73. 80 CHAPTER II

80 CHAPTER II

not-self. If the subject and the object are completely cut off from each other, are of nature, essentially different from each other, and have mutually exclusive and independent existence, they can as little meet each other as can the two logs, which are being carried by two currents, which sepa- rately lose themselves in the sands. In regard to the Buddhistic doctrine of momentariness his position is slightly different. He accepts Buddhistic doctrine of momentariness of ideas, but rejects the doctrine of momentariness of the subject. For, if there be no perma- nent subject, capable of retaining the memory of objective ideas, it the subject be momentary and, therefore, were to disappear with the disappearance of each idea, the unifica- tion of ideas, necessary for consciousness of a combined whole, would be impossible. Similarly in regard to the Vedantic conception of the Maya he holds that it is wrong to say that Maya is neither of the nature of being nor that of not-being and, therefore, indefinable. For, the Vedantin lands himself into contradiction when he says that this indefinable is the cause of the phenomenal world. Is not the assertion that Maya is the cause of phenomenal world, in itself a definition ? He. therefore, holds the Māya to be real, as power of the Ulti- mate, and maintains identity of power and its possessor. We will deal with this point in detail in its proper context. He was very much influenced in his conception of the transcendental categories by the Indian Philosophy of Grammar. He recognises Bhartrhari, the author of the Vākyapadīyam, a very authoritative work on the Philosophy of Grammar, to be a great authority and frequently quotes from this work to support his own views. He, however, naturally follows the view of Somananda, as presented in the third chapter of the Siva Drsti that Para is distinct from