1. Epistemology of Textual Reuse in the Nyaya Manjari Alessandro Graheli (Article)

J Indian Philos (2015) 43:137-170 DOI 10.1007/s10781-014-9234-7

Epistemology of Textual Re-use in the Nyāyamañjarī

Alessandro Graheli

Published online: 25 September 2014 C The Author(s) 2014. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com

Abstract The epistemology of śabda is one of the main themes in Bhatta Jay- anta's Nyāyamañjarī, and, in the hypotheses explored in this paper, also the conceptual basis of Jayanta's textual re-use. The sixth chapter of the Nyāyamañjarī contains a debate between Vaiyākaraņas and Mīmāmsakas who, respectively, advocated an holistic or atomistic theory of language. Selected Jayanta's re-uses from Vyākaraņa, Mīmāmsā, and Nyāya sources are here surveyed and analyzed, with a focus on their meaning and on the context. The method of analysis is partially following Moravcsik's scheme for a classification of citations, as well as Small's classification by symbolic functions. By re-using texts Jayanta not only imparted authority to his own arguments, but also reassessed the relation of his tradition with other ones. Re-used ideas and words stand for symbols of those authors' tenets, and those authors represent symbols of their respective traditions. Moreover, by quoting a certain author Jayanta often anointed him with a symbolic status of trustworthy authority, and his statement with a status of śabdapramāņa.

Keywords Jayanta · Nyāyamañjarī · Citations · Textual re-use · Verbal testimony . Sabda

This paper is based on the material gathered for the forthcoming critical edition of the sixth chapter of Bhațța Jayanta's Nyāyamañjarī, for the large part researched during project M-1160 G-15, July 2009 to June 2011, a project financed by the FWF (Fonds zur Förderung der wissenschaftlichen Forschung) and based at the ISTB, University of Vienna. Manuscript material used in relation to this paper was provided by the NBh projects at the ISTB (FWF Projects P-17244, P-19328 and P-24388). For most of the Nyāyabhāșya quotations used in this paper I am indebted to these projects, and to Karin Preisendanz in particular. Special thanks are due to Elisa Freschi, who read early drafts of the paper and enhanced its value by insightful remarks.

Department of South Asian, Tibetan and Buddhist Studies, University of Vienna, Vienna, Austria A. Graheli ()

e-mail: [email protected]

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1 Introduction

1.1 Bhatta Jayanta and the Nyāyamañjarī (NM)

The Nyāyamañjarī (henceforth NM) is a treatise on the tenets of Nyāya, the system of epistemology, dialectics and logic traditionally rooted in the Nyāyasūtra (NS). It was written by Bhatta Jayanta in the ninth century CE.1 The NM is composed of 12 chapters. In NM 3 to 6, about one third of the whole work, Jayanta examines in depth the epistemology of śabda (on this term, see Sect. 2). The present paper is grounded on a survey of a selection of re-use of texts in the sphota section of NM 6. By "re-use" I mean the adoption of previously existing textual passages and ideas, as a general and widely encompassing term. Verbatim re-use will be here called "quotation", in cases where I am confident that Jayanta is consciously quoting existing texts. This particular section of the NM consists of an investigation on the aetiology of śabda-produced knowledge, in which Jayanta stages a debate among Vyākaraņa and Mīmāmsā schools. There are three main reasons behind the choice of this particular section: first, my critical edition of this portion, based on all the available manuscripts,2 is at an advanced stage, so its text is for the purposes of this paper more reliable than that of other parts of the NM; secondly, with a well structured sequence of arguments and counter-arguments, such as that of this section of the NM, it is easier to assess the function of textual re-use in Jayanta's system; thirdly, in the course of the editing process, I had already identified a significant amount of re-used passages and their sources, which allows me to invest time and energy in evaluating re-uses, rather than in tracing them.

1.2 Truth-Values, Epistemic Function, and Symbolic Effect of Re-used Texts

In the analysis and classification I will mostly focus on the quality and the context of re-uses. Following in part the scheme for a classification of citations devised by Moravcsik and Poovanalingam (1975) and the classification by symbolic functions, introduced by Small (1978), I will classify re-uses in the NM by asking the following questions about Jayanta's intentions:

(1) Truth value: Is the re-use confirmatory or negational? In other words, did Jayanta consider the re-used passage true or false? (2) Symbolic value: Which tradition, author, or idea does the re-used text stand for?

Moravcsik and Poovanalingam (1975, p. 88) envision four dichotomies in their scheme: (1) conceptual/operational, (2) organic/perfunctory, (3) evolutionary/ juxtapositional, (4) confirmatory/negational. Of these four, (1) is ignored here,

1 For evidence about the date and other biographic information on Bhatta Jayanta, also known as Jayanta Bhațta, see Slaje (1986, p. 245 ff.), Potter (1995, pp. 345-346), Dezső (2005, Introduction), Kataoka (2007), Slaje (2012). 2 For a list and description of extant NM manuscripts, see Graheli (2012a).

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since it is specific to the natural sciences. (2) and (3) would both be relevant, but for want of space they will need to be addressed elsewhere. (4) is here discussed and implemented in terms of truth-value. As for the symbolic function, it was introduced by Small (1978, p. 328):

[Previous] studies have missed the role citations play as symbols of concepts or methods. This cognitive function arises from the formal requirement imposed on the scientist-author of embedding his references to earlier literature in a written text. This leads to the citing of works which embody ideas the author is discussing. The cited documents become, then, in a more general sense, 'symbols' for these ideas. [ ... ] In the tradition of scholarship, the references are the 'sources' which the author draws upon to give further meaning to his text. Reversing this view, as I am suggesting here, the author is imparting meaning to his 'sources' by citing them. [ ... ] In general, [by 'symbolic'] I mean that an object 'stands for' an idea; for citations, the cited document is the 'object' and the 'idea' is expressed in the text which cites it.

When applied to the re-use of texts in the NM, the term "symbolic" can encompass at least three different levels, the first two intended by the author, the third probably accidental:3

· By re-using texts, Jayanta not only imparted authority to his own arguments, but also reassessed the relation of his tradition with other ones. Re-used ideas and words stand for symbols of those authors' tenets, and those authors represent symbols of their respective traditions. · By quoting a certain author Jayanta may intend to assign him a symbolic status of trustworthy authority (apta), and to his statement a status of sabdapramāņa. · By arranging textual passages in a new order (see Sect. 4), Jayanta endowed them with new meanings.

While analyzing the context and the structure of re-uses, I will therefore try to identify the tradition, author, and concept symbolized by the cited text.

1.3 Contents of this Paper

The epistemology of śabda is not only the subject matter of NM 6, but also, in the hypotheses explored in this paper, the conceptual basis of Jayanta's re-use of sources. Therefore, in Sect. 2 a brief sketch of the epistemology of śabda is provided. In the sphota section of NM 6 Jayanta hardly ever re-uses material from his own tradition. The reasons behind this absence of Nyāya sources are explored in Sect. 3.

3 A concise yet exhaustive survey on the use of the term "symbol" can be found in Eco (1996, pp. 199- 225). Symbols as "linguistic signs which are conventional and arbitrary" (see pp. 210-211), according to Eco already used by Aristotle in a similar sense, seem particularly relevant in the present application of the NM.

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Further clues about Jayanta's attitude in relation to his own tradition can be derived from some introductory verses of the NM. The most relevant passages are examined in Sect. 4. Section 5 is a synopsis of the structure of sphota section of NM 6, needed to facilitate the comprehension of my analysis of the style and the epistemic value of re-uses. Arguments for and against the sphota theory are staged as an articulate dialog between Vaiyākaraņas and Mīmāmsakas. Accordingly, in Sects. 7 and 8, textual re-uses in the whole sphota section are surveyed in two distinct parts. For a more exhaustive assessment of Jayanta's modality of re-use, I decided to compare his treatment of Mīmāmsā and Vyākaraņa sources with that of Nyāya ones, and since Nyāya sources are almost absent in NM 6, in Sect. 9 some NS and NBh re- uses from other parts of the NM are also examined.

2 The Epistemology of śabda

In Nyāya an authoritative instance of śabda must come from a source that satisfies the criteria of trustworthiness. If textual re-use has epistemic purposes, therefore, clarity about the identification of the source and its authoritativeness becomes particularly relevant. The formal style of a quotation, moreover, may reflect an appreciation or criticism of the source, in conformity with the assessment of a given quotation as representing an accepted truth or a false tenet. To contextualize the survey of quotations in the NM, some basic notions related to śabda epistemology are discussed next.

2.1 Comprehension, Knowledge, and Their Object

In most cases I will leave untranslated the terms śabda and artha, in want of English equivalents that can give justice to their technical and polysemous usages. Also, the two terms are not always treated homogeneously in Nyāya, Mīmāmsā and Vyākaraņa. As a general orientation, in the present context śabda is to be understood as "epistemic linguistic expression", i.e., "linguistic expression having the purpose of conveying knowledge", and its artha as "object of epistemic linguistic expression". Although śabda is often rendered with "word" or, at best, "linguistic expression", and artha with "meaning", such equivalents fail to convey the epistemic import of these terms. In the use of Sanskrit expressions such as śabdabodha, śabdārthapratīti, śabdārthasampratyaya, padārthapratipatti, vākyārthapratipatti, etc., the distinction between understanding words and knowing from words is not explicit and is philosophically problematic. As noted by Matilal and Chakrabarti (1994, Introduc- tion, pp. 9-11), in Nyāya literature the implied assumption is that verbal knowledge (śabdabodha) is "knowledge derived from the words of a truth-teller", rather than "understanding of words", although in English translations a tendency to render śabda and artha in the latter context seems prevalent.

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The conflation of "comprehension of words" and "knowledge from words" that we witness in Sanskrit literature, however, may not necessarily be a philosophical flaw, if we consider how comprehension is a fundamental and inextricable part of word-derived knowledge.4

2.2 Šabda in Nyāya

In NBh ad 1.1.7, śabda as an instrument of knowledge is defined as follows:

śabda is the instruction (upadeśa) of a trustworthy instructor. It is of two kinds, since it can have either a perceivable or an imperceivable artha. āptopadeśaḥ śabdaḥ // sa dvividho drstādrstārthatvāt //

The trustworthiness of the source concerns language in general, so that it is considered the ground for the validity of both common and Vedic language. Unlike in Mīmāmsā, in Nyāya the authority of the Veda is also founded on the trustworthiness of their source:

And that [Veda] is a valid source of knowledge because its trustworthy instructor is a valid source. [ ... ] tatprāmāņyam āptaprāmāņyāt //

A trustworthy instructor is defined as follows:

Trustworthy is the instructor (upadestr) who has directly experienced the essential property (dharma) [of things], and is moved by the desire to describe [things] as they are or they are not. āptaḥ khalu sākșātkṛtadharmā yathādrstasyādrstasya cikhyāpayișayā pra- yukta upadeșțā /

Being grounded on the utterance of a trustworthy instructor, śabda can by no means be considered permanent (nitya) by the Naiyāyikas, since such an utterance must have occurred at some point in time. Moreover, the relation between śabda and artha is considered conventional, rather than natural, because it is based on stipulations (sanketa) established by divine or human beings (NBh ad 2.1.55-56).

2.3 Differences in Mīmāmsā and Vyākaraņa

In Mīmāmsā, śabda is accepted ipso facto as natural and unalterable (Mīmāmsāsūtra 1.1.5, see SBh, p. 28), so issues related to its development or aetiology are deliberately ignored as pointless. The possibility of an author is irrelevant for its

4 The Nyāya and Mīmāmsā traditions are counted by Julie Jack (1994) among exponents of what she labels "Uniqueness School", according to which there is a "uniqueness of knowing from words as a form of knowledge,-its irreducibility either to perception or to inference [ ... ]" (1994, p. 165). In her essay she also explores the problematic overlap of comprehension, judgment, and rational belief in verbal testimony.

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validity as an instrument of knowledge (which in Mīmāmsā is, specifically, knowledge of dharma) and for its reality, i.e. its relation with a (mental or concrete) object. The fixedness (nityatā) of such a relation necessarily implies the permanence of śabda: the idea that śabda is ephemeral, common to most opponents of Mīmāņsā, is rejected in Mīmāmsāsūtra 1.1.18:

[śabda] must be permanent (nitya) [in relation to its artha], because [its] appearance is for the purpose of [communicating with] someone else. nityas tu syād darśanasya parārthatvāt //

If śabda were ephemeral, how could there be a continuous and consistent inter- subjectivity of speakers and hearers, who comprehend a same expression in the same way? To account for the sheer phenomenon of communication, the relation of a śabda with an artha must be understood as stable and permanent. In Bhartrhari's philosophy of grammar, the ultimate reality (paramārtha) is a non-dual śabdatattva, while all dualities and differences, including the distinction into śabda and artha, appear as such only on the relative level of worldly interactions (vyavahāra), and not in an absolute, real sense (see VP, 1.1). Moreover, since the ultimate reality is śabda, true knowledge must be grounded in it (VP, 1.131):

In this world there is no cognition without the comprehension of śabda. Every knowledge shines as if penetrated by śabda. na so 'sti pratyayo loke yah śabdānugamād ṛte / anuviddham iva jñānam sarvam śabdena bhāsate //

Jayanta sums up Bhartrhari's philosophy of śabda as follows (NMVa II, pp. 156,19-157,1):

The non-dual Absolute, śabda, whose apparent differences are caused by traces of a beginning-less nescience, is deceptively perceived as if related to the artha. There is actually no signified thing separated from the signifier. Therefore, this signified-signifier (vācyavācaka) subdivision, which is merely theoretical, is nothing but nescience used as a tool to achieve awareness (vidyā).

The non-dual reality is śabda, so in Bhartrhari's perspective Nyāya concepts such as "trustworthy instructor" and "conventional meaning" are fictional ones. Also the śabda-artha dichotomy is imaginary, since such duality does not exist in reality. The segmentation of language into sentences, words, and phonemes is an artificial operation, certainly useful for didactic purposes, but ultimately unreal.

2.4 The Oral and Written śabda

Traditionally, in India, śabda typically pertains to the realm of orality, while present analyses of textual re-use mostly concern written literature.5 It is debatable to what

5 The distinction between the oral and written nature of śabda is not always made, e.g. in Saksena (1951, pp. 38, 46), who interprets śabda as "verbal or written authority" or "verbal or written testimony". Bhattacharyya (1994, p. 76) points to an important difference, relevant to the context of the NM, between spoken and written expressions: "Whether what is spoken endures when speaking is over is debatable;

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extent Jayanta used written sources or, rather, had them committed to memory when he wrote the NM. We also do not know how works such as the NS or the NBh were originally composed and, if orally composed, when they began to be preserved and transmitted in written form. However, judging from the epistemic importance of śabda and from teaching and learning habits in traditional circles witnessed in modern times, it is possible that the performative tradition of these works was mainly oral, and that they were often memorized and taught without much reliance on writing.° For easily memorizable works, such as those in aphorisms and verses, the written record was probably perceived as secondary. In other words, the authority of orally taught truths, passed on from teacher to pupil, was probably superior to that of written ones. As for large and digressive works such as the NM, they were more likely composed in written form to begin with and were not commonly meant to be memorized in their entirety. If this is the case, then, also the purpose of their written transmission must have been different. In 1472 CE, Sitikaņthācārya Svāmin, the learned copyist of the oldest extant NM manuscript, wrote in his colophon (P, fol. II 271r,1) that the NM had been copied by him for teaching purposes (śisyān adhyāpayitum). In any case, what is the epistemic role of written words for Jayanta? During his refutation of the sphota, he makes clear that written letters convey knowledge of the artha indirectly, through an inferential process:

[ ... ] Therefore the knowledge of the artha caused by the ink traits is based on the inference of the phonemes (tasmād varņānumānapurassaraiva rekhābhyo 'rthāvagatiḥ).

It thus seems theoretically acceptable to consider writing as leading to an instance of epistemically effective śabda. Just like the perception of phonemes assists the hearer in knowing from śabda, so can the perception of the ink traits assist an inference of those very phonemes, which again assists the hearer in knowing from śabda. One should also keep in mind that in Nyya epistemology the possibility of knowing one and the same object through different instruments of knowledge (pramānasamplava) is acceptable (NMVa I, pp. 87-93). Furthermore, loud reading of a written source, either by the teacher to the pupils or on one's own, may also play a role in these considerations.

3 Why did Jayanta Use Mīmāmsa Sources?

Before Jayanta, in Nyāya sources, there had been no focus on the sentence, with linguistic analyses mostly concerned with words and their link to external things. In NM 5 (NMVa II, pp. 135,15-136,10), after examining various theories on sentence

Footnote 5 continued what is written survives the act of writing. So all written words exist side by side [ ... ]". Mohanty (1994, p. 31) suggests slight modifications in the utterer-conditions to make room for written testimony as śabda. 6 This, incidentally, would also explain the absence of a manuscript tradition of the NS independent of the NBh in the early stage of the transmission.

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signification, Jayanta explained why he could not fully count on his own tradition on this matter, and, implicitly, why he largely drew from Mīmāmsā theories:

[Objection:] The authors of the [Nyāya]sūtra and of the [Nyāya]bhāsya have not described the artha of the sentence anywhere: from where shall we learn about the nature of the artha of the sentence, in order to expound it? [Counter- objection:] [ ... ] this discipline of reasoning (ānvīkșikī) is the science of means of knowledge, not the science of the artha of the sentence. [Objection:] Yet, if such is the case, why was the artha of the word taught, [by the sūtra] "the artha of the word, however, is the individual thing, [its] conformation (ākrti), [its] universal character (jāti)" [NS 2.2.66]? [Counter- objection:] This is a good point. That effort, however, was done by the author of the [Nyāya]sūtra in order to establish the epistemic validity of śabda, and to calm down protests that there is no contact between śabda and artha. [Objection:] Yet, if this is the case, without an external object as the artha of the sentence the epistemic foundation of the science would remain shaky, so an effort should be done also in this area. [Counter-objection:] True. The author of the [Nyāya]sūtra, by teaching only the artha of the word, meant to take care [also] of that [artha of the sentence], so he did not teach the artha of the sentence separately from that of the word. Therefore, his idea is that the very artha of the word is the artha of the sentence; [ ... ] not that the artha of a single word is the artha of the sentence; rather, the artha of several words is the artha of the sentence.

In this passage, Jayanta stressed the epistemic focus of the Nyāya discipline. Also, he apparently endorsed a realist epistemology in which the artha is external and real (bāhya and vāstava). Lastly, he hinted at the strategy that he was going to adopt to explain the transaction from word to sentence signification, on the one hand respecting the letter of the NS (2.2.66), were the artha of the word is defined, and on the other integrating a modified version of the Bhātta Mīmāmsā theory of sentence signification in the Nyāya system."

4 Jayanta on Re-use and Originality

In the introductory verses of the NM (NMVa I, pp. 2-4), there are further indications about Jayanta's relation with his own tradition, a source of many of his re-uses. In verse 4 he traced back the Nyāya tradition to sage Akșapāda, to whom the NS is attributed, and in verses 7-9 he portrayed the tradition of Nyāya as the source of his tenets, claiming for himself only the merit of having craftily re-ordered pre-existing notions:8

7 On the rival Mīmāmsā theories of abhihitānvaya and anvitābhidhāna, and on Jayanta's understanding of these, see Kunjunni Raja (1963, p. 215) and Graheli (forthcoming). 8 Besides Jayanta, other well-known authors, such as Abhinavagupta, have portrayed themselves as mere re-arrangers of traditional tenets. This typical self-description by three heterogeneous authors such as Jayanta, Abhinavagupta, and Jīva Gosvāmin, is compared and related to the issue of novelty and repetition in Graheli (2008).

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This superior essence was collected in the forests of the herbs of Nyāya. It was extracted like butter from the milk of reasoning (ānvīkşikī).9 How could I be capable of even envisioning a new topic? Here my only concern is a variety (vaicitrya) in arrangement of the [traditional] statements. Flower chaplets crafted in the past can generate new interest if their very flowers are recomposed on a new string.

After comparing the Nyāya system to a mighty tree cared for by Akșapāda, Jayanta depicted himself as merely capable of a partial view of its full richness:

In fact, the tall tree of logic laid down by Aksapāda bears a load of fruits oozing thick nectar. I will gently shake it, being uncapable of climbing on it. [Thus] I cannot even see its full burden of riches.

To sum up, Jayanta planned his NM as a new structure built with tenets of a rich pre-existing tradition, without any claim for originality, except for the arrangement of the presentation.

5 The Argumentative Structure of the sphota Section of NM 6

To examine the formal aspect of quotations and other re-uses, and to assess their epistemic value, the context of the argumentative structure is crucial. The sphota section of NM 6 can be segmented in five argumentative steps: problem, thesis, first antithesis, second antithesis, synthesis (sketched in Fig. 1).

· The topic is introduced by the philosophical problem (samśaya) that is going to be dissected and settled: in the epistemic process of knowing something upon hearing a linguistic expression, what is precisely the cause of knowledge of an artha? Is it the ephemeral phonemes, as claimed in Nyāya (pratijñā, thesis)? Or is it the indivisible entity called sphota, as claimed in Vyākaraņa (pūrvapakșa, first antithesis)? Or is it the permanent phonemes, as claimed in Mīmāmsā (uttarapakșa, second antithesis)? . The thesis is that phonemes are heard in sequence form words and sentences, and thus they collectively cause knowledge of an object, though phonemes are not permanent entities, but rather ephemeral ones. · The first antithesis (pūrvapakșa) is the solution of the problem as proposed in Vyākaraņa, based on Bhartrhari's holistic theory of meaning. · The second antithesis (uttarapaksa), which refutes the first one, is the solution of the problem as proposed in Mīmāmsa, largely based on Kumārila's atomistic arguments.10 · The synthesis (siddhānta) consists of a minor modification of the Mīmāmsā arguments, to suit the Nyāya needs.

9 On the evolution from Ānvīkșikī to Nyāya, see Preisendanz (2009). 10 "Atomism" and "holism" are here used as relative terms: Kumārila has an atomistic perspective in relation to Bhartrhari, but Nyaya views before Jayanta could be considered more atomist than Kumārila's. On the use of the terms "holism" and "atomism" in relation to the context and composition principles and to the Indian theories of meaning, see Matilal and Sen (1988, p. 84).

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Problem (NM II 143)

What is the cause of verbal knowledge? Ephemeral phonemes, eternal phonemes, or the eternal sphota?

Thesis (Nyāya)(NM II 143 -- 144)

Objection (Mim.): Permanent phonemes are the cause of knowledge Counter-objection (Vya.): The eternal sphota is the cause of verbal knowledge Verdict (Nyā.): Ephemeral phonemes must be the cause of verbal knowledge

First Antithesis (Vyākaraņa, sphoța defense)(NM II 144 -- 159) The eternal, holistic sphota is the cause of verbal knowledge Counter-objection (Mim.): Permanent phonemes are the cause of verbal knowledge Verdict (Vyā.): Verbal knowledge is unitarian, so the sphota must be the cause of verbal knowledge

Second Antithesis (Mīmāmsā, sphoța refutation)(NM II 159 -- 184)

Objection (Mīm.): Permanent and recollected phonemes are the cause of verbal knowledge

Counter-objection (Vyã.): The theory of phonemes is anti-economical, so the sphota is the cause Synthesis (Jayanta) Verdict (Mīm.): Phonemes, memory are factual, the sphota is fictional, so phonemes are the cause

Synthesis (Nyāya)(NM II 184)

Ephemeral phonemes form words and are the necessary cause of verbal knowledge

Fig. 1 Argumentative structure of the sphota section of NM 6

The thesis and the two antitheses are in turn structured in a dialogic form of progressive objections (paksa), counter-objections (pratipakșa), and verdicts (nirņaya), so that in the first antithesis the objections and the verdicts are Bhartrhari's, while the counter-objections are (mainly) Kumārila's; in the second antithesis the roles are reversed. The problem, the thesis, and the synthesis are presented very concisely, while the two antitheses form the bulk of the section.

6 Re-uses in the NM

In the following, a selection of re-uses in defense and refutation of the sphota are documented in tabular form. For pragmatic reasons, I limited myself to re-uses of the Śābarabhāșya (ŚBh), Ślokavārttika (ŚV), Šlokavārttikatātparyațīkā (ŚVTȚ),11 and Vākyapadīya (VP). I ignored other sources such as the Brhatī (Brh) and the

11 The debt of Jayanta to Umveka's commentary is clear from many passages (see Sects. 7.1, 7.3, 7.6, 8.1, and 8.2 below). In a number of occasions (GBh, pp. 24,14, 149,4, 182,17), Jayanta's commentator, Cakradhara, also noticed the connection and explicitly mentioned Jayanta's references to Umveka.

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Sphotasiddhi (SphS).12 The list of re-uses presented here is a selection without claims of exhaustiveness, as there are less evident re-uses which were discarded, and other possible ones that may have escaped my attention. Re-uses are sorted according to their sequence of occurrence in the NM and are grouped in tables on the basis of the argumentative structure of the NM. Each table is contextualized by a brief synopsis of the philosophical issues at stake, and followed by some comments on the interesting features of the re-uses. The first column contains the origin of the text re-used by Jayanta, with the reading of the most reliable edition available to me (NS, NBh, SVRa, SVTT, VP; for quotations from parts of the SV not covered by SvRa, I used SVDva instead); manuscript research on these sources, although important for a conclusive assessment, was not feasible at this stage. The second indicates the truth value (True/False) from the source viewpoint. The third, fourth and fifth columns contain the re-use as found in the NM, sub- classified into three segments: the re-use (sequentially numbered for cross-reference purpose in this paper) preceded or followed by pre- and post-quote markers, when present; re-used expressions, including also differently inflected stems, are shown in bold face. Lastly, the sixth and the seventh columns indicate the truth value from the point of view of the symbolic speaker, and the tradition symbolized by the statement (Vyākaraņa/Mīmāņsā/Nyāya). All the NM passages reproduced in this paper refer to the pagination of NMVa. Whenever other relevant witnesses13-namely NMGa, the Nyāyamañjarīgran- thibhanga (GBh) and the important manuscripts (P and C)-have substantive variants that differ from NMVa, such readings are either received in the text or shown in critical notes below the tables.

7 First Antithesis: Re-use in Defense of the sphota

7.1 Phonemes do not Cause Verbal Knowledge

Vaiyākaraņas maintain that phonemes cannot convey meaning, neither indepen- dently nor collectively. Independent phonemes are just meaningless parts of words. And if a word is considered a collection of phonemes, one must explain if they function simultaneously or in sequence, and both options are not tenable. The simultaneous existence of phonemes is ruled out in (1). The only possibility of a simultaneous utterance of the phonemes composing a word would be that each

12 Although in the NM there are no explicit references to Mandana or to the SphS, there are some instances that suggest some relation. The most striking one is the argument in NMVa, 150,13-14, where eke, contrasted to apare, i.e. to Bhartrhari, may refer to Maņdana Miśra. The SphS, 89,4-6 reads: yathā ratnaparīkșiņaḥ parīkșamāņasya prathamasamadhigamānupākhyātam anupākhyeyarūpapratyayopā- hitasamskārarūpāhitaviśeșāyām buddhau krameņa carame cetasi cakāsti ratnatattvam. The NM reads: yathā ratnaparīkșakāņām prathamadarśane ratnarūpam amalam prakāśamānam api punah punaḥ parīkșamāņānām carame cetasi cakāsti niravadyam ratnatattvam. The terminological similarity is noteworthy. I could not find this jem/jeweller comparison in early sources, except for Vācaspati Miśra's Tattvabindu (see TB, p. 70), for which there are arguments in favor of its posteriority in respect to the NM. 13 A detailed explanation of the criteria for selecting relevant NM witnesses is provided in Graheli 2012b.

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of a group of speakers simultaneously utters one of the phonemes composing the word, which is absurd (2). So, since a plurality of phonemes is uttered by a single speaker, there must necessarily be a chronological sequence of phonemes in such an utterance (3) (Table 7.1). In (1), the link with Kumārila's statement is more evident in the variant of P, with the reading sattā, in place of satām of the NM editions. For both opponents, as well as for Jayanta, (1) denies the possibility of the simultaneous existence of the phonemes forming a word. Although because of different reasons, for all of them it is true that by itself a group of phonemes can not cause verbal knowledge. For Mīmāmsakas śabda is permanent and thus an ontological simultaneity of phonemes is acceptable, but phonemes need to be uttered and grasped in order to be effective, and they are uttered and grasped in sequence. Also for Vaiyākaraņas śabda is permanent, but an ontological simultaneity of phonemes is impossible because phonemes are ultimately fictional entities. For Naiyāyikas a simultaneous existence of phonemes is simply not possible, due to the ephemeral nature of śabda. In (2) the absurdity of many people simultaneously pronouncing different phonemes of a same word is stated, and this is obviously shared by all. (3) is also true for everyone involved here, because if a single person utters a series of phonemes there must necessarily be a sequence.

Table 7.1 The theory of phonemes is wrong

Source Truth Pre- Re-use Post- Truth val. Point val. quote quote of view

yaugapadyāgṛhīteś ca True (1) na cakșurādīnām iva True Vyā. samudāyau na sidhyataḥ / varņānāņ kārakatvam, na sattāyaugapadyasya yenāgṛhītānām eva vyavahārāngateșyate // (ŚvDvā, vākya 7cd-8ab) sattāa yaugapadya- mātram arthapratyā- yanāngaņ syāt / etad apy aghāțamānam (NMVa II, p. 145,6-7) yaugapadyam ca True (2) tatrāneka purușabhā- True Vyā. śakyatvān naiva teșām șitānāņ kolāhala- ihāśritam / kartrbhedaś ca svabhāvatvena tatra syān na caivam svarūpabheda eva drśyate 'bhidhā // (ŚVRa duravagama (NMVa II, sphoța 72) p. 145,12-13) vaktraikatve nimitte ca True (3) ekavaktrpra- True Vyā. krame sati niyāmakam / yuktānāņ tu prayuñjānasya yat prayatnasthānakaraņa- pūrvaņ vṛddhebhyaḥ kramāparityāgād kramadarśanam; vaktur avaśyambhāvī ekatvāc ca varņānām kramaḥ / NMVa II, p. avaśyambhāvini krame 145,16-17 [ ... ] (ŚVRa, sphoța 71; ŚVTȚ, sphoța 71)

a sattā] P; satām NMGa NMVa, sato C · b tatrāneka] P C NMGa; tatra ekadāneka NMVa

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7.2 The Last Phoneme does not Cause Knowledge

Conceding that phonemes do not convey meaning, neither independently nor collectively, the Mīmämsakas argue that the perception of the last phoneme triggers verbal knowledge, while assisted by the memory of previous phonemes (4). This, however, is unacceptable, because such memory would be caused by a mental disposition (samskāra), which would be in turn produced by the perception of each phoneme. But memory and mental dispositions are not accepted as instruments of valid knowledge, so this theory is not sound (Table 7.2). The tenet expressed here is true for Mīmāmsakas, but false for Vaiyākaraņas.

Table 7.2 The theory of the last phoneme is wrong

Source Truth Pre-quote Re-use Post-quote Truth val. Point val. of view

pūrvavarņaja- True yad apy (4) pūrvavarņaja- iti tad apy False Vyā. nitasaņskārasahito ucyate nitasaņskārasahi- ayuktam 'ntyo varņaḥ to 'ntyo varņaḥb pratyāyakaḥ / (ŚBh ad 1.1.5, p. 55,1-2) pratyāyaka (NMVa II, p. 146,4)

a pūrva] P C; pūrvapūrva NMVa . b 'ntyo varņaḥ] P C NMGa, antyavarņaḥ NMVa

7.3 A Cognition Made of Memory and Perception is Impossible

The passage quoted in (4) has been interpreted by Kumārila by postulating a single, variegated cognition embracing the memory of the past phonemes and the perception of the last one, to avoid the issue raised by the Vaiyākaraņas, namely that memory or mental dispositions of past phonemes cannot cause valid knowledge. But, argue the Vaiyākaraņas, such a variegated and unitary cognition is also impossible, because mental dispositions cannot possibly produce a single cognition together with sense organs: mental dispositions cause recollections, while sense organs cause perceptions (Table 7.3).

Table 7.3 The variegated cognition is impossible

Source Truth Pre- Re-use Post-quote Truth Point val. quote val. of view

citrarūpām ca tām buddhim True atha (5) sańkalanājñānam tad api False Vyā. sadasadvarņagocarām / vadet ekam sadasad- durāśāmātram (ŚvRa, sphoța 111ab); varņagocaraņ apare tu citrākāramª samskāratrayajanyām bhavișyati / varņasmaraņarūpām̧ tadupārūḍhāś ca sańkalanātmikām icchanti varņā artham (ŚVTȚ, sphoța 112) pratyāyayișyanti / (NMVa II, p. 146, 18-19)

a citrākāram] C; om. NMGa NMVa, P n.a

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In (5) the two concepts of a variegated (citrarūpā) and cumulative (sanka- lanātmikā) cognition used by Kumārila and Uveka as two alternative scenarios in the theory of phonemes, seem to be reduced to a single one by Jayanta. The notion, in any case, is false from the Vaiyakaranas's point of view.

7.4 Language Acquisition does not Justify the Existence of Phonemes

In defense of the theory of phonemes, Mīmamsakas claim that language-produced knowledge requires linguistic competence, which is acquired through the repeated observation of a given pattern of phonemes in relation to their artha (6-7) (Table 7.4). From the Vaiyakaranas' point of view it is false that language acquisition occurs through phonemes.

7.5 The Theory of Phonemes is not Supported by Common Usage

People commonly say that "from śabda we know an artha", where the use of the singular, "from śabda", matches the unity of the sphota, not a plurality of phonemes (Table 7.5). From the Vaiyakarana's point of view it is correct that common usage favors the sphota, so (8) is true. The same argument was present in the source in the form of an objection, and thus considered false there.

Table 7.4 Language acquisition does not require phonemes

Source Truth Pre- Re-use Post-quote Truth Point val. quote val. of view

sambandhagrahaņavaśena True nanu (6) vyutpattivaśena śabdo iti False Vyā. varņānām 'rthapratyāyakatāmª arthapratipādakatvaņ upayāti / vyutpattau ca yeșām̧ ca yāvatām̧ ye" yāvanto yatkra- yatkramakāņām ca yat tad makāc varņā yamd asti, tat teșām tāvatām eva artham abhivadanto tatkramakāņām drstāh, te tāvantas tate ekavaktṛprayuktānāņ ca kramakās tam artham pratipādakatvam ity arthaḥ abhivadișyanti (NMVa (ŚVTȚ, sphoța 69) II, p. 147,11-13) yāvanto yādṛśā ye ca True tad (7) yāvanto yādṛśā iti duravagamā False Vyā. yadarthapratipādane / uktam ye ca yadarthapra- hi varņavartanī varņāḥ prajñātasā- tipādane / varņāḥ marthyas te tathaivavabo- dhakāḥ // (ŚVRa, sphoța 69) prajñātasāmar- thyās te tathaivāva- bodhakāḥ // (NMVa II, p. 146,15-16)

a pratyāyakatām] P NMGa NMVa, grāhakatām C · b ye] P C; om. NMGa NMVa · c yatkramakā] P C NMGa; yatkrama NMVa . d yam] P C NMGa; yad NMVa . e tat] P NMGa NMVa, tāvat C

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Table 7.5 The theory of phonemes goes against common usages

Source Truth Pre- Re-use Post- Truth Point val. quote quote val of view

nanv evam api False (8) sphoto 'rthapratipādakaḥ, True Vyā. śabdād artham śabdād arthaņ pratipadyāmaha iti pratipadyāmaha iti laukikam vacanam vyavahārāt (NMVa II, anupapannaņ syāt / (ŚBh 1.1.5, p. 56,1-2) p. 148,12)

7.6 Phonemes do not Qualify as śabda

To argue that śabda must by definition be audible, and that phonemes are audible while the sphota is not, does not make sense, because audibility is not an exclusive character of phonemes (9) (Table 7.6). The Mīmämsaka may argue that although it is not an exclusive characteristic, it is still the main one, and that the phonemes are audible while the sphota is not. Yet, the characteristic mark of śabda is not the mere audibility, but rather, its capacity to cause knowledge of the artha (10-11). And such character belongs to the sphota, not to phonemes. People are erroneously led to think that phonemes are the cause of verbal knowledge only because the sphota manifests through articulated language, but actually this idea is the result of a false-cause fallacy (12) (Table 7.6). It is false, from the Vaiyakarana's viewpoint, that the audibility of phonemes qualifies them as śabda (9). (10) and (11) are false for the Mīmāmsakas and true for the Vaiyākaraņas, who have the interest of underscoring causality of cognition over audibility. (12), which is true for the Mīmāmsakas, is rejected by Vaiyākaraņas as false.

7.7 The Theory of the sphota is not Anti-economic

The Mīmāmsakas object that if the sphota is manifested by phonemes, as maintained by some Vaiyākaraņas (see above, footnote 12 on the SphS), a criticism moved against the theory of phonemes stands also against the theory of the sphota, which basically adopts the theory of phonemes with its implications and on top of it postulates a further entity (13-14) (Table 7.7). The economy of the theory of phonemes in (13) and (14) is true for the Mīmāmsakas, but false for the Vaiyākaraņas.

7.8 The sphota is Manifested by Articulated Sound

According to other Vaiyākaranas, however, this is not true: the sphota is not manifested by phonemes, but rather by phonetic sounds (dhvani), i.e., the combined result of breath, articulation, etc., which in any case do not have ultimate ontological status (15) (Table 7.8). From here to the end of the first antithesis, all re-uses are of Vaiyākaraņa texts, and thus true also in the sources.

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Table 7.6 Phonemes are not śabda

Source Truth Pre- Re-use Post- Truth Point val. quote quote val. of view

śrotragrahane hy arthe True nanu (9) śrotragrahaņe hy naitad False Vyā. loke śabdaśabdaḥ arthe śabdaśabdaḥ evam prasiddhaḥ (ŚBh 1.1.5, prasiddhaḥ / te ca p. 54,8) śrotragrahaņā iti / (NMVa II, p. 149,4-5) ato gakārādivyatirikto False (10) tasmād yato True Vyā. 'nyo gośabdo 'sti yato 'rthapratipattiḥ sa 'rthapratipattiḥ syāt śabda / arthapratipattiś (ŚBh 1.1.5, p. 54,12-13) ca sphoțād eva, na varņebhyaḥ iti sphoța eva śabdaḥ / (NMVa II, p. 149,7-8) atha gaur ity etasmin False (11) atha gaur ity atra True Vyā. vijñāne śrotre bahavo śrotrea pratibhāse 'rthāḥ pratibhāsante / tatra bahavo 'rthāḥ kas teşām śabda ity pratibhāsante / tatra upakramya yenoccari- kas teșāņ śabdaḥ ity tenārthapratyayo bhavati upakramya yato sa śabda ity 'rthapratipattiḥ sa upasamhrtam / (ŚVTȚ, śabda ity upasamhṛte sphoța 3) (NMVa II, p. 149, 11-12)

na gauņo 'kșareșu True nanu ca (12) iyam arthapratītir ucyate / [ ... ] False Vyā. nimittabhāvaḥ, tadbhāve varņeșu bhavatsu idam tv bhāvāt tadabhāve bhavantī teșv anyathāsid- cābhāvāt (SBh 1.1.5, abhavatsu cābhavantī dham p. 58,3-4) (NMVa II, p. 149,15)

a śrotre] C, GBh; śrautre P; śrotraja NMGa NMVa

Table 7.7 The argument of economy is not valid

Source Truth Pre-quote Re-use Post-quote Truth Point val. val. of view

yasyānavayavaḥ True nanu [ ... ] (13) yasyānavayavaḥ iti [ ... ] False Vyā. sphoțo vyajyate āha ca naișa bhaṭțaḥ sphoțo vyajyate varņabuddhibhiḥ / varņabuddhibhiḥ / doșaḥ so 'pi paryanuyogena so 'pi paryanuyo- naivaitena vimucyate // (ŚvRa, sphota 91) gena naivānena vimucyata (NMVa II, p. 150,7-8) nanu saņskārakal- True bhāșyakṛtāpi (14) nanu saņskāra- iti naișa False Vyā. panāyām kalpanāyām doșaḥ adrsțakalpanā / ucyate / adṛstakalpanā iti śabdakalpanāyām sā ca āśankya prativihitam śabdakalpanā ca (ŚBh śabdakalpanāyāņ sā 1.1.5, p. 54,10) ca śabdakalpanā ca (NMVa II, p. 150,9- 10)

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Table 7.8 The manifestation of the sphota

Source Truth Pre-quote Re-use Post- Truth Point val. quote val. of view

indriyasyaiva saņskāraḥ True apare tu (15) dhvanaya eva True Vyā. śabdasyaivobhayasya vā / vadanti sphoțasyaª vyañjakāḥ kriyate dhvanibhir vādās (NMVa II, p. 151,2) trayo 'bhivyaktivādinām // (VP, 1.80)

a sphoțasya] P C; sphoțasya ca NMGa NMVa

7.9 The Sentence is the Linguistic Unity

Not only are phonemes unreal, even words are fictional abstractions (16). The sentence is not a whole made of parts; rather, it belongs to a class of its own (17). One may argue that there is a one-to-one correspondence between each phonemic string and its respective artha, but this is not true; for instance (18), in unrelated words like kūpa, yūpa, and sūpa, we see that some phonemes are identical, yet there is no similarity in meaning (Table 7.9).

7.10 Words are Fictional Abstractions

The signification of words is thus a fictional device, like that of roots and suffixes. Words are an abstraction, useful for didactic purposes, etc., but devoid of ontological status (19-20) (Table 7.10).

Table 7.9 The vākyasphoța

Source Truth Pre- Re-use Post- Truth Point val. quote quote val. of view

padāni vākye tāny eva varņās True (16) avayavakalpanāyām hi True Vyā te ca pade yadi / varņeșu yathā vākyasyāvayavāḥ varņabhagānām bhedaḥ syāt padāni, padānām avayavā paramāņuvat // (VP, 2.28) varņāḥ, evam varņānām apy avayavair bhavitavyam / (NMVa II, p. 153,12-13) gavaye narasimhe cāpy True (17) artho 'pia vākyasyaika eva True Vyā. ekajñānād ṛte yathā / bhāgam narasiņhākāraḥ / jātyan- jātyantarasyaiva sadṛśam taraņ hi narasiņho nāma / pratipadyate // na tatra narārtho nāpi siņhā- (VP, 2.90) rthaḥ / (NMVa II, p. 154,2) na kūpasūpayūpānām anvayo True (18) na, kūpayūpasūpānāmc True Vyā. rthasya drśyate / ato anekāk șaranugameª 'py 'rthāntaravācitvam arthānugamābhāvāt / (NMVa samghātasyaiva gamyate // (VP, 2.169) II, p. 154,12)

a 'pi] P NMGa Va; 'pi ca C .b na tatra] P C NMGa, tatra na NMVa . yūpasūpānām] P C; sūpayūpānām NMGa NMVa · d anekākșarānugame] P; ekākānugame C; ekākșarānugame NMGa NMVa

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Table 7.10 Words are abstractions

Source Truth Pre- Re-use Post- Truth Point val. quote quote val. of view

yathā pade vibhajyante True (19) kalpanāmātram tv etad True Vyā. prakṛtipratyayādayaḥ / iyam prakṛtir eșa apoddhāras tathā vākye pratyaya iti / evam padānām upapadyate // padānām api vākyāt (VP, 2.10) kalpanayaivaª apoddhāraḥ / (NMVa II, p. 155,11) apoddhṛtyaiva True tad (20) apoddhṛtyaivab iti True Vyā. vākyebhyaḥ uktam vākyebhyaḥ prakrtipratyayādivad iti // prakṛtipratyayādivad // (VP, 3.1.1cd) (NMVa II, p. 155,12-13)

a vākyāt kalpanayaiva] C; vākyāt kalpanayoddhāraḥ P; vākyārthaparikalpanayaiva NMGa NMVa .

NMGa NMVa b apoddhrtyaiva] C GBh; padam kaiścid dvidhā bhinnam caturdhā pañcadhāpi vā / apoddhrtyaiva P

In (20), remarkably, while in C and GBh only the second hemistich of VP 3.1.1 is present, in P and in the vulgata also the first hemistich is present. C and GBh, when reading together, are evidence of an earlier stage of the NM transmission.

Table 7.11 The absolute unity, śabda

Source Truth Pre- Re-use Post- Truth Point val. quote quote val of view

anādinidhanam brahma True (21) śabdabrah- True Vyā. śabdatattvam yad maivedam advayama akșaram / vivartate anādyavidyāvāsanopa- 'rthabhāvena prakriyā plavamānabhedam jagato yataḥ // (VP, 1.1) arthabhāvena vivartate / (NMVa II, pp. 156,20-157,1) na so 'sti pratyayo loke True (22) vāgrūpatā tu tattvam True Vyā. yaḥ śabdānugamād ṛte / sarvatrac pratyaye, anuviddham iva jñānam tadanapāyāt / (NMVa II, sarvam śabdena bhāsate // (VP, 1.131) p. 157,3)

vāgrūpatā ced utkrāmed True yathoktam (23) vāgrūpatā ced itid True Vyā. avabodhasya śāśvatī / na utkramed avabodha- prakāśaḥ prakāśeta sā hi sya śāśvatī / na pratyavamarśinī // (VP, prakāśa prakāśeta sā 1.132) hi pratyavamarśinī // (NMVa II, p. 157,5-6)

a advayam] P NMGa NMVa; om. C . b tu] P C; om. NMGa NMVa . c sarvatra] P C; sarva NMGa NMVa . d iti] NMGa NMVa, om. P C

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Table 7.12 The threefold śabda

Source Truth Pre-quote Re-use Post- Truth Point val. quote val. of view

vaikharyā madhyamāyāś True (24) sā ceyam vāk iti True Vyā. ca paśyantyāś caitad traividhyena adbhutam / vyavasthitāª anekatīrthabhedāyās avabhāsate, vaikharī trayyā vācaḥ param madhyamā paśyantī / padam // (VP, 1.159) (NMVa II, p. 157,8) sthāneșu vivrte vāyau True tad uktam (25) sthāneșu vivrteb iti True Vyā. kṛtavarņaparigrahā / vāyau kṛtavarņa- vaikharī vāk prayoktrņām parigrahā / vaikharī prāņavrttinibandhanā // vāk prayoktīņāņ (VP, 1.165) prāņavṛttini- bandhanā // (NMVa II, p. 157,12-13) kevalaņ buddhyupādānā True tad uktam (26) kevalam iti True Vyā. kramarūpānupātinī / buddhyupādānā prāņavrttim atikramya kramarūpānupātinī / madhyamā vāk prāņavṛttim pravartate // (VP, 1.166) atikramya madhyamā vāk pravartate // (NMVa II, p. 158,1-2) avibhāgā tu paśyantī True tad uktam (27) avibhāgāt tu iti True Vyā. sarvataḥ samhrta- paśyantī sarvataḥ kramā / svarūpajyotir saņhṛtakramā / evāntaḥ sūkșmā vāg svarūpajyotir evāntaḥ anapāyinī // (VP, 1.167) sūkşmā vāg anapāyinī // (NMVa II, p. 158,5-6)

vyavasthita] P C; vyavasthitaiva NMGa NMVa . b vivrte] P NMGa Va; vidhrte C

7.11 Sabda is the Absolute, Indivisible Reality

The absolute reality is an indivisible śabda, while fictional differences are nothing more than instruments to move towards an awareness of the śabda unity, or didactic means to describe language (21-23) (Table 7.11).

7.12 The Threefold Manifestation of śabda

Even if in reality it is one and indivisible, śabda manifests in the world of phenomena in three aspects, vaikhārī, madhyamā, and paśyantī (24-27) (Table 7.12).

8 Second Antithesis: Re-use in the Refutation of the sphota

With the exception of (40) below, in this section both re-uses and sources are arguments presented from the Mīmāmsaka viewpoint, so they express true concepts both in the source and in the re-use.

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8.1 Sequential Phonemes Can Cause a Cumulative Cognition

In response to the Vaiyākaraņas' objections (see Table 7.1), the Mīmāmsakas argue that the sequential utterance of phonemes is not an issue: although phonemes are uttered and grasped in sequence, they still are, collectively, the cause of verbal

Table 8.1 Sequential causes can result in a cumulative effect

Source Truth Pre- Re-use Post- Truth Point val. quote quote val. of view

ekasādhanasaņsthāś ca True (28) tathaikānuvāka- True Mīm. vyāpārāvayavā yadā / grahaņe samsthānāņ svarūpato nirīkșyante kramabhāvinīnām api yaugapadyam asat tadā // sāmastye sati kim punar bahavo bhinnā- sāmarthyam, ekayāpia bhinnasādhanasam- samsthayā vināb śritāḥ / bhaveyur tadāmukhīº- yaugapadyena vyāpārāḥ karaņāsam- kramavartinaḥ // (ŚVRa bhavād / (NMVa II, sphoța 77-78) p. 160,6-7) darśapūrņamāsābhyām True (29) vede 'pi True Mīm. ity upapadasamar- darśapūrņa- pitasāhityetikarta- māsābhyām ityd atrae vyatāviśișțānām itaretarayo- āgneyādīnām gaśamsinā dvandvena ekapreryavi- samarpitasāhityānām śeșaņotpāda āgneyādiyāgānām̧ katvaņ krameņa, pakşadvaya prayo- karaņānām āgneyādīnāņ jyatvena cāparihārya kșaņikatvena kramāņām ekādhikāra- yaugapadyāsambhavāt / sampādakatvam̧ (ŚVTȚ, sphoța 74) drstam / (NMVa II, p. 160,8-10)

abhyāse True (30) tathā ain- True Mīm. caindravāyavādīnām dravāyavaņ grhņāti, ekādhikāranișpāda- āśvinaņ gṛhņāti iti katvam / loke 'pi somagraha8- padādhyayanādīnām grahaņābhyā- ekānuvāka- sānā samastānāņ grahaņasādhakatvam / kramabhāvināņ (ŚVTȚ, sphoța 74) caikapradhānani- rvartakatvam drsțam iti / (NMVa II, p. 160,10-12)

a ekayāpi] P C; ekayā NMGa NMVa . b vinā] P C NMGa; om. NMVa · āmukhī] P NMGa NMVa, abhimukhī C .d ity] P NMGa NMVa; om. C NMGa NMVa .e atra] P; om. C NMGa NMVa .f dvaya] P C; dvaye NMGa NMVa . g graha] P C; om. NMGa NMVa

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knowledge. Instances of collective and sequential causes that bring about a cumulative effect are well known, as in the case of drills to memorize verses (28) or of intermediate sacrifices (29-30) in the economy of the main one (Table 8.1).

8.2 Dispositions and Memory in the Theory of Phonemes

The principle that the perception of the last phoneme triggers verbal knowledge, aided by the memory of the previous phonemes (31), which was quoted and refuted by the Vaiyākaraņas (see Table 7.2), actually stands valid. Objections on the capacity of dispositions to produce verbal knowledge do not hold, if we understand "mental disposition" as vāsanā, a quality of the self. From observation we know that perceptions cause dispositions, and observation is a universal instrument of knowledge (33). And it would be silly to ask "From where does such a mental disposition arise?", because everyone knows that mental dispositions are caused by perception (34) (Table 8.2). (31) was also quoted above (see Table 7.2). In that occasion the line in favor of atomism was not credited, unlike here. It could be because of the obviousness of the source, but it is quite likely that the absence of credits had rhetoric implications: the honorific tatrabhāvatā stresses the authoritativeness of the statement, while in

Table 8.2 Phonemes, dispositions, and memory

Source Truth Pre- Re-use Post-quote Truth Point val. quote val. of view

pūrvavarņaja- True (31) pūrvavarņa- iti tatrabhāvatā True Mīm. nitasaņskārasahito 'ntyo janitasaņskārasahito mīmām̧sābhā- varņaḥ (ŚBh ad 1.1.5, 'ntyo varņaa șyakṛtā p. 55,1-2) (NMVa II, p. 163,14) varņitam athavā True (32) [ ... ] varņānubhava- True Mīm. gakārādivijñānajani- sam̧skṛtamateḥ pum̧saḥ tavāsanām evāha arthapratītidarśanāt / na bhāșyakāraḥ hi smaraņaśaktiḥ saņskāraśabdena / saņskāraḥ / kin tv tadviśisțasyai- ātmaguņo vāntyāvayava- vāsanākhyaḥ / sa ca syārthapratipattau smṛtim ivārthapratītim hetutvaņ api janayitum utsahate smaraņānyathānupapat- (NMVa II, p. 164,7-8) tipramāņakam / (SVTȚ, sphoța 99) sarvatra no darśanam True (33) sarvatra no True N. pramāņam / (ŚBh ad darśanaņ pramāņam / 1.1.5, p. 53,1-2) (NMVa II, p. 164,9) tad uktam / vastudharmo True tathā (34) vastudharmo hy iti True Mīm. hy eșa yad cāhuḥ anubhavapațīyān eșa, yad anubhavaḥ pațīyān smṛtibījam smṛtibījam ādhatte iti / (ŚVTȚ, sphoța 100, found ādhatte / (NMVa II, p. 164,18-19) also in PSȚ, Ch. 1, Part 1, 1.5, p. 49,10)

a 'ntyo varņa-] P C; 'ntyavarņa NMGa NMVa

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the previous case, where the argument is developed from the Vaiyākaraņas' perspective, the authoritativeness of the source was meant to be undermined. In (32) Jayanta gives a Vaiśeşika twist to the word samskāra used by Sabara, interpreting it as the quality of the self called vāsanā. The latter term is also used by Umveka in the immediate context.

8.3 The Theory of Phonemes is More Economical

Alternatively, the Mīmāmsakas may concede that mental dispositions do not cause knowledge of the artha directly. Yet, they can do it through memory: mental dispositions of the past individual phonemes in sequence, together with the perception of the last one, cause a new mental disposition that produces the memory of the full word, which in turn causes the knowledge of the artha. When the Vaiyākaraņas argue that this theory is anti-economical, the Mīmāmsakas, with Sabara, reply that they are postulating a single entity (the mental disposition), while the Vaiyākaraņas necessarily must postulate two (the sphota and the mental dispositions, through which the sphota manifests) (35). When the Vaiyākaranas claim that, at least, they did not violate the law that mental dispositions cause only memory, the Mīmāmsakas reply that they did indeed violate it, because when they deal with the cause of the manifestation of the sphota (see Table 7.8), they have to explain it in a similar way. In addition, they postulate the sphota (36). And the explanation of the gradual manifestation of the sphota does not hold, because knowledge of an artha is not a gradual, but rather a sudden phenomenon (37) (Table 8.3).

Table 8.3 The economy of the theory of phonemes

Source Truth Pre-quote Re-use Post- Truth Point val. quote val of viev

śabdakalpanāyām̧ True uktam atra (35) śabdakalpanāyāņ iti True bhā- sā ca śabdakalpanā sugṛhī sā ca śabdakalpanā syakāra ca / (SBh ad 1.1.5, tanāmnā ca (NMVa II, p. 166,3) (Mīm.) p. 54,10) bhāșyakāreņa sadbhāvavyatirekau True tad uktam (36) sadbhāvavyatirekau iti True Mīm. ca tathāvayavavarja- ca tathāvayavavarja- nam / tavādhikam nam / tavādhikaņ bhavet tasmad yatno bhavet tasmād yatno 'sāv arthabuddhișu // (ŚvRa, sphoța 94) 'sāv arthabuddhișu // (NMVa II, p. 167,1-2) alpīyasāpi yatnena True yathoktam (37) alpīyasāpi yatnena True Mīm. śabdam uccaritam śabdam uccaritama matiḥ / yadi vā naiva matiḥ / yadi vā naiva gṛhņāti varņam vā grhņāti varņam vā sakalam sphuțam // sakalaņ sphuțam // vRa, sphota 10) (NMVa II, p. 167, 11-12)

a uccaritam] P C; uccāritam NMGa NMVa

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8.4 The Sequence is a Property of Phonemes

The sequence is just a property of phonemes, so no entity needs to be postulated in addition to the phonemes (38) (Table 8.4).

8.5 The sphota does not Qualify as śabda

Phonemes are the only basic linguistic elements, other fictional entities are not required (39); śabda is said to be of two types, articulated and not articulated, and the sphota is neither of these two (40) (Table 8.5). (40) is one of the rare cases, in NM 6, in which Jayanta quotes from his own tradition.

Table 8.4 The sequence is not a separate entity

Source Truth Pre- Re-use Post- Truth Point val. quote quote val. of view

dvaye saty api tenātra True tatra (38) dvaye saty api True Mīm. vijñeyo 'rthasya vācakaḥ / coktam tenātra vijñeyo varņāḥ kiņ nu 'rthasya vācakaḥ / kramopetāḥ kim̧ nu varņāḥ kiņ nu varņāśrayaḥ kramaḥ // kramopetāḥ kiņ nu kramaḥ kramavatām varņāśrayaḥ aṅgam iti kim̧ kramaḥ // kramaḥ yuktisādhyatā / kramavatām aṅgam iti dharmamātram asau kiņ yuktisādhyatā / teșām na vastvantaram dharmamātram asau ișyate // (ŚVDvā teșāņ na vastvanta- śabdanityatā 285-286) ram işyate // (NMVa II, p. 169,12-15)

Table 8.5 The sphota is not śabda

Source Truth Pre-quote Re-use Post- Truth Point val. quote val. of view

parasparānapekșāś True tad uktam (39) parasparānapekșāś iti True Mīm. ca śrotrabuddhyā ca śrotraªbuddhyā svarūpataḥ / varņā svarūpataḥ / varņā evāvasīyante na evāvasīyante na pūrvāparavastunī // pūrvāparavastunī // (ŚvRa, sphota 9) (NMVa II, p. 172, 14-15) dvividhaś cāyam śabdo True tad uktam (40) dvividhaś cāyamb iti True bhāșyakṛt varņātmā dhvanimātraś bhāșyakṛtā śabdo varņātmā (Nyā.) ca / (NBh ad 2.2.40) dhvanimātraś ca (NMVa II, p. 173,7)

a śrotra] P C NMGa, śrautra NMVa . b cāyam] P NMGa NMVa, tv ayam C

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Table 8.6 The smallest unity of śabda

Source Truth Pre- Re-use Post- Truth Point val. quote quote val. of view

śaighryād alpāntaratvāc ca True (41) bhinnājupaśleșe tu True Mīm. gośabde sā bhaved api / devadatta ity ādau devadattādiśabdeșu sphuțo nānākșaragrahaņam eva bhedaḥ pratīyate // (SVRa, vilambitam anubhūyate / sphoța 121) (NMVa II, p. 174,12-13) alpīyasāpi yatnena śabdam True sūktam̧ (42) alpīyasāpi yatnena True Mīm. uccaritam matiḥ / yadi vā naiva hy etat1 śabdam uccaritamb grhņāti varņam vā sakalam sphuțam // (ŚvRa, sphoța 10) matiḥ / yadi vā naiva gṛhņāti varņaņ vā sakalaņ sphuțam // (NMVa II, p. 179,17-18)

a sūktaņ hy etat] P; uktam hy etat C; tathā hy uktam etat NMVa . b uccaritam] P C; uccāritam NMGa NMVa

8.6 The Smallest sabda Unity is the Phoneme

While in short words such as "cow" there is an impression of unity due to the brevity of the sound, there are many long words, such as "Devadatta" where the differences of sounds composing the word are clearly audible (41). The Vaiyākaraņas proposed the reductio ad absurdum that if sentences are made of words and words are made of phonemes, also phonemes must have parts. But parts of phonemes are never perceived: a phoneme is either fully perceived, or it is not perceived at all (42) (Table 8.6).

Table 9.1 Re-uses from the NS

Source Truth Pre-quote Re-use Post- Truth Point val. quote val. of view

pratyakșānumāno- True tad āha (43) pratyakșā- True Akșapāda pamānaśabdāḥ sūtrakāraḥ numāno- pramāņāni pamānaśabdāḥ (NS, p. 1.1.4) pramāņāni // (NMVa I, p. 71,6) [ ... ] tattvajñānān True akșapādas (44) ātmajñānān iti True Akșapāda niḥśreyasādhi- tāvad evam niḥśreyasādhi- gamaḥ upadiștavān gamaḥ (NMVa II, (NS, p. 1.1.1) p. 461,9-10) tattvādhya- True samāhitam etad (45) tattvādhya- iti True Akşapāda vasyāyasaņra- bhagavatā vasyāyasaņrakșa- vadatā kşaņārtham sūtrakāreņaiva ņārthaņ jalpa- jalpavitaņde vitaņde bījapraro- bījaprarohasam- hasaņrakșa- rakșaņārtham̧ ņārthaņ kaņțaka- kaņțakaśākhā- śākhāparivara- varaņavat navat (NMVa II, (NS, p. 4.2.50) p. 648,3-4)

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Table 9.2 Uncredited re-uses from the NBh

Source Truth Pre- Re-use Post- Truth Point val. quote quote val. of view

tattvasya jñānam̧ True (46) tattvasya jñānam True Nyā. niḥśreyasasyādhi- niḥśreya- gama iti ca karmaņi syādhigama iti șașthyau (NBh ad karmaņi șasthyau 1.1.1, p. 2,11) (NMVa I, p. 19,7) saņśayādayo hi True (47) samśayādayas tu True Nyā. yathāsambhavaņ padārthā pramāņeșu prameyeșu yathāsambhavaņ cāntarbhavanto (NBh pramāņeșu ad 1.1.1, p. 2,17-18) prameyeşua cab antarbhavanto (NMVa I, p. 23,1-2) tatra nānupalabdhe na True (48) tatra True Nyā. nirņīte 'rthe nyāyaḥ nanupalabdhe 'rthe pravartate / kim tarhi / na nirņīte saņśayite 'rthe / pravartate / kiņ tu (NBh ad 1.1.1, saņśayite nyāyas p. 3,3-4) tadaṅgaņ tena saņśayaḥ // (NMVa I, p. 23,4-5) trividhā cāsya True (49) trividhā cāsya True Nyā. śāstrasya pravrttir śāstrasya pravrttirc uddeśo lakșaņaņ uddeśo lakșaņaņ parīkșā ceti / tatra parīkșetid / nāmadheyena nāmadheyena padārthamātrasyā- padārthābhidhā- bhidhānam uddeśaḥ / namātrame uddișțasya uddeśaḥ / uddiștasya tattvavyavasthāpako tattvavya- dharmo lakșaņam / vasthāpako dharmo lakșitasya lakșaņam1 / yathālakșaņam lakșitasya upapadyate na veti tallakșaņamg pramāņair upapadyate na veti avadhāraņaņ parīkșā / vicāraḥn parīkșā / (NBh ad 1.1.1, p. 8,7- (NMVa I, p. 29,5-8) 9)

a pramāņeșu prameyesu] C NMGa NMVa, prameyapramānesu P . b ca] C NMGa NMVa, om. P · c pravrttir] C NMGa NMVa; gatiḥ P · d parīkșeti] P C; parīkșā ceti NMGa NMVa . e mātram] C; om. P NMGa NMVa . f dharmo lakşaņam] P NMGa NMVa, dharmopalakșaņam C · g tallakșaņam] C NMGa NMVa, tallakşaņam idam P . h vicāraḥ] C NMGa NMVa, om. P

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Table 9.3 Credited re-uses from the NBh

Source Truth Pre-quote Re-use Post- Truth Point val. quote val. of view

pradīpaḥ True āha ca (50) pradīpaḥ iti True Vātsyā- sarvavidyānām bhāșyakāraḥ sarvavidyānām yana upāyaḥ upāyaḥ sarva- sarvakarmaņām / karmaņām / āśrayaḥ āśrayaḥ sarva- sarvadharmāņām̧ dharmāņāņ vidyoddeśe vidyoddeśe prakīrtitā // (NBh ad parīkșitā // (NMVa I, 1.1.1, p. 5,19-20) p. 28,14-15) agnir āptopadeśāt True tad (51) agnir iti True Vātsyā- pratīyate amutrāgnir udāhāraņam - āptopadeśāt yana iti / pratyāsīdatā tu bhāșya- pratīyate 'mutreti / dhūmadar- kāraḥ pratyāsīdatā śanenānumīyate / pradarśitavān dhūmadarśanenā- pratyāsannena ca numīyate / pratyakșata pratyāsannatareņa upalabhyate / upalabhyata ityādi / vyavasthā punaḥ kvacit tu vyavasthā agnihotram juhuyāt drśyate yathā svargakāma iti / agnihotram juhuyāt laukikasya svarge na svargakāma iti lińgadarśanaņ na asmadāder āgamād pratyakșam / eva jñānam, na stanayitnuśabde pratyakșā- śrūyamāņe numānābhyām / śabdahetāv stanayitnuśab- anumānam / tatra na daśravaņāt pratyakșaņ nāgamaḥ / taddhetuparijñānam pāņau pratyakșata anumānād eva, na upalabhyamāne pratyakșāga- nānumānaņ nāgama mābhyām / iti / (NBh ad 1.1.3, p. svahastādau tu 9,11-16) pratyakşād eva pratītiḥ, na śabdānumānā- bhyām (NMVa I, p. 93,5-13)

yat punar anumānaņ True bhāșyakāreņa (52) yat punar iti True Vātsyā- pratyakșāga- uktam anumānam yana maviruddhaņ pratyakșāgamavi- nyāyābhāsaḥ sa iti ruddham̧ (NBh ad 1.1.1, nyāyābhāsaḥ sa p. 3,13-14) (NMVa I, p. 293, 14-15)

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Table 9.3 continued

Source Truth Pre-quote Re-use Post- Truth Point val. quote val of view

pramāņena khalv True (53) pramāņena khalv iti ca True Vātsyā- ayam jñātārtham aya jñātārtham bruvāņo yana upalabhya tam īpsati upalabhya tam bhāșya- vā jihāsati vā / īpsati vā jihāsati vā / kāraḥ tasyepsājihāsāpra- tasyepsājihāsā- [ ... ] yuktasya samīhā prayuktasya samīhā pravrttir ity ucyate / pravrttir ucyate / sāmarthyaņ punar sāmarthyam̧ asyāḥ phalenābhisam- punar asyāḥ bandhaḥ / (NBh ad phalenābhisam- 1.1.1, p. 1,7-9) bandhaḥ / (NMVa II, p. 135,12-14) nigrahasthānebhyaḥ True (54) nigrahasthā- iti bhāsya- True Vātsyā- pṛthag uddișțā nebhyaḥ pṛthag kāra yana hetvābhāsā vāde upadișțā hetvābhāsā vacanāt codanīyā vāde codanīyā bhavișyantīti / (NBh bhavişyanti (NMVa ad 1.1.1, p. 5,13) II, p. 597,19-20)

9 Re-use from Nyāya Sources

In Tables 9.1-3 there is a small sample of re-uses from the NS and the NBh, as a term of comparison with the above-listed sources from other traditions. In Table 9.1, three quotations of the NS are shown, as an example of the many occurring in the NM. In Table 9.2, there are some re-uses from the NBh without an explicit mention of the NBh author. Finally, in Table 9.3, a few NBh re-uses with an explicit attribution are listed.

10 Conclusions

In Tables 10.1, 10.2 and 10.3 some characteristics of all the above re-uses are summarized for a better appreciation of specific patterns. The sequential number is shown in bold typeface when the re-use is a quotation. The context shows how re-uses constitute the back-bone of the whole argumentation in favor and against the sphota. It would be possible, indeed, to make sense of the main structure of the sphota section just by following the concatenation of arguments present in the quotations. The sequence of the arguments, however, differs from that found in previous sources, so Jayanta's claim of his role as a re-arranger seems corroborated by this survey. In the re-uses surveyed here there are always three subjects involved: besides Jayanta himself (the Nyāya exponent), in fact, a dialog is staged between a symbolic re-user and the utterer of a re-used source, in the present case alternatively the Vaiyākaraņa or the Mīmāmsaka. The symbolic re-user is in some cases explicitly

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Table 10.1 Sphota defense

Author of Context of re-used Symbolic Epist. val .: Epist. Epist. source passage re-user of author val .: val .: text of source symb. Jayanta re-user

Objections (Mīmāmsaka) and Counter-objections (Vaiyākaraņa) (1) Kumārila Rejection of Vyā. True True True simultaneity of phonemes (2) Kumārila Rejection of Vyā. True True True simultaneity of phonemes

(3) Kumārila, Necessity of sequence Vyā. True True True Uņveka of phonemes (4) Śabara Process of yad ucyate True False signification of (Sabara, phonemes Mīm.)

(5) Kumārila Variegated or Vyā. True False cumulative sonic image

(6) Uņveka Phonemes are Vyā. True False True necessary to acquire language competence (7) Kumārila Phonemes are tad uktam True False True necessary to acquire (Kumārila, language Mīm.) competence (8) Śabara Common usage of Vyā. False True False language supports the sphota (9) Śabara Phonemes are audible, Vyā. True False True thus they are śabda (10) Śabara śabda is the cause of Vyā. False True False knowledge of the artha, i.e. the sphoța (11) Umveka śabda is the cause of Vyā. False True False knowledge of the artha, i.e. the sphoța (12) Sabara The phonemes as Vyā. True False True signifiers (13) Kumārila The theory of bhațta True False True phonemes is more (Mīm.) economical (14) Śabara The theory of bhāșyakṛt True False True phonemes is more (Mīm.) economical

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Table 10.1 continued

Author of Context of re-used Symbolic Epist. val .: Epist. Epist. source passage re-user of author val. val .: text of source symb. Jayanta re-user

Verdict (Vaiyākaraņa) (15) Bhartrhari The sphota is apare True True False manifested through (Vyā.) articulate sound (16) Bhartrhari Phonemes and words Vyā. True True False are fictional abstractions

(17) Bhartrhari The sentence is not a Vyā. True True False whole made of parts (18) Bhartrhari Phonemes have no Vyā. True True False independent meaning (19) Bhartrhari Words are fictional Vyā. True True False abstractions (20) Bhartrhari Words are fictional tad uktam True True False abstractions (Bhartrhari, Vyā.) (21) Bhartrhari Divisions of Vyā. True True False śabdabrahman as tools

(22) Bhartrhari Divisions of Vyā. True True False śabdabrahman as tools

(23) Bhartrhari Divisions of yathoktam True True False śabdabrahman (Bhartrhari, as tools Vyā.) (24) Bhartrhari The three-fold śabda Vyā. True True False

(25) Bhartrhari The three-fold śabda tad uktam True True False (Bhartrhari, Vyā.) (26) Bhartrhari The three-fold śabda tad uktam True True False (Bhartrhari) (27) Bhartrhari The three-fold śabda tad uktam True True False (Bhartrhari)

mentioned, and in others clearly identifiable in the flow of the argument, according to his role in the debate either as proponent (paksin) or opponent (pratipakșin). Although the Mīmamsaka role in the staged debate is that of presenting a second antithesis (uttarapaksa) and not a final verdict (siddhānta) one cannot fail to notice how Jayanta's views are very close to the Mīmāmsaka's, so much so that in the present list of re-uses, insofar as the truth value of the statements, Jayanta almost invariably agrees with the Mīmāmsaka. In these conclusive tables, the truth values seen from Jayanta's viewpoint are in bold face, together with the truth values of those who agree with him.

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Table 10.2 Sphoța refutation

Author of Context of Symbolic re-user Epist. val. Epist. val. Epist. re-used text re-used passage of text according according val. to author to according of source symbolic to Jayanta re-user

Counter-verdict (Mīmāmsaka) (28) Kumārila Phonemes in Mīm True True True sequence produce a cumulative effect (29) Umveka Phonemes in Mīm. True True True sequence produce a cumulative effect (30) Umveka Phonemes in Mīm. True True True sequence produce a cumulative effect (31) Śabara The last phoneme tatrabhāvān True True True triggers knowledge mīmām̧sā- of the artha bhāsyakṛt (Mīm.) (32) Uņveka Dispositions are Mīm. True True True qualities of the self (33) Sabara Perception is the Mīm. True True True main instrument of knowledge (34) Umveka Perceptions produce tathā cāhuḥ True True True dispositions, which (Mīm.) produce memory (35) Śabara The theory of sugṛhītanāma- True True True phonemes is more bhāșyakāra, economical Mīm.

(36) Kumārila The theory of the tad uktam True True True sphoța is anti- (Kumārila, economical Mīm.)

(37) Kumārila A gradual yathoktam True True True manifestation of the (Kumārila) sphoța is impossible (38) Kumārila The sequence is a tatra coktam True True True property of (Kumārila phonemes, not an Mīm.) additional postulation like the sphoța (39) Kumārila The sphota does not tad uktam True True True qualify as śabda (Kumārila, Mīm.)

(40) Pakşilasvāmin The sphota does not bhāșyakṛt (Mīm.) True True True qualify as śabda (41) Kumārila The smallest śabda Mīm. True True True unity is the phoneme (42) Kumārila The smallest śabda sūktaņ hy etat True True True unity is the phoneme (Kumārila, Mīm.)

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Table 10.3 Nyāya sources

Author of Context of re-used Symbolic re-user Epist. val. Epist. val. Epist. val. re-used text passage of text according according according to author to symbolic to Jayanta of source re-user

Re-uses from the NS (43) Akşapāda The instruments tad āha True True True of knowledge sūtrakāraḥ (Nyā.) (44) Akşapāda Knowledge of the akșapādas tāvad True True True self leads to the evam summum bonum upadișțavān (Nyā.) (45) Akşapāda The purpose of samāhitam True True True jalpa and etad bhagavatā vitaņdā sūtrakāreņa (Nyā.) Uncredited re-uses from the NBh (46) Vātsyāyana The syntax of NS Nyā. True True True 1.1.1

(47) Vātsyāyana The relation of Nyā. True True True pramāņa and prameya with the other padārthas (48) Vātsyāyana Inference is used Nyā. True True True to solve doubts (49) Vātsyāyana The three Nyā. True True True pravṛttis: uddeśa, lakșaņa and parīkșā Credited re-uses from the NBh (50) Vātsyāyana Ānvīkșikī is the āha ca True True True supreme science bhāșyakāraḥ (Nyā.) (51) Vātsyāyana The convergence tad udāhāraņam tu True True True of instruments of bhāșyakāraḥ knowledge in a pradarśitavān single object (Nyā.) (52) Vātsyāyana Pseudo-inferences bhāșyakāreņa True True True uktam (Nyā.) (53) Vātsyāyana Definition of iti ca bruvāņo True True True pravrtti bhāșyakāraḥ (Nyā.) (54) Vātsyāyana The scope of iti bhāșyakārava- True True True pseudo-logical canāt (Nyā.) reasons

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Throughout the NM, when not explicitly credited to the author, quotations are almost invariably introduced by tad uktam, or, more rarely, yathoktam. The overwhelming percentage of quotations thus introduced is in verse or sūtra form. This tad uktam pre-quote expression can be considered Jayanta's marker for a precise quotation, so much so that it may be used as a valuable clue to identify quotations from undetermined or lost works. Also, it is a signal that the specific tradition derived from the context, in the above cases Vyākaraņa and Mīmāmsā, is symbolized in the quotation. Unlike Sabara and Kumārila, Bhartrhari is never explicitly credited. Since Jayanta's views are certainly closer to the Mīmāmsakas's, such explicit credits could by themselves be not only tokens of respect, but also of the trustworthiness of the source. The almost invariable concomitance of the tad uktam formula with quoted verses and aphorisms may have several reasons. It is possible that verses were more suited for quotation purposes, for mnemonic reasons, and that therefore Jayanta thinks more appropriate to introduce them with an explicit "so it was said". It is also possible that verses and aphorisms, since they were more easily memorized and thus faithfully transmitted, enjoyed a special status as śabdapramāņa in Jayanta's perspective. It is remarkable how differently re-uses from Nyāya sources are treated. First of all, in these cases the tad uktam pre-quote is not systematically present anymore. There is a substantial amount of uncredited quotations from the NBh, which is all in prose, except for rare passages (see Table 10.3). Perhaps these passages were so well known to Jayanta and his audience to make irrelevant the necessity of credits, or perhaps in Jayanta's understanding only versified passages were worthy of credits, but in some cases they could also be unconscious re-uses creeping in the NM.14 In the context of versification, I found (48) particularly interesting, where a prose passage of the NBh is integrated and completed in metrical form by Jayanta. In relation to re-use in Nyāya literature, in any case, it seems that the impact of the oral tradition, and thus of massive portions of works committed to memory, must be taken into account.

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References

Abbreviations and References to Primary Literature

Brh Prabhākara Miśra (1929). Brhatī by Prabhākara Miśra with the commentary Rjuvimalā of Śālikanātha Miśra. Ed. by A. Chinnaswami Sastri. Chowkhambā Sanskrit Series 391. Benares: Vidya Vilas Press. C Ms. 2606, Malayalam Department of the University of Calicut, Thenjipalam (Malappuram District). Undated; foll. 188; cm. 5 x 48 ca .; palm-leaf; Malayālam. Contains the complete NM 1- 6 and about one third of NM 7. In the original foliation, the first leaf is foliated as śrī, and is followed by foll. 1-187 in letter numerals.

14 For a parallel case in Mīmāmsā, see Freschi's contribution in this volume.

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GBh Nagin J. Shah, ed. (1972). Cakradhara's Nyāyamañjarī-granthibhanga. Lalbhai Dalpatbhai series, 35. Ahmedabad: L.D. Institute of Indology. NBh Anantalal Thakur, ed. (1997b). Gautamīyanyāyadarśana with Bhāșya of Vātsyāyana. Nyāyaca- turgranthikā 1. For the first chapter, it is the revised edition of the same author's edition of the Nyāyacaturgranthika, Adhyāya 1. Mithila Institute Series Ancient Text 20. Darbhanga 1967. New Delhi: Indian Council of Philosophical Research. NMGa Mahamahopadhyaya Gangadhara Shastri Tailanga, ed. (1895). The Nyāyamañjarī of Jayanta Bhatta. Vizianagram Sanskrit Series 8. Benares: E.J. Lazarus and Co. NMVa K.S. Varadācārya, ed. (1969-1983). Nyāyamañjarī: with Țippaņī Nyāyasaurabha. Two volumes. Mysore: Oriental Research Institute. NS see NBh. P Ms. 390/1875-76, Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, Pune. Saka 1394 [CE 1472]; foll. 432; mm. 130 x 130; birch-bark, bound; Sāradā. The manuscript is presently constituted of 432 leaves (435 according to Cat. Report 1875, p. XXV). The original foliation runs up to NM 3 and restarts from NM 4: 3-149 (= NM 1-3) + 1-270 (= NM 4-12) + 282-286 (an unidentified work) + 7 (parts of Raghuvamśa 15.11-78). Except for occasional missing leaves, the NM is complete. The first two folios are lost. PSȚ Ernst Steinkellner, Helmut Krasser, and Horst Lasic, eds. (2005). Jinendrabuddhi's Viśalāma- lavatī Pramāņasamuccayațīkā. Beijing-Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences Press. ŚBh Kashinath Vasudev Abhyankar and Ganesh Shastri Ambadas Joshi, eds. (1970-1974). Mīmāmsādarśana. Ānandāśramasamskrtagranthāvāli 97. Vol. 1: MS 1.1, with Sābarabhāșya and Prabhabhidha commentary by Vaidyanath Shastri. Vol. 2: MS 1.2-2.1, with Sābarabhāsya and Tantravārttika. Vol. 3: MS 2.2-2.4, with Sābarabhāșya and Tantravārttika. Vol. 4: MS 3.1- 3.8, with Sābarabhāşya and Tantravārttika. Vol. 5: MS 4.1-7.4, with Sābarabhāșya and Țupțīkā. Vol. 6: MS 8.1-10.8, with Sābarabhāsya and Țupțīkā. Vol. 7: MS 11.1-12.4, with Śābarabhāsya and Țupțīkā. Or. ed. 1930-1933. Pune: Anandashrama. ŚvDvā Šāstrī Dvārikādāsa, ed. (1978). Ślokavārttika of Srī Kumārila Bhatta with the Commentary

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