56. HISTORY OF INDIAN ÆSTHETICS 61

HISTORY OF INDIAN ÆSTHETICS 61

presentation) shine wonderfully, though they are actually non- existent. They are mere creations of imagination and therefore, are without any fixed form and are capable of millions of imaginative additions. They are different from objects of dream and illusion etc., and therefore, are capable of fully captivating the heart. They are products of actors, who in the course of production do not abandon their essen- tial nature, exactly as Brahman does not give up his essen- tial nature when he creates the phenomenal world. But inspite of all this they are capable of giving rise to æsthetic experience and thus serve a human purpose. Just so this phenomenal world, which is nothing but mere name and form, which really do not exist, serves the highest human purpose,1 through reflection and contemplation. He also makes use of the Vedantic conception of Ananda, as predominance of pure Sattva, free from all admixture of Rajas and Tamas. He represents the æsthetic experience to be akin to the mystic realisation of Brahman. He, however, does not thoroughly stick to Vedantic technique in his exposition of the æsthetic theory. We shall briefly give an account of Vedantic and allied conceptions, utilised by Bhatta Nayaka, in proper context. BHATTA NAYAKA'S CRITICISM OF OTHER THEORIES. He rejects the theory that dramatic presentation gives rise to emotive experience in the spectator as related to their individuality. For, in that case presentation of sorrow shall have to be admitted to arouse an unpleasant experience. Further, the experience of personal emotion is not poss- ible, because historic character, such as Sīta, is not related to him as a stimulus to his personal emotion. The personal emotion cannot be said to be due to recollection of the object of his own love, at the sight of stage.presentation, on the 1. A. Bh. Vol. I. 5.

62 aoTanTa CHAPTER I THOTEIH

part of the spectator, for, it is against the fact of experience; there is no such remembrance. 1p He also rejects the theory that the cognition of emotion in the presented is due to inference or Verbal presentation. For, such a cognition cannot give rise to æsthetic experience. On the contrary, it will give rise to the feelings of envy, shame and hatred etc., just as such sights do in actual world. He equally rejects the theories that Rasa is effected or that it is suggested. HIS NEW TECHNIQUE. Common criticism of the above theories is that even if the psycho-philosophical objections be waved aside, no man, who has had the æsthetic experience, will agree that they give a true picture of the experience. Æsthetic presentation is never the cause of painful feeling. Tragedies also enliven. It does not arouse those responses, which the real does. This needs explanation. Hence the adoption of a new technique, not applicable to ordinary worldly experience. This new technique was adopted by Bhatta Nayaka. According to him, as according to all his predecessors in the field of æsthetics, æsthetic experience is due to objec- tive cognition of the presented. Unlike, however, his predecessors, he maintains, and rightly too, that both, the cognising self and the cognised object, are free from all limitations, which give individuality. And the resultant subjective state is, according to him, a state of perfect rest of the self within itself because of the predominance of the quality of Sattva and total relegation of the qualities of Rajas and Tamas to the background. Hence that state is characterised by the absence of all conscious physical, psychological and volitional activities and so by freedom from all attachment to and aversion from all that can enter into consciousness.