1. Exposition Of Vedantaparibhasa Akkubhotlu Sharma B

42307 54304 AN EXPOSITION

OF

VEDÃNTAPARIBHÃSÃ

OF

DHARMARĀJĀDHWARINDRA

Dr. G. AKKUBHOTLU SARMA M.A., Ph.D.

AN EXPOSITION

OF

VEDÃNTAPARIBHÃSÃ

OF

DHARMARÃJDHWARINDRA

Dr. G. AKKUBHOTLU SARMA M.A., Ph.D.

AN EXPOSITION OF VEDĀNTA PARIBHÃSÃ OF DHARMARAJĀDHWARINDRA

First Edition: Bodhana Ekādasi - Sri Bhãva November 1994 Copies 1000

D.T.P. Composing & Printing at: M/s G.K. Print Hoase 49 34 11 Noar Andhra Bank. Abıİnagar Alkayyapalem VISAKIIAPATNAM 530 O16

For Copies : Smt. G.V.P. Vardhani, Plot 167, Sector-4, M.V.P. Colony, VISAKHAPATNAM-530 017.

Tho Author acknowlodgos with thanhs the financial assistanco rondorod by

Tirumala Tirupati Devasthanams

TIRUPATI, under their "Aid to religious publications" scheme.

Dr. D. SIVAPRASAD MA., Ph.D. Professor Dept. of Sanskrit ANDHRA UNIVERSITY

PUNYÂHA VACHANAM

Vedănta Darsana is a unique Darsana of Hindus. The reason for its uniqueness is that it represents the life aspiration of the Hindus in general and seekers of truth in particular. The Hindu nation has a special character which distinguishes the Hindu from other nations. Whatever the Hindu does he does for Atmanomoksardham Jagaddhitaya ca. As such the Hindu has given the shape to his aspiration (i.e., Moksa and Jagaddhita) in the form of Vedänta Darsana. And the Vedanta Darsana in its turn moulded the Hindu as seeker of truth whether literate or illiterate.

The seekers of truth from times immemorial have done penance and reduced their realisation into verbal form which is called prasthāna trayi. The Vedānta Darsana has a parampara and a tradition. That is the basis for Vedanta Darsana. Unless one gets guidance from an able guru who is trained traditionally it is very difficult to master the subject. The author of the present work Dr. G.A. Sarma, M.A., Ph.D., has studied the Vedānta darsana in a traditional way and got guidance from our master Prof. Veluri Subba Rao, who is an epitome of tradition and modernity. The author is an able, shrewd researcher and is evidenced at every stage in the work. As Dharmarjädhwarindra shows his scholarship in various systems of knowledge while dealing the subject the author of the present work also proved his scholastic competence to do research on Vedănta parisbhāșa. The author has presented the subject in a lucid and readable way. Such works really evoke interest in abstruse subjects such as this. Hence I wish that many more such works should come out from the pen of Dr. G.A. Sarma.

Visakhapatnam, D. SIVA PRASAD 13-11-1994.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am extremely grateful to my cstecmcd Professor, Philoso- pher and teacher Late Dr Veluri Subba Rao. M 4.Ph D, for his sincere inspiring guidance throughout my endeavor of leamning

I am verymuch indebted to my Professor well-wisher Dr D Sn a Prasad.M4.PhD Professor of Sanskrit. Andhra Univer- sity for his valuable foreword to this work

I am greatly indebted to the authorities of the Tirumala Tirupatı Devasthanams. Tirupati for their financial assistance in bringing out this work

I must also acknowledge the immense help extended by M/s G.K. Print Honse, P. S.Siddeswara Rao, (PTS & DTPO.) & M.G.V.Seethapathi, (MA Lit.) for their untiring work to bring out this book in this beautiful form in record time.

I will bc failing in my duty if I donot acknowledge the help rendered by my brother's son Ch. Phani Kumar. B Sc . B.Ed who did a splendid job of proof reading

Visakhapatnam. G. Akku Bhotlu Sarma

13-11-1994

Bodhana Ekādasi - Sri Bhâva

CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I 1 VALID KNOWLEDGE AND PRAMANAS

CHAPTER II 7 PERCEPTION

CHAPTER III 39 INFERENCE

CHAPTER IV 51 COMPARISON

CHAPTER V 54 VERBAL TESTIMONY

CHAPTER VI 77 PRESUMPTION

CHAPTER VII 82 NON-PERCEPTION

CHAPTER VIII 95 VALIDITY OP KNOWLEDGE

CHAPTER IX 100 IS MIND A SENSE-ORGAN?

CHAPTER X 106 VRTTI

CHAPTER XI 114 BRAHMAN, ISWARA, AND JIVA

CHAPTER XII 125 THEORY OP CREATION AND DESTRUCTION

CHAPTER XIII 135 LIBERATION

CONCLUSIONS 147

BIBLIOGRAPHY 152

ABBREVIATIONS

BG Bhagavadgitã

Br Up. Brahadãranyaka Upanısad. Br. Su. Brahma Sutras

Ch Up Chãndogya Upanısad

Ka Up Katha Upanisad

Kau. Up. Kausıtaki Upanisad

Mu Up. Mundakopanısad N.S. Nyãya Sutras

SB Siddhânta Bindu

S.L.S Sıddhãntalesasangraha

Sv Up. Svetãsvatara Upanısad

Tait. Up. Taittinya Upanisad

T.S. Tarkasangraha

Vãk. Pad Vãkya Padiyam

VP Vedãnta Paribhãsã (with Sikhãmani com ed

Venkateswara Steam Press, Bombay) Mm. A K. Sãstry Mm. Anantakrishna Sãstry's edition of Vedãnta Paribhãsã.

V.P.S. Vivarana Prameya Sangraha.

आ

INTRODUCTION

Among the six systems of Indian Philosophy, vedãnta occupies a unique place. Every aspirant for salvation should have a knowledge of Brahman and the self and it is arrived at through the vedãntic texts. Different scholars have interpreted the vedãntic texts expounding their own lines of thought - the chiefly known schools of thought being Advaita, Visistadvaita, and Dvaita. Advaita intends to preach the non-difference ofthe jiva and the Brahman as frequently taught in the upanisads Bãdarãyana codifies the vedãntic thought in the form of aphorisms called Brahmasutras. The Brahmasutras, the Bhagavadgitã and the Upanisads put together are called prasthãnatraya. This is the basis of all the vedãntic studies

Sankara (788-820 A D) the chief preceptor of Advaita Vedãnta commented upon the above three works. He is of the view that knowledge of the non-difference of Jiva and Brahman leads to the final goal of life - Emancipation (Moksa). The Bhãsya of Sankara on Bãdarãyana Brahmasutras invited a number of valuable commentaries which interpreted his views on Jiva and Brahman relation and on the nature of world illusoriness. After Sankara, Padmapãda (820 A.D.) and Vãcaspati Misra (820 A D ) are the two chief writers who represent the distinct thoughts (views) in the interpretation of Vedãnta (Advaita) in their commentaries-Pañcapãdikã and Bhãmãti respectively. These lines of Vedãnta interpretations were seriously continued by the later writers in the form of commentaries and in original works. Padmapãda's Pañcapãdikã was commented upon by the celebrated author. Prakāsätmayati (1200 A.D.) in his Pãncapãdikãvivarana. There are some other commentaries also on Pañcapãdika1. The Pañcapādikãvivarana of Prakãstman enjoys a very great reputa- tion and it influenced the followers of Advaita in its dialectical

1. Prabodhaparisodhini of Ātmasvarupa, a pupil of Nrsimha and Tātparyārthadyotini of Vinanatman - Pancapādikā with these two cmmentaries was published. Vide Madras Govt. Oriental Series, CLV, 1958.

literature Akhandananda's (14th century A D.) (PupilofÀnandagiri) Tattvadipana is the most widely known commentar on the Pancapâdıkāvivarana 2 Bhāratıtirtha Vidyāranya (14th C A D) has elaborated the views of the Vivarana in his work. Vivaranaprameyasmgraha' The Vivaranopanyãsa of Ramanandasaraswati is another work written on the lines of the Vrvarana '

The commentary, Bhãmati of Vãcaspati Misra, on the Brahmasutrabhäsya was commented upon by Amalãnanda (13th century A D) in his kalpataru This Kalpataru has a further commentary 'Kalpataruparımala' by the prolific writer Appaya Dik sita (16th century A.D ) Abhogais a commentary on this again, written by Laksminrsimha at the end of 17th century A D.5 Appavadiksita is also the author of a famous work 'Sıddhntalesasamgraha' a digest of Advaita Philosophy.6 Some of the dialectical works in the field of Advaita Philosophy are the Khandanakhandakadya of Sriharsa (1150 A D) and the T'attvapradıpıkā of Cıtsukhācārya (1200 A D) The other chief works in the field are the Samksepasariraka of Sarvajñamuni (900 A D ) and the Prakatarthavivarana of an unknown author who lived eitherin | Ith Century A.D.orin 12th century A D.' These are some of the chief works of the Advaita Vedanta in the two lines of iterpretation Vivarana and Bhmati

2 These are some other commentaries on the Pancapådikà Vivarana, called Rıjuvivarana by Vısnubhattopādhyāya, son of Janārdana, and Paňcapādıkā vivaranabhåva- prakāsikā, by Nrsimhāsrama at the beginning of the 16th Century A D Vide - A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol II - 1975 by S Dasgupta, page 52 Govt Onental Manuscript Library, Madras published the vivarana with lwo commentaries in 1958 Govt Oriental Manuscripts Library Series No CLV 1958 3 Prof S S Suryanarayana Sastry edited and translated Vivaranaprameya Sangraha, Andhra University Series No 24,25, 1941 4 Chowkhamba Sanskrit senes Book depot. 1901 Banaras 5 Bhåmati with Kalpataru and Parimala - edited by Mm Pandit N S Anantakrıshnasastry, Calcutta University 6 Translated by S S. Suryanarayana Sastry, Pulbished by University of Madras 7 Vide - A History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. Il, P 196 by S N. Dasgupta.

Dharmarãjädhwarindra, a pupil of Nrsimhãsrama occu- pies a unique place in Advaita. This famous work, the Vedãntaparibhãsã on Advaita Vedãnta including epistemology be speaks the worthy contribution of the celebrated author to the line ofinterpretation of the Vivarana. Dhrmarãja hails from the village, Kandramänikkam in Tanjore district This fact can be evidenced from his commentary, Tarkacudãmani8 on the Prakãsa of Rucidatta Misra This Prakasa is in itself a commentary on Gangesa's Tattvacıntãmani Dharmarãjamentions with respect Nrsimhãsrama as his grand preceptor in the opening verse ofthe Vedãntaparibhãsã 9 Nrsimhãsrama the author of Bhedadhikkara lived in the early half of the 16th century 10 Sri V Swaminathan places Nrsimhasrama between 1470 A D -- 1550 A D So Dharmarãja can be placed in the second half of the 16th century A D 11 N S Anantakrisna Sastry. the editor of the Vedanta Paribhasã with his own commentary, Prakãsikã, states that Dharmarãja is a contemporary of Appayadiksita, the author of the Siddhãntalesasamgraha 12 Frahlädachandrasekhara Divanji is of the view that Dharmarãja is a contemporary of Madhusudana Saraswati13 who lived in 16th century A D. So Dharmarãja must have lived in the 16th century

8 इति श्रीमत्कण्डरमाणिक्कग्रामवासिना त्रिवेदि नारायणयज्वानुजेनधर्मराजाध्वरोन्द्रेण Descriptive Catalogue Vol XI, P 4586, 4756, Tanjore Library 9. यदन्तेवासिप्जास्यैर्निरस्ता भेदिवारणाः। तं प्रणौमि नृसिंहाख्यं यतीन्द्रं परमं गुरुम्। Vadāntaparbhāsā - verse 2 (Here after denoted as V P Venkateswara Steam Press, Bombay) 1928 10 Introduct onto Tattvacıntāmani of Gangesa with Prakāsa of Rucidatta and Nyāya Sikhāmanı of Ramaknshnādhwarn- Ed by N S Rāmānujatātachārya, Kendnya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, Tirupatı, Series - 20, P 29,30 :1 Vide Preceptors of Advaita, page 285 ed. by Kańchikāmakoti Math, Secunderabad and अतः नृसिंहाश्रमप्रशिष्यस्य धर्मराजाध्वरिणः काल: षोडशशताब्द्याःउत्तरार्ध इति तत्पुत्र श्रीरामकृष्णाध्वरिणः कालोऽपि षोडशशताब्य्याः अन्तिम भागः सप्तदशशताब्य्याः आद्य भागश्चेति निश्चेतुं शक्यते इति। Vide - Introduction to Nyāyasikhāmani Kendriya Sanskritvidyapeetha Series 20, page 30, Also Critique on Vivarana, P. 271. 12. वेदान्तपरिभाषाग्रन्थसम्पादका ..... etc.Vide Vedantaparibhasawith Prakasika, Calcutta Univ., 1930 ed. by Mm. Pandit. N S. Anantakrishnasastry Introduction, pages 125, 126. 13. Siddhntabindu. Gaekwad Oriental Series - 11, CXIX -CXV.

A.D.14 Thus from the available sources we may safely assign Dharmarãja to the latter half of the sixteenth century A.D. Dharmaraja is a well noted scholar both in Nyaya and Vedãnta. From the introductory verses of the Vedãntaparibhãsa. We learn that he is also the author of Nyaya works. His famous Nyãya works are the commentary on Rucidatta's Tattvacintamaniprakãsa called Tarkacudãmani15 the Yuktisamgraha16 and the Nyayaratna or the Nyãyasiddhãntadipikãprakãsikã on Sasadhara's Nyãyasiddhãnta- dipa.17 The author of the Vedãntaparibhãsa himself speaks of the greatness of his work Tarkacudamani as dasatikavibhanjani. The known Vedanta works of the author are only two; the Vedãntaparibhãsã and the Padadipikã or Padayojanikã, a gloss on Pancapãdikã18 The Vedãntaparibhãsã is a very popular manual of Advaita Vedãnta and its popularity can be estimated by the number of commentaries written on it from time to time. This has several commentaries. The most popular commentary on this work is by Ramakrsna, son of the author and is called Sikhamani. This has a further sub-commentary called Maniprabhãby Amaradãsa.19 These two commentaries are very useful to the readers of the Advaita Vedãntaparibhāsã.

14 Vide. History of Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, 419. 15 Vide Introductory verses of VP. येन चिन्तामणौ टीका दशटीकाविभञ्जिनी। and परंतु तर्कचूडामणिनामकानां तालकोशानां आमूलाग्रं परिशीलनेन स ग्रन्थः न चिन्तामणेः साक्षाव्य्याख्यानरूप अपितु रुचिदत्तमिश्रकृतस्य तत्वचिन्तामणिप्रकाशस्य व्याख्यानरूप इत्यस्माभिरवगतम् Vide Tattvacintamani with commentaries Prakasa etc page 27. Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyāpeetha senes No.20. Tirupathi 16. Vide Tanjore Library Manuscripts Catalogue XI, P. 4764 17. टीकाशशधरस्यापि etc .. Vide journal of Tanjore Saraswati Mahal Library, 1962, Vol. XVI, P.3 Article by S. Jagadisan 18 पदयोजनया पञ्चपादिका व्याकृता तथा॥ This work Padadipika Is unpublished Ibid Prof. S.S. Suryanarayana Sastry in his introduction mentions that the Manu- script is damaged and incomplete etc., Vide Introduction to Vedānta Paribhāsă ed. and translated by S.S. Suryanarayana sastry, published by Adyar Library Series No. 34, 1942 & 1971, p. XIV. 19. The work Vedäntaparibhäså with the two commentaries Sikhāmani Maniprabhå has been pulbished by Venkataswara Steam Press - Bombay, 1901 and 1933.

Pedda Diksita, son of Trivedi Nãrãyana Diksita wrote a commentary Prakãsikã on this work.20 Sivadatta commented on this work Vedãntaparibhãsã in his Arthadipika21. Asubodhini is another commentary by krsnanãthanyãya Pañcãnana.22

Mahãmahopãdhyãya N.S. Anantakrsnasãstry is one of the latest of the commentators on the work, Vedãntaparibhãsã. He was the author of the commentary, Prakasika.23. The author of the commentary has edited this work with a detailed introduction (Bhumikã) A Compendium of the Vedãnta Paribhãsã has been com- piled by a former Maharaja of Cochin late Sir Rãma Varma under the title Paribhãsãsamgraha.24

In addition to the above there are some more commentaries and modern translations of this work in English and Hindi also.25 Now regarding the content of the present work the Vedãntaparibhãsã we find that it can mainly be divided into three sections - Pramãnas (means of valid knowledge), Vişaya (subject matter) and Prayojana (the fruit). The pramãna section, of course, comprises of six chapters. In all these chapters the author tries to establish the means of valid knowledge from the Vedantic stand

20. This was pulbished by Government of Travancore in 1928. 21. Published in 1911 at the Venkateswara Steam Press, Bombay and in 1927 by Haridass Samskrit Series - 6. 22. This commentary along with the text Vedantaparibhaså was published by Clear Printing Press, Calcutta in 1892 and 1930. 23. Published by Calcutta University in 1930. 2nd edition. 24. Published in the Cochin Sanskrit Series. Mm. N.S. Anantakrsna Sastrin wrote Introduction to this work. 25. Prof. S.S. Suryanarayana Sastry edited and translated this into English Published at Adyar Library Series No. 34, No. I in 1942 and 1971. Swami Madhavänanda edited the text with his English translation Published at Râmakrana Mission Belur Math (4 editions). Edited with Hindi Prakāiśa commen- tary by Gajanana Sastry, Beneras.

point and as such very often deals with the refutation of other systems of philosophy like Nyãya, as in the case of presumption and Non-cognition 26 He defends the Vedantin's school of thought with the help of the Navya-Nyaya phraseology. This clearly shows that he is one of the authors who made a dialectical approach to Advaita Vedãnta. Since his time the Advaita Vedãnta come to be regarded as a sound rational school of thought.

Though mostly a follower of the Mimamsã school of thought in Pramãnas, in certain places he criticises the Mimâmsã stand-point also e g. Sabdanityatva and definition of perception In the prameya (subject matter) chapter also he discussed at length the views of Advaita Vedanta He has shown a great originality in the interpretation of the statement 'Tattvaması' We can easily understand from a study of his text, the Vedãntaparibhãsã, that our author faithfully follows the vivarana branch of the school of Advaita His work is very often quoted by authors of works on Advaita especially by the Kosakäras in the field of epistemology The chapter division of the present work has been mainly based on the order of contents ofthe original work. While discussing the pramãna chapters, the views of the other systems of Indian Philosophy have also been referred to. The interpretations of the text by the commentators and their mutual divergencies have also been carefullv studied. In a way, a critical study of the Vedãnta Paribhãsã has intensively been carried out in the present work Thus an attempt has been made to study the work, the Vedãnta Paribhãsa, with a critical outlook collecting facts from the available commentaries on it.

26. The Naiyäyika's stand that presumption is a case of Kevalavyatireki inference is not admissible to the Vedantin.

VALID KNOWLEDGE

The author of the Vedãnta Paribhãsã Dharmarãja begins his work with a discussion about the valid or correct knowledge He observes that among the four goals of life1 liberation is the highest goal as against the other three He hails it as the highest goal on the authority of the Holy texts2 like "just as this world attained by Karma gets destroyed so also the other worlds (heaven etc ,) obtained by performance of rites etc also gets destroyed in course of time Thus the other three goals of life are found to be ephemeral and the fourth goal of life, Moksa is considered to be the permanent on the basis ofthe Holy text'He does not come back',3 which speaks of the eternality of Moksa As Brahmajñãna is the cause of the attainment of liberation, he wants to enter into a detailed discussion of the knowledge of Brahman and its valid means

In this connection the author lıke the Naiyayıkas and others, holds that the efficient means of valid knowledge is what is called pramãna and quite to the point, as a knowledge of the pramãna presupposes a knowledge of pramã (as its constituent)4, the author of the Vedãnta-Panbhãsã discusses the nature of pramã While the Naiyayıka holds tt at knowledge in which 'that' is the attributive in the substratun. of 'that' is valid,5 the Vedäntin observes, on the lines suggested by the Mimämsaka, that knowledge is valıd when it has for its object something which is not contradicted 6 For example, li there is the knowledge of a pot which is not contradicted by any other means of knowledge, it is considered to be valid This definition holds good in the case of all valid knowledge -- be it recollection (smrti) or experience (anubhava) If, however, valıd

1 धर्म, अर्थ, काम and मोक्ष 2 यथेह कर्मचितोलोक क्षीयते, एवमेवामुत्रपुण्यचितो लोक:क्षीयते - Ch UP 3 नसपुनरावर्तते Ch UP VII-XV-I 4 प्रमाकरणं प्रमाणम् V P page 19 घटक 5 तद्वति तत्प्रकारकज्ञानत्वम् 6 स्मृतिसाधारणं तु अबाधितार्थविषयक ज्ञानत्वम् V P page 20

2 VEDÂNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

experience7 alone is to be defined then it should be defined as 'the knowledge of an object which is neither contradicted nor previously cognised'. In the definition, the word 'previously not cognised' (anadhigata) has been used to avoid overlapping on recollection. In recollection what was once cognised by a person is again cognised, but in experience it is not so. Again the word 'uncontradicted' has been used in the definition of valid knowledge in order to exclude Invalid knowledge from its scope Thus between the definitions of two validities (of Smrti and Anubhava) the difference is only the adjective of artha, anadhigata (not known previously)

Here the author foresees a difficulty in the definition of validity in the case of a continuous cognition like 'this is a poť', 'this Is a poť etc. (dhãravăhikabuddhi) The actual difficulty here is that the same knowledge which is produced in the previous minute is being produced again and again in a series for sometime and hence the question arises whether the second and subsequent knowledges are what have been previously cognised8 (adhigata) in which case, the definition 'anadhigata' etc. will not apply in the case of a valid knowledge like ' this is pot, this is pot, etc in a series. To this Dharmaraja has an apt reply that in every minute there is a separate jñãna produced in a cognition series because the concerned minute is also included in the cognition He bases his argument on experiences such as 'this is a poť', 'I am going' etc., wherein time is also a factor of perception. He accepts the view that though time is colourless, it is an object of perception. It cannot be admitted to be inferred since no vyāptijñāna is present in this case. It may also be noted that even the Naiyãyikas hold that the colourless jāti is an object of perception where the object concerned is perceived on account of its Mahatva and Udbhutarupa.

7 स्मृतिव्यावृत्तं प्रमात्वमनधिगताबाधितार्थविषयक ज्ञानत्वम् 8 अधिगत and not अनधिगत

VALID KNOWLEDGE 3

In the same way, when an object is perceived the time factor also, qualifying it is perceived Otherwise, there should be a doubt regarding its presence in the present time when the object is perceived Thus the Advaitin establishes that the different times present different cognitions of the same object in different moments In a series and give such a knowledge scope for being included in the definition of valid knowledge 9

The Advaitin further explains that in a cognition in a series, there is no difference in the knowledge in the final view Even one single jñãna may take many moments to make the object presented before us and hence it cannot be stated that in such a cognition there is no validity It should not, however, be questioned how one single knowledge is produced when different psychoses of internal organs (antahkarana vrttıs) are present To this the Advaitin replies that he admits that there is only one mental mode of internal organ in the form of pot (ghatãkäräntahkarana vrtti) as long as the pot is perceived, as the Ãsubodhinikãra says, jñãna in the form of consciousness is only one The difference in cognition is conceived on account of the differences in vrtti which are not actually real10 He further admits thai a vrtti abides till a different vrtti arises in the perceiver11 In the Naiyayıka's view, however, knowledge like that of Śabda etc. lasts for only two moments12 In the first minute it Is produced, in the second it is there and in the third it is destroyed The Advaitin does not accept ths point of view of the logician He thinks that unless the earlier vrtt is destroyed, another vrtti cannot be produced. Hence till the latter vrtt is produced the former remains Intact, just as the vrtt is one till another vrtt is produced the knowledge produced by it also is one standing as long the vrtti is present because this knowledge producea (of the pot etc.) Is of the form of consciousness reflected in the vrtti.

9 Vide Vedānta Paribhāsā com Sıkhāmanı page25-27 10 Vide Āubodhini Com on V P page 12 11 Vide details about Vrtti 12 ... शब्द बुद्धीनां दिवक्षणास्थायित्वम्

4 VEDÂNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

Now there is a question regarding the word 'uncontradicted' (abãdhita) in the definition of validity, for in the final view of the Vedäntin all the objective world is false and hence the contradiction How can such bãdhitajñãna be pramã? To this the Vedantin has a fitting reply on the basis of the Holy texts 13 that the objective world is contradicted only after Brahmasãksätkãra At the time of Brahmasãksãtkära the objective world along with its efficient cause (upãdãna) avidyã gets stultified-just as in the case of Silverin nacre which is stultified by the statement of a reliable person that the object Is nacre but not silver. But before Brahmasãksãtkãra i e before a knowledge of the purport of the mahãväkyas ın vedãnta 'That Thou Art' etc. the entire objective world exists 14 In this way the author of the Vedãnta Paribhãsã tries to establish that a knowledge of the objective world is valid as long as this transmigratory stage (samsãra) is present and hence the word 'uncontradicted' in the definition cannot be said not to have covered the valid knowledge of pot etc., On this point he is obliged to ancient thinkers of the advaita school on the basis of the verse quoted by him.15

PRAMĀNA

By the word 'pramãna' we mean the means by which a person attains Valid Knowledge16 By Pramã is meant Vald knowledge and by the word Karana is meant the special cause which has an activity of its own.17 For example with regard to a Valid knowledge of Perception the sense organ, 'eye' etc. Is a pramãna Here the sense organ 'eye' has an activity in the form of contact with the object concerned. This is the activity of the sense organ which Is the special cause of Perception. We very well know that, inspite

13 'यत्रत्वस्य सर्वमात्मेवा भूत्केन कं पश्येत्' 14 यत्र हि द्वैतमिवभवति तदितर इतरं पश्यति 15 देहात्मप्रत्ययो यद्वत् V.P 37

16 प्रमीयते अनेन इतिप्रमाणम् करणे ल्युट् Vatsyāyanabhasya T.S P. 36 17 व्यापारवदसाधारणं कारणं करणम्। T S. Page 36

5

of the presence of the Pramãta. Prameya etc without the help of Indriyärthasannikarsa, no perception can be achieved Hence the contact of the sense organ is the special cause So also in the case of anumiti a knowledge of concomitance (Vyãptijñăna) is the · special cause Consideration (parãmarsa) is its activity part and the result is inferential knowledge

According to the Bhãtta Mimãmsaka, by Pramãna ıs meant that entity (means) by which a knowledge not previously known is secured 18 But this means of Valid Knowledge does not engender a Valıd Knowledge in a series. The Prbhãkara defines Pramãna as simple experience which is different from recollection Thus in his view there is no invalid knowledge at all The Bauddha calls that, Valid Knowledge which does not disagree with the object concerned The above two views appear to speak of Valid Knowledge and not its means

There is a large divergence of opinion regarding the Pramãnas, their number and their definition We have noted some definitions of Pramana above Some more will be discussed in the relevant places in this work.

The Number of Pramãnas is also a matter of controversy Thinkers of the Carvaka School hold that there is one single Pramāna, Pratyaksa alone The Vaišeşikas and tne Bauddhas believe that Pratyaksa and Inference are the only two Pramãnas The Smkhyas add one more pramãna Sabda and make them three The Naiyãyika holds that there are four Pramãnas including analogy. The Prabhakara is of the view that presumption also should be included as a fifth Pramãna whereas the Bhtta Mimãmsaka argues

18 Vide Nyãya theory of knowledge-S C Chatterjee page 66,73 Calcutta university 1939

6 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

that the number is six including Anupalabdhi (Non-perception) The Advaita Vedäntın also holds the same opinion The Paurãnikas add to this list two more possibility (Sambhava) and Aıtihya (heresay) and make the number eight.19 Those who argue that there is a less number of pramãnas try to include the other pramãnas among the fewer accepted by them. With this short background, let us try to examine the means of Valid Knowledge according to the Advartin as interpreted by the author of the Vedãnta Paribhãsã

19 Vide Mānameyodaya of Nārāyana (Adyar publication ) Page 8

7

PERCEPTION

Perception is the primary source of human knowledge Gautama, the founder of the Nyãya school of philosophy defines perception as the non-erroneous cognition produced by the inter- course of the sense organs with the objects, not associated with any name and well defined 1 Itis also defined as that cognition which Is produced by the contact of the sense organs with the objects 2 This definition has some demerits attached to it An objection is raised that cognition of the self and pleasure, pain etc are not covered in the definition of perception as mind is not counted as a sense organ by Gautama 3 Vtsyãyana, however, interprets that Gautama considers mind to be a sense organ The later logicians defined perception as the knowledge of which no other knowledge is an instrument (efficient cause).4 This definition excludes inferen- tial knowledge etc. because inferential knowledge is produced through the instrumentality of a knowledge of universal concomi- tance. This applies both to human perception and 'God's perception. Gangeśa, the great exponent of the Navya Nyãya school also defines perception in this way. Perception is direct or immediate knowledge It is right to state that perception as right knowledge is not denved through the instrumentality ofsome other knowledge.5

Jaimini defines perception as the cognition produced in the self by the intercourse of the sense organs with objects and points out that it cannot apprehend super-sensuous object.6

1 इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षोत्पन्नं ज्ञानं अव्यपदेश्यं अव्यभिचारि व्यवसायात्मिकं प्रत्यक्षम् Nyāya sutra 1.1.4 2 इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम् T.S 42 3 Gautama does not include mind among the sense organs N S.1-1-12 4 ज्ञानाकरणकं ज्ञानम् प्रत्यक्षम् --- Tattva Cintamani, Pratyaksalaksanavada 5 प्रत्यक्षस्य साक्षात्कारित्वं लक्षणम् --- Tattva Cintamani Sannikarsavadarahasyam 6 Jaimini Sutras 4, 1-4.

3 VEDANTAPARIBHASA

Prabhãkara also defines perception as direct apprehen- sion . Every act of perception consists of three aspects of consciousness-the perception of the knowing self, the known object. and knowledge itself This is designated the Triputi pratyaksavada of Prabhākara

Kapila defines perception as cognition which describes the form of an object as related to it R

Iswarakrsna considers perception as determinate cognition of an object (produced by its proximity to the sense organ) 9

Kapıla's analysıs of perception is in this way

There should be a real object of perception This dıstin- guishes the knowledge from illusion. Here perception not only Involves the existence of an object and the intercourse of a sense organ with the object but it also involves the operation of the intellect The external sense organs give an immediate apprehension of their objects

According to Sankara Vedãnta also perception is immedi- ate The Advaitins think that there is no necessary connection between perceptional knowledge and sense activity 10 Despite the factthat God has no senses, He has immediate knowledge of things Some others who do not regard mind to be a sense organ, hold that internal perception is a case ofimmediate knowledge independent of sense activity.11 Accordng to them pleasure, pain etc are cognised by the witness self-consciousness (sãksibhãsya)

7 साक्षात् प्रतीति: Prakaranapaficrka 8 यत्संबंधसिद्ध तदाकारोल्लेखि विज्ञानं तत् परृत्यक्षम् Sankhyasutra 1,89 3 प्रतिविषयाध्यवसायोदृष्टम् Sankhyakanka 5 10 Vedānta Paribhāsā - page 50 11 Some thinkers of Advaita I.e. Vivarana followers do not consider mind to be a sense organ

PERCEPTION 9

Any systematic treatment of the means of knowledge (pramäna) is not found in Sankara's works.12 It is also to be noted that the elaborate discussion of vrtti going out and assuming the form of the object is to be found neither in Sankara nor in Padmapäda.13 The theory of perception with details is evolved by the author of the Vivarana.14 Dharmaraja on a close study of all those views has elaborated this theory in a systematic way applying logical grounds. As Prof.S.N.Dsgupta puts it "Dharmarãja and his son, Rämakrsna worked out'a complete scheme ofthe theory of Vedäntic perception and inference. This is in complete agreement with the general Vedänta metaphysics."15

According to Advaita, valid perception is only conscious- ness.10 Though this is one, it is modalized in three ways The consciousness is modalized by different objects and called object consciousness (Visaya Caitanya), when this consciousness is determined by the mental mode (vrtti) it is said to be pramãna caitanya (or knowledge Consciousness) and when the same consciousness is modalized by the internal organ (mind) it is known as pramätr caitanya or subject Consciousness. The sense organs produce the mental mode, which serves to modalize the eternal (light of) consciousness. The activity of the internal organ is said to be cognition (jñäna) in a secondary sense since it determines the knowledge concerned.17 It may be noted here, that whereas the Logician believes that the sense-object contact itself produces a knowledge of the object, the Vedäntin holds that actual knowledge is produced after the production of vrtti. The Vedäntin observes that the sense-object contact is just for the sake of producing vrtti,18

12 History of Indian Epistemology page 309 13 Sankara's Theory of Knowledge page 96 14 Ibid - 96 15 History of Indian Philosophy Vol 1, page 470 16 प्रत्यक्षप्रमात्वत्र चैतन्यमेव V P page 41 17 अन्तः करणवृत्तौ ज्ञानत्वोपचारात् V.P page 43 and vide panicapadika Vivarana 203 18 इन्द्रियार्थसन्निकर्षजन्यं ज्ञानं प्रत्यक्षम्-T.S page 42

10 VEDÂNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

Pratyaksa or perception has been defined as that which is the distinctive cause of valid perceptional knowledge.19

In perception, the function (vrtti) ofinternal organ is involved The internal organ which is of the nature of light (tejas) goes out to the object through the channels of the sense organs, reaches the object and gets modified into its form. This process may be compared to the process of water flowing through the channels occupying the land, being modified into the form of the object. 20 This modification of the internal organ in the form of the object (to be) cognised is known as 'vrtti' Hence vrtti is that which apprehends the object The object of perception and vrtti come to be in the same locus outside when pratyaksa is produced 21

This process of vrtti going out through the sense organs occurs only in perception. Therefore it is immediate knowledge In inference etc. the vrtti does not go outside Hence inference etc are designated as mediate knowledge (Paroksa) In perception the consciousness determined by the apprehending mental mode becomes identified with the consciousness determined by the object, as the determinants of the two consciousness stand in the same locus In the perception of a jar, ghatvaccinna caitanya is identified with the consciousness determined by the mental mode which is modified into the form of the jar (ghatākäravrttyavaccinnacaitanya). Thus there is an identification ofthe apprehending mental mode (pramänacaitanya) with the object consciousness (vişayacaitanya). Hence it may be noted that by 'Identification' is meant 'standing in the same locus'.

19 प्रत्यक्षप्रमाकरणं प्रत्यक्षप्रमाणम् V.P.page39. 20 V.P. page 57 21 बहि : एकत्र -- V.P.Page 58

PERCEPTION 11

In the case of perception the vrtti and the object should not only occupy the same place but also the same time. The perceptual process and the object must have the same time moment, otherwise there arises a contingency that perception of pleasure and pain would be similar to those of the recollection of pleasure etc. In the perception of pleasure, the mental mode (vrtti) and the object (pleasure) occupy the same place -- when the present time is also accepted to be a requisite. But in the case of recollection of pleasure, however, the mode in the form of recollection exists at the present time whereas the object (pleasure) relates to the past time Hence they are not present at the same time. Hence there is no overlapping of the definition of perception on recollection 22 It may also be noted that in the case of Inference, though there is Abheda between the vrtti and the object, both ofthem are not present at the same time. Hence the definition of pratyaksa does not apply in the case of inference

Now again in order to avoid the difficulty of a śabdajñãna by which supersensuous objects like ones own merit and demerit coming under the scope of perception,23 a qualification in the form of yogya (fit to be perceived) is necessary to be included in the definition as an adjective to the word object (visaya) of perception concerned.24 The only way to judge which object is competent for perception and which not, is to be known only by the result of our attempt to perceive them as the Vedäntin states.25 If the word yogya is not included as an adjective in the definition of pratyaksa there arises a contingency of merit and demerit (dharma and adharma) coming under the scope of perception since

22 वर्तमानत्वं विषयविशेषणं देयम् V.P page 60 23 since qa, as, the objects are present and the vrttis also are present in the same moment. 24 योग्यत्वस्यापि विषय विशेषणत्वात् -- V.P.Page 61 25 किंचिद् योग्यं किंचिदयोग्यं इत्यत्र फलबलकल्प्यः स्वभाव एव शरणम् ibid page 62.

12 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

dharmãkäravrtyavaccinnacaitanya and dharmāvaccinnacaitanya both are non-different. In order to avoid this difficulty the Paribhāsākāra suggests that the word'yogya' should also be added. Here it may be noted that (dharma) merit is not an object which is fit for perception (yogya).26

Even then there may arise another difficulty of the pot being perceived when the sound (säbda) is heard, for in sound also there is as much of perceptibility (yogyatva) through the sense organ (ear) as in the pot which has perceptibility through the sense organ (eye). Hence it is that, the author uses the word tattadindriya yogya i.e.(perceptible with the help of that particular organ). Now, of course, there will be no difficulty in the definition of pratyaksa as, though both the objects (sabda and pot) can be perceived by the sense organ in general, both ofthem are not capable of being perceived by one and the same individual sense organ.

Now on this account it may not be urged that, as happiness (sukh), misery etc. are not capable of being perceived by the sense organ (not indriyayogya) they cannot come under the scope of perception as they legitimately should In order to avoid this difficulty the author of the commentary 'Ãsubodhiní suggests that the author of the Paribhãsã here intends to convey, in deference to the opinion of the Bhãmati school that (manas) mind should also be taken to be a sense organ. But in his commentary, M.M. Anantakrsnasästry condemns this view of Ãsubodhiníkära27 and argues that mind according to Dharmarãja, is not a sense organ and in order to avoid the above mentioned difficulty, he suggests that the word 'tattadindriya yogya' should be made to signify by the capacity ofimplication called ajahallaksanā28

26 As Dharma is something that can be known only through verbal testimony 27 From the A.K. Sästry's book page 59 last para 28 From the A.K. Sastry's book V.P. page 59; 62

PERCEPTION 13

both tattadindriyayogyatva as well as 'anavrtatva'29. It means that when happiness and misery are anävrta (unveiled) in their case also perception is rendered possible. As a result of this, it may be noted that even Iswarapratyaksa (God's perception) comes under the scope of the general definition of pratyaksa, otherwise in the opinion ofÃsubodhiníkãra, a different definition for Iśwarapratyaksa is found necessary -- for in order to generate pratyaksa in Hımself -- God has neither a sense organ nor mind

All this difficulty, Mm AK Sastry says, is avoided by accepting laksana in the word 'Tattadındnyayogya' as stated above

Again, even ifthere is non-difference of the object (with the above mentioned qualifications) with the vrtti or mental mode (vrttyavaccınnacaitanya) there is the contngency of the colour of the pot being cognised when the pot itself is intended to be cognised as the vrtt (antahkaranavrtti) is present in both the cases In order to avoid this difficulty, the Paribhãsãkãrã cleverly includes the word svãkara, as an adjectival of vrttı in the definition 30 That is to say, in perception the vrth should be of the form of the object (of the pot- form when the put is perceived, of the colour form when the colour Is perceived and so on) 31

In this way the final definition of pratyaksa in a particular aspect, as deftly concluded by Dharmarãja "the sameness of locus between the consciousness limited by the vrtti of a particular form and the consciousness limited by the object which is present and Is competent to be apprehended by the particular sense organ" 32

29 For word " अनावृतत्व " Siddhantalesa Sangraha Page 34 ed by SS Suryanarayana Sāstry Madras University. अनावृतत्वं नाम भातीति व्यवहार:। 30 स्वाकारवृत्यवच्छिन्नचैतन्य VP page 60 31 the objects are present and the vrttis also are present in the same moment 32 तत्तदिन्द्रिययोग्यवर्तमानविषयावच्छिन्नचैतन्याभिन्नत्वं तत्तदाकारवृत्त्यवच्छिन्नज्ञानस्य तत्तदंशे प्रत्यक्षत्वम्।VP74

14 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

Hereby abhinna (non-difference) between the two consciousness is not meant actual identity as may be expected, in which case the resulting perception should be of the form "I am the pot" (aham ghatah etc.) and not "I am perceiving the pot" Hence the author .of the Paribhas interprets that by non-difference here is meant 'occupying the same place' (ekadesasthatva) Indeed perception Is produced when both the consciousness limited by the internal organ and the consciousness limited by the object coexist in the same place Even according to the Logicians we know that the object and the sense organ should be in contact with each other According to the above definition, as Dharmarãja puts it, (anumiti) Inference s not brought under the scope of perception, since the internal organ does not go out through any sense organ.33 Here a question has been raised in the commentaries as to whether the Internal organ assumes the form of the object and then goes to the object or whether reaching the object, it assumes the form of the object. Obviously, the second view is acceptable to Dharmarãja as he defined vrtti as the mode of the internal organ assuming the form of the object as it can do so only on reaching it. So the word vrttinirgamana (vrtti going out) generally used in certain places is to mean going out ofinternal organ (antah karaņanirgamanah). The above definition of pratyaksa, it may be noted, is intended to define pratyaksa in general whether valid or invalid. That is why probably Dharmarãja includes the epithet 'not sublated' (abädhita) as adjec- tival to the object (visaya). That is to say 'if sublation (of the object) is cognised then the pratyaksa becomes invalid'.34

There is also another interesting point in this connection as well as in connection with all knowledge whether all parts of the antahkaraņa go out, oniy certain parts ofit. The question also arises what the antahkarana actually is? If only a part of it is subjected

33 वृत्तेः निर्गमनाभावेन 34 Vide the theory of invalid knowledge

PERCEPTION 15

to reach the object of perception, what particular constituent of internal organ does so, is to be stated There is also another point whether, as the Sänkhya admits, the cognition is the reflection of the concerned vrtt in the consciousness All these points have not been specifically raised by the Paribhäsãkära, they will have to be Inferred probably from the text wherever possible 35 The percepti- bility of the object (vısayapratyaksatva) has been defined by the author as the non-difference of the consciousness delimited by the internal organ (Prarmãtã) and the consciousness delimited by the object (visaya) 36 All the epithets used in the former definition jñãnagata pratyaksatvaprayojaka except 'unsublated' (abãdhita) are to be understood here also 37 The only difference is that non- difference (abheda) here (In the case of vısayapratyaksa) dos not signify the meaning of being in the same locus as in jñãnagata- pratyaksatvaprayojaka but signifies "Not having a reality different from the reality of the pramata".38 Here the author intends to point out that there is parsimony (läghava) in this stand taken by hım The view of the Logician in this respect is that "pratyaksatva in the object is 'being the object of perception",39 in which case if all the three vrttis, Pramtã and the Prameya are to become objects of knowledge, then there is the prolixity (gaurava) of accepting pramtrabheda to effect pratyaksavıșayatva. In order to avoid this prolixity, Dharmarãja originally suggests non-difference of the pramätr (pramätrabheda) as the cause of object of perception (vişayapratyaksa). That is why the entire definition of pratyaksa holds good even in the case of an invalid knowledge like 'This is silver' (idam rajatam) in the case of nacre (sukti) as the same type of reality

35 Vide V.P. 136 36 Here see Dasgupta's "History of Indian Philosophy" Vol-Il Page 207-208 for discussion. 37 प्रमात्रवच्छिन्न (अन्तःकरणावच्छिन्न) चैतन्यस्य विषयचैतन्यस्याभेद: V.P.Page76 38 प्रमातृसत्तातिरिक्तसत्ताकत्वशून्यत्वं 39 विषयप्रत्यक्षत्वं च प्रत्यक्षविषयत्वं।

16 VEDÂNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

does not exist between the pramãtã and the object -- one has hallucinational existence (prătibhãsikasattă) and the other has a pragmatic (vyãvahãrikasattā) existence.40

Most of these arguments appear to have sprung up from the great originality ofthe author ofthe Paribhãsã. As we observe from his arguments he was not only a "Vedäntin by creed but also a scholar in Navya Nyya. It may be noted here that the same author has also produced works in Navya Nyãya like the commentary 'Tarkacûdãmani'. Though some ofthese points have been dealt with In treatises like the Pañcapãdikãvivarana, the arguments advanced and the final views established bear vivid testimony to the great originality of Dharmarãja Though he appears to have accepted and argued the rival opinions in certain places he is mostly a follower of the vivarana school of Vedãnta.

SAVIKALPAKA AND NIRVIKALPAKA PRATYAKSA

DETERMINATE AND INDETERMINATE KNOWLEDGE

Perception is of two types -- Determinate and Indeterminate Perception.41 The Naiyãyika accepts the distinction between the Determinate and the Indeterminate perception Gangesa holds that the Nirvikalpaka is the first stage of perception where the object is not seen in its actual form and not characterised by attributes, relations etc.42 When the object is differentiated and attributed through a relation, then it is a pratyaksa of the type of savikalpaka Some thinkers like 'the Grammarians' hold that there is no indeterminate knowledge since language enters into the very texture

40 Theories of erroneous knowledge 41 This division of direct knowlege began with the Mımämsaka Vide Indian Epistemology, page 249-250 42 Tattvacıntāmani -- Savikalpakavāda

PERCEPTION 17

of all kinds of knowledge without any exception.43

Kumrila and other Mĺmämsakas refuted the above argu- ment of the grammarian and established the nirvikalpaka. They argue that at first sight there exists some primary (indeterminate) knowledge ofthe pure object like the knowledge of a child or a dumb person. The Prbhäkara maintains that the indeterminate cognition perceives both the generic and specific characters in an undistin- guished mass. To the Sämkhya indeterminate perception is a single apprehension ofthe object The Bauddhas admit only indeterminate pratyaksa as real It is to be noted that indeterminate knowledge is not recognised by monotheistic Vedänta consisting of the five schools of Vaisnavism.44

According to Gangeśa a knowledge of the indeterminate type can neither be true nor false since it does not have any practical value.45 According to Sankara Advaita Savikalpaka means the pratyaksa of an object which speaks of relation etc. In the example 'the pot is blue' the pot and the colour blue and their relatedness are clearly noted. Hence it a case of determinate knowledge. By 'Indeterminate Knowledge' is meant that cognition which is devoid of any syntactical connection. According to Dharmarãja sentences like 'That thou art 'Soyam Devadattah' etc. signify cases of indeterminate knowledge inasmuch as there is no difference between the consciousness delimited by Devadatta and that by the internal organ. Hence these are cases of perception. It may be asked how these cognitions become perceptual when they are not sense-produced, on the other hand they are to be treated as verbal cognitions (săbdajnäna) because they are generated by sentences.

43 नसोस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके यः शब्दानुगमाद्टते (Vak Pad I-123) Poona University-1965 44 Rāmānuja - Visistādvaita, Nımbārkā - Dvaitādvaita, Vallbhā-cārya - Suddhādvaita, Mādhva - Dvaita, Baladeva Vıdyābhùsana -- Vide (Methods of Knowledge' under Notes page 107 45 However there is another opinion among Logicians that it is vald - Vide Nĺlakanthabhāsya. 236-237.

18 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀSÃ

In reply to the above Dharmarãja argues that the perceptual character of a cognition does not lie in its sensuous origin, but the identification of pramãna consciousness with the consciousness of the object (prameya) which is fit to be perceived and present at that particular moment. All these conditions are evidently present in the case of 'Soyam Devadattah'.

Hence the knowledge produced by sentences such as "this Is that Devadatta" are only cases of perception. Similarly the. knowledge produced by the statements That Thou Art is perceptual in character. Here the cognising self itself is the object and hence the identification of the (mental mode) Vrtti with the object.

Still it may be questioned how statements like "That Thou Art' can be brought under perception. If the sentence does not apprehend-the meaning of the subject, the object and their relation, it cannot give the meaning. Ifit be so, then it cannot be an example of indeterminate perception. It is not essential, the author of the Vedãnta Paribhãșã replies to bring a relation between the object and the subjectin order to get the meaning ofa proposition. Ifthe context and the intention ofthe speaker are clearly known, then the meaning of the sentence is known. According to Dharmarãja, there is only an identity of essence between the subject and the object. In this sentence there is no question of relation etc. Hence it is known as 'Akhandärtha'. Akhandärtha is that meaning of a proposition which is understood without any relation among its parts. Hence the meaning of the sentence is indeterminate.48

Thus in the view of Dharmarãja an indeterminate perception is that in which there is an identification of the vrtti with the object (being perceived)- be it sense-generated or not. The idea here is that in sentences like "soyam Devadattah" (This is that Devadatta) etc., as the Tärkika holds, there is the relation of non-difference or identity, between the consciousness

46 V.P. Šikhămāni - page 90-100

PERCEPTION 19

qualified by the omniscient and the consciousness qualified by limited knowledge. Hence there is that syntactical connection of non-difference between the two consciousnesses But the Vedäntin's view is that non-difference cannot exist between the two distinctly separate entities which are qualified by different times and spaces. Even if the Tärkika objects that, in order to avoid this difficulty, we are to omit time and space parts of the meaning and establish non- difference, then the meaning of the sentence should be something like a reiteration or a restatement (anuvãda)-that is to any 'con- sciousness is consciousness'. Evidently this does not produce any new valid knowledge. Hence the Advaitin argues that sentences like "This is that Devadatta" (Soyam Devadattah) produce only a knowledge of the essence of Devadatta (Devadatta svarupamătram) and as such there is no need for a syntactical connection and hence such sentences as produce such knowledge are called 'Akhandärtha Väkyas'. Hence 'Akhandārtha' signifies as the Āsubodhinīkāra says, "Samsargãnavagãhi yathärtha jñanajanaka . The word (yathärthajñäna) correct knowledge in the above is expected to exclude a false knowledge like the king's man (rãjapurusah) where a person may falsely comprehend non-difference between the king and the purusa. The same argument holds good in the case of "Tattvamasi" also where the knower himself (the consciousness limited by the internal organ) ascertains his Brahmanhood.

The author quotes in support of the definition of his 'akhandärthatva' a verse from Citsukhãcãrya.47 Dharmarãja accepts the second definition also given by Citsukhäcärya in his verse "Tatprätipädikärthatä". The idea is that by akhndärtha is meant the meaning signified only by the Nominal Bases (Prtpadikãs) themselves. This definition has also been accepted as it is more

47 संसर्गासड्िगसम्यग्धीहेतुताया गिरामियम् उक्ताखण्डार्थता, यद्वातत््रातिपदिकार्थता Tattvapradipikā page 192, V.P P 101

20 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

simple. Here also it may be noted that only the meaning of the Prätipadika is intended to be expressed and not that of the case (Vibhakti) also.

This (meaning) of sentences like 'Soyam Devadattah' according to the Vedãntin cannot be a case ofsãbdajñãna as it may superficially appear to be, but a case of pratyaksa sınce the internal organ of the cogniser assumes the form of Devadatta and there is no difficulty in accepting non-difference between the two-cogniser consciousness and the Devadatta consciousness Hence this is only a case of perception according to the Vedntins Same is the case with sentences like 'Satyam jñãnamanantam Brahma" Prakrsta Prakäsah Chandrah etc. But all other sentences like 'I know the poť' etc. are cases of determinate knowledge where there is samsarga or syntactical connection understood

The author of the Paribhãsã raises a doubt as to why the meaning of a sentence like "Soyam Devadattah" etc. necessarily comprehends the syntactical connection and as such how it could be classified as Indeterminate knowledge where syntactical connec- ton is notknown. The author himself gives the reply thatthe meaning produced by a sentence does not necessarly depend upon the syntactical connection of the meanings signified by the words Otherwise even in the context of taking meal, the sentence Saindhavamãnaya may produce a meaning that a horse is to be brought as an uncontextual syntactical connection exists between the horse and the bringing. But, as a matter of fact, it is not the case. Hence Dharmarãja argues that it is not the syntactical connection that produces the sentence meaning but it is the import (Tătparya) that does so. In cases like 'Tattvamasi' the author states that, by the sixfold cause of Import (tätparyalingas),48 the Vedänta

48 उपक्रमोपसंहारावभ्यासो पूर्वता फलम्, अर्थवादोपपत्ती च लिङगं तात्पर्यनिर्णये॥ Vide Śikhamaņı on V.P 94 Vıde P.K. Sundaram · Advaita Epistemology, Page 35 (Notes).

PERCEPTION 21

texts have their import in Brahman and as such Brahmanhood is intended to be spoken of in such sentences and samsarga is no criterion at all in such cases. Though in sentences like 'dandena gămabhyãya' there is necessity for syntactical connection, in sentences like 'Tattvamasi' 'satyam jñãnam anantam Brahma' which are called svarupa vãkyas ( mahãvăkyas) there is no syntactical connection among the expressed meanings. Why it is so is that the implied sense (laksyrtha) only one (consciousness alone) and as such to infer the syntactical connection in such cases is contradicted. Even to agree that in such cases, between the limited consciousness and the unlimited consciousness there may be no Implication but there may be Svamibrutyabhãva etc and as such syntactical connection is possible, is not proper, for, in case he argues it is implied in the sentence meaning due to the relation of the meanings of the words (Padärthasamsarga) then the word saindhava in the sentence 'Saindhavamãnaya' in the context of a meal may also give the meaning of a horse since there is a connection. If, on the other hand, the meaning is due to purport (tătparya), it will be evident from the study of the Holy Text that the undual Brahman is the meaning of the sentence on account of the sıx lingas.

A very popular example of such sentences which have no syntactical connection is 'Prakrstapraksh candrah.' This sentence is a reply to the question of an inquirer who puts the question "who is the moon among the luminary bodies". Here the Vedäntin holds that the question is regarding the mere 'Prätipadıkärtha'. And an apt reply to it would be the prätipadikärtha. Otherwise there would be no agreement between the question and the answer As the Tärkika argues the enquiry here is about the meaning signified by the word 'moon' and hence it is not only prätipadikartha', it may also be about her unusual character (asãdhāranadharma) or atadvyvrtti. But the Vedäntin refutes is view by stating that the asädhäranadharma (the prakrstaprakãsa) is known to be present in the moon by

22 VEDANTAPARIBHĀSĀ

pratyaksa. Nor is atadvyãvrtti the meaning of the enquiry because there is the definite knowledge that the moon is different from the non-moon. It may not also be that the sentence signifies 'moon' Is the object expressed by the word moon since there is already the knowledge that moon is the object denoted by the word 'moon' So the Advaitin 'concludes that the doubt of the inquirer is only about where moonhood is located. In support of the statement the Advaitin quotes statements like "I know the moon is the object signified by the word moon" but I do not know its svarupa 49 Nyãya, MÎmãmsa and Sämkhya holds that all the sense organs are prapyakrins They all apprehend object only in contact, such sense organs are known as präpyakärins. But the Vedäntins are of the opinion that the five external senses, the olfactory organ, the gustatory organ and the tactual organ comprehend their objects standing in their owr place However the eye and the auditory sense organs go out to their object and apprehend it.

Dharmarãja differs from the logicians regarding the nature of the sense organ ear. The logicians hold that sound reaches the ear whereas the Advaitins hold that the auditory organ itself goes to the object 50 Dharmarja argues that as the ear is an object of limited dimension like the eye, it proceeds to the spot ofthe sound- production kettledrum etc.51 In Support of this he advances the argument that a common man has such experience as 'I have heard the sound of the kettle drum'. Here Dharmarãja appears to differ from the Naiyãyika who argues that the ear is only of the form of ether. This author's view is that the ear is a particular kind of object limited in its size and produced from ether, ãkäsa. Even the sruti declares that the auditory sense-organ is produced from the ākāsatanmātra.

49 For further details about the argument vide Silkhämani page 98 onwards. 50 Vide V.P. Page 180-181. 51 According to some Naiyāyikas, it is only a misapprehension

PERCEPTION 23

Dharmarãjãdhwarindra further argues that the stand of rival thinkers that sound produced is carried to the ear either on the line of a series of waves or in the manner of the production of the kadamba buds is untenable because there is a large amount of prolixity in assuming the production of numerous sounds produced from one another Itis also argued that there is another prolixity in their stand- experiences like "I have heard the kettle drum sound' etc are to be designated invalid pratyaksa. He, however, appears to have adopted the view of the Mimämsakas of the Bhätta School who speak of samyoga, samyukta tadātmya, samavãya is replaced by tadatmya or identity.52 THEORIES OF ERRONEOUS (INVALID) KNOWLEDGE

Towards the close of the chapter on Pratyaksa Dharmarãja finds an occasion to discuss the theory of error from the Advaita standpoint. According to the different schools different theories have been expounded to explain rationally how erroneous knowledge is engendered. According to a traditional verse five such theories have been listed down though there are a few more allied theories in addition. They are the (1) Átmakhyäti theory of the Vijñnavädin (Idealistic Buddhistic school of thought), Asatkhyäti of the Mädhyamika school of Buddhists, the Akhyati theory of Prabhkara Mimãmsaka and the Anyathäkhyäti theory of the Naiyayika and

52 Vide Mänameyodaya, page 14-15 ed. by K.K. Raja

24 VEDÂNTAPARIBHÂSĀ

Anirvacaniyakhyäti of the Sankara Advaitin.53 The Visistadvaitin accepts Satkhyãti.54 Vãcaspati Misra also accepts asatkhyāti with some difference where he speaks of a false apprehension of relation between the sukti and the rajata. Detailed explanations of these theories, inferences in their favour and definitions of error are found in treatises of the particular schools.

The author of the Paribhãsã does not make a mention of many of these theories of error, for the target of his attack is mostly the anyathã-khyäti theory of the Naiyãyıka school While assessing the contribution of the author of the Vedãnta Paribhãsã it is enough for our purpose to confine ourselves to the theory ofanivacaniyakhyāti as supported by our author and the lines on which the Naiyãyika theory has been rejected.

According to the Sankara Advaitin the theory of error in short is as follows - In the case of an erroneous cognition like 'this is silver' (idam rajatam) with reference to nacre, the silver that is apprehended Is actually produced (utpanna) but it is defined as anirvacaniya and it is this indefinable silver that is apprehended in the erroneous cognition. It cannot be maintained that this silver produced is real (sat) inasmuch as it is later known as a case of invalid knowledge when we finally come to know that the silver is sublated It can neither be unreal, in which case the silver should not have been experienced at all nor sublated later on. A non-existing silver can

53 आत्मख्यातिरसत्ख्याति रख्यातिः ख्यातिरन्यथा। तथानिर्वचनीयख्याति इत्येतत्ख्याति पंचकम्॥ योगाचारा माध्यमिका मीमांसकापि नैयायिका मायिनश्च पंचख्याती: क्रमाज्जगुः। आत्मनः ख्यातिःबुद्धे: ख्याति र्विषयरूपेण भानम्। असतः (असद् रजतादेःख्याति:) अख्याति: प्रतोत्यभाव: अन्यथा ख्यातिः अन्यथास्थितस्य अन्यथा प्रतीतिः अनिर्वचनीय ख्यातिःसत्वासत्वादि भेदेन अनिर्त्रचनीयस्य रजतादेः भानम्। 54 सत एव वस्तुनः ख्यातिः।

PERCEPTION 25

neither be apprehended nor sublated later. Thus the advaitin calls this the theory of anirvacanıyakhyati 55 Though this mainly corre- sponds with the definition given by Sankara in his adhyãsabhãsya 'atasminstadbuddhih' there are some fundamental differences in thought

The author while discussing the difference between sımple pratyaksa and valıd perception he says 'not being sublated (abãdhıttva) should be made a qualification (visesana)56, ofthe object cognised Because ofthis adjective there is no overlapping of the definition on an erroneous percepticn which is sublated (bãdhita) later It is accepted on all hands that error is arrived at as inferred from an unsuccessful attempt When one thinks of nacre as sılver (rajata) and this (erroneous) silver is not capable of a successful attempt e g to purchase something or the like the knowledge is called 'bhrãntı or bhrama' The logician argues here that there is no need to accept that in such an erroneous knowledge silver is produced More concisely it may be accepted that the silver already known to exist in the shop serves the purpose (to produce an incorrect knowledge) But the Vedãntin replies that the silver in a different place (desäntariya) cannot be perceived here because it is not in contact with the eye But if the logician is to somehow create a separate supra-normal contact of the form of jñãnalaksanã and somehow explain that the knowledge can be brought under pratyaksa, the Vedäntin rejons that, in such a case, even when the knowledge of smoke is there, fire also can be said to have been

55 The view of the Naiyayika in this respect is that the sukti comes into contact with the sense organ possessed of a defect and makes us apprehended the silver that is present elsewhere in the shop etc His inference in this regard canbesummansed thus विमतं शुक्तिशकलं रजतज्ञानविषयः। रजतोपाये सति, रजतार्थि प्रवृत्ति विषयत्वात्। In other words he accepts that a knowledge which cognised 'that' in the substratum of the absence of 'that' Is what is called 'error' तदभाववति तूप्रकारकं ज्ञानम्। 56 योग्यवर्तमानाबाधितविषयचैतन्याभिन्नत्वम् प्रमाणचैतन्यम्।

26 VEDÂNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

perceived (pratyaksa) since the knowledge of fire may serve the purpose of a super normal contact. This position cannot be admitted even by the Tärkika as the entire world of inference will be set at naught by this argument.57 Now the other question raised by the author is as to how the silver is produced, when the silver molecules are not present at all. The reply of the advaitin is that the causes of production in such cases are different from those ofthe world of ordinary objects. The same is explained in detail as under. The defective sense organ comes into contact with the object in front and due to diseases like kãca etc. a mental mode of the form of glittering (cãkacakya) is produced.58 And in this mental mode the caitanya as defined by 'this part' (idam) is reflected in that. As a result of this reflection, in persuance of his own theory as enunciated in the pratyaksapariccheda, there is identity (abheda) attained between the consciousness delimited by 'this' part, the consciousness ofthe pramãtr and the consciousness delimited by the vrtti and as such the object silver is experienced. What happens here is, the avidyã which has nacrehood as its feature in the presence of some defect aided by the impression of the silver stimulated by a knowledge of similarity of glittering takes the form of silver (parinamati). This is the view of the author of the pañcapadikã-vivarana followed by our author. The author of the kalpataru, however, is ofthe view that the avidyã itselfis capable of producing silver even without silver proper. Even without an evolving material cause, avidyã is all-powerful and capable of producing (false) silver in the form of a dosa.59

57 For details of jnänalaksanapratyāsātti vıde Nyāyasiddhānta Muktāvali, page.207 The idea is that if the knowledge of fire (recollection of fire) is produced from the contact between the sense organ and the object perceived there is possibility to percaive the fire instead of inferring. 58 Timira disease of the eye causes cåkacakya according to Åyurveda 59 Vide Mm. A.K. Sästry's com. on V.P. Pag 110, line 4 onwards 'Aghatitaghatanāpetiyasi avidyā.

PERCEPTION 27

According to the Vivarana it is the substratum ofjñäna which is the material cause for the superimposition.60 Hence the tulāvidyā subsisting in the pramätrcaitanya is said to exist in the visayacaitanya so thatit may serve as an upãdăna for the superimposition (vivarta). On this subject also our author follows the Vivarana school.61

The author's opinion here is that Tulavidya is the actual upãdãnakãrana, Mulãvidya as a dosa is the auxiliary cause, kãca etc. also contribute to the auxiliary cause (Nimitta). In the case of rajjusarpa also it has to be agreed that Tulãvidyã is the upãdãnakãrana ofthe parinãma of rope (rajju) into snake (sarpa) and since both the material cause (upãdãnakãrana) and the kãrya, Serpent are at the same level, pragmatic level, it is a case of parinãma. In case Mulãvidyã is considered to be the cause of this rajjusarpabhrãnti since pure consciousness which is at the päramärthika level is involved in the change, it should be a case of vivarta (as the Caitanya as such has no real evolution). Here it may be noted, thatthe erroneous silver is a case of parinãma with respect to avidyã because both of themi e. silver and sarpa are objects at the non-päramärthika level but the same rajata with reference to caitanya is to be called vivarta. Both of them i.e. caitanya and rajata are at different levels Caitanya is an object at the päramärthika level but sılver is one at the non-pramärthika level. Here the author defines for our clarification parinãma and vivarta separately.62 Here according to the Àsubodhinikãra, the author

60 For a detailed discussion as to which is the substratum of the dream substance vide Mm A.K. Sästry's Comm 124 page 61 Vide Mm. A.K Sästry's com on V.P page110 onwards 110-124 62 विवर्तो नामोपादानविषमसत्ताककार्य्यापत्तिः। VP.page 141.

28 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

appears to have divided the objects63 of the world only into two levels At the Pãramärthika level, there is only one consciousness and in the non-paramarthika level are included all objects of the world including hallucinational objects (Prãtibhãsikapadãrthas). With reference to parinãma and vivartha the author has spoken of only these two levels. Thus making no distinction between the vyãvahärika level objects and hallucinational level objects (though they have been separately treated of elsewhere by him in this work) the author accepts only two levels for the purpose of these definitions The author argues that the silver, a parinãma of avidyã subsists in the 'idamavacchinnacaitanya' consciousness defined by 'this 'part' which is the seat of avidyã. According to the Vedãntin, all objects of this world exist in the substratum of the avidyã which is their material cause, upādãna. Sankara defines adhyāsa as smrtirūpah paratrapūrvadrstävabhäsah.64 This is the same as the other defini- tion given by Sankara. As the Bhamatikara explains it, the word smrtirpa has been used to denote the distinct object which is at a different level of reality and the word 'paratra' has been used in order to denote the reality of the substratum 'sukti' etc. The statement of the Pancapädikã is that the word 'paratra' in the definition has been used in order to exclude false knowledge without a substratum and the word 'smrtirupa' in order to avoid overlapping on smrti and the word Pûrvadrsta is for the sake of clarification.65

Now the author raises another question as to how the silver which is present in the consciousness is identified with the object in front by the statement 'this is silver'. Without giving a direct reply

63 Āśubodhıni - P.80-81 Mm. A K.Śastry accepts the view of the Āsubodhinikāra when sūktirajata etc. are consıdered Mulavidyākāryas and nottulāvıdyā kāryas but in the other alternative, tulăvidyākāryatvapaksa, he thinks this view is not tenable Vide Mm.A.K. Sāstry's Comm. P.111 64 A. Sankarabhāsya pages 16-17. Bhāmatı under adhyāsabhāsya 65 See note on this by Mm. A.K. Sastry in his comm. of V.P page 112.

PERCEPTION 29

the author cites how a similar stand has been taken by the Naiyãyika to explain pleasure, pain etc. existing in the soul as existing in the body.66 It is on similar lines that he explains his theory also.67

The idea here is that simple consciousness is not the substratum of the silver since it is all pervasive but it is the idamavacchinna caitanya and thus the meaning of 'this' (the object in the front) is the delimiting factor and hence hallucinational silver comes into the contact of identity with the object in front and this consciousness of the object (Visayacaitanya) is identical with the consciousness delimited by the internal organ which has the mental mode of the form of this caitanya (idamakāra Vrttimadantah karanopahita) and silver is imposed on the säksin and thus it is cognisable by the saksin alone. Otherwise the apperception (anuvyavasãya) of the type 'I perceive silver' where the experience of the relation to the säksin, will not be rendered possible. That is to say this hallucinational silver is experienced only by the säksin but not by the sense organ etc. like pleasure and pain.68

Now another doubt arises as to why then the hallucinational silver is not experienced on the lines of pleasure, pain etc., where, there is the experience 'I am the enjoyer', 'I am happy'. Similarly why is it that a knowledge like 'I am silver, I have silver' is not produced.69 Here though pleasure, pain etc. are experienced directly by the säksin itself not through any other agent, in the case ofunreal silver (Mithyärajata), however, the silver is secured with the help ofthe sense organ an agent coming into contact with the object in front. Hence the object of invalid knowledge cannot be known

66 शरीरस्थसुसाद्यधिकरणतावच्छेदकत्वात्। 67 तथा चैतन्यमात्रस्य रजतं प्रत्यनधिष्ठानतया VideVP page 142. 68 अन्तः करणोपहितचैतन्यं साक्षी। 69 This is the view of Bhāsyakāra. Vide Šaņkarabhāsya page 34 Pańcapādikā Vivarana page 174 An account of how '1 have silver' (aham rajatavān) ıs possible to be accepted by the Åsubodhinikära and how it has been contradicted, vide Mm.A.K.Sastry's comm V.P. page 115, paras 4&5

30 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

only to the säksin (kevalasäksivedya). To this the reply is that as the author points out that the two cases are different; for, pleasure, pain etc. are the products of avidya existing in pure consciousness but not that in the consciousness delimited by the internal organ. In the case of nacre-silver, however, the nacre-silver is of the form of silver as superimposed on the nacre-consciousness. It is this that makes all the difference. The author gives the regulatory rule in this regard.70 He posits that a particular object which is the product of avidyã aided by an impression (samskăra) derived froma particular type of experience begets a knowledge of the object of the same form. That is to say that, when we see a pot there is the avidyã aided by the impression of the pot (ghatasamskāra) and so a knowledge of ghata is produced, not that of a pata. Since the Vedãntin accepts innumerable types of impressions (samskãras) in this beginningless samsära-there is no difficulty for him in maintaining that the avidyã aided by that samskāra begets a knowledge of the same pot, why a knowledge of 'pata' is not produced is due to an auxiliary cause which may be taken as unseen merit (adrsta visesa).

It is on these lines that the author accounts for different types of experience 'this is the body' I am the body etc.71 The author finally closes the argument by stating that, in the case of real silver there is no experience of the type 'I am silver'. So also in the case of a false knowledge there is no experience of the type 'I am silver' (aham rajatam). When there is the possibility of avidya evolving into the form ofsilver in the idamākåravrttyupahita antahkarana72 and identity can be established with the säksin directly, how is it that the rajatākāra

70 किंतु यस्य यदाकारानु - भवाहितसंस्कारसहकृताविद्याकार्थ्यत्वं तस्य Vide VP page 148. 71 इदं शरीरम् अहदेहः Vide V.P. 148 72 According to the Bhämati, avidyā is not the material cause but only a helping cause by being a fault (dosa). Mm.A.K. Sästry refutes this argument on the ground that dosa is of the form of gunasadrsya

PERCEPTION 31

vrtti of avidya is said to be involved in the mode of the form of silver. That is to say when it is possible to state that a vidya evolves in the form of silver in the internal organ itself why should the mode of avidyã be accepted separately. To this the Vedantin replies that as a rule in every immediate (aparoksa) knowledge, it is essential to hold that there is the absence of difference in the realities in the consciousness having the mental mode of the form of the object as its adjunct. Hence, without the mode of avidyã (avidyãvrtti) the unreal rajata cannot be directly perceived. The other issue here is that the mental mode ofthe internal organ in the form of this has for its object the object in front and the mode of avidya in the form of silver (rajatãkãra avidyã vrttı) has for its object, silver as the object in the object in front and hence two different pieces of knowledge are produced, and there is no knowledge of their identity as in the case of the Prabhäkara school and so the Vedãntin cannot speak of the unreal knowledge (bhramajñãna) like the Prabhãkara 73 To this the author replies that surely the false knowledge is rendered possible because in both the Vrttis the Caitanya which gets reflected is one and hence the identity is noticed by the individual between the real and the false.

Another question that has been raised is that when the silver in the shop etc. are themselves products of avidyã and superim- posed and suktrajata is one such where is the difference between the two 74 The resourceful author of the Paribhãsã readily cites the Naiyãyika view that though some substances are satya (true) some of them are stated to be eternal and some of them momentary (ksanika),75 as such whatever explanation you mention in this

73 For Prabhakara there is no erroneous knowledge Anubhavaha Pramãnam 74 This questiôn arises only on the alternative that the nacresilver is an effect of the subsidiary avidyå In the case that it s an effect of the primal avidyã, however, vyāvahärikatva is duel to the effect of avidyåand hallucination is due to the effect of subsıdıary avidyā. 75 e.g. knowledge which is a characteristic of ätman should be eternal

32 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

respect' --- let it be of the nature of adrsta --- or something else' applies in this case also.

But the author is not satisfied with this reply making nature .as a criterion in this respect. He wants to explain it in a more rational way. He argues that in the case of superimposition of a pot, avidyã as a dosa is the cause. In superimposition of nacre-silver, however disease etc. are also considered additional dosas. In this case it is an adventitious defect that is responsible for the unreality of the object. That is why also our author accepts, as a Vedäntin, that the objects in the dream state are also unreal in as much as they are produced with the help of adventitious defects in the form ofsleep etc.

By dream state is meant a state in which there is an internalorgan-mode of the immediate type which has for its objects, objects which are not perceived,76 by the senses. Here the word not generated from the senses is included in order to exclude the waking state. The word internal organ has been included in the definition in order to avoid 'deep sleep' state when there is only the mode of avidyã present but not the mode of the internal organ.77

Next our author turns his attention to the objects of dream state and discusses whether they are objects actually produced or are only objects recollected. The objector is of the view that it is enough that the objects of dream state are recollected from previous experience and it is too prolix to accept production of objects in the dream. The author does not accept this on the ground of experience 'I am seeing the chariot in (the dream state) and after waking up 'I saw the chariot in the dream'. Such experience is stultified in case the objector's stand is taken. On the other hand there is also the

76 इन्द्रियाजन्यविषयगोचरापरोक्षान्तः करणवृत्त्यवस्था स्वप्नावस्था, Vide V.P.page .. 394 77 For definitions of "Waking State" and 'deep sleep' vide V.P. page . 395

PERCEPTION 33

contradiction of the srutivakya where it is stated that in the dream state objects are created.78 Hence our author concludes through experience and verbal testimony that the dream objects like nacre silver (śuktirajata) are unreal (hallucinational). As to the question how the dream-objects like the nacre-silver exist only as long as they are experienced, it may be noted that in case such objects are considered effects of primary avidyã (nescience) then halluci- nation is produced from avidyã aided by some adventitious defect Thus on this alternative, both of them (the Avidya as well as the defect) are required to produce prãtibhãsikatva. In the other alternative that by hallucination is meant stultification by something other than the knowledge of Brahman (brahmajñãnetarabädhyatva) or stultification of Vyãvahãrikajñna, it must be admitted that hallucination is an effect ofthe subsidiary avidyã. Thus adventitious defect, it has to be admitted, does not cover all instances of prãtibhãsikatva. e.g. pleasure pain etc. which are illusory cannot necessarily be stated to be due to an adventitious defect. Hence it is that the dream objects do not exist after their experience. Here also our author follows the school of Vivarana 79

Now again the question arises whether just like the chariots in the dream state the place also in which these chariots are kept in the dream state should also be considered to have been produced as a separate hallucinational substance since the space in the dream state is not in contact with the eye. In such a case where should the superimposition of the dream-space be made? This is a pertinent question. To this our author has a ready reply that consciousness which is self-luminous is the substratum of either the chariot or the space, since both of them are experienced as existent (sat). Not only that, even the chariot etc. being perceived

78 अथ रथान् रथयोगान् पथः सृजते -Br.UP IV-iii-10 Vide V P page 161 79 Vide V.P. 156-157 Vide Pańcapădikāvivarana page 180

34 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀȘĀ

by the eye is also a hallucination, it has to be admitted, since all sense organs do not act at that time. The author also counteracts the argument that there is the possibility of the dreamer experiencing the state 'I am an elephant' etc. on the same grounds as stated earlier.80 These points have been raised in the Vivarana and our author has followed those arguments not only in regard to dream objects but also in the case of hallucinational objects.81 The author also gives the two views on the subject that dream-objects are evolutes of cosmic nescience (Mãyã) directly and that they are Mãyã evolutes through the agency of the internal organ.

Here the author raises a further question why the dream objects do not persist even after waking up since these objects have been superimposed on pure Caitanya and even after waking up there is no suddha caitanyasãksätkära for the person.82 (This is so because the hallucinational silver which is the product of avidyã superimposed on nacre-consciousness, is destroyed by the percep- tion of the real nacre).

To this the author gives a fitting reply based on the way in which the products are destroyed.83 One way is destruction along with the material cause which is called 'bädha' (nullification) but the other is the destruction caused even when the material cause is present (Nivrtti). In our experience we see both the types. The former type of destruction is caused by the säksätkära of the reality of the substratum. This is so because avidya from which the particular product is derived cannot be removed without the help of the realisation of the supreme. That is why the entire world is stultified (bädhita) only when avidyå is removed. This is the case with bädha. In the case ofcessation (Nivrtti) however, the destruction is caused

80 Vide (Aham etc.) 81 VideV.P Spage 48and S.L.S. page 451-466 Jivănanda Vidyāsāgar edition, Calcutta 82 This is possible only at the time of release. 83 बाघःअन्यार्थिनो अन्यत्रप्रवृत्ति निरोधः Vide Vivarana page 176 and also page 178 for Nivrtti.

PERCEPTION 35

either by production of a different mode of internal organ (antahkaranavrtti) or by the removal of the defect. Hence in the present case the dream state objects may not have the bãdha type of destruction because there is no Brahmasãksätkära But there Is no difficulty whatever in maintaining that there is the cessation (nivrtti) type of destruction because of a different vrtti in the mind or because of the defect in the form of sleep etc being removed The author explains the same in detail how in nacre-silver itis a case of bãdha if suktirajata be considered to be a product ofthe subsidiary avidya84 present in the nacre consciousness. But when primary avidyã is considered to be the cause of erroneous knowledge since primary avidyã cannot be removed except by Brahmasãksātkāra, there is only the cessational type of destruction where the reality of nacre is known on the lines of a pot getting destroyed by the blow of a club

Now another doubt rises The silver (rajata) experienced in nacre (sukti) is considered to be a reality at the hallucinational level suppose the state of false knowledge is over and the perceiver has the knowledge 'this is not silver' which is the accepted experience of all 85 The absence of Identity of silver (rajatatãdãtmyãbhãva) experienced at the state cannot be said to pertain to the three tenses past, present and future -- as it should, because according to the advaitin it was silver that was expenenced though at the hallucinational level for sometime But there should be a knowledge ofthe type 'this not silver now. Hence the question arises how the knowledge 'this is not silver' is produced'. To this the author has his own reply. The author views this abhãva in the case of 'nedam rajatam' as a mutual non-existence86 and not an

84 Subsidiary avıdyā! which gets destroyed in the empirical world (b) Primary avidyå! which does not get destroyed in the empirical world 85 रजततादात्म्याभावप्रतीतिःशुक्तिकायां दृश्यते। 86 तादात्म्यसंबन्धावच्छित्प्रतियोगिताकाभाव।

36 VEDÂNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

absolute non-existence87 and as such it can comprehend all the three times. The author's idea is that the tadtmyãbhãva concerned here is not niravacchinna.88 Here the property of conventional reality (Laukıka pāramārthikatva dharma) cannot determine the counterpositive (pratiyogin) since it is not present in the pratiyogin. It is a vyadhikaranadharma.89 How could then it be possible that a dharma of this type could be present in the pratiyogin Though Saundada accepts vyadhikaranadharmãvaccinna pratiyogitãkãbhãva, the other Naiyãyikas do not accept this type of abhãva But our author saves the situation by accepting such an abhãva 90

Now there is another question to be solved here. We know it has been stated that the absence of the hallucinational sılver (prãtibhsika rajatăbhãva) has for its counterpositve the convention- ally real silver (laukika pāramārthika rajata). The objector is likely to put a question here whether the reality of the silver (pãramärthika) is one known or not known. In case it is stated not to be known, since the counterpositive is not known, the absence of silver (in the case of the statement "this is not silver") cannot be considered to be perception (pratyaksajñäna). On the other alternative in case the reality (påramärthikatva) is stated to be known, since perception invariably requires the presence of the object at the time of perception, the Advaitin will be obliged to accept that an indefinable reality (päramärthikatva) also is produced in that silver just as an indefinable silver was said to (have been) produced previously and

87 The author treats the 'abhāva' as traikālika tādātmyābhāva 88 किंतु लैकिकपारमार्थिकत्वार्थिकत्वावच्छिन्न etc Vide VP.page 177 89 For a explanation of Vyadhikaranadharmāvacchınna bhāva, Vide V.P ed. by Rämakrsna Mission page 63 F Notes. 90 According to ancient Vedäntins this is the position But according to the modemns among the Vedäntins, there is no need to accept such an abhäva Inasmuch as it could be asserted that there is a comprehensive common concpt of rajatatva which is present both in the hallucinational silver and the vyävahärika level silver. According to ancients, however the relation of identity (tadätmya) has to be accepted between the hallucinational silver and the vyāvahārika one. Vide Mm. A.K. Sästry's Comm. on V.P.page 131.

PERCEPTION 37

when such a reality (päramärthikatva) is present therein where is the scope for a pãramärthikarajatābhäva which pertains to all the three times (in a statement like 'this is not silver').

The author ofthe Paribhäsa accepts the second alternative that the reality of the hallucinational (pratibhasika) silver is only cognised but it is not produced. To the question raised by the objector he replies that the reality of the hallucinational silver is rendered possible since reality is present in the nacre (sukti) which is the substratum Thus in the nacre which is the substratum of the hallucinational silver just as 'thisness' is presented in that silver so also the laukika pãramãrthikatva also can be accepted to be present. Hence the reality (päramärthikatva) is not produced in invalid knowledge Now the Vedäntin is caught in a trap If, in such cases something not produced is capable of being seen he has unwillingly accepted the anyathäkhyati theory of the naiyayikas Hence there is no point in the Vedäntin accepting indefinable (anirvacanlya) production of the things in certain cases only; instead he could accept anyathäkhyäti theory in general. To this also the author has an apt reply to give.91 He argues that, in the case ofthose objects superimposed which are not in proximity, there only hallucinational production of things (prātibhāśika vastutpathi) is accepted, not in other cases. That is why in the case of a crystal when the red (japākusuma) hibiscus is in proximity, redness Is perceived by the sense organ. The Vedäntin does not accept the production of the indefinable redness. If, however, the objector argues, he is ready to accept that the redness is produced when the japäkusuma is near the crystal but covered by something else.

The author of the Vedānta Paribhāșā Dharmarāja follows closely on the lines ofthought presented in the Vivarana school while

91 Vide VP page 172-174 Also vide mm .A.K. Sastry's com on V.P. page131-135

38 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

dealing with the indefinable khyāti (anirvacaniyakhyāti).92 He criticises the Naiyãyika point of view mostly whereas the Vivarana deals with the refutation of several khyäti theories of some other schools also. Our author does not refer to any other khyat theory and criticise it but simply states the Vedäntin point of Anırvacaniyakhyāti, raises the possible objections and tries to vindicate the Vedãntin's point ofview. He accepts impression aided by similarıty by which the avidyã in the nacre transforms itself by vivarta into silver and the avidyã pertaining to the mode also aided by the impression of the vrtti which cognises the silver, transforms itself by vivarta into the form of the vrtt. So the author of the Vivarana clearly speaks oftwo vivartas, the vivarta of silver and the vivarta of the vrtti both of which are reflected in the saksicaitanya which is their substratum, Now since there are two vrttis, the vrtti of the internal organ and the vrtti ofthe avidyã two knowledges pieces, they get moulded into one because the 'this part' and 'silver part' are mutually interrelated and since the result also is one, we designate the 'bhrama' knowledge as one. On all these points Dharmarãja is Indebted to the Vivaraņakāra.

92 For details regarding how 'bhrama' is produced vide Vivaranaprameyasangraha' page 42, and 51 of V.P.S line 13 onwards.

39

INFERENCE OR ANUMĀNA

All schools of Philosophy except that of the carvãka accept that'Inference' (Anumäna) is a means of arriving at truth not directly but through a previous knowledge of concomitance (vyäpti) between the major term (sädhya) and the middle term (sädhana) Hence unlike perception, Inference yields mediate knowledge.

According to the Vaisesika, Inference is the knowledge that is produced from the perception of the mark (linga or hetu) which is uniformly connected with something else. The Buddhist speaks of inference from the stand point of causality or the principle of identity (tadutpatti and tădätmya). The sämkhya, the Mimãmsakã and the Vedäntin define Inference as 'the knowledge of one term of a relation which is not seen (while the other termis seen and known) as invariably connected with the first term'. The Naiyayika defines Anumãna as the means of the knowledge of the mark (linga) and that of its universal relation (vyapti) with the inferred object.1 According to the Advaitin Inference (anumãna) is the special cause of Inferential cognition.2 Inferential knowledge is generated by the knowledge of pervasion as knowledge of pervasion (not as another). In order to exclude overpervasion on apperception or reflective cognition (Anuvyayasãya) vyāptijñãna is to be construed as Vyāptijñăna only.3 Vyäpti is the co-existence of the probandum with the probans (hetu). The Advaitin defines Vyãpti as the co-existence of the major term with the middle termin all the loci in which the middle term may exist.4 This definition of Dharmarãja applies in the case of Valid Vyäpti. For example when we infer fire from smoke, smoke,

1 Vide The Nyaya Theory of Knowledge page 253 by S C Chatterjee 2 अनुमितिकरणमनुमानम् . V.P page 183 3 व्याप्तिज्ञा नत्वेन व्याप्तिज्ञानजन्या .... VP 186. 4 व्याप्तिश्च अशेषसाधनाश्रयाश्रितसाध्यसामानाधिकरण्यम् page 200Vide D M Datta's work six ways of knowing for details of def on Vyäpti, and V.P 198.

40 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀSÀ

the mark is co-existent with fire, the sadhya, which is found in all . the loci of smoke because we invariably find fire wherever there is smoke This definition does not apply in the case of an invalid Vyãpti. In the reverse of the above case if we wish to infer smoke from fire we find that fire, the mark is not coexistent with the sädhya smoke in all the loci of fire (the mark) e.g. in a hot Iron ball where fire only is present but not smoke. Thus Dharmarãjädhvarindra's definition holds good in the case of correct Vyapti but does not apply in the case of incorrect Vyãpti. It is also to be observed that this definition of Dharmarãjãdhvarindra applies in the case of all positive concomi- tance.

The author clearly states in his work his rejection of the theory of the Logician that there are three types of marks (lingas) kevalaãnvayın, kevalavyatirekın and Anvayavyatirekin.5 He believes that there is only one affirmative mark (anvayilinga). The reason why he rejects the exclusively affirmative type of linga is, as he himself states, that in the Advaita point ofview all propertes (Dharmas) are the counterpositives of the Absolute Negations (Atyantbhãva) existing in B ahman. There is no other property (dharma) which is not one such. Thus even jñeyatva, prameyatva etc. which are considered to be as pervasıve as Brahman ın the Naıyãyıka point of view, are not considered to be such by the Vedäntın. Brahman is All pervasive and the only entity that exists in the real sense of the word. Hence one cannot speak of the Kevalănvayilinga

Dharmaraja refutes the Inference based on Kevalãvyatirekilinga also because it is not capable of establishing a positive type of concomitance between the two objects i.e. the mark and the Inferred object, e.g. even if the negative type of concomitance between the absence of fire (sãdhyãbhãva) and the

5 From a different point of view there are three inferences also Purvavat, Sesavat and Sämänyatodrsta The Advaitin does not speak of these three at all. Vide D.M. Datta215, 216 Six ways of knowing.

INFERENCE OR ANUMĀNA 41

absence of smoke (sādhanābhäva) is known by the negative concomitance®, the presence of fire when the smoke is present is not possible to be cognised from the above. This cognition, can, however, be arrived at through the means of presumption (arthäpatti) according to the Advaitin.7 This is the Advaitin's point of view with regard to the Kevalvyatirekin on the lines of the Mimamsakas. Rämakrsna8 believes that arguments like "suktirupyam mithyã; dršyatvāt; yannivam tannivam Brahmavat", given in the original texts on Vedãnta in certain places, accept vyatirekyānumāna also as a pramãna accepted by the Advaitin. How Anumäna is generated according to the logician is this "A knowledge of concomitance (of the linga with the sädhya) is the efficient cause (karana) of Inferential knowledge." This knowledge of concomitance produces in its turn a recollection of vyãpti which is considered as the vyãpära or activity and the resultantis Inferential knowledge. Dharmaräja for the first time, refutes this theory from the stand point of the pancapădika that it is not necessary to consider recollection of vypti (vyäptismrti) as the activity of vyäptijñäna. It is enough if we accept impression of vyäpti (vyäptisamskära) alone as the activity concerned. It cannot, however, be urged that since vyäptisamskära is always present in the individual inference should always exist, for, its udbodha is stated to be essential for Inferential knowledge. Thus vyptisamskärodbodha is enough to be accepted for the generation of Inference. This appears to be a very deft argument advanced by Dharmaräja in the case of Inference.

6. It may be noted here that in the Negative type of Inference the vyäpti is to be stated like this -यत्र साध्याभावः तत्रहेत्वभावः Whereas in the positive type it runs as यत्र हेतुस्तत्र साध्यम्। 7 Forcounterarguments regarding this see Sikhāmani Comm. on V.P.page 206 8 Mulagranthesu Sukti' etc. page 210 9 Vide Pancapādikā page 53

42 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

Now again he argues that a doubt may arise as to whether. the vyäptisamskra is the cause of Inference when the recollection of Vyãpti (vyãptismrti) exists in the individual.10 Even in such a case vyãptisamskãra alone produces inferential knowledge. He does not accept the view of some logicians that smrti destroys samskãra inasmuch as we see cases ofrecollection (smrti) in a series (dhãra). As stated earlier samskãrodbhodha is an auxiliary cause (sahakãrin)

Dharmarãja agrees, on the lines of the Mimãmsaka view, with on the point that paksadharmatajñãna and vyptisamskärodbodha are capable of producing inferential knowl- edge. Hence it is not necessary either to admit vyãptismarana as stated earlier or even to accept trtiyalingaparãmarsa.11 Where there is a qualified knowledge since it is cumbersome on the one hand and there is no accepted pramãna for it on the other. The idea is that when it is possible to argue that inferential knowledge is produced from vyãptijñãna, tatsamskãra tadudbodha and paksadharmata, vyãptismarana which is only subsequent to vyãptisamskära will be a prolixity in case itis accepted as producing inferential knowledge. The prolixity in accepting Visistavaisistyāvaghi jñāna as a cause ofinference is quite clear.12

Now the author of the Paribhăsã raises another originai issue and states that in inferences like 'there is fire because of smoke, vyptijñãna is an efficient cause (karaa) only in the cognition ofthe fire part but not in the mountain part ofthe knowledge. He also argues that there is no difficulty even if anumtitva as a jāti, is not rendered possible because the mountain part ofthe knowledge

10 Vide Sikhāmaņı page 198-200 11 वह्नव्याप्य धूमवानयं पर्वतः etc.aleo vide Sastra Dipika page 170 onwards 12 But the Vedäntin has to account for the absence of inferential knowledge in the case of two separate pieces of knowledge like धूमो वह्नव्याप्य:and धूमो पर्वतः आलोकवान्, where there is no Visesanavisistyajfnais possible. Vide Siddhănta Muktāvați p.214

INFERENCE OR ANUMÃNA 43

is pratyaksa and the fire part is inference and as such the same knowledge has two dharmas pratyaksatva and anumititva and the knowledge as such, cannot have the category jäti, for, the Vedäntin does not believe in the existence of jäti or upädhi which cannot be established by any means of knowledge.13 As to the way in which vyãpti is to be cognised,. Dharmarāja states that the cognition of concomitance, when there is no cognition of its vyabhicära, is the cause of the vyapti.14 By non-cognition of vyabhicãra is meant absence of a knowledge ofthe presence of the linga in something other than that possessed of the sadhya. This is in consonance with the Nayãyika point of view also.15 The Advaita Vedãnta Paribhãsã does not attach much importance to whether this sahacãradarsana is arrived at either in one observation or several observations.18 May be, sahacra is cognised sometimes by one observation and some times by frequent observations. What is required is only a knowledge of concomitance (sahacra). This also is in conformity with the Naiyayika view. The author of the Ãsubodhini says that repeated observation is essential when a doubt arises about the general validity of vyäpti known through a single observation.17 Prabhäkara accepts that even a single observation is enough for arriving at a knowledge of vypti. Svārthānumāna and Parārthānumāna:

The classification of Inference into svärtha and parärtha is also acceptable to the Advaitin like the Naiyyika.18 An inference is known to be svärtha when it is aimed at the knowledge of an unperceived object on the partofa man who employs that inference.

13 See V.P. page 197 and onwards. 14 सच व्याभिचाराज्ञाने सति सहचार दर्शनं गृह्यते. V.P. 201 15 व्यभिचारज्ञान विरह सहकृत सहचारज्ञानं व्याप्तिग्रहकारणम्। 16 तच्चसहचार दर्शनं भूयोदर्शनंसकृद्दर्शनंचेति विशेषो नादरणीयः। वे.प. 201 17 ĀŚUBODHINICOM. ONV P. 120 18 S.C. Chatterjee - Nyäya Theory of knowledge, p.289

44 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

For example, when a person sees smoke on the mountain, he infers for himself the presence of fire on the mountain. The other type of inference is called Parărthãnumãna (inference for the sake of another person). Thatis to say one infers fire on the mountain from the smoke that is present and argues out the same for the benefit of another. Here he has to take recourse to a membered syllogism (avayava) in order to make him infer the presence of fire. This distinction between the two types of anumãna is accepted by the Naiyyika and the other Darsanakäras also. The controversy, however, lies in the point of the number of members of a syllogism (Avayavasamkhyã). Five members have been enunciated in syllo- gistic inference by the Naiyäyika.19 But the Advaita Vedäntin does not accept the stand taken by the Naiyayika but faithfully accepts, with the Mimämsaka,20 that a three-membered syllogismis enough for parärthänumäna-either with the first three members or the last three members but not all the five as stated in the Sastradipika.

He argues that anumiti is of the essence of paksadharmatăjñäna. These two are secured by the hetu and the pratijña and as such there is no need for the other members -- udāharana, upanaya and nigamana. The same purpose, in the alternative, is served by the last three members also. Hence the Advaitin criticises the logician's five-member syllogism. The other two members in either case are purposeless.21 The author of the commentary Sikhāmani criticises the Buddhistic view in this regard which accepts only udäharana and upanaya as the two are enough to speak of vyäpti and paksadharmată on the ground that the statement of vyäpti is out of place when the probandum is not spoken of. He also criticises the five-membered syllogism of the Vaisesika on the ground that lingaparāmarsa is not required. Though vyäpti

19 Pratijña, hetu, udšharaņa, upanaya, Nigaman-N.S.1.1.32. 20 Vide Sastradipika-page 179.अनुमाननिरूपण Chapter 21 But the Naiyayika states the purpose served by each of the'other two members aiso in his avayavagrantha vide gadadhari.

INFERENCE OR ANUMÃNA 45

and Paksadharmata both are secured by udäharana and hetu, pratijñã is rendered necessary for establishing the vyäpti by syntactical connection. The view that abādhitatva and asatpratipaksatva not secured in pratijñ should be separately shown in the nigamana, is rejected by the Vedäntin on the ground that unsublatedness etc. are not required for the purpose of anumiti which is the actual purpose served by the members of the syllogism.22

INFERENCE OF THE UNREALITY OF THE UNIVERSE

In order to prove the unreality of the universe which is other than Brahman, a syllogism has been cited.23 It is as follows:(1) Everything other than Brhman is unreal, (2) because of otherness from Brahman, (3) whatever is such (other than Brahman) is unreal like nacre-silver. Quite in accordance with the three membered syllogism propounded by them, Dharmarãja shows only three members and not five as the logician does. The word Brahman has been used in the inference in order to avoid Brahman from the minor term. The word 'all' (that is different from Brahman) has been used in the inference in order to avoid the fault of establishing what is already established. Thus though in suktirupya. etc., the sādhya is established, the sädhya unreality has not been established in all the things of the world and hence in this inference there is no fault ofsiddhasādhana.

It should not be urged how nacre-silver which is one of the entities other than Brahman (Brahmabhinna) can be an illustration

22 For details vide Sikhämani page 212 onwards 23 Madhusudanasaraswati in his Advaitasiddh has given some twenty six inferental statements for the unreality of the world. For details vide Advaita Epistemology, page 71 - Notes.

46 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

(drstãnta) since it has already been otherwise established to be unreal.24

Here the opponent argues that the example given nacre- silver is not established. That is to say there is no pramăna to establish the unreality of nacre-silver. If we speak of another inference to establish the falsehood of the example then it comes under the fault of regressus ad infinitum since there is no other type of example to be given in the case of the second inference. This objection has been set aside by the author by arguing that it is not secured by inference but by stating nacre-silver to be a hallucinational substance (mithyävastu) being produced from an external fault by pratyaksapramäna.25 Another objection is raised by the opponent that the-nature of being other than Brahman is not the determinant of unreality as the cause because the particular mark (linga) given here does not set out the expected sädhya. That is to say otherness from Brahman as a reason cannot determine the unreality of the nacre-silver. Thus the objector argues that a reason like avidyākärya is really what is capable of establishing the falsehood of nacre- silver.28 To this Dharmarãja gives a fitting reply :- 'Just like 'nacre- silver' (suktirupya) which is false even avidyã is a false entity. Ifyou say avidyākāryatva is the deciding factor of unreality, (for the unreality of avidyå itself) again we will have to speak of otherness from Brahman as a reason. Then the Vedäntin replies that it is unnecessary to hold two different deciding factors (prayojakas) for unreality (otherness from Brahman in the case of avidyã, avidyãkäryatva in the case of other objects). Instead he argues that, by the law of parsimony27, it is better to hold otherness from Brahman (Brahmabhinnatva) as one deciding factor for all unreality.

24 For further details Vide Sikhämani page 217. 25 In case of sarparajju also 26 The vyäpti here is 'yatra yatra avidyākāryatvam, tatra tatra mithyātvam 27 V.P. Page 219

INFERENCE OR ANUMĂNA 47

Definition of unreality :-

This unreality has been defined as being the counter positive of the absolute non-existence that abides in the totality of whatever is supposed to be its substratum.28

Here the word 'sva' has reference to the particular object whose unreality is spoken of. The word (abhimata) 'supposed to be' in the definition has been used in order to ward off the fault of impossibility (asambhavadosa). Indeed we cannot speak of the absolute non-existence of an object when and where it actually exists.29 On the other hand, ifit is supposed that there is a particular object in a particular substratum then its absolute non-existence can possibly exist since by delusion (bhränti) an object may appear to exist in a place where it does not. The word 'yavat' Totality in the definition has been used in order to preclude other undesired objects. For example in a tree which is supposed to be the substratum of the conjunction of a monkey, there is the absolute non-existence of conjunction of the monkey which is present in the trunk of the tree and its counterpositive is the conjunction of a monkey which is presentin the branch ofthe tree, since the monkey is on the branch and hence the definition of unreality applies to the conjunction of a monkey even in the branch of the tree.

In order to avoid this contingency the author uses the word 'yãvat' in the definition. When this word is used in the definition the conjunction of a monkey present either in the branch or in the trunk is covered by the word 'totality' and non-existence of the conjunction of a monkey existing in the entire tree has to be taken into account. In support of his stand he quotes Citsukha, he is indebted to him on this point.30

28 मिथ्यात्वं च स्वाश्रयत्वेनाभिमत यावन्निष्ठात्यन्ताभावप्रतियोगित्वम् V.P Page 220. 29 स्वाश्रयत्ववतिस्वात्यन्ताभावविरोधात्। 30 सर्वेषामपि भावानां स्वाश्रयत्वेन सम्मते Vide Page 67 Citsukha's Tattvapradipika प्रतियोगित्वमत्यन्ताभावं प्रति मृषास्मता॥V.P page221

48 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

For example in the well known nacre-silver there is the unreality of silver. In the totality nacre which is supposed (by the conceiver) to be the substratum of silver, there is the absolute non- existence of silver and thus silver is the counterpositive and hence itis false.31 This definition is possible in the case of all unreal objects of the world including ether. It should not be urged that the substratum of ether is not known and as such the definition of unreality is not applicable since the holy text speaks of Brahman as its substratum.32

Dharmarãjã is not satisfied with the inference of unreality stated previously probably because, as the Āsubodhinikāra says, there is the fault of mutual dependency in the case of the falsehood of the universe of ether etc. (viyadädi)33 and gives an alternative inference of unreality avoiding this fault of mutual dependency, when otherness from Brahman is taken as the deciding factor of unreality. The second type of falsehood runs as follows34 It takes up individual cases and establishes unreality. The inference runs as follows: 1. This (piece of) cloth is the counterpositive of the.absolute non- existence existing in this thread because it is a (piece of) cloth just as another piece of cloth". Thus the author states establishing the inference of unreality.35 In this particular thread there is the absolute non-existence of this piece of cloth and hence this piece of cloth is the counter positive. Thus all wholes are stated to be the counterpositives ofthe non-existence existing in parts because the wholes are possessed of parts. In this way the unreality of all things in the world including ether can be established. This argument is

31 रजताश्रयत्वेन अभिमते समग्रे शुक्तिवस्तुनियोरजतात्यन्ताभावःतत्प्रतियोगित्वं रजलस्य। तथा चरजतस्य मिथ्यात्वम्। 32 तस्माद्वा सतस्माद आकाशःसंभूतः etc. 33 For details vide Åsubodhini page 131 34 ब्रह्माभिन्न सर्व मिथ्याब्रह्मभिन्रत्वात्। etc. 35 अयं पट: एतचंतुनिष्ठात्यंताभावप्रतियोगिपटत्वात्V.P.page221.

INFERENCE OR ANUMÃNA 49

also taken from his predecessor citsukha as the author himself cites.36

It should not be urged thatif'poť etc. be inferred to be unreal then there is contradiction with our perception 'the pot is existent'. To this our author cleverly replies that it is only the existence of Brahman, the locus (of the pot) that is the object of our perception but pot etc. are all false. It cannot be urged, the author says, how Brahman devoid of colour, is an object of ocular perception for even In the opinion of the Naiyayika, colour itselfis an object of perception though it has no colour in itself.37 Or if the logician holds that a colourless dravya cannot be the object of ocular perception the vedantin denies dravyatva also in the case of Brahman. The idea is that Brahman being qualitiless (Nirguna), He cannot be consid- ered to be a dravya.38 Nor can Brahman be viewed as a samavāyikārana of any particular thing as samavāya is not admitted by the Vedantins.39 Even accepting it no parinama is accepted in the case of Brahman.40 Even then since Brahman is considered to be both the (abhinnanimittopãdäna) both the material and the efficient cause ofthe universe, somehow substancehood (dravyatva) will have to be accepted in the case of Brahman. On account of this Dharmarãja cleverly shifts to another type of argument that, though Brahman is a colourless dravya, still he is an object of ocular perception just like time which is colourless.41 The Naiyäyika must

36 अंशिन: स्वांशगात्यंताभावस्य प्रतियोगिन: अंशित्वादितरांशीवदिगेषैव गुणादिष्विति Vide V.P.Page 221&Tattvapradipika page 69 37 गुणेगुणानंगीकारात्। 38 गुणाश्रयो द्रव्यम्। 39 समवायिकारणतावच्छेदकतया द्रव्यत्वजातिसिद्धः। 40 Ārambhavāda also is opposed by the Vedăntin 41 नीरूपस्यापि कालस्य इन्द्रियवेद्यत्वाभ्युपगमात्।V.P.page 222

50 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

also accept Time as pratyaksa as ın cases like 'idanim ghato nãsti'. Now there is no pot here.42 Even then the Vedantin is not satisfied with his argument because his inference ofthe unreality ofthe world Is stultified by pratyaksa. Pratyaksa, a powerful pramāņa, cannot be set aside by Inference. Hence the author is obliged to take recourse to a different argument. He very deftly comes to the point by stating that there are three levels of existence 1) In the real sense (as in the case of Brahman alone) 2) Pragmatic existence (vyavhãrika sattã) (in the case of objects of the world) and 3) Hallucinational reality (in the case of nacre-silver) and as such though there is emprical existence in usages like 'the jar existent' it is valid only at the vyävähärika level. But in reality it is not there Thus the pot etc. are not existent in the real sense; Hence there is no contradiction in a statement 'the pot is existent' on the one side and is non-existent on the other.

On this view, the author is careful to make a note that the definition of unreality should be accordingly modified by giving an epithet in the form of"paramarthikatvavaccinnapratiyogitäkatva" 'the counterpositiveness relating to which is characterised by absolute realityness "as an adjective of the absolute non-existence in the original definition of 'unreality'. Here the difficulty has been raised and solved by the author of the Vedănta Paribhãsã in a dexterous way.

42 काल:इन्द्रियवद्यः।

51

COMPARISON (UPAMÃNA)

The Mimamsakas and the Advaitins consider consider Upamãna as a distinct means of mediate knowledge, which is different from inference. Out of the other Indian philosophers only the Naiyãyikas recognise Upamãna as a separate means of valid knowledge. The Naıyãyika's ınterpretation of Upamãna fundamen- tally differs from that of the Mimamsakas

According to the Vedäntin who follows the Mımmsaka, knowledge obtained through Upamãna is as follows. A person who has the knowledge of the cow goes to a forest and sees a gavaya. He cognises the similarity that that gavaya is like his cow. Then he forms the judgement that his cow is like this gavaya This perception of the similarity to the cow present in the gavaya is the special cause of the upamiti; the cognition of the similarity in the cow to that of the gavaya is the result.1 This knowledge by comparison is neither perception nor inference. Some thinkers (Vaisesikas) argue that the Vedãntins Upamãna can be reduced to an inference. They sav that it is possible to derive Upamãna through a syllogism "My cow is like this gavaya, since it is the correlate (pratiyogı) of sımılarity present in this".

(This Gavaya is like my cow, therefore, my cow is like this gavaya)

Dharmrãja question the Vaisesika as to what the knowledge ofthe mark (linga) is ın arriving at similarity to gavaya (gavayasãdrsya) in the cow. He suggests two alternatives. Is it that, in arriving at the knowledge of the similarity of gavaya which exists in the cow (gonista gavaya sädrsya) the knowledge of similarity of a cow in gavaya (gavayanistagosädrsya) is the linga in which case, since the similarity to the cow present in the gavaya (gavayanistagosãdrsya) is not presentin the cow, it cannot be held to be present in the subject

1 गवयनिष्ठगोसादृश्यज्ञानं करणम्: गोनिष्ठ गवयसादृश्यज्ञानं फलम V.P page 230

52 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

(paksa) as it will be a fallacious reasoning. In the alternative if it be argued that ıt is gavayanısta gosādrsya- pratyogitvam that is the lınga n arriving at (gonista gavayasdrsyajñãna), the knowledge of the similarity of gavaya which exists in the cow and hence inference is possible Dharmarãja argues that even if such inference is made deliberately, the knowledge of similarity of gavaya which exists in the cow (gonistagavayasadrsyajñana) is arrived at by ordinary expenience Hence that should be a vyabhicāri linga. In addition to this he argues that there is the apperception 'I am comparing (upaminomi)' in such cases2 and as such it is only a case of Analogical knowledge. Therefore, comparison cannot be replaced by inference This again is one of the solid contributions made by the author in defence of the Mimamsaka3 theory of comparison.

It may not be questioned what then is the difference between the two similarities since similarity is one and the same between the two objects To this the advaitin should reply that though there is no distinction in the (visesya) qualified part i.e. (similarity (sãdrsya) there is certainly distinction in the visesana part of it (in one case the similarity (sadrsya) which exists in the gavaya and In the other that which exists in the cow). If this position is not accepted when one sees similarity to the cow (gosädrsya), in the gavaya why should he not have an apperception (anuvyavasãya) that he is seeing (gavayasadrsya) similarity of gavaya in the cow.4 The Sämkhya school of thinkers object that Upamãna is not a separate pramãna but say it is a case of perception. They argue that the features from which a statement of similarity between the gavaya and the cow is obtained are identical in the cow and the gavaya 5

2 V P pages 234, Vide Sıkhamanı page 233 & 234 for arguments 3 Vide Slokavārtika - upmāna prakarana page 374-378 4 See Āsubodhini page 136-138 5 अत एवस्मर्थंमाणायां गवि गवयसाहण्यजानं प्रत्यक्षम् (Āsubodhını 137 page ( Tattvakaumudi)

COMPARISON (UPAMÃNA) 53

Hence they hold that just like the knowledge of similarity to the cow (gosdrsyajñãna) presentin the gavaya due to sannikarsa, so also in the recollected cow also (gavayasãdrsyajñãna) Is (pratyaksa) perceptible. Hence Upamãna cannot be a separate means of valid knowledge.

The Advaita Vedäntin rejects the view of the samkhya on the ground that the cow is not in proximity with the sense organ when the resulting jñãna is produced and hence it cannot be a case of pratyaksa. The Naiyayika point of view on this pramãna is, however, different

The process of analogical cognition on this view is like this A person hears from a foreigner thatgavaya resembles a cow. Then he goes to a forest and sees a particular entity resembling the cow there and the recollects the meaning ofthe (atidesaväkya) forester's statement and arrives at the resulting knowledge, that that particular entity is gavaya.e Here we definitely see that a new knowledge is gained by this pramäna as compared with that of the advaitin. Of course, here also there have been controversies as to whether this could be a case of verbal testimony etc. They thus hold that a knowledge of the relation of the Samjnă and the samjnin is the result of a knowledge of similarity (sädrsya). According to them knowledge of similarity (upamäna) is the karana and recollection of a forester's statement (atidesa văkyărtha smaraņa) is the activity (vyãpāra).

6. अयं पिण्डः गवयपदवाच्यः According to Muktavali गवयो गवयपदवाच्य: Vide Muktavali page 261.

54 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

VERBAL TESTIMONY

Testimony has been accepted as an independent source of knowledge by all Indian philosophers except the Crvãka, the Buddhist and the Vaisesika. The Carvaka refutes the Validity of Testimony The Vaisesika brings Testimony under the scope of Inference Gautama defines Verbal Testimony as the statement of a reliable person 1 Here the validity of the knowledge derived from this depends mainly on the reliability ofthe person concerned. Any statement made by a person is liable to error and as such a human utterance cannot be relied upon as legitimate testmony. The logician on the other hand believes that Vedic Testimony is valid Inasmuch as it is uttered by the omniscient (sarvajña) and hence there can be no error in it.

That is why the Mimämsaka argues that the Testimony of a being other than a human being is valid.2 So Kumārila rejects the Naıyãyika view and defines Verbal Testimony as a statement which produces in the mind of the hearer, who knows the meaning of words, a knowledge of facts that lie beyond the range of his perception. This is explained by Părthasarathy Misra as the knowledge obtained through the statement depending on the meaning of the words This knowledge must be a new one.4 This knowledge based on Testimony is divided into two types, i. the knowledge arisıng from the words of a reliable person and ii. the knowledge arising from words of impersonal origin (apauruseya).

1 आमोंपदेश शब्द NS117 The M .åmsaka view is that bhrama' and the pramada etc are r ossibilities of human utterence The sämkhyas hold the same opinion as the Naiyāyıka 2 Vide slokavārtika page 350 onwards 3 र गव्दतिज्ञानाटसन्निकुष्ट र्थे विज्ञानम् Vide 'Bhatta Epistemology,page 231 4 िज्ञाताचव्दान पदार्थाभिवानद्वारेण यद वाक्यार्थविज्ञानं तच्छ्दं नाम प्रमाणम् Vide Sāstradıpıka page 51

VERBAL TESTIMONY 55

The Vaisesika is of the opinion that Testimony is nothing but inference. The inference runs like this :- 'These words presup- pose a knowledge of the (syntactical) connection of the meanings recalled since they are a group of words possessed of expectancy etc.5 Hence according to them sabda is not a separate pramãna.

Mm. A.K. Sastry argues that6 if the sentence is made the paksa in the inference and arthavrttitva is the sädhya and sentence is the mark (hetu) then there is a fault of identity between the paksa and the hetu. If on the other hand the meaning is made the paksa, and sabda the hetu, then since sabda exists in ether and not in the meaning the paksa, there is fault of svarupãsıddhi (svarupãsiddhi). Sımilarly it can be proved that the concomitance in the homologue and its negation in the antilogue is absent.

If the above inference is considered to be true and such Inferental knowledge of a statement is considered valid then the statements of even an unreliable persons should be taken to be valid. The Sikhãmanikära, Rämakrsna7 refutes the anvitäbhidãna theory where syntactical connection also is included in the meaning of the word. To this the Vaisesikas reply that it is not judicious to overburden the meaning of the word with the additional meaning of the word which is secured by the indispensable inference Hence the meaning of a sentence is secured by inference according to them.

Now let us see how the Advaitin is interested in establishing a separate sabdapramãna and how it helps hım in his sästra. In the final view of the Advaitin, even the entire holy text comes under the realm of unreality since Brahman is the only real existent for

5 एतानि पदानि स्मारितार्थ आकांक्षादिमत् पदकदंबकत्वात्। एतेपदार्था-तात्पर्यविषयमिथसंसर्गवन्तःयोग्यपद स्मारितत्वात् संप्रतिपन्नवत् Asubodhini page 142 6 Vide Mm A K Sâtry's com on V P 179-180 7 Vıde Sıkhāmani pages 241-243

53 VEDĀNTAPARIBHÂSĀ

them Then how could it be that he favours Verbal Testimony as a means of Valid knowledge. This possible objection is met by the author of the Bhamati8 in a very shrewd way We know that even correct facts are cognised by taking recourse to invalid means e.g taking the word 'Naga' and 'Näga' by the simple difference in property of 'a' after 'nakära', long or short, a correct idea of the tree or an elephant is cognised by the listener, and verily this knowledge is not false, on the other hand it is correct as the word 'Naga' means a tree and 'Nãga' means an elephant. Hence the Advaitin argues that testimony is an essential means of knowledge to establish the existence of the external intelligent Brahman, its identity with the Individual soul and the falsehood of the universe etc

To the Advaitin, as to some other philosophers who rely mainly or exclusively upon the Holy Texts, 'Sabdapramãna' is a very potent source ofvalid knowledge. Though the Paribhasăkära does not state this verbatim, all the philosophic manuals of Advaita treat Testimony as the most important source of valid knowledge 9 The Mimãmsaka goes even to the extent of maintaining that 'dharma' etc, is established only with the help of Testimony, a 'means of knowledge They also declare that anything following vedic testimony though stated by a human being also is a means of valid knowledge 10 Even Sankara admits in his work that the codes (smrtis) texts of the ancient sages constitute valid means of knowledge in so far as they do not contradict the meaning of the vedic texts. But when there is a contradiction between the Holy texts and the smrtis, the holy text gains precedence over smrti. This bears ample testimony to the fact that Sankara lays stress on sruti being the source of valid knowledge. May, he even goes to the extent of arguing that one should not indulge in suskatarka but try to

8 Vıde Bhämatı on Brahmasutra Sankarabhāsya-pages 10 9 वेदोऽखिलो धर्ममूलम्। Manusmrtı - 2nd Ch-6th verse 10 स्मृतिशीले च तद्विदाम्।

VERBAL TESTIMONY 57

establish fact as propounded in the Veda with the help of Logic He designates simple logic unaided by the support of Veda as suskatarka.11 When there is a possibility for certain statement to be brought under sabdapramãna, he prefers to subordinate the other pramãnas to testimony.12 mere logic of the Tãrkikas, received very adverse criticism in his works. His idea is that things which are beyond the ken of human experience should not be tried to be brought under the scope of inference.13 Indeed it is so Anumãna Is based on the concomitance between the hetu and the lingin Inferential knowledge presupposes this knowledge of concomitance in statements like 'Jyotistomena svarga kãmoyajeta' etc We cannot establish by any stretch of inference, the concomitance between the Jyotistoma and svarga (Heaven), hence the importance of Sabdapramäna in the filed of knowledge especially philosophy

Keeping all this in mind and following the Mimamsa school of thought, the Advaitin defines Testimony in this way .- 'That sentence is a means of Valid knowledge whose syntactcal connection is arrived at by its import and which is not stultified by another pramãna 14

The word 'not stultified' (abãdhita) is used in the definition to avoid overlapping of the definition in the case of sentence like 'He drenches with fire' (Vahninã sincati) where fire is stultitied as the cause ofdrenching. The word Tätparya Vısayıbuta' ın the definition has been used in order to avoid inapplicability in the case of sentences like 'Prajãpati has taken out his own omentum' (Sa prajãpati rãtmano vapăm Udakhidat) where there is stultification

11 Sankara Sutrabhāsya 2-1-3-6, 2-1-3-11 12 eg जन्माद्यस्थै यितः etc Sutrabhasya on 1-1-2-2 13 अचिन्त्यात्खंलु ये भावान् न तां तर्केणयोजयेत्। Vide Bhasya 2-1-3-6 Also Bhāmatı 2-1-3-11 14 यस्य वाक्यस्य तर्थ्यविषर्याभूत संसर्गो मानांतरेण न बाध्यते तद्वाक्यं प्रमाणम् V.P.page 239

58 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

even at the vyavaharika level. Here in order to avoid this stultification of Prajãpati taking out his own omentum it has to be explained in accordance with the 'tätparyavisyibuta samsarga (the relation that is the object of import) by stating that the taking out of the omentum of yajamãna in the holy text has its import in taking out the omentum of the tuvara animal15 which is possible to be removed by the sacrificer. By this kind of superimposition of the tuvara omentum on the omentum of a sacrificer is a case of import which lauds the tuvaravapa removed is as valuable as the sacrificer's own omentum.

The word 'by another means' has been used in the definition as an adjective of relation (samsarga) since, otherwise the syntac- tical connection of sentences like Jyotistomena svargakãma etc. would be stultified (bãdhita) by sentences lıke 'Neha nãnãstı kincana'. Here it may not be questioned how then the syntactical connection between 'Yäga' and 'svarga'is not stultified by sentences which speak of the reality of one supreme Brahman, for, the author replies (as the commentator, holds) that 'by another means (mãnăntara) in the definition' means only one of its own kind. That Is to say a sentence giving a meaning at the Vyãvahärika level etc.16 If it is stultified by a sentence at the pãramärthika level it does not matter, e.g. in the above objection the (sādhyasädhanabhāva) nature of probandum and probans between the sacrifice and Heaven (Svarga) at the conventional level (vyävahaärika) is stultified only by a sentence at the absolute level which speaks of the truth of one Brahman but not by an another means of the same type (sajātiya pramãnăntara) at the conventional level (vyāvahārika level). The Advaitin refutes the theory of the Vaisesika by arguing that Expectancy (ākāņksä), compatibility (yogyata) and proximity (äsatti) along with the knowledge of import (tätparyajñäna) are the

15 Tuvara is a cow without homs. 16 Mm. A.K. Sästry however, refutes the view of the Åsubodhnikära by stating that an object at the same reality level cannot be expressed by both the 'bädhya' and bädhaka'. Vide A.K. Sästry's Comm. on V.P.

VERBAL TESTIMONY 59

necessary antecedents of a knowledge of sentence-meaning (vākyărthajñāna). Here the author intends to say that these four causes of säbdabodha distinguish it from inferential knowledge. These causes are not present in the case of inference. Even if it be objected that the first three ãkãnksã, yogyatã and Åsatti can be brought somehow under the scope of inference, it cannot be established on any plea whatever, that the knowledge of import is a cause of inference.17 Truly even when there is no knowledge of concomitance, if there are the three causes (ãkänksã etc.) syntac- tical connection is experienced in life. Hence Verbal Testimony cannot be brought under Inference. The author's view probably is that, if sabda is not accepted as a means of Valid knowledge, even Inference could be dispensed with since Anumana may be said to have been secured by mental perception (mãnasa pratyaksa). If on the other hand, the Vaisesika argues, that there is no appercep- tion in the form 'I am perceiving' but there is apperception 'I am Inferring' and as such inference in separate pramãna, the Advaitin argues on similar lines since there is the experience,18 'I know this from Testimony' Sabda should be regarded as a separate pramãna.

This again is an ingenious explanation given by the author of the Vedänta Paribhäsa refuting the inferential nature of sabda pramăņa.

The author now tries to define the four causes of the knowledge of sentence-meaning väkyärtha jñãna) in detail. Accord- ing to him by äkänksã is meant the competence of being the object, for a mutual knowledge of the desire for the objects signified by the words. In some what similar lines the Naiyāyika also defines Ăkānksa1· The word yogyatva' has been used by the Paribhāsäkära in the definition in order to make it applicable even in the case of

17 For an interesting argument ın this regard vide Sikhāmanı page 241. 18 शब्दात् अमुं अर्थ प्रत्ययामि। 19 पदस्य पदान्तरव्यतिरेकप्रयुक्तान्वयाननु भावकत्वम्।VideT S page 67

60 VEDÂNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

a person who has no desire to know. Though there is no desire on the part of the listener, still there is the competency in such syntactically connected words and that is what is called Ãkãnksã. The author also speaks of the determinant (avacchedaka) of yogyata mentioned above without which it is incomprehensible The determinant ofsuch a competence ıs kriyätvam (actıon) kārakatvam, itikartavyatãtvam; etc. and it is also because of this expectancy of the determinant that there is no overlapping on statements like 'Gauh' Asvah etc. In these cases since after 'Gau', there is no agreement with action (kryã), the definition of Ãkãnksã does not apply here and hence there is no overlapping here. In cases of sentences like "Tattwamasi', where there is relation by identity, there is no overlapping since in apposition (abhedãnvaya) the determinance of competence (yogyatvãvacchedaka) is 'being sıg- nified by a word having a same case ending' Hence the author accepts the fact of'being signified by words having the same case ending' also as the determinant of yogytā.

In support of his argument the author tries to show that the Naiyãyika definitions of Ākānksã are not acceptable to him 20 He agrees with the Mimämsakas that it is not the words that have äkänksã but the objects denoted by the words. Here in the ligh* of his knowledge of Mimãmsasastra, he discusses in detail the Vedic sentence 'Vaisvadevyãmiksã, Vajibhyo Vājanam' (those curds belong to the Vaisvadevas and the whey is for the väjins') where he argues that the Vaisvadeva sacrifice is not connected syntac- tically with vajana.21 Here in the first part of the sentence the word Vaiśvadevi is a taddhita and by sruti pramãna it argues with ămiksã and becomes

20 The Naiyayika definitions are पदस्यपदान्तरप्रयुक्तान्वयाननुभावकत्वम् "अभिदान अपर्यवसानम् T.S.page 67 21 This is found in the Devatäbhedakrtakaramabhedakrtädhikarane. Here the Bhäsyakāra shows the relative strength of āmiksa and Vajin. Vide Mm.A.K.Sästry's com. on V.P. page 189-193

VERBAL TESTIMONY 61

a simple sentence But in the next part the word 'Vajibhyah' is in the dative case and here in the case of dative the agreement in a single sentence is with Väjina and of these two the srut and the vãkya, there is controversy, and sruti gains precedence over vākya and hence the miksã väkya fits in with the Visvadeva deities but not with Vājina.22

Next the author defines 'yogyata' as non-stultification ofthe (syntactical) connection which is the object of import 23 In a sentence like "he drenches with fire" there is stultification since fire is not an implement in drenching 24 This definition is different from the Tarkika's definition,25 in that the latter speaks of stultification of meaning and not the relation

By äsatti (contiguity) is meant the recalling of the objects expressed by the words without delay 26 The word 'produced by these words' has been included in order to exclude objects secured by pratyaksa etc. and for the same reason the author accepts that in cases like 'close' the particular word 'door' (dvãra) etc (but not the object door) that is to be supplied. In this respect he agrees with the Naiyayika who holds the same view If the word is not supplied then the meaning of the sentence cannot come under the

22 For details of argument, vide V P page 245, 246 23 तात्पर्यविषयीभूतंसंसर्गाबाध योग्यता V P page 258 As per the word तात्पर्यविषयीभूत Indefinition 24 The Advaitasıddhi omits word 'Samsarga' ın its definition of yogyatā Vide Mm A K Sastry's V P page 193 Mm A K Săstry is of the opinion that the word samsarga in the definition is knot intended to be stated and hence the definition of yogyată in the Advaita Sıddhı Here it may be noted that Nāgesa and others do not accept 'yogyata'as a cause of säbdabodha It is possible to explain that 'ayogyatanıschaya'ısanımpedement in the case of säbdabodha and as such it becomes a cause of 'Säbdabodha' by being the negation of this impedement Really we have to admit the negation ofthe impedement as a cause of any effect 25 अर्थाबाधो योग्यता Vide Siddhanta Muktavali page 310 26 आसत्तिश्चाव्यवधानेन पदजन्यपदार्थोपस्थिति: Vide V.P page 259

62 A CDĀNTAPARIBHASĀ

scope of sabdabodha. Hence the Naiyayika accepts that the word' should be supplied. The Munamsaka is. however, of the opinion that it is enough that the meaning is supplied In support of his argument the author of the Parbhasa states that in the variant sacrifices when 'saury charu' s to be sacrificed he supplies the word 'for the Sun' (Suryãya) in the case of 'saurya chäru' on the lines of 'To Agnı (Agnaye), I offer these so as to please him'. Thus in the Vikrt in the place of Agni, with the help of uha the word 'Surya' is to be used

Now coming to import (Tätparya) the author ofthe Parbhãsa criticises the Naiyãyika stand point that, by import is meant 'being pronounced, with the desire of producing a particular knowledge 27 The idea here is that a person who has no knowledge of meaning also pronounces words (like Vedic words) but we find that there is meaning comprehended, though the man who utters the word does not know the meaning. Since there is the knowledge that the meaning is not understood by the pronouncer even tãtparyabhramã cannot be said to be present. Nor can it be urged that the knowledge of import of God is responsible for Tätparya, for even one who does not accept God gets at the meaning of the sentence. Hence the author defines Tätparya by modifying the statement of the logician He defines import as the one that is competent to produce a particular import 28 He gives an example 'there is a potin the house' This sentence is competent to produce a knowledge of the connection of pot with the house The author raises an objection here that in case of words having more than one meaning, there is possibility of the other meaning not relevant, e.g. Bring the Saindhava', it is possible to read the meaning even 'horse' to be brought at the time of eating since there is potentiality by its own nature (svarupayogyatä) for the word (in that sense) The author cleverly meets this objection by adding another phrase in the

27 तत्प्रतीतीच्छ्योच्चरितत्वं तात्पर्यम्। Tarkasangrah Dipika page330 28 तत्प्रतीतिजननयोग्यत्वम्। Vdanta paribhasa page 288

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definition 'while not being pronounced with the desire of producing a different knowledge.29 Now there is no avyäpti for this definition in a sentence uttered by a person who does not know its meaning or in the word uttered by a parrot since the word "Tatpratiticchã" has been avoided. The author raises another objection that in sentences where a knowledge of two things is desired to be expressed in a sentence there is avyäptı, since the idea here is that the phrase used in the definition.30 signifies 'not being uttered with the desire of producing only one knowledge' which is different from that. Now an important issue is raised by the author regarding whether tätparya is one of the causes of sabdabodha at all. This has ansen on account of a fact that in the fourth Varnaka Vivaranakära has rejected the view that tätparya is a cause of sãbdabodha. Hence the author explains the refutation of tätparya (by praksãtman) as defined by the Tãrkikã.31 He argues that, otherwise, that the entire Vedäntasästravicära which aims at arriving at the import of the Veda should be purposeless.32

The author also gives some other view33 that the refutation In the Vivaranagrantha aims only at refuting the knowledge ofimport as a cause of säbdaboda itself. On this view a knowledge oftätparya is a cause of sabdabodha34 visesa consequent on a doubt about

29 Hence the complete definition now would be तदितर प्रतीति इच्दछ्यानुच्चरितत्वे सति, तत्प्रतीति जननयोग्यत्वम् For an intersting controversy as to whether both the words in the definition (of Tätparya) are indıvidually called tātparya or jointly vide Mm.A K Sāstry's Comm. on V P. page 217. Last para. 30 i.e. While being etc 31 i.e.तात्प्रतीतीच्छया उच्चरितत्वरूप तात्पर्यम्। 32 Vide Mm.A.K Sästry's Comm. on V.P. page 221, para-1. 33 This appears to be the view of Abhedaratnäkara according to the Åsubodhini. 34 For details vide Mm. A.K Sastry's Comm. V.P. page 219 last para. Vivarana Prameya sangraha - page 228 शब्दत्वसिद्भवे शब्द एव प्रमिति हेतु: This view does not accept the Naiyäyika view of tätparya, i.e. that it is the desire of a person but it is a property existing in the words and hence our author takes up the question on the 'abhyupagamyaväva' point of view.

;: VEDĀNTAPARIBIASĀ

the import or an illusion about the import. In such cases only they holt that tătparyajñãna is a hetu This import (tātparya) Is ascertained with the help of maxims enunciated by the Mimãmsaka35 But in daily life it is done with the help of prakarana (context) linga, aucitya, desa, kãla etc. The difference is that sentences spoken are simnly translations of what is already known through other sources of knowledge. But in the Holy textthe meaning is something novel but not a mere translation.36

The next important question raised by our author is whether injunctive sentences (kãryaparānı vēkyãni) alone are valıd e g Jyotıstomena svargakãmo yajeta, sınce they produce vyutpatti or whether assertive sentences (sıddhãparavãkyas) also are valid (e.g Văyurvaiksepistha devatã) though they do not help activity. Her the controversy is whether injunctive sentences alone are valid producing a new knowledge or whether simple assertive sentences also are capable of prcducing such meaning. Itis in shorta question whether corroborative statements (arthaväda) have their import like Injunctive sentences The author is of the opinion that even sıddhaparavākyas have a valid import That is why sentences like 'TATTWAMASI' and others prove the import n Brahman. The Prăbhäkara it may be noted, is of the opposite view in this respect He argues that corroborative sentences do not have any import until they are read as a single sentence with injunctive sentence.37 Here also the author, as usual, agrees with the Bhãtta Mimãmsakã view that assertive sentences have an import of their own. As a matter

35 उत्रमोपसहागैetc. 36 ग्वगं कामो यजेत e g ithas notbeer.ascertained by any other sentence except the above that Jyotistom sacrifice produces 'Heaven' stated here for the first tme 37 e g Chaitrah Putraha tejātaha This sentence according to Prābhākara gives no meaning until it is read with the next sentnce, ataha tam chumba since some activity is produced only then.

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of fact, we find that the statement 'a son is born to you' definitely produces some import; otherwise, we cannot account for the bloom in the face of the father, Caitra on hearing the birth of the child.38

The next question is whether the holy textis eternal or not.

The view of the logician in this respect is that though the Holy text is valid because it is spoke by the eternal omniscient parameśwara, it is momentary (ksanika) sınce words are momen- tary in their view This is not acceptable to the Vedäntin. The view of the Pûrva Mimamsaka39 is that the vedas are valid since they are eternal and devoid of human error But the Vedãntin does not consider the Veda as eternal since it is a product. Vedic sentences themselves bear Testimony to this fact.40

The momentary nature of Veda is also not accepted by the Vedäntin since there is a recognition in the reader that he is studying the same Veda as another person has studied. Similarly he maintains that letters like 'ga' are not momentary for the same reason. The Veda is produced like 'ether at the time srsti and gets destroyed at the time of pralaya'. But he does not accept the intermediary production and destruction of Vedic words for this entails great prolixity. If it is then questioned why they (letters) are not cognised (in case they are already here), the Vedãntin replies the revealing medium (vyañjaka) in the form of pronunciation is not there. Thus the Vedäntin does not admit a momentary nature for Vedas. Nor on this account can it be said that the Veda being created by God becomes connected with a person (pauruseya) and the theory of 'not connected with a person' as stated in the sariraka Mimāmsäbhäsya will be set at naught.41 No for, as Dharmarãja

38 For details vide 'Philosophy of a sentence and its parts' Prof.V S Rao, page 37-38 39 Vide A.K. Sästrys Com on V P. page 229 40 अस्य महतो भूतस्य निःश्वसितमेतद्यद्दग्वेदो यजुर्वेदःसामवेदोथर्ववेदः। Br UP II-NV10 41 Sankarabhāsya 1-2-1.

66 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

clearly points out, pauruseyatva (connection with a person) does not mean being uttered by a person. He defines 'connection with a person' as 'being the object of utterance that is independent of any utterance of the same kind.42 That is to say, all sentences we speak in this world are pauruseya since we are not constructing them as constructed previously. But the Veda on the other hand comprises sentences which have the same construction as in the previous ages. This factis proved in the Veda.43 But the Mahbhārata etc. are cases of sentences (utterances) connected with a person (pauruseya). Thus the controversy of connection with person' (pauruseyatva) of the Veda has been solved by our author. VRTTI VICĀRAH:

Like most other schools of philosophy and the Mimamsakā school in particular, our author admits only potentialities for words- -saktı (primary signification) and Laksaņā (implication).44 The meanings signified by them are sakya and laksya (primary and implied) respectively. According to our author sakti is not of the form of'desire of God (Iswareccha)' as the Tärkikas hold, for, even Ti, gu, bhã etc. in grammatical parlance signify their own meaning as intended by Pānini; nor is it desire alone since by dint of one's desire one cannot make a word like 'pot signify 'pata'. So the Vedäntin accepts sakti as a separate substance (padărtha). In all causes we can infer the existence of sakti by the effect produced. Similarly from the words used we can infer the sakti present in them from the verbal knowledge produced. Here also the author of the Paribhãsã accepts the Mimämsă stand point that sakti is another substance (Padärthäntara)45 whereas for the logicians sakti, is only

42 सजातीयोच्चारणानपेक्षोच्चारणविषयत्वम्। 43 धाता यथापूर्वमकल्पयत् etc.also vide Asubodhin, page 193,line.3 44 Vyanjana of the Rhetoricins, has not been accepted 45 Vide Mm A K Sastrys Com. on V.P. page 197

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a form of abhävapadartha48 in the sense of capacity and the desire of God (Iśwarasanketa) in the case ofwords. The idea ofthe ancient logician is that the desire of God that a particular word should signify a particular objectis called the sakti ofthe word, whereas the modern Logician argues that in view of modern technical words like Ti, Ghu, Bhã of Pănini sakti is cognised because they have some sense attached to them and hence they hold that simple desire is sakti. By saying so, the word sakti is possible to be explained even in the case of those who do not believe in God's existence. But the Mimamsaka holds a different view here. For them abhidha is a kind of sakti and sakti is an altogether different category. It does not come under the abhäva category. He argues that there is what is called burning capacity in fire. It cannot come under the scope of either matter (dravya) or quality (guna) or karma (action) etc. He gives various reasons as to how sakti cannot be brought under the scope of any padärtha stated by the logician. Hence Sakti is a different padärtha. Hence he concludes that like all other saktis the one existing in a word also is a different padrtha known as sakti.

Next the author takes up the hotly debated question as to whether generic attribute (jäti) or individual vyakti is the meaning signified by a word. Scholars of different philosophies are very much at variance on this point.47 The Naiyayika holds that the generic character (jäti) form (äkrti) and individual (vyakti) etc. are the meanings of a word.48 According to the Mimamsaka49 generic attribute alone is the meaning signified. Our author is in agreement with the Mimãmsã point of view as usual. He argues along with them that there is great

46 प्रतिबंधकाभाव Tarka sangraha dipika under saktivada. 47 Vide the Philosophy of a sentence andits parts Prof. V S. Rao page 160, 166, 167 48 For the idea of Navya Naiya vide Mm. A.K. Sāstry's comm. on V.P. page 197 Last lines. 49 Vide Philosophy of a Sentence and Its Parts. page 167

68 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀSÂ

prolixity if individual be the meaning signified. Hence generic attribute (jãti) alone has a rightful signification. Now the question arises how then in certain cases the individual is signified by the word.50 To this the author replies along with the Prabhakara that the individual (vyakti) is arrived at by presumption.51

Here the logician is ofthe opinion that, though a word a like 'gau' may mean an individual cow, he argues that there is no prolixity (of each cow being signified separately) since the word 'cow'signifies that which is determined by cowhood.52 But the Mimamsaka and the Vedãntin reject this view ofthe logician as it is too prolix. Instead of admitting 'cowhood' as a determinant of säkya it is more simple to admit that gotva is the sakya. Nor can this be refuted by the logician as, since gotva itselfis cognised earlier53 than the individual cow as such the former should be treated as the meaning of the word.

Now it is for the Advaitin to explain how an individual is cognised as the meaning of a word. Though the author of the Paribhãsã accepts the individual meaning also by 'samãna samvit samvedyatva' (presumption) he takes recourse to a different argu- ment. The reason is probably that presumption (samãna samvit samvedyatva) is a pramãna different from sabda and because just like gotva also which is secured by the contact ofidentity (samyukta tãdätmyasambandha) in the case of perception, so also in sabdapramãna, it may be argued by the logician, that both the meanings are possible to be signified by the word. Hence he gives an alternative explanation in view ofthe above difficulty.54 The idea is that the meaning of the individual signified by the word 'cow' etc.

50 e.g. in sentences like 'gām badhäna' (Tie the cow) 51 By presumption Prabhakara means,समान संवित् संवेद्यत्व 52 गोत्वाद्यविच्छत्नेशक्तिः। 53 In accordance with the rule न गृहीत विशेषणा बुदि्ध: विशेष्ये उपतिष्ठति 54 यद्वागबादिपदानां व्यक्तौ शक्ति:।V.P.270page

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is due to the significatory capacity in itself by virtue of its existence only (svarupasati) but not as cognised (jñäta) whereas in the case of the generic attribute, (jãti) the significatory capacity has to be cognised.55 The Advaitin argues that, in the case of denotation of the individual, a knowledge of śakti is not necessary as in the case of jäti since it is too prolix. Another reason for this is that, from a knowledge of jätisakti, there is no delay in arriving at the knowledge of vyakti. That is why even in the Naiyayika point of view the potentiality in the syntactical connection is stated to be cognised by virtue of its own presence (svarupasati) 56 But of these two meanings, the Advaitin argues that only jäti is the conventional meaning (vächyrtha) since it is the object of the denotational capacity as known (jñãta).57

Now the author again sees another difficulty in the above argument as prolixity has again arisen since both the meanings are signified by the word. The prabhäkaras, however argue that, in a sentence meaning, sakti is accepted even in the syntactical connection of words.

55 It should not be however urged vyaktsaktı as cognised may be taken to be the cause of säbdabodha and jātsaktı may be taken as the cause because there is no vinigamaka for in sucha case it is not possible to have a knowledge of the cow seen in a different place to be named a cow The Bhāttās however, do not accept this theory of Prabhäkara since it is too prolix For details vide Mm.A K Sastry's Comm page 199 नेदं मतं भाट्टानामभिमतम् 56 Anvaya saktih svarupasatı V P 271 57 But there appears to be a contradiction between the Paribhāsakara's own stand that jati, is in the final view, the meaning expressed by a word and that jātıvısistavyaktı is the meaning of a word in his later statements like 'svrthaıkadesam vıhāya ekadese vartate, tatra ajahallaksaņā' and also 'soyam Devadattastattvaması, ıtyādau visısta vācakānām padānāmekadesaparatvepi na lakshaņā. This is a self-contradiction in his own statement. For a possible solution of this controversy vide Sıkhāmanı, p.276 also Äkrtivisista etc ' vide Mm. A.K. Šāstry's Commentary on V P p.202.

70 VEDÂNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

Hence our author is obliged to argue that implication may be accepted in the case of the 'individual' meaning of a word on the strength of the statement 'the meaning of a word is to be obtained from no other source ( but from the word itself)

'Ananyalabhyah sabdārthah'. Hence the individual is secured by taking recourse to implication.58

Now the author turns his attention to the capacity of Implication by which the implied meaning is made known. Though a comprehensive definition of laksanã is not given separately the author divides laksanā59 Into two groups 'pure Laksaņā and double laksanã (kevala and laksita) on the lines of the Navya Naiyãyika theory 60 The various divisions of Laksan as given by the different schools of philosophy are too well known to be recounted here. The author is of the opinion that a direct relation with the sakyartha is what is called kevala laksanã e.g. a 'hamlet on the Ganges' where the word Gangã has its implication in the bank which is connected with the word Gangã. But where a different meaning is known by an indirect relation with the primary or denoted meaning, there is double Laksană (Laksita Laksan) e g the word 'Dvirepha' has connection with a word having two rephas (i.e Bhramara) and this word 'Bhramara' is again connected with its meaning 'bee' and as such the word 'dvirepha' is said to signify by indirect implication a 'bee' The author of the Paribhãsã does not accept 'gauni' as a separate type of implication as is done by the Mimãmsakã. He

58 Vide V P P 271 59 जातिवाचकशब्दस्य तद्विशिष्टेलक्षणा Vide VP P 272 स्वशक्यसंबन्धो लक्षणा Lagician, प्रतिपाद्यसंबन्धो लक्षणाबोध्यसंबन्धो लक्षणाMmamsaka शक्यतावच्छेदकारोपो VIT. Grammanans, the Grammarians divide it into two suddha and gauna as do the Rhtoricians 50 It may be noted here that even in the laksaniyårtha, it is not possible to hold » tkt itself as the cause because there are many cases of Laksanıyārtha. bank, dadhyupaghātaka animal etc and to accept all these as cases of saktı will be too prolix and hence it must be accepted that there is a separate vrtti alled Laksanå which relates the implied meaning to the denoted mean.ig

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includes it under the comprehensive group, double laksana since the relation here also is indirect e.g. in the statement "the boy is a lion", since the 'boy' cannot be a lion, the implication for the word 'lion' is cruelty etc., for the word 'lion' signifies a lion. The lion is related with cruelty and by indirect implication this cruelty is related to the boy. Hence this is also a case of Laksitalaksana. Next the author divides Laksanã from a different point ofview into three types:

(1) Exclusive implication (jahallaksana)

(2) Non-exclusive implication (ajahallaksanã)

(3) Exclusive-Non-exclusive implication.

The third varety is otherwise known a bhãgatyãgalaksanã and is accepted by the Advaitin only.81 In an implication where the denoted meaning of the word is excluded and a different meaning Is known there is the jhallaksanã type of implication e.g the statement 'take poision'62 where the denoted meanings as well as another meaning are known there is what is called "jahallaksan". Similar is the case with the statement the cloth is white 63

Now coming to the third type of laksana64 the author observes that there is this type ofimplication where a word excludes a part of its denoted meaning and retains the other part, e.g. 'this is that Devadatta' Here the identity between Devadatta as qualified by the present time and as qualified by the past time cannot be established with the help of the denoted meaning since they are contradictory. Hence both the words by implication retain the substantive part (visvesyamätra) only and not their adjective part.

61 The Sıkhāmanıkära thinks that there cannot be Jahadajahallaksanā at all etc Vide ADVAITAEPISTEMOLOGY page 102F Notes 62 Here the meaning is 'you should not eat in your enemy's house 63 Here the word White' means an object as also the whiteness existing in it 64 Jāgadisa ubdıvıdes it ınto five types - vide Sabdasaktiprakāsika verse-24

72 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

This type of implication65 has much to do in Advaita Vedănta especially in explaining the meaning of the Mahavakyas 'TATTWAMASI' etc.66 Take the mahãvãkya thou art that (TATTWAMASI) the sentence, as it is, conveys the identity .between the individual soul possessed of limited capacity etc. and the supreme soul possessed of unlimited knowledge, power etc On its very face this is a contradiction and in order to explain the identity between the two we have to take recourse to this bhãgalaksaņã Thus the two words concerned imply only svarupa i e to say the substantive caitanya alone unqualified by adjectives 67 This is the view of the traditional Vedãntın

But here the author of the Vedãnta Paribhasã has a very solid contribution68 to the explanation of the Mahãvãkya where he tries to remove the contradiction in the denoted meaning signified by the words by not taking recourse to laksan and by explaining it successfully otherwise This particular argument be speaks his great imagination as well as erudition He does not accept that laksanã is necessitated in such cases while fully agreeing thatthese words denote only a part of their meaning His confirmed opinion Is that when there is no possibility of agreement by identity between two qualified objects denoted by words there is not difficulty in establishing identity between the two substantive parts (omitting the attributes) denoted by the word 69

In support of his argument he cites the sentence 'the pot Is transitory' where the transitoriness is in agreement only with the individual pot which is a part of the denoted meaning of 'the poť',

65 This is severally called Bhagalaksana/ भागत्यागलक्षणा-Vide Pancadasi page 262 66 And such sentences are called svarupavākyas 67 स्वरूपं विषेष्यी भूत चैतन्यम्। 68 Vide Mm A K Sästry's Comm on V P.page 207 para-1 "एवंच तत्वमस्यादि ... etc सांप्रदायिकमतं परित्यजन् स्वाभिप्रायमाह" 69 Vide 'Saktyupasthitavısistayoha' etc V P.275

VERBAL TESTIMONY 73

but it does not agree with the other part of the meaning 'genus' (ghatatvajāti) because jăti cannot said to be transitory. Thus we can see in such cases that it is only with a part of the denoted meaning that the other word agrees. So also in the case of 'TATTWAMASI' also it can be argued that the substantive part (caitanya) of the denoted meaning of the word 'TAT' agrees with the substantive part of the meaning (consciousness) denoted by the word Tvam. The rule according to him is this. Laksaņă has to be accepted in cases where there is contradiction the agreement of the attributive part of the meaning with another, e.g. Nityo ghatah. The potis eternal. Here it may be noted that the individual pot which is the substantive part of the denoted meaning of the word cannot be called nitya because an individual pot is anitya. Hence in such statements we have to take recourse to Laksaņă (in this case it may be noted that 'potness' is the visesana) and when we want to connect that alone with the word nitya we are oblized to take recourse to laksaņā. In the same way in the case of a sentence like 'TATTWAMASI' even though the substantive parts of the denoted meaning are syntactically con- nected by non-difference there is no sublation.70 Here since both the consciousnesses are substantives according to the above rule, there is no need for applying laksanā. In support ofthe above contention the author cites examples of sentences like 'bring the pot' (ghatamänaya) where both the meanings of potness and pot which are the visesana and visesya respectively cannot syntactically agree by karmatvasambandhã (relation of objecthood) with potness since ghatatva cannot be brought separately and as such (that is because both the parts of the denoted meaning of the word do not agree with bringing ) the logician will be oblized to accept laksanä in case the above rule is not accepted, but the logician does not actually accept laksaņã in such cases. Hence the above cited rule ofthe Advaitin is justified.

74 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

It may also be noted, as the Ãsubodhinikara says that the rule 'padärthah padărthena anveti, na tu padarthaikadesena', refers only to the visesana part of the denoted meaning 71

Now the author of the Paribhãsa knows that he has contradicted the opinion of the cärya as also the author of the Pancadasi who speak of bhagalakşana72 in such cases. To this question the author of the Vedãnta Paribhãsã replies that this is a case of 'abhyupagamyavada' that is taking it as a traditionally accepted view of arguing (abhyupagamyavãda).

Now there is another question which remains to be answered - 'since laksana has not been accepted by our author in cases like TATTWAMASI, what could be an illustration for a laksanã (implication) of the jahadajahad type? To this our author replies an instances like 'protect the curds from the crow' (kãkebhyo dadhi raksayatäm) are illustrative of the jahadajahallakșana type. When we say the curd is to be protected from the crow, it means that the curd is to be protected from all animals that destroy the curd. Hence he admits that the word 'crow'in the sentence abandons its denoted meaning not denoted (asakya). It may not be questioned how then the author of the Vedanta Paribhãsa calls it as jahadajahallaksaņă because the denoted meaning 'crow' is com- pletely omitted in his import, for, as he replies, though the word 'crow' implies, according to him, the meaning 'destroyer of curds (which is not a denoted meaning), still along with the destroyers dog etc. the crow also comes back into the picture as a destroyer of curd and as such there is finally the sakya and asakya meaning for the word 'crow' and hence it is a case of jahadajahallaksaņā.

Along with the Navya Naiyayikas our author believes that inconsistency ofthe import (tätparyänupatti) is the cause of laksanã

71 Vide Sikhamanı page 277 ... Asubodhini 167 and also Mm A.K. Śāstry' Comm on V.P.208 72 Vide Pancadasi page 262, ed. by Rämakrishna Math VII - 74 verse

VERBAL TESTIMONY 75

and not the unintelligibility of syntactical relation (Anvayãnupapatti). Why it is so is that in, cases like 'protect the curd from the crow etc. there is no unintelligibility in syntactical connection but still there is laksaņā. Thus the author ofthe Vedãnta Paribhãșã appears to be very catholic in his views accepting even what the logicians say when something is found more convincing. The non-intelligibility ofimport is found in all cases ofanvayãnupapatti but notvice versa.

Now our author takes up the hotly debated point whether laksaņã is only in a word (padavrtti) or in sentence (vākyavrtti) also.73 The author cites the stock example the 'hamlet in the deep river' "gambhiräyam nadyämghosah" where he accepts Laksana for both the words gambhirã and nadi in gambhiranaditira. Hence he concludes that that laksanã is present in sentences also. This again is on the lines of the Mimãmsaka view point.74 But there arises a question here now there can be laksanã in a sentence since the sentence itself is not one possessed of sakti (sakta) and hence relation of sakya (sakyasambandha) cannot be established in it. This objection is ruled out by him on the ground that though the word meaning is signified by 'sakti, the väkyärtha also like padārtha is indirectly signified and since the implied meaning is connected with that, laksanã can be accepted in a sentence also.75

73 According to the Prabhäkara in the anvitäbhidänaväda theory even in the wordsthemselves (Inthe sentence)there s svarupa in syntactical connection Hence säbdabodha is understood only with the help ofsaktı Even in Bhāttăs view, in the Abhihitānvayavāda, sakti in the form of syntactical connection Is accepted not in the words in the sentence, but in the object signified by the word and as such säbdabodha is expressed with the help of sakti only ındırectly (śaktijnāpya sambandha) and hence lakşanā isaccepted even n a sentence According to the Naiyāyika, however, expectency (ākānkșā) etc are responsible for a knowledge of syntactical relation and hence there is no sakti for a sentence in its meaning. Vide Philosophy of a sentence and Its parts, page. 67-72 74 Vide K. Sästrys com. on V.P page 211- para 1st "तदिदं मीमांसकमतं मनसि निधायाह 75 शक्तिज्ञाप्यश्च यथापदार्थ: तथा वाक्यार्थोपि न काचिदनुपपत्ति:IVideV.P.p.278,80.

76 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀSÂ

In corroborative sentences accordingly the author accepts, according to kumärila, implication in prăsastya and condemnation (in condemnatory sentences)76 The author is of opinion that it is implication in a sentence (Vākyalaksanä) in arthavada sentences; if it were a case of word implication we could have only one word instead of many in a sentence; the other words would be purpose- less. Hence he accepts that all the words in corroborative (Arthaväda) statements imply commending and condemning and agree with the injunctive word and form one single sentence. Thus he establishes padaikavākyatã for arthavda vkyas in this case. Then the question arises where is the scope for unitary passage in respect of a sentence then?

The author replies that, where there are more than one sentence which agree with one another and signify the meaning of the Mahäväkyas, there is a unitary passage in respect ofsentence, e.g. between sentences like 'one who desires heaven should perform the now and full-moon sacrifices, and 'one should perform the samidh sacrifice', there is unitary passage when the relation of whole and the parts is conveyed by them. Here he cites Kumärila's77 sanction. "Sentences that are complete in themselves as regards the expression of their meanings again combine in view of their relatior of whole and part etc. and become a unitary passage".

76 The idea is that the arthavádaväkya agrees as a word, but not as a sentence with the injunctive sentence. Vide A.K. Sástrys Com. on V.P. page 212-213 77 Tantravirtika verse 4 under Pürva Mimämsa Sütra 1.iv.24.

77

PRESUMPTION (ARTHĀPATTI)

Purva Mimãmsã and Advaita Vedănta establish presumption to be a separate means of valid knowledge as different from Inference. It is a process of assuming some unknown fact in order to account for a well-known fact which is otherwise inexplicable Sābara defines arthãpatti as the supposition of a thing not seen on the ground that a thing heard or seen in otherwise not possible.1 For instance Devadatta who is alive is not found at home, then there anses an assumpton that Devadatta is outside the house Unless this is assumed, the fact of his being alive, stands unexplained.

Prabhãkara explains presumption as follows: We observe some fact and if that fact is to be proved, another thing is to be assumed Then that assumption of the thing is called arthãpatti Prabhäkara holds that there must be an element of doubt as to the truth of the two inconsistent facts perceived.

The element of doubt is removed by the presumption This Is the fact which distinguishes arthäpatti frominference The person Devadatta is alive and his absence from the house is perceived. By this perception, a doubt as to whether the person is alive or not strikes the mind. This doubt will exist till it is assumed that he is outside. So his existence outside removes the doubt This is the function of the presumptive cognition.

But this is not acceptuble to Kumãrila Bhatta. According to Bhatta the concept of presumption lies not in doubt but in mental irreconcilability between two established facts. Thatinconsistency is removed by the cognition of a third fact and it is this last cognition

1. अर्थापत्तिरपिद्टष्ट श्ृतोवार्थोन्यथा नोपपद्यते इत्यर्थकल्पनायथाजीवतोदेवदत्तस्यगृहाभावदशनिन बहिर्भावस्यादृष्टस्य परिकल्पना - S&baraphasya-38 page G. Jha Púrva Mimămsa in its sources page 157

78 VEDÂNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

that settles presumption. In the above given example, if the man's existence is doubtful then it is not treated as the basis for the presumption. If the person's living is certain then only the presumption operates. So there cannot be any doubt about the life of Devadatta. Only the certainty of his life associated with the cognition of the absence from the house, gives us the presumption that, he is outside the house. Kumãrila illustrates several kinds of presumption in his sloka Vartika.2

Dharmarãja explains presumption following the Mimãmsakas's view Arthäpatti is the presumption of a fact to account for an (otherwise) unintelligible fact. A person is known to be stout, though he fasts during the day. Then that stoutness becomes unintelligible without the assumption of his eating at night 3 So eating at night makes the fact 'stoutness' intelligible. It may be observed here that upapãdyajñana should be taken as upãpãdyajñãna only when we consider this point. Otherwise there will be overlapping on the apperception of the upapãdyajñãna which is produced from the upapãdyajñāna itself. According to Dharmarãja arthãpatt does not overlap on the vyatirekyanumãna4 (as stated by the logician) for, the later has already been rejected by the advaitin5

Here the author of the commentary Sıkhãmani with a soft corner for the logician's point of view suggests that, in the alternative of Vyatirekyanumãna being admitted, it is possible to arrive at the anvayavyāptijnāna from the vyatirekisahacărijnāna. But it is inter- esting to note that citsukha® criticises this view point by stating that the absence of Devadatta is present only in the house but not in

2 Kumārıla, has shown several Arthāpattıs Vide Slokavartıka page 390 onwards Presumption based on perception, etc Vide Advarta Epistemology page 165 3 Vide V.P. page 309 4 Fordetailed argumentvide Sikhāmani, p 308 (line 9to 12) Maniprabhā line 17 5 Vide chapter on Inference. 6 Vide Citsukha's Tattvapradipikā, page 429, line 8.

PRESUMPTION (ARTHÃPATTI) 79

Devadatta.7. Whatever is unintelligible when some other fact is not known, that particular fact is the upapadaka. In the present case unless eating at night is assumed the fact of being fat in the case of a man who does not eat by day is not intelligible and as such to make the statement intelligible eating at night should be assumed. Here eating at night is the fruit of the presumption and the cognition of what is to be made intelligible "stoutness" is the special cause.

Here the word Arthäpatti applies both to the result and the instrument. When the result is intended to be stated it should be viewed as a genitive compound8(a) as "the assumption of a thing" (eating at night). Here the meaning of the word 'apatti' is Kalpana. When the special cause is intended we have to consider it as a compound of Bahuvrihi, 8(b) meaning that from which a thing is assumed. Here the word means that by which Kalpana is made.9

Citsukha has raised a very pertinent doubt as to whether there is the relation of the type of Avinbhutatva between the Kalpya and Kalpaka. If there is the relation of the type Avinābhāva (Avinäbhãvasambandha) then arthäpatti is nothing but another name for anumäna. In the alternative if the thing is not specific (aniyata) anything in the world could be a Kalpaka10, not to the particular presumptron made.

7 For further argument vide Citsukhi page 430, Il.3 to 7 in the example of arthäpattı namely jıvan Devadattah bahirasti grhe abhāvāt 8 (a) अर्थस्य आपत्ति: कल्पना (Gen Compound) (b) अर्थस्य आपत्तिः यस्याः सा (Bah Compound) 9 Vide Mm. A.K. Śāstry's Commentary on VP page 238, 4th para, vide V.P.रात्रिभोजनकल्पनारूपायां प्रमितौ अर्थस्य आपत्तिः कल्पना इति षष्ठी समासेन अर्थापत्ति शब्दो वर्तते।etc.310 10 The replyforthis should be found in Dharmaraja's statement तत्र किमिदं तेन विना अनुपपन्नत्वम्। तदभाव व्यापकीभूताभावप्रतियोगित्वमिति ब्रूमः।

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The author of the Vedãnta Paribhãsã is of the definite opinion that when arthäpatti is accepted as a separate means of valid knowledge (vyatirekyanumäna) inference based on the negative concomitance is excluded from the purview of the pramãnas11. He argues that in the statement "Earth is different from the other elements" as (Gandhavatva) possession of odour is not intelligible without difference from the others (itarabheda) · it is assumed that the earth has (itarabheda) difference from (other entities like) the earth He has also pointed out that the apperception (Anuvyavasãya) In this case is only of the form (prthivyãmitarabhedam kalpayãmi), 'I am assuming difference (from other things) in the earth'.

The point has been well noted by Dharmarãja that in the absence of inference based on negative concomitance (vyatirekyanumãna), in the advaitin's point of view, it is quite essential to admit arthăpatti without which falsehood cannot be established in the case of silver (rajata) etc.12 in invalid knowledge.

This presumption is of two types13 1. Presumption from what is seen (drstärthäpatti) 2. Presumption from what is heard (srtärthãpattı). The former type is the assumption of a third fact to explain the apparent incongruity contained in the two perceived facts This can be illustrated from the example of illusory silver A person first apprehends something else as silver Afterwards he denies that it is not silver. Discarding the silver, he assumes that the silver appearing as such is false. This is a case of drstărthãpatti.

The other type is the assumption of a sense on account of the unintelligibility in the sense. For instance, in the chändogya

11 But for the opposite view being favoured by Kumārila -- Vide Slokavārtika "एवं स्वभावात्यनुमानशब्दं लभेत येदस्तु यथेप्सितं नः"IVerses ed.by Madras Univ 12 Vide V.P. page 311. 13 Prabhäkara interprets the word of Sabara "drstova srto" as meaning the samething. Drsta means well known and srta is another word meaning the same thing in common usage. Thus according to Prabhäkara, there is no srtärthāpatti.

PRESUMPTION (ARTHĀPATTI) 81

upanisad it is stated "The knower of the selftranscends grief".14 This is unintelligible since the bonds represented by the word (soka) 'grief cannot be thrown out by knowing the self. So the sense of falsehood (of the bond) is to be presumed in order to make it intelligible.

This srutärthäpatti is again of two types non-intelligibility due to incompleteness ofverbal expression (Abhidãna) and (2) that due to the incompleteness of the meaning (Abhihita). In the first case, we assume some additional word on hearing a part of the sentence, in order to get at the intention of the speaker. The word 'door' when uttered does not have any syntactical relation. So we have to supplement the word 'close' in order to make it intelligible. Here in a statement like "one should perform visvagit sacrifice" without the help of the word denoting the subject, sacrifice is rendered unintelligible. Hence the word "one who desires heaven" has to be assumed.

The other type, the Abhihita type is explained thus. When it is stated "He, who desires Heaven, should perform Jyotistoma, then there is a doubt as to how a momentary sacrificial rite leads one to heaven which is after life. There we have to assume the existence of the unseen (apúrva) between the present act and the ultimate result.15

14 तरति शोकमात्मवित् - Ch.UpanigadVil-1.3 15 Vide V.P. page 313.

82 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀSÃ

NON-PERCEPTION OR ANUPALABDHI

The Advaitins and the Bhätta Mimamsaka hold the view that the absence of an object or its attribute from a locus is known only through the means known as no-apprehension (anupalabdhi) but not by any other means of knowledge like perception. The non- existence of a thing is apprehended by its non-perception Non-apprehension of a thing is a means to the apprehension of its non-existence. The author of the Slokavärtika speaks of non- apprehension as nothing butthe absence of the five previously stated pramãnas.1 That is to say that, in a case where the pramãnas like perception fail to operate efficiently in bringing about the knowledge ofthe existence of an object, we have the idea ofthe non-existence of an object and the means by which we comprehend the non- existence is called Non-perception. According to Prabhäkara the non-existence of an object is not different from its actual locus, that is to say that the absence of a pot on the floor is not different from the floor itself. This view is rejected by almost all of the schools of philosophy including the Bhãtta Mimämsakas and the Advaitins. Părthasārathi Mišra holds that existence and non-existence are two different aspects of a thing. It cannot be stated that the non-existence of a jar is identical with its locus, say, ground. The Bhättas hold that existence and non- existence cannot by any means be reduced to non-existence and existence respectively.2 According to the author of the Vedanta Paribhāsă anupalabdhi is the special cause ofthe experience ofnon- existence which is not generated by a special means in the form of knowledge.3 In this definition, the word 'experience' serves to

1 प्रमाणपंचकाभावो अनुपलब्धिः। प्रमाणपंचकं यत्र वस्तुरूपेण जायते। वस्तु सत्वावबोधार्थ तत्राभावप्रमाणता। Slokavārtika vide p.409 Abhāvavāda 2 Vide 'Six ways of knwoing' - D.M. Datta - page 160 3 ज्ञानकरणाजन्याभावानुभवासाधारण कारणमनुपलन्धिरूपं प्रमाणम्।

NON-PERCEPTION OR ANUPALABDHI 83

exclude the definition from overlapping on samskara which is the special cause of a memory of non-existence. That is to say the simple word jñãna has been used in the definition since (abhãvasmrti) recollection ofnon-existence which has got samskära for its efficient cause will have to be considered as anupalabdhi. The word 'which is not generated by a special means of knowledge of the form of cognition'ıs used in order to exclude inference of non-existence etc. The idea here is that anupalabdhi only by virtue of its existence (svarupasati)4 is a cause of the knowledge of the non-existence of an object but not by virtue of its being cognised (na tu jñãtã) like the sense organ in pratyaksa, in which case even inference leading to abhãva jñãna through cognition would come under the scope of anupalabdhi. Otherwise, as Citsukhã states, Anupalabdhı pramãna itself is to be cognised by another Anupalabdhi and so on ad Infinitum. He also clarifies that if anupalambha by itselfis the cause ofa knowledge ofthe non-existence even in deep sleep there should be a knowledge ofnon-existence. In order to avoid this contingency ifwe include the phrase 'yogya'as an epithet of anupalabdhı, it does not save the situation for from yogyanupalabdhi it must be stated the knowledge of non-existence is produced as fire from smoke. Then where is the question of its being a separate pramãna. Citsukhã continues his prima facia argument by stating that anupalabdhi does not come under inference because it need not be known, otherwise there should be (anavasthä) regresses ad infinitum. To this the possible reply is that as for upalabdhi, for anupalabdhi as well the säksin is the cause. Otherwise even the Vedäntin cannot come out of the clutches of (anavasthã) regresses ad infinitum. If anupalabdhi is not at all cognised, its instrumentality (karaņatva) which is to be cognised, will not be cognised. If, for the purpose, another anupalabdhi is accepted there is anavasthã again.

Vide Tattvapradipikā - page 435 ońwards Vide Mm. A.K. Śastry's com on V P page 243

34 VEDÂNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

Asecond valid objection raised by Citsukha is that anupalabdhi cannot be an efficient means of valid knowledge because its Intermediate activity is not stated-Neither the recollection of the counterpositive (pratiyogismarana) nor cognition of its locus (adhıkaranagrahanam) cannot be considered to be its vyãpära, as those two are of the positive type of knowledge and hence cannot be generated from anupalambha, a negative object.5 Here a question naturally arises whether anupalabdhi is a separate pramãna According to the logicians non-existence is cognised only with the help of the sense organ and comes under the scope of perception.6 According to the logician, however, in the case of ajñatãnupalabdhi non-existence is cognised by the sense organ itself since its activity does not cease; till then anupalabdhı Is a sahakärın (helping cause) but in places where anupalabdhi is cognised it is a case only of inference but not non-cognition. They hold that the sense organ with the aid of the helping cause (sahkri kärana) in the form of anupalabdhi is capable of producing a knowledge of non-existence and as such there is no need for a separate means of knowledge called anupalabdhi.7 Their idea is that when the pot is apprehended the non-existence of the pot is not apprehended and hence the non-apprehension of the counter positive (pratiyogyãnupalabdhi) i only a helping cause ofthe sense organ but not a separate means of knowledge. They also advance the argument that after a knowledge of non-existence like 'there is no pot here' there cannot be an apperception of the type 'I am perceiving the non-existence ofthe pot here'. They hold that where anupalabdhi not cognised is the cause it is a case of pratyaksa, where it is cognised it is a case of inference.

5 For other arguments vide Citsukha's Tattvapradıpika p.438 onwards. 6 येनेन्द्रियेण या व्यक्तिमृंहयतं तेनेन्द्रियेण तद्गता जाति:तदभावश्च गृह्यते। 7 Vide Tarkadipika and Nilakanthiya on that page 244 of T S

NON-PERCEPTION OR ANUPALABDHI 85

Both the Präbhäkara and the Bhätta Mimämsakas reject the knowledge of non-existence as caused by the sense organ since there is no contact between the sense organ and the thing absent. Hence there should be another pramäna which establishes non- existence or at least the relation between the non-existence and its locus.8 It may not be urged that even in the case of inference of supersensuous non-existence, anupalabdhi may be considered as the special causeº for, as the author of the Paribhãsa says, though there is the non-apprehension of merit etc in such cases, a definite knowledge of the absence of merit etc. is notthere. Hence he propounds that yogyånupalabdhi is he cause of knowledge ofnon- existence. The author ofthe commentary ofthe Vedãntaparibhãsã, (Mm. Anantakrsnasästry) however, does not agree with this point of view as expressed by the authors of the Sikhãmani and Ãsubodhini commentaries since it comes into conflict with the statement of kumārila that pramãna pancakăbhãva s the cause of non-existence but not the negation of pratyaksapramã na alone 10 Then Mm. A.K. Sastry will have to reconcile the statement of the author "atindriyabhavānumitisthalepi" etc. This means of non-cognition is useful only when the objects are capable of being perceived, had they existed Ifthe roomis filled with darkness then the object in that locus is not perceived Here the non-cognition is not operative for this reason, that only when light etc. exist, there is yogyatva in the non-cognition (anupalabdhi) as "had a pot existed here it would have been seen" As light is not existing in the present case, there is no yogyãnupalabdhi and hence non-cognition of a pot cannot operate. Dharmaräja holds along with the other theorists that compe- tent (yogyänupalabdhi) non-cognition is the efficient means. But a very interesting question has been raised by the author as to the

8 For details vide Mm. A.K. Sästry's comm on V P page 245 para 2 9 Forexample असौ धर्माभाववान् वेदविहितकर्मवत्त्वात्। 10 Mm. A.K Sästry's comm. on V.P page 249 para - 1

85 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀSĂ

formation of the word yogyänupalabdhi-whether it is a genitive compound (Yogyasya anupalabdhih) of the non-cognition of the competent or locative compound yogye (adhikarane) anupalabdhi. The author is of the view neither of these alternatives serves the purpose for, on the first alternative11 there is the contingency ofthe difference from the demon existing in the post (stambha) becoming non-perceptual.12 Nor is the second alternative13 valid since there Is the unwelcome contingency of the negation of merit (dharmãbhãva) etc existing in the soul becoming perceptual. Thus our author scores out the possibility of either the genitive compound or the locative compound and resorts to the karmadhãraya compound when he speaks of yogyãnupalabdhı 14 The idea is that the means ofvalid cognition of non-existence is only a competent non-cognition (yogyãnupalabdhi but not any anupalabdhi). So much so a definition of yogyata in the anupalabdhi concerned has to be carefully defined. The author accepts the Naiyäyika definition of yogyatã ofanupalabdhi as "Being possessed of a cognition of a counterpositive which has been imposed by the existence of the posited counter positive 15 The idea is that when we apprehend the non-existence ofthe pot, there is the possibility of supposition (ăpădana) that the pot would have been perceived had it been on the floor (of course when there is the aid of light etc.) and hence there is yogyata present in the anupalabdhi. And as a result of this, the absence of the pot

11 Yogyasya pratıyogınah anupalabdhı Vıde V P page 317 12 That is to say that the post is ,not a demon is an object of perception and according to this alternative definition it should become non-perceptual 13 योग्ये (अधिकरणे) (प्रतियोगिनः) अनुपलब्धि: IVP-317 14 योग्याचासौ अनुपलब्धि: च। 15 त्क्तिप्रतियोगिसत्वप्रसञ्जित प्रतियोगि उपलब्धिकत्वम्। For an explanation of this compound vide V.P .- 249 अधिकरणे तर्कितेन प्रतियोगसत्वेन प्रसञ्जनयोग्यं आपादनयोग्यं प्रतियोग्यनुपलब्धिस्वरूपं यस्य अनुपलंभस्य अनुपलब्धे: तद् योग्यत्वम्।

NON-PERCEPTION OR ANUPALABDHI 87

Is cognised. But in darkness it is not possible to make such a supposition (ãpãdana) because of the absence of light. Similarly In the non-existence of a demon (pisaca) in the pillar, the supposition (ăpãdana) is of the form 'yadi stambhe pisãcah syãt, tarhi upalabhyeta stambhatvavät'. Hence there is the competent non-cognition in this case also and thus the absence of a demon in the post is arrived at by non-cognition In the case of the absence of merit, and the absence of demerit in the soul, since these two are supersensuous and the concerned supposition is not rendered possible, it cannot be stated that the absence of merit and demerit etc. (dharmãdharmädyabhäva) is arrived at through non-cognition Thus the supposition (ãpädana) of the cognition of the counterpositive is different in different places, sometimes due to the subject being incompetent (ayogya), sometimes due to the absence of necessary perceptual causes and other reasons. We have already seen earlier that the point of view of the Naiyãyika in this respect is that the sense organ be taken as the already established means and anupalabdhi as its aiding cause (sahakărikäraņa). To this along with the Mimmsaka the Advaitin replies that, though the presence of the established sense organ is a condition precedent in cognising non-existence, it should not be taken that it is the efficient means even in the case of the mental mode in the form ofnon-existence. The reason given by the Advaitin is that, since non-cognition also is an established reason, it is considered by him to be the instrument (karana), for this reason that the sense organ has no contact with the negation; even the activity of the sense organ which the opponent speaks of as inevitable ceases with the perception of the locus of the negation (abhävädhikarana) and hence the sense organ becomes a super- fluity (anyathāsiddha). Another subtle point has been raised by the author in this connection. This also is an original contingency raised and solved by him. The author states prima facie that the opponent may hold

88 VEDÂNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

that, as the resulting knowledge of abhäva (e.g. there is no pot on the floor) is a sense percept according to both, it may be argued that consciousness limited by the non-existence of the pot (ghatäbhävävacchinna caitanya) has become non-different from the pramăta as with the consciousness limited by the floor (bhùtalãvacchinna caitanya) and as such knowledge ofthe absence of the pot (ghatăbhãvajnãna) should be a case of perception; but he finally rejects the view by stating that though knowledge of abhãva is pratyaksa there is no rule that its instrument (karana) also should be pratyaksa. As an example of this the author quotes the well known instance of "you are the tenth" (dasamastvamasi), where its knowledge though perceptual, its karaņa happens to be verbal testimony which is different from the means of perception It should not be urged that a particular knowledge should result from one particular efficient means (karana) only. (There may be a difference in the means). A different mental mode (vrtti) is enough to deem something to be a pramna. Thus a knowledge of the absence of the jar, according to him,16 is not produced from the sense organ as there is no contact but it is produced from the non-cognition of the pot (ghatänupalambha) which is a different pramāņa The astute intellect of the author raises another intricate question here that, even in the case of non-cognition being a different pramãna, since the cognition of non-existence is pratyaksa, there is the strange contingency ofindescribable non-existence of the jar (anirvacaniya ghatăbhãva) where, in a particular spot where there is a pot, the invalid knowledge of non-existence of the pot also becomes pratyaksa. The objection here states that this position cannot be accepted by the Vedäntin for, if this indescribable non- existence of the pot be considered to be produced from Mãyã (cosmic illusion), the efficient cause, it cannot be a non-existence. If it is not produced from Mäyã, then there is the contigency that

16 Vide V.P. page 322

NON-PERCEPTION OR ANUPALABDHI 89

all products are not produced from mäyã which stand the Vedantin cannot take. To this the author replies that, in this case17 the invalid knowledge of the absence of pot (ghatbhäva) does not relate to the absence of pot (ghatbhãva) which is produced at that particular moment, but it is a phenomenal non-existence of pot (laukikaghatäbhãva) which is superimposed on the floor. Here the author accepts anyathaākhyāti alone and not anirvacaniyakhyāti. This is the case in all places where there is sense contact (sannikarsa) of the superimposed object.18 This is a bold divergence from the Advaitic point of view. Even accepting that, in such cases, the non-existence of pot etc. is considered indescribable (anitvacaniya) the author argues that Mãyã alone is the efficient cause (upădãna). He boldly asserts that there is no necessity for entire similarity (sajätya) between the material cause and its products as between the thread hood (Tantutva) and clothhood (patatva). But if it is insisted that some similarity (sãjätya) should be there then between Mãyã and anirvacaniya there is sımilarity (sãjätya) in the form of falsehood. (Mithyãtva).

Another doubt is raised here. If the Advaitin accepts the objects of two different classes (jãtis) could be material cause (upãdäna) and effect (upãdeya), then he is forced to accept that Brahman is the material cause ofthis world. To this the author replies that this is acceptable to him for Brahman can be the (upãdãna kāraņa) material cause of this world because it is the substratum of the false knowledge of this world, though he does not accept Brahman to be the material cause by the process of evolution as Brahman has no parts.19

17 Where there is the invalid knowledge of non-existence of pot in a place where there is a pot. 18 Vide Sikhāmani page 324. 19 Vide V.P. pegé 323-325.

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The author of the commentary Sikhamani gives ample argument to contradict the author ofthe Vedäntaparibhãsã on non- cognition being advocated as a separate pramãna. The argument deserves to be seriously discussed 20 As the commentator himself states the reply is very difficult to his objection The commentator rases a question why anupalabdhi Is considered as a separate pramãna. Is it because, (1) no other pramãna is consistent here or (2) because ofthe force of expenence On the first alternative he argues that a sense organ is an established pramãna, it may be considered thatitis a pramãna of non-existence. it should not be argued, however, that there is no relation between the sense organ and the non-existence sınce samyukta visesanatã may be considered to be the relation because there is the experience there is a negation of the pot on the floor "bhutale ghatabhavah"21 He also gives another reason in the form of inference 22 Otherwise, he argues, that the author himself will have to be considered as having contradicted himself-in his statements23 like 'dhvamasasya svãdhikarana kapälanäsena'. Sothe author should have considered some relation, let it be the relation ofthe nature ofsvarupasambandha or any other Even the second alternative does not hold good for there is the experience, "I see the potless floor". This apperception clearly states that the knowledge of non-existence is pratyaksa. Another reason stated is thatin pratyaksapramã, pratyakșapramāņa Is the karana. This is the general rule and the knowledge of non- existence also is pratyaksa as accepted by the Advaitin. Without a sound (badhaka) obstacle the same sense organ can produce a knowledge of non-existence. Therefore non-cognition cannot be a separate means.

20 Vide Sikhāmanı on Vedānta Paribhāsā page 331 - 'atradam ālocaniyam' onwards 21 चक्षु:संयुक्ते भूतले घटाभावो विशेषणम्। 22 घटाभावज्ञानं संबन्धविषयकं विशिष्ट ज्ञानत्वात्। 23 ध्वंसस्यस्वाधिकरण कपालनाशेन and also अधिकरण सादित्वे Vide V.P.page 326

NON-PERCEPTION OR ANUPALABDHI 91

But the author ofthe Maniprabhã tries to vindicate the author's view in his commentary.24

KINDS OF NON-EXISTENCE

The Advaitin accepts the view of the logician on the fourfold division of the prameya of non-existence.25 (1) Previous non- existence (pragabhava), (2) Destructional non-existence (dhvamsãbhãva), (3) Absolute non-existence (atyntãbhãva) (4) Mutual non-existence (anyonyãbhãva) of difference (bheda) The absence of an effect (a jar) in its cause (clay etc ) before the effect is produced, is known as previous non-existence This Is cognised by a statement such as 'there will be a pot'. Sıkhãmani gives a more comprehensive definition of this absence 26 Unless this kind of abhava is accepted the same pot should be produced again and again. This has no beginning but has an end when the effect is produced, according to the logician

Destructional non-existence is the absence of a thing e.g. a pot is cognised by statements like 'the pot is destroyed' According to the logician due to destruction of the asamavãyıkarana in an object a thing is destroyed And this destructional non-existence according to him is endless because the particular pot continues to be non-existent for ever This view Is not acceptable to an Advaitin.27 He is of the opinion that destructional non-existence itself a destruction, is destroyed when its locus (kapäla) is destroyed. Here the view of the logician is that the absence of an absence is of the form of the counterpositive and as such the logician cannot accept destruction in the case of

24 For details vide Maniprabhā on Šikhāmaņı comm. on V.P. page 332. 25 Nrsimhsrama accepts only Absolute Non-existence see T M.P. Mahadevan Philosophy of Advaita p.46 26 कार्यसमवायकालान्यावृत्तित्व सति कार्योत्पत्ति पूर्वकालीना भावत्वम्। Sikhamani-325 27 Vide Mm. A.K. Sästry's comm. on V.P. page 260-61

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destructional non-existence, for, in that case the destroyed pot should be produced again. But the Advaitin is of the opinion that even the destruction of the pot should be destroyed since both destructional non-existence and previous non-existence are, as a rule, present in the locus of the counterpositive and as such the kapla also becomes the locus of destruction. The idea is that this destruction (of the pot) is destroyed by having no locus when the kapãlas are destroyed. Thus the Advaitin argues that even the destruction of the destruction of the pot is a destruction whose counterpositive is the pot. Ifthis be notaccepted, when the potwhich is of the form of the destruction of the previous non-existence is destroyed, the previous non-existence should reappear. He further questions how, when the locus of the destruction happens to be permanent (nitya), the destruction connected with it can be destroyed. To this he replies that if such a locus be different from consciousness, then it is not nitya, for in the Advaitin' opinion all that is different from Brahman ceases to exist, when Brahmjñãna dawns. It is an established fact in Advaita Vedänta that the destruction of any particular thing produced is nothing but one remaining in the form of its substratum. Absolute non-existence is the absence of a thing at all the times in a place, e.g. there is absolute non-existence of colour in air. The Advaita Vedantin accepts this non-existence also as the counterpositive of destruction. Again the author differs from the Naiyāyikā point of view. The logician thinks that Absolute non- existence is Nitya. The idea is that Absolute non-existenc is destroyed at the time of annihilation though it is long standing like ether etc.

Mutual non-existence popularty called difference is the object of cognitions like ' this is not that (idamidamna)'. So far he agrees with the logician but he differs from him in holding the view that disjunction (vibhäga) and separateness (prthaktva) are not different from Mutual Non-existence whereas the logician views that vibhäga

NON-PERCEPTION OR ANUPALABDHI 93

and prthaktva are two different gunas and Mutual non-existence is a substance coming under the abhava category. One author of the Vedāntaparibhãsa holds that there is no proofto hold that these two are different from mutual non-existence. It is all the same whether he says that is different from that or this is other than that etc

The Advaitin divides Mutual Non-existence into two types, one with a beginning and the other without a beginning. The examples respectively are the absence of cloth in pot, (2) the difference of Brahman from Jiva. But both these differences in his view are the counterpositives ofthe destruction. When the nescience is removed this consequential difference is also removed The Advaitin speaks of another division of Mutual Non-existence into two varieties- conditioned and un-conditioned.

As an example ofthe first type is pot-defined ether and room- defined ether. The one ether on account of the upädhi gets the difference as room-defined ether and pot defined ether Similarly due to difference in the internal organs Brahman also differs from individual to individual. An example of the unconditioned type of Mutual non-existence is the difference of a pot from a piece of cloth etc.

Now there arises an issue that Advaita is at stake in case Mutual Non-existence is accepted between Brahman and the world. To this the Advaitin has a reply. It does not admit a real difference between the two-just as ether limited by pot is not different from the ether limited by the room because both are ether. This world is only superimposed on Brahman. The author concludes the chapter on non-cognition by accepting the ontological category abhäva in the Advaita philosophy. Very few Därsinikas have spoken of this Abhäva in their philosphy. The Sämkhyas hold that absence ofthe potis nothing different from the transformation of the ground. Guru, Prabhákara, has no abhãva substance. The abhäva is of the form ofthe locus as already stated. Though the logician and the Vaisesika speak of abhäva as a category

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the Naiyãyika has no abhãva category. Even Tutãtabhatta, Mimãmsa accepts only four categories, substance (dravya) quality (guna) action (karma) and generality (samãnya) and no abhãva. And why does the Advaitin accept abhava? This is a very pertinent question raised by the author in the ontology part of Advaita Ifthis is not accepted, its varieties previous non-existence etc. are to be avoided in the arguments This is risky position for an Advaitin also. It is not only this author that accepts this category of abhãva as an Advaitin, he quotes, as already stated, statements lıke 'ghatobhavisyati' where previous non-existence etc are expe- rienced He also cites sentences from the Vivarana, and the Tattvapradipikã where abhãva is spoken of 28 According to the Mimãmsaka, as stated earlier, the absence of the five prãmãnas is held to be non-cognition That is to say that by anupalabdhi is meant non-cognition (the cognition may be ofany type, pratyaksa etc.) in which case abhãva should be viewed, as a pramãna. In all these varieties details have to be worked out If on the ether hand, the absence of pratyaksapramãna alone is to be called non-cognition then non-perception alone is anupalabdhi- pramãna. As stated by D M. Datta29 as noticed by Mm A.K Sãstry and expatiated by Datta the point needs to be clarified as to which of these two alternatives is accepted by these theorists It appears as though the Vedantin speaks of the (pratyaksābhãva) absence of pratyaksa type of anupalabdhi and the Mimämsaka of the other alternative though he does not actually comment upon them.

28 a. प्रमाण्यज्ञानं स्वप्रागभावव्यतिरिक्तत्वविषय।Vide Mm.A.K. Sastry's comon V.P page 82 b. Tattvapradipikā page 436-438. 29 D.M Datta-Six ways of knowing, pages 181, 182

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VALIDITY OF KNOWLEDGE

After the pramna have been discussed there arises a question whether the knowledge obtained by these pramãnas is valid Intrinsically or extrinsically. The question of the definition of prãmãnya also arises Different scholars have expressed different views about this. Validity means the certitude of the knowledge obtained The Naiyayika holds that by validity is meant that nature of knowledge where in 'that"1 is the attribute in the locus of 'that' 2 That is to say when we cognise the dharma, pothood in the substratum of pothood, then there is validity in that piece of knowledge. Otherwise it is invalid.3 This view is refuted by the Advaitin We shall consider later how it has been refuted by the author of the Vedãntaparibhãșã There is a great controversy which has raged for several centuries whether validity of knowledge is cognised from internal sources or from external sources i.e. to say whether knowledge gains its validity from its own sources or from some external sources This is considered from two points of view generally-in its produc- tional aspect (utpattau) and in its cognitional aspect (jñaptau).4 The Samkhyas hold that validity and invalidity of knowledge obtained by the pramãnas is intrinsically valid quite in accordance with their satkäryaväda.5 The Bhätta school of Mimämsa6 also subscribes to the above view of the samkhya on validity only, but for them invalidity is from external sources. Unlike the Vedantin, the Naiyäyikas hold the theory of the extrinsic validity of knowledge

1 I.e a particular धर्म 2 तद्वति तत्प्रकारक ज्ञानत्वम् Vide T.S. page 33 3 तद भाववति तत्प्रकारकं ज्ञानम् Ibid page 344 4 उत्पत्तौ स्वतस्त्वम् and ज्ञप्तौ स्वतस्त्वम्। 5 What does not exist cannot come into existence 6 Vide Mm A.K. Sästry's com. on V P. page 266 & vide Slokavrtıka page 56 onwards

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(paratah prāmānya). The Naiyãyikã argues ıf every knowledge is certified by intrinsic validity then there is no possibility for a doubt which is sometimes experienced by men. In case the Mımãmsaka view is accepted it results that there is no invalidity even in the case of illusory knowledge. The validity of any knowledge is testified to by its practical efficiency in the production of the purpose expected to be served by it (arthakriyã jñãna). When the activity involved in bringing about the desired object is successful then that knowledge with which we have started is valid. If it be questioned as to how the cognition itself is proved to be valid or invalid, the Naiyãyika argues that there is no fault ofregresses ad infinitum since the result ofour activity will have been achieved by then Or otherwise as long as there persists a doubt about validity of any knowledge it is necessary to make an inference. But the doubt will not persist in the individual unceasingly. The Advaitin argues that the validity of cognition is self-evident. The question ofvalidity has been discussed at least from two points of view in the productional aspect (utpattau) and the cognitional aspect (jñaptau). They hold that cognition and its validity are produced at one and the same time and also cognised from the same causes. Dharmarãja tries to define validity which is common to both recollection and experience (anubhava). The definition runs as follows:7 validity (of knowledge) is that nature of knowledge which has that' as the attributive in the locus of the 'that'. For example a knowledge in which potness is attributive to its substratum (pot) is valid. And this validity is produced from the common causes of knowledge. This is what is called Intrinsicity (svatastvam) in the productional aspect.8 The very causes of knowledge which produce the knowledge produce validity also. This is the theory of the Vedäntin. He holds that no other cause in the form ofguna (merit) is necessary for the production of validity. The Naiyäyika holds that guna in the form of frequent contact between

7 स्मृत्यनुभवसाधारणं संवादिप्रवृत्त्यनुकूलं तद्वति तत्प्रकारकज्ञानत्वं प्रामाण्यम्V.P.page333 8 उत्पत्तौस्वतस्त्वम्।

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the sense-organ and the object, correct reason etc. are the gunas (merits) (in the knowledge that produce validity. The Advaitin rejects this view of the naiyayika for this reason that there is no common guna that can be traced in all the different pieces ofknowledge. Nor is it possible to hold that a frequent contact of the sense organ and the parts of the objects produces validity for there is no such possibility in the case of the perception of colour or Ãtman since colour and Atman both do hot have parts. Even if it be urged that the contact of the sense organ and the object produce validity, it is wrong since the perception the 'conch is 'yellow' is invalid. Same is the case with all the other pramãnas-Inference etc. It should not, however, be urged that in the Vedäntin's view even invalid knowledge (apramã) becomes valid (pramã) because there is no difference in the case of the two as the totality of the causes of knowledge are the same. To this the Vedãntin replies that the absence of defect is an additional cause in the case of invalidity.9 But on this ground the Naiyãyika cannot dispute that knowledge is validated from an external cause (dosãbhãva) for the Vedäntin is of the opinion that externality comes in when there is a positive cause which comes from outside adventitiously. That is to say 'dosābhāva sahakrtajñănasāmānyasāmagri janyatvam utpattauh paratastvam10. The same view has been expressed by Citsukha also. Now the Advaitin turns his attention to his svatahprămãnyavãda in the cognitional aspect (Jñaptausvatastvam) validity as intrinsically cognisedi.e. as being cognised by totality of causes which cognise the particular knowledge when there is no defect present.11 Here 'svāsraya' is prāmānyāsraya i.e. vrttijñāna, and the cause of its

9 Vide Mm.A.K. Sästry's com. page 269-70 10 Vide आहु: विज्ञानसामग्री etc. Vide Citsukhi page 215 11 स्वतो ग्राह्यत्वं च दोषाभावे सति यावत्स्वार्श्रयग्राहकसामग्रीग्राह्यत्वम्। Vide page 336

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cognition (tadgrãhakam) is witness-self i.e the consciousness limited by the pramätr (pramãtrcaitanya). When the vrttijnãna is cognised by the säksin, at the very same time (and with the same causes) the validity of knowledge is also cognised Now the Naiyãyika raises an issue that ın case the prãmãnya Is from internal sources, any doubt about it cannot arise at all To this the reply of the Vedäntin is that, in view of doubt (samsaya) sometimes setting in, it should be concluded that there should be a defect present and thus since the causes grasping its substratum (svãsrayagrãhakasãmagri) are not qualified by dosabhãva, a cog- nition of validity cannot ensue. But even here the Vedäntin is not satisfied with his argument since the totality of causes (sãmagri) Is not the general samagri in both validity and invalidity as stated in the definition as, in the case of invalidity (samsaya) 'dosãbhãva' Is an additional qualification inserted and hence there is difference In the meaning of the word 'sva' (svapada) in the two cases and hence he proposes another better definition of'svatastva' 12 By spontaneity (svatastvam) is meant 'deserving to be cognised by the totality of causes of the knowledge (with whose validity we are concerned) The idea here is that, according to this definition, in the case of samsaya though that capacity (yogyatã) is present, it is not cognised because of the presence of a defect. Hence the doubt Is justified. As regards invalidity (aprãmănya) the Vedăntin takes a different stand aligning himself with the Mimamsaka here also. He states invalidity of knowledge in the cognitional aspect is not caused by the totality of the general causes of the knowledge alone. Invalidity is caused by 'defect' as an additional cause. He does not admit that invalidity is cognised by the totality of the causes of knowledge because the qualifying epithet 'the absence of thať' (tadabhãva) which is included in the definition ofinvalidity (aprãmänya) has not been cognised by the vrttijñäna and as such the jivasäksin

12 यावत्स्वाश्रयग्राहकग्राह्यत्वयाग्यत्वम्।V.P page 338

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also cannot cognised it How then is invalidity (aprãmãnya) cognised according to the Vedäntin? In this case, he agrees with the Naiyayıka and Mimamsaka that invalidıty is cognised by an Inference where 'unsuccessful effort' (visamvãdipravrtti) is the mark.13 Thus to the Vedãntin validity is from internal sources and Invalidity from external sources in both the aspects productional as well as cognitional.

13 इदं ज्ञानमप्रमा, विसंवादिप्रवृत्तिजनकत्तवात् is the Inference

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IS MIND OR ANTAHKARANA - A SENSE ORGAN

Among the two main branches of Advaita Vedãnta, Bhãmati Prasthãna and Vivarana Prasthäna, the Bhämati holds the mind to be a sense organ1 while the other considers it is not one. Văcaspatı opines that pleasure, pain etc. are considered to be real knowledge (valid) as they are sense (mind) produced. In the view ofthe Vivarana they are not sense-produced but they are manifested by the witness- self (sãksibhãsya). In the Vedãnta Paribhãsã it is explained thus The consciousness defined by pleasure pain etc. and conscious- ness defined by the mode of pleasure etc are present in the same locus, and hence the perception of pleasure etc The activity of the sense organ is not required in the case of internal perception since pleasure, pain etc. are cognised by the witness-self sãksin According to the logician there is no antahkarana different from manas and this manas is considered to be an internal sense organ and itis established as the means of a direct perception of pleasure, pain etc. (It has been of necessity accepted by him) since knowledges of all the senses and all the object are not produced at the same time3 An agency which controls knowledge as connected with one object at a time should be accepted as intervening and it is the mind according to the Tärkika. The seat of all knowledge (jñãna) is considered to be the soul and all through the waking state it is deemed that the Åtman and the mind are in contact with each other and as such throughout the state there is some knowledge or other produced. According to them, the mind is atomical in size since it produces one knowledge at a time.

1 मनसस्तु इन्द्रियत्वे स्मृतेरवगते ? etc. Vide Bhamati 2-4-17,p.646. 2 सुखाद्युपलब्धिसाधनं इन्द्रियं मनः।. Tarkasamgrahp.20 3 युगपत् ज्ञानानुतपत्तिर्मनसो लिड़गम् Tattvacintamani, Chapter Manas.Nyayasutras 1-1-16.

IS MIND OR ANTAHKARANA - A SENSE ORGAN 101

According to the Naryãyka, manas in considered to be a supersensuous object (atindriya) in common with all the other senses. But this theory of the Naiyayika is rejected by the author of the Vedanta Paribhäsã on the lines of the vivarana as opposed to that of the Bhãmatı 4

The question whether mind is a sense organ or not has been discussed by the Vedantin and finally maintained by him that it is not a sense organ. He criticises the definition of 'sense organ' as given by the Logician The logician defines the sense organ as the seat of mind contact which is a cause of knowledge while not being the seat of an unmanifested special quality which is different from sabda5 and this definition applies equally to the mind also and as such the mind is a sense organ Here the word ending the 'satı' has been used in order to exclude Atman from the purview of the definition Since the contact of Manas, the cause of knowledge is present in the sense organs, they are called ındrıyas The Vedãntin argues that the contact of mind (Manssamyoga) is present only in the five sense organs but not in the mind since its own contact cannot subsist in itself Hence Manas cannot be a sense organ even according to the Logician The author of the Vedãnta Paribhãsã holds that there is no valıd proof in stating that the antahkarna is a sense organ. The Inference 6 that the antahkarana is an atındrıya because itis a sense organ'is in the opinion of the Advaitin a fallacy of the svarupasiddha type since 'indriyatva' the hetu is not present in the mind. He totally rejects the view that there is any pramãna ofthe verbal Testimony

4 Vide Bhāmati on sutrabhāsya 2-4-17 page 647 Mm A K Sāstry's com on V.P page 41 43 5 Sabdetarodbhutavısesagunānāsrayatve satı Jñānakāranamanassamyogāsrayatvam For other reasons why Mind cannot be a sense organ. Vide Introduction of V.P. P.26. (Venkateswara Steam Press, Bombay) 6 मनः अतीन्द्रियं इन्द्रियत्त्वात्, चक्षुरादिवत्।

VEDANTAPARIBHĀSĀ

type anywhere in the holy texts (srutis) to this effect He appears to reject the view of the lexicographers like Amara who accept that the mind is a sense organ He also probably contradict the view of the statements attributed to Manu,8 that manas partakes of the qualities of both the senses of knowledge and senses of action.

Dharmaraja does not appear to refute the Naiyayika's theory that Manas is an indriya directly on the basis of any .other inference than by stating that there is no valid proofin their argument. He takes sentences from the Holy texts which are commented upon from the point of view of the Naiyãyika and rejects them on his own lines It may be urged that the statement9 'sense organs with the mind as the sixth' clearly states that the mind is a sense organ The reply to this is this Here the word 'sixth' does not indicate that the mind is a sense organ. There is no rule that the number which completes the particular number contained in the senses by an indriya alone. A non-Indriya may also complete the number (six) In support of his argument the author cites an instance, 'priests who are five with the yajamana eat ida10 Here though the yajamãna is not a rtvik, yet the number five is completed by him along with the other four who are rtviks He also cites another instance in this connection 'He taught the Vedas of which the Mahãbhãrata is the fifth 11 Here though the Mahãbhãrata is not a Veda, as we all know, yet the number five is completed by the Mahabharata. In support of his stand the author quotes from the Upanisads, 'objects are superior to the sense, mind is superior to the objects'.12 From this it is evident that manas is not an indriya since it has been spoken of separately from the indriyas.

7 मनो नेत्रादि धीन्द्रियम्। 8 एकादशं मनोज्ञेयं स्वगुणेनोभयात्मकम्। Manusmrti- 2nd chapter Verse-92 9 मन: षष्ठानी न्द्रियाणि प्रकृतिस्थानि कर्षति।B.G.XV-7 0 यजमानपंचमा इडां भक्ष्ययन्ति IV.P.50 ·1 वेदानध्यापयामास महाभारत पंचमान्। V.P 51. ·2 इन्द्रियाणि पराह्यर्था अर्थेभ्यः परं मनः।Vide KathopanisadI-iii-10.

IS MIND OR ANTAHKARANA - A SENSE ORGAN 103

Nor can it be urged by the logician that manas is an indriya on the strength of passages like 'I am the mind among the sense organs'13 since this passage need not necessarily mean that the mind should be included among the sense organs (as this may not be a case of nirdhärane sasthi) for, in the previous passages the statement made in naksatränäm aham sası', as ıs well known, the moon is not one of the stars, to be interpreted on the same lines as indriyanam manascãsmi. Hence there is no valid proof in maintaining that the mind is a sense organ

It should not be objected, however, that in case manas is not considered to be a indriya, we cannot establish that pleasure, pain, etc are immediate knowledge (perception) since this perception as a rule should be produced from the sense organ according to the logician. To this objection our author replies in a peculiar way that the cause of immediacy of knowledge is not 'being produced from the indriya' but (it is) 'identity between the pramana caitanya and the Visayacaitanya etc.'. On the other hand if the objection is held as valid, inferential knowledge also should come under the scope of pratyaksa since it (Inference) is also produced from manas which is a sense organ according to the logician. On the other hand since the knowledge of God (Iswara) is not produced from a sense organ (because He has no action and consequently no sense organs)14 his knowledge cannot be designated 'pratyaksa' Now another question arises as to how consciousness as which is beginningless can be produced by the senseorgan. To this our author has an apt reply. Pratyaksapramãna, as already discussed, in the chapter on the pramanas is ofthe form of caitanya. This is based on the statement of the holy text which purports to say 'Brahman is of the form of perception15 and as such pratyaksa

13 Bhagavadgitā X Chapt. verses 22,21 14 For an interesting discussion on how manas ıs not an indrya vide 'Bhumika of Sikhamani' Comm. on V.P P 26-27. Mm.A K S Com on V.P.pages 41-43 15 यत् साक्षादपरोकादू ब्रह्या Vide Br.llplII -1

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also should be of the form of caitanya since caitanya is not a product', the sense organ cannot be considered as its cause Then how is it that perceptual knowledge appears to be produced at a particular time. The reply is that, though caitanya is beginningless the mental mode which manifests it (consciousness) is produced by the contact of the sense organ and it is this consciousness described by the mental mode that is said to be produced. It is on this ground that (since vrtti is the determinant of the knowledge (ñãna) that it is also designated jñãna in a secondary sense This can be explained by an example - 'the black pot is produced'. Here though the pot has previously been there there was no 'blackness'- associated with it. But in the above statement we speak of the pot also as being produced (of course as qualified by blackness), so also though the consciousness qualified by the vrtti (vrttivısistacaitanya) ıs not produced its determinant (vrtti) is pro- duced from the contact of the sense organ and as such the former also is stated to be produced in a secondary sense. We speak of this only as a secondary signification because it is only the vrtti that is actually produced but not the caitanya part of it also. Thus though there is distinction between jñana and vrtti a secondary signification is taken recourse to because of their close resem- blance To this argument the author of the Vedãnta Paribhãsã attests the sanction of Prakasatman in his Vivarana 16

The author next turns his attention to another point whether the internal organ is composed of parts or not (savayava or niravayava). This question arises because the author speaks of Parinãma when he speaks of the modification ofthe internal organ. Parinãma signifies a change in the parts and as such the Advaitin is oblized to hold that manas is a substance composed of parts. This is contrary to the view of the logician who argues that the mind

16 अन्तः करण वृत्तौ ज्ञानत्वोपचारात् Vide V.P.43 Also vide vivarana page 203

IS MIND OR ANTAHKARANA - A SENSE ORGAN 105

is atomic in size and hence has no parts.17 In case parts are accepted it should be accepted that they are produced, destroyed and so on and by the law of parsimony it is better to hold that manas is an impartiate entity (niravayavapadartha)'. Rejecting the above view ofthe logician the author proves the 'sãvayavatva' ofthe mind from the reason ofits being a beginningful dravya (sädidravya).18 The word 'beginningful' (sädi) has been used in the inference in order to exclude 'ether' etc. This is also stated in the holy text where itis stated 'He created the internal organ"19 Even the sruti holds that the subtle part of our food becomes manas and hence manas is only material and composed of parts (sãvayava).

Now the other question arises whether knowledge is a property ofthe mind in case vrtti is called jñana in a secondary sense. But this is acceptable to the Advaitin and the author supports this view with citations from the Holy texts.20 Now one more question remains to be answered -- ifdesire etc, are considered properties of the internal organ how is it that statements like 'I desire, I know etc.' speak of their being the properties of Ãtman.21 To this there is a ready reply from the author who takes the help of adhyãsa Just as a man states 'I am happy' by superimposing the Ãtman on the Internal organ which has that mental mode, so also concepts like 'I desire' (ahamicchãmi) are produced. The author illustrates this with the help of the well-used sentence 'the iron burns' Here though the iron ball does not actually burn things, the burning fire does it, still in ordinary usage we make no difference between the fire and the iron ball that has fire in it.

17 Vide T.S. 21 18 अन्तः करणं सावयवं सादिद्रव्यत्वात्। Vide VP 43 page 19 स मनो असृजत Br.upl।।। 20 काम: संकल्पो विचिकित्सा श्रद्धा Br. up.I.V.3 21 Here the word 'Asham' speaks of Ātman.

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VRTTI

Many Advaitins have illustrated the division ofÎswara and jiva (both one and the same) with the help of nescience. Some advocated the theory of jiva being a reflection in nescience, Îśwara being the prototype. Some others have advocated, as we presently see1 that the jiva is the self as determined by the internal organ (antahkaranãvacchinna) and iśwara as one determined by nescience. The author of the Bhamati holds the individual soul is finite inasmuch as it is limited by the internal organ which is plural in number. But according to the vivaranakara and some others the individual soul is one characterised by having avidyã as its adjunct (upädhi). Hence the jiva is infinite and one. In both these cases (whether jiva is one or many and finite or infinite) there arises a question as to how only one object is apprehended in one single point of time.2 That is to say, in case the jiva is one and is infinite, there is the contingency that he should cognise all objects at one and the same time as he comes into contact with every object in this world; hence we have to find out a way in which only one objectis cognised and the other object are removed from the purview of the Individual soul. So also in the view that the individual soul is finite, the question arises as to how one particular individual soul is connected with only one particular object at a time in this world of myriads of objects as practically found in experience.

The reply that the advaitins give in both the above cases is the intervention of what is called 'vrtti' or the modification of the internal organ. In other words, the advaitin's point of view is that, unless the vrtti intervenes between the jiva and the object, no cognition of a particular object can be effected. This is quite in consonance with practical life. Unless the mind (and the sense

1 S L S. page 100-109 J Sägar Ednwith com. Vide Vivarana page 308 - 313 onwards 2. Vide V.P.S. page 88 Sec. XIII

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organ) in necessary cases are diverted towards the particular object, no perceptual knowledge can be achieved. The Naiyãyikas also hold that in the case of perception, the contact between the mind and the sense organ, 'and the sense organ and the object, (Indriyãrtha sannikarsa) is obligatory. Such a view with some differences has been accepted by the advaitins also. They view this type of contact between the individual soul and the object as Vrtti.

Before we consider what is meant by Vrtti, let us examine the metaphysical aspect of world creation according to the Advaitin. According to him, from the one unqualified Brahman, as such, no creation could be effected because He cannottransform Himselfinto this objective world, since he is not liable for change. He has to take help of Mãyã to create this world. Mãyã should not be understand to be different from Brahman, for, it is a beginningless (anãdi) substance which actually helps create the world. This Mãyã is endowed, it has to be accepted, with two powers, one, the veiling or concealing power (Ãvarana sakti) by which it conceals Brahman thatis present everywhere and with the help of another power, called Viksepaśakti (Viksepa) it projects this entire universe of objects. Unless there is concealment of truth, no illusion can be broughtinto being. The Jíva under the influence of avidyã aided by his own previous karma creates his own objects, whereas Iswara who is not subject to karma pervades the entire world of objects with reference to his power of Mãyã. He knows all things in the world and hence is considered as Omniscient. But the Jíva as considered by some is one and infinite, inasmuch as he is nondifferent from Brähman, but he is one with nescience as his adjunct (upãdhi) or he is the reflection of Îswara in avidyã according to some.3 Some others believe that Jívas are many and finite because they view him as Brahman delimited by the internal organ.4 Thus there are two

3 Vide V.P S. page 91, para XV 4 Bhämati (This is the view of the Bhämati) and vide S.L S 140-150. 1st chapter jivānanda vidyāsāga Edn.

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opposite theories among the advaitins - one holding that the Jíva is one and hence infinite, and the other that it is manifold and hence finite. Now under this background let us try to examine what the advaitins mean by vrtti and in how many ways this vrtti is capable of effecting the cognition of only one object at a time (pratikarmavyavasthã).

Two questions arise in this connection which have to be properly answered. One is what is the reason for the Jiva who is all pervading to perceive only one object at a time when a number of them are actually presented before him and the second is how is he capable of perceiving the particular object like ghata, pata. We will discuss these points in the next few paragraphs.

According to Advaita, nescience which is positive, is the cause of all sorts of empirical distinctions. It obscures the omnipresent intelligent self and projects itself in diverse (phenom- enal) ways. The transformation of Nescience called internal organ dwelling in the body pervades all over. The internal organ possesses the predominance ofsattvaguna.5 This inner organ goes out through the channels of the sense organ concerned and pervades the concerned objects like pot.6 This transformation of either the inner organ or that of nescience (avidyavrtti) is known as mental mode'. The particular intelligence which is limited by the internal organ is able to cognise the objects. As the internal organ varies from person to person, the cognition of objects also varies from person to person. According to the Advaitin's theory knowledge when present removes ajñãna; here there is the contingency ofthe destruction of the entire ajnãna is that of a pot is cognised inasmuch as ajnãna is one. To this the Advaitin replies that ajnäna is not one but many and when

5 शरीरमध्येस्थितः सर्वशरीरज्यापक: सत्वप्राधान्येनVide Siddhantabindupage32. 6 As the waterflows through the channels and pervades the field vide V.P page 57 and V.P.S. page 87 para CXIlla.

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ajnãna is destroyed, the other ajnana remain as they are 7 Hence the assumption of the internal organ is necessary to bring the connection between the self and the objects Unless such an association is present, the object cannot be perceived The self which is of the form of intelligence is not in association with the objects as it has no contact (asanga). A mental mode which is the transformation of the internal organ, is necessary to bring about this connection. As the bare fire which is incapable of burning grass burns when it combines with the an iron ball, so also the jiva Intelligence, manifests objects only when it is associated with the mental mode (vrtti) of the internal organ.8 Here three aspects of Intelligence are seen. Though intelligence is one the Advaitin analyses it into three.

The aspect of intelligence which is defined by egoism is pramãtã, the aspect or intelligence which is defined by the cognitive mode is pramãna, the aspect of intelligence defined by the fitness for manifestation portion (of that object) residing in the object is known as cognition (pramiti).9 The function of the mental mode is to manifest objects. In other words the mental mode (vrtti) brings about a connection between the self and the object-defined intelligence Visayávacchinnacaitanya. The function of this mental mode is classified as three according to the definition given to jíva.

Though three purposes10, have been enumerated in the Siddhäntalesasangraha still it appears that though 'abhedābhıvyakti' between the sense-defined consciousness and the object defined consciousness is the final cause of all perceptual knowledge; and

7. इन्दो मायाभि: पुरुरूप ईयते 8 This argument has been taken from the Vivarana - Vide Pañcapādıka Vivarana page 312. 9 विषयचैतन्यं प्रमाणचैतन्य and प्रमातृचैतन्य तस्य च अभिव्यक्तस्य चैतन्य एकत्वेऽपि अभिव्यंजकान्तः करणभाग भेदात् त्रिधाव्यपदेश: Vide S. Bindupage 33 10 Abhedābhivyakti, Ciduparāga, āvaranābhibhava

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as such the only two important purposes should be the other two. In the alternative that jíva is stated to be limited ciduparäga is the purpose served and in case He is omnipresent it is for the sake of ãvaranabhanga. The author maintains on the lines of the Vivarana that the jiva is one who has avidya for his adjunct and is all-pervasive. Here a question arises why then all the objects of the world are not presented at once but only one like a pot, mat etc. are presented. To this the author replies, (in order to avoid such a contingency) we have to accept an ajnãna which veils the consciousness defined by the pot which depends upon the primitive avidyã (Mulvidyã). Thus the contingency is avoided. But on this ground it cannot be objected that, since the ajnãna veil covers the pot, the object cannot be perceived at any time which stand goes against common experi- ence. Hence it is that we have to accept something which removes the veil. 'What is it that removes that veil'? The author questions. If you say it is the simple caitanya that removes veil, it is impossible, for, the caitanya which is meant to revel the object cannot remove the veil because it is capable of revealing only objects which are not veiled by avidyã. If, on the other hand, caitanya with vrtti as its upãdhi is accepted as the removing agent of the veil, then there is the contingency of mediate knowledge also being produced at the time of perception or immediate knowledge (because there also there is vrtt though it does notgo out) and hence Dharmarãja accept that a particular vrtti which is excluded from the mediate is the remover of the veil 11 Even this reply does not satisfy our author since vrtti is an inert substance and it is only caitanya that reveals the objects. Hence he finally suggests that the remover of the veil actually is caitanya with paroksavyãvrttivisesa as its adjunct, when the individual self is considered universal and not unlimited (aparicchinna) the function ofvrtti is too fold to establish a connection and to remove the veil. Here the universality does not mean that,

11 परोक्षव्यावृत्तवृत्तिविशेष्यावरणभड़गजनकत्वम्।videvp.389

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at all times, all objects must be known. As in the case12 of 'cowness' though it pervades all, it does not exist in the particular one, horse; so only those objects which come in the purview of the inner organ are apprehended.

In case the individual self is unlimited, it must be naturally connected with every object. So where is the necessity to bring again this connection with the mental mode? In case, it does not posses any attachment, even then it should not connect itself, after the appearance of the vrtti To this objection the author of the Vedanta paribhãsã replies that the general connection is never ruled out. But the particular connection which leads to the cognition of the jar etc. only is denied. That particular connection which is of the form ofthe revealer and the revealed (vyangya vyañjakabhãva) which is only occasionally produced with the help ofthe mental mode of that formis denied by the mentalstate The luminous mind may manifest consciousness by the nature of its transparence. That is to say, the subject provides a place to receive an object, but the object may not be capable of revealing itself due to its inertness (as in the case of pot). It mean that a mere desire to know on the part of the self does not bring about knowledge but the other factors are also necessary for the revelation of the object.

The Paribhãsãkãra raises another question. Ifthe capacity of manifestation is only in the mind, how is it that the object also gets the capacity of manifestation This question has been answered by Dharmaraja in this way.13 Just as the nternal organ has the capacity of manifestation, so also it has to be admitted that the object with which the internal organ comes into contact is also

12 The author is indebted to the Vivarana for supplying this argument Vide S.L S page 24, Vıvarana 310, 312 13 अन्तःकरणं हि स्वस्मिन्निव स्वसंसर्गिण्यपि घटादौ चैतन्याभिव्यक्तियोग्यतामापादयति। Vide Vivarana page 305-306; vide V.P 392

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involved in the manifestation This discussion is extended further by giving the example that even an opaque substance can receive the reflection when it combines with a transparent object as in the case of the wall, by the contact of water 14 In the case of mediate knowledge (paroksa) the inferred fire etc cannot have a direct . connection. Hence it is not immediately known

This concept (establishing the connection) can also be extended even when the jiva is finite and not the locus ofthe universe. Our author argues thus. In case the jiva is considered to be finite and not the material cause, the jiva has no connection with the object As Brahman is the material cause it is connected with all jars The individual soul cannot manifest a jar, unless the consciousness becomes one with Brahman-consciousness. Hence the necessity of the mental mode. But the question is how this oneness between the jiva and the object is effected by the mental mode since their limiting adjuncts are different.15 It can be answered that the mental mode (vrtti) reaches entirely outside the body, so that the mind and the object occupy one and the same place.16 It must be noted here that though the two limiting adjuncts are different (are not in the same locus) still the consciousness which is the upadheya in both the cases, is the same when vrtti emerges.17 The final view given by the Vivaranakära that vrtti is for the sake ofuparaga has been taken by the author 18 THE STATES OF JIVA

While discussing the mental mode of the internal organ the author speaks of three states. One is the waking state, the second

14 In giving this e g the author is indebted to Vivarana - Vide Vivarana 305 15 In the case of Jiva consciousness, the internal organ is the Upädhi and in the case of the pot consciousness, the Upädhi is the object 'pot' vide V P 393 16 This is what is meant by non-difference (abheda) but not identity, For details vide 'Perception' 17 For details regarding Vrtti, vide Chapter on Perception 18 Vide V P.S. page 90; para XV Vivarana 310.

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is the dreamstate and the third is the profound sleep state (susupti). He defines the dream state19 as the state of the mental mode which produces an immediate knowledge which has for its object some- thing and which is not produced from the sense organs. The word 'thatis not caused by the sense-organs' is included in order to avoid overlapping of the definition on the waking state. The word antahkarana has been used in order to avoid overlapping on susupti where the mental mode is not admitted but only avidyāvrtti. By susupti is meant the mode of avidyã which has for its object avidyā since after 'deep sleep' we find one, say 'I slept and did not know anything. The avidyavrttis like 'I don't know the pot' etc. found in the waking and drearn states are only antahkaranavrttis and not avidyävrttis and hence there is no overlapping of definition on those two states. The author states that some hold the view that swooning and death are separate states. Some argue that they are a kind of a susupti. Our author does not go into the details since he says it is not relevant in the context of describing 'Tvam'.

19 इन्द्रियाजन्यविषयगोचारापरोक्षान्तःकरणवृत्त्यवस्था स्वप्नावस्था।Vide V.P.page394; Vide Mm. A.K.Sastry's com. on V.P. page 330

114 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀȘĀ

BRAHMAN, IŚWARA AND JIVA

The self is pure. It is of the form of Intelligence and It is one. To interpret It to appear as one 'God' on the one hand and 'many' (Individual souls) on the other, it is supposed to have the veil of Mãyã. In reality there is no difference, yet the difference is illusory. Sankara appears to have used the analogy of reflection and the pot-defined ether to establish the jiva concept. From this it may be understood that he maintains no difference in the explanation of the jiva either by reflection of caitanya or by intelligence defined by nescience.1 The differences in the concepts have arisen only after him. In order to explain this, different scholars have accepted different theories. Some hold that Iswara and Jiva are reflections of consciousness. Although all the advaitins accept the real non-difference between the Jiva and the Iswara, they differ in the interpretation of these two entities-one school of advaitins, viz. The Vivarana school sticks to the reflection theory (Pratibimbavãda). Some others of the Bhämatikära group are of the opinion that Iswara is intelligence delimited by Mãyă (Mãyãvacchinna caitanya) and the Jiva is one thatis limited by the internal organ (Antahkaranãvacchinnacaitanya)

Some others hold the semblance theory. (Abhãsavda) Sureswara, the Värtikakãra holds the Äbhäsa Theory to explain the difference between Iswara and Jiva. These three theories have subtle distinctions in their explanations. Hereunder is undertaken a brief explanation of these theories and Dharmarãja's views on these points.

Madhusudanasaraswati views this in the following way :- Sureśwara however, holds the semblance theory to explain away the difference between Iswara and Jiva. On this view Ãtman having ajñãna as its adjunct experiences identity with it (ajñāna) but does

1 Vide The Philosophy of Advaita · T.M.P. Mahadevan, page 220.

BRAHMAN, ISWARA AND JIVA 115

not know the fact and as such is called antaryamin or witness self (sãksin)2 On the other hand Ätman with buddhi as its adjunct establishes its own identity with buddhi which does not know the fact and is hence termed as doer, enjoyer, and knower. It may be noted here that ajñana is one and unitary and there is no difference In cidãbhäsa and as a result there is no distinction in the Säksin caitanya. It may not, however, be urged that there is that a contingency the Abhãsa alone is bound (baddha) and pure intelli- gence alone is liberated (mukta) and hence no effort is needed for moksa for he argues that pure intelligence is considered to be baddha through the Ãbhãsa

In the chapter on subject matter, the author speaks of Iswara and Jiva as defined by different scholars in his own school ofthought, Advaita Vedänta. Some hold that consciousness which is common to Iswara and Jiva is the prototype and the reflection ofthis prototype in Avidyã is Iswara while the reflection of the same in the internal organ is termed Jiva. This is supported by statements in the Holy texts.3 Here by 'Kärana' is meant Mãyã and by 'Krya' is meant its product internal organ. This is the view of the author of the sanksepasäriraka.4 On this point of view the distinction between jiva and parameśwara is like that between the reflection of the Sun in the pot and in the potsherd Since avidyã is extensive, Iswara also with his avidyã as adjunct is considered as all-pervading. But due to the antahkarana Jiva is considered to be limited. The author points out the defect in this argument that the faults consequent on avidyã found in the Jiva are liable to be found in Iswara also because the adjunct upãdhi always affects the reflection. (Pratibimba) In order to obviate this inconsistency there is the view of a second school of thinkers who hold that the prototype is the Iswara-

2 Vide S L S page 99 - 1st chapt Jiveswara Nırupanam 3 कार्योपाधिरयं जीवःकारणोपाधिरीश्वरः। VideV P.page380 4 Vide S Bindu; 28 page S.L.S. page 13 Vol.Il

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consciousness and not more consciousness. The one conscious- ness viewed as the bimba is Iswara and viewed as the reflection it is jíva and the adjunct that is responsible for this reflection is avidyã in the case of one soul theory and the internal organ in the case of the theory of many souls. The advantage in this view is that the faults ofthe adjunct (upädhi) accrue only to Jíva who is the reflection but not to Parameswara, the prototype. On this view the distinction between jiva and Iswara is like one existing between the sun on the sky and the sun as reflected in water. This is the view of the author ofthe Vivarana which has been adopted by our author as faultless.5

The author now tries to defend his argument against possible attacks from objectors. In the reflection point of view if Iswara, the prototype is not present in the place of the jiva, just as the face on the neck is not present near the mirror, how can Iswara be stated to be all pervading? To this our author replies just as when ether (the sky) containing clouds and stars is reflected in water we find that the prototype, all pervading ether, is found connected with the water, so also the prototype of the unlimited Brahman can be expected to be connected with the place where the reflection is connected. Of course objects or limited dimension which form the prototype may not be able to be connected with the place of reflection. This is to say since Brahman is all pervading there is no difficulty in its being present even in the place occupied by the Jíva and hence his antaryãmitva is not affected in any way.

Another objection may be raised as to how the colourless Brahman is fit to be reflected. To this the author has a very piercing reply aimed at the Tärkikas mostiy. He states that colour itselfwhich is not endowed with colour is found to be reflected.® If, on the other hand, the objector holds that it is the dravya without colour that

5 Vide Mm.A.K. Śastry'scom. on V.P. page 321 para-land vivaraņa page 289 6 Colour hes no colour in it. गुणे गुणानगड़ीकारात्

BRAHMAN, ISWARA AND JIVA 117

cannot be reflected, the author holds that Ätman is not a dravya at all. He quotes a passage in support.7 On the other hand the objector's inference that Brahman cannot be reflected is stultified by the Holy text.8

The author while speaking about pratyaksa divides it into two varieties- Iswarasäksin and Jíväsaksin That is to say that which makes known the objects to Iswara and Jíva respectively. The one pratyaksa is looked at from the point of each separately. While defining Jíva Dharmarãja appears to have taken the Bhãmatí school and defines Jíva as consciousness delimited by the internal organ.9 That is to say consciousness as qualified by the internal organ is what is called Jíva. But the Jívasaksin is consciousness which has the internal organ for its adjunct. He makes clear the difference between the two by stating that in the case of the Jiva the internal organ is an qualifying attribute (Visesana) and in its sāksin aspect the internal organ is an upädhi. He distinguishes visesana and the upãdhi concerned here which are responsible for the difference in the consciousness. By visesana is meant 10 that which differenti- ates, is present, and is connected with something related to it The idea here is that, in the case ofthe Jiva the internal organ agrees with the consciousness part and the latter part in called jiva which is vidheya. At the same time since the internal organ distinguishes the jiva from pure consciousness it is called a visesana. In the Jivasäksin however, the case is different. Thus we may say the witness is that consciousness that has the mind as its limiting adjunct (antahkaranoipahitam caitanyam Sākşin). It means the caitanya part alone is the säksin and the antahkarana part which agrees with the caitanya part does not agree with its

7 एकधाबहुधाचेव etc.Amr.bin up12. 8 यथा ह्ययं ज्योतिरात्मा विवस्वा etc.vide V.P.page 383 9 जीवो नाम अन्तःकरणावच्छिनं चैतन्यम्।V.P.page 102 10 विशेषणं च कार्यान्वयि वर्तमानं व्यावर्तकम् e.g. नी लं घटं पश्यामि V.P-103

118 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀȘĀ

vidheya säksitva. But at the same time it is a distinguishing feature which is present.11 After illustrating visesana and updhi the author treats of the necessity for accepting an upãdhi in the case of the jívasãksın. Since the antahkarana is an insentient substance it cannot cognise objects and hence the necessity for its being the upãdhi of consciousness which can do so Thè author holds multiplicity of the souls. If the word Jiva is considered one then, if caitra cognises something, Maitra, another, is also expected to know it Here we may note that certain thinkers of Advaita hold the other view (e.g. Bhämatı Kãra etc ) Now coming to Iswara sãskin author defines it as consciousness with Mãyã as its adjunct and that is accepted to be one, the reason being that Mãyã, the adjunct, Is only one in number.

Now a question may be raised here as to how the passages of the Holy texts 'indro mãyabhih' etc. could be explained where Mãyã is referred to in the plural number. To this the author replies that the plural number is intended to speak of several capacities residing in Mãyã or three constituents -sattva, rajas etc To support hs argument further he cites instances the word Mãyã used mostly In the sıngular number 12 This Îswarasäksın ıs beginningless sınce ts upãdhi Mayã is beginningless. Îswara has, however, been defined as consciousness determined by Mãyã, where Mãyã ıs a visesana unlike in Îswarasksin where Mãyã, where Mãyã ıs an upãdhi. In the actual substratum (consciousness) there is no difference between Îswara and Îswarasäksin. This Iswara, though one, as already stated, assumes different states like Brahma, Vishnu, Maheswara (Siva). He is referred to as Brahma, Visnu and Maheswara in view ofits adjunct Mãy with its threefold gunäbheda- when rajas is predominant it is called Visnu, etc.

11 उपाधिश्च कार्यानन्वयी व्यावर्तको वर्तमानश्चा v.p. Page 103 12 मायान्तु, प्रकृतिं विद्यान्मायिनं तु महेश्वरम् तरत्यविद्यां etc Vide SVUPIV-10 Vide 'A study of Sankara'by N. Sastry EDn. Univ. of Calcutta 1942 P 151- 154

BRAHMAN, ISWARA AND JIVA 119

Another very relevant and important question is that, ifÎswara and Îswarasaksın are beginningless how could it be that the Vedic passage says "He desired let me multiply".13 The question here is, when Îswarasäksin is considered to be beginningless,14 how could it be that He would have started seeing (before creation) when He Himself is expected to be the saksın? This is the most fundamental question in Philosophy which appears to have been satisfactorily answered by the Vedãntin As usual our author cites the argument that the different mental modes are produced in the Internal organ, the adjunct of the Jiva, with the help of the contact of the sense organ and the object, so also in Îswarasaksin different Mãyãvrttis are produced because ofthe difference in the past actions of beings to be created - Vrttis like this has to be created, this has to be protected etc and since these Mãyavrttis have a beginning, the caitanya as reflected in Myävrtti is said to have a beginning

As to the question of Sagunabrahman (Brahman with qualites our author holds that it is only the superimposition of qualities on consciousness which are necessary for worship - not that Brahman has qualities. As to the sagunaväkyas read ın the nırgunaprakarana it may be stated that they are meant to state the counterpositives of nisedah. That is to say we are simply superimposing qualities In Brahman but actually they are not there.

While speaking of the one soul theory and the many souls he refers to the view of some philosophers that the Jiva is atomic in size.15 But our author explains the passage as meaning that the Ãtman is considered to be a pramãna (only) when it has for its adjunct the size of the internal organ which is signified16 by the word buddhi.

13 तदैक्षत बहुस्यां प्रजायेय Cha up VI-ii-3 14 Vide S.L.S (Jivananda Vidyāsāgar Edn) p 251 onwards 'A study of Sankara - by N Sāstry p 151-153 pub univ of Calcutta 1942 15 Ārāgramātro hyavaropi drstah Sv 7 16 Vide V.P. page 395

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This Jiva is considered self-effulgent and the author rejects the view ofthe Naiyayikas. According to the author the Jiva illumines himself, he is apprehended neither by the sense organ nor by inference. In support of his stand the author quotes the Brhadäranyaka passage17 where He is stated to be light (svayamjyotih). Nor should it be considered to relate to something different from Jiva because, in the context of the dream state, only the Jiva should have been mentioned not paramätman and because he happens to be self- effulgent he cannot be insentient and so he is stated to be of the form of cit. He cites passages from the Mändukyopanisad.18 Now it may not be objected how then the common experience 'I know' Is rendered possible because there is a scope for such a thing when the consciousness is reflected in the mode ofthe internal organ and we have seen how vrtti is secondarily called jñãna.

BRAHMAN :-

Our author tries to define the meaning of 'That' in the mahãvãkya. He speaks, as usual, of the two types of definition- essential characteristics (svarūpa) and secondary ones (tatastha laksana). By svarupalaksana is meant its own form, e.g. Truth etc. are the essential characteristics of Brahman. Now the author raises a question how svarupa can be a definition because it is not a property which exists in itself. The author replies that it could be so because the very thing itself becomes a 'property' (Dharma) as well as a substrate (dharmin) with reference to itself. In support of this he quotes pañcapādikā passages.19

By tatasthalaksana is meant that differentiating property which does not stand all the time that the object to be defined is

17 Br. up. IV 3.9. 18 प्रज्ञानघन एव। 19 आनन्दो विषयानुभवो नित्यत्वंचेति paficapadika-page 23

BRAHMAN, ĪŚWARA AND JIVA 121

present20 e.g. the Tațasthalaksana of Īśwara is his being the cause of production etc. of this world. Though this quality of God is always not present in Him still it defines 'Him'. Indeed we define 'Earth' as one which possesses odour though odour is present only on certain occasions, not all e.g. just at the moment of the production of a pot21 etc. and in the final atoms in the mahäpralaya. Here by jagat is meant all products in general. By kãraņa is meant kartã and hence the definition of God does not overlap on avidyã which cannot be called kartri because it is insentient. By kartrtva is meant being possessed of effort, desire to act and an immediate knowledge of the material cause.

The author quotes from the Holy texts passages which speak of these three qualities of the Karta22 Bhagavan Sankara's bhāşya on the sutra 'Janmädyasya yatah' invites a clarification whether knowledge (jñãna), desire (icchä), agency (krti) are together in- tended to be expressed or individually. Our author is of the opinion that it is enough that one of them is stated in the definition, not all the three. Otherwise the other two adjectives will be purposeless. Thus from the aphorism ofVysa mentioned above we can hold that nine individual definitions can be given. The Holy text also concedes this point of view.24 The author gives an alternate definition because kartrtva in the definition of Īśwara may lead. one to misunderstand that the potter may also be a kartā. Brahman is the material cause of the entire world. By the use of the word 'nikhila' probably the present and the future objects are intended to be expressed. By Upädäna is meant the substratum of superimposition of the entire world since the entire world is superimposed on Brahman. So this

20 यावत्लक्षयकालमनवस्थितत्वे सति यद्व्यावर्तकम्।V.P.page343 21 उत्पन्नं द्रव्यं क्षणमगुणं निष्क्रियं च भवति। 22 यःसर्वशः सर्ववित्, यस्यज्ञानमयं तपः सोऽकामयत बहुस्यां प्रजायेय; तन्मनोऽकुरुत। 23 Vide V.P. Āfubodhinikāra - 247 Last para. 24 यतो वा इमानि भूतानि जायन्ते .... Tait.IIIi.

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definition does not overlap on Mäyä. Now even here the author finds a fault.25 Hence the author gives a more precise definition of upădãna as the one which is the substratum of Mäyã which evolves in the form of this world. It is in this way that God is considered to be identical with the world. He also quotes how identity is expressed between Iśwara and the world by statements like 'the pot exists, pot is manifest, pot is desirable, which respectively speaks of Existence, knowledge and Bliss-the nature of Brahman identified with world objects.

Now a question-cannot be raised as to how, if all the objects of the world come under Bliss, pain also should be considered as Bliss To this our author has a ready reply that only when there Is superimposition, (then only) we seek the cause for it. But we don't adopt superimposition because there is the cause. Of course in misery we can admit the superimposition of Existence and knowledge aspects but not in the Bliss aspect. The other two aspects-name and form are due to the effect of avidyã.26

How is it possible to argue that there is identity between 'THOU' and 'THAT' in the Mahäväkya 'Tattvamasi' because there Is the expenence 'I am not God (iswara) and because the Jiva is of limited knowledge and iswara of unlimited knowledge etc. Even from the sruti passages Dvāsuparņā', Dvāvimau purusau etc. it is clearly known that there is distinction between Jiva and Parameśwara and hence the objector argues that in the Mahvakya identity is intended to be stated only in the secondary sense27 (just as 'the sacrificial, post is called the Sun' etc.).

25 Vide V P Āsubodhini - p 249 line 8 26 अस्ति भातिप्रियं रूपं नाम चेत्थंशपंचकम्। आद्यं त्रयं ब्रह्मरूपं जग्रुपं ततो द्वयम्I। Vide V.P page 353. 27 Ādityo yupaha The Mimåmsakas argue that the post yüpa cannot be Sun and hence in order to praiseit, it is stated to be the 'Sun'. That is to say the Yūpa is as resplendent as the Sun. Vide Mm. A.K. Śastry's com on V.P. page 86 onwards vide v.p. page 401

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To this our author replies that the perception of difference (between the Jiva and iśwara ) which is produced by a fault in the instrument (karaņa) of knowledge is set aside by Vedic Testimony where there is no fault. Nor can it be urged that experience should not be contradicted for, what the astronomers say that the moon is of a big size etc. is an authority though we actually experience her is a small ball. Now what about the other objection, says the opponent, that there is the experience '1 am not Iswara'. Does the Vedäntin call it bhränti? To this our author has a reply. He illustrates such statements as the above with a sentence in common experience like 'this is not a black pot' when it is seen to be red with heat. The author's idea is that the statement 'I am not iśwara' is one like 'This is not a black pot'. In the latter sentence 'This' refers to a black pot which was originally there and with reference to it the negation of the black pot is stated in the sentence. Hence due to sublation we have to admit that it is not at all intended to be stated like that. The rule in this connection is that, when there is sublation with reference to the qualified entity either an injunction or a prohibition (Vidhinisedhau) attach themselves to the qualification and not to the qualified entity. Thus the 'black pot' in its entirety is not negated in the above sentence but only the blackness )the qualification alone) is negated. So also in the statement '1 am not Īśwara'itis only the 'nature of possessing an upådhi (sopädhitkatva) that is negated but not the qualified entity caitanya also.28 And because verbal testimony is more powerful than any other, even inference cannot be a valid pramãnã with reference to Sabda. When Meru is said to be a mountain of gold it cannot be inferred that it is made of stone because it is a mountain. Our author penetrates deeper into the subject and thinks the objector may question how there is no difference between the Jiva and Iswara on the basis of the text 'Dväsuparnä' etc .. The author replies that, when there are

28 Here the rule 'Savıseşhana hı vidhınişedhau .. sati viśesye bādhe 'may be noted.

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two statements in the Holy Text, one seeming to contradict the other, we have to hold that one of them is not intended to be expressed and with reference to it whatis intended to be expressed becomes more powerful. that is to say, by the ttparyaliņgas upakrama, upasamhāra etc., the sentence speaking of identity between the two souls becomes more powerful29

Nor can it be objected that it is contrary to hold two opposing properties in the same object, for we find the cold water is experienced 'hot' because of the adjunct 'fire'. So it is a case of superimposition. Now how does the first superimposition come in without the concerned latent impression (Samskära). To this the author replies that there is no first superimposition because this world is beginningless (anädi).

29 V.P. page 403

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THEORY OF CREATION AND DESTRUCTION

While discussing Brahman's tatastha laksaņa the author turns his attention towards the theories of creation and destruction ofthe universe. The author discusses the particular order in which creation is undertaken. All objects of creation did not appear simultaneously in the universe. Then what is the order in which the universe has been created? Atthe beginning of creation the supreme soul Parameśwara in the company ofMãyã possessing innumerable indescribable capacities and aided by the past deeds of the living beings which account for the manifoldness of the universe to be created, thought of this universe of the form of name and forms and desired to create. This statement has the sanction ofthe scriptures.1

Now before coming to the question of the order in which creation has been made, let us discuss why the theory of creation has been propounded as above by the Vedäntin, and of what use it is to the Vedäntin. The Paramätman who is asanga according to Advaita cannot undertake creation unless Mãyã comes to Hıs aid and this beginningless Mäyä must have had several indescrib- able capacities, Without which this world of a wide variety of objects and beings could not have come into being. As we know Mãyã has two capacities mainly- veiling and projecting. In the former capacity it conceals the truth and with the help of the latter it creates the entire world of objects which are in reality nothing else but name and form. Another question her is how the supreme soul was in need of the accessory cause-the past actions of living beings for his creation and how living beings and past actions existed even before his creation. This is a very important question that baffles all religious

1. बुध्दौतदेक्षत बहुस्यां प्रजायेयेति .. Ch.Up, VIi.3.

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theory regarding creation. Ifwe hold that the lord crated the entire universe by Himself without any accessory cause God will have to be subjected to either of the crimes-inequality in creation (Vaisamya) or mercilessness (Nairghrunya) butif He undertook the creation with the help of the activity ofthe living beings undertaken by themselves in the previous birth, He would not be subjected to the defects. This question has been raised in the Bădarãyanasutras and discussed.2

Now another issue involved in this argumentis, if, even before the creation, living beings and past actions had existed how could the Supreme soul have started creation at any particular moment. To this the Vedäntin has a very satisfactory reply which cannot be rejected by any rational school of thought. The Vedäntin's view is that Mãya along with the Jivas etc.3 existed along with Brahman without a beginning. Thus we have to admit that God's creation has no beginning (but certainly has an end). If the creation has no beginning, all the six enumerated in the popular verse must be considered beginningless. Thus creation is beginningless for the Advaitin. Then what do the scriptural texts regarding creation mean4 which appear to speak of a beginning. These passages in fact do not speak of any sudden beginning of the universe. The universe has been created on the lines ofthe creation of the previous universe and that previous creation on the lines of the previous creation and so on ad infinitum. With the acceptance of this theory all the Vedic passages regarding creation, merit and demerit, God's role in dispensing reward and punishment can all the satisfactorily ex- plained. There are some passages in support of this Theory.5

2. वैषम्यनैर्पृण्ये न सापेक्षात्त्वात्I Vide Badarayana Brahmasutras. 2-1-12.34 3. जीव इ्शोविशुद्धाचित् तथा जीवेशयोर्भिदा, अविद्यातच्चितोर्योग: पडस्माकमनादय: 4 तदै क्षत बहुस्यां प्रजायेयेति। Cha.Up.Vii.3. 5. Vide बथा सूर्याचन्द्रमसी धाता बथा पूर्वमकल्पबत् Taitt. Up. also न कदाचिदनीहश नगतू।

127

Under this background now let us examine the order in which the creation is made-when God willed that He should become manifold, then came the five elements Ether, air, Fire, Water, Earth in their subtle forms (tanmätras). That is to say they were not quintuplicated at that time. Among these ether has sabda for its property, air sabda and touch, fire śabda, touch and colour; water- rasa also and earth all the four along with smell. The Vedāntin does not accept the logician's view that sabda is the property of ether alone because it is found in all the other elements as well. Nor can this fact be considered invalid since we don't find any stultifying factor.® All these elements are the products of Mäyå with its three qualities (guņas) sattva rajas and tamas. From these unquintuplicated elements with their sattvaguna are created the ear, the skin, the eye, the tongue and the nose. These are considered products of tanmätras because they are very subtle in nature like the tanmātras themselves. From these five elements (bhutas) combined possess- ing sattvagupa individually are produced, the four organs mind, buddhi, ego and citta. Since these are also subtle they are said to be produced from the tanmätras. Since sattva is of the form of illumination, mind and other organs are also prakaśas (illuminatives). They are also considered to be a combination of all the five elements because each of these organs mind etc. is capable ofapprehending śabda, rupa etc.

Next the author gives the presiding deities of the five sense organs mind, Buddhi etc. Fromthe five bhutas possessing the guņa of rajas, the five motor organs are produced, this is to because rajoguņa is responsible for these due to their Rajasika nature. From these very five elements possessing rajas combinedly are produced

6. The author of the Comm. Asubodhini tries to defend the other view-Vide Ãdubodhini page-256. The logician on the other hand, believes that the gross bodies of the universe are formed from the atoms of each element through the agency of the dvyanuka and so on. Also Vide Mm. A.K. Saatry's Comm. on V.P. page 293.

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five air prãna, apăna etc. The author defines the five7 väyus. And from these five unquintuplicated elements possessing the ingredient oftamas the quintuplicated five elements are produced. Since these five gross elements are inanimate they are said to be products of tamas Thus the gross elements came into existence. There are passages in the Veda-which speak of the process of quintuplication (Pañcıkarana). The sentence in the chändogya® speaks only ofthe three elements entering into combination but by implication, it also speaks of Pañcikarana. Thus is the process of quintuplication. Along with fire, water and earth, ether, and air also are involved. Whereas the former may be called as trivrtkarana (where only three elements are involved) in the latter, all the five elements are involved.9 The process of quintuplication has been described by the author asusual. Each element is individually taken, divided into two halves and one ofthese halves (in the case ofeach element) is again divided into four parts and the parts of the other elements are added to them. Thus each compound form of the element consists of half ofits own element and the other half of the four other elements. Why some compounds are called earth etc. is because its own element predominates in it. The Brahmasutra also is quoted in support of this.10

It is from these unquintuplicated elements that the subtle- body (linga-sarira) is produced. This linga śarira is to be accepted

7 तत्र प्राग्गमनवान् वायुःप्राणौ नासादिस्यानवर्ती। अर्वाग्गमन्नवानपान: पाय्वादिस्थानवर्ती।

अशितपीतान्नादि समीकरणकरःसमानः नाभिस्थानवर्ती। 8 त्रिवृतं त्रिवृतमेक्कां करवाणि। Cha.Up.Vi.i.3. 9 This process of quintuplication is suggested in Praén. Up. आकाशश्च आकशायात्रा य। Also Vide Vienupurana आकाशवायु तेजांसि। 10 वैशेष्यातु तद्वादस्तद्वाद: Br. Su.II.N.22

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because after abandoning this gross body, this subtle body is necessary to go to the other worlds and this lingasarira is sustained by the Jiva till liberation is attained.11 The (lingasarira) subtle body consists of seventeen entities-mind, buddhi, the five sense organs, five motor organs and the five pranas. This is testified to froma verse in the Ãtmabodha.12 This lingasarira is two-fold-the superior (para) one and the inferior (apara) one. The former one is that of Hiranyagarbha which is the original body and comprises the conglomerate of all the jiva bodies. This subtle body is called mahat- tattva. Though in the sûtrabhäsya the Buddhi of Hiranyagarba is called Mahän, one author calls it the entire body of Hiranyagarbha because the latter comprises the former. The lingasariras of jivas are called egos. By ego is meantthe particular mental mode present in our subtle bodies which is responsible for a conception of doer, enjoyer etc. But our author calls the entire body of the jiva as ahankãratattva.

Now from the gross elements possessing ingredients of tamas the seven upper worlds and the seven lower worlds and the entire universe (brahmända) is produced. The author describes the four types of gross bodies i.e. jarãyuja etc. The author argues that trees etc. are considered to be bodies since with these bodies pleasure and pain are enjoyed.13 Now the author raises another question how the entire world is said to be produced from Iswara when we actually see that some objects are created by us. In the other alternative, if some objects

the world. To this our author replies that Parameswara the direct cause of creation in respect of the five tanmatras,14

11 For a criticism of the view of Asubodhinikara in this connection - Vide Mm.A.K.Sastry's Comm on V.P page 398 12 पंचप्राणमनोबुदि्धदशेन्द्रिय समन्वितं etc .... Atmabodha-12. 13 Vide Manu. Samhită page 469 Chapt 12. Verse. 9 14 तत्तजो असृजत etc.

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Hiranyagarbhasthulasarira15 and the subtle body. All the other objects of the rest of the universe are produced through the agency of Hiranyagarbha.16 Hiranyagarbha17 who is thus the first jiva and who is ofthe form ofthe samasti of all the bodies in the universe is different from Brahman Visnu and Maheśwara who are only beings with three names and forms according to their adjuncts sattva, raja and Tamas. DISSOLUTION OF THE UNIVERSE :-

As the sustenance (sthiti) of the universe is very well known to us, the author turns his attention to dissolution. By dissolution is meant the destruction of the three worlds. He does not include the destruction of all worlds in his definition since in the four types of destruction (pralaya) he is going to speak about shortly the destruction of only the three worlds is involved and not all. This dissolution is fourfold Daily (Nitya), Basic (Prãkrta), Occasional (Naimittika) and Absolute (ãtyantika). He discusses in detail the four types of dissolution. Among these what is meant by daily or routine pralaya is deep sleep because it obstructs all activity. Then how is it unlike a mukta, (the man) experiences pleasure and pain as soon as he wakes up? The author replies that the dharma and adharma and past impressions-all exist in him in the subtle form of cause (kärana). That is why after he wakes up he is able to experience pleasure and pain, So also there is no difficulty in accepting smarana in his case as the impressions are in a dormant state. Nor should it be objected that, since the internal organ is destroyed, the activity of life etc. should not be present in a person in deep sleep. To this our author replies boldly that, though in reality

15 योब्रह्मणंविदधातिपूर्वम् 16 हन्ताहमिमास्तिसीदेवता अनेन जीवेनात्मनानुप्रविस्य नामरूपे व्याकरवाणि। ...... Cha.Up.VI.M.27 17 स वै शरीरी प्रथम: स वै पुरु्ष उच्चते ...... eiC.

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there is no respiration etc. in him, the fact that 'it is there' is only a mistaken notion. It is there like his body, the life activity etc. that is mistaken to be existing there. Nor in such a case should it be urged that he is not different from a dead person, for the subtle body of the sleeping person is in the form of samskära even in the gross body butin the case of a dead person the subtle body is in a different world. When a person dies he goes to the other world along with his subtle body. But the author is not satisfied with this explanation because as already accepted by the author even if life activity etc., absent in the person are mistaken by other people to exist in him, in such a case others should also.18 mistakenly see in him the activities of the motor organs also but this is not the case since nobody observes any activity in a sleeping person. Hence he offers an alternate argument in this connection. The internal organ has two capacities-capacity of knowing (jñãnasakti) and capacity of activity (krıyasakti) and it may be held that in the case of a sleeping person. though the internal organ with the capacity of knowing is destroyed, the internal organ with the capacity of acting is not destroyed and hence the life activity is possible in him. As to how this deep sleep is a sort of dissolution in Brahman, the author quotes passages from the Kausheetaki19 and chandogya Upanisads20 By Präkrtapralaya is meant the destruction ofthe entire world of products consequent on the destruction of the Käryabrahman. That is to say when the krya Brahman completes his Prãrabdhakarma and his activity, he attains liberation of bodilessness because he must have attained the realisation of Brahman

18 Mm. A.K. Šästry objects this type ;of statement raised by the Asubodhini on the ground that when there is a nimittaka, the Naimittika is considered but not vide-versa. Hence the objection is not tenable. Vide Mm. A.K.S. Comm. on V.P. page 306-7. 19 यदा सुप्तः स्वप्नं न कंचन पश्यति .... etc.Kau. Up. 20 सता सोम्य तदा सम्पन्नो भवति, स्वमपीतो भवति (Cha.Up.VI-8-1)

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(Brahmasāksātkära). Along with him the residents of his world who get the knowledge of Brahman also get bodiless salvation. The author cites passages in this connection.21 And when thus the kärya-Brahman and his colleagues in His world are released that entire world, its elements and compounds get dissolved in Mãyã or Prakrti but not in Brahman. Thatis why this is called Prakrtalaya. Only destruction in the form of sublation is found in Brahman.

Now coming to Naimittikapralaya it is the destruction occa- sioned by the close of the day for the karya-Brahman. Here only three worlds Bhu etc. are involved. Thousand revolutions of the four yugas together is on day for Brahman.22 This pralayakãla continues for a long a time as the day of Brahman which is called his night time.23 Probably the author does not find scriptural evidence in support of Prakrta and Naimittika. Pralaya, so he quotes Purăna verses as authority.24

The fourth type of Pralaya is a consequence of the realisation of Brahman or tattvajñäna. In this type of Pralaya along with all its effects avidya is destroyed. In case one-soul theory is accepted, then with one individual soul attaining Mokşa all the individual souls simultaneously get salvation because Jiva is considered to be an avidyopadhika and avidya is only one on this alternative. But sincr this theory is not acceptable to all because ofits obvious incongruity, the author takes up the theory of many souls and argues that Mukti is in a particular order. That is to say each individual soul gets its own release at one time and not all at the same time. A Holy text supports him.25

21 ब्रह्मणा सह ते सर्वे सम्प्राप्ते प्रतिसंचरे etc .. Kurma. 22 चतुर्थगसहम्राणिब्रह्मणो दिनमुच्यते .. BrhannaradiyaPurana. 23 यदा सदेवो जागर्ति Manu Smrti page 16.1at chapt. verse 52. 24 दिवपरार्धे त्वतिक्रान्ते ब्रह्मण: परमेष्ठिनःतत्राप्रकृतयःसप्तकल्प्यन्ते प्रलयायहि। Vide V.P.page 372 25 "सर्व एकीभवन्ति।" .... Vide V.P. page 372

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Of these four types of dissolutions enumerated above the former three i.e. Nitya, Naimittika, and the Präkrta are caused by the abandonment of karma, i.e. to say by sleep in Nitya Pralaya, by the non-existence of Hiranyagarbha in the pråkrtapralaya, by the sleep of Hiranyagarbha in the Naimittikapralaya, whereas in the fourth type of pralaya since tattvajñãna dawns, ajñãna is destroyed and the entire universe disappears.

Now what is the order in which destruction takes place. The elements and objects produced from them don't get destroyed in the same order as they are produced. The reason for this being that even ifthe cause gets destroyed, the products will still be there. When the products are still there it cannot be maintained that the cause is destroyed because the cause is found in the effect. Hence the author of the Vedãnta Paribhãșã suggests that the destruction of the universe is carried out in away reverse to that of creation. He argues that all the products are destroyed when the unseen cause producing it is destroyed. Since destruction of the material cause is not competent to do so. (Even the Naiyãyika believes that the kärya is destroyed when its non-inherent cause gets destroyed).26 The difficulty of accepting the destruction of the material cause as the cause of the products i.e. kärya, should baffle even the Naiyäyika, for as the author points out the colour smell etc. of earth-atoms in the final dissolution should not get destroyed. They hold that even in Pralaya atoms lie swung hither and thither. Hence even they have to admit that colour etc. of the atom are destroyed when the unseen favourable cause is destroyed. Against this background the author gives the order of dissolution. Earth gets merged in water, water in fire, fire in air, air in the ether, ether in the ego of the Jiva and the ego of the Jiva in

26 Vide Nyšya Siddhānta Muyktāvali page 65

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the ego of Hiranyagarbha and the last finally in avidy. This is just the reverse of the process of creation. In support of his statement the Veteran scholar quotes from the Visnupurãna.27

Now one more question remains that since Brahman is the material cause of the universe, Brahman should exist along with the world or the entire world will have to be considered as Brahman. Otherwise the Theory of Creation as enunciated in the sruti has no meaning. To this objection raised by the opponent author replies ihat the passages connected with creation in the Holy Text do not purport to speak of creation-but in the secondless Brahman. It may look strange how it is so. What is the connection between creation and the secondless Brahman? Our author gives a satisfactory reply to this question. If the objector argues the Vedic passage had not spoken of creation and simply discussed its absence in Brahman, everybody would have a mistaken notion that the world is not in Brahman and certainly situated somewhere else - on the lines of the statement 'Vayau Rupam Nasti' where the idea is that colour Is not present in Väyu but certainly present somewhere else. And thus the reader should dismiss the mistaken notion to get the final doubtless notion of the secondless Brahman intended to be stated by the Holy Text. Thus, from the statements of creation, since Brahman is considered to be the cherished object and since a product cannot exist without a material cause, with the help of negative statements 'Neti, Neti' regarding Brahman the existence of this world is denied in Brahman as also outside, and since the entire world is considered worthless, a mistaken notion of all duality is removed and the one, impartiate sat, cit, jñăna rupa, Brahman of the form of Bliss is arrived at indirectly through the statements of creation. Then it may not be questioned how Brahman is the author of creation (which is his tatasthalaksana) for, even with the help of a false (non-existing) entity, an existent object may be understood.

ट7 जगत्प्रतिष्ठा देवर्षे पृथिव्यप्सु प्रलीयते। .... etc Visnupurana

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The author now takes up the purpose (prayojana) served by a study of Vedänta which teaches the identity between the individual soul and the supreme soul. In a strictly logical manner he defines the word 'purpose'. By prayojana is meant that which as known is the object of desire as related to oneself.1 Purpose is two-fold, the main one and the secondary one. In the present case the main purpose is Bliss and absence of pain (dukhãbhãva). The secondary purpose is the means of attainment of either of them e.g. sacrifice etc. for heaven and prãyaschitta for the absence of pain. The author divides pleasure into two varieties - that which is surpassed (by another) and that which is unsurpassed. The surpassed pleasure is a particular type of manifestation of a moiety of the pleasure effected by the difference in the mental mode produced by the object concerned. The idea is that, since Brahman is of the form of Bliss and all the objects are superimposed on Brahman, a part ofthe same pleasure is experienced in the object. The author attests a quotation from the sruti to this effect.2 The other variety of pleasure is Brahman itself. Itis unsurpassed Bliss.3 That is why moksa or salvation has been described as the attainment of Brahman of the form of the Bliss. As a consequence there is annihilation of misery. He rejects he view that going to other world or attaining pleasure consequent on themis moksa on the ground that they are produced-and hence impermanent and there is the fear of coming back to this world,4 once again. So our author accepts only'sãyujya' as the highest goal of life as against the other types of mukti Särupya etc. It should not be urged that moksa being of the form of the attainment of

1 यवगतं सत् स्ववृत्तिता इष्पते तत् प्रयोजनम्। Vide V.P.p.406 2 "एतस्यैवानद्दस्यान्यानि भूतानि मात्रामुपजीवन्ति।" Vide Br.IV.iii-32 3 "आनन्दो ब्रह्मेति व्यजानाठ्" etc. Tait. Up.lIl-6. 4 नस पुनरावर्तते । ch.up. Vil-XV-1

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Brahman and thus having a beginning, Säyujyamukti suffers from the same faults as Sarupyamukti etc. The idea is that, if the attainment of Brahman has a beginning, it should be a product. If, on the other hand attainment of Brahman is always there without a beginning, there should be no need to undertake śravana etc. To this the advaitin replies that "attainment of Brahman" which is a real existent (siddha) is mistaken as non existence (Asiddha) and hence sravana etc. deserve to be undertaken. As regards annihilation of misery it should not be urged by the opponent that an abhãvapadãrtha cannot be considered to be asiddhapadärtha according to the advaitin, since it goes against the nonduality of Brahman. To this our author replies that cessation of misery is identical with its substratum Brahman.5 In support or his argument our author taken an example from common experience. The idea is that it is not strange that attaining what is already attained and discording what is already discarded is considered a purpose in common experi- ence. The person who has gold in his fist but has forgotten about it, when reminded by another person, gets pleasure and feels as though he got something which he didn't possess at all.6 Hence moksa is the purpose served by the study of Vedānta. This liberation is attained only with the help of knowledge jñäna7 and ajñäna is also rooted out with the help of knowledge and what is this knowledge that liberates a person? This is the knowledge ofidentity between the individual Soul and the supreme soul.8

This knowledge of Brahman is of the immediate type. If it is not considered perceptual, if cannot remove the false knowledge of aparoksa.

5 अधिष्ठान सत्तातिरिक्तसत्ताया: अड्गीकारात् in the Adv. view. 6 Vide यथा हस्तगतस्मृतसुवर्ण ...... etc. V.P.41 7 तमेवविदित्वातिमृत्युमेति .... Sv.Up.1ii-8,iv-15. 8 अभयं वे जनक प्राप्तोसि। Br.iv. -i4

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Next the author discusses how the immediate knowledge of Brahman is attained. There are difference of opinion in this regard. Some thinkers like Padmapäda hold that the knowledge of Brahman is produced directly fromsentences like TATTWAMASI some others e.g. those of the Bhamati school hold that such knowledge is produced with the help of the internal organ, with its impressions of (Manana) reflection and meditation (Nididhyãsana). The author explains how knowledge derived from a sentence can be immediate knowledge. The author appears to be in full agreement with the opinion held by the ancient philosophers. He once again reiterates in the chapter on 'prayojana' his view® regarding the immediacy of knowledge as held by ancient scholars of Vedänta. With them he believes that immediacy of Knowledge is not effected by being produced from a particular Karaņa. But is depends upon the particular object to be known. And following this line of argument, our author argues that, as soon as sentences like 'TATTWAMASI' are strictly comprehended, non-difference is estab- lished between the ego-defined consciousness and Brahman and as such the knowledge that is effected by it; though produced from verbal Testimony, must be considered immediate Knowledge (Perception). The author cites in support of this a statement from the pratardanädhikarana which reveals that such knowledge, though derived from sentences, is pratyaksa as the word 'drsta' has been used in the statement of the Brahmasutra.10

9 Vide Chapter on Perception'. 10 शास्त्रदृष्ट्यातूपदेशो वामदेववत् Sut.1 -- 30. Pratardana approaches Indra with a request to reveal to him the final goal of life. Then Indra replies that he is the Prana (Vital air) Prajfia etc. प्राणोस्मि अमृतं वे and asks nim to adore Him. The Bhäyakāra finally decides that the word prana signifies Brahman. Then how is it that Indra says "adore me" because he is not Brahman and so the reply is given in the next sutra "शास्त्रदृष्ट्रयातूपदेशो वामदेव वत्।"The idea here is that Indra identifies himself with Brahman from the perception resulting from the Gastra i.e. Brahmätmaikyajnäna. Here the word drati' signifies percaption produced from hearing sentences of sastra like TATTWAMASI'.

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The author also refer to the other view on the subject. It is argued that directness of Perception is caused only by a particular Karana but not by a particular type of object. That is to say if the object is in proximity, it should not be considered that it produces perception. The opinion of the followers of Bhãmatí is that, though the object may be in proximity in a particular person, the perceptual knowledge may not a be produced. The object may be perceived by a person possessing a capable sense organ, whereas it is not so in the case of one whose sense-organ is deficient. As such the rule that perceptibility of knowledge is produced only by the sense organ is due to its production by the sense organ and hence knowledge of Testimony is only mediate. Hence in their view the perception of Brahman is not effected by sentences like 'TATTWA MASI'. Hence the other question arises 'which is the efficient cause of Brahman perception?' To this they reply that manas as impressed (samskrta) by manana and Nididhyãsana is the efficient cause. They support their statement by Vedic passages11. If the objector urges that there are passages Holy text which speak of Brahman being 'Beyond the reach of world and mind' it should be interpreted as Brahman being beyond the reach of manas which has no Samskäras as stated above.12 Neither should another objection be launched against this view that, on this view, Brahman ceases to be the self as represented by Upanisads as explained in the sruti13 for the manas which we speak of, acts only after attaining the knowledge of the Vedic passages 'TATTWAMASI' and thus the manas depends upon the vedic sentences for its action. Hence there Is no contradiction. The objection would have been there ifthe mind had acted with the help of something else but the Veda. Even, in the Sutra the word sästra should have been explained on these lines

11 मनसैवानुद्रष्टव्यम्। .... Br. IV. iv-19. 12 यतो वाचो निवर्तन्ते अप्राप्यमना सह। .... Tait .- II-iv .- 1 13 तमैव औपनिषदं पुरुषं भृच्छामि। Br.up.iii-ix-26

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that is to say Brahman-realisation is called sästradrsti as it is called a mental perception having for its object Brahman. The idea here is that, after the knowledge of the Holy text, the mind acts realising Brahman and hence the realisation is considered to be effected by Sastra and hence the word 'sastradrsti14 in the passage. It may be noted that the same is the case with the removal of the rope- snake mistake (rajjusarpabhrãnti etc.). The same is the case with sentences 'you are the tenth' etc. In support of their view there is a verse quoted by the author15. Now the author turns his attention to the way in which such knowledge of identity with the supreme is produced. He is ofthe opinion, as a Vedäntin, that such knowledge is the result of a dissolution of sin (päpaksaya) and sin is destroyed by undertaking Karma. That is to say Karma is an indirect cause of Tattvajnäna but not a direct cause. Thatis to say Karma destroys sin and as a result the mind becomes pure as it detaches itself from worldly objects and the aspirants deserves to know Brahman and undertakes manana and Nididhyãsana. In support of this idea that Karma brings about final salvation (though indirectly) he quotes Vedic passages,16 from the srutis and smrtis17 Hearing Reflection, Meditation (SRAVANA, MANANA AND NIDIDHYĀSANA)

Now the author discusses the place ofthe three direct means of attaining knowledge18. Hearing reflection, Meditation (Sravana,

14 शास्त्रदृष्ट्यादूपदेश:VideV P.page 424 15 अपि संराधने .... Kalpataru.p.218 Vide Mm. A.K Sastry's com on V.P.345-349 16 तमेतं वेदानुवचनेन ब्राह्मणा विविदिषन्ति, यज्ञेन दानेन तपसानाशकेन etc.Br.IV-iv-22 17 कषाये कर्मभि:पक्के ततो ज्ञानं प्रवर्तते .... Smrti Vide Mm.A.K.Sastry's com on V.P.

18 This subject should, as a rule, -actually be included in the sadhana pāda as page 348-

done by the sutrakära and others. But our author does not have a separate Sadhanapāda in hisscheme and hence Sravana, Manana, etc. aare included by him in the Prayojana Pariccheda.

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Manana and Nididhyäsana). To this he attests the sanction of the Holy Text19. Now the author states the view of some other Vedantins before he gives the Vivaranakära's view in which he is interested. Sravana has been defined as the mental activity which is conducive to a decisive knowledge of the purport in the secondless Brahman of all the Vedänta passages20 Manana is defined as a mental activity which produces a knowledge of anukula tarka which can counter act doubts produced in the mind by other conflicting pramãna in the meaning ascertained by Vedic passages21. By Nididhyāsana is meant that mental activity which is conducive to the firm establish- ment (of the mind) in the object Ätman distracting it (the mind) from worldly objects to which it is attracted due to its beginningless evil impressions.22 Of these three, as stated above, some Vedãntins hold that Nididhyasana is the direct cause of perception of Brahman. Vedic passages support this.23 And to this Nididhyãsana, Manana is the cause since Nididhyasana cannot be practised by a person who has not undertaken Manana since the reality is not firmly established in his mind. For Manana, Sravana is the cause, without Sravana the purport is not ascertained. Since the necessary sentence meaning is not there, one cannot think of Manana which is conducive to the ascertainment that the knowledge gained by him through the sentence is proper. According to this view, thus, Sravana, is a cause ofManana, Manana the cause of Nididhysana.

19 आत्मा वा अरे द्रष्टव्यः श्रोतव्यो मन्त्रव्यो निदिध्यासि तव्य :- Br.Up.ll.iv.5; 20 श्रवणं नाम वेदान्तानामद्वितीये ब्रह्मणि तात्पर्यावधारणानुकूलमानसी क्रिया।V.P.123

व्यापारः। lbid 423 22 निदिध्यासनं नाम अनादिदुर्वासनया विषयेष्वाकृश्यमाणस्य चित्तस्य विषयेभ्योऽप कृष्य

23 ते ध्यानयोगानुगता अपश्यन्, देवात्मशक्तिं स्वगुणर्निगुढदाम्।Sv.Up.1-3.

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Thus these three are considered by them to be the causes of knowledge leading to the identity of the supreme with the individual.24

As opposed to this there is yet another opinion as held by the Vivarana school of thought which holds Sravana as the main cause, the other two manana and Nididhyãsana which effect the knowledge of Brahman, the results of Sravana being subsidiary, though both of them happen to be subsequent to sravana. Thus the two are considered by these thinkers as angas being directly helpful (ãrãdupakarakas). The author holds that this subsidiariness (angatva) should not be considered to be of the form of sstra as enjoined by jaimini in the third pada of third chapter. How there is no Sesatva inspite of its being a subsidiary is clearly argued by our author from the Mímamsaka stand point of view which he should have mastered well.25 He holds that the six-sruti, linga etc. reveal that a particular thing is the subsidiary of another. Such a possibility of argument does not exist in the present case.26 None of the pramãnas speaking of a subsidiary (aņgatvabodhakapramănas) applies here. Tospeak of Manana and Nididhyãsana as subsidiaries of sravana there is no case of sruti27 where there is the instrumental case which speaks of Vríhi etc. being the part of a sacrifice, nor is there linga which ascertains lingatva28. It is no case of Vākya also29. Nor is prakarana being capable of applied here30. Here the author raises a question as to why this cannot be a case of prakarana

24 Vide Bhämati - 3rd Chapter 4th päda and 4th chapter 1st pāda 25 Forarguments in this regard Vide Citsukhi - Karanibhuta-sabdagata. etc For details of explanation vide Mm.A.K. Śāstry Com. p.354. 26 श्रोतव्यो मन्तव्यो निदिध्यासितव्यः। .. Br.Il-iv-5 27 As in the case of व्रीहीभिर्यजेत 28 As in the case of बर्हिर्देवसदनं दामि wherein the mantra is an anga of कुशलवन 29 As in the case of प्रवर्गस्याग्रिष्टोमे प्रवृणक्ति where the pravarga though arriving

Vākya. at a different context is an anga of agnistoma by dint of the pramäna the

30 As in the case of angas of prayaja etc. of दर्शपूर्णमासयाग।

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since after reiterating the knowledge of Brahman the Veda enjoins Sravana (as a duty) and since itis expected to have a result thereof and in the context of Sravana since Manana and Nididhyāsana have been mentioned (and therefore) Manana and Nididhyäsana ought to be angas on the analogy of the prayãjadis in the Darsapûrnamäsayäga. To this our author replies that if cannot be so because in some other Vedic texts,31 it has been declared that meditation is the anga of darsana and as such we are oblized to hold, in that case that, on the analogy of prayājas, Sravana and Manana alone are the angas of Nididhyäsana. The other last two pramãnas Krama and samākhya cannot apply here. This is how the pramänas) speaking of subsideriness angatva bodhaka pramnas cannot establish sesatva as revealed in the third pāda of third chapter. Further the author argues that, whereas in the case of prayãjas, there is some purpose served by the consideration of subsidiariness i.e. in the variant (vikrti) sacrifices, prayãjas should not be undertaken is the prima face view but there should be undertaken in the final view. But in the present case there is no such possibility as sravana is not a case of a thing and Manana Nididhyãsanas are not its variants (vikrti). So the author argues that here, as in the case of the pot etc. there is a every possibility of arguing about the main cause and auxiliary causes. So also in the case of Sravana, Manana, Nididhyäsana as suggested by the Vivaranakāra in his work, the author holds that the pramana is expected to be very closely connected with the prameya and it is only sravana which is ofthe form of the ascertainment of the sabda as qualified by the import and its potentiality. That is the immediate cause ofthe knowledge ofthe tätparya. Manana and Nididhyäsana on the other hand, become causes of experience of brahman (Brahmänubhava) simply because they produce concentration of the mind derived fromimpressions which converge towards the inner self and thus these two are only mediate causes with reference to

31 ते ध्यानयोगानुगतापश्यन्।Sv Up.l-3.

LIBERATION 143

Brahmänubhava and as such they are called angas of Sravana as they are far removed from ascertainment of the meaning of the sentence.

Now the author proposes to discus 'who is eligible for Sravana'. One who is desirous of attaining Moksa is eligible for Sravaņa. This is because in all actions performed with a desire, the desire of the result gives eligibility to the person. The desire for Mukti is consequent on six factors.32 Of these six the author defines for the sake of clarity, calmness (sama) self-control (dama), self-withdrawal (Uparati) fortitude (titiksa), concentration (samãdhãnam) and faith (sraddha).33 In this way some Vedãntins hold that there is eligibility for Sravana only for sanyasins since they only have self-withdrawal (uprama). But other Vedäntins are of opinion that the word uparama does not signify sanyasa but only absence ofdistraction ofsanysa which is possible even in the case ofhouseholders. They argue that Janaka is an example of the type who made Brahmavicära being a householder and as such Sravana etc. are not the monopoly of Sanyãsa alone but of all the four stages of life.

Another question that engages author is meditation on the conditioned Brahman (saguna Brahma Upãsanã). He holds that meditation on the conditioned one leads to the unconditioned Brahman through concentration of the mind. By Saguna Brahma

32 नित्यानित्यवस्तुविवेकस्येहामुत्रार्थफलभोगविरागस्यशमदमोपरति तितिक्षासमाधा श्रद्धानांच विनियोग: | V.P.429 33 अन्तरिन्द्रियनिग्रहः शमः। बहिरिन्द्रियनिग्रहो दमः। विक्षेपाभाव उपरतिः। शीताष्णादिद्वन्द्वसहनं तितिक्षा चित्तैकाग्रयं समाधानम्। गुर्वेदात्तावाक्येपु विश्वास: श्रद्धा। Ibid-430

144 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

Üpäsana is meant the worship of Brahman as seen in the form of Ăditya etc.34 The auther quotes verses from the Kalpataru in support of this.35 The idea is that persons who are unable to undertake meditations on the unconditioned Brahman are eligible to undertake saguna upäsana which is easier as a result of which the mind is controlled which, later on leads to the saksätkara of the uncondi- tioned Brahman by removing the adjuncts concerned. These Sagunopãsakas attain to the world of Brahma through the way of light etc (archiradi). There they are expected to do Sravana as a result of which they attain Brahma sksätkära or Moksa along with Brahma in the world of Brahma.38 As regards these who undertake Karma or activity, they attain the world of the manes (pitrloka) through the way ofsmoke37 (Dhùmãdi) and there they enjoy the fruits of their past actions and when the Karma is destroyed they again take rebirth-some where in the ladder of life between Brahman and the insentient beings according to their meritorious or evil actions as the cause may be. This is supported by the sruti text.38 Those who undertake actions prohibited in the Veda go to Hells or different types, Raurava etc. and experience their due share of extreme sorrow and take birth again as quadrupeds or birds etc. or even Insentient things.

It may be noted here that those who have realisation of the unconditioned Brahman do not go to any other world. A Vedic passage supports this.3° As to what happens then to such a knower of Brahman, the author replies, that he experiences pleasure, pain, till the end of his prärabdhakarma and later gets final salvation. The

34 आदित्य also पंचाग्निविद्या, मधुविद्याetc. 35 निर्विशेषं परं ब्रहम् साक्षात्कर्तुमनीश्वरा:Vide Vedanta Kalpataru - Verses 1-2 on Brahma Su.1-i.20. 36 Ch. Up. 37 Ch Up. 38 रमणीय चरणा रमणीयां योनिमापद्यन्ते, Ch.Up .- V-X-7 39 न तस्य प्राणा उत्क्रामन्ति ...... Br.UP.iv-IV.6.

LIBERATION 145

author raises a pertinent question here whether all the past actions are destroyed after the attainment of Brahmajñäna or only some of them. The doubt arises because of the particular Sruti and smrti texts40 which declare that all the past actions are destroyed by (the fire of) knowledge. But our author cities counter examples from the same texts41 which declare that only accumulated and agāmi karma alone is destroyed by Brahmajñãna but not prārabdhakarma too which has already started producing its effects. Accumulated Karma is of two types-Good and evil. This is also attested to by the 42 Veda. How is it that when Brahmajñana removes the entire primal nescience its effect prärabdhakarma also should be removed. Then how is it that the Brahmajñanin possesses a body etc. This objection is met by the author by stating that as long as the impediments in the form of prärabdhakarma continue, cessation of ajñãna is not acceptable. Itis only knowledge of Brahma unimpeded by such karma that removes ajñana. A further doubt is also foreseen by the author as to whether through tattvajñãna one individual soul gets - salvation or all the souls are released. This is so because avidya is considered to be one and when that is removed there is no samsära.43 This is not taken as an objection by some Vedäntins. But probably as it looks absurd our author speaks of its from another aspect. The reason is that if, with the release of one individual soul, all souls are finally released, when the Veda and Smrti texts declare that Suka, Närada etc. are released souls how can it be that people

40 क्षीयन्ते चास्य कर्माणि तस्मिन् दृष्टे परावरे Mu.Up.ll.ii.8. ज्ञानाभि:सर्वकर्माणि भस्मसात् कुरुते यथा B.Gita IV-37 41 तस्य तावदेव चिरं यावन्र विमोक्ष्ये etc ... Cha.Up.VI-XIV.2and नाभुक्तं क्षीयते कर्म

42 तस्य पुत्रादायमुपयन्ति 43 It may be noted here that some Vedäntins are of the view that the knower of Brahman is not experiencing pleasure and pain because of his cessation of ajhäna, but he appears to all others as though he is experiencing pain and pleasure.

146 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

like us are not released? Hence the other point of view is stated that avidyã is considered manifold in view of the plural number of the word Mãyabhih in the Vedic statement.44 Though this solves the difficulty, still, on the basis of some texts in the Veda,45 avidyã Is taken to be one and one only. But the plural in the word Mãyäbhih in the previous text should have, therefore, been used in the sense of its particular capacities inherent in it or the three gunas existing in it; even this view appears not to be quite sound. Hence some other Vedäntins hold that even though avidyã is one and the ãvarana potentiality corresponding to it is also one, still there is manifoldness in it by being the ãvarana as related to one particular soul each and on this view the particular individual soul who attains Brahmajnana destroys its avidyã as qualified on the particular potentiality of avarana of Brahma (Brahmasvarûpāvaranasakti) of that particular soul but not that of the others. Hence the objection that, when one gets released all others should get released, is not tenable. That Is exactly why in a Brahmasûtra, 46 in the final view, it has been given thatthe persons of eligibility (adhikärikapurusas) like Indra who have already attained Brahmajñãna posses bodies because they attain bodiless satvation only after their prärabdhakarma, which gives them their Adhikära, is destroyed. The author quotes Vãcaspati Miśra in support ofthis. 47 This explanation given to the sûtra quoted above by implication reveals that all souls are not released when a particular one is released. Thus our author the opinion that though avidyã is one it is but quite expedient that the difference of ävarana Is different in the case of each individual soul. This is the way in which Brahmajñãna is attained by an aspirant.

44 इन्द्रो मायाभि: पुरुरुपईयते। Br Up. II-V-19 45 अजामेका Sv Up Iv-5

47 उपासनादिसंसिद्धतोवितेश्वरचोदितम्।अधिकारंसमाप्यैते प्रविशन्ति परं पदम्। .... Bhamat 3-3-32 page 313.

147

CONCLUSIONS

From an entire survey of the work, the Vedanta Paribhãsa, one is oblized to note that the author is a versatile scholar of the entire Darsana literature This is evidenced not only from internal evidence but also from the nature of the works attempted by him Probably it is for the first time that an erudite scholar of such mental calibre has attempted to systematise the basic tenets of Advaita Vedãnta which formerly lay scattered in a number of works like the Upanisads, the sutras of Bãdarãyana, the sûtrabhãsya of Sankara, the Vartika of Sûtrabhãsya of Saňkara, the Pañcapādika Vıvarana, the Citsukhi etc He profusely quotes from all these works at relevant places and all through his work we find that he has mastered the science of the Advaita Vedãnta to a considerably high degree. Nor Is his knowledge of Purãnas less displayed in the concerned topics where much evidence of the Srutis is, probably, not available. His quotations from the Smrti texts in respect of Creation bear ample testimony to his knowledge of the Purãnas

Most probably 't is for the first time in the History of Advaita Literature that a scholar so well versed ın Navya - Nyãya as to write a commentary the Tarkacûdãmanı, attempted to collect, systematise and present the facts of Advaita Philosophy in strict Navya-Nyãya terminology. Very often his plan of work is to defend the Advaitin's point of view on any topic from a possible attack from others especially the Naiylykas. Through out the work we find tirades made by him against the Naiyãyıka and ın some places against the Mímämsaka also. He attacks the Mimamsaka on the question of Sabda (Veda) - Nityatva and refutes it tooth and nail. This displays his knowledge of Mimämsä, when referring to the Balbalädhikarana, while commenting upon expectancy, while discussing the relative importance of sravana, Manana and Nididhysana he accepts them primary and secondary causes; he also speaks of the six pramānas which reveal subsidiariness (Angatva) and shows how all of them are in applicable in the present context. Of course on the Pramãna

148 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀSĀ

side he mostly accepts the Bhätta argument an it is wont with the Advaitin-according to the oft quoted maxim 'Pramäne Bhättanayah'. But here too while discussing perception etc. he has the courage to set aside the definition of the Mimämsaka and presents his own point of view in a different way.

His arguments based on Navya-Nyāya principles vindicating the Advaita tenets are to be found throughout the work. The entire perception chapter appears to be a product of his own ingenuity where he speaks of jñānagatapratyaksatva proyojaka and Visayagatapratyakşatva Prayojaka lucidly, the justification of the . different epithets included in the definition of pratyaksa etc., Much against the Tarkika stand point, he argues on the basis of the Vivarana how Śabda can give immediate knowledge. He advocates non-difference (abheda) between the Vişayacaitanya and Pramänacaitanya for the production ofimmediate knowledge but not simple contact. He does not accept the view that production from a sense organ contributes to pratyaksatva. He also contradicts the view of the Naiyäyika that inferential knowledge is entirely of an inferential nature. The subject part of it is immediate and the other part is mediate and thus he contradicts the logician's view. In this context he rejects the concepts of generic attribute (jäti) and adjunct (Updhi) of the Naiyäyika as invalid. While speaking about indeter- minate perception he holds the opinion that the syntactical connec- tion (Padärthasamsarga) does not contribute to the objectivity ofthe knowledge derived from a sentence. He upholds the Akhandārthavāda much against the view of the logician with quotation from Citsukha. He makes a clear distinction of Jíva, Iswara, Jivaskşin and Iswarasäksin with the help of the technical words updhi and Visesana While speaking of delusion (bhränti) he rejects the jñãnalaksanaprattyāsatti advocated by the logician. He clearly distinguishes between parinäma and vivarta and shows how the hallucinational silver can be considered both as a parimäna as well as a Vivarta from two different points of view. He raises a number of doubts in the theory of illusion and solves them from the Advaltic

CONCLUSIONS 149

standpoint. He rejects the Kadambagolaka Nyãya by which sound Is stated to be propagated by some Naiyãyikas. As a follower of the Vivarana school, the author refutes the Naiyayika view that mind is a sense organ and discusses the subject from Vedic and Smrti evidences.

In inference he rejects the established Theory ofthe logician that the recollection of Vyapt is the intermediary activity of the inference. Instead he advocates that Vyapti samskra is enough for the purpose. He also rejects the Naiyayıka division of the mark (Hetu) into three and establishes his own point of view as the one of a form anvaya only. He rejects the Kevalavyatirekin also He applies his knowledge of Anumäna to establish the Unreality of the world quoting citsukha and vindicating his theory from possible attacks. In his argument that, according to the logician, colour which itself does not possess colour in it, is an object of sense perception. This is a wonderful argument He speaks ofthe three kinds of realities from the Advaita stand point In the chapter on comparison he follows the Mímamsa Theory and criticises the logician.

In the Sabdakhanda he gives his own definition of ãkãnksã, He criticises the theory of capacity for a word in the individual (Vyaktisakti) and accepts the theory of the Mímamsaka 'Jātisakti' As against the tradition of many other theorists, he maintains that implication is two-fold-pure (kevala) and Laksıtalaksana. Here he has a special contribution in respect ofimplication while interpreting sentences like 'soyam Devadattah, Tattvamasi' He suggests that there is no need to take recourse to laksana. He boldly asserts that 'Sankara's acceptance of implication in such cases is of the nature of Abhyupagamyaväda. He agrees with the Mímämsaka that Implied Sense (laksanä) may be present in a sentence also and not only in a word. As regards purport (Tätparya) he gives a definition of his own and rejects the Naiyäiyika's view. He upholds the Bhätta Mímämsaka view regarding Presumption (Arthäpatti) and Non- Perception (Anupalabdhi). He discusses Yogyänupalabdhi in some detail. He does not accept absolute non-existence as eternal.

150 VEDĀNTAPARIBHĀȘĀ

While discussing the validity of knowledge (Prāmänya) he rejects the Tärkika stand-point that merit (guna) is the cause of Validity (Pramä) and fault (Dosa) is the cause ofinvalidity (Apramä). He includes absence of fault in the definition of Pramã. He advocates the theory ofselfvalidity ofthe Mĺmämsaka and creates a possibility for a doubt also that may arise.

The author in the prameya part of the work discusses the essential and the secondary characteristics like subject hood (kartrtva) and shows how Brahman is the cause of the universe. He also argues skilfully how misery which is superimposed on Brahman is not a source of happiness. In his description of creation of the Universe he rejects the Naiyāyika view that 'Sabda is a Viseşaguņa of ether alone. He gives a clear description of creation in a logical way. In point of destruction he does not accept the Naiyayika view that the destruction of the Non-inherent cause is the cause of the destruction of the effect. He views that adrstanäsã is necessary to be accepted even by the logician. His argument that Sentences of the Holy Text have their import in Brahman is very interesting and illuminating. Specally instructive is his elucidation of Jiva and Parameśwara regarding their being either bimba or Pratibimba. He gives arguments for and against these views while discussing the meaning of 'Tat'. While discussing the word 'Tvam' he discusses Mukti and its utility in detail. The various views thereon are discussed, theory of one soul and multiplicity of souls etc. dream, waking state etc. have been defined. He also shows how Sabda can set aside perception in point of Validity. He accepts the beginningless nature of this world. He agrees with the Mĺmamsaka that Siddhaparaväkyas also convey meaning. In the chapter on 'Prayojana' he makes clear how Śravana etc. are necessary though liberation has always been there. He does not accept the Bhämati view that Manana etc. are the direct causes. He agrees with the Vivarana that sravana is the direct causes, Karma leads to knowiedge and knowledge (jñäna) leads to the final goal.

CONCLUSIONS 151

He discusses the sagunopāsană and Nirguņopāsanā forms of worship. He also discusses the oneness ofavidyã, gradual liberation (Kramamukti), liberation with the body.

Thus the Vedănta Paribhāșa of Dharmarāja is a unique work on Advaita Vedänta which tries to explain all aspects of Advaita including technical terminology. It may be maintained without a shadow of doubt that the Vedanta Paribhäșã is an unparalled treatise on Advaita Vedänta. That is why in the latter Advaita works etc. very often quotation are cited from this work only mostly on the Pramãna side.

152 VEDÂNTAPARIBHÂȘĀ

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Brahmasutrabhãsya with Ed by N Anantakrıshna Sãstry Bhãmati Kalpataru and Calcutta, Published by Nirnaya Parimala Sãgar, Edition 1917

Epistemology of the Govardhan, P Bhatt, Sanskrit Bhãtta School of Purva Senes, 1962 Mımãmsa

History of Indian Philosophy Das Gupta, Vols I and II, 1975

History of Indian Jwala Prasad, C/o Munshiram Epistemology Manoharlal, 1958.

Indian Philosophy S Rãdhkrishnan, Vols.l and II

Indian Psycnology, · Sınha JN 1934 Perception

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Journal of the Tajore Saraswati Mahal Library

Lights on Advaita . Viramani Upãdhyãya. Vedãnta Mãndukya Upanisad

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Methods of Knowledge : Swamy Satprakāsänanda, George Alen and Unwin Press, London Mimmsa in its sources (Purva) : Dr. Gangānādh Jha, 1942.

Manusmrti : Nimnayasägar Edn. 1925, Bombay. Mānameyodaya of : Ed. by K. Kunhan Rāja Närāyana : Adyar. Pub. Mundakopanisad

Nyāyasiddhāntamuktāvali : 3rd Edition, Chowkhamba San skrit Series, 1972 Nyãyasutras : English Translation by Jha. Nyya Theory of knowledge : S.C. Chatterjee. Pañcadasi : Bhäratitirtha Vidyāranya R.K.Mission Pañcapādikā, Vivarana and : Madras Government Oriental Commentaries Series NoCLV. Philosophy of Advaita : T.M.P. Mahadevan. Preceptors of Advaita : Ed. by T.M.P. Mahadevan, Sri Kanchikāmakoti Sankara Mandir, Secunderabad, 1968 Problems of Post-Sankara : J.N. Sinha, Sinha Publishing Advaita House, Calcutta Philosophy of a Sentences : Prof. V.Subba Rao, and its parts Munshiräm Manohar Lal. Sabara's Bhāsya .. on the Mimämsasutras Sankara Bhāsya on : the Brahmasutras Chändogya Upanisad Brhadāranyaka Upanisad Taittiriya Upanisad Bhagavad-gitā Sāstradipikā : Pårthasärathi Misra, Chowkhambha Sanskrit Series 188 ; 1913

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