211. ABHINAVAGUPTA'S THEORY OF MEANING 235

ABHINAVAGUPTA'S THEORY OF MEANING 235

LAKŞAŅĀVĀDINS' POSITION CRITICISED. 1. The identity of Dhvani as a power of language and Lakșaņā is indefensible, because they are essentially different from each other. Their spheres are different. The sphere of Dhvani is that where both, the word and the meaning, are mainly intended to convey the suggestible image, as in the illustration discussed above. The sphere of Lakşanā, however, is that where a certain point is exaggerated or greatly emphasised as in "Gangayam ghosah" or "Simho manavakah". In the former case it is the nearness of the hamlet to the Ganges that is, exaggerated and in the latter the similarity with a lion Further, it often happens that when a certain statement is made, the fourth power of the language, namely, that of conveying a suggested meaning, which is different from the third, namely, that of Laksaņā, does not operate, though its operation is possible. The fourth meaning, the suggested, though it can be got from the statement, yet, being unnecessary, it is totally ignored, so that it does not figure in the hearer's consciousness. The interpretative, process stops immediately after the consciousness of the secondary meaning. Thus, if one power of linguistic expression can operate while the other is inoperative ; if Lakşanā can operate and give rise to the secondary meaning1 while Vyañjana is perfectly inoperative, though there is room for it to operate, how can then the two be identical ?

2. The secondary meaning cannot be represented to be a characteristic mark of Dhvani. For, there are innumerable instances in the existing literature, wherein the words are used in the secondary sense simply because of the established usage, but there is no suggestible 1. Dh. L., 51.