by some other positive fact. It is only when the dity is known immediately by the same set of conditions that the cogni- annihilating factor comes into operation that aprāmānya (invalidity) zer proceeds to act as soon as a particular cognition arises in his mind. of a particular cognition is ascertained. Hence, invalidity is known Regarding the knowledge of invalidity, however, we cannot say by a condition which is external to the conditions generating know- that the factors which are responsible for the generation of the ledge and its invalidity. This external, annihilating and positive con- knowledge and its invalidity are also the factors which make its in- dition is the production of unsuccessful effects in the external world validity known to the cognizer. In the case of invalid knowledge the by acting on the basis of that knowledge. So the occurrence of 'samvādīpravrtti pratīkūlatā' is necessary for making invalidity of the

as follows : intrinsic conditions which produce knowledge and its invalidity are cognition known to the cognizer. Origination of unsuccessful results

1. Indriya vrtti due to operation of karaņas. takes place in the external world. The positive annihilating condition 2. Buddhi vrtti of an unreal object along with a real one due to the is, therefore, neither internal, nor is it included in the generating con-

awakening of a desire for the unreal object. ditions of knowledge. Hence, we can say that according to Sāmkhya,

3. Vivekägraha of the real and the unreal. aprāmānya is svatah in regard to origination but parataḥ in regard Both vivekāgraha and the desire for the unreal object are the to its cognition. effects of the tamoguna resulting from the improper overpowering of It is not proper to say that if invalidity is svatah, then there can tamoguna, by the sattvaguna. As such these two factors are non-diffe- be no activity at all. Had Samkhya held that invalidity is known by rent from the tamoguna which is in excess. Knowledge is always pro- the same set of conditions which generate knowledge and its invali- duced when the tamoguna of the buddhi is overpowered by the dity, then this objection could have some value. In that case, we sattvaguņa. In fact, adhyavasāya or knowledge stands for the proper could have said that invalidity would, therefore, be known to us predomination of the sattvaguna in buddhi resulting from the proper simultaneously with knowledge. Since, in our previous discussion, suppression of tamas brought about by the operation of the karaņas. If we have tried to prove paratah jñapti of invalidity there is no diffi-

52 Classical Samkhyo: A Critical Study Èpistemology 53

culty in holding that invalid knowledge too, can give rise to karma- when arises is treated as invalid. Pramāna is uncontradicted know- pravrtti (inclination to act). When knowledge originates, the knower ledge which possesses 'arthakriyā kāritva (pramāņam avisamvādī is not aware of its invalidity. It is the awareness of invalidity of a jnānam arthakriyā sthitiḥ avisamvādanam etc., Dharma kirtti, pramāņa- particular knowledge that really prevents the knower from acting vārttika) according to that knowledge. Invalidity is to be known by the exter- The two characteristics, namely, uncontradictedness and artha- nal condition in the form of the creation of unsuccessful effects. In kriya karitva, are to be verified in practice. So long as they are not other words, invalidity of a cognition becomes known to us only verified, knowledge is not treated as valid. The condition like

when it is applied in practical life. avisambāditva (which is equivalent to arthakriyā kāritva) cannot be So far as available texts of the classical Samkhya are concerned, included in the generating conditions of knowledge; because in that there is practically no discussion about the validity and the invali- case, all knowledge will be avisambādī and arthakriyā kari and will dity of knowledge both in respect of origination and apprehension. leave no room for visambādī knowledge. So, according to the Iț was probably Sucarita Misra who for the first time, declared that buddhistic school, validity is extrinsic. When this school says that the Samkhya was in favour of accepting both validity and invalidity invalidity is intrinsic, it does not seem to mean anything more than as svatah. Since then, it has become customary to hold that the the non-arousal of the certainty about the avisamvādī and arthakriyā Samkhya School believes in intrinsic validity and intrinsic invalidity kārī nature of a cognition at the very moment of its inception. In in knowledge. Whether this 'svatasta' is in regard to utpatti (origina- other words, at this moment, there is no cognition of the form "This tion) or in regard to jñapti (apprehension) or in regard to both, has cognition is valid". This lack of certainty about the validity of a

not, however, been clearly discussed by anybody. cognition does not prevent any man from doing actions on the In the discussion held so far, we have tried to prove that the basis of this knowledge. Sämkhya School believes in svatoh utpatti and svatah jñaptī in respect The Sämkhya position is, however, different. According to this of the validity of cognition, but in respect of invalidity the said school, validity is svatah in respect of both origination and appre- school believes in svatah utpatti and paratah Jñaptivāda. If anybody hension. Hence, it seems to us that if invalidity too is believed to be is inclined to believe that in respect of apprehension of invalidity svatah in respect of both origination and apprehension, then one and also, the Samkhya seems to believe in 'svatasta' then such a view too, the same cognition may be known as both valid and invalid at the can be logically harmonised with the philosophical position of the same time which is absurd.

Sāmkhya School. Now, it is our contention that even if we believe in svatah jñapti The Buddhistic School has admitted that aprāmānya is svatah in in regard to invalidity, the situation will not become so alarming. respect of its apprehension. The philosophers of this school have Truly speaking svaprakāsatva of knowledge means that knowledge also tried to show how practical behaviour is to be explained on the does not need the assistance of any other thing to perform its own recognition of Svatah jñapti of invalidity in knowledge. function (svavyavahära). As soon as there is knowledge, there is In the opinion of the buddhistic philosophers, pravrtti samarthya revelation of object. Inclination to action or refraining from action is the condition that makes us aware of validity in knowledge. When (pravrtti and nivrtti) may originate from revelation of the object knowledge is produced in such a manner that it brings about success- only. Knowledge of validity or invalidity is not necessary for the ful activity, then only, it becomes clear to us that this cognition is arousal of pravrtti and nivrtti. Invalidity, however, (though self- not invalid. Prior to the actual production of successful activity, revealed) may not always be revealed due to the presence of some validity of a cognition cannot be known. Since validity is known by external factors such as distance, dim light, defective organ etc. a posterior condition external to the generating conditions of know- When invalidity thus, remains non-revealed, there may be pravrtti ledge, there was no certainty about its arthakriyā kāritva at the due to revelation of object. In such a situation production of un- moment of its production. Hence, it has been held that knowledge, successful effects makes the invalidity known to the knower. Such a

54 Classical Sämkhya : A Critical Study Epistemology 55

thing happens in the case of illusion. When invalidity is known hot revealed due to presence of dosas. Only the tallness of the object immediately, it is known simultaneously with knowledge. There may is revealed validly and there is the doubt. Where the validity of a be such a case where the perceiver says "The thing before me looks knowledge is revealed simultaneously with its origination, there the like a piece of silver but it is conch shell." Here, the invalidity of generating conditions of the buddhivrtti are not accompanied by the the perception of conch shell as silver is known as soon as there is vitiating factors. Hence, vrtti is revealed properly and is also known

perception. to be so. If there is any pratibandhaka in the process of apprehension, Cognition, to be effective, does not need to be known as valid. then phenomena like doubt, illusion etc., occur in the sphere of Non-apprehension of the invalidity of a particular cognition is suffi- knowledge. Even the objection that if validity and invalidity are cient for inspiring a man to act on the basis of a particular cogni- both svatah in respect of apprehension, then no certain knowledge is tion. Sambādi or visambādi pravrtti does not form a constitutive possible,-may be regarded as a point in favour of svatah jñaptivādā condition of validity or of invalidity; nor does it really make validity of both validity and invalidity of knowledge. The buddhistic school or invalidity known to the cognizer. The true function of the success believes in the svatah jnapti of invalidity only. Hence, an objection . or failure of pravrtti is to confirm the knowledge of validity and is raised to the effect that if invalidity of a cognition is immediately invalidity of cognition. It is only where self-revealed validity and known, then there can be no inclination to act on the basis of that invalidity remain hidden due to some interfering conditions, that knowledge. We do act on the basis of knowledge which is discovered success or failure of actions makes validity or invalidity known, to as invalid only afterwards. Sämkhya, however, is supposed to believe the knower. If one is seeing a piece of rope from a distance, he may in the svatah jñapti of both validity and invalidity of knowledge. So, have a knowledge of this form. "It seems, I am seeing a piece of in this philosophy, there is room for the arousal of doubtful cogni- rope lying at that place ; let me see, if it is really so". Here, validity tion and the doubtful cognition is not unfavourable for the origina- (though svaprakāśa) is grasped only vaguely. Thus, immediate tion of an inclination to act (Doubt never acts as an hindrance to revelation of validity or invalidity depends on the non-presence of pravrtti). doșas (doșābhava) as dosas or interfering conditions which arise silently The Mimamsa believes in the svatah jñapti of validity only and so in the process of the cognition of validity and invalidity prevent the it faces difficulty in explaining the possibility of nisphala pravrtti .. revelation of prāmāņya and aprāmānya in knowledge. Hence, even on (unsuccessful efforts). admission of both validity and invalidity as svatah, there will be If the Sämkhya view, as stated above, is accepted, then the origina- enough scope for the arousal of doubt, illusion etc., in the philosophy tion of doubtful cognition will explain satisfactorily the occurrence of the Sämkhya School. Doubt, in such a case, is to be explained as of both successful and unsuccessful activities. being due to pratibandhakas which prevent the immediate manifesta- Further, particular dharmī may possess a number of characteristics tion of the validity of a cognition. Doubtful cognition is that kind of knowledge, the truth of which has not been ascertained. In doubt- (dharmas). There is no such rule that all the characteristics will ful knowledge, a particular is dharmī revealed truly but its charac- always be revealed along with the revelation of the dharmī. A jar, for example, possesses so many characteristics in the forms of jarness, teristics are not properly ascertained. Regarding the characteristics substantiality, solidity, smell etc. It is quite possible, that at the time .of the dharmi, the mind wavers between the two sets of qualities of the manifestation of the jar, all qualities will not be revealed. In which are simultaneously revived in memory due to similarity. When the same manner, we can suppose that at the time of revelation of we perceive a tall object from a distance but do not perceive the knowledge also, all its characteristics in the forms of jnātatva, pra- peculiar features of the object correctly we have doubtful perception, such as, "Is it a lightpost or a man"? Here, we are definite about mātva, apramātva etc. may not be revealed simultaneously. Hence, the tall object; but whether the tallness of the object is associated even if we believe that validity and invalidity are svatah, in respect of apprehension, still it does not follow that they should always be „with the peculiar characteristics of the post or of a human being, is known immediately as soon as there is knowledge.

56 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Epistemology 57

MEANING OF SVATAHGRAHYATVA IN REGARD TO PRĀMĀNYA AND mulate a definition to define svatahgrähyatva of invalidity in know-

A PRĀMĀŅYA ledge. The buddhists believe in svatah aprāmānyavāda, but they have The Vedāntaparibhaşā has defined svatahgrahyatva of prāmāņya (spontaneous apprehension of validity) in the following words : not attempted to define svatasta of invalidity. "Doşābhāve sati yāvatsvāsrāyagrāhāka sāmagri-grāhyatvam" (Spon- taneous apprehension is the fact of being grasped by the totality DEFINITION OF SVATAHGRĀHYATVA OF APRĀMAŅYA FROM THE of causes that apprehend the substratum of the validity, provided no SAMKHYA POINT OF VIEW

defect is present.) In the Nyāyacintāmani svatahgrāhyatva of validity has been defined The substratum of validity is vrtti jñna and the cause of its cogni- as apprehension of knowledge-apprehending conditions which, are tion (svāsraya grahaka) is the witnessing consciousness or sākșī- incapable of causing apprehension of invalidity in knowledge. By caitanya). When the witnessing consciousness apprebends conscious- following this definition of Nyāyacintāmani, we can formulate a ness manifested in the form of vrtti, it apprehends also the validity definition of spontaneous apprehension of invalidity to suit the pur- of vrttijñāna. According to Sāmkhya, however, the svāśraya grāhaka pose of the Samkhya School. The definition will be as under : caitanya is the consciousness in the form of purusa which is reflected Spontaneous apprehension of invalidity means apprehension of through buddhivrtti. When purusa is revealing the bubdhivrtti which knowledge-apprehending conditions which are incapable of causing is the substratum of validity, it is revealing the latter (i.e., validity) as apprehension of validity in knowledge. If 'spontaneous apprehension well. Here, deficiency, in the flow of sattvaguna and the consequent of validity and invalidity is defined in the manner of Nyāyacin- increase in the tamoguna, will be regarded as dosa. Spontaneous tāmani, then the fear, that one and the same knowledge may be apprehension of validity, therefore, can be defined in the Sāmkhya in both valid and invalid at the same time, can be removed easily from the words which have been used in the vedānta paribhāsa (i.e., doșā- our minds. Validity is apprehended by such knowledge-apprehend- bhāv sati yāvat svāśrayagrāhaka sāmagrī grāhyatyam) ing conditions (jñāna grāhaka sāmagrī) which are agrāhaka of in- According to Vedāntaparibhāșa, thec onditions which cause appre- validity: invalidity is, likewise, apprehended by such knowledge- hension of knowledge, cause apprehension of the validity of know- apprehending conditions which are agrahaka of validity. When the ledge, as well. Even then, validity is not always spontaneously knowledge apprehending conditions contain an excess flow of sattva- apprehended, as in the case of doubt. So, the qualifying word, "dosa- guna they become agrahaka of invalidity. When, on the other hand, bhāve sati" are to be added to the definition of spontaneous appre- knowledge-apprehending conditions contain such a quantity of tamo-

hension of validity. guna which is just sufficient for hiding the true nature of the object The Vedāntaparibhāsā has admitted paratah jñāpti of aprāmānya but insufficient for keeping invalidity unrevealed to the perceiver, because according to the said text, the grāhaka sāmagrī of knowledge these conditions become incapable of causing apprehension of validity: are the conditions only of the apprehension of validity in knowledge. they are, however, capable of causing spontaneous apprehension of These conditions, however, do not cause the apprehension of invali- invalidity. I perceive a piece of rope as a snake but I understand at dity. Invalidity which is extrinsic to knowledge is known through the same time that my perception of the snake is invalid. The real inference. When proceeding to act on a particular cognition, we find object is something else the nature of which has not been revealed to that it does not satisfy our practical need, we infer that it is false. me. Thus, when the grāhaka sāmagrī of prāmānya (in the form of the If we hold the view that the Samkhya like the advaita vedanta excess flow of sattvaguna) is not present, there is no apprehension of believes in paratah jñāpti of knowledge, then the definition of svatah- validity even though there is knowledge : in a similar manner, when grāhyatva of validity only will be sufficient. We have, however, seen the grāhaka sāmagrī of invalidity is not present, there is no appre- that svatahgrahyatva of invalidity too, may be logically accepted from hension of invalidity in knowledge. the samkhya point of view. If this is so, then we shall have to for- While defining the spontaneous apprehension of validity, the vedānta paribhașa has used the qualifying words. "dosabhāva" in the

Classical Samkhya": A Critical Study place of the qualifying statement "absence of the apprehending condi- tion of invalidity" (aprāmānya grāhakābhāva. According to the author of the Vedānta Paribhașa, dosābhāva is not adjective. It is negative and as such, it does not contribute anything from outside towards the Chapter 2

validity of knowledge. Dosa, on the other hand, is treated as an Metaphysics

adjective and as additional factor due to the presence of which, the advaita believes in the paratah jñapti of invalidity. According to the Sāmkhya philosophy both doșa and doşābhāva may be treated as Sāmkhya Approach is based on an Analysis of Human Experience adjectives. These are, however, nothing but excess of tamoguna The Sämkhya system is admitted on all hands as one of the oldest and excess of sattvaguna in knowledge. These are, therefore, not systems of thought, because the seeds from which the Classical

regarded as additional factors. Sämkhya sprung up as a well-knit system are strewn over a vast field Further, the author of the Vedāntaparibhāșā holds that invalidity of philosophic writings of ancient India. The earliest available system- which is the nature of 'tadabhāvavati,' cannot be received directly by atic exposition of the Classical Samkhya is found in the Sāmkhya the vrtti of buddhi; because buddhivrtti is capable of catching directly kārika of Īśvara Krishna; Gaudapāda's commentary on Sāmkhya- the image of that thing only which has a form. Hence, invalidity is kārikā, Vācaspati Misra's Tattvakāumudī, Aniruddha's Vrtti and

to be known through inference. Sâmkhyapravacanabhāșya of Vijñānabhiksu are some of the well- According to Samkhya, abhava can be perceived directly by means known posterior texts on the Samkhya Philosophy. of samyuktatādātmya sannikarșa. That there is no harm in admitting Life in this world (as all of us know) is a ceaseless flow of ex- perceptual knowledge of abhāva by visual organ has been explained perience. It is, therefore, expected that a good Philosophy which fully in the Nyāyamañjarī. It is only in the case of bhāvavastu that seeks to explain the significance of human life in relation to the whole the visual organ cannot perceive a thing without being related to it. universe, should establish its claim to general acceptance by showing This rule does not apply in the case of abhävavastu where even though that it has formulated its theory on the basis of a thorough analysis there is no prāpyakāri sambandha, still the visual organ is capable of experience. of apprehending negation directly. We should however, remember A philosopher, who is a lover and interpreter of life, is unable to that the perception of negation is relative to the perception of its turn his eyes away from the living experiences of every moment; our substratum which should be within the range of vision. So, if abhava reason must fall back upon experience for collecting its own data. If can be regarded as an object of perception, then invalidity which is reason wanders away from experience, it will create a system of dead of the nature of 'tadabhāvavati' can be perceived spontaneously. thoughts, devoid of any touch of life and reality. A thorough analysis of human experience is also the starting point of the Sämkhya Philosophy. Experience is the felt result of the opera- tion of the subtle tattva which is ordinarily imperceptible. Hence, if the tattva is to be known, it can be known through a thorough analysis of experience. Just as a chemist finds out the chemical ingredients by means of analysis of the joint effects produced, by the combined operation of different chemical substances, in the same manner, a philosopher discovers the underlying principles of ex- perience. by means of a thorough analysis of experience. In fact, this process of analysis by means of which the subtle root principles and their essential natures and characteristic effects become manifested,

60 Classical Sāmkhya : A Critical Study Metaphysics 61

has been deemed essential in all the philosophical systems of India. The advaita-vedānta analyses experience and discovers that the being or the sattã of the object. mutable principle involved in experience is false and non-existent Each fact of experience is a being or sattā and this being or exis- from the metaphysical point of view. The discovery of Sāmkhya is, tence constitutes its intelligibility. This intelligibility or existence, however, different. In the opinion of the Sämkhya School, the two therefore, is the ultimate factor in an object of experience and it is fundamental principles, lying at the root of experience, are real. called sattvaguna by the Samkhya philosophers. Puruşa and triguņātmikā Prakrti are not mythical and airy but they Now, the object of experience also possesses certain characteristics are at the very root of the possibility of knowledge or experience. like resistance, impenetrability, shape and form, which are, in fact, Experience is not possible unless there are objects of experience, due to the presence of massiveness in objects. It is because an object body, organs, ego-sense, mind etc., which will constitute the instru- is massive in nature that it can assume shape and can also resist its ments and objects of experience. These are also not enough to bring complete destruction through change allowing only the change of about experience. Experience presupposes consciousness; unless there form. Mass or tamoguna, therefore, is another element present in the is some principle of consciousness, mere unconscious instruments and object besides its sattvaguna or intelligibility. The object undergoes objects are incapable of producing experience. So, the fundamental changes. It changes from form to form. There is no monotonous principles and categories of Sāmkhya were not dogmatically postu- lingering of the same character in any object. This change or move- lated; but they were discovered and accepted after proper analytical ment is due to the presence of another principle which is called

study of experience. rajoguna. Thus, sattva (existence or intelligence stuff), rajas and tamas (mutability and mass) are the three gunas which are responsi-

THEORY OF THE GUNAS ble for all sorts of experience of a purusa. These are objective, The most distinguishing characteristic of the Sāmkhya-system is its ultimate and the irreducible elements of experience. guna theory, which holds that all mental and material objects of this Due to the presence of the sattva element, phenomenal world, are the combinations in different proportions of the an object exists and is intelligible. three ultimate reals which are technically known as triguna. The con- Due to the presence of the raja element, ception of these gunas arose in the minds of these philosophers, the object undergoes changes. undoubtedly as a result of their analysis of our phenomenal con- Due to the presence of the tamas,

sciousness and its objects. the object assumes shape and resists All objects of the world, whether simple or complex, have in them its utter destruction through changes. pure being or sattā (existence) as their ultimate basis and essential These gunas are not the so-called qualities of the vaisésika system stuff. This existence constitutes the intelligibility of an object. Only an because they, themselves, possess the characteristics of lightness, existent object can be related to knowledge and can become intelligible movement and heaviness.1 One quality cannot be thought of as to us. A sky-flower, for example, being devoid of sattā can never be possessing other qualities. These gunas, of course, become seemingly intelligible to anybody. Consciousness is revelation; and if we are to associated with and dissociated from the purusa,2 still they cannot be become conscious of something, then that thing must have sattā or intelligibility by virtue of which it can be revealed as being related to regarded as qualities of the purusa since qualities actually and con- stantly inhere in the substance. So, these gunas are substances consiciousness as its object. When this chair becomes an object of (Dravyas). All objects of the world, both physical and mental, are my consciousness or thought, it becomes so only because it possesses the results of the different permutations and combinations of these intelligibility which is nothing but its capacity of becoming revealed three ultimate reals. Our thoughts and ideas, which seem to possess a as soon as it comes in contact with consciousness. This capacity lies character different from that of the physical world, are not, in fact, in the very being of the object and can very well be identified with the outside the realm of these three gunas. These are as much the effects *The Sāmkhyakārikā, verse 13. *Sāmkhyapravacanabhaşya, 1, 61.

62 Classical Sāmkhya : A Critical Study Metaphysics 63

or the modifications of the ultimate reals as the so-called physical woman. The lovely woman is not merely the assemblage of ideas in things. The only difference lies in the fact that in the mental sphere, some mind as is held by the idealistic philosophers, nor is she abso- the element of sattva predominates, whereas in the sphere of the lutely different from thoughts or feelings, as is ordinarily held by the physical universe, tamoguna becomes the dominating element. Tamo- realistic philosophers. Thought and thing, matter and the so-called in- guna is present in all our ideas of objects, otherwise, these mental tellectual processes do not lie in two absolutely distinct regions; and, products could not assume the forms of their objects in order to therefore, the establishment of any kind of direct action and inter- make possible the experience of an individual. In fact, in every citta- action between them, is not at all difficult. Thus, the correspondence vrtti, the indistinguishable union of the gunas is detectable. (Buddhi between the inner world and the outer world has been satisfactorily vrtti becomes manifested, it assumes the form of its object, and this explained 'by the Sämkhya philosophers on the hypothesis that they needs movement). Our phenomenal consciousness as well as its represent two allied lines of development from a common source, objects are due to the functioning of these three gunas which are the (i.e., the three gunas.). These reals, thus, on their supposition, are

sole productive forces of this universe. neither mental nor physical and in this respect, they remind us of Our experience, however does not possess a cognitive aspect only, the neutral entities of Bertrand Russell. Like those neutral stuff, the it has also a feeling aspect which is more primitive and more per- gunas also get arranged in different relations. When arranged in one vasive than the cognitive one. While analysing the guna concept, way, they appear as mental and when arranged in a different way, Prof. S.N. Dasgupta has shown that feeling formulates the marginal they appear as physical or material. line between thought and matter, the animate and the inanimate. Now, these reals are called gunas because they act as ropes for From feeling complexes, we can easily descend to matter complexes binding purusa and also because they are subordinated to the purușa and from matter complexes, we can go upto feeling complexes very whose interest they serve. smoothly. That is why there is always the likelihood of mistaking a These gunas are infinite in number but they have been brought feeling complex for a matter complex and vice versa. Sāmkhya under three types in accordance with their three different character- Philosophy also does not recognize any rigid distinction between istics.1 When we speak of sattvaguna, we do not mean one substance thought and matter. Both matter and thought are constituted of the only; rather we refer to an infinite number of subtle substances pos- same feeling-substances which form the neutral borderline between sessing the common characteristics of self-shiningness and lumino- them. The gunas are also these feeling substances. Since the whole sity. Similar is the case with rajas and tamas. external world is made up of these elements, each object of cognition These gunas, when they act together for the production of objects, possesses the capacity of producing three different feelings in the exert mutual influence upon one another, and by so doing, they minds of human beings, i.e., pleasure, pain and delusion or indi- bring into existence new qualities and new substances. An object is fference. So, from the point of view of knowledge, these three gunas called sāttvika, rājasika and tāmasa in so far as it represents the are known as sattva, rajas and tamas, but from the point of view of predominance of sattva, rajas and tamas; but even when sattvaguna feeling, they appear as pleasure, pain and delusion.1 A lovely woman, predominates, rajas and tamas remain in conjunction with it, for instance, excites the feeling of pleasure in the beloved person, the although in a subdued form. As soon as the influence of sattva feeling of pain in the co-wife and the feeling of delusion in the dis- weakens, due to some causes, the sahakāri guņas at once become appointed person. This, she can do, simply because she is objectively active and more prominent. In each act of production, these three pleasurable, painful and delusive. In other words, sattva, rajas and guņas become operative, although all of them cannot maintain the tamas, which on the plane of consciousness appear as intelligence- same status quo at the same time. In revelation, it is not sattva alone stuff, energy and mass and on the plane of feeling, as pleasure, pain that is active, but sattva as dominating rajas and tamas. and delusion, have themselves been transformed to create that lovely The gunas, no doubt, possess different characteristics; but while

1Sāmkhyapravacanabhaşya, 1, 127; Sāmkhyakārikā, 12. 1Yogavarttika, chapter, 11-18.

64 Classical Sāmkhya : A Critica l Study Metapbysics 65

they act, there is co-operation or commingling like that of oil-wick and flame.1 If these three are not arranged in proper subordination object-knowledge. It is only when the two get related due to sannidhi and superordination, there will be terrible conflict resulting in chaos that there is the illumination of buddhivrtti or the knowledge of an and confusion. Their proper manipulation, however, will bring about object. creation of new things and new varieties, just as the proper mani- The gunas and the purusas are, thus, the main principles accepted pulation of wind, bile and phlegm contributes to the substance of in the philosophy of the Samkhya. Both the categories are equally eternal, but while the purușas are pure and inactive principles of

the physical body. consciousness, the gunas are the unconscious, ever-changing dyna- When light is produced, it is produced for the enjoyment of some mic energy of the universe. They ceaselessly undergo changes, but conscious being, and not for the benefit of oil, wick and flame. Similar is the case with the conjunction of these gunas. The creativity changes take place in these ultimate constituents in two ways which are known as sarūpa pariņāma and virūpa pariņāma; sarūpa pariņāma of these reals is not an end in itself; on the contrary, it serves as the exists in the state of equilibrium of the three gunas when they exert only means for the attainment of purusa's end. Enjoyment and libe- equal influences without creating any commotion. This state of ration are the purușārthas and the guna stuff creates this ceaseless equilibrium is absolutely indeterminate, undifferentiated and indefi- flow of modifications and complexities for his enjoyment and libe- nite and it is called Prakrti. The word Parināma always implies ration. All products are, therefore, upkaranas for purușa's experience; change or modification which is of the form of action (Kriyātmaka). but the gunas, while creating the realm of experience, do not get Activity belongs to rajoguņa. Hence in sarūpa pariņāma too, sattva mixed up with purusa like salt and water. Rather, they serve the and tamas must be related to rajas so as to be able to undergo ho- bhoga purpose of purușa by mere sannidhi or proximity.2 Of course, mogeneous modification (i.e., modification in which one guna will this sannidhi does not mean nearness in space; rather it means that not overpower the other). Rajas possesses kriyasakti by nature; but purușa bodha and guna bodha form indistinguishable parts of the same this kriyāśakti of rajas becomes excessive when there is a distur- idea and are cognized as identical through mistake. Buddhi or intel- bance in the Prakrti-state due to purusrtha samyoga. In the equilib- lect is sāttvika prakāśa whereas purușa is revealing consciousness. riated state, there is no excess in the activity of the rajoguna. The Due to ignorance, these two are not discriminated. All vrttyātmaka natural activity of rajas becomes excessive in the vaisamyāvasthā as a changes of the intellect are, therefore, falsely attributed to purușa al- result of which there are excessive modifications in sattva, rajas and though the latter is immutable in nature. Suppose two glass cases tamas. The result of such excess in the activities of the gunas is the are hung on the opposite walls and suppose one of them contains a production of new categories. (Tattvāntara pariņāma or virūpa pari- picture; now, if a man does not know that one of them is cmpty, he nāma means the process of forming unequal aggregation of the gunas will perceive pictures in both the cases. Here, due to ignorance and through their excessive interaction and interdependence). Hence, reflection, the picture of the one glass case will create the con- when the virūpa pariņāma takes place, the gunas begin to manifest fused perception of a picture in the other glass case which is, in their various characteristics and the phenomenal products come into reality, empty. Similar confusion arises when an individual thinks of being. himself as the knower and the enjoyer of the worldly objects due to This is the dynamism of the Samkhya physics and this aspect is non-discrimination between his buddhi and pure consciousness. as real and as obvious as the aspect of permanence. All sorts of The example of 'oil and wick' has made it clear that mere oil can- movements and changes are so very real and forceful that they can not produce light, mere wick also fails to illuminate a room. It is be denied by no means. This fact of becoming should be accepted only when oil co-operates with wick and flame that there can be in every system of philosophy to avoid one-sidedness and narrow such a thing as light. Similarly, neither the buddhivrtti alone nor the perspective. Gunas, in the state of equilibrium and the purusa are pure consciousness alone can produce phenomenal knowledge or the minimum noumenal realities which form the mutable and im-

1Sāmkhyakārika, 13 (2). *Tattvavaisaradi, 11-18. mutable pre-suppositional principles of the Samkhya view. The

66 Classic al Samkhya : A Critical Study Metaphysics 67

entire universe of diversity and change is produced out of these as the characteristics of lightness, movement, heaviness etc., belong- gunas in association with the purușa or pure consciousness. The ing to fire, water, earth etc. They are never experienced as substances. world we live in, is not a static world; it is out-and-out dynamic. like clay, gold etc. They are also accepted in all other scriptural texts Perpetual changes, vibrating currents of life and constant move- as qualities.1 Further, the Samkhya has accepted one cause of the ments, are the keynotes of this phenomenal show. The world that world. If three gunas are recognized and each guna is, again accept- we see, feel and work upon does not remain steady and unchanging. ed as infinite in number, then the theory of one ultimate cause be- On the contrary, it changes and changes every moment because of comes a myth. its inner push and inner mobility which are due to the palpitating Secondly, Samkhya holds that the three gunas are the universal nature of the three gunas. The gunas explain clearly both the same- elements of all objects. But if we reflect carefully, we find that these ness and diversity, affinity, and difference which are so obvious and gunas are not the real elements constituting the substances of all unignorable in the physical world. Sameness of objects is due to objects. These three gunas really represent three stages of modifica- sameness of the ultimate stuff (i.e., the three reals,) but diversity is tion which a thing undergoes in order to assume a particular form. due to the different types of relatedness of these elements. Cause "When a thing is by nature subject to modification, then it must and effect, substance and attribute are identical from the point of have a stage from which modification should start and it must offer view of the stuff, but from the point of view of forms and names, some amount of resistance to modification. This implies its inertia

they are different. which is called tamas. Secondly, the process of modification implies These gunas also form the realistic setting of the Samkhya School. its stage of activity or change which is called rajas. Thirdly, the stage Knowledge and its objects belong to the realm of gunas which are at which it arrives as a result of its modification is the stage of self- totally independent of the purusa. An idealistic system holds that in manifestation or sattva. In whatever condition, a body may be, the acquisition of knowledge, consciousness contributes every item whether mental or material, it is always subject to change and it and that the object of knowledge is convertible into consciousness. must have these three movements. The discovery of the three in all The classical Sämkhya, however, holds that the stuff of which the objects would simply signify the discovery of the fact that all things object of knowledge is composed, is radically distinct from conscious- of the world are changing. These three gunas, being, really three ness and is also independent of it. The whole world, therefore, rests movements of the process of modification, to regard them as con- on a principle which is as eternal and independent as the spiritual stituents would amount to substantiation of abstract features". principle. Thus, according to Sämkhya, both matter and spirit are Further, according to Sāmkhya, the gunās are innumerable in equally real, although matter, being an obstacle in the path of libera- number. Here a question may be posed: are they atomic or all-pervad- tion, is of inferior value. The purua can realise its true nature only ing or madhyama parimāņa in size? when it turns away from the pain-producing Nature. Pain, according If the gunas are regarded as atomic, then the effects which are not to Sāmkhya, is real but the connection of purusa with the painful atomic, will be different from the cause in nature and this will go experience is false. In the opinion of the advaita vedanta, however, against the Sāmkhya theory of Satkāryavāda. So, the gunas cannot pain is false, Sämkara has admitted transcendental reality of con- be atomic because the effects are not atomic and the Samkhya believes sciousness only. The unconscious upādhi in the form of Mayā is that the effects are identical with the cause in nature. The gunas can- transcendentally false. Hence, Samkara-philosophy has assumed the not be middle-sized (madhyama parimāņa) because middle-sized things form of an absolute idealism or advaita caitanyavāda. are products and are non-eternal. The gunas are eternal. The gunas

Objections Considered cannot also be all-pervading. If the gunas are all-pervading then It has been objected that the three gunas of the Samkhya School there will be no change in them. are not substances but qualities; because they are always experienced 1Śribhāşya.

68 Classical Samkhya : A Cr itical Study Metaphysics 69.

Lastly, if all causal substances are all-pervading, why should the ff light is different from the lamp, then the non-difference between

effects be limited in nature? the cause and the effect will be destroyed. So, luminosity or move- ment is not a mere quality. If luminosity is a quality, then its cause

Objections Met also is a quality (because the cause is non-different from the effect). These objections, raised against the guna theory of the Samkhya Sämkhya has described the unconscious material-stuff as guna simply School, are not difficult and unanswerable. A little reflection on the because of the fact that the unconscious updāna is of no use unless original position of the Samkhya School will help us to solve the it is related to consciousness. Hence consciousness is regarded as

riddles. primary and the unconscious material stuff as the secondary (i.e., So far as the first objection is concerned, we can say that Rāmānuja guna in the sense of gauna) in the process of creation. is not logically justified in raising it against the Sämkhya theory of So far as the second objection is concerned, we can say that there the gunas It is true that Samkhya has used a single word (Prakrti) is no inconsistency from the Samkhya point of view if anybody holds to denote the 'equilibriated' state of the three gunas and it is also that these three guñas are the three states of modification. This, how- true that Prakrti has been admitted as the root cause of the world. ever, does not imply that the three gunas cannot be regarded as Now, although Prakrti is a single word, still according to Samkhya, substances. A state is always a state of a substance and according to it is nānātmakā in nature. It possesses the potency of creating the Sämkhya, there is non-difference between the state and the possessor multifarious universe. Sāmkara too, has regarded Prākrti or Māyā as of state. (i.e., avastha and avasthavan). Moreover, even if we regard the a principle of multiplicity and difference (vaicitryātmikā). So Prakrti three gunas as three different states through which an object passes is the root-cause of the world. Brahman cannot be the primary when it changes from one form to another, we would be careful not material cause of the world because Brahman is one and does not con- to allow any time-interval between one state and the other. There is tain in itself the potency of difference. Again, one substance may no succession in the changing gunas. The succession occurs in vrtti possess different qualities but this fact cannot be regarded as a justi- only. If this successive nature of vrtti is ascribed also to the nature fication for admitting the substance itself as many. The body possesses of the thing, then there will be a hopeless blunder which will create many characteristics such as height, weight, complexion etc., but still only confusion of thought. the body is regarded as one. Hence, there is no harm in admitting In reply to the third objection we can say that it is Vijñānabhiksu Prakrti as one although it possesses multifarious capacities. Further, who has admitted the all-pervading nature of the gunas and also their according to Sāmkhya, there is tādātmya between substance and qua- innumerable number.1 He has done this because otherwise, there will lity and "manyness" cannot be introduced in a place where abheda or be difficulty in holding that creation is taking place everywhere. The non-difference is accepted. Moreover, the Samkhya School has not Nyaya system too, has admitted a number of things as all-pervading. used the word 'guna' in the Nyāya-vaiseșika sense. Rāmānuja, himself, The souls are all-pervading, God is all-pervading. Space and time are has not accepted the Nyaya definition of quality. According to Nyāya, all-pervading and ākaśa is also all-pervading. Even then, there is no that which is admitted as a quality, can never be admitted again as difficulty in the generation of motion necessary for creation. Accord- a substance; but according to Rāmānuja, knowledge is both a quality ing to the Nyaya School, it is only an object, endowed with the and a substance. The classical Samkhya, however, holds that if the quality of touch, that occupies space. As all these things, mentioned substance and the quality are admitted as distinct and different, then above, are devoid of touch, they do not occupy space and do not resist there will be violation of the law of parsimony (gaurabadosa) because movement. In the Samkhya system too, the three gunās possess the every bit of experience can be explained satisfactorily by admitting quality of touch in a very subtle form (so subtle that it cannot even non-difference between substance and quality. Since, there is abheda be felt as the quality of touch different from other qualities). Hence, (non-difference) between substance and quality, luminosity, move- ment and heaviness are not merely qualities, they are also substances. *Yogavarttika, chapter, 11-18; Sāmkhyapravacanabhāşya, 1-127.

20 Classical Sāmkhya : A Critical Study Metaphysics 71

the three gunas too, do not occupy space in such a manner as to ed as an uncaused principle; otherwise, there will be the fallacy of

resist movement. infinite regress. : Lastly, the difficulty in regard to the explanation of middle-sized The world process always reveals itself as an unending series of effects arising from the all-pervading cause at the beginning of crea- causes and effects and when by following the long line of causation, tion (adisrsti) is not peculiar to the Sāmkhya system. In the case of we arrive at the concept of the first or primary cause, we find that this the advaita vedānta too, Māyā, the changeable material stuff of the ground principle is to be supposed as eternal, uncaused and beyond the universe, is all-pervading besides the all-pervading Brahman. Hence, region of this phenomenal existence. This is the Prakrti of the Sāmkhya the question of the production of limited effects from the all-pervad- system. Since, this Prakrti is the uncaused first cause of this vast and ing cause at the very beginning of creation arises in this system also. multifarious universe, it is unlimited, all-pervasive and infinite.1 Of course, the supporter of the advaita vedānta may say that Māyā Sāmkhyakārikā describes Prakrti as ahetumat, nityām, vyāpi, niş- is mithyā but the Prakrti of the Sämkhya School is real. The objec- kriyam, ekam, anāśritam, alimgam, niravayavam, svatantram, avyaka- tion regarding the production of limited effects from the all-pervading tam, triguņam, aviveki, vișaya, sāmānyam, acetanam and prasava- cause however, does not create any special difficulty for the Samkhya dharmi.2 School. Prakrti is not only real but it also possesses the potency of In other words, Prakrti is uncaused, it is eternal and all-pervading; creating effects which are vilaksana in nature. Truly speaking, this it is immobile only in the sense that in the avyakta state, there is no objection is one which can be raised against any system that believes manifestation of products like mahat, ahamkāra etc.3 Motion and

in satkāryavāda. changes take place also in this equilibriated state. Further, Prakrti is one and is nothing but the unity of the three gunas in a state of PRAKRTI AND THE DISTURBANCE OF THE PRAKRTI STATE potentiality and incoherence. It supports all, being the cause of all : Previously, it has been stated that the three gunas of the Sāmkhya and is not supported by anything else. It is alimga for it does not School constitute the ground forces from which the diverse trans- serve as the middle term to prove the existence of any other category. formations and changes of this world have come into being, and that Prakrti is also partless, since in this state, the production of different the movement, within these gunas either holds these three in a state evolutes, does not commence. It is independent, non-manifested and of equipoise or breaks up their equilibrium just to make them change unconscious, and is also the objective ground of all cognitions. and develop in the form of this manifold universe. Now, when the Again, as such, it is not limited to individual consciousness, but gunas are held in a state of equilibrium, and there is no manifesta- enters into the knowledge of all. tion of any characteristic or modifications, it is called the state of The most important characteristic of Prakrti is that it is out-and- Prakrti, avyakta or pradhāna.1 This state of equipoise is absolutely out productive (being an assemblage of the three palpitating reals). indeterminate, undifferentiated and homogeneous and it exists only Primal Nature is ever undergoing changes into forms and categories, as the possible source of energy of the whole world. Just as a forest thereby creating this phenomenal existence. Being is not the only is nothing but an assemblage of different species of trees, in the same irreducible ultimate of knowledge or experience as is held by the way, Prakrti is nothing but an assemblage of the three ultimate reals, vedānta philosophers. Movement or becoming is also another incon- held in a state of avyakta or non-manifestation.2 So, although with vertible principle of experience and this principle is Prakrti or the appearance and disappearance of individual objects, gunas too triguna. Nature has two movements : forward (anuloma) and back- seem to appear and disappear, yet, in fact, gunas never get merged ward (pratiloma). In its forward movement Prakrti becomes the into something else, since they, themselves, are the Prakrti and there generating agent of all sargas: while in the backward movement, it is no other entity that can be admitted as their cause or ground. retraces the stages through which it has developed. Again, if Prakrti is the root-cause of this world, it should be regard- 1Sāmkhyapravacanabhaşya, 1-76. "Sāmkhyakārikā, 10-11.

1Sāmkhyapravacanabhāşya, 1-61. .* Yogavarttika, chapter, 11-18. *Yogavarttika, 11-18.

72 Classical Sāmkhya : A Critical Stuđy Metaphysics 73

Sāmkhya also gives us rational justification for postulating an influenced by the transcendental purusa. Hence, this blind teleologi- avyakta Prakrti as the inexhaustive source of the manifest world. "Because of the finite nature of specific objects, because of homo- cal force of Nature is also said to be due to the transcendental in- fluence of the spiritual principle. "Just as the unintelligent milk flows geneity, because of evolution being due to the efficiency of the cause, from the udders of the cow for the nourishment of the calf, so it is because of separation between cause and its product and because of the function of the unconscious Pradhana to liberate the souls from the merging of the whole world of effects, there is the unmanifest as the cause".1 Whatever is finite is itself caused and all categories in- the sorrows and sufferings of this world".1 This unconscious teleo- cluding mahat are limited and finite. Hence, mahat too, is produced logy is, thus, an important hypothesis on the ground of which the by that which has the uncaused potentiality of mahat, that is to say, Samkhya School seeks to explain the creation of this well-ordered by the Pradhana or Prakrti. Further, all objects of the world manifest universe by an unconscious Prakrti even in the absence of any active guidance from purușa. a common nature in the sense that each of them is capable of pro- This natural change of the gunas in the form of this systematized ducing pleasure, pain and indifference. This is because of the fact that they are all made of some such substance which is capable of universe also benefits Prakrti to a very great extent. In other words, producing these three different feelings. Such a substance is Prakrti. mutual help or mutual benefit forms the basis of this need for dis- Again, the Sāmkhya theory of satkāryavāda holds that the effect is turbance and evolution. The verse 21 of the Sāmkhyakārikā runs thus: "For the sake of Purusa's perception of Prakrti and for his already existent in the cause, and that in every case of causation, we release, a union of the two takes place, which resembles a union of have not the production of some new characteristics, but the un- the lame and the blind. By that union, evolution or creation of the covering of something already in existence. Hence, a cause can world is effected.2 The Yogasūtra of Patanjali says: "The union be- produce that effect only for which it possesses efficiency or potency. tween Puruşa and Prakrti takes place for the sake of knowing the All categories, therefore, from mahat down to five gross elements, essential nature of Purușa and Prakrti."3 must exist in the state of the unmanifest or Prakrti before their Thus, it is clear and evident that the real object of disturbance in creation. The effect emerges from the cause and also merges into it the guna equilibrium and the creation of the universe is twofold. (1) at the time of its so-called destruction. The unevolved or the avyakta, Prakrti becomes the precept of the Purusa and (2) the Purușa attains therefore, must be supposed to exist as the great merging ground of release from the torments and tortures of life on perceiving its own

the whole world of experience. distinction from Nature. Now, Prakrti, in the unevolved state is the equipoise of the three Being disturbed and dislocated from its state of equipoise by gunas and it evolves the material world out of itself when there is a purușārtha, Prakrti creates this manifold world of pleasures and pains; disturbance in the guna equilibrium. The question, therefore, arises: but this world of joys and griefs, happiness and misery gets merged what is it that causes the disturbance of the equilibrium? The Sam- into the pralaya state of Nature, when the actions of the gunas become khya answer is that it is the purusārtha samyoga of Prakrti with the disintegrated forming again the state of equilibrium. The inherent inactive consciousness, the purpose of which is served by the evolu- teleology of the gunas again, at the right moment, breaks up this tion of Nature. Nature is, no doubt, unconscious and unintelligent, equilibriated state of Prakrti and gives start to a fresh process of still there is some inherent teleology (unconscious) in the gunas as a creation. Thus creation and dissolution are the two functions under- result of which they produce this world. The inherent teleology means taken by nature to serve the purpose of the spiritual principle. nothing but the disposition of unknowingly serving the purposes of enjoyment and liberation of purusa. The movement of Prakrti, for the production of the world, is, thus, in a manner, controlled and 1Sāmkhyakārikā, 57.

1Samkhyakārikā, 15, 16. ªSārkhyakārika, 21. *Yogasūtra, Sādhanapāda, 23.

74 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Metaphysics 75

Objections Considered Objections Met The Samkhya conception of Prakrti as the independent and uncon- These objections are not very serious. A little reflection on the scious material stuff of the universe has invited criticism from many quarters. Samkara, for example, has said that since Sāmkhya has fundamental position of Samkhya will make us conscious of the unsound nature of these objections. admitted independent existence of two principles (one unconscious So far as the first objection is concerned, we can say that the rela- and the other indifferent) and has not admitted a third spiritual tion which is suitable for creation, exists between purusa and Prakrti principle, there can never be any samyoga or samyogabhaşa between from beginningless time. So the question, how did these two inde- the two. Hence, there can never be any creation of the world. pendent principles enter into a relation suitable for creating the · Prof. C.D. Sharma has supported this statement of Samkara and universe,-does not arise at all. Just as Brahman is related to Māyā has said that an unconscious and independent Prakrti can, at least, from beginningless time, in the same manner, there is anādī sristyo- create a mechanical and purposeless universe. A meaningful creation, payogi sambandha (beginningless relation suitable for creation) we can never expect to result from the movement of an unconscious between Purusa and Prakrti. No question regarding the why, how or

material stuff. when of this relation can be raised legitimately. According to Samkara has also criticised the use of the spontaneous flow of Sāmkhya, vivekāgraha of purușa and Prakrti is beginningless just as milk from the udders of the cow to explain the Samkhya hypothesis in advaita vedānta, Māyā or avidya is beginningless. In the jīvan- of unconscious teleology. The cow is a conscious animal and there is mukta state too, the relation between buddhi and purușa is not des- the motherly love of the cow for her calf that acts as an inspiring troyed. Buddhi remains in that state as a tattva; but the self, in the agent. Prakrti of the Samkhya School does not possess these charac- state of jīvan-mukti, has realised its distinction from the intellect and

teristics of the cow. so it becomes non-attached to buddhi. Vivekāgraha is the real creative The example of unconscious grass changing automatically in the force of Prakrti. The mere relation between two all-pervading tattvas form of milk too, is not a suitable illustration to explain the inherent (Purușa and Prakrti) is not the real moving force behind creation. unconscious teleology of Prakrti. Grass changes into milk only when Since vivekāgraha is beginningless, creation too is beginningless. eaten by a milch cow and not when it is eaten by a bull. Hence, there is no difficulty in understanding the emergence of the The example of the lame and the blind, working together for world from Nature even in the absence of a third uniting principle mutual benefit, is also not a satisfactory one. Both the lame and the in the form of God. If anybody points out any difficulty in the blind are conscious and they are, therefore, capable of making a plan Sämkhya, in regard to this fact, then he may be asked to find out which will be beneficial to both. Prakrti, however, is unconscious and how this difficulty is solved in the advaita-vedanta. purușa is indifferent. So, these two principles can never come together With regard to the second objection, we may say that according to form a plan by which both of them will be benefited. to advaita-vedānta also, Māyā is unconscious. Even then Māyā is Nor can we say that purusa, like a magnet, disturbs Prakrti, by capable of producing a meaningful world. How is this possible? Brah- means of mere sannidhi. Sannidhi is eternal and there will always be man is eternal and immutable consciousness and is also eternally disturbance in the Prakrti resulting in creation of the world-forming satisfied. Brahman has no need to be fulfilled through creation; still categories. Hence, there will never be any Prakrti state of the gunas or there is the creation of this purposeful universe.

the state of dissolution. Further, enjoyment which is the purpose of Purusa and which is Moreover, Prakrti is creating the universe and purusa is enjoying fulfilled through creation, means simply the manifestation of the it. That is to say, purusa is reaping the fruits of the activities perfor- med by Nature. This goes against the law of karma. vişayā-kard-vrttis of the intellect through reflection. According to other schools, the object, when it is manifested, is also accepted either as beneficial (ista) or as harmful (anist). In the Sāmkhya, however, the purusa, in its neutral nature, simply manifests the objects. Now,

76 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Metaphysics 77

the disinterested attitude, which is referred to by the word udāsina, is also a vrtti of the intellect. Asakti or attachment is a kliștavrtti brium. There is also the consequent creation of the categories. whereas anāsakti or detachment is an aklistavrtti of the intellect. This Lastly, the bhoktritva of Purusa and the kartritva of the intellect disinterested attitude is not negative in nature. It is a special state of do not create any problem for the Sämkhya philosophy. Tbe sense the buddhi which arises as a result of concentrated and continued in which the word bhoktritva is used in the Samkhya-philosophy, is spiritual sādhanā. The niruddhāvasthā of the citta is not of the form not in conflict with the doctrine of Karma. The word 'enjoyment,' of abhāva according to the yoga philosophy. It is something positive. used in relation to purușa, refers simply to the connection which jīva The udāsinā state (in which there is no āsaktivrtti) is a state of buddhi purușa happens to have with the buddhivrttis through reflection. This similar to the niruddha state in which all cittavrttis are stopped. type of enjoyment is wholly different from the enjoyment of the In answer to the third objection, we can say that Purusa and fruits of actions in the forms of pleasures and pains. Hence, this sort Prakrti, being all-pervading, are always related. Prakrti, which is the of enjoyment by purusa is not prohibited by the law of Karma. More- cause of the world is a cetanavistā Prakrti (Prakrti, permeated with ever, in practical life, we do, very often, come across instances in consciousness). Further, as long as there is vivekāgraha there is no which the fruits of actions of one person are found to be reaped by distinction between purusa and Prakrti. Hence, there is no separation another due to false identification. The son commits crimes and is between the conscious principle and the unconscious principle. punished; the affectionate father suffers pains on that account. Here, Cetanāvișt Prakrti is a mixed category in which aviveka is working the sufferings of the father are due to his false identification of him- as a creative force. Just as there is intelligence-part (caitanyāmsa) self with the son and this identification is expressed in the form of and body-part (sarīrāmsa) in a cow, in the same manner there is love and affection for children. In the case of avivekī purușa also, intelligence part and acetana part in non-discriminated and intelli- there is 'ekameva darsanam' due to aviveka. Hence, the pleasures and gised Prakrti. Hence, there can be teleological evolution from Nature. the pains which really belong to buddhi are mistakenly appropriated Hence, the example of the flow of unconscious milk from the udders by the avivekī jiva purușa due to ekameva darśanam caused by

of the cow is not an unsound one. ignorance. The example of the co-operation of the blind man and the lame man is also not unsuitable from the point of view of the Sāmkhya Objections, raised by Venkatanath philosophy. Here, the author of the Sāmkhyakārikā has simply Venkatanath has raised some objections against the arguments tried to prove that Purusa, by itself or Nature by itself, is incapable used by the Sämkhya School to prove the existence of Prakrti (by of producing this world,-a creation which is beneficial to both of inference). them. The lame man cannot come out of the forest independently, In his opinion, the first argument "Bhedānām parimānit" can serve nor can the blind man, by himself perform this function. It is only as a middle term to prove the existence of an unlimited cause only; when the two act together, that they can reach their goal. Pure con- it cannot prove the existence of an avyakta Prakrti.1 This argument sciousness is immutable and as such is incapable of producing any- is based on the supposition that the cause must be greater in quantity thing by itself. Pure Prakrti is unconscious and as such is incapable than the effect. This, however, is not always true. A big piece of cloth of creating independently this meaningful world. Two must unite. can be produced from a small bundle of threads. A huge tree is Prakrti must be vitalised by consciousness so as to be able to evolve always produced from a cause which is very insignificant in quantity.

this multi-coloured world. The argument "Samanvayāt" is also invalid. The qualities which Even the example of the magnet does not create any difficulty for are inherent in certain things may not always be their causal factors. the Sämkhya School. Creation is not due to mere sannidhi. In (Na hi yat yeşu-anugatam tatteşām kāraņamiti niyamaḥ; sarvartha addition to sannidhi, there must be aviveka. It is only when aviveka siddhi). The qualities of whiteness, cowness etc., inhere in a large acts as a creative force, that there is disturbance in the guna equili- 1Tatvamuktakalapa with Anandayini tika, published by Oriental Research Institute, Mysore, p. 112.

78 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Metaphysics 79

number of objects but they are never regarded as the causes of those cause is called Prakrti because the word stands for the material stuff things and beings. In the case of earthen jars, cups etc., the quality of which anything is composed. of earthiness which is transmitted to them, is not their cause. This The second argument (samanvayāt) again, refers to the fact that quality inheres in the effect. The causal substance is never inherent the effect is always connected with the cause (kāranānvita). It is also in the effect. The followers of the Samkhya School cannot, further, of the nature of cause (Kāranātmaka). It is due to this fact that hold that the cause and the effect are of the same material stuff as qualities of a causal substance are found in all the effects generated they are of the same form. In that case, the cause can never be from it. The quality of being woodenness is found in all things made distinguished from the effect.1 Further, if the three gunas are regard- of wood. Since, the qualities of pleasure, pain and indifference, are ed as the cause of the world since they are present in all objects, found in all objects of the world, they are to be regarded as the then the Sämkhya will not be able to establish the existence of a qualities of the substance which is the cause of the world. The sub- single cause in the form of avyakta Prakrti. Even in sāmyāvasthā, the stance which is capable of producing pleasure, pain and indifference, three gunas cannot be regarded as one because they in that state is no other than the trigunātmikā prakrti. We should also remember

also, produce their different types of effects. that according to Samkhya, the qualities of whiteness, cowness etc., The third argument "saktitah pravrtteśca" too, is no good. The are not different from their respective substances. The Sämkhya has word "sakti" implies the energy form of the effect. The oil, in the admitted tādātmya between the substance and the quality. White form of energy, remains in the oilseed. Oilseed is the substratum of threads do, in fact, constitute the cause of the white cloth. To meet the oil. If avyakta implies energy, then like oil-energy, it, too, must the third objection, we can also point out that the Samkhya has not have a substratum, as otherwise the example of oil and oilseed will admitted any difference between power (sakti) and the possessor of be an unsuitable one. If the avyakta needs a substratum, then there power (śaktimān) and hence there is no need for a substratum of will be more principles than what has actually been accepted by the avyakta. Śakti is not something new. It is what is called pariņāma.

Sāmkhya. · It is due to the presence of pariņāmasakti in the causal substance Lastly, the argument "Kāraņa-kārya-vibhāgādavibhāgāditi" is also that the latter shows a tendency towards manifestation in the form faulty. The ribhāgāvibhāgahetu establishes both the efficient and the of the effect. Just as there is oil-seed possessing oil energy in the material cause of the world; the sämkhya definition of cause, how- same manner there is some changeable substance possessing the

ever, covers the material cause only. capacity of changing in the form of the world. This modifiable sub- stance which possesses changing capacity (parināmaśākti) is regarded

Solution as avyakta in the Sāmkhya. So far as these objections (raised by Venkatanath) are concerned, The vibhagavibhaga hetu, too establishes Prakrti as the material

we can meet them in the following manner: cause of the world. Truly speaking, there is no avibhäga between the The first argument does not seek to prove the existence of Prakrti efficient cause and the effect. The word 'avibhaga' really exists in the on the basis of the principle that the cause must be greater in case of the ādhāra-ādheya relation and the ādhāra-adheya relation quantity than the effect as is supposed by Venkatanath. Here, the exists only between the material cause and the effect. Pārthivāmsa* principle postulated is "whatever is limited (Parimita) is an effect. of a piece of wood is not the cause of fire. It is the tejo part of the The root-cause, therefore, must be unlimited (aparimita) as otherwise wood which is the upādāna kārana of fire. It is because the pārthi- we shall have to suppose a further cause of the root-cause (becoming vāmśa is associated with the tejo part of the wood that whenever an effect, due to limitation) which is absurd. This unlimited root- there is fire in a piece of wood, the pārthivāmsa is seen to be related inseparably to fire. Even then there is no ādhār-adheya relation be-

Mysore, p. 126. 1Tattvamuktakalapa with Sarvarthasiddhi, Oriental Research Institute, *(Earth-portion)

80 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Metaphy sics 81

tween the fire and the parthivamsa of the piece of wood and so there principle of consciousness is always pure and its nature is intelligence

is no avibhaga between the two. and non-activity. The Sāmkhyakārikā describes purușa as atriguņa,

PURUȘA vivekī, cetana, aprasavadharmī, kevalī, drașțā, akartā etc. and all these If all the movements of Prakrti are for the experiences and libera- characteristics reveal that purusa and prakrti are diametrically tion of Purușa, then the consideration of Purușa's nature and its opposite; while the essence of prakrti is change, the essence of purusa relation to Prakrti becomes an important problem for the Sāmkhya is changelessness. Both are, however, equally, free and fundamental

Philosophy. and both lie at the root of the world and its experience. Prakrti stands for the unconscious dynamic principle that under- The existence of purusa is also proved by certain arguments in the goes changes and transformations for the creation of the empirical Sāmkhyakārikā which may be summarised as follows : world. Although the contents of consciousness always change and Spirit exists as distinct from matter since (a) collocation serves become different, 'consciousness' as the principle of illumination and the purpose of something other than themselves ; (b) since the other revelation remains always the same. So, there are not merely changes must be the reverse of what is composed of the three constituents; and transformations in the universe of ours; there is also the perma- (c) since, there must be control of the collo cations; (d) since, there nent principle of consciousness which manifests all these passing must be an enjoyer ; and (e) since, there is activity for the purpose of phenomena of the phenomenal world. This eternal principle of con- release from three-fold misery.1 sciousness is the purusa in the Sämkhya analysis of the world. An The first four arguments seek to prove the existence of the soul on the ground that as the controller and enjoyer of the world of unconscious principle alone cannot produce a universe which seems to be full of meaning and purpose. Hence, at the root of the world, composite things, some intelligent being must be recognized to exist we should admit the existence of spirit (like purusa) which, somehow, and that this intelligent being must not be of the nature of pleasure, influences the unconscious principle in its process of creation or pain and indifference. The world-process, therefore, is not moving evolution. Moreover, Prakrti, being unconscious, the contents of and developing aimlessly, there is the eternal principle of pure intel- experience cannot be synthesised and organized into one meaningful ligence which though inactive, yet through reflection, co-ordinates, object, by its efforts. The principle of unity that can account for the synthesises and gives meaning to all our worldly experiences. These relatedness of the different bits of experience and also for that arguments, therefore, may be regarded as telological in the sense that they refer to the spirit as the central purpose of this world of change reason can give meaning to the contents of experience, must be spiritual in nature and this spiritual principle is the purușa. Thus, and mutation. The last argument is based on the scripture which for the creation of this cosmic universe and also for effecting a promises release from misery and prescribes activity to that end. Nature or Prakrti is unconscious and therefore, the release, striven meaningful knowledge of its objects (epistemological necessity), a spiritual principle is as necessary as the principle of objectivity and for, must relate to a principle other than Prakrti. This can be accept- change. Purusa or spirit is pure consciousness and as such it is ed as a form of ontological argument for proving the existence of changeless and infinite. It is the transcendental principle and, there- soul or Purusa. Thus, both by telology and ontology, Sāmkhya has fore, its nature, per se, is non-apprehensible by experience. It, how- sought to prove the existence of Purusa which is an eternal principle ever, appears as the apriori principle in all forms of human know- beşides Prakrti. ledge. In other words, purușa is the logical pre-supposition of all Professor D.D. Vadekar, in his learned article under the title 'The knowledge. Beneath the forms of knowledge, there is some principle Sāmkhya arguments for the Purusa"2 has taken great pains to show which is changeless but which reveals all mental states and processes that the Sämkhya arguments, employed in the seventh karika, fail to by its own power of illumination. Purusa is this principle of con- prove the existence of the pure Sämkhya purusa, the nature of which sciousness distinct from the ideas and images of knowledge. This 1The Saikhyakārikā, 17 ªpublished in Philosophical Quarterly, January 1960.

82 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Metaphysics 83

has been described (in the nineteenth kārikā) as indifferent and what we find ordinarily in the case of the enjoyment of such objects neutral. Here, the first point that should strike us at once is that by human beings. this seventeenth kārikā has been employed to prove the existence Further, there is no such rule that there can be no enjoyment un- only of purușa and not its indifference and neutrality. This purușa is less there is a desire for it. There may be an experience when there the one that has been caught in the snare of Prakrti through reflec- is no desire for it. The prisoners undergo jail experiences against tion. Hence, there is no difficulty in supposing that this purușa is a their will. purposeful being and that its purpose is being fulfilled through the The second argument too seeks to prove the existence of jīva activity of the three gunas. Hence, one may pose a question ; if this purușa. It is only in such a purușa that viveka in the sense of intel- purușa is a bound purușa, then how are we to prove the existence of an lectual understanding of the distinction between spirit and matter indifferent and neutral self ? If we think over the metaphysical signi- can arise. Such viveka is a vrtti of the intellect. So, it is only a purușa ficance of this argument deeply and carefully, we shall be able to endowed with buddhi that can become the possessor of viveka-jñāna. discover that this argument can be employed to prove the existence Just as the purely unconscious Prakrti is incapable of having such of the pure purusa as well. The real meaning of the first argument is viveka, in the same manner, a pure purușa, dissociated from buddhi, that the existence of the unconscious matter becomes meaningful is not in a position to have viveka-jñāna. Vrttyātmaka-viveka belongs only when it is associated with consciousness. Matter, by itself, is of to buddhi only. The viveka, that belongs to purua is only Prakāsāt- no use unless it is revealed by consciousness. In the absence of its maka viveka, which implies simply the manifestation of two principles revelation by spirit, it is as good as non-existent. Prakrti is pure as different, and does not refer to an intellectual understanding and potentiality and such a pure potentiality, devoid of any actual evaluation of the distinction. Hence, prakāśātmaka viveka is not in character, is of no advantage to anyone. Prakrti assumes a definite contradiction with the indifference and neutrality of purusa. Just as character through its connection with spirit and so, in and through there is no distinction between caitanya and cetana in the Philosophy the whole process of its manifestation, the meaning of Prakrti is be- of Sämkhya, so also there is no distinction between viveka and vive- ing continuously revealed through its connection with Purușa. kin. Vrttyātmaka viveka belongs to purușa only when it is associated Prakrti looks upwards to Purușa and finds in it its true meaning. with buddhi. Even then, such intellectual modifications are owned by Consciousness as mere revelation is always pure, indifferent and non- purusa through reflection only. Therefore vrttyātmaka viveka is a agent. The word samghāt (collocation) refers to unconscious matter seeming attribute of purusa and a real attribute of buddhi. There is, and the word parärthatvät implies that without the existence of con- therefore, no contradiction in describing purusa both as vivekin (from

sciousness, matter is blind and meaningless. the point of view of Prakāśa) and indifferent. Even if we understand by samghata, the objects of enjoyment like The subjectivity of Purusa again refers simply to its power of re- bed, mat etc. and hold that the existence of these objects prove the ceiving the reflection of buddhi vrtti that has assumed the form of an existence of a bhoktr purusa only, then also there will be no contra- object. In other words, purusa is a subject on account of the fact that diction in holding that purusa in its pure form, is indifferent and it reveals naturally any object that happens to lie in its proximity. neutral. This is because, if we analyse bhoktritva metaphysically, This vişayasambandha however, does not signify that purusa is not we find that bhoktritva ultimately implies nothing but the illuminating indifferent; on the other hand, every body will admit that conscious- consciousness that constitutes the nature of the pure purusa. Such a ness as mere revelation of objects, cannot be regarded as anything pure consciousness is always indifferent and neutral. but neutral. The objects of the world are getting manifested by the The examples of bed, mat etc. are given here, only to show that light of the sun; but nobody will admit that in respect of the objects these things cannot have any meaning unless they are related to which are manifested by the sun's rays, the attitude of the sun is any- some conscious being. These examples are not meant to suggest that thing but neutral. Trigunadi viparyayāt means that purusa is indiffe- a purușa too, enjoys the products of Prakrti in a manner similar to rent from the three gunas which form the stuff of all the objects of

84 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Metaphysics

enjoyment. In the bound condition also, the self refers to pure con- The last argument seeks to prove the existence of purusa on the sciousness only and not to buddhi, even though it is the most powerful basis of the observed facts of the world. In this world, we find that jadaprakāśa. All the objects of the world are manifested by the intelli- the whole of creation is marching towards freedom which seems to gised buddhi, and all attributes like agency, enjoyment of worldly be its supreme goal. Pure unconscious matter can never have the goal experiences, purposefulness, the motive of evolution etc. belong only of freedom which belongs to the soul. So, we are led to believe that

to the intellect and not to the pure purusa. there must be bound souls which are to be made free in and through Here, we must remember that according to the Samkhya, the true this process of world creation. In other words, the world is marching jīva is not the prativimbha purușa which is destroyed in the state of towards the freedom of these souls. All desires and strivings belong emancipation. Jiva is purușa, the consciousness of which is reflected to prakrti. The pure self is not an agent. The winding up of the colo- in a particular buddhi. Hence the arguments which establish the exis- urful net of prakrti is done by prakrti itself and not by purușa. Bond- tence of the jīva also establish the existence of pure purusa. Any age means a false unification of consciousness with matter and libe- attribute like subjective, discriminative etc. belongs to purușa from ration means its dissociation. Unless, there is Pravrtti (striving) in the point of view of Prakaśa only. Consciousness in the sense of pure Nature there will be no change and mutation, and consequently, the prakāśa is always indifferent, non-agent and neutral. distinction of a static prakrti from a static purușa cannot be fully In regard to the third argument, Prof. Vadekar says "This argu- realised. So, the argument that the strivings of Nature are for the ment, most evidently proves, if it proves anything, the agency of the purpose of emancipation (kaivalyārtham pravrttiśca) is quite logical

purușa, rather than its non-agency." from the dualistic standpoint of the Samkhya physics. This argument simply seeks to prove that purusa is intelligising Thus, all the arguments given in the seventeenth kārikā do prove Prakrti by its mere sannidhi so as to make Nature fit for the creation what they actually intend to prove (viz., the existence of purusa as of this world. Purusa is not, therefore becoming an agent : purușa is consciousness and illumination.) the principle of consciousness that vitalizes Prakrti by its mere exis- tence (sattă). Brahman too, is the adhișthāna of Māyā : but nobody MULTIPLICITY OF SELVES

imputes agency to Brahman on that account. Now, the self or purusa according to Sāmkhya is not one; rather The fourth argument seeks to prove the bhoktribhāva of the purușa there is the multiplicity of purusas and all of them are infinite, un- that has already been connected with Nature through reflection. En- changeable, all-pervasive and eternal. The plurality of spirits follows joyment in the ordinary sense, is not possible in the case of pure from 'the distributive nature of the incidence of birth and death and matter; nor is it possible in the case of pure consciousness. It is of the endowment of the instruments of cognition and action, from only the seemingly unified category of spirit and matter that becomes bodies engaged in action, not all at the same time and also from diffe- the enjoyer of worldly experiences. So, the purusa that emerges from rences in (the proportion of) the three constituents (in different en- this argument (when taken by itself) in its pure and unconnected tities like sages, ordinary mortals and beasts)1. In the absence of such form, must be admitted as neutral and indifferent, since pure con- a plurality of souls, birth and death should be one for the wholé uni- sciousness can never be the subject of any kind of experience. More verse. If one person be blind and deaf, all others should be blind and over, Vacaspati has explained the bhoktribhāva of purusa in the deaf : but this does not happen in the world. We perceive that people sense of drastribhāva whereas Vijñāna bhikșu has interpreted bhoktri- are born and die at different times and are differently constituted. bhäva in the sense of enjoyment through reflection. How can we then say that there is only one purusa and not many? Further, enjoyment and indifference are not really two contradic- Vikșu holds that oneness of spirit advocated by the śruti, the vedānta tory terms. They can go together. A jivanmukta purușa is indifferent etc. refers to the homogeneous nature of the purusas and not to their to pleasures and pains ; still, he has to go through pains and suffer- numerical unity.2 ings, as long as his prārabdha karma is not wholly worked out, 1The Sāmkhyakārikā, 18. *Sāmkhyapravacanabhāşya, 1.154.

86 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Metaphysics 87

We cannot say that there is one spirit only and that this one spirit rences created by all these causes in the empirical lives of the diffe- appears as many due to the imposition of different upädhis* on it. In rent individual souls are also real. Differences, which are noticed in the case of space, limited by a chair the chair can be removed and the different reflections of different buddhis are all real. Since the the portion of space can be saved from limitation by such a removal images or pratibimbas are different the bimbas also must be diffe- of its upadhi. Even then there is the possibility that this same portion rent. Real distinction in effects can be produced by really distinct of space may, again, be limited by the imposition of some other thing on it. So, if one spirit is recognized, bondage and liberation, limita- causes. In the empirical sphere, we find real difference among individuals and this difference must, therefore, exist in the transcen- tion and freedom will become absurd and meaningless. dental sphere as well. There are different buddhis, different pratibimbas Gaudapāda, however, has made an attempt to prove that the self or reflections and different bimbas or purusas. When a purușa is finally in the Sämkhya philosophy, too, should be treated as one. It is a fact liberated, the reflection is destroyed and so purușa becomes fully dis- that in the Sāmkhyakārikā the singular number has been used in sociated from its buddhi which then gets merged in Prakrti. Diversity respect of purusa : "Tadviparitaśtathā capumān" (Kārikā 1); "Puru- and multiplicity in creation are real and these can be satisfactorily șasya darsanārtham" (Kārikā 21). While commenting on Karikā 11, explained by assuming the existence of the different avivekas of the Gaudapāda has said, "Anekam vyaktamekamavyaktam tathā ca pumā- different purusas. Created objects are many and the selves that reveal napyekah". While describing the points of similarities between vya- these objects in different ways are also many. If we hold that consci- kta and avyakta, Iśvara Krishna has said ; Sakriyamanekamāsritam ousness is one and it falsely appears as many due to unreal invest-

limgam (Kārikā 10). ments (upädhis) then we shall not be able to do justice to the essen- Gaudapāda has joined anekam of (Kārikā 10) with vyakta contrast- tially realistic and the dualistic position of the Sämkhya. Real diffe- ing vyakta with avyakta and purușa. Thus, in the opinion of Gauda- rence in the upädhis can never be caused by mere difference in the

pāda, purușa is to be regarded as one. limiting adjuncts. A man may put on different dresses at different Now, if we think of the realistic position of the Samkhya School, times ; but this difference in his dresses will not cause any real diffe- we sincerely feel that non-dualistic Atmavāda cannot be the keynote rence in him. In the opinion of the Sämkhya, difference in all its of this philosophical system. Sämkhya admits real differences in the forms, is eternal. So, if difference is created by the non-eternal upādhi, experiences and pains of different jīvas. Difference is a felt experience then, with the destruction of the upādhi, difference, too, will vanish ; and hence it must be admitted as real. The difference between spirit and if difference is destroyed, the realistic and the dualistic position and matter, the difference between one material object and another and the difference between one individual soul and another are of the Samkhya cannot be maintained. all real facts. Hence, these real facts must exist in all levels of ex- The use of the singular number (in Kārikā 11 and Kārikā 21) is perience. The advaita-vedānta believes in the falsity of difference and not unjustifiable from the Samkhya point of view. It should be so all sorts of difference vanish in the air in the advaita state of mukti. remembered that the realistic Samkhya has admitted multiplicity in Now, if we make an attempt to interpret the Samkhya with advaita respect of purusa owing to its admission of the reality of the indivi- inclinations, then we are bound to meet with logical contradiction dual buddhis but in its opinion, one purusa only is revealing itself to and irregularity at every step. For advaita, jīvabhāva, or jīvatva pro- a particular buddhi to which it is related from beginningless time duced by buddhi, ahamkāra etc. is false. It is purely imaginary while owing to aviveka. So, a particular buddhi is getting the impression the only reality is the undivided consciousness or Brahman. According of a single principle of consciousness and not of many. Each purusa, to Sāmkhya however buddhi, ahamkāra etc. are not false. They are as the real seer, becomes associated with a particular buddhi through real as consciousness. What is false is the relation of these with purusa. reflection ; and due to this seeming union, the experiences of the Since buddhi, ahamkāra, vāsanā, samskāra etc. are all real, the diffe- intelligised buddhi are falsely owned by the purusa through ignorance.

*Upādhis-Limiting adjuncts. The subjective ground is, thus, as real as the objective one.

88 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Stuđy Metaphysics 89

Objections Considered The Sämkhya theory of multiplicity of selves has been unsym- and its multiplicity.

pathetically criticised by many critics. It has been pointed out by some critics that qualitative identity BHOKTRIBHAVA

cannot go with numerical plurality. If all selves are of the same The problem of bhoktribhāva of purușa is, however, a very subtle nature, there can never be many selves, since, there will be nothing one and it is to be understood by a careful philosophical thinking.

to distinguish one purușa from another. Bhoktritva, in the case of jīva purusa, cannot mean enjoyment of Another objection is that according to the Samkhya, there is no worldly pleasures and pains which are the results of actions, because difference among the selves in point of proximity to prakrti, due to there is no vrtti in consciousness. In this case therefore, the word which sorrows and sufferings happen to them. So, it follows that 'enjoyment' means simply the manifestation of the visayākārāvrttis when one self is afflicted with sorrow, all the other selves will be of the intellect and also owning these vrttis on account of ignorance.

equally afflicted. Due to sannidhi, a reflection of consciousness is caught in the buddhi Lastly, there is misunderstanding regarding the bhoktribhāva of by virtue of which all buddhivrttis get apparently changed into purușa. The critics raise the objection : how can an indifferent consciousness ; and this apparent change in the character of vrttis purușa be an enjoyer ? Moreover, activity belongs to buddhi and gives rise to a sense of false identity between purusa and buddhi. It enjoyment to purusa. This overthrows the moral law of karma. is due to this feeling of false unity that the buddhivrttis are under- stood by the aviveki purusa as parts and parcels of its own nature. It

Objections Met is this false appropriation that has been described as bhoktribhāva of If we reflect on the first objection carefully, we find that this purușa.1 When bhoktritva is understood in this sense, there cannot objection cannot be logically justified. Truly speaking, it is possible be any logical inconsistency in ascribing bhoktritva to purușa for us to have numerical plurality even without qualitative difference. although real vrttis in the forms of pleasures and pains belong to In fact, qualitative identity loses its meaning unless there is numeri- buddhi which is the actual acting principle. Hence, the immutable cal plurality, unless, there are at least two, there is no sense in assert- nature of purușa remains unimpaired in the philosophy of the ing the existence of 'qualitative identity'. The expression, 'qualita- Sämkhya-school. tive identity' can never be used if there is only one substance. This Perception of the visible world is not possible in the case of pure point has also been emphasised in the Muktābalītīkā, of the Bhāșā- purușa ; nor is it possible in the case of pure matter. It is only the

pariccheda. seemingly unified category of spirit and matter (jīva purușa) that can The second objection, too, can be set aside very easily. Here, we be the perceiver of the visible world through modification of the should remember that a self is not afflicted with sorrows and miseries intellect. due to sannidhi alone. Pleasures and pains occur to a purușa on account of its karmavāsanā which remains stored up in the buddhi Further elucidation of the bhoktribhāva of purusa with which it is associated from beginningless time. Enjoyment, Purușa is to be known through inference. The world is an object therefore, is different for selves. Aviveka creates a seeming associa- of enjoyment and as such it has got to be enjoyed by a spiritual tion of attachment and identification between spirit and matter, and principle. (Bhogyena bhokturanumānam). Prakrti being unconscious; it is due to this sort of contact that a self goes through the experi- cannot be the bhoktā and so purușa, the seer, is also the enjoyer of ences of pleasures and pains. When this karmavāsanā or aviveka of the world. What then is the meaning of Bhoktritva of purusa ? a particular self is destroyed, that self is liberated. If we consider Here I propose to consider critically the interpretations offered by the Sämkhya philosophy from this point of view, there will be no Vācaspati Miśra and Vijñānabhikșu in regard to the Bhoktribhāva of contradiction or irrationality in respect of the nature of pure purușa Purușa mentioned explicitly in the fourth argument of the seven- 1Tattvavaisaradi.

90 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Metaphysics 91

teenth Kārikā of the Sāmkhyakārikā of Iśvarakrsņa. The philosophy of Samkhya is not merely a dualistic system : it is pati Miśra, due to sannidhāna, a reflection of consciousness is also a rationalistic and realistic metaphysics, because it mainly caught in the buddhi by virtue of which all buddhi-vrttis get apparent- depends on logical analysis and argumentation at every step. Being ly changed into consciousness; and this apparent change in the an orthodox system, it believes in the authority of the Vedas. But it character of vrttis gives rise to a sense of false identity between has not made any attempt to justify any of its views by appealing to purușa and buddhi. It is on account of this feeling of false unity that

the revealed texts. the buddhi-vrttis are understood by the aviveki purusa as part and The Samkhya arguments for the existence of purusa are based on parcel of its own nature. It is this false appropriation that has been Logic and Reason and they are quite in harmony with the dualistic described as the bhoktribhāva of purușa.1 Since the consciousness of

and realistic position of the classical Samkhya. purușa is the cause of manifestation of the modifications of buddhi Critics have expressed doubt about the applicability of the fourth in the waking state, it seems as if purusa is non-different from the argument to prove the existence of purusa. It is argued that if purușa intellect and there is only one principle, not two. This fact has been is by nature neutral and indifferent to all worldly happenings, then mentioned by Pañcasikhāchārya in his famous sūtra Ekameva darśa- how can we ascribe bhoktribhāva to purușa ? Both Vācaspati and nam, khyātireva darśanam. Although purușa-caitanya is radically Vijñānabhiksu have tried to solve this riddle in a manner which will different from the intellect, the two are fused together intimately so not be incompatible with the unaffected nature of purusa. as to give rise to a false sense of oneness which hides the real truth .: We should remember that the seventeenth kārikā has been employ- While explaining sannidhana, Vācaspati has said that this does ed by the author of Sāmkhyakārika to prove only the existence of not mean any form of spatial or temporal contact between purusa purușa and not its indifference and neutrality. This purusa is one that and buddhi. Rather it implies a special kind of capability or yog- has been caught in the snare of prakrti. It is a subject that reveals yatā on the part of purusa to enlighten the states and the processes naturally any object that happens to be in its proximity. [This of buddhi, as a result of which, in the state of ignorance, a false vişaya-sambandha, however does not prove that purușa is not indiffe- sense of ownership arises in the spirit. Hence the spirit appears as rent. On the contrary it is admitted that consciousness as a reveal- the pramātā bhoktā etc.2 ing principle only (Prakāšātmaka Caitanya) cannot but be neutral]. Vācaspati's view has been criticised by Vijñānabhikșu on the Perception of the visible world is not possible in the case of pure ground that mere cicchāyā in buddhi is not potent enough to account matter : nor is it possible in the case of pure Spirit. It is only the for the world-sense of the real purusa. If buddhi is only intelligised seemingly unified category of Spirit and matter (Jīva-purușa) by the single reflection of consciousness in it and there is not the that can be the perceiver of the Drsya through modifications of the double reflection of the buddhivrttis in spirit, then, truly speaking,

intellect. there can only be a relation between the image of purusa and buddhi Accordingly, to Vācaspati bhoktribhāva of such a jīva-purușa refers and not between buddhi and real purusa. In such circumstances, to its capacity of perceiving the world in a manner as if the latter has intelligised buddhi plays the part of both the revealer and the reveal- been imaged in its own vrttis. In Tattvavaiśāradi, Vācaspati has ed and as such this theory commits the fallacy of accepting one and introduced his unique conception of cicchāyā with a view to explain- the same category as both kartā and karma. Further, if yogyatā is ing the bhoga or bondage of purusa. Whether this cicchāya refers to believed to constitute the nature of purusa, it will continue even in a unique relation or to simple reflection of cit in buddhi has not the state of emancipation and, therefore, purusa's experience will been clearly indicated. For the purpose of this paper, we shall how- never come to an end. Consequently, emancipation will become ever, be using the term 'cicchāy' to signify the reflection of consci- meaningless. Hence, Vijñānabhiksu gives us his theory of double ousness in buddhi, although in practical life we do admit a reflection which explains the bhoktribhāva of jīva-purusa in a better distinction between chdyā and pratibimba. In the opinion of Väcas- 'Tattvavaisaradi, chapter 1-4. *Tattvavaisaradi, 1-4, 11-24.

106 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Metaphysics 107

cal elements, can be radiated outside both by the object and the sense-organ. Prāpyakāritā of the sense-organ, therefore, really of clay, changing into the form of a pot. This is called dharma signifies that the inherent tanmätras of the sense-organ meet the inhe- pariņāma. Again, all the changes may be viewed as existing in an rent tanmätras of the object. The inner sense-faculty is carried to the object as sublatent, actual and latent which may be termed as past, object through the tanmātras in a continuous process and is modified present and future. So, the appearance of a thing may be apprehend- in the form of the object. The whole of this process may be regarded ed from the point of view of the three stages, the unmanifested, the as vrtti and as such we may also hold logically that vrtti connects the manifested and the previously manifested. An object will come into

senses with their objects. being, it comes into being and it is no more,-these are the three The vrtti is neither a part nor a quality of the senses. It is not a stages which the object passes through, and these changes constitute quality because the quality of an object is static in nature. If vrtti is the laksana parināma of the thing. Then the thing passes through the regarded as a quality, then it will be incapable of connecting an stages of old and new and this constitutes its avasthaparināma. These indriya with its object and will thus fail to serve its purpose. Vrtti is three forms of changes are all that can be seen in the present form of also not a part of the sense-organ. If it is a part and if this part is transformation, and so the evolution of newer and newer stadia is no supposed to go out to the object then there will be a gap between longer found in this world. the mulasthana of the indriya and the object. The process will not be The most important point regarding the evolution of the Samkhya- a continuous one and hence there will be no knowledge due to dis- system is that although the ultimate evolving agent is regarded as sociation of the mulasthana of the indriya from the object. Hence an unconscious principle, it does not give us any mechanical inter- Bhikşu has said: 'visphulingavad vibhaktāmše rūpādi-vadguņaśca na pretation of the evolutionary process. The Sämkhya philosophy vrttih'. We may however regard vrtti as a substance because it is the asserts that all these changes or modification take place because of modification of a substance (indriya). If we stretch a piece of rubber the teleology inherent in Nature. To be of service to the purusa is the then the stretched portion (which is a modification of the original central purpose in Nature and this goal guides the whole course of piece) will be called 'rubber' and not anything else. Similarly vrtti is the process of evolution through its different stages. a modification by which indriya reaches the object and since indriya Further, according to the Samkhya theory, there is no distinction is a substance vrtti also may be regarded as a substance. Of course, between power and the possessor of power. So, Nature and all its Bhikşu has said: Vrttir dravya eveti niyamo nāsti' because vrtti means evolutes are both dravya and sakti (substantive entity and power). vyāpara i.e. function or kriyā. Even if we hold that vrtti is a function Mahat, ahamkāra and tanmātra are all substantive entities and are or kriyā, then also there is no harm in calling vrtti a substance. This not as such distinct from their 'respective' powers of transformation is because kriyā is always dravyāsrita and whenever there is kriyā, into the succeeding categories. Each of them is a substance and is there is dravya also. Moreover the Samkhya does not admit distinc- also a potential power which finds actual modification in the succeed-

tion and difference between kriya and kriyavan. ing product. Thus, mahat is intelligence-stuff but it is also the The gross atoms cannot be developed into any other order of exis- potential egohood that springs forth from it. All viśeșas and aviśeșas tence and so, according to the view of the Sämkhya, the evolution are, thus, actualisation of the latent powers, embodied in Nature-the of the world stops at this point. Evolution really means tattvāntara- ultimate source of inexhaustive potency and dynamism. parināma, and as this does not take place after the evolution of the Time and space, too, are not independent of prakrti; they are gross atoms, these paramānus constitute the last stadium in the evolu- dependent on the ākāśa and its upadhis in the form of finite objects. tionary flow of nature. These gross elements, however, undergo Limited space and limited time arise from the ākāśa and its upādhis ceaseless changes but these changes are either dharma parinām or in the form of finite objects. Limited space and limited time arise lakşaņa pariņama or avasthā pariņāma. Objects always change their from akāśā when it becomes limited and determined by the adjuncts, qualities or appearances as is generally noticed in the case of a lump but the eternal time and the eternal space are the same as Nature.1 1Sāmkhyapravacanabhāşya, II, p. 12.

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The minutest part of a limited time is called a moment and the minutest part of an object, an atom. The time that will be needed discussion on the problem of causation suggests these two principles by an atom for changing its own point of space is measured as one as its basic implications. The details of the theory are logically moment. All objects and conditions of the world are constantly woven from these two, although the Samkhya philosophers were not undergoing changes and the changes generate in our intellect, a sense conscious of this fact. What this theory of causation has sought to of sequence of events which we perceive as time. Each unit of change prove is not the existence of the effect as such, but the existence of is measured as one moment. Collocation of these moments gives rise the effect in the cause prior to its production. The verse nine of the to our concepts of hour, day, month, year etc. This act of measur- Sāmkhyakārikā runs thus "the effect exists (even prior to the opera- ing time and stating the evolutionary process in a temporal fashion tion of the cause) since what is non-existent cannot be brought into is wholly a function of our buddhi. Hence, in Yogasutra, succession existence by the operation of the cause; sincet here is recourse of the and collocation of moments have been described as buddhinirmāna. appropriate material cause, since there is no production of all by all, Modern physics also refers to this subjective nature of the measur- since the potent cause effects only that of which it is capable and able time and it describes time as the fourth dimension of space. since the effect is non-different from the cause."1 The subjective nature of Time has been beautifully illustrated by The first argument states precisely that the non-existent can never Einstein in his humorous exposition of the relativity principle to a be brought into existence. Blue can never be turned into yellow even non-scientist friend. His statement amounted to that if one was in by the combined efforts of a thousand artists. It is also a matter of company of some fine girls, an hour would seem like being just a our daily experience that one who wishes to produce a particular minute; on the other hand if one happened to be sitting on a stove, effect, seeks the appropriate material cause. For example, if any

a minute would appear like an hour. body intends to produce butter he chooses milk as its upādāna karaņa From the above discussion on evolution, it is clear that all objects and not water. Again, if the effect were non-existent in the cause of the world, without a single exception, are the creations of the prior to its production then anything could come out of anything three moving reals and consequently, at every moment every object which really does not happen in this world. Moreover, a cause of the universe is undergoing modification or change. The potential can produce that effect only for which it possesses potency and is, thus, becoming the actual in course of such transformation and power. Milk produces curd, because it is capable of producing movement, and the actual also is constantly becoming the sublatent. that particular effect. Lastly, the relation between the cause and This transition or passage, from the potential to the actual, is what is the effect is a relation of identity in difference and not of known as the causal transformation and, therefore, for grasping more mere difference without identity. Thus the cloth does not differ clearly the nature of the evolutionary changes, a consideration of the essentially from the threads-its cause. They are different in form Samkhya theory of causation becomes urgent and unavoidable. but identical in essence. So, the relation between the two is spoken of here as the relation of identity in difference. The effect emerges from

THE SAMKHYA THEORY OF CAUSATION the energy of the cause and is, therefore, of the same substance. The Sämkhya theory of causation is based primarily on the princi- Having taken into account all these points, regarding the relation of ple that whatever is non-existent cannot be brought into existence cause and effect, the Sämkhya-school holds that the effect is pre- and whatever is existent cannot be made totally non-existent. The existent in the cause. Before actual production, the effect exists in corrollary, that follows logically from this, may be stated thus: the the guna collocation in the form of potential energy, on account of effect that is produced from the cause is not totally dissimilar to it, certain obstacles which prevent its actualisation; but as soon as the as no intercourse is possible between two absolutely distinct barriers are removed, the energy gets a free passage and produces entities. Of course, these two tenets are not so fully and the necessary transformation known as the effect. Thus, conservation clearly stated in the Sämkhya philosophy, yet the whole trend of and transformation of matter and energy from one form to another 1Ķārika 9,

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seems to be the basis of the Samkhya theory of causation. The effect cause enters into the effect, the efficient cause exercises influences is only the cause transformed and modified in a new fashion. Like from outside for the removal of the impediments. Milk is the material causes always produce like effects, leaving no place for miracle and cause of the butter and the churning machine that removes all obsta- supernatural forces. The Samkhya theory of causation has, in this cles barring the manifestation of the said effect, is the efficient cause. respect, some similarity with the Aristotelian view of causation, as There are some barriers, however, which cannot be removed in the Aristotle also used to believe in the maxim: "Something can never ordinary manner and these act as the regulating forces for directing come out of nothing." Causation is nothing but transition from the potential being to the actual being. Hegel, too, has defined causation the course of the evolutionary flow through the definite channels. These are space, time, form and causality. We cannot expect a human as a passage from the implicit. to the explicit. Cause and effect are, indeed, the potential and the actual forms of the same matter and baby to be born of a cow simply because of the resistance offered by 'form' against such manifestation. If these "niyāmakas" (regulating

energy. Vācaspati Miśra has given some arguments to prove the tādātmya forces) were not in operation, then the current of evolution could flow in any and every direction. relation between the cause and the effect. Cloth is not different from This theory of causation, offered by the Samkhya-school, is termed the threads because there is neither conjunction nor separation between them. Both conjunction and separation are found to take as Satkāryavāda and pariņāmavāda as it states that the effect pre- place in objects which are different from one another. There is con- exists in the cause. Pariņāmāvāda is that form of satkāryavāda accord- junction between the well and the bucket and there is also separation ing to which the cause and the effect belong to the same level of between the Himalaya and the Vindhya. In the case of cloth and reality (samasattäka). Oil pre-exists in the oilseeds before production thread, there is neither conjunction nor separation. There is only and it is also an actual transformation of its causal form. This law

tādātmya between the two. of causation is at the root of the Samkhya conception of evolution. Further, the cloth does not contain in itself anything which makes Creation (srsti) is nothing but the process of transforming the its weight different from that of the bundle of threads. An object implicit in to the explicit form. Ahamkara remains in an implicit form differing in essence from another always possesses a different weight. in the mahat and the mahat in Prakrti. When the barriers are remov-

Cloth is not, therefore, different from the threads. ed, and the gunas are thrown out of balance, Prakrti changes into the form of the great principle, the great principle in the ahamkāra Now, since the cause and the effect are the undeveloped and the developed states of one and the same substance, all production and so on and so forth. is development and all destruction is disappearance into the cause. The three gunas are capable of producing unlimited diversities by There is no such thing as utter destruction or annihilation. means of their unequal aggregations. The respective proportions of But when we say that the effect exists in the cause before its crea- the three gunas in a particular combination is, however, determined tion, we must not suppose that it exists as such in the upādana or the by merits and demerits (accumulated as effects of the past deeds of the individual souls.) If the merits of an individual soul become very material from which it will be subsequently derived. It pre-exists in the cause only in the form of power or sakti and not in the form of powerful, then the constituent elements of his mind-body system full-fledged effect. Therefore, the effect, in its potential form or begin to change in quantity. Such a change is brought about by the removal of the obstacle in the form of adharma or demerit. When causal form, cannot serve the same purpose that can be served by it in its actual form. When the existing force, that obstructs the merit and demerit remain equally powerful, the individual soul is manifestation, is removed, the conserved power or energy receives a encased in a human body; but when merit becomes more powerful natural flow and appears in a new shape and new form (i.e. the effect). than the demerit, then the three gunas, constituting the body-mind Now, in an act of production, we generally make a distinction system of an individual soul change in such a manner that the indivi- dual comes to have a divine body (devaśarīra). Thus, it is clear that between the efficient cause and the material cause. While the material Prakrti possesses power to produce immense diversities, Diversities

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are implicit in prakrti which is anekātmikā in character. But since organs whereas the causal operation that produces manifestation of creation is regulated by dharma and adharma which are also the the jar is performed by the stick, wheel etc. disposition of prakrti, all diversities are not always manifested every- Moreover, when the jar is destroyed there is the non-existence of

where. the jar in the potter's wheel. Hence the principle "Nāsato Vidyate Now, although this law of causation reveals to us a continuous bhāvo, nā bhāvo Vidyatesatah" is not acceptable. process of becoming, yet at the very root of it, something eternal is Even if we admit the prior existence of the jar in the lump of clay clearly admitted: and this eternal principle, though essentially muta- in the form of energy, then also there will be difficulty. The question tive, is still the underlying support of all changes and mutations. will arise : what is energy or power ? If this power is different from Becoming is the becoming of some dynamic force and so the changes the nature of the jar (ghata svarupa) then we shall have to admit that here are not hanging in the air or nothingness. Change is merely the the jar can not exist in a form which is other than its real nature. change of form and not the production of something new. The If the power is the same as the form of the jar, then also the Jar Sämkhya theory of causation is, thus, different from the Nyaya-vai- cannot exist in the lump of clay prior to its production because no- śesika theory of asatkāryavādā according to which the effect is a new body perceives the Jar in the clay before it is produced. creation. It does not pre-exist in the cause prior to its production. Power or sakti really means (i) being possessed of suitability This is because according to the Nyāya-vaiseșika if the effect is (ii) being of the form of cause

existent (in the effect form) in its cause before production, the Karaka (iii) being in proximity of the assisting

vyāpara, becomes absolutely useless. Further, if the followers of the factors.

Samkhya-school say that the jar which is the effect does not pre-exist Power is also of two forms : in the cause in the jar-form but in the form of the lump of clay, then Avasthita śakti and āgantuka śakti. also there is no sense in saying that the Jar exists in its cause prior That which exists only in the cause is to be called avasthita śakti. to its production; because there is then nothing but the lump of clay. That which exists in the assisting factors is to be called āgantuka It is only by the operation of the causal factors that the jar comes śakti. The effect is the result of the combined action of both the

into being afterwards. powers. The effect itself cannot be called power because in that case To say that the effect, first of all, exists in the form of energy and the effect will be produced from the effect. One jar cannot be pro- is manifested afterwards by Kāraka vyāpāra is also not proper. duced from another Jar. What is the meaning of manifestation? Does it mean that the effect Suitability or fitness constitutes the form of the lump of clay (i.e. comes into existence in the form of the effect, or in the form of the cause) and so in the empirical world we behold the operation of samsthäna (arrangement of parts) or in the form of Pratīti or aware- the upādāna kārana niyama due to which a particular kind of effect

ness? can be produced only from a particular kind of cause. There is no If by manifestation, one has to adhere to the meaning of the first need for admitting the theory of satkārya .* alternative, then he has to admit that what was non-existent before Now, if we consider carefully the philosophical positions of the has, now, become existent. This is nothing but the theory of asat- Sāmkhya and the Nyāya School, we shall be able to find out logical karya. If the Samkhya-school still says that the jar existed before grounds for these different theories of causation advocated by them. production, then the causal operation becomes meaningless. If any body interprets the word manifestation in the sense of the Both Sämkhya and the Nyāya believe in the real transformation of second alternative, then it means nothing but avayava sanniveśa. the cause into the form of the effect and according to both the schools, The Nyāya-school believes in avayavas and in the paramānus. the cause and the effect belong to the same level of reality. The effect is as real as the cause. The Samkhya, however, believes avasthā Pratīti or awareness cannot be the sense of 'manifestation' because the causal operation that produces pratīti is performed by the sense- pariņamā whereas the Naiyāyikas believe in dravyapariņāma. Accord- *Nydyamanjarī.

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ing to the Samkhya, the causal substance is one and the effects are the so many states of one and the same substance rising and dying gunī). Now, the differentiating characteristic which the Naiyāyikas out continuously through the operation of the efficient causes and the will make use of to distinguish the samavāyī kārana from the asama- regulating forces (niyāmaka). There is tādatmya between the states vāyī karāņa, will be accepted as the kārya śakti of the upādāna by the and the possessor of the states. The states or the avasthas can, there- Sāmkhya school. fore, exist in the causal substance in the form of potency before According to the Nyaya school, the relation of samavâya is needed actual production. The Naiyāyikas, on the other hand, admit both for the samavāyī kāraņa. The relation of samavāya is a relation of cause and the effect as substances which are different and distinct inseparableness (ayuta-siddha). Ayutasiddhatva means that the effect from one another. Hence, one substance cannot exist in another is not found in any other substratum save the appropriate samavāyī

substance prior to its production. kārana. Now, the specific characteristic (viśeșatā) which will be need- ed to describe this ayuta-siddha nature of the relation of samavāya

Objections met between the cause and the effect, will be accepted as upādāna śakti If we reflect carefully upon the objections raised by the author of by the followers of the Samkhya school. While the Samkhya has made use of the tādātmya relation, the Nyāyamañjarī, we find that they are not really very serious. The Naiyāyikas have admitted the existence of 'avasthita śakti' in Nyāya has admitted the relation of samavaya between the cause and the upādāna kāraņa. The avasthita śakti has been described as kārya the effect. Tādātmya, in the Nyāya, means 'sarvatha abheda' but not śakti by the Sāmkhya-school. According to Sāmkhya, āgantuka šakti so in the Sāmkhya. Nor is the Sāmkhya conception of tādātmya of the Naiyāyikas simply removes the obstacles or pratibandhakas (Prakrti savarūpam virupam ca) identical with the Nyaya conception due to the presence of which the effect remains non-manifested. of the relation of Samaväya. While holding a discussion on the Sam- The Naiyayikas have not felt the necessity for admitting the exis- khya and the Nyaya view of causation, we should remember the tence of power or energy in the material cause to preserve upādāna- difference that exists between the Nyaya conception and the Samkhya niyama; but they have admitted the existence of something like conception in respect of tādātmya samavāya etc. If the words are yogyatā, avasthita śakti or prāgabhāva to uphold the existence of interpreted in the senses in which they are actually used in different upādāna-niyama in the empirical world. So, they have to admit that systems, then much of fighting and controversy over the issue of cau- there is something in the upādāna due to the presence of which a sality will surely disappear. particular material cause is capable of producing only a particular kind of effects. The difference of opinion arises only in regard to the Objections, raised by Venkatanath

nature of this 'something.' Venkatanath too, has criticised the Samkhya view that the cause The author of the Nyayamañjarī has raised questions in regard to is that wherein the effect already exists in an unmanifested form. In the presence of krya sakti in the causal substance. Similar alterna- the opinion of Venkatanath, causation is production. It is not the tive questions can be raised regarding the avasthita sakti of the manifestation of what is already existent in an implicit form. Naiyāyikas also. We can raise such questions: Is avasthita śakti of Production and manifestation are two different words having diffe- the form of the effect? or, is it of the form of the cause? The defects rent meanings. Production always implies origination of a single pointed out by the Nyāya in regard to the kāryašakti of the Sāmkhya effect by the whole of a karaka, whereas in the case of manifestation, will, then, creep into their own theory of causation. the manifesting agent can reveal many things existing in the same The Naiyayikas make a distinction between the Samavayī and the place and perceivable by the same sense with the help of other exist- asamavāyī cause. Such a distinction is not necessary in the Sāmkhya ing factors. (Tattvamuktā kalapa) A lamp, for example, can manifest philosophy because both are covered by the upādān kāraņaa. (This is many other things besides a Jar. If the Sämkhya says that the mani- because Sāmkhya does not admit any distinction between guna and festation of a specific object can be effected only by a special mani- festing agent with regard to a particular sense-organ and at a parti-

116 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Metaphysics 117

cular place where the manifesting agent exists, then this also is not contribute a good deal towards the production of the effect. If the tenable; because the Sämkhya has to prove, first, that only the Sämkhya holds that the efficient cause too, possesses the potency of potential energy is manifested in the form of the effect and that no producing the effect, then the Smkhya will have to admit that the

new thing is thereby produced. world exists in a potential state in the purusa as well (which is absurd The supporters of the Samkhya view may urge that instances from the Samkhya point of view). available in our daily life invariably prove that causation means The Samkhya cannot hold that the upadeya is always different manifestation of what is latent in the cause. The lump of clay can from the upadana as this system has not stated clearly what should manifest a Jar simply because the Jar is an implicit state in the be the real function of the material cause. The effect cannot be re- causal stuff. There is no instance in which a non-existent thing comes garded as a mere modification of the material cause (tadvikāratva) be- into being as a result of the causal operation. Venkatanath, however, cause in that case there will be perfect identity between the cause and says that this contention of the Sämkhya school is true only in res- the effect as the Samkhya has not admitted any distinction between pect of the absolutely non-existent object. It is only a sky flower that 'avasthāvān' and 'avasthā.' Again, upādeyatva of the upādāna cannot can never be brought into being by the operation of the causal agent. mean tajjanyatva (i.e. due to the operation of the material cause) be- No effect, produced from a cause, is non-existent in this absolute cause the effect will then be non-different from the efficient cause as sense. An effect becomes existent or non-existent only in relation to well. Upādeyatva cannot be tatsambandhitva either; because if there time. None can dispute the fact that the pre-existence of the effect in is perfect identity between the cause and the effect, then there can- the cause takes away from the causal operation all its importance not be any question of relation as relation always relates two relata and necessity for existence. Moreover, if a thing is prāksat, it can- together.

not at the same time be kriyamāņ. The Samkhya view that the relation of identity is to be inferred in The Sämkhya view of the satkāryavāda contradicts our perceptual all cases where relation of contact is non-existent, is also inadmis- experience. Had the effect been already existent in the cause, we could sible. The relation of contact exists in those cases where both the have perceived it. But the effect is perceived only when it is produc- terms denote substances. If one of the objects related is not a sub- ed. The cause is really the unconditional and invariable antecedent stance, then there cannot be any samyoga. The denial of samyoga, of the effect and this definition is quite competent to explain the however, does not establish the existence of the relation of non- production of an effect which was previously non-existent in the difference. The effect, which is not a different substance, is a state

cause. of the cause and as such is distinct from the cause. They are related Again, according to Samkhya, the relation of constant compresence together by the relation of aprithaksiddhi. There is neither samyoga (nityaprāpti) implies that there is the relation of upādāna and upā- nor tadātmya. deya between the cause and the effect. This argument too, is not sound. There is nityaprāpti between puruşa and prakrti but there is Objections met no upādāna-upādeyā relation between them. The follower of the The difference between the Sämkhya view and the view of Venkata- Sāmkhya philosophy may say that it is not nityāprāpti alone that nath arises because of the fact that the latter has used the word sat proves causation: this nityapräpti ought to be a case of ubhayaprāpti in a different sense. According to Venkatanath 'sat' is that which as well. This will not save Samkhya because in the Sāmkhyakārikā, exists at any time. If it is non-existent with reference to the present the union of purusa and prakrti has been compared with that of a time, it may be existent in future. If it is existent in regard to the blind man and a lame man which is a case of ubhayaprāpti. present moment, it may become non-existent in future. According to The Sämkhya describes the cause as the potential effect. This des- Sāmkhya, however, a sat object must be eternally existent. It can cription, however, is applicable only to the material cause and not only swing between potentiality and actuality, manifestation and to the efficient cause and other assisting factors, although they, too, non-manifestation. It can never be totally destroyed. Since the effect

118 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Metaphysics 119

is sat, it is always existent. Venkatanath, however, holds that the effect is a state of the cause. When this state is produced, it is exis- world. The upanisads have emphatically declared that purușa is by tent in the cause, and when it is destroyed or is not produced, it is nature immutable and non-attached (asamga). Admission of the non-existent. Sämkhya has used the word sat to mean eternal existence non-causal nature of purusa alone will keep intact the unchange- involving no time reference, whereas Venkatanath seems to have used ability and non-attachment of the spiritual principle. the word sat to mean existence in time only and not in the sense of Further, in the opinion of the Samkhya school, the cause can eternity which is not punctuated by time. Hence, in his opinion, a never be apariņāmī. In order to produce the effect, the cause must causal substance can be described as (sadasadātmaka). It is sadāt- either change its nature or it must exert active influence to bring maka in respect of that characteristic which exists in a specific time about the effect. The cause will, therefore, cease to be immutable. and asadātmaka in respect of its past and future states. Vijñana- The Nyāya-vaiseșika has ascribed efficient causality to God and in bhiksu in his Vijñānāmrtabhāşya, has admitted the sadasadātmaka the opinion of this school, the efficient causality does not impair the nature of the cause in the practical sphere. A causal substance immutable nature of God. This is because there is distinction and is sadātmaka in respect of the existent state; but in respect of the difference between power and the possessor of power according to past state which is no more and the future state which is yet to be, the Nyāya-vaiseșika school. Efficient causality of God is, thus, real

the causal substance is asadātmaka. and not false. Rāmānuja school, too, has admitted the real causality Further, the Samkhya philosophy has concentrated its attention of God who is both the efficient and material cause of the world: on the explication of the material cause; because its main task is to but God is not the changeable material cause. He is called upādāna establish Prakrti as the material cause of the whole world. Venkata- kārāna because He is the substratum of the material cause. Samkara, nath, on the other hand, has given equal importance both to the however, has not admitted causality as real. Perhaps, he realised, material cause and the efficient cause and has considered them to- that it would not be possible for him to preserve the immutability gether under the conception of causation. He has described causation of Brahman by such acceptance. This is because the advaita vedānta in such a manner as to include the efficient cause as well. The admits identity between the power and the possessor of power. efficient cause works on the material stuff from outside only and the Hence, God, in Samkara's philosophy has made His appearance as effect is not produced out of the potency of the material cause. The the false creator of a false world. The fact that Samkara has preserv- purpose of the Sämkhya is to prove that there is no production of ed the immutable nature of Brahman by denying all causality to it, an entirely new thing out of Prakrti; there is just the manifestation may be viewed as an effect of the influence of the Sāmkhya philo- of what is already potentially existing in Nature. So, the Sāmkhya sophy which was the first one in the fold of orthodox systems to has not taken the trouble of including it into its definition of the declare that immutability and causality could not belong to one and material cause. All the arguments of the Sāmkhyakārika have been the same tattva. directed to prove simply the truth that the material cause always possesses the potency of bringing into existence certain specific effects which are its own states.1 NON-CAUSALITY OF PURUŞA The Sāmkhya philosophy has never admitted causality of purușa. Puruşa is neither the material cause nor the efficient cause of the 1A detailed discussion on the topic of Venkatanath's refutation of the Samkhya conception of causation is to be found in my book A Critical Study of the Philosophy of Ramānuja.

Ethics 121, foreign elements which are by nature painful. In fact, this process of analysis, by means of which the subtle root principles and their essential natures and characteristic effects become manifested, has

Chapter 3 Ethics been deemed essential in all the philosophical systems of India. The Advaita Vedānta analyses human experience and declares that the THE SAMKHYA CONCEPTION OF SUBHA AND ASUBHA changeable causal principle involved in experience is false and, from

(GOOD AND EVIL) the transcendental point of view, non-existent or tuccha. The Sam- The most important feature of the Sāmkhya ethics is its emphasis khya, however, analyses experience and finds out that the two on moral considerations which, in its opinion, should spring from fundamental principles lying at the root of the world-experience ontological necessity. It particularly lays stress on the fact that in are real and are also of value in their respective spheres. Both can our moral life we should be guided by the principle : 'Whatever is therefore be given due recognition without doing violence to the real is good or 'subha'. This means that the conception of śubha Vedic tradition. Analysis of experience, thus, becomes a moral obli- must be identified with metaphysical reality; otherwise, morality can gation in the empirical life of every individual soul. Aviveka, which is never be of unquestionable authority. If moral consideration arises the creative force of Prakrti, is both epistemological and moral. It from social needs only, then morality becomes relative and condi- is the ignorance both of the true and the good. In the sphere of tional. Whatever is subha or good for the society now may not be knowledge, aviveka implies ignorance of the true, whereas in the so for it after a hundred years. Moreover, duties arising from social realm of morality it is nothing but ignorance of the good. Both good needs are of empirical import only, and are therefore helpful only in and evil are the necessary outcome of evolution of Nature on the

social relations. psychical plane, because buddhi possesses knowledge and ignorance, According to the Sämkhya, apavarga or liberation arising from detachment and attachment, virtue and vice, lordly powers and discriminative knowledge of Puruşa and Prakrti (seemingly unified absence of lordly powers, as its inherent disposition. Hence, in the through ignorance) is the real good or subha. It is this apavarga that Yogasūtra bhāşya (I. 12), it has been remarked : 'Vahati kalyāņāya is to be aimed at by man as the summum bonum of this life. Aśubha vahati pāpāya ca'-(The stream of mind flows towards good and or evil is thus anything that keeps a man away from the path of flows towards evil.) Truly speaking Präkrtic evolution is a struggle liberation. Both good and evil are metaphysical in the sense that against and a conquest of error in the sphere of knowledge and of they are the offshoots of Prakrti, the metaphysically real material evil in the sphere of morality. Worldly life of man is thus a life of

cause of the whole universe. constant struggle against error and evil so as to be able to reach the According to the Sämkhya, experience is the joint effect of two realm of truth and good. The bound life is a life in which sattva- subtle principles. If we wish to find out which of these two is res- guna remains in a subdued state, with the result that all moral dis- ponsible for the threefold miseries of life, we shall have to analyse orders and disabilities which are asubha or evil raise their heads and experience thoroughly to detect the subtle principles lying at the offer resistance in the path of spiritual progress. Moral life is the root. These subtle principles should, therefore, be discriminated life in which all these disabilities are gradually subjugated by the through analysis: and this discrimination will enable the experiencer ever increasing influence of the sattva-guna. Since sattva-guna, which to understand his own contribution to experience and also his own is of the nature of illumination, is more akin to spirit, purification of essential nature, as a result of which he will be able to differentiate the sattva-guna results automatically in the realization of the Atma- himself (as the experiencer) from his experience as well as from the svarupa. The bound souls are therefore striving ceaselessly to reach object. This discrimination, effected through analysis, is therefore the highest goal of Self-realization, which is the culminating point of śubha, since it enables the individual to dissociate himself from the evolutionary flow of Prakrti. The true nature of the soul can be realized through adhyātma-yoga.

122 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Ethics 123

It is through yogic discipline alone that the buddhi becomes sāttvika Prakrti, mahattatva ahamkāra, and the five tanmātras. In Yoga in nature, and the sāttvika buddhi is the only mirror that reveals the Darśana, tamas appears in the form of avidyā, which causes confu- true form of Atman. One has therefore to go beyond Prakrti with sion between spirit and matter. Tamas, thus, is not mere negation of the help of Prakrti. When moral disorders and disabilities arise in knowledge of the Self, but a positive abhedagrahana of two radically the intellect of an individual, he remains closely tight to Prakrti and distinct things. Samkara, too, has admitted the positive character of takes pleasure only in worldly enjoyments. These disabilities, how- avidyā, and, in this respect, there seems to be some similarity bet- ever, do not constitute the sole fate of a bound individual. In and ween the avidya of Samkara and the tamas of the Samkhya philoso- through his various births in various wombs, he enjoys Prakrti to phy. Even then, the difference between the two is very prominent his heart's content. Gradually, he realizes that Prakrti is of inferior and pressing. Avidyā of Samkara is positive and also not positive in value in comparison with Purusa. This is the stage of the emergence nature (bhāvābhāva-vilakșana). It is positive in the sense that it is of the sättvika buddhi. Liberation is just one step beyond. Since both different from negation of knowledge. It is also not positive, because bondage and liberation are brought about by Prakrti, the author of it is not an occurrence in the realm of reality. According to the

the Sāmkhyakārika (62) has declared emphatically : Sämkhya, however, the abhedagrahana or ekamevadaršana is positive

Tasmān na badhyate'ddhā na both in the sense that it is different from jñānābhava and in the sense

mucyate nā'pi samsarati kaścit : that this viparyaya is a real offshoot of Prakrti, occurring in a real

Samsarati badhyate mucyate ca world.

nānāśrayā Prakrtih- Further, avidya in Samkara Vedānta is the a priori root, whereas in 'Of a certainty, therefore, not any spirit is bound or liberated, nor the Samkhya the root cause is Prakrti and not tamas or avidyā. does any migrate ; it is primal Nature, abiding in manifold forms, Intellect or buddhi emerges from Prakrti, and it is from the intellect

that is bound, is liberated and migrates.' that tamas emerges and causes ekamevadarśana of Puruşa and buddhi- Thus, according to the Samkhya, the ethical life, which is real and vrtti .* In the opinion of the Samkhya, non-discrimination (aviveka) not false, remains confined to the sphere of empirical existence, i.e. of Puruşa and Prakrti is not a category different from Purușa and to the sphere of Prakrti, where the tragic confusion between spirit Prakrti in the manner in which avidyā of the Advaita Vedānta is diffe- and matter exists owing to error and evil. As soon as such errors rent from Brahman. Hence, the mula aviveka of the Samkhya school and evils are removed by spiritual culture, which results in the sub- may be regarded either as negation of discrimination or as vāsanā jugation of rajas and tamas, the sāttvika buddhi becomes luminous of false knowledge (mithyā-jñāna). enough to reveal the true nature of the Self, which then shines forth Moha is of eight kinds, and is characterized by love for eight as distinct and different from buddhi. These errors and evils (aśubhas) attainments such as animā, laghimā, etc. If an aspirant, after attain- that cause hindrance to liberation are termed viparyayas, aśaktis and ing aśțasiddhis, thinks that he has become a siddha purusa (a perfect tuștis, whereas siddhis, which fall under the category of śubha, are soul), then he is said to suffer from moha or delusion. Moha, thus,

described as effective means to liberation. corresponds to asmitā, of the Yoga philosophy. This asmitā, when

VIPARY AYAS it emerges in the intellect, brings about the downfall of the aspirant from the higher stage. Viparyaya or erroneous knowledge is of five varieties. These are : Mahāmoha stands for attachment to objects of sense. The objects tamas, moha, mahāmoha, tāmisra, and andha-tāmisra, Tamas, again, is of eight kinds; mahāmoha is of ten kinds: and each of the of sense are five in number. Each object of enjoyment, again, may remaining two, i.e. tāmisra and andha tāmisra is of eighteen kinds. be either divine or human (alaukika or laukika). There are thus Tamas refers to false knowledge, owing to which the individual soul ten objects of enjoyment; consequently, mahāmoha, too, is of ten identifies itself with one or another of the following tattvas, viz. varieties. Mahamoha corresponds to the affliction raga of the Yoga *Puruşa and buddhivrtti are apprehended as one.

124 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Ethics 125

philosophy. Tamisra is of eighteen kinds corresponding to eighteen objects of of sattva is always accompanied by a feeling of pleasure, the activity enjoyment, namely, the five tanmātras, the five mahābhūtas, and the of rajas by a feeling of pain, and the activity of tamas by a feeling of aștasiddhis already mentioned. These objects of enjoyment are imper- dullness and delusion. So, knowledge resulting from the function of manent. If an individual is deprived of any one of them, he dislikes the gunas is always of the form of pleasure, pain, or delusion, the it and gives vent to his unwholesome feeling. This is tämisra, or what form being determined by the nature of the object of knowledge. So, in the Yoga philosophy is known as the affliction dvesa of the mind. from the Samkhya point of view, there is no logical or psychological Andha-tāmisra is also of eighteen varieties, and relates to the same mistake in including moha, mahāmoha, tāmisra, and andhatāmisra in objects as tāmisra. This particular viparyaya stands for the fear of the list of illusions or viparyayas. These are the feeling aspects of being deprived of these eighteen objects of enjoyment by death or non-discriminative knowledge, caused by the abhedagrahana of the some external agencies. This corresponds to the affliction abhinivesa Purușa and buddhi. Avidyā or tamas is truly the false knowledge

of the Yoga philosophy. (viparyaya); moha or asmitā, mahāmoha or rāga, etc. are the feelings Of these five, tamas or avidya is the generator of the other four arising from this false knowledge and, as such, they are regarded as forms of viparyayas. It is due to abhedagrhhana* of spirit and matter products of avidyā by Vācaspati Miśra. As the Sāmkhya recognizes resulting in the formation of what in the Advaita Vedanta is known tādātmya between the cause and the effect, which are the differen1 as cidacidgranthi, that the delusive feeling of being a powerful ego states of the same causal substance, it can legitimately describe the who is out to enjoy the objects of sense arises in due course. Väcas- products of false knowledge as false knowledge. It is for this reason pati Miśra has remarked thus in his Tattvakaumudī1: 'Egotism that avidyā has been described as 'five-jointed by Vārsagaņya. and the rest partake of the nature of error; though, as a matter of fact, they are the products of error.' In fact, one may raise ORGANIC INJURIES (INDRIYA-VADHA)

an objection here by saying that from amidst that five viparyayas Now, viparyayas are not the only impediments which the aspirant mentioned in the Sāmkhyakārikā, we can compare avidyā alone to has got to overcome in the path of his liberation. Man is endowed false knowledge since false knowledge means false identification in with eleven organs so that, by using these organs, he can know the knowledge of two distinct and different principles. Tamas or avidyā world, can act on the world, and can churn out of the world the is thus cognitive in nature, and it alone can be termed as viparyaya. cream of happiness. Egotism or asmitā is more of the nature of feeling than of cognition, The external sense-organs are the channels through which infor- since it is identifiable with the feeling of vanity. Feeling of attach- mation regarding external objects reaches the intellect, the main ment, feeling of aversion, fear of loss by death or some internal power cognitive-affective-conative instrument of the individual soul. Hence, are affections and not cognitions. Why should these be described as defects in the organs will cause failure of the intellect, which will viparyayas or illusions? To defend the Samkhya, it can be said that, automatically result in confused knowledge and perverted feeling according to this school, buddhi is the principle that produces both and action. Such organic injuries are deafness, insensibility to touch, cognition and feeling, as a result of which the feeling aspect of blindness, numbness of tongue, insensibility of the olfactory nerves, experience often remains indistinguishable from the cognitive aspect dumbness, paralysis of hands, lameness, impotency, intestinal para- (Sukha-duhkhānubhavo hi bhogah, sa ca buddhau, buddhiśca purușarūpa lysis, idiocy, etc., consequent on the failure of the several sense- iva iti-Sāmkhyatattvakaumudī, 37). The whole structure of the organs. These are the eleven forms of disability. These disabilities Samkhya philosophy is based on the theory of the three gunas. The affect intellect indirectly through the organs, but the intellect has its operational relation between the three gunas is such that an activity own disabilities also. These are seventeen in number (nine atusțis and eight asiddhis: 'Buddheh saptadasavadhā, tușți-siddhānām vipar-

*Apprehension as one. 'Translated by G. Jha yayāt.'

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NINE TUSTIS AND THEIR VIPARYAYAS These belong to those who practise vairāgya, but nevertheless regard Acquisition of knowledge is not a very easy task. Even if one does nature, intellect, ego-sense, etc. as the spirit. These forms are called not suffer theoretically from false knowledge or does not possess any external, because they presuppose the existence of spirit without kind of organic disability, he may suffer from sloth and indolence, knowing what it is and appertain to what is not spirit. The objects owing to which he fails to proceed actively in search of further truth. of sense being five, the abstinence from these must also be fivefold. By reading the Sämkhya philosophy, he understands that the spirit These five abstinences are due to the perception of defects in the is different from nature, but he may be ill advised by his preceptor process of sense-enjoyment, involving as it does the trouble of earn- that realization of this discriminative knowledge comes as a matter ing, saving, wasting, pleasures and killing." of course. Being thus advised and being indolent by nature, the as- To acquire wealth, one has to take recourse to some sort of pirant may think that since liberation is sure to come by natural service, and service is always a source of pain to the servant. Con- process, there is no use making efforts. It is only a question of time tentment that results from the abstinence from the objects of sense or good luck or little spiritual practice. So he remains satisfied and owing to consideration of the painful nature of work is called pāra. does not make any further efforts for gaining spiritual realization. If wealth is acquired, then also it brings with it further trouble of This type of intellectual indolence is manifested in four forms of saving it from the hands of the thieves etc. Tusti owing to abstinence ādhyātmika tusti, viz., prakrti, upādāna, kāla, and bhāgya. arising from the consideration of such troubles is called supāra. Tuşți in the form of prakrti: Prakrti is sure to bring about libera- Again, one may acquire wealth and keep it in safe custody. Then

tion by her own efforts. also there arises the fear of its being spent up. Tusti owing to absti- Atușți in the form of Prakrti: Prakrti is not capable of bringing nence arising from this consideration is called pārāpāra.

about liberation. Further, when one becomes interested in sense objects, one's Tușți in the form of upādāna: Vairāgya is a disposition of buddhi, desires for pleasure increase ; the very possibility that these desires and so, if one embraces sannyāsa, he is sure to gain liberation. So, may not be satisfied brings about the abstinence that leads to the

there is no need for meditation etc. contentment called anuttamāmbha. Atusți in the form of reverse of upādāna: Intellectual purification Lastly, there is the idea that there can be no enjoyment of things by cultivation of vairagya can never bring about liberation. without the cruel process of killing animals. Trusti owing to the Tusți in the form of kāla: Even if one has recourse to the path of abstinence arising from the realization of the cruelty of this process renunciation, he can attain moksa only when the time is ripe for it. is called uttamāmbha. There is no need for under-going the troubles of renunciation before Viparyayas of these tustis, in the form of abstinence from sense-

time. enjoyment, will mean indulgence in sense-enjoyment without realiz- Atusți in the form of akäla : There is no time when the buddhi ing the defects inherent in them.

can bring about liberation. The reverses of the nine forms of tusti mentioned are admitted by Tusti in the form of bhagya : This refers to the feeling of satisfac- all as impediments to true knowledge. Vācaspati Miśra has, however, tion that arises from the following: 'Discriminative wisdom proceeds stated that these nine forms of tusti, too, are impediments to true neither from nature nor from any other means, nor does it depend knowledge. But J.N. Mukherjee, the learned author of the book

solely upon time, but it comes only by luck.' entitled Samkhya or the Theory of Reality,1 has asserted boldly that Atusti in the form of the reverse of bhägya : Luck can never give tușțis have been absolutely misinterpreted by Vācaspati Miśra.'

us liberation. 'Tuşțis are not disabilities, but means to power.' The reason for his Besides these internal tustis, there are five kinds of external tușțis. holding this view is the use of the word 'viparyayat' in the Samkhya- These are based on the five objects of sense-enjoyment. "The exter- kārikā (49). The last line of the said kārika runs as follows : nal forms are five, arising from abstinence from sound, odour, etc. 1op. cit., p. 87.

128 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Ethics 129

Saptadaśavadhā buddher-viparyayāt tușți-siddhīnam.' According to J.N. Mukherjee, the word 'viparyayāt' is to be inter- will arise in the mind of the aspirant when he will not be pro- preted in relation to both tusti and siddhi, and so the meaning will perly advised. So, these tuștis presuppose intellectual advancement to a certain extent, although their emergence is harmful for real be that the disabilities of the intellect will be caused by the rever- ses of both tusti and siddhi. Hence, in his opinion, tustis are powers progress. Atustis on the other hand, always imply intellectual back-

and not disabilities born of indolence and sloth. wardness and disability, which are as harmful as the defects in the organs. So, in the Sāmkhyakārikā (49), atușțis (or viparyayas 'Tusti is the sense of power born of the firm conviction that every- thing, the whole machinery of the universe, will submit to the demands of tușțis) and asiddhis (or viparyayas of siddhis) are specially of rational and moral meaning. Nature, conditions, opportunities, mentioned as buddhi-badhā, along with the injuries of the eleven and even destiny will follow the determined Purusa like a tame dog .... organs : Even error and evil are bound to provide nourishing conditions.' Ekādaśendriyavadhā saha I agree with J.N. Mukherjee in holding that tustis are helpful for buddhibādhairaśaktiruddiştā; liberation, but I differ from him in believing that they are helpful Saptadaśavadhā buddher-viparyayāt only up to a certain limit. Like virtue, tustis, which were vrttis of tușți-siddhīnām. the intellect, are also to be given up by an aspirant, if he seeks to Tutis which are on a different plane are counted as asaktis, but reach the supra-intellectual stage. It is due to this fact that Vācas- their viparyayas are included in the group of twenty-eight aśaktis, pati Miśra has described tuștis, too, as impediments; no aspirant mentioned in the Sāmkhyakārikā (49). Viparyayas of siddhis, too, are included in the list of asaktis and tustis and siddhi are mentioned can reach the final luminous stage if he is not wholly free from these intellectual dispositions. These are, therefore, pratibandhakas together as 'viparyayat tusți-siddhīnam'. Siddhis are always helpful like virtues. It is true that in the Sāmkhyakārikā, viparyayas of tușțis for liberation, and since tustis are mentioned along with siddhis, one (i.e. atusțis) are specially mentioned as aśakti. This is because atușți may be induced to think that tustis (like siddhis) are direct means to is not a negative term according to the Sāmkhya. Atuști does not liberation and that they are to be adhered to till the end. It is with a view to removing such a false impression from the mind of the merely imply the absence of tusti. It is something positive and very harmful in nature. An atusți always hampers spiritual progress and reader that Vacaspati Miśra has remarked that 'success (siddhi) is the most desired by all, and error, disability, and contentment are never comes to any help of the aspirant. The viparyaya of the prakrti form of tușți (i.e. Prakrti as moksadā) is not merely the impediments to success'. Sāmkhyakārikā (51) has also been under- absence of knowledge regarding the power of Prakrti to bring about stood by him as lending support to his previous view. The Kārikā says: The eight forms of success are : (1) reasoning; (2) oral ins- liberation; but this is a definite knowledge of Prakrti as amoksadā truction: (3) study; (4-6) threefold suppression of pain; (7) acquisi- (i.e. Prakrti as incapable of bringing about liberation.) Hence, atustis tion of friends: (8) and purity. 'The three before mentioned are are real aśaktis, as they always create difficulties and illusions which checks to success.' The last line, 'the three before mentioned are prevent a soul from undertaking any work favourable for liberation. Tușțis are, however, inspiring to a certain extent. This is because checks to success', refers to 'error, disability, and contentment'. And these act as curbs on the various forms of success, because tuștis do not occur when the Jiva Purușa remains in a state of com- plete aviveka. It is only when one aspires for liberation and is told they retard their progress; the success being likened to so many ele- phants whose movement is curbed by the goad (ankuśa) and thus that liberation is attained on the realization of the distinction bet- being opposed to 'success', the latter three are ever to be abandon- ween Purușa and Prakrti and that this realization comes to everyone ed'. (Tattvakaumudī). in the natural course, that he can be satisfied. In other words, he will Svami Narayana Tirtha has expressed a similar view in his com- have that form of contentment which is known as prakrti. In the same mentary on the Sāmkhyakārikā: 'Āsāmupādeyatvam viparyayāśakti- manner, the contentment in the forms of upādāna, kāla, bhāgya, etc. tuştīnām tu heyatvam jñāpayişyannāha siddheh pūrvo'nkuśastrividha

130 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Ethics 131

iti' etc. CONCLUSION

The same view is found in the Gaudapadabhāşya of the Smkhya- kārikā: 'Siddheḥ pūrvā yā viparyayāśaktitustayasta eva siddherankuša- In the empirical life, buddhī is the supreme jadaprakāśa that guides a man through all stresses and strains of life. It is the intellect that stadbhedādeva trividhaḥ, yathā hasti grhitānkušena vašī bhavati evam is producing both jñānavrtti and ajñānavrtti, dhārmikavrtti and viparyayāsaktitustibhirgrhīto lokojñānamāpnoti, tasmādetāḥ paritya- adhärmikavrtti, in the mental sphere of an individual, as a result of jya siddhiḥ sevyā, siddhestattvajnānamutpadyate tasmānmokșa iti.'1 which his life is becoming a constant struggle between knowledge and ignorance, virtue and vice, sattva and tamas. The seeds of bond-

SIDDHIS Siddhis are eight in number. They are: (1) üha; (2) śabda; (3) adhya- age as well as of liberation are rooted in the intellect, and it is the yana; (4-6) conquest of the three bandhas; (7) suhrtprāpti; and (8) duty of a bound soul to help the seed of liberation grow and bear fruits after rejecting the seed of bondage.

dāna. Hence comes the karma-yoga of the Samkhya philosophy. The Adhyana: This consists in reading properly the philosophical texts Sāmkhya believes in the inviolable law of Karma that creates and

with the help of the teacher. This is called tāra. sustains the empirical existence of man and his worldly affairs. Truly Sabda: This means receiving oral instructions from the teacher and also understanding fully the meaning of such instructions. This speaking, the law of Karma is a law of psycho-biological develop- ment of living beings; growth, development, and psychological

success is called sutāra. Uha: This consists in establishing truth by removing all doubts progress of life in different spheres of existence are fully controlled and determined by this law. Our actions are the dynamic manifesta- and objections with regard to it. This success is called tārātāra. tions of our psychological dispositions and physical energy. The Threefold suppression of pain: Three kinds of pain are to be sup- kind of action that a man chooses to perform is limited and deter- pressed. These three suppressions of pain are called pramoda, mudită, mined by his own psychical make-up; character or personality of

and modamāna. this life is the result of psychic dispositions of the previous life, and Suhrtprapti: One should not only establish truth by the right there is thus a continuous psychical inheritance. What a man thinks, process of reasoning, but should also discuss it with his fellow feels, and wills is therefore of very great importance for himself as students with a view to winning their agreement. This success is call- well as for the whole cosmos. It is by his own thoughts, feelings,

ed ramyaka. and emotions that an individual determines his own nature, existence, Dāna: Vācaspati Miśra has interpreted dāna as purity. By purity and environment in this life as well as in the next. Man is liberated is meant 'the process of placing discriminative wisdom on a clear basis, after having destroyed all doubts and mistaken notions minded only when he attains discriminative knowledge and gets out of the with different kinds of cravings or desires. This purity is not obtain- sphere where the law of Karma operates. Purification of intellect or able without the refinement arising from a long, careful, and uninter- the psychical apparatus is therefore regarded in the Samkhya as the most essential step towards attainment of peace and perfection. rupted course of practice; hence, the word dāna (purity) includes (as Of course, to a casual observer it may appear that the classical a means to success) this practice also.' This is called sadāmuditā. All the siddhis lead an aspirant to liberation, whereas reverses of Sämkhya is incapable of giving full satisfaction to the conative nature of man as, in the opinion of this school, the real doer of

these act as impediments. action is the unconscious intellect and not the inherently conscious Self. If the individual soul is not the real agent at least in the empiri- 'Error, disability and contentment, which have been mentioned before, are checks to success. Just as an elephant is kept under control with the help of cal life, he will never feel inspired to lead a good and active life; the goad, in the same manner, a person, who is under the influence of error, there is thus no scope for freedom of will, which is the basic pro- disability and contentment, remains in ignorance. So in order to attain libera- blem of morality.

tiọn he should try to avoid them. In reply to this, it may be pointed out that although the soul is

132 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Ethics 133

always asamga, still there is ample scope for free will and morality in the classical Samkhya. It is true that cognition, conation, etc. are action is a fact of experience, and this removal of desires is possible, dispositions of buddhi, and never really belong to Purusa even in the because these are foreign to the Self. The soul in its pure form is empirical life. But these dispositions are not the dispositions of a eternally free. Its freedom is unchecked. The soul is different from purely unconscious buddhi; these dispositions arise in buddhi only buddhi, and so it is devoid of vrttis and desires. Hence, the question when it is permeated with consciousness (i.e. only when the buddhi of freedom of will does not arise in the case of an emancipated soul. is intelligized). Moral life belongs to bound souls only. Now, owing Freedom of will and moral practices are necessary as means to to the emergence of asakti in the form of tamas in the bound soul, liberation. When liberation is attained, the means cease to have any the latter feels as if it is identical with the intelligized buddhi and significance. that there are not two principles but one (ekameva-darśana). Conse- According to Advaita Vedānta also desires belong to buddhi and quently, the bound soul falsely regards vrttis of buddhi in the forms not to consciousness. According to Nyāya, however, desires arise in of knowledge, desires, and action as its own. Liberation really means the embodied soul; but there also, moral practice is necessary so two things; (1) not to have the feeling of 'myness' in relation to all long as there is sarīrābhimāna. This sarīrābhimāna is due to erroneous desires seeking materialization in the form of actions: (2) not to be knowledge. According to Rāmānuja also, the freedom of will, which ignorant of the real source of these desires. So long as the bound is the basis of morality, is prakrtika (natural), and is therefore heya soul lives in the world of 'as if' (iva), he never feels that these from the point of view of the soul. Thus, we can say that the freedom desires are not his own desires. Moral discipline is necessary to make of will does not have any place in the metaphysical or transcendental him realize what he has forgotten (i.e. to make him realize that the sphere from the point of view of all orthodox systems of Indian soul is asamga and that all desires belong to buddhi, which is distinct philosophy. But it has a place in the empirical sphere as a means to and different from that soul). Now, so long as the jiva does not the highest end in all the systems, including the Sāmkhya. realize that these desires are the modifications of the buddhi, he feels as if he is free in willing and acting according to his will. So he LIBERATION

thinks himself responsible for his actions, makes a distinction bet- Our life, on earth constantly swings like a pendulum between ween śubha karma and asubha karma, and undergoes experiences of pleasures and pains, happiness and misery. Even if it is possible for pleasures and pains resulting from actions falsely owned by him a man to shun all other pains and pleasures, it is impossible for him through ignorance. Moral responsibility does not require that indivi- to resist decay and death. Of course, all men earnestly strive to dual soul must have freedom of will in the metaphysical or real remove every kind of misery and pain, but so long as we remain on sense. Even a false belief of freedom of will may inspire a human the empirical level only, we cannot enjoy unmixed and pure being to practise moral rules, since they do not know. that their pleasure or happiness. This is the most important truth regarding belief is false. The rope-snake causes fear in the mind of the per- our life on earth. So, if a man is to rise above the level of sorrowful ceiver, as a result of which the perceiver runs away from it. Moral existence he must, first of all, realise that all worldly pleasures lead responsibility is due to false identification of the soul and the intel- to sorrow and that no worldly means can remove forever the suffer- ligized buddhi, and it is because of this moral responsibility that there ings of this empirical life. The Sämkhya system has started with an is scope for moral purification, that there is the enjoyment of analysis of three kinds of misery that generally destroy the pleasures pleasures and pains according to karma, that there are births and of life. These are the adhyātmika pain, adhibhautika pain, and rebirths, and so on. Moral purification is necessary for removing adhidaivika pain. The first kind is caused by the disorders of the false identification of the soul with the intelligized buddhi, and this mind-body system. It includes under it fever, anger, greed, fear etc. can be done by leading an honest life and performing niskāma karma. The second is produced by external agents like other men, beasts, That the soul can destroy desires and can perform disinterested natural force etc. The third kind is produced by supernatural causes e.g., the pains inflicted by ghost and demons etc.

134 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Ethics 135

All these evils of life cannot be removed forever either by science of binding such a self to this life of samsära. It should, however, be or by religious practices and other known means. The performance remembered that with the attainment of release by a single purușa of sacrifices according to vedic rites, may remove pain for a short prakrti does not cease to function. There are other purusas who are period but as these actions involve the sacrifices of animals, they still to be liberated and Nature goes on working in her own way for must ultimately produce pain and no pleasures. But this sort of re- the release of those bound souls. The released purusa too perceives lief, too, is very short-lived, as there will be recurrence of such prakrti, but is no longer deluded by her powers of creation. In that mental and physical ailments. The knowledge of science and perfor- state of release, both the principles exist: What has been brought to mance of religious sacrifices, cannot, therefore, lead to the final an end is the delusion under which purusa thought that the evolutes annihilation of sufferings and pains, though these ordinary means of nature were its own creation and therefore identical with itself. have a limited value in making life at least tolerably happy on this earth. Hence, the question arises, "how are we to attain absolute Now, the question arises, how is this beginningless delusion to be removed? Or how is tattvābhyāsa resulting in liberation, to be done? freedom from all pain and suffering?" The Sämkhya says that all The tattvābhyasa, prescribed for liberation embraces yogaprakriyā our misery is due to ignorance. Buddhi and purusa are distinct and different, but through ignorance a seeming unity between the two is which has been fully discussed in the Yogasutra of Patañjali. In the initial stage, the study of the Samkhya philosophy will wrongly established (ekamevadarśanam) as a result of which sorrows and sufferings, pain and misery which really belong to buddhi, seem provide the aspirant with paroksa jñāna (Mediate knowledge) of the distinction between puruşa and Prakrti. The aspirant will receive to follow purusa from birth to birth. It is necessary, therefore, that through tattvabhyasa, we should form in buddhi, the true conception instructions on the Sämkhya state from the preceptor. This is the of the nature of purusa and then with the help of this saving know- stage of śravana. Next stage is the stage of manana. This is the stage of rational reflection. The aspirant will reflect on the truths learnt ledge, we shall be able to attain liberation from the sorrows and from the Sāmkhya sūtra rationally; he will drive out all possible

sufferings of this world. objections that can be raised against the Sämkhya by reasoning and Change is in Prakrti alone and it is the body that grows old and arguments (yukti & tarka) with the result that the truths (gained dies. The spirit is ever free but through misconception, bondage and from the Samkhya philosophy) will become firmly rooted in his mind. liberation are attributed to the self. When the self is conceived of This is the stage when the aspirant develops a firm faith and respect as bound and fettered, it experiences all the sorrows and joys that (śraddhā) for ātma sākșātkāra. This śraddhā automatically results in really happen to its case, i.e. the body. When discriminative know- virya or eagerness and mental capacity to undertake the difficult task ledge is attained through tattvābhyāsa, Nature ceases to evolve in of self-realisation. The vīrya, in its turn, increases dhyānaśakti or regard to the aspirant, the seeming unity is destroyed and the self the power of meditation. The aspirant, then, becomes fit for attain- attains release which is the final goal of Nature's evolution. It is ing the stage of samädhi which is the stage of pure knowledge and through a long course of spiritual training that the intellect becomes self-realisation. free from the soiling influences of rajas and tamas,1 it becomes almost Hence, after the stage of manana the aspirant enters into the stage similar to the purusa in purity and transparence. In that purified of nididhyāsana or the stage of actual yogic practice which in due condition of the buddhi, is reflected the true nature of the spiritual course, results in immediate knowledge of ātmasvarūpa. principle and so the 'buddhi' feels itself to be different from and The eight limbs of the yogic process are to be followed strictly and unrelated to the pure and transcendental soul as a result of which in order: of course, yama and niyama are to be practised (in a sense) ignorance of the jīva is totally destroyed. Under such circumstances, even in the initial stage to become the adhikārī for tattvajñāna. This Nature turns its back on the liberated purușa and ceases its activity is because a man, with a pure intellect alone, is capable of grasping 1Rajas and Tamas cannot, however, be totally eliminated but their presence the true significance of the scriptural truth. Before coming to the

will be harmless for all practical purposes. preceptor, the aspirant should have a broad general training in

136 . Classical Sämkhya : A Critical Study Ethics 137

ethical disciplines-a training which is absolutely necessary to develop will be perceived by him not in its pure form but in a state of indis- human character; otherwise there cannot be much hope of success tinguishable union (avivikta state) with the subtle parts of Prakrti. in the stages of spiritual life. But when the aspirant follows the path This is what happens to videhalayī and Prakrtilayī yogins who still of astānga yoga, the ethical disciplines prescribed for yogic sādhanā suffer from aviveka. Such a samādhi which has ignorance at its root and devotional practices are to be performed rigidly and with con- is known as bhavapratyaya. But the aspirant, who has got his viveka-

centrated attention. jñāna firmly rooted in him, by śravana, manana etc. and has also been When the aspirant will rise upto the mental level of one pointed able to perceive the distinction between caitanya and the gross matter attention and will be able to remain there steadily for a long period of the world is, now, in a position to perceive the śuddha svarūpa of time, he will become the fit person to attain samadhi with the help (pure form) of the subtle substances of the world and also of the of attention and contemplation (Dhyāna, dhāranā). The samādhi that true form of consciousness. Although he will be able to perceive takes place in the ekāgrabhumi of the citta is called samprajñāta indriyas in this stage, still his egosense or ahamvrtti will not be anni- samādhi which again, involves four stages. These four stages are hilated. Ahamvrtti which lies at the very root of our practical life and known as four forms of concrete communion (samprajñāta samādhi). without which dealings in the practical sphere, cannot be carried on, In the first stage, there is the perception of gross substances and is very firmly rooted in us. Removal of egosense, therefore, needs also of the distinction between consciousness and the gross sub- strenuous spiritual sādhanā. This ahamvrtti nirodha becomes the stances of the world. Consciousness, no doubt, will be still visaya of special sādhanā of the third and the fourth stages of samprajnāta the cittavrtti (since caitanya will be reflected in the vrtti of the gross samādhi which are known as ānanda samādhi and asmitā samādhi. object): even then, consciousness will be perceived as something In the stage of ānanda samādhi, the object of meditation is purely different from the gross substance. When an individual remains in sāttvika ahamkāra. Due to the application of dhyāna, dhāranā and the aviveki stage, he can perceive neither the pure consciousness, nor samādhi to svāttika ahamkāra, rajas and tamas parts become practi- the gross object in its pure form. He, then, perceives both conscious- cally ineffective, only the pure sattvāmśa of ahamkāra remains opera- ness and gross matter in a mixed form. So long as the citta does not tive. Sattva is of the nature of happiness or bliss. Hence, in the stage become steady, consciousness in its pure form cannot be perceived. of änanda (due to increasing activity of the sattva guna) the aspirant Such perception, therefore, occurs only in the stage of yoga. By experiences a pleasurable feeling all the time. This happiness is pure repeated performance of the triad of attention, contemplation and happiness (unmixed with the effects of rajas and tamas which have meditation, this spiritual progress will become steady and firmly become inoperative). Many aspirants become interested in the enjoy- rooted in the personality of the aspirant and he will be able to ment of this unmixed happiness and prefer to remain in this stage. perceive the difference that exists between consciousness and the They do not make any more efforts to reach the highest stage of gross matter. This stage is known as savitarka stage in the yoga liberation. The happiness enjoyed in the änanda stage is inferior to

philosophy. the bliss which forms the essence of consciousness. Since self-realisa- The next stage of spiritual progress is the stage of savicara when tion is regarded as the highest and the best, the self must be by practising the triad of attention, concentration and meditation, admitted as the object of love and adoration. That which is very the aspirant will be able to perceive the difference of consciousness dear to us, is surely of the nature of ānanda. (Yat paramānan- from all subtle things of the world. Here, we should remember that darūpo na bhavati sa niratiśaya premavișayo na bhavati, Pañcadaśi). if anybody follows the path of yoga without possessing tattvajñāna1 Hence, to attain self-realisation, one has to go beyond the third stage he will not be able to have a perception either of the mahābhūtas or of the samprajñata samādhi. He has to make concentrated efforts to of the tanmatras, indriyas etc. in their pure form. Consciousness too, rise up to the asmita stage which is the final stage of the concrete 1i.e. the parokșa jñāna of the difference between Jada and Caitanya is not union or samprajñāta samādhi. By the time the asmitā stage is

properly attained by the aspirant. reached, the egosense that individualises a jīva, comes to an end; its

138 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Ethics 139

cause however, (in the form of mahattattva permeated with con- sciousness,) does not cease to be. By applying the triad of attention, manifested in its pure form: vivikta1 condition is attained and snare concentration and meditation, the aspirant is capable of having a of prakrti is totally removed. This is the stage of jīvanmukti. The perceptual knowledge of the pure mahattattva and also of its distinc- jīvanmukta has risen upto the stage of svarūpa avasthana but this tion from consciousness which is the svarupa of the aspirant. This is stage has not become firmly rooted as yet. Hence, the jīvanmukta the stage which cannot be properly described in words. In this stage will have to make efforts to attain this svarūpa sthiti permanently. also, there will be some vrttis of the form of jada (unconscious) along Vrtti should not rise (even for a moment) either spontaneously, or with the caitanyavrtti but there will be no awareness of what this by efforts. This is the first stage of asamprajñāta samādhi or the stage jadavişaya is. Just as in the cases of some of our dreams, we can of jīvanmukti according to Sāmkhya-yoga. How long this stage will simply remember that we have dreamt of something but what this continue will depend upon prārabdha karma. something is, is beyond our recollection, in the same manner, in this When the asamprajñata state or the nirvrttika state will become stage also, there is only the manifestation of the vrtti; the object of steady and fixed, vrttis will be stopped for ever. There will no more, the vrtti is not known. It is because the object or the grāhya is not be any grahana and consequently the feeling of grahitā, grahana, too, manifested that there is no differentiation between grahitā, grahana will come to end. Citta or buddhi in this stage, will stop functioning and grähya even though the intelligised intellect in the form of grahitā for ever and so it will start contracting which will ultimately result in and vrtti in the form of grahana are manifested. Vrtti is no doubt the merging of the citta in its causal substance (i.e. the gunas). So manifested; even then we cannot describe it, because its object is not long as buddhi persists in its buddhi form (although it may be con- manifested. It appears as nirvișayaka vrtti. It is because such vrtti is tracted to a considerable extent), the jīvanmukta will continue to live beyond the comprehension of human beings that the Nyaya-vaisesika in this world: because there will still be the vital function due to the and Rāmānuja have not admitted the existence of nirvişayaka existence of the citta. As soon as citta gets merged in the gunas, the

jñāna. vital function too stops automatically and the yogi is separated for- ever from the body. This is the stage of videhamukti according to

Asamprajñāta Samādhi Sāmkhya-yoga. Samprajñāta Samādhi is not the final stage of the svarūpa avasthāna of the purusa because in this stage, there is still the manifestation of consciousness through vrtti. Manifestation of conciousness without vrtti is what is described as svarūpasthiti of the purușa in the sūtra "Tadā draştuh svarūpe avasthānam." Hence the aspirant has to reach another stage of yoga which is known as asamprajnta stage or the stage in which purusa is mani- fested without vrttis. Such a manifestation of purușa is possible only when all vrttis are stopped. In the stage of samprajnāta samādhi, vrtti annihilation starts and progresses step by step and finally it is completed in the asampra- jñāta stage of samādhi. It is because all vrttis are stopped in the asamprajñāta stage, that this stage is known as the stage of vrtti- nirodha. Now, such a state, in which all vrttis are stopped and con- sciousness is manifested without vrttis, lasts (in the beginning) for a short duration. With the disappearance of all vrttis, consciousness is 1Vivikta: Differentiated.

Theology 141 adhyakșatā in the advaita vedānta. Now, God, in the advaita vedānta, is consciousness, qualified or limited by samaşți antaḥkaraņa or māyā. Brahman, by accepting

Chapter 4 māyā or Samașți antaḥkaraņa as a qualifying adjective (Višeșaņa)

Theology appears as the creator, preserver and destroyer of the world. It is because māyā becomes a viseșaņa or adjective of God that He is regarded as the adhyaksa of māyā. Consciousness, qualified by MEANING OF SAMKHYA ATHEISM (NIRISVARAVADA) samașți antaḥkaraņa (samaști antaḥkaraņa viśișta caitanya) is the The classical Sāmkhya represented by the Sāmkhyakārika, Sām- creatór God. When māyā becomes simply a limiting adjunct (upādhi) khya Stra etc. is regarded as Nirīśvara Sāmkhya and it is held that of consciousness, the latter, then, appears as Iśvara sākși and 'serves there is no place for devotion and worship of God in the classical as the steady revealer and steady background of creator God. This

Sāmkhya. is the position of the advaita vedanta in regard to God. It is, of course true, that the Samkhya School has not admitted In the philosophy of Samkhya, however, we find that conscious- God as the efficient and material cause of the world as has been ness of purușa reflects through samasti buddhi and thereby makes done in the advaita vedänta. Even then, it is not proper to say that samașți buddhi its own avacchedaka. This consciousness can be there is no scope for devotion and worship of God in the classical compared with the Hiranyagarbha of the advaita vedānta. Hence, in Samkhya. The term "Niriśvara" really implies that according to the Sämkhya too, consciousness can be regarded as the adhyaksa of classical Samkhya, there is no other conscious principle, besides the the buddhi tattva or samasti buddhi. When this samasti buddhi serves purușa. This purușa has been described in the upanișads as asamga. simply as a limiting adjunct of purușa caitanya, then the latter So to keep this upanișadic conception unimpaired, the classical assumes, simply, the form of sāksi. According to Sāmkhya, samașți Sāmkhya has not described purușa as the efficient and material cause buddhi or mahattattva possesses lordly powers (aiśvarya). Hence, of the world. (In the opinion of the Samkhya school the cause is there is no harm if purușacaitanya, which has samasți buddhi as its bound to be changeable in nature). Although purusa has not been avacchedaka, is accorded the place of God of the advaita vedānta. described as the cause of the world, still purusa is absolutely necess- By worshipping such a God, the aspirant may be the possessor of ary for creation in the sense that Prakrti becomes vitalised and fit many purușārthas except mokșa or liberation. for evolution due to the sannidhi of Purusa. Hence, the function of Truly speaking, the aspirant who follows the course of Samkhya- the advaitic God is, here, done by the Purusa. According to advaita Sādhanā, has to reach samasti buddhi by passing over vyasți buddhi vedānta, creative urge does not belong to Brahman in its pure form. (individual intellect). In the initial stage, he should realise that his It is the māyopādhika Brahman that really palpitates with the crea- consciousness, which is the revealer of his body, is different from the tive urge. The creative desire is a vrtti of māyā. The Sāmkhya view, body. Next, he should realise that his consciousness is also different if understood properly, is not very different from the view of the from his sense-organs and the mind. Even when this type of reali- advaita vedānta. According to Sāmkhya, the creative desire may be sation dawns upon the aspirant, he still feels that his consciousness supposed to arise in the cetanavista Prakrti.1 Creation is the result is non-different from his ego-sense (ahamvrtti) and the intellect. of this creative urge. According to advaita vedānta also māyā is the Hence, in this stage, also the aspirant thinks of himself as an indivi- real material cause of the world. It is because Saguņa Brahman or dual. When, by means of samprajñāta samādhi, this ego-sense dis- God is the adhyakşa2 of māyā that He is said to participate in world- appears, then the aspirant feels his non-difference from the Samasti creation. The question, therefore arises, what is the meaning of this buddhi: just as the worshipper of God of the advaita vedānta reali-

*Prakrti permeated with consciousness. ses his identity with all jivas, as soon as his feeling of individuality

'Adhyakşa: One who exercises supervision. and separateness disappears, in the same manner the aspirant, who

142 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study Theology 143

feels his non-difference from the Samasti buddhi only, experiences a The world is so full of sins and sufferings that it cannot be said to be sort of sāmyabhāva (sameness) with all things and beings of the the creation of a good God who works only for the benefit of his world. God of the advaita vedanta is the yoni of the whole world: own offsprings. mahattattva of the Sämkhya too, is regarded as the seed of the whole The 5th chapter contains some tenets, which when interpreted, world. After reaching the state of non-difference with samasti buddhi, give us the following view : the aspirant very easily passes on to the stage where he realises his God is supposed to create the world of pleasures and pains for all distinction from the samasti buddhi and prakrti. If Māyopādhika living beings in accordance with the law of karma. The wrong doers caitanya of the advaita vedanta can be the object of devotion and are punished with pain and suffering but the doers of good deeds are worship, then the samati buddhyavacchinna caitanya of the Sāmkhya blessed with pleasures. If this is so, then let karma alone become the too can inspire an aspirant with devotion and can very well serve as agent of the products of action: what need is there of a creator God?

an object of bis upāsanā. Here, it is clear from these arguments that the Samkhya school is It is true that Väcaspati Miśra in his commentary on the Sāmkhya- not in favour of recognizing any conscious principle as the cause of kārikā no. 56. has refuted the existence of God. In the first and the the world because consciousness cannot remain immutable if causal- 5th chapters of the Sāmkhya pravacana sūtra, too, we meet with ity is ascribed to it. When purusa is capable of vitalising Samaști refutation of the existence of God. But all these refutations simply buddhi by Sannidhi only then where is the need for admitting another indicate that in the opinion of the Sämkhya school, there is no conscious principle as the efficient and material cause of the world? conscious adhyaksa1 of prakrti excepting purușa. The arguments as Purușa cannot be regarded as cause because purușa is an immutable stated in sutras of the 1st chapter of the Sāmkhyapravacanabhāsya, principle. The creative urge does not arise in pure purușa: This urge

run as follows : belongs to Samasti buddhi permeated with consciousness. Intelligised

(a) "On account of the non-proof of Iśvara." buddhi-tattva is actively and independently producing power in the (b) "As Iśvara can be neither free, nor bound, nor be anything of form of aviveka. When the creative desire and also the creative a different character, there is no proof of his existence." activity belong to intelligised mahattattva, then there is no sense in (c) "If free from desires and attachment He cannot be the crea- describing purusa as the creator God. The word God stands for that tor, and if bound, He must be as ignorant as we are. So, He conscious being who, of his own accord, becomes the material and

cannot exist as the creator God." the efficient cause of the world. (d) "The sacred texts, which speak of Iśvara are either glorifica- In the advaita vedānta too, it is a false Godhood (Iśvaratva) which tions of the free self or homages paid to one made perfect by has been ascribed to Brahman. The desire for creation and also the

yoga". creative activity belong to Māyā, but these are superimposed on The above arguments may be summed up in the following Brahma due to ajnāna. Brahman is regarded as world-cause only

manner. illusorily (vivarta kāraņa). In other words, Brahman is cause in name God does not exist, for if He exists, he must be either bound or liberated. A bound spirit cannot be accepted as God because of his only and not in actual fact. Of course, according to advaita vedānta, it is the mayopādhika Brahman who prossesses lordly powers. Māyā, attachment with merit and demerit, nor can a freed soul be regarded in the form of potential creative power belongs to God: so, in the as the creator God, as He would have no desire to act and create this advaita vedānta, mayopādhika Brahman is regarded as the creator manifold world. Hence, God cannot be admitted as the agent in the God. The Sāmkhya school does not believe in vivarta vāda or the process of creation because of his liberated and non-attached nature. illusory modification of the cause in the form of the effect. In the Nor can we say that God has undertaken the task of creating this opinion of the Samkhya, causality and mutability cannot be separated universe disinterestedly for the good of his own creatures only. even in thought. Hence, in the Samkhya, lordly power, creative

1Supervisor. potentiality and creative activity etc. belong to intelligised Prakrti.

144 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study In the act of creation, Prakrti is the primary principle (Pradhana). Prakrti is the world-cause and purusa is asamga in the strict sense of the term. Thus from the above discussion, it becomes clear that Samkhya too can claim to have a God in the form of intelligised mahattattva .Appendix 1 The Problem of the Existence of God in a manner similar to that of the advaita vedānta where, too, Brahman by nature does not possess any aiśvarya. Just as there is scope for Iśvara upāsana in the advaita vedānta, in the same manner, there is scope for devotion and worship of God in the Samkhya. By means of upāsanā the follower of the Samkhya, too, will be able to Questions concerning the existence and reality of God are very

enjoy the fruits prescribed by the scriptures. significant from the point of view of human life. Those who believe in In the case of avatāras like Ram, Krishna etc., there is no origina- God, believe also that the ever-shining light of God is in every living tion and destruction of consciousness: but these avatāras possess being. The Divine Light or the Light Eternal is the central fact in buddhis (the upadhis) which are endowed with highly developed human-life and all higher values which adorn the character of human moral excellences and extra-ordinary powers. It is because of their beings, are believed to be the finite crystallization of Divine Good- extra-ordinary buddhiśakti, that they are regarded as sarvajña. There ness. God or Divinity is the source of the world and life and is also is better scope for admission of such avatāras in the Sāmkhya Philos- the protector and benefactor of the entire creation. Being Almighty ophy, than in the advaita vedānta. In the advaita vedānta, conscious- and Eternal, God is supposed to be absolutely independent and ness is one. Distinction in the forms of Brahmā, Vișņu and Maheś- uncaused. vara is due to differences in the upadhis whereas in the Sāmkhya Human beings are finite, frail, limited in power and dependent Philosophy, which admits plurality of selves, there is difference not entirely on external conditions which are wholly beyond their control; only in the upädhis but also in the jivapurusa or souls which become because of their finitude and limitation they are incapable of ful- associated with the upadhis. These avataras are the objects of love filling all aspirations of their minds in the material world. Their

[ and worship. desires are often frustrated, their powers fail, their health is frequent- ly affected by diseases, which finally destroy their material bodies which are so dear to them. These evils of life are sure to befall each and every human being and the thoughts of these evils always cast a gloom on the life of the average man. This utter helplessness in the midst of the various turmoils of the worldly-life leads him to think of a Supreme being not only as a source of the world but also as a merciful, loving and responsive Being who (Through mercy) comes into intimate personal contact with the needs and sorrows of all who love Him and pray to Him with humility and devotion. The Utilitarian approach of the average man The average man believes in the existence of God because God is, for him, the only power which can enrich his worldly-life with various kinds of enjoyable pleasures, after removing all obstacles that may crop up in the way of his enjoyment. His devotion to God is, thus, utilitarian. It is based on the worldly-relation of 'give and take." He

146 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study The Problem of the Existence of God 147

offers prayer to God and wishes to receive through His agency, God only and nothing else. He lives and moves and has his being in happiness and prosperity in his mundane life. It is because of this God. Such is the approach of a truly religious man to the problem utilitarian character of his devotion to God that the average man is of the existence of God. Theocentric religion has an inner tendency always found to swing like a pendulum between belief and disbelief to become a value-centric religion because God is regarded as the in God. When he prays to God and gets what he asks for, he declares source and ground of all moral and spiritual excellences. Religion emphatically the reality of a Divine Personality. When he is baffled involves not only a subject and an object but also an intimate rela- and is adversely affected by undesirable conditions of life, inspite of tion between the two. This relation is an intimate personal relation his repeated prayers to God, he becomes suspicious about the of love and respect for a super-human being who is at once the existence of a Divine all powerful Being; he does not even hesitate to Supreme value and the standard of all values. Although on the sub- declare that there is no God and no ruler of the world. So far as the jective side, the devotee is aroused more through feelings and average man is concerned, the existence and the non-existence of emotions, still cognition and volition too are essential ingredients of God is relative to the fulfilment and non-fulfilment of their worldly religion. On the objective side, religion refers to a divine Being with desires through prayers. If his prayer for worldly happiness bears whom the devotee seeks to have a living relation through worship, fruits, God exists for him; if his prayer fails, God also fails to have love and service.

any meaning for him. While religion is mainly an emotional attitude towards God, Philosophy is essentially a cognitive approach to the problem of the Approach of philosophy and religion to the problem of God as found Highest Reality. A Philosopher's approach to the problem of God

in the Western world is thus, based on reasoning and argumentation: his quest is a quest If we go through western philosophy and religion, we find that the western philosophers and theolo gians have approached the for truth and knowledge and his attitude is detached and objective. A number of theologians and philosophers of the western world problem of God dispassionately on the basis of reason and faith. have struggled hard to answer the question of the existence and Faith also gives us certain knowledge and it is generated in us reality of a Supra-personal Spiritual Being and the main arguments through the operation of the recognized sources of knowledge. which they have offered reveal the variety of ways which have been Wavering faith is no faith. Faith inspires a man to speak with assu- devised in the west to answer this significant question of human-life rance of the existence of an abiding ideal; It gets very deeply rooted and human aspirations. in human nature and is very intimately linked with the forward march of man in search of his desired goal. If a man has faith in the existence of Divinity, he is sure to open himself to the divine in- brièf Some arguments of the western philosophy and religion considered in flow so as to be able to become clean and good, expansive and .The arguments which are generally offered in the west to prove spiritually advanced. Faith, indeed, is energy-giving' and creative. It the existence of God are termed as (1) Cosmological, (2) Teleologi- acts as a force in the life of a man and leads him to his spiritual cal, (3) Moral and (4) Ontological. goal. A true believer cannot remain satisfied without discovering The aim of the cosmological argument is to reason from our actual and knowing the object in which he has pinned his faith. Truly experience of the world to an absolutely necessary cause of this speaking, faith in Divinity is a faith in moral and spiritual values of experience. In our worldly experiences of various kinds, we find that life and one who believes in God, lives always in the light of these the events which cause experiences are all conditioned events; one values in all spheres of his existence. He never approaches the pro- event produces another one along with its specific feeling tone. If we blem of the existence of God from an utilitarian point of view. In take all the events of the world under consideration or the world as fact, God is the key-note of the life of His true devotee who devotes whole, we are consequently forced to admit the existence of an all time and energy to have a direct relationship with Him. He wants uncaused supreme cause as the root of the world. The conditioned

The Problom of the Esistonce of God 149

148 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study 'objective' or absolute Morality. A moral ideal can exist no where world exists and it must be the effect of an absolutely necessary and no how but in a mind from which all Reality is derived. Our being as otherwise we shall have to move endlessly in the midst of a moral ideal can only claim objective validity in so far as it can vortex of conditionality without finding any resting place. This, rationally be regarded as the revelation of a moral ideal eternally indeed, is an argument which refers to the transitory, non-substantial existing in the mind of God.1 and everfleeting nature of the events of the world. We are not satis- The cosmological argument seeks to prove the existence of God as fied with the ever-changing and imperfect character of our empirical the uncaused first cause of the world. It is the conditioned character life as it always keeps us confined within the sphere of conditionality of the worldly events that lead a thinking mind to believe in the exis- and uncertainty of the worldly events. We, therefore, believe that tence of an uncaused Being as the source of the world; because an an eternal and all-sufficient Being must exist necessarily not only as unconditioned being alone can produce a conditioned world. Further, the uniting thread of the various events of life and the universe but the wonderful regularity and order of the phenomenal occurrences also as the ground and explanation of all facts and phenomena of of the world impresses beyond measure the mind of a thinker and he the world. According to the teleological argument, on the other hand, realises through reasoning and argumentations that such an ordered the first cause is not only unconditioned, absolute and omnipotent, world which maintains its equilibrium in a wonderful manner, can but it is also supremely intelligent. We find that things of the world not be the creation of any material and unintelligent being. Hence, are selected properly and combined beautifully to serve as means to God is conceived by him as an intelligent law-giver who is guiding some ends; we are, therefore, led to believe that the world is brought and controlling the events of life and the world in a harmonious and into being, sustained and regulated by an omniscient Being whose end-fulfilling manner (i.e., in a teleological manner). Again, there are knowledge is perfect and infinite. A supreme mind is working behind moral and spiritual values which human beings alone can be con- this systematic universe in which lower ends are subordinated to scious of; 'value-awareness' is peculiar to human beings and the higher ones and a process of continuous adjustment is going on. The moral and spiritual values alone constitute the elixir of human-life. moral argument on the other hand, asserts that the world is a moral Man feels that he is guided in his activities by the ideal of goodness order and that its purpose is essentially moral. This is so because and this ideal seems to exert an authoritative influence on his life. the world has emanated from a supremely intelligent God who is This ideal of goodness cannot float in the air. It must have a con- essentially moral. God possesses not only infinite intellect and scious being as its support and that being is God. God is goodness. power but also goodness and moral perfection. It is because God is Moral excellences which constitute the golden strings of a human- supremely good and absolutely moral that higher inspirations of a life are the finite forms of the Divine Excellence finding expressions higher life move the hearts of human beings in different degrees in through earthly mediums. the enlightened moments of their empirical existence. Dr. Rash dall There is another significant argument for proving the existence of has said "An absolute Moral Law or moral ideal cannot exist in God. This is called ontological argument. This is an argument that material things. And it does not exist in the midst of this or that seeks to prove the existence of God from the very idea of God. individual. Only if we believe in the existence of a Mind for which According to Descartes, we have the idea of God as the most the true moral ideal is absolutely in some sense real, a Mind which perfect being and since this idea is a clear idea there must be a is the source of whatever is true in our moral judgement, can we Supreme Being corresponding to it. A clear and distinct idea neces- rationally think of the moral idea as no less real than the world itself, sarily points to a fact. only so can we believe in an absolute standard of right and wrong, Truly speaking, God is the source of both thought and nature. which is independent of this or that man's actual ideas and actual The conscious life of a man is based on Divine consciousness. Hence, desires as the facts of material nature. The belief in God, though every human thought and every human idea necessarily indicate the not like the belief in a real and active self, a postulate of there being *The Theory of Good and Evil, II. any such thing as Morality at all is the logical presupposition of an

150 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study The Problem of the Existence of God 151

existence of God. The idea of God which arises spontaneously in beliefs. It is because of this intimate relation between reason and human mind, therefore, presupposes the existence of Divine con- revelation that in India religion has never been separated from

sciousness. Philosophy. They are united and integrated in such a manner as to The above discussion regarding the western attitude towards the lead a man effectively to the attainment of his highest and the best. problem of God and His existence will enable the reader to have a Peace eternal is the supreme human goal and both philosophy and better understanding of the same problem from the Indian point of religion open up for man a higher way of living that culminates in view. Religion, which India has proclaimed, is a religion of human- Peace and Perfection of Life. It is because of this intimate relation nity. It aims at raising man to the level of divine purity and excel- between philosophy and religion that the former has always laid lence by awakening in him his sleeping divinity. God is not separated great emphasis on ethnical life as an indispensable condition of libe- from man. The Isa upanishad has declared "By the Lord is enveloped ration or self-realisation. Philosophy is not merely a form of rational all this, whatever moving thing there is in the world.' In other words, reflection about the mystery and meaning of life and the world. It is the whole universe is an expression of God. It is the joy of the life also a source of inspiration which favours continuous moral and Divine which is finding expressions in and through all the forms and spiritual growth of man, thereby, enabling him to transform his figures of the world. All evolutionary changes bear the stamp of philosophical knowledge into an art of living in the light of Truth Divinity and proceed towards the single goal, namely, the perfection and Goodness. and completion of life in man. The presence of God can be felt every Regarding the problem of the existence of God, however, the where by one who has acquired the power of feeling and visualising truth. God is the indwelling principle of both Man and the world. philosophical systems, based on the upanisadic tradition, differ in their perspectives. We shall however discuss here only the views of God is pouring out His delight and Love continuously in this world and it is because of this divine gift that the entire creation remains the Nyaya system, the Samkhya-yoga system and the Vedanta system of Samkara. lively and refreshed even in the midst of decay and death. Man can The Nyaya system proves through inference, the existence of God. feel his oneness with God only if he can perceive and realise the God can be established on the basis of the fact that the world is an presence of Divinity in the inner recess of each and everything of the effect. An effect can be produced by such an intelligent agent only world. This is the real sadhana of man and it is through this sādhana who (1) knows directly the material to be used for the purpose of that he can attain the perfection of his own being and can also have producing the effect (2) has a desire to produce it and (3) also makes a taste of immortality which is his divine heritage. The goal of human life, according to the upanishadic tradition, is to express the an effort to produce the effect. In regard to the world as an effect, infinity of his being through his finite life and finite actions. It is the we can assume the existence only of an omniscient and omnipotent body of man that is destroyed but the luminous being which is his Cause, capable of fulfilling all these conditions. That cause, there- fore, is God. Further, the way in which different parts are arranged real essence is eternal and indestructible. This essence is his divinity indicates the existence of an intelligent cause and that intelligent

which is birthless and deathless. Though in India, both the orthodox philosophy and the orthodox cause is no other than God. In fact, God can be known to exist by means of intelligence possessing the potency of skillfully creating religion have accepted the authority of the vedas, still neither of the this world. The being that is characterised by the possession of such -two can be called dogmatic or authoritarian. Here, reason has not intelligence is to be regarded as God. He creates the world according been made a slave to scriptural authority. According to Vacāspati, all scriptures cannot claim authoritative domination. Only the to meritorious and demeritorious actions of living beings. He exists meaningful scriptures can claim such authority. Scriptures, to be as the efficient cause of the world. The 'creative nature or Prakrti, authoritative, should possess intelligibility and should admit of atoms and actions are all unconscious and as such they can be made active and productive only through the agency of a conscious rational interpretation. Reason is to act as a corrective to religious being. That conscious being is God. Moreover, pleasure, pain,

152 Classical Sämkhya : A. Critical. Stuđy The Problem of the Existence of God 153

merit, demerit can occur in a proper and regulated manner only if priate time. The whole of creation is supported by God. It is through the world is governed by a conscious Being. Divine consciousness. is Divine guidance that all padarthas of the world associate and disso-

eternal. ciate according to the actions of the individuals. He behaves 'like a .Udayana has skillfully presented him arguments for establishing loving father and provides man with different ways to exhaust the the existence of God and his arguments are treated as classic argu- effects of their past actions. ments of the Nyaya school for proving the existence of God. He Here sinee the Nyaya seeks to prove the existence of God as the has given eight reasons in favour of God's existence, and these cause of the world from the world as an effect, it may appear to us

reasons can be summarised in the following manner: that the system is giving us an instance of the cosmological proof of (1). The world, being an effect like a jar, must be produced by an the western world.

intelligent agent. The Nyaya argument however, differs to a certain extent, from the (2) The universe is composed of (unconscious) atoms. Atoms cosmological argument of the west. It is cosmological in the sense should combine to produce the world. So, there must be an intelli- that here we reason from the world to its first cause, but the Nyaya gent prime mover to move atoms to meaningful actions. That prime has never referred to the fleeting and conditioned character of the

mover is God. worldly events to prove the existence of an unconditioned and neees- (3) The nniverse must be supposed to be supported by the consci- sary being as its cause; on the other hand, the followers of this ous force of a conscious being otherwise it would have fallen down. school have referred to the vastness of the universe with its innumer- Just as a stick carried by a flying bird does not fall down in the same able variety and have asserted that such a big effect cannot be way the universe does not fall down because there is a conscious produced by the limited knowledge and power of human beings.

being (i e. God) to support it. The Nyaya argument from the world as an effect to God as its (4) We use words to signify definite things. There must be a first cause has a teleological orientation as well. This argument implies intelligent being who has settled the meanings of different words that the agent of the world is a conscious being who possesses direct

definitely. This intelligent being is God. knowledge of the material which he wants to use for the production (5) The vedic judgments are faultless and true. This proves that of his desired effect. His action therefore, is purposive and is direc- the author of the vedas must be without any defect and his knowledge ted towards the fulfilment of a definite end. must be correct. This author can be no other than omniscient God. The Nyaya philosophers seem to have felt that the teleological (6) The vedas which are similar to Ayurveda must have an author. argument should not be treated as an independent argument to

This author is God. prove the existence of God. It should be linked with the cosmologi- (7) The vedas are composed by a conscious being because they cal argument which considers the world as an effect. Atoms which,

are composed of sentences like the Mahabharata. in their opinion, are the material stuff of the universe, are arranged (8) In the beginning of creation, there was no other conscious not chaotically but in a harmonious system which is meaningful and being except God. So, numbers like two, three etc., could be produ- purposive. So, the existence of such a world justifies the existence of

ced at that time by the apeksabuddhi of God. an intelligent agent as its creator and controller. When we reflect All the arguments, advanced by the Nyaya philosophy, prove the existence of God as the efficient cause of the world and not as the upon the world, we do not only discover its conditioned nature but we do also feel that the conditioned events are arranged as ends and material cause. He produces motion in the atoms which then group means. The earth, water and the sunshine serve as means to the together in different ways to bring the world into being. preservation of the plant life. The plant again serves as a means to Since God gives creative motion to the atoms, He is regarded as the preservation of the life of lower animals. Again both plant and the creator of the world. God is also the destroyer of the universe; animal life serve as means te human life and human mind. Such an it is through Divine agency that atoms get disintegrated at appro- arrangement and adoptatien of means and ends in the world proves

154 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study The Problem of the Existence of God 155

the existence of an intelligent first cause. By linking together the The Nyaya too has followed the Upanishadic method consisting of cosmological and the teleological proofs for the existence of God, the Nyaya philosophers have displayed soundness of their power at Sravana manana and mididyasana for the realisation of both 'Self' and 'God'. At first, one has to gether full and correct knowledge of God

judgment. from the Sruti, smriti etc. After that, he has to perform worship in The Philosophers of the Nyaya school have also sought to establish the form of reflection on God by inference and argumentation. The the existence of God on the ground that He alone can be the author of the vedas as well as of the words, sentences and their meaningful last stage is meditation on God whose nature has been fully revealed by the śruti and whose existence has been fully assured of both by arrangement. This argument is unique and has no counterpart in revelation and reasoning. All these three vidhis are necessary for pure

western philosophy and theology. and profound realisation of Divinity. God also exists as the moral ruler of the universe. He is the giver of the fruits of actions and the upholder of justice in human life. Nyāyacarceyamīśasya mananavyapadeśabhāk Upāsanaiva kriyate śravanāntarāgatā (Nyayakusumanjali, 1st Unless God is accepted as the moral supervisor, the distribution of Stavaka, 3) fruits of actions in a planned manner cannot be explained. This assertion of Udayana reveals clearly the close connection of . The main arguments of the Nyaya school in favour of God are, as the Nyaya philosophy with the upanishads.

under: To make a sincere attempt towards realisation of the nature of

(i) God is the creator of the world. (ii) God is the supervisor of merits and is the dispenser of the God by means of inferential thinking is nothing but a form of Divine fruits of actions in accordance with the law of Karma. worship which is to be followed by deep concentration and meditation. (iii) At the beginning of each creation, God becomes the teacher Samkara, the great exponent of the advaita Philosophy and a staunch believer in revelation has followed the same discipline con-

of the vedas. sisting of three stages, namely Sravana, Manana and Nididhyasana, According to the Nyaya philosophy, reflection on God or under- for the attainment of self-realisation or liberation. standing the nature of God by means of inferential thinking is essen- After ascertaining the nature of Brahman from the Śruti, the

tial for liberation. aspirant is advised to have recourse to rational thinking of Brah-

Iśvaramananam Cādrstadvārā man so as to be able to remove all doubts regarding the nature of Svātmasākșātkāra dvārā vā muktau hetuņ. (Nyayakusumanjali, Reality and the world-cause by rational argumentations. This is to

1st Stavaka, I) be followed by Nididhyasana which is constant musing of Brahman Reflection on God produces desert as a result of which liberation as sat, cit and ananda. The last stage is to be adopted only when the is attained. It also produces in the aspirant the desired fitness for aspirant is rationally convinced of the truths revealed to the seers of self-realisation. Both self-realisation and God-realisation culminate the upanishads through intuitions at the highest level of communion

in liberation. with the Reality; Samkara has used rational arguments to refute It is generally held that the Nyaya philosophy has not accorded 'Prakritivada' of the sāmkhya 'Paramanuvada' of the vaisesikas, mere any significant place to the Sruti or revelation and has taken the efficient causality of God of the Nyaya school and so on. While help of Yukti and tarka (reasoning and argumentation) to prove the refuting the Prakrtivada of the sāmkhya, Samkara has also given existence of God. There are some scholars who hold that the Nyaya Philosophy has no immediate connection either with Vedic litera- cosmological and teleological arguments to prove the existence of Brahman as the world cause. He has shown by reasoning that tures or with tradition. Such views, however, do not seem to be nothing else but brahman can be regarded as the cause of the world. correct and convincing. The Nyaya being an orthodox (astika) Philosophy, is based on the upanishads and is not really unconnected Although Samkara has repeatedly said that Brahman can be known with tradition established by the Upanishadic thoughts. only through scripture and not through argumentations, (Srutyava gāhyamatigambhīram param brahma na tarkāvagāhyam (Brahma-

156 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Stuđy sütra, Samkara bhāsya, 2.1.31) even then he has admitted the im- 157

perative need for the exercises of reason to resolve all sorts of con- The Problem of the Existence of God

flicts and confusions regarding the views of Brahman as the non-dual inseparably associated with the conception of the world. The world Reality. He has considered the views of his opponents with a and the world-creator are related to each other. God is both the mate- rationalistic method. Samkara has quoted profusely from the sruti rial and efficient cause of the world. He is also the giver of the fruits because the ultimate questions such as the existence of God, crea- of actions. God is to be realised by means of devotion or bhakti. The tion of the world, the ultimate goal of man etc., are beyond percep- worshipper of God, however, can not attain liberation in its true form. tion and inference. So these are to be known through revelation. The worshipper of God goes to the Brahmaloka. On reaching Brah- The Nyaya philosophers, however, have not done so. They have maloka, he becomes the possessor of lordly powers, excepting the followed with Zeal the "manana vidhi" so as to be able to have firm power of oreation.1 faith in Divine Existence which has been so forcefully established While in Brahmaloka, the soul remains in the presence of God and and repeatedly declared in the sruti. These philosophers, too, will enjoys divine pleasures under the supervision of God. agree with Samkara that God with His wonderful powers can not be The most striking feature of Samkara-Vedanta is that it has recog- known through any other source than the sruti. The admission of nized absolute non-difference between man and God, a recognition Sravana Vidhi as the first stage of spiritual discipline, proves that the upanishads are treated with great respect in the Nyaya philoso- that is supposed (by the advaitins) to have enhanced the dignity of man beyond measure. There is non-difference between Man and God, phy as well. The Vedanta has developed a tradition and has also God and the qualityless Absolute. Man appears to be different from been divided into different schools; the exponents of these schools God only when he is considered from the narrow perspective of the have interpreted the upanishads and the Gita from their own stand- individualistic worldly-life. From the point of view of Truth and point. Hence, they have no difficulty in explaining all super-sensible Reality, there is absolute non-difference between Brahman and the in- problems with the help of the sruti, smriti etc. The Nyaya has no dividual self. such tradition and the upanishads and the Gita have not been com- Samkara has advanced the following arguments to prove the exis-

mented upon by the followers of the Nyaya school. tence of God, because according to him, God can be known by direct realisation, by inference and also by scriptural testimany. A 'Siddha-

SAMKAR'S VIEW vastu' (accomplished thing) can be known through more than one According to Samkara, qualityless Brahman appears as a qualified source. While explaining the sūtra no: 2.3.9. Samkara has asserted A.

and personal God because of the beginningless Nescience or Māyā that Brahman should be regarded as the uncaused cause of the world that resides in man and covers the vision of his eye of wisdom. Due otherwise, we shall not be able to save ourselves from committing to the operation of such ignorance, the real form of Brahman is cove- the fallacy of infinite regress. Since the world is an effect, it must have red and both the self and the not self are joined together to create a a cause and that cause is God "Whose origin in impossible". Sam- fictitious ego-sense. This false ego-sense (adhyāsika ātman) enjoys kara, too has said that the things of the world have been so meaning- through the internal organ the false effect, i.e., the false world of the fully arranged as to suggest the existence of an intelligent being as its false Māya. When Brahman through reflection, vitalises Māya and creator.2 An unconscious cause can never produce such an ordered makes it fit for becoming the changeable matrix of the world, lordly world. These arguments correspond to the cosmological and teleogi- powers emerge in the Sättvika upädhi (limiting adjunct) which are fal- cal arguments of the west. The teleological argument, however, has sely ascribed to Brahman. Brahman, thus, seems to assume the role been introduced by Samkara not so much to prove the existence of of God in respect of both the universe and the man. Brahman, in the God as to refute the Sämkhya view of an unconscious first cause of form of God, becomes the object of religious worship. He is the crea- the world. tor, preserver and destroyer of the world. The conception of God is The most important proof that Śamkara has given us to establish 1 Brahmasūtra, Śamkara's commentary, 4.4.17. *Brahmasūtra bhāşya 2.2.1.

SAMKnYA ON 90D f tee is no place for devokon and wos shup SoD in the dass cal samknyo . IE alo geuaall held that Samkuya is ninsraia and sosars ses vala ...

158 Classical Sāmkhya : A Critical Study The Problem Or IRe ExIsTeuce of God 159

the existence of God may be described as an ontological one. Accord- ing to Samkara, to have the clear and correct knowledge of a thing, The conception of God is to be adhered to only when Brahman is spoken of as the material-efficient cause of the world. Brahman ap a man's attention should first of all be drawn towards that specific object of knowledge. It is only when one pays his attention to an pears as God in relation to the world .. As ultimate Reality, Brahman object wholeheartedly that knowledge arises in his mind spontane- is qualityless. ously in conformity with the object. So our clear and correct know- Thus, even though God, according to Samkara, is necessary for the ledge of an object always implies the existence of the object (III.2.21) average man on the path of his spiritual march, still it is imperative

Brahmansutra bhāșya. on us to remember that from the transcendental point of view, God · Moreover, the idea of liberation, too, implies the reality of Brah- also is illusory and phenomenal; A liberated person looks upon God man because liberation is nothing but the realisation, on the part of only as the false ruler of a false world. For him, nothing is real the individual soul, of its oneness with the Brahman. Brahman is except the 'nirguna Brahman'. consciousness, existence and bliss and the realisation of one's own nature as that is what is called perfection or liberation. Since libera- tion is realisation of one's own nature as Brahman, this realisation When we come to Samkhya-yoga, we find a different approach to must be based on Reality as otherwise it can never be a realisation the problem of a Personal Divinity. If we go through the available

in the true sense of the term. Samkhya-texts, it apnears to us as if there is n is also generally held

God has also to be admitted as the moral ruler of the universe. e may summarise

Since fruition of an action takes place long after the performance of the deed, the action itself cannot be the producer of its fruits. So, it here, some of the argumems wincn nave veen made use of by various is absolutely necessary to recognize the existence of God as the ethi- commentators of the Samkhya philosophy to refute the existence of cal ruler of the universe. God creates this world in accordance with a 'creator-God'. the accumulated merits and demerits of the individual soul. Since the unconscious 'creative-nature' or Prakrti is endowed with God has also appeared in the advaita-vedänta in the form of Hir- the power of making teleological movement (like the unconscious anyagarbha. The totality of subtle bodies is said to have constituted milk which flows spontaneously from the udders of the cow for the the body of Hiranyagarbha; the totality of intellects constitute his nourishment at the calf) creator-God is unnecessary. Moreover, the fu .

limiting adjunct. Consciousness that identifies itself with these totalit- existence of God as the creator of the world cannot be rationally ies is called Hiranyagarbha. He is present everywhere. All objects of justified. Why should God create the world ? Being a completely satis- the world are rooted in Him. He is the essence and the Vital princi- fied Person, He cannot create the world to satisfy an unfulfilled ple of the whole universe. He is the upholder of all actions, the regu- desire. Nor can He be supposed to create the world out of compas- lator of all actions, and the distributor of the fruits of all actions. sion; because prior to creation, souls, not being associated with the He was manifested first. Other souls have received their respective bodies, cannot have feelings of misery and pain. God can not be subtle bodies from him.The conception of Hiranyagarbha is the con- supposed to be compassionate either. Had He been so, he would not ception of a personal God who is represented as manifesting himself have created a world full of tears and frustrations. directly through the development of the material world. It is, however, urged that God bestows pleasures and pains on the We shall, however, remember that according to Samkara, there is living beings, following the law of Karma. The wrong-doers are only the unqualified Reality or the nirguna Brahman. Owing to the punished with pain but the doers of good actions are blessed with diversity of illusory intellects, the qualityless Reality is falsely thought pleasures. If this is so, then let Karma alone become the agent of the of as 'Saguņa-Brahman', Iśvara, Hiraņyagarbha, Vișņu, Rudra, Jīva, products of actions. What need is there of a creator-God?

Jagat and so on. Even the argument that actions are unconscious and as such these are to be supervised by God, is not a sound one. When the 'creative-

fraksihooo is copabl d mauyen0nd dave and dhe reglahri forer orelati fo cay Creahie Cas nature' is supposed to possess inherent capacity to create according tion and worship of God in the classical samkhya. In the chapter on to virtuous and vicious actions of embodied living beings, the exis- theology (of this book) an attempt has been made to show how the tence of God, for doing this work, is absolutely redundant. *consciousness-principle' which has aggregate of intellects as its All these arguments are based on the refusal of the Sämkhya phi- limiting adjunct, can serve as God having a position similar to that losonhy to admit God as the 'material-efficient, cause of the world. of Hiranyagarbha of the advaita-vedanta. Swami Hariharananda, (the founder of Kapila Math and a pro-

the world. Is to be regarded as both the material and efficient cause of or the 'creative-nature ifanting found exponent of the Samkhya-yoga philosophy) has very aptly ex- wwbut all the modifications are not simultane- plained, why an eternal God as the creator of the world has not been ously manifested in the same place at the same time. This is because admitted in this system. tamoguna, which acts as a covering, prevents the effect from getting According to Yogasūtra 1.23, God has been described as a special manifested. Efficient causes (nimittas) are necessary to remove the kind of eternally liberated soul. His uniqueness lies in the fact that covering constituted of the tamoguna. An efficient cause does not He is ever free, ever liberated. In other words, God is a particular generate movement in the 'creative-nature' but it simply removes the soul who has never been affected by afflictions, actions, results of covering and helps the effect to get manifested. It simply exercises actions or the latent impressions of actions. In the opinion of influences for the removal of impediments. The material cause, the Swami Hariharananda, the existence of such an eternally free soul is efficient cause, and the regulating forces are all necessary to produce. logically justifiable. If worldly souls involved in the worldly-life from a particular effect. Since merit, demerit, space and time etc., are beginningless time are supposed to be cxistent then an eteraal soul, natural, they cannot move the 'creative-nature' or Prakrti to action. free from beginningless time, can also have justification for existence. The 'creative-nature' or Prakrti is inherently mobile. That free and world-bound souls are existent from beginningless Here, we should remember that in the case of common creation, time is the view of both the Samkhya and the yoga, according to the the movement of Prakrti from the subtle to the gross, is natural and founder of the Kapila Math. uniform. It is only in the creation of varieties that the ffoi Further, to be free from beginningless time implies that God pos-

and the romlating forcad oont sesses a 'citta' which is always calm, always wise and always endowed Here, the distinction between the efficient with divine greatness. Such a soul cannot be many because one cauise and the mareriaf cause is a distinction of the practical world. liberated soul is to be distinguished from another by means of the Since these efficient causes are natural (Prakrtika) from the metaphy- prior unpurified cittas which were different in different cases. sical point of view, the Sāmkhyakārikā does not give any definition This cannot be done in the case of God who is ever free and is, of the efficient cause. The single causal substance in the form of the therefore, the possessor of His pure citta from beginningless time. 'creative-nature' is both the material and the efficient cause of the As the possessor of a free 'citta', God becomes a unified category world. No ever-free Divine personality is postulated here either as of the consciousness-principle and 'creative nature'. Being a compo- the 'material-efficient' cause of the world as in the Vedanta or simply site category, God cannot be regarded as an original eternal princi- as the efficient cause of the world as in the Nyaya philosophy. Since ple besides purușa and Prakrti. all products of the 'creative-nature are existent from beginningless Again, because God is an ever free personality, He cannot be sup- time, both the 'world-bound' citta and the ever-free citta' should also posed to have any desire to create the world. He is indifferent to

be supposed to be so existent. both creation and dissolution. It is not possible for us to justify The fact that the Samkhya philosophy has not admitted a third rationally how an ever-free God can be the Creator, Preserver and eternal and divine personality in the form of God who is eternally Destroyer of the world. Since God possesses discriminative knowledge engaged in creation and destruction of the world cannot, however, from beginningless time, His ever pure 'citta' always remains in a be regarded as a basis for asserting that there is no scope for devo -. merged state. He is, therefore, beyond the control of the three consti-

162 Classical Sāmkhya : A Critical Study The Problem of the Existence of God 163

tuents (gunas) and as such He is aptly described as Nirguņa.' His ness. He should aspire for knowledge and cleanliness of his heart. If ever-free nature does not justify His interference in the 'world-affairs an aspirant places his mind in the calm and serene mind of God and as the Grcater, Preserver and Regulator of the universe. meditates on calmness and divine purity, the divinity, hidden in his oThe yoga philosophy has proved the existence of such an eternally heart, gets gradually manifested through Divine Grace with the result

free God Who is Omniscient, by inference. that finally he becomes equal to God in peace and purity. Both will- Knowledge is progressive. It goes on increasing from lower grades power and the spirit of dependence on God mingle together to pro- of living beings to higher ones. God is that Being in whom knowledge duce the highest good of man. has reached the highest point. The person who possesses knowledge God, aecording to Samkhya-yoga, is not the creator of the world.

in its full and complete form, is called Iśvara. Nor is He the giver of the fruits of actions. Whatever is happening is Inference, however, only proves that an omniscient God exists. It happening due to natural functioning of the three gunas according to cannot reveal to us the specific characteristies which God possesses. their own inherent laws. Causal necessity is the determining factor These are to be known through scriptures. God, being an ever-free in the natural world. No ever-free God is necessary to move the spirit, cannot be unkind. No impure thoughts or feelings can ever three constituents to action. arise in a pure citta. Divine compassion finds expression in God's According to Swami Hariharananda, however, the Samkhya-yoga desire to save suffering human beings through instructions and to philosophy believes in the existence of a Being, perfected by Yoga in fulfill this compassionate task, He assumes a creative mind (when- his previons birth (qualified God). He is a creator in a limited sense. ever necessary) and imparts instructions to the seakers of truth with He creates from pre-existent materials, He is called Hiranyagarbha. a view to awakening in them the glow of the saving knowledge. This He is a yogin, who succeeded in reaching the stage of Sasmita Sa- Nirguna Iśvara is an object of devotion, according to the Sāmkhya- mädhi in his previous birth, as a result of which he has become yoga school, although God, in this form, has not been mentioned in omniscient and omnipotent in his present birth as Saguna Isvara the available texts of the Samkhya school his seems to be due to (qualified God). It is from his resolution that a particular creatiom the fact that the philosophy of Sämkhya is concerned mainty with the gets manifested. It is wrong to hold that an ever-free diyine person- ultimate principles whieh are at the root of the creation of world. ality is the efficient cause of this world. In fact, the Yogasutra Bhasya God, however is a composite category, having consciousness and in- 3.45 refers to such a Saguna Isvara as the efficient cause of the world. ternal organs as ingredients, which fall under the dual principles of The whole world is supported by the mind of such a divinity. As soon purusa and prakrti. So God has not been explicitly dealt with in the as the world gets manifested, all living beings, who still possess latent

classical Sāmkhya. impressions, suitable for re-embodiment, get associated with appro- Man is, no doubt, fond of exercising his own will power (atma- priate subtle and gross bodies in accordance with their own samska- śakti) but he has also a softer side which prompts him to depend on ras. In fact, the Samkhya-Sutras "Sa hi Sarvavit Sarva Karta" some higher authority, capable of bearing his whole burden on the and "idrsesvara siddhih siddha" prove the existence of such a maker up-hill journey of his life. Man is fully satisfied when both these as- of the world who has become Iśvara by means of his own spiritual pects are properly integrated and both of them are emphasised upon. sadhana. When Hiranyagarbha, presiding over a particular creation, Sämkhya-yoga philosophy has given due recognition to both these attains liberation, the world gets dissolved immediately. Each crea- aspects of human-natureby prescribing knowledge as well as devo- tion is effected through the resolution of a particular Saguna Iśvara tion as means of liberation. The path of devotion (Iśvara pranidhana) or Hiranyagarbha who plays the role of the creator and the preserver gives full satisfaction to the dependent nature of Man. Too much of the world for a limited period of time. It is this Hiranyagarbha emphasis on one aspect only, to the exclusion of the other, produces who has been referred to in the upanisads as Saguna Brahman. It is either scepticism with its intolerable vanity or perverted emotionalism. from the resolution of this qualified Brahman that the world gets Man should not pray to God for material prosperity and happi- manifested. The world emerges from the divine consciousness of the

The Problem of the Existence of God 163

164 Classical Sāmkhya : A Critical Study and destroyer of the world. He is not, however, the creator of the form "I am in all things which exist and all exist in myself." The atoms. Atoms, soul, space, time, mind etc. are all eternal and co- minds of all percipients are activised by the divine mind. The ideas of existent with God. It is by God's purposive will that the first action the divine mind affect minds of all animate beings of the world in starts in the atoms. These atoms then follow their own laws and such a manner as to produce in them various sensations which bring the world into existence.

constitute the external world. God according to the Nyaya is external to the individual soul but The way, in which the conception of Hiranyagarbha as the creator there is an intimate relation between the two. God is the loving and of the world has been introduced in the Samkhya-yoga philosophy affectionate father and is always concerned with well-being of man. and has also been assigned the place of a Divine Mind, influencing He is always eager to inspire man to do what is beneficial to him. the minds of all worldly beings, seems to be an original contribution His pure nature and immeasurable compassion prompts Him to work of Swami Hariharananda Aranya. It is a significant contribution to untiringly to remove the miseries of man. Inspite of such an affec- the Sämkhya-yoga philosophy in the sense that this conception pos- tionate bond between God and Man, the Nyaya system is not compe- sesses the potency of giving a rationally satisfactory explanation of tent to arouse true religious fervour in a devotee of God. There is an the manifestation and non-manifestation of the world through the unbridgeable distance between the two. Man may seek His favour working of a divine mind without in any way jeopardizing the origi- and affection like a child seeking the same from his respected and nal position of this system of philosophy, regarding the evolution of dignified father but he cannot cling to Him as his own soul, as his

the world from an independent Prakrti. beloved and as one who becomes one with him. The devotee cannot say "you and I are one in love and by making you the living ideal of

CONCLUSION my life, I shall become as pure and divine as you are. Wherever such Whenever we make an attempt to interpret religion rationally with emotional outflow is possible, there the real religious urge and fer- the help of argumentation and rational process, we prove the exis- vour too become noticeable. This type of religious heat cannot be tence of God as the uncaused first cause of the world. He is the generated by the Supreme Personality of the Nyaya School whose source of all things and the fashioner of finite lives. The ultimate pur- necessity is more philosophical than religious. God, here, is no doubt, posiveness which binds both the animate and the inanimate worlds, all powerful, just and merciful. He is the creator, the controller and the distributor of happiness and misery to human-beings in accor- is nothing else but divine purposiveness. This purposiveness can, there- fore, be viewed as a uniting thread. Its aim is to give man (Who is dance with the law of Karma; but God is not love and bliss; nor is the highest category in the living world) full scope for his develop- He the indwelling spirit in man. He is, no doubt, the teacher of the ment and perfection. Man should be able to attain all human values scriptural knowledge and He has also created the world with a view which will make him pure and perfect. Since the purposive nature of to imparting the knowledge of the rightway of living to man. Even God aims at the completion of man as man, it appears that all parts then, we cannot overlook the fact that the Nyaya system has admit- of the universe are operating in different ways solely for the fulfil ted the existence of God because according to this school, an effect, to

ment of this divine end. be produced needs the operation of an intelligent efficient cause. The Our firm faith in such a divine personality and Divine Goodness world as an effect, therefore, needs the efficient causality of an intelli- enables us to raise ourselves higher and higher in the sphere of moral gent being and that intelligent being can be no other than God. and spiritual perfection. It is only when a man succeeds in manifesting, Metaphysical explanation of the intelligent efficient cause of the in his character all moral and spiritual values that we say, "God has world may satisfy the intellect of a man but it cannot offer proper been revealed in him." God has been called 'father' and 'lord', 'friend' nourishment to a human heart which yearns for love and commu- and beloved and is, thus, brought into a close and sweet relation with nion. If God is identified with love and bliss and, thus, becomes the

man. support of a loving human heart, then the face of the world changes The Nyaya philosophy has admitted a personal God as the creator

166 Classical Samkhya: A Critical Study The Problem of the Éxistence of God 167

at once in the eyes of a devotee of God. Man cannot rest satisfied it assumes the form of love and devotion. merely by feeding his intellect with logical arguments. He has an in- Samkara, too, has, admitted the following as the main characteris- tense desire to know the highest and the best so as to get nourishment tics of God: directly from that supreme source by coming in close relation with (i) He creates, sustains and destrays the world. it. He wants to place his beloved God in the citadel of his loving- (ii) He punishes the wicked and rewards the virtuous. heart so that he may open all the fragrant petals of his pure and (iii) He upholds the moral balance of the world. He distributes elevated being through Divine grace and divine inspiration. This desire of the heart can be well satisfied by a God Who Himself is (Tadanugraha hetu ke naiva ca vijnanena moksa siddhi bhavitum grace. love. If God is only a God of Reason and not also of heart, then arha-lī) such a God may be pleasing to a philosopher but the devotee will Since Samkara has admitted God as the material-efficient Cause not be satisfied with such a Supreme Being as his object of devotion. of the world, God has become both immanent and transcendent. Love has a natural power of attraction and this power is the divine God is very near; He is also far away. The devotee's heart is power with which God of Love is endowed. God has sown the seeds always bathed with the milky flow of divine love. of His great love in the fertile soil of human-hearts. It is this power The fact that love and devotion to a qualified and creator God is which unites the living beings by its silken thread and draws them necessary for man on the path of his spiritual march, has been recog- towards God,-the infinite source of infinite love and happiness. Thus, nized by Samkara also. For that reason, he has introduced the quali- human beings get the scope for their moral and spiritual growth as a fied Brahman. Being false, this qualified Brahman is, however, inca- result of which they can have a direct experience of bliss and sweet- pable of arousing intense love and devotion in the heart of a devotee. ness of God. Being bound in the soft and precious chain of love and The devotee of God wishes to remain always a devotee so as to be able sympathy, human hearts get more and more purified. Religion, thus to drink the nectar of divine-love all through his life. He never wants creates a wonderful music of love in this world by attuning human to use his sincere devotion for God as a means to another higher stage.

hearts with the Divine heart. He has no desire to transcend the stage of his God-realisation so that Our journey to the appex of life is a journey from the finite expres- he may reach the stage of the qualityless impersonal being. He never sions of love to the Infinite Love itself. The unity with all creatures, adopts the path of religion, thinking that this path is suitable for him when realised through love, gives the devotee a very delightful and so long as he is ignorant. According to advaita it is in the state of all-pervasive concept of existence. The various forms of joy that start ignorance only that the devotee as devotee has to cling to God as his from a man's own self in relation to persons and things of the world, refuge. As soon as his eye of wisdom opens, he realises the falsity of are to be regarded as having their ever-expanding source in the the object of his love and devotion and forsakes Him. This, however, Divine Love. At such a wonderful moment of a wide and expansive is not true. A believer in God has a firm faith that God will always existence, everything partakes of the nature of love for the devotee. dwell in his heart and will always support him and nourish him. He has plunged himself, as it were, into the very source of love in Śamkara has declared the world as false; he has falsified the God of which he has lost his separate existence. It is the pure and disinte- religion and he has also made the devotee, with his concrete thoughts, rested love, rooted in the love of God, that can certainly lead to the emotions and will, a mere appearance. God is apparent, and the full blossoming of the devotee's moral and spiritual life. devotee too is apparent. Both of them are mere projections of imagi- The advaita vedanta holds that God is bliss. Being bliss, God also nation which disappears completely when knowledge arises. becomes an object of love. The two statements 'God is bliss' and Sämkhya-yoga according to Swami Hariharananda has admitted 'God is love' convey the same truth. Bliss indeed is the inner aspect both Saguna Iśvara and Nirguna Iśvara. Nirguna Iśvara is nirguna as and Love is the outer expression of Divinity. God dwells in the heart it is not under the influence of the three gunas. This God is external of man as bliss and when this bliss is expressed in the external world, to individual soul. Saguna Iśvara on the other hand is an individual

168 Clasaical Säshkhya : A Critical Stuđy The Problem of the Existence of God 169

soul that attained perfection through asmita Samadhi in the previous birth. It is because of the admission of such produced gods that the actions which are in keeping with these tendencies and thus goes on Sāmkhya-yoga philosophy has given a dignified status to man; every weaving his net of birth, life-span and worldly enjoyment of happi- man is supposed to carry within him the potency of godliness. If this ness and misery. Situations, under which a man is placed, controls potency can be actualised, then he can become a Saguna Iśvara, pos- to a certain extent his pleasure and pain and these situations are not sessing lordly powers. He can then transcend this stage and attain determined by his past actions. Situations change continuously owing liberation which is nothing but the realisation of himself as pure to inherent dynamism of the three gunas. God is omniscient. He consciousness-principle, devoid of any relation to anything else. Ever- knows that it is by going beyond the sphere of the gunas through free God on the other hand, becomes an ideal in our spiritual efforts cultivation of detachment and also by making continuous efforts to to attain divinity and purity like Him. This ideal which becomes the realise his true nature that a man can attain permanent peace which source of religious inspiration and religious fervour naturally be- is termed liberation. Hence God creates a mind (nirmana citta) and comes very dear to the devotee, because by surrendering himself to with its help imparts knowledge and other necessary instructions to such an ideal he can rise higher and higher in the scale of perfection. human beings with a view to bringing them on the right path of living. Man gets attached to such a spring of grace and compassion and his Man's misery is due to his perverted perspective of life which heart clings to Him with immeasurable love and devotion. By loving makes him forget his higher existence as pure consciousness, beyond God, the yogin also changes into that form and becomes calm, serene the confines of all prakrtika relations. When a man's individuality and pure. The seed of godliness, hidden in him, gets manifested cannot develop properly through an ever-extended sphere of exis- through such whole-hearted devotion and produces the desired tence and experience due to his deep involvement in the worldly

moral and spiritual elevation of the yogin. affairs, he cannot form a correct and wide idea of his own self; as a If we follow this interpretation, we can do away easily with the result, he identifies himself with all his sorrows and pains which be- objections raised against the God of Yoga by Samkara. Sāmkara has fall him and sheds tears under their heavy pressure. The empirical said that the divine personality of the yoga philosophy is another personality of a man is actually reacting to diverse life-situations and category besides purușa and Prakrti. All the three categories are eter- is not, therefore, static in nature. Various experiences and activities nal, all-pervasive and partless. So, there cannot be any 'supporter- of life are all the time arising, developing and enriching the empiri-

supported relation' among them. cal personality of a person. The experiences which a person gathers Swami Hariharananda has proved cogently that God is not a in his living-state modify his character and also find newer and single and ultimate category in yoga. He is a combination of both newer expressions in the external world. Beyond this empirical purușa and prakrti. He has been described in the yoga-philosophy as personality, is the immutable 'seer' with the reflected light of which eternally free. The eternally free principle is that being, who posses- the empirical personality is getting revealed with its multi-coloured ses from eternity, a citta endowed with discriminative knowledge. experiences. God makes man conscious of his real essence which is Since God is always the possessor of discriminative knowledge, his immutable, peaceful and serene. citta is a merged one. God is not therefore a third category in the yoga It is the Saguna Iśvara who has willed the things of the world to besides purușa and prakrti. Swami has also shown that God has not be what they are. He is the lord of the creation that has become been recognised in the yoga either as a creator of the world or as the manifested through his resolution and so a yogin, too, does not want giver of the fruits of actions to the living beings. It is not the function to cause any disturbance in His world by making any change in the of God to distribute worldly pleasures and pains in accordance with order of things, willed by Him. the law of Karma. Man is born with samskaras and tendencies, accord- The wish of the previously perfected one (Hiranyagarbha) is res- ing to the kinds of actions performed by him in his previous births. pected by the yogins who do not go against Iśvara. It is this perfected He cultivates those tendencies in the present life, gets engaged in Saguna Iśvara that has been referred to by the Samkhya sutra when it has said "He is all knowing and all-powerful,"

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172 Classical Samkhya: A Critical Study Varanasi, 1966. Samkhyapravachanabhasya, edited by Rama Shankar Bhattacharya. Varanasi, 1966. Vācaspati Misra, Sāmkhyatattvakaumudī, edited by Pandit Shiv- narayana Shastri. Bombay, 1940. Index

-- Tattvavaisaradī, Sacred Books of the Hindus Series. Allahabad, 1924. Visvanath, Bhāșāpariccheda edited by Sri Pancanan Sastri. Calcutta, abhāva 34, 35, 46, 58 65, 83, 89, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 105,

abhimāna 99

1354 (Bengali year). 123, 126

abhivyānga abhivyānjaka 12

Yuktidīpikā, An ancient commentary on Sāmkhyakarikā of Iśvara- adhyavasāya 19, 20, 21, 25, 26, 27, 50 cause 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 118,

krsna, edited by R.C. Pandeya. Varanasi, 1967. adhyatma-yoga 121 123, 125, 138, 140, 143, 147, 151, Ahamkāra 10, 12, 18, 22, 23, 26, 27, 153, 154, 155, 157, 158, 160, 165, 28, 29, 33, 71, 86, 92, 99, 100, 101, 167

103, 104, 105, 107, 111, 137 akhyātivāda 12 causation 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 118

akliştavrtti 76 Alocana (ālocanamātram jñānam) 24 cicchāyā 90, 91 Antaḥkaraņa 10, 11, 15, 141 Città 136, 139, 161

Anupalabdhi 34, 35, 46 Cittavrtti 62, 76, 136 Classical Samkhya 1, 2, 52, 59, 68,

aprithak-siddhi 117 Arthapatti 44, 45, 46 90, 92, 131, 140, 159, 161, 162

ašakti 122 compresence 116

asatkāryavāda 112 Cosmological 147, 153, 154, 155, 157

aśubha 121, 122 Atheism 140 dharmapariņāma 34, 106, 107

Atuşți 126, 128, 129 Discriminative wisdom (knowledge) avasthāpariņāma 34, 106, 107, 113 126, 130, 131, 134, 161, 168 avidyā 10, 17, 49, 51, 75, 123, 124, effect 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115,

125 116, 117, 118, 119, 120, 125, 151, aviveka 13, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 76, 77, 87, 88, 93, 94, 95, 121, 123, 128, 136, 152, 153, 165 epistemological 2, 14, 16, 17, 30, 47,

137, 143 80,121

Avītam 37, 38, 40 of the three

Ātman 1, 29, 30, 122, 156 equilibrated state guņas (Prakrti) 68

bhoktritva 77, 89 evolution 95, 96, 97, 99, 101, 102, Bondage 2, 85, 90, 95, 99, 122, 131 106, 107, 111, 121

bodhaḥ 20, 21 external tuști 126 buddhi 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 12, 15, 16, 17, Extrinsic invalidity 47 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 25, 26, 64, 77, 78, experience 59, 60, 61, 66, 68, 71, 80, 79, 83, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 83, 84, 86, 87, 93, 120, 121, 147 93, 94, 95, 97, 98, 99, 100, 105, 108, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 131, 132, Faith 146 133, 134, 139, 141, 142, 143, 144 False identity 12

buddhinirmāņa 108 Freedom of will 131, 132, 133 buddhivrtti 6, 9, 21, 50, 55, $6, 62, 64, God 69, 75, 97, 104, 119, 140, 141,

174 Classical Samkhya : A Critical Study İndex 175

142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 149, 150, 151, 152, 154, 155, 156, 157, Mithyã 2, 70 reflection 12, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, Sukhitva prakāraka avidyā 10, 48, 49

158, 159, 160, 162, 163, 164, 165, moral 147, 149, 151, 154, 156, 158, 21, 27, 36, 42, 56, 64, 68, 75, 81, 82,

166, 167, 168, 169 164, 166, 168 83, 84, 87, 92, 95, 135, 141, 151, 155, 156 tamas 1, 2, 19, 48, 49, 50, 51, 56, 57,

Guņa 1, 4, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, nirvikalpaka 24, 26, 34 relation 2, 4, 8, 9, 10, 11, 20, 26, 28, 58, 122, 123, 124, 125, 131, 132, 137,

67, 68, 69, 70, 72, 73, 76, 78. 82, 83, 160

95, 98. 109, 111, 114, 124, 125, 163, nirvikalpaka indriya vrtti 105 30, 32, 33, 37, 40, 41, 43, 86, 91, 92,

167,169 non-discrimination 2, 8, 12, 13, 16, 95, 109, 110, 114, 115, 116, 117, tanmātras 124, 136

17, 33, 49, 64, 76, 123 120, 124, 146, 147, 151, 166 tattvābhyāsa 134, 135 teleological 147, 153, 154, 155, 157,

Hiraņyagarbha 141, 158, 161, 163, 164, 169 ontology 120, 147, 149, 158 relation suitable for creation 75 relata 2, 117 159

ontological argument 81 religion of humanity 150 theocentric 147 time 126, 160, 165

Inference 10, 11, 17, 18, 19, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42, 44, 45, 47, 48, 56, Pakşadharmatajñāna 36 Śabda 10, 18, 19, 37, 41, 42, 44, 48 tuccha 2

58, 156, 157, 162 Paramāņus 103, 104, 106, 112 Sadasat Khyāti 10, 11 Tuşți 122, 126, 127, 128, 129

pāramārthika tattva 3 sadasatātmaka 118

inherent teleology 72, 73 Sahakāri Kāraņa 4 udbuddha vāsanā 34

intellect 11, 13, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, perception 10, 12, 13, 17, 18, 19, 20, .25, 26, 31, 35, 36, 37, 40, 44, 46, 47, Sahopalambhaniyama 3 upamāna 43, 44

21, 24, 26, 27, 29, 48, 76, 77, 84, 90, Sammugdham 23 upanişad 1, 140, 142, 144, 150, 154,

91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 98, 125, 128, 131, 49, 54, 58, 73, 89, 90, 93, 156

134, 158, 165 Pramāņas 13, 14, 15, 20, 37, 45, 46, Sannidhāna 12, 64, 65, 74, 76, 88, 91, 155, 156, 163

Internal tuşți 126 48 95,140 utilitarianism 145, 146

Prakrti 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 12, 15, 21, 23, 30, Sannikarşa 20, 28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 34,

Intrinsic validity 47, 52 46.56 value centric 147

Intrinsic invalidity 52 42, 51, 60, 65, 68, 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 76, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, Sarūpa pariņāma 65 videhamukti 139

89, 93, 95, 96, 97, 98, 99, 104, 107, Satkāryavāda 67, 72, 111, 113, 116 Vijñānavādin 3

Jīvan mukta 75, 94 Sattva 1, 3, 4, 19, 48, 49, 50, 56, 57,

123, 126, 128, 134, 135, 137, 139, 58, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 67, 101, 102, viparyayas 122, 123, 124, 125, 126,

Jivan mukti 75, 139 111, 112, 116, 118. 120, 121. 122, 127, 128, 129

140, 142, 143, 144, 151, 159, 160, 103, 121, 125, 131, 137 Virūpapariņāma 65

Kaivalya lakşaņo®vasthā parināma 161, 162, 164, 168 Savikalpaka 24, 26, 34 Vitam 37, 38

34 Prāmāņya 48, 54, 56, 57 Svarūpa bhéda 13 viveka 83

Karma 77, 91, 94, 132, 143, 159 Prāņagā Prakrti 97, 98 Sākși 13, 14, 16, 17, 19 vivekāgraha 11, 12, 49, 50, 51, 75, 76

Karmavāsanā 88 prāpyakārī 27, 28, 58, 106 Sākși caitanya 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, vrtti 8, 9, 10, 11, 13, 16, 17, 19, 20,

kartritva 77 19,56 21, 28, 30, 32, 34, 36, 48, 49, 55, 56,

kliştavrtti 76 Prāpyaprakāśakārī 27 Purușa 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 13, Sāmānyatodrstam 38, 39 59, 69, 89, 106, 128, 138, 139

14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 27, 30, Siddhis 122, 128, 129, 130 vyāptijñāna 36, 56

lakşaņa pariņāma 106, 107 33, 42, 60, 61, 63, 64, 65, 66, 73, 74, Śubha 120 vyāpāra 21, 36, 37, 50, 106, 112

law of Karma 74, 77, 88, 131, 143, 75, 76, 77, 78, 80, 81, 82, 83, 84, 85,

154, 159, 165, 168 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 93, 94, 95, 97, liberation 95, 99, 120, 122, 125, 126, 99, 107, 120, 122, 123, 125, 132, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 151, 154, 134, 135, 138, 140, 141, 142, 143,

155, 158, 163, 168, 169 144 purușārtha 72 Mahābhūtas 102, 104, 105, 124, 136 puruşārtha samyoga 1 Māyā 7, 68, 70, 75, 84, 141, 143 memory 12, 13, 15 Rajaguņa 1, 5, 58, 62, 63, 65, 67, 98,

methods 39, 40 100, 122, 125, 137

metaphysical 2 realism 2