1. Emergence in Dual Aspect Monism Vimal R.L.P

This is a longer version in a little different format of: Vimal, R. L. P. (2012). Emergence in Dual-Aspect Monism. In A. Pereira Jr. & D. Lehmann (Eds.), The Unity of Mind, Brain and World: Current Perspectives on a Science of Consciousness (Vol.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. [Available for comments: http://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/Home/2012-Vimal-Emergence- UMBW-CUP.pdf. Please do not quote without author's permission. Last update: Friday, March 08, 2013.

Emergence in Dual-Aspect Monism

Ram Lakhan Pandey Vimal

Vision Research Institute, 25 Rita Street, Lowell, MA 01854 USA

Contents Abbreviations 1. Introduction 2. Philosophical positions regarding mind and matter 2.1. Materialism 2.2. Extended dual-aspect monism (the DAMv framework) 2.2.1. DAM and the doctrine of inseparability 2.2.2. Dual-mode in DAM 2.2.3. The concept of varying degrees of the dominance of aspects in DAM with dual-mode 2.2.4. The evolution of universe in the DAMv framework 2.2.5. Comparisons with other frameworks 2.2.5.1. Velmans, Trehub, Pereira, and Searle 2.2.5.2. Damasio, Schwalbe, Baars, Dehaene, Edelman, and Crick-Koch 2.2.5.3. Damasio 2.2.5.4. Maturana, Varela, Rudrauf et el., and Lutz-Thompson 2.2.5.5. Fingelkurts 2.2.5.6. Nani-Cavanna and Edelman 2.2.5.7. Hameroff-Powell-Penrose (Pan-protopsychism Neutral Monism), Stubenberg, Leibniz's monads, Koch, Sayre, Chlamers (Protophenomenal properties), Tononi (Information), Vedanta, Kashmir Shaivism, and Buddhism 2.2.5.8. Jackson

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2.3. Realization of potential subjective experiences 3. Explanation of the mysterious emergence via the matching and selection mechanisms of the DAMv framework 4. Future researches 4.1. Brute fact problem 4.2. Origin of subjective experiences 5. Concluding remarks

Abbreviations

BA: Brodmann's areas BN: Biological naturalism CEMI: Consciousness electromagnetic information cMDR: Conventional mind-dependent reality CMS: Cortical midline structures DAMv: Dual-Aspect Monism with Dual-Mode and the varying degrees of the dominance of aspects depending on the levels of entities DMN: Default-mode network M: Mental aspect MIR: Mind-independent reality NCC: Neural correlates of consciousness NDE: Near-death experience NN: Neural-network OBE: out-of-body experience P: Physical aspect RM: Reflexive Monism SE(s): Subjective-experience(s) PE(s): Proto-experience(s) TAM: Triple-Aspect Monism uMDR: Ultimate mind-dependent reality

Key Words: Dual aspect monism, dual mode, emergence, matching and selection mechanism, subjective experience, consciousness, brain, mind, environment, co-evolution, neural network

1. Introduction

Subjective experiences potentially pre-exist in the universe, in analogy to a tree that potentially pre-exist in the seed. However, the issue of how a specific subjective experience (SE) is actualized/realized/experienced needs rigorous investigation. In this regard, I have developed two hypotheses: (1) the existence of mechanisms of matching and selection of SE patterns in the brain-mind-

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environment, and (2) the possibility of explaining the emergence of consciousness from the operation of these mechanisms. The former hypothesis was developed in the theoretical context of the DAMv framework: the Dual-Aspect1 Monism (Vimal, 2008b) with Dual-Mode (Vimal, 2010c) and the varying degrees of the dominance of aspects depending on the levels of entities (Vimal, 2011e, 2011f), where the inseparable mental and physical aspects of the states of entities are assumed to have co-evolved and co- developed. The DAMv framework is consistent, to a certain extent, with other dual- aspect views such as reflexive monism (Velmans, 2008), retinoid system (Trehub, 2007), and also triple-aspect monism (Pereira Jr., 2012), and complementary to the Global Workspace Theory (Baars, 2005; Dehaene, Kerszberg, & Changeux, 1998), Neural Darwinism (Edelman, 1993), the Neural Correlates of Consciousness framework (Crick & Koch, 2003), Emergentist Monism (Fingelkurts, Fingelkurts, & Neves, 2009; Fingelkurts, Fingelkurts, & Neves, 2010a, 2010c), Autopoiesis and Autonomy (Maturana, 2002; Varela, Maturana, & Uribe, 1974; Varela, 1981), Theories of Cognitive Embodiment/Embeddedness (Thompson & Varela, 2001), and Neurophenomenology (Varela, 1996). It is also affine to theories of Self- Organization-based genesis of the self (Schwalbe, 1991), and the mind-brain equivalence hypothesis (Damasio, 2010). The latter proposes that brain states and mental states are equivalent. This can be re-interpreted using the DAMv framework; for example, when the physical aspect of the self-related neural-network (NN) state or process is generated in three stages (protoself, core self, and autographical self), its inseparable mental aspect emerges because of the doctrine of inseparability of aspects. The hypothesis of emergence is often taken as a mysterious one (Vimal, 2009h). In this Chapter, I further elaborate on this emergence hypothesis, considering it a case of strong emergence (according to the concept advanced by (Chalmers, 2006)) of SE that can be unpacked in terms of matching and selection mechanisms. Given the appropriate fundamental psychophysical laws (Chalmers, 2006), a specific SE is strongly emergent from the interaction between (stimulus-dependent or endogenous) feed forward signals and cognitive feedback signals in a relevant NN. These laws, in the proposed framework, might be expressed in the matching and selection mechanisms to specify a SE. We conclude that what seems to be a mysterious emergence could be unpacked partly into the pre-existence of potential properties, matching, and selection mechanisms.

2. Philosophical Positions Regarding Mind and Matter

One could categorize all entities of our universe in two categories: physical (P: such as fermions, bosons and their composites including classical inert entities and neural networks (NNs)) and mental entities (M: such as SEs, self, thoughts, attention, intention, and other non-

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physical entities). This categorization entails four major philosophical positions: (I) M from P (P is primitive/fundamental): naturalistic/physicalistic/ materialistic nondual monism, physicalism, materialism, reductionism, non-reductive physicalism, naturalism, or Cārvāka/ Lokāyata (800-500 BCE: (Vimal, 2011e) and (Raju, 1985; Singh, 2002))); (II) P from M (M is primitive): idealism, mentalistic nondual monism, or Advaita (788-820 AD: (Vimal, 2011e) and (Radhakrishnan, 1960)); (III) P and M are independent but can interact (both P and M are equally primitive: interactive substance dualism, Prakrti and Purușa of Sāmkhya (1000-600 BCE or even before Gīta) or Gīta (3000 BCE) (Vimal, 2011e) and (Radhakrishnan, 1960); and (IV) P and M are two inseparable aspects of a state of an entity (fundamental entity, such as fermions and bosons, the 'primitive' quantum field/potential2 or unmanifested Brahman, is primitive): dual- aspect monism (DAM), triple aspect monism (M can be further divided into non-conscious M and conscious M), neutralism, Kashmir Shaivism (860-925 AD) and Viśiştādvaita (1017-1137 AD: mind (cit) and matter (acit) are adjectives of Brahman), see (Vimal, 2011e) and (Radhakrishnan, 1960)). We will concisely elaborate (I) and (IV); (II) and (III) are detailed in (Vimal, 2010d, 2011e).

2.1. Materialism

The current dominant view of science is materialism, which assumes that mind/consciousness/SE somehow arises from non-experiential matter such as NNs of brain. In materialism (Levin, 2006; Levin, 2008; Levine, 1983; Loar, 1990, 1997; Papineau, 2006), qualia/SEs (such as redness) are assumed to mysteriously emerge or reduce to (or identical with) relevant states of NNs, which is a brute fact (that's just the way it is). The major problem of materialism3 is Levine's explanatory gap (Levine, 1983): the gap between experiences and scientific descriptions of those experiences (Vimal, 2008b). In other words, how can our experiences emerge (or arise) from non-experiential matter such as NNs of our brain or organism-environment interactions? In addition, materialism makes category mistake (Feigl, 1967): mind and matter are of two different categories and one cannot arise from other. Furthermore, materialism has 3 more assumptions (Skrbina, 2009): matter is the ultimate reality, and material reality is essentially objective and non-experiential.

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2.2. Extended Dual-Aspect Monism (the DAMv Framework)

Since materialism has problems, we propose the 'Dual-Aspect Monism framework with dual-mode and varying degrees of dominance of aspects depending on the levels of entities' (the DAMv framework) (Vimal, 2008b, 2010c), which will be concisely detailed later. This framework is optimal because it has the least number of problems (Vimal, 2010c). The mental aspect of a state of an entity (such as brain) is experienced from the subjective first person perspective; it includes subjective experiences such as color vision, thoughts, emotions, and so on. The physical aspect of the same state of the same entity (brain) is observed from the objective third person perspective; it includes, in this example, the appearances of the related neural-network of the brain and its activities. To elaborate it further, the physical aspect of a state of an entity has two components: (i) the appearances or measurements of the entity from the objective third person perspective, and (ii) Kant's 'ding an sich' or thing-in-itself, whatever that might be (the intrinsic nature of matter or matter-in-itself is unknown to us; we can only hypothesize what it might be). For example, it may be (a) matter-in-itself composing physical objects in classical mechanics, (b) mind-in-itself or mind-like states and processes (Stapp, 2001, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c) in wave theory of quantum physics, and (c) elementary-particle-in-itself in the Standard Model, based on the particle theory of quantum physics. Since we do not have consensus about which theory or model is correct now, the DAMv framework should encompass all views until there is consensus. If an entity is a classical object (such as a ripe-tomato), then we - as third persons - can observe its appearance, but we will never know its first person experience (if any!), because for that we would need to be the ripe-tomato. One could then argue that in this case the physical aspect of the state of the ripe-tomato is dominant and its mental aspect latent. If an entity is a quantum entity (such as the electron), then we as third persons should observe the 'appearance' of the electron, but we cannot 'see' the electron (as it is too small); we can measure its physical properties (such as mass, spin, charge in the Standard Model). We will never know the first person experience (if any) of the electron because for that we would need to be an electron. One could then argue that the physical aspect of a state of electron is dominant and its mental aspect is latent for us, which is similar to the classical objects as proposed above.

2.2.1. DAM and the Doctrine of Inseparability

In the DAMv framework, the state of each entity has inseparable mental and physical aspects, where the doctrine of inseparability is essential to address various relevant problems discussed in (Vimal, 2010d).4 There are a number of hypotheses in this framework. In (Vimal, 2010d), (Vimal,

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2010c), and (Vimal, 2009g), three competing hypotheses about the inseparability and status of SEs and proto-experiences (PEs) are described: (i) superposition based (hypothesis H1), (ii) superposition-then- integration based (H2), and (iii) integration based (H3) where superposition is not required. In H1, the mental aspect of the state of each fundamental entity (fermion or boson) or a composite inert matter is the carrier of superimposed potential SEs/PEs5. In H2, the mental aspect of the state of each fundamental entity and inert matter is the carrier of superimposed potential PEs (not SEs); these PEs are integrated by neural-Darwinism (co-evolution, co-development, and sensorimotor co-tuning by the evolutionary process of adaptation and natural selection). There is a PE attached to every level of evolution (such as atomic-PE, molecular-PE, genetic-PE, bacterium-PE, neural-PE, and neural-net-PE). In H3, for example, a string has its own string-PE; a physical entity is not a carrier of PE(s) in superposed form as it is in H2; rather its state has two inseparable aspects. H3 is a dual-aspect panpsychism because the mental aspect of the entity-state is in all entities at all levels, even though psyche (conscious SE) only emerges when PEs are integrated at human/animal level. These two aspects of the state of various relevant entities for brain-mind and/or other systems are rigorously integrated via neural-Darwinism. In H1, a specific SE arises (or is realized) in a neural-net as follows: (i) there exists a virtual reservoir that stores all possible fundamental potential SEs/PEs. (ii) The interaction of stimulus-dependent feed- forward and feedback signals in the neural-net creates a specific dual- aspect NN-state. (iii) The mental aspect of this specific state is assigned to a specific SE from the virtual reservoir during neural Darwinism. (iv) This specific SE is embedded in the mental aspect of related NN as a memory trace of neural-net-PE. And (v) when a specific stimulus is presented to the NN, the associated specific SE is selected by the matching and selection process and experienced by this NN that includes also self-related areas such as cortical midline structures (Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004; Northoff et al., 2006). For example, when we look at red ball, it generates a state/representation in brain, which is called redness-related brain state; this state has two inseparable aspects: mental and physical aspects. Our subjective color experience is redness, which is the mental aspect of NN- state. The red ball also activates a brain area called visual V4/V8/VO color area; this structure and other related structures (such as self- related cortical midline structures: CMS) form a NN that has related activities such as neuronal firing that we can measure using functional MRI. The physical aspect of this NN-state consists of the NN and its activities. These two aspects are inseparable in the dual-aspect monism. Here, the 'substance' is just a single entity-state (the NN-state), which

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justifies the term 'monism'; however, there are two inseparable aspects/properties, which justifies the term 'dual-aspect' (Vimal, 2011e). In hypotheses H2 and H3, a specific SE emerges mysteriously in a NN from the interaction of its constituent neural-PEs, such as in feed- forward stimulus-dependent neural signals and fronto-parietal feedback attentional signals. In all hypotheses, a specific SE is realized and reported when essential ingredients of SEs (such as wakefulness,

2011b). reentry, attention, working memory, and so on) are satisfied (Vimal,

2.2.2. Dual-Mode in DAM

In (Vimal, 2010c), the dual-mode concept6 is explicitly incorporated in dual-aspect monism. The two modes are non-tilde and tilde modes: (1) The non-tilde mode is the cognitive nearest past approaching towards present; this is because memory traces (that contains past information) are stored in feedback system, which are involved in matching process (matching with stimulus dependent feed forward signals). In the DAMv framework, the state of each entity has two inseparable (mental and physical) aspects. Therefore, the NN-state of the cognition (memory and attention)-related feedback signals in a NN of the brain has its inseparable mental and physical aspects. (2) The tilde mode is the nearest future approaching towards present and is an entropy-reversed representation of non-tilde mode.7 This is because the immediate future is related to the feed forward signals due to external environmental input and/or internal endogenous input. The NN-state of feed forward signals has its inseparable mental and physical aspects. The physical aspect (P) of non-tilde mode is matched with the physical aspect of tilde mode (P-P matching) and/or the mental aspect (M) of non- tilde mode is matched with the mental aspect of tilde mode (M-M matching). In other words, there is no cross-matching/cross-interaction (such as M-P or P-M) and hence there is no category mistake. As mentioned before, mind and matter are of two different categories and one cannot arise from other; mind and matter cannot interact with each other; a mental entity has to interact with another mental entity but NEVER with a physical entity and vice-versa; cross-interaction is prohibited; otherwise we will make massive category mistake. Interactive substance dualism (where mind and matter interact), materialism (mind arises from matter), and idealism (matter arises from mind)8 make category mistake and hence they are rejected. This is because we do not have scientific evidence for M-P or P-M. However, we have evidence for P-P from physics, which implies that same-same interaction cannot be rejected. If we find scientific evidence for cross- interaction M-P or P-M then we can reject the categorization of all entities

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into two categories if needed as in materialism or idealism to avoid category mistake. In that case, we cannot reject materialism, idealism, and substance dualism based on category mistake. If we cannot reject the doctrine of category mistake, then it clearly supports ONLY dual- aspect monism and its variations such as the DAMv and triple aspect monism frameworks. For linking and addressing biological structure and function, there are many neuroscience models related to five major sub-pathways of two major pathways (stimulus dependent feed forward and cognitive feedback pathways): (i) The classical axonal-dendritic sub-pathway for neuro-computation (Crick & Koch, 1998; Damasio, 1999; Litt, Eliasmith, Kroona, Weinstein, & Thagarda, 2006; Steriade, McCormick, & Sejnowski, 1993) and neural Darwinism (Edelman, 1993, 2003) and the classical sub-pathway related to consciousness electromagnetic information field (CEMI field) theory (McFadden, 2002a, 2002b, 2006), (ii) the quantum dendritic-dendritic sub-pathway for quantum- computation (Hameroff & Penrose, 1998) and quantum coherence in the K+ ion channels (Bernroider & Roy, 2005), (iii) astro-glia-neuronal transmission (Pereira Jr., 2007), (iv) (a) the sub-pathway related to extracellular field, gaseous diffusion (Poznanski, 2002), or global volume transmission in the gray matter as fields of neural activity (Poznanski, 2009) and (b) the sub- pathway related to local extrasynaptic signaling between fine distal dendrites of cortical neurons (Poznanski, 2009), and (v) the sub-pathway related to information transmission via soliton propagation (Davia, 2006; Vimal & Davia, 2008). Furthermore, to link structure and function with experiences, there are two types of matching mechanisms in the DAMv framework: (a) the matching mechanism for the quantum dendritic-dendritic MT pathway, and (b) the matching mechanism for classical pathways. In other words, we propose that (a) the quantum conjugate matching between experiences in the mental aspect of the NN-state in tilde mode and that of the NN- state in non-tilde mode is related mostly to the mental aspect of the NN- state in quantum MT-dendritic-web, namely (ii). And (b) the classical matching between experiences in the mental aspect of the NN-state in tilde mode and that of the NN-state in non-tilde mode is related to the mental aspect of the NN-state in remaining non-quantum pathways, namely (i) and (iii)-(v). Similarly, the physical aspects are matched. In all cases, a specific SE is selected (a) when the tilde mode (the physical and mental aspect of NN-state related to feed forward input signals) interacts with the non-tilde mode (the physical and mental aspect of NN-state related to cognitive feedback signals) to match for a specific SE, and (b) when the necessary ingredients of SEs are satisfied (Vimal, 2011b). When the match is made between the two modes, the world-

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presence (Now) is disclosed; its content is the SE of subject (self), the SE of objects, and the content of SEs. The physical aspects in the tilde mode and that in the non-tilde mode are matched to link structure with function, whereas the mental aspects in the tilde mode and that in the non-tilde mode are matched to link experience with structure and function. However, if physical aspects are matched, mental aspects will be automatically and appropriately matched and vice versa because of the doctrine of inseparability of mental and physical aspects.

2.2.3. The Concept of Varying Degrees of the Dominance of Aspects in DAM with Dual-Mode

In (Vimal, 2011a, 2011e, 2011f), we introduced the third essential component of our framework, namely the concept of varying degrees of the dominance of aspects depending on the levels of entities in the dual- aspect monism (Vimal, 2008b) with dual-mode (Vimal, 2010c) framework. The combination of all these three essential components is called the DAMv framework.9 For example, in inert entity, such as rock, the physical aspect is dominant from the objective third person perspective and the mental aspect appears latent (as we really do not know because one has to be inert-entity/rock to know its subjective first person perspective). When we are awake and conscious, both aspects are equally dominant. At quantum level, the physical aspect is dominant and the mental aspect is latent, similar to classical inert objects. By the term 'latent', we mean that the aspect is hidden/unexpressed/unmanifested that will re-appear when appropriate conditions are satisfied. Let us start examining aspects with respect to the mind-independent reality (MIR)10 from humans to classical inert entities to quantum entities. As per (Kant, 1929), thing-in-itself (in MIR) is unknown, we know only its appearance (in the conventional mind-dependent reality (cMDR)). However, as per neo-Kantians, since the mind is also a product of Nature, the mind must be telling us something about MIR and the human mind is the only vehicle to know MIR. If we assume that 'entity- in-itself' (MIR) has inseparable double/dual (mental and physical) aspects, then 'human-in-itself' has physical aspect (such as body-brain system and its activities) and mental aspect (such as SEs, intentions, self, attention, functions, and other cognitions). Animal kingdom and birds have physical aspect (such as body-brain system and its activities) but mental aspect seems to be of lower degree compared to humans. Plants have physical aspect such as their roots to branches and activities and the mental aspect in term of functions; it is unclear if they have experiences, self, attention, and other human-like cognitions. Dead bodies (human, animals, birds, plants) and inert entities (such as car, rock, building, roads, bridges, water, air, fire, sun, moon, planets, galaxies, and so on) and other classical macro and micro (such as

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elementary particles) entities have the dominant physical aspect and latent mental aspect. When we march on to quantum entities, the dominance of aspects needs further clarification: we are puzzled on a third person perspective as we are unable to visualize and we depend on our models and indirect effects. We see quantum effects, such as non-local effects (EPR hypothesis (Einstein, Podolsky, & Rosen, 1935) and Aspect's experiments (Aspect, 1999)) and probabilities/potentialities. These are mindlike effects (Stapp, 2001, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c) from the objective third person perspective. Furthermore, we will never know what quantum entities experience; so, the mental aspect of a state of a quantum entity is hidden to our first person perspective. Therefore, we propose that quantum entities have dominant physical aspect and latent mental aspect. However, quantum mental aspect is not like human mind; rather, the quantum mindlike mental aspect has to co-evolve with its inseparable physical aspect over billions of years and the end product is human mind (mental aspect) and inseparable human brain (physical aspect), respectively. This concept of varying degrees of the dominance of aspects is introduced to encompass most views. For example: (i) in materialism, matter is the fundamental entity and mind arises from matter. This can be re-framed by considering the state of fundamental entity in materialism as a dual-aspect entity with dominant physical aspect and latent mental aspect. (ii) In interactive substance dualism, mind and matter are on equal footing, they can independently exist, but they can also interact. This can be re-framed as the state of mental entity has dominant mental aspect and latent physical aspect, and that of material entity has dominant physical aspect and latent mental aspect. (iii) In idealism, consciousness/mind is the fundamental reality, and matter-in- itself emerges from it. This can be re-framed, as the state of fundamental entity (in idealism) is a dual-aspect entity with dominant mental aspect and latent physical aspect; the matter arises from the physical aspect. Thus, the DAMv framework encompasses and bridges most views; and hence it is close to a general framework.

2.2.4. The evolution of universe in the DAMv framework

The evolution of universe in the DAMv framework (Vimal, 2008b, 2010c) is the co-evolution of the physical and mental aspect of the state of universe starting from the physical and mental aspect of the state of quantum empty-space at Big-Bang to finally the physical and mental aspect of the states of brain-mind over 13.72 billion years. It can be summarized as: "[Dual-aspect fundamental primal entity (such as unmanifested state of Brahman, sunyatā, quantum empty-space/void at the ground state of quantum field with minimum energy, or

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Implicate Order: same entity with different names)] -> [Quantum fluctuation in the physical/mental aspect of the unmanifested state of primal entity] - Big Bang -> [Very early dual-aspect universe (Planck epoch, Grand unification epoch, Electroweak epoch (Inflationary epoch and Baryogenesis)): dual- aspect universe with dual-aspect (unified field -> four- fundamental forces/fields: gravity as curvature of space, electromagnetic, weak and strong) via inflation in dual-aspect space-time continuum] [Early dual-aspect universe (Supersymmetry breaking, Quark epoch, Hadron epoch, Lepton epoch, Photon epoch (Nucleosynthesis, Matter domination, Recombination, Dark ages)): Dual-aspect 'fundamental forces/fields, elementary particles (fermions and bosons), & antiparticles (anti-fermions)' in dual-aspect space-time continuum] -> [Dual-aspect Structure formation (Reionization, Formation of stars, Formation of galaxies, Formation of groups, clusters and superclusters, Formation of our solar system, Today's universe): Dual-aspect 'matter (fermions and composites, galaxies, stars, planets, earth, and so on), bosons, and fields' and dual-aspect 'life and brain-states (experiential and functional consciousness including thoughts and other cognition as the mental aspect (Vimal 2009b, 2010d), and NNs and electrochemical activities as the physical aspect) in dual- aspect space-time continuum] -> [Ultimate fate of the dual- aspect universe: Big freeze, Big Crunch, Big Rip, Vacuum metastability event, and Heat death OR dual-aspect Flat Universe (Krauss, 2012)]. In DAMv framework, the dual-aspect unified field has the inseparable mental and physical aspects, which co-evolved and co-developed eventually over 13.72 billion years (Krauss, 2012) to our mental and physical aspects of brain-state. The mental aspect was latent until life appeared; then its degrees of dominance increased from inert matter to plant to animal to human; for awake, conscious, active humans, both aspects are equally dominant; for inert entities, the mental aspect is latent and physical aspect is dominant" (Vimal, 2012b).

2.2.5. Comparisons with other frameworks

2.2.5.1. Velmans, Trehub, Pereira, and Searle: The DAMv framework is consistent, to a certain extent, with other dual-aspect views such as (a) reflexive monism (Velmans, 2008), (b) retinoid system (Trehub, 2007), and also (c) triple-aspect monism (physical, unconscious mental, and conscious mental aspects) (Pereira Jr., 2012). According to Velmans:

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"Reflexive Monism [RM] is a dual-aspect theory ... which argues that the one basic stuff of which the universe is composed has the potential to manifest both physically and as conscious experience. In its evolution from some primal undifferentiated state, the universe differentiates into distinguishable physical entities, at least some of which have the potential for conscious experience, such as human beings. [ ... ] the human mind appears to have both exterior (physical) and interior (conscious experiential) aspects [ ... ] According to RM conscious states and their neural correlates are equally basic features of the mind itself. [ ... ] the reflexive model also makes the strong claim that, insofar as experiences are anywhere, they are roughly where they seem to be. [ ... ] representations in the mind/brain have two (mental and physical) aspects, whose apparent form is dependent on the perspective from which they are viewed" (Velmans, 2008).

In my view, the RM framework needs to address a few explanatory type problems: (i) What is that mechanism which differentiates the presumed primal undifferentiated state f the universe into distinguishable physical entities, at least some of which have the potential for conscious experience, such as human beings? (ii) What is so special about some entities that become conscious? (iii) How can mind (a mental entity) have two aspects: exterior (physical) and interior (conscious experiential) aspects, i.e., how can a mental entity mind have physical aspect? Is this because the third person perspective (that we usually say physical aspect) is also mind's construct? (iv) How can the objects of experiences are 'roughly where they seem to be' whereas the process of experiencing is in the NN of brain? One could argue that the SEs, such as redness, belong to the subject (in her/his subjective first person perspective) and is the function of the triad: brain, body, and environment; objects reflect long wavelength lights; otherwise, achromat should also be able experience redness if redness only belongs to external objects such as the ripe-tomato. In DAMv framework, the SE of 3D phenomenal world can be nothing more than the mental aspect of a brain-state/representation that must be inside the brain. However, its physical aspect can consist of (a) the related NN and its activities that are inside the brain, (b) the body and (c) the environment. Moreover, the aspects of the brain-state and that of 3D- world-state are tuned (Vimal, 2010c). In other words, DAMv, like RM, accepts (a) the world appearance-Reality (cMDR-MIR) distinction and (b) that conscious appearances (SEs) really are (roughly) how they seem to be. The term 'appearance' is in our daily cMDR; and the term 'Reality' is thing-in-itself or MIR that is either unknown as per Kant or partly known via cMDR as per neo-Kantian view because mind is also a product of Nature and hence it must be telling us at least partly about thing-in-

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itself. In RM, perceptual projection is "a psychological effect produced by unconscious perceptual processing" (Velmans, 2000).p.115. This is the mental aspect of related brain-state in the DAMv framework, which incorporates some of the features of both RM and biological naturalism (BN), where BN is 'non-reductive' or emergent forms of physicalism (Searle, 2007; Velmans, 2008). In DAMv, the real skull and its (tactile, visual image in a mirror) appearance are between the mental aspect of brain-state and the psychologically projected phenomenal world 2.2.5.2. Damasio, Schwalbe, Baars, Dehaene, Edelman, and Crick- Koch: The Self, in the DAMv framework, is the mental aspect of the self- related NN-state; its physical aspect is self-related NN and its activities. Self is inside the brain where it roughly seems to be. The NN for protoself, core self, and autobiographical self are discussed in (Damasio, 2010) and below The DAMv framework is complementary to the framework of self- organization based autogenesis of the self (Schwalbe, 1991), which elaborates in detail the autogenesis of the physical aspect related to consciousness and self, using the anti-reductionistic materialism. (Schwalbe, 1991) proposes four stages of self-organization for the development of the physical aspect for consciousness and the self: (1) self-organization of neural networks (NNs), (2) the selective capture of information by the body, (3) the organization of impulses by imagery, and (4) the organization of imagery by language. Since the mental aspect is inseparable from its physical aspect in the DAMv framework, the autogenesis of the mental aspect is completed when the autogenesis of the related physical aspect is completed, and vice-versa. The DAMv framework is also complementary to the neuroscience of consciousness approached from the mind component such as: (a) Global Workspace Theory (Baars, 2005; Dehaene et al., 1998) that proposes massive cross-communication of various components of mind process and highly distributed brain process underlying consciousness; (b) Neural Darwinism (Edelman, 1993) that proposes selection and reentrant signaling in higher brain function based on the theory of neuronal group selection for integration of cortical function, sensorimotor control, and perceptually based behavior; and (c) NCC framework that proposes: "a coherent scheme for explaining the neural correlates of (visual) consciousness [NCC] in terms of competing cellular assemblies" (Crick & Koch, 2003).

2.2.5.3. Damasio: The DAMv framework is also complementary to the neuroscience of consciousness approached from the self-component and the mind-brain equivalence hypothesis (Damasio, 2010) that proposes (a) the two stages of evolutionary development of the self: the self-as-

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knower ('I') and the self-as-object ('me') and (b) the three steps of the self- as-knower: protoself, core self, and autographical self.

According to Damasio: "two stages of evolutionary development of the self, the self-as- knower having had its origin in the self-as-object [ ... ] James thought that the self-as-object, the material me, was the sum total of all that a man could call his [personal and related entities] [p.9 ... ]. There is no dichotomy between self-as-object and self-as- knower; there is, rather, a continuity and progression. The self-as- knower is grounded on the self-as-object. [ ... ] In the perspective of evolution and in the perspective of one's life history, the knower came in steps: the protoself and its primordial feelings; the action- driven core self; and finally the autobiographical self, which incorporates social and spiritual dimensions" (Damasio, 2010, p.10).

Damasio elaborated in detail the physical aspect of the three steps of self-as-knower (Damasio, 2010): (i) protoself (generated in brain-stem for the stable aspect of the organism with primordial feelings such as hunger, thirst, hot, cold, pain, pleasure, and fear; it is independent of the organism-environment interaction); (ii) core self ("generated when the protoself is modified by an interaction between the organism and an object and when, as a result, the image of the object are also modified" (p.181); it involves the 'feeling of knowing the object', its 'saliency', and a sense of ownership (p.203)); and (iii) autobiographical self ("occurs when objects in one's biography generate pulses of core self that, subsequently, momentarily linked in a large-scale coherent pattern" (p.181), it allows interaction with multiple objects). When the protoself interacts with an object, the primordial feeling and master organism are modified, which creates core self with (a) the feeling of knowing that results saliency of object and ownership/agency and (b) perspective (Damasio, 2010, p.206). The autobiographical self is constructed as follows: (i) past biographical memories (sum total of life experiences including future plans), individually or in sets, are retrieved and grouped together so that each can be treated as an individual object. (ii) Each of these biographical objects (and/or current external multiple objects) is allowed to interact and modify the protoself to make object- image conscious, which (iii) then creates a core self pulse with the respective feelings of knowing and consequent object saliency via core self mechanism. (iv) Many such core-self pulses interact and the results are held transiently in a coherent pattern. A coordinating mechanism coordinates steps (i), (ii), and (iv) to construct the autobiographical self (p.212-3). Qualia are a part of self-process (p.262). The neural correlates of protoself include: (i) area postrema (AP: critical homeostatic integration center for humoral and neural signals,

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toxin detector) and nucleus tractus solitarious (NTS: for body state management and primordial feelings) of medulla, parabrachial nucleus (PBN: for body state management and primordial feelings) of pons, periaqueductal gray (PAG: for life regulation and feelings) and superior colliculus (deep layers: for coordination) of midbrain, and hypothalamus for interoceptive integration at brain-stem level; and (ii) insular cortex and anterior cingulate cortex for interoceptive integration, and frontal eye fields (BA8) and somatosensory cortices for external sensory portals at cerebral cortex level (Damasio, 2010, p.191, 260). The neural correlates of the core-self include: (i) all brain-stem nuclei of protoself, (ii) nucleus pontis oralis and nucleus cuneiform of brain-stem reticular formation, (iii) intralaminar and other nuclei of thalamus, (iv) monoaminergic (noradrenalinergic, norepinephrinergic locus coeruleus, serotoninergic raphe, and dopaminergic ventral tegmental) and cholinergic nuclei (Damasio, 2010, p.192, 193, 248). The neural correlates of autobiographical-self include: (i) all structures (in the brain stem, thalamus, and cerebral cortex) required for core self, and (ii) structures involved in coordinating mechanisms, such as (a) posteromedial cortices (posterior cingulate cortex, retrosplenial cortex, and precuneus; BA 23a/b, 29, 30, 31, and 7m), (b) thalamus and associated nuclei, (c) temporoparietal junction, lateral and medial temporal cortices, lateral parietal cortices, lateral and medial frontal cortices, and posteromedial cortices, (d) claustrum, (e) thalamus, and so on (Damasio, 2010, p.215-224, 248). As per (Philippi et al., 2012), "It has been proposed that self- awareness (SA), a multifaceted phenomenon central to human consciousness, depends critically on specific brain regions, namely the insular cortex, the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC), and the medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). Such a proposal predicts that damage to these regions should disrupt or even abolish SA. We tested this prediction in a rare neurological patient with extensive bilateral brain damage encompassing the insula, ACC, mPFC, and the medial temporal lobes. In spite of severe amnesia, which partially affected his "autobiographical self", the patient's SA remained fundamentally intact. His Core SA, including basic self-recognition and sense of self-agency, was preserved. His Extended SA and Introspective SA were also largely intact, as he has a stable self-concept and intact higher-order metacognitive abilities. The results suggest that the insular cortex, ACC and mPFC are not required for most aspects of SA. Our findings are compatible with the hypothesis that SA is likely to emerge from more distributed interactions among brain networks including those in the brainstem, thalamus, and posteromedial cortices." Brain stem, thalamus, and cerebral cortex all contribute to the generation of the triad related to consciousness: wakefulness, mind, and self. Some of Brain stem functions can be divided as follows: (i) medulla for breathing and cardiac function; its destruction leads to death; (ii)

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pons and mesencephalon (back part) for protoself; their destruction leads to coma and/or vegetative state; (iii) tectum (superior and inferior colliculi) for coordination and integration of images; and (iv) hypothalamus for life regulation and wakefulness (p.244). The thalamus (a) relays critical information to cerebral cortex, (b) massively inter- associates cortical information, (c) addresses the major anatomo- functional bottleneck between small brain stem and hugely expanded cerebral cortex (that has object-images in detail) by disseminating brain stem signals to cortex and the cortex in turn funnels signals to brain- stem directly and with the help of subcortical nuclei such as amygdalae and basal ganglia (p.250-1), and (d) participates in coordination necessary for autobiographical self (p.247-51). The cerebral cortex, with the interaction of brain stem (for protoself) and thalamus (for brain-wide recursive integration), (a) constructs the maps that become mind, (b) helps in generating the core self, and (c) constructs autobiographical self using memory (p.248-9).

As per Damasio, "whenever brains begin to generate primordial feelings-and that could be quite early in evolutionary history-organisms acquire an early form of sentience" (Damasio 2010, p.26). One could query precisely how can sentience arise, be acquired, happen, or emerge from non-sentient matter? In other words, it seems that he assumes that subjective experiences including self (protoself, core self, and autobiographical self) (mental/experiential entities) somehow emerge from non-mental/non-experiential matter such as related neural networks and their activities. It is unclear: precisely how can experiential entity emerge from non-experiential entity and what is the evidence for that mechanism?

Damasio writes further, "Qualia II ... Feeling states first arise from the operation of a few brain-stem nuclei The signals are not separable from the organism states where they originate. The ensemble constitutes a dynamic, bonded unit. I hypothesize that this unit enacts a functional fusion of body states and perceptual states protofeeling ... " (Damasio 2010, p.257-263).

It is unclear that if Damasio has addressed satisfactorily, via 'Qualia II', the Levine's explanatory gap problem (Levine, 1983) and Feigl's category mistake problem: mind/experiences/self and matter/brain are of two different categories; so to generate mind from matter is a category mistake (Feigl, 1967; Searle, 2004). This query is related to Chalmers' 'hard' problem (Chalmers, 1995a), which has not been addressed in materialism/emergentism framework satisfactorily.

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If materialism cannot address these problems then we may need to consider the next best the dual-aspect monism framework as a complementary to materialism (Bruzzo & Vimal, 2007; Vimal, 2008b, 2010c): the state of neural network (or of any entity) has two inseparable aspects: physical (objective 3rd person perspective) and mental (subjective 1st person perspective) aspects. This is not inconsistent with (Damasio, 2010): "The word feelings describes the mental aspect of those [composite neural] states [p.99]. the mental state/brain state equivalence should be regarded as a useful hypothesis [ ... ] mental events are correlated with brain events [ ... ] Mental states do exert their influence on behavior [ ... ] Once mental states and neural states are regarded as two faces of the same process downward causality is less of a problem" (Damasio 2010, p.315- 316, bold mine).

Table 1: Status of the three steps of self-as-knower under various conditions; see also (Damasio 2010, p.225-240)

Natural & neurological conditions Protoself Core self Autobiographical self

Wakefulness normal normal normal

Dream REM not normal not normal not normal

suspended, Dreamless sleep (non-REM) but brainstem suspended suspended is still active11

Revelation/ samadhi/mystic- transcendental transcendental transcendental12 state

Near-death & out-of-body experiences compromised/ compromised/ compromised/ altered-state altered-state altered-state

Anesthesia-superficial level intact intact anesthetized

Anesthesia-deepest level anesthetized anesthetized anesthetized

Alzheimer's disease-initial stage intact intact compromised

Alzheimer's disease-mid stage intact compromised compromised

Alzheimer's disease-final stage compromised compromised compromised

Epilepsy intact intact compromised

Locked-in syndrome intact intact compromised

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Minimally conscious state13 compromised compromised compromised/ dysfunctional Vegetative14 compromised Compromised/ dysfunctional compromised

Coma15 compromised compromised/ dysfunctional compromised

Death dead dead dead

In the framework of (Fingelkurts & Fingelkurts, 2011), when functionally integrated in healthy subjects, default-mode network (DMN) persists as long as subject is self-consciously engaged in an active, complex, flexible and adaptive behavior. Such mode of DMN functioning can, therefore, help to integrate self-referential information, facilitate perception and cognition, as well as provide a social context or narrative in which events become personally meaningful. The authors further proposed, that since the integrity of DMN is increased in schizophrenic patients, who have an exaggerated focus on self, diminished in children and autistic patients who is lacking of self-representation, very low in minimally conscious patients, extremely minimal during anesthesia, in coma and in vegetative patients, and absent in brain death (see references therein), one may conclude that functionally integrated and intact DMN is indeed involved in self-consciousness. If this is correct, the 'self' dies with the brain death. In the DAMv framework, once the necessary conditions for subjective experiences or consciousness are satisfied (Vimal, 2011b), a relevant NN- state (or a brain-process) is created that has two inseparable aspects: physical and mental/experiential aspects. The necessary conditions (Vimal, 2011b) for access (reportable) consciousness are (i) formation and activation of neural networks, (ii) wakefulness, (iii) reentrant interactions among neural populations that bind stimulus attributes, (iv) fronto- parietal and thalamic-reticular-nucleus attentional signals that modulate the stimulus related feed forward signal and consciousness, (v) working memory that retains information for consciousness, (vi) stimulus at or above threshold level, and (vii) neural-network PEs that are superposed SEs embedded in a neural-network. Attention and the ability to report are not necessary for phenomenal consciousness. 2.2.5.4. Maturana, Varela, Rudrauf et el., and Lutz-Thompson: Furthermore, the DAMv framework can be considered as complementary to the Maturana-Varela's materialistic biogenic-embodied/embedded- phenomenal framework of autopoiesis/autonomy (Maturana, 2002; Varela et al., 1974; Varela, 1981), radical embodiment and embedded- subsystems (Thompson & Varela, 2001), and neurophenomenology (Varela, 1996) reviewed in (Rudrauf, Lutz, Cosmelli, Lachaux, & Le Van Quyen, 2003). For example, molecular processes or states underlying molecular autopoeitic systems can be considered as dual-aspect entities

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to avoid the problems of materialism. In addition, the mind/consciousness/self can be considered as the mental aspect of the state/process whose physical aspect is brain-body-environment.

According to (Lutz & Thompson, 2003), "Whereas neuroscience to-date has focused mainly on the third- person, neurobehavioural side of the explanatory gap, leaving the first-person side to psychology and philosophy, neurophenomenology employs specific first-person methods in order to generate original first-person data, which can then be used to guide the study of physiological processes" (Lutz & Thompson 2003, p.48).

The functional aspect of consciousness (such as detection and discrimination of color) (Vimal 2009b, 2010d) can be somehow spontaneously created in the materialistic biogenic-embodied/embedded- phenomenal framework of 'autopoiesis/autonomy-radical embodiment- neurophenomenology' discussed in (Maturana, 2002; Thompson & Varela, 2001; Varela et al., 1974; Varela, 1981, 1996) and elaborated further in (Lyon, 2004) and (Rudrauf et al., 2003). However, it is unclear how SEs can arise from non-experiential matter. 2.2.5.5. Fingelkurts: The framework of (Fingelkurts et al., 2010a) is the 'ontological monism'. They speak about 'emergentist monism' according to which the relationship between the mental and the physical (neurophysiological) is hierarchical and metastable (Fingelkurts et al., 2010c). According to this view, emergent qualities (conscious mind) necessarily manifest themselves when, and only when, appropriate conditions are obtained at the more basic level (brain). More precisely, within the context of the brain-mind problem conceptualized within their Operational Architectonics framework (Fingelkurts & Fingelkurts, 2001; Fingelkurts & Fingelkurts, 2004, 2005; Fingelkurts et al., 2009; Fingelkurts et al., 2010c), mental spatial-temporal patterns should be considered supervenient on their lower-order spatial-temporal patterns in the operational level of brain organization. Emergentism on the other hand, usually allows for changes of higher-order phenomena that need not possess a one-on-one, direct linkage with changes at any underlying lower-order levels. Thus, according to the (Fingelkurts et al., 2010c) the mental is ontologically dependent on, yet not reducible to, the physical (neurophysiological) level of brain organization. However, it is reducible to the operational level, which is equivalent to a nested hierarchically organized local electromagnetic brain fields and is constituent of phenomenal level (Fingelkurts et al., 2010c). In my view, the Emergentism and also the Operational Architectonics frameworks are based on the mysterious and problematic materialistic framework and hence has explanatory gap problem and makes category mistake: how can experiences emerge from non-experiential matter?

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I argue that (a) the DAMv framework has fewer problems (such as the justifiable 'brute fact' of dual-aspect) compared to other views, and (b) addresses problems not resolved by the other frameworks, including the explanatory gap in materialism.

2.2.5.6. Nani-Cavanna and Edelman: As per (Nani & Cavanna, 2011), "Our thesis has been that the phenomenal transform [qualia], the set of discriminations, is entailed by that neural activity. It is not caused by that activity but it is, rather, a simultaneous property of that activity. (Edelman, 2004)" (Nani & Cavanna 2011, Section 4).

Although Edelman's thesis is based on materialism, the second sentence can also be interpreted in terms of dual-aspect monism as the simultaneous properties of that activity are inseparable mental and physical aspect of the same NN-state. Moreover, (Nani & Cavanna, 2011) commented, "If a certain property is necessarily implied by certain physical processes (in such a way that the latter could not bring about the same effect without the former, as Edelman claims), then either that very property and those physical processes are different aspects of the same entity, or that very property is part of the co- occurring physical processes." (Nani & Cavanna 2011, Section 4, italic mine).

That italic statement is again consistent with the DAMv framework. In other words, there is no cross-causation: mind/consciousness does not cause physical neural activities and vice-versa; there is no category mistake because both physical and mental are inseparable aspects of the same NN-state. The same-on-same (mental-on-mental or physical-on- physical) causation is allowed as it does not make a category mistake, but cross-causation is not allowed because it makes this mistake. Therefore, consciousness, via mental downward causation, can cause mental aspect of specific behavior, which is then automatically and faithfully transformed to the related physical aspect of behavior because of the doctrine of inseparability. 2.2.5.7. Hameroff-Powell-Penrose (Pan-protopsychism, Neutral Monism), Stubenberg, Leibniz's monads, Koch, Sayre, Chlamers (Protophenomenal properties), Tononi (Information), Vedanta, Kashmir Shaivism, and Buddhism: Pan-protopsychism is a view that proposes that: (a) consciousness or its 'proto-conscious' precursors are somehow built into the structure of the universe, e.g., pan-experiential qualities are embedded in Planck scale geometry (10-33 cm, 10-43 s, the lowest level of reality) as discrete information states, "along with other entities that give rise to the particles, energy[/mass], charge and/or spin

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of the classical world" ((Hameroff & Powell, 2009); (b) objective reductions (OR) occurs as an actual event occurring in a medium of 'basic field of proto-conscious experience'; and (c) "OR are conscious, and convey experiential qualities and conscious choice" ((Hameroff & Powell, 2009). According to (Hameroff & Powell, 2009) proto-conscious experience is the fundamental property of physical reality, which is accessible to a quantum process (such as Orchestrated OR: Orch OR) associated with brain activity (Hameroff, 1998). Orch OR theory proposes: (a) an objective critical threshold for quantum state reduction, which reduces the quantum computations to classical solutions connecting brain functions to Planck scale fundamental quantum spacetime geometry; (b) that "when enough entangled tubulins are superpositioned long enough [avoiding decoherence] to reach OR threshold (by E=h/t, E is the magnitude of superposition/separation, h is Planck's constant over 2x, and t is the time until reduction), a conscious event (Whiteheadian 'occasion of experience') occurs" ((Hameroff & Powell, 2009); and (c) that neuronal-level functions (such as axonal firings, synaptic transmissions, and dendritic synchrony) orchestrate quantum computations in brain's microtubule network. Furthermore, (Hameroff & Powell, 2009) defend Neutral Monism, claiming that matter and mind arise from or reduce to a neutral third entity 'quantum spacetime geometry (fine-grained structure of the universe)', and that Orch OR is the psycho-physical bridge between brain processes (regulating consciousness) and pan-experiential quantum spacetime geometry (repository of proto-conscious experience). A neutral entity is "intrinsically neither mental nor physical" (Stubenberg, 2010). In addition, Orch OR events are: (a) transitions in spacetime geometry; (b) equivalent to Whitehead's 'occasions of experience' (a moment of conscious experience, a quantum of consciousness, corresponding to Leibniz's monads, Buddhist-Sarvāstivādins' transient conscious moments, or James' specious moments); and (c) correlated with EEG gamma synchrony at 40 Hz. Moreover, Orch OR is the conscious agent, which operates in microtubules within y-synchronized dendrites, generating 40 conscious moments per second. "Consciousness is a sequence of transitions, of ripples in fundamental spacetime geometry, connected to the brain through Orch OR" ((Hameroff & Powell, 2009). However, this view has explanatory gap problems: how can the 'quantum spacetime geometry' be simultaneously a pan-experiential and neutral entity, and how can mind and matter arise from or reduce to the neutral entity? It seems that (Hameroff & Powell, 2009) propose that mind and matter arise from the neutral entity 'quantum spacetime geometry' by means of 'OR' and 'decoherence measurement', respectively. However, it is still unclear where do mind and matter come from, and how does matter arise by means of 'decoherence measurement'.

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(Koch, 2012) proposes Leibniz's monads16 as an alternative to 'emergence and reductionism'. He now believes that "consciousness is a fundamental, an elementary, property of living matter. It can't be derived from anything else; it is a simple substance, in Leibniz's words. ... Any conscious state is a monad, a unit-it cannot be subdivided into components that are experienced independently" (p.119, 125). In the DAMv framework, a monad (any conscious state) is a dual-aspect state to minimize problems. As per Sayre, "the concept of information provides a primitive for the analysis of both the physical and the mental" (Sayre, 1976).p.16. Moreover, Sayre recently proposed that a neutral entity is a mathematical structure such as 'information' (Stubenberg, 2010). Since a neutral entity is intrinsically neither mental nor physical, 'information' may qualify for being a neutral entity in Neutral Monism. However, this view has an explanatory gap problem: how can (a) mind (first person subjective experiences within an entity and by the entity, such as the redness experienced by a trichromat looking at ripe-tomato), (b) matter (objective third person appearances of the material entity, such as the appearances of related brain areas activated by long wavelength light reflected from the ripe-tomato) and (c) the matter-in-itself (mind- independent tomato-in-itself and material properties such as mass, charge, and spin of elementary particles) arise from or reduce to this neutral entity? According to Chalmers, protophenomenal properties are "the intrinsic, nonrelational properties that anchor physical/informational properties ... the mere instantiation of such a property does not entail experience, but instantiation of numerous such properties could do so jointly" (Chalmers 1996, 154). Chalmers (1995a) suggested that information has double aspects (phenomenal/mental/intrinsic and physical/extrinsic aspects), which might be related to psychophysical laws (Chalmers, 1995b), but its nature and function are unclear. The intrinsic aspect of information is hidden, which is what it feels like be such an information-processing system'. As per (Koch, 2012), "Chalmers's formulation of dual-aspect theory is crude. It considers only the total amount of information, whereas consciousness does not increase with the mere accumulation of bits. [ ... ] Surely, it's not just the amassing of more and more data that matters, but the relationship among the individual bits of data. The architecure of the system, its internal organization, is critical for consciousness." Tononi (2004) proposed an information integration theory of consciousness, where "consciousness corresponds to the capacity of a system to integrate information"; it is based on differentiation ("the availability of a very large number of conscious experiences") and integration ("the unity of each such experience") attributes of consciousness; moreover, "the quality of consciousness is determined by the informational relationships among the elements of a complex, which

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are specified by the values of effective information among them. [ ... ] The theory entails that consciousness is a fundamental quantity, that it is graded, that it is present in infants and animals, and that it should be possible to build conscious artifacts [ ... ] The effective information matrix defines the set of informational relationships, or 'qualia space' for each complex " (Tononi, 2004). Furthermore, as per Koch (2012), "In our ceaseless quest, Francis and I came upon a much more sophisticated version of dual-aspect theory. At the heart lies the concept of integrated information formulated by Giulio Tononi [p.124 ... ] the way in which integrated information is generated determines not only how much consciousness a system has, but also what kind of consciousness it has. Guilio's theory does this by introducing the notion of qualia space, whose dimensionality is identical to the number of different states the system can occupy. [p.130 ... ] The theory postulates two sorts of properties in the universe that can't be reduced to each other-the mental and the physical. They are linked by way of a simple yet sophisticated law, the mathematics of integrated information. [p.130 ... ] if it [any system: human, animal, or robot] has both differentiated and integrated states of information, it feels like something to be such a system; it has an interior perspective. The complexity and dimensionality of their associated phenomenal experiences might differ vastly [p.131 ... ] the Web may already be sentient. [p.132 ... ] By postulating that consciousness is a fundamental feature of the universe, rather than emerging out of simpler elements, integrated information theory is an elaborate version of panpsychism. [p.132 ... ] Integrated information is concerned with causal interactions taking place within the system ... although the outside world will profoundly shape the system's makeup via its evolution [p.132]" (Koch 2012). However, it is unclear (i) where experiences come from in 'qualia space'; (ii) how a specific experience is matched and selected from innumerable experiences; (iii) if the integrated information theory (IIT) is a version of dual-aspect theory; (iv) if 'information' is a neutral entity (neither physical not mental as Sayre proposed: see (Stubenberg, 2010)) or a dual-aspect entity (as Chalmers proposed) in IIT framework; (v) what the relationship between the input and the output of the system (i.e., the relationship between the system and its surrounding environment) might be; (vi) how IIT accounts for memory and for planning; and (vii) if mental and physical aspects of a conscious state of brain are inseparable. (viii) If 'integrated information theory is an elaborate version of panpsychism', the seven problems of panpsychism (Vimal, 2010d) need to be addressed. The DAMv framework can address the above problems by hypothesizing that a state of a neutral entity has inseparable double/dual aspect with mental and physical aspects latent/hidden. One could try comparing DAMv and neutral monism with eastern systems. There are at least 6 sub-schools of Vedanta (Radhakrishnan, 1960): (i) Advaita (non-dualism, Śankarācharya: 788-820), (ii) Viśiștādvaita

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(qualified non-dualism, Ramānujāchārya: 1017-1137) or cit-acit Viśiștādvaita (mind-matter qualified non-dualism, Rāmānandārchārya: 1400-1476 and Ramabhadracharya: 1950-), (iii) Dvaitādvaita (Nimbārkāchārya: 1130-1200), (iv) Dvaita (dualism, Madhvacharya: 1238-1317), (v) Shuddhādvaita (pure non-dualism, Vallabhacharya: 1479-1531), and (vi) Achintya-Bheda-Abheda (Chaitanya Mahaprabhu, 1486-1534). The DAMv framework is close to (a) cit-acit Viśiştādvaita, where cit (consciousness/mind) and acit (matter) are qualifiers of a nondual entity, and (b) Trika Kashmir Shaivism where Siva is the mental aspect and Sakti is the physical aspect of same state of primal entity (such as Brahm) (Kaul, 2002; Raina Swami Lakshman Joo, 1985; Vimal, 2009b; Wilberg, 2008). Kashmir Shaivism seems close to neutral monism: Siva (Purua, consciousness, mental aspect) and Sakti (Prakrti, Nature, matter, physical aspect) are two projected aspects of the third transcendental 'ground' level entity (Brahm, Mahātripurasundarī) (personal communication with S. C. Kak). The primal neutral entity of Neutral Monism (Stubenberg, 2010) might have various names such as: (a) primal information, (b) aspectless unmanifested state of Brahman (also called kāran (causal) Brahman) of Śankarāchārya's Advaita (Radhakrishnan, 1960), (c) Buddhist emptiness (Śunyatā) (Nāgārjuna & Garfield, 1995), (d) Kashmir Shaivism's Mahātripurasundarī/ Brahm (Kaul, 2002; Raina Swami Lakshman Joo, 1985; Vimal, 2009b; Wilberg, 2008), and (e) physics' empty-space at the ground state of quantum field (such as Higgs field with non-zero strength everywhere) along with quantum fluctuations (Krauss, 2012). The state of primal entity appears aspectless (or neutral) because its mental and physical aspects are latent. After 'cosmic fire' (such as the Big Bang) the manifestation of universe starts from the latent dual- aspect unmanifested state of primal entity, and then the latent physical and mental aspects gradually change their degree of dominance depending on the levels of entities over about 13.72 billion years of co- evolution; perhaps, first, the physical aspect (matter-in-itself and its appearances, such as formation of galaxies, stars, planets) evolved and then after billions of years (perhaps, about 542 million years ago during Cambrian explosion) the mental aspect (consciousness/experiences) co- evolved in humans/animals. In other words, the mental aspect (from a first person perspective) becomes evident or dominant in conscious beings after over 13 billion years of co-evolution, rather than being evident before the onset of universe when the mental aspect was presumably latent. However, one could argue for a 'cosmic consciousness,' different from our consciousness, which might be the mental aspect of any state of universe. As there are certainly innumerable states of the universe, 'cosmic consciousness' might vary according to these states.

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In our conventional daily mind-dependent reality, the state of apparent aspectless neutral entity (quantum spacetime geometry or information) proposed by Neutral Monism would have both mental and physical aspects latent/hidden, according to the DAMv framework. These latent aspects become dominant depending on measurements. If it is the subjective first person measurement, then the mental aspect of a brain- state shows up as subjective experiences. If it is the objective third person measurement (such as in fMRI), then the physical aspect of the same brain-state shows up as the appearances of the correlated neural- network and its activities.

2.2.5.8. Jackson: As per (Jackson, 2012), " ... something's looking red is good evidence for its being red. If we call the background evidence in question 'A', we can say it this way: the conjunction of A with x's looking red is good evidence for x's being red. [ ... ] we have a powerful argument to the conclusion that red # Rp. [ ... ] I suggest, about the relationship between being red and looking red: x's looking red carries the information that x is red but it isn't caused by x's being red, and of course, if looking red carries information about being red, that allows it to be good evidence for being red." In the quote above, 'being red' means 1pp(first person perspective)- subjective experience (SE); and 'looking red' can carry either (i) 3pp(third person perspective)-physical information such as the appearance red of surface x with surface reflectance Rp (but red # Rp) or (ii) 1pp-mental information about the SE redness. Information seems a dual-aspect entity. This seems that (Jackson, 2012) includes both physical and mental attributes for explaining subjective experience of redness. It helps if we compare the SEs and color processing in trichromats and achromats for viewing a ripe tomato. (Jackson, 2012) seems consistent to some extent with my framework of extended Dual-Aspect Monism (DAMv), where each state of an entity has inseparable subjective 1pp-mental (M) and object 3pp-physcial (P) aspects and the dominance of aspects varies with levels of entities. This is NOT the 'mind-brain identity theory' of materialism, where "colour experience is essentially representational" (Jackson, 2012), which has serious problems. Rather, in the DAMv framework (Vimal, 2008b, 2010c, 2012a), the redness related brain-state is created through (i) the matching of stimulus dependent feed forward signals and cognitive feedback signals and (ii) then the selection of this specific matched brain- state (Vimal, 2008b, 2010c); this state has inseparable 1pp-mental aspect (such as subjective experience of redness) and 3pp-physical aspect (such redness related neural-network (NN) and its activities). In addition, 3pp-physical aspect is NOT causing 1pp-mental state (materialism: P-M) and vice-versa (idealism: M-P); these metaphysics

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have serious problems such as they make massive category mistake. Rather, these aspects are inseparable (dual-aspect monism) for a specific NN-state that is 'caused' or 'created' by the matching (M-M or P-P) and selection mechanism of the DAMv framework (Vimal, 2008b, 2010c), which is problem-free. It should be noted that the DAMv framework is NOT the problematic interactive substance dualism (M-P or P-M), which also makes massive category mistake. Furthermore, 'M1 causes P2' (idealism) can be interpreted in the DAMv framework as M1 is automatically and instantaneously translated into P1 because M1 and P1 are inseparable aspects of the same state of an entity; then P1 causes P2. Similarly, 'P1 causes M2' (materialism) can be interpreted in the DAMv framework as P1 causes P2; then P2 is automatically and instantaneously translated into M2 because P2 and M2 are inseparable aspects of the same state of an entity. In the DAMv framework, information has inseparable 1pp-mental aspect (mental information) and l 3pp-physical aspect (physical information).

2.3. Realization of potential subjective experiences

If we assume that SEs really pre-exist, the hypothesis H1 of the DAMv framework (Vimal, 2008b, 2010c) seems to entail Type-2 explanatory gap: how it is possible that our subjective experiences (SEs) (such as happiness, sadness, painfulness, and similar SEs) were already present in primal entities in superposed form, whereas there is no shred of evidence that such SEs were conceived at the onset of universe. To address this gap, we propose that since there is no evidence that SEs pre-exist in realized/actualized form, SEs (and all other physical and mental entities of universe) potentially pre-exist. It is noted that the pre-existence of realized/actualized SEs is indeed a mystery. However, the pre-existence of potential (or possibility of) SEs (or any entity) is NOT a mystery. If a tree potentially does not pre-exist in its seed, it would never be realized. This term is important in quantum superposition where all potential SEs are hypothesized to be in superposed form in the mental aspect of the state of each entity. It is different matter how a potentially pre-existed entity (such as a specific SE) can be actualized, which certainly needs rigorous investigation. One such investigation is the matching and selection processes, detailed in (Vimal, 2008b, 2010c).

3. Explanation of Mysterious Emergence via the matching and selection mechanisms of DAMv

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There are many models for emergence (Bedeau, 1997; Broad, 1925; Chalmers, 2006; Fingelkurts et al., 2010a, 2010c; Freeman, 1999; Freeman & Vitiello, 2011; Kim, 1999; McLaughlin, 1992). However, SEs emerge mysteriously in all of them. Emergence can be of two kinds: strong and weak emergence: "We can say that a high-level phenomenon is strongly emergent with respect to a low-level domain when the high-level phenomenon arises from the low-level domain, but truths concerning that phenomenon are not deducible even in principle from truths in the low-level domain. [ ... ] We can say that a high- level phenomenon is weakly emergent with respect to a low-level domain when the high-level phenomenon arises from the low-level domain, but truths concerning that phenomenon are unexpected given the principles governing the low-level domain. [ ... ] My own view is that, relative to the physical domain, there is just one sort

2006). of strongly emergent quality, namely, consciousness" (Chalmers,

Weak emergence is compatible with materialism, but not strong emergence because SEs cannot be derived from the current laws of physics. The hypothesis of emergence of SEs is considered as a case of strong emergence. This can be unpacked in terms of matching and selection mechanisms. For example, if a specific SE is strongly emergent from the interaction between (stimulus-dependent or endogenous) feed forward signals and cognitive feedback signals in a relevant NN, we need appropriate fundamental psychophysical laws (Chalmers, 2006). These laws, in the proposed framework, might be expressed in the matching and selection mechanisms to specify a SE. We conclude that what seems to be a mysterious emergence could be unpacked into pre-existence of potential properties, matching, and selection mechanisms. In reductionist approaches, a complex system is considered to be the sum of its parts or can be reduced to the interactions of their parts/constituents. (Corning, 2012) discusses the relationship between reductionism, synergism, holism, self-organization, emergence and its characteristics. The common characteristics of emergence are: "(1) radical novelty (features not previously observed in the system); (2) coherence or correlation (meaning integrated wholes that maintain themselves over some period of time); (3) a global or macro 'level' (i.e., there is some property of 'wholeness'); (4) it is the product of a dynamical process (it evolves); and (5) it is 'ostensive'-it can be perceived. [ ... ] The mind is an emergent result of neural activity [ ... ] Emergence requires some form of 'interaction'-it's not simply a matter of scale [ ... ] Emergence does not have logical properties; it cannot be deduced (predicted)" (Corning, 2012).

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Emergence refers to the followings: (i) "the arising of novel and coherent structures, patterns and properties during the process of self-organization in complex systems" (Goldstein, 1999).

(ii) "The higher properties of life are emergent" (Wilson, 1975).

(iii) "The scientific meaning of emergent, or at least the one I use, assumes that, while the whole may not be the simple sum of its separate parts, its behavior can, at least in principle, be understood from the nature and behavior of its parts plus the knowledge of how all these parts interact" (Crick & Clark, 1994).

(iv) "In emergence, interconnected simple units can form complex systems and give rise to 'a powerful and integrated whole, without the need for a central supervision" (Rudrauf et al., 2003).

(v) "Emergence requires that the ultimate physical micro-entities have 'micro-latent' causal powers, which manifest themselves only when the entities are combined in ways that are 'emergence- engendering,' in addition to the 'micro-manifest' powers that account for their behavior in other circumstances" (Shoemaker, 2002).

Let us first consider the emergence of water from the interaction of hydrogen and oxygen (Vimal, 2010g): In the DAMv framework, some of the properties related to the physical aspect of the state of water may be somewhat explained using the reductionistic view and some using holistic mysterious emergence (Corning, 2012). However, how do we explain the mental aspect of the state of this (water) entity? Its liquidness and its appearance are the SEs constructed by mind (constructivism). Emergentists would argue that the doctrine of emergence could explain SEs, but how it could explain is still the mystery. In other words, water (with its properties we know of) potentially pre- exists; when hydrogen and oxygen are reacted in certain proportion under certain conditions some entity needs to be assigned to the resultant H2O. By trial-and-error method (rather trial-and-success process), evolution, selection, and adaptation assigned 'water' (with the properties we know of) to H2O because water fitted the best. This unpacking principle of emergence is based on (i) the potential pre- existence of irreducible entities, (ii) matching of latent properties superposed in physical and mental aspects of the state of constituting entities, and then (iii) selecting the best-fitted properties. For example, hydrogen is inflammable and oxygen is life force for animals (including

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humans). One could argue that some of the possible properties of H2O can be: (A) fire extinguishing (opposite to inflammable) and essential life supporting non-toxic properties for animals and other properties, which belong to water, (B) inflammable and toxic for animals, (C) inflammable, (D) life supporting non-toxic but not fire-extinguishing, and so on. Evolution might have tried all but the water-property (A) fitted the best and hence was selected and was assigned to H2O. Another example is: one might try to unpack the emergence of SE redness based on the DAMv framework (Vimal, 2008b, 2010c, 2011e) and using the necessary conditions for SEs (summarized in Section 2.2.5 and detailed in (Vimal, 2011b)) as follows: (1) at cone and retinal level, (a) the specificity of SEs is higher than that of the mental aspect related to external object-signals because cone signals are specific for vision only and external signals could be for all senses; (b) information processing is non-conscious and is perhaps for the functional (such as detection and discrimination of wavelengths) aspect of consciousness (Vimal 2009b, 2010d); and (c) SEs do not get actualized because retina is not awake as there is no ARAS projection to retina and there is no cognitive re-entrant feedback. (2) The specificity of SEs increases as signals travel from cone to ganglion cells to LGN to V1 to V2 to V4/V8/VO to higher up. (3) At V4/V8/VO-level, SE becomes specific to redness for long wavelength light, perhaps due to (a) V4/V8/VO NN can be awake as there are ARAS projections and (b) there are re-entrant cognitive feedback signals that interact with feed forward stimulus dependent signals. (4) The first feedback entry related to the mental aspect of the V4/V8/VO-NN-state, when neural signals (its physical aspect) re-enter in the NN, results very faint sensation below threshold level. Then repeated re-entry increases the strength of this sensation, which gets self-transformed in some kind of SE. (5) In the co-evolution of physical and mental aspects, the natural selection would have selected redness for long wavelength light. Therefore, eventually experience related to redness is selected for long wavelength light reflected from say ripe-tomato. (6) However, one could ask further where does this redness come from? Or how and why the initial feeling of sensation is generated and how did the transformation of sensation to an experience occur? Similarly, all emerged entities including structure and the functional and experiential (SEs) aspects of consciousness (Vimal 2009b, 2010d) can be elaborated. This implies that the same unpacking principle for emergence holds for all, namely, structure, function, experiences, and all physical entities including human artifacts. Thus, the mystery of emergence could be unraveled in this manner to some extent.

In other words, the mysterious strong emergence can be partly unpacked by the following three premises: (I) All irreducible higher-level entities (and their properties), such as SEs, potentially pre-exist.

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(II) Their irreducible physical and mental properties are potentially superposed in the respective physical and mental aspects of the states of all fundamental entities. (III) A specific SE is realized/actualized by the matching and selection mechanism as detailed in our hypothesis H1 of the DAMv framework (Vimal, 2008b, 2010c).

4. Future Researches

4.1. Brute fact problem

The dual-aspect monism framework has the problem of dual-aspect 'brute' fact (that is the way it is!), although it is justified as we clearly have NNs in brain (physical aspect) and related subjective experiences (mental aspect); however, it is indeed an assumption. This assumption is similar to the assumption of God, soul, Brahman, physics' vacuum/empty-space with virtual particles, strings in string-theory, and other fundamental assumptions in all frameworks. Further investigation is needed to address the brute fact problem. One speculative attempt is as follows. One could ask: what is the origin of the inseparable mental and physical aspects of the state of each entity in the DAMv framework? To address this, let us consider wave-particle duality and brain's NN-state. As per (Fingelkurts, Fingelkurts, & Neves, 2010b), "the physical brain produces a highly structured and dynamic electromagnetic field". If we apply the concept of wave-particle inseparable dual-aspect of 'wavicle' to brain-NN-state, then it seems that there are 3 inseparable aspects of the same brain-NN-state: (i) physical particle-like NN, (ii) wave-like electromagnetic field generated by activities of the NN in brain, and (iii) related phenomenal subjective experience (SE). The wave-like electromagnetic field is mind-like as per mind-like nondual monism based on the wave-only hypothesis (Stapp, 2001, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c)17. Moreover, as per CEMI field theory (McFadden, 2002a, 2002b, 2006), SE is like 'looking' from the inside CEMI field. In above, one could argue that (ii) and (iii) can be combined as the mental aspect of brain-NN state. If this is acceptable, then one could argue that: (a) the origin of mental aspect is the wave-aspect of wave-particle duality (as electromagnetic field radiation is mindlike because a photon can be anywhere within a field of radius of 186,000 miles in one second of electromagnetic radiation); and (b) the origin of physical aspect is its particle-aspect. Thus, in physics, it seems that the mental aspect is already built-in from the first principle, and we do not have to insert mental aspect in physics 'by hand'. If this is correct, then the 'brute fact' problem is addressed.

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However, one could argue that both wave and particle aspects of 'wavicle' are physical aspect because energy (E), frequency of wave (v), and mass (m) of particle are related by E = hv = mc2, where h is Planck constant and c is speed of light. Thus, it is debatable.

4.2. Origin of subjective experiences It is unclear where do subjective experiences (SEs) (including conscious experience related to self) come from? The hypotheses for the origin of SEs are as follows:

(I) All SEs actually pre-exist (Vimal, 2009g, 2009h). For example, the 'self' in living system is the SE of subject (Bruzzo & Vimal, 2007), which has been assumed to pre-exist eternally as soul/jiva/ ruh in religions. If the pre-existence of self/soul is true, then it can be interpreted, in the DAMv framework, as (i) the 'abstract-ego' in von Neumann quantum mechanics (Stapp, 2001), if it is independent of brain, with its mental aspect dominant and its physical aspect latent after death. Moreover, (ii) when we are alive and fully awake the mental and physical aspects related to 'self' are equally dominant. In other words, the physical aspect of self-related NN-state is the self-related NN that includes cortical midline structures (Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004; Northoff et al., 2006) and their functional synchrony (Fingelkurts & Fingelkurts, 2011) and other activities. The mental aspect of self-related NN-state, which is projected inside the brain where it roughly seems to be, is the SE of subject or self. However, this hypothesis entails Type-2 explanatory gap as elaborated in Section 2.3. The problem of actually pre-existence of SEs is that there is no empirical evidence because the pre-existed entity must really exist in at least one of the three realities, namely, our daily cMDR, samadhi state ultimate mind-dependent reality (uMDR), or unknown or partly known MIR. The SEs of subject and objects must satisfy the necessary ingredient of consciousness and self, such as the formation of NNs, wakefulness, re-entry (Edelman, 1993), attention, working memory, four stages of (Schwalbe, 1991)'s self-organization, and so on (Vimal, 2011b). Then only an actual SE can be experienced. Therefore, the hypothesis of potentially pre-existence of SEs is more viable because it does not have such problems. Furthermore, (D'Souza, 2009) discussed some debatable (Stenger, 2011) evidence of life (and self/soul) after death; in addition, there are some debatable evidence for life-after-death from near-death experiences (NDEs), out-of-body experiences (OBEs), reincarnation research, nonglossy, hypnosis, deathbed visions, quantum physics, dream research, after-death communications research (Guggenheim & Guggenheim, 1995; Schwartz & Russek, 2001), synchronicity, and remote viewing.

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(D'Souza, 2009) has tried best to argue out materialism and to argue out arguments against life after death based on data and theories related to (i) near death experiences, (ii) modern (quantum) physics, (iii) modern biology, (iv) neuroscience, (v) modern philosophy, (vi) morality and cosmic justice, and (vii) social and individual issues. He has shown the benefits of the hypothesis of the life after death in (i) fear of death, (ii) meaning and purpose of life, (iii) moral values, and (iv) better, healthier, and happier life. This hypothesis might be useful in reducing the fear of death; but the remaining other benefits can be acquired without it. The arguments against materialism are interesting; but the arguments for the life after death are debatable; (Stenger, 2011) refutes most of the claims. Furthermore, (Fingelkurts & Fingelkurts, 2009) uses materialistic emergentism metaphysical framework for explaining the occurrence of religious experiences in brain. In science, (a) there is no evidence for the life after death, God, and Soul, and (b) our dead body disintegrates in to its dual-aspect constituents from which the body was originally formed via reproductive process. It should be noted that fundamental metaphysics of most theist religions are the same: (a) idealism and (b) interactive substance dualism. Both views have problems (Vimal, 2011e, 2011f). Though NDEs are reported, however, (D'Souza, 2009)'s interpretation that the life after death or soul exists after death is debatable. This interpretation is based on interactive substance dualism that has 7 problems ((Vimal, 2010d) and (Vimal, 2011f), Section 2). In addition, one could interpret these data without invoking the interpretation based on substance dualism. For example, the data can be interpreted using the theist version (Vimal, 2011e, 2011f) of the DAMv framework (Vimal, 2008b, 2010c) that has the least number of problems or even using the problematic materialism (Blackmore, 1993; Blackmore, 1996; French, 2005; Klemenc-Ketis, Kersnik, & Grmec, 2010; Stenger, 2011) to some extent. The DAMv framework is a middle path between (i) idealism and substance dualism and (ii) materialism (mind from matter). There are two versions of the DAMv framework: theist and atheist (Vimal, 2011e, 2011f). This is because the theist-atheist phenomenon is genetic (such as 'God gene' (Hamer, 2005)) and/or acquired (such as accidents, how one is raised, and so on). Therefore, the fundamental truth and (worldly-local and cosmic-global) justice should be independent of theist-atheist phenomenon. Speculations: (i) In atheist version related to 'no-self religions such as Buddhism, after death karma may be imprinted in some dual-aspect quantum field entity. (ii) In theist religions, karma may be imprinted in the physical aspect of the state of a dual-aspect quantum entity (such as subtle body, tachyon) that has soul/jīvātman/ruh as its mental aspect. Tachyon as mind field, in substance dualism framework, is proposed by (Hari, 2010, 2011). If soul exists after death, then it must be a dual-

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aspect entity/field/particle; this new elementary particle or field (or its effects) still need to be detected. (iii) God/Brahman/ Allah is the fundamental primal dual-aspect entity from which other entities arose via the co-evolution and co-development of both aspects. One could argue: who created God? The usual answer (He is omnipresent, omnipotent and omniscient, so nobody created Him because He always existed) will have hard time to satisfy atheists and scientists. Some could argue that He is created by human mind. If God/ Brahman/Allah and soul/Atman/ruh exist, they must be dual- aspect entities. It is argued that Brahman is beyond mind (Adi Śankarāchārya, 1950; Swami Krishnananda, 1983); and therefore, perhaps, He is an entity in MIR; MIR is either unknown or partly known via our cMDR and uMDR (Vimal, 2011e, 2011f). The relationships between entities in MIR are presumably the same as in cMDR and uMDR, and hence these relationships are invariant over these three realities. Alternatively, one could argue that the unmanifested state of Brahman is the state of primal aspectless neutral entity; this has been interpreted as its both mental and physical aspects being latent in Section 2.2.5. My view is as follows: We do not know if God, soul, and 'life after death' exist because we do not have scientific evidence and cannot prove or disprove them. In addition, these concepts arose from human minds to begin with in cMDR and/or uMDR. Thus, at present time, it is beyond scientific investigation because they need testable hypotheses that are acceptable to skeptics. Therefore, the best we can do is (a) to do rigorous scientific investigations on topics related to 'life before death' and (b) keep on trying our best in the investigation of 'life after death', soul, and God. Both science and religions are certainly needed in our daily lives because they are beneficial in a complementary manner.

(II) Only cardinal SEs actually pre-exist (including the SE of subject) and other SEs emerge or are derived from them (Vimal, 2009b). For example, all colors can be matched psychophysically with 3 cardinal/primaries (red, green, and blue) (Vimal, Pokorny, & Smith, 1987). However, the subjective experience of each color is unique and appears irreducible. Moreover, this hypothesis entails Type-2 explanatory gap as elaborated in hypothesis (I) and Section 2.3. Therefore, cardinal SEs potentially pre-exist.

(III) All SEs emerge or are derived from the interaction of one proto- experience (such as the self that actually pre-existed) and three gunas (qualities) of eastern Vedic system (Vimal, 2009b). However, three gunas (sattva, rajas, and tamas: part of Prakriti) were initially postulated for emotion related SEs in Vedic system. However, it is unclear how other SEs can be derived.

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(IV) The SE of subject (self-as-the-knower) actually pre-exists but the SEs of objects (such as redness) potentially pre-exist, which somehow emerge or are actualized during the matching and selection processes. The problem of hypothesis (I) still remains.

(V) SEs potentially pre-exist but somehow emerge or are actualized during the matching and selection processes (Vimal, 2008b, 2010c); this seems somewhat consistent with (Atmanspacher, 2007). This is still mysterious, but acceptable by most investigators because one could argue that every entity that empirically exist must potentially exist in analogy to a tree potentially pre-exist in its seed. In Pereira Jr.'s Triple-Aspect Monism (TAM) framework ((Pereira Jr., 2012) and personal communication in March-2011), the three aspects of each entity-state are (1) physical-non-mental, (2) mental-non-conscious, and (3) conscious mental aspects. In the DAMv framework, they, respectively, correspond to (1) mind-independent 'thing-in-itself' physical-aspect, (2) third-person mind-dependent physical-aspect, and (3) the first-person mind-dependent mental-aspect. It seems that TAM has combined both MIR and cMDR, i.e., its first aspect is MIR-physical-aspect (MIR-mental-aspect is missing), its second aspect is cMDR-physical (third-person-mental-non-conscious), and its third aspect is cMDR-mental (first-person-mental-conscious). If the missing MIR-mental-aspect were also considered, then there would be four aspects: two for MIR and two for cMDR. If TAM is divided into MIR and c-MDR, we get the DAMv framework in MIR (MIR-physical-aspect: such as mass, charge, spin; MIR-mental-aspect: such as attractive and repulsive forces) and c-MDR (c-MDR-physical-aspect: such as third- person-objective NNs and activities including their third-person- appearances; c-MDR-mental-aspect: such as first-person-subjective experiences). Therefore, TAM can be reduced to the DAMv framework that has only two parameters (mental and physical) for all entities (including MIR-entities) and hence it is more parsimonious as per Occam Razor. In addition, the origin of SEs is potential 'elementary forms' that are actualized in an individual's mind. For TAM, SEs are affects, feelings and actions elicited by the reception of a complex of forms by an individual. Forms are the mental aspect of the universe. They are fully actualized only in the consciousness of individuals. However, one needs to elaborate precisely how the reception of the mental aspect of universe (a complex of forms) by an individual human subject (such as a trichromat) can elicit a specific subjective experience such as redness.

(VI) None of the above; there is some unknown mechanism for the origin of SEs that still need to be hypothesized and tested.

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The degrees of clarity/transparency related to precisely how a specific SE is actualized decreases from hypothesis (I) to (V). The degrees of mystery of emergence of SEs also increase from hypothesis (II) to (V). Further research is needed to test these hypotheses and unpack the mystery of emergence fully.

4. Concluding Remarks

5. The mystery of emergence (including the emergence of self (Edelman, Gally, & Baars, 2011) and consciousness (Allen & Williams, 2011) from brain-body-environment interactions) can be partly unpacked by the hypothesis of the pre-existence of potential properties, and the matching and selection mechanisms.

6. In the DAMv framework (Dual-Aspect Monism framework with dual- mode and varying degrees of dominance of aspects depending on the levels of entities), we proposed the following propositions (3-7):

7. A SE related to objects occurs in respective NN and is projected on the objects where it seems to be through the matching and selection mechanisms. In other words, the representation of objects in the NN generates NN-state that has two inseparable mental (first person perspective) and physical (third person perspective) aspects. The physical aspect of NN-state is NN and its activities encompassing brain-body- environment and its mental aspect is the SEs of objects and the subject (self). The NN includes self-related areas (such as brain-stem for protoself, CMS, and other areas for core self and autobiographical self) and emotion related area as well in addition to the brain-areas related to stimulus-dependent feed-forward and cognitive feedback signals. These cognitive feedback signals interact with the stimulus dependent feed- forward signals in re-entrant manner; SE is experienced by the whole NN that includes self-related areas.

8. Self, as the SE of subject and/or the awareness of awareness of objects, is the mental aspect of self-related NN-state that is generated by the representation due to the re-entrant activities in self-related NN. In addition, the related physical aspect is the self-related NN and its activities. If there are objects to be experienced, the self-related activities need to be synchronized with all other related activities such as stimuli- related and emotion-related activities. Alternatively, one could argue for global NN that includes NN for stimulus-representations, and self- and

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emotion-related NNs; they are bound through rapid re-entry of signals; see also (Van Gulick, 2004, 2006) for Higher-Order Global States model.

5. (Damasio, 2010) proposed (a) the two stages of evolutionary development of the self: the self-as-knower ('I') and the self-as-object ('me') and (b) the three steps of the self-as-knower: protoself, core self, and autographical self. Since self can be both subject and object of experience/perception, reflexivism and reflectionism/introspectionism are not deeply incompatible, rather they reveal different facets of the self (Chadha, 2011).

6. There are two stages of processing: first, there is non-conceptual or phenomenal awareness/consciousness/experiences, which is then followed by conceptual or access awareness when cognitive such as attentional and memory related signals kick in; see also (Chadha, 2010, 2011; Hanna & Chadha, 2011; Prevos, 2002a, 2002b).

7. We do not know if there exists a dual-aspect entity after death that carries the impressions/traces of our good and bad karmas/actions (as Buddhism suggests) or that has attributes of Ātman/soul/ruh as suggested by theist religions. We do not yet have proof for the existence or non-existence of God/Brahman/Allāh, soul/Ātman/ruh, and/or life after death in the DAMv (or any other) framework; see also (Vimal, 2011e, 2011f). If soul exists after death, then it should be a dual-aspect entity; this entity (or its effects) still needs to be detected. Therefore, further research is needed and is beyond the scope of this chapter.

Acknowledgments

The work was partly supported by VP-Research Foundation Trust and Vision Research Institute research fund. Author18 would like to thank Alfredo Pereira, Wolfgang Baer, Andrew Fingelkurts, Ron Cottam, and other colleagues for their critical comments, suggestions, and grammatical corrections. This article is the shorter version of (Vimal, 2011d).

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Vimal, R. L. P. (2009b). Derivation of Subjective Experiences from a Proto-experience and three Gunas in the Dual-Aspect-Dual-Mode Framework. Vision Research Institute: Living Vision and Consciousness Research [http://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/ Home/ 2009-Vimal-Guna-LVCR-2-5.pdfl, 2(5), 1-140. Vimal, R. L. P. (2009c). Dual Aspect Framework for Consciousness and Its Implications: West meets East for Sublimation Process Available: http://sites.google.com/ site/ rlpvimal/Home/ 2009-Vimal-Consciousness-and- its-implications-recent-version-LVCR-2-11.pdfl. In G. Derfer, Z. Wang & M. Weber (Eds.), The Roar of Awakening. A Whiteheadian Dialogue Between Western Psychotherapies and Eastern Worldviews (Vol. 3 of Whitehead Psychology Nexus Studies, pp. 39-70). Frankfurt / Lancaster: Ontos Verlag. Vimal, R. L. P. (2009d). Interpretation of Empirical Data of Samadhi State and the Dual- Aspect Dual-Mode Optimal Framework. Vision Research Institute: Living Vision and Consciousness Research [http://sites.google.com/ site/rlpvimal/ Home/ 2009- Vimal-Samadhi-LVCR-2-3.pdfl, 2(3), 1-130. Vimal, R. L. P. (2009e). Linking Dynamic Systems theory & Fractal Catalytic Theory with Standard Representation Theory using PE-SE framework. Vision Research Institute: Living Vision nd Consciousness Research [http://sites.google.com/ site/rlpvimal/ Home/ 2009-Vimal-DST-SRT-PESE-LVCR-2- 6.pdfl, 2(6), 1-50. Vimal, R. L. P. (2009f). Meanings attributed to the term 'consciousness': an overview. J Consciousness Stud (Available: http://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/ Home/ 2009-Vimal-Meanings-LVCR-2- 10.pdf), 16(5), 9-27. Vimal, R. L. P. (2009g). Subjective Experience Aspect of Consciousness Part I - Integration of Classical, Quantum, and Subquantum Concepts. NeuroQuantology [Available: http://sites.google.com/ site/ rlpvimal/ Home/ 2009- Vimal-PE-SE-SQ-Part1-LVCR-2-8.pdfl, 7(3), 390-410. Vimal, R. L. P. (2009h). Subjective Experience Aspect of Consciousness Part II: Integration of Classical and Quantum Concepts for Emergence Hypothesis. NeuroQuantology [http://sites.google.com/ site/ rlpvimal/ Home/ 2009-PE-SE- Emergence-Part2-LVCR-2-9.pdfl, 7(3), 411-434 Vimal, R. L. P. (2010a). Consciousness, Non-conscious Experiences and Functions, Proto-experiences and Proto-functions, and Subjective Experiences. J Consciousness Exploration & Res, 1(3), 383-389. Vimal, R. L. P. (2010b). Interactions among Minds/Brains: Individual Consciousness and Inter-subjectivity in Dual-Aspect Framework. J Consciousness Exploration & Res, 1(6), 657-717. Vimal, R. L. P. (2010c). Matching and selection of a specific subjective experience: conjugate matching and subjective experience. J Integr Neurosci [<http://sites.google.com/ site/rlpvimal/ Home/ 2013-Vimal-Matching-Selection- LVCR-3-1.pdf>l, 9(2), 193-251. Vimal, R. L. P. (2010d). On the Quest of Defining Consciousness. Mind Matter (Available: <http://sites.google.com/ site/ rlpvimal/ Home/ 2010-Vimal-DefineC- LVCR-3-2.pdf>), 8(1), 93-121. Vimal, R. L. P. (2010e). Towards a Theory of Everything Part I - Introduction of Consciousness in Electromagnetic Theory, Special and General Theory of Relativity. NeuroQuantology, 8(2), 206-230. Vimal, R. L. P. (2010f). Towards a Theory of Everything Part II - Introduction of Consciousness in Schrödinger equation and Standard Model using Quantum Physics. NeuroQuantology, 8(3), 304-313. Vimal, R. L. P. (2010g). Towards a Theory of Everything Part III - Introduction of Consciousness in Loop Quantum Gravity and String Theory and Unification of Experiences with Fundamental Forces. NeuroQuantology, 8(4), 571-599.

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Vimal, R. L. P. (2010h). Variable Concept of Free Will: Semi-Free Will in Dual-aspect Dual-mode Framework. Vision Research Institute: Living Vision and Consciousness Research [Available: <http://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/Home/ 2010-Vimal-FreeWill-LVCR-3- 10.pdf >], 3(10), 1-50. Vimal, R. L. P. (2011a). Bridging Materialism and Anti-materialism via Dual-Aspect Monism. Vision Research Institute: Living Vision and Consciousness Research [Available: <http://sites.google.com/ site/ rlpvimal/ Home/ 2011-Vimal-Bridging Materialism-and-antiMaterialism-LVCR-4-2.pdf >], 4(2), 1-100. Vimal, R. L. P. (2011b). Necessary Ingredients of Consciousness: Integration of Psychophysical, Neurophysiological, and Consciousness Research for the Red- Green Channel. Vision Research Institute: Living Vision and Consciousness Research [http://sites.google.com/ site/ rlpvimal/ Home/ 2009-Vimal-Necessary- Ingredients-Conciousness-LVCR-2-1.pdfl, 2(1), 1-50. Vimal, R. L. P. (2011c). Origin of Subjective Experiences: Dual-Aspect Monism. Vision Research Institute: Living Vision and Consciousness Research [Available: <http://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/ Home/ 2011-Vimal-Origin-of-SEs-LVCR-4- 6.pdf>l. 4(6), 1-90. Vimal, R. L. P. (2011d). Partly Unpacking the Mysterious Emergence: Matching and Selection Mechanisms of Dual-Aspect Monism. Vision Research Institute: Living Vision and Consciousness Research, 4(1), 1-50. Vimal, R. L. P. (2011e). Scientific Hinduism: Bringing Science and Hinduism Closer via Extended Dual-Aspect Monism (Dvi-PakDa Advaita). Vision Research Institute: Living Vision and Consciousness Research :< http://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/ Home/2011-Vimal-Dvaita- Advaita-Visistadvaita-DAM-4-9.pdf >, 4(9), 1-130. Vimal, R. L. P. (2011f). Scientific Religions: Science-Religion Unification through Extended Dual-Aspect Monism and its Novel Critiques. Vision Research Institute: Living Vision and Consciousness Research: http://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/ Home/ 2011-Vimal-Problems-Dualism- Religions-DAM-4-8.pdf, 4(8), 1-50. Vimal, R. L. P. (2011g). Towards a Theory of Everything Part IV: Information in Dual- Aspect Monism. Vision Research Institute: Living Vision and Consciousness Research, 4(7), 1-50. Vimal, R. L. P. (2012a). Emergence in Dual-Aspect Monism. In A. Pereira Jr. & D. Lehmann (Eds.), The Unity of Mind, Brain and World: Current Perspectives on a Science of Consciousness (Vol.). Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. In Press [Longer version is available for comments: <http://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/Home/2012-Vimal-Emergence-UMBW- CUP.pdf>l. Vimal, R. L. P. (2012b). Evolution of Universe in Dual-Aspect Monism. Vision Research Institute: Living Vision and Consciousness Research [Available at <http://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/Home/ 2012-Vimal-Evolution-of-Universe- in-Dual-Aspect-Monism-LVCR-5-1.doc >], 5(1), 1-60 Vimal, R. L. P. (2012c). Scientific Hinduism: Bringing Science and Hinduism Closer through Extended Dual-Aspect Monism (Dvi-PakDa Advaita). Vision Research Institute: Living Vision and Consciousness Research [Available: http://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/Home/ 2012-Vimal-Scientific-Hinduism- Bringing-Science-and-Hinduism-closer-DAMv-5-4-book.pdf; summary at http://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/ Home/ 2012-Vimal-Dvi-Paksa-Advaita.doc, 5(4) Vimal, R. L. P., & Davia, C. J. (2008). How Long is a Piece of Time? - Phenomenal Time and Quantum Coherence - Toward a Solution. Quantum Biosystems (Available: http://www.quantumbionet.org/ admin/files/QBS2%20102-151.pdf and http://www.quantumbionet.org/ admin/files/QBS2%20102-151.pdf), 2, 102-151.

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Vimal, R. L. P., & Davia, C. J. (2010). Phenomenal Time and its Biological Correlates. J Consciousness Exploration & Res, 1(5), 560-572. Vimal, R. L. P., Pokorny, J. M., & Smith, V. C. (1987). Appearance of steadily viewed light. Vision Res., 27(8), 1309-1318. Vitiello, G. (1995). Dissipation and memory capacity in the quantum brain model. Int J Mod Phys, B9, 973-989. Wilberg, P. (2008). Heidegger, Phenomenology and Indian Thought. UK: New Gnosis Publications, www.newgnosis.co.uk. Wilson, E. O. (1975). Sociobiology: The new synthesis. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Endnotes:

1 One could argue that the term 'dual' aspect resembles dualism and the term 'double' aspect suggests complementarity (such as wave-particle complementarity). In this chapter, however, these terms are used interchangeably and represent the inseparable mental (from the subjective first person perspective) and physical (from the objective third person perspective, and/or matter-in-itself) aspects of the same state of same entity. This is somewhat close to the double aspect theory of Fechner and Spinoza (Stubenberg, 2010).

2 See ('t Hooft, 2005).p4 for 'primitive' quantum field, (Bohm, 1990) for quantum potential, and (Hiley & Pylkkänen, 2005) for "primitive mind-like quality at the quantum level via active information".

3 Steiner on Materialism and the Hard Problem (multisenserealism): "Materialism can never offer a satisfactory explanation of the world. For every attempt at an explanation must begin with the formation of thoughts about the phenomena of the world. Materialism thus begins with the thought of matter or material processes. But, in doing so, it is already confronted by two different sets of facts: the material world, and the thoughts about it. The materialist seeks to make these latter intelligible by regarding them as purely material processes. He believes that thinking takes place in the brain, much in the same way that digestion takes place in the animal organs. Just as he attributes mechanical and organic effects to matter, so he credits matter in certain circumstances with the capacity to think. He overlooks that, in doing so, he is merely shifting the problem from one place to another. He ascribes the power of thinking to matter instead of to himself. And thus he is back again at his starting point. How does matter come to think about its own nature? Why is it not simply satisfied with itself and content just to exist? The materialist has turned his attention away from the definite subject, his own I, and has arrived at an image of something quite vague and indefinite. Here the old riddle meets him again. The materialistic

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conception cannot solve the problem; it can only shift it from one place to another." Rudolf Steiner, The Philosophy of Freedom (A nice quick video along similar lines: http://www.youtube. com/watch? v=5dlBROdVjjI.

As per (Flanagan, 1988), "If mind and matter are dual or complementary aspects of a single stuff, then we might expect that changes in one be accompanied by changes in the other, and we have ample evidence that this is so." This seems consistent with the doctrine of inseparability of dual-aspect monism with inseparable aspects.

5 In general, PEs are precursors of SEs. In hypothesis H1, PEs are precursors of SEs in the sense that PEs are superposed SEs in unexpressed form in the mental aspect of every entity-state, from which a specific SE is selected via matching and selection process in brain- environment system. In hypotheses H2 and H3, PEs are precursors of SEs in the sense that SEs somehow arise/emerge from PEs.

6 The dual-mode concept is derived from thermofield dissipative quantum brain dynamics (Globus, 2006; Vitiello, 1995).

7 Entropy is related to time.

8 No category mistake, if idealism is the emergence of 'appearance' (mental entity) of matter from mind. However, the 'matter-in-itself' is a real matter and assuming it emerges from mind or is a 'congealed' mind is indeed a category mistake.

9 The DAMv framework is discussed in detail in (Vimal, 2008b, 2010c, 2011e) and elaborated further in (Bruzzo & Vimal, 2007; Caponigro, Jiang, Prakash, & Vimal, 2010; Caponigro & Vimal, 2010; MacGregor & Vimal, 2008; Vimal, 2008a, 2009a, 2009b, 2009c, 2009d, 2009e, 2009f, 2009g, 2009h, 2010a, 2010b, 2010d, 2010e, 2010f, 2010g, 2010h, 2011b, 2011c, 2011g; Vimal & Davia, 2010).

10 Adapted from my discussion with Len in http://www.physicsforums.com/private.php: Ram Vimal (RV): As per (d'Espagnat, 1998), "At our disposal we have the basic rules of quantum mechanics, which are excellent observational predictive rules, that do predict correlations. But their very existence requires an explanation of some sort, the minimal element of which seems to be the existence of something external to us acting as a support of them. It is this something that should, by definition, be called Mind-Independent Reality. It is not described by these rules since the latter are predictive, not descriptive of anything. Still, we must consider it exists. [ ... ] This 'something' however needs not be anything like a 'substance'. Could it just be a law ? Could it

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• after all - be a mere 'observational predictive law'? In other words, can the conditions we impose on whatever we accept as 'explanation' be relaxed to the extent that, as cursorily noted above, the laws, including even those that are merely predictive of observations, could be seen as constituting an 'explanation' ? Maybe. But then the 'explanatory power' of these laws entirely lies in their generality, so that the latter cannot be thought of as limited by contingencies or circumstances. The explanatory power in question is preserved only if we reject such statements as, for instance, 'unknown laws do not exist' (Meyerson, 1907) or if we refuse to identify the 'laws' such statements mention with the 'great laws' we consider as candidates for constituting an explanatory basis. Hence, this corroborates the above. It seems to imply that even along such a 'minimal' view as the one under discussion in this paragraph there must be 'something' - namely these laws - that does not depend on us. A 'something' then, that constitutes, by definition so to speak, an 'ultimate' reality." There are other rationale for MIR in this article.

Len M (LM): I have read d'Espagnant extensively: "On Physics and Philosophy", "Veiled Reality" and "Conceptual foundations of Quantum Mechanics" as well as the papers you cite. His philosophical conclusions regarding the nature of our reality I find compelling, though those conclusions can lead to some uncomfortable notions regarding dualism as being only a construct of our reality as opposed to it existing in that form outside of our reality "within" what d'Espagnat refers to as mind independent reality. If you were interested in d'Espagnat, I would recommend "On Physics and Philosophy".

RV: Subject-object dualism can be explained more efficiently using the DAMv framework. For example, each entity-state (including brain-state) has 1st person perspective (1pp)-mental and 3rd person perspective (3pp)- physical aspects. When a subject views an object, the 1pp-mental aspect of dual-aspect brain-state is a subject and the 3pp-physical aspect of dual-aspect object-state is an object. It does not have to be interactive substance dualism (mind and matter as two independent categories of entities, but they can interact); it could be extended dual-aspect monism (DAMv) even if we include mind independent reality (MIR). In other words, each entity-state can have dual-aspect: mental and physical aspect. The physical aspect of an entity/object (a) could be 3pp-mind dependent in terms of object's 'appearances' or (b) could be mind independent (thing-in-itself, Kant's 'ding an sich'), which is either unknown or partly known through our minds because a mind is also a product of Nature.

LM: I find it somewhat difficult to relate my understanding of d'Espagnat to other lines of enquiry, mainly because I am not that well versed in

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philosophy or physics in any kind of academic sense. But my interest spans many years and through d'Espagnat I think I have finally (well perhaps not finally!) arrived at some (philosophical) understanding of what constitutes this strange existence of ours in terms of fundamental questions regarding the nature of space and time (and hence dualism, (dualism couldn't exist without space and space can't exist without time)) and that which we perceive within that framework of dualism. From your very brief (and I haven't as yet looked at your url links) introduction to your subject area I feel you are approaching the subject at the next level up (so to speak) from d'Espagnat's more fundamental question regarding nature. However I can't be sure, so I have written a brief and incomplete resume of d'Espagnat's work as understood by myself. Hopefully this will give you a better idea of my impressions of your work in relation to d'Espagnat. My brief comments on how I see your work in this manner is contained after my resume of d'Espagnat below.

The essence of d'Espagnat's thesis concerns our reality (which is all we can ever know) and the possibility of there existing a "something" that lay outside of our reality. Within our reality space and time exist in a manner that we all agree on (d'Espagnat terms this as intersubjective agreement). The apple falls to the ground in the same manner in the same time for all of us. But does that apple exist, along with space and time outside of our reality? Realism looks to say something "true" about that which lay outside of the mind (i.e. within mind independent reality as defined by d'Espagnant, but not your definition), but d'Espagnat says that mind, consciousness, our "whole" emerges from mind independent reality (the "something" but in manner that is entirely unknown. In this sense, it is impossible to say something "true" (in a scientific sense) about mind independent reality because the reality that we frame that question from is all we can ever know and that reality is a construct that exists only in terms of sentient beings. Kant maintained that space and time are a priori and so maintains the notion of dualism as being absolute, there exists in one corner the observer and in the other corner the object. Kant maintains that the object is subject to our interpretation, so we can never know the "thing in its self", but he maintains the thing in its self is "something" outside of our existence and has structure based in space and time. D'Espagnat would say that the object is part of our construct, it does not have any form that we can envisage existing within space and time outside of that construct. So for example, the star that emerges before sentient beings were around exists in terms of its historical time line only within our reality. We project back to a time of birth of that star in terms of our laws of physics and are able to say what that star would be like if a hypothetical human being were present at that time. Outside of our reality there is no historical time line, there is no birth of that star.

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But d'espagnat falls short of embracing idealism (and solipsism); *he maintains that nature as we scientifically perceive it seems to depend on something other that what we have in our minds *(he gives various arguments in favour of this which I won't repeat but can be found in his books). Not dependent in a causal sense within space and time, but rather dependent upon "something" that exists outside of our reality. This is not at all to imply a "God" (and despite winning the Templeton prize has never invoked arguments in favour of a "God" in any manner, his message is rather about there (philosophically) being a requirement for "something" existing outside of our reality (or as he describes it within his definition of mind independent reality) that gives rise to our physical laws. Rather he describes the "something" as being "open", in other words we can't say anything scientific about it, it is a philosophical conjecture. So for d'Espagnat, idealism is rejected for realism, but a realism that is quite unlike that coveted by most physicists (who often don't realise they are invoking philosophy when using the term "realism"). It is a realism that he terms "Open Realism"; it is "something" that lay beyond our reality, our minds and our consciousness, it is "something" that does not exist within space and time but from it emerges our reality, our minds and our consciousness. So our reality is not a simulation from this "something", our reality is VERY real! But it is not absolute; objects, space and time only take on that form within the construct that emerges from the "something" in terms of rules that are the same for everybody. The structure of our reality in terms of these rules stem (in an unknown manner from the "something").

D'espagnat derives this thesis through his work as a physicist in terms of quantum mechanics and classical physics. He deduces that QM can account for all of our macroscopic laws, so considers that the quantum level is a universal base within our reality (though very importantly he does not attach ontological status to QM). At the QM level, counterfactuality breaks down, so objectivity becomes weak. The strict dualism present in the macroscopic breaks down at the quantum level and thus strong objectivity which arises through subject/object separation at the macroscopic also breaks down at this level. The scientific method relies on the separation of subject and object, at the quantum level it only survives because the subjective nature of quantum experiments gives the same outcomes for everybody. But this is all played out within the only reality we know. d'Espagnat considers that the quantum level (whereby events are observations rather than events independent of observations) gives rise to our macroscopic reality. Decoherence gives a mathematical rendering of this process, though d'Espagnat is at pains to point out that decoherence does not render itself as being a true statement of mind independent reality because

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decoherence gives rise to improper mixtures, they are mixtures that refer to the inabilities of humans in being able to measure the predicted proper mixtures. Decoherence thus becomes weakly objective because it refers to the abilities (or not) of humans. It must be stressed again, QM is part of our reality, the experiments are carried out within space and time, we carry them out, so the rules of quantum mechanics does not indicate any kind of ontological status, they are not the building blocks of mind independent reality, they have been discovered within mind dependent reality, our reality. What d'espagnat says is that they are the building blocks of our reality, it is this base that gives rise to our macroscopic reality and dualism.

Quantum entanglement at the quantum level for d'Espagnat gives rise to his notion of space as being a construct of our macroscopic reality. Space within quantum entanglement does not exist, yet from our macroscopic perspective we cannot use this feature in any manner, we can only observe it. d'Espagnat considers that this is a clue pertaining to the nature of a "something" that lay outside of our reality, it is a reality that does not have space and hence (because of relativity) does not have time. So his open realism is an "entity" that exists not in space or time and exists outside of our "whole". Within our "whole", we are able to practice science on the basis of a separation of subject and object, but that separation is in appearances only, it is not an absolute notion that is universally applicable within nature. It is only applicable within our reality which must include mind and consciousness. Outside of mind, consciousness, space and time, there is no separation, there is no rock, there is no historical timeline, there is no "infinite" universe, there is no expansion of space, those aspects only "exist" within our reality (in whatever way that reality is made up). So the ball moving past our observation is a construct, outside of our construct there is no movement. The ball doesn't exist as an independent object, infinitely copying itself through a time line, that process is a construct of our "whole".

So from your brief introduction to your work, I'm not sure that it complements d'Espagnat, rather I think it operates within our reality, our "whole". To talk about a physical aspect being mind dependent or mind independent seems possible only through the construct of dualism. Within that construct, we can say our senses may deceive us, or only give an approximate rendition of the object, and that is entirely true. In this sense, the rock exists as "something" within mind independent reality but as a rock within mind dependent reality, but only when using those terms within a context of existing as such in our reality. This simply affirms the rules that make up our processing systems, the rules governing electromagnetic "propagation", the rules of wavelength and

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many others. But all of these rules exist within the "construct" of dualism and are part of and shape our reality. But this has never satisfied me as to the nature of reality at its most fundamental, (by that I mean nature as it exists with no reference at all to sentient beings). The mechanism that exists within our reality that allows us to perceive objects in some manner (even if that differs massively from the intrinsic properties of that object) within space and time is part of our "whole". The questions that have always interested me concern what (if anything) exists outside of that "whole"; namely (1) whether our "whole" is a construct from "something"(realism), or (2) solely from our minds (idealism) or (3) is actually what fundamentally exists throughout nature and the universe. (Naive realism).

Through d'Espagnat I am opting (philosophically) for (1) (open realism), it just all makes so much sense to me. Within (3), (naive realism) this seems implausible; there are is so much within our reality that suggests things are not "right". For example relativity and the variability of perceived time, entanglement and the negation of space, an infinite physical universe, the "something" before expansion of space, the movement of physical objects (in macroscopic terms, the object having to copy itself through space and time an infinite number of times), the strange nature of "photons" (they do not interact with each other and can have no wavefunction) and "travel" at a constant c independently of a moving carrier. As to (2) (idealism), I go with d'Espagnat in rejecting solipsism and idealism because it seems that "something else" is at work in determining the "rules" of our reality. So I do think something exists outside of our reality but we can never access it scientifically because we are trapped within our reality, our minds and our consciousness, we cannot place ourselves in one corner and examine mind independent reality (d'espagnat's definition of mind independent reality, not yours) in the other, our whole means of scientific investigation takes place within the construct of dualism, space and time, i.e. our reality. So this something "exists" for me philosophically in terms of what we perceive of our reality through scientific investigation. Our science implies what d'espagnat describes as open realism and gives a powerful philosophical account of mind independent reality (MIR as defined by d'Espagnat, not your definition).

I hope this gives a very brief summary of d'Espagnat's work, I do think he is a very important figure within physics and philosophy. I hope my understanding of what you say has not been hastily arrived at on my part, obviously one paragraph from you can hardly do justice to your work in progress. However I hope I have been able to put over the perspective I hold and why I think your work would not easily fit within d'Espagnat's scheme of things. To quickly summarise, I think your

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definition of mind independent reality differs entirely from d'Espagnat's use, you use it as a state existing within dualism, as if dualism exists universally outside of our reality and contains mind independent "objects" that we see as perceptions in a distorted manner, the nature of those "true" objects" being contained within your "mind independent reality"). d'Espagnat (and I) use it as a state outside of dualism since dualism is a construct that encompasses (and is constructed from) the mind which as a whole emerges (in an unknown manner and form, not in any way causal involving space and time) from something that is truly outside of (and independent of) the mind as we perceive that mind within our reality.

In any event I hope you find my resume of interest even if it may not have any great relevance to your line of enquiry. This of course is entirely my interpretation of d'Espagnat and whilst there is much that I still ponder over and find perplexing with his work, I believe that fundamentally I understand his basic premise of mind independent reality, open realism and empirical (our) reality as well as broadly understanding the very basic technicalities of quantum mechanics and decohoerence theory and the thorny question of proper and improper mixtures. It goes without saying that the definitive reference are his books! (Especially Veiled Reality).

RV: (1) It is unclear how QM can account the emerged property of whole from its constituent quantum parts. For example, it is unclear that how quantum laws can explain all classical 'emerged' properties (e.g. 'emerged' properties of water and salt from their quantum constituents). (2) In our brain, an object is represented in stimulus-dependent feed forward signals and the subject is represented by cognitive feedback signals that contain self related signals from cortical midline structures (CMS). These two kinds of signals (feed-forward and feedback) interact in both 1pp-mental aspect and 3pp-physical aspect of brain-states and results our subjective experiences via matching and selection mechanics of the extended dual-aspect monism (DAMv) framework. The objects external to our brain-mind system must exist otherwise we will never experience them. For example, if you are looking at your coffee cup and then if you remove it, you will stop experiencing it. Therefore, when you are not observing that coffee cup, whatever that might be (cup-in-itself), it is indeed beyond your mind and hence it is in mind-independent reality (MIR) although it will remain unknown.

LM: Thank you for describing to me some of your work, I think it has helped me to continue to try and get to the bottom of the differences between your use of the term mind independent reality and that of d'Espagnat. I think I now clearly see the difference, but I have laid out

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my reflections on this issue below if you are interested. The distinction counts for nothing really in terms of your work, but I do hold quite strong views on the role of science and the role of philosophy, I think the two often get mixed up by many scientists and instead of embracing the distinction they end up doing philosophy but call it science. I'm not suggesting for one minute that this applies to you, but it is within that vein of distinction that I seem best able to distinguish between what you refer to as mind independent reality and the way in which d'Espagnat (and myself) refer to it. I do hope you gain from understanding this distinction that I make and perhaps brings you a bit closer to d'Espagnat's work.

(1) Emergence: d'Espagnat describes quantum universality as being able to account for the behavior of macroscopic objects, their evolution in time and their interactions at least as well as the classical ones do. I would think that the molecular structure of water and salt fall under this general condition, but you may wish to read what he says about this. On page 186 of d'Espagnat's book "On Physics and Philosophy" he outlines very briefly the work in progress on this matter in particular by Roland Omnes (1994b). d'Espagnat states: " .... Hence we have now no reason to believe that there are, on one side the macroscopic systems, obeying one definite set of physical laws and on the other side the macroscopic systems obeying quite another set of laws bearing no relation to the former. Quite on the contrary we have to consider that it is because they follow from the quantum rules (under some definite but practically quite often satisfied conditions) that the classical mechanics computation rules yield the successful observational predictions that we know of [ ... ] This is a far-reaching program. And since this field of study is a very active one at the moment, to try and give some kind of an overall view of it would be risky. However, a few guiding ideas are already clear. The main one of them has to do with the fact that any macroscopic object- a stone, a table, etc .- is endowed with immensely many degrees of freedom that may be viewed as those of all the atoms composing it. These parameters may be distributed in two sets: on the one hand the physical quantities-length, width, positions, velocities, etc .- that are more or less directly accessible to us, on the other hand all the remaining ones. If we assume, as a first approximation, that these two sets do not interact with one another we may focus our attention on the first one, the elements of which are termed 'collective variables.' In short, the problem then may be stated as follows. Since we take as our starting point the idea that the quantum formalism constitutes the basic theoretical framework, the variables in question have to be described within the said formalism. They must therefore be represented by 'operators'17 the time evolution of which should obey the laws of the latter. But, on the other hand, in classical physics they are represented by numbers and their evolution

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obey classical mechanics. Our problem is to check that these two modes of descriptions are compatible. In other words, it is to start from the quantum formalism, which yields observational predictions, and show that the classical way of describing the said variables and the evolution thereof finally yields observational predictions not differing from those derived by means of quantum theory. Now, it turns out that to really prove that much-on a level of strictness high enough to justify calling the outcome a proof-is not an easy task, far from it. In fact, it is only comparatively recently that such an enterprise was undertaken and that convincing developments (that we already alluded to) started appearing. But they were successful. And indeed-due, in particular to Roland Omnes' work (1994b)-it may presently be claimed that we do dispose of a genuine proof. Hence we have now no reason to believe that there are, on the one side the microscopic systems, obeying one definite set of physical laws and on the other side the macroscopic systems, obeying quite another set of laws bearing no relation to the former. Quite on the contrary we have to consider that it is because they follow from the quantum rules (under some definite but practically quite often satisfied conditions) that the classical mechanics computation rules yield the (successful) observational predictions that we know of.18 In other words (and to be somewhat more precise), let us consider a macroscopic system concerning which some amount of macroscopic information has been gathered. 'We might represent the latter by means of a set of mathematical data of, very roughly speaking, the type of those called D in chapter 4, derive from it, for any later time t, a corresponding symbol D, and finally derive from D, what impressions we should have were we to observe the system at time t. But, of course, we may just as well represent the information in question by means of a set of numbers representing the values at time zero of the quantities (positions, velocities, etc.) we are familiar with, and use the classical mechanics computation rules to calculate their values at time t. It follows from the above-mentioned investigations that the results of the two methods will coincide. In other words, the observational predictions yielded by the values in question will be the same as the ones the first method provides us with. Since the second method is considerably simpler and more familiar to us than the first, it is of course the one that is made use of in practice. And this habit we have of using it, together with the fact that it is realistically interpretable (and always successful in practice), results in that we quite naturally reify by thought the various quantities the values of which it yields. Of course, there are some well-identified cases-when, for example, the system is composed of a particle accelerator and a bubble chamber - in which the interaction between the collective variables and the other ones may not be neglected and concerning which the above does not hold. But such cases are well specified and, on the whole, exceptional. In other words, in standard situations quantum

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theory itself shows that the observational predictions from classical mechanics will prove correct. And, the latter being deterministic, it is understandable that the notion of a strict cause-effect link should quite naturally have arisen. We know that such and such impression we have implies that if, later, we decided to observe this or that we would get such and such result. This suggests to us the converse. From the fact that we now have such and such an impression we infer that if, in the past, we had looked at this or that we would have had such and such sensation. We hypostatize this view, that is, we raise it to the level of a representation of the past conceived of as being the cause of the present, and so on. In other words, our elaboration of empirical reality is at work with respect not only to the present but also to the past and the future. (But, to repeat, let us not interpret such an elaboration as corroborating radical idealism. We build up empirical reality in somewhat the same way as the gardener and the dragonfly both build up their own vision of the garden. And since these two visions differ from one another, certainly one of them at least is not a trustworthy picture of reality. However, granting this does not imply negating the reality of the garden.)"

Philosophy", d'Espagnat's explanation of quantum universality is taken from "On Physics and

Universality). page 186 -187, the chapter entitled (Measurement, Decoherence,

So essentially the universality of quantum mechanics is the starting point for d'Espagnat, and it is the evolution through decoherence theory that gives rise to macroscopic objects. That evolution has to include all that we macroscopically perceive and think about, it includes the blood vessels of the brain, the pathways, our sense organs, everything. There are very interesting experiments that have been carried out that examine the transition from the quantum to classical that provides real evidence of this one way process from quantum to classical via decoherence (see Maximilian Schlossshauer "Decoherence and the Quantum-To-Classical Transition")

(2) MIR: To repeat what needs stressing and is often not understood by physicists - there is no scientific basis in which to prove that dualism is universal throughout nature, that is a philosophical position to take. So the realism that is taken as a default position by most scientists (the rock has properties within space and time independently of our perception of that object) is just that, it is an assumed "truth". On that basis science is taken (by default) to be capable of drilling down to the deepest levels and eventually will find the most basic level that constitutes nature as it exists independently of the means by which the discoveries are made. That "default" realist position is as much a philosophical position as idealism is. In terms of the scientific method, that method is applicable only within the realm of dualism, it has an

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applicability, value and "truth" only within our reality. Since clearly dualism is a philosophical concept (we cannot prove that dualism is a universal aspect of nature independent of our means of establishing that notion). So the universality of quantum mechanics should not be taken as indicating that particles exist in that manner independently of our role in establishing their existence. The particles exist within the framework of our reality. To extend any scientific "truth" beyond the remit of our involvement is to invoke a philosophical position, some take various flavours of realism to be their philosophical position, others tend towards idealism (some go to solipsism).

It is with that in mind that I wish to again clarify the two different definitions of mind independent reality that have surfaced in these discussions. d'Espagnat's definition (and mine) hopefully by now is getting clearer, but to recap. Our reality exists in space and time, we cannot step outside of our reality (outside the concept of space and time, structures, thought,) in order to examine what may lay outside of that reality - it's impossible. We can try and model our reality and then examine it with a view to escaping from it, but all of that process is being still carried out within the framework of our reality, our minds and our consciousness, we are using our reality to model our reality! We perceive our reality through our mind, but I wouldn't classify mind and consciousness as an object in one corner looking at a stone in the other corner other than in the sense of that's how it "appears" to be. It appears to be like that because that's the only means we have of making sense of our environment, but that sense of separation between mind and object could be a construct of the "whole". It is mind and consciousness that creates the sensation of me and my brain in one corner examining the rock in the other corner. D'Espagnat sees our reality, within space and time as a construct that is not universal in nature. So from this perspective, mind independent reality means a reality that is completely independent of the "whole", the "whole" consisting of our dualistic reality as we live and perceive it. Within that "whole" there are no independently existing objects, there is no independently existing "substance, mass, forces, movement, space or time, they only exist within the collective "whole" which is our reality and a reality that we perceive and understand through the mechanism of the brain. That we think of the mind and consciousness as being in one corner and the rock in another could be a manifestation of the "whole", this being the only way we can think and live our lives. The mistake is to think that by default the mind is actually in one corner and the rock is actually in the other corner existing in space and time in an absolute sense. The rock is perhaps a rock within our reality only. It is this kind of mistake that leads us to think of the universe by default as evolving outside of our place in that universe. It needn't be that way, the

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historical time line of our universe could just as well be only part of our reality, it may not be an intrinsic self contained item. I say "mistake" in the sense that we cannot know through science if dualism is universal and absolute, it may well be, but in making a judgment either way is to invoke a philosophical stance. Our science is only applicable within our "whole", we cannot extend that science beyond our "whole" and claim it to be still science, it becomes philosophy because once you are past that point the bedrock of that science is a philosophical stance. So to repeat, in terms of d'Espagnat and myself, mind independent reality refers to a philosophical area of enquiry that considers there "exists" something that lay outside of our "whole" and that cannot be accessed through science since science is a product only of our reality. But an important rider here, no one can say that our reality isn't absolute, that space and time, stars and galaxies don't exist independently of our reality, and neither I or d'Espagnat are saying such a thing. But what can be said is that the position one takes on this is a philosophical question and each person has to decide for themselves, science cannot prove or disprove it. I and d'Espagnat adopt the philosophical position of Open Realism. As I have said before, most scientists don't acknowledge that their stance is a philosophical one, they assume that their hard realist stance is a default stance and is "true". From that they take their science to be applicable and "true" to the most fundamental aspects of nature as it exists independently of our involvement in that science.

I would now like to clarify your definition of mind independent reality in terms of your definition [The objects external to our brain-mind system must exist otherwise we will never experience them]. You classify the brain-mind system as being in one corner looking at an object in the other corner. This is as we intuitively think the case to actually be, in the same manner that we would place a computer and optical input in one corner and analyzing the object in the other. This is science being carried out within our "whole", within the construct of dualism. The act of separation that you describe is an inherent part of the "construct" that I describe, it is the only means we have of living and understanding our lives. Take the object away and it ceases to be part of the computer analysis, but as part of our macroscopic reality we can reliably assume it to still exist and evolve even though it is no longer being analysed by the computer. That is the basis of conterfactuality holding in the macroscopic (but breaks down at the quantum level). So I'm not saying that external objects don't exist, there is obviously a mechanism going on between what we perceive as the brain in one corner sensing an object in the other corner, what I am saying is that whole scenario is a construct that is being played out to us in the only way we can ever know, i.e with a brain in one corner and the object in another corner. The science that you carry out in order to understand that process is obviously valid

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within that context, but it is not valid to extend that science in order to say that the external object is real outside of that scenario of the brain in one corner and the object in another corner, its applicability to the question of whether the object is real or not becomes a philosophical enquiry. So in this sense your definition of mind independent reality takes place within a dualist framework that places the brain and mind in one corner and the object in another. That dualist framework is a philosophical stance to take and thus places your definition as scientific one within a philosophical category. d'Espagnat's definition of mind independent reality (and mine) takes us completely out of the dualistic philosophical framework and treats it us "something" outside entirely of our mind and consciousness, space and time.

To conclude, you are practicing science within the framework of our reality (our brain in one corner and an object in the other corner) and evolve definitions within that framework. So it is science within a philosophical framework that encompasses our reality. But that science cannot be extrapolated to the realm beyond our reality in terms of giving intrinsic properties to the object, once you do that then your science changes to philosophy. So your term mind independent reality is a narrow definition that is applicable only to the realm in which it is practiced, the cup that I don't see is not a cup existing within an external absolute mind independent reality, it is a cup that exists within our reality but beyond my mind. d'Espagnat would say that the cup is always real and always exist within our macroscopic reality even though it may not be looked at, but outside of the philosophical framework of our "whole" has no existence. Outside of our "whole", that what exists is part of a reality that is entirely independent of mind (mind in a general sense that indicates our reality is a construct that primarily is centered around the mind, but through that construct gives rise to what you describe as the brain and mind in one corner and the object in the other corner).

So I hope I have managed to convey the fundamental difference between d'Espagnat's use of the term mind independent reality and your use. The former relates to deep philosophical questions related to the nature of our existence and what may lay outside of that, the latter (yours) relates to a scientific analysis of our perceptions of separated objects within a philosophical framework that we call our reality.

Just in passing you may wonder (as many do) what the point is of thinking about d'Espagnat's mind independent reality if we cannot access it. It is a valid point, but for me the very notion of that inaccessible mind independent reality places our reality into context. It is a notion that is pointed to by physics rather than being

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entirely speculative or religious and it is from this vantage point that the strength of the idea becomes important. It gives rise to a plausible scenario that suggests our reality is not absolute and that beyond it lay a "ground of things" that though not accessible through science can offer a much broader perspective of nature and our place in it that does not rely on religion. It thus places into perspective the role and limits of science. The role of science now becomes the means by which we observe, correlate and predict aspects of our world in terms of a reality that includes us at all times but maintaining the objectivity of subject/object separation. The limits refer to the inability of science to be applicable to that which lay outside of our reality, that which may exist independently of our minds, consciousness, space and time.

RV: (1) Emergence: It is clear that QM can explain the CM's first set of properties/parameters such as the physical quantities-length, width, positions, velocities, and so on. However, it is unclear how QM can explain CM's second set of 'emerged' properties such as edible properties of table salt from its quantum entities that do not have those properties.

(2) MIR: Once we close our eyes, we will not experience the cup, space- time and so on, i.e., both the subject (the 'mind' for 'seeing' the cup) and the object (the cup) are absent for each other and hence mind dependent reality (MDR) is not present. Then it is unclear why Kant's 'ding an sich' (cup-in-itself) (and my) view of mind independent reality (MIR) differ from d'Espagnat's (and your) view of MIR. Since metaphysics (philosophy) is the foundation of science and everything else, then it is unclear why we should keep them apart and create an artificial wall between them.

LM: I think I see where you are coming from, but that fact perplexes me even more. Nowhere within d'Espgnat's writings (that I know of) does he mention mind independent realty in terms of a subject and object, it is always about an inaccessible realm "existing" outside of a construct (our reality) whose properties and laws along with the mind "emerge" a temporally from this realm. But I take your point that within d'Espagnat's construct (our reality), my mind as part of my brain can only sense external objects in terms of them being mind dependent. The object (presumably) itself has intrinsic properties of being mind independent whether being observed or not (assuming there is some kind of object actually there). So if I shut my eyes, the rock, as part of my thought process is a mind independent feature. If I open them, it becomes a mind dependent feature.

Perhaps I'm just chasing a red herring looking for differences in the interpretations, I'm not sure. It's possible that d'Espagnat's elaboration involves so much in the way of physics and philosophy in order to reach

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his conclusions regarding the nature of our reality that I place too much emphasis on his term mind independent reality by assuming that the term is a rather unique categorisation of d'Espagnat's "ground of things" as he calls this realm. Rather perhaps, it is a generic term that has applicability within many differing layers of enquiry. It may be the case that although d'Espagnat is on a different journey of enquiry to yours, both can encompass the term mind independent reality as having pretty much the same meaning. My earlier posts containing references to philosophy and physics as being distinct relate to d'Espagnat's journey in that he does deliberately split the journey between physics and philosophy, the physics being applicable to our reality, the philosophy being relevant to that which lay outside of our reality. The philosophy derived via the physics leads him to consider that our reality is a construct emerging from a realm not embedded in space or time, which he terms mind independent reality. So my emphasis on the distinction between physics and philosophy was intended to try and lead you down d'Espagnat's path to his mind independent reality ("the ground of things") rather than suggest an artificial distinction.

Anyway, many thanks for your input here, it has forced me to re appraise my understanding of mind independent reality and to find out whether d'Espagnat does consider the term to have some unique offerings that are solely applicable to his "ground of things". I will have a look at your work to see if that helps me in this quest.

RV: MIR: d'Espagnat's "ground of things" is a plenum or source-field for the emergence of universe including us, which may be the unmanifested state of primal entity (such as dual-aspect Brahman: see (Vimal, 2012c)). His 'veiled reality' is Kant's MIR, which is veiled by the 'appearances' of mind-dependent reality (MDR).

LM: I am working through dEspagnats books again with a view to clarifying my understanding of the two issues you have brought up, namely universality and mind independent reality. I have also downloaded your paper Emergence in Dual Aspect Monism. I would like to try and address this issue of universality in the light of my understanding of its context within dEspagnats Veiled Reality thesis and your concerns over the term emergence as it relates to quantum universality. Im not sure if you disagree entirely with the emergence aspect of QM universality or have concerns about its shortcomings in dealing with entities you describe such as the edible properties of salt. I have quickly glanced through your paper above and emergence seems to be an important aspect within it. So perhaps the macroscopic emergence dEspagnat puts forward as occurring from the Quantum realm in terms

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of decoherence is at odds with your conception of emergence, Im not sure as yet, I will have to properly read your paper. Anyway, I hope that which is contained below is of some interest to you. As a backdrop to this question I would just like to mention (as you are probably aware) that much of dEspagnats basic premise can be derived through purely philosophical enquiry. DEspagnat in particular cites the work of Francois Bonsack (p362 Veiled Reality) and without going into any detail, Bonsack comes to the conclusion that there are two worlds, a world-2 and a world-0. dEspagnats discussion of Bonsacks derivation of these two notions concludes with his statement that the world-2 closely corresponds with his (dEspagnats) mind independent reality and the world-O closely corresponds to his (d'Espagnat's) empirical reality (our reality as we live and perceive it). dEspagnat however is a physicist first and philosopher second and is especially well versed in quantum mechanics. So his philosophical bent has played out within his world of quantum mechanics and to that end he has wished to use quantum mechanics as a means in which to feed the on going philosophical enquiry into the nature of reality. In fact, within his book 'On physics and philosophy', he makes clear the reluctance of pure philosophers to embrace the lessons of quantum mechanics. So it is understandable that the thrust of dEspagnats investigations into the nature of reality concern QM (and is comprehensively explored within his book conceptual foundations of Quantum Mechanics). That he sees QM as essentially predicting observations and not events forcefully brings home the absolute involvement of the observer at that level. This breakdown of counterfactuality at the quantum level is contrasted with the apparent strong objectivity at the classical level and poses the question of whether the weak objectivity of QM is a manifestation of classical physics, or is classical physics a manifestation of the quantum realm? The former is a stance used against me a few times in forums in defending realism as a default, absolute position within science. The latter implies that the observer is an integral part of macroscopic reality but plays out as a separation of subject and object within space and time. So clearly, any evidence that QM is universal implies that the classical world may emerge from QM. Decoherence provides very strong evidence for this upwards emergence, especially the experiments I mentioned previously concerning the transition between the two states (see Brune et al (1996) and the Zeilinger group (2002)). So it is understandable that dEspagnat uses universality as a means of suggesting that the very subjective element present within QM is the bottom line (not in any ontological manner though), the apparent strong separation between subject and object at the macroscopic is a manifestation of this bottom line. Such a scenario, from dEspagnats perspective gives additional weight to support a purely philosophical

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argument that suggest our intuitive picture of subject/object separation within our reality is in appearances only. But dEspagnat does point out that universality is a stance to optionally take on board or not, it is not something set in stone, it is just another tool in which to arrive at ones own interpretation of QM in relation to our experience at the macroscopic level.

But to address your specific reservation about universality, I think that firstly the word emergence is used in too strong a fashion by yourself perhaps with regards to our reality emerging from QM in relation to what dEspagnat actually claims for universality. And remember, dEspagnat does not impart any ontological status to QM, QM is just as much an embedded part of empirical reality as the macroscopic, its not as if he is saying the microscopic contain the most irreducible fundamental parts from which everything we know emerges from those building blocks, rather it is part of our reality that shows up under certain experimental conditions. Those parts dEspagnat formulates as rules, and those rules it seems can account for macroscopic rules (laws) equally as well as classical physics does. I mean to say, classical laws in physics do not directly predict the flapping of a birds wings and no one would expect them to (I think). But within those laws, there are indications that every aspect of those flapping wings could be accounted for in principle by the laws of physics, but not in any formal mathematical way. The above paragraph is my clumsy way of attempting to read into dEspagnats use of universality, so, I think it much better to let him defend his use of the term in the extract below. I hope this goes some way to answering your concerns, if only in terms of the context in which dEspagnat makes use of universality rather than producing any counter argument to your reservations (which I dont think it does). The relevant section of the extract I think to be most relevant to your concerns are highlighted in bold. "dEspagnat, from On Physics and Philosophy The question "is quantum mechanics a universal theory?" becomes "do the predictive rules of classical mechanics and of the rest of physics follow from those of quantum mechanics or do they not?' So, do they? 'Well, from all that we have seen we may conclude that, with an appropriate shade of meaning, the answer is "yes." And this, in spite of the fact that, at first sight, appearances favor a negative one (since the phenomena are localized while quantum theory is holistic, etc.). Indeed, after quantum mechanics was discovered the idea that the classical approach is somehow more basic than the quantum one was still, for a long time, held to be true. Clearly it underlay Bohr's assertion that our everyday language-suitably refined through the adjunction of technical words is, ultimately, the basic one. It also underlay Landau's often quoted remark according to which quantum physics has to rely on

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classical physics for its very formulation. In fact, what turned the scales in this respect was the advent of decoherence theory. For, as we saw in sections 8-2-1 and 8-2-2, this theory is a great step forward towards understanding the classical appearance of a quantum world. And what is even more remarkable in this respect is the way in which experiment confirmed the validity of the theory. We already explained (section 8-2-1) the reasons why the work of, in particular, the Haroche group (Brune et al. 1996) constitutes a truly convincing factual argument in favor of the universality of quantum mechanics. "The above mentioned 'shade of meaning' in no way lessens the importance of the developments just alluded to but, still, should be noted. It consists in the fact that, contrary to what might be guessed at first sight, the developments in question do not at all imply that such sciences as chemistry, biology, etc. could, in principle, be strictly deduced from quantum mechanics and nothing else. Decoherence theory does not imply that an angel knowing nothing but quantum mechanics and an appropriate set of initial conditions would be able to calculate what he or she would see were he/she to come down within our world. The reasons why this is so were explained in section 5-4. In order to proceed from quantum mechanics to, even just simply chemistry, it is necessary to make-by hand, so to speak-some abstractions. In the formulas, some terms that the quantum formalism definitely shows are there must purposely bedropped. It seems that it is only by doing so that it becomes possible to infer from quantum mechanics facts such as the shapes of large molecules and many others (Primas 1.981., t994). In other words, quantum mechanics achieves the feat of reconciling the universal character of the laws with a nonreductionist world view, in which our human way of conceiving things has a crucial role in determining what we finally perceive".

RV: (1) Emergence problem: It is unclear how decoherence or any interpretation of quantum mechanics (QM) can explain the emergence of edible property of table-salt from its quantum constituents that do not even have a potential precursor of this property.

(2) Mind Independent Realty (MIR): One could hypothesize that there exists a primal entity as a MIR fundamental plenum that is the source field, in potential form, for QM, emergence laws, experiences/consciousness and other relevant psychophysical laws, which in turn entails classical mechanics (CM >= QM + emergence laws) and us [>= (CM + experiences/consciousness + psychophysical laws)].

11 During non-REM sleep, the inferior frontal gyrus, the parahippocampal gyrus, the precuneus and the posterior cingulate

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cortex, as well as the brainstem and cerebellum are active (University of Liège, 2008, October 8).

12 Prophets/rishis/seers usually have three kinds of transcendental experiences at revelation/samadhi/mystic state with altered activities in various brain-areas: bliss, inner light perception, and the unification of subject and objects (Vimal, 2011e, 2011f).

13 As per (Fingelkurts, Fingelkurts, Bagnato, Boccagni, & Galardi, 2011), "A minimally conscious state (MCS) is 'a condition of severely altered consciousness in which minimal but definite behavioural evidence of self or environmental awareness is demonstrated. In MCS, cognitively mediated behavior occurs inconsistently, but is reproducible or sustained long enough to be differentiated from reflexive behaviour' [(Giacino et al., 2002)]."

14 As per (Fingelkurts et al., 2011), "A vegetative state (VS) is 'a clinical condition of unawareness of self and environment in which the patient breathes spontaneously, has a stable circulation, and shows cycles of eye closure and opening which may simulate sleep and waking' [(Monti, Laureys, & Owen, 2010)]."

15 As per http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coma, "a coma ... is a state of unconsciousness, lasting more than six hoursl1l in which a person cannot be awakened, fails to respond normally to painful stimuli, light, sound, lacks a normal sleep-wake cycle and does not initiate voluntary actions.[1] A person in a state of coma is described as being comatose. Although, according to the Glasgow Coma Scale, a person with confusion is considered to be in the mildest coma. Although a coma patient may appear to be awake, they are unable to consciously feel, speak, hear, or move.[2] For a patient to maintain consciousness, two important neurological components must function impeccably. The first is the cerebral cortex which is the gray matter covering the outer layer of the brain. The other is a structure located in the brainstem, called reticular activating system (RAS or ARAS).[3] Injury to either or both of these components is sufficient to cause a patient to experience a coma. The cerebral cortex is a group of tight, dense, 'gray matter' composed of the nucleus of the neurons whose axons then form the 'white matter", and is responsible for perception, relay of the sensory input (sensation) via the thalamic pathway, and most importantly directly or indirectly in charge of all the neurological functions, from simple reflexes to complex thinking. RAS, on the other hand, is a more primitive structure in the brainstem that is tightly in connection with reticular formation (RF). The RAS area of the brain has two tracts, the ascending and descending tract. Made up of a system of acetylcholine-producing neurons, the

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ascending track, or ascending reticular activating system (ARAS), works to arouse and wake up the brain, from the RF, through the thalamus, and then finally to the cerebral cortex. [4] A failure in ARAS functioning may then lead to a coma. It is therefore necessary to investigate the integrity of the bilateral cerebral cortices, as well as that of the reticular activating system (RAS) in a comatose patient."

16 "Leibniz spelled it out in the early eighteenth century in the opening statements of his Monadology [(Leibniz, 1714)]: 1. The MONOD, which we shall discuss here, is nothing but a simple substance that enters into composites-simple, that is, without parts" (Koch, 2012). The Leibniz's monads and parallel (soul ~ experience and body ~ representation) duals (Leibniz, 1686; Leibniz, 1714) seem to address the problems of Descartes and Spinoza, namely, the problematic interaction between mind and matter arising in Descartes' framework and the lack of individuation (individual creatures as merely accidental) inherent in Spinoza's framework. Monads could be the ultimate elements of the universe, human being, and/or God. Leibniz's monad could be absolutely simple, "without parts, and hence without extension, shape or divisibility ... subject to neither generation nor corruption [ ... ] a monad can only begin by creation and end by annihilation" (Rutherford, 1995) (pp. 132, 133).

17 According to (Stapp, 2009b), "quantum mechanics conforms at the pragmatic/ operational level to the precepts of Cartesian duality, but reduces at a deep ontological level to a fundamentally mindlike nondual monism."

18 The author is also affiliated with Vision Research Institute, 428 Great Road, Suite 11, Acton, MA 01720 USA; Dristi Anusandhana Sansthana, A-60 Umed Park, Sola Road, Ahmedabad-61, Gujrat, India; Dristi Anusandhana Sansthana, c/o NiceTech Computer Education Institute, Pendra, Bilaspur, C.G. 495119, India; and Dristi Anusandhana Sansthana, Sai Niwas, East of Hanuman Mandir, Betiahata, Gorakhpur, U.P. 273001 India. His email address: [email protected], and URL: http://sites.google.com/site/rlpvimal/Home/.

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