1. Doherty_Contemporary_Debate_Advaitins_on_Avidya ( Article)

Journal of Indian Philosophy (2005) 33:209-241 c Springer 2005 DOI 10.1007/s10781-004-2599-2

MARTHA DOHERTY

A CONTEMPORARY DEBATE AMONG ADVAITA VEDANTINS ON THE NATURE OF AVIDYA

There is a current debate among Advaita Vedantins that has at stake the core tenets of Advaita - the possibility of non-duality (advaita) and of liberation (moksa) from samsāra. At the heart of the debate is a centuries-old dispute about the nature of avidya, which, though commonly translated as ignorance, has a much wider significance in Advaita Vedanta. Avidya has not only an epistemological meaning, but an ontological sense which is a major focus of the debate. The topic of avidya has a long history of controversy in the Advaita Vedanta tradition that may predate Sankara.2 It was Śankara's treat- ment of avidya, however, that triggered centuries of polemics by rival schools that criticized it, and Advaitins who defended it. Sankara's views on avidyā are also the focus of the current debate. It is legitimate to ask, however, how significant is the concept of avidya to the core tenets of Vedantic thought? Are differences of opinion mere "scholastic disputes over words or modes of expression [which] have but little philosophical significance," as Surendranath Dasgupta maintains (Dasgupta, 1991: 11)? Of what significance is the nature of avidya in understanding Sankara's thought? Sankara's commitment is to an inquiry into the nature of Brahman, not avidyā, as he clearly demonstrates on three different occasions where he abruptly dismisses a line of questioning that is pursuing the locus (aśraya) of avidyā. When asked to whom avidya belongs, Śankara

1 Expanded from a paper presented to the Fourteenth International Vedanta Congress, Oxford, Ohio (April, 2004). 2 Kumārila Bhațta (650-700 A.D.) in ślokavārtika-sambandhāksepaparihāra 84 asks how avidya can act on Brahman. "Since it is pure, and nothing other than that exists, how could avidya have any activity (pravrtti) on it, like in a dream?" svayam ca śuddharūpatvād asattvāc cānyavastunah svapnādivad avidyāyāh pravrttis tasya kimkrtā || Kumārila may be arguing against the Buddhists here, rather than against avidyā as a material cause, but the commentator, Pārthasārathi Miśra (1075 A.D.), calls the proponents of this view "those who hold that the self is non-dual" (ātmādvaitavādins). Also, Maņdana Miśra (660-720 A.D.), presenting the view of an opponent in the Brahmasiddhi, speaks of "those who contend that ignorance is the material cause of difference," (avidyopādana-bheda-vādibhiḥ). Brahmasiddhi, p. 10.

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replies that it belongs to the one who is asking the question, "If you ask, 'Whose then, is this avidya?' we say, 'It is yours, the one who asks.'"3 Or, it belongs to the one who sees it. "Here, one says, 'Whose is this avidya?' For whomever it is seen, it is his alone." And Sankara goes on to say that the question "Who sees avidya?" is meaningless.4 In the Upadeśasāhasrī, the same question, framed slightly differently, asks whether the mutual superimposition (adhyaropa) of the body and the self on one another is done by the assemblage of the body, etc., by the self, Sankara responds, "Whether it is done by the assemblage of the body, etc., or it is done by the self, what of it?" When the student persists and concludes that the superimposition is done by himself, Sankara cryptically replies, "Then don't do it."5 These answers may be a method of circumventing the logical diffi- culties in assigning the locus of avidya either to the individual (jīva) or Brahman, as Mayeda suggests (Mayeda, 1979: 79), or they may be a way of dealing with the reality of avidyā, as Hacker suggests, observing that these answers, though "not philosophically exact" are "pedagogically compelling" (Hacker, 1995: 65-66). In any event, they underscore Sankara's commitment to revealing the nature of Brahman, and to that end, removing avidya, not investigating its nature, a topic that, in contrast, occupied the attention of many of his successors. There is good reason for this preoccupation, however. The concept of avidya is crucial to the Advaita position, for without it, there is no non-duality (advaita). The perceived duality is sublated as a reality by the knowledge of an underlying non-dual reality. Understanding the duality as real is an error, which is a function of ignorance (avidya) of the non-dual reality. Recognizing that the tenability of advaita is dependent upon the establishment of avidyā, criticisms of avidyā are numerous among the opponents of Advaita Vedanta. If the concept of avidya can be dismantled, advaita is untenable. The most well known, though not the first, serious critic of avidyā was Rāmānuja (1017-1137) who opened the Śrībhāsya, his commentary on the Brahmasutra, with a 140-page mahā-siddhānta,

3 Kasya punar ayam aprabodha iti cet | yas tvam prcchasi tasya ta iti vadāmah BSBh 4.1.3., 833 in Brahmasūtraśānkarabhāsyam with the commentaries Bhāsyarat- naprabhā of Govindānānda, Bhāmatī of Vacaspatimiśra, Nyāyanirnaya of Anandagiri, ed. J.L. Shastri (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980). 4 atrāha sāvidyā kasya iti | yasya drśyate tasyaiva, BGBh 13.2, 311 in Bhaga- vadgītā Sānkarabhāsya Hindī-anuvāda-sahita (Gorakpur: Gītā Press, 1988). kim bhagavān dehātmanor itaretarādhyāropeņa dehādisanghātaktā athavātmakṛteti | gururuvāca yadi dehādisanghātakrtā yadi vātmakrtā kim tatra syāt U.S. 2.2.62-65.

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offering seven reasons why avidya as presented by Sankara is untenable (saptānupapatti). The conflict over the nature of avidyā has been primarily between the Viśistadvaitins or the Madhva dualists, on the one hand, and the Advaitins on the other, and has continued into this century.6 Recently, however, an interesting development has occurred which is the focus of the current controversy. Swami Satchidanandendra Saraswati (1880-1975), a scholar, prolific author and professed Advaitin criticized the Advaita tradi- tion's interpretation of avidya, not as an opponent of Sankara, but as an adherent.7 He advanced the view that all the post-Sankara com- mentators, apart from Sureśvara, have misinterpreted Sankara's representation of avidya. As a result, he maintained, the current

6 Among the earliest to attempt to refute the tenability of avidyā was Bhāskara (750 A.D.), who held that there is both identity and difference (bhedabheda), and elaborately criticized the avidya of Sankara in his commentary on the Brahmasūtra, the Bhāskarabhāsya. The Viśistādvaitin, Yāmunācārya (916-1038 A.D.) argued to refute the Advaita concept of avidya in his Samvit-siddhi, and his critique was sub- sequently elaborated upon by Rāmānuja (1017-1137). Rāmānuja's arguments were further elaborated upon by his commentators Sudarśana and Vedānta Deśika in the Śrūtaprakaśika and Satadusani respectively. The Advaita tradition has responded to these criticisms, most notably in the Advaitasiddhi, Madhusūdana Saraswati's (1570 A.D.) response to Vyāsarāya's (1478-1539 A.D.) criticism of avidyā in his Nyāyamrta. Advaitins maintain that the ciriticisms of avidya in Advaita are based on a faulty understanding of Sankara's concept of avidya and of the nature of con- sciousness. Rāmānuja's seven 'untenables' (saptānupapatti) have been closely ana- lyzed in this regard by a twentieth century pandit, Anantakrishna Shastri (1991), whose work, Satabhūsaņī , was a refutation of Vedānta Deśika's Sațadūșanī. For a brief history of this discussion, see John Grimes (1990), The Seven Great Untenables, pp. 3-4. Swami Satchidanandendra's core ideas appear in his first Sanskrit work, the Mulāvidyānirasa, published in 1929 under his pūrvāśrama name, Yellambalase Subbaraya (also Y. Subbarao, Subba Rao and Y. Subramanya Sarman). As the title suggests, this is primarily a detailed refutation of the Advaita tradition's presentation of avidya as having a causal component (mūlāvidya). Satchidanandendra authored over 200 works in Sanskrit, Kannada and English, each targeting a different type of readership; Sanskrit for his "orthodox section of the earnest students of Advaita Vedanta" (Māndūkya Rahasya Vivrti 1958: Introduction, p.1), Kannada as the vernacular for the lay people of his region, and English for both interested seekers and non-Sanskritic scholars, whom he generally disparages and considers less seri- ous. Among his Sanskrit works are Vedantadindima (1934), a commentary on Narasimha Saraswati's work of the same name; Sugama (1955) a commentary on Śankara's introduction to the Brahmasūtrabhāsya, the Pañcapādikaprasthāna (1957) an analysis of selected portions of the Pañcapadika which he compares with Śankarabhāşya; the Māndūkyarahasyavivrti (1958) an independent commentary on Gaudapāda's kārikās; the Kleśāpahārini (1968), an extensive commentary on Sur- eśvara's Naişkarmyasiddhi. The monumental Vedantaprakriyāpratyabhijña was published in 1964 to establish the method of Vedänta, which he determined as superimposition and negation (adhyāropa-apavāda). This work is also a detailed

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Advaita tradition, exemplified by the Śrngeri and Kañchi Śankarācarya Maths, is propagating an inaccurate view of Sankara, and one that is incompatible with non-duality (advaita) and with liberation (moksa). He offered his own interpretation of Sankara on avidya,8 for which he found endorsement in Gaudapāda. Conse- quently, he reduced the lineage of authentic Advaita ācāryas to Gaudapāda, Sankara, Sureśvara, and, implicitly, himself. He urged a return to the study of Sankara without what he considered the con- taminating influences of the post-Sankara commentators. In his lifetime he appealed to the Advaita tradition to concur with his position, engaging in a life-long dialogue with representatives of the Śrngeri and Kañchi Sankarācārya Maths, and with traditional Advaita pandits.9

(Footnote 7 Continued) analysis of the works of pre and post-Sankara commentators vis a vis their consis- tency with Sankara. The Sankaravedanataprakriya (1971) originally written in Kannada in 1956 is an exposition of the main features of Sankara's works. It was subsequently translated into Tamil and Telegu, and into English as the Salient Features of Sankara's Vedanta (1967). In 1974, just one year before his mahasamadhi at the age of 95, Satchidanandendra published a fresh commentary on Sankara's introduction to the Brahmasutras, the adhyasabhasya. He intended the work, Śankaravedāntamīmamsabhasya, to be the first part of a new commentary on the first five adhikaranas of the Brahmasutras, but due to failing eyesight was only able to complete the first part of this work. A posthumous publication of Parama- hamsamīmamsa was brought out in 1994 by his "grand-disciple" Kesavadhani, grandson of Swami Advaitanandendra, one of the first disciples of Swami Satch- idanandendra. In this work Satchidanandendra analyzes the śruti and smrti passages concerned with sannyāsa-viddhis. 8 The Mulāvidyanirasa (1929), Swami Satchidanandendra's first publication, is the primary source used in this work for his thoughts on the nature of avidya. In this work he gives his most comprehensive treatment of this topic and the arguments presented there appeared repeatedly throughout his subsequent publications. The original Sanskrit work is out of print and there are no plans to reprint it, though the English translation of A. J. Alston has been printed as The Heart of Sankara, by Shanti Sadan, London (1993). The work is organized into 187 short numbered sections and in referencing this work, I have used the Sanskrit text and referred to the relevant sections as paragraph numbers, except where there is a specific quote, in which case I have given the page number along with the paragraph number. 9 In 1961 Satchidanandendra published the Vijñapti, a detailed account of his differences with the Advaita tradition, which by this time had spanned more than 30 years. The Vijñapti was accompanied by a pamphlet "An Appeal to Thoughtful Vedantins" in which he listed three 'Points to be Settled,' to which he urged Advaita Pandidts to respond. This was followed in 1962 by his edited collection of some of those responses, the Vedantavidvadgosthī, along with his own English summary of each.

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These Advaitins, and their contemporary counterparts, reject Satchidanandendra's understanding of avidya, finding it, in turn, inadequate for the establishment of non-duality (advaita) and liber- ation (moksa). Through publications and public debate, they have defended the view of avidyā elaborated by the post-Sankara com- mentators, and argued for its fidelity to Śankara.10

POST-ŚAŃKARA ADVAITA COMMENTATORS' INTERPRETATION OF AVIDYĀ

To review the well-known Advaita Vedanta tradition's understand- ing of avidya, it is considered a twofold power (śakti) that has the capacity to both conceal reality (āvarana-śakti), and project an error (viksepa-śakti). Due to the concealing power of avidyā, an individual is denied the knowledge that (a) the world is not separate from Brahman, its 'cause' and (b) that Brahman is the nature of himself. Since what is concealed is the reality of a self-evident being, one's own self, this concealing power of avidyā provides the basis for a mistake. A pro- jection is inevitable, and transpires in the mind of the individual as an error about the nature of the self as limited in terms of time, place, etc. This error is a superimposition (adhyāropa|adhyāsa) upon the unrec- ognized reality, Brahman. There is a cause effect relationship between the concealing factor and the projected error; that is, the concealment (avarana) is the cause for the projection (viksepa) of the error. On the principle of the material cause inhering in the effect, both the concealing factor and its effect, the projection, are called avidya. To distinguish between them, some post-Sankara commentators refer to the con- cealing factor as "root-ignorance" (mūlāvidyā) in keeping with its

10 Opposing the views in the Vijñapti (see note 9 above) were S. Subramanya Sastri, Madras; K. Krsna Joshi Sarma, Bangalore; S. S. Raghavacarya, Mysore; and Laksminarasimha Sastri. Supporting Satchidanandendra's views were his student, Laksminarasimahmurti, S. Vittala Sastri, the āsthanavidvān of the Mysore Court; Joshi Ramakrsna Sarma; S, S, Ventkatesa Sarmsrti; P. Subrahmanya Sarma; and S. Anantamurti Sastri. Polagam Srirama Sastri did not respond to the Vijñapti, but in the Vedantavidvadgosthi Satchidanandendra printed selected portions of Polagam Srirama Sastri's Introduction to the Pañcapadika in which he had criticized Satch- idanandendra's views. One of the respondents to the Vijñapti, K. Krsna Joshi, published a more extensive defense of the traditional views in his Mūlāvidyā Bhāsya- vārtika-sammatā. A rebuttal to this, the Mūlāvidyā Bhāsya-vārtika-viruddhā was published by S. Vittala Sastri shortly after the mahāsamadhi of Swami Satchida- nandendra. A few months after its publication, these two authors, K. Krsna Joshi and S. Vittala Sastri, were the principle participants in a debate at Bangalore to try to settle the issue of Sankara's position on mūlāvidyā (see note 39).

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causal status. The reality that is concealed in the mind of an individual who has avidya is Brahman, the cause of the world (jagat). The Advaita ācāryas hold that avidya is not mere absence of knowledge. It is considered to have some kind of existence (kiñcid bhavarupa),12 because of its capacity to produce a manifest error. It exists, however, only until it is dispelled by a cognition (vrtti-jñana) that is its opposite, as light is opposite to darkness. Thus, the nega- tive particle (a = nañ) in a-jñana or a-vidya is understood in the sense of opposition, virodhārthe nañ. Avidyā is something (bhāvarūpa), which stands opposed to knowledge. Knowledge being its opposite (ajñana-virodhi), has the capacity to remove it. The cognition that dispels the avidya has the same degree of reality as avidya. Both are mithya, being dependent for their existence on Brahman. As an ontological term, the Advaita ācāryas consider avidyā syn- onymous with maya, the factor introduced to account for the world (jagat). While Brahman is the unequivocal cause of the jagat, both intelligent and material (abhinna-nimitta-upādāna-kāraņa), since Brahman is entirely without form and attributes, it cannot completely account for the name-form creation as its product. Māyā|avidyā, though not real, in that it is dependent for its existence on Brahman, provides, together with Brahman, the cause for the name-form world (jagat). The manifest jagat has the same degree of reality as its cause, māyā/avidya; both are dependent on Brahman for their existence, and are therefore mithya. Drawing support from Sankara,13 the Advaita tradition holds that, in addition to māyā the words avyākrta, avyakta, prakṛti, akaśa, and aksara are also synonyms of avidya. They all signify the unmanifest, undifferentiated, causal condition of the jagat. This causal avidya is also present in sleep, accounting for the oblivion experienced by the individual in that state. In sleep, the mind, shrouded in avidya, is aware of neither the self nor anything else. Consequently, there is no experience of the subject-object dis- tinction that characterizes the dream and waking states, and also,

11 Mandana Miśra, an elder contemporary of Sankara, is considered the first commentator in the Advaita tradition to clearly define the distinction of a concealing causal avidya and its projected effect, also called avidyā. The term mūlāvidyā was introduced later, probably by the post-Sankara commentator Vacaspati Miśra (960 A.D.). 12 Sadānanda Yogīndra, Vedāntasāra 2.33. 13 Most notably, avidyātmika hi bījaśaktir avyaktaśabdanirdeśyā parameśvarāśrayā māyāmayī mahāsuptiḥ ... tad etad avyaktam kvacid ākaśaśabdanirdistam ... kvacid akşaraśabdoditam. . . kvacin māyeti sūcitam. BSBh 1.4.3, Brahmasūtraśankarabhāsyam, p. 297. This is discussed in detail below. See note 32.

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defines samsāra. This avidyā in sleep is the same causal avidyā which accounts for the effect, the manifest projection of the waking and dream worlds, to which the individual emerges from the state of sleep. Appropriately, the individual in sleep is said to be wholly identified with his 'causal body' (karaņa-śarīra).

SWAMI SATCHIDANANDENDRA'S VIEWS ON AVIDYĀ14

Nature of Avidyā

Swami Satchidanandendra considers that avidya is used by Sankara only in the sense of superimposition (adhyāsa) - the mutual super- imposition of the self and the not self, as well as their properties, on one another. He bases this on a definition of avidya given by Sankara in his introduction to the Brahmasūtrabhāsya.

"Still, superimposing on one thing, another, as well as its properties, due not dis- tinguishing from one another the properties and their substantives which are com- pletely different, mixing up reality and unreality, there is this natural/innate behavior [worldly expression], 'I am this; this is mine', caused by mithyājñana ... That superimposition thus described, the learned consider avidya."15

Relying primarily on this definition and maintaining that it is the only definition of avidya given by Sankara, Swami Satchidanandendra proposes that superimposition (adhyasa) is the only meaning of avidyā used by Sankara. This avidyā/adhyasa, Satchidanandendra maintains, is uncaused. He provisionally accepts that the adhyasa is due to a lack of discrimination (aviveka) of the real and not real, and that this aviveka is also called absence of knowledge (a-jñāna). In discussing this absence of knowledge or viveka, Sankara, he main- tains, never uses the word avidya, but rather, a number of synonyms that imply "want of knowledge," like ajñāna, agrahana, anavagama, anavabodha. Thus the nañ in these compounds he reads as abhavārthe

14 Swami Satchidanandendra's thought was significantly influenced by his mentor Krishnaswamy Iyer, author of Vedanta or the Science of Reality (1930), though it was Satchidanandendra who systematically argued these ideas and sought support for them in Sankara. The single idea that can be considered Satchidanandendra's ori- ginal contribution is that there is no avidya in sleep. He successfully argued this point with Krishnaswamy Iyer who then persuaded him to publish his findings in what became the Mūlāvidyānirāsa (1929). 15 tathāpy anyonyasminnanyonyātmakatām a anyonydharmāmś tarāvivekenātyantaviviktyor dharmadharmiņor mithyājñananimittah satyārte mi- cādhasyetare-

thunīkrtya ahamidam mamedam iti naisargiko'yam lokavyavahārah | ... tam etam evam laksaņam adhyāsam panditā avidyeti manyante. BSBh, Introduction, 9-10, 19.

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nañ. He grants that because it is the cause of wrong knowledge "it is sometimes also called cause (kārana)." So too, he writes, "Wrong knowledge is referred to in the authoritative texts as the 'effect' of absence of knowledge," (Satchidanandendra, 1989: 48) with 'effect' in quotations indicating his use of the term only as a provisional con- cession. Since this superimposition (adhyasa), known as avidyā, is described by Sankara as beginningless (anādi),16 Swami Satchida- nandendra concludes, finally, that adhyāsa can have no cause. Swami Satchidanandendra, therefore, considers avidyā purely in its manifest form as error, which he also calls mithyā-jñana, false know- ledge. He does not accept a concealing power (āvarana-śakti) as its cause, even in an epistemological sense. Where there is ignorance of the self, Swami Satchidanandendra considers this to be absence of knowl- edge (jñana-abhāva), rather than the presence of a concealing power. Naturally, Swami Satchidanandendra's concept of avidyā in Śankara has no positive content (bhāvarupa), nor does he accept any ontological sense of the word avidya. Since Brahman is the only cause of the world, he rejects the concept of a causal avidyā (mūlāvidya). He finds no support in Sankara for a causal avidya accounting for the projection of the world (jagat), and regards this as an invention of post-Sankara commentators. He accepts māyā, prakrti, avyakta as causal at the level of known experience (vyavahāra), but does not accept avidyā. It follows that he rejects the equating of avidyā with māyā, prakrti, avyakta. Central to Satchidanandendra's position is that there is no avidya in the state of sleep; only the reality, Brahman, exists there. Consequently, the self is considered available in the state of sleep in its true form and the method of the analysis of the three states of experience (avasthātraya-prakriyā) assumes great importance.17

16 evam ayam anādir ananto naisargiko'dhyāso mithyāpratyaya-rūpah kartrtva- bhoktrtva-pravartakah sarva-loka-pratyaksah BSBh Introduction, Brahmasūtra- śankarabhāsyam, p. 25. 17 In his early works, beginning with the Mūlavidyanirasa, Swami Satchidanan- dendra maintained that the knowledge of reality is arrived at merely by an analysis of the three states of experience, waking, dream and sleep. All other methods were con- sidered to either subserve or compliment this method and to be unable to reveal reality on their own. He reasoned that since there is nothing outside of these three states, when they are analyzed, the truth is understood (Mūlāvidyānirāsa para. 65-67, 174). A sig- nificant part of this analysis is the state of sleep. There, he maintains that because of the absence of any limiting adjunct (upadhi) the self is available in an unconditioned form. Later Satchidanandendra modified his position on the method of determining reality. Though the analysis of the three states always had primacy, his search to "determine the true method of Vedanta" (Mūlāvidyānirāsa para. 2, p. 2) finally resolved in adhyāropa- apavāda, the governing thesis of his Vedānta-prakriyā-pratyabhijñā (1964).

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Source of divergent views

Satchidanandendra considers that the concept of a causal avidya (mūlavidya) has gained a place in the Advaita Vedanta tradition be- cause it has been the practice to study Sankara through two inter- preting schools of thought, the Vivarana18 and the Bhamati prasthanas.19 The third interpretive tradition, the Vartika school of Sureśvara, unlike the other two, Swami Satchidanandendra views as consistent with Sankara on every issue, including mūlāvidyā. Swami Satchidanandendra traces the introduction of the concept of avidyā as existent (bhāvarūpa), and as the material cause for the world (jagad-upādāna-kārana) to Padmapāda. These and other key elements of the concept of mūlavidya were indeed discussed by the author of the Pañcapadika, though he does not use the term mūlāvidya. The crux of the problem is Padmapada's reading of the compound mithyajñananimitta, in the section of the introduction to the Brahmasūtrabhāsya where Satchidanandendra determined that Śankara has defined avidyā as adhyāsa. There, as we saw, Šankara says that superimposing on one thing, another, "there is this natural/ innate behavior [worldly expression], 'I am this; this is mine,' caused by mithyajñana." ,,20 In commenting on this bhasya, Padmapada resolves the compound mithyājñananimittaḥ as mithyā-ajñana-nimitta and Swami Satchida- nandendra translates Padmapada's commentary on this passage from Śankara's bhāsya as,

"The compound word mithyajñana is made up of the words mithya and ajnana Mithyā means anirvacanīya [not definable] and ajñana means the insentient poten- tiality of avidyā as opposed to jñāna or sentiency. Adhyāsa has this avidyā-śakti [power of avidya] for its nimitta [cause], i.e., upādāna or material cause. This is the meaning."21

18 The Vivarana tradition originates from the Pañcapādikā, a commentary by Padmapāda on Sankara's bhāsya on the first four Brahmasūtras. 19 The Bhamati tradition is based on the Brahmasutra commentary of the same name by Vacaspati Miśra. 20 BSBh, Introduction, Brahmasūtraśankarabhāsyam, pp. 9-10, see note 15 above. 21 Satchidanandendra, Vedānta-prakriyā-pratyabhijña, pp. 106-107, English translation of mithyājñana-nimittaḥ iti| mithyā ca tad ajñanam ca mithyājnanam mithyeti anirvananīyatocyate| ajñānam iti ca jadātmakāvidyā-śaktir jñana-par- yudāsenocyate| tannimttaḥ tad upādāna ity arthaḥ. Šrī Padmapādācārya's Pañcapādikā with the Commentaries Vivarana by Śrī Prakāśātmamuni, Tattvadipana by Śrī Akhandanandamuni and Rjuvivaraņa by Šrī Visnubhattopādhyāya. (1992) p. 46.

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Swami Satchidanandendra finds several difficulties in this passage from the Pañcapadika. The most important one is Padmapāda's resolution of Sankara's compound mithyajñana as mithyā-ajñāna, it is ignorance and it is false (mithyā ca tad ajñānam ca mithyajñānam). As we saw, Swami Satchidanandendra understands it as mithyā-jñana, "false knowledge" or error. Other problems that he has are the various characterizations of avidyā as indeterminable (anirvacanīya), inert (jada), a power (śakti) and the opposite of knowledge (jñana- paryudasa). Satchidanandendra particularly rejects the assertion that the power of avidyā (avidyā-śakti) is the material (upādana) cause of superimposition (adhyāsa). The concept of avidya as a twofold power, one concealing and one projecting, existing in a cause effect relationship, Swami Satchida- nandendra traces to Mandana Miśra. Presenting it as the view of an opponent, which he subsequently accepts, Mandana characterizes avidya as a failure to apprehend (agrahana), resulting in an erroneous apprehension (viparyaya).22 Though Satchidanandendra attributed the introduction of the concept of this twofold avidya to Mandana, he determined that it was elaborated upon and firmly established in the Advaita tradition by Vacaspati Miśra in his Bhāmatī.23 To the extent that they subscribed to these ideas of Padmapāda and Mandana/Vacaspati, on avidyā, Satchidanandendra considers that subsequent commentators in the Advaita tradition have erro- neously presented the Advaita position.24 In his estimation, only Gaudapāda, Saņkara, and Sureśvara have maintained fidelity to the Advaita tradition in understanding avidya only in the sense of superimposition (adhyāsa).

22 tasmād agrahaņa-viparyaya-grahaņe dve'vidye kārya-kāraņa-bhāvenāvasthite,

20, 32, 33, 122. Brahmasiddhi by Acārya Mandanamiśra, pp. 149-150. See also Brahmasiddhi, p. 9,

In his commentary on BS 1.3.30, Vacaspati says that at the time of dissolution (mahapralaya), the mind and other phenomena are "dissolved in their own cause, the anirvacanīya-avidya," and "abide there in a subtle potential form along with the impressions of avidya which are the tendencies to the projections of actions. svakaraņe anirvacanīya-avidyayam tīnaḥ ... sukşmeņa śaktirūpeņa karma- viksepakāvidyā-vāsanābhih saha avatisțanta eva. Bhāmatī on BS 1.3.30. Translation is Satchidanandendra's, Vedānta-prakriyā-pratyabhijña, 114. 24 In addition to the nature of avidya, there are other issues on which these prasthanas differ significantly, both from each other and from Sankara. The con- clusions I draw about the post-Sankara commentators fidelity to Sankara on the

analysis. issue of avidya do not extend to other issues, each of which requires an independent

A CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 219

Implications

For Swami Satchidanandendra and his adherents,25 the view that avidyā has a causal form (mūlāvidyā), is a misrepresentation of Ad- vaita with far-reaching consequences.26 The most serious is that the concept of a mūlāvidyā makes it impossible to prove non-duality, for if mūlāvidyā is postulated as a cause of the world, this undermines Brahman's status as the only cause. If there is a cause other than Brahman, there is duality.27 The presence of avidya in sleep is simi- larly problematic, for if avidya is present in all three states, it is real, as real as Brahman, and therefore, a second reality.28 With a mūlāvidyā as an independent reality parallel to Brahman, there is duality. Consequently, there is no release (moksa) of the individual from the knower-known duality, which constitutes samsāra.

ADVAITINS' ARGUMENTS AGAINST SATCHIDANANDENDRA

The response of the Advaita tradition to Swami Satchidanandendra has been thorough and sustained. A full treatment of it is beyond the scope of a single paper, so I will just touch on one or two points here. The most vigorous respondent to Satchidanandendra's challenge was his elder contemporary, the eminent Polagam Srīrama Sastri, who devotes more than 100 pages of his introduction to the Pañcapadika to refuting Satchidanandendra's views.29 There, he identifies Swami Satchidanandendra's position as a reworking of the views of the Sanskrit grammarian, Nāgeśa Bhatța (1650-1750) in his Vaiyākaraņa-siddhānta-laghumañjusā.30 Since the issue is the correct understanding of Sankara, a common approach of both Swami

25 See note 10 above. 26 "It was the 'twist' of these commentators which gave rise ... to the ... Viśistadvaita of Śrī Rāmānuja and the Dvaita of Srī Madhva." K.B. Ramakrishna Rao, Introduction to S. Vittala Šāstri, Mūlāvidyā-bhāsya-vārtika-viruddhā, p. 7. 27 Mūlāvidyānirāsa, para. 53, 129. 28 ibid. para. 27. 29 Pañcapādikā of Śrīpadmapādacārya with Prabodhapariśodini of Atmasvarūpa, Tātparyārthadyotini of Vijñanātman, Pañcapādikāvivaraņa of Śrī Prakāśātman, Tātparydīpikā of Citsukhācārya and Bhāvaprakāśikā of Nrsimhāśrama, edited by S. Śrīrāma Sāstri and S.R. Krishnamurthi Sāstri (1958). 30 There is some historical basis for this, as Satchidanandendra deeply revered and is reported to have studied with the Mahabhagavata of Kurukoti, who was known in his time as an exponent of Nageśa Bhatta. Satchidanandendra's views on avidyā in Sankara have several features in common with those of Nageśa Bhatta. Nageśa rejects the interpretation of avidyā as existent (bhāvarūpa), indeterminable (anirva- canīya) and beginningless (anādi). He maintains, rather, that avidyā in Sankara's

220 MARTHA DOHERTY

Satchidanandendra and his opponents to defending their position is citing Sankara.

Avidyā and Māyā/Prakrti

Of the numerous bhasya passages which Srīrāma Sastri cites to demonstrate the causal nature of avidya, one which is of particular interest31 is Sankara's commentary on Brahmasūtra 1.4.3 (tadadhīnatvād arthavat).32 Sankara is demonstrating to an opponent that the causal (bijatmaka), unmanifest (avyakta) prior condition of this world (pragavastha), is not like the pradhāna of the Sankhyas because it is dependent on parameśvara. The pradhāna of the Sankhya, on the other hand, is independent. This prior condition has to be accepted, says Sankara, because without it, one cannot establish that parameśvara has the status of a creator. This would make the śruti statements that parameśvara 'creates' the world (jagat) untena-

(Footnote 30 Continued) commentaries signifies error (bhrānti-jñana) and the impression created by it (tat- samskāra). He considers avidyā only as an effect, with an undifferentiated and dif- ferentiated manifestation, but no causal form. This is consistent with Satchidanan- dendra's representation of avidya purely as an effect, and his rejection of a causal avidya. Although in other ways Satchidanandendra's views on avidya differ from those of Nagea, the seeds for his understanding of avidya in Sankara only as superimposition (adhyasa) can be seen here. It is likely, however, that Satchida- nandendra was not aware of the Mahabhagavata's adherence to Nageśa or the influence it had on his own thinking. When he was accused of plagiarizing Nageśa by S. Srirama Sastri, Satchidanandendra vigorously denied the charges and took pains to distance himself from Nageśa's views. While he agreed that adhyasa is the meaning of avidya in Sankara, and that apparent objects cannot have a birth, Satchidanan- dendra said that he found Nageśa's views "fundamentally opposed to Shankara," (Vedāntavidvadgoșțhī, p. 34). 31 This bhasya was also cited in a debate organized by Srngeri Math in 1976 in Bangalore to try and resolve the issue of mūlāvidya. See note 39 below. 32 yadi vayam svatantram kancit pragavasthām karanatvenabhyupagacchema prasañjayema tadā pradhānkāraņavādam parameśvarādhīnā tv iyam asmābhih prāgavasthā jagato'bhyupagamyate na svatantrā | sā cāvasyābhyupagantavyā arthavatī hi sā | na hi tayā vinā parameśvarasya srastrtvam siddhyati | śaktirahitasya tasya pravrttyanupapatteḥ | muktānām ca punaranutpattih | kutaḥ bījaśakter dahāt | avidyātmikā hi bījaśaktir avyakta-śabdanirdeśya parameśvarāśrayā vidyayā tasyā

māyāmayī mahāsuptiḥ | yasyām svarūpa-pratibodha-rahitāḥ śerate samsāriņo jīvāh tad etad avyaktam kvacid ākāśa-śabda-nirdistam 'etasminnu khalv aksare gārgy ākāśa otaś ca protaś ca' iti śruteḥ | kvacid akșara-śabdoditam 'akşarāt paratah paraḥ' iti śruteḥ | kvacin māyeti sūcitam 'māyām tu prakrtim vidyān māyinam tu maheśvaram' iti mantravarņāt | avyaktā hi sā māyā tattvāntatva-nirūpaņasya-aśakyatvāt BSBh 1.4.3, Brahmasūtraśankarabhāsyam, pp. 297-298.

A CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 221

ble.33 Without power (śakti), no activity (i.e. of creation) is possible. Since śruti attributes the activity of creation to parameśvara, the śakti required for that must necessarily reside with parameśvara. Then Sankara makes the argument that without the acceptance of avidyā, liberation is untenable. Liberation is due to the destruction of the causal potency (bīja-śakti) of avidyā by knowledge. The statement most germane to our discussion then follows. Sankara reiterates that this causal potency (bīja-śakti) is in the form of avidyā, has its basis in par- ameśvara (parameśvarāśraya) and is called avyakta. He goes on to say that in it are sleeping the individuals (samsārinah) who have no knowledge of their nature. This same avyakta is called ākāśa in some places. "In this imperishable akaśa, Gargī, is the warp and woof of creation,"(BrU 3.8.11). In some places it is called akşara. "The ultimate is beyond the highest imperishable, aksara," (MuU 2.1.2). In some places it is called is it called māyā. "May one know māyā as the cause, prakrti, while the one who wields the māya is the Lord," (SvU 4.10). It is not difficult to see why this is such a popular bhasya for the proponents of mulavidya. Here we find the kernel of several important ideas. First there is the statement that the prior condition, or causal form, of the world is in the form of avidya. Further, this avidyā, has a number of synonyms - avyakta, ākaśa, akara and māyā. From this is derived the equivalence of the words avidya and maya. Through the Śvetaśvatara-śruti quotation (SvU 4.10), these two, avidyā and māyā, are further equated to prakrti. Further, this cause is a power (śakti) that belongs to parameśvara. Some of the most striking equations of avidya and māyā/ prakrti occur in Sankara's comments on the Bhagavadgīta.34 Srīrāma Sāstri

33 sa īkşata lokānnu srjā iti AiU 1.1, idam asrjata Tai.U 2.6.1; tattejo'srjata ChU 6.2.3; idam sarvamasrjata BrU 1.2.4. 34 bhagavato māyāśaktih kşarākhyasya purusasya utpattibījam anekasamsāri-jan- tu-kāma-karmādi-samskārāśrayo'ksarah purusa ucyate | BGBh 15.16 Bhagavadgītā Śankarabhāşya Hindi-anuvādasahita, p. 377. svabhāvaḥ īśvarasya prakrtih trigunātmikā māyā atha vā janmāntarakrta-samskārah prāņinām vartmāna-janmani svakāryābhimukhatvenābhivyaktaḥ prabhavah yeșām guņānām | BGBh 18.41, ibid. p. 434. bhūtagrāma-bījabhūtād avidyālaksaņāt avyaktāt | BGBh 8.20, ibid. p. 222. mama māyā triguņātmikā avidyālaksanā prakrtih sūyate utpādyati sacarācaram jagat BGBh 9.10, ibid p. 232. prakrtiś ca trigunātmika sarva-kārya-karana-viśayākāreņa pariņata purusasya bhogāpavargārtha-kartavyatayā dehendriyādy-ākāreņa samhanyate BGBh 13 Introduction, ibid p. 298. prakrtav avidyālaksaņāyām kārya-kāraņākāreņa pariņatāyām sthitah prakrtisthah prakrtim ātmatvena gata ity etat | ... etad uktam bhavati prakrtisthatvākhyā avidyā guņesu sa sangaḥ kāmaḥ samsārasya kāraņam iti BGBh 13.21, ibid pp. 334-335.

222 MARTHA DOHERTY

cites these as well as some Upanişadbhāşyas (Kenopanişad 1.4, Kathopanişad 1.3.11, and Isāvāsyopanișad 12).35 To show the con- currence of the vārtika-prasthāna with the Advaita tradition on this issue, he cites Sureśvara's Brhadāraņyaka Upanişadbhāsya-vārtikas.36 Thus, there is ample evidence that Sankara considers avidyā as a causal component in the creation of the world (jagat).37 Why, then, did Satchidanandendra find it necessary to dispute this, maintaining that avidya in Sankara is only adhyāsa, and that a causal avidyā that is present in sleep is not compatible with non-duality or moksa?

35 aviditād vidita-viparitād avyaktād avidyālaksaņād vyākrtabījad anyat | KeUBh 1.4., in Upanisadbhāsyam: with the commentaries of Shri Anandagiricharya for all, and in addition commentaries for Katha, Māndūkya and Taittirīya by great acharyas and Taittirīyavārtikā Shri Sureshvaracharya with commentary, p. 20 ( 1979). mahatah paramavyaktam sarvasya jagato bījabhūtam krta-nāmarūpa-satattvam sar- vakārya-kāraņa-śakti-samāhārarūpam avyaktāvyākrtākāśādi-nāma-vācyam paramāt- many otaprotabhāvena samsāritvam vațakanikāyām iva vațavrksa-śaktih KaUBh 1.3.11, Upanişadbhāsyam p. 95. sambhavanam sambhūtih sā yasya kāryasya sā sambhūtih tasyā anyā asambhūtih prakrtih kāranam avidyā avyākrtākhyā kāma-karma-bīja-bhūta-adarśanātmikā | IUBh 12, Upanisadbhāsyam p. 12. Several other passages from Upanisadbhāsyas are cited by S. Srirama Sastri in his Introduction to the Pañcapādika of Padmapādācārya, 36-42. 36 ātmāvidyaiva nah śaktih sarvaśaktasya sarjane nāto'nyathā śaktivādah pramāņenāvasīyate BrUBhV 4.3.1784 tasmād ajñāta-ātmaiva śaktir ity abhidīyate ākāśādes tato janma yasmāt śrutyā'bhidhīyate | BrUBhV 4.3.1787 nāmarūpādinā yeyam avidya prathate'satī māyā tasyāh param saukșmyam mrtyunaiveti bhanyate || mrtyur vai tama ity evam āpa evedam itya api avidyā prathate maulī vyaktāvyakātmanā'niśam || BrUBhV 1.2.135-136 see also BrUBhV 1.3.54, 188; 1.4.16, 151, 167, 358; 4.3.347, 348, 355, 382, 383 asya dvaitendrajālasya yad upādāna-kāraņam ajñanam tad upāśritya brahma kāraņam ucyate || BrUBhV 1.4.371 idam jagad upādānam sarva-śakty-ajam avyayam svātmaikājñanāvrttena grasisnu prabhavisnu ca BrUBhV 1.2.126 See also BrUBhV 1.4.382, 383; 3.9.160; 4.3.1, 388; 4.4.39; TUBhV 1.49, 6.78. 37 Paul Hacker agrees with Satchidanandendra that avidya means adhyasa in Sankara and suggests that namarupa, is the causal 'stuff' of the world. Space does not permit a full treatment of that topic, but in two of the instances cited by Hacker (2.1.14, 27), nāmarūpa is said to be brought about or created by avidyā (avidyā- kalpita). He concedes that Sankara does sometimes equate avidyā and māyā with avyākrta-nāmarūpa, which he considers a power, śakti, of Brahman. (Hacker (1995) "Distinctive Features of the Doctrine and Terminology of Sankara: Avidya, Nāmarūpa, māyā, īśvara" in Wilhelm Halbfass (ed), Philology and Confrontation: Paul Hacker on Traditional and Modern Vedanta, p. 72) For a discussion of this issue see Comans, (2000) The Method of Early Advaita Vedanta: A Study of Gaudapāda, Śankara, Sureśvara and Padmapāda, pp. 215-249.

A CONTEMPORARY DEBATE 223

COMPETING VIEWS ON AVIDYĀ

Philosophical considerations

It is significant that Satchidanandendra's primary difficulty with the Advaita tradition's representation of avidyā, is that it is bhāvarupa.38 In a debate organized by the Srngeri Sankaracarya Math in 1976 to try to settle the issue of Swami Satchidanandendra's 45 years of contention with the Advaita tradition, the question that surfaced to frame the debate was whether or not Sankara accepts bhāvarūpa- mūlavidyā as the cause of samsāra.39 In the course of the debate the opponents of mulavidya raise an interesting objection which touches on the core of the dispute. If mūlavidya is the cause for adhyasa, they argue, it cannot itself be superimposed (adhyasta) and therefore, cannot be destroyed by knowledge of the truth (tattvajñana). This has the undesirable consequence of duality (dvaita-prasana) and the impossibility of moka (anirmoksprasanga). The Advaitin respondent identifies the problem here as not understanding the basic position of Vedanta - Brahman alone is the absolute reality (brahmaiva paramārthasatya) and everything different (bhinna) from Brahman is not real (avāstava). Thus, though avidya is existent (bhāvarūpa), it is not real (avastava), and therefore, there is no untenability (anupap- atti) in it being removed by knowledge of the truth.

38 There are many issues to be discussed here. For instance, if avidyā is purely adhyāsa how do we understand Sankara's use of compounds like avidyādhyāropita, avdyādhyasta, avidyadhyaropana? This, and other issues, can comprise separate discussions, but by sorting out the basic issue of whether or not avidya can have any existence (bhavarupa), many of them will resolve. 39 The debate appears to have been initiated by the Advaita ācāryas, who felt that Satchidanandendra's objections to mūlāvidyā had been satisfactorily met by publi- cations of the Advaita tradition and that the continued "controversial propagation" of the views of Satchidanandendra was leading to confusion. Through the debate they hoped to come to a definite understanding that would be acceptable to both sides. The traditional Advaita ācaryas were represented by V. Ramachandra Sastri and K. Krsna Joshi, and the proponents of Satchidanandendra's views by S. Vittala Sastri. The discussion was overseen by a panel of observers; Veda Brahma Sri Pat- anka Chandrashekhar Bhat, Hoskere Sri Anantamurti, Sri B. Ramabhat and the poet, Narasimha Bhat. An edited version of the proceedings of the debate was published in Kannada by the Srngert Math. I am grateful to M. N. Nadkarni for an unpublished English translation of this publication. There is very little in the debate that was not presented, and presented more fully, in the Mūlāvidyānirasa, but it is interesting to see which issues surfaced for discussion and remained unresolved almost half a century after the publication of the Mūlāvidyānirāsa.

224 MARTHA DOHERTY

The problem of reifying avidya resulting in the untenability of non-duality was not unknown to Sankara, who resolves it by estab- lishing that avidya is mithya. In his commentary on BS 4.1.3 (ātmeti tūpagacchanti grahayanti ca), there is a contention that the self (paramātman) which is taught in the śastra is not the same as the individual self, since they have opposite qualities, the self being free from fault (apahatapapman), while the individual is the opposite. Sankara responds that this is not a difficulty, for the status of having opposite properties is resolved in their being mithya.40 Then, at the end of this discussion Sankara adds this interesting note. "The fault/ objection that is put forward by some, that non-duality is untenable because the self has duality due to avidya, that also is answered by this (discussion)."41 That is, avidyā is mithyā. A discussion of the mithyātvam of avidyā is particularly relevant in considering Satchidanandandra's work, since the outcome of Satchidanandendra's understanding of mithyā, and of avidyā as purely superimposition, is subjective idealism (drsti-srsti), which he acknowledges and defends.42 Since this is a view which is refuted by Śankara, who argues for a srsti-drsti-vāda,43 Swami Satchidānan- dendra's understanding of mithya requires examination. It is based on a definition of satya and anrta in the Taittiriopanisadbhāsya.44 There, Sankara defines what is real as that which never deviates in nature from the form in which it was originally ascertained, while what is not real (anrta) departs from the form in which it was first determined. What is real is not restricted by the three periods of time, past, present and future, while what is false, by implication, is.45 In the Upadeśasahasrī, showing the reality of the self, Sankara

40 na hy apahata-pāpmatvādi-guņo viparīta-gunatvena śakyate grahitum viparītaguņo vāpahatpāpmatvādi-guņatvena. .. yat tūktam na viruddha-gunayor any- onyātmatva-sambhava iti naișa doşah viruddha-gunatāyā mithyātvopapatteh ... evam ca sati advaiteśvarasyāpahatpāpmatvādi-guņatā viparītaguņtā tv itarasya mi- thyeti vyavatisthate. BSBh 4.1.3, Brahmasūtraśāņkarabhāsyam, pp. 833-834. 41 yo'pi dosaś codyate kaiścid avidyaya kila atmanah sadvitīyatvād advaitānupap attir iti so'pi etena prayuktah BSBh 4.1.3, Brahmasūtraśāņkarabhāsyam, p. 834. 42 Mūlāvidyānirāsa, para. 41, 42. 3 BSBh 2.2.28; GKBh 4.3.28. 44 yadrūpena yan nisitam tat tadrūpam na vyabhicarati tat satyam | yadrūpeņa yan niśitam tat tadrūpam vyabhicarati tad anrtam ity ucyate | TUBh 2.1.1; also ekarūpeņa hy avasthito yo'rthah sa paramārthah | loke tadvisayam jñānam samyagjñānam ity ucyate BSBh 2.1.11. 45 kālatrayena yanna parichidyate. KaUBh 1.2.14.

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points out that it does not deviate from its nature in all three states of experience.46 On the basis of these statements, Swami Satchida- nandendra concludes that if avidya were to exist in all three states of experience, it would be real and could not be removed by knowl- edge.47 It therefore becomes imperative for him to establish that avidyā does not exist in sleep in order to establish that avidyā is not real.48 Further, considering reality in terms of causality, Swami Satchidanandendra argues that what is false (mithya) has no requirement for a material cause, etc., for it is not tenable that something that is established as having a cause effect relationship is also mithya.4 He makes two related assertions here about mithya. One is that something that is mithya cannot have a material cause. It is because it is mithya that its appearance is tenable.50 Indeed, what is called the falseness (mithyatva) of a thing is that it appears without existing. The second is that it is not tenable that something that has a cause-effect relationship is mithya. If it does, it cannot be mithya.51 Sankara's definition of satya and anrta in the Taittiriopa- nişadbhāsya provides for distinguishing subjective (prātibhāsika) from empirical (vyāvahārika) reality. Sankara extends his definition to in- clude the vyāvahārika| pāramārthika distinction when he adds, "Therefore, modification is false," and illustrates his statement defining satya and anrta by citing the Chāndogya Upanisad 6.4.1, vacarambhana-śruti.52 "Modification is mere name centered on speech/the tongue; clay alone is real', because in this manner it is ascertained that sat alone is real." In the Upanisad and Sankara's

46 na hi yasya yatsvarūpam tat tadvyabhicāri drstam | svapnajāgarite tu caitan- yamātratvād vyabhicarataḥ | susupte cet svarūpam vyabhicaret tannastam nāstīti vā bādhyam eva syāt, āgantukānām ataddharmānām ubhayātmakatvadarśanāt, yatha dhanavastrādīnām nāśo drsțah | Upadeśasāhasrī 2.89 (prose). 47 Mūlāvidyānirasa, para. 27, 53. A similar argument is made against the retention of the distinction between Brahman and the individual in sleep (Mūlāvidyānirāsa para. 44) 48 Swami Satchidanandendra's first publication, the Mūlāvidyānirāsa (1929) was

avidyā in sleep. written at the urging of his mentor, Krishnaswamy Iyer, to prove that there is no

49 tad etad asāram mithyāvastuna upādānādikānksā-virahāt | na hi kārya-kāranādi-

40, p. 47. bhāvena vyavasthitam vastu atha ca mithyety upapadyate | Mūlāvidyānirāsa, para.

50 Ibid. para. 125, 126. 51 yat tu mithyārthasya prathanānupapattir eva tasya sopādānatvam sādhyatīti tad apy apeśalam | mithyātvād eva tat-prathanopapatteḥ | idam eva hi mithyātvam nāma vastuno yad vastusannabhavatyatha ca prathata iti | Mūlāvidyānirāsa, para. 128, p. 153. See also note 40 above. 52 This is the basis of the important Brahmasutra 2.1.14 tad ananyatvam aram- bhanaśabdadibhyah.

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commentary here and elsewhere,53 mithya is presented as that which has no independent existence (adhisthāna-ananyatva), while satya depends on nothing else for its existence.54 Clay, for example, is real (satya) relative to the pot that is created from it, since the clay exists independently of the existence of the pot. The clay pot, on the other hand, has no existence at all without clay, and is, therefore, mithya. Thus, while Swami Satchidanandendra maintains that mithya has no requirement for a material cause, arguing that it is not tenable that something that is established by a cause effect relationship is also mithya, his Advaita opponents hold just the opposite view. What is mithya is defined as that which has a requirement for a material cause (adhişthāna-ananya). Further, what is mithya is an effect, and is established as having a cause effect relationship. Satya, on the other hand, in the absolute (pāramarthika) sense, is the 'cause' of all causes, that is, it is not within the realm of cause effect. The subjective idealism that follows from Satchidanandendra's understanding of mithya does have validity in the Advaita tradition from the absolute (pāramārthika) standpoint. Prakāśānanda (1550- 1600), an Advaita ācārya, propounds this view predominantly, and other acaryas advance it on occasion when the context is purely pāramārthika. Indeed, from the pāramārthika standpoint, there is no avidya at all. Such a view, however, does not account for the empirical reality (vyāvahārika-sattā), which is why Sankara argues against it, and in favor of a view that does (srsti-drsti).55 Sankara holds that the world is not a creation of the observer (drsti-srsti), but rather, is seen because it is there (srsti-drsti). Both prātibhāsika and vyāvahārika realities are superimposed on, or have their being in, Brahman. In the recognition of oneself as Brahman is the recognition that one is the reality of everything (sarvatmabhava), which Sankara has characterized as liberation (moksa).56

2.1.15 53 See the ananyatva-adhikarana of the Brahmasutra, especially bhāve copalabdheḥ

54 tadadhīnatvād arthavat | BS 1.4.3; vācārambhaņam vikāro nāmadheyam mrtikety eva satyam | ChU 6.4.1; abhyupagamya ceyam vyāvahārikam bhoktr-bhogyalakșanam vibhāgam syāl lokavad iti parihāro'bhihitah | na tv ayam vibhagah paramārthato'sti yasmāt tayoh kāryakāraņayor ananyatvam avagamyate kāryam ākāśādikam bahup- rapañcam jagat, kāraņam parambrahma, tasmāt kāranāt paramārthato'nanyatvam vyatirekenābhāvah kāryasyāvagamyate | kutah | ārambhanśabdadibhyah BSBh 2.1.14, p. 372. 5 BSBh 2.2.28; GKBh 4.3.28. 56 See IUBh 9; KeUBh 2.4; KUBh 2.1.10; TUBh 2.1.1; MuUBh 3.1.2,, 4, 9; MāUBh 3; BSBh 2.1.14, 2.3.46.

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Shifting standpoints Satchidanandendra makes frequent use of shifting from a vyāvahārika to a pārmārthika standpoint in an effort to establish his position. This is a known technique in advaita dialectics and is par- ticularly compatible with his subjective idealist position. But he is often intractable on this, creating otherwise resolvable conflict. A brief look at an objection raised agaist the absense of ignorance in sleep and Satchidanandendra's response to it will illustrate how he uses this tactic. His opponent asks how the world which cannot be experienced in sleep can appear without any cause, i.e. avidya, when one awakes. Satchidanandendra dismisses the objection by an appeal to experience and a change of standpoint. The world that is false in the vision of a liberated person is experienced by the one who is bound.57 Later, when it is pointed out that the one who is liberated in sleep (because of the absence of avidya there) cannot become bound when he wakes up, Satchidanandendra answers that a person, even though always free, imagines himself to be bound. Thus, the indi- vidual thinks that the world is not perceived in sleep and exists when he is awake, even though there is always no world.58 This is all true, of course, from the absolute standpoint (pāramārthika-drstya) and Satchidanandendra's opponents would not contest this. The issue under discussion, however is within the relative (vyavahārika) standpoint. It is only from this standpoint that any discussion about avidyā, states of experience, the world, etc., is relevant. From the absolute standpoint, none of these has any existence.

Historical/sociological considerations

In considering what drove Satchidanandendra to contest traditional views on avidyā in Sankara, there are not only philosophical, but compelling historical and sociological factors. The Advaita tradition has a rich history of responding to new situations and challenges, both external and internal. Besides defending basic tenets, it has also responded by assimilating new ideas or approaches that enhance its exegesis without harming its fundamental position of non-duality. For example, Sankara uses

57 maivam| muktadrstyā mithyābhūtasyāpi prapañcasya baddhenānubhūyamānat- vadarśanāt. Mūlāvidānirāsa, 101, para. 76. 58 evam eva susuptau prapañcagrahanam prabodhe ca prapañcasatyatvam cabhi- manyate sadā nisprapañca eca san iti, ibid.

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Sankhya categories in his discussions of the nature of creation, and both Gaudapāda and Sankara use Buddhist terminology as well as structures of argument found in the works of Nāgārjuna. New developments in the field of Nyaya (navya-nyaya) were incorporated into the dialectics of Madhusūdana Saraswati and others. The most recent challenge to the Advaita tradition, and to Indian thought in general, has come from Western thought. Not just the ideas but the form in which they appeared had far-reaching conse- quences for Indian thought. With British colonialism, changes were introduced that created a new situation for the Indian thinker. The most important was the change in the education system. The intro- duction of Western thought into the education system with, signifi- cantly, English as the medium of instruction (Viswanathan, 1995: 431-437), and coupled with this, the segregation of traditional San- skrit studies into separate institutions creating what Daya Krishna has called an "effective apartheid" between traditional and modern education (Daya Krishna, 1997: 191),59 posed unique challenges to Indian thinkers. Exposed to Western thought and estranged from his own intellectual tradition, the Indian thinker found himself in a "predicament" which has been eloquently expressed by J. L. Mehta.

Under the colonial origins of his modernization, the Indian encountered 'philosophy' and 'religion' and began forthwith the long journey of reinterpreting his tradition in these Western categories. More importantly, he began thinking about it and re- conceiving it in the English language, not just to expound it to English scholars, but as the principal medium of his own self-understanding. Such self-understanding was reflected back in new meanings being given to ancient words in the Indian languages, and it also expressed itself in the way traditional meanings were themselves reflected in the use of concepts embedded in English words (Mehta, 1974: 60).

This new group of Indian thinkers developed in different directions, and by the time of Satchidanandendra there were two main streams of Westernized research. One was purely rational, an apologetic to Western criticism of Indian thought as mystical and non-rational, attempting to legitimate Indian thought to the West. The other was a post-colonial reaction to the rational approach. These thinkers pre- sented Indian thought as intuitive and attempted to establish an identity independent of European thought. Satchidanandendra's work, particularly the Mūlavidyānirasa, reflects both these streams. Though his commitment was philosophical, Satchidanandendra was

59 Daya Krishna traces the beginning of this "apartheid' to the establishment of the Calcutta Madrasa in 1781, the Sanskrit College in 1782 and the Asiatic Society of Calcutta in 1784, Indian Philosophy, 191.

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not immune to the socio-political influences of his time. His search for an authentic tradition was symptomatic of the Indian thinker's post-colonial search for an identity "uncontaminated by universal- istic or Eurocentric concepts," (During, 1995: 125). Though Satch- idanandendra began his work before the independence of India, as Ashcroft et al. have noted, post-colonialism begins with the moment of colonial contact, since it is at this point that the "discourse of oppositionality", and necessarily, efforts at self-definition begin (Ashcroft et al., 1998: 117). Subject to the pressures of modernity he responded with what Hacker has called " a hastily improvised mix- ture" of tradition and Western thought "impinging upon it" (Mehta, 1974: 61).

Traditional influences on Satchidanandendra Though Satchidanandendra places himself firmly within the Advaita tradition, his exposure to traditional instruction was limited. He was deeply inspired by Kurtukoti Mahābhāgavata (Gangoli, 1997: 12, 14), who later became the Sankaracarya of Karvir Math, and his ideas on avidya were almost certainly shaped by this Mahābhāgavata, an exponent of Nageśa Bhatta. It was he who arranged for Satch- idanandendra's intitation into the study of Sankarabhāsya by Swami Sivabhinava Narasimha Bharathi of Srngeri Math, and for his sub- sequent study of the Sankarabhasya with Virupaksa Sastri, the offi- cial pandit (asthānavidvān) of the Mysore court. Virupaksa Sastri did not go into great detail with his student because he felt that his knowledge of Sanksrit was limited and that he lacked expertise in grammar (vyākaraņa), logic (tarka) and other disciplines considered prerequisite to the study of the bhasya. His study was thus confined to a very simple reading of the Upanisadbhasyas with no study of the Brahmasūtrabhāsya or the explanatory texts (vyākhyānas) that would normally be part of the traditional study.60 It is this, his disciples say, that accounts for the purity of Satchidanandendra's understanding of Śankara - it was never corrupted by the influences of the vyākhyānas. What is extolled here by his disciples is regarded as a serious defi- ciency in his study by the traditional Advaitins. When Satchidanan- dendra submitted the manuscript of the Mūlāvidyānirāsa to Virupaksa Sastri, he wrote on the manuscript "It should not be respected by those who are desirous of liberation," (śreyaskāmair na

60 Personal communication from Satchidanandendra's disciple, Laksmina- rasimhamurthi.

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adaranīyam). He observed that Satchidanandendra "did not know sampradaya" placing him outside of the Advaita tradition.61 Apart from a few months of study with Virupaksa Sastri, Satchidanan- dendra undertook independent study of Vedanta texts. He studied the works of several Advaita thinkers, in addition to Śankara (Satchidanandendra, 1964) and some of their ideas are evi- dent in his work. Like Mandana, Satchidanandendra finds that avidyā is not a material cause (upādānakārņa) or a power (śakti) and that Brahman is the only cause of the world. Satchidanandendra's interpretation of avidya as the superimposition of the self and non- self due to the absence of knowledge of Brahman is similar to Bhäskara's view that avidya is the misapprehension of the self as the non-self and its cause is not knowing Brahman. Prakāśānanda's subjective idealism, the ramifications of it like the untenability of causality and his arguments to support these positions also appear in Satchidanandendra's Mūlāvidyānirasa. The most striking influence, however, is that of Nāgeśa Batta (1650-1750), a grammarian who wrote a treatise on Vedanta in his Vaiyākaraņa-siddhānta-lagh- umañjusā. Nāgeśa, like Satchidanandendra, rejects the Pañcapādikā's characterization of avidyā as existent (bhāvarūpa), indeterminable (anirvacanīya) and beginningless (anādi). Instead, Nāgeśa maintains that avidyā in Sankara's commentaries signifies error (bhrānti-jñāna) and its impressions (tatsamskara). He sees avidya only as an effect, having an undifferentiated and differentiated form, but no causal form. This is consistent with Satchidanandendra's representation of avidya purely as an effect, and his rejection of a causal ignorance. In other ways, Satchidanandendra's views on avidya differ from those of Nāgeśa, but the seed for his understanding avidyā only as superim- postion can be seen here. Apart from avidyā being adhyāsa and apparent objects not having a birth, Satchidanandendra found Nāgeśa's views "fundamentally opposed to Sankara" (Satchidanan- dendra, 1963: 34). He appears to have been unaware of the influence of Nageśa on his own thought, through his teacher, Kurtukoti Mahābhāgavata (see note 30).

Modern influences on Satchidanandendra There were two modern thinkers who greatly influenced the thought of Satchidanandendra. K.A. Krishnaswamy Iyer (1865-1942) author of Vedanta or the Science of Reality and V. Subrahmanya Iyer (1869-

61 Laksminarasimhamurthi personal communication.

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1949. author of An Inquiry into the Truth or Tattva Vicara were significant mentors and patrons for Satchidanandendra. Both authors attached great, even exclusive importance to the analysis of the three states of experience (avastha-traya-viveka) in the Māņdūkya Upanişad and emphasized the study of Gaudapāda's kārikās on this Upanişad. V. Subrahmanya Iyer repeatedly refers to this method as the unique and superior contribution of Indian thought to the Wes- tern world (e.g. Subrahmanya Iyer, 1980: 116, 119). Satchidanan- dendra's emphasis on the method of the analysis of the three states of experience (avasthā-traya-prakriyā) as the best, and even the only effective method of inquiry into the nature of the self, especially in his earlier writings, was undoubtedly influenced by V. Subrahmanya Iyer and K. A. Krishnaswamy Iyer who held this position. The avastha- traya-prakriya formed not only the substance of their understanding of Vedanta, but was also a means to assert the superiority of Vedanta over Western philosophical approaches to discerning reality. The analysis of the three states of experience was presented as Vedanta's unique and consummate contribution to the understanding of reality (Krishnaswamy Iyer, 1969: 79, 83). Since Western approaches dealt only with the waking state, these authors judged them inherently inferior and ultimately inadequate methods of revealing reality. The speculations of Western thinkers that encompassed only one state were compared unfavorably to Vedanta's comprehensive analysis of all states of experience. Interestingly, the analysis of the three states of experience, with particular emphasis on the analysis of the state of sleep as revelatory appears frequently in Western/Westernized research.62 The principal features of Satchidanandendra's thought which can be traced to the works of these authors are a focus on the av- asthatrayaprakriyā with the presentation of sleep as a state through which one can gain insight into reality, the absence of potentiality or ignorance in that state, and a subjective idealism in the waking state. In addition, there is the emphasis on intuition and rational inquiry, and the subordination of the authority of scripture (śruti) to these modes of inquiry. The preoccupation with methodolgy and narrow insistence on one defining method was a significant part of the legacy that Satchidanandendra inherited from these authors.

62 See, for example, K. C. Bhattacharyya, Studies in Philosophy; Debabrata Sinha,

States. Metaphysics of Experience in Advaita Vedanta and Andrew Fort, The Self and Its

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Both K.A. Krishnaswamy Iyer and V. Subrahmanya Iyer urged a return to the study of the Prasthānatrayabhasyas disregarding all the sub-commentaries and it was likely from them that Satchidanan- dendra drew guidance for his own study of Vedanta. Both authors were familiar with Western thought, with V. Subrahmanya Iyer engaged in dialogue with, and critical of, Western philosophers, while K. A. Krishnaswamy Iyer., though occasionally critical, tended to look for common ground, sometimes appropriating their arguments for his own exposition of Vedanta. Satchidanandendra addresses contemporary Western scholars or Indian Western educated scholars in his English works, particularly his English introductions to his Sanskrit works (Satchidanandendra, 1958, 1964). He is uniformly critical of them, but gives them only superficial consideration. Unlike his mentors, V. Subrahmanya Iyer and K. A. Krishnaswamy Iyer, Satchidanandendra does not engage in sustained dialogue with his Western counterparts. His focus is, rather, on traditional Advaitins as his serious dialogue partners. Though he is hardly mentioned in Satchidanandendra's works, Vivekananda had an early and lasting influence on him. He was commissioned to translate Vivekananda's Rajayoga into Kannada, and with the proceeds from this work started his publishing unit, the Adhyatma Prakasha Karyalaya (Gangoli, 1997: 15). We can see Vivekananda's influence in Satchidanandendra's mission to discover the 'real' Sankara in order to restore Vedanta to its authentic form. The theme of the 'disciples who did not understand the Master' in Satchidanandendra's rejection of all the subcommentaries beginning with the Pañcapādikā, is also reminiscent of Vivekananda (Complete Works 8, Vol. 3, 265). Vivekananda's called for a retrieval of the 'real' Sankara was much more clearly linked to social and political reforms, and he made no serious scholarly attempt to do this, rein- terpreting Sankara in accord with his larger political agenda. Satch- idanandendra, however, took this call seriously, delving deeply into textual studies to recover the 'authentic' Sankara.

'Retrieving' Sankara| Vedanta Satchidanandendra sought to free Vedanta from both modern mis- conceptions in the form of Western interpretations of Vedanta, as well as 'corruptions' introduced by post-Sankara commentators which made advaita vulnerable to later attacks. Historically, he considered that Vedanta had been misunderstood and criticized by Rāmānuja and others on the issue of avidya. In modern times, he faulted West-

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ernized scholars like Radhakrishnan and Dasgupta and Western scholars like Thibaut for misunderstanding Vedanta as not con- forming to Western standards for philosophical thought (Satchida- nandendra, 1964). Vedanta was considered non-rational (mystical), speculative and theological in that it is dependent on revelation. Therefore, to legitimate Sankara, and thereby, Vedanta, to Western thought, Satchidanandendra attempted to show that Sankara advo- cated reason and intuition, and was neither theological nor speculative. He characterized Sanakra's method for understanding Brahman as a "rational system based on universal intuition" (Satchidanandendra, 1957: 11). He also ruled out śruti as the only pramāna, subordinating it to reason and one's own experience. To remove what he considered the speculative elements of the concept of avidya, he criticized mūlavidyā. Satchidanandendra held that Sankara's system differs from others in that it is not speculative. It is not "one more school" of speculation created by the "artifice of certain peculiar ways of inter- pretation." What makes it genuine is its method of inquiry. Sankara does not postulate any theory like that of mūlāvidya, or require the acceptance of pramanas. Rather, he begins with a discussion of adhyāsa and "appeals to universal intuition." (Satchidanandendra, 1973: 8). Avidyā, as adhyāsa, is available for everyone's experience. It is merely "mistaking one thing for another (atasmin tadbuddhih)" and need not be proved for it is recognized in the experience of all of us (sarvaloka-pratyakşah). It is understood in relation to knowledge (vidya) and is "intelligible to all who are familiar with the antipathy between knowledge and error in everyday life" (Satchidanandendra, 1957: 11). By characterizing avidya in this commonly understood way, Satchidanandendra sought to free it from the speculative and theo- logical elements that he found in the concept of mūlāvidyā. Thereby, Sankara could be legitimated in Western terms. Sankara is not spec- ulative because he appeals to reason and intuition and does not pos- tulate a hypothetical mūlavidya. He is not theological because śruti is not the final pramana, that being oneself. With this commitment to independent rational inquiry, as opposed to an exegesis of scripture along traditional lines, an emphasis on certain established methods in Advaita Vedanta follows naturally. One of the most prevalent is the emphasis on negation (neti neti) as the means to know the self as Brahman. The premise is that once all the features erroneously attributed to the self have been negated, its nature will remain, self-revealing. Paradoxically, in spite of the self- revealing nature of the self, and claims of the adequacy of negation as

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a method, there is the necessity for a final "intuition" of the self as Brahman. This is a hallmark of Neo-Vedanta thought, which we see in the works of K. C. Bhattacharyya and R. Das, for example. Purely analytical philosophers, on the other hand, avoid appeal to intuition as incompatible with the analytic approach. Among them, G. C. Nayak seriously challenges the legitimacy of intuition as a means for enlightenment, according to Sankara (Nayak, 1995-1996: 71-82). While Satchidanandendra is unequivocal on the primacy of reason and intuition over śruti, he is ambiguous about his appropriation of another Western research method. When addressing his "orthodox ... students of Vedanta" Satchidanandendra adheres to the tradi- tional view that Western historical and chronological methods are not applicable to the teachings of Vedanta (Satchidanandendra, 1958: 1). But when addressing his Western readers in English, he makes use of these methods. In the Vedanta-prakriyā-pratyabhijña, for instance, he traces the origin and development of ideas, discusses questions of authorship and outlines a historical view of Vedanta, dividing it into three periods. His interest, however, is not historical, but approbation by both the Western and Advaita traditions. He uses historical and philological methods both to defend traditional views and to sub- stantiate his own challenges to the tradition. Thus, Satchidanan- dendra has at least two stances towards Western thought. On the one hand, he appropriates Western methods and ideas to present his own views of the Advaita tradition, possibly to legitimate the tradition to the West and resist its marginalization. On the other hand, he uses those appropriated means to refute Western interpretations of Vedanta.

Authenticity As a result of the appropriation of Western concepts and methods, and their application to the retrieval of tradition, Satchidananden- dra's work is what post-colonial theorists consider the inevitable hybrid of post-colonial works. This amounts to the tradition being 'retrieved' in a non-traditional form, and consequently, from the standpoint of the tradition, brings its authenticity into question. There are those who argue that in the post-colonial situation, authenticity is always "relative and context bound" and that it is not possible to distinguish between authentic and inauthentic discourse with regard to ancient traditions (Fee, 1995: 245). Appropriation of new approaches is historically part of the the Advaita tradition,

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however, and does not compromise authenticity if it is consistent with non-duality. There are those who regard efforts to recover authentic pre-colonial traditions as misguided, since they tend to essentialize traditions and overlook the possibility of a developing, dynamic tradition (Ashcroft et al., 1998: 21). Further, assuming they are successful, they run the risk of marginalizing the 'authentic' tradition and thereby undermining its social and political aims, if there are any.63 Moreover, post-colonial theory challenges the very assumption that there is an 'authentic' homogeneous pre-colonial tradition. Even if there is, hybridization has made it impossible to retrieve it.64 A unique feature of Satchidanandendra's work that distinguishes him from other post-colonial authors working to retrieve an authentic tradition is that he is not only trying to rid the tradition of colonial influences, but also, of pre-colonial influences. In fact, his effort to free the tradition from Western 'contamination' is only secondary. His primary focus is on elimination of the contaminating elements within the tradition. This is not at all inconsistent with the aim of legitimating the tradition to the West, for the aspects of the tradition that he challenges are those that are problematic to a Western reading of it. Satchidanandendra worked on the premise that the basic teachings are complete, and therefore, that there is no possibility of a devel- opment of ideas. There is no room for innovation; any new insight, such as mulavidyā, is viewed as heretical, or anticipated by the earliest works. He handles the innovative aspect of his own work by dis- claiming it as not his own thinking, but the previously unrecognized, though accurate, representation of Sankara. In his view, time had brought degeneration in the tradition so that the task of the present is to "live up to the potential of the past" (Halbfass, 1988: 361). Achieving continuity with the past, specifically with Sankara and Gaudapāda, is given great importance. The project of retrieving the 'authentic' Sankara was linked to the larger aim of uncovering the authentic Advaita tradition. Because of Sankara's stature within the tradition, these were seen a synonymous endeavors. While this connection is not contested within the Advaita tradition, there is, nevertheless, a shift in emphasis in Satchidanan- dendra's approach that reflects a non-traditional influence. Though

63 Diane Brydon, "The White Inuit Speaks: Contamination as Literary Strategy," 141; Gareth Griffiths, "The Myth of Authenticity," 237-241; Margery Fee, "Who Can Write as Other?" 242-245 in Post-Colonial Studies Reader. 64 Griffiths, 237-241; Fee, 242-245; Sharpe, 99-102; Spivak, 24-28; Brydon 136-142; Sangari, 141 in Post-Colonial Studies Reader.

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post Sankara commentators, both critics and defenders of Sankara, engage with ideas whose origin can be traced to Sankara, there is no direct reference to Sankara by name, and little oblique reference to, or quoting of his works, even by his purported immediate disciples. The focus in Indian thought, well-known as a source of frustration to historians, was always on the ideas, not a given person. For Satch- idanandendra, on the other hand, the focus is entirely on Sankara. The question that informed his entire life's work can be formulated as "What did Sankara say?" He deals with possible points of conten- tions in the works of other commentators by measuring them against Sankara. His standard for determining authenticity in Advaita is Sankara, which the tradition would not contest, but the focus on a single person as representative of tradition is foreign to the Advaita tradition of parampara. The difference between Satchidanandendra and the tradition on this point is a radical one. Satchidanandendra effectively places Sankara above the tradition and is willing to sep- arate Sankara from the tradition on a point of conflict. The tradition, on the other hand, works to reconcile divergent views while (ideo- logically, at least) subordinating the views of any given person to the vision of non-duality. Not surprisingly,65 the very features of Satchidanandendra's thought that authenticate him in one tradition, Western or Indian, deny him that approbation in the other. Yet there are ways in which he is authentic in both - and neither. Although he challenges the Advaita tradition, he sees himself as its reformer and purifier and seeks validation from the tradition. Though he follows certain tra- ditional norms and professes a non-dual vision, he departs from tradition in both his method and in the substance of his doctrine. Several features of his work that distance him from the Advaita tradition lend him credibility in Western thought, many of them, of course, appropriated from Western thought. His minimizing the status of śruti as a pramana, giving primacy to reason, circumventing the need for a teacher and oral transmission, finding the text an adequate source of knowledge, and his generally philological/histor- ical approach along with problematizing the contraditictions in the works of the post-Sankara Advaita commentators are all aspects of

65 See Halbfass, India and Europe, especially chapter 19 for an account of the structure of Hindu traditional thought and how it differs from Western thought structures.

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his work that deny his validation by the Advaita tradition but are compatible with Western thought. Though Western thought may endorse these aspects of his work, it cannot fully embrace him, for in several other ways, he does not conform to Western intellectual standards. Some of these are the same features that legitimate him within the Indian thought tradi- tions. For example, his rejection of the concept of progress and thought development, with all innovations being anticipated in the original texts, and the disclaiming of ideas as his own. The attempt to reclaim the 'authentic' tradition, the idealizing of the past and efforts to maintain continuity with it, as well as the conviction that there is one true reading of a text are hallmarks of the Indian tradition which are rejected by post-modern thought, though not the Enlightenment thought that was prevalent in Satchidanandendra's time. There are other features of Satchidanandendra's thought that are problematic for both Indian and Western traditions. One is his approach to innovative thought. Neither tradition takes as rigid a position as he in rejecting new developments, though the Western tradition has necessarily much wider acceptance of new ideas since the search for truth always remains open. Similarly, while Satchidanandendra's willingness to address contradictions within the tradition is commendable in Western thought, the categorical nature of his disposing of them may not be so readily accepted. Neither does the Advaita tradition accept his failure to attempt to resolve con- tradiction within the tradition, or his dismissal of innovative thought without trying to account for it as an extension of prior thinking. His concept of tradition as static rather than dynamic is anathema to both traditions, but again, the Advaita tradition is dynamic within much narrower limits than the Western thought tradition. As we have seen, the hybrid nature of Satchidanandendra's work does not necessarily undermine its authenticity. Historically, the Advaita tradition has appropriated methods from the other darśanas as aids to exegesis that enhance the unfoldment of the basic tenets of non-duality. Similarly, appropriating Western methods, or even concepts, should not in itself be considered problematic, as long as non-duality is not compromised. The history and spirit of the tradi- tion allow for such appropriation. However, there are those in both traditions who idealize a return to a 'pure' form of the tradition, uncontaminated by later influences, and on that basis, judge it to be authentic. Ironically Satchidanandendra is one of them, evidently not aware of the hybrid nature of his own work.

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During his lifetime Satchidanandendra drew the attention of some modern Indian scholars who engaged in dialogue with him over the contents of the Mūlāvidyanirasa.66 The issues raised there are still being addressed by Indian scholars today.67 A learned group of his adherents gained the name, among certain scholars, "The Mysore School" (Mahadevan, 1985: 46-49). With two notable exceptions, Western scholars have barely noticed his work. Paul Hacker independently came to some of the same conclusions as Satchidanandendra on avidyā in Sankara finding "unexpected support" for his conclusions in the Mulāvidyānirāsa (Hacker, 1995: 66). Hacker's thoughts in this regard have been commented upon by Michael Comans (Comans, 2000: 246 249). Karl Potter, more than 20 years ago, identified Satchidanan- dendra as a "vehement critic of the distinction of the two avidyās (of Maņdana)" (Potter, 1981: 79), and recently reversed an earlier assess- ment and expressed support for Satchidanandendra's views.68 Though Satchidanandendra would locate himself at the core of the tradition, even more traditional than his traditional Advaita con- temporaries and a large part of the tradition itself, in fact, he strad- dles both Indian and Western traditions. He was a professed Advaitin, but sought validation from both traditions, though less vigorously, and perhaps less consciously, from the Western thought tradition. He appropriated methods and ideas from both, conforming in certain ways to the norms of each. In some sense he came close to forming a bridge between the Western and Indian thought traditions; finally, perhaps inevitably, he is not fully endorsed by either. Yet he has made a lasting contribution to the vitality of the Advaita thought tradition by reviving intense debate, both within and across the boundaries of the Advaita tradition, on an important topic that has ramifications for the possibility of non-duality and moksa. The dis- cussion on the nature of avidya has engaged some of the finest Indian thinkers for centuries, and Satchidanandendra has contributed to extending the reach of this discussion beyond the borders of India. The dialectics in his Sanskrit works reminds us that fruitful engage- ment with this issue requires in-depth exploration of source material,

66 Kuppuswami Sastri and M. Hiriyanna are named in Paul Hacker's, "Distinc- tive Features of the Doctrine and Terminology of Sankara" in Philology and Con- frontation: Paul Hacker on Traditional and Modern Vedanta, p. 98 n. 24. 67 See A. G. Krishna Warrier, God in Advaita, 111, n. 52; and T. M. P. Mahad- evan, Superimposition in Advaita Vedanta. 68 Karl Potter, More on Why Most Advaitins Were Not Sankara's Advaitins, paper presented at the 14th International Vedanta Conference, Miami, Ohio, April 2004.

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and offers opportunities for a level of discussion that can deepen our understanding of key issues in Indian thought.

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