51. 54 CHAPTER I

54 CHAPTER I

(i) Imitation theory cannot be maintained from the spectator's point of view. Firstly, because consciousness of imitation presupposes direct perception of what is spoken of as an imitation. As for instance, when a certain person drinks milk in a certain way, and says "Thus X drinks wine", drinking of milk, which is directly perceived by the spectator, is taken by him to be an imitation of wine-drink- ing of X. Now, in the case of æsthetic object, what is there in the actor, who is considered to be imitating, that is directly perceived and is taken to be an imitation of Sthāyī ? His body, various kinds of mimetic changes and physical states that he exhibits and variety of articles of dress that he wears, are the only things, which are directly perceptible. But nobody will be prepared to accept them as imitation of a basic state, because of essential difference in their nature; the former are physical, but the latter is primarily mental. There is difference in the means of their cognition also. In the one, eyes play an important part, but the other is purely the work of mind.

And secondly, because the consciousness of imitation presupposes the knowledge of both the imitated and the imi- tation. But the basic mental state of the imitated historic person, the spectator cannot be supposed to know, because of his being very far distant in time. As for its knowledge through literature, Srīsankuka himself holds, as we have already stated, that language can give only a conventional image of basic mental state of ordinary run, but not the ideal one. ( ii ) The second argument disposes of the second question, namely, does the actor imitate ? For, just as a spectator requires the knowledge of the imitated to have the consciousness of imitation, so does the actor to imitate. But just as the one cannot have it so cannot the other either.