214. 238 CHAPTER IV

238 CHAPTER IV

called suggestible meaning, in the arousal of which the different stages from the conventional to the contextual and from that to the secondary are not noticeable, is really tne Laksaņā meaning; because the so called suggestible meaning also is one that has invariable concomitance with the conventional. Hence the conscious- ness of the central fact in the æsthetic experience is aroused not by Dhvani but by Lakșaņā as defined above. For, æsthetic experience involves the conscious- ness of the basic mental state, which cannot be conveyed through the conventional power, which presents the situation and the mimetic changes etc. But it is unnecessary to admit a fourth power of language to arouse a fourth type of meaning. For, Laksaņā, as a power, capable of arousing all the meanings, which are invariably concomitant with the conventional, is sufficient to explain the rise of the basic mental state also, for which a separate power of language, called "Dhvani," is admitted. A little careful reflection will make the unsoundness of the opponent's position clear. It is well known that the law of association leads the consciousness of one thing to that of another, associated with it. When, for instance, a person is made conscious of smoke by hearing the conventional word for it, in the language of his land. the idea of "fire" is naturally aroused through association. The latter is associated in the memory with the fire's power to warm and so on. The follower of the aforesaid definition of Laksana will have to take all that as a secondary meaning and will have to admit indefiniteness of the aroused meaning. But if he were to say that the word "smoke" has the capacity of arousing only one particular meaning, because its capacity is so limited that it conveys its peculiar meaning and not all those meanings which are