286. MAHIMA BHATTA'S CRITICISM OF DHVANI 317

MAHIMA BHATTA'S CRITICISM OF DHVANI 317

But it may be asked that if the imitation represents the sounds only of the words, how does the hearer get at the meanings of the words from their imitative presentation ? In reply to this Mahima Bhatta says that the words, which are the objects of imitation, are of two kinds : (1) meaningless and (2) meaningful. The imitative presentation of the words, which possess meanings, gives rise to the consciousness of the original words and thus it is the imitated (anukārya) and not the imitation that arouses the consciousness of the meaning1. As for the imitated words, they are separated from the rest of the words by the word 'iti' and, therefore, stand for the sounds only and not for the meaning. As regards the words, which are not imitations, they stand for their meanings and, therefore, necessarily occupy a subordinate position, because they are used for arousing the meanings. And whatever is used for the sake of something else, occupies a subordinate position, just as a pitcher does to water, for fetching which it is used. For, otherwise the determination of the relation of the principal and the subordinate will have no rational basis. Thus, Mahima Bhatta holds that the definition is impossible, (Asambhava) because the primary meaning can never occupy subordinate position to words. Common criticism of the adjuncts of both the word and the meaning (Sabda and Artha) is that even if we accept the position of the Dhvanivadin that in the case of Gūņībhūta vyangya the conventional meaning dominates and, therefore, it is to be excluded from the sphere of application of the definition of Dhvani by the adjunct of Artha: similarly if word be accepted to have more power than one to arouse different types of meaning, there 1. V. V. 14-15.