48. HISTORY OF INDIAN ÆSTHETICS 51

HISTORY OF INDIAN ÆSTHETICS 51

tial nature of æsthetic experience. He, therefore, confines himself to the psychological process, which is involved in the course of its rise. He has nothing to do with the point of view of unæsthetic observer of the æsthetic object. Thus, according to him, the spectator, when he comes to theatre, has either got the image of the hero in his mind, if the hero is an historical character, or such an image is generated in his mind by description, contained in the general introduction to the drama, if the hero is an invention of the genius of drama- tist, as in the case of Carudatta in Sudraka's Mrcchaka- țika. Therefore, when the dramatic hero appears on the stage, the spectator mistakes him for the historic or fictitious character, because of close similarity between the mental picture in the spectator and the stage-presentation.

But the spectator's attitude is not practical; on the contrary, it is æsthetic. His psychic activity does not pass into physical. He does not verify facts. He does not put himself in practical relation with the presented. Therefore, error is no error to him, because it is not contradicted by any subsequent cognition that he, as an æsthetic observer, has. His recognition may be erroneous from the point of view of unæsthetic observer, but surely it is not so to him, because his attitude is not practical. Hence Śrī Sankuka holds that æsthetic recognitive judgement is not erroneous.

ÆSTHETIC JUDGEMENT NOT DUBIOUS.

We have stated in a preceding section that the charac- teristic feature of doubtful cognition is the oscillation of mind between two images, one that is generated by the object, which is directly present ; and the other, which arises because of similarity with it, in consequence of de- fective perceptual condition, such as dimness of light etc. As in the case of recognitive æsthetic experience there is no