29. 32 CHAPTER I

32 CHAPTER I

E/ 2. Consciousness of all the constituents of the æsthetic object is necessary for æsthetic experience, though various methods may be employed for the purpose.

1.3. Mental states cannot be known directly: nor are they directly expressible in conventional language.

The objector attributes a theoretic motive to Bhatta Lollata, while the latter's outlook is essentially practical. According to him, the view of Rasa, stated above, is un- sound, because it does not hold good in regard to Rasa, as appearing in the spectator's consciousness. The basic mental state, which is the most essential constituent of Rasa, is not directly apprehended. How does it then find its way into the mind of the spectator? The conventional language proves inadequate for explaining how the basic mental state of the hero is induced in the spectator's mind. The conventional language can convey only the usual imagery of daily life and not the sense of the ideal. If then the most essential constituent of Rasa be absent in the spectator's consciousness, how can Rasasvada (Æsthetic experience) be possible? Bhatta Lollata's theory, therefore, is unsound. It cannot meet the theoretic considerations, put forward by Srīsankuka, based on the three assumptions, stated above.

We may point out another interesting fact in this connection. After the central point in Bhatta Lollata's view of Rasa, had been misrepresented by Śrīśankuka, it suffered further misrepresentation in the hands of subsequent writers on poetics, chiefly the commenta- tors on the earlier works on poetics. They have gone a step further and have attributed to Bhatta Lollata a theory of æsthetic experience, as a correlate of the objective percep- tion, as follows :-