217. ABHINAVAGUPTA'S THEORY OF MEANING 241

ABHINAVAGUPTA'S THEORY OF MEANING 241

argumentum.ad-infinitum. Another thing that the oppone t forgets is that in the case of the consciousness of the suggest- ed meaning there is necessarily no experience of contradiction,

CRITICISM OF LAKSAŅĀ SUMMARISED.

The function of Laksanā is simply to bring in the additional idea to remove the apparent contradiction, implied by different words used in a sentence: for instance, the idea of "bank" in "Hamlet on the Ganges'" or that of "like" in "lion boy". The ideas, which moved the speaker to use such contradictory expressions, are aroused by an altogether different power. For, the conception of a power is based upon the function that it performs. And when the conditions, required for one power to function, differ from those of another and the result achieved is also different, difference of such powers from one another has naturally to be accepted.

"SAHAKĀRI BHEDĀCCA SAKTIBHEDAH".

The ideas, which the suggestive power of words is intended to arouse, are certainly different from those which the secondary power is said to give rise to. The necessary condition for the power to operate in the latter case is the apparent lack of harmony in the different constituents of a sentence. But the former does not presuppose this condition. If a statement is intended to suggest what is not directly expressed, or rather under the circumstances cannot be so expressed, but is suggested by a peculiar arrangement and choice of the words, it requires the power of visualisation (Pratibha) in the hearer, and not simply the knowledge of the secondary convention (Laksana). Hence distinction between Laksaņā and Dhvani has got to be admitted. THE ANVITABHIDHANA THEORY OF THE PRABHĀKARAS. In opposition to the Abhihitanvaya theory of the 31