130. ABHINAVAGUPTA'S THEORY OF ÆSTHETICS 149
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ABHINAVAGUPTA'S THEORY OF ÆSTHETICS 149
s0er5. Nor is the actor imagined to be the historic person because of the causal attributes, just as a poet imagines a lovely face as the "moon" because it gives the same delight to the percipient as does the moon. The reason for not classifying the spectator's consciousness of the object with the last two is again the same, namely, that they involve an objective perception of the presented.
UNWORLDLY NATURE OF THE ÆSTHETIC OBJECT.
The question that arises now is, if the æsthetic object cannot be classed with any real or illusory object of ordinary experience, what is it ? The answer that the majority of æstheticians have given is that it is unworldly, (Alaukika). It does not mean, that it is transcendental, supernatural or shadowy nothing. What is meant by this, is that the essential nature of the æsthetic object is such as does not allow it to be classed with any one of the accepted types of the objects of the world of daily life. It is an object of the æsthetic world and as such has only æsthetic reality and that too for those only who breathe and have their being in that world. It is a world, which is a creation of poetic genius. Its subject and object both, as configurations, are very different from those of the common world. The objects are neither pure creations of mind nor reproductions of the historic facts; but a harmonious mixture of both. Similarly its subjects are those to whom such objects appeal, when presented, as having a peculiar reality of their own ; a reality which is no less a reality than the common world reality, simply because it is æsthetic reality.
THE CONSTITUENTS OF ÆSTHETIC PERSONALITY. 1. Taste or Rasikatva.
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150 CHAPTER III ATSUDAVAMIHaA po:Taste is the inborn faculty of discerning the æsthetic elements in a presentation and of finding great satisfaction innæsthetic contemplation. 61
II. Sahrdayatva or æsthetic susceptibility. The æsthetic experience at the second level is the realisation of a basic mental state at a high pitch due to the identification with the focus of the presented. It presupposes, therefore, an experience of the emotive situations, similar to those presented on the stage, in ordinary life, on the part of the spectator. In the absence of similar emotive experiences in ordinary life, the æsthetic presenta- tion will have as little meaning as the sight of a very delicious fruit has to one who sees it for the first time and is perfectly ignorant of. its taste. A love scene, for instance, will have no meaning to a life-long celibate. The following few lines will make it clear how practical experi- ences, similar to those æsthetically presented, help in æsthetie experience :- Every1 group of sensations, apart from the transient immediate effect in leading to a certain experience, has more lasting effect on the percipient inasmuch as it affects his vitality, the power to react, so as to make it better fitted for reaction to a similar stimulation in future. Thus, after a few experiences of the same kind, the nervous system, like a trained body of soldiers, gets ready for all the appropriate responses at the stimulation by any part of the total situation. Let it be clearly understood that this response is involuntary and more or less mechanical, because it does not presuppose any psychic function. When the vital forces are so affected by a series of practical experiences, the response to the stimulation by any part of an emotive situation is such as if the whole situation 1. P. V., 47-9.