1. Constructive survey of Upanishadic philosophy

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA DEPARTMENT OF ARCHAEOLOGY CENTRAL ARCHAEOLOGICAL LIBRARY

CLASS 3684

CALL No. 181.41 Ran

.. A. 79.

AN ENCYCLOPAEDIC HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

VOL. 2.

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A

CONSTRUCTIVE SURVEY

OF

UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

BEING

A SYSTEMATIC INTRODUCTION TO INDIAN METAPHYSICS

3684

BY

R. D. RANADE M. A., Director, Academy of Philosophy and Religion, Formerly, Professor of Philosophy, Fergusson College, Poona.

PUBLISHED UNDER THE PATRONAGE OF THE LATE CAPTAIN SIR PARASHURAMRAO BHAUSAHEB, K.C.I.E., Chief of Jamkhandi.

ARCHA OLOGIOALR /81.41 New Delhi RAL NT

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1926. Oriental Book Agency Rs.17,8

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. .MUNSHI RAM/MANOHAR LAL SANSKRIT & HINDI BOOKSELLERS NAI SARAK DELHI-6

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CENTRAL ART"ALOGIGAD LIB 3684 Date. 2. 10.55. 161.41/Ranmm Call No.111

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PREFACE

1. The Occasion of the Work .- Ever since the nucleus of the following Survey of Upanishadic Phi- losophy was presented for the first time to the public of Bangalore and Mysore in a series of lectures in- augurated under the Presidentship of His Highness the Maharaja Gaekwar of Baroda at the time of the foundation of the Sanskrit Academy in Bangalore in July 1915, the author has been bestowing con- tinual attention on the substance of these lectures, and making them suitable for a thorough-going phi- losophical survey of the Upanishads, in the firm hope that what may thus be presented by way of exposi- tion of Upanishadic philosophy will satisfy every seeker after Upanishadic truth by giving him in a brief, though in a very solid, compass all the chief points of Upanishadic thought in their full philosophi- cal sequence. I must thank Pandit Mahabhagvat of Kurtkoti, now Shankaracharya of Karvir, and Mr. V. Subrahmanya Iyer, B. A., Registrar of the University of Mysore, for having given me an op- portunity at that time of placingtn choughts on the Upanishads for the first .tirfe berere thearte public of Bangalore and Mptehe l Beems that the lec- tures were much appreciated in Bangalore at the time of their delivery, and His Highness the Maha- raja Gaekwar advised that "the lectures be printed in English and the Vernaculars and distributed broad-cast, so that the knowledge imparted might be made widely available ". But what through stress of other work and what through unforeseen difficulties that beset the progress of any important

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undertaking, this volume could see the light of day only after the lapse of such a long period after the idea first sprang into my mind that the Upanishadic Phi- losophy was worth while presenting, and would serve as an incentive both to students of European and Indian thought alike.

2. The Combination of Philosophy and Philology .- Though I had begun my study of the Upanishads much earlier than 1915, it was in that year that I first conceived the idea of a presentation of Upani- shadic Philosophy in terms of modern thought, while a literary inspiration in that direction came to me first from a lecture of the late Sir Ramkrishna Gopal Bhandarkar in February 1915. It was not long be- fore I could discover that the Upanishads contained not one system of philosophy, but systems of philo- sophy rising one over another like Alps over Alps, and culminating in a view of Absolute Reality which was worthy of the fullest consideration of our con- temporary Philosophers of the West. With that end in view and in order that the Upanishadic philosophy might be made intelligible to the Western mind, I boldly struck out the plan of presenting it according to the methods of Western thought, so as to make it understandable and appreciable by those who were trained to think according to those methods. It might easily be seen by casting a glance at the con- tents of this volume that the manner of presentation is strictly one which is amenable to the methods of Western philosophy. Another difficulty, however, stood in my way. In trying to present the spirit of Upanishadic philosophy in the garb of European thought, it was incumbent on me not to do injustice to the letter of Upanishadic philosophy. It was thus that philological considerations weighed with

PREFACE 3

me equally with philosophical considerations. I had seen in my study of Greek Philosophy how much Dr. Burnet's method of interpreting the Early Greek Philosophers by reference to the Original Sources had revolutionised the study of Greek Thinkers, and I thought a similar presentation of Upanishadic Phi- losophy according to that method was certainly one which was worth while attempting. It was hence that I culled out Sources from Upanishadic literature, classified them into groups according to the va- rious departments of Upanishadic thought, arranged them in philosophical sequence, and interpreted them with due regard to considerations of philology, taking care all the while that the philological interpre- tation of these Texts would not become so crude and unintelligible as not to appeal to students of philoso- phical thought. It was this problem of the combi- nation of philology with philosophy that has made the task of an intelligent interpretation of the Upa- nishads in philosophic sequence so taxing and formi- dable. I leave it to the student of Upanishadic phi- losophy and philology to see how far I have succeeded in my attempt.

3. The Place of the Upanishads in Indian Phi- losophy .- The Upanishads indeed occupy a unique place in the development of Indian thought. All the later Systems of Indian Philosophy, as we be- lieve has been shown in detail for the first time in the history of Upanishadic literature in the fourth Chapter of this work, have been rooted in the Upani- shads. The indebtedness of particular systems of Philosophy to the Upanishads has been partially worked out by a Garbe or an Oldenberg ; but the entire problem of the relation of all the later Systems of Philosophy to the Upanishads has been hither-

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to an unattempted task. Oldenberg has indeed fairly worked out both in his earlier volume on "Buddha " as well as in his later "Die Lehre der Upanishaden and die Anfänge des Buddhismus " how the Upanishads prepared the way for Buddhis- tic thought, and deserves praise for having attempted a hitherto unattempted task. Garbe in his " Sam- khya-Philosophie " has discussed how far we could legitimately trace the origin of Samkhya Philosophy to the Upanishads, and has come to the conclusion that the roots of the Samkhya Philosophy cannot be traced to the oldest Upanishads ( p. 27), but that the Samkhya ideas came into existence only during the interval elapsing between the older period of the Brihadaranyaka and the Chhandogya on the one hand, and the later period of the Katha, the Śveta- śvatara, the Praśna, and the Maitri on the other. Garbe points out truly that the Ahamkara of Chhan- dogya VII. 25 is to be understood not as the egoism of Sämkhya philosophy, but as the mystical ego, and there is much truth in what Garbe says. He simi- larly makes a discussion about such conceptions as those of Sambhuti and Linga occurring in the earlier Upanishads, and comes to the conclusion that even they have no Samkhyan connotation. So far so good. It is, however, when Garbe refuses altogether to find any traces of Samkhya doctrine in the older Upanishads that it becomes impossible for us to go with him. Indeed, in our fourth Chapter we have pointed out how the conception of the three colours in the Chhandogya must have led to the conception of the tri-coloured Prakriti in Samkhya Philosophy ( pp. 182-183), and as the Chhändogya is recognised to be an old Upanishad all round, a general statement such as the one which Garbe makes that no traces whatever of Samkhya doctrine are to be found in

PREFACE 5

the older Upanishads becomes hardly convincing. As regards the Vedanta, also, we have tried to work out systematically in what respects all the later Ve- dantic systems, the monistic, the qualified-monistic, and the dualistic, could be traced to the Upanishads as to a parent. Indeed, when we recognise that all the great commentators, Sankara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva have made the Brahma-sutras the pivot for their philosophical speculations, and when we re- member also that the Brahma-sutras were an apho- ristic summary of the doctrines of the Upanishads, it would seem a little strange why we have not dis- cussed the arguments of these philosophers at even greater length than we have done. There are how- ever two reasons why we have not done so. In the first place, we wanted to take recourse to the objec- tive method of presentation, going to the Texts of the Upanishads themselves, unbiassed by any theo- logical interpretations of the Commentators whether on the Upanishads or the Brahma-sūtras. And, in the second place, it was thought desirable that a full discussion of all the theologico-philosophical points would best be reserved for a later volume on Vedanta philosophy proper. Indeed the Vedanta Philosophy stands to the Upanishads almost in the same relation in which the Philosophy of the School- men stood to Aristotle. We might say about the theological disquisitions of these Commentators what Bacon said about the arguments of the Schoolmen, borrowing the idea from Ariston, that they "resemble more or less a spider's web, admirable for the ingenuity of their structure, but of little substance and profit": τοΐς μεν αραχνίων υφάσμασιν είκαξεν, ούδεν μεν χρήστμους, λίαν δε TExMkoUs. This might be a little harsh judgment ; but it shows how there is a fundamental difference in the methodologies of the Upanishads and the Vedanta.

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In the one case, we have the intuitional method, in the other only the logical. We have no desire to exalt the intuitional at the expense of the logical. The intuitional, we believe, is not contradictory of the logical, but subsumptive of it. It must be remem- bered that we are not speaking here about the sub- relational intuitional method, but rather of the super- relational. Hence, even though we agree with Ol- tramare in his judgment that the Upanishads "regard the normal operations of Intellect as powerless to grasp Ultimate Reality" (p. 134), we differ from him when he says that " fearlessly and imperiously doth the Intuition of the Upanishadic Philosophers say fie to experience and give discharge to all demonstrations, while it does not even try to eliminate contradictions" ( pp. 131-132 ). The relation of Intuition to Intellect raises a large philosophical problem, and, as we have said at a later place in this volume (pp. 339-341), we cannot enter into a philosophical discussion about their comparative competence to solve the problem of reality in a work professedly dealing with Orientalia.

4. Examination of the Opinions of a few Orien- talists .- The work which has been accomplished by Western Scholars upon Upanishadic literature has not been by any means scanty. Though the volume of work turned out by them on Upanishadic litera- ture is neither so large nor so profound as that turned out on Vedic literature, it is neither on the other hand either meagre or small. Towards the end of the present volume may be found a succint account of all the work that has been done on Upanishadic li- terature by scholars like Weber, Röer, Max Müller, Böhtlingk, Whitney, Deussen, Oldenberg, Oltramare, Hertel, and Hillebrandt. Deussen 's work on the Upanishads is a monument to his great scholar-

PREFACE 7 ship, industry, and insight, and so is the work of O1- denberg and Oltramare. We do not wish to enter here into a detailed examination of the various opinions held on the subject of Upanishadic literature by early scholars, which have become the common property of all Upanishadic students ; we only wish to examine here a few of the latest utterances on the subject. When Hertel, for example, says in his brilliant, though somewhat one-sided, introduction to the Kenopanishad in his "Die Weisheit der Upanishaden," that Brahman in that Upanishad is not to be understood as "the World-Soul in which all the individual Souls ultimately merge", he forgets to notice the point that the aim of that Upanishad is simply to describe Brahman, in Wordsworthian fashion, as a power or a presence, "Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns, And the round ocean, and the living air, And the blue sky, and in the mind of man.' This must verily be the upshot of that Upanishad wherein we are asked to meditate on Brahman as the Reality in the world of Nature and in the world of Mind : tasyaisha ādeso yadetad vidyuto vyadyutada itīti nyamīmishadā ityadhidaivatam ; athādhyātmam yade- tad gachchativa cha mano anena chaitad upasmaratya- bhikshnam samkalpah ( Kena IV. 29, 30). With all due deference to Hertel's favourite theme of the identi- fication of Brahman with Fire, we must say that we can- not accuse the Upanishad of not having considered a point which is not the point at issue. The point at issue being the spiritual description of Brahman as a presence or power, it would be an ignoratio elenchi on the part of that Upanishad to go into the description of the Brahman as a "World-Soul in which all the other souls ultimately merge." Then, secondly, when Hertel points out that the Kenopanishad dispenses

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with the necessity of a Spiritual Teacher for the pur- pose of spiritual realization, that the Self must accord- ing to that Upanishad be regarded as capable of being realised simply by internal illumination, and that Uma in that Upanishad does in no way help Indra in realising the Absolute, he forgets entirely to notice the fact that the true rôle of a Spiritual Teacher consists just in the office which Uma has been performing, namely, like a lamp-post on the Pathway to God, of simply directing the benighted wanderer on the path of spiritual progress without herself going it. Dogmatic statements such as this about the teachings of Upanishads come merely out of taking partial views about a subject. This is also illus- trated in Oltramare's accusation against the Upanishads in his "L 'Histoire des Idées théosophiques dans l'Inde" that "in affirming the identity of the Universal and the Individual Soul, from which follows neces- sarily the identity of all souls, the Upanishads have not drawn the conclusion-Thou shalt love thy neigh- bour as thyself " (p. 137). True that the Biblical expression "Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy- self " is not to be found in the Upanishads ; but it would be bold on the part of any writer on Upanishadic Philosophy to affirm that the senti- ment is not present in the Upanishads. What else is the meaning of that Upanishadic dictum yasmin sarvāņi bhūtāni ātmaivābhūd vijānatah (Isa 7), except that a Sage, who has realised the Atman, must see the Atman in all human beings, must, in fact, regard all human beings as living in a Kingdom of Ends ? Finally, when Oldenberg in his brilliant work on the Upanishads "Die Lehre der Upani- shaden" tells us that the true parallel for Upanishadic Philosophy is to be found rather in the teachings of Plotinus, the Sufis, and the Chris-

PREFACE 9

tian mystics like Eckhart than in the Philosophy of Kant, and when he therefore a little superciliously disposes of the teaching of the Upanishads by saying " Der eine der Weg der Mystik, der andre der Kants", we are tempted to say about Kant with a little va- riation upon what Aristotle said about Plato, "Let Kant be our friend, but let Truth be our divinity". When Oldenberg commends Kant by saying that the central principle of Kant's philosophy is the "Formbegriff," while that of Upanishadic Phi- losophy is the "Formlosigkeit," he is blinding him- self to the fact that his Critique of Pure Reason was only the first premiss of a grand philosophical syllogism whose minor premiss and conclusion were respectively the Critiques of Practical Reason and Judgment, wherein conceptions of Goodness and Value supplemented the considerations of Pure Rea- son, for, on the grounds of Pure Reason, what philoso- phy could there be about the ultimate realities of human life, the Self, the World, and God, except a philosophy of paralogisms that paralyse, antinomies that make one flounder, and ideals which can never be realised at all ? The " Cognoscendo ignorari " of Augustine, the " Neti Neti " of Yajñavalkya, the "Weder dies noch das" of Eckhart, would be far more sure indexes of spiritual humility, and conse- quent possession of reality, than the self-satisfied and half-halting dictates of an Agnosticism on the grounds of Pure Reason, which must destroy know- ledge in order to make room for faith.

5. The Upanishads and Contemporary Thought .- The comparison of Upanishadic Philosophy with Kant suggests the parallelism, in a number of points, of the philosophical thought of the Upanishads with the tendencies of Contemporary Thought. Time was 2

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10 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY when Upanishadic Philosophy was compared with the doctrine of Plato and Parmenides ; time was yet again when it was compared with the philosophies of Kant and Schopenhauer ; we, however, who live in the world of Contemporary Thought can scarcely afford to neglect its parallelisms with the tendencies of the thinking world of to-day. Anybody who will take the trouble to read the argument of the present work will see how very provocative of thought it would be for one who is interested in the tendencies of con- temporary philosophy. Here, in the Upanishads, we have doctrines of Absolute Monism, of Personalistic Idealism, of Pluralism, of Solipsism, of Self-realisation, of the relation of Intellect to Intuition, and so forth,- doctrines which have divided the philosophic world of to-day. Had it not been for the fact that Com- parative Philosophy, like a virgin consecrated to God, bears no fruit, the parallelism of Upanishadic Philosophy with the tendencies of Contemporary Thought would have even invited a volume on Comparative Philosophy. What we, however, would much rather like to have is a constructive than a comparative philosophy. With the advance of knowedge and with the innumer- able means for communication and interchange of thought, the whole world is being made one, and the body of Western philosophers could ill afford to neglect the systems of Indian philosophy, and more particularly the Upanishads. The same problems which at the present day divide a Bradley from a Bosanquet, a Ward from a Royce, a Pringle-Pattison from a McTaggart, also divided the Upanishadic philoso- phers of ancient times. Here we have the same con- flict of views about the relation between the Abso- lute and the Individual, the nature of Immortality, the problem of Appearance, and the Norm of human conduct. The elan vital, which, in Bergson, wears

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not much more than a physiological aspect, appears in Āruņi (Chh. VI. II) as a great organic force, only much more psychologised and spiritualised. The pyramidal depiction of Reality as on the basis of Space and Time with the qualitative emergence of Life and Mind and Deity in the course of evolution, which we meet with in Alexander and Lloyd Morgan, is present in those old Upani- shads only with a stress on the inverted process of Deity as the primary existent, from which came forth Mind and Life and Space and Time in the course of devolution. The very acute analysis of the epis- temology of Self-consciousness, which we meet with in the Upanishads, can easily hold its own against any similar doctrine even of the most advanced thinker of to-day, thus nullifying once for all the in- fluence of that ill-conceived and half-thought-out bluster of an early European writer on the Upani- shads that " they are the work of a rude age, a de- teriorated race, and a barbarous and unprogressive community." Our presentation of the problems of Upanishadic philosophy would also lay to rest all the charges that are made against it on the supposition that it is a block-philosophy and does not allow of any differentiation inside it. For is it not a familiar charge that we hear made against Indian philosophy, that it is all Pantheism, Determinism, Karmism, A-moralism, and Pessimism ? It would be out of place here to answer each and all of the charges that have been thus made against Indian Philosophy in general, and Upanishadic Philosophy in particular. If our present work brings to the notice of these critics the variety and wealth of Upanishadic ideas on every conceiv- able subject in the domain of philosophy, it should have fulfilled its raison d'etre. Thus, to say that the Upanishads teach only "an unreal morality, or a mere

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Antinomianism", would entirely miss the mark, be- cause it would be a flank-attack and not directed against the main body of Upanishadic doctrine. Finally, to say that the Upanishads teach only a Pessimism is to entirely miss the tenor of Upanisha- dic Philosophy. For the simple reason that there is a phase of Pessimism in a certain portion of Upani- shadic teaching, it does not follow that all Upanisha- dic teaching is pessimistic. It has been cus- tomary with European writers on Indian subjects to suppose that all was pessimism and sorrow before the days of Tagore in India, and that Tagore brought the evangel of joy and bliss from the West. It is noth- ing of the kind. Tagore's philosophy of joy and bliss is only the crest-wave of that great huge ocean of blissful existence depicted in Upanishadic philosophy. If the present book points to any moral, it is the moral of the life of beatific vision enjoyed at all times by the Mystic. When Lord Ronaldshay, therefore, fixing him- self, among other things, on a passage of the Upani- shads, says in his book on "India, a Bird's eye-view" that pessimism infects the whole physical and intel- lectual life of India, and that the Indian Philosophers have never been able to paint any positive pic- ture of bliss ( p. 313), with all due deference to him we must ask him to see if the final upshot of Upani- shadic Philosophy, as we have depicted it, would not enable him to revise his judgment. To the charge, finally, that even supposing that the Upanishads teach a doctrine of bliss, the bliss of the Indian is one thing and that of the Christian another, that the one is negative while the other is positive, ( "Upanishads and Life" pp. 69, 70), we may say, as against Mr. Urquhart, in the first place, that we cannot conceive of any bliss being negative, for it would be a contradiction in terms, and in the

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second place, that this bliss is the same for all human beings whether they live in India or in Europe, for where the same intellect and feeling and will have been ordained to mankind by God, He has also made provision for a like consummation in each case. Oldenberg indeed has the candidness to admit, which these critics have not, that the opposite view is at least equally tenable that it should be inconceiv- able how the world which is "pierced by Brahman through and through" should ever wear a pessimistic aspect (pp. 115-116). Let those, however, who wish to find sorrow in the Upanishads, find sorrow, and those who wish to find bliss, find bliss ! Torrer xprukrar μέτρον άνθρωπος.

6. The three-fold purpose of the Work .- As may have been noticed from our previous discussion, the two chief purposes of the Work with which we have been hitherto concerned are to put into the hands of the Orientalists a new method for treating the pro- blems of Indian Philosophy, and into the hands of European Philosophers a new material for exercising their intellects on. But these are not the only pur- poses with which the Work has been written. The ultimate purpose of the Work is the spiritual purpose. To that end, everything else is subservient. Time and oft have the Upanishads compelled a spiritual ad- miration from all Oriental Scholars, both European and Indian. Dr. Goldstücker said that the Upani- shads formed the basis of the enlightened faith of India. R. C. Dutt, when he read the Upanishads, felt a new emotion in his heart, and saw a new light before his eyes. Ram Mohan Roy felt his whole life transformed when he happened to read a page of the Isa Upanishad flying past him. Pratt regards the Upanishads as essentially

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a religious rather than a philosophical work. Geden acknowledges how all the attempts at religious reform in India have taken their rise from the study of the Upanishads. Mead has gone to the length of calling the Upanishads a World-Scripture. From these utterances it may be seen in what high spiri- tual esteem the Upanishads have been held by Thin- kers, both of the East and the West. If we may say so without exaggeration, there is no piece of litera- ture in the whole realm of Indian Philosophy, except possibly the Bhagavadgita, which is so truly religious as the Upanishads, and demands from young India an intellectual justification of her faith in the light of modern thought. Those who have observed the course of the development of European thought during the last half century know how very much it owes its existence, its inspiration, and its fulfilment to the establishment of the Gifford Lectures. It is a good sign of the times that the University of Cal- cutta should have risen to the occasion, and been a pioneer in establishing Lectureships by means of which a similar ambition might be fulfilled in India. The Upanishads well deserve to constitute a very important chapter in the World 's Philosophy of Religion. It will not be possible hurriedly to esti- mate the contribution which the Upanishads are likely to make to the formation of tendencies in Con- temporary Thought. The trend of the present vo- lume is to show how all the teachings of Upanishadic Philosophy converge towards the realisation of the mystical goal. We do not wish to enter here into any philosophical disquisition about the nature and meaning of Mysticism; nor have we any desire to discuss how the Mystic criterion of reality compares with those of the Idealist, the Pragmatist, and the Realist. The veracity and the virility of any meta-

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taphysical theory is to be gauged by its power of making life more divine, and therefore more worth while living. Readers of the last Chapter of this volume may feel that, after all, the consummation that the Upanishadic philosophy affords is the realisation of the divine in the Individual Soul, and that it is not seen there working itself out in the social and political affairs of humanity. The practical application of the spiritual philosophy was, however, to come later on from the Bhagvadgita, which taught a life of a disinterested activism on a spiritual basis, so that the divine purpose may come to be realised in the affairs of men. It cannot be denied that the Upani- shads supply the philosophic foundation upon which the Bhagavadgīta later on erects its theory of spiri- tual activism. In either case, however, the mysti- cal motive has been most predominant. It would be a problem for the Philosophy of the Immediate Fu- ture to place Mysticism on a truly philosophical basis. Rational Mysticism, which has been hitherto regarded as a contradiction in terms, must now be a truism. The author shall feel his labours amply rewarded if he finds that his exposition of the Upanishadic Philoso- phy makes a contribution, however small, to the realisation of this Ideal.

7. The Academy of Philosophy and Religion and its Aims .- The present work is the first publication of the Academy of Philosophy and Religion, an in- stitution which has been recently founded in India with the purpose of bringing together all those who are interested in a philosophical investigation of the problem of God. This aim of the Academy is to be achieved primarily by Publications, embodying con- tinued and sustained research in all the Philosophies and Religions of the world. There will also

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be a number of Lectures from time to time on behalf of the Academy at great educational centres in India, which might also help the propagation of the cause of the Academy. The present centres of the Academy will be Poona, Bombay, and Nagpur, and so on, while the work of the Acade- my will be extended to other centres also in course of time. The Academy is intended to be an All-India Body, the Personnel of whose Council is drawn from representatives of all the Universities of India. For all those who are interested in the work of the Aca- demy of Philosophy and Religion, there will be an Ashram at Nimbal, a Railway Station on the M. S. M. Railway in the District of Bijapur, which might be used as an intellectual and spiritual resort. If Bacon's maxim may be requisitioned for our present purposes, we may say that the Academy must take all philosophical and religious knowledge for its pro- vince, irrespective of differences of creed, caste, nation, or race. The universal vision which must inspire the work of the Academy may be made apparent from the following quotation from the preamble of its Prospectus : "The problem of finding the uni- versal in the midst of particulars, the unchanging in the midst of change, has attracted the attention of every man of vision, whether he be Philosopher or Prince. Plato and Sankaracharya among Philosophers, Asoka and Akbar among Princes are illustrations of the way in which this universal vision has been sought. Plato is known for nothing so much as for his synoptic vision of the universal among the parti- culars. Sankarāchārya spent a lifetime in seeking to know that by knowing which everything else comes to be known. Aoka, in one of his Rock-Edicts, forbade the decrying of other people's faiths,-for in that way he said one was doing disservice to one's own faith,-

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PREFACE 17 and he taught the virtue of Concourse ( Samavāya ). Akbar sought after the universal vision by sum- moning a Council of Religion, for perchance, in that way, he thought that 'that lock whose key had been lost might be opened'. There is a far cry from the days of Plato and Śankarāchārya, or of Akbar and Asoka, to the present day. Knowledge has taken immense strides with the growth of time. Scientific inventions have enormously enriched the patrimony of man. The old order has changed, and a new one has taken its place. Nevertheless, the goal of human life as well as the means for its attainment have re- mained the same. Unquestionably, the search after God remains the highest problem even to-day, and a philosophical justification of our spiritual life is as necessary to-day as it was hundreds of years ago." More information about the Academy could be had from the Director of the Academy of Philosophy and Religion, Poona Branch, Poona, or, Nimbal, M. S. M. Railway, District Bijapur, India.

8. Patronage for this Volume .- I must express my heartfelt gratefulness to the late Shrimant Capt. Sir Parashuramrao Bhausaheb Patwardhan, K.C.I. E., Chief of Jamkhandi, to whose kind patronage the preparation of this volume has been entirely due. It is impossible for me to express adequately how much I owe to him and to his State, in which I was born and educated, and from which I was sent out into the literary world. At a time when the idea of free Primary Education was not even mooted in British India, Shrimant Appasaheb, the father of the late Chief, boldly conceived the idea of making even Secondary Education free in his Native State. It was only becoming in the generous successor of Shri- mant Appasaheb to have been so kind in his pa- 3

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tronage of letters as to even voluntarily offer to patronise this among a number of other projected publications. It pains me all the more that Shri- mant Bhausaheb did not live to see the publication of this volume which was brought out under his generous patronage. He met a hero's death in trying to educate a wild tusker, and it is all the more to be mourned that he did not live to see the fulfil- ment of the projected series of works of which this is only the first. It is not too much to say that it was the promise of patronage which I received from the late Chiefsaheb of Jamkhandi that impelled me and my friend Dr. S. K. Belvalkar to approach, among others, Lord Ronaldshay, the late Governor of Bengal, who in a previous Convocation address had discoursed so ably on the aims of Indian Phi- losophy, for sympathy in the cause of the History of Indian Philosophy, which was then only recently projected. It was the encouragement that we re- ceived from Lord Ronaldshay, as well as the keen interest which Sir George Lloyd, the late Governor of our Presidency, took in our work that enabled us to approach the University of Bombay to extend their kind patronage to our projected scheme for a History of Indian Philosophy, and we are glad to point out that our University came forth, in the first instance, with a generous grant for three Volumes in the Series, which will be brought out under their patronage in course of time. Two of these Volumes, out of a total number of sixteen that have been projected, are now in the Press, and may see the light of day before long.

9. The "Constructive Survey" and the " Creative Period " .- The mention of the grant of the Univer- sity of Bombay to three volumes in the History of

PREFACE 19

Indian Philosophy makes it necessary for the present writer to say here a few words in regard to the rela- tion that subsists between the present volume on the "Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy" and the Volume on the " Creative Period of Indian Philosophy " in the H. I. P. Series, which latter, it is hoped, may be published before long. The " Crea- tive Period " discusses the contribution that was made by the Brahmanas, the Aranyakas, the Upa- nishads, and the Post-Upanishadic period to the de- velopment of Indian Thought, and so far as the Upa- nishads are concerned, as befits a volume in the History of Indian Philosophy, undertakes a full dis- cussion of the Upanishads one after another in their chronological and stratificatory order, paying atten- tion to the analytical study of Upanishadic thought. The "Constructive Survey," on the other hand, focusses its attention only on the Upanishads, groups the various problems of Upanishadic thought under suitable headings, and takes a synoptic view of Upa- nishadic Philosophy. The one is an entirely analyti- cal study, the other a thoroughly synthetic one. The relation that exists between these volumes can be made clear, if we give a parallel from Greek philo- sophy. The "Dialogues of Plato," to which the Upanishads might best be compared, could be dis- cussed either analytically or synthetically; that is to say, we could either undertake an analytical in- vestigation of the various Dialogues one after another in their chronological and stratificatory arrangement, or else we might take a synoptic view of the philoso- phical doctrines of Plato as advanced in the various Dialogues together. There is the same relation be- tween the " Creative Period " and the " Construc- tive Survey ", as there is, for example, between Gom- perz 's analytical survey of Plato 's Dialogues, and

20 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY Zeller 's synthetic presentation of Plato 's philoso- phy, the one looking at the Dialogues seriatim, the other in toto. It is needless to add that for the stu- dent of Upanishadic thought, both the volumes are equally indispensable, the one only supplementing and not at all supplanting the other. 10. The method followed in this Volme .- The method followed in this presentation of Upanishadic Philosophy is, as the name implies, a method of con- struction through a systematic exposition of all the problems that emerge from the discussion of Upa- nishadic thought in their manifold bearings. As the alternative title of this work suggests, it is also a systematic Introduction to the problems of Indian Metaphysics. We have already pointed out how a systematic study of the Upanishads may serve as an excellent introduction to the Systems of Indian Philosophy. For long the necessity has been felt of an adequate text-book for introduction in the cur- ricula of our Indian Universities on the subject of Indian Philosophy, and it is hoped that this work may supply the long-felt want. The aim of the present writer has been to group together all the different theories that have been advanced in the Upanishads under suitable headings such as Cosmogony, Psy- chology, Metaphysics, Ethics, and Mysticism in their logical sequence, and to make an attempt at envi- saging his own point of view through a developmental exposition of these problems. The writer is only too aware of the value attaching to an objective pre- sentation of philosophical problems, and it is for this reason that his own point of view has never been de- liberately stated throughout the Volume ; but anybody who will take the trouble of following the full se- quence of the logical argument of the volume will see

PREFACE 21 what elements of constructive thought the writer has to offer. Such a method of presentation is not new to Western Scholars, and has been ably illustrated in Pringle-Pattison's "Idea of God" published during recent years. The aim of the present writer, as may become apparent from a study of the work, has been to prepare the way for a deliberate formulation of his own thought on the problems of Metaphysics, which, God willing, he hopes to achieve in a forthcoming publication of the Academy on "The Pathway to God ".

11. Thanks .- To Dr. Brajendranath Seal, Vice- Chancellor of the University of Mysore, I must ex- press my most heartfelt thanks for the very kind trouble he took in reading through the typescript of this volume at his usual lightning speed, and in making important suggestions. To Prof. K. N. Dravid, M. A., of the Willingdon College, Sangli, I am most indebted for reading the whole volume with me before it was sent to the Press, as well as for suggesting improvements. Dr. S. K. Belvalkar has laid me under deep obligations by al- lowing me to quote in this work a passage or two from our joint Volume on the Creative Period of Indian Philosophy, as well as for help in other respects. I am also indebted to my friend Prof. R. Zimmermann, S. J., of St. Xavier's College, Bom- bay, for having looked through this Preface, as well as in having checked the Bibliographical Note which occurs at the end of the volume. I must express my most heartfelt thanks to my nephew, Prof. N. G. Damle, M. A., of Fergusson College, Poona, who has helped me much by looking through a larger part of the proofs of this volume. I must also thank my young friend, Mr. R. D. Wadekar, B. A., for his

22 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY very conscientious help in discussing the Upanishadic Bibliography with me, as well as in looking through certain proofs of the Volume. Also, I must express my obligations to my former pupils, and now Pro- fessors, V. S. Gogate, M. A., and K. V. Gajendra- gadkar, M. A., of the Arts College, Nasik, for having helped me in the General Index and the Upanishad Index respectively. The untiring efforts of my pupil and friend, Mr. G. K. Sane, M. A., in the preparation and final disposition of the General Index deserve all commendation. The constant, day-to-day, cheerful help which my stenographer Mr. S. K. Dharmadhi- kari has extended to me, as well as his indefatigable diligence and resolve to stick to his guns through thick and thin, can never be adequately praised. The zealous and constant interest which Dr. N. G. Sardesai, Manager of the Oriental Book Agency, Poona, has evinced in this work cannot be praised too highly. Mr. Nanasaheb Gondhalekar, the Pro- prietor of the Jagaddhitechu, Press, Poona, has not spared himself, his Press, and his men for turning out this Volume in the fashion in which it is offered to the public. There are also a few other persons to be thanked. But as their interest in this Volume is spiritual, it behoves me, in the manner of the Kenopanishad, to leave their names unmentioned. "To gild refined gold, to paint the lily, To throw a perfume on the violet .... Is wasteful and ridiculous excess ". R. D. RANADE.

. .

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface I

Table of Contents 23

Chapter I. The Background of Upanishadic Speculation H Chapter II. The Development of Upanishadic Cosmogony .. 73 Chapter III. Varieties of Psychological Reflec- tion .. II3 Chapter IV. Roots of Later Philosophies .. 178 Chapter V. The Problem of Ultimate Reality in the Upanishads .. 246 Chapter VI. The Ethics of the Upanishads .. 287 Chapter VII. Intimations of Self-Realisation .. 325 General Index ... .. 363 Upanishad Index .. 405 Bibliographical Note .. 42I

. .

CHAPTER I

THE BACKGROUND OF UPANISHADIC SPECULATION

I. The Significance of the Study of the Upanishads ... I

2. The Upanishads and the Rigveda. .. .. .. .. 2

3. The Upanishads and the Atharvaveda. 4

4. The Upanishads and the Brāhmaņas. .. 6

5. Meaning of Revelation. 8

6. The Upanishadic view of Revelation. I0

7. Chronological arrangement of the Upanishads. I2

8. The Brihadaranyaka Upanishad. 18 ..

9. The Chhāndogya Upanishad. .. .. 21

10. The ISa and the Kena Upanishads. .. 24 II. The Aitareya, the Taittirīya, and the Kaushitaki Upani- shads. .. .. 25 12. The Katha, the Mundaka, and the Svetāsvatara Upani- shads ... .. 27 13. The Prasna, the Maitri, and the Mandukya Upanishads :.. 30 14. The Methods of Upanishadic Philosophy : .. 34 ( i) The enigmatic method. .. 34 (ii ) The aphoristic method. .. 35 (iii) The etymological method .. 36 (iv) The mythical method. 36 (v) The analogical method. .. 37 (vi) The dialectic method. .. .. 38 (vii) The synthetic method. .. .. 38 (viii) The monologic method. .. .. 38 (ix) The ad hoc method. .. .. 39 (x) The regressive method. 40 15. The Poetry of the Upanishads. .. 40 16. The Philosophers of the Upanishadic period. .. 44 17. Mystical, Moral, and other philosophers. . .. .. 45

CONTENTS 25

18. Cosmological, and Psychological Philosophers. 47 19. Metaphysical Philosophers: .. 50

(i) Šāndilya. 50 (ii) Dadhyach. .. 51

(iii) Sanatkumāra ... 52 (iv) Āruņi. .. .. 53 (v) Yājfavalkya ... 55 20. General social condition : .. .. 59 (i) Origin of Castes and Orders. .. 59 (ii) The position of Women. 61 (iii) The relation of Brahmins to Kshatriyas ... .. 6I 21. The Problems of Upanishadic Philosophy. .. 63

Sources I. .. 65

CHAPTER II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF UPANISHADIC COSMOGONY

I. Search after the Substratum. 73 2. Progress ot the Chapter 74

I. Impersonalistic Theories of Cosmogony.

3. Water as the Substratum. .. 76

4. Air. .. 78

5. Fire. .. 79

6. Space. .. 80

7. Not-Being. .. 8I

8. Not-Being, and the Egg of the Universe. .. .. .. 83

9. Being. . .. 85

I0. Prāņa. .. .. 87

II. The Controversy between Prana and the Organs of Sense 88

I2. Prăna, a bio-psycho-metaphysical conception. .. 9I

II. Personalistic Theories of Cosmogony. 13. The idea of a Creator, and the Creation of mythological and philosophical dualities ... .. .. .. 92 14. The Atman, and the creation of the duality of sex. 93

4

..

26 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

15. Creation by Atman through the Intermediary Person. .. 94 16. Atman and the theory of Emanation. .. .. .. 97 17. The Personal-Impersonal theory of Creation in Mundaka. 99 18. The Theistic theory of Creation in Svetāsvatara. .. .. I00 19. The Theory of Independent Parallelism as an explana- tion of the analogies of Upanishadic and Greek philo- sohpies. IOI

Sources II. .. I05

CHAPTER III VARIETIES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REFLECTION

I. Empirical, Abnormal, and Rational Psychology ... .. II3 I. Empirical Psychology.

2. The relation of Mind to Alimentation. .. II3 3. Attention involves suspension of breath. II4 4. Analysis of fear. II5 5. The claim of Will for primacy. II6 6. The claim of Intellect for primacy. I17 7. Classification of mental states. .. II8 8. Intellectualistic Psychology and Idealistic Metaphysics ... 119 II. Abnormal Psychology.

3. The problem of Death in Chhandogya. .. I20 IO. The problem of Death in Katha. .. I2I II. The problem of Sleep: the Fatigue and Puritat theories. I22 12. The problem of Sleep: the Prana and Brahman theories. I24 13. The Dream Problem ... .. I26 14. Early Psychical Research. .. I27 15. The Power of Thought ... .. I28

III. Rational Psychology.

16. No psychology ohne Seele - I29 17. The question of the seat of the soul. .. I30 18. The heart and the brain as seats. .. .. I3I 19. The relation of the body and the soul. .. I33

CONTENTS 27

20. The history of the spatial extension of the soul. .. .. 134 21. The soul, both infinitely large and infinitely small. .. I37 22. Analysis of the states of consciousness. I39 23. The microcosm and the macrocosm. 140 24. The " sheaths " of the soul. .. I4I 25. Limitations of a modern interpretation. .. .. 143 26. The problem of sheaths, at bottom the problem of sub- stance. .. .. .. .. I44 27. The idea of Transmigration, an Aryan Idea. .. 145 28. Transmigration in the Rigveda: the Xth Mandala. .. 147 29. Transmigration in the Rigveda: the Ist Mandala. .. 149 30. The ethno-psychological development of the idea of Trans- migration. . I52 31. Transmigration in the Upanishads : the Kathopanishad. 153 32. Transmigration in the Upanishads : the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad. .. .. I54 33. The destiny of the evil soul ... .. I57 34. Eschatology in the Brihadāranyaka. .. .. 158 35. Eschatology in the Chhandogya: the two Paths. .. .. I59

21. The moral backbone of Upanishadic eschatology. .. I61

22. Upanishadic and Platonic eschatology .. 162

23. Variation in the conception of the Path of the Gods. .. 163

24. Idea of Immortal Life. .. 164

Sources III. .. I66

CHAPTER IV ROOTS OF LATER PHILOSOPHIES

I. Introductory ... .. 178 2. The Upanishads and Buddhism. .. .. I79 3. Sāmkhya in the Chhändogya, Katha, and Praśna Upani- shads. .. 182 4. Samkhya in the Svetasvatara Upanishad. . .. 185 5. The Upanishads and Yoga ... .. 187 6. The Upanishads and Nyāya-Vaiseshika. ... .. ... I90 7. The Upanishads and Mīmānsa. .. .. .. I92

.

28 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

8. The Upanishads and Saivism. .. 193 9. Phraseological and Ideological identities between the Upa- nishads and the Bhagavadgita. .. .. 195 ro. Development of the Bhagavadgita over the Upanishads. 196 If. The Asvattha in the Upanishads and the Bhagavadgita. 198 12. The Krishna of the Chhandogya and the Krishna of the Bhagavadgitā .. 20I 13. The Upanishads and the Schools of the Vedānta. .. 205

9. Madhvaism in the Upanishads. .. 207 15. The Triune Absolute of Rāmānuja. .. 209 16. God, the Soul of Nature. .. 2I0

10. God, the Soul of Souls ... .. 212 18. Ramanuja's Doctrine of Immortality. .. 213 i9. The fundamental propositions of Sankara's Philosophy. 215 20. The Absolute, the only Reality. 216 21. The negative-positive characterisation of the Absolute ... 219 22. Sankara's Doctrines of Identity, Creation, and Immorta- lity. .. .. 221 23. Three theories about the origin of the Doctrine of Maya. 223 24. The Doctrine of Maya in the Upanishads ... .. 225 25. Vicissitudes in the historical development of the Doctrine of Māyā. 228 Sources IV. 233

CHAPTER V

PROBLEM OF ULTIMATE REALITY IN THE UPANISHADS

I. The Supreme Philosophical Problem. .. 246 2. The three Approaches to the Problem in the history of thought : cosmological, theological, psychological. .. 247 I. The Cosmological Approach, 3. Regress from the cosmological to the physiological cate- gories. .. .. 249 4. Regress from the cosmological and physiological to the psychological categories. .. .. 25I

.

CONTENTS 29

5. The cosmological argument for the existence of God : God is all-powerful. .. 252 6. God is supreme resplendence. .. 255 7. God is the subtle essence underlying phenomenal exis- tence ... .. 256 8. The physico-theological argument ... .. 257 II. The Theological Approach. 9. Regress from polytheism to monotheism ... .. 258 10. The theistic conception of God and His identification with the Self. .. 259 II. The immanence-transcendence of God. . 261 III. The Psychological Approach. 12. The conception of the Self reached by an analysis of the various physiological and psychological categories. .. 263 13. The states of consciousness: waking consciousness, dream- consciousness, sleep-consciousness, Self-consciousness ... 264 14. The ontological argument for the existence of the Self. .. 269 IV. The Significance of Self-conciouseness. 15. Self-consciousness: its epistemological and metaphysical significance contrasted with the mystical. .. 270 16. The Epistemology of Self-consciousness. .. 271 (i) The Self is unknowable in his essential nature. .. 272 (ii) The Self is unknowable because he is the eternal subject of knowledge. .. .. 272 (iii) The Self can still know himself ; hence Self-con- sciousness is not only possible, but is alone real. .. 273 17. The Metaphysics of Self-sonsciousness. .. 275 18. The Ladder of Spiritual Experience. .. .. 276 : Sources V. .. .. 278

CHAPTER VI

THE ETHICS OF THE UPANISHADS

I. Metaphysics, Morality, and Mysticism. .. 287 a. Progress of the Chapter. .. .. 88

30 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

I. Theories of the Moral Standard.

3. Heteronomy. .. .. 289 4. Theonomy. .. 290 5. Autonomy. .. 29I II. Theories of the Moral Ideal.

4. Anti-Hedonism. .. 292

5. Pessimism. .. 294 8. Asceticism, Satyāgraha, and Quietism. .. 295

6. Spiritual Activism. .. 296

I0. Phenomenal Activism. .. 297 II. Eudæmonism ... .. 299

I2. Beatificism. .. 300

I3. Self-realisation. .. 30I

14. The Ethical and Mystical sides of Self-realisation. .. 304

I5. Supermoralism. .. 306

III. Practical Ethics.

16. Virtues in the Brihadāranyaka. .. .. 307

17. Virtues and Vices in the Chhandogya. .. 308 18. The hortatory precepts in the Taittiriya. .. .. 309

18. Truth, the Supreme Virtue ... .. 3II 20. Freedom of the Will ... .. 3I3 21. The Ideal of the Sage. .. 315 Sources VI. .. 317

CHAPTER VII

INTIMATIONS OF SELF-REALISATION

I. Philosophy is to Mysticism as Knowledge is to Being. .. 325 2. The Lower Knowledge and the Higher Knowledge. .. 326

3. Qualifications for Self-realisation. .. .. 328 Necessity of initiation by a Spiritual Teacher. .. .. 329 The parable of the blind-folded man. .. 33I 6, Precautions to be observed in imparting spiritual wisdom. 332 7. Meditation by means of Om, the way to realisation. ... 333

CONTENTS 31

8. The Mandukyan exaltation of Om .. 9. Practice of Yoga. .. 335

9. Yoga doctrine in Svetāsvatara. .. 336

II. The Faculty of God-realisation. .. 338

12. The thorough immanence of God. .. 339

Types of mystical experience. .. 34I 13. .. 342 14. The acme of mystic realisation. 15. Reconciliation of contradictions in the Atman. .. 345

16. Effects of realisation on the mystic. .. 346

17. Raptures of mystic ecstasy. .. 347

Sources VII. - 350 ₩ 353

CHAPTER I

THE BACKGROUND OF UPANISHADIC SPECULATION.

1. In the History of Indian Thought, every revi- val of the study of the Upani- The Significance of shads has synchronised with a the Study of the Upa- nishads. great religious movement. When, about two thousand four hundred years ago, the author of the Bhagavadgita tried for the first time to synthesise the truths of Upanishadic philosophy in that immortal Celestial Poem, it was evidently with the desire of giving a new impulse to religious thought and thus laying the foundations of a truly mystical religion which should prove the guiding light of all mystical activities for ages to come. Then, about twelve hundred years later, when for a second time the architectonic builders of Vedantic philosophy came to construct their Systems of Reality out of the material placed at their disposal by the Upanishadic Seers, there was again witnessed a phe- nomenon of a new religious revival, this time the religious revival taking the shape more of an intellect- ual than of a purely mystical religion. In the twentieth century to-day, after the lapse of another twelve hundred years, under the impact of Western civilisation and Western culture, supported by the infinite progress of modern science and an all-round study of the philosophies and religions of the world, we in India, who are the inheritors of a great spiritual past that has been left to us by our Upanishadic ances-

2 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

tors, stand face to face with a very difficult problem, namely, that of reconciling mysticism with intellect- ualism in such a way that any thought-construction that we might put forth on the basis of the eternal truths of Ätmanic experience suggested to us by the Upanishads, might harmoniously synthesise the claims of Science and Philosophy and Religion, so that our . philosophical view of reality may not be disturbed but may only be supported by the advance of modern science, and both our scientific and philosophic views be made to redound in such a way to the glory of God that "the highest link of Nature's chain may only be seen to be tied to the foot of Jupiter's chair." The present writer believes that the Upanishads are capa- ble of giving us a view of reality which would satisfy the scientific, the philosophic, as well as the religious aspirations of man ; because they give us a view which may be seen to be supported by a direct, first-hand, intuitive, mystical experience, which no science can impeach, which all philosophy may point to as the ultimate goal of its endeavour, and which may be seen at once to be the immanent truth in the various forms of religion which only quarrel because they cannot converge. 2. It would be interesting to trace in a very brief outline the relation of these The Upanishads and the Rigveda. "Mystical texts " called the Upa- nishads to the earliest poetry of the Aryan race, namely the Rigveda, which must be regarded as having preceded them by a period of over a thousand years. In the first place, we must note that the Rigveda is a great hymnology to the personi- fied forces of nature, and thus represents the earliest phase in the evolution of religious consciousness, namely, the objective phase of religion. The Upani- shads, on the other hand, mark the subjective phase

.

§21 CHAPTERI: THE BACKGROUND 3

of religion. There are no hymns to gods or goddesses of nature in the Upanishads, but on the contrary, they contain a scientific search for the Substratum underlying the phenomenal forces of nature. There are neither any offerings of prayers to gods in the Upa- nishads, nor is there visible, throughout the Upani- shadic period, any inordinate fear of the wrath of these natural forces personified as gods. In other words, we may say that as we go from the Vedic period to the Upanishadic period, there is visible at every stage the process of a transference of interest from God to Self. When the individual Self has become the uni- versal Self, when, in short, the Ätman has been re- alised, whom and what may anybody fear ? For whom and what may any offerings be made? For whom and what may anybody pray to divinity? In a word, we may say, that as we pass from the Vedas to the Upanishads, we pass from prayer to philosophy, from hymnology to reflection, from henotheistic poly- theism to monotheistic mysticism. Then, secondly, we must not fail to notice the progress that was already being made towards the conceptions of cos- mogony even in certain hymns of the Rigveda itself. If we just take into account such a hymn as Rigveda x. 88, where the seer inquires what was the "hyle" out of which the heavens and the earth were built eternally firm and what it was upon which the Crea- tor stood when he upheld the worlds, or yet again hymns like x. 5 and x. 27, where the conceptions of Being and Not-being in a cosmological sense are being already broached, or even that famous agnostic hymn of creation x. 129, where the primal existent is declared as being superior to both Being and Not- being and where the cognisant activity of the Creator himself is called in question, we may say that a begin- ning was made even at this Rigvedic period of the

4 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§2

real philosophical impulse which passing through the Brähmanic period was to gather force at the beginning of the Upanishadic period. Thirdly, from the psy- chological point of view, we may say that while the Rigveda may be regarded as a great work of emotion and imagination, the Upanishads may be regarded as a work of thought and reason. There are many passages in the Rigveda, especially in the hymns to Varuņa, which have a close analogy to the devotional psalms of the Bible both in point of language and ideas-passages which are rarely to be met with in the literature of the Upanishads; on the other hand, in the Upanishads, we have more or less the coolness of intellectual argument exhibiting itself in a system- atic search after the Ultimate Reality. Thus it hap; pens that while there are to be met with in the Rigveda many hymns which express the meek submission of the suppliant devotee asking for gracious forgiveness from a divinity which is the creation of his own imagi- nation, the Upanishads say in bold terms: " Seek not favour from any such divinity ; reality is not the divi- nity which you are worshipping-nedam yad idam upa- sate ; the guardian of order is not outside; natural and moral order does not come from without; it springs from the Atman, who is the synthesis of both outside and inside, who is veritably the ballast of nature, who is the unshakable bund that prevents the stream of existence from flowing recklessly as it lists." 3. When we pass from the age of the Rigveda to The Upanishads the age of the Atharvaveda, we and the Atharvaveda. pass from the universe of hymns to the universe of incantations. Goblins, ghosts, sorcer- ers, witches, diseases and death, take the place of the god of thunder, the god of rain, the god of celestial and terrestrial fire, the god and goddess of light. The

§3] CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND 5

Atharvaveda is veritably a store-house of the black art of the ancients. There is no doubt some relieving feature to the Mantrasastra of the Atharvaveda, when auspicious charms take the place of destructive charms. But the general impression which the Athar- vaveda leaves upon our mind is that of the blood- sucking activity of the ghoulish demon which saps the fountains of both devotion and reason, and leaves us in the arid wastes of witcheries and incantations. It is a far cry from the Atharvaveda to the Upanishads. The two are almost as poles apart. No doubt there can be found in the Atharvaveda some sort of philo- sophical reflection as in the hymns to Kala xix. 53-54, nor can we say that the Upanishads contain no trace whatsoever of the Atharvic influence so far as incan- tations and charms are concerned, but the general distinction is quite clear, that when we pass from the Atharvaveda to the Upanishads, we pass from the domain of incantations to the domain of philosophy. We must not forget, however, to mention the few blemishes on Upanishadic thought that are to be found in the Brihadāranyaka and the Kaushītaki, which show the influence of a degraded order of cus- toms even in the reign of philosophy. When as in Brihadāraņyaka vi. 4 we read of helps towards secu- ring the love of a woman, or the destruction of the lover of a wife, or the fulfilment of the desire for pro- creation, or yet again when in Kaushītaki ii, we read of means for the magical obtainment of a rich treasure, or securing the love of any man or woman, or yet again of charms which may prevent the death of child- ren during one's life-time, or finally of the "Daiva Parimara" taught in that Upanishad by means of which the enemies die round about us as the effect of the charms exercised against them, we have to re- member that these are the only specimens of blemishes

6 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

on an age otherwise wholly devoted to philosophical and mystical reflection, and that, as the poet express- es it, instead of marring the beauty of Upanishadic thought, like spots on the face of the moon they only heighten the beauty of the philosophic reflection- malinam api himamsor lakshma lakshmīm tanoti. 4. When we come to the age of the Brahmanas, we come to an age of ceremonia- The Upanishads and the Brahmanas. lism and ritualism. As the chief topic of the Atharva- veda is incantation, similarly the chief topic of the Brahmanas is sacrifice. It passes one's understanding how the original purity of the hymnology of the Rigveda should have been so much sullied in the age of the Brähmanas, which only try to foist a super- structure of meaningless ceremonialism upon the hymnology of the Veda, and press into their service passages and texts from the Vedas which they utilise in such a way as to support the not-very-glorious life of the sacrificer. Curious indeed are the ways in which the Brähmana passages mingle together legends, exegeses, dogmas, philological and philosophical spe- culations so as to exhibit the efficacy of the Mantras for the practical life of the sacrificer. It is a pitiful phenomenon to notice how at the time of the Brah- manas so much intellect should have been wasted on the formulation of the details of the various sacrifi- cial rites: it only reminds one of the wheels within wheels of the scholastic interpretations of Christian dogma in the Middle Ages. The spirit of the Upa- nishads is, on the other hand, barring a few excep- tions here and there, entirely antagonsitic to the sacrificial doctrine of the Brahmanas. The halting attitude of the Mundaka in regard to the efficacy of Brahmaņic ritualism is an exception to the general Upanishadic reaction in favour of philosophical thought

§4] CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND 7

against the barren and empty formalism of the Brah- maņa literature. While, in one passage, the Muņdaka tells us that the only way towards securing the goal of human life consists in blindly following the routine of sacrificial and ritualistic works enjoined upon us by our ancestors (S. I. a), in another passage closely following upon the one which we are discussing, we are told that "Sacrifices are like those unsteady boats on the ocean of life which may take one at any time to the bottom of the sea. Those who regard sacrifices as the highest good of human life, go again and again from old age to death. Living in the midst of darkness, these soi disant wise men move about to and fro like blind men led by the blind. They regard themselves as having reached the goal of their life even while living in the midst of ignorance. Full of desire, they fall down from their places in the heavens as soon as their merit is exhausted. Think- ing that sacrifice is the highest end of human life, they cannot imagine that there is any other end. Having enjoyed in the heavens the reward of their good works, they descend down to this world, or to a lower world still. It is only those who practise pen- ance and faith in a forest, who tranquil their passions, lead the life of knowledge and live on alms,-it is only these that go to the immortal Atman by the door-way of the Sun" (S. I. b). The Upanishads which stand for knowledge as against the Brāhmaņi- cal philosophy of works very rarely exhibit even this halting attitude towards ritualism to be met with in the Mundaka. Their general tone is to try to find out the philosophical end of human life. Even so early as at the time of the Chhandogya, the efficacy of the " inner sacrifice" had come to be definitely recogni- sed : "Our real sacrifice consists in making oblations to the Prana within us. One who does not know

8 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§4 this inner sacrifice, even if he were to go in for a formal sacrifice, throws oblations merely on ashes. On the other hand, he who knows this inner sacrifice is re- lieved of his sins as surely as wool is burnt in a flame of fire. Knowing this inner sacrifice, even if a man were to do acts of charity for a Chandala, he may verily be regarded as having sacrificed to the Univer- sal Soul " (S. 2. a). The Kaushītaki again tells us definitely, referring probably to the custom at the time of the Aranyakas to perform acts of mental sacrifice, that " the ancient sages did not go in for a formal sacrifice knowing that an endless sacrifice was going on all the while within themselves" (S. 2. b). We thus see how the Brahmanical idea of sacrifice comes to be modulated in the days of the Upanishads so as ultimately to be entirely transformed into a new conception of sacrifice altogether-that of a mental sacrifice-which is helpful to the process of the acquisition of spiritual knowledge. On the whole, it may not be untrue to say that the futility of works was definitely recognised at the time of the Upanishads which tried to substitute a philosophy of knowledge for the Brahmanical philosophy of works. 5. The Vedas, the Brahmanas and the Upanishads Meaning of Revelation. have all of them been recognised from times immemorial as "Śruti" or Revelation. Let us try to find out what the real meaning of this expression is. It has been customary among all religious to regard their basal works as being revealed to them by God. Some regard their religious works as having been revealed to them in the midst of light and thunder, either from without or within. Others regard them as having been deliver- ed to them in the form of significant sounds. In this way have the Bible and the Koran, like the Vedas and the Upanishads, been regarded as revelations of

§51 CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND 9

God to man. The real meaning of Revelation seems to the present writer to be not any external message delivered to man from without, but a divine afflatus springing from within, the result of inspiration through god-intoxication. It was for this reason that St. Paul said that it was not he but God that spoke through him. It was for this reason that Jesus Christ advised his disciples to take no thought as to what they were going to speak, but that they should speak straight- way and then God would speak through them. It was for this reason likewise that Plato explained in his Ion the origin of poetical composition through the afflatus of god-intoxication : "The authors of those great poems do not attain to excellence through the rules of any art, but they utter their beautiful melodies of verse in a state of inspiration, and, as it were, pos- sessed by a spirit not their own. Thus the composers of lyrical poetry create those admired songs of theirs in a state of divine insanity ...... Thus every rhapsod- ist or poet ...... is excellent in proportion to the extent of his participation in the divine influence, and the degree in which the Muse itself has descended on him. .. ... And thus it appears to me .... that these transcendent poems are not human, as the work of men, but divine, as coming from God." This pas- sage gives us a very good account of the way in which all poetry, and likewise, all philosophy worthy of the name comes to be produced. It was in this way that we may say that the Vedic seers composed their hymns, and the Upanishadic philosophers set forth intellectual arguments. It is futile to discuss, as the Naiyāyikas and the Mīmāmsakas later discussed, as to whether the Vedas and the Upanishads are " apau- rusheya" or "paurusheya." The Naiyāyikas main- tained that these works were "paurusheya", that is, composed by God. The Mimamsakas, on the other 2

10 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

hand, believing in the eternity of sound, said that they were "apaurusheya", that is, they were com- posed neither by man nor by God, but that, in the form of sounds in which they have come down to us, they existed from all eternity. As contrasted with both these schools, the Vedantins maintain that the Vedas and the Upanishads are "apaurusheya", in the sense that they were inspired by God-purushapra- . yatnam vina prakațibhuta. This last meaning of the word " apaurusheya" comes quite close to the mean- ing which we have tried to assign to the word Revela- tion ; and thus we may see how the Vedas and the Upanishads must, like the basal literature of all other religions, be regarded as having been composed by seers in a state of god-intoxication. 6. Let us see what the Upanishads themselves

The Upanishadic have got to say on the question view of Revelation. of the meaning that we have assigned to the term Revelation. The Brihadaranyaka tells us that " the Rigveda, the Yajurveda, the Samaveda and the Atharvangirasa have all of them been breathed forth by that great Primeval Being ; likewise also have all history, all mythology, all sciences, all Upanishads, all poems, all aphorisms and all the commentaries thereon been breathed forth by that Great Divinity " (S. 3.). It is important to remember that this Upanishadic passage classes the Vedas and the Upanishads on the one hand, with History and Mythology on the other, as being breathed forth by God. Now nobody has re- garded the Histories and the Mythologies as " Śruti" or Revelation, even though the Vedas and the Upani- shads have been so regarded, and yet the Upanishadic passage classes the two together as being the result of the breathing forth of God. The only meaning, it soems to us, that we can assign to the above passage

.

CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND 11

is that all these great works, whether we take the Vedas and the Upanishads on the one hand, or History and Mythology on the other, may be regarded as having been due to the inspirational activity of God in the minds of those who composed them. It was not the writers of these works that were the authors of them, but it was the Divinity within them that was responsible for their production. We thus have the Upanishadic view of the Upanishads as the result of the inspirational activity of God, the philosophers to whom they are attributed having served merely as instruments for the display of this activity. This is a sort of a new Upanishadic Occasionalism, where the Seer or the Sage serves merely as an occasion for the creative activity of God. Thus, when the sage Śvetaśvatara said, that the Upanishad, which is named after him, was revealed to him through the power of his penance and the grace of God (S. 4. a), and yet again when the sage Trisanku uttered his vedanuvachana, which expression might be understood to mean either a "post-illuminational" discourse, or one which was "in consonance with his mystical illumination" (S. 4. b), they are supporting the view of the meaning of Revelation which we have taken above. There is yet again a second view which im- plies more or less a human participation in the trans- mission, if not in the composition, of these revealed texts, when, as in the Isa and the Kena Upanishads, we are made aware of a continuity of philosophical tradition which had come down to the days of the Upanishads (S. 5. a). In the Chhandogya Upanishad, likewise, we are told that Sages of old were careful to learn spiritual wisdom from their Teachers, for fear that when these Teachers had departed, there would be nobody living who would tell them " what could not be otherwise heard, what could not be otherwise thought,

12 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ §6 what could not be otherwise known " (S. 5. b). Finally, we have in the Brihadāranyaka a strange view of the genesis of Revelation, when we are told that the Rigveda, the Yajurveda and the Samaveda were all of them produced by the God of Death, who having coupled himself with a wife of his own creation, namely Speech, produced the above-mentioned Vedas along with all men and cattle from his union (S. 6)-a view which is quixotic enough for philosophical pur- poses, unless we understand it as having an anthropo- logic value, and as being the remnant of an old mythological way of thought which is to be found in plenty in most Brähmanical as well as in some Upani- shadic literature. On the whole, it may not be untrue to say that the Upanishads are regarded by the Upa- nishads themselves as being the work of the inspira- tional activity of God in the human mind. 7. Having cleared the Upanishadic view of reve- Chronological ar- lation, let us try to arrange in a rangement of the Upa- chronological order the Upani- nishads. shads which are going to be the subject-matter of the present Volume. It must be remembered at the outset that we must make a clear division between the Old Upanishads and the New Upanishads, the Old batch comprising the Thirteen Upanishads to be enumerated presently, while the New Upanishads contain such of the remaining Upa- nishads as can be proved to be authentic by higher literary criticism. The four Upanishads which Dr. Schrader has discovered recently, namely, the Bash- kala, the Chhagaleya, the Arsheya and the Saunaka will not concern us in the present Volume, because their authenticity has not yet been universally ac- cepted. The Mahānārayanopanishad has also been recently proved to be obviously of a later date, and hence it cannot be included in our Older batch of

§71 CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND 13

the Upanishads. The Thirteen Upanishads, which will be the subject-matter of the present Volume, may be arranged according to the order of the Muktika canon as Īśa, Kena, Katha, Praśna, Muņdaka, Māņ- dukya, Taittirīya, Aitareya, Chhāndogya, Brihadā- raņyaka, Śvetaśvatara, Kaushītaki and Maitri. This, however, is an order which does not take the chrono- logical sequence of the Upanishads into account, and it thus becomes necessary in the light of modern literary criticism and a historico-philological evalua- tion of the Upanishads to arrange them in proper chronological perspective. The problem has been so thoroughly treated by us elsewhere that it would be re- dundant to go over once more into the problem of the chronological arrangement of these Upanishads. We shall merely content ourselves with mentioning the conclusions that have been arrived at. Considering the Upanishadic age to have been placed somewhere between 1200 B. C., and 600 B. C., it becomes necessary to distribute the Upanishadic literature into chronolo- gical periods within the general limits that have been so fixed. Various tests have been employed as to the chronological arrangement of these Upanishads. (1) The language, the style, the vocabulary, the inflection and other grammatical peculiarities are one obvious test for determining the age of an Upanishad; but this cannot be a final test, because an old Upanishad may have been written in a fairly lucid style, while a newer Upanishad may have been composed in an almost archaic style. (2) Nor is the distinction between prose and verse a sufficient criterion for the chronological arrangement of the Upanishads. It seems to have been taken for granted by critics like Deussen that the oldest of these Upanishads were written in prose, that others which followed them were written in verse, and that a few others that remained came to

14 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§7 be written in prose again. This is a gratuitous assumption which in the light of modern criticism does not seem to hold much water. (3) A third test, namely that of a successive elaboration of detail, is a fairly good test though it is not absolutely conclusive. Thus it may not be entirely incorrect to find the chronological order of certain Upanishads according to the elaboration of detail of the story of the "War of the Senses" as found in them. This story occurs in the Chhandogya, the Brihadaranyaka, the Aitareya, the Kaushitaki and the Praśna Upanishads, and it must be legitimate to argue for the precedence or sequence of any of these Upanishads according to the elaboration of the detail of the story. (4) A fourth and a more difficult test, namely that of a regular ideological development, is not without its use. Thus, for example, the development of the idea of the rela- tion of the "Two Souls," the Individual Soul and the Universal Soul, which occurs in the Kathopanishad, the Mundakopanishad and the Śvetaśvataropani- shad could be regarded as a legitimate test for the chronological sequence of these Upanishads in that order, inasmuch as in the story of the Kathopanishad the two Souls are regarded as being on a par with each other as enjoying equally the fruits of their action, while in the Mundaka only one is described as tast- ing of the fruits of action, the other being de- scribed simply as an on-looker, while finally in the Śvetaśvatara an addition is made to the con- ception in the Mundaka, namely that of the unborn Prakriti, consisting of the three qualities, the red, the white and the black, which the Individual Soul enjoys, but which the Universal Soul leaves off (S. 7). (5) A fifth test, which is only a particular case of the last test, but which deserves separate mention on account of the importance it has attained at the

§7] CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND 15

hands of certain modern writers, especially Prof. Keith, centres itself round the development of the idea of Transmigration in the Upanishads. Just as a similar attempt has been made in regard to the chro- nological arrangement of the Dialogues of Plato on the basis of the development of the doctrine of Ideas as found in them, similarly, an attempt is here made to find out the chronological sequence of the Upanishads on the basis of the development of the idea of Transmigration. It must be remembered, however, that this test comes very often to base itself upon negations, instead of positive assertions. Ab- sence of the idea of Transmigration does not neces- sarily prove the priority of an Upanishad, because, it may be, that the idea may not form the subject- matter of that Upanishad, while the Upanishad itself may not be amenable to the postulation of that idea. Prof. Keith has argued, and many others have fol- lowed him in saying, that the Aitareya Aranyaka, especially in its older portion, must be regarded as very old indeed, because the idea of Transmigration does not occur in it. These writers seem to argue in a circle, because they hold that the older portion of the Āraņyaka must be separated from the newer portion on account of the absence of the idea of Transmigra- tion in it, and then they say that the idea of Trans- migration must be regarded as late because it does not occur in the older portion. Now even supposing that we can succeed in making a division between the older portion and the newer portion of the Aitareya Äranyaka, the absence of the idea of Transmigration in the older portion can be regarded as no argument for its chrnonological severance from the newer por- tion ; while it is necessary to remember that the Fifth Chapter of the Second Section of the Aitareya Aranya- ka does definitely assert the fact of Transmigration

16 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§7 when it describes a man as veritably coming to life after death-a fact which it calls his "third birth". (6) Finally, the only test which may be regarded as being absolutely definite about the chronological arrangement of the Upanishads is that of inter-quota- tion. Thus we may say that the Taittirīya is definite- ly later than the Brihadaranyaka, inasmuch as the Taittirīya refers to the Brihadāranyaka in the very words in which this latter Upanishad states the doc- trine of "quintuple existence" (S. 8). But this test can have no universal significance because we find only few definite inter-quotations among the Upanishads. More- over, if we just take into account the different strata of composition in the various Upanishads, and divide each of the Upanishads according to the sub-units of which it may be composed, the problem of a general chronological arrangement of these sub-units becomes a hard one indeed ; but if we make all the allowance that we can for the existence of these strata in the Upanishads, and judge of the Upanishads as a whole, we may say that the Thirteen Upanishads, which we have mentioned above and which will form the theme of our present Volume, may be classed together into the following five different groups :- I. Brihadāraņyaka and Chhāndogya. II. Īsa and Kena. III. Aitareya, Taittirīya and Kaushītaki. IV. Katha, Muņdaka and Śvetāśvatara. V. Praśna, Maitri and Māņdukya. A study of the Brihadāranyaka and the Chhandogya may easily lead us to regard them as belonging to the oldest group of the Upanishads. Even though they may be seen to consist of several sub-units, on the whole we may say that they belong to the oldest group. The Upanishads in group II, namely Iśa and Kena, it is customary to relegate to a comparatively

§7] CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND 17

late period ; but the language, the sentiment and the archaic tone of the Isa, especially the common ma- terial it has with the Brihadaranyaka and the Kena, which latter may be placed almost in the same category with it, may be regarded as constituting the second group. Of group III, the Aitareya must be regarded as an old Upanishad, but not necessarily as the oldest simply for the reason that has been adduced, namely, that it belongs to the earliest Veda, the Rigveda. The Taittirīya goes in the same group with the Aitareya, while the Kaushitaki, even though it may be regarded as on the whole an unoriginal Upanishad, still in the parts which belong to it properly, may be classed along with the Aitareya and the Taittiriya to consti- tute group III. Group IV is quite definite. The Mundaka comes after the Katha, and the Śvetāśva- tara comes after the Mundaka, and even though there is an evident archaism in the Śvetāsvatara and a clear sub-division of it into the first chapter on the one hand, and the other chapters on the other, on the whole it may be said to bring up the rear among these great poetical Upanishads. Of group V, the Praśna which forms quite a pre-conceived unity entirely unlike the other Upanishads, must be re- garded as belonging to the latest group; the Maitri whose vocabulary is quite peculiar to itself and which has evidently two or more definite strata in it, must, on account of its mythological and astronomical re- ferences, be regarded as coming quite near to the time when the Pauranika tradition began; while the Man- dukya, which may be said to develop the thought of the Maitri itself in certain respects, namely, in postu- lating three and a half moræ, while the Maitri postu- lates only three, of the symbol Om, as well as on ac- count of its aphoristic method of thought-presenta- tion, may be regarded as being the last of the Older 3

18 SVRVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

batch of the Upanishads. It would be hard to determine the exact date of the composition of any of these Upanishads; but the upward and the lower limits of the whole Upanishadic period may be fixed without much difficulty as being between 1200 and 600 B.C., and the later Upanishads of the above canon may be seen to be dovetailed into that next period of Indian Thought, when Buddhism was germinating in India, when the Samkhya and the Yoga were being syste- matised, and when the Bhagavadgita was being com- posed to finally hush the voice of the materialist and the atheist by synthesising the points of theistic significance in the Samkhya and the Yoga, and by gathering together the red-letter pieces of Upanishadic philosophy and welding them all up together into a theistic-mystic poem-the pattern of many similar imitations in days to come. 8. It would be necessary for us to revicw briefly the contents of the various Upani- The Brihadaranyaka. shads as arranged chronologically in the above outline, and to set forth in a brief way the main points of interest in those Upanishads from the philosophical point of view. A full analysis of the Upanishads is neither possible nor desirable in this place, but we refer our readers to our History of Indian Philosophy Vol. II. for a full account of the contents of them. In order, however, that our readers may understand and appreciate the problem- by-problem treatment of the Upanishads in the succeed- ing chapters of this work, it would be necessary for us to introduce them briefly to the contents of the various Upanishads. We may begin by an analysis of the Brihadaranyaka. This Upanishad contains six chap- ters, of which the second, the third and the fourth are alone of philosophical consequence, the others con- taining philosophical matters interspersed with much

§8] CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND 19

miscellaneous reflection. In the first chapter, we have a good description of the Cosmic Person considered as a sacrificial horse; then we pass to the theory of Death as the "arche" of all things ; and then we have a parable in proof of the supremacy of Prana, which is followed by a number of creationist myths put together at random. In the second chapter, we have the famous conversation between Gargya, the proud Brahmin, and Ajatasatru, the quiescent Kshatriya king. It is in this chapter likewise that we are intro- duced for the first time to the great sage Yājnavalkya, who is making a partition of his estate between his wives, as well as to the sage Dadhyach Atharvana whose philosophical teaching we shall consider at a later stage in this chapter. The sage Yajñavalkya, to whom we are introduced in chapter two, becomes the prominent figure of chapters three and four, and just as in chapter two we see him discoursing with his wife Maitreyi, similarly in chapter three we see him discoursing with a number of philosophers in the court of king Janaka, and in chapter four with king Janaka himself. The philosophical teachings of Yajnavalkya we shall consider somewhat later; but it would be necessary for us here to say something about his per- sonality. An irascible philosopher by nature, as may be seen from the fate to which he subjects Sakalya who was disputing with him in the court of king Janaka, he seems nevertheless to possess the kindness of human feelings, especially in his relations with his wife Maitreyī. Given to bigamy, he nevertheless maintains a strict spiritual relation with Maitreyi, while Katyāyanī, his other wife, he regards merely as a woman of the world and prizes accordingly. Ad- umbrating as he does his doctrine of immanence to Gargi when she torments him with question after question, and wanting in chivalry as he seems to us

20 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§8

as he proceeds without much ceremony to check her philosophic impudence, he nevertheless appears to be a shrewd man, who, when pressed by the sage Jarat- kārava to some deepest questions, takes him by the hand out of the assembly and discourses with him on the topic of Karman, and a prudent man likewise who gives ad hoc answers to his controversialists, as may be seen from the way in which he ritualistically disposes of the ritualistic questions of Asvala. A eudæmonist by nature, who supposes that the accept- ance of presents is not incompatible with the im- parting of philosophical knowledge, and therein main- taining rather the Sophistic view of wisdom, than the Socratic view that a great spiritual teacher must never contaminate himself with the acceptance of presents, Yājñavalkya is, undoubtedly, the greatest philosopher of the Upanishadic times, who, by his consistent philosophical Idealism and by his thorough- going practical Atmanism, may give lessons to many a thinker of the present day. King Janaka, who seems to be an ardent lover of philosophical and spiri- tual wisdom, falls prostrate at the feet of this great philosopher, offering him his kingdom and his pos- sessions, which the philosopher scarcely avails himself of. This king Janaka figures largely in the third and fourth chapters of this Upanishad, in the third chapter being only a spectator of the great controversy in his court, and in the fourth taking the liberty to learn per- sönally from Yajnavalkya himself. It is this king likewise who is also introduced for a while in the fifth chapter of this Upanishad, which contains many other things besides, such as a number of miscellaneous re- flections on ethical, cosmological and eschatological matters ; while the sixth and the final chapter of the Upanishad contains the celebrated parable of the senses, and we are introduced to the philosopher Pra-

§ 9] CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND 21

vāhaņa Jaivali whose celebrated doctrine of "Five Fires" we shall notice below. This last chapter, as has been pointed out above, ends with certain supersti- tious Brahmanical practices, and contains, among other things, a statement of the genealogical tradition of the Upanishad which may be taken for what it is worth. 9. The Chhandogya, which belongs like the Bri-

The Chhandogya. hadāraņyaka to our group I, is an Upanishad which does not rise to such high literary or philosophical eminence as the Brihadäranyaka, even though it is quoted and re- ferred to oftener by the later author of the Vedanta- sūtras. Chapters six, seven and eight alone are of philosophical importance, the others not coming up to that level at all. The first and the second chapters are merely a Brähmanism redivivus, and if we just want to point to portions of the Upanishads in which the Brahmanical liturgy and doctrine exercise the greatest amount of influence, we may point to the first and second chapters of this Upanishad. There is a small cosmological argument here and a little philosophical disquisition there ; on the whole, these two chapters contain only such subjects as the significance of Om, the meaning, the kind and the names of Saman, and the genesis and function of Om. There is, however, one very good satirical piece towards the end of the first chapter of this Upanishad which is worth remarking. It concerns the singing of the Mantras with a material end in view. - We are told how, once upon a time, Baka Dalbhya, or as he was also called, Gläva Maitreya, had gone to a retired place to recite his Veda, how a white dog appeared before him, how a number of other dogs came to this dog and begged of it to chant certain hymns because they said they were hungry and by its chants the white dog might prooure food for them, how the white dog told the

22 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ §9 other dogs that they might come to it the next morning, how Baka Dalbhya, who was intent upon seeing what this canine recitation of hymns would be like, waited next morning to watch the dogs meet together, how the dogs, as previously settled, came together the next morning, each holding the tail of another in its mouth, as the priests do when they walk in proces- sion at the time of sacrifice each holding the gown of the fore-going priest in his hand, how when they sat down, they began to sing " Hin ! Om, let us eat, Om, let us drink, Om, let the gods procure food for us, O Lord of food, bring food to us, bring it to us, Om." This seems to us to be a ridicule poured upon the Mantra-singers who went in for their business with the desire of obtaining some material end. It seems to us that this Canine Chant-the Sauva Udgitha as it has been called-may be regarded as a good invective against the Brähmanical belief in externalism, in the interest of the assertion of the supremacy of the spiritual end to any material end whatsoever. The third chapter of this Upanishad contains the famous description of the Sun as a great bee-hive hanging in space. It also contains a de- scription of the Gayatri Brahmana-wise, the bon mots of Sandilya, a description of the world as a huge chest, the all-too disconnected instruction of Angirasa to Krishna who was the son of Devaki, and finally a piece of heliolatory, with the myth of the emergence of the Sun out of a huge egg. In the fourth chapter we have the philosophy of Raikva, the story of Satya- kāma Jabala and his mother, and the story of Upa- kosala who in his turn obtains philosophical wisdom from his teacher Satyakāma Jabāla. The fifth chapter con- tains the eschatological teaching of Jaivali, which is identical in substance with the account to be found in the Brihadaranyaka, while it also contains the famous synthesis of thought effected by Aśvapati

CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND 23

Kaikeya out of the six cosmological doctrines ad- vanced by the six philosophers who had gone to learn wisdom from him. The sixth chapter is evidently the best of all the chapters of the Chhandgoya, and we have here the highly-strung " identität " philosophy of Aruni, who establishes an absolute equation between individual and universal spirit, for whom, in other words, there is no difference between the two at all. Āruni is the outstanding personality of the Chhan- dogya, as Yajnavalkya is of the Brihadāraņyaka. The Śatapatha Brāhmaņa tells us that Aruņi was a very renowned sage of anitiquity, and that Yajña- valkya was a pupil of Aruni. The philosophy which Āruni advances in the 6th chapter of the Chhandogya does really entitle him to that position. So far so good : but it seems to us that when once the reputation of Äruni as a great philosopher had been established, other Upanishads felt no scruple in utilising him for the development of their own doctrine and we find Aruni playing quite a subordinate and unimportant rôle even in such an admittedly late Upanishad as the Kaushi- taki. It is unfortunate that authors should feel the necessity of reviving the memory of a great man and turning it to bad account. A Falstaff reborn, as Shakespearian readers know, loses all the interest which he originally had when he first appeared. Even likewise with Aruni. He did play a great part, indeed, in the Chhandogya: but later writers had no scruple in utilising his name, as we have said above, for very unim- portant purposes. The seventh chapter of the Chhan- dogya contains the famous discourse between Narada and Sanatkumara, the main points of which we shall discuss at a later stage of this chapter. Finally, the eighth chapter of this Upanishad contains some very excellent hints for the practical realisation of the Atman, as well as the famous myth of Indra and Virochana

24 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§ 9

which we shall have occasion duly to notice in a later chapter of this work. 10. The Isa and the Kena Upanishads, which form our group II, are both named The Isa and the Kena Upanishads. after the initial words of these trea- tises, just as the ancient chronicles of Scandinavia are named "Heimskringla" after their opening words. The Isopanishad is quite a small Upanishad, and yet it contains many hints which show an extraordinarily piercing insight. Within the short compass of 18 verses, it gives us a valuable mystical description of the Ätman, a description of the ideal Sage who stands unruffled in the midst of temptations and sorrows, an adumbration of the doctrine of Karmayoga as later formulated, and finally a reconciliation of the claims of knowledge and works. The most valuable idea that lies at the root of the Upanishad is that of a logical synthesis which it attempts between the two opposites of knowledge and works, which are both re- quired according to that Upanishd to be annulled in a higher synthesis. It is this idea of the logical synthesis of opposites which is an unconscious contribution which the Sage of the Upanishad makes to the development of Indian Thought. The Kenopanishad which consists of four sec- tions, two balancing against two, the first two being composed in verse, the last two in prose, exhibits also the division of the subjective and objective approach- es to the proof of Atman, namely, the psycho- logical and the cosmological. The verse part of the Upanishad gives us a psychological argument for the existence of Atman as the inspirer of the various sense-functions ; it also breaks the idols, literally and metaphorically, in favour of the worship of Ultimate Reality conceived as Atman ; and finally it makes an essay in spiritual agniology telling us in a paradoxical

§11] CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND 25

fashion that those who know really do not know, and those who do not know may alone be said to know the ultimate reality. The prose part of the Upanishad gives us the famous myth of Indra and the Damsel and advances a cosmological argument for the proof of the Immeasurable Power which lies at the back of the forces of Nature. It teaches us a lesson of humi- lity, inasmuch as it tells us that no man who is not humble may hope to come into the presence of this Power ; while it lays the moral foundation for this "esoteric doctrine" when it tells us that austerity, restraint and action are its mou orâ, the Vedas its limbs, and Truth its shelter. The Upanishad also advises us to find the same reality in objective as well as subjective existence, in the flash of the lightning as in the motion of the mind. 11. The Aitareya Upanishad, properly so-called, is The Aitareya, the Tai- only a part of the larger Aitareya ttiriya, and the Kaushi- Aranyaka beginning with the taki Upanishads. fourth section of the second chap- ter of the Äranyaka and going to the end of that chapter. There are three chapters of the Upanishad itself, all of which are important. The first is given to a description of the creation of the world by the primeval Ätman through the intermediary Viraj. The second contains the famous philosophy of "Three Births" probably belonging to the sage Vamadeva, a Vedic sage mentioned in Rigveda IV. 27. I, whose opinions are cited with approval in the present Upani- shad, and whose example is held up before the eyes of one who is desirous of gaining immortality. We shall discuss the philosophy of Vamadeva at a later stage in this chapter ; but we cannot forbear from remarking here that the idea of life after death is definitely in- troduced in this chapter. Finally, the last chapter of this Upanishad is a very bold statement of the funda- 4

26 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§ 11 mental doctrine of idealistic philosophy that all psy- chical and cosmical existences must be regarded as the expression of a common principle, namely, intellect. The Taittiriya is divided into three chapters. In the first chapter occurs the famous physiological description of the "nipple-like" gland which hangs downwards in the brain, and which is regarded as the seat of the Immortal Being. In this chapter likewise occur two famous ethical descriptions, as well as the mystical utterances of Trisanku. The second chapter is a collection of miscellaneous points contain- ing, among other things, the first mention of the so- called " Doctrine of Sheaths", as well as a description of the Beatific Calculus. The third chapter takes up the question of the Sheaths from the second chapter and exhibits these as a ladder of metaphysical exist- ences, and ends with that famous mystical monologue in which subject and object and the subject-object relation are all described as being ultimately one. The Kaushītaki is divided into four chapters, of which the first is merely an enlarged variant on the des- cription of the path of the Gods and the path of the Fathers, as occurring in the Chhändogya and the Briha- dāraņyaka Upanishads, and the last is again a repetition of the story of Balaki and Ajatasatru as occurring in the Brihadaranyaka. It is only the second and the third chapters of this Upanishad which may be said to be- long to the Kaushitaki proper. The second chapter is a collection of quite disconnected units and contains the doctrines of the four philosophers, namely, Kaushītaki who is described as " Sarvajit", or an all-conquering sage, as well as Paingya, Pratardana and Śushkabhrin- gāra. Moreover, it contains a description of a number of social customs of the time, which are superstitious and which may therefore be regarded as irreligious. In the third chapter, Pratardana is described as

§ 12] CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND 27

imbibing the principles of philosophy from Indra. Now Indra is only a mythological name, a name of Vedic repute, and we may say that the points of philosophy contained in this chapter belong to Pratardana himself rather than to Indra. Nevertheless, we must consider the story as it is, and take into account the references that are freely made here to Indra's exploits as found in the Rigveda. Indra tells Pratardana that the only good for mankind here below is to know Him ; that He it was who had killed the three-headed son of Tvashtri; that He it was who had delivered over the Arunmukhas to the jackals; that having broken many a treaty, He it was who killed the sons of Pral- hada in the heaven, the Paulomas in the inter-mundane regions, and the Kalakañjas on earth ; and that even though He had done these deeds, not a hair of His body was injured ; and that finally any one who under- stands Indra to be of this nature, and to have per- formed these exploits, never suffers, even though he may kill his mother or father, or go in for a theft, or destroy an embryo ; nor does the bloom ever depart from his face. It is in this conversation also between Indra and Pratardana that Prāna comes to be under- stood first as the principle of life, then as the principle of consciousness, and then is equated with Ultimate Reality, namely the Atman, and we are told that it is this Atman who is the cause of all good and evil actions in this world, and that all human beings are merely instruments in His hands. 12. The Katha, the Mundaka and the Śvetaśva- The Katha, the Mun- tara Upanishads which form our daka, and the Sveta- fourth group are related to each svatara Upanishads. other asno three of the other Upa- nishads are. They all aim at envisaging the highest philosophical truths in a poetic manner, and thus be- come the chief sources from which the Bhagavadgītā

28 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ §12

and other philosophical poems later freely borrow, the only difference between the Upanishads being that the Kathopanishad is more or less a metaphysical work, the Mundaka an emotional work, and the Śve- taśvatara a commixture of philosophy and mysticism. All the three Upanishads seem, moreover, to have been written at a time when the Samkhya and the Vedanta had not yet parted ways. Of these the Katha has its natural termination at the end of the first Adhyāya, as may be seen from the repetition of words at the end of the Adhyaya, as well as the " phalaśruti " which is also given at the same place. The second Adhyāya thus seems to be tacked on to the original redaction of the Upanishad, and even though this latter Adhyaya seems to furnish a sequel to the Nachiketas-Death story as may be seen from the last verse of that Adhyaya, as well as from the repetition of words even here, still, as may be seen by reference to Kathopanishad II. 5. 6, Yama seems at this place just to be supplying an answer to the query of Nachiketas in I. i. 29, which suggests that all the intervening portion is a later addition. The Katha, like the Mundaka and the Śvetaśvatara, will be so often quoted in this work that it would be needless for us to discuss its contents at any length. Two of the most prominent features of the Katha are the description of the " Chariot of the Body", and the death and dream approaches to the problem of reality. The whole of the Katha is sur- charged with lofty ideas about the Immortality of the Soul, as well as suggestions for the practical attain- ment of Ätman. In one passage, the Katha brings out a distinction regarding the realisation of Atman in the various worlds. While we are dwelling in this body on earth, we can visualise the Atman only as in a mirror, that is contrariwise, left being to the right and right being to the left. In the world of the

§ 12] CHAPTER I : THE BACKGROUND 29

fathers, we visualise the Atman as in a dream, the image leaving a psychical impression indeed, but being unreal. In the world of the Gandharvas, we are told, we see Him as one sees a pebble under water, the image being true but refracted. It is only in the Brahman-world, we are told, that we can distinguish the Atman from the non-Atman as light from shade, that is, we can see the Atman as in broad day-light. This is a valauable contribution which the Kathopa- nishad makes to Upanishadic thought. The Mundakopanishad is, as the name implies, an " Upanishad addressed to Shavelings," and may be classed according to its subject-matter along with the later Samnyasa Upanishads. Its eclecticism is apparent on the face. The position it takes in regard to ritualism is halting . Its cosmology is suffused both by Samkhya and Vedantic ideas. Its metaphysics is squarely based on Vedic ideas and has a ritualistic tinge. While as a work which can incite to mystic thought, it has no parallel in the whole literature of the Upanishads. The Śvetaśvatara seems to have been written in the interests of Saivism. It seems to have had its natural termination at the close of the first chapter, as may be seen from the repetition of the words at the end of it. The other chapters seem to have been added at a later stage. In the first chapter, we have suggestions for a good criticism of contemporary doc- trines, including even Ätmanism, in favour of a Śaivite trinitarian monism. The second chapter con- tains a classical description of Yoga. The third, the fourth and the fifth chapters are devoted to a discuss- ion of Śaivite and Samkhya philosophies, and invite a discussion as to the meaning of the word "kapila" which has been mentioned in V. 2; while the last chapter is the only unsectarian portion of the Upani-

30 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ §12

shad which gives us a purely theistic view of the God- head, and introduces the idea of Bhakti to Guru as to God. As in the case of its compeer Upanishads, the Śvetasvatara was written at a time when the Samkhya and the Vedanta were yet intermixed. " The Samkhya had not yet lost its God who is des- cribed as ruling the Pradhāna (VI. Io), while the Vedānta had not yet definitely had its Māyā, a mere metamorphosis of the Samkhya Prakriti. The three Gunas as in IV. 5 were yet the common property of both the Samkhya and the Vedanta, having had their origin so far back as the Chhandogya VI. 4. Nor had the Samkhya yet laid an emphasis on the subjectivity of sense-perception, which was primarily responsible for the parting of the ways between the Samkhya and the Vedanta. The doctrine of creation in the sense of evolution was mooted V. 5, but its full implications had not been yet thought out. The psychology and the metaphysics of the Samkhya were yet in the mak- ing, and had not yet been sundered from those of the Vedanta as with a hatchet. It is for all these reasons that we say that the Śvetasvatara, in which lie embedded side by side the Samkhya and the Vedantic doctrines of cosmology, psychology and metaphysics, is a very valuable Upanishad for the genetic study of the parting of the ways between the two great sys- tems." 13. The Praśnopanishad, which evidently belongs to a very late date in the history The Prasna, the Mai- of Upanishadic literature, is a tri and the Mandukya Upanishads. preconceived systematic unity, as almost no other Upanishad is. The six Sages, who are mentioned as going to Pippalada to learn wisdom, ask each of them a question of Pippa- lada in such a way that the person last mentioned asks his question first, and the order of their questions is

§ 13] CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND 31

such that they educe an evolving philosophy from Pippalada, which we shall consider later. The nature, the style and the manner of presentation of the argu- ment in the Praśnopanishad are also comparatively modern. The Maitri is a very important Upanishad in the history of Upanishadic literature, inasmuch as its vocabulary and its many references are peculiar to itself. It can be divided into two different strata, the first four chapters constituting the first stratum, and the last three constituting the second. We may even say that the first four chapters of this Upanishad may be taken to be a comparatively early redaction, and, therefore, alone relevant for our purposes. The last three chapters contain references to such astrological names as Sani, Rahu and Ketu (VIII. 6), Brihaspati, the author of a heretical philosophy (VII. 9), and a six- fold Yoga (VI. 18), which is the pattern of the later eight-fold Yoga. F'or the purposes of the present work which considers only the old Upanishadic philo- sophy, therefore, xe may even restrict our attention to the first four chapters of this Upanishad. Under the spell of the Samkhya and Buddhistic doctrines, king Brihadratha is introduced in this Upanishad as giving vent to a pessimistic mood, which is unusual in Upani- shadic literature. This king goes to Sakayanya and begs of him to teach him the secret of philosophy. Sakayanya tells him what he has himself learnt from the sage Maitri, who may thus be regarded as the pro- mulgator of the doctrines of this Upanishad. The first point in his philosophy is a description of the pure noumenal Self who "arising from the body shines in his own greatness," and the second is a description of the phenomenal Self called the Bhutatman who is subject to the influence of actions good and bad, and who therefore undergoes transmigration. We do not

32 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§13 know how far to regard the description of the Rajasa and the Tamasa qualities in this Upanishad as a har- binger of the later doctrine of the Bhagavadgīta on that head; but it is worth while remarking that this Upanishad mentions among Tamasa qualities such qualities as infatuation, fear, dejection, sleep, sloth, hurt, age, grief, hunger, thirst, niggardliness, anger, atheism, ignorance, jealousy, pitilessness, folly, shame- lessness, roguery, haughtiness and changeability ; and among Rajasa qualities such qualities as desire, affect- ion, passion, covetousness, injury, love, a longing eye, activity, rivalry, restlessness, fickleness, instability, greed, partiality to friends, the support of those who are round about us, aversion for the undesirable, and attachment to the desirable (III. 5). It is interest- ing to note that while the pure noumenal Self is re- garded as the Mover of the Body, under whose direct- tion the Body goes round like a wheel driven by a potter, the sensory organs being the rein, the motor organs the horses, the body the chariot, the mind the charioteer, and the temperament the whip (II. 9), the phenomenal Self is declared to be like a beast chained by the fetters of good and evil, bound like one in prison, subject to terror as one in the hands of death, deluded by pleasure like one intoxicated by liquor, rushing headlong like one possessed by an evil spirit, bitten by adversity as by a great serpent, blinded by passion as by night, filled by Māyā as by sleight-of-hand, false like a dream, unsubstantial like the pith of the Banana tree, changing its dress like an actor, and falsely delighting the mind like a painted wall (IV. 2). So far about the earlier portion of the Maitri. In the later portion we have a heliotheism bordering upon pantheism, a number of astronomical speculations (VI. 14-16), the doctrine of the Word and the non-Word, non-Word being even superior to

§13] CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND 33

Word, an exhortation to avoid the company of those who always live in a state of hilarity, those who beg, those who live on handicraft, those who perform sacri- fices for the unworthy, the Sudras who learn scriptures, the rogues who wear knotted hair, dancers, merce- naries, prize-fighters, mendicants, actors, those who have been dismissed from king's service, those who pretend to allay the evil influence of sprites and goblins, those who wear red-dress, ear-rings and skulls, and finally those who by their sophisms shake the faith of the people in the Vedas (VII. 8). We have also an adum- bration of the later Hathayoga practices such as those of pressing the tongue against the palate, and con- veying the breath through the Sushumnā (VI. 18-21), and finally a description of the seven mystical sounds which are heard in the process of contemplation, namely, those of a river, a bell, a brazen vessel, a wheel, the croaking of frogs, the pattering of rain, and finally a voice which comes from a place of seclusion (VI. 22). The Mandukya which is the last of the early great Upanishads-we may almost call it "the Last of the Romans "-is noticeable as laying once for all the foundations of the later Vedantic philosophy. It parti- tions the symbol Om in three different moræ and adds a fourth mora-less part, corresponding to which there are different states of consciousness, corresponding to which, again, are different kinds of Soul. The great originality of the Mandukya consists in positing the four states of consciousness, namely, wakefulness, dream, sleep, and a fourth un-nameable state of consciousness ; while it teaches that there is an aspect of the Gcdhead corresponding to these states of con- sciousness, the last alone being ultimately real. The Absolute of philosophy surpasses even such a theo- logical conception as that of God. 5

34 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY t§14

14. After having taken a brief review of the contents The Methods of Upa- of the Upanishads, we shall nishadic Philosophy. pass on to a discussion of the various methods that have been employed by the Upa- nishadic philosophers. There is not one method alone which is adopted by the Upanishadic philosophers : various methods have been resorted to by them at different times according to the necessities of discuss- ion. (i) In the first place, we must note the enigmatic method which occurs from time to time in these Upanishads. When Sandilya said that reality was "tajjalān," he was adopting a cryptic way for saying how God could be regarded as the origin, the end, and the life of all things. When the philosopher of the Īsavāsyopanishad introduced the Vidyā and Avidyā, and the Sambhuti and Asambhūti triplets, he was also taking recourse to the same method, pointing to a synthesis of opposites underlying the apparent contradictions involved in the formulation of the two riddles. The best illustration, however, of the enig- matic method is to be found in the Śvetaśvataropani- shad, where we are told that reality is like a great circumscribing felly, whose tyres are the three Guņas, whose ends are the sixteen Kalas, whose spokes are the fifty Bhavas or conditions of Samkhya philosophy, whose counter-spokes are the ten Senses and their ten Objects, whose six sets of eights are the eights such as the Dhätus, the Gods, the eight-fold Prakriti and so on, whose single rope is the Cosmic Person, whose three paths are the Good, the Bad and the Indifferent, or yet again, the Moral, the Immoral, and the A-moral, and finally which causes the single infatuation of the Ignorance of Self on account of the two causes, namely, Good and Bad works (S. 9. a). The philosopher of the Śvetaśvatara again tells us that he contemplates

§14] CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND 35

Nature which is like a vast expanse of water contri- buted to by the five different streams of the Senses, whose springs are the five Elements which make it fierce and crooked, whose waves are the five Prāņas, whose fount is the Antahkaranapanchaka, whose whirl-pools are the five Objects of sense which entangle a man into them, whose five rapids are the kinds of grief caused by Generation, Existence, Transformation, Declination and Decay, which diverts itself into the fifty channels of the Bhavas of Samkhya philosophy, and finally, which has the five tides of periodic overflow namely, at Birth, in Childhood, in Manhood, in Old age and at Death (S. 9. b). Philosophy would be arid and dry, if it did not occasionally contain such enigmatic riddles. Even Plato describes how a man and no- man, seeing and not-seeing a bird and no-bird on a tree and not-tree, killed it and did not kill it, with a stone and no-stone. (ii) Then, there is the aphoristic method as employ- ed in the Mandukya, which is the pattern of the later Sutra literature of the various Systems of philosophy. This method has the advantage of compressing all the material of thought in short pregnant sentences, while leaving the commentator to scratch his head as best he may on the interpretation of them. It is for this reason probably that the same Vedanta-sūtras, for example, came to be interpreted in such different fashions by the various commentators on them. To translate from the Mandukya, we are told how "the syllable Om is verily all that exists. Under it is in- cluded all the past, the present and the future, as well as that which transcends time. Verily all this is Brahman. The Atman is Brahman. This Ätman is four-footed. The first foot is the Vaisva- nara, who enjoys gross things ...... in the state of wakefulness. The second foot is the Taijasa, who

36 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§14 enjoys exquisite things ...... in the state of dream. The third is the Prajna, who enjoys bliss ...... in the state of deep-sleep ...... The fourth is the Atman, .... who is alone, without a second, calm, holy and tranquil". This passage has been verily the basis upon which all the later systems of Vedantic philosophy have come to be built. (iii) We have next the etymological method which was adopted in many places by the Upanishadic seers under the spell of Brahmanism, which had not yet ceased to influence the formulation of thought. In the Chhandogya we are told how "svapiti" means "satā sampanno bhavati," or " svamapito bhavati," that is, becomes one with himself ; how " asisishati " means "apa eva tadasitam nayante," or water is leading off all that is eaten ; how " pipāsati" means " teja eva tatpītam nayate," that is how heat is drying up what is drunk (S. Io. a). The Brihadara- ņyaka tells us that "purusha" is really " purisaya", that is inhabiting the citadel of heart (S. 1o. b). Final- ly even such a late Upanishad as the Mandukya tells us that the first letter A of the syllable Om is equiva- lent to Äpti or attainment, because it possesses the property of Adimattva or beginningness ; the letter U means Utkarsha or exaltation, because it signifies Ubhayatva or intermediateness ; and the third letter M means Miti or Apiti, because it signifies measurement or destruction (S. 10. c). But we may put it to the credit of the Upanishadic philosophers that such word-puzzles are to be met with only occasionally in Upanishadic literature, (iv) The fourth is what we may call the mythical method which is resorted to very often in the Upani- shads. This method is adopted in the first place for the purpose of conveying a moral lesson, as for exam- ple, in the Kenopanishad, where the parable of Indra

§ 14] CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND 37

and the Damsel is introduced to convey the lesson of humility, to show, in other words, that nobody can attain Brahman unless he is humble at heart. In the second place, the myth introduced may have an aetiological purpose, as for example, the myth of the Sun as coming out of the huge World-egg, the myth being serviceable here to mark the course of the generation of the world-system from a Primeval Egg, which itself originally came from Being, and Being from Not-Being. Thirdly, the transcendental myth itself is not wanting, when, for example, we are told, as in the Aitareya, how the Atman entered the human skull and became individualised as the human soul, from which place again he looked back at his origin, and convinced himself that he was the Atman. Or, finally, we may have a myth introduced even for the sake of- parody, as for example, the Canine Chant which we have already had the occasion to notice in a previous section of this chapter. (v) Then, again, we have the analogical method, which is to be found employed in many places by the Upanishads. When, for example, the sage Yajña- valkya introduces the analogy of the drum, the conch or the lute in order to explain the process of the ap- prehension of the Self, or when again Aruni introduces the analogy of the juices, which in constituting honey cease to be different from it, or yet again of the rivers that flow into the ocean and become merged in it, or of salt which becomes one with water when it is poured into it-all these illustrations serving to show the non-difference of the Individual Soul from the Universal Soul-we have the analogical method which tries to envisage by images what cannot be explained by the rigour of logic. (vi) Then, sixthly, we have the dialectic method which is the stock-in-trade of the Upanishadic argu-

38 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ §14

ment, and could be seen employed at every stage of the development of Upanishadic philosophy. We must take care to understand the word "dialectic" here in its root sense, as the method of the dialogue, instead of in the Platonic or the Hegelian sense in which it may otherwise be understood. The dialogue occa- sionally takes the form of a severe disputation as at the Symposium in king Janaka's court, which unfor- tunately became a tragedy on account of the impreca- tion uttered by Yajavalkya on his last disputant, namely, Śakalya. In short, unless the superiority of the leading philosopher is implicitly acknowledged, a discourse very often takes the form of wrangling, and may end tragically, as it did at the Symposium we are referring to. (vii) As contrasted with the dialectic method, we have what we may call the synthetic method of philosophy. Here an attempt is made not to destroy, but to fulfil, as may be seen by the synthesis of thought effected by Asvapati Kaikeya out of the doctrines of the six cosmological philosophers in the Chhandogya, or by Pippalada out of the six psycho-metaphysical ques- tions propounded to him by the six seers in the Praśnopanishad, or finally by Yajñavalkya out of the six metaphysical points of view suggested to him by King Janaka in Brihadaraņyaka IV. There is neither a tu quoque argument here, nor any indiffer- ent and precise cutting of the knot, but a sympa- thetic inclusion of the points of view suggested by others in a higher synthesis. (viii) As against the dialectical and the synthetic methods, we have what we may call the monologic method, the method of soliloquy. The Upanishadic philosophers are generally very chary of imparting spiritual wisdom ; but it so happens occasionally that when they have given the right answer to their ques-

§14] CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND 39

tioners' problem, they overhit themselves in their ex- position, and lose themselves in a soliloquy in the midst of many. Thus it was that Yajnavalkya at the Symposium, after he had answered the question pro- pounded to him by Uddalaka, lost himself into a re- verie, and began to think aloud on the aniversal immanence of God in the famous passage which has been known as the Antaryami-Brāhmana. Thus was it also that Yajfavalkya poured himself out in his conversation with Janaka on the immutable nature of Ātman in the Brihadāranyaka IV. 3-4. Finally, even though Yama, in the Kathopanishad, was unwilling to impart wisdom to Nachiketas on the third question which was asked him by Nachiketas, when once he began to speak, he spoke in a philosophical monologue which absolutely overhit the bounds of the original question. The truth is, that in the case of these Upa- nishadic philosophers, it does not generally rain ; but when it does rain, it pours profusely. (ix) We have next the ad hoc or temporising method which is also a noticeable feature of Upanishadic philo- sophising. Very often the philosophers are absolutely pertinent, and never illuminate on any topic except the one which is immediately before them, and according to the capacity of the learner. In the celebrated Indra- Virochana myth, their preceptor Prajapati tells them the secret of philosophy not all at once, but only when either of them has prepared himself for receiving the wisdom to be imparted. It thus happens that Virochana is completely satisfied with the first answer of Prajapati, but Indra is not, and presses his Master again and again for the solution of his difficulties, Prajapati disclosing the secret of his philosophy only ultimately. It thus comes to pass that the Atman is successively proved to be no longer a mere bodily double, or as identical with the Self in the states of

40 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY İŞ14 dream or deep-sleep, but with the Self as-identical- with-itself. Prajapati only gives what his pupils need, and thus supplies us with an excellent example of the ad hoc method employed in Upanishadic philosophy. (x) Finally, we have the regressive method which takes the form of many successive questions, every new question carrying us behind the answer to the previous question. Thus it was that when Janaka asked Yajnavalkya what was the light of man, Yajña- valkya said it was the Sun. Janaka went behind answer after answer, carrying Yajñavalkya from the Sun to the Moon, from the Moon to the Fire, from the Fire ...... to the Ätman, which exists behind them all as the Light-in-itself (Bri. IV. 3). Thus it was also how Gārgī took Yajñavalkya from question to question, asking him what was the support of water and Yajna- valkya answering it was air, asking again what was be- hind air and Yajnavalkya answering it was the inter- mundia, and so on, until from behind the intermundia, the world of the Sun, the world of the Moon, the world of the Stars, the world of the Gods ...... Gargi carried Yajnavalkya to the region of Brahman. But when Gargī asked again what lay behind the world of Brah- man itself, she exhibited the inordinate curiosity of the female kind, especially when given to philo- sophy, which leads necessarily to a regress ad infini- tum, Yājnavalkya checking the progress of the ques- tionnaire in the only appropriate way-"Thy head shall fall off if thou inquirest again " (S. II). 15. There is a branch of the Upanishadic method of philosophising which calls for treat- The Poetry of the Upanishads. ment under a separate section. It is what we may call the poetical method of philosophy. This method does really suffer from the defect, that what is suggested under the garb of poetry can never be regarded as the rigorous

§15] CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND 41

truth of philosophy. The poetical method is appli- cable to philosophy where an emotion is to be created about the nature of reality, or when this reality be- comes a fact of mystical apprehension. When such is the case, the seer gives no heed to the principles of metrification, and the metre he employs is wild and irregular, though at the same time pleasing by its wildness. "Like the Corybantes, who lose all con- trol over their reason in the enthusiasm of the secret dance, and during this supernatural possession are excited to the rhythm and harmony which they com- municate to men, these poets create their admired songs in a state of divine insanity." And thus, as we may naturally expect, the Upanishadic poetry is mys- tical, moral, or metaphysical, rather than heroic, or lyrical, or given to the description of nature or love. It may be remembered that the moral tone of Upa- nishadic poetry is strictly subservient to its meta- physical implications, and it does not rise, as in the case of the hymn to Varuņa in Rigveda VII. 88, to an expression of the innermost feelings of the human heart, to a confession of sin, or to a prayer for gracious atonment to divinity. The poetry of the Isopanishad is a commixture of moral, mystical and metaphysical elements ; that of the Kenopanishad is psycho-meta- physical ; that of the Kathopanishad has as its chief topic the teaching about the Immortality of the Soul and the practical way to the realisation of Ätman ; the poetry of the Svetāśvatara rises in the sixth chapter to a theistic description of God, and a representation of Him as causa sui; it is only in the Mundakopanishad that we find the highest emotion of which the Upani- shads are capable. This of course is not yet of the highest order, but we may say that never elsewhere in the Upanishads do we find the stage of emotionalism that is reached in the Mundaka. There are, however, 6

42 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ §15

a number of passages in the Upanishads which are couched in prose, and yet are highly poetic in sentiment. They are what a modern writer has called "conflagrations of prose-poetry". Thus for example, as a piece of sustained imaginative composition in prose, we may take the passage from the Chhändogya which tells us that " the heaven must be regarded as the supporting beam from which the intermundane region hangs like a bee-hive. The Sun is the honey of the gods as preserved in this bee-hive. The rays which the Sun spreads in different quarters, namely, the eastern, the southern, the western, the northern and the upward directions are the different honey-cells looking in the various directions. The hymns of the four Vedas are the bees which work on the bee-hive from the various sides. The different colours of the Sun are the different kinds of nectar on which the various gods live", and, we are told, these gods live on them not by the ordinary processes of drinking or eating, but by merely "looking" at them (S. 12. a)- an expression which gives us an insight into the Gewpia of the Upanishadic gods. As an example of allegory in the Upanishads, we may take the eschato- logical passage from the Kaushītaki which speaks of " the river of agelessness, the hall of omnipresence, the couch of grandeur, the damsel of mind, the hand- maid of vision, the flowers of the worlds which these are intent on weaving, the passage of the Soul through the river merely by the motion of the mind, the haven of safety which it reaches by the assertion of its identi- fication with the highest Brahman-a fit concatena- tion of circumstances that befall the Soul which is described as the Child of the Seasons." We have said above that the Upanishads do not contain either nature-poetry or love-poetry, and hence the beautiful does not much fall within the scope of Upa-

§15] CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND 49

nishadic thought; but the Upanishads deal neverthe- less with the sublime in nature, or with the sublime in the region of mind, or even in the transcendental sphere. As an example of the sublime in nature, we may take the passage from the Brihadaranyaka which tells us that "by the command of the imperishable Brahman, the sun and the moon stand in their places ; by the command of that Brahman, the heaven and the earth stand apart ; by the command of that Brahman, the moments and the hours, the days and the nights, the half-months and the months, the seasons and the years, all stand apart ; by the command of that Brah- man, some rivers flow out to the east from the White Mountains, and others to the west or some other quarter" (S. 12. b.). As an example of sublimity in the subjective sphere, we may quote the passage from the Chhandogya in which we are told that the city within is exactly like the city without, that the heart is the citadel of Ätman as the universe itself is, that just as in the outer world there is that unending space which contains within it the heaven and the earth, the fire and the wind, the sun and the moon, the lightning and the stars, similarly, even here, within this little citadel, are they to be equally found (S. 12. c). Finally, as an example of sublimity in the transcenden- tal sphere, we have the passage from the Chhan- dogya which tells us that " Infinity alone is bliss ..... When one sees nothing else, hears nothing else, under- stands nothing else, that is the Infinite ...... The Infinite is above, below, behind, before, to the right and to the left ...... I am above, I am below, I am behind, I am before, I am to the right and to the left ...... The Self is above, the Self is below, the Self is be- hind, the Self is before, the Self is to the right and to the left. He who knows this truly attains Swarājya" (S. 12. d).

44 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ § 16

16. Let us now turn to a brief discussion of the doctrines of the great philosophers The Philosophers of the Upanishadic perlod. that lived and thought in the Upanishadic period. We shall be considering the doctrines in detail in the later chap- ters of this work, where they would be found distributed according to problems. At this place, we have to content ourselves with merely a concise statement of them for fear of repetition of the material in the later chapters. It is also necessary for us to introduce our readers to the names of the great philo- sophers, each of whom made some contribution to the development of Upanishadic thought, and, in the case of the metaphysical philosophers especially, to ex- hibit the logical link between their doctrines in order to indicate the lines for a fuller and systematic study of them. We shall severely exclude from our present conspectus the names of unhistorical or mythological personages. The dialogue between Indra, Virochana and Prajapati, for example, merely serves to bring out certain philosophical conceptions, without enabling us to attribute them to historical personages. Indra, Viro- chana and Prajäpati are all of them mythological per- sonages, and hence we can attribute to neither of them the doctrines that have been advanced in that great story. It is unfortunate that the author of that story should have entirely hidden himself behind it. Simi- larly, in the dialogue between Indra and Pratardana in the Kaushītaki, between Bhrigu and Varuna in the Taittirīya, and between Nachiketas and Yama in the Katha, Indra, Varuņa and Yama seem respectively to be unhistorical persons. Nachiketas may have been a historical personage; while there is not much ob- jection to regard Pratardana and Bhrigu as historical. Then, again, it must be remembered, that many of the doctrines of the Upanishads are entirely untraceable

§ 17] CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND 45

to their authors. Thus, for example, the doctrines of the Mundaka cannot be traced to any particular author. The author must have been a great eclectic indeed; but it is unfortunate that we cannot trace his person- ality. The doctrines of the Śvetasvatara, on the other hand, could be definitely attributed to the sage Śvetā- śvatara, whose name has been mentioned towards the end of that Upanishad (VI. 21). While, therefore, we shall notice in the following short survey the names of the persons, which, without objection, may be regarded as historical, it is necessary to remember that there must have been many a philosopher who lived, and thought, and died unknown. His work has remained, though his personality has been lost. 17. Of the mystical philosophers, Trisanku seems in- deed to have been a man of great Mystical, Moral and other philosophers. insight, as may be seen from the little scroll that he has bequeath- ed to us in the Taittiriya Upanishad. Nor must we forget that Maitri himself, the promulgator of the Maitri Upanishad, was a great God-realiser, as may be seen from his description of "the Ätman as realised" in that Upanishad. Rāthītara, Pauruśishți and Nāka Maudgalya has each of them left to us the virtue which he regarded as of supreme importance, namely, Truth, Penance, and the Study of the Vedas. Mahīdāsa Aitareya seems to have been a philosopher interested in eugenics. His problem was the prolongation of human life, even though he tried to realise it ritualis- tically (S. 13. a). Äruni must have witnessed, if not practised, the fasting philosophy of ancient times (S. 13. b). The sage Kaushītaki was the inventor of the doctrine of Prana as Brahman. He seems to have been an ancient "satyagrahin," and to have practised the virtue of non-begging. He was the author of the doc- trine of the "Three Meditations," namely on the Sun;

46 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§17 the Full moon, and the New moon, for the fulfilment of some specific desires. Paingya seems to have been the henchman of Kaushitaki in his doctrine that Prana was the lord of the Senses as well as the Mind. Pratardana was a free-thinker of antiquity, disbelieving in the efficacy of external ritualism, advocating the doctrine of the inner sacrifice which is always going on within us, and contributing to thought, probably, the doc- trine of Prajñatman, a bio-psycho-metaphysical con- ception. Sushkabhringara seems to have taught that if a man regarded the Rigveda as supreme, all beings would worship him (archante); if he regarded the Yajurveda as supreme, all would join (yujyante) to prove his supremacy; and that if he regarded the Samaveda as supreme, all would bow down to him (samnamante). This is a philologico-philosophical con- tribution of Sushkabhringara made under Brāhmaņic influence. Finally, the sage Jaivali seems to have held that the Universe exhibits at every stage the principle of sacrifice. "When we cast our glance at the sky, he said, we see that the heaven is a great altar in which the sun is burning as fuel, his rays being the smoke, the day being the light of the sacrificial fire, the quar- ters the coals, and the intermediate quarters the sparks of the fire ; from the oblation that is offered in this sacrifice, namely Sraddha, rises the Moon. If we look at the sky again, we see that "parjanya" is the great altar in which the year is burning as fuel, the clouds being the smoke, the lightning being the light of the sacrificial fire, the thunderbolt the coals, and the rumbling of the clouds the sparks of the sacrificial fire ; from the oblation offered in this sacrifice, namely the Moon, rises Rain. Then again, the whole world is a great altar in which the earth burns as fuel, fire being the smoke, night being the light, the moon being the coals, and the stars the sparks of the fire ; from the

$18] CHAPTERI: THE BACKGROUND 47

oblation offered in this sacrifice, namely Rain, rises Food. Fourthly, man himself is a great altar in which the opened mouth is the fuel, the breath the smoke, the tongue the light, the eyes the coals, the ears the sparks; from the oblation offered in his sacrifice, namely Food, rises Seed. Finally, woman herself is a great altar, in which Seed being offered as an oblation, rises Man. In this very peculiar way does Jaivali's philosophy connect the Sraddha libation with the Moon, the Moon with Rain, the Rain with Food, the Food with Seed, and finally the Seed with Man. This is his celebrated Doctrine of Five Fires. Finally, when a Man is cremated, from out of the fire of cremation which serves as altar, a lustrous person arises, who goes either to the World of the Gods, or to the World of the Fathers, as his qualifications enable him to proceed". 18. Of the cosmological philosophers, a passage from

Cosmological an d the Chhandogya (V. II) tells us Psychological philo- that while Uddalaka held that the sophers earth was the substratum of things, Prachinasala held that it was the heaven which was so, while Budila, Śarkarakshya, and Indradyumna held that water, space and air were respectively the substrata of things, and Satyayajña said that the substratum was the Sun-the celestial fire. In this passage we have the names of the persons who held that the elements were the ultimate substrata of things, even though in many other Upanishads these doctrines have been left un- traced to philosophers. Raikva alone is elsewhere described as having held with Indradyumna that air was the substratum of all things. Asvapati Kaikeya, who adopts the synthetic method, is described in the Chhandogya as having incorporated these views into his doctrine of the Universal Atman, the Atman Vaiśvānara, who is "prādeśamātra" and " abhivi-

48 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§18

mana "-expressions whose meaning we shall deter- mine later on-the heaven constituting the head of the Ätman, the sun his eye, the air his breath, space his body, water his bladder, and the earth his feet (Chhan. V. 18). A transition is made from cosmology to phy- siology when Satyakāma Jābāla teaches Upakosala that reality is to be found not in the sun, or the moon, or the lightning, but in the person in the eye (Chhan. IV), and from cosmology and physiology to psychology, when Gargya thinks that the physical categories such as the sun, the moon, and the wind, and physiological categories such as the eye are the ultimate reality, and Ajataśatru, his instructor, tells him that reality is to be found in the deep-sleep-consciousness (Bri. II). The very much greater interest that is taken in psychology rather than in cosmology by the Upanishadic philo- sophers is evident from the way in which they always ask questions about psychological matters. Of the interlocutors of Pippalada in the Praśna Upanishad, the first, namely, Kabandhī Katyayana alone seems to be interested in cosmology when he asks- From what primal Being are all these things created ?- while the others are interested in some kind of psychological question or other. Bhārgava Vaidarbhi is interested in physiological psychology, and asks-What sense is the lord of all the others? Kausalya Asvalāyana is interested in the metaphysics of psychology, and asks the question- From what being Prana, the lord of the senses, was born ? Sauryāyani Gārgya is an abnormal psychologist, taking interest in the problem of dreams. Śaibya Satyakāma is interested in mysticism, and asks the question about the efficacy of meditation on Om; while Sukesī Bhāradvāja is again interested in the metaphysics of psychology, when he asks the question about the nature of the Person with

§18] CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND 49 Sixteen Parts. The philosophy of Pippalāda emerges in the answers that he gives to these seers. Pippa- lāda is a great psycho-metaphysician of antiquity, ad- vocating the doctrine of Rayi and Prana, which is equivalent to the Aristotelian doctrine of Matter and Form, as well as the doctrines of the supremacy of the vital breath above the senses and the primary emergence of the vital breath from the Atman. He regards the state of dream as one in which the mind of man has free play, bodying forth the forms of things inexpe- rienced as well as experienced, and the state of deep sleep as one in which the light of the man is over- powered by the light of the Self. Pippalada also teaches that by meditation on Om till the time of death, one goes to the celestial regions where one learns from Hiranyagarbha to see the all-pervading Person, while in regard to the doctrine of the Person with Sixteen Parts, he prepares the way for the later Sāmkhya and Vedantic doctrine of the Linga-sarīra. Bhujyu and Uddālaka, who are mentioned in the Brihadäranyaka are both of them interested in psychi- cal research. The curious personality of Vamadeva which appears for the first time in Rigveda IV. 26, 27, is introduced again in the Brihadāranyaka I. 4. 10, where he declares himself as having been Manu and the Sun in a previous birth, as well as in the Aitareya II. 4, where the philosophy of "Three Births" is declared to have been in consonance with his teaching. This sage, who seems to have been intensely interested in the question of rebirth, declares that " while yet in embryo he tried to know all the births of the gods. A hundred iron citadels tried to hold him ; but a hawk that he was, with swiftness he came down to the earth. In embryo indeed did Vāmadeva speak in this manner." Vamadeva seems to have held that there were three births of man: the first birth of a man occurs when 7

50 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§19 the spermatozoon combines with the ovum ; his second birth occurs when a child is born to him; his third birth takes place when he is himself reborn after death. Bhrigu, who is mentioned in the Taittirīya, was a great metaphysical psychologist, who held that food, life-breath, mind, intellect and bliss constituted, in the order of gradation, the expressions of Atman. Finally, we are introduced in Brihadaraņyaka IV to the doctrines of certain psycho-metaphysicians, when we are told that Jitvan Sailini held that speech was the highest reality; Udanka Saulbayana that breath was the highest reality; Varku Vārshņa, Gardabhi- vipīta Bharadvaja, Satyakāma Jābāla and Vidagdha Śakalya held respectively that the eye, the ear, the mind and the heart constituted the ultimate reality; while Yanjavalkya, following the synthetic method, found a place for each of these doctrines in his final synthesis. 19. Of the metaphysical philosophers, Śandilya, Metaphysical philo- Dadhyach, Sanatkumāra, Āruņi sophers. and Yajnavalkya are the most prominent, the last being the greatest of them all. (i) The complete philosophy of Saņdilya is preserved for us in that small section of the Chhandogya, namely, III. 14, where Sandilya formulates for us the main doctrines of his philosophy. In Sandilya. the first place, he gives us the cosmological proof of the Absolute which he calls "Tajjalan ", that from which things are born, to which they repair and in which they live. Secondly, he teaches the doctrine of Karmanand says that fate alone betakes a man in the next world for which he has paved the way by his works in this life. In the third place, he gives us a characterisation of Atman in thoroughly positive terms. This stands against the later negative theology of Yajnavalkya. Fourthly,

§191 CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND 51

he tells us that the Atman is both great and small; greater than the great, and smaller than the small ; infinite and infinitesimal. Lastly, he tells us that the end of human life consists in being merged in the Ätman after death, a consummation, which, he is sure he will reach. (ii) The sage Dadhyach who, like Vamadeva, is a

Dadhyach. sage of Vedic repute, as referred to in Rigveda I. I16. 12, is also a sage who occupies a prominent place in Brihadā- raņyaka II. The "Madhuvidya" referred to in the Rigveda is in this Upanishad expounded in great detail. As regards his personal history, we are told in the Rigveda that he knew the secret of the " Madhuvidya," and that he had been enjoined upon by Indra, on pain of capital punishment, not to disclose the secret to anybody. The Asvins wanted to learn that wisdom from Dadhyach, and, because they were convinced that Indra would fulfil his threat, they first cut off the head of Dadhyach themselves, and substituted on his trunk the head of a horse. Dadhyach thereupon spoke by the horse's head to the Asvins, and taught them the "Madhuvidya." Indra was very wroth to see that the secret had been imparted by Dadhyach, and so he cut off the head from the body of Dadhyach, upon which, the Asvins re-substituted the original head, and Dadhyach became whole again ! It was this sage Dadhyach who is introduced in the Briha- daranyaka as having held the doctrine of the mutual interdependence of things, because all of them are in- dissolubly connected in and through the Self. To quote from the History of Indian Philosophy Volume II, "all things are in mutuum commercium, because they are bound together by the same vinculum substantiale, namely, the Self. The earth, says Dadhyach, is the honey of all beings, and all beings are the honey of

3684

52 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§19 the earth, just because the same 'lustrous,' 'immortal" Self inhabits them both. The fire is the essence of all things, and all things are the essence of fire, just because the immortal self is the essence of both. Simi- larly, are the wind, the sun, the space, the moon, the lightning, the thunder, the ether, and even law, truth, and humanity the essence of all things whatsoever, and all things are the essence thereof, inasmuch as the same law, the same element, the same indissoluble bond connects them both. Finally, the individual Self is itself the essence of all things, and all things are the essence of the individual Self, inasmuch as both of them are held together by the same Universal Spirit. It is this Universal Spirit which is the lord and king of all things. As all the spokes are contained between the axle and felly of a wheel, all things and all selves are connected in and through the Supreme Self. It is on account of the Supreme Self, that all things stand related together. All things appear on the back-ground of this eternal curtain. 'Nothing exists that is not covered by the Supreme Self. He becomes like unto every form, and all the forms are only partial revelations of Him. The Lord appears many through his magic power'. Thus does Dadh- yach teach the doctrine of the supreme existence of the one, and the apparent existence of the many." (iii) The third philosopher who invites our attention

Sanatkumara. is the sage Sanatkumāra of the Chhändogya, the preceptor of Nārada. Leaving aside his sorites of psychological, physical and metaphysical categories which is of little consequence for philosophy, let us note here the points of value in his philosophy. In the first place, Sanatkumara seems to teach a spiritual hedo- nism. Happiness-and, in Sanatkumāra's hands, happi- ness becomes the equivalent of spiritual happiness-is

.

§19] CHAPTER 1: THE BACKGROUND 53

the spring of all action ; action is the cause of faith; faith, of belief ; when a man believes, he thinks ; when he thinks, he knows; and when he knows, he reaches the truth. In this way, happiness, action, faith, belief, thought, knowledge and truth constitute, in Sanatkumāra's hands, a moral ladder to realisation (VII. 17-22). Secondly, it is Sanatkumāra who teaches the doctrine of Bhuman. "Bhuman" is that infinite happiness which arises by the vision of the divinity all around. When anything else is seen, that is " Alpa." Thus all possessions in the shape of cows and horses, elephants and gold, servants and wives, lands and palaces, are of little consequence as con- trasted with Bhūman (VII. 23-24). Thirdly. the reali- sation of Bhūman occurs when an experience such as is implied in the expression "Sohamātma" is attained (VII. 25). Lastly, Sanatkumāra teaches that Ätman is the source of all things whatsoever. From Ätman spring hope and memory; from Ätman spring space, light and waters; from Atman everything unfolds, in Ätman everything hides itself. Atman is the source of all power, all knowledge, all ecstasy (VII. 26). (iv) Āruņi, the greatest of the Upanishadic philo- sophers, barring of course Yājña- Aruni. valkya, though he has been re- ported to be the latter's philosophical teacher-as may be seen also from a number of points of resemblance between Aruni and Yajnavalkya, especially in regard to their theories of Sleep and Dream on the one hand, and of Monistic Idealism and Doctrine of Appearance on the other-is a philosopher, who, like his other compeers of the Upanishadic period, is a great psycho- metaphysician. In regard to his psychological theo- ries, we must remember that he advances the "Fatigue" theory of sleep (VI. 8. 2), and tells us that in the state

54 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§19 of sleep, the individual Self becomes one with the Ātman (VI. 8. 1)-points which have become the current coin of Upanishadic thought. In regard to departing consciousness, he teaches that, while a man is dying, his speech first becomes merged in the mind, then his mind becomes merged in breath, then breath becomes merged in light, and finally light be- comes merged in the deity (VI. 15)-a theory which Yajnavalkya later borrows and expatiates upon. In regard to his metaphysical doctrines, he views Sub- stance from the cosmological point of view, regarding it as the final substratum of all things, in fact as the material cause of the universe, just as iron is the material cause of all iron-weapons, and gold of gold- ornaments (VI. I. 4-6). Secondly, he tells us that this underlying Substance is "alone real", all else is merely a name. Aruni is an extreme nominalist who paves the way for the Doctrine of Illusion (VI. I. 4-6). Thirdly, he tells us that what thus exists as the primal hypostasis cannot be regarded as Not- being, for from Not-Being nothing can come. Hence the hypostasis is Being (VI. 2. 1-2). This Being pro- duces from itself first fire, then water, then the earth, in that order (VI. 2. 3-4). Interpreted generally, the Sanskrit words he uses, namely Tejas, Ap, and Anna, could be interpreted as meaning respectively the energizing principle, liquid existence, and solid exist- ence. Fourthly, all things that exist in this world, animate as well as inanimate, are made up of these elements by the process of Trivritkarana, a doctrine which Aruni first enunciates. Things are unreal; the Elements alone are real ; and more than the Ele- ments, Being, which is the root of them all (VI. 3-4). Next Aruni teaches that it is this Being which is also the Self in man. "That art Thou" is the recurring instruction of Aruni to his son Śvetaketu (VI. 8 ff).

§.19] CHAPTER 1: THE BACKGROUND 55

The spirit in nature is thus at the same time the spirit in man. It is interesting to note the parallel of Aruni's idea with Green's. Cosmologically, this Being is the subtle essence which underlies phenomena, and which can be grasped only by faith (VI. 12), and by apt instruction from the teacher (VI. 14). Biologically, it is the supreme life-principle which gives life to the universe. The branches may die and yet the tree lives ; but when the tree dies, the branches die also. Similarly, the universe may vanish, but God remains ; but God cannot vanish, and hence the latter alterna- tive is impossible (VI. II). Psychologically, it an- nihilates all individualities. Do not juices lose their individuality in honey, asks Aruni (VI. 9) ? Do not the rivers lose their individuality in the ocean (VI. 10) ? Even likewise do all souls lose their individuality in the Atman. Viewed from the moral point of view, the Atman is truth. One who makes alliance with truth, makes alliance with Ätman also (VI. 16). Metaphysically, the Atman pervades all. As salt may pervade every particle of water into which it is put, the Atman fills every nook and cranny of the universe. There is nothing that does not live in Ätman (VI. 13). We thus see how Aruni boldly postulates an idealistic monism in which there is no room for difference even from within. (v) Yajnavalkya, like his teacher Āruņi, is a great

Yajnavalkya. psycho-metaphysician. We shall consider the points of his meta- physics first, and then go on to the consideration of his psychological doctrines. In fact, Yajñavalkya's philo- sophy would be so much called upon in our later Chapters, that we can only indicate it here very briefly and for the purpose of giving a synoptic view of his philosophy. We shall not consider the points of Yajña- valkya's philosophy in the order in which he answers

56 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§19 the questions of his wife, and of the philosophers that meet him in King Janaka's court, and of King Janaka himself in the second, third and fourth chap- ters respectively of the Brihadäranyaka. We shall con- sider them only logically. In Chapter III of the Brihadā- raņyaka, he had, no doubt, a formidable number of intellectual adversaries to grapple with. Aśvala and Śakalya were interested more or less in ritualism and theology, and so they could be easily disposed of; but Jaratkārava, who was interested in eschatology Bhujyu, whom we have already met with as a psychical researcher, Ushasta, who was interested in the nature of Ultimate Reality, Kahola, who wanted to know the practical way to the realisation of Atman, Gargī and Uddālaka, who were both interested in the problem of immanence, the one dynamically, the other statically, were, in any case, a formidable list of oppo- nents. The philosophy of Yajnavalkya which emerges in his conversation with these adversaries as well as his wife and king Janaka, may be briefly set down as follows. He teaches that all objects are centred in the Self, as all thoughts are centred in the mind, as all touches in the skin, as all waters in the ocean (II. 4. II). The Atman pervades all. Yajñavalkya also uses the simile of the immanence of salt in water (II. 4. 12), borrowing it probably from his teacher Āruņi. Secondly, Yajñavalkya teaches that all things exist for the Self; if we do not so re- gard them, they would vanish for us (II. 4. 6). Third- ly, he tells us that all things are dear for the sake of the Self. In every act of mental affection, the Atman is calling unto Atman. The realisation of Atman is the end of all endeavour (II. 4. 5). Fourthly, Yajnavalkya says that this Atman alone is real; all else is "artam" -a mere tinsel-show (III. 4. 2 and III. 5. I). Yajña- valkya then proceeds to characterise the Atman in

§19 ] CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND 57

negative terms ; the Ätman is neither large nor small, neither short nor long; he is flavourless, eyeless, odourless, and quality-less (III. 8. 8). Contrast this negative theology of Yajnavalkya with the posit- ive theology of Sandilya. As a proof of the exist- ence of Ātman, Yajnavalkya draws upon the argu- ment from order : Atman is the "bund" of all exis- tence : our very hours and days are measured by this Ātman (III. 8. 9). The Atman is universally imma- nent. He is the inner controller of all things. We are merely like little dolls, and throw out our hands and feet according as the great Thread-puller, Ātman, wishes to make us dance (III. 7). The Atman is the ultimate light of man; all other lights are lights by sufferance. When Atman is realised as the light of man, one reaches self-consciousness (IV. 3. I-6). The Atman alone is the ultimate hearer, seer, thinker : there is no thinker beside Him (III. 4. 2). The Ätman perceives himself. Only when there is a duality, then one may see another; but when One alone is, processes of perception and thought are alike im- possible, and we are reduced to a state of solipsism (II. 4. 14). But Yajnavalkya takes care to say that the organs of perception of the percipient do not cease to function. That, from the epistemological side, is the relieving feature of his solipsism (IV. 3. 23-30). In psychology, Yajñavalkya teaches, like other Upa- nishadic philosophers, that when the state of dream occurs, the Ätman spreads out his own light (IV. 3. 9). The Atman in this state moves out from his nest, guarding it nevertheless with breath (IV. 3. 12). It must be remembered, however, that the Atman only seems to move, or only seems to imagine in the state of dream, and does not really move or imagine (IV. 3. 7). Yajnavalkya advises that when a man is dreaming, let no one wake him up suddenly, for fear, appa-

58 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY . [§19 rently, that the Soul may depart (IV. 3. 14). A father in that state is not a father; a mother, a mother; a thief a thief ; a murderer, a murderer; a Chandāla, a Chandala ; and analogically, a Brahmin a Brahmin (IV.3.22). As regards the state of sleep, he advocates, like Āruņi, the fatigue theory (IV.3.19). He tells us, furthermore, that sleep is a twilight condition, where one sees this world as well as the other world (IV.3.99). As regards departing consciousness, Yajñavalkya tells the story of the process of death in such a realist- ic fashion that we cannot but regard him as an ex- ceedingly shrewd observer of nature. At the time of death, the corporeal self is mounted on by the intelli- gent self, the Sarīra Atman by the Prajna Ātman, and it moves along groaning like a heavy-laden cart (IV. 3. 35). Before death occurs, the person in the eye first turns away (IV. 4. 1). The end of the heart is lighted. and by that light, the soul departs either by the way of the eye, or the head, or any other part of the human body (IV. 4. 2). His "Karman" alone accompanies him : it is the guardian of his destiny (IV. 4. 5). It is probably this doctrine of "Karman" that, we may say, Yajñavalkya imparted to Jāratkārava in III. 2. 13, and thus silenced him. According to Yajñavalkya, it seems that only when the Atman has prepared another abode for himself that he leaves the body. Not unless it finds another blade to rest upon would a caterpillar leave its original blade (IV. 4. 3). Ya- jnavalkya says also that the newer existence must be even a brighter existence: does not the goldsmith create from the old gold a newer and brighter form (IV. 4. 4) ? If the Self has left any desires in him while yet he lives in his body, he returns from his sojourn to this existence again ; if no desires be left in him, he becomes one with Brahman (IV. 4. 6). At that time no consciousness remains. Consciousness is

§ 20] CHAPTER I : THE BACKGROUND 59

merely a "fleeting" phenomenon due to the entry of the Atman in the elements which produce the bodily form (II. 4. 12). Yajñavalkya's wife was really frightened at the pass to which Yajnavalkya's philo- sophy had led, but we, who understand Yajnavalkya's absolute idealism may not wonder if, from that point of view, he regarded even transmigration as a delu- sion. If we may be allowed to use Yajñavalkya's own manner of philosophising, we may well ask, when the Atman alone is, at all places and at all times, from what would he transmigrate, and to what ? But all this is only implied in Yajñavalkya. For fear of disturbing the ordinary routine of thought, of which his wife supplies us with an illustration, Yajñavalkya hastily excuses himself from the impasse to which his doctrine had led him, by saying that sufficient for the nonce was the wisdom he had imparted (II. 4. 13). 20. Let us now examine somewhat the social con- General social con- dition in which these philosophers dition. lived and made their speculations. (i) It seems the castes did evidently exist at the time of the Upanishads. We have the formulation of the caste system so far back as at the time of the Purusha- sukta, which must be, in any case, considered anterior to the Upanishads. In the Brihadāranyaka, there is a very unorthodox theory about the origin of castes. This Upanishad does not argue, like the Bhagavadgīta at a later date, that the castes were created by God according to "qualities and works." On the other hand, we are told in the Brihadaranyaka that Brah- man was the first to exist ; but because it was alone, it did not fare well, and therefore it produced a better form, namely Kshatriya-hood. It was thus that from the original Brahman were created such heavenly deities as Indra, Varuna, Soma, Rudra, Parjanya, Yama, Mrityu and Isa. These constitute the warrior

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60 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ § 20

caste in the heavenly kingdom. Furthermore, after having created even Kshatriya-hood, Brahman did not fare well; and therefore it created Vaisya-hood in the heavenly kingdom, namely the Vasus, the Rudras, the Adityas, the Maruts and the Viśvedevas. But even then it thought it was deficient, and there- fore, it created the Sudra order, represented in the heavenly kingdom by the god Pūshan. In order to give itself completeness, again, Brahman created Dharma or Law, which probably binds all these castes together. Finally, Brahman assumed the form of Agni who was the Brahmin of the gods, and then we are told that the castes on the earth were created after the pattern of the castes in the heaven (S. 14). In this unorthodox theory, we have the origin of the earthly caste system on the pattern of a heavenly caste system almost in the manner in which the ectypes in Plato's theory of Ideas are merely replicas of the archetypes. Then, again, as regards the exis- tence of Asramas at the time of the Upanishads, we learn from the Taittiriya Upanishad that those of the student and the householder did definitely exist (S.15. a) ; while we have to conclude from other passages where one is advised " to leave the world as soon as one becomes weary of it " that the order of the reclu- ses did also exist ; and finally, from such Upanishads as the Mundaka as well as the mention of Samnyasa elsewhere, that the order of the Samnyasins came last and was the completion of the three previously mentioned. In the Chhandogya we have all the four orders enumerated deliberately. The householders are advised to give themselves up to sacrifice, study and charity; the recluses to penance; and the students to a life of celibacy with the master and extreme emaci- ation in his service. All these verily reach the holy worlds after death ; but we are told that he alone who

§ 20] CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND 61

lives in Brahman, referring probably to the life of the Samnyasin, attains to immortality (S. 15. b). When we rearrange these orders, we find that the foundations of the future Aśrama system are already to be found firmly laid even in such an old Upanishad like the Chhandogya. So far about castes and orders at the time of the Old Upanishads. (ii) Now about the position of women in society in the Upanishadic times. In the Upanishads, we meet with three chief different types of women : Kātyāyanī, the woman of the world, who is only once mentioned in the Brihadāranyaka ; Maitreyī, the type of a spiri- tual woman, a fit consort to the philosopher Yajña- valkya; and Gärgī, the Upanishadic suffragette, who, fully equipped in the art of intellectual warfare, dares to wrangle with Yajnavalkya even at the court of King Janaka where a number of great philosophers are assembled, and declares that she would send two missiles against her adversary, Yajnavalkya, and that if he succeeds in shielding himself against those mis- siles, he may certainly be declared to be the greatest of the philosophers that had assembled. Bold and sturdy, she presses Yajñavalkya to a regressus ad infi- nitum, and had not Yajñavalkya checked her impu- dence by an appeal to the argumentum ad caput, she would have succeeded in nonplussing Yajña- valkya. But, even though she was to all appearances vanquished, she appears again a second time with two more moderate questions, and elicits from Yajña- valkya his doctrine of dynamic immanence (S. 16). (iii) As regards the relations of the Brahmins and the Kshatriyas, the Brihadāraņyaka declares that a Brahmin ought to take his seat below a Kshatriya at the Rajasuya sacrifice, thus giving him the honour that he deserves. On the other hand, the Kshatriya must remember that because Kshatrahood has been born

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62 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ § 20

from Brahminhood, therefore, even though he may attain to the highest state, he must rest upon the Brahmin as his source, that is, must live under the control and guidance of the Brahmins (S. 17. a). In the Chhandogya we are told by Jaivali that Aruni was the first man in the Brahmin circle to receive spiritual wisdom, and that therefore it was the Kshatriya caste that reigned supreme (S. 17. b). In the Brihadāran- yaka, we are told that it was only when Aruni went with the desire of living like a pupil to Jaivali, whom he regarded as superior to himself, that Jaivali could be prevailed upon to impart to him his spiritual wisdom (S. 17. c) ; and yet again in the Kaushītaki King Chitra Gargyāyani complimented Äruņi who had gone to him, fuel in hand, upon having approached him in an humble manner and therefore having been really worthy of Brahminhood, whereupon he proceeds to instruct him in spiritual knowledge (S. 17. d). All these passages indicate both the earthly and the spiri- tual supremacy of Kshatriyahood to Brahminhood. On the other hand, in certain passages as in the Bri- hadaraņyaka and Kaushītaki, where Gargya, the proud Brahmin, had gone to King Ajataśatru to learn wis- dom, we read that Ajatasatru told him that it was against the " usual practice " that a Kshatriya should instruct a Brahmin in spirituality, but that Ajātaśatru in the course of his conversation with Gārgya felt his superiority so much that he could not be prevented from imparting his higher wisdom to Gargya, when, fuel in hand, the latter approached him in an hum- ble manner (S. 18). It would seem from the above passage that the Brahmins were usually superior to Kshatriyas in spiritual knowledge, but that occasion- ally a Kshatriya might be superior to a Brahmin in that respect. Finally, in certain passages from the Upa- nishads, especially in the Brihadāranyaka and the

§ 21 ] CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND .63

Maitri, we find that certain Brahmin sages stood very much superior to Kshatriya kings, who learnt wisdom from their Brahmin masters. "Here, O Yajnavalkya, is my kingdom," said King Janaka when he stood astonished at the great intellectual and spiritual wis- dom of the Sage, "and here am I at your service" (S. 19. a). In the Maitri Upanishad we read that King Brihadratha, filled with repentance and remorse, went to the Sage Sakāyanya, and implored him to help him out of the world of existence, as one would help out a frog from a waterless well (S. 19. b). From these passages, it would seem that the Brahmins did very often maintain their intellec- tual and spiritual superiority. It must be remember- ed, however, that occasionally a Kshatriya, and occa- sionally a Brahmin, would be the intellectual and spiritual head of his age according to his abilities and powers, and that no charter was given either to Brah- min-hood or Kashatriya-hood that it alone should be the repository of intellectual and spiritual wisdom, and that, therefore, it would be ridiculous to argue, on the one hand, that the Brahmins alone, or on the other, that the Kshatriyas alone, were the custodians of spiritual culture, and thus, as in modern times, even a man belonging to the lowest order of society could, if he possessed the necessary ability and means, be in the vanguard of those who knew. 21. It is only in the fitness of things that we should

The Problems close this introductory chapter Upanishadic philo- with a statement of the chief pro- of

sophy. blems that emerge out of a con- sideration of the doctrines of the Upanishadic philo- sophers, as well as exhibit their inter-relation. Won- der, as Plato said, was the roof of philosophy in Greec as in India. The Upanishadic philosophers, we have seen, ceased to understand the forces of nature as

64 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ § 21

certain heavenly deities before whom they had to bow down their heads in unconscious awe. From the Rigveda to the Upanishads we find the same transi- tion as we find in the History of Greek Philosophy from Homer and Hesiod to Thales and Anaximander. Natural forces cease to be personified, and a definite attitude comes to be taken which is worthy only of speculative thinkers. "What is that," asked the Upanishadic philosophers, " which being known, every- thing else becomes known" (S. 20)? In short, they wanted to know the "arche" of knowledge. They first tried to find this in the cosmological sphere; but having failed to find it therein, they began to search after it in the psychological domain. What is it, they asked, which persists when the body is dead ? What is it, again, which lives and persistently creates, even though the body may go into a state of sleep (S. 21) ? Not without reason did Yajñavalkya stand victorious in the intellectual arena in Janaka's court when he appealed to the transmundane problem of the persis- tence of the Self after death. What is the real root, he asked, from which the tree of life springs again and again, even though knocked and cut down by that Dark Cutter, Death (S. 22)? We may well imagine how Janaka, who saw in the elephant, on which he was riding, a former sage, namely Budila, must have been regarded as a very wise man of the day (S. 23). Eschatological knowledge was regarded as the most precious of all. But even then, the desire of man to know the Ultimate could not be finally quenched. He must know the answer to the most central problem-What is the Real, What is the Ätman, What intellectual construction could he make about it ? An attempt to solve this problem would lead the Upanishadic philosopher into the very heart of metaphysics, and when a certain intellectual solu-

§ 21] CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND 65

tion was arrived at, the next problem would be how practically to attain to that knowledge, what should be the norm of conduct following which one may hope to "appropriate the God-head." As the culmination of this practical endeavour would come in the mystical attitude, which would complete the moral endeavour, which, without it, would be like the Hamlet with Hamlet out. Mysticism was the culmination of Upa- nishadic philosophy, as it is the culmination of all philosophies, and one who does not understand that the cosmology and the psychology, the metaphysics and the ethics of the Upanishads are merely a propae- deutic to their mystical doctrine can scarcely be said to have understood the spirit of Upanishadic philosophy.

SOURCES I

I (a) तदेतत्सत्यं मंत्रेषु कर्माणि कवयो यान्यपशयस्तानि व्रेतायां बहुधा संततानि। तान्याचरथ नियतं सत्यकामा एष वः पंथाः सुरुतस्य लोके।। -मुं. I.2. I. (b) प्रुवा त्येते अढा यक्षरूपा अष्टादशोक्तमवरं येषु कर्म। एत- च्छ्ेयो येऽभिनंदन्ति मूढा जरामृत्युं ते पुनरेवापियन्ति॥ अवि- द्यायामन्तरे वर्तमाना: स्वयं धीराः पंडितं मन्यमानाः। जंघन्य- माना: परियन्ति मूढा अंधेनैव नीयमाना: यथांधाः ॥ अवि- द्यायां बहुधा वर्तमाना वयं कृतार्था इत्यमिमन्यन्ति बालाः। यत्कार्मिणो न प्रवेदयन्ति रामात्तेनातुराः क्षीणलोकाश्यवन्ते॥ इष्टापूर्ते मन्यमाना वरिष्ठ नान्यच्छेयो वेदयन्ते प्रमूढाः। नाकस्य पृष्ठे ते सुरुतेऽनुभूत्वेमं लोक हीनतरं वा विशन्ति॥ तपःश्रद्धे ये छुपवसन्त्यरण्ये शान्ता विद्वांसो भैक्षचर्या चरन्तः। सूर्यद्वा- रेण ते विरजा: प्रयान्ति यत्रामृतः स पुरुषो हाव्ययात्मा ॥ मुं. I. 2.7-II. 2 (a) प्राणाय स्वाहा । व्यानाय । अपानाय"। समानाय"। उदानाय"। सय इदमविद्ानसिहोत्रं जुहोति यथांगारानपोह्य भस्मनि

9

66 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

जह्ुयात्। ... । यथेषीकातूलमझौ प्रोतं प्रदूयेत एवं हास्य सर्वे पाप्मानः प्रदूयन्ते य एतदेवं विद्वान अभ्निहोत्रं जहोति। तस्मादु हैवंविद्यदपि चंडालायोच्छिएं प्रयच्छेदात्मनि हैवास्य तद्वैश्वानरे हुतं स्यात्। छा. V. 19-24. (b) अथातः सांयमनं प्रातर्दनमांतरमग्निहोत्रमित्याचक्षते यावद्वै पुरुषो भाषते न तावत्प्राणितुं शक्कोति प्राणं तदा वाचि जुहोति यवद्वै पुरुषः प्राणिति न तावन्द्ाषितुं शक्कोति वाचं तदा प्राणे जुहोत्येतेSनन्ते5मृते आहुतीर्जाग्रच्म स्वपंश्र संततमव्य- वच्छिनं जुहोत्यथ या अन्या आहुतयोऽन्तवत्यस्ताः कर्ममय्यो भवन्त्येतद्ध वै पूर्वे विद्वांसोSसिहोत्रं न जुहवाचकु: । कौ. II. 5. 3 एवं वा अरेऽस्य महतो भृतस्य निःश्वसितमेतचयटन्वेदो यज्ुर्वेद: सामवेदोऽथर्वीगिरस इतिहास: पुराणं विद्या उपनिषद शोका: सत्राण्य नुव्याख्यानानि अस्यैवैतानि सर्वाणि निःश्वसितानि। बृ. II. 4. I0. 4 (a) तपःप्रभावाद्देवप्रसादाच्च ब्रह्म ह श्वेताश्वतरोऽथ विद्वान्। अत्याश्रमिभ्यः परमं पवित्रं प्रोवाच सम्यगृविसंघजुष्टम्।। शवे. VI. 2I. (b) अहं वृक्षस्य रेरिवा। कीर्तिः पृष्ठं गिरेरिव। उर्ध्वपवित्रो वाजि- नीव स्वमृतमस्मि। द्रविणं सवर्चसम्। सुमेधा अमृतोSक्षितः। इति त्रिशंकोवेदानुवचनम्। तै. I. I0. 5 (a) अन्यदेवाहुर्विद्ययान्यदाहुरविद्यया। इति शुभ्रुम धीराणां ये न- स्तद् विचचक्षिरे॥ ई. 10. अन्यदेव तद्विदितादथो अविदितादधि। इति शुश्रुम पूर्वेषां ये नस्तद्विचचक्षिरे॥ के. I. 3. (b) पतद्ध स्म वै तद्विद्वांस आहु: पूर्वे महाशाला महाश्रोत्रिया न नोऽद्य कश्चनाश्रुतममतमवि्ामुदाहारि ्यतीति ह्योभ्यो विदां चक्रु: । छां.VI. 4. 5. 6 सो (मृत्युः) Sकामयत द्वितीयो म आत्मा जायेतेति। स मनसा वाचं मिथुनं समभवत्। ... । स तया वाचा तेन आत्मना इर्द सर्वमसृजत यदिदं किंच ऋचो यजूंषि सामानि छंदासि यज्ञान्

7 प्रजा: पशून्। बृ. I. 2.4-5- ऋतं पिवन्ती सुकृतस्य लोके गुहां प्रविष्टी परमे परार्धे।

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छायातपौ ब्रह्मविदो वदन्ति पंचागयो ये च त्रिणाचिकेताः॥ क. I. 3. I. द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते। तयो- रन्य: पिप्पलं स्वादृत्ति, अनश्रन्नन्यो अभिचाकशीति। सुं. III. I. I. अजामेकां लोहितशुककृष्णां बह्ीः प्रजाः सृजमानां सरूपाः। अजो होको जुषमाणोऽनुशेते जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगां अजोन्यः।। शे.IV.5. 8 पृथिव्यंतरिक्षं दौर्दिशोऽवांतरदिशाः । अभ्विर्वायुरादित्यअ्चंद्रमा नक्षत्राणि। आप ओषधयो वनस्पतय आकाश आत्मा। इत्य- धिभूतम्। अथाध्यात्मम्। प्राणो व्यानोऽपान उदानः समानः। चक्षुःश्रोत्रं मनो वाक् त्वक। चर्म मांसं स्नावास्थिमजा। एत- दधिविधाय ऋषिरवोचत्। पांकत वा इद सर्वे पांकेनैव पांक स्पृणोतीति। तै. I. 7. स एष पांक्तो यक्ष: पांक्त: पशुः पांक्तः पुरुषः पांक्तमिद सर्वे यदिदं किंच। बृ. I. 4.17. 9 (a) तमेकनेमि त्रिवृतं षोडशान्तं शतार्धारं विशतिप्रत्यराभिः। अष्टकैः षड्भिर्विश्वरूपैकपाशं त्रिमार्गभेदं द्विनिमित्तकमोहम्॥ शे. I.4. (b) पंचस्त्रोतोंवुं पंचयोन्युग्रवकत्रां पंचप्राणोर्मि पंचबुध्यादिमूलाम्। पंचावर्ती पंचदुःखौधवेगां पंचाशज्जेदां पंचपर्वामधीमः॥ श्वे. I. 5. 10 (a) उद्दालको हारुणि: श्वेतकेतुं पुत्रमुवाच स्वप्रान्तं मे सोम्य विजा- नीहीति। यत्रैतत्पुरुषः स्वपिति नाम सता सोम्य तदा संपन्नो भवति तस्मादेनं स्वपितीत्याचक्षते। .... अशनायापिपासे मे सोम्य विजानीहीति। यत्रैतत्पुरुषोSशिशिषति नाम अप एव तदशितं नयन्ते। ... यत्रैतत्पुरुषः पिपासति नाम तेज एव तत्पीतं नयते। छां. VI. 8. I-3. (b) स वा अयं पुरुषः सर्वासु पूर्षु पुरिशयो नैनेन किंचनानावृतं नैनेन किंचनासंवृतम्। बृ.II.5.I8. (c) अकार: प्रथमा मात्रा आप्तेरादिमत्वाद्वा। ... उकारो द्वितीया मात्रा उत्कर्षादुभयत्वाद्वा । ... मकारस्तृतीया मात्रा मिंतरपी- तेर्बा। मां. 9-I1.

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II अथ हैनं गार्गी वाचक्षी पप्रच्छ याजवल्क्येति होवाच यदिदं सर्वमप्स्वोतं च प्रोतं च कस्मिलु सल्घाप ओताश् प्रोताश्चेति वायौ गार्गीति। कस्मित्ु खलु वायुरोतश्च प्रोतश्चेत्यन्तरिक्ष- लोकेषु गार्गीति। कस्मिकु खल्वन्तरिक्षलोका ओताश् प्रोता- श्चेति गंधर्वलोकेषु गार्गीति । कम्मितु खलु गंधर्वलोका ओताश्च प्रोता्चेत्यादित्यलोकेषु गार्गीति। कस्मिन्ठु खल्वादित्य- लोका औताश्च प्रोताश्चेति चंद्रलोकेषु गार्गीति । कस्मिभु खलु चंद्रलोका ओताश्च प्रोताश्चेति नक्षत्रलोकेषु गार्गीति । करमिल्ष खलु नक्षत्रलोका ओताश्ष प्रोताश्ेति देवलोकेषु गार्गीति। कस्मिष्ट खलु देवलोका ओताश्ष प्रोताश्चेतींद्रलोकेषु गार्गीति। कस्मिन्ु खन्विद्लोका आताक्ष प्रोताश्ेति प्रजापतिलोकेषु गार्गीति। कस्मिक् खलु प्रजापतिलोका अताश्च प्रोताश्चेति ब्रह्मलोकेषु गार्गीति। कस्मिक्ष खलु ब्रह्मलोका ओताक्ष प्रोता- श्चेति स होवाच गार्गि मातिप्राक्षीर्मा ते सूर्धा व्यपप्तदनति- प्रदन्यां वै देवतामतिपृच्छसि गार्गि मातिप्राक्षीरिति ततो ह गार्गी वाचक्व्युपरराम। -बृ.III.6. I. 12 (a) असी वा आदित्यो देवमधु तस्य धौरेव तिरशीनवंशान्त- रिक्षमपूपो मरीचयः पुत्राः । तस्य ये प्रांचो रक््मयस्ता एवास्य प्राच्यो मधुनाड्य ऋच एव मधुकृत ऋग्वेद एच पुष्पं ता अमृता आपस्ता वा पता ऋचः। ... अथ येऽस्य दक्षिणा रक्ष्म- यस्ता पवास्य दक्षिणा मधुनाड्यो यर्जूप्येव मधुकृतो यजुर्वेद एव पुष्पं ता अमृता आपः। ... अथ येऽस्य प्रत्यंचो रइमयस्ता पवास्य प्रतीच्यो मधुनाड्यः सामान्येव मधुकृतः सामवेद एव पुष्पं ता अमृता आप:। ... अथ येऽस्योदंची रद्मयस्ता पवास्यो- दीच्यो मधुनाड्योऽथर्वीगिरस एव मधुकृत इतिहासपुराणं पुष्प ता अमृता आप:। ... अथ येडस्योर्ध्वा रद्मयस्ता एवास्यो- धर्षा मधुनाड्धो गुह्या एवादेशा मधुकृतो ब्रह्मैव पुष्पं ता अमृता आप:। ... अथ तत ऊर्ध्च उदेत्य नैवोदेता नास्तमेतैकल एव मध्ये स्थाता तदेष छोकः। न वै तत्र न निम्लोच नोदि- याय कदाचन। देवास्तेनाहं सत्येन मा विराधिषि ग्रह्मणेति। न ह वा अस्मा उदेति न निम्लोचति सकृड्िया हैवास्मै भवति य एतामेषं ब्रह्मोपनिषदं वेद। छां.III.I-II. (b) एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि सूर्याचंड्मसौ विधृती तिष्ठत एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि द्यावापृथिव्यौ

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विधृते तिष्ठत पतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि निमेषा मुहूर्ता अहोरात्राण्यर्धमासा मासा कतवः संवत्सरा इति विधृतास्तिष्ठन्त्येतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि प्राच्यो Sन्या नदः स्यंदन्ते श्वेतेभ्यः पर्वतेभ्यः प्रतीचोऽन्याः। बृ. III. 8. 9. (c) अथ यदिदमस्मिन्ब्रह्मपुरे दहरं पुंडरीकं वेदम दहरोऽस्मिन्र न्तराकाशस्तस्मिन्यदंतस्तदन्वेष्टव्यम्। तद्वाव विजिशासितव्य- मिति। तं चेद् व्रयुर्यदिदमस्मिन्ब्रह्मपुरे दहरं पुंडरीकं वेश्म दहरोऽस्मिन्नंतराकाशः कि तदत्र विद्यते यदन्वेष्टव्यं यद्वाव विजिज्ञासितव्यमिति । स ब्रयाद्यावान्वा अयमाकाशस्तावा- नेषोऽन्तर्हृदय आकाश उभे अस्मिन्द्यावापृथिवी अन्तरेव समा- हिते उभावसिश्च वायुश्र सूर्याचंद्रमस।वुभौ विद्युन्नक्षत्राणि यञ्चास्येहास्ति यब्च नास्ति सर्वे तदस्मिन्समाहितमिति। छां. VIII.I. I-3· (d) यो वै भूमा तत्सुखं ... यत्र नान्यत्पश्यति नान्यच्छृणोति नान्य- द्विजानाति स भूमा ... स एव अधस्तात्स उपरिष्टात्स पश्चाव स पुरस्तात् स दक्षिणतः स उत्तरतः स एवेदं सर्वमिति। अथातोऽहंकारादेश .... । अथात आत्मादेश पवात्मैवाधस्ता- दात्मोपरिष्टादात्मा पश्चादात्मा पुरस्तादात्मा दक्षिणत आत्मो- त्तरत आत्मैवेद सर्वमिति स वा एप एवं पश्यश्रेवं मन्वान पवं विजानन्नात्मरतिरात्मक्रीड आत्ममिथुन आत्मानंद: स स्वराड भवति॥ छां. VII. 23-25. 13 (a) पुरुषो वाव यक्षः। तस्य यानि चतुर्विशतिवर्षाणि तत्प्रातः- सवनम्। ... । अथ यानि चतुश्चत्वारिशद्वर्षाणि तन्माध्यंदिनं सवनम्। ... ।अथ यान्यष्टाचत्वारिशद्वर्षाणि तत्तृतीयं सवनम्। पतद्ध स्म वै तद्विद्वानाह महिदास पतेरयः स किम एतदुपत- पसि योहमनेन न प्रेष्यामीति। स ह षोडशं वर्षशतं अजी- वत् प्र ह षोडशं वर्षशर्तं जीवति य एवं वेद। छां. III. I6. (b) घोडशकल: सोम्य पुरुषः । पंचदशाहानि माशीः। काममप: पिय। अपोमयः प्राणो न पियता विच्छेत्स्यत इति। छां. VI. 7. I. I4 ब्रह्म वा हदमप्र आसीत् एकमेव तदेकं सत्न व्यभवत्। तच्छरेयो रप अत्यसृजत क्षत्रं यान्येतानि देवता क्षत्राणि इंद्रो वरुणः

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सोमो रुद्रः पर्जन्यो यमो मृत्यु: ईशान इति। स नैव व्यषव् सविशमसृजत बसवो र्द्रा आदित्या: विश्वेदेवाः मरुत इति। स नैव व्यभवत् स शौद वर्णमसृजत पूषणं, इयं वै पूषा, इयं हीद सर्वे पुष्यति। स नैव व्यभवत् तच्छ्रेयो रूप- मत्यसृजत धर्मम। तदेतड्रहा, क्षत्रं, विद, शूद्र: देवेषु। अग्निनैव वेवेषु ब्रह्माभवत्, ब्राह्मणो मनुष्येषु, क्षत्रियेण क्षत्रियो, वैश्येन वैश्यः, शूद्रेण शूद्र:। बृ. I.4. II-I5. 15 (a) वेदमनूच्याचार्योऽन्तेवासिनमनुशास्ति ... आचार्याय प्रियं धन- माहृत्य प्रजातंतुं मा व्यवच्छसीः। सै.I.II. I. (b) त्रयो धर्मस्कंधाः यज्ञोऽध्ययनं दानमिति प्रथमः, तप एव द्वितीयो, ब्रह्मचार्याचार्यकुलवासी तृतीयो अत्यंतमात्मान- माचार्यकुले5वसादयन्। सर्व एते पुण्यलोका भवन्ति, ब्रह्म- संस्थोSमृतत्वमेति। छां. II.23. I. 16 यथा काइयो वा वैदेहो वा उग्रपुत्र: उज्ज्यं धनुरधिज्यं कृत्वा द्वौ वाणवन्तौ सपत्नी अतिव्याधिनी हस्ते कृत्वा उपोत्तिष्ठेद् एवमेवाहं त्वा हा्या प्रआ्नाम्यां मुपोदस्थां तो मे ब्रृहीति। बृ. III. 8.2. 17 (a) तम्मात्क्षत्रात्परं नास्ति। तस्मादब्राह्मणः क्षत्रियमधस्ताद् उपा- स्ते राजसूये ... सेषा क्षत्रस्य योनिर्यद्ब्रह्म तस्माद्यदयपि राजा परमता गच्छति ब्रह्मैव अंततः उपनिश्रयति। बृ.1.4. II. (b) यथेयं न प्राक् त्वत्त: पुरा विद्या ब्राह्मणान् गच्छति, तस्माडु सर्वेषु लोकेपु क्षत्रस्यैव प्रशासनमभूदिति। छां. V. 3. 7. (c) स (आरुणिः) होवाच प्रतिज्ञातो म एष वरो या तु कुमार- स्यांते वाचमभाषथास्तां मे बूहीति। स (जैवलिः ) होषाच दैवेषु वै गौतम तदूरेषु मानुषाणां बूहीति। स होबाच विज्ञा- यते हास्ति हिरण्यस्यापात्त गोअश्वानां दासीनां प्रवाराणं परिदानस्य मा नो भवान् बहोरनंतस्यापर्येतस्याभ्य वदान्यो भूदिति स वै गौतम तीथनेच्छासा इत्युपैम्यहं भवन्तमिति वाचा ह स्मैव पूर्व उपयन्ति स होपायनकीर्त्योवास। बृ. VI. 2. 57.

CHAPTER I: THE BACKGROUND 71

(d) स (आरुणिः) ह समित्पाणिः चित्र गार्ग्यायिणि प्रतिथक्रमे उपायानीति। तं होबाच ब्रह्मार्हौऽसि गौतम यो मां उपागाः । एहि त्वा झपयिष्यामीति। कौ. I. I. 18 स होवाचाजातशत्रुः प्रतिलोमं चैतद यद ब्राह्मणः क्षत्रियमु- पेयाद् ब्रह्म मे वक्ष्यतीति। व्येच त्वाजपयिप्यामीति तं (गार्ग्य) पाणावादाय उत्तस्थौ। बृ.II. I. I5. अथ ह चै गाग्यों वालाकिरनूचान: संस्पष्ट आस। सोऽयमुशी नरेषु संवसन्, मत्स्येषु, कुरुपंचालेपु, काशीविदेहैप्विति। स हाजातशत्रुं काश्यमेत्योवाच ब्रह्म ते ब्रवाणीति। तं होवाचा- जातशत्रुः सहस्रं दझ्स्त पतरयां वाचि। स होवाच बालाकिर्य पवंष आदित्ये पुरुषस्तमेवाहमुपास इति । चंद्रमसि विद्युति स्तनयित्नी 'वायौ आकाशे अङी 'अप्सु 'आदशे छायायां प्रतिशुत्कार्यां शब्दे शरीरे दक्षिणेऽक्षिणि 'सव्ये- Sक्षिणि। तत उ ह बालाकिस्तूर्ष्णमास। तं होवाचाजातशत्रु- रेतावनु बालाका ३ इति पतावदति होवाच बालाकिः। तत उह बालाकि: समित्पाणि: प्रतिचक्रम उपायानीति तं होवाचा- जातशत्रुः प्रतिलोमरूपमेव तन्मन्ये यत् क्षत्रियो ब्राह्मणसुप- नयेत। पहि व्येव त्वा क्षपयिष्यामीति। कौ. IV.I-19. 19 (a) याज्ञवल्क्य, यो नो भगवन् अभयं वेदयसे, नमस्तेऽस्तु, इमे विदेहा, अयमहमस्मि। बृ.IV. 2.4. (b) बृहद्रथो वै नाम राजा विराज्ये पुत्रं विधापयित्वेदमशश्वतं मन्यमान: शरीरं वैराग्यमुपेतोऽण्यं निर्जगाम। स तत्र परमं तप आस्थायादित्यमृदीक्षमाण उर्ध्वबाहुस्तिष्ठति। अन्ते सह- स्राहस्य अन्तिकमाजगाम अझिरिवाधूमकस्तेजसा निर्द- हन्निवात्मविद भगवान् शाकायन्यः । उत्तिष्ठीत्तिष्ठ वर वृणी- प्वेति राजानमद्रवीत्। स तस्मै नमस्कृत्वोवाच। भगवन्नाह- मात्मवित्। त्वं तत्ववित् शुभ्रुमो वयम् ।सत्वं नो बरूहीति। शिरसास्य चरणावभिमृशमानो राजेमां गार्था जगाद। ... अन्धोदपानस्थो भेक इवाहमस्मिन्ससारे, भगवंसवं नो गतिः त्वं नो गतिः। मै. I. I-7. 20 कस्मिनु खलु भगवो विज्ञाते सर्वमिदं विज्ञातं भवति। मुं. I. I. 3. 21 अस्य विस्रंसमानस्य शरीरस्थस्य देहिनः । देदाद्विसुच्यमानस्य

72 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY किमत्र परिशिष्यते॥ पतद्वैतत्॥ ... । य एय सुप्तेषु जागर्ति कामं कामं पुरुषो निर्मिमाणः । तदेव शुक्ं तद्ब्रह्म तदेवामृत- मुच्यते॥ पतद्वैतत्॥ क. II.54-8.

22 तान् हैतैः श्कोकैः पप्रच्छ। यथा वृक्षो वनस्पतिस्तथैव पुरुषो- 5मृषा । तस्य लोमानि पर्णानि त्वगस्योत्पाटिका बहिः। त्वच एवास्य रुधिरं प्रस्यंदि, त्वच उत्पटः।तस्मात्तद् आतृण्णा- त्प्रैति, रसो वृक्षादिवाहतात् ।I मांसान्यस्य शकराणि, किनाटं स्नाव तत्स्थिरम्। अस्थीन्यंतरतो दारुणि, मज्जा मज्जोपमा कृता॥। यद वृक्षो वृक्णो रोहति मूलान्नवतरः पुनः । मर्त्यः स्विन्मृत्युना वृक्ण: करमान्मूलात्मरोहति॥ बृ. III. 9.28.

23 एतद्ध वै तज्जनको वैदेहो बुडिलमाश्वतराश्विमुवाच यष् हो तद्गायत्रीविदवृथा अथ कथं हस्तीभूतो वहसीति मुरं हस्या: सम्राण्न विदांचकारेति होवाच तस्या अझिरेव मुखं यदि ह वा अपि बह्धिवाग्नावभ्यादधति सर्वमेव तत् संदह त्येवं हैवैवंविद्यदपि बह्विव पापं कुरुते सर्वमेव तत्सप्साय शुद्ध: पूतोऽजरोSमृतः संभवति। बृ.V.I4.8.

SUaFFe pia mura i

CHAPTER II

THE DEVELOPMENT OF UPANISHADIC COSMOGONY

1. When Sir Henry Maine said that except the Search after the blind forces of nature nothing Substratum. moves in this world which is not Greek in its origin, he should have at least excluded from the scope of his assertion the Upanishadic philo- sophy, and more particularly, the Upanishadic cosmo- gony. The hey-day of Upanishadic philosophy was that great millenium before ever the earliest Greek philosophers, Thales and Anaximander, began to specu- late, and as in Greek philosophy, so in Upanishadic philosophy, the primary impulse to thought came from cosmologic, and more particularly from cosmogonic, speculation. The starry heavens above, the regula- rities of the moving seasons, the roaring of wind in the firmament, the conflagrations of the all-powerful fire, the periodical inundations of waters, in general, the settled recurrence of all happenings in nature, must have filled the natural inquirer with an impulse to find out the real meaning of all these phenomena ; and it is no wonder that as in Greek philosophy, so in Upanishadic philosophy, the primary search was after the dhors of things. What is that which abides in the midst of changes ? What is that, which as the Upanishad puts it, may be called the " Tajjalan "? What is that from which all things spring, into which they are re- solved, and in which they live and have their being ? (S. I. a) ? From the Taittiriyopanishad we learn that "that alone might be regarded as the Ultimate 10

74 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§1

Reality of things, from which all these beings were born, by which they live when born, to which they repair and into which they are finally resolved" (S. I. b). This is very much like the way in which Aristotle tells us the early Greek cosmologists con- ceived of their primary substance: ξ ού γάρ έστεν άπαντα τά όυτα, καί έξ ού γίγνεται πρώτον καί είς ο φθείρεται τελευταΐον .... τούτο στοιχείον καί ταύτην άρχήν φασιν είναι των όντν. Then again, when the Sage of the Śvetaśvataropanishad asks in wonder at the very beginning of his trea- tise, " From whom are we born, in whom do we live and have our being ?" (S. I. c), we are put in mind of a similar remark of Hesiod at the opening of his "Theogony" when he asks " Who made all this, and how did he make them ?". The search after the ultimate cause of things, the substratum, the øiois of things, is as characteristic of the early Upanishadic cosmogony, as it is of the later Greek cosmogony; and even though, as we may see in the sequel of this chapter, there is no justification for saying that Greek cosmogony was derived from the Upanishadic, still on account of the universally acknowledged, and definitely proved, priority of the Upanishadic spe- culation, he must be a'bold man indeed who dares to say that all things except the blind forces of nature have come from Greece ! 2. Coming to the details of Upanishadic cosmo- Progress of the gony, even though it may not be Chapter. impossible for us to trace the pro- bable historical evolution of the different theories held on the subject of the genesis of the universe by the Upanishadic seers, based upon a more or less final chronological stratification of the different passages in the Upanishads, -- a task which has been attempted by us elsewhere,-the necessities of methodology require that in a work like the present which professedly

COSMOGONY 75

takes a synoptic view of the problems of Upanishadic thought, we should re-arrange the theories in such a way as to enable us to institute a comparison between those theories and the theories held on the subject in a country like Greece. We may thus at once proceed to divide the theories of Upanishadic cosmogony into two main groups : the impersonalistic and the person- alistic. Among the impersonalistic theories may be included the theories which regard either or all of the elements as the substratum of things, or even such abstract conceptions as not-Being, or Being, or Life-force as lying at the root of all things whatsoever. Among the personalistic theories are theories which try to ac- count for the origin of creation from the Atman or God, and insist in various ways either on the dualistic aspect of creation, or the emanatory, or even the highly philosophic aspect implied in Theism proper. When the Upanishadic Sages regard the elements as the source of things, we must take them to mean what they say, and not, as certain later com- mentators under the spell of their theological idea have done, regard those elements as equivalent to deities. Thus for example, when it is said that either fire or water or air is the source of things, we have to under- stand the Upanishadic sages to imply that it is the elements that go by those names that are to be re- garded as responsible for the unfoldment of creation. All theological commentators on the Upanishads such as Śankara and Ramānuja have understood these elements as meaning deities and not the ele- ments proper. But if we just consider for a while the naiveté with which the theories were ushered into being, it may seem impossible for us to doubt that the Upanishadic seers meant by the elements the elements proper, and not the deities corresponding to those ele- ments. It is true that the word " divinity" is, on certain

76 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

occasions, used in the case of these elements, but it must be remembered that a similar word ecos was used in the case of their elemental substrata even by Greek philosophers, and it is not without reason that Aristophanes should call such apotheosisers of ele- ments by the name of &eeot. Then again, the idea of creation ex nihilo seems to be generally repugnant to the Upanishadic mind, and as in Greece, so in India we have the firm belief of the Upanishadic sages in the impossibility of the generation of anything from out of Nothingness, or Not-Being. When, again, it seems to have been felt impossible by the Upanishadic seers that either the elements, or such abstract conceptions as Not-Being or Being could be held responsible for the explanation of creation, they felt the neces- sity of explaining that genesis from Life-force or Cosmic-force. Finally, when even this could not be regarded as a sufficient explanation of creation, they were obliged to take recourse to the idea of the Person, by whom the creation could be said to have been brought into being. We must also note that there is not much room for the idea of creation in an absolu- tistic system of metaphysics, which would try to explain away all creation as being only an illusion or appearance. We shall take this aspect of the problem of creation also into account before we proceed, at the end of the Chapter, to say what the theistic idea of creation in the Upanishads was, especially in the account given by the Śvetaśvataropanishad.

3. To begin with the elements as constituting the Water as the øiois of things, we have first to Substratum. take into account the theory in the Brihadaranyakopanishad which tells us almost in Thalesian fashion that water was the source of all things whatsoever: " In the beginning, verily, the

§3] COSMOGONY 77

Waters alone existed; from the Waters was born Satya or Truth; Satya produced Brahman, Brahman gave birth to Prajapati, and from Prajāpati were born the gods ; these gods worship Satya alone" (S. 2. a). In this passage we are told not that the Atman or any personal Being existed originally, but that the waters were the first to exist, and that everything later came from them. It is curious to note also that Brah- man is here declared to have been created from Satya, which means that we have not to understand the word Brahman in the sense of primal reality as we under- stand it later. Then, again, when it is said that Satya was born from Water, we have to understand by Satya the ultimate " concrete" existent. We are also told that the Satyam consists of three syllables : the first is Sa, the second is Ti, and the third is Yam, the first and the last being real, and the second unreal (S. 2. b). Freely interpreted, this passage would mean that unreality is enclosed on both sides by reality: the present moment which is evanescent is enclosed on both sides by an eternity which is real : we move from eternity to eternity, halting for a short while in the caravansary of the present ; and it is wonderful to notice that the whole of the "Satyam" has been supposed to have come out of the primeval waters. This is almost Thalesian, for Thales regarded water as the origin of all things and his philosophy did not need the hypothesis of a God as responsible for the creation of Water, unlike the Genesis which required the spirit of God to move upon the face of the prime- val waters, or unlike Manu who said that water was only the first existence that was created by God. The Brihadāraņyakopanishad, like Thales, regards Water as the origin of all things whatsoever, dispos- ing of a belief in God as the creator of the Water itself,

78 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [$4 4. After water comes air. Raikva, who holds the

Air. theory of air as the final " ab- sorbent " of things, and therefore probably as the origin of them, has an interesting story connected with him. Once upon a time, we are told, king Jānaśruti was wandering in a forest when he happened to overhear the conversation between two swans. One of these swans said to the other, just as all the lower throws of dice merge in the highest throw, that is, pass to the winner, similarly all the good things that people do in the world pass to the sage Raikva, the philosopher with the car. Now Janaśruti was so astonished at the conversation, that he at once sent his attendant to inquire and return to him with the knowledge as to where this sage Raikva dwelt. The attendant, after having visited different places, found out Raikva who was scratching his itch beneath a car, and then returned to his master to tell him that he had found out Raikva. King Janaśruti went to Raikva with a number of cows, a gold necklace and a chariot drawn by a she-mule, and prayed to the Sage to teach him what god he worshipped. The sage Raikva replied that he had no business with the cows, the necklace and the chariot of the Śudra king, and advised him to return. King Janaśruti returned, but went back again to the Sage with the cows, the golden necklace, the chariot, as well as his beautiful daughter ; whereupon, the sage Raikva seemed to be satisfied, and having lifted the beautiful daughter's face towards himself, said, "Verily, O Śudra, you are making me speak on account of this face," and then he imparted to the king the knowledge which he possessed, namely that he believed that the Air was the final absorbent of all things. "When fire is extinguished it goes to the air, when the sun sets it goes to the air, when the moon sets it goes to

§41 COSMOGONY G YAVAU 79

the air, when the waters dry up, they go to the air : thus verily is Air the final absorbent of all things whatsoever " (S. 3). In this way did the sage Raikva with his car, who reminds us singularly of Diogenes with his tub, tell king Janasruti that Air was the end of all things. The logical conclusion from such a position is that if air be the end of all things, it may also be regarded as the beginning of them. In fact, Raikva's philosophy is like that of Anaximenes, the Greek philosopher, who taught that air was both the beginning and the end of all things : only Raikva does not say definitely that air is the oiots, but only leaves us with the remark that air is the end of all things. This is indeed a very crude conception and has not much scientific value, because Raikva does not explain the actual process of the absorption of all things into air, as Anaximenes later explained both the origin and the end of all things in air by the processes of rarefaction and condensation. We must, however, praise Raikva for having had the boldness to regard Air as the final absorbent of all things, more par- ticularly, of both Water and Fire, which according to other philosophers of his time, were regarded as con- stituting the øiois of all things whatsoever.

5. The theory of fire as the origin of all things is not

Fire. maintained very explicitly in the Upanishads ; but there is a passage in the Kathopanishad whcih tells us that Fire, having entered the universe assumed all forms (S. 4. a), which is almost equivalent to the Heracleitean formula that Fire is exchanged for all things and all things for Fire. On the other hand, in the Chhandogyopanishad, we are told that Fire was the first to evolve from the primeval Being, and that from fire came water, and from water the earth (S. 4. b). It

80 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§5 is interesting to note that in this passage the Hera- cleitean idea of the Way Up and the Way Down is also brought in, inasmuch as it is maintained that from fire is born water and from water earth, while, counter-logically, at the time of dissolution, the earth may be dissolved in water, the water in fire, and the fire in the Primeval Being. It is rather difficult for any philosopher to hold the opinion that fire is the origin of all things, inasmuch as it seems evident that fire burns up all, and is therefore a fit instrument for the process of a general exnupuois, and it is not difficult to deduce from the theory advanced in the Chhandogyo- panishad the idea of a periodic conflagration of things. The difference, however, between the Chhān- dogyopanishad and Heracleitus is that while Heracleitus regards Fire as the very origin of all things, the Chhändogyopanishad makes Fire the first evolute from the primeval Being ; while the Chhandogyopanishad does not insist upon the idea of change, of which Fire seems to be the very type to the change-loving mind of the Ephesian philosopher.

6. When we come to Pravāhaņa Jaivali's doctrine of

Space. space as the origin of all things, we come to a much higher conception than has yet been reached in the schemes of the fore- going philosophers. Even in Greek philosophy, the con- ception of space as the "arche" of things came very late in the development of thought. With Thales, Anaxi- menes, Heracleitus and Empedocles we meet with the conceptions of water, air, fire, earth, either indivi- dually or collectively. It is only when we come to the time of Philolaus, that, according to Aristotle's evi- dence, we get to the notion of space as the "arche" of all things. Fire, air, water and earth are more or less tangible; but "space " to be regarded as the

§71 COSMOĞONY 81

"arche" of all things requires a higher philosophical imagination. When Pravāhana Jaivali was asked what was the final habitat of all things, he answered it was Space. "All these beings emerge from space and are finally absorbed in space; space is verily greater than any of these things; space is the final habitat " (S. 5. a). This passage from the Chhandogyo- panishad is corroborated by another passage from the same Upanishad in which we are told that "space is really higher than fire. In space are both the sun and the moon, the lightning and the stars. It is by space that man is able to call ...... In space and after space are all things born. Meditate upon Space as the highest reality " (S. 5. b). According to these passa- ges from the Chhändogyopanishad, then, we must re- gard space as a higher entity than any of the concep- tions that have been hitherto reached.

7. There are certain passages in the Upanishads Not-Being. which teach that Not-Being, To ov, was the primary existent. The Taittirīyopanishad tells us that " at the beginning of all things what existed was Not-Being. From it was born Being. Being shaped itself of its own accord, It is thus that it is called well-made or self-made" (S. 6). Commentators on this passage who do not want a privative conception like not-Being to be the "arche" of all things, rightly understand this passage to signify that at the very beginning of things it was "as if" nothing existed and not that not-Being was verily the first concrete existent, and that it was from such a semblance of non-existence that Being was created. We could very well conceive how philosophers like Śankarāchārya who believe in an Ultimate Being would explain such a passage; but it must be remembered that in this agnostic conception of a primal non- II

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existent, the Taittiriyopanishad is anticipated by that famous Sukta in the Rigveda, which is called after its opening words, the Nāsadiya Sukta, which tells us that at the beginning of all things, there was neither Being nor not-Being, but that what existed was only an ocean of Night (RV. X. 129). It must be remem- bered that the conception of a primary Void or Night is to be met with even in Greek philosophy in the theory of Epimenides. A passage from the Briha- dāranyakopanishad also tells us that "in the begin- ning of all things, verily nothing was existent but that everything was covered by Death or Hunger, for Hunger is verily Death. Death made up his mind, let me have a Self, and thus worshipping, he began to move. From his worship were born the waters. The froth of the waters solidified, and became the earth. Death toiled on the earth, and as a result of his toil, fire was produced" (S. 7). Here we have the origin of the elements water, earth, and fire from primeval Not-Being, call it either Death or Hunger, or equate it, if you please, with the Void or Night of Greek philo- sophy. In any case, it seems to be implied in such passages that there is a stage in the development of human thought, when finding it impossible to grapple with any concrete existence, it is compelled to take recourse to a privative logical conception like Not- Being, from which even positive Being comes to be later explained. Even in such highly developed systems of philosophy as those of Plato and Aristotle, we have the recognition of a Not-Being, and it can- not be gainsaid that at least for the purposes of logic the existence of Not-Being has to be taken account of even in positive constructions of philosophy. When, on the other hand, philosophers like Gorgias try to prove that there is a real Not-Being as contrast- ed with the Being of Parmenides, we must suppose

§81 COSMOGONY 83

that they are doing so merely for the purposes of eristic; for by what other name shall we call that process by which from the equational fact of Not- Being being Not-Being, they deduce the existence of Not-Being, from which, contrariwise, they try to prove that Being does not exist ? We need not be con- cerned with such an eristic philosophy like that of Gorgias, but we must needs take into account the recognition of Not-Being in philosophies of positive construction like those of Plato and Aristotle. It was in this sense, it seems to us, that the passages from the Taittirīyopanishad and the Brihadāranyakopanishad are to be explained, and by Not-Being we must under- stand not absolute Not-Being but only relative Not- Being, the primal semblance of existence as contrast- ed with later concrete existence.

8. There is however, an interesting side to the Not-Being and the Egg theory of Not-Being as the "arche" of the Universe. of all things. The Chhandogyopani- shad connects the philosophy of Not-Being with the myth of the Universal Egg. We are told in the Upanishad that "what existed in the beginning was Not-Being. It then converted itself into Being. It grew and became a vast egg. It lay in that position for the period of a year, and then it broke open. Its two parts were, one of gold and the other of silver. The silvery part became the earth, and the golden part became the heaven. The thick membrane of the egg became the mountains; the thin membrane became the clouds ; the arteries of the egg became the rivers of the world; the fluid in its interior became the ocean ; while what came out of the egg was the Sun. When the Sun was born, shouts of hurrah arose" (S. 8). Readers of comparative mythology need scarcely be reminded as to how

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similar the myth from the Chhandogyopanishad is to corresponding myths in Babylonian, Egyptian, Phænician, Persian, and Greek mythologies. In Greece, we know, how in the Orphic cosmogony, Chronos and Adrastea produced a gigantic egg which divided in the midst, and with its upper half formed the sky, and with the lower the earth, and how out of the egg came Phanes, the shining God, containing within himself the germs of all the other gods. It is interest- ing to note that behind Chronos and Adrastea, as we have them in this myth, are ideas of time and necess- ity respectively. The word Adpearetx occurs in Greek literature so far back as the 8th century B.C .; and it is customary to derive it from dtoparxe and take it as signifying "that which is not inclined to run away." May we venture to make a suggestion that the word Adrastea seems very much to be the Greek counterpart of the Sanskrit "Adrishta" which also signifies necessity ? One does not know how, but it seems probable that, the idea of Adrishta was conveyed to the Greek people at a time when the Greek and the Indian Aryans lived together. To return to our argument, however, the myth of the Sun coming out of the egg has parallels in the mythologies of many ancient peoples ; but the creation of this egg from a primeval Non-existent seems to be peculiar to the Indian myth as we have it in the Chhändogyopa- nishad. We must notice also that just as the universe was regarded by the Upanishadic sages as a huge egg, similarly it also came to be regarded as " a huge chest with the earth as its bottom and the heavens as its upper lid, the sky as its inside and the quarters as its corners, containing in its inside a rich treasure". (S. 9). We are noting here this alternative concep- tion of the universe regarded as a huge cubical chest merely for the purpose of contrasting it with the

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universe regarded as a great spherical egg, though it has got nothing to do with the philosophy of Not- Being.

9. After the conception of Not-Being as the "arche"

Being. of things we come to the con- ception of Being. A passage from the Chhandogyopanishad tells us directly that Being alone existed at the beginning of things. It takes to task those who suppose that the primeval Existent must be regarded as Not-Being, and that Being must be regarded as having been produced therefrom. " How could it possibly be so," asks the Upanishad, "how could Being come out of Not-Being, existence from non-existence ? It is necessary for us to suppose that at the beginning verily all this was Being, and it was alone and without a second. This Primeval Being reflected, let me be many, let me produce; having bethought thus to itself, it produced fire. Fire thought, let me be many, let me produce ; and it pro- duced water. Water thought, let me be many, let me produce ; and it produced the Earth (food or matter)" (S. 10. a). "The Primeval Being then thought, verily I am now these three deities. Let me enter into them by my Self, and unfold both Name and Form. Let me make each of them three-fold and three-fold " (S. 10. b). "It thus comes about that what we call the red colour in a flame belongs really to fire. Its white colour is that of water and its black colour belongs to the earth. Thus does vanish the flame-ness of a flame. The flame is indeed only a word, a modification and a name, while what really exists is the three colours. What we call the red colour in the Sun, is really the colour of fire, its white colour is the colour of water, its black colour is the colour of the earth. Thus verily vanishes the sun-

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ness of the Sun. The Sun is only a word, a modifica- tion and a name. What really exists is the three colours. Thus likewise does depart the moon-ness of the moon, and the lightning-ness of the lightning. What really exists is the three colours only " (S. Io. c). It is interesting to note in these passages, in the first place, that the primeval existent is regarded as Being, and is described as being one without a second. In the second place, we see how from this primeval Being is produced the three-fold Prakriti which we might call " tejobannātmikā" Prakriti, that is con- sisting of fire, water, and earth. Then, thirdly, it must be noted that the Chhändogyopanishad teaches us definitely the doctrine of " trivritkarana" which is the Upanishadic prototype of the "pañchīkaraņa" of later Vedanta. Just as in the Vedantic theory of pañchīkarana, out of the five original elements, fire, air, water, earth, and space, half of each element was regarded as being kept intact, while the other half was regarded as being divided into four equal differ- ent parts, four such parts from the different elements one after another going to make up a half, which in combination with the half of the original element made up one transformed evolute of the original element, similarly, in the case of the Upanishadic trivrit- karaņa each of the three original elements namely fire, water and earth is to be regarded as being divided into two equal portions, one half being kept intact, while the other half is divided into two equal portions, the two quarters of the two other elements in combi- nation with the one-half of the original element making up a transformed evolute of the original ele- ment. This idea of the mixture of the elements in the Upanishads is a very interesting one from the point of view of its analogy with a similar idea in the philosophy of Anaxagoras who taught that there

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was a portion of everything in everything, and thus that the elements came to be mixed with each other and gave rise to transformed products. Then, fourthly, we must remember that the Chhandogyopanishad tells us that there are three different colours belonging to the three different elements namely the red, the white and the black, which it must be noted were later borrowed by the Samkhya philosophy and made to constitute the three different colours corresponding to the three different qualities of the Samkhya Pra- kriti. Finally, the Chhandogyopanishad tells us that what really exists is the three different colours, or the three different elements, while all such objects of nature as, the sun, the moon, and the lightning, which are constituted out of the three original elements or colours are merely words or names or modi- ficatory appearances of the original elements. In the spirit of an extreme nominalism, the Chhandogyo- panishad tries to reduce all later products to mere semblance or appearance, while it keeps the door open for the real existence of the three elements alone, all of them having been born from the Primeval Being- a sort of a philosophical trinitarian monism ! 10. When we come to the conception of Prana as the puois of things, we rise to Prana. a higher conception than was reached in Greek philosophy. Prana originally meant breath; and as breath seemed to constitute the life of man, Prana came to signify the life-principle ; and just as the life-principle in man came to be called Prāna, similarly the life-principle in the universe came also to be designated Prāna. By Prāņa is thus meant either life-force or cosmic-force. When Ushasti Chakrayana was asked in the Chhandogyopanishad what might be regarded as the ultimate substratum of all things, he said it was Präna : for " verily it is into

88 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [$10 Präna that all these beings enter and it is from Prāņa that they originally spring" (S. II. a). Of the same import is the doctrine of Raikva in the Chhando- gyopanishad when he tries to bring out a correspond- ence between the macrocosm and the microcosm, and when he says that just as air is the life-principle of the universe-a theory which we have already noticed- similarly breath is the life-principle in man. " Prāna is verily the final absorbent; for when man sleeps, his speech is reduced into Prāna, his eye and his ear and his mind are all absorbed in Prāņa. It is Prāņa which is the final absorbent of all these things" (S. II. b). " We may thus say," says Raikva," that there are these two absorbents ; one in the macrocosm and the other in the microcosm, the one being Air, and the other being Prana" (S. II. c). Having re- cognised this supremacy of Präna, the Chhandogyo- panishad, in the doctrine which Sanatkumāra imparts to Narada, has no difficulty in maintaining that, "just as all the spokes of a wheel are centred in its navel, similarly all these beings, and in fact, everything that exists is centred in Prāna" (S. 12. a). Prāņa may thus be regarded as the very navel of existence. The philosopher Kaushītaki tells us that " Prana is the ultimate Reality, the mind being its messenger, the eye the protector, the ear the informant, and the speech the tire-woman. To this Prana as the Ultimate Reality, all these beings make offerings, without Prana having ever sought them " (S. 12. b). We thus see in a general way how Prāna comes to be recognised as supe- rior to all the organs of sense in the human system. 11. There are, however, one or two classical pas- The Controversy bet- sages in the Upanishads which tell ween Prana and the us in the language of myth the Organs of Sense. supremacy of Prana. It was once resolved, we are told in the Chhandogyopanishad. by

COSMOGONY 89

the senses of man to decide which of them was supreme, and for that reason they went to Pra- japati, their Creator. The Creator replied that that sense might be regarded as the soverign of them all. which after departing leaves the body powerless and in a pitiable condition, upon which the senses resolved to run the race for supremacy. Speech was the first to go out of the body, and having lived outside for a year, came back and wondered how the body could exist in spite of its absence. It was told that the body lived like a dumb man not speaking, but breathing with the breath, seeing with the eye, hearing with the ear, and thinking with the mind, upon which speech returned. Then the organ of vision departed, and having lived outside for a year, came back and wondered how the body could live in spite of its absence. It was told that the body lived like a blind man not seeing, but breathing with the breath, speaking with the mouth, hearing with the ear, and thinking with the mind, upon which the eye re-entered. Then the organ of audition departed, and having lived out- side for a year, came back and wondered how the body could still exist in spite of its absence. It was told that the body lived like a deaf man not hearing, but breathing with the breath, speaking with the mouth, seeing with the eye, and thinking with the mind, upon which the ear returned. Then the mind went out, and having lived outside for a year, returned and wondered how the body could still exist in spite of its absence. It was told that the body lived like a child without mind, but breathing with the breath, speak- ing with the mouth, seeing with the eye, and hearing with the ear, upon which the mind re-entered. Then, finally, when the breath was on the point of depart- ing, it tore up the other senses as a well-bred horse might tear up the pegs to which it is tethered. Then

90 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§-11

the organs of sense assembled together and said to Praņa, 'Sir, thou art our lord; depart not from us'; and the tongue said to the Prana, ' if I am richest, it is really thou that art richest'; and the eye said, "if I am the support, it is really thou that art the support.'; and the ear said, ' if I am wealth, it is really thou that art wealth'; and the mind said, "if I am the final abode, it is really thou that art the final abode' It is for this reason that people have declared the primacy not of the organs of sense, of the speech, or the eye, or the ear, or the mind, but of breath. For the breath is verily all these " (S. 13. a). This passage in the Chhandogyopanishad is probably the earliest and the most classical as illustrating the controversy be- tween the organs of sense and Prana, and the resulting supremacy of Prana over the organs. With a little variation, the same story occurs in the Kaushitaki Upanishad also (II. 14), which, being so much the later, we are not much concerned with as merely re- peating for us the story of the Chhandogyopanishad. But there are one or two points in the story of the controversy of the Senses and Prana in the Praśnopa- nishad which we cannot leave unnoticed. There, in the first place, the elements namely space, wind, fire, water, and earth join hands with the organs of sense, namely, speech, mind, eye and ear in the controversy with Prana. In the second place, we must note the two similies employed in the Prasnopanishad. The body is there called Bana, which, as Max Müller sug- gests, may well be taken to mean a harp, and the ele- ments as well as the organs of sense contend that they have the power to uphold this harp and to modulate it. Incidentally, it is interesting to notice the descrip- tion of the body in the Prasnopanishad as a harp, which is almost Pythagorean or Platonic. Then again when Prana wants to go out, it is compared to the

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queen-bee, which, when it goes out, is accompanied by all the bees that move after it, and which, when it comes back, is likewise followed by the bees that re- turn forthwith. Thirdly, there is an almost henotheis- tic worship of Prana by the organs of sense in the Praśnopanishad where it is regarded not merely as the sovereign of the organs of sense, but also as the sovereign of the deities of the universe. It is thus that Prana comes to be identified with Agni, with Sürya, with Parjanya, with Vayu, with Being, as well as Not-Being ; and in the spirit of the prayer offered in the Chhandogyopanished, here also the Prāna is requested not to move out, as it is the Prana which informs, and is immanent in, the organs of sense, such as speech and hearing and vision, as well as mind (S. 13. b).

12. In the account of Prana which we find in the Prana, a bio-psycho- Kaushitaki Upanishad there are tlon. metaphysical concep- certain noticeable features which do not oocur either in the Chhändogyopanishad or the Praśnopanishad. In the flrst place, Prāna is directly identified with life (Ayuh). This is as much as to say that life exists so long as Prana exists and life departs as soon as Prāņa departs. Then again, Prāņa is identified with consciousness (Prajña). It is interest- ing to note that consciousness is here distinguished from life as the higher category of existence. There may be forms of life without consciousness; but wherever there is consciousness there must be life; and the KaushItaki Upanishad seems to recognise this differ- ence and describes Prana not merely as the principle of life but as the principle of consciousness also. Then, thirdly, the Upanishad identifies Prana with the tman itself, the Ultimate Reality which is ageless and immortal, which does not increase by good

92 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC- PHILOSOPHY Cf12 actions nor diminish by bad actions (S. 14). It thus comes about that Prana is life from the biological point of view, consciousness from the psychological point of view, and Atman from the metaphysical point of view. This is verily a philosophical apotheo- sis of Prāna. 13. We now come to the personalistic theories of creation. Hitherto we have dis- The idea of a Creator, and the creation of cussed theories which regard either mythological and phi- or all of the elements, namely fire, losophical dualities. air, water, earth and space, or even such privative conceptions as Not-Being or Night or Hunger or Death, or even such an abstract meta- physical conception as Being, or finally the highly deve- loped bio-psycho-metaphysical conception of Prāņa, as the øuois of things. We must note that in all these theories of creation, no creator with a personal existence is brought in for the purposes of creation. We have a more or less naturalistic account of cosmo- genesis. On the other hand, in the theories which we are now about to discuss, we shall have to take account of the personal element in creation. In the Praśno- panishad we are told by Pippalada that at the begin- ning of creation, the creator became desirous of creat- ing, and, with that end in view, practised penance, and after having practised penance, first created a pair namely Rayi and Prana, corresponding respec- tively to matter and spirit, with the intention of creating all existence whatsoever from them. While we must give credit to Pippalada for having conceived the notion of a duality of primary existences, Rayi and Prana, almost in the spirit of Aristotle's Matter and Form, the application which Pippalada makes of his twofold principle is rather amusing. The moon is matter, he says, while the sun is spirit; the

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path of the fathers is matter, while the path of the gods is spirit ; the dark half of the month is matter, while the bright half is spirit; night is matter, while day is spirit. It was in this way that the Creator was able to create all the dual existence what- soever in the world (S. 15. a). In a similar spirit does the Taittiriyopanishad tell us that " the Creator at the beginning of things practised penance, and having practised penance, created all things that exist, and having created them entered into them, and hav- ing enered into them, became himself both the mani- fest and the unmanifest, the defined and the undefined, the supported and the unsupported, the conscious and the unconscious, the true and the false" (S. 15. b). Though the Taittiriyopanishad agrees with the Praśno- panishad in positing a Creator who at the beginning of things was required to practise penance, still it differs from it in substituting the philosophical duality of the defined and the undefined, the conscious and the unconscious, the true and the false, instead of the mythological duality of the Praśnopanishad, namely, the dark half of the month and the bright half of the month, the path of the fathers and the path of the gods, night and day, the moon and the sun, and the rest. But it is evident that in the two passages we have been considering, we have the idea of a Creator introduced, which enables us to say that these passages logically mark an advance over the earlier ones which give merely an impersonalistic account of creation.

14. Another explanation of the duality of existence,

The Atman, and the this time of the duality of sex, creation of the duality occurs in the Brihadaranyakopa- of sex. nishad, where we are told that "*the Atman alone existed in the beginning of things

94 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§14

and he had the form of man ...... He first said to himself, I am He, and it was for this reason that he came to be called I. It is for this reason also that when a man is asked who he is, he first replies it is I, and then he gives out his name ...... This Atman was afraid; it is for that reason that when a man is alone, he fears. Then the Atman began to reflect, why should I fear if there is nothing existing beside me, of which I might be afraid ; it was thus that all fear de- parted from him ...... It is said verily that fear pro- ceeds only from a second. But the Atman could not still find satisfaction ; for that reason it is that when a man is alone, he does not find satisfaction. The Ätman therefore wished for a second, ...... and having divided himself into two halves, became both the husband and the wife, man as well as woman. The woman began to reflect, 'how having generated me from him- self, he seeks intercourse with me?' 'Let me hide myself ' she said, and so she became a cow ; the Atman, however, became a bull and had intercourse with her. .She became a mare, while he became a horse. She became a she-ass, and the other became a he- ass and had intercourse with her. It was thus that both the male and the female creatures were created by the Atman up to the very ants. All these were created by him " (S. 16). It must be noted, as we have pointed out above, that this passage gives us an explanation of the generation of the duality of sex from the Atman in the organic world, but it yet leaves the inorganic generation entirely unexplained.

15. A very much more elaborate explanation of

Creation by Atman the generation of all the objects through the Interme- in the universe is offered in the diary Person. Aitareyopanishad, which we might very well regard as giving us the fullest account of

TROEOTA COSMOGONY 95

the fact of creation in the Upanishads. We are told there, that in the beginning the Atman alone existed, and that there was no other blinking thing whato- ever. The Atman thought to himself, let me create the worlds; whereupon he created the four worlds, namely those of the super-celestial region of waters, the heavens with their celestial lights, the mortal earth, and the subterranean region of waters. It was thus that the heaven and the earth were encompassed on the upper and the nether sides by regions of water. After these worlds were created, the Atman pro- ceeded to create first a World-Person-an inter- mediate entity subsisting between the Atman, the primary reality, and the Universe, the object of later creation-whom he fashioned out of waters, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life. It is interesting to note in passing that this is the only analogue in the Upanishadic cosmogonies to the con- ception of Logos in Greek or Christian philosophy, but it must be remembered that this Logos in the Upani- shadic philosophy plays quite a subservient and se- condary part to the Atman. The Atman then brood- ed upon this World-Person, and as a result of his brooding, created first his various organs of sense, then the functions corresponding to them, and lastly the deities or the world-governors corresponding to such functions in the Cosmos. "He first created the Mouth from which proceeded Speech, and from Speech, Fire. He created the Nostrils from which proceeded Breath, and from Breath, Air. He created the Eyes from which proceeded Sight, and from Sight, the Sun. He created the Ears from which proceeded Hearing, and from Hearing, the Quarters,

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He created the Skin from which proceeded Hair, and from Hair, the Herbs and Trees. He created the Heart from which proceeded Mind, and from Mind, the Moon. He created the Navel from which proceeded the Down-Breath, and from Down-Breath, Death. Finally, he created the Generative Organ from which proceeded Semen, and from Semen, Water."

It is interesting to note that in this explanation of the creation of various categories of existence, the function always follows the structure in the microcosm of the intermediary Person, but always precedes it in the macrocosm of the Universe. Thus the organs of sense, such as the mouth, the nostrils, the eye and the ear were created in the Person before their functions namely, speech, breath, sight, and hearing, which having been created were the cause of the crea- tion of objective existences such as fire, air, the sun and the quarters in the macrocosm of the Universe. The Atman thereupon attacked the Person with Hunger and Thirst, which, in the Aitareyan cosmogony, reminds us of Love and Hate in Empedoklean cosmo- logy. Hunger and Thirst said to the Atman, find us places in this creation. The Atman replied to them that he would find them places in the deities them- selves, and thus he made them co-partners with them. It is for. this reason that whenever any offerings are made to a deity, Hunger and Thirst are always allot- ted a share in those offerings. After the creation in this fashion of the Worlds, the Cosmic Person, the World-governors, and Hunger and Thirst, the Atman next proceeded to create Matter as food for them all, ..... which being created, the Atman finally pro- ceeded to create the Soul in the human body. How

§16] COSMOGONY 97

shall this body live without me ?', he thought to him- self, 'but how may I enter this ?' Having thus be- thought himself, he rent open the place where the hair are made to part, and entered by that door. This is called the "door of division". This also is the " place of rejoicing". It is at that place that women part their hair. It is at that place that on the skulls of children we see a hole. It is on that spot that when a Samnyāsin dies, a cocoanut is broken with the purpose of releasing his pent-up Soul. To come to our argument, when the Atman entered the body by the door of division, and was so born as the individual Soul, he began to be subject, so the Aitareyopanishad tells us, to the three states of consciousness, namely, the waking, the dreaming and the deep-sleep state of consciousness. After having been born, the indivi- dual Soul began to look about himself at all things to see whether they proclaimed a erepos, but to his great astonishment only saw the supreme Brahman spread everywhere. It is for the reason that the individual Soul saw (dra) the Brahman (Idam) spread everywhere that he is called Idandra, which by con- traction has become Indra, a mysterious name given to the Godhead by the mystery-loving gods (S. 17). We thus see how the individual Soul was the last object to be created by the Ätman and how ultimately there is a metaphysical identity between the indi- vidual Soul and the supreme Soul. 16. So far we have had more or less mythological explanations of the creation of Atman and the theory of Emanation. objects from the primeval Ātman. We have said at the beginning of the chapter that there are a few descriptions in the Upanishads which come very near to full-fledged theories of creation. But before we proceed to these accounts, we must consider briefly how in the T3

98 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY T§16

Taittriyopanishad we have an emantaory theory of cosmogony where we are told that " from the Atman, in the first instance, proceeded space, from space air, from air fire, from fire water, and from water the earth " (S. 18). This is a complete enumeration of the five different Elements which are described as having proceeded one after another from the primeval Atman, who, to all intents and purposes, is described in the passage as not playing any very active part in creation. It is important to remember that the expression that is used in the passage to designate the fact of emanation is Sambhutih. From the Ätman emanated Space, and from Space in the course of progressive generation the rest of the Ele- ments. We are not told that the Atman " created" Space, and from Space created Air, and so on. It is also important to notice in this passage the dos &ro and the odos xaro. At the time of the origin of the universe, from the Atman proceeded space, and from space air, from air fire, from fire water and from water the earth : this is the Way Down. At the time of destruction, counter-logically, the earth would be resolved in water, water in fire, fire in air, air in space, and space in the eternal Atman : this is the Way Up. In general, we may say that the passage from the Taittirīyopanishad which we are discussing is very significant for us, first, as enumerating most definitely for the first time in the whole region of Upanishadic litera- ture the five different Elements ; secondly, for having introduced the Heracleitean conception of the Way Up and the Way Down; thirdly, for the theory of emana- tion as apposed to creation implied in it ; and lastly, for the realistic trend of its argument which has been a standing crux to all absolutistic interpreters of Upa- nishadic philosophy, who would try to reduce every- thing except the Atman to an appearance or illusion.

§17] COSMOGONY 99

17. The Mundakopanishad offers a connecting link

The Personal-Imper- between such an emanatory theory sonal theory of creation of creation and a theistic theory in Mundaka. as in the Śvetaśvatara which we shall presently discuss by suggesting a personal-im- personal theory of the origin of the universe and tell- ing us that "at the beginning of creation, there . existed a heavenly Formless Person who was un- born, without a mind, lustrous, and super-immut- able. From him were born life, mind, senses, space, air, light, water, and earth, which last is the basis of the universe ...... From him also were born gods of various descriptions, angels, men, beasts, and birds. From him were born rice and barley, penance and faith, truth, celibacy, and religious law ...... He was likewise the source of all the oceans and mountains, the rivers which run to and fro, the herbs and trees, and the essence which runs through them, by which verily the inner Soul holds them all together " (S. 19). In this way were all earthly and celestial existences, all organic and inorganic nature; all moral and psychological qualities born from the pri- meval Person, who is yet described as formless and beyond even what we call the immutable. Even this account of the origin of the universe from the primeval Person is not entirely untainted by mythological con- siderations; but it stands much higher than any of the afore-discussed theories, and approaches the truly theistic theory of creation which accounts for the crea- tion of all sorts of existences by the primeval Person. The truly theistic tinge, however, is yet lacking, because the passage from the Mundakopanishad which we are discussing describes the Person as impersonal and speaks of emanation (Syandante) or generation (Jāyate) instead of creation proper, en .. sdf vol tgate

100 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ §18

18. This entirely personal setting for the supreme The Theistic theory of Creation in Svetas- Godhead is to be found in the vatara. Śvetaśvataropanishad. It is true that the Śvetasvataropanishad was written in the interest of a Saivite theory of theism; but if we just divest our minds of this sectarian aspect and equate the god Siva of the Śvetasvataropanishad with the supreme Godhead, which has, in fact, been done in many places by the Śvetāśvataropanishad itself, we may see how the Svetasvataropanishad tries philosophically to account for the creation of the world by the Godhead by the method of construction through criticism of the various extant opinions on thesubject of the origin of the world. The passage from the Śvetāśvataropanishad I. 2 makes a classical enumeration of the various opinions held at the time of the Upanishad on the subject of the origin of the world. " Some people say ", says the Upanishad, "that it is Time, others Nature, others Necessity, others Chance, others the Elements, others yet the Person, still others the Combination of these, and yet a few others the Atman, which is the cause of all things whatsoever" (S. 20. a). The Śvetāśvataro- panishad in the course of its chapters criticises all these theories and puts forth a constructive programme of Saivite theism in explanation of the origin of the universe. We cannot say, says the Śvetāśvataro- panishad, that Time is the origin of all things, for, is not God, it asks, the very Time of Time, or as an- other Upanishad puts it, Death to the very God of Death ? (S. 20. b). We cannot try to explain the origin of the world from Nature, says the Śvetaśvataro. panishad ; for is not Nature itself brought to maturity by the presence of God inside it ? (S. 20. c). Nor can we say that Necessity and Chance are the origin of things : they are either too fatalistic or too unphiloso- phical ways for the explanation of creation. The Ele-

.

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ments cannot be regaded as the "arche" of things, for the elements are merely the garmnent of God, and it is due to His supreme skill in work that earth, water, fire, air and space were created (S. 20. d). Nor can we say that the Combination of all these elements is a veritable " arche," because for these to be combined, we must have an eternal Being who is the primal cause of their combination (S. 20. e). Nor can we finally say that either the Purusha of the Samkhyas, who is too free from creation to be ever regarded as responsible for it, or the Ätman of the Vedantins, who is really a power- less Being if we just consider that he is the cause of happiness as well as of sorrow, can be regarded as responsible for creation. Rudra alone who rules the world by his powers, who stands before every being at the time of destruction, and creates the universe at the time of its origin, can be regarded as the Creator of all things that exist. He is the supreme Godhead, to whose power is due the whirling round of the wheel of the universe (S. 20. f). He is the supreme cause, the lord of all Souls ; of him there is neither generator nor protector ; he is the self-subsisting mover of the unmoving manifold, and causes the one primal secd to sprout in infinite ways (S. 20. g). In this manner does the Śvetāśvataropanishad advance a truly philo- sophic theory of creation, in which all power is ulti- mately due to a personal Godhead who causes the whole universe to move round his finger-' Im Kreis das All am Finger laufen liesse."

19. We have hitherto considered both the imper- The Theory of Inde- sonalistic and the personalistic pendent Parallelism as an explanation of the theories of creation, pointing out analogies of Upanisha- dic and Greek philo- incidentally the analogies which sophies. subsist between the Upanishadic and the Greek theories of cosmogony. Even though.

102 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§19

however, the similarities have been pointed out, they have not yet been explained. The problem of the rela- tion of Greek and Indian cosmogonies, and in general, of Greek and Indian philosophies, is a very interesting problem, and it may just be worth our while to at- tempt a brief solution of it. The problem of the rela- tion of the two philosophies is only a branch of the general Græco-Indian problem of the relation of the two cultures. In an analysis of the two cultures in the various departments, we may say that there are three theories which can be advanced to explain their extraordinary similarities. (1) The Theory of Borrowal either by Greece from India or by India from Greece could find historical justification only after the date of Alexander. Just as Greece left a mark upon Indian progress in the departments of sculpture and numismatics after Alexander's invasion, similarly, India left a deep impression upon the Platonists of Alexandria as seen especially in the all-to Yogic ecsatasy of the Neo-Platonists, and their borrowal of the three qualities wmuxricol. Vuxtol. Bwol from Samkhya philosophy. But the far more important . question in the general Græco-Indian problem is how the two cultures were related before the invasion of Alexander. Diogenes, the biographer of Greek phi- losophers, and Jamblichus, the Neo-platonist, narrate to us stories of the visit to Brahmins of early Greek philosophers, among them philosophers like Thales and Pythagoras. But this fact has yet to be historically proved. The absence of a single reference in Plato to Indian philosophy forbids the truth of such a statement. (2) Thus, in order to explain the many analogies of Comparative Mythology and Com- parative Philology, we have to take recourse to a second theory, namely the Theory of Common Origin. The story for example. of the Universal Being as an

§19] COSMOGONY 103

egg-like sphere, and Phanes, the shining god, coming out of its two lids, namely, the earth and the sky; the bi-partition of the primeval Atman into two por- tions, the man and the wo-man, with its analogy in Hebrew literature ; and the similar descriptions of the Asvattha in the Kathopanishad and the Igdrasil in Scandinavian mythology, may all be traced to a time when the European and the Indian Aryans lived to- gether. Similarly, about Comparative Philology. The present writer has proved in his essay on " the Compa- rative Study of Greek and Sanskrit" that the many great analogies of the entire grammatical structure of the two languages could hardly be explained except on the theory of a continued stay together of the two peoples, thus reinforcing from an altogether different point of view the truth of the Theory of Common Origin in certain departments of the two cultures.(3)Finally, there is the Theory of what we may call Independent Parallel- ism, which is of especial value to us in explaining the analogies of philosophical concepts. We have already noticed how the definitions of the primary substance in the two philosophies are identical ; how the query of Hesiod at the beginning of his work corresponds almost exactly to the query at the beginning of the Śvetaśvataropanishad; how the conception of water as the "arche " in the Brihadāranyakopanishad has its counterpart in the theory of Thales ; how the doctrine of air as the final absorbent in the Chhandogya has its analogue in the theory of Anaximenes ; how the Hera- cleitean conception of the exchange of fire for all things is to be met with in the Kathopanishad ; how the earth as the basis of the cosmos as we find it in the Mundakopanishad is echoed in Hesiod ; how the conception of Space as the fifth element recognised in the Taittiriyopanishad has its parallel in the theory of Philolaos; how the conceptions of Not-Being and

104 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [$19 Being in the Taittiriya and the Chhandogya Upanishads have their parallels in the theories of Gorgias and Parmenides ; how the Way Up and the Way Down in Taittiriyopanishad are repeated in the theory of Hera- cleitus ; how, finally, the conception of Trivritkarana in the Chhandogya Upanishad has its analogue in the Anaxagorian doctrine of there being a portion of everything in everything. So far about the cos- mological resemblances proper. Nor are the extra- cosmological resemblances of the two philosophies less interesting. The Pythagorean doctrine of Transmi- gration and its Indian analogue dating so far back as the days of the Rigveda, the Phaedrus myth of the Charioteer and the Horses and an exactly similar myth in the Kathopanishad, the representation of the idea of the Good in Plato as the Sun of the world of ideas having its counterpart in the description in the Kathopanishad of the Atman as verily the Sun who is the eye of the world and is free from all imperfections, the ai or of Plato corresponding phonetically, philo- logically and even philosophically to the Māya of the Vedanta, Parmeides's attack in Plato against the Universality of the Idea represented to a word in the famous criticism by Sankara of the Naiyāyika idea of the Universal, the analogy of the Vak in Rigveda to the Logos in Heracleitus, the Stoics, and Greek philosophy generally-all these could not be said to be less interesting specimens of the analogies of Greek and Indian Thought. How may we explain these cosmological, and extra- cosmological, analogies ? Not by the Theory of Bor- rowal, for this cannot be historically proved. Nor by the Theory of Common Origin, because, in spite of the similarities, the philosophical concepts of the two lands are placed in a setting all their own, the Pytha- gorean theory of Numbers and the Platonic theory of

§19] COSMOGONY 105

Ideas being as peculiar to Greek thought, as the Upanishadic doctrine of the Turiya and the Miman- saka doctrine of the Sphota are peculiar to Indian thought. We must needs take the help of the Theory of the Independent Parallelism of Thought, where no borrowing or common origin could be historically proved. The Gita conception of God as the A of the Indian alphabet and the Gospel conception of God as the Alpha and Omega of things, and the Kalidasian descrip- tion of the stream of love as raging all the more on account of hindrances in its path finding its echo in the Shakes- pearean description of love in the"Two Gentlemen," are instances how imagination may work absolutely alike in regions of poetry or philosophy. There is nothing to prevent the flights of genius from achieving the same ends wherever it may be placed. Neptune might be discovered by Adams and Leverrier at the same time. Darwin and Wallace might simultaneously discover the principle of Natural Selection. Scott and Amundsen might reach the North Pole at the same moment. What might prevent Philosophers from grasp- ing the same point of view, even though separated by Time and Place ?

SOURCES II

(a) तज्जलानिति शान्त उपासीत। छां.III. I4. I. H (b) यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते, येन जातानि जीवन्ति, यत्प्रयन्त्यमिसंविशन्ति तद्विजिश्ञासस्व तद्रह्मेति। à. III. I. (c) कि कारणं ब्रह्म कुतःस्म जार्ती जीवाम केन क च संप्रतिष्ठाः। शे. I. I. 2 (a) आप एवेदम्र आसुस्ता आपः सत्यमसृजन्त, सत्यं ब्रह्म, I4

106 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

ब्रह्म प्रजापति, प्रजापतिर्देवान्। ते देवाः सत्यमेवोपासते। बृ.V. 5. I. (b) तदेतत् त्र्यक्षर सत्यमिति। स इत्येकमक्षरम् । तीत्येकमक्षरम्। यमित्येकमक्षरम्। प्रथमोत्तमे अक्षरे सत्यम्। मध्यतोऽनृतम्। तदेतदमृतमुभयतः सत्येन परिगृहीतं सत्यभूयमेव भवति। बृ.V. 5. I. 3 वायुर्वाच संचर्यों यदा वा अगिरुद्वायति वायुमेवाप्येति यदा सूर्योऽस्तमेति वायुमेवाप्येति यदा चन्द्रोऽस्तमेति वायुमेवाप्येति॥१॥ यदाप उच्छुप्यन्ति वायुमेवापियन्ति वायुह्यवैतान्सर्वान्संवृङ्क इत्यधिदैवतम् ॥२॥ छां. IV. 3. I-2. 4 (a) अझनिर्यथैको भुवनं प्रविष्टो रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव। क. II. 5. (b) एवमेव खलु सोम्य अन्नेन शुंगेनापोमूलमन्विच्छ, अद्भिः सोम्य शुंगेन तेजोमूलमन्विच्छ, तेजसा सोम्य शुंगेन सन्मूलमन्विच्छ। सन्मूलाः सोम्येमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सदा- यतना: सत्प्रतिष्ठाः। छां. VI.8.4. 5 (a) अस्य लोकस्य का गतिरित्याकाश इति होवाच । सर्वाणि ह वा इमानि भूतान्याकाशादेव समुत्पद्यन्ते, आकाशं प्रत्यस्तं यन्ति। आकाशो हि एव एभ्यो ज्यायान्। आकाशः परायणम्। छां. I. g. I. (b) आकाशो चाव तेजसो भयान्। आकाशे वै सर्याचंद्र- मसाबुभी । विद्यन्नक्षत्राण्यम्निः। आकाशेनाह्वयति ... आकाशे जायते। आकाशमभिजायते। आकाशमुपारस्वेति। छां.VII.I2.I. 6 असद्वा इदमग्र आसीत। ततो वै सदजायत। तदात्मानं स्वयमकुरुत। तस्मात्तत्सुकृतमुच्यत इति। तै. II. 7.

7 नैवेह किंचनाग्र आसीन्मृत्युनैवेदमावृतमासीत्। अशना- यया। अशमाया हि मृत्युः। तन्मनोऽकुरुत। आत्मन्वी स्यामिति। सोर्चन् अचरत् । तस्यार्चत आपोऽजायन्त। ... । तद्यदपां शर आसीत्समहन्यत। सा पृथिव्यभवत्। तस्या- मश्राम्यत्। तस्य श्रान्तस्य तप्तस्य तेजो रसो निरवर्तताझिः। बृ. I. 2. I-2.

COSMOGONY 107

8 आदित्यो ब्रह्मेत्यादेशः । तस्योपव्यास्यानम् । असदेवेदमग्र आसीत्। तत्सदासीत्। तत्समभवत्। तदाण्डं निरवर्तत। तत्संवत्सरस्य मात्रामशयत् । तन्निरमिद्यत । ते आण्ड- कपाले रजतं च सुवर्णे चाभवताम् । तद्यद्रजतं सेयं पृथिवी। यत्सुवर्ण सा घौः। यजरायु ते पर्वताः। यदुल्वं स मेघो नीहार: । या धमनयस्ता नद्यः। यद्वास्तेयमृदकं स समुद्रः। अथ यत्तदजायत सोऽसावादित्यः । तं जायमा्न घोषा उलूलवो अनूदतिष्ठन्। छां.III.I9. I-3.

9 अन्तरिक्षोदर: कोशो भूमिवुघ्नो न जीर्यति। दिशो ह्यस्य स्नक्तयो दौरस्योत्तरं बिलम्। स एष कोशो वसुधान: तस्मिन्विश्वमिदं श्रितम्।। छां. III. I5. I. I0 (a) सदेव सोम्येदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयम्। तद् एक आहुरसदेवेदमग्र आसीदेकमेवाद्वितीयं तस्मादसतः सजायत । कुतस्तु खलु सोम्य एवं स्यादिति होवाच कथमसतः सज्जायेतेति । सत्त्वेव सोम्येदमअ्र आसीत एकमेवाद्वितायम् । तदैक्षत बहुस्यां प्रजायेयेति । तत्तेजो- Sसृजत । तत्तेज पक्षत बहुस्यां प्रजायेयेति तदपोऽस- जत ... । ता आप :... अन्नमसृजन्त। छां. VI. 2.I-4. (b) सेयं देवतैक्षत हन्त अहमिमास्तिस्त्रो देवता अनेन जीवेन आत्मना अनुप्रविश्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि। तासां विब्रृतं त्रिवृतं एकैकां करवाणीति। छां. VI. 3. 2-3. (c) यदसे रोहितं रूपं तेजसस्तदूपं, यच्छुक्कं तदपां, यत्कृष्णं तदन्नस्य अपागादझेरसित्वं, वाचारंभण विकारो नामधेयं, त्रीणि रूपाणि इत्येव सत्यम् । यदादित्यस्य० यच्चंद्रमसो® यद्विद्यतो®। छां.VI.4.I-4. II (a) कतमा सा देवतेति। प्राण इति होवाच सर्वाणि ह वा इमानि भूतानि प्राणमेवाभिसंविशंति, प्राणमभ्युजिहते। छां.I.1I.5 (b) अथाध्यात्मं प्राणो वाव संवर्गः स यदा स्वपिति प्राणमेव वागप्येति, प्राणं चक्षुः, प्राणं श्रत्रं, प्राण मनः, प्राणो होवैता- न्सर्वान्संवृंक्त इति। छां. IV. 3. 3.

108 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY (c) तो वा पती दौ संवर्गी वायुरेव देवेषु प्राणः प्राणेषु। छां. IV. 3.4. I2 (a) अथ वा अरा नाभौ समर्पिता एवमस्मिन्प्राणे सर्वे सम- र्पितम् । छां. VII.I5. I- (b) प्राणो ब्रह्मेति ह स्माह कौर्षाताकिः । तस्य ह वा पतस्य प्राणस्य ब्रह्मणो मनो दूतं, चक्षुर्गोप्त, श्रोत्रं संश्रावयितृ, वाक्परिवेष्ट्री। तस्मै वा एतस्मै प्राणाय ब्रह्मण एताः सर्वा देवता अयाचमानाय बलि हरन्ति। कौ. II. I- 13 (a) अथ ह प्राणा अहंश्रेयसि व्यूदिरेऽहं श्रेयानस्म्यहं श्रंयान- स्मीति। ते ह प्राणाः प्रजापर्ति पितरमेत्योचुर्भगवन्को नः श्रेष्ठ इति तान्होवाच यस्मिन्व उत्कान्ते शरीरं पापिष्ठ- तरमिव दृश्येत स वः श्रेष्ठ इति। सा ह वागुच्चकाम सा संवत्सरं प्रोष्य पर्येत्योवाच कथमशकर्तें मज्जीवितुमिति यथा कला अवदन्तः प्राणन्तः प्राणेन, पश्यंतश्चक्षुषा,शण्वन्तः श्रोत्रेण, ध्यायन्तो मनसैवमिति प्रविवेश ह वाक्। चक्षुह्दों सक्राम तत्संवत्सरं प्रोष्य पर्येत्योवाच कथमशकतरते मज्जी- वितुमिति यथांधा अपश्यन्तः, प्राणन्तःप्राणेन, वदन्तोषाचा, शृण्वन्तः श्रोत्रेण, ध्यायन्तो मनसैवमिति प्रविवेश ह चक्षुः। शोत्रं होच्चकाम तत्संवत्सरं प्रोष्य पर्येत्योवाच कथमशकतरते मज्जीवितुमिति यथा बधिरा अश्ृण्वन्तःप्राणंतःप्राणेन,वदन्तो वाचा, पश्यन्तश्चक्षुषा, ध्यायन्तो मनसैवमिति प्रविवेश ह ओ्रोत्रम्। मनो होखचकाम तत्संवत्सरं प्रोष्य पर्येत्योवाच कथ- मशकतर्ते मज्जीवितुमिति यथा बाला अमनसः, प्राणन्तः प्राणेन, वदन्तो वाचा, पशयन्तश्चक्षुषा, शृण्वन्तःश्रांत्रेणैवमिति प्रविवेश ह मनः । अथ ह प्राण उच्चिकमिषन्स यथा सुहयः

त्योचुर्भगवन्नेधि त्वं नः श्रेष्ठोऽसि मोत्कमीरिति। अथ हैनं वागुवाच यदहं वसिष्ठोस्मि त्वं तद्वसिष्ठीऽसीत्यथ हैनं चक्षुरुवाच यदहं प्रतिष्ठास्मि त्वं तत्प्रतिष्ठासीति। अथ हैन श्रोत्रमुवाच यदहं संपदस्मि त्वं तत्संपदसीत्यथ हैन मन उवाच यदहमायतनमस्मि त्वं तदायतनमसीति। न वै वाचो न चक्षृंषि न ओत्ाणि न मनांसीत्याचक्षते प्राणो हावैतानि सर्वाणि भवति॥ छा. V.I. 6-15. (b) भगवन्कत्येव देवा: प्रजां विधारयन्ते कतर पतत्प्रकाशयम्ते

COSMOGONY 109

कः पुनरेषां वरिष्ठ इति। तस्मै स होवाचाकाशो ह वा एष देवो वायुरझिराप: पृथिवी वाकानश्रक्षुः श्रोत्रं च।ते प्रकाश्याभिवदन्ति वयमेतद्वाणमवष्टम्य विधारयामः। तान्व- रिष्ठः प्राण उवाच मा मोहमापद्यथाहमेवैतत्पंचधात्मानं प्रविभज्यैतद्वाणमवष्टम्य विधारयामीति तेऽभ्रद्दधाना बभूवुः । सोऽभिमानादू्ध्वमुत्तमत इव तस्मिनुत्कामत्य- थेतरे सर्व एवोत्कामन्ते तस्मिश्च प्रतिष्ठमाने सर्व एव प्रतिष्ठन्ते। तद्यथा मक्षिका मधुकरराजानमुत्तामन्तं सर्वा एवोत्कामन्ते तस्मिश्च प्रतिष्ठमाने सर्वा एव प्रतिष्ठन्ते एवं वाढनश्चक्षु: श्रोत्रं च ते प्रीताः प्राणं स्तुचन्ति। एपोऽसि- स्तपत्येष सूर्य एष पर्जन्यो मघवानेष वायुरेष पृथिवी रयि- दैवः सदसच्चामृत च यत्। ... । या ते तनूर्वाचि प्रतिष्ठिता या श्रोत्रे या च चक्षुषि। या च मनसि संतता शिवां तां कुरु मोत्क्मीः । प्र. II. I-I2.

I4 आयुः प्राणः प्राणो वा आयुः। ... । अस्ति त्वेव प्राणानां निःश्रेयसमिति। जीवति वागपेतो सूकान्हि पश्यामो, जीवति चक्षुरपेतोऽन्धान् हि पश्यामो, जीवति श्रोत्रापेतो बधि- रान्हि पश्यामो, जीवति मनोऽपेतो बालान्हि पश्यामः । यो वै प्राणः सा प्रश्ञा, या वा प्रश्ञा स प्राणः सह होताव- स्मिञ् शरीरे वसतः, सहोत्कामतः। ... यथाझेर्ज्वलतः सर्वा दिशो विस्फुलिंगा विप्रतिष्ठेरन् एवमेवैतस्मादात्मनः प्राणाः यथायतनं विप्रतिष्ठन्ते, प्राणेभ्यो देवा:, देवेभ्यो लोकाः। ... तद्यथा रथस्यारेधु नेमिरर्पितो, नाभावरा अर्पिता एवमेवैता भृतमात्राः प्रश्ामात्रास्वर्पिताः प्रशामात्रा: प्राणेऽपिंताः ।स एष प्राण एव प्रशात्मा आनंदोऽजरोड मृतो न साधुना कर्मणा भूयान्भवति, नो एवासाधुना कनीयान्। को. III. 2-9.

15 (a) भगवन् कुतो ह वा इमाः प्रजाः प्रजायन्त इति। तस्मै स होवाच। प्रजाकामो वै प्रजापतिः।स तपोऽतप्यत।स तपस्तप्त्वा। स मिथुनमुत्पादयते। रयि च प्राणं चेतौ मे बहुधा प्रजा: करिष्य इति। आदित्यो ह वै प्राणो रयिरेव चंद्रमा :... संवत्सरो वै प्रजापतिः तस्य अयने दक्षिणं चोत्तरं च ... एष ह वै रयि: यः पितृयान :... मासो वै प्रजापतिः तस्य कृष्णपक्ष एव रयि: शुक्क: प्राणः .... अहो-

110 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

रात्रो वै प्रजापतिः तस्य अहरेव प्राणो रात्रिरेव रयिः। प्र. I.3-I3 (b) सोऽकामयत बहु स्यां प्रजायेयेति । स तपोऽतप्यत। स तपस्तप्त्वा इद सर्व असृजत यदिदं किंच। तत्सृष्टा तदे- वानुप्राविशत् । तदनुप्रविश्य सच्च त्यच्चाभवत्। निरुक्त्त चानिरुकं च । निलयनं चानिलयनं च । विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं च। सत्यं चानृतंच। तै. II. 6.

16 आत्मैवेदमग्र आसीत् पुरुषविध ...... । सोहमस्मीति अग्रे व्याहरत्। ततोऽहंनामाभवत्। तस्मादप्येतहि आमंत्रितो अह्मयमित्येकाग्र उक्त्वा अथ अन्यन्नाम प्रव्नृते .... । सोड विभेत्। तस्मादेकाकी बिभेति। स हायमीक्षांचक्रे यन्मदन्य- न्नास्ति कस्मान्नु बिभेमीति तत एव अस्य भयं वायाय .... द्वितीयाद्वै भय भवति। स वे नैव रेमे तस्मादेकाकी न रमते। स द्वितीयमैच्छत् ... । स इममेवात्मानं द्वेघाऽपात- यन्ततः पतिश्च पत्नी चाभवताम् .... । सा हेयमी्षिांचक्रे कथ नु मात्मन एव जनयित्वा संभवति, हन्त तिरोऽ सानीति सा गौरभवत् वृषभ इतरस्तां समेवाभवत् .... । वडवा इतराभवत् अश्ववृष इतरो। गर्दभी इतरा गर्दभ इतरस्तां समेवाभवत् .... । अजायन्त एवमेव यदिदं किंच मिथुनमापिपीलिकाभ्यः, तत्सर्वमसृजत। बृ.1.4.I-4 17 आत्मा वा इदमेक एवाग्र आसीन्नान्यत्किंचन मिपत्। स ईक्षत लोकान्नु खृजा इति। स इमांलोकानसृजत अंभो मरीची:, मरं, आप :.... । स ईक्षतेमे नु लोका लोकपा- लान्नु सृजा इति। सोउन्ध एव पुरुषं समुष्दत्यामुर्च्छयत् तमभ्यतपत्तस्याभितप्तस्य मुखं निरभिद्यत यथांडं मुखा- द्वाग्वाचोऽग्निर्नासिके निरभिद्येतां नासिकाभ्यां प्राणः प्राणाद्वायुरक्षिणी निरभिद्येतामक्षिभ्यां चक्षुश्वक्षुष आदित्य कर्णो निरभिद्येतां कर्णाभ्यां श्रोतं श्रोत्राद्विशस्त्वङ्् निर- भिद्यत त्वचो लोमानि लोमभ्य ओषधिवनस्पतयो, हृदयं निर- भिद्यत हृदयान्मनो मनसञ्चंद्रमा, नाभिनिरभिद्यत नाभ्या अ- पानोऽपानान्मृत्यु: शिक्षं निरभिद्यत शिक्षाद्वेतो रेतस आपः। तमशनापिपासाभ्यामन्ववार्जत् ... । तं (आत्मानं) अश

COSMOGONY 111 नापिपासेSनृतां अभिप्रजानीहीति । तेऽब्रवीदेतास्वेव वां देवतासु आभजामि, एतासु भागिन्यौ करोमीति। तस्माद्यस्यै कस्यै च देवतायै हविर्गृह्यते भागिन्या एव अस्यां अशनापिपासे भवतः ॥ स ईक्षतेमे नु लोकाश्च लोकपालाश्च, अन्नमेभ्यः सृजा इति। ... स ईक्षत कथं नु इदं मटते स्यादिति। स ईक्षत कतरेण प्रपद्या इति ... । स एतमेव सीमानं विदार्य पतया द्वारा प्रापद्यत। सैषा विद्तिर्नाम द्वाः । तदेतन्नांदनम्। तस्य त्रय आवसथाः त्रयः स्वप्नाः अयमावसथोSयमावसथो Sयमावसथ इति । स जातो भूतान्यभिव्यैख्यत् किमिहान्यं वावदिपदिति। स एतमेव पुरुषं ब्रह्म ततमपश्यत्। इदं अदर्शमिती १३ । तस्मादिदंद्रो नाम .... तमिदंद्रं संतं इन्द्र इत्याचक्षते परोक्षेण। । परोक्षप्रिया इव दि देवाः। परोक्षप्रिया इव हि देवा:। ऐ. I. I-3. I8 तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाश: संभूतः । आकाशाद्वायुः, वायोरझि:, अझ्नेराप:, अद्भ्य: पृथिवी। तै. II. I. 19 दिव्यो ह्यमूर्तः पुरुषः सबाह्याभ्यंतरो ह्ाजः । अप्राणो ह्यमनाः शुभ्रो ह्यक्षरात्परतः परः॥ एतस्माजायते प्राणो मनः सर्वै- द्रियाणि च । सरं वायुर्ज्योतिरापः पृथिवी विश्वस्य धारिणी। .... तस्माच देवा बडुधा संप्रसुताः साध्या मनुष्या: पशचो वयांसि। प्राणापानौ व्रीहियवौ तपश्च श्रद्धा सत्यं ब्रह्मचर्य विधिश्च ॥ ... अतः समुद्रा गिरयश्च सर्वेऽस्मात्स्यंदन्ते सिंधवः सर्वरूपाः। अतश्च सर्वा ओष- धयो रसश्च यैनेष भूतैस्तिष्ठते ह्यांतरात्मा॥ मुं. II.I-9. 20 (a) काल: स्वभावो नियतिर्यडच्छा भूतानि योनिः पुरुष इति चित्यम्। संयोग एपां न त्वात्मभावादात्माप्त्यनीश: सुख- दुःखहेतोः॥ शे. I. 2. (b) येनावृतं नित्यमिदं हि सर्वे ज्ञः कालकालो गुणी सर्व- विद्यः। शे. VI.2. स विश्वकृद्विश्वविदात्मयोनिर्ज: कालकालो गुणी सर्व- विद्यः। शे. VI.I6. अह्मन्नमन्नमदन्तमाझि। तै. III.I0.6. (c) यच्च स्वभावं पचति विश्वयोनिः। शे. V.5

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(d) तेनेशित कर्म विवर्तते ह पृथिव्यप्ेजोऽनिलखानि चिन्त्यम्। शे. VI. 2. कर्माध्यक्ष: सर्वभूताधिवासः। शवे.VI.II. (e) आदि: स संयोगनिमित्तहेतुः परस्रिकालादकलोपि दष्टः। शे. VI.I. (/) एको हि रुद्रो न द्वितीयाय तस्थुः य इमांल्लोकान ईशत ईशनीभिः। प्रत्यङ्जनास्तिष्ठति संचुकोपान्तकाले संसृज्य विश्वा भुवनानि गोपा:।। शवे. III. 2. स्वभावमेके कवयो वदन्ति कालं तथान्ये परिमुह्यमानाः। देवस्यैष महिमा तु लोके येनेद स्राम्यते ब्रह्मचक्रम्॥ शे.VI.I. (g) स कारणं करणधिपाधिपो न चास्य कश्िञ्ञनिता न चाघिप:। शे. VI.9. एको वशी निष्क्रियाणां बहनामेक बीजं बडुधा यः करोति। शे.VI.I2.

CHAPTER III

VARIETIES OF PSYCHOLOGICAL REFLECTION

1. If we were to consider the date at which the

Empirical, Abnormal Upanishadic seers lived in India, and Rational we would be surprised to find that chology. Psy- they could have to their credit such an amount of psychological reflection. The Upanishad- ic seers were foremost in their age in philosophical reflection in general, and psychological reflection in particular. The three departments of their speculation in the field of Psycholcgy may be classified as the Empirical, the Abnormal, and the Rational ; and even though their Empirical Psychology was less develop- ed than the Abnormal, and the Abnormal less than the Rational, we would have to take account of their speculation in all these fields before we could adjudge the value of their psychological reflection as a whole. I-EMPIRICAL PSYCHOLOGY

2. We must, however, bear in mind that Empiri- cal Psychology is a science The relation of Mind to Allmentation. of recent growth, and thus we must not expect to find a full-fledg- ed empirical investigation of mental science in the days of the Upanishads. We must, on the contrary, be content with what little information is supplied to us under that head in the various Upanishads. The Upani- shadic philosophers believed that the mind for its formation was dependent upon alimentation. The mind was supposed to be manufactured out of the food that we take (S. I. a). "The food that we eat", z5 .

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says a passage, "is transformed in three differ- ent ways: the heaviest part of it becomes the excrement, that of medium density is transformed into flesh, and the subtlest part goes to form the mind" (S.I.b). " Just as in the churning of curds, the subtlest part rises up and is transformed into butter, so when food is eaten, the subtlest part rises up and is transformed into mind" (S. I. c). Later, even in the days of the Bhagavadgita, we find that the three different mental temperaments, the Sattvika, the Rajasa, and the Tamasa were supposed to be due to the different kinds of food that we eat (XVII.8-10). When once it was believed that the qualities of the food consumed formed the quality of the mind of the consumer, it was natural to insist, in the interest of the highest morality, upon a kind of katharsis in alimentation. "When the food is pure," says a pas- sage (S. 2), "the whole nature becomes pure; when the nature becomes pure, memory becomes firm ; and when a man is in possession of a firm memory, all the bonds which tie a man down to the world become unloosed. .It was because he (Narada) had his impurity destroyed, that the venerable Sanat- kumara pointed out to him the way beyond dark- ness". The way which leads us beyond: darkness, therefore, must be sought for in purity of alimenta- tion, which involves in its train the purity of mind. 3. One of the acute observations which these Attention Involves ancient seers made concerns the. suspenslon of breath. fact that in the process of at- tention we always hold our breath, and seem neither to breathe out nor to breathe in. When we speak, we neither expire nor inspire (S. 3. a). When we do an action which involves voluntary effort, as, for example, "producing fire

§4] CHAPTER III : PSYCHOLOGY 115

by rubbing two sticks together, or running a race, or bending a bow and stringing it, we neither exhale, nor inhale" (S. 3. b). Our attention in such acts is concentrated on the action itself, and it cannot be diverted to such subsidiary processes as those of breathing out and breathing in. This is what in the- Kaushitaki Upanishad is called the "inner sacrifice", which goes after the name of its discoverer, the sage Pratardana, and is called the Pratardana sacrifice.Pratardana said, that while a man is speaking, he is not able to breathe, and therefore may be said to sacrifice his breath in his speech; on the contrary, while a man is breathing, he is not able to speak, and may be said to sacrifice his speech in his breath. "These two endless and im- mortal oblations," said Pratardana, "man offers always, whether waking or sleeping. All other obla- tions have an end, for they consist of works. Know- ing this, the ancient sages did not offer the ordinary sacrifice" (S. 3. c). In this passage, a justification is found for not performing the ordinary sacrifice when one knows that an inner sacrifice is ever going on inside him.

4. Another curious observation which these seers

Analysis of fear. made may be mentioned in pass- ing. This concerns the analysis of the emotion of fear. It is only when a feeling of otherness gains lodgment in us (S. 4. a) that we come to entertain the emotion of fear. The primeval Atman feared, as he was alone; but "on finding out that there was no other person whom he should fear, he became fearless ; for it is only from (the idea or existence of) a second that fear proceeds" (S. 4. b). It is in this way that all feeling of fear departs from a man who recognises his own true Self, because

116 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§4

this recognition implies that beside his own true Self there is no other entity which might cause fear.

5. Another very important point in connec- tion with the psychology of the The claim of Will for primacy. Upanishads is the conflict mani- fested in the Chhāndogya Upa- nishad beween the respective claims for pri- macy of the Will or the Intellect. Here we have in brief the indication of a future quarrel between Voluntarism and Intellectualism. The fol- lowing passage most eloquently describes the stress which the seer first lays on Will as the primary rea- lity: "All these therefore ...... centre in will, con- sist of will, abide in will. Heaven and earth willed, air and ether willed, water and fire willed. Through the will of heaven and earth, rain falls ; through the will of rain, food wills; through the will of food, the vital airs will; through the will of the vital airs, the sacred hymns will ; through the will of the sacred hymns, the sacrifices will ; through the will of the sa- crifices, the world wills ; through the will of the world, every thing wills. This is Will. Meditate on Will. He who meditates on Will as Brahman ...... he is, as it were, lord and master as far as Will reaches- he who meditates on Will as Brahman" (S. 5). The seer of this Upanishad is evidently imbued with the all-pervading power of Will. It seems that this passage among others must have influenced the philo- sophy of that admirer of the Upanishads, Schopen- hauer, who laid so much stress on Will as the Ding- an-sich. We may compare the following passage from The World as Will and Idea (Book I). "If we observe the strong and unceasing impulse with which the waters hurry to the ocean, the persistency with which the magnet turns ever to the north pole, the readi-

CHAPTER III: PSYCHOLOGY 117

ness with which iron flies to the magnet, the eager- ness with which the electric poles seek to be reunited, and which, like human desire, is increased by obsta- cles ; if we see the crystal quickly take form with such wonderful regularity of construction, ...... if we observe the choice with which bodies repel and attract each other, ..... if we observe all this, I say, it will require no great effort of the imagination to re- cognize, even at so great a distance, our own nature. That, which in us pursues its ends by the light of knowledge, but here, in the weakest of its manifesta- tions, only strives blindly and dumbly in a one-sided and unchangeable manner, must yet in both cases come under the name of Will. " According to the doctrine which is common to this Upanishad and Schopenhauer, the whole world seems to be filled with the force of will ; and "what appears as motiva- tion in human beings is the same as what appears as stimulation in the vegetative life and as mechanical process in the inorganic world"-motivation, stimula- tion, and mechanical process being different manifest- ations of the same force of Will.

6. As against this primacy of Will, the seer of

The claim of Intellect the Chhandogya Upanishad goes

for primacy. on in the very next section of that work to affirm the primacy of Intellect. The affirmation of Will is the thesis, to which the seer opposes the affirmation of Intellect as the antithesis: "Intellect is better than Will. For it is only when a man thinks that he wills ..... All these centre in Intellect, consist of Intellect, abide in Intellect. Therefore, if a man does not think, even if he knows much, people say of him, he is nothing ....... But if a man thinks, even though he knows little, people indeed desire to listen to him.

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Intellect is the centre, Intellect is the self, Intellect is the support of all these. Meditate on Intellect. He who meditates on Intellect as Brahman ........ he is, as it were, lord and master as far as Intellect reaches-he who meditates on Intellect as Brahman" (S. 6. a). The seer of this Upanishad is here defini- tely asserting the supremacy of Intellect over Will: Voluntarism here makes way for Intellectualism. This conclusion is supported by another passage from the Maitri Upanishad, where the writer speaks of the mind in its reflective aspect as being the fount and source of all mental modifications whatsoever: "He (man) sees by the mind alone; he hears by the mind; and all that we call desire, will, doubt, belief, disbelief, resolution, irresolution, shame, thought, 'and fear,-all this is but mind itself" (S. 6. b). 7. This intellectualistic way of thought finds its culmination in the Aitareya Upa- Classification of mental states. nishad, where, by a bold stroke of genius, the seer of that Upani- shad makes a noteworthy classification of the various mental functions, at the basis of which, he says, lies Intellection. This passage is remarkable as being the earliest contribution to a classification of mental states : "Sensation, perception, ideation, conception, understanding, insight, resolution, opinion, imagina- tion, feeling, memory, volition, conation, the will-to- live, desire, and self-control, all these are different names of Intellection " (S. 7). It is remarkable that the seer not merely mentions the different levels of intellectual experience such as sensation, percep- tion, ideation, and conception, as different from one another, but also recognises the other two characte- ristic forms of experience, feeling and volition ; makes a distinction between volition which need not involve

§81 CHAPTER III: PSYCHOLOGY 119

the idea of activity, and conation which does; as well as recognises the processes of imagination and memory. Finally, the intellectualistic trend of thought in the seer is apparent from the way in which he makes Intellect the fount and source of all mental activity whatsoever.

8. It is no wonder if this intellectualistic psycho- logy makes room for an idealis- Intellectualistic Psy- chrology and Idealistic tic metaphysics. The intellect- Metaphysics. ualistic seer of the Aitareya Upa- nishad is an idealist as well. In the very section that follows the one we have quo- ted, the author goes on to point out how Intellect is the backbone, not merely of psychical functions, but of reality itself: "This god Brahma, and this god Indra, ......... these five great elements (earth, air, ether, water, fire), .. ... creatures born from the egg, from the womb, and from perspiration, sprouting plants, horses, cows, men, elephants, whatsoever breathes whether moving or flying, and in addition whatsoever is immovable-all this is led-by Intellect and is supported on -- Intellect.The world is led by Intellect. Intellect is the support. Intellect- is the final reality" (S. 8. a). This is as outspoken an Idealism as Idealism can be. The author says that all the mova- ble and immovable objects in this world, all those crea- tures which walk or fly, all the elements and gods exist by virtue of intellect and in intellect. This is in the very spirit of Berkeley who-says in his" Treatise/' ""All the choir of heaven and furniture of the earth, in a word, all those bodies which compose the mighty frame of the world have not any subsistence with- out a mind ; that their being is to be perceived of known; that consequently so long as they are not actually perceived by me, or do not exist in my- mind

120 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

or that of any other created spirit, they must either have no existence at all, or else subsist in the mind of some Eternal Spirit :- it being perfectly unintelli- gible and involving all the absurdity of abstrac- tion to attribute to any single part of them an existence independent of a Spirit". Of like import is the passage from the Maitri Upanishad which tells us that it is the inner self which governs "external" existence, that, in short, the in- ner Prana is the source of the existence of the Sun- a knowledge, which, the passage says, is given only to a few (S. 8. b).

II-ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY

9. We now pass on to consider the aspects of Abnormal Psychology "The problem of death developed in the Upanishads. as In Chhandogya. The question as to what becomes of a man's soul after the death of the body recurs time after time in the Upanishads. Not content with a discussion of man's life here below, the seers of the Upanishads make the eschatological question assume quite an extraordinary importance. The question is very often asked-what must be considered the root of human life ? "The tree, if hewn down, springs anew from the previous root ; what must be the root of a man's life in order that it may spring up again, even though hewn down by (the great cutter) Death" (S. 9. a). It is sup- posed, moreover, that eschatological knowledge is the highest kind of knowledge. Let nobody call himself wise unless he knows what becomes of a man after death. It was thus that the Sage Jaivali accosted Śvetaketu, the son of Āruni, and proved to him that even though he reckoned

§ 10] CHAPTER III: PSYCHOLOGY 121 himself wise, he was after all merely an ignor- amus :- "Boy, has your father instructed you ?" "Yes, Sir." "Do you know where all the creatures go to from hence ?" " No, Sir." "Do you know how they return again ?" "No, Sir." "Do you know where the path of the gods and the path of the fathers diverge ?" "No, Sir." " Do you know why that (the other) world never becomes too full ?" " No, Sir." "Then, why did you say that you had been instructed? How can a man, who does not know these (simple) things, say that he has been instructed ? " (S. 9. b). 10. The most important passage, however, where eschatological knowledge is re- The problem of death In Katha. garded as the " highest good" occurs in the celebrated dialogue in the Katha Upanishad between Nachiketas and Yama, the God of death, where Nachiketas, being offered three boons by Yama, and having chosen two already, declines to choose for the third boon any- thing short of the knowledge of the soul's existence after the death of the human body :- N: "There is this doubt in the case of a dead man; some say that he is, others say he is not. I would like to be instructed by thee in this matter. This do I choose for my third boon." Y: "Even the gods have formerly entertained doubt about this matter. Nor is this matter easy of comprehension, being a subtle one. Choose another boon, O Nachiketas, press me not, and let me alone on this point." N: "Verily, the gods themselves have entertain- ed doubt about this matter ; and thou hast thyself 6 .

122 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ § 10 said that this matter passes comprehension. It is impossible for me to find another instructor in that subject beside thyself, nor do I find that any other boon would be equal to this." Y: " All those desires which are impossible to be satisfied in this world of mortals, ask me for them if you so wish : these damsels with chariots and musical instruments, such as are indeed impossible for men to obtain-be waited upon by these, which I shall present to you; but, Nachiketas, do not ask me about death." N: "All these, O God of death, are but ephemer- al objects, and wear out the vigour of the senses. Moreover, life itself would be short (for their full enjoyment); keep them unto thyself-these horses, these dances, and these songs. What mortal would delight in a long life, after he has contemplated the pleasures which beauty and enjoyment afford? No. That which has become a matter of doubt and in- quiry, O Death, speak to me about that great Here- after. Nachiketas chooses no other boon than that which concerns this great secret." (S. 9. c). 11. After the question of the nature of death, The problem of Sleep: comes the question of the nature of the Fatigue and Puri- sleep, which is only a palliated tat theories. form of death. On this subject we find very interesting theories advanced by those seers of antiquity. One passage proclaims unmistaka- bly an explanation of the nature of sleep given by modern physiology-the 'Fatigue' theory of sleep: "As a falcon or any other bird, after having flown in the sky, becomes tired, and folding his wings re- pairs to his nest, so does this person hasten to that state where, when asleep, he desires no more desires, and dreams no more dreams." (S. 10). But beyond

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this proper physiological explanation of sleep, we find very curious theories held on this point by the sages of the Upanishads. The seer of the Praśna Upanishad holds that sleep is caused by the senses being absorbed in that highest 'sensorium,' the mind: "as all the rays of the Sun, O Gargya, become collected into the bright disc at the time of sunset, and emerge again from it at the time of sunrise, so do all the senses become collected into that highest sensorium-the mind: that is the reason why (in deep sleep) man is not able to hear, nor to see, nor to smell. People say about him that he has slept." (S. II. a). This same seer qualifies his statement a little further, and says that the reason of the deep sleep is that the mind is merged into an ocean of light: "and when he is overpowered by light, then does this god (Soul) see no dreams, and at that time great happiness arises in the body." (S. II. b). Another theory which is advanced in the Chhandogya Upanishad is, that sleep is caused by the soul getting lodgment in the arteries: "When a man is fast asleep, and being happy knows no dreams, then his soul has moved in the arteries." (S. II.c). This same idea is elaborated in the Bri- hadäraņyaka Upanishad, where a physiological ex- planation, which in the light of modern science appears almost a mythological explanation, is offer- ed according to the ancient ideas. It was imagined that the heart sent forth about 72,000 arteries to the 'Puritat ', which Deussen translates as 'peri- kardium', and which Max Muller, following the commentator, wrongly translates by ' the surrounding body'. This Puritat corresponds to the pineal gland of Descartes, so far as function is concerned; but it differs from it in its anatomical location. The Pu- ritat must be considered as meaning a kind of mem-

124 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§ 11 braneous sac round the heart. It was imagined by those ancient seers, that in deep sleep the soul moved from the heart by means of the arteries and got lodgment inside the Puritat, whence sleep follow- ed. This same idea was later developed in the Nyaya philosophy where sleep was explained as be- ing due to the moving of the soul right inside the Puritat, the state of dream being explained as due to the soul's position just on the threshold of the Purītat-the soul knocking for entrance inside it,-while it was imagined that during the waking state the soul kept moving from the heart to the Purītat. The origin of this doctrine in the Nyaya philosophy is to be traced to the passage in the Brihadāraņyaka which we are at present discussing: " When a man is fast asleep and when he is not conscious of anything, his soul moves by means of the arteries, called Hitāh, which are 72,000 in number, and which are spread from the heart to the Puritat; there he sleeps like a youth, or a great king, or a great Brahmin who has reached the summit of happiness." (S. II.d). 12. Another explanation of the phenomenon of sleep is offered by the seer of the The problem of sleep: the Prana and Brah- Chhändogya Upanishad when he man theorles. says that sleep occurs when the mind is merged in Prāna, that is breath or energy : "As a bird when tied by a string flies first in every direction, and finding no rest any- where, settles down at last on the very spot where it is fastened, exactly in the same manner, my Son, the mind, after flying in every direction, and finding no rest anywhere, settles down on breath; for indeed, my Son, mind is fastened to breath" (S. II.e). The next explanation of sleep occurs in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad where we are told

§12] CHAPTER III : PSYCHOLOGY 125 that sleep occurs when the soul goes to rest in the 'space' inside the heart. In order to prove this to Gärgya an experimental inquiry was undertaken by Ajātasatru. He took Gargya by the hand and came to a place where a man was sleeping. He then called out to him by these names, "Thou, Great one, clad in white raiment, Soma, King of all", and (yet) he did not rise. Then he rubbed him with his hand, (struck him with a stick-Kau.,) and he got up. Then said Ajatasatru "when this man was asleep, where then was this Person full of intelligence, and from whence did he return ?" Gargya did not know the answer. Thereupon, Ajatasatru said "when this man was asleep, then the Person full of intelligence (i.e. the Soul) lay in the space which is in the heart." (S. II. f). The last explanation offered of the phenomenon of sleep is the very curi- ous explanation, that, in deep sleep, the Soul is at one with Brahman ! This is like saying that when one has no explanation to give, one might excuse himself with the Absolute! A passage from the Praśna Upani- shad, again, tells us that in deep sleep "the mind, which is the sacrificer, is carried every day to Brahman," which is corroborated by another passage from the Chhandogya, which says "when a man sleeps, then, my dear son, he becomes united with the True, he is gone to his own (Self). Therefore they say, 'svapiti', he sleeps, because he is gone (apIta) to his own (sva)." (S. II.g). The idea was that in deep sleep the Soul was at one with Brahman, and thus deep sleep was likened to the state of ecstasy. There is, in fact, as much likeness, or as little, between sleep and ecstasy, as there is, as Spinoza would have said, between God and Dog : the same letters, but what an important difference ! It seems that this difference was later appreciated even in the Upanishads when it was said

126 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§12

that even though the soul was at one with Brahman in deep sleep, it still did not know this, was not cognisant of it: "as people, who do not know a field, walk again and again over a golden treasure that is hidden somewhere in the earth, and yet are not able to discover it, thus do all these creatures day after day become merged in Brahman, and yet do not discover it, because they are carried away by untruth." (S. II. h).

13. The next question to consider is the analysis

The Dream Problem. which the Upanishadic philo- sophers make of the dream-state of consciousness in reference to the state of sleep. A famous passage in the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad tells us how, at the end of sleep, the soul "moves away from his nest" wherever he likes ; "guarding with breath the lower nest, the immortal one moves away from his nest, to where he can roam at will-That golden person, the lovely bird! Going hither and thither at the end of sleep, the God creates manifold forms for himelf, either rejoicing with women, or eating, or seeing terrible sights." (S. 12. a). The same passage tells us how the states of sleep and dream constitute an intermediate state between consciousness and unconsciousness : "there are two states for that person, the one here in this world, the other in the other world, and there is an intermediate third state (which we may call the twilight state of consciousness), consisting of the states of dream and sleep; remain- ing in this third state, he sees both those states which belong to this and the other world." We are also told how the soul in this state resembles a fish moving from bank to bank: "as a large fish moves along both the banks, the nearer and the farther, so does this person move along both these states, the

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state of sleeping and the state of waking." And it is also said how the soul puts forth a great deal of creative activity in this state: "And there are no chariots, nor horses, nor any roads, but he himself creates the chariots and the horses and the roads; there are no joys, nor pleasures, nor any blessings, but he creates the joys and the pleasures and the blessings ; there are no ponds, or lakes, or rivers, but he creates the ponds and the lakes and the rivers-because he is indeed the Maker." We see here what a great stress is laid on the constructive activity of the soul in the state of dream. Finally, we are told in a passage of the Praśna Upanishad, how dreams, even though they are usually a mere replica of actual waking ex- perience, also occasionally involve absolutely novel construction : "There that god experiences greatness in sleep. What is seen over and over again, he sees once more (in the dream); what is heard over and over again, he hears once again (in the dream) ...... ... What is seen and not seen, what is heard and not heard, what is enjoyed and not enjoyed, he ex- periences all, because he is the All." (S. I2. b). This must indeed be regarded as a very subtle analysis of dream-experience.

14. As the Upanishadic philosophers made this acute study of the sleeping and Early psychical re- search. dreaming states of consciousness, they were not slow to take into account the aberrations of consciousness as manifested especially in the phenomena of mediumships and possessions. If we might say so, they conducted their own psychical research, however rudimentary, and however noiseless, it might have been. We have a definite illustration of this kind to show that the problem of psychical research had attracted their

128 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ §14

attention even in those old days. For example, we are informed in a passage of the Brihadāraņyaka Upani- shad (S. 13) how the sage Bhujyu, the son of Lāhyāyana, in his student days, went to the Madra country and came to the house of Patañchala, the son of Kapi. This Patañchala had a daughter who was possessed by a Gandharva, an aerial spirit, and who thus served as a medium. Bhujyu asked the spirit who he (the spirit) was, and received the answer that he was Sudhanvan, the son of Angiras. On know- ing this, Bhujyu asked the spirit two more questions : one was as to the actual extent of the world, and the other as to where the sons of Parikshit were, who, by the bye, at that time, must have been regarded as historical personages. What answer Bhujyu received to these questions we are not told : but we see definite- ly how Bhujyu must, on account of these questions, be regarded as an occultist who worked according to his own lights in his days on the lines of modern Psychical Research.

15. Finally, we must notice the very great stress

The Power of Thought. that is laid in various passages of the Upanishads on what the New Psychology calls "Thought-power". "He who knows and meditates on the foot of Brahman, consisting of the four quarters as resplendent, becomes (himself) endowed with splendour in this world;" "he who meditates on the Brahman as lustre becomes himself illustrious. reaches the illustrious and bright worlds ;" "when the Sun was born, all sorts of shouts rose round about him ......; he who knows this, and meditates on the Sun as Brahman, him shall reach pleasant shouts from all sides, and shall continue, yea, shall continue;"" if one meditates on Brahman as support, he himself will find support ; if as greatness,

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he himself will become great; if as mind, he himself will receive honour; if as the parimara of Brahman, round about (pari) him shall die (mri) all the enemies who hate him"; and lastly "he who meditates on Brahman as Not-Being, shall himself cease to exist ; he, on the other hand, who will meditate on Brahman as Being shall (always) exist ; this is what they know" (S. 14). We recommend these passages to all those who believe in the thaumaturgy of thought.

III-RATIONAL PSYCHOLOGY

16. Modern writers on Psychology give no atten-

No psychology "ohne tion to Rational Psychology ; they Seele." consider it either useless or meta- physical. As Prof. James Ward points out, modern psychologists vie with each other in writing a psychology ohne Seele. The ancient conception of Soul has evaporated, and in its place we find a self, which is regarded as a "centre of interest," and which is supposed to be generated when a new interest springs up and destroyed as soon as the interest terminates. The impasse into which such a view brings the Psychologists may be realised at a glance when we consider that some of them have been forced to recognise the continuance of such a bloodless self even after the death of the body, and in place of the old-world view of an immortal Soul we find the idea of a "centre of interest" which survives (!) after the death of the body when the interest is not fulfilled in the person's life-time. The old-world view, as in Plato so in the Upanishads, planted itself squarely on the recognition of the Soul as an entity which was free to take on a body, as it was also free to go away and transmigrate. Whatever the limitations of such a view, it was a view which one could at least under- 17

130 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ § 16

stand ; but the modern notion of an anæmic " centre of interest," which could continue to exist after the death of the body, passes absolutely beyond the com- prehension of anybody except a metaphysician who makes such concessions to naturalism as to make an entire farrago of his philosophical ideas.

17. The first question with which a Rational Psy-

The question of the chology may be concerned is the seat of the soul. question of the seat of the soul. And when this question is asked, it is not unusual to answer it by taking a spatial view of the habitation of the soul. It is likely to be ignored that the soul is an unextended entity, and that as such it is bereft of all spatial connotation. And yet, Rational Psychology has concerned itself with a dis- cussion of the part or parts of the body with which the soul comes more directly into contact. Prof. James says: "In some manner our consciousness is present to everything with which it is in relation. I am cogni- tively present to Orion whenever I perceive that constel- lation, but I am not dynamically present there, I work no effects. To my brain, however, I am dynamically present, inasmuch as my thoughts and feelings seem to react upon the processes thereof. If, then, by the seat of the mind is meant nothing more than the locality with which it stands in immediate dynamic relations, we are certain to be right in saying that its seat is somewhere in the cortex of the brain."' The views that have been held in regard to this question have been many and various. I. H. Fichte, as we know, supposed that the soul was a space-filling prin- ciple. Descartes imagined that the seat of the soul was the pineal gland, while Lotze maintained that the soul must be located somewhere in the "structureless 1 Principles of Paychelogy 1, 214.

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matrix of the anatomical brain-elements, at which point .... all nerve-currents may cross and combine." We have already seen the opinion of Prof. James that if the soul's activity is to be referred to one part of the body more than to any other, it ought to be referred to the cortex of the brain. Aristotle supposed that the seat of the soul was in the heart ; and he came to this conclusion by observing " (1) that the diseases of the heart are the most rapidly and certainly fatal, (2) that psychical affections, such as fear, sorrow, and joy cause an immediate disturbance of the heart, (3) and that the heart is the part which is the first to be formed in the embryo."* The Upanishadic psychology agrees with the Aristotelian in locating the soul in the heart. We have already seen how important a part the " peri- cardium" plays in the Upanishadic psychology of sleep. The Upanishadic philosophers felt no difficulty in loca- ting the soul in the heart ; and it is not till we reach a later era in the evolution of Indian thought that we find that the seat of consciousness is transferred from the heart to the brain. It is only in the Yogic and the Tantric booksa that the cerebro-spinal system comes to be recognised, and it is there that consciousness comes to be referred to the brain instead of to the heart.

18. In one important Upanishadic passage, however, we already find an incipient tran- The heart and the brain as seats. sition from the one view to the other. Though in the Upanishads as a whole we find that the heart is regarded as the seat of the soul, in a passage of the Taittirīya Upani- shad, in a very cryptic style and with a good deal of prophetic insight, the Upanishad-seer gives his reflec- tions as to the way in which the soul in the heart I Hammond, Aristotle's Psychology p, xxili. 2 Vide Seal's Positive Sciences of the Ancient Hindus pp. 218-219.

132 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§18 moves by a passage through the bones of the palate right up to the skull where the hairs are made to part, and on the way greets the Brahman who is his lord and master. It is important to remember that while the soul in the heart is characterised as the manomaya purusha, the Brahman that resides in the brain is called manasaspati, the soul's overlord. "What we know as the space inside the heart, therein is this immortal golden being, namely mind (or soul). What we know as hanging like a nipple between the bones of the palate, through it is the entrance to the Lord' on the passage right up to the skull where the hairs are made to part. Bhuh .. Bhuvah .... Suvah ...... Mahah-when these (mystic) words are uttered, the soul moves right up to Brahman. The soul gains autonomy, joins the Ruler of mind (or soul), becomes the lord of speech, the lord of sight, the lord of hearing, the lord of know- ledge, becomes (in short) the Brahman who bodies himself forth in space" (S. 15). A great deal of difficulty has been experienced in the interpretation of this passage. The passage no doubt tells us that the sense- centres as well as the intellect-centre are to be referred to the brain, inasmuch as it says that the soul can obtain mastery over these only by moving to the brain from the heart; yet, the actual path which has been indicated in the above passage cannot be traced with- out difficulty. What is the "nipple-like" appearance of which the Upanishad speaks ? Is it the uvula, or the pituitary body ? Deussen and Max Müller have both understood it to be the uvula. Are we then to under- stand that the Upanishad-philosopher was so struck I Indra, elsewhere paraphrased as Idandra, braahing throogh the shull : cf. तस्मादिदन्द्रो नामेदन्द्रो ह वै नाम तमिदन्द्रं संतामेन्द्र इत्याचक्षते पसे- क्षेण परोक्षप्रिया इव हि देवा: । ऐ. I. 3.14

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by the inexplicably hanging uvula that he regarded it to be the door to the overlord of soul, and are we to understand that Deussen and Max Muller took into account the experiences of the mystic who regards the uvula as the medium by which he comes to taste the nectar which oozes in the state of ecstasy from the ventricles of the brain into the pharynx ? Or, are we to suppose that the Upanishad-philosopher was so fortunate as to witness a skull dissected open and to observe that the pituitary body is situated just above the pair of bones of the hard palate, and then to be able to suppose that the soul in the heart could travel along the course of the sympathetic nerves to the pituitary body, and through it move further to its over- lord in the lateral ventricle, around which, in the grey matter, are situated the various special sense-centres ? The latter interpretation is not improbable; but one does not know whether the Upanishad-philosopher knew anatomy enough to trace the actual path, or was interested in occultism enough to see the path with his mental eye !

19. However this may be on the physiological side, we may say that the Upanishadic The relation of the body and the soul. philosophers definitely raised the psychological question of the rela- tion between body and soul. The Maitri Upanishad, though it is a late Upanishad, raises the question of an efficient cause, and in Platonic fashion endows the soul with the power of motion. It tells us that there were certain sages in ancient times called the Valakhilyas who went to the Prajapati Kratu and asked him who was the driver of the chariot of the body : " The body, vene- rable Sir, is verily like an unmoving cart ; may your Honour be pleased to tell us if you know who is the mover of it." And the Upanishad tells us that the

134 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§19

answer which they elicited from the Prajapati was that the mover of the body-chariot was the soul, "the pure tranquil, imperishable, unborn entity who stands independently in his own greatness" (S. 16. a). Moreover, the Kaushitaki Upanishad tells us that the soul must be regarded as the master of all bodily faculties, the lord of all sense-functions : "As a razor is placed in the razor-case, or fire in the fire-hearth, similarly does this conscious self pervade the body up to the very hairs and nails. These senses depend upon the soul as the relatives upon the rich man. As the rich man feeds with his kinsmen, and as the kinsmen feed on the rich man, even so does this conscious self feed with the senses and the senses feed on the self" (S. 16. b). This passage tells us how the various bodily senses are dependent on the self and how the self is immanent in the whole body.

20. The passage quoted above leads to the view The history of the that the soul fills the whole of the spatial extension of the body, a doctrine which is not un- soul. likely to have led to the Jaina doctrine that as large as the body is, even so large is the soul,-that the soul of the elephant is as large as the body of the elephant, while the soul of the ant is only as large as the body of the ant-" hastipudgalam prāpya hastipudgalo bhavati, pipīlikāpudgalam prāpya pipīlikapudgalo bhavati." This is the reductio ad absur- dum of a belief in the extended nature of soul, which will not allow us to think of the soul except under spatial limitations. The history of the doctrine of the space-filling nature of the soul as advanced in the Upanishads is a very interesting one. In the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad we are told that "the intelligent luminous self in the heart is as small as a grain of rice or barley, and yet it is the ruler o

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all and lord of all, overruling all this and whatsoever else exists" (S. 17. a). In a passage of the Katha Upanishad, as well as elsewhere, we find that the soul is no longer conceived as of the size of a mere grain of rice or barley, but is thought to be of the size of a thumb -an idea which plays a very important part in the Upanishads: "The soul, who is the lord of all things that have been and that are to be, and is therefore over-awed by none of them, is of the measure of a thumb and dwells in the midpart of the body (that is, in the heart) " (S. 17. b). In a passage of the Chhändogya Upanishad, the soul is understood as not of the size of a thumb, but of the measure of a span (S. 17. c). The soul is here called " prādesamātra " and " abhi- vimana." These words have occasioned a very great difficulty to the commentators. Śankarāchārya, who understands the soul as all-pervading, cannot bring himself to be reconciled to the statement that the soul should be merely a span long, prādesamatra.' Now the word pradesa is really an important word. In the Amarakosha, it is understood as meaning a span, as also in the Medinīkosha.3 Śankarāchārya himself knew that the word pradesa was " elsewhere " used in the sense of a span,* which his scholiast Änan- dagiri explains as being the meaning of the word in Jabālaśruti. According to Śankara, the word prādeśa elsewhere signified not merely a span's length but 1 This is the reason why he explains the expression as युमूर्धादिभि: पृथिवीपादांतविशिष्टमकं प्रादेशमात्रम् । 2 प्रादेशतालगोकर्णास्तर्जन्यादियुते तते। II. 6. 83. The Commenta- tor explains प्रादेश by saying that it means तर्जन्यादिसहितवि स्तृतांगुष्ठः 3 प्रादेशो देशमात्रे स्यात्तर्जन्यंगुष्ठसंमिते। * शाखांतरे तु मूर्धादिश्चिबुकप्रतिष्ठ इति प्रादेशमात्रं कल्पयति। इह तु न तथाऽमिप्रेतम्। C. on छां V.18. I. .

136 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ § 20 the span's length from the forehead to the chin. This is a very significant fact as we shall presently see. In the Mahabharata,' Bhīmasena has been described as being a span's length taller than his younger brother Arjuna. In the Maitri Upanishad, the word prā- deśa has manifestly the same meaning. Under these circumstances it is but natural that the word prādesa in the passage which we are discussing may be taken to mean a span, especially, as Śankara points out, the span's length between the forehead and the chin. The word " abhivimana " has also caused a great deal of difficulty. The interpretation which Śankarachārya has put upon it, and with which Deussen, Max Müller and Rajendralal Mitra have all agreed, seems after all to be an unnatural interpretation. Thus Sankara3 ex- plains the word as meaning one who knows himself- the Kantian "I am I"-an interpretation which does not come out of the expression "abhivimana." Deussen* translates the whole passage in a way which only sup- ports the meaning of Sankara so far as the word "abhivimana " is concerned : "Wer aber diesen Atman Vaiśvānara so [zeigend] als eine Spanne gross auf sich selbst (abhi) bezogen (vimana) verehrt, der isst die Nahrung in allen Welten, in allen Wesen, in allen Selbsten." Max Müller' translates "abhivimana" as, "identical with himself," while Rajendralal Mitra says it means " the principal object indicated by the pronoun I." All these interpretations err in under- प्रमाणेन भीमसेनः प्रादेशेनाधिकोऽर्जुनात्। म. भा. V.51. 19. 2 शरीरप्रादेशांगुष्ठमात्रमणोरप्यण्व्यं ध्यात्वा अतः परमतां गच्छति। मै. VI. 38. 3 प्रत्यगात्मतयाSभिविमीयतेSहमिति शायत इत्यमिविमान:। C. on छा. V. 18. I. 4 Sechzig Upanishad's pp. 150-151. 5 Sacred Books of the East Vol. I. p. 88 6 Twelve Principal Upanishads by Tukaram Tatya p. 578, .

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standing too much by the preposition abhi. By no manipulation, however clever, could the meaning of "self" be extracted out of it as Deussen and others have tried to do. Would it not be much more natural to understand "abhivimāna " as meaning simply " mea- suring"? The expression " prādesamātram abhivi- manam " could then be understood as equivalent to " measuring the span's length from the forehead to the chin," and the interpretation of the whole pas- sage becomes easy: "He who worships the Self as measuring the span's length from the forehead to the chin, and as existing in all men, he enjoys food in all worlds, in all beings, and in all selves." In fact, we are asked in this passage to worship the Soul who re- sides in the span's distance between the forehead and the chin, and who is therefore the master of the head, which by a consensus of opinion is recognis- ed in Hindu thought as the " uttamanga " or the best part of the body. No wonder that Prof. James could trace the feeling of Self in certain cephalic movements of his, and say that "the Self of selves, when care- fully examined, is found to consist mainly of the col- lection of these peculiar motions in the head, or bet- ween the head and the throat." 21. We have hitherto seen some of the stages in the The soul, both infini- logical, not necessarily historical, tely large and infinitely evolution of the idea of the extension small. of the soul. Being first regarded as merely of the size of a grain of rice or barley, it was then regarded as of the size of a thumb, and later of the size of a span, while we have also seen that the Kaushi- taki Upanishad speaks of the soul as filling the whole extent of the body and being hidden in it as the razor is hidden in a razor-case. We now come to treat of 1 Principles of Psychology I. 301. 18

138 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§21

the idea of the soul as not being restricted to any part of the body, but being verily infinite and occupying all space. The Mundaka Upanishad speaks of the "eternal, all-pervading, omnipresent, subtle, and imperishable Soul who is the origin of all beings, and whom the wise alone can perceive," and the Katha Upanishad lends its support to this statement by saying that "the wise man ceases to grieve when he has known this great all-pervading Soul" (S. 17. d). The Maitri Upanishad, not being able to choose between the rival theories about the size of the soul, offers an easy eclecticism by combining all of them together in a promiscuous statement. It tells us that a man "reaches the supreme state by meditating on the soul, who is smaller than an atom, or else of the size of the thumb, or of a span, or of the whole body" (S. 17. e). In this promiscuous statement it is difficult to make out which theory this Upanishad advocates. An alternative interpretation of the passage can also be offered, as it has been offered by Cowell and Max Müller, following the commentator Ramatīrtha, but to say as Ramatīrtha says that the soul is "of the size of a thumb in the span-sized heart in the body " does not lessen difficulties. That the Upanishadic philoso- phers felt the necessity of reconciling such contrary statements as that the soul is only of the size of a grain of rice or barley, and that it is all-pervading and omnipresent, may be seen from a passage in the Katha Upanishad which asks us to believe the contradiction that " the soul of the living being is subtler than the subtle, and yet greater than the great, and is placed in the cavity of the heart, "-a statement which, with equal seeming contradiction, is corroborated by the philosopher of the Chhandogya Upanishad who says: "My soul in the heart is smaller than a grain of rice or barley, or a mustard or a canary seed ; and yet my

§ 22] CHAPTER III: PSYCHOLOGY 139 soul, which is pent up in the heart, is greater than the earth, greater than the sky, greater than the heaven, greater than all these worlds " (S. 17. f). The Nemesis of the theory which attributes a spatial extension to the soul lies just in these contradictions, and there is no way out of the difficulty except on the supposition that the soul transcends all spatial limitations. 22. And yet, so far as the soul comes to inhabit the

Analysis.of the states body, it must be recognised as of consciousness. passing through certain psychical states ; and the analysis which the Māndūkya Upanishad makes of the four states of con- sciousness must be regarded as very acute, and consider- ing the date of its production, wholly extraordinary. The credit which a modern psychologist gives to Swami Vivekananda for having introduced the conception of the " superconscious" in psychology must be rightfully given to the author of the Mandukya Upanishad. There are not merely the three obvious states of con- sciousness, says the philosopher of this Upanishad, but a fourth must also be recognised, which corresponds to what is usually called the " superconscious." But the word superconscious in our opinion is an unhappy word to designate this fourth state: to speak of a "superconscious state of consciousness" is to utter a solecism. And so, we here propose to use the word "self-conscious " to designate this fourth state. The soul, then, according to the Upanishad, experiences four chief states, namely, those of wakefulness, dream, deep sleep, and pure self-consciousness : "This soul is four-footed (that is, has four conditions). The first condition is that of wakefulness, when the soul is conscious only of external objects and enjoys the gross things, and then it is to be called Vaisvanara. The second condition is that of dreaming, when the soul

140 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§22

is conscious of internal objects and enjoys the subtle things, and then it is called Taijasa. When the person in sleep desires no desires, and dreams no dreams, that state is to be called the state of sound sleep. Thus, the third condition of the soul is that of sound sleep, when being centred in itself and being full of knowledge and bliss, it feeds on bliss : it is then called Prajna. The fourth state of the soul is that of pure self-consciousness, when there is no know- ledge of internal objects nor of external ones, nor of the two together; when the soul is not a mass of in- telligence, transcending as it does both consciousness and unconsciousness ; when it is invisible, uncommu- nicable, incomprehensible, indefinable ; when it is beyond thought and beyond the possibility of any indication, being virtually the quintessence of self- intuition, in which all the five kinds of sensation are finally resolved; when it is tranquil and full of auspi- ciousness and without a second : it is then to be called Ātman" (S. 18).

23. This recognition of the four chief states of in- dividual consciousness, the waking, The microcosm and the macrocosm. the dreaming, the sleeping, and the self-conscious, as well as the names which are assigned to the soul in these states, namely those of Vaisvanara, Taijasa, Prajna, and Atman, have played a very large part in the later more systematized Vedanta. This is the reason why the Mandūkya Upani- shad has been regarded as a late Upanishad. But it is to be noted that the Upanishad does not make mention of the corresponding four states of the con- sciousness of the Cosmic Self. In later Vedanta, the Cosmic Self as it passes through its four states comes to be called the Viraj, Hiraņyagarbha, Isa and Brahman respectively. Corresponding to the four

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aspects of the microcosm, there come to be recognised the four aspects of the "makranthropos," a decidedly better word to use than "macrocosm". The Cosmic consciousness comes to be regarded as corresponding state by state to the Individual consciousness, and what is in the Individual comes to be found also in the World. Even though this idea is not fully brought out in the Upanishads, we already trace in them an incipient tendency towards that view. Leib- nitz's theory of representation is already present in the Chhandogya Upanishad : "Within this city of Brahman (this body), there is a small lotus-like place (the heart), and within it a small internal space; that which is within this small space is worthy of search and understanding .... Of the very kind as this outer space is, of the same kind is this internal space inside the heart; both heaven and earth are contained within it, both fire and air, both the sun and the moon, both the lightning and the stars" (S. 19). Here we see the root of the theory that the individual is to be regarded as the world in miniature, and the world only the individual writ large, and that the indi- vidual object serves as a mirror in which the whole of reality is reflected-a theory to which Leibnitz gives expression when he says : " In the smallest particle of matter, there is a world of creatures, living beings, animals, entelechies, souls. Each portion of matter may be conceived as like .... a pond full of fishes."*

24. Another interesting problem in connection with the Upanishadic psychology is the The " sheaths" of problem of the so-called sheaths the soul. or bodies of the soul. We all know what importance has been attached to the con- ception of these " bodies of man " by modern Theoso- 1 Monadology 66-67.

142 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ §24

phists. Corresponding to these bodies, they have also recognised seven different planes, on which, according to them, the several bodies of man keep functioning. Thus, the various planes which they recognise may be said to be respectively the physical, the astral, the mental, the intuitional, the spiritual, the monadic, and the divine. Let us see what justification there can be for such a view in the light of the theory which the Upanishads advance. In fact, the only Upanishad where we find mention of a theory of this kind is the Taittirīya Upanishad. In the second chapter of this Upanishad, we are told that " within this physical body which is made up of food, is another body which is made up of vital air ; the former is filled with the latter, which is also like the shape of man. More internal than the body which is made up of vital air is another body which consists of mind; the former is filled with the latter, which is again like unto the shape of man. More internal still than the mental body is another body which is full of intelligence; the former is filled with the latter, which is again like unto the shape of man. Finally, still more internal than this body of intelligence is another body consisting of bliss; the former is filled with the latter, which still is like the shape of man" (S. 20. a). Here we are told that various bodies are pent up within this physical body,- as if the physical body were like a Pandora's box,- that the wise man is he who knows that there are what may be called by sufferance the physical, astral, mental, intuitional, and beatific "bodies" of man, that every internal body is enclosed within an external one, and, finally, that all these bodies have the shape of man. It was possibly such a passage as this which has been responsible for spreading such a notion as that of the "pancha-kosas" or the five bodies of man.

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25. Among modern Theosophists, this theory has assumed quite an extraordinary Limitations - of modern interpretation. importance. The etheric double, they say, is exactly like the shape of the human body, that it lingers a few days after the death of the physical body, that the etheric double of a child lingers only for three days after its death but that in the case of an adult it may linger for a sufficiently long time to allow for the period of mourning, that in dreams while we are having the curious experience of flying like a bird in mıd-air or swimming like a fish in the seas' it is our etheric double which by a kind of endosmosis is transmitting its experience into the physical body, that the scheme of the five bodies mentioned in the Upanishads is only a description of the "manifest " bodies of man, and that over and above these, there are two more "unmanifest" bodies which may be called the Monadic and the Divine, the Anupadaka and the Ädi, or in Buddhistic termino- logy, the Parinirvaņa and the Mahaparinirvāņa. So far as we apprehend it, the general mistake of this theory consists in taking words for things, in refusing to see that what are by sufferance called the " bodies" of man in the Upanishads are nothing more than mere allegorical representations of certain psychological conceptions. Man is made up of a physical body, of vital air, of mind and intellect, and of the faculty which enables him to enjoy an ecstatic Oewpio. This only is what is meant by the passage in question. To ignore its mere psychological aspect and to pro- ceed to erect an occultist philosophy upon the doc- trine is hardly justifiable. The great Sankara did recognise the "kośas," but he understood them as having merely an ideal existence. We have to dis-

1 The Spencerians would explain these experiences as being due to a rem- nant of racial experiance that may have been transmitted to the individual

144 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§25 criminate in thought (viveka),' he says the five differ- ent kośas, and to find our true Self beyond the physical body, beyond the vuxi or vital principle, beyond the mind and intellect, and beyond even our beatific consciousness. He wavers," however, in deciding as to whether we should identify the Brahman with beatific consciousness, or whether we should even penetrate beyond it to find the Brahman ; but in any case, he insists that the kośas or sheaths have no real existence, and that a theory which is built upon the conception of the sheaths is a theory which is " built upon ignorance." 26. That the words " anna, praņa, manas, vijñāna, The problem Sheaths, at bottom the of and ānanda " are not to be under- stood as meaning veritable sheaths problem of Substance. may be seen by reference to a celebrated passage in the third chapter of the same Taittirīya Upanishad, where the author is discussing what should be regarded as the øuois of things ; and he rules out of order the theories that "matter," "life," " mind," or " intellect" could be regarded as the prin- ciple of things, and comes to the conclusion that "intuitive bliss " alone deserves to be regarded as the source of reality. The seer of that Upanishad makes Bhrigu approach his father Varuna, and ask him about the nature of ultimate reality. The father directs

एकैकांतरभारजा भजति विवेकात्मकाश्यतामात्मा ।I स्वात्मनिरूपणम् 2 Contrast his C. on Taittirlya III. 6 एवं तपसा विशुद्धात्मा (अन्न) प्राणादिधु साकल्येन ब्रह्मलक्षणमपश्यन् शनैः शनैरन्तरनुप्रविश्य अन्तरतम- मानंदं ब्रम्म विज्ञातवान् तपसैव साघनेन भृगु: with C.on Taittiriya II. 2 अन्नमयादिम्य आनंदमयातेम्य आत्मम्योऽम्यंतरतम ब्रह्म विद्यया प्रत्यगात्मत्वेन दिदर्शयषु: शास्त्रमविद्याकृतं पंचकोशापनयनेन अनेक- तुषकोद्रववितुषीकरणेनेव तदन्तर्गततण्डुलान् प्रस्तौति।

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him to practise penance and learn the truth for him- self ; he only gives him the hint that the ultimate prin- ciple should be one "from which things spring, in which they live, and into which they are finally re- solved." The boy after practising penance returns to his father and tells him that food (or matter) may be regarded as the principle of things. The father is not satisfied, and asks him to practise penance again. The son comes back with the answer that vital air may be regarded as the principle, and so on. The father is not satisfied with the successive answers which his son brings him, namely, that the ultimate reality may be regarded as vital air, mind, or intellect, and when the son finally brings the answer that it may be beatific consciousness which may be regarded as the source of all things whatsoever, the Upanishad breaks off, and we have no means of knowing whether the father was satisfied with the final answer. We are only told that this piece of knowledge shall be forever mysteriously known as the Bhārgavī Vāruņī Vidyā and that this is "exalted in the highest heaven" (S. 20. b), meaning thereby that it is honoured even amongst the gods.

27. We now pass on to discuss the question of The Idea of Trans- Transmigration in the Upanishads, migration, an Aryan but we cannot understand its full Idea. significance unless we see it on its background, namely the form which it takes in pre-Upanishadic literature. The question of Trans- migration may fitly be regarded as the crux of Early Indian Philosophy. We have been often told that the idea of Transmigration is of a very late origin in Indian thought, that it did not exist at the time of the Rigveda, that it was an un-Aryan idea, that, as Professor Macdonell puts it, "it seems more 19

146 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§27

probable that the Aryan settlers received the first im- pulse in this direction from the aboriginal inhabitants of India,"' that even though " the Aryan Indians bor- rowed the idea from the aborigines, they certainly deserve the credit of having elaborated out of it the theory of an unbroken chain of existences, intimately connected with the moral principle of requital." Having said that the idea of Transmigration is of un- Aryan origin and that it was received from the abori- gines by the Indian Aryans, Professor Macdonell is obliged to account for the appearance of the same idea in Pythagoras by saying that the "dependence of Pythagoras on Indian philosophy and science certainly seems to have a high degree of probability ...... The doctrine of metempsychosis in the case of Pythagoras appears without any connection or explanatory back- ground, and was regarded by the Greeks as of foreign origin. He could not have derived it from Egypt, as it was not known to the ancient Egyptians."* Since the appearance of Herr Rohde's book on Psyche, Seelen- kult and Unsterblichkeitsglaube der Griechen in 1894, we have come to see that the real source of a belief in transmigration among any people, under certain cir- cumstances, lies in their own ethno-psychological de- velopment, and not in an unproven or unprovable inter-influence from one country to another. It is upon this fruitful hypothesis that we can see the upspringing and the continuance of the idea of trans- migration among the Greeks from Homer downwards through Orpheus to Pythagoras in their own native land ; it is upon the same hypothesis that we can see the development of the same idea among the Indian Aryans from the Rigveda through the Brahmanas to the Upanishads, without invoking the aid of any 1 History of Sanskrit Literature, p. 387. e Loc cit. p. 422.

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unwarrantable influence from the aborigines of India. And thus, the idea of transmigration, so far from being merely an un-Aryan importation in Aryan thought, appears clearly to devlop stage by stage in Aryan thought itself. 28. It is quite true that in the major part of the Transmigration in Rigveda, the idea of Transmigra- the Rigveda : the Xth tion seems conspicuous by its ab- Mandala. sence. The cheerful and joyous attitude of the Indian Aryans made it impossible for them to think too much of the life after death. They believed in the world of the gods, and they believed in the world of the fathers, and they did not care to be- lieve in anything else. It was sufficient for them to know that the godly men went to a Heaven which overflowed with honey,' and that the commonalty went to a world where Yama had the privilege first to go and to gather a number of men about him,-a not uncovetable place, it seems, " of which it was impossi- ble that anybody could be robbed." Even though, then, we grant that the idea of Transmigration is not very conspicuous in the greater portion of the Rigveda, it remains at the same time equally true that, in cer- tain other places, an approach is being made to the idea of Transmigration. The first stage in the evolu- tion of this idea consists in taking an animistic or hylozoistic view of the world. In a verse of the 16th hymn of the tenth Mandala which is devoted to the des- cription of a funeral occasion, the eye of the dead man I तदस्य प्रियममि पाथो अश्यां नरो यत्र देवयवो मदन्ति। उरकरमत्य स हि बन्धुरित्था विष्णोः पदे परमे मध्व उत्सः ॥ ऋ.

2 यमो नो गातुं प्रथमो विवेद नैषा गव्यूतिरपभर्तवा उ। i. 154. 5-

यत्रा नः पूर्वे पितर: परेयुरेना जश्ञाना: पथ्या ३ अनु स्वाः ॥ ऋ. x. 14. 2.

148 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§28

has been asked by the Seer to move back to the Sun which is its analogue in the makranthropos, the anima to the wind which is its analogue, and the animus has been directed to go to the heaven or to the earth accord- ing to its qualities (dharma), or else to move even to the waters or the plants if it so suited it.' This verse instead of expressing transmigration proper may be said to be putting forth certain hints towards an ani- mistic or hylozoistic view of the world ; but the word dharma which it introduces is a very significant word. It is the earliest trace of a theory of karman, especially as the soul is asked to go to heaven or to earth accord- ing to its qualities. But a still more definite passage is found in another hymn of the tenth Mandala of the Rigveda, where a hylozoism is advocated with even greater stress. There we definitely know that the whole hymn* is addressed to a departed spirit, and the poet says that he is going to recall the departed soul in order that it may return again and live. The poet says that the spirit which has gone far away to the world of death he will recall and make live once more. The spirit, he continues, "which may have gone to heaven or earth or to the four-cornered globe, which may have been diffused in the various quarters or have taken resort in the waves of the sea or the beams of the light, which may have ensouled the waters or the herbs, or gone to the sun or the dawn, or rested on the moun- tains, or which may have spread through the whole universe and become identical with the past and the future"-that soul, says the poet, he will recall by means of his song, and make it take on a tenement.

I सूर्ये चक्षुर्गच्छतु वातमात्मा यां च गच्छ पृथिवीं च धर्मणा। अपो वा गच्छ यादि तत्र ते हितं ओषधीषु प्रतितिष्ठा शरीरैः॥ ऋ. x. 16. 3. z Rigveda X.58.1-12.

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Too great a belief in the power of song ! But the fact remains that the whole hymn breathes an atmosphere of hylozoism, and the poet makes us feel that a soul is not wholly lost after bodily death, being mixed with the elements.

29. But is hylozoism the final word of the Rigveda?

Transmigration By no means. We have one very the Rigveda: the 1st characteristic hymn of the Rig- in

Mandala. veda which, we fear, has not been noticed with even a tithe of the attention which it really deserves. The meaning which Roth, and Böht- lingk and Geldner have found in at least two verses of the hymn has been strangely overlooked, and it is wonderful that people keep saying that the idea of Transmigration is not to be found in the Rigveda. The hymn we refer to is the great riddle-hymn of the Rigveda, i. 164. It consists of fifty-two verses and breathes throughout a sceptico-mystical atmosphere. It says that He who made all this does not himself probably know its real nature,' and it sets such a high price on the mystical knowledge which it glori- fies that any one who comes to be in possession of this knowledge, so the hymn proclaims, may be said to be his father's father.ª It is no doubt true that even though the hymn occurs in the first Mandala of the Rigveda, it is not for that reason to be understood as belonging to the oldest part of the Rigveda. For example, it advocates a facile unity of godhood,3 which is only a later development of thought. It quotes the

I य ह चकार न सोऽस्य वेद । ऋ. . 164. 32. 2 कविर्यः पुत्रः स ईमा चिकेत यस्ता विजानात् स पितुष्पिता सत्। I. 164. 16. 3 एकं सद्िपा बहुषा वदन्ति अभि यम मातरिश्वानमाहुः॥ ऋ. I. 164. 46.

150 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§29

very same verse' which we find in the celebrated Purushasūkta, which has been rightly recognised as one of the late productions of the Vedic period. It even contains the famous verse on the "Two Birds" which later plays such an important part in the Muņdaka Upanishad. All these things point unmista- kably to the fact that the hymn of the Rigveda which we are considering must be regarded as a late hymn of the Rigveda, even though it has the privilege of being included in the canon of the first Mandala. Never- theless, the fact remains that the very important re- velations which it makes on the subject of the idea of transmigration have been strangely neglected. In spite of the Herakleitean style in which the whole hymn has been composed, in spite of the fact that it contains allusions to such various conceptions as those of the Fire, the Cow and the Calf, and the First-born of the Law, a psychological vein is ever present through the whole hymn, and among other things, the reference to the " Two Birds," namely the individual soul and the universal soul, makes it unmistakable that the poet is darkly expressing, in his own metaphorical way, his ideas about the nature of soul and the relation between the individual and universal souls. For ex- ample, the poet asks us, who has ever seen the precise mode in which the boneless soul, the very life-blood and informing spirit of the earth, comes to inhabit a bony tenement ? And if a man did not know this himself, who has ever moved out of himself and gone to the wise man to receive illumination on it ?' Then I यज्ञेन यज्ञमयजन्त देवास्तानि धर्माणि प्रथमान्यासन्। ऋ. I. 164. 59. 2 द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखया समानं वृक्षं परिषत्वजाते। तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्वत्यनभ्रज्नन्यो अमिचाकशीति ॥ ऋ. I. 164. 17. 3 को ददर्श प्रथमं जायमानमस्थन्वंतं यदनस्था बिभर्ति। भूम्या असुरसृगात्मा कस्वित् को विद्वांसमुपगात् प्रष्टुमेतत् । ऋ. L 164. 4.

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the seer says categorically that this breathing, speed- ful, moving life-principle is firmly established inside these tenements of clay.' Moreover he tells us that the immortal principle, conjoined with the mortal one, moves backwards and forwards by virtue of its natural power; but the wonder of it is, the poet goes on to say, that the mortal and immortal elements keep moving ceaselessly in opposite directions, with the result that people are able to see the one but are unable to see the other." These two last verses were regarded by Roth and Böhtlingk and Geldner as against Oldenberg to have supplied sufficient evidence as to the proof of the existence of the idea of transmigration in the Rigveda, as they rightly thought that the verses tell us that the soul is a moving, speedful life- principle which comes and goes, moves backwards and forwards, comes in contact with the body and then moves from it in the opposite direction. Oldenberg is evidently wrong when he understands verse 38 to re- fer to the morning and evening stars, as he must ac- knowledge that the verse speaks of the mortal and immortal principles. But the culminating point of the whole doctrine is reached when the poet tells us that he himself saw (probably with his mind's eye) the guardian of the body, moving unerringly by back- ward and forward paths, clothed in collected and diffusive splendour, and that it kept on returning frequently inside the mundane regions.' That this "guardian" is no other than the soul may be seen I अनच्छये तुरगातु जीवमेजद् ध्रुवं मध्य आ पस्यानाम्। ऋ. I. 164.30. 2 अपाड् प्राडेति स्वघया गुभीतोऽमत्यों मर्त्येना सयोनिः। ता शश्चन्ता विषूचीना वियन्ता न्यन्यं चिक्युर्न निचिक्युरन्यम्॥ ऋ.

3 अपश्यं गोपामनिपद्यमान आ च परा च पथिमिश्ररंतम्। I. 164. 38.

स सध्रीची: स विधूचीर्वस्ान आ वरीवर्ति भुवनेष्वन्तरिति ॥ ऋ. L 164. 31.

152 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§29

from the way in which verse 31 follows immediately on verse 30 which mentions the " breathing, speedful, moving life-principle"; moreover, the frequentative (varivarti) tells us the frequency of the soul's return to this world. It was with this idea uppermost in his mind that the poet talks, in Herakleitean fashion, of those who come hither as those who are moving away, and those who are moving back as already returning hither,' as Herakleitos should talk of the gods being mortals and the men immortals. 30. We have been obliged to make this long sur- The ethno-psycho- vey of the Vedic idea of life after logical development of the idea of Transmigra- death only in order to prove that tion. the three chief moments in the idea of Transmigration, namely the passage of the soul from the body, its habitation in other forms of exis- tence like the plants or the waters, and even its re- turn to the human form, are all implicitly found even so far back as the times of the Rigveda; and when these are coupled with the incipient idea of the quality of action (dharma) which determines a future exis- tence, we see that there is no reason why we should persist in saying that the idea of Transmigration is an un-Aryan idea, that the Indians borrowed it from the non-Aryan aborigines of India, and that in some in- explicable way the idea found entrance in other countries and cults beyond India. On the principles of ethnic psychology, almost every nation contains within it the possibility of arnving at the idea of Transmigration from within its own proper psychologi- cal development; and there is no more reason why we should say that Greece borrowed the idea of Trans- migration from India than we might say that Egypt I येऽर्वाज्चस्ताँ ठ पराच आहुयें पराध्चस्ताँ उ अर्वाच आहुः ॥ ऋ. L 164. 19.

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herself borrowed it from India. If Prof. Keith' acknowledges that the Egyptians themselves believed in the possibility of a dead man " returning to wander on earth, visiting the places he had loved in life, or again changing himself into a heron, a swallow, a snake, a crocodile or a girl," there is no justification for saying, as he does, that " this is indeed transmigra- tion, but a different transmigration from either that of Greece or India." Whenever there is recognised the possibility of the soul coming to inhabit a body as a god-like principle from without, wherever it is sup- posed that the soul could likewise part from the body as it came, wherever it is thought that the soul after parting from the body could lead a life of disem- bodied existence, and wherever it is supposed to re- turn again to the earth and inhabit any form of exis- tence whatsoever, there is a kind of undying life con- ceived for the soul from which the step to actual Trans- migration is not very far removed ; while the crowning idea in transmigration, namely that of akurnois is a product of very late growth, and even though it is found in Pythagoras and Plato and the Indian system of Yoga, we have no reason to attribute it definitely to the Vedic seers or to the Upanishadic philosophers, unless perhaps we scent it in the rather unconscious utterance of the sage Vämadeva that he was in a former life " Manu or the Sun."" 31. We now come to deal with the question of the Transmigration In idea of Transmigration in the Upa- the Upanishads : the nishads themselves. We have al- Kathopanishad. ready tried to prove that the idea of Transmigration has been adumbrated in the great 1 R. A. S. Journal 1909 p. 569 seq : " Pythagoras and transmigration, 2 अहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्र । बृ. I. 4. 10. 20 .

154 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ §31 riddle-hymn of the Rigveda. In the Upanishads, on the other hand, the idea has been most explicitly ad- vanced. When the father of Nachiketas told him that he had made him over to the God of Death, Nachi- ketas replied by saying that it was no uncommon fate that was befalling him : "I indeed go at the head of many to the other world ; but I also go in the midst of many. What is the God of Death going to do to me ? Look back at our predecessors (who have already gone) ; look also at those who have succeeded them. Man ripens like corn, and like corn he is born again" (S. 21. a). Nachiketas is anticipating the gospel, and saying more than the gospel of St. John : "Except a cor of wheat fall into the ground and die, it abideth alone ; but if it die, it bringeth forth much fruit."* The gospel never says that the corn of wheat is reborn ; but Nachiketas says that just as a corn of grain ripens and perishes and is born again, so does a man live and die to be born again. 32. The locus classicus, however, of the idea of Transmigration in Transmigration is to be found in the Upanishads: the Brihadaranyaka Upa- the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad, uishad. which goes into great details over the manner in which a man dies and is born again. We are first told how at the time of birth all the ele- ments wait upon the approaching soul, their lord and king ; and then we are told, how these wait again upon the soul to give him a send-off when he is about to depart : " And as on the approach of a king, the police- men, magistrates, charioteers, and governors of towns wait upon him with food, and drink, and tents, saying ' he comes, he approaches,' similarly do all these ele- ments wait on the conscious self, saying this Brahman comes, this Brahman approaches ; and again, as at the

1 St. John. 12.24.

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time of the king's departure, the policemen, magis- trates, charioteers, and governors of towns gather round him, similarly do all vital airs gather round the soul at the time of death" (S. 21. b). Then follows a very realistic description of the actual manner of death : "When the vital airs are gathered around him, the Self collecting together all the portions of light moves down into the heart ; and when the ' person in the eye ' has turned away, then he ceases to know any forms. He becomes concentrated in himself, that is the reason why they say he is not able to see; he becomes at one with himself, that is the reason why they say he is not able to speak, or hear, or know. Then the tip of his heart is filled with light, and, through that light the soul moves out either by the way of the eye, or the head, or any other part of the body. As the Self moves out, life moves after it; and as the life moves, the various vital airs depart after it. Him follow' his knowledge, his works, and his former consciousness" (S. 21. c). It is important to notice that in this last sentence a doctrine of karman is being advanced, which becomes still more explicit almost immediately; " And as a caterpillar, after reaching the end of a blade of grass, finds an- other place of support and then draws itself towards it, similarly this Self, after reaching the end of this body, finds another place of support, and then draws himself towards it. And as a goldsmith, after taking a piece of gold, gives it another newer and more beauti- ful shape, similarly does this Self, after having thrown off this body and dispelled ignorance, take on an- other, newer, and more beautiful form, whether it be I The verb anvarabh is understood by Max Muller and Deussen as meaning 'take hold of", e.g., Deussen translates " Dann nehmen ihn das Wissen und die Werke bei der Hand und seine vormalige Erfah- rung"-Sechrig Upanishad's p. 475-

156 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§32

of one of the Manes, or Demi-gods, or Gods, or of Prajapati, or Brahman, or of any other beings. This Self, then, as his conduct and behaviour has been, so does he become. He whose works have been good be- comes good ; he whose works have been evil becomes evil. By holy works, he becomes holy; by sinful works, sinful. It is for this reason that they say that a person consists merely of desires ; as his desire is so is his will ; as his will, so his work ; as his work, so his evolution" (S. 21. d). This passage is important from various points of view. It tells us in the first place that a Soul finds out its future body before it leaves its former one : in fact, it seems that the passage calls in question a "disembodied" existence. Then again, it tells us that the Soul is a creative entity, and in Aristotelian fashion, creates a body as a goldsmith creates an ornament of gold. Then again, the passage says that the Soul is like a Phænix which at every change of body takes on a newer and more beautiful form. Next, it regards the Soul as amenable at every remove to the law of karman, and tells us that it re- ceives a holy body if its actions have been good, and a sinful body if its actions have been bad. Further, the same passage tells us that " as to the man who has no desires left in him, who is desireless because he has all his desires fulfilled, his desires being centred only in the Self, the vital airs do not depart : such a man being Brahman (while he lived) goes to Brahman (after death). Of that import is this verse: 'when a man becomes free of all desires that are in his heart, mortal as he is, he nevertheless becomes immortal and obtains Brahman.' And as the slough of a snake might lie on an ant-hill, dead and cast away, even so does his body lie. Being verily bodiless he becomes immortal ; his vital spirits are (merged in) Brahman, and become pure light" (S. 21. e).

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33. Of this immortal existence, however, we shall have occasion to speak presently. The destiny of the evil soul. Before we do this, we must ex- plain what was supposed by the Upanishadic philosophers to be the fate of the ordi- nary soul, and especially of the bad soul. To speak of the latter first, there are various passages in the Upani- shads, for example, in the Brihadāranyaka, Isa, and Katha Upanishads, which tell us that the Upanishadic philosophers believed that the wicked soul was destined to go to a "joyless" " demonic " region which was "enveloped in darkness." This conception-the be- lief in a Hades-the Upanishadic philosophers share with many other branches of the Aryan race. There is however, nothing on record in the Upanishads to show whether these bad souls had to suffer eternal damnation in this sunless region, or whether their stay in that region was only temporary. " Joyless indeed are the regions " says the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad " and also enveloped in pitchy darkness where igno- rant and [unenlightened men go after death." " De- monic' are the regions " says the Isa Upanishad " and also enveloped in pitchy darkness, where those who have destroyed their souls are obliged to go." This same Upanishad adds that " those who worship what is not real knowledge enter into gloomy darkness," which idea is also elesewhere expressed by the Briha- dāranyaka Upanishad. While the Katha Upanishad tells us that " those who make a gift of barren cows which have drunk water and eaten hay and given their milk, themselves go to the joyless regions" (S. 22). These passages show us that the Upanishadic 1 Dr. R. G, Bhandarkar in an important article in the B. B. R. A. S. Journal makes the following interesting suggestion. The Sanskrit equivalent of the word demonic viz. " Asurya " may here refer to the Assyrian country, " Assyrian" and "Asuryan" being philologically identical, the y and the w being interchangeable as in Greek.

.

158 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§33 philosophers believed in a sunless region where the ignorant, the unenlightened, the self-murdering, and the pseudo-charitable were obliged to go after death.

34. As regards the other souls, a passage in the Brihadāraņyaka Upanishad, which Eschatology in Brihadaranyaka. the seems to be the oldest of its kind, tells us that a soul after death ascends through the regions of the wind and the sun and the moon, and comes at last to a region which is like the Platonic " Isles of the Blessed" and which is free from grief and snow, and there dwells through eter- nity : "When a man goes away from this world, he comes to the wind. There the wind opens for him a hole as large as the hole of a chariot-wheel. Through it he moves upward and comes to the sun. There the sun opens for him a hole as large as the hole of a 'Lambara'. Through it he moves upward and comes to the moon. There the moon opens for him a hole as large as the hole of a drum. Through it he ascends and comes to a world which is sorrowless and snowless and there remains for aye" (S. 23). This passage must be regarded as one of the oldest of eschatological passages in the Upanishads. In the first place, the passage, in itself or in its context, does not make it clear whether such a fate is reserved for all souls or for the good souls only : it speaks of souls without distinc- tion. The eschatological passages in the Chhandogya Upanishad, which we shall quote presently, must be regarded as of a later date, because that Upanishad goes into very great details over the respective fates of the ascetic or the householder, and consigns the one to the way of the Gods, and the other to the way of the Fathers. In fact, we find in that Upanishad a differential elaboration of the eschatological idea which is advanced in the passage from the Brihadāraņyaka

§ 35 ] CHAPTER III: PSYCHOLOGY 159

which we have already quoted. Secondly, it is re- markable that, as in the Upanishads generally, so in this Upanishad, the world of the moon is regarded as situated at a greater distance from us than the world of the sun. Thirdly, it is to be noticed that the Region of the Blessed of which the passage speaks is a region "without snow." Does this mean that the Upani- shadic philosopher was tormented by too much cold in the region where he lived ? And finally, the idea of " eternity " is already introduced in that important passage, and we are told that such a soul lives in these blessed regions for ever and ever. 35. In the Chhandogya Upanishad, on the other

Eschatology in the hand, as we have pointed out, Chhandogya : the Two the eschatological idea undergoes Paths. a deal of transformation. There we are told that there are two ways open to the mortals, the bright way and the dark way, the " archir- marga" and the "dhuma-mārga," the " devayana" and the " pitriyana," the Way of the Gods, and the Way of the Fathers. It is these two paths which were later immortalised in the Bhagavadgita' as they are already adumbrated in the hymns of the Rigvedae. I अभिर्ज्योतिरहः शुक्क: षण्मासा उत्तरायणम्। तत्र प्रयाता गच्छंति ब्रद्म ब्रह्मविदो जनाः ।। धूमो रात्रिस्तथा कृष्णः षण्मासा दक्षिणायनम्। तत्र चांद्रमसं ज्योतियोंगी प्राप्य निवर्तते॥ शुक्ककृष्णे गती होते जगतः शाश्वते मते। एकया यात्यनावृत्तिमन्ययाऽवर्तते घुनः ॥ म. गी. VIII 24-26. 2 The Devaylna which is mentioned in Rigveda X. 19. 1 has the same meaning as in the Upanishads: परं मृत्यो अनु परेहि पंथां यस्ते स्व इतरो देवयानात्। The path which in the above verse is regarded as "different irom" the Way of the Gods must be only the Way of the Fathers-Pitriytina The word Pitriyana, however, in the Rigveda is often used with a sacrificial instead of a funeral connotation : of : पंथामनु प्रविद्वान् पितृयाणं दुमदे समिघानो बिभाहि। ऋ. X. 2.7.

160 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ § 35 As regards those who practise penance and faith in a forest, says the Upanishad, whether after their death people perform their obsequies or not, their souls enter the path of light, and they move suc- cessively "from light to day, from day to the bright half of the month, from the bright half of the month to the six months during which the sun moves to the north, from these months to the year, from the year to the sun, from the sun to the moon, and from the moon to the lightning. There is a per- son not-human who carries them to Brahman. This path is known as the path of the Gods, or the path of Brahman. Those who proceed on this path never return to the cycle of human existences, yea never return" (S. 24. a). Over against this path, there is according to the same Upanishad another path re- served for those, who, living in towns, lead a life of charitable deeds and perform works of public utility. Such people do not indeed travel by the path of the Gods which is reserved only for the penance-perform- ing ascetics of the forest. They travel by the path of smoke, "from smoke they go to night, from the night to the dark half of the month, from the dark half of the month to the six months during which the sun moves to the south, but they do not reach the year. From these months they go to the world of the fathers, from the world of the fathers to the sky, from the sky to the moon. There they dwell till the time comes for them to fall down. Thence they descend by this road : from the moon they come down to the sky, from the sky to the wind. Having become wind they become smoke; having become smoke they become mist; having become mist they become a cloud; having become a cloud they rain down. Then they are born as .either rice or barley, herbs or trees, sesamum or beans. At this stage, verily the path is difficult to

§ 36] CHAPTER III : PSYCHOLOGY 161

follow. Whoever eats the food or discharges the seed, like unto him do they become" (S. 24. b).

36. It is not difficult to understand that these so- The moral backbone called paths are merely imaginary of Upanishadic escha- ways in which the primeval mind tology. tried to express itself in regard to the eschatological idea; but they were not so understood for a great length of time, and dogmatic systematisers tried to justify them in one way or another, the most reasonable of these justifications being that the Sun and the Moon and the Smoke and the Night were regarded as presiding deities, and therefore the soul was understood as being given over in the charge of these deities who sent him whither he deserved. It is not difficult to see that the two paths which are spoken of in the above passage are merely mythological explanations of an insoluble problem. The great Ramadāsa, the patron saint of the Deccan, said in his Dasabodha that one does not need to believe in the two paths.' What becomes of the soul after death it is not given to man to understand ; and if any credit is to be given to the author of the Upanishadic passage, it is not for having solved the problem but for having attempted the solution. Philosophically speaking, we are not much concerned with the actual stages of the ascent or descent of the soul, but only with the idea of ascent and descent. And looking at the problem in this way, one is filled with a great deal of surprise and admiration when one sees that the ideas of ascent or descent were placed on no less than a moral founda- I उत्तरायेण ते उत्तम। दक्षणायेन तें आधम । हा संदेहिं बसे भ्रम ॥ साधु तो निःसंदेह । १२ ॥ शुक्कपक्ष उत्तरायेण। गही दीप दिवा मरण अंती राहावें स्मरण। गती कारणें ।। १४ ।। इतकें नलगे योगियासी। तेो जांतचि मुक्त पुण्यराशी। तिळांजुळी पापपुण्यासी। दिघली तेणें ॥ १५ ॥ दा. VII. 10.13-15. 21

164 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ §38

summer solstice," or finally " the world of the year," it substitutes "the worlds of deities" which are recognised as properly deities. Then it tells us, that " when such a soul has reached the world of Brahman, Brahman directs his attendants to run towards the soul and receive him with all the glory which is due to himself alone. He says that as the soul has reached the Ageless river, he can never be- come old. Upon the command, five hundred celes- tial damsels move towards the soul-a hundred with fruits, a hundred with ointments, a hundred with gar- lands, a hundred with clothes, and a hundred with perfumes ; and they decorate the soul with all the orna- ments which are due to Brahman. Being so decorat- ed, the soul knowing Brahman, moves towards Brahman. He comes to the Ageless river which he crosses merely by the motion of the mind. He then shakes off his good deeds as well as his bad deeds. His beloved relatives partake of the good deeds, and unbeloved of the bad deeds. And as a man driving fast in a chariot looks down on the revolving wheels, so does the soul look at day and night, good and bad, and all the contrary pairs. Being free from good and free from evil, knowing Brahman, he moves towards Brahman" (S. 24. f).

39. The culminating point, however, of the Upani- shadic psychology is reached when Idea of Immortal Life. we come to the treatment of the idea of Immortal Life. This is one of the crucial points in the interpretation of Upani- shadic doctrine, and expert opinion has been divided on this point for the simple reason that every dogmatic philosopher has wished to find nothing but his own doctrine in the Upanishads. We, who stand for no dogma in particular, know how to understand the

CHAPTER III : PSYCHOLOGY 161

follow. Whoever eats the food or discharges the seed, like unto him do they become" (S. 24. b).

36. It is not difficult to understand that these so-

The moral backbone called paths are merely imaginary of Upanishadic escha- ways in which the primeval mind tology. tried to express itself in regard to the eschatological idea; but they were not so understood for a great length of time, and dogmatic systematisers tried to justify them in one way or another, the most reasonable of these justifications being that the Sun and the Moon and the Smoke and the Night were regarded as presiding deities, and therefore the soul was understood as being given over in the charge of these deities who sent him whither he deserved. It is not difficult to see that the two paths which are spoken of in the above passage are merely mythological explanations of an insoluble problem. The great Ramadasa, the patron saint of the Deccan, said in his Dasabodha that one does not need to believe in the two paths.' What becomes of the soul after death it is not given to man to understand ; and if any credit is to be given to the author of the Upanishadic passage, it is not for having solved the problem but for having attempted the solution. Philosophically speaking, we are not much concerned with the actual stages of the ascent or descent of the soul, but only with the idea of ascent and descent. And looking at the problem in this way, one is filled with a great deal of surprise and admiration when one sees that the ideas of ascent or descent were placed on no less than a moral founda- I उत्तरायेण ते उत्तम । दक्षणायेन तें आधम । हा संदेहिं बसे भ्रम ॥ साधु तो निःसंदेह ।। १३ ॥ शुक्कपक्ष उत्तरायेण। गहीं दीप दिवा मरण अंती राहावें स्मरण । गती कारणें ।। १४ । इतके नलगे योगियासी। तो जांतचि मुक्त पुण्यराशी। तिळांजुळी पापपुण्यासी। दिघली तेणें ॥ १५ ॥ दा. VII. 10.13-15.

164 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ §38

summer solstice," or finally " the world of the year," it substitutes "the worlds of deities" which are recognised as properly deities. Then it tells us, that "when such a soul has reached the world of Brahman, Brahman directs his attendants to run towards the soul and receive him with all the glory which is due to himself alone. He says that as the soul has reached the Ageless river, he can never be- come old. Upon the command, five hundred celes- tial damsels move towards the soul-a hundred with fruits, a hundred with ointments, a hundred with gar- lands, a hundred with clothes, and a hundred with perfumes ; and they decorate the soul with all the orna- ments which are due to Brahman. Being so decorat- ed, the soul knowing Brahman, moves towards Brahman. He comes to the Ageless river which he crosses merely by the motion of the mind. He then shakes off his good deeds as well as his bad deeds. His beloved relatives partake of the good deeds, and unbeloved of the bad deeds. And as a man driving fast in a chariot looks down on the revolving wheels, so does the soul look at day and night, good and bad, and all the contrary pairs. Being free from good and free from evil, knowing Brahman, he moves towards Brahman" (S. 24. f).

39. The culminating point, however, of the Upani- shadic psychology is reached when Idea of Immortal Life. we come to the treatment of the idea of Immortal Life. This is one of the crucial points in the interpretation of Upani- shadic doctrine, and expert opinion has been divided on this point for the simple reason that every dogmatic philosopher has wished to find nothing but his own doctrine in the Upanishads. We, who stand for no dogma in particular, know how to understand the

§39] CHAPTER III: PSYCHOLOGY 165

Upanishadic passages on this head, because we want to take a merely historical survey of the doctrine, and not to press the passages into the service of any parti- cular view to which we may be committed. Looking at the Upanishads from this point of view, we see that there is a systematic evolution that could be traced through them of the ideas that were held on the sub- ject of Immortality. We are told in a passage of the Chhandogya Upanishad that the best kind of eternal life that may be conceived for anybody is that he should be "lifted to the region of the deity " whom he has loved and worshipped during life, and that he should partake of all the happiness that is possible in that region (S. 25. a). Another passage from the Muņdaka Upanishad tells us that the best kind of eternal life should be regarded rather as the "companionship" of the highest God with whom the soul should be libe- rated at the time of the great end (S. 25. b). Not satisfied with a mere companionship, another passage declares that eternal life consists in attaining to an absolute "likeness " to God and enjoying life of per- sonal immortality, a view which plays so large a part in the theology of Ramānuja (S. 25. c). On the other hand Śankarachrya would be satisfied with nothing short of an "absorption in divinity " and a life of impersonal immortality. As rivers which flow into the sea disap- pear in the mighty waters and lose their name and form, even so does the wise soul become absorbed in the transcendent Person and lose its name and form. As when honey is prepared by the collection of various juices, the juices cannot discriminate from which tree they came, even so when the souls are merged in the Real they cannot discriminate from which bodies they came (S. 25. d). This is nothing short of a doctrine of impersonal immortality. Finally, an important passage from the Mundaka Upanishad tells us that the soul of

168 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

अश्वा, गाव:, पुरुषा, हस्तिनो, यर्त्किचेदं प्राणि जंगमं च पतत्रि च, यच्च स्थावरं, सर्वे तत्परश्ञानेत्रं प्रज्ञाने प्रतिष्ठितं। प्रज्ञानेत्रो लोक: प्रज्ञा प्रतिष्ठा। प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म। पे. III. 3. (b) द्विधा वा एष आत्मानं विभ्त्ययं यः प्राणो यश्चासावादित्यः असौ वा आदित्यो वहिरात्मा, अंतरात्मा प्राणोऽतो वहि रात्मक्या गत्याउन्तरात्मनोऽनुमीयते गतिरित्येवं ह्याह।

न्निष्ठआवृत्तचक्षुः सोऽन्तरात्मक्या गत्या बहिरात्मनो ऽनु मीयते गतिरित्येवॅ ह्याह। मै. VI.I. 9 (a) यद् वृक्षो वृक्णो रोहति मूलान्रवतर: पुनः। मर्त्यः स्विन्मृत्युना वृक्ण: कस्मान् मुलात्प्रोहति। बृ. III. 9. 28. (b) शवेतकेतुर्हारुणेयः पंचालानां समितिमेयाय तं ह प्रवाहणो जैवलिरुवाच कुमार अनु त्वा अशिषत् पिता इति। अनु हि भगव इति। वेत्थ यदितोऽधि प्रजाः प्रयंतीति, न भगव इति। वेत्थ यथा पुनरावर्तन्त इति, न भगव इति। वेत्थ पथोर्देवयानस्य पितृयाणस्य च व्यावर्तना इति, न भगव इति। वेत्थ यथाऽसी लोको न संपूर्यत इति, न भगव इति। अथानु किमनुशिष्टोऽबोचथाः यो हीमानि न विद्यात्कर्थ सोऽनुशिष्टो ब्ृवीतेति। छां. V. 3. I-4. (c) येयं प्रेते विचिकित्सा मनुष्येऽस्तीत्येके नायमस्तीति चैके। एतद्विद्यामनुशिष्टस्त्वयाहं वराणामेष वरस्तृतीयः ॥ देवै- रत्रापि विचिकिस्सितं पुरा न हि सुविज्ञेयमणुरेष धर्मः । अन्यं वरं नचिकेतो वृणीष्व मा मोपरोत्सीरति मा सृजै- नम्॥ देवैरत्रापि विचिकित्सितं किल त्वं च मृत्यो यक्र सुविज्ञेयमात्थ। वक्ता चास्य त्वादगन्यो न लभ्यो नान्यो चरस्तुल्य एतस्य कश्ित्। ये ये कामा दुर्लभा मर्त्यलोके सर्वान् कार्माश्छंदतः प्रार्थयस्व। इमा रामा: सरथा : सतूर्या न हीडशा लम्भनीया मनुष्यैः । आभिर्मत्य्त्ताभि: परि- चारयस्य नचिकेतो मरणं मानुप्राक्षीः । श्वोऽभावा मर्त्यस्य यदन्तकैतत्सर्वेन्द्रियाणां जरयंति तेजः। अपि सर्व जीवित- सल्पमेव तवैव वाहास्तव नृत्यगीते॥ अजीर्यताममृतानामु

§ 39 CHAPTER III: PSYCHOLOGY 165

Upanishadic passages on this head, because we want to take a merely historical survey of the doctrine, and not to press the passages into the service of any parti- cular view to which we may be committed. Looking at the Upanishads from this point of view, we see that there is a systematic evolution that could be traced through them of the ideas that were held on the sub- ject of Immortality. We are told in a passage of the Chhandogya Upanishad that the best kind of eternal life that may be conceived for anybody is that he should be " lifted to the region of the deity " whom he has loved and worshipped during life, and that he should partake of all the happiness that is possible in that region (S. 25. a). Another passage from the Mundaka Upanishad tells us that the best kind of eternal life should be regarded rather as the "companionship" of the highest God with whom the soul should be libe- rated at the time of the great end (S. 25. b). Not satisfied with a mere companionship, another passage declares that eternal life consists in attaining to an absolute "likeness" to God and enjoying life of per- sonal immortality, a view which plays so large a part in the theology of Rāmānuja (S. 25. c). On the other hand Śankaracharya would be satisfied with nothing short of an "absorption in divinity " and a life of impersonal immortality. As rivers which flow into the sea disap- pear in the mighty waters and lose their name and form, even so does the wise soul become absorbed in the transcendent Person and lose its name and form. As when honey is prepared by the collection of various juices, the juices cannot discriminate from which tree they came, even so when the souls are merged in the Real they cannot discriminate from which bodies they came (S. 25. d). This is nothing short of a doctrine of impersonal immortality. Finally, an important passage from the Mundaka Upanishad tells us that the soul of

168 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

अश्वा, गाव:, पुरुषा, हस्तिनो, यर्त्किचचेंद प्राणि जंगमं च पतत्रि च, यच्ञ स्थावरं, सर्वे तत्पज्ञानेत्रं प्रज्ञाने प्रतिष्ठितं। प्रशानेत्रो लोक: प्रज्ञा प्रतिष्ठा । प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म । पे. III. 3. (b) द्विधा वा एष आत्मानं विभर्त्ययं यः प्राणो यश्चासावादित्यः असौ वा आदित्यो बंहिरात्मा, अंतरात्मा प्राणोऽतो वहि रात्मक्या गत्याऽन्तरात्मनोऽनुमीयते गतिरित्येवं ह्याह। अथ यः कश्चिद्विद्वानपहतपाप्माSक्षाध्यक्षोऽवदातमनास्त- श्निष्ठआवृत्तचक्षुः सोन्तरात्मक्या गत्या बहिरात्मनो ऽनु मीयते गतिरित्येवॅ ह्याह। मै. VI. I. 9 (a) यद् वृक्षो वृक्णो रोहति मूलान्नवतर: पुनः। मर्त्यः स्विन्मृत्युना वृक्ण: कस्मान् सुलात्म्रोहति॥ बृ. III. 9. 28. (b) शवेतकेतुर्हारुणेयः पंचालानां समितिमेयाय तं ह प्रवाहणो जैवलिरुवाच कुमार अनु त्वा अशिषत् पिता इति। अनु हि भगव इति। वेत्थ यदितोऽधि प्रजाः प्रयंतीति, न भगव इति । वेत्थ यथा पुनरावर्तन्त इति, न भगव इति। वेत्थ पथोर्देवयानस्य पितृयाणस्य च व्यावर्तना इति, न भगव इति। वेत्थ यथाऽसी लोको न संपूर्यत इति, न भगव इति। अथानु किमनुशिष्टोऽवोचथाः यो हीमानि न विद्यात्कर्थ सोऽनुशिष्टो ह्रुवीतेति। छां. V. 3. I-4. (c) येयं प्रेते विचिकित्सा मनुष्येऽस्तीत्येके नायमस्तीति चैके। एतद्विद्यामनुशिष्टस्त्वयाहं वराणामेष वरस्तृतीयः ॥ देवै- रत्रापि विचिकित्सितं पुरा न हि सविशेयमणुरेष धर्मः । अन्यं वरं नचिकेतो वृणीष्व मा मोपरोत्सीरति मा सृजै- नम्॥ देवैरतरापि विचिकित्सितं किल त्वं च मृत्यो यक्र सुविज्ञेयमात्थ। वक्ता चास्य त्वादगन्यो न लभ्यो नान्यो वरस्तुल्य एतस्य कश्चित् ॥ ये ये कामा दुर्लभा मर्त्यलोके सर्वान् कामांश्छंदतः प्रार्थयस्व। इमा रामा: सरथा : सतूर्या न हीदशा लम्भनीया मनुष्यैः । आभिर्मत्प्रत्ताभि: परि- चारयस्य नचिकेतो मरणं मानुप्राक्षीः । श्वोऽभावा मर्त्यस्य यदन्तकैतत्सर्वेन्द्रियाणां जरयंति तेजः । अपि सर्व जीवित- मल्पमेव तवैव वाहास्तव नृत्यगीते॥ अजीर्यताममृतानामु-

CHAPTER III: PSYCHOLOGY 169 पेत्य जीर्यन्मर्त्यः क्धस्थः प्रजानन् । अभिध्यायन् वर्णरति- प्रमोदानतिदीर्घे जीविते को रमेत॥ यस्मिन्निदं विचिकि- त्सन्ति मृत्यो यत्साम्पराये महति वृहि नस्तत् । योऽयं वरो गूढमनुप्रविष्टो नान्यं तरमान्नचिकेता वृणीते॥ क. I. I. 20-29. IO तद्यथास्मिन्नाकाशे श्येनो वा सुप्णो वा विपरिपत्य श्रान्तः सम्हत्य पक्षौ संलयायैव ध्रियत एवमेवायं पुरुषः एतस्मा अन्ताय धावति यत्र सुप्तो न कंचन कामं कामयते न कंचन स्वमं पश्यति। बृ. IV. 3. 19. II (a) यथा गार्ग्य मरीचयोऽर्कस्यास्तं गच्छतः सर्वा एतस्मिस्ते- जोमण्डल एकीभवंति ताः पुनः पुनरुदयतः प्रचरंत्येवं ह वै तत्सर्वे परे देवे मनस्येकीभवति। तेन तह्ोष पुरुषो न गृणोति, न पश्यति, न जिव्रति, स्वपितत्याचक्षते। प्र.IV. 2. (b) स यदा तेजसाभिभूतो भवति अत्रैष देवः स्वम्ान्न पश्य- त्यथ तदैतस्मिञ् शरीरे एतत्सुखं भवति। (c) तद्यत्रैतत्सुप्तः संप्रसन्नः स्वर्म न विजानाति, आसु तदा प्र. IV. 6. नाडीषु सृप्तो भवति। छां. VIII. 6.3. (d) अथ यदा सुषुप्तो भवति यदा न कस्यचन वेद, हिता नाम नाड्यो द्वासप्ततिसहस्राणि हृदयात् पुरीततमभिप्रतिष्ठते, ताभिः प्रत्यवसृत्य पुरातति शेते, स यथा कुमारो वा महाराजो वा महाव्राह्मणो वा अतिर्ष्नामानंदस्य गत्वा श्यीत एवमेवैष एतच्छेते। बृ.II. I. 19. (e) उद्दालको हारुणि: श्र्वेतकेतुं पुत्रमुचाच स्वप्नांत मे विजा- नीहीति। .... स यथा शकुनिः सूत्रेण प्रबद्धो दिशं दिशं पतित्वा अन्यत्रायतनं अलब्धवा बंधनमेवोपश्रयते एवमेव खलु सोम्य तन्मनो दिशं दिशं पतित्वा अन्यत्रायतनं अलब्ध्वा प्राणमेवोपश्रयते प्राणबंधनं हि सोम्य मनः। छां. VI. 8. I,2. (f) स होवाचाजातशत्रु: प्रतिलोमं चैतद् यद्ब्राह्मणः क्षत्रिय- मुपेयाद् ब्रह्म मे वक्ष्यतीति, व्येव त्वा जपयिष्यामीति, त (गाग्ये) पाणावादाय उत्तस्थी तौ ह पुरुषं सप्तमागतु: तं एतैर्नामभिरामंत्रयांचके "वृहन पांडरवास: सोम राजन्" इति, स नोत्तस्थौ, तं पाणिनापेशं बोधयांचकार 22

170 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY (v. . यष्टथा विचिक्षेप-कौ०) स होत्तस्थौ। स होवाचा- जातशत्रुःयत्रैष पतत्सुप्तोऽसूद्य एष विज्ञानमयः पुरुषः ववैष तदाभृत् कुत एतदागादिति तदु ह न मेने गार्ग्यः । स होवाचाजातशत्रुर्यत्रैष एतत्सुप्तोऽभूद्य एष विज्ञानमयः पुरुष :.... एषोऽन्तर्हृदय आकाशस्तस्मिच्छेते। बृ. II. 15-17. (g) मनो ह वाव यजमान:। इष्टफलमेवोदान:, स एनं यजमानं अहरहर्ब्रह्म गमयति। प्र.IV.4. यत्रैतत्पुरुषः स्वपिति नाम, सता सोम्य तदा संपन्नो भवति, स्वमपीतो भवति, तस्मादेनं स्वपिर्तीत्याचक्षते। छां. VI.8. I. (hi) यथापि हिरण्यनिधि निहितमक्षेत्रज्ञा उपर्युपरि संचरंतो न विदयु: एवमेवेमा: सर्वाः प्रजा अहरहर्गच्छन्त्यः एतं ब्रह्म- लोक न विदति अनृतेन हि प्रत्यूढाः । छां. VIII.3.2. 12 (a) तस्य वा एतस्य पुरुषस्य द्वे एव स्थाने भवत इद च परलोक- स्थानं च, सन्ध्यं तृतीयरस्वप्नस्थानं, तस्मिन् सन्ध्ये स्थाने तिष्ठन्नेते उभे स्थाने पश्यतीदं च परलोकस्थानं च। .. न तत्र रथा न रथयोगा न पन्थानी भवन्त्यथ रथान् रथयो- गान् पथः सृजते, न तत्रानन्दा मुदः प्रमुदो भवन्त्यथान- न्दान् मुदः प्रमुद: सृजते, ने तत्र वेशान्ता: पुष्करिण्य: स्नवन्त्यो भवन्त्यथ वेशान्तान् पुष्करिणीः स्रवन्तीः सृजते स हि कर्ता। .... प्राणेन रक्षनरवरं कुलायं बहिष्कुलायाद- मृतश्चरित्वा। स ईयतेऽमृतो यत्र कामरहिरण्मय: पुरुष एकहंसः ॥I स्वप्नान्त उच्चावचमीयमानो रूपाणि देव: कुरुते बहनि। उतेव स्त्रीभिः सह मोदमानो जक्षदुतेवापि भयानि पशयन् ॥। .... तद्यथा महामत्स्य उभे कूलेऽनुसंच- रति पूर्व चापरं च, एवमेवायं पुरुषः एतावुभाचन्तावनु- संचरति स्वप्नान्तं च बुद्धान्तं च। बृ. IV. 3. 9-18. (b) अत्रैष देव: स्वमे महिमानमनुभवति । यहष्टं दृष्टमनुपश्यति, श्वुतं श्तमेवार्थमनुशृणोति .... हषं चाएं च, श्रुतं चाशु तं च, अनुभूत चाननुभूतं च, सच्चासच्च, सर्व पशयति, सर्व: पश्यति। प्र.IV. 5 13 अथ हैनं भुज्युर्लाह्यायनिः पत्रच्छ याज्ञवल्क्येति होवाच मद्रेषु चरका: पर्यव्रजाम ते पतञ्चलस्य काप्यस्य गृह्दानैम तस्यासीडुहिता गन्धर्वगृहीता तमपृच्छाम कोऽसीति सोड

CHAPTER III : PSYCHOLOGY 171

ब्रवीत्सुधन्वाSSडिगरस इति, तं यदा लोकानामन्तानपृ- च्छाम अथैनमत्रुम क पारिक्षिता अभवन्निति क पारिक्षिता अभवन्, स त्वा पृच्छामि याज्ञवल्क्य क पारिक्षिता अभव- न्निति। बृ. III. 3. I. 14 (a) सय एतमेवं विद्वान् चतुष्कलं पादं ब्रह्मणः प्रकाशवा- नित्युपास्ते प्रकाशवानस्मिल्लोके भवति। छां. IV. 5. 3. स यस्तेजो ब्रह्मेत्युपास्ते तेजस्वी वै स तेजस्वतो लोकान् भास्वतो अभिसिद्धयति। छां. VII.II.2. (b) अथ यत्तदजायत सोऽसावादित्यस्तं जायमानं घोषा उलू- लवोऽनूदतिष्ठंत .... स य एतमेवं विद्वानादित्यं ब्रह्मेत्यु- पास्तेऽभ्याशो ह यदेनरसाधवो घोषा आ च गच्छेयुरूप- छां. III. 19.4. (c) तत्प्रतिष्ठेत्युपासीत प्रतिष्ठावान् भवति। तन्मह इत्युपासीत महान् भवति। तन्मन इत्युपासीत मानवान् भवति। ... तह् ब्रह्मण: परिमर इत्युपासीत पर्येनं प्रियंते द्विषन्त सपतनाः। तै.III.I0. 3-4. (d) असन्नेव स भवति असद् ब्रह्मेति वेद चेत्। अस्ति ब्रह्मेति चेद्वेद संतमेने ततो विदुः॥ तै. II. 6. 15 स य एपोऽन्तर्हृदय आकाशः। तस्मिन्नयं पुरुषो मनोमयः। अमृतो हिरण्मयः । अन्तरेण तालुके। य एष स्तन इवा- वलम्बते। सेन्द्रयोनिः। यत्रासौ केशान्तो विवर्तते। व्यपोह्य शीर्षकपाले । भू ...... भुवः ... सुच ... मह इति ब्रह्मणि। आप्नोति स्वाराज्यम्। आप्नोति मनसस्पतिम्। वाक्पतिश्च- क्षुष्पतिः । श्रोत्रपतिर्विज्ञानपतिः । एतच्ततो भवति । आकाशशरीरं ब्रह्म। ै.I.6.I-2. 16 (a) अथ अपहृतपाप्मानस्तिग्मतेजसा ऊर्ध्वरेतसो वालखिल्या इति धूयंते। अथ ऋतुं प्रजापतिमन्लवन्। भगवन् शकट- मिवाचेतनमिद शरीरं .... प्रचोदयिता वा अस्य यद् भग- वन् वेत्सि तदस्माकं ब्रह्दीति। तान् होवाचेति। यो ह खलु चाव शुद्ध ... शांतः ... शाश्वतोऽजः स्वतंत्रः स्वे महिम्नि तिष्ठति। अनेनेदं शरीरं चेतनवत प्रतिष्ठापितं। प्रचोद- यिता वैषोऽप्यस्येति। म. II. 3-4.

172 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

(b) तद्यथा क्षुरः क्षुरधाने हितः, विश्वंभरो वा विश्वंभरकुलाये एवमेवैष प्रज्ञात्मा इदं शरीरमनुप्रविष्ट आ लोमभ्य आ नखेभ्यः। तमेतमात्मानं एत आत्मानोऽन्ववस्यन्ते यथा श्रेष्ठिनं स्वा:। तद्यथा श्रेष्ठी स्वैर्मुक्ते यथा वा स्वाः श्रेष्ठिनं भुंजंति, एवमेवैष प्रज्ञात्मा पतैरात्मभिर्भुक्ते एवमेवैत आ- त्मान एतमात्मानं भुंजंति। कौ. IV.20. 17 (a) मनोमयोऽयं पुरुषो भाःसत्यस्तस्मिन्नन्तहदये यथा व्रीहिर्वा यवो वास एष सर्वस्येशान: सर्वस्याधिपतिः सर्वमिदं प्रशास्ति यदिदं किंच। बृ. V.6. 1. (b) अंगुष्ठमात्र: पुरुषो मध्य आत्मनि तिष्ठति। ईशानो भूतभव्य- स्य न ततो विजुगुप्सते॥ क. II. 2. 12. (c) तान्होवाचैते वै खलु यूयं पृथगिवेममात्मानं वैश्वानरं विद्वां- सोऽनमात्थ यस्त्वेतमेवं प्रादेशमात्रमभिविमानमात्मानं वैश्वानरमुपास्ते स सर्वेषु लोकेषु सर्वेषु भूतेषु सर्वेष्वात्म- स्वन्नमत्ति। छां. V. 18.1. (d) नित्यं विभुं सर्वगतं सुसूक्ष्मं तदव्ययं यद् भूतयोनि परिप- इयंति धीरा:। मुं. I. 1. 6. महांतं विभुमात्मानं मत्वा धीरो न शोचति। क. I. 2. 21. (e) शर्ररिप्रादेशांगुष्ठमात्रमणोरप्यण्व्यं ध्यात्वा अतःपरमर्ता ग- चछति। मै. VI. 38. (/) अणोरणीयान् महतो महीयानात्मास्य जंतोर्निहितो गुहा- याम्। क. I. 2. 20. एष म आत्माउन्तर्हदये5णीयान् व्रीहेर्वा यवाद्वा सर्पपाद्वा इयामाकाद्वा श्यामाकतण्डलाद्वा, एष म आत्माऽन्तर्हदये ज्यायान् पृथिव्या ज्यायानन्तरिक्षाज्ज्यायान् दिवो ज्याया- नेभ्यो लोकेभ्यः । छां.III.14.3. 18 सोयमात्मा चतुष्पात्। जागरितस्थानो वहिःप्रज्ञः स्थूल- भुग्वैश्वानर: प्रथम: पादः ॥ स्वप्रस्थानोऽन्तप्रज्ञः प्रविवि- क्तभुक तैजसो द्वितीय: पादः ।यत्र सुप्तो न कंचन काम कामयते न कंचन स्वमं पश्यति तत्सुषुप्तम् । सुषुप्तस्थान एकाभूत: प्रज्ञानघन एव आनंदमयो ह्यानन्दभुक प्राज्ञस्तृ- तीय: पादः ॥ ..... । नान्तप्रजञं न वहितप्रश्षं नोभयतःप्रश्षं न प्रज्ञानघन न प्रशं नाप्रज्ञम्। अदष्टमव्यवह्यार्यमग्राह्यम-

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लक्षणमचिन्त्यमव्यपदेश्यमेकात्म्यप्रत्ययसारं प्रपंचोपशर्म शांतं शिवमद्वैतं चतुर्थ मन्यन्ते स आत्मा। मां. 2-7. 19 अथ यदिदमस्मिन् ब्रह्मपुरे दहर पुण्डराकं वेश्म दहरोS- स्मिन्नंतराकाशस्तर्मिन् यदन्तः स्तदन्वेष्टव्यं तद्वाव विजि- ज्ञासितव्यमिति। ..... यावान् वा अयमाकाशस्तावानेषोऽ- न्तर्हृदय आकाश उभे अस्मिन् द्यावापृथिवी अन्तरेव समा- हिते उभावझिश्च वायुश्च सूर्याचन्द्रमसाबुभौ विद्युन्नक्षत्राणि। छां. VIII. I. 1-3. 20 (a) तस्माद्वा एतस्मादन्नरसमयाद् अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा प्राणमयः तेनैष पूर्णः। स वा एष पुरुषविध एव। .. । तस्माद्वा एत- स्मात्म्राणमयाद् अन्योन्तर आत्मा मनोमयः । तेनैष पूर्णः । स वा एप पुरुषविध एव । ... । तस्माद्वा एतसमान्मनोमयाद् अन्योऽन्तर आत्मा विज्ञानमयः । तेनैष पूर्णः । स वा एष पुरुषविध एव । ... । तस्माद्वा एतरमाद्विजानमयाद अन्योS- न्तर आत्माSSनन्दमयः। तेनैष पूर्णः। स वा एष पुरुषविध एव। तै. II. 2-5. (b) भृगुवै वारुणिः वरुणं पितरमुपससार। अधीहि भगवो ब्रह्मेति। तस्मा एतत्प्रोवाच। ..... । यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायंते, येन जातानि जीवंति, यत्प्रयन्त्यभिसंविशन्ति। तद्विजिश्चासस्व तद्व्रह्मेति। स तपोऽतप्यत स तपस्तप्त्वा अन्नं ब्रह्मेति व्यजनात्। अन्नाद्येव खल्विमानि भूतानि जायंते, अन्नेन जातानि जीवन्ति, अन्नं प्रयन्त्यभिसंविश- न्तीति। तद्विज्ञाय पुनरेव वरुणं पितरमुपससार। अधीहि भगवो ब्रह्मेति। तं होवाच तपसा ब्रह्म विजिज्ञासस्व तपो ब्रह्मेति। स तपोऽतप्यत स तपस्तप्त्वा प्राणो ब्रह्मेति व्यजा- नात्। ...... । स तपस्तप्त्वा विज्ञानं ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात्। ... । स तपस्तप्त्वा आनन्दो ब्रह्मेति व्यजानात् । ...... । सैषा भार्गवी वारुणी विद्या परमे व्योमन् प्रतिष्ठिता। तै. III 1-6. 21 (a) बहूनामेमि प्रथमो बहनामेमि मध्यमः। किस्विद्यमस्य कर्तव्यं यन्मयाद्य करिष्यति॥ अनुपश््य यथा पूर्वे प्रतिपश्य तथा परे।

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सस्यमिच मर्त्यः पच्यते सस्यमिवाजायते पुनः ॥ क. I. 1. 5-6. (b) तद्यथा राजानमायांतमुग्राः प्रत्येनस: सृतग्रामण्योSन्नैः पानै- रावसथैः प्रतिकल्पंतेSयमायात्ययमागच्छतीत्येवं हैवंविदं सर्वाणि भूतानि प्रतिकल्पंत इदं ब्रह्मायातीदमागच्छतीति। तद्यथा राजानं प्रतियियासंतमुग्रा: प्रत्येनस: सूतग्रामण्योS- भिसमायन्त्येवमेवेममात्मानमंतकाले सर्वे प्राणा अभि- समायन्ति। बृ. IV. 3.37-38. (c) स यत्रायमात्माS5बल्यं न्येत्य संमोहमिव न्येत्यथैनमेते प्राणा अभिसमायंति, स एतास्तेजोमात्राः समभ्याददानी हृदयमेवान्ववक्रामति, स यत्रैष चाक्षुषः पुरुषः पराङ् पर्या- वर्ततेऽथारूपज्ञो भवति। एकीभवति न पश्यतीत्याङ्डुः ... एकीभवति न वदतीत्याहुरेकीभवति न शृणोतीत्याहुः ... एकीभवति न विजानातीत्याहुस्तस्य हैतस्य हृदयस्याग्रं प्रदयोतते तेन प्रद्योतेनैष आत्मा निष्कामति चक्षुष्टो वा मुध्नों वाऽन्येम्यो वा शरीरदेशेभ्यः, तमुत्कामंतं प्राणोऽनू- त्क्रामति, प्राणमनूत्कामन्तं सर्वे प्राणा अनृत्कामन्ति .... तं विद्याकर्मणी समन्वारभेते पूर्वप्रज्ञा च। बृ. IV. 4.1-2. (d) तद्यथा तृणजलायुका तृणस्यांतं गत्वाऽन्यमाक्रममाक्र्कम्या- त्मानमुपसंहरत्येवमेवायमात्मा इदं शरीरं निहत्य ... अन्य- माक्रममाकम्यात्मानमुपसहरति। तद्यथा पेशस्कारी पेशसो मात्रामुपादायान्यन्नवतरं कल्याणतरं रूपं तनुत एवमे- वायमात्मा इदं शरीरं निहृत्य अविद्यां गमयित्वाऽन्यन्नवतरं कल्याणतरं रूपं कुरुते, पित्र्यं वा गांधर्वे वा दैवं वा प्राजा- पत्यं वा ब्राहमं वाऽन्येषां वा भूतानाम्। स वा अयमात्मा यथाकारी यथाचारी तथा भवति साधुकारी साधुर्भवति पापकारी पापो भवति पुण्य: पुण्येन कर्मणा भवति पाप: पापेन। अथो खल्वाहु: काममय एवायं पुरुष इति स यथाकामो भवति तत्क्तुर्भवति, यत्कतुर्भवति तत्कर्म कुरुते, यत्कर्म कुरुते तदभिसपद्यते। बृ. IV.4.3-5. (e) अथाकामयमानो योऽकामो निष्काम आप्तकाम आत्मकामो न तस्य प्राणा उत्कामंति ब्रह्मैव सन् ब्रह्माप्येति। तदेष खोको भवति।

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यदा सर्वें प्रमुच्यंते कामा येऽस्य हृदि श्रिताः। अथ मर्त्यो5मृतो भवत्यत्र ब्रह्म समश्रुत इति । तद्यथाSहिनिल्वयनी वल्माके मृता प्रत्यस्ता शयीत, एव- मेवेद शरीर शेतेऽथ अयमशरीरोऽसृतः प्राणो ्रह्मैच तेज एव। बृ.IV. 4.9-7. 22 अनंदा नाम ते लोका अंधेन तमसावृताः। तांस्ते प्रेत्याभिगच्छंत्यविद्वांसोऽबुधो जनाः॥। बृ.IV.4.11. असुर्या नाम ते लोका अन्धेन तमसावृताः। तांस्ते प्रेत्याभिगच्छंति ये के चात्महनो जनाः ।। ई.3. अंधं तमः प्रविशंति येSविद्यामुपासते।। ई.g. and ब. IV. 4. 10. पीतोदका जग्धतृणा दुग्धदोहा निरिंड्रियाः। अनन्दा नाम ते लोकास्तान्स गच्छति ता ददत्॥

23 क. I. 1.3. यदा वै पुरुषोऽस्माल्लोकात्पैति स वायुमागच्छति तस्मैस तत्र विजिहीते यथा रथचकस्य सं स तेन स ऊर्ध्च आक्रमते स आदित्यमागच्छति तस्मै स तत्र विजिहीते यथा लम्ब- रस्य खं तेन स ऊर्ध्च आक्रमते स चन्द्रमसमागच्छति तस्मै स तत्र विजिहीते यथा दुन्दुे: खं तेन ऊर्ध्व आक- मते स लोकमागच्छत्यशोकमहिमं तस्मिन्वसति शाश्वतीः समा:। बृ. V.10.1. 24 (a) अथ यदु चैवास्मिञ् छव्यं कुर्वन्ति यदि च न, अर्चिषमे- वाभिसंमवन्ति, अर्चिषोऽहः, अह आपूर्यमाणपक्षं, आपूर्य- माणपक्षाद्यान् पडुदकडेति मासांस्तान् , मासेभ्यः संवत्सरं, संवत्सरादादित्यं, आदित्याच्चन्द्रमसं, चन्द्रमसो विद्युतं तत्पुरुषोSमानवः स एतान् ब्रह्म गमयत्येष देवपथो ब्रह्म- पथ एतेन प्रतिपद्यमाना इम मानवमावर्ते नावर्तन्ते नाव- तन्ते। छां. IV. 15.5-6. (b) तद्य इत्थं विदुये चेमेSरण्ये श्रद्धा तप इत्युपासते तेऽचिष- ममिसंभवन्ति ...... स एतान् ब्रह्म गमयत्येष देवयानः पन्था इति। अथ य इमे ग्राम इष्टापूर्ते दत्तमित्युपासते ते धूमममिसंभवंति, धूमाद्वात्रि, रात्रेरपरपक्ष, अपरपक्षाद्यान् षहू दक्षिणैति मासांस्तान, नैते संवत्सरमभिप्राप्नुवंति। मासेम्यः पितृलोकं, पितृलोकादाकाशं, आकाशाच्चन्द्रमसं

176 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY ..... तस्मिन् यावत्संपातमुषित्वा अथ एतमेवाध्चानं पुन- र्निवर्तन्ते, यथतमाकाशमाकाशाद्वायुं, वायुर्भूत्वा धूमो भवति, धूमो भृत्वाऽभ्रं भवति, अभ्रं भृत्वा मेघो भवति, मेघो भृत्वा प्रवर्षति, त इह व्ीहियवा ओषधिचनस्पतय- स्तिलमाषा इति जायन्तेउतो वै खलु दुर्निष्प्रपतरं यो यो ह्यन्नमत्ति यो रेतः सिंचति तद भूय एव भवति। छां. V. 10.1-6. (c) तद् इह रमणीयचरणा अभ्याशो ह यत्ते रमणीयां योनि- मापदयेरन् ब्राह्मणयोनि वा क्षत्रिययोनि वा वैश्ययोनि वा अथ य इह कपूयचरणा अभ्याशो इ यत्ते कपूयां योनिमा- पद्येरन् श्वयोनि वा सुकरयोनि वा चांडालयोनि वा। छां. V.10.7. (d) ये वै के चास्माल्लोकात् प्रयंति चन्द्रमसमेव ते सर्वे गच्छन्ति .... एतद्वै स्वर्गस्य द्वार यच्चन्द्रमाः । तं यत्प्रत्याह तम- तिसृजते य एनं प्रत्याह तमिह वृष्टिरभृत्वा वर्षति, स इह कीटो वा पतंगो वा मत्स्यो वा शकुनिर्वा शार्दूलो वा सिंहो वा परश्वान् वा पुरुषो वाऽन्यो वैतेषु स्थानेषु प्रत्याजायते यथाकर्म यथाविद्यम्। कौ. I. 2. (e) अथैतयोः पथोर्न कतरेणचन तानीमानि क्षुद्राण्यसकृदाव- तीनि भूतानि भवन्ति। जायस्य म्रियस्वेत्येतत्तृतीयं स्थानं, तैनासौ लोको न संपूर्यते तर्माज्जुगुप्सेत। छां. V.10.8. त इड व्याघ्रो वा सिंहो वा वृको वा चराहो वा कीटो वा दंशो वा मशको वा यद्यन्वंति तदाभवंति। छां. VI. 9. 3. (/) स एनं देवयानं पंथानमासाद् अझनिलोकमागच्छति, स वायुलोकं, स वरुणलोकं, स आदित्यलोकं, स इंद्रलोकं, स प्रजापतिलोक, स ब्रह्मलोकें .... तं ब्रह्म आह अभिधावत मम यशसा, विजरां वाय नदीं ग्रापत्, न वाडयं जिगी- व्यतीति। तं पंचशतान्यप्सरसां प्रतियंति शतं फलहस्ताः शत आंजनहस्ता: शत माल्यहस्ताः, शतं वासोहस्ता शत चूर्णहस्ता :... तं ब्रहमालंकारेणालंकुर्वति। स ब्रह्मालंकारेणा- लंकृतो ब्रह्म विद्वान ब्रह्माभिप्रति ... स आगच्छति विजरां नदीं तां मनसैवात्येति, तत्सुकृतदुष्कते धूनुते। तस्य प्रिय- ज्ञातयः सुकृतमुपयंत्यप्रिया दुष्कतम्। तद्यथा रथेन धावन् रथचक्रे पर्यवेक्षत एवमहोरात्रे पर्यवेक्षत एवं सुकृत-

§ 16] CHAPTER III: PSYCHOLOGY 177 दुष्कते सर्वाणि च द्वंड्वानि।स एष विसुकृती विदुष्कृतो ब्रह्म विद्वान् ब्रह्मैवाभिप्रैति। को. I. 4. 25 (a) स य एवमेतद्राजनं देवतासु प्रोतं वेद पतासामेव देवतानां सलोकतां सार््टितां सायुज्यं गच्छति। डां. II. 20. 2. (b) वेदान्तविज्ञानसुनिश्चितार्थाःसंन्यासयोगाद्यतय: शुद्धसत्वाः। ते ब्रह्मलोकेधु परांतकाले परामृता: परिमुच्यंति सर्वें॥ मुं. III. 2.6. (c) यदा पशय: पशयते रुक्मवर्णे कर्तारमीशं पुरुष ब्रह्मयोनिम्। तदा विद्वान् पुण्यपापे विधूय निरंजन: परम साम्यसुपैति॥ मुं. III. I. 3. (d) गताः कला: पचदश प्रतिष्ठाः देवाश्च सर्वे प्रतिदेवतासु। कर्माणि विज्ञानमयश्च आत्मा परेऽव्यये सर्व एकीभवंति। यथा नद्यः स्यंदमाना: समुद्रेऽस्तं गच्छंति नामरूपे विह्ाय। तथा विद्वान्नामरूपाद्विमुक्त: परात्परं पुरुषसुपैति दिव्यम्। मुं. III. 2. 7 .- 8. स यथेमा: नदः स्यंदमाना: समुद्रायणाः समुद्र प्राप्यास्तं गच्छंति भिद्येते तासां नामरूपे समुद्र इत्येवं प्रोच्यते एव- मेवास्य परिद्रष्टुरिमा: षोडशकलाः पुरुषायण: पुरुषं प्राप्यास्तं गच्छंति भिदयते तासां नामरूपे पुरुष इत्येषं प्रोच्यते स एोऽकलो5मृतो भवति। प्र. VI. 5. यथा सोम्य मघु मधुकृती निर्तिष्ठंति नानात्ययानां वृक्षाणां रसान् समवहारमेकतां रस गमयंति ते यथा तत्र न विवेक लभंतेSमुष्याहं वृक्षस्य रसोऽस्म्यमुप्याहं वृक्षस्य रसोऽस्मी त्येवमेव खलु सोम्येमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः सति संपद्य न विदु: सति संपद्यामह इति। .... इमाः सोम्य नद्यः पुरस्तात्याच्यः स्यंदंते पश्चात्प्रतीच्यस्ताः समुद्रात् समुद्रमेवापयति समुद्र एव भवति ता बथा तत्र न विदुरियमहमसमीति। छां. VI.6.I0. (6) संग्राप्यैनमृषयो ज्ञानतृप्ताः फृतात्मानो वीतरागाः प्रशाताः। ते सर्वगं सर्वतः प्राप्य धीरा युक्कात्मान: सर्वमेवाविशन्ति॥ मुं. III. 2. 5.

23

CHAPTER IV

ROOTS OF LATER PHILOSOPHIES

1. It has been customary among commentators of

Introductory. Upanishadic Philosophy to regard the variegated philosophical texts of the Upanishads as constituting one systematic whole. Thus the many great commentators on the Upanishads, such as those belonging to the schools of Pluralism, Qualified Monism, Monism, Pure Monism and others, have tried to utilise even those passages, whose import is manifestly against the particular doctrines which they are holding, as authoritative texts to prop up their own particular dogmas. The primary cause of such a hand- ling of the Upanishads is a mistaken notion of the mean- ing of revelation. The Upanishads, like the Rigveda, having been regarded as a revelation from God, it seems impossible to these commentators that such a revelation should contain texts which are contra- dictory of each other. A second reason for the manifest attempt to press all the Upanishadic texts into the service of the particular dogma to which these philo- sophers are committed is the lack of a historico-critical spirit which refuses to see in the Upanishads the bub- bling up of the thoughts of numerous sages of anti- quity, each of whom tried to express as naively, as simply, and as directly as possible the thoughts which were uppermost in his mind, and which he regarded as fully descriptive of the view of reality which cons- ciously or unconsciously had sprung up within him. As we shall see in the course of the chapter, the Upani- shads supply us with various principles of thought, and may thus be called the Berecynthia of all the later sys-

§21 CHAPTER IV : ROOTS OF PHILOSOPHIES 179

tems of Indian Philosophy. Just like a mountain which from its various sides gives birth to rivers which run in different directions, similarly the Upanishads'con- stitute that lofty eminence of philosophy, which from its various sides gives birth to rivulets of thought, which, as they progress onwards towards the sea of life, gather strength by the inflow of innumerable tri- butaries of speculation which intermittently join these rivulets, so as to make a huge expanse of waters at the place where they meet the ocean of life. It is thus that we see in the Upanishads roots of Buddhistic as well as Jain Philosophy, of Sarkhya as well as Yoga, of Mīmānsa as well as Saivism, of the theistic-my- stic philosophy of the Bhagavadgita, of the Dvaita, the Vīsishțādvaita as well as the Advaita systems. Let no man stand up and say that the Upanishads advo- cate only one single doctrine. A careful study of the Upanishads, supplemented by a critico-historical spirit engendered by the study of Western thought, will soon reduce to nought all such frivolous notions that there is only one system of thought to be found in the Upanishads. For long the personal equation of philosophers has weighed with them in determining the interpretation of texts so as to suit their own parti- cular dogmas. As against these, it shall be our busi- ness in the course of this chapter to point out how from the Upanishads spring various streams of thought, which gradually become more and more systematised into the architectonic systems of later Indian Philo- sophy.

2. We shall begin by a consideration of the sources

The Upanishads and of Buddhism as found in Upani-

Buddhism. shadic literature. It may be re- membered that the end of the Upanishadic period and the beginning of the Bud-

180 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [}2

histic period are contemporaneous, and that the one gradually and imperceptibly merges into the other. When the Chhandogyopanishad said that in the be- ginning verily Not-Being alone existed, and that it was later that Being was born from it (S. I. a), we have to understand that a reference was made here to a doc- trine which was to become full-fledged in the later denial of existence and the maintenance of a void in Buddhistic literature. When in his commentary on the above passage, Sankarāchārya states that this may refer to the doctrine of the Buddhists, who said that "sadabhava " alone existed before the creation of anything, he is right in referring it to the doctrine of the Buddhists. The metaphysical maintenance of Not-Being has its psychological counterpart in the main- tenance of the theory of the denial of Soul. When the Kathopanishad said, that when a man is dead, various people think variously about the spirit that inspired him, some saying that it still lives, others saying that it has ceased to exist (S. I. b), we have in embryo the "anatta-vada " of the Buddhists, the theory of a denial of Soul, a theory which the Bud- dhists probably held in common with the Chārvākas with whom there was no soul except the body. Then again, the cry of Nachiketas-that everything that exists exists only for the nonce and never for the morrow, that objects of sensual enjoyment only wear away the vigour of the senses, that life is only as short as a dream, that he who contemplates the delights issuing from attachment to colour and sex may never crave for longevity (S. I. c)-all this may be taken to be equally well the cry of Buddhism, which is almost contempo- raneous with the thoughts put into the mouth of Nachiketas, that everything in this world is full of sorrow, "sarvam duhkham duhkham," that every thing that exists is fleeting and evanescent, "sarvam

§ 21 CHAPTER IV : ROOTS OF PHILOSOPHIES 181 kshaņikam kshanikam." The injunction given in the Brihadaranyaka that a man who thus becomes dis- gusted with the world should rise from desires for pro- geny or wealth, and take to the life of a mendicant (S. I. d) is only too prophetic of the order of Bhikkus in Buddhism as well as Jainism. When again, the Aitareyopanishad said that all the existence in this world-the five great elements, all the beings that are born from the egg or the embryo or owe their exis- tence to perspiration or germination from the earth, all horses and cattle and men, and finally everything that breathes or moves or flies or is stationary-all these are known by intellect and are based in intellect (S. I. e), we have here enunciated for us the root-principle of the metaphysics and the epistemology of the Vijña- navadins, when we remember that there is only an easy passage from the word " prajñana" which is actually used in the quotation, to the word " vijnana," which the Vijñanavādins use. Finally, when in the conversa- tion between Jaratkārava and Yājnavalkya in the Brihadāraņyaka, Jaratkārava pressed Yājñavalkya to the deepest issue, Yajnavalkya said that it behoved them to retire to a private place and discuss the merits of the question he had asked only in private, and we are told that what passed between Jaratkārava and Yajña- valkya was only a conversation about the nature of Karman, and that they together came to the conclu- sion that a man becomes holy by holy actions and sinful by sinful actions (S. I. f.)-a thought which was probably later reiterated in the Kathopanishad where we are told that the souls take on a new body in inorganic or live matter according to their works and wisdom (S. I. g)-a passage where we have once for all laid down for us the principle of Karman which became the inspiration of Buddhistic as well as other systems of philosophy in India, but which appears

182 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§2

with a peculiar moral force in Buddhistic as in no other system of philosophy. Thus we see that all the main rudiments of Buddhism are present in embryo in the Upanishads : the doctrine of Not-Being, the doctrine of Denial of Soul, a contempt of sense- pleasure bordering upon pessimism, the order of men- dicants, the idealistic theory of knowledge, and finally the doctrine of Karman. It is true that with these rudiments Buddhism constructed a philosophy which seems to be fundamentally different from the philoso- phy of the Upanishads, but which as we have seen, found sufficient inspiration from them to be traceable to them as to a parent.

3. Like Buddhism, Sāmkhya was also a system of Samkhya in the Chha- philosophy which was very early ndogya, Katha and to come into existence. Its origin Prasna Upanishads. may certainly be traced to Upa- nishadic literature if not even earlier. It is true that the Sämkhya, along with its compeer system the Yoga, is mentioned by name only in such a late Upanishad as the Śvetāśvatara (S. 2. a); but the root-ideas of Sämkhya are to be found much earlier in Upanishadic literature. When in the Chhandogya we are told that behind all things, there are really three primary colours, namely the red, the white, and the black, and that it is only these three colours which may really be said to exist, while all other things that are constituted out of them are merely a word, a modification and a name, we have the rudiments of the theory of three Gunas of the later Samkhya philosophy-a fact which was made use of in the description of the original Prakriti, made up of the red, the white and the dark colours by the Śvetāśvataropanishad (S. 2. b). We must re- member, therefore, that for the origin of the three Gunas in the Samkhya philosophy we have to go to the concep

§3] CHAPTER IV : ROOTS OF PHILOSOPHIES 188

tion of the three colours in the Chhandogyopanishad as repeated also in the Svetāśvataropanishad. Then again, we have an interesting specimen of how Sāmkhya philosophy was yet in the making at the time of the Kathopanishad. When we are told in that Upani- shad that above the Mind is Buddhi, above the Buddhi is the Mahat Atman, above the Mahat Atman is the Avyakta, above the Avyakta is the Purusha, and that beyond and above the Purusha there is nothing else (S. 3. a), and yet again, when we are told, just a little after the verse which we have considered above, that the Mind must be merged in the Jnana Atman, the Jnana Atman in the Mahat Atman, and the Mahat Atman in the Santa Atman (S. 3. b), we have evidently to equate the Buddhi of the one passage with the Jñana Atman of the other, the Mahat Atman of the one with the Mahat Atman of the other, and the Purusha of the one with the Santa Ätman of the other, only the Avyakta of the first passage which comes in between the Mahat Atman and the Purusha having been elided in the second scheme for the sake of convenience, or even for the sake of metre. In any case it stands to reason that we may suppose that in these two passages we have enunciated tor us Mind and Intellect, the Mahat, the Avyakta, and the Purusha,-categories which play such an important part in the later Samkhya philosophy. Then also we have to note that the conception of the Linga-Sarīra in the later Samkhya philosophy is already adumbrated for us in the Praśnopanishad, which re- iterates from time to time the nature of the Purusha with sixteen parts. In this body verily is that Being who is made up of sixteen parts, says one passage (S. 4. a) ; another goes on to enumerate the constitu- ents of this Person which are breath, faith, space, air, light, water, earth, the senses, mind, food, power,

184 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY penance, ritual, karman, the worlds, and the name (S. 4. b). It may be noticed that the sixteen parts that are here declared to constitute the Person are more or less mythological and fabulous in their nature ; but we are concerned here more with the idea of the Person with sixteen parts than with the constituents of the Person themselves. When the later Samkhya Philo- sopher developed his conception of the Linga-sarira con- sisting of seventeen parts, he must have had at the back of his mind this conception of the Person with sixteen parts from the Praśnopanishad, even though there is an amount of difference between the two conceptions. It is to be remembered, nevertheless, that the Prānas and the elements, the senses and the mind, which are enumerated in the Praśnopanishad as constituting the Person with sixteen parts, are also included in the conception of the Linga-sarīra in the later Samkhya philosophy, which only elaborates these and makes the Linga-sarira consist of the five elements, the five Pranas, the five senses, and the mind, all of which are included in the scheme of the Praśnopanishad, with the addition of intellect only. Finally, the relation of the sixteen parts in the Prasnopanishad to the Person himself is also noteworthy, as we are told that these parts are to the Person as rivers are to the Ocean, the former merging themselves into the real being of the latter, what exists really and ultimately being the Person in one case, and the Ocean in the other. " As the rivers which flow to the Ocean disappear after having reached the Ocean, their very name and form are destroyed, and they are simply called the Ocean, even so these sixteen parts tend towards the Person, and reaching him disappear, their very name and form are destroyed, and they are simply called the Person, who is himself without parts and immortal" (S. 4. c). Or, to take another metaphor, this time a realistic one,

§4] CHAPTER IV : ROOTS OF PHILOSOPHIES 185 these parts are centred in the Person as spokes in the navel of a wheel (S. 4. d). In any case, it is noticeable that the conception of the Person with sixteen pårts in the Prasnopanishad may safely be regarded as the precursor of the later Samkhya conception of the Linga-śarīra, which was itself borrowed by the later Vedantic philosophy.

4. We have hitherto considered the traces of Upa- nishadic Samkhya philosophy in Samkhya In the Sve- tasvatara Upanishad. the Chhandogya, Katha and Pras- na Upanishads. The locus classi- cus, however, of Samkhya philosophy is the Śvetāśva- tara which gives us a fuller and more detailed account of Samkhya philosophy as understood in those days. To begin with, it may be remembered that the Svetaśva- tara was written at a time when the Vedanta, the Samkhya, and the Yoga were yet fused together. There was yet no definite line of cleavage between the Māya of the Vedanta and the Prakriti of the Samkhya, and the Samkhya was, like its compeer system the Yoga, theistic in its metaphysical standpoint. The Śvetāśvataropanishad wavers between the theistic and the deistic view of the Godhead. In one place God is described as bringing to maturity Nature o: Svabhäva, when he is said to preside over the pro- cess of development and to utilise the Gunas as best he may (S. 5. a). He is also described as the Lord of Pradhana or Prakriti, of individual Souls, as well as of Guņas (S. 5. b). Like a spider that weaves a web out of the material from within itself, the one God-head unfolds himself by means of the qualities born of Prakriti (S. 5. c). The Prakriti is merely God's magic power, and God is the great magician (S. 6. a). With his powers, God is described as crea- ting the world, while the other, namely the Indi- 24

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vidual Soul, is described as bound in the chains forged for him by the Universal Soul (S. 6. b). In this way we get a theistic description of the God- head, who is endowed with all activity, and the power of creation and government. On the other hand, there are other passages where God is described as living apart from Prakriti in a transcendent sphere, while the Individual Soul in the blindfoldment of his ignorance lies by the Prakriti and is caught in the meshes of her love (S. 7. a). In a true deistic spirit God is described as only the spectator of actions, as being absolutely free from the influence of qualities and as thus living apart from contamination with Prakriti (S. 7. b). We need not point too often that the Śvetāśvatara was written at the time of the part- ing of the ways between the Vedantic, the Samkhya and the Yoga Schools of Thought, which explains why we have not in the Śvetaśvatarı cut-and-dry doc- trines about Nature and God and their inter-relation That the Samkhya and the Vedanta were merged together at the time of the Śvetasvatara could also be proved by the way in which the Upanishad describes the tawny-coloured being (Kapila) as first created by the Godhead, who is described as looking upon him while he was being born (S. 8. a). Much controversy has arisen about the interpretation of the word "Kapila" in the above passage and doctrinaires are not wanting who hold that the Kapila referred to in the above passage was no other than the originator of the Sam- khya Philosophy. It need not be denied that the author of the Śvetaśvatara had no idea whatsoever at the back of his mind about the existence of Kapila, the originator of the Samkhya Philosophy, but it is evident from the way in which two other passages from the same Upanishad tell us that the Kapila of the above passage is merely the equivalent of Hiraņya-

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garbha, the Intermediary Person, the Logos of Indian Philosophy, who was the first to be created by God, and who was endowed by him with all powers (S. 8. b) ; while what doubt may still be lurking about such a Vedantic interpretation of the word Kapila, which the author of the Upanishad must have had in mind, may finally be set at rest by the consideration of a last passage from the Śvetaśva- tara, where we are told that it was Brahma, the Creator, who was first created by the Godhead as in- termediary between himself and creation (S. 8. c), thus placing beyond the shadow of a doubt the identity of the Kapila Rishi of Śvetaśvatara V. 2 with the Hiraņyagarbha of Śvetāśvatara III. 4 and IV. 12, as well as the Brahma, the Creator, of Śvetasvatara VI. 18.

5. As for the roots of the Yoga system, we must also turn to the Śvetāśvatara, The Upanishads and Yoga. which is its locus classicus. There is a passage of a very peculiar in- terest in the second chapter of the Svetaśvatara which gives us the rudiments of the practice and philosophy of the Yoga doctrine as later formu- lated. It may be seen that in the first place it calls our attention to the posture of the body at the time of practising the Yoga. Anticipating the Bhagavadgita, it tells us that we should hold the trunk, the neck, and the head in a straight line at the time of meditation. No elaborate scheme of Asanas is yet furnished, which was to form the principal theme of the New Upanishads, especially those pertain- ing to Yoga which brought Rajayoga into line with Hathayoga. Then, secondly, we are advised to con- trol our senses by means of mind, a process equivalent to the later Pratyahara, Thirdly, we are told to rec

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gulate our breath, implying that it should be made rhythmical, which practice may be called the precursor of the later Pranayama. Fourthly, we are told that the environment in which one should practise meditation should be pure, and free from sand and fire, as well as sounds and water-pools, and that as far as possible, the meditation should be practised in the recesses of a cave. Fifthly, we are informed of the harbingers of a spiritul day-light to come, namely the forms of mist and smoke, the sun and the fire, as well as other appear- ances which will be discussed in the last chapter of this work. Sixthly, we are led into the secret of the physiological effects produced by the "fire of Yoga". We are told that one who practises Yoga becomes age- less and immortal; and that he feels his body to be light and completely healthy. Lastly, the Śvetāśva- tara immediately carries us to the highest result secur- ed by the practice of Yoga, namely, to the state of Samadhi, where the Individual Soul sees the Univer- sal Soul and becomes one with him (S. 9. a), a fact adumbrated in the famous Yoga-Sutra-tada drash- tuh svarūpe avasthānam. The process of Dhāraņā and Dhyāna as preparatory to Samādhi are not separately mentioned in this Upanishad for the reason that both of them may be seen to be parts of, and thus capable of being incorporated in, the highest state, namely, that of Samādhi. The Kathopanishad, however, makes mention of Dharana and tells us that this consists in a continued equanimity of the senses, mind, and intellect, and calls it the highest state of Yoga (S. 9. b) ; while the Dhyana is also mentioned in the Śvetāśvatara I. 14, where we are asked to meditate upon the Godhead and to bring him out of the recess of our heart (S. 9. c). We thus see that if we just add the Yama and the Niyama of later Yogic philosophy to the various elements of Yoga as mentioned in

CHAPTER IV : ROOTS OF PHILOSOPHIES 189 the old Upanishads, namely, the Āsana, the Prāņayāma, the Pratyāhāra, the Dhārana and the Dhyāna, all as preparatory to Samadhi, we have the full-fledged eight-fold scheme of the Yoga, or the Way to Spiritual Realisation. Moreover, the deistic conception of God as advanced in the Yoga-Sūtras, especially in a Sūtra like klesakarmavipakasayaih aparāmrishtah purusha- visesha Iśvarah, is already present in the Upanishads when, as in the Mundaka, we are told that the Uni- versal Soul merely looks on, while the Individual Soul is engaged in the enjoyment of Prakriti, or, as in the Katha, the Godhead is described as being beyond the reach of the sorrows of the world, just as the Sun, who is the eye of the world, is beyond the reach of the de- fects of vision (S. 9. d). Finally, the physiological basis of Yoga was being already discussed in the days of the Kaushitaki and the Maitri, when it seems an impetus was being given to physiological thought, which, as later advanced by the embryological and other discussions in the Garbhopanishad, was to pave the way for a physiology which was to be at the root of the systems propounded by Charaka, Agniveśa and others. Thus in the Maitri Upanishad an enumera- tion is made of the seven Dhātus : bone, skin, muscle, marrow, flesh, semen and blood ; of the four Malas, namely, mucus, tears, fæces, and urine; and of the three Doshas, namely, wind, bile, and phlegm (S. 9. e); and in the Kaushitaki Upanishad we are told that the blood-vessels that go from the heart to the Purītat are as small as a hair divided thousand-fold, and that they are either tawny-coloured, or white,or dark, or yellow, or red (S. 9. f). With a little variation these blood-vessels were described, before the time of the Kaushitaki, in the Chhandogya, as being tawny, white, blue, yellow and red (S. 9. g), and in the Briha- dāranyaka as white, blue, tawny, green and red

190 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§5

(S. 9. h). Whatever we may say about the "white" blood-vessels or "yellow " blood-vessels and the rest, it is evident that the authors of these passages knew at least the distinction between the blue and the red blood-vessels, a fact of great physiological importance. It was the study of Yoga which was the cause of the rise of physiological science which was the precursor of the later full-fledged systems of medicine.

6. The mention of blood-vessels and the Puritat takes us toanother subject, namely, The Upanishads and the source of certain Nyaya-Vai- Nyaya-Vaiseshikn. seshika doctrines as found in the Upanishads. It may easily be seen that the Upani- shads are in a sense entirely different in their tenor and argument from the systems that go under the names of Nyaya-Vaiseshika. While the business of the Vaise- shika philosophy is to make a catalogue of ultimate existences in Nature, and of Nyaya philosophy to discuss the nature of dialectic and its aberrations, the Upanishads aim at stating as simply as possible the metaphysical doctrine of Ätman. The only point of contact, it seems, between the Nyaya-Vaiśeshika on the one hand and the Upanishads on the other, so far as their metaphysics is concerned, is the concep- tion of the Summum Bonum or Moksha which the Nyāya-Vaiśeshika systems derive from the Upanishads. Moreover the Nyaya-Vaiseshika systems of philosophy require a highly developed stage of logical thought which would care more for the instrument of know- ledge than for knowledge itself. Hence we do not find many traces of the Nyāya-Vaiseshika doctrine in the Upanishads. But the doctrine of the Purītat as advanced in the Upanishads has been bodily taken by the Nyaya and Vaiseshika systems of philosophy, and a change for the better has been also introduced in that

§6] CHAPTER IV : ROOTS OF PHILOSOPHIES 191 doctrine by those systems. While the Brihadaranya- kopanishad tells us, probably for the first time in the history of Upanishadic Thought, that at the time . of sleep, the Soul moves by the Nadis to the Puritat, in which it takes lodgment and causes the physiological action of sleep (S. 10. a), the Nyaya philosophy takes up this idea from the Brihadaranyaka, only substitu- tes Mind for Soul, and says that it is the Mind which thus moves through the arteries to the Puritat, and it is only when the Mind is lodged in the Puritat that sleep occurs. The principal reason for the change thus introduced by the Nyaya Philosophy seems to be, probably, that one could easily predicate sleep about the Mind, but could never predicate it about the Soul, which must be regarded as always un-sleeping ! Secondly, the Vaiseshika philosophy itself, particularly in its enumeration of the Dravyas, namely the five different Elements along with Kala, Manas and Ätman, the Dik being included in the Akasa, is in- debted to many passages from the Upanishads where the five Elements are mentioned along with other conceptions, as for example, to the passage in the Śvetaśvatara where we are told that the Ätman is the Time of Time, and that the Elements, namely, earth, water, fire, air and ether are merely his handi- work (S. 10. b). Finally, when the Chhāndogya Upa- nishad says that it is the Akasa or ether which is the carrier of sound,-for we are told, it is by Akāsa that man calls, it is by Ākāśa that man hears, it is by Akāśa that man is able to hear the echo of a sound (S.Io.c),- we are introduced to a conception which later played such an important part in the Naiyayika philosophy when it defined Akāśa by its principal mark, namely, that of being the carrier of sound. The Mimansa doctrine, on the other hand, it may be remembered by the bye, is more scientifically correct than the

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Upanishadic-Naiyāyika doctrine when it tells us that it is the air which is the carrier of sound and not ether-a fact corroborated by modern science.

7. The Mimansa school of thought, by the very nature of its ritualistic problems, The Upanishads and Mimansa. has not much in common with Upanishadic philosophy, whose business it is to consider the nature of the Ultimate. But there is one very important philosophical doctrine of the Mimansakas which has been advocated by the Isāvāsyopanishad. This Upanishad tells us that " those who walk on the path of ignorance, namely, that of works, go to pitchy darkness ; while those who walk on the path of knowledge go to greater darkness still. Ignorance leads to the one result, while knowledge leads to the other. This is what we have heard from the Sages, who have told us about the nature of ignorance and knowledge. But he, who knows both the path of ignor- ance and the path of knowledge together, by his know- ledge of the one is able to cross the bund of death, and by his knowledge of the other to attain to immortality " (S.II). This very important quotation from the Isāvāsyo- panishad tells us the way of synthesis out of the conflict ing claims of works and knowledge. On the one hand, mere works are insufficient, on the other, mere know- ledge is insufficient. The Purva Mimansa which advocates the one and the Uttara Mimansa which advocates the other may both be said to take partial views. As against both these the Isavasyopanishad tells us that he who knows how to reconcile the claims of both works and knowledge is able to extricate him- self from the evils inherent in either and to enjoy the advantages of both by going beyond both of them. We know how in later times there was a very great con-

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flict between the schools of Prabhākara, Kumārilabhatta and Sankara, the first maintaining that absolution could be attained only by means of works,-and know- ledge itself he regarded as work,-the second main- taining that absolution could be attained only by a combination of knowledge and works, and the third maintaining that absolution must be attained only by knowledge. The Isavasyopanishad puts forth an idea which supports neither the doctrine of Prabha- kara on the one hand, nor the doctrine of Śankara on the other, but only the doctrine of Kumarilabhatta that absolution is to be obtained by a combination of know- ledge and works, while it even goes beyond Kumārila- bhatta in asserting that both knowledge and works are to be negated in the higher synthesis of realisa- tion. As Kumārilabhatța said a bird could not fly in the heaven merely by one wing, but only by means of both wings together, similarly, says the Isāvāsya, man must reconcile the claims of both knowledge and works to be able to soar in the regions of the Infinite, the synthesis of soaring being even superior to the fact of equipoise. We thus see how the Isavāsyopani- shad puts forth a theory which later became the pivot of the doctrine of the moderate Mīmānsakas, support- ing as it does neither the doctrine of the ultra-MI- mansakas, nor that of the ultra-Vedantists.

8. As for the roots of Saivism in the Upanishads, we must turn again to the Śvetāśva- The Upanishads and Salvism. tara. Even though Uma as a heavenly damsel is mentioned so far back as the Kenopanishad, still, for a detailed and systematic philosophy of Saivism, we must neces- sarily turn to the Svetasvatara. It is true that the conception of Rudra-Siva was being developed since the days of the Rigveda and the Atharvaveda; #5

194 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§8

but it is only when we come to the time of Śveta- śvatara that we find the doctrine of Siva placed on a more or less philosophical foundation. We are told in this Upanishad that "it is the God Isa who supports both the mutable and the im- mutable, the manifest and the unmanifest. As con- trasted with Him is the powerless Atman, who is bound on account of his being the enjoyer of the fruits of action; but that, when this Ätman knows the Isa, he is relieved of his bonds, namely, the Pasas" (S. 12. a). The philosophy of Paśu, Pati, and Pāśa is thus to be already seen in an embryonic stage in the Śvetaśvatara. "Rudra is the only Lord God. They do not maintain another God. He who rules these worlds by means of his powers, standing before every man's face, and destroying the created world in anger at the time of the Great End (S. 12. b)-He is the Lord Siva, who, hidden in all beings, is the sole enve- loper of the universe, who is like the very subtle film at the top of ghee, by the knowledge of whom alone comes freedom from the meshes of ignorance" (S. 12. c). " Verily does the God spread manifold the meshes in his hands, and move on the surface of this globe. He creates and recreates and maintains his sove- reignty over all the worlds" (S. 12. d). In this fashion is the God Rudra, who is identified with Siva or Isa, magnified in the Śvetāśvatara as the only Lord God who is the Supreme Soul of Souls and who is the Governor of the universe, by the knowledge of whom alone the individual Soul, who is bound down in the meshes of ignorance, can attain absolution. This was the manner in which the Śvetasvatara paved the way for later Saivism, its theistic way of glorification, suffused with a trinitarian monism, becoming the pivot of the doctrines of Kasmir Saivism and Southern Śaivism.

CHAPTER IV : ROOTS OF PHILOSOPHIES 195

9. When we come to discuss the relation between

Phraseological and the Upanishads and the Bhaga- Ideological identities vadgītā, we must observe at the between the Upanishads outset that a full discussion of and the Bhagavadgita. this problem cannot be attempted at the short space at our disposal in this chapter. The problem is so interesting and so wide that a full discussion of it could be attempted only in a sepa- rate treatise. It is necessary for us nevertheless to indi- cate the main lines of the relation between the Upani- shads and the Bhagavadgīta at this place. There is an amount of truth in the famous verse which tells us that " the Upanishads are like a cow, Krishna like a milk-man, Arjuna like the calf that is sent to the udders of the cow before milking, and the Bhagavadgita like the milk-nectar that is churned from the udders of the cow." As illustrations of the way in which the Bhagavadgītā borrows ideas, phrases and even senten- ces from the Upanishads, we have to note how the verse from the Kathopanishad which tells us that " the Atman is never born nor is ever killed, he never comes from anything, nor becomes anything, he is unborn, imperishable, eternal, has existed from all eternity, and is not killed even when the body is killed" (S. 13. a) is reproduced almost word for word in Bhagavadgita II. 20 ; as well as that other verse from the Katha which tells us that " when a killer thinks he is killing and when the killed thinks he is being killed, neither of them verily knows, for the Atman is neither killed nor ever kills," (S. 13. b) is reproduced in those very words in Bhagavadgita II. 19. Then again we see how a verse from the Kathopanishad which tells us that " the Atman is not even so much as heard of by many, that even hearing Him people do not know Him, that the speaker of the Atman is a miracle, that the obtainer of Him must have exceed-

196 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

ing insight, that he who comes to know him after being instructed by such a wise man is himself a mira- cle " (S. 13. c) is paraphrased and adopted in Bhaga- vadgītā II. 29; while another verse from the same Upanishad "What word the Vedas declare, what word the penances busy themselves about, what word inspires the life of spiritual discipleship, that word, briefly I tell thee, is Om " (S. 13. d) is also reproduced al- most word for word in Bhagavadgita VIII. 13. Finally, the conception of Devayana and Pitriyana, the path of the Gods and the path of the Fathers (S. 13. e), which the Upanishads, as we have seen, themselves borrowed from the Vedas, was handed over by them to the Bhagavadgita, which, in a very crisp descrip- tion of the two paths (VIII. 24-25), tells us, in the very same strain as the Upanishads, that those who move by the path of the Gods move towards Brahman, while those who go by the path of the Fathers return by the path by which they have gone.

10. So far we have considered the passages from Development of the the Bhagavadgita and the Upani- Bhagavadgita over the shads which are substantially Upanishads. idenical from the point of view of either phraseology or ideology. We shall now consi- der those passages and ideas from the Upanishads which the Bhagavadgita has borrowed, transformed, and developed, so as to suit its own particular philo- sophy. The verse from the Isavasyopanishad which tells us in a spirit of apparent contradiction that "a man should spend his life-time only in doing actions, for it is only thus that he may hope to be untainted by action " (S. 14. a), has supplied the Bhagavadgīta with an idea so prolific of consequences that the Bhagavadgīta has deemed it fit to erect a whole philo- sophy of Karmayoga upon it. As we may also point

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out in the chapter on the Ethics of the Upanishads, this passage supplies us with the means as well as the goal of moral life, without giving us the connecting link between them. As we shall see later, the prin- cipal theme of the Bhagavadgīta is to teach a life of activity coupled with the effects of actionlessness through the intermediate linkage of un-attachment to and indifference to the fruits of action. Secondly, when in the Mundakopanishad we find the descrip- tion of the Cosmic Person with fire as his head, the sun and the moon as his eyes, the quarters as his ears, the Vedas as his speech, air as his Prana, the universe as his heart, and the earth as his feet (S. 14. b), we have in embryo a description of the Viśvarūpa which later became the theme of the famous Eleventh Chapter of the Bhagavadgita on the transfigured personality of Krishna. It is true at the same time that the Mundakopanishad probably borrows the idea from the Purushasūkta, but it is equally true to say that it supplies the Bhagavadgita with a text upon which the latter enlarges, and evolves the conception of the Cosmic Person, who fills all, who is all-powerful, to whom the past and the future are like an eternal now, submission to whom and assimilation to whom consti- tute the ends of mortal endeavour. Then, thirdly, while the Kathopanishad gives us a scheme of psycho- logical and metaphysical existences mixed together in a famous passage where it declares that beyond the senses are the objects, beyond the objects is mind, beyond the mind is intellect, beyond the intellect is Mahat, beyond the Mahat is the Avyakta, and finally beyond the Avyakta is the Purusha, beyond whom and outside whom there is nothing else (S. 14. c), the Bhagavadgīta simplifies the scheme very much by retaining only the psychological categories and doing away with the metaphysical,

198 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§10

for the simple reason that it understands the passage to have a psychological rather than a metaphysical significance. Thus, when the Bhagavadgita in III. 42 tells us that beyond the senses is mind, that beyond the mind is intellect, and that beyond intellect is the Purusha, it drops out altogether the categories of the objective world,-the Mahat and the Avyakta,-retains only the psychological categories and simplifies the scheme immensely. Finally, the devotional im- pulse which beats in the heart of Narada when he im- plores Sanatkumāra to initiate him into spiritual wis- dom (S. 15. a), as well as the equally fervent emotional attitude of Brihadratha when he requests Śakayanya to lift him out of the mire of existence like a frog from a waterless well (S. 15. b),-which emotional attitudes may be seen to be strangely in contrast with the otherwise generally dry intellectual argumentation of the Upanishads,-become later almost the founda- tion-stone for the theistic-mystic philosophy of the Bhagavadgīta, in which the dry intellectualism and the speculative construction of the Upanishads dis- appear, and we have the rare combination of poetry and philosophy which makes the "Upāsana" of the Śvetāśvatara (S. 15. c), or "Bhakti" to God as to Guru (S. 15. d) the sine quâ non of a truly mystic life, whose end is the realisation of God.

11. In one important respect, however, the Bha- The Asvattha in the gavadgīta takes a position almost Upanishads and the antagonistic to the position ad- Bhaģavadģita. vanced in the Upanishads. In the Kathopanishad, we have the description of " the eter- nal Asvattha tree with its root upwards and branches downwards, which is the pure immortal Brahman, in which all these worlds are situated, and beyond which there is nothing else " (S. 16). In this passage we are

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told that the Asvattha tree is the Brahman itself, and that it is imperishable. On the other hand, the Bha- gavadgīta, at the opening of its 15th Chapter, tells us that "the Asvattha tree has its root upwards and branches downwards. Its leaves are the Vedas. It sends out its branches both downwards and upwards, which are nourished by the Gunas. The sensual objects are its foliage. Yet again, its infinite roots spread downwards in the form of action in the human world. It is not possible to have a glimpse of that tree here in this fashion. It has neither end, nor be- ginning, nor any stationariness whatsoever. After having cut off this Asvattha tree, which has very strong roots, by the forceful weapon of unattachment, we should then seek after that celestial abode from which there is no return, and reach the primeval Person, from whom all existence has sprung of old " (XV. 1-4). We are not concerned here to dis- cuss the merits or demerits of this description of the Asvattha tree in the Bhagavadgīta. We shall not consider the contradictions that are introduced in this description, but we are concerned here only to find how far this description from the Bhagavadgita agrees with the description in the Kathopanishad. It may be noted at once that there is an agreement be- tween the Upanishad and the Bhagavadgīta so far as the Asvattha tree is regarded as having its root upwards and its branches downwards. But, while the Upani- shad teaches that the Asvattha tree is real, and iden- tical with Brahman, and therefore impossible of being cut off, the Bhagavadgita teaches that the Asvattha tree must be regarded as unreal, and as identical with existence, and therefore that it is necessary to cut off this tree of existence by the potent weapon of non-attach- ment. The two descriptions seem to be almost at daggers drawn. It may be noticed by students of

200 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§11

comparative mythology that the descriptions of the Asvattha tree in the Upanishad and in the Bhagavadgīta have an analogue in the description of the tree Igdrasil in Scandinavian mythology. It is important to notice also that the description of the Igdrasil agrees with that of the Upanishads in making the tree identical with Reality, and therefore having a real concrete ex- istence. On the other hand, it agrees with the Bha- gavadgītā in making the actions, the motives, and the histories of mankind the boughs and branches of this tree of existence. We cannot do better than quote in this place Carlyle's famous description of the tree Igdrasil : "All Life is figured by them as a Tree. Igdrasil, the Ash-tree of Existence, has its roots deep down in the kingdoms of Hela or Death; its trunk reaches up heaven-high, spreads its boughs over the whole Universe ; it is the Tree of Existence. At the foot of it, in the. Death-kingdom, sit Three nornas Fates,-the Past, Present, Future; watering its root from the Sacred Well. Its 'boughs,' with their bud- dings and disleafings,-events, things suffered, things done, catastrophes,-stretch through all lands and times. Is not every leaf of it a biography, every fibre there an act or word? Its boughs are Histories of Nations. The rustle of it is the noise of Human Ex- istence, onwards from of old. It grows there, the breath of Human Passion rustling through it ;- or storm-tost, the stormwind howling through it like the voice of all the gods. It is Igdrasil, the Tree of Existence. It is the past, the present and the future ; what was done, what is doing, what will be done ; the infinite conjugation of the verb To do." It is unfortu- nate that the Scandinavian description should have placed the roots of the Ash tree deep down in the kingdoms of Hela or Death, and even though its trunk is described as reaching up heaven-high, it were much

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to be wished that its roots had come from the region of the life eternal. In that respect, both the Bhaga- vadgīta and the Upanishads have a distinct advan- tage over the Scandinavian mythology.

12. We must not forget, however, to discuss the

The Krishna of the merits of a question which has Chhandogya and the assumed some importance at the Krishna of the Bha- hands of certain modern inter- gavadģita. preters of the Bhagavadgītā and the Upanishads, especially because it seems to us that these interpreters have raised a dust and com- plain that they cannot see. In the Chhandogya, there is the mention of a Krishna who was the son of Devakī, and these interpreters feel no difficulty in facilely identifying him with Krishna, the son of Devakī, who was the divine hero of the Mahabharata. We shall see how futile such an identification is. But before we go on to this discussion, we must state first the meaning of the passage where the name of Krishna, the son of Devaki, occurs. In the third chapter of Chhändogya, there is a passage which stands by itself, the purport of which is to liken a man to a sacrificer and thus institute a comparison between the human life and the sacrificer's life. What hap- pens in the case of the life of a sacrificer ? When he undertakes to perform a sacrifice, he is first disallowed to take food, or to drink water, or in any way to enjoy. This constitutes his Diksha. Then, secondly, there are certain ceremonies called the Upasadas in that sacrifice, in which he is allowed to eat and drink and enjoy himself. Thirdly, when such a sacrificer wishes to laugh, and eat and practise sexual inter- course even while the sacrifice is going on, he is allowed to do so if he just sings the hymns of praise called the Stutasastras. Fourthly, he must give certain 26

202 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§ 12

Daxinas or gifts to the sacrificial priests in honour of the sacrifice that he is performing. Fifthly, he pours out the Soma libation which is equivalent to a new birth of the sacrificer. Finally, the sacrificer takes the Avabhritha bath at the end of the sacrificial ceremony which puts an end to the sacrifice. These are the stages through which a sacrificer's life passes. Now we are told in the passage which we are discussing that Ghora Ängirasa, the reputed teacher of Krishna who was the son of Devaki, institutes a comparison be- tween the life of a sacrificer and the life of a man in general. At the initial stage of a man's life, he has to serve merely as an apprentice, and cannot eat and drink and enjoy on certain occasions. Secondly, another stage opens before him, namely, when he can eat and drink and enjoy himself. Thirdly, when he grows a little older, he can laugh and eat and practise sexual intercourse. Fourthly, the price which he has to pay for leading a holy life is that he should cultivate the virtues, namely, penance, liberality, straightforward- ness, harmlessness, and truthfulness. Fifthly, when he has procreated, we may say he is born again in his child. The final act of the human drama takes place when death lets down the curtain, and the man is on the point of departing from his life. At such a critical time, says Ghora Angirasa to Krishna-and we are told that when this knowledge was imparted to Krishna he never thirsted again for further knowledge- -man must take refuge in these three thoughts: Thou art the indestructible ; Thou art the unchange- able; Thou art the very edge of life (S. 17). From this passage a number of modern critics have argued that the Krishna, the son of Devaki, who is mentioned in this passage, must be regarded as identical with Krishna, the son of Vasudeva, who, as we have pointed out, is the divine hero of the Mahabharata. Mr.

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Grierson in the "Encyclopædia of Religion and Ethics" points out in a very facile fashion, that "Krishna Vasudeva, who was the founder of the new monotheistic religion, was the pupil of a sage named Ghora Angirasa, who taught him so that he never thirsted again." In answer to such an identification of Krishna, the son of Vasudeva, and Krishna, the pupil of Ghora Angirasa, we have to point out that this is merely an assertion without proof. It passes our understanding how for the simple reason that Krishna, the pupil of Ghora Angirasa, was the son of Devaki as mentioned in the Chhandogya, he could be identified with Krishna, the son of Devaki, of the Mahabharata, where no mention is made whatsoever of Ghora Angirasa who was the teacher of Krishna in the Chhandogya. Such a fact cannot be easily ignored in a work like the Mahabharata which is expected to give us everything about the divine warrior Krishna, and not leave the name of his teacher unmentioned. If the Krishna of the Chhandogya is to be identified with the Krishna of the Mahabharata, for that matter why should not we identify the Harischandra of the Aitareya Brahmana who had a hundred wives with the Harischandra of mythology who had only one wife ? Mere similarity of name proves nothing. It fills one with humour that a new facile philosophy of identifications Brähmana-wise should have been insti- tuted in modern times by a host of critics of no small calibre when they would raise a huge structure of mythico-imaginary identifications by rolling to- gether the god Vishņu of Vedic repute, Narayana the Cosmic God, Krishna the pupil of Ghora Angirasa, and Vasudeva the founder of a new religion, and thus try to prove that the sources of the religion of the Bhagavad- gīta are to be found in the teaching of Ghora Angirasa ! There would seem to be some meaning, however, in the

204 SURVEY OP UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ § 12 attempted identification of the Krishna of the Chhan- dogya with the Krishna of the Bhagavadgītā, when, in verse 4 of the passage we are discussing, we are told that the gifts which such a sacrificer should make to priests are those of the following virtues: Tapas, Dānam, Arjavam, Ahinsā and Satyavachanam. This list is closely similar to the list of virtues enum- erated in the Bhagavadgīta XVI.I-2, where the same virtues are enumerated along with a number of other virtues, and almost in the same order. But this fact also proves nothing, because, as we have pointed out in the preceding paragraphs, the Bha- gavadgītā is a congeries of quotations, phrases, and ideas borrowed from the Upanishads, and it is only by accident, as we may say, that the five virtues mentioned above should have been enumerated in the Upanishadic passage where Krishna, the son of Devakī, is also mentioned. There is a story about the Delphic Oracle that a number of trophies were hung round about the temple in praise of the god who had saved so many souls at different times from ship- wreck in the midst of waters. A philosopher went to the temple and asked, Yea, but where are those that are drowned ? Similarly may we say about the virtues in the Chhändogya passage which are identical with the virtues in the pas- sage from the Bhagavadgīta. True, that the virtues enumerated in the Chhandogya almost correspond to the virtues enumerated in the Bhagavadgītā; but, why, for the world, should not the essence of the teach- ings of Ghora Angirasa have been incorporated into the Bhagavadgita, when the Upanishad passage tells us that at the last moment of a man's life, he should take resort to these three thoughts: Thou art the indes- tructible, Thou art the unchangeable, Thou art the very edge of life ? Why should not the Bhagavadgīta

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have profited by these three expressions : Akshita, Achyuta and Pranasamsita? Why should it have left us merely with the advice that a man should utter Om at the time of his death and meditate upon God ? Finally, we may say that the burden of the proof of the identification of the two Krishnas falls upon those who make the assertion, and so far as their arguments have gone, we do not think that they have, in any way, proved the identification at all.

13. The relation of the Upanishads to the Brahma- The Upanishads and sūtras is no less interesting and the Schools of the Ve- no less important than the rela- danta. tion of the Upanishads to the Bhagavadgīta. In fact, the whole of the philosophy of the Vedanta in its various schools has been based upon these three foundation-stones, namely, the Upa- nishads, the Brahmasūtras, and the Bhagavadgītā, and thus it may easily be expected that the inter- relation of the Brahmasutras to the Upanishads from which they were derived must constitute an equally important problem. Badarayana, the author of the Brahmasutras, borrows so frequently and so immense- ly from the Upanishads, in fact, all his aphorisms are so much rooted in the texts of the Upanishads, that it would be impossible either to understand or to interpret the Brahmasutras without a perpetual re- ference to the texts of the Upanishads. As to whe- ther he taught the dualistic Vedanta or the qualified monistic Vedanta, or the monistic Vedanta, it is not our business here to discuss ; but it must be remem- bered that each of the three great schools of Vedantic philosophy, namely, the schools of Madhva, Rama- nuja, and Sankara, interprets the Brahmasūtras as well as the Upanishads in its own way. The Suddhad- vaita, the Dvaitädvaita and other interpretations of the

206 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY philosophy of the Brahmasutras and the Upanishads are merely varied combinations of the ultimate posi- tions reached in these three main systems of philosophy. Hence, when we have discussed how far the Upanishads sanction the difference between the Dvaita, the Visishtadvaita and the Advaita schools of philosophy, we have exhausted all the different fundamental con- ceptions of the Vedanta, from whose permutation and combination all the other systems are derived. And even while we are discussing these three main schools of Vedantic philosophy, a number of fundamental propositions arise, difference in the treatment of which constitutes difference in the systems themselves. Thus the main problems which these philosophers have to answer are these : What is the nature of God ? Is He different from, included in, or identical with the Ab- solute ? In other words, are the theological concep- tion of God and the philosophical conception of the Absolute one and the same ? What is the relation of the Individual to the Universal Soul in these systems ? Do these systems maintain the reality of creation, or, do they suppose that, after all, creation is only an appearance and an illusion ? What is the doctrine of Immortality in these systems ? What do these systems say about the immanence and transcendence of God ? How can we define the Absolute-in positive terms, in negative terms, in both, or in neither ? The an- swer to these and other problems of the same kind constitutes the fundamentum divisionis of the systems themselves. We shall see how the three great schools of Vedäntic philosophy find answers for these pro- blems according to their different lights in the texts of the Upanishads.

14. The dualistic school of philosophy initiated by Ānandatīrtha finds justification for its maintenance of

.

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the doctrine of the entire disparateness of the Indivi- dual and the Universal Souls in Madhvaism in the Upanishads. such a passage as the one from the Katha, which tells us that "in this world there are two Souls which taste of the fruits of action, both of which are lodged in the recess of the human heart, and which are as different from each other as light and shade" (S. 18. a), corrected, as later, in the passage from the Mundakopanishad which tells us that " there are two birds, companions and friends, both sitting on the same tree, of which one partakes of the sweet fruits of the tree, while the other without eating mere- ly looks on " (S. 18. b). The difficulty in the passage from the Kathopanishad which we have quoted above is-how can we regard the Universal Soul as enjoying the fruits of action ? The enjoyment of the fruits of action could be predicated only about the Individual Soul and not about the Universal Soul which must be regarded as above such enjoyment. Hence, it was probable, that the Mundaka Upa- nishad relieved the Universal Soul of the burden of the enjoyment of the fruits of such action, and laid the fact of enjoyment at the door of the Individual Soul. In any case, it is worth while noting that the Individual Soul is in the above two passages spoken of as being entirely distinct from the Universal Soul, and as being probably dependent upon it. These are the texts, which, like the later one from the Bhagavadgīta "there are two Persons in this world, the Mutable and the Immutable ; the Mutable is all these beings, while the Immutable is the one who exists at the top of them" (XV. 16), have been quoted in support of their doctrine of the entire disparateness of the Individual and the Universal Souls by the followers of Madhva. Then, again, when they speak about

.

208 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§14

the existence of a supreme God, who is the creator, the preserver and the destroyer of the universe, who exists as a personal Being, and as over-lord of all the Souls who are his servants, they have ample justifica- tion in passages like the one from the Śvetaśvatara which tells us that " there is a single God who is hidden in all beings, who pervades all, and who is the inner Soul of all Souls" (S. 19. a), as well as those others from the Śvetaśvatara itself which tell us that "beyond this universal God there exists nothing, than whom there is nothing subtler or greater, who stands motionless like a tree in the sky and fills every nook and cranny of the universe" (S. 19. b), or again like that last passage from Śvetāśvatara, which, in the spirit of Xenophanes, tells us that God is all eye and all ear- ούλος όρα, ούλος δε νοεΐ, ούλος δέ τ'υκούει -with his face everywhere, his hands and feet every- where, who creates the beings of the earth and the fowl of the air, and who brings into being both the heaven and the earth (S. 19. c). Such a theory of the sovereignty of the Lord over organic as well as inorganic nature brings in its train a realistic theory of creation which tells us that " all these beings were created from Him ; they live and move and have their being in Him ; and they are ultimately resolved in Him " (S. 20. a), as well as that all inorganic nature was created by Him, "space being the first to come out of Him, from which later were produced air and fire and water and earth, and the herbs and the trees and the food in the universe " (S. 20. b). We have already seen in our discussion of the theories of cosmogony in an earlier chapter that a realistic account of creation such as is implied in these passages is really an obstacle to those who try to make creation merely an appearance or an illusion, and that therefore these texts support the doctrine of the realistic theory of creation of

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Madhva as of none else. It is true that Śankara tries to explain the ablative implied in "yatova" or " tas- mādvā" as being Adhishțhāna-panchamī, Rāmānuja trying to explain it as merely Upadāna-pañchamī, while Madhva explains it truly as Nimitta-pañ- chami. This is as much as to say, that while accord- ing to Sankara the Atman or the Ultimate Reality stands behind the universe as the support and sub- stratum of all creation which merely appears on it, according to Ramanuja, the Atman is the material cause of the universe as gold of gold-ornaments or earth of earthen-ware in quite a realistic manner, while according to Madhva, the Atman or the Supreme Soul is the creator of the universe or the instrumental cause of its unfoldment. Finally, so far as the doctrine of im- mortality is concerned, a passage like the one from the Chhandogya which tells us that the worshipper is lifted up to the region of the deity whom he has worshipped in life (S. 21) supports the doctrine of Madhva that absolution consists not in being merged in the Absolute, nor even in being assimilated to Him, but in coming near his presence and participating in his glory so that the devotee may be lifted, according to the requirements of the doctrine of Kramamukti, along with the God whom he has worshipped, to the state of the highest absolution at the end of time.

15. Rāmānuja agrees with Madhva in maintaining

The Triune Absolute the utter separateness of the In- of Ramanuja. dividual Souls and God, the reality of Creation, as well as to a great extent the doctrine of Immortality; but he differs from him in regarding the Absolute to be of the nature of a Triune Unity,-a sort of a philosophic tripod,-of which Nature, the Individual Souls, and God form the feet. So far, again, as the relation 27

210 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ § 15

between the Souls and God is concerned, he disagrees with Madhva in maintaining a qualitative monism, though he agrees with him in maintaining a numerical pluralism. For his doctrine of Triune Unity, Rāmā- nuja finds ample justification in the passages from the Śvetaśvatara which tell us that there are "three ulti- mate existences, all of them eternal and all together constituting the Absolute, namely, the powerless un- knowing Soul, the powerful knowing God, and the eternal Prakriti, which exists for the enjoyment of the individual Soul, and from which he receives recompense for his works" (S. 22. a), and yet again that " man need but know the three entities which constitute the Absolute, namely, the enjoyer, the enjoyed, and the mover, and that when a man has known these three, nothing remains to be known" (S.22.b). Thus we see that the Absolute of Ramanuja consists of Nature, Soul and God, God being identical with the Absolute considered in his personal aspect, while there is only this difference between them that while God is the theological conception, the Absolute is the philosophi- cal conception, of the Triune Unity. It thus comes about that God is as much the Soul of Nature as he is the Soul of Souls. This is the fundamental platform in the philosophy of Ramanujacharya, and we shall see what justification he finds for such views in the Upanishads themselves.

16. How is God the Soul of Nature? There is

God, the Soul of Na- a passage in the Brihadāraņyaka ture. which tells us that God is the Antaryamin of the universe : He lives inside and governs the universe from within. This doctrine of the Antaryamin, which is advanced in that Upanishad in the conversation between Udda- laka Aruņi and Yajñavalkya, constitutes the funda-

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mental position in the philosophy of Ramanuja when he calls God the the Soul of Nature. Uddalaka Āruņi asked Yajnavalkya two questions. " Pray tell me," he said, "what is the Thread by which this world and the other world and all the things therein are held together ?" "Pray tell me also," he con- tinued, "who is the Controller of the Thread of this world and the other world and all the things therein?" These are the two celebrated questions propounded in the passage which we are discussing, namely, the doctrine of the Thread and the doctrine of the Thread-Controller. Yajñavalkya answered the first question by saying that Air might be regarded as the Thread by which this world and the other world and all the things therein are held together. The second question he answered by saying that He alone might be regarded as the inner Con- troller " who dwells in the earth and within the earth, whom the earth does not know, whose body the earth is, who from within controls the earth. He is thy Soul, the inner controller, the immortal. He who dwells in the waters and within the waters, whom the waters do not know, whose body the waters are, who from within controls the waters, He is thy Soul, the inner controller, the immortal." Thus Yajnavalkya went on to tell Uddalaka Aruņi that the inner Controller is He who is immanent likewise " in fire, in the intermundia, in air, in the heavens, in the sun, in the quarters, in the moon, in the stars, in space, in darkness, in light, in all beings, in Prāņa, in all things and within all things, whom these things do not know, whose body these things are, who con- trols all these things from within. He is thy Soul, the inner controller, the immortal. He is the unseen seer, the unheard hearer, the unthought thinker, the ununderstood understander; other than Him, there is

212 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§ 16

no seer, other than Him there is no hearer, other than Him there is no thinker, other than Him there is no understander ; He is thy Soul, the inner controller, the immortal. Everything beside Him is naught " (S. 23. a). In this wise does Yajñavalkya declare the immanence within, and the inner control of the universe by the all-pervading God. In the same fashion does the author of the Taittiriya tells us that "at the time of creation, God entered everything that he created, and after having entered, became both the This and the That, the Defined and the Undefined, the Supported and Supportless, Knowledge and Not- Knowledge, Reality and Unreality-yea, he became the Reality ; it is for this reason that all this is verily called the Real" (S. 23. b). This passage also decla- res the immanence of God in all things whatsoever, even in contradictories, and tells us that what thus comes to exist is the Real. The whole of Nature, therefore, which is God's handiwork, as well as God's garment, is filled and inspired by God who is its inner Controller and Soul.

17. How is God the Soul of Souls ? We are told in the Brihadäranyaka by the help of God, the Soul of Souls. a simile which is oft repeated in the Upanishads that "just as the spokes of a wheel are held together in the navel and felly of a wheel, similarly in this Supreme Soul are centred all these beings, all gods, all worlds, all the individual souls-the Supreme Soul is the king of them all" (S. 24. a). In another passage, the same Upanishad tells us, by a change of metaphor, that "just as little sparks may come out of fire, even so from the Supreme Soul all pranas, all worlds, all gods, all beings come out. This is to be mystically expressed by saying that the Supreme Soul is the verity of verities; the

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pranas, as well as other things mentioned along with them, are verities, of whom the Universal Soul is the supreme verity" (S. 24. b). In these passages we are told how God may be regarded as the Soul of Souls, and we are also unmistakably told that the Supreme Soul is the Real of the Reals, the verity of verities, the individual souls and the world being themselves verities. This is corroborated by another passage of the Brihadaranyaka which tells us that God is the All -- "both the formed and the formless, the mortal and the immortal, the stationary and the moving, the this and the that ...... He is the verity of verities, for all these are verities, and He is the supreme verity" (S. 24. c). Both the moving and the stationary are thus the forms of God ; this is as much as to say, that God is the Soul of organic as well as inorganic nature. He fills the Souls as he fills the Universe, and controls them both as their inner governor.

18. What is the doctrine of Immortality corres- ponding to such a philosophic Ramanuja's Doctrine of Immortallty. position ? Ramanuja's main text in this matter is the passage from the Mundaka which tells us that "when the de- votee sees the golden-coloured Person who is the all- doer, the all-governor, and the source of the universe, he shakes off both sin and merit, and free from these, attains to divine likeness " (S. 25. a). We have already noticed to a certain extent in the concluding portion of the last chapter how this conception of the immortal life in Ramanuja compares with the concep- tions both of Madhva and Sankara. While, to Madhva, beatitude consists in being lifted up to the region of the deity and coming into his presence, to Ramanuja it consists in attaining to divine assimilation and in being like him though different from him, while to

214 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§ 18

Śankara it consists in being finally atoned to Divinity and being absorbed in that Divine Life in such a way that no trace of personal existence remains. These concep- tions of Immortality are the logical outcome of the philosophical positions advanced by these thinkers. We are not concerned here to discuss which of them seems to us to be philosophically sound, but we are only noting how each of these philosophers finds justification for his theory of the immortal life in the Upanishads themselves. There is a further point in which Madhva and Ramanuja agree with each other and differ from Śankara. In a passage from the Mundaka we are told that "a man, who has attained to a per- fect catharsis from evil, and has his intellect firmly rooted in the principles of the Vedanta, after death goes to the regions of Brahma, with whom he attains to final absolution at the time of the great end" (S. 25. b). This passage preserves the personal im- mortality of the souls and keeps them from being absorbed in divinity. Such a "Kramamukti," as it is called, is not in line with the real philosophical posi- tion of Advaitism, which sees in man the possibility of being liberated even while he lives. According to Advaitism, it is possible for man to attain to " Jīvan- mukti" as it is called, to become free while living and though living, to say nothing about the state of the soul after man's death. When a man has realised God, he becomes one with Him, and is absorbed in him. That is the Advaitic position. There is an end of the matter, and the help of no celestial god, how- ever great, need be invoked for carrying such a de- votee along with him to the state of liberation at the time of the Great End.

19. How does Śankara's philosophy lead to such a view of the immortal life ? What are the logical pre-

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suppositions of such a doctrine ? What, in other words, are the fundamental concep- The fundamental pro- tions of Sankara's philosophy which positions of Sankara's Philosophy. ultimately justify such a view of the absorption of the Individual into the Universal Soul ? How does Sankara answer the problems which have been mooted in the systems of Madhva and Ramanuja ? A full solution of these questions cannot be attempted here. We can only in- dicate the lines on which Sankara answers the oppo- site points of view and constructs an Advaitic philo- sophy, which is all the while, according to him, based on the Upanishads themselves. From the point of view of the Absolute, sub specie æternitatis, Nature and Soul and God are all equally appearances. The Absolute alone is : and Nature and Soul and God are, only so far as they are, the Absolute. But, sub specie temporis, there is a Nature, there are the Souls, there is a God. Sankara makes the great distinction between the Paramarthika and Vyavaharika views of reality as Kant makes the distinction between the noumenal and the phenomenal. It is from the phenomenal point of view that we may say that Souls are different from God ; that Nature exists as a heteros ; that God creates; but noumenally, the Absolute alone exists, and Nature, and Souls, and God are all merged in the Absolute. For him who sees the Ätman everywhere, what differ- ence can ever remain, asks Sankara? All difference vanishes for him. "Theologians may battle among themselves, but the Absolutist battles with none." It is from this point of view that the truths of the dualistic and the qualified-monistic systems of the Vedanta are both subsumed in the higher synthesis of the monistic. We shall see how Śankara finds justification for such views in the Upani- shads.

216 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§20 20. The fundamental platform of Śankarite philo- sophy is that the universe is one : The Absolute, the only Reality. that there is no difference within it, or without it. From death to death does he go, says the Kathopanishad, who sees difference in this world; non-difference can be perceived only by the highly trained intellect (S. 26. a). Brahman is alike throughout its structure, and the knowledge of any part of it is the knowledge of the whole. When Svetaketu returned from his teacher's house, proud, self-satisfied, and thinking himself learned, his father asked him whether his teacher had taught him the knowledge of Ultimate Existence, "by hearing which everything that is not heard becomes heard, by thinking which everything that is not thought becomes thought, by knowing which everything that is not known becomes known." Śveta- ketu plainly confessed ignorance and requested his father to tell him what that supreme instruction was. Then Aruni, his father, told him that, "just as by the knowledge of a lump of earth, everything that is made of earth comes to be known, all this being merely a word, a modification and a name, the ultimate sub- stratum of it all being the earth ; that just as by the knowledge of a piece of iron everything made of iron becomes known, all this being merely a word, a modi- fication and a name, the ultimate substratum of it all being iron ; that just as by the knowledge of a pair of nail-scissors, everything made of steel becomes known, all this being merely a word, a modification and a name, the ultimate substratum of it all being steel " (S. 26. b), similarly, when any part of Brahman is known, the whole of it is known, the ultimate substratum of it all being Brahman itself, which is self-identical, self- subsistent, and self-known. The implication of this passage is that everything that exists is Brahman.

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This is corroborated also by a passage from the Briha- dāranyaka when in his conversation with his wife Maitreyi, Yajnavalkya said "all this Brahmana-hood, all this Kshatriya-hood, all these worlds, all these gods, all these beings, in fact, everything that exists is Atman. Just as when a drum is being beaten, one is not able to grasp the external sound, but by grasp- ing the drum or the beater of the drum, the sound be- comes grasped ; just as when a conch-shell is being blown, one is not able to grasp the external sound, but by grasping the conch-shell or the blower of the conch- shell, the sound becomes grasped ; that just as when a lute is being played, one is not able to grasp the ex- ternal sound, but by grasping the lute or the player of the lute, the sound becomes grasped " (S. 26. c), similarly, in the case of the knowledge of the external world, if one is not able to grasp the external world as it is in itself, by grasping the Mind, or by grasping the Atman, the external world becomes grasped. This latter statement, of course, is only implied in the above passage, and not explicitly stated; but it cannot be gainsaid that the Atman is here compared to the lute- player or the drum-beater or the conch-blower, while the Mind by means of which the Atman perceives is compared to the lute or the drum or the conch, while the external world is compared to the sounds that issue from these instruments. This is verily an ideal- istic monism in which the active part is attributed to the Ätman, while the Mind serves as the instrument for its activity. In another passage of the same Upa- nishad, Yajnavalkya tells Maitreyi that the Atman is the only knower and that he could not be known by anyone except himself. "It is only when there seems to be a duality that one smells the other, that one sees the other, that one hears the other, that one speaks about the other, that 28

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one imagines about the other, that one thinks about the other ; but where the Atman alone is, what and whereby may one smell, what and whereby may one perceive, what and whereby may one hear, what and whereby may one speak, what and whereby may one imagine, what and whereby may one think? He who knows all this, by what may anybody know Him ? He is the eternal knower, by what may He be known?" (S. 26. d). Such a doctrine takes Yajñavalkya peri- lously near the position of an absolute solipsism from which he tries to extricate himself in his conver- sation with king Janaka in a later chapter of the same Upanishad when he tells us that "when it is said that such a one does not see, the real truth is that he sees and yet does not see; for never is the vision of the seer destroyed, for that is indestructible; but there is nothing besides him, and outside him, which may be said to be seen by him. When it is said that such a one does not smell or taste or speak or hear or imagine or touch or know, he does all these things and yet does not do them, for never are the olfaction, the taste, the speech, the audition, the ima- gination, the touch and the knowledge of him des- troyed, for they are indestructible ; there is, however, nothing outside him and different from him which he may smell, or taste, or speak, or hear, or imagine, or touch, or think" (S. 26. e). In this way, does Yajñava- lkya extricate himself from the absolutely solipsistic position in which his absolute monism has landed him. The outcome of these passages is, that for the Abso- lutist there is nothing different from or outside the Ätman, that knowledge of any part of him is the knowledge of the whole, that all causation is ultimately due to him, that everything beside him is an appea- rance, that he is the only eternal knower, and that it is only when he becomes entangled in the phenomenal

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acts of perception and knowledge that he may be said to perceive and know, and yet the truth is that he does not perceive and know. The Ätman is the only entity to exist, and there is naught beside him.

21. Even though metaphysical philosophy may re- The negative-positive quire such a rigoristic conception characterisation of the of the Absolute, for the purposes of Absolute. religion and for the explanation of the phenomenal existence of the world, a God has to be invented, who, in Mandukyan fashion, should be the lord of all, the knower of all, the inner controller of all, the fons et origo of all, the final haven of all. Advaitism does not negate such a conception of God. It requires God just for the sake of the pur- poses above mentioned ; but higher than God philo- sophically, it regards the conception of the Absolute. God to an Advaitist is the personal aspect of the Absolute, and the Absolute the impersonal aspect of God. It is in this spirit that the Mandukyopani- shad makes a distinction between the conceptions of God and the Absolute, and regards the latter con- ception as philosophically even a higher one. "The Absolute is neither inwardly cognisant, nor outwardly cognisant, nor on both sides together. It is not a cognition-mass. It is neither knower nor not-knower. It is unseen, unpracticable, ungraspa- ble, indefinable, unthinkable, unpointable. It is the essence of the experience of self-identity ; in it all this universe ceases. It is tranquil, blessed, and without a second " (S. 27. a). It is true that there are a few posi- tive characterisations of the Absolute in this passage ; but the general description of it is, as may be easily re- marked, couched only in negative terms. It is impossi- ble for any absolutist philosophy to say anything, and to say at the same time that it is not outside itself.

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However much a rigorously monistic philosophy may describe the Absolute in negative terms, the very negation becomes affirmation, and it cannot rid itself entirely of some positive characterisation at least of the Absolute. It was this that happened in the case of the Upanishadic Absolute. The Brihadāranyaka describes the Absolute as "the not-gross and the not- subtle, the not-short and the not-long, the not-glowing and the not-shadowy, the not-dark, the not-attached, the flavour-less, the smell-less, the eye-less, the ear- less, the speech-less, the mind-less, the Prana-less, the mouth-less, the un-internal, the un-external, con- suming nothing, and consumed by none" (S. 27. b). This is a purely negative characterisation of the Ab- solute in the Brihadaranyaka. The Katha mixes up negative and positive characteristics of it, as does the Mundakopanishad. The Katha tells us that the Brahman is "sound-less, touch-less, form-less, taste- less, imperishable, smell-less, beginning-less, end-less, greater than the great and eternal, garnering which one is able to escape the clutches of death " (S. 27. c). The Mundaka tells us that the Brahman is "unpointable, ungraspable, without family and without caste, without eye and without ear, without hands and without feet, eternal, all-pervading, omnipresent, extremely subtle, imperishable, and the source of all beings" (S. 27. d). The typical formulation of the negative characterisa- tion of the Absolute is in the famous formula " Neti Neti," which, as we shall presently point out, is itself interpreted in a negative as well as a positive signifi- cation. In most of the passages from the Brihada- ranyaka in which this famous expression occurs, the intended meaning is that the Absolute is character- less and indefinable ; that whatever may be predicat- ed of it falls outside it and thus fails to define it. "The Atman is ungraspable for he cannot be grasped ;

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he is indestructible for he cannot be destroyed ; he is unattached because he clings to nothing ; he is un- bound, he does not wriggle, he is not injured ...... Know this to be the secret of immortality, said Yajña- valkya to Maitreyi, and forthwith he entered the order of Samnyāsa" (S. 27. e). There is, however, one passage from the Brihadaranyaka where an at- tempt is made to give a positive connotation to the expression Neti Neti : " It is for this reason that they describe the Absolute as Neti Neti : there is nothing which exists outside it, the Brahman being all-inclu- sive" (S. 27. f). The inclusive character of the Absolute leads to a transcendental view about it in a later passage of the Brihadaranyaka where the Absolute is described as full both " of light and not-light, of desire and not- desire, of anger and not-anger, of law and not-law, having verily filled all, both the near and the far-off, the this and the that, the subject and the object" (S. 27. g). We thus see how the Upanishadic characterisation of the Absolute passes from the negative stage of neither- nor, through the affirmative stage of inclusiveness, to the transcendental state of either-or.

22. What is Sankara's answer to the question of Sankara's Doctrines the relation between the Self and of Identity, Creation the Absolute ? It is true that the and Immortality. Absolute sub specie æternitatis is the only reality ; but what can we say about the reality of what we empirically call the Self ? Sankara an- swers that the Self is empirically real, but transcen- dentally ideal. From the phenomenal point of view, we say that it exists as a separate entity ; but transcendentally, it is identical with the Absolute. There are many passages in the Upanishads which support this view of Sankara. The Chhandogya tells us that "the Self which inhabits the body is verily

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the Brahman, and that as soon as the mortal coil is thrown over, it will finally merge in Brahman" (S. 28. a). In the Śvetaśvatara we are told that " the individual Self flutters like a swan in the wheel of Brahman considering itself and its Mover as separate entities ; but it is only when it becomes one with it that it becomes immortal" (S. 28. b). The Briha- dāraņyaka tells us that "he who worships the deity as separate from himself is merely the beast of the gods" (S. 28. c). In the Taittiriya an identity is asserted between the person in the Man and the person in the Sun (S. 28. d). The Mundakopanishad teaches the identity of the Soul pent up in the recesses of the human heart with the Supreme Person, and identifies both with the Universe (S. 28. e). Finally, in that oft- repeated instruction which Aruni imparts to Śveta- ketu, he teaches the absolute identity of the Self and Brahman (S. 28. f). These passages are verily a crux to the non-Advaitic interpreters of the Upanishads. What does Sankara say, again, to the question of Creation ? What, according to him, is the relation that subsists between the world and the souls on the one hand and Brahman on the other so far as creation is concerned ? To explain creation empiri- cally, Śankara draws upon the Muņdakopanishad which tells us that "just as a spider creates and re- tracts its thread, as the herbs and trees grow upon the surface of the earth, just as from a living person the hairs of the head and the body grow, similarly, from this immutable Brahman does all this universe spring" (S. 29. a) ; and yet again " just as from a fire well-lit thousands of scintillations arise, and into it are resolved, similarly, from this immutable Brahman manifold beings come into existence and into it are merged " (S. 29. b). As regards the doctrine of Immortality, Sankara asserts the impersonal immorta-

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lity of the liberated Souls in their final mergence in the Absolute. "Just as rivers, which flow into the ocean, disappear in it after having thrown away their name and form, similarly, the Sage after having thrown off his name and form enters the highest heavenly Person (S. 30. a). "His breath does not expire; being Brahman himself, he goes to Brahman ; as a serpent may throw off his slough, even so does the Sage cast off his mortal body " (S. 30. b). This last passage im- plies also the state of " Jivanmukti," inasmuch as it asserts that having realised his identification with Brahman even while life lasts, he merges in Brahman when he has thrown off his mortal coil.

23. We now come to discuss a problem, upon which Three theories about there has been a great deal of differ- the origin of the Doc- ence of opinion among interpre- trine of Maya. ters of Vedāntic philosophy, name- ly, problem of the sources of the doctrine of Māya. There are, on the whole, three different theories which try to account for the doctrine of Maya, as found in Śankara and later writers, in three different ways : according to the first, the doctrine of Maya is a mere fabrication of the fertile genuis of Sankara; according to the second, the doctrine of Maya as found in Sankara is to be traced entirely to the in- fluence of the Sunyavada of the Buddhists; accor- ding to the third, Sankara's doctrine of Māyā is to be found already full-fledged in the Upanishads, of which he is merely an exponent. To say that the doc- trine of Maya is a fabrication of Sankara is to deny outright the presence of its sources in the Upanishads. To say that it is the outcome of the nihilism of the Buddhists is to give, in addition, merely a negativistic, nihilistic interpretation to the philosophy of Sankara. To say, again, that the doctrine of Maya is to be

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found full-fledged in the Upanishads is to deny the process of the development of thought, especially in such a well-equipped mind as that of Sankara. All these theories could be disproved if we find sufficient justi- fication for the sources of the doctrine of Maya in the Upanishads, and if Śankara's philosophy be shown to have developed these, and brought them to maturity. One of the chief ways in which an attempt is generally made to trace the source of the doctrine of Maya in the Upanishads is to find in a Concordance references to a word like Maya, and to argue therefrom as to the presence or otherwise of that doctrine in the Upani- shads. Such a procedure is an entirely ridiculous one, inasmuch as it finds the existence of a doctrine like that of Maya in words rather than in ideas. To find out whether the doctrine of Maya is present in the Upanishads or not, we must examine the ideology of the Upanishads, and see whether this affords us sufficient justification for saying that the doctrine is to be met with there. We shall see in the sequel of this chapter that there are definite traces of that doc- trine to be met with in Upanishadic literature, and that so far from Sankara having fabricated a new conception altogether, or having owed it to the influence of the nhilistic school of thought, he may definitely be said to have gone back to the Upanishads to find his in- spiration there, and as may befit a true thinker and philosopher, to have elaborated it out of the inchoate mass supplied to him by the Upanishads. Our con- clusion, therefore, is that Śankarāchārya only elabo- rated the ideas that he found in the Upanishads, and wove them into the contexture of his Advaitic philo- sophy.

24. As we have said, we shall examine the ideas instead of the words in the Upanishads, and see whether

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the traces of the Maya doctrine cannot be found in them. The Isopanishad tells us that The Doctrine of Maya in the Upanishads. truth is veiled in this universe by a vessel of gold, and it in- vokes the grace of God to lift up the golden vessel and allow the truth to be seen (S. 31. a). The veil that covers the truth is here described as golden, as being so rich, gaudy, and dazzling that it takes away the mind of the observer from the inner contents, and rivets it upon itself. Let us not be dazzled by the ap- pearance of gold, says the Upanishad, everything that glitters is not gold. Let us penetrate deeper and see the reality that lies ensconced in it. We have thus, first, the conception of a veil which prevents truth from being seen at first glance. Then, again, we have another image in the Kathopanishad of how people living in ignorance, and thinking themselves wise, move about wandering, like blind men following the blind, in search of reality, which they would have easily seen had they lodged themselves in knowledge instead of ignorance (S. 31. b). We have here the conception of blindfoldness, and we are told that we deliberately shut our eyes to the truth before us. Then, thirdly, ignorance is compared in the Mundako- panishad to a knot which a man has to untie before he gets possession of the Self in the recess of his own heart (S. 3I. c). Fourthly, the Chhandogyopanishad tells us how knowledge is power, and ignorance im- potence (S. 31. d). We, who are moving in this world without having attained to the knowledge of Atman, are exhibiting at every stage the power of the impo- tence that lies in us. Not unless we have attained to the knowledge of Atman can we be said to have attained power. Then, fifthly, the famous prayer in the Brihadāraņyaka, in which a devotee is praying to God to carry him from Not-Being to Being, from 29

228 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§24

for many times in the Upanishads, still the coneeption that underlies Maya is already present there, and even though we do not find there the full-fledged doctrine of illusion in its philosophical aspects as in Gaudapāda and later writers, still we do find in the Upani- shads all the material that may have easily led śankara to elaborate a theory of Maya out of it. When we consider that we have the conceptions of a veil, of blind-foldness, of a knot, of ignorance, of not- being, of darkness, of death, of unreality and uncer- tainty, of untruth, of crookedness and falsehood and illu- sion, of the power of God, of this power as identical with nature, of meshes, of semblance, an as-it-were and an appearance, and finally, of a word, a mode and a name, let no man stand up and say that we do not find the traces of the doctrine of Maya in the Upanishads !

25. Having traced the source of the doctrine of Maya in the Upanishads, it is but Vicissitudes in the historical development proper that we should give a very of the doctrine of Maya. brief account of the vicissitudes of that doctrine in its historical de- velopment in the post-Upanishadic period, and especially of the transformation of it which was effected by Gaudapada and Śankara, inasmuch as this particularly concerns the question as to how far Śankara may be said to have elaborated his full- fledged doctrine from the teachings of the Upanishads and from those of his spiritual ancestor, Gaudapāda. In the post-Upanishadic period, as early as even in the days of the Bhagavadgita, we do not find the doctrine stated in the terms in which the philosophers Gauda- pāda and Sankara state it. In the Bhagavadgīta, the word Maya is used in the sense almost of magical power, and God, the great magician, is declared to cause the spirit-host to revolve as by the power of His

226 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§24

Darkness to Light, from Death to Immortality, mere- ly voices the sentiment of the spiritual aspirant who wishes to rid himself of the power of Evil over him. Unreality is here compared to Not-Being, to Darkness, or to Death (S. 31. e). The Kathopani- shad declares that the Sages never find reality and certainty in the unrealities and uncertainties of this world (S. 31. f). Maya is here described as an "adh- ruva"-an Unreality, or an Uncertainty. The Chhan- dogya again tells us that a cover of Untruth hides the ultimate Truth from us, just as the surface of the earth hides from us the golden treasure that is hidden inside it. We, who unconsciously move to the re- gion of Truth day after day, do yet labour under the power of Untruth, for we do not know the Atman. This Atman is verily inside our own hearts. It is only he, who reaches Him every day, that is able to transcend the phenomenal world (S. 31. g). Maya is here compared to an Untruth, an "anrita." Then again, the Prasnopanishad tells us that we cannot reach the world of Brahman unless we have shaken off the crookedness in us, the falsehood in us, the illu- sion (Māyā) in us (S. 31. h). It is important to rem- ember that the word Maya is directly used in this passage, and almost in the sense of an illusion. In the same sense is the word Maya used in the Śveta- śvatara where we are told that it is only by meditation upon God, by union with Him, and by entering into His Being, that at the end there is the cessation of the great world-illusion (S. 31. i). Here again, as before, the word Maya can mean nothing but illusion. It must be remembered, however, that the word Maya was used so far back as at the time of the Rigveda in a passage, which is quoted by the Brihadāranyaka, where Indra is declared to have assumed many shapes by his " Maya" (S. 31. j). There, appa-

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rently, the word Māya meant "power" instead of "illusion "-a sense in which the Svetasvatara later uses it, when it describes its God as a Māyin, a magi- cian, a powerful Being who creates this world by his powers, while the other, namely, the individual soul is bound down again by " Maya" (S. 31. k). Here it must be remembered that there is yet no distinction drawn, as in later Vedantic philosophy, between the Māya that envelops Isvara and the Avidya that en- velops Jiva : for both the generic word Maya is used, and in the passage under consideration it means only "power "-almost the same sense which Küno Fischer gives to the "Attributes " of Spinoza. Then again, in the Śvetāśvatara, Māyā is once more identifi- ed with Prakriti (S. 31. 1), a usage which prevailed very much later, as may be seen from the way in which even the author of the Kusumanjali had no ob- jection in identifying the two even for his theistic pur- pose. The Śvetaśvatara also contains passages which describe the Godhead as spreading his meshes and making them so manifold that he catches all the beings of the universe in them, and rules over them (S. 31. m). Here we have the conception of a net or meshes, inside which all beings are entangled. Then again, a famous passage from the Brihadāraņyaka, which we have already considered, which speaks of "as if there was a duality," implying thereby that there is really no duality, signifies the identification of Maya with a semblance, an as-it-were, an appearance (S. 31. n). Finally, in that celebrated conversation between Svetaketu and Äruni which we have also had the occasion to consider, we are told that every- thing besides the Atman is merely a word, a mode, and a name (S. 31. o). We thus see from an exami- nation of the various passages in the Upanishads that even though the word Maya may not have been used

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divine magic (XVIII. 61), and yet again the beings in the world are declared to be resorting to the demoniacal sort of life when God robs them of their wisdom by his power (VII. 15). Moreover, it must be remem- bered, that here again we have to investigate the doc- trine of Maya in ideas rather than in words. Also, the Bhagavadgita is a short treatise compared with the Upanishads, nor does the theistic-mystic trend of the argument leave much room for a philosophical de- velopment of the conception of Maya. When we come to Gaudapada, however, we find that a great stride forward is taken in the development of that doctrine. Gaudapāda uses Buddhistic terminology, but sets forth an original doctrine. He tries to write a sys- tematic treatise on philosophy instead of only giving a lift to the spiritual impulse of man in the manner of the Bhagavadgita. Hence he states his opinion deli- berately and fully, and we find him in his Karikas maintaining the doctrine, not simply that the world is an appearance or an illusion, but that the world was never created at all ! His was what has been known in the history of Indian Thought as the doc- trine of "Ajatavada," the doctrine of Non-creation. " If there were a universe, the question might arise whether it would hide from our view ; but the universe is not ; duality is only Maya; non-duality is the only reality " (I. 17). The sage Gaudapāda, however, is not decided as to whether he should regard the world as a dream or an illusion, or not. In one place, he praises those who have called the world an illusion : he calls such people the " well-versed in the Vedantic science" (II. 31). On the other hand, when he is enumerat- ing the various views about the creation of the uni- verse, he is stating the view that the world is a dream or an illusion as a view which is held by others besides himself. "Some people regard the universe

230 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§25 as the greatness of God, others as his creation, others as a dream, others as an illusion, others regard it as merely the will of God, ...... still others the object of His enjoyment, some people call it the play-thing of God, and yet others regard it as God's nature " (I. 7-9). As contrasted with these views, he states his position that he is at one with those who maintain the doctrine that the universe was not created at all (IV. 4-5). But it must be remembered that for the purposes of spiritual perfection and ethical conduct, Gaudapāda has to take account of the world as a verity. "That is the state of the highest Samadhi, in which all talk is at an end, all anxiety is at an end, which is full of the highest tranquillity and eternal illumination" (III. 37); and, again, " creation has been recom- mended by the sages for the benefit of those who can- not but find the world to be real (Upalambhat) and who must needs be led on the path of good conduct (Samāchārāt) " (IV. 42). We thus see how even the sage Gaudapāda has to take some cognisance at least of the world as real, though it may be for the perfec- tion of mystical endeavour or ethical conduct, even though, philosophically, he may regard it as not having been created at all. Sankara profits by all the conceptions that have preceded him, and weaves his full-fledged doctrine out of the strands left at his dis- posal by the Upanishads and Gaudapāda. If we exa- mine carefully the expressions which Sankara uses about Māyā in his great Commentary on the Brahma- sūtras and elsewhere, namely those of inexplicability (sadasadanirvachanīyasvarūpatva), super-imposition (atasmin tadbuddhih), and illicit transformation (raju- sarpa and śuktikārajata) on the one hand, and those of subjective modification (akāśe talamalinatvādi), and postulation of negation (khapushpa, mrigatrishņikā, aindrajālika, sasavishāņa and vandhyāputra) on the

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other, all to designate the phenomenal appearance of the world, we shall see that Sankara is placing himself between the doctrines of lesser reality and illusion ; but his meaning is entirely unmistakable, that the world is merely an appearance on the background of Brah- man. We cannot enter here into greater details about the doctrine of Māyā as Sankara develops it. But we cannot leave unmentioned even in the short space at our disposal here the objections which Ramanuja raises against Śankara's doctrine of Māyā, in order that we may be able to understand the real meaning of Śankara's doctrine better. Rāmānuja asks-What is the seat of Maya, the Soul or Brahman ?- How does the ever-luminous Brahman come to be hidden ?- Is Māya real or unreal ? If real, it cannot be an illusion ; if unreal, it cannot be an "upadhi" of Brahman-Is not the description of Brahman that it is incapable of definition a definition itself ?- What is the criterion of the proof of Maya ?- Is it not a contradiction in terms to say that Maya ceases by the knowledge of the attri- buteless Brahman ?- Is not the removal of ignorance, once established, for ever impossible ?- all these ob- jections would seem to be merely an ignoratio elenchi, if we only consider for a while Sankarāchārya's criticism of the Vijfanavadins and the Sunyavadins in his ex- position of the Brahmasutra "Nabhava upalabdheḥ" (II. 2. 28), where by a severe criticism of theories which hold that the world is merely an idea, or that the world is merely a naught, Śankarāchārya proves himself to be neither an epistemological idealist, nor an epistemo- logical nihilist. To Sankara, the world is real, but only phenomenally real. Noumenally, sub specie æter- nitatis, it is unreal. We shall entirely mistake Śań- kara's point of view if we do not consider the great distinction that he draws between the " pāramarthika" and the " vyavaharika " views of reality. Like his

232 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§25 later successor in Germany, he was the first in India to bring into vogue the distinction between empirical reality and transcendental ideality. Kant was him- self charged with having been an Idealist in spite of his celebrated Refutation of Idealism. In like manner has Sankara been charged with having been an idealist-nihilist in spite of his celebrated criticism of these doctrines. The recognition of the distinc- tion between the Vyavaharika and the Pāramārthika views of reality, added to the recognition of the Pratibhāsika and the Svāpnika views, which may also be gathered from his philosophy elsewhere, yields us a doctrine of the Degrees of Reality, which is all the while implicit in Sankara, though it is never explicitly stated. Greater reality than the reality of the world of illusion belongs to the world of dream; greater reality than the reality of the world of dream belongs to the world of life ; greater reality than the reality of the world of life belongs to the world of the Self, or God, or the Absolute, which are all ultimately identical with one another. Every system of philosophy must needs take account of some sort of appearance. From the days of Parmenides, Plato, and Plotinus to the days of Berkeley, Hegel, and Bradley, there has been the same cry. There is an extraordinary "moral" meaning in the doctrine of Appearance which critics of that doctrine systematically ignore. To quote the words of Carlyle : " Where is the cunning eye and ear to whom that God-written Apocalypse will yield arti- culate meaning ? We sit as in a boundless Phan- tasmagoria and Dream-grotto; boundless, for the faintest star, the remotest century, lies not even nearer the verge thereof : sounds and many-coloured visions flit round our sense; but Him, the Unslumber- ing, whose work both Dream and Dreamer are, we see not ; except in rare half-waking moments, suspect

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not. Creation, says one, lies before us, like a glorious Rainbow; but the Sun that made it lies behind us, hidden from us. Then, in that strange Dream, how we clutch at shadows as if they were substances ; and sleep deepest while fancying ourselves most awake! ...... Where now is Alexander of Macedon ?...... Napoleon too, and his Moscow Retreats and Auster- litz campaigns ! Was it all other than the veriest Spectre-hunt ?...... That warrior on his strong war- horse, fire flashes through his eyes; force dwells in his arm and heart: but warrior and war-horse are a vision; a revealed Force, nothing more. Stately they tread the Earth, as if it were a firm substance : fooll the Earth is but a film ; it cracks in twain, and warrior and war-horse sink beyond plummet's sounding, Plummet's ? Fantasy herself will not follow them. A little while ago, they were not ; a little while, and they are not, their very ashes are not ...... Thus, like a God-created, fire-breathing Spirit-host, we emerge from the Inane; haste stormfully across the astonished Earth; then plunge again into the Inane .. But whence ?- O Heaven, whither ? Sense knows ..

not; Faith knows not ; only that it is through Mys- tery to Mystery, from God and to God."

SOURCES IV

1 (a) तद्ध एक आहुरसदेवेदमग्र आसीत । एकमेवाद्वितीयम्। तस्मादसतः सज्जायत। Bi. VI.2. I. (b) येयं प्रेते विचिकित्सा मनुष्ये अस्तीत्येके नायमस्तीति चैके। क. I. 1.20. (c) श्योभावा मर्त्यस्य यदन्तक पतत्सर्वेन्द्रियाणां जरबन्ति तेजा। 30

234 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

अपि सर्वे जीवितमल्पमेव॥ अभिध्यायन् वर्णरतिप्रमोदान अतिदीर्घे जीविते को रमेत॥ क. I. 1. 26, 28. (a) ते हस्म पुत्रैषणायाञ्च वित्तैषणायाश्च लोकैषणायाञ्च व्युत्थाय अथ मिक्षाचर्य चरन्ति। बृ.IV. 4.22. (c) इमानि पञ्चमहाभूतानि .... अण्डजानि च जारुजानि च स्वेदजानि च उन्धिज्जानि च अश्वा गावः पुरुषा :.... यत्किचेदं प्राणि जंगमं च पतत्रि च यच्च स्थावरं सर्वे तत्प्रज्ञानेत्रं प्रज्ञाने प्रतिष्ठितम्। ऐ. III. 3. (f) आहर सोम्य हस्तम्। आर्तभागी आवामेव एतस्य वैदि- प्यावः। न नावेतत्सजन इति। तौह उत्कम्य मन्त्रयांचकाते। तौ ह यदूचतुः कर्म हैव तदूचतुः अथ यत्पशशंसतुः कर्म हैव तत्प्रशशंसतुः । पुण्यो वै पुण्येन कर्मणा भवति पाप: पापेनेति। बृ.III.2.13. (g) योनिमन्ये प्रपद्यन्ते शरीरत्वाय देहिनः। स्थाणुमन्येऽनु- संयन्ति यथाकर्म यथाश्षुतम्। क. II. 5.7. 2 (a) तत्कारणं सांख्ययोगाधिगम्यं ज्ञात्वा देवं मुच्यते सर्वपाशैः। शे. VI. 13. (b) यदसे रोहितं रूप तेजसस्तदूपं, यच्छुकं तदपां, यत्कृष्णं तदननस्य, अपागादझेरसित्वं, वाचारंभणं विकारो नामधेयं त्रीणि रूपाणि इत्येव सत्यम्। छां. VI. 4.1. अजामेकां लोहितशुक्ककष्णां बह्नीः प्रजाः सृजमाना सरूपा:। शवे. IV. 5. 3 (a) इन्द्रियेभ्य: परा हार्था अर्थेभ्यक्ष परं मनः । मनसस्तु परा बुद्धिर्दुद्धेरात्मा महान्पर:। महतः परमव्यक्तं अव्यक्तातपुरु- पः परः। पुरुषान्न परं किचित् सा काष्ठा सा परा गति:॥ क. I.3. IO, 11. (b) यच्छेद्ाङमनसि प्राश्तः तद्यच्छेव्द्ञान आत्मनि। श्ानमा- त्मनि मदति नियच्छेत् तद्यच्छेच्छांतआत्मनि। क. I. 3. 13. 4 (a) इहैवान्तःशरीरे सोम्य स पुरुषो यस्मिन्नेताः षोडशकलाः .02 प्रभवन्तीति। प्र. VI. 2. (b) स प्राणमसृजत, प्राणाच्छूद्ा, सं, वायुः, न्योति:, आपः

GHAPTER IV: ROOTS OF PHILOSOPHIES 235

पृथिवी, इन्द्रियं, मनः,। अन्नं,अन्राद्वीर्य, तपो, मन्त्रा:, कर्म, लोका:, ळोकेषु च नाम च।। प्र. VI.4. (c) स यथेमा नदः स्यन्दमाना: समुंद्र प्राप्य अस्तं गच्छन्ति। भिद्येते तासां नामरूपे समुद्र इत्येवं प्रोच्यते। एवमेवास्थ परिद्रपुरिमा: षोडशकला: पुरुषं प्राप्य अस्तं गच्छन्ति। भिद्येते तासां नामरूपे, पुरुष इत्येवं प्रोच्यते। स एषोड कलो5मृतो भवति। प्र. VI. 5. (d) अरा इव रथनाभौ कला यस्मिन्प्रतिष्ठिताः । तं वेदयं पुरषं वेद, यथा मा वो मृत्यु: परिव्यथा इति॥ प्र. VI. 6. 5 (a) यञ्च स्वभावं पचति विश्वयोनिः, पाच्यांश्च सर्वान् परिणा- मयेद्यः । सर्वमेतद्विश्वमधितिष्ठत्येको, गुणांब् सर्वान विनि- योजयेद्यः॥ शवे. VI. 5. (b) प्रधानक्षेत्रज्ञपतिर्गुणेशः। .VI. I6. (c) यस्तूर्णनाभ इच, तन्तुभिः प्रधानजैः स्वभावतो देव एक: समावृणोत्। 9वे.VI.I0, 6 (a) मार्यां तु प्रकृर्ति विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम्। श्े.VI.I0. (b) अस्मान्मायी सृजते विश्वमेतत्तरि्मिश्चान्यो मायया संनिरद्ध: शवे. VI.9. 7 (a) अजो होको जुषमाणोनुशेते जहात्येनां भुक्तभोगामजोन्यः। शे.IV. 5. (b) कर्माध्यक्षः सर्वभूताधिवासः साक्षी चेता कंवलो निर्गुण्। श्वे.VI. I. 8 (a) ऋर्षि प्रसूतं कपिलं यस्तमग्रे ज्ञानैर्विभर्ति जायमानं च पश्येत्। शे. V. 2. (b) हिरण्यगर्मे जनयामास पूर्वम्। शे. III. 4. हिरण्यगर्भ पश्यत जायमानं स नो बुद्धया शुभया संयु- शे.IV.I2. (c) यो ब्रह्माणं विदधाति पूर्व यो वै वेदांश् प्रहिणोति तस्मै। नकु।

शे. VI.I8. 9 (a) त्रिरुन्तं स्थाप्य समं शरीरं हृदीन्द्रियाणि मनसा संनिरुध्य। ब्रह्मोडपेन प्रतरेत विद्वान्स्ोतांसि सर्वाणि भयावद्दानि॥

236 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

प्राणान्प्रपीड्येह स युक्तचेष्टः क्षीणे प्राणे नासिकयोच्ट्र- सीत। दुष्टाश्वयुक्तमिव वाहमेनं विद्वान्मनो धारयेताप्रमसः॥ समे शुची शर्करावह्निवालुकाविवर्जिते शब्दजलाश्रयादिमिः। मनोऽनुकूले न तु चक्षुपाडने गुहानिवाताश्रयणे प्रयोजयेत्॥ नीहारघूमार्कानलानिलानां खद्योतविद्युत्स्फटिकशशिनाम्। पतानि रूपाणि पुरःसरणि ब्रह्मण्यभिव्यक्तिकराणि योगे।। पृथ्व्यप्तेजोऽनिलसे समुत्थिते पञ्चात्मके योगगुणे प्रवृत्ते। न तस्य रोगो न जरा न मृत्यु: प्राप्तस्य योगाग्निमयं शरीम्। लघुत्वमारोग्यमलोलुपत्वं वर्णप्रसाद: स्वरसौष्ठवं च । गन्धः शुभो सूत्रपुरीषमल्पं योगप्रवृत्ति प्रथमां वदन्ति ॥ यथैव बिम्बं मृदयोपलिस्तं तेजोमयं भ्राजते तत्सुधातम् । तद्वात्म- तत्त्वं प्रसमीक्ष्य देही एक: कृतार्थो भवते वीतशोकः ॥ यदा- त्मतत्वेन तु ब्रह्मतत्त्वं दीपोपमेनेह युक्त: प्रपश्येत्। अजं ध्रुवं सर्वतत्त्वैरविशुद्धं शात्वा देवं मुच्यते सर्वपाशैः॥ शे. II. 8-15. (b) यदा पञ्चावतिष्ठन्ते ज्ानानि मनसा सह। बुद्धिश्च न विचे- प्टति तामाड्डः परमां गतिम् ॥ तां योगमिति मन्यन्ते स्थिरा- मिन्द्रियधारणाम्। अप्रमत्तस्तदा भवति योगो हि प्रभवाप्ययौ।

(c) ध्याननिर्मथनाभ्यासाद्देवं पश्येत्निमूढवद्। क. II.6.10-11.

शे. I.14. (a) तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्ृतत्ति अनभ्रन्नन्यो अभिचाकशीति। मुं. III. 1.1. सूर्यों यथा सर्वलोकस्य चक्षुः न लिप्यते चाक्षुषैर्बाह्यदोषैः। एकस्तथा सर्वभृतान्तरात्मा न लिप्यते लोकदुःखेन बाह्यः॥ क. II. 5.11.

विण्मूत्रवातपित्तकफसंघाते दुर्गन्धे निःसारेऽस्मिञ् शरीरे कि कामोपभोगैः। मै. I. 2. (f) हिता नाम पुरुषस्य नाडयो हृदयात्पुरीततमभिप्रतन्वन्ति। तद्यथा सहस्रधा केशी विपाटितस्तावदण्व्य: पिङ्गलस्या- णिम्ना तिष्ठन्ते, शुक्कस्य, कृष्णस्य, पीतस्य, लोहितस्य च। तासु तदा भवति यदा सुप्तः स्वमं न कंचन पश्यति॥ कौ. IV. 19.

CHAPTER IV: ROOTS OF PHILOSOPHIES 287 (g) अथ या एता हृदयस्य नाडयस्ता: पिङ्गलस्याणिश्रस्तिष्ठन्ति शुक्कस्य नीलस्य पीतस्य लोहितस्येत्यसी वा आदित्य: पिङ्गल एष शुक्क एष नील एष पीत एष लोहित:। छां. VIII. 6.1. (Ai) ता वा अस्यैता हिता नाम नाडयो यथा केशः सहस्रधा भिन्नस्तावताणिम्ना तिष्ठन्ति शुक्कस्य नालस्य पिङ्गलस्य हरितस्य लोहितस्य पूर्णाः । बृ. IV.3.20. 10 (a) अथ यदा सुषुप्तो भवति यदा न कस्यचन वेद, हिता नाम नाड्यो द्वासप्रतिसहस्त्राणि हृदयात् पुरीततमभिप्रतिष्ठन्ते, ताभिः प्रत्यवसृप्य पुरीतति शेते स यथा कुमारो वा महा- राजो वा महाव्राह्मणो वा अतिष्नीमानन्दस्य गत्वा शयीत एवमेवैष पतच्छेते। बृ.II.1.19. (b) येनावृतं नित्यमिदं हि सर्वे ज्ञः कालकालो गुणी सर्वविद्यः। तेनेशित कर्म विवर्तते ह पृथिव्यप्तेजोऽनिलखानि चिन्त्यम्॥ शे. VI.2. (c) आकाशेनाङ्रयति, आकाशेन शृणोति, आकाशेन प्रति- शृणोति। आकाशमुपारस्वेति। छा.VII.I2. I. II अन्धं तमः प्रविशन्ति ये अविद्यामुपासते। ततो भूय इव ते ो य उ विद्यायां रताः । अन्यदेवाहुरविद्यया अन्यदाहुर- विद्यया। इति शुश्रुम धीराणां येनस्तद्विचचक्षिरे। वि्द्या चा- विद्यांच यस्तद्वदोभयं सह। अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्यया- मृतमश्नुते। ई.9, II. 12 (a) संयुक्तमेतत्क्षरमक्षरं च व्यक्ताव्यक्तं भरते विश्वमीशः। अनीशश्चात्मा वध्यते भोक्तृभावात् झात्वा देवं सुच्यते सर्वपाशैः। शे. I. 8. (b) एको हि रुद्रो न द्वितीयाय तस्थुः य इमान् लोकान ईशत ईशनीभिः। प्रत्यकजनास्तिष्ठति संचुकोपान्तकाले संसूज्य विश्वा भुवनानि गोपा: ॥। शे. III. 2. (c) घृतात्परं मण्डीमवातिसूक्ष्मं शात्वा शिवं सर्वभृतेषु मूढम्। विश्वस्पैक परिवेष्टितारं शात्वा देवं मुच्यते सर्वपाशैः॥ शवे.IV. 16.

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(d) एकैक जालं बहुधा विकुर्वन् अस्मिन्क्षेत्रे संचरत्येष देवः। भूय:सृष्ठा यतयस्तथेष: सर्वाधिपत्यं कुरुते महात्मा।। शे. V.3. 13 (a) न जायते म्रियते वा विपश्चिन्नायं कुतश्चिन्न बभूव कश्चित्। अजो नित्य: शाश्वतोऽयं पुराणो न हन्यते हन्यमाने शरीरे॥ क. I. 2.18. (b) हन्ता चेन्मन्यते हन्तुं हतश्चेन्मन्यते हतम्। उभौ तौ न विजा· नीतो नायं हन्ति न हन्यते॥ क. 1.2. 19. (c) श्वणायापि बहुभियों न लभ्यः शृण्वन्तोऽपि बहवो य्र विदयुः । आश्चर्यों वक्ता कुशलोऽस्य लब्घाश्चयों ज्ञाता कुश"

() सर्वे वेदा यत्पदमामनन्ति तपांसि सर्वाणि च यद्दन्ति। लानुशिष्टः॥। क. I. 2.7.

यदिच्छंतो ब्रह्मचर्य चरन्ति तन्ते पदं संग्रहेण ब्रवीम्यो-

(e) तद्य इत्थं विदुये चेमेSरण्येश्रद्धा तप इत्युपासते तेऽर्चि- मित्येतत्। क. I. I. I5.

षमभिसंभवन्त्यर्चिषोऽहरह्व आपूर्यमाणपक्षमापूर्यमाणपक्षा- द्यान्पडुद्ङ्डेति मासांस्तान् ।I मासेम्यः संवत्सरं संवत्स- रादादित्यमादित्याच्चन्द्रमसं चन्द्रमसो विद्युतं तत्पुरुषोS- मानवः स एनान्त्रहम गमयत्येष देवयान: पन्था इति॥ अथ य इमे ग्राम इष्टापूंर्ते दत्तमित्युपासते ते धूममभिसंभवन्ति धूमाद्रात्रि रात्रेरपरपक्ष अपरपक्षाद्यान्यदक्षिणैति मार्सा- स्तान्नैते जंवत्सरं अभिप्राप्नुवन्ति II .. ।। तस्मिन्यावत्सं- पातमुषित्वा अथ एतमेवाध्चानं पुनर्निवर्तन्ते। छां.V.I0. I-5. 14 (a) कुर्वन्नेवेह कर्माणि जिजीविषेच्छतं समा। एवं त्वयि नान्यथेतोऽस्ति न कर्म लिप्यते नरे॥ ई. 2. (b) अगनिर्सुर्धा, चक्षुषी चन्द्रसूयौं, दिशः श्रोत्रे, वाग् विवृ- ताश्च वेदाः । वायुः प्राणो, हृदयं विश्वमस्य पद्भ्यां पृथिवी ह्ेष सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा। मुं. II. I. 4. (c) इन्द्रियेभ्यः पराहयर्था अर्थेभ्यश्च परं मनः । मनसस्तु परा बुद्धि बुद्धेरात्मा महदान्परः ॥ महतः परर्मव्यकं अव्यक्ता-

CHAPTER IV: ROOTS OF PHILOSOPHIES 239

रपुरुषः परः। पुरुषान्न परं किंचित् सा काष्ठा सा परा गतिः। क. I.3. I0-II. 15 (a) सोऽहं भगवो मन्त्रविदेवार्मि, नात्मवित्, श्रुतं होव मे भगवद्दशेभ्यस्तरति शोकमात्मविदिति सोऽहं भगवः शोचामि, तं मा भगवान् शोकस्य पारं तारयित्विति।। छां. VII. I. (b) उद्धर्तुमर्हसीत्यन्धोदपानस्थो भेक इवाहमस्मिन्संसारे भग- वंस्त्वं नो गतिसत्वं नो गतिः । मै. I.7. (c) ते विश्वरूपं भवसृतमीड्यं देवं स्वचित्तस्थमुपास्यपूर्वम्। शे. VI. 2. (त) यस्य देवे परा भक्तिर्यथा देवे तथा गुरौ। श्वे. V1. 53. 16 ऊर्ध्चमूलोऽवाक्शाख एषोऽश्वस्थ: सनातनः। तदेव शुकं तद्ब्रह्म तदेवामृतमुच्यते। तस्मिल्ठोका श्रिताः सर्चे तदु नात्येति क्न। पतद्वैतव्। क. II.6. I. 17 स यदशिशिषति यत्पिपासति यन्र रमते ता अस्य दीक्षाः । अथ यदभ्नाति यत्पिबति बद्रमते तदुपसदैरेति ॥ अथ यद्धसति यज्जक्षति यन्मैथुनं चरति स्तुतशस्त्रैरेव तदेति। अथ यत्तपो दानमार्जवमहिसा सत्यवचनमिति ता अस्य दक्षिणाः। तस्मादाडुः सोष्यत्यसोष्टेति । पुनरुत्पादनमे- वास्य तन्मरणमेवावभृथः। तद्ैतद् घोर आद्गिरस: कृष्णाय देवकीपुत्रायोक्त्वोवाचापिपास एव स बभूव सोउन्तवेलायामेतत्त्रयं प्रतिपद्येताक्षितमस्यच्युतमसि प्राण- संशितमसीति। छां. III. 17. I-6. 18 (a) ऋतं पिबन्ती सुकृतस्य लोके गुहां प्रविष्टौ परमे पराधें। छायातपौ ब्रह्मविदो वदन्ति ॥ क. I. 3. I. (b) द्वा सुपर्णा सयुजा सखाया समानं वृक्षं परिषस्वजाते। तयोरन्यः पिप्पलं स्वाद्ृत्यनश्रन्नन्यो अभिचाकशीति॥ मुं. III. I. I. 19 (a) एको देव: सर्वभूतेषु गूढ: सर्वव्यापी सर्वभूतान्तरात्मा। शे.VI.I.I.

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(b) यस्मात्परं नापरमस्ति किंचित् यस्मान्नाणीयो न ज्यायो- डस्ति कश्चित् । वृक्ष इव स्तब्धो दिवि तिष्ठत्येकस्तेनेदं पूर्णे पुरुषेण सर्वम्॥ शे. III. 9. (c) विश्वतश्क्ुरुत विश्वतोमुखो विश्वतोबाहुर्त विश्वतस्पात्। संवाहुभ्यां धमति सं पतत्रैर्ध्यावाभूमी जनयन् देव एक:॥ शवे. III. 3. 20 (a) यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते येन जातानि जीवन्ति यत्प्रयन्त्यमिसंविशन्ति तद्विजिज्ञासस्व तद्ब्रह्मेति। तै. III. I. (b) तस्माद्वा एतस्मादात्मन आकाश संभूत: आकाशाद्वायुः वायोरअि: अझेरापः अदूभ्यः पृथिची पृथिव्या ओषधयः ओषधिभ्योऽन्रम्। तै. II. I. 2I स य एवमेतद्राजनं देवतासु प्रोतं वेद पतासामेव देवताना सलोकतां सार्प्टितां सायुज्यं गच्छति। छां. II. 20.2. 22 (a) शाजौ द्ावजावीशानीशावजा होका भोक्तृभोगार्थयुक्ता। अनन्तश्रात्मा विश्वरूपो ह्यकर्ता त्रयं यदा चिन्दते ब्रह्ममेतत्। शवे. I. 9. (b) पतज्जषेयं नित्यमेवात्मसंस्थं नातःपरं वेदितव्यं हि किं. चित्। भोक्ता भोग्यं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा सर्वे प्रोक्तं त्रिविधं ब्रह्ममेतत्॥ श. I. I2. 23 (a) वेत्थ नु त्वं काप्य तत्सुत्रं येनायं च लोक: परश्च लोक: सर्वाणि च भुतानि संडब्धानि भवन्तीति ... वेत्थ नु त्वं काप्य तमंतर्यामिणं य इमं च लोकं परं च लोकं सर्वाणि घ सूतानि योऽन्तरो यमयतीति .. यस्तत्काप्य सूत्रं विद्यात् सं च अन्तर्यामिणमिति स ब्रह्मवित् स लोकवित् स वेदवित् स भूतवित् स आत्मवित् स सर्वविदिति। ... वायुरचे गौतम तत्सृत्रम् । याज्वल्क्य अन्तर्यामिणं ब्रूहीति। यः पृथिव्यां तिष्ठन् पृथिव्या अन्तरो, यं पृथिवी न वेद, यस्य पृथिवी शरीर, यः पृथिवीमन्तरो यमयत्येष त आत्मा उन्तर्याम्यमृतः। अप्सु, अभौ, अन्तरिक्षे, वायौ, दिवि, आहित्ये, विश्वु, चन्द्रतारके, आकाशे, तमसि, तेजसि,

CHAPTER IV: ROOTS OF PHILOSOPHIES 241

सर्वेषु भृतेषु, प्राणे, वाचि, चक्षुषि, श्रोत्रे, मनसि, त्वचि, विज्ञाने, रेतसि। .. ।एष त आत्मान्तर्याम्यमृतोऽतोऽन्यदार्तम्।

(b) तत्सृष्टा तदेवानुप्राविशत् । तदनुप्रविश्य सच्च त्यश्च बृ. III. 7

अभवत्। निरुक्तं चानिरुक्तं च । निलयनं चानिलयनं च। विज्ञानं चाविज्ञानं च । सत्यं चानृतं च। सत्यमभवत् यदिदं किंच तत्सत्यमित्याचक्षते। तै. II. 6. 24 (a) स वा अयमात्मा सर्वेषां भूतानां राजा, तद्था रथनाभौ च रथनेमी च अराः सर्वे समर्पिताः पवमेवास्मिन्नान्मनि सर्वाणि भूतानि सर्वे देवाः सर्वे लोका: सर्व एत आत्मान: समर्पिताः। बृ. II. 5. 15. (b) यथाझे: भ्ुद्रा: चिस्फुलिङ्गा व्युच्चरन्त्येवमेव अस्मादात्मनः सर्वे प्राणा: सर्वे लोकाः सर्वे देवा, सर्वाणि भूतानि व्युच्चरन्ति । तस्य उपनिषत् सत्यस्य सत्यमिति । प्राणाः वै सत्यं, तेषामेष सत्यम। बृ.II. I.20. (c) द्वे वाव ब्रह्मणो रूपे मूर्त चैवामूर्तच, मत्य चामृतं, च स्थितं च यच, सच्च त्यक्च I। .. ।। अथ नामधेयं सत्यस्य सत्य- मिति, प्राणा वै सत्यं तेषामेष सत्यम्। बृ.II.3. I-6. 25 (a) यदा पश्यः पशयते रुक्मवर्ण कर्तारमीशं पुरुषं ब्रह्मयोनिम्। तदा विद्वान् पुण्यपापे विधूय निरज्जनः परमं साम्यमुपैति॥ मुं. III. I. 3 (b) वेदान्तविज्ञानसुनिश्चितार्थाः संन्यासयोगाद्यतयः शुद्धसत्वाः। ते ब्रह्मलोकेषु परान्तकाले परामृता:परिमुच्यन्ति सर्वें। मुं. III. 2.6. 26 (a) मनसैवेदमाप्तव्यं नेह नानास्ति किचन। मृत्योः समृत्युं गच्छति य इह नानेव पदयति। क. II.4.II. (b) तं ह पितोवाच श््वेतकेतो यञ्ु सोम्य इद महामना अनूचा- नमानी स्तब्धोऽस्युत तमादेशमप्राक्ष्यः। येनाश्रतं श्रुतं भवति अमतं मतमविज्ञातं विज्ञातमिति कथं नु भगवः से आदेशो भवतीति॥ यथा सोम्यैकेन मृ्त्पिडेन सर्वे मृन्मयं विज्ञातं स्याद्वाचारंभण विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिकेत्येव 31

242 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

सत्यम् ॥ यथा सोम्य लोहमणिना सर्व लोहमयं विज्ञातं स्याद्वाचारंभणं विकारो नामधेयं लोहमित्येव सत्यम्॥ यथा सोम्यैकेन नखनिकृंतनेन सर्वे काण्णायसं विज्ञातं स्याद्वाचारंभणं विकारो नामधेयं कृष्णायसमित्येव सत्य- मेवं सोम्य स आदेशो भवतीति ॥ न वै नूनं भगवन्तस्त एतद्वेदिषुर्यद्धधेतदवेदिष्यन कर्थ मे नावक््यन्निति भगवां- स्त्वेव तद्ब्रवात्विति तथा सोम्येति होवाच।। छां. VI. I. 2-7. (c) इदं ग्रह्म इदं क्षत्रं इमे लोकाः इमे देवाः इमानि भूतानि इदं सर्व यदयमात्मा। स यथा दुंदुभेर्हन्यमानस्य न बाह्यान् शब्दान् शक्नुयाद्ग्रहणाय दुंदुभेस्तु ग्रहणेन दुंदुभ्याघा- तस्य वा शब्दो गृहीतः ॥ स यथा शंखस्य ध्मायमानस्य न बाह्यान् शब्दान् शक्नुयाद्ग्रहणाय शंखस्य तु ग्रहणेन शंखध्मस्य वा शब्दो गृहीतः ॥ स यथा वीणायै वाद्य- मानायै न बाह्यान् शब्दान् शक्नुयाद्ग्रहणाय वीणायै तु ग्रहणेन वीणावादस्य वा शब्दो गृद्दीत:॥। बृ. II. 4.6-9. (d) सा होवाच मैत्रेयी अत्रैव मा भगवान् अममुहत् न प्रेत्य संज्ञास्तीति स होवाच याज्ञवल्क्यो न वा अरेऽहं मोहं ब्रचीमि॥ यत्र हि द्वैतमिव भवति तदितर इतरं जिघ्रति तदितर इतरं पश्यति तदितरं इतरं श्णोति तदितर इतरं अभिवदति तदितर इतरं मनुते तदितर इतरं विजानाति यत्र वा अस्य सर्वमात्मवाभूत् तत्केन कें जिघ्रेत् तत्केन कें पद्येत् तत्केन के शृणुयात् तत्केन के अभिवदेत् तत्केन कं मन्वीत तत्केन के विजानीयात् येनेदं सर्वे विजानाति त केन विजानीयात्। विज्ञातारमरे केन विजार्नीयादिति॥ बृ.II.4.I3, I4. (e) यद्वै तन्न पश्यति, पशयन्वै तन्न पश्यति, नहि द्रपुर्दृष्टेविपरि- लोपो विद्यतेSविनाशित्वात्। न तु तद्द्वितीयमस्ति ततोS- न्यद्िभ्क, यत्पश्येत् । 'जिघ्रति 'रसयते दति 'गृणोति ·मनुते ' स्पृशति विजानाति । यत्र वाअन्यािव स्यात् तत्र अन्यो अन्यत्पश्येत् जिघ्रेत् रसयेत् वदेत् शृणुयात् मन्वीत स्पृशेत् विजानीयात्। बृ. IV.3.23-31.

CHAPTER IV: ROOTS OF PHILOSOPHIES 243 27 (a) एष सर्वेश्वरः एष सर्वज्ञः एपोऽन्तर्याम्येष योनि: सर्वस्य प्रभवाप्ययी हि भूतानाम्। नान्त:प्रश्ञं न वहिष्प्रशं नोभयतः- प्रजञं न प्रज्ञानघनं न प्रज्ञ नाप्रज्ञम्। अटष्टमव्यवहार्यमग्राह्य मलक्षणमचित्यमव्यपदेश्यमेकात्मप्रत्ययसारं प्रपंचोपशमं शान्तं शिवं अद्वैतं चतुर्थ मन्यन्ते स आत्मा स विज्ञेयः॥ मां. 6,7. (b) स होवाचैतह्वै तदक्षरं गार्गि ब्राह्मणाः अभिवदन्ति। अस्थूलं, अनणु, अन्हस्वं, अदीर्घ, अलोहितं, अच्छायं, अतमो, असंग, अरसं, अगंधं, अचक्ुष्कं, अश्रोत्रं, अवाकू, अमनो, अप्राणं, अमुखं, अनन्तरं, अबाह्यं, न तदभ्नाति र्किंचन, न तदश्नाति कश्चन। बृ. II.8.8. (c) अशब्दमस्पर्शमरूपमव्ययं, तथाSरसं नित्यमगंधवच्च यत्। अनादयनंतं महतः परं धुवं निचाय्य तन्मृत्युमुखात्म्रमुच्यते॥ क. I. 3. 15. (d) यत्तद्रेश्यमग्राह्यमगोत्रमवर्णमचक्षुशश्रोत्रं तदपाणिपादम् । नित्यं विभुं सर्वगतं सुसूक्ष्मं तदव्ययं यद्भतयोनि परि- पश्यन्ति धीराः॥ मुं. I. I. 6. (e) स एष नेति नेतीत्यात्माSगृह्यो न हि गृह्यते, अशीर्यों न हि शीर्यते, असंगो न हि सज्यते, असितो न व्यथते न रिप्यति खल्वमृतत्वमिति होक्त्वा याज्ञवल्क्यो विजहार। बृ. IV.5. I5; cf.also बृ. III. 9.26; IV.2. 4; IV.422. (/) अथात आदेशः नेति नेति। "न" हि एतस्मादिति "न " इति अन्यत्परमस्ति। बृ.II. 3.6. (g) तेजोमयोऽतेजोमय:, काममयोSकाममयः, क्रोधमयोSको- धमयः, धर्ममयोऽधर्ममयः, सर्वमय तद्यदेतत् इदमयोऽदो- मयः॥ बृ. IV.4.5. 28 (a) एष म आत्माउन्तर्हृदय एतढब्रह्म पतमितः प्रेत्यामिसंभ- वितास्मीति। छा. III. I4:4. (b) अस्मिन् हंसो स्राम्यते ब्रह्मचकरे। पृथगात्मानं प्रेरितारं च मत्वा जुष्टस्तत: तेनामृतत्वमेति॥ शवे. I. 6. (c) ब्रह्म वा इदमग्र आसीत् तदात्मानमचेत् अहं ब्रह्मास्मीति। तस्मात् तत्सर्वे अभवत् तद्यो यो देवानां प्रत्यबुध्यत स एव तद्भवत् तथा ऋषीणां तथा मनुष्याणाम् ... य एवं

244 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIG PHILOSOPHY वेद अहं ब्रह्मास्मीति स इदं सर्वे भवति। अथ योऽम्पां देवतां उपास्ते अन्योऽसौ अम्योऽहमस्मीति, नस वेद यथा पशुरेवं स देवानाम्। बृ.I.4. I0. (d) स यश्चायं पुरुषे यश्चासावादित्ये स एकः॥ तै. II. 8. (e) पुरुष एेदं विश्वं ... पतद्यो वेद निहितं गुहायां सोऽविद्या- ग्रंधि विकिरताह सोम्य ।। मुं. II.I.IO. (/) स य एयोऽणिमा पतदात्म्यमिदं सर्व तत्सत्यं स आत्मा, तत्त्वमसि शवेतकेतो। छां. VI. 8. 7. 29 (a) यथोर्णनाभिः सृजते गृह्गते च यथा पृथिव्यामोषधयः संभ- चन्ति। यथा सतः पुरुषात्केशलोमानि तथाक्षरात्संभवर्ताह विश्वम्॥। (b) तदेतत्सत्यं यथा सुदीप्तात्पावकाह्विस्फुलिंगा सहस्रशः मुं. I. I.7.

प्रभवन्ते सरूपाः । तथाक्षराद्विविधाः सोम्य भावाः प्रजा- यन्ते तत्र चै वापियन्ति॥ 30 (a) यथा नद्यः स्यंदमाना: समुद्रे अस्तं गच्छन्ति नामरपे मुं. II.I.I.

विहाय । तथा विद्वान नामरूपाद्विमुक्त: परात्परं पुरुष- मुपैति दिव्यम्॥ मुं. III. 2.8. (b) न तस्य प्राणा उत्कामन्ति ब्रह्मैव सन् म्रह्माप्येति ... तद्यथाS- हिनिल्ववनी वल्मीके मृता प्रत्वस्ता शयीत एवमेव इदं शरीरं शेते। बृ. IV. 4.6-7. 3I (a) हिरण्मयेन पात्रेण सत्यस्यापिहितं मुखम्। तत्वं पूषत- पावृणु सत्यधर्माय दष्टये।। (b) दूरमेते विपरीते विषूची अविद्या या च विद्येति जाता। ई. I5.

अविद्यायामन्तरे वर्तमाना: स्वयंः धीरा: पंडितं मन्यमाना: वंद्रम्यमाणा: परियन्ति सूढा अन्धेनैव नीयमाना वथांधाः। क. I. 2. 4, 5. (c) पुरुष एवेदं विश्वम् .. एतद्यो वेद निहितं गहायाम्। सोऽ- विद्याग्रथि विकिरतीह सोम्य।। मुं. II.I.I0. (d) नाना तु विद्या च अविद्या च। यदेव विद्यया करोति श्रद्धयोपनिषदा तदेव वीर्यवत्तरं भवतीति। छा. I. I. I0 (e) असतो मा सद्रमय । तमसो मा व्वोतिर्गमय। मृत्योर्मा समृतं गमय । बृ. I.3.28

CHAPTER IV : ROOTS OF PHILOSOPHIES 245

(/) अथ धीरा अमृतत्वं विदित्वा भुवं अघुवोधिह न प्रार्थ- बन्ते। क. II. 4.2. (g) त इमे सत्या: कामाः अनृतापिधानाः तेषां सत्यानां सरतां अनृतमपिधानम् । यो यो हि अस्य इतः प्रैति न तमिह दर्शनाय लभते। .. तद्यथा हि हिरण्यनिर्धि निहितं अक्षेत्रज्ञा उपर्युपरि संचरन्तो न विन्देयुः एवमेव इमाः सर्वाः प्रजाः अहरहर्गच्छंत्यः एतं ब्रह्मलोकं न विन्दन्ति अनृतेन हि प्रत्यूढाः। स वा एष आत्मा हृदि .. अहरहरवां एवंवित्स्वर्गे लोकमेति। छा. VIII.3. I-3. (/) तेषां असौ विरजो ब्रह्मलोको न येषु जिहं अनृतं न माया चेति। प्र.I.16. (i) तस्यामिध्यानात् योजनात् तत्त्वभावात् सयश्धान्ते विश्व- मायानिवृत्ति:। पे. I. I0. (i) रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभूव तदस्य रूपं प्रतिचक्षणाय। इंद्रो मायाभि: पुरुरूप ईयते युक्ता हयास्य हरय: शतादश ॥ बृ. II. 5. 19; cf.also क. VI.47. 18. (k) अस्मान्मायी सृजते विश्वमेतत् । तस्मि्ान्यो मायया संनिरुद्धः। शे.IV.9. () मायां तु प्रकृति विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम्। शे.IV.I0. (m) य एको जालवानीशत ईशनीमि: सर्वान् लोकानू ईशत ईशनीभिः। शे. III.I. एकैक जालं बडुधा विकुर्बन् अस्मिन्क्षेत्रे संचरत्येष देवः। भूय: सृष्ठा यतयस्तयेष: सर्वाधिपत्यं कुरुते महात्मा।। शे. V. 3. (xi) यत्र हि व्वैतमिव भवति तदितर इतरं पश्यति। बृ.II.4.I4. (०) यथा सोम्ब एकेन मृत्पिडेन सर्वे मृन्मयं विज्ञातं स्यात् वाचारंभण विकारो नामधेयं मृत्तिका इत्येव सत्यम्। छां. VI.I. 4.

CHAPTER V

THE PROBLEM OF ULTIMATE REALITY IN THE UPANISHADS

1. In the midst of all the metaphysical conflicts

The Supreme Philo- that we have witnessed in the last sophical Problem. chapter, there arises one supreme question-what, if any, is the core of Upanishadic teaching ? Shall our minds be only tossed on the waves of philosophical conflicts, or can we have a ballast which will give the necessary poise to our philosophical speculations ? Shall our minds be only sunk in the mire of the metaphysical conflicts of Pluralism, Qualified Monism, and Monism as we find them in the Upanishads ? Is there not, at the basis of these various attempts at the solution of the central metaphysical problem, one fundamental conception, which will enable us to string together the variegated philosophical speculations of the Upanishads ? This raises a very important pro- blem-the problem of Ultimate Reality as understood by the Upanishadic seers. As we shall notice in this chapter, the Upanishadic philosophers solved the pro- blem by taking recourse to the conception of Ätman, a word which originally signified the breathing principle in man, but which came in the end to denote the essence of the Universe. Readers of Greek philosophy need hardly be reminded of the close parallel that exists between this Upanishadic conception of Atman and the Platonic conception of the drò wud' soro. The Ätman, as we shall see in the course of this chapter, is

§ 21 CHAPTER V: METAPHYSICS 247

the ultimate category of existence to the Upanishadic seers. How they arrived at this conception, and what use they made of it in the solution of the fundamental philosophical problem will form the theme of the present discourse.

2. If we look at the history of philosophic thought, we shall see that there are various The three approaches to the Problem in the ways in which the problem of Ulti- history of thought: mate Reality has been approach- cosmological, theologi- cal, psychological. ed. The three chief types of ap- proach are the Cosmological, the Theological, and the Psychological. Dr. Caird has said, that, by the very constitution of man's mind, there have been only three ways of think- ing open to man: "He can look outward upon the world around him; he can look inward upon the Self within him ; and he can look upward to the God above him, to the Being who unites the outward and inward worlds, and who manifests himself in both."* According to him, the consciousness of objects is prior in time to self-consciousness, and the conscious- ness of both subject and object is prior to the consci- ousness of God. As he also elsewhere expresses it : "Man looks outward before he looks inward, and he looks inward before he looks upward."" The ques- tion arises : Is this account of the development of the consciousness of Reality ultimately valid? Is it ne- cessary that man must look at the outside world before he looks within, and must he always look within before he can look up to God ? The solutions which the history of philosophy gives to this problem are not exactly as Caird would have them. The Cartesian solution does not start by saying that the I Evolution of Religion, I. 77. = Evolution of Religion, II, 2.

248 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY t$2 outside world is real. For Descartes, the Self is the primary reality, self-consciousness the primary fact of existence, and introspection the start of the real philosophical process. From the Self, says Descartes, we arrive at the conception of God, who is the cause of the Self, and whom we must therefore regard as more perfect than the Self. Finally, it is from God that we arrive at the world which we started by negating, by regarding as the creation of a deceptive evil spirit. On the other hand, to the God-intoxicated philosopher, Spinoza, neither the Self nor the world is the primary reality. To him, God is the be-all and the end-all of all things, the alpha and the omega of existence. From God philosophy starts, and in God philosophy ends. The manner of approach of the Upanishadic philo- sophers to the problem of ultimate reality was neither the Cartesian nor the Spinozistic one. The Upanishadic philosophers regarded the Self as the ulti- mate existence and subordinated the World and God to the Self. The Self, to them, is more real than either the World or God. It is only ultimately that they identify the Self with God, and thus bridge over the gulf that exists between the theological and psycho- logical approaches to Reality. They start, no doubt, by looking out into the world, but they find that the solution of the ultimate problem cannot come from the world without : it is necessary for us, they say, to go back to the psychololgical category. Then they try another experiment : they go by the theological approach to the problem of reality, but they find that also to be wanting. Finally, they try the psychological approach, and arrive at the solution of the problem of ultimate existence. We thus see that the problem of ultimate Reality to the Upanishadic philo- sophers is a cosmo-theo-psychological problem : finding both the cosmological and theological approaches

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deficient, they take recourse to the psychological approach and arrive at the conception of the Self, which they call the Atman. We shall proceed to show at length in this chapter how the Upanishadic philo- sophers regarded the cosmological and theological ap- proaches as only ancillary, and the psychological ap- proach as the only true approach to the ultimate solution. I-THE COSMOLOGICAL APPROACH 3. We shall first discuss the cosmological approach, and see how it was found defi- Regress from the cos- mological to the phy- cient. The naive mind of the na- siological categories. tural man is likely to consider the forces of nature as ultimate reali- ties ; but a deeper speculation and a greater insight into events show that the phenomenal forces cannot be taken to be ultimate realities. This fact is illustra- ted by a story in the Chhandogya Upanishad, where we are told how one student, Upakosala, lived for in- struction with his preceptor, Satyakāma Jābāla, and served him assiduously for twelve years; how even though the ordinary period of tutelage was over, his teacher would not leave him; how the wife of the teacher asked her husband why it was that he would not leave this one disciple while he had left the others : how, when Upakosala had once gone to the forest, the three sacrificial Fires, whom he had assiduously served in his master's house, rose in bodily form before him; how the first, namely Gahrapatya, told him that the ultimate reality was to be found in the sun; how the second, namely Anvahar- yapachana, told him that it was to be found in the moon ; how, the last, namely Ahavaniya, told him that it was to be found in the lightning; how, in fact, Upakosala seemed to be temporarily satisfied with the

250 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ §3

instruction imparted to him by the three Fires; how, when he returned home, his teacher asked him why it was that his face shone as if with spiritual illumina- tion ; how the student told him that the spiritual illu- mination, if at all, was due to the instruction imparted to him by the three Fires; how the teacher replied that the teaching imparted to him by the Fires was deficient and inferior to the teaching which he himself knew ; how he ultimately imparted that teaching to his disciple, which consisted in saying that the ulti- mate reality was to be found neither in the sun, nor in the moon, nor in the lightning, but in the image of the person reflected in the human eye. "It is this image," said Satyakāma Jabāla, "which is the Ätman. It is this image which is fearless, and the ultimate reality. It is this image which brings all blessings. It is this image which is the most resplendent thing in all the worlds. He who knows it to be so will himself be resplendent in the worlds" (S. I). This passage evidently indicates a regress from the cosmological to the physiological category. Not satisfied with objective existences being regarded as ultimate reality, Satyakāma de- clares that ultimate reality is to be found in a phy- siological category, namely, the eye. This, in itself, as we shall see later on, is only an inferior truth, though evidently it has the merit of taking us from the outside world to the physiological sphere. In a sımi- lar spirit, in another passage of the Chhandogya Upa- nishad, we are told how the light " which shines in the high heavens in transcendent space is the same light which is within man, and of this we have tactual proof, namely, when we feel the warmth in the body, and audible proof when after closing our ears we hear what may be regarded as the thunder of heaven, or the bellowing of an ox, or the sound of a burning fire. He who meditates on ultimate reality as thus dwelling in

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the human body becomes himself conspicuous and celebrated" (S. 2. a). This same idea is expressed in the Maitri Upanishad when the author of that Upani- shad speaks of the ultimate reality in man as being verily the sound which a man hears after shutting his ears (S. 2. b). We thus see that in these passages we have a regress from the cosmological to the physio- logical categories, namely, the eye, or bodily warmth, or the sound that man hears after closing his ears. The cosmological approach has been tried and found wanting. It seems necessary for the Upanishadic philosophers to halt at the caravansary of the physio- logical categories' before they can proceed to the psychological destination.

4. In a passage which occurs both in the KaushItaki Regress from the cos- and the Brihadāranyaka Upani- mological and physlo- shads, we are told how both the logical to the psycholo- cosmological and physiological gical categories. categories must be regarded as deficient, and how they must, therefore, necessarily pave the way for the psychological category. There is here a discussion as to how the proud Bālāki once went to Ajātatśatru, the king of Kāśī, and how he tried to impose upon him by saying that he would impart superior wisdom to him; how Ajatasatru welcomed this great man who told him that he would impart superior knowledge; how the proud Balaki began by saying that true wisdom consisted in regarding the sun as ultimate reality; how he went on to say that the ultimate reality was to be found, one after another, in such objects as the moon, the lightning, the thunder, the wind, the sky. the fire, the water, the mirror, the image, the echo, the 1 There is the same distinction between physiology and psychology a Matthew Arnold would say between the poetries of Byron and Wordsworth.

252 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§ 4 sound, the body, the right eye and the left eye ; how ultimately Balaki's mouth was gagged when he could proceed no further in his peculiar way of philoso- phising ; how Ajātasatru took Balāki by the hand, went to a man who had fallen in deep sleep, and called upon him saying ' Thou great one, clad in white raiment, O king Soma'; how the man, who had fallen in deep sleep, still remained lying ; how he rose at once when Ajātasatru pushed him with his stick; and how, finally, Ajatasatru told Balāki that in the person who had gone to sleep, the sleeping consciousness may be regarded as ultimate reality (S. 3). In this passage we have evidently the deficiency of both the cosmological and physiological categories brought out ih favour of the psychological category, namely, the deep-sleep consciousness. We shall see later how even this is an inferior answer to the problem that has been raised ; and, therefore, we shall not stop at this place to discuss the final psychological answer of the Upanishadic philosophers on this head.

5. The cosmological approach has been tried

The cosmological and found wanting in favour argument for the exls- either of physiological or psycho- tence of God: God is logical categories. But it does not all-powerful. by any means follow that the cosmological speculations of the Upanishadic philo- sophers did not lead them indc pendently to the positing of Absolute Existence. If we look deeper, we shall find in them the same kind of cosmological proof for the existence of the Absolnte, as we find, for ex- ample, in the history of Greek Philosophy. A passage of the Taittirlya Upanishad declares that behind the cosmos there must be an existence which must be re- garded as responsible for its origin, sustenance, and absorption: "that from which all these beings come

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into existence, that by which they live, that into which they are finally absorbed, know that to be the eternal verity, the Absolute " (S. 4. a). And, again, a cryptic formula of the Chhandogya Upanishad declares that a man must compose himself in the belief that the world has come out of, lives in, and is finally absorbed in the Absolute. The philosopher of this Upanishad expresses this whole conception by means of a single word tajjalan, which means that it is from the Absolute that the world has sprung, it is into it that it is dissolved, and it is by means of it that it lives (S. 4. b). This "cosmological" proof for the existence of an eternal verity behind the cosmos by reference to the origin, existence, and destruction of the world is known to all students of philosophy, and we find the same thing in the Upanishads also. It is true that the same kind of objections that were advanced by Kant against the traditional cosmological argument may likewise be advanced against this way of argu- mentation in the Upanishads ; but the fact cannot be gainsaid that the argument is there. When once an eternal verity behind the cosmos has been postulated, the Upanishadic philosophers have no hesitation in making it the fount and source of all power whatso- ever. They consider it to be the source of Infinite Power which is only partially exhibited in the various phenomena of Nature. Thus the forces of Nature that we are aware of are ultimately only partial manifes- tations of the power that is in the Absolute. There is a very interesting parable in the Kenopanishad which tells us how this is so. Parables and myths in philosophical works are to be understood as merely allegorical representations of philosophical truths, and it is thus that the story in that Upanishad of Brah- man, the eternal Verity, showing its prowess against the arrogant godlings of Nature, must be under-

254 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§ 5 stood. The story runs, that there was, once upon a time, a great fight between the gods and the demons, and the gods were successful. The gods thought that the success was due entirely to their own power, and forgetting that this power was only a manifestation of the power of Brahman in them, they became proud. The Brahman, knowing this, suddenly made its appearance before them, and the gods were greatly wonderstruck, not knowing what it was. Then they sent forth one of them, namely, the god of fire, as an emissary to Brahman, and charged him with the task of learning the real nature of that Great Being. The god of fire ran in pride to Brahman. Brahman asked him who he was, and the god of fire proudly answered that he was Jatavedas, in whom lay the power of burning the whole of the earth if he pleas- ed. Then Brahman threw before him a small blade of grass, and asked him to burn it if he could. The god of fire was unable to burn it with all his might. He became disappointed and returned to the gods. Then the gods sent another godling of nature, the god of wind, and charged him with the same mis- sion. The god of wind ran in pride to Brahman, and, being asked who he was, said that he was Matariśvan, in whom lay the power of blowing away anything from off the surface of the earth. Brahman again threw a blade of grass before him. Not with all his might was the god of wind able to move it to an infinitesimal dis- tance. Then the god of wind returned in shame, not being able to know the nature of that Great Being. Then the gods sent Indra and charged him with the same mission. Indra was a more modest god than either the god of fire or the god of wind. He ran to Brahman to know its nature, and Brahman disappeared from his sight, for the simple reason, it seems, that Indra was more humble than either of the gods previously sent.

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Then suddenly sprang before Indra one very beautiful celestial damsel, from whom Indra inquired what that Great Being was, which had made its sudden dis- appearance from before him. Then that damsel told him that it was Brahman, and said further, that it was due to the power of the Brahman that the gods had gained victory over the demons, and not to their own personal power. God Indra was shrewd enough and understood that the power of the gods was only a manifestation of the power of the Absolute. It was on account of this humility, which made it possible for him to go to Brahman and touch him nearest, that he became the foremost of the gods. " It is verily the power of Brahman which flashes forth in the lightning and vanishes again. It is the power of Brahman which manifests itself as the motion of the soul in us and bethinks itself" (S. 5. a). This parable tells us that all physical as well as mental power is to be regarded merely as a manifestation of the power of Brahman. We thus see how the philosopher of the Kenopanishad arrives cosmologically at the conception of an un- manifested Power which lies at the back of the so- called manifest powers of nature and mind, and which must therefore be understood as the primary reality.

6. It is not merely that all the power in the world is ultimately due to Brahman : the God is supreme re- very resplendence and illumination aplendence. that we meet with in the world are also to be regarded as manifestations of the great unmanifest luminosity of the Absolute. " Does the sun shine by his own power ?" asks the Kathopa- nishad; "Do the moon and the stars shine by their own native light ? Does the lightning flash forth in its native resplendence ?- Not to speak of the paltry

256 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ § 6

earthly fire, which obviously owes its resplendence to something else ?" Shall we say that all these so-called resplendent things are resplendent in their own native light, or must we assert that they derive their power of illumination from a primal eternal verity which lies at the back of them all, and whose illumi- nation makes possible the illumination of the so-called luminous objects of nature? "Before Him the Sun does not shine, before Him the moon and the stars do not shine, before Him the lightning does not shine; far less this earthly fire. It is only when the Absolute shines first, that all these objects shine afterwards. It is by His luminosity that they become luminous" (S. 5. b).

7. The Brahman, therefore, which must be posited as God is the subtle es- the fount and source of all existen- sence underlying phe- ce, and which must be regard- nomenal existence. ed as the origin of all power and resplendence, must also be taken, say the Upanishadic thinkers, as the subtle essence underlying all the gross manifestations that we meet with in the world. An- other parable, this time from the Chhandogya Upani- shad, tells us how in the conversation that took place between a teacher and his pupil, the teacher, in order to convince his pupil of the subtlety of the underlying essence, directed him to bring to him a small fruit of the Nyagrodha tree; how, when the disciple had brought one, the teacher directed him to break it open ; how, when it was broken open, he asked him to see what was inside the fruit of the tree; how, when the disciple looked into it, he saw that there were seeds infinite in number, and infinitesimal in size; how when the teacher again directed him to break open one of those seeds, the disciple did so, and, being asked to see further what was there, said "Nothing.

$81 CHAPTER V: METAPHYSICS 257

Sir ", upon which the teacher told him, " My dear boy, it is of the very subtle essence that you do not perceive there-it is of this very essence that the great Nya- grodha tree is made. Believe it, my dear boy" (S. 6). This parable tells us how the underlying essence of things is to be regarded as subtle and un- manifest, and how the gross and manifested objects are to be understood as merely phenomenal appear- ances. There is, however, a further point in the parable which we must duly notice. When the teacher told his disciple that behind the Nyagrodha tree there lay a subtle essence which was unmanifest, he also told him that it was to be identified with the Self, and fur- ther, that the disciple must identify himself with it (S. 6). We see here the limitation of the mere cosmo- . logical conception of an underlying essence of things, and it seems as if cosmology must invoke the aid of psychological categories once more before the essence underlying the cosmos could be identified with the essence that lies at the back of the human mind. Thus the whole Universe becomes one, only when we suppose that there is the same subtle essence underlying both the world of nature and the world of mind.

8. The cosmological argument, as it happens in the history of thought, seems also to The physico-theolo- gical argument. take the help of the physico- theological proof and the two together seem to offer a formidable front to the think- ing mind. Likewise does it happen in the case of Upa- nishadic philosophy. The argument from design and the argument from order are merely the personal and impersonal aspects of the physico-theological argument. Those who believe in God believe in design. Those who believe in an impersonal Absolute believ 33

258 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [$ 8 only in order. Very often, as in the case of the Upa- nishadic thinkers, the personal and impersonal aspects are fused together, and we are told how the Self as per- sonal existence is yet "an impersonal bund which holds the river of existence from flowing by. Neither night nor day, neither age nor death, neither grief nor good nor evil, are able to transgress this eternal bund of existence" (S. 7. a). "It is at the command of this imperishable existence," says the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad, "that the sun and the moon stand bound in their places. It is due to the command of this Ab- solute that the heaven and the earth stand each in its own place. It is due to the command of this imperish- able Brahman that the very moments, the hours, the days, the nights, the months, the seasons, and the ears have their appointed function in the scheme of ings. It is at the command of this Brahman that some eis flow to the east from the snow-clad mountains, le others flow to the west" (S. 7. b). We shall y to disentangle here the personal and impersonal s of the physico-theological proof, the aspect of and the aspect of order. Suffice it to say that sico-theological proof is present in the Upani- nting out that the Absolute must be regarded ast of the cosmos, preventing it from rock- fro at the slightest gust of chance.

-THE THEOLOGICAL APPROACH 1 now see how the Upanishadic philoso- phers went by the theological 'y- approach to the conception of . reality. They began by inquiring ust be supposed to exist in the uni- not rest content until they arrived d, who was the ruler of the whole they identified this God with the

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inner Self in man. In this way did theological categories become subservient to the psychological category of the Self. We shall see how this happens. In the contro- versy which took place between Vidagdha Sakalya and the sage Yajñavalkya as reported in the Brihada- ranyaka, we are told that the former asked Yajña- valkya how many gods must be regarded as existing in the world, to which the first answer of Yajnavalkya was " three and three hundred," Yajnavalkya closely following upon this by saying that there were "three and three thousand." Not satisfied with the answers, Śakalya asked again how many gods there were. Yajnavalkya replied there were thirty-three gods. Śakalya was again dissatisfied and asked again. Yajnavalkya replied there were six gods. In answer to further inquiries from Śakalya, Yajñavalkya went on to say that there were three gods, and then two gods, and even one-and-a-half (!) god, and finally that there was only one God without a second. Yajnavalkya was merely testing the insight of Sakalya as to whether he would rest satisfied with the different answers that he first gave, and when Sakalya did not seem satisfied, he finally said that there was only one God. By mutual consent, Sakalya and Yajfiavalkya came to the conclusion that He alone is the God of the Universe, "whose body the earth is, whose sight is fire, whose mind is light, and who is the final resort of all human souls" (S. 8. a).

10. The Śvetāśvatara Upanishad develops this con-

The theistic concep- ception of a personal God. In a tion of God and His theistic vein it declares how the identification with the one God, whom it calls Rudra, Self. beside whom there is no second, and who rules the worlds with his powers, stands behind all persons, creates all the worlds, and, in

260 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ § 10 the end of time, rolls them up again. He has his eyes everywhere, and his face everywhere; his hands and feet are also omnipresent. He creates the men of earth and endows them with hands. He creates the fowl of air and endows them with wings. He is the only God who has created the heaven and the earth (S. 8. b). In a later passage of the same Upanishad, the author inquires further into the nature and attributes of this God. He calls him the only Lord of the universe, the creator, the preserver, and the destroyer of all. He ends by declaring that it is only to those who regard this God as identical with the Self within,-to those be- longs eternal happiness, to none else: "Some so- called wise men, being under a great philosophic de- lusion, regard Nature, and others Time, as the source of being. They forget that it is the greatness of the Lord, which causes the wheel of Brahman to turn round. It is by Him that all this has been covered. He is the only knower, he is death to the god of death, the possessor of all qualities and wisdom. It is at His command that creation unfolds itself, namely, what people call earth, water, fire, air and ether. He is the permanent as well as the accidental cause of unions. He is beyond the past, the present, and the future, and is truly regarded as without parts. That univer- sal God, who is immanent in all these beings, should be meditated upon as dwelling in our minds also -- that God who is the Lord of all gods, who is the Deity of all deities, who is the supreme Master of all masters, and who is the adorable Ruler of the universe. There is no cause of Him, nor any effect. There is none equal to Him, nor any superior. The great power inherent in Him manifests itself alike in the form of knowledge and action. There is no master of Him in this world, nor any ruler, nor is there anything which we might

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regard as His sign. He is the only Cause, the Lord of all those who possess sense-organs. There is no generator of Him, nor any protector. He is the self-subsistent mover of the unmoving manifold, who causes the one seed to sprout in infinite ways. It is only to those who regard this Universal Being as immanent in their own Selves, to them belongs eternal happiness, to none else " (S. 8. c). In this theistic description of the Śvetaśvatara Upanishad we are told how God is the only cause of the world, and how ultimately he is to be regarded as identical with the Self within. Here again the purely theological category becomes subservient to the psychological category of the Self; and it seems as if the ultimate category of existence to the Upani- shadic philosophers is God-Atman.

11. The Upanishads are not without reference to the immanence and transcendence The immanence- transcendence of God. of God. There are some passages which declare merely his im- manence, others merely his transcendence; others again bring together the two aspects of the imma- nence and transcendence of God. Thus, for example, we are told in the Śvetaśvatara Upanishad that " God is to be regarded as being present in fire and in water, in all the universe, in the herbs and plants." In the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad we are told how God-Ātman is immanent in us from top to toe, as a razor is entirely closed up within the razor-box, or again, as a bird is pent up within its nest. A story from the Chhandogya Upanishad also brings into relief this aspect of the immanence of God. We are told there how the disciple was asked by his teacher to place a small piece of salt in water at night, and come to him in the morning ; how the disciple did as he was commanded; how, when the teacher asked

262 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§ 11

him what had become of the salt, the disciple could not find it out because it had already melted in the water ; how when the teacher asked him to taste the water from the surface, then from the middle, and then from the bottom, the disciple replied that it was salt in all places ; then how the teacher told him that the salt, even though it seemed to have disappeared in the water, was thoroughly present in every part of it. Thus, verily, says the clever teacher, is that subtle Ātman immanent in the universe, whom we may not be able to see, but whom we must regard as existing as the supreme object of faith (S. 9. a). All these passa- ges speak of the thorough immanence of God. A passage from the Kathopanishad, which reminds us of a similar one from the Republic of Plato, which speaks of the Sun of the world of Ideas, tells us how the universal Self is to be regarded as beyond all the happiness and the misery of the world -- " like the celestial Sun who is the eye of all the universe and is untouched by the defects of our vision" (S. 9. b). Here the transcendence of God is clearly brought into relief. In other passages, we are also told how God is to be regarded as having " filled the whole world and yet remained beyond its confines." "Like the fire and the wind which enter the world and assume various forms, the universal Ätman is immanent in every part of the universe and protrudes beyond its confines." "Verily motionless like a lone tree does this God stand in the heaven and yet by Him is this whole world filled." This is how the Śvetasvatara Upanishad declares the transcendence and immanence of God (S. 9. c). We see from all these passages how God-Ātman is to be regarded as having filled every nook and cranny of the Universe, and yet having overflowed it to a limitless extent. In any case, the God in the universe is to be regarded as iden-

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tical with the Self within us : it is only when this identifi- cation takes place that we arrive, according to the Upani- shadic philosophers,at the ultimate conception of Reality. III-THE PSYCHOLOGICAL APPROACH 12. Let us now proceed to see how the Upanishadic

The conception of the philosophers reached the idea of Self reached by an ana- ultimate reality by the psycholo- lysis of the various gical method. In a conversation physiological and psy- chological categories. which took place between King Janaka and Yajñavalkya as re- ported in the Brihadāranyaka Upanishad, we find that Yajnavalkya asked Janaka as to what psycho- logical doctrines he had heard about the nature of ul- timate reality. Janaka was a very inquisitive and philosophically inclined king, and he had therefore known all the opinions on that head which had been imparted to him by different sages. He proceeded to tell Yajñavalkya the opinions of these various philosophers. "Jitvan Śailini told me," said king Janaka, "that speech was the ultimate reality." Yajnavalkya answered that this was merely a par- tial truth. Then king Janaka told him that Udanka Śaulbayana had said to him that breath was the ultimate reality. This also, said Yajnavalkya, was only a partial truth. Varku Varshni had told him, said Janaka, that the eye was the final reality. This again, said Yajñavalkya, was only a partial truth. Then the king went on to say how Gardabhi-vipIta Bharadvaja had told him that the ear was the final reality; how Satyakama Jabala had said that the mind was the final reality; how Vidagdha Sākalya had told him that the heart was the final reality ;- all of which opinions, said Yajñavalkya, were only partial truths (S. Io. a). In this enumeration of the opiniens of different Upanishadic philosophers as re-

264 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§ 12

gards the various physiological or psychological cate- gories as constituting the ultimate reality, and in Yajñavalkya's rejection of each one of them in turn, there lies implicitly the conception that ultimate reality can be found only in the Self, and not in the accidental adjuncts with which the Self may come to be clothed. This same idea has been developed in the Kena Upanishad where we are told that " the Self must be regarded as the ear of ear, as the mind of mind, as the speech of speech, as the breath of breath, as the eye of eye. Those who know the Self thus are released from this world and become immortal." "That which speech is unable to give out, but that which itself gives out speech, know that to be the ultimate reality, not that which people worship in vain. That which the mind is unable to think, but which thinks the mind, know that to be the ultimate reality ; that which the eye is unable to see, but that which enables us to see the eye, know that to be the ultimate reality ; that which the ear does not hear, but that which enables us to perceive the ear, that which breath is not able to breathe, but that by which breath itself is breathed, know that to be the final reality" (S. I0. b.). In this passage we are told that the Self must be regarded as the innermost existence, while all the physiological and psychological elements are only external vestures, which clothe reality but which do not constitute it.

13. We now come to a very famous parable in the The states of con- Chhandogya Upanishad which un- sciousness : waking- mistakably tells us how we must consciousness, dream- consciousness, sleep- arrive at the conception of the consciousness, Self- Self-conscious Being within us as consclousness. constituting the ultimate reality. In a very clever analysis of the psychological states

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through which a man's soul passes, the author of that Upanishad brings out how the ultimate reality must not be mistaken with bodily consciousness; how it must not be confused with the dream- consciousness ; how it transcends even the deep-sleep- consciousness ; how, finally, it is the pure Self-cons- ciousness, which is beyond all bodily or men- tal limitations. We are told in the Chhandogya Upani- shad that the gods and demons were, once upon a time, both anxious to learn the nature of final reality, and they therefore went in pursuit of it to Prajapati. Prajapati had maintained that "that entity, which is free from sin, free from old age, free from death and grief, free from hunger and thirst, which desires nothing, and imagines nothing, must be regarded as the ultimate self." The gods and demons were anxious to know what this Self was. So the gods sent Indra and the demons Virochana as their emissaries to learn the final truth from Prajapati. They dwelt there as pupils at first for a period of thirty-two years, which condi- tion was necessary before a master could impart spiri- tual wisdom to his disciples. Then Prajapati asked them what it was that had brought them there. Indra and Virochana told him that they had come to him in order that they might know the nature of the Self. Now Prajapati would not immediately tell them the final truth. He tried to delude them by saying first that the Self was nothing more than the image that we see in the eye, in water, or in a mirror. It was this, he said, which must be regarded as the immortal and fear- less Brahman. Indra and Virochana became compla- cent in the belief that they had understood the nature of the Self. They bedecked themselves by putting on excellent clothes and ornaments, cleaned themselves, looked into a water-pan, and imagined they had visualised the ultimate Self, and went altogether com- 34

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posed in mind. Virochana told the demons that he had been in possession of the ultimate secret, namely, that the so-called Self was no other than the image that one sees in the eye, in a mirror, or in a pan of water, thus identifying the Self with the mere image of the body. The Upanishad tells us how there are a certain set of people who take this as final gospel, which it calls the gospel of the Asuras. There must be a slight reference here to those, who, like the later Charvakas, maintained that the Self was nothing more than the mere consciousness of body. Indra, however, un- like Virochana, bethought himself that Prajapati must not have given him the final answer in the matter of the knowledge of ultimate reality. There was this difficulty that pressed itself before him. " It is true," he said, "that, when the body is well adorned, the Self is well adorned ; when the body is well dressed, the Self is well dressed ; when the body is well cleaned, the Self is well cleaned ; but what if the body were blind, or lame, or crippled ? Shall not the Soul itself be thus regarded as blind, or lame, or crippled"? He thought that there was this great difficulty in the teaching that had been imparted to him by Prajapati, and so he went back again to Prajapati to request him once more to tell him what ultimate reality was. Prajapati advised him to practise penance once more for thirty-two years, and, when Indra had performed that penance, Prajapati supplied him with another piece of knowledge. "The true Self is he, " said Praja- pati, "who moves about happy in dreams. He is the immortal, the fearless Brahman." In fact, Prajapati told him that dream-consciousness must be re- garded as identical with the Self. This seemed to please Indra and he went back ; but before he reached the gods, he saw again that there was another diffi- culty in the information that bad been imparted to

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him by Prajapati. "Do we not feel," he asked himself, "as if we are struck, or chased in our dreams ? Do we not experience pain, and do we not shed tears in our dreams? How can we account for this difficulty if the Self were to be identified with dream-consciousness"? So he went back to Prajapati again, and told him that the knowledge which he had imparted to him could not be final, inasmuch as the dream-consciousness seemed to him to be affected with feelings of pain and fear. The true Self could experience neither pain nor fear. Prajāpati saw that Indra was a pupil worthy to know better things, and so he asked him once more to prac- tise penance for another thirty-two years, at the end of which time he imparted to him another piece of knowledge which was yet not the highest knowledge, namely, when he said, that the true Self must be re- garded as identical with the deep-sleep consciousness in which there is perfect repose and perfect rest. Indra was satisfied with the answer which Prajapati had given and returned. But before he reached the gods, he again saw that the real Self could not be identified even with deep-sleep consciousness for the simple reason that in deep sleep we are conscious neither of our own selves nor of objects. In fact, in deep-sleep we are as if we were only logs of wood. There is neither consciousness of self nor consciousness of the objective world. Feeling this great difficulty in the teaching that had been imparted to him by Prajapati, he went back again and told him that he could not be satisfied with the knowledge which had been imparted to him, namely that the ultimate Self was to be found in the consciousness of deep-sleep. For, he said, in that state there was neither self-conscious- ness, nor any consciousness of the objective world; and it seemed as if the soul was entirely annihi-

268 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§ 13 lated in that state. This could not be regarded, said Indra, as the final wisdom. Prajapati now saw that Indra by his shrewd insight had made himself worthy of receiving the highest knowledge. So he asked Indra once more, and this time finally, to practise penance for five years again. Indra practised penance for five years, thus completing the round of penance for a hundred and one years. At the end of that period, he went in all humility to Prajāpati and implored him to give him an insight into the final knowledge. Prajāpati said, " Verily, O Indra, this body is subject to death, but it is at the same time the ves- ture of an immortal Soul. It is only when the Soul is encased in the body, that it is cognisant of pleasure and pain. There is neither pleasure nor pain for the Soul once relieved of its body. Just as the wind and the cloud, the lightning and the thunder, are without body, and arise from heavenly space and appear in their own form, so does this serene being, namely, the Self, arise from this mortal body, reach the highest light, and then appear in his own form. This Serene Being, who appears in his own form is the highest Person." There is here an indication of the true nature of ulti- mate reality as being of the nature of self-consciousness. That which sees itself by itself, that which recognises itself as identical with itself in the light of supreme knowledge-that must be regarded as the final reality. The final reality, therefore, according to the Chhando- gya Upanishad, is reached in that theoretic, ecstatic, self-spectacular state in which the Self is conscious of nothing but itself. (S. I1). There is a great meaning which runs through this parable. By an analysis of the different states of consciousness, the philosopher of the Chhandogya Upanishad points out that the bodily consciousness must not be mistaken for final reality, nor the consciousness in dreams, nor that in deep sleep.

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The Soul is of the nature of pure self-consciousness, the Kantian " I am I." Those who mistake the ulti- mate Self as identical with bodily consciousness are the materialists. Those who identify it with the con- sciousness in the dream-state rise a little higher no doubt, but they mistake the Self for what the modern Theosophists call the " etheric double." Those, on the other hand, who regard the Self as identical with deep- sleep consciousness also misunderstand its nature, be- cause there is in that state no consciousness either of the object world or of the Self. The true Self could only be the self-conscious Being, shining in his own native light, thinking of nothing but his own thought, the vongis rongeus of Aristotle, the supreme theoretic Being, the eternal Self-spectator.

14. We have hitherto seen how the philosopher of The ontological ar- the Chhandogya Upanishad arrives gument for the exis- at the conception of Self-cons- tence of the Self. ciousness as constituting the ulti- mate reality. We have seen also how the Upanishadic philosophers generally regard God as identical with this pure self-consciousness. The philosopher of the Taitti- rīya Upanishad gives us certain characteristics of this final reality which enable us to regard his argument as almost an ontological characterisation of reality. " The Absolute," he says, "is Existence, Conscious- ness, and Infinity " (S. 12. a). In this identifica- tion of the Absolute with Consciousness, we have again the real nature of the Atman brought out in bold relief. Existence to that philosopher means Consciousness. The same idea is repeated elsewhere in the Aitareya Upanishad, where the author of that Upanishad speaks " of the gods of the heaven and the beings of the earth, whether produced from eggs, or embrye, or sweat, or from the earth, everything

270 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§14

that moves, or flies, or is stationary-Self-consciousness is the eye of all these. They are rooted in Self- consciousness. Self-consciousness is the eye of the world; it is Self-consciousness which is the Absolute" (S. 12. b). Here we have unmistakably the ontological argument, namely, that ultimate Exis- tence must be identified with Self-consciousness. Thus by a survey of the different approaches to the problem of Reality, namely, the cosmological, the theolo- gical, and the psychological, we see that the Upa- nishadic philosophers try to establish Reality on the firm footing of Self-consciousness. Self-consciousness to them is the eternal verity. God to them is not God, unless he is identical with Self-consciousness. Existence is not Existence if it does not mean Self- consciousness. Reality is not reality, if it does not ex- press throughout its structure the marks of pure Self-consciousness. Self-consciousness thus constitutes the ultimate category of existence to the Upanishadic philosophers.

IV-THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

15. The great question that now confronts the Upanishadic seeker after truth is : Self-consciousness : its epistemological and if Self-consciousness is the final metaphysical signifl- reality, how would it be possible cance contrasted with the mystical. for us to realise it? Can bare intellect suffice to give us a vision of this final reality, or is there any other process beyond the reach of intelligence which has the power of taking us within the portals of pure Self-consci- ousness? The Upanishadic answer is that mere in- tellect would be lame to enable us to realise pure Self-consciousness. Pure Self-consciousness could only be reached in a state of mystic realisation. Whether

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the mystical faculty, which may be called intui- tion, is higher than, analogous to, or included in the faculty of intellect, whose product all philosophy is, we shall not stop here to consider. It raises a large problem which does not lie within the scope of this work. We shall, however, try to describe it partly in our last Chapter on "The Intimations of Self-Realisation, " where we shall see how it would be possible mystically to realise Self-consciousness. Our answer there would evidently be the super-sensuous and the super-intellectual answer. Intuition, as we shall see, is a superior faculty to either mere sens- uous perception, or intellective apprehension. At pre- sent, however, we are concerned merely with the "philosophic" aspect of pure Self-consciousness, which may be looked at from two different points of view, the epistemological and the metaphysical. We shall see first what the epistemological aspect of Self-consciousness is according to the Upanishads, and then shall end this chapter by bringing out its full metaphysical significance, reserving the mystical aspect of it for our last chapter.

16. Epistemologically, we are told in various

The Epistemology of passages of the Upanishads, it

Self-consciousness. would not be possible for us to know the Self in the technical meaning of the word " knowledge." Our readers might bring to mind the fact that Kant equally well regarded Reality, as consisting of God and the Self, as techni- cally unknowable. These werè, he said, merely mat- ters of faith. The Upanishadic answer is that it is true that God and the Self are unknowable, but they are not merely objects of faith, they are objects of mystical realisation. Then, again, the Upanishads do not regard the Self as unknowable in the agnostic

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sense of the word, for example, in the sense in which Spencer understands it. Rather, it is "unknowable" from the standpoint of philosophic humility. (i) The Ätman, say the Upanishadic philosophers, is unknowable in his essential nature. "That, from which our speech turns back along with mind, being unable to comprehend its fulness, is the ultimate rea- lity, " says the Taittiriya Upanishad. "That where the eye is unable to go, where neither speech nor mind is able to reach-what conception can we have of it, except that it is beyond all that is known, and beyond all that is unknown !" says the Kenopanishad. The philosopher of that Upanishad says in an Augustinian mood that he who thinks he knows does not know, while he who thinks he doesnotknow does really know. Cognoscendo ignorari, et ignorando cognosci. The Kathopanishad in a similar vein says that "the Self is not in the first instance open to the hearing of men, but that even having heard him, many are unable to know him. Wonderful is the man, if found, who is able to speak about him; wonderful, indeed, is he who is able to comprehend him in ac- cordance with the instruction of a teacher " (S. 13. a). We see in all these passages how the Atman is to be regarded as unknowable in his essential nature.

(ii ) There is, however, another side to the sub- ject of the unknowability of Atman. The Atman is unknowable because He is the Eternal Subject who knows. How could the Eternal Knower, ask the Upa- nishads in various places, be an object of knowledge? " The Atman is the Great Being," says the Śvetas- vatara Upanishad " who knows all that is knowable ; who can know him who himself knows?" In the Brihadaraņyaka Upanishad, in various passages, we are put in possession of the bold speculations of the

§16] CHAPTER V : METAPHYSICS 273 philosopher Yajnavalkya. "That by whom everything is known, how could he himself be known ? It is impossible to know the knower." " It would not be possible for us to see the seer, to hear the hearer, to think the thinker, and to apprehend him by whom everything is apprehended." "He is the eternal seer without himself being seen ; he is the eternal hearer without himself being heard ; he is the only thinker without himself being thought; he is the only com- prehender without any one to comprehend him; beyond him there is no seer, beyond him there is no hearer, beyond him there is no thinker, beyond him there is no being who comprehends "(S. 13. b.) We thus see that the question of the unknowability of Atman has another aspect also, namely, that He is unknowable because He is the Eternal Subject of knowledge, and cannot be an object of knowledge to another beside Him.

( iii ) But this raises another fundamental ques- tion. Granted that the Self is the eternal knower of objects, granted also there is no other knower of him, would it be possible for the knower to know himself ? This very subtle question was asked of Yajfavalkya in another passage of the Brihadāran- yakopanishad, and here again we see the brilliant light which the sage Yajnavalkya throws on the problem. It is possible, he says, for the knower te know himself. In fact, Self-knowledge or Self-con- sciousness is the ultimate category of existence. The Self can become an object of knowledge to himself. According to the philosophy of Yajñavalkya, nothing is possible, if self-consciousness is not possible. Self- conselousness is the ultimate fact of existence. We see here how boldly Yajnavalkya regards both in- trospection and self-consciousness as the verities of 33

274 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§16 experience. We also see the nudity of the doctrines of Kant and Comte when they try to deny the fact of introspection. Introspection is a psychological process corresponding to Self-consciousness as a me- taphysical reality. Self-consciousness is possible only through the process of introspection. The Self is endowed with the supreme power of dichotomising himself. The empirical conditions of knowledge are inapplicable to the Self. The Self can divide himself into the knower and the known. It is wonderful how Kant should have posited the " I am I" as the supreme metaphysical category, which he called the transcendental, original, and synthetic unity of ap- perception, and yet should have denied the reality of the corresponding psychological process of in- trospection. The answer of Yajnavalkya is that Self-consciousness is possible, and is not only possible, but alone real. King Janaka asked Yajfavalkya what was the light of man. Yajnavalkya first said that the light of man was the sun. It is on account of the sun that man is able to sit and to move about, to go forth for work, and to return. " When the sun has set, O Yajnavalkya, " asked king Janaka "what is the light of man ?" Yajnavalkya said that then the moon was the light of man. For, having the moon for light, man could sit, and move about, and do his work, and return. " When both the sun and the moon have set, " asked king Janaka, "what is the light of man ?" " Fire indeed," said Yajfavalkya, "is man's light. For having fire for his light, man can sit and move about, do his work, and return." "When the sun has set, when the moon has set, and when the fire is extinguished, what is the light of man ?" asked Janaka. " Now, verily," says Yajñavalkya, "you are pressing me to the deepest question. When the wun bas set.

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when the moon has set, and when the fire is extin- guished, the Self alone is his light " (S. 13. c.). Ya- jnavalkya is here clearly positing what Aristotle called "theoria, " the act of pure self-contempla- tion in which the Self is most mysteriously both the subject and object of knowledge.

17. We have seen, hitherto, the epistemological significance of the conception of The Metaphysics of Self-consclousness. pure Self-consciousness in the Upa- nishads. We have seen that the Self is regarded as unknowable in his essential nature, as well as because he cannot be an object of knowledge. We have seen also that he can dichotomise himself and make himself at once the knower and the known. It remains for us now to discourse on what may be called the metaphysical significance of the conception of Self- consciousneess. In the preceding Chapter we have seen how the whole field of philosophic thought was torn by the conflicts of the metaphysicians, some regarding the Self as entirely distinct from the Abso- lute, others regarding it as a part of the Absolute, and yet others regarding the Self and the Absolute as entirely identical. These constitute respectively the fundamental positions of the three great metaphy- sical schools-the dualistic, the quasi-monistic, and the monistic. Never has any land possibly experi- enced such bitter and prolonged argumentative battles as were witnessed in India throughout the history of its thought. The question arises: Is there any way out of the difficulty! How is it that each of these different metaphysical schools comes to interpret the same Upanishadic passages as confirm- ing its own special metaphysical doctrines? Shall we not say that the Upanishads are higher than the Commentators ? Is there not a common body of meta-

276 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§ 17

physical doctrine in the Upanishads which each of the metaphysical schools has only partially envisaged ? Is the utterance of that greatest of Indian philosophers to be regarded as vain, when he said that the Schools may battle among themselves, but yet that Philosophy is above the Schools? May we not find a supreme clue to the reconciliation of these different battling doctrines ? We must go back to the Upanishads them- selves, with our mind entirely purged of all scholastic interpretation. Let us make our mind a tabula rasa, an unwritten slate upon which there is no hurtful im- print of scholastic superstition, and we shall see that there is a clue through the labyrinth and mazes of the philosophic conflicts. It is true that the reconciliation of the different schools must come, if at all, only through mystical experince. It is only in mystic experi- ence that each school and each doctrine can have its own appointed place and level. But it may also be granted to us to look even philosophically at the problem, to go back to the texts of the Upanishads themselves, to arrange them in a serial order of developing philosophical propositions, and finally to see a vista of supreme reconciliation spreading out before us among the battling forces.

18. We may arrange the different stages of spiri- The Ladder of Spirt- tual experience, as developed in tual Experience. the Upanishads, philosophically interpreted, in a series of five developing proposi- tions. We may regard them as constituting the ladder of spiritual experience with a series of five ascending steps. The first stage of spiritual experience would consist, according to Brihadaranyaka Upani- shad, in realising the Self, in mystically apprehending the glory of the Self within us, as though we were distinct from him (S. 14. a ). Now comes the second

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stage. Another passage from the Brihadaranyaka Upanishad. tells us that the Being, which calls itself the " I" within us, must be identified with the Self that is hithertofore realised. We must experience that we are really the very Self, and that we are neither the bodily, or the sensuous, or the intellectual, or the emo- tional vestures; that we are in our essential nature entirely identical with the pure Self. This is the second stage (S.14. b ). In the third stage of spiritual expe- rience, we must come to realise, according to Briha- dāranyaka Upanishad, that the Self that we have realised is identical with the Absolute. This same identification of the Atman and the Brahman, of the Individual Spirit and the Universal Spirit, of the Self and the Absolute, is also proclaimed by the episto- lary stanza of the Isa and its cognate Upanishads, where we are told that the Atman must be regarded as verily the Brahman, that the Atman is infinite in its nature as also the Brahman, that the Atman de- rives its being from Brahman, that subtracting the infinity of the Ätman from the infinity of the Brah- man, the residuum is even infinite. Thus does that epistolary stanza pile infinities over infinities, and, taking the mathematical lead, speak as if when the infinity of the Atman is deducted from the infinity of the Brahman, the remainder itself is infinite. The inner meaning of this assertion is that we should see that there is no difference between the Self and the Absolute. This constitutes the third stage ( S.14.c). Now comes the fourth. If the Being that calls itself the "I" within us is the Atman according to our second proposition, and if it is to be entirely identified with the Brahman according to our third proposition ; that is, in other words, if I am the Self, and the Self is the Absolute ; then, it follows syllo- gistically that I am the Absolute. This is unmis-

878 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§18 takably inculcated by a passage of Brihadāraņyaka Upanishad, where we are told that we must iden- tify the "I" with the Absolute. Another aspect of the same doctrine is proclaimed in the Chhandogya Upanishad, where the "Thou" comes also to be " projectively " identified with the Absolute. This constitutes the fourth stage (S. 14. d. ). If now the "I" is the Absolute, and if also the "Thou" is equally the Absolute, if, in other words, both the sub- ject and object are the Absolute, then it follows that everything that we see in this world, Mind and Nature, the Self and the not-Self, equally consti- tute the Absolute. Whatever falls within the ken of apprehension, equally with whatever we are, goes to make up the fulness of the Absolute. The Brahman according to the Chhandogya Upanishad is verily the "ALL" (S. 14. e). To such a giddy height does the philosophic ladder take us on the rising steps of philosophic thought. This is verily the position of Absolute Monism. Whether this state of Absolute Monism is to be merely intellec- tually apprehended, or mystically realised, depends upon whether we are by nature destined to be merely torch-bearers or mystics in the spiritual pilgri- mage. That we should prefer the second alternative will be evident in our last Chapter on the " Intima- tions of Self-Realisation."

SOURCES V

I उपकोसलो ह वै सत्यकामे जाबाले ग्रह्मचर्यमुवास। तस्य इ द्ादशवर्षाण्यग्रीन्परिचचार। स ह स्मान्यानन्तेवासिन: समावर्तयंस्तं ह स्मैव न समावर्तयति। तं जायोवाच

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तप्तो ब्रह्मचारी कुशलमग्नीन् परिचचारीन मा त्वाप्रय: परि- प्रचोचन् प्रबूह्यस्मा इति तस्मै हाप्रोच्यैव प्रवासाचके। .. । अथ हाग्यः समुदिरे तप्तो ब्रह्मचारी कुशलं नः पर्यचारी- दन्तास्मै प्रत्रवामेति तस्मै होचुः। ... । अथ हैनं गाईपत्यो- नुशशास पुथिव्यभनिरन्नमादित्य इत्ति। य एष आदिस्ये पुरुषो रश्यते सोहमस्मि स पवाहमस्मीति। ... । अथ हैनं अन्वाहार्यपचनोऽनुशशास आपो दिशो नक्षत्राणि चंद्रमा इति। य एष चंद्रमसि पुरुषो दश्यते सोहमस्मि स एवा- हमस्मीति। ... । अथ हैनं आहवनीयोऽनुशशास प्राण आकाशो दौर्विद्युदिति। य एव विदुति पुरुषो हश्यते सोऽहमस्मि स एवाहमस्मीति । ... । ते होचुरुपकोसळ एषा सोम्य तेऽ्समद्विद्या आत्मविद्या च आचार्यस्तुते गर्ति वक्तेत्याजगाम हास्याचार्यः। तमाचार्योऽभ्युवाद उपको- सल ३ इति। भगव इति ह प्रतिशुभ्राव। ब्रह्मविद हय सोम्य ते मुरं भाति कोनु त्वानुशशासेति। ... । य एषोड- क्षिणि पुरुषो दश्यत एव आत्मेति होवाच एतदमृतमभय- मेतह् ब्रह्मेति । ... । एतं संयद्वाम इत्याचक्षत ... एष उ एव वामनी :... एष उ एव भामनी: सर्वेधु लोकेधु भाति य एवं वेद। छां.IV.I0.I5. 2 (a) अथ यदतः परो दिवो ज्योतिर्दीप्यते विश्वतः पृष्ठेषु सर्वतः पृष्ठेषु अनुत्तमेधु उत्तमेषु लोकेषु इदं वाव तद्यदिदमस्मि अ्न्तःपुरुषे ज्योतिस्तस्यैषा दृष्टिः यत्र एतद् अस्मिम शरीरे संस्पर्शेनोष्णिमानं विजानाति। तस्यैषा भुतिर्यत्रेत- स्कर्णावपिगृह्य निनदमिव नदथुरिध अेरिच ज्वलत उप- शुणोति। तदेतद्टएं च भुतं चेत्युपासीत चश्रुष्य: भरुतो अवति य एषं वेद। छा.III. I3. (b) अन्यत्ाप्युक्तम्। अयमग्निवैश्वानरो योऽयमंतःपुरुषे। येजेद- म्भ पच्यते। यदिदमद्यते तस्यैष घोषो सबति। यमेतत्कर्ण- वपिधाय शृणोति। मै. II. 6. 3 जय ह वे गाग्यों बालाकिरनूचान: संस्पष्ट आस ... स हाजलशतु काइममेत्योचाच ब्रद् से अवाणीत्त ।सं होबाचा-

280 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY जातशत्रुः सहसरं ददस्त एतस्यां वाचि। स होषाच बालाकिर्य एवैष आदित्ये पुरुषस्तमेवाहमुपास इति। चंद्रमसि विद्युति 'स्तनयित्नी वायी आकाशे 'अझ्नौ अप्सु आदर्शे छायायां प्रतिशुत्कायां शब्दे "शरीरे दक्षिणेऽक्षिणि 'सव्येक्षिणि। तत उह वालाकिस्तृष्णी- मास। ... । तं होवा चाजातशत्ु: ... ए हि व्येव त्वां पि व्यामिति। तं ह पाणाचभिपद्य प्रचवाज तौ ह सुप्तं पुरुष- मीयतुस्तं हाजातशत्रुरामंत्रयांचकरे बृहत्पांडरवास: सोम राजन्निति। कौ. IV. I-18; also बृ. II. I. I-15. 4 (a) यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायंते। येन जातानि जीवंति। यत्प्रयंति अभिसंविशंति। तद्विजिज्ञासस्व। तद्ब्रह्मेति। तै. III. I. (b) तज्जलानिति शान्त उपासीत। डा.III. 14.1. 5 (a) ब्रह्म ह देवेभ्यो विजिग्ये तस्य ह ब्रह्मणो विजये देवा अमहीयन्त। त पक्षन्त । अस्माकमेवायं विजयोSस्माक्क- मेवायं महिमेति। तद्धैषां विजज्ञौ। तेभ्यो ह प्रादुर्वभूव तन्न व्यजानन्त किमिदं यक्षमिति। तेऽझिमन्ुवन् जातवेद पतद्विजानीहि किमेतद्यक्षमिति । तथेति। तदभ्यद्रचत्

अहमरमीति। तस्मिस्त्वयि कि वीर्यमित्यपीद सर्व दहेयंयदिवं पृथिव्यामिति । तस्मै तृण निदधावेतद्दहेति तदुपप्रेयाय सर्वजवेन तन्न शशाक दग्घुम्। स तत एव निववृते नैतद- शकं विज्ातुं यदेतद्यक्षमिति। अथ वायुमन्रुवन् वायवेतद्वि- जानीहि किमेतद्यक्षमिति । तथेति। तदभ्यद्रवत् तम्य- षदत् कोसीति वायुर्वा अहमस्मीत्यव्रवीन्मांतरिश्वा वा अहमस्मीति। तास्मिस्त्वयि कि वीर्यमित्यपीदं सर्वमाददीयं यदिदं पृथिव्यामिति। तस्मै तृरणं निद्धावेतदादत्स्वेति तदुपप्रेयाय सर्वजवेन तन्न शशाकादातुम्। स तत एव निववृते। नैतदशकं विज्ञातुं यदेतद्यक्षमिति। अथेद्रम- सुवन् मघवन एतद्विजानीहि किमेतदक्षमिति। तथेति तदभ्यद्रवत् । तस्मात्तिरोदघे। स तस्मिन्नेवाकाशे स्रि्रिय - माजगाम यहुशोभमानां उर्मा हैमवर्ती तां होषाच किमेत

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दक्षिति। सा ब्रह्मेति होवाच ब्रह्मणो वा पतद्विजये महीय- ध्वमिति ततौ हैव विदांचकार ब्रह्मेति। ... । तस्माद्वा इंद्रो- 5तितरामिवान्यान्देवान् स होयन्नेदिए पस्पर्श स हेनत् प्रथमो विदांचकार ब्रह्मेति। तस्यैष आदेशो यदेतद्विद्युतो व्यद्युतदा ३ इतीति न्यमीमिषदा ३ इति ... यदेतद्रच्छताव च मनोऽनेन चैतदुपस्मरत्यभीक्ष्णं संकल्पः। के. III. IV. (b) न तत्र सूर्यो भाति न चंद्रतारकं नेमा विद्युतो भाति कुत्तो- Sयमझिः। तमेव भांतमनुभाति सर्वे तस्य भासा सर्वमिदं विभाति। क. II. 5.15. 6 न्यग्रोधफलमत आहरेति। इदं भगव इति। भिन्धीति। भिन्नं भगव इति। किमत्र पद्यसीति । अण्व्य इवेमा धाना भगव इति। आसामङ्ग एकां भिन्धीति। भिन्ना भगव इति किमत्र पश्यसीति न किंचन भगव इति। तं होवाच यं वै सोम्य एतमणिमानं न निभालयस एतस्य वै सोम्य एषोऽणिम्न एवं महान््यग्रोधस्तिष्ठति। श्रद्धत्स्व सोम्येति। स य एषोऽणिमैतदात्म्यमिदं सर्व तत्सत्यं स आत्मा तत्त्व- मसि श्वेतकेतो इति। छां.VI.I2. 7 (a) अथ य आत्मा स सेतुर्विधृतिरेषां लोकानामसंभेदाय नैतं सेतुमहोरात्रे तरतः न जरा न मृत्युर्न शोको न सुकृतं न दुष्कृतम्। छा.VIII. 4. 1. (b) पतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि सूर्याचंद्रमसौ विघ्वतौ तिष्ठतः, एतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि द्यावापृथिव्यौ विधृते तिष्ठतः, पतस्य वा अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि निमेया मुहर्ता अहोरात्राण्यर्धमासा मासा ऋतवः संवत्सरा इति विधृतास्तिष्ठन्ति, एतस्य अक्षरस्य प्रशासने गार्गि प्राच्यो- उन्या नदयः स्यंदन्ते श्वेतेभ्यः पर्वतेभ्यः प्रतीच्योऽन्याः। बृ. III. 8. 9. 8 (a) अथ हैन विदग्धः शाकल्यः पप्रच्छ कति देवा याजवल्क्येति त्रयश्च त्री शता, त्रयक् त्री च सहस्रेत्योमिति होवाच। कत्येच देवा याश्वळ्क्येति त्रयखिरश्दित्योमिति होषाच। 86

282 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

कत्येव देवा याशवव्क्येति पडित्योमिति होवाच। कत्येव देवा याजवल्क्येति त्रय इत्योमिति होवाच। कत्येव देवा याशवल्क्येति द्वावित्योमिति होवाच। कत्येव देवा याज- वल्क्येत्यध्यर्ध इत्योमिति होवाच। कत्येव देवा याज्ञवल्क्ये- त्येक इत्योमिति होघाच । ... । कतम एको देव इति ... पृथिव्येव यस्यायतनमझनिलोंको मनो ज्योतिः यो वै ते पुरुषं विद्यात्सर्वस्यात्मनः परायणं स चै वेदिता स्याद्याश्ष- वल्क्य वेद वा अहं तं पुरुषं सर्वस्यात्मनः परायणम्। बृ. III. 9. I-10. (b) एको हि रुद्रो न द्वितीयाय तस्थुर्य इमांलोकानीशत ईश- नीभिः । प्रत्यङ्जनास्तिष्ठति संचुकोपान्तकाले संसृज्य विश्वा भुवनानि गोपाः ।। विश्वतश्चक्षुरुत विश्वतोमुखा विश्वतोबाहुरुत विश्वतस्पात्। सें बाहुभ्यां घमति सं पतत्रैर्द्यावाभूमी जनयन्देव एक:॥ वे. III. 2.3. (c) स्वभावमेके कवयो वदति कालं तथान्ये परिमुह्यमानाः। देवस्यैष महिमा तुलोके येनेदं भ्राम्यते ब्रह्मचक्रम्। येना- वृतं नित्यमिदं हि सर्चे पः कालकालो गुणी सर्वविद्यः। तेने- शितं कर्म विवर्तते ह पृथ्व्यप्तेजोऽनिलखानि चिन्त्यम्। .. I आदि: स संयोगनिमित्तहेतुः परस्त्रिकालादकलोSपिदए्टः।तं विश्वरूपं भवभूतमीढ्यं देवं स्वचित्तस्थमुपास्य पूर्वम्॥ ... तमीश्वराणां परमं महेश्वरं तं देवतानां परमं च दैवतम्। पति पतीनां परमं परस्ताद्विदाम देवं भुवनेशमीड्यम्॥ न तस्य कार्य करणं च विद्यते न तत्समश्चाभ्यधिकश् दृशयते। परास्य शक्तिर्विविधैव श्रूयते स्वाभाविकी ज्ञान- बलक्रिया च॥ न तस्य कश्चित्पतिरस्ति लोके न चेशिता नैव च तस्य लिंगम्। स कारणं करणाधिपाधिपो न चास्य कश्चिज्ञनिता न चाधिप: ॥ .. । एको वशी निष्कियाणां बहनामेकं बीजं बहुधा यः करोति। तमात्मस्थं येऽतुप- इयंति धीरास्तेषां सुखं शाश्वत नेतरेषाम् ॥ श्वे. VI.I-12. 9 (a) यो देवोऽसौ योऽप्सु यो विश्वं भुवनमाविवेश। य ओष- धाघु यो वनस्पतिषु तस्मै देवाय नमो नमः।। शे. II. 17.

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स एष इह प्रविष्ट आनखाग्रेभ्यो यथा क्षुरः क्षुरधानेऽवहितः स्याद्विश्वंभरो वा विश्वंभरकुलाये तं न पश्यन्ति। बृ.I.4.7. लवणमेतदुदकेऽवधायाथ मा प्रातरुपसीदथा इति। स ह तथा चकार। तं होवाच यह्ोषा लवणमुदकेऽवाधा अंग तदाहरेति तद्धावमृश्य न विवेद यथा विलीनमेव। अंग अस्य अंतादाचामेति कथमिति लवणमिति। मध्या- दाचामेति कथमिति लवणमिति । अंतादाचामेति कथ- मिति। लवणमिति। अभिप्राश्यैनदथ मोपसीदथा इति। तद्द तथा चकार। तच्छश्वरसंवर्तते। तं होवाचात्र घाव किल सत्सोम्य न निभालयसेSत्रैव किलेति। स य एषोऽ- णिमा .. तत्सत्यं स आत्मा तत्त्वमसि श्वेतकेतो। छां. VI. I3. I-3. (b) सूर्यो यथा सर्वलोकस्य चक्षुर्न लिप्यते चाक्षुषैर्बाह्यदोषैः। पकस्तथा सर्वभूतांतरात्मा न लिप्यते लोकडुःखेन बाह्यः॥ क. II. 5-II. (c) स भूमि विश्वतो वृत्वाऽत्यतिष्ठद्दशांगुलम्। शवे. III. I4 (also RV. X. g0I). अ्नियर्थकौ भुवनं प्रविष्टो रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बभू । एक- स्तथा सर्वभूतांतरात्मा रूप रूपं प्रतिरूपो बहिश्व। वायुर्य- थैको भुवनं प्रविष्टो रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बसव । एकस्तथा सर्वभूतांतरात्मा रूपं रूपं प्रतिरूपो बहिश्व। क. I. 5.9, I0. वृक्ष इव स्त्धो दिचि तिष्ठत्येकस्तेनेदं पूर्ण पुरुषेण सर्वम्। श्वे. III. 9. 10 (a) यत्ते कश्चिदव्रवीत्तच्छृणवामेत्यव्रवीन्मे जित्वा शैलिंनिर्वाग्वै ब्रह्मेति .. एकपाद्ा एतत्सम्राडिति। ... । अन्रवीन्म उदङ्क: शोल्यायन: प्राणो वै ब्रह्मेति ... एकपाद्वा पतत्सम्राडिति। ... । अब्रवीन्मे वर्कुर्घार्ष्ण: चक्षुवैं ब्रह्मेति ... एकपाद्वा एतत्स- प्राडिति। ... । अब्रवीन्मे गर्दभीविपीतो भारद्वाजः श्रीत्रं वै ब्रह्मेति ... एकपाद्वा पतत्सम्राडिति। ... । अग्रवीन्मे सत्य- कामो जावालो मनो वै ब्रह्मेति ... एकपाद्वा एतत्सम्राडिति। ... । अव्रवीन्मे विदग्ध: शाकल्यो हृदयं ब्रह्मेति ... एकपाद्वा एतत्सम्राडिति। डृ.IV. I. 2-7.

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(b) श्त्रस्य ओत्रं मनसो मनो यद्ाचो ह वाचं सउ प्राणस्ब प्राणः । चक्षुपश्चक्षुरतिमुच्य धीरा: प्रेत्यास्माल्लोकादमृता भवंति ॥ ... । यद्वाचानभ्युदितं येन वागभ्युदते। तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि नेदं यदिदमुपासते॥ यन्मनसा न मनुते येनाहुर्मनो मतम्। तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि नेदं यदिदमुपासते। यच्यक्षषा न पश्यति येन चक्षृंषि पश्यति। तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं वि्धि नेदं यदिदमुपासते। यच्छोत्रेण न शृणोति येन ओ्रोत्रमिंदं क्षतम्। तदेव ब्रह्म रवं विद्धि नेदं यदिदमुपासते। यत्प्राणेन न प्राणिति येन प्राण: प्राणयिते । तदेव ब्रह्म त्वं विद्धि नेदं यदिदमुपासते।। के. I. 2. 8. II तद्ोभये देवासुरा अनुबुबुधिरे ... इन्द्रो है देवानाममि- प्रवव्राज, विरोचनोऽसुराणां, तौ ... समित्पाणी प्रजापति- सकाशमाजग्मतु :... तो ह प्रजापतिरुवाच य एषोऽक्षिणि पुरुषो दृश्यते एष आत्मेति होवाच ... योयं भगवोप्सु परि- ख्यायते यश्चायमादशें। ... । तौ ह साध्वलंकृती सुवसनौ परिष्कृतौ भूत्वोदशरावेऽवेक्षांचक्राते ... एष आत्मेति हो- वाच पतदमृतमभयमेतद्ब्रह्मेति । तो ह शान्तहृदयौ प्रव- वजतु:। ... । शान्तहृदय एव विरोचनोऽसुरानाजगाम। ... अथ हेन्द्रोSप्राप्यैव देवानेतन्दयं ददर्श यथैव खल्वयमस्मित्रु शरीरे साध्यलंकृते साध्वलंकृतो भवति सुचसने सुवसनः परिष्कृते परिष्कृत: एवमेवायमस्मिन्नन्धेऽन्धो भवति स्नामे साम: परिवृकणे घरिवृकण :... नाहमत्र भोग्यं पश्यामीति स समित्पाणिः पुनरेयाय। ... । तस्मै (इन्द्राय) होवाच य एष सवमे महीयमानश्वरत्येष आत्मेति होवाच पतदसृत- मभयमेतद्ब्रह्मेति। स ह शाम्तहृदय: प्रवव्राज सह अप्रा- प्यैच देवानेतन्ज्यं ददर्श ... अ्रियवेत्तेव भवति, अपि रो- दितीव नाहमत्रभोग्यं पश्यामीति समित्पाणिः पुनरेयाय। ... । तस्मै (इन्द्राय) होवाच तद्यतैतत् सुप्ः संप्रसन्नः स्वमं न विजानात्येष आत्मेति होवाच ... स ह शान्तहृदय: प्रच- व्राज स ह अप्राष्यैव देवानेतज्जयं ददर्श न खलु अयमेवं संप्रत्यात्मानं जानात्ययमहमस्मीति नो एव इमानि भूतानि विनाशमेवापीतो भवति नाहमत्र भोग्यं पश्यामीति स समि- स्पाणिः पुनरेयाय । ... । तस्मै ( इन्द्राय ) होषाच। मघवन मत्ये वा इदं शरीरमानतं मृत्युना। तदस्य अमृतस्य अशरी-

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रस्य आत्मनोऽिष्ठानम्। आत्ती वै सशरीर: प्रियाप्रियाम्या न वै सशरीरस्य सतः प्रियाप्रिययोरपहतिरस्ति। अशरीरं वाव सन्तं न प्रियाप्रिये स्पृशतः । अशरीरो वायुरत्रं विद्युत् स्तनयितु: अशरीराण्येतानि तद्यथैतान्यमुष्मादाकाशा त्समुत्थाय परं ज्योतिरुपसंपद्य स्वेन स्वेन रूपेणामिनिष्प- दयन्ते एवमेवैष संप्रसादोऽस्माच्छरीरात्समुत्थाय परं ज्योतिरुपसंपद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यते स उत्तम: पुरुषः। छां. VIII. 7.I2. 12 (a) सत्यं ज्ञानमनन्तं ब्रह्म यो वेद निहितं गुहायां परमे व्योमन्। तै. II. I. (b) एष ग्रह्मा एष इन्द्र .... पते सर्वें देवा इमानि च पंचमहा- भूतानि ... अंडजानि च जारुजानि च स्वेदजानि च उन्ि- ज्ानि। ... । यत्किचेदं प्राणि जंगमं च पतत्रि च यब स्था- वरम्। सर्व तत्प्रज्ञानेत्रं प्रश्ाने प्रतिष्ठित प्रश्ञानेत्रो लोक: प्रश्ञा प्रतिष्ठा प्रज्ञानं ब्रह्म। पे. III. 3. 13 (a) यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्य मनसा सह। तै. II. 4. न तत्र चक्षुर्गच्छति न वाग्च्छति नो मनो न विभ्ो न विजानीमो यथैतदनुशिष्यादन्यदेव तद्विदितादथो अवि- दितादधि। के. I. 3. यस्यामतं तस्य मतं मतं यस्य न वेद सः। अविज्ञातं विजा- नतां विज्ञातमविजानताम्। केन. II. 3. श्रवणायापि बड्डभियों न लभ्य: शण्वंतोऽपि बहवो यं न विद्युः । आश्रयों वक्ता कुशलोऽस्य लब्धाSSआर्यो जाता कुशलानुशिष्टः॥ क. I. 27. (b) स वेत्ति वेदं न च तस्यास्ति ेत्ता। तमाहुरप्यं पुरुष महान्तम्। शरे. III. 19. येनेदं सर्व विजानाति तं केन विजानीयात्। विश्ातारमरे केन विजानीयादिति। .ु. II. 4.14.

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न दष्टेर्द्रष्टारं पशयेरन अतेः श्रोतारं शृणुयार्न मतेर्मैतारं मन्चीथा न विज्ञातेर्विज्ञातारं विजानीयाः। बृ. III. 4.2. अदृष्टो द्रष्टाऽश्रुतः श्रोताऽमतो मन्ताऽविज्ञातो विज्ञाता, नान्योऽतोस्ति द्रष्टा, नान्योऽतोस्ति श्रोता, नान्योऽतोस्ति मंता, नान्योऽतोऽस्ति विज्ञाता। बृ. III. 7. 23. (c) याज्वल्क्य, किंज्योतिरयं पुरुष इति। आदित्यज्योतिः सम्राडिति होवाच आदित्येनैचाय ज्योतिषास्ते पल्मयते कर्म कुरुते विपल्येतीत्येधमेवैतद्याज्नवल्क्य। अस्तमित आदित्ये याजवल्क्य किज्योतिरेवायं पुरुषइति चंद्रमा एवास्य ज्योतिर्भवतीति ... । अस्तमित आदित्ये याज्वल्क्य चंद्रमस्यस्तमिते किज्योतिरेवायं पुरुष इति अगनिरेवास्य ज्योतिर्भवतीति .. । अस्तमित आदित्ये याज्रवल्क्य चंद्र- मस्यस्तमिते शान्तेऽझी किंज्योतिरेवायं पुरुष इति आत्मै- वास्य ज्योतिर्भवतीति। बृ. IV. 3. 2-6. 14 (a) आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः । बृ.II. 4. 5. (b) आत्मानं विज्ानीयादयमस्मीति पुरुषः । बृ.IV.4. 12. (c) अयमात्मा ब्रह्म। बृ. II. 5.19. पूर्णमद: पूर्णमिदं पूर्णात्पूर्णमुदच्यते। पूर्णस्य पूर्णमादाय पूर्णमेवावशिष्यते॥ शांतिः॥ (d) अहं ब्रह्मास्मि। बृ.I.4.I0. तत्त्वमसि। डां. VI.8.7. (e) सर्व खल्विदं ब्रह्म। छां. III.I4. I.

CHAPTER VI

THE ETHICS OF THE UPANISHADS

1. After a discussion in the last chapter of the

Metaphysics, Mora- central metaphysical position

Itly, and Mysticism. reached in the Upanishads, and after a suggestion that that position is to be attained more by the way of mysticism than by the way of thought, it would behove us for a while to bestow our attention on the moral problem in the Upanishads, which might easily be seen to be connected with their metaphysics on the one hand, and mysticism on the other. The problem of the relation of metaphysics and mo- rality has been a much-debated problem from very ancient times ; nor is the problem of the relation of morality and mysticism in any way a less important problem. For, just as it is hard to decide as to which of the two-metaphysics and morality-should receive the primacy in the discussion of the develop- ment of man's consciousness as a whole, similarly, it is equally hard to decide which of the two- morality and mysticism-plays a more important part in that development. If we take into account, however, the integrity of man's consciousness as a whole, it would seem absolutely impossible, in the interest of the highest development of which man's conscious- ness is capable, to sunder the intellectual from the moral, as the moral from the mystical element. In- telligence without the moral backbone might only degenerate into the cleverest forms of chicanery, and a mystic without morality, if such a one were possible,

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might only be a hideous creature who is a blot on the spiritual evolution of man. And, again, just as morality, to be ratiocinative, must be firmly linked to the intellect, similarly for its consummation, it must end in the mystical attitude, which alone is the goal and end of the life of man. In short, Metaphysics, Morality and Mysticism are as inseparable from each other in the interest of the highest spiritual development of man, as intellect, will, and emotion are inseparable for his highest psychological development. It would thus seem necessary for a while to linger on the discussion of the moral problem in the Upanishads, as the con- necting link between the metaphysical position reach- ed therein and the final mystical realisation taught in the Upanishads. 2. At a time when moral reflection in other lands

Progress of the Cha- had hardly reached even the gno- mic stage, it is interesting to pter. note that, in the Upanishads, we have a fairly good discussion of all the more im- portant ethical problems ; while, in certain cases at least, the solution reached might be contemplated upon with great profit even by present-day moralists, because the solution which the Upanishads attempt is a solution which is based upon the eternal truths of Atmanic experience. It is true that in the Upanishads we have not a very full discussion of the theories of the moral standard as apart from the theories of the moral ideal, inasmuch as thought is required to be necessarily more abstract in the dis- cussion of the former, while in that of the latter it has to deal with the concrete problem of the end of human life. In the course of the present chapter, we shall first discuss the rudiments of the theories of the moral standard as we find them in the Upanishads,

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and after a consideration of the limitations of the theories so advanced, we shall proceed to a discussion of the theories of the moral ideal. Of these latter, two at least are specially noteworthy-the Doctrine of Beatificism, and the Doctrine of Self-realisation. After having considered these theories, we shall next go on to the discussion of practical ethics in the Upani- shads, and thus survey the lists of virtues enumerated in the various Upanishads, considering more especially the virtue of Truth. It is undoubtedly true that in the discussion of the practical side of ethics, the Upanishadic period is surpassed by the Neo-Upanishadic period, for there the metaphysical interest having waned, interest in practical conduct got the upper hand. Then, after a short discussion of the problem of the freedom of the will as considered in the Upanishads, we shall conclude the chapter by a short portrayal of the ideal of the Upanishadic Sage, bringing out the contrast between the Upanishadic Sage on the one hand and the Stoic and Christian Sages on the other.

I-THEORIES OF THE MORAL STANDARD

3. Coming to the consideration of the theories of the

Heteronomy. moral standard as advanced in the Upanishads, we have to note at the outset, that, as in the childhood of man, so in the child- hood of the race, heteronomy is the first principle which serves to dictate rules for moral conduct. Reference is always made in such cases to the conduct of others, of those who are better situated morally than ourselves as dictating to us the principle of con- duct for our own behoof. Not without reason did Aristotle think that the opinion of men of trained character should count as the principle of moral authority in cases when one is not able, on ac- 37

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count of one's ignorance, to choose the way of moral action for oneself. 'The Taittirīyopanishad contains a celebrated passage, where the disciple is told that "he should follow only the good actions of the spiritual teacher ; that he might even more profit- ably follow the good actions of those who are still better situated than the spiritual teacher; that if ever he should seek to find out the intimate nature of duty or conduct, then he should always be guided by this one principle only, namely, how the Brahmins, who are cautious, gentle, and intent upon the law, conduct themselves in that particular case" (S. I). This quotation evidently implies the maxim that we should always mould our conduct on the pattern of the conduct of those who are better than ourselves and are in a position to give us rules of conduct by their example. The opinion of Society in general, or the opinion of the State, are rather vague terms for defining the nature of heteronomic duty. It may not be possible for either the Society or the State to always impart to us one uniform principle of moral conduct. On the other hand, if we penetrate deeper, we shall find that the opinions of the Society or the State are themselves based upon the maxims of conduct which are sup- plied to them by Wise Men. There is an oligarchy in Morality, as there is an oligarchy in the Society or the State, and it is the voice of the Moral Oligarchy which, according to the Taittiriyopanishad, ought to prevail in supplying us with the pattern of conduct.

4. Theonomy is also a sort of heteronomy, inas- much as the "theos " is also a "heteros" from the

Theonomy. properly moral point of view. But it is convenient to consider Theonomy as separate from Heteronomy, inasmuch as T. Nicomachean Ethics I. 46

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the Law of God stands in a somewhat different category from the Law of Man. Unless it were possible to know the wishes of God in every particular case affecting moral conduct, unless it were possible even so much as to note what principles in general might be regarded as constitut- ing the wishes of God-if we were not to understand these as identical with the dictates of Conscience which is the candle of the Lord within us-it might not seem very possible to set down in detail the Laws of God as enjoin- ing the performance of certain duties upon us, in pre- ference to, or in cancelment of, other duties. But in communities which entertain a vague fear about God as a Being who is separate from ourselves, the laws which are after all "attributed" to God by man ever hang like the sword of Damocles on the moral agent, and theophobia instead of theopathy supplies the rules for moral life. It was thus that the sage of the Kathopanishad said that "God is that great fear- ful Thunderbolt which is raised over our head, by knowing which alone can man become immortal. For is it not through His fear, that the fire burns, the sun shines, the god of gods, the wind, and death as the fifth, run about doing their work ?" Of the same import is the passage from the Taittiriyopa- nishad which only reiterates the passage from the Katha with slight alterations (S. 2). But when all has been said in favour of the Law of God, on a careful consideration of the intimate nature of moral action, it may become evident that the law issuing from anybody except one's own Self can never be regarded as a sufficient guarantee for the moral tone of actions.

5. It is thus that moralists have arrived at the conception of autonomy which Autonomy. alone supplies the true principle of moral conduct. It is neither the Society, nor the

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State, nor God, who can give us the essential rule for moral conduct. This must spring entirely from within ourselves. We cannot say that the Upanishadic seers envisaged this principle of moral action unless of course we see it in that quotation from the Chhan- dogya Upanishad where we are told that the mind should be meditated upon as the Ultimate Reality (S. 3. a), or even again in that other quotation from the same Upanishad where we are asked to regard the mind as verily the Ätman in us, as also the Ultimate Reality (S. 3. b). These passages have been under- stood by a recent writer on Hindu Ethics as involving the theory of Intuitionism. But it may be easily seen that inasmuch as it is the Mind which is here equated with the Highest Reality and not the Self which is mentioned as apart from it, we can only understand the passage as involving a lower intui- tionism instead of the higher intuitionism of auto- nomy. Instances are not wanting even in the history of European Morals where aesthetic or sympathetic intuitionism prepares the way for the higher intui- tionism of autonomy. It was not till the days of the Bhagavadgita in the history of Hindu Ethics that the real nature of autonomy was clearly appreciated, and the categorical imperative of duty with all its Kantian purism severely inculcated. We have thus to regard the Upanishadic Ethics as on the whole deficient in the principle of autonomy as supplying the rules for moral conduct.

II-THEORIES OF THE MORAL IDEAL

6. It is however when we come to the formulation

Anti-Hedonism. of the theories of the Moral Ideal that the Upanishadic seers are at their best. We have said above that the

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formulation of such theories is a more concrete pro- blem than the formulation of the theories of the Moral Standard, which is by the very nature of the case bound to be abstract. As there is a variety of Metaphysical theories in the Upadishadic literature as we saw in a previous chapter, similarly there is a variety of theories about the nature of the Moral Ideal. To begin with, we have an entirely anti-hedonistic theory advocated by the author of the Kathopanishad. We are told there that " there are two different paths, the path of the good and the path of the pleasant, and that these two diverse paths try to seduce a man each to itself. Of these, he who follows the path of the good is ultimately rewarded by the fulfilment of his aim, while he who follows the path of the pleasant loses the goal which he is pursuing. When the good and the pleasant present themselves before a man, he looks about him if he be wise, and decides which of them to choose. The wise man chooses the good before the pleasant, while the fool chooses the pleasant before the good " (S. 4. a). In these two verses from the Katho- panishad we have a classical expression of the con- flict between the good and the pleasant as experienced even in the Upanishadic days. Who will not say that the story of the conflict between the Good and the Pleasant in the Kathopanishad trying to attract a man to themselves reminds one of a similar story of the choice of Hercules in Xenophon, where the two mai- dens, Pleasure and Virtue, present themselves before Hercules with their several seductions, and Hercules chooses Virtue? As with Hercules, so with Nachi- ketas. Even though the God of Death tries to seduce Nachiketas by the offer of a life of pleasure and glory, Nachiketas refuses to be imprisoned in the chains which Yama has forged for him (S. 4. b), and therein proves that he is not like the ordinary run of mankind

294 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ § 7 which hugs to its heart the path of plesaure and glory to be only ultimately disillusioned in its choice. Nachiketas, true anti-hedonist as he is, refuses to be seduced by the life of pleasure.

7. It is likely, however, that anti-hedonism may Pessimism. degenerate into an utter pes- simism, and so likewise does it happen in the case of certain Upanishads. The Katho- panishad asks in a pessimistic vein : " what decaying mortal here below would delight in a life of the con- templation of the pleasures of beauty and love, when once he has come to taste of the kind of life enjoyed by the unageing immortals ?" (S. 5. a). This is almost in the spirit of Schopenhauer who said that the best thing for man here below is not to have been born at all, and the second best to have died young. In a similar spirit, the Kathopanishad condemns the desire for a long life of sensual enjoyment in pre- ference to even a momentary contemplation of the life immortal. This pessimistic mood is most expres- sively brought forth in the Maitri Upanishad, where, our attention having been called to the contemplation of the universal evil that exists in the world and the imper- manence of things having been most poetically ex- pressed, life is described as the source of eternal mi- sery. " What is the use of the satisfaction of desires," asks Brihadratha, "in this foul-smelling and unsub- stantial body, which is merely a coglomeration of ordure, urine, wind, bile and phlegm, and which is spoilt by the content of bones, skin, sinews, marrow, flesh, semen, blood, mucus and tears ? What is the use of the satisfaction of desires in this body which is afflicted by lust, anger, covetousness, fear, deject- ion, envy, separation from the desired, union with the undesirable, hunger, thirst, old age, death,

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disease and grief ? Verily all this world merely decays. Look at the flies and the gnats, the grass and the trees, that are born merely to perish. But what of these ? The great oceans dry up, the moun- tains crumble, the pole-star deviates from its place, the wind-cords are broken, the earth is submerged, and the very gods are dislocated from their positions" (S. 5. b.). Contemplating such a situation, Brhad- ratha entreats Śakāyanya to save him "as one might save a frog from a waterless well." This pessimistic attitude of Brihadratha is the logical outcome, only carried to an excess, of the anti-hedonistic attitude put into the mouth of Nachiketas.

8. Closely connected with pessimism is the theory of asceticism and its monastic Asceticism, Satya- graha, and Quietism. practices. Unless a man begins to feel the interest in life waning for him, he does not see the necessity of harbouring the ascetic virtues. It is only when his heart begins to be set on the Eternal that he wishes to adopt the life of renunciation. It was in this way, we are told by the Brihadaranyakopanishad, that the wise men of old began to feel that there was no use for them of any wealth or fame or progeny. "What shall we do with progeny," they asked, "if it does not bring to us nearer the Eternal?" In this manner did they leave all ambition for progeny and wealth and fame and adopt the life of an ascetic (S. 6. a). The Kaushītaki Upanishad goes even further, and by a curious analogical explanation advocates the attitude of Satyagraha. "Just as Prana which is identical with Brahman is served by the mind as its messenger, the eye as its guard, the ear as its informant, the speech as its tire-woman, and just as all the senses bring offerings to Prana even though it does

996 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§8

not solicit them, similarly all these beings will bring offerings to a man who knows this secret even though he does not solicit them. For him the rule of life is ' Beg not'. When he has gone to alms in a village and does not find any, he may sit down with the re- solve that he shall not partake of anything that may be offered to him, and those who had formerly refused him shall come near him and speak to him good words-for this is verily what happens to a man who does not solicit alms-and bring offerings to him and say they shall give" (S. 6. b). This passage from the Kaushītaki enjoins upon an ascetic the attitude of non-begging in the firm belief that when he does not beg, things will come to him of their own accord. The Brihadāraņyakopanishad gives further characteristics of the ascetic life, inasmuch as it tells us that "a Brahmin ought to grow disgusted with all wisdom, and lead a life of child-like simplicity " (S. 7. a) ; believing in the quietistic life, " he should never give himself up to too many words, for that is verily a weariness of the flesh" (S. 7. b). 9. There is, however, a positive side to the quietis- tic life taught in certain Upani- Spiritual Activism. shads. The Mundakopanishad tells us that "we should verily leave away all words, but should devote ourselves to the knowledge of the Ätman, for the Atman is the bund of immortality. Meditate upon the Atman with the help of the symbol Om; for thus alone may it be possible for you to go beyond the ocean of darkness. Sages see Him by the help of the light of knowledge, for he manifests him- self, the Immortal One, in the form of bliss" (S. 8. a). We must therefore remember that even though we are told that we should lead a quietistic life, that is only as a sort of recoil from the unreal and empty world of

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sense ; within itself, however, it may contain the marrow of self-realisation. "It was thus," says the Brihada- ranyakopanishad, "that one who lived a peaceful life, of self-control, of cessation from activity, and of patient suffering, having collected himself, saw the Atman within himself, saw in fact everything as verily the Atman. Evils cease to have any power over him, for he has overcome all evil. Sin has ceased to torment him, for he has burnt all sin. Free from evil, free from impurity, free from doubt, he has be- come properly entitled to the dignity of a Brahmana" (S. 8. b). The Muņdakopanishad makes a more posi- tive assertion by telling us that " a man who has left off all argument in the superiority of his spiritual illumi- nation begins to play with the Atman, and to enjoy the Atman, for that verily constitutes his action. Thus does he become foremost among those who have known Brahman" (S. 8. c). Here we are told that though, to all appearances, such a person may be leading a life of freedom from the bustle of society, alone to himself in the privacy of spiritual solitude, he still has an object to play with, an object to enjoy, namely the Atman. In fact, his life in Atman is a life of intense spiritual activity, and not, as it may seem to others, a life of retirement and quietude.

10. Contrasted with this kind of Activism, however, stands that other kind of Activism, Phemomenal Actl- vism. with which alone people are ordi- narily familiar, namely, what we may eall Phenomenal Activism. The Isopanishad tells us that "a man should try to spend his life-span of a hundred years only in the constant perform- ance of actions. It is thus only that he can hope not to be contaminated by actions " (S. 9. a). It is important to note that even though this passage 88

298 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY (§ 10

from the Isopanishad tells us that we should spend our life-time in doing actions, the actions that are here implied have no further range than possibly the small circumference of "sacrifice "; and further, the way in which, even in the midst of a life of action, freedom from contagion with the fruit of action may be secured is not here brought out with suffi- cient clearness. It is only later, when we come to the days of the Bhagavadgita, that we see how even in the midst of the life of action actionlessness may be secured, only if attachment to action is annihilated once for all and no calculating desire is entertained for the fruit of action. The Isopanishad does not supply these two links between the life of action and the goal of actionlessness and point out that action- lessness may be secured in the midst of action only through freedom from attachment to action, and the annihilation of any desire for the end of action. But, at any rate, it is evident that the Isopanishad goes very much beyond the other Upanishads when it tries to reconcile the life of action with the life of knowledge. "To pitchy darkness do they go," it tells us, " who pursue the path of ignorance, namely the path of action. To greater darkness still do they go who devote themselves to the life of knowledge for its own sake. Sages have told us from very ancient times that knowledge leads to the one result, while action leads to the other. But he alone who can synthesise the claims of knowledge and action is able by means of action to cross the ocean of death and by means of knowledge to attain to immortality" (S. 9. b). In this way does the Isopanishad try to reconcile the claims of knowledge and action, telling us that the life of bare contemplation and the life of bare activity are alike fraught with evil ; but that he alone may be said to attain the goal of life who knows how to harmonise

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the two different paths. Thus we may see how the later claims of Aristotle for the contemplative life, and of Bacon for the active life, are prophetically reconeiled by the philosopher of the Isopanishad.

11. When the phenomenal side of Activism is thus

Eudaemenism. recognised, it is not very difficult to deduce from it a theory of the moral ideal which must needs take account of pheno- menal good. The moral good may not be regarded as the Summum Bonum, and the worldly good may come to be recognised as at least on a par with it in the for- mation of the conception of the Summum Bonum. On the other hand, the verse from the Śvetāśvataropa- nishad which comes at the end of its fourth chapter is an echo of the spirit of Vedic prayer, where worldly good is craved for as being even a superior moment in the conception of the highest good. "Make us not suffer in our babies or in our sons," says the Upanishad; "make us not suffer in lives, or in cows, or in horses ; kill not our powerful warriors, O Rudra, so may we offer to thee our oblations for ever and ever l" (S. ro. a). When the eye of the moral agent is not turned in- wards, the good he seeks is evidently the external good only. On the other hand, when as in the case of the Taittiriya Upanishad, the internal good comes also to be recognised as of no meaner value, we are asked to choose both Truth and Law which have moral, along with Happiness and Prosperity which have material value (S. ro. b). It was thus that even that great idealistic philosopher Yajnavalkya, when he went to the court of King Janaka and was asked as to whether he desired wealth and cattle, or victory and controversy, said he wanted both: he wanted the cows along with their golden coin, as well as victory in the argumentative battle with the

300 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ § 11 other philosophers in Janaka's court. The apology which Yajnavalkya apparently offered for his conduct was that "he was enjoined by his father not to take away any wealth without having imparted spiritual instruction " (S. 10. c). It is evident that Yajña- valkya desired both material as well as spiritual good ; and in spite of his otherwise supremely idealistic teach- ing, he possibly wanted to set an example by showing that the consideration of external good cannot be entirely ignored even by idealists as constituting a moment in the conception of the highest good.

12. The author of the Taittiriyopnishad goes even Beatificism. a step further, and tells us that probably there is no distinction of kind between physical good and spiritual good, and that we may thus regard the two as commensurable in terms of each other. In a famous passage he makes for us an analysis of the conception of bliss. Physical good to him is itself an aspect of "bliss," as spiritual good constitutes the acme of "bliss"; and according to that author, there is a scale of values con- necting the so-called physical bliss on the one hand with the highest spiritual bliss on the other. What, according to him, is the unit of measurement ? We are told that the unit of measurement may be taken to be "the happiness of a young man of noble birth and of good learning, who is very swift and firm and strong, and to whom is granted the possession of the whole earth full of wealth. Of a hundred such blisses is made the bliss of the human genii; of a hundred blisses of these genii is made the bliss of the divine genii ; of a hundred of these latter blisses is made the bliss of the fathers ; of a hundred blisses of the fathers is made the bliss of the gods who are born gods; of a hundred of these is made the bliss of the gods who have

CHAPTER VI: ETHICS 301

become gods by their actions; of a hundred such blisses is made the bliss of the highest gods; of a hun- dred blisses of these gods is made the bliss of Indra ; a hundred blisses of Indra constitute the bliss of Brihaspati ; of a hundred such blisses is made the bliss of Prajāpati ; and a hundred blisses of Prajāpati make the bliss of Brahman : and each time we are told that all the blisses, severally and progressively, belong to the Sage who is free from all desires" (S. I1). It is impor- tant to note that there is here no distinction of kind brought out between physical good on the one hand and spiritual bliss on the other, unless of course it were intended by the author that the physical good may be taken to be as good as naught before the highest bliss. That, however, does not seem to be the trend of argu- ment by which the beatific calculus is arrived at after such labour by the author of the Taittiriyopanishad with the help of a physico-mythological scale of measurement. It is also equally important to remember that all these various blisses are said at all times to belong to the Sage who is free from all desires. If, in short, desirelessness is to constitute the highest bliss, there is no meaning in saying that the highest good could be measured in terms of the unit of physical good. In any case, it does not seem possible that spiritual good can be of the same kind as physical good: the two are probably entirely incommensurate, differing not in degree but in kind. The bliss of the Sage, who has realised Brahman, cannot be measured in terms of the physical happiness of any beings whatsoever, however highly placed or however divine they may be.

13. Indeed, there cannot be any physical scale for

Self-realisation. the measurement of spiritual val- ues. The bliss of Self-realisation is entirely of its own kind, absolutely sui generis. But

302 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ § 13

to cavil at the theory of Self-realisation by saying that the Self "is realised" already, and that therefore there is no necessity of "realising" the Self seems to us to be merely a listless evasion of the true significance of Self-realisation. When Canon Rashdall says that the Self is realised already, he is speaking about a meta- physical fact. On the other hand, when it is said that the Self is to be realised, we are asked to take into account the whole ethical and mystical process by which the allurements of the not-Self naturally ingrained in the human being are to be gradually weaned out, and the Self to be made to stand in its native purity and gran- deur. It is in the doctrine of Self-realisation that the ethical and mystical processes meet, a fact to which we shall have to allude presently. It need hardly be said that by Self-realisation, as the Upanishadic seers understand that expression, is meant the unfoldment and the visualisation of the Atman within us, instead of the incipid and soul-less realisation of the various "faculties" of man, namely, the intellectual, the emo- tional and the moral, in which sense Bradley and other European moralists have understood that ex- pression. The Brihadaranyakopanishad tells us that the Atman, who constitutes the Reality within us as without us, is and ought to be the highest object of our desire, higher than any phenomenal object of love, such as progeny, or wealth, or the like, because, the Upanishad tells us, the Ätman, being the very kernel of our existence, is nearmost to us. "If a man may say there is another object of love dearer to him than the Atman, and if another replies that if there be God overhead he shall destroy his object of love, verily it shall so happen as this man says. Hence it is that we ought to meditate on the Atman as the only object of desire. For him who worships the Atman in this way, nothing dear

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shall ever perish" (S. 12. a). There is a further reason why, according to the same Upanishad, the Self should be regarded as the highest object of desire ; because, when one has attained the Self, there are for him no desires left to be fulfilled, and he becomes entirely desireless (S. 12. b). But the Upanishadic doctrine of Self-realisation implies more than that the Atman is the sole object of desire. In a very celebrated conversation between Yajnavalkya and Maitreyī in the Brihadāranyakopānishad, we are told that when Yajñavalkya wanted to make a partition of his estate between his two wives, Kātyāyanī and Maitreyi, Maitreyi chose rather the spiritual portion of her husband's estate, saying "Supposing I obtain the possession of the whole earth full of wealth, by that I shall never attain to immortality." "Verily not," replied Yajñavalkya, " thy life will be only like the life of those who have all kinds of convenience for them; but there is no hope of immortality by the mere possession of wealth." Maitreyi thereupon replied: "What shall I then do with that by which I may not grow immortal?" " Verily most dear to me art thou, my wife, who art talking thus, " said Yajñavalkya, "Come, I shall in- struct thee in spiritual wisdom. It is not for the sake of the husband, that the husband is dear, but for the sake of the Ätman ; it is not for the sake of the wife that the wife is dear, but for the sake of the Atman ; it is not for the sake of the children that the children are dear, but for the sake of the Atman; it is not for the sake of wealth that wealth is dear, but for the sake of the Atman .... It is not for the sake of everything that everything is dear, but for the sake of the Atman. This Ätman, O Maitreyi, ought to be seen, ought to be heard, ought to be thought about, ought to be me- ditated upon ; for it is only when the Atman is seen and

304 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ § 13

heard and thought about and meditated upon does all this become verily known " (S. 13). It is important to remember that this passage is not to be interpreted in the interest of an egoistic theory of morals, as some have done, but only in the interest of the theory of Self-realisation. We have not to understand that the wife or the husband or the sons are dear for one's own sake, interpreting the word Atman in an egoistic sense. The word Atman which comes at the end of the passage in the expression Atma va are drashtavyo forbids an egoistic interpretation of that word in the previous sentences. We are thus obliged to interpret the word Atman throughout the passage in the sense of the Self proper, the Ultimate Reality, and, therefore, to understand that the love that we bear to the wife or the husband or the sons is only an aspect of, or a reflection of, the love that we bear to the Self. It is, in fact, for the sake of the Self that all these things become dear to us. This Self the Brihadaranyaka enjoins upon us to realise by means of contemplation.

14. The ethical and mystical sides of Self-rea- lisation are fused together no- The ethical and mys- where better than in that cele- tical sides of Self-rea- lisation. brated passage from the Chhän- dogya Upanishad, where having started an inquiry as to what it is that induces a man to perform actions, and having answered that it is the consideration of happiness which impels him to do so,-for, we are told, had he experienced unhappi- ness in his pursuit, he would not have gone in for the actions at all,-the author of the Chhandogya Upani- shad comes to tell us that real happiness is the happi- ness that one enjoys in the vision of the Infinite, and that every other kind of happiness is only so-called, and of really no value whatsoever as contrasted with

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it. It thus comes about that, according to the author of that Upanishad, there are two radically different kinds of happiness, namely what he calls the Great and the Small. Great happiness consists in seeing, hearing, and meditating upon the Ätman. Little happi- ness consists in seeing, hearing and meditating upon other things besides the Atman. Great happiness is im- mortal; Little happiness is perishable. If the ques- tion be asked, in what this Great happiness consists, the answer may be given, in Herakleitean fashion, that it consists in its own greatness, and possibly not in its own greatness! People say that cows and horses, elephants and gold, servants and wives, lands and houses-these constitute greatness. No, says the author, these rest in something else, but the Infinite rests in itself. Great happiness is experienced when the Infinite is seen above and below, before and be- hind, to the right and to the left, and is regarded as identical with everything that exists ; when the Being, that calls itself the I within us, is realised above and below, before and behind, to the right and to the left, and is regarded as identical with everything that exists ; when the Atman is seen above and below, be- fore and behind, to the right and to the left and is regard- ed as identical with everything that exists. He who thus realises the triune unity of the Infinite, the I, and the Ätman, and experiences the truth of the sentence So Aham Atma, is alone entitled to enjoy the highest happiness. One who comes to see this, and think about this, and meditate on this, really attains Swārājya : he loves his Self, plays with his Self, enjoys the company of his Self, and revels in his Self (S. 14). In this way, according to the Chhandogya Upanishad, the ethical Summum Bonum consists in the mystical realisation of the triune unity as the goal of the aspirant's one- pointed endeavour. 39

306 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [$15 15. We must not fail to take account, however, of

Supermoralism. a phase of the theory of the moral ideal as propounded in the Upa- nishads. This is the theory of what we may call Supermoralism, the state of being beyond good and bad, the ethical counterpart of the metaphysical theory of Absolutism. There is, however, a distinc- tion between the supermoralism of Bradley and Nietzsche on the one hand, and the supermoralism of the Upanishads on the other. Neitzsche's super- moralism affects only the superman, who, in the pos- session of absolute strength, defies, and therefore rises above, all conceptions of good and bad. The Brad- leyan supermoralism affects only the Absolute, which in its absoluteness is to be regarded as being beyond both good and bad. On the other hand, the Upani- shadic supermoralism affects the Individual as well as the Absolute, and the Individual only so far as he may be regarded as having realised the Absolute in himself. The passage from the Kathopanishad which tells us that " the Absolute is beyond duty and beyond non- duty, beyond action and beyond non-action, beyond the past and beyond the future," supported likewise by the passage from the Chhandogya Upanishad which tells us that " the bodiless Atman is beyond the reach of the desirable and the undesirable" (S. 15. a), has its counterpart in the passage from the Mundakopanishad which tells us that " the Moral Agent shakes off all con- ceptions of merit and demerit, that is, in other words, goes beyond the reach of virtue and vice, and good and bad, when he has attained to divine assimilation after realising the golden-coloured Being who is the lord and governor of all" (S. 15. b). Similarly, we are told in the Brihadaranyakopanishad that the Atman who lives in the citadel of our heart, and who is the lord and protector of all, grows neither great by good actions

§ 16] CHAPTER VI : ETHICS 807

nor small by evil actions (S. 16. a), while he who con- templates upon this Atman himself attains a like vir- tue, when his greatness ceases to grow by good actions, or diminish by bad actions (S. 16. b). These passa- ges tell us that the Moral Agent goes beyond the reach of good and bad, when and only so far as he has attained to likeness with, or becomes merged in, the Ätman, who is himself, metaphysically speaking, beyond the reach of good and bad.

III-PRACTICAL ETHICS

16. We have discussed hitherto the theories of the

Virtues In the Bri- Moral Standard and the Moral

adaranyaka. Ideal which have been advanced in the Upanishads. We shall now go on to a consideration of the practical side of Ethics, namely the enumeration and inculcation of certain virtues in the various Upanishads. And first, about the three cardinal virtues which are enumerated in the Brihadāranyakopanishad. There we are told how "once upon a time the gods, men, and demons all went to their common father, Prajāpati, and asked him to communicate to them the knowledge which he possessed. To the gods, Prajapati communicated the syllable Da, and having asked them whether they had understood what he had said to them, received the answer that they had under- stood that they were asked to practice self-control (Damyata), upon which Prajāpati expressed satisfac- tion. To the men he also communicated the syllable Da, and after having asked them whether they had understood what he had said to them, received the answer that they had understood that they should prac- tise charity (Datta), upon which Prajapati said he was satisfied. To the demons likewise, Prajāpati commu-

308 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§16

nicated the syllable Da, and having asked them whe- ther they had understood what he had said to them, received the answer that they had understood that they should practise compassion (Dayadhvam), upon which Prajapati expressed satisfaction again " (S. 17. a). Even though thus Prajapati gave the same instruction to the different inquirers, they understood the import of the instruction according to their different capacities, and learnt what was for them the right thing to do. We are told by the author of the Upanishad that" when the celestial voice, the Thunderbolt, repeats Da, Da, Da, it intends to communicate the three different sets of virtues, namely, Self-control, Charity, and Compassion." These, then, are the three cardinal virtues for people who are born with the Sattvika, the Rajasa and the Tamasa elements predominating in them. To those who, like the gods, occupy an elevated position, the divine voice says : " Be self-controlled, for other- wise, out of your elation, you might do acts of un- kindness." To those who are in the position of men, equals among equals, the divine voice says: "Be charitable, and love your fellows." To those, again, who, like the demons, have in them the capacity of doing infinite harm, the divine voice says: "Be compassionate. Be kind to those with whom you would otherwise be cruel." Thus we are told in the above passage that Self-control, Charity, and Compassion con- stitute the three different cardinal virtues for the three different sets of people, each one of them having a certain predominating psychological temperament.

17. So far about the Brihadaranyakopanishad. In the Chhandogya Upanishad we Virtues and Vices in the Chhandogya. meet with a different list of vir- tues in the conversation between Ghora Angirasa and Krishna, the son of Devaki.

§ 18] CHAPTER VI : ETHICS 809

Who this Krishna was, and what the purport of the instruction which Ghora Angirasa imparted to Krishna might be taken to be, we have had occasion to consider in a previous chapter. At present we are concerned merely with the list of virtues that are enumerated there, and their ethical significance. We are told that the chief virtues of man are austerity, charity, straightforwardness, harmlessness, and truth- fulness : these according to Ghora Angirasa constitute the chief virtues of man (S. 17. b). We have already seen the analogy which the enumeration of these vir- tues bears to the enumeration of a similar list of vir- tues in the Bhagavadgīta (XVI. I. 2). Then, in the Chhandogya Upanishad again, a little later on, we find the mention of the five chief different sins of which man is capable. We are told there that "he whe steals gold, he who drinks wine, he who pollutes the bed of his teacher, he who kills a Brahmin, all these go down to perdition ; likewise also he, who even asso- ciates with them" (S. 17. c). In this passage we are told what were regarded, by the Upanishadic seers, the five chief different kinds of sin. The thief, the drunkard, the adulterer, the Brahmocide, and the man who associates with them, are all re- garded as worthy of capital punishment : this is very much like the later injunctions in Manu and Yajña- valkya (III. 5. 227), where the same crimes are des- cribed as the greatest of all sins.

18. The Taittiriya Upanishad is evidently the most hortatory of all the Upanishads. The hortatory pre- cepts in the Taittiriya. It adopts a deliberately didactic tone, and impresses a number of virtues to be observed, the study and teaching of the Sacred Scriptures forming the burthen of the discourse. We are asked to respect the Law, to tell the Truth, to

310 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§18

practise Penance, Self-control, and Tranquillity, to offer ceremonial as well as daily Oblations to the Fire, to receive guests with Hospitality, to practise Humanity, and to Increase and Multiply. We are also told the opinions of three different moralists, each of whom insisted upon a special virtue. The sage Satya- vachas Rathītara taught the virtue of Truth. The sage Taponitya Paurusishți insisted upon the virtue of Penance. Finally, the sage Naka Maudgalya said that there was no virtue higher than the Study and Teaching of the Sacred Books, for that, he said, consti- tuted penance-that verily constituted penance (S. 18.). On the other hand, a little further on, we have in the same Upanishad a direct moral advice imparted by the teacher to the out-going pupil. When the pupil has finished the course of his studies at his master's house, the master by way of a parting advice, tells him to speak the Truth, to respect the Law, and not to swerve from the Study of the Vedas ; after having offered to the preceptor the kind of wealth he would choose, he should go out into the world to marry and to produce children, so that the family lineage may not be broken. The pupil is further advised not to swerve from the duties that are due to the Gods and the Fathers; to regard the Mother as his god; to regard the Father as his god ; to regard the Preceptor as his god ; to regard the Guest as his god. In gene- ral, the pupil is advised only to perform those actions which might be regarded as faultless by the society. Those, says the Spiritual Teacher, who are higher than ourselves in Brahminhood, should be respected "by giving a seat"-an expression which is otherwise inter- preted as implying also that "in the presence of such, not a word should be breathed by the disciple." Finally, the Teacher imparts to his disciple the various con- ditions of Charity : Charity should be practised with

§ 491 CHAPTER VI: ETHICS 311

Faith, and not with Un-Faith, with Magnanimity, with Modesty, with Awe, and with Sympathy (S. 19). We thus see how the author of the Taittiriya Upanishad enumerates the different virtues that are necessary for practical life.

19. More, however, than any of the other virtues, Truth seems to find particular Truth, the Supreme Virtue. favour with the Upanishdic seers. Illustrations of this virtue are scattered in the various Upanishads. When auda- cious potentates speak from the viceregal chair that in Indian Scriptures there does not seem to be any consideration made of the supreme virtue of Truth, it were much to be wished that they had studied the Upanishads, where Truth is inculcated as the supreme virtue, before they made their daring state- ments. In a famous passage of the Chhandogya Upanishad we are told how Satyakama, the son of one Jabala, who had led a wanton life in her youth, asked his mother when he came of age, as to who it was from whom he was born, how the mother answered that she could only tell him that he was born of her though she was not quite sure from what father he was born, how when Satyakama went to his spiritual teacher in order to get himself initiated, he was asked by the teacher as to what family it was from which he had come, how the youth Satyakäma gave a straightforward reply saying that he did not really know from what family he had come, but that he only knew his mother's name, and that she had told him that she did not know from what father he was born, herself having led a very wanton life in her youth. "Heigh !" exclaimed the spiritual teacher to Satyakama, "these words could not eome from a man who was not born of a Brahmin.

812 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY §[19

Come, I shall initiate you, because you have not swerved from the Truth" (S. 20). This story tells us how even the son of a wanton girl could be elevated to the position of a Brahmin merely for having told the pure and unadulterated Truth. Then, again, in that same Upanishad, we are told how Truth has the power of saving a man even from death, for Truth, we are told, is merely the counterpart of Reality. "When a man who has committed theft is brought hand- cuffed to the place of trial, they heat an axe for him, and if he has really committed the theft, then he covers himself with untruth, catches hold of the axe and is burnt to death. On the other hand, if he has not committed the theft, he covers himself with truth, catches hold of the axe, and is not burnt at all, but acquitted" (S. 21). This is how they used to distin- guish the culprit from the true man in ancient times. Whatever may be said in modern times of the efficacy of such a trial, the fact remains that underlying the idea of this trial, there lies an unshakable belief in the power of Truth. Be true and fear not. Your strength would be as the strength of ten, if only your heart is pure. On the other hand, if you hide the canker of Untruth in your bosom, in mortal fear you shall walk even in the midday sun. Of like import is the utter- ance of Bhāradvaja in the Praśnopanishad where we are told that if a man may tell the Untruth he shall be dried up from the very roots; hence it is, he says, he dare not tell the Untruth (S. 22. a). On the other hand, the Mundakopanishad tells us, that Truth alone becomes victorious in the world, and not a lie; by Truth is paved the path of the gods, by which travel the sages, who have all their desires fulfilled, to where lies the highest Repository of Truth (S. 22. b). This is how the practice of Truth as a moral virtue enables one to reach the Absolnte. Finally, in the conversation

§20] CHAPTER VI: ETHICS 313

between Narada and Sanatkumara, when Narada had gone to his teacher to receive instruction from him in regard to the nature of Truth, the teacher answered it was only when a man had realised the Ultimate that he might be said to tell the Truth, while other truths were truths only by sufferance (S. 22. c). This is verily in the spirit of the jesting Pilate who asked what truth was, and would not stay for an answer. While, however, Pilate expressed a doubt as to the nature of truth, Sanatkumāra gives a more positive interpretation of it when he says that ultimate Truth is to be found only in the attainment of Reality. What people call truth is really no Truth at all. It is Truth only by sufferance. Thus we see how Truth is regarded by the Chhandogya Upanishad as the ultimate moral correlate of the real- isation of the Absolute.

20. We next come to the treatment of the

Freedom of the Will. problem of the Freedom of the Will. It may be easily admitted that a proper discussion of this problem requires a very high stage in the development of moral philosophy; hence there is not much wonder if the treatment of the problem of the Freedom of the Will in the Upanishads is but scanty. There are, however, a few remarks showing a rather acute insight in regard to the problem, and we must not fail to give the credit for them to the Upanishadic philosophers, The Bri- hadāranyakopanishad tells us that man is merely a conglomeration of desire, will, and action: "as his desire is, so is his will; as is his will, so is the action that he performs; as his action is, so is the fruit that he procures for himself "(S. 23). There is here a very clever discussion of the relation between desire, will, action, and the effect of actiona contribution indeed of the Upenishadic 40

314 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ § 20

sages to the Psychology of the Moral Self. In the Kaushītaki Upanishad, again, we have the enunciation of a theological determinism, inasmuch as we are told there that man is but a puppet in the hands of God, who makes him do good actions if he wishes him to rise, and bad actions if he wishes him to fall (S. 24. a). This is a regular denial of the freedom of man, and we are told that man does not possess true freedom at all as moral philosophy understands that expression. On the other hand, in the Chhandogya Upanishad, we are told that even though true freedom cannot be said to belong to man before the realisation of Atman, still we can say that it does belong to him after that realisation. Man in the foolishness of the contempla- tion of his small success regards himself to be the lord of all he surveys; he believes that he may be the master of any situation in which he may be placed, and that he may compel nature any time to bend to his sove- reign will ; but events in life prove that these are after all false expectations, and that even though a little freedom may be granted to man in small matters, he is yet not free in the highest sense of the term. Pent up within the gaol, he thinks like a prisoner that he is free ; but he is free only to drink and eat and not to move about. Like a falcon to whose foot a string is tied, he can only fly in the limited sphere described by the length of the tether, but he is bound beyond that region. Similarly, man may vainly imagine that he is free to do any actions he pleases, but his freedom is the freedom of the tethered falcon. The Chhāndo- gya Upanishad tells us that it is only when we have known the Ätman that there is freedom for us in all the worlds; but if we have not known the Ätman, there is no freedom for us at all (S. 24, b). The same Upanishad tells us again a little later, that when we bave known the Ätman we can obtain any

§21] CHAPTER VI: ETHICS 315

object we please, thus testifying to the sovereignty of man's will over nature, which proceeds from the reali- sation of the Atman (S. 24. c). Finally, even though there is no discussion in the early Upanishads of the conflict of motives which leads to the moral choice, still in the Muktikopanishad we have a passage where we are told that the river of desire runs between the banks of good and bad, but that, by the effort of our will, we should compel it to move in the direction of the good (S. 25)-a contribution, though a belated one, to the psychological aspect of the problem of freedom. 21. What is now the Ideal of the Upanishadic Sage ? The Ideal of the Sage. It may be seen by reference to the progress of the argument in the Chapter that moral values are by the Upanishadic seers almost invariably linked with mystical values and that just as there can be no true mysticism unless it is based upon the sure foundation of morality, so morality to be perfect must end in the mystical atti- tude. In the Upanishads, there is no mere moral agent whose morality does not consummate in mystical realisation. Thus, the Upanishadic Sage differs on the one hand from the Stoic Sage, who represents in him- self the acme of moral perfection connected with an intellectual contemplation instead of a mystical rea- lisation of the Absolute. On the other hand, he differs from the Christian Sage, who no doubt sticks rightly to the triadic norm of conduct, faith, hope, and charity, but who centres his hopes for mystical perfection in a heteros-Jesus Christ-and not in himself. The Upanishadic Sage believes in the possibility of greater or less mystical realisation for every being according to the greater or less worth of his character, belief, and endeavour : he sees the Atman in all, and sees the Atman alone. The Isopanishad tells us that "for a

816 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PEILOSOPHY [§21 man to whom all these beings have become the Atman, what grief, what infatuation, can there pos- sibly be, when he has seen the unity in all things ?" (S. 26. a). He has gone to the end of sorrow, and has torn asunder the ether-like skin of desire that had so long enveloped him in darkness and despair (S. 26.b). All his desires have been at an end, because he has attained to the fulfilment of the highest desire, namely the realisation of the tman (S. 26. c). As drops of water may not adhere to the leaf of a lotus, even so may sin never contaminate him (S. 26. d). There is no feeling of repentance for him : he never bethinks him- self as to why it was that he did not do good actions, or why he did only evil ones (S. 26.e). He has come to learn of the nature of Reality, and has thus gone be- yond the reach of these duals (S. 26. f). If ever any- body may intend evil to him, or try to persecute him, his hopes will be shattered, as anything dashing itself against an impenetrable rock may shatter itself to pieces, for, verily, the Sage is an impenetrable rock (S. 27). He has attained to eternal tranquillity, be- cause as the Upanishad puts it, he has " collected" the Godhead (S. 28. a). All his senses along with the mind and intellect have become motionless on account of the contemplation of the Absolute in the process of Yoga (S. 28. b), and having realised the Atman, he has found eternal happiness everywhere (S. 28. c). How this mystical perfection can be attained, and how morality may thus culminate in mysticism, will form the theme of our next Chapter.

GHAPTER VI: ETEICs 317

SOURCES VI

I यान्यस्माकं सुचरितानि तानि त्वयोपास्यानि नो इत- राणि। ... । ये के चास्मच्छरेयांसो ब्राह्मणा :... । अथ यदि ते कर्मविचिकित्सा वा वृत्तविचिकित्सा वा स्यात्, ये तत्र ब्राह्मणा :... संमर्शिनः अलूक्षा: धर्मकामाः स्युः यथा ते तत्र वर्तेरन् तथा तत्र वर्तेथाः। एष आदेशः। एष उपदेशः। एषा वेदोपनिषद्। सै. I. 11.

2 महज्जय वज्रमुद्यतं य पतद्विदुरमृतास्ते भवंति। भया- दस्याग्निस्तपति भयात्तपति सूर्यः । मयारदिदम् वायुश् मृत्युर्धावति पंचम:॥ क. II. 6.2-3. भीषाऽस्माद्वात: पवते र भाषोदेति सूर्यः। भीषाSस्मादभिश् इद्रश्र मृत्युर्धावति पंचम इति। तै. II. 8. 3 (a) मनो ब्रह्मेत्युपासीत। छां. III.18. I. (b) मनो ह्यात्मा ... मनो हि ग्रहम मन उपासस्वेति। छां. VII.3. I. 4 (a) अन्यच्छ्रेयोऽन्यदुतैव प्रेयस्ते उमे नानार्थें पुरुषं सिनीतः। तयो: श्रेय आददानस्य साघुर्भवति हीयतेऽर्थाद्य उ प्रेयो वृणाते॥ श्रेयश्च प्रेयश्च मनुष्यमेतस्तौ संपरीत्य विविनक्ति घीरः। श्रेयो हि धीरोऽभिप्रेयसो वृणीते प्रेयो मंदो योगक्षे- मादू वृणीते॥। क. I.2. I-2.

नैतां सृंकां वित्तमयीमवापी यस्यां मञ्जन्ति बहचो मनुष्या:।। क. I. 2.3. 5 (a) अजीर्यताममृतानामुपेत्य जीर्यन्मर्त्यः क्वघस्थः प्रजानन्। अभिध्यायन्वर्णरतिप्रमोदानतिदीर्घे जीविते को रमेत।। क. I. I. 28.

विण्मूत्रवातपित्तकफसंघाते दुर्गन्धे निःखारे5स्मिब्दारीरे

318 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY कि कामोपभोगैः । कामक्रोधलोभभयविषादेष्येष्टवियोगा-

ऊशरीरे कि कामोपभोगैः । सर्वे चेदं क्षयिष्णु पश्यामो यथेमे दंशमशकादयस्तृणवनस्पतय उद्भूतप्रध्घंसिन :... । अथ किमेतैर्वान्यानां शोषणं महार्णवानां शिखरिणां प्रपतन घुवस्य प्रचलनं वश्चनं वातरज्जनां निमज्जनं पृथिव्या: स्थानादपसरणं सुराणां इत्येतद्विधेऽस्मिन्संसारे कि कामोपभोगैः । मै. I. 2-7. 6 (a) एतमेव प्रवाजिनो लोकमिच्छंतः प्रग्रजन्ति। पतद्ध स्म वै तत् पूर्वे विद्वांस: प्रजा न कामयन्ते कि प्रजया करि- व्यामो येषां नोऽयमात्माडयं लोक इति। ते ह रम पुत्रै- षणायाञ्च वित्तैषणाया्च लोकैषणायाव्य व्युत्थायाथ मिक्षा- चर्य चरन्ति। बृ. IV.4.22. (b) प्राणो ब्रह्मेति ह स्माह कार्षाताकः । तस्य ह वा एतस्य प्राणस्य ब्रह्मणो मनो दूतं, चक्षर्गोप्त, श्रोत्रं संश्रावयितृ, वाक्परिवेष्ट्री। तस्मैवा एतस्मै प्राणाय ग्रह्मण पताः सर्वा देवता अयाचमानाय बलि हरन्ति। एवं हैवास्मै सर्वाणि भूत न्ययाचमानायैय बलिं हरन्ति य एवं वेद । तस्योप- निषन्न याचेदिति। तद्यथा ग्रामं भिक्षित्वाSलब्ध्वीपविशे- न्नाह्मतो दत्तमश्नीयामिति त एचैनमुपमंत्रयंते ये पुरस्ता त्प्रत्याचक्षीरन्। एष धर्मोडयाचतो भवति। अन्नदास्त्वेवैन उपमंत्रयन्ते ददाम त इति। कौ. II. I. 7 (a) एवं वै तमात्मानं विदित्वा ब्राह्मण: पुत्रैषणाया्च विस्तै- षणायाश्च लोकैषणायाञ्च व्युत्थायाय भिक्षाचर्य चरन्ति ... । तस्मादू ब्राह्मण: निर्विद्य बाल्येन तिष्ठासेद्। बृ. III.5. I. (b) तमेव धीरो विजञाय प्रशां कुर्वीत ब्राह्मणः। नानुष्यायाद् बहूञ् शब्दान् वाची विग्लापनं हि तत्। बृ. IV.4. 21. 8 (a) तमेवैकं जानथात्मानं अन्या वाचो विमुंचथ अमृतस्यैष सेतुः। ओमित्येवं ध्यायथ आत्मानं स्वस्ति वः पराय तमसः

CHAPTER VI : ETHICS 819

परस्तात्। तद्विजानेन परिपश्यंति धीरा: आनंदरूपममृतं यद्विभाति। मुं. II.2.5-7. (b) तस्मादेवंविच्छांतो दान्त उपरतस्तितिक्षुः समाहितो भूत्वा आत्मन्यात्मानं पद्यति। सर्वमात्मानं पश्यति। नैनं पाप्मा तरति, सर्वे पाप्मानं तरति, नैनं पाप्मा तपति, सर्वे पाप्मानं तपति, विपापी विरजोऽविचिकित्सो ब्राह्मणो भवति। बृ. IV. 4. 23. (c) प्राणो ह्योष यः सर्वभूतैर्विभाति विजानन्विद्वान्भवते नाति- वादी। आत्मक्रीड आत्मरतिः क्रियावानेष म्रह्मविदां वरिष्ठः ॥ मुं. III. I. 4. 9 (a) कुर्वन्नेवेह कर्माणि जिर्जीविषेच्छतं समाः। एवं त्वयि नान्य- थेतोऽस्ति न कर्म लिप्यत नरे॥ ई. 2. (b) अंधं तमः प्रविशंति येऽविद्यामुपासते। ततो भूय इव ते तमोय उ विद्यायां रताः ॥ अन्यदेवाहुर्विद्ययान्यदाडुर- विद्यया। इति शुश्रुम र धाराणों ये न स्तद्विचचाक्षिरे॥ विद्या चाविद्यां च यस्तद्वेदोभयं सह।अविद्यया मृत्युं तीर्त्वा विद्ययामृतमश्ुते॥ ई. 9-11. 10 (a) मा नस्तेकि तनये मा न आयुषि मा नो गोधु मा नो अश्वेषु रीरिषः । वीरान्मा नो रुद्र भामिनोऽवधीर्हविष्मंतः सद- मित्वा हवामहे। शवे.IV.22. (b) सत्यान्न प्रमदितव्यम् । धर्मान्न प्रमदितव्यम्। कुशलान् प्रमदितव्यम्। भत्यै न प्रमदितव्यम्। तै. I. II. I. (c) तं होवाच " याशवल्क्य, किमर्थमचारी:, पशूनिच्छन् अण्वन्तानिति" । उभयमेव सम्राडिति होवाच। बृ.1V.I.I. स हावाच याज्वल्क्यः ।पिता मेऽमन्यत न अननुशिष्य हरेतेति। बृ. IV, 1. 7. II सैपाउऽनंदस्य मीमांसा भबति। युषा स्पास्साचुयुषा.

320 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

ध्यायक:। आशिष्ठो द्रदिष्ठो बलिष्ठः। तस्येयं पृथिवी सर्वा वित्तस्य पूर्णा स्यात्। स एको मानुष आनंदः। ते ये शतं -मानुषा आनंदाः । स एको मनुष्यगंधर्वाणामानंदः । श्रोत्रि- यस्य चाकामहतस्य । इत्यादि। तै. II. 8. 12 (a) तदेतत्प्रेयः पुत्रात्मेयो वित्तात्प्रेयोऽन्यरमात्सर्चस्मादंतरतर यदयमात्मा। स योऽन्यमात्मनः प्रियं न्ुवाणं ब्रूयात् प्रियं रोत्स्यतीतीश्वरो ह तथैव स्यादात्मानमेव ग्रियमुपासीत स य आत्मानमेव प्रियमुपास्ते न हास्य प्रियं प्रमायुक भवति। बृ. I. 4.8. (b) तंद्ा अस्यैतदातकामं आत्मकामं अकामं रूपं शोकान्तरम्। ब. IV. 3.2. योडकामो निष्काम आप्तकाम आत्मकाम:। बृ. IV. 4.6. I3 सा होवाच मैत्रेयी "यशु म इयं भगोः सर्घा पृथियी वित्तेन पूर्णा स्यात् कथं तेनामृता स्यामिति"। "नेति" होवाच याज्वल्क्यः "यथैवोपकरणवरता जीवितं तथैव ते जीवितं स्यात् अमृतत्वस्व तु नाशास्ति वित्तेनेति" । सा होवाच मैत्रेयी "येनाहं नामृता स्यां किमहं तेन कुर्याम्। ... ।" स होवाच याश्वल्क्यः प्रिया बतारे नः सती प्रियं भाषस पद्यास्स्व व्याख्यास्यामि ते । .. स होवाच न वा अरे पत्युः कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवति, आात्मनस्तु कामाय पतिः प्रियो भवति । ज्यायायै० पुत्राणां°, वित्तस्य, ब्रह्मणः, क्षत्रस्य, लोकानां, देवानां, भूतानां, सर्वस्य°।आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रीतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः । आत्म- नो वा अरे दर्शनेन अवणेन मत्या विज्ञानेनेदं सर्वे विदितम्। बृ. II. 4.2-5. I4 यदा वै सुख लभतेऽथ करोति, नासुसं लब्धवा करोति सुखमेव लब्घ्वा करोति, सुखं त्वेव विजि्ञासितव्यम् ... । यो वै भूमा तत्सुखं, नाल्पे सुखमस्ति। भूमा त्वेव विजि- शासितव्यः । यत्र नान्यत्पश्यति नान्यच्छृणोति, नान्य- द्विजानाति स भूमा। अथ यत्रान्यत्पश्यति, अन्यच्छृणोति, अन्यद्विजानाति तदस्पम्। यो वै भूमा तदमृतं अथ यद्ल्पं सम्मस्पण्। स्र (थूमा) भवन: कक्मिन्प्रतिप्रित इति स्पे

CHAPTER VI: ETHICS 391 महिम्नि यदि वान महिम्नि इति। गोअश्वमिह महिमे- त्याचक्षते इस्तिहिरण्यं दासभाये क्षेत्राण्यायतनानीति। नाहमेवं प्रवीमि। स एवाघस्ताव, सउपरिष्टाव,स पम्चाल्, स पुरस्ताव्, स दक्षिणतः, स उत्तरतः, स एवेदं सर्वे इस्प- थातो अहंकारादेश:, अहमेवाधस्ताव, अहमुपरिष्ठात्, अहं पश्चात्, अहं पुरस्तात्, अहं दक्षिणतो, अहमुत्तरतो, अह· मेषेदं सर्वमित्यथात आत्मादेशः आत्मैवाधस्ताल्, आत्मोपरिष्टाद, आत्मा पश्ात्, आत्मा पुरस्तात, आत्मा दक्षिणतः, आत्मोत्तरत:, आत्मैषेद सर्वमिति। स वा एव एवं पश्यश्रेवं मन्वान एवं विजानभ्रात्मरतिरात्मक्रीड आतम- मिथुन आत्मानंद: सस्वराद भवति तस्य सर्वेषु लोकेषु कामचारो भवति। छा. VII. 22-25. 15 (a) अन्यन् धर्मादन्यत्राधर्मादन्यत्रास्मीत्ृताकताद्। अन्यन सूताब भम्याब यत्तत्पश्यसि तद्द।। क. I.a. I4: अशरीर घाव संत न प्रियाप्रिये स्पुशतः। छा. VIII.I2.I. (b) यदा पश्य: पशयते वकमवरणे कर्तारमीशं पुरुषं ब्रह्मयोनिम। तदा विद्वान्पुण्यपापे विधूय निरंजन: परमं साम्यमुपैति॥ मु. III. I. 3. 16 (a) य एषोऽतईदय आकाशस्तीस्मन्ेते सवेस्य वशी सर्वस्े- शान: सर्वस्याधिपतिः स न साचुना कर्मणा भूयाओो पव असाधुना कनीयान्। yृ. IV. 4.22. (b) एव नित्यो महिमा ब्राह्मणस्य न वर्धते कर्मणा नो कमीबान। सृ. IV.4. 23. 17 (a) त्रयः प्राजापत्याः प्रजापतौ पितरि ब्रह्मचर्यसपुर्वेवा मनुष्पा असुरा उषित्वा ब्रहमचर्ये देवा ऊचुर्रवीतु नो भवानिति तेम्मो हैतदक्षरमुधाच द इति व्यश्ञासिष्टा ३ इति व्यक्षा- सिम्मेति होचुर्दाम्यतेति न आत्येत्योमिति होषाच व्यक्षा- सिष्टेति। अथ हैवं मनुष्या ऊचचुर्भवीतु नो भवानिति तेम्यो हैतदेवाक्र मुधाच ए इति ष्यशासिश् ३ इति व्यशासिम्मेति दोसुर सेलि न आस्येश्योमिति होबाच व्यशासिरेति। ब्रथ 41

322 SURVEY OP UPANISHADIC- PHILOSOPBY

हैनमसुरा उचुर्व्रवीतु नो भवानिति तेभ्यो हैतदेवाक्षरमु- 1. चाच द इति व्यश्ासिष्टा २ इति व्यक्षासिप्मेति होनुरदय ध्वमिति न आत्थेत्योमिति होवाच व्यज्ञासिष्टति तदेत- देवैषा दैवी वागनुवदृति स्तनयित्लुर्द द द इति दाम्यत दत्त दयध्वमिति तदेतत् त्रयं शिक्षेदमं दानं दयामिति। वृ. V. 2. I-3. (b) अथ यत्तपो दानमाजर्वमहिसा सत्यवचनमिति ता अस्य दक्षिणा:। छां. III.17.4. (c) स्तेनो हिरण्यस्य, सुरां पिबंश्, गुरोस्तल्पमावसन्, ब्रह्मह्दा चेते पतन्ति चत्वार: पंचमश्चाचरस्तैरिति। छां. V.I0. 9. 18 ऋर्तं च स्वाध्यायप्रवचने च। सत्यं च° । तपश्च°। दमश्°। शमश्र।असयश्र'1-अगिहोत्रं च°। अतिथयक्ष'। मानुषं च° प्रजा च°। प्रजनश्च°। प्रजातिश्च। सत्यमिति सत्यवचा .: I सथीतरः। तप इति तपोनित्य: पौरुशिष्टिः । स्वाध्याय- प्रवचने पवेति नाको मौदल्यः । तद्धि तपस्तद्धि तपः। तै. I. 9. 19 वेदमनूच्याचार्योऽन्तेवासिनमनुशास्ति। सत्यं वद धर्मे चर स्वाध्यायान्मा प्रमद्ः।आचार्याय प्रियं धनमाहृत्य प्रजातंतु माव्यवच्छेत्सीः। ... देवपितृकार्याभ्यां न प्रमदितव्यम्। मातृदेवो भव, पितृदेवो भव, आचार्यदेवो भव, अतिथि- देवो भव। यान्यनवद्यानि कर्माणि तानि सेचितव्यानि नो इतराणि। ... । ये के चास्मच्ड्रेयांसों ब्राह्मण: तेषां, त्व- याSडसनेन प्रश्वसितव्यम्। श्रद्धया देय, अश्रद्धयाऽदेयम्। थिया देयं, हिया देयं, भिया देय, संविदा देयम्। तै. I.II. I-3. -20 सत्यकामो ह जावालो जवालां मातरमामत्रयांच क्रे ग्रह्मचर्य भवति विवत्स्यामि कि गोत्रोऽहमरमीति। सा हैनमुवाच नाहमेतद्वेद तात यद्गोत्स्त्वमसि बह्वहं चरन्ती परिचा- रिणी यौवने त्वामलमे साहमेतन्र वेद यद्ोत्रस्त्वमसि जवाला तु नामाहमस्मि सत्यकामो नाम स्वमसि स सत्य- काम एव जावालो घुवीया इति। स ह हाष्टमत गौतम- मेरयोवाच ब्रह्मचर्य भगवत्ति वत्स्याम्युपेयां मगवन्तमिति I र6 होवाच किंगोतों से सोम्यासीति स धवाच नाइमेत.

CHAPTER VI : ETHIeS 323

छ्वेद भो यहोत्रोहमस््यपृच्छ मातर साा प्रत्यव्रधीत् बहहं चरन्ती परिचारिणी यौचने त्वामलमे साहमेतन्र वेद यद्गोत्रसत्वमसि जवाला तु नामाहमस्मि सत्यकामो नाम त्वमसीति सोऽहं सत्यकामो जावालोड़स्मि भो इति। तं होघाच नैतदव्राह्मणो विवक्तुमर्दति समिघं सोम्याहरोप त्वा नेष्ये न सत्यादगा इति। डं. IV. 4. I-5. 21 पुरुषं सोम्योत हस्तगृहीतमानयन्त्यपहार्षीत्तत् परशुमस्मै तपतेति स यदि तस्य कर्ता भवति तत पवानृतमात्मानं कुरुते सोऽनृताभिसंधोऽनृतेनात्मानमन्तर्धाय परशुं तसं प्रतिगृण्हाति स दह्यतेऽ्थ हन्यते। अथ यदि तस्याकर्ता भघति तत एव सत्यमात्मानं कुरुते स. सत्याभिसंघः सत्ये- III नात्मानमन्तर्धाय परशुं तप्तं प्रतिगृण्हाति स न दह्यतेऽथ मुच्यते। छां.VI. 16. I-2. 22 (a) समूलो वा एष परिशुष्यति योऽनृतमभिचदति। तरुमान्ना हामि अनृतं चक्तुम्।

(b) सत्यमेव जयते नानृतं सत्येन पन्था विततो देयानः। येना. प्र. VI. I.

कमन्त्युषयो ह्याप्तकामा यत्र तत्सत्यस्य परं निधानम्॥ मुं. III. I. 6. (c) सत्यं भगवो विजिज्ञास इति । ... । यदा वै विजानात्यथ सत्यं वदति नाविजानन् सत्यं वदति विजानन्रेव सत्यं

23 वदति। छां. VII. 16, 17. अथो खल्वाहु: काममय एवायं पुरुष इति। स यथाकामो भवति तत्कतुरभेवति, यत्कतुर्भवति तत्कर्म कुरुते, यत्कर्म कुरुते तदभिसंपद्यते। बृ. IV. 4.5. 24 (a) एष ह्येव साधु कर्म कारयति ते यमेभ्यो लोकेम्य उन्निनीषत एप उ एवासाधु कर्म कारयति तं, यमधो निर्नाषत, एष लोकपाल: एष लोकाधिपतिरेष लोकेशः सम आत्मेति विद्यात् स म आत्मेति विद्यात्। कौ. III. 9. (b) य इहात्मानमननुविद्य व्रजन्ति तेषां सर्वेषु लोकेषु अकाम- चारो भवति। य इहात्मानं अनुविद्य वजन्ति तेषां सर्वेषु लोकेषु कामचारो भवति। छा. VIII.I. 6.

824 SURVBY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPMY

(c) ये पे अन्त अभिकामो सवति े मे कामयते सोऽएच लंक- ल्पादेव समुत्तिष्ठति तेन संपन्नो महीयते। छं. VIII. 2,I0. 25 शुभाशुभार्म्यां मार्गाम्यां वहंती वासनासरित् । पौरषेण प्रयत्नेन योजनीया शुमे पथि। अशुमेषु समाषिष्ट घुमेन्ये- चावतारयेद्। मुक्तिक II. 5, 6. 26 (a) यस्मिन् सर्वाणि भूतानि आत्मैवाभूद्विजानतः। तत्र को मोहः कः शोक: एकत्वमनुपश्यतः। ई.7. (b) यदा चर्मवदाकाशं वेष्टयिष्यन्ति मानवाः । तदा देवमवि- जाय दुःखस्यांतो भविष्यति। शे. VI. 20. (c) पर्याप्तकामस्य कृतात्मनस्तु हइष सर्वे प्रविलीयंति कामाः। मं. III. 2.2. (d) यथा पुष्करपलाश आपो न निप्यंत एवमेवंविदि पार्प कर्म न लिप्यते। डं. IV. I4. 3. (e) एतं ह वाव न तपति किमई साघु नाकरबम्। किमह पापमकरवमिति। चै. II. 9. () स य एवं विद्वान पते आत्मानं स्पृणुते, उमे शोवैष पते आरमान स्पृणुते। a. II. 9. 27 एवं यथाश्मानमख्णं ऋरवा विभ्वंसत, एवं हैष स विष्वं- सते य एवंविदि पापं कामयते यम्जैनं अभिदासति स

28 (a) तमीशानं वरदं देवमीक्य निचाय्येमां शान्तिमत्यंतमेति। छां. I. 2.8.

शे.IV.II. (b) यदा पंचावतिष्ठंते शानानि मनसा सह । बुद्धिद्च न विचे- प्टति तामाडुः परमां गतिम्। तां योगमिति मन्यन्ते स्थिरा- मिद्रियधारणाम्। क.II.6.IO-II. (c) तमात्मस्थं पेऽनुपश्यन्ति धीरास्तेषां सुख शाश्बतं नेतरे- पाम्। शो. VI. 12.

CHAPTER VII

INTIMATIONS OF SELF-REALISATION

1. In a previous Chapter we have seen how the Philosophy is to Mya- Upanishadic seers arrived at the ticiam as Knowledge ia conception of a unitary Atman to Belng. who fills the whole world of nature as of mind, from whom the world comes into being, in whom the world lives, and into whom the world is finally absorbed. It is this conception of Atman which we saw to be the quintessence of the phi- losophical teachings of the Upanishads ; it is this con- ception which enables us to bridge over the disputes between the various contending theological schools ; and finally, it is this conception which gives a proper place to the various constructions of reality in the ultimate explanation of things. We also suggested in that Chapter that the Upanishads afforded a prac- tical lesson for the realisation of Atman. They are not content with merely constructing an intellectual explanation of Reality, but suggest means for the prac- tical attainment of it. It is true that, in the very nature of things, the problem of Self-realisation could not be expected to be expounded in a deliberate fa- shion by the Upanishadic Seers. They only throw hints and suggest the way for realising the Self, only too cognizant of the fact that any description of the great mystic experience by word of mouth would fall short of reality, as much as any mediate, intellectual, or expressible knowledge would fall short of immediate, intuitive, first-hand experience. There is the same gulf between the expression of an experience

826 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§1

and the enjoyment of it, as there is between knowledge and being. Nevertheless, mystic experience has it- self to be suggested and communicated in a concealed fashion so as to enable the seekers after mystic life in their otherwise dark journey to know the lamp- posts on the mystic way. It is thus that we find in the various Upanishads mystical intimations of the realisation of the Self, which are hidden like jewels beneath an intellectual exterior, and which he alone who has the eye for them can discern to be of im- measurable value.

2. The Upanishadic seers fully realise the fact that no amount of mere intel- The Lower Know- ledge and the Higher lectual equipment would enable

Knowledge. us to intuitively apprehend Rea- lity. They draw the same dis- tinction between Apara Vidya and Parā Vidyā, bet- ween lower and higher knowledge, as the Greek philo- sophers did between Doxa and Episteme, between opinion and truth. The Mundakopanishad tells us that there are two different kinds of knowledge to be known, one the higher, the other, the lower knowledge. Of these the lower knowledge is the knowledge of the Vedas, of grammar, of etymology, of metre, of the science of the heavens; while the higher knowledge is that by which alone the imperishable Being is reached (S. I.a). The same typical distinction between the way of know-, ledge and the way of realisation is brought out in a conversation between Nārada and Sanatkumāra, where Narada, the spiritual disciple, goes to his Teacher to learn the science of realisation. Asked to. say what branches of knowledge he has hitherto studied, Nārada tells Sanatkumara that he has stu- died all the Vedas, as well as all history and mytho- logy; he has studied the science of the manes, mathe-

§31 CHAPTER VII : MYSTICISM 327

matics, the science of portents, the science of time, lagic, ethics, the science of the gods, the science of Brahman, the science of the demons, the science of- weapons, astronomy, as well as the science of charms, and fine arts. But he tells his master that grief fills him that so much knowledge is not competent to land him beyond the ocean of sorrow. He has studied only the different Mantras ; but he has not known the Self. He has known erewhile from persons revered like his Spiritual Teacher that he alone is able to go beyond the ocean of sorrow who can cross it by the saving bund of Atman. Would his Spiritual Teacher enable him to cross over the ocean of ignorance and grief ? (S. I. b). This passage brings into relief the distinction between the lower knowledge and the higher knowledge, and sets the knowledge of Self on shch a high pedestal indeed that all intellectual know- ledge seems to be merely verbal jugglery, or an utter weariness of the flesh, as contrasted with it. Finally, the extremely practical character of the Upanishadic Seers towards the problem of Self-realisation is ex- hibited in the Kenopanishad, where we are told that the end of life may be attained only if the Self were to be realised even while the body lasts ; for if Self-know- ledge does not come while the body lasts, one cannot even so much as imagine what ills may be in store for him after death (S. 2. a). The same idea is urged with a slightly different emphasis in the Kathopani- shad, where we are told that unless a man is able to realise the Self while the body lasts, he must needs have to go from life to life through a series of incarna- tions (S. 2. b).

3. The question now arises.if the Atman is capable of being realised even while the body lasts, why is it that all people doriot realise him i their life-time, or yet

398 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§3

again, if he can be realised by some, what can we re-

Qualifications for gard to be their qualifications for Self-realisation. that realisation ? The Upanishads abound in references to the quali- fications necessary for the spiritual life. The first quality requisite for a spiritual aspirant is, the Katho- panishad tells us, introversion: "Our senses have been created by God with a tendency to move out- wards. It is for this reason that man looks outside himself rather than inside himself. Rarely a wise man, who is desirous of immortal life, looks to his inner Self with his eye turned inwards" (S. 3. a). The same out-moving tendency of the senses is em- phasised in the Śvetasvataropanishad, where we are told that the individual self lives pent up in its cita- del of nine doors with a tendency to flutter every time outside its prison-house (S. 3. b). In order to bend the wand to the other extreme, it thus seems neces- sary for the spiritual aspirant at the outset to entirely shut himself up to the outside world so as to be able to look entirely within himself. This is the stage of introversion. After "introversion" comes "catharsis." The Kathopanishad tells us that unless a man has stopped from doing wrong, unless he has entirely com- posed himself, it may not be possible for him, however highly-strung his intellect may be, to reach the Self by force of mere intellect (S. 4. a). The Mundakopa- nishad insists upon truth and the life of penance, right insight and the life of celibacy, as essential conditions for the unfoldment of the Self within us (S.4.b). The Kathopanishad brings into relief the non-intellectual, in the sense of the super-intellectual, character of Self-realisation, when it declares that the Self can be reached neither by much discourse, nor by keen intellect, nor by polymathy (S. 4. c). The Isaväsyo- panishad in a very famous parsage inculcetes the same

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logophobia as in the Kathopanishad, when it tells us that knowledge is even more dangerous than ignorance, inasmuch as those who pursue the path of ignorance go after death to a region of pitchy darkness, while those who pride themselves upon their possession of knowledge go to greater darkness still (S. 4. d). The Mundakopanishad points out that the Atman can not be realised by a man who has not sufficient grip and tenacity to lead the severe life of spirituality, nor can he be reached by a man whose life is a bundle of errors (S. 4. e). The same Upanishad gives further characteristics of the life of Self-realisation. "Unless a man feels disgusted with the worlds to which his actions may bring him, and unless he be- lieves firmly that the world which is beyond the reach of actions can never be obtained by any actions how- soever good," unless, in other words, he regards the life of Self-realisation as uniquely superior to the life of action, "he has no right to enter into the spiritual world, to seek which he must forthwith go in a humble spirit, fuel in hand, to a Spiritual Teacher who has realised the Self " (S. 4. f). We thus see that, for the realisation of the Self, the Upanishads inculcate a life of introversion, with an utter disgust for the world and catharsis from sins, a spirit of humbleness, and a life of tranquillity, truth, penance, insight, strength, and right pursuit. Unless these conditions are fulfilled, the aspirant after spiritual life may never hope to realise the Self.

4. When the equipment in moral virtues is thus being perfected, the next step in Necessity of Initia- tion by a Spiritual Tea- the path of Self-realisation is ini- cher. tiation by a worthy Spiritual Teacher. Time and oft have the Upanishads inisted upon the necessity of initiation 42

330 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

by a Guru. Satyakāma in the Chhāndogya Upa- nishad is merely voicing the opinions of many when he tells his teacher that he has heard erewhile from people as revered as his own spiritual teacher that unless one be initiated by a Guru in the path of Self-realisation, one cannot attain the goal of mystic life (S. 5. a). The Kathopanishad believing in the natural descent of spiritual knowledge from a higher to a lower level tells us that " unless the spiritual teacher be really of a superior calibre, spirit- ual knowledge would be hard of attainment, and again, that unless the initiation comes from a Spiritual Teacher who has realised his identity with the Self, There can be no knowledge of the subtle path which transcends all power of logic and argumentation. Let us not divert our intellect into wrong ways by mere logic-chopping ; for, how can we hope to attain to the knowledge of Atman unless we are initiated by another "? (S. 5. b). "Arise," says the same Upanishad in another passage, "Awake, and learn from those who are better than ye; for the path of realisation is as hard to tread as the edge of a razor. Very wisely have sages called it an inaccessible path " (S. 5. c). These and other passages make it clear that the knowledge of Self could not be attained by an individual striving for himself on his own behalf; for, we are told, the knowledge is so subtle and mystic that nobody could by his own individual effort ever hope to attain it. Secondly, it is necessary that the Teacher to whom we go to seek wisdom must have realised his identity with the ultimate Self. For, unless the Teacher has realised such an identity, unless, in other words, he stands on the lofty pedestal of unitive experience, the knowledge which he can impart can never be expected to be fructified in any indivi- dual who receives it. Doubt has oftentimes been ex-

§51 CHAPTER VII : MYSTICISM 331

pressed as to the necessity of having a spiritual teacher from whom to learn spiritual wisdom. Why, it is contended, may we not hope to attain it by reference to books? Persons who put forth this objection must remember what Plato said about the comparative value of the knowledge to be obtained from books, and the knowledge to be obtained from a teacher by word of mouth. The first is entirely lifeless ; the second is the outcome of the full-fledged life of the master. This makes all the difference in the world ; for, books can never be expected to solve the actual difficulties in the path of Self-realisation, while a Teacher who has walked on the path may take his aspiring disciple from step to step on the ladder of spiritual perfection.

5. There is a very interesting parable in the Chhan- dogya Upanishad to illustrate The parable of the blindfolded man. how the disciple is carried by his Spiritual Teacher from step to step on the path of Self-realisation. There we are told how a man was once led away from his country, namely the Gandhāras, by some robbers who took him, with his eyes covered, to a very lonely and uninhabit- ed place, and there left him to roam as best he might in any direction he pleased; how, as he was piteously crying for help and instruction to be able to reach his original home, he was told by a person who suddenly happened to come there, "Go in that direction : in that direction are the Gandharas"; and how, there- upon, exercising his intelligence as best as he could, he asked his way from village to village on his retum journey, and finally came back after much travail to his original home (S. 6). This parable of the blind- folded man is as full of spiritual wisdom as the parable of the cave in the Republic of Plato. It exhibits in a very typical fashion the whole process of the original

332 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

benightment of the Soul and its later illumination. Our real country is the country of Brahman, from which we are led away by the thieves, namely, the passions, into the forest of utter ignorance, with our eyes blind- folded by lust for unreal things. Then we cry aloud and piteously that some help may come, which may give us more light and lead us back to Brahman. Suddenly, we meet with a Spiritual Teacher, probably as the consequence of our having previously perform- ed meritorious actions. The Teacher imparts to us knowledge of the way to our original home, and then, exercising our faculties as best we may, we go from stage to stage in the spiritual path until we reach back the country of Brahman which was our original home.

6. There are, however, certain necessary precau- tions which must be observed by Precautions to be ob- served In Imparting the Spiritual Teacher before he splritual wisdom. imparts the mystic knowledge to his aspiring disciple. The Mun- dakopnishad tells us that unless a disciple has perfomed such a difficult task as that of carrying fire over his head, his Spiritual Teacher should not impart the knowledge of the mystic way to him (S. 7. a). The passage which gives this admonition is also otherwise interpreted as embodying the principle that no man has the right of entrance into the mystic path unless he is a "shaveling." This implies that only a Samnyasin can be a worthy student of the spiritual science. We have no intention to discredit the order of Samnyāsa, but we may say that other passages from the Upani- shads do not always describe Samnyasa as being the only fit mode of life for receiving mystic wisdom. The Chhandogya Upanishad tells us that "mystic knowledge may be imparted to either the eldest son,

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or to a worthy disciple who has lived with his master for a long time, but to none else. Not even a treasure which fills the whole sea-girt earth would be a suffi- cient recompense for communicating mystic knowledge" (S. 7. b). The passage from the Śvetāśvataropanishad which is a comparatively later passage, and which in- troduces the word "Bhakti " for the first time in Upanishadic literature, tells us that unless the disciple has absolute Faith (Bhakti) in God as in the Master, the spiritual secret should not be imparted to him (S. 7. c). We thus see how a Spiritual Teacher must be very jealous of imparting the knowledge of the mystic path. The Bhagavadgītā (XVIII. 67), taking up the same word Bhakti, later tells us that the mystic knowledge should not be imparted to one who does not make himself worthy of it by long penance, who has no faith either in God or the Master, who has no desire to listen to the spiritual wisdom, or else who harbours within himself an antagonism to spiritual knowledge.

7. The actual means of meditation which a Spiri- tual Teacher imparts to his disci- Meditation by means ple is described unanimously in of Om, the way to Real- the Upanishads as being the sym- isation. bol Om. It is also to be noticed that Om is described as not merely the supreme means of meditation, but the goal to be reached by the meditation itself. The Om occupies in Indian philosophy the same position which the Logos oc- cupies in Christology. The Upanishads repeat from time to time the efficacy of meditation by means of the supreme symbol. "The word which the Vedas declare and which is the subject of all aus- terities, desiring which men lead the life of religious stu- dentship, that word, I tell thee, is briefly Om; that

334 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§7

word is the Supreme Brahman; that word is the Supreme Symbol; that word is the Supreme Support" (S. 8. a). In these terms does the Kathopanishad identify the means of meditation with the goal to be reached by it ; the symbol, in short, stands for both the means and the end of spiritual life. The Chhandogya Upanishad declares that all speech is interwoven on this symbol Om, in the same manner as the leaves of a tree are woven together on a stalk (S. 8. b). The Mundakopanishad tells us by the help of a very happy simile that "we should take into our hand the bow of the Upanishads, and put upon it the arrow of the Soul, sharpened by devotion. We should next stretch it with concentrated attention, and penetrate the mark which is the Supreme Brahman. The mystic symbol Om is the bow ; the arrow is the Soul; and Brahman is the mark to be pierced. We should penetrate it with undistracted attention, so that the arrow may become one with the mark" (S. 9). We are told here how devotion is necessary for the whetting of the point of the arrow, how concentrated attention and undistracted effort are necessary for making the arrow of the Soul pierce the target of Brahman, how, finally, the arrow is to become so absorbed in the target that it ceases to exist as a separate entity. If unitive life is to be expressed by any metaphor,-and all verbal expressions, it must be remembered, fall short of the experience of reality, -the metaphor of the arrow and the target invented by the Mundakopanishad must be considered a very happy one, as most fittingly characterising the commu- nion of the lower and the higher selves so as to involve the utter destruction of the separate individuality of the lower self. Further, the Om has not merely an individual, but a cosmic efficacy as well. It not merely serves to help the meditation of the individual

§8] CHAPTER VII : MYSTICISM 335

person, but the Sun himself, we are told, travels the universe, singing the symbol Om (S. 1o). Finally, the moral efficacy of meditation by means of Om is brought out in the Prasnopanishad where Satyakama inquires of his teacher as to what happens to a man by his continuing to meditate by means of that symbol till the hour of his death, and the answer is given that "just as a snake is relieved of its slough, similarly is the man who meditates on Om relieved of his sins, and, by the power of his chants, is lifted to the highest world where he beholds the Person who informs the body, and who stands supreme above any living complex whatsoever " (S. II).

8. The Mandukya Upanishad supplies us with a unique exaltation of Om and its The Mandukyan ex- altation of Om. spiritual significance. We are told there that Om consists not mere- ly of the three moræ A U M, which it might easily be seen to contain, but that it con- tains also a fourth mora-less part. The reason for this four-fold division of Om lies manifestly in the author's intention of bringing into correspondence with the parts of Om the states of consciousness on the one hand, and the kinds of soul on the other. The Om is supposed to represent in miniature the various states of consciousness, as well as the various kinds of soul. Thus, on the one hand, it stands for the state of wakefulness, the state of dream, and the state of deep-sleep, as well as the supreme self-conscious state which is called the Turya. On the other hand, it stands for the different kinds of soul, namely the Vaiśvānara, the Taijasa, the Prajña, as well as the fourth, namely the Atman. The mora-less part of Om has correspondence with the fourth dimension of psychology, namely the Turya

336 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY as well as with the fourth dimension of metaphysics, namely the Ätman. The Vaisvanara is the enjoyer of gross things, as the Taijasa is the enjoyer of the subtle. The Prājña is described as the equivalent of what philosophy calls God, " the Lord of all, the all- knowing, the inner controller of all, the origin and end of all beings." Contrasted with these stands the Ätman, which is the Mandukyan equivalent of what philosophy calls the Absolute. It is described as "neither inwardly nor outwardly cognitive, nor yet on both sides together. It is not a cognition-mass, and is neither knower nor not-knower. It is invisi- ble, impractiable, incomprehensible, indescribable, un- thinkable, and unpointable. Its essence is the know- ledge of its own self. It negates the whole ex- panse of the universe, and is tranquil and bliss- ful and without a second" (S. 12). The spiritual significance of the psycho-metaphysical correspon- dence of the parts of Om lies in the great help that is supposed to be given by meditation on it in in- tuiting the Atman in the Turya state of consciousness after a negation of the other kinds of Soul in the other states of consciousness. Nowhere else as in the Mandukya Upanishad do we find such an exaltation of Om, and the great value for spiritual life of medita- tion by means of that symbol. 9. The aim of the Upanishads is a practical one, Practice of Yoga. and we find scattered through- out the Upanishads certain hints for the practical realisation of the Godhead by means of Yoga. In the Śvetasvataropanishad we are told that our body should be regarded as the lower stick and meditation on Pranava as the upper one, and that by rubbing together these two sticks, we have to churn out the fire of God that is hidden

§9] CHAPTER VII : MYSTICISM 337

in us (S. 13. a). The reference to the body and the Pranava as the lower and the upper sticks in the process of spiritual churning which we meet with in this passage of the Svetasvataropanishad is a remarkable one, as it enables us to interpret correctly another passage from the Kathopanishad, where a reference to the sticks is to be met with again, and where we are told that just as the earthly fire is ensconced within the two churning sticks like a fœtus in the womb of a pregnant woman, and just as this fire is to be worshipped with offerings day after day by people who keep awake for that purpose, similarly in between the two sticks in the practice of Yoga,-namely, as we can now interpret the expression by reference to the Śvetas- vatara, the body and the Pranava,-between these sticks is ensconced the spiritual fire, which we have to worship day after day by keeping ourselves awake, and giving it the offerings of the psychical teuden- cies in us (S. 13. b). This passage in the Kathopani- shad can also be interpreted in another way, as we find a little later on in the same Upanishad that the two sticks in the process of Yoga may also be regarded as the upper breath and the lower breath, the Prana and the Apana, and that between the two is seated the beautiful God whom all our senses worship (S. 14. a). Instead of regarding the two Aranis as the body and the Pranava as in the Śvetāsvataropanishad, we might as well take them to mean the upper and the lower breaths, in between which is seated the beautiful Atman; and a reference from the Mundakopanishad is also not wanting, where we are told that the mind for its puri- fication is dependent upon the Pranas, and that it is only when the mind is purified after an initial control of the Pranas that the Atman reveals himself (S. 14. b). 43

338 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§ 10

10. The Yoga doctrine in the Śvetaśvataropani- shad is a more developed one than Yoga doctrine in Sve- tasvatara. in the other Upanishads, and we have in the second chapter of that Upanishad a classic and almost systematic descrip- tion of the practices and effects ot Yoga, which may be said to carry the Upanishad quite near to the time when the Yoga doctrine came to be systematised in a new school of philosophy. We are told that "we should hold our body with its three erect parts quite even, and that we should pen our mind, along with our senses, in the heart. We should concentrate upon Brahman, and, with the help of that boat cross all the fearful streams that bar our spiri- tual progress. Controlling our breath and with our actions quite measured, we should throw out by the nose our Prana when it becomes quite exhausted in the process of inspiration, and we should regulate our mind which is like a chariot to which are yoked very evil horses. We should sit for the practice of Yoga on an even and pure piece of ground which is free from pebbles, fire, and sand, and which is also free from sounds and watery resorts. The place where we sit for practice should be delightful to the mind, and not jarring to the eye; and we should choose for practice a place in the still recesses of a cave" (S. 15. a). The Śvetaś- vataropanishad also lets us into the mystery of the physiological effects achieved by this practice of Yoga. "When the five-fold result of Yoga arising from the different elements, namely, earth, water, fire, air, and ether comes well to operate, the practiser of Yoga knows neither disease, nor old age, nor death, for verily his body has become full of the fire of Yoga. His body now becomes very light, the pulse of health beats within him, he becomes free from desires, his

§11] CHAPTER VII : MYSTICISM 339

complexion becomes clear, and his pronunciation very pleasing. He emits a smell which is holy, and his excretions become very slight; it is by these marks that one should know that the novice in Yoga is being well established in his practice" (S. 15. b). The spiritual effects of the practice of Yoga which are given in the Śvetaśvataropanishad will be discussed somewhat later in this chapter, our present concern being only the details of the manner of Yoga-practice, and its physiological effects.

11. The end of the practice of Yoga is evidently

The Faculty of God- the realisation of God. But be-

realisation. fore we discuss the nature of God- realisation, we must answer a previous question-By what Faculty is it that a mystic is able to realise God? Is it Sense, or is it Thought, or is it any super-sensuous and super-intellectual faculty of Intuition, by means of which one is able to realise God? The Kathopanishad tells us that the form of God does not fall within the ken of our vision. " Never has any man been able to visualise God by means of sight, nor is it possible for one to realise Him either by theheart, or by the imagination, or by the mind. It is only those who know this sublime truth that become immortal" (S. 16. a). Later writers have translated the above passage in a different way. They tell us that even though it may not be possible for us to "visualise" the form of God, still it " may be possible for us to realise Him by means of the heart, or by the imagination, or by the mind." It is true that the grammatical construction of the above passage does not come in the way of this interpretation also. But it must be remembered that the verse from the Kathopanishad which comes almost immediately after it makes it quite clear that it is "not possible

340 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ § 11

to realise God either by word of mouth, or by the mind, or by the eye. It is only those who know that God is, to them alone, and to none else, is God revealed " (S. 16. b). We are here told that it is not possible at all to realise God by means of the mind, which makes it quite clear that we have to "understand" in the earlier verse from the Kathopanishad the nega- tive adverb in the second part, which would then im- ply that it is never by means of the mind that one can realise God. It is also noteworthy from the later verse from the Kathopanishad that the nature of God- realisation is like that of a "fact." You can never question it. You can never argue about it. You can never think about it. If you only know that God is, then alone is God realised by you. The value of a fact can never be disturbed by any probings into its pros and cons, by logical manipulation about its na- ture, or by any imaginative or highly-strung intel- lectual solutions. It thus becomes clear that neither Sense nor Thought enables us to realise God. But a further question arises-if God can be realised at all, has man got any Faculty by means of which he can so realise Him ? To that question, another verse from the Kathopanishad supplies an answer. "This Atman who is hidden in all beings is not patent to the eyes of all. It is only the subtle seers who can look with the one-pointed and piercing faculty of Intuition (Buddhi) that are able to realise God" (S. 16. c). Opinions differ as to whether even this Buddhi can lead us to the vision of God. In one passage of the Bhagavad- gītā (VI. 21) we are told that the happiness of God- realisation can be apprehended by means of Buddhi; on the other hand, we are told in another passage of that same work (III. 42), that just as God is beyond all senses and mind, similarly He is beyond even this faculty of Buddhi or Intuition. But when words fail

§ 12] CHAPTER VII : MYSTICISM 341

to exactly describe the nature of the Faculty of God- realisation, it may become serviceable psychologically to "invent" a term, to call it either Buddhi or Intuition, and then to make it responsible for the vision of God. The Upanishads, however, take yet another turn, and look at the ques- tion of God-realisation not from the psychological but from the moral point of view. The Munda- kopanishad tells us that "it is only when a perfect katharsis of the whole moral being takes place by the clearness of illumination, that one is able to realise the immaculate God after meditation ; for He can be attained neither by sight, nor by word of mouth, nor by any other sense, nor by penance, nor by any actions whatsoever" (S. 17. a). Of like import is that other passage from the Kathopanishad which tells us that " it is only when the whole moral being is purged of evil that one is able to realise the greatness of God" (S. 17. b). We prefer to understand the reading "Dhatuprasada " instead of "Dhatuhprasāda" in the above passage, for to our mind the idea of Dhatri or Creator is absolutely irrelevant to the passage and can only be illegitimately smuggled into it, the purifica- tion of the moral being yielding quite a necessary and legitimate sense.

12. Time and oft we are told in the Upanishads, as in the passage above quoted from The thorough imma- nence of God. the Kathopanishad, that the mys- tic is able to "see" God. Another passage from the same Upanishad tells us that " we ought to extract the Atman courageously from our body, as one extracts a blade of grass from its sheath. When the Atman is thus drawn out, let a man know that he is the lustrous Immortal Being-yea, the lustrous Immortal Being" (S. 18. a). The process of

342 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§ 12

the extraction of the Atman from this frail body implies a thorough immanence of the Atman in the body. The Atman is to the body what the wheat is to the chaff. The wheat must be separated from the chaff, even though the chaff may temporarily cover it. Even so must the Atman be extracted from the body, even though, for a while, the body may serve as a covering for it. "Just as a razor is laid in a razor-case or a bird is pent up in its nest, even so is this Conscious Being placed in the body up to the very nails, up to the very hair of the body" (S. 18. b). In this wise does the Kaushītaki Upanishad declare the immanence of Atman. The Śvetaśvata- ropanishad tells us that just as oil is hidden in sesa- mum, or ghee in curds, just as water is hidden in springs, or fire in the churning sticks, even so is the Ätman immanent in the body" (S. 18. c). Another passage from the Śvetāśvataropanishad tells us that "just as there is an extremely subtle film on the sur- face of ghee, even so does the Godhead who is imma- nent in all beings envelop the whole universe, by knowing Whom alone is a man released from all bonds" (S. 18. d). The essence of all this teaching about the immanence of God is that if man may but try in the proper way, he may be able to realise God even within himself.

13. It is just the possibility of God-realisation within himself that vindicates the Types of mystical ex- mystic's search after God by a perience. long process of purification and contemplation. References are not wanting in the Upanishads, though we cannot say they are to be met with there to the fullest extent, to the visions and auditions which the mystic experiences on his spiri- tual journey. Four types of experience on the whole are

§13] CHAPTER VII : MYSTICISM 343

to be found scattered in the Upanishads, which bear respectively on the forms, the colours, the sounds, and the lights which are experienced by the mystic in the process of contemplation. These we shall indicate from the various Upanishads, without trying to sever the different experiences from one another. In the second chapter of the Śvetāśvataropanishad, there is a classic reference to the different forms and lights that are experienced by the mystic on the threshold of his spiritual pilgrimage. We are told that he ex- periences forms such as those of "mist and smoke, the sun, the fire and the wind, the fire-fly and the light- ning, the crystal and the moon " (S. 19. a). An early pas- sage from the Brihadaranyakopanishad tells us almost in the same strain that to the vision of the advancing mystic appear such forms as those of the saffron-colour- ed raiment, of the red-coloured beetle, of a flame of fire, of a lotus-flower, and of a sudden flash of light- ning : these constitute the glory of the advancing mystic " (S. 19. b). It seems, however, on the whole, that the Upanishadic mystics are either morphists, or photists, rather than audiles. There are only few re- ferences to the experience of audition in the Upani- shads, and these also are not well accounted for. In the Brihadaranyaka, as in the Maitri Upanishad, we are told that the mystic hears certain sounds within himself which are attributed by the authors of those Upanishads to the process of digestion that is going on within the system. We are told that " the sound is a result of the processes of digestion and assimila- tion, that a man is able to hear it merely by shutting his ears, and finally that when a man is dying he is not able to hear the sound" (S. 20. a). The Chhandogya Upanishad in a similar strain tells us that the indica- tion of the presence of Reality within us can be ob- tained merely by shutting our ears, and by being

344 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY t§13

able to hear sounds like those of the roaring of an ox, or the peal of a thunder, or the crackling of fire (S. 20.b). Mystic expereince has shown that it is not merely by shutting our ears that we are able to hear the mys- tic sound, that we can hear it even with our ears quite open, and that finally even a deaf man who cannot hear anything else is yet able to hear this sound. Then, again, we cannot call the mystic sound a result of the processes of digestion and assimilation within us. It is true that the mystic sound is to a certain extent dependent upon physiological circum- stances. But to call the sound a result of those cir- cumstances is like putting the cart before the horse. We thus see that even though a reference is unmista- kebly made to the auditions experienced by a mystic, the Upanishadic seers are not correct in giving their raison dåtre, nor even in defining their exact nature. On the other hand, when they come to deal with the photic experiences, the Upanishadic mystics are evi- dently at their best. "On a supreme disc set with gold," says the Mundakopanishad, "is the spotless and immaculate Brahman, which is the light of all lights which the seekers after Ätman experience" (S. 21. a). The Chhandogya Upanishad tells us that "after having crossed the bund of phenomenal exis- tence, even though a man may be blind, he ceases to be blind ; even though he may be pierced, he is as good as unpierced ; after having crossed this bund, the very night becomes like day, for before the vision of the aspiring mystic the spiritual world is suddenly and once for all illumined " (S. 21. b). Another pas- sage from the Chhandogya Upanishad tells us that before such a mystic, there is neither ever any sun- set nor any sun-rise. "Only if this be true, "says the author of the Upanishad, "may I not break my peace with God! When there is neither any sun-rise

§141 CHAPTER VII : MYSTICISM 345

nor any sun-set, there is eternal day before the aspiring soul " (S. 21. c). Finally, this same idea is reiterated once more in the Śvetäśvataropanishad, where we are told that " when there is neither day nor night before the mystic, when there is neither being nor not-being, God alone is", thus testifying to the transcendence of God beyond both night and day, beyond both being and not-being, as the result of an utter cancelment of these in divine omnipresence (S. 21. d).

14. The photic or auditive experiences which we The acme of mystic have referred to above, though reallsation. they may be called the harbingers of a full-fledged realisation to come, do not yet constitute the acme of Self-realisa- tion. One very celebrated passage of the Mundakopa- nishad tells us that the Atman cannot be realised exeept by one whom the Atman himself chooses : before such a one does the Ätman reveal his proper form (S. 22. a). This is verily the doctrine of Grace. It implies that man's endeavours after a full-fledged realisation of God may always fall short of the ideal, unless Grace comes from above. It is only when the Atman chooses the saint for the manifestation of his supreme glory that the mystic will be able to perceive Him. It is only then that the golden-coloured Being of the Chhandogya Upanishad who can be seen on the Sun, "with golden mustaches, and golden hair, and who shines like gold up to his very toes, " can come to be identified, as by the sage of the Isopanishad, with the Being within oneself (S. 22. b). It is only then that the Individual Spirit can become one with the Universal Spirit. The Śvetasvataropanishad tells us that "just as a mirror which is cleaned of its impurities becomes lustrous and capable of reflecting a lustrous image, even thus does the mystic see Himself at the height of 44

346 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY T§14

his spiritual experience and reach the goal of his en- deavour. Just, again, as with the help of a lamp one is able to see an object, similarly by the help of the Individual Self he sees the lustrous Universal Self, who is unborn, who is the highest reality, and who is beyond all existences" (S. 22. c). The mystic ima- gery implied in the above quotations from the Śvetas- vatara is made absolutely clear in the teaching of the great sage Maitri who imparted to his disciple " the highest secret of the Upanishads" when he said that at the acme of spiritual expreience the mystic sees his own form in a flood of supreme light arising from within himself, which indeed constitutes the realisation of the immortal and fearless Ätman (S. 22. d).

15. The Upanishads abound in passages which try to reconcile opposite qualities Reconciliation of in the Atman as realised. The contradictions in the Atman. Śvetāśvataropanishad tells us that " the Atman is neither male nor female, nor is the Ätman of an intermediate sex: what body He takes, in that body does He lie enscon- ced" (S. 23. a). The Isopanishad tells us that "the Atman may be said to move and yet not to move. He is far as well as near. He is inside all things as well as outside all things." A daring mystic of the Kathopanishad asks-Who except himself has been able to realise the Atman who rejoices and rejoices not, who can walk in a sitting posture and move about everywhere in a lying one ? In the Mundakopanishad an attempt is made to reconcile the infinite greatness of the Atman with his infinite subtlety: "Great and lustrous is that incontemplatable Being, and yet he is subtler than the subtle. He is farther than any far-off end, and yet quite near to us, being shut up in the cave of our heart." In like manner

§16] CHAPTER VII: MYSTICISM 347

does the Kathopanishad tell us in an oft-quoted pas- sage that the Atman is subtler than the subtle and greater than the great, and is pent up within the recesses of our heart. On the other hand, passages are not wanting, as in the Śvetaśvataropanishad and the Kathopanishad, where the Atman is described as being of the size of a thumb and glorious like the sun ; or even again as being as small as the tip of a needle, or a hundredth part of the end of a hair divided into a hundred infinitesimal portions (S. 23. b). What is meant exactly by saying that the Atman is neither male nor female, that He moves and yet does not move, that He is both far and near, that He is greater than the great and smaller than the small, or that He is of the size of a thumb, only the mystics can know. We, who judge from the outside, can have no idea of how the seeming contradictions may be re- conciled in the infinite variety and greatness of the Ātman.

16. The Upanishads discuss in many places the psychological and other effects Effects of realisation on the Mystic. which the realisation of God produ- ces upon the perfected Mystic. "One who knows his identity with the Self and comes to realise that he is the Atman-for what reason should such a man enter into any feverish bodily activity, for his desires are fulfilled and his end is gained?" (S. 24. a). This is as much as to say that when the identification with Atman comes to take the place of the identifica- tion with body in a perfected Mystic, all his desires for bodily accommodation vanish immediately. Then, secondly, " the knots of his heart are broken, all his doubts are solved, and the effects of his actions are an- nihilated, when once he has seen God who is higher than the highest " (S. 24. b). The doubts which had so long

348 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [§16 harassed his mind, and the actions from whose result he used to suffer, break away immediately ; while one may know the perfected Mystic by this one prin- cipal mark, that he has left no doubts to solve. If he is once for all in sure possession of reality-what doubts ean he any further have ? Then, thirdly, in the Mundakopanishad, we have the great contrast between the want of power in the Mystic before Self-realisation, and the obtainment of power after it. "Though the individual Soul was lying so long with the universal Soul on the same tree, he was yet infatuated and was grieving on account of his complete impotence, but when he has once become atoned with the Highest, who is the source of all power, his grief vanishes im- mediately, and he begins to participate in the other's infinite power " (S. 24. c). Fourthly, we have in the Taittirīya Upanishad a classic description of the illimitable bliss that a perfected Mystic experiences after his communion with the Highest-a description which we have had oecasion to notice in our account of the beatific calculus in a previous chapter. But the Brihadaranyakopanishad, in the vein of an almost erotic mysticism, tells us further that the only earthly analogue which we can have for the bliss of God- realisation,-indeed a very imperfect and partial ana- logue after all,-is the bliss arising from union with a dear wife. " Just as when a man is embraced by his dear wife, he knows nothing outside nor anything in- side ; similarly when the individual Self is embraced by the universal Self, he knows nothing outside nor anything inside; for he has attained an end which involves the fulfilment of all other ends, being verily the attainment of Atman which leaves no other ends to be fulfilled " (S. 24. d). We do not know how far to justify this analogy. But it seems after all that there might be a difference of kind between the two

§16] CHAPTER VII : MYSTICISM 849

blisses which the Brihadaranyakopanishad is compa- ring, instead of merely a difference of degree ; or, at least, that the one kind of bliss is so insignificant as con- trasted with the other that there is as much analogy between them as there is between the light of a candle and the light of the sun. Further, all such erotic analogues have this defect in them, that those who betake themselves to sexual enjoyment may be thereby vainly made to imagine that they are after all experiencing an iota at least of the great divine bliss. In our opinion, it is foolish to regard the relation between the Self and God as in any way analogous to the relation between the bride and the bride- groom, and still more foolish to regard it as ana- logous to the inverted relation between the bride- groom and the bride as in certain pseudo-mystic teachings. In fact, there ought to be and can be no analogue for the unique relation between the Self and God in the state of ecstasy. To return to our argument, however, fifthly, we are told in the Taittiririya Upanishad that the direct result of the enjoyment of divine bliss is that the Mystic is divested once for all of all feeling of fear. The one kind of emotion kills the other, and the feeling of bliss kills once for all the emotion of fear. Whom and what may such a perfected Mystic fear, when he finds infi- nite joy in all directions and at all times? "He becomes fearless, " says the Taittirīya Upanishad, " because he has obtained a lodgment in that invisi- ble, incorporate, indefinable, fearless, supportless sup- port of all" (S. 24. e). Finally, we are told in the Chhandogya Upanishad that " if such a Mystic should ever want to have any end fulfilled at all, he should wait upon the Atman, and pray to him, without the slightest touch of egoism, for the fulfilment of his de- sire : immediately is the end fulfilled for him for which

350 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY [ § 16

he had prayed to God" (S. 25. a). "The Ātman," says the Chhandogya Upanishad, "is sinless, without age, without death, without fear, without any hunger or thirst, and has all his desires or ends fulfilled. This Atman should be sought after ; this Atman should be known. He who realises the Atman in this way after having sought after him, for him all the worlds are gained, and all desires fulfilled" (S. 25. b). The Mundakopanishad tells us also that "a man can have all his desires fulfilled, and obtain any world he may seek, even if he only waits upon and worships a Mystic who has realised the Self" (S. 25. c). We thus see, on the whole, that the immediate effects of God-realisa- tion upon the Mystic are the entire abatement of bodily excitement, the resolution of all doubts, the obtainment of infinite power, the enjoyment of illimi- table joy, the destruction of all fear, and the fulfil- ment of any end that may be contemplated by the Mystic.

17. The Upanishads have preserved for us a few mystic monologues which contain Raptures of mystic ecstasy. the essence of the raptures of spi- ritual experience. The Sage of the Mundakopanishad, when he came to realise the im- mortal Brahman, fell into mystic raptures when he saw that "the Brahman was before him and behind him, to his right and to his left, above and below," and broke forth into the Leibnitzian exclamation that " this was the best of all possible worlds" (S. 26). He considered himself fortunate that he was ever born into this world at all, for, was it not his appearance on the terrestrial globe that led him, by proper means and through adequate stages, to the vision of the God- head wherever his eye was cast ? The Sage Vāma- deva of the Brihadaranyakopanishad came to know

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that " just as, at the origin of things, Brahman came to self-consciousness and then understood that it was verily the All, similarly, whoever among the gods, or the mortals, or the sages comes to self-consciousness be- comes verily the All "; and thus the Sage, to whom - the infinite past was like an eternal now, broke forth into the exclamation that "he it was who had lived in Manu, and that he it was who had given light to the Sun" (S. 27),-even like the Maratha saint Tukaram, who, at a later date, exclaimed that, in bygone ages, when Śuka had gone to the mountains to reach Self-realisa- tion, he was himself present to watch that Great Act in spirit, if not in body. The Mystic of the Chhändogya Upanishad declares that even as a horse might shake its mane, similarly had he himself shaken off all his sin, that even as the Moon might come out entire after having suffered an eclipse from Rahu, even so, having been freed from the mortal coil, had he obtain- ed the eternal life in the Atman (S. 28). Then, again, the utterances of Trisanku in the Taittiriya Upanishad are remarkable for the grandeur of the ideas involved in them. After Trisanku had reached Self-realisation, he tells us he felt as if he was the " Mover of the Tree." What is the Tree to which Trisanku is referring ? It may be the Tree of the Body, or it may even be the Tree of the World. It is not uncustomary for Upani- shadic and post-Upanishadic writers to speak of the Body or the World as verily a Tree. In fact, Trisanku tells us that, like the true Soul that he was, he could move the Tree of the bodily or worldly coil. He tells us, furthermore, that his glory was " like the top of a mountain," which is as much as to say that when he had come to realise the Self, he felt that everything else looked so mean and insignificant to him from the high pedestal of Ätmanic experience that he felt as if he was on the top of all things whatsoever. Trisanku

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tells us furthermore that "the source from which he had come was Purity itself." May this not refer to the Purity of the Divine Life from which all existence springs ? Then, again, Trisanku tells us that he was as it were " the Immortal Being in the Sun,"-an iden- tification Isavāsya-wise of the Individual and Univer- sal Spirit. Furthermore, Trisanku says that he re- garded himself as "a treasure of unsurpassable value," referring probably to the infinite wealth of Atmanic experience that he had obtained. Finally, he tells us that he was verily "the intelligent, the immortal and the imperishable One," thus identifying himself with Absolute Spirit (S. 29). Finally, that greatest of the Mystics whose post-ecstatic monologue is pre- served for us in the Taittirīya Upanishad, tells us in a passage of unsurpassed grandeur throughout both Upanishadic as well as post-Upanishadic literature that when he had transcended the limitations of his earthly, etheric, mental, intellective, and beatific sheaths, he sat in the utter silence of solipsistic soli- tade, singing the song of universal unity : " How won- derful, how wonderful, how wonderful ; I am the food, I am the food, I am the food; I am the food-eater, I am the food-eater, I am the food-eater ; I am the maker of their unity, I am the maker of their unity, I am the maker of their unity," which utterances only mean, metaphysically, that he was himself all matter and all spirit as well as the connecting link between them both, and epistemologically, that he was himself the subject-world and the object-world as well as the en- tire subject-object relation-a stage of spiritual ex- perience which has been well characterised by a modern idealistic thinker as a stage where the differ- ence between the field, the fighter, and the strife vani- shes altogether-the culmination of the unitive song being couched in terms which are only too reminiscent

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of like mystic utterances from other lands, " I am the first-born of the Law; I am older than the gods; I am the navel of Immortality; he that gives me, keeps me; him, who eats all food, I eat as food ; I envelop the whole universe with splendour as of the Sun" (S. 30.)

SOURCES VII

I (a) द्वे विद्ये वेदितव्ये इति ह रम यद् ब्रह्मविदो वदति परा चैवापरा च। तत्र अपरा ऋग्वेदो यजुर्वेद: सामवेदोऽ- थर्ववेदः शिक्षा कल्पो व्याकरणं निरुक छंदो ज्योतिष- मिति। अथ परा यया तदक्षरमधिगम्यते॥ मुं. I. 1. 4-5. (b) स होवाच ऋग्वेदं भगवोऽध्येमि यजुर्वेदं राशि दैवं निधि वाकोवाक्यमेकायनं देवविद्यां ब्रह्मविद्यां भूतविद्यां क्षत्र-

भगवो मंत्रविदेवास्मि नात्मविच्छुतं ह्योव मे भगवह्शेम्य- स्तरति शोकमात्मविदिति सोऽहं भगवः शोचामि तं मा भगवान् शोकस्य पारं तारयत्विति। छां. VII. I.2-3. (a) इद चेदवेदीदथ सत्यमस्ति न चेदिहावेदीन्महती विनष्टिः। के. II. I3. (b) इह चेदशकद्वोदुं प्राक शरीरस्य विन्सः । ततः सर्गेषु लोकेषु शरीरत्वाय कल्पते।। क. II.6. 4. 3 (a) परांचि खानि व्यत्तृणत्स्वयंभूस्तस्मात्पराङ्पश्यति नान्त- रात्मन्। कश्िद्धीर: प्रत्यगात्मानमैक्षदाधृत्तचक्षुरमृतत्व- मिच्छन्॥ क.II.4. I. (b) नवद्वारे पुरे देही हंसो ळेलायते बहिः। *े. III. I8. 49

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4 (a) नाविरतो दुश्चरितालाशांतो नासमाहितः । नाशान्त- मानसो वापि प्रज्ञानेनैनमाप्तुयात्। क. I. 2. 24 (b) सत्येन लभ्यस्तपसा ह्येष आत्मा सम्यग्ज्ञानेन ब्रह्मचर्येण नित्यम्। अंतःशरीरे ज्योतिर्मयो हि शुभ्रो यं पश्यंति यतयः क्षीणदोषाः। मुं. III. I. 5. (c) नायमात्मा प्रचचनेन लभ्यो न मेधया न बहुना श्रुतेन। क. I. 2.22. (d) अंधं तमः प्रचिशन्ति येऽविद्यासपासते। ततो भूय इच ते तमो य उ विद्यायां रताः॥

(e) नायमात्मा वलहीनेन लभ्यो न च प्रमादात्तपसो वाप्य- ई. 9. लिंगात्। मुं. III. 2.4 (/) परीक्ष्य लोकान् कर्मचितान् ब्राह्मणो निर्वेदमायान्नास्त्य कृतः कृतेन। तद्विज्ञानार्थ स गुरुमेवाभिगच्छेत्समित्पाणिः श्रोत्रियं ब्रह्मनिष्ठम्। मुं. I.2. I2. 5 (a)शुतं होव मे भगवद्दृशेभ्यः आचार्याद्धधेव विद्या विदिता साधिष्टं प्रापयतीति। छां. IV. 9.3. (b) न नरेणावरेण प्रोक्त एष सुविशेयो बहुधा चिन्त्यमान:। अनन्यप्रोक्ते गतिरत्र नास्ति अणीयान् ह्यतर्क्र्यमणुप्रमाणात्। नैषा तर्केण मतिरापनिया प्रोक्तान्येनैच सुज्ञानाय प्रेष्ठ। क. I. 2. 8-9. (c) उत्तिष्ठत जागत प्राप्य वरान्निबोधत। क्षुरस्य धारा निशिता दुरत्यया दुर्ग पथस्तत्कवयो वदन्ति॥ क. I. 3. I4. 6 यथा सोम्य पुरुषं गंधारेभ्योऽभिनद्धाक्षमानीय तं ततोS तिजने विसृजेत्स यथा तत्र प्राङ्लोदड्काडघराङ्ा प्रत्यङ्का प्रध्मायीताभिनद्धाक्ष आनीतोSभिनद्ाक्षो विसृष्टः ॥ १॥ तस्य यथाभिनहनं प्रमुच्य प्रब्ूयादेतां दिशं गंधारा एतां दिशं वजेति स ग्रामाद् ग्रामं पृच्छन् पण्डितो मेधावी गंधा- रानेघोपसंपद्येत एवमेवेहाचार्यवान पुरुषो वेद तस्य तावदेव चिरं यावन् विमोक्ष्येऽथ संपत्स्य इति ॥२॥ डां. VI. 14. 1-1.

CHAPTER VII : MYSTICISM 355 7 (a) क्रियावन्तः श्रोत्रिया ब्रह्मनिष्ठाः स्वयं जुव्हत एकर्षि श्रद्ध- यंतः । तेषोमेवैतां ब्रह्मविद्यां वदेत शिरोवतं विधिवद्ैस्तु चीर्णम् ।। मुं. III. 2. I0. (b) इदं वाच तज्ज्येष्ठाय पुत्राय पिता ब्रह्म प्रबयात्प्रणाय्याय वान्तवासिने । नान्यस्मै कस्मैचन यद्यप्यस्मा इमामन्दि: परिगृहीतां घनस्य पूर्णी दद्यादेतदेव ततो भूय इत्येतदेव ततो भूय इति।। छां. III.II. 5-6. (c) वेदान्ते परमं गुह्यं पुराकल्पे प्रचोदितम्। नाप्रशान्ताय दातव्यं नापुन्रायाशिष्याय वा पुनः ॥ यस्य देवे परा भक्ति: यथा देवे तथा गुरौ। तस्यैते कथिता हर्थाः प्रकाशन्ते महात्मनः प्रकाशन्ते महात्मनः॥ शे. VI.22-23. 8 (a) सर्वे वेदा यत्पदमामनन्ति तर्पासि सर्वाणि च यद्दन्ति। यदिच्छंतो ब्रह्मचर्य चरन्ति तत्ते पदं संग्रहेण ब्रवीम्यो- मित्येतत्॥। पतद्धधेवाक्षरं ब्रह्म एतद्धधेवाक्षरं परं एतज्ये- चाक्षरं जात्वा यो यदिच्छति तस्य तत्।। क. I.2. 15-17. (b) तद्यथा शंकुना सर्वानि पर्णानि संतृण्णानि एव्मोकारेण सर्वा वाक संतृण्णा ऊँकार एवेदं सर्वम्। छां. II. 23. 3. 9 धनुर्गह्ीत्वौपनिषदं महास्त्रं शर ह्युपासानिशितं संधयीत। आयम्य तन्भावगतेन चेतसा लक्ष्यं तदेवाक्षरं सोम्य विद्धि। ३।। ग्रणवो धनुः शरो ह्यात्मा ब्रह्म तललक्ष्यमुच्यते। अप्रमत्तेन वेद्व्यं शरवत्तन्मयो भवेत् ॥ ४ ॥ मुं. II. 2. 3-4 IO ॐ इति ह्येष स्वरन्नेति। छां. I. 5. I, 3. II अथ हैनं शैव्य: सत्यकामः पत्रच्छ। स यो ह वैतद् भगव- न्मनुष्येषु प्रायणान्तमोकारमभिध्यार्यीत। कतमं वाव स तेन लोकं जयतीति। तस्मै स होवाच "पतद्ै सत्यकाम परं चापरं च ब्रह्म यदोंकार: । तस्माद्विद्वानेतेनैचायतने- नैकतरमन्वेति । ..... यथा पादोदरस्त्वचा विनिर्मुच्यत एवं ह चै स पाप्मना विनिर्मुक्त स सामभिरुत्रीयते ब्रझ्म-

356 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY लोकं स एतस्माज्जीवघनात्पर पुरिशयं पुरुषमीक्षते"। प्र. V. I-5. I2 भूतं भवद्दविष्यदिति सर्वमोकार एव । यच्चान्यत्त्रिका- लाततिं तदप्योङकार एव ॥१॥ सर्व होतद् ब्रह्मायमात्मा ब्रह्म। सोऽयमात्मा चतुष्पात् ॥। २।। जागरितस्थानो वहिःप्रज्ञः सप्तांग एकोनविशतिमुखः स्थूलभुग्वैश्वानर: प्रथम: पाद: ॥ ३॥ स्वम्स्थानोऽन्तःप्रशः सप्तांग एकोनविशति- मुखः प्रविविक्तभुक तैजसो द्वितीयः पादः ॥४॥ यत्र सुप्तो न कंचन कार्म कामयते न कंचन स्वप्नं पश्यति तत्सुषुप्तम् । सुपुप्तस्थान एकीभूत: प्रज्ञानधन एवानंदमयो हानंदभुक चेतोमुखः प्राज्ञस्तृतीयः पादः॥५॥ एष सर्वे- श्वर एष सर्वश्ञ एपोऽन्तर्याम्येष योनिः सर्वस्य प्रभवाप्यय हि भूतानाम् ॥ ६।। नान्त:प्रश्षं न वहिःप्रज्ञं नोभयतःप्रशञं न प्रशानघनं न प्रश्षं नाप्रश्ञम्।अटए्टमव्यवहार्यमग्राह्यमल- क्षणमचिन्त्यमव्यपदेश्यमेकात्मप्रत्ययसारं प्रपञ्चोपशमं शान्तं शिवमद्वैतं चतुर्थ मन्यन्ते स आत्मा स विज्ञेयः॥७॥ सोडयमात्मा5ध्यक्षरमोंकारोऽधिमाचं पादा मात्रा मात्राश्च पादा अकार उकार मकार इति।। ८॥ .... । अमात्रश्चतुर्थों- उव्यवहार्य: प्रपंचोपशमः शिवोष्द्ैतं एव्मोकार आत्मैव संविशत्यात्मनात्मानं य एवं वेद य एवं वेद ।। १२ ।। मां. I-12. 13 (a) स्वदेहमरणि कृत्वा प्रणर्व चोत्तरारणिम्। ध्याननिर्मथना- भ्यासाद्ेवं पश्येननिगूढवत्।। शे. I.I4. (b) अरण्योर्निहितो जातवेदा गर्भ इव सुभृतो गर्मिणीभिः। दिवे दिव ईढ्यो जागृवन्िर्हविष्मन्भि: मनुष्येभिरभिः॥ क. II. 4.8. 14 (a) ऊ्ध्च प्राणमुन्नयत्यपानं प्रत्यगस्यति। मध्ये वामनमासीनं चिश्वे देवा उपासते।। क. II. 5.3. (b) प्राणैश्चितं सर्वमोतं प्रजानां यस्मिन्विशुद्धे विभवत्येष आात्मा। मुं. III. I. 9. 15 (a) त्रिरुन्नतं स्थाप्य समं शरीरं हदीद्रियाणि ममसा संनि- वेश्य। ब्रह्मोड्डपेन प्रतरेत विद्वान् स्रोतांसि सर्वाणि भया-

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वहानि ॥।८।। प्राणान्प्रपडियेह स युक्तचेष्टः क्षीणे प्राणे नासिकयोच्छुसीत। दुष्टाश्वयुक्तमिव वाहमेनं विद्वान्मनो धारयेताप्रमत्तः ॥९॥ समे शुची शर्करावह्निवालुका- चिवर्जिते शब्दजलाश्रयादिभिः । मनोनुकूले न तुचक्ष- पीडने गुहानिवाताश्रयणे प्रयोजयेत् ॥ १० ॥ श्वे. II. 8-IO. (b) पृथिव्यप्तेजोऽनिलसे समुत्थिते पंचात्मके योगगुणे प्रवृत्ते। न तस्य रोगो न जरा न मृत्युः प्राप्तस्य योगाभमिमयं शरीरम्॥ १२ ॥ लघुत्वमारोग्यमलोलुपत्वं वर्णप्रसादः स्वरसौष्ठवं च। गंधः शुभो सूत्रपुरीषमल्पं योगप्रवृत्ति प्रथमां वदन्ति ॥ १३॥ शे. II. I2-13. 16 (a) न संदशे तिष्ठति रूपमस्य न चक्षुषा पश्यति कश्धनैनम्। हृदा मनीषा मनसाभिकलप्तो य एतमिदुरमृतास्ते भवन्ति। क. II. 6. 9. (b) नैव वाचा न मनसा प्राप्तुं शक्यो न चक्षपा। अस्तीति स्रुवतोऽन्यत्र करथ तदुपलभ्यते।। क. II.6. I2. (c) एष सर्वेंषु भृतेषु गढोत्मा न प्रकाशते। डदयते त्वध्ययाबुद्धधा सूक्ष्मया सूक्ष्मदर्शिमिः ॥ क.I.3.I2. 17 (a) न चक्षुषा गृह्यते नापि वाचा नान्यैर्देवस्तपसा कर्मणा वा। ज्ञानप्रसादेन विशुद्धसत्वः ततस्तु तं पश्यते निष्कलं ध्यायमान:।। मुं. III. I. 8. (b) तमकतुः पश्यति वीतशोको धातुप्रसादान्माहमानमात्मनः। क. I. 2.20. 18 (a) तं स्वाच्छरीरात्प्रवृहेन्मुआ्षादिवेषीकां धैर्येण। तै विद्याच्छु- कममृतं त विद्याच्छुक्मसृतमिति। क. II.6. 17. (b) तद्यथा क्षुरः स्षुरधाने हितः विश्वंभरो वा विश्वंभरकुलाये एवमैव एष प्रजञात्मा इद शरीरं अनुप्रविष्टः आलोमम्यः आनसेभ्यः। कौ. IV. 20. (c) तिलेषु तैलं दधिनीव सर्पिरापः स्रातःस्वरणीषु चाभिः।

358 SURVBY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

एवमात्मात्मनि गृह्यतेऽसौ सत्येनैनं तपसा योऽनुपश्यति॥ श्व. I. I5. (d) घृतात्परं मंडमिवातिसूक्ष्मं झात्वा शिवं सर्वभूतेषु गूढम् । विश्वस्यैकं परिवेष्टितारं शञात्वा देवं मुच्यते सर्वपापैः॥ शव.IV. 16. 19 (a) नीहारधूमार्कानलानिलानां सद्योतविद्युत्स्फटिकशशिनाम्। एतानि रूपाणि पुरःसराणि ब्रह्मण्यभव्याक्तिकराणि योगे ।। श्वे. II. II. (b) तस्य ह पतस्य पुरुषस्य रूपं यथा महारजनं वासो, यथा पाण्ड्ादिकं, यर्थेद्रगोपो, यथा अगन्यार्च:, यथा पुण्डरीकं, यथा सकृद्विद्युत्। ते ह वा अस्य श्रीर्भवति य एवं वेद। बृ. II. 3.6. 20 (a) अयमग्निवैश्वानरो योयमंतःपुरुषे येनेदमन्नं पच्यते यादिद मद्यते तस्यैष घोषो भवति यमेतत्कर्णावपिधाय शृणोति स यदोत्क्मिष्यन् भवति नैनं घोषं शृणोति। बृ. V. 9. I; मै. II. 6. (b) तदस्मित शरीरे संस्पर्शेनोष्णिमानं विजानाति। तस्यैषा श्रुतिः। यत्र कर्णावपिगृह्य निनदमिव, नदथुरिव, अग्नेरिव ज्वलत उपशृणोति। छां.III.I3.8. 2I (a) हिरण्मये परे कोशे विरजं ग्रह्म निष्कलं। तच्छुभ्नं ज्यो- तिषां ज्योतिस्तद्यदात्मविदो विदुः ॥९॥ मु. II. 2. 9. (b) एतं सेतुं तीर्त्वा अंघः सन्ननंधो भवति, विद्धः सन्नविद्धो भवति, तस्माद्वा एतं सेतुं तीर्त्वापि नक्तमहरेवाभिनिष्प- दते। सकृद्विमातो होवैष ब्रह्मलोक:॥ छां. VIII. 4. 2. (c) न वै तत्र न निम्लोच नोदियाय कदाचन। देवास्तेनाहं सत्येन मा विराधिषि ग्रह्मणा ॥ २॥ न ह वा अस्मा उदेति न निम्लोचति सकृहिवा हैवास्मि भवति य एतां ब्रह्मो- पनिषदं वेद ॥ ३ ॥ छां.III.II. 2-3. (d) यदाऽतमः तन्न दिवा न रात्रिन सन्न चासन् शिव एव केवलः। शवे.IV. 18.

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22 (a) यमेवेष वृणुते तेनैव लभ्यः तस्यैष आत्मा विवृणुते तनूं स्वाम्। मुं. III. 2. 3. (b) य एषोतरादित्ये हिरण्मयः पुरुषो दशयते हिरण्यशमश्रुहिं- रण्यकेश आप्रणखात् सर्व एव सुवर्णः। छां. I. 6. 6. योऽसावसौ पुरुषः सोहमस्मि। ई. 16. (c) यथैव बिंवं मृदयोपलिप्तं तेजोमयं भ्राजते तत्सुधातम्। तद्वात्मतत्वं प्रसमीक्ष्य देही एक: कृतार्थो भवते वीतशोक: ।। १४ ॥ यदात्मतत्वेन तु ब्रह्मतत्त्वं दीपोमेनेह युक्तः प्रप- श्येत्। अजं ध्रुवं सर्वतत्त्वैर्विशुद्धं शात्वा देवं मुच्यते सर्व- पारौः ॥ १५॥ वे. II. I4-15. (d) अयं वाव खल्वात्मा ते। यः कतमो भगव इति। तं हो- चाच। अथ य एष संप्रसादोSस्माच्छरीरात्समुत्थाय परं ज्योतिरुपसंपद्य स्वेन रूपेणाभिनिष्पद्यत इत्येष आत्मेति होवाच एतदमृतमभयमेतद् ब्रह्मेति। अथ खल्वियं म्रह्मविद्या सर्वोपनिषद्विद्या वा राजनस्मार्क भगवता मैत्रिणाऽख्याता। मै. II. I-3. 23 (a) नैष स्त्री न पुमानेष न चैचाय नपुंसकः । यद्यच्छरीरमा- दत्ते तेन तेन स रक्ष्यते।। शवे.V.I0. (b) अनेजदेकं मनसो जवीयो नैनदेवा आप्तुवन् पूर्वमर्रद। ... तदेजति तन्नैजति तद्दूरे तद्वन्तिके। तदन्तरस्य सर्वस्य तदु सर्वस्यास्य बाह्यतः।। ई.4,5. आसीनो दूर व्रजति शयानो याति सर्वतः। कस्तं मदा- मदं देवं मदन्यो शातुमईति॥ क. I. 2.21 बृह्च तहिव्यमचिन्त्यरूपं सूक्ष्माच्च तत्सृक्ष्मतरं विभाति। दूरातसुदरे तदिहान्तिके च पश्यत्स्विहैव निहिंत गुहायाम्॥ मुं III. I.7. अणोरणीयान्महतो महीयानात्मास्य जंतो्निहितो मुह्दा- पासू। क. I. s. s0.

360 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY अंगुष्ठमात्रो रवितुल्यरूप: संकल्पाहंकारसमीन्वतो यः । बुद्धेर्गृणेनात्मगुणेन चैव आराग्रमात्रो ह्ावरोऽपि दृषटः॥८॥ बालाप्रशतभागस्य शतधा कल्पितस्य च। भागो जीवः स विशेयः स चाSऽनंत्याय कल्पते ॥ ९॥ शे. V. 89. अंगुष्ठमात्र: पुरुषोन्तरात्मा सदा जनानां हृदये संनिविष्टः। क. II.6. 17. 24 (a) आत्मानं चेद्विजानीयादयमस्मीति पुरुषः । किमिच्छन् कस्य कामाय शरीरमनुसंज्वरेत् ।। बृ.IV.4.12. (b) मिद्यते हृदयप्रंिश्छिद्यंते सर्वसंशयाः । क्षीयंते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे। मुं. II. 2.8. (c) समाने वृक्षे पुरुषो निमओोऽनीशया शोचति मुह्यमानः। जुएं यदा पश्यति अन्यमीशमस्य महिमानमिति वीतशोकः॥ मुं. III. I. 2. (d) तद्यथा प्रियया स्त्रिया संपरिष्वक्तो न बाहयं किंचन वेद, नांतरं, एवमेवायं पुरुषः प्राशेनात्मना संपरिष्वक्तो न बाहयं किंचन वेद, नान्तरम्, तद्वा अस्य पतदाप्तकार्म आत्मकार्म अकामं रूपम् ।। बृ. IV. 3.2I. (c) आनंदं ब्रह्मणो विद्वान् न विभेति कदाचन। तै. II. 4.

प्रतिष्ठां विन्दते। अथ सोडभयं गतो भवति। तै. II. 7. 25 (a) आत्मानमंते उपसृत्य स्तुवीत कार्म ध्यायन् अप्रमत्तो, अभ्याशो ह यत्, अस्मै स कामः समृध्येत यत्काम: स्तुवी- तेति। छां. I. 3. I2. (b) य आत्मा Sपहृतपाप्मा विजरो, विमृत्यु:, विशोकोSविजि- घत्सोऽपिपास, सत्यसंकल्प:, सोन्वेष्टव्य:, स विजिश्ञा- सितव्यः। स सर्वोश्च लोकानाप्नोति सर्वाश्च कामानू यस्त मात्मानमनुविद्य विजानातीति। wi. VIII. 7. I.

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(c) यं यें लोकं मनसा संविभाति विशुद्धसत्वः कामयते यांश्र कामान्। तं तं लोकं जयते तांश्च कामांस्तस्मादात्मझष हर्चयेद् सतिकाम:॥

26 मुं. III. I. I0. ब्रह्मैवेदममृतं पुरस्ताद् ब्रह्म पश्चाद् ब्रह्म दक्षितश्चोत्तरेण। अधश्चोर्ष्वे प्रसुतं ब्रह्मैवेद विश्वमिदं वरिष्ठम्।। मुं. II.2.II. 27 ब्रह्म ह वा इदमत्र आसीत्तदात्मानमवेत्। अहं ब्रह्मास्मीति। तस्मात् तत्सर्वमभवत्। तद्यो यो देवानां प्रत्यबुध्यत स एव तदभवत् तथा ऋषीर्णा, तथा मनुष्याणाम्। तद्धैत- त्पश्यन् ऋषिर्वामदेवः प्रतिपेदेऽहं मनुरभवं सूर्यश्चेति।

28 बृ.I.4.I0. अश्व इव रोमाणि विधूय पापं, चंद्र इव राहोर्मुखात्ममुच्य, धूत्वा शरीरं, अकृतं कृतात्मा ब्रह्मलोकमभिसंभवामीति। छां.VIII.I3. I. 29 अहं वृक्षस्य रेरिवा। कीर्तिः पृष्ठं गिरेरिव। उर्ध्वपवित्रो वाजिनीव स्वमृतमस्मि । द्रविणं सवर्चसम् । सुमेधा अमृतोऽक्षितः । इति त्रिशंकोर्वेदानुवचनम्। तै. I. I0. 30 सथ एवंवित्। अस्माल्लोकात्प्रेत्य। एतमन्नमयमात्मानमुप- संक्रम्य। एतं प्राणमयमात्मानमुपसंक्रम्य। एतं मनोमयमा- त्मानमुपसंक्रम्य। एतं विज्ञानमयमात्मानमुपसंक्रम्य। एत- मानंदमयमात्मानमुपसंक्रम्य। इमाँलोकान्कामान्ीकामरूप्य- नुसंचरन्। एतत्साम गायन्नास्ते। हा३ वु हा ३ वुहा३वु। अहमन्नमहमन्नमहमन्नम् । अहमन्नादो ३ Sहमसादो ३ डहमसाद:। अह१ श्ोककदह १ शोककृदह* लोककृत्। अहमस्मि प्रथमजा ऋता ३ स्य। पूर्व देवेभ्योऽसृतस्य ना ३ भायि। यो मा ददाति स इदेव मा २वाः।अहमन्नमन्नम- दन्तमा ३ दि। अहं विश्वं भुवनमभ्यभवा ३ म्। सुवर्न ज्योतीः।। तै. III. I0. 5-6.

46

GENERAL INDEX.

A. Absolute Monism, mystical rea- lisation of, p. 278. A, as Äpti or Ādimattva,p. 36. Absolutism, of Yājñavalkya, p. Aberrations, of the Dialectic 59 ; and theory of creation, of Nyaya, p. 190; of con- p. 98; the realistic theory of sciousness, p. 127. creation, a crux to, p. 208 ; Abhivimāna, meanings of, p. and Solipsism, p. 218 ; and I36. Supermoralism, p. 306. Abnormal Psychology, p. 120. Absolutist View of Knowledge, Absolute, as surpassing the p. 218. conception of God, p. 33: Achyuta, p. 205. definition of, in positive and Action and Knowledge, recon- negative terms, p. 206; the ciliation of, p. 298. philosophical conception of, Activism, spiritual, the theory p. 206 ; and God, relation of, of, p. 296 ; phenomenal, the p. 206 ; Triune Unity of the, theory of, p. 296. p. 209; nature of the, ac- Actionlessness, how possible in cording to Rāmānuja, p.210; the midst of action, p. 298. the only Reality, according Active life, Bacon on, p. 299. to Sankara, p. 216 ; posi- Ad hoc answers of Yajfvalkya, tive characteristics of, p.219; p. 20. negative characteristics of, p. Ad hoc method, p. 39. 219; rigoristic conception of Adams : discovery of Neptune, the, p. 219; conception of p. I05. the, higher than the concep- Adhishthanapanchami, p. 209. tion of God, p. 219; nega- Adhruva, Māyā compared to, tive-positive characterisation p. 226. of the, pp. 219-220 ; nega- Adrastea, the Greek equivalent tive, affirmative, and tran- of the Sanskrit Adrishta, p. 84- scendental characterisation Advaita School of Philosophy, of, p. 221; only partially re- vealed in the forces of Na- p. 179. Ageless river, p. 164. ture, p. 253; the power of Agniology, spiritual, of the the, p. 255; as the ballast of Kena, p. 24. the cosmos, p. 258; as be- Agnivea, anticipation of the yond good and bad, p. 306. teaching, of, p. 189.

364 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

Agnosticism, Augustinian view Analogical method, p. 37. of, p. 272; Upanishadic view Anamnesis, or recollection, in of, p. 272; Spencer 's view Pythagoras, Plato, the Up- of, p. 272. nishads, and Yoga, p. 153. Air, as the source of all things, Ānandagiri on prādesa, p. 135. pp. 78-79; as the absorbent Anandatīrtha, dualistic school of all things, p. 79; as car- of, p. 207; see also Madhva. rier of sound in Mimānsa Anatomy, Upanishadic know- philosophy, p. 192; as the ledge of, p. 133. Thread, p. 2II. Anattā-vāda in Buddhism, p. Aitareya Āranyaka : differentia- I80. tion of the older and newer Anaxagoras : his idea of the portions of, p. I5. mixture of the elements as Aitareya Brāhmana : reference similar to that of the Upa- to Harischandra, p. 203. nishads, pp. 86-87 ; doctrine Aitareya, Mahidāsa, a eugeni- of portions, p. 104- cal philosopher, p. 45. Anaximander, pp. 64. 73- Aitareyopanishad, summary of, Anaximenes : his doctrine of pp. 25-26. air, pp. 79,103 ; his theory Ajatasatru, the quiescent Ksh- of rarefaction and condensa- atriya king, p. 19; his doc- tion, p. 79. trine of reality as consist- Anima and Animus, p. 148. ing in deep-sleep conscious- Animism in the Rigveda, pp. ness, p. 48; and Gārgya, I47-148. p. 62; his instruction to Anrita, Maya compared to, p. Gärgya concerning the na- 226. ture of sleep, p. 125; the Antaḥkaranapafichaka, the teaching of, p. 252. fount of Nature, p. 35- Ajatavada, or the doctrine of Antaryāmi-Brāhmāna, as illus- Non-creation, p. 229. trating the method of soli- Akasa, the carrier of sound in loquy, p. 39. the Upanishads and Nyāya, Antaryāmin, the doctrine of, p. I9I. p. 210. Akshita, p. 205. Anti-hedonism in the Upani- Alexander, invasion of, p. 102; shads, p. 293- a spectre, p. 233. Anvārabh, meanings of, p. 155- Allegory in the Upanishads, Aparā Vidyā, same as doxa, p. 42. P. 326. Alpa, as contrasted with Bht- Apocalypse, God-written, p.232. man, p. 53- Aphoristic method, p. 35- Amarakosha : meaning of prā- Appearance, doctrine of, in desa, p. 135. Aruņi and Yajñavalkya, p. 53;

GENERAL INDEX 365

or semblance, doctrine of, trine of Self-speectator, p. p. 87; Creation as, p. 98; 269; on Theoria, p. 275; om Nature and Soul and God as, the wise men as dictating p. 215 ; the moral side of the the rules of conduct, p. 289; doctrine of, p. 232; doctrine on the contemplative life, p. of, in Parmenides, Plato, Plo- 299. tinus, Berkeley, Hegel, and Arrow and the Target, the meta- Bradley, p. 232. phor of, p. 334 Apperception, synthetic unity Aruni, the outstanding philo- of, p. 274. sopher of the Chhändogya, Aranis, the two, as ensconc- p. 23: his allegory of juices ing the spiritual fire, p.337 ; and honey, p. 37; the philo- as ensconcing the beautiful sophy of, pp. 53-55 ; a great god, p. 337; as meaning the psycho-metaphysician, p. 53: Body and Pranava, p. 337; his doctrine of Substance as as meaning the Upper and underlying all things, p. 54: the Lower breaths, p. 337. his Doctrine of Illusion, p. Aranyakas, custom of mental 54; his doctrine of the iden- sacrifice at the time of the, tity of Individual and Uni- p. 8. versal spirit, p. 54; and Jai- Arche of knowledge, the pro- vali, p. 62; his teaching of blem of, p. 64. Ultimate Reality to Śveta- Archirmärga, or the bright way ketu, p. 216; the first of the for the dead, p. 159. Brahmin circle to receive Architectonic systems of In- spiritual wisdom, p. 62. dian Thought, p. 179. Arunmukhas, delivered to the Argumentum ad caput, ap- jackals, p. 27. peal to the, p. 61. As If, the philosophy of, p. 227. Aristophanes, on the apotheo- Asanas, not elaborately treated sisers of the Elements, p. 76. in the old Upanishads, p. Arjuna, as higher by a prāde- 187. Sa than Bhimasena, p. 136; Asceticism, p. 295; and pes- compared to a calf, p. 195. simism, p. 295. Aristotle : doctrine of Matter Ascetic life, characteristics of, and Form, pp. 49.92; Meta- p. 296; potency of, for Self- physics, quotation from, p. realisation, p. 297. 74: on Philolaus, p. 80; re- Ash-Tree of existence, p. 200. cognition of Not-Being, pp. Asramas, to what extent exis- 82-83; on the heart as the tent in Upanishadic times, seat of the Soul, p. I3I; p. 60. Upanishadic psychology as Astrology and Astronomy, in agreeing with, p. 13I; doc- the Maitri, pp. 31,32.

366 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

Asuras, gospel of, p. 266. 209: as the material cause Asurya, as connected with As- of the universe, p. 209; as syrian, p. 157- the instrumental cause of the Asvala, ritualistic questions of, world p. 209; as the source of p. 20; and Yājñavalkya, p. activity, p. 217: compared 56. to the lute-player, or Asvapati Kaikeya, a syntheti- the drum-beater, or the tical philosopher, p. 38; his conch-blower, p. 217; origi- synthesis of cosmological doc- nal meaning of, in the Upa- trines, p. 23; his doctrine nishads and Plato, p. 246; of the Universal Atman as the ultimate category of ex- Vaisvānara, p. 47. istence, p. 247; as the eter- Asvattha, in the Kathopani- nal Subject of knowledge,p. shad, p. 103; the descrip- 272; as the highest object tion of, in the Upanishads, of desire, p. 302; conception p. 198; the description of, of, the quintessence of the in the Bhagavadgitā, p.199; teachings of the Upanishads, as real in the Upanishads, p. 325; as self-consciousness, and unreal in the Bhagavad- p. 335; as the fourth dimen- gītā, p. I99. sion of metaphysics, p. 336; Asvins and Dadhyach, the sto- as separable from the body, ry of, p. 51. as a blade from its sheath, p. Atharvaveda, transition from 34I, or as wheat from chaff, Rigveda to, pp. 4-5; a store- p. 342; as immanent in the house of the black art of the bodyas a razor in a razor-case, ancients, p. 5: conception of Rudra-Siva, p. 193. p. 342, or as oil in sesamum, p. 342; recopciliation of Atman, the ballast of Nature, opposites in, p. 346. p. 4: proofs of, subjective Ātmanism, practical, of Ya- and objective, p. 24; as the jnavalkya, p. 19. inspirer of sense-functions, Attention, involving suspen- p. 24; realisation of, in the sion of breath, pp. 114-115. various worlds, pp. 28-29: Audile experience, p. 343- as Turya or the fourth, p. Augustine, on knowledge as 36; as the source of all po- ignorance, p. 272. wer, knowledge, and bliss, Austerlitz campaigns, p. 233. p. 53; as the origin of things, Autonomy, as the true princi- pp. 100-IOI; as a powerless ple of morality, p. 291; in being, p. I01; as the self- the Upanishads and the Bha- conscious aspect of the In- dividual Self, p. 140; as the gavadgītā, p. 292. Avabhritha, the bath at the substratum of creation, p. the end of sacrifice, p. 202.

GENERAL INDEX 367

Avyakta, pp. 183,198. tion from the 'Treatise' re- garding the primacy of Mind, B pp. II9-I20. Bhagavadgita: its attempt to Babylonian mythology. p. 84. synthesise the truths of Upa- Bacon, quotation from, on the nishadic philosophy, p. I; chain of Nature, p. 2; and its theistic reconciliation of the active life, p. 299. Samkhya and Yoga, p. 18: Badarāyana : his frequent bor- its borrowings from the Ka- rowal from the Upanishads, tha, Mundaka and Sve- p. 205. tāsvatara Upanishads, pp. Baka Dālbhya, or Glāva Mai- 27-28; castes created accord- treya, the story of, pp. 21-22. ing to qualities and works, Balāki and King Ajāsatru, dia- p.59: conception of God as the logue between, p. 251. A of the Indian alphabet, p. Bana, the name of the body 105; its theory that tempe- in Praśna, p. g0. raments are due to the kind Beatific calculus, pp. 26, 301; of food eaten, p. 114; descrip- beatific consciousness and tion of the Two Paths, p.I59: Brahman, p. 144- on holding the body erect, Beatificism, the theory of, p. p. 187: compared to nectar. 300. p. 195; and the Upanishads, Beatitude, various conceptions relation of, p. 195; its theis- of, p. 213- tic-mystic philosophy, p.198; Beg not, the rule of life for the and the Upanishads, anta- ascetic, p. 296. gonism between, p. 198; re- Being, and Not-Being, concep- ligion of, not derived from tions of, in the Rigveda, the teaching of Ghora An- p. 3: Aruni's idea of, girasa, p. 203; and Chhn- compared with that of dogya, a similarity, p. 204; on Green, p. 55; Being con- the Mutable and Immutable ceived cosmologically, psy- Persons, p. 207; doctrine of chologically, biologically, Māyā in, p. 228; and the doc- morally, and metaphysical- trine of autonomy, p. 292; ly, p. 55: Being, as the begin- and Kant, p. 292; reconci- ning of all things, pp. 85-87; liation of action with action- Being in Parmenides, p. 104. lessness, p. 298; and the Iso- Belief, the necessity of, p. 257. panishad, on the achieve- Berecynthia of the systems of ment of actionlessness, p. philosophy, p. 178. 298; and Chhāndogya, enu- Berkeley, Appearance in the meration of virtues, p. 308; doctrine : of, p. 232; quota- on the conditions of impart-

368 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

ing spiritual wisdom, p. 334; Blind-folded man, parable of its conflicting views about the, p. 331 ; interpretation of Buddhi as the faculty of the parable, p. 332. God-realisation, p. 340. Blindfoldness, of human be- Bhandarkar, R. G., Dr., on the ings, p. 225. meaning of Asurya, p. 157. Bliss, as the source of Reality, Bharadvāja, on the virtue of p. 144; the doctrine of the Truth, p. 312. commensurability of, in the Bhārgavī Vāruņī Vidyā, p. Upanishads, p. 300; ana- 145. lysis of the conception of, p. Bhärgava Vaidarbhi: his in- 300; scale for the measure- terest in physiological psy- ment of, p. 300; of Self-rea- chology, p. 48. lisation, p. 301; as consist- Bhakti, to Guru as to God, p. ing in the realisation of de- 30; to God as to Guru, p. 198; sirelessness, p. 301. in Upanishadic literature, p. Blood-vessels of variegated co- 333. lours, p. 189. Bhavas, or ' Conditions ' in Sam- Body, compared to a potter's khya philosophy, pp. 34-35- wheel, p. 32, to a harp, p. 90. Bhikkus, order of, p. 181. Body and soul, relation of, pp. Bhīma, as taller by a prādesa I33-134. than Arjuna, p. 136. Böhtlingk, on the riddle-hymn Bhrigu, and Varuna, p. 44; a of the Rigveda, p. 149; on great metaphysical psycho- the idea of Transmigration logist, p. 50; his question to in the Rigveda, p. 151. his father Varuna about Ul- Borrowal, theory of, p. 102. timate Reality, p. 144. Bradley, "Appearance" in the Bhujyu, interest in psychical doctrine of, p. 232; defec- research, p. 49: a psychical tive view of Self-realisation researcher, p. 56; and the in, p. 302; idea of Supermo- daughter of Patanchala, the ralism in, p. 306 ;. story of, p. 128; an occultist, Brahman, as created from Sat- P. 128. ya, p. 77; meditation on, as Bhūman, Sanatkumara's doc- resplendence, as sound, as trine of, p. 53. support, as greatness, as Bhūtātman, or the phenome- mind, as parimara, as Not- nal self, p. 3I. Being, pp. 128-129; as the Bible, a revelation like the Self-conscious aspect of the Upanishads and the Koran, Cosmic Self, p. 140; and the p. 8. God of Fire, p. 254; and the Births and deaths, round of, God of Wind, p. 254; and P. 163. Indra, p. 254; as the source

GENERAL INDEX 369

of all physical and mental on the field, the fighter, and power, p. 255; as the sub- the strife, p. 352. tle essence underlying all exi- Canine Chant, an invective stence, p. 256; as Atman, p. against the Brahmanical be- 277. lief in externalism, pp. 22, 37- Brahma-sutras, and the Upa- Cardinal Virtues, Prajāpati's nishads, p. 205; and the Bha- doctrine of, p. 307. gavadgītā, p. 205; different Carlyle : description of the tree interpretations of, p. 205; Igdrasil, p. 200; on appeara- reference to Nabhava Upa- nce p. 232. labdheḥ II.2.28, p. 23I. Caste, origin of, p. 59: system, Brahmins, their relations with carthly, modelled on the pat- Kshatriyas, pp. 61-63; visit of tern of the heavenly, p. 59. Greek philosophers to, p. 102. Categorical Imperative of Kant, Brain, as the seat of conscious- p. 292. ness, p. I3I. Caterpillar, analogy of the, p. Bride and Bride-groom, the 58; the image of the, p. 155. analogy of, p. 349. Catharsis, or the purging of Brihadāra ņyakopanishad, a the inner man, p. 328. summary of, pp. 18-21. Causa sui, representation of Brihadratha, the disciple of God as, p. 41. Sakāyanya, p. 31; and Sa- Causation, as due to Atman, p. kāyanya, pp. 63,198; the 218. pessimism of, p. 294- Centre of interest, soul as am Brihaspati, the author of a anæmic, p. 130. heretical philosophy, p. 31. Cephalic movements, as con- Buddhi, its relation to Mind stituting the feeling of Self, and Ätman, p. 183; and the p. 137. vision of God, conflicting Cerebro-spinal system, recog- views about, p. 340. nition of, in Tantric litera- Buddhism, roots of, in the ture, p. I32. Upanishads, pp. 179-182. Chākrayana, Ushasti : doctrine Budila : his doctrine of water as of Prāna, p. 87. the substratum, p. 47; re-in- Chance, not the origin of things, carnated in an elephant, p. 64- p. 100. Byron, Matthew Arnold on the Chāndala, charity to a, as sa- poetry of, p. 251. crifice to the universal Soul,

C. Change, love of the idea of, p. 80. p. 8.

Chariot, and the horses, the image Caird, Dr., on looking outward, of the, p. 338; of the body, inward, and upward, p. 247; description of, p. 28. 47

370 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

Charity, conditions of, pp. 310- Common Origin, theory of,pp. 3II; to be practised by I02-103 faith, p. 310 ; with magna- Communion of Higher and Lo- nimity, p. 311 ; with modesty wer Selves, p. 334. and sympathy, p. 3II. Comparative mythology, pp. Charvakas, the doctrine of, pp. I02-103; philosophy, pp. 102- 180,266. 103. Chest, the prototype of the Comte : denial of the process world, p. 84. of introspection, p. 274- Chhändogyopanishad, a sum- Conch-shell, grasping of the mary of, pp. 21-24; quoted sound of the, p. 217. most often in Vedanta-su- Conflagration, idea of periodic, tras, p. 21. p. 80. Chitragärgyāyani, teacher of Conscience, the candle of the Āruni, p. 62. Lord within us, p. 291. Christ, Jesus : advice to dis- Conscious Self, as feeding the ciples not to take thought other senses, p. 134- of what they should speak, Consciousness, a fleeting phe- p. 9; as a heteros, p. 315. nomenon, pp. 58-59; seat of, Christianity : on the Ideal of transferred from the heart the Sage, p. 315; on the to the brain, p. I3I; analy- triadic norm of conduct, p. sis of the states of, p. 264:

Christology and Logos, pp. 95. 315. identical with Existence, p. 269 ; the unity of, p. 288.

Chronos, or Time, p. 84- 333- Construction through critici- sm, method of, p. 100. Churning out of the Fire of Contemplative Life, Aristotle God, p. 336. Citadel of Nine Doors, p. 329. on, p. 299; and Active Life, reconciled in Isa, p. 299. Character, beautiful and ugly, Corn of Wheat, reference to, p. 162. in the Katha and in St. Charaka, anticipation of the John, p. 154. teaching of, p. 189. Corybantes, the secret dance Childhood of man, p. 289; of of p. 4I. the race, p. 289. Cosmic Force, creation from, Collecting the Godhead, p. 316. p. 76. Colours, theory of the three, Cosmic Person, considered as p. 86; three primary, p. 183. a sacrificial horse, p. 19: Combination of Elements, as Self, four states of, in later the origin of things, p. 100. Vedānta, p. 140; Person, de- Commensurability of bliss, Up- scription of, in the Munda- anishadic doctrine of, p. 300. ka, the prototype of the

GENERAL INDEX 371

Visvarūpa in the Gītā, p. 307; as meaning compassion 197. P. 308. Cosmogenesis, naturalistic ac- Dadhyach Atharvana, p. 19; the count of, p. 92. philosophy of, pp. 51-52; and Cosmogony, Vedic, p. 3; Upa- Asvins, p. 51 ; his doctrine nishadic, p. 73 ff. of the Self as all-pervading, Cosmological approach, found deficient, p. 249; categories, pp. 51-52. Daivaparimara, in the Kaushī- regress from, p. 250; argu- taki Upanishad, p. 5. ment for the existence of Dante's conception of the Pur- God, p. 252; proof of God in gatory, p. 162. Greek philosophy, p. 252; Darwin : discovery of natural proof, Kant's criticism of, selection, p. 105. p. 253; proof, linked with the Death, as the arche of all physico-theological, p. 257. things, p. 19; the Dark Cut- Cowell: interpretation of a ter, p. 64; or Hunger as the passage in Maitri, p. 138 . origin of all things, p. 82; Creation, as evolution, p. 30; to the god of Death, p. I00; theories of, p. 75; as illu- the Great Cutter, p. 120: sion or appearance, p. 76; the problem of, pp. 120-122; personalistic theories of, and birth, manner of, p. pp. 92-93; as opposed to 154; realistic description of, emanation, p. 98; realistic p. 155- theory of, an obstacle to ab- Defined and Undefined, p. 212. solutism, p. 208; the abso- Degrees of Reality, doctrine of, lutist view of, p. 222. pp. 231-232. Creator, required to practise Deistic view of the Godhead, penance, p. 93. p. 185. Critico-historical spirit, engen- Deism in the Yoga-sūtras, p. 189. dered by Western thought, Delphic oracle, story of the, p. 179. P. 204. Culture, relation of Greek to Damocles, the sword of, p. 291. Indian, p. I02. Departing Consciousness, p. 54- Curzon, Lord, on the non-re- Descartes, on the pineal gland cognition of the supremacy as the seat of the Soul, p. of Truth in Indian literature, 130; conception of Reality P. 3II. according to, p. 248. Design, argument from, p. 257. D. Desirelessness, as constituting the highest Bliss, p. 301; as Da, as meaning self-control, p. the result of Self-realisation, 307; as meaning charity, p. P. 347.

372 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

Desires,fulfilment of, as due to the Didactic tone of the Taittiriya, realisation of Atman, p. 349. p. 309. Destruction, process of, p. 98. Die to live, the rule of, p. 163. Determinism, theological, in Dichotomy of Self by Self, p. the Upanishads, p. 314- 274- Deussen: his chronological ar- Difference and Non-difference, rangements of the Upani- P. 216. shads, pp. 12-13; interpre- Diksha of a Sacrificer, p. 201. tation of "puritat", p. 123; Ding-an-sich, Schopenhauer's on the nipple-like appear- stress on Will as the, p. I16. ance as signifying the uvula Diogenes, the biographer of p. 132; on the experience of Greek Philosophers, p. 102. the mystic, p. 133; mean- Diogenes, with his tub, com- ing of Abhivimāna, p. 136; pared to Raikva with his meaning of Anvārabh, p. 155- car, P. 79. Devayāna, history of, the con- ception of, p. 159; and Pitri- Discipleship, qualifications for, P. 332. yāņa, dogmatic justification Disembodied existence of Soul, of, p. 161; conception of, in denial of, p. 156. the Bhagavadgita and the Distinction of Degree between Upanishads, p. 196. See physical good and spiritual also Path of the Gods. Dharma, in the Rigveda, as good, p. 301; of Kind bet- ween physical good and spi- suggestive of the earliest ritual good, p. 301. trace of a theory of Karma, p. Divine Life, Purity of, p. 352. 148; as determining future Divine plane, p. 142. existence, p. 152. Door of Division, p. 97/ Dhāraņā, as preparatory to Doshas, the Three, p. 189. Samādhi, p. 188. Doubt, the resolution of, as ef- Dhatuprasāda, or Dhātuhpra- fected by God-realisation,p. sada, which ?, p. 341. Dhätus, the eight, p. 34: the 347. Doxa and Episteme, same as seven, p. 189. Aparā and Parā Vidyā, P. Dhuma-märga, or the dark 326. way, p. 159. Dream, the problem of, pp. Dhyāna, as preparatory to Sa- I26-127; and sleep, interme- mādhi, p. 188. diate states between con- Dialectic method, p. 37; Pla- sciousness and unconscious- tonic, Hegelian, Upanishadic, ness, p. 126; a state of crea- p. 38; in Nyāya, p. 190. tive activity, p. 127; as in- Dialogues of Plato, determina- tion of the chronology of,p. 15. volving novel construction, p. 127; and Dreamer, p. 232;

GENERAL INDEX 378

-consciousness how far to be Empedocles, on Fire, Air, identified with Self, p. 266. Water, Earth, p. 80; cosmo- Drum, grasping of the sound logy of, compared to Upa- of a, p. 217. nishadic, p. 96. Duhkham, Duhkham, the cry Empirical psychology, p. 113. of Buddhism, p. 180. Empirical reality, and trans- Duty, the Categorical Impera- cendental ideality, p. 232. tive of, p. 292. Encyclopædia of Religion and Dvaita school of Philosophy, Ethics, reference to Krishna, pp. 179, 206. p. 203. Dvaitadvaita interpretation of Endosmosis, process of, p.143. the Brahmasūtras p. 205. Enigmatic method, p. 34- Entelechy, p. I4I. E. Ephesian philosopher, p. 8o. Epimenides : conception of Night Ecstasy, Yogic and Neo-Pla- or Void as primary, p. 82. tonic, p. 102; raptures of, Epistemological Idealist, p. 231; p. 350. Nihilist, p. 231. Efficient cause, problem of the, Epistemology, of the Vijna- p. I33. navādins, p. 181; of Absolute Egg, Primeval, as generating Experience, p. 352. the world-system, p. 37- Eristic, in Gorgias, p. 83. Egoistic interpretation of Ya- Erotic Mysticism, criticism of, jñavalkya's dictum, p. 304. p. 348. Egyptian Mythology, p. 84. Eschatological knowledge, as Egypt, and the idea of metam- most valuable to Upanisha- psychosis, p. 146; and India, dic philosophers, p. 64; the problem of transmigration, highest kind of knowledge,

Elements, as emanating from Eschatology, Upanishadic, pp. p. I52. p. I20.

the Atman, p. 98; not the 158-161; moral backbone of, origin of things, p. 100; as p. 161; Upanishadic and the garment of God, p. Platonic, p. 162. IOI. Esoteric doctrine, in the Ke- Emanation, p. 75; theory of, na, p. 25. pp. 97-98; as opposed to Eternity, from Eternity to, p. creation, pp. 98-99. 77: life of, pp. 158, 159. Embryology, in the Garbho- Etheric double, p. 143; theo- panishad, p. 189. sophical conception of, p. 269. Emotionalism, in the Munda- Ethno-psychological origin of ka, p. 41; in the Upanishads, the idea of Transmigration, p, 198. pp. 146,152.

874 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

Etymological Method, p. 36. struction of, as an effect of Eudæmonism of Yajnavalk- God-realisation, p. 349. ya, p.299; relation of, to idea- Fætus in the womb, the analogue lism, p. 300. for the spiritual fire, p. 337. Eudaemonist, Yājnavalkya as Female kind, inordinate cu- an, p. 20. riosity of the, p. 40. Evil, power of, p. 226. Fire, as the origin of all things, Evil Soul, destiny of, p. 157. pp. 79-80; as exchanged for Evolute, transformed, p. 86. all things, in Heracleitus, p. Evolution of Religion: on look- 79; as the first evolute from ing outward, and inward, the primeval Being, in the and upward, p. 247. Upanishads, p. 80; as the Ex nihilo, Creation, repugnant origin of things, in Heraclei- to the Upanishadic as well as to the Greek mind, p.76. tus, p. 80. Fires, Five, doctrine of, p. 21; Experience, photic and audi- Jaivali's doctrine of, p. 47: tive, p. 345: first-hand, in- Sacrificial, rising in bodily tuitive, p. 325. form, p. 249. External world, knowledge of Fitche, I. H .: his view of the the, p. 217. soul as a space-filling prin- ciple, p. 130. F. Fons et origo, soul as, p. 219. Food and the Food-eater, Faculty of God-realisation, p. epistemological a n d me- 339- taphysical significance of, p. Faith, God and Self as objects 352. of, p. 271: the necessary con- Force, revealed, p. 233. dition for discipleship, p.333- Formless Person, the beginning Falstaff, reborn, p. 23. of Existence, p. 99. Fatalism, p. 100. Fourth dimension, of meta- Fates, watering the Tree Ig- physics, p. 336; of psycholo- drasil, p. 200. Father, to be worshipped as Freedom of Will, in the Upa- gy, p. 336.

God, p. 310. nishads, pp. 313-315: possi- Fathers, the path of the, p. ble, only after Self-realisa- 196. tion, p. 314. Fatigue theory of Sleep, pp. 53; Frequency of return of Soul, 122; theory of sleep of Yaj- p. I51. favalkya, p. 58. Fundamental divisionis of Fear, analysis of, pp. 115-116; Vedantic Schools, p. 206. only a feeling of otherness Funeral occasion, description lodged in us, p. 115: the de- of a, in the Rigveda, p. 147.

GENERAL INDEX 375

G. mentioned in the Mahabha- rata, p. 203; enumeration of Gandharvas, the world of the, virtues, p. 308. 29; the country of the, p. Gnomic stage of ethics, p. 288. 33I. God, and the Absolute, p. 33; Garbhopanishad: on embryo- the Lord of Pradhana, p. logy, p. 189. 185; as magician, p. 185; as Gärgī, the questioner of Yāj- the Spectator of actions, p. ñavalkya, p. 19; her dispu- 186; and the Absolute, the tation with Yajnavalkya,p. relation of, p. 206; the theo- 40; interested in the problem logical conception of, p.206; of immanence, p. 56; the as all-eye and all-ear ac- Upanishadic suffragette, p. 61. cording to Xenophanes, p. Gärgya, the proud Brahmin, 208; and the Absolute in p. 19; doctrine of the reality Rāmānuja, p. 210; the Soul of physical and physiologic- of Nature, p. 210; the Soul al categories, p. 48; and of Souls, p. 210; the Soul Ajātašatru, p. 62; obtains of Souls, p. 212-213; and the instruction about sleep from Absolute, comparison of the AjātaŠatru, p. 125. conceptions of, p. 219; as Gaudapāda, and Sankara, p. Alpha and Omega, p. 248; 228; doctrine of, p. 228; de- cosmological argument for the velopment of the doctrine existence of, p. 252 ; as supre- of Mayā in, p. 229 ; doctrine me resplendence, p. 255; iden- of Non-creation of, p. 230; on tified with the inner Self, the state of Samadhi, p. 230; p. 259; one, without a se- on the reality of the world cond, p. 259; no gods, but and the moral law, p. 230; God, p. 259; theistic concep- on Philosophy being superi- tion of, pp. 259-260; nature or to the conflict of schools, and attributes of, p. 260; p. 276. -Ātman as the Ultimate Ca- Geldner, on the riddle-hymn tegory of existence, p. 261; of the Rigveda, p. 149; on identical with the Self with- the idea of Transmigration in, p. 261; the only cause of in the Rigveda, p. 151. the world, p. 261; immanence Genealogical Tradition of the and transcendence of, pp. Upanishads, p. 21. 261-262; ontological argu- Genesis : description of the spirit ment for the existence of, p. of God moving upon the 269; and the Absolute, in the surface of the waters, p. 77- Māndūkya Upanishad, p. 336. Ghora Angirasa, instruction to Godhead, unity of, as a later Krishņa, pp, 22, 202; not development of thought, p.

376 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

149; theistic view of, p. 185; Greek and Indian Philosophy deistic view of, p. 185. Godlings of nature, and Brah- analogies of, how explained, p. IOI. man, the parable of, p. 253. Greek Mythology, p. 84; Phi God-realisation, the faculty of, losophy and Logos, p. 95. p. 339; the nature of, as that Green 's idea of the nature of of a fact, p. 339; inefficiency Spirit, compared to Aruni's, of sense and intellect for, p. 55- p. 340; Intuition as the fa- Grierson, on the identity of culty of, p. 340; indescribable the Krishna of the Maha- nature of the faculty of, p. 341. bharata and the Chhandog- Gods, the path of the, p. 196; ya, p. 203. number of the, 258. Gunas, the three, the common God to Soul, transference of property of Samkhya and interest from, p. 3- Vedānta, p. 30; the origin Goethe, quotation from, p.IOI. of, p. 182. Golden-coloured Being, descri- Guru, Bhakti to, as to God, p. ption of, p. 345- 198; necessity of initiation Goldsmith and gold, compar- by, p. 329; precautions to be ed to Soul and body, p. 58; observed by, in imparting the image of, p. 155- spiritual wisdom, p. 332. Good, in Plato, the Sun of the world of Ideas, p. 104; and H. pleasant, conflict between, p. 293: physical, as an aspect Hades, belief of the Upanisha- of Bliss, p. 300; spiritual, as dic philosophers in a region the acme of Bliss, p. 300. like the, p. 157; in the Upa- Gorgias, his conception of a nishads and Plato, p. 162. real Not-Being, p. 82; on Hamlet, with Hamlet out, p.65. Not-Being, p. 104. Hammond, on Aristotle's loca- Gospel conception of God, as tion of the Soul, p. I31. the Alpha and Omega of Happiness, as the motive for things, p. 105. actions, p. 304; true, as vi- Grace, Upanishadic doctrine of, sion of the Infinite, p. 304; p. 345- Great and Small, p. 305. Grasping or apprehension, the Harischandra, in the Aitareya process of, p. 217. Brähmana, p. 203; in the Great Happiness, consisting in Purānas, p. 203. the vision of the Infinite,p. 305. Hathayoga, adumbration of,p. Greece and India : problem of Heart, as the seat of conscious- 33- the origin of the idea of Transmigration, p. 152. ness, p. I3I.

GENERAL INDEX 377

Heaven, described in the Veda as Historico-critical spirit, lack of, overflowing with honey p. 147. p. 178. Hebrew literature, on man and Hitah, or arteries, spreading wo-man, p. 103. from the heart to the Pu- Hedonism, spiritual, of Sanat- ritat, p. I24. kumāra, p. 52; anti-, of Homer, p. 64; and the idea of Nachiketas, pp. 293-294- Transmigration, p. 146. Hegel, appearance in the doc- Horatory precepts, in the Taitti- trine of, p. 232; the dialec- rīya, p. 309. tic of, p. 38. Hospitality, as due to guests, Heimskringla, the ancient P: 310. chronicles of Scandinavia, p. Human life, compared to a 24. sacrificer's life, p. 201; the Hela, kingdom of, p. 200. six stages of, p. 202. Heliolatory, p. 22. Hunger, equated with death, Heliotheism, p. 32. p. 82; and Thirst, compared Henotheistic Polytheism, tran- to Love and Hate, p. 96. sition from, to Monotheis- Hyle, the conception of, in tic Mysticism, p. 3. the Rigveda, p. 3. Henotheistic worship of Pra- Hylozoism, in the Rigveda,pp. na, p. 91. I47-148. Heracleitus : the Way Up and Hypostasis, as Not-Being or the Way Down, pp. 80,98, Being, p. 54. 104; on the exchange of fire for all things, pp. 79,103: I. on Logos, p. 104; paradoxi- cal language of, pp. 150, 152; I am I, of Kant, pp. 136, 269. contradictions of, p. 305. Idandra, a mysterious name Hercules, the choice of, bet- of the Godhead, p. 97. ween Pleasure and Virtue, Idealism, monistic, of Aruņi p. 293; compared to Nachi- and Yajñavalkya, p. 53: of ketas, p. 293. the Aitareya, similar to that Hesiod, p. 64; reference to the of Berkeley, p. rI9; and Eu- Theogony, p. 74: on the daemonism, p. 300. Earth as the basis of the cos- Idealistic Metaphysics, p. II9; mos, p. T03. Theory of Knowledge, p.182. Heteronomy, p. 289. Ideas, development of the Doc- Heteros, Nature as a, p. 215. trine of, as supplying a new Hiranyagarbha, the dream as- principle for the chronologi- pect of the Cosmic Self. p. cal arrangement of the Dia- 140; the Logos of Indian loguies of Plato, p. 15; Pla- Philosophy, p. 187. to's theory of, p. 60, 105; 48

378 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

world of p. 104; the Sun of p. 165; different doctrines of, the world of, p. 262. p. 209; Rāmānuja's doctrine Identifications, philosophy of, of, p. 213; the Navel of, p. p. 203. Identitat Philosophy of Aru- 353 Incommensurability, of phy- ni, p. 23. sical good and spiritual Idols, breaking of, literal and good, doctrine of, p. 301. metaphorical, p. 24. Individual, as mirroring reali- Igdrasil, in Scandinavian my- ty, p. 14I; as the World in thology, p. 103; description miniature, p. 141; Soul, of, p. 200; Carlyle's descrip- bound in chains, p. 186. tion of, p. 200. Indra and Virochana, the fa- Ignoratio elenchi, p. 231. mous myth of, pp. 23, 39, Illicit transformation, ( Rajju- 265; and the Damsel, the sarpa and šuktikārajata), p. myth of, pp. 25, 36, 255; his 230. exploits as found in the Rig- Illusion, in the doctrine of Āruņi, p. 54; creation as, p. veda, p. 27; how far histori-

98; Māyā as, p. 226. cal, p. 44; and Dadhyach,p. 51; a contraction of Idan- Image in the eye, as Ultimate Reality, p. 250. dra, p.97; as Idandra, break- ing through the skull, p. 132; Immanence, dynamic and sta- on dream-consciousness, p. tic, doctrine of, pp. 56, 61; 266; on deep-sleep-conscious- famous doctrine of, pp. 2II- ness, p. 267; shrewd insight 212; of God even in contra- of, p. 268. dictories, p. 212 ;- transcen- Indradyumna: on Air as the dence of God, p. 261. substratum, p. 47. Impersonal Immortality, Sankara, p. 165. in Infinite, as bliss, p. 43; con- jugation of the verb to do, Impersonalistic Theories of p. 200; vision of, as consti- Upanishadic cosmogony, p. tuting true happiness, p.304. 75. Infinities, piling of Infinities Impotence, the power of, p. 225. over, p. 278. Immortality, the Katha sur- Infinity, deduction of Infinity charged with ideas about, p. from, p. 278. 28; personal and impersonal, Initiation, Necessity of, p. 329. p. 165; as consisting in being Intellect, its claim for prima- lifted to the region of the deity, p. 165; as absorbtion cy, pp. 117-118; higher than Will, p. 117; meditation of, in God, p. 165; as companion- ship of the highest God, p. as Brahman, p. 118; the back-bone, not only of psy- 165; as assimilation to God, chical functions, but of rea-

GENERAL INDEX 379

lity itself, p. 119; centre of, tic, p. 292; higher, of auto- as referred to the brain, p.132; nomy, p. 292; in Hindu Ethi- will, and emotion, relation cs, p. 292. of, p. 288; and intuition, re- Inversion, implied in the ana- lation of, p. 271; inability logue of the bride-groom and of, to apprehend Reality, p. the bride, p. 348. 326; inefficacy of, to rea- Ion, Plato's : explanation of lise God, p. 340. real poetry as an effect of Intellectual experience, differ- God-intoxication on, p. 9. ent levels of, p. I18. Īsa, the deep-sleep aspect of Intellectualistic psychology, p. the Cosmic Self, p. 140.

Intellectualism, its quarrel with II9. Isles of the Blessed, in Plato, p. 158; in the Upanishads, Voluntaralism, p. 116; in the and Plato, p. 162. Upanishads, p. 198. Īsopanishad, a summary of, Intermediary Person, creation p. 24. of the world by Atman, ĪSvara, conception of, in Yoga through the, pp. 94-95; the Philosophy, p. 189. Logos of Indian Philosophy, p. 187. J. Inter-quotation, the only de- finite test for the chronology Jabāla, the mother of Satya- of the Upanishads, p. 16. kāma, p. 3II. Introspection, the psychologi- Jain doctrine of Soul, p. 134- cal process corresponding Jaivali, Pravāhaņa, doctrine of to self-consciousness, p.244; Five Fires, p. 21; eschato- the start of the philosophi- logical teaching of, p. 22; cal process, p. 248; reality his doctrine of the Universe of the process of, denied by as exhibiting at every stage Kant and Comte, p. 274. the principle of sacrifice, pp. Introversion, the first qualifi- 46-47; on space as the origin cation for self-realisation,p. of all things, p. 80; on space 328. as the final habitat, p. 81. Intuition and Intellect, rela- Jamblichus, the Neo-Platonist, tion of, p.271; as compared p. 102. with sense and thought, p. James, William, Prof. : on the 339 ; as the faculty of God- seat of the Soul, p. 130; on realisation, p. 340. the feeling of Self, as con- Intuitional body, p. 142. sisting in certain cephalic Intuitionism, higher and lower, movements, p. 137. p. 292; autonomic, p. 292; Janaka, the patron of Yajna aesthetic, p. 292; sympathe- valkya, p. 19; question about

380 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

the light of man, p. 40; and lity, p. 271; on the synthe- Budila, p. 64; and Yājña- tic unity of apperception, valkya, dialogue between, p. P. 274: on the denial of the 263. process of introspection, p. JanaSruti and the Swans, p.78; 274; and the categorical and Raikva, p. 78. imperative, p. 292. Jaratkārava, aporia about Kar- Kapila, meaning of the word, man, p. 20; an eschatologist, p. p. 29; controversy about the 56; and Yajñavalkya, p. 181. meaning of the word, pp. Jatavedas, the god of Fire, p. 183, 186; same as Hiranya- 254. garbha, and Brahman(m), p. Jivanmukti, the doctrine of, p. 187. 223; conception of, in Ad- Karman, the topic of discus- vaitism, p. 214. sion between Jaratkārava Jnanatman, p. 183. and Yājñavalkya, p. 20; Joy, illimitable, as the effect Śandilya's doctrine of, p. 50; of Self-realisation, p. 348. Yājñavalkya's doctrine of, p. Jupiter 's chair, Nature 's 58: earliest trace of the theo- chain linked to, p. 2. ry of, in the Rigveda, p. 148; doctrine of, in the Briha- K. dāranyaka, p. 155; as in- fluencing the birth of soul, Kabandhin Katyāyana : his cos- p. 156; explicit mention of mological question, p. 48. the doctrine of, in Kaushitaki, Kahola, seeker after Realisa- p. 162; in the Upanishads tion, p. 56. and Buddhism, p. 181; mo- Kālakan̄jas, p. 27. ral force of the doctrine of, Kala, hymns to, in the Athar- P. 18z. vaveda, p. 5- Karmayoga, adumbration of Kalidasa : description of love the doctrine of, in the Isa, similar to that of Shakes- p. 24; roots of the philoso- peare, p. 105 phy of, in the Isa, p. 196; Kant, I am I, p. 136: distinc- the philosophy of, in the tion between Noumena and Bhagavadgītā, p. 196. Phenomena, p. 215; Refuta- Kashmir Saivism, p. 194. tion of Idealism, p. 232; on Katha, two strata of composi- the Cosmological proof of the tion in, pp. 27. 28. existence of God, p. 253; on Katharsis, in alimentation p. pure Self-consciousness, p. I14; moral 328. 269; on God and Self as ob- Kathopanishad, a summary jects of faith, p. 271; on the of, pp. 27-29; and the Re- unknowable nature of Rea- public of Plato, p. 262.

GENERAL INDEX 381

Katyayani, the materialistic works of, in Sankara, p. 193: wife of Yajnavalkya, p. 19; absolutist view of, p. 218; the woman of the world, p. lower and higher, p. 326; 61; the material choice of, p. intellectual, as merely ver-

303. bal jugglery, p. 327; more Kausalya Āsvalāyana: his in- dangerous than ignorance, terest in the metaphysics of p. 329. psychology, p. 48. Knowability of Atman, mean- Kaushītaki Upanishad, a sum- ing of, p. 273. mary of, pp. 26-27; the grand Koran, a revelation like the eschatological allegory _in,p. Upanishads and the Bible, 42; the philosopher of the, p. 8. as inventor of the doctrine Kosas, as having an ideal of the identity of Prana and existence, p. 143. Brahman, p. 45, an ancient Kramamukti, meaning of the Satyāgrahin, p. 45, the au- doctrine of, p. 209; incon- thor of the doctrine of sistent with Advaitism, p. ' Three Meditations , p. 45: 214. on the primacy of Prāna, p. Krishna, the son of Devaki, p. 88. 22; compared to a milk- Keith A. B., Prof., on the idea man, p. 195: transfigured of Transmigration as deter- personality of, p. 197; the mining the age of an Upani- son of Devaki, in the Upa- shad, p. 15; on the absence nishads and the Mahabha- of the idea of Transmigration rata, p. 201; the divine hero in the older portion of the of the Mahabharata, p. 201; Aitareya, p. 15; on Egyp- the disciple of Ghora Angi- tian Transmigration, p. 153- rasa, p. 202; the son of Va- Kenopanishad, a summary of, sudeva, founder of a new re- pp. 24-25. ligion, p. 203; controversy Khapushpa, or the postulation about the personality of, of negation, p. 230. pp. 201-205. Knot, ignorance compared to a, Kshanikam Kshanikam, the p. 225. cry of Buddhism, p. 181. Knowledge and works, a re- Kshatriyahood, its relation to conciliation of, pp. 24,298; Brahminhood, pp. 61-63. synthesis of p. 192; recon- Kumārila, on a bird flying on ciliation of, in Kumārila, p. both the wings together, p.

304. 193: on the reconciliation of Knowledge, the idealistic works and knowledge, p. 193. theory of, p. 182; instrument Kuno Fischer, on the "Attri- of, p. 190; superiority to butes" of Spinoza, p. 227.

382 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

Kusumānjali, identification of World-Person, p. 95; com- Māyā and Prakriti, p. 227. pared to Vāk, p. 104; in Heracleitus, p. 104; in the L. Stoics, p. 104; in Indian Philosophy, p. 187; in Chris- Lateral Ventricle, p. 133- tology, p. 333- Law, first-born of the, p. 150; of Lotze, on the seat of the soul, God, and of Man, p. 291; instruction to respect the, p. pp. 130-I31. Love and Hate, in Empedo- 309; first-born of the, p. 353- Leibnitz: his theory of repre- cles, p. 96. Luminosity, all, as due to God, sentation already present in the Chhandogya, p. 14I; Lute, grasping of the sound p. 256.

quotation concerning his of a, p. 217. theory of microcosm, p.141; on the best of all possible M. worlds, p. 350. Leverrier: discovery of Nep- M, as Miti or Apiti, p. 86. tune, p. 105. Macdonell, Professor, on the Life, as the source of eternal borrowal of the idea of trans- misery, p. 294. migration by the Indian Ar- Life-force, as lying at the root of things, p. 75: creation yans from the aborigines, p. 146; transmigration and the from, p. 76. Light of man, problem of the, moral principle of requital, p. 146; probable derivation p. 40; Janaka and Yājña- of the idea of transmigra- valkya on the, p. 274. Lingasarira, doctrine of, adum- tion by Pythagoras from Indian philosophy, p. 146. brated in Pippalāda, p. 49; Macrocosm, p. 88; of the Uni- in Sāmkhya and Vedānta, verse, p. 96; and Makran- p. 184: relation of the, to throps, p. 14I. Purusha, p. 184; with se- Madhuvidya, or the Doctrine venteen parts, p. 184; the of Honey, p. 51 ; in the Rig- conception of the, p. 183. veda, and the Brihadāran- Live to die, the rule of, p. 163. yaka, p. 51. Localisation, problem of, in Madhva, the dualistic school the Upanishads, p. 132. Logic-chopping, p. 330. of, p. 205; and Rāmānuja, comparison of the views of, Logophobia, of the Upanishads, p. 209; conception of beati- P. 329. tude, p. 213. Logos, in Greek and Chris- Madhvaism, in the Upanishads, tian thought, p. 95; and the P. 207.

GENERAL INDEX 383

Mahabhārata, use of the word Matthew Arnold, on the poe- prādesa, p. 136; no mention tries of Byron and Words- of Ghora Angirasa in, p. worth, 251. 203; on the parentage of Max Muller : explanation of Ba- Krishna, pp. 201, 202. Mahat Atman, in two passa- na as a harp, p. 90; interpre- tation of Puritat, p. 123; on ges of the Katha, p. 183; as the nipple-like appearance as intermediate between Bud- the uvula, p. 132; on the ex- dhi and Avyakta, p. 197. Maine, Sir Henry: on the perience of the mystic, p.

Greek origin of all culture, 133: meaning of Abhivima- na, p. 136; interpretation of P. 73- a passage in Maitri, p. 138; Maitreyi, the spiritual wife of Yājñavalkya, p. 19; the type meaning of Anvārabh, p. 155. Māyā, a Vedāntic metamor- of spiritual woman, p. 61; phosis of the Samkhya Pra- the spiritual choice of, p.303. kriti, pp. 30,185; considered Maitri, the teacher of Saka- phonetically, philologically, yanya, p. 31; two strata in and philosophically, p. 104; the, p. 31: Upanishad, a three theories about the ori- summary of, pp. 31-33: a gin of, pp. 223-224; not a great God-realiser, p. 45; fabrication of Sankara, p. on the highest secret of 223; if springing out of the the Upanishads, p. 346. Sanyavada of the Buddhists, Makranthropos, a better word p. 223; developed by Śanka- than Makrocosm, p. 141; ra from the Upanishads, p. reference to, p. 148. 224; to be found in ideas Malas, the Four, p. 189. rather than in words, p. 224; Manasaspati, Brahman that manifold conceptions of, in resides in the brain, p. 132. the Upanishads, pp. 225-228; Manifest Bodies, p. 143. as "power", compared with Manomaya Purusha, Self that the "attributes" of Spinoza resides in the heart, p. 132. Manu, p. 49: his doctrine of p. 227 : vicissitudes in the historical development of water as the first creation the doctrine of, p. 228; in of God, p. 77; on the five the Bhagavadgitā, as magi- kinds of sin, p. 309. Matarisvan, the god of Wind, cal power, p. 228; in Gau- dapāda, p. 229; elaboration p. 254. of the theory of, by San- Materialists : on the bodily con kara, p. 230; inexplicable na- sciousness as Self, p. 269. ture of, p. 230; Ramānuja's Matter and Form, Aristotle's criticism of the doctrine of, doctrine of, pp. 49.92. p. 231.

384 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

Measurement of Bliss, unit of, Mind, dependent on alimenta- p. 300. tion, p. 113; compared to Medicine, and Yoga, p. Igo. the lute, or the drum, or Medinīkosha: on prādesa, p. 135. the conch, p. 217; instru- Meditation, environment for ment of the activity of At- the practice of, p. 188; by man, p. 217; compared to a means of Om, the way to chariot, p. 338. Realisation, p. 333. Mirror, the Atman as a, p.345- Mediumship, the phenomena of, Mode, Māyā as, p. 227. p. I27. Monadic plane, p. 142. Mendicants, order of, p. 182. Monism, school of, p. 178; Mental states, classification of, Pure, school of, p. 178; as pp. 118-119; plane, p. 142. the synthesis of Dualism, Meshes, Mayā as, p. 227- and Qualified Monism, p.215; Metaphors, realistic and illu- Qualified, school of, p. 178; sionistic, p. 184. Qualitative, p. 210; Trini Metaphysical conflicts, p. 146; tarian, p. 194. clue to reconciliation of ,p.276. Monologic method, p. 38. Metaphysics of Aristotle, quota- Monologues, post-ecstatic,pp. tion from, p. 74: of Absolute 350-352. Experience, p. 352- Monotheism, springing out of Metempsychosis, in Pythago- Polytheism. pp. 258-259- ras, without any explanatory Monotheistic Religion, of background, p. 146. Krishna, p. 203. Methods of Upanishadic Phi- Moon, situated at a greater losophy, pp. 34-40. distance than the Sun, p. 158. Microcosm, of the Intermedia- Morac of Om, A, U, M, p. 335- ry Person, p. 96; and Macro- Mora-less part of Om, p. 335- cosm, pp. 140-14I. Moral ladder to realisation,p. Mimansa doctrine of Air as 52; problem, the connecting the carrier of sound, pp. link between metaphysics I9I-192; and Upanishads, pp. and mysticism, p. 288; stan- I92-193. dard, theories of, as abstract, Mimansakas, their view that p. 288; ideal, theories of, as the Vedas are Apaurusheya, concrete, p. 288; oligarchy. pp. 9-ro; their discussion the voice of, p. 290; good, as with the Naiyyayikas re- the Summum bonum, p.299; garding the Apaurusheyat- good, and wordly good, va of the Vedas, p. 9; doc- p 299; agent, as beyond trine of Sphota, p. 105: ttl- good and bad, p. 306; Self, tra -- , p. 193: moderate-, psychology of the, in the p. 193. Upanishads, P. 314:

GENERAL İNDEX 385

Morality, and Intellect, rela- the function of, in philoso- tion of, p. 287; metaphysics phy, p. 253; allegorical and mysticism, relation of, meaning of, p. 253. p. 287; based upon Atma- Mythical Method, p. 36. nic experience, p. 288; link- Mythology, Comparative, p. 200. ed with mysticism, p. 315. Morphic Experience, p. 343- N. Moscow Retreats, p. 233- Mother, to be worshipped as Nābhāva Upalabdheh, p. 231. God, p. 310. Nachiketas and Death, story Motives, conflict of, not elabo- of, p. 28; pupil of Yama,p.39; rately treated in the Upani- and Yama, dialogue between, shads, p. 315; as treated in pp. 121-122; and St. John, the Muktika, p. 315. p. 154; the pessimistic cry of, Mover of the Body, p. 32. p. 180; and Hercules, p. 293 ; Mrigatrishņikā, postulation of a true anti-hedonist, p. 294- negation, p. 230. Nail-scissors, a pair of, p. 216. Mundaka and Māņdūkya, sum- Naiyyayikas: their view that maries of, pp. 29.33. the Vedas are Paurusheya, Mutuum Commercium, p. 51. p. 9; their theory of the uni- Mystery to Mystery, p. 234- versal, Sankara's criticism of Mystic experience, the faculty p. 104. of, p. 271; as a clue to the Naka Maudgalya, propounder reconciliation ot the different of the study of the Vedas as philosophical schools, p.276; the supreme virtue, p. 45; concealed nature of, p. 326; on the virtue of the study of four types of, pp. 342-345: the Sacred Books, p. 310. the acme of, p. 345; raptures Name and Form, p. 85. of, p. 350. Napoleon, a Spectre, p. 233. Mysticism, the culmination of Nārada, and Sanatkumāra, pp. all Philosophy as of Upani- 23, 88, 198; enumeration of shadic, p. 65; and morality, the sciences he has studied, problem of, p. 278; and pseu- P. 326. do-mysticism, p. 348; erotic, Nārāyana, the Cosmic God, p. limitations of, p. 348. 203. Mystics, and the spiritual pil- Nasadīya Sūkta: doctrine of grimage, p. 278; worship of, Night as the primeval exis- for the obtainment of any tent, p. 82. end, p. 350. Natural Selection, the princi- Myths, of three different kinds: ple of, discovered by Dar- moral, aetiological, and win and Wallace simulta- transcendental, pp. 36-37: neously, p. 105. 49

386 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

Naturalism and Cosmogenesis, question as to whether it is p. 92. the uvula or the pituitary Nature, not the origin of things, body, p. 132. p. 100: brought to maturity Niyama, as the preliminary of by God, p. r00; organic and Yoga, p. 188. inorganic, sovereignty of Nominalism of Aruni, p. 54: God over, p. 208. in the Chhandogya, p. 87. Necessity, doctrine of, p. 84; Non-creation, the doctrine of, not the origin of things, in Gaudapāda, p. 229. p. 100. Nornas, watering the Tree of Negation, and affirmation, p. Existence, p. 200. 219; postulation of, p. 230. Not-Being, as the creator of Negative Theology, of Yajna- Being, p. 37; creation from, valkya, pp. 50, 56. p. 76; the primary existent, Nemesis, of the idea of the spa- pp. 81-83; absolute and rela- tial extension of the Soul, tive, p. 83; in Gorgias, p.103; p. 139. in Buddhism, p. 180. Neo-Platonism, and Yogic ecs- Noumena and Phenomena, in tasy, p. 102. Kant, p. 215. Neo-Upanishadic period, su- Numbers, Pythagorean theory perior moral interest in, p. of, p. 104. 28g. Nyagrodha tree, parable of the, Neptune, discovered by Adam P. 256. and Leverrier at the same Nyaya Philosophy, Purītat time, p. 105. theory of sleep in, pp. 124, Neti Neti, as having a nega- I91; on dialectic and its tive as well as a positive aberrations, p. Igo. content, p. 220: negative Nyāya-Vaišeshika, and the Upa- connotation of, p. 220; posi- nishads, p. Ig0; and the in- tive connotation of, p. 221. strument of knowledge, p. Numismatics, p. 102. Igo. New Psychology, p. 128. 0. Nietzsche : idea of Supermora- Occasionalism, Upanishadic, p. lism in, p. 306. II. Night, the 'arche' in Epimeni- Occultism, p. 133- des, p. 82; as the primary Occultist Philosophy, and existent in Greek thought, Theosophy, p. 143- p. 82. Oldenberg: mystical interpre- Nihilism, Buddhistic, p. 223. tation of a Vedic passage, Nimitta-pañchami, p. 209. p. I51. Nipple-like gland, the seat of Om, the genesis and function the Immortal Being, p. 26; of, p. 21; the symbol parti

GENERAL INDEX 387

tioned in three different mo- Pañchikarana : its relation to rae, p. 33 ; meditation on, at Trivritkaraņa, p. 86. the time of death, p. 205; Pandora's box, p. 142. and the Logos, p. 333; as the Parables and myths, allegori- symbol of meditation, p.333; cal meaning of, p. 253- the manifold importance of Parable of the Cave, and the meditation by, p. 334; a= Parable of the Blind-folded both the means and end of man, p. 33T. spiritual life, p. 334; the Parallelism, independent, bet- cosmic efficacy of, p. 334. ween Upanishadic and the moral efficacy of medita- Greek Philosophies, pp. 101- tion by, p. 335; the Mandu- Paramārthika view of Real- 103. kyan analysis of, p. 335: the moral-less part of, p.335; ity, pp. 215,231. as representing states of Parā Vidyā, same as Epis- consciousness as well as as- teme, p. 326. pects of soul, p. 335; inter- Parikshit, the sons of, p. 128. pretation of the constituent Parimara, meditation on Brah- syllables of, p. 335- man as, p. I29. Ontological argument, for the Parmenides, on Being, pp. 8z, existence of God, p. 269. 104; attack on the Ideal Opinion and Truth, the same theory, p. 104: appearance as Aparā Vidyā and Parā in the doctrine of, p. 232. Vidyā, p. 326. Pasu, Pati, and Pasa, philo- Opinion of wise men, as sup- sophy of, p. 194. plying rules for moral Patafichala, the daughter of, conduct, p. 290. possessed by a Gandharva, Order, argument from, p. 257. p. I28. Origin of the world, various Path of the Gods, and the opinions about, p. 100. Path of the Fathers, p. 26; Orion, consciousness cogni- later development in the tively present to, p. 130. conception of, p. 163. See Orpheus, and the idea of Trans- also Devayana and Pitri- migration, p. 146. yāna. Orphic Cosmogony, compared Paul, St., on God as speaking to Upanishadic, p. 84. through him, p. 9. Paulomas, p. 27. P. Paurusheya-Apanrusheya Vā- da, pp. 9-I0. Paingya, p. 26; as the hench- Paurusishți, propounder of man of Kaushitaki, p. 46. Penance as the supreme vir- Panchakosas, theory of, p. 142. tue, p. 45-

388 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

Penance, as principal virtue Phœnician Mythology, p. 84. with Taponitya Paurusish- Photic experience, p. 343. ți, p. 310. Physico-theological argument Pericardium : its place in the for the existence of God, p. Upanishadic psychology of 257; personal and imperso- sleep, p. I3I. nal aspects of, p. 258. Persian Mythology, p. 84. Physiological categories, re- Person, with sixteen parts, Pip- palāda's doctrine of, p. 49: gress from cosmological cate- gories to, p. 250. creation by the, p. 76; the Physiology, rise of, p. 189; Intermediate, pp. 94-95; as and Yoga philosophy, p.I90. the origin of things, p. 100; Pilate: on the nature of in the eye, turning away at the Truth, p. 313. time of death, p. 155; with Pineal gland, as the Seat of sixteen parts, idea of, the the Soul, p. I31. precursor of the Lingaarīra, Pippalāda, philosophy of, pp. p. 184; the constituents of, 30-31; a synthetical philo- p. 184; without parts, p. 184- Persons, the Mutable and Im- sopher, p. 38; doctrine of Rayi and Prāņa, p. 49; his mutable, in the Bhagavad- notion of dual existence, p. gītā, p. 207. 92. Personal, Immortality in Ra- Pitriyana, or the Way of the mānuja pp. 165,214; eqa- Fathers, history of the con- tion of Philosophers, p. 179; ception of, p. 159; concep- existence, continuance of, p. tion of, in the Bhagavad- 214 :- impersonal theory of gītā and the Upanishads, p. creation, p. 99. I96. Personalistic theories of Upa- Pituitary body, as the nipple- n shadic cosmogony, p. 75 : like appearance, p. 132; si- theories of creation, p. 92; tuated above the bones of Pessimism, in Buddhism, p. the hard palate, p. 133- 182; and anti-hedonism, p. Planes, the Theosophic con- 204; the logical outcome of ception of the Seven, p. 142; anti-hedonism, p. 295. of Consciousness, as corres- Phanes, the shining God, pp. ponding to the Bodies of 84,103. Man, p. 142. Phaedrus: the charioteer and Plato, in the Ion, on real poetry the horses, p. 104. as originating in God-into- Pharynx, p. 133. xication, p. 9; his enigmatic Philolaus : his doctrine of Space description of a man and no- as the 'arche' of all things, man, p. 35; the dialectic of, pp. 80,103. p. 38; description of the

GENERAL INDEX 389

Corybantes's dance, p. 41; 41; not nature poetry, or on wonder as the root of love poetry, or heroic poe- philosophy, p. 63; recogni- try, p. 41. tion of Not-Being, pp. 82- Polytheism, regress from, to 83 : description of the body monotheism, pp. 258-259. as a harp, p. 90; absence of Positive Theology of Sandilya, reference to Indian Philoso- pp. 50,59. phy in, p. 102; reference to Positive characterisation of Parmenides, p. 104; and the the Absolute, p. 219. Phaedrus Myth, p. 104; on Power, and Impotence, contrast the Good as the Sun of the of, p. 348; in the Universe, world of Ideas, pp. 104, 262; as due to Brahman, p. 255- theory of Ideas, pp. 60, 104; Prabhākara, on the superio- recognition of an Immortal rity of Works, p. 193. Soul, p. 129; the Soul en- Prachīnasala: his view of hea- dowed with the power of ven as the substratum of all motion, p. 133: on recollec- things, P. 49. tion, p. 153: on the Isles of Pradesamātra, controversy the Blessed, p. 158,162; on about the meaning of, pp. the Hades, p. 162; concep- I35-137. tion of the Tartarus in, p. 162; Pradhāna, ruled by God, p. appearance in the doctrine 30; or Prakriti, p. 185. of, p. 232; and the Upani- Prajäpati, the teacher of In- shads, conception of Atman, dra and Virochana, p. 39: p. 246; on the comparative -Kratu on the Mover of the value of Books and Tea- body, p. 133; instruction to chers, p. 331; on the Parable Indra and Virochana, p. of the Cave, p. 33I. 265; on the true nature of Platonists of Alexandria, p. Ultimate Reality, p. 268; on I02. the cardinal virtues, p. 307. Plotinus,1 appearance in jthe Prājña, the third foot of Ät- doctrine of, p. 232. man, p. 36; the deep sleep Pluralism, the school of, p. aspect of the Individual Self, 178; numerical, p. 210; its pp. 140,335. conflicts with qualified Prajñana, p. 181. Monism and Monism, p. 246. Prājña-Ātman, p. 58. Poetical Method of Philosophy, Prakriti, the eight-fold, p. 34; employed in the Upani- the three-fold, p. 86; in the shads, pp. 40-43; its defect, Upanishads and Sāmkhya, p. p. 40; its application, p. 4I. 182 ; and Māyā, p. 185; as Poetry, Upanishadic: mysti- God's magic power, p. 185. cal, moral, metaphysical, p. Pralhāda, the sons of, p. 27.

390 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

Prāna, oblation to, as real sa- Prose-poetry, conflagraitons of, crifice, p. 7; parable prov- in the Upanishads, p. 42. ing the supremacy of, p. 19; Psalms of the Bible,. compara- as the principle of life, as the ble to Hymns to Varuna, p. 3. principle, of consciousness, as Psychical Research, early, pp. ultimate reality, p. 27; as I27-128. life-force, or cosmic-force, p. Psychological Approach to 87 ; controversy of, with the Reality, the final approach, organs of sense, in the Ch- hāndogya, Kaushītaki, and pp. 247, 249 ; categories, su-

Praśna, pp. 88-91; a bio- periority of, to cosmological and physiological categories, psycho-metaphysical concep- p. 252; doctrines about the tion p. 91 ; identified with life, nature of reality, p. 263; with consciousness, and with Ātman, p. gr ; compared to a temperaments : Sattva, Ra- jas, and Tamas, p. 308. queen-bee, p. gr; a philoso- Psycho-metaphysical interpre- phical apotheois of, p. 92; tation of Om, p. 336. purification of, as necessary to the realisation of Atman, p. 337- Psychology : empirical, abnor- mal, and rational, p. 113; Prānasamsita, p. 205. ohne seele, p. 129; in the Prānāyāma, in the Upanishads, Upanishads, pp. 113-166. P. 188. Purgatory, in Dante, p. 162; Praśnopanishad, a summary the World as a, p. 163. rof, pp. 30-31. Purification, justification of Pratardana, p. 26; a free thin- the process of, p. 342. ker of antiquity, p. 46; ori- Puritat, the connecting link ginator of the doctrine of between Nyāya-Vaiśeshika and Prajnātman, p. 46; giving the Upanishads, p. 190; name to a sacrifice called translated as perikardium, p. after him, p. 115. 123; as the surrounding bo- Pratyāhāra, p. 187. dy, p. 123 ; corresponding to Prātibhāsika view, p. 232. the pineal gland of Descar- Prayer to the Atman, for the tes, p. 123; as a kind of mem- fulfilment of any end, pp. braneous sac round the 349-350. heart, pp. 123-124; entrance Preceptor, to be worshipped of mind or soul in, as caus- as God, p. 310. ing sleep, p. 191. Principle, the definition of the, Purity of Divine life, p. 352. p. I45. Purusha, as purisaya, p. 36; Projective identification of not the origin of things, p. the Thou and the Absolute, IOI; as the Highest Exis- P. 278. tence, pp. 183, 197.

GENERAL INDEX 391

Purushasūkta: formulation of Raikva, the philosophy of, p. the caste-system in, p. 59: 22; his doctrine of Air as the reference to, p. 150; descrip- substratum, p. 47: the phi- tion of the Cosmic Person losopher with the car, p. in, p. 197. Pūrva Mīmānsā: on superiority 78; scratching his itch, p. 78; the philosopher of Air, p. 78; of Works to Knowledge, p. correspondence of Macrocosm I92. and Microcosm, p. 88; doc- Pythagoras, his visit to India, trine of Praņa as the final p. 102; theory of Numbers, absorbent, p. 88. p. 104 ; doctrine of Transmi- Raison dåtre, of mystic sound, gration, p. 104; question of the dependence of, on Indian P- 344-

Philosophy for the idea of Rajasa qualities, description of,

Transmigration, p. 146; idea .p. 32. Rājasa temperament, p. 114; of Metempsychosis in, with- cardinal virtue of the, p. 308. out any explanatory back- Rajendralal Mitra, meaning of ground, p. 146; on recollec- Abhivimāna, p. 136. tion, p. 153. Pythagorean description Rajjusarpa, illicit transforma- of the body as a harp, p. 90. tion, p: 230. Rarefaction and Condensation, in Anaximenes, p. 79- Ramadasa : on the Two Paths,

Questionnaire, Gargi's, p. 4. P. 161. Ramanuja: on the Elements Quietism, as an ethical theory, as Deities, p. 75; view of Im- p. 296; the positive side of, mortality, p. 165; the qua- p. 296; and Self-realisation, lified-monistic school of, p. p. 296, Quietistic Life, as a recoil from 205; and Madhva, partial similarity of the views of, p. the empty world of sense, 209; view of the Absolute, p: 296. Quintuple existence, the doctrine p. 210; and Madhva, differ- ence between the views of, of, p. 16. p. 210; idea of God, p. 210; conception of Beatitude, p. R. 213; and Madhva, difference from Sankara, p. 214; his Racial Experience, as trans- mitted to the Individual, p. objections against the doc- trine of Maya, p. 231. 143. Ramtirtha, interpretation of a Rahu and the Moon, the ana- passage in Maitri, p. 138. logy of, p. 351. Rapids, five kinds of, p. 35.

392 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

Raptures of Mystic Ecstasy, through God-intoxication, p.9; p. 350. Upanishadic view of, p. 10; Rashdall, Canon: his criticism mistaken notion of, p. 178. of the theory of Self-realisa- Rhode, Herr : on the ethno- tion examined, p. 302. psychological origin of the Rational Psychology, p. 129. idea of Transmigration, p. 146. Rathītara, the propounder of Riddle-Hymn of the Rigveda, Truth as the Supreme Vir- p. I54. tue, p. 45- Rigveda, a great hymnology Rayi and Prāņa, Pippalāda's to the Forces of Nature, p.2; doctrine of, p. 49; correspon- a great work of emotion and ding to Matter and Spirit, p. imagination, p. 4; hymns to Varuņa, p. 41; mention of Real of Reals, God as the, p. 213. 92 Vāmadeva, p. 49; reference Realisation of God, the end of to the sage Dadhyach, p.51; mystic life, p. 198. reference to the Madhuvid- Realistic theory of creation, p. 98. yā, p. 51; reference to the Reality, as mirrored in the Nāsadīya Sūkta, p. 82; the Individual, p. 141; and Un- riddle-hymn of the, I. 164, reality, p. 212; development as breathing a sceptico-mys- of the consciousness of, p. tical atmosphere, p.149; idea 247; as a cosmo-theo-psycho- of transmigration in, pp. 147, logical problem, p. 248; and 149; and the Upanishads: Truth, p. 3II. conception of the Two Reductio ad absurdum, p. 134- Birds, p. 150; conception of Refutation of Idealism, by Rudra-Siva, p. 193. Kant, p. 232. Rôth : on the riddle-hymn of Regressive Method, p. 40. the Rigveda, pp. 149, 151; Regressus ad infinitum, p. 40. on the idea of Transmigra- Rejoicing, place of, p. 97. tion in the Rigveda, p. 151. Religious Consciousness, evo- Rudra, the only Creator of all lution of, from objective to things, p. 101; identified subjective, p. 2. with Siva, or Isa, p. 194- Renunciation, life of, p. 295. Rudra-Siva, conception of, in Representation, theory of, in the Rigveda and the Atha- Leibnitz, p. 141. rvaveda, p. 193- Republic of Plato, and the Kathopanishad, p. 262. S. Revelation, the meaning of,p. 8; not any external message, Sacred books, the Study of, as but a divine afflatus from the principal virtue in Nāka within, a result of inspiretion Maudgalye, p. 310.

GENERAL INDEX 393

Sacrifice, the chief topic of the Samkhya, and Vedanta, rela- Brāhmaņas, p. 6; mental, a tion of, in the Śvetasvatara, new conception formulated p. 30; its borrowal of the in the days of the Aranya- conception of three colours kas, and the Upanishads, p. from the Upanishads, p.87; 8; conception of, in Pratar- question as to whether Pu- dana, p. 115. rusha is the origin of things, Sacrificer's life, stages of a, p. I01; borrowal by Neo- pp. 201-202. platonism of the Three Quali- Sadabhāva, Buddhistic doc- ties from, p. 102; roots of, in trine of, p. 180. the Upanishads, pp. 182-187; Sadasadanirvachanīyatva, in- in the making, p. 183; fu- explicability, p. 230. sion of, with Yoga and Ve- Sage, Ideal of the, in Stoicism, dānta, p. 185; theistic, in Christianity, and the Upa- the Upanishads, p. 185; the nishads, pp. 289, 315. locus classicus of, in the Śaibya Satyakāma: his inter- Upanishads, p. 185; and Ve- est in Mysticism, p. 48. danta, parting of the ways St. John and Nachiketas, p. 154. between, p. 186. Saivism, in the Svetasvatara, Samnyāsa, and Spiritual Realisa- p. 29; and Theism, p. 100; tion, relation between, p. 332. roots of, in the Upanishads, Sanatkumara, the teacher of pp. 192-193: Kashmirian, p. Nārada, pp. 23, 88, 114; 194; Southern, p. 194- the philosophy of, pp. 52-53; Sakalya, the disputant of Ya- on Truth as consisting in the jñavalkya, p. 19; Yājñaval- attainment of Reality, p.313- kya's imprecations on, p. 38; Sandilya, the bon mots of, p. his interest in ritualism, p. 22; the philosophy of, pp. 56; and Yajñavalkya, dia- 50-51; his doctrine of Taj- logue between, p. 259. jalān, p. 50. Sakāyanya, the philosophy of, Sani, Rahu, and Ketu, mention p. 31; and Brihadratha, p. of, in the Maitri, p. 3I. 63; the teacher of Briha- Sankara: on the Elements as dratha, pp. 198,295. Deities, p. 75; his interpreta- Samāchara, in Gaudapāda, p. tion of creation out of Not- 230. Being, p. 81; criticism of the Samadhi, the highest stage of Naiyyayika theory of the Yoga, p. 188; the state of, Universal, p. 104; his inter- p. 230. pretation of prādesamātra, Sambhūti and Asambhūti tri- pp. 135-136; his interpretation plets, p. 34; Sambhuti as of abhivimana, p. 136; on the meaning emanation, p. 98. Kośas, p. 143; on the relation 50

894 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

of beatific consciousness to Satyakama Jabāla, the story Brahman, p. 144; his view of Immortality, p. 165: on of, p. 22; on the person in the eye as constituting Rea- Sadabhāva as Buddhistic lity, p. 250; and Truth, p. 31I; doctrine, p. 180; on the su- on the necessity of finding a periority of Knowledge to Guru, p. 330. Works, p. 193; the monis- Satyam, syllabic division of, tic school of, p. 205; his con- p- 77. ception of beatitude, p. 213; Satyavachas Rāthītara: on the fundamental propositions the virtue of Truth, p. 310. of the philosophy of, p. 215: Satyayajña, on celestial fire his view of creation, p. 222; as the substratum of things, his view of Immortality, p. P. 47. 223; and Sūnyavāda, p.223; Sauryayāņi Gārgya, an abnor- his elaboration of the theory mal psychologist, p. 48. of Maya from the Upani- Sauva Udgītha, an invective shads, and Gaudapāda, p. against the Brahmanical be- 228; his criticism of the Sun- lief in externalism, p. 22. yavādins, p. 231; his criti- Scandinavian chronicles of cism of the Vijnānavādins, Heimskringla, p. 24; mytho- p. 231; on the phenomenal logy, p. 200; mythology,com reality but noumenal un- pared to that of the Upani- reality of the world, p. 231; shads and the Bhagavadgīta, charge on, as idealist-nihi- p. 201; mythology, and the list, p. 232. Santātman, p. 183. description of the Igdrasil,

Sarira Ātman, p. 58. p. 103.

Śarkarākshya : on Space as the Sceptico-mysticism, of Rigve- da I. 164, p. 149. substratum, p. 47- Scholastic superstition, burt- Sarvajit, the title of the phi- ful imprint of, p. 276. losopher Kaushitaki, p.26. Schopenhauer, his stress on Sasavishāņa, postulation of Will, p. 116; quotation from negation, p. 230. "The World as Will and, Śatapatha Brāhmaņa : on Yāj- Idea", pp. 116-117; on moti- navalkya being a pupil of vation as being the same Āruņi, p. 23. as stimulation or mechani- Sattvika temperament, p.II4; cal process, p. 117; on Will cardinal virtue of, p. 308. as filling the whole world, p. Satyāgraha, attitude of, p.295. Satya, the ultimate concrete 117; as the apostle of pessi- mism, p. 294. existence, born from Water, Schrader, Dr., his discovery of P. 77. four old Upanishads, p. I2.

GENERAL INDEX 395

Science, Philosophy, and Re- realisation, p. 270; the mysti- ligion, reconciliation of, pp. cal significance of p. 271; I-2. the metaphysical significance Scott and Amundsen, as reach- of, p. 271; the epistemological ing the North Pole at the significance of, p. 271; as same moment, p. 105. the ultimate category of Seal, Brajendranath, Dr., re- existence, p. 273- ference to the Positive Sci- Self-murderers, going to Ha- ences', p. I3I. des, p. I57. Seat of the Soul, the question Self-realisation, the bliss of, of the, pp. 130-131. p. 301; the meeting-point of Self, as a centre of interest, p. the ethical and mystical pro- 129; continuance of a blood- cesses, p. 302; as not limited less, p. 129; immanent in to the realisation of the the whole body, p. 134; em- "faculties" of man, p. 302; pirically real, but transcen- true meaning of, p. 302; as dentally ideal, p. 221; and unfoldment of Ātman, p. 302; the Absolute, identity of, p. and egoism, p. 304; ethical 221; as the Utlimate Reality, and mystical sides of, p. pp. 248,264 ; as dream-con- 304-305; intimations of, p. sciousness, p. 266; as deep- 325; super-intellectual cha- sleep consciousness, p. 267; racter of, p. 328; qualifica- as mere consciousness of body, tions for, p. 328; inefficacy p. 266; as appearing in his of any individual effort for, own form, p. 268; and the Absolute, relation of, p. 275; p. 330; helpfulness of the Spiritual Teacher for, p.331; as the supreme light of man, difficulties in the path of, p. 275; as both the subject not to be solved by books, and object of knowledge, p. P- 331; Yoga as a means of, 275; and God, the unique rela- p. 336; effects of, on the tion of, p. 348. See also Soul. Self-consciousness, pure, fourth mystic, pp. 347-50. Self-spectator, of Aristotle, p. state, p. 139; the concep- 26g. tion of, as superior to that Sense-centres, as referred to of super-consciousness, p. the brain, p. 132. 140; primary reality, accord- Senses, the out-moving ten- ing to Descartes, p. 148; dency of, p. 329; inefficacy prior to consciousness of of, to realise God, p. 340. God, p. 247; the basis of Seventeen Parts, of the Linga Ultimate Reality, p. 270;the Sarīra, p. 184. significance of, p. 270-276; Sex, explanation of the duality to be reached only in mystic of, pp. 93-94-

396 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

Shakespeare : Falstaff reborn, p. Snowless region, pp. 158-159. 23; reference to the "Two Society, and the Moral Law, p. Gentlemen," p. 105; descrip- 290. tion of love similar to that Socrates: on the non-accept- of Kālidāsa, p. 105. ance of fees, p. 20. Shavelings, Upanishad ad- Soham Atmā, doctrine of, p. dressed to, p. 29; and Self- 53: realisaticn of, p. 305. realisation, p. 332. Soliloquy, method of, p. 38; Sheaths, doctrine of, in the Yājfavalkya's p. 39; Ya- Taittiriya, p. 26; of the Soul, ma's, p. 39. pp. I4I-I42. Solipsism, Yājfavalkya's, p. Shelley: Adonais, quotation 57: and Absolutism, p. 218. from, p. I66. Solipsistic Solitude, of the Mys- Sin, confession of, p. 41; the tic, p. 352. "shaking" of, by means of Soma libation, pouring of, p. Self-realisation, p. 351; enu- 202. meration of five kinds of, Song of Universal Unity, p. p. 30g; the conception of, in 352. Manu and Yājñavalkya, p.309. Sophistic view of Wisdom, Sixteen Parts, of the Purusha, Yājñavalkya's, p. 20. p. 183-184. Sorites of categories, in Sanat- Sleep, a twilight condition, p. kumāra, p. 52. 58; four different theories of, Soul, endowed with the power pp. 122-126; caused by fati- of motion, p. 133; as the gue, p. 122; by the soul get- the mover of the body, p. ting lodgment in the arte- 133: Jain doctrine of, p. 134: ries, p. 123; by the mind history of the spatial exten- being merged in Prūna, p. sion of, pp. 134-137; both 124: by the mind being unit- infinitely large and infinite- ed with the True, p. 125; ly small, pp. 137-139; as compared with death, p.I22; transcending all spatial li- compared with ecstasy, p. mitations, p. 139; movement 125; in Nyãya philosophy, of, at the time of death, p. due to the motion of the 155; as a creative entity, p. Mind to the Puritat, p. 191. 156; compared to a Phoe- Sleeping consciousness as nix, p. 156; ascent or decent Ultimate Reality, p. 252. of, based on a moral founda- Slough of a snake, the image of tion, p. 161; the denial of, in the, p. 156. Buddhism, p. 180; Indivi- Small Happiness, consisting in dual and Universal, relation the obtainment of ordinary of, in the dualistic system, p. ends, p. 305. 207; original benightment of,

GENERAL INDEX 397

p. 332; later illumination of, Spiritual Wisdom, precautions p. 332. See also Self. for imparting, in the Upani- Sound, seven different kinds shads and the Bhagavadgita, of, p. 33; mystical, not the P. 332. result of the process of di- State, and the Moral Law, p. gestion, p. 344. 290. Space, as the origin of all- States of Consciousness, the things in Pravahana Jalvali, four, pp. I39-I40. pp. 80-81; as the highest rea- Stoicism and Logos, p. 104; and lity, p.81 ; in Philolaos,p. 103. Tthe Ideal of the Sage, p.315. Spencer, on racial and indivi- Stutasastras, hymns of praise, dual experience, p. 143- p. 20I. Sphota, Mīmansaka doctrine Subject-Object relation, p. 352. of, p. 105. Subjective Modification, p. 230. Spinoza: his ironical compari- Subjectivity of sense-percep- son of God and Dog, p. I25; "Attributes" of, p. 227; on tion, p. 30. Sublimity, in Nature, p. 43; God as the Primary Reality, Transcendental, p. 43; Sub- p. 248. jective, p. 43. Spiritual Development, analogi- Sub Specie Adernitatis, in cal to psychological, p. 288. Śankara, p. 215. Spiritual Experience, ladder Substance, from the Cosmolo- of, p. 276; first stage of, as gical point of view, p. 54- mystical apprehension of the Substratum, a scientific search glory of the Self, p. 276; se- of, in the Upanishads, p. 3: cond stage, wherein is per- search after the, p. 74; va- ceived the identity of the rious conceptions of, pp. 76- 'I' with the Self, p.277; third 92. stage, identity of the Self Suddhadvaita interpretation of with the Absolute, p. 277; the Brahma-sūtras, p. 205. fourth stage, identification Sudhanvan, becoming a spirit, of the 'I' with the Absolute, p. I28. as well as the 'Thou' with Sudras and Scriptures, p. 33. the Absolute, p. 278; fifth Suka and Self-realisation, p. stage, experience of Brah- 35I. man as the All, p. 278. Sukesin Bhāradvāja, interested Spiritual Pilgrimage, and the in the metaphysics of psy- Mystics, p. 278. chology, p. 48. Spiritual Plane, p. 142. Suktikārajata, illicit transfor- Spiritual Teacher, necessity of mation, p. 230. a, p. 329; qualifications of a, Summum Bonum, conception p. 330. of, p. 190; the moral good

398 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

as, p. 299; as consisting in Swarajya, the true meaning mystical realisation, p. 305. of, p. 305. Sun, as a great Bee-hive hang- Sympathetic nerves, p. 133. ing in space, p. 22; the birth Symposium, in King Jana- of, from the Universal Egg. ka's court, p. 38. p. 83. Sanyavāda, Šankara's eriti- Synthesis, logical, idea of, p. 24; of Dualism and Qua- cism of, pp. 223, 231. lified Monism in Monism, p. Superconscious state of con- 215. sciousness, a solecism, p. 139; Synthetic Method, p. 38. conception of the, in psychology, p. 140. T. Superimposition, doctrine of, p. 230. Tabula rasa, p. 276. Supermoralism, European and Taijasa, the second foot of Indian, p. 306; of Nietz- Atman, p. 35; the second sche, as affecting the super- state of (dream) conscious- man, p. 306; of Bradley, as ness, pp. 139-140; the dream affecting the Absolute, P. aspect of soul, p. 335- 306; of the Upanishads, as Taittirīyopanishad, a summary the ethical counterpart of of, p. 26. Absolutism in Metaphysics, Tajjalan, reality described as, p. 306. p. 34; search after the, p. 73: Sushumna, p. 33- Śushkabhringāra, p. 26; his the cryptic formula of the Chhāndogya, p. 253- philologico-philosophical con- Tamasa qualities, full descrip- tribution, p. 46. tion of, p. 32; temperament, Svabhāva, or Nature, p. 185. p. 114; temperament, car- Svapiti, as Svamapītobhavati, dinal virtue of, p. 308. p. 36. Tanric books, recognition of Svāpnika view, p. 232. the cerebro-spinal system,p. Śvetaketu, Aruni's instruction I3I. to, p. 54; and Jaivali, dis- Taponitya Paurusishti: on the course between, pp. I20-121; virtue of Penance, p. 310. his request for the final in- Tartarus in Plato, p. 162. struction, p. 216. ŚvetaŠvatara : revelation of the Tejobannātmika Prakriti, p. 86 Upanishad to the Sage of Tennyson : 'In Memoriam' quo- the name, p. II; a sum- tation from, p. 166. mary of, pp. 29-30; author Tests, for the chronological ar- of the Upanishad of that rangement of the Upani- name, p. 45- shads, pp. 13-16.

GENERAL İNDEX 399

Thales, pp. 64.73 ; Water as the Time, not the origin of things, arche of things, pp. 76-77: theory of Water, p. 103; story p. 100 ; of Time, p. 100. Torch-bearers, and the Spiri- of the visit of, to India, p. 102. tual Pilgrimage, p. 278. Thaumaturgy of Thought, p.129. Transcendence of God, p. 261. Theism, and Creation, p. 75, Transfigurated Personality of 99; Saivite, p. 100; and Krishna, p. 197. the Godhead, p. 185. Transmigration, development Theogony of Hesiod : search of the idea of, as a basis after the Ultimate Cause, p. for the chronology of the 74- Upanishads, p. 15; a delu- Theological, Approach, p. 247; sion, p. 59; Pythagorean and categories, regress from, pp. Indian, p. 104; problem of, 251-252 ; categories, as sub- the crux of early Indian servient to psychological, thought, p. 145: idea of, pp. 259,26I. Āryan or Anāryan ? p. 146; Theonomy, a sort of heterono- ethno-psychological origin of my, p. 290. the idea of, p. 146; in Theopathy, as supplying rules Rigveda, Xth Mandala, p. of moral conduct, p. 29I. Theophobia, as supplying rules 147; in Rigveda, Ist Mandala, p. 149; three of moral conduct, p. 2g1. stages of the develop- Theoria, of the gods, p. 42; in ment of the idea of, in the Aristotle, p. 275- Rigveda, p. 152; origin of the Theosophists, modern, their idea of, explained on the emphasis on the Bodies of principles of Ethnic Psycho- Man, pp. 14I-142; on the logy, p.152; idea of, not un- " etheric double, " p. 269. Aryan, p.152; in the Katha, Thirteen Upanishads, their p. 153: in the Brihadāraņyaka classification, p. 16. p. 154; locus classicus of, This and That, p. 212. in the Upanishads, p. 154- Thought-power, pp. 128-129. Tree, of the Body, p. 351; of Thread, and Thread-puller the World, p. 351. or Thread-Controller, Trinitarian Monism, p. 87; Sai- Yājñavalkya's doctrine of, pp. vite, pp. 29,194. 57,2II. Trisanku, his post-illumination- Three Births, doctrine of, pp. al discourse, p. II ; the mys-

Three Meditations , doctrine of, 49-50. tical utterances of, p. 26; a mystical philosopher, p. 45; p. 45- grandeur of his ideas, p. 35r. Thunderbolt, God compared Triune Unity, realisation of, to a, p. agt. p. 305.

400 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

Trivritkaraņa, Āruni's doc- Two Gentlemen, Shakespea- trine of, pp. 54, 104; its rela- rean description of love in tion to Pañchikarana, p. 86. p. 105. Truth, as veiled by a vessel of Two Souls, development of gold, p. 225; and Law, as the idea of, p. 14- on a par with Happiness and Prosperity, p. 299; the U. principal virtue, with Satyavachas Rāthītara p. U, as Utkarsha or Ubhayat- 310; as counterpart of va, p. 36. Reality, p. 31I; and Sat- Uddālaka, his view of the yakāma Jābāla; p. 311; Lord earth as the substratum of Curzon on the absence of all things, p. 47; and psy- the supremacy of, in Indian chical research, p. 49; in- Scriptures, p. 3II; and the terested in the problem of sage Bhāradvāja, p. 312; as immanence, p. 56 ;- Āruņi saving a man from death, and Yajnavalkya, dialogue p. 312; the ultimate victory between, p. 210. of, p. 312; belief in the Ultimate Reality, problem of, power of, p. 312; God as the in the Upanishads, p. 246; repository of, p. 312 ; as the various views about, p. 263; moral correlate of the reali- sation of the Absolute, p. psychological doctrines ab- out, p. 263; not identical 313; popular and philoso- with bodily consciousness, phical, p. 313; the realisation p. 265; not identical with of, as consisting in the rea- dream-consciousness, p. 265; lisation of the Ultimate, p. not identical with deep- 313; contrast of the ideas sleep consciousness, p. 265; of Pilate and Sanatkumāra -identical with Self-conscious- about, p. 313. ness, p. 265; as the serene Tukārāma, as the Spectator Being who appears in his of Suka's realisation, p. 351. own form, p. 268; ontologi- Tu quoque argument, p. 38. cal characterisation of, p. 269. Turīya, doctrine of, p. 105; Umā, a heavenly damsel, p. the self-spectacular state, p. Unattachment, weapon of, p. 193. 335; the fourth dimension of psychology, p. 336. Tvashtri, the three-headed son Unitive Experience, p. 352: I99.

of, p. 27. Two Birds, the conception of, Life, appropriate metaphor

in the Rigveda and the Upa- to express the nature of, p.

nishads, p. 149. 334; Song, the culmination of the, p. 352 .-

GENERAL INDEX 401

Universal Egg, the myth of a, Ushasta, interested in Ulti- p. 83. mate Reality, p. 56. Unknowable, God and Self as, Uttaramīmānsa: superiority according to Kant, p. 271; of Knowledge to Works, in the Upanishads, Augus- p. I92. tine, and Spencer, p. 272. Uvula, as the nipple-like ap- Unmanifest bodies, p. 143- Unreality, encircled by Reali- pearance, p. 132.

ty, p. 77. v. Upādāna-pañchamī, p. 209. Upakosala, the story of, p. 22; Vaiśeshika : enumeration of and his teacher Jābāla, p. Dravyas, p. 191; catalogue 249. of Ultimate Existences in, Upālambha, in Gaudapāda, p. p. 192. 230. Vaisvānara, the first foot of Upanishadic view of Revela- Ātman, p. 35; who is prāde- tion, p. 10; period, the up- Samātra and abhivimāna, p. per and the lower limits of, 47; the first state of (wak- p. 18; philosophy, the me- thods of, p. 34; philosophy, ing ) consciousness, p. 139; the wakeful aspect of Soul, the problems of, p. 63. Upanishads, and the Rigveda, P.335- Vāk, and the Logos, p. 104- p. 2; and the Atharvaveda, Vālakhilyas: their question re- p. 4; and the Brāhmanas, garding the Mover of the p. 6; the older batch, Body, p. 133. p. 13; four newly discovered, Vāmadeva : his philosophy of p. 12; newer batch, p. 12; Three Births, p. 25; curious chronological arrangement personality of, p. 49; expla- of, pp. 12-18; groups of the, nation of his doctrine of p. 16; poetry of the, p. 40; Three Births, pp -49-50; ut- classification of the philo- terances of, as suggestive of sophers of the, pp. 44-59; the idea of Reminiscence, p. the Berecynthia of the sys- tems of Indian Philosophy, 153; his mystic ejaculations,

p. 178; relation of the, to pp. 350-35I. Vamana, the dwarf God or the Brahma-sūtras, p. 205; beautiful God, seated bet- core of the teaching of, ween the upper and lower p. 246. breaths, p. 337. Upasadas, the name of certain Vandhyaputra, postulation of ceremonies in a sacrifice, p. negation, p. 230. 20I. Varivarti, as implying fre- Upāsanā, mention of, p. 198. quency of return, p. 152. 5I

402 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

Varuna, hymns to, compared state of the Cosmic Self, p. with the devotional psalms of the Bible, p. 4; hymn to, Virochana and Indra, the myth I40.

Rigveda VII. 88, p. 41. of, p. 265. Vasudeva, the father of Krish- Virtues, in the Chhändogya and na in the Mahabharata, p. Bhagavadgītā compared, p. 202. 204; enumeration of, in the Vedānuvachana, meaning of, Upanishads, pp. 307-312. II. Visishțādvaita school of phi- Vedanta, monistic, qualified losophy, pp. 179, 206; roots monistic, and dualistic, of, in the Upanishads, pp. p. 205; philosophy, funda- 209-214. mental conceptions of, p.206. Vishņu and Nārāyana, identi- Vedānta-sūtras: more frequent fication of, p. 203. reference to Chhändogya Vision and Audition, as mysti- than to Brihadāraņyaka, p. cal experiences, p. 342.

21. Visvarūpa, roots of the con- Vedānta, later: four states of ception of, p. 197. the Cosmic Self in, p. 140. Vivekānanda, Swami, his idea Vedantins : their view that the of the superconscious, p.139. Vedas are "Apaurusheya" in Void, the existence of a, p.180. the sense of being inspired Voluntarism : its quarrel with by God, p. 10. Intellectualism, p. 116. Vedāntists, ultra-, on the su- Vyāvahārika view of Reality, periority of knowledge, p. pp. 215,23I. I93. Vedic Hymns, to call back the W. departed soul, p. 148. Vedic prayer, spirit of, p. 299. Wallace, discovery of Natural Veil, conception of a, p. 225. Selection, p. 105. Ventricle, p. 133. War of the Senses, story of the, Verity of Verities, Atman as p. I4. the, p. 212. Ward, James, Professor, on a Vijñāna, p. I81. psychology ohne Seele, p.129. Vijnanavadins, the metaphysics Water, as the source of all and espistemology of, p.181; things, pp. 76-77; in the Sankara's criticism of, p. Genesis, p. 77; the first exis-

Vinculum Substantiale, p. 51. 23I. tence in Manu, p- 77- Way Up and Way Down, pp. Virāj, as intermediary bet- 80,98,104. ween the Atman and the Way of the Gods, in Rigveda World, p. 25; as the waking and the Upanishads, p. 159.

GENERAL INDEX 403

Way of the Fathers, in Rigveda my, p. 19; the out-standing and the Upanishads, p. 159. Philosopher of the Brih- Weariness of the flesh, p. 196. White Mountains, p. 43- adāraņyaka, p 23; his me-

Will, as ding-an-sich, p. 116; taphors of the drum, the

its relation to Intellect, p. conch, and the lute, p. 37: a synthetical philosopher, p. 117; the claim for the pri- 38; his doctrine of the Light macy of, pp. 116-117. Woman, her position in of man, p. 40; and Gārgi: on the doctrine of Final Sup- Upanishadic times, p. 6r; the origin of, p. 94. port, 40 ; and his adversaries,

Wonder, as the root of all phi- p. 56; philosophy of, pp. 55-

losophy in Plato, 63. 59; a great psycho-metaphy-

Word, and Non-word, p. 32. sician, p. 55; his doctrine of Ātman, pp. 56-57; his argu- Wordsworth and Byron, poe- ment from order, p. 57; his tries of, p. 25I. Works and Knowledge, syn- negative theology, p. 57; his doctrine of Karman, p. 58; thesis of, p. 192; reconcilia- his absolute idealism, tion of, in Kumārila, p. 193. Works, superiority of, to p. 59; on the nature of Kar-

knowledge in Prabhākara, man, p. I81; and Uddālaka Āruni: doctrine of the An- p. 193. World, as a grand Purgatory, taryāmin, p. 210; and Jana- ka, dialogue between, p.263; p. 163 ;- Person, intermediate between Atman and the on Self-consciousness, p.273;

world, p. 95; as the In- and Janaka, interpretation

dividual writ large, p. 14I. of the doctrine of the Light of man, p. 274; and Aristo- tle, p. 275; his eudaemonism, X. p. 299; and the partition of

Xenophanes, description of his estate, p. 303; and the

God as all-Eye and all-Ear, doctrine of Self-realisation,

P. 208. p. 303 ;- Smriti, on the five Xenophon, on the choice of kinds of sin, p. 309.

Hercules, p. 293. Yama: his philosophical monologue, p. 39: and Y. Nachiketas, dialogue be- tween, pp. I21-122; the world Yajnavalkya, full description of, as described in the Rig- of the character of, pp. 19- veda, p. 147. 20; his disputation with Yama, as the preliminary of Sākalya, p. 19; his biga- Yoga, p. 188.

404 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

Yatova, interpretation of, ac- tion, p. 189; the physiologi- cording to Sankara, Madhva cal basis of, p. 189; roots of, and Rāmānuja, p. 209. in the Upanishads, pp. 187- Yoga, on recollection, p. 153; 190 ;- sūtras, deism in, p. mentioned along with Sam- 189; as precursor of physio- khya, p. 182; locus classicus logy and medicine, p. 190; of, p. 187; doctrine of Self- conditions of the practice of, spectator, p. 188; eight-fold 338 ; physiological effects of, scheme of, p. 189; as the pp. 188, 338 ; spiritual effects Way to Spiritual Realisa- of, pp. 339, 347.

UPANISHAD INDEX

BRIHADĀRANYAKA UPANISHAD.

I. 2. 1-2. On Death as the pri- I. 4. 17. The doctrine of Quin- mary existent, p. 82. tuple Existence, p. 16. I. 2. 4-5. The Vedas as pro- duced by the God of Death II. I. I-15. The Sleeping Con- from his wife Speech, p. 12. sciousness as the Ultimate I. 3. 28. Maya conceived as Not- Reality, pp. 251-252. Being, Darkness, and Death, II. 1. 15. On the superiority of pp. 225-226. the Brahmins to the Ksha- I. 4. 1-4. Generation from Ät- triyas, p. 62. man of the duality of sex, II. I. 15-17. Sleep occurs when pp- 93-94- the Soul rests in the space I. 4. 2. Fear proceeds only inside the heart, p. I25. from a Second, p. I15. II. I. 19. Sleep caused by the I. 4. 7. The immanent God Soul's lodgment in the Pu- still unseen, p. 26r. rītat, p. I24- I. 4. 8. The Atman as the II. r. r9. In sleep, the Soul highest object of desire and moves by the Hita Nādis love, p. 302. to the Puritat, p. 19I. I. 4. 10. The worshipper of the II. I. 20. All things spring like Deity as separate from him- sparks from the Supreme self is the beast of the gods, Soul, pp. 212-213. p. 222. II. 3. 1-6. God as the Verity I. 4. 1o. On the introj ected of Verities, p. 213. identity of the I and the II. 3. 6. Attempt at a posi- Brahman, p. 277. tive interpretation of "Neti I. 4. 1o. Vāmadeva's ejacula- Neti, " p. 321. tion that he lived in the II. 3.6. Description of photic Manu and the Sun, p. 35- and morphic experiences, I. 4. II. On the relation of P. 343- Brahmins and Kshatriyas, II. 4. 2-5. Everything is dear pp. 61-62. for the sake of Atman, I. 4. 11-15. An unorthodox p. 303. Theory about the origin of II. 45. On the mystical vislom castes, pp. 59-60. of the Self, p. 276.

406 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

II. 4.6-9. The grasping of all III. 8.8. Negative character- things by the grasping of isation of the Absolute, Atman, p. 217. p. 220. II. 4. 10. On the Vedas and III. 8. 9. Poetical description Sciences having been breathed of the Order in the Universe, forth by the great Primal P. 43. Being, p. I0. III. 8. 9. A physico-theological II. 4. 13, 14. It is not possible proof for the existence of to know the Knower, p. 217. Brahman, p. 258. II. 4. 14. Maya as semblance an III. g. I-1O. The absolute unity as-it-were, an appearance, p. 227. of the Godhead, p. 259. II. 4. 14. It is impossible to III. 9. 26. The negative mea- know the Knower, p. 273- ning of "Neti Neti," p. 220. II. 5. 15. All things centred in III. 9. 28. Appeal to the tran- the Supreme Soul, p. 212. smundane problem of the II. 5. 18. On the etymology of persistence of the Self after ' purusha,' p. 36. bodily death, p. 64. II. 5. Ig. Maya as the power III. 9. 28. On the question about of God, p. 226. the root of human life, p.120. II. 5. 19. On the identity of Atman with Brahman, p. 277. IV. I. I. Yajfavalkya's de- sire for both cows and III. 2. 13. The nature and sig- controversy, p. 299. nificance of Karman, p. 181. IV. I. 2-7. The various tenta- III. 3. I. On the possession tive views about the nature of Patanchala's daughter by of Ultimate Reality, p. 263. an aerial spirit, p. 128. IV. I. 7. One should not take III. 4. 2. The impossibility of away money without im- knowing the Knower, p. 273- parting instruction, p. 300. III. 5. I. The spiritual life, a IV. 2.4. On the superiority of life of child-like simplicity, the Brahmins to the Ksha-

III. 6. I. On the regressus ad IV. 2. 4. The negative mean- p. 296. triyas, p. 63.

infinitum in Gargi's ques- ning of "Neti Neti," p. 220. tionnaire, p. 40. IV. 3. 2-6. Self-consciousnes III. 7. The famous Doctrine of the ultimate category of the Antaryamin, p. 2II. existence, pp. 274-275. III. 7. 23. The Self as the Ul- IV. 3. 9-18. Dream as a twi- timate Seer, Hearer, a nd light state of consciousness Thinker, p. 273- III. 8. 2. The two missiles of IV. 3. 19. The Fatigue theory p. I26.

GlrgI, p. 61. of Sleep, p. I22.

UPANISHAD INDEX 407

IV. 3. 20. A description of the IV. 4. 12. Cessation of feve- blood-vessels of various co- rish activity after the rea- lours, pp. 189-Ig0. lisation of God, p. 347. IV. 3. 21. Realisation of the IV. 4. 21. Too many words, a Self involves the fulfilment weariness of flesh, p. 296. of all desires, p. 303- IV. 4. 22. One disgusted with IV. 3. 21. The erotic analogy the world should take to for the experience of the the life of a mendicant, p.I81. happiness of God, p. 348. IV. 4. 22. The negative mean- IV. 3. 23-31. The Seer sees and ing of "Neti Neti," p. 220. yet does not see, p. 218. IV. 4. 22. A contempt for IV. 3. 37-38. The welcome and wealth, progeny, and fame send-off of the Soul by the in the interest of spiritual Elements, pp. 154-155- realisation, p. 295. IV. 4. 1-2. Description of the IV. 4. 22. The Atman grows passing Self, p. I55. neither great by good ac- IV. 4. 3-5. The Self throws off tions, nor small by evil ac- this body, and takes on a new tions, pp. 306-307. one, according to his Kar- IV. 4. 23. A real Brahmin is man, pp. 155-156. he who sees the Atman IV. 4. 5. A transcendental des- everywhere, p. 297. cription of the Absolute, IV. 4. 23. The wise sage grows p. 221. neither great by good ac- IV. 4. 5. Man as a conglome- tions, nor small by evil ac- ration of desire, will, and tions, p. 307. action, p. 313. IV. 5. 15. The negative mean- IV. 4. 6. Desire for Atman is ing of"Neti Neti,"pp.220-221, desirelessness, p. 303- IV. 4. 6-7. A man without de- V. 2. 1-3. Self-control, Charity, sire obtains Brahman, and and Compassion as the becomes immortal, p. 156. cardinal virtues, p. 308. IV. 4. 6-7. The Body, called the V. 5. I. On Water as the pri- slough of the Soul, p. 223. mal existent, pp. 76, 77. IV. 4. 10. The worshippers of V. 5. I. On the cryptical mean- false knowledge enter into ing of the three syllables of pitchy darkness after their ' Satyam ', p. 77. death, p. 157. V. 6. I. The Soul, as small IV. 4. I1. The ignorant go to as a grain of rice or barley, joyless regions after death, pp. 135-136. p. 157- V. g. I. Description of the IV. 4. 12. On the identity of Internal Sound, p. 343- the I and the Atman, p. 277. V. 1o. I. Ascent of the de-

408 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

parted Soul to the snowless, chatological knowledge, p. 64. sorrowless region through the wind, the sun, and the VI. 2. 5-7. On the superiority moon, p. 158. of the Kshatriyas to the V. 14. 8. On the dignity of es- Brahmins, p. 62.

CHHĀNDOGYA UPANISHAD.

I. I. 10. Māyā as Ignorrance, III. II. 2-3. The aspiring mys- p. 225. tic experiences Eternal Day, I. 2. 8. The Saint as an im- p. 345- penetrable rock, p. 316. III. II. 5-6. Mystic Knowledge I. 3. 3. Speech involves sus- more valuable than the pension of breath, p. 114. Earth full of treasure, p. 333- I. 3. 5. Voluntary action in- III. 13. Light or Sound within volves suspension of breath, man as the Ultimate Rea- pp. II4-II5. lity, pp. 250-251. I. 3. 12. Fulfilment of all de- III. 13. 8. Description of the sires after God-realisation, Internal Sound as of the P. 350. roaring of an ox, or the peal I. 5. 1.3. The Sun verily sings of a thunder, p. 344- Om, p. 335- III. 14. I. The Absolute as I. 6.6. The golden-coloured Tajjalān, p. 73- Being seen on the Sun, p. 345. III. 14. I. Cosmological defini- I. g. I. On Space as the final tion of the Ultimate Reality habitat of all things, p. 81. I. II. 5. On Prana as the Ulti- p. 253- III. 14. I. On the vision of the mate substratum, pp. 87-88 Brahman as the All, p. 278

II. 20. 2. Man lifted up to the III. 14.3. The Soul as smaller than a mustard seed, and as region of the Deity he wor- ships during life, p. 165. greater than the sky, pp. I38-139. II. 20. 2. Madhva's conception of Immortality, p. 209. III. 14. 4. " I shall reach Brah- man after throwing off the II. 23. I. Reference to the four different Asramas, p. 60. bodily coil," pp. 221-222. III. 15. I. The Universe con- II. 23. 3. All speech as per- ceived as a huge chest, p.84. meated by Om, p. 334- III. 16. Mahidāsa Aitareya, and

III. I-II. The intermundane the question of the prolonga- tion of life, p. 45. region described as a bee- hive p. 42. III. 17. 1-6. Krishna and Ghora Angirasa, p. 202.

UPANISHAD INDEX 409

III. 17.4. The list of virtues V. 3. 7. On the superiority of according to Ghora Angira- the Kshatriyas to the Brah- sa, p. 309. mins, p. 62. III. 18. I. Meditation upon V. 10. 1-5. The path of the mind as the Ultimate Rea- Gods and the path of the lity, p. 292. Fathers, p. 196. III. 19. 1-3. The myth of the V. 10. 1-6. Ascent and descent Universal Egg, p. 83. of the departed Soul by the III. 19. 4. Meditation on the path of Darkness, pp. 160-161. Sun as Brahman, p .. 128 V. 10. 7. The quality of cha- racter as determining the IV. 3. 1-2. On Air as the final nature of rebirth, p. 162. absorbent of all things, V. 10. 8. The fate of creatures pp-78-79. low in the scale of evolution, IV. 3. 3. On Prana as the final p. I62. absorbent, p. 88. V. 10. 9. The five cardinal sins, IV. 3.4. On Air and Prāna as p. 309. the absorbents in the ma- V. 18. I. The Soul is of the crocosm, and microcosm, p.88. measure of a span, p. 135- IV. 4. 1-5. Truth as supreme V. 19-24. On the Inner Sacri- virtue, illustrated by the fice, p. 8. story of Satyakāma, pp. 3II- 312. VI. I. 2-7. Brahman alone is IV. 5. 3. Meditation on Brah- real, everything else is a man as resplendence, p. 128. modification and a name, IV. 9. 3. Necessity of a Spiri- p. 216. tual Teacher, p. 330. VI. I. 4. Māya as a word, a IV. 10.15. The image reflect- mode, and a name, p. 227. ed in the human eye as the VI. 2. 1. "Being"born from Ultimate Reality, pp. 249-250. "Non-Being," p. 180. IV. 14. 3. Sin does not touch VI. 2. 1-4. "Being"as the a Saint, p. 316. source of Fire, Water a n d IV. 15. 5-6. Final ascent of the Earth. p. 85. Soul by the path of light, VI. 3.2. 3. On the tripartition p. 160. each of, Fire, Water, and Earth, p. 85. V. 1.6-15. On the controver- VI. 4. 1. The three Gunas of sy between Prana and the Samkhya philosophy adum- Organs of Sense, pp. 88-90. brated in the description of V. 3. 1-4. Knowledge incom- the Three Colours, p. 182. plete without eschatological VI. 4. 1-4. The doctrine: of knowledge, pp. I20-I2I. "Trivritkaraņa" pp. 85-86, 52

410 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY VI. 4.5. On the Sages of old VI. 16. 1-2. The efficacy of the having learnt spiritual wis- heated axe for the moral or- dom from their Masters, deal, p. 312.

VI. 5. 1. The subtle part of VII. I. Narada's request for pp. II-I2.

food as forming the mind, initiation, p. 198. p. 114- VII. I. 2-3. The ocean of grief VI. 5. 4. Mind as manufactured can be crossed only by the out of food, p. 113. knowledge of Atman, p. 327. VI. 6. 1-2. The subtle part of VII. 3. I. Mind as the Atman food is transformed into in us, and as the Ultimate mind, p. 114. Reality, p. 292. VI. 7. I. On a fasting-philoso- VII. 4.2. On the primacy of phy, p. 45- the Will over the Intellect, VI. 8. 1. In sleep, man is unit- p. 116. ed with the Real, p. I25. VII. 5. 1. On the primacy of VI. 8. 1, 2. Sleep occurs when the Intellect over the Will, the mind settles down on pp. I17-I18. breath, p. I24. VII. I1. 2. Meditation on Brah- VI. 8. 1-3. On the etymology man as lustrous, p. 128. of 'svapiti', 'asisishati' and VII. 12. 1. Space as the high- pipāsati, p. 36. est Reality. p. 81. VI. 8.4. On Fire as the first VII. 12. I. Akāsa as the Car- evolute from the Primal Be- rier of sound, p. I9I. ing, p. 79. VII. 15. I. On Prana as the VI. 8. 7. Identity of Self and navel of existence, p. 88. Brahman, p. 222. VII. 16, 17. Truth means ul- VI. 8. 7. On the projected timately the realisation of identity of the Thou and God, p. 313. the Brahman, p. 278. VII. 22-25. Description of VI. 9. 3. The perpetual round Bhūman, p. 305. of births and deaths for low VII. 23-25. Meaning of Swā- creatures, p. 162. rājya, p. 43- VL 9-I0. Doctrine of Imper- VII. 26.2. Purity of mind de- sonal Immortality, p. 165. pends upon purity of food, VI. I2. God as the subtle es- p. II4- sence underlying all things, pp. 256-257. VIII. I. 1-3. The City within VI. 13. 1-3. God as the Salt of described as exactly like the life, pp. 261-262. City without, p. 43. VI. 14. 1-2. The story of the VIII. 1. 1-3. The microcosm and man from Gandhara, p. 331. the macrocosm, p. I41.

UPANISHAD INDEX 411

VIII. I. 6. No true freedom the blood-vessels that pro- without the knowledge of ceed from the heart, p. 189. Ātman, p. 314- VIII. 6. 3. Sleep caused by the VIII. 2. 10. Sovereignty of entrance of the Soul in the man's will after God-realisa- arteries, p. 123. tion, pp. 314-315. VIII. 7. 1. The obtainment of VIII. 3. 1-3. Māyā as Untruth, all the worlds after God- p. 226. realisation, p. 350. VIII. 3.2. In sleep,there is no cons- VIII. 7-12. The great parable ciousness of Brahman, p. 126. of Indra and Virochana to VIII. 4. I. The Self as the eter- discover the nature of the nal bund of existence, p.258. Self, pp. 265-268. VIII. 4. 2. The sudden illumi- VIII. 12. 1. The Absolute as nation of the Spiritual World beyond happiness and sor- in the night of existence, row, p. 306. p. 344- VIII. 13. 1. Release from the VIII. 6. I. A description of eclipse of desire, p. 351.

ĪSĀVĀSYA UPANISHAD.

Santi. The Atman and Brah- 9. The worshippers of false man as two Infinities, p.277. knowledge enter into pitchy 2. Exhortation to spend a life darkness, p. 157. of activism, p. 297. 9-II. Reconciliation of Vidya 2. Freedom from action at- and Avidya. p. 192. tained by doing actions, p. 196. 9-IT. Reconciliation of the 3. The soul-murderers go to claims of Action and Know- demoniac regions. p. 157. ledge, p. 298. 4. 5. Atman as speedful and 1O. The continuity of philoso- not-speedful, p. 347. phical tradition, p. 11. 7. No infatuation and grief 15. Māyā as a Veil, p. 225. for the God-realiser, p. 316. 16. Realisation of the Per- 9. Knowledge as more dan- son without as the Person gerous than ignorance for within, p. 345- realisation, p. 329.

KENA UPANISHAD.

I. 2. 8. The Ultimate Reality I. 3. The continuity of philo- as the mind of mind, the sophical tradition, p. II. eye of eye, and the ear of I. 3. The Atman as beyond the ear, p. 264- Known and beyond the Un known, p. 272.

412 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

II. 3. Cognoscendo ignorari, et III. IV. All physical and men- ignorando cognosci, p. 272. tal power as due to the IL. 13. Exhortation to realise power of Brahman, pp.254- the Self while the body lasts, 255- P. 327.

AITAREYA UPANISHAD.

1. 1-3. Creation of the Uni- III. 3. On Intellect as the verse by the Atman through final reality, p. 119. the Intermediary Person, III. 3. All existence is based pp. 95-97. on Intellect, p. 18r. III. 2. Intellectualistic classifica- III. 3. Self-consciousness as the tion of mental states, p.II8. Absolute, pp. 269-270.

TAITTIRĪYA UPANISHAD.

1. 6. 1-2. The passage of the I. II. 1-3. The parting advice of Soul from the heart to the the Teacher to his Pupil, skull through the nipple-like pP. 3I0-3II. part between the bones of the palate, p. 132. II. I. The Theory of the ema- I. 7. On the doctrine of"Quin- nation of the Elements from tuple Existence" being bor- Ātman, p. 98. rowed from the Brihadāran- II. I. All inorganic nature born yaka, p. 16. from God, p. 258. I. 9. An enumeration of dif- II. I. The Absolute as Ex- ferent virtues, p. 310. istence, Consciousness, and I. 1o. The post-illuminational Infinity, p. 269. discourse of Trisanku, p. II. II. 2-5. The five Sheaths of the I. 10. Trisanku's Self-experience Soul, p. 142. as the Mover of the Tree, p. 352. II. 4. Destruction of fear I. II. Exhortation to follow after God-realisation, p. 349. the good actions of the el- II.4. The Ātman as unspeakable, ders, or presbyters, p. 290. and unthinkable p. 272. I. II. I. Reference to the two II. 6. Creation of dualities, Asramas of the Student and the House-holder, p. 60. II. 6. Meditation on Brahman P. 93-

I. II. I. Exhortation not to as Not-Being or Being, p.I29. neglect Truth and Law, as II. 6. The entry and imman- well as Happiness and Pros- ence of God even in contra- perity, p. 299. ries, p. 212.

UPANISHAD INDEX 413

II. 7. Lodgment in the fearless III. I. The Absolute as the God confers fearlessness, origin of life, and the end of P. 349. things, pp. 73-74- II. 7. Being described as born III. I. All organic nature born from the primal Not-Being from God, p. 208. p. 8r. III. 1. Cosmological definition II. 7. On the feeling of other- of the Ultimate Reality, ness as causing fear, p. 115. pp. 252-253- II. 8. Identity of the Person III. 1-6. Matter, Life, Mind, in the Man and the Person Intellect, and Bliss as forms in the Sun, p. 222. of Brahman, pp. 144-145- II. 8. God as the source of III. 10. 3-4. Meditation on Brah- terror, p. 291. man as support, greatness, II. 8. The beatific calculus, mind, and 'parimara',

p. 300. pp. I28-129. II. 9. The Saint goes beyond III. 10. 5-6. The song. of Uni- the reach of duals, p. 316. versal Unity, p. 353- II. 9. The Sage has no cause III. 10. 6. God as the Devour- for repentance, p. 316. er of the Devourer, p. 100.

KAUSHĪTAKI UPANISHAD.

I. I. On the superiority of and Atman, pp. 91-92. the Kshatriyas to the Brah- III. g. Man as a mere puppet mins, p. 62. in the hands of God, I. 2. Man's birth as depend- p. 314- ing upon his Karman and Knowledge, p. 162. IV. I-18. The Sleeping Con- I. 4. A belated description sciousness as the Ultimate of the path of the Gods, Reality, pp. 251-252. pp. 163-164. IV. I-18. On the superiority of the Brahmins to the Ks- II. I. Satyāgraha, p. 295. hatriyas, p. 62. II. I. On Prana as the Ulti- IV. 19. A description of the mate Reality, p. 88. blood-vessels that proceed II. 5. On the Inner Sacrifice, from the heart to the Puri- p. 8. tat, p. 189. II. 5. On the sacrifice taught IV. 20. The Self as Lord of by Pratardana, p. 115. all the bodily faculties, p.134- IV. 20. Thorough immanence of III. 2-9. Identification of Prāņa the Atman in the body, with Life, Consciousness, p. 342.

414 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

KAȚHA UPANISHAD.

I. I. 3. The givers of barren cows I. 2. 20. Soul as subtler than go to joyless regions, p. 157. the subtle, and greater than I. 1. 5-6. Like corn man ri- the great, p. 138. pens, and like corn he is I. 2. 20. Atman as both large born again, p. I54- and small, p. 347- I. 1. 20. Denial of the existence of I. 2. 20. God's greatness rea- Soul after bodily death, p. 180. lised after a catharsis of the I. 1. 20-29. On eschatological moral being, p. 341. knowledge as the highest I. 2. 21. Atman as moving in good, pp. I21-122. a sitting posture, p. 347. I. 1. 26, 28. The pleasures of I. 2. 22. The Soul as omnipre- the senses, p. 180. sent, p. 328. I. 1. 28. Want of delight in the I. 2. 23 The Self not reached life of worldly pleasures, p. 294. by much learning, p. 328. I. 2. 1-2. The conflict of the I. 2. 24. Cessation from sin, re- good and the pleasant, p.293. quisite for Self-realisation, I. 2. 3. Refusal of Nachiketas P. 328. to be chained in the life of I. 3. I. On the relation of the pleasures, p. 293- Individual Soul and the Uni- I. 2. 4, 5. Mayã as blindfoldness, versal Soul, p. 14. P. 225. I. 3. r. Description of the Two I. 2. 7. The first-hand report, Souls, p. 207. knowledge, and realisation of I. 3. 10-I1. The Purusha as Ātman as miraculous, the Highest Category of exis- pp. 195-196. tence, p. 183. I. 2. 7. The Knower of At- 1. 3. 10, II. There is nothing man a miracle, p. 272. above the Purusha, p. 183. I. 2. 8-9. The Teacher must I. 3. 12. God realised by the sub- have realised his identity tle faculty of Intuition, p. 340. with the Self, p. 330. I. 3. 13. Description of Jñānāt- I. 2. 14. The Absolute as mo- man, Mahat Atman, and rally transcendent, p. 306. Sānta Ātman, p. 183. I. 2. 15. Om as the Word de- I. 3. 14. Mystic way as sharp clared by the Vedas, p. 196. as a razor's edge, p. 330. I. 2. 15-17. Meditation on Om I. 3. 15. Mixing up of negative as the supreme way, p. 334. and positive characteristics I. 2. 18. Atman as unborn, eter- of the Absolute, p. 220. nal, and indestructible, p. 195. I. 2. 19. Ātman neither kills, II. 4. 1. Introversion requisite , nor is ever killed, p. 195- for Self-realisation, p. 328.

UPANISHAD INDEX 415

II. 4. 2. Māyā as unreality and II. 5. I1. Adumbration of the uncertainty. p. 226. deistic conception of God as II. 4. 8. Spiritual Fire to be in Yoga doctrine, p. 18g. worshipped day after day, II. 5. 15. God as supreme res- p. 337- plendence, p. 256. II. 4. 11. Perception of dif- II. 6. I. Description of the ference leads one from death eternal ASvattha tree, p.I98. to death, p. 216. II. 6.2-3. God as a fearful II. 4. 12. The Soul is of the Thunderbolt, p. 291. measure of a thumb, p. 135- II. 6. 4. Want of Realisation, II. 5. 3. The Dwarf God en- the cause of reincarnation, sconced between the upper p. 327. and the lower breaths, p. II. 6. g. God not realised by

337- Sight or by Mind, p. 339. II. 5. 4-8. On the persistence II. 6. 10-II. Yoga as equani- of the Self in sleep and after mity of the senses, mind, bodily death, p. 64. and intellect, p. 188. II. 5. 7. Rebirth of Souls in II. 6. 10-II. Mental equanimi- inorganic or live matter ac- ty reached in the process cording to works, p. 181. of contemplation, p. 316. II. 5.9. On Fire as assuming II. 6. 12. God revealed only to all forms in the Universe, those who know that God is, p. 340. II. 5. 9, 10. The Universal At- p. 79- II. 6. 17. Atman as of the size man as both immanent and of a thumb, p. 341. transcendent, p. 262. II. 6. 17. On the extraction of II. 5. I1. God, the Sun of the the Atman from the body, World, as untouched by the as of a blade from its sheatb, defects of vision, p. 262. P. 347.

MUNDAKA UPANISHAD.

I. I. 3. On the "arche" of I. 1.7. The universe thrown knowledge, p. 64- out and re-absorbed by the I. 1. 4-5. The higher and the Immutable Brahman, p. 222. lower knowledge, p. 326. I. 2. 1. On the following of the I. 1. 6. The Soul as omnipre- sacrificial routine, p. 7. sent, p. 138. I. 2. 7-11. Sacrifices are like I. 1. 6. Mixing up of negative unsteady boats, p. 7. and positive characteristics of I. 2. 12. Disgust for the world the Absolute, p. 220. and humility, necessary for

416 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

the realisation of the Self, III. I. 3. The idea of Immor- P. 329. tal Life as "assimilation"_to Divinity, p. 165. I1. I.I. Manifold beings as only III. 1. 3. Ramanuja's doctrine scintillations from Brahman, of Immortality, p. 213. p. 222. III. 1. 3. Doctrine of Supermo- II. 1. 2-9. Creation of the ralism, p. 306. world from the formless Per- III. I. 4. Life in Atman, a life son, p. 99. of intense spiritual activity, II. 1.4. A description of the P. 297. Cosmic Person, p. 197. III. 1. 5. Truth, penance, and II. I. 10. Identity of the Self insight necessary for Self- with the Supreme Person, realisation, p. 428. and the Universe, p. 222. III. I. 6. The triumph of II. I. IO. Māyā as a Knot, Truth, p. 312. p. 225. III. 1. 7. Atman as great and II. 2. 3-4. Om as the bow,Soul small,as far off and near,p.347. as the arrow, and Brahman III. 1. 8. God realised after a as the mark, p. 334- catharsis of the moral be- II. 2. 5-7. Meditation on At- ing, p. 341. man as the Bund of Im- III. I. 9. The Atman reveals mortality, p. 296. Himself after the purifica- II. 2. 8. The breaking of the tion of mind, p. 347. knots of the heart after God- III. I. IO. The fulfilment of realisation, p. 347. any end after the vision of II. 2. 9. Brahman as an im- God, p. 350. maculate light set in a disc III. 2. 2. The annihilation of de- of gold, p. 344 sires by the realisation of II. 2. I1. The vision of Brahman God, p. 316, as above and below, to the III. 2. 3. The doctrine of right and to the left, p. 350. Grace, p. 345- III. 2. 4. The Atman cannut III. I. I. The idea of the rela- be reached by a life of tion of the Two Souls, p. 14- weakness and error, p. 329 .! III. I. I. The deistic concep- III. 2. 5. The liberated Soul tion of God as an onlooker, mingles with the whole Uni- P. 189. verse, p. I66. III. I. I. The dualistic con- III. 2.6. Enjoying the com- ception of the relation of the Self and God, p. 207. panionship of God after

III. I. 2. The acquisition of power death, p. 165. III. 2. 6. Doctrine of Kramamu- after God-realisation, p. 348. kti, p. 214.

UPANISHAD INDEX 417

III. 2. 7-8. The Idea of Im- III. 2. 10. The carrying of mortal life as Atonment to fire over one's head requi- Divinity, p. 165. site for one's initiation, III. 2. 8. Sankara's doctrine of p. 332. Impersonal Immortality,p.223. ŚVETĀŚVATARA UPANISHAD

I. I. An Aporia regarding the II. 8-10. Requirements of the origin and substance of practice of Yoga, p. 338. things, p. 74 II. 8-15. A classic description I. 2. Enumeration of contem- of the practice of Yoga, porary theories of creation, pp. 187-188. p. I00. II. II. Description of phutic I. 4. Reality cryptically com- experience, p. 343- pared to a great Circum- II. 12-13. The physiological ef- scribing Felly, p. 34- fects of Yoga, p. 339. I. 5. Nature cryptically des -- II. 14-15. Vision of the Self cribed as a vast expanse of compared to the vision of a water contributed to by five lustrous Mirror, p. 346. different streams, p. 35- II. 17. The immanence of God I. 6. Immortality means the in the Universe, p. 262. union of the Atman and the Mover, p. 222. III. I. Maya as the Meshes of I. 8. The Universe as con- God, p. 227. trasted with Isa, p. 194. III. 2. Rudra, the Creator and I. 9. Triune unity of Brah- Destroyer of all things, p. 102. man, p. 210. III. 2. Rudra, as the only one I. 10. The cessation of the God, p. 194. world-illusion due to the po- III. 2,3. The One God creates wer of God, p. 226. the heaven and the earth, I. 12. The Enjoyer, the En- pp. 259-260. joyed, and the Mover as the III. 3. God as all eye, and all constituents of the Abso- ear, p. 208. lute, p. 210. III. 4. Hira nyagarbha as first- I. 14- Mention of the process born of God, p. 186. of Dhyāna, p. 188. III, 9. God standing like a I. 14. Spiritual fire as churned motionless Tree in the hea- out of the two sticks of the ven, p. 9. Body and the Pranava, p. 337. III. 9. Personalistic description I. 15. Atman immanent in of God, p. 208. the body, as oil in sesa- III. 14. The transcendence of mum, p. 342. God, p. 262. 53

418 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

III. 18. The out-moving ten- V. 2. Reference to the tawny- dency of the Self, p. 328. III. 19. The Atman always the coloured Rishi, as the first- born of God, p. 186. subject of knowledge, and V. 3. God as the spreader of never the object, p. 273- the meshes, p. 194.

IV. 5. On the relation of the V. 3. Māyā as the Meshes of God, p. 227. Individual Soul, and the Uni- V. 5. Nature brought to ma- versal Soul, p. 14. turity by God, p. 100. IV. 5. The Prakriti as made of V. 5. God as presiding over the red, white, and dark colours, process of development, p. 185. p. 182. V. 8-9. Atman smaller than IV. 5. The Supreme Soul lives the hundreth part of a hair apart from Prakriti, while divided hundredfold, p. 347. the Individual Soul is caught V. 10. Ātman realised as nei- in the meshes of her love, ther male nor female, p. 346. p. I86. IV. 9. The Individual Soul as VI. 1-12. The nature of the enchained by the magic po- Supreme Godhead, and His wers of the Universal Soul, identification with the Self, pp. 185-186. pp. 260-261. IV. 9. Māyā as the power of God in the creation of the VI. I. The whirling of the wheel of the Universe due to world, p. 227. Rudra, p. I02. IV. o. God compared to a VI. 2. God as the Time of spider, p. 185. Time, p. 100. IV. 10. Māyā as Prakriti, p.227. VI. 2. The Elements cannot IV. II. One attains to tran- be the "arche" of things, pp. quillity by "collecting"the I00-IOI. Godhead, p. 316. VI. 2. The Five Elements as IV. 12. Hiranyagarbha, as the the handiwork of God, p.191. first creation of God, p.186. VI. 5. God as the cause of the IV. 16. God as a subtle film combination of Elements, enveloping the Universe, P. IOI. P. 342. IV. 16. Saivite description of VI. 5. Upāsana, or the men- tal worship of God, p. 198. the Godhead, p. 194. IV. 18. God experienced as be- VI. 9. Rudra as the Supreme Cause, and Lord of Souls, yond both night and day, P. I02. P. 345- VI. I0. God as the Magician, IV. 22. A eudemonistic pra- and Prakriti as his Magic yer to Rudra, p. 299. Power, p. 185.

UPANISHAD INDEX 419

VI. II. The Elements as in- VI. 16. God as the Lord of formed by God, pp. 100-I01. Pradhāna, p. 185. VI. II. God as the Spectator, VI. 18. Brahma as the first p. 186. VI. I1. The One God as im- creation of God, p. 187. VI. 20. There can be no end manent in the whole Uni- to sorrow without the know- verse, p. 208. ledge of God, p. 316. VI. 12. Rudra as the Mover of VI. 21. The revelation of the theunmoving manifold, p. ioz. VI. 12. Highest happiness Upanishad through the Grace of God, p. II. arises by seeing God within VI. 22. 23. Faith necessary oneself, p. 316. for the communication of VI. 13. Mention of Sāmkhya mystic knowledge, p. 333- and Yoga together, p. 182. VI. 16. God described again VI. 23. Bhakti to God as to Guru, p. 198. as the Time of Time, p. 100.

PRAŚNA UPANISHAD

I. 3-13. Rayi and Prana con- V. 1-5. Meditation on Om re- ceived in the manner of moves the slough of sin, Aristotle's Matter and Form, p. 335- pp. 92-93- I. 16. Māya as crookedness, VI. I. Untruth, as drying up falseness, and illusion, a man from the very roots, p. 226. P- 312. VI. 2. The Purushawith II. 1-12. On the supreme im- Sixteen Parts, p. 183. portance of Prāņa, pp.90-91. VI. 4. The Constituents of the Person with Sixteen Parts, IV. 2. Sleep caused by the ab- pp. 183-184. sorption of the Senses in VI. 5. Destruction of Name the Mind, p. 123. and Form in the final mer- IV. 4. The Mind, which is the Sacrificer, is carried to Brah- gence in the Absolute, p. 165. man every day, p. 125. VI. 5. The parts are to the IV. 5. Dreams as both produc- Person as rivers are to the tive and reproductive, Ocean, p. 180. pp. 126-127. VI. 6. The parts of Purusha IV. 6. Mind is merged in an are centred in Him as spokes ocean of light in deep sleep, in the navel of a wheel, p.185. p. I23.

420 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

MAITRI UPANISHAD.

L. 1-7. On the superiority of II. 8. Internal sound as the the Brahmins to the Ksha- result of the processes of di- triyas, p. 63. gestion and assimilation, I. 7. Brihadratha's request P 343- for initiation, p. 198. II. 8. The Sound within man I. 2-7. The pessimism of Bri- as the Ultimate Reality, p. hadratha, p. 294- 25I. I. 2. An enumeration of the seven Dhātus, p. 189. VI. I. The inner Self governs all external existence, p. 120. II. 1-3. Vision of one's Self in VI. 30. Thought as the root a flood of supreme light, of all mental processes, p. I18. P. 346. VI. 38. The Soul described as II. 3-4. The Soul as the Mo- either atomic, or of the size ver of the body-chariot, of a thumb, a span, or the pp. 133-134- whole body, p. 138.

MĀŅDŪKYA UPANISHAD.

I-12. Om as the representa- sciousness and the four Aspects tion of the various States of of Soul, pp. 139-140. Consciousness, and the va- 6, 7. God and the Absolute, rious Aspects of Soul, p. 219. P. 336. 9-II. On the meaning of the 2-7. The four States of Con- parts of Om, p. 36.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE

I. TEXTS.

A handy edition of the texts of the Upanishads can be had at the Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay, entitled Twenty-eight Upanishads, which contains almost all of the more prominent Upanishads, ex- cluding the Maitri. Another edition of the Twenty-eight Upa- nishads is published also at the Venkateshwar Press, Bombay. The Anandashram Press, Poona, has published an edition of Thirty-two Upanishads, which excludes the famous ten Upanishads, with an inclusion, however, of Kaushitaki and Maitri along with other Minor Upanishads. This edition of Minor Upanishads is printed with the commentaries of Narayana and Sankarananda. Jacob has brought out an edition of the Eleven Atharvana Upanishads in the Bombay Sanskrit Series, which also contains Upanishads be- yond the ordinary ten. An excellent edition of the Miscellaneous Upanishads can be had at the Adyar Library, Madras, edited by the Director of the Manuscripts Library. Dr. Schrader, who was the Director of that Library in 1912, brought out an edition of the Samnyasa Upanishads during that year, but when he was re- quired to go to Europe during the war, his place was taken up by his successor A. Mahadev Shastri, who has recently brought out editions of the Yoga Upanishads in 1920, Vedanta Upanishads in 1921, and Vaishnava Upanishads in 1923. It seems only one volume on Saiva Upanishads from out of the original plan yet re- mains to be edited. All the Upanishads have been edited with the commentary of Upanishad-Brahmayogin. The get-up of the volumes leaves nothing to be desired, and we cannot recommend to our readers a more beautiful or more handy edition of the Minor Upanishads than the edition of the four volumes brought out from Adyar.

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As regards the Hundred and Eight Upanishads, there was an edition brought out by Subrahmanya Shastri at Madras in 1883. Later on, the Tattvavivechak Press, Bombay, brought out an edition of the same Hundred and Eight Upanishads, while a handy edition of the Hundred and Eight Upanishads can now be had even at the Nirnayasagar Press, Bombay. In the absence of a more reliable edition, we can recommend this to all students of Upanishadic literature, who care for the canon of the Upanishadic literature "in extenso." There are a number of other Upanishads which exist beyond the so-called Hundred and Eight, which have been catalogued in the volume on the bibliography of the Upanishads published at Adyar, as well as with greater fulness and precision in the " Creative Period of Indian Philosophy " by S. K. Belvalkar and R. D. Ranade.

It is strange that there should not have been even a single ex- ceedingly reliable edition of the Texts of the Upanishads. We recommend the production of such a one to all those who are in- terested in the literary side of the Upanishads. Lanman's dictum ("Beginings of Hindu Pantheism") remains only too true that "a critical text of all the old Upanishads conveniently assembled in one volume with a philologically accurate translation and various useful appendices is still one of the pressing needs of Indology."

Colonel Jacob has laid all students of Upanishadic literature under immense obligations by editing a Concordance to the Princi- pal (56) Upanishads, along with the Bhagavadgita. This piece of literary work is exceedingly creditable to one who was serving in the Indian Army. One wishes that there were more happy surprises of that kind from the Indian Army !

II. COMMENTARIES.

All the great Schools of Vedanta Philosophy have had their own commentaries on the Upanishads, as on the Brahma-Sutras, and the Bhagavadgita. The Commentaries of Sankara on the various Upanishads have been printed in the Anandasram Press, Poona, u

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 423

also in the collected edition of his works printed at Vanivilas Press. They are also edited in one volume by H. R. Bhagavat, Poona. Sankara's commentary on the Karikas of Gaudapāda, which are themselves a commentary on the Mandokyopanishad, is most famous, as well as his commentary on the Brihadaranyaka. This last has been again commented on by Suresvarācharya in his Värtika. Doubt has sometimes been thrown upon Śankara's commentary on the Svetasvatara Upanishad ; but his commenta- ries on the other Upanishads have been regarded as authentic. There has been a very good one-volume edition of the principal Eleven Upanishads commented on by Swami Achintya Bhagawan and printed at the Nirnayasagar Press, 1910, which follows in substance the commentary of Sankara on the Upanishads. If one wishes to have an epitome of Sankara's commentaries on the Upanishads, one can have it in this edition of Swami Achintya Bhagawan. The edition is also beautifully printed and is handy. Another running commentary on the substance of the various Upanishads, following the Advaita school of Philosophy, is entitled " Anubhütiprakaśa, " and has been written by the famous Madha- vācharya.

The Commentaries of Ramanuja on the Upanishads are not so well-known as his commentary on the Brahma-Sutras. There is a mention of the existence of his commentaries on the Upani- shads in an edition printed at Madras, which is however, in any case, not very accessible. On the other hand, the commentaries of Ranga Ramanuja on the various Upanishads following the Visishtadvaita school of thought are better known. The Anan- dashram Press has printed Ranga Rāmānuja 's commentaries on the Brihadaranyaka, the Chhandogya, the Katha and the Kena Upanishads. The last two Upanishads with Ranga Rama- nuja 's commentary have been also edited by Shridharashastri Pathak, of the Deccan College, Poona.

The Commentaries of Madhva on the Upanishads can be had in the Sarvamula Series edited at the Madhavavilas Book Depot,

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Kumbhakonam. Extracts from Madhva 's commentaries along with the original Upanishads and translations have been pub- lished at the Panini Office, Allahabad.

The Brahma-sütras themselves are an aphoristic summary of the Upanishads, borrowing words and ideas from them, and link- ing them together in a theologico-philosophical context. It is the commentaries of the great Teachers on the Brahma-sūtras, which are, however, more famous than the commentaries on the Upanishads themselves. These commentaries constitute the later Vedanta proper, and use the scholastico-logical method, as has been pointed out in the Preface, instead of the mystico-intuitional one.

III. TRANSLATIONS.

The most important work that has been hitherto done on the Upanishads is the work of Translation. Through a long perlod ot years the Upanishads have afforded a temptation for the aspiring Translator to try his hand at in various languages. The first known translation of the Upanishads was done into Persian during the years 1656-1657 by the Pandits in the court of Dara, the son of Shah Jahan. The first notice of the Upanishads to the Western world was through Anquetil du Perron's translation en- titled the "Oupnek 'hat, " two volumes, Strassburg, 1801-1802, which was a rendering into Latin of the Persian translation above referred to. The substance of the Latin translation appeared in French in the year 1832 in J. D. Lanjuinais's " Recherches sur les Langues, la Littérature, la Religion et la Philosophie des Indiens," 1832. Ram Mohan Roy published his translation of the Isa, Kena, Katha, and Mundaka Upanishads during the same year. namely, 1832. Exactly fifty years later, the Oupnek'hat was translated into German at Dresden, 1882. It may thus be seen how the Sanskrit Upanishads were rendered into Persian at the time of Dara, how the Persian translation in its turn was rendered into Latin by Anquetil du Perron in 1801-1802, and how the Latin translation was itself rendered both into the French and German languages during the course of the last century.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 425

One of the earliest translators of the Upanishads into English was Roer, who published his translations of nine Upanishads, Isa, Kena, Kațha, Prašna, Muņdaka, Māndūkya, Aitareya, Taittirīya, and Śvetasvatara at Calcutta in 1853. His translation of the Bri- hadāranyaka came also later on. Max Muller was the first syste- matic translator of all the chief Upanishads at the Clarendon Press in two volumes, 1879-1884. Whitney published a review of this translation in the American Journal of Philology in 1886, in an essay entitled The Upanishads and their latest Transla- tion ". Paul Deussen's monumental "Sechzig Upanishad's des Veda, " pp. 946, was published at Leipzig, 1897, and con- tains a translation of all the fifty Upanishads included in the Oup- nek'hat, as well as ten other Atharvana Upanishads. It is un- fortunate that Deussen 's translation has not yet been rendered into English. It contains very useful introductions to all the Upa- nishads, as well as to each section of them. This work was re- viewed by Bohtlingk in an essay entitled "Bemerkungen zu einigen Upanishaden " in 1897, where he pointed out a number of points in which he differed from Deussen.

G. R. S. Mead 's translatlon of the Upanishads in collaboration with J. C. Chhattopadhyaya in 1896, in two volumes, was pub- lished by the London Theosophical Society. Volume I. contains translations of the Isa, Kena, Katha, Prasna, Mundaka, and Man- dukya Upanishads, and Volume II, of the Taittiriya, Aitareya and Śvetasvatara Upanishads. Mead 's translation excited such an interest in the European world that it was translated both into the French and Dutch languages in 1905 and 1908. S. Sitaram Shastri and Ganganath Jha's Translation of the Upanishads in five volumes with Sankara's commentary ( Natesan, Madras, 18g8-1901 ) contains texts of the Isa, Kena, Mundaka, Katha, Prašna, Chhāndogya, Aitareya and Taittirīya Upanishads, and is so neatly done and so finely printed that it perforce invites the study of the beginner in Upanishadic literature. One wishes very much that Natesan might add the translation of the five remain- ing Upanishads, Mandūkya, Brihadāraņyaka, Švetāśvatara, Kau- 54

426 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY

shitaki, and Maitri to the already translated eight, so as to make a fine set of volumes of the Translations of the chief Upanishads along with Texts. Sitanatha Tattvabhushan's Translation of the Upanishads in three volumes, Calcutta, 1900, contains all the thirteen principal Upanishads except Maitrāyani. S. C. Vasu has edited the Isa, Kena, Katha, Prasna, Mundaka, and Man- dakya Upanishads with extracts from Madhva's commentary, Panini Office, Allahabad, 1911. He has translated the Chhân- - dogya and the Brihadaranyaka Upanishads likewise with extracts from the commentary of Madhva. Tukaram Tatya has brought out an eclectic edition of the Translations of the Twelve principal Upanishads which includes the translation of the Isa, Kena, Katha, Praśna, Mundaka, Māndūkya, Aitareya, Taittirīya, Śvetāsvatara and Brihadāranyaka Upanishads by Roer, of the Chhandogya by Rajendralal Maitra, and of the Kaushitaki by Cowell. The Maitri is unrepresented in this volume. R. E. Hume's translation of the Thirteen Principal Upanishads, Oxford, 1921, is the latest, most handy, and most serviceable of all. Mr. Hume has profited by the translations of all his predecessors, while his Bibliography is remarkably clear and useful. Our own Bibliographical Note owes not a little to him.

Of the translations of the Upanishads in the Vernaculars, there are many. We might mention C. G. Bhanu's translation of the Various Upanishads in Marathi along with the commentary of Sankara in a series of volumes, and H. R. Bhagavat's text and translation in Marathi of various Upanishads in two volumes, the first containing the more important and classical Upanishads, and the other a few of the minor Upanishads. Vishnu Shastri Bapat's translation of the Upanishads in Marathi as well as his translation of the Bhashya of Sankara on the Upanishads are the most pains- taking of Marathi translations. There are translations of the Upanishads in every language of India, and particularly the Ben- gali. The Bibliography would be inordinately swollen if we were to mention all the translations in the various languages.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 427

As regards the translations of single Upanishads in serial order, we might mention first Aurobindo Ghose 's translations of the Isa, Katha, and other Upanishads, which are interspersed with the philosophical reflections of the author. Prof. M. Hiriyanna's translations of the Kena, Katha, and other Upanishads with the commentary of Sankara have appeared recently, while the Keno- panishad has been transliterated and translated by Oertel, Pro- fessor at Yale, 1894. The Kathopanishad seems to find parti- cular favour with translators, and there are numerous transla- tions of it in various languages. Thus Paul Regnaud published a translation of the Kathopanishad in French, Paris, 1898, while the same Upanishad was also translated into Swedish by Butenschön, Stockholm, 1902, and into Italian by Belloni-Filippi, Pisa, 1905. Whitney's translation of the Kathopanishad, Boston, 1890, is a remarkable piece of work, in which he proposes a num- ber of textual emendations, and adds a critical introduction.

Johannes Hertel has recently published a critical edition of the Mundakopanishad, Leipzig, 1924. Hertel's is an ambitious method of editing. He goes into questions of Metre and Language, differentiates the Traditional from the Original text, then gives a Restored text, and then discusses the contents, the origin, and the age of the Mundakopanishad, along with its references to Jainism. After this prelude, Hertel prints the text of the Mundakopanishad by the anastatic method, borrowing it from. the Bibliotheca Indica. Hertel may have been inspired to adopt his method of the discus- sion of the Mundakopanishad from attempts like that of Father Zimmermann on the Mahānārāyana Upanishad, which was his Ph. D. Thesis, in which he discusses the Sources and the Relation between the different recensions of that Upanishad. Prof. Zimmer- mann goes into the text-parallels of the Upanishad, and the relation of them, and then proceeds to point out the contents and the sources of the Upanishad, and then ends with an arrangement of matter. In fact, such a method of procedure should be made ap- plicable to every Upanishad,

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M. N. Dvivedi's translation of the Mandukya Upanishad with the Karikas of Gaudapada and the Bhashya of Sankara, 1894, is remarkable in many respects. It was the first notice of that great Heracleitian philosopher Gaudapada in English. Recently an amount of literature is coming out on Gaudapada and on his relation to the Madhyamika Sutras. Prof. Vidushekhara Bhattacharya, Shantiniketan, is making a special study of Gauda- pāda, and one feels no doubt that when Gaudapāda is rendered well into English, his relation to the Madhyamika Sutras is pointed out, and a survey is taken of his contribution to Philosophy, he is bound to startle the world of thought. As regards the Tait- tirīya Upanishad, A. Mahadeva Shastri has brought out a classical edition of that Upanishad with an English translation and the Commentaries of Sankarāchārya, Surešvarāchārya, and Vidyā- ranya, pp. 791, Mysore, 1903, which would be most serviceable to all the students of that Upanishad.

Otto Bohtlingk has done very classic work in turning out the editions of two of the biggest Upanishads, namely the Brihadaran- yaka and the Chhandogya, the one printed at St. Petersburg, and the other at Leipzig. It is remarkable that the two editions were printed simultaneously, and appeared in the same year, namely 188g. While both the editions have been carefully edited, the Chhandogya has particularly a very beautiful appearance. The principle of paragraphing is retained in both the Upanishads, and Böhtlingk has emended the text in various places, though not always successfully. For example, for the reading Vijitāya (Chhändogya IV. I. 4) Böhtlingk substitutes Vijitvarāya, and for Tajjalāniti, he reads Tajjānānīti (Chhāndogya III.14.1.), of which the first is unnecessary, and the second awkward. Nevertheless, the editions of the Brihadaranyaka and the Chhan- dogya edited with text and translation by Böhtlingk have re- mained quite classical, though they are somewhat inaccessible in India. Böhtlingk soon followed this achievement by his edi- tions of the Katha, Aitareya and Prasna Upanishads, with their texts in Devanagari, and translation and notes in German, Leip-

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 429

zig, 1891. Whitney published a review of Böhtlingk's transla- tions of the various Upanishads in the American Journal of Phi- lology, subjecting them to a very detailed examination, and Böht- lingk replied to these criticisms in 1891. All this is a matter of literary give and take, which would certainly be enjoyed by those who take a philological interest in the Upanishads.

E. B. Cowell's translations of the Kaushitaki and the Maitri Upanishads with the commentary of Ramatirtha ( 1861,1870). have also remained classical works on those two Upanishads. A. Mahadeva Shastri's edition of the Amritabindu and Kaivalya Upanishads, text and translation, is a handy little volume. Narayanaswami Iyer has translated Thirty Minor Upanishads at Madras, 1914. Finally, S. K. Belvalkar's "Four Unpublished Upanishads," containing texts and translations of the Bashkala, the Chhägaleya, the Arsheya, and the Saunaka Upanishads ( 1925), of which the first was printed by Dr. Schrader but the rest were only in MS. form in the Adyar Library, has been published by the Academy of Philosophy and Religion, and can be had at its Poona Branch, Poona, India.

IV. SELECTIONS.

One of the earliest of books of Selections from the Upanishads was by Paul Regnaud entitled Materiaux pour servir à l'histoire de la philosophie de l'Inde, Paris, 1876. It contains numerous passages from the original Upanishads in transliterated form to- gether with French translation and topical arrangement. Reg- naud had intended this book for a short account of the ancient philosophy of India. Another book on Selections from the Upa- nishads in English by John Murdoch, Madras 1895, is intended not so much to illustrate the philosophy of the Upanishads, as to prove the superiority of Christianity to the philosophy of Hin- duism. L. D. Barnett's Some Sayings from the Upanishads London, 1905, as well as his Brahma-Knowledge, London 1906, are sprightly little volumes which take us to the heart of Upanishadic

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teaching. Deussen's Die Geheimlehre des Veda, Leipzig, 1907, is intended as a summary of the "Sechzig Upanishad's" and contains selections from fourteen Upanishads. Hillebrandt, the famous Vedic scholar, has produced a work of selections entitled Aus Brahmanas und Upanishaden, Jena, which contains typical pas- sages from the Brahmanas as well as the Upanishads to illustrate the early philosophy of India. Hillebrandt does not make a sufficient differentiation between the Brähmanas on the one hand and the Upanishads on the other, and hence finds " ritual and superstition freely mixed with pure ideas of philosophy " in his little volume. He says that he is satisfied that he has many agreements with Oldenberg, particularly when the latter says that the philosophy of the Upanishads cannot, in any way, be com- pared to the philosophies of Kant and Schopenhauer, and is there- fore open to the same criticism which we have made against Old- enberg in the Preface. As a sprightly little volume, Johannes Hertel's Die Weisheit dex Upanishaden, Munchen, 1921, is more sti- mulating than Hillebrandt's selections, though occasionally one- sided. Hertel brings together selections from the Isa, Kena, Kațha, Chhāndogya, Brihadāranyaka, Aitareya, and Kaushītaki Upanishads, and says that he wants to present the Upanishads in readable German, not that his book is intended specifically for Indologists. Hertel's work whets thought, even though his conclusions are not always satisfactory. We have noticed in the Preface how in two little points we disagree with the meaning which Hertel finds in the Kenopanishad. Hertel gives introduc- tions to all his selections, which makes the book more valuable than Hillebrandt's, which does not contain such introductions. Paul Eberhardt's Der Weisheit letzter Schluss, Jena, 1920, is also a book of selections from the Upanishads, and contains thirty- seven passages topically arranged. The author of the present work has also an intention of bringing out an edition of Selee- tions from the Upanishads from the specifically spiritual point of view. It was Ram Mohan Roy's deliberate opinion that Selections from the Upanishads published and largely circulated would contribute more than anything else to the moral and religious

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 431 elevation of his countrymen, and it may seem as if the spiritual Selections from the Upanishads which the author of the present work intends to bring out will satisfy this urgent need.

V. REFERENCES.

The references to Upanishadic literature are vast and various. We can tabulate here only the principal among them under three different heads, references in the Histories of Literature, refer- ences in the Histories of Religion, and references in the Histories of Philosophy. Weber's Indische Studien Vols. I. and II. con- tain series of articles on almost all of the Upanishads in this vol- ume, with the exception of the Aitareya and the Brihadāran- yaka. We have also a treatment of the Upanishads in his His- tory of Indian Literature, as well as in Monier Williams's Indian Wisdom. Other references to the philosophy of the Upanishads are to be found in Leopold von Schroeder 's Indiens Literatur und Cultur, 1887, in Prof. Macdonell 's History of Sanshrit Literature, pp. 218-243, as well as in Winternitz's Geschichte der indischen Lit- teratur Vol. I., pp. 210-229. All these try to sum up concisely the teachings of the Upanishads, and indicate their general place in the history of Sanskrit Literature.

So far as the Histories of Religion are concerned, we may men- tion Hopkins's Religions of India, and Geden's Studies in Eas- dern Religions, as well as his later Studies in the Religions of the East. These indicate the religious place of the Upanishads in Indian thought.

Among Histories of Indian Philosophy we might make special mention of Prof. Radhakrishnan's Indian Philosophy Volume I., and Das Gupta's History of Indian Philosophy Vol. I., which con- tain recent pronouncements on the philosophy of the Upanishads. Strauss 's Indische Philosophie contains a treatment of the philo- sophy of the Old Upanishads at pp. 42-61, and of the New Upa- nishads at pp. 62-85, which would amply repay perusal.

432 SURVEY OF UPANISHADIC PHILOSOPHY Among other references to Upanishadic literature, we might make mention of Prof. Keith's chapter on the Upanishadic Period in the Cambridge History of India Vol. I, chapter 5, wherein he points out that the theory of Transmigration was a new theory in the Upanishadic days, having been entirely absent in the Bräh- mana period. He also suggests that it would not be correct to suppose that the Brahman Doctrine was the reaction of the noble class against the devotion of the priests to the ritual. On the other hand, he points out that it must have been through policy that the Brahmins ascribed the Brahman doctrine to the noble class (pp. 142-144). We have pointed out in the third chapter of this book how the idea of Transmigration could be traced even "to the Vedic days ; hence it was not entirely new to the Up- nishads. Also, we have suggested at the end of the first chapter that the doctrine of Brahman conld be regarded neither as Brah- manic nor as Kshatriyan, and that anybody, who came to "know', to whatever class he might have belonged, was regarded as a Sage. To attribute policy to the Brahmins would not be a satisfactory solution. A last reference to Upanishadic literature we should make men- tion of is an Article on the Upanishads in the Encycyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics by the Rev. A. S. Geden, the Translator of Deussen's Philosophy of the Upanishads. The editor of the Encyclopaedia could not have pitched upon a more suitable per- son to write the article on the "Upanishads." The article also con- tains a useful little Bibliography at the end of it. VI. ESSAYS AND WORKS. There are a number of important essays and systematic trea- tises connected with either a part or the whole of Upanishadic Philosophy. We must begin by noting a somewhat brilliant idea in Otto Wecker's Der Gebrauch der Kasus in der alteren Upa- nishad-literatur, Tübingen, 1905, wherein by a consideration of the various cases in ten of the principal Upanishads he comes at a chronological order of the Upanishads relative to the age of

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 433

Panini. This is rather an important idea ; for, Panini seems to have flourished before the Upanishadic era had faded away, and therefore, some Upanishads wherein the Paninian uses do not occur may safely be taken to be pre-Panini, while others where they do occur may be taken to be post-Panini. With this important hint, Wecker arranges the Upanishads in four groups ; Group one con- sists of the Brihadaranyaka, the Chhandogya, and the Kaushi- taki ; Group two, of the Aitareya, the Taittiriya, and the Katha: Group three, of the Kena, and the Isa ; Group four, of the Svetāsva- tara and the Maitri. The first two are evidently pre-Panini, the third possibly pre-Panini, while the last is post-Panini. In fact, this procedure of Wecker, in which he tries to arrive at a date of the Upanishads from a grammatical point of view is far more valid than that which avails itself of the presence or absence of the idea of Transmigration which we have noted in the first chapter of this work. One wonders why the idea of Incarnation has not been similarly requisitioned for such purposes. In an essay on The Dramatic Element in the Upanishads in the Monist, 1910, Charles Johnston discusses certain dialogues from the Brihadāranyaka, the Chhan- dogya, and other Upanishads. A. H. Ewing writes a study in Upanishadic psycho-physics by considering the Hindu conception of the function of Breath. Dr. Betty Heimann offers a review of the Upanishadic speculations on deep-sleep in his Die Tiefschlaf- Spekulation der alten Upanishaden, 1922, while Rumball has writ- ten an essay on The Conception of Sin in the Upanishads, Open Court, 1909. We thus see how a searching analysis of the Upa- nishads has been made in the interest of the different studies pursued by Scholars.

Similar is the case with certain other essays on Upanishadic subjects. We have already pointed out in our Preface how in his Die Samkhya-Philosophie, Leipzig, 1894, Richard Garbe goes into a detailed survey of the relation of the Upanishads to the Samkhya system, and comes to the conclusion that the Sam- khya system originated in the mid-Upanishadic period. Dr. Macnicol 's chapter on the Theism of the Upanishads in his work 55

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on Indian Theism is a very clever analysis of the theistic teach- ing of the Upanishads. Macnicol 's thesis is that we may suppose that the Upanishads maintain the theistic theory, because, as he says, the doctrine of Maya is unknown to the Upanishads. Mac- nicol comes to the conclusion that the Upanishadic theory of God is theistic-mystic, instead of pantheistic: "Dr. Caird in his luminous exposition of the closely parallel speculation of Plotinus has distinguished the body of ideas to which it appears to me the reflection of the Upanishads belongs as Mysticism from what is properly to be denominated Pantheism" (p. 59). We cannot go with Dr. Macnicol when he says that the Doctrine of Maya is unknown to the Upanishads ; but we do agree with him when he speaks about the mystic trend of Upanishadic doctrine, though a mysticism need not always be a mere theism. Professor John McKenzie's Hindu Ethics, Oxford, contains an excellent essay on the Ethics of the Upanishads ( pp. 67-99). We entirely agree with Mr. McKenzie that the Upanishadic ethical thinking is con- ducted in full view of the wider implications of human existence, namely, in other words, that the Upanishadic Ethics reposes on a solid Metaphysical basis : but we do not agree that the Upanishadic morality is ultimately unreal, or only Antinomian. A survey of the various views on Upanishadic Ethics in our Chapter VI would surely disprove all such partial views.

Of the strictly philosophical essays on Upanishadic subjects, we have, in the first place, Josiah Royce 's essay on the Mystical Con- ception of Being, as illustrated primarily from the Upanishads, in his World and the Individual. Royce tells us that he dwells so long on the Upanishads, because, as he says, "they contain already the entire story of the mystic faith so far as it had a philosophical basis " (p. 175). Royce characterises the mystical method as immediacy, and though he is not himself in sympathy with mys- ticism, nobody could have explained the mystic position better than Royce has done. Prof. Radhakrishnan's Reign of Religion in Contemporary Philosophy, McMillan, 1920, ends with a chapter on "Some suggestions for an approach to Reality based on the

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 435

Upanishads". We might see from this how Prof. Radhakrishnan himself regards the Upanishads as capable of giving us a point of view in contemporary thought. Prof. G. H. Langley, of Dacca University, writes an essay on the Conception of the Universal Spirit in the Upanishads, and its identity with the Individual Spirit in the Indian Philosophical Review, edited by A. G. Wid- gery and R. D. Ranade, April, 1920. Herein also he points out how the Upanishads differ from Kant. Not that Kant himself, according to Prof. Langley, is ultimately right, "for Kant re- gards that the Self in synthesising the given intuitions distorts the representations of the real object which give rise to them, On the other hand, Croce must be regarded as nearer the truth than Kant, when he says that the Self in synthesising is not dis- torting that which is given in experience, but is exercising only the essential function of spirit in revealing its true nature" (pp. 126-127 ). Finally, Dr. Barua in his Pre-Buddhistic Philosophy, Calcutta, 1921, goes into a very detailed analysis of all the Thin- kers of India before the days of Buddha, and naturally has to con- sider in extenso the teachings of Upanishadic philsophers like Uddālaka, Yājnavalkya, Pippalāda, and others. The great difficulty in the case of these Upanishadic Philosophers is, however, to clinch their personalities and doctrines, and if this could be successfully done,a volume on the " Philosophers of the Upanishads" could well be written on the lines followed by Dr. Burnet in his Early Greek Philosophy. Rudiments of such a possible work have been already indicated in the first chapter of the present volume.

It is to the great credit of the Christian Missions in India that they should have instituted research in various departments of Indian thought, and the Upanishads have not escaped their close attention. Even though the views that they take are bound to be in the interest of Christianity, nobody could question the la- bour they bestow upon the subjects they deal with. Slater's book on Studies in the Upanishads, Madras, 1897, is a very good and clever production ; only Slater does not suppose that the Upanishads are capable of supplying the idea of a universal religion :

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" If the dream of a universal religion be true-and we have but one science of the universe; and if the Fatherhood of God and the Brotherhood of man be true, there can be but one bond of spiritual union for such a family-that religion cannot possibly be based on the Upanishads. If you make them your religion, then you must be content to see it confined to a small corner of the globe, and to a select coterie even in that corner. For if, as it has often been urged, this ancient system can be properly un- derstood only in the original Sanskrit, then true religion at its highest, depends, not only on superior intellect, but also on special linguistic talent, and talent to study a dead language ! The thing, at lowest, is impracticable " (pp. 72). We fail to see what connection the idea of a universal religion has with language ; it has to do only with spirit, and not with the expression of it in any language. H. D. Griswold's treatise on Brahman : a study in the History of Indian Philosophy discusses at length the doctrine of Brahman in the Upanishads, and considers its religious, ethical, and philosophical consequences. Urquhart's Upanishads and Life, Calcutta, 1916, the argument of which work he also pursues further in his larger book on Pantheism and the Value of Life, dis- cusses the theism and the pessimism of the Upanishads, their metaphysical inadequacy, their religious and ethical effects, and ends with the message of Christianity for India.

Of the more systematic works on Upanishadic Philosophy as a whole, we have to mention first A. E. Gough 's Philosophy of the Upanishads, London 1882, which is probably the earliest of the kind, and which is a brilliantly written work, though it has a somewhat unsympathetic tone. Gough's view about the rela- tion of Sankara to the Upanishads is that his philosophy may be supposed to be a legitimate outcome of the teachings of the Upa- nishads-an opinion which has been challenged by critics who point out that Sankara 's philosophy is not the legitimate outcome of the teachings of the Upanishads. Deussen's Philosophy of the Upanishads, which has been translated by the Rev. A. S. Geden, 1906, is the next most systematic work on the Upanishads.

BIBLIOGRAPHICAL NOTE 437

Having spent a number of years on his "Sechzig Upanishad's", Deusen could speak with a master's voice on the central teachings of the Upanishads. Deussen 's work is entirely indispensable to students of Upanishadic thought. Prof. Radhakrishnan's Phi- losophy of the Upanishads, a separate print from his Indian Phi- losophy Vol. I., which has lately appeared, is a masterly and running survey of the teachings of the Upanishads, and comes from the hand of one who is deeply read in Western thought. Dr. S. K. Belvalkar and R. D. Ranade 's Creative Period of Indian Philosophy which will be published under the patronage of the University of Bombay, has been in the Press for some time past, and gives a detailed analysis of the contents of the various Upanishads arranged in their chronological and stratificatory order. There is also a very exhaustive survey in that book of a Century of Minor Upanishads, most of which have never been hitherto translated, and some of which have never been even printed.

There remain, however, two masterly treatises on the Philoso- phy of the Upanishads, one by Oltramare and the other by Olden- berg. Oltramare 's L'Histoire des Iddes theosophiges dans l 'Inde, Paris, 1907, contains a full account of Upanishadic phi- losophy in French, pp. 63-131. Oltramare first discusses such topics as Brahman, the Individual Soul, and the Identity of the Brahman with the Individual Soul. Then he proceeds to tell us how to know the Individual Soul is to know Brahman. He proceeds next to the question of the individualisation of Brahman, as well as the relation of the World to Brahman and Soul. Further, Oltramare proceeds to discuss the doctrines of Samsara and Moksha. Under these headings, he discusses such problems as the Mechanism of Metempsychosis, Works and Salvation, Knowledge and Salvation, and finally, the Meaning of Salvation. Lastly, he winds up by discussing the new tendency of religious thought in the Upa- nishads, as well as by an examination of the intellectual and moral influence of the Upanishads. Oldenberg 's Die Lehre der Upanishaden und die Anfänge des Buddhismus, Göttingen, 1915,

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pp. 374, is entirely worthy of the veteran scholar. In part one of this work, Oldenberg discusses the old Upanishads ; in part two, the new Upanishads and the beginnings of Samkhya and Yoga ; while in part three, he discusses the beginnings of Buddhism. After a preliminary chapter discussing such topics as the Land and Folk, the pre-historic back-ground, the Vedic gods, Death and the other world, and so forth, Oldenberg goes to the central con- ceptions of the Upanishads, namely those of Brahman and Atman, and their identification. He then discusses the problem of the relation of the Absolute to the World, and the meaning of the One and the Many. He proceeds next to discuss the question of the Absolute in itself, and the problem of the Personal and the Impersonal. He then applies himself to the question of " Seelen- wanderung", as well as to that of the Worth of Existence. He proceeds to discuss the question of Emancipation, the relation of Knowledge and Works, and the problem of the knowability of the Absolute. He ends his first part by a review of the literary form of the Upanishads, namely the prose and poetry of the Upani- shads, their dialogues, and such other similar matters. In part two, he considers the beginnings of Samkhya and Yoga, wherein he discusses such problems as the Gunas, the Purusha and the Pra- kriti, the discipline of Prana, the Asanas, and Miracles. In part three, he discusses the origin of Buddhism in a survey spreading over about sixty pages. We might easily see from these contents of Oltramare 's and Oldenberg's works that, like their great pre- decessor in the field, Deussen 's Philosophy of the Upanishads, they are fully philosophical in tone, and grapple with the central problems of Upanishadic thought. But they aim less at construc- tion than at mere exposition, and they have been written from the standpoint of the philosophy of the past. It might be easily seen, therefore, how a constructive presentation of Upanishadic Philosophy from the standpoint of contemporary thought was the necessity of the hour.

ERRATA PAGE 22. ( 10th line from the bottom ) heliolatory, read heliolatry 63. ( 3rd line from the bottom ) roof of philosophy in Greec read root of philosophy in Greece 75 ff. For Cosmogony, insert Heading Chapter II : Cosmogony 81. TO oy read To un op 95. ( 3rd line from the top ) whatoever read whatsoever 153. ανάμνησες read drcuvnG iS 223 ( 18th line from the top ) problem read the problem 228 ( 7th line from the top ) Sankara read Sankara 277 ( 5th line from the bottom ) it is read the Atman is 295 ( 1oth line from the bottom ) to us nearer read us nearer to 304 ( 1oth line from the top ) drashtavyo read drashtavyah 306 ( 1oth line from the top ) Neitzsche read Nietzsche 330 ( 14th line from the top ) There read there 344 ( 15th line from the top ) unmistakebly read unmistakably 106 कठ II. 5 कठ II. 5. 9 1I2 (6) शे. VI. I (e) शे. VI. 5 170 बृ. II. 15-17 ₹. II. 1. 15-17 172 कठ II. 2.12 कठ II. 4.12 कठ I. 2.21 कठ I. 2.22 175 7. IV. 4. 9-7 ब.IV. 4.6-7 177 डां. VI.6.Io छां. VI. 9-10 235 शे. VI. 5. शे. V.5 A. VI. 10 से. IV. I0 शे. VI. 9. शे. IV. 9 शे. VI. I. से. VI. II 237 ई.9, II. ई. 9-II. 238 कठ I. I.15 कठ I. 2. I5 239 . VI. 2. मे. VI. 5. से. VI. 53 के.VI. 23 शे. VI. I. I शे. VI. II 243 ₹. II. 8.8 व. III. 8.8 279 म. II. 6 म. II. 8. 282 शे. III. 2.3 शे. III. 2,3. 283 कठ II. 5-II कठ II. 5.I1 ₮. X. 901 T. X. 90.1 284 केन I. 2.8 केन I. 2-8 285 डो. VIII. 7.12 छो. VIII. 7-12 कठ I. 27 कठ I. 2.7 320 बृ. IV. 3.2 . IV. 3.21.

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AN ENCYCLOPAEDIC HISTORY OF INDIAN PHILOSOPHY.

The Academy of Philosophy and Religion has undertaken the preparation and publication of an Encyclopædic History of Indian Philosophy in sixteen volumes, much like the Cambridge Modern History, or the Cambridge History of English Literature, making use of the specialised labours of the many great savan/s of Philo- sophy in India, and bringing their researches to a focus in the Encyclopædic History, the volumes of which may be set down as follows :-

Vol. I. The Philosophy and Religion of the Vedas. Vol. II. A Constructive Survey of Upanishadic Philosophy (Now out.) . Vol. III. Philosophy and Religion of the Mahabharata, and the Bhagavadgīta. Vol. IV. The Philosophy of Buddhism. Vol. V. The Philosophy of Jainism. Vol VI. Philosophy of the Darsanas: Sāmkhya, Yoga, and Pūrva-mīmānsā. Vol. VII. Philosophy of the Darsanas : Nyaya and Vaiseshika. Vol. VIII. The Philosophy of Advaitism. Vol. IX. Non-Advaitic Vedānta. Vol. X. Indian Mysticism : Mysticism in Mahārāshtra (In the press). Vol. XI. Indian Mysticism: Mysticism outside Mahārāshtra. Vol. XII. Tendencies of Contemporary Thought. Vol. XIII. Sources. Vol. XIV. Sources. Vol. XV. Sources. Vol. XVI. Index.

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#5. Principal A. B. Dhruva, M. A., Professor of Sanskrit, Hindu University, Benares. 6. Prof. M. Hiriyanna, M. A., Professor of Sanskrit, Maharaja's College, Mysore. 7. Prof. Krishnaswami Iyengar, M. A., Professor of History, University of Madras, Madras. 8. V. Subramanya Iyer Esqr., B. A., Registrar, University of Mysore, Mysore. * 9. Dr. Ganganath Jha, M. A. D.Litt., Vice-Chancellor, Uni- versity of Allahabad, Allahabad. 10. Prof. K. Subramanyam Pillay, M. A. M. L., Law College, Madras. *II. Prof. S. Radhakrishnan, M. A., Professor of Philosophy, University of Calcutta, Calcutta. #12. Prof. R. D. Ranade, M. A., Director of the Academy of Phi. losophy and Religion, Poona Branch, Poona. #13. Dr. Brajedranath Seal, M. A. Ph. D. D. Sc., Vice-Chancellor University of Mysore, Mysore, Chairman. 14. Prof. Kuppuswami Shastri, M. A., Professor of Sanskrit, Presidency College, Madras. 15. Prof. E. A. Wodehouse, M. A., Professor of English, Dec- can College, Poona. 16. Prof. R. Zimmermann, S. J., Ph. D., Professor of Sanskrit, St. Xavier's College, Bombay'

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