39. 42 CHAPTER I

42 CHAPTER I

ing internal states and external objects. Its atomicity accounts for limited knowlodge in the knowing subject. For, the soul, inspite of its all-pervasiveness, can know only what comes to it through the Manas. As the Manas is atomic and the soul is entirely dependent on it for all knowledge, it can know only that with which it is put in indirect limited contact by the Manas. It also accounts for succession in sensuous knowledge. For, the senses, though five in number, each having a distinct object of its contact, cannot convey their impressions simultaneously to the soul, because only that sense can communicate its impression to the soul, which is mediated by Manas. And Manas, being atomic, can link up only one sense with the' soul.

THE OBJECT OF KNOWLEDGE (PRAMEYA). Generally speaking, all that is not the means of knowle- dge is the object of knowledge. Thus soul, body, senses, the objects of senses, knowledge, Manas, physical, mental and vocal action, attachment and aversion, rebirth2, pleasure and pain as the fruits of action and liberation are all objects of knowledge. Taking, however, the word "object" in a restricted sense of the world of nature, Nyaya, like the Vaiseşika, holds that it is made up of eternal, unchanging and causeless atoms and that it exists independently of thought.

MEANS OF KNOWLEDGE (PRAMĀŅA). Nyaya admits four means of knowledge (i) Direct perception (Pratyaksa) (ii) Inference (Anumāna) (iii) Com- parison (Upamāna) and (iv) Verbal testimony (Śabda). Direct perception, Pratyaksa, as a means of knowledge, is 1. N. D. 221-3. 2. N. D, 18.