1. Jivan Mukti Viveka Jivanmukti in Transformation Andrew Fort Sunny Press

JĪVANMUKTI in Transformation

Embodied Liberation in Advaita and Neo-Vedanta

Andretv O. Fort

Jīvanmukti in Transformation

This One

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Jīvanmukti in Transformation

Embodied Liberation in Advaita and Neo-Vedanta

Andrew O. Fort

STATE UNIVERSITY OF NEW YORK PRESS

Published by State University of New York Press, Albany

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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Fort, Andrew O. Jivanmukti in transformation : embodied liberation in Advaita and neo-Vedanta / by Andrew O. Fort p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0-7914-3903-8 (hardcover : alk. paper). - ISBN 0-7914-3904-6 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Mokşa. 2. Advaita. 3. Vedanta. I. Title. BL1213.58.F67 1998 181'.482-dc21 97-39409 CIP 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1

To Sam and Meredith, joys of my life, and to Wilhelm Halbfass, for his scholarly inspiration

Contents

Preface and Acknowledgments ix

Abbreviations xi

1 Introduction: What Kind of Liberation is Liberation While Living? 1

Part 1. Embodied Liberation in Traditional Advaita Vedanta

1. The Development of the Idea of Embodied Liberation before Sankara: The Early Upanişads, the Brahmasūtras, Gaudapāda, and the Bhagavad-Gītā 19

2. Knowing Brahman While Embodied: Śankara on Jīvanmukti 31

3. Mandana Miśra and Śankara's Disciples on Jīvanmukti: Sureśvara, Sarvajñātman, and Vimuktātman 47

4. Jīvanmukti in Later Scholastic Advaita: Prakāśātman, Citsukha, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, Prakāśānanda, Sadānanda, and Dharmarāja 58

Part 2. Jīvanmukti in "Yogic Advaita"

5. Rāmānuja and Sāmkhya/Yoga on Liberation While Living 77

6. Yogic Advaita I: Jīvanmukti in the Yogavāsiștha 84

vii

viii o Contents

7. Yogic Advaita II: Liberation While Living in the Jīvanmuktiviveka 97

8. Yogic Advaita III: Jīvanmukti in the Pañcadaśi, the "Minor" Upaniads, and Madhusūdana's Gūdārthadīpikā 114

Part 3. Embodied Liberation in Neo-Vedanta: Adaptation and Innovation

9. Neo-Vedanta and the Transformation of Advaitic Jīvanmukti 129

10. A Liberated Being Being Liberated: The Case of Ramana Maharshi 134

11. Candrasekharendra Sarasvati: Šankarācārya and Jīvanmukta? 152

12. The Liberated Being and Social Service: Vivekananda, Radhakrishnan, and the Neo-Vedantic Jīvanmukta 172

Notes 187

Bibliography 235

Index 245

Preface and Acknowledgments

This book has had a long gestation. I first started thinking about jīvanmukti in Advaita in 1987 and organized a panel for the American Acad- emy of Religion on Living Liberation in Hindu Thought in 1989. That panel eventuated in the 1996 State University of New York (SUNY) Press book of the same name, co-edited with Patricia Mumme. While that and this book are not a "matching set," each informed the other. As I read more in the scho- lastic Advaita tradition, I became aware that the ostensibly Advaitic Yogavāsiștha and Jīvanmuktiviveka presented a different, "Yogic Advaita" version of jīvanmukti. My interest in "neo-Vedanta" came later, as I noticed the transformation of the traditional conceptions of jīvanmukti to a more ecumenical and "socially conscious" model in post-British times. This inter- est was part of a more general inquiry, prompted especially by Wilhelm Halbfass's work, into the impact of Western ideas on modern Indian thinkers and into the possibilities of genuine cross-cultural understanding. An earlier version of parts of chapter 1 appears in "Going or Knowing? The Development of the Idea of Living Liberation in the Upanisads," Jour- nal of Indian Philosophy 22 (December 1994): 379-90, and chapter 2 is a revision of "Knowing Brahman While Embodied: Śankara on Jīvanmukti," Journal of Indian Philosophy 19 (December 1991): 369-89. Both appear here with kind permission from Kluwer Academic Publishers. The above-men- tioned book, Living Liberation in Hindu Thought, includes a chapter called "Liberation While Living in the Jīvanmuktiviveka: Vidyāranya's Yogic Advaita"; it appears here in revised form as chapter 8 by permission of the State University of New York Press. Finally, an earlier version of chapter 12

ix

X nn Preface and Acknowledgments

appears in Beyond Orientalism: The Work of Wilhelm Halbfass and Its Im- pact on Indian and Cross-Cultural Studies, edited by Eli Franco and Karin Preisendanz, Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of Sciences and Humanities, No. 59, Amsterdam/Atlanta: Editions Rodopi, 1997. It is a pleasure to acknowledge those who helped me bring this book into being. I benefitted greatly from an American Institute of Indian Studies (AIIS) senior research fellowship in 1990, particularly from the assistance of the AIIS officer in Madras, Pappu Venugopala Rao. I also received signifi- cant assistance from the staff of the Kuppuswami Shastri Research Institute, directed by S. S. Janaki. Dr. Janaki introduced me to Dr. R. Krishnamurti Sastry of the Madras Sanskrit College, who was of critical importance in helping me understand the views of traditional Advaita thinkers on jīvanmukti. Others in India who helped me better comprehend various Advaitins on lib- eration while living include Drs. R. Balasubramanian, P. K. Sundaram, N. Veezhinathan, K. Kunjunni Raja, and Arabinda Basu. I also learned a great deal from the members of the Sriramana (Maharshi) Ashram and from the Śankarācāryas of Kanchipuram and Sringeri. Stateside, I am grateful to Professors Mackenzie Brown, William Cenkner, and Lance Nelson for con- versations about and insights into jīvanmukti. Finally, Texas Christian Uni- versity has been supportive in many ways, from grants to visit India to a congenial and collegial department in which to work.

Abbreviations

BāU Brhadāraņyaka Upanișad BS Brahmasūtras (of Bādarāyaņa) ChU Chāndogya Upanișad JMV Jīvanmuktiviveka LYV Laghu Yogavāsistha PD Pañcadaśī PPV Pañcapādikāvivaraņa ŚB Śrī Bhāsya SK Sāmkhyakārikās SS Samkşepa-śārīraka US Upadeśasāhasrī VPS Vivaraņaprameya-samgraha YS Yogasūtras YV Yogavāsiștha

xi

Introduction: What Kind of Liberation Is Liberation While Living?

The nature of liberation (mukti, moksa) is a central concern of Indian thought. The group of related systems of thought within "Hinduism"1 called "Vedanta," which is based on the Vedic corpus culminating in the Upanisads, in particular investigated the character of liberation at length, without any unified conclusion. When considering liberation, one common question was whether liberation is possible in life, that is, while embodied. The answer to this question also varied in Hindu thought, in part because the idea that one can reach the supreme goal while still living is quite audacious, and many thinkers, within and outside of Vedanta, recoiled at such an idea. Others felt living liberation, often called jīvanmukti, was certainly possible.2 This book will look at the views of the widely known and influential nondualist Advaita Vedanta tradition on this matter. There has been vigorous debate and analysis of the existence and nature of jīvanmukti within Advaita, and the general conclusion seems to be that one can be liberated while living. However, members of the Advaita tradition also regularly express reserva- tions about or describe limitations in full liberation while embodied. The chapters that follow explore in greater depth the kind of liberation that Advaitins say liberation while living is. The first section of this book will consider the development of the idea of jīvanmukti in what I will call traditional Advaita, that is, the classical scholastic tradition of Sankara. I range from the Upanișads and Gaudapāda to Mandana Miśra and Sankara, then turn to disciples and commentators like Sureśvara, Sarvajñātman, Vimuktātman, Prakāśātman, and Citsukha, and end this section considering late scholastic Advaitins like Madhusūdana Sarasvatī,

2 aa Introduction

Prakāśānanda, Sadānanda, and Dharmarāja. After briefly considering the in- fluential views on living liberation of Rāmānuja and the Samkhya and Yoga schools that contest those of Advaita, I then turn to what I will call "Yogic Advaita," particularly as seen in the Yogavāsistha and the Jīvanmuktiviveka, as well as the more difficult to categorize Pañcadasī and so-called minor Upanişads. "Yogic Advaita" adds emphases on Sāmkhya concepts and Yoga practices to traditional Advaitic concerns. The final section will look at the modern "neo-Vedanta" view of the jīvanmukti concept. By neo-Vedanta, I mean the confluence of traditional Advaitic ideas with modern Western concepts like global ecumenism and humanistic social concern for all. While the Advaitin scholastics claimed that they held the true and final view, they recognized themselves as a "school" or lineage; neo-Vedantic writers, however, hold that Vedanta is a universal truth transcending a mere position or "religion." I therefore use the term neo- Vedanta (vs. neo-Advaita) to better distinguish these self-understood inclu- sive "Vedantic" thinkers from the more dialectical traditional Advaitins. After starting the final section with some general comments on the transformation of the Vedanta tradition under the influence of the modern West, I will look at a number of continuities and changes in traditional Advaitic thought gen- erally, and jīvanmukti in particular, first from the perspectives of the modern saints Ramana Maharshi and the late Sankarācārya of Kanchipuram, Candrasekharendra Sarasvati. Finally, I consider more neo-Vedantic views, particularly of Swami Vivekananda and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, and how, from the impact of Western ideas, the notion of social service has been linked to Advaitic jīvanmukti today. Numerous works have been written dealing with jīvanmukti in Advaita. The interested reader could start with Lance Nelson's excellent chapter in Living Liberation in Hindu Thought, and J. F. Sprockhoff's more focused studies.3 In addition, one can turn to L. K. L. Srivastava's neo-Vedantic work Advaitic Concept of Jivanmukti (which is discussed in some detail in the final chapter), A. G. Krishna Warrier's The Concept of Mukti in Advaita Vedanta (Madras: University of Madras,1961), S. K. Ramachandra Rao's Jīvanmukti in Advaita (Bangalore: IBH Prakashana, 1979), Chacko Valiaveetil's Liber- ated Life (Madurai: Dialogue Series, 1980), or by consulting Karl Potter's The Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies volume on Advaita Vedanta (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1981).

I want to say a bit more about my approach, vantage point, and in- tended audience. This book considers the historical development of the Advaita religio-philosophical conversation on the nature of liberation while living.4 My study is based on texts written by members of an elite scholastic tradi-

Introduction a 3

tion, and focuses on what texts the central figures have read, and who they discuss and argue with. I will give some of the cultural and ideological context as I proceed, especially with neo-Vedanta. Of course, discussion of embodied liberation was certainly not limited to the scholastic Advaita tradi- tion, as is apparent in texts like the Bhagavad-Gītā and Yogavāsistha or in schools following yogic or neo-Vedantic experiential practices. The breadth of the aspiration for and belief in liberation while living is clear when one observes the many saints, sages, and siddhas who have been claimed as living liberated beings in Indian history. I aim to illumine but a small portion of this field. I bring to this study the broadly humanistic and historical-critical values (or in less exalted terms, baggage) of most late twentieth century American academics. It is impossible to read closely the material I consider without being aware of the gulf between my worldview, that of traditional Advaita, and the modern neo-Vedantic hybrid of them. One manifestation of this gulf (and my values) is my attempt to use nonsexist language where possible, but simultaneously to respect the fact that the Advaita tradition was far from "gender inclusive." Liberation in traditional Advaita was generally meant for male Brahmin samnyāsins.5 I am aware of, but will generally not engage directly with, postmodernism in general and the conversation about Orientalism in particular.6 Some might see my scholarly interests as being part of a continuing neocolonialist "discourse of domination" that favors the Indian past (improperly called "classical," as this term suggests both some- thing frozen and a superior "golden age") and the classism and sexism of Brahminical thought.7 It is certainly the case that my work falls within a text- based Sanskritic Brahminical construction that was privileged by British and subsequently Indian interpreters, and has been used, overtly and covertly, for political purposes. I must also take seriously the responsibility of "speaking for" the Advaita tradition, as many readers will not read the original texts. This entails careful listening to the tradition's representatives, using appropri- ate categories, and acknowledging limits to understanding.8 Questions about political implications of and power asymmetries in academic inquiry are important to raise. My explicit project is, however, to make clear, through careful and respectful examination, what specific Advaitic texts and thinkers in their particular contexts say about jīvanmukti, how they are similar, dis- tinct, and how perspectives on living liberation transform over time. I believe that the humanist project of enlarging our horizons and understanding others more accurately on their own terms is fraught with political dimensions, but is not confined to them. My intended audience is scholars and others (Indian or Western) inter- ested in Indian religion and philosophy, and those curious about how modern Western thought has influenced modern Indian thinkers. Thus, I am reading

4 Introduction

these texts for purposes not intended by their authors, meaning both my goal of "disinterested" scholarly description and my selective foregrounding of certain "philosophical views" in them. The intended audience of those about whom I write is, especially in the classical tradition, quite different-the community of scholars and teachers within the Advaita tradition and those of other Indian schools of thought (darsana). Their quest was liberating insight and rigorously reasoned defense of truth-claims against opponents, not in self-consciously "locating themselves" as subjects or in disengaged "accurate description." Let me here note that I recognize that language like "accurate description" is contested by postmodernists and others. All readings are se- lective and all understandings limited, of course, and I endorse the notion of multiple readings and meanings of a text. However, I am not ready to aban- don the idea (and importance) of investigating authorial intent or of claiming that some "constructions" or "imaginings" are more legitimate than others. One sees the impact of differing approaches and audiences in the primacy traditional Advaitins give to close reading of scripture (and its com- mentators), as has been brilliantly analyzed by Francis X. Clooney in his Theology after Vedanta.9 The Veda (meaning here particularly the Upanișads) is regarded as the key source of knowledge about the highest truth. Thus, in significant ways, the Advaita tradition looks backward, with writers attempt- ing to clarify and elaborate on the Veda and its proper interpretation,10 rather than displaying an interest in "breaking new ground," as is common in the West. Creative thought is imbedded within commentary; it is recovery rather than discovery. Unlike in neo-Vedanta (and much of modern Western think- ing), sacred texts are more authoritative than personal experience or logic and reason. As Clooney shows, proper textual exegesis is of fundamental impor- tance because the texts take the skilled reader to liberating insight. And as time went on, the corpus needing mastery grew in length and sophistication. Reasoning is often rigorous, but in light of scriptural teaching; personal views need legitimation via śruti, for unguided reasoning is endlessly debatable. While modern scholars would say that the texts are read selectively, an Advaitin like Śankara would counter that Vedic texts are coherent (not made coherent) when understood properly.11 Further, as Clooney points out, the reader must possess the proper qualification or authority (adhikāra) to read these texts; he must be prepared and worthy. I should note, however briefly, that I (and all Western scholars) are not, according to the classical tradition, authorized readers, though I have been greatly assisted by modern representatives of this tradition. As stated earlier, I am using the text for, from a traditional perspec- tive, unintended purposes. I hope, however, to prove a respectful transgressor of propriety.

Introduction 5

What Is Jīvanmukti?

It is now time to turn directly to the fundamental question of this book: What is jīvanmukti, living liberation? Here I will focus on the traditional Advaitic, not the neo-Vedantic, conception. In traditional Advaita (nondual) Vedanta, liberation (moksa, mukti) is, broadly, release from bondage to the cycle of transmigratory existence (samsāra). This realm of phenomenal appearance is experienced by embodied beings due to ignorance (avidyā) of their true nature; this ignorance causes desire-filled action (karma) continu- ally binding them to the transmigratory cycle. One gains release through immediate knowledge (vidyā, jñāna) of partless, pervasive, unchanging, and self-luminous reality known as brahman. Brahman is realized to be one's true self (ätman); this self is not tied to the body or intellect and is free from all limitation and sorrow. Such knowledge rises through proper understand- ing of sacred texts, not by devotion or works. Jīvanmukti is knowing, while still in the body, that you are really the eternal nondual self (which is brahman), and knowing further that the self is never embodied, since the body (and all world appearance) is not ultimately real. Somewhat like a reflection in a mirror, the world appears and exists, but it is not finally real. One is bound to the realm of transmigratory existence by (karma-bearing) ignorance, not by the body, and liberation arises from knowledge, not from dropping the body.12 Knowledge alone is the necessary and sufficient condition for liberation. Thus our problem is not the presence of a body, but identification of the qualityless self with the conditioned body. Believing you are the body, and that the body is real, is the cause of (re)embodiment.13 Since destroying this idea that the self is embodied, not the fall of the body, brings liberation, we can conclude that knowing the self's identity with brahman does not contradict bodily existence-though cessa- tion of ignorance will eventually bring eternal release from the body.14 If, from this perspective, the one true liberation is freedom from the bonds of ignorance, then the presence or absence of the body is (in a sense) irrelevant. However, looking more closely, a (human) body is in fact useful and even necessary, since it provides the vehicle for liberation.15 One might underline here that Advaitins say little about about the liberation of divine beings. In his chapter in Living Liberation in Hindu Thought,16 Lance Nelson makes a fascinating argument, never made within Advaita, for regarding Advaitic īśvara as a jīvanmukta, as both are free from ignorance and ego- ism, although the jīvanmukta is not a cosmic creator or controller and has a trace of karma remaining. In the Bhagavad-Gītā, the person with firm wisdom, or sthita-prajña, is said to act with egoless detachment, like Krsna himself. Perhaps even more interesting is the idea that īśvara, like the

6 Introduction

jīvanmukta, is limited by being in samsāra: he is constrained by the karma of creatures and the necessity of conforming to name and form arising from ignorance (as mentioned in Sankara's commentary on Brahmasūtra II. 1. 14). Thus, as Nelson writes, īśvara is, "like the jīvanmukta, liberated but some- how not yet fully liberated (44)." Both await final bodiless (videha) release, but the lord will actually have to wait far longer than a human. Such an unwelcome conclusion is perhaps why this idea was never explored within the tradition. To return to the issue of human embodiment, one sees a tension in Advaitic thought between the idea that all mukti is necessarily originally jīvanmukti because one becomes liberated (i.e., gains knowledge) only when in a body, with mind and senses, and the notion, consistent with the world- denying aspect of Advaita (in which one finds empirical experience regularly compared to an illusion, a dream, or an eye defect), that full liberation is only gained after death (sometimes, generally in Yogic Advaita, called videhamukti). Because Advaita's nondualism devalues empirical reality (unlike the in-the- world monism of Tantra or Kāśmīrī Saivism), it is unsurprising to find a variety of statements in Advaita that imply that bodiless liberation must be superior to embodied mukti, since the body is the locus of bondage; it inevi- tably decays and is not the self. It is said to be just a shadow (Maņdana, Sarvajñātman), like a shed skin of a snake (BāU IV. 4. 7), or a piece of burnt cloth (Citsukha, Madhusūdana).17 This tension is related to the fact that the notion of liberation solely as knowledge of brahman/ätman identity is quite different from another impor- tant Indian conception of liberation that finds resonances in Advaita: that of mukti as freedom from the inevitable suffering of transmigratory existence (samsāra) or as the absence of pain (duhkhābhava). This more "negative" idea of liberation generally requires some form of world renunciation that normally includes some kind of yogic practice and ends in perfect isolation (kaivalya) of the spirit.18 From this perspective, the body is quite a significant limitation, since only when free from embodiment can one gain freedom from suffering (the final goal).19 Still, until we reach what I call the "Yogic Advaita" of the Yogavāsistha and the Jīvanmuktiviveka, the relative absence of reference to yogic practices and meditation is remarkable. I will point out later that to Advaitins like Sankara, meditation is a helpful support for attain- ing liberating brahman knowledge, but it is still an action of a deluded indi- vidual agent in the dualistic realm of means and ends. The notion of liberation as absence of suffering and sorrow (and thus embodiment) raises an important question: If liberated, why is one still in a body? From the earliest Upanisads on, many strands of the Hindu tradition shared the notion that being embodied impedes release and that death brings it.20 Despite the Advaita position that knowledge and not embodiment is the

Introduction 7

key issue, a thoughtful reader can argue that a rationale for continued em- bodiment is needed to satisfy both reason and experience. Experience seems to show that embodiment inevitably entails suffering, disease, and seeing illusory duality. It is reasonable to hold that none of these should exist for a truly liberated being. Holding to embodied liberation also presents some problems for basic Advaitic doctrines. To Advaitins, the body is a result of prior activity (karma),21 which is part of ignorance (avidyā), and thus is in some sense opposed to knowledge (vidyā). Gaining knowledge of nondual brahman is said to destroy ignorance, thus it should bring immediate liberation (sadyomukti), annihilat- ing all karma, including the body. Since the body does not cease when knowledge rises, ignorance of some form must remain, and how can there be avidyā post-vidyā?22 This question can be said to be the central problem in the Advaitic conception of jīvanmukti. It is so serious because Advaitins largely accept that there is total opposition between, rather than degrees of, knowledge and ignorance.23 They sometimes use the analogy of the opposi- tion of darkness and light.24 Yet while light and darkness can be said to be opposed, one can also point to twilight, and other degrees of light and dark. This response is, of course, an argument from everyday experience (pratyaksa), used to counter a theoretical problem (tarka).

Advaitin Rationales for Embodiment after Liberation

There are at least three answers to the problem of the continuity of embodiment post-realization, an issue that received a great deal of attention in later Advaita.25 The first answer is that you are "bodiless" while embodied, when you know the self is not the body. As Śankara states in his BS I. 1. 4 commentary, embodiment (saśarīratva) is caused by ignorance, that is, iden- tifying body and self. Knowing that the eternal self is not and never was embodied shows one is by nature eternally bodiless (aśarīra), so the knower is in a sense asarīra while living (or "bodiless" while embodied).26 Bodilessness is complete detachment, not lack of a physical body. As BāU IV. 4. 7 states, the body is to a brahman-knower like a cast-off skin is to a snake. Put another way, the body "disappears" for the knower (as in sleep or swoon), although the knower's body doesn't disappear. The second answer focuses on a more practical point: jīvanmukti exists so that we can learn from enlightened teachers, who compassionately remain in a body to assist ignorant humans. Sankara mentions such teachers in Chāndogya Upanișad bhāsya VI. 14. 2 (the ācārya who removes the blind- fold of delusion that one is a body) and BāU bhāsya II. 1. 20 (the young hunter [embodied being] is awakened to his true nature as a prince [supreme

8 a Introduction

brahman] by a teacher). Vimuktātman, following Sankara, adds Gītā IV. 34, which says that only the wise sages who realize the truth teach the highest knowledge.27 We could not know about (or reach) liberation unless enlight- ened teachers exist, and they could not exist if the body falls immediately after knowledge. This would at least be the case according to the all-or- nothing view of vidyā. In everyday experience, we actually see many teachers without perfect knowledge helping those with even less knowledge. Also, if (as Advaitins argue) śruti reveals nondual brahman, we could learn about moksa from a nonhuman (apaurușeya) source. Interestingly, both Sarvajñātman (chapter 3) and Prakāśānanda (chapter 4) argue for the idea that, from the highest perspective, the liberated teacher is only imagined yet can still bring liberation to the ignorant. Modern neo-Vedantins make much of the role of enlightened teachers, and add another rationale for a jīvanmukta's continuing existence here-to provide selfless social service to suffering humanity. Much more will be said on this subject in the final chapter. There is little discussion of the idea that the liberated being would return to teach or help when the current embodi- ment ends. This certainly differentiates jīvanmukti from the Buddhist bodhisattva ideal. Sankara opens this possibility once, in response to BS III. 3. 32, which suggests a being might take birth again if there is a commission (adhikāra) to perform (chapter 2).

The third explanation for the body's continuation after liberation is given great attention in the later Advaita scholastic tradition. It begins with the general rule that when brahman is known, all ignorance (and thus karma) is destroyed-so how can the karma-based body continue? Later Advaitins assert that a remnant or trace (leśa) of avidyā can exist even after one gains release; this remnant is based on karma whose fruits have already com- menced manifestation (prārabdha karma). Before one's final disembodiment, one must experience ("enjoy," bhuj) the fruits of those actions, which cannot be removed by knowledge. Put another way (following Sankara in ChU bhāsya VI. 14. 2), one can know brahman without quite yet attaining brahman. This interpretation is much elaborated on in later Advaita and requires further explanation. Most important is that, for Advaitins, there are three kinds of karma, only two of which are removed by knowledge. The first is samcita karma, the accumulated mass of past karma that has not yet borne fruit. Knowledge burns all such karma.28 The second is āgamī karma, karma to be obtained in this life that would bear fruit in the future. After brahman knowledge, this karma will not bind, since the false notion of agency has disappeared (so it seems that "backsliding" is not possible). The third type of karma, mentioned

Introduction 9

earlier, is currently manifesting or prārabdha karma. Such karma, which produced the current body, is not destroyed by knowledge and must bear fruit before the body falls.29 The idea that when one is liberated most, but not all, kinds of karma are destroyed was seen, both in and outside of Advaita, as a problem. How can knowledge destroy some, but not all, karma (and why the unexperienced rather than the partially experienced karma)? Further, if there is no immedi- ate (sadyo) mukti, why would it happen eventually? If there is a little delay in liberation, why not a lot? Śankara and Mandana Miśra set the pattern for the responses to this latter question, and ChU VI. 14. 2 becomes the key text for this issue.30 ChU VI. 14. 2 states that the delay in final release is only as long as one is not free.31 Sankara asserts that this means there is delay in attaining the self as long as an ignorant embodied person enjoys the (already commenced) fruits of karma. Then, utilizing the ChU terminology, he makes a crucial distinc- tion, mentioned earlier, between knowing (jñā, vid) brahman, which is imme- diate and happens in the body, and attaining (sampad) brahman, which is simultaneous with release from the body (but delayed as long as prārabdha karma manifests). Thus Sankara argues that final release (versus "mere" lib- eration) happens at the time the body drops away (dehapāta),32 not when knowledge rises. Mandana specifies that the delay in the body's fall is brief (or very brief, ksipra), being only the time it takes to experience already manifesting fruits.33 The continuance of the mukta's body due to prārabdha karma is com- monly likened to the continued whirling of a potter's wheel, even after the potter has left (from Sāmkhya Kārikā 67),34 or the continued flight of an arrow after the initial impetus of the shot.35 Body, wheel, and arrow continue for a time due to their momentum, but gradually and inevitably they will come to rest. One can find a number of problems with the analogies, the most serious of which is that the bow and arrow and the rotating potter's wheel are, in the examples, real things in a real world.36 After knowledge, however, one realizes that the body (and arrow and wheel) are illusions and were never really connected with the Self. A real thing is not analogous to an unreal imagining. Vimuktātman (and Citsukha) further distinguish the type of karma whose fruits must be experienced before bodily continuity ceases post- realization (chapter 3). There is a kind of karma that causes knowledge to arise, or has knowledge as its object-this (vidyārtha) karma bears fruit in a body born from karma, having "enjoyment" as its object (bhogārtha). Citsukha claims only vidyārtha karma (which accounts for living liberation) exists after knowledge, and it neither creates a new body nor immediately destroys the existing body (chapter 4).

10 Introduction

The most commonly voiced objection in the later Advaita tradition to the notion of the remnant of ignorance is that the embodied person's prārabdha karma, even if only a trace of avidyā, is still ignorance, and one possessing ignorance cannot be completely liberated. As Prakāśānanda asks, how can knowledge have two natures simultaneously-both destroying and not de- stroying ignorance? The primary response to this objection is that ignorance itself (in the form of prārabdha karma) does not remain, only an impression, or samskāra, of ignorance, abides.37 The impression alone causes the body to remain, even after all karma is destroyed. In BS bhāsya IV. 1. 15 (and Gītā bhāsya 18. 48), Sankara gives the example of the impression of two moons that persists in one with eye disease, although the ignorance that more than one moon exists has been destroyed. Mandana holds that while samskāras outlast karma, the body still will drop soon (and samskāras forever cease), as a samskāra is only an effect of ignorance,38 and the effect is not equal to the root cause (prārabdha karma). Prakāśātman and Madhusūdana (who also hold that impressions can continue even without ignorance) use the example of the slight smell ("trace") of a flower remaining in a vase after all the flowers, the smell's cause, have been removed, and liken the samskāra-based bodily continuity after knowledge to the slight remnant of cloth form remain- ing after the cloth is burnt. The analogy most often made is that of the trembling (here equivalent to the samskāra) that continues even after the cessation of fear (equivalent to avidyā), generated by mistaking a rope for a snake.39 When one knows the truth, fear (the cause of the trembling) ceases, but trembling (a mere effect) continues for a little while, inevitably but only gradually lessening over time. In the same way, when one gains the highest truth, ignorance (the cause of the body) ceases, but the body (a mere effect) continues for a little while and then inevitably falls.40 I should note that Vimuktātman disagrees with this view, claiming that there are no samskāras without avidyā. While both the impressions and ignorance (their locus) form the body (i.e., essential nature) of ignorance, fear and trembling are not the body of the "snake"/rope, so the latter is not a good example. The "snake" appearance is based on ignorance itself, not a samskāra, and when ignorance ceases, the rope-based illusion of the snake never rises again.41 As we shall see, these ideas become even more refined (or baroque) over time: Prakāśātman differentiates tattva (reality) jñāna (which negates all ignorance) from the more specific vyatireka-jñāna, which negates the reality of particular objects like a snake or body (chapter 4). This suggests that one can know a specific "snake" is a rope without realizing the whole world is such a superimposition, and one can have the highest realization while still

Introduction 11

mistaking a specific rope for a snake. Citsukha and Madhusūdana discuss three forms (ākāra) or powers (śakti) of the ignorance trace, and a variety of later writers mention the role of the concealing (āvarana) and projecting (viksepa) powers of āvidya, in which the former is removed by knowledge, but the latter continues due to prārabdha karma.42 Issues discussed in the preceding paragraphs, which will be fleshed out in the following chapters, show that much time and energy went into consid- ering the problem of how any remnant of ignorance can continue after lib- erating knowledge. Despite all the attempts to clarify this issue, Advaitins are left with the following quandary: either samskāras are avidyā (thus the em- bodied one is not a perfect knower) or they are not (thus should not cause the ignorance-based body to continue).43

Jīvanmukti and Worldly Activity

Before beginning the study of specific texts and thinkers in the follow- ing chapters, I will address one more issue, about how the liberated being acts in the world. While relatively unexamined in scholastic Advaita, this topic becomes progressively more significant in later Advaita analyses of jīvanmukti. How does one who has reached the final goal even while living behave? First, the training on the path to liberation is highly demanding. Very briefly, Advaitins from Sankara on hold that the route includes becoming eligible (adhikr) by such qualifications as discriminating the eternal (that is, brahman) from the noneternal, being detached from enjoying fruits of actions here or later, practicing tranquility, self-control, and so on, and intently desiring lib- eration (BS bhāsya I. 1. 4). One must also hear, reflect on, and assimilate (e.g., perform śravana-manana-nididhyāsana) the Vedic scriptures. These long and difficult efforts will lead one to renunciation (samnyāsa) and detach- ment (vairāgya) from everyday activity (vyavahāra).44 It is evident that for traditional Advaita, householding is not compatible with true renunciation, though following the dharma is certainly important preparation, and one is not free from ritual obligations until released. However, once liberated, must the sage continue to renounce the world? Is nonaction better than action, even for the knower? The answer depends in part on how one defines action or renunciation. Does renunciation prima- rily indicate inaction and physical world withdrawal or simply the mental attitude of detachment?45 After all, while physically renouncing the world may remove one from objects of desire, it still leaves one with the dualistic notion of a (limited) self opposed to a world full of temptation. World renunciation can thus reinforce a concept of liberation that takes the body to be real and the locus of suffering. Advaitins hold, however, that a liberated

12 Introduction

being knows that the body is unreal and unrelated to the true self (this knowledge brings surpassing bliss). As stated earlier, thinking you are the agent in transmigratory existence, not acting, is the problem. If one has desires and thinks oneself an agent, then both action and inaction bind, but if one is desireless and knows the self is not an agent, then neither bind. So real renunciation is that of the body-self identity and of the "I" notion, not of the world or activity. This point is largely assumed by scholastic Advaitins, but the nature of the liberated being's renunciation is discussed at some length in the yoga- influenced Advaita of the Yogavāsistha and Jīvanmuktiviveka.46 The jīvanmukta's actions, according to these texts, will be considered in chapters 6 and 7. Here it suffices to say that after knowing the self is brahman, detached "worldly" action is still possible, as King Janaka and Yājñavalkya demonstrate. The JMV describes the Gītā's sthita-prajña (one with firm wis- dom) as the model of detached, desireless action.47 The mainstream Advaita position can be summarized this way: Given the apparent necessity of long and intense renunciation before liberation, world withdrawal might be "natu- ral" for one now liberated, but it is not necessary. Some action while embod- ied is inevitable, but the amount and kind of bodily activity is an issue only to the ignorant, those on the vyāvahārika level who see body/self linkage. While the ignorant see the embodied mukta acting in the world, the liberated being sees only brahman. While it is clear that the liberated being acts, the question remains whether this person must act in any particular way. It is important to remem- ber here that for traditional Advaita, "acting" seems to refer more to perform- ing ritual duties and following the dharma than to a Western notion of being or doing "good." For example, Prakāśātman writes that even while still see- ing duality (i.e., alive), the jīvanmukta does not perform rites, as no regula- tions or goals remain for one knowing the real (chapter 4). Yet is the jīvanmukta rule bound at all? Earlier Advaitins gave limited consideration to whether the fully detached jīvanmukta would do "whatever he pleases (yathestācarana)," apparently meaning ignoring dharmic duties. In comments on BS II. 3. 48, Sankara mentions in passing that a liberated being will not do whatever he pleases, since identifying (falsely) with the body causes action and the knower identifies with the self. Sureśvara, while em- phasizing nondual knowledge over action, claims in Naişkarmyasiddhi IV. 62ff. that a desireless brahman knower will never violate the dharma by doing whatever he wishes. Both Sureśvara and Prakāśātman note that all evil ceases with knowledge, yet so does the wish to do any action (implicitly even good acts). The Pañcadaśī author Bhāratītīrtha writes that, while unneces- sary, activity in accordance with sacred texts is certainly not prohibited (VII. 268-70 [chapter 8]). Sadānanda's Vedāntasāra seems to represent the tradi-

Introduction 13

tional Advaitic position well when it states, after mentioning Sureśvara's views, that only good qualities like humility and nonenmity are present in, but remain mere ornaments to, the jīvanmukta.48 The consensus seems to be that although free from dharmic obligations, the desireless liberated being would never violate the dharma.49 Modern Advaitin thinkers and scholars argue both that the jīvanmukta is beyond "morality," so no action, even good action, is necessary, and that this being would be "naturally" good, because, knowing identity with all, he lacks the selfish desires that generate evil. Many of these neo-Vedantins also claim that the jīvanmukta, out of solicitude for others, will not only share his realiza- tion but also will actively "do good" and show social concern in ways that seem familiar to the modern Christian West. The traditional Advaitic commit- ment to following the dharma is certainly different from social concern as it has been understood in Western religious traditions (i.e., good works for oth- ers). As I will point out in chapter 12, if all is always nondual, one might well argue that Western-style social service is transcended. The interest in the "so- cial ethics" of the liberated being and the entire way of speaking about "good" and "morality" is a recent and Western-influenced phenomenon.50 The final chapter will discuss the relationship of jīvanmukti and social service as a case study of the neo-Vedantic transformation of the Advaita tradition.

To close, let me mention again some of the distinctive characteristics of living liberation in traditional Advaita. These characteristics include know- ing that the self is not the body and that the body continues due to a remnant or an impression of ignorance in the form of currently manifesting karma. There is much controversy about the exact nature of the ignorance (and the time limit for the body) that remains after liberating knowledge, particularly whether it is a trace or an impression of a trace. This seems driven by the conviction that embodiedness is, after all, a limitation, which is quite consis- tent with Advaitic world devaluation. We have also seen that the jīvanmukta, after treading a long and difficult path, renounces agency, not action, and that the liberated being can teach and bring comfort while embodied (though not, at least in the traditional model, acting as a social reformer). With these ideas in mind, we turn, after notes on the terms Hinduism and understanding, to the development of the idea of liberation while living in the Upanișads.

A Note on "Hinduism"

It is quite appropriate to pay close attention to what is revealed and what is concealed in all broad categories, and certainly such problematic ones

14 a Introduction

as "Hindu" and "Hinduism."51 Reflection on these terms is important, even if one is not convinced that their usage is part of a hopelessly "Orientalist, colonialist, totalizing, and hegemonic discourse of domination." While one might find postmodern critics of Orientalism also holding to problematic totalizing discourses attempting to gain domination, they have, as mentioned earlier, properly made us more aware of issues of power and representation, who "we" are speaking for and about. It bears repeating that the term Hindu was originally used by Persians to describe those who lived around the Indus River (thus, "Hindu" was first a geographical or political identification). While there have long been follow- ers of the Veda, the varnāśrama-dharma, and the notions of karma and rebirth, "Hinduism" was a term (and eventually an ideological and institu- tional reality) born in the nineteenth century, when the British- and Western- educated Bengalis like Ram Mohan Roy-began to describe or "construct" the "religion" (another originally Western notion) of most "Indians" (yet another). This Anglo-Brahmin collaboration helped reinforce the sociopolitical order, though not without resistance by groups including low- and outcastes, Muslims, and Christians. One finds this "Hinduism" in "world religions" textbooks and among some modern Indians who utilize it as part of national identity: It is seen as a single, ancient, tolerant, and inclusive sanātana ("eter- nal") dharma, with great classical glory (based in Sanskrit and Vedanta) and medieval decline (due in part to the Muslim "invasions") before its modern "renaissance."52 I will occasionally use the terms Hindu and Hinduism in the text, gen- erally without scare quotes, despite their problematic nature. I have no inten- tion of suggesting any concept or practice as being essential or normative to the Hindu "religion." As long as these terms are recognized as useful con- structs, with traditions of their own, they can be used meaningfully. My own sympathies lie with Heinrich von Stietencron's notion that it would be useful (and accurate) to refer to Hinduism not as a religion, but as "a geographically defined group of distinct but related religions, that originated in the same region."53 These religions coexist and mutually influence one another, and range from Veda-oriented Smārta traditions to anti-Brahmin bhakti traditions to manifold "folk religions" throughout India. Von Stietencron points out that asceticism and sensual indulgence, animal sacrifice and nonviolence, Vedic exclusion and devotional inclusion of women and low- or outcastes are all part of Hinduism. Thus, all "Hindu" groups are minorities in one form or another. Relevant to my later chapters is the notion that neo-Vedanta can perhaps be called a new "religion" within "Hinduism." Von Stietencron also makes the interesting point that the degree of similarity and difference within "Hinduism" is akin to that of the "Abrahamic religions" (also founded in a single region) of Judaism, Christianity, and

Introduction a 15

Islam.54 One could even argue the latter share more commonality than do the traditions of Hinduism. Still, von Stietencron rightly indicates that neither group has a single agreed-upon doctrine or theology, sacred text, founder or leader, teaching lineage, cosmogony, or ritual. Further, in "Hinduism," one person's supreme deity might be another's lesser manifestation, demonic force, or ignorant notion. Yet the ability of "Hindus" to coexist relatively amicably (at least until recently) does, as von Stietencron writes, present a challenge to the civilizations holding to Abrahamic traditions.

A Note on "Understanding"

When describing my goals in research and teaching, I often say that my primary commitment is to "understanding."55 By this term, I mean the appre- ciative inquiry into, and sympathetic attempt to become informed about, other people(s) and their perspectives. This includes both their similarities with and differences from one's own worldview. It is an important humanistic goal to learn how an "other" thinks and speaks about himself or herself, then to communicate that thinking and speaking as accurately as possible to those in one's own culture. Understanding demands openness, a desire to learn, careful and patient inquiry, a capacity to gather information and find appropriate categories, and a comprehension of complexity. It also requires one to recognize and over- come stereotypes, prejudices, and sheer ignorance. An important component of this process is dialogue: meeting, talking with, listening to, and asking questions of others. Another component is the close, nuanced examination of specific thinkers and texts in their particular context and historical situation. One important result is awareness of topics and issues that arise in the culture or tradition itself. Understanding has limits-there is no "objectivity" or neutral ground. We never have complete information. We all begin with presuppositions and a (or some) perspective(s), and must bridge from the familiar to the unfamil- iar. We must make generalizations (even while recognizing there is no "grand narrative") and use categories that objectify and reify. We also choose to emphasize certain themes or issues, which will to some extent distort a text's or thinker's own plan, questions, or way of knowing. These problems are practical inevitabilities, part of the process of coming to understand itself (which includes not understanding), and can be mitigated (though not over- come) by the careful process of inquiry detailed earlier. An issue that is perhaps more difficult and raises concerns about "Orientalism" is the fact that the "other" may not want to be understood by outsiders, and a Western academic attempt to understand may, with its

16 Introduction

relentless intrusiveness, alter others by lessening their autonomy and depriv- ing them of an earlier identity. Here, despite-or because of-"the best intentions," one becomes part of a "discourse of domination." I want to argue that this risk is in part unavoidable56 and in part worth taking in service of enlarging human horizons. First, dialogue inevitably puts self-understanding into play-on both sides. Second, no culture is static; individual and social dialogue is always underway. Third, attempts to understand can teach-and have taught, as in the case of "Hinduism"-the investigators about the limits of their own understanding and have led to recognition of what has been "constructed" or "imagined" without sufficient collaboration with indigenous representatives or grounding in the context being examined. Such efforts, in Indology and elsewhere, can and have, for example, demonstrated political dimensions of, and power asymmetries in, the inquiry.57 Finally, it is possible to hold to one perspective without dehumanizing or disrespecting another; in fact, recognizing and affirming difference is a form of respect. Thus the project of understanding (anyone or anything) without diminishing or exaggerating difference from oneself is ambiguous and prob- lematic, but it is worth the effort, especially when considering the risks of the alternatives.

Part I

Embodied Liberation in Traditional Advaita Vedanta

ONE

The Development of the Idea of Embodied Liberation before Sankara: The Early Upanisads, the Brahmasūtras, Gaudapāda, and the Bhagavad-Gītā

The notion of liberation while living found in Advaita Vedanta devel- oped slowly over many centuries, and did not become a formal doctrine until after the time of Sankara. Still, the basic elements of the Advaitic conception of jīvanmukti can be traced back to the earliest Upanisads. There we find both the idea that one (or one's essential being) gains immortality (eternal life) in a heavenly realm only after leaving the body and the rudiments of a conception of liberation (and immortality) while living by knowing ātman/ brahman identity.1 This liberation (mukti, moksa) by nondual knowledge takes one beyond both the life-and-death cycle of samsāra and any "physical" or material heavenly realm.2 Many scholars have noted that early Indian religious texts generally describe liberation not as knowing the self but as reaching a heavenly realm (brahma or svarga loka), that is, "going somewhere" in time and space. In some early Upanisads, two paths (yāna) are described that require the per- formance of sacrificial acts or faith and asceticism; one is the path of the fathers (pitr), which goes via the moon and leads to rebirth, the other is the path of the gods (deva), which is associated with the sun, heaven, and even- tually knowledge.3 Even when one attains the realm of the gods, liberation and immortality are tied to a place, albeit a heavenly and blissful place that lacks the sorrow and frustration of our human realm. This view also implies that one gains liberation and immortality only after death, since only then does one reach heavenly realms. The notion that one goes to another realm

19

20 caa Embodied Liberation in Traditional Advaita Vedanta

by the path of the gods is called by later Advaitins "liberation by stages" (kramamukti).4 As the ideas of karma and rebirth take hold, however, it becomes apparent that for most beings even a heaven is temporary, and one must eventually (and repeatedly) return to this realm of suffering and desire. Upanisadic thinking now begins to focus on the idea of liberation from all death and rebirth through desire-ending knowledge, and immortality is linked with knowing one's identity with brahman, rather than with going to a heav- enly realm. One no longer fulfills one's desires (in heaven), one discontinues desiring (human pleasures, but not the self); this ceasing of desire and con- comitant liberating knowledge can (or must) happen while living. This shift in focus takes place over an extended period, and the ideas of immortality as the attainment of a blissful eternal abode and as desire-ending knowledge of brahman often are found in close proximity. In some cases, one can gain liberating knowledge in a body, but one does not reach immortality or heaven before death. This position presages the extended Advaita debate about whether one can truly be fully liberated while living.

Immortality in the Early Upanișads

A look at the concept of immortality in the Upanisads clearly illustrates the slow and equivocal development of the idea of liberation while living. The term immortal [ity] (amrta[tva]) appears many times in the early or "major" Upanisads.5 Its exact meaning varies among and even within various Upanișads (illustrating their nonsystematic nature), and certain usages are ambiguous, as I shall soon show. In these texts, immortality can refer to eternal life in a heavenly realm after the body falls, but it also can mean knowing the highest truth, even while embodied. We shall see that later Advaitins did have war- rant to refer back to the Upanisads for passages that indicate knowledge of ātman /brahman as final "immortal" liberation, yet these writers also could have found other passages describing immortality as a state a person reaches only in a heavenly realm. While there is no simple chronological develop- ment in meanings of immortality, one can perhaps discern a "direction" in Upanișadic passages mentioning amrta(tva) from "going" (to a heaven) to "knowing" and "being" (ātman/brahman). Most Upanisadic texts referring to immortality are "in the middle" of this shift, so can seem ambiguous or "unclear," especially since "going" or "attaining" can be read figuratively or literally. Before turning to the texts, I should point out that throughout the Upanișads, immortal(ity) is often used as one among many modifiers for our true essence or being, which is generally termed ātman or brahman. Brahman

Development of the Idea c 21

and ätman are certainly immortal,6 and the three terms are used together in ChU VIII. 14. 1 and BaU IV. 4. 25. Two other entities found in the Upanisads that often refer to our true essence or being are regularly called immortal: the person (purusa) and the vital breath[s] (prāna[s]).7 The vital breath is said to be immortal in BāU I. 5. 7, I. 6. 3, II. 3. 5, and IV. 4. 7 (where it is identified with brahman), as well as Praśna II. 5 and III. 11-2 (which says that the wise one, knowing the prāna, becomes immortal). According to Kauşītaki III. 2, prāņa as prajñātma is immortal, and with this prāna, one obtains immortality in this world.8 The purusa is termed immortal in ChU IV. 15. 1, BāU II. 3. 5, IV. 3. 12, Mundaka I. 2. 11, Praśna VI. 5, and Taittirīya I. 6. 1. The Kațha explicitly says the immortal purusa is brahman (V. 8, VI. 1) and ātman (VI. 17). An extensive parallelism is made in BãU II. 5. 1 ff., where the immortal purusa in the earth and body and so on is termed the self, brahman, and all.

Now we may look at specific references to immortality in the early Upanișads. First, while virtually all relevant Upanisadic passages say knowl- edge is central to liberation, some seem to indicate that one becomes immor- tal only when one reaches another realm. Aitareya IV. 6 states that the bodiless knower obtains all desires in heaven (svarga) and then becomes immortal, and Kausītaki II. 14 holds that one who knows the vital breath (prāna) leaves the body, goes to where the gods (deva) are, and becomes immortal like them.9 Kena I. 2 says that the wise become immortal upon departure from this world. There are a number of other passages, especially in the Mundaka Upanisad, which also seem to indicate that one "goes to" immortality, but goes by knowing. For example, Mundaka I. 2. 11 claims that knower- renouncers, practicing austerity (tapas) and faith (śraddha), depart to where the immortal purusa dwells, and II. 2. 5 states that knowing (brahman) as the self is the bridge (setu) to immortality.10 Two other passages mention know- ing the immortal (brahman) without indicating any "going": Mundaka II. 2. 2 simply says the imperishable and immortal brahman is to be known, while II. 2. 8 states that the wise see the blissful immortal shine. The most impor- tant, and ambiguous, Mundaka passages linking immortality and liberation (while living) by knowledge are III. 2. 6 and 9. Verse 6 states that Vedanta- knowing ascetics are immortal and liberated at the end of time among the brahma-worlds. Verse 9 also combines the idea of knowing brahman with "crossing over" (sorrow and evil) to immortality. (These texts will be looked at more closely later in this chapter.) Other Upanisads also have passages that say that after knowing brahman one "goes to" (gam) immortality. Katha VI. 8 states that when knowing the pure partless purusa, one is liberated and goes to immortality, and ChU II. 23. 1 holds that one established in brahman goes to immortality.

22 n Embodied Liberation in Traditional Advaita Vedanta

If one understands "go" in these passages to be figurative, then the texts are saying that when one knows brahman, one becomes immortal-indicating immortality is a state reached here rather than in a heaven reached after death. This very view can be seen in the largest number of references to immortality in the Upanisads, which indicate that immortality arises from knowing, without any mention of "going." These passages lead us most di- rectly to the Advaitic idea of liberation as a state of knowing brahman while living. The idea that one becomes immortal by knowing ātman or brahman appears as early as the Brhadāranyaka. In the Yājñavalkya-Maitreyī dia- logues (II. 4. 2-3 and IV. 5. 3-6), one is said to become immortal by know- ing the self. BäU IV. 4. 14 states that those who know (ätman/brahman) become immortal, and others go to sorrow.1 BaU IV. 4. 17 holds that know- ing immortal brahman, one is immortal. Other Upaniads make similar claims. Kena II. 4 states that one gains immortality by vidyā (of brahman). Īśa 11 says that the knower of vidyā and avidyā together gains immortality by vidyā. According to Katha IV. 1-2, the wise one, desiring immortality, turned in- ward and saw the self; knowing immortality, the wise seek what is stable (the self). Finally, there are the important BāU IV. 4. 7 and Katha VI. 14-5 passages explicitly stating that when desires cease, the mortal becomes im- mortal, and one attains brahman here (more on these soon). Before expand- ing on this text, let us return to passages that link "knowing" and "going" but do not mention immortality. These linkages are made in a number of ChU passages that suggest that after knowing brahman (here), one can roam heavenly realms. ChU VII. 25. 2 states that one who knows the self is all this (world) has the delight and bliss of the self, and can roam all the worlds (loka). ChU VIII. 1. 6 claims that those who depart here not knowing the self do not move freely among the worlds, but those who depart knowing the self do move freely in all worlds.12 It remains unsaid whether the Self-knower keeps or drops the physical body before moving among other worlds. In the same way, few Upanisadic texts explicitly state the brahman-knower is fully liberated (or immortal) while here-though this is certainly a possible reading. For example, BãU I. 4. 10 claims that gods awakened to "I am brahman" become brahman-as do rsis (such as Vāmadeva) and men (manusya), and BāU III. 5. 1 states that brahman is the self of all, and a Brahmin who knows the self (beyond illu- sion, old age, and death) goes beyond desires for sons, wealth, or the world. According to BãU III. 9. 28. 7, brahman, which is knowledge and bliss, is the final goal, and the knower of it is not born again. This could suggest, but does not say, that the knower may overcome ignorance while here in this birth.

Development of the Idea eac 23

Three Key Upanisadic References to Liberation While Living

We now turn to the relatively few Upanisadic passages that explicitly speak of attaining or becoming brahman here. These texts are, of course, central to the development of the conception of living liberation in later Advaita. The first of these passages is BaU IV. 4. 6-7 (and 22-3).13 BaU IV. 4. 3-4 state that the self throws off this body and takes rebirth in a new one (which it creates); verse 5 claims that as one acts and desires (in earlier births), so does one become: good by good actions, evil by evil actions. BāU IV. 4. 6 then holds that one with karma-bearing desires must return to this world to perform action, but one who is free from desire, or who has satisfied the desire for the self, gains identity with brahman. Then one's vital breath (prāņa), that is, transmigrating self, does not pass away (utkram) and thus one no longer suffers rebirth. This verse closes: "Being brahman indeed, one goes to (or merges with) brahman" (brahmaiva san brahmāpyeti).14 This passage suggests both "knowing" and "going," that is, it seems to indicate that when one is brahman (by desirelessness and knowledge), one goes to brahman (a state or place).15 BaU IV. 4. 7 then indicates that being brahman (by freedom from desire) is the essential, transformative aspect: "When all desires fixed in the heart are released, then a mortal becomes immortal, (and) one attains brahman here."16 The brahman-being is immortal while the body remains, but this body is now to him like a sloughed off snake skin is to the snake. This bodiless, immortal being is indeed brahman (ayam aśarīro'mrtaḥ prāno brahmaiva). This passage contains an idea absolutely central to jīvanmukti: one who exists, but is already dead to desire, can be said to be "bodiless" while embodied.17 These verses put a particular emphasis on desirelessness: becoming desireless brings immortality, bodilessness, and being brahman itself. This passage continues with another clear linking of "knowing" and "going:" BāU IV. 4. 8-10 state that wise brahman-knowers, being freed (vimukta), go to a heavenly realm (svarga loka) by the ancient path. While the brahman-knower goes by this bright path, the ignorant proceed into dark- ness. However, later verses continue to make evident that one can gain knowl- edge of the self while alive, and such knowledge is the highest goal. According to BãU IV. 4. 14, we can know this (self) while here (iha), but if we lack self- knowledge, our ignorance is great destruction: knowers become immortal, all others go to sorrow. BāU IV. 4. 22-3 state that after knowing the eternal and limitless self, all desires (such as those for sons and wealth) cease, and all karmic activity is overcome. The serene and self-controlled brahman-knower is now free from any taint of evil and can wander freely in the world.18 Thus, BāU IV. 4 contains a particularly clear example of passages that use the terminology of going from embodiment and suffering to a higher, "immortal"

24 an Embodied Liberation in Traditional Advaita Vedanta

state (or place), while at the same time indicating that knowledge of brahman (linked with desirelessness) is the central element of liberation and that one can truly be liberated even while living (and not just after going to a heavenly world).19 It is worth briefly mentioning here a similar mixing of "knowing" and "going" (while adding that purification by renunciation is a crucial first step) found in Mundaka III. 2. 5-6. Verse 5 states that having attained brahman, seers (rsi) are desireless, serene, full of knowledge, and yoked to the self, so they enter the all (sarva). As mentioned earlier, verse 6 claims that when purified by renunciation, Vedānta-knowing ascetics (yati) are immortal and liberated (parimuc) at the end of time among the brahma-worlds.

The second crucial early Upanisadic text is ChU VI. 14. 2, which contains the idea that the embodied self is "blindfolded" by ignorance and can find its way home (to liberating brahman-knowledge) only with the help of a teacher.20 This passage is part of the famous instruction to Svetaketu about his true nature as ātman/brahman (tat tvam asi: you are that), a nature that is omnipresent but unseen (the prior verses refer to a seed's invisible essence generating a tree and unperceived salt pervading water). ChU VI. 14. 1 tells of a blindfolded man who desires directions after being abandoned. In verse 2, the man is said to find his way by someone removing the blindfold and directing him home. The text claims that in just this way an ignorant ("blindfolded") person here (i.e., embodied in samsāra) who "gains direc- tion" from a teacher (ācārya) comes to know, "I will remain here just as long as I am not released (vimuc), then I will attain (release[?])."21 This śruti text, which can be read in a number of ways, is central to the Advaitic concept of jīvanmukti, for it raises an issue that will continue to bedevil much later Advaitins: What is the relationship between embodiment and full, final liberation? Put another way, if, although liberated, one remains here still in a body (inevitably tied to desire and suffering), is one even more liberated (or immortal) after death?22 The precise meaning of the last part of this passage is uncertain in part because exactly what one is released from or what one then attains is unstated. "Release" and "attainment" can indicate both "knowing" and "going," and the text leaves their referents unspecified. The passage may simply suggest that one remains embodied here until re- leased from ignorance, and then one immediately attains the final (bodiless) end-immortality and/or identity with brahman. Thus, release from igno- rance ("knowing") brings simultaneous release from the body ("going"). Alternatively, it can suggest that although a Self-knower, one still remains until released from a body, and only then does one attain final liberation. In this reading, the knower, since still embodied, has not yet attained the highest goal (perfect brahman identity), so one liberated (by knowledge) while living

Development of the Idea oamo 25

becomes "more" liberated at death (meaning no full knowing until after going). A related, but not identical, interpretation is to suggest that the knower re- mains embodied here having attained brahman (which is, by definition, lib- eration) but not the final end (heaven or immortality), that is, full knowing can precede going. In this case, one remains not due to any lack of perfected knowledge, but due merely to the workings of a remnant of karma that causes the body to continue for a short time. We shall see that this is the preferred answer in later Advaita.

Finally, we can look at a group of related passages in the Katha and Mundaka Upanisads that are the most suggestive of living liberation in all the early Upanisads. These passages (some of which refer back to BāU IV. 4. 7)23 seem to indicate clearly the idea of liberation while living by knowledge of brahman, yet still contain imagery of freedom from embodiment bringing immortality (eternal life). The aforementioned Mundaka III. 2. 6 illustrates this point; it states that Vedanta knowing ascetics, purified by samnyāsa, at their final end are immortal among brahma-worlds and all liberated (parimuc). Katha VI. 4 seems to claim that if one knows (brahman) here before the body ceases, one is liberated; otherwise there is (re)embodiment among created worlds (sarga loka). Yet perhaps the clearest statement of living liberation in all the "major" Upanisads, integrating language of immortality with attaining brahman here, lies in Katha VI. 14-5. Katha VI. 14 quotes from BāU IV. 4. 7: "When all desires fixed in the heart are released, then a mortal becomes immortal (and) here attains brahman." Katha VI. 15 introduces the graphic, physical image of cutting knots in the heart to gain freedom; it says, "When all the knots in the heart are cut here, then a mortal becomes immortal-such is the teach- ing."24 Mundaka II. 1. 10, while echoing this, makes the central role of knowledge clearer: "One who knows this (brahman), hidden in the heart (guha), cuts the knots of ignorance here"(etad yo veda nihitam guhāyām so'vidyāgranthim vikiratīha). Finally, Muņdaka III. 2. 9 ties together a num- ber of earlier ideas by claiming, "One who knows that supreme brahman becomes brahman itself, no one in his family lacks brahman-knowing; (the knower) crosses over sorrow and evil, (and) freed from knots in the heart, becomes immortal."25 Again, we see knowing brahman (Advaitic liberation) mixed with body-based language (knots in the heart), and "crossing over" to immortality through freedom from knots/desires. We also see the close con- nection between knowing and becoming or attaining (i.e., "going to") brahman. The early Upanisads go no further in developing the idea of liberation while living. The notion of liberation or immortality does seem increasingly to shift from a "going" to a blissful heaven after death to a desireless "knowing"

26 ean Embodied Liberation in Traditional Advaita Vedanta

of ätman/brahman. Yet while most passages focus on brahman-knowledge, none is completely free of the spatially oriented language of "going to" or "attaining" liberation. As ChU VI. 14. 2 makes especially evident, we also cannot find any clear statement about whether one must leave the body for full liberation or whether the liberated being will take rebirth to assist others (such as by teaching). Finally, nowhere is there a formal distinction made between living (jīvan) and bodiless (videha) mukti. These issues will appear repeatedly in later Advaita. Still, it is not difficult to understand why Sankara and other later Advaitins used these Upaniadic passages as proof texts for their views on jīvanmukti.

Jīvanmukti and the Brahmasūtras

Bādarāyaņa's Brahmasūtras (BS) are a group of brief aphorisms in- tended, in part by systematizing Upanișadic ideas, to illuminate the nature of reality (which is brahman), the ways to know it, and the fruits of that knowl- edge; the text takes into account both remarks by other early Vedantic think- ers and those of members of other schools of thought. Badarayana's ideas are interesting in their own right, but have become even more important (and contested) because of the commentaries that Sankara, Rāmānuja, and other Vedantins wrote on the sūtras. Since certain aphorisms in the Brahmasūtras have been interpreted as supporting the notion of jīvanmukti, we may pause briefly to consider them. The meaning of the relevant sūtras, when looked at in isolation, is not by any means clear. To the degree one can understand them independently of commentary, one seems to find that the realm of liberation (brahma-loka) is reached only after death.26 Even the most likely references to the idea of jīvanmukti are quite ambiguous and opaque without a number of parenthetical additions. The extent of interpolation needed is exemplified by BS III. 4. 51; it speaks of living liberation if it is read to say "(liberation arises) even in this realm/life (api aihika), if there is no obstruc- tion (pratibandha) in the subject discussed (i.e., liberation) due to seeing that (according to scripture)."27 BS III. 4. 52 adds, "thus there is no rule concern- ing the fruit of liberation (i.e., that it occurs only after death) due to ascer- taining that state (i.e., jīvanmukti)."28 BS IV. 1. 13ff. can also be read a number of ways, one being an argument for the continuity of a special form of karma after liberation. Sūtra 13 can be read to claim "when that (brahman) is realized, there is destruction of and disconnection (aślesa) from all earlier and later evil acts (agha)." BS IV. 1. 14 then adds "so also with the other (i.e., good acts), there is no connection (with karma) when (the body) falls."29 For one fa- voring jīvanmukti, IV. 1. 15 then introduces a crucial distinction in types of

Development of the Idea aa 27

karma: "But only those effects which have not commenced acting (anārabdha kārya) (are destroyed) due to the limit (avadhi, i.e., death) of that."30 This of course suggests the notion central to later Advaita of a special (limited in duration) karma, called currently manifesting (prārabdha) karma, which al- lows for liberation while still embodied. Following this, BS IV. 1. 19 con- cludes that "finishing off the other two (currently manifesting good and evil karma) by experiencing (bhoga), one attains (sampad) (brahman)."31 Of course, one could read the above sūtras very differently, perhaps as referring to sacrificial ritual (IV. 1. 16 even refers to the agnihotra), for most of the key words are left implicit. BS III. 3. 32 supports jīvanmukti if it is read to say that (bodily) exist- ence (avasthiti) (continues even after liberation) for those with a commission (adhikāra) as long as the commission exists.32 BS IV. 2-4 focus on the nature of the self being released, the paths it goes on, and the realms it goes to. Nowhere here is jīvanmukti clearly asserted. BS IV. 4. 15-17 seem to claim that the self can enter and animate various bodies, while sūtra 22 states that there is no return (anāvrtti)-but of what and to what is uncertain. Thus, while the sūtras may refer to jīvanmukti, they also may be far from such a notion. Again, we will revisit these texts when we look at Sankara, his fol- lowers, and, for a differing view, Rāmānuja.

Gaudapāda and Living Liberation

While considering possible early influences on later Advaitic concep- tions of jīvanmukti, it is appropriate to look at a figure named Gaudapāda who, according to tradition, authored a group of stanzas (kārikā) that osten- sibly comment and elaborate upon the Māndūkya Upanișad. Gaudapāda is often held to be the teacher of Sankara's teacher, and his kārikās (GK), the first writing of the Advaita school. Our examination can be brief, for Gaudapāda never directly addresses living liberation, or uses the term jīvanmukti. How- ever, he does have a number of references to a knower or advanced yogin; these verses implicitly suggest the existence of a being who is liberated while living. We shall look at two passages in particular, beginning with the end of the second chapter (prakarana).33 Although GK II. 32 says that there is nei- ther seeker of liberation (mumuksu) or liberated being (mukta), II. 34-38 speak of the (living) knower or sage. There are references to truth-knowers (tattva-vid) (II. 34), sages (muni) free from anger, fear, and passion (II. 35), the knower who has realized nonduality (II. 36), the homeless ascetic (yati) who does as he pleases (II. 37), and one who, having seen reality (tattva) inside and out, enjoys it and becomes it (II. 38).34 All of these apparently liberated beings are of course found here while living.

28 ena Embodied Liberation in Traditional Advaita Vedanta

The third chapter closes by describing the yoga of no-touch (asparśa) and alludes to a state of perfect mental control while living. GK III. 32 states that by realizing the truth of the self (ātma-satya), one goes to "mindlessness" (amanastā). The mind of the wise is controlled (nigrhīta) and without fluctuation (nirvikalpa), unlike in sleep (III. 34). Now one achieves fearless all-knowing brahman (III. 35). In serene and unmoving samādhi, no thought arises or is grasped, and knowledge is established in the self (III. 37-38). While this yoga of no touch is hard for all yogins to realize, their awakening, peace, and cessation of sorrow depend on this mental control (III. 39-40). The following verses continue to urge controlling distractions and desires, and keeping the mind detached, tranquil, and in equilibrium. When the mind (citta) is neither dissolved (in sleep) nor distracted, it remains motionless and imageless, and then attains brahman (III. 46),35 self-established, serene, un- born, and all-knowing (III. 47). These verses use predominantly yogic lan- guage, yet speak of the mind attaining brahman here, implicitly acknowledging the possibility of liberation while living.36 While these ideas are suggestive of jīvanmukti, Gaudapāda's particular terminology here is not influential in later Advaita, and he is rarely mentioned by later writers in the jīvanmukti context.

The Bhagavad-Gītā and Jīvanmukti

The Bhagavad-Gītā, on the other hand, is clearly important for later Advaitins, particularly those whom I will call "Yogic Advaitins," such as the authors of the Yogavāsistha and the Jīvanmuktiviveka. As is well-known, the Gītā describes a variety of yogas, and the liberated being here is generally seen as a master yogin, not an Advaitic jīvanmukta. Even when nondual knowledge is praised, one reaches such knowledge by a yogic path. Still, the status of the text made an Advaita commentary necessary, probably by Sankara himself, and other, later, Advaitins refer to the Gīta for scriptural support on occasion. The most important description of a liberated being for our purposes (in part be- cause of the significant role it plays in the Jīvanmuktiviveka) is that of the one with firm wisdom, the sthita-prajña, found in Gītā II. 54 ff.37 The one with firm wisdom abandons all desires and is satisfied with the Self (55), is neither distressed by sorrow nor longing for joy, is without anger, fear, or passion (56), is all ways unattached, and neither desires or hates when obtaining good or evil (57). Such detachment and renunciation of desires are shared goals of both Advaitins and followers of yoga. The next verses focus more on liberation through (yogic) pacification of mind and senses, however. The sthita-prajña withdraws senses from their objects (58) and restrains them, sitting yoked and intent on Krishna; one whose senses are controlled is established in wisdom (61). The roiling senses carry away the

Development of the Idea cam 29

mind (60) and dwelling on sense objects causes attachment, desire, anger, delusion, and finally utter destruction (62-63). However, when one is self- controlled, all sorrows cease and one attains serenity and wisdom (64-65). The focus on sense control and yogic restraint (samyama) continues to the chapter's conclusion. Detachment, serenity, and renunciation of desire are compatible with Advaitic jīvanmukti, but the Gītā is clearly describing the master yogin, not the liberated being of Advaita. Similar descriptions are found in later chapters. Gītā IV. 19-23 de- scribe a sage who acts without desire or attachment, is satisfied with whatever is obtained, and is equipoised in success or failure, with a mind established in knowledge (jñāna). Jñāna is a central term in mainstream Advaita, where it means immediate realization of ātman/brahman identity. Gītā IV. 24 ff. describe a form of sacrifice that brings one to brahman, and verse 34 states "by (devotees') submission, questioning, and service, knowers (jñānin) see- ing the truth will teach you their knowledge,"38 and verse 37 claims that the fire of knowledge turns all karma to ashes.39 All this could be consistent with Advaita, suggesting that the sage/knower above is a jīvanmukta, but verses 38-39 point to the necessity of yoga. According to 38, purifying knowledge is eventually seen in the self by perfecting yoga, and verse 39 asserts that one focused on knowledge with controlled senses obtains knowledge and soon reaches the highest peace (parām śāntim).40 Gītā V. 23-24 make clear that the model of living liberation is the well- disciplined yogin. According to Gīta V. 23, the one who is able here, before liberation from the body, to withstand the agitation (vega) rising from anger and desire-is disciplined (yukta) and happy.41 He has inner happiness, joy, and radiance; this yogin becomes brahman and reaches brahma-nirvāna (24). The following verses describe the route to achieving brahma-nirvāna,42 again emphasizing mastering the mind and emotions, and knowing the self. With such yogic control, one is liberated forever (28). Chapter VI continues to describe the detached master yogin at length. It concludes by addressing the question of what happens at the death of the not-quite-liberated being (the "almost jīvanmukta"). Krishna teaches that no meritorious effort in this (or any) birth is wasted (40-46). The yogin who fails to attain liberation in this life will be reborn with strong mental discipline in a wise or wealthy family, and will, after intense effort, go to the supreme goal. This yogin then sur- passes renunciants (tapasvin), those who perform ritual action, and even knowers (jñānin); mainstream Advaita would of course not concur with this view. Still, this passage will resonate through the later strand of thought I call "Yogic Advaita." The Gītā also provides other characterizations of living liberated beings that use terms quite similar to the master yogin, including descriptions of the devotee (bhakta) of the lord (which particularly emphasizes equanimity) (XII.

30 a Embodied Liberation in Traditional Advaita Vedanta

13.9), and the one beyond all qualities (gunātīta), also stressing equipoise and detachment (XIV. 22-26).43 The Jivanmuktiviveka will expand on many of the aforementioned passages, an indication both of the importance of the Gītā and of the JMV's concern to integrate perspectives of both yoga and Advaita. On the other hand, the Gita's extensive descriptions of the apparently liber- ated while living yogin are not central to the later mainstream Advaitic con- ception of jīvanmukti. To expand on this point, let us now turn to the founder of mainstream Advaita, Sankara.

A Note on Mukti in the Upanisads

References to derivatives of the verb "muc" are surprisingly rare in the early Upanisads. They appear mostly in the Brhadāranyaka and Katha, and many of the usages that exist do not suggest Advaitic liberation. BāU I. 5. 17 says a son frees his father from all faults, and BaU III.1. 3-5 describe how a sacrificer frees himself from death, day and night, and the waxing and waning lunar fortnights, respectively. Verse 6 says the sacrificer ascends to svarga loka by Brahmin, mind, and moon, which is mukti and extreme (ati) mukti. In BāU IV. 2. 1, Yājñavalkya begins to tell Janaka where he will go when liberated (vimukta), and in IV. 3. 14, Janaka asks for further instruction about liberation. BãU IV. 3. 36 states that a person frees (pramuc) himself from his limbs as a fruit frees itself from a stalk (when ripe). These passages generally suggest liberation entails going to a new place or condition. In Katha I. 11, Yama says he will free (pramuc) Svetaketu from the face (mukha) of death and III. 15 holds that this freeing comes from knowing the self. Katha V. 1 claims that by ruling oneself, having been freed (vimukta), one is freed (perhaps following BāU IV. 4. 6) and V. 4 asks what remains when the self is released (vimuc) from the body (the answer is ātman/brahman). Katha VI. 8 states that one knowing the supreme person (purusa) is liberated (muc) and goes to immortality. Mundaka III. 2. 8 claims the knower reaches the supreme purusa when freed (vimuc) from name and form. These passages emphasize that knowing brings liberation more than do those of the BaU. (Incidentally, the later theistic Śvetāśvatara I. 8 claims that by knowing the lord, one is liberated from all bonds, and VI. 16 says the lord rules samsāra and mokșa.). Forms of muc appear in the important (and related) BāU IV. 4. 7-8, Kațha VI. 14, and Mundaka III. 2. 9 texts (which speak of releasing desires or knots in the heart), discussed at some length in the body of the chapter, as are the usages in ChU VI. 14. 2 (see page 24). While all of these passages are certainly significant, the relative rarity of Upanisadic usages is surprising, given how often Indian thought is claimed to be focused upon liberation.

TWO

Knowing Brahman While Embodied: Sankara on Jīvanmukti

Śankara, the great architect of Advaita, repeatedly addresses the nature of liberation in general and often focuses specifically on whether liberation is possible while embodied.1 While Sankara only once uses the term jīvanmukta2 and never directly describes the state or person, he certainly holds to the possibility of liberation while living. While later Advaitins take the discussion of jīvanmukti much further, Sankara, as we see so often in Advaita, sets many of the parameters for considering this subject.3 One can see clearly here that Sankara did not think of himself as an innovative and a solitary "philosopher," but as a part of the Vedantic tradition; his views are based on and led by insights from the authoritative sacred Upanisadic texts. In the following, I will utilize those writings generally agreed to be by Sankara. The Brahmasūtra (BS) bhāsya will be the most important source for his views, although he also addresses relevant issues in the Brhadāranyaka (BāU), Chāndogya (ChU), Katha, and Mundaka Upanisad commentaries. In the context of living liberation, Sankara seems most concerned with exploring why and how long the body continues after liberation, which raises issues about the relationships between liberation and embodiment, knowledge and action, and kinds of karma (with their fruits). Issues concerning the role of the teacher, and the goals of heaven and immortality also appear. (For some related comments on Sankara and Yoga, see the note at the end of the chapter.) Briefly, Sankara argues that liberation arises from knowledge of brahman/ātman identity; it does not come from, and is not the same as, the

31

32 an Embodied Liberation in Traditional Advaita Vedanta

fall of the body,4 or even becoming immortal in heaven. The highest knowl- edge is that you are the flawless and self-luminous self, not a body/mind entity; in fact, belief in the body's reality causes (re)embodiment, and ending identification of body and self brings liberation. Since one achieves knowl- edge while embodied, one can (actually, must) become liberated while living, as implicitly seen in brahman-established teachers. Clearly then, liberation does not contradict bodily existence (although cessation of ignorance will eventually bring cessation of embodiment). Further, knowledge of the self does not result from any embodied ac- tion (including meditation or achieving godlike powers), but some actions (like sacrifice) can assist in attaining brahma-jñāna. Finally, the body contin- ues after knowledge due to the need to experience the fruits of currently manifesting actions, but there is a limit to the continuity of this body (and in a few exceptional cases, later bodies).

Some Definitions

Next we shall look at how Sankara describes living liberation and the liberated being, but we must first consider how he defines certain terms crucial for understanding jīvanmukti: the self (ātman), liberation (mukti/ moksa), and knowledge (jñāna/vidyā).5 While these conceptions may vary slightly among later Advaitins (and we find some terminological vagueness and ambiguity in Sankara himself), Sankara's understanding will generally set conventional boundaries. The self is, of course, identical with brahman, qualityless ultimate re- ality, which is the single, conscious, efficient, and substantial cause of the world. Sankara defines the self most clearly in his commentary on BS I. 1. 4: it is the highest reality, eternally preeminent, all-pervasive like the sky, with- out any activity, eternally satisfied, partless, and naturally self-luminous.6 It also is free from bondage and any limitation, such as those that condition waking, dream, or deep sleep (BS IV. 4. 2).7 In his BāU IV. 3. 7 commentary, Śankara describes at some length the ätman's self-luminous and other- illuminating nature. This self-evident and ever-shining inner light makes all knowing, sensing, and acting possible. The self's light is confused with the intellect (buddhi) and body and sense activity (kārya-karaņa-vyavahāra), which causes the superimposition (adhyāsa) of unreal on the real (and vice-versa), which manifests as the name and form apparent to us.8 Śankara defines moksa9 as the cessation of ignorance and bondage to transmigratory existence (samsāra). More positively, liberation is the nature of the self (ātmasvabhāva) like heat and light are the nature of fire (BāU IV. 4. 6). Being liberated is like regaining your natural well-being after an illness

Knowing Brahman While Embodied 33

(BS IV. 4. 2).10 Moksa also is being the self of all (BāU III. 9. 28, Taittirīya III. 10. 5-6), which is the fruit of knowledge (BS III. 3. 32, III. 4. 52).11 The self is brahman, so it is no surprise to find liberation is also called the eternally pure nature of brahman (BS I. I. 4), being brahman (BS III. 4. 52, BaU IV. 4. 6-7) or merging with brahman (as a handful of water thrown into a water tank merges there, BāU III. 9. 28). Śankara elaborates in BS III. 4. 52 by saying that the liberated being's "state" (avasthā) is one form: simply brahman alone.12 There are no degrees or distinctions in liberation, and it is not something to reach, as it is always attained.13 Liberation (being brahman and the self of all), while always attained, is not always recognized. This is related to the fact that there are two kinds of knowledge-that of the everyday world (vyavahārika) and the highest nondual knowing (paramārthika). Everyday "knowledge" is really ignorance (avidyā), false knowledge (mithya-jñāna) or superimposition (adhyāsa). From the vyava- hārika level, we do not know who or what we are. That is, only after knowing the nonduality of self and brahman does one realize that mukti is always (i.e., already) attained (siddha).14 The highest knowledge is unqualified (nirguna), and since it has no distinctions, its fruit (liberation) is also without difference.15 To introduce a point I will return to later, Sankara's understanding of moksa and jñāna, while making plausible liberation while living, also make him uncomfortable with much Upanisadic language describing the highest end of existence. In BãU IV. 4. 6, for example, he describes liberation in terms different from the more traditional Upanisadic notion of the highest end as physical immortality in heaven (as discussed in chapter 1). Since liberation is the eternal nature of the self, moksa is not really another state, reached only after death.16 Were this so, the Upanisadic teaching of the oneness of the self would be contradicted and karma (not jñāna) would cause liberation. Thus, any distinction between "mukta" and "amukta" is ultimately a delusion.17

Given these definitions, let us consider how Sankara describes libera- tion while living. Living liberation arises from knowledge of the self while embodied. As he writes in BS III. 3. 32: Liberation is simultaneous with right insight (samyag-darśana, which is simultaneous with the destruction of igno- rance), and is directly and indubitably experienced here,18 as is said in BāU III. 4. 1 ("brahman is direct and immediate") and the famous "tattvamasi" of ChU VI. 8. 7: "you (ātman) are that (brahman)," not "you will become that after death." BāU IV. 4. 6 puts it succinctly: "Being brahman, one attains (or merges with) brahman (brahmaiva san brahmapyeti)," and Śankara adds this occurs here and not when the body falls. Śankara addresses living liberation perhaps most clearly in his Katha Upanisad commentary. In Katha V. 1, he writes that one can be free from

34 nn Embodied Liberation in Traditional Advaita Vedanta

ignorance and desires here while living and as śruti says, "having been lib- erated (from avidyā), he is indeed liberated (vimuc)," that is, he will not take on another body. Katha VI. 4 says that if one is able to awaken here before the body falls (visrasa) (one is liberated, and if not) one becomes embodied in the world of creatures. Sankara adds that therefore one should reach for self-realization before dropping the body, for here alone (i.e., while living and liberated) one sees the self as clearly as in a mirror.

The Living Liberated Being

What is the character and conduct of the liberated yet still embodied being? Sankara never directly addresses this question.19 One should probably assume success in achieving the qualifications set out in BS I. 1. 1: discrimi- nating eternal from noneternal things; detachment from enjoying fruits here or later; tranquility, self-control, and so on; and the desire for liberation. One should certainly have performed śravana-manana-nididhyāsana, that is, have heard, reflected on, and assimilated Vedic scriptures on brahman. The closest Sankara comes to full descriptions of the liberated being are probably the Upadeśasāhasrī's characterizations of the student desirous of liberation and the teacher (acarya), and the Bhagavad-Gita's account of the one with firm wisdom (sthita-prajña). Upadeśasāhasrī (US) Prose I. 2 char- acterizes one desirous of liberating knowledge as: indifferent to all noneternal things, without desire for son, wealth, or world, in the highest state of men- dicancy (paramahamsa parivrājya), endowed with equanimity, self-control, compassion, and so on.20 According to US I. 6, the teacher comprehends diverse points of view, shows concern for others, and is versed in scripture.21 He also is detached from visible and invisible enjoyments, beyond all works and means, and knowing and established in brahman. He has faultless con- duct, being free from flaws like selfishness, lying, jealousy, trickery, evil- doing, and so on, and having the sole aim of helping others, wanting to employ his knowledge. These passages are interesting for many reasons, but the most important one here is the relatively succinct way they summarize Sankara's view of the attributes of the liberated being. Sankara generally says more about mukti than about the conduct of a mukta, and his remarks about proper conduct cover conventional ethical ground. His emphases on desirelessness, knowl- edge of brahman, equanimity, and detachment from works and enjoyments are expected and consistent with much else he says about liberation while living. One also could anticipate the lack of emphasis on yogic practice, dharmic activity, or supernatural powers. What is more unusual is the re- peated emphasis here on the jīvanmukta's compassion (dayā) and concern

Knowing Brahman While Embodied 35

(anugraha) for others. As we shall see, neither Sankara nor later Advaitins mention such concern often in the context of living liberation (which strongly differentiates them from modern neo-Vedantins). Śankara also looks at the liberated being at some length in the section on the one with firm wisdom (sthita-prajña) in the Bhagavad-Gītā (II. 54 ff). When considering the Advaitic conception of jīvanmukti, one must treat the Gītā passages and comments with some caution, since, as suggested in the prior chapter, the views of the Gīta are rather different from those of Sankara and the Upanisadic passages on which he most heavily relies. Still, the Gītā's one with firm wisdom is recognizably similar to the Advaitin jīvanmukta, and Śankara describes the sthita-prajña in much the same language as the afore- mentioned mukta: a brahman-knower or one who has become brahman. His comments on Gīta II. 55 are typical: gaining the highest insight (discriminat- ing self and not self), this being is indifferent to all and enjoys the self. As pointed out earlier, the Gīta says that the sthita-prajña abandons all desires, is without feelings (fear, anger, pleasure, etc.), is beyond like or dislike, and withdraws his senses from objects like a tortoise into a shell. As his senses and desires are controlled, he is detached and serene. In his com- mentary on this section, Sankara repeatedly uses the term samnyāsin (re- nouncer) to describe the sthita-prajña/jñānin.22 The renouncer (like a knower) abandons sons, wealth, and worldly desires. He wanders, doing only enough to keep himself alive, without a desire even to remain in the body. Having renounced as a brahmacārin, he rests in brahman (II. 55, 71-72). While it is not our purpose here to elaborate on the relationship between brahma-jñāna and renunciation, Sankara generally affirms that they go together.23 He also generally focuses on attaining knowledge-renouncing the I notion, not ac- tion, is the highest end. A jīvanmukta-like figure also appears in Gītā V. 23-28, which, we have seen, refers to the well-disciplined yogin who has become brahman and at- tained brahma-nirvāna here before liberation from the body. Sankara calls this (non)condition moksa,24 even while living. Such a yogin has a controlled mind, with desire and anger gone. Sankara again calls this being a samnyāsin, one having gained immediate (sadyo) and permanent (sadā) mukti. ankara's only explicit usage of "jīvanmukta" (in any work) appears when the Gītā describes the yogin with peaceful mind, who, being brahman, gains the highest happiness (VI. 27). Śankara simply adds that such a one is liberated while living.

Liberation and Embodiment

A number of passages assert that liberation-granting knowledge burns the seed of karma and ends all rebirth. These assertions lead us into the

36 a Embodied Liberation in Traditional Advaita Vedanta

central problems with the Advaita view of jīvanmukti. As mentioned earlier, possibly the most important issue concerning jīvanmukti, to Śankara and in later Advaita, is why and how long the body continues after liberating knowl- edge. As suggested in the Introduction, one can set up the problem this way: the body is a result of prior activity (karma), which is part of ignorance, and it is the locus of suffering and seeing duality seemingly inherent in being embodied. Knowledge of the self brings liberation, thus apparently ending ignorance and destroying karma (including the body). How then does em- bodiment continue? Śankara answers this question in a number of ways. One important response appears when he describes the relationship between liberation and embodiment in BS I. 1. 4, and involves an unusual understanding of bodilessness. He writes that liberation itself is called bodilessness (aśarīratva).25 But bodilessness does not mean being without a physical body; being liberated/bodiless means being utterly detached, untouched by dharmic activity or likes and dislikes. One now knows one is the naturally and eternally bodiless self which does not perform actions and is different from the fruits of action (including the body).26 Since the self is not con- nected with the body, one does not become bodiless merely by the fall of the body.27 Thus, you are "bodiless" while embodied when you know the self is not the body. Embodiedness, on the other hand, is caused by the false "knowledge" (mithyajñāna) that identifies the body with the self. The notion of an "I" (ahampratyaya) with a body is a false imagining. As Sankara says in BS I. 3. 2, thinking "I am the body" is avidyā, and results in desire for adoring the body, hatred for its injury, and fear of losing it. He concludes in BS I. 1. 4 that one who knows that embodiedness is a false notion is bodiless while living (like the Gītā's sthita-prajña).28 In BāU IV. 4. 7, śruti and Śankara emphasize the knower's abandonment of the body, using the well-known image of the skin shed by a snake. The mukta's body, known not to be the self, is to him like cast-off skin is to the snake. When one thinks that the body, tied to desire and action, is the self, one is embodied and mortal, but one is truly separate from the body and immortal.29 Incidentally, this should help clarify Sankara's references to moksa as abandonment of or complete separation from the body (BaU IV. 4. 6-7, III. 9. 28. 7, etc.). Moksa is not physical death, but mental detachment from the body. As he says in BaU IV. 4. 6, one is only "as if" with a body-it appears but is known as unreal. In BāU III. 3. 1, he adds that moksa is the death of transmigratory death, gained by knowledge rather than physical termination. While the mukta's body and senses remain until being permanently discarded at death, they have already "disappeared" for him.

Knowing Brahman While Embodied . 37

Bodily Continuity after Liberation

The explanation Sankara most often uses for the continuity of the body is slightly different. It focuses on karma and more readily accepts the every- day understanding of embodiment.30 The starting point for this interpretation is the general rule that when brahman is known, all karma is destroyed. Mukti certainly exists for the knower after the body falls. Yet the body (which consists of karma) continues after brahma-jñāna. Why? Śankara's basic position is that all one's karma must bear fruit before one's body drops, and only karma with uncommenced (anārabdha) fruits is immediately de- stroyed by knowledge (BS IV. 1. 14-5, 19, BāU I. 4. 7, 10). This point bears elaboration, for Sankara is trying to distinguish be- tween different kinds of karma and fruits, distinctions that become clearer and more formalized in later Advaita. All types of karma and fruits but one are destroyed immediately by knowledge, including those actions accumu- lated (samcita) in prior lives or in this life before jñāna arises and those fruits that have not yet commenced (apravrtta, anāgata) manifestation.31 The one kind of karma that endures post-liberation is that bearing partially experi- enced fruits by which this present life is begun and continues.32 Thus, uncommenced fruits of actions accumulated in prior births or done before or after knowledge in this birth (i.e., all actions except prārabdha karma) are destroyed by right knowledge.33 When enjoyment of the karmic mass (āsaya) requiring seeing duality (i.e., prārabdha karma) ends, kaivalya34 inevitably arises as the body falls (BS III. 3. 32, IV. 1. 19). As indicated in the Introduction, the idea that when liberated most, but not all, kinds of karma are destroyed was seen, both in and outside of Advaita, as a problem. How can knowledge destroy some, but not all, karma? Further, if there is no sadyo (immediate) mukti, why would it happen eventually? If there is a little delay in liberation, why not a lot? Śankara addresses these questions at greatest length when commenting on ChU VI. 14. 2 and BS IV. 1. 15. Final release35 (versus "mere" liberation) happens at time of body drop (dehapāta), not when knowledge rises. Jñāna is effective for liberation, but not for the immediate fall of the body. ChU VI. 14. 2 states that delay in final release is as long as one is not free (from the body). Śankara interprets this to mean that the delay in attaining the self is as long as the blindfold of ignorance remains in the form of an embodied person enjoying the (already commenced) fruits of action. He then makes a crucial distinction between knowing (jñā, vid) brahman (or sat), which is immediate and happens in the body as opposed to attaining (sampad) brahman/ sat, which is simultaneous with release from the body (but delayed as long as prārabdha karma manifests).

38 n Embodied Liberation in Traditional Advaita Vedanta

Śankara then gives the opposing pūrvapakśin's view: since there is karma accumulated in prior births with uncommenced fruits, another body will be taken on to enjoy these fruits when this body falls. (Sankara would agree so far.) And one continues to perform enjoined or forbidden actions in the body, even after knowledge rises, which then causes another embodiment and more karma. (Śankara parts ways here.) Thus knowledge is useless relative to fruit- bearing actions. On the other hand, if knowledge destroys action, then it would cause final release (i.e., attaining sat/body fall) immediately. If this were so, there could be no teacher and thus no knowledge giving liberation (since lib- erating knowledge comes from a teacher and a teacher needs a body). Sankara rejects this reasoning by holding to the aforementioned distinc- tion between the commenced and uncommenced fruits of karma. The knower does not permanently bear fruits of uncommenced karma (causing an endless series of embodiments); delay in body fall is only for the time it takes to experience already manifesting fruits. The body is like an arrow once launched: its momentum both necessarily continues for a time and inevitably dimin- ishes and ceases.36 Further, all other karma possibly leading to another body, both those with uncommenced fruits and those done after knowledge, is burnt by knowledge (and expiation).37 So since the brahman-knower does not reach final release while living, he must be enjoying the commenced fruits of ac- tion; once a knower, no karma remains. For him, delay is for only so long. BaU I. 4. 7 and 10 put most strongly that, while knowledge halts almost all effects of ignorance, prārabdha karma is stronger than jñāna.38 Past activity causing a body must bear fruit, so bodily and mental activity necessarily con- tinues, even after obtaining right knowledge (like the loosed arrow must finish its flight).39 The body, arising from actions caused by faults and perverse (viparīta) notions, bears fruits of a sort connected with these faults and notions, and until the body falls, it throws off the faults by enjoying their fruits.40 Prārabdha karma can even block jñāna from ever arising in this em- bodiment. Śankara writes in BS III. 4. 51 that vidyā rises in this birth if the means of knowledge is not blocked specifically by actions now bearing fruit (i.e., prārabdha karma); however, even if it is so blocked now, knowledge will rise in a future birth. Actions may need to bear fruit first, but once these fruits are experienced, liberation is assured eventually. The example given is that of Vämadeva, who became brahman in the womb (Aitareya II. 5-6) showing that practice in a prior birth leads to knowledge in a later one (for a baby certainly does not practice in a womb). Sankara also refers to Gītā IV. 40, which says that no yoga or right action is wasted and Gītā VI. 43-45, which says one gains the highest goal over many births.41 In BS IV. 1. 15, Śankara again argues (in accordance with the ChU śruti) that knowledge does not destroy all karma immediately, but he here adds that the rise of knowledge is actually aided by residual actions (karmāśaya) whose

Knowing Brahman While Embodied . 39

effects have commenced. (This raises the issue of the dependence of jñāna on karma, to be dealt with soon.) This assistance also requires a waiting period for the cessation of the "momentum" (vega) of worldly existence, as the momen- tum of an abandoned whirling potter's wheel only gradually ceases. One might mention here (as numerous others have) that both the analo- gies of the potter's wheel (from Samkhya kārikā 67) and the aforementioned loosed arrow are problematic. Both wheel and arrow are real, but the body with prārabdha karma is part of avidyā. Unreal imaginings are not analogous to real things. On a related issue, B. N. K. Sharma has asked the sensible question of why karma not yet experienced at all wouldn't be even stronger (less "burnable") than partially experienced prārabdha karma.42 The BS IV. 1. 15 commentary also addresses the problem of why the body lasts even (but only) a little while after knowledge, briefly giving an answer much elaborated upon by later Advaitins. While realizing the self cuts off all karma, a certain ignorance (mithyajñāna) continues awhile, due to the power of mental impressions (samskāra),43 like the impression of two moons persists in one with eye disease despite this person having the accurate knowl- edge that only one moon exists. We shall see that later Advaitins debate at length how this impression, a mere effect of ignorance, is related to its cause. Finally, after giving śruti quotations and reasoning explaining why the body continues after knowledge, Sankara here turns to a kind of argument he rarely uses, the experience of the sages themselves. He states that the jñānin knows he is brahman even while his embodiment continues. How can any other person contradict one convinced in his heart of hearts that he knows brahman while retaining a body? Sankara again gives as an example the Gīta's one with firm wisdom, the sthita-prajña.

Jīvanmukti and Rebirth

While the body continues for a time after knowledge, it generally is assumed that the mukta is now at the end of the body series. This being now remains only "as if" having a body-that is, it still appears, but it is no longer thought to be real. Thus, two points are true simultaneously: immediate "merging" in brahman is only figurative, and yet the continual succession of bodies does now end (BāU IV. 4. 6-7).44 In BS III. 4. 51, however, Sankara suggests release might be delayed for an embodiment or two, as some texts indicate. But if brahman-knowers can take on another body, why would they? Is there some reason beyond the power of prārabdha karma ? Sankara responds to this question in BS III. 3. 32, saying that certain liberated beings can take another body while an adhikāra (commission) exists due to the condition of the world. As we see the sun (in

40 can Embodied Liberation in Traditional Advaita Vedanta

accordance with its role) continue to shine for 1,000 ages, then cease, or a brahman-knower continue until his already commenced karma ceases, so one even with highest knowledge, when commissioned by the Lord (to promul- gate the Veda, etc.), continues to be embodied as long as the commission (and prārabdha karma) remains. One should note here that this conception of commission requiring re-embodiment is specifically addressed by Bādarāyaņa's sūtra. While Sankara grants the idea here, he mentions it no- where else (and adds that prārabdha karma must remain), which suggests that he is mostly responding to the demand of śruti.45 Sankara continues by saying that brahman-knowers move freely from one body to another to ac- complish their commissions, while their residual actions (karmāśaya) bear fruit once and for all in due course.46 Śankara then addresses a question arising from this point: Can some new karma arise and produce yet further embodiments after currently manifesting residual karma (in this round of bodies) is consumed? If so, some karma with unburnt seed (versus only karma already manifesting) would remain after knowledge, and thus knowledge would not inevitably cause liberation. Śankara says this cannot be, as it is well-known from scripture (Mundaka II. 2. 8, ChU VII. 26. 2) that knowledge completely burns the seed of karma. Moksa follows jñāna without exception.47 Note that Sankara always returns to the point that prārabdha karma, and it alone, delays liberation. We might here briefly consider if, upon taking rebirth, the liberated being has yoga-aiśvarya, or godlike powers. When discussing the possibility of the re-embodiment of brahman-knowers in BS III. 3. 32, Sankara says that such powers allow one to enter and superintend several bodies successively or simultaneously. The sage's power to enter many bodies (as one lamp can light many others) is also mentioned in BS IV. 4. 15. However, Sankara is careful to point out in III. 3. 32 that sages pursuing such powers later become detached from them after noticing the powers cease (i.e., are not eternal). Only then do they gain ātma-jñāna and attain final release (kaivalya).48 BS IV. 4. 16 emphasizes that attaining the state with divine powers is different from knowing ätman/brahman identity; the former is from the maturing (vipāka) of meditation (upāsana) on brahman with qualities (saguņa). The latter is higher, and it alone provides right insight, which removes the pos- sibility of return (BS IV. 4. 22).

Teaching and Jīvanmukti

Another reason for holding to a delay in the body's fall after knowledge is to allow for the existence of teachers who are liberated. Put in its strongest form, not only does teaching aid in bringing liberation, unless liberated be-

Knowing Brahman While Embodied 41

ings compassionately remain here to teach, we cannot know about liberation at all. The view that jīvanmuktas stay to share their realization appears repeat- edly in later Advaita (especially in neo-Vedanta). Sankara however does not put much emphasis on this argument, and the idea that teachers are necessary in fact contradicts the notion that śruti by itself can bring full knowledge. Still, one can find occasional references to realized beings teaching in Śankara's works. In Gītā IV. 34, he suggests one approach a teacher (ācārya) and ask about the nature of bondage and liberation, knowledge and ignorance. Sankara says the knower-teacher will respond, and only knowledge taught by those with right insight will bring peace. Mundaka I. 2. 12, with Sankara's concur- rence, urges the Brahmin renouncer to go to a Veda-knowing and brahman- established teacher for the highest knowledge, and when explicating Katha III. 8, Sankara refers to a teacher who sees nonduality and who manifests the ätman/brahman identity that he teaches. Following ChU VI. 14. 2, he states that a teacher leads one to liberation by taking off the blindfold of delusion (that "I am a body" by indicating one is really the self). Sankara waxes eloquent here, saying that the blindfold includes desires for many objects and bonds to wife, child, and friend.49 The brahman-established teacher, supremely compassionate and meritorious, then shows this ignorant person that the transmigratory path is flawed, saying, "You are not a transmigrating thing, so what of being a son or possessing the dharma? You are that (brahman)!" Freed by the teacher from the blindfold of delusion, the person becomes happy, arriving at (i.e., realizing) the self, as the formerly blindfolded man quickly arrives home. The importance of the teacher is also made apparent in Sankara's fa- mous example (in BaU II. 1. 20) of the prince abandoned at birth in a forest and raised by (and as) a hunter, both being ignorant of his royal lineage. Similarly, the embodied being, not knowing it is the self, follows the path of embodiment and transmigration, thinking "I am a body/sense entity, etc." with threefold desires for son, wealth, and heaven. Both the young hunter and the embodied being need awakening to their true natures (being a prince and supreme brahman, respectively) by a compassionate teacher. When properly instructed, the prince becomes fixed on the idea of royalty and the student on the idea of brahman. Perhaps the best way to look at this matter is mentioned in the BaU II. 5. 15 commentary: It is only those who follow the path shown by śruti and teachers (ācārya) who pass beyond ignorance.50

The Relationship of Knowledge and Action in Jīvanmukti

It is well-known that Sankara holds to utter nonconjunction between knowledge and karmic activity. Finite activity cannot bring about an infinite,

42 n Embodied Liberation in Traditional Advaita Vedanta

eternal result (BS I. 1. 4). But, as we have seen, if knowledge immediately and completely destroys all karma, this would disallow living liberation. One remains in the body because prārabdha karma is stronger than knowledge. One can go further: achieving jñāna also is dependent on the mass of karma to create a body in which to gain liberation. Sankara says this explicitly in a couple of places: You need a body for knowledge to arise (BS IV. 1. 15, BaU III. 9. 28). In fact, the world is the means for experiencing the fruits of one's karma (so liberation can then arise), and the purpose of going from body to body is to experience these fruits.51 While knowledge alone causes liberation, embodied action is necessary to gain liberation for two other reasons: One must not only experience fruits of actions here, but to reach liberation one also needs to perform certain actions in this body. These actions, which remove obstacles to brahma-jñāna, are duties tied to caste and life stage. While Sankara does not emphasize the role of caste and life stage in this context, neither does he avoid addressing the issue. For example, in BS III. 4. 26, he responds to the apparent contra- diction that knowledge is independent of action and yet dependent on per- forming certain duties at different life stages (āśrama). He says that knowledge, once arisen, attains its result (liberation) independently, but it depends on some actions (like sacrifice) to arise. In sūtra 27 comments, he continues that sacrifices (yajña), if performed without motive, become means (albeit "exter- nal," bāhyatara) for a mumuksu to gain knowledge. This point is made even clearer in BS IV. 1. 18, where he states that rites like the agnihotra, performed with or without meditations (vidyās) in this or a prior life, cause brahman realization if done with liberation as the aim. Activities like rites destroy sins acquired because the realization of brahman is blocked-that is, certain dharmic actions can remove other ac- tions that block knowledge, so these actions indirectly cause liberation (which arises directly only from knowledge).52 Rites and actions like hearing, reflection, and devotion are therefore proximate (antaranga) causes bringing the same result (i.e., liberation) as brahmavidyā. Thus, again, the need to perform certain actions and experience the fruits of other karmic activity leads to the conclusion that one gains liberation while (and only while) living.

Liberation and the Path to Heaven

Does the liberated being aim for and reach heaven? Śankara discusses the path to heavenly worlds in many places (see especially BS IV). However, he also repeatedly says knowing brahman (the aim and achievement of the jīvanmukta) is very different from reaching heavenly realms (loka, svarga) of Brahma, the gods, or the fathers. Such realms are reached by correct dharmic

Knowing Brahman While Embodied . 43

action, and as seen earlier, Sankara is generally committed to the nonconnection between knowledge and karmic activity (jñāna-karma-asamuccaya). The differing routes of actions leading to heaven and knowledge bringing libera- tion are addressed in BãU III. 5. 1, which mentions two types of mendicancy (parivrājya). One type uproots all desires and is a limb of ātma-jñāna; the other leads to the world of Brahma. This lower type of mendicancy is for the ignorant, for whom regulations like the sacred thread matter. The Self-knower, renouncing desires and abandoning all karmic activity, is the highest (paramahamsa) mendicant.53 Only the highest mendicant could be a jīvanmukta, since no knowledge but that of nondual brahman can bring liberation. All other vidyā is a "medi- tation" on brahman with qualities (saguna) that will bring fruits like heavenly life. As the BS III. 4. 52 commentary puts it, only the highest ("surpass- ing,"utkrsta) vidyā is "really" knowledge, other inferior (nikrsta) or qualified (saguņa) vidyās arise from activities like meditation. Since different qualities exist, saguna vidyās and their results can be different. These various means to the highest knowledge might have degrees and be faster or slower, but the highest knowledge, and its fruit liberation, cannot have difference. Sankara adds in BS I. 1. 12 that meditations (vidyās, upasāna) cause attainment only of lower saguna brahman (i.e., heaven) in stages (kramamukti) versus the immediate (i.e., living) liberation (sadyomukti) caused by ātma-jñāna. In Kațha VI. 15, he says that middling (manda) brahman-knowers practicing the lower vidyās are fit only for transmigration or the world of Brahma, and thus śruti describes another path (cutting the knots of the heart by self-realization) in order to praise the highest (brahman) vidyā. Finally, as said earlier, one can attain godlike powers (aiśvarya) from the maturing (vipāka) of meditations, but not liberation (BS IV. 4. 16).54 Śankara's main aim here seems to be to define following the lower vidyās as a form of activity leading to heaven (vs. knowing nondual brahman), whereas the earlier, more approving, reference to performance of and even dependence on certain actions (especially sacrifice) is related to their ability to remove obstacles to gaining highest brahman (the goal of jīvanmukti).

Living Liberation and Immortality

The relationship of liberation and heaven is associated with the ques- tion of the immortality of the liberated being. As discussed earlier, Sankara must deal with numerous Upanisadic references to gaining immortality when desires cease (BāU IV. 4. 7, Kațha VI. 14-15, Muņdaka III. 2. 6). Because he wants to move beyond the notion of heaven as the highest end, and to separate all karmic activity from the highest knowledge, Sankara repeatedly

44 n Embodied Liberation in Traditional Advaita Vedanta

deemphasizes the Upanisadic conception of physical imperishability and frames immortality as becoming one with brahman, that is, knowing rather than going. For example, when BaU IV. 4. 14 states "the ignorant suffer and are destroyed, and the knowers are immortal," Sankara writes that we are immor- tal when we know ätman is brahman (but the ignorant get death unceas- ingly). Most significantly for us, this recasting of the notion of immortality allows for living liberation, since one gains knowledge (i.e., immortality) while embodied. The clearest example of Sankara's effort to adapt concrete or corporeal Upanișadic terminology to his aims occurs when Katha VI. 14-15, Mundaka II. 2. 8, and III. 2. 9 refer to cutting the knots in the heart,55 which makes one immortal and one then gains brahman here.56 Sankara interprets "immortal- ity" to mean the attainment of knowledge and mortality as action, desire, and ignorance, rather than as a bodily state. In Katha VI. 15, Śankara writes that the heart's knots, cut here even while living, are notions of ignorance (which are the roots of desire). These notions are indicated by statements like "I am this body," "this wealth is mine," or "I am happy/sad." The knots/notions (and the desires rooted in them) are destroyed by knowing brahman/ātman identity opposed to the aforementioned. This knowledge manifests in the thought, "I am indeed brahman and not a transmigrating being." Thus, Śankara concludes, one becomes brahman even while living by the complete severing of the knots of ignorance through realizing the pervasive, distinctionless self.57 Mundaka III. 2. 5 describes brahman-knowers established in the self as entering all (when the body drops, Śankara adds). Mundaka III. 2. 6 says such Vedanta-knowing ascetics, purified by samnyāsa, at their final end are im- mortal among brahma-worlds and all liberated. Sankara once again takes the Upanisadic language indicating physical state change to mean becoming one with brahman. He says samnyāsa here means being established in brahman alone58 and immortality is becoming brahman even while living. Pervasive and partless brahman has no spatial limits like going (to heaven), which is the object of samsāra. In addition to mentioning the immortality derived from cutting the knots in the heart, Mundaka III. 2. 9 again says that whoever knows the supreme brahman becomes brahman, crossing over grief and evil (and Sankara again adds "even while living").59 Thus to Śankara, going to heaven is a lower, karma-bound path and true immortality is knowing brahman.

To conclude, and to set the stage for the discussions of jīvanmukti in later Advaita, let us summarize Sankara's main points concerning liberation while living. As said earlier, his characterization of a liberated being is only implicit, although the Gītā's sthita-prajña or the Upadesasāhasrī's ācārya seem close approximations. Here and elsewhere Sankara stresses that libera-

Knowing Brahman While Embodied 45

tion arises from knowledge of nonduality or brahman/ātman identity.60 A key part of this knowledge is the realization that the real you is not the body (including mind and senses) but the eternal, unchanging self. Sankara rejects the notions that liberation is inherently related to the end of physical embodi- ment or gaining physical immortality in heaven. In fact, believing you are embodied causes embodiment. You become bodiless and immortal when you know only the self and not your body is immortal. Further, liberation (and therefore bodilessness) is not a result of karmic activity. Actions like meditation bring lower, qualified brahman and attain- ment of heavenly worlds. Still, one needs a body, both to gain liberation and to perform certain actions that help clear the way for the highest knowledge. Once one gains liberation, all past uncommenced karma is burnt, and no new karmic activity will bind. Yet one still remains in the body awhile due to the only gradually but inevitably decreasing momentum of karma currently bear- ing fruit, and when these fruits finish manifestation, the body drops. The jīvanmukta might (but does not have to) teach and, in rare and extraordinary cases, a liberated being might return to perform a commission.61 Thus, as Śankara writes in ChU VI. 14. 2, one knows brahman in the body and attains it upon release from the body. Therefore, his views certainly support the idea that one gains liberation while (in fact only while) living.

A Note on Śankara and Yoga

Many writers have explored Sankara's views on Yoga; some, most prominently Paul Hacker, have held that Sankara was a follower of Yoga before an Advaitin.62 Sankara does seem more hostile to Sāmkhya philosophy (particularly the idea that pradhāna or prakrti is the cause of the world) than yogic practice, but there is no question that for Sankara (and, he claims, śruti), only knowledge (jñāna, vidyā) of brahman brings liberation. As Michael Comans has pointed out,63 Sankara rarely discusses the highest yogic state, samādhi, and nowhere says that unconditioned or nirvikalpa samādhi is the Advaitin's goal. In fact, Sankara explicitly says in BS II. 1. 9 that one in samādhi (like one in sleep) does not see any difference (vibhāga), but since false knowledge (mithyā-jñāna) is not removed, duality will necessarily re- appear. Still, Sankara holds that ritual activity and meditation (upāsana) can purify one,64 and thus prepare the way for knowledge. He writes in the BS II. 3. 39 commentary that the aim (prayojana) of samādhi is ascertaining (pratipatti) the self known in the Upanisads, and in BS III. 4. 26-27 he says ritual action and self-control are means (sādhana) to knowledge, although knowledge's result (release) is dependent only on vidyā. Again, in BS II. 1.

46 an Embodied Liberation in Traditional Advaita Vedanta

3, he writes: While Sämkhya and Yoga are recognized as means to the highest human goal (parama-purusārtha), one cannot attain the highest end (nihśreyas) by the Yoga path (märga) or Sāmkhya knowledge, but only by knowing the oneness of the self from the Veda.65 Throughout his writings, Sankara repeat- edly makes the point that all activity, even yogic practice, remains part of a dualistic world of means and ends, act and result, in which one identifies oneself as the agent.66 Perhaps Sankara's most significant statement about yogic practice ap- pears in his commentary on Brhadāranyaka Upanișad I. 4. 7. He states that meditation (upāsana) does not generate a special knowledge (viśiștha-vijñāna) whose object is the self. He refers to the stream of recollection (smrti-samtati) of Self-knowledge, which arises from hearing śruti, and asserts that this knowledge causes the cessation of all other notions. This thought stream is apparently unwavering, leading to a steady, clear mental flow. Further, the cessation of mental impressions (citta-vrtti-nirodha) is not a means to libera- tion (moksa-sādhana). According to the Upanisads, knowing that the self is brahman is the only means to the highest human end (purusārtha). The sole means for ceasing mental impressions is through the stream of recollection of Self-knowledge, which arises from hearing śruti.67 As mentioned earlier, Śankara here goes on to add that brahman knowledge is not a goal to be reached by mental or physical action (i.e., meditation or ritual); the self is attained by removing the obstructions that veil one's original, eternal nature. Renunciation and detachment can here play a role by regulating the stream of recollection of Self-knowledge in the face of prārabdha karma. Yoga is rarely mentioned in discussions of jīvanmukti among the later Advaita schoolmen; the most significant references are in Madhusūdana Sarasvati's commentary on the Gītā (see chapter 8). I will briefly discuss jīvanmukti in Sāmkhya and Yoga before the section on what I will call "Yogic Advaita," in which the importance of yoga increases in part because yoga- oriented Advaitins are more interested in syncretism than are Advaitin school men like Sankara. In the neo-Vedanta of Swami Vivekananda, yogic practice actually becomes a necessity for liberation, as Anantanand Rambachan points out in The Limits of Scripture.68 He shows that Vivekananda holds that scrip- tural reports from the Upanisads and other texts must be "directly experi- enced" or "personally verified" by one of the yogas (jñāna, karma, bhakti, or especially rāja).69 Such experience-based language is remarkably rare in ear- lier Advaita. According to Vivekananda, Patañjali's teaching, called rāja yoga, culminates in samādhi, which is the authoritative source of brahma-jñāna (rather than the Veda, as is the case for Sankara).70 Still, most neo-Vedantic teachers and scholars discussed here do not say much about the role of yoga in living liberation.

THREE

Mandana Miśra and Śankara's Disciples on Jīvanmukti: Sureśvara, Sarvajñātman, and Vimuktātman

The task of looking at jīvanmukti in the Advaita tradition becomes a bit easier after Sankara, as various thinkers address this topic directly and gen- erally in one place. The next chapters will examine the development of this concept among the well-known "schoolmen" of mainstream or "classical" Advaita. None of Śankara's immediate pupils deal with jīvanmukti at great length,1 although Sureśvara's views are important and will be described shortly. Śankara's contemporary and purported one-time adversary Maņdana Miśra does look closely at jīvanmukti, however, and his well-nuanced understand- ing introduces issues that remain oft discussed throughout later Advaita, par- ticularly concerning the role of certain attenuated impressions of ignorance called samskāras in the continuance of the liberated being's body. After describing Mandana's and Sureśvara's views, this chapter concludes with a consideration of Sureśvara's disciple Sarvajñātman and the slightly later Advaitin Vimuktātman,2 who both argue that living liberation arises due to a trace or remnant of ignorance (avidyā-leśa). These writers also express con- cern with explaining the nature of the delay in body fall, referred to in ChU VI. 14. 2, and the role of the teacher in bringing liberation.

Mandana Miśra on Jīvanmukti

Mandana, probably an elder contemporary of Śankara,3 wrote an Advaitic (if not Sankaran) work called Brahma-siddhi (On Ascertaining Brahman).4

47

48 an Embodied Liberation in Traditional Advaita Vedanta

This text attempts, as the title indicates, to establish clearly the nature of nondual brahman, and how it is obscured by ignorance. Mandana sets a pattern for later Advaita by discussing jīvanmukti late in the text, and his analysis is remarkably sophisticated for such an early consideration of living liberation in Advaita. He addresses the questions of delay in the body's fall after mukti, how long the delay is, the nature and role of the impressions (samskāra) of prārabdha karma, and the relationship between samskāras, karma, and embodiment. He begins by showing the apparent contrast between two views in śruti: Mundaka II. 2. 8 says that when brahman is seen, the knots in the heart are cut, all doubts cease, and all karma (which of course includes the body) is destroyed-so mukti is immediate, with no waiting for eventual body fall. On the other hand, ChU VI. 14. 2 and BS IV. 1. 15 and 19 suggest that not all karma (i.e., the body) ceases immediately with mukti. Thus, all ripening of karma is not cut off when avidyā is cut off. The mukta's body continues for a while (but only briefly), waiting for prārabdha karma to cease by enjoy- ment (bhoga).5 Mandana mentions the analogy of the launched arrow's momentum here. So far, Sankara and Mandana are in accord, but Mandana goes on to clarify this issue further. What then is the limit (avadhi) of the time delay between knowledge and body drop? Mandana uses the word ksipra, meaning "very brief or im- mediate." What then counts as "immediate?" Mandana says that the limit is the time it takes to enjoy the currently manifesting karma, and he emphasizes the speed, rather than the delay, in reaching liberation. The ChU VI. 14. 2 text states, "there is a delay (in body fall) only as long as I am not free (from ignorance)."6 Here "only as long as" (tāvad eva) conveys speediness not delay, like "having bathed and eaten, I will come" suggests haste and not delay. So, in Mandana's analysis, the above "contradictory" śrutis (ChU VI. 14. 2 vs. Mundaka II. 2. 8) really differ little. Mandana then introduces the objection of a pūrvapaksin who (like Śankara) takes the Gītā's one with firm wisdom (sthita-prajña) to be a jīvanmukta. The objector suggests either no living liberated being exists be- cause knowledge and body fall are simultaneous, or knowledge and body drop are not simultaneous (so jīvanmukti is possible) but one cannot specify a limit at which the body will fall, as there should be no waiting at all when all karma is destroyed. This latter possibility calls into question whether knowledge quickly and necessarily leads to liberation. Mandana responds first that the sthita-prajña is not a siddha ("accom- plished being," or jīvanmukta) with completely pure knowing but is an ad- vanced student (sādhaka), having almost attained release. While this seems opposed to Sankara's view that there is only one kind of mukti and the sthita- prajña has it, one can take this to mean that, like Sankara says in ChU VI.

Disciples on Jivanmukti cana 49

14. 2, one can know brahman without quite yet attaining brahman. Thus, there can be living liberation, since he does not say that the (immediate and embodied) knowing of brahman is simultaneous with separation from the body (delayed as long as prārabdha karma manifest). However, to respond to the objector's second point, the delay in body fall does have a specified limit-the time it takes for one to enjoy the fruits of prārabdha karma. And Mandana has tried to show above that the delay will not be long. Mandana then expands on the amount of time post-realization it will take the body to drop. He compares the delay to the time it takes one to stop the fear-based trembling arising from imagining a rope to be a snake.7 Both trembling and embodiment continue awhile after the truth is realized, due to the continued ripening of mental impressions (samskāra) of ignorance (avidyā). This notion of samskāra continuity is critical in later Advaita (especially to Prakāśātman and Madhusūdana) to account for bodily continuity despite karmic cessation.8 Mandana and some later Advaitins hold that samskāras-"weak" remnants of action-cause the body to remain, although all karma is de- stroyed, often using as an example the image of the continuing but inevitably diminishing momentum of the potter's wheel after the potter's departure.9 Mandana then fields a natural objection in the context of the extent of delay in bodily cessation: if brahman knowers continue to experience igno- rance-based duality until the body falls, what guarantee is there that final liberation (kaivalya) will come even then? Mandana responds that liberation will then arise since the samskāra is a fruit not equal to (i.e., weaker than) its root cause, prārabdha karma rising from avidyā. There are many ex- amples of an effect (trembling, potter's wheel whirling, samskāra, body) remaining but gradually (kramena) and inevitably ceasing after the cause (fear, potter, prārabdha karma, ignorance) disappears.10 Maņdana writes that although ignorance ceases after all karmic effects (commenced or uncommenced) cease, the self continues as if an embodied enjoyer, but with- out attachment (abhiniveśa), due to the samskāras arising from prārabdha. Mandana is here going a step beyond Sankara: The body continues due to samskāras, which remain even after commenced karmic fruits cease. Samskāras alone cause bodily continuity. Thus, Mandana cannot be criticized for distinguishing out one form of karma different from all others, though he can be and was (especially by Vimuktātman) taken to task for saying the effect (samskāra) is not equal to its cause (karma). The detached-but still embodied-enjoyer of the self is the sthita- prajña (apparently equivalent to a jīvanmukta). This desireless knower sees that objects and the forms of sorrow (or joy) are mere shadows (chāya), existing only due to the slight samskāra of ignorance. To this being, the body is like the shed skin of a snake (BāU IV. 4. 7). The ignorant, agitated by attachments, see mere shadows as real (like taking a clay form to be a real

50 n Embodied Liberation in Traditional Advaita Vedanta

tiger). Mandana then reiterates that the body will not long continue, since the samskāra of prārabdha karma continues only a short time before exhaustion, and this (briefly existing) state is called jīvanmukti.11

At this point, Mandana addresses some objections that arise from the problematic relationship among karma, samskāras, and embodiment, focus- ing on differentiating the power of karma and samskāras. Samskāras do not continue once the body falls, since the body's continuity (post-liberation) itself is solely due to the samskāras themselves remaining from karma, which began this body. No uncommenced effects, old or new, will arise, so once the samskāras of prārabdha karma cease, the body falls and final release (kaivalya) is obtained by the knower.12 The objector then argues that avidyā remains in samskāras (thus show- ing that ignorance does not completely cease while embodied). Mandana responds that no bondage or suffering whatever remains after knowledge because of the utter insignificance (akimcitkāratva) of the samskāras.13 Their ripening does not touch the pure self. Interestingly, Mandana focuses on the absence of suffering and bondage caused by ignorance, but he does not ex- plicitly say all ignorance disappears. He gives two analogies with the end of the self's bondage when only samskāras remain: After experiencing the reality of a picture (either knowing its mere "pictureness" or seeing "the thing itself" outside the picture), one does not desire mere forms appearing in the picture;14 or when you know that a flaw in your appearance is from a defect (like a smudge) in a mirror, you are not upset. Similarly, the Self-knower does not suffer from impurities (malinatva) or enjoy attractiveness, since these are known as mere appear- ances, and not part of the self.15 Thus, as while using a defective mirror, flaws still appear as if on the face but one is unmoved; in the same way, while samskāras manifest, the "flaw" of embodiment continues (i.e., appears "on" the self), but there is no suffering or bondage (i.e., ignorance). The final objection returns to whether there is any difference between bodily continuity due to karma and that due, as Mandana argues, merely to samskāras (the "insignificant" effect of karma). The objector points out that BS IV. 1. 19 says that one attains liberation (and the body ceases) by enjoy- ment of already commenced fruits of karma (not mere samskāras). Maņdana responds that for the ignorant who possess sorrow and joy, karma keeps ripening which (at least the ignorant believe) "touches" (samsprs) the self (and thus there is bodily continuity), but for the wise the self remains un- touched, having only the continued appearance of the body due to samskāras.16 Further, there is no ripening of karma since one experiences no loving or hating of anything, as Gītā II. 57 indicates by stating that the sthita-prajña

Disciples on Jivanmukti m 51

neither loves nor hates in good or ill fortune. So, for Mandana, there is a difference between karma- and samskāra-based bodily continuity; only the latter is free from bondage. One then knows the body as mere appearance- ultimately the same as not being seen at all since the self remains untouched. Although Mandana attempts to clearly distinguish samskāras from karma (and avidyā itself), mental impressions are still a problem. As S. Suryanarayana Sastri points out,17 no matter how "insignificant" samskāras are, either they are avidyā (and thus one is not liberated) or they are not (and thus the sthita- prajña is not a mere sādhaka). Sastri tries to resolve this problem by saying "[T]he samskāra of avidyā does exist, but for the body, not for the released spirit (p. xlvi)." But avidyā of any sort or intensity never exists for the ever- released spirit. There is no way to resolve the continuity of the ignorance- based body post-realization if knowledge is completely opposed to ignorance and all its derivatives. To sum up Mandana's views, some delay of body fall after liberation exists, but such delay is brief and due only to the need to experience samskāras of prārabdha karma. Samskāras are the effect of, and weaker than, their cause (karma)-but they still have the power to cause the body to continue for a short time (as trembling is an effect of fear but continues after fear ceases). The mukta, although samskāra-laden, still knows the body is a mere appearance, and all bondage is unreal.

Sureśvara on Jīvanmukti

Some have claimed that Sureśvara and Mandana were one person, Maņdana the Mīmāmsaka becoming Sureśvara the Advaitin after conversion by Śankara in debate. I will not enter this controversy, but will simply concur with the generally prevailing view that they are different people (and that Mandana precedes Sureśvara).18 In the context of jīvanmukti, Sureśvara (un- like Maņdana) does not discuss avidyā-samskāras and stresses the difference between works (which include meditation, or prasamkhyāna) and knowledge. He also treats the ChU śruti a bit differently than does Mandana. On liberation while living, as with many other topics, Sureśvara largely follows Sankara. In his summary of Advaita thought, called Naiskarmyasiddhi (On Ascertaining the Actionless),19 Sureśvara (like Śankara) says that once igno- rance is removed by knowledge, no action remains to be done, and no desires remain.20 However, verses IV. 60-61 indicate that the body continues for a time, since the effect of a delusion (the body) can continue awhile after the delusion itself (ignorance of brahman) ceases-like trembling continues awhile after fear (from mistaking a rope for a snake) ceases.21 As an uprooted tree withers only gradually, so does the body of the knower wither as prārabdha karma manifests.

52 Embodied Liberation in Traditional Advaita Vedanta

In his Brhadāraņyaka Upanişad Bhāsya Vārtika I. 4. 1528 ff.,22 Sureśvara addresses in greater detail the problem of embodiment post-realization. He, like the earlier writers, argues that the body, although based on karmic activ- ity, ignorance, and desire, remains after knowledge solely due to the mani- festation of prārabdha karma's fruits, and likens continued existence to the momentum of a launched arrow or whirling wheel. An opponent objects that knowing the self should destroy all karma (including commenced karma) and its fruits immediately. If any karma remains, samsāric action and attendant desires will cause continued activity and repeated rebirth; without cessation of action, liberation will not arise. The opponent also suggests that a mass of mental conceptions ("imaginations," bhāvanā) cannot be removed without regular, intense practice. Sureśvara replies in verses 1539-41 that brahman knowledge rises from understanding sacred texts, and with this knowledge, all desires cease and one attains final liberation. He refers here to Mundaka III. 2. 9: If one knows brahman, one becomes brahman, and this being the case, how could one have any desire? Right knowledge destroys the intellect (dhi), the world, and all objects. In verses 1546-54, Sureśvara addresses the problem of the delay men- tioned in the ChU VI. 14. 2 text. After hearing various śruti and smrti quo- tations stating that when knowledge arises, the body immediately falls and all karma is destroyed,23 how can one hold to any delay, no matter how brief, in body fall? Sureśvara argues that the Chāndogya text is an apavāda-a special exception to a general rule. The delay here is only so that a teacher can guide the seeker blindfolded by ignorance "home"; the knower/teacher will delay (i.e., remain embodied) just as long as the veil of ignorance is not removed. Sureśvara is of course following reliable guides himself here-śruti and Śankara.24 In Naişkarmyasiddhi IV. 62-64, Sureśvara also addresses the issue of how "free" the mukta is to go beyond dharmic regulations. Verse 62 asks, "If one awakened to the truth of nonduality would do as he pleases (yathestācarana), what is the difference between truth-seers (tattva-drś) and dogs in eating what is impure?" He argues that the liberated being will not do whatever he pleases, despite being free from dharmic duties.25 Doing whatever one wishes arises from ignorance and improper action, and thus could not be a result of dharmic activity. He points to the Gīta's rejection of the idea that the desireless sage does as one wishes (IV. 19, XIV. 22), and continues by arguing that not even one desirous of liberation (much less a jīvanmukta) would do as he pleases.26 It is reasonable to imagine that since it is a long, hard path to liberation, if one followed the dharma and did no evil on the way, it is absurd to argue that having reached the goal, one will do ill. Desirelessness and freedom do not lead to violating dharma.

Disciples on Jīvanmukti . 53

Sarvajñātman on Jīvanmukti

We next turn to Sarvajñātman, by tradition one of Sureśvara's students (c. eighth-ninth century C.E.) and successor to Sankara and Sureśvara at the Kanchi Kāmakoți Pīțha. His major work, the Samksepa-śārīraka (SS),27 is a verse summary of Śankara's Brahmasūtra-bhāsya, and follows Sureśvara's emphases on qualityless (nirguna) brahman and śruti as the key to gaining brahma-jñāna. In the context of living liberation, Sarvajñātman shows allegiance, but not obsequious adherence, to Sankara. He stresses the importance of samnyāsa as a preliminary to moksa, the difference between knowledge and karmic activity (and the futility of such activity to bring liberation), and the significance of experience in establishing the existence of the trace (leśa) of ignorance. He also makes interesting remarks about the imagining (klrp) of the teacher, the possibility of liberation in various classes and life stages, and the nature of the remnant of ignorance (avidyā-leśa). Sarvajñātman considers living liberation at some length in two places: SS III. 346 ff. and IV. 38 ff. The former emphasizes that one gains knowledge in this life by a combination of following the right path (which includes sacrifice and renunciation) and right comprehension of śruti. Hearing, reflecting, and assimilating remove ignorance, which allows Upanisadic state- ments like tat tvam asi to directly reveal the nondual self. Thus, while the two work together, only the latter (the mahāvākyas) gives final release or apavarga (346-9). SS III. 349-50 (following Śankara's BS III. 4. 51 commentary) intro- duce the idea that liberating knowledge may come only in a future birth due to an impeding cause (i.e., prārabdha karma), but also add that following the proper path (sādhana) in an earlier life will bring on vidyā later. He gives the example of Vämadeva, who gained knowledge in the womb due to practice in a prior life.28 Sarvajñātman then discusses proximate versus direct means to libera- tion. Means such as Vedic ritual action, devotion, and especially self-control (śamadamādi) remove defects and purify one, thus are helpers (upakāraka) to knowing the self. In fact, a supreme ascetic's (paramahamsa) experience of the highest truth is based on these means. However, while these actions purify, they do not end all bondage. One must abandon all notion of "agentness" (kartrtva) for the full ripening of knowledge (351-8). It is crucial to renounce on the way to self-knowledge.29 Only the pure paramahamsa ascetic attains liberation here (after employing means men- tioned in śruti and smrti like hearing, reflecting on, and assimilating the truth). For those in other classes (varna) and life stages (āśrama), knowledge

54 an Embodied Liberation in Traditional Advaita Vedanta

only ripens in a later birth (359-60). Sūdras are excluded here due to śāstric prohibition against their hearing śruti.30 However, Sarvajñātman goes on to say knowledge will ripen at some point if one practices right means like hearing, and so on, and samnyāsa in prior births, and may even ripen when one is not a renouncer (perhaps accounting for non-Brahmin or otherwise "impure" jīvanmuktas). He then quotes as support the Mundaka III. 2. 6 passage, which says Vedanta knowing ascetics, purified by samnyāsa, at the end of time are immortal among brahma-worlds and all liberated (361-2),31 and he ends this chapter by praising renouncing, and ceasing all activity (which brings moksa) (363-6).

The other passage in which living liberation is prominent focuses on the presence of jīvanmukti, whether liberation is immediate or if a remnant or trace (leśa) of ignorance remains post-mukti. The section (SS IV. 4 ff.) begins by stating that only knowing the self (not ritual action) removes ig- norance,32 and that knowing the self only removes ignorance (not a body). Verses 8-11 and 49-50 argue against any connection (samuccaya) between jñāna and karma in bringing liberation, and 29-37 state that mukti, the fruit of knowledge, is eternal, and is unlike, and unreachable by, karmic activity.33 He is here clearly Śankara's (and Sureśvara's) pupil. SS IV. 38-39 seem to hold to sadyomukti, in which knowledge destroys all ignorance completely and immediately. If this is so, as we have seen, the body should drop at once, so there could be no "jīvan" mukti. Sarvajñātman seems to argue here that the scriptural notions of "jīvanmukti" or the "jīvanmukta" are to be utilized and are meaningful, but only as long as these things are imagined (klrp) to exist. SS II. 225-7 help make sense of this statement. The ignorance-bound mind (citta) is said to imagine (or "create") everything, including the guru who teaches the truth of nonduality. This presents the problem of something unreal revealing the real. The teacher, though like all else merely imagined, still can bring full knowledge, since he is imagined to be omniscient. As long as imagined to be real, the teacher is useful and actually leads the ignorant to vidyā.34 Thus, from the sadyomukti perspective, Sarvajñātman accepts jīvanmukti as a useful imagining. The next verses state that jīvanmukti also makes sense if one accepts the existence of a remnant of ignorance (avidyā-leśa) even after knowledge. As was the case with avidyā-samskāras for Maņdana, Sarvajñātman says the remnant or trace of ignorance, which causes the lib- erated being to act, is not the same as ignorance itself-otherwise final lib- eration (vimukti) would not be attainable (IV. 40-41). Sarvajñātman then introduces an important new element to this position by emphasizing "experience" (pratīti) as evidence for a trace of ignorance

Disciples on Jivanmukti aa 55

(IV. 42-44). He states that according to Sankara (particularly in BS bhāsya IV. 1. 15),35 avidyā-leśa36 is the experience (or "persisting knowledge") of ignorance. Sarvajñātman reiterates that we know by experience (pratīti, svānubhūti) that jīvanmukti and the "shadow of duality" brought about by the avidyā trace coexist. Awakening (bodha) does destroy the delusion obstruct- ing knowledge of nonduality, but one should still accept the trace of this delusion (the avidyā-leśa), since one has the experience (pratyaksa) of dual- ity continuing even after knowledge.37 SS IV. 45-46 indicate, in terminology reminiscent of Sankara, that the jīvanmukta continues to experience the fruits of commenced karma born from the avidyā remnant, and when the fruits are completely consumed, one goes to kaivalya (final liberation). Sarvajñātman quotes Śvetāśvatara I. 10, which closes by saying, "again, at the end, all māyā ceases" from repeated attention to, meditation on, and knowledge of, reality.38 This text seems to be meant to support both the ideas that a remnant of ignorance continues until "the end" (i.e., until the body falls) and that continual practice of meditation, and so on, is central. Sarvajñātman then turns to the difference between the path of the gods and brahma-vidyā, and how karmic activity is only an indirect means to liberation. Section IV concludes by emphasizing that the student should come to know the nondual self as real and the world and body as unreal from the teachings of the guru and śruti. The teacher is given gratitude and praise here, and throughout the SS, but is not explicitly called a jīvanmukta.39 We also saw Sarvajñātman say that the teacher, while omniscient, is also imaginary. While a teacher and a jīvanmukta might be identical, it is significant that traditional Advaitins do not automatically argue this (and that modern neo- Vedantins do).40 So Sarvajñātman, in this and other contexts, is part of the Sankara tradition, with particular emphases on the imaginary teacher, samnyāsa as the preliminary path to liberation, and the importance of experience in showing the existence of the avidya-lesa. The discussion of the teacher and of the trace of ignorance continues with a slightly later Advaitin, Vimuktātman, and his text, the Istasiddhi.

Vimuktātman on Jīvanmukti

The Istasiddhi (Ascertaining What is Desired) of Vimuktātman (c. 850- 1050?)41 is primarily concerned with the nature of māyā and avidyā in Advaita; Vimuktātman argues that ignorance is not describable (anirvacanīya). He takes up jīvanmukti in the first chapter of the text,42 and has clearly read Maņdana and Śaņkara on this topic. Vimuktātman claims that liberation does

56 n Embodied Liberation in Traditional Advaita Vedanta

come while living, that a teacher is necessary for gaining knowledge, that the trace of ignorance causes this body to continue but brings no further births, and that (contra Mandana) the body remains due to the ignorance trace itself, not mere samskāras. Vimuktātman begins the relevant section (I. 9) by stating that a remnant of ignorance (ajñāna-śesa) exists, since we see bodily continuity for a knower,43 but this remnant will not cause the knower another birth. Further, if the knower's body fell simultaneously with vidyā, then the ChU VI. 14. 2 śruti about a delay would be wrong. The delay is in the moment of the knower's body fall and not in realization, since the latter cannot occur after the body drops. So, death is not simultaneous with knowledge.44 The existence of the living liberated teacher also points to knowledge while embodied. The idea that one gains knowledge from a teacher (ācārya) who is both living and released is quite significant to Vimuktātman. He says, following Gīta IV. 34, that the wise teacher realizes the truth and truth- knowers (tattva-darśin) alone teach the highest knowledge. If the body fell immediately after knowledge, there could be no teacher, thus no reaching vidyā, thus no liberation-which again shows that the knower's body remains for awhile.45 Incidently, Vimuktätman, the Advaitin who emphasizes the teacher's role the most, never suggests the teacher is imagined.

Vimuktātman introduces a new focus for why the body continues post- realization. A knower must, he says, enjoy (bhuj) the fruits of all prārabdha karma before death, including those actions that cause knowledge to arise. Even the karmic activity that brings knowledge itself can bear fruit only in the body, which arises from and is the locus of enjoyment of fruits begun by other karma. Thus, there can be no conflict between gaining vidyā and living out the effects of prārabdha karma. And while the embodied knower remains until all karmic activity is enjoyed, the actions that have knowledge as their fruit will not bring on another body.46 Further, karma having knowledge as its fruit "protects" the knower's body for awhile, that is, until he meets a teacher (without whom one cannot gain vidyā), as the ChU śruti says.47 Again, Vimuktātman stresses that one needs an ācārya; actions alone cannot bring knowledge. He concludes that by accepting that the knower's body continues for a time, one accepts the trace of ignorance. Vimuktātman then begins to look at the nature of avidyā-samskāras. A pūrvapaksin (holding to Mandana's view) argues that the knower's body can continue due to samskāras without avidyā itself, like fear and trembling, caused by the snake illusion, continue even after the "snake" is realized to be a rope. Vimuktātman responds that there are no samskāras without avidyā.

Disciples on Jivanmukti aa 57

While both samskāras and avidyā (their locus) form the body (i.e., essential nature) of ignorance, fear and trembling are not the body of the "snake"/rope, so the latter is not a good example. The snake illusion based on the rope never rises again in the absence of avidya, and when the "snake" rises it is based on avidyā itself, not a samskāra.48 Thus the knower's body remains due to avidyā-leśa (based on prārabdha karma), not a "mere" samskāra.49 Still, no ignorance that would produce another birth remains in the knower-the fire of Self-knowledge has burnt off avidyā, the seed of samsāra/ rebirth. No evidence exists for the knower's rebirth,50 nor for the knower enjoying the fruits of any not yet commenced body (vs. the enjoyment of the fruits that produced this body). Thus, the knower attains liberation at the rise of jñāna, but a trace (seemingly similar to Maņdana's samskāra) remains just strong enough to cause the (body-sustaining) appearance of fruits from prārabdha karma. When the body falls, these "enjoyments" cease forever; the ignorance trace cannot cause transmigration to another body. Vimuktātman proceeds to quote various scriptural texts, which support jīvanmukti with the avidyā-leśa and reject additional rebirths. The śrutis are familiar from Sankara, "having been liberated [from avidyā], one is liberated (released)" (Katha V. 1), "being brahman, one merges with brahman (BāU IV. 4. 6), "the knower becomes immortal here" (Katha VI. 14-5), and so on. Further, the Gītā passages refering to the sthita-prajña (II. 54 ff.) and the one beyond all qualities (gunātīta, XIV. 20 ff.) also are said to illustrate living liberation. Finally, BS IV. 1. 15 and 19 (presumably including Sankara's bhāsya thereon)51 are mentioned as favoring liberation while living. He closes this section by arguing that these sacred texts do not conflict with those referring to going (gati) to liberation by the path of light, and so on. Such śrutis refer to the lower, or kārya, brahman. The highest brahman has no going or place to go-it is one, pervasive, and always attained.52 For all of the aforementioned reasons, jīvanmukti is established.

To sum up, in affirming living liberation, Vimuktätman focuses on the importance of the teacher, the role of karma that has knowledge as its fruit, and the nature of the ignorance trace. He distinguishes between avidyā (which causes samsāra/rebirth), avidyā-leśa (based on prārabdha karma causing the present body to continue a short time), and avidyā-samskāras (powerless alone to sustain the body-opposing Mandana's view). Like earlier Advaitins, he also takes care to give scriptural support to his position. Next we shall leap a number of centuries and consider living liberation in later scholastic Advaita.

FOUR

Jīvanmukti in Later Scholastic Advaita: Prakāśātman, Citsukha, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, Prakāśānanda, Sadānanda, and Dharmarāja

In this chapter, we shall look at later scholastic Advaitins, beginning with Prakāsātman, a thirteenth-century proponent of the Vivarana school in Advaita, who wrote an influential commentary on Padmapāda's Pañcapādikā, called Pañcapādikā-vivaraņa (PPV, Explanation of the Five Verses).1 Prakā- śātman is a central figure in the elaboration of Advaita epistemology, and like his fellow dialectician Citsukha, engages in anti-Nyāyā polemics. Prakāśātman's work contains much more on living liberation than does Padmapāda's, and Prakāśātman has clearly read earlier writers on this topic, particularly Sureśvara. I also will consider here a commentary on the Pañcapādikā-vivaraņa called the Vivaraņa-prameya-samgraha (VPS, Sum- mary of What Is to be Known in the Explanation), authored by Bhāratītirtha- Vidyaranya in the fourteenth century.2 The VPS usually follows the PPV quite closely, but unlike the PPV, mentions jīvanmukti explicitly a number of times. This pattern of subcommentaries elucidating and clarifying com- mentaries on other textual exegeses is typical of the scholastic Advaita tradition. The Pañcapādikā-vivaraņa elaborates on basic issues concerning jīvanmukti in two places (pp. 105-6, 283-4). Prakāśātman focuses on bodily continuity after liberation. He considers how embodiment, seeing duality, and karma (their basis) can remain after avidyā is destroyed. Like earlier writers, he speaks of the special nature of prārabdha karma. He argues that the mukta 58

In Later Scholastic Advaita 59

does not perform rites and/or do whatever he pleases (last mentioned by Sureśvara). Finally, he claims that avidyā creates samskāras, that samskāras can produce the appearance of duality (due to their being a flaw of pure consciousness, or caitanya), and that both samskāras and ignorance are based on the self. The two sections on living liberation appear in the form of a series of brief pūrvapakșin-siddhāntin exchanges. The second passage (p. 283 ff.) takes us to the heart of Prakāsātman's concerns (which, we shall see, are often similar to Citsukha's), particularly the relation between karma and ignorance. The opponent begins by asking: If immediate (aparoksa) knowledge ends false (mithyā) knowledge, whence comes (still) seeing duality, and how can seeing duality, caused by karma, continue after karma (an effect of mithyā- jñāna) ceases? Prakāśātman answers that seeing duality rises from another limitation different from jñāna (i.e., prārabdha karma), as mentioned in ChU VI. 14. 2. One imagines (klrp)3 that the body and senses remain for a little while since (prārabdha) karma, their cause, remains. The previously discussed issue of the samanvaya (agreement in mean- ing) of śruti appears here. The opponent asks whether śruti really speaks with one voice about the destruction of all karma, to which Prakāśātman responds affirmatively, for imminent destruction is the implied meaning (arthäpatti) of even the ChU passage. As Sureśvara earlier suggested, the ChU text gives a specification (viśesa) of a general (sāmānya) rule: Karma is burnt by jñāna, with the specific exception of the continuity of prārabdha karma. The VPS adds that Mundaka II. 2. 8 ("all karma are destroyed when brahman is seen") refers to uncommenced (anrabdha) karma, and that the śrutis are similar in that both refer to the removal of karma. While knowing the real (tattva-jñāna) removes ignorance, the basis of all karma, it does not touch already commenced karma, which is merely a fruit (phala) of ignorance. The pūrvapakșin seems unpersuaded by the śruti quotations and returns to his question: If immediate knowledge completely destroys ignorance, how can karma remain? Prakāśātman responds by focusing on the power of prārabdha karma. The appearance of duality is dependent on prārabdha karma, and tattva-jñāna does not have the ability to remove this appearance. Thus, prārabdha karma obstructs knowledge, though jñāna removes all other ignorance, desire, and action. Still, Prakāśātman says there is no relationship between the jīvanmukta's experience of brahman/ätman identity and seeing duality; the latter is caused by a flaw (dosa) based on already commenced karma. Thus one in a body can have immediate knowledge (i.e., jīvanmukti), since jñāna arises after other karma (samcita and āgami) different from prārabdha is destroyed. Put another

60 a Embodied Liberation in Traditional Advaita Vedanta

way, direct (aparoksa) seeing does not destroy all karma, so such insight is possible in a (prarabdha-formed) body as in the case of Vyāsa.

Prakāśātman then addresses how a liberated being acts in the world. First, even when seeing duality, he does not perform rites (anusthāna).4 Ritual performances are based on rules (niyama) of time, place, eligibility, and so on. These (and other) actions, caused by prārabdha karma, gradually cease, since no specific time and place and so on rules remain for one knowing reality. This is reminiscent of Mandana's comments on ChU VI. 14. 2, which assert that karmic activity continues but lessens over time. For Prakāśātman, activity ceases since for knowers ritual action has no goal.5 However, even if beyond śāstric regulation, knowers will not do what- ever they please (yathestācaraņa). Prakāśātman points out that knowers have no desire to obtain good or avoid evil.6 Without the desire to accomplish any human goal (purusārtha) due to their direct experience of the self, any activ- ity or wish to act ceases; all that remains is surpassing bliss in the self (of the jīvanmukta, adds Bhāratītīrtha). Prakāātman sums up here that the body remains due to the power of prārabdha karma, but after knowledge there is no chance of increase in non- manifesting (i.e., other than prārabdha) karma caused by ignorance, desire and others. Commenced karma causes only its own fruit. So the (embodied) truth-knower sees only the duality appearance caused by prārabdha karma (and both appearance and this karma will imminently cease). The same issue of bodily continuity is addressed earlier,7 focussing here on the nature of the samskāras remaining post-knowledge. (Incidently, at the end of the passage, Prakāśātman says the term "samskāra" also indi- cates the trace of ignorance (avidyā-leśa), thus collapsing a distinction impor- tant to Mandana, Citsukha, and others.) Prakāśātman first introduces a useful distinction in types of knowledge. A pūrvapaksin here argues (as have earlier ones) that brahma-jñāna should cause the immediate fall of the body and senses (since without ignorance [the cause], the body [the effect] cannot exist), yet activity in samsāra continues even after immediate knowledge. The opponent here points to (a purportedly inappropriate) plurality of knowledges: tattva-jñāna (which negates all ignorance) and more specific vyatireka-jñāna, which negates the reality of particular objects like a snake or body. Prakāśātman (seconded at some length by the VPS) responds by affirming this distinction, but further argues that tattva-jñāna removes the root (mūla) avidyā, and not the (vyatireka) knowledge that negates the body's reality. Thus, bodily appearance continues due to the remaining samskāra (an effect of avidyā, like footprints remaining after the foot is gone). Put another way,

In Later Scholastic Advaita aa 61

one can come to know a specific "snake" is a rope without realizing the whole world is such a superimposition, and one can have the highest realiza- tion while still on occasion mistaking a specific rope for a snake. The rest of this section looks more deeply into the nature of the samskāra, advancing beyond Mandana's or others' understanding (and preparing the way for Madhusūdana Sarasvatī). Prakāśātman gives a number of reasons why ignorance and its effects (rather than action or knowledge) generate the samskāra. First, samskāras are the residue of ignorance, like the flower smell that remains in a pot after the flowers are removed. Second, a samskāra of everything remains in destruction (pralaya), so we can infer that there is a samskāra of ignorance in ignorance's destruction. Third, ignorance and its effects are illusory (mithyā, not "real") knowledge. Finally, samskāras arise from ignorance, since they are merely an appearance (abhāsa) of knowledge based on the witness consciousness (sāksi-caitanya). The VPS adds that the witness consciousness abides eternally within avidyā (and thus reveals both knowledge and ignorance simultaneously). The opponent then asks how a samskāra can produce the appearance of duality in immediate (i.e., present dualistic) experience.8 Prakāśātman re- sponds that it is possible because a samskāra, like avidyā, is a flaw (doșa) based on pure consciousness (caitanya). The VPS adds that this is like a dust speck on the (pure seeing of the) eye. The dosa, a flaw but still based on caitanya, is the cause of the illusory appearance (of prapañca) in immediate experience. Similarly, the dust speck is adventitious, but causes something to appear to the eye. Finally, the pūrvapaksin states that only ignorance, not the samskāra, is based on the self (samskāras are said to be based on avidyā). Prakāśātman retorts that both are based on the self, which is why samskāras can continue even without the presence of avidya. The VPS agrees that pure conscious- ness is the locus of both, and adds that samskāras need no material cause, since such a cause is necessary only for existent things (not mere traces of ignorance). Prakāśātman concludes that for the aforementioned reasons, the continuity of samskāras does not refute (imminent) bodiless liberation. Samskāra cessation (and consequent body dropping) happens gradually but inevitably due to the remembrance (anusamdhāna) of knowledge of the real (tattva-jñāna). Bhāratītīrtha adds that after such knowledge, living libera- tion with a remnant of ignorance continues until prārabdha karma is destroyed.9 To sum up, Prakāśātman is concerned with giving a clear rationale for karmic and bodily continuity post-realization, with explaining the relation- ship of ignorance and samskāras, and with indicating the way a jīvanmukta acts in the world. Later Advaitins, particularly Madhusūdana Sarasvati, will also take up these concerns.

62 a Embodied Liberation in Traditional Advaita Vedanta

Citsukha on Jīvanmukti

Citsukha (fl. thirteenth century) is another important Advaita thinker who follows Śrīharsa's dialectical (and anti-Nyāyā) approach. He is best known as the author of Tattvapradīpikā (Illumining the Real),10 (or Citsukhī) a comprehensive defense of Advaita doctrines;11 jīvanmukti is discussed at the very end of the text. He focuses on the nature of the trace of ignorance (avidyā-leśa), introducing the notion of three forms (ākāra) of ignorance, as well as the power of (prārabdha) karma to cause bodily continuity post- vidyā, and the relation of paroksa (indirect) and aparoksa (immediate) knowl- edge (also mentioned in Pañcadaśī VI. 15). He has certainly read earlier Advaitins, especially Vimuktātman and Maņdana. Citsukha's discussion of jīvanmukti is in the form of a long pūrvapaksa, then response; I will break the passage into its component parts. The oppo- nent first argues that if knowing the self removes ignorance, then the body (part of ignorance) would drop when knowledge rises. Even the trace of ignorance ceases when knowledge rises. Karma (including prārabdha, the cause of the body), the effect of ignorance, ceases when avidya ceases. The opponent also holds that śruti (like Mundaka II. 2. 8 and even ChU VI. 14. 2) points out that all karma without remainder (e.g., not excluding prārabdha) is destroyed by knowledge. Citsukha's response to the issue of bodily continuity post-vidyā due to the trace of ignorance12 is as follows: knowledge, he says, is obstructed by strong prārabdha karma. Jīvan mukti exists since when the avidyā-leśa con- tinues, karma (like the body) born from it also persists, despite the rise of self-knowledge. Citsukha accounts for this persistance in a new and subtle way. While asserting ignorance is ultimately one, he distinguishes three forms (ākāra) of avidyā, following the Nyāyā-sudhā (by a Jñānottama claimed as teacher by Citsukha).13 The first form of ignorance causes the illusion that prapañca (phenom- enal manifestation) is the highest truth, the second form produces the notion that things in empirical reality have practical utility (arthakriyā), and the third produces the notion that objective forms really appear in perception.14 Each form ceases in a different way. The first (imagining duality as truly real) ceases by recognizing ("theoretically") the truth of nonduality; the second (imagining-for reasons of practical utility-that māyā is the basis of the world) ceases by the direct experience (sāksātkāra) of reality. It seems that when these two forms of ignorance cease, the jivanmukta sees the world as unreal and has no attachments to it.15 However, the third form or trace of ignorance remains for the jīvanmukta, producing objects that seem actually to appear in perception.16 This form may temporarily disappear in meditative enstasis (samādhi), but otherwise it con- tinues, causing the appearance of the body and the world. This appearance,

In Later Scholastic Advaita 63

while known by the jīvanmukta as unreal, thus allows mediate or paroksa jñāna despite having the highest knowledge, which answers another objec- tion of the opponent.17 This form ceases only after the fruits of prārabdha karma are enjoyed (and then the body falls). To close, Citsukha adds a śruti text (BāU II. 5. 19), which confirms that māyā takes manifold forms.18 Citsukha also rejects the argument that the trace of ignorance ceases when tattva-jñāna rises, repeating that knowledge is obstructed by strong already commenced karma. He makes the important distinction (following Vimuktātman),19 between karma having knowledge as its object (vidyārtha) and karma having "enjoyment" as its object (bhogārtha). The former bears fruit in a body born from the latter. Put another way, vidyārtha karma is based on bhogārtha karma, which causes the body's rise (one cannot get knowledge without a body), so these two kinds of karma are not opposed. It appears that only vidyārtha karma (which accounts for living liberation) exists post-knowledge, and it neither creates a new body nor immediately destroys the existing body. The opponent then makes a second argument, based on the Gīta IV. 34 passage about the wise (jñānin) who realize the truth (tattva-darsin) teaching the highest knowledge.20 The question arises whether the jñānin has paroksa (mediate) or aparoksa (immediate) knowledge, an important distinction for Citsukha. The pūrvapaksin holds that these embodied knowers have only mediate knowledge,21 in part because one cannot have the highest aparoksa jñāna "within" paroksa. Citsukha responds by affirming that both śruti and teaching aim for immediate knowledge, not lower mediate jñāna. This is seen in the expres- sion of amazement which indicates highest knowledge as in the śruti text "when he understood [tattvamasi], he went 'Ha' " (ChU VI. 16. 3). Such an indication is not necessary for mere paroksa jñāna. Nor in the Gītā passage describing the knowers' teaching is the knower (like Mandana's mere sādhaka) doing repeated practice that produces merely mediate knowledge. Darśana indicates immediate insight, and it is an illusion that only mediate knowledge exists in the immediately known self. Further, since illusions appear in paroksa jñāna, if it was the goal there would be the flaw of variability in the highest knowledge.

The opponent continues by examining the nature of the trace of igno- rance (avidyā-leśa). He argues it is neither a portion of ignorance, since avidyā has no parts like a pot, nor another form (ākāra) of ignorance, since no form can remain when its substratum disappears. Mandana's view is then proposed: duality appearance continues due to a samskāra alone, like fear and trembling continue even after the snake illusion ceases (or the body remains awhile like the unattended potter's wheel continues to spin for a

64 Embodied Liberation in Traditional Advaita Vedanta

time). This view is denied: a samskāra, effect of avidyā, ceases when igno- rance ceases (as Vimuktātman writes in chapter 3). All duality is unreal, so how can a samskāra be real? And a false samskāra cannot have reality as basis. Finally, the self cannot be the basis of the samskāra, since the self has no connection with ignorance. Thus, neither the self nor the samskāra can be a real basis for duality. (The pūrvapaksin here seems to be ruling out all of the alternatives for some mediation between vidyā and avidyā, including the samskāra. If all alternatives are impossible, so is jīvanmukti.) Citsukha then adds another explanation for the continuity of karma post-realization, due to the avidyā-leśa, again focusing on the third form of ignorance. His argument comes in response to the objection that the avidyā- leśa and karma are mutually dependent, that is, each continues due to the existence of the other. Citsukha denies this, refering to the important Śvetāśvatara I. 10 text, "again (bhūyas) at the end, all māyā ceases."22 He explains that while the two forms (ākāra) of avidyā (or māyā), mentioned earlier, cease immediately after vidyā, the third continues while one is alive. Karma continues simultaneously with ignorance because precisely karma itself (in commenced form) is the form of the avidyā-leśa. All avidyā, without remnant, ceases when the opposer of vidyā (the remnant specifically characterized by karma with commenced fruits) ceases. He concludes (in agreement with earlier Advaitins) that despite the general statements of śruti, that "all karmas cease" with knowledge, it is proper to say karmas other than prārabdha cease, and, as indicated by ChU VI. 14. 2 ("it remains for just so long"), there is the (temporary) abiding both of prārabdha karma and its effect (the body). Finally, Citsukha rejects the pūrvapaksin's denial that the sthita-prajña or the gunātīta references in the Gītā characterize living liberation. Following Mandana, the opponent calls these the state (avasthā) of being a sādhaka, not a jīvanmukta (who is siddha). Citsukha argues that the sthita-prajña and the guņātīta are not just sādhakas, since the Gītā says they have fully abandoned desires. Cessation of all desire is only proper for the direct experience (sākşātkāra) of the highest self, that is, jīvanmukti. He quotes Gītā II. 59 ("desire [rasa] itself ceases when one has seen the highest") and Katha VI. 14 ("when all desires fixed in the heart cease, then a mortal becomes immor- tal and attains brahman here"). Citsukha concludes therefore that jīvanmukti (not just advanced studenthood) is proclaimed in sacred texts and cannot be denied merely because of personal distaste. Thus, with Citsukha (as with Prakāśātman), we see a well-developed tradition of discourse on the nature of jīvanmukti (following Mandana, Śankara, Vimuktātman, and others). He makes his own contributions, of course, espe- cially his refinements on the forms of ignorance and types of karma in the avidyā-leśa and on a/paroksa jñāna.

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Madhusūdana Sarasvatī on Jīvanmukti

Madhusūdana Sarasvatī (sixteenth century), by general agreement one of the preeminent post-Sankara Advaita thinkers, is a particularly interesting figure in later Advaita reflection on jīvanmukti. With living liberation (as many other topics), Madhusūdana clearly writes for different audiences in different texts, which shows his fascinating but problematic attempt to inte- grate devotion to Krsna with traditional Advaitic views on nonduality and renunciation.23 Jivanmukti is discussed in the fourth chapter (on liberation) of his magnum opus, Advaitasiddhi (Establishing Nonduality),24 and he expands on many of the points addressed by earlier Advaita schoolmen, particularly Citsukha and Prakāsātman.25 His commentary on the Bhagavad-Gīta, the Gūdārthadīpikā (Illumining the Deepest Meaning),26 however, shows much more devotional and yogic influence, following the Yogavāsistha and the Gītā itself. For these reasons, I will discuss his perspective on jīvanmukti in the Gūdārthadīpika in the section on "Yogic Advaita." In the Advaitasiddhi, Madhusūdana emphasizes the following points: the body continues due to the avidyā trace, that is, a samskāra (an effect of prārabdha karma) which arises from, but is not based on, ignorance. The trace of igno- rance rises from one of avidya's powers-that of producing objects capable of immediate perception. Jīvanmukti exists while the avidyā-leśa state continues, then one reaches final liberation. Following Madhusūdana's arguments is par- ticularly challenging, given the intricate web he weaves of pūrvapaksin posi- tions and counterpositions before introducing the siddhāntin view.27 Madhusūdana begins by stating that jīvanmukti is established prima- rily by the self-experience (svānubhava) of jīvanmuktas themselves. This statement, interesting in itself, is unfortunately an isolated remark; nothing more is said here about the experience of liberated beings. Madhusūdana continues with a standard definition of jīvanmukti: it is the appearance (pratibhāsa) of bodily continuity despite ignorance's cessation by knowl- edge of the truth (tattva-jñāna).28 Although avidyā is destroyed by tattva- jñāna, the body does not fall immediately.29 It continues due to a samskāra (mental impression), like the potter's wheel continues spinning without a stick or like fear and trembling continue, although the illusion of the snake ceases. Madhusūdana concurs with Prakāśātman that samskāras (traces of ig- norance) arise from ignorance (and not from action and knowledge), as the smell ("trace") of a flower remains in a container after the flowers are thrown out. All destruction, including the destruction of knowledge, is pervaded by samskāras-except the destruction of samskāras themselves. Madhusūdana continues that samskāras, although an effect of ignorance, have the pure self, not ignorance, as their locus; thus they are like avidyā and do not depend on

66 Embodied Liberation in Traditional Advaita Vedanta

avidyā. He likens the samskāra-based bodily continuity post-jñāna to the slight remnant of cloth form remaining after the cloth is burnt. Effects of commenced karma like samskāras (and embodiment) do not continue due to the continuance of ignorance itself, since even a thing in destroyed (vinaś) condition (burnt cloth or liberated being) can be seen to continue without a material cause (cloth or body). The opponent then grants that the burnt cloth or body of the jīvanmukta might last a few moments, but no longer. Madhusūdana argues that if you grant any continuity, the exact length of time a thing remains is pointless to consider. But he goes on to say that unlike a fast dissipating burnt cloth, the jīvanmukta's body continues for a time (e.g., until death), because only at death is there the added assistance of the absence of any obstacle to the body dropping-that is, only then has prārabdha karma disappeared. Madhusūdana is concerned to indicate here that currently manifesting karma, and not knowl- edge, is responsible for the body's rise and fall. He says that the body does not cease due to any final increase in knowledge (which might indicate some difference in the knowledge of jīvan- and videha-mukti) but due to the help of the absence of any obstacle like prārabdha karma. The opponent then says that unalloyed bliss should manifest in the jīvanmukti state, yet even after the truth is known, there is continuity of contra- dictory delusions, as in the case (mentioned by Sankara in BS bhāşya IV. 1. 15) of seeing two moons even after realizing only one is real. Madhusūdana counters that the two moons example does not fit the case of living liberation, since with the latter all flaws (dosa) are removable by knowledge. The flaw (of embodi- ment) may not be removable as long as the obstacle of prārabdha karma exists, but eventually knowledge removes even this flaw. He here offers a śruti text saying that no flaw is eternal (e.g., what rises must cease). Madhusūdana then continues to point to the avidyā-leśa, not ignorance itself, as the cause of bodily continuity. The pürvapaksin says that the igno- rance trace is not apart from avidyā, since ignorance has no parts (avayava), so avidyā itself remains as long as the body exists, again like a form of cloth remains after burning, although the cloth's "material basis" is gone. Mad- husūdana, however, holds that although ignorance has no parts, still only its trace continues after jñāna. Like Citsukha, Madhusūdana argues that "leśa" here means "ākāra" or form, and it is accepted that avidyā has many forms as in the śruti "Indra goes about in many forms by (his) magic powers" (BāU II. 5. 19). While the form's basis (avidyā) ceases, the form continues. He gives as an example the continuity of the class (jāti) of pots despite the cessation of an individual pot (the "basis" of the class). The opponent immediately asks for more detail on the nature of the form of ignorance. Is it in fact a class, or is it a quality (dharma) like power (śakti), or a particular state (avasthā) of a thing like gold in form of a ring?

In Later Scholastic Advaita 67

Madhusudana says it is not the first two, since if they are the basis of the illusion of the body, they would be avidyā itself (and not a lesa), and if they are not the basis of the body illusion, this illusion would arise without a basis. Further, they are different from the self (being removable by jñāna) and thus, being necessarily part of ignorance themselves, they cannot exist when igno- rance ceases. Madhusūdana argues for the third alternative, despite the apparent prob- lem that no state like avidyā-leśa can exist without something (avidyā) "pos- sessing" the state. The trace state can exist because of avidyā's many powers (first seen in Citsukha's writing, although Madhusūdana here substitutes the word śakti, or power for Citsukha's term ākāra, or form). The first two powers of avidyā cease by direct experience (sākșātkāra) of the truth; they are the power causing the illusion that phenomenal manifestation (prapañca) is the highest truth and the power producing the capacity for practical efficiency (arthakriyā) in prapañca. The third power continues after knowledge (which exists simultaneously with prārabdha karma); it is the power producing object semblances (ābhāsa)-such as the body-capable of immediate perception (aparoksa-pratibhāsa). Put in other words, we can say that the projecting power of ignorance remains due to prārabdha karma, even though the con- cealing power has disappeared.30 Although Madhusudana allows that such a kind of ignorance remains, it is not admitted as "full" ignorance, for that would disallow living libera- tion. He argues that the mukta remains in avidya, only waiting for this third power to end. This power, like all of ignorance's powers, is destroyed by knowledge, but only when knowledge is not obstructed by prārabdha karma at life's end. Madhusūdana next refers back to Citsukha's views on the avidyā-leśa in two ways. First, he mentions the Śvetāśvatara I. 10 text, which concludes "again (bhūyas) at the end, all māyā ceases," which seems to mean that only when the prārabdha karma sustained body drops ("the end") do all forms of illusion (including the ignorance trace) cease.31 Second, he disputes the no- tion that karma and the avidyā-leśa are mutually dependent. When properly understood with the help of the aforementioned śruti, one realizes both that they exist simultaneously (not "dependently") and that ultimately the igno- rance trace continuity is the cause of karma (and bodily) continuity. Madhusūdana closes by again arguing that the leśa is a subtle state (sūksma-avasthā) of ignorance. He points out that a Mīmāmsāka opponent accepts that even after a sacrifice is finished, apūrva, the subtle state of sacrifice, continues and accomplishes a result (like attaining heaven); in the same way, Madhusūdana holds that after ignorance is finished, the leśa, the subtle state of avidyā, continues and allows one to "accomplish" understand- ing the body (as unreal appearance).32 Both apūrva and leśa remain after their

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bases, sacrifice and avidyā, are gone. The Mīmāmsāka accepts the interval between cause and result (heaven) in sacrifice as Advaitins accept an interval between knowledge (cause) and body fall (result). Madhusūdana thus con- cludes that jīvanmukti is well-established by the continuity of the trace of avidyā.

Prakāśānanda on Jīvanmukti

Another important Advaitin writer of this era is Prakāśānanda (late 1500s). He is the author of Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvalī (loosely, Pearls of Wisdom from the Vedanta),33 a work largely concerned with the natures of awareness and ignorance according to the "drsti-srsti" or "objects exist only in perception" viewpoint.34 Prakāśānanda gives an elaborate pūrvapaksa against jīvanmukti, making the case against earlier Advaita (especially Madhusūdana's) arguments for jīvanmukti in a clear and effective manner, particularly con- cerning the problematic nature of ignorance and its effects. While the final arguments are in fact for jīvanmukti, one wonders if Prakāśānanda himself was fully persuaded by his responses to these criticisms.35 The section on liberation while living begins at a familiar point: If knowledge by its very nature destroys ignorance (and its effects, like embodi- ment), the fall of the body should be simultaneous with knowledge. And if ignorance and all its effects immediately cease after vidyā (and one then reaches bodiless isolation, videha-kaivalya) the whole lineage (of teachers) would be cut off (thus liberation, which must be taught by brahman-knowers, would become impossible).36 The opponent continues that the body cannot be said to remain, due to the power of prārabdha karma, since such karma is an effect of ignorance and thus cannot remain in avidya's absence-like cloth cannot remain in the absence of thread.37 Nor (contra Mandana, etc.) can one say that ignorance continues for a short time sufficient for enjoying prārabdha karma's fruits, since knowledge would then lose its nature as the destroyer of ignorance. And destroying ignorance cannot become its nature only at a later time, because a single thing cannot have two natures. Prakāśānanda's pūrvapakșin also denies Madhusūdana's view that the concealing (avarana) power of ignorance ceases while its projecting (viksepa) power continues (due to the support of prārabdha karma). There are not, as implied here, two ignorances, and if ignorance is one, it should not have two powers, differently present or absent, for it is contradictory for one thing to cease and exist simultaneously. Nor can one argue that the power alone ceases, since the power and its possessor (ignorance) are not different; if different, ignorance does not cease when the power does.38

In Later Scholastic Advaita 69

The opponent continues that ignorance does not cease by the cessation of prārabdha karma, since prārabdha cessation is not a means of knowledge (pramāna), which alone ends ignorance. Further, neither knowledge obstructed (pratibaddha) or unobstructed by currently manifesting karma ends igno- rance: obstructed knowledge could not destroy ignorance because of prārabdha's interference, and knowledge unobstructed by prārabdha cannot end ignorance because knowledge is itself absent after the body falls (i.e., when prārabdha is destroyed). Nor can one argue (like Mandana and others do) that an impression (samskāra) or trace (leśa) of ignorance continues after knowledge, because any such remnant is an effect of ignorance (and thus must cease with its basis). Also, it is absurd to use the term samskāra when it is really just ignorance itself. The pūrvapaksa then addresses issues concerning scripture. One can- not claim the knower's body continues based on the authority of śruti and smrti, which teach living liberation, since such teaching is not the aim of scripture. When the śāstras urge those desirous of liberation to listen to scripture, those passages are ancillary explanations (arthavāda) for injunc- tions (vidhi) to hear scripture. Thus, both worldly reasoning (indicated in the preceding paragraphs) and Vedic texts contradict the continued exist- ence of the body of a knower. One might note here that the śruti passages quoted by earlier writers, from BaU IV. 4. 6-7 through Katha VI. 14-5, make the latter point questionable. The opponent continues that the loosed arrow example (i.e., the arrow, once shot, continues for a time at a slowly diminishing rate of speed) does not establish the existence of (bodily prolonging) prārabdha karma, since in the arrow example the basis of action (the arrow) is not destroyed, while ignorance, the basis of karma (and thus the body), is destroyed. Nor is the common agreement (prasiddhi) among people about the existence of jīvanmukti unchallengeable, for common agreement without proper proof (pramāna) is merely blind tradition.39 Although jīvanmukti is unproven, the śāstra authors have a purpose in teaching it, that is, they want to destroy the ignorant student's distrust of the teacher (and this distrust can be removed by suggest- ing the teacher is liberated here and now).40 The opponent now concludes (as argued earlier) that since knowledge by nature completely destroys ignorance, knowledge cannot arise because any knower is immediately liberated, and thus no teacher who has knowledge ever exists. The existence of the brahman-knowing teacher is vital since, as śruti says, gaining knowledge is dependent on the teacher: "one having a teacher knows" (ChU VI. 14. 2), "this view is not achieved by reason, (but when) taught by another, it is well understood" (Katha II. 9), "the teacher will tell you the way" (ChU IV. 14. 1), and "there is no way there unless taught by another" (Katha II. 8), and so on. Thus, while agreeing with

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Vimuktātman and others that a brahman-knowing teacher is crucial, the pūrvapaksin argues that such a teacher cannot exist.

After all of these arguments, Prakāśānanda now responds, focusing on the idea that a teacher is necessary but never exists. He states that there is a teacher, albeit imagined (kalpita), the teacher instructs, and this accords with the sastras. Further, there is no flaw of uncertainty in this conclusion (avinigama) due to the (wrong) conclusions of those who are ignorant. Al- though (as Sarvajñätman wrote)41 no teacher exists from the highest perspec- tive, since the knower is immediately liberated, still no impropriety exists because knowledge can arise from an imagined teacher. The imagined teacher can bear true knowledge (satya-jñāna), as shown in the aforementioned Vedic texts, and by the illustration of mirror reflection (the "false image" gives a "true reflection"). Further, there is no uncertainty as to who is the imaginer, teacher or student. The imaginer is the one who is ignorant (thus the student), and such a state is improper for the knower-teacher who lacks any seed of imagining. An intellect such as Prakāśānanda's could certainly see weaknesses in the arguments for an "imagined teacher," and he does not even address the problematic nature of ignorance and its effects/traces/powers, including prārabdha karma, nor does he sufficiently answer the objection about the aim of scripture. It is difficult to know why he ignores all of the objections above. Perhaps he wants to hold that there is a point at which reason ends, for he concludes this section by asserting (sounding like Sankara's Upadeśasāhasrī) that by the direct experience arising from Vedic texts like "you are that" reached by the grace of teacher and scripture, and by the simultaneous dis- appearance of ignorance and its effects that obstruct the appearance of libera- tion, he (the student) thinks, "I am eternal, pure, awakened, free, (and) by nature nondual bliss," and then all is accomplished.

Late Scholastic Advaitins on Jīvanmukti

The latest scholastic Advaitins are a heterogeneous group. We will begin here by considering Appayya Dīkșita (sixteenth century), who wrote one of the best-known compilations of Advaitin thought, called the (Sāstra) Siddhāntaleśa-samgraha.42 He discusses Advaita views of jīvanmukti briefly at the beginning of the text's fourth section. He begins with the standard Advaita view that the jīvanmukta retains the appearance (pratibhāsa) of the body after the direct experience (sākşātkāra) of the truth (brahman), due to the binding of prārabdha karma, which has the remnant of ignorance as its

In Later Scholastic Advaita a. 71

basis. This view raises the customary problem that direct brahman-experi- ence is impossible if prārabdha karma as avidyā-leśa remains. So what is the avidyā-leśa (which allows for jīvanmukti)? Appayya gives various views: some say it is a bit (amśa) of projective power (viksepa-śakti) remaining from root (mūla) ignorance, which leads to bodily continuance due to prārabdha karma. Others (such as Madhusūdana and Prakāśātman) say it is an impression (samskāra) of ignorance, imagined like the smell of garlic remaining in an emptied pot of garlic, or it is root ignorance following the example of the burnt cloth (i.e., the form lingers after the substance is gone). Still others (here Sarvajñātman) say texts on jīvanmukti are only explanations (arthavāda) of injunctions (vidhi) such as "hear, reflect, assimilate," since ignorance continuity is impossible after the rise of direct experience opposing the remaining avidyā trace, and since it is not the aim of scripture to cause jīvanmukti attainment. Ignorance with pleasurable im- pressions (vilāsavāsanā) ceases only by the rise of brahman experience from assimilating (nididhyāsana) the scriptural truth. Appayya does not here argue for any particular alternative; instead, he goes on to describe views on the cessation of ignorance itself, without discussing jīvanmukti further.

Sadānanda's Vedāntasāra (The Essence of the Vedanta)43 (sixteenth to seventeenth century) is a popular and syncretic summary of Advaitin thought and practice, with a particular emphasis on establishing the competency of the student. Concerning jīvanmukti, Sadānanda stresses the liberated being's freedom from bondage, detachment from the body, and constant goodness, although being beyond virtue. The liberated being is said to live out his prārabdha karma, then merge in brahman. As in numerous other texts, jivanmukti is the last topic addressed in the Vedāntasāra. Sadānanda states that when partless brahman is immediately realized as one's own essence by the removal of ignorance and its effects (misapprehension, doubt, and accumulated karma), then the jīvanmukta is said to be grounded in brahman and free from all bondage. Sadānanda also refers to the earlier cited Mundaka II. 2. 8 text: "The knot of the heart is split, all doubts is cut off, and all his karma is destroyed when it (brahman) is seen, both higher and lower." Sadānanda emphasizes the jīvanmukta's awareness of the unreality of the body and actions. After rising (from meditation), the liberated being sees actions undertaken due to prior dispositions (vāsanā) and experiences their commenced fruits with: 1) a body that is the seat of flesh, blood, urine, and feces, 2) senses that are the seat of blindness, dullness, and so on, and 3) an internal organ (antahkarana) that is the seat of hunger, thirst, sorrow, and delusion; still, he does not regard these things as truly real. Sadānanda gives

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the example of one who sees a magic trick (indra-jāla) and, knowing it to be magic, does not regard it as truly real (also PD VII. 175-80). He also cites Upadeśasāhasrī verse X. 13: "the one who, although seeing, does not, due to his nonduality, see duality in waking state, like one in deep sleep, and who, although acting, is actionless-he, and no other, is a knower of the self." Sadānanda then addresses a concern formulated by Sureśvara (and addressed by Prakāśātman and the Pañcadasī) about the propriety of the liberated being's behavior. He claims that while the jīvanmukta continues practices like eating or wandering that precede knowledge, he now either follows only virtuous dispositions or is indifferent to virtue and vice (śubhāśubha). He quotes Sureśvara's Naiskarmyasiddhi IV. 62, which asks, "If one awakened to the truth of nonduality would do as he pleases, what is the difference between truth-seers and dogs in eating what is impure?" Sadānanda, like Sureśvara, does not directly answer this question, but does point to an important difference: only the liberated Self-knower realizes brahman. He also writes that means to knowledge like humility and good qualities like non-emnity now serve merely as ornaments (alamkāra) of the jīvanmukta. He again turns to the Naiskarmyasiddhi (IV. 69) for support: "For one whose Self-knowledge has arisen, qualities like nonemnity occur effortlessly; they are no longer means for him."44 Sadānanda then sums up his view. While formulaic, it represents well the mainstream Advaita view of living liberation. The jīvanmukta, only to continue his bodily journey, experiences the fruits of commenced karma marked by joy and sorrow, obtained by his own desire, or without desire, or by the desire of others, and illumines the appearances (abhāsa) in his internal organ. When the fruits are exhausted and the vital breath merges into the highest brahman, which is innermost bliss, then due to the destruction of mental impressions and ignorance with its effects, he abides as partless brahman, free from the appearance of any difference, the unitary essence of bliss, and abso- lute isolation. He closes with well-known supporting texts: "his breaths do not depart (and being brahman indeed, one merges with brahman," BāU IV. 4. 6), "(the breaths) unite here (BāU III. 2. 11)," and "having been liberated [from avidyā], he is released [from the body]," Katha V. 1).

Dharmarāja's seventeenth-century Vedāntaparibhāșa (Explanation of Vedanta)45 is a classic introduction to and systemization of later Advaita epistemology (largely following Prakāśātman's Vivaraņa school). Once again we find the text's conclusion analyzing jīvanmukti. Dharmarāja is particularly concerned with the role of prārabdha karma, and argues that while one gains liberation by brahman knowledge here, final release (videha-kaivalya) arises only after the working out of prārabdha karma.

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Dharmarāja, like Sankara, claims that liberation is the attaining of brahman, consisting of bliss and the removal of sorrow, and it is not attaining some other realm (loka) or an objective bliss (which would be a noneternal effect) (IX. 6-7). In IX. 46-56, he elaborates on living liberation, writing that one with the direct experience (sāksātkāra) of qualityless brahman does not go to another realm (following the BaU IV. 4. 6 text: "his breaths do not depart"); instead, one experiences joy and sorrow until prārabdha karma is destroyed, and then one is released (apavrj). Dharmarāja then addresses the familiar (and central) problem for Advaitins of some form of ignorance coexisting with the direct experience of nondual brahman.46 He states that although all karma is burnt by knowledge (following Mundaka II. 2. 8 and Gītā IV. 37), prārabdha karma can remain, following ChU VI. 14. 2, since knowledge destroys only accumulated (samcita) karma, which is different from activated (kārya) karma (IX. 47-48). Further, a knower can still have a body despite brahman knowledge's removal of root (mūla) ignorance. Only unobstructed (apratibaddha) knowledge removes (all forms of) ignorance-but contra Prakāśānanda, it does; the cessation of ig- norance is not accepted when there is an obstruction in the form of (body- sustaining) prārabdha karma (IX. 49-50). The text continues by addressing the issue of the number of ignorances (avidyā), and whether when one being is released, all are released (sarvamukti). Dharmarāja rejects the view implied in the BāU II. 5. 19 text: "Indra (goes about in many forms) by (his) māyās [plural]." He holds (like Madhusūdana) that ignorance is unitary, but there are different veiling powers (āvarana- śakti) on brahman in different individual beings (jīva), and these veilings of brahman in the jīvas are destroyed at different times (so no sarvamukti) (IX. 51-54). Dharmarāja concludes that, as Brahmasūtra III. 3. 32 holds, the knower's body continues as long as there is some commission (adhikāra), so one like Indra could remain embodied even after the rise of knowledge. The final view, which concurs with Sankara, is that bodiless release (videha- kaivalya) comes (only) after commenced karma causing the commission is finished (IX. 55).47 Dharmarāja ends by returning to the definition of moksa proposed in IX. 6-7: Liberation is from knowing brahman, and is the re- moval of evil and attainment of the unsurpassed bliss of brahman. Still, it seems the embodiment of the liberated being continues as long as there is prārabdha karma.

As a final reflection, before turning to ideas about jīvanmukti beyond the traditional Advaita fold, I would like to consider a point about the nature of jīvanmukti using different, more Western, language, following an article by G. R. Malkani in Philosophy East and West.48 The question can be asked

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whether, and in what way, the jīvanmukta can "know" or "be" brahman.49 First, as Malkani points out, from the highest view, the idea of an "I" (even a jīvanmukta's "I") knowing brahman is an illusion. In everyday usage, knowing is always dualistic, with a subject and an object, and such dualism is delusive. All conceptual knowledge of "I" knowing "something" is flawed, even "I know brahman." In this sense, to have awareness of oneness is contradictory. Ultimately, you do not merely "know" brahman, the real you, the self, is brahman. However, from an everyday understanding, one does need to come to know brahman, even if one already is brahman. From our deluded dualistic way of thinking, we hold the wrong notion that brahman-hood is to be, rather than already being, achieved. We think identity with brahman is a goal, rather than realizing we are eternally brahman. Ultimately, then, the jīvanmukta is different from us by the realization that s/he is not (ontologically) different from us. Only s/he knows who s/he (already) is. Again, from everyday understanding, our separateness while living is real enough: when embodied, we have a unique mind and personality, differ- ent from others, both in our own self-understanding and in the view of an observer. In this sense, one can rightly say "I am brahman" only after real- izing nonduality. You are brahman (only) when you know that the individu- ated you is not really you. Moreover, our separate bodies must be cared for and our individual minds inevitably have ever-changing states (even nirvikalpa samādhi is a temporary state in one mind). Therefore, in an important, if ultimately delu- sive, sense, embodiment does not allow one to "be brahman" constantly.50 A person is thus inherently limited while living, so one might say that the remnant of ignorance after realization is the human condition, that is, having bodily needs such as hunger, thirst, and rest, as well as experiencing emotions and desires. Thus, one might put the particular nature of jīvanmukti this way: The living liberated being may have immediate knowledge of nondual brahman, but one cannot simply "be brahman" (or be brahman simply) while still in a body. We now widen our field of vision, first to look at Ramanuja's and some Sāmkhya and Yoga views on the possibility and nature of liberation while living, and then consider the "Yogic Advaita" perspective of the Yogavāsistha and the Jīvanmuktiviveka.

Part 2

Jīvanmukti in "Yogic Advaita"

FIVE

Rāmānuja and Sāmkhya/Yoga on Liberation While Living

Before turning to "Yogic Advaita" perspectives on jīvanmukti, I want to briefly consider an important and very different view of the possibility of embodied liberation from within Vedanta, that of Sankara's influential critic Rāmānuja (fl. twelfth century), the founder of the Visistādvaita (qualified nondualist) Vedanta tradition.1 I will then more directly prepare the way for "Yogic Advaita" by introducing some Sāmkhya and Yoga views on liberation while living. Rāmānuja's discussion of living liberation is interesting in its own right, but is especially relevant here because it occurs mostly in the context of his rejection of Advaita views.2 I will focus here on the relevant comments in Rāmānuja's Brahmasūtra commentary, called the Śrī bhāșya (ŚB), particularly I. 1. 4. There are, of course, a number of fundamental differences between Rāmānuja and Sankara that underlie their divergent understandings of the possibility of living liberation. Rāmānuja, unlike Sankara, holds that the in- dividual self is real and an active agent. This self is truly bound in a real world (ŚB I. 1. 1). Full liberation from bondage is not realization of nondual brahman,3 but communion of the soul with Lord Visnu in heaven, and thus requires the cessation of embodiment. The supreme bliss of experiencing the Lord's full presence is inconceivable to the being who, since embodied, is inevitably bound by karma and ignorance. To Rāmānuja, mere awareness of the self's bondage as ultimately unreal is insufficient for liberation. To re- move one's real bondage, one must both take refuge in the Lord and perform

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78 a Jivanmukti in "Yogic Advaita"

proper ritual actions.4 In his writings on jīvanmukti, Rāmānuja particularly emphasizes performance of ritual action to bring about and sustain release. Ramanuja's most thorough statement on this topic, found in his com- ments on Śrī bhāsya I. 1. 4, explicitly attempts to counter the Advaita posi- tion favoring living liberation. His discussion of jīvanmukti directly follows his argument that injunctions to meditate (dhyāna) are necessary, for igno- rance does not cease just by understanding sacred texts. He begins by writing that asserting liberation with a body exists is as absurd as saying "my mother is childless." He points out that Advaitins themselves use sacred texts that indicate that liberation entails freedom from embodiment (more on this shortly). Rāmānuja then allows the Advaitin to define the realization of the unreality of the body's appearance as the cessation of embodiment. Rāmānuja responds that if for an Advaitin this realization means the end of embodiment, jīvanmukti would thus be just like bodiless liberation, which is also the cessation of the body's false appearance (thus conflating realization of the body's unreality with the cessation of that unreality). Rāmānuja then offers the "Advaita position" that the jīvanmukta's embodied appearance persists, even though this illusory appearance is an- nulled, just like the appearance of two moons to one with an eye disease persists even after the illusion of the moon's dualness is recognized. Rāmanuja's retort to this view is that knowledge annulling appearance cannot have nondual brahman itself as its object; here, the appearance of embodi- ment, an illusion caused by ignorance, is annulled by knowledge, so the annulled appearance cannot persist. In the case of the two moons, the defect causing the appearance (eye disease) is not the object of the annulling knowl- edge (i.e., that one moon alone exists), so the annulled appearance (two moons) can here persist. Put another way, in the first case, the cause of illusion (ignorance) is destroyed (by knowledge of brahman), so the illu- sion-embodiment-is destroyed; in the second case, the cause of illusion (eye disease, a physical defect) is understood (not destroyed), so the illu- sion-two moons-persists, even after understanding.5 When Rāmānuja returns to śruti, his first example is ChU VI. 14. 2, which he reads to say that one attains release only after disembodiment, not just after knowing the real (which, for Sankara, is liberation, if not the final end).6 Rāmānuja then refers to Āpastamba Dharmasūtra II. 9. 13-17, which also states that release is not from knowing the self alone, for after release one should not (but inevitably does) experience suffering here. He then con- cludes that the cessation of all plurality (i.e., liberation) is impossible while one is living. He continues that bondage ceases only by employing medita- tion (dhyāna-niyoga), which brings direct brahman knowledge. Release rises not from the (noneternal) meditations themselves, but from their destruction

On Liberation While Living Ra 79

of all obstacles to direct brahman knowledge. The mind is cleared (and kept clear) by meditation, then knowledge arises. The fundamental problem with Ramanuja's arguments here is that he misrepresents the Advaita position, which does not identify realization of an illusion with its immediate "objective" cessation. It is not the case that Sankara, for example, holds that all appearance (including the body) is simply "un- real," and later Advaitins are careful to describe appearance as neither real nor unreal, and indescribable (anirvacanīya). Further, Rāmānuja does not here take into account prārabdha, or currently manifesting, karma, the entity that Advaitins claim causes embodiment to persist, even after liberating in- sight. Rāmānuja does address the nature of continuing karma in ŚB IV. 1. 15- 19. He holds that after brahman knowledge, fruits of uncommenced (anārabdha) karma perish (whether good or evil), but others continue. He again here refers to ChU VI. 14. 2, which, he claims in IV. 1. 19, refers not to release at the termination of embodiment, but to release from karma following the experience of its fruits. He rejects the Advaita idea that the liberated being's body contin- ues for a time merely due to ongoing impetus, like a potter's wheel abandoned while spinning. Instead, he specifies that the body continues due to the Lord's pleasure or displeasure, which is caused by good or evil deeds. He also states, in ŚB IV. 1. 16, that performance of ritual actions like the agnihotra must continue even after knowing brahman; these actions are means causing knowl- edge to arise and repetition of them further perfects knowledge by clarifying the mind (antahkarana). This seems to suggest, contra Sankara, that degrees of knowledge are possible, and that one might "fall back" from knowledge with- out the constant support of ritual activity. Rāmānuja explicitly addresses the question of what happens to karma currently bearing fruit after brahman knowledge in ŚB IV. 1. 9, specifically whether such karma ends when the current body (in which liberation arose) ceases, or whether it can cause future births. We have seen he does not read the ChU VI passage to claim that all karma ceases with liberation from current embodiment. He asserts that one must first experience all results of earlier good and evil actions before one becomes one with brahman (which occurs when the results cease). This cessation may happen at the end of this birth, or such experiencing may require a number of births. As he states in ŚB III. 4. 51, release is due to knowledge rising from meritorious works, but its time is not fixed, since obstruction from other works must also cease. Even a brahman-knower may have powerful evil deeds to overcome. Still, Rāmānuja agrees with Sankara that all action performed before brahman knowledge whose results have not begun to bear fruit is immediately destroyed by this knowledge, and later works do not attach to the self.

80 ca. Jīvanmukti in "Yogic Advaita"

Advaitins also wrestle with the question of whether the liberated being will return or not. The key text on this topic is BS III. 3. 32, which speaks of a commission (adhikāra) causing some to return. Rāmānuja holds that some (like Vasistha) who have gained the highest knowledge still retain good or evil works at death, since they have obtained some commission from prior action. They must complete their commission before the effects of the karma causing the commission cease, and only then do they obtain heaven's path. Again, commenced karma can only be destroyed by experiencing its fruits.

Jīvanmukti in Sāmkhya and Yoga

Unlike Rāmānuja, Sāmkhya and Yoga do not contest the possibility of liberation while living. They share the Advaitic assumption that ignorance of the true nature of reality ends by discriminating knowledge that brings re- lease. However, the key Sāmkhya/Yoga concepts of prakrti, purusa, and kaivalya are certainly not identical with Advaita's māyā, ātman, and mokșa. Similarly, the notion of freedom from attachment while living exists in both Sāmkhya and Yoga, but this concept is not a central one, nor does the term jīvanmukti appear in the earliest texts of these schools. Īśvarakrsņa's Sāmkhya Kārikā (SK) describes liberation as the realization (which happens while embodied) that the pure, inactive but conscious witness (purusa) is not re- lated to unconscious manifest nature (prakrti). Further, SK 67 uses the image, important in the prārabdha karma debate, of bodily existence continuing like a potter's wheel continuing to spin from prior momentum. Patañjali's Yogasūtras (YS) state that all afflicted action ceases for the master yogin, who then lives on without impurity in a "cloud of dharma" (IV. 29-30). Next, I will briefly examine ideas related to living liberation in these foundational texts (and some later Advaita-influenced Sāmkhya/Yoga writings), and some similarities and differences with jīvanmukti in Advaita. The SK extolls discriminating knowledge that brings utter detachment and claims that activity ceases due to loss of desire and motive to act when the purusa's difference from personal mental activity is recognized. One now attains the final state in Sāmkhya and Yoga, often designated kaivalya, or perfect isolation (a term Sankara uses on occasion as well). In kaivalya, the pure witness, purusa, rests serenely without attachment (SK 68, YS 2.25, 3. 55, 4.34); such isolation does not seem possible while living, though the YS states that the pure seer observes that which is seen (II. 20). The key passage relevant in this context is Sāmkhya Kārikā 64-68. It first states that after the knowledge that the "I" (aham) does not truly exist, the disinterested purusa sees prakrti, and all prakrti's activity ceases, al- though the two are still conjoined (SK 64-66). Virtue (dharma) and all other

On Liberation While Living a 81

causes now cease to function, due to the attainment of perfect knowledge, but purușa remains embodied due to the power of past impressions (samskāra), like the potter's wheel continues whirling after its cause (the potter's activity) has ceased (SK 67). In his commentary, Gaudapāda adds that knowledge burns away all (not yet germinating) seeds of evil or good action, as well as precluding all future karma, concluding that liberation (moksa) rises when the body falls, due to the destruction of the samskāras. All of this, of course, is consistent with the Advaitic doctrine of prārabdha karma. SK 68 then states that when purusa separates from the body and now inactive prakrti ceases, final complete isolation (kaivalya) is attained. Little more that is relevant to living liberation is said in the SK. It does not discuss the path to freedom or proper activity after liberating knowledge, nor does it claim the destruction of all impurity before death, saying merely that karmic impressions (samskāra) persist until death, as in the potter's wheel analogy. As Christopher Chapple points out in an essay on living liberation in Sāmkhya and Yoga, this might be in part due to the kind of text the SK is, a sort of abstract philosophical poem, without the practical "manual of methods for purification" aspect seen in the YS.7 Some much later Sāmkhya thinkers, clearly influenced by Advaita, do explicitly mention jīvanmukti. The Sāmkhyasūtras with Aniruddha's com- mentary (c. 1500s?) discuss living liberation in III. 77-84, in part referring back to the aforementioned SK verses.8 The important synthesizer of Advaita and Sāmkhya/Yoga thought Vijñānabhiksu (c. late 1500s?) basically follows this view in his Sāmkhyasūtras subcommentary (bhāsya), but he uses more unambiguously Advaitic terminology, such as jīvanmukti, prārabdha karma, and ātma-jñāna. These sūtras introduce the notion of different degrees of discrimination (viveka), the highest of which brings no further experiencing (upabhoga). The jīvanmukta is said to have middle-level discrimination (madhya-viveka),9 in which prior impressions (samskāra) force the desireless knower to continue experiencing for a time (77-78). Evidence for the con- tinuing existence of the liberated being is shown by the master-disciple rela- tion (i.e., the teacher, though liberated, remains embodied to assist the student), and by mention in scripture (śruti), as in BaU IV. 4. 6's "being brahman, one goes to brahman." Otherwise, the text points out, there would be blind tra- dition (andha-paramparā), that is, an ignorant teacher unable to awaken the student. As Vijñānabhiksu states, the ignorant/blind would (mis)lead the ignorant/blind (79-81). The potter's wheel analogy is mentioned in III. 82, and Aniruddha adds that release is delayed due to the karmic impressions (samskāra) which create and support the body and can be exhausted only by experience. Sūtra III. 83 refers to the jīvanmukta's continued existence arising from a trace (leśa) of the samskāra. Vijñānabhiksu shows his familiarity with the Advaita controversy

82 nn. Jivanmukti in "Yogic Advaita"

over how the body, or any trace of ignorance, can remain after knowledge. He claims that the body remains due to the trace of an impression of an object, not an impression of ignorance, as the latter would entail production of karma. Ignorance is not necessary for experiencing prārabdha karma; jīvanmuktas just have the "semblance" of experience. The chapter ends with the statement that one attains release when all suffering ceases by discrimi- nation (III.84). In his Sāmkhyasāra, Vijñānabhikșu devotes a brief section (II, 7) to the characteristics of the jīvanmukta, which in part refers back to the Gītā's formulation of the sthita-prajña, one with firm wisdom: the living liberated being is said to be even-minded, without desire or aversion, undeluded, and experiencing the bliss of the self. This being is said to attain final liberation when the mind is destroyed, due to the attentuation of samskāras. When the intellect ceases, final isolation (kaivalya) arises and the self abides alone. The interpenetration of Sāmkhya and Advaita ideas is also clear here.10

Yoga practice attempts to purify the body and free the mind from all attachments, conscious and unconscious, by a variety of techniques; these practices culminate in meditative enstasis or samādhi (while living, of course). One overcomes karmic propensities (samskāra) and afflictions (kleśa) such as ignorance and passion by these techniques, perhaps best known in Patañjali's eight-limbed Yoga formula (YS II. 29 ff.). According to Patañjali, after proper moral discipline and body and breath control, one progressively withdraws the mind from sense objects and concentrates on achieving increasingly subtle meditative states climaxing in seedless (nirbīja) samādhi. One now attains discriminating knowledge (viveka-khyāti) since all seeds of attachment and residual impure impressions are "burnt," and none can sprout again. While one finds much discussion of the means to and nature of libera- tion in the Yoga school, little is explicitly said about liberation while living.11 The most significant verses for our purposes are YS IV. 29-30. Sūtra 29 states that when liberated, discriminating knowledge and from that dharma-megha (cloud of virtue) samādhi arise (IV. 29), and IV. 30 claims that all affliction and action (kleśa-karma) then cease, though presumably some purified action continues until death. Vyāsa's commentary on IV. 30 adds that afflictions from ignorance and stores of good and bad action are utterly destroyed by knowledge, and "when affliction and action cease, the knower is liberated, even while living."12 Since delusion (viparyaya) causes existence, its destruc- tion ends rebirth. This seems to be the first reference in the classical Yoga tradition to "jīvanmukti," a serene, detached liberation while still living. One does not find much relevant to the Advaita concept of jīvanmukti in later Yoga writings until Vijñānabhiksu's YS commentary, and even here

On Liberation While Living aa 83

jīvanmukti is generally mentioned briefly.13 Vijñānabhiksu emphasizes that the jīvanmukta (one who directly experiences discriminating knowledge, viveka-sākșātkārin) has no afflictions (kleśa), or even seeds (bīja) or impres- sions (samskāra) of them (II. 4). Nor do afflictions cause karma or fruits; remaining commenced fruits cease by action. Only the ignorant (including some then current Advaitins, according to Vijñānabhiksu) hold that a trace of ignorance remains for jīvanmuktas, either as a mental modification (vrtti, II. 11) or to enjoy fruits (II. 13).14 Vijñānabhikșu argues that jīvanmuktas experience joy and sorrow from commenced fruits of karma but not from egoism (ābhimānika), since no kleśa exists that causes egocentricity (II. 14). The jīvanmukta has only the appearance of enjoyment (bhogābhāsa); enjoyment is secondary (gauna) for him, and he only experiences joy (sukhādi) (II. 6, 18). His wish (icchā) is not actual (attached) desire (rāga) (II. 7). Vijñānabhikșu seems to be trying, as many Advaitins before him, to explain why the jīvanmukta is still embodied, despite apparent liberation.15 In his commentary on YS IV. 30, Vijñānabhiksu opens with an objec- tion to Vyäsa's reference to one being liberated while living when kleśa and karma cease. The objector points out that liberation is supposed to be the total cessation of suffering (duhkha) and suffering is certain while living (as ChU VIII. 12. 1 states). Vijñānabhiksu replies that even the lesser (gauna) mukti is the total uprooting of the cause of suffering; one knows this through the means of knowledge (pramāna) called noncognition (anupalabdhi) (that is, no sorrow is experienced then). Since the jīvanmukta's afflictions and attendant impressions (vāsanā) are totally burnt, accepting that any afflictions remain (as some contemporary Vedantins asserted) is, Vijñānabhikșu main- tains, based on ignorance. In commenting on YS IV. 31, which holds to the endlessness (anantya) of knowledge from which all covering (āvarana) is removed, Vijñānabhikșu asserts one is then in the jīvanmukti state, since all affliction and karma, flaws covering knowledge, are removed by the endless light of knowledge. Next we look at a number of texts that also integrate Yoga and Advaita concepts, beginning with the Yogavāsistha.

SIX

Yogic Advaita I: Jīvanmukti in the Yogavāsistha

One who stands firm while doing everyday activity, Abiding like the empty sky: he is called liberated while living. One who does everyday activity having achieved perfect awakening, In waking (seeming) like one asleep: he is called liberated while living. His luminous countenance does not rise in joy or fall in sorrow, Having attained his proper place: he is called liberated while living. One who is awake while seeming asleep, for him waking does not exist.1 Fully awakened without mental impressions: he is called liberated while living. Although acting according to passion, hatred, and fear, etc. One who remains (internally) transparent as the sky: he is called liberated while living. One whose nature is not ego-centered, whose intellect is untainted While acting or not acting: he is called liberated while living. One who comprehends (cosmic) creation and destruction in the blink of an eye, He sees the three worlds as his own self: he is called liberated while living. One who fears no one and no one fears,

84

Yogic Advaita I an 85

Free from fear, anger, and joy: he is called liberated while living. Tranquil amid roiling phenomenal existence, partless though having parts (limbs), The one who, though conscious, is without (fluctuating) mind: he is called liberated while living. One who is cool while dealing with all things, Filled with the self while among material objects: he is called liberated while living.2

This passage introduces jīvanmukti in the Yogavāsistha,3 an eleventh- century eclectic mix of myth, poetry, philosophy, and moral exhortation, containing approximately 30,000 stanzas in six sections (khanda).4 The Yogavāsistha seems to have played a role in popularizing the notion of lib- eration while living, and to have been important in the development of what I call "Yogic Advaita," also seen in the Jīvanmuktiviveka and many later Upanisads. Briefly, Yogic Advaita holds to Sankara's view that knowledge of the nondual self brings liberation, yet adds emphases on Sāmkhya ideas5 and Yoga practices, exerting control of mental states (and even urging "destroying the mind"), and the contrast between jīvan- and videha-mukti, as well as much less interest in prārabdha karma than mainstream Advaita. Along with this Yogic Advaita perspective, the YV also contains more Bud- dhist (particularly vijñānavāda) and Puranic ideas6 (but less Upanișadic material) than any other work considered here. Throughout the text, the liberated sage Vasistha exhorts his student Räma (and the reader) to be detached, destroy the ego, lose the mind, know the world to be illusory and to differentiate the transient body from the self. While in the world, one should do one's duty, follow the sacred texts (śāstra), and associate with the wise. According to the Yogavāsistha, libera- tion while living is possible. Like Sankara, the YV holds that mukti arises from knowledge of the nondual self, not from austerity or right (dharmic) action. The jīvanmukta can act in the world or renounce all action with complete detachment. The YV (and later the JMV) do not say much about the body's continuity after liberation, due to prārabdha karma; instead, they emphasize the control of the jīvanmukta's mind and destruction of mental impressions, which brings one to a nondual "state" beyond all con- sciousness states. References to jīvanmukti and the jīvanmukta appear throughout the text,7 and as with most topics in the Yogavāsistha, living liberation is not considered systematically. Still, the Upaśama khanda (chapter on Cessation) contains many of the most important passages, and various (largely congru- ent) themes appear repeatedly. These will be discussed next.

86 am Jivanmukti in "Yogic Advaita"

The World and Human Bondage

To begin, we will look at the Yogaväsistha's view of the nature of the world and human bondage in it. The most common perspective is the Advaita view that the world is an illusion, appearing as it does due to ignorance and delusion; all visible objects are utterly unreal, empty like a rainbow or mi- rage.8 While without reality, the manifest world is as if existent; birth and destruction appear but are not real.9 Perhaps most eloquent is the Buddhist- sounding Up 77. 35-37: in this world containing the endless rise and fall of beings, life is like a froth bubble, people arise and scatter perpetually, and the sights of the world vanish in a moment. Numerous passages detail the characteristics of bondage and those who are bound. First, it is, as Sankara writes, bondage to think the self is a body or otherwise limited. Second, it is bondage to have an uncontrolled mind; such a person is like one drunk or stupid, or like a child, grabbing at every- thing without knowing its proper application (Up 77. 24-25). Sunk in the muck of everyday enjoyments, those with uncontrolled minds are attracted to useless, sorrow-producing wealth or to beautiful but empty women who lead them to burn in hell.10 These attachments bind one to impure vāsanās (mental impressions); one now enjoys what one desires, but also suffers from its loss. When ad- dicted to external objects, the presence or absence of desired things gives constantly changing sorrow or joy.11 Thus, foolish-minded non-jīvanmuktas are never at peace;12 their minds, attached to samsāra, buzz with joy and sorrow like flies; the fool is like a worm or a dog, undeserving of liberation.13

Knowledge Leads to Liberation

The Yogavsistha and Advaitins like Sankara concur on the way out of bondage to illusion and sorrow; the route is knowledge (jñāna) or right dis- crimination (viveka, vicāra)-specifically knowledge of the self. The defining characteristic of one liberated while living is knowledge (while embodied) of the nondual, unfettered self.14 The text repeatedly states that those solely intent on ātma-jñāna reach liberation while living, and one obtains liberation only by right discrimination; jīvanmuktas are termed ātma-jñānins, tattva- jñas, and tattva-vids.15 Seeing the self in the not self or reality in unreality arises from nondiscrimination and is destroyed by discrimination (Up 86. 17). King Janaka is the model of unvarying flawless insight (Up 12. 4-5),16 but anyone, outcast (mleccha) or animal, who attains the highest knowledge is liberated (U 118. 22). While obtainable only by the few (Up 74. 56), once obtained, jīvanmukti is never destroyed (Ut 125. 56).17

Yogic Advaita I aa 87

Interestingly, the Yogaväsistha says it is the crucial text that leads to right knowledge and liberation while living. Utpatti 8. 15-16 states that one gains jīvanmukti upon hearing this text,18 and Ut 95. 25 asserts that only by studying this "mahārāmāyaņa šāstra" does one obtain jīvanmukti. Utpatti 8 continues by claiming that one attains liberation by knowledge alone: jīvanmukti is not gained by almsgiving, austerity (tapas), or thousands of Vedic performances. Upaśama 12. 17 adds that jīvanmukti can not be gained by virtue, guru, sacred text, or associating with the wise, but only by clear discrimination. Further, the highest sage (sādhu) is awakened from heaven, future rewards, and the fruits of austerity (tapas) or charity (dāna); tapas, and so on, destroy suffering only for a short time, but equanimity (samatā) brings indestructible happiness (P 101. 36-37). While not forbidding performance of dharmic actions, it is clear in these passages that such duties are not the route to moksa.

The Utter Detachment of the Jīvanmukta

The YV, like traditional Advaita, also emphasizes that the living liber- ated being is detached (asanga, asamsakti) and indifferent (sama).19 Sama also suggests being always the same, constant, equable, impartial, and even- minded. The jīvanmukta is calm and sama in all states of awareness.20 Amid whatever happens, the liberated sage always remains the same, as motionless water and shifting waves, or still air and gusting wind, are the same (Mumuksu 4. 1, 5). Detachment is even more commonly mentioned; entire chapters are devoted to the nature of detachment and behavior of the detached jīvanmukta (see Upaśama 77). Detachment brings the highest end and is the essential cause of crossing samsara.21 The detached sage is unchanging in joy and despair, thinks "the partless self is all," and has lost all desire and anger.22 Jīvanmuktas wander the world with detached minds whether rulers (like Janaka) or renouncers.23 Throughout the Yogavāsistha, the detached jīvanmukta is said to be always even-minded and indifferent to the dualities of sorrow and joy, dis- likes and (pleasant) desires.24 He does not give or take praise or blame, joy or grief; he is not ashamed or shameless, elated or sad.25 The liberated being may laugh or cry on the outside, but truly remains unmoved,26 desiring nei- ther what most people wish for nor avoiding what people detest.27 A real sage is to be sorrowless whether god or ruler, failure or worm (Up 93. 98-99). The Yogavāsistha mentions, but does not emphasize, that the jīvanmukta ulti- mately realizes that there is not even any bondage or liberation. The nondual self cannot be bound, and if it is not bound, how can there be release? For one not even considering bondage or liberation, the world is one.28

88 can Jīvanmukti in "Yogic Advaita"

The Jivanmukta and Action in the World

More than any other Advaita text discussing jīvanmukti, the YV emphasizes the jivanmukta's detached action in worldly or everyday activity (vyavahāra).29 The text asserts that many men (and gods) abide in samsāra while liberated, doing various activities in everyday life with a "cool mind" (Up 75. 25-26).30 The jīvanmukta goes in the world, not aban- doning or striving after anything, being in accord with all beings (S 46. 26). The JMV will make similar points, but puts more emphasis on renunciation (samnyāsa). Instead of rigorous world renunciation, then, the Yogavāsistha empha- sizes that one should do whatever course of action falls to one (P 56. 3). A jīvanmukta performs everyday activities according to his circumstances (yathā- sthita) and does whatever is proper to his place without attachment. Internally renounced, the mukta does actions according to customary or family duties and his own karma.31 Content with whatever is obtained, the jīvanmukta takes whatever comes with equanimity.32 This peacefulness allows the sage to understand human behavior and the world as they are, without delusion (Up 18. 10). The contrast between external activity (like following customary du- ties) and inward detachment is a constant theme. We saw earlier that due to internal indifference, the sage is not really joined to any aim and reaps no fruits. That is, the truly detached person never "acts" in the karmic sense (and is certainly never said to do "evil" acts). Outwardly, this being seems active and hoping for good, but inwardly grasps no hope and does not act.33 While acting and enjoying, the liberated being has abandoned the illusion of being the doer; only fools think "this act will I shun, this act will I choose."34 The jīvanmukta is, in a sense, "sleepwalking"; with a one-pointed "sleep mind," he is not a doer even while acting. When "asleep while awake," one who does all does nothing (that is, nothing that brings fruits).35 Because of appar- ent worldliness, the jīvanmukta is not recognized as liberated by unliberated folk, despite having destroyed all mental impressions and possessing an unmoving mind.36

The Yogaväsistha clearly takes the position that, according to the high- est truth, there is no gain by doing or not doing anything (Ut 125. 49). Some jīvanmuktas have abandoned action and duties, and some have not (we shall see that the JMV generally takes a "harder line" on the importance of samnyāsa). This point is made most clearly in Utpatti khanda 199, which describes the diversity of behavior among detached and liberated beings, and begins with the question, "What is the point of abandoning or desiring any

Yogic Advaita I 89

action?" The wise know there is nothing to be striven for or abandoned, so, as said earlier, they do whatever is appropriate to their station. Some with detached minds are kings or householders, and others wander,37 having aban- doned all duties. Some follow actions prescribed in the Veda, adhering to the agnihotra, and so on, and those within the four varnas ("castes") perform various actions such as meditation, worshipping gods (devārcana), and so on (199. 9-12). On the other hand, some abandon everything and remain beyond all (dharmic) acts eternally. They devote themselves to meditation in empty forests, or practice conduct to gain peace, promote virtue, and be loved by the wise and good. Some leave their native places to avoid desire and hatred, and they settle elsewhere. Others wander from place to place, whether woods, city, mountain, shore, or cave. Visits to Banaras, Prayāga, Badari, and Mathura, among other holy cities and mountains, are mentioned with approval (199. 13-24). Still, the text continues, many sages are settled "in the world," and the cause of liberation is not forest dwelling or practicing austerity. In fact, those who are proud of their knowledge and who abandon all action are only half awakened. The chapter concludes that neither abandoning nor resorting to action is the essential cause of crossing samsāra; as stated elsewhere, a detached mind is what brings liberation and nonreturn (199. 28-33).

The Variety of Liberated Beings

The jīvanmukta is generally seen as a human being, though there also are a number of references to gods as jīvanmuktas.38 King Janaka is the most often cited jīvanmukta in the Yogavāsistha. Desireless, cool, and even-minded, Janaka rules and acts without delusion and with flawless insight; he does whatever comes without attachment and knows the self of all beings.39 Upaśama 75 mentions Janaka, along with a long list of other humans and gods, who are jivanmuktas, acting in the world while detached. This chapter, more than any other in the YV and unlike any other Advaita text when considering jīvanmukti, shows the wide variety of beings who are liberated while living. It begins by referring to Janaka, who governs his kingdom while detached, as do Buddha (!) and Manu, who is eternally the form (ākrti) of jīvanmukti. Māndhātā also obtained the highest goal, though constantly active in battle.40 Bali, a renouncer doing good in hell, and Prahlāda, protector of hell, are both detached jīvanmuktas. While possessing desire, they act without desire (Ut 125. 62).41 Namuci and Vrtra have inner control and cool minds while fighting; other gods, drinking soma, are detached. Even the sacrificial fire, which eats all, is free while enjoying.

90 n Jīvanmukti in "Yogic Advaita"

Lord Hari, always free, moves and plays in the sea of duality.42 Liber- ated Siva is joined in body with Gaurī, and Skandha makes war while mukta. Sage Nārada, liberated by nature, wanders with cool actions, and the jīvanmukta Viśvamitra presides over Vedic sacrifices. Seșa bears the earth, Sūrya makes the day, and Yama causes death, all while jīvanmukta. Many other yaksas, asuras, and men abide in this realm of rebirth while actually liberated. Acting in everyday life with an inner coolness, they are unmoving, like stones. This passage indicates clearly that dharmic behavior and a liberated mind can be linked. Mental detachment and world renunciation are not iden- tical. Further, as we saw in the previous section, these gods and humans need not reside in any particular place. Some (Bhrgu, Viśvamitra), having attained the highest knowledge, go to the forest, and some (Janaka) remain as rulers. Some abide in the sky, some in the sphere of the gods, and some (like Bali and Prahlāda) in a cavelike hell. Even some animals are said to be wise, and some gods are foolish. All of this indicates that knowledge, not bodily form or location, leads to jīvanmukti.

Bodiless Liberation (Videhamukti)

The notion that embodiment is not central to defining who is liberated is an important theme in the Yogavāsistha. The point is made explicitly in a number of places: the liberated sage is the same with or without a body, like still water and rolling waves or gusting wind and motionless air are the same. With or without form, one does not experience objects or enjoyments; in both conditions, the jīvanmukta sees oneness of the self (M 4. 1-6). A peaceful mind, untouched by joy, sorrow, or their objects, is possible with or without a body.43 Upon first reflection, it seems implausible to speak of the irrelevance of the body's presence or absence. However, like Sankara and Vidyāraņya's Jīvanmuktiviveka, the Yogavāsistha asserts that one can be "disembodied" while in the body. This notion is put most clearly in Up 60. 2-7: When all- knowing, you are free from life and death in the body. Although embodied, when detached you are adeha (not embodied) like the wind in the sky. The body is irrelevant to those at peace and knowing the real. Since you are always one pure consciousness, why should you grasp or reject the body? Echoing Sankara, the YV states that "I am embodied" is a false notion,44 and emphasizes detachment and right knowledge. Uttaranirvāņa 125. 31-32, 38 adds that once liberated, the mind of the embodied jīvanmukta is not bound and never again bindable, like a fruit fallen from its stalk. The jīvanmukta's essence does not die at (body) death. Thus, one's fundamental identity is not tied to one's body.

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Despite this line of reasoning, there are numerous passages distin- guishing those liberated in the body (jīvanmukta) and those liberated with- out a body (a- or videha-mukta). In fact, the "Yogic Advaita" texts introduce the category "videhamukti," not used in scholastic Advaita (though some later schoolmen refer to videha-kaivalya). According to Up 42. 11-13, two types of liberation are possible, with and without a body. The jīvanmukta is detached and desireless, while the bodiless videhamukta is free from rebirth and does not enter the visible (drśyatā). Utpatti 9, which begins by saying that those who reflect and are solely intent on knowledge of the self reach both forms of mukti, later describes videhamukti as like motionless wind, not rising or setting, existing or not existing, without I or other.45 Interestingly, this kind of liberation is here termed nirvāna, literally, of course, "extinction." In this context, it is often implicit or explicit that while jīvanmukti is truly liberation, videhamukti is a little "higher" kind of liberation-a notion that also appears in the JMV. Upaśama 16. 14-17 say that complete abandon- ing of jñeya ("thinkable") vāsanās leads to cessation and the videhamukta's bodiless freedom in all-encompassing brahman. Merely abandoning dhyeya ("fit for meditation") vāsanās leaves one with a (moving) body although the body is unafflicted and one is indifferent and "gone to brahmanhood." Upaśama 90. 4 says there is extinction of mind (citta-nāśa) with form (sarūpa, jīvanmukti) and without form (arūpa, dehamukti).46 The latter is the highest: pure, flawless, beyond sattva-bearing good qualities (guna), and beyond joy and sorrow; nothing at all is seen there (90. 23-27). Finally, Upaśama 71. 2-3 asserts that jīvanmukti is the mysterious and final "fourth" (turīya), but adehamukti is beyond the fourth. Only videhamuktas reach the distant way of peace, like only birds reach the way of the sky.47 Thus, although the main stream of the Yogavāsistha suggests that liberation is one, whether in a body or not, nonembodiment here, as elsewhere in the tradition, sometimes seems a higher (non) condition than embodiment.

The Nature of the Jivanmukta's Mind

The nature of the liberated being's mind (cetas, citta, dhi, manas)48 is another oft-discussed aspect of jīvanmukti in "Yogic Advaita." In many pas- sages of the YV, the mind (the locus of desire and ignorance) is seen as our greatest problem and its destruction (or at least control) the way to liberation. We shall later see that mental impressions (vāsanā) and their presence (or absence) are a particular focus when the mind is discussed. This terminology is largely foreign to the Advaita schoolmen, though we will find some more systematic reflections on the nature of the mind in the Jīvanmuktiviveka.

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Many passages devalue the mind: the mind pervaded by tāmasic (dull, ignorant) impressions is the cause of birth and is the root and seed of the forest of sorrows (Up 90. 6-9). The mind is a vāsanā mass causing rebirth, and the ignorant (mūdha, aprabuddha) mind is bound and born repeatedly (P 101. 28, 31-32). Further, jīvanmuktas and those knowing reality (tattva- jña) have no minds (or destroyed minds); awakened beings are not "mind- based" (citta-bhū). Pure and clear minds are called sattva; in such minds, burnt by the fire of knowledge, delusion does not sprout again-as burnt seeds sprout no flowers.49 Other passages point to the jīvanmukta's controlled (vs. destroyed) mind: it rests unmoving, with senses controlled and passions gone, without pride, lust, or envy, having doubts burnt by knowledge.50 Using more traditional Advaitic language, the YV says one should in particular abandon the aspect of the mind called the "I" notion (ahamkāra, ahambhāva). The attachment to separate "individuality" causes great sorrow. One is a detached and clear-minded jīvanmukta when without the "I" in action or rest and when the "me" and "mine" are utterly destroyed.51 The "I" notion is treated in more detail twice, when it is said that the jīvanmukta attains the highest viewpoint. Sthiti 33. 49-53 describes three types of ahamkāra: the first (worldly, or laukika) imagines the body with hand and foot; this body-based conception must be forsaken, as it causes desire and attachment. The second type, linked to jīvanmukti, imagines the "I" as a minuscule hair and pure consciousness different from all. The highest liber- ating conception is of the self as all this ("aham sarvam idam viśvam"). Upaśama 17.13-20 is roughly similar, but adds a fourth kind of "I" notion. The first conception, tied to bondage, sees the "I" and body as made by mother and father; the second, bound for liberation, sees the "I" as finer than a hair and beyond all beings. The third "I" notion is the indestructible self, the essence of world appearance that never experiences sorrow. The fourth "I" concept is held by śūnyavādins (adherents of emptiness); to them, the "I" and world are completely empty, like the sky.52 Each of the latter three are said to shine as jīvanmukti. Both of these descriptions hold to an Advaitic understanding: the first concept is dualistic and tied to bondage, the second "almost there" but still contains some separation, and the third recognizes the nondual self. Given that the latter conceptions are "higher," one wonders why the emptiness view is put last; unified fullness should transcend "mere" emptiness.

Mental Impressions (Vāsanā) and the Jīvanmukta

The existence and destruction of latent impressions (vāsanā) in the mind are a particular focus of the Yogavāsistha, and of Yogic Advaita

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generally.53 Vāsanās are said to be the cause of bondage and their absence the cause of liberation (Uttaranirvāna 125. 61). As stated earlier, the mind at root is a mass of mental impressions causing rebirth.54 Attachments are evil (malina) vāsanās and only fools are bound to them. The impure and unreal embodied self (jīva) has the form (ākāra) of vāsanās, and the jīva ceases when vāsanās cease. Even those devoted to the dharma, if not free from impressions, are bound like a bird in a cage. There is no permanent satisfaction, even in pleasant vāsanās: one bound to impressions enjoys what is desired but also suffers from their loss. Vasanās constantly change to joy or sorrow in the presence or absence of desired objects.55 Pure (śuddha) vāsanās are free from joy and sorrow, and cause no further birth. When fully awakened, one gains no pleasure from objects nor suffers when they are destroyed-so one should try to minimize or remove vāsanās.56 As moksa is free from vāsanās, the jīvanmukta is free from the snare of mental impressions; in fact, vāsanā destruction is a defining charac- teristic of one liberated while living (as it is in the JMV). Such absence of vāsanās also brings inner coolness.57 As mentioned earlier, Upaśama 16. 9-14 describes two kinds of vāsanās, those fit for meditation (dhyeya) and those to be known (jñeya). The former seems to refer to a more limited set of impressions than the latter. One destroys dhyeya vāsanās by acting with a cool intellect (antahśītala-buddhi) and abandoning the notion of an "I-maker." One devoted to destroying such impressions is a jīvanmukta (like King Janaka).58 The destruction of jñeya vāsanās brings indifference, peace, and renunciation of the body, eventuating in attainment of videhamukti. The two types of vāsanās are unfortunately not described further here, but they do affirm the aforementioned notion that videhamukti is a bit "higher" than jīvanmukti.

When the jīvanmukta's vāsanās (or lack thereof) are discussed, the term sattva (sometimes spelled satva), untainted wisdom, regularly appears. The jīvanmukta is said to possess pure sattva-vāsanās, which lead to freedom from rebirth. Noble Prahlāda rested 1,000 years turned within to his own sattva-vāsanās.59 More commonly, we hear that the jīvanmukta's mind is sattva when without vāsanās. The awakened mind or intellect with clear discrimination is called sattva. The jīvanmukta's "vāsanā" is not really a vāsanā, but pure wisdom (śuddha-sattva). Worldly vāsanās are called mind, but the jīvanmukta has gone to the sattva realm.60 Further, the sattva-established mind of the jīvanmukta is variously called controlled, abandoned, and destroyed. When the mind is destroyed but with form (i.e., jīvanmukti), it is explicitly called sattva; when one's (destroyed) mind attains formlessness, his pure wisdom, bearing a mass of good qualities

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(guna) also disappears.61 Sattva absence, like body absence, is the highest state. The references above to sattva, the gunas, and mental processes gener- ally bring to mind Sämkhya/Yoga conceptions. By far the most interesting passage relevant in this context is Upaśama 89. 9-21, which looks at why jīvanmuktas do not exhibit yogic siddhis (supernatural powers) like flying.62 Following the Advaita view, it is said that knowing the nondual self is different from, and superior to, supernatural powers. Self-knowers are not attached to such powers, unlike the unliberated who try to master mantras or yoga. Self- knowers enjoy the self and do not sink into the ignorance of bondage to worldly things (including powers like flying). Knowers could fly if they wanted to, but they are beyond such things, content in the self, doing and desiring nothing.63

The Jivanmukta's "State of Consciousness"

A related topic in the YV's "Yogic Advaita" discussion of jīvanmukti is the liberated being's elevated "state of consciousness," particularly when compared to everyday states such as dream and sleep. These ideas also are mentioned in the JMV, but most JMV references to the topics discussed next are borrowed from the YV. Even though awake, the mukta's vāsanās and vrttis are at rest. Thus, the liberated being is often described as "asleep while awake": detached and desireless, doing all while doing nothing, having per- fect equanimity in activity. When acting with a one-pointed "sleep mind," this being is not a doer and acts without bondage.64 The jīvanmukta's "state of consciousness" also is frequently discussed in the context of the fourfold catuspād doctrine (waking, dream, deep sleep, and the unifying "fourth," turīya).65 Waking and dream mislead us into ac- cepting illusory duality.66 Deep sleep (susupta) is valued more highly because one then experiences no duality or suffering. In the vāsanā-less deep sleep state, the knower has equanimity and coolness within. When detached and possessing the self after "awakening" as a jīvanmukta, one sees like one asleep, that is, always fixed on the formless.67 Sleep, when vāsanās are destroyed, leads to the nondual fourth, turīya, which is also jīvanmukti (U 22. 7).68 Blissful turīya is further described as the single object of jīvanmukti and of vāk (i.e., śruti), beyond fear, sorrow, and the illusion of samsara, and without the bondage of rebirth or the darkness of egoism.69 There is even a stage beyond the fourth, called turīyātīta, which is a nondual "state" beyond great (and no) bliss. Turīyātīta, unsurprisingly, is associated with bodiless (videha) liberation.70 Jīvanmukti also appears in a seven-stage (bhūmi) meditation model linked in the Yogavāsistha with the four states doctrine.71 One version (P 120.

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3-9) says jīvanmukti begins in the fifth stage (ānandarūpa or śuddha samvid), which is called "deep sleep" (susupta), since (like sleep) it is a mass of bliss. Jīvanmukti also exists in the sixth ("massed sleep," susupta ghana) and sev- enth (equanimous and peaceful turīya) stages. The utterly full (paripraudha) seventh stage is beyond the fourth (turīyātīta), the highest nirvāna, ungraspable by mind or words, and not the object of the living (i.e., videhamukti). A second version (P 126. 64-71) says the sixth stage, beyond eternally restful "massed sleep," manifests jīvanmukti. This stage unites opposites: it is neither I or not I, being or not being, without duality or oneness, full and empty within and without, like a water-filled pot in the ocean (or an air-filled pot in air). The seventh stage is again called "bodiless liberation," which is peaceful and unreachable by words. While these models are not completely congruent (in this and many other respects), they do indicate the high status accorded to jīvanmukti, as well as its "junior" relationship to videhamukti.72

Conclusion

Let us review the main points the Yogavāsistha makes about liberation while living. Like mainstream Advaita, the Yogavāsitha holds that jīvanmukti arises from knowledge of the nondual self, not from austerity, powers, or karmic acts. The apparently manifold world with its pleasures and sorrows is an illusion (as bondage itself is ultimately an illusion). More in line with "Yogic Advaita" is the idea that utter detachment allows the jīvanmukta to act freely in the world according to dharma, or to renounce the world and all action. Gods and humans are liberated when detached, not due to any form of action-or inaction. Instead, the notion of being an "actor" disappears. Even embodiment itself can be seen as irrelevant to liberation, though there also is a recurrent theme that bodiless liberation is a little "higher" than jīvanmukti. While mainstream Advaita emphasizes the self-body difference, the Yogic Advaita of the YV stresses the cessation of mind and its impressions. The jīvanmukta's mind (and especially the individuating "I" notion) must be controlled or destroyed; all mental impressions (vāsanā), good or bad, must be removed-ultimately including the highest impression, sattva. The mind is fundamentally just a mass of mental impressions causing rebirth. The lib- erated being also must go beyond the illusions of waking, dreaming, and even undifferentiated deep sleep. The jīvanmukta rests in nondual turīya, the "state" beyond states of consciousness. While Śankara's Advaita and the Yogavāsistha emphasize different things, there are no irreconciliable contradictions. The Yogavāsistha spends more time on detached action in the world and the nature of the jīvanmukta's

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mind (and mental states) than does Sankara. There also is less concern with bodily continuity due to prārabdha karma, criticizing other darśanas or with rejecting dharmic action in the Yogavasistha. Many aspects of this Yogic Advaita perspective also can be seen in the text to which we now turn, Vidyāraņya's Jīvanmuktiviveka.

SEVEN

Yogic Advaita II: Liberation While Living in the Jīvanmuktiviveka1

The Jīvanmuktiviveka (JMV) (Discerning Liberation while Living)2 is a syncretic fourteenth-century work by Vidyäranya,3 which outlines the nature of living liberation and teaches the path to liberation via a combination of knowledge, yogic practice, and renunciation.4 This text is especially interest- ing because of the author's attempt to weave a number of strands of Indian thought together into what I have called "Yogic Advaita." While primarily an adherent of Advaita (nondual) Vedanta, Vidyāranya also emphatically en- joins following the ascetic path, and refers far more often and more favorably than does Sankara to the yogic practices of Patañjali and the Bhagavad-Gītā. In a way rarely seen in Sankara's "mainstream" Advaita, Vidyāraņya claims that yoga and ascetic renunciation (samnyāsa) together both lead to and ex- press the liberating knowledge (jñāna, vidyā) of brahman. In fact, the text uses the terms yogin, samnyāsin, and mukta (with appropriate qualifiers) to identify the same person-one with full knowledge of nondual brahman. Another indication of Vidyāranya's Yogic Advaita is his repeated cita- tion of the Laghu (short or abridged) Yogavāsistha (LYV);5 at times, the JMV virtually becomes a commentary on the LYV. While deeply influenced by the LYV, the JMV is more respectful of Vedic and samnyāsa traditions linked with mainstream Advaita, while the LYV has a much greater complement of Sāmkhya, Puranic, and Buddhist ideas. The significant differences in emphasis and focus between Vidyāranya's (and the LYV's) Yogic Advaita and Sankara's mainstream "Vedantic" Advaita

97

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rarely lead to direct opposition or contradiction-thus it is still Advaita. For example, Vidyāranya does not dispute Sankara's (and most later Advaitins') views on the importance of ending identification of self and body, and on bodily continuity, due to currently manifesting (prārabdha) karma, but he does not focus on them. He spends much more time than does Sankara on yogic issues relating to the mind and its manifestations (citta-vrtti) and the importance of renunciation to make suffering cease. While Vidyāranya talks of ātman/brahman more than of puruşa/prakrti, he describes the Sāmkhya evolutes at some length and makes far more use of Sāmkhya and Yoga ter- minology and analysis than does Sankara. The JMV cites Sankara, and other Advaitins like Sureśvara,6 but references to the Sāmkhya-Yoga influenced LYV and Bhagavad-Gītā are far more extensive. Unlike Śankara, who takes a dialectical approach (stressing reasoning and debate), Vidyāranya seems to be a syncretist. Where Sankara excludes or disputes Yoga concepts of mental activity or Sāmkhya ideas of world evolu- tion, Vidyāranya wants to be inclusive, or at least omit opposition. Yogic Advaita agrees with the Advaita schoolmen that knowledge of nondual brahman is the sine qua non of jīvanmukti. However, while Sankara holds that yogic practice is at best merely a preparatory form of action, Vidyāranya claims it is central in attaining and safeguarding brahman knowledge. We shall see that this perspective further shapes Vidyāranya's views on the re- lationships between embodiment and liberation, and renunciation and living in the world.

The Nature of Jīvanmukti

As stated previously, Vidyäranya holds that knowledge of nonduality is the fundamental cause of liberation while living, but yogic practice is neces- sary to gain and safeguard this knowledge. Both aspects can be seen in his definition of liberation while living. He writes, "Bondage exists for a living being since the nature of affliction [is] having mental notions consisting of joy and sorrow, being enjoyer and doer, and so on. Living liberation is the cessation of this."7 When such dualistic notions as "I am doer/enjoyer" cease due to knowledge of brahman, one is liberated while living. Vidyāranya then immediately adds a yogic component to this Advaita claim; he writes that ultimately all mental modifications (citta-vrtti) that cause this bondage can be overcome by repeated yogic practice (yogābhyāsa) (10, 195). Here and through- out the text, Vidyāranya's view seems to be that the jīvanmukta must, first and foremost, realize nondual brahman and thereby gain Advaitic serenity; but he must also concomitantly work to end suffering by destroying the mind and its impressions (vāsanā) by means of renunciation (samnyāsa) and yogic

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enstasis (samādhi). According to Vidyāranya, then, attaining living liberation requires personal renunciation and yogic body mastery as necessary comple- ments to nondual knowledge. One of Vidyāranya's main reasons for emphasizing yogic practice for the jīvanmukta is related to yoga's role in removing karma currently bearing fruit (prārabdha karma) (10, 195). Vidyāraņya follows mainstream Advaita in holding that the fruits of currently manifesting karma obstruct ignorance- destroying knowledge and cause the body and senses to continue. However, he parts company with the Sankaran tradition by claiming that one can over- come the necessity of experiencing the fruits of actions by making personal effort-specifically repeated yogic practice. Vidyāranya here argues (unlike Śankara) that even though prārabdha karma is stronger than ignorance- destroying knowledge, yogic practice is stronger even than prārabdha karma (11,196). He repeatedly declares the necessity of human effort to overcome being controlled by mental modifications and preexisting karma. These ef- forts include Advaitic means such as following the sacred texts (śāstra) and associating with the wise (although he does not here mention the fourfold sādhana Sankara discusses in Brahmasūtra bhāsya 1. 1. 1) as well as yogic efforts such as resisting desires and controlling the mind. He cites approv- ingly the LYV claim that all results-hell, heaven, or liberation-derive from human effort, and only right effort can bring the highest goal (12, 197-8). He also endorses the LYV claim that strong and repeated personal effort will allow one to guide the everflowing stream of mental impressions (vāsanā) into the right channel, creating waves of good (subha) impressions that wash over impure ones (13, 199).8 Sankara, on the other hand, carefully separates the effort of yogic practice from knowledge, which alone brings liberation.9 Thus, in Vidyāraņya's Yogic Advaita, unlike mainstream Advaita, yogic effort is necessary to both foster and sustain knowledge of nondual brahman. However, Vidyāranya curiously changes course at this point (15, 201). He agrees with the LYV statement that after accumulating enough good im- pressions, one then gives up all impressions and desires, including the desire to follow a sacred text and a master. When the highest goal is realized, the effort to give up all desires is abandoned. Put another way, the supreme effort takes one to a state beyond any effort. Vidyāraņya concludes that jīvanmukti is indisputably due to the disappearance of all desire by yogic practice. Vidyāraņya could be clearer here. He is perhaps suggesting that efforts and practices, even yogic ones, indicate that one still sees the world dualis- tically, as if there is something left to do or someplace to get. Ultimately, however, the jīvanmukta is content with whatever comes his way-and "what- ever" comes, of course, only from currently manifesting (prārabdha) karma, since the jīvanmukta no longer initiates any efforts of his own. We will return to this point when we discuss the highest renunciant (paramahamsa) yogin.

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The Jīvanmukta as Sthita-prajña

We can also find yogic Advaita in Vidyāranya's interpretation of the Bhagavad-Gītā, particularly in his consideration of the jīvanmukta as one having firm wisdom (sthita-prajña) (20, 211 ff.). It is significant that the Gītā, with its extensive use of Sāmkhya and Yoga categories like qualities (guna) and mental manifestations (citta-vrtti), is second only to the LYV in number of references throughout the JMV. This suggests not only the author- ity of the Gītā to Vidyäranya and his audience, but also its congeniality with his views. Vidyāranya wants to show that the existence of living liberation is established through the many scriptural references, not only to the jīvanmukta per se, but also to one having firm wisdom, one who is devoted to the Lord (bhagavad-bhakta), to one gone beyond the three qualities (gunātītā), to one who is a true Brahmin, and to one who has transcended caste and life stage (ativarņāśramin). According to Vidyāranya, all of these persons are (at least potentially) liberated while living. Vidyāraņya spends considerable time elaborating on the Gītā's descrip- tion (II. 54-72) of the sthita-prajña. He explains that firm wisdom gives knowledge of the real (tattva-jñāna, the highest end of jīvanmukti), and one with firm wisdom, abandoning all desires, attains the highest renunciation by repeated yogic practice. The sthita-prajña's mind never budges from the truth, and (in an image surprising given the text's misogyny) the sage focused on truth is compared to a woman whose mind is constantly on her lover, forgetting even her household duties (20, 211). Vidyāranya holds to the mainstream Advaita position that knowing the self brings supreme satisfac- tion and a bliss higher than any bliss from mental manifestations, including those in concentrated (samprajñāta) samādhi. The sthita-prajña is detached from joy and sorrow, attraction and repulsion, craving, anxiety, and anger. These attachments arise from actions currently bearing fruit, and especially from dull, ignorance-filled (tāmasic) mental impressions (vāsanā). Such im- pressions are impossible for a sage (22, 214). While the sthita-prajña is also an exemplar of the liberated being to Śankara, we saw that his description emphasizes the sthita-prajña's knowl- edge of brahman and desireless renunciation. Vidyāranya again adds a strong yogic component: by the repeated practice of meditative enstasis (samādhi), the sthita-prajña's senses are restrained and mastered and brahman is "seen" (23, 216). Before knowledge arises, pursuing it by means like samādhi takes effort, but such means become natural for one with firm knowledge. Put another way, efforts (like samädhi) bring and safeguard knowledge; after the rising of firm wisdom, samdhi is natural. Knowing the self by unbroken self-illumination is in fact called jīvanmukti (25, 217).10 Again, we see Vidyāranya's ambivalence about the necessity of unceasing yogic efforts for

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a jīvanmukta. He seems to want to hold both that unceasing efforts are nec- essary and that the one who reaches the highest goal is beyond any effort.

The Threefold Means to Obtain Jīvanmukti

So far we have seen how Vidyāranya describes the nature of living liberation; we next consider his views on how to reach this mukti. The largest portion of the Jivanmuktiviveka (37, 232 ff.) is devoted to describing and analyzing the threefold means for obtaining liberation while living: knowing the truth (tattva-jñāna), extinguishing the mind (mano-nāśa), and destroying mental impressions (vāsanā-kşaya). While Vidyāranya holds that priority must be given to knowing the truth (the highest end in Advaita), he also claims that without practicing all three means, liberation while living is impossible. These means are mutually reinforcing and should be worked on together. Both the focus on the mind and its impressions and the model of threefold means are central to Vidyāranya's Yogic Advaita, and references to the LYV and the Gītā abound in this section. On the other hand, the threefold means to libera- tion does not appear in Sankara's Advaita, which holds that yogic practices of any sort are a form of action, and thus are ultimately part of the lower, dualistic realm. Vidyāranya analyzes the relationship of these three means by discuss- ing the continuity and discontinuity among them (this is formally called "positive and negative concomitance" or anvaya-vyatireka). Throughout this section he seems to be both descriptive and normative. For example, he claims that destroying impressions and extinguishing the mind must take place simultaneously (40, 237). Impure impressions (vāsanā) generate anger and other mental forms (ākāra); destroying such impressions prevents anger from arising (even with just cause), since it implants pure impressions like self-restraint and equanimity born of right discrimination (another way of saying tattva-jñāna). When mental manifestations (vrtti) cease (mano-nāśa), new, impure impressions will not arise, and when impure impressions are destroyed, mental transformations will cease. Mental manifestations also cease by the first means, knowing the truth (tattva-jñāna), that is, knowing that apparent diversity is illusory and the self alone is real. Until nonduality is known, mental forms continue as a fire constantly fed with fuel continues. These ever-arising forms then reaffirm the experience of apparent diversity, creating a never-ending cycle. Thus, knowing the truth of nonduality destroys mental impressions like anger, whose de- struction, with the concomitant rise of equanimity, reveals nondual brahman. Vidyāranya is suggesting that practicing any one means reinforces the others. His emphasis on the importance of repeated human effort, particularly to

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counter impure mental impressions by developing pure impressions, shows the influence of yoga. Impressions are not destroyed all at once, nor is lib- eration gained with one insight. Knowledge and yogic practice are linked, for discerning nonduality breeds the cessation of mental activity, and ceasing mental activity by yoga assists seeing nonduality. Vidyāranya also points out that these three means stand in different relationship for renouncers desiring and those already possessing knowledge- though in all cases these means should be pursued simultaneously. In seeking to clarify the proper relationship of these means, Vidyāranya is perhaps set- tling a then-current dispute on primacy of means to liberation (within Vedanta or between "Vedantins" and "yogins"). For the renouncer seeking knowledge (vividişā-samnyāsin), coming to know the truth (tattva-jñāna) is primary; but for the renouncer already having knowledge (the jīvanmukta), extinguishing the mind and destroying impressions is primary. While vāsanās and mental manifestations continue after knowledge (thus necessitating continued yogic practice), becoming a jivanmukta is not possible without gaining knowledge (45, 244).11

Destroying the Mind to Gain Living Liberation

Vidyāraņya's entire chapter on extinguishing the mind (mano-nāśa) indicates his Yogic Advaita; the chapter's theme is controlling and restrain- ing the mind by yogic discipline, particularly Patañjali's eight-limbed yoga.12 He claims that while the mind is extinguished when mental impressions are destroyed, only repeated practice of mano-nāśa secures permanent destruc- tion of mental impressions. In fact, Vidyäranya begins the chapter by calling extinguishing the mind the means to living liberation (atha jīvanmukti- sādhanam manonāśam), for only extinction of the mind keeps destroyed impressions from ever rising again (86, 303). This yoga-oriented emphasis on extinguishing the mind is not found in Śankara or later mainstream Advaitins, yet Vidyāraņya's exegesis of mano- nāśa still affirms the centrality of knowledge of brahman. Yogic practices, while crucial on the path to jīvanmukti, must still be informed by knowledge of the nondual self. For example, Vidyāraņya notes that some yogins attain supernatural powers (siddhi) like flying, which are not seen in jīvanmuktas. However, even one ignorant of the self can get powers like flying, and such powers are not the object of self-knowledge. The pursuit of powers only indicates one's ignorance and does not help one attain the highest end. All desires must cease, so desiring powers is ultimately an obstacle. Further, since such wonderful powers come from the self, any one who knows the self could achieve them (103, 327).13 This passage echoes a common Indian refrain

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that brahman-knowers can certainly gain and use supernatural powers, but they are too wise and detached to do so. Such claims affirm the ultimacy of the path of knowledge over yogic mastery.

Throughout the chapter on extinguishing the mind, Vidyāranya exam- ines types of meditative enstasis (samādhi) that aim to still the mind, and urges the cessation of the activity of Sāmkhyan evolutes through yogic prac- tice. However, he says, even the highest (nirodha or asamprajñāta) yogic samādhi is not the final goal; it leads to knowledge of the self (114, 344). Vidyāraņya here indicates clearly a limitation in yoga alone: texts of the Yoga school focus only on stilling the mind by samādhi, so they do not explicitly mention the Advaitic realization of the self (ātma-darsana), and seeing the self is the ultimate goal. He claims that even after one attains the highest samādhi, another mental manifestation (vrtti) called knowledge of brahman (brahma-vidyā) must arise in order to reach identity with brahman. This vrtti appears by hearing the Upanisadic great statements (mahāvākya), like "you are that" (tat-tvam-asi). Thus, one can realize one's self, the "basis of you" (tvampadārtha), by either the highest meditative enstasis (yoga) or by Sāmkhyan discrimination of consciousness (cit) and gross matter (jada), but one only realizes the highest (Advaita) teaching that the self (the "basis of you") is brahman by the Upanişadic great sayings (115, 345). Once again we see Vidyāraņya's "Yogic Advaita" holds both that meditation is vital and that the path of knowledge is higher.14 Another passage that makes this point appears when Vidyāranya di- rectly addresses the relative status of a yogin and a knower (147, 391). He considers whether the yogin concentrated (samāhita) in meditation is better than the truth-knower involved in the world (loka-vyavahāra). He quotes Laghu Yogavāsistha 25. 5-9 which states that they are equally good, if both keep their "inner cool" (antahītalatā). This inner cool takes form as both destruction of impressions and extinction of the mind. For Vidyāranya, the key to liberation is mental quiescence, not action (or lack thereof) in the world He continues by arguing that at one level the yogin concentrated in meditation is better than a person involved in the world, although ultimately knowing the truth is the highest goal. Generally, samādhi is better than worldly involvement. If one lacks knowledge and still has mental impressions, samādhi practice is better because it leads to heaven (uttama loka). However, worldly involvement without mental impressions is better than samädhi with them- and such a samādhi is not really the highest samādhi anyway. Once knowl- edge is fully established and impressions are absent, samādhi is then also superior to worldly involvement, for it preserves liberation while living (148,

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392-3). Again, in Vidyāraņya's Yogic Advaita, liberation is beyond mere yogic practice but is at risk without it.

Jīvanmukti and Videhamukti in the JMV

We also see the Yogic Advaita of the JMV in its discussion of the relationship between liberation while living (jīvanmukti) and bodiless liberation (videhamukti).15 While Vidyāranya argues that one certainly gains liberation here (in life), he sometimes suggests that embodied liberation is not quite equal to liberation without a body. His reservation appears in two not completely congruent claims, to be documented more fully soon. Apparently influenced by the yogic notion that embodiment (with its inevitable suffering) is a limitation, he seems at times to claim that videhamukti is a greater achievement than jīvanmukti, precisely because one then has no body. In other places, he follows mainstream Advaita, asserting that liberation while living and after death are essentially similar, as both lack any notion of duality and in both only pure self- luminous consciousness remains. From this view, merely dropping the body, without the liberating knowledge of the unconditioned self, will inevitably bring reembodiment. One is fully liberated even while living, since the body and senses are merely adventitious adjuncts of the self. Both of these claims can be seen in his very first reference to living versus bodiless mukti (15, 202 ff.). He here interprets Katha V. 1, which says "having been liberated, he is released," to mean that one liberated from present bondage (like desire) while living is further liberated from future bondage at the fall of the body (deha-pāta).16 This implies that videhamukti is beyond jīvanmukti, because one then has no body and this state lasts forever. However, he goes on here to say one is liberated when all mental manifestations (dhi-vrtti) cease after knowledge, citing the Brhadāranyaka Upanișad IV. 4. 7 claim that the desireless sage realizes brahman even here. He explains (following Sankara) that one should not aim merely to drop the body, since without liberation one will soon again be embodied in another birth. Only knowledge of the unconditioned self brings permanent liberation (16, 203). In the most important way, says Vidyāranya, liberation while liv- ing and after death are similar, as neither contain any notion of dualism. They are differentiated "merely" by the presence or absence of the body and senses, both adventitious adjuncts of the self (16, 204). In the most interesting passage on this topic (45, 245 ff.), Vidyāraņya introduces a new solution to this difficult issue of the relationship between full liberation and embodiment. He begins by saying that knowledge alone brings release or perfect isolation (kaivalya), and release means being bodiless (videha). Destroying impressions and extinguishing the mind without studying the knowl- edge texts (jñāna-śāstra) will not bring release, since only knowledge destroys

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the subtle body (linga-deha) and all bondage (46, 246).17 Bodiless liberation is therefore simultaneous with the rise of knowledge. However, as seen earlier, he repeatedly claims that one can have knowledge while living (i.e., embodied). An implicit but obvious question then arises: How can this be so if bodilessness is simultaneous with the rise of knowledge?18 Vidyāranya clarifies this point here with an interesting definitional maneuver. He claims one can have bodiless liberation while living. This view does not contradict mainstream Advaita, but he gives a novel articulation of it. He points out (accurately) that the term deha (body) has been understood in many ways (47, 247).19 Here, deha refers just to future (bhāvi) bodies; the present body is a prior acquisition, so it can not cease even with knowledge. Bodiless liberation is thus freedom from future (not present) embodiment, and knowledge is simultaneous with this freedom. Dropping the present body is no mark of knowledge, for death will be reached eventually by even the most ignorant person. Here, Vidyāranya, like other Advaitins, holds that knowledge removes only uncommenced (anārabdha) karma, not actions bearing fruit now (prārabdha) (47, 248). Knowledge is thus the necessary but not sufficient cause of bodilessness. Only when prārabdha karma ceases will the body/ sense world cease. A fire must burn out its current fuel, and knowledge is not water, but absence of fuel. So knowledge and embodiment this time around are not related, allowing Vidyāranya to state "bodiless" liberation and knowl- edge arise simultaneously. Thus the jīvanmukta-who will take no future body-is also a videhamukta.20

However, Vidyäranya elsewhere seems to suggest that videhamukti is actual bodilessness, not living liberation with no future births (128, 365). He cites LYV 28. 15-27, which says that the extinguished mind has two modes: with form (sarūpa), belonging to the jīvanmukta, and without form (arūpa), belonging to the videhamukta.21 The jīvanmukta's "formed" mind (sarūpa citta) contains the quality of purity (sattva guna), full of attributes like friend- liness. The extinguished mind of the videhamukta is beyond even this, how- ever; it is formless, for even purity (sattva) is dissolved there. This apparently "bodiless mind" is pure bliss, taking all space itself (ākāśa) as its body. Thus, Vidyāraņya seems to argue that while jīvanmukti is full liberation, bodiless (or space-embodied) videhamukti is a little fuller.

The Purposes of Attaining Liberation While Living

Vidyāraņya's yoga-influenced Advaita is also evident in his description of the five "purposes" (prayojana) of attaining living liberation: guarding knowledge (jñāna-raksa), austerity (tapas), nondisputation (visamvādābhāva),

106 . Jivanmukti in "Yogic Advaita"

destroying suffering (duhkha-nāśa), and manifesting serenity (sukhāvirbhāva) (130, 367 ff.). One should note that Vidyāranya's usage of prayojana- translated by Sastri and Ayyangar as "purpose" or "aim"-can be taken a number of ways. Jivanmukti would not seem to have any purpose beyond itself, for realizing nondual brahman while living is itself the ultimate aim of existence. Neither are the five "purposes" simply causes or benefits of living liberation. The difficulty can be partly clarified by the lack of distinction in the text between means and end. Vidyāranya seems to regard these "pur- poses" both as the practices of one who wants to reach liberation and the identifying marks of one who has already achieved it. Put another way, one practices these means to attain the highest end, and the achiever of the high- est end is recognized by his constant practice of these means. Further, Vidyāranya is here describing the prescription for liberation (or better, pre- scribing his description). Both the yogic and Advaita influences on Vidyāranya are apparent in his exposition of the five aims. Consistent with his claim that knowledge is the central, but not sole, characteristic of jīvanmukti, Vidyāraņya makes clear that guarding (or preserving) knowledge is the primary purpose and mark of attaining liberation while living. However, he adds that unless the jīvanmukta guards his knowledge by practicing yogic pacification of mind, doubt (samśaya) and error (viparyaya) may arise, even after the truth is known (130, 367).22 Vidyāraņya then differentiates knowers (jñānin) and jīvanmuktas, a distinction foreign to Sankara but significant for yoga-influenced Advaita, for it suggests that "merely" knowing the truth is somehow less than the fullest liberation-which is brought by yogic practice. He describes types of brahman- knowers (brahmavid) based on the stage of knowledge each has achieved (134, 373). This categorization of brahman-knowers is based on passages from the Laghu Yogavāsistha (13. 113-23). As J. F. Sprockhoff points out (1970, p. 137 ff.), Vidyāranya combines the model of seven stages of knowl- edge (jñānabhūmi), seen in chapter 118 of the Yogavāsistha's Utpatti khaņda, with a similar model in Pūrvanirvāņa khanda 126, which includes talk of states of consciousness.23 One becomes a knower of brahman, but not yet a jīvanmukta, in the stage (fourth of seven), which brings the direct realization of brahman/ätman unity from the Vedantic great sayings. The next three stages, Vidyāraņya writes, are subdivisions (avantārabheda) of jīvanmukti; they derive from differing degrees of repose (viśrānti), which arise from repeated practice of unconditioned (or nonconceptual, nirvikalpa) samādhi (136, 375).24 Thus, Vidyāranya holds that there are even degrees of jīvanmukti, and these degrees arise from yogic practice. Unlike Sankara, who makes no distinction between a brahman-knower and a liberated being, Vidyāranya finds knowledge of brahman a necessary, but not sufficient, cause for jīvanmukti. How can one be a brahman-knower, but not a jīvanmukta?

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According to Vidyāranya, only in the jīvanmukti stages does no doubt or error arise, since all appearance of duality has vanished. Only after one gains the repose from the highest samādhi is knowledge completely safeguarded (so jīvanmukti attained) (137, 377). Vidyāranya also discusses how it is possible for a brahman-knower to have attachments, such as pride in learning, if the knowledge that ends in jīvanmukti supposedly allows for no pride (73, 285). Vidyāraņya first claims the knower has only the semblance (ābhāsa) of attachment, and he recog- nizes its mere seeming, like recognizing the rope's appearance as a "snake." But what then of the sage Yajñavalkya, proud, greedy for cows, and even cursing Sakalya to death (Brhadāraņyaka Upanișad 3. 1)?25 Vidyāraņya says Yājñavalkya is not a jīvanmukta with peaceful mind, even though he is a knower of brahman (74, 287). Brahman-knowers (unlike jīvanmuktas) have impure impressions like jealousy and anger. This point reinforces Vidyāranya's emphasis on continuing to extinguish the mind and mental impressions even after knowledge of the real. Further evidence is his distinction between 1) a knower (jñānin) or seeker (vividișā) renunciant and 2) a jīvanmukta or real- ized (vidvat) renunciant (51, 254).26 The "mere" knower must renew his efforts of destroying impressions and extinguishing the mind to become fully realized. Due to currently manifesting (prārabdha) karma, even one with knowledge cannot permanently remove impressions and mental manifesta- tions without practicing yoga steadily. Doubt, error, and other attachments fully disappear only when (by yoga) the mind is pacified (51, 255).

The four latter purposes or marks of attaining liberation while living reinforce and reflect the first, guarding knowledge. Austerity (tapas) focuses on gaining a one-pointed mind from yogic practice and detachment from works, not on bodily mortification (137, 377 ff.). The most interesting aspect of this section is Vidyāranya's suggestion that austerity provides for the welfare of the world (loka-samgraha). Here we may glimpse what a jīvanmukta does for others, his "social ethics" and role in society (which will be dis- cussed at some length in the final chapter). Austerity here has a transpersonal, or even cosmic, potency. Vidyāranya suggests that the "austere" yogin performs a most impor- tant activity or service by allowing others to follow, serve, and worship him. His presence is a great favor. For example, those who take the yogin as teacher (guru) attain knowledge rapidly. Devotees who provide his food and shelter are doing the equivalent of austerity by such service. Believers (āstika) merely observing him begin to follow the right path (san-mārga), and even unbelievers are freed from evil when seen by him. Thus, the opportunity to serve or even see the yogin/jīvanmukta arises from his grace (upakāritva).27

108 . Jīvanmukti in "Yogic Advaita"

According to Vidyāranya, the third aim, nondisputation (visamvādābhava), arises because the sage has no concern with the world, so no reason for argument or censure rises. As he is without anger and talks only of the self, how could anyone dispute with him (143, 385)?28 The last two aims of jīvanmukti, destroying suffering (duhkha-nāśa) and manifesting serenity (sukhāvirbhāva) combine knowledge, following dharmic regulation, and re- nunciation (145, 388 ff.). Serenity, described in terms also used by Sankara, manifests in three ways: obtaining all desires, completing all duties, and attaining all that is attainable (146, 389). Also like Sankara, Vidyāraņya here affirms that the jīvanmukta realizes he is brahman, and not a body. Thus, in Vidyāraņya's Yogic Advaita, these aims and practices taken together both point to and demonstrate having reached and safeguarded the highest end, jīvanmukti.

Samnyāsa and Jīvanmukti

Throughout the text, Vidyāranya closely connects liberation while liv- ing with renunciation (samnyāsa). As suggested earlier, he distinguishes two kinds of renunciation: the renunciation of one who possesses knowledge (vidvat), which is the cause of liberation while living, and the renunciation of one who merely desires knowledge (vividisā), which causes liberation only after death (1, 177). (How exactly they "cause" liberation and how any lib- eration can happen after death go unexplained.) While knowledge of nondual ätman/brahman is the defining feature of liberation, renunciation (which includes yogic practice) both leads to and follows knowledge. Vidyāraņya's description of the practice (sādhana) of the renunciant (samnyāsin) is in line with mainstream Advaita. The samnyāsin, he says, renounces the worlds of the not self to experience the self alone, abandons desire-impelled actions, and studies the Veda (3, 181). The realized renunciant (vidvat-samnyāsin) specifically has attained the truth by having renounced worldly desires for offspring and wealth, and by having performed hearing, reflection on, and assimilation of (śravana-manana-nididhyāsana) the Veda (4, 183). While virtually all Advaitins endorse samnyāsa, few emphasize it as much as Vidyāranya. He repeatedly prescribes rejecting the world's tempta- tions. Attachment to wife and children is bad: women's bodies are tempting but disgusting, and parenting is a misery (77, 291 ff.). Isolation and indiffer- ence, on the other hand, bring many benefits. For example, the renunciant should not greet or bless others, because such acknowledgment demands the mental agitation of attending to proper word choice for salutation (29, 223). Following Śankara (in Upadeśasāhasrī 17. 64), Vidyāranya here asks: When

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established in the nonduality beyond names, who would one greet (30, 224)? The samnyāsin should remain alone, focused on meditation; three mendicants together are a village, and more are a city. Solitude allows uninterrupted meditation, but a place full of people hinders realizing the bliss of the self (33, 228). Again we see Vidyäranya's close intertwining of knowledge of nondual brahman with renunciation and yogic practices like solitary meditation. This emphasis on renunciation diverges from the Yogavāsistha's stress on de- tached action in the world, seen in the prior chapter. The JMV repeatedly speaks of isolation and abnegation, while the Yogavāsistha puts more empha- sis on the nondifference between bondage and liberation and the ease of completely detached action in the world. For the YV, abandonment of any activity is virtually optional.

The Way of Liberation: The Renunciation of the Paramahamsa Yogin

Vidyāranya recounts the jīvanmukta's way of life most clearly in the final chapter of the Jīvanmuktiviveka, which forms a commentary on the Paramahamsa Upanisad. The chapter, devoted to describing the supremely ascetic (paramahamsa) yogin or realized renunciant (vidvat-samnyāsin), in- terweaves renunciation, yogic practice, and knowing nonduality. We here find the terms yogin, samnyāsin, and mukta, with their respective qualifiers (paramahamsa, vidvat, and jīvan) all identifying the same being. This discus- sion illustrates both the path to, and "lifestyle" in, living liberation. While Vidyāranya's understanding is undergirded by Advaitin metaphysics and eth- ics, it is certainly not narrowly Sankaran, for it includes notions of yogic practice and transcending dharmic duties unexpressed by Sankara. To Vidyāraņya, a paramahamsa yogin (i.e., jīvanmukta) combines the best qualities of the knower and the yogin: a mere yogin does not have knowledge of the real and desires supernatural powers like flying; a mere paramahamsa, while knowing reality (brahman), spurns Vedic injunctions and prohibitions (vidhi-nisedha). A paramahamsa yogin, however, neither desires powers nor disregards injunctions (150, 395). Thus, this yogin still follows both the Vedantic and yogic paths. He removes ignorance (of nonduality) by realizing the meaning of the great sayings (mahāvākya) and removes impressions (vāsanās) arising from ignorance by repeated yogic practice (159, 412). Only together can these paths bring eternal awakening (nitya-bodha). What then, Vidyāranya asks, is the worldly manner (dress, speech, etc.) of this rare bird of a yogin? And what is his internal condition (sthiti)?

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Sometimes Vidyāranya simply argues that the paramahamsa yogin treads the path of total renunciation, including the abandonment of "dharmic" regula- tions: he departs from family and friends, and ignores even Vedic study and ritual action. He gives up all that brings worldly or heavenly rewards (155, 405). All rules and injunctions are abandoned since such everyday conven- tions breed attachment (27, 221).29 Clothed or unclothed, he roams anywhere and eats anything, recognizing neither good nor bad-for separating these two (or seeing any opposites) is itself a flaw.30 Vidyāranya goes on, however, to claim that the renunciation of the knower (vidvat-samnyāsa) has another dimension: while ultimately uncon- cerned with actions and injunctions, the brahman-knower also continues to perform them. Performing duties is necessary, since even after the self is known, adventitious adjuncts (upādhi) remain in the yogin's "mind" (antahkarana). Although knowing the truth, he still has not achieved the satisfaction (trpti) and mental repose that comes from completing every duty (154, 402-3).31 Vidyāranya's inclination toward synthesis and perhaps purposeful am- biguity are apparent here. He could certainly say more about the need to perform duties after knowledge (which is not the same as continuing yogic practice so often emphasized elsewhere), but he nowhere explicitly explains why the dharma-transcending jīvanmukta will live in accord with the dharma, a topic briefly discussed by Sureśvara and other later Advaitins.32 One pos- sible reason is that since the dharma is the cosmic structure and law, a detached jīvanmukta (despite being beyond the dharma) will "instinctively" follow the nature of things.33 Still, while renunciation and knowledge go together for Vidyāranya, knowing the nondual self ultimately takes one beyond conventional samnyāsa. Ordinary renunciation affects the body, not the ever-detached self. For the paramahamsa yogin, body-based injunctions such as wearing a loincloth and using a bamboo walking stick (danda) are not essential, for thinking about them could perturb his one-pointed mind (156, 407-8). Renunciants in the lower stage of merely desiring knowledge (vividisā) hold on to the bamboo stick and the performance of Vedic injunctions, while the paramahamsa yogin carries no stick-or, rather, carries only the "stick" of knowledge. The true ascetic (tridandin) does not hold a triple staff, but shows threefold control of speech, mind, and action (163, 419). He needs no blanket, as he is beyond feeling any heat or cold. And he is certainly beyond slander, pride, greed, anger, and so on. He disputes with no one, knowing no other truly exists. Clearly then, the highest knowledge takes one beyond mechanical adherence to Vedic ritual and the ascetic path. Still, how can anyone, even the paramahamsa yogin, give up all material goods and worldly feelings while embodied? Vidyāranya, citing the Paramahamsa Upanisad, states that the

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yogin's body is now merely like a corpse (kunapa), since it is known as other than the self that is pure consciousness (caitanya). Feelings like slander and pride can be abandoned while living when the body (different from con- sciousness) is seen as a corpse (158, 411).34 Thus, detachment from the body ultimately comes from knowledge, not renunciation.

The text concludes by reaffirming Yogic Advaita, that is, maintaining the importance of yogic practice and renunciation in both leading to and expressing knowledge of nondual brahman. The liberated being (jīvanmukta, vidvat-samnyāsin, or paramahamsa yogin), with sense activity at rest and unobstructed meditative enstasis, abides in the self. Blissfully realizing "I am brahman," he has completed all duties (172, 431). Thus, in Yogic Advaita, repeated human effort (via yogic practice) and renunciation are necessary to end all desires and gain brahman knowledge. The liberated being also is recognized by his yogic practice and renunciation. However, the true jīvanmukta is no longer bound even to samādhi or a ritually pure life (which presuppose duality). His effortless nondual bliss both results from and per- fects samādhi and purity.

Conclusion

I will close by reviewing Vidyāranya's key arguments. First and most important is his claim that to be liberated while living one must have the knowledge (jñāna) that brahman and ätman are one. Such knowledge, which comes from hearing and studying the Vedanta texts, is the necessary basis for jīvanmukti. However, one who knows (i.e., the jñānin) is not automatically a jīvanmukta. Vidyāraņya points out that even a sage like Yājñavalkya was jeal- ous and proud, and that even a brahman-knower can have doubt and error. Due to currently manifesting (prārabdha) karma, one must also practice yoga re- peatedly to destroy the mind and mental impressions (which produce doubt and error). Karma currently bearing fruit is stronger than knowledge, but yogic practice can overcome even the necessity of experiencing prārabdha karma. Vidyāranya repeatedly stresses the importance of yogic techniques in destroying mental impressions (vāsanā-ksaya) and extinguishing the mind (mano-nāśa) while seeking knowledge of the truth and even after finding it; this is a key reason for calling his view "Yogic Advaita." Yogic influence also appears in his concern about the "mental state" and samādhi level of the jīvanmukta. However, Vidyāraņya makes it clear that yoga alone cannot make one a jīvanmukta. To be liberated while living, one needs both discernment (viveka, or brahma-jñāna) and sense-restraining "unconditioned" (asamprajñāta

112 a. Jīvanmukti in "Yogic Advaita"

or nirvikalpa) samādhi. A concentrated yogin without knowledge may have supernatural powers and may go to heaven, but is not liberated, nor better than a knower acting in the world. This yogin reaches the insight of the "basis of you" (tvampadārtha), but not of the unity of ātman and brahman. Again, we see Vidyāranya's central claim that both Vedantic knowledge and yogic enstasis are necessary to gain and sustain full liberation. Further, Vidyāranya's discus- sion of both the threefold means to liberation and the five marks or purposes of jīvanmukti indicates that the means to reach liberation are also the way of life after liberation. They not only lead to and safeguard liberation, they are the expressions of the achievement of moksa. Vidyāranya also holds that one can be fully liberated while embodied- if liberation means knowing the nondual self, extinguishing the mind and its impressions, and never taking another birth. The embodied knower of brahman is already dead to the world, a corpse, so in a sense "without a body" (videha). However, he also suggests that videhamukti only exists when one is literally without a body, and this mukti is the fuller liberation. Thus, for Vidyāraņya, liberation does occur while embodied, but he also considers bodilessness to be a sign (or reward?) of the highest release.

Finally, Vidyāranya points out that renunciation is critical to jīvanmukti, both as a path to and as an indicator of liberation. However, he suggests that the path to jīvanmukti goes beyond conventional samnyāsa, which calls for living in solitude and renouncing desires and all that consists of worldly "householding"-gaining wealth or offspring, or even performing Vedic ritual actions. Knowledge of nondual brahman leads ultimately to a renunciation higher than conventional world renunciation. In a sense, "dharmic" renuncia- tion affirms the existence of the world of duality by rejecting it. The realized (vidvat) renouncer (and paramahamsa yogin) goes beyond (but does not trans- gress) all Vedic prohibitions and "good" or "evil": he is both a Brahmin and beyond any caste or life stage. As the Bhagavad-Gītā says, mental detach- ment is more important than worldly action (or nonaction). The highest yogin is not one with a loincloth and staff, but one who keeps his "inner cool" (antahśītala), destroying the mind and its impressions. He thus lives "in the world" completing karmic duties, and as a truly free being, passes beyond disgust for, and rejection of, everyday human existence. At this highest level of detachment, he can allow others to follow and serve him, freeing them and purifying the world by his injunction-transcending austerity.35

To conclude, let us again briefly contrast Vidyāranya's Yogic Advaita with Sankara's mainstream Advaita. While their views are rarely directly

Yogic Advaita II a 113

opposed, their emphases and interests are often dramatically different. Vidyāranya's Yogic Advaita is linked, both by philosophical commitment and by extent of textual references, more to the views of the Laghu Yogavāsistha and the Gītā with their Sāmkhya and Yoga emphases than to Śankara and the scholastic tradition-though, as mentioned earlier, the JMV is not as free from concerns with performing dharmic duties and following the path of samnyāsa as are both forms of the Yogavāsistha. Both Vidyāraņya and Sankara hold that the primary mark of a jīvanmukta is knowing nondual brahman, but only Vidyāranya claims that such knowledge cannot be gained or sustained without repeated yogic practice. With such practice, liberation can be achieved while embodied; and with the highest knowledge, the jīvanmukta can live in the world while detached from it. Vidyāranya's em- phases on yogic practice, cessation of mental activity, and the distinction between the jīvanmukta and brahman-knower are not shared by Śankara. On the other hand, Vidyāranya rarely explores some of Sankara's central con- cerns, such as discriminating between body and self or the utter separation of knowledge and activity. Also unlike scholastic Advaitins, who focus on the role of prārabdha karma (or any remnant of ignorance) in the continuity of embodiment, Vidyāranya instead emphasizes the importance of yogic prac- tice now to remove remaining karma. Vidyāraņya and Sankara do not dis- agree on "bodiless" liberation, but Vidyāranya's understanding is more refined and clearly articulated. Sankara does argue that one is bodiless while embod- ied when one knows that the self is not the body and that embodiedness itself is a false notion (BS I. 1. 4). However, he never uses the term videhamukti, much less employs Vidyāranya's specification of videhamukti as freedom from future (versus present) embodiment, nor does he discuss the relationship between jīvan- and videha-mukti (or Vidyāranya's occasional suggestion that the latter is "more" free). Vidyāranya's examination of the purposes or marks of attaining jīvanmukti, which describes a nondisputatious and actively world- purifying liberated being, is also expanded far beyond any of Śankara's de- scriptions. Finally, both argue that renunciation is central to liberation, but Vidyāraņya's intense focus on samnyāsa and his claim that the renouncer passes beyond all dharmic duties would be disputed by Śankara. Thus, Vidyāranya, while Advaitin, is his own kind of Advaitin-a yogic Advaitin.

EIGHT

Yogic Advaita III: Jīvanmukti in the Pañcadaśi, the "Minor" Upanisads, and Madhusūdana's Gūdārthadīpikā

While the Yogavāsistha and Jīvanmuktiviveka are the central texts for "Yogic Advaita," there are some other works that should be mentioned in this context. We will first look at the Pañcadasi (The Fifteen Chapters) (PD),1 which is a widely known thirteenth to fourteenth century introduction to Vedanta. While primarily committed to Advaita views, it includes Sāmkhya cosmological ideas (prakrti and the gunas), and does not fit comfortably into either the "mainstream" or "Yogic" Advaita category. There is also some doubt about whether the PD and Jīvanmuktiviveka are by the same author, as is asserted within the Advaita tradition. The best discussion of this issue is still that of T. M. P. Mahadevan, though the matter is best regarded as unresolved. Mahadevan argues that there is a Bhāratītīrtha-Vidyāranya who was a teacher of Mädhava-Vidyāranya (who was also possibly the brother of Sāyaņa).2 Mahadevan holds that Bhāratītīrtha-Vidyāranya is the author of the PD (and the Vivarana-prameya-samgraha), and Mādhava-Vidyāraņya the au- thor of the JMV.3 Even after taking into account the different interests of the texts, I also find it unlikely that the Vidyāranya of the Pañcadasi (who I shall henceforth call Bharatītīrtha) is the same Vidyaranya who authored the JMV.4 Both in general and specifically when considering jīvanmukti, the Pañcadaśī author follows the Sankara tradition of Advaita more closely than does the JMV author. To a degree quite different from the JMV, the Pañcadaśi emphasizes knowing the world's unreality, cidābhasa ("ego") versus kūțastha (self), the

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nature of bliss (ānanda), and the role of prārabdha karma in causing bodily continuity. On the other hand, key aspects of the JMV, such as types of renunciation, extinguishing the mind (mano-nāśa) and destroying mental impressions (vāsanā-ksaya), and the purposes of jīvanmukti are mentioned rarely or not at all. Further, the Pañcadasi contains more references to key Upanișadic passages on jīvanmukti (such as ChU VI. 14. 2, Kațha VI. 14- 15, and Mundaka III. 2. 9) and far fewer to the Laghu Yogavāsistha than does the JMV (though both refer to the Gīta often). Finally, although already discussed here, the JMV is certainly later, as it refers to the Brahmānanda section of the PD twice (JMV, pp. 293, 388). Still, some similarities exist, as I shall point out in the following pages.

As with the YV and JMV, the PD does not address living liberation in a consistent, systematic way. Perhaps the best summary of Bhāratītirtha's views on this topic appears in IX. 75-76. He here claims that realization (bodha) arises from contemplation (vicāra), and burns off any belief in the reality of samsāra. Reaching liberation, one has accomplished all (krta-krtya), gained eternal satisfaction (trpti), and attained jīvanmukti, waiting only for the destruction of commenced karma. Still, Bhāratītīrtha almost never de- scribes a jīvanmukta directly, and often makes his points about living libera- tion when referring to other texts-texts we are familiar with from earlier authors. For example, he calls the Gītā's sthita-prajña (here: sthira-dhi), one well-established in knowing nonduality, as a jīvanmukta (II. 102-3).5 He quotes Gita II. 72, which says such a one has gained a "state" of brahman (brahma-sthiti, brahma-nirvāņa). In VI. 259-60, he refers to two scriptural texts (BāU IV. 4. 7 and Katha VI. 14-15) important for jīvanmukti. These verses state that when all knots of the heart are cut, that is, when all heart-based desires cease, then one gains immortality and brahman here. Bhāratītīrtha goes on to claim that when ignorant, the self (cidātman) and the "I"-consciousness (ahamkāra) are thought to be one; when the knower realizes their difference, desires may exist due to commenced (prārabdha) karma (more will be said about such karma later), but they do not bind, since their knots are cut (261-3).6 Thinking the "I" is the self is the knot; in fact, the only difference between mūdha (fool) and buddha (sage) is this knot (266). When the self is known and I- consciousness disappears, one is as unmoved by one's bodily condition as by the growth and death of a tree (perhaps following NS IV. 61) (264). As suggested earlier, Bhāratītīrtha, like other Advaitins, often empha- sizes that to know the real and to attain jīvanmukti one must throw off the bonds of desire. Śruti teaches that the path to liberation is by calmness (śama) and concentration (samādhi), and the goal is desirelessness. Like Śankara, he

116 . Jivanmukti in "Yogic Advaita"

holds that there is ultimately no satisfaction even in a heavenly birth, only in abandoning desire (IV. 50-53). Bhāratītīrtha then makes a point based on Sureśvara's Naişkarmyasiddhi. He claims that if, after knowing the truth, one does not abandon desire, the supposed sage will do whatever he wishes (yathestācaraņa), like a dog eating impure food (NS IV. 62). Before the purported realization, one only had internal faults (dosa), but now (since he falsely claims desirelessness) the whole world censures him-what a "knowl- edge." So the knower should not be a desire-filled pig (or dog), and must abandon all mental faults to be worthy of worship as a god by the people (IV. 54-57). Bhāratītīrtha also holds to the utility of constant contemplative practice over time (IX. 33 ff.) to assist liberation. He claims that no practice is wasted, even if one is not liberated in the present birth. His starting point is Sankara's commentary on BS III. 4. 51. He states that if the self is not obtained here before death, despite repeated contemplation (vicāra), one will gain it later (amutra), presumably in another birth, when all obstacles (pratibandha) are destroyed. As Katha II. 7 indicates, many who hear the truth here still do not know. As evidence for future (living) liberation from present practice, he also refers to Vämadeva's realization while still in the womb, due to prior re- peated contemplation (33-35). Further obstacles are destroyed by proper calming (śama), hearing (śravana) sacred texts, and so on, and then one attains brahman, as Vāmadeva did in a single additional birth (44-45). Again following Śankara on BS III. 4. 51, Bhāratītīrtha refers to the Gītā passage that affirms this point (VI. 40-45): the yogin may take many births to destroy impediments, but no contemplation is useless. From knowing the reality of the self, one obtains a realm of virtue (punya), and even one having desires is born in a pure and rich family. If desireless, one comes to a family of pure- minded yogins, there controls the mind as in prior births, advances by follow- ing earlier practice, and, ultimately over many births attains the highest goal (46-50).

While often following Sankara, the PD's discussion of living liberation has clear echoes of the JMV's "Yogic Advaita" in two places. In IV. 59-61, Bhāratītīrtha writes, following Gītā II. 62, that dwelling on any object causes desire, anger, and delusion; these can be overcome by samādhi. Verse 62 says manorājya (the realm of delusion) is overcome by realizing the truth, the absence of mental faults, and one-pointed vāsanā, reminding us of the three- fold practice mentioned in the JMV .? After overcoming delusion, the pure mind rests empty of any modification and nirvāņa is gained, as Vasișțha teaches Räma in the YV (Sthiti 57. 28) (63-64). PD VI. 276 mentions another interrelated threefold means to achieve liberation: realizing the truth (tattva-

Yogic Advaita III 117

bodha), renunciation (vairāgya), and cessation of activity (uparama). While the latter two are not identical with (and less yogic than) the JMV's mano- nāśa and vāsanā-ksaya, the former is said in both to be the main and most direct means to liberation (281). Like the JMV, verses 283-4 say detachment (vairāgya) and cessation (uparati), without bodha, bring a heavenly world (punyaloka), not moksa, but realization, even without the other two, gives full awakening now (though visible sorrow is not destroyed). Perhaps the later JMV formalizes and expands on these suggestions of a threefold model of means to liberation. Also similar to the JMV (10, 195) is Bhāratītīrtha's claim in IV. 66-69 that the mind is distracted by enjoying karma and concentrated by repeated yogic practice (abhyāsa). Without dualistic projection (viksepa), one is not merely a brahman-knower, but is brahman itself. The jīvanmukta's final stage is freedom from the duality of the jīva.8 Similarly, in XIII. 82, he writes that by repeated practice (abhyāsa), one becomes well established in knowl- edge (vidyā) and then free from the body even while living.

Much is written in the Pañcadaśi about the relationship of prārabdha ("commenced," or already manifesting) karma and liberation. According to VII. 175-80, knowledge and commenced karma are not opposed, since they have different objects. The aim of knowing the real is recognizing the world as illusory, while the aim of commenced karma is the enjoyment of pleasure and pain by the individual self (jīva). As one enjoys seeing magic although knowing it is an illusion, so one's enjoyment (or experience) of commenced karma does not require imagining the world to be real. Neither does knowl- edge destroy the world (annihilating commenced karma), it awakens us to the world's illusoriness. Thus, as knowing a magic show to be unreal destroys neither the show nor people's enjoyment, so knowing the world's illusory nature does not destroy the illusion or one's experience of it. Bhāratītīrtha, like virtually all other Advaitins, uses the existence of prārabdha karma to explain why embodiment continues post-liberation. He argues that embodiment continues because karma only gradually ceases, using analogies both old (trembling from fear of a "snake") and new (the healing of a head wound) (VII. 241-50). He begins here by referring to the oft-used Mundaka III. 2. 9 śruti, which states that the one who knows brahman (which occurs while living) becomes brahman (241). Yet as long as the body exists (due to the enjoyment of commenced karma's fruits), there is no (immediate) freedom from appearance-as even after the "snake" is known as a rope, trembling ceases only gradually. Still, even if, while enjoying fruits, one sometimes thinks "I am mortal" (as when seeing the rope in the darkness, one might be frightened again), this mistake does not destroy knowledge of the

118 a. Jīvanmukti in "Yogic Advaita"

truth, since jīvanmukti is a natural condition (vastu-sthiti), and not a vow or practice (vrata) (243-46).9 Bharatītirtha then introduces a variation of the "tenth man" example. A person searching for a "missing" tenth person in a group suddenly realizes "I am the tenth." The person then stops crying and beating his head (out of sorrow for the "lost" tenth person). Happy now, the sorrower forgets the aching head, and, with the help of medicine, the wound gradually heals. Similarly, obtaining mukti (with the help of repeated contemplation) causes one to forget the sorrow (or "heal the wound") of commenced karma, but such karma must still be enjoyed before final liberation (VII. 247-50). Bhāratītīrtha, like Madhusūdana, also says embodiment continues due to the projecting (viksepa) rather than the concealing (āvarana) aspect of ignorance (VI. 53-56). Knowledge destroys the concealment of self, but projection is removed only by experiencing prārabdha karma. Like Maņdana, Bhāratītīrtha argues that an effect (like a body) can continue for a moment, even after its basis (ignorance) is destroyed, as illustrated by śruti (ChU VI. 14. 2), reason, and experience (potter's wheel). Bhāratītīrtha states a number of times that the conduct (vartana) of awakened beings varies according to differences in (prārabdha) karma, al- though realization itself is always the same (VI. 287-8)-a point also made in the YV and JMV. For example, one can be both a knower and a ruler (like Janaka, VII. 130). Verse IX. 114 states that knowing the truth is not affected by any means (sādhana), so the knower can rule (rightly). The mind and senses do not disappear when one is a knower, so one can (and must) act (IX. 90). Further, while desireless since knowing the world is unreal, one may meditate or act in various ways according to one's prārabdha karma (IX. 115). In fact, karma's destruction proceeds by awakened and unpolluted beings living according to their karma. Bhāratītirtha states that from following this karma, even these beings are not beyond any flaw, for who is able to prevent manifestation of karma? While commenced karma is the same for the knower and the ignorant, the knower alone has no affliction (kleśa), due to patience (dhairya) (VII. 131-3). Again we see it argued that karma must manifest, but the knower is untouched by its working. Bhāratītīrtha holds that support for this view comes from the Gītā as well. PD VII. 152-61 point out that no one can avoid experiencing one's karma, even if one does not want to, like Arjuna (in Gītā III. 36-37). But how can the knower have desires? While desires (like karma) are not absent, they are annulled (bādha) like the (im)potency of a burnt seed (VII. 163). As a roasted seed cannot germinate, a wise man's desires, known to be unreal, cannot produce an effect. Yet as a roasted seed can still be used as a bit of food, so the sage's desires yield a little (alpa) enjoyment (but not evil habits) by the fructifying of prārabdha karma. Full-fledged evil habits (vyāsana)

Yogic Advaita III 119

arise only by the illusion that one is an enjoyer (VII. 164-6). Bhāratītīrtha here shows his sensitivity to the central Advaita problem of a form of igno- rance (desire, karma) remaining after knowledge. Finally, PD VII. 252 ff.10 describe the nature of the satisfaction (trpti) of the jīvanmukta at some length. Sounding unlike most mainstream or yogic Advaitins, he claims satisfaction is limitless (nirankusa) and constant, requir- ing no further vow or duty. After liberation, one has accomplished all and obtained all obtainable (252-4).11 Bharatītirtha then expounds on his joy in the first person.12 He states that unlike the ignorant with worldly desires, he is full of the highest bliss. The supreme bliss of liberation takes him beyond ritual duty, competence/commission (adhikāra), or meditation: "Let those wanting another realm (paraloka) perform ritual activity; pervading all realms, how and why should I act? Let those with competence explain scripture or teach Veda; I have no commission since without activity. I do not wish to sleep or beg, I do not bathe or purify myself; if observers imagine so, what are other's imaginings to me?" (256-8) He even goes so far as to reject the three- fold means of hearing, reflecting, and assimilating: only those not knowing the truth need to listen to śruti, and only those with doubts need to reflect (260). Bhāratītīrtha then specifically rejects the efficacy of meditation (dhyāna, samādhi) to remove karma (which distinguishes this text from the JMV).13 Since he has no wrong notions (viparyāsa), the sage has no need to meditate. Although undeluded, he still thinks "I am human (manusya)," a notion imag- ined due to propensities (vāsanā) developed over a long time (cira).14 When commenced karma is destroyed, worldly activity (vyavahāra) ceases, but as long as such karma continues even thousands of meditations will not end this activity. Knowing this, why should the liberated being meditate? Both pro- jection (vikşepa) and meditative enstasis (samādhi) are merely transforma- tions of the mind, and being the essence of experience (anubhava-rūpa) itself, the mukta has (as said earlier, verse 252) accomplished and obtained all (261-66). Yet, in a distinct change of tone, Bhāratītirtha then presents a more "dharmic" approach-although its optional status is emphasized. He states that, although all is accomplished, there is no harm (ksati) in following the sāstric path, rising from a desire to benefit the world (lokānugraha).15 While not necessary, various actions are not prohibited. From this perspec- tive, one may beg, bathe, chant, or worship god. Still, when a witness (sāksin), one truly does nothing and causes no action, whether meditating on Visnu or merging in brahman bliss (268-70). Thus, as suggested earlier, the Pañcadaśī is an Advaita text, but with- out the consistent, dialectically oriented argumentation of scholastic Advaita, nor with the degree of yogic orientation of the JMV and Yogavāsistha. Bhāratītīrtha's primary emphases concerning jīvanmukti seem to be the im- portance of desirelessness and contemplation (vicra), which will allow one

120 Jivanmukti in "Yogic Advaita"

to accomplish all and to attain living liberation, and (like mainstream Advaita) the role of prärabdha karma in delaying final liberation. And while the text acknowledges that yogic practice has value, unlike in the JMV, it is not central to liberation.

Jīvanmukti in the Minor Upanișads

Most references to living liberation in the large corpus of works known as "minor" Upanisads are congruent with the "Yogic Advaita" seen in the Yogavāsistha and the Jīvanmuktiviveka. J. F. Sprockhoff has examined the concept of jīvanmukti in these Upanisads in great detail, including an exten- sive listing of parallel references in the minor Upanisads and the YV and JMV.16 The Upanisads that mention jīvanmukti are found primarily in the grouping called "Sāmānya-Vedānta" Upanisads.17 Like the rest of the minor Upanișads, these texts do not follow or argue for any formal philosophical school. Instead, they focus more on descriptions of the path to liberation by knowledge, renunciation (samnyāsa), or yogic meditation, or on the nature of the liberated being, and often seem conducive to use in chanting or other ritual contexts. They often refer to the ideas of extinguishing the mind (mano- nāśa) and destroying mental impressions (vāsanā-kşaya), seen in the JMV. The Mahā, Tejobindu, and Varāha (the latter two "Yoga" Upanişads) Upanișads are typical. Mahā II. 42-62 verses, which duplicate those in the Yogavāsistha,18 end with the refrain "he is called liberated while living" (sa jīvanmukta ucyate), and list the many qualities of the jīvanmukta, stressing peace, mindlessness (amanastā), and being beyond opposites like joy and sorrow. The same refrain is used in Varaha IV. 2. 21-30, which follows YV Utpatti khanda 9. 4-13 and emphasizes realizing the unreality of the world and obtaining pure, objectless consciousness. Here, as in the minor Upanisads mentioned below, there is great emphasis on elevated consciousness states and mind control, as well as on the serenity and bliss of liberation, making jīvanmukti a bit more "positive" than in Śankara's Advaita. Tejobindu IV. 1-32 also includes the "sa jīvanmukta ucyate" refrain, and the virtues of living liberation are clearly intended to be chanted here. Bodiless liberation is praised in verses 33-81. In the context of living liberation, perhaps most interesting among the "minor" Upanişads are the Annapūrņa and Muktika. The Annapūrņa Upanișad mentions jīvanmukti in a number of places, first stressing being detached (asanga, II. 3-6), reaching the blissful fourth (turīya) state of consciousness (II. 18), and destroying the mind (II. 24). Annapūrna III begins by describing the living liberated sage Mändavya, emphasizing his firmly controlled mind. The yogic language and focus on consciousness states seen here is clearly

Yogic Advaita III caaa 121

representative of Yogic Advaita. Annapūrņa IV. 14-20 describe the distinc- tion between the extinguished mind (citta-nāsa) "with form" (sarūpa) of the jīvanmukta and that without form (arūpa) of the videhamukta seen in the JMV (128, 365) and Muktika II. 32-35. As in these other texts, "formless" bodiless mukti here seems a little more liberated than "mere" living libera- tion.19 Various verses in Annapūrna V clearly refer to ideas also found in the YV and JMV: detachment (4), forms of vāsanās or mental impressions (6, 16), the importance of effort or prayatna (68), and the seven-stage (bhūmi) con- sciousness state model (83). The concluding verse (V. 120) asserts that one who studies this Upanisad with a guru attains liberation while living and becomes brahman itself. Muktika Upanișad II bears close resemblance to the JMV in places and mentions most of the ideas referred to earlier. Sprockhoff finds the Muktika II passage the most important among all minor Upanisads, suggesting it influenced the JMV.20 Muktika II begins by virtually duplicating the JMV passage that asks about the aims, characteristics, and means of attaining jīvanmukti, as well as its definition of living liberation, which states that "bondage exists for a person since the nature of affliction [is] having mental notions consisting of joy and sorrow, being enjoyer and doer, and so on. Living liberation is the cessation of this."21 The one significant change in the Muktika is the direct reference there to bodiless (videha) mukti. Following the definition of living liberation, it next says, "bodiless liberation is due to the destruction of commenced (karma), (and is) like the space in a pot free from any limitation."22 (The final verse-II. 76-also mentions reaching bodiless liberation after leaving jīvanmukti). The Muktika, unlike the JMV, then adds that the means of knowing (pramāna) both forms of liberation is studying the 108 Upanisads. Both texts go on to emphasize obtaining living liberation by human efforts, including yogic practice and hearing the Vedanta, which destroy all vāsanās. The Muktika continues by describing various forms of vāsanās, and how to extinguish them and the mind (II. 1-31). The talk about the interplay of mind, its impressions, and bodily extinction is again quite typical of "Yogic Advaita." Muktika II. 32 ff. continue this theme, but use language emphasiz- ing destroying the mind (citta/mano-nāśa); this section begins with the "formed" (sarūpa, jīvanmukti) and "formless" (arūpa, videhamukti) types of mental destruction seen in the JMV (and Annapūrna IV. 14-18 mentioned earlier). While jīvanmukti goes virtually unmentioned in the rest of the chap- ter, the remaining portion continues to describe the path to liberation and to praise achieving it. Like the YV and JMV, the remaining text includes tradi- tional Advaita language about knowing the self and yogic ideas of breath (prāna) control and stilling the mind, along with its primary focus on types of vāsanā that need extinguishing for liberation.

122 a .. Jīvanmukti in "Yogic Advaita"

Incidentally, although renunciation (samnyāsa) is often an important part of the path to liberation (as we saw in the JMV), the specific language of jīvanmukti is not commonly linked with samnyāsa in the minor Upanișads. Patrick Olivelle, in his translation and analysis of the branch of minor Upanişads called "Samnyāsa" Upanișads, writes that "[t]hroughout these documents there are eulogies of the renouncer who has liberated himself in this very life."23 However, direct references to jīvanmukti are relatively infre- quent and often are derived from other texts. For example, the Brhatsamnyāsa includes a series of verses from the YV Upaśama khanda,24 and the Brhad- Avadhūta takes verses from Pañcadaśi VII. 253-70 and 291-97.25 The Paramahamsa, a "Samnyāsa" Upanișad, was, we have seen, interpreted by Vidyāraņya in the JMV. Its references to jīvanmukti, as those of Jābāla Upanișad VI, are largely indirect. Maitreya Upanișad III is a song of praise about being released, but does not explicitly speak of living liberation. Thus, while the minor Upanisads do mention living liberation and continue the "Yogic Advaita" emphases on renunciation and yogic practice, along with Self-knowledge, they break little new ground.

Madhusūdana on Jīvanmukti in the Gūdārthadīpikā

As mentioned earlier, Madhusūdana wrote a commentary on the Bhagavad-Gītā called Gūdārthadīpikā. He discusses aspects of jīvanmukti in a number of places in the commentary, and he offers a much more "Yogic Advaita" interpretation here than in the Advaitasiddhi. The first reference to jīvanmukti occurs in the introduction and uses terminology familiar to the JMV. In verses 20-22, Madhusūdana writes that all karma is destroyed by knowledge, but mental impressions (vāsanā) rising from the projection (viksepa) of already commenced (prārabdha) karma per- sist. These impressions cease through the yogic practice of samyama (dhārana, dhyāna, and samādhi of the Yogasūtras). Samādhi is said to be attained quickly by fixed attention on the Lord (iśvara-pranidhāna), which brings extinction of the mind (mano-nāśa) and destruction of mental impressions (vāsanā-ksaya) (23). With repeated practice of these two, along with know- ing the real (tattva-jñāna), jīvanmukti is firmly established (24). Madhusūdana states that sacred texts (here unreferenced) call this threefold means to libera- tion the renunciation of the knower (vidvat-samnyāsa) (25). He continues that one having achieved the highest nonconceptual (nirvikalpa) samādhi is called (in various places in the Gītā) a Brahmin, the best of brahman-knowers, one beyond qualities (gunātīta), one with firm wisdom (sthita-prajña), a devotee of Vinu, one beyond caste and life stage (ativarņāśramin), and a jīvanmukta; since all is accomplished, even the sacred

Yogic Advaita III a 123

texts cease for this being (26-29). Unlike in the Advaitasiddhi, Madhusūdana here says devotion to the Lord (bhagavad-bhakti) must be employed in all stages of the pursuit of liberation, and worshipping Krsna is natural even for the detached Self-knower who attains living liberation (31-37).26 The notion of liberation while living next appears in Madhusūdana's discussion of the one with firm wisdom, the sthita-prajña, in Gītā II. 54 ff. He writes that the samadhi-established sthita-prajña is thoroughly detached, but continues to experience good and bad fruits from prārabdha karma (II. 54-57). The one with firm wisdom has senses disciplined (indriya-samyama) and the direct experience (sāksātkāra) of being brahman from hearing the key sayings of the Vedanta (68-69). All ignorance and karmic activity now cease, and, attaining the renunciation of the knower (vidvat-samnyāsa), one is now a jīvanmukta (70). The body continues and experiences fruits from the power of commenced karma, but one is peaceful, desireless, and without samsaric sorrows. The knower exists in the "condition" of brahman (brahma- sthiti, brahma-nirvāņa) as long as life continues (71-72).27

The Yogic Advaita of the JMV and YV is seen most clearly in commen- taries on two passages in the Gītā, III. 18 and VI. 43 ff. Gīta III. 17-18 assert that one knowing and content in the self needs neither to do nor avoid doing works. Madhusudana affirms that one cannot attain the highest goal (nihśreyasa) by action, for the self is eternally attained. The Self-knower established in brahman has no aims (prayojana), whether acting or not. Madhusūdana then turns to the LYV's description of the seven stages of knowledge (jñāna-bhūmi).28 This model, also appearing in the JMV, suggests that there are degrees of jīvanmukti and that these degrees are related to yogic practices. These ideas are not found among other Advaita schoolmen, nor in the Advaitasiddhi. Madhusūdana here writes that in the first three stages one begins by desiring liberation, preceded by pursuit of the fourfold means for gaining release (meaning those stated by Sankara in BS I. 1. 1), then one hears and reflects on the sayings of the Vedanta after approaching the guru, and finally one has the capacity to grasp subtle matters (sūksma-vastu) by a one-pointed (ekāgrata) mind through the repeated practice of assimilation (nididhyāsana) of sacred texts.29 The fourth stage (called sattväpatti, obtaining the real) is the direct experience (sākşātkāra) of unchanging brahman/ātman identity, and the yogin attaining this stage is called a brahman-knower (brahma-vid).30 Following Vidyāraņya (JMV 136, 375), Madhusūdana says that bhūmis 5-7 are three stages of jīvanmukti, differing in degree (avantārabheda). He re- peats Vidyāranya's point about the achievement of ever higher degrees of

124 e Jīvanmukti in "Yogic Advaita"

brahman-knowing31 through the progressive deepening of mental restraint by practice of nonconceptual meditative enstasis (nirvikalpa samādhi), and his homologization of these stages with deep sleep and the highest fourth "state," turīya.32 The highest liberated being can never be roused from samādhi, sees no difference whatever, and constantly abides in a perfect mass of bliss. His body is taken care of by others and vital breath (prāna) directed by (and to) the supreme Lord. Among other texts, Madhusudana here quotes the BaU IV. 4. 7 passage about the similarity of this brahman-knower's body to a dis- carded snake skin on an anthill, and he concludes that the living liberated knower has no commission (adhikāra) to act. Gītā VI. 43 ff. describe how wisdom and yogic attainment carry over from prior births.33 Madhusūdana, after affirming that no prior effort (such as renouncing all action and following the guru) is wasted on the way to gaining highest knowledge, again refers to the LYV's seven stages of knowledge model, found in the JMV.34 Using language quite similar to the preceding passage, Madhusudana says that after following the fourfold sādhana for gaining release (indicated by Sankara in BS I. 1. 1), renouncing all action, and hearing, reflecting on, and finally assimilating the sayings of the Vedanta (done in stages 1-3), one gains direct experience of the real (tattva-sāksātkāra) in stage 4. Madhusūdana again says here that bhūmis 5-7 are three stages of jīvanmukti, differing in degree. Once having obtained the fourth stage, one will, if not actually be liberated while living, certainly gain bodiless isolation (videha-kaivalya) upon death.35 Following VI. 46, which describes the preeminence of the yogin over an ascetic, ritualist or knower, Madhusudana states that the yogin with imme- diate (aparoksa) knowledge is better than the knower with mere everyday (paroka) knowledge, and the yogin who is a jīvanmukta by having extin- guished mind (mano-nāśa) and destroyed mental impressions (vāsanā-kșaya) is greater than one with immediate knowledge who is not liberated while living, due to lack of such mental cessation. Like Vidyāraņya, Madhusūdana asserts that the highest, living liberated, yogin simultaneously brings about mental cessation, impression destruction, and knowledge of the real (tattva- jñāna). Again, the talk about yogic practice, mental discipline, stages of jīvanmukti, and the threefold means to liberation are all typical of Yogic Advaita, and range far afield from topics considered by Advaita schoolmen, including Madhusūdana's own Advaitasiddhi.

A Note on the Sthita-prajña as "Yogic Jīvanmukta"

In some texts mentioned earlier, the Gītā's sthita-prajña, one with firm wisdom, could be called a "yogic jīvanmukta." Like Advaita's jīvanmukta,

Yogic Advaita III 125

the sthita-prajña is a detached renouncer, but this being gains liberation primarily through yogic practices of controlling the senses and pacifying the mind, rather than by knowing brahman.36 We saw Sankara's relevant Gītā comments (chapter 2) give the sthita-prajña a largely Advaitic cast, however, calling him a brahman-knower and emphasizing his desireless renunciation (samnyāsa).37 Yet we have also seen that the JMV's elaboration on the Gītā's descrip- tion of the sthita-prajña (chapter 7) adds back a significant yogic element to Śankara's emphasis on this being's brahma-jñāna and desire-free renuncia- tion (though in the jīvanmukti context, the sthita-prajña goes unmentioned in other "Yogic Advaita" texts). Vidyāranya speaks of the importance of re- peated practice of vāsanā-removing and sense-controlling samādhi, which becomes "natural" when wisdom is firm (and one is liberated while living). In his aforementioned Gītā commentary, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī also com- bines yoga and Advaita, saying the sthita-prajña/jīvanmukta has both sense- disciplining samädhi, and the direct experience of being brahman. Both also say the jīvanmukta is a desireless vidvat-samnyāsin. Finally, we observed the Advaita-influenced Sāmkhya/Yoga commenta- tor Vijñānabhikșu refer to the Gītā's formulation of the sthita-prajña when describing the characteristics of the jīvanmukta in his Sāmkhyasāra (chapter 5); here, the living liberated being is called an even-minded, undeluded, and detached Self-knower. He is said to reach liberation when the mind is de- stroyed and samskāras attentuated. When the intellect ceases, there is perfect isolation (kaivalya) and the self abides alone. Thus, as with the others men- tioned here, it is fair to call Vijñānabhiksu's liberated being a "yogic jīvanmukta."

Part 3

Embodied Liberation in Neo-Vedanta: Adaptation and Innovation

NINE

Neo-Vedanta and the Transformation of Advaitic Jīvanmukti

In the Introduction, I indicated that Western categories and ways of thinking have had a profound influence on many modern Indian thinkers.1 In the last section of this book, I want to look at this matter more closely. My views here have been particularly informed by Wilhelm Halbfass' India and Europe: An Essay in Understanding,2 which demonstrates brilliantly (from a European perspective) how the "Europeanization of the earth" has affected these thinkers.3 The book argues that the modern encounter of India and Europe was initiated and sustained by the West, and that India had no choice but to respond to this unprecedented, pervasive penetration. Western thought has become so influential in India that even when challenged, it is often presupposed. However, I agree with Halbfass that the modern West's "over- coming" of India does not mean the superseding of Indian thought. "Moder- nity," purportedly neutral, open, and self-questioning, is, like every perspective, a parochial horizon, and the "Europeanization of the earth" is not necessarily good or humanity's end point.4 Those who write about and see themselves as part of Sankara's Advaita tradition have certainly felt the impact of the West. As mentioned earlier, I call these thinkers and/or scholars "neo-Vedantins" to suggest both that they are part of a tradition based on the Upanisads and Sankara's nondualist interpretation thereof,5 and that these figures are participating in and contrib- uting to a new understanding of this Vedanta tradition, one influenced by

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Western premises and categories (imposed and chosen), which include hu- manistic globalism, the importance of egalitarian social ethics, and a focus on psychological experience.6 Such influence is not surprising, as most neo- Vedantins, including such well-known figures as Swami Vivekananda and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, were schooled in educational institutions (often missionary-founded) that follow Western models in administration, curricu- lum, and language of instruction. Thus, to varying degrees, the connection of neo-Vedantins to the Hindu tradition came after a Western, Christian-influenced and English-language-based intellectual formation.7 We shall see that even the relatively more traditional teachings of certain modern figures who them- selves are regarded as jīvanmuktas, such as Ramana Maharshi and the re- cently deceased Sankaracārya of Kanchipuram, Candrasekharendra Sarasvati, show the impact of their early Christian mission school training. Neo-Vedanta has become the primary interpretive model in modern Indian scholarship on Advaita. In this model, one finds both new terms like philosophy and religion (versus darśana or sampradāya) and old terms like dharma and yoga that carry new meaning. Discussing the modern rein- terpretation of long-established Hindu ideas is beyond our scope, though I might mention in passing that the traditional view of dharma as a birth- determined moral and social law unique to Aryans, maintained by Vedic rituals and hereditary duties, undergoes a dramatic change in neo-Vedanta, becoming a global, ahistorical, ethical norm related to a person's dispositions and talents. This "dharma" is found in, though it transcends, all religions. Fortunately, however, the Advaitic concept of jīvanmukti itself offers a vivid illustration of how a traditional Hindu idea has been and is being transformed by Western ways of thinking.8

There is not just one neo-Vedanta view, of course. In the following section of this book, I want to look first at more traditional figures, espe- cially Ramana Maharshi and Candrasekharendra Sarasvati, then some more highly Westernized thinkers, such as Vivekananda and Radhakrishnan. The discerning reader will find as the Vedantins become more "neo," my re- marks become somewhat more critical. I want here to express some am- bivalence about faulting neo-Vedantins for their sometimes tradition-distorting reinterpretation of classical Advaita and occasionally insufficiently self- conscious appropriation of Western ideas. This ambivalence has a number of sources. First is the fact of my own "Westernness," which appears both in my participation in the Western scholarly model and in my personal sympathy for neo-Vedanta tolerance, globalism, and humanism, and its jet- tisoning of various aspects of the tradition like casteism and world devalu- ation long part of foreign critiques.9 Humility and respect are important in

Neo-Vedanta and Transformation 131

any analysis that comes from a tradition that has a history of political domi- nation and "categorical imperialism." Second, enduring traditions build over time a body of writings that later thinkers reflect on and refine. Unlike neo-Vedanta, Sankara's Advaita school has a long history of scriptural learning and exegesis and of rigorous critical thinking (and both the attraction and difficulty of being genuinely "other" to a modern Western worldview). This lack of a tradition of disciplined reflection and critique has contributed to the at times muddled and insufficiently self- aware thought found in neo-Vedanta. I concur with Anantanand Rambachan's view that while scholastic Advaita's reasoning and critical analysis (all under guidance of the Veda, of course) led to good arguments for and against key doctrines, Swami Vivekananda and later neo-Vedantins too often emphasize "experience" while downgrading "mere theory."10 While sympathetic to some of the neo-Vedantins' agendas, I find their reasoning often easier to criticize than the clear, if hard to digest, arguments of traditional Advaitins. Third, I am utilizing these authors' (or their interpreters') English writ- ings in which they inevitably use Western terminology and categories and which clearly indicate that the intended audience is Western (including Indi- ans educated in Western-style schools). Of course, a Western education or writing in English does not necessarily indicate complete enclosure in West- ern thought. In fact, deep knowledge of two traditions can assist in compre- hending each one, as Halbfass and J. L. Mehta illustrate. Perhaps most important is the recognition that all religious traditions- whether broad groupings like "Christian" and "Hindu" or narrower ones like "Episcopalian" and "Advaita"-are products of a never-ending process of assimilation and integration of concepts (and practices) deriving from a va- riety of sources. All thinkers, when attempting to formulate a coherent and plausible worldview, select and interpret from the cultural materials available to them. All people also respond to current personal and social issues before them and look to discover how past traditions may address (or serve) present concerns and interests. Neo-Vedantins struggle, to differing degrees, with the tension between understanding and responding to the Sanskrit- and pandit- dominated commentatorial tradition of scholastic Advaita and the increas- ingly privileged science-influenced historical-critical tradition of Western scholarship. One sees the impact of the latter in a pattern common to many neo-Vedanta scholars of Advaita, who defer to or claim validation from pri- marily Western scholarly "authorities." It is sometimes forgotten that this tradition's "objectivity" and self-questioning skepticism is itself Eurocentric and historically conditioned. Still, one can credit both more traditional thinkers like the Śankarācāryas and the "neo" Vedantins like Vivekananda or Radhakrishnan with being at the forefront of creative religio-cultural assimilation, syncretizing and

132 Embodied Liberation in Neo-Vedanta

harmonizing past and present. During a time of rapid cultural change (not to say breakdown and unrest), they are undertaking two difficult and important tasks: that of self-definition and identity forging and that of mediating be- tween and trying to integrate two (at least) very different cultures. One could fairly say that reinterpreting and finding new meaning in one's tradition is not only a right, but a duty. In this respect, an outsider should listen carefully to neo-Vedantins and honor their ability to speak for and challenge themselves- which in turn can bring Western self-understandings into question. For ex- ample, a number of neo-Vedantins claim that Hindu thought generally, and Advaita in particular, is superior to that of the West, as it goes beyond "mere" philosophical theorizing and analysis or the "dogmatic faith" of religion. Instead, it emphasizes transforming intuitive "experience" and the achieve- ment of fully liberating insight. Documenting and contesting these claims goes beyond our purposes here, but does indicate an attempt to challenge Western "hegemony" of thought. Particularly relevant here is the plausible claim that the very idea of living liberation (vs. mere post-mortem salvation) shows the superiority of Advaitic thought. This assertion has perhaps been inhibited by the constraints, thoroughly discussed earlier, of prārabdha karma on jīvanmukti, and by the tradition's limiting of liberation largely to Veda- knowing male Brahmin renouncers.11 Still, one can argue that making the case for the value of living liberation today is a legitimate task, not only for traditional Advaitins, but also for all modern seekers of wisdom from the Hindu tradition.

The criticisms that I make will focus not on the ultimate truth or value of neo-Vedantic claims, but on a distortion of traditional Advaitic under- standings and ways of knowing and a related lack of self-awareness about certain fundamental premises, goals, and conversation partners among neo- Vedantins (both scholars and advocates) writing on traditional Advaita in general and on jīvanmukti in particular. Within most understandings of Western and Advaitin scholarship, we need to, and indeed it is in our interest to, understand and make explicit our assumptions and represent accurately both our allies and opponents. The limitations mentioned earlier make neo-Vedantic claims less persuasive than they might be otherwise. An important part of the problem is the degree to which Western thought and values have affected modern neo-Vedantic thinkers. This influence has made them, like most in the West, "other" to the classical Advaita tradition. For example, as mentioned earlier, neo-Vedantins do not hold textual exege- sis (Vedic or otherwise) in the same esteem as does scholastic Advaita, and they privilege experience more. Their otherness can be seen as part of the ongoing "Europeanization of the earth" (or at least India) mentioned so

Neo-Vedanta and Transformation a. 133

prominently-and ambivalently-by Halbfass (and Hacker and Heidegger). Yet neither are neo-Vedanta thinkers and scholars fully imbedded in the Western tradition of "critical inquiry," though they often use categories and research methods of Western scholarship. As I will show in the case of jīvanmukti and social service, one often finds neo-Vedantins advocating Vedantic truths rather than analyzing Vedanta as a perspective or an ideol- ogy, or examining specific thinkers and texts in their particular historical context. Not being fully in either tradition, and a lack of self-consciousness about this fact, hinders the neo-Vedantic scholar's ability to contribute to either. While some may find these judgments presumptuous, they are in- tended to increase awareness of our assumptions and bring an even greater understanding of and respect for traditional Advaita thought. As mentioned earlier, I also acknowledge that neo-Vedantins may have good reasons to "update" Advaitic thought, yet still want to argue that accurate representation is one form of respect due to important thinkers, and neo-Vedantins some- times fall short of honoring Sankara and classical Advaita in that way.12

As stated previously, there are degrees of enclosure within the neo- Vedantic perspective. I want to begin with two well-known figures who are commonly regarded as modern Hindu saints, Ramana Maharshi and Candrasekharendra Sarasvati. I start with them for two important reasons: they are less Westernized than many neo-Vedantins, though they are simi- larly mission educated and hold some similar views on religious ecumenism and social service. Their primarily Hindu focus is reflected in their relative lack of concern with Western audiences and English writings. Second, they are religious models of jīvanmukti more than scholars writing about jīvanmukti. They are therefore the best indicators of what counts as living liberation today.

TEN

A Liberated Being Being Liberated: The Case of Ramana Maharshi

The South Indian nondualist Ramana Maharshi is generally regarded as one of the great religious figures in modern Indian history. Most contempo- rary advocates of Advaita consider Ramana our century's best example of a jīvanmukta. His followers even refer to him as Bhagavan, or "God." Perhaps the next most revered modern figure among contemporary Advaitins is the recently deceased senior Śankarācārya of Kanchipuram, Candrasekharendra Sarasvati. Such major religious personages are worth discussing for many reasons, but it is particularly interesting for us to observe how these two figures, thought to be jīvanmuktas themselves, viewed various means to lib- eration (such as renunciation and devotion), what they understood living liberation to be, and how their followers understood them to represent living liberation. As part of our consideration of neo-Vedantic ideas, and to prepare for the final chapter, it will also be valuable to look at how these reputedly liberated beings view other religions, and to consider their positions about the relationship of liberation to the social order and social service in everyday existence (vyavahāra). We will observe the extent to which their understand- ings are consistent with the classical Advaita tradition, and when not, ways in which they have altered it. Both are traditionally Advaitin in a number of ways: they are philosophically nondualist (though terming Ramana an Advaitin is in some ways problematic), are committed to the renouncer ideal, and hold knowing the Self to be more important than practicing yoga or devotion. Both

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The Case of Ramana Maharshi aa 135

are also committed more to Self-realization than social reform, and Can- drasekharendra is a defender of the traditional order of caste and life stage (varņāśrama-dharma). However, I will also argue that both Ramana and Candrasekharendra, in different ways, are examples of figures who creatively adapt the Advaita tradition to modernity. In Ramana's case, this alteration of the tradition can be seen in his advocacy of the primacy of personal experience over scripture and tradition, and in a relatively broad-minded approach to other religions. With Candrasekharendra Sarasvati, we find active promotion of Hindu ecumenism and to some extent concern with social welfare. This advocacy of religious inclusivism, personal experience, and social service is, I have ar- gued, typical of neo-Vedanta. Neo-Vedantin scholars, who generally hold (or have held) posts in Western-style universities in India and often write (in English) for a Western or Western-educated audience, are some of the leading proponents of the teachings of both Ramana and the Sankarācārya. In the next two chapters, I will refer regularly to a prime example of such proponents, the highly influential neo-Vedanta scholar T. M. P. Mahadevan, who was widely read in both Western and scholastic Advaita philosophy, and also was the first director of the Center for the Advanced Study of Philosophy at the University of Ma- dras. Throughout the following chapters, we shall see that while neo-Vedantins like Mahadevan argue that Advaita views are superior to any Western doc- trine, they are also comfortable discussing Advaitic thought using Western categories like "philosophy" and "religion" (and Christian ones like "grace" and "love"), and hold that traditional Advaita provides great resources for the modern Western interests in "experience" and social service. Neo-Vedantins are also, like Ramana, religiously ecumenical (and socially liberal about caste) in ways unlike any traditional Advaitin thinker. In Mahadevan's book on Ramana,1 for example, we find the claim that in order to understand the similarity of Ramana's and Sankara's views, one must recognize that Advaita "is the culmination of all religious sects and philosophical schools [and] the common end of all philosophical endeavour and religious practice (123)." Mahadevan goes on to explain that "[w]hen Sankara points out the defects and inconsistencies in the various schools and cults, he does so not in the spirit of a partisan, but with a view to making them whole (126)." Such an argument is a clear indicator of Mahadevan's neo-Vedantic perspective, for Śankara himself was unreservedly a partisan. In what follows, then, we shall keep in mind the relationship of Ramana, Candrasekharendra Sarasvati, and their interpreters to both traditional Advaita and neo-Vedanta. This chapter will look specifically at aspects of the life and thought of Ramana Maharshi, himself a reputedly liberated being. We will consider Ramana's-or followers' reports of Ramana's-understanding of liberation,

136 Embodied Liberation in Neo-Vedanta

how he viewed various means to liberation (such as devotion and yoga) and other religions, and his position about the role of social service when pursu- ing liberation. Finally, we will explore what Ramana understood living lib- eration to be, and how his followers understood him to represent jīvanmukti.

The Life of Ramana Maharshi

While many are familiar with the outline of Ramana's life,2 it is appro- priate to mention a few key events again here. Ramana, born near Madurai in South India in 1879, was a seventeen-year-old student in a mission high school when he had his famous transformative "death experience," realizing that while the body dies, one is not the body.

I was sitting alone in a room on the first floor of my uncle's house. I seldom had any sickness, and on that day there was nothing wrong with my health, but a sudden violent fear of death overtook me ... I just felt "I am going to die" and began thinking what to do about it .... The shock of the fear of death drove my mind inwards and I said to myself mentally, without actually framing the words, "Now death has come; what does it mean? What is it that is dying? The body dies." And at once I dramatized the occurence of death. I lay with my limbs stretched out stiff as though rigor mortis had set in and imitated a corpse so as to give greater reality to the enquiry. I held my breath and kept my lips tightly closed so that no sound could escape, so that neither the word "I" nor any other word could be uttered. "Well then," I said to myself, "this body is dead. It will be carried stiff to the burning ground and there burnt and reduced to ashes. But with the death of this body am I dead? Is the body I? It is silent and inert but I feel the full force of my personality and even the voice of the 'I' within me, apart from it. So I am Spirit transcending the body. The body dies but the Spirit that transcends it cannot be touched by death. That means I am the deathless Spirit." All this was [seen] as living truth which I perceived directly, almost without thought-process.3

While this passage largely speaks for itself, note particularly the impor- tance of his realization that his essence was not a body and the very fact of the report being firsthand. Traditional Advaitins like Sankara emphasize that one's self is not the body, but they rarely speak of their own experience. It is also interesting to note that Ramana compares death to his body's temporary silence and inertness during which he still feels his personality and "I" voice.

The Case of Ramana Maharshi 137

After this realization, Ramana became an ardent meditator and Siva devotee and journeyed (from Madurai) to the well-known Saiva center of Tiruvannamalai at the foot of Arunacala hill in north central Tamil Nadu. He never again left the city. He quickly became famous for his rigorous austeri- ties, sitting in airless temple corners in deep trance and fasting until forced to eat. According to his biographers, he only now began to read traditional Advaita texts, generally in Tamil. The texts he read and commented upon were not Sankara's classic Upanişad or Brahma-sūtra commentaries, but were works like the Vivekacūdāmani and Ātmabodha, which modern Western scholarship regards as unlikely to be by Sankara. The work considered here to which he refers most often is the "Yogic Advaita" Yogavāsistha (as will be seen later). During this period, Ramana lived a renouncer's life, at first in a cave halfway up the hill. As he steadily gained followers, including his mother and brother, he moved to an ashram at the base of Arunacala hill, and this modest retreat eventually grew to include a temple, school, offices, dis- pensary, library, bookstore, and lodgings for his followers. As time went on, Ramana became more willing to live "in the world"; he ate regularly, read papers and books, did daily chores, and gave audience (darshan) daily. He began to gain Western followers, the best-known being Paul Brunton,4 who was sent to Ramana by Candrasekharendra Sarasvati. All reports indicate that he remained simple, humble, and kindly to all, and much is made of his fondness for animals. There are numerous accounts of the peace and security people felt in his presence, of the serenity his followers gained by his touch or look, and of the profound teaching by his example of perfected living. Ramana's health began to fail in 1948, yet he remained detached to the end, saying the body itself was a disease. He died of cancer in 1950.

The ashram, currently thriving,5 is well-managed by the third genera- tion of Ramana's brother's family and is an oasis of quiet surrounded by the bustling city. Both visitors and resident devotees are generally silent, calm, and often withdrawn. During both of my visits, over 100 were living in or staying at the ashram, including approximately thirty Western devotees; In- dian visitors seemed to be mostly middle-class Tamils. A respectful place (and permanent housing) is given to senior devotees, who continue to em- body and communicate Ramana's message. Dozens take part in the daily round of worship, chanting in Sanskrit and Tamil, and meditation. Ramana's "samadhi hall," where these activities pri- marily take place, is rather spare; most of its decor is large pictures of the sage. The adjoining shrine to Ramana's mother is more traditionally Saiva and includes a number of Ganeśa images. During worship, many people

138 Embodied Liberation in Neo-Vedanta

circumambulate the central pūjā shrine within the hall.6 Ramana's sitting room has become a meditation space, which, on my visits, had an average of twenty-five attendees in late afternoon. His retiring room, still as he left it at death, has become a memorial site, and there are burial shrines to his mother, leading devotees, and favored animals. Fittingly, given Ramana's love of animals, monkeys, dogs, and peacocks freely wander the grounds (though cows are tethered in the gośāla). The lodging rooms are spartan, but clean and comfortable (donations are accepted, but not directly requested). Free vegetarian meals are available to all in residence. These meals, like all activi- ties, are well-organized and begin right on schedule. The ashram also offers a well-attended feeding of sādhus at 11 A.M. daily, as well as a free dispen- sary. The ashram library has a good selection of Hindu religious magazines and Ramana's works, both in Tamil and English, and it is often crowded. Many visitors also take a daily twenty to thirty minute hike to Skandashrama, Ramana's early retreat halfway up Arunacala hill, which has an excellent view of the Tiruvannamalai temple, city, and environs.

Ramana's Writings

Ramana wrote very little, so most of his thoughts come to us filtered through the understandings of his devotees. To discover his views on jīvanmukti and the other topics discussed here, an English speaker's major sources must be two books edited by a Western follower, Arthur Osborne: the already mentioned The Teachings of Bhagavan Sri Ramana Maharshi in His Own Words (henceforth Teach) and The Collected Works of Ramana Maharshi (henceforth CW).7 Both are published by the ashram itself and are in their fifth editions. These texts present a variety of hermeneutical problems. Both books consist of translations (from Tamil), often of oral dialogues, and Osborne writes that some translations by others have been "improved" by him. The Teachings are Osborne's selection, intended "to build up a general exposition of the Maharshi's teachings by selecting and fitting together passages from these dialogues and from his writings." Osborne adds "(n)o distinction is made between the periods at which the Maharshi made any statement (1)." Nor are particular questioners always identified. A final hermeneutical prob- lem is Osborne's self-conscious attempt to avoid using Sanskrit terms "to avoid giving the false impression that the quest of Self-Realization is some intricate science which can be understood only with a knowledge of Sanskrit terminology (Teach, 5)." One can hardly imagine what earlier Advaitins would have made of such a claim! It is certainly the case that Ramana was never concerned with writing down a systematic body of doctrine. As Osborne states, "The Maharsi wrote

The Case of Ramana Maharshi an 139

very little" and "(n)early everything that he wrote was in response to some request, to meet the specific needs of some devotee" (CW, ix). He and his followers claim that his silent presence spoke loudest. While Ramana's re- spect for and knowledge of the classical Advaita tradition is made clear by his reported composition of hymns to Sankara, the founder of Advaita, and his free translations of various stotras and other works (such as the Atmabodha and Drk-drśya-viveka) purportedly by Sankara, he did not feel bound to scrip- tural commentary as did Sankara and many other Advaitins. Unlike earlier Advaitins, Ramana claimed that his reading of texts came after his experience of liberation. He reportedly said that the "strength of experience" is decisive for liberating knowledge, not "the strength of the scriptures (CW, 74)." As mentioned earlier, only after arriving at Tiruvannamalai did he study any Advaita literature, and then he claimed that "the books were analysing and naming what I had felt intuitively without analysis or name (Teach, 4)." In fact, when asked if his teaching was the same as Sankara's, Ramana is said to have replied that his teaching "is an expression of [my] own experience and realization. Others find it tallies with Sri Shankara's (Teach, 9)." The experience-based language here raises both questions of how traditionally "Advaitin" Ramana is and to what extent his ideas have been altered when written down and translated.8 Thus, the Ramana discussed here will be to some degree Osborne's Ramana, although it will be informed by other understandings (such as that of T. M. P. Mahadevan) and my visits to his ashram and conversations with some living devotees. The two most authoritative followers I interviewed, the senior devotee Kunju Swami (now deceased) and the librarian J. Jayaraman, gave views of Ramana consistent with the one found in Osborne's transla- tions. Additional indications of Osborne's reliability as a witness are the fact that he was a favorite devotee and his works are endorsed by the ashram community as a whole. So, given the limitations mentioned earlier, let us proceed to briefly outline Ramana's thought and then look more closely at his views on various means to liberation, social service, and jīvanmukti.

Ramana and the Path to Liberation

Ramana's views are certainly profoundly nondualist and in line (though not identical) with classical Advaita, which holds that all this (idam sarvam) is brahman, and brahman is the Self (ātman). As seen earlier, his greatest emphasis is on Self-inquiry, particularly into the question, "Who am I?" He claims that this inquiry takes one beyond the "I" thought (which identifies itself with the body and is really just the false "I" of the mind or ego) to realize the true "I," the Self. To Ramana, bondage is thinking "I am the

140 ea Embodied Liberation in Neo-Vedanta

body," and liberation arises when the origin of this false "I" (the Self) is seen. From the highest view, Ramana claims, you are really already the Self, eter- nally liberated: "If you consider yourself as the body, the world appears to be external; if you are the Self, the world appears as Brahman manifested (Teach, 41)." There is really no bondage (or liberation), no "doer" or karma, and no body (thus, as we shall see, he denies the distinction between living and bodiless [videha] mukti). In a passage reminiscent of Sankara, Ramana is reported to have said "[r]ealization consists only in getting rid of the false idea that one is not realized. It is not anything new to be acquired. It must already exist or it would not be eternal (Teach, 19)." Further, "[t]here is no goal to be reached. There is nothing to be attained. You are the Self (148)." Ramana often uses the analogy of a cinema show, where the Self is both the lamp and the screen on which the illusory show (whose appearance we take to be real) is projected.9 Ramana always advocates Self-Enquiry as the highest path, but he makes a place for other practices and routes to gain liberation, both within Hinduism and among other religions. This point is worth emphasizing, for Ramana takes an interesting middle position between the sometimes polemical assertiveness of traditional Advaitins (from Sankara even to later Advaitin harmonizers like Appayya Dīkșita) and the expansive ecumenism of modern Western-influenced neo-Vedanta. Osborne provides a good example of neo- Vedanta when he introduces the section on Ramana's views of other reli- gions. Osborne asserts that Ramana "was not opposed to any religion" and "[s]trictly speaking, [Ramana] was not exclusively a Hindu ... since Hindu- ism recognises that one who is established in constant conscious identity with the Self is above all religions; he is the mountain peak towards which the various paths converge (Teach, 62)."10 This statement sounds more like Swami Vivekananda than Ramana. Ramana himself is reported to have said that the utilization of various paths or religions depends "on the temperament of the individual (Teach, 168)."11 He continues, "I approve of all schools. The same truth has to be expressed in different ways to suit the capacity of the hearer (169)." How- ever, "[a]ll these viewpoints are only to suit the capacity of the learner. The absolute can only be one (170)." Further, while Ramana is quoted as holding that "[a]ll methods and religions are the same (Teach, 65)" and that "the highest state is the same" for all (67), whenever pressed, he indicates that all methods lead to, and the "same" highest state is, Advaitic Self-realization. Interpretations may be different due to "upbringing" or "circumstances," but ultimately the (nondual) "experience is the same (67)." Ramana's statements indicate a lack of interest or even impatience with discussions of religious differences; he seems to be more concerned with experientially bridging those divergences. This certainly differs from traditional Advaita's reliance on śruti

The Case of Ramana Maharshi an 141

and dialectic. If doctrines and sacred texts speak of differences, one must look beyond them: "People will not understand the bare and simple truth- the truth of their everyday, ever-present and eternal experience. That is the truth of the Self .... Because [people] love mystery and not the plain truth, religions pamper them-only to bring them around to the Self in the end (Teach, 69)."

Ramana explicitly ranks various methods of liberation in his "Essence of Instruction" (Teach, 209). While inquiry into the "I" leads to dispassion and knowing the Self, "if the aspirant is temperamentally unsuited for Self- enquiry, he must develop devotion," whether to God or guru or some other ideal. Attachment to the object of devotion breeds detachment from all else. "If neither enquiry nor devotion appeals to him, he can gain tranquility by breath control," and if none of these suit the aspirant, "he must try karma marga, the path of good deeds and social service," which develops his "no- bler instincts" and prepares him for one of the other paths (209-10). As mentioned earlier, one can observe the pursuit of all of these paths at Ramana's ashram today. Along with meditative Self-inquiry, there is regular offering of pūjā, Vedic chanting, yogic practice, and social service in the form of feeding and basic medical care. Ramana's ranking and discussion of these various methods illumines both his close relation to traditional Advaita and the influence of neo-Vedanta. First let us consider Ramana's understanding of the role of devotion. Although he always emphasizes the primacy of knowing the Self, he (like Candrasekharendra Sarasvati) seems to speak freely of a God who is infinite, and in a sense "personal," and he quotes statements from the Bible like, "I am that I am (Teach, 57)." He advocates surrender to and trust of God, not so much to gain a Lord's grace, but to burn out other attachments. To Ramana, no God or liberation external to oneself truly exists; the surrender is that of the ego to the Self within (Teach, 57, 195, 201). God is really seen "only in the devotees' mind (65)." Still, one should not object to a person "having a separate God to worship so long as he needs one (199)." Moreover, he is largely unconcerned with any debate between dualism and monism; one must realize the "I," and only then can one know "whether the 'I' will get merged in the Supreme Being or stand apart from Him (Teach, 52)." Complete sur- render is the goal; "[d]o that first and then see for yourself whether the one Self alone exists or whether there are two or more (199)." His own worship of a deity is also ultimately nondual. While he says "Śiva is eternal," Śiva is held to be better known as "Consciousness" and "BE-ing (Teach, 202-3)." When asked about his composition of a number of hymns to Siva and to the sacred hill Arunacala, Ramana is recorded as saying, "[t]he devotee, God,

142 Embodied Liberation in Neo-Vedanta

and the hymns are all the Self (54)" and "[t]he Self is Arunacala (55)." Can- drasekharendra Sarasvati is not so unambiguous. Ramana also claims, particularly in his earlier writings,12 that hatha yoga, āsanas, and breath control are useful, but he never argues that they are more than auxiliaries: "Breath control is only an aid for diving inwards .... On the mind being controlled, the breath is automatically controlled (Teach, 175)." In contrast to the deep trance of yogic samādhi, the samādhi that Ramana advocates allows one to remain aware: "In this state, you remain calm and composed during activity. You realize that you are moved by the deeper Real Self within and are unaffected by what you do or say or think (Teach, 227)." He also states that a mild, vegetarian diet is best, and fasting unnecessary (192). He is unimpressed by kundalinī yoga (186-8), and, like earlier Advaitins, downplays the significance of supernatural powers (siddhi). He is reported to have said, "Enlightened enquiry alone leads to Liberation. Supernatural powers are all illusory appearances created by the power of maya .... They come unsought to some persons through their karma. Know that union with Brahman is the real aim of all accomplishments (CW, 73)." Further, "[t]he spiritual force of Realization is far more powerful than the use of all occult powers (Teach, 220)."13 Ramana, rather surprisingly given his own ascetic background, also rejects traditional renunciation, claiming that one can be in the world and detached. Passages on this topic provide clues to his views on jīvanmukti. He states that even after realization, the knower can act in the world. "Some withdraw to solitary places and abstain from all activity ... [while others] carry on trade or business or rule a kingdom .... We cannot make any gen- eral rule about it (Teach, 228)." To Ramana, the key to renunciation is know- ing you are not the doer. "Knowledge and activity are never mutually antagonistic," and the householder, when detached, is rendering "selfless service" to his family (Teach, 93). Ramana is reported to have said that samnyāsa is "renouncing one's individuality, not shaving one's head and putting on ochre robes (91)," and real brahmacārya is living in brahman, not being celibate (90). This position differs dramatically from traditional Advaita (and Candrasekharendra's views as well). Consistent with his other views, but also differentiating him from ear- lier Advaitins, is the extent of his indifference to intellectual training and textbook study: he is quoted as holding that "[m]ere book learning is not of any great use" to gain liberation (Teach, 7). Followers should attain realiza- tion first and ask questions (about even such basics as the truth of rebirth) later (24). After all, the intellect cannot understand its source (Teach, 52). This view was supported by J. Jayaraman, who was identified to me as the ashram "intellectual" by two devotees. Jayaraman said that cultivating the intellect is useful to a point, but experiencing the Self is the highest goal.

The Case of Ramana Maharshi a 143

Ramana and Social Service

Ramana's views on social service are especially worth considering because he is said to exemplify how a liberated being acts in this life. His emphasis on being detached and knowing the Self rather than doing "good works" is more consistent with classical Advaitic ideas than with modern Indian neo-Vedanta scholars who hold that Advaita has always had a large measure of social concern. Ramana felt that self-reform should precede social reform and that concern about the world's suffering stemmed from the misidentification of body and self.14 He consistently devalues the "external world" and its social reality. To mention an obvious example, while Ramana himself was apparently not caste conscious, he certainly did not take a strong position against the this-worldly inequities of the varnāśramadharma system. On the other hand, he does not endorse it to the degree Candrasekharendra Sarasvati does. Moreover, it is clear from The Teachings that many visitors were inter- ested in, and even troubled about, Ramana's views on "social ethics." When asked about the cause of famine, pestilence, and other miseries, Ramana is said to have responded "[t]o whom does this all appear?" The questioner retorts sharply, "[t]hat won't do. I see misery all around." Ramana's response is uncompromising: "Turn inwards and seek the Self and there will be an end both of the world and of its miseries." When told such an answer is "selfishness," Ramana is said to add, "Because you wrongly identify yourself with the body, you see the world outside you and its suffering becomes apparent to you; but the world and its sufferings are not real. Seek the reality and get rid of this unreal feeling (Teach, 38-39)." Here Ramana is certainly consistent with traditional Advaita in devaluing the merely apparent everyday realm (vyavahāra): "[t]he trouble now is due to your seeing the world outside and thinking there is pain in it. But both the world and the pain are within you (Teach, 40)." Even when specifically asked if a war then underway "is only in the imagination," Ramana replies that it is just a thought of the deluded questioner (41): "All suffering is due to the false notion 'I am the body.' Getting rid of this is knowledge (42)."15 Do sages play any role in ending worldly suffering? Ramana is reported to assert that "mahatmas" (great souls) help by silent centeredness: "Public speeches, outer activity, and material help are all outweighed by the silence of the Mahatmas. They accomplish more than others (Teach, 39)." To Ramana, silence is "the highest spiritual instruction (125)." Ramana seems suspicious that much socially oriented talk and action might really be egotism masquer- ading as altruistic concern for others: "[p]reaching is simple communication of knowledge and can be done in silence also .... Which is better: to preach loudly without effect or to sit silently sending intuitive force to act on others

144 a Embodied Liberation in Neo-Vedanta

(Teach, 105)?" It is not coincidental that many admirers of Ramana, ranging from senior follower Kunju Swami to neo-Vedanta scholar T. M. P. Mahadevan to Western seeker Paul Brunton, specifically refer to his silent presence as ending all questions and leading to serenity and liberation. Brunton is a good example. After sitting in Ramana's presence for over an hour, he writes, "I become aware of a silent, resistless change which is taking place within my mind. One by one, the questions which I prepared in the train with such meticulous accuracy drop away ... I know only that a steady river of quiet- ness seems to be flowing near me, that a great peace is penetrating the inner reaches of my being, and that my thought-tortured brain is beginning to arrive at some rest."16 According to Ramana, the real way to ameliorate the condition of the world is to "remain free from pain" by turning within (Teach, 40), as mahātmas do. "Self-reform automatically results in social reform (98)." Also, "a self- realised being cannot help benefiting the world. His very existence is the highest good (Teach, 108)." In response to the Tibetologist Evan-Wentz ask- ing if the sage's "realization leads to the uplift of mankind without their being aware of it?", Ramana reportedly responds, "Yes, the help is imperceptible but it is still there. A Realized Man helps the whole of mankind, although without their knowledge (107)." The sage does not mix with others, but realizes there are no others to mix with (108). Evan-Wentz then leads Ramana into criticism of the Western notion that one must work "in the world" to be useful. Ramana is said to hold that "Europe or America" are "but in the mind," and when the self is realized "all is realised (108)." Thus, Ramana's lack of Western-style social concern is replaced by a focus on Self-realization, which, one might argue, gets nearer ignorance, the root of all evil, than does addressing any of ignorance's particular effects through social action. This response, of course, appears in a variety of Hindu (and Buddhist) schools of thought. When reporting on Ramana's views about social reform, Mahadevan supports and elaborates on Ramana's view that self-reform must come first: "It very often happens that so-called social service is a self-gratification of the ego," which increases the ego's pride and demoralizes the one served. "It is only such service as that which contributes to the reduction of the ego that is the harbinger of good ... so, unless one seeks to know the true Self, one cannot really serve society .... He who has realised the End and has become liberated while alive works-or more correctly appears to work-for the salvation of the world (loka-sangraha)."17 Ramana's de-emphasis of social service has been problematic for some neo-Vedantins. The Advaita scholar R. Balasubramanian,18 seems to take the neo-Vedantic position that Ramana advocates social activism. He disputes critics who argue that nondualists (and jīvanmuktas) like Ramana "do not

The Case of Ramana Maharshi m. 145

care for the welfare of others and that they do not actively endeavour to remove the misery of the people through social reform."19 He writes that mystics or jīvanmuktas like Sankara and Ramana are a "source of inspiration" and "exemplar[s] of perfect life on earth." For support of this view, Balasubramanian quotes Sankara's Gītā commentary III. 25, calling for one who knows the Self to act on behalf of others (parānugraha) and Ramana's advocacy of detachment and living with "the good."20 Balasubramanian's references here show Ramana's (and Sankara's) spiritual concern for individuals, but not "social reform." He seems to realize this at the end of his article (231). He again denies that Ramana was "indif- ferent to the miseries of the people," and reminds us of the "solace" Ramana's "gracious look" provided to so many. However, Balasubramanian then states that a mystic cannot "be judged exclusively in terms of moral and social activities," which are not the only ways to show concern for others. A sage like Ramana can comfort others "by his benign look and gentle touch, and also by his 'eloquent silence.' " This, of course, is all Ramana claimed to do, as Balasubramanian notes: "Ramana used to say that only those who know the Self can serve others; moral activity, social reform, and community ser- vice undertaken by the rest will be much propaganda and little service." Thus we see here Balasubramanian's attempt to deny Ramana's lack of Western- style social ethics, ethics that Ramana never advocates, ends up by granting its absence. One can certainly argue that Ramana's spiritual service of spreading peace and calm is a sufficient "moral" contribution, unless one (perhaps under the influence of a Western value system) feels that this individualistic effort is insufficient and Western social reform more valuable. Ramana himself comes closest to supporting Western-style social ser- vice in responding to the following question: "But we see pain in the world. A man is hungry. It is a physical reality. It is very real to him. Are we to call it a dream and remain unmoved by his suffering (Teach, 39-40)?" After reiterating that the world of suffering is a dream, he is reported to have answered

But all this is not to say that while you are in the dream you can act as if the suffering you feel in it is not real. The hunger in the dream has to be appeased by dream food. The fellow beings you find hungry in the dream have to be provided with dream food .... Similarly, till you attain the state of Realization and thus wake out of this illusory, phe- nomenal world, you must do social service by relieving suffering when- ever you see it. But even so you must do it without ahankara, that is without the sense of: "It-is-I-who-am-doing-it." Instead you should feel: "I am the Lord's instrument." Similarly you must not be conceited and think: "I am helping a man who is below me. He needs help and I am

146 n Embodied Liberation in Neo-Vedanta

in a position to give it. I am superior and he is inferior." You must help him as a means of worshipping God in him. All such service is serving the Self, not anybody else. You are not helping anybody else, but only yourself (Teach, 102-3).

Thus, Ramana here can be found to accept a subsidiary role for social action. Still, even this, his clearest statement on social service, is hedged by saying such service is part of a "dream," and recognition of it as Self-service is stressed. Also interesting is his (or Osborne's version of his?) reference to being the Lord's instrument. While not completely inconsistent with other passages, this idea is certainly not one Ramana emphasizes.

Ramana on Jīvanmukti

Ramana's views on living liberation are particularly interesting be- cause he has been seen by many people as the preeminent twentieth-century jīvanmukta. Articles or books about Ramana referring to him as liberated while living have been written by the important neo-Vedanta scholars T. M. P. Mahadevan, N. Veezhinathan, and R. Balasubramanian. Mahadevan, who knew Ramana and Candrasekharendra Sarasvati personally, wrote a biogra- phy and summaries of Ramana's works in his Ramana Maharshi: The Sage of Arunacala.21 Mahadevan assumes, rather than argues for, Ramana's sta- tus as a jīvanmukta. He often compares Ramana with Sankara,22 and regards Ramana's views on liberation and other topics as authoritative, precisely because he is a jīvanmukta. N. Veezhinathan's "Bhagavan Ramana-A Jīvanmukta,"23 gives thanks to Mahadevan as teacher, and like him, calls both Ramana and Sankara jīvanmuktas. Veezhinathan's paper largely de- scribes living liberation according to the Yogavāsistha and Bhagavad-Gītā, and he argues that Ramana exemplifies the jivanmukta's characteristics of impression (vāsanā) free devotion and detachment. Such characteristics "were clearly discernable in the Bhagavan [Ramana] whose life and teachings vindicate the ancient truth imparted in the Upanisad-s (17)." Like Veez- hinathan, R. Balasubramanian's aforementioned article refers to Ramana's status in the title "Ramana Maharshi, The Liberated-in-Life," and in it he calls Ramana, like Sankara, an "exemplar of perfect life on earth (230)," the "embodiment of freedom (228)" and the "personification of love (229)."24 Finally, it is worth mentioning that the currently reigning Śankarācārya of Kanchi, Jayendra Sarasvati, also, when asked, called Ramana a jīvanmukta, although the Sringeri Sankarācārya Bharati Tirtha termed him a mahant, but not a jīvanmukta.

The Case of Ramana Maharshi aa 147

While Ramana mentions jīvanmukti in various places and he certainly accepts its existence, remarks about living liberation are usually brief and only in response to queries. For example, when asked a series of questions about jīvanmukti (whether it was possible, the role of karma, etc.), Ramana is reported to have answered, "Why worry about all these things? Does Lib- eration consist in knowing the answer to these questions? So I tell [question- ers], 'Never mind about Liberation. First find out whether there is such a thing as bondage. Examine yourself first (Teach, 213).' " Perhaps his longest statement on jīvanmukti appears in his first work, called "Self-Enquiry," which was compiled from responses to disciple's questions when Ramana was just twenty-two and living in a cave on Arunacala hill. When asked about the characteristics of both the jīvan (living) mukta, and the videha (bodiless) mukta, Ramana is said to have responded that the jīvanmukta is one who realizes "I am not the body; I am Brahman which is manifest as the self." Further, a jīvanmukta is one "endowed with a mind that has become subtle [through prolonged meditation], and who has the experience of the Self (CW, 34)." The state of living liberation is also called attributeless brahman and Turiya (the fourth state beyond limited consciousness).25 Ramana then makes a remark about currently manifesting (prārabdha) karma, a central focus of traditional Advaita when jīvanmukti is discussed. He states that until liberated, one may experience misery due to currently manifesting karma. In accordance with the tradition, Ramana holds that everyone's "course of conduct in this life is determined by prarabdha (Teach, 97)," that one remains embodied here due to prārabdha karma despite being a knower, and that "karma alone is responsible for the activity or inactivity of the sages (CW, 72)."26 He elsewhere adds that the jīvanmukta may appear to lapse into ignorance due to prārabdha, but really he "revels" in the Self alone, and "[a] jivanmukta is one who does not see anything separate from the Self."27 With jīvanmukti, as elsewhere, Ramana wanted to focus the seeker's attention on detachment from the body. He is quoted as saying, "So long as one identifies oneself with the body, all this is hard to understand. That is why it is sometimes said ... that the body of the Realised Man continues to exist until his destiny [karma] has worked itself out, and then it falls away." He uses the traditional Advaitic analogy of bodily continuity being like an arrow loosened from its bow, continuing until it hits its mark.28 "But the truth is that the Realised Man has transcended all destiny and is bound neither by the body nor by its destiny (Teach, 231)." On bodiless liberation (videhamukti), Ramana is reported to have said, "[W]hen even the subtle mind gets resolved, and experience of self ceases,

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and when one is immersed in the ocean of bliss and has become one with it without any differentiated existence, one is called a videha-mukta (CW, 35)." This passage generally accords with traditional Advaita, though the nature of "subtle mind" remains obscure. Ramana seems uninterested in, and in fact disputed, differences between embodied and bodiless liberation. One report has him responding to a question about the difference between these muktis by denying any true distinction: "A jnani with a body is a Jivanmukta and he attains Videhamukti when he sheds the body. But this difference exists only for the onlooker, not for the jnani. His state is the same before and after the body is dropped (Teach, 126)." Both Kunju Swami and J. Jayaraman endorsed this view. He is also reported to have said that "[t]here are no stages in Realization or Mukti. There are no de- grees of Liberation. So there cannot be one stage of Liberation with the body and another when the body has been shed (Teach, 236)." In the final verse of "Reality in Forty Verses," Ramana is quoted as claiming, "If it is said that Liberation is of three kinds, with form, without form and with and without form, we say Liberation is the destruction of the ego which dis- cusses whether it is with form, without form and with and without form (CW, 119)."29 Ramana recognized that there are different views on this matter; he is reported to say that "Jivanmukti and Videhamukti are differ- ently described by different authorities; Videhamukti is sometimes said to occur even when the man is seen with a body (Talks, 213)."30 However, although "[b]ooks speak of different kinds of Liberation" (that is, jīvan- and videha-mukti), "[t]here may be different stages on the path but there are no degrees of Liberation (Teach, 200)." In a later dialogue, which, after rearrangement and expansion by devo- tees, was designated "Spiritual Instruction," Ramana addresses the nature of the knower or jñānī (CW, chapter 4). The jñānī is said to belong to the fourth of seven stages of knowledge (jñānabhūmis, as mentioned in the Yogavāsistha and Jīvanmuktiviveka), and stages 4-7 are said to be based on experiences of the jīvanmukta or "realized person (CW, 70-1)." Although seven stages are mentioned, Ramana again states that there is no distinction in stages of knowl- edge once released; the ego of the jñānī dies in the fourth stage (71).31 In "Self-Enquiry," he is said to have held that categories of brahman-knowers are used "[b]ecause of the grades in misery and happiness," but the distinc- tions are only from the standpoint of the observer, really "there are no dis- tinctions in release gained through jnana (35)." While Ramana's aforementioned views are certainly comfortably within Advaitic orthodoxy, he does not appear to have read the scholastic writers on this topic. Still, jīvanmukti is mentioned at the end of his introduction to his paraphrase of the probably pseudo-Śankaran Vivekacūdāmaņi. He says that attaining the "state of freedom from duality is the real purpose of life, and

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only he who has done so is a jīvanmukta." According to Ramana, Sankara declares the jīvanmukta "to be free from the bonds of threefold karma (sanchita, agami, and prarabdha). The disciple attains this state and then relates his personal experience. He who is liberated is indeed free to act as he pleases, and when he leaves the body, he abides in Liberation and never returns to this birth (CW, 198)." Actually, Sankara never specifically writes of threefold karma, nor does he endorse "relating one's own experience." As with most subjects, Ramana's views here show both continuity with and change from traditional Advaita. Finally, one should note that Ramana, like Sankara (and unlike many modern neo-Vedantins), makes few references to the ethical actions of the jīvanmukta. He reportedly said, "[i]f a man is Self-realized, he cannot tell a lie or commit a sin or do anything wrong," though even here Ramana adds, "Self-enquiry is quite enough for acquiring all the divine qualities; [one] need not do anything else (Teach, 162)." In a different context, Ramana is said to claim that the jīvanmukta's "actions should be taken to be only divine mani- festations on the plane of humanity .... He lives only for the good of the world (Talks, 423)." This statement is in line with the neo-Vedantic view, and one may wonder here about the exact terms Ramana himself used.

In the preceding pages, I have attempted to show how a reputedly liberated being talks about liberation and goes about being liberated. Ramana primarily preached and practiced meditative Self-inquiry, leading to knowl- edge of nondual brahman. I have also tried to show that while some consider Ramana Maharshi an uncontroversial representative of traditional Advaita, it would be more accurate to say that Ramana's ideas are generally consistent with Advaitin thought, but he did not feel bound to the tradition of Sankara. Ramana, unlike classical Advaitins, shows little interest in making distinc- tions among religious paths and faiths, and he emphasizes personal experi- ence over scriptural tradition. Yet on the issue of Western-style social service, Ramana appears quite traditional; instead of social reform, he emphasizes the primacy of knowing the Self and the grace of the silent presence of the teacher. And to the degree he says anything about living liberation, his views would be unobjectionable to earlier Advaitins. Thus, Ramana Maharshi, while not a completely traditional Advaitin, can be seen in part to bridge the gap between Śankara's Advaita and modern neo-Vedanta. After a brief look at Sri Aurobindo's views on jīvanmukti, we turn to another figure who bridges this gap, and who is also the main competitor for Ramana's preeminent status as a contemporary jīvanmukta, Candrase- kharendra Sarasvati, about whom all the earlier named neo-Vedantins have also written.

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A Note on Sri Aurobindo on Jīvanmukti

Sri Aurobindo Ghose, the nationalist turned mystic and founder of Integral Yoga, is another not-quite-Advaitin who mentions jīvanmukti occa- sionally. In this (and many other) context(s), his perspective is similar to, but more world-affirming than, the Advaita of Sankara (or Ramana). Most inter- esting here is Aurobindo's consideration of how one can remain in māyā while a jīvanmukta. It seems that liberation while still living, in a body with a personality, makes more sense from Aurobindo's viewpoint than from Śankara's. Since Aurobindo holds that existence, from grossest Matter to highest Spirit, is an integral unity, the deluded individuated self (jīva) is real and can evolve back to its Spirit-ual basis (Supermind). Put another way, for Aurobindo brahman includes māyā, and māyā is dynamic (śakti), including its derivations of mind and body. True (integral) liberation is not separation from samsāra, but realization of the Divine (brahman) in the Divine. Thus, while traditional Advaita must resort to a logically suspect notion of a trace of ignorance remaining after knowledge, Aurobindo does not need to reject lower levels of truth or hold that the body is inevitably bound by karma. To Aurobindo, activity assists you to liberation, whereas to Sankara, actions can not bring you to liberation because they are part of the realm of samsāra.32 Still, Aurobindo's viewpoint on jīvanmukti is in many ways Advaitic. When writing about various states of Self/brahman, Aurobindo states that a jīvanmukta is "one who lives and is yet released in his inner self from the bondage of phenomenal existence." He continues that "brahman, as realized by the jivanmukta ... is that which we usually term Parabrahman, the Su- preme Eternal and the subject of the most exalted descriptions of the Vedanta (XII, 15)."33 He makes a number of remarks on jīvanmukti in his commentary on the Ishavasya Upanisad, focusing on detached action or nişkāma karma. He defines mukti as release from ignorance (thinking that you are bound) and the knowledge that all is and always will be brahman, so one cannot be bound. One then acts without fear, knowing "once free, always free. Even if he is reborn he will be reborn with full knowledge of what he really is, of his past lives and of the whole future and will act as a Jivanmukta (XII, 463)." A jīvanmukta is ready to live even 100 years, but is utterly detached from his body (464).34 Desireless (nişkāma) karma is beyond bondage, so one can be liberated even while acting. "Both the teaching and practice of the greatest Jivanmuktas and of Bhagavan [Krishna] himself have combined Jnana and Niskama karma as one single path to mukti (461)." In accordance with Śankara, he holds that "no one who possesses a body can be free from karma," and without mukti, "this karma will forever bind him." Further, "even if he is Mukta, his body and mind are not free from karma until his body is dropped

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off, but go on under the impulse of prarabdha until the prarabdha and its fruits are complete (461-2)." When asked about the central Advaitic problem of how one can be both mukta and bound, Aurobindo responds (as Guru in the text)

The Jivanmukta is not indeed bound, for he is one with God and God is the master of His prakrti, not its slave; but the Prakrti attached to this Jivatman has created causes while in the illusion of bondage and must be allowed to work out its effects, otherwise the chain of causation is snapped and the whole economy of nature is disturbed .... In order to maintain the worlds therefore, the Jivanmukta remains working like a prisoner on parole,35 not bound indeed by others, but detained by him- self until the period previously appointed for his captivity shall have elapsed (XII, 462).

He later adds, "When we know the Self and experience our true Self, then we are masters of our Prakrti and not bound by her creations (XII, 465)." Aurobindo's interpretation here recasts the problem in terms of Sāmkhya- Yoga notions of prakrti and God (īvara), which allows him to say that the jīvanmukta controls his actions and remaining embodiment.

Aurobindo wrote a poem called Jivanmukta, which stresses silence, timelessness, and the ecstasy of liberation. His language here is far more world affirming than is typical of traditional Advaita. As he says when com- menting on the poem, "[t]he subject is the Vedanta ideal of the living liber- ated man-Jivanmukta-though perhaps I have given a pull towards my own ideal which the strict Vedantin would consider illegitimate (V, 581)." He writes that the poem is "a transcript of a spiritual condition" and expresses "the essential spiritual emotion of the state." It is a "feeling of possession by the Ananda rapture ... the tremendous and beautiful experience of being ravished, thoughtless and wordless, into the 'breast' of the Eternal who is the All-Beautiful, All-Beloved (IX, 436)." The poem indicates that, "Although consenting here to a mortal body,/He [the jīvanmukta] is the undying; limit and bond he knows not." His soul enjoys "Infinity and the sempiternal All is his guide and beloved and refuge (V, 576)." We have come a long way from Śankara here.

ELEVEN

Candrasekharendra Sarasvati: Śankarācārya and Jīvanmukta?

Unlike absolute renunciates like Ramana Maharshi, Śankarācāryas, while celibate ascetics, have duties traditionally associated with being leaders of Brahminical or Smārta Hinduism. The model is obviously Advaita's founder, "Ādi" Śankara. Like the first Śankara, Šankarācāryas today play a variety of roles, including teacher/scholar, administrator, and spiritual leader.1 In addi- tion to effectively representing and transmitting this tradition, Candrasek- harendra Sarasvati, the recently deceased Sankarācārya of Kanchipuram, is also widely regarded (by Advaitins and others) as the foremost contemporary example of a jīvanmukta. His stature is indicated in William Cenkner's state- ment that "[h]e, Sri Ramana Maharshi, and Sri Aurobindo Ghose have domi- nated South India as religious personalities in modern times, but the Śankarācārya has the broadest appeal and effectiveness among the people."2 T. M. P. Mahadevan, a particularly ardent devotee of Candrasekharendra, writes that the Sankarācārya is "[c]ast in the image of Ādi Sankara, the immaculate Sage is divine and yet human; his saving grace is universal in its sweep; his concern is for all-even for the lowliest and the last."3 Shortly before his death in January 1994, the popular journal Hinduism Today praised Candrasekharendra's almost century-long "distilled piety and unremitting selfless service in the cause of Sanatana Dharma," and refered to government plans to issue a commemorative stamp and coin honoring him.4 In the following chapter, in addition to the Sankarācārya's statements about jīvanmukti and the methods to attain liberation, I will consider his views on other religions and social service, which are an interesting mix of

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Candrasekharendra Sarasvati ac 153

traditional Advaita, in which he emphasizes Self-knowledge, Vedic study, and performing dharmic duties, and neo-Vedanta, in which he concurs with its emphases on religious ecumenism and social service. Both aspects are of course significantly influenced by his role as Sankarācārya, especially in a time of great cultural change. In fact, his successor Jayendra Sarasvati has expanded the emphasis on social reform and the opening to new, non-caste groups. It is worth observing how any Sankarācārya works to conserve and update the Hindu tradition, and the interest is only enhanced when this project is undertaken by a reputedly liberated being.5 One of the most intriguing points of tension between traditional and modern views in Candrasekharendra's thought is his expansive notion of Hinduism as "religion" versus his far more restrictive view of Hinduism as "social system" (i.e., the varņāśrama-dharma). Put another way, he is far more concerned about Hindu orthopraxy than orthodoxy. We shall see that the Śankarācārya shows great ecumenical inclusivism for different views within Hinduism and toward other religions; for example, he long allowed Indian Muslims and Westerners of all types to visit and talk with him.6 On the other hand, he fully endorses some of the most conservative social prac- tices of Brahminical Hinduism, such as supporting Brahmin and samnyāsin privilege as well as wives' submission to their husbands. On this and other issues, Candrasekharendra embodies in a most interesting way the puzzle of how to be "modern" while still representing traditional Smārta Hinduism. Many contemporary (Brahmin) Advaita scholars who represent neo- Vedanta also wrestle with this issue, and it is no coincidence that a number of them have close relationships with the Kanchi Sankarācaryas.7 Many of these scholars have taught at the University of Madras (thus near Kanchi) and count Candrasekharendra as their paramaguru, as do the more traditional scholars at the Madras Sanskrit College and Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute (KSRI) in Mylapore. In fact, when in Madras, the Śankarācārya stayed and gave talks at the latter's grounds. Further, the KSRI library is housed in Candrasekharendra Sarasvati Hall, and pandits affiliated with the Sanskrit College helped train both the reigning and future Sankarācāryas.8 It would be fascinating, but beyond my goals here, to examine the relationships and influences of these figures on one another. Instead, we shall begin with a review of the Sankarācārya's life, noting particularly aspects relevant to his views on "society" and "religion," and how he integrates tradition and modernity.

The Life of Candrasekharendra Sarasvati

Candrasekharendra Sarasvati was born in central Tamil Nadu (Villupuram) in 1894 and began his education at an American mission school.9 Unlike Ramana, however, he was an outstanding student, excelling at

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languages. He was chosen to become the sixty-eighth Kanchi Sankarācārya at age thirteen. He spent most of the next decade studying classical Advaita texts (in Sanskrit), learning the branches of Vedic knowledge, and otherwise preparing himself for his life's work. He lived in Kumbakonam, not setting foot in Kanchi until 1931. He began the first of many walking tours (yātra) of India in 1919. On his tour, Candrasekharendra both lectured in Sanskrit to other pandits and gave eloquent popular discourses. In these talks, he at- tempted to revitalize the traditional teachings and customs of the Hindu dharma, while still being aware of cultural changes. From the start, he met with harijans ("untouchables"), Muslims, and Christians, which certainly was a major innovation for a Šankarācārya, traditionally the locus of Brahminical purity.10 His popular following was greater than that of any prior Sankarācārya. He traveled throughout South India over the next decade, speaking, perform- ing pūjās, and consecrating temples. According to Mahadevan, the San- karācārya's presentations included "[t]he essentials of Hindu dharma, the obligatory duties, the supreme duty of being devoted to God, the harmony of the Hindu cults, the significance of the Hindu festivals and institutions, the cultivation of virtues, and the grandeur of Advaita ("Sage," 37)." Robert Slater adds that Candrasekharendra's tours allowed him to gain "intimate acquaintance with the life of the people and shape his teaching to their chang- ing needs [which showed] his concern not only for their spiritual but also their physical welfare,"11 such as his interest in cooperative projects for vil- lage improvement. Spiritual welfare came first, however; as the Sankarācārya also said (to Paul Brunton), "[n]othing but spiritual understanding between [nations and peoples] will produce goodwill and thus bring real peace and prosperity."12 We shall look more closely at the relative emphases on the aforementioned themes in the following pages. While not playing any overtly political role during the Indian struggle for statehood, Candrasekharendra endorsed nationalist activity in a way Ramana never did. In the 1920s and 1930s, he met with a number of nationalists, including a cordial meeting with Gandhi in 1927 (though they disagreed on the merits of the caste system and whether or not harijans could enter temples).13 When India achieved independence, the Sankarācārya lamented communalism and issued a statement which says in part, "For a long time our country has striven for freedom; by the Grace of God, by the blessings of sages, and by the unparalleled sacrifices of the people, freedom has came (sic) to us. Let us pray to the all-pervading God that he may shower his Grace so that our country will become prosperous, being freed from famine conditions, and the people will live unitedly and amicably without any communal strife ("Sage," 52)." This statement clearly indicates the Sankarācārya's ecumenism and this worldly social concern, which differ significantly from that of world devaluation and philosophical disputation prevalent in traditional Advaita.

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He also differs here from Ramana Maharshi. Candrasekharendra visited Tiruvannamalai in both 1929 and 1944 for a month during a festival, decades after Ramana settled there, but the two never met. Ramana of course never left his ashram, and it would have been unseemly for the Sankarācārya to go to Ramana, but, given Candrasekharendra's interest in Hindu ecumenicity, one wonders if attempts to arrange such a meeting were made. It certainly would have been fascinating to hear the conversation of the two most promi- nent modern Advaitin "jīvanmuktas." The fact that neither considered it imperative to meet is another indication of Ramana's unconcern with adher- ing to the classical Advaita tradition. In this context, it is also interesting that two years later, in response to Paul Brunton's request for a guru (including possibly the Sankarācārya himself), Candrasekharendra said he was too busy for personal pupils and sent Brunton to Ramana with his endorsement ("Sage," 33-34). After a lengthy yätra in northern India,14 Candrasekharendra spent the next three decades performing a wide variety of duties. He continued to promote the study and teaching of Sanskrit and Vedic literature; he also favored mass education, especially if it included moral instruction. Can- drasekharendra regularly met with leaders of other religious institutions to promote unity, teaching of dharma, and otherwise supporting Vedic tradi- tions. He had a great concern for temple renovation and the popular obser- vation of appropriate dharmic duties and Vedic ceremonies. He also organized assemblies of pandits, conferences for scholars, and publications about Advaita. Finally, he advocated social service for the needy. He initiated charitable giving by his followers to feed the poor and low caste and to pay for crema- tions, medical services, and talks on dharma to prisoners. His work in each of these dimensions has borne fruit: today there are trusts set up to support schools and conferences and to establish a university at Kanchi (called Candrasekharendra Sarasvati Vidyalaya, which I saw under construction outside Kanchi in 1997) to teach both traditional Vedic and modern Western subjects, funds to provide income for temple renovation and for worshippers (arcaka) who memorize and recite hymns, and a social service foundation to provide for the needy. Given all of these activities, it is no surprise that Kanchi is the wealthiest Sankarācārya pīțha in India. In 1954, when he was sixty, Candrasekharendra selected and began to train his successor Jayendra Sarasvati, who was then nineteen. In 1957, he celebrated his 50th anniversary as Sankarācārya and spent two years in Madras performing pūjās and temple consecrations and giving talks that often had the themes of Advaita's all-inclusive nature and the goal of interreligious under- standing. He continued his travel through Tamil Nadu and Andhra Pradesh until the early 1970s and then turned the affairs of the matha over to Jayendra Sarasvati.15 From that time on, he generally lived in silence and seclusion. He

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died in January 1994 at the age of ninety-nine and tens of thousands came to Kanchi to mourn his passing.

Candrasekharendra and the Hindu "Religion"

Candrasekharendra's teachings, at least according to his popular lec- tures in Madras, mentioned earlier, are an interesting mix of traditional and neo-Vedanta. Unlike in Ramana's case, these discourses were formally pre- pared by the Šankarācārya himself, and his command of English was re- ported to be quite good. The lectures range over a wide variety of topics in Hinduism and Vedanta, but often focus on the nature of the Veda and dharma, the all-embracing character of Hinduism, and the importance of devotion (which ultimately is identical with knowledge).16 Candrasekharendra both uses and brings into question problematic Western terminology like "Hinduism" and "religion." He begins one talk by saying, "The name Hinduism which is used now to denote our religion was unknown to our ancestors and is also unknown to the common man among us (Aspects, 1)." Elsewhere, he states, "It is a misnomer to call our religion as 'Hinduism.' That is the name given to it by the foreigner as the religion of the people who lived on the banks of the Sindhu. The more proper name is to call it Vaidikamata, the religion of the Vedas. It is also called Sanatana- dharma, the eternal religion [which existed] from time immemorial (Call, 33)." To Candrasekharendra, the beginningless Vedic "religion" preexisted all "founded" religions. As source of all religion, the Vedas originally "minister[ed] to the spiritual needs of mankind as a whole (Aspects, 2)." They are also "the taproot of all sects of our religion. Whatever denomination we may belong to, our common allegiance is to the Vedas (Aspects, 3)." Like many neo-Vedantins, Candrasekharendra holds to the view that Vedic teaching was the original and best religion, and that since all religions grew from the Veda and lead to the same goal, all should be respected. Mahadevan reports him to say that a "resurgent and strong Hinduism is necessary not only for the salvation of the Hindus but also for the betterment of the world. The Veda ... is not a sectarian text. Whatever truth was de- clared by any great prophet can be traced to the Vedas" ("Sage," 57)."17 While using the modern term spirituality, Candrasekharendra follows Advaita tradition by repeatedly arguing that all must follow the Veda. "[A]ll spirituality must be firmly established on a high moral code, which involves the doing of what is prescribed and the avoidance of what is prohibited (Aspects, 17)."18 He adds, "the first stage in the spiritual ladder is the due performance of the obligatory duties prescribed in the sastras19 (22)." These include wearing the sacred thread, propitiating ancestors, and so on. If the

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Veda is unclear, one should follow the smrtis and example of good people. Here and elsewhere, the Sankarācārya laments modern India's secularism and falling away from Veda study and ritual performance (Call, 85, 125). He is quoted in Hinduism Today to say, "People have given up a lot of the shastric rules. If I myself were to relax them, how much more lax will the people become?" He criticizes modern subjectivist and psychologistic ten- dencies: "Now-a-days, however, the fashion is ... to give the first place to what is called one's conscience relegating all the other prescribed guidances to a secondary place, or, as is often done, to condemn them as meaningless and irrational (Aspects, 20)." Unlike Ramana and many influenced by the modern West, Candrasekharendra does not put personal experience above Vedic revelation. Still, as mentioned earlier, Candrasekharendra is a keen advocate of harmony among Hindus and between Hindus and other religions. His ecumenicity and humanitarianism, like his use (despite reservations) of cat- egories like "Hindu" and "religion," is shared by well-known neo-Vedantins like Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan and Swami Vivekananda. The Šankarācārya certainly looks beyond Hinduism in a way rare in earlier Vedantic thought. Both Mahadevan and Candrasekharendra himself seem to see his role as being a "jagadguru" or world teacher in a way that would be foreign to traditional Advaitins.20 As Mahadevan writes, "the Sage's teachings are meant for the entire mankind. Even when they are addressed to the Hindus, they are applicable mutatis mutandis to the followers of other faiths ("Sage," 15)." Candrasekharendra was an advocate for the neo-Vedanta view favoring reli- gious harmony and argues that "the teaching of the Vedas" is that there are "many paths to the same goal (Call, 26)." He writes that "[w]hen it is realised that all paths in religion lead to the same goal, there will be no need to change the path one is already following (Aspects, 46)."21 Mahadevan further reports the ankarācārya to say that "[a]s the God of all religious denominations is one, there is no need to give up one religion and adopt another. This does not mean that all the religions are uniform; uniformity is not important; what is important is unity; and all our faiths are united in proclaiming the supreme reality of one God ("Sage," 56)."22 In a statement reminiscent of Ramana, Candrasekharendra adds that, "religions are many only to cater to the differ- ent tastes of man (56)." The neo-Vedantin Mahadevan both speaks for himself and accurately represents Candrasekharendra's views when he writes that "[t]he special contribution of Hinduism to the world's history of religions is the truth that there are as many modes of approach to Godhead as there are minds. And yet, on account of misunderstanding and narrowness, the followers of the different cults of Hinduism have indulged in quarrels sometimes ("Sage," 47)." Mahadevan states that Candrasekharendra, on the other hand, wants "to

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call attention to the golden thread of unity that runs through the differing sects and keep alive the idea of unity, the central theme of Hinduism (Call, 134)." Candrasekharendra both pleads for Hindus to become unified and argues that unity is the basis of Hinduism. He worked particularly hard for unity between Saivas and Vaisnavas in Tamil Nadu and organized a number of conferences to promote such unity. He says that a "fellow feeling between the different sects" is needed, and that it is an "article of faith" for Hindus that different religious sects are "only various phases of one Eternal Religion (Call, 134-5)." To Candrasekharendra, "according to all our scriptures and the teachings of all the great masters, Siva and Vishnu are one ("Sage," 56)."23 These statements are, of course, highly debatable and are key elements of the neo-Vedanta view. Interestingly, Candrasekharendra claims that the Hindu tendency to accommodate and reconcile other views starts from Sankara's Advaita. Ig- noring Sankara's many polemical statements against other schools, he speaks of the "catholicity of Advaita" and asserts that Sankara believed that "no school of thought is foreign to Advaita," which "comprehends every warring sect and system into its all-embracing unity." He continues that "the survival of Hinduism is itself due to this Advaitic temper (Call, 225)."

Like Ramana, the Sankarācārya endorses different teachings for differ- ent levels of spiritual awareness. He urges all Hindus, who are overwhelm- ingly householders, to follow dharma, worship God by pūjā, japa (chanting), and prayer, and to follow the possibly universal but certainly Western ethical standards to do good, be kind, and live a simple life. Only a few (such as pandits and students in the matha) can purify the mind through meditation, or comprehend the highest teaching, nirguna brahman of Advaita.24 Can- drasekharendra seems even more open than Ramana (or Sankara) to the worship of God as a start on the path to liberation, and he refers to devotion (bhakti) toward a personal Lord in many discourses. He argues, "When practicing devotion, it is enough if one has knowledge of a sort of God. Without such knowledge there can be no devotion. Starting with devotion to God limited by name and form, if one later realizes the unlimited nature of God, the limited will then be transcended. Yet, to realise the unlimited, one must start with devotion to the limited (Aspects, 39)." Further, even jñānins enjoy "the delights of contemplating God's form and features (Call, 240)." Still, Candrasekharendra holds that ultimately Hindus do not have many gods; instead "we think of God in many ways and worship Him in many forms. We give a separate name to each of these forms to help us in our acts of worship and contemplation ... [but] the One can manifest itself and be worshipped according to the tastes and the capacities of the worshippers, and according

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to the innumerable varieties of functions of Divinity ... How can there be higher or lower, superior or inferior, when in reality there are not two, but it is only One God manifested differently (Aspects, 42-43)?" When discussing image worship, the Sankarācārya makes a similar point:

Our religion recognizes the psychological limitations of ordinary men. Not all of them can at one bound contemplate God in His abstraction from physical features. For directing the mind towards God and keep- ing it steady during contemplation of Him, a concrete image or idol is an invaluable help. The frail mind must go from the concrete to the abstract, from the forms of God in images to God without form ... [Finally], even though in the ultimate conception He is formless, there is nothing inherently impossible in His assuming a variety of forms for the sake of His devotees (Aspects, 59-60).

As the aforementioned suggests, Candrasekharendra is finally an Advaitin, however. He says that devotion ultimately leads to nondual knowl- edge (jñāna), for "[t]he goal of bhakti is the annulment of duality and the attainment of oneness (Aspects, 26)." While one begins by choosing a par- ticular form of god (istadevatā), as one "progresses in his devotion and con- centration, he will be led on to the One where the differences disappear (Aspects, 43)."25 He also states "[u]ltimately, being oneself is to realize one's true Self which is God. That is the consummation of bhakti (Aspects, 26)." The highest truth is thus Advaitic: the knower or jñānin is the highest being, and realizes that one is the ātman, not the body, and ātman is brahman. Candrasekharendra at times sounds much like Ramana: "By proper training one should learn to detach the atman from the body and its parts. The sense of the 'I' must be separated from the body. When this happens, the sufferings will be understood as pertaining to the body and the person will be unaffected by them (Aspects, 30)." He concludes that "[h]aving attained this goal of unitive consciousness with the Supreme, nothing remains to be deemed higher than that ... One who has acquired it is a true jnani (30)." According to Mahadevan, the Šankarācārya also states that "[t]he man of wisdom, the Sage, is the ideal of man. He has no attachment and aversion; praise and blame are equal to him ... Moksha or release is not a post-mortem state; it is the eternal nature of the Self. The jñānī realizes this; and hence there is no more travail for him ("Sage," 57-58)." Thus, the jñānin is a jīvanmukta. But, according to Mahadevan's report, Candrasekharendra goes on to hold the neo-Vedantic view that such a jñānin/jīvanmukta is not tied to Advaita or Hinduism: "Such jnanis have appeared at all times and in all places. Their presence is a blessing to the world ... There is no discord or divergence of views among the wise. The peace that passeth understanding is what they

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spread (58)." A reader of Vivekananda's works might again be struck here at the similarities with Candrasekharendra.

Candrasekharendra and the Social Order

Despite his favoring of Hindu (and even global) unity in worship, Candrasekharendra is far more traditional in his support of the hierarchical societal divisions in the varnāśrama-dharma system and a woman's submis- sion to her husband. Like earlier Advaitins, the Sankarācārya sees important differences between people in everyday reality. He argues that the traditional caste and life stage divisions are proper (even if "arrogance" about them is not), and that social service, while valuable, is secondary to Self-knowledge. On these topics, his role as guarantor of the Smārta tradition continues. Concerning caste, he acknowledges that many foreigners and Indians criticize the caste system, and that "in the context of modern life, the rules of caste are not practiced as before," but he wants to inquire into whether caste "is so bad and injurious as it is said to be (Aspects, 48)." The caste system "was designed for the smooth functioning of society ... each man doing his allot- ted duty and all contributing to the general welfare of the community (49)." Candrasekharendra claims that "[t]he main argument against caste is that it has led to conflicts (48)." Actually, the main arguments by foreigners and many modern Indians have been that it is discriminatory and oppressive, and thus its injustices have led to conflict. But Candrasekharendra holds that since conflict due to caste is comparatively recent, while the system has survived for thousands of years, "[t]hat it has survived all through shows it is not so bad after all. If it were really injurious to society, our ancestors would have abolished it long ago (48)." It is notable here that he uses historical continu- ity, not Vedic scripture, to support his position. He compares "quarrels" over caste to controversies over differing forms of government and language, and points out that no one recommends abolishing these things (though few hold that either language or government are inherently unjust). He then concludes that instead of abolishing caste, "the sane view is to retain the thing for its good and eliminate the root cause of the evil (49)." What is the root cause of the evil in caste? It is when "one caste consider[s] itself superior to another," for which "there is no justification (49)." Such an argument certainly flies in the face of the numerous justifications of superiority, or at least hierarchy, in classical dharma-śāstra.26 "We should think only of the duties of our respective castes without any consciousness of superiority or inferiority (50)." Here Candrasekharendra seems to fall some- where between ardent defenders of the transcendentally ordained dharma and the modern reformers in India who find the caste structure itself, not "feelings

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of superiority" about one's caste, to be the root evil. On the one hand, he states that "[w]hatever be one's caste, if one has devotion to God, one can become divine in essence (50)." However, despite our inherent similarity in divine essence, he also argues that there are "certain restrictions [which] pertain to marriages and personal observances. They are restrictions which each caste imposes on itself; they are not imposed from outside (49-50)." Again, we see a human- (vs. Veda-) centered legitimation. Further, many would dispute such a benign understanding, which could fairly be called Brahmin-centered. Mahadevan and other (Brahmin) neo-Vedantins ignore the elitist implications of this outlook, and one should note that Candrase- kharendra's successor, Jayendra Sarasvati, has moved some distance beyond this view. Candrasekharendra also gives a benign interpretation of the rationale for the duties of the Brahmin caste. He states that Brahmins are obliged to take on the lifetime job of learning the Veda, and "[p]ursuit of other avoca- tions will interfere with" this task (Aspects, 5)." To preserve the Veda, Brah- mins "are forbidden from engaging in other pursuits [and those with other avocations] have been prohibited from learning the Vedas. This is not to be understood as discriminating against them. This has been ordained only to ensure that they discharge their own functions in society undistracted by other pursuits (5)." (He ignores here the view of Sankara and later traditional Advaitins that only learning the Veda allows one to enter the path to libera- tion, and access to the Veda is limited to twice-born males.) Candrasekharendra shows an awareness of viewpoints that question Brahmin prerogatives: "[T]his is not to be understood as giving the Brahmin a privileged position in society, nor is he to be considered as a parasite on society (6)." The Brahmin tradi- tionally has accepted his duty to look after the "spiritual welfare" of others with "joyous willingness," though "[u]nfortunately, in modern times, most brahmins have neglected this duty and are pursuing professions proper to others in the society (6)." He goes on to make the tradition-altering argument that "[c]aste-con- sciousness can be eradicated only if one is filled with regard for dharma, is imbued with bhakti, and has acquired jnana," like holy men and sages (As- pects, 50). It is in one sense true that, as Candrasekharendra states, single- minded bhaktas and jñānins have "no caste consciousness," but such figures have been rare and either passively ignore or actively reject the mainstream dharmic order. He continues that the "[a]rrogance of caste superiority is a sin according to our sastras (50)." While one cannot ask for scholarly documen- tation in a public discourse, such a claim ignores much textual counterevidence and seems to indicate a modern neo-Vedantic compromise with the tradition. One might also argue that the Šankarācārya's main aim is not to pro- mote Brahmin privilege, but to restore morality and order in the chaos of

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modern life. He claims that when caste "was strictly observed it was an effective instrument to keep people in the path of righteousness." If one violated the rules of one's caste, one lost caste and was "degraded and ostra- cized from the community. This practice had a deterrent effect on the people and hence the moral tone of the community was high (Aspects, 51)." This beneficial effect (of social debasement) has been lost with "the loosening of restrictions," so less efficacious legal means must now be used (51). Modern education has also led to the breakdown of dharma. In ancient India, "edu- cation was what was in accord with dharma. Modern education is utilitarian; it does not aim at the cultivation of character and the development of noble virtues (Call, 169)." This lament for the loss of long-standing social norms in the transformation to a modern secular society is widely shared. Still, one might respond that modern education does aim to cultivate character and virtue, but ones different than the traditional model, and in fact, ones that call parts of the Vedic tradition into question.

The disparity between Candrasekharendra's and modernity's views on "noble virtues" is raised in perhaps starkest fashion in Candrasekharendra's discussion of the role of women in marriage, which may include self-immo- lation (sati). In fact, he acknowledges women's existence generally only in the marital context. For Hindus, he writes, "marriage is a sacrament for the elevation of the soul (Call, 110)." For women, marriage is "a means of spiritual attainment"; while men are to seek a religious guru, "to the woman, her husband alone is her guru. She is to look upon him as her God and in that attitude, she has to surrender herself to him, body and soul." He claims that "[t]he disciplines and restrictions regulating marital relations are willingly accepted by women," and notes in this context that "[w]hen we question why a particular religious practice should be observed, it is a sign that we are beginning to lose faith or bhakti (110)." It would be interesting to see his arguments and evidence for women's willing acceptance of the disciplines regulating marriage, and to hear further why questioning them is to him a loss of faith. The Sankarācārya uses satī as an example of wifely faithfulness in the past: "When a woman has dedicated her body completely to her husband or God, she finds no use for it after the death of her husband (Call, 111)." Then, in an apparent endorsement of sati in principle, he adds, "[I]t is good to observe a practice with faith even though we may not know the reason for it. The practice of sati may appear cruel if considered apart from the ideal of which it is the expression. It is not every woman who can practice it. For such widows who cannot sacrifice themselves in the funeral pyre of their hus- bands," such as those who have small children to care for, other codes have

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been prescribed (112). For Candrasekharendra, religious liberation is obvi- ously not related to nor contradicted by social or gender equality, a position to which few Western or modern Indian admirers of the Sankarācārya draw attention, and which might well make many of them uneasy. Candrasekharendra also defends the āśrama (life stage) system, par- ticularly that of the last stage, the renunciant or samnyāsin, one who is de- sirous of, and is ideally near, liberation. The Sankarācārya endorses the traditional lifestyle of the world-devaluing renouncer more than does Ramana, who emphasizes knowing one is not the doer (vs. any specific doing or not doing). For Candrasekharendra, it seems that male Brahmin samnyāsins alone can gain liberation, though this goes unstated in his English writings. Thus, the characteristics of the renunciant illumine Candrasekharendra's views of the nature of living liberation. He makes much of the importance of the sam- yāsin in society, but this importance is more spiritual than social. He rejects the "wrong view that Sanyasins are parasites of society, because they do not do 'productive' work (Aspects, 53)." While some wanderers are mere beg- gars, a "real sanyasin is a spiritual stalwart spending his time in contempla- tion of the Supreme and in instructing others in the way of dharma." He further "is the exemplar of the highest values of life and as such is an asset to society (54)." Politics or public service are "not at all the duty of a sanyasin. It is his life mission to purify himself steadily and gradually and throw himself completely into the quest and experience of the ultimate Truth, namely God (55)." To Candrasekharendra, like Ramana, the highest service a samnyāsin can perform is serene detachment: "in truth, service to others is offered in the largest measure possible, by persons who are dedicating them- selves to self-purification and complete God-consciousness more than any body else. A person who has not purified himself cannot purify others .... The mere existence in the world of a few such souls engaged in self-purification creates an aura by itself which tends to bring solace and peace to an innumer- able number of troubled hearts." Echoing Ramana, the Sankarācārya con- cludes that samnyāsins are "benefactors of society much more than any political or social leader (Aspects, 55-56)." Candrasekharendra further holds to the primacy of detachment when he considers the connection between knowledge (jñāna) and social service. He states that "[t]here is an impression that service to another is for the purpose of relieving his sufferings and to help him. This may be the ostensible pur- pose of service. But the main thing is that such service chastens your own mind (Call, 130)." He continues that the true bhakta sees others as God, and "does to them what he would do to his God." This activity "is true paro- pakaram (service to others). A life habituated to paropakaram is both the means to jnana and the effect of it (131)." He argues that in the Bhagavad- Gītā Krishna teaches detachment by jñāna before social service: "[U]nless

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one is perfect oneself, one is not qualified to engage oneself in acts of public good, lokaksema." If one overcomes sorrow and anger, "then his very exist- ence will contribute to public weal. He need not actively reform the world; he need not strive for lokaksema; the world will learn by his example to reform itself (Call, 198)." The evidence for this last assertion is certainly mixed. Despite the aforementioned focus on individual detachment, Can- drasekharendra rejects the accusation by other religions that "Hindus are mainly concerned with individual salvation and are indifferent to the collec- tive welfare of mankind in general."27 He states that this "indifference" (which is really serene detachment) is only true for renouncers in the fourth life stage. He points to King Janaka, who as ruler worked without attachment for the welfare of others and whose "dealings with the people of the world is love and kindness in an equal and impartial spirit."28 The Sankarācārya sup- ports service by manual labor (well digging, temple or road construction, etc.), again with the goal of liberating nondual insight: "[B]y such physical labour people will shed their vanity and egoism and develop a feeling of oneness with others. Their minds will, thereby, be disciplined and cleansed of impurities, be in a proper condition to receive and enshrine the Paramatma, which is the ultimate purpose of life (Call, 172)." Candrasekharendra also argues that the West can learn from Hinduism, though a question remains as to whether the teaching he offers focusing on love is influenced by the West or put in neo-Vedantic terms for the West. When asked by a visitor what message the Sankarācārya would want to send West, Candrasekharendra is reported to have replied, "In all that you do, let love be the sole motive ("Sage," 63)." While violence, punishment, and even war may be necessary, "whatever be the nature of action, the agent must act out of love. Passions such as desire and hatred, anger and malice must be totally eschewed." According to Candrasekharendra, this understanding is "the message of the sages and saints of India (63)." His conception of "love" seems more what Westerners would call "detachment," and his views on the dharmic order indicate that love does not include Western notions of equality among castes or genders.

Candrasekharendra on Jīvanmukti

Candrasekharendra's views on jīvanmukti are particularly interesting because, like Ramana, the Śankarācārya is himself widely considered liber- ated while living. Jayendra Sarasvati, Candrasekharendra's successor, is typi- cal in linking the Śankarācārya with two other reputed jīvanmuktas: Śankara and Ramana.29 The translator of his discourses, P. Sankaranarayan, writes,

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"[o]ur Acarya's advaitic temper coupled with his endearing karuna [compas- sion] is opposed to whatever is private or partisan and is all-comprehensive. A Jivan-mukta himself, he exhibits a synthesis of karma, bhakti, and jnana .... To us of this generation belongs the rare good fortune to be alive at this time, to have his darshan, to listen to his voice, and, if only we would, to abide by his precepts (Call, 15-16)." I have already mentioned T. M. P. Mahadevan's view. When I visited Mahadevan in 1979, a picture of the Śankarācārya hung over the inside front doorway, and he explicitly termed Candrasekharendra a jīvanmukta. Mahadevan claims all of Candrase- kharendra's visitors experience "an inner transformation" and "a noble revo- lution in their soul ("Sage," 16)," and quotes a variety of foreign seekers and scholars, including Paul Brunton, Arthur Koestler, and Syed Hussain Nasr, about the effect meeting Candrasekharendra had on them. Typical are Robert Slater's comments: the Sankarācarya had both "saintly serenity" and "con- cerned interest" in the world, as well as an "ecumenical outlook."30 N. Veezhinathan, in his article on the Sankarācrya and the Kanchi pītha,31 also states that Candrasekharendra follows in the line of jīvanmuktas like Sankara and Sarvajñātman in presiding over this matha. The bulk of Veezhinathan's essay describes jīvanmukti (or being a "realized soul [86]").32 He concludes here, as he did when writing on Ramana, that Candrasekharendra achieves the characteristics of jīvanmukti discussed in various classical texts; he states that "temperance in speech, self-control, and a sense of detachment constitute the essential nature of the Sage of Kanchi, and He reveals them in order that his disciples may realize them to achieve perfection (90)." He ends praising the Sankarācārya, and says, "[i]t is our good fortune that His Ho- liness is in our midst as a jīvanmukta directing us at every stage in the spiritual path (90)." Candrasekharendra, like Ramana, does not deal with jīvanmukti at length, but one can glean from a few passages that his understanding accords with traditional Advaita. He holds that "[t]he source of the body is the karmas that we performed in previous lives. Those that we do now only serve to perpetu- ate the bodily state in future lives too. So to get rid of suffering, we should get rid of the body" by ceasing karma, its cause (Call, 56)." He also writes that "[s]ince residual karma brings the soul in conjunction with the body, all karma should be liquidated, burnt out, with the body of the present life (Aspects, 17)." Further, as suggested earlier, Candrasekharendra holds that the knower or jñānī is the highest being. According to Mahadevan, the Śankarācārya holds that "[t]he man of wisdom, the Sage, is the ideal of man. He has no attachment and aversion; praise and blame are equal to him ... Moksha or release is not a post-mortem state; it is the eternal nature of the Self. The jñānī realizes this; and hence there is no more travail for him ("Sage," 57-58)." Thus, the jñānī seems to be a jīvanmukta. But

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Candrasekharendra holds (according to Mahadevan's report) that such a jñānī/ jīvanmukta is not tied to Advaita or Hinduism: "Such jnanis have appeared at all times and in all places. Their presence is a blessing to the world .... There is no discord or divergence of views among the wise. The peace that passeth understanding is what they spread (58)." Candrasekharendra himself explicitly mentions jīvanmukti only in a few places. Two will be mentioned here: the first is is a brief, rather conven- tional, statement; he says that the "final realization is the result of jnana of the Supreme Truth received from the guru and contemplated on by the pupil. In that state, one is freed from the shackles of life and is said to be liberated even while one is alive. This state is called jivanmukti. This is the goal of the spiritual path laid out in our religion (Aspects, 32)." The second appears in a discussion about the peaceful mind. Candrasekharendra states that to ac- quire peace (śānti) is to attain mukti. He then quotes sacred text (śruti): "Thus the knower becomes immortal here."33 He continues by arguing (in accor- dance with Ramana and traditional Advaitins) for liberation while embodied, rather than after death:

It [śruti] conveys that one attains mukti here, in this life. The Sruti speaks about jivan-mukti and not about videha [bodiless]-mukti .... If videha-mukti is the truth, then one would have to acquire santi after death and attain mukti by that santi. But how can santi arise after death if there was none before death? Therefore, for obtaining mukti, which is freedom from rebirth, one should acquire santi springing from Brahma- jnana in this life itself and that is the only means to mukti (Call, 49).

Candrasekharendra continues by refering to Gītā V. 23, which states that one is able here (iha), before liberation from the body, to withstand the agitation (vega) rising from anger and desire, is disciplined (yukta) and happy. This, he concludes, is the real peace (Call, 50). Such a view is in harmony with Sankara's ideas. One also observes no linkage of jīvanmukti with social service.

In conclusion, let us explore the relationship between the traditional understandings of a Sankarācārya and a jīvanmukta. This comparison is well illumined by the differences between Candrasekharendra and Ramana Maharshi. We begin by considering the Śankarācārya's roles. As Cenkner writes, the first task of a Śankarācārya is to be a teacher and leader of the Brahminical tradition, not a "saint" or "mystic."34 The Hinduism Today ar- ticle offers a similar, popular understanding of the differences between world- renouncing ascetics and Šankarācāryas, who must "mix with the world, guide,

Candrasekharendra Sarasvati a 167

comfort, instruct ... [and] be more concerned with the fostering and perpetu- ation of the ageless Sanatana Dharma than with their individual salvation (p. 1). "This was echoed by the Sringeri Śankarācārya Bharati Tirtha, who said that his main responsibility was "to propagate the sanātan dharm." As these statements suggest, Sankarācāryas primarily represent a social and religious institution within Hinduism that bears responsibility for con- tinuing the traditions of Vedic education and ritual activity and for following customary dharmic duties. This in part accounts for the relative lack of emphasis on the philosophical subtleties of Advaita Vedanta, which is far less comprehensible to most Hindus than worship of a deity or performing Vedic duties. Yet, as Cenkner points out, the Sankarācāryas' traditional vision is losing influence today among the majority of urban and secular Hindus, who show diminishing interest in Vedic ritual and education, and who question caste and sect exclusivity and a lack of social concern.35 With their calls for ecumenicity and social service, the Kanchi Sankarācāryas (as well as various neo-Vedantic thinkers) are clearly attempting to make themselves and Hindu dharma relevant to the contemporary world by reaching out to modern Indi- ans, particularly Westernized Tamil Brahmins. Ultimately, however, at least until the ascension of the most recent Sankarācārya, Jayendra Sarasvati, the Śankarācāryas have been far more representatives and transmitters of the varnāśrama-dharma tradition than social activists. The Śankarācārya, then, is a model of a teaching guru and "worldly ascetic," while the jīvanmukta is primarily a detached, liberated being whose principal "teaching" is his serene presence. A jīvanmukta like Ramana em- bodies oneness with brahman, and tasks like teaching about dharma, admin- istering a matha, and consecrating temples are tangential to this. Similarities certainly exist: both Ramana and Candrasekharendra are religious models and spiritual guides, Ramana taught, and Candrasekharendra embodied wisdom and saintliness. Further, both preached global ecumenicity and both started organizations that assist the needy, yet neither felt social service to be their primary task. Still, their primary roles were different. As Jayendra said to me, caring for the welfare of the world (loka-samgraha) is necessary for a Šankarācārya, but not for a jīvanmukta like Ramana. A Šankarācārya must teach Hindu dharma, but samsāric activity is finished for a liberated being.36 In this context, the Sringeri Sankarācārya Bharati Tirtha quoted Gītā III. 22- 23, which indicates that the liberated being (here Krsna) need do nothing, but still engages in action to properly lead the common people. While not identical, these traditional roles can to some degree be inte- grated (though it is harder to make either fit a Western-style social progressive model, as some neo-Vedantins would like). The model Sankarācārya, and a model jīvanmukta, is said to be Ādi Śankara. He both achieved knowledge of

168 Embodied Liberation in Neo-Vedanta

brahman/ätman identity and lived in the world as teacher, philosopher, de- bater, and administrator. If Ramana is justly famed for the purity of his insight into nonduality, Candrasekharendra is so significant because of the claim by his followers that he combined qualities of both Śankarācārya and jīvanmukta. As suggested earlier, the Sankarācārya tradition remains strong, at least in South India. I have had the opportunity to speak with the reigning Kanchi and Sringeri Šankarācāryas, Jayendra Sarasvati and Bharati Tirtha, respec- tively, about jīvanmukti. Before turning to what I see as a further stage in the transformation of traditional Advaita to Western-influenced neo-Vedanta, I include here brief remarks on these figures' view of embodied liberation.

Interview with Jayendra Sarasvati

I had the chance to have darshan of Candrasekharendra and an inter- view with Jayendra Sarasvati (attended by Vijayendra) on the morning of January 9, 1990. We conversed in a receiving area on the porch of his matha, and our talk was interrupted regularly by offerings and requests for blessings. The Śankarācārya's views on jīvanmukti were generally traditional, perhaps most closely identified with the "Yogic Advaita" of the Jīvan- muktiviveka. When asked what jīvanmukti is, Jayendra responded that nor- mally the individualized self goes "I," "I," "I" or "my," "my," "my," and experiences joy and sorrow (sukha-duhkha); cessation of this experience is liberation while living. All samsāra is destroyed (nasta) for the jīvanmukta; his ātman is peaceful (šānta) and eternal (nitya). According to Jayendra, jīvanmukti exists where there is knowledge (jñāna) of brahman, and all sor- row and fear is destroyed. Following the Brhadāranyaka Upanişad, Jayendra claimed that the liberated being sees no duality, for he knows there is no other thing to see. As examples of jīvanmuktas, he mentioned Sankara, Ramana Maharshi, and Candrasekharendra; Sri Aurobindo was termed a karma-yogī. He held that the Jīvanmuktiviveka and Pañcadaśī, as well as Śankara's bhāșyas and the Upadeśasāhasrī, were instructive texts (śāstra) about jīvanmukti. The Yogavāsistha was termed a book about means to liberation (sādhana-grantha). When asked, he agreed with Vidyāranya's view that videhamukti meant jīvanmukti with no future birth, and that Janaka was a jñānī, then a mukta. When questioned about the relationship of renunciation (samnyāsa) to living liberation, Jayendra stated that the jīvanmukta is totally detached, so renunciation is then unnecessary. No desire or bond of any sort remains.37 Still, renunciation is a means (sādhana) to liberation. The jīvanmukta is be- yond (ātīta) Vedic regulations (vidhi/nisedha), meditation (dhyāna), chanting (japa), and ritual performance (yajña), though all of these are means. Jayendra

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also held that yoga was a means (sādhana), and that jīvanmukti comes after samādhi. He continued that one first hears the sacred texts, meditates (dhyāna), and achieves samādhi, then one reaches knowledge of brahman and self- illumination (ātma-prakāśa), which bring living liberation. Jayendra also claimed that the jīvanmukta was not required to act for the welfare of the world (loka-samgraha). No action of any sort is necessary for one whose karma is completely finished (Hindi: khatam), as was the case with Ramana Maharshi. He continued that the jīvanmukta's samcita and āgamī karma are finished, and that when the remaining prārabdha karma is expe- rienced (bhoga), one attains bodiless liberation (videhamukti). The Śan- karācārya, on the other hand, must act for the welfare of the world, which means he must teach (pracāra) Hindu dharma. When asked, Jayendra stated that a jīvanmukta does remain embodied to teach, preparing students (śişya), and giving instruction (upadeśa) to others. When discussing social reform in Hinduism, Jayendra became quite animated, quoting the Bhaja Govindam and the Gītā ("all forms (viśvarūpa) are within me [Krishna])." Seeing any difference indicates ignorance. He held that since the highest self (paramātman) is in all of us, we must not do evil to others. He concluded by talking about choosing a new Sankarācārya,38 and claiming that the institution of Sankarācārya rule and Hinduism in general were strongest in South India.

A Note on the Sringeri Sankarācāryas

The Sringeri pītha, in the coffee- and tea-growing hills of Karnataka, was reputedly the first matha (along with a shrine to Śrī Sāradā) founded by Sankara and has had an unbroken succession of Sankarācāryas since his pupil Sureśvara. It attained high status during the Vijayanagara empire under the leadership of Bhāratītīrtha and Vidyāranya, authors of the Pañcadaśi and JMV.39 It is a thriving pilgrimage site, which features both a renovated Sāradā temple and a large Vidyāśankara temple. Next to the reigning Sankarācārya's residence, across the river from the temples and matha offices, there is a memorial housing samādhi shrines honoring the last three Sankarācaryas. Narasimha Bharati (ruled 1878-1912) revived Sringeri as a pilgrimage site, had a shrine built to Ādi Śankara in his reputed birthplace Kaladi, and arranged for the publication of Śankara's collected works (granthāvali) by Vanivilasa Press. His successor, Candra- sekhara Bharati (ruled 1912-1954), is called a jīvanmukta in mațha litera- ture.40 Candrasekhara Bharati was known for his intense tapas and was often said to be in samādhi.41 Like other Šankarācāryas, he emphasized studying the Veda, following the guru and śāstras, performing dharmic duties, and

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held that worshipping God was good, although the highest brahman is be- yond name and form. Interestingly, reports show he was often critical of British rule and modern secular society, and felt the West had too strong an influence on India. He saw secular tolerance as anti-Hindu, or at least against the traditional dharmic order. He said that women should stay at home, all Hindus should keep to the caste structure, and one could only attain happi- ness through following the dharma.42 The recently deceased Sringeri Śankarācārya, Abhinava Vidyatirtha (ruled 1954-1989), was also called a jīvanmukta and was widely revered in southern India (though perhaps not as widely as Candrasekharendra Sarasvati). Like Candrasekharendra, he is described as being warm, approachable, and charismatic as well as a skilled administrator. He also spent years touring South (and later North) India performing pūjās, giving discourses, and con- secrating temples. Again, like Candrasekharendra, he was an expert linguist, and while teaching that brahma-jñäna was the highest truth, he stressed fol- lowing ritual duties and offering devotion to God. In accordance with his predecessor, he seemed less responsive to modern ecumenical trends than Candrasekharendra, emphasizing issues like cow protection and the difficulty of right action in the modern world.43 The current Sankarācārya, Bharati Tirtha, like those mentioned earlier, a Telugu Brahmin and an excellent linguist, was born in 1951. He became Abhinava Vidyatirtha's disciple at age fifteen, was designated his successor at twenty-three, and was installed as Sankarācārya in an elaborate ceremony in October 1989.44 I had the opportunity to interview him about jīvanmukti on a visit to Sringeri on January 10, 1997. Bharati Tirtha defined a jīvanmukta as one who has attained the direct experience of brahman (brahma-sāksātkāra); such persons include Sankara, Vidyāraņya, and Abhinava Vidyatirtha.45 The JMV was said to be the most important text on liberation while living. Bharati Tirtha stated that the jīvanmukta has no need to act. When asked whether this created some tension between being a jīvanmukta and a Śankarācārya, Bharati Tirtha responded by quoting Gītā III. 22-23.46 Krșņa here states that he has nothing he must do, nothing to attain that is not attained, yet still he engages in action. If he did not continually act properly, neither would common people. When I asked if this constituted loka-samgraha, Bharati Tirtha agreed. He added in Hindi that whatever path great people (mahān log) go along, others follow, and, in English, that the latter "imitate" the former. He said specifically that Sankara and Abhinava Vidyatirtha (both liberated Šankarācāryas) taught about liberation by their examples, but "for them, there is absolutely no necessity of action." I then asked about the difference between living and bodiless (videha) mukti. Bharati Tirtha said the only difference was embodiment-sa- versus a-śarīratva. When the jīvanmukta's body goes (upon completing fruits of

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prārabdha karma), then there is videhamukti. ("yah hi, bas"). I inquired if Patañjali's astānga yoga was necessary for the jīvanmukta. Bharati Tirtha stated that some yogic practice is necessary for settling the mind (man). When mental activity lessens, then knowledge is obtained, and the practice (sādhana) is completed. Further, he held that the jīvanmukta pursues no supernormal powers (siddhi); powers are "obstacles" to liberation. Finally, I inquired whether it was important for living liberated beings to be present today. Bharati Tirtha rapidly replied (in English), "Of course, they are always important."47

TWELVE

The Liberated Being and Social Service: Vivekananda, Radhakrishnan, and the Neo-Vedantic Jīvanmukta

It is now time to turn to some neo-Vedantins who (like T. M. P. Mahadevan), by the categories and medium of discourse (English) they use, often seem at least as much influenced by and in dialogue with Western ideas and writers than with the classical Advaita tradition.1 As I have argued ear- lier, I believe this Western orientation interferes with a good understanding and an accurate representation of traditional Advaita.2 An obvious example is how a number of neo-Vedantins, generally in response to Western, particu- larly Christian missionary, criticisms of traditional Advaita, have-to a much greater degree than Ramana or Candrasekharendra Sarasvati-downplayed or even ignored often censured Advaitic teachings about caste exclusivity and devaluation of everyday activity.3 On the other hand, ideas seen as laudable to the West, such as this-worldly technological progress, valuing ecological harmony with nature,4 or caring for and actively providing humanitarian social service to all persons without distinction, are claimed to be present but go without support (or even reference) in the classical texts. We will here examine the attempt of some modern neo-Vedantic think- ers and scholars of Advaita to significantly reinterpret the traditional notion of jīvanmukti from a conception tied to world renunciation and a call for liberation from bondage to all desire to one that fits a Western (both humanist and Christian) ideal. This ideal includes worldly action requiring social ser- vice, that is, actively performing "good works" for the welfare of others, especially the poor. This notion of service is quite different from that of

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worshipful service (sevā) to a god or guru, as well as from the guru's spiri- tual service of teaching and blessing devotees. Many neo-Vedantins then attempt to read this newer understanding back into traditional Advaitic views. As stated earlier, all traditions change, and adding social service to the clas- sical model of jīvanmukti is legitimate (and one might even say good), yet it is still important to note that this idea is a reinterpretation-even a distor- tion-of the views of Sankara and his followers. It is a greater break with the past than admitted or might first seem apparent. While it is traditional to claim unity and continuity in Advaitic thought, those of us in the Western academic tradition cannot so easily ignore changes from earlier ideas, par- ticularly when unrecognized or unstated.

Traditional Advaita tells us that liberation is the cessation of ignorance about the nondual nature of reality and the end of bondage to transmigratory existence (samsāra). One who attains liberation while living realizes the identity of ätman/brahman and becomes utterly detached from worldly de- sires, knowing the self is not related to the conditions and sorrows of body and "ego." Questions about the relevance of social service in this view in- clude: thus detached, does the Advaitin jīvanmukta show concern for the welfare of other, ignorant beings, and, if so, how? In particular, does the jīvanmukta actively do "good works" for all or perform social service in ways familiar to the modern West? Will the liberated being at least teach others about his realization? In the following pages, we shall see that neo-Vedantins (including many contemporary Indian scholars of Advaita) assert that jīvanmukti and social service are compatible and/or are closely related. They hold that the jīvanmukta, although desireless and knowing that all is ultimately nondual, stays here to teach and serve other (ignorant) beings. Social service, while not necessary for one so detached, is regarded as the "natural" outflow of the compassionate love of the liberated being. This view, I will argue, stems largely from a desire to justify jīvanmukti, and Indian "ethical" thought, generally, in light of Western and Christian notions that a perfected person looks after the welfare of others, particularly "the least among us." It also is meant to establish the relevance of the jīvanmukti ideal in contemporary life. To begin, we should look at the central problem with which neo- Vedantins must contend when asserting their views on social service: the devaluation of everyday existence (vyavahāra) in Advaita thought. If the liberated being realizes the world of duality lacks ultimate reality, this being would not necessarily show any concern for (non)others in this realm, even by teaching them. R. C. Pandeya has made the case well that Advaitic views on nonduality lead to a "transcendence" of Western-style social ethics,5 (and we have seen his view implicitly supported by many of Ramana Maharshi's

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teachings). He argues that while the body and the social realm persist for a jīvanmukta, this being knows they are not the highest truth. Thus, liberation brings a thoroughgoing detachment from everyday existence, with no man- datory duties. Looking out for the welfare of others means attending to the world of duality and the "others" there to care for. Not only is concern for others ultimately based on a delusion, but such concern can itself become an attachment. We might even grant that once one knows nonduality, the liber- ated being will do no evil action, given the extensive training on the path to liberation, but there still is no imperative to do Western- (or bodhisattva-) style good. Pandeya concludes that while some modern Indians might be uncomfortable in finding Advaita lacking social concern, they must admit that, from the traditional Advaita view, such concern is based on ignorance (avidyā).6

When turning to the actual textual record in classical Advaita, one finds no explicit call to perform social service or to do "good works" for those who suffer. In light of neo-Vedantic claims to come about tolerance and brother- hood, we might briefly mention here that Advaitin statements about the metaphysical identity of all being(s) are not linked to statements about help- ing others in need, or more generally to social and religious equality in vyavahāra. It is well known that the hierarchical varnāśrama-dharma (law of caste and life stage) privileges certain people (especially Brahmin males) by birth. In current language, it is classist and androcentric. Sankara clearly concurs with this privileging; in his Brahmasūtra I. 3. 34-38 commentary, he states that low-caste śūdras, even if interested and literate, are not entitled to hear or study the Veda or to perform Vedic rites (the necessary starting points to gain release), for they have not undergone investiture of sacred thread. In fact, the commentary on sūtra 38 refers to texts indicating a sūdra hearing the Veda should have his ears filled with lead and one reciting the Veda should have his tongue chopped off.7 Women are not even mentioned in this context. Contrary to neo-Vedantins, who generally ignore this passage, traditional Advaitins find the highest nondual truth irrelevant to equality in everyday social relations, and, as Halbfass writes, they instead link identity in libera- tion with "an uncompromising adherence to an unequal, caste-bound access to it."8 One might add here that while some have argued that Sankara himself, through his activity as debater and teacher, embodied the social action of the jīvanmukta, he nowhere demonstrates or advocates the liberated being as egalitarian "social worker." In fact, the clearest indications of a "proactive" concern for ignorant beings in traditional Advaita appear when Sankara and later Advaitins occa- sionally refer to the knower as a teacher, that is, one who compassionately

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remains in a body to share his (spiritual) realization. In his commentaries, Śankara writes that the brahman-knower will, out of great compassion, teach one blinded by samsāra about the true nondual self (ChU VI. 14. 2) and that the truth-seer teaches the supreme knowledge (Gītā IV. 34).9 One could argue that Sankara himself was an example of such a person. Sankara also ex- presses concern for ignorant beings in Upadeśasāhasrī Prose I. 6, in which the teacher's compassion (dayā) and concern (anugraha) for others are men- tioned, but not elaborated upon. I pointed out earlier that the traditional Advaita thinker, Vimuktātman, makes the liberated being's role as teacher a central issue. He and others claim that a teacher is necessary for liberation, but not that a knower (jñānin) is obliged to teach.10 It is probably going too far to suggest, as some have, that social service is intended in Sankara's comments on BS III. 3. 32,11 which imply that a liberated being could take birth again to fulfill a certain commission (adhikāra) arising due to the con- dition of the world. Sankara seems here to be responding to the demands of the text; he does not mention the idea of a commission elsewhere. He also indicates the commission is to promulgate the Veda, which, while keeping the world well ordered, is not what a reader might immediately think of as the neo-Vedanta version of social service. When arguing that Sankara calls for "social service," most neo-Vedantins make reference to the idea of loka-samgraha, which is often translated "wel- fare of the world," and suggest that this is part of the liberated being's orientation to perform service to society. However, in the most important references to loka-samgraha relevant here, found in Bhagavad-Gītā III. 20 and elsewhere, Krishna seems to instruct Arjuna to act for the "well-being" of the world (or people in general) by upholding or preserving dharmic order rather than general (and perhaps hierarchy challenging) human or global welfare. In his commentary on this passage, Sankara certainly holds to a dharma-affirming understanding of loka-samgraha. Sustaining the dharma may bring well-being, in the cosmos and to (Aryan) people, but will not necessarily provide service or "welfare" for all, especially the downtrodden. From this traditional view, Gītā III. 20 states that one attains perfection (samsiddhi) through (detached) action (karma), so one should act considering only loka-samgraha, that is, the world's well-being, which is brought about by selflessly upholding the dharmic order. In his commentary, Sankara argues that while pursuing or after achieving right insight (samyag-darśana), in which one achieves perfection (i.e., moksa), one continues acting, due to currently manifesting or prārabdha karma. Sankara seems to suggest that the wise person should be a "role model" and world order preserver; he here defines loka-samgraha as preventing the world's (or people's) activity from going astray (lokasya-unmārga-pravrtti-nivāraņam). The exact nature of this activity, while unspecified, seems to mean not straying from the dharma. In

176 a Embodied Liberation in Neo-Vedanta

accord with the ensuing verses (III. 21-25), Sankara points out that since people follow the standard a superior person sets, such a person, despite being (like Krishna) utterly detached and needing to do nothing, should and does act only for the sake of others.12 Here then one may see a call to attend to the well-being of the world (at least the part that includes the Aryan twice- born), but neither Sankara nor the Gītā prescribe any Western-style "social action," nor do they describe the actions the wise perform for the world's welfare as humanistic service to all.13 And, this is certainly not a theme in later scholastic Advaita.14

Swami Vivekananda on Jīvanmukti and Social Service

I stated earlier that the most common interpretive framework in modern Indian scholarship on Advaita is that of neo-Vedanta. All lines of interpreta- tion have a history and, to some degree, an identifiable "lineage." Two modern thinkers who have greatly influenced all later members of the neo-Vedanta lineage on a wide range of topics are Swami Vivekananda and Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. Like many later neo-Vedantins, both were trained in English- speaking missionary schools, read widely in Western literature and philoso- phy (and read many "Hindu" texts first in translation), and travelled extensively in the West. Both endorsed Western values like rationalism, tolerance, and social progress. Neither was simply "Western," of course; both were familiar with, and claimed as authoritative, Vedantic texts and Indian philosophical thought in Sanskrit. They also were critical of Western individualism and materialism, and hoped to "conquer the world" with Vedantic "spirituality." They emphatically claimed that Advaita Vedanta-not Christianity-was the most ethical, scientific, progressive, and universal religion. Their writings and lives can be seen as models for the interaction and assimilation of traditional Hinduism with Western humanistic traditions. It is certainly the case that to understand the claims of contemporary neo-Vedantic scholars of Advaita about the close relationship of jīvanmukti and social service, we must begin with Vivekananda and Radhakrishnan. Swami Vivekananda, the most famous disciple of the Bengali master Ramakrishna, exemplifies the neo-Vedantic mix of Indian and Western influences mentioned earlier. In addition to a British mission education, he also participated in both sides of the traditional guru-student system, took the vow of samnyāsa, and worshipped the Goddess. Although his views were quite different from Ramakrishna's, he certainly felt guided by his guru's spirit. He organized a Hindu monastic order, but his "practical Vedanta" stressed Christian-style charity and the performance of social service activi- ties to uplift the masses at least as much as retreat and contemplation. In his

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view, renunciation and selfless service go together naturally. Vivekananda also became, following the 1893 Parliament of Religions in Chicago, by far the best-known messenger of Hinduism in the West. He is particularly impor- tant here both because of the exemplary nature of his remarks on living liberation and social service and because many present-day Indian scholars of Advaita refer to Vivekananda as a model of modern jīvanmukti. Detailing Vivekananda's interpretation of Advaita and of "Hinduism" generally is beyond the scope of this inquiry; here I will merely point out that he calls Advaita "the fairest flower of philosophy and religion that any country in any age has produced."15 For him, Vedanta was not a religion, but a univer- sal truth reconciling and transcending all religions. We shall see here that, while a skillful communicator and an advocate, Vivekananda was little con- cerned with scholarly accuracy or systematic philosophy, and made little ref- erence to the problems of interpreting and matching categories and concepts across cultures.16 Certainly he was in part purposefully revising the tradition to incorporate his concerns for social service and national uplift and unity.17 Vivekananda often claimed that Vedanta and social service are com- pletely compatible; spiritual and social reform should happen simultaneously. Reacting in part to criticism of Hindu caste boundedness (and general "lack of ethics") by Christian missionaries, he argued strenuously for "spiritual harmony," tolerance, and universal brotherhood, and held that such ideas were Vedantic because Vedanta teaches the "oneness of all" and that "you are your brother." For example, he claimed that when we feel oneness in human nature and with the universe, we "rush forth to express it .... This expression of oneness is what we call love and sympathy, and it is the basis of all our ethics and morality. This is summed up in the Vedanta philosophy by the celebrated aphorism Tat Tvam Asi, 'Thou Art That.'" This means your soul and body are one with all others, and "in hurting anyone you hurt yourself; in loving anyone you love yourself."8 Serving others thus becomes a form both of spiritual training and love of self. Interestingly, however, Wilhelm Halbfass points out that when Paul Hacker surveyed ethical maxims in Sanskrit literature and their links with philosophical teachings, he found no evidence that the metaphysical identity statement "tat tvam asi" was ever used to justify "practical" ethical imperatives as Vivekananda attempts to do.19 Vivekananda admits that India has actually been a nonpareil "land of privilege," but he goes on to say that "[n]one can be Vedantists and at the same time admit of privilege to anyone," and that "[t]he work of the Advaita, therefore, is to break down all these privileges." His exemplar of one holding to a "Vedantic ethics" of equality without special perogatives is the Buddha.20 Such statements are, of course, advocacy rather than description and go far afield from traditional Advaita (and even from the views of his master, Ramakrishna). Further, he was of course speaking primarily to the privileged

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educated upper caste elite, and his rather paternalistic reformism did not threaten Brahmin power.

Vivekananda only rarely explicitly mentions jīvanmukti, and in these passages he sounds rather traditional and generally does not make extrava- gant claims for the social ethics of the liberated being. For example, he writes that "there are men still living for whom delusion has vanished forever." Although having the highest knowledge, their bodies will continue "until the momentum of past work is exhausted." Further, "[t]he man who has in this life attained to this state ... is called 'free while living.' This is the goal of the Vedantist, to attain freedom in life."21 He expands on these ideas else- where, comparing the body's continuation after liberation to the unattended potter's wheel temporarily continuing motion. He states that when the liber- ated being knows the world's unreality, and lives without bondage or pain, in "that state he is called jīvanmukta, 'living-free.'" Jīvanmukti is the "aim and end in this life for the jnana-yogi." He "can live in this world without being attached," like the lotus, water-borne but unwet. He is "the highest of all beings; for he has realized his identity with the Absolute" and oneness with God. Vivekananda then specifically asks, after liberation, "[W]hat good shall we do to the world?" Once we know "there is nothing else but this ätman, that everything else is but a dream, with no existence in reality, then this world with its poverties, its miseries, its wickedness, and its goodness will cease to disturb us. If they do not exist, for whom and for what shall we take trouble? This is what the jñāna-yogis teach."22 Here Vivekananda takes seriously the world devaluation of traditional Advaita, and thus one finds no social responsibility mandated for the jīvanmukta. Yet Vivekananda has a bit more to say about living liberation and action in the world. While the liberated being is utterly free and beyond all moral law, Vivekananda disputes that the jīvanmukta would do any evil; "good is the inner coating of the Real Man, the Self." He argues that "what is left attached to the man who has reached the Self and seen Truth is the remnant of the good impressions of his past life, the good momentum." This good manifests in a remarkably Christian-sounding way:

Even if he lives in the body and works incessantly, he works only to do good; his lips speak only benediction to all; his hands do only good works; his mind can think only good thoughts; his presence is a bless- ing wherever he goes. He is himself a living blessing. Such a man will, by his very presence, change even the most wicked persons into saints. Even if he does not speak, his very presence will be a blessing to mankind. Can such men do any evil?23

Liberated Being and Social Service an 179

Vivekananda concludes that the realized being does good by loving all, thus bringing peace. Here we see a neo-Vedanta mix of social and spiritual ser- vice, combining saintly presence and good works.

Radhakrishnan on Jīvanmukti and Social Service

After Vivekananda, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan is probably the best-known champion of neo-Vedanta. Radhakrishnan, born a Telugu Smārta Brahmin, was, like Vivekananda, educated in English in mission schools and steeped in Western ways of thinking (valuing "rationality," religious humanism, and "progress" in history). Unlike Vivekananda, however, he saw himself as a university-based scholar/educator and studied Vedanta and Sanskrit in depth. One notes his commitment to and success in the Western model of education by his appointments to the vice chancellorship of Banaras Hindu University and the Spalding chair at Oxford.24 Throughout Radhakrishnan's works, one sees a tension between his desire to be an impartial scholar and his inclination to be an apologist, for a reified "Hinduism" in general, and for Sankara's Advaita in particular. As Paul Hacker has written, one can understand Radhakrishnan's desire to rein- terpret Vedanta for his time, while still criticizing his lack of attention to the original philological and historical context of Advaitic thought.25 This tension is quite evident in his writings on both jīvanmukti and social service. As Robert Minor points out in his Radhakrishnan: A Religious Biography,26 Radhakrishnan constructed his own normative "Hinduism," whose essence was not, as its critics charged, world-denying, polytheistic, caste-bound, or deficient in social concern.27 Instead, like Vivekananda, Radhakrishnan claims that Hinduism is a progressive, activist, rational, and tolerant "religion of the spirit." The purportedly experience-based "monistic idealism" of Advaita Vedanta is the highest manifestation of this spiritual religion (which is also the essence of all religions). Particularly relevant here is the importance that Radhakrishnan, again like Vivekananda, ascribed to social ethics and his sensitivity to Christian missionary criticisms of Advaitic "world denial." Radhakrishnan argues that Advaita's inclusive, eternal wisdom would bring world community (unlike the exclusivist "dogma" found in much of Christianity). He claims that de- tachment due to realization of nonduality is not necessarily world renuncia- tion, and that in fact, Advaita is quite compatible with social service. In his more than 200-page chapter on Sankara's thought in Indian Philosophy,28 Radhakrishnan writes that Sankara's own life "is a standing refutation of the charge that the existent world order with its institutions is a thing to be escaped from (632)," and that Sankara's emphasis "is not on retirement from

180 Embodied Liberation in Neo-Vedanta

the world, but on renunciation of the self (633)." So far, Radhakrishnan's view has merit: according to the Advaita tradition, Sankara was an active teacher and a debater. Yet Radhakrishnan goes on to link this activity with a more expansive and questionable claim of selfless world saving; he contin- ues (and anticipates his description of the jīvanmukta elsewhere) that the detached person's attitude is not "world-fleeing, but world-saving. The per- fect man lives and dies, not for himself, but for mankind (633)." He makes a similar claim in Eastern Religions and Western Thought, where he writes that "[T]he liberated individual works for the welfare of the world (1)," and quotes the Bhagavad-Gīta to that effect. Until their absorption into "the Absolute," he states, "freed individuals share, though in a disinterested spirit, in the work of the world (11)." While words like "freedom" and "welfare of the world" can at times appropriately be linked to the terms moksa and loka- samgraha, Radhakrishnan's usage here seems rather different than Sankara's. The alteration of meanings in shared terminology is made evident when Radhakrishnan goes on to suggest (as Vivekananda does) that "tat-tvam-asi" (you/ätman are that/brahman) indicates social responsibility as well as meta- physical identity. Responding to Albert Schweitzer's ideas, he claims that tat- tvam-asi "is bound up with an ethic of active service." His support for this assertion comes not from Sankara or another Advaitin, but from Paul Deussen, the German scholar of Advaita, who draws a parallel with the Sermon on the Mount by saying "That art thou" indicates "[y]ou should love your neighbor as yourselves because you are your neighbor."29

Radhakrishnan's most extensive comments on jīvanmukti specifically are at the end of the introduction to his translation of the Brahmasūtra.30 His interpretation is largely in accordance with the Advaita tradition: One can be liberated while living, for liberation is based on detachment and knowing brahman, not on dropping the body.31 However, consistent with his desire to deny that Hinduism is world renouncing, he emphasizes the idea, found in the Yogavāsistha, that the detached knower may act in the world in various ways (he mentions Krsna, Suka, Rāma, and Janaka). He gives a long (unreferenced) quotation from the Yogavāsistha on the detached action of the jīvanmukta, and states that "what binds us is not action but the spirit in which it is done (217)." He does not here claim that Advaitins hold that the egoless activity of the liberated being is social service. Still, he clearly presents his own Christian-influenced neo-Vedantic views by saying he favors the liberated being acting for "sarva-mukti," which he calls "corporate salvation (218)" and "world redemption (22)." For Radhakrishnan, "[t]wo conditions are es- sential for final salvation, (i) inward perfection attained by intuition of self, (ii) outer perfection possible only with the liberation of all. The liberated

Liberated Being and Social Service 181

souls which attain the first condition continue to work for the second (219)." While he implies that Sankara agrees with this view, he explicitly writes only that "Sankara's view of the Jivan-mukti condition makes out that inner per- fection and work in the finite universe can go together (222)." Even this goes without citation, however. One can see here the tension between accurate reporting and apologetic wish.32 The activity of the jīvanmukta also is mentioned in Indian Philosophy: While Sankara first seems to say that the nondual realization of moksa is not consistent with dualism-accepting work in the world, Radhakrishnan states that "so far as jīvanmuktas are concerned, activity is allowed," since they are "above the sense of egoity" and the "law of karma (644)." Again, no textual citation appears, although he does go on to mention the BS III. 3. 32 passage on the possibility of a liberated being taking rebirth to fulfill a commission (adhikāra), such as teaching the Veda. Further, concerning ethical behavior, Radhakrishnan also claims that Sankara "holds that moral obligation has no meaning for the freed soul," yet "moral virtues are [not] abandoned by him." For the liberated being, "[e]vil action is psychologically impossible," for he has "died to sin (62)."33 Once again, Radhakrishnan's writing about Sankara's views is filtered through Christian categories of "morality" and "sin." In the next section, we shall see that, as Vivekananda and Western ways of thinking shaped Radhakrishnan, modern scholars of Advaita continue to be shaped by Radhakrishnan and the enduring impact of Western thought on India.

Modern Advaitin Scholars on Jivanmukti and Social Service

Modern scholars of Advaita do not speak with one voice about living liberation and social service. Some argue that while jīvanmuktas do not per- form or promote Western-style social action, they do assist others by being teachers and "good examples" of liberated living. For example, Chacko Valiaveetil writes that the jīvanmukta's presence and teaching increase the spiritual, versus material, welfare of the world, but that no "social" activity is possible given ultimate nonduality.34 Ramana Maharshi can be seen as such a teacher; his primary "lessons" were said to be his peace-giving presence and his comforting and healing look. In his book translating Sarvajñātman's Samksepa-śārīraka, N. Veezinathan also writes that "a preceptor is necessary in order to preserve and propagate the Advaitin tradition (p. 139)." The view that the jīvanmukta compassionately teaches can, as mentioned earlier, be grounded in the Advaita tradition. Veezhinathan's view on the necessity of a teacher echoes that of Vimuktātman, and Veezhinathan points to passages in sacred texts that hold that "one who has a teacher directly experiences brahman-ātman " (ChU VI. 14. 2) and that truth-seeing sages impart that

182 Embodied Liberation in Neo-Vedanta

knowledge to students (Gīta IV. 34).35 These are not far from Śankara's interpretations. The Vedanta pandit at Madras Sanskrit College, R. Krisnamurthi Sastry, gave two additional reasons why a jīvanmukta would remain and teach. First, he claimed that since anyone remaining embodied still has prārabdha karma, which includes a unique personality, it might be part of a particular jīvanmukta's disposition to teach or do good. He also suggested the idea that the jīvanmukta stays to teach, due to the good karmic fruits of the not yet liberated. In this view, we ignorant beings cause the detached liberated one to remain. Other contemporary neo-Vedanta scholars writing on living liberation follow traditional Advaitic thinking in part, yet also make some more original claims concerning the social ethics of the jīvanmukta. While accepting that the jīvanmukta is utterly detached from desire and has no duty to act, many of these scholars stress that the liberated being's nature is to "altruistically" love and serve others. While not contradictory to the gracious action of a traditional guru, these conceptions of "love" and "service" are not typical of traditional Advaita. This refashioning can be seen in N. Veezhinathan's and S. K. Ramachandran's assertions that the jīvanmukta has a "mission as teacher and saviour ... to enable men to realize their true self (127)," and that the liberated being "cannot but help others to attain" liberation (128), for "pure love [is the] spontaneous expression of his very nature (127)."36 Veezhinathan and Ramachandran also claim that the jīvanmukta tells followers to follow their dharma "out of sheer love for fellow-beings (129)." In a similar vein, A. G. Krishna Warrier, author of The Concept of Mukti in Advaita Vedanta, argues that liberated beings postpone "deliverance [for] missions of service to struggling humanity (58)." He elsewhere adds that such a "superman ... invites and assists all to self-transcendence. The mukta rules by the power of self-effacing love and service (503)." A. K. Lad claims that the jīvanmukta is "Supra-moral, not immoral," and that while doing "spontaneous activity for the welfare of the world," he "overcomes the dualism of 'Is' and 'Ought.' "37 Few, if any, classical textual references are supplied for any of the aforemen- tioned assertions, and one can argue, as Pandeya does, that Advaitic desire- lessness in practice has not and in theory will not "naturally" breed love and service. Neo-Vedantic views combining spiritual and social service were also held by the contemporary scholars and translators of Advaita texts, P. K. Sundaram and R. Balasubramanian. We have already observed Balasub- ramanian's remarks on Ramana as a jīvanmukta (chapter 10). Balasubramanian has also written that the jīvanmukta is "engaged in action of his own accord for the sake of lokasangraha, that is, for the preservation of the world order, for social service, without the sense of 'I' or 'mine.' "38 One notes here (and will see again soon) the explicit linkage of preservation of the world order

Liberated Being and Social Service na 183

(loka-samgraha) with social service, a tie never specifically made in tradi- tional Advaita. In conversation, Balasubramanian added that the jīvanmukta, seeing others suffer in the world of duality, serves both as a model for right action and as a teacher, due to compassion for the ignorant. He added, "His attachment is not like ours. He acts without any sense of agency," and is not (like us) impelled by desire.39 P. K. Sundaram also held the view that after knowing oneness, one would naturally altruistically help alleviate the suffer- ing of others, since with his mental clarity, a jīvanmukta sees human unity. For one knowing identity with others, social service is inevitable, since, Sundaram argued, no one wants to hurt oneself (in actuality, a debatable proposition). In response to the view that the liberated being would not act since he knows suffering to be unreal, Sundaram claimed that the jīvanmukta's activity is "not logical but phenomenological" because he knows the ignorant person feels the suffering as real.40 I have written elsewhere about the clearest recent example of linkage between jīvanmukti and a highly Westernized (particularly Christian) notion of social service: L. K. L. Srivastava's Advaitic Conception of Jīvanmukti.41 Srivastava, who is a good example of the neo-Vedanta "lineage" of Vive- kananda and Radhakrishnan, argues that the mukta is a "detached saint," rooted "in an all-comprehensive love;" further, "his service is rendered to all regardless of caste and class .... His actions tend towards the uplift of the whole human race (17)." The liberated being looks from the "viewpoint of the welfare of mankind," an ideal "based on universal brotherhood and love (24)"; he "is not fulfilled if he does not do good to others or does not strive for removing woes and sufferings from the world (25)." Srivastava concludes that liberated beings "should perform selfless activity so that others may be benefitted" and "should spotlight the dark corners of the enquirer's sub- consciousness (25)."42 One does not find such language in earlier Advaita, and this is a particularly clear opportunity to note the modern alteration of the notion of jīvanmukti. Srivastava, however, claims that this view is part of the loka-samgraha notion found in the Gīta. Yet, as discussed earlier, detached action that sus- tains the world's dharmic order is not the same as social service for all.43 When Srivastava argues that his notion of loka-samgraha "represents the true spirit of Indian culture" (25), one must respond that this statement is true only of an "India" influenced by modern Western ideas. At times, Srivastava rec- ognizes that traditional Advaitins like Sankara emphasize karma-samnyāsa and no obligations to society, including social service (28). Srivastava, show- ing untraditional but quite neo-Vedantic ecumenism, here and later praises Buddhist and Jain models of socially concerned liberated beings,44 while lamenting the lack of such examples found in Sankara's and Vidyāranya's writings (80 ff.).45

184 Embodied Liberation in Neo-Vedanta

Srivastava then indicates that the life-affirming ethical aspect of jīvanmukti reappears in modern, Western-influenced figures like Ramakrishna, Gandhi, and Aurobindo, who are part of "a line of spiritual personages" who proclaim that "service to humanity is the only end of an enlightened one (29)." Unsurprisingly, here and later, he focuses in particular on Swami Vivekananda as the ideal model of jīvanmukti.46 However, he does not men- tion the radical cultural changes in India after the British arrived, or the profoundly different influences on Vivekananda due to these changes. Srivastava accurately states that Vivekananda "gave a new pattern to the Advaitic thought of India (3)," and his views on living liberation, are, unlike the world-renouncing emphasis of Vidyāranya, in "conformity with the hu- manistic demand of the modern mind (285)."47 Srivastava approvingly quotes Vivekananda's aforementioned claim that the liberated person "works only to do good, his lips speak only benediction to all, his hands do only good works; his mind can only think good thoughts, his presence is a blessing wherever he goes."48 While Srivastava argues that Vivekananda is "a burning example of this ideal (284)," the ideal mentioned seems closer to a nineteenth-century image of a Christian saint than that of the jivanmukta in traditional Advaita. It seems apparent that the number and range of the arguments put forward here by modern neo-Vedantin thinkers and scholars of Advaita are in part an attempt to counter the view that Advaita is not concerned with being compassionate or doing good in the world (as opposed to the Buddhist bodhisattva or some Christian ideals). These scholars seem persuaded that interest in and action to increase social welfare is good, and thus the Advaitin jīvanmukta (at least today) must have such concern. In closing, I would argue, however, that one might better compare the traditional image of a jīvanmukta in Advaita to a Theravada Buddhist arhat than to a socially active saint or bodhisattva, for the arhat assists others primarily by "mere" pres- ence, being a field of merit and modeling detached serenity (as well as teach- ing). Yet in the end, the arhat is not focused on world-affirming social service, but is waiting to reach anupādhiśesa nirvāna (which Advaitins might say occurs when prārabdha karma ceases).

Throughout this book, and particularly in this final section, we have observed the transformation of the Advaitic concept of jīvanmukti over time, watching meanings be added, expanded, and subtracted. We have noted vari- ous thinkers wrestle with why and how a remnant of ignorance remains, causing continued embodiment even after liberating knowledge. We have seen different views on the role of yogic practice in attaining jīvanmukti, and on the nature and extent of a jīvanmukta's worldly activity. In recent times, we have especially noticed the influence and power, if not "hegemony," of

Liberated Being and Social Service 185

Western ideas on the jīvanmukti concept, resulting in new topics and issues being addressed and old ones downplayed. In this chapter, I hope to have shown that, due to the impact of new perspectives, neo-Vedantins do not always fully comprehend or accurately represent the traditional Advaitic way of thinking, in part because they do not sufficiently recognize and acknowl- edge its otherness to their own thinking. This is unfortunate for a number of reasons: Proper delineation is generally inherently desirable and self-con- sciousness of one's own position aids in giving integrity and consistency to one's views. Also, recognizing otherness inhibits the inaccurate projection of personal views and comprehending difference can widen our own viewpoint. Like Halbfass, I think that part of the importance of traditional Indian thought is precisely that it is not encompassed by Europe or modernity; it offers new understandings (one of the goals of modern Western thinking), since it is not part of the "new." One merit of the increasing historical and philosophical self-awareness of the modern West is that it illumines the limits of its own hermeneutical horizon, and its distance from traditional Indian thinking. Ironi- cally, then, we must come to know that, at least to some degree, by under- standing, we cannot understand.

Notes

Introduction

1. See "A Note on Hinduism."

2. One might begin looking at this topic with Living Liberation in Hindu Thought, edited by Andrew O. Fort and Patricia Y. Mumme (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996).

3. "Die Vorbereitung der Vorstellung von der Erlösung bei Lebzeiten in den Upanisads." Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sudasiens 6 (1962): 151-78, "Die Idee der Jīvanmukti in den Späten Upanisads." WZKSO 7 (1963): 190-208, and "Der Weg zur Erlösung bei Lebzeiten, Ihr Wesen and Ihr Wert nach dem Jīvanmuktiviveka des Vidyāraņya." WZKSO 8 (1964): 224-62 and 14 (1970): 131-60.

4. While it is the case that from the highest view (paramārtha), jīvanmukti is ineffable, we shall see that the Advaita tradition says a great deal about embodied liberation, showing that fine philosophical distinctions and close reasoning were im- portant to them.

5. I will not enter into the debate about who exactly is eligible for renuncia- tion and liberation in traditional Advaita. Interested readers can turn to Śankara's comments on BaU I. 4. 15 and IV. 4. 22 and Mundaka I. 2. 12.

6. For a valuable and an illuminating discussion of these views, with conclu- sions similar to my own, see Wilhelm Halbfass's introduction to Beyond Orientalism: The Work of Wilhelm Halbfass and Its Impact on Indian and Cross-Cultural Studies. Edited by Eli Franco and Karin Preisendanz. Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of Sciences and Humanities No. 59. ( Amsterdam/Atlanta: Editions Rodopi, 1997). Among

187

188 Notes

other things, Halbfass points out that critics of Orientalism generally use English, live and teach in the West, and write for Western academics. These critics often polemi- cally collapse and essentialize many different thinkers and strands of thought over a long period of time, as they accuse their opponents of having done. More perni- ciously, they remain Western (or Westernized) authorities, still speaking for and about (and not much to) Indians. 7. This is discussed a bit more in "A Note on Hinduism." 8. For more on this subject, see "A Note on Understanding." 9. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1993). See also Texts in Context, edited by Jeffrey Timm (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992). 10. Thus, the Vedanta comes to be called "the later exegesis," or uttara mīmām̧sā. 11. If one takes seriously Clooney's argument, one might fault my topical or thematic approach for insufficiently recognizing various texts' and thinkers' own plans and interests, and for decontextualizing the topic of jīvanmukti too much from impera- tives of the (particularly Pūrva Mīmāmsā) tradition. I would argue that my tracing of this theme, which arises from the tradition itself, does not inappropriately distort the concerns of the tradition and, more positively, illumines aspects of it helpfully for my audience.

12. Liberation is not gaining immortality in heaven either.

13. Put in another (more Western) way, liberation is a transformation in one's perspective: the body exists, but is without value; your worldview shifts, but you do not leave the world. When brahman is known, no desire remains, because all (of value) is obtained.

14. I will mention only in passing that Advaitins debated vigorously about the nature of individualized selves (jīva) and whether ignorance (avidyā) is located in the jīva. In general, it was thought that there are many jivas, each with ignorance, and thus one jīva is liberated at a time.

15. See chapter 2. While the example is given of Vämadeva gaining liberation in the womb (Sankara, Sarvajnātman, JMV, Pañcadaśī), Advaitins do not argue that gods or animals attain jīvanmukti. 16. Pp. 38-44.

16. For a good discussion of this point, see Nelson's essay, pp. 45-47.

17. See Christopher Chapple's chapter in Living Liberation in Hindu Thought. In scholastic Advaita, (videha-) kaivalya indicates final release "beyond" living liberation.

18. I will not here examine a third conception of liberation: that of love of and communion with a personal lord. Many Indian thinkers argue that a loving surrender beyond "mere" world withdrawal or serenity in the self is the highest liberation. For more on this, see Chacko Valiaveetil's Liberated Life, p. 64 ff.

Notes 189

20. For more on this, and for a good analysis of the development of the jīvanmukti concept in the Upanisads, see J. F. Sprockhoff's 1962 article, mentioned in note 3.

21. Karma is a difficult term to translate, as it can mean all activity, the effects of action, morally retributive action, sacrificial rites, and so on. Here, it will generally indicate those actions that bear fruits that must manifest, in accord with the moral and ritual order, before liberation is attained.

22. A different but related issue is how long the body continues after knowl- edge. See especially Sankara and Mandana (chapter 3) on this matter.

23. The problematic implications of their complete opposition was brought out most effectively by Prakāśānanda; see chapter 4.

24. See, for example, Sankara's BāU bhāşya III. 5. 1.

25. A fourth answer, one based upon experience, is remarkably absent. Śankara only uses this argument once, and even here only after giving scriptural texts and reasoning. At the end of BS bhāsya IV. 1. 15, he writes that the jñānin knows he is brahman even while embodiment continues. Sankara asks: How can any other person contradict one convinced in his heart of hearts that he knows brahman yet retains a body? Sarvajnātman refers to this experience as evidence for the presence of the trace (leśa) of ignorance (chapter 3). In his Advaitasiddhi, Madhusūdana Sarasvatī mentions in passing that jīvanmukti is established primarily by the self-experience (svānubhāva) of jīvanmuktas themselves (chapter 4).

26. In BS bhāsya IV. 1. 15, Sankara talks of the brahmavid who knows he is brahman, yet remains in the body. He attains, but does not yet become, brahman (ChU bhāsya VI. 14. 2). Vidyāraņya, in his Jīvanmuktiviveka, takes a slightly differ- ent tack. He claims that "jīvanmukti " refers to liberation with no future births, so one in the last birth is a videhamukta while living (chapter 7).

27. Other supporting quotations from śruti can be found in chapter 4.

28. They also can be removed by certain ritual actions, thus indicating karmic

(chapter 2). activity can assist one in attaining brahma-jñāna. See Sankara's BS bhāsya IV. 1. 18

29. This kind of karma is responsible for the return of one with a commission mentioned in BS III. 3. 32. Such return will be brief (for no work is wasted, Gītā IV. 40 and BS III. 4. 51) says Sankara and Sarvajñātman, but Vimuktātman holds force- fully that a jīvanmukta will never return. Interestingly, there is no discussion of different types of prārabdha karma, "good" or "bad."

30. The most often-mentioned text holding the opposing view is Mundaka II. 2. 8, which says that when brahman is seen, all karma (which of course includes the body) is destroyed-so mukti is immediate, with no waiting for eventual body fall (Maņdana, Citsukha, Prakāśātman, and Sadānanda).

190 Notes

31. tasya tāvad eva ciram yāvan na vimoksye, atha sampatsya.

32. I will regularly refer to "body fall" or "body drop" instead of "death," since these terms put the focus where it should be, on the body.

33. As I will show in the chapter on Mandana's views, he holds that the "only as long as" (tavad eva) in the statement "there is delay only as long as one is not free (from the body)" conveys speediness not delay, like "having bathed and eaten, I will come" suggests haste and not delay (chapter 3). Sureśvara calls the ChU text an apavāda-a special exception to a general rule (chapter 3). Prakāśātman agrees (chap- ter 4). The delay here is only so that a teacher can guide the seeker blindfolded by ignorance "home"; the knower will delay just this long.

34. A more modern example is the whirling of the ceiling fan that continues but slowly diminishes after the electricity stops.

35. To use the arrow analogy with the two other types of karma, one would say that after liberation, the quiver full of arrows is dropped (samcita), and no future arrows will be shot (āgamī).

36. Also, they are not destroyed, while ignorance (the basis of body and karma) is, as Prakāśānanda's pūrvapaksin points out (chapter 4). 37. See Śankara's BS bhāşya IV. 1. 15 and Maņdana Miśra, who devotes much of his writing on jīvanmukti to differentiating samskāras from karma. The later writ- ers Vimuktātman, Citsukha, Prakāśātman, and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī also discuss this topic.

37. Maņdana calls the samskāra a "weak" and an "insignificant" remnant of karma (chapter 3).

38. Maņdana, Sureśvara, Vācaspati, Vimuktātman, and Bhāratītīrtha mention this.

39. Sureśvara gives the analogy of gradual body cessation being like the gradual withering of an uprooted tree (Naiskarmyasiddhi IV. 61).

40. Vimuktātman, chapter 3. See also Citsukha's pūrvapakșin, chapter 3. 42. On the concealing and projecting powers, see Appayya, Madhusūdana, and Dharmarāja contra Prakāśānanda's pūrvapakșin (all in chapter 4). See also PD (Chap. 8) and Lance Nelson's above-mentioned essay (pp. 33-34).

41. Their commitment to wrestling with this issue shows its importance and Advaitins' problems in connecting a real self with unreal physical manifestation. Still, I think their arguments for the linkage of karma, body, and realization while living are more forceful and widely shared than does Lance Nelson in Living Liberation in Hindu Thought.

42. It is worth noting here that Sankara rarely writes about the conduct of a mukta at any length. Perhaps most revealing are Upadeśasāhasrī Prose I. 2 and 6, where he characterizes the student desirous of liberation and the teacher (ācārya). See chapter 2.

Notes 191

45. For an illuminating discussion of this topic, see Mackenzie Brown's chap- ter on Śuka in the Mahābhārata and Purānas in Living Liberation in Hindu Thought.

46. One result of which is the introduction of stages of jīvanmukti.

47. For more on the one with firm wisdom, see chapter 1 and "A Note on the Sthita-prajña as "Yogic Jīvanmukta" after chapter 8. Among mainstream Advaitins, the sthita-prajña is mentioned occasionally, but is not emphasized. Sankara (chapter 2) says the sthita-prajña is a samnyāsin, for whom renunciation and knowledge of brahman go together (though the latter is more important). Mandana examines whether the sthita-prajña is an advanced seeker (sādhaka) or a fully liberated siddha (chapter 3), concluding it is the latter, with which Citsukha agrees. Vimuktātman also mentions the sthita-prajña in passing (chapter 3).

48. Chapter 4. For a similar modern perspective, see Ramana Maharshi's view that "[w]hen knowledge comes, ignorance goes and all the divine qualities appear automatically. If a man is Self-realised he cannot tell a lie or commit a sin or do anything wrong." The Teachings of Bhagavan Sri Ramana Maharshi in His Own Words. Edited by Arthur Osborne. 5th edition. (Tiruvannamalai: Sri Ramanashramam, 1988), p. 162.

49. The rationale for this is never clearly argued, but one could hold that the long, hard path to liberation burns out the possibility of doing evil and that the desireless jīvanmukta would, when acting, "naturally" follow the dharma. 50. The liberated being's concern for others is mentioned in "Yogic Advaita" texts like Vidyāraņya's JMV, however. See especially his description of austerity (tapas) as an aim of jīvanmukti (chapter 7).

50. Of course, categories like "the West" or "Euro-American" also are prob- lematic. One can always subdivide such reified geographical and cultural entities. For good introductions to the problems in using "Hindu(ism)," see John S. Hawley, "Naming Hinduism," Wilson Quarterly, summer 1991: 20-34, Robert Frykenberg, "Construc- tions of Hinduism at the Nexus of History and Religion," Journal of Interdisciplinary History 23: 3 (winter 1993): 523-50, and Alf Hiltebeitel, "Hinduism," The HarperCollins Dictionary of Religion. Edited by Jonathan Z. Smith. San Francisco: Harper San Francisco, 1995.

51. This conception of Hinduism also has become linked to the growing, highly politicized "fundamentalist" movement of Hindutva, which includes an exclusivist nationalism.

52. "Hinduism: On the Proper Use of a Deceptive Term," in Hinduism Recon- sidered. Edited by Gunther Sontheimer and Hermann Kulke (Delhi: Manohar Munshiram, 1989), p. 20.

53. He writes that "some of the Hindu religions are closely related to each other," deriving from similar sources, using some similar concepts and techniques, and many influencing each other. "But the same close relationship, the same type of similarities derived from common origin, common stock of traditions, and common

192 Notes

theological and ethical concepts exist between Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, and yet they are different religions (p. 17)."

55. For a good, thought-provoking look at "understanding" in the contexts addressed in this book, see Beyond Orientalism.

56. When one culture or ideology confronts another, there is generally essentializing, suppression, and exclusion, whether within or between (for example) the West, India, China, or the Islamic world.

57. One example of a text demonstrating the current awareness of these issues is Orientalism and the Postcolonial Predicament: Perspectives on South Asia. Carol Breckenridge and Peter van der Veer, Eds. (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994).

Chapter 1

1. As mentioned in the Introduction, J. F. Sprockhoff has written extensively on the development of the notion of jīvanmukti in the Upanisads (both early and late), and is very informative on these matters. See the Introduction, note 3.

2. See the "Note on Mukti in the Upanisads" at the end of the chapter.

3. While the nature of these paths is an interesting topic, it is not central to this study, as it is not discussed much in the context of Advaitic living liberation. See Sprockhoff (1962), pp. 160-64 and A. G. Krishna Warrier, The Concept of Mukti in Advaita Vedanta. (Madras: University Madras, 1961), pp. 477-80. See also Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy (1922; Reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975), Vol. 1, pp. 53-58; Paul Deussen, The Philosophy of the Upanishads, Trans. A. S. Geden (1906; Reprint, New York: Dover Publications, 1966), pp. 334-38, 359-61; Wilhelm Halbfass, Tradition and Reflection: Explorations in Indian Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1991), pp. 323-28; and Kim Skoog in Living Liberation in Hindu Thought, p. 83.

4. Kramamukti is contrasted with immediate (sadyo) and living (jīvan) libera- tion, which are attained by nondual knowledge. I would here concur with Krishna Warrier, who writes that the Advaitic notion of kramamukti tries to "make sense of the various statements of the Upanisads regarding the departure of certain types of knowers along the path of the gods, and their nonreturn to a state of earth life. Perhaps here we have to reckon with an article of ancient faith in a heaven beyond our present habitat, and in life there as the destiny of virtuous and wise souls" (Concept of Mukti, p. 480). This also seems to be Sprockhoff's view. Again, not much is said about kramamukti when Advaitins discuss jīvanmukti; the time of body fall is tied much more to the end of the fructifying of commenced (prārabdha) karma. 5. I try to avoid the latter term, since there is no unanimity on what consti- tutes a "major" Upanisad. I refer to the scholarly consensus represented by Hume

Notes 193

et al., while acknowledging that there may be a nondualistic bias in that consensus that would contribute both to a particular (mis)reading of these Upanisads and to their ranking as "major."

6. In this context, the terms immortal and fearless (abhaya) often are paired, especially in the ChU when referring to brahman. See ChU IV. 15. 1, VIII. 3. 4, 10. 1, 11. 1, and BaU IV. 4. 25. See also Mundaka II. 2. 12 on immortal brahman. Ātman is termed immortal in ChU VIII. 12. 1 and BaU III. 7. 3 ff.

7. ChU I. 4. 4-5 claims the om mantra is immortal and fearless, and upon entering it, the gods-and humans-also become immortal and fearless.

8. This seems to differ from Kausītaki II. 14, mentioned in the next paragraph.

9. As mentioned above, Kauşītaki III. 2 seems to hold a different view, hold- ing that one can be immortal here.

10. This image seems taken from ChU VIII. 4. 1-2 and BāU IV. 4. 22, which describe a bridge separating this and other worlds but do not say knowing is the bridge to immortality. The later, devotional Svetāśvatara calls the Lord the bridge to immortality (VI. 19). 11. For similar statements, see also Katha VI. 2 and 9, and see Śvetāśvatara III. 1, 10, 13, and IV. 17 and 20 on the Lord as immortal. The Śvetāśvatara passages are very similar in describing knowing as bringing immortality, but its knowing is theistic. Thus, it argues that by knowing the Lord, one becomes immortal (III. 10) or blessed by the Lord, the jīva goes to immortality (I. 6). 12. In a similar vein, ChU VIII. 4. 1-3 say that the self is the bridge to the flawless brahma-world, and only the brahmacārin moves freely in all worlds. 13. Sprockhoff (1962) is illuminating here; see p. 166 ff. 14. One might see a similarity in Katha V. 1, which says that one ruling one's mind and senses does not grieve and after being freed (vimuc), one is indeed freed.

11. This idea seems to appear in ChU III. 14. 4 as well: one knowing brahman as the self of all reaches brahman upon departing from here.

12. yadā sarve pramucyante kāmā ye'sya hrdi sritāḥ, atha martyo'mrto bhavati, atra brahma samaśnute. Note that the verb indicating attaining (sam-as) includes a prefix denoting close conjunction. 17. This text will be critical to Sankara, who argues that embodiment (saśarīratva) is related to ignorance, not directly to a physical body-thus, one can have knowledge while embodied. See chapter 2. 18. An interesting sidelight here is the statements in IV. 4. 22, that the Self- knower is unaffected by good or evil karma, and in 23 that the brahman-knower is free from evil (pāpman). One can read this to mean that a liberated being can do no wrong. This issue of "liberated ethics" is not, unfortunately, explored at any length

194 Notes

here or in the later Advaita tradition. In this context, see also ChU IV. 14. 3, which says that as water does not cling to a lotus leaf, evil (pāpman) karma does not cling to one who knows. Kausītaki III. 1 also suggests a brahman-knower can do no wrong. All of these passages seem to refer to a brahman-knower still in a body, that is, a jīvanmukta. In later Advaita, Sureśvara briefly discusses the brahman-knower being free to do whatever he pleases (yathestācarana); see chapter 3.

19. However, we are still far from the explicit distinctions between brahman- knower and jīvanmukta or jīvanmukta and videhamukta, found in later Advaita and the YV/JMV.

20. The issue of the necessity for a teacher to attain liberation is important to later Advaitins. For a brief summary of the pros and cons, see chapter 4.

21. Tasya tāvad eva ciram yāvan na vimoksye, atha sampatsya. This passage closes by stating again that the self is the subtle essence of all, and "you are that, Śvetaketu." Note that, as with BaU IV. 4. 7, the verb indicating attaining (here sampad) includes a prefix denoting close conjunction. Incidentally, the verbal root describing release from the blindfold is pramuc, and from life is vimuc.

22. This question leads directly to the later distinction between jīvan- and videha-mukta, and to the notion of prārabdha karma. 23. Katha VI. 14-15 and Mundaka II. 1. 10 and III. 2. 9.

23. yadā sarve pramucyante kāmā ye'sya hrdi sritāḥ, atha martyo'mrto bhavati, atra brahma samaśnute. yadā sarve prabhidyante hrdayasyeha granthayaḥ atha martyo'mrto bhavaty etāvad anuśāsanam.

This may also in part refer back to ChU VII. 26. 2, which claims that one who sees that all is from the self sees and obtains all, and ultimately gains release from all knots in the heart.

25. sa yo ha vai tat paramam brahma veda brahmaiva bhavati, nāsyābrahmavit kule bhavati, tarati śokam tarati pāpmānam guhā-granthibhyo vimukto'mrto bhavati. 26. Dasgupta, History, Vol. 1, p. 421. This is unsurprising if, as George Thibaut in his BS bhāsya translation (and others) have argued, Rāmānuja's interpretation of the BS is closer to Bādarāyana's than is that of Sankara.

26. aihikam apyaprastutapratibandhe taddarśanāt.

27. evam mukti-phalāniyamas-tadavasthāvadhrtes-tadavasthāvadhrteḥ.

28. tadadhigama uttara-pūrvāghayor-aślesa-vināšau tadvyapadeśāt. Itarasyāpy- evam-asamślesaḥ pāte tu.

29. anārabdha-kārye eva tu pūrve tadavadheḥ.

Notes 195

31. bhogena tvitare ksapayitvā sampadyate.

32. yāvad-adhikāram-avasthitir-ādhikārikāņām.

33. Thus I shall only mention in passing claims in the first prakarana that one awakens to nonduality (GK I. 16), that the wise sage (muni) is worthy of adoration and respect (I. 22), and that the om knower is a sage (I. 26). All of this presumably occurs in this life.

34. GK II. 38: tattvam ādhyātmikam drstvā tattvam drstvā tu bāhyatah, tattvībhūtas tadārāmas tattvād apracyuto bhavet.

35. III. 46: yadā na līyate cittam na ca viksipyate punah, aninganam anābhāsam nispannam brahma tat tadā.

36. Various statements also implying living liberation can be found in the fourth prakarana, which many have argued is by a different (and Buddhist) author than are the first three chapters. The statements here are as suggestive but also as inconclusive as the aforementioned references. There are allusions to one who is all- seeing (IV. 84) and to one who has attained perfect omniscience, the nondual brāhmanic goal (sarvajñatām krtsnām brāhmaņyam padam advayam, IV. 85). The one with great intellect (mahādhi) becomes omniscient everywhere (IV. 89). Great knowers are cer- tain of the unborn and uniform (sāmya) (IV. 95). The last verse (100) urges that, after awakening to the profound and hard to see unborn and uniform state, homage be constantly given. Again, these suggest the existence of a liberation while living.

37. The sthita-prajña is mentioned by Sankara, Maņdana, Citsukha, and Madhusūdana as well.

38. tad viddhi praņipātena paripraśnena sevayā/upadekșyanti te jñānam jñāninas tattva-darśinaḥ. This passage is mentioned by Šankara, Vimuktātman, and Citsukha as well.

39. jñānāgniḥ sarva-karmāņi bhasmasāt kurute tathā.

40. Similarly, V. 6 claims that the sage yoked to yoga soon reaches brahman, and V. 20 states that the undeluded brahman-knower is one with a stable intellect.

41. śaknotīhaiva yaḥ sodhum prāk šarīra-vimokșaņāt kāmakrodhodbhavam vegam sa yuktah sa sukhī naraḥ.

42. This combination of terms is interesting, given that the Gītā is generally hostile to Buddhism. Perhaps it is both arguing that the yogic path gives the highest Buddhist goal and suggesting that those who pursue brahman (i.e., Advaitins) are, like the Buddhists, a bit misguided.

43. Lists of virtuous qualities of a liberated being also are found in XVI. 1- 3 and XVIII. 50-54 (one who has become brahman).

196 Notes

Chapter 2

1. This chapter is a revised version of my article, "Knowing Brahman While Embodied: Sankara on Jīvanmukti," Journal of Indian Philosophy 19 (1991): 369-89.

2. In comments on Gītā VI. 27, he writes "brahma-bhūtam jīvanmuktam."

3. While I will not duplicate the form of argument adopted by Śankara, I should point out that his thinking is imbedded in commentary format. He generally takes up a topic determined by the text he is commenting on, introduces a doubt and/ or an opponent's view (the pürvapaksa), and then gives his counter, correcting posi- tion (uttarapaksa), concluding with the proper view (siddhānta). 4. As mentioned earlier, I use the words "body fall" or "body drop" instead of "death" throughout, since these terms put the focus where it should be, on the body. 5. For a highly illuminating essay on some key terms in Sankara's thought, refer to Paul Hacker's "Distinctive Features of the Doctrine and Terminology of Šankara: Avidyā, Nāmarūpa, Māyā, Iśvara," in Philology and Confrontation, edited and translated by Wilhelm Halbfass (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1995). Hacker makes the excellent point that Sankara was not prone to tight definition and rigorous conceptual schematizing (p. 95). His followers were more "scholastic" in their systemic and polemical theorizing. 6. Paramārthikam kūțasthanityam vyomavat sarvavyāpi sarvakriyārahitam nityatrptam niravayavam svayamjyotiḥ svabhāvam. 7. Thus, while deep sleep might suggest liberation because one is then bliss- ful and nondual like when knowing brahman, still one is not aware during sleep and one always returns to waking. See Andrew O. Fort, The Self and Its States (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1990), pp. 17-21, 55-61.

4. For more, see Philology and Confrontation, chapters 4 and 9.

5. On occasion, Śankara uses kaivalya (literally, "isolation") as a synonym for moksa, but it is significant that Advaitic liberation (knowing ätman/brahman iden- tity) is more positive than mere monadistic isolation. Yogic kaivalya suggests that only freedom from embodiment brings freedom from suffering (the final goal); San- kara's usage of kaivalya is not this clear.

6. Health, like knowing one's identity with brahman, is one's "natural state." One recovers this condition by removing the dis-ease of avidya. See also the mention of svasthā in Upadesasahasri 14. 23 and 17. 74.

7. In BS IV. 4. 2, he adds that moksa is a "fruit" only in reference to the cessation of knowledge, not in reference to the arising of any new result, as is the case with karma. Sankara is always careful to keep separate the results of knowledge and action. Moksa also is called the death of (transmigratory) death (BāU III. 3. 1) and brahman-knowers are said to be immortal (BāU IV. 4. 14). More will be said later on how Sankara deals with the Upanisadic language of immortality.

Notes 197

12. A number of well-known Upanisadic texts are quoted in support of this view: "neti, neti" (BāU III. 9. 26), "where one sees no other" (ChU VII. 24.1), "all this is this self" (BaU II. 4. 6), and so on.

13. We shall see that "Yogic Advaita" texts like the YV and JMV do talk about degrees of jīvanmukti.

14. BS I. 1. 12 specifies this knowledge as immediate liberation (sadyomukti), as opposed to gradual (krama) liberation that arises from "meditation" (upāsana)- I will say more on this later.

15. This point is significant in part because of Sankara's wish to decouple knowledge and action.

16. In BaU IV. 4. 7, he reiterates that one attains brahman here, so liberation is not dependent on going to some other place (like heaven).

17. Still, the mukta is at the end of the body series and does not transmigrate as before.

18. Unlike the attainment of a heavenly world that is uncertain, since it hap- pens only after one experiences the fruits of actions.

19. There are a few brief indications of his view in the Upanisad commentar- ies, such as BäU IV. 4. 6, which says the mukta is both desireless and has attained all desires (since he has attained the self). This passage speaks of the knower as ātmakāma, āptakāma, nișkāma, and akāma. Desire is the root of transmigratory ex- istence, causing limitation and connection with karma, while desirelessness causes liberation. BaU I. 4. 2 describes Prajāpati as knowing unity while in human form, since all sins caused by the opposite of dharma, knowledge (jñāna), renunciation (vairāgya), and aiśvarya (supernatural powers) are burnt. He now has excellence in memory, intelligence, and insight.

20. Other qualities indicate proper understanding of caste and life stage. This is, of course, reminiscent of, and expands on, the fourfold sādhana, discussed in BS bhāsya I. 1. 1.

21. A little later in the passage, Sankara writes he should teach śrutis instruct- ing the unity of the self, such as "this being is one without a second" (ChU VI. 2.1), "the self is all this" (ChU VII. 25. 2), "all this is brahman" (ChU III. 14. 1), and so on.

22. See also Mundaka III. 2. 6 on the jīvanmukta as samnyāsin.

23. For a good introduction to this issue, see Yoshitsugu Sawai, "Sankara's Theory of Samnyasa." Journal of Indian Philosophy 14 (1986): 371-87.

24. Sankara substitutes the term "moksa" for "nirvāņa" in V. 24, 25, and 26, as well as II. 71-72. He is clearly not comfortable with "brahma-nirvāna."

25. Something similar is said in ChU VIII. 12. 1: aśarīratva is from vidyā and saśarīratva is from avidyā.

198 Notes

26. This idea is emphasized in Sankara's best-known noncommentatorial work, the Upadeśasāhasrī. Verse X. 6 states that since bodiless, I have neither virtue nor vice, caste nor life stage. Verse XV. 6 says bodilessness is not a fruit of action (which causes connection with the body). According to Verse XVII. 6, actions are based on caste, which belongs to the body.

27. Both Vācaspati Miśra's Bhāmatī and Ānandagiri follow Śankara rather closely here. They elaborate some points and add some illustrations, but little new ground is broken. In Vācaspati Miśra's case, this seems to indicate a certain lack of interest in the jīvanmukti doctrine, since he does not follow Sankara so closely on every issue.

28. Ānandagiri here says that such a being is a jīvanmukta, in a body (dehastha), but not transmigrating (a samsārī).

29. Here as elsewhere, Upanisadic language links knowledge and cessation of desire with immortality, a physical state Sankara wants to deemphasize.

30. This account appears in numerous places, including BS III. 3. 32, IV. 1. 15, 19, BāU I. 4. 7, 10, IV. 4. 6-7, and ChU VI. 14. 2.

31. BS IV. 1. 15, BaU I. 4. 10. Further, future evil notions do not arise for the knower, since they have no support.

32. The terminology for kinds of karma is later formalized as āgamī (future fruit-producing activity), prārabdha (currently manifesting actions), and samcita (the mass of previously accumulated actions).

33. ChU VI. 14. 2 adds that anārabdha karma is also burnt by expiatory acts (prāyaścitta).

34. Here suggesting final release, later called videhakaivalya or videhamukti.

35. This is called ksema or "ease" in IV. 1. 15.

36. This analogy also is used in BS III. 3. 32 and BaU I. 4. 7 and 10.

37. He quotes Gīta IV. 37 here: "The fire of knowledge turns all actions to ashes."

38. This view is echoed strongly in Vidyāranya's Jīvanmuktiviveka. We shall look at the relationship between knowledge and action more closely later.

39. Śankara, rather uncharacteristically, mentions yogic practice in I. 4. 7, stating that when knowledge is weaker than already commenced karma, the stream of recollection of ātma-jñāna must be regulated by the power of sādhanas like renun- ciation and detachment. This action-centered approach is of course only enjoined as an alternative, depending on the circumstance. For more, see the endnote on Śankara and Yoga.

40. In BS IV. 1. 19, Śankara adds that although seeing difference continues after full insight, it will not continue after the body falls, since the cause of seeing difference before the body falls (the enjoyment of prārabdha karma) ceases at death.

Notes A 199

41. The late Advaitin Madhusūdana Sarasvati also mentions these passages. See chapter 8.

42. B. N. K. Sharma. The Brahmasūtras and Their Principal Commentaries. Vol. III. Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1978. 43. See also the brief reference to commenced samskāras in ChU III. 14. 4. Vācaspati Miśra here mentions the later often-used analogy of samskāras being like the trembling that continues awhile, even after a snake is realized to be truly a rope. Trembling and samskāras inevitably but only gradually cease after fear and karma cease.

43. In BS II. 1. 8, Sankara adds muktas are not reborn, since right insight removes delusive "knowledge" (mithya-jñāna). This is as opposed to deep sleep or a world dissolution (pralaya) in which ignorance and its adjuncts (upādhi) remain.

44. This passage and issue are largely ignored in later Advaita, being men- tioned only briefly in Dharmarāja's Vedāntaparibhāșa. (IX. 55) and Pañcadaśī VII. 252 ff.

45. Vācaspati Miśra follows Sankara rather closely here. He stresses the neces- sity of experiencing the fruits of prārabdha karma before gaining liberation. He also uses unSankaran terminology in emphasizing the immediate experience (anubhava, sākșātkāra) of nondual reality (Advaita-tattva).

46. This topic is addressed in similar fashion in BS IV. 1. 19. Karma can produce other fruits after the fall of the body only when supported by mithya-jñāna. False "knowledge" has been burnt away by full insight, however. Thus, when a knower's already commenced activity ceases, kaivalya is inevitable.

47. Ānandagiri underlines that jñāna, and not aiśvarya, brings liberation.

48. He then describes some of the "thousands of attachments" of the ignorant person who thinks "I am son of x and related to y, I am happy/sad, foolish/wise, born/ aged/dead; my son is dead, wealth gone, I am destroyed. How shall I live? Where shall I go? Etc."

49. Teaching others can be seen as an aspect of "social service" (i.e., West- ern-style "doing good"), or in more Indian terms, protecting (samgraha) and favor- ing (anugraha) the world order. Many neo-Vedantins in particular have argued that jīvanmuktas are socially concerned, performing good works for others. Much will be said about this issue in Chapter 12, including the fact that Sankara does not emphasize the knower's solicitude for others, although he does refer to it on occa- sion. Here I will only say that while teaching can be regarded as spiritual service, active social service is not emphasized in the classical Advaita tradition, and one could argue that when one sees no duality, there are no others (or "society") to be concerned about.

50. BāU IV. 3. 36. A similar statement on the body as the seat for experiencing the fruits of karma appears in BS II. 2. 1. We also have seen that the Gītā points out that even the advanced yogin takes many lives to gain perfection (VI. 42-45).

200 Notes

52. He makes a related point in comments on BaU IV. 4. 22. Ritual actions cause purification, and when purified, one can know the self revealed by the Upanisads without impediment. Still the main means (mukhya sädhana) to the world of the self is renouncing all activity; those desiring this world should, like the wise, renounce (pravraj). 53. Among the many passages where Sankara argues at length for the utter separation between knowledge and karmic activity, one can look at BāU III. 3. 1 or IV. 5. 15. It will suffice here to mention that the latter commentary points out that activity is for the ignorant, although while ignorance persists, mendicancy and per- forming rites are recommended for those desirous of liberation. Since non-Brahmins are not entitled to mendicancy, they should definitely perform rites throughout their lives. See also BS III. 4. 20 (which emphasizes that only samnyāsins should pursue attaining brahman while those in other life stages should continue to follow all ap- propriate duties), and ChU II. 23. 1 on this issue. 54. On the other hand, Sankara does say, in BaU IV. 4. 8 and elsewhere, that brahman-knowers, being free, go to heavenly worlds after the fall of the body. 55. Katha VI. 14 actually refers to the departing of the heart's desires, which Śankara says are seated in the intellect (buddhi) and not the self.

53. See related passages in chapter 1. Mundaka II. 1. 10 puts it the other way: One who knows the supreme immortal brahman existing in the heart destroys the knot of ignorance here (i.e., while living). Both the Katha VI. 14 and Mundaka III. 2. 6 commentaries say that becoming brahman here is like the blowing out of a lamp. 57. Śankara refers back to BāU IV. 4. 6 here: being brahman, he merges in brahman. Mundaka II. 2. 8 (and Sankara's commentary on it) largely echo the Katha VI passage. It adds all doubts are cut, and Sankara reiterates that actions with uncommenced fruits are destroyed, but not those with fruits now manifesting. 58. A similar notion is mentioned in his commentary on the sthita-prajña in the Gītā.

54. This passage also says, following Māndūkya Upanișad 10 (and Gītā VI. 41-42) that no non-knower of brahman is born in the knower's family.

55. In addition to knowing brahman, the liberated being is said to be desireless, detached from works, and concerned for others.

56. Such a being might now have and use supernatural powers, but these powers are not as significant as or essential to brahma-jñāna. 62. See "Sankara the Yogin and Sankara the Advaitin: Some Observations" in Philology and Confrontation. In Tradition and Reflection, Wilhelm Halbfass disagrees with Hacker's view that Sankara wrote a Yogasūtra commentary. For more on this issue and on the role of yoga and meditation in Sankara's thought, see J. Bader, Meditation in Sankara's Vedanta (New Delhi: Aditya Prakashan, 1990). 63. "The Question of the Importance of Samadhi in Modern and Classical Advaita Vedanta," Philosophy East and West 43 (January 1993): 19-38.

Notes 201

64. For example, see his remarks on the value of meditation on the om mantra in BS I. 3. 13 and BāU I. 3. 9.

65. In comments on BaU III. 5. 1, he writes that the contemplative sage (muni) becomes a yogin from the strength (bälya) of knowing the self and from scholarship (pānditya). Having removed all ideas of the non-self, all is accomplished (krtakrtya), and one becomes a yogin.

66. Incidentally, Sankara has no reservation about granting the existence of supernatural yogic powers. See BS II. 1. 25, III. 2. 5, III. 3. 32, or IV. 4. 15.

67. Śankara also refers to upāsana as a continuous stream (pravāha-karaņa) of similar thoughts (samāna-pratyaya) in BS IV. 1. 7.

68. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994. See also Coman's article, pp. 19-21 and 30.

69. Limits of Scripture, p. 65 ff.

70. Ibid., p. 97.

Chapter 3

1. One of these pupils, Padmapāda, mentions living liberation briefly; he seems to follow Sankara's comments on BS IV. 1. 15. Padmapāda states that knowl- edge ends all attachment and transmigratory existence, but the apparent consciousness of sense-objects endures, due to the continuance of residual karma for this life, like the moon continues to appear twofold to one with an eye defect. See Padmapāda's Pañcapādika. Translated by R. D. Venkataramiah. Gaekwad's Oriental Series, Vol. 107. (Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1948), p. 328.

2. Though dating these figures exactly is, of course, problematic.

3. For a brief comment on the Mandana-Sureśvara identity controversy, see the beginning of the next section.

4. Edited by S. Kuppuswami Sastri. (Delhi: Sri Satguru Publications, 1984). Jīvanmukti is discussed on pp. 129-33. For more on Mandana and this text, see Allen Thrasher, The Advaita Vedanta of the Brahmasiddhi (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1993).

5. That is, experiencing karmic fruits until completion.

6. Tasya tāvad eva ciram yāvan na vimoksa. An alternate reading could be: "There is a delay (in liberation) only as long as I am not free (from the body)," which would have very different implications.

7. An image used by Sureśvara, Vācaspati, and Vimuktātman.

8. On the other hand, we shall see Vimuktātman make an eloquent critique of this idea.

202 Notes

9. This example first appears in Sāmkhya kārikā 67, and is used by Śankara in his BS bhāsya IV. 1. 15. 10. And, he twice states that there is no other cause of the effect ceasing. 11. This is perhaps the first usage of this term in Advaita. 12. He repeats here that although prārabdha karma (the cause) ceases, samskāras (the effect) remains awhile, causing continued embodiment as the potter's wheel and trembling continue after their causes (potter and fear) cease. 13. S. Kuppuswami Sastri calls them "extremely attenuated and entirely pow- erless" to cause any binding (ibid., p. xxxix). 14. Nor will one desire anything appearing in māyā. 15. This last phrase also can be understood to say "since the highest knowl- edge destroys the appearance of both these in the self." 16. Like a jewel that is only reflected in a mirror. 17. The Bhāmatī of Vācaspati Miśra. Edited and translated by S. Suryanarayana Sastri and C. Kunhan Raja. (Adyar: Theosophical Publishing House, 1933), p. xliii. 18. For a brief summary of the issue and further reference, see Potter, pp. 346- 47, or S. Kuppuswami Sastri's introduction to the Brahmasiddhi, pp. xxiv-xlvii. In- cidentally, both the Kanchi and Sringeri pīthas claim Sureśvara as a founding Śankarācārya. 19. The Naiskarmyasiddhi of Sureśvara. Edited and translated by R. Bala- subramanian (Madras: University of Madras Press, 1988). 20. See Naişkarmyasiddhi IV. 56 ff. 21. Sureśvara's use of this example (unmentioned by Sankara) may in fact be a reference to Mandana. 22. Edited by S. Subrahmanya Sastri. (Varanasi: Mahesh Research Institute, 1982).

10. For example, Mundaka II. 2. 8, Gītā IV. 37 (the fire of knowledge burns all to ashes). 24. For more on Sankara on ChU VI. 14. 2, see chapter 2.

11. While this issue is surprisingly little discussed in Advaita writings, one can refer to Prakāśātman and Sadānanda in chapter 4 and Pañcadaśī IV. 54-57 in chapter 8. 26. He quotes Śankara's Upadeśasāhasrī 18. 231-32. 27. Edited and translated by N. Veezhinathan (Madras: University of Madras, 1972). 28. Aitareya II. 1. 5. He also refers to Gītā VI. 41, which points out that no right practice is wasted. Sankara gives the same examples in BS III. 4. 51. See also PD IX. 35.

Notes 203

29. This perhaps expands on Sankara's BS III. 5. 1 commentary; see chap- ter 2.

30. A surprising echo of this is found in Ramana Maharshi's teaching. See The Teachings of Bhagavan Sri Ramana Maharshi in His Own Words. Edited by Arthur Osborne. Fifth edition. (Tiruvannamalai: Sri Ramanashramam, 1988), p. 28.

31. For Sankara's analysis of this passage, see chapter 2.

32. The usual term Sarvajñātman uses for ignorance is tamas. 33. SS IV. 47-48 add that the mukti of Brahmā, and so on, via the path of the gods mentioned in śruti, is not connected with knowledge of nirguna brahman but with a lower vidyā; see also chapter 2. Vimuktätman will make a similar argument.

33. For more on this, see Prakāsānanda as pūrvapakşin and siddhāntin in chap- ter 4.

34. This text mentions the experience of two apparent moons that persists in the diseased eye even after one knows only one is real. This passage also is the one place Sankara refers to the brahman-knower who is convinced in his heart of hearts (i.e., his "experience") that he is brahman and yet remains in a body.

35. The remnant also is called scent (gandha), shadow (chāya), or impression (samskāra).

36. Though, notably, neither Sankara nor Sarvajñātman claim such experience themselves.

37. The exact meaning of this śruti will be discussed in more detail by Citsukha and especially Madhusūdana Sarasvatī in chapter 4.

38. In IV. 3, apparently following Sankara on ChU VI. 14. 2, the teacher is said to be "the one marked with compassion" who brings knowledge to the disciple ("the one to be led").

39. This point is in fact largely worth making because the text translator, N. Veezhinathan, makes a claim common to neo-Vedantins that "the perogative of the jīvanmukta is to keep alive the Advaitic tradition for the benefit of posterity (p. 138)." For more on this topic, see chapter 12.

40. Edited and translated by P. K. Sundaram. Two vols. (Madras: Swadharma Swaraajya Sangha, 1980).

41. See pp. 74-78 (text) and 77-81 (translation).

42. The body continues since it requires food and drink, which depends on seeing duality, which is based on ignorance.

43. This follows Sankara, and does not mention Mandana's point about the brevity of delay.

44. For śruti support of this position, see Prakāśānanda pūrvapaksin in chap- ter 4.

204 Notes

46. For a similar analysis, see Citsukha in chapter 4.

47. This passage is not completely clear. It also may suggest that these actions cause the teacher to remain to "protect" the continuity of knowledge (which would cease if the teacher died before passing it on).

48. Vimuktātman also argues against samskāras alone remaining for a jīvanmukta (p. 335 text; p. 411, translation). He says illusion does not come from and is not merely impressions. If it were, when samskāras disappear, so does the teacher, and (as said earlier) a teacher is necessary for liberation.

49. He does not address Mandana's idea that an effect is weaker than its cause.

50. This seems to conflict with BS III. 3. 32, which Śankara's bhāsya reluc- tantly supports; see chapter 2.

51. These refer to the continuation of commenced fruits of action, which must be experienced before brahman is attained, as mentioned in chapter 2.

52. For a similar, but more extended, analysis, see chapter 2.

Chapter 4

1. The Pañcapādikā of Śrī Padmapādācārya with the Pañcapādikā-vivaraņa of Śrī Prakāśātman, edited by S. Srirama Sastri and S. R. Krishnamurthy Sastri (Madras: Government Oriental Series, Vol. 155, 1958). 2. There is an English translation of this text by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri and Saileswar Sen. Andhra University Series No. 24. (Kumbakonam: Sri Vidya Press, 1941).

2. This term may refer back to Sarvajnatman's conception of the imagined teacher.

3. This seems to be stronger than the subordinate but still relevant place Śankara gives ritual activity.

4. The VPS adds that the accumulated mass of evil actions are destroyed by jñāna.

5. Sadānanda will concur with this.

6. Page 105 in the edition referenced above.

7. As opposed to only in memory (smrti), since a samskāra, a residual trace of ignorance, should only be possible after direct experience is gone. 9. Upon this destruction, the avidyā-leśa ceases due to knowledge of the real. 10. I used the Kāsī Sanskrit Series edition, No. 242 (Varanasi: Chaukhambha Sanskrit Sansthan, 1987).

8. For a good basic summary, see V. A. Sharma's Citsukha's Contribution to Advaita (Mysore: Kavyalaya Publishers, 1974). Among other things, Citsukha argues

Notes 205

that śruti is the means to direct knowledge of brahman (assisted by manana and nididhyāsana), that brahman is the locus of ignorance, and that there is no jñāna- karma-samuccaya.

12. He significantly calls this the name for various forms of illusion (moha).

13. Madhusūdana Sarasvatī will expand on this conception.

14. The third form is aparoksa-pratibhāsa-vișayākāra-kalpaka.

15. To use other Advaitic language, one could say the āvarana (concealing) forms of avidyā are now removed.

16. aparoksa-pratibhāsa-yogyārthābhāsa-janaka.

17. For an interesting discussion of Madhva's teaching about aparoksa jñāna as direct knowledge of God, see the chapter by Daniel Sheridan in Living Liberation in Hindu Thought.

18. Citsukha, later in this passage, argues again that a form (the threefold avidyā-leśa) can remain after its substratum (avidyā) ceases, since when a particular aspect of something consisting of both particular and general ceases, the general form (prārabdha karma) remains. He here is disputing the Nyāyā position on the difference between the general (sāmānya) and the particular (viśeșa).

19. Chapter 3.

20. A passage also mentioned by Vimuktātman.

21. Which arises from the repeated practice of virtue (abhyāsaśīla).

22. Also mentioned by Sarvajñātman (SS IV. 46) and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī.

23. Lance Nelson has done some valuable work on Madhusūdana's views about the role of bhakti in Advaita. See "Madhusūdana Sarasvati on the 'Hidden Meaning' of the Bhagavad-Gītā: Bhakti for the Advaitin Renunciate" in Journal of South Asian Literature 23 (1988): 73-89 and "Bhakti-Rasa for the Advaitin Renunciate: Madhusūdana Sarasvati's Theory of Devotional Sentiment," Religious Traditions 12 (1989): 1-16.

24. Edited by N. S. Ananta Krishna Sastri (Delhi: Parimal Publications, 1988). Pp. 890-92.

25. He also wrote a commentary called Sāra-samgraha on Sarvajñātman's Samkşepa-şārīraka, which can be found in Kashi Sanskrit Series 18, edited by Bhau Sastri Vajhe. (Benares: Vidya Vilas Press, 1924).

26. Bhagavad-Gītā with Gūdārthadīpikā of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī. Edited by Hari Narayana Apte. (Anandasrama Sanskrit Series No. 45. Poona, 1912). Refer also to Madhusūdana Sarasvatī on the Bhagavad-Gītā. Sisir Kumar Gupta, translator (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1977).

27. I am particularly grateful to Dr. R. Krishnamurthi Sastry of the Madras Sanskrit College for his assistance in untangling Madhusūdana's thought here.

206 Notes

28. jīvanmuktaśca tattvajñānena nivrttāvidyo pyanuvrttadehādipratibhāsah.

29. When discussing the topic of the self not being the body (p. 617), Madhusūdana refers to jīvanmukti in a single sentence. He states that in living libera- tion superimposition (adhyāsa) based on the concealing power (āvarana-sakti) of ignorance is absent, but superimposition based on avidyā's projective (viksepa) power is still possible. These powers of ignorance in connection with jīvanmukti are unelaborated here and unmentioned in the major passage discussed below. In the Sāra-samgraha commentary on SS IV. 41-43, Madhusūdana says a number of times that the avidyā-leśa possesses the power of projecting appearance, despite the cessa- tion of the concealing power.

30. Madhusudana confirms this in comments on SS IV. 41-43.

31. This text can be taken in quite a different way if one focuses on the prior line in śruti: "due to attending to (abhidhyāna), yoking with (yojana), and knowing the reality of (tattvabhāva) the lord (deva) more and more (bhūyas), at the end, all world illusion (māyā) ceases." Madhusūdana argues that "bhūyas" should go with the last portion of the line, instead of being an intensifier referring to the practices men- tioned at the line's beginning. If "bhūyas" was combined with "yojana," then the text would not point to the continuity of the trace of avidyā until the body ends (which is the desired meaning). He says "bhūyas" goes with "nivrtti" (cessation) for three reasons: words properly combine with the main noun (which is nivrtti) "tattvabhāva" is not connected with "bhūyas" (and it intervenes between yojana and bhūyas), and if "bhūyas" is connected with "yojana," then "ante" is useless (which is undesirable in śruti). In Sāra-samgraha IV. 46, which also refers to this passage, Madhusūdana writes that by direct experience from ripened meditation, the māyā-leśa, which causes the illusion of vyavahāra, ceases "at the end." That is, when duality is destroyed by experiencing out all prārabdha karma, one becomes fully identified with ātman/ brahman. Thus, at the end, "all māya ceases" (including the third form that produces illusory object appearance) by knowing the real.

32. Or it allows one to conform to the the imagined body (until commenced karma ceases).

33. Edited and translated by Arthur Venis (Varanasi: Chaukambha Orientalia, 1975), pp. 137-142.

34. For more on Prakāśānanda's drsti-srsti-vāda, see S. Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975), vol. II, pp. 17-19 and 221-25.

35. Still, unlike Lance Nelson in Living Liberation in Hindu Thought, I think he does finally argue for jīvanmukti.

36. More will be said about this later.

37. This perhaps responds to Madhusudana's image of the cloth form remain- ing after the cloth is burnt.

Notes 207

38. Perhaps refering to Madhusūdana.

39. This is similar to the "Sāmkhya/Yoga Vedantin" Vijñānabhiksu's reference to blind tradition in chapter 5.

40. One might, of course, wonder how a false teaching would, in the long run, breed trust.

41. Chapter 3.

42. Edited by S. R. Krishnamurti Sastri and N. Veezhinathan. (Secunderabad: Srimad-Appayya-Diksithendra-Granthavali Prakashana-Samiti, 1973). See pp. 364-66.

43. Edited and translated by M. Hiriyanna. 2d ed. Poona Oriental Series No. 14. (Poona: Oriental Book Agency, 1962).

44. For a number of good Upanisadic quotations on how a liberated being is free to do evil (inc. Kauşitaki III. 1, BāU IV. 3. 22 and IV. 4. 23, and ChU IV. 14. 3), see G. A. Jacob's translation, A Manual of Hindu Pantheism: The Vedantasāra (Varanasi: Bharat-Bharati, 1972), pp. 128-29. These passages are ignored here and by Sureśvara.

45. Edited and translated by S. S. Suryanarayana Sastri. (Madras: Adyar Li- brary, 1971).

46. Suryanarayana Sastri has a useful footnote on the development of Advaita responses to this problem in endnote 85, pp. 216-17.

47. Dharmarāja quotes a supporting text by Vācaspati Miśra, but one might note that Vacaspati states that the commission is assigned by God (īśvara), not caused by prārabdha karma.

48. "A Note on Liberation in Bodily Existence,"Philosophy East and West 5 (1955): 69-74.

49. For a rather different interpretation than the one given here, see Lance Nelson on the jīvanmukta's similarity to īśvara in Living Liberation in Hindu Thought.

50. This question of being arises in S. K. Ramachandra Rao's book Living Liberation (Bangalore: IBH Prakashana, 1979), in which he introduces, but does not pursue, conceptualizing jīvanmukti in Heideggerian language (pp. 8-10). If, as he suggests, liberation is pure Being, one might ask how a liberated person could simply be while "in the world"? While embodied, is not our being always conditioned "be- ing-in-the-world"?

Chapter 5

1. For an extended analysis of Rāmānuja's views on jīvanmukti, see Kim Skoog's "Is the Jīvanmukti State Possible? The Perspective of Rāmānuja," in Living Liberation in Hindu Thought.

208 Notes

2. Much of the Dvaita Vedantin theologian Madhva's writings on living lib- eration are also devoted to anti-Advaita polemics. See Daniel P. Sheridan's "Direct Knowledge of God and Living Liberation in the Religious Thought of Madhva," also in Living Liberation in Hindu Thought. Sheridan makes a persuasive case that the role of direct and immediate knowledge (aparoksa-jñāna) in Madhva's thought is func- tionally similar to that of jīvanmukti in Sankara's Advaita, though their substantive views of brahman and liberation are very different.

3. In ŚB IV. 4. 4, Rāmānuja writes that the self, when liberated, is a mode (prakāra) of brahman. The self is inseparable but conscious of its nonseparateness, one but not identical with brahman, and equally pure but not nondual.

4. For more on this point, see Yoshitsugu Sawai, "Ramanuja's Theory of Karman," Journal of Indian Philosophy 21 (1993): 11-29.

5. Skoog's essay, pp. 66-68, is particularly helpful here.

6. I have noted elsewhere that this passage may be read in different ways, for that which one is released from and to remain unstated; see chapter 1.

7. In Fort and Mumme, Eds., Living Liberation in Hindu Thought, p. 127.

8. For more detail, see The Sämkhya Philosophy (with the Sāmkhya-pravacana sūtra, Aniruddha's vrtti, and Vijñānabhiksu's bhāsya), Nandalal Sinha, translator (1915. Reprint; New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1979), pp. 352-60 and the Sāmkhya volume of the Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies, edited by Gerald Larson and R. S. Bhattacharya (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 327-29, 352-53.

9. Vijñānabhiksu says middling discrimination rises by samprajñāta yoga, and perfect viveka by asamprajñāta yoga.

10. Larson and Bhattacarya, pp. 411-12.

11. One reason might be, as Chapple points out (Living Liberation, p. 116), that in the Yoga tradition, publicly available texts about liberation are not important; instead, a student should be part of a lineage in which the master personally discerns and guarantees authentic liberation.

12. kleśa-karma-nivrttau jīvanneva vidvān vimukto bhavati. Chapple indicates (p. 124) that the absence of afflicted action also is associated with Iśvara, or God (YS I. 24).

13. See Yogavārttika of Vijñānabhiksu. Translated and annotated by T. S. Rukmani. Four vols. (Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1978-89).

14. Rukmani points out that this allows for prārabdha karma to both exist and cease without the presence of kleśa.

15. While ranging a bit afield from Advaitic jīvanmukti, Vijñānabhikșu's commentary on YS II. 27, which mentions seven kinds of prajña, is rather interest- ing. This passage has echoes of, but no clear references to, the sevenfold jñānabhūmi model that appears in the YV and JMV. He begins that in nirodha or asamprajñāta

Notes 209

samādhi (the third kind of prajña), which rises from the destruction of ignorance, one has the direct experience (sāksātkāra) of sorrow-free moksa to come. This will arise after the body falls. This view raises the questions: How can one experience this perfection while still embodied? How can there be unconditioned samādhi in a body? While not addressing this directly, Vijñānabhiksu says that jīvanmukti is the completion of what is to be done and liberation from action. He asserts that having tattva-jñāna (see the JMV), known as prajñā, the aforementioned is the first stage of mental destruction (citta-nāśa), which has the form of higher detachment (vairāgya). Citta-mukti is called the highest liberation, prajña's object, and is threefold, not de- pendent on any means (sädhana). The intellect (buddhi) here has completed both enjoyment (bhoga) and release (apavarga). (See also II. 18 on apavarga and bhoga. The former is called jīvanmukti and the latter bondage when the buddhi separates from purusa.) After paravairāgya (stage one), the buddhi-gunas like joy and sorrow merge with prakrti in stage two (and the linga-sarira is destroyed), and finally (stage three) the purusa is not connected with the gunas and buddhi, is just the form of light (jyotis), objectless, flawless, and solitary (kevali), undivided among liberated isolates. This final stage of bodiless (videha) kaivalya is attainment of utter absorption (laya). This threefold citta-bhūmi to come is, Vijñānabhiksu concludes, directly experienced by the pure-minded yogī in the jīvanmukti state. He continues that the jīvanmukta sees prajñā, a buddhi-vrtti, only as witness (sāksin), without selfish desire (abhimāna). This is distinct from the highest mukta (i.e., purusa) due to the flaw of pratiprasava, that is, although the mind is absorbed, there is still pleasantness (kuśala), that is, kuśala gunas without dukha or sattva. While anything unpleasant is annulled in the jīvanmukti state, kuśalatva is secondary (gauna) but still present. Thus, it seems that jīvanmukti is not quite equal to kaivalya, since pleasantness gunas remain.

Chapter 6

1. The sleeper (susupta) rests in the self, while waking, the realm of delusory objects is not present.

2. yathāsthitam idam yasya vyavahāravatofpi ca astam gatam sthitam vyoma jīvanmuktaḥ sa ucyate bodhaikanisthatām yāto jāgraty eva sușuptavat ya āste vyavahartaiva jīvanmuktaḥ sa ucyate nodeti nāstamāyāti sukhe duḥkhe mukhaprabhā yathā prāptasthiter yasya jīvanmuktaḥ sa ucyate

yo jāgarti suuptastho yasya jāgranna vidyate yasya nirvāsano bodhaḥ sa jīvanmukta ucyate

rāgadveșabhayādīnām anurūpam carannapi yofntarvyomavad acchasthah sa jīvanmukta ucyate

210 Notes

yasya nāhamkrto bhāvo yasya buddhir na lipyate kurvatofkurvato vāpi sa jīvanmukta ucyate

yasyonmeşanimeşārdhād vidaḥ pralayasambhavau paśyettrilokyāḥ svasamaḥ sa jīvanmukta ucyate

yasmānnodvijate loko lokānnodvijate ca yaḥ harsāmrsabhayonmuktaḥ sa jīvanmukta ucyate

śāntasamsārakalanaḥ kalāvānapi nișkalaḥ yah sacittopi nişcittah sa jīvanmukta ucyate yaḥ samastārthajātesu vyavahāryapi šītalaḥ padārtheșvapi pūrņātmā sa jīvanmukta ucyate

Utpatti khaņda 9. 4-13. For references to passages using similar terms, see chapter 8. Other good summaries of the nature of jīvanmukti appear in Upaśama 70. 1-10 and 77. 1-44.

3. The Yogavāsistha of Vālmīki. Vasudeva Laxmana Sharma Pansikar, Ed. 2 vols. 3rd edition (Bombay: Nirnaya Sagar Press, 1918. Reprint; Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984).

4. I abbreviate the khanda names below as follows:

V = Vairāgya Up = Upaśama M = Mumuksu P = Pūrvanirvāņa U = Utpatti Ut = Uttaranirvāņa S = Sthiti

5. The Yogavāsistha has many cosmogonic passages that make extensive use of Sāmkhya categories, but when jīvanmukti is considered, the Advaita framework predominates.

6. Readers interested in the Puranic dimension should look at Mackenzie Brown's chapter in Living Liberation in Hindu Thought on Suka as jīvanmukta in the Mahābhārata and the Bhāgavata and Devī-Bhāgavata Purāņas.

7. The text also mentions many other kinds of sages: muni, siddha, guru, yogin, sādhu, and jñānin. We will focus on passages where the term jīvanmukta is specifically used.

8. One of the distinctive characteristics of the Yogavāsistha is its (often liter- ally) flowery language. Many chapters include luxuriant descriptions of natural phe- nomena, which are then called illusory and necessary to renounce. Natural metaphors abound: wisdom is said to "blossom like flowers" and "shine like the full moon's beams" in the "forest of awakening" (Up 18. 4-5). The world is ultimately "burnt in the fire of the intellect," and clear minds do not "sprout illusion" like burnt seeds sprout no plants (P 2. 46-49). The jīvanmukta (or his mind) is often termed "clear" or "empty," like the cloudless (autumn) sky (U 9. 8, Up 17. 18, 18. 25, 53. 74, 77. 33, 89. 19, P 56. 2). A typical image appears in Ut 125. 63-65: the jīvanmukta sees all characteristics

Notes 211

without any difference, like "space" (akāsa) in the sky, and knows a brilliant rainbow, like all visible objects, is really only an empty reflection. 9. V 3. 1-3, Up 18. 28-30, Ut 95. 17-21, 125. 65-68.

10. Up 18. 13-15. The JMV will reiterate this theme, and those that follow.

11. The point seems to be, as Ut 125. 36 says, that the mind is bound and burning whether sad (having body cut up) or happy (sitting on a throne).

12. Up 17. 5, 93. 84, 87, P 120. 18-19.

13. Ut 95. 26, 199. 34-35.

14. U 8. 16, Up 18. 30, 34. A common synonym for jīvanmukta is mahātma ("great self"); both are detached, have a controlled mind, and so on.

15. U 9. 2, S 46. 23-24, Up 12. 15-16, 75. 45.

16. A point also made by the texts Mackenzie Brown studies in his chapter in Living Liberation in Hindu Thought.

17. As with traditional Advaita, we shall see that the key to liberation lies with neither the body's presence or absence, nor performance of action or nonaction, nor supernatural powers (siddhi).

18. In Ut 95. 16, Vasistha says he is here teaching among us since he did not reach brahman-hood. One wishes for further elaboration on this admission.

19. Various forms of the root sam, indicating peacefulness, also appear frequently. 20. Up 53. 80, 68. 5, 70. 24, 86. 5, 93. 93, Ut 125. 56. 21. Up 68. 9, Ut 199. 32.

20. Up 68. 4, 70. 1, 93. 90-91. 23. Up 70. 1, P 101. 30, Ut 199. 9. We shall later consider liberated beings' detachment from supernatural powers (Up 89) and impure vāsanās (Up 93). 24. U 118. 18, Up 12. 8-10, 16. 18, 68. 7, 77. 26, and so on. Both the JMV and the Gītā speak of the highest yogin in similar terms.

21. Up 74. 37, 77. 12, 32.

22. Up 18. 24, Ut 125. 37. It is also often said that the jīvanmukta smiles while internally detached.

23. Up 16. 19-20, 71. 10, 77. 43.

24. Up 18. 27-29, 17. 8, 77. 19-20.

25. There are a few passages that suggest that he does not act at all: the detached man completely abandons all actions and fruits (Up 68. 8), all hopes and undertakings (Up 74. 38), and the Self-knower does and desires nothing (Up 89. 17).

212 Notes

However, the overwhelming emphasis in the Yogavāsistha is on detachment, not non- action.

30. The "inner cool" (antahsītalatā) of the jīvanmukta is often mentioned (this term also appears in the JMV). In general, inner coolness is linked to detachment in action and lack of delusion or vāsanā (U 9. 13, Up 16. 9, 18. 11, 53. 82, 70. 22, 75. 26, P 56.1, Ut 125. 35). It also rises from investigating the Yogavāsistha (Ut 95. 28).

31. U 9. 4, Up 18. 18-19, 77. 10, 93. 97. 32. U 9. 6, Up 12. 2, 17. 4, 70. 18, 93. 93.

32. Up 18. 18-22, 77. 9, 27.

33. Up 77. 11, P 56. 5.

34. Up 70. 19-20, 77. 8.

35. U 22. 8, 118. 28, Ut 125. 33. This also is the case with Janaka in the Devi- Bhāgavata Purāņa.

36. I translate the root vi-hr, which appears repeatedly in passages that discuss jīvanmukti, as "wander." Vi-hr suggests both detached roaming in the world and withdrawal or separation from the world. For example, it is said the sage with jīvanmukti-mind roams the world following all customs yet indifferent to all, and wanders detached and even-minded while in everyday activity (Up 18. 17-26, 93. 92- 93, P 101. 30, Ut 199. 9). Sage Nārada and Lord Viśvamitra are said to wander the world as jīvanmuktas (Up 75. 22, 86. 9).

37. We see the Puranic element of the YV clearly here. Gods are also called videhamuktas in note 45.

38. Up 12. 1-9, 16. 9-13, 75. 47, Ut 125. 59. For more (and for conflicting reports) on Janaka's character, see Mackenzie Brown's article in Living Liberation in Hindu Thought.

39. Māndhāta's liberation while living is also mentioned in Ut 125. 60.

40. Up 42. 17 says Prahläda rested within himself with his own pure sattva vāsanā until awoken by a conch.

41. Ut 125. 51 adds that Visnu, creator and destroyer, is a jīvanmukta.

42. Up 75. 50, P 120. 11.

43. Up 17. 13 says the body made by parents is unreal, and S 33. 66 states that the highest goal is knowing that the notion of a body-based "I" (ahamkāra) is unreal.

44. Ut 9. 16-21 continues that the videhamukta is pervasive, controlling all- as sun, he rules three worlds like the trimūrti; as sky, he supports the gods; as earth, he supports animals and plants; as fire and water, he burns and melts; he also becomes light and darkness and makes animals and mind move. Elsewhere (P 126. 71-73), it is said that the peaceful and incomprehensible videhamukta is called Siva, Brahma,

Notes 213

or prakrti, according to how others imagine the self. These passages are representative of several (see p. 10 ff.) that suggest that the jīvan- or videha-mukta is a god or supreme being, rather than an "individual" liberated spirit. 46. This also appears in the JMV (128, 365). See chapter 7 and chapter 8. 47. P 126. 70-71 makes this same point in a different model: the sixth (of seven) stages is jīvanmukti; the seventh stage, called videhamukti, is utterly peaceful and unreachable by words.

48. I could find no consistent definitional differentiation among these terms.

49. P 2. 43, 47-49, P 101. 24, 27-28, Up 90. 15.

50. Up 77. 21-22, 86. 12, 93. 94-95, P 2. 4-5. These jīvanmuktas are said to wander detached from joy and sorrow, solely intent on knowing the self, at peace and unaffected by samsāra (Up 68. 5-6, 70. 1-9, P 101. 30). 51. U 9. 9, 22. 11, Up 16. 20, 18. 25. 52. This idea is one of several passages apparently influenced by Buddhist ideas in which jīvanmukti appears. While Buddhist terms occasionally are mentioned in the jīvanmukti context, almost no Buddhist technical language is used. Most common is the word "nirvāna"; generally, it designates the highest goal, often videhamukti (U 9. 25, V 3. 5-6, Up 53. 75, P 120. 6). The detached but "in the world" jīvanmukta might be influenced by the concept of the bodhisattva, but no explicit connection is made. 53. See chapter 7.

51. P 2. 43, 101. 28.

52. Up 93. 84, 87, P 120. 18-19.

53. Up 93. 85, P 120. 20.

54. V 3.8-9, U 22. 8, P 2. 45, P 55. 42-45, P 56. 1, P 101. 34. Sleep without vāsanās also brings inner coolness and liberation (called turīya here). Sleep is said to arise from the vāsanā-less dream state, and liberation from vāsanā-less waking state (U 22. 4, Up 70. 22, 26, P 126. 64-65). 58. Refer here also to P 2. 44 and Up 18. 3.

55. Up 42. 14-17, P 101. 29. 60. U 22. 5, P 2. 42-43, 47-49, 101. 31.

56. Up 90. 17, 21-25, P 101. 30, 33. This also appears in JMV 128, 365 (and is taken from the LYV).

57. This topic also appears in the JMV (103, 327), also taken from the LYV; see chapter 7.

58. A list of oft-repeated terms describing the jīvanmukta follows: eternally satisfied (nitya-trpta), tranquil self (praśāntātma), passions ceased (vītarāga), and without vāsanās.

214 Notes

64. U 9. 5-7, Up 12. 2, 13, 16. 19, 22, 60. 20, 70. 10, 16, 19, 77. 8, 86. 6, P 56. 6.

65. For more on this doctrine, in the Yogavasistha and Advaita thought in general, see my book The Self and Its States (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1990).

66. References to dream can be found in U 22. 1-4 and Ut 95. 17, 23-24. The theme is that dreams and their objects are unreal, and cease with knowledge. Waking is "real" only relative to dreams.

67. Up 42. 15, 70. 22, 77. 3-4.

68. See also Up 70. 26: When fully established in sleep from repeated yogic practice, this is turīya, and Up 71. 4: Having enjoyed the worldly condition in sleep state, one then goes to the fourth.

69. U 118. 15, Up 70. 27-33, 71. 1.

70. U 118. 16, Up 70. 32, 71. 5. One passage, in contrast, says one resting in the fourth abides there dead (kayānta) or in bodily state (Up 86. 6). 71. For more on this, and connections between the Yogavasistha and the Jīvanmuktiviveka, see J. F. Sprockhoff's "Der Weg zur Erlosung bei Lebzeiten ... " in Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sud und Ostasiens 14 (1970), p. 137 ff.

71. The JMV refers to this passage (see chapter 7) as well as a third seven-stage model in U 118, which says those in the seventh stage are great selves (mahātma), great enjoyers (mahābhāga), and enjoyers of the self (ātmarāma). The latter is a common synonym for jīvanmukti; U 118. 20, for example, states that the enjoyer of the self takes no pleasure in worldly activity like those asleep take no pleasure in beautiful women around them.

Chapter 7

1. This chapter is a revision of my essay "Liberation While Living in the Jīvanmuktiviveka: Vidyāraņya's 'Yogic Advaita," in Living Liberation in Hindu Thought.

2. Edited and Translated by S. Subrahmanya Sastri and T. R. Srinivasa Ayyangar (Madras: Adyar Library and Research Center, 1978). Translations cited are mine. Page references that follow indicate text and translation, that is, (33, 178). 3. There has been some debate about the relationship of the JMV author to Sāyaņa, Mādhava, Bhāratītīrtha, and the Vidyāranya of the Pañcadasī (including whether they are different people or the same person at different stages of life). As I will discuss in the chapter on the Pañcadasī, it is unlikely that the Vidyāranya of the JMV is the same Vidyāranya who authored the Pañcadasi, whom I shall call Bhāratītīrtha.

3. For an excellent summary and analysis of this text, one can consult J. F. Sprockhoff's two-part article on the Jīvanmuktiviveka, "Die Weg zur Erlösung bei

Notes 215

Lebzeiten, Ihr Wesen and Ihr Wert, nach dem Jīvanmuktiviveka des Vidyāraņya." Wiener Zeitschrift fur die Kunde Sud- und Ost-asiens 8 (1964): 224-62 and 14 (1970): 131-59. A more recent work focusing on living liberation in the JMV is L. K. L. Srivastava's Advaitic Concept of Jīvanmukti (Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1990). This book is less satisfactory than Sprockhoff's work, as it is heavily neo-Vedantic and lacking in critical analysis. For more on Srivastava, see chapter 12.

5. Translated by K. Narayanaswami Aiyer (Madras: Adyar Library and Re- search Center, 1971).

6. See, for example, pp. 30, 224; 72, 285.

7. "Jivataḥ purușasya kartrtva-bhoktrtva-sukhaduhkhādi-lakșaņaś citta- dharmah kleśa-rūpatvād bandho bhavati, tasya nivāraņam jīvanmuktih." (10, 194). See also Muktika Upanişad 11.

8. Vidyāranya discusses mental impressions at some length, devoting an en- tire chapter to the destruction of impressions (vāsanā-ksaya) as a means for attaining jīvanmukti. He adopts the LYV definition of vāsanās as an intense binding to a thing, which, because of strong attachment, causes one to think one's delusory impression is the real thing (sadvastu) (52, 256). The rest of the chapter describes various kinds of pure (śuddha) and impure (malina) vāsanās. Pure vāsanās are sense activity that merely keeps the body alive, without causing rebirth (56, 261). Impure mental impres- sions that have the form of profound ignorance and intense egoism are of three types: loka (desire for the world's praise), śāstra (addiction to, and pride in, mere textual study and ritual observance) and deha (the threefold illusion that the body is the self, that it can be beautified, and that its flaws can be removed) (56, 261 ff.).

9. See note on Sankara and Yoga in chapter 2. Still, we have seen that Śankara does, on rare occasions, speak of the value of mental concentration as a preparatory stage, encouraging the rise of knowledge.

10. Still following the Gītā, Vidyāranya goes on to describe the jīvanmukta as a detached and content devotee of the Lord (bhagavad-bhakta) and as one who has gone beyond the threefold qualities (gunātīta) (25, 218 ff.). Here we see Vidyāranya's commingling of devotional, yogic, and nondualistic strands of Indian thought. He writes that the discriminating gunātīta is beyond activity or superimposing the "I" on action. The one beyond qualities aims to serve the self by knowledge, repeated medi- tation, and unswerving devotion (a theme clearly emphasized in the Gīta)

11. Vidyāraņya here (pp. 43, 241 ff.) also goes over the divine (daiva) and demonic (asura) qualities leading to and from jīvanmukti, again taking his lead from the Gīta (XVI.1-4). He also speaks of two types of bondage, sharp (tīvra) and mild (mrdu), with their guna-based vrttis, which are removed by mano-nāśa and vāsanā- kșaya.

12. Sprockhoff (1964) has a detailed analysis of this portion of the text, and points out that Vidyāranya, while following Patañjali in many ways, has his own version of yogic limbs (p. 251).

216 Notes

13. The passage quoted is from LYV 28. 1-9. See also Yogavāsiștha Upaśama khanda 89. 9-21 (chapter 6).

14. A similar call to go beyond a yogic samādhi appears in the chapter on destroying vāsanās, which closes calling for cultivation of the "consciousness only" (cinmātra) vāsanā, then impressionless (nirvāsanā) samādhi. As the LYV says (16. 45-46, 5. 92, 18. 26-29 [pp. 83, 299]), the real jīvanmukta is free from any vāsanā at all. He is "asleep while awake," beyond karma or efforts of any sort (ritual, medi- tation, or textual study). The utterly detached jīvanmukta thus illustrates the benefits of destruction of mental impressions. On the other hand, a little later (pp. 116, 347) Vidyāranya quotes (and agrees with) Gita VI. 46, which asserts that yoga is superior to asceticism and knowledge. The kind of knowledge referred to here is not clear. It is never termed brahma-jñāna. Also, on pages 127 and 364, Vidyäranya states that the mind is extinguished when extremely ascetic yogins attain asamprajñāta (undiscriminated) samādhi. At this point, jīvanmukti is said to be firmly established.

15. The closest equivalent for this term in scholastic Advaita is videha-kaivalya.

16. jīvanneva drstabandhanāt kāmāder-viśeseņa muktaḥ san dehapāte bhāvibandhanād-viśeșanena mucyate (15, 202).

17. He here gives many examples of Upanişadic jñāna-śāstra: Muņdaka II. 2. 8 and 10, III. 2. 9, Katha III. 8, Brhadāraņyaka Upanisad I. 4. 10, and so on.

18. Vidyāraņya here quotes a pseudo-Sankaran text, Vākyavrtti 52-53, which says (following ChU VI. 14. 2 and mainstream Advaita) that one is a jīvanmukta (i.e., has knowledge while living) while currently manifesting karma causes the body to continue, and when this karma is used up, one then attains blissful kaivalya (i.e., videhamukti).

19. Śankara's discussion of aśarīratva (bodilessness) in Brahmasūtra bhāsya I. 1. 4 is exemplary here.

20. To this mainstream Advaita position, he adds a familiar Yogic Advaita point: Knowledge of the truth is the main, direct means to mukti (here "bodiless"), while destroying both the mind and impressions are means to knowledge. Though inferior, they are still necessary (49, 252).

21. Found also in Muktika Upanisad II. 32 ff. and Annapūrņa Upanișad IV. 14-20.

22. Vidyäranya argues that doubt is even worse than error (such as the erro- neous belief that ritual action can bring release). One can at times be happy when ignorant or in error, but doubt prevents worldly enjoyment as well as liberation, thus allowing no satisfaction on either level.

23. See chapter 6. These stages of knowledge are said to be preceded by asceticism (vairāgya). The first three stages include desiring purity, reflection (vicārana), and accomplishing good acts (sadācāra) while reducing mental activity (tanumanasā).

Notes 217

Since these stages do not remove all trace of duality, they are only a means to knowledge, not brahmavidyā proper.

24. In describing degrees of living liberation, Vidyāranya seems to be trying to address a controversy about the necessity post-knowledge of "departing" or "ris- ing" from (vyutthāna) samādhi, and the extent of one's control over samādhi. In the fifth stage, the "preferred" brahman-knowing yogin leaves the highest samādhi on his own; in the sixth stage, the "better" brahman-knowing yogin's samādhi is so concen- trated that he only leaves it with a companion's assistance. The meditative enstasis of these yogins is so profound that it seems like deep sleep, free from a sense of diversity or even unity. Finally, the "best" brahman-knowing yogin never departs from nonconceptual samādhi at all; all texts describing yogic states are said to end here. This sevenfold model reappears in Madhusūdana Sarasvati's Gītā commentary, the Gūdārthadīpikā III. 18 and VI. 43.

25. In response to the latter point, Vidyäranya argues that even killing a Brah- min does not bar liberation; no act can bar liberation, since, after all, we are not our bodies or attendant actions.

26. More will be said on this distinction later.

27. There is another way that the yogin's personal (but not body-based) aus- terity affects many. As Sūtasamhitā II. 20. 45 says, by knowing brahman, he saves his ancestors from rebirth, sanctifies all of his family, and purifies the whole earth. By transforming his consciousness, he transforms his entire lineage. This can be seen as an excellent example of the difference between Christian "doing good" by serving others and Hindu "doing good" by allowing others to serve you. The guru serves by "being," not "doing." In the final chapter, I will suggest that later Advaita scholars, in part trying to show that Advaita includes the Christian notion, are not always sufficiently aware of this distinction.

28. Furthermore, he does not argue with doctrinaire "text lovers" (śāstra-prema), since he acts in accordance with Vedic texts that say not to challenge other schools of thought, nor care to establish one's own views. Seeing your "opponent" as yourself, what is the point? In one of his most extreme attempts to syncretize (144, 387), Vidyāranya then makes an interesting, and certainly debatable, assertion: all thinkers (tairthika) except Lokāyatas (but including Buddhists, Jainas, and Sāktas, among others) agree on (angī-kr) liberation (moksa) and would not dispute that yogic conduct (yogicārita), that is, the yogin's eight-limbed path, is the way to liberation, even if the topics on which these thinkers expound differ. While it may be true that practices often are more similar than doctrines, Vidyaranya's assertion here certainly oversimplifies the great diversity of Indian practices toward liberation. In any case, the point he wants to make here is that the Advaitic yogin is honored by all, leaving no room for dispute. One can here point out that nondisputation is certainly not a goal of mainstream Advaita, nor an attribute of Śankara, himself often called a jīvanmukta.

29. It does not seem that one can be so detached about women, however. Vidyāraņya claims they are forbidden (pratișiddha) and disgusting (jugupsitā), like

218 Notes

corpses. They overcome men by causing desire, despite having vaginas like oozing sores, and so on (32, 227).

30. This is reminiscent of the figure Suka in the Purānas. For more, see Mackenzie Brown's chapter in Living Liberation in Hindu Thought. 31. Still, Vidyäranya states, after liberation, completing these duties will not cause future births. Injunctions to study, meditate, and assimilate remove obstacles to brahma-jñāna but do not add karma/apūrva (154, 403).

31. See also the Introduction on this matter.

32. Further, as we saw in Vidyāranya's discussion of austerity (tapas), at this highest level of detachment, the jivanmukta can allow others to follow and serve him, freeing them and purifying the world by his injunction-transcending austerity.

33. Asceticism is prescribed through the rest of this chapter, and a mendicant is described as being beyond mantra or dhyāna, beyond textual debates and the distinction of "I" and "you." One with the stick (danda) of knowledge is abodeless, only sky-clad, greets no one, and does not propitiate ancestors (166, 422). Abodelessness is important because even living in a monastery reinforces the "I," as does possession of utensils and plates. This renouncer shuns students, rejects gold, and remains always detached. He simply rests in brahman, avoiding all mixing with the world. 35. Vidyāraņya's views here represent a common theme in religious literature: after rejecting the world, one can return, and be "in" but not "of" the world. When ignorant, one thinks one must get from "here" (the world of suffering and attachment) to "there" (liberation). From the liberated viewpoint, however, the duality of "here" and "there" is an illusion. Jivanmukti is in part predicated on the idea that you can be both here and there.

Chapter 8

1. Panchadashi. Hari Prasad Shastri, Ed. and Trans. (London: Shanti Sadan, 1965).

2. In the Sringeri Sankarācārya tradition, Bhāratītīrtha is held to be the younger brother (though senior in taking samnyāsa) of Vidyāraņya. 3. T. M. P. Mahadevan, The Philosophy of Advaita with Special Reference to Bhāratītīrtha-Vidyāraņya. (Madras: Ganesh and Co., 1957), pp. 1-8. See also L. K. L. Srivastava's Advaitic Concept of Jivanmukti (Delhi: Bharatiya Vidya Prakashan, 1990), pp. 30-38. S. N. Dasgupta argues for joint authorship of the PD by Bhāratītīrtha and (Mādhava) Vidyāranya in History of Indian Philosophy (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975), Vol. II, p. 216n. 4. Dasgupta argues the latter is later, History, Vol. II, p. 251n. 5. The Gīta is also quoted or referred to in this context in IV. 59-62, VII. 156- 61, and IX. 46-60.

Notes 219

6. This point is echoed in PD VII. 2, which says that the satisfaction (trpti) of the jīvanmukta is clearly known by studying a śruti (BāU IV. 4. 42), which ends desire by teaching knowing the "I" as the self.

7. 37, 232 ff .; chapter 7.

8. VI. 13-14 reiterates that realization (bodhi) is knowing the falsity (mithyātva) of the world and jiva, and certainty that the highest self remains and is real-thus supporting living (jīvan)mukti.

9. This answer again raises the thorny problem of how the knower can be deluded.

10. Verses 253-70 are repeated in XIV. 40-57.

11. IX. 76 repeats this point.

12. As seen in portions of the Upadeśasāhasrī, and later in Prakāśānanda (chap- ter 4).

13. PD IX. 97 ff. also state that meditation is optional for the truth-knower.

14. In his translation, Shastri adds a neo-Vedanta footnote here: "The illu- mined sage does not pose as a superior man, but behaves like a thorough gentleman (p. 258)." The prior verses hardly seem typical of a British gentleman.

15. This is an interesting, but isolated, reference to concern for the world's welfare, again probably related to the Gītā (III. 20). 16. "Die Idee der Jīvanmukti in den Späten Upanisads," WZKSO 7 (1963): 190-208.

16. The Sāmānya-Vedānta Upanișads. Edited by A. Mahadeva Sastri. (Madras: Adyar Library, 1916).

17. Particularly Pūrvanirvāna 115; see Sprockhoff, p. 193, and beginning of chapter 6.

18. In this context, see also Tejobindu Upanisad IV 33 ff., which exalts bodi- less liberation as the highest bliss, and so on.

19. Sprockhoff, p. 196. 21. JMV 10, 194; see chapter 7. 22. upādhi-vinirmukta-ghațākāsavat prārabdha-ksayād videhamuktiḥ. 23. Samnyāsa Upanisads (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), p. 80, note 25.

20. See Olivelle, pp. 246-50.

21. On the earlier group of verses, see the section on the Pañcadai.

22. Lance Nelson offers a valuable description of Madhusūdana's different messages for different audiences on the role of bhakti in Advaita in his "Madhusūdana

220 Notes

Sarasvatī on the 'Hidden Meaning' of the Bhagavad-Gīta: Bhakti for the Advaitin Renunciate" in Journal of South Asian Literature 23 (1988): 73-89.

27. In IV. 23, Madhusūdana states that Janaka and others, as sthita-prajñas, know they are not doers and have all ignorance removed, but perform sacrifices and do good acts due to prārabdha karma.

28. LYV 13. 113-14. See JMV 134-36, 373-75.

29. He homologizes each stage to a state of consciousness, saying here, for example, that yogins call these three stages the waking state, since the world now appears as differentiated. 30. The fourth stage is called the dream state, since it displays the falsity of the whole world. The fifth and sixth are called deep sleep (susupti) and profound (gādha) deep sleep.

30. brahmavid-vara, -varīyas, and -variștha. 32. See chapter 7, particularly footnote 24. 33. A little earlier, VI. 27 describes the yogin with peaceful mind (praśānta- mānasam), and Madhusudana holds that this yogin, convinced that "having become brahman, all is indeed brahman," obtains brahman, is a jivanmukta, and goes to the highest bliss (uttama sukha). 34. See JMV 134-35, 373-74.

31. He adds that the samnyäsin who, due to the strength of the mental impres- sion of detachment (vairagya-vāsanā), which manifests by the Lord's grace, has only a weak desire for more enjoyment (bhoga) at death will be born in a family of brahman-knowers. Such a renouncer will surely gain liberation.

32. See Gīta II. 54 ff. in chapter 1.

33. We also noted that in scholastic Advaita, Mandana Miśra introduces (but does not clearly settle) the issue of whether the one with firm wisdom is a siddha ("accomplished being," and a jīvanmukta) or "merely" a highly advanced student (sādhaka). In brief references, Vimuktātman and Citsukha hold the sthita-prajña (and the guņātīta) to be liberated while living, and not just a sādhaka.

Chapter 9

1. I also remind the reader that I recognize that such broad categories like "India," "Hindu," and "the West" both conceal and reveal. Still, such terms can be useful, and are in fact inevitable.

2. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988).

3. Halbfass has closely read Heidegger (and Gadamer), and holds J. L. Mehta, one of Heidegger's foremost interpreters (and of course an Indian), in high esteem. One can also notice Paul Hacker's influence on Halbfass' thought.

Notes 221

4. For more, interested readers should look at India and Europe (particularly pp. 16-17 and 434-42) and the recent volume Beyond Orientalism: The Work of Wilhelm Halbfass and Its Impact on Indian and Cross-Cultural Studies, edited by Eli Franco and Karin Preisendanz, Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of Sciences and Humanities No. 59 (Amsterdam/Atlanta: Editions Rodopi, 1997). One might also refer with profit to Tradition and Reflection, and his translation of Paul Hacker's writings, Philology and Confrontation.

5. Though they also think they go beyond "mere" scholastic Advaita.

6. S. K. Ramachandra Rao's book on living liberation is a good example of the use of modern psychological language. He states that the jīvanmukta knows the "essential unity of all experience," and calls jīvanmukti an "altered state of conscious-

being (7)." ness (58)," "authentic living (69)," and "intense awareness of a new dimension of

7. A further elaboration of what is generally "Western" and what is more specifically Christian is interesting and important, but beyond my scope here. Much more could also be said about the sociopolitical realities that brought about neo- Vedanta, but again this is not my focus.

8. I document an example of this phenomenon in "Neither East Nor West: A Case of Neo-Vedanta in Modern Indian Thought," Religious Studies Review 18 (April 1992): 95-100, which considers L. K. L. Srivastava's Advaitic Concept of Jīvanmukti. This book covers the Advaita concept of living liberation in greater breadth (though not in greater depth or rigor of analysis) than any prior work, focusing particularly on the Jīvanmuktiviveka. While ostensibly about jīvanmukti in the Advaita tradition, this book is also an attempt to make this concept relevant to modern Western concerns, such as psychological well-being and social service. At times, one gets more of the neo-Vedanta view of living liberation than the "Advaitic Concept of Jīvanmukti." For more, particularly concerning social ethics issues, see chapter 12.

9. I should mention that there is an ongoing delegitimation of the neo-Vedantic worldview of Vivekananda and Radhakrishnan in modern India, which is one of the reasons behind the rise of the ideology of "Hindutva." I consider this ideology both destructive and at least as intellectually removed from traditional Indian thought as neo-Vedanta. It is certainly more inimical to the humanistic values that I personally and professionally hold dear. I will regret if my criticisms here contribute to the loss of neo-Vedantic values like tolerance and inclusion.

10. The Limits of Scripture (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1994), p. 133. Rambachan writes that Vivekananda was an early and extremely important pro- ponent of the notion that the highest truth in Hinduism (and all religions) is known by direct "intuitive" experience (often called samādhi), unlike Śankara's view that apauruseya śruti is the definitive source for knowing the real (brahman). L. K. L. Srivastava shows a typically neo-Vedantic individualistic and experi- ence-based psychologism quite foreign to traditional Indian thought; for him, "true" religion must be "experiential," that is, "something inward and personal [which] unifies all values and organizes all experience (3)." The "ethical or ritualistic aspect of religion"

222 Notes

is "secondary," but a "prerequisite to the art of conscious self-revelation or contact with the Divine" (4). Sankara, on the other hand, talks of the authority of śruti, not of "religion," and of immediate knowledge of ātman/brahman, not of "experience" as a state of awareness.

11. Still, modern Vedantins certainly seem less committed than traditional Advaitins to the notion that empirical experience is always a limitation or a defect (like an eye disease), and utter isolation and bodiless liberation our final goal.

12. As mentioned in the Introduction, "accurate representation" falls within a range of understandings.

Chapter 10

1. Ramana Maharshi: The Sage of Arunacala (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1977).

2. A number of books record his life. In addition to Mahadevan's book, men- tioned in the prior note, see also Arthur Osborne's Ramana Maharshi and the Path of Self-Knowledge (London: Ryder and Co., 1954), or K. Swaminathan's Ramana Maharshi (Delhi: National Book Trust, 1975). Each of these books is rather hagiographic; for a good brief summary, see David Kinsley's Hinduism: A Cultural Perspective (Englewood Cliffs, N. J .: Prentice-Hall, 1993).

3. The Teachings of Bhagavan Sri Ramana Maharshi in His Own Words. Edited by Arthur Osborne. 5th ed. (Tiruvannamalai: Sriramanashrama, 1988), p. 2. 4. See his A Search in Secret India (London: Ryder and Co., 1964). There are some references to interviews between Ramana and the Tibetologist Evans-Wentz in the Teachings. Some research into their discussions would be a welcome addition to Ramana scholarship.

4. I had the opportunity to be a guest at the ashram in January 1990 and December 1996. I found a slightly larger number of visitors and additional buildings during my second visit.

5. At the back of this central shrine is a statue of Ramana, with a plaque indicating that Indira Gandhi was present at its installation in 1980.

6. The Collected Works of Ramana Maharshi. Arthur Osborne, Ed. 5th edition. (Tiruvannamalai: Sri Ramanasramam, 1979).

7. A short chapter of Mahadevan's Ramana Maharshi: The Sage of Arunacala compares Sankara and Ramana. Mahadevan argues that their views are very similar and gives two examples of Ramana's and Sankara's kinship of thought. The first is that both hold that there are levels of understanding, the highest being that all is nondual (127). The second example quotes a passage just mentioned, where Ramana tells a questioner that his teaching expresses his own experience, while "[o]thers find

Notes 223

that it tallies with Sri Shankara's." Ramana then adds that "[a] realised person will use his own language (128)." While Mahadevan claims that this indicates Ramana finds their teachings in "complete identity," one could argue instead that Ramana here explicitly avoids making such a statement. Mahadevan here seems to be attempting to show more continuity than exists, a goal shared by many thinkers over the centu- ries, who want to argue that Advaitic thought is a seamless web. An attempt to find distinctions can be seen, from this perspective, as exhibiting a lower level of under- standing.

9. Teach, 10, 106, 235. J. Jayaraman also used this analogy in our con- versation.

10. Osborne follows this with a paragraph on the nature of "religion," a mod- ern Western term with no exact equivalent in Advaita. We should here be especially careful in uncritically accepting Osborne's translations.

11. This view was explicitly endorsed by Kunju Swami.

12. See "Self-Enquiry" in Collected Works, pp. 29-32. He here makes a dis- tinction between yogic and "jnanic" breath and mind control, which is not found elsewhere.

13. According to N. Veezhinathan, in his manuscript, "Bhagavan Ramana-A Jivanmukta," Ramana said that "atma-siddhi is the highest siddhi (11)."

14. This view was firmly endorsed by both Kunju Swami and J. Jayaraman.

15. Ramana takes a similar position concerning nationalism. When asked if it is one's duty to be a patriot, he is said to respond, "It is your duty to BE and not to be this or that (Teach, 103)." As far as working for the country's welfare goes, he states, "[f]irst take care of yourself and the rest will naturally follow (104)." However, his view of Gandhi is said to be that "Gandhiji has surrendered himself to the Divine and works accordingly with no self-interest (104)."

16. From Bhagavan Sri Ramana: A Pictorial Biography (Tiruvannamalai: Sri Ramanasramam, 1981), p. 96. This is also quoted by R. Balasubramanian in his article on Ramana as a jīvanmukta, mentioned later.

17. Ramana Maharshi, pp. 62-63.

18. Balasubramanian has been chair of the philosophy department at the Uni- versity of Pondicherry and head of the Centre for the Advanced Study of Philosophy at the University of Madras.

19. "Ramana Maharshi, The Liberated-in-Life," Indian Philosophical Annual 17 (1984-85), p. 230.

20. Ibid., pp. 230-31. For more on this passage, including Balasubramanian's views of it, see chapter 12.

21. This book is later than, and includes parts of, Mahadevan's Ramana Maharshi and his Philosophy of Existence (Tiruvannamalai: Sri Ramanashramam,

224 Notes

1967). One might characterize this latter book (and the second half of the former) more accurately as Mahadevan's philosophy of existence, with support from Ramana Maharshi. Mahadevan also wrote a book on South Indian holy men called Ten Saints of India (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1971), and he includes bhakti poet- saints, as well as Vedantins. It is revealing that of ten biographies the longest two are those of Sankara and Ramana.

22. For example, see previous note 8.

23. Given to me by the author in manuscript form.

24. He also writes that Ramana, like Jacob Boehme, gained a sudden but full "mystical" illumination at a young age. In a comparison within the Hindu tradition, Veezhinathan says, "as in the case of Vamadeva of the Upanisadic fame, in the case of Bhagavan [Ramana] too, self-realization came as a flash (6)."

25. Videhamukti is then called "transcendent" attributeless Brahman and Turiya.

26. This view was explicitly supported by J. Jayaraman.

27. Talks with Sri Ramana Maharshi (Tiruvannamalai: Sri Ramanashramam, 1978), pp. 422-23.

28. However, he refers to the mark as an animal that departs and is replaced by another. This part of the analogy is not part of traditional Advaita and is unclear to me.

29. It would be valuable to know to what Ramana is referring in his mention of "with and without form."

30. This last comment could indicate his familiarity with Vidyāranya's Jīvanmuktiviveka, though there is no clear evidence of his knowledge of this text. Also, Kunju Swami told me that one is a videhamukta while living, when not thinking dualistically.

31. Both the stages of brahman-knowing and their ultimately singular nature were stressed by Kunju Swami.

32. I am grateful to Professor Arabinda Basu of the Aurobindo Ashram for clarifying my understanding here.

33. He further states that the jivanmukta "is made one with the luminous shadow of Parabrahman, which we call the Sachchidananda (XII, 460)." All references are to the Sri Aurobindo Birth Centenary Library (Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram Press), 1970-73.

34. Elsewhere he states that "[a] man may be a great Rishi or Yogi without being a Jivanmukta. Yoga and spiritual learning are means to Mukti, not Mukti itself (XII, 463)." This seems to accord with the Jivanmuktiviveka and other Yogic Advaita texts.

35. A novel image, and an interesting choice for a former political prisoner.

Notes a 225

Chapter 11

1. For an excellent introduction to the Sankarācārya tradition, see William Cenkner's A Tradition of Teachers (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1983). For an inter- esting social scientific perspective on the Kanchi Sankarācāryas, particularly the reign- ing Šankarācārya, Jayendra Sarasvati, see Mattison Mines and Vijayalakshmi Gourishankar, "Leadership and Individuality in South Asia: The Case of the South Indian Big-Man," Journal of Asian Studies 49: 4 (November 1990): 761-86.

2. Cenkner, p. 123. Jayendra Sarasvati, Candrasekharendra's successor, com- pares him to Ramana and Śankara himself. 3. "The Sage of Kanchi (henceforth, "Sage")," which appears in a book he edited called Spiritual Perspectives: Essays in Mysticism and Metaphysics (New Delhi: Arnold-Heinemann, 1975), p. 15. One must note that to an extraordinary degree, the image Mahadevan's words cast here is that of Christ, not Sankara. 4. "Renowned Hindu Saint Begins Hundredth Year," Hinduism Today 15: 5 (May, 1993), p. 1. Interestingly, both Mahadevan and the article's writer refer to Candrasekharendra as a "pontiff."

3. One might note that, according to Advaita tradition, Ādi Sankara established four teaching pīthas (seats) in the four corners of India, and it is generally agreed that the southern seat was founded at Sringeri in present-day Karnataka. Thus, there is a good deal of controversy about whether the Kanchipuram matha (monastic institution) should count as a Sankarācārya's seat (see Cenkner, p. 109 ff.). Followers of Candra- sekharendra not only claim this to be a Sankarācārya seat, but say it is the one from which Sankara himself presided. This debate is not central to our aims; it suffices here to say that the Kanchi pitha is currently one of the best-known and most active Šankarācārya seats and has been for many decades. The Kanchi matha (like that of Sringeri) has affiliated temples, schools, a library, and additional satellite institutions. In his article referenced in note 3, Mahadevan does not mention the controversy between the Sringeri and Kanchi Sankarācāryas, but R. Sankaranarayan in The Holy Advent (Madras: Sri Surabhi Printers, 1982) writes that in 1925, they performed pūjās five miles from each other (27), and that Candrasekharendra stayed in Sringeri in 1927 (35). One point of contention has been the current Kanchi Sankarācārya's increasing rejection of caste barriers. 6. One of whom was Professor Russell Blackwood of Hamilton College, who has been generous in sharing his perspective and other material on the Kanchi Śankarācārya.

4. These scholars include Mahadevan, R. Balasubramanian, P. K. Sundaram, and N. Veezhinathan.

5. As this indicates, there are in fact currently two Sankarācāryas at Kanchi: Jayendra is ruling, and his successor, Vijayendra, is in training. 9. Biographical facts are based on T. M. P. Mahadevan's aforementioned 1975 biography, "The Sage of Kanchi," R. Sankaranarayan's The Holy Advent (Madras: Sri

226 Notes

Surabhi Printers, 1982), and the Kuppuswami Sastri Research Institute's Journal of Oriental Research (henceforth JOR) 34-35 (1964-1966) volume dedicated to Candrasekharendra. These writings largely agree in fact and interpretation about Candrasekharendra's life.

10. This openness has been continued and extended by Jayendra Sarasvati, who, it would be fair to say, is something of a political or social activist. Jayendra has rejected untouchability and caste distinctions to a greater degree than did Candrasekharendra and started the Jan Kalyan (People's Welfare) group for voca- tional and moral training of harijans. See Mines and Gourishankar (1990) and India Today (June 30, 1988), pp. 83-84. The India Today article discusses the new social activism of a variety of mathas, and quotes Jayendra as saying, "[T]he reason for our social work is to sincerely do social service to the people. Another motive is to spread the feeling of humanitarianism. The third, most important, reason is to dispel the impression that only other religions do missionary and social work (84)." This indi- cates clearly how deeply neo-Vedanta has entered the most traditional bastion of Vedantic and Smārta Hinduism.

11. JOR, 170.

12. Quoted both by Mahadevan (33) and Slater (171).

13. JOR, 178. 14. In 1933, Candrasekharendra began a year-long pilgrimage on foot to Banaras via Andhra Pradesh and Prayaga (Allahabad). He spent six months in Banaras, then proceeded to Calcutta. Throughout his journey, he regularly performed pūjās and consecrations (abhisekha), and gave many public discourses. On his journey back southward during 1936, he stopped at Puri, another Sankarācārya seat, without, how- ever, meeting with the Puri Sankarācārya. He finally returned to Kanchi and Kumbakonam in 1939

14. The Hinduism Today article mentions that Indira Gandhi visited the Šankarācārya during Emergency rule and tried to defend her position. In response, Candrasekharendra was said to have asked, "If you say that whatever you have done is for the good of the country, then why are even your own partymen opposed to you?" (p. 7). 16. There are two overlapping collections of discourses compiled from presen- tations given in Madras in 1957-1958, Aspects of Our Religion (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1988; henceforth Aspects) and The Call of the Jagadguru: Sri Sankar- acarya of Kanchi. Compiled by P. Sankaranarayan. (Madras: Ganesh and Co., 1958; henceforth Call). This latter collection often expands on themes introduced in the former, giving more examples from the tradition. 17. While beyond the scope of this paper, one wonders if the Sankarācārya was at all influenced by Swami Vivekananda's views. 18. See also Call, p. 69 ff.

Notes 227

19 Here and elsewhere in Aspects, the text uses double vowels (aa) for a long vowel in Sanskrit (e.g., saastra, aatman, jnaani); in the interest of easier reading, I have sinply used the single consonant. 20. He seems to have been to some extent successful as a world teacher. Maladevan claims that all Candrasekharendra's visitors experience "an inner trans- famation" and "a noble revolution in their soul (16)," and quotes a variety of foreign seekers and scholars, including Paul Brunton, Arthur Koestler, and S. H. Nasr, about the effect meeting Candrasekharendra had on them. Typical are Robert Slater's com- ments: the Šankarācārya had both "saintly serenity" and "concerned interest" in the world, as well as an "ecumenical outlook." See his "There is no bar in religion," JOR, p. 170-71.

21. See also Call, 84 ff.

22. Blackwood writes that the Sankarācārya even asked him about American Indian religions ("The Two Shankaracharyas of Kanchi Kamakoti Peetham," paper delivered at Colgate University, April 1991, p. 6). Slater also mentions this (JOR, p. 171).

23. For an excellent article contesting many of these points, see Heinrich von Stietencron's "Religious Configurations in Pre-Muslim India and the Modern Concept of Hinduism," in Representing Hinduism: The Construction of Religious Traditions and National Identity. Edited by Vasudha Dalmia and H. von Stietencron (Delhi: Sage Publications, 1995).

24. According to Cenkner, the Sankarācārya matha schools (pathaśala) have students in the few dozens. They focus on Vedic memorization and recitation and on studying the commentaries (bhāsya) of Sankara (pp. 118-21). And while the Kanchi Śankarācāryas have become more open to all castes, the matha schools are still populated only by Smārta Brahmins.

25. Mahadevan quotes these in "Sage," pp. 48-49.

26. See, for example, Manu's hierarchical differentiation of varnas in I. 87-88, or his famous remarks on women's dependence on father, husband, and son in V. 148.

27. "Veda and Vedanta-Are They Contradictory?" The Voice of Sankara 13. 4 (February 1989), pp. 7-8.

28. Ibid., p. 7.

29. On 1/9/90, I had the opportunity to interview Jayendra individually about jīvanmukti, but, regretfully, not Candrasekharendra himself. One can infer, however, both from Candrasekharendra's existing comments and Jayendra's rather traditional understanding, that Candrasekharendra's views remain in the Advaita mainstream.

30. "There is no bar in religion," JOR, p. 170-71.

31. Mahadevan (1975), pp. 85-90.

228 Notes

32. He first gives the model of seven stages of knowledge (jñānathumis) seen in the YV and JMV (but not mentioned by Candrasekharendra himself). Ve zhinathan then turns to the sthita-prajña in the Gīta, calling him "a jivanmukta in the stae of samadhi (88)," and elaborates by way of Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's Gītā commntary. 33. Tamevam vidvān-amrta iha bhavati. I was unable to determine the text in which this appears.

33. Cenkner's book and subsequent conversations with him have assisted me greatly here.

34. Cenkner, pp. 182, 186. While adherence to the traditional Brahminical model may be lessening, the Sankarācāryas themselves are still generally greatly honored. They continue to provide a comforting link to the tradition for many other- wise rather Westernized Hindus.

35. Interview, 1/9/90.

36. He agreed that vāsanās might remain for a short time after prārabdha karma disappears.

37. He said the prospect must pray, talk, train, and then take samnyāsa. Even after all this preparation, sometimes the trainee leaves; in some pīthas, no one is ready (though he added the Kanchi pītha was ready).

38. As mentioned earlier (chapter 8), the exact relationship of these two is uncertain.

39. See, for example, the standard introduction to the Sringeri matha, The Greatness of Sringeri (Bombay: Tattvaloka Press, 1991).

40. Some have questioned his mental stability, especially in light of his appar- ent suicide by drowning in the Tunga River.

41. See, for example, The Call of the Jagaduru by R. Krishnaswami Aiyar (Madras: Ganesh and Co., 1961), Dialogues with the Guru, compiled by R. Krish- naswami Aiyar (Bombay: Chetana Pubs, n.d.), or Our Duty by Chandrasekhara Bharati (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1982).

42. See S. Y. Krishnaswamy, The Saint of Sringeri in Sacred India (Madras: Sringeri Jagadguru Sanatana Dharma Vidya Samiti, 1968) and Cenkner's A Tradition of Teachers.

43. For a fascinating description of this occasion with interpretive comments, see Glenn Yocum, "The Coronation of a Guru: Charisma, Politics, and Philosophy in Contemporary India," in A Sacred Thread: Modern Transmission of Hindu Traditions in India and Abroad, Raymond Brady Williams, Ed. (Chambersburg, Penn .: Anima Publications, 1992): 68-91.

44. When asked if Ramana Maharshi was a jīvanmukta, he stated that while perhaps not a living liberated being, certainly he was a mahant (and he added, in English, a "great person").

Notes 229

46. And responding affirmatively to my question if the jīvanmukta was a sthita- prajña. 47. Before leaving, I also asked what he thought his most important duty as a Śankarācārya today was. He held it was most important to "protect the practices (pracāra) of the sanātan dharm." To this end, he said, his teacher (Abhinava Vidyatirtha) directed him to establish schools, conduct rituals, undertake tours (yātra), and encourage discourses and meetings of teachers. All, he concluded in English, "to propagate the sanātan dharm."

Chapter 12

1. This chapter (and part of chapter 9) is a revision of my essay "Jīvanmukti and Social Service in Advaita and Neo-Vedanta," in Beyond Orientalism.

2. A good example of these tendencies is S. Radhakrishnan's Brahmasūtra "commentary," The Brahma Sutra: The Philosophy of Spiritual Life (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1960).

3. On the issue of caste in the Hindu tradition, see chapter 10 in Halbfass' Tradition and Reflection.

4. On this, see Lance Nelson, Purifying God's Earthly Body: Ecological Con- cern in India's Religious Traditions (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1998).

5. See his "Jivanmukti and Social Concerns." India Philosophical Annual 2 (1966): 119-24. When conversing with K. Kunjunni Raja of the Adyar Library in Madras, I found he largely agreed with Pandeya's view.

6. K. Kunjunni Raja added that while one can argue that seeing oneness will lead to helping others, this view is not made explicit in traditional Advaita (personal interview, 1/22/90). 7. Like Śankara, Rāmānuja holds that śūdras are not competent to know brahman, for they are not eligible to study or hear the Veda, so cannot understand it or perform rites mandated there. He also agrees that they can eventually get liberation by hearing the histories and purānas (See ŚB I. 3. 38). However, in comments on I. 3. 39, he goes on to claim that Advaitins cannot prove the sūdra's ineligibility. His own argument against śūdra competence is that injunctions on meditation that give ignorance-ending love of the Lord are learned only from Veda study of one rightly initiated. Since śūdras cannot be initiated, they cannot learn the Vedic injunctions. On the other hand, in commenting on BS III. 4. 36-37, both Sankara and Rāmānuja hold that one outside the life stages (anāśramin) is eligible for knowledge via prayer (japa), donation (dāna), and fasting (upavāsa). Neo-Vedantins, of course, claim that Sankara's views were very different. In his biography of Śankara (based on the traditional Sankara-digvijaya of Mādhava),

230 Notes

the neo-Vedantin I. S. Madugula asserts a candāla (really Siva in disguise) teaches Śankara a lesson in "practical Vedanta" by pointing out that one should identify only with the nondual Self and not with the body or Brahmin caste. After this instruction, Madugula writes, Sankara "realized his error which was the result of his social con- ditioning and his upbringing but entirely contrary to his conviction." The Ācārya: Śankara of Kaladi (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1985), p. 26.

8. Tradition and Reflection, p. 385.

9. Chapter 2.

10. Iștasiddhi, pp. 74-78; see chapter 3. Sarvajñātman's Samkşepaśārīrika (II. 225-27) and Prakāśānanda's Vedānta-siddhānta-muktāvalī state that there is an imag- ined teacher who, when thought to be omniscient, brings knowledge to the ignorant in accordance with the śāstras.

11. S. K. Ramachandra Rao, Jīvanmukti in Advaita (Bangalore: IBH Prakashana, 1978), p. 61, S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, Vol. II, p. 644, and P. K. Sundaram in conversation. For Sankara's views, see chapter 2.

12. The idea that despite having no aims of one's own after liberating knowl- edge one continues to act to uphold the world order also appears in Sankara's com- mentary on Gītā II. 10 and IV. 20. 13. The liberated being's concern for others is somewhat of an issue in yoga- influenced Advaita texts like Vidyāranya's Jīvanmuktiviveka, however. See especially his description of austerity (tapas), the second purpose of attaining jīvanmukti, in chapter 7.

13. This conclusion is supported by Satya P. Agarwal's recent The Social Role of the Gita: How and Why (Delhi: Urmila Agarwal [Motilal Banarsidass], 1993). Agarwal favors the neo-Vedanta conception of loka-samgraha, but acknowledges that this conception has been "elaborated, modified, and updated to suit the changing sociopolitical needs" of today (p. 442), primarily by Vivekananda, B. G. Tilak, Aurobindo, and Gandhi.

14. What Religion Is in the Words of Swami Vivekananda. John Yale, Ed. (London: Phoenix House, 1962), p. 74. The best statement of Vivekananda's views on numerous topics relevant here is probably his four lectures on "Practical Vedanta." See The Yogas and Other Works (New York: Ramakrishna-Vivekananda Center, 1953), pp. 338-77.

15. For example, his usage of "freedom" sometimes suggests Mill more than moksa, and "evolution" Spencer more than Sāmkhya.

16. In fact, Paul Hacker argues that Vivekananda propagates neo-Vedanta views largely for nation-building purposes, to bring pride to and unify India around "Hin- duism" broadly and Vedanta in particular. See "Vivekananda's Religious National- ism" in Philology and Confrontation. 18. What Religion Is, p. 32.

Notes 231

19. India and Europe, p. 239. For a further discussion of whether there can be "nondualistic ethics" if no relationships truly exist, see Hacker's "Schopenhauer and Hindu Ethics" in Philology and Confrontation, pp. 273 ff, and Halbfass' "Practical Vedanta" in Representing Hinduism, pp. 211-23.

20. What Religion Is, pp. 46-47. He also writes that while Śankara made Vedanta "rationalistic," and stressed the "intellectual" side of Vedanta, the Buddha emphasized the "moral" side (The Yogas, p. 249). This notion will reappear in Radhakrishnan's thought.

21. The Yogas, p. 333.

22. What Religion Is, pp. 84-85.

23. The Yogas, pp. 334-35.

24. He eventually became president of India as well.

25. See "A Prasthänatraya Commentary of Neo-Hinduism: Remarks on the Work of Radhakrishnan," in Philology and Confrontation.

26. (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1987), p. 131 ff.

27. Radhakrishnan writes extensively on the caste system, in part defending it and in part agreeing with its critics. His position is that caste is, or should be, based on temperament or character and natural capacity, not on heredity (thus offering "equal opportunity" given our unequal dispositions). However, in his clearest state- ment on caste, the last lecture in The Hindu View of Life (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1927), he claims that caste does discourage "indiscriminate racial amalgam- ation (98)." He defends castes as customary social groupings that emphasize mutual benefit and cooperation, and are "functional" in a complex society. The caste system also gives a feeling of solidarity to a society, as opposed to Western individualism and competitiveness. Radhakrishnan shows his Brahmin solidarity here, emphasizing caste members' spiritual development and holding that Brahmins are "said to be above class interests and prejudices," being "freed from the cares of existence" to perform duties like developing and broadcasting "spiritual ideals (18)." See also his Eastern Reli- gions and Western Thought (London: Oxford University Press, 1940), pp. 351-78, and Robert Minor's insightful "Radhakrishnan as Apologist for the Class/Caste Sys- tem as a Universal Religion-Social System," delivered at the August 1994 Congress on Vedanta in Oxford, Ohio. Incidentally, Radhakrishnan distorts Sankara's views on the varnāśrama-dharma, repeatedly suggesting that Sankara was merely meeting "the common beliefs of his age (616)." In Indian Philosophy, (Vol. II. Rev. 2nd ed. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1931), he claims that while "the efficacy of caste institutions has ceased to be vital for Samkara, he allows room for belief in it (616)." He admits that Śankara privileges Brahmins and samnyāsins, yet argues that overall "Samkara undermined the belief of the exclusive right of the upper classes to salvation (617)." (He passes over the exclusion of women in one sentence.) Radhakrishnan's interpretation of the relevant Brahmasūtra commentary here demonstrates both his attempt to represent

232 Notes

the text accurately and his desire to make the text fit his view of what Hinduism/ Vedanta/Sankara should say.

28. He here asserts the common neo-Vedantic view that Sankara was "ratio- nal," a "philosopher," and a "social idealist" aiming to unify earlier "Hindu" thought (pp. 655-58). 29. Eastern Religions and Western Thought, p. 11. 30. Pp. 215-18, 222.

29. He also mentions currently manifesting karma and the two moons analogy (in which one knows only one moon exists, but sees two from eye disease, found in Brahmasūtra bhāșya IV. 1. 15).

30. He makes a number of similar, but less focused comments on the nature of the liberated being in the introduction to his translation of the principal Upanisads (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1953), pp. 121 ff. Minor writes that Radhakrishnan, when speaking on the Dhammapada, called the Buddha a jīvanmukta who realized tat-tvam-asi and then returned to the world as a social reformer and prophet of Vedanta (97). Radhakrishnan was not always quite this "ecumenical."

31. Other comments on good and evil appear in Eastern Religions and Western Thought, pp. 12-13. 34. Liberated Life (Madurai: Dialogue Series, 1980), pp. 162-64. 35. Veezhinathan, pp. 138-39.

32. This and the following quotations come from their essay that immediately follows the Pandeya article mentioned earlier, called "The Social Concern of the Jīvanmukta," India Philosophical Annual 2 (1966): 125-30.

33. A Comparative Study of the Concept of Liberation in Indian Philosophy (Burhanpur: Gindharlal Keshavdas, 1967), pp. 118-19. 38. The Naiskarmyasiddhi of Sureśvara, p. 385.

34. Personal interview, 1/19/90.

35. Personal interview, 1/10/90.

36. See chapter 9, note 6.

37. Later, Srivastava writes that the jīvanmukta's "spiritual enlightenment is only for doing good for people. It is with the same view that Sankara says that jīvanmuktas are reincarnated to save the world." (264). (This is at the least a distortion of Sankara's position, presumably in BS III. 3. 32). 43. In fact, when Srivastava goes over loka-samgraha in the Gītā, he turns for support not to Advaitins, but to the modern Gītā-Rahasya commentary of B. G. Tilak. 44. He calls the tīrthamkara a compassionate karma yogin (85), and says the Buddha taught a "wise and reasonable ethical system." The Buddha's "ideal of life" was "service to all sentient beings (87)."

Notes 233

45. Srivastava finds Śankara puts more emphasis on jīvanmukti's "ethical as- pects" (i.e., lokasamgraha) than does Vidyāranya. Again offering a neo-Vedantic perspective, he says that Sankara's own life "shows how, after attaining the highest spiritual illumination, he engaged himself in active service of humanity ... only to spread the Truth." Vidyäranya, on the other hand, is more "negative," ignoring the Yogavāsiștha's "ethical implications" regarding jīvanmukti (i.e., internal renunciation of results, not action) (276). Srivastava psychologizes that Vidyāranya, post-samnyāsa, "felt disillusionment with regard to the possibility of benefitting societies through sociopolitical action (277)." Without some textual evidence, such speculation could be argued to represent Srivastava more than Vidyāranya.

46. Vivekananda was also mentioned by P. K. Sundaram.

47. An interesting piece of evidence for this claim could be seen at the 1992 International Congress on Vedanta in Oxford, Ohio, which was dedicated to Vivekananda. These meetings regularly attract many neo-Vedantins, both Indian and Western. In 1992, Vivekananda's "practical Vedanta" was praised often and at length. 48. Found in Vivekananda's Complete Works, Vol. II, p. 284.

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Index

A 65-71, 81, 204-206; according to Citsukha, 62-64; according to Mad- adhikāra (authority, commission), 4, husūdana, 66-67; according to Sar- 8, 11, 27, 39-40, 73, 80, 119, 124, vajñātman, 54-55; according to 175, 181 Vimuktātman, 56-57 Advaita Vedanta, passim; rationales for embodiment after liberation in, 7-11; and social service, 173-76 B Advaitasiddhi, 65, 122-24, 189 Aitareya Upanișad, 21, 38, 202 Balasubramanian, R., 144-46, 182-83, ākāra (form) of ignorance, 11, 62-64, 223, 225 66-67; according to Citsukha, Bhagavad Gītā, 3, 5, 12, 28-30, 62-63 34-35, 38-39, 41, 48, 50, 52, amrtatva. See immortality 56-57, 63-65, 73, 82, 98, 100-101, Annapūrņa Upanișad, 120-21, 216 112-13, 115-16, 118, 122-25, 146, aparoksa jñāna (immediate knowl- 163, 166-70, 175-76, 180, 189, edge), 59-60, 62-64, 67, 124, 205, 195-200, 202, 205, 211, 215-16, 208 218-20, 228, 232; Gītā IV. 34, 8, Appayya Dīkșita, 70, 140, 190 29, 41, 56, 63, 175, 182, 195; ātman (self), passim Śankara bhāșya on, 10, 35, 145, Aurobindo Ghose, Sri, 150-52, 168, 175-76, 196, 230. See also sthita- 184, 224, 230 prajña āvaraņa śakti (concealing power), 11, Bharati Tirtha (Sringeri Šankarācārya), 68, 73, 118, 205-206 146, 167-71, 229; interview, 170-71 avidyā-leśa (remnant or trace of igno- Bhāratītīrtha (-Vidyāraņya), 2, 58, rance), 8, 10, 13, 47, 53-57, 60, 60-61, 114-19, 169, 190, 214, 218

245

246 Index

bodiless liberation. See videhamukti D brahman, passim; Sankara on, 32-33 Brahmasūtras (of Bādarāyaņa), 6, 8, dharma, 11-14, 42, 52, 89, 93, 95, 26-27, 40, 43, 48, 50, 57, 73, 77, 110, 113, 119, 130, 154-56, 158, 80, 113, 180-81, 189, 204, 229; 160-62, 167, 169-70, 175, 182, Rāmānuja bhāșya on, 77-80, 208, 191, 197; renouncer and/or jīvan- 229; Śankara bhāșya on, 7, 10-12, mukta going beyond, 12-13, 109-12 31-43, 45, 53, 66, 99, 116, 123, 137, Dharmarāja, 2, 72-73, 190, 199, 207 144, 175, 189-90, 194, 196-204, 216, 229, 231-32 Brhadāranyaka Upanișad, 6, 21-23, E 30, 44, 46, 63, 66, 72-73, 107, 168, 187, 193, 196-98, 207, 216, 218; Embodiment: and liberation, 5-7; BāU IV. 4. 6-7, 6-7, 21-23, 25, 30, Śankara on, 31-32, 35-39, 41, 45 32-33, 36-39, 43, 49, 57, 69, 72- 73, 81, 104, 115, 124, 194, 197, 200; Šankara bhāșya on, 7, 31-33, G

36-38, 41-44, 46, 189, 196-201 Brunton, Paul, 137, 144, 154-55, 165, Gaudapāda, 1, 27-28, 195; kārikās on 227 Māņdūkya Upanișad, 27-28, 195

Buddha/Buddhism, 8, 85-86, 97, 177, Gūdārthadīpikā, 65, 122-25, 205, 207 183-84, 195, 213, 231-32 H C

Candrasekharendra Sarasvati, 2, 130, Hacker, Paul, 133, 177, 179, 196,

133-35, 137, 141-43, 146, 149, 200, 220-21, 230-31

152-72, 225-28; and the Hindu Halbfass, Wilhelm, 129, 131, 133,

"religion," 153, 156-60; on 174, 177, 185, 187-88, 192, 196,

jīvanmukti, 164-66; life of, 153-56; 200, 220-21, 229, 231

on paths to liberation, 158-59; and "Hinduism," 13-15, 156, 179, 191

the social order, 160-64 Cenkner, William, 152, 166-67, 225, 227-28 I

Chāndogya Upanișad, 7-9, 21-22, 24, 40, 51, 63, 69, 83, 193-94, 197-98, immortality, 19-22; in early Upani-

207; ChU VI. 14. 2, 7-9, 24, 26, 30, șads, 20-22; Śankara on, 43-44

37, 41, 45, 47-48, 52, 56, 59-60, Iștasiddhi, 55-56, 230

62, 64, 69, 73, 78-79, 115, 118, 175, 181, 189-90, 198, 216; Śan- J kara bhāsya on, 7-8, 31, 33, 37-38, 41, 45, 175, 197-200 Janaka, King, 12, 30, 86, 89-90, 118, Chapple, Christopher, 81, 188, 208 164, 168, 212, 220 Citsukha, 1, 6, 9, 11, 58-60, 62-67, Jayendra Sarasvati, 146, 153, 155, 189-91, 195, 203-205, 220 161, 164, 167-69, 225-27; inter- Clooney, Francis X., 4, 188 view, 168-69

Index 247

jīvanmukta (embodied liberated be- kramamukti, 20, 43, 192, 197 ing), passim; detached action of, in Krishna/Krsna, 5, 28-29, 65, 123, 150, Yogavāsistha, 87-89; doing as he 163, 167, 169-70, 175-76, 180 pleases, 12, 52, 60, 72, 116; nature Krishna Warrier, A. G., 2, 182, 192 of mind of, in Yogavāsistha, 91-95; and Śankarācārya compared, 166- 68; as sthita-prajña, 100 L jīvanmukti (living liberation), passim; as consciousness state in Yogavā- Laghu Yogavāsiștha, 97-101, 103, siștha, 94-95; defined, 5-7; defined 105-106, 113, 115, 123-24, 213, by Vidyāraņya, 98; and rebirth to 215-16, 220 Śankara, 39-40; and social service leśa (remnant or trace of ignorance). according to Neo-Vedanta, 13, 173, See avidyā-leśa 178-84; and teaching, see teachers; liberation. See mukti threefold means to obtain, in Jīvan- liberation while living. See jīvanmukti muktiviveka, 101-103; and worldly living liberation. See jīvanmukti activity, 11-13 loka-samgraha (welfare of the world), Jīvanmuktiviveka, 2, 6, 12, 28, 30, 107, 144, 167, 169-70, 175, 182- 85-125, 148, 168-70, 189, 191, 83, 199, 230, 232-33; in Neo- 194, 197-98, 208-209, 211-15, Vedanta, 175, 182-83, 232-33 219-21, 224, 228, 230; brahman- knower vs. jīvanmukta in, 106-107; jīvanmukti defined in, 98-99; re- M nunciation (samnyāsa) in, 108-12; sthita-prajña in, 100; videhamukti Madhusūdana Sarasvatī, 1, 6, 10-11, in, 104-105, 112-13; yogic practice 46, 49, 61, 65-68, 73, 118, 122-25, in, 98-101, 111-13 189-90, 195, 199, 203, 205-207, 217, 219-20, 228 Mahadevan, T. M. P., 114, 135, 139, K 144, 146, 152, 154, 156-57, 159, 161, 165-66, 172, 218, 222-27 kaivalya (perfect isolation), 6, 37, 40, Malkani, G. R., 73-74 49-50, 55, 80-82, 104, 125, 196, Maņdana Miśra, 1, 6, 9-10, 47-51, 199, 209, 216; videha-kaivalya, 68, 54-57, 60-64, 69, 118, 189-91, 72-73, 91, 124, 198, 209, 216 195, 201-204, 220 Kanchipuram. See Candrasekharendra mano-nāśa (extinguishing the mind), Sarasvati 101-102, 111, 114, 117, 120-22, karma, passim; three kinds of, 8, 37, 124, 215 149, 169, 190, 198 "minor" Upanişads, 2, 120-22. See Kațha Upanișad, 21-22, 25, 30, 34, also Upanișads 41, 43-44, 57, 64, 69, 72, 104, mokșa (liberation), passim 115-16, 193-94, 200, 202-203, mukti (liberation), passim; Sankara 216; Śankara bhāșya on, 31, 33-34, on, 32-33; in the Upanisads, 30-31 41, 43-44, 200, 202-203 Muktika Upanişad, 120-21, 215-16 Kauşītaki Upanișad, 21, 193-94, 207 Mundaka Upanişad, 21, 24-25, 30, knowledge (jñāna, vidyā), passim 40-41, 43-44, 48, 52, 54, 59, 62,

248 a Index

Mundaka Upanișad (continued) 71, 73, 115, 117, 187, 189, 193-94, Dharmarāja, 72-73; according to

197, 200, 202, 216; Śankara bhāșya the Pañcadaśi, 117-19; according to Prakāśānanda, 68-69; according on, 31, 41, 44, 200 to Prakāśātman, 59-60; according to Śankara, 37-39; according to

N Vidyāraņya, 99, 111 Purāņas, 85, 97, 191, 210, 212, 218, Naişkarmyasiddhi, 12, 51-52, 72, 229 115-16, 190, 202 purușa (person), 21, 30 Nelson, Lance, 2, 5-6, 188, 190, purușa (pure conscious witness), 80- 205-207, 219, 229 81, 98, 209 Neo-Vedanta, 2-4, 8, 13-14, 35, 40, 46, 55, 129-35, 140-41, 143-44, 149, 153, 156-59, 161, 164, 167-68, R

172-85, 203, 215, 219, 221, 225-26, 229-33; defined, 2, 129-30; and Radhakrishnan, S., 2, 130-31, 157,

traditional Advaita, 130-33, 172-73, 176, 179-81, 183, 221, 229-32; on

185; and Western thought, 13, 129- jīvanmukti and social service, 180- 81 33, 135, 172-73, 176, 185, 221 Ramachandra Rao, S. K., 2, 207, 221, 230

O Ramana Maharshi, 2, 130, 133-59, 163-69, 172-73, 181, 191, 203, Orientalism, 3, 14-15, 188, 192 222-25, 228; on jīvanmukti, 146- Osborne, Arthur, 138-40, 145, 222-23 49; life of, 136-38; on paths to liberation, 139-42; and social ser-

P vice, 143-46 Rāmānuja, 2, 26-27, 77-80, 194, Padmapāda, 58, 201, 204 207-208, 229; arguments against Pañcadaśī, 2, 12, 62, 72, 114-19, jīvanmukti, 77-80; Śrībhāșya of, 122, 168-69, 190, 199, 202, 214, 77-80, 208, 229 218-19 Rambachan, A., 46, 131 Pañcapādikāvivaraņa, 58-61, 204 renunciation. See samnyāsa paramahamsa (yogin), 43, 109-12 in the Jīvanmuktiviveka, 109-12; Paramahamsa Upanișad, 109-10, S

122 Sadānanda, 2, 12, 71-72, 189, 202, Patañjali, 46, 80, 82, 102, 171, 215 204 Prakāśānanda, 2, 8, 10, 68-70, 73, sadyomukti (immediate liberation), 7, 189-90, 203, 206, 219, 230 9, 35, 37, 43, 54, 192, 197 Prakāśātman, 1, 10, 12, 49, 58-61, sākşātkāra (direct experience), 62, 64, 64-65, 72, 189-90, 202 67, 70, 73, 83, 123-24, 170, 199, prakrti (manifest nature), 45, 80-81, 209 98, 114, 151, 209, 213 śakti (power) of ignorance trace, 11, prārabdha (currently manifesting) 66-67; according to Madhusūdana, karma, passim; according to 66-67

Index 249

samādhi (meditative enstasis), 45-46, 62, 82, 99-100, 103, 107, 111-12, Brhadāranyaka Upanişad bhāsya; Chāndogya Upanişad bhāya; 115-16, 119, 122-25, 142, 169, 200, 209, 216-17, 221, 228; in the Kațha Upaniad bhāşya; Muņdaka Upanișad bhāşya; Upadeśasāhasrī Jīvanmuktiviveka, 100, 103, 216-17 Šankarācārya, 2, 130-31, 134-35, Sāmkhya, 2, 45-46, 77, 80-82, 85, 146, 152-72, 202, 225-28; and 94, 97-98, 100, 103, 113-14, 125, jīvanmukta compared, 166-68 151, 208, 210, 230 Sarvajñātman, 1, 6, 8, 47, 53-55, 70- Sāmkhya Kārikās (of Īśvarakrșņa), 9, 71, 165, 181, 189, 203-205, 230 39, 80-81, 202 social service, 13, 143-46, 163-64, Sāmkhyasāra, 82, 125 172-84, 199, 217; according to Sāmkhyasūtra, 81-82 Ramana Maharshi, 143-46; and Samkşepa-śārīraka, 53-55, 203, 205, jīvanmukti, 13, 173-84; modern 230 Advaitin scholars on jīvanmukti samnyāsa (renunciation), 11, 25, 44, and, 173, 178-84; in traditional 53-55, 88, 97-98, 107-13, 120-25, Advaita, 173-76; on jīvanmukti and 142, 168, 176, 183, 199, 218, 228, social service, 178-79 233; and jīvanmukti in the Jīvan- Sprockhoff, J. F., 2, 106, 120-21, muktiviveka, 107-12 189, 192-93, 214-15, 219 samnyāsin (renunciant), 3, 35, 97, Sringeri Śankarācāryas, 169-71, 218, 102, 108-12, 125, 153, 163, 191, 225, 228-29

197, 200, 220, 231; and parama- Srivastava, L. K. L., 2, 183-84, 215, hamsa yogin in the Jīvanmuk- 218, 221, 232-33

tiviveka, 109-12 stages of consciousness (sapta-

samskāra (impression of ignorance), jñānabhūmi) theory, 94-95, 106-

10-11, 39, 47-51, 56-65, 69, 71, 107, 121, 123-24, 148, 208-209,

81-83, 125, 190, 199, 202-204; 214, 217, 220, 228; in the Gūdār-

and karma according to Maņdana thadīpikā, 123-24, 220; in the

Miśra, 49-51; according to Jīvanmuktiviveka, 106-107, 217; in

Madhusūdana, 65; according to the Yogavāsistha, 94-95, 214

Prakāśātman, 60-61; according to sthita-prajña (one with firm wisdom),

Vimuktātman, 56-57 5, 12, 28-29, 34-36, 39, 44, 48-51,

Śankara, passim; on action and 57, 64, 82, 100, 115, 122-25, 191,

jīvanmukti, 41-42; on bodilessness, 195, 200, 220, 228-29; according

7, 36; compared with Vidyāraņya to Citsukha, 64; according to

on jīvanmukti, 97-98, 112-13; on Mandana, 48-49; in the Bhagavad-

immortality and jīvanmukti, 43-44; gītā, 28-29; in the Jīvanmuktivi-

on the jīvanmukta, 34-35; on veka, 100; Sankara on, 34-35; as

jīvanmukti, 33-34; on liberated "Yogic Jīvanmukta," 123-25

teachers, 7, 38, 40-41, 174-75; on Sundaram, P. K., 182-83, 203, 225,

liberation and the path to heaven, 230, 233

42-43; on loka-samgraha, 175-76; Sureśvara, 1, 12-13, 47, 51-54, 58-59,

on the sthita-prajña, 34-35; and 72, 98, 110, 116, 169, 190, 194,

Yoga, 45-46. See also Bhagavad- 201-202, 207

gītā bhāşya; Brahmasūtra bhāșya; Śvetāśvatara Upanișad, 30, 55, 64, 67, 193

250 Index

T vāsanā-kşāya (destroying mental im-

Taittirīya Upanișad, 21, 33 pressions), 101-102, 111, 114, 117,

tattva-jñāna (knowing the real), 100- 120, 122, 124, 215

102, 122, 124, 209 Vedāntaparibhāșa, 72-73

teachers, 7-8, 38, 40-41, 68-70, 81, Vedāntasāra, 12, 71-72, 207

167, 174-75, 181-82, 204; accord- Vedāntasiddhāntamuktāvalī, 68, 230

ing to neo-Vedanta, 8, 181-82; ac- Veezhinathan, N., 146, 165, 181-82,

cording to Prakāśānanda, 69-70; 202-203, 223-25, 228, 232

imagined teacher, 8, 54-55, 70, videhamukta ( bodiless liberated be-

230; importance to Vimuktātman, ing). See videhamukti

8, 56, 175; role according to videhamukti (bodiless liberation), 6,

Śańkara, 7, 38, 40-41, 174-75 26, 66, 85, 90-91, 93, 95, 112-13,

Tejobindu Upanişad, 120, 219 121, 124, 139, 147-48, 166, 168-

turīya, 91, 94-95, 120, 124, 147, 71, 189, 194, 198, 212-13, 216,

213-14, 224 224; according to Ramana Maharshi, 147-48; in the Jīvanmuktiviveka, 104-105, 112-13; in the

U Yogavāsistha, 90-91 Vidyāraņya, 90, 97-113, 122-24,

"understanding," nature of, 15-16, 192 168-70, 183-84, 189, 191, 198,

Upadeśasāhasrī, 34, 44, 70, 72, 108, 214-18, 224, 230, 233; compared 168, 175, 190, 196, 198, 202, 219 with Śankara on jīvanmukti, 97-98, Upanișads, 1, 4, 6, 13, 19-26, 30-33, 112-13. See also Jīvanmuktiviveka

44 46, 53, 85, 103, 115, 120-22, Vijñānabhikșu, 81-83, 125, 207-209 129, 137, 146, 150-51, 192-93, viksepa śakti (projecting power), 11, 196-200, 219, 232; immortality in, 68, 71, 118, 122, 206

19-22. See also Brhadāraņyaka, Vimuktātman, 1, 8-10, 47, 49, 55-57,

Chāndogya, Kațha; Mundaka, 62-64, 175, 181, 189-91, 195, 201, Śvetāśvatara 203-205, 220 Vivaraņaprameya-samgraha, 58-61, 114 V Vivekananda, Swami, 2, 46, 130-31, 140, 157, 160, 176-81, 183-84, Valiaveetil, Chacko, 2, 181, 188 221, 226, 230, 233 Vāmadeva, 22, 38, 53, 166, 188, 224 Von Stietencron, H., 14-15, 227 varņāśrama-dharma (law of caste and life stage), 14, 42, 53, 100, 135, 143, 153, 160, 163, 167, 174, 231 Y vāsanā (mental impression), 71, 83, 86, 91-95, 98-102, 109, 116, 119, Yājñavalkya, 12, 22, 30, 107, 111, 180 121-22, 125, 146, 212-13, 215-16, Yoga (school), 2, 45-46, 77, 80-83, 220, 228; and jīvanmukti in the 85, 94, 98, 100, 102-103, 113, 125, Yogavāsiștha, 91-93; in the Jīvan- 151, 171, 198, 208, 215-17; and muktiviveka, 99, 216 Śankara, 45-46

Index 251

yogābhyāsa (repeated yogic practice), 87-89; nature of jīvanmukta's mind 98-99, 112-13, 117, 214 in, 91-95; videhamukti in, 90-91 Yogasūtras (of Patañjali), 80-83, 122, Yogic Advaita, 2, 6, 12, 28-29, 46, 200, 208 77, 85, 91-92, 95-97, 99, 102-104, Yogavāsiștha, 2, 3, 6, 12, 28, 65, 108, 110-14, 116, 120-25, 137, 83-96, 106, 109, 114-16, 118-24, 168, 191, 197, 216, 224; compared 137, 146, 148, 168, 180, 194, 197, with Śankara's Advaita, 85, 95-98, 208, 210-14, 216, 228, 233; de- 112-13 tached action of jīvanmukta in,

JĪVANMUKTI in Transformation

Embodied Liberation in Advaita and Neo-Vedanta

Andretv O. Fort

Liberation (mukti) is a central concern in Hinduism, particularly in Advaita (nondual) Vedanta, perhaps the best known school of Hindu thought. There has been vigorous debate and analysis about the possibility and nature of liberation while living (jivanmukti) in Advaita from the time of Sankara, the school's founder, to the present day. While the general conclusion seems to be that one can achieve living liberation, members of the Advaita tradition also regularly express reserva- tions about, or describe limitations to, full liberation while embodied. Jivanmukti in Transformation examines the development and transforma- tion of the concept of jivanmukti from the Upanisads to the modern era. It gives the most thorough treatment of the scholastic Advaita tradition on liberation while living, makes the novel argument for a distinct "Yogic Advaita" tradition found in the Yogavāsistha and Jivanmuktiviveka, and explores the modern "neo-Vedanta" view of jivanmukti, which has been influenced by modern Western concepts like global ecumenism and humanistic social concern for all. The book includes analysis of the views of modern Hindu figures such as Swami Vivekananda, Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, Ramana Maharshi, and Sankarācāryas of Kanchi and Sringeri, and considers these thinkers in the context of current academic discussions about the encounter of India and the West. "This book is very strong in its historical treatment of the notion of the jivanmukta. The author clearly establishes the concept to be a dynamic and changing one. He does so by working closely with the central texts of the Advaita tradition and the presentation is enriched by a discussion of recent figures. His textual analysis is rich and detailed." -Anantanand Rambachan, Saint Olaf College Andrew O. Fort is Professor of Asian Religions at Texas Christian University. His previous publications include Living Liberation in Hindu Thought (coedited with Patricia Y. Mumme), also published by SUNY Press and The Self and Its States: A States of Consciousness Doctrine in Advaita Vedānta.

SLATE UNIVERSITY ISBN 0-7914-3903-8 90000> OF NEW YORK PRESS EAN Visat oat web site at http: wwx sonvpress edu 9 780791 439036