221. ABHINAVAGUPTA'S THEORY OF MEANING 245

ABHINAVAGUPTA'S THEORY OF MEANING 245

of the instrumentality of the consciousness of one meaning in the rise of that of another for the following reasons :- 1. He admits the distinction of the primary meaning from the secondary. If the former be not instrumental in the arousal of the latter, how can the distinction between the two be maintained ?

2. He admits that where there is a coalition of DirectI Declaration, Indicative power, Syntactical Connection, Context, Position, and Name, that which follows is always weaker than the one preceding it ; because it is more remote from the purpose in view x2, i.e. indication of the use of Mantra.

As no comparison can be made when each of them treats of different subjects, they have to be taken in the present context as referring to one and the same subject. For, the sutra speaks of their 'Samavaya,' 'coalition', which implies their bearing upon a single subject. Among x3 these six, that which follows is weaker than that which precedes it, as they are more and more remote. Because in the case of all of these it is universally considered necessary to admit that there is the corroboration of a Direct Assertion, laying down the necessary application; and the cog. nition brought about by this corroborative Direct Assertion var ies in its proximity to each of the six means of cognition in question.

For instance, in the case of Indicative Power x*, there in no pointing out of the use, until there is a prior inference 1. J.S., 3-3-14. x2. Jha, 1164. x3. Jha, 1175. x4. Jha, 1178.

246 CHAPTER IV of the Direct Assertion (laying down that use); and hence in this case there is a certain degree of remoteness, which is not present in the case of Direct Assertion, wherein the declaration of the use having been duly cognized, it is the presence of this use that leads to the inference of the necessary capability. In all cases where the two means of knowledge proceed towards a common objective, that which is found to take more time in reaching it, is taken as remote from it, and as weaker in its authority than the other. Thus it is clear that the Mīmamsaka admits that Sruti and Linga etc. are different from one another as regards their strength or weakness to indicate the utility of a particular Mantra on a certain occasion. And this admission is based on the recognition that one is more remotedly connected with the indication of the use of Mantra than another. This means that he recognises difference in the causality (Nimitta) as sufficient ground for differentiation. Therefore, he has no justification in criticising the distinctive nature of the Dhvani as admitted by the followers of the theory of Dhvani. Because the suggested meaning is admitted to be different from others just for the reason that the means of conveying it (Nimitta) are different from those which are employed in conveying the conventional or the secondary. BHAȚȚA NĀYAKA'S EXPLANATION OF THE CONSCIOUSNESS OF THE SUGGESTED MEANING AND ITS CRITICISM. We have dealt with the æsthetic theory of Bhatta Nayaka in the first chapter. We have adduced historical reasons to show how the points of agreement between him and Abhinavagupta are more than those of difference, regarding the problem of æsthetics, viewed from the point of view of experience. His difference from Abhinava on the problem of Dhvani also is of the same nature. He