139. ABHINAVAGUPTA'S THEORY OF ÆSTHETICS 159

ABHINAVAGUPTA'S THEORY OF ÆSTHETICS 159

association of the experience, consequent upon identification, with the individual self and subsequent remembrance of the æsthetic experience, will not be possible. (2) We are talking of the identity of the actor and the spectator only in reference to æsthetic experience, but the actor is not simply an æsthete like the spectator. Hence, while they are identical as experiencers, the former differs from the latter inasmuch as one is what the other is not. This difference is constituted by the consciousness of a task and the consequent action attitude in the actor. Hence all the above processes are involved in the experience in the actor; but they are only incipiently aroused in the spectator. Firstly, because they come upon the mind of the latter without preparation ; and secondly, because while the former identifies himself with the historical character primarily through organic feelings, action attitudes etc., the latter does so primarily through visual and auditory experiences, which give rise to the organic attitudes. PHILOSOPHICAL EXPLANATION OF ELIMINATION OF TIME ETC. We have said that, according to Ābhāsavādin, every object is unity in multiplicity. It is made up of a number of Abhasas, "the universals". Every Abhasa, that figures in the consciousness of a particular cognising subject, need not necessarily appear in every other percipient. The constituents of the objective aspect of experience differ with the difference in the attitude, that the subject takes towards the object. The attitude is the main factor in apprehending the contents of the objective aspect of experience. The objective time, the time, the consciousness of which depends upon viewing the given in relation to a standard of measure, such as the sun, is not necessarily a content of every objective experience.